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HISTORY 


OF 


THE  WAR 


VOL.  XV 


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PRINTING    HOUSE    SQUARE. 


PRINTED  AND  PUBLISHED  BY  "THE  TIMES,' 
PRINTING  HOUSE  SQUARE,  LONDON. 


191 8. 


CONTENTS    OF    VOL.    XV 


CHAPTER  CCXX1I.  page 

South  America,  1914-1917         ..  ..  ..  ..  ..         ..         1 

CHAFrER  CCXXIH. 
The  Western  Offensives  of  1917  :   Bullecourt     ..  ..  ..  ....  37 

CHAPTER  CCXXIV. 
The  Western  Offensives  of  1917  :    Messines  ..  . ;  ..  ..  ..        73 

CHAPTER  CCXXV. 
India  during  the  War     . .  . .  . .  .  .  . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .      109 

CHAPTER  CCXXVI. 
The  Capture  of  Jerusalem      . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .      145 

CHAFrER  CCXXVII. 

From  the  Battle  of  Messines  to  the  Third  Rattle  of  Ypres    .  .  . .  . .      181 

CHAPTER  CCXXVIII. 

Victoria  Crosses  of  the  War  (IV.)  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..     217 

CHAPTER  CCXX1X. 
Food  Control  and  Rations  in  Great  Britain         . .  . .  . .  . .  . .     253 

CHAPTER  CCXXX. 
Germany:    August,  1910— February,  1918 289 

CHAPTER  CCXXX1. 
The  Third  Battle  of  Ypres  (I.)         ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .,  ..     325 

CHAPTER  CCXXXII. 
The  Third  Battle  of  Ypres  (II.)         ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..      361 

CHAPTER  CCXXX  III. 
The  Italian  Offensive  of  July — September,  1917     ....  . .  . .  .  .      397 

CHAPTER  CCXXXIV. 
The  Shipping  Problem  (II.)      ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..     433 


CHAPTER  CCXXII. 


SOUTH  AMERICA,    19 14- 17. 


Traditional  Relations  with  Europe — First  Effects  of  the  War— Balance  of  Sympathies — 
Influence  of  the  United  States — The  Monroe  Doctrine — -Pan-Americanism — Economic 
Conditions  :  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile — The  "  Black  List  "  and  German  Trade — German 
Propaganda  and  Intrigue — The  Luxburg  Dispatches — -Argentina  and  Germany — Chile 
and  Germany — Other  States — The  Brazilian  Declaration  of  War. 


UPON  the  outbreak  of  war  the  at- 
titude of  educated  public  opinion 
throughout  South  America  towards 
the  belligerents  was  generally 
one  of  detachment  and  neutrality,  tempered 
by  great  and  widespread  affection  for  France, 
as  the  spiritual  home  of  Latin  civilization. 
The  Governments  of  the  Republics,  in  declaring 
their  neutrality  in  1914,  acted  in  accordance 
with  public  sentiment,  which,  as  in  the  United 
States,  had  then  no  desire  to  take  an  active 
part  in  the  struggle.  The  foreign  policy  of  the 
leading  Republics — Argentina,  Chile,  and  Brazil 
- — reflected  the  Monroe  doctrine's  theoretical 
aloofness  from  the  destinies  of  monarchical 
and  "  capitalist  "  Europe  ;  it  reflected  also 
an  unmistakable  though  subdued  undercurrent 
of  popular  opinion,  that  none  of  the  belligerents 
had  shown  in  the  past  sufficient  appreciation 
of  the  moral  and  material  progress  of  Southern 
(as  distinguished  from  Central)  America  to 
justify  any  overt  manifestation  of  sympathy  or 
support.  Material  considerations,  the  finan- 
cial and  commercial  interests  involved,  all 
tended  at  the  outset  to  impose  strict  neutrality 
upon  the  Latin  Republics  of  South  America, 
and  this  policy  wa3  energetically  reinforced 
in  a  vigorous  Press  propaganda  by  Germany's 
political  and  commercial  agents  all  over  the 
Continent . 

During  the  first  onrush  of  .the  Teutonic 
hordes  in  the  invasion  of  France  the  attitude 
Vol.  XV.— Part   183 


of  Germans  from  Patagonia  to  Pemambuco 
was  so  boastful  and  blustering  as  to  lead  many 
South  American  thinkers  and  writers  to 
perceive  something  of  the  dangers  to  which 
the  democracies  of  the  new  world  must  speedily 
be  exposed  in  the  event  of  victorious  Germany 
becoming  the  paramount  Power  in  Europe 
In  Chile,  and  more  especially  in  South  Brazil, 
the  typically  insolent  bearing  of  the  German 
colonists  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war 
was  of  the  kind  that  is  not  easily  forgiven  or 
forgotten  ;  it  led  to  the  rapid  growth  of  feelings 
hostile  to  Germany  in  many  quarters  where 
none  had  previously  existed,  and  prepared  the 
public  mind  for  the  gradual  process  of  its 
identification  with  the  cause  of  the  Allies. 
After  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  and  even  more 
markedly  after  the  destruction  of  the  German 
squadron  at  the  Falkland  Islands,  the  sons  of 
the  Fatherland  began  to  walk  more  delicately 
overseas ;  their  dreams  of  creating  a  Now 
Germany  to  extend  from  Southern  Brazil  to 
the  River  Plate  were  relegated  to  the  back- 
ground of  prudent  silence.  But  as  the  German 
Government's  contempt  for  all  the  ideals  and 
agreements  of  civilized  humanity  became 
more  and  more  emphasized  in  its  methods 
of  warfare,  public  opinion  tliroughout  South 
America  became  more  and  more  unmistakably 
convinced  that  the  Central  Powers  were  re- 
sponsible for  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  that 
German  Kultur,  as  displayed  by  her  military 


THE    TIMES    H1ST0BY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Declared  War 
on  Germany 

Shown  thus- 

\(97» 


shown  thus-i. 


Neutral  shown  white 


SEVERED  RELATIONS  WITH  GERMANY. 

S.Domingo.June  1917 

Haiti "       " 

Peru Oct.     » 

Uruguay »        « 

Ecuador\.-Dec.   1917. 


NEUTRAL., 
Argentina      Paraguay       Salvador 
Colombia       Chile  Costa  Rica 

Venezuela     Du.  Guiana      Porto  Rico 


SOUTH     AND    CENTRAL    AMERICA:    WAR   MAP   AT   END    OF    1917. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


and  political  leaders,  involved  the  negation  of 
the  elementary  principles  of  humanity  and 
decency.  And  side  by  side  with  this  conviction 
the  old  love  and  reverence  for  France,  as  the 
fountain-head  of  the  Latin  ideal  of  democracy, 
acquired  new  inspiration  and  a  new  strength. 
The  process  was  naturally  more  rapid  and  more 
emphatic  in  certain  places  than  in  others. 
In  some  it  was  restrained  from  above  by  the 
successful  activities  of  German  propaganda  in 
high  places ;  in  others,  the  pro-German  influence 
of  many  of  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  tended 
to  check  the  growth  of  active  sympathy  for 
the  cause  of  the  Allies  ;  in  others  'again,  a 
lavish  expenditure  of  German  money,  and  the 
ramifications  of  commercial  interests  thereby 
created,  served  to  modify  the  expression  of 
widespread  popular  indignation  against  every- 
thing German.  But  after  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania  and  other  similar  manifestations  of 
Germany's  methods  of  warfare,  while  prudent 
statecraft  still  continued  to  recognize  the 
necessity  for  maintaining  neutrality  so  long 
as  the  United  States  had  not  been  drawn  into 
the  struggle,  there  was  ho  longer  any  question 
as  to  the  feelings  of  the  people  in  Buenos  Aires, 
Montevideo,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  or  Santiago.  They 
had  come  to  realize  that  the  war  was  in  truth 
a  stupendous  clashing  of  two  forms  of  civiliza- 
tion fundamentally  and  eternally  antagonistic, 
a  conflict  between  the  German  doctrine  of 
might  superior  to  right  and  the  Latin  ideal 
of  the  predominance  of  law  over  force.  They 
had  come  to  regard  Germany's  methods  of 
enforcing  her  doctrine  as  something  unspeak- 
ably sinister  and  inhuman — a  new  point  of 
view,  which,  even  before  it  was  emphasized 
and  confirmed  by  the  truculent  treachery  of 
Count  Luxburg,  found  expression  in  the  break- 
ing of  many  German  official  windows.  During 
the  celebration  of  tha  centenary  of  the  Argentine 
Republic  in  July,  1916,  despite  the  benevolent 
neutrality  of  the  Government,  the  German 
flag  was  conspicuous  by  its  absence  from  every 
street  and  public  ceremony.  In  the  same  year 
the  Uruguayan  Government  officially  pro- 
claimed the  I4th  of  July  as  a  national  festival ; 
the  citizens  of  Montevideo  celebrated  the  occa- 
sion by  enthusiastic  singing  of  the  "Marseillaise" 
and  by  a  gala  entertainment  at  the  Urquiza 
Theatre  in  honour  of  M.  Boudin'3  special 
mission,  at  which  fervent  sympathy  was 
expressed  for  the  Allies  and  particularly  for 
the  sufferings  of  Belgium.  Even  in  Rio,  where 
the  influence  of   Germany's   "  peaceful  pene- 


tration "  was  most  marked  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  a  distinct  revulsion  of  popular 
feeling  had  taken  place  beforo  the  end  of 
1915,  and  many  neutral  traders,  hitherto 
conspicuous  for  their  pro-German  tendencies, 
had  begun  to  realize  the  possible  scope  and 
effect  of  the  British  Black  List  and  to  make 


DR.    WENCESLAO    BRAZ, 
President  of  Brazil. 

profession  of  their  complete  independence  of 
all  German  connexions. 

In  Chile,  as  the  result  of  the  influence  of  tho 
Roman  Catholic  clergy  on  the  one  hand  and 
of  German  professors  and  military  instructors 
on  the  other,  the  attitude  of  the  Government 
was  characterized  from  the  outset  by  a  neu- 
trality which  on  more  than  one  occasion 
appeared  to  be  unduly  strained  in  favour  of 
the  Teuton.  This  was  particularly  the  casa 
during  the  period  in  which  the  German  cruisers, 
effectively  aided  by  German  residents  in  Chile, 
waged  destructive  warfare  upon  British  and 
Allied  merchant  shipping  on  the  Chilean  coast. 
But  the  outrages  committed  by  these  German 
cruisers  served  to  convince  the  Chilean  peoplo 
— they  also  produced  a  profound  economic  crisis 
throughout  the  country — that  a  nation  which 
could  act  with  such  cynical  indifference  to 
international  law,  and  to  the  sovereign  rights  of 
smaller  nations,  would  eventually,  if  victorious, 
threaten    thou:    own    liberties.     Senor    Carlos 

183     2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Silva  Vild6sola,  an  eminent  publicist  of  San- 
tiago, writing  at  the  beginning  of  1916,  declared 
that  the  great  majority  of  his  countrymen 
had  come  to  desire  the  triumph  of  the  Allies 
and  the  destruction  of  German  militarism, 
"  in  defence  of  the  constituent  principles  of  all 
democracies  and  to  save  from  destruction  the 
Latin  civilization  to  which  we  all  belong." 
It  is  interesting  to  record  the  fact  that,  a  year 
before  President  Wilson  had  definitely  pro- 
claimed his  country's  recognition  of  the 
necessity  for  crushing  "  this  menace  of  com- 
bined intrigue  and  force  which  we  now  so 
clearly  see  as  the  German  power,  a  thing 
without  conscience  or  honour,  or  capacity  for 
covenanted  peace,"  SenorVild6solahad  summed 
up  the  convictions  of  his  countrymen  on  funda- 
mental points  in  memorable  words,  which,  like 
those  uttered  by  Senhor  Ruy  Barbosa  at  Rio, 
expressed  the  general  (as  distinct  from  the 
official)  sentiments  of  South  America.  Amongst 
other  things  Seiior  Vildosola  declared  : 

"  That  the  triumph  of  a  nation  which 
proclaims  military  necessity  as  a  sufficient 
reason  for  violating  treaties,  and  in  which 
nations  are  denied  their  essential  liberties' 
would  be  the  greatest  peril  that  could  be 
encountered  by  modern  democracies  and 
by  all  those  principles  upon  which  American 
independence   was   established ;     and 

"  That  there  exists  at  the  heart  of  this 
struggle  a  conflict  between  the  two  philoso- 
phical and  political  tendencies  that  have 
disputed  for  the  domination  of  peoples  and 
the  inspiration  of  their  movements — one  based 
upon  right  and  the  other  upon  force ;  one 
upon  liberty  and  the  other  upon  subjection  ; 
one  upon  fraternity  and  the  other  upon 
hatred,  cultivated  as  a  sacred  and  almost 
mystical  principle." 

Similarly,  Sefior  Nicolas  F.  Lopez.s  a  dis- 
tinguished military  officer  and  Government 
official  of  Ecuador,  in  a  pamphlet  published 
in  1917,  expressed  the  increasing  apprehension 
of  public  opinion  in  regard  to  the  possible 
effect  of  the  world  struggle  upon  the  future 
destinies  and  liberties  of  South  America. 
Sefior  Lopez  laid  stress  on  the  duty  incumbent 
upon  all  the  Latin  Republics,  as  a  matter  of 
self-preservation  and  national  dignity,  to  unite 
"  in  frank  and  decided  support  of  the  United 
States,  which  has  presented  itself  as  the 
paladin  of  the  liberties  of  the  world  against 
the  iniquities  of  the  Great  War."  He  con- 
tended   that   as   Germany   had   lightly  set   at 


naught  the  fundamental  rights  of  neutrals, 
in  regard  to  the  inviolability  of  their  territory 
and  the  freo  use  of  the  sea  as  a  commercial 
highway,  the  twenty-one  American  Republics 
could  not  do  otherwise  than  suspend  diplomatic 
relations  with  her,  "  particularly  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  Germany  had  not  denied  the 
reports  concerning  a  suggestion  wliich  she  made 
to  the  countries  of  the  Entente  with  respect 
to  a  possible  return  of  all  the  invaded  territory 
of  Belgium,  Russia,  and  the  Balkans,  provided 
she  be  given  a  free  hand  in  Latin -America." 

Before  the  end  of  1916  every  instinct  of 
humanity,  apart  from  that  of  self-preservation, 
had  led  to  a  very  general  consensus  of  opinion 
throughout  all  classes  in  South  America  in 
favour  of  the  cause  of  the  Entente.  At  the 
same  time  it  was  clearly  perceived,  by  all  who 
looked  ahead,  that  if  the  United  States  con- 
tinued to  adhere  to  a  policy  of  neutrality, 
nothing  in  the  Monroe  doctrine  could  hereafter 
protect  from  German  retaliation  and  invasion 
any  Republic  which  might  throw  in  its  lot  with 
the  Allies.  Realization  of  this  fact  undoubtedly 
carried  much  weight  with  South  America's 
statesmen  in  determining  their  adherence 
to  prudent  courses  of  neutrality,  even  after 
their  rights  as  neutrals  had  been  violated  by 
Germany's  declaration  of  indiscriminate  sub- 
marine warfare.  But  when  it  became  apparent 
that  the  Colossus  of  the  North  was  about  to 
join  in  the  struggle  "  to  make  the  world  safe 
for  democracy,"  the  whole  situation  in  the 
Latin  Republics  was  immediately  altered. 
Slowly  but  surely,  as  the  nature  of  Germany's 
preparations  for  war,  her  methods  of  waging 
it,  and  her  ambitions  towards  world  supre- 
macy became  more  and  more  apparent, 
the  truth  was  perceived  that  the  fertile  and 
thinly  populated  countries  of  South  America 
had  enjoyed  immunity  from  attack  and  inva- 
sion mainly  thanks  to  the  armed  forces  of 
Great  Britain  and  France,  upholders  of  the 
sacredness  of  treaties  and  of  the  liberties  of 
small  nations. 

Senator  Root  expressed  the  prevalent  opinion 
on  this  subject  on  January  25,  1917,  when,  ad 
dressing  the  Congress  of  Constructive  Patriotism 
at  Washington,  he  said  that  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine was  not  international  law,  and  that  it  had 
been  maintained  by  three  things  :  first,  that 
the  men  of  Monroe's  time  had  never  thought 
of  such  a  thing  as  not  being  ready  to  fight  for 
their  rights  ;  secondly,  that  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe  had  been  so  even,  and  every- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


body  had  been  so  doubtful  about  what  the  other 
fellows  were  going  to  do,  that  nobody  found 
it  worth  while  to  take  on  a  row  with  the 
United  States  ;    and,  thirdly,  England's  fleet. 

In  the  lace  of  the  futility  of  the  treaty 
which  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  of  the  humane  ordinances  of  the 
Hague  Convention,  it  was  manifest  that 
the  Monroe  doctrine  could  afford  no 
valid  defence  against  German  Imperialism 
triumphant  so  long  as  the  United  States 
remained   in   a   condition   of   military   unpre- 


of  the  war  must  be  reckoned  the  change  which 
took  place  in  the  attitude  of  the  South  American 
Republics,  not  only  in  regard  to  the  future 
of  the  Monroe  doctrine  but  to  that  of  the 
Pan-American  ideal.  In  the  early  stages  of 
the  struggle  it  became  apparent  that,  without 
resort  to  force,  the  United  States  could  not 
aspire  to  maintain  the  doctrino  in  its  original 
scope.  In  October,  1914,  a  statement  by 
Count  Bernstorff,  the  German  Ambassador 
in  Washington,  was  published  through  the 
Associated  Press,  that  Germany  might  obtain 


CENTENARY    CELEBRATIONS    AT    BUENOS     AIRES,    JULY,    1916. 
Troops  parading  before  the  President. 


paredness  :  no  panoply  of  sounding  phrases 
could  serve  henceforward  to  guard  the  world's 
richest  granaries  against  the  danger  of  high- 
handed aggression.  The  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  put  an  end  to  the  long- 
jjherished  tradition  of  American  self-sufficiency 
And  to  the  splendid  dream  of  continental 
isolation  ;  but  it  gave  the  continent,  north 
and  south,  new  assurances  for  dignified  security 
in  the  future,  in  co-operation  with  the  foremost 
democracies  of  the  Old  World,  which  the 
political  insight  of  the  Latin  Republics  was  not 
slow  to  perceive  and  to  appreciate  at  their 
true  significance. 

Amongst  the  most  conspicuous  consequences 


"  at  least  a  temporary  "  foothold  in  Canada 
if  she  could  land  troops  there,  and  the  state- 
ment was  accompanied  by  the  suggestion  that» 
as  Canada  had  sent  troops  to  Europe,  such 
retaliation  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Monroe  doctrine.  This  foolish 
utterance,  like  many  others  from  the  same 
source,  did  more  to  enlighten  public  opinion 
in  the  United  States  and  to  stiffen  it  against 
Germany  than  any  of  the  Allies'  official  pro- 
paganda. Herr  Djrnburg,  then  chief  German 
propagandist  in  the  United  States,  hastened 
to  repudiate  his  Ambassador's  indiscretion  by 
declaring  that  Germany  would  not  only  regard 
South  America  as  inviolable  but  that  she  would 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


BUENOS    AIRES; 


PROCESSION    ON    THE    OCCASION    OF    THE    TAKING    OF    THE 
OATH    BY    THE    PRESIDENT. 


extend  the  benefits  of  the  Monroe  doctrine 
to  Canada  ;  but  the  cat  was  out  of  the  bag. 
Its  subsequent  excursions  into  the  field  of 
American  politics  were  assisted  by  a  declara- 
tion made  by  Mr.  Taft  to  the  effect  that 
nothing  in  the  Monroe  doctrine  precluded  a 
German  invasion  of  Canada  "  provided  it 
is  not  followed  by  an  attempt  to  hold  terri- 
tory permanently."  The  doctrine  was  evi- 
dently in  extremis.  At  the  end  of  November, 
1914,  The  Times  Correspondent  at  Washington 
observed  that  Mr.  Taft's  view  was  universally 
accepted,  "  just  as  everybody  accepted  the 
administration's  view  that  the  Allies  had 
the  right  to  take  temporary  police  measures 
in  South  America."  (This  referred  to  certain 
breaches  of  neutrality  in  favour  of  Germany 
by  Ecuador  and  Colombia  to  which  Great 
Britain  had  taken  exception.)  He  noted  at 
the  same  time  "a  growing  tendency  to  make 
the  primary  object  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  the 
prevention  of  the  permanent  acquisition  by 
extra- American  Powers  of  territory,  especially 
near  Panama  ;  and  to  avoid  its  more  vague  and 
barren  responsibilities."  Confronted  by  a  world 
in  arms,  the  famous  doctrine  proved  to  be 
practically  useless  for  the  fulfilment  of  its 
original  purposes,  as  Admiral  Mahan  had 
i  lie  lured  it  to  be.  The  United  States,  not  to 
mention  the  leading  Republics  of  the  South, 
had  grown  too  large,  and  the  world  too  inter- 


dependent, for  it.  President  Wilson,  it  is 
true,  reaffirmed  his  adherence  to  the  doctrine 
in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  in  December. 
1915,  emphasising  "  the  rights  of  the  American 
Republics  to  work  out  their  destinies  without, 
interference,"  but  his  words  carried  no  great 
conviction  or  comfort  to  those  immediately 
concerned,  and  certain  of  the  more  turbulent 
Republics  of  Central  America  did  not  fail  to 
point  out  that  unwelcome  interference  in  their 
destinies  had  hitherto  come  from  the  United 
States.  A  year  later,  after  the  failure  of 
his  final  effort  to  make  such  honourable 
terms  with  Germany  as  would  have  justified 
him  in  remaining  neutral,  Mr.  Wilson's  message 
to  Congress  vaguely  implied  the  forthcoming 
abandonment  of  the  doctrine  of  continental 
aloofness  from  the  "  European  system,"  and 
the  substitution  in  its  place  of  a  world  League 
of  Nations,  not  to  enforce  but  to  ensure 
peace.  The  new  shibboleth  proposed,  "as  it 
were,  that  the  nations  should  with  one  accord 
adopt  the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as 
the  doctrine  of  the  world ;  that  no  nation 
should  seek  to  extend  over  any  other  nation 
or  people,  but  that  every  people  should  be  left 
free  to  determine  its  own  polity,  its  own  way 
of  development,  unhindered,  unthreatened, 
unafraid,  the  little  along  with  the  great  and 
powerful."  The  nations,  moreover,  were  hence- 
forth   to    avoid    "  entangling    alliances    which 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


would  draw  them  into  competitions  of  power." 
South  America,  to  judge  from  Press  utterances 
on  the  subject,  found  nothing  very  attractive 
in  the  idea  of  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

Quite  apart,  however,  from  its  apparent 
ineffectiveness  as  a  weapon  of  defence  against 
aggression  from  or  by  Europe,  the  Monroe 
doctrine  had  fallen  into  disrepute,  even  before 
the  war,  in  several  of  the  Southern  Republics, 
where  public  opinion  was  frankly  opposed  to  it 
on  the  ground  that  on  moro  than  one  occasion 
the  manner  of  its  assertion  by  the  Government 
at  Washington  involved  claims  to  a  moral 
trusteeship  and  general  protectorate  incom- 
patible with  their  dignity  as  sovereign  States. 
President  Wilson's  expansion  of  the  doctrine  in 
connexion  with  the  troubles  in  Mexico  was 
widely  construed  in  South  America  as  placing 
the  United  States  in  the  position  of  censor 
morum  over  the  Central  Republics  ;  the  Latin 
American  Press,  even  in  countries  far  removed 
from  the  seat  of  trouble,  expressed  lively 
apprehension  and  resentment  at  the  idea.  A& 
Lord  Bryce  has  observed  in  his  work  on  South 
America,   "  South  American  statesmen    appre- 


ciate the  value  of  Washington's  diplomacy  in 
trying  to  preserve  peace  between  those  Re- 
publics whose  smouldering  enmities  often 
threaten  to  burst  into  flame.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  are  jealous  of  their  own  dignity,  not 
at  all  disposed  to  bo  patronisod,  and  quick  to 
resent  anything  bordering  on  a  threat  even 
when  addressed,  not  to  themselves,  but  to  some 
other  Republic."  In  regard  to  the  action  of 
the  United  States  in  Mexico,  the  protestations 
of  American  disinterestedness  wen  greeted 
with  general  scepticism,  frankly  expressed. 
Popular  hostility  to  "  Monroismo,"  as  asserted 
by  the  United  States,  had  become  in  1913 
a  force  that  threatened  to  stultify  Pan- 
American  activities  and  ideals.  In  Argentina, 
Brazil  and  Chile,  the  idea  of  an  alliance  of  the 
Latin  Republics  was  widely  mooted,  for  the 
purpose  of  preserving  the  balance  of  power. 
Mr.  Roosevelt's  lecture  tour  in  South  America, 
undertaken  in  that  year,  was  intended  to  soothe 
the  susceptibilities  and  assuage  the  fears  of 
Latin  America  ;  the  burden  of  his  message  was 
contained  in  a  Pan-American  extension  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  which  was  to  become  conti 


THE    AVEN1DA  UK    MAYo.    BUENOS    AIRES. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


nental  and  cease  to  be  unilateral  ;  the  greater 
southern   Republics   were    to   share    with   the 
United    States    the    duty    of    protecting    and 
policing  the  Continent.     The  Confederation  of 
the  Americas,  thus  adumbrated,  was  to  be  a 
stage  in  the  progress  towards  world-confedera- 
tion,   and    the    modernized    Monroe    doctrine 
would   thus   become    a   potent   instrument    of 
pacifism.     Mr.  Roosevelt's  idea,  in  short,  was 
to   put   the   hegemony   of   the   Americas   into 
commission,  in  much  the  same  way  as  that  of 
dynastic  Europe  was  vested  in  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance a  century  before.  But  his  tour,  despite  the 
warmth  of  the  personal  welcome  accorded  to 
him,   revealed   a   very   general    disposition   to 
concur    in    the    declaration    made    by    Sefior 
Marcial  Martinez,  in  welcoming  the  ex-President 
to  the  University  of  Chile,  namely,  that  the 
Monroe  doctrine  had  become  obsolete,  in  so  far 
at  least  as  it  had  been  interpreted  to  imply  any 
right  of  supervision  by  the  United  States  over 
the  independent  Latin  Republics.     At  Santiago 
de  Chile  the  attitude  of  tho  crowd  was  unmis- 
takably hostile  to  Mr.  Roosevelt,  and  his   ap- 
pearance was   greeted   with  shouts    of   "  Viva 
Mexico !  "  and  "  Viva  Colombia  "  !      At  Buenos 
Aires  Sefior  Zeballos,   ex-Foreign    Minister    of 
Argentina,  while  welcoming  Mr.  Roosevelt's  de- 
claration that  suchRepublics  as  Argentina,  Brazil 
and  Chile  had  attained  a  position  which  entitled 
them  to  claim  equality  with  the  United  States, 
took  care  to  emphasize  his  opinions  that  tho 
Monroe  dootrine  could  not  be  applicable  to  tho 
Argentine  Republic.     In  a  letter  to  the  editor 
of  The  Times  (January  27,  1914)  he   gave  his 
reason  for  this  opinion,  in  the  following  words, 
significant  of  rifts  that  were  likely  to  be  revealed 
subsequently  in  the  Pan-American  lute.     "  The 
Argentine  civilization,"  he  said,  "  is  in  origin 
and  character  purely  European,  it  can  therefore 
only  follow  a  Pan-American  policy    on   con- 
dition   of     respecting     and     maintaining     its 
strong   moral,  intellectual   and  economic  ties 
with  Europe." 

The  views  expressed  by  these  speakers  and 
many  others  at  that  time  emphasized  tho 
determination  of  the  leading  South  American 
Republics  to  reject  any  Pan-American  project 
or  policy  which  might  fetter  them  in  their  free 
initiative  and  independent  relations,  as 
sovereign  States,  with  European  countries,  not 
only  in  the  realm  of  finance  and  economics  but 
in  political  affairs.  President  Wilson's  declara- 
tion that  the  United  States  would  not  tolerate 
any  foreign   financial   or  industrial   control   in 


Latin  America  resulted  in  crystallizing  public 
opinion  in  this  direction.  It  was  openly 
denounced  in  the  Brazilian  Chamber  as 
meaning  in  effect  "  that,  under  pretence  01 
emancipating  these  Republics  and  of  guard- 
ing them  from  a  highly  fanciful  peril  of 
European  Imperialism,  the  United  States 
would  submit  them  purely  and  simply  to  its 
own  control." 

It  was  inevitable  that  one  of  the  first  results 
of  the  war  in  Europe  should  be  to  increase  the 
political,  financial  and  commercial  influence  of 
the  United  States  in  South  America  ;  equally 
inevitable  that,  as  the  struggle  proceeded  and 
as  admiration  and  sympathy  foi  France 
increased,  the  Latin  Republics  should  become 
more  definitely  opposed  to  the  idea  of  excluding 
from  their  Continent  the  political  influence  of 
those  European  Powers  which  might  serve  as  a 
counterpoise  to  the  development  of  "  Yankee 
Imperialism."  A  leading  article  in  the 
Santiago  Mercurio  expressed  the  common 
sentiment  in  this  matter  in  May,  1916,  as 
follows  : 

The  collective  formula  for  the  guarantee  of  territorial 
integrity  and  of  the  republican  model  is  unnecessary, 
and  tends  to  destroy  the  moral  equilibrium  of  the 
true  Continental  policy,  by  giving  a  juridical  foundation 
to  possible  tendencies  towards  the  predominance  of  one 
part  of  the  Continent  over  another.  The  Pan-American 
policy  of  concord— we  have  said  it  many  times — is  a 
spontaneous  sentiment  and  expression  of  union  ;  that 
of  predominance,  in  one  form  or  another,  is  a  threat  of 
discord,  in  respect  either  of  the  form  or  of  the  underlying 
principle. 

From  this  significant  modification  of  Pan- 
Americanism  there  followed  gradually,  in 
many  influential  circles  of  political  thought, 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  emergence  of 
the  United  States  into  the  front  rank  of  World 
Powers  could  not  fail  to  render  obsolete 
Washington's  policy  of  avoiding  "  entangling 
alliances."  The  tradition  of  aloofness  as  a 
fundamental  axiom  of  national  policy  might 
die  hard  amongst  the  older  politicians,  but 
public  opinion  had  been  rapidly  educated  by 
the  war  to  substitute  the  planetary  for  the 
parochial  conception  of  human  affairs.  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  in  his  speech  to  the  Pan-American 
Congress  in  January,  1916,  appeared  to  cling  to 
his  ideas  of  consolidating  all  the  nations  of  the 
new  world  into  a  happy  family,  far  removed 
from  the  troubles  of  the  old,  and  preserved 
from  possibilities  of  strife  by  arbitration  agree- 
ments and  mutual  guarantees,  ideas  which 
he  had  previously  failed  to  embody  in  formal 
Treaties  owing  to  the  lack  of   active  sympathy 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


displayed  towards  them  in  the  Southern 
Republics.  The  Congress  at  Washington  sup- 
ported the  central  idea  of  a  Pan-American 
Alliance  for  the  protection  of  democracy  and 
the  territorial  integrity  of  all  concerned,  but 
the  feeling  was  prevalent  that  the  successful 
application  of  President  Wilson's  idaas  must 
ultimately  be  dependent  upon  force,  and,  this 
being  so,  that  an  "  American  "  Confederation 
pledged  to  ideals  of  civilization  and  humanity 


doctrine  in  1913  had  gone  beyond  that  of  1909. 
"  Pan-Americanism,"  it  declared,  "  is  a  tripod 
that  cannot  stand  on  two  legs  alone.  Only 
a  combination  of  the  Latin  countries,  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  that  is  to  say 
a  combination  of  all  the  American  Powers,  can 
make  it  a  safo  and  useful  organization  in  the 
world  to-day."  Doubtless,  as  the  attitude  of  the 
Senate  indicated,  these  radical  changes  of 
opinion  in  the  most  vital  region  of  American 


Pin.      ;        l 

■la.''  **"                           "ti&fc 

1 

M 

• 

*    L       m 

r 

[Harris  &  Ewinf. 


THE    COUNCIL    OF    THE    PAN-AMERICAN    UNION. 
Photographed  at  the  sitting  of  November  1,   1916. 


Reading  round  the  table  from  the  left  are  : — Hon.  R.  Lansing,  president  (United  States  Secretary  of  State),  Dr.  R.  S. 
Naon  (Argentine  Ambassador),  Dr.  C.  M.  de  Pena  (Minister  of  Uruguay),  Dr.  S.  Mennos  (Haiti),  Dr.  S.  A.  Domfnici 
(Venezuela),  Don  M.  de  Freyre  y  Santander  (Peru),  Don  G.  M.  Varela  (Chile),  Mr.  Barrett  (Director-General,  standing), 
and  Don  F.  J.  Yanes  (Sub-Director).  Right  from  the  president  in  front  : — Dr.  D.  da  Gama  (Brazilian  Ambassador), 
Don  I.  Calder6n  (Bolivian  Minister),  Don  J.  Mendez  (Minister  of  Guatemala),  Dr.  A.  Membreno  (Mhmter  of  Honduras), 
Dr.  G.  S.  Cordova  (Minister  of  Ecuador),  Dr.  C.  M.  de  Cespedes  (Cuban  Minister),  Dr.  R.  Zaldfvar  (Minister  of  S.  Sal- 
vador), Dr.  J.  C.  Zavala  (Nicaragua),  Don  J.  E.  Lefevre  (Panama).  The  Ministers  of  Colombia.  Paraguay,  Mexico, 
Costa  Rica,  and  the  Dominican  Republic  were  not  present  at  this  sitting. 


must  sooner  or  later  come  to  include  the  British 
Empire,  as  one  of  the  greatest  territorial 
and  democratic  Powers  on  the  Continent.  As 
the  Philadelphia  Ledger  put  it,  "  it  seemed 
an  absurdity  to  talk  of  '  Pan-Americanism ' 
and  in  the  same  breath  to  ignore  the  fact  that 
one  of  the  greatest  of  the  American  Powers 
is  not  included  in  it."  The  New  Republic, 
always  in  the  van  of  intelligent  anticipation 
in  the  field  of  world  politics,  went  farther, 
giving  to  Pan-Americanism  a  new  definition 
as  far  advanced  beyond  that  of  pre-war  days 
as  Mr.  Roosevelt's  re-definition  of  the  Monroe 


foreign  policy  were  ahead  of  their  time,  but 
they  were  nevertheless  straws  that  showed 
the  force  of  the  wind  which  the  war  had  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  edifice  of  ancient  tradition. 

As  regards  the  effect  of  the  war  on  the 
economic  conditions  and  trade  of  South 
America,  three  facts  stood  out  conspicu- 
ously from  the  experiences  of  the  leading 
Republics  during  1914-1917  ;  first,  that  the 
Continent  as  a  whole  was  being,  and  would 
hereafter  be,  liberally  compensated  for  the 
disabilities  with  which  it  had  had  to  contend 


10 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


in  common  with  other  neutral  countries,  by 
reason  of  the  greatly  increased  demand  and 
high  prices  paid  by  Europe  for  foodstuffs  and 
raw  materials  ;  secondly,  that,  as  a  result  of 
the  inevitable  curtailment  of  manufactured 
goods  from  Europe,  an  impetus  had  been 
given  (most  notably  in  Brazil)  to  the  develop- 
ment of  valuable  national  industries  ;    thirdly, 


LOADING  CHILLED  BEEF  AT  LA  PLATA. 

that  the  compulsory  curtailment  of  many  of 
the  conveniences  and  luxuries  of  life  had  given 
the  easy-going  South  American  communities 
a  badly  needed  lesson  in  self-denying  economy, 
which  but  for  the  war  they  might  only  have 
acquired  by  direct  and  more  painful  experience. 
This  last  fact  stands  out  most  prominently 
in  the  case  of  Argentina,  a  country  whose 
economic  position  had  probably  benefited 
more  from  the  war  than  any  other,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  Japan.  She  had  not  only 
gained  ,  by  the  enormously  increased  value  of 
her  staple  exports — grain,  meat,  wool  and  hides 
— but  in  the  development  of  local  industries 
and  by  the  fact  that  the  war  compelled  the. 
nation  to  take  stock  of  its  position  and  to 
modify  its  expenditure.  A  year  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  struggle  in  Europe  Argentina 
had  been  confronted  with  a  severe  crisis,  due 
to  over-importation  and  prodigality  in  public 
finance.  The  crops  of  wheat,  linseed  and  oats 
in  1914  had  been  comparative  failures,  and  the 
fact  had  been  clearly  reflected  in  the  trade 
statistics  of  the  first  half  of  the  year.  The 
first  effect  of  the  war  was  a  renewal  of  financial 


depression  and  a  restriction  in  consumption  due 
to  interference  with  supplies  from  the  belligerent 
countries.  The  general  tightness  of  money 
which  resulted  from  the  curtailment  of  credits 
in  Europe  was  acutely  felt  in  Buenos  Aires  in 
1914,  but  it  proved  a  blessing  in  disguise, 
in  that  it  cured  the  light-hearted  estanciero's 
"  mafiana  "  habit  of  mind,  addicted  to  piling 
up  commitments  to  be  met,  God  willing,  by 
the  proceeds  of  future  harvests.  The  first 
week  of  the  war  brought  something  like  a 
panic :  the  banks,  the  Bolsa  and  the  Caja 
Conversi6n  remained  closed  till  August  10 ; 
a  30  days'  moratorium  was  declared  for  80  per 
cent,  of  liabilities,  credits  were  rigorously 
curtailed  and  many  businesses  closed  down. 
It  was  not  long,  however,  before  the  effect 
of  remedial  measures  began  to  make  itself 
felt ;  New  York  came  forward  to  take  the 
place  of  London  in  supplying  the  capital 
required  to  lubricate  the  wheels  of  Argentine 
finance.  In  1915  the  country's  imports  were 
greatly  reduced,  while  exports  advanced  rapidly, 
as  the  following  table  shows  : 


Imports. 

£ 
45,000,000     .. 

Exports. 
£ 
.      110,550,000 

1915    ... 

1914    ... 

53,825,327     . 

.       69,159,000 

1913    ... 

83,436,000     . 

95,744,000 

1912    ... 

76,208,600     . 

95,127,000 

1911    ... 

72,635,800     . 

.       64,296,000 

During  1916  difficulties  in  the  matter  of 
tonnage  began  to  be  seriously  felt,  and  the 
export  of  cereals  was  considerably  reduced 
in  consequence,  but  the  shipments  of  meat  to 
(Ireat  Britain  and  her  Allies  surpassed  all 
records.  The  country's  finances  were  sensibly 
improved,  the  Government's  estimates  for 
1916  showing  a  small  surplus,  as  compared 
with  an  actual  deficit  of  nearly  £15,000,000 
in  1914.  During  1915  the  German  import 
trade  into  Argentina  officially  came  to  an  end, 
though  until  the  entry  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war  it  continued  to  be  carried  on 
through  subterranean  channels.  In  1913 
this  trade  amounted  to  a  value  of  £14,121,000 
(as  against  Great  Britain's  £22,641,000)  ; 
German  money  continued  nevertheless  to  be 
freely  spent  throughout  the  country  in  whole- 
sale purchases  of  wool  and  hides.  Much  of 
the  remarkable  rise  in  prices  for  these  and  other 
products  of  South  America  was  directly 
due  to  German  competition ;  at  an  early 
stage  of  the  war  far-seeing  individuals  in 
Hamburg  and  Berlin  realized  that  non-perish- 
able goods  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


11 


were,  likely  to  prove  a  better  investment  than 
the  German  mark.  At  the  end  of  1915  the 
Germans  at  Buenos  Aires  and  Montevideo 
were  credited  with  holding  wool  (much  of  it 
said  to  be  purchased  on  Government  account) 
to  the  value  of  over  £6,000,000,  and  were 
loading  it  in  their  interned  steamers  to  save 
storage  expenses.  The  price  of  cereals  was 
also  rapidly  advanced  as  the  result  of  German 
competition ;  there  was  no  possible  reason 
for  doubting  that  the  enormously  increased 
shipments  of  grain  to  Scandinavian  ports 
were  bought  on  German  account  by  enter- 
prising neutrals. 

In  Germany  the  actual  and  prospective  value 
of  South  America  as  a  source  of  supply  for 
foodstuffs  and  raw  materials  and  as  a  dumping 
ground  for  German  manufactures  was  fully 
realized    before    the    war.     Apprehensions    as 


community  continuod  long  after  the  outbreak 
of  war  to  reflect  the  country's  cosmopolitan 
tendencies  and  its  lack  of  homogeneous  public 
opinion ;  and  the  organized  State-directed 
activities  of  the  Fatherland  took  full  advantage 
of  the  situation.  They  were  greatly  encouraged 
and  assisted,  moreover,  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment's inexplicable  reluctance  to  put  an  end 
to  trading  with  the  enemy  during  the  first  two 
years  ot  the  war  and  its  failure  to  use  the 
effoctive  weapon  of  the  Black  List  for  the 
uprooting  of  German  commerce.  It  sounds 
almost  incredible,  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  true, 
that  owing  to  the  graceful  concessions  made 
by  Great  Britain  in  1915,  German  goods 
continued  to  arrive  in  Buenos  Aires,  often  in 
British  ships,  both  directly  and  from  the 
United  States.  The  particular  concession 
(made  in  deference  to  protest  by  the  American 


TRANSPORTING    WOOL    IN    ARGENTINA. 


to  the  future  protective  policy  of  the  Allies, 
as  outlined  at  the  Paris  Conference,  served  to 
emphasize  that  value  after  the  German  flag 
was  driven  from  the  seas  and  German  trade 
compelled  to  seek  the  kindly  offices  of  neutrals 
to  avoid  complete  destruction.  In  Argentina 
several  causes  contributed  to  assist  the  German 
in  retaining,  more  or  less  successfully,  his 
place  in  the  sun.  Although  public  sentiment, 
as  distinguished  from  the  official  attitude, 
was  overwhelmingly  pro-Ally  from  the  outset, 
the  views  and  proceedings  of  the  commercial 


Government)  by  virtue  of  which  German 
goods  were  released  for  export  if  ordered  and 
paid  for  beforo  March,  1915,  was  naturally 
abused  and  exploited  to  the  utmost,  German 
houses  combining  with  native  firms  to  secure 
the  permits.  Had  no  such  facilities  been 
given  for  enemy  trailing,  it  is  safe  to  say  that 
'  rune-tenths  of  the  Germans  in  South  America 
would  have  gone  out  of  business  before  the 
end  of  1915.  What  actually  happened  under 
the  benevolent  latitude  allowed  them  was  that 
they  were  frequently  placed  in  a  position  of 

183—3 


12 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


MONTE 

advantage  as  compared  with  British  firms. 
The  British  command  of  the  sea  had  made  it 
practically  impossible  for  the  German  in  South 
America  to  return  to  the  Fatherland ;  he, 
therefore,  remained  to  serve  his  country  by 
keeping  his  business  going  while  thousands  of 
his  British  competitors  returned  home  to 
enlist.  Those  that  remained  had  to  contend 
with  restricted  credit  facilities,  whilst  the 
German  banks,  backed  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment, gave  extra  assistance  to  their  country- 
men to  enable  them  to  keep  up  their  business. 
Even  so  the  bulk  of  their  trade  must  speedily 
have  been  extinguished  had  it  not  been  for  the 
complaisance  of  the  British  Government  and 
the  support  extended  to  German  houses  by 
British  financiers  and  traders  of  the  cosmopoli- 
tan, free-trading  persuasion.  As  a  Times 
correspondent  pointed  out,  there  existed  no 
efficient  censorship  of  overseas  mails  until 
late  in  1915,  and  the  censorship  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  South  America  did  not 
commence  until  June,  1916.  Hence  it  will 
hardly  come  as  a  surprise  to  anyone  to  know 
that  a  great  deal  of  German  South  American 
business  was  actually  financed  fr6m  London, 
and  that  the  Germans  in  Buenos  Aires  were 
thoroughly  satisfied  with  the  general  progress 
of  events.  Writing  in  January  *1916,  The 
Times  Correspondent  at  Buenos  Aires  welcomed 
Lord  Robert  Cecil's  declaration  that  the  pro- 
hibition of  enemy  trading  was  to  be  extended  so 


VIDEO. 

as  to  include  enemy  firms  in  neutral  countries  ; 
he  added  the  significant  statement  that  "  up  to 
now  German  firms  here  have  been  as  free  to 
trade  with  British  firms,  and  British  firms  at 
home  with  local  German  houses  here,  as  if 
there  had  been  no  declaration  of  war  and  no 
Orders  in  Council."  German  goods  disap- 
peared in  1915  from  the  official  Argentine 
returns,  but  German  firms  were  still  able  to 
accept  large  orders  with  guarantees  of  normal 
delivery  and  to  compete  openly  with  their 
British  rivals.  They  received  their  stocks 
through  various  channels  ;  in  some  cases  direct 
from  British  firms,  in  others  through  Sweden 
and  Holland,  where  the  shipments  were  duly 
certified  by  consular  certificates  to  be  of 
Swedish  or  Dutch  origin.  Small  wonder  if 
the  Argentine  official  and  citizen,  observing  these 
things,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  British 
trade  was  dependent  at  many  points  on  German 
intelligence  and  energy ;  small  wonder  that 
British  prestige  suffered  accordingly.  Under 
the  circumstances  it  was  unreasonable  for 
Englishmen  on  the  spot  to  criticize'  the  cautious 
prudence  of  Argentina's  utilitarian  neutrality. 
The  institution  of  the  Black  List  came  as 
a  severe  shock  to  German  traders  in  South 
America  and  to  their  friends  in  Europe,  and  the 
German-subsidized  Press  in  Buenos  Aires  and 
elsewhere  waxed  violently  abusive.  Argentine 
politicians  were  invited,  and  some  were  induced, 
to  challenge  the  legality  of  the  measure  on  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


13 


ground  of  neutrality.  This  proving  to  be 
impracticable,  a  German  Chamber  of  Commerce 
was  started,  for  the  purpose  of  consolidating 
German  trade  interests  in  Argentina,  especially 
for  post-war  activities,  and  to  "  black  list  " 
the  majority  of  British  firms  as  a  retaliatory 
measure.  Meanwhile,  in  order  to  evade  the 
Statutory  List,  German  business  took  to 
concealing  its  identity  under  various  disguises, 
using  faked  names  and  addresses  for  the 
beguiling  of  European  shippers,  or  trading  as 
bond  fide  American  or  Argentine  concerns, 
with  managers  Schultz  and  Schmidt  in  the 
position  of  industrious  German  employees. 
Simultaneously  an  enormous  expansion  took 
place  in  the  parcel  post  traffic  to  South  America 
from  Lisbon  and  the  United  States.  It  was  only 
after  the  latter  country's  entry  into  the  war 
that  the  German  trader  in  the  Southern  Con- 
tinent was  made  to  realize  the  seriousness  of 
his  position  and  to  look  to  the  future  with  gloomy 
forebodings. 

The  effect  of  the  war  on  the  finances  and 
trade  of  Brazil  is  fairly  reflected  in  the  following 
trade  returns  : 


Imports. 
£ 
1916      40,537,948 

Exports. 

£ 
55,375,377 

Trade  Balance. 

£ 

+  14,837,429 

1915      30,088,000 

52,970,000 

+  22,882,000 

1914      35,439,000 

46,511,000 

+  11,072,000 

1913      67,166,366 

64,948,000 

—   2,217,605 

In  1913  the  country  was  suffering  from  acute 
economic  depression.  The  outlook  was  any- 
thing but  promising,  there  being  no  immediate 
prospect  of  relieving  the  national  finances  from 
the  vicissitudes  which  had  resulted  from  their 
dependence  upon  the  two  staple  products, 
rubber  and  coffee,  exposed  to  severe  com- 
petition from  Ceylon,  the  Dutch  Colonies  and 
Malaya.  At  the  close  of  1914  the  foreign  debt 
amounted  to  £104,481.728  and  the  Federal 
Government  was  compelled  to  promulgate  a 
scheme  in  October  whereby  the  groater  part  of 
this  amount  was  included  in  a  funding  arrange- 
ment, interest  being  paid  for  three  years  in  new 
5  per  cent,  bonds  and  sinking  funds  suspended. 
In  1915,  thanks  to  a  drastic  reduction  of 
expenditure  and  a  steady  increase  in  trade, 
the  credit  of  the  Republic  began  to  improve. 
To  meet  the  situation  created  by  the  inevitable 
curtailment  of  imports  from  Europe  new 
industries  were  successfully  established;  to 
this  industrial  development  must  be  ascribed 
the  rapid  recovery  which  took  place  in  the 
finances  of  the  State  of  Rio.  In  an  address 
delivered  before  the  Manufacturers'  Association 
at  Rio  de  Janeiro  on  September  29,  1917,  tin- 
Brazilian  Minister  of  Finance  (Dr.  Antonio 
Carlos)  observed  that  the  war  had  naturally 
brought  about  a  great  reduction  of  imports 
into   Brazil,    which   meant    a   serious    loss    of 


DRYING    HIDES,    MONTEVIDEO. 


14 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


revenue  from  Customs  duties;  since  1913 
the  Treasury  had  subsisted  on  revenue  derived 
from  the  taxation  :>f  products  for  national 
consumption.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  many 
necessities  formerly  imported,  several  branches 
of  national  industry  had  increased  their  capacity 
and  range  of  production.  Their  large  output 
had  greatly  contributed  to  reducing  the  cost 
of  living  in  Brazil  ;  at  the  same  time  economic 
reforms  hail  been  introduced  with  excellent 
results.  In  spite  of  the  reduced  immigration 
caused  by  the  war,  Brazilian  agriculture  had 
succeeded  in  extending  the  area  under  cultiva- 
tion throughout  the  country  and  introducing 
new  products,  so  that  a  certain  amount  of 
cereals  had  become  available  for  export.  The 
situation  created  in  Europe  by  the  depletion  of 
stocks  of  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs  had 
constituted  an  opportunity  for  countries  like 
Brazil  to  develop  their  resources  to  meet  the 
new  demand.  The  development  of  the  Brazilian 
trade  in  frozen  meat  had  afforded  striking 
proof  of  the  possibilities  of  the  pastoral  industry 
of  the  country  in  the  future.  The  Minister  of 
Finance  estimated  that  the  consumption  tax 
on  national  produce  would  bring  in  about 
£6,000,000  in  1917,  a  sum  nearly  sufficient  to 
balance  the  loss  of  import  duties. 

In  view  of  the  abundant  stocks  of  coffee  held 
in  England  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  and  the 


necessity  for  conserving  tonnage,  Great  Britain's 
embargo  upon  further  importation  was  fully 
justified  ;  it  was  none  the  less  a  source  of 
serious  embarrassment,  economic  and  political, 
to  the  Brazilian  Government,  and  was  exploited 
to  the  utmost  for  the  purposes  Of  German 
propaganda  in  the  Republic.  Until  the  entry 
of  Portugal  into  the  war,  Brazil's  neutrality 
was  marked  by  a  very  deferential  attitudo 
towards  Germany  and  the  Germans  ;  nor  is 
this  surprising  in  view  of  the  large  German 
colonies  established  in  the  southern  maritime 
provinces  of  the  Republic  and  the  widespread 
influence  of  German  trade  and  finance  through- 
out the  country.  Portugal's  enlistment  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies  naturally  produced  a 
marked  effect  on  public  opinion  ;  nevertheless, 
so  long  as  the  United  States  remained  neutral, 
it  was  safe  to  predict  that  Brazil  would  do  the 
same.  Even  after  the  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations,  when  a  declaration  of  war  by  Brazil 
against  Germany  had  become  practically 
inevitable,  the  opinion  continued  to  be  widely 
held  in  commercial  circles  that  the  door  should 
be  kept  open  for  trading  with  Germany  in  the 
future,  as  she  was  likely  to  be  a  better  customer 
than  Great  Britain.  The  coffee  embargo 
remained  a  sore  point  and  accounted  in  no 
small  measure  for  the  President's  non-committal 
attitude.     The  Rio  Impartial  gave  expression 


LOADING   COFFEE    AT    SANTOS,    BRAZIL. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


15 


TRAMP    STEAMERS    OF    THE    ALLIES    LOADING    AT    BAHIA    BLANCA. 


to  the  Germanophile  view  in  commenting 
editorially  on  the  Finance  Minister's  address 
in  October  1917.  It  observed  that  Great 
Britain's  future  policy  would  be  to  favour  the 
produce  of  her  own  Colonies  and  Dominions 
by  a  protective  tariff,  whereas  Germany  would 
continue  to  purchase  raw  materials  from 
Brazil,  sending  in  return  manufactured  produce 
upon  advantageous  conditions.  The  German 
banks  and  big  traders  certainly  did  their  best 
to  prove  themselves  good  customers.  Their 
large  purchases  of  coffee  and  other  produce 
at  Santos,  Bahia  and  Pernambuco  constituted 
a  powerful  argument  in  their  favour  especially 
when  contrasted  with  Great  Britain's  embargo 
on  the  country's  chief  staple  export.  These 
questions  are  referred  to  farther  on  in  dealing 
with  the  course  of  events  that  led  to  Brazil's 
declaration  of  war  on  October  26,  1917. 

The  first  results  of  the  war  in  Chile  were 
clearly  reflected  in  the  sharp  contrast  between 
the  trade  returns  for  1914  and  1915  ;  they 
pointed  to  a  severe  dislocation  of  the  nation's 
vital  industry — the  production  and  sale  of 
nitrate — so  severe  as  to  make  the  fiscal  position 
of  the  country  a  source  of  serious  anxiety. 
The  figures  are  as  follows  : 


Imports. 

Export*. 
£ 
13,917,303 

First  half  of  1914    .. 

.     10,986,482 

„     „  1915    .. 

4,781,607 

9,803,070 

The  balance  of  trade  remained  largely  in 
Chile's  favour,  so  that  Chilean  exchange  stood 
high  ;  but  as  the  Chilean  Treasury  derives 
nearly  half  its  revenues  from  the  export  duty 
on  nitrate,  and  as  the  shipments  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war  amounted  to  only  about 
half  of  the  total  for  the  preceding  twelve 
months,  the  position  remained  somewhat 
critical  for  a  time.     By  March,    1915,  out  of 


134  nitrate  companies  in  working  when  the 
war  broke  out,  98  had  suspended  operations, 
and  the  price  of  the  commodity  had  fallen  to 
something  near  the  cost  of  production.  There- 
after, as  the  demand  increased  for  refined 
nitrate  for  the  making  of  explosives,  the  tido 
turned  swiftly  in  Chile's  favour,  with  the  result 
that  the  country's  trade  and  finances  for 
1916  touched  high-water  mark.  In  1914 
the  Treasury  had  had  to  face  a  deficit  of 
£2,700,000  ;  the  estimates  for  1916  showed  a 
surplus  of  a  million.  As  in  other  parts  of 
South  America,  one  of  the  first  effects  of  the 
war  was  to  make  necessity  the  mother  of 
many  salutary  inventions.  Willy-nilly,  the 
country  learned  how  to  do  without  things 
from  abroad  ;  imports  in  1915  decreased  by 
over  50  per  cent.  At  the  same  time  the  pro- 
duction of  iron  and  copper  was  stimulated 
and  increased  attention  was  directed  to  agri- 
culture, with  excellent  results.  The  position 
attained  in  1916  was  succinctly  stated  in  The 
Times'  financial  review  for  the  year  : 

Never  before  has  the  year's  export  of  nitrate  of  soda, 
the  prime  factor  in  the  national  economy,  approached 
within  measurable  distance  of  the  quantity  shipped  in 
the  last  12  months,  or  enjoyed  so  strong  a  market ;  and 
not  for  many  years  has  the  Chilean  peso  touched,  as  in 
November  last,  the  shilling  mark. 

Copper  and  wool,  two  export  products  which  are  now 
of  real  importance,  were  shipped  in  record  quantities  and 
fetched  unprecedented  prices ;  national  industry, 
favoured  by  the  state  of  war  in  Europe,  made  in  1916  an 
indubitable  start  ;  capital,  chiefly  North  American, 
evinced  a  very  practical  interest  in  Chile's  potentialities, 
mainly  in  the  direction  of  mining  ;  agriculture  in  the 
centre  of  the  country  has  benefited  by  the  state  of 
aff.iira  in  the  nitrate  pampas  of  the  north.  Evidence  of 
this  general  prosperity  is  naturally  visible  in  the  savings 
banks  returns.  It  has  been  a  boom  year  for  Chile,  and 
to  crown  all  Congress  announced  towards  the  end  of 
October  that  the  British  Government  had  presented  the 
Chilean  Navy  with  five  American-built  submarines  as 
compensation  for  the  disorganization  of  Chile's  naval 
construction  programme  caused  by  the  requisitioning  of 
certain  important  Chilean  units  building  in  British 
shipyards  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


16 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A  certain  number  of  the  nitrate -producing 
companies  are  in  German  hands,  and  a  con- 
siderable proportion  of  the  total  output  before 
the  war  was  absorbed  by  Germany  for  agri- 
cultural purposes.  The  stock  (about  200,000 
tons)  held  by  these  companies  was  necessarily 
immobilized  bv  British  trade  restrictions, 
until,    through    the    medium    of    the    Chilean 


DR.    HIP0LITO    IRIGOYEN, 
President  of  the  Argentine  Republic. 

Government,  they  were  sold  (in  September 
1917)  to  the  American  Dupont  Powder  Com- 
pany acting  under  instructions  of  the  United 
States  Government,  an  arrangement  which 
enabled  the  German  concerns  to  renew  their 
producing  activities  and  to  lay  up  fresh  stocks 
for  use  after  the  war.  In  other  directions 
German  traders  were  compelled  to  mark 
time.  Their  movements,  here  as  elsewhere, 
were  drastically  curtailed  by  the  operation  of 
the  Black  List ;  so  much  so  that  all  their 
powers  of  intrigue  and  propaganda  were  directed 
to  induce  the  Chilean  Government  to  adopt 
retaliatory  measures.  Resulting  therefrom  a 
discussion  on  the  subject  took  place  in  the 
Senate,  and  a  declaration  was  obtained  from 
t  he  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  he  was 
discussing  the  possibility  of  joint  action 
with  Argentina  and  Brazil.  But  the  entry 
of  the  United  States  into  the  war  made  such 
discussions  unprofitable.  Before  the  end  of 
1917   American    cooperation   in    measures    de- 


signed to  prevent  shipments  from  reaching 
German  firms  through  intermediaries'  had 
produced  most  satisfactory  results,  and  the 
German  Government's  efforts  to  maintain  the 
back  door  open  in  Argentina  and  elsewhere 
had  begun  to  assume  an  aspect  of  futility  that 
impressed  even  its  sympathisers. 

In  Venezuela,  where  Germany's  share  of 
the  foreign  trade  (20  per  cent.)  was  almost 
equal  to  that  of  Great  Britain,  the  outbreak 
of  war  was  severely  felt.  The  cessation  of 
German  activities  led  to  demoralization  in 
the  market  for  hides  and  other  produce.  The 
principal  business  houses  at  Ciudad  Bolivar, 
for  example,  being  German,  found  it  impossible 
to  import  or  export  anything  through  Trinidad, 
and  were  compelled  to  suspend  their  operations 
until  regular  communication  had  been  estab- 
lished with  La  Guaira,  the  port  of  transhipment 
for  cargo  consigned  to  the  United  States. 
The  result  was  a  glut  on  the  New  York  markets 
for  Venezuelan  produce  and  a  temporary 
cessation  of  demand. 

Condemned  perforce  by  England's  command 
of  the  seas  to  a  period  of  watchful  waiting, 
the  Germans  in  South  America  were  not  content 
to  be  idle  in  the  service  of  Deulschtum  and  the 
protection  of  their  own  trade  interests.  On 
the  contrary,  throughout  all  the  Latin  Republics 
German  agents  and  propagandists  worked 
unceasingly  to  educate  public  opinion  to  the 
idea  that  the  economic  position  of  Germany 
after  the  war  would  be  such  as  to  make  her 
the  best  possible  customer  and  general  pur- 
veyor for  South  America,  and  that  to  alienate 
her  goodwill  would  be  a  suicidal  policy.  In 
many  places,  notably  in  Buenos  Aires  and 
Santiago  de  Chile,  much  of  the  German  seed 
thus  sown  fell  upon  ground  well  prepared 
to  receive  it.  On  the  one  hand,  the  heavy 
artillery  of  German  finance  was  brought  to 
bear  in  buying  up  vast  quantities  of  Argentine 
and  Uruguayan  wool,  Brazilian  coffee,  and 
other  staples  ;  on  the  other,  the  light  infantry 
of  their  commerce,  in  skirmishing  order, 
ranged  all  over  the  continent,  showing  ranges 
of  samples,  canvassing  for  orders,  and  offering 
guarantees  of  delivery  after  the  war  at  pre-war 
prices.  So  long  as  their  interned  ships  remained 
laden  with  German  cargo,  under  the  German 
flag,  conspicuous  in  all  the  chief  harbours 
of  the  South  American  seaboard,  they  served 
to  reinforce  the  arguments  and  assurances 
with    which    politicians,    pressmen,    and    mer- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


17 


chants  were  industriously  assailed.  These 
vessels  were  an  earnest  of  future  German  activi  - 
ties,  which,  as  the  propagandists  explained, 
were  bound  to  be  concentrated  on  South 
American  markets  because  of  the  restrictions 
that  Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  would  place 
on  them  elsewhere.  Possibly  the  guarantees 
for  the  delivery  of  cheap  German  manu- 
factures after  the  war  might  be  of  no  more 
value  than  any  other  scrap  of  paper,  but 
there  was  every  reason  for  Argentine  and 
Chilean  importers  to  believe  that  Germany 
would  re-enter  the  field  with  large  surplus 
stocks,  to  be  dumped  in  generous  mood  upon 
South  America  in  return  for  wool,  hides,  tallow, 
and  foodstuffs.  Would  England  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  offer  them  similar  advantages  ?  If 
not,  was  it  wise  to  deprive  themselves  of  the 
opportunities  thus  presented  by  boycotting 
German  commerce  as  a  penalty  for  the  crimes 
of  German  militarism  ?  This,  roughly  speaking, 
was  undoubtedly  the  attitude  of  a  considerable 
section  of  political  and  commercial  opinion 
in  most  of  the  Latin  Republics.  Strictly 
unsentimental  and  utilitarian,  it  was  opposed 
to  the  chivalrous  instincts  of  the  great  bulk 
of  the  people,  but  it  was  none  the  less  influential 


in  high  places.  It  was  supported  with  charac- 
teristic thoroughness  by  societies  officially 
inspired  and  organized  in  Germany,  and  by 
the  publication  of  illustrated  monthly  papers 
in  Spanish  and  Portuguese  (El  Mensajero  de 
Ultramar  and  0  Transatlantico)  nicely  adapted 
to  gild  the  pill  of  peaceful  penetration  with 
the  sugar  of  lofty  sentiments  and  idealistic 
motives. 

The  "  German  Economic  Association  for 
South  and  Central  America  "  was  established 
at  Berlin  in  1915,  and,  notwithstanding  the 
difficulty  of  interrupted  communications,  it 
was  able  to  boast  before  the  end  of  1916  that  it 
had  successfully  established  branches,  in  touch 
with  it,  in  all  the  21  Republics.  Some  time 
later  a  Germanic  League  for  South  America 
was  organized,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  together  into  closer  union  "  all  persons 
of  German  extraction  whose  speech,  sympathies 
and  habits  of  thought  are  German "  (or,  in 
other  words,  the  quest  of  tho  wandering  sheep) ; 
but  the  League  announced  its  readiness  to 
welcome  to  its  ranks  "  all  representatives  of 
such  nation^  as  think  it  of  vital  importance 
to  the  world  that  Germanic  morality  and 
Germanic  civilization  should  be  preserved  to 


DRYING    AND    PACKING    NITRATE,    CHILE. 


18 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


it  in  all  their  purity."  One  of  the  principal 
objects  Enumerated  in  the  League's  pro- 
gramme is  "  the  cultivation  of  the  German 
language  and  Germanic  customs  and  assidu- 
ous cooperation  in  the  preservation  and 
foundation  of  German  schools  and  other 
Germanio  educational  institutions."  In  South 
Brazil  and  in  Chile,  where  the  insidious  in- 
fluences of  the  independent  German  school 
hail  long  been  denounced  by  patriotic  citizens 
as  a  danger  to  the  State,  subversive  alike  of 
national  unity  and  dignity,  the  assertion  of 
the  League's  founders  that  its  purposes  were 
in  no  sense  political  was  not  likely  to  mislead 
any  but  those  who  wished  to  be  deceived. 

But  German  propagandist  activities  were 
by  no  means  confined  to  the  legitimate  object 
of  maintaining  and  extending  German  trade 
and  influence  in  South  America  after  the  war. 
Throughout  the  Latin  Republics,  as  in  the 
United  States  and  in  the  Far  East,  Germany's 
agents,  spies  and  hirelings  worked  unceasingly 
and  unscrupulously,  under  the  direction  of  their 
Legations,  to  create  internal  and  international 
dissensions  favourable  to  the  German  cause. 
Much  energy  and  money  were  spent  in  sub- 
sidizing and  acquiring  control  of  sections  of  the 
Press.  From  the  outset  German  telegrams 
emanating  from  the  New  York  branch  of  the 
German  Press  Bureau  were  supplied  gratuitously 


to  every  newspaper  that  would  print  them  ; 
these  war  bulletins  were  of  the  usual  men- 
dacious type,  systematically  directed  to- 
wards discrediting  the  Allies  and  throwing 
upon  them  all  responsibility  for  the  war. 
Towards  the  end  of  1914  a  German  organ 
printed  in  Spanish,  La  Union,  made  its  ap- 
pearance in  Buenos  Aires,  and  Argentina 
was  flooded  with  a  number  of  profusely 
illustrated  periodicals,  whereby  German  Kul- 
tur  was  skilfully  displayed  for  the  edification 
of  the  masses.  For  the  benefit  of  the  large 
Italian  colony  in  Argentina  the  Central 
Labour  Exchange  at  Berlin  organized  the 
publication  of  a  paper,  II  Lavoro,  which  was 
widely  circulated. .  Directed  from  Buenos  Aires, 
the  influence  of  German  propaganda  radiated 
throughout  the  continent.  Its  influence  was 
particularly  noticeable  in  Chile  :  the  Press  of 
Santiago  refrained  with  practical  unanimity 
from  editorial  comments  on  the  sinking  of 
the  Lusitania.  A  "  Society  for  German  Kul- 
tur  "  was  founded  in  that  city  by  Germans 
and  German-Chileans ;  for  a  long  time  Ger- 
man influence  continued  to  be  paramount 
in  the  clerical,  military  and  financial  circles 
of  the  Chilean  capital.  In  Buenos  Aires 
also  was  located,  under  the  competent  direction 
of  the  notorious  Luxburg,  the  headquarters 
of  a  system  of    espionage  and  intrigue  whose 


THE    CUBAN    INSURRECTION:    UNITED    STATES    BLUE-JACKETS    LANDED   IN 
SANTIAGO    TO    RESTORE    ORDER. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


19 


activities  extended  northward  to  the  Carihbean 
Sea.  The  Times  Correspondent  at  Washington 
in  September  1917,  quoting  a  Buenos  Aires 
dispatch  to  the  New  York  World,  reported 
that,  a3  the  result  of  official  enquiries,  the  head- 
quarters of  this  spy  system  had  been  located 
in  a  German  Bureau  financed  by  the  German 
Government,  and  that  the  Argentine  authorities 
were  in  possession  of  proof  that  German  agents 
had  been  regularly  collecting  information  con- 
cerning the  departures  and  cargoes  of  ships 
and  the  movements  of  neutral  vessels. 

All  the  evidence  available  on  the  spot  con- 
cerning the  causes  conducing  to  the  serious 
railway  strike,  which  cut  off  Buenos  Aires  from 
communication  with  the  interior  in  October, 
1917,  tended  to  confirm  the  opinion  of  those 
who  looked  beyond  the  superficial  aspects  of 
the  movement  that  Gorman  machinations 
and  German  money  were  behind  it.  As  The 
Times  Correspondent  observed  at  the  time  : 

There  has  existed,  and  still  exists,  in  the  minds  of  99 
out  of  every  100  men  outside  the  ranks  of  the  strikers 
themselves,  the  conviction  that  German  intrigue, 
Gorman  money  and  German  designs  were  at  the  root  of 
the  strike.  The  coincidence  between  the  declaration  by 
both  Houses  of  the  Argentine  Congress  in  favour  of  a 
rupture  of  relations  with  Germany  and  the  outbreak  of 
a  general  strike  was  too  marked,  especially  when  the 
analogy  of  similar  strikes  at  critical  moments  in  Spain, 
in  the  United  States  and  in  Russia,  is  taken  into  account. 

There  was  ample  evidence  among  the  strikers 
of  money  in  profusion,  far  beyond  anything 
that  could  have  come  from  their  own  resources  ; 
another  significant  feature  of  the  movement 
was  the  notable  recrudescence  of  anti-British 
and  pro -neutrality  propaganda. 

In  the  chronically  turbulent  tropics  and  in 
the  lesser  Republics  bordering  on  the  Caribbean 
Germany  found  material  for  cruder  and  more 
overt  treasons  and  stratagems  than  she  could 
safely  foment  in  the  south.  The  Cuban  insur- 
rection of  February,  1917,  was  attributed  by 
the  State  Department  at  Washington  to  the 
instigation  of  German  agents ;  later  in  the 
year  they  fomented  a  strike  of  the  sugar -mill 
operatives  at  Santa  Clara  ;  there  was  evidence, 
moreover,  to  prove  that  the  Cuban  Consul- 
General  at  Rotterdam  had  been  induced  to  act 
as  the  forwarding  agent  for  German  corre- 
spondence. (In  the  same  way  Chilean  official 
channels  were  used  to  evade  the  censorship  of 
the  Allies.  The  Ba  ico  Aleman  Transatlantico 
was  thus  enabled  to  remit  funds  to  Germany  ; 
the  Chilean  Government  denied  direct  responsi- 
bility and  attributed  the  breach  of  neutrality 
to  the  slackness  of  subordinates.)    At  Panama 


the  activities  of  German  plotters  compelled 
the  Government  in  May,  1917,  to  arrest  and 
deport  to  Col6n  the  most  prominent  offenders. 
In  Nicaragua  a  violent  demonstration  against 
the  United  States  occurred  in  March  1917, 
Congress  demanding  the  withdrawal  of  the 
United  States  marines ;  German  instigation 
was  undoubtedly  a  factor  in  this  outbreak. 
In  Colombia  the  services  of  one  Haines,  an 
Irish  rebel,  were  enlisted  to  take  command  of 


SENOR    J.    LUIS   SANFUENTES, 
President  of  Chile. 

a  buccaneering  expedition,  which  equipped 
two  coastguard  vessels  with  German  crews, 
at  Puerto  Colombia.  At  Bahia  bombs  were 
placed  on  board  of  British  and  Allied  ships, 
timed  to  explode  three  days  after  the  vessels 
had  put  to  sea.  The  Republic  of  San  Salvador 
received  through  Mexico  in  February,  1917,  a 
"  present  "  of  a  complete  Telefunken  wireless 
installation,  with  German  mechanics  to  erect 
it.  In  Costa  Rica  and  Haiti  German  intrigue 
was  a  powerful  factor  in  local  politics  ;  in  the 
former  Republic  German  priests  displayed  the 
greatest  activity  in  propagandist  work  directed 
against  the  United  States.  Throughout  the 
Central  Republics  the  aggressive  Germanophile 
proclivities  of  the  Mexican  Government  under 
Sefior  Carranza  were  fully  exploited  to  create 
dissensions  and  unrest,  especially  in  Guatemala 
and  Honduras.  But  in  spite  of  all  these 
pernicious     activities,     the     weight     of    public 


20 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


GERMAN    SHIPS    AT    BUENOS    AIRES 

opinion    in    most    of     these    minor    Republics 


became  more  and  more  pronouncedly  hostile 
to  Germany  as  the  truth  concerning  her  methods 
of  warfare  emerged  from  the  smoke-clouds  of 
her  propaganda.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  by  the 
end  of  1917  the  name  of  Germany  stank  in  the 
nostrils  of  the  general  public,  of  every  self- 
respecting  gaucho  and  peon  from  Panama  to 
Patagonia,  and  it  was  clear  that,  whatever  the 
prudent  path  of  politicians  might  be,  it  would 
be  long  before  the  German  in  South  America 
could  live  down  the  infamies  which  had  dis- 
graced his  nation  in  this  war. 

The  infamous  telegrams  transmitted  to 
Berlin  by  the  German  representative  at  Buenos 
Aires  (Count  Luxburg)  through  the  Swedish 
legation,  which  were  made  public  by  the 
State  Department  at  Washington  on  Sep- 
tember 8,  1917,  and  subsequent  dates,  left 
no  further  ground  for  any  disinterested  neutral 
to  doubt  the  nature  and  extent  of  German 
official  intrigues.  As  in  the  United  States 
(to  quote  President  Wilson's  words)  it  was 
clear  that  from  the  outset  of  the  war  Germany 
liad  filled  the  unsuspecting  communities  of 
the  South  American  Republics  "  and  even  the 
offices  of  Government  with  spies,  and  set 
criminal  intrigues  everywhere  afoot  ;  more- 
over, that  these  intrigues  were  carried  on  with 
the  support  and  even  under  he  personal 
direction  of  official  agents  of  the  German 
Government  accredited  to  the  Governments 
of    the    Republics."     Count    Luxburg's    par- 


ticularly   cynical    machinations    had    involved 

not  only  the    Swedish  Government  but  that  of 

Argentina  in  gross  breaches  of  the  elementary 

obligations  of  neutrality  ;  they  served  to  throw 

final  enlightenment  on  the  criminal  practices 

of  German  diplomacy,   as  earlier  revealed  in 

the  von  Papen  papers,  and  to  evoke  violent 

manifestations  of  indignation  throughout  the 

Latin  Republics. 

The  announcement  in  which  the  Secretary 

of    State   for   Foreign   Affairs    at   Washington 

published  the  first  three  of  the  long  series  of 

dispatches   which    had   been   secured    by   the 

United  States — there  were  over  400  of  them — 

was  as  follows  : 

The  Department  of  State  has  secured  certain  tele- 
grams from  Count  Luxburg,  Gorman  Charge  d'Affaires- 
at  Buenos  Aires,  to  the  Foreign  Office.  Berlin,  which  I 
regret  to  say  were  dispatched  from  Buenos  Aires  by 
the  Swedish  Legation  as  their  own  official  messages 
addressed  to  the  Stockholm  Foreign  Office.  The  follow- 
ing are  English  translations  of  the  German  text : — 

"May  19,  1917,  No.  32. — This  Government  has  now 
released  the  German  and  Austrian  ships  in  which  hitherto- 
a  guard  has  been  placed.  In  consequence  of  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Monte  (Protegido)  case  there  has  been  a 
great  change  in  public  feeling.  The  Government  will  in 
future  only  clear  Argentine  ships  as  far  as  Las  Palmas. 
[Las  Palmas  is  one  of  the  Canary  Islands,  and  is  the  last 
neutral  touching  place  on  the  ordinary  ocean  route- 
between  South  America  and  North-westorn  Europe;  It 
belongs  to  Spain.]  I  beg  that  the  small  steamers  Oran 
and  Guazo,  January  31  (meaning  which  sailed  on  Janu- 
ary 31),  300  tons,  which  are  now  nearing  Bordeaux,  with 
a  view  to  changing  flags,  may  be  spared  if  possible,  or 
else  sunk  without  a  trace  being  left  (spurlos  versenkt). — 

LUXBUHG." 

The  second  message  reads  : — 

"July  3,  1917,  No.  59. — I  learn  from  a  reliable  source- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


21 


that  the  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  is  a 
notorious  ass  and  Anglophile,  declared  in  secret  session 
of  the  Senate  that  Argentina  would  demand  from  Berlin 
a  promiso  not  to  sink  more  Argentine  ships.  If  not 
agreed  to  relations  would  be  broken  off.  I  recommend 
refusal,  or,  if  necessary,  calling  in  the  mediation  of  Spain. 
— Signed  Luxburg." 

The  third  message  reads  : — 

"July  9,  1917,  No.  64. — Without  showing  any  ten- 
dency to  make  concessions  postpone  reply  to  Argentine 
Note  until  receipt  of  further  reports.  Change  of  Ministry 
probable.  As  regards  Argentine  steamers,  I  recommend 
either  compelling  them  to  turn  back,  sinking  thorn 
without  leaving  any  trace,  or  letting  them  through. 
They  are  all  quite  small. — Ltjxbtjro." 

Thus,  as  The  Times  put  it, 

The  accredited  representative  of  the  German  Empire 
at  Buenos  Aires,  while  actually  enjoying  the  hospitality 
of  the  Argentine  "Republic,  was  seen  advocating  the 
deliberate  murder  of  Argentine  subjects  on  the  high  seas, 
in  order  that  the  sinking  of  Argentine  ships  by  German 
submarines  should  leave  no  trace  which  would  make 
their  crime  known  in  the  Argentine,  and  so  make  an 
enemy  of  that  country. 

Public  opinion  in  Argentina  and  elsewhere 
was  not  slow  to  express  its  indignation  at 
the  damnable  treachery  which  had  solemnly 
promised  "  to  respect  the  Argentine  flag," 
even  while  it  was  plotting  to  sink  it  "  without 
a  trace  being  left  "  ;  it  was  equally  incensed 
at  the  manner  in  which  the  Argentine  Govern- 
ment had  welcomed  Germany's  "settlement" 
of  the  Monte  Protegido  case  and  proclaimed 
it  as  a  diplomatic  victory  and  justification  for 
benevolent    neutrality.     Count    Luxburg    had 


placed  his  friend  President  Irigoyen  in  the 
awkward  predicament  of  confessing  himself 
either  the  associate  or  the  dupe  of  the  apostles 
of  criminal  Kulltir.  That  the  German  Govern- 
ment promptly  disavowed  its  representative's 
actions  in  reply  to  Argentina's  request  for 
"  explanations  "  had  little  or  no  effect  in  quelling 
popular  resentment.  On  September  12  Count 
Luxburg  received  his  passports  with  an  inti- 
mation to  tho  effect  that  he  had  ceased  to  be 
persona  grata,  but  throughout  South  America 
the  Press  generally  remained  unsatisfied  and 
urged  the  inauguration  of  a  Pan-American 
movement  in  support  of  the  United  States  and 
Brazil.  On  the  same  night  there  were  serious 
anti-German  riots  in  Buenos  Aires  ;  the  German 
Club  was  set  on  fire  and  several  business  houses, 
including  the  office  of  the  German  newspaper, 
destroyed.  On  September  15  a  large  public 
meeting  was  held  at  Buenos  Aires,  demanding 
a  rupture  with  Germany  and  the  extirpation 
of  espionage  ;  meanwhile  the  friends  of  Count 
Luxburg,  with  cynical  effrontery,  had  circu- 
lated a  report  to  the  effect  that  Senor  Pueyr- 
redon,  the  Argentine  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  had  himself  suggested  to  Count  Luxburg 
the  sinking  of  Argentine  ships  without 
leaving  a  trace  !  It  was  subsequently  proved 
by  further  publication  of  the  German  repre- 
sentative's dispatches  and  of  his  Government's 


A    HERD    OF    LLAMAS. 

The   Llama  is  bred  in  the   higher   parts   of  Ecuador,  Peru    and    Rolivia,  and    its  wool,  like    that    of  the 

Alpaca,  constitutes  a  staple  export  of  those  countries. 


22 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


replies  that  the  German  Government  was  fully 
informed  and  approved  of  his  "  diplomacy." 

Undeterred  by  the  dismissal  of  Count  Lux- 
burg,  public  opinion  at  Buenos  Aires  continued 
to  display  intense  indignation,  in  remarkable 
contrast  to  the  non-committal  complacency  of 
Seiior  Irigoyen's  Cabinet.  On  September  20, 
by  23  votes  to  1,  the  Senate  approved  a 
minute  in  favour  of  a  rupture  with  Germany. 


COUNT    LUXBURG, 

German    Minister   at    Buenos    Aires    until 

September,   1917. 

On   the   night   of   the    22nd   the   Minister   for 

Foreign    Affairs    announced    in    the    Chamber 

that  he  had  asked  Germany  for  satisfactory 

explanations,     failing     which     the     Argentine 

Government  would  adopt   extreme  measures. 

Just   as  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  about 

to  vote  for  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations 

it  was   informed   that  the   following  dispatch 

had  been  received  from  Berlin  : 

The  Imperial  Government  keenly  regrets  what  has 
happened,  and  absolutely  disapproves  of  the  ideas 
expressed  by  Count  Luxburg  on  the  method  of  carrying 
out  submarine  warfare.  These  ideas  are  personal  to 
him.  They  have  not  had,  and  will  not  have,  any 
influence  on  the  decision  and  promises  of  the  Empire. 
(Signed)  Kuhlmann. 

In  view  of  this  official  sacrifice  of  the  diplo- 
matic scapegoat,  the  Chamber's  action  was 
adjourned  to  the  25th,  when  the  vote  in  favour 
of  an  immediate  rupture  was  adopted  by 
53  to  18.     The  Cabinet  was  expected  to  take 


action  accordingly,,  but  nothing  happened, 
all  the  Government's  attention  being  apparently 
concentrated  on  an  opportunely  instigated 
railway  strike.  But  the  end  of  the  Luxburg 
revelations  was  not  yet.  On  October  28 
messages  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  were  published 
in  the  Press  of  Buenos  Aires,  announcing  that 
the  Brazilian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
had  confirmed  the  statement  that  the  further 
deciphering  of  the  ex-Minister's  telegrams  had 
revealed  a  plot  for  a  German  invasion  of  South 
Brazil.  The  Argentine  Press  thereupon  de- 
manded that  the  reticence  of  the  Government 
in  regard  .to  1  he  Luxburg  dispatches  should 
cease  and  that  it  should  either  publish  the 
documents  in  full  or  authorize  foreign  Govern- 
ments to  publish  them.  On  November  11 
these  Brazilian  intrigues  were  cheerfully  dis- 
avowed by  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office.  Herr 
von  Kuhlmann's  alacrity  to  disassociate  the 
ex-Minister  from  all  connexion  with  his  Govern- 
ment betrayed  Germany's  desperate  anxiety 
to  avoid  a  rupture  with  Argentina,  and  Presi- 
dent Irigoyen  was  pleased  to  be  able  to  place 
all  responsibility  upon  Count  Luxburg  per- 
sonally. However,  more  was  yet  to  come. 
On  December  20  the  State  Department  at 
Washington  published  a  further  batch  of  tele- 
grams, one  of  which  revealed  the  fact,  of 
international  importance  to  South  America, 
that  Count  Luxburg  had  induced  the  President 
of  the  Argentine  Republic  to  endeavour  to 
form  a  secret  agreement  with  Chile  and  Bolivia, 
with  a  view  to  "  a  mutual  rapprochement  for 
their  protection  against  North  America." 
Indicative  of  the  means. which  the  German  repre- 
sentative had  employed  for  communicating  with 
the  Berlin  Foreign  Office,  one  of  these  dis- 
patches refers  to  his  fear  that  his  "  secret 
wire  "  might  have  been  discovered.  The  secret 
agreement  dispatch  was  as  follows  : 

August  I. — The  President  has  at  last  made  up  his 
mind  to  conclude  secret  agreement  with  Chile  and 
Bolivia  regarding  a  mutual  rapprochement  for  protet  ■ 
tion  vis-d-vis  N.  America  before  the  Conference  idea  is 
taken  up  again.  Saguier,  with  friendly  Under-Secretary 
of  State  and  full  power,  is  en  route  to  .  .  .  and  Santiago. 

Statements  by  the  Argentine  Ministe  •  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  by  the  President  of  Chile 
denied  the  truth  of  Count  Luxburg's  state- 
ments in  regard  to  the  alleged  negotiations, 
but  public  opinion  remained  uneasy  and  un- 
convinced. Meanwhile  Count  Luxburg's  own 
position  had  become  one  of  extreme  discomfort. 
Unable  to  obtain  a  safe  conduct  for  Europe, 
he    first    asked     permission    to    reside    at    an 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


23 


mfancia  in  the  interior  as  a  private  citizen  ; 
this  was  refused.  He  then  endeavoured  to 
make  arrangements  to  go  to  Chile,  but  neither 
that  country  nor  Uruguay  nor  Paraguay 
would  receive  the  unwelcome  guest.  Finally, 
on  October  7,  he  disappeared,  and  it  was 
rumoured  that  he  had  left  in  a  tug  to  join  the 
steamer  Reina  Victoria  Eugenia  at  the  mouth 
of  the  River  Plate  for  Spain.  It  subsequently 
transpired  that  he  had  attempted  to  escape 
into  the  interior  ;  he  was  arrested,  brought 
back  to  Buenos  Aires  and  interned  (October  12) 
on  the  island  of  Martin  Garcia,  a  result  which 
The  Times  Correspondent  at  Buenos  Aires 
attributed  to  "  the  pressure  of  popular  indig- 
nation at  his  remaining  in  the  country." 
Next,  an  Argentine  citizen  applied  for  a  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  for  the  ex-Minister,  claiming  his 
right  to  reside  as  a  private  individual  in 
Argentina.  Eventually,  the  British  Govern- 
ment magnanimously  granted  him  a  safe 
conduct  on  condition  that  he  should  sail  by 
the  Dutch  s.s.  Hollandia  in  November  for  some 
country  bordering  on  Germany.  He  was 
thereupon  released  from  internment  and 
restored  to  the  German  Legation  pending  his 


departure  :  but  the  strain  had  been  too 
groat,  even  for  a  German  diplomatist,  and  ho 
was  shortly  afterwards  admitted  to  a  German 
hospital  suffering  from  mental  and  nervous 
breakdown.  Exit  Luxburg,  sunk,  not  without 
•traces,  by  his  own  craft.  The  fashionable 
world  and  the  clubs  of  Buenos  Aires  regretted 
the  disappearance  of  one  whose  petulant 
outbursts  of  almost  Kaiserlike  tantrums  had 
long  been  a  source  of  innocent  merriment  to 
the  community.  A  very  different  individual 
from  the  suave  and  studious  Luxburg  known 
to  Peking  diplomacy  in  former  days  was 
the  mailed-fist-and-shining-sword  individual 
developed  in  Buenos  Aires  by  the  bitter  uses 
of  adversity  and  the  sense  of  increasing  isola- 
tion. He  endeavoured  to  console  himself 
and  his  compatriots  for  the  undignified  help- 
lessness of  their  position  by  continual  and 
cliildish  protests  on  every  conceivable  ground, 
asserting  his  dignity  at  the  Plaza  Hotel  (from 
which  he  refused  to  remove  his  unwelcome 
presence)  by  declining  to  use  the  lift  in  company 
with  any  fellow  guest  of  enemy  nationality, 
and  by  many  other  similar  displays  of  Teutonic 
temper. 


ANTI-GERMAN     RIOTS     IN     BUENOS     AIRES:    THE     GERMAN    CLUB,     WHICH     WAS 

BURNT    BY    THE    POPULACE. 


24 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


■  At  the  close  of  the  year  1917  the  majority  of 
the  South  American  Republics  had  followed 
the  example  of  the  United  States  and  officially 
declared  their  sympathy  with  the  Allies.  The 
two  most  notable  exceptions  were  Argentina 
and  Chile.  In  the  latter  country  German 
influence  had  too  long  been  firmly  established 
in  military,  educational  and  clerical  circles  ; 
nevertheless,  as  has  already  been  shown,  this 
influence  steadily  declined,  while  that  of  the 
Entente  increased,  as  the  war  revealed  German 
Kultur  in  all  its  frightfulness.  Popular  senti- 
ment, here  as  in  Argentina,  had  been  converted 
to  the  cause  of  the  Allies  long  before  the  third 
year  of  the  war  ;  but  the  Government,  power- 
fully swayed  by  Roman  Catholic  influence  and 
by  fear  of  German  reprisals,  adhered  persistently 
to  its  policy  of  cautious  neutrality.  North 
America's  entry  into  the  war  was  not  calculated 
to  modify  its  attitude,  for  the  reason  that 
the  United  States  have  never  been  popular  in 
Chile.  To  put  the  matter  briefly,  the  Govern- 
ment at  Santiago  feared  the  United  States 
more  than  Germany ;  furthermore  it  showed 
itself  to  be  extremely  jealous  of  anything 
savouring  of  infringement  on  its  independent 
initiative.  In  April  1917,  the  Chilean  Govern- 
ment intimated  tlirough  its  Minister  in  London 
that  it  did  not  feel  called  upon  to  follow  the 
example  of  the  United  States  and  Brazil  for 
the  reason  that  Chile's  sovereign  rights  had  not 
been  attacked  by  Germany.  If  they  were, 
Chile  would  be  prompt  to  take  suitable  action. 
The  tendencies  of  the  official  class  were  indicated, 


even  at  this  period,  by  the  fact  that  the  Chilean 
Government  appointed  a  German  as  its  Con- 
sular representative  at  Tampico,  a  danger 
point  of  friction,  and  that  its  Consul-General 
in  Mexico  City  was  also  a  German.  In  June 
it  declined  to  place  armed  guards  on  board 
the  interned  German  ships,  citing  in  support 
the  example  of  Argentina.  But  even  the 
Chilean  administration  was  shaken  by  the 
depths  of  depravity  and  duplicity  revealed  in 
the  Luxburg  dispatches,  and  towards  the  close 
of  the  year  there  was  evidence  in  the  Press  of  a 
growing  sense  of  the  disadvantages  of  national 
isolation.  The  action  taken  by  the  Peruvian 
Government,  in  severing  relations  with  Ger- 
many (October  5),  was  not  without  weight  at 
Santiago  de  Chile,  for  until  the  sinking  of  the 
barque  Lorton,  the  attitude  of  Peru  had  been 
in  all  important  respects  similar  to  that  of  her 
neighbour.  Nevertheless,  at  the  end  of  1917 
the  attitude  of  the  Chilean  Government 
remained  to  all  appearances  as  it  was  when 
officially  defined  at  the  time  of  the  United 
States  entering  the  war,  namely,  that  Chile 
would  maintain  her  impartial  neutrality  so 
long  as  she  was  not  the  object  of  direct  attack. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  flagrant 
violations  of  Chilean  neutrality  committed  by 
German  warships  in  Chilean  waters  and  the 
assistance  rendered  to  these  warships  by  vessels 
clearing  from  Chilean  ports  led  to  a  situation 
which,  had  it  developed,  might  easily  have 
embroiled  Chile  with  the  Allies.  But  the 
action    taken    by    the    Chilean    authorities    in 


LOADING    ORANGES    ON    THE    PARANX    RIVER. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


25 


suppressing  the  activities  of  German  wireless 
stations  and  supply  ships  of  the  Kosmos  line 
relieved  the  strain  produced  by  earlier  incidents: 
moreover,  the  spontaneous  attacks  by  the 
crowd  at  Valparaiso  on  the  German  Consulate 
and  Bank  were  a  compensating  feature.     Even- 


URUGUAYAN   GAUGHOS. 

tually  the  undeniable  violation  of  Chilean 
territorial  waters  by  the  British  squadron 
which  sank  the  Dresden  (March  14,  1915),  close 
in  shore  off  Juan  Fernandez,  was  tacitly 
accepted  on  both  sides  as  a  squaring  of  accounts, 
fittingly  terminated  by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  ample 
apology.  The  Chilean  Press  expressed  com- 
plete satisfaction  with  "  the  happy  conclusion 
of  the  incident "  and  contrasted  the  Britisli 
Government's  prompt  amende  with  Germany's 
failure  to  reply  to  five  protests  lodged  by  the 
Chilean  Government  between  December  1914 
and  May  1915. 

Similarly,  the  Chilean  Press  strongly  sup- 
ported the  action  of  the  United  States  in 
February  1917.  According  to  The  Times 
Correspondent  at  Valparaiso,  the  effect  of  the 
German  declaration  of  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare  was  "  to  undo  the  work  of  2  J  years  of 
laboured  propaganda."  The  Chilean  Govern- 
ment denned  its  position  in  reply  to  Mr. 
Wilson's  Note  by  declaring  that  "  Germany's 
declaration  implied  a  restriction  of  the  rights 
of  neutrals  which  could  not  be  accepted." 
After  the  United  States  declaration  of  war  the 
position  of  Chile  became  one  of  considerable 
difficulty,  especially  in  view  of  the  future  of  the 
nitrate  trade  with  North  America.  Following 
upon  several  meetings  of  the  Cabinet  it  was 
decided  that  Chile  had  no  valid  reasons  to  take 
separate  action  in  support  of  the  United  States, 


while  Argentina  was  obviously  holding  back. 
The  attitude  of  the  Chilean  Government  was 
likewise  influenced  by  the  fact  that  Germany 
held  £2,500,000  of  conversion  funds  and  that 
she  had  confiscated  Cliilean  iodine  (just  as  she 
confiscated  Brazilian  coffee)  in  German  hands, 
for  which  Chile  could  not  hope  to  receive 
payment  except  in  the  shape  of  German  ships. 
In  Argentina  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
there  were  several  reasons  to  make  prudent 
neutrality  a  popular  policy.  In  the  first  place, 
the  Argentine  army  had  been  trained  by  German 
officers  and  wore  German  uniforms,  like  the 
armies  of  Chile  and  Paraguay.  Belief  in 
German  military  power  was  therefore  almost 
universal  ;     just    as,    thanks    to    the    German 


A    ROUGH    ROAD    IN     ASUNCION, 
PARAGUAY. 

banks,  was  the  belief  in  German  trade  organiza- 
tion The  stout  defence  put  up  by  invaded 
Belgium  and  the  barbarities  inflicted  upon  her 
brave  people  were  the  first  factors  in  creating 
a  definite  anti -German  feeling  throughout 
Argentina.  The  shooting  of  Mr.  Hummer,  the 
Argentine  Vice-Consul  at  Dinan,  by  the  Germans 
increased  this  feeling.  The  Times  Correspondent 
at    Buenos    Aires    reported    (October    9)    that 


26 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


there  was  much  public  irritation  at  the  Govern- 
ment 8  failure  to  obtain  satisfaction  for  this 
outrage,  and  "  it  was  feared  that  the  inactivity 
of  the  Government  might  give  rise  to  a  wrong 
impression  abroad."  Unfortunately,  many  sub- 
sequent events  tended  to  create  the  impression, 
especially  after  the  election  of  Sefior  Hip61ito 


DR.    FEL1CIANO    VIERA, 
President  of  Uruguay. 

Irigoyen  to  the  Presidency  (June  12,  1916), 
that  public  opinion  in  Argentina  does  not 
exercise  the  driving  power  or  the  influence 
in  public  affairs  which  in  theory  it  possesses, 
and  this  because  of  its  cosmopolitan  and 
conglomerate  nature.  Moreover,  as  the  atti- 
tude of  Sefior  Irigoyen  proved,  the  policy  of 
Argentina  is  constitutionally  inclined  rather  to 
base  itself  on  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  in 
South  America  than  to  take  a  wide  view  of 
world  politics  and  international  agreements. 
Rivalry  with  Brazil  for  the  predominant  posi- 
tion in  the  Southern  Continent  has  been,  and  re- 
mains, a  determinant  factor  of  Argentine  policy, 
and  the  fact  that  Brazil  is  more  American- 
ized than  Argentina  affords  in  itself  a  partial 
explanation  of  the  latter's  refusal  to  follow  the 
lead  of  the  United  States  against  Germany. 
Finally,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  to  the 
Clerical  influences  brought  to  bear  upon  Presi- 
den  Irigoyen  and  some  of  his  advisers  must 
lx-  ascribed  in  great  measure  his  disregard  of 
the  sentiments  unmistakably  expressed  by 
the   majority   of    his   countrymen   and    of   the 


advice  of  Congress.-  At  certain  moments  in 
1917  the  attitude  of  his  Government  seemed 
to  be  wavering,  in  tho  face  of  some  particularly 
strong  demonstration  of  public  irritation  (as 
after  the  sinking  of  the  Monte  Protegido),  but 
on  each  occasion  Germany  was  prompt  to  save 
the  face  of  the  Government  and  to  enable  it  to 


DR.    MANUEL   FRANCO, 
President  of  Paraguay. 

justify  its  passivity  by  apparently  graceful 
concessions.  The  Argentine  reply  to  Germany's 
declaration  of  indiscriminate  submarine  warfare 
expressed  regret  that  the  Emperor  should  have 
deemed  it  necessary  to  adopt  such  extreme 
measures,  but  added  that  "  the  Republic's 
conduct  would  continue  to  be  based  on  the 
fundamental  principles  of  international  law  " 
In  subsequent  conversation  with  the  German 
representative,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
explained  that  the  Republic  could  not  agree 
to  the  German  blockade,  and  that  it  desired 
to  reserve  its  freedom  of  action  with  a  view 
to  initiating  peace  negotiations,  should  occasion 
arise — to  avail  itself,  in  fact,  of  the  opportunity 
to  secure  the  disputed  leadership  of  South 
America.  Public  opinion  was  frankly  disap- 
pointed and  convinced  that  the  original  terms 
of  the  Note  had  been  reduced  to  non-committal 
mildnoss  by  the  President ;  furthermore,  that 
a  splendid  opportunity  of  establishing  the 
solidarity  of  the  leading  South  American 
Republics  had  been  sacrificed  to  the  desire  to 
i\dminis  er  a  rebuff  to  the  United  States.     It 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


27 


is  of  interest  that  at  this  juncture  much  German 
gold  was  being  remitted  to  Buenos  Aires  from ' 
North  America. 

On  February  26  the  Buenos  Aires  Press 
reported  that  the  Argentine  Government  had 
taken  the  lead  in  a  movement  for  joint  action 
by  the  South  American  Republics  to  offer 
mediation  to  the  belligerents  and  to  discuss 
measures  for  the  protection  of  thei  •  own 
mutual  interests.  This  idea  of  a  Latin- 
American  Conference,  subsequently  mooted  on 
several  occasions,  was  doomed  to  futility  by 
reason  of  the  conflicting  interests  and  opinions 
of  those  concerned.  At  the  end  of  1917  even 
President  Irigoyen  appears  to  have  recognized 
its  hopelessness  (at  that  date  only  Mexico  had 
definitely  promised  to  attend),  but  during  the 
critical  period  after  the  United  States'  severance 


of  relations  with  Germany  it  frequently  ?erved, 
as  Count  Luxburg's  dispatches  show,  to  com- 
plicate the  issues  and  to  divert  public  attention. 
Brazil's  rupture  with  Germany  on  April  11 
created  no  little  sensation  in  Buenos  Aires. 
An  official  statement  issued  by  the  Argentine 
Government  on  the  night  of  the  10th  announced 
that  the  Government  supported  the  position 
taken  up  by  the  United  States  in  reference  to 
Germany  ;  this  was  followed  by  enthusiastic  pro- 
Ally  demonstrations  in  the  capital.  But  those 
who  thought  that  Argentina  was  now  definitely 
committed  to  an  attitude  of  active  sympathy 
for  the  cause  of  the  Allies  were  speedily  un- 
deceived ;  on  the  16th  the  German  representa- 
tive lodged  a  protest  against  the  demonstrations 
which  had  taken  place  (in  which  the  German 
Legation  and  Consulate  had  been  attacked)  after 


SOUTH    AMERICAN    AGRICULTURE :     PLOUGHING    UP    ESPARTILLO  GRASS  FOR 

WHEAT-SOWING. 


•IS 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the  Mont*  Protegido  inciden  .  The  Argentine 
Government  replied  by  demanding  an  explana- 
tion through  its  Minister  in  Berlin  ;  Germany 
thereupon  agreed  to  make  reparation  and  to 
salute  the  Argentine  flag.  Honour  was  thus 
satisfied,  and,  in  the  words  of  The  Times 
Correspondent  at  Buenos  Aires,  "  discussion 
of  the  project  for  a  South  American  Conference 
temporarily  overshadowed  the  Monte  Protegido 
incident." 

During  May  and  June  the  Argentine  Govern- 
ment's attitude  continued  to  give  evidence  of 
decidedly  benevolent  tendencies  towards  Ger- 
many. Its  action  in  placing  an  embargo  on 
wheat  exports  was  so  obviously  directed  against 
Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  that  it  evoked  a 
threat  from  the  United  States  to  prohibit 
shipments  of  coal  to  Argentina,  and  the  British 
Minister  at  Buenos  Ares  advised  the  diversion 
of  British  shipping  from  Argentine  ports. 
Early  in  June  permission  was  granted  for  the 
establishment  of  a  wireless  telegraph  station 
to  provide  direct  communication  between 
Argentina  and  Germany.  The  first  week  of 
July,  however,  brought  the  sinking  of  two  more 
Argentine  vessels  by  German  submarines,  «the 
Oriana  and  the  Toro,  followed  by  a  fresh  out- 
burst of  public  indignation.  Negotiations  with 
Germany  ensued  ;    in  a   Note   dispatched   on 


July  4  the  Republic  demanded  guarantees 
that  the  Argentine  flag  would  henceforth  be 
respected  wherever  found,  and,  as  Germany 
evaded  the  issue,  a  categorical  Note  was  sent 
to  Berlin  early  in  August.  On  August  26 
Germany's  friends  at  Buenos  Aires,  led  by 
Senor  Demaria,  President  of  the  Chamber,  and 
a  group  of  Catholic  deputies,  came  forward 
and  submitted  a  manifesto  to  the  President, 
urging  maintenance  of  Argentina's  neutrality 
and  supporting  the  Pope's  peace  movement. 
Two  days  later  Germany's  reply  to  the  Argen- 
tine Note  promised  compensation  in  the  Toro 
case,  and  the  Government  hastened  to  proclaim 
the  result  as  a  triumph  of  diplomacy  for  the 
Republic.  Then  came  the  Luxburg  dispatches, 
revealing  the  manner  in  which  Senor  Irigoyen 
and  his  advisers  had  been  cajoled  and  the 
Argentine  people  duped,  with  the  results 
already  recorded.  On  September  25  The 
Times  Correspondent  at  Buenos  Aires  (assum- 
ing a  breach  with  Germany  to  be  inevitable) 
telegraphed  a  report  that  the  Government's 
naval  and  military  mobilizations  were  probably 
being  made  with  a  view  to  sending  a  contingent 
to  Europe  ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  might 
only  be  intended  to  deal  with  the  railway 
strike.  On  the  27th  he  described  the  anti- 
German    demonstration    of    the    previous    day 


RIO   DE   JANEIRO:   A   PRO- WAR   PROCESSION   IN   THE   AVENIDA   CENTRAL   IN    1917 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


29 


THE    CAPITOL,    BUENOS    AIRES:    THE   SEAT    OF    THE    ARGENTINE    LEGISLATURE. 


as  overwhelming  proof  of  the  strength  of  public 
opinion ;  it  was  emphasized  by  similar  demon- 
strations in  Uruguay  and  Paraguay,  both  these 
States  evidently  expecting  Argentina  to  take 
the  lead  at  last.  But  President  Irigoyen  was 
not  to  be  shaken  from  his  policy  of  inaction 
either  by  votes  of  the  Chamber  or  by  other 
manifestations  of  the  will  of  the  people.  On 
the  contrary,  he  proceeded  to  convert  the  inter- 
national situation  into  a  question  of  party 
politics  and  to  make  support  of  his  neutrality 
a  test  of  loyalty  for  the  Radical  Party  which 
had  elected  him  to  office.  Even  Uruguay's 
severance  of  relations  with  Germany  (October  7) 
failed  to  move  him,  though  its  effect  upon  the 
amour  propre  of  his  countrymen  was  un- 
mistakably reflected  in  the  Buenos  Aires  Press. 
As  one  Republic  after  another  took  independent 
action  in  support  of  the  fundamental  ideals 
of  civilization,  Senor  Irigoyen's  hope  of  forming 
a  South  American  League  of  Neutrals  was 
reduced  to  undignified  futility  Early  in 
October  there  were  rumours  of  gra-we  dissensions 
and  resignations  in  his  Cabinet.  Nevertheless, 
the  President  remained  firm  in  his  policy  of 
neutrality  Thus  matters  stood  at  the  close  of 
the  year,  Argentina,  the   "leading"   Republic, 


lagging  behind  the  flowing  tide  of  South 
American  sentiment  in  a  backwater  of  oppor- 
tunism. 

The  Republic  of  Venezuela  declined  to  take 
any  action  in  regard  to  Germany's  submarine 
campaign  in  February  1917,  although  strongly 
urged  to  do  so  by  the  United  States  Government 
on  the  curious  ground  that  the  Venezuelan 
Government  had  received  no  direct  communica- 
tion from  Germany  in  the  matter.  The 
Presidential  message  on  the  subject  contained 
nothing  more  than  platitudinous  expressions  of 
goodwill  towards  men.  But  the  internal  con- 
dition of  Venezuelan  politics  in  1916-17  was 
of  a  nature  to  preclude  any  reasonable  hope 
of  the  country's  achieving  an  enlightened 
foreign  policy.  Indeed,  towards  the  end  of 
1917  it  seemed  more  than  probable  that 
President  Gomez's  cup  of  wickedness  must 
overflow  and  necessitate  forcible  intervention 
by  the  United  States  for  the  protection  of  life 
and  property  and  the  maintenance  of  inter- 
national amenities.  His  regime  of  summary 
arrests,  plunder  and  peculation  became  a 
matter  of  concern  to  the  Allies  in  August  1917, 
when,  by  his  orders,  two  newspapers  favourable 
to  the  Entente   and  opposed  to   Venezuela's 


31) 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SANTIAGO    DE    CHILE:     THE    CHILEAN    NATIONAL   CONGRESS    BUILDING. 


maintenance  of  neutrality  were  arbitrarily 
suppressed.  In  June  the  ever-active  Tele- 
funken  Company  were  negotiating  for  the 
erection  of  a  wireless  station  on  an  island  off 
the  Venezuelan  coast.  In  fact,  throughout 
all  the  politically  distressful  and  morally  back- 
ward region  that  lies  to  the  north  of  the  Amazon 
and  on  the  shores  of  tbe  Caribbean  Sea  Ger- 
many's agents  were  persistently  active. 

The  attitude  of  Ecuador,  like  that  of  Vene- 
zuela, was  to  a  great  extent  determined  at  the 
outset  by  jealous  susceptibilities  and  fears  of 
interference  in  her  internal  affairs  by  the 
United  States,  especially  as  regards  the  vexed 
question  of  her  financial  obligations.  The 
country  suffered  severely,  after  the  second  year 
of  the  war,  from  lack  of  coal,  as  the  result  of 
which  railway  communications  were  frequently 
suspended.  Public  opinion,  whenever  it  found 
expression  after  Brazil's  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany,  was  opposed  to  President 
Moreno's  policy  of  lukewarm  neutrality, 
but  its  inclination  towards  the  cause  of  the 
Allies  was  based  more  often  on  commercial  and 
financial  grounds  than  on  intelligent  appre- 
ciation of  the  moral  issues  of  the  European 
conflict.  In  1917  a  marked  change  took 
place,  however,  and  in  August  the  Government 
intimated  its  readiness  to  follow  the  example 
of  tin-  United  States  and  Brazil  if  assured  of 
facilities  for  the  importation  of  jute,  coal  and 
i  nancy  ;  Great  Britain  was  also  asked  to  allow 
a  certain  amount  of  cocoa  to  be  imported  from 
Ecuador  into   England.     The  Republic's  rela- 


tions with  Germany  were  finally  severed  on 
December  7. 

Throughout  the  rest  of  Central  and  South 
America  the  tide  of  public  opinion  .turned 
decidedly  against  the  Central  Powers  after 
February,  1917.  Bolivia  severed  her  relations 
with  Germany  on  April  13,  formally  intimating 
her  intention  to  support  unreservedly  the 
American  policy  of  Brazil,  where  the  German 
Minister  had  received  his  passports  two  days 
earlier.  Bolivia  had  her  own  grounds  of  com- 
plaint against  Germany  by  reason  of  the  sinking 
of  the  Tubantia,  attacked  by  a  submarine  in 
neutral  waters.  In  February  the  Government 
announced  its  intention  of  supporting  the  policy 
of  the  United  States,  and  organized  a  special 
mission  to  Peru,  Colombia,  Venezuela  and 
Ecuador  to  urge  upon  these  Republics  the 
advisability  of  joint  action. 

After  a  long  period  of  anxious  hesitation, 
induced  partly  by  fears  of  an  armed  German 
colonists'  invasion  from  Southern  Brazil,  and 
partly  by  the  example  of  Argentina's  persistence 
in  neutrality,  the  Republic  of  Uruguay  severed 
its  diplomatic  and  commercial  relations  with 
Germany  on  October  7,  1917.  There  was  never, 
at  any  time,  any  real  doubt  as  to  the  sym- 
pathies of  tlus  small  but  highly  cultured  and 
progressive  State  ;  the  cautious  prudence  of  its 
Government  during  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
conflict  was  induced  by  traditional  recognition 
of  the  country's  highly  vulnerable  position. 
Because  of  its  situation  as  a  buffer  State 
between    Argentina    and    Brazil,    the    foreign 


THE    TIMES    HISTOEY    OF    THE    WAR. 


81 


policy  of  Uruguay  has  always  been  domin- 
ated by  South  American  rather  than  inter- 
national considerations,  and  by  a  very 
natural  desire  to  avoid  doing  anything  at 
the  instance  of  either  of  these  rival  States 
which  might  give  umbrage  and  a  cause  of 
offence  to  the  other.  In  the  present  instance, 
so  long  as  Brazil's  attitude  remained  undefined, 
it  would  have  been  folly  for  the  Uruguayan 


SENOR    JOSE    PARDO, 
President  of  Peru. 

Government  to  declare  for  the  Allies,  and  thus 
risk  the  possibility  of  an  armed  incursion  of 
predatory  Germans  from  over  the  Brazilian 
frontier.  Moreover,  apart  from  the  local 
aspects  of  the  problem,  the  Uruguayan  Govern- 
ment hoped  to  obtain  from  England,  France  and 
Italy  certain  political  advantages  in  return  for 
following  the  example  of  the  United  States  and 
Brazil,  namely,  the  signature  of  a  Treaty  of 
Arbitration,  originally  proposed  in  1914, 
whereby  all  disputes  would  be  settled  by  arbi- 
tration and  without  diplomatic  intervention. 
Until  the  visit  of  the  United  States  squadron 
to  Montevideo,  at  the  end  of  July  1917,  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  not  disposed  to 
revoke  the  Republic's  neutrality  Decrees  in 
favour  of  the  Allies,  pending  a  satisfactory 
conclusion  of  this  Treaty  question.  After  the 
overwhelming  demonstration  of  welcome  given 
by  the  citizens  of  Montevideo  to  the  American 
squadron  it  became  evident  thab  Uruguay 
would  not  wait  much  longer  for  the  expected 
lead  from  Argentina.  On  October  15,  a  week 
after  the  severance  of  relations  with  Germany, 


the  Government  revoked  its  Decrees  of  neu- 
trality in  favour  of  the  Entente,  to  the  manifest 
satisfaction  of  the  nation.  No  specific  reason 
was  given  to  the  German  Minister  for  handing 
him  his  passports  ;  it  was  generally  stated  by 
the  Press  to  be  due  to  the  Government's  desire 
to  emphasize  Pan-American  solidarity  and  to 
emphasize  the  country's  condemnation  of 
Germany's  methods  of  waging  war.     The  joint 


GENERAL    GOMEZ, 
President  of  Venezuela  in  1917. 

resolution  of  both  Houses  of  Congress  in  favour 
of  the  rupture  of  relations  was  adopted  by 
105  votes  to  6. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  South 
American  Republic  which  had  attracted  by  far 
the  largest  number  of  German  colonists,  Brazil, 
should  have  been  the  first  to  declare  war  on 
Germany — a  fact  which  goes  to  show  that  the 
Teuton  does  not  identify  or  ingratiate  himself 
with  the  Latin  country  of  his  adoption.  The 
large  German  settlements  in  the  Southern 
States  of  Brazil — Parana,  Santa  Catharina  and 
Rio  Grande  do  Sul — had  long  been  a  source  of 
anxiety  to  the  Brazilian  Government.  Many 
thoughtful  writers  had  drawn  attention  to  the 
dangers  arising  from  the  imperium  in  imperio 
which  they  had  gradually  been  allowed  to 
create  in  these  fertile  provinces.  Senor  Garcia 
Calderdn  in  his  work  on  "Latin  America" 
pointed  out  that  the  350,000  Germans  esta')-. 
lished  there  "  enjoy  rights  of  self-government, 
despise  the  half-castes  and  negroes  and  live  in 
aristocratic  isolation."  The  German  colonies 
were  exponents  of  DetUschium  ;    they  had  re 


82 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


MULE   TEAM    CARRYING    WINE    FROM    SAN    RAFAEL,    ARGENTINA. 


tained  the  language,  traditions,  and  prejudices 
of  their  native  country. 

They  proudly  contrast  the  magnificent  destinies  of  the 
Vaterland  with  the  turbulent  federalism  of  the  Brazilian 
States.  The  colonization  companies  affiliated  to  the 
powerful  and  active  banks  (especially  the  "  Deutsche — 
Uberseeische")  are  extending  the  prosaic  Teutonic  hege- 
mony through  Brazil  and  the  whole  of  Latin  America. 

Senhor  Sylvio  Romero,  discussing  the  perils 
of  the  German  expansion  in  A  America  Latina 
in  1907,  advised  that  the  teaching  of  Portuguese 
be  made  compulsory  in  the  German  settlements' 
schools,  that  the  creation  of  large  land  trusts  be 
prohibited,   that   military   colonies    should   be 
established    in    the    threatened    regions    and 
indigenous  centres  created  among  the  German 
settlers.     German   writers   had   justified   these 
fears.     One  of  them,  Milkau,  declared  "  we  are 
effecting  a  new  conquest,  slow,  persistent  and 
pacific  in  the  means  employed,  but  terrible  in 
its    ambitious    intention."     Another     (Hentz) 
prophesied  that  the  Germans  would  eventually 
"  kill  off  the  sensual  and  foolish  natives  who 
have  built  up  their  societies  upon  the  splendid 
soil  and  have  degraded  it  by  their  turpitude." 
Small     wonder    that    the     "  foolish    native  " 
compared   these    truculent   self-invited   guests 
with    the    loyal    citizenship    and    assimilative 
quality  of  the  Italian  settlers  in  tb.3ir  midst. 
Even  at  Petropolis,  the  headquarters  of  diplo- 
macy near  Rio,  the  German  community  was  a 
law  unto  itself,  its  religion,  education  and  poli- 
tical aspirations  supplied  and  controlled  from 
Berlin.     A  writer  in  The  Times  pointed  out  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  (September  22,  1914) 
the  tendency  of  their  organized  system  of  peace- 
ful p>-n<tration. 

Little  secret   is   made   in   Germany  [he  said]  of  the 
political  asplrations  towards  the  eventual  possession  of, 


at  all  events,  the  vast  and  fertile  regions  in  the  south  of 
Brazil ;  a  map  of  "  Antarctic  Germany,"  comprising  at 
least  those  territories,  has  already  been  published,  if  not 
at  the  instigation  or  with  the  approval,  at  least  with  the 
taoit  sanction,  of  the  German  Government. 

All  these  dreams  were  based  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  United  States  would  not  take  part 
in  the  war  and  that  America  would  be  unable  to 
maintain  the  Monroe  doctrine  once  Germany 
had  reduced  Europe  to  submission.  The  actual 
result  of  the  war  was  to  arouse  the  rulers 
and  people  of  Brazil  to  their  danger.  They 
had  learned  the  real  significance  of  these 
German  colonies  in  their  midst  and  would  no 
longer  tolerate  them  on  the  old  footing. 
German  towns  like  Porto  Alegre  (the  capital 
of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul)  would  either  have  to 
change  their  methods  and  manners  to  conform 
to  Brazilian  ideas  of  good  citizenship  or  they 
would  become  centres  of  Teutonic  emigration 
on  a  large  scale. 

Owing  to  the  insidious  influences  of  German 
finance  and  the  widespread  ramifications  of  the 
German  credit  system  in  commerce,  and  also 
because  of  the  general  detachment  of  public 
opinion  in  Brazil  from  European  affairs,  which 
at  the  outset  obscured  the  real  causes  and 
meaning  of  the  war,  the  attitude  of  the  average 
Brazilian  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war 
was  characterized  by  aloofness.  But  after 
the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  all  Germans  were 
expelled  from  the  Club  Central  at  Rio  ;  there- 
after Portugal  took  her  place  with  the  Allies, 
and  the  main  issues  became  clear  to  the  Bra- 
zilian people,  the  artful  piping  of  the  German 
propagandist  fell  upon  deaf  ears,  and  the  work 
of  the  patriotic  Ligapelos  AlHados became  more 
and  more  popular.     As  Germany's  methods  of 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


83 


barbarism  in  warfare  developed,  sympathy  with 
the  Allies  became  more  generally  manifest. 
The  German  band,  which  continued  to  earn  its 
livelihood  by  making  music  in  the  streets  of 
Rio,  had  become  tactfully  cosmopolitan  by  the 
summer  of  1916  ;  its  repertoire  included  the 
"  Marseillaise  "  and  even  "  Tipperary."  That 
the  Germans  were  wise  in  walking  delicately 


DON    JOSfi    N.    GUTIERREZ    GUERRA, 
President  of  Bolivia. 

was  shown  by  the  outbursts  of  popular  feeling 
which  took  place  after  the  United  States' 
declaration  of  war — serious  anti-German  riots 
occurred  at  Porto  Alegre  and  Sao  Paolo  in 
April — and  by  the  increasing  evidence  of  public 
dissatisfaction  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Dr.  Lauro  Miiller,  whose  German 
extraction  and  proclivities  were  continually 
attacked  until  his  resignation  (May  2,  1917). 
After  the  sinking  of  the  Parana,  the  Liga  pelos 
AUiados  urged  the  confiscation  of  all  arms  held 
by  the  Confederation  of  German  Rifle  Clubs  in 
South  Brazil  and  the  establishment  of  perma- 
nent supervision  over  all  German  residents. 

The  position  of  the  Brazilian  Government 
in  regard  to  the  war  and  the  expression  of  its 
active  sympathy  for  the  cause  of  the  Allies 
were  affected  by  several  considerations  upon 
which  little  stress  was  laid  by  the  Brazilian 
Press.  There  was  not  only  the  traditional 
rivalry  between  Argentina  and  Brazil  to  be 
taken  into  account ;    inter-State  rivalries  and 


jealousies  within  the  Republic  frequently 
proved  detrimental  to  the  expression  of  a 
united  national  policy.  Thus,  for  example, 
when  the  proposal  to  sever  relations  with 
Germany  came  to  the  front  in  April  1917,  the 
State  of  Sao  Paolo  was  not  at  first  prepared 
to  support  it  unless  Great  Britain  and  her 
Allies  would  undertake  to  guarantee  payment 
of  the  sum  of  £6,000,000  due  to  the  Sao  Paolo 
Treasury  by  Germany  for  coffee  seized  at 
Hamburg  and  Antwerp.  Moreover,  certain 
political  representatives  of  this  rich  and 
powerful  State  were  opposed  to  supporting 
Great  Britain,  on  the  ground  that  the  British 
embargo  on  coffee  had  been  imposed  with 
the  object  of  coercing  Brazil,  and  that  to  submit 


DR.    JOSE"    VICENTE    CONCHA, 
President  of  Colombia. 

to  this  embargo  was  therefore  inconsistent 
with  the  nation's  dignity  ;  in  the  same  way  they 
were  opposed  to  the  seizure  of  the  German 
ships  interned  in  Brazilian  harbours,  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  afford  Germany  a  pretext 
for  refusing  to  pay  for  the  requisitioned  coffee. 
Dr.  Lauro  Miiller,  to  give  him  his  due,  was  by 
no  means  the  principal  creator  of  the  difficulties 
with  which  the  pro-Ally  element  in  the  Govern- 
ment had  to  contend  ;  in  fact,  his  German 
supporters  in  his  native  State  of  Santa  Catharina 
attacked  him  just  as  fiercely  for  his  lack  of 
proper  German  feelings  as  his  enemies  did  for 


54 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


.■ 


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THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


35 


his  pro-German  tendencies — fair  evidence  that 
as  Foreign  Minister  he  did  his  best  to  play  an 
impossible  part.  The  President  of  the  Republic, 
Dr.  Wenceslao  Braz,  was  for  a  long  time 
opposed  to  severing  relations  with  Germany — 
in  fact,  until  public  opinion  became  too  strong 
for  him.  His  attitude  was  influenced,  no 
doubt,  by  tactful  regard  for  the  critical  finan- 
cial condition  of  the  Republic  (currency  depre- 
ciation had  reached  55  per  cent,  in  February 
1917)  and  by  his  anxiety  to  avoid  all  appearance 
of  allowing  Brazilian  policy  to  be  dictated, 
or  even  suggested,  from  the  outside. 

After  the  sinking  of  the  Brazilian  steamer, 
Parana  (April  4),  State  and  party  opinions  alike 
gave  way  to  a  sense  of  the  nation's  dignity 
and  responsibilities.  In  answering  the  German 
submarine  Note  on  February  9,  Brazil  had 
announced  her  intention  to  hold  Germany 
responsible  for  whatever  consequences  might 
ensue  from  these  threats  against  neutral  ship- 
ping. Discussing  the  sinking  of  the  Parana, 
with  the  loss  of  several  of  her  crew,  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Rio  said  :  "  The  whole 
world  has  seen  how  prudent  Brazil's  attitude 
has  been  in  the  past  ;  it  shall  now  see  how 
firm  her  attitude  will  be  in  the  future. "'  After 
a  Cabinet  meeting  held  on  April  9,  the  President 
declared  himself  "  determined  to  act  with  the 
spirit  demanded  by  the  national  dignity." 
The  German  Minister  received  his  passports 
on  the  11th.  His  proposal  to  discuss  com- 
pensation for  the  loss  of  the  Parana  was  ignored. 

The  Brazilian  Press  was  by  no  means  satisfied 
with  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  ; 
even  the  semi-official  0  Paz  was  in  favour  of 
war  with  Germany.  But  six  months  were  to 
elapse  before  the  Government  was  prepared 
to  take  this  step.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
executive  at  the  end  of  April  the  situation  was 
considered  equivalent  to  "a  state  of  war,  but  it 
was  left  to  Congress  to  decree  this  state  and 
to  put  it  into  execution.  On  May  22  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  revoked  the  Decree  of 
April  23  whereby  Brazil  had  proclaimed  her 
neutrality  .as  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Central  Powers.  On  June  2  the  Govern- 
ment took  possession  of  45  German  vessels 
(235,191  tons)  interned  in  Brazilian  ports. 
At  this  time  Sonhor  Nilo  Pecanha,  a  former 
President  of  the  Republic,  had  succeeded  Dr. 
Lauro  Miiller  as  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
His  policy  was  frankly  pro-Ally,  but  he  found 
himself  confronted,  as  his  predecessor  had  been, 
by  a  strong  agitation  against  Great  Britain's 


embargo  on  coffee,  Brazil's  chief  export  staple. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  had  it  not  been  for 
this  agitation,  and  for  the  financial  difficulties 
created  by  the  drastic  limitation  of  coffee  ship- 
ments, Brazil  would  have  joined  the  Allies 
much  sooner  than  she  did.  At  the  end  of 
July  the  coffee  question  was  still  a  very  vexed 
one,  but  the  situation  was  relieved  at  the 
beginning  of  August  when  France'  removed 
her  restrictions  on  the  trade  and  arranged  to 
purchase  a  year's  supply.     Great  Britain  was 


SENHOR    NILO    PEgANHA, 
Brazilian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

also  prepared  to  allow  shipments  to  be  resumed 
on  the  understanding  that  the  German  vessels 
should  be  used  for  the  purpose,  but  the  Brazilian 
Government  was  not  disposed  to  accept  this 
condition.  Meanwhile  preliminary  negotiations 
had  taken  place  with  the  United  States,  of  a 
nature  calculated  to  improve  Brazil's  financial 
position  and  prospects,  their  main  object  being 
to  provide  arrangements  whereby  the  United 
States  would  assist  Brazil  with  funds  and 
expert  advice  in  the  reorganization  and  equip- 
'  ment  of  her  dockyards,  iron  works  and  arsenals. 
On  June  28  the  Brazilian  Government 
revoked  the  Decrees  which  had  proclaimed  its 
neutrality  in  the  war  between  the  Allies  and 
Germany ;  in  official  circles  at  Washington 
this  step  was  regarded  as  implying  Brazil's 
active  participation  in  the  war,  especially  as 
it  was  followed  by  an  intimation  that  the 
Brazilian  Navy  (16  units)  would  cooperate 
with  United  States  warships  in  patrol  work 
on  the  South  American  coast.  Without  a 
formal  declaration  of  war,  the  situation  thus 
created  was  undeniably  irregular.  Senhor 
Pecanha  explained  it  in  May  by  saying  that 


86 


THE    TIMES    HISTOBY    OF    THE    WAR. 


"  Brazil  was  not  declaring  war  on  anybody, 
but  merely  defending  herself."  But  it  was 
evident  that  this  state  of  affairs  could  not  be 
protracted  indefinitely,  even  though  Brazil 
might  have  no  intention  of  sending  any  armed 
forces  to  Europe.  The  torpedoing  of  the  Brazi- 
lian (ex-German)  ship  Macao  off  the  Spanish 
coast  on  October  22  afforded  good  and  final 
grounds  for  a  formal  declaration  of  war,  which 
was  accordingly  proclaimed  on  the  26th.  The 
vote  in  the  Chamber  was  carried  by  149  to  1. 
On  November  3  a  Presidential  message  to 
Congress  advised,  inter  alia,  the  cancellation 
of  all  contracts  with  Germans,  the  control  of  all 
German  banks  and  commercial  firms  and  the 
internment  of  German  suspects.  Thus,  as 
the  result  of  her  submarine  campaign,  Germany 
had  destroyed  all  her  long  labour  of  years, 
all  her  far-reaching  plans  in  Brazil,  one  of  the 
most  important  of  the  countries  overseas  upon 
whose  goodwill  must  depend  her  supplies 
of  many  raw  materials  in  the  lean  years  to 
come. 

Peru's  attitude  towards  the  belligerents  on 
both  sides  during  the  first  three  years  of  the 
war  was  one  of  dignified  and  impartial  neu- 
trality, in  many  respects  similar  to  that  adopted 
by  her  neighbour,  Chile.  The  Peruvian  Govern- 
ment's reply  to  the  United  States  Note  on  the 
subject  of  Germany's  submarine  campaign  in 
February  1917  was  friendly  but  non-committal, 
and  a  similar  attitude  was  adopted  in  reply 
to  Brazil  at  the  end  of  April,  when  that 
Republic  communicated  its  severance  of  rela- 
tions with  Germany.  In  both  cases  the 
Government's  action  was  endorsed  by  public 
opinion.  In  June  a  proposal  to  place  armed 
guards  aboard  the  interned  German  ships  (10 
vessels,  aggregating  42,000  tons)  was  negatived 


by  the  Government,  following  the  example  of 
Argentina.  In  September,  however,  the  tor- 
pedoing of  the  Peruvian  vessel  Lorton  and 
,  Germany's  subsequent  disregard  of  the 
Peruvian  Government's  ultimatum  on  the 
subject  resulted  in  the  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  (October  5)  by  a  resolution  in  Con- 
gress, voted  by  105  to  6.  Peru's  final  opinion 
in  regard  to  the  war  was  shown  by  her  agree- 
ment with  Brazil  in  November  to  accept  the 
Argentine  Government's  invitation  to  a  South 
American  Conference  only  on  condition  that 
Argentina  should  bind  herself  also  to  sever 
relations  with  Germany.  In  October  she 
offered  the  hospitality  of  her  harbours  to  His 
Majesty's  ships. 

Of  the  Central  American  States,  Panama 
severed  her  relations  with  Germany  in  April, 
1917,  President  Valdez  signing  a  proclamation 
on  April  7  committing  Panama  unreservedly 
to  the  assistance  of  the  United  States  in  the 
defence  of  the  Canal.  Cuba  declared  war 
against  Germany  on  the  same  day.  Guatemala 
broke  off  relations  on  April  27,  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua  in  May.  and  Haiti  and  San  Domingo 
in  June. 

In  less  than  a  year,  by  the  display  of  her 
insolent  indifference  to  international  law  and 
civilized  usage  in  warfare,  Germany  solidified 
public  opinion  against  her  throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  South  American 
continent,  amongst  nations  which  were  destined 
by  their  peculiar  economic  advantages  and 
resources  to  play  no  small  part  in  the  future 
history  of  the  world.  The  wisdom  of  the 
Junker  would  have  it  "so  ;  but  the  German 
nation  was  likely  to  repent  at  long  leisure  the 
Berseker  folly  which  had  made  the  name  of 
Germany  a  byword  from  Panama  to  Patagonia. 


CHAPTER    CCXXIII. 

THE  WESTERN  OFFENSIVES  OF 
19 1 7  :  BULLECOURT. 

Situation  on  April  17 — The  German  Devastation — April  23  :  Battle  of  Gavrelle— Fontaine 
— Analysis  of  Three  Days'  Operations — Results  Achieved — April  28  \  Arleux — Coopera- 
tion with  the  French — May  'A  :  Fresnoy — The  Capture  of  Bullecourt — The  Australians 
— Preparations  for  the  Battle  of  Messines — Sir  Douglas  Haig's  Strategy. 


THE  gains  made  by  the  British  up  to 
April  16  have  been  described  in 
Chapter  CCXX. 
On  April  16  the  sun  at  first 
shone  brightly,  but  was  soon  obscured.  Tor- 
rential rain  descended,  accompanied  by  a 
south-west  gale.  Notwithstanding  the  weather, 
fighting  proceeded  on  the  north  and  south  of 
Lens,  from  which  thick  volumes  of  smoke  were 
seen  rising.  A  fierce  struggle  raged  round 
Hill  70,  near  Loos,  and  Home's  men  pushed 
their  way  through  the  mining  suburb  of  St. 
Edouard,  captured  some  machine  guns  and 
drew  closer  to  the  city  along  the  Bethune  road. 
South  of  Lens  the  enemy  resisted  stubbornly 
on  the  Arras  road  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Culotte 
redoubt.  Though  Prince  Rupprecht  may  not 
have  fathomed  Haig's  intentions,  it  was  no 
part  of  the  British  plan  to  squander  the  lives 
of  his  men  in  the  centre  of  the  mass  of  battered 
houses.  Lens  was  not  such  a  dangerous  salient 
in  the  German  as  Ypres  was  in  the  British  lines. 
The  proper  tactics  were  clearly  to  surround,  not 
storm,  the  city,  and  meanwhile  to  deluge  it 
with  high  explosives  and  gas  shells. 

The  weather  continued  bad  through  the 
night,  and  on  the  17th  there  were  snort  bursts 
of  watery  sunshine  alternating  with  squalls  of 
rain  and  snow,  driven  before  a  howling  wind. 
Throughout  the  day  encounters  took  place 
Vol.  XV.— Part   184 


west  and  north-west  of  Lens,  and  along  the 
region  between  Lens  and  Bullecourt  our 
artillery  kept  Up  a  tremendous  bombardment 
which  might  or  might  not  be  the  prelude  to 
another  pitched  battle  This  day  a  sergeant- 
major  of  the  German  141st  Regiment,  lying  in 
a  hole  before  Vis  en-Artois,  a  village  on  the 
road  from  Arras  to  Cambrai  below  the  Scarpe 
Heights  in  the  valley  of  the  Cojeul,  made  an 
entry  in  his  diary  which  is  a  striking  comment 
on  the  discomfort  which  his  countrymen  had 
to  suffer  when  driven  out  from  the  comfort- 
able lines  they  had  held,  and  forced  to 
remain  in  a  new  position  composed  mainly  of 
holes  made  by  the  British  shells.  The  diary 
complains  : 

It  is  misery  to  be  here  ;  the  dogs  at  homo  are  better 
off  than  we  are.  The  61st  Regiment  is  said  to  have 
had  heavy  losses  yesterday.  Not  half  the  men  are 
left  in  some  companies.  It  is  a  scandal  that  the  troops 
who  were  here  before  gave  up  to  the  enemy  such  com- 
fortable, such  beautifully  built  positions,  while  we  have  to 
lie  out  here  in  the  open.  The  English  are  again  bombard- 
ing the  whole  country  with  their  artillery  as  if  they 
were  mad. 

South  of  the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road  the 
British  approached  close  on  both  sides  of  the 
Peronne-Cambrai  railway  at  two  points.  During 
the  previous  night  they  had  captured  Tombois 
Farm,  two  miles  east  by  south  of  Epehy,  and 
they  had  gained  ground  along  the  sptir  north- 
cast  of  Epehy  station  on  the  railroad.    Nearer 


37 


88 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Cambrai  on  the  17th  they  progressed  west  of 
the  railroad  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Havrin- 
court  Wood 

North  of  Lens  our  line  started  at  the 
Bethune-Lens  road,  600  yards  north  of  the 
latter  city,  ran  east  of  the  suburbs  of  St. 
Pierre  and  Jeanne  d'Arc  through  Riaumont 
Wood  to  the  Souchez  river.  Thence  it  went 
east  of  Cite  Memicourt  through  the  Petit 
Bois,  over  the  Arras-Lens  road,  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  south  of  La  Coulotte.  It 
then  proceeded  a  mile  south  of  Mericourt  in 
the  direction  of  the  Scarpe,  passing  west  of 
Arleux-en-Gohelle,  Oppy  'and  Gavrelle.  Tl.e 
Scarpe  was  touched  between  Fampoux  and 
Rceux.  South  of  the  river  it  twisted  just 
east  of  Monehy-le-Preux  and  west  of  Gue- 
mappe,  descending  into  the  valley  of  the 
Cojeul  east  of  Wancourt  and  Heninel.  From 
Heninel,  over  the  low  ground,  it  ran  south- 
eastwards  round  the  ends  of  the  two  German 
lines  at  Bullecourt  and  Queant,  crossed 
the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road  east  of  Boursies, 
and  turned  south,  traversing  the  western  and 
southern  faces  of  Havrincourt  Wood,  and  east 
of  Gouzeaucourt,  crossed  the  Peronne -Cambrai 
chaussee.  Next  to  the  east  of  the  Peronne- 
Cambrai  railway  it  passed  west  of  Gouche 
Wood  to  Tombois  Farm,  and  between  Hargi- 


court  and  Villoret-  struck  southwards  to  Le 
Verguier.  From  the  latter  village  it  turned 
eastwards,  approaching  the  Cambrai-St.  Quen- 
tin  high  road  at  Fricourt  and  Fayet,  and  finally 
went  back  by  Francilly  and  Savy  Wood,  round 
the  western  environs  of  St.  Quentin. 

Such  was  the  situation  on  April  17  On 
the  morning  of  the  18th,  Homo's  troops 
captured  some  of  the  enemy's  trenches  south- 
east of  Loos,  and  during  the  night  of  the 
17th-18th  Allenby's  men  gained  ground  north 
of  the  Scarpe  in  the  direction  of  Rceux. 
South-west  of  Queant,  near  Lagnicourt,  we  also 
progressed,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  18th  the 
village  of  Villers-Guislain,  south-east  of  Gou 
zeaucourt,  between  the  Peronne-Cambrai  rail 
road  and  the  Scheldt-Somme  canal,  was  cap- 
tured. On  the  19th,  by  which  date  the  number 
of  German  guns  captured  since  the  9th  amounted 
to  228,  we  advanced  slightly  south-east  of  L003, 
east  of  Fampoux,  and  south  of  Monchy-)e- 
Preux,  but  the  heavy  and  continuous  rain 
delayed  our  movements.  Before  assaulting 
the  Oppy-Queant,  Drocourt-Queant  and 
Queant-St.  Quentin  lines,  it  was  necessary  to 
bring  forward  the  heavy  guns  which  had  been 
so  successful  at  the  Battle  of  Vimy-Arras,  but 
the  effect  of  the  rain  on  the  roads  and  on  the 
ground  devastated  by  the  Germans  retreating 


[Canadian, War  Rtvords. 

A    CONCRETE    FORT    NEAR    LENS    DESTROYED    BY    CANADIAN    ARTILLERY. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


39 


[Official  photograph. 

PIONEER    RELIEF    PARTY    PASSING    PIONEERS  RETURNING   FROM   THE  TRENCHES. 


between  Arras  and  St.  Quentin  rendered  this  a 
difficult  and  laborious  operation. 

Friday,  April  20,  when  the  weather  im- 
proved, was  an  uneventful  day  but  for  the  fact 
that  after  dark  the  British  dislodged  the  enemy 
from  Gonnelieu,  east  of  Gouzeaucourt  and 
north  of  Villers-Guislain  The  village  was  on 
high  ground  ;  on  the  south-east  there  was  a 
drop  of  75  ft.  in  500  yards.  Sunken  roads, 
well  fortified,  protected  the  approaches,  but 
nothing  could  withstand  the  impetuous  charge 
of  our  soldiers.  A  number  of  prisoners  were 
captured,  and  when  the  next  day,  Saturday, 
April  21,  the  enemy  attempted  to  recapture 
this  important  post,  he  was  caught  by  shell  fire 
and  retired  precipitately,  leaving  behind  him 
a  trail  of  dead  and  wounded.  The  same  day 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Scarpe  we  edged 
towards  Rceux,  while  our  line  was  slightly 
advanced  south-west  of  Lens,  two  German 
counter-attacks  being  beaten  off.  During 
Sunday,  April  22,  the  fighting  continued  west 
and  north-west  of  Lens,  the  enemy  violently 
but  fruitlessly  counter-attacking.  South  of 
the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road  we  carried  the 
southern  portion  of  Trescault,  a  ruined  village 
just  east  of  Havrincourt  Wood,  which  was  by 
now  almost  isolated.  The  condition  of  Tres- 
cault may  be  gathered  from  a  German  soldier's 
letter,  found  on  a  prisoner,  written  while  the 
"  Hindenburg  devastation"  was  being  carried 

out.* 

To  give  you  a  picture  of  our  situation  I  will  go  back 
in  my  mind  a  few  days  to  Trescault  It  is  8  p.m. 
Our  company  has  just  returned  from  trench -digging. 
A  beautiful  scene  is  presented  to  our  eyes.  A  little 
later    there    suddenly    arise    flames,    and    Trescault    is 

'Manchester  Guardian,  April   18. 


doomed  to  destruction.  Everywhere  explosions  are 
heard.  A  terrific  heat  reaches  us.  Then  we,  too,  are 
seized  with  the  madness  of  destruction  and  set  fire  to 
everything.  All  Trescault  is  in  flames,  and  a  mar. 
vellous  spectacle — one  which  I  shall  never  forget — meets 
the  eye.  On  a  little  hill  stands  the  wonderful  castle, 
spared  by  us  till  the  last  moment  because  we  were 
quartered  there.  But  the  castle  must  go  too,  and  quickly 
flames  envelop  it.  Where  before  were  a  peaceful 
people  and  a  flourishing  village  is  now  a  heap  of  ruins. 

Far,  indeed,  did  the  destructive  fury  of  the  230th 
extend,  and  we  can  scarcely  be  looked  upon  as  soldiers. 
When  we  are  up  at  the  front  it  is  as  if  we  were  the 
greatest  criminals.  Thus  it  is  we  do  our  work  of  des- 
truction in  France. 

Picture  to  yourself  how  we  live  now- — not  like  men, 
but  liko  beasts.  Far  and  wide  there  are  no  trenches, 
only  bare  fields  and  stumps  of  trees  growing  where 
once  man  chosen  of  God  ploughed  his  field  and  worked 
for  wife  and  child.  That  is  our  retirement  and  our 
part  in  it.  My  mind  cannot  dispel  the  dark  thought 
that  I  shall  not  return. 

The  obstacles  encountered  by  Allenby's, 
Gough's  and  Rawlinson's  forces  moving  across 
the  region  devastated  by  Hindenburg's  orders 
rendered  such  incidents  as  the  capture  of 
Gonnelieu  and  Trescault  very  meritorious.  A 
Times  correspondent,  on  April  22,  described 
what  he  saw  when  he  paid  a  visit  to  the  out- 
skirts of  St.   Quentin. 

I  have  spent  the  last  two  days  at  the  south  end  of 
the  battle  front,  working  over  new  parts  of  the  area 
recently  evacuated  by  the  enemy,  and  once  more 
getting  so  close  to  St.  Quentin  that,  though  the  air  was 
thick,  the  details,  not  only  of  the  Cathedral  but  of  the 
other  main  buildings,  were  clearly  visible. 

All  the  country  through  which  I  have  passed  is  one 
indescribable  scene  of  desolation,  rapine,  and  wanton 
brutality,  but  I  think  that  what  fills  one  most  with 
rage,  amid  all  the  havoc,  are  the  ruins  of  the  village 
and  chateau  of  Caulaincourt.  It  was  a  princely  estate, 
Caulaincourt,  and  lying  in  a  hollow  on  the  little  stream 
of  Omignon,  it  had,  and  could  have,  no  strategic  value. 
Before  reaching  the  village,  by  the  roadside,  is  a  fine 
mortuary  chapel,  wherein,  on  tablets  closing  tho 
entrances  to  the  tombs,  one  reads  the  honours  of  the 
family,  the  head  of  which  is  the  Marquis  of  Caulain- 
court and  Duke  of  Vicenza.     The  ladies  of  the  house, 

184-2 


40 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


as  one  reads,  were  daughters  of  "  very  high  and  very 
puissant  seigneurs,"  and  dames  in  waiting  to  Josephine 
and  Marie-Louise.  They  read  very  stately,  those 
tablets  of  black  marble,  with  gold  lettering,  and  half 
of  them  have  been  wrenched  out  of  place  by  the  Hun 
and  lie  on  the  floor,  exposing  the  tombs  within,  and 
you  can.see  where  coffins  have  been  opened  and  imper- 
fectly screwed  up  again. 

Beyond  in  the  village  was  a  church,  but  nothing 
remains  of  it  now.  Out  of  the  wreckage  where  it  stood 
British  hands  have  rescued  and  set  up  conspicuously 


[Official  photograph. 

TOMB      OF        THE       MILHEM  •  DEVAUX 

FAMILY   IN  VENDELLES   CEMETERY, 

SACKED    BY    THE    GERMANS. 

by  the  roadside  one  pathetic  tablet  which  says  :  "  Here 
lios  the  heart  M  (so  it  is  worded)  "  of  Anne  Josephine 
Barandier,  Marquise  of  Caulaincourt,  Duchess  of 
Vioanza,  etc." 

I  say  again  that  the  destruction  of  this  church,  where 
the  heart  of  the  poor  Duchess  hoped  to  find  peace, 
could  have  no  possible  military  value.  Nothing  but 
pure  ferocity  dictated  its  destruction,  and  that  of 
village  and  chateau. 

So  noble  a  seat  was  the  chateau  that  its  ruins  make 
almost  a  new  Coliseum.  It  is  destroyed  to  every  wall 
of  stable,  outhouse,  cottage,  and  belvedere  as  utterly 
at  rage,  armed  with  all  modern  explosives,  could  destroy. 
Among  the  acres  of  tumbled  brick,  showing  the  massive- 
ness  of  every  building,  whence  one  looks  on  the  sweeping 
park  and  lovely  artificial  lake,  one  finds  fragments  of 
statues, '  carved  lions'  heads,  and  great  vases  broken 
and  overturned.  It  fills  one  with  bitter  anger  and 
contempt. 

And  from  refugees  one  hears  how  each  successive 
hatch  of  German  officers  who  occupied  the  chateau 
took  off  what  plunder  from  the  priceless  furnishings, 
tapestries,  pictures,  and  bric-ct-brac  pleased  their  fancy. 
Layer  by  layer,  the  old  chateau  was  denuded  of  every- 
thing of  value,  till  at  last  the  day  came  when  lyddite 
n.id  torch  did  their  last  ignoble  work.  Of  course,  it  is 
only  the  same  as  a  hundred  other  things  all  over  this 
country,  but  I  think  none  of  us  who  has  seen  them  will 
fr.il  to  remember  as  the  most  brutal  outrage  of  all  the 
violation  of  the  tombs  and  the  wreckage  of  the  chateau 
of  the  family  of  Caulaincourt. 

Beside  it  pales  even  the  pathos  of  the  Church  of 
Monfl-cn-Chaus6e,  with  the  graves  evidently  recently 
opened  in  the  churchyard  and  filled  again  hastily  with 
tumbled  clods,  and  whence  again,  from  among  the 
wreckage,  British  soldiers  have  gathered  what  they 
could — such  as  an  iron  crucifix,  set  leaning  against  a 
fragment  of  wall,  an  eagle  lectern,  blown  by  the  explo- 


sion out  into  the  churchyard.  Missals  and  other  Holy 
books  scorched  by  fire  and  warpod  by  exposure  in  the 
rain.  — 

Of  the  other  villages  in  this  aroa  there  is  little  indi- 
vidually to  be  said.  In  Vraignes,  although  the  church, 
if  cracked  and  tottering,  still  stands,  each  building, 
even  the  poorest  cottage,  has  been  separately  burned. 
Of  Pceuilly,  nothing  remains  but  a  litter  of  bricks  and 
the  tall  crucifix  at  the  cross-roads  outside  the  village. 
The  ancient  earth  ramparts  of  Vermand  enclose  only 
acres  of  ruin.  Attilly  is  non-existent,  as  is  Brie,  which 
once  must  have  been  a  very  pleasant  place  on  the  high 
banks  above  the  river,  with  an  open  tree-studded  slope, 
between  which  once,  doubtless,  was  the  village  park 
and  the  lovers'  meeting  place. 

I  have  threaded,  also,  the  paths  through  Bois  d'HoInon, 
paths  made  by  the  feet  of  German  soldiers,  which  ran 
from  one  camping  ground  to  another  within  the  wood, 
and  outside  the  wood  on  the  St.  Quentin  side  the  eart 
tracks  and  hoof  marks  are  deep  in  the  softer  ground  of 
the  little  valley  through  which  the  German  transport 
came  up  to  the  troops.  The  best  thing  about  the  wood 
is  the  large  quantity  of  cut  firewood  nicely  stacked  in 
cords,  which  the  enemy  had  provided  for  his  own  use 
and  left  behind. 

'  It  is  from  beyond  there  that  nowadays  one  gets  the 
best  view  of  St.  Quentin,  crowned  by  the  great  mass  of 


[Official  pholi graph. 

A    VAULT    RIFLED    BY    THE    GERMANS. 

the  church,  with  its  curious  bell-shaped  tower  over  the 
lantern,  and  with  all  the  lesser  spires  and  factory 
chimneys  and  blocks  of  buildings.  From  where  we 
were  they  say  that  on  a  clear  day  you  can  see  individual 
Germans  and  machine-guns  in  the  windows.  Perhaps. 
We  were  content  to  have  a  day  when,  if  we  could  not 
see  the  enemy,  he  could  not  see  us. 

Externally,  St.  Quentin  looks  reasonably  intact  as 
yet,  but  that  is  no  indication  of  what  it  will  be  when  it 
again  becomes  French.  Reports  through  civilians, 
refugees  from  the  neighbourhood,  say  that  most  things 
of  value  have  long  ago  been  removed,  from  private 
houses  and  public  buildings  alike.  The  famous  pastils 
of  Quentin  de  la  Tour  are  specifically  mentioned  as  gone, 
as  doubtless  they  would  be.  After  seeing  Caulaincourt 
one  realizes  more  than  ever  how  nearly  synonymous  the 
words  German  officor  and  thief  have  come  to  be,  and  one 
wonders  if,  in  the  final  settlement,  each  individual 
thief  is  to  be  punished  and  made  to  disgorge  his  iwag. 
There  can  be  no  possible  question  that  such  outrages 
as  these  must  find  their  place  in  the  ultimate  account, 
and  in  some  measure  the  disgrace  ought  to  be  made 
personal  to  those  responsible. 

On  April  16,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter 
CCIX,  the  French  on  their  part  had  commenced 
their  main  offensive  on  the  Aisne,  and  shortly 
after  that  date  the  weather  on  the  Arras  front 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


41 


GENERAL    VIEW    OF    THE    RUINS    OF 

began  to  improve.  Our  preparations  made 
more  rapid  progress,  and  we  were  ready  to 
deliver  our  next  attack  on  April  21.  High 
winds  and  indifferent  visibility  persisted,  how- 
ever, and  so  interfered  with  the  work  of  our 
artillery  and  aeroplanes  that  it  was  found 
necessary  to  postpone  operations  for  a  further 
two  days.  Meanwhile  there  were  frequent  local 
fights,  and  our  line  was  improved  slightly 
ftt  a  number  of  points. 

On  April  22  the  German  sergeant-major  sta- 
tioned at  Vis-en- Artois,  part  of  whose  diary  has 
alroady  been  quoted,  made  his  last  entry.  "  The 
English  commenced,"  he  said,  "  an  absolutely 


[Official  photograph. 

THE    CHATEAU    OF    CAULAINGOURT. 

dreadful  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire.  Our  men 
never  got  forward.  It  appears  that  our  troops 
could  not  get  back  to  our  line  and  had  to  lie 
in  the  open  till  the  evening.  No  one  has  any 
protection.  Arras  will  certainly  be  an  eternal 
memory  to  all.  Everyone  only  asks  to  get  out  of 
it  alive."  The  next  day,  Monday,  April  23,  the 
British  attacked. 

The  battle  of  Gavrelle-Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 
which  lasted  three  days,  was  not,  as  the  German 
Staff  mendaciously  alleged  in  its  communique  of 
April  24,  "  a  great  thrust  in  order  to  break 
through  the  German  lines."  Nor  was  it  de- 
livered "  on  a  front  of  30  kilometres  (20  miles)." 


RUINS    OF    THE    CHATEAU    OF    CAUI.AINCOURT:    BRITISH    SOLDIERS  CLEARING  A 

PASSAGE    FOR    THE    WATER. 


42 


THE-   TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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CLEARING    THE    SCARPE    OF    FALLEN    TREES. 


[Official  photograph. 


It  was  equally  untrue  to  state  that  fighting 
took  place  in  "  the  western  suburbs  of  Lens, 
Avion,  and  Oppy."  Allenby's  aim  was  more 
modest.  Some  nine  miles  of  the  lino  from 
Gavrelle  on  the  Arras-Douai  road  across  the 
Scarpe  near  Roeux  to  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles 
was  subjected  to  intensive  treatment  with 
high  explosive  shells  of  all  calibres.  Gavrelle 
and  Roeux,  the  latter  situated  between  the 
Arras-Douai  railroad  and  the  marshy  Scarpe, 
Pelves  across  the  river  at  the  foot  of  the  Scarpe 
Heights,  the  Sart  and  Vert  Woods  just  below 
Monchy-le-Preux  on  those  heights,  Guemappe 
south  of  Monchy  and  the  Arras-Cambrai 
ehaussee  on  the  eastern  edge  of  the  ridge  were 
to  be  attacked  from  the  west,  while  from  the 
south  we  were  to  push  down  the  undulating 
valley  of  the  Sensee  and  its  western  tributary 
the  Cojeul.  The  course  of  the  Cojeul  had 
already  been  secured  as  far  as  Wancourt, 
which  lies  just  south-west  of  Guemappe,  but 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Sensee  the  enemy  was 
Btrongly  entrenched  in  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles 
three  miles  or  so  south-east  of  Wancourt,  and, 
north  of  Fontaine,  in  Cherisy.  Where  the 
Arras-Cambrai  road  crossed  the  Sensee  he  held 
Vis-en- Artois  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and 
the  high  wooded  ground  north  of  the  road  and 


east  of  the  stream.  From  Vis-en-Artois  rein- 
forcements could  be  brought  over  the  Cojeul 
into  Guemappe  and  the  Sart  and  Vert  woods. 
As  the  Drocourt-Queant  line  was  not  quite 
completed,  Prince  Rupprecht  was  not  pre- 
pared to  abandon  these  positions.  He  was 
fighting  for  time,  and  to  gain  it  division  after 
division  was  thrown  into  the  battle.  For 
example,  between  the  Scarpe  and  Fontaine- 
lez-Croisilles,  the  fortified  zone  on  his  extreme 
left  was  held  by  the  35th  Division  (61st, 
141st  Pomeranian  and  171st  Regiments)  which 
had  just  replaced  the  18th  Reserve  Division. 
In  the  course  of  the  fighting  the  division  had 
to  be  withdrawn  and  the  13th  Division  sub- 
stituted for  it.  This  in  turn  was  so  mauled 
that  the  199th  Division  was  seht  to  relieve  it. 
Similarly  the  3rd  Bavarian  Division  round 
Guemappe  was,  during  the  struggle,  reinforced 
by  the  4th  Bavarian  Division  and  the  3rd 
Guard  Reserve  Division,  while  in  front  of 
Monchy  the  26th  Wiirtemburg  Division  had 
on  the  25th  to  be  deployed  in  Sart  and  Vert 
Woods.  North  of  the  Scarpe  similar  scenes 
were  enacted.  Before  the  battle  ended  the 
4th  Division  of  Prussian  Guards  and  the  26th 
and  220th  Divisions  made  their  appearance, 
so  important  did  it  seem  to  the  German  Higher 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


48 


Command  that  Allenby  should  not  get  wit'iin 
striking  distance  of  the  Drocourt-Queant  line. 
Moreover,  though  inferior  to  our  own,  the  Ger- 
man artillery  was  considerably  stronger  than 
it  had  been  at  the  opening  of  the  fighting. 
Having  but  half-finished  entrenchments  to 
defend,  the  enemy  was  obliged  to  do  his  utmost 
to  keep  down  the  fire  of  our  guns  by  counter- 
battery  work. 

The  atmosphere  on  April  22  had  been  pecu- 
liarly clear,  and  the  British  artillerymen, 
assisted  by  ovir  intrepid  airmen,  had  surpassed 
even  the  bombardment  which  had  preceded 
the  battle  of  Vimy-Arras.  Throughout  the 
bitterly  cold  night  the  guns  thundered  con- 
tinuously from  the  region  of  Loos  to  the  west 
of  St.  Quentin.  "  This  is  no  longer  war," 
said  an  old  Bavarian  sergeant  who  lived  through 
the  battle  only  to  be  taken  prisoner,  "  this  is 
no  longer  war,  it  is  wholesale  murder,  for 
men  cannot  stand  against  guns."  A  similar 
lament  burst  from  the  lips  of  a  Prussian 
lieutenant,  who  in  excellent  English  apostro- 
phized liis  captors.  "  Why  don't  you  fight 
fairly  ?  "  he  demanded,  to  which  they  naturally 
replied :  "  Why  don't  you  ?  "  Under  the 
pitiless  hail  of  shells  villages  and  farms  crumbled 
away,  "  pill-boxes "  vanished,  the  deepest 
dug-outs  became  death  traps,  and  barbed  wire 
entanglements  were  rent  into  shreds. 


At  dawn  on  Monday,  April  23,  in  bright 
spring  sunshine,  Allenby's  men  poured  forward, 
Englishmen,  Scotsmen  and  Newfoundlanders. 
It  was  St.  George's  day,  the  day  of  the  year 
when  Shakespeare,  Froude  and  Allenby  him- 
self had  been  born.  Many  of  the  soldiers  wore 
red  and  white  rosettes  to  commemorate  the 
day.  The  poet  and  the  imperialist  historian, 
whose  "  Oceana "  had  made  us  realize  the 
nature  of  the  British  Empire,  would  have 
seen  in  soldiers  and  leader  worthy  descendants 
of  the  Elizabethans  who  had  defeated  Spain 
and  settled  in  Newfoundland.  Tanks  ac- 
companied the  advance,  breaking  through 
obstacles  and  wiping  out  the  fire  from  redoubts 
and  trenches. 

To  avoid  confusion  it  will  be  well  to  treat 
the  three-days  battle  in  three  parts,  and  to 
follow  tho  fortunes  of  the  British  first  on  the 
left,  next  in  the  centre,  and  then  on  the  right. 
It  will  not  bo  forgotten  that  Allenby's  turning 
movement  was  directed,  on  the  right,  up 
the  valley  down  which  flows  the  Cojeul  and 
the  Sensee.  So  long  as  the  part  of  the  German 
line  from  Lens  through  Mericourt,  Acheville, 
Fresnoy,  Oppy  to  Gavrelle  held,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  attack  the  enemy  between  Gavrelle 
and  Guemappe  from  the  north. 

On  all  three  days  activity  in  the  air  was 
most  marked,  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig  observed 


[From  a  German  photograph. 

GERMAN    SOLDIERS    CHANGING    GUARD    IN    THE    PLACE    DE    L'HOTEL    DE   VILLE, 

ST.    QUENTIN. 


44 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


that  on  the  23rd  "  inert)  was  a  greater  amount 
of  fighting  in  the  air  than  has  before  taken 
place  in  a  single  day."  P'ifteen  German 
machines  were  destroyed,  24  driven  down 
out  of  control  and  a  twin-engine  three-seater 
aeroplane  captured.  These  aerial  contests, 
in  which  the  new  German  fighting  machines 
with  red  wings  took  part,  were  well  described 
by  the  Associated  Press  Correspondent  at  the 
British  Headquarters. 

The  intensely  bitter  ground  fighting  of  the  past  two 
days  has  been  reflected  in  the  air,  and  the  British 
Royal  Flying  Corps  yesterday  established  a  new  record 
by  bringing  down  40  German  machines.  The  remark- 
able part  of  yesterday's  performance  is  that  only  two 
British  machines  are  missing.  It  was  the  finest  day's 
war  flying  that  the  young  pilots  in  khaki  ever  had. 

One  intrepid  young  flying  man,  failing  to  find  a 
single  German  observation  balloon  aloft,  sought  out 
one  in  its  hangar  on  the  ground,  dived  at  it,  and  set 
the  big  gasbag  ablaze  from  stem  to  stern.  A  British 
pilot,  after  felling  two  German  machines  and  all  his 
ammunition  being  gone,  descended,  reloaded,  filled  up 
his  petrol  tanks  and  took  the  air  again,  and  within  half 
an  hour  had  bagged  his  third  machine  for  that  day. 
Another  pilot  felled  two  others,  35  German  machines 
being  divided  among  a  similar  number  of  British 
pilots. 

The  greatest  fight  yesterday,  oddly  enough,  was  a 
drawn  battle.  One  of  the  British  pilots  met  a  brilliant 
German  flier,  and  for  a  full  hour  they  manoeuvred  in 
the  most  marvellous  manner  without  either  being  ab!e 
to  bring  his  gun  to  bear  on  the  other.  They  rolled, 
looped,  twisted,  and  deliberately  stalled  their  engines, 
and,    standing   their   machines    on    the    tail    end,    slid 


backwards  through  the  air,  but  all  to  no  avail.  It 
was  probably  the  most  wonderful  air  duel  the  war 
has  yet  seen.  The  British  pilot  reported  to-day  that 
several  times  he  felt  sure  he  would  get  his  adversary 
between  his  sights,  but  the  latter  invariably  wriggled 
out  of  the  line  of  fire.  The  British  airman  was  himself 
kept  busy  avoiding  the  German,  and  once  he  had  to 
dive  almost  perpendicularly.  The  combat  did  hot 
break  off  until  both  pilots  had  fairly  exhausted  both 
themselves  and  their  petrol.  Strangely  enoxigh,  later 
in  the  day  another  British  pilot  encountered  the  same 
German  machine.  He  was  winging  his  way  home 
after  a  hard  day's  work,  but  jockeyed  with  the  German 
for  nearly  a  quarter  of  an  hour  before  flying  on. 

In  strange  contrast  to  this  was  the  experience  of  the 
British  pilot  who  somewhat  peevishly  complained 
last  night,  "I  only  got  a  rabbit."  He  explained  this 
by  saying  that,  while  his  opponent  had  a  good  machine, 
he  was  a  clumsy  fellow  who  could  not  fight  at  all,  and 
was  sent  spinning  with  the  first  burst  of  gunfire.  Still 
another  pilot,  mounted  on  a  fast  new  machine,  deli- 
berately allowed  a  German  machine  to  get  on  his  tail. 
Then  suddenly  he  looped  behind  his  adversary,  caught 
him  just  within  the  sights,  end  fired,  killing  him  instantly. 
The  machine  swerved,  and  the  dead  man  was  pitched 
out    10,000  ft.  from   the  ground. 

An  enemy  machine  was  also  shot  down  by 
anti-aircraft  gunners,  and  the  day  before  seven 
kite  balloons  had  been  sent  to  the  ground  in 
flames.  Railways,  ammunition  dumps,  and 
aerodromes  behind  the  German  lines  were 
treated  with  bombs,  one  on  the  24th  blowing 
an  engine  off  the  line  and  wrecking  its  train. 
On  the  same  day  seven  enemy  aeroplanes 
were  destroyed,  eight  others  driven  down  out  of 


[Official  photograph, 

A    SIGNAL-BOX   DESTROYED    BY    SHELL    FIRE,    THE    LEVERS    REMAINING    INTACT. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR, 


45 


control,  and  two  observation  balloons  were 
exploded.  Our  total  losses  in  the  two  days 
righting  were  eight  machines,  but  on  the  26th 
the  balance  was  against  us  and  we  lost  three 
machines  to  two  of  the  enemy's  destroyed  and 
a  third  forced  to  descend. 

These  exploits,  it  need  hardly  be  observed, 
were  not  the  only  deeds  of  prowess  performed 
by  the  modern  Knight  Errants.  Our  airmen 
discharged  jets  of  bullets  at  the  heads  of  the 
enemy  moving  across  country,   or  along  the 


north  of  Gavrelle  reinforcing  the  garrison  there. 
The  attack  on  Roeux  was  a  matter  of  greater 
difficulty  because  of  the  marshy  ground  in  its 
vicinity  and  because  the  enemy  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Scarpe  and  in  Pelves  could  rake  the 
approaches  to  the  village  on  the  Farnpoux  or 
British  side.  It  was  shielded  also  from  the 
north  by  the  embankment  of  the  Arras-Douai 
railroad.  Just  outside  Roeux  on  the  Gavrelle 
road  were  strongly  fortified  chemical  works  in 
which  were  numerous  mine  throwers.     Thesp 


A    TANK    BESTRIDING 

roads.  Our  aeroplanes  had  become  flying 
machine-guns. 

The  sector  to  be  assaulted  north  of  the 
Scarpe  extended  from  Gavrelle  over  the  Arras- 
Douai  railroad  to  Roeux  on  the  edge  of  the 
Scarpe.  A  cross-road  connected  the  two 
villages.  Gavrelle  lay  in  the  plain  a  couple  of 
miles  or  so  south-east  of  the  southern  end  of 
the  Vimy  Ridge.  Beyond  it — nearer  to  Douai 
—  was  Fresnes,  which,  like  Gavrelle,  was  on  the 
ehaussee  from  Arras  to  that  city.  From  Roeux 
through  Plouvain  a  cross-road  ran  to  Fresnes, 
beyond  which  there  was  a  wood.  Between 
Fresnes  and  Plouvain  wore  a  group  of  copses 
affording  cover  for  counter-attacks,  and  a  low 
ridge — Greenland  Hill — ran  from  Plouvain 
north-westwards  to  the  east  of  Gavrelle. 

Holding  as  we  did  the  high  Vimy  ridge,  we 
could  prevent  by  gun  fire  the  enemy  from  Oppy 


A    TRENCH. 

works,  the  railway  station  and  chateau,  formed 
one  fortress  closely  attached  to  the  loopholed 
cemetery  and  ruined  cottages  of  the  village. 

On  the  main  front  of  attack  good  progress 
was  made  at  first  at  almost  all  points.  By 
10  a.m.  the  remainder  of  the  high  ground  west 
of  Cherisy  had  been  captured  by  the  attacking 
English  brigades,  and  Scottish  troops  had 
pushed  through  Guemappe.  East  of  Monchy- 
le-Preux  British  battalions  seized  the  western 
slopes  of  the  rising  ground  known  as  Infantry 
Hill.  On  their  left  English  county  troops  had 
reached  the  buildings  west  of  Rceux  Station 
and  gained  the  line  of  their  objectives  on  the 
western  slopes  of  Greenland  Hill,  north  of  the 
railway. 

Gavrelle  was  a  typical  example  of  a  German 
fortified  post — one  of  the  dug-outs  there  alone 
sheltered  60  men  and  four  machine-guns — but 


46 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


before  10  a.m.  on  Monday,  April  23,  it  was 
taken  by  the  Royal  Naval  Division. 

Our  men  were  not  left  in  undisturbed 
possession.  No  less  than  five  times  on  Monday, 
three  times  on  Tuesday,  and  more  than  once 
during  the  night  of  Tuesday- Wednesday  the 
enemy  charged  up  the  Arras-Douai  road  from 
Fresnes  and  its  wood.  As  many  as  6,000  men 
were  employed  in  one  counter-attack.  All 
these  attacks  were  completely  crushed  by  our 
artillery  barrage  and  machine-gun  fire.  In  one 
instance  only  did  a  wave  of  Germans  momen- 
tarily eject  the  British  from  the  ruins.  It  was 
but  a  temporary  success.  A  bayonet  charge 
swiftly  sent  the  enemy  flying  back  towards 
Fresnes.  When  the  battle  died  down  swathes 
of  German  corpses  lay  between  Gavrelle  and 
Fresnes,  wliile  500  prisoners,  including  17 
officers,  had  been  sent  to  the  British  rear. 

Simultaneously  with  the  advance  of  the 
English  on  Gavrelle,  Highland  Territorials 
of  the  51st  Division,  with  more  Highland 
troops  (the  staunch  9th  Division)  on  their  left, 
attacked  the  western  outskirts  of  Ropux  wood. 
They  stormed  the  railway  station,  chemical 
works,  and  chateau,  and  even  penetrated  into 
the  cemetery  and  the  village,  between  which 


and  Gavrelle  the  German  line  ran.  But  the 
failure  of  our  troops  to  storm  Pelves  across  the 
river  rendered  the  position  of  the  Scotsmen  in 
the  village  and  cemetery  untenable.  Disputing 
every  inch  of  the  ruins  and  tombs  they  fell 
back  and  maintained  themselves  in  the  chemical 
works,  which  were  successfully  defended  up  tc 
the  end  of  the  battle. 

Between  Gavrelle  and  Roaux  desperate 
German  counter-attacks  in  combination  with 
the  assaults  on  Gavrelle  were  beaten  off. 
Wave  after  wave  of  infantry  came  over  the 
low  ridge  and  through  the  copses.  Raked  by 
our  machine  guns  in  Gavrelle  and  scattered  by 
shrapnel,  Brandenburgers  and  Hamburgers 
retired  in  confusion.  Two  battalions  of  the 
161st  Regiment  of  Rhinelanders  massing  for  a 
counter-attack  near  the  Arras-Douai  railway 
were  caught  by  our  artillery  fire  ;  one  battalion 
was  wiped  out  and  the  other  so  depleted  that 
for  practical  purposes  it  may  be  said  to  have 
ceased  to  exist.  During  the  afternoon  counter- 
attacks in  great  force  developed  all  along  the 
line,  and  were  repeated  by  the  enemy  with 
the  utmost  determination,  regardless  of  the 
heavy  losses  inflicted  by  our  fire.  Many  of 
these  counter-attacks  were  repulsed  after  severe 


AWAITING    THE    ORDER    TO    ADVANCE. 


[Official  photograph. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


47 


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A    BRITISH    BOMBING    PARTY    CLEARING    A    TRENCH    NEAR    RCEUX. 


fighting,  but  on  our  right  our  troops  were 
ultimately  compelled  by  weight  of  numbers  to 
withdraw  from  the  ridge  west  of  Cherisy  and 
from  Guemappe.  As  soon  as  it  was  clear  that 
the  whole  of  our  objectives  for  the  23rd  April 
had  not  been  gained,  orders  were  issued  to 
renew  the  advance  at  6  p.m.  In  this  attack 
Guemappe  was  retaken  by  men  of  the  15th 
Scottish  Division,  but  farther  south  our 
troops  were  at  once  met  by  a  counter-attack  in 
force,  and  made  no  progress.  Fighting  of  a 
more  or  less  intermittent  character  continued 
in  tliis  area  all  through  the  night. 

It  has  been  mentioned  that  Roeux  could  not 
be  completely  captured  on  the  23rd  because 
the  English  county  troops  had  been  unable  to 
oust  the  Germans  from  Pelves  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Scarpe.  It  had  been  attacked  at 
dawn  by  the  17th  Division,  which  fought 
heroically  with  all  advantage  of  the  ground 
in  the  enemy's  favour,  but  snipers  and  macliine- 
gunners  from  hidden  trenches  thinned  their 
ranks,  and  the  repulse  of  the  simultaneously 
delivered  attack  on  the  Vert  and  Sart  Woods 
in  front  of  Monchy  rendered  it  advisable 
to  suspend  the  advance,  as  the  enemy 
might  have  thrown  himself  on  the  flank  of  the 
British  and  driven  them  into  the  river. 

In  the  early  morning  of  April  24  the  enemy's 
resistance  weakened  all  along  the  front  attacked 


south  of  the  Arras-Cambrai  Road.  Our  troops 
were  thus  able  to  reach  most  of  their  objec-. 
tives  of  the  previous  day  without  serious 
opposition 

After  24  hours  of  very  fierce  righting,  there- 
fore, in  which  the  severity  of  the  enemy's 
casualties  were  in  proportion  to  the  strength 
and  determination  of  his  numerous  counter- 
attacks, we  remained  in  possession  of  the 
villages  of  Guemappe  and  Gavrelle,  as  well  as 
of  the  whole  of  the  high  ground  overlooking 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  and  Cherisy.  Very  ap- 
preciable progress  had  also  been  made  east  of 
Monchy-le-Preux,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Scarpe, 
and  on  Greenland  Hill.  In  the  course  of  these 
operations  of  April  23  and  24  we  captured  a 
further  3,029  prisoners,  including  56  officers, 
and  a  few  guns.  On  the  battle  field,  which 
remained  in  our  possession,  great  numbers  of 
German  dead  testified  to  the  costliness  of  the 
enemy's  obstinate  defence. 

To  the  Vert  and  Sart  Woods  the  Germans 
naturally  attached  great  importance,  as  they 
prevented  our  men  in  and  around  Monchy 
from  moving  down  the  Scarpe  Heights  and 
turning  Pelves.  Redoubts  on  the  Arras- 
Cambrai  road  enfiladed  the  Middlesex  and 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  companies  endeavouring 
to  eject  the  Germans  from  the  woods  ;  never- 
theless, our  men  entered  them,  although  the 

184-3 


48 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


greater  part  were  obliged  to  fall  back.  But  a 
considerable  detachment  of  these  men  remained 
behind  and  were  able  to  maintain  their  position. 
At  10  a.m.  strong  bodies  of  Rhinelanders 
emerged  from  the  Vert  Wood  and  counter- 
attacked. The  grey  lines  with  bayonets  glitter- 
ing in  the  sunshine  moved  forward  as  if  on 
parade.  "  It  was  so  much  like  the  pictures  of 
war  I  saw  as  a  child,"  said  one  young  officer, 
"that  we  simply  admired,  and  for  a  moment  for- 
got our  real  purpose.  .  .  .  The  only  comment 
I  heard  from  one  of  my  men  was,  '  I  wish 
they  had  brought  their  bands  with  them  !  '  ' 
They  checked  our  advance,  but  were  them- 
selves almost  wiped  out  by  the  rifle  fire  of  the 
Newfoundlanders  and  Worcesters  of  the  29th 
Division.  Some  4,000  Germans  who  had 
been  moved  unperceived  into  the  Sart  Wood 
were  detected  by  our  airmen,  and  the  British 
artillery  with  gas  and  other  shells  killed  and 
wounded  most  of  them.  In  the  afternoon 
the  German  guns  began  to  bombard  Monchy, 
which  had  hitherto  been  spared,  doubtless  in 
the  hope  that  it  might  be  retaken.  First 
the  roofs  of  the  village  disappeared,  and  then 
cottage  after  cottage  vanished  in  great  pink 
clouds  Before  sunset  there  was  not  a  single 
wall  standing.  Fortunately  the  British  were 
not  within  but  on  the  outskirts  of  the  village 
At  dawn  on  Tuesday  they  resumed  the  advance, 
and  succeeded  in  rescuing  the  party  of  Middlesex 


Official  photograph. 

CHARGE     OF    HIGHLANDERS     IN 
THE    EARLY     MORNING. 

and  Argyll  and  Sutherlands  who,  with  their 
14  prisoners,  had  held  out.  Throughout 
the  day  the  struggle  before  Monchy  went 
on,  each  side  being  strongly  reinforced.  On 
Wednesday  the  26th  Wurtemburger  Division 
relieved  the  hard-pressed  enemy  in  the  Vert 
and  Sart  Woods.  These  were  still  in  German 
hands  when  the  battle  closed. 

Between  the  Scarpe  and  the  Arras-Oambrai 
chaussee  there  had  been  a  standstill.  It  was 
south  of  the  highway  that  Allenby  scored  most 
heavily.  In  the  dim  light  which  preceded 
sunrise  on  the  23rd,  long  loose  lines  of  the 
Highlanders  of  the  15th  Division  followed  the 
barrage  down  the  Scarpe  Heights  and  made 
for  the  ruins  of  Guemappe  and  the  northern 
banks  of  the  Cojeul.  For  nearly  three  hours 
they  were  engaged  in  extinguishing  the  fire 
from  the  numerous  strong  points  in  front 
of  the  village.  Troops  of  the  3rd  Bavarian 
Division  offered  a  stubborn  resistance,  but, 
one  by  one,  the  nests  of  machine-guns  were 
bombed  and  200  prisoners  taken.  Then 
with  loud  shouts  and  cheers  the  impetuous 
Celts  went  through  and  beyond-  Guemappe. 
A  blast  of  bullets  from  Cavalry  Farm  and  some 
"  pill-boxes  "  momentarily  checked  them,  but 
the  charge  was  driven  home  and  the  enemy 
flung  back  across  the  stream.  Towards  noon 
huge  masses  of  Bavarians  issuing  from  Vis-en- 
Artois  massed  in  the  valley  between  the  Sensee 
and  the  Cojeul.  An  avalanche  of  shells  de- 
scended on  Cavalry  Farm  and  Guemappe  as 
the  Bavarians  forded  the  Cojeul  to  close  with 
the   Highlanders.     Lewis  guns,   rifle   and   rifle 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


49 


grenade  fire  tore  rents  in  the  waves  of 
Germans  ascending  the  ridge.  Over  the  dead 
and  wounded  the  survivors  pressed  on. 
Evacuating  Cavalry  Farm  the  Highlanders, 
with  their  faces  to  the  foe,  slowly  retired  on 
Guemappe.  In  small  groups  they  kept  the 
Bavarians  at  bay.  For  four  hours  one  officer 
with  70  men  remained  isolated  north  of  the 
village.  The  cemetery  was  the  scene  of  a 
terrible  conflict.  Officers  could  be  seen  working 
the  machine  guns  or  sniping  at  the  enemy. 
In  vain  the  German  artillery  ringed  Guemappe 
with  barrages,  for  a  time  completely  isolating 
the  village.  The  Bavarians  were  unable  to 
overpower  the  brave  garrison.  At  6  p.m.  fresh 
Highland  troops  dashed  through  the  barrage 
from  the  direction  of  the  Arras-Cambrai  road. 
The  Bavarians  in  the  ruins  were  bayoneted  or 
taken  prisoners.  Supported  by  their  comradss 
whom  they  had  come  to  support,  the  High- 
landers passed  onwards  ;  Cavalry  Farm  was 
retaken  and  the  enemy  sullenly  re -forded  the 
Cojeul  and  sought  refuge  in  Vis-en-Artois.  On 
Tuesday  and  Wednesday  the  Bavarians,  rein- 
forced by  the  3rd  Guard  Reserve  Division,  made 
furious  efforts  to  drive  the  Highlanders  from 
Cavalry  Farm  and  Guemappe.     Cavalry  Farm 


was  recovered,  but  Guemappe,  like  Monchy  to 
its  north  and  Wancourt  to  its  south-west, 
remained  in  British  occupation.  Another  link 
in  the  German  line  had  been  gained. 

On  the  first  night  of  the  battle,  in  the  un- 
dulating open  country  between  the  Cojeul  and 
the  Sensee,  down  which  it  was  designed  to  turn 
the  enemy,  there  had  also  been  a  long  and 
bloody  struggle.  The  British  21st,  30th,  33k I. 
and  50th  Divisions  were  engaged  in  this 
southern  sector  of  the  attack.  The  enemy  had 
constructed  a  cordon  of  trenches  from  the 
Cojeul,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Wancourt, 
to  the  Sensee,  south  of  Fontaine  lez-Croisilles 
Through  both  villages  counter-attacks  could 
be  delivered  against  the  right  flank  of  the 
British  pushing  forward  between  the  streams. 
At  dawn  on  Monday  we  attacked  the  14 1st 
Pomeranian  Regiment  of  the  35th  Revel  Vt) 
Division  holding  this  arc  of  trenches  and 
redoubts.  The  nerves  of  the  Pomeranians 
had  been  shattered  by  the  bombardment 
and  they  put  up  a  poor  resistance.  Some 
1,600  prisoners  were  captured  and  a  battery 
of  field  guns.  Pressing  on,  our  men  approached 
Kontaine-lez-Croisilles,  the  whole  area  about 
which    was    a   very    labyrinth    of   trench    and 


lOfficul  photograph. 


IN     MONCHY. 


50 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


fortified  positions.  At  this  moment  parties 
of  riflemen  hidden  in  a  disused  quarry  or 
concealed  in  craters  suddenly  fired  on  our 
men  from  the  rear,  while  a  body  of  the 
enemy  rushed  at  them  from  the  village.  The 
British  retreated,  but  at  6  a.m.  again  charged 
up  to  the  outskirts  of  Fontaine.  At  7  p.m. 
columns  of  the  Germans  issued  from  Fontaine 
and  Cherisy  and  once  mora  our  troops  fell  back. 
During  the  night  and  on  the  morning  of 
Tuesday  we,  however,  again  .advanced.  First 
the  German  13th  Division  and  then  the  199th 
Division  were  brought  iip  to  stem  the  tide. 
They  succeeded  in  saving  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles 
but  were  unable  to  regain  the  trenches  and  the 
tower,  on  which  had  once  stood  a  windmill, 
occupied  by  the  Pomeranians  at  the  opening 
of  the  struggle. 

Such  was  the  Battle  of  GavreJle-Fontaine-lez- 
Croisilles.  On  the  24th  the  Kaiser  sent  the 
following  message  to  Prince  Rupprecht : 

The  fresh  British  assault  on  the  battlefield  of  Arras 
has  been  broken  by  your  troops.  To  the  heroes  of 
Arras  and  their  trustworthy  leaders,  who  in  capacity, 
ability,  and  success  have  equalled  their  comrades  on  the 
Aisne  and  in  Champagne,  I  send  mine  and  the  Father- 
land's thanks. 

God  help  you  further. 

Wilhelm  I.R. 


It  was  even  more  a  perversion  of  the  trut  h  than 
usual.  The  "  fresh  British  assault,"  which  had 
not  been  delivered  on  "  the  battlefield  of  Arras  " 
but  miles  to  the  east  of  that  city,  had  resulted 
in  the  Germans  losing  two  sections  of  the  Oppy- 
Queant  line  and  great  numbers  of  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners 

While  the  battle  was  proceeding  we  had 
also  captured  on  Monday  most  of  Havrincourt 
Wood,  and  the  remainder  of  the  village  of 
Trescault  and  Villers-Plouich  and  Beaucamp 
east  of  it,  and  gained  ground  east  of  Epehy, 
reaching  the  Scheldt-Somme  Canal  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Vend'huile.  In  the  minor 
operations  south-west  of  Lens  Cornish  troops 
established  themselves  on  the  railway  loop 
east  of  Cite  de»  Petits  Bois,  and  succeeded 
in  .  maintaining  their  position  in  spite  of 
numerous  hostile  counter-attacks.  On  the 
night  of  April  24,  the  hamlet  of  Bilhem, 
north-east  of  Trescault,  was  also  carried. 

On  Friday,  April  27,  preparations  for 
another  thrust  between  Lens  and  the  Scarpe 
were  made.  Our  troops  moved  a  little 
eastwards  to  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  Greenland 
Hill.  South  of  the  Scarpe  they  dislodged 
the  enemy  from  strong  points  on  the  Arras- 


BHBBn 


{Official  photograph. 

A    BRANU-NEW    GERMAN    59    HOWITZER,    MADE    ON    THE     13th     FEBRUARY 
CAPTURED    IN    APRIL    ON    THE    WESTERN    FRONT. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


WANCOURT. 


[French  official  phoU-graph 


Cambrai  road.  During  the  preceding  night 
we  had  ejected  the  enemy  from  quarries  on 
the  eastern  outskirts  of  Hargicourt,  nine  miles 
north-west  of  St.  Quentin,  and  we  had  defeated 
a  minor  attack  near  Foyet  in  the  northern 
environs  of  that  city. 

The  strength  of  the  opposition  encountered 
in  the  course  of  this  attack  was  in  itself  evidence 
that  our  offensive  was  fulfilling  the  part 
designed  for  it  in  the  Allied  plans.  As  the 
result  of  the  fighting  which  had  already  taken 
place  12  German  divisions  had  been  with- 
drawn exhausted  from  the  battle  or  were  in 
process  of  relief.  A  month  after  the  com- 
mencement of  our  offensive  the  number  of 
German  divisions  so  withdrawn  had  increased 
to  23.  On  the  other  hand,  the  strength  of 
the  enemy  opposite  our  front  compelled  us  for  a 
time  to  adopt  the  less  aggressive  form  of  a 
wearing-down  battle. 

On  the  Aisne  and  in  Champagne,  also,  the 
French  offensive  had  met  with  very  obstinate 
resistance.  It  was  becoming  clear  that  many 
months  of  heavy  fighting  would  be  necessary 
before  the  enemy's  troops  could  be  reduced 
to  a  condition  which  would  permit  of  a  more 
rapid  advance.  None  the  less,  very  consider- 
able results  had  already  been  achieved,  and  our 
Allies  continued  their  efforts  against  the  long 
plateau  north  of  the  Aisne  ft-aversed  by  the 
Chemin-des-Dames.  In  order  to  assist  them, 
we  arranged  that,  until  their  object  had  been 
attained,  we  would  continue  our  operations 
about  Arras.  The  necessary  readjustment  of 
troops,  guns  and  material  required  to  complete 


our  preparations  for  our  northern  operations 
was  accordingly  postponed,  and  preparations 
were  undertaken  to  repeat  our  attacks  on  the 
Arras  front  until  the  results  of  the  French 
offensive  should  have  become  evident. 

The  first  of  these  attacks  was  delivered  on 
April  28  on  a  front  of  about  eight  miles,  north 
of  Monchy-le-Preux.  With  a  view  to  econo- 
mizing our  troops,  our  objectives  were  shallow  ; 
and  for  a  like  reason,  and  also  in  order  to  give 
the  appearance  of  an  attack  on  a  man  imposing 
scale,  demonstrations  were  continued  south- 
wards to  the  Arras-Cambrai  road  and  north- 
wards to  the  Souchez  River.  The  front  attacked 
was  smaller  than  in  the  battle  of  Gavrelle- 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.  The  Germans  pre- 
tended that  it  measured  nearly  19  whereas  in 
reality  it  was  about  seven  miles  long.  They 
also  alleged  that  it  was  another  "attempt  to 
break  through  the  German  lines,"  which,  on 
the  face  of  it,  was  absurd,  because  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  would  never  have  tried  to  storm  the  intact 
Queant-Drocourt  line,  until  he  had  made 
further  gaps  in  the  German  line  in  front  o^ 
it.  Since  the  estimate  (grossly  exaggerated) 
of  our  losses  given  in  the  German  communique 
of  Apiil  :i0  was  only  6,000  killed  and  wounded, 
etc  ,  and  1,000  prisoners,  with  40  machine- 
guns  taken  and  10  Tanks*  destroyed,  the 
German  stall  was  well  aware  that  it  was 
lying.  It  could  not  have  seriously  supposed 
that  a  battle  on  a  front  of  19  miles,  delivered 
with  the  object  of  piercing  two  fortified  zones, 
would    have    resulted    in    loss    less    than    that 

*  No  Tanks  were,  as  a  tact,  employed  iti  this  battle. 


2 

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as 
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a 
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en 


=5 
35 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


p3 


suffered  by  us  in  1915  at  the  action  of  Neuve 
Chapelle. 

It  was  with  the  object  of  clearing  the  way  for 
an  assault  on  the  Queant-Drocourt  positions 
that  the  battle  was  delivered,  not  in  "great 
masses,"  as  the  German  Staff  asserted,  small 
numbers  only  being  employed  and  only  con- 
centrated where  serious  attack  was  undertaken, 

The  left  of  the  British  now  rested  on  the  Vimy- 
Acheville  road,  some  4,000  yards  south  of  Avion, 
the  southernmost  quarter  of  the  Lens  mining 
district.  As  the  enemy's  line  at  Arleux-en- 
Gohelle  was  well  to  the  west  of  Acheville  to  the 
north  of  that  village,  no  attempt  was  made  to 
storm  Acheville.  The  British  advanced  to  within 
1,200  yards  of  Acheville  and  awaited  the  result 
of  the  fighting  between  Arleux  and  the  Scarpe. 
At  Oppy  a  trench  ran  northward  along  a  crest 
round  Arleux -en-Gohelle  to  Acheville,  and 
behind,-  to  the  east  of  it,  another  trench  con- 
nected Acheville,  Fresnoy  and  Oppy.  Our  main 
efforts  were  directed  to  securing  the  external  or 
western  trench  with  the  villages  of  Arleux  (this 
was  taken  by  the  Canadians)  and  Oppy.  Our 
possession  of  Gavrelle,  which  was  attacked  no 
less  than  seven  times  on  April  28  and  29,  and 
ground  to  its  north,  enabled  us  to  attack  Oppy 
from  the  south  as  well  as  from  the  west. 

Arleux,  the  buildings  in  which  were  still 
comparatively  undamaged,  consisted  of  a  single 
straggling  street,  flanked  by  isolated  groups  of 
cottages  with  small  gardens  and  orchards. 
Each  of  the  cottages  had  been  turned  into  a 
German  redoubt.  Wire  entanglements  of 
great  width  extended  in  front  of  the  village.  To 
its  north  three  successive  sunken  roads  had  been 
wired  and  provided  with  numerous  machine-gun 
posts.  The  ground  before  Arleux  was  undulating, 
and  the  attackers  had  to  advance  along  two 
hollows,  an  intervening  ridge  hiding  one 
column  of  assault  from  the  other.  Behind 
Arleux  a  long  dip  ran  backwards  towards 
Fresnoy  and  German  machine-guns  swept  this 
open  funnel.  The  111th  German  Division 
defended  the  line  from  Arleux  to  Oppy. 
Unfortunately  our  gunners  had  not  completely 
destroyed  the  wire,  and  the  Canadian  battalion 
deputed  at  dawn  to  storm  Arleux  found  difficulty 
in  advancing.  Its  left,  delayed  by  the  machine- 
guns  in  the  sunken  roads,  was  foe  a  time  held  up. 
The  centre  and  right,  however,  penetrated  into 
the  village,  and.  though  losing  heavily,  reduced 
one  by  one  the  strongholds  there  Some  300 
prisoners,  including  7  officers,  were  captured, 
and   when  the  last  cottage  fell  the  assaulting 


infantry  was  rejoined  by  the  companies  on  the 
left  who  had  at  last  secured  the  sunken  roads. 
Scarcely  was  this  accomplished  when  the 
German  artillery  poured  a  deluge  of  shells  on 
Arleux.  Its  buildings  disappeared  in  clouds 
of  red  and  yellow  dust.  Towards  evening  a 
violent  counter-attack  from  Fresnoy  was 
delivered  against  it ;  it  was  repulsed  and, 
when  sun  set,  the  Canadians  were  well  east  of 
Arleux  in  front  of  Fresnoy. 

Meanwhile  at  Oppy  and  in  the  wood  which 
screened  it  an  even  fiercer  struggle  had  been 
proceeding.  In  the  branches  of  the  trees 
platforms  for  machine-guns  had  been  con- 
structed and  the  English  troops  could  only 
move  slowly  and  carefully  through  the  wood  to 
the  village.  At  last  the  wood  was  cleared,  but  in 
the  cottages  there  were  desperate  hand-to-hand 
conflicts.  In  the  German  background  lines  of 
motor -omnibuses  could  be  seen  racing  for 
.Neuvireuil,  whence  streams  of  reinforcements 
were  poured  into  Oppy  and  towards  Gavrelle. 
Counter-attack  succeeded  counter-attack,  and 
at  nightfall  we  were  still  only  on  the  outskirts 
of  the  village.  Our  advance,  too,  from  Gavrelle 
on  Oppy  had  been  checked. 

Still  the  enemy's  trenches  for  two  miles  north 
and  south  of  Arleux -en-Gohelle  and  some  posts 
north  of  Gavrelle  had  been  secured.  At  the  same 
time  we  had  advanced  up  the  western  slopes  of 
Greenland  Hill  between  Gavrelle  and  Roeux, 
the  troops  engaged  here  being  the  37th  and 
34th  Divisions,  which  had  already  seen  very 
hard  fighting  in  the  Arras-Vimy  battle  and  were 
much  under  strength  This  ridge  ran  south- 
eastwards  to  the  Arras-Douai  railway  near 
I'louvain,  north-east  of  Rohix.  Its  capture 
would  ensure  the  defeat  of  the  Germans  in 
Roeux  A  thousand  yards  east  of  the  western 
edge  of  Greenland  Hill  was  a  small  patch  of 
woodland,  known  a.s  Square  Wood.  The  trench 
in  front  of  it  had  been  obliterated  by  our 
gunners,  and  two  companies  of  a  London 
regiment  crossed  it  and  drove  the  German 
garrison  out  of  the  shattered  trees.  A 
thousand  yards  beyond  was  another  and  larger 
wood,  called  "  Railway  Copse."  The  Londoners, 
with  both  flanks  in  the  air,  made  for  it  and 
forced  the  enemy  to  withdraw  liis  guns  on  the 
western  edge  of  the  wood,  entering  which  our 
men  dug  themselves  in  and  waited  for  their 
comrades  to  line  up  with  them.  As  these  had 
had  to  halt  to  receive  counter-attacks,  the  two 
companies  fell  back  through  Square  Wood. 
In  the  meantime  on  their  right  a  determined 


64 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


effort  had  been  made  by  other  troops  of  the 
37th  Division  to  seize  the  crest  of  Greenland 
Hill  Round  the  remains  of  a  windmill  on 
the  crest  charge  followed  charge,  but  at  night- 
fall the  highest  point  above  Plouvain  still  re- 
mained in  German  hands.  While  the  struggle 
swayed  to  and  fro  on  the  ridge,  troops  of  the 
34th  Division  from  the  Chemical  Works  flung 
themselves  on  the  cemetery  and  ruins  of  Rceux, 
which,  in  the  words  of  a  British  officer,  "  simply 
bristled  with  machine-guns."  Some  progress 
was  made  but  the  bulk  of  the  village  was  not 
reduced.  Across  the  Scarpe,  under  fire  from 
the  Roeux  Wood  on  the  north  bank  and  from 
the  Monchy  region,  the  British  drew  a  little 
nearer  to  Pelves,  and  between  Pelves  and 
Monchy-le  Preux  we  slightly  advanced  our 
line. 

In  the  course  of  the  bloody  fighting  on  the 
28th  an  incident  occurred  worthy  of  mention. 
A  Bavarian  battalion,  counter-attacking,  ex- 
pelled some  of  our  men  from  a  captured  trench. 
Pursuing  blindly  they  were  cut  off  by  a  body  of 
Lincolns  and  North  Country  troops  inferior  to 
them  in  numbers.  A  terrible  combat  at  handy- 
strokes  ensued,  with  bayonet,  clubbed  rifle  and 
even  stones  and  flints      The  result  was  that  the 


British  practically  destroyed  the  whole  batta- 
lion, except  some  two  or  three  prisoners.  On 
Sunday,  April  29,  we  increased  our  gains  by 
taking  a  mile  of  the  enemy's  trench  system 
south  of  Oppy.  The  Germans  offered  a  stub- 
born resistance  and  delivered  several  unsuccess- 
ful counter-attacks.  On  April  30,  the  date 
when  the  Battle  of  Moronvilliers  had  beer, 
renewed,  the  Germans  counter-attacked  between 
the  Scarpe  and  Monchy-le-Preux,  but  were 
completely  repulsed  and  failed  to  recover  the 
ground  lost  between  Arleux  and  Gavrelle. 
The  Oppy  Wood  was  the  scene  of  very 
severe  fighting. 

During  April  1917  the  British  had  taken 
over  19,500  prisoners  including  over  400  officers, 
and  captured  257  guns  and  howitzers,  among 
them  98  heavy  guns  and  howitzers,  also  227 
trench-mortars  and  404  machine-guns.  They 
had  gained  the  Vimy  Ridge  and  the.  Scarpe 
Heights.  Nevertheless  the  area  in  front  of  any 
considerable  section  of  the  Wotan  line  (as  the 
Germans  called  the  Drocourt-Queant  line)  had 
not  yet  been  cleared. 

To  prevent  Prince  Rupprecht  reinforcing 
the  German  Crown  Prince's  armies  south  of 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

CANADIANS    IN    POSSESSION    OF    AN    OLD    GERMAN    TRENCH    NEAR    LENS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


55 


[Official  photograph. 

CROSS-ROADS    NEAR    TINCOURT    BLOWN    UP    BY    THE     GERMANS. 


Laon  and  north  of  Moronvilliers,  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  on  May  3  once  more  attacked.  May  1, 
1917,  had  been  uneventful.  The  next  day, 
Wednesday,  May  2,  all  our  batteries  rained 
projectiles  from  the  south  of  Lens  to  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Cambrai.  The  German  guns 
replied  fiercely.  This  artillery  duel  was  the 
prelude  to  the  Battle  of  Fresnoy-Bullecourt. 

The  two  preceding  battles  had  brought  us  up 
to  the  Oppy-Queant  line.  In  that  about  to  be 
narrated  the  objective  of  Home  and  Allenby  and 
Go  ugh,  whose  Fifth  Army  cooperated  on  Allen- 
by 's  right,  was  to  clear  the  enemy  out  of  it  from 
the  north  of  Arleux  across  the  Scarpe  to  Bulle- 
court  where  the  line  touched  the  devastated 
region.  The  front  assaulted  measured  con- 
siderably longer  than  had  hitherto  been  the 
case.  While  the  Third  and  First  Armies 
attacked  from  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  to  Fresnoy 
the  Fifth  Army  was  to  move  once  more  against 
the  Hindenburg  line  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Bullecourt.  The  total  distance  was  over  16 
miles. 

Our  preliminary  bombardment  was  terrific. 
On  the  night  of  Wednesday,  May  2,  the  whole 
sky  was  lighted  up  with  the  blaze  of  guns  and 
of  bursting  shells.  At  3.45  a.m.  on  Thursday, 
May  3,  the  advance  began  in  the  dark.  It  was, 
indeed,  by  the  accident  of  weather,  too  dark. 
Our  men  had  great  difficulty  in  keeping 
direction.  The  number  of  troops  used  was 
small  in  proportion  to  the  front  attacked, 
and  taken  as  a  whole,  the  day  was,  perhaps, 
the  least  satisfactory  of  all  the  fighting  in 
this  area. 

The  attack  penetrated  the  German  positions 
practically  along  the  whole  front.  Eastern 
county  battalions  entered  Rceux  and  captured 
the  German  trenches  south  of  Fresnoy.  On 
the  extreme  left  Home's  Canadians  from 
Arleux    assaulted    Fresnoy    village ;     on    the 


extreme  right  Gough's  Australians  endeavoured 
to  wedge  themselves  between  Bullecourt  and 
Queant,  the  southern  terminus  of  the  German 
line  from  Drocourt,  while  south  of  the  Canadians 
and  north  of  the  Australians,  battalions  of 
English,  Scottish,  and  Irish  regiments  threw 
themselves  at  the  German  entrenchments  in 
the  district  traversed  by  the  Scarpe  between 
Arleux  and  Bullecourt.  It  was  a  day  of  hot 
sunshine,  and  the  physical  energies  of  the  men 
were  tried  to  their  utmost. 

Fresnoy,    defended    by    the    German     15th 
Reserve  Division  (10th,   29th  and  69th  Regi- 
ments), was  very  strongly  fortified  and  wired. 
Between  the  wire  and  Arleux  the  enemy  put 
up    a   barrage    of    shells    through    which    the 
Canadians   who   attacked    here    had    to    pass. 
Following   our    own    barrage    some    of    them 
rushed    for    the    gaps    in    the    entanglements, 
others  tried  to  force  the  ruins  from  the  north 
and  south.     Innumerable  feats  of  valour  were 
performed.     For  example,  one  Canadian  single- 
handed  killed  the  crew  of  a  machine-gun  as  it 
emerged  from  a  dug  out ;    another  Canadian 
when  a  Stokes  bomb  fell  at  his   (eel  picked  it 
up  and  flung  it  at  a  "  pill-box."     The  Germans 
beat  off  the  frontal  attack  but  the  flunk  attacks 
succeeded.     Some     250     prisoners    and    eight 
officers  were  captured.     The  garrison  in  Fres- 
noy, which  had    been    strengthened,  made    a 
sortie    against    our    line    an    hour    later    and 
suffered  very  heavily.     In  the  evening  hostile 
infantry  violently  counter-attacked  supported 
by     an     intense     bombardment      of      heavy 
guns.     Fighting  of  the  most  severe  character 
ensued  which  raged  during  the  afternoon  and 
far  into  the  night,  and  our  troops  were  forced 
back   from   Rceux   and   Cherisy.     They   clung 
on,  however,  to  Fresnoy  and  the  Hindenburg 
line   east  of   Bullecourt   and   to  parts   of   the 
German  trenches  west  of  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles 


56 


THE    T1ME8    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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MAP    ILLUSTRATING    THE    FIGHTING    AROUND    BULLECOURT. 


and  south  of  the  Scarpe.  These  operations 
had  given  us  968  prisoners,  of  whom  29  were 
officers. 

While  the  enemy  retained  Oppy  and  Rosux 
it  was  impossible  to  advance  on  a  wide  front 
north  of  the  Scarpe  -  against  this  part  of  the 
German  line.  Of  the  two  villages  Oppy 
was  the  more  exposed,  because  it  was 
menaced  by  the  British  in  Arleux  to  it* 
north  and  in  Gavrelle  to  its  south.  Roaux, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  protected  on  the 
south  by  the  Scarpe  and  by  the  Germans 
between  the  river  and  ther  Sart  Wood. 
To  the  defence  of  Oppy  Prince  Rupprecht 
sent  forward  the  Prussian  2nd  and  1st  Guard 
Reserve  Divisions.  The  2nd  was  disposed 
round  Oppy  ;  the  1st  confronted  the  British 
in  the  vicinity  of  Gavrelle.  Before  daybreak 
on  May  3,  English  troops,  after  the  guns  had 
thinned  the  trees  and  demolished  the  entangle- 
ments in  Oppy  Wood,  burst  into  it,  and 
entered  the  street  leading  to  Neuvireuil. 
They  penetrated   as   far  as  the  south-eastern 


end  of  Oppy,  but  were  forced  back  by  vigorous 
counter-attacks.  The  Prussian  Guards  had 
not  been  entirely  cleared  out  of  the  wood. 
Many  from  platforms  in-  the  trees  poured 
jets  of  bullets  from  their  machine  guns  ;  the 
wrecked  chateau  in  the  wood  had  not  been 
reduced.  Attacked  in  flank  from  the  south 
and  south-east  by  masses  of  Prussian  Guards 
our  men  slowly  evacuated  the  village  and  wood. 
Between  Fresnoy  and  Oppy,  however,  some 
progress  had  been  achieved,  and  the  English 
had  united  up  with  the  victorious  Canadians. 

From  Oppy  to  Gavrelle  the  ground,  studded 
with  "  pill-boxes,"  had  been  the  scene  of 
desperate  and  prolonged  fighting.  The  wind- 
mill on  the  outskirts  of  Gavrelle,  just  north  of 
the  Arras-Douai  road,  changed  hands  no  less 
than  nine  times.  The  Prussian  Guards,  issuing 
from  the  ruins  of  Manville  Farm,  north-east 
of  Fresnes,  and  from  the  Fresnes  Woods, 
refused  to  abandon  the  brick-strewn  mound, 
but  at  nightfall  the  British  by  a  magnificent 
bayonet    charge    succeeded    in     securing    this 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


57 


coveted  and  long-disputed  spot.  The  struggle 
between  Fresnoy  and  Gavrelle  had  been  in- 
decisive ;  from  Gavrelle  over  Greenland  Hill 
to  Roeux  and  Plouvain  on  the  Scarpe  the 
enemy  also  stubbornly  maintained  his  position. 
The  terrain  was  so  churned  up  with  shell 
craters  that  our  troops  could  advance  only 
with  the  greatest  difficulty.  In  every  crater 
were  German  snipers  and  machine-guns.  At 
the  end  of  the  day  we  had  not  captured 
Rceux,  but  we  had  edged  round  it  on  three 
sides,  and,  in  the  afternoon,  our  artillery  had 
inflicted  heavy  losses  on  two  battalions  of  the 
enemy  coming  from  Plouvain. 


Plouvain  were  fairly  protected  from  fire  across 
the  river. 

It  was  with  a  view  to  rendering  tho  position 
of  the  Germans  between  the  Scarpe  and  the 
Arras-Cambrai  road  untenable  that  Allenby's 
right  wing  delivered  its  attack  from  Guemappe 
to  Bullecourt.  On  May  3,  Cavalry  Farm,  north- 
east of  Guemappe,  was  stormed,  and  our  tioope 
forced  their  way  down  the  road  to  St.  Rohart 
Factory  on  the  Cojeul,  about  a  mile  west  of  Via 
en-Artois.  Just  south  of  the  road,  the  enemy 
were  ensconced  in  a  triangular  patch  of  wood- 
land, called  "Triangle  Wood,"  and  in  three 
quarries  joined  up  by  tunnels  with  exits  leading 


-r.    Au  A 


graph. 


BREAKING    UP    A    GERMAN    STRONGHOLD. 


South  of  the  Scarpe,  Allenby's  troops  on 
May  3  won  several  minor  actions.  They  ad- 
vanced between  the  river  and  the  Arras- 
Cambrai  chaussee  on  the  average  about  500 
yards,  carrying  "  Infantry  Hill."  When  sun 
set  we  were  in  Keeling  Copse,  1,500  yards  due 
south  of  Pelves,  and  our  outposts  were  300 
yards  west  of  the  Vert  Wood.  The  Sart  and 
Vert  Woods  had  been,  throughout  the  day, 
converted  into  veritable  infernos,  the  British 
gunners  throwing  streams  of  shells  into  them. 
But  neither  the  woods  nor  Pelves  was  taken, 
and  until  they  were,  the  Germans  in  Rceux  and 


to  the  Sensee.  The  wood  was  slowly  cleared  and 
the  garrisons  of  the  quarries  bombed  into  the 
open,  where  they  were  annihilated  by  a  barrage. 
At  this  point  the  Sensee  was  crossed. 

Meantime  our  troops  had  assaulted  Cherisy 
at  dawn,  from  the  banks  of  the  Cojeul,  west  of. 
the  Sensee.  Trench  lines,  heavily  wired,  and 
two  sunken  roads  ran  in  front  of  the  village. 
Overcoming  all  obstacles,  the  British  troops 
burst  over  the  ruins  and  reached  the  Sensee 
which  was  also  crossed  at  this  point.  But  a 
succession  of  German  counter-attacks  and 
powerful  barrages  obliged  the  British  to  retreat, 


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53 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY     OF    THE    WAR. 


59 


and  Cherisy  was  recovered  by  the  enemy. 
Simultaneously  with  the  attack  on  Cherisy, 
other  British  troops  had  proceeded  against 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Sensee.  The  wood  north  of  the  village  was 
gained,  but  in  the  ruins,  in  the  sunken  roads 
west  of  and  in  the  trenches  south  and  south- 
east of  them,  the  enemy  continued  to  hold  his 
own.  Prince  Rupprecht  was  still  fighting  for 
time  to  complete  the  Queant -Droeourt  line, 
and  the  Germans  clung  desperately  to  Fon- 
taine, the  possession  of  which  impeded  our 
advance  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Sensee. 

From  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  the  German  forti- 
fied zone  ran  southwards,  passing  to  the  west 
of  Bullecourt.  Thence  it  proceeded  south- 
eastwards  to  the  west  of  Queant,  where  the 
junction  was  protected  by  a  deep  semi-circular 
system  of  trenches  and  wire  entanglements  of 
immense  strength.  On  April  11,  it  will  be 
remembered,  Australian  troops  had  broken 
the  zone  between  Bullecourt  and  Queant,  to 
the  left  of  the  junction.  It  was  the  first  effort 
to  use  Tanks  instead  of  artillery  barrage  in  an 
assault,  but  only  a  dozen  were  employed,  and 
they  failed  to  make  any  impression  upon  the 
great  fortress  of  Bullecourt,  on  the  Australians' 
left,  which  was  to  have  been  stormed  by 
British  troops  after  the  Tanks  had  given. the 
signal— a  signal  which  was  either  not  given  or 
not  seen.  Nearly  surrounded,  enfiladed  from 
both  sides,  without  much  artillery  support, 
and  without  communication,  trenches,  the 
Australians  were  ordered  back. 

This  first  peep  into  the  much-vaunted 
Hindenburg  line  had  been  sufficient  to  ■  prove 
its  strength.  But  it  was  by  no  means  un- 
conquerable. It  could  not  compare  with  the 
later  "  pill-box  "  and  concrete  redoubt  system 
adopted  by  General  Sixt  von  Armin  in  the 
north,  which  compelled  on  our  part  a  strategy 
of  limited  offensives,  and  required  in  Flanders 
a  policy  of  consistent  steady  thrusts.  The 
Hindenburg  lino  was  little  more  than  two  lines 
of  massive  trenches,  some  80  yards  apart. 
Each  line  was  heavily  wired,  and  replete  with 
deep  dug-outs  and  shelters,  but  the  British 
and  Australian  corps  in  the  Somme  country 
had  so  harried  and  hastened  the  retreat  that 
the  Germans  had  not  had  time  to  complete 
the  system,  and  even  as  late  as  May  no  revetting 
had  been  done  in  the  trenches. 

The  fighting  in  this  sector  was  judged  of 
special  importance.  For  it  was  hoped  that 
the  Fifth  Army  by  breaking  the  Hindenburg 


line  would  cut  off  and  capture  the  Germans 
as  they  were  driven  down  from  the  north- 
west by  Allcnby. 

The  end  of  April  and  the  first  days  of  May 
saw  the  completion  of  Gough's  far-flung  pre 
parations  for  his  section  of  the  attack.  Battery 
after  battery  had  been  driven  or  dragged  over 
the  devastated  Somme  region,  and  there  were 
great  accumulations  of  shells.  Although  the 
Fifth  Army  had  moved  20  miles  from  its 
winter  lines,  a  barrage  probably  without 
parallel  on  our  side  until  that  date,  was 
arranged  There  was  little  time  for  the 
studied  emplacement  of  guns,  and  detaihil 
observation  of  enemy  positions,  which  previous- 
ly at  Vimy  and  later  at  Messines  and  Ypres, 
made  destruction  of  defences  certain  ;  it  was 
a  battle  barrage  under  the  conditions  of  the 
new  war  of  movement,  which  Hindenburg's 
Somme  retreat  had  brought  into  being.  Yet 
it  seemed  to  express  the  full  meaning  of  Britain's 
vast  efforts  in  the  making  of  munitions.  The 
"  heavies "  mercilessly  pounded,  for  many 
days,  the  German  defences  and  their  covering 
wire -work.  And  when  the  barrage  opened 
at  dawn  on  May  3,  it  was  like  a  rolling  storm  of 
projectiles.  "  Before  the  first  grey  light  of  the 
morning,"  wrote  Mr.  C.  E.  W.  Bean,  the 
Official  Pross  Correspondent  vwith  the  Austra- 
lians, "  guns  for  mile  upon  mile  behind  us,  and 
to  the  north-west  behind  the  British  front  as 
far  as  the  eye  could  see,  burst  into  a  fire  faster 
than  the  rolling  of  a  kettle  drum."  This 
barrage  continued  without  reduction  for  more 
than  three  hours.  It  showered  destruction 
upon  the  Germans,  rolling  onwards  to  far 
beyond  their  trench  system,  whilst  heavy  guns 
pounded  their  back  areas  and  the  points 
where  their  troops  left  the  vehicles  to  march 
on  foot  to  the  front  trenches. 

Varying  fortunes  attended  the  day.  On 
the  right  half  of  General  Gough's  sector, 
the  Fifth  Corps  dented  the  Gennan  lines,  but 
did  not  get  through.  On  the  left,  the  Second 
Australian  Division  fought  through  the  whole 
system  of  defences,  and  awaited  the  fall 
of  Bullecourt  for  a  further  advance.  That 
evening  it  seemed  that  the  great  aim  was 
to  be  achieved.  Strong  counter-attacks  were 
expected,  but  the  ultimate  junction  of  Allenhy's 
troops  with  the  Australians  would  have 
enveloped  a  large  German  force,  and  another 
attack  at  dawn  was  ordered  against  the 
great  impediment — Bullecourt. 

That  fortress  was  to  become  the  centre  of  a 


60 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


maelstrom  which  raged  for  13  days,  and  it  is 
worth  describing  in  detail.  Wherever  men  of 
York,  of  Aberdeenshire,  of  Essex,  tell  of  the 
deeds  of  their  sons,  Bullecourt  will  be  on  their 
lips  ;  in  the  lonely  country  homes  and  thriving 
cities  of  Australia,  it  is  known  with  Gallipoli, 
Pozieres,  and  Passchendaele  as  a  national 
battle-name.  Its  great  strength  lay  in  its 
concrete  machine-gun  emplacements  and  cellars, 
its  deep  tunnel  through  which  reserves  were 
constantly  brought  up,  and  in  the  tenacity  of 
its  defenders.     Tts  few  dozen  cottages  clustered 


with  the  Australian  division  at  Riencourt, 
up  the  hill,  towards  which  Victorian  troops 
(Sixth  Brigade)  had  already  gone  according  to 
time-table.  That  they  did  not  manage  this 
was  due  to  nothing  that  valour  or  death 
could  achieve ;  for  in  Bullecourt  they  had 
encountered  a  defensive  position  which  with 
Thiepval  will  rank  as  one  of  the  stoutest 
ever  defended  by  German  troops  in  France. 

The  fighting  of  May  4  brought  no  change, 
and  all  hope  of  captures  had  to  be  given 
up.     Counter-attacks  pushed  back   the   troops 


GET1ING    A    HEAVY    HOWITZER    INTO 

between  a  large  brick  building  at  the  south- 
western edge,  and  a  refinery  at  the  back.  All 
lay  on  the  flat  and  almost  treeless  side  of  a  hill, 
overlooking  the  Hindenburg  line  to  the  south, 
and  hidden  to  the  north  by  the  rise  of  the 
slope.  It  jutted  out,  a  sinister  ravelin,  in  such 
a  way  as  to  seem  ahead  of  the  chosen  line, 
like  a  solitary  fortress  ;  but  it  was  stiffly 
connected  into  the  general  defence,  and  a 
strong  trench  system  ran  round  it. 

The  62nd  Division  had  penetrated  through 
this  system  on  May  3,  and  had  proved  the 
merits  of  the  late  divisions  of  the  New  Army 
by  storming  many  of  the  village  defences. 
Isolated  parties  were  in  Bullecourt  through- 
out the  day  ;  some  even  reached  the  refinery 
across  the  Hindenburg  line  They  were  des- 
perately   anxious   to    keep    their   appointment 


[Official  ph.„os,aph. 

POSITION     DURING    THE    ADVANCE. 

at  Cherisy  and  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  to  their 
original  line,  and  the  attack  on  Bullecourt, 
which  was  not  accompanied  by  heavy  artillery 
fire,  owing  to  the  hope  of  saving  the  resolute 
British  troops  holding  out  in  it,  failed.  The 
Australians  had  had  a  severe  day  and  night. 
They  had  indeed  several  times  been  within  an 
ace  of  that  retirement  to  the  old  line  which 
had  become  inevitable  along  other  portions  of 
the  battle  front.  Their  hold  on  the  Hindenburg 
line  was  extraordinarily  slender.  Originally  it 
was  a  mere  400-yard  break  made  by  the  23rd 
and  24th  Battalions  (Victorian),  whose  third 
wave  had  passed  on  towards  Riencourt  before 
the  failure  of  the  attacks  on  Bullecourt  had 
bee  i  realized.  The  Fifth  Brigade  (New  South 
Wales)  which  had  advanced  on  the  right  of  the 
Sixth,  forming  the  extreme  right  flank  in  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


61 


A    BOMBARDMENT    WITH    HEAVY    HOWITZERS    IN    PROGRESS. 


■order  of  battle,  had  found  the  German  lines 
held  in  great  strength,  and  all  those  who 
reached  it  were  killed.  Part  of  the  Brigade 
later  joined  their  Victorian  comrades,  and  with 
great  dash  bombed  down  the  German  trenches 
towards  their  first  and  second  objectives.  This 
work  was  continued  by  the  Seventh  and  the 
First  Brigades,  and  by  night  time  the  Austra- 
lians had  secured  all  that  portion  of  the  Hinden- 
burg  line  marked  out  for  them  in  the  general 
scheme — some  1,200  yards.  More  than  half  of 
this  had  been  won  by  bombing,  which  was  now 
the  intensest  form  of  hand-to-hand  fighting  on 
the  Western  front.  Some  Western  Australian 
troops  had  also  been  sent  against  the  south- 
western side  of  Bullecourt,  to  aid  the  62nd 
Division  ;  the  first  wave  was  annihilated,  and 
the  orders  to  the  others  were  countermanded. 

Throughout  the  night  the  Germans  tried 
desperately  to  turn  the  Australians  out  of  the 
line,  and  counter-attacks  were  numerous.  The 
Australian  position  was  like  a  large  flower  on 
a  very  slender  stalk — a  single  communication 
sap,  bravely  dug  by  the  engineers  during  the 
first  hours  of  the  attack,  being  the  only  link 
between  the  new  positions  and  the  old.  The 
heaviest  counter-attack  was  made  at  10,  and 
consisted  of  waves  of  "  storm  troops,"  who 
advanced  from  Bullecourt  on  the  one  side  and 
from  Queant  on  the  other.  They  used  flame 
throwers,  mortars  and  bombs,  and  were  met 
with  a  hail  of  Stokes  mortar-bombs  and  with 
cold  steel      The  Australians'  right  was  slowly 


driven  in.  The  Germans  reached  even  to  the 
sap.  They  came  on  wave  after  wave  ;  the 
heroic  survivors  of  the  23rd  and  24th  Bat- 
talions, which  still  clung  to  their  gains  of  the 
morning,  seemed  doomed  to  isolation.  "  The 
precious  grip  on  the  Hindenburg  line."  wrote 
an  Australian  correspondent,  "  seemed  to 
slacken  and  fail  under  mere  weight  of  the 
enemy  thrusts.  Back  at  the  railway  embank- 
ment, the  old  Australian  front  line,  every  man 
was  given  a  post  of  defence.  The  Brigadier 
seized  a  rifle.  Eight  hundred  yards  forward  in 
the  new  line  the  word  went  round  to  retire. 
'  Who  said  retire  ?  '  said  the  men.  '  None  of 
our  officers  will  say  retire.'  They  resolved, 
these  Victorians,  to  die  where  they  stood  rather 
than  give  up  their  gains.  And  it  seemed  at  that 
moment  that  the  choice  had  definitely  come." 

The  counter-attacks  were  beaten  back  before 
midnight,  and  during  the  day  troops  of  the 
First  Australian  Division  recovered  by  bombing 
all  the  lost  ground.  By  the  evening  of  May  4 
the  battle  had  become  a  stern  struggle  for 
the  retention  of  this  pathway  throxigh  the 
Hindenburg  line.  To  the  north  the  fighting 
simmered  down  ;  the  hope  of  great  captures 
was  abandoned.  But  here  was  the  vital  breach, 
through  which  further  advance  might  become 
possible  ;  and  the  forthcoming  events  on  the . 
French  front  demanded  that  the  full  enemy 
strength  should  be  kept  employed. 

General    Gough    brought    up    the    Seventh 
Division,    which    relieved    the    62nd    on    the 


62 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Bulleeourt  front ;  the  remaining  brigades  of 
the  First  Australian  Division  moved  up  in 
support  of  the  Second  Australian  Division, 
and  General  Hobbs's  Fifth  Australian  Division 
was  brought  within  striking  distance.  It 
was  determined  to  take  Bulleeourt  by  a 
series  of  frontal  assaults,  and  to  Tiold  at  all 
costs  the  breach  in  the  Hindenburg  line 
to  the  right,  despite  the  mass  of  artillery 
which  the  Germans  were  now  concentrating  on 
this  solitary  spot 


that  some  of  the  62nd  Division  were  still  holding 
out,  was  commenced.  Bulleeourt  changed 
shape  visibly  under  our  fire.  During  May  5 
and  6,  and  indeed,  though  in  lesser  degree, 
throughout  the  remaining  days  of  the  battle, 
Bulleeourt  and  the  positions  to  the  south  were 
an  inferno  of  explosions.  The  enemy  barrages 
were  little  less  fierce  than  our  own,  whilst  our 
steady  pounding  of  the  ruined  buildings  cast  a 
pall  of  dull  reddish  smoke  over  the  battlefield. 
A  strong  assault  was  launched  by  Gordons 


\O0icial  pliotograptl. 

A    TRACTOR    DISABLED    BY    THE    ROUGHNESS    OF    THE    ROAD. 


The  battle  of  Fresnoy-Bullecourt  had  thus 
yielded  appreciable  results.  Home's  Cana- 
dians had  secured  Fre3noy.  Birdwood's  Aus- 
tralians had  inserted  themselves  between  the 
Oppy-Queant  and  the  Drocourt-Queant  lines. 
On  the  first  day  we  had  taken  over  900  prisoners, 
including  28  officers,  and  we  had  prevented 
I'rince  Rupprecht  reinforcing  the  German 
Crown  Prince,  who,  as  described  in  Chapter 
CCIX,  was  successfully  attacked  on  May  4,  5 
and  6  by  General  Nivelle  north  of  the  Aisne. 

Some  brave  reconnoitring  work  by  officers' 
patrols  and  aeroplane  observation  established 
the  fact  that  all  the  life  showing  in  Bulleeourt 
was  German.  The  drenching  with  heavy 
shells,   which   had   been  avoided   in  the  hope 


of  the  7th  Division  in  the  early  morning  of 
Monday,  May  7.  The  207th  German  Division 
had  been  brought  up  to  defend  it,  and  the  fight- 
ing was  stubborn.  The  Gordons  penetrated  into 
the  ruins,  and  at  the  same  time  troops  of  the 
1st  Australian  Division  began  to  bomb  down 
the  trenches  on  the  western  side.  Since  May  3 
the  Australian  position  had  been  fully  exposed 
on  each  flank,  the  points  where  their  occupation 
of  the  German  system  ended  being  marked 
only  by  sand-bag  barricades.  The  Scottish 
troops,  known  everywhere  amongst  the  Aus- 
tralians as  "  Jocks,"  clung  to  a  line  across  the 
south-eastern  corner  of  the  village,  and  about 
noon  that  day  the  union  of  Scottish  and  Au- 
tralians  took  place  in  the  Hindenburg  line  on 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


68 


the  south-western  slope  of  Bullecourt,  and  a 
continuous  front  was  established  firmly  from 
the  pounded  hillside  to  which  the  Australians 
had  so  tenaciously  held. 

The  Germans  would  not  yet  admit  defeat. 
But  in  a  supreme  test  of  strength,  in  which 
they  showed  no  lack  of  men,  guns,  or  shells, 
they  were  being  steadily  thrust  back  off  their 
highly-prized  ground.  Their  leadors  seemed 
apprehensive  and  nervous.  They  were  not 
yet    ready    with    the    Drocourt-Queant    line, 


from  one,  and  seeming  to  lurch  forward  and 
plunge  into  the  next.  It  was  well  done,  but 
it  was  irresistibly  funny  to  watch.  Our  men 
stood  on  the  parapet,  and  breast-high  against 
it,  with  cigarettes  in  their  mouths,  and  shot  as 
they  havo  seldom  had  the  chance  to  shoot. 
The  attackers  were  simply  wiped  out  with 
rifle  and  machine-gun  fire,  though  somo  got 
close  to  our  line.  They  tried  at  the  same 
time  a  bombing  attack  on  the  flank,  and  this  was 
well  countered  by  our  Stokes  guns." 


[Oficutl  pkvtograpk. 

A    GERMAN    OBSERVATION    POST    DESTROYED    BY    GUN-FIRE. 


according  to  the  reports  of  our  airmen,  and  they 
placed  great  importance  upon  regaining  what 
they  had  lost  near  and  in  Bullecourt.  By  May  8 
they  had  counter-attacked  in  this  area  no 
less  than  13  times.  New  methods  were  em- 
ployed. An  Australian  general  thus  described 
a  counter-attack  in  which  shell  holes  were 
used  :  "  It  was  for  all  the  world  like  a  school 
of  seals.  First  the  heads  of  a  number  of  Ger- 
mans wore  seen  in  the  sunken  road,  near 
Biencourt,  to  which  some  of  our  men  had 
penetrated  during  the  first  minutes  of  the 
assault.  The  counter-attacking  troops  were 
forming  up.  Then  they  came  over  the  top. 
They  came,  two  or  three  hundred  together, 
diving  from  shell-hole  to  shell-hole— crawling 


By  all  the  theory  of  war  the  Australians 
should  have  been  thrown  put  of  their  position. 
A  captured  Prussian  officer,  who  could  not 
understand  their  venturing  to  retain  so  exposed 
a  salient,  spoke  of  them  hopelessly  as  "  those 
madmen  from  the  Antipodes."  But  every  yard 
gained  in  Bullecourt  increased  the  area  over 
which  the  Germans  had  to  distribute  their 
shells,  and  the  linking  up  with  the  7th  Division 
firmly  secured  the  left  flank. 

By  a  second  assault  the  7th  Division 
slightly  increased  their  grip  on  the  village, 
but  for  four  days  after  the  junction  great 
efforts  were  still  required  to  consolidate  the 
position,  defeat  counter-attacks,  and  pre- 
pare    for    the    assault    planned    for    May    12 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE     WAB. 


65 


At  dawn  on  that  day  the  village  was  assaulted 
from  three  sides.  Gordon  Highlanders  and 
Devons  dashed  into  the  ruins  from  the  west, 
English  troops  from  the  south-west,  and 
Australians  from  the  south-east.  The  battle 
proceeded  during  this  day  and  the  next  with  all 
its  old  fury.  The  Australians'  part  was 
entrusted  to  the  loth  Brigade  (Victorians), 
who  were  so  close  to  the  German  positions 
that  an  artillery  preparation  had  to  be  dis- 
pensed with.  There  were  in  particular  here 
two  strong  posts  bristling  with  machine 
guns  in  concrete  emplacements,  and  fenced 
with  thick  wire.  Fearing  to  withdraw  his  men 
whilst  artillery  destroyed  the  entanglements, 
lest  the  Germans  should  oacupy  their  old 
positions,  Birdwood  decided  to  rely  wholly 
upon  a  hurricane  fire  with  Stokes  mortars. 
The  fight  was  a  lively  one,  but  thoroughly 
successful.  A  heavy  German  barrage  descended 
before  the  attack,  and  two  sections  of  Stokes 
mortars  were  blown  away  or  buried.  The 
remaining  guns,  however,  together  with  the 
larger  trench  mortars,  provided  an  adequate 
though  singular  barrage.  In  and  about  one 
strong  point  there  were  150  dead  Germans, 
and  those  who  survived  seemed  utterly  cowed. 
The  storming  troops  met  a  shower  of  bombs, 
but  the  Germans  soon  capitulated. 

Similar  success  on  the  other  sides  of  the 
village  brought  the  British  line  on  Sunday, 
May  13,  through  the  northern  corner  of  Bulle- 
eourt,  and  all  that  remained  to  be  done  was  the 
capture  of  a  strong  point  near  the  refinery. 
Sunday  we  spent  in  repulsing  counter-attacks 
and  evicting  the  enemy  from  the  cellars  and 
dug-outs,  and  the  gap  in  the  Hindenburg  line 
became  nearly  two  miles  in  width. 

A  final  effort  was  made  by  Prince  Rupprecht 
to  re-establish  it.  On  May  12  he  had 
withdrawn  the  Lehr  Regiment  from  the  3rd 
Guard  Division,  which  opposed  the  Aus- 
tralians.* The  regiment  was  one  of  the  most 
famous  in  the  Gorman  Army.  It  was  told  that 
the  honour  of  recovering  the  Hindenburg  line 
was  to  belong  to  it,  and  that  after  the  battle  it 
would  be  sent  to  a  pleasant  resting  place. 
Whether  the  "  Cockchafers  " — the  regiment's 
nickname  at  Potsdam  and  Berlin— enjoyed 
the      prospects — which      had      been      earned, 

*  The  Lehr  Regiment  consists  of  small  detachments 
brought  together  from  the  various  Prussian  regiments 
to  be  trained  together  so  as  to  ensure  when  they  return 
to  their  units  that  they  may  impart  instruction  on 
identical  lines. 


they  were  told,  by  their  singular  prowess  on 
the  .Eastern  Front — is  not  related  in  the 
records  of  the  prisoners  afterwards  taken.  But 
they  appear  to  have  rehearsed  the  attack 
with  great  thoroughness.  Aeroplane  photo- 
graphs were  taken  of  the  Australian  positions, 
and  model  trenches  made  for  the  rehearsals. 
The  regiment  went  over  the  attack  by  day, 
and  then  by  night.  Little  white  screens  were 
used  to  mark  4 he  distances,  so  that  the  men 
would  by  practice  know  almost  by  instinct 
the  places  they  had  reached.  Every  man 
was  taught  his  exact  duty  in  the  attack. 

A  great  bombardment  preceded  this  assault. 
All  day  on  May  14  German  artillery  and  mor- 
tars pounded  the  Australian  line.  At  night 
the  bombardment  intensified,  and  an  hour 
before  dawn  it  became  terrific.  At  3.45  the 
"  Cockchafers  "  advanced.  They  attacked  the 
Australians  from  right  flank,  which  was  still 
in  the  air,  to  the  junction  with  the  7th 
Division,  whilst  other  specially  trained  troops 
advanced  towards  the  British  in  Bullecourt 
itself.  At  this  point  the  Germans  had  to  come 
in  frontal  assault  across  level  ground,  and  our 
garrison  of  London  troops  shot  them  down 
before  they  reached  the  trenches.  .  On  the 
right,  however,  where  Australians  and  Ger- 
mans were  only  40  yards  apart,  severe  hand- 
to-hand  fighting  took  place.  Mr.  Bean  wrote 
the  following  description  of  the  "  Cockchafers'  " 
temporary  success  : 

One  after  another,  four  waves  of  dark  figures  attempted 
to  rush  over  the  tumbled  earthen  sea  against  the  two  end* 
of  the  trenches  held  by  the  Australians.  A  good  part  of 
them  were  mown  down  at  once  with  botnbs  and  machine- 
guns.  A  portion  managed  to  struggle  through  towards 
our  front  trench,  and  the  dark  figures  could  be  nan 
running  along  it  and  at  once  dropping  in.  But  the  attack 
was  always  utterly  disorganized.  Within  two  minutes  of 
the  assault  having  been  begun,  the  results  of  all  this 
careful  planning  and  practice  had  been  thrown  to  the 
winds.  All  that  remained  of  it  was  between  two  and 
three  hundred  Germans  in  a  section  of  Australian  trench, 
with  scarcely  any  idea  of  where  they  were  and  what 
was  happening,  machine -gun  bullets  sweeping  above 
their  heads  and  making  any  sort  of  movement  utterly 
perilous. 

The  Germans  held  their  small  gain  for  some 
three  hours.  None  escaped.  All  were  im- 
mediately cut  off  from  their  own  line  by  a 
heavy  barrage,  which  thundered  down  with 
fine  precision  behind  them.  Two  counter- 
attacks, both  launched  straight  at  them  across 
the  top  by  the  New  South  Wales  garrison, 
accounted  for  the  lot.  The  first  counter- 
attack drove  them  into  a  small  corner  of  the 
trenches ;  the  second,  which  was  supported 
by  Londoners,  who  temporarily  took  over  part 


66 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  the  Australian  line,  cleared  them  all  up. 
This  counter-blast  was  delivered  in  broad  day- 
light, and  it  marked  the  finish  of  the  German 
resistance  in  the  battle  of  Bullecourt.  Next 
day  the  last  strong  point  on  the  battlefield 
was  seized  by  British  troops. 

The  prolonged  battle  for  Bullecourt  and  for 
the  consolidation  of  the  conquered  southern 
sector  of  the  Oppy-Queant  line  had  its  main 
value  in  the  distinct  beating  and  hammering 
it  inflicted  upon  Prince  Rupprecht's  army.  As 
events  turned  out,  the  possession  of  Bullecourt 
was  not  made  use  of  in  further  movement  in 
this  sector,  for  immediately  upon  the  stoppage 
of  the  French  offensive  changes  were  made  in 
the  Allied  plan,  and  the  centre  of  the  British 
actions  moved  farther  to  the  north.  But  Bulle- 
court tied  German  divisions  to  the  sector  during 
fateful  days,  it  mauled  them,  and  it  had  a 
distinct  moral  effect.  It  proved  our  definite 
capacity,  despite  massing  of  troops  and  guns, 
to  advance  into  and  even  beyond  the  Hinden- 
burg  line. 

During  the  battle  of  Fresnoy-Bullecourt 
and  in  the  interval  between  it  and  the  battle  of 
Wytschaete-Messines,  several  incidents  occurred 
deserving  of  detailed  notice.  On  Saturday, 
May  5,  a  day  of  great  heat,  when  there  was  a 
haze  so  thick  that  from  a  height  of  2,000  feet 
aviators  could  scarcely  see  the  ground,  five  of 
our  aeroplanes  engaged  a  squadron  of  27 
German  machines  arranged  in  three  formations, 
one  of  which  had  cut  in  behind  the  British 
fliers.  For  a  full  hour,  from  5  to  6  p.m.,  the 
unequal  combat  proceeded,  ■  the  enemy's  anti- 
aircraft guns  pouring  shells  upward  through 
the  haze  to  the  danger  of  friend  and  foe  alike. 
In  the  first  few  minutes  one  German  machine 
was  seen  to  fall  in  flames.  Then  another  went 
down,  turning  over  and  over.  A  third  was  sent 
spinning  down  and  crashed  on  the  ground. 
Directly  afterwards  a  British  machine  in  trouble 
dived  from  11,000  to  3,000  feat  pursued  by  a 
German  aeroplane.  The  pursuer  was  in  his 
turn  pursued  and  put  out  of  action,  and  our 
machine  righted  itself,  in  the  midst  of  exploding 
shells,  and  rejoined  its  comrades  at  the  moment 
when  still  another  Gorman  aviator  was  sent  to 
his  doom.  Again  a  British  machine,  with  its 
reserve  petrol  tank  in  flames,  was  obliged  to 
descend  and  was  pursued.  It  made  its  way 
towards  our  lines.  A  German  aeroplane  which 
dived  at  it  was  mortally  hit  and  dropped  like 
a  stone.     Three  more  German  aeroplanes  were 


next  disposed  of,  and  the  rest  of  the  squadron, 
which  was  believed  to  be  "  von  Billow's  circus,"  * 
retired.  The  performance  of  our  men  was  the 
more  meritorious  because,  with  the  exception 
of  the  flight  leader,  few  of  them  had  had  much 
experience  of  aerial  fighting. 

The  same  day  Captain  Ball,  the  well-known 
aviator,  fought  two  of  his  last  successful  fights. 
Having  disposed  of  hostile  machines  he  re- 
turned safely  to  his  aerodrome.  On  Sunday, 
single-handed,  he  attacked  four  Albatross 
scouts  of  a  new  type,  sent  one  to  the  ground 
and  put  the  remaining  three  to  flight. 

Saturday,  May  5,  was  also  memorable  for 
the  capture  of  a  section  of  the  German  front 
line  south  of  the  Souchez  river.  On  Sunday 
morning  a  counter-attack  was  beaten  off. 

It  was  on  the  evening  of  Monday,  May  7, 
that  Captain  Ball  closed  his  career.  Together 
with  another  machine  he  drove  down  a  Hun 
aeroplane  and  then  closed  with  four  others. 
His  comrade  sent  one  crashing  to  the  ground, 
but,  wounded  in  the  wrist,  was  forced  to  make 
for  home.  What  exactly  happened  to  Captain 
Ball  has  not  yet  transpired.  He  was  in  his 
21st  year  ;  he  had  accounted  for  some  forty 
enemy  machines  in  the  course  of  his  brief  and 
heroic  career  and  he  met  his  death  in  glorious 
encounter. 

The  next  day,  Tuesday,  May  8,  the  Germans 
gained  their  first  distinct  success  since  the 
opening  of  the  British  offensive.  Under  cover 
of  a  tremendous  bombardment  and  clouds  of  a 
new  poison  gas,  the  15th  Reserve  and  the  4th 
Guard  and  1st  Guard  Reserve  Divisions 
assaulted  the  Canadian  and  English  troops  in 
and  around  Fresnoy.  They  were  repulsed, 
but,  later  in  the  morning,  an  entirely  fresh 
division,  the  5th  Bavarian,  was  flung  in  close 
formation  at  our  weary  men.  Fresnoy  and  its 
Wood  were  lost.  A  few  hours  later  part  of  the 
abandoned  ground  was  recovered,  but  the 
village  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  evening  German  attacks  north  of  Fres- 
noy and  north-east  of  Gavrelle  collapsed. 

On  Wednesday,  May  9,  there  was  violent 
fighting  round  Fresnoy.  The  next  day, 
May  10,  at  nightfall,  the  Germans,  encouraged 
by  their  recovery  of  Fresnoy,  attacked  Arleux 
and  the  British  defences  between  that  ruined 
village  and  the  Souchez  river.     Columns  and 

♦There  were  two  of  these  "circuses'*  at  this  date; 
the  other  was  commanded  by  Captain  Baron  von  Richt- 
hofen.  Each  comprised  from  24  to  30  machines.  They 
travelled  along  the  front  and  were  used  at  various 
points.     Hence  the  name. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


67 


waves  of  men  were  recklessly  thrown  forward, 
only  to  be  thinned  and  cheeked  by  our  guns 
and  machine-guns.  On  the  11th  the  attacks 
were  renewed  for  three  hours  against  our 
positions  south  of  the  Souchez.  With  flame- 
throwers the  enemy  succeeded  in  •  driving  us 
back,  but  all  the  trenches  were  recaptured  in 
the  afternoon  by  counter  attacks. 

Meanwhile  the  loss  of  Fresnoy  had  been 
counterbalanced  by  the  capture  of  most  of 
Roeux.  After  a  terrific  bombardment  on  the 
evening  of  Friday,  May  11,  English,  Scottish 


Haig  was  able  to  announce  that  the  whole  of 
Roeux  was  in  the  possession  of  the  British. 

On  May  16,  in  the  morning,  the  enemy 
counter-attacked  between  Gavrelle  and  tho 
Scarpe.  The  advance  was  preceded  by  one  of 
the  heaviest  bombardments  yet  experienced 
by  our  men.  Three  several  coliunns  came  on 
behind  the  German  barrage.  One  moved  up 
the  north  bank  of  tho  river  ;  another  between 
Rooux  and  the  chemical  works  ;  the  third  fol- 
lowed the  embankment  of  the  Douai -Arras 
railway.     The  first  two  columns  were  smashed 


[Official  photograph. 

COOKING    DINNER    AMID    THE    RUINS    OF    A    CAPTURED    VILLAGE. 


and  Irish  troops  at  last  cleared  the  enemy,  con- 
sisting chiefly  of  troops  of  the  4th  Ersatz 
Division,  out  of  the  chemical  works,  the 
chateau,  cemetery  and  western  houses  of  the 
village.  On  the  morning  of  Saturday,  May  12, 
we  continued  our  advance  and  carried  the 
German  positions  on  a  front  of  about  a  mile 
and  a  half.  Some  700  prisoners,  including  11 
officers,  and  a  number  of  trench  mortars  and 
machine-guns,  were  captured.  Simultaneously, 
south  of  the  Scarpe  along  the  Arras-Cambrai 
road,  we  stormed  a  German  fort  and  pushed 
forward  to  a  point  about  1,500  yards  east  of 
Guemappe.     On  Monday,  May  14,  Sir  Douglas 


by  the  British  shells  and  bullets  ;  the  third 
temporarily  penetrated  our  lines,  to  bo  promptly 
evicted  before  many  minutes  had  elapsed.  A 
number  of  prisoners  were  left  in  our  hands. 

North-west  of  Bullecourt,  near  Fontaine-lez- 
Croisilles,  our  troops  the  same  day  progressed 
a  little  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Sensee. 

The  capture  of  Bullecourt  was  followed  by 
a  vicorous  and  successful  blow  aimed  at  the 
German  lines  between  Bullecourt  and  Fontaine- 
lez-Croisilles.  Shortly  after  5  a.m.  on  Sunday, 
May  20,  the  day  when  the  French  finished  the 
Battle  of  Moronvilliers  by  capturing  Mt. 
Cornillet    and    its    tunnel,    English,    including 


68 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Kentish,  and  Scottish,  troops  attacked  the 
German  49th  Reserve  Division,  consisting  of 
the  225th,  226th  and  228th  Regiments.  Our 
guns  had  been  relentlessly  pounding  the  sector 
for  several  days,  and  the  Germans  on  both 
sides  of  the  Sensee  offered  little  effective 
resistance.  Some  3,000  yards  of  trenches  and 
redoubts — 600  yards  west  and  2,400  yards  east 
of  the  river — were  captured.  A  second  attack 
in  the  early  evening  carried  us  forward  into  the 
enemy's  support  line,  and  involved  the  capture 
of  the  huge  long  tunnel  beneath  it.  Con- 
structed by  gangs  of  British  and  Russian 
prisoners  and  fitted  with  alcoves  containing 
sleeping  bunks,  shelves  for  rifles  and  bomb 
supplies,  and  lighted  by  electricity,  it  had 
formed  a  valuable  shelter  for  Germans,  the  loss 
of  which  involved  a  long  part  of  the  trenches 
connected  with  it.  Over  200  prisoners  had 
been  secured  in  this  operation.  With  the 
exception  of  a  front  of  2,000  yards  adjoining 
Bullecourt  on  the  north-west,  the  Germans 
now  retained  nothing  south  of  Fontaine-lez- 
C'roisilles. 

The  action  on  May  20,  like  that  on  the  same 
day  at  Mt.  Cornillet,  virtually  closed  for  the 
time  being  the  Allied  offensive  between  Lens 
and  Auberive.     From  May  20,  to  the  opening 


of  the  Battle  of  Wytschaete-Messines,  on 
June  7,  little  was  accomplished  on  the  British 
front  in  the  Arras  region.  On  the  23rd  we 
successfully  raided  the  enemy's  lines  south-east 
of  Gavrelle.  Two  days  later  (May  25)  a  portion 
of  the  enemy's  front  trench  system  south-east 
of  Loos  was  secured  with  25  prisoners,  and 
counter-attacks  north-east  of  Arleux  and  south- 
west of  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles  were  repulsed. 
West  and  north-west  of  the  last-named  village 
we  progressed  slightly  on  Saturday,  May  26, 
and  on  Sunday,  May  27,  when  also,  after  dark, 
German  raids  south  of  Lens  and  north-west  of 
Cherisy  ended  in  our  inflicting  numerous  casual  - 
ties  and  taking  prisoners.  On  the  27th  several 
combats  in  the  air  occurred.  We  wrecked  12 
and  drove  down  10  other  machines  out  of 
contiol  with  a  loss  of  three  of  our  own  aero- 
planes. One  hostile  machine  was  shot  down 
by  our  anti-aircraft  guns.  During  the  night  of 
May  29-30,  more  enemy  raids  near  Fontaine- 
lez-Croisilles  and  west  of  Lens  were  repulsed. 
The  next  night  a  slight  advance  was  made  by 
us  west  of  Cherisy.  By  that  date,  since  May  1, 
we  had  captured  3,412  prisoners,  including  68 
officers,  1  field  gun,  21  trench  mortars,  and  80 
machine-guns. 

In  the  first  days  of  June  there  was  renewed 


PRISONERS    AWAITING    THEIR    RATIONS. 


[Official  phott graph. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


69 


WORKING    PARTIES    FOLLOWING    UP    THE    ADVANCE. 


[Offiii.il  fih<.Lgrapk. 


liveliness.  On  the  night  of  Friday,  June  1, 
the  Germans  vigorously  attacked  a  post  south 
of  Oppy,  and  on  the  night  of  Saturday,  June  2 
the  Canadians  west  and  south-west  of  Avion 
assaulted  the  enemy  on  a  front  of  2,000  yards 
south  of  the  Souchez  river,  while  the  Germans 
attacked  our  line  of  advanced  posts  south-west 
of  Cherisy.  The  moon  that  night  shone 
brightly.  By  early  dawn  on  June  3,  the 
Canadians  had  taken  the  trenches  garrisoned 
by  troops  of  the  56th  Bavarian  Division,  and 
also  the  ruins  of  the  electric-light  works, 
500  yards  south  of  the  Souchez,  and  those  of 
a  so-called  brewery  on  the  Arras-Lens  road 
700  yards  farther  east.  Over  100  prisoners 
had  been  made.  The  Canadians  were,  how- 
ever, not  destined  to  hold  the  captured  ground 
long.  Numerous  German  guns  east  of  Lens 
opened  fire  and  waves  of  Germans  advanced. 
By  nightfall  our  men  had  been  forced  back  to 
thoir  original  position. 

At  Chensy  during  the  night  of  June  2-3,  the 
enemy  made  some  progress,  but  counter  attacks 
drove  him  back  and  the  last  post  won  by  him 
was  retaken  on  the  night  of  June  3-4.  Twenty- 
four  hours  afterwards  the  electricpower  station 
south  of  the  Souchez  river  passed  into  our 
hands,  and  the  next  night  (June  5-6)  and  on 
the  morning  of  June  6,  between  Gavrelle  and 
Rcenx,  we  ejected  the  Germans   from  a  mile 


of  trenches  on  the  western  slope  of  Greenland 
Hill,  162  prisoners  (including  4  officers) 
being  brought  in. 

On  the  British  front  in  less  than  a  month 
there  had  been  captured  nearly  20,000  prisoners, 
including  400  officers.  The  gains  in  material 
amounted  to  257  guns  of  which  98  were  of 
large  calibre,  464  machine  guns,  227  trench 
mortars  and  immense  quantities  of  other  war 
material. 

While  the  fighting  which  followed  the  Battle 
of  Fresnoy-Bullecourt  proceeded  between  Lens 
and  Bullecourt,  nothing  occurred  of  much 
moment  north  of  the  former  and  south  of  the 
latter.  Apart  from  some  small  progress  made 
north  of  Havrincourt  Wood,  north  of  Connelieu, 
north-east  of  Hargicourt,  east  of  \jp  Verguier 
and  Gricourt— a  village  between  Le  Verguier 
and  St.  Quentin  within  a  few  hundred  yards 
of  the  Cambrai-St.  Quentin  chaussee-  1 1 1<  • 
British  marked  time  and  consolidated  their 
front  in  the  devastated  region.  Between  Lens 
and  the  Belgian  coast  several  raids  by  British 
and  Germans  were  reported  in  the  neighbour- 
hoods of  Ypres,  Messines,  Wytscluvte,  Ploeg- 
stecrt  Wood,  Armenti' res.  Xeuve  Chapelle 
and  the  battlefield  of  Loos. 

Whit  Monday,  May  28,  was  celebrated  by 
our  aeroplanes  bombing  St.  Pierre  Station  at 
Ghent,  the  junction  of  the  Bruges,  Dixmude, 


70 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


[Officio:  photograph. 

A    TIMBERED    ROAD    THROUGH    A    CAPTURED    FRENCH    VILLAGE. 


Courtrai,  Oudenarde  lines.  The  Kaiser  and 
Hindenburg  were  in  the  waiting-room  when 
at  8.45  p.m.  our  airmen  appeared  above  the 
station  Considerable  damage  was  inflicted 
but  the  German  Emperor  and  his  suite  escaped 
unscathed. 

On  the  night  of  June  4-5,  the  hostile  shipping 
in  Zeebrugge  was  successfully  bombed  and  on 
Tuesday,  June  5,  our  monitors  shelled  Ostend. 
The  majority  of  the  workshops  in  the  dockyard 
were  either  wrecked  or  totally  destroyed.  The 
entrance  gates  to  the  dockyard  basin,  the 
wharf,  the  submarine  shelter  and  a  destroyer 
under  repair  were  badly  damaged.  The  next 
day  (June  6),  a  squadron  of  naval  aeroplanes 
hit  a  big  shed  at  the  aerodrome  at  Nieuwmun- 
ster,  15  miles  from  Blankenberghe. 

On  that  day  a  German  soldier  on  the  Messines 
ridge  wrote  a  letter,  which  was  subsequently 
found  by  our  men,  the  address  of  which  was, 
"  A  Shell  Hole  in  Hell." 

We  are  quite  helpless  against  the  English.  Thirty 
men  have  been  buried  in  mine  galleries,  and  are  burning 
into  the  bargain.  Every  day  the  English  fetch  over 
some  of  those  in  the  front  trench,  or  rather  hole.  What 
are  the  poor  fellows  to  do  ?  Every  one  refuses  to  go  to 
the  frontline.  We  wait  all  night  in  immediate  readiness 
for  action.  We  can  no  longer  sit  or  lie  down.  Our 
heads  ache  from  the  gas.     Our  cigarettes  taste  of  gas. 


The  23-centimetre  steel  shell  would  drive  a  lion  mad,  and 
its  effect  is  indescribable.  Our  artillery  cannot  fire  in 
the  daytime.  Three  days  more  and  we  shall  go  right  up 
to  the  front  line  again  for  five  days.  We  all  look  forward 
with  joy  to  being  made  prisoners.  We  do  not  touch 
the  hand  grenades.  It  would  be  useless.  Nowhere  can 
a  man  be  worse  off,  not  even  among  Hottentots.  Such  a 
pitiful  life — no  food,  no  drinking  water  all  day,  and  the 
sun  burns.  At  midnight  dinner,  and  at  .1  in  the  morning 
coffee,  but  not  always,  as  in  every  act  there  is  danger  to 
one's  life.  If  we  are  not  soon  relieved  we  shall  go  mad  ; 
we  are  already  all  muddled. 

He  had  only  24  hours  to  wait  to  find  a  still 
worse  fate  would  overtake  him,  when  on  the 
opening  day  of  the  British  attack  he  and 
thousands  of  his  countrymen  were  blown  sky- 
high  by  the  mines  which  had  been  driven 
under  their  position. 

The  above  letter  shows  admirably  the  nature 
of  the  British  preparations  which  preceded 
the  battle  delivered  by  Sir  Herbert  Plumer  on 
June  7,  against  the  German  positions  between 
Wytschaete  and  Messines  on  the  eastern  edge 
of  the  Mt.  des  Cats  ridge. 

In  the  period  just  described  the  main  opera- 
tions may  be  taken  as  terminating  on  May  5, 
which  brought  to  an  end  the  first  half  of  General 
Haig's  plan.  The  decisive  action  which  it  had 
been  hoped  might  have  resulted  from  the 
French  advance  had  been  proved  to  be  impossible 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


71 


for  a  time,  though  the  results  obtained  presaged 
well  for  the  future.  So  far  as  the  British 
gains  were  concerned  our  line  had  been  pushed 
forward  along  20  miles  to  a  depth  which  at 
some  points  exceeded  five  miles  and  which 
everywhere  represented  a  large  and  important 
conquest  of  enemy  positions.  We  had  snatched 
from  his  hold  some  60  square  miles  of  territory. 

The  ground  now  held  represented  a  very 
great  improvement  in  our  military  position, 
compared  with  that  at  the  commencement  of 
the  operations  in  question.  The  occupation 
of  Vimy  ridge  had  removed  a  constant  menace 
to  the  security  of  our  line  and  had  turned 
what  had  been  a  danger  to  us  into  one  which 
now  threatened  the  enemy.  His  new  lines 
from  Oppy  to  Queant  had  been  penetrated, 
and  we  were  in  a  position  to  assume  more 
active  steps  against  him  whenever  we  saw 
fit  so  to  do.  But  for  a  time  it  was  not  necessary 
to  press  forward  in  this  quarter,  and  ia  ancord- 
ance  with  his  plan  previously  alluded  i*.  §>ir 
Douglas  Haig  took  the  second  step  in  the 
general  advance  of  the  British. 

General  Sir  Herbert  Plumer,  with  the  Second 
Army,  was  now  to  advance  on  June  7 
against  the  Messines-Wytschaete   Ridge.      Its 


capture  was  of  the  highest  importance,  as  it 
was  a  perpetual  source  of  danger  to  our  trenches 
in  front  of  Ypres,  which  were  completely 
dominated  by  it.  Moreover,  the  Germans 
from  these  positions  were  able  to  see  far  over 
our  lines  farther  north  and  to  the  west.  The 
situation  was  analogous  to  what  had  been  tin- 
case  at  the  Vimy  Ridge,  but  even  more  danger- 
ous to  us.  To  conquor  it  was  an  indispensable 
postulate  to  the  Flanders  advance  to  be  under- 
taken later. 

The  British  Commander-in-Chief  had  none 
too  many  troops  at  his  disposal,  and  to  obtain 
sufficient  it  was  agreed  that  the  French  should 
again  tak<s  over  charge  of  part  of  the  front  which 
had  been  occupied  by  British  on  the  Allies'  left 
at  the  commencement  of  the  year.  This  opera- 
tion was  carried  out  without  hindrance  on 
May  20,  by  the  French  extending  their  front  to 
the  River  Omignon. 

But  something  more  wa3  needed  than  a  mere 
offensive  against  the  line  Messines-Wytschaete. 
It  was  necessary  to  keep  the  enemy  fixed  in 
front  of  the  newly  won  positions,  and  so  to 
attract  attention  as  to  render  it  impossible  for 
him  to  judge  front  which  quarter  the  next 
blow  was  to  be  aimed.     This  was  accomplished 


[Official  photograph. 

"PINE-APPLE"    GRENADES    LEFT    BEHIND    BY    THE    GERMANS    IN    THEIR 

HURRIED    RETREAT. 


72 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


CAVALRY    TAKING    THEIR    HORSES    TO    WATER. 


by  a  carefully  considered  series  of  operations 
limited  to  a  selected  series  of  important  objec- 
tives. They  were  to  be  attacked  mainly  by 
powerful  artillery  fire,  the  infantry  being  used 
on  the  most  economical  scale  compatible  with 
the  proper  carrying  out  of  the  objects  to  be 
attained.  Here  feigned  attacks  were  made ; 
there  others  were  undertaken  beyond  the 
immediate  area  of  operations.  The  result  was 
that  the  enemy  was  quite  unable  to  determine 
from  what  point  the  new  assault  was  to  be 
delivered. 

The  Germans  naturally  made  the  Vest  they 
could  out  of  the  situation.  In  accordance  with 
their  habitual  practice,  every  raid  limited  in 
character  and  from  which  our  men  were  as  a 
matter  of  coui-se  drawn  back  was  magnified  into 
a  bloody  repulse  of  enormous  British  forces. 
These  existed  only  in  the  Teutonic  imagination  ; 
but  they  probably  served  to  placate  popular 


opinion  in  Germany.  These  various  move- 
ments appear  also  to  have  puzzled  the 
leaders  of  our  enemy's  forces,  for  although 
they  knew  attack  was  likely  to  come  in 
the  Messines  Ridge  direction,  the  attack 
was  quite  unexpected  at  the  moment  it  was 
made.  Yet  there  had  been  going  on  in  that 
quarter  a  series  of  mining  and  counter-mining 
operations  which  could  only  be  the  prelude  to 
a  more  definite  attack. 

Of  course,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  was  unable  to 
deny  the  gigantic  successes  claimed  by  the 
Germans — it  was  not  to  his  benefit  to  publish 
the  details.-  But  the  various  undertakings  he 
had  set  going  did  their  work,  and  our  leader 
had  no  cause  to  complain  of  the  campaign  of 
German  lying,  which  was  a  very  feeble  offset 
to  the  solid  British  successes  which  had  been 
gained  and  were  now  about  to  be  repeated  on 
a  larger  scale. 


CHAPTER   CCXXIV. 

THE  WESTERN  OFFENSIVES  OF 
1 9 1 7  :    MESSINES. ' 

The  German  Right  in  Junk,  1917 — The  British  Objective — Preparations  from  Ypres  to 
the  Lys — The  Front  of  Attack — Wytschaete — Messines  Ridge — Sixt  von  Armin — General 
Plumer — Mining  Operations  at  the  Ridge — Explosion  of  the  Mines  on  June  7 — The 
Advance — Major  W.  Redmond — Capture  of  the  Ridge — The  British  Victory. 


IN  earlier  chapters  we  have  seen  the 
successes  gained  hy  the  French  from 
Craonne-Reims  to  Moronvilliers,  described 
the  capture  of  the  Vimy  Ridge,  and 
observed  the  reasons  why  the  Messines  ridge 
was  to  be  the  next  objective  of  the  British 
Forces.  The  more  advanced  positions  which 
had  been  gained  by  the  French  were  better 
suited  for  defence  than  those  they  had  held 
before,  but  still  were  not  favourable,  for  a  time 
at  any  rate,  for  a  further  forward  movement 
in  that  region. 

In  front  of  the  Vimy  Ridge,  which  had 
resisted  the  attempts  of  Foch  to  take  it  in 
September  1915,  but  had  now  been  stormed 
by  the  British,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  decided 
for  the  present  not  to  push  forward  into  the 
plain  of  Douai  or  to  fight  a  second  Battle  of 
Loos.  Nor  did  he  propose  to  attack  the  La 
Bossee  salient,  which,  owing  to  the  gains  of 
the  British  at  the  Battle  of  Loos,  was,  like  the 
salient  of  St.  Mihiel,  too  narrow  for  Hindenburg 
to  use  as  his  base  in  an  offensive  westwards. 

From  the  western  environs  of  La  Bassee 
through  Neuve  Chapelle  to  Frelinghien  on  the 
Lys  a  belt  of  fortifications  protected  the  British 
against  an  advance  westwards  of  Prince 
Kupprecht's  Army  from  the  Aubers  ridge,  the 
northern  face  of  the  La  Bassee  promontory. 
Sir  Douglas  could,  therefore,  safely  mass  the 
Vol.  XV.— Part   185.  73 


bulk  of  his  available  forces  north  of  the  Lys 
and  fight  a  third  Battle  of  Ypres. 

Now  undoubtedly,  from  a  strategical  point  of 
view,  the  most  favourable  direction  for  the  Allies 
to  deliver  their  main  stroke  was  against  the 
extreme  German  right  in  Belgium.  For  this 
it  was  a  necessary  preliminary  to  improve  the 
British  position  at  Ypres,  pushing  back  the 
German  trenches  from  the  location  they  held 
which  completely  dominated  our  own 

The  aim  of  Joffre  and  French  in  1914  at  the 
first  Battle  of  Ypres  and  at  the  Battle  of  the 
Yser  had  been  to  move  on  Ghent,  so  as  to  turn 
the  right  flank  of  the  German  Army.  Met  by 
an  enormous  superiority  of  men  and  gnus, 
they  had  been  forced  to  adopt  the  defensive. 
Thanks  largely  to  inundations,  the  Duke  of 
Wiirtemberg's  army  had  been  baffled  on  the 
Yser  and  the  Germans  had  been  unable  to 
force  their  way  along  the  coast  to  Dunkirk 
and  Calais. 

In  June  1917  the  enemy's  outposts  were  in 
the  Dunes,  well  east  of  Nieuport.  Thence, 
southwards,  by  Dixmude,  extended  a,  lagoon 
to  the  edge  of  the  forest  of  Houthulst  north 
of  Ypres  and  east  of  the  canal  which  connects 
the  Yser  with  the  Lys.  As  the  tongue  of  dry 
land  between  Nieuport  and  Ostend  was  of  no 
great  width  and  the  enemy's  coast  batteries 
forbade  a  landing  from   the  sea,   the  area  in 


74 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


MAP    ILLUSTRATING    THE    BATTLE    OH    MESSINES. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


75 


which  it  was  possible  in  the  summer  of  1917 
to  attack  the  Germans  lay  between  the  flooded 
region  and  Frelinghien  on  the  Lys.  This  area 
was  traversed  by  the  canal  known  north  of 
Ypres  as  the  Yperlee  and  south  of  that  city 
as  the  Ypres-Comines  canal.  The  Allies,  at 
the  end  of  the  first  Battle  of  Ypres,  had  retained 
a  considerable  salient  east  of  these  canals 
from  near  Steenstraate  on  the  Yperlee,  well 
south  of  the  Forest  of  Houthulst,  to  a  point 
north-west  of  Hollebeke,  some  three  miles 
from   Ypres  on   the  canal   which  from   Ypres 


even  on  the  western  bank.  The  effect  of  these 
untoward  events  was  most  unfortunate.  The 
Ypres  salient  and  Ypres  itself  had  become  shell 
traps  which  had,  it  is  true,  been  gallantly  clung 
to,  but  which  were  intrinsically  bad. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  enemy  possessed  a 
footing  on  tho  Yser-Lys  canal  bank  north  of 
Ypres.  South  of  Ypres,  during  the  first  battle 
of  that  name,  he  had  fought  his  way  up  the 
wide  valley  between  the  canal  and  the  eastern 
end  of  the  Mont-des-Cats  range,  almost  up  to 
St.   Eloi,   two   and  a   half  miles  from    Ypres  ; 


[Official  photograph. 

A    FRENCH    SOLDIER    CARRYING    A    WOUNDED    BRITISH    COMRADE. 


enters  the  Lys  at  Coinines.  This  salient  had 
been  greatly  reduced  in  size  during  the  second 
Battle  of  Ypres  in  April-Mny  1915,  when, 
with  the  aid  of  poisonous  gas,  the  Germans 
had  temporarily  broken  our  line.  Near  Holle- 
beke we  had  been  driven  from  Hill  60,  an 
earth  heap  formed  from  the  cutting  of  the 
Ypres-Lille  railroad  ;  we  had  had  to  abandon 
the  woods,  so  celebrated  in  the  first  battle, 
on  both  sides  of  the  road  from  Ypres  to  Menin 
and,  further,  to  evacuate  Broodseinde  and  also 
Zonnebeke  on  the  Ypres-Roulers  railroad. 
Pushed  back  to  about  three  miles  from  Ypres 
on  the  latter  line,  our  front  and  that  of  the 
French,  which  had  originally  embraced  Lange- 
marck  and  Pilkem  on  the  Ypres-Staden- 
Thourout  railway,  had  been  withdrawn  west- 
wards to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Ypres  and 
to  the  Yperlee  canal  at  Boesinghe.  At  some 
points  north  of  Steenstraate   the  enemy  were 


he  had  captured  the  woods  north  and  west  of 
Wytsohaete  and  the  end  of  the  range  from 
Wytschaete  to  Messines.  From  Messines  his 
line  went  south  over  the  Douve,  a  tributary 
which  joins  the  Lys  at  Warneton. 

Since,  apart  from  the  hill  of  Cassel,  south  of 
Dunkirk,  the  eight  mile  long  Mont-des-Cats,  a 
range  of  abrupt,  isolated  elevations,  contains 
the  only  considerable  eminences  in  the  vast 
plain  between  the  Lys  and  the  North  Sea,  the 
presence  of  the  Germans  at  Wytschaete  and 
Messines  was  a  menace  to  the  Allied  forces  in 
Flanders.  Their  communications  with  Ypres 
and  the  salient  east  of  the  canal  were  under 
observation  and,  at  any  moment,  the  Germans 
might  take  the  offensive  and  endeavour  to 
deprive  us  of  Kommel,  the  highest  point 
of  the  Mont-des-Cats  range.  This,  and  thp 
remainder  of  the  range,  secured,  they  would 
render  untenable  our  lines  north  and  south  of 

185—2 


76 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


[Official  photograph. 


THIRSTY    SOLDIERS    AROUND    A    WATER-CART. 


it  and  be  in  a  position  again  to  strike  at 
Dunkirk  and  Calais. 

Before,  then,  it  would  be  safe  to  break  out 
from  the  Ypres  salient,  it  was  necessary  to 
expel  the  enemy  from  his  strongholds  on  the 
Mont-des-Cats  range  and  also  to  compel  him 
to  abandon  a  large  part  of  the  low,  broken 
ground  between  it  and  the  Ypres-Comines  canal. 
From  Wytschaete  undulating  but  lower  ground 
stretches  north-eastwards  to  the  Ypres-Menin 
road  and  then  northwards  past  Passchendaelo 
to  Staden  on  the  Ypres-Thourout-Bruges 
railway.  If  this  rising  ground  could  also  be 
captured,  it  would  form  an  advantageous  step 
for  the  advance  on  Roulers  and  Ghent,  and 
the  position  of  the  Germans  towards  Lille  and 
south  of  it  would  also  be  menaced. 

Further,  the  British  attack  might  ultimately 
turn  the  German  defences  on  the  Belgian  coast 
so  that  they  would  be  compelled  to  abandon  it 
and  give  up  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge,  those  bases 
for  torpedo  boats,  light  cruisers  and  submarines 
from  which  so  much  harm  had  been  done  to 
Allied  shipping  carrying  food  and  raw  materials 
to  Great  Britain. 

The  plan  of  Sir  Douglas  TTaie  and  General 
Petain  was  first  to   throw   tne  British  Second 


Army  at  the  German  salient  south  of  Ypres. 
and  to  expel  the  enemy  from  the  eastern  end 
of  the  Mont-des-Cats  range  and  the  high  ground 
north-east  of  it  between  Wytschaete  and  the 
neighbourhood  of  "  Hill  60,"  east  of  the  Ypres- 
Comines  canal.  That  being  accomplished,  the 
British  Fifth  Army,  moved  up  from  the  south  of 
Arras,  supported  on  its  left  by  a  French  Army 
under  General  Anthoine,  the  victor  of  Moron- 
villiers,  and  on  its  right  by  the  British  Second 
Army,  was  in  the  autumn  to  debouch  from  the 
salient  east  of  Ypres  and  endeavour  to  gain  the 
high  ground  between  "  Hill  60  "  and  Staden. 

Since  November  1916,  when  the  plan  of 
campaign  for  the  next  year  had  been  settled 
at  tho  conference  of  military  representatives 
of  the  Allied  Powers,  the  preparations  of  the 
British  in  Flanders  had  been  steadily  pro- 
ceeding. The  change  of  plans  described  in 
the  last  chapter  had  delayed  the  offensive 
north  of  the  Lys,  and  it  was  not  till  the  prior 
demands  of  the  operations  round  Arras  had 
been  satisfied  that  labour  and  material  in 
sufficient  quantities  could  be  released.  The 
work  of  preparation  was  then  swiftly  carried 
to  completion.  At  the  opening  of  the  war 
the  area  behind  the  British  front  from  Ypres 


THE    TIMES    HISrOh'Y    OF    THE     WAR. 


77 


CARTING    STONES     FOR    ROAD-MAKING. 


[Official  pholr  graph. 


+o  the  Lys  had  been  served  by  only  one  railway, 
the  trunk  line  from  Calais  to  Lille  by  Armen- 
tieres.  At  Hazebrouek,  a  line  branched  off 
from  it  which,  skirting  the  western  end  of  the 
Mont-des-C'ats  range,  connected  Ypres  with 
the  railroads  leading  to  Ostend,  Bruges  and 
Ghent.  Between  the  first  Battle  of  Ypres  and 
the  Battle  of  Vimy-Arras  these  inadequate 
railway  communications  had  been  greatly 
supplemented,  and  in  the  subsequent  weeks 
they  developed  to  such  au  extent  that  behind 
our  lines  there  existed,  in  the  language  of  a 
war  correspondent,  "  a  series  of  Clapham 
Junctions,  with  broad  gauge  and  narrow  gauge 
trains,  all  as  busy  as  a  London  terminus  beforo 
a  football  Final." 

At  the  same  time  the  roads  and  paths  in  the 
district  were  enlarged,  metalled  or  extended. 
Forward  dumps  of  material  were  made  for  the 
purpose  of  constructing  new  or  reconstructing 
old  thoroughfares  in  the  crater-pitted  region 
defended  by  the  enemy.  As  the  battle  was  to 
be  fought  in  the  summer,  special  precautions 
had  to  be  taken  to  supply  thYi  assaulting 
infantry  with  water.  Existing  lakes  were 
tapped,  pits  to  catch  rain-water  were  dug  on 
-the  Mout-des-Cats  range  round   Kemmel,   and 


the  water  of  the  T.ys  was  pumped  into  barges 
and  then  sterilized.  From  lakes,  pits  and 
barges,  pipe  lines  were  taken  forward  anil  pro- 
vision made  for  their  rapid  extension  in  the 
event  of  victory.  What  was  achieved  by  our 
engineers  may  be  surmised  from  the  fact  fiat 
six  days  after  the  battle — on  June  15— from 
450,000  to  600,000  gallons  of  water  daily  were 
being  supplied  to  our  men. 

Arrangements  were  also  made  for  the  trans- 
port of  water,  rations  and  stores  by  mules, 
horses,  and  men.  So  successful  were  they  that 
during  the  attack  water  was  delivered  to  the 
troops  within  20  to  40  minutes  of  the  taking  of 
new  positions,  while  in  one  case  carrying  parties 
arrived  with  water  and  rations  four  minutes 
after  the  capture  of  an  objective. 

It  will  be  recollected  that,  before  the  Battle 
of  Vimy-Arras,  a  plasticine  model  of  the 
enemy's  position  had  been  constructed.  A 
model,  but  on  a  larger  scale  covering  more  than 
an  acre  of  ground,  had  also  been  made  of  the 
Gorman  lines.  There,  officers  and  men  could 
study  hour  by  hour  miniature  reproductions 
of  the  ruined  villages,  farms,  inns  and  shattered 
woods.  Thanks  to  our  airmen,  most  of  the 
Germau  trenches,  redoubts  and   "  pillboxes  '. 


73 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


were  indicated  on  it  The  battle  had  been 
rehearsed  bit  by  bit.  Particular  features  on 
the  model  had  been,  in  another  place,  enlarged 
to  their  natural  size  and  infantrymen  carefully 
trained  to  act  against  them. 

The  front  selected  for  attack  measured  nearly 
10  miles,  from  Mt.  Sorrel  to  St.  Yves.  Our 
final  objective  was  the  Oosttaverne  Line,  which 
lay  between  these  two  points.  Beginning 
at  Mt.  Sorrel,  it  extended  south-westwards 
through  "  Hill  60 "  to  the  Ypres-Comines 
canal.  West  of  the  canal,  it  ran  just  south 
of  St.  Eloi  and  ascended  to  the  Grand  Bois 
north  of  Wytschaete.  Skirting  the  western 
side  of  this  wood,  it  went  southwards  well 
to  the  west  of  the  village  of  Wytschaete  (260  ft. 
high),  which  commanded  the  ruins  of  Yprer, 
and  the  whole  of  the  British  positions  in  the 
salient  east  of  the  Yser-Lys  canal.  North-east 
of  Wulverghem  the  German  line  zig-zagged 
eastward  down  the  valley  of  the  Steenebeek 
— a  tributary  of-  the  Douve — traversed  this 
rivulet  and,  on  the  southern  slopes  of  the  spur 
of  Messines,  again  turned  southwards,  crossed 
the  Douve  and  ended  east  of  St.  Yves.  Mes- 
sines, behind  the  German  front,  besides  giving 
observers  there  a  wide  view  of  the  valley  of  the 
Lys,  enfiladed  the.British  lines  from  the  Douve 
to  the  Lys. 

The  main  road  from  Ypres  to  Armontieres 
on  the  Lys  passed  through  St.  Eloi  and  crossed 
the  Wytschaete -Messines  ridge.  From  St. 
Eloi  another  chausee  went  east  of  the  ridge, 
through  the  low  ground  between  it  and  the 
Ypres-Comines  canal  to  Warneton,  also  on  the 
Lys.  On  this  high  road,  level  with  Wytschaete, 
was  the  village  of  Oosttaverne,  and  level  with 
Messines  that  of  Gapaard.  The  villages  of 
Hollebeke  (north-east  of  Oosttaverne)  and 
Houthem  (north-east  of  Gapaard)  on  the 
western  bank,  the  chateau  of  Hollebeke  and  the 
hamlet  of  Kortewilde  on  the  eastern  bank, 
barred  an  advance  to  the  Lys  along  the  canal, 
and  beyond,  or  east  of,  the  canal  the  famous 
broken  and  wooded  ground  round  Klein-Zille- 
beke  lay  in  the  path  of  our  men. 

In  the  sector  of  the  arc  between  the  Ypres- 
Menin  road  and  the  canal  the  most  important 
features  were  Mount  Sorrel  and  "  Hill  60."  The 
latter,  since  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres,  had 
been  constantly  attacked  above  and  below  the 
surface  of  the  ground.  The  German  position 
in  this  part  was  a  mass  of  tunnels  and  redoubts. 
As  "  Hill  60  "  was  the  most  favourable  of  their 
three  artillery  observation    posts  in  the  Ypres 


region,  the  Germans  had  used  their  best  en- 
deavours to  strengthen  its  defences.  To  give 
one  instance,  they  had  constructed  a  timbered 
gallery  leading  to  a  chamber  8  ft.  high.  The 
roof  of  this  receptacle  consisted  of  concrete  6  ft. 
thick  in  which  were  embedded  masses  of  iron 
rails,  rivetted  solidly  together.  A  flight  of 
steps  led  up  to  a  horizontal  loophole  in  the  outer 
wall,  through  which  could  be  seen  the  whole 
of  Ypres,-  the  back  of  Mt.  Sorrel  and  all  our 
intricate  mesh  of  trenches  on  the  flank  of  the 
city. 

Between  "  Hill  60  "  and  the  canal  there  were 
two  spoil  banks,  one  behind  the  other,  very 
strongly  prepared  for  defence. 

Beyond  and  on  the  edge  of  the  canal  and  west 
of  Hollebeke,  was  a  park  surrounded  with  a 
wood,  "Battle  Wood"  or  "Ravine  Wood." 
In  this,  opposite  the  second  of  the  spoil  banks, 
were  the  ruins  of  the  Chateau  Matthieu  or 
White  Chateau,  once  a  fine  mansion.  In  the 
park  surrounding  it  a  stream,  in  places  20  ft. 
broad,  connected  the  canal  with  an  artificial 
lake,  south  of  which  were  the  remains  of  some 
large  stables.  The  timber  in  park  and  woods 
had  been  cut  down  and  torn  by  shell  fire,  but 
the  trunks  and  branches  with  the  brick  work 
still  afforded  some  cover  to  the  garrison,  when 
it  emerged  from  its  underground  shelters  there. 
A  straight  road  or  drive,  the  Damm  Strasse, 
ran  up  from  the  White  Chateau  to  Wytschaete. 
This  road  was  partly  sunken  and  partly,  in 
front  of  St.  Eloi,  raised  on  an  embankment 
half  a  mile  long  and  some  15  ft.  high.  The  sun- 
ken portion  of  the  road  was  protected  by  deep 
concreted  dug-outs,  which  sheltered  the  neces- 
sary garrisons,  while  on  the  embankment  were 
rows  of  "  pill -boxes."  In  front  of  the  Damm 
Strasse  facing  St.  Eloi  was  the  "Mound,"  a 
heap  of  earth,  the  spoil  bank  from  a  tunnel. 
This  mound  had  been  lost  by  the  Canadians 
the  year  before.  Its  surface  was  now  pitted 
with  craters  produced  by  our  mines. 

South  of  the  Damm  Strasse  were  innumerable 
redoubts  and  stretches  of  barbed  wire.  An  inn 
on  the  side  of  the  St.  Eloi- Warneton  road,  called 
In  de  Sterkie,  had  been  converted  into  a  for- 
midable defence.  Between  the  latter  road  and 
Wytschaete  lay  Oosttaverne  Wood,  honey- 
combed with  dug-outs,  while,  nearer  Warneton, 
the  villages  of  Oosttaverne,  Wambeke  and 
Gapaard  had  been  prepared  for  a  stout  defence 
by  the  enemy's  engineers. 

Two  chord  positions  had  been  constructed 
south    of   the   Damm    Strasse.     The    first   ran 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


79 


PREPARATIONS    FOR    THE    ADVANCE. 
Australians  examining  a  large  scale  model  of  the  battlefield. 


L.4  ustralian  official  photograph* 


slightly  to  the  east  of  Oosttaverne.  The  second 
— a  little  more  than  a  mile  to  the  east  of  the 
first — was  known  as  the  Warneton  line,  because 
it  ended  at  that  town.  Both  barriers  would 
have  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  British  descending 
from  St.  Eloi  to  the  Lys. 

From  Wytschaete  to  the  White  Chateau  and 
the  Ypres-Comines  canal  stretched  the  Damm 
Strasse,  with  its  belt  of  "  pill-boxes."    Between 


the  Mound  and  the  Grand  Bois  was  a  series  of 
formidable  defences  with  barbed-wire  entangle- 
ments covering  the  Wytschaete  end  of  the 
Wytschaete-Messines  ridge.  The.  Grand  Bois 
was  powerfully  fortified,  and  just  below  the 
eastern  crest  of  the  ridge  were  obstacles  called 
the  Obvious  Trench  anil  Obvious  Alley. 
Beyond  them  a  farm  building,  known  as  the 
North  House,  had  been  made  into  a  nest  of  dug- 


so 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE     WAR. 


outs  and  machine-gun  .shelters.  North  House 
commanded  the  approaches  from  Obvious  Alley 
to  Oosttaverne  Wood. 

Wytschaete,  a  mere  shapeless  mass  of 
masonry,  had  been  organized  as  a  circular  fort ; 
west  of  the  village  a  large  wood — Bois  de 
Wytschaete — and,  beyond  it,  the  Petit  Bois, 
formed  defences  of  the  type  so  familiar  in  this 
war 

Seen  from  our  side,  the  Wytschaete-Messines 
ridge  south  of  the  former  village  was  only  a 
long,  low  slope  running  north  and  south — a  few 
fields  and  patches  of  woodland  showing  above 
marshy  ground.  But  this  slope,  so  easy  of 
ascent  in  times  of  peace,  was  seamed  with 
trenches,  and  dotted  with  concrete  redoubts 
sticking  up  from  an  enormous  barbed-wire 
entanglement.  Along  the  top  of  the  mile  and 
a  half  long  plateau  ran  the  road  which  ascends 
from  St.  Eloi,  and,  traversing  Messines,  descends 
to  the  Douve,  and,  by  the  west  of  Ploegsteert 
Wood,  joins  Ypres  to  Armentieres. 

At  a  point  midway  between  Wytschaete 
and  Messines  were  the  ruins  of  some  buildings 
christened    by   us    "Middle   Farm.'1      Beyond 


"  Middle  Farm,"  on  the  crest  looking  down 
into  the  Steenebeek  valley  and  across  to  the 
British  lines,  were  Hell  Wood  (Bois  de  l'Enfer) 
■ — organized,  like  the  other  woods — north  of 
it  a  strong  point  with  works  of  heavy  blocks 
of  concrete  called  "  L'Enfer,"  and  south  of  it 
a  nest  of  redoubts,  known  as  Hell  Farm. 
Numerous  machine-guns  in  L'Enfer  enfiladed 
the  area  south  of  Wytschaete,  those  in  Hell 
Farm  the  region  north  of  Messines. 

In  front  of  Hell  Farm  was  a  curved  projec- 
tion, concreted  and  wired,  "Occur  Trench," 
and,  hard  by  Hell  Farm,  another  redoubt, 
"  Styx  Farm."  To  reach  the  Wytschaete- 
Messines  road  our  men  would  have  to  advance 
down  a  long,  exposed  slope,  cross  the  Steenebeek 
rivulet,  mount  the  ridge  and  carry,  beside  Hell 
Wood  and  the  redoubts,  three  lines  of  trenches. 
The  road  crossed,  they  would  have  stiUJ;o  storm 
two  other  trenches — October  Treroh  and 
October  Support  Trench — which  ran  south- 
eastward from  a  little  east  of  Wytschaete  to 
the  east  of  Messines,  and  also  Despagne  Farm 
at  the  head  of  the  shallow  valley  running 
down  to  Oapaard.     North  of  Deconinck  Farm 


[French  offuiai  fftolngraph. 

Tut    SURE-FOOTED    DONKEY    DOES    USEFUL    WORK    ON    SLIPPERY    ROADS. 

Carrying  reels  of  telephone  wire. 


THE'   TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


81 


there  was  a  flat  plateau,  affording  no  cover 
till  Oosttaveme  and  Gapaard  were  carried. 
Messines  itself  was  strongly  defended  and  the 
approach  to  its  western  face  protected  by  the 
work  constructed  round  the  hospice. 

To  penetrate  the  mile  and  a  half  of  fortified 
ridge  and  plateau  between  Wytschaete  and 
Messines  was,  therefore,  as  difficult  a  task  as 
any  set  by  the  German  engineers  to  the  Allies 
on  the  Western  Front. 

It  need  hardly  be  mentioned  that  the  garrison 
of  the  ruins  of  Messines  and  the  southern  and 
western  slopes  of  its  hill  had  been  provided 
with  every  device  for  resisting  the  British. 
Beneath  the  foundations  of  the  ruined  church 
and  in  the  main  square  a  number  of  deep 
concreted  caves  had  been  established.  A 
redoubt — "Fanny's  Farm" — guarded  on  the 
north-east  the  approaches  to  the  village.  At 
the  southern  foot  of  Messines  Hill  ran,  like  a 
ditch,  the  Douve,  three  or  four  yards  wide. 
Both  banks  of  the  river  eastwards  from  the 
spot  where  the  Ypres-St.  Eloi-Wytschaete- 
Messines-Armentieres  chaussee  crossed  it  were 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  whose  external 
line  ran  over  a  low  ridge  southwards  east  of 
St.  Yves  and  the  Ploegsteert  Wood  to  the  Lys 
at  Frelinghien.  The  road  from  the  Douve 
upwards  to  Messines  was  wired  and  protected 
by  defences  such  as  Grey  Farm  and  Hun's 
Walk.  The  neck  of  land  between  the  German 
outermost  line  and  the  Lys  from  Frelinghien 
to  Warneton  where  it  is  joined  by  the  Douve, 
was  a  tangle  of  trenches  and  "  pill-boxes." 

The  Germans  had  had  over  two  years 
to  prepare  the  position  above  described. 
As  it  may  be  looked  on  as  the  gateway  to 
Dunkirk,  Calais  and  Boulogne,  they  had 
naturally  not  wasted  the  time  at  their  dis- 
posal, and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  of  war 
had  been  ceaselessly  at  work  on  this  sector. 

Anticipating  danger  in  this  quarter,  Hinden- 
burg  had  entrusted  the  defence  to  General 
Sixt  von  Armin,  a  veteran  of  the  war  of  1870-1, 
who  had  fought  at  Gravelotte  and  had  recently 
commanded  a  corps  at  the  Battle  of  the  Sonune. 
The  Fourth  Army  under  him  was  posted  between 
the  Douve  and  the  Ypres-Menin  road.  South  of 
the  Douve  the  right  wing  of  the  German  Sixth 
Ai-my  held  the  line  to  the  Lys  at  Frelinghien, 
while  several  divisions  were  held  in  reserve 
at  Bruges  and  elsewhere  ready  to  support 
Sixt  von  Armin,  should  he  be  attacked. 

To  deal  with  the  British  Tanks  four  of  the 
new  anti-tank  batteries  were  stationed  behind 


the  second-line  trenches  on  the  Wytschaete- 
Messines  ridge.  Two  were  close  to  Wytschaete, 
two  near  Messines.  Each  battery  consisted  of 
six  short  7 '7  cm.  guns  mounted  on  low  carriages 
which  could  be  rapidly  moved  along  the 
trenches.     They  fired  shells  capable  of  pene- 


y>  :;  "ST*   ■  *.- 


^<V*W;>  ' 


ft* 


.  'As 


[Official  pkcHogriph. 

SAPPERS   DIGGING  A  COMMUNICATION 
TRENCH    NEAR    MESSINES. 

trfiting  the  walls  of  a  tank,  which  if  hit  by  one 
of  these  was  almost  certain  to  be  rendered 
liars  -de-combat.  But  on  this  occasion  these 
weapons  did  little  harm.  One  battery  was 
literally  knocked  to  pieces  by  our  artillery 
as  its  position  had  been  accurately  ascertained 
by  one  of  our  aeroplanes,  although  only  brought 
into  action  at  the  last  moment.  In  this  par- 
ticular instance  three  of  the  six  guns  wore 
actually  struck  by  direct  hits. 

Quite  early  in  June,  when  the  British 
intensive  bombardment  was  already  in  progress, 
Sixt  von  Armin  warned  his  troops  that  they 
would  be  attacked.  The  front  of  the  expected 
battle  was  defined  with  considerable  accuracy. 


82 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


General  von  Laffert,  the  commander  of  the 
4th  Corps,  entrusted  with  the  defence  of  the 
Wytschaete-Messines  ridge,  issued  on  June  1 
an  Order  to  his  men  pointing  out  that  the 
retention  of  the  natural  strong  points  of 
Wytschaete  and  Messines  was  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  the  domination  of  the  Wytschaete 
salient.  "  These  two  strong  points,"  he  added, 
"  must,  therefore,  not  fall,  even  "temporarily, 
into  the  enemy's  hands.  Both  must  be 
defended  to  the  utmost  and  be  held  to  the  last 
man,  even  if  the  enemy  cuts  the  connexions 
on  both  sides  and  ilso  threatens  them  from  the 
rear."  The  reserves  of  the  divisions  attacked 
would,  von  Laffert  assured  his  officers,  be  avail- 
able for  the  purpose  of  repelling  assaults.  These, 
kept  in  forward  positions,  would  strengthen 
the  parts  of  the  line  attacked  and  aid  them 
in  holding  it,  and  thus  give  time  to  bring  up 
the  division  reserves  for  an  immediate  and 
powerful  counter-attack.  The  troops  were  also 
to  be  told  that  very  strong  battle  reserves  both 
of  infantry  and  artillery  were  posted  close 
behind  the  front.  These  were  to  be  used  to 
thrust    back  by  a  concentrated  and  powerful 


then  any  specially  weak  or  threatened  point. 
Behind  all  these  *ere  the  special  battle  re- 
serves at  the  disposal  of  the  commanders  of 
the  various  sectors  for  the  support  of  threatened 
points  or  for  counter-attack. 

The  Germans  had,  as  we  know,  introduced 
poison  gas  into  warfare,  although  this  was 
distinctly  forbidden  by  the  Hague  Convention 
of  July  29,  1899,  which  had  been  signed  by 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  on  September  4, 
1900.  Naturally  we  had  replied  to  this  by 
like  measures.  We  seem,  indeed,  to  have  gone 
one  better.  At  any  rate,  it  is  quite  certain 
that  German  leaders  and  German  troops  had, 
as  they  would  themselves  express  it,  "a 
heathen  anxiety  "  with  regard  to  the  British 
gas,  as  the  Commander  of  the  German  40th 
Division  in  an  Order  addressed  to  the  troops 
under  his  command  shows.  He  said  the 
greatest  precautions  were  to  be  taken  against 
hostile  gas  attacks,  as  the  next  division  on  the 
left  had  recently  lost  one  hundred  men  from 
tliis  cause.  Disguise  it  as  they  might,  there 
could  be  no  doubt  that  the  forthcoming  attack 
was  looked  upon  with  apprehension,  not  merely 


BRITISH    SOLDIERS    ON    THE    WAY    TO    THE    TRENCHES. 


[Official  photograph. 


attack  any  of  the  hostile  forces  which  might 
manage  to  break  through,  if  the  divisional  battle 
reserves  failed  to  stop  them. 

The  method  employed  seems  to  have  been 
somewhat  as  follows :  The  actual  front  trenches 
were  held  by  the  minimum  forces  necessary  for 
immediate  security,  behind  these  were  sheltered 
supports,  the  two  belonging  probably  to  the 
siimi'  regiments,  and  forming  together  the  first 
6ghting  line.  Farther  back,  but  still  fairly  close 
and  under  shelter,  each  division  had  in  second 
line  reserve  troops  which  could  be  used  to  streng- 


by  the  troop  leaders,  but  also  by  the  troops 
under  them.  For  the  same  General  von 
Laffert  instructed  his  troops  that  it  was  very 
important  to  determine  the  instant  the 
actual  attacks  were  begun  by  the  British  so 
that  their  infantry  forces,  while  advancing, 
might  at  once  be  subjected  to  the  most 
powerful  fire  to  make  their  losses  as  heavy  as 
possible.  An  excellent  maxim  suited  to  most 
occasions,  but  one  not  always  easy  to  put 
into  practice.  For  our  plan  was  first  of  all  to 
bombard  a  length  of  German  trenches  far  be- 


THE    TIMES    HTSTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


83 


GENERAL    SIXT    VON    ARMIN, 
Commanded  the  German  Fourth  Army. 

yond  the  point  selected  for  assault,  and  further 
by  bursts  of  high  intensive  artillery  fire  and 
other  means  to  make  our  opponents  think  an 
attack  was  imminent  at  various  points.  These 
feints  deceived  them  and  made  them  nervous. 
"Is  it  coming  here  ? — no,  there  !  "  Were 
reserves  brought  up,  they  were  subject  to 
heavy  fire  on  the  road.  Far  back  the  lines 
of  approach  were  swept.  Numerous  trench 
.aids  added  to  their  anxiety.  Did  these  mean 
the  first  attempts  of  a  heavy  attack  or  were 
they  merely  little  local  affairs  ? 

The  sum  total  of  these  acts  completely 
puzzled  the  Germans,  at  any  rate  so  far  as 
the  front  trenches  were  concerned,  and  kept 
their  garrisons  in  a  constant  state  of  ner- 
vousness. 

Added  to  this  was  the  necessity  of  seeing  thai 
reinforcements  sent  up  to  the  front  line  actually 
reached  it  When  a  column  was  moving  up  to 
the  trenches  it  was  laid  down  that  "  an  ener- 
getic officer  must  always  march  in  the  rear  of 
the  column  to  prevent  the  men  falling  out." 
In  other  words,  the  men  were  shirking  the  duties 
of  the  fire  trench.  "  Every  man  who  left  the 
front  or  reserve  lines  must  have  a  pass."  This 
was  plainly  for  the  same  reason.  "  In  casualty 
reports  nothing  is  to  be  concealed  about  the 
condition  of  the  troops,  on  the  other  hand  the 
conditions  are  not  to  be  painted  unnecessarily 
black  " 


The  whole  of  the  3rd  Bavarian  Division, 
which,  as  it  transpired,  relieved  the  40th  Saxon 
Division  on  the  ridge  the  night  before  the 
battle,  had  been  placed  at,  von  Laffert's  dis- 
posal* to  support  if  necessary  the  counter- 
offensive. 

Sixt  von  Armin,  it  may  be  added,  had,  before 
our  bombardment  began,  vastly  increased  his 
reserves  of  ammunition  and  the  number  of  his 
howitzer  batteries.  At  the  same  time,  in 
anticipation  of  a  reverse,  he  had  removed 
farther  back  many  of  his  heavy  batteries.  The 
troops  in  the  front  line,  in  case  they  were 
isolated,  had  been  supplied  with  extra  quan- 
tities of  ammunition,  food  and  water. 

The  reverse  side  of  the  German  position  from 


GENERAL    VON    LAFFERT, 
In  command  of  the  4th  Army  Corps. 

the  Ypres-Comines  canal  to  St.  Yves  was  by 
nature  of  about  the  same  strength  as  the  side 
about  to  be  assaulted.  At  the  crisis  of  the 
First  Battle  of  Ypres  this  position  had  been 
successfully  defended  for  48  hours  against  two 
"  nearly  fresh  German  Corps  "  by  our  weary 
dismounted  troopers  (probably  some  4,000 
men)  of  the  then  depleted  British  cavalry 
Corps,  supported  by  two  Indian  battalions,  and 
by  4,000  men  of  British  infantry  together  with 
a  battalion  of  the  London  Scottish  Territorials, 
placed  in  roughly  constructed  trenches  affording 
but  little  cover.  Since  the  First  Battle  of 
Ypres  the  enemy  had  had  more  than  two 
years  to  render  their  naturally  strong  position 
vastly     stronger.     From     his     posts     on     Hill 

*  This  division  had  an  unfortunate  and  brief  expe- 
rience. It  came  up,  was  severely  handled,  and  retired 
within  24  hours.  It  had  also  suffered  heavily  in  the 
fighting  south  of  Lens. 

185— 3 


84 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


LAYING    A    RAILWAY    LINE 

60,  the  Mound,  Wytschaete  Wood  and  near 
Messines  every  movement  of  the  British,  unless 
they  were  underground  or  otherwise  hidden 
from  view,  was  visible.  The  confidence  dis- 
played by  von  Laffert  was,  therefore,  apparently 
justified,  and  a  frontal  assault  on  the  position 
was  no  light  task.  Fortunately  the  General 
opposed  to  Sixt  von  Armin  was  cautious  and 
ingenious  yet,  withal,  daring. 

Sir  Herbert  Charles  Onslow  Plumer,  who 
commanded  the  Second  Army,  on  which  the  task 
devolved,  was  a  Devonshire  man.  Born  on 
March  13,  1857,  the  year  of  the  Indian  Mutiny, 
he  was  in  June  1917  just  turned  60  years  of  age. 
He  entered  the  York  and  Lancaster  Regiment 
in  1876.  Promoted  captain  in  1882,  he  first 
saw  active  service  in  the  Soudan  in  1884,  when, 
as  adjutant  of  the  1st  Battalion  of  his  regiment, 
he  was  present  at  the  Battles  of  El  Teb  and 
Tamai.  During  the  campaign  conducted  by 
Sir  Gerald  Graham,  he  distinguished  himself 
and  was  mentioned  in  dispatches,  receiving  the 
medal  with  clasp,  the  4th  Class  of  the  Medjidieh 
and  the  Khedive's  Star.  A  major  in  1893  he, 
three  years  later,  served  with  Sir  Frederick 
Carrington  in  Rhodesia.  There  he  raised  and 
commanded  a  corps  of  mounted  rifles,  which 
materially  helped  to  put  down  the  Matabele 
rebellion.  Again  he  was  mentioned  in  dis- 
patches and  received  the  medal. 

In  the  summer  of  1899,  he  was  sent  to  South 
Africa  as  a  Special  Service  officer.  Under 
Colonel  Baden-Powell's  direction,  he  raised  a 


[Official  photograph. 

ON    GROUND    JUST    CAPTURED. 

force  for  the  protection  of  the  southern  frontier 
of  Rhodesia  in  the  event  of  our  being  engaged, 
as  was  then  highly  probable,  in  hostilities  with 
the  Boers.  When  the  South  African  War 
broke  out,  Colonel  Baden-Powell,  as  will  be 
well  remembered,  threw  himself  into  Mafeking. 
For  seven  months  Plumer  with  a  few  hundred 
men,  though  completely  isolated,  maintained  a 
vigorous  offensive,  diverting  large  Boer  forces 
from  the  lines  round  Mafeking.  In  May  1900, 
Plumer  joined  Mahon's  force  for  the  relief  of 
this  place,  which  was  accomplished  on  May  17, 
1900.  Joining  subsequently  in  the  advance  on 
Pretoria,  Plumer  received  the  command  of  a 
column.  His  tireless  pursuit  of  De  Wet 
through  Cape  Colony  won  him  golden  opinions, 
and  in  the  rapid  and  successful  advance  on 
Pietersburg  in  April  1901  he  exhibited  great 
energy.  Slightly  wounded  in  the  course  of  the 
South  African  War,  ho  was  mentioned  three 
times  in  dispatches,  received  the  brevet  of 
Colonel,  made  A.D.C.  to  King  Edward  VII., 
created  a  C.B.,  and  finally  promoted  Major- 
General  for  distinguished  service  in  the  field 
in  August  1902.  "  Throughout  the  campaign," 
wrote  Lord  Kitchener  in  his  dispatch  of  June 
23,  1902,  "  he  has  invariably  displayed  military 
qualifications  of  a  very  high  order.  Few 
officers  have  rendered  better  service." 

Plumer  left  South  Africa  with  a  high  repu- 
tation. In  the  interval  between  the  Peace  of 
Vereeniging  and  the  opening  of  the  Great  War 
he  commanded  the  4th  Brigade,  1st  Army  Corps, 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


S5 


arid  the  10th  Division  and  the  19th  Brigade, 
4th  Army  Corps.  He  deserves,  therefore,  some 
■of  the  credit  for  the  training  of  the  troops  who 
rendered  such  invaluable  services  in  the  first 
year  of  the  gigantic  struggle  on  the  Western 
Front. 

In  1904-5  he  was  Quartermaster -General  to 
the  Forces  and  Third  Military  Member  of  the 
newly  created  Army  Council.  When  Lord 
Haldane  became  Minister  of  War,  Plumer  was 
given  the  command  of  the  5th  Division,  Irish 
Command,  and  in  1908  was  made  a  Lieutenant- 
General.  From  1911  to  1914  the  Northern 
Command  was  under  his  direction. 

Plumer  was  not  among  the  officers  who 
accompanied  the  original  Expeditionary  Force 
to  France.  His  organizing  abilities  had, 
however,  ample  scope  at  home  in  those  momen- 
tous months  when  Lord  Kitchener  was  busy 
creating  the  New  Army.  But  in  January, 
1915,  he  was  given  the  command  of  the  Vth 
Corps,  forming  part  of  the  Second  Army 
under  Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien.  His  powers 
of  leadership  were  at  once  subjected  to  a  severe 
test.  The  Vth  Corps  (27th  and  28th  Divisions) 
had  to  be  hurried  into  the  Ypres  salient  to 
relieve    troops    of    General    d'Urbal's    Army. 


"The  trenches  (so-called)  scarcely  existed," 
says  an  eye-witness,  quoted  by  Sir  A.  Conan 
Doyle,  "and  the  ruts  which  were  honoured 
with  the  name  were  liquid."  On  March  14, 
two  days  after  the  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
Plumer  was  violently  attacked  in  the  region 
of  St.  Eloi,  but,  though  he  had  to  give  ground, 
ho  prevented  the  enomy  breaking  through. 
At  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  in  April-May 
1915,  during  the  surprise  caused  by  the  treach- 
erous use  of  poisonous  gas  by  the  Germans,  the 
Vth  Corps  was  on  the  right  of  the  Canadians, 
and  it  was  largely  due  to  Plumer's  action  in 
reinforcing  the  latter,  that  the  surprise  failed. 
So  well  had  Plumer  behaved  in  the  Second 
Battle  of  Ypres  that,  when  Smith-Dorrien 
returned  to  England  at  the  end  of  April, 
Plumer  took  his  place. 

Since  the  successful  termination  of  that 
desperate  contest  for  Ypres,  Plumer  had  had 
to  remain  on  the  defensive.  The  Second  Army 
had  formed  the  northern  pivot  of  the  British 
line,  when  it  attacked  to  pierce  the  German 
position  at  Loos,  north  of  the  Somme  and 
north  and  south  of  Arras.  The  minor  engage- 
ments (Hooge  and  the  Bluff)  fought  by  Plumer 
between  May  1915  and  June   1917  have  been 


Official  photograph. 

A    CONCRETE    STRONGHOLD    LEFT    INTACT    BY    THE    GERMANS. 


86 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


described  in  previous  chapters.  He  had  fully 
justified  his  selection  and  was  now  about  to 
associate  his  name  with  one  of  the  most  striking 
successes  won  in  the  war. 

After  tho  improvement  of  the  roads,  rail- 
roads, and  water  supply  behind  Plumer's 
lines,  other  measures  had  been  taken.  In  the 
days  preceding  the  bnttlc  a  great  number  of  guns 
of  all  calibres,  howitzers,  and  trench  mortars 
were  brought  up  for  the  final  bombardment, 
and   poured   a   continuous   and    overwhelming 


[Official  photograph. 

A    SMASHED    FORT    AT     MESSINES. 

rain  of  shells  on  the  German  positions.  Most 
important  of  all,  the  gigantic  series  of  mines 
designed  to  blow  up  the  whole  main  German 
front  position  was  brought  to  completion. 

To  obtain  the  command  of  the  air  was  in  this 
case  a  condition  precedent  to  victory,  because 
otherwise  observation  of  the  German  position 
was  impossible.  Unless  the  entrenchments 
and  gun  positions  were  accurately  ascertained 
the  attack  would  have  been  very  costly. 

When  the  Arras  offensive  died  down  in  the 
middle  of  May  a  strong  aerial  offensive  was 
commenced  against  the  enemy.  Between  June  1 
and  June  0,  at  a  cost  of  10  machines,  no  less 
than  24  German  aeroplanes  were  destroyed, 
and  23  others  driven  down  out  of  control. 
The  result  of  this  attack  was  so  successful  that 
the  mastery  of  the  air  was  gained  over  a  line 
which  overlapped  considerably  the  front  of 
attack.  Accurate  observation  located  every 
new  trench  or  strong  point.  Every  gun 
position  was  noted  and  the  German  commu- 
nications to  the  rear  were  continuously  bombed. 
So  far  as  our  airmen  could  accomplish  it,  the 
fortified  zone  to  be  stormed  was  isolated. 

Behind  their  front  line  the  German  communica- 


tions, billets  and  back  areas  were  all  brought 
.    under  heavy  fire. 

The  supremacy  in  the  air  which  was  thus 
obtained  not  only  assisted  our  map-makers 
but  most  materially  aided  the  gunners  engaged 
in  the  work  of  sweeping  away  the  wire  en- 
tanglements, destroying  the  defences  and 
silencing  the  German  batteries.  The  devasta- 
tion wrought  by  the  bombardment  which 
opened  on  tho  last  day  of  April  and  continued 
steadily  up  to  the  eve  of  the  battle  exceeded 
anything  hitherto  attempted  in  war.  Trees 
were  reduced  to  match -wood,  the  slopes  of  the 
iiills  stripped  bare,  and  the  villages — notably 
Wytschaete  and  Messines — were  turned  to 
shapeless  heaps  of  broken  brickwork.  In  a 
week  the  guns  had  reduced  the  scene  from 
cultivated  civilization  to  primeval  chaos. 

The  Germans  in  the  Great  War  had  sprung 
several  surprises  on  their  enemies.  The  huge 
Austrian  dismountable  howitzers  had  reduced 
Liege  and  Namur.  Throwing  their  treaty 
obligations  to  the  winds  they  had  introduced 
flame  throwers  and  asphyxiating  gas,  though 
neither  of  these  produced  the  effect  their 
treacherous  inventors  hoped  for.  The  British 
Army  had  also  brought  many  novelties  into  the 
field.  The  Stokes  mortars  with  their  very  rapid 
fire  of  shells  ;  the  Tanks,  which  had  proved  so 
useful  on  the  Somme  were  completely  new  to 
war  ;  while  our  liquid-fire  shells  were  a  great 
improvement  on  the  clumsy  flame-throwers  of 
the  German?. 

The  result  of  our  continuous  artillery  fire 
was  that  the  carefully  prepared  defensive 
organizations  of  the  enemy  were  swept  away 
by  our  batteries.  Gun-pits  were  wrecked ; 
telephone  lines  above  ground  were  cut  and  even 
some  of  the  buried  cables  destroyed,  thus 
rendering  it  almost  impossible  to  keep  up  com- 
munication from  front  to  rear.  Forward  posts 
could  only  summon  aid  by  rockets,  and  it  was 
often  almost  impossible  to  send  up  supports  or 
provisions  to  the  first  line.  In  the  latter,  life 
was  a  complex  hell  of  devastating  explosions 
and  deafening  noise,  and  the  garrisons  -could 
do  little  more  than  sit  down  under  it  and  wait, 
with  rapidly  deteriorating  nerves,  for  the 
coming  blow.  The  general  direction  of  this 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  known  to  the  enemy, 
but  not  the  special  point  of  assault  Yet  all 
this  whirlwind  of  destruction  bore  but  a  small 
proportion  to  the  absolute  annihilation  which 
was  to  come. 

For   many    months   mining    operations    had 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


87 


GENERAL    SIR    HERBERT 

l>een  in  progress  on  so  vast  a  scale  that  nothing 
like  it  had  ever  before  been  seen  in  war.  The 
Messines-Wytschaete  ridge  offered  favourable 
ground  for  subterranean  war.  Mining  gal- 
leries could  be  driven  underneath  it  which  for 
some  time  would  bo  unlikely  to  be  detected  by 
the  enemy,  and  undeterred  by  the  magnitude 
of  the  task  the  British  leaders  had  undertaken 
it.  For  if  successfully  carried  out,  its  effect 
on  the  enemy's  front  position  would  be  decisive 
— it  would  be  blown  bodily  away. 


[httiott  6-  Fry. 
C.    O.    PLUMER,    G.C.B. 

The  project  had  been  under  discussion  since 
July  1915,  when  indeed  some  steps  were  taken. 
But  it  was  not  till  Januarv  1916  that  it  was 
finally  determined  to  begin  the  mining  opera- 
tions on  the  gigantic  scale  on  which  they  were 
thenceforward  conducted.  The  British  Army 
was  fortunate  in  having  many  mining  com- 
panies of  Royal  Engineers  recruited  among 
miners  from  the  Mother  Country  and  from 
the  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas.  To  these 
trained  men   the  excavation   of   the  galleries, 


RS 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Official  plwugrapli. 


A    MINE    EXPLODING    ON    THE    WYTSCHAEIE    KIDGE. 


compared  with  what  they  had  been  accustomed 
to  in  civil  life,  was  mere  child's  play.  But 
there  were  features  in  its  actual  carrying  out 
which  were  novel  ;  thoy  were  exposed  to  the 
risk  of  destruction  by  the  enemy's  counter 
mines,  a  danger  greater  naturally  than  any 
they  had  previously  ran  in  the  most  dangerous 
coal  mines. 

It  is  difficult  for  those  who  have  never  been 
engaged  in  a  struggle  of  this  kind  to  compre- 
hend its  trying  nature.  The  gallery  is  driven 
onward,  here  and  there  listening  galleries  will 
be  pushed  out  right  and  loft  to  listen  for  the 
sound  of  the  enemy's  counter-operations.  A 
faint  sound  of  picks  or  the  deadened  sound  of 
mining  machinery  shows  that  the  opponent  is 
also  thrusting  out  his  galleries,  to  intercept 
or  blow  in  our  own.  He  will  go  on  till  he  is 
near  enough  to  strike,  then  the  sound  ceases — 
he  is  loading  up  to  blow  in  our  gallery.  We 
endeavour  to  anticipate  him  and,  if  successful, 
blow  in  his  counter-mine  and  gallery.  The 
charges  used  in  these  cases,  technically  known 
as  camouflets,  are  smaller  than  for  mines  in- 
tended to  produce  a  crater.  This  is  not  their 
object,  but  rather  is  it  to  be  avoided,  as  if  a 
crater  were  made  it  could  be  seized  by  the 
aggressive  side  and  would  act  as  a  stepping 


stone  onward  towards  its  objective.  The 
camouflet  aims  only  at  destroying  the  gallery 
and  killing  the  miners  without  disturbing  the 
surface  of  the  ground. 

This  short  description  shows  the  trying 
nature  of  subterranean  warfare.  The  men 
engaged  on  it  once  they  have  approached 
fairly  near  to  the  enemy's  line  never  know  when 
they  may  suddenly  be  destroyed  by  an  ex- 
plosion or  confined  behind  a  destroyed  gallery 
which  alone  can  give  them  a  safe  exit,  and  thus 
Sad  themselves  imprisoned  in  a  living  tomb. 

Besides  the  inherent  dangers  of  their  task 
the  British  minors  on  the  Messines  Ridge  found 
many  physical  difficulties  in  their  way.  Water- 
bearing strata  were  met  which  had  to  be  coffer- 
dammed  off  and  the  water  which  had  run  into 
the  mine,  before  this  had  been  done,  pumped 
out.  In  such  conditions  had  many  of  our  men 
worked  over  a  year.  Well  might  an  Aus- 
tralian officer  exclaim,  "  No  more  underground 
work  for  me  after  this  war."  On  one  occasion 
he  had  been  buried  for  48  hours,  and  had  to 
dig  his  own  way  out ! 

Twenty-four  mines  were  constructed,  four 
of  which  were  outside  the  front  eventually 
assaulted,  while  one  was  destroyed  by  a  German 
counter-mine.      Of    the     19     left     many    had 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


been  completed  a  year  before  they  were  made 
use  of,  and  these  required  ceaseless  care  to 
prevent  injury  from  the  enemy's  counter- 
measures.  For  the  Germans  had  become  aware 
in  a  general  and,  fortunately,  inaccurate  way 
of  the  work  we  had  in  hand,  and  were  thorn  - 
selves  using  a  deep -lying  mine  system  to  coun- 
teract it. 

Thus  beneath  Hill  60  a  continuous  struggle 
was  kept  up  during  the  10  months  before  the 
final  explosion.  Here  we  had  two  mines  of 
great  importance  which  were  only  saved  from 
destruction  by  persistent  watchfulness  in  the 
face  of  always  threatening  danger.  Just  before 
the  date  settled  for  the  advance,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  Germans  were  driving  a 
gallery  which  would  have  cut  into  the  one  which 
gave  access  to  our  two  mine  chambers  under 
the  German  lines  on  the  Hill  in  question. 
Careful  listening  and  careful  deduction  from  it 
enabled  our  engineers  to  say  that  if  the  date 
for  the  assault  were  adhered  to  the  enemy 
would  just  jail  to  reach  our  gallery.  The  reader 
can  judge  for  himself  the  delicacy  of  this 
situation. 

Altogether    the    length    of    galleries    driven 


amounted  to  little  short  of  five  miles  The 
mines  they  served  were  loaded  with  over  a 
million  pounds  of  the  high  explosive  ammonal, 
an  amount  which  had  never  been  used  in  any 
land  operation  before,  but  of  which  the  aggre- 
gate effect  had  been  precisely  calculated  by 
the  engineers  who  had  prepared  it.  The 
whole  operation  did  them  much  credit.* 

While  listening  to  the  operations  of  the 
enemy  the  mines  had  to  be  loaded,  and  this 
done  so  quietly  as  not  to  attract  attention  by 
the  rumbling  of  trucks  bringing  up  the  charges 
or  other  materials,  so  that  the  enemy  should 
hear  nothing  which  would  lead  him  to  believe 
that  we  were  getting  ready  It  was  a  near 
thing,  but  was  successfully  accomplished, 
and  on  "Our  Day  "  we  were  ready  and  the 
enemy  was  not. 

At  the  point  known  as  the  Bluff  also  the 

*  On  October  10,  1885.  some  140  tons,  or  313.600  lb., 
of  Rack-a-Rock  had  been  employed  to  blow  up  the  Flood 
Rock  at  the  dangerous  point  for  navigation  known  as 
Hell  Gate  in  the  Channel  approaching  New  York. 
Nine  acres  of  rock  had  been  shattered  ;  and  the  sur- 
rounding water  had  risen  by  the  explosion  to  a  height 
of  200  ft.  On  the  Messines-Wytschaete  ridge,  it  will  be 
observed,  more  than  three  times  this  amount  nraa 
employed. 


A  ustrahan  ojjktai  phuUnra^K 


GEKMAN    SHELLS    BURSTING    IN    YPRES. 


90 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


underground  combat  went  on  without  cessa- 
tion between  January  16,  1916,  and  June  7 
in  the  following  year ;  27  camouflets  were 
exploded  in  this  locality.  Seventeen  of  these 
were  our  work,  10  that  of  the  Germans. 

From  the  beginning  of  February  1917,  it 
became  evident  that  the  enemy  was  begin- 
ning to  be  uneasy  at  the  extensive  mining 
operations  which  he  had  in  some  measure 
begun  to  realize.  Camouflets  were  fired  to 
crush  in  our  galleries,  and  several  heavy 
mines  exploded  in  the  hope  of  severely  damaging 
our  work.  One  of  these  blew  in  a  gallery 
which  led  to  the  Spanbroekmolen  mine,  and 
cut  through  it,  thus  rendering  it  useless.  Two 
Australians  stationed  in  a  listening  gallery 
hard  by  were  isolated  there.  Neither,  fortu- 
nately, was  injured,  and  they  contrived  to  keep 
a  record  of  what  they  heard  until  both  were 
rescued.  Communication  with  them  was  only 
reopened  after  the  most  strenuous  efforts 
and  only  terminated  on  the  day  preceding  the 
attack.  Then  the  mine  was  loaded  and  when 
it  was  exploded  at  the  right  moment,  produced 
the  largest  crater  of  all  the  nineteen,  which  com- 
pletely annihilated  everything  over  a  radius  of 
70  yards  . 


On  Wednesday,  June  6,  1917,  all  was  now 
ready,  and  the  final  touch  had  been  given 
to  the  preparations,  with  a  thoroughness 
and  attention  to  detail  beyond  all  praise 
which  reflected  the  greatest  credit  on  Sir 
Herbert  Plumer,  the  Commander  of  the  Second 
Army,  and  his  staff,  as  well  as  on  the  leaders  of 
the  various  formations  concerned  and  on  the 
artillery  and  engineers. 

The  final  objective  of  our  troops  was  the 
Oosttaverne  Line,  which  lay  between  Mount 
Sorrel  and  St.  Yves.  This  represented  a 
depth  to  be  captured  of  two  and  a  half  miles. 

During  the  previous  night  the  3rd  Bavarian 
Division  was  coming  into  the  German  trenches 
to  relieve  the  Saxons  on  the  Wytsehaete- 
Messines  ridge,  at  the  same  time  as  the  men  of 
the  British  Second  Army  made  their  way  to 
the  posts  assigned  to  them,  when  our  protecting 
barrage  started.  Both  German  divisions  were 
caught  by  it,  and  both  alike  suffered  heavily. 
The  contemplated  transfer  of  duties  never  took 
place,  the  few  Germans  who  tried  to  stop  were 
thrust  back  a  mile  by  our  infantry  advance. 
The  11th  Division  after  its  experience  in  the 
Bullecourt  fighting  had  been  sent  to  svipport  von 
Armin's  men  by  forced  marches      It  is  not  to 


A  ust'alian  official  photograph. 
GUNNERS    AT    WORK    DURING    A    GAS    ATTACK. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


91 


BRIDGING    A    MINE    CRATER    ON    A    ROAD. 


,  Official  pliolograph. 


* 


be  wondered  that  it   had  but  small  stomach 
for  further  fighting. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  diary  of  a 
German  stretcher-bearer  at  Messines  from 
May  27  to  June  6  show  what  the  preliminary 
treatment  of  the  German  lines  had  been  : 

May  27. — The  English  are  firing  on  us  heavily. 

May  28. — We  have  two  dead  and  two  wounded. 
That  is  a  charming  Christian  festival  (Whit  Sunday). 
One  despairs  of  all  mankind.     This  everlasting  murder. 

June  1. — The  English  are  bombarding  all  the  trenches 
and  as  far  as  possible  destroying  the  dugouts.  They 
keep  sending  over  shot  after  shot.  To-day  we  have  a 
whole  crowd  of  casualties.  The  casualties  increase 
terribly 

June  2. — The  English  never  cease  their  bombard- 
ment. All  the  trenches  are  clodded  up.  Nothing  more 
to  be  made  of  them.     Casualties  follow  on  casualties. 

June  3. — The  English  are  trying  to  demolish  our 
dugout,  too. 

June  4. — The  casualties  become  more  numerous  all 
the  time.  No  shelter  to  bring  the  men  under.  They 
must  now  sleep  in  the  open  ;    only  a  few  dugouts  left. 

June  5. — Casualty  follows  casualty.  We  have 
slipped  out  of  the  dugout  and  moved  elsewhere.  There 
are  many  buried  by  earth.  To  look  on  such  things  is 
utter  misery. 

June  6. — The  English  are  all  over  us.  They  blow 
up  the  earth  all  around  us  and  there  is  shell  hole  after 
shell  hole,  some  of  them  being  large  enough  for  a  house 
to  be  built  in.  We  have  already  sustained  many 
casualties.  m 

It  is  not  surprising  that  nerve-shattered  as 
the  Germans  were  they  did  not  put  up  any- 
great  resistance  to  the  first  attack. 


Along  this  front  three  of  the  six  army  corps 
composing  our  Second  Army  were  disposed. 
The  northernmost  of  these  was  the  X.  Corps 
under  General  Morland,  comprising  the  23rd, 
47th,  and  51st  Divisions  in  front  line,  with 
the  24th  Division  in  support.  Next  this 
came  the  IX.  Corps,  General  Hamilton 
Gordon,  with  the  19th,  16th,  and  30th  Divisions 
leading  the  attack,  and  the  11th  Division 
supporting  it.  On  the  south  was  the  II. 
Anzac  Corps,  General  Godley,  having  the  25th 
(Ulster)  Division  on  its  left,  then  the  New 
Zealand  Division,  the  3rd  Australian  Division 
on  the  right  and  the  4th  Australian  Division  in 
reserve.  * 

The  3rd  Australian  Division  was  astride  the 
Douve,  the  New  Zealanders  above  them  faced 
Mi  ssines.  The  ridge  from  Messines  to  L'F.nfer 
had  been  assigned  to  the  25th  Division,  which 
included  the  Cheshire  Rtgiment.  In  reserve 
behind  was  the  4th  Australian  Division. 

The  right  flank  attack  mustered  in  the 
trenches  north  of  the  village  of  Wulverghem. 
L'Enfer  and  the  ridge  as  far  as  the  southern 
defences  of  Wytschaete  Were  the  objectives 
of    the    Ulster    Division.      A   South    Ireland 

*  The  order  of  these  Corps  and  Divisions  is  given 
from  left  to  right. 


92 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


BATTLE    OF    MESSINES 

Division  on  its  left  was  to  storm  the  Petit 
Bols  and  the  Bois  de  Wytschaete  and 
assault  Wytschaete  from  the  west.  Welsh 
and  West  Country  troops  had  the  task  of 
clearing  the  Grand  Bois  at  the  angle  of  the 
enemy's  line  north  of  Wytschaete.  Thence 
to  the  Ypres-Comines  Canal  were  deployed  other 
English  County  regiments  with  the  Londoners 
on  their  left.  The  Londoners  wore  to  advance  on 
both  banks  of  the  canal ;  the  others  were  to 
assist,  them  in  capturing  Ravine  Wood  and  the 
White  Chateau,  and  were  also  to  carry  the 
Mound,  south  of  St.  Eloi,  the  Damm  Strasse, 
and,  in  conjunction  with  the  Westerners,  the 
outskirts  of  Oosttaveme.  To  the  east  of  the  Lon- 
doners, English  North-Country  troops  formed 
the  extreme  left  of  the  army.  It  may  be 
pointed  out  that  Sir  Herbert  Pluiner  placed  the 
Australians  side  by  side  with  the  New  Zea- 
landers,  and  the  South  Irish  Division  (composed 
mostly  of  Catholics)  botween  the  Ulster  and 
Welsh  troops.  Thus,  the  various  races  were 
placed  in  a  friendly  rivalry. 

The  few  days  preceding  the  battle  had  been 
almost  continuously  fine  and  extremely  hot. 
On  June  6,  between  6  and  7  p.m.,  a  very  violent 
thunderstorm,  accompanied  by  torrents  of  rain, 
burst  north  of  the  Lys.  The  heat  caused  the 
mist  to  rise  up  from  the  rain-soddened  low 
ground  and  covered  for  a  time  the  ground  over 
which  the  attack  was  to  be  delivered.  The  sky 
was  overcast,  rendering  the  air  warm.  The 
enemy  suspected  something  was  about  to 
happen  and  sent  up  Very  lights  and  red,  green 
and  yellow  rockets  from  their  lines,  asking  for 


[Australian  official  photograph. 
GERMAN    SHELLS    BURSTING. 


barrage  fire  and  possibly  for  the  divisional 
supports  to  come  up  into  the  front  line.  In 
answer  to  these  signals  the  enemy's  guns  poured 
shrapnel  and  high-explosive  on  the  roads 
leading  back  from  our  lines  and  on  all  places 
where  our  troops  were  expected  to  be  congre- 
gating. The  British  bombardment  on  the 
other  hand  was  becoming  somewhat  less  intense 
as  if  for  the  time  the  intention  to  attack  had 
been  abandoned.  It  caused,  however,  soon 
after  midnight,  a  huge  conflagration  north  of 
Wytschaete,  probably  due  to  the  ignition  of 
an  ammunition  dump. 

By  2.30  a.m.  on  Thursday,  June  7,  the  clouds 
had  almost  disappeared  and  a  full  moon  looked 
down  on  the  battlefield.  A  party  of  bombing 
aeroplanes,  each  showing  a  tiny  light,  came 
back,  and  other  machines  by  fours  and  sixes 
flew  eastward  to  continue  the  work  of  bombing 
various  objectives  behind  the  enemy's  lines. 
In  the  half  light  balloons  wont  up,  flashing  back 
luminous  signals  to  report  what  they  saw.  The 
flames  from  a  thousand  or  more  German  guns 
showed  up  their  positions  behind  their  front, 
while  the  shells  they  fired  hurtled  through  the 
air  and  burst  about  our  lines. 

A  little  before  the  hour  fixed  for  the  explosion 
of  the  mines,  groups  of  officers  stood  in  various 
dug-outs  round  the  switches  which  were  to 
make  the  electrical  contact  to  fire  the  charges 
and  set  in  action  the  hvige  masses  of  explosives. 

"  The  last  two  minutes,"  related  one  officer, 
"  seemed  interminable.  I  thought  the  final 
30  seconds  would  never  finish.  Slowly  the 
tired  hand  of  my  watch  crawled  up  '.he  finishing 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


9S 


quarter  of  the  dial — 60  seconds  were  complete 
— it  was  ten  minutes  past  three — -Fire  !  "* 

Precisely  at  8.10  a.m.  the  order  was  given 
The  surface  of  Hill  60  was  seen  to  bo  thrown 
into  mighty  waves  with  a  dull  sound,  and 
mounting  upwards  to  the  sky  they  were  rent  in 
segments,  accompanied  by  a  mighty  roar  which 
was  heard  in  London  and  other  parts  of  England 
The  first  phase  of  the  battle  had  begun. 

The  smoke  towered  aloft  and  among  its 
clouds  were  seen  fragments  of  trench  and  con- 
crete, of  wire  entanglement,  and  portions  of 
what,  a  few  seconds  before,  had  been  living 
human  beings 


onlookers  from  the  Mont  des-Cats  observing 
positions,  the  scene  was  indescribably  grand 
and  terrible.  Volcanoes  belching  fountains  of 
orange  flame  suddenly  appeared  on  the  long 
arc  from  Hill  60  to  the  ruins  of  Messines. 
Pillars  of  dust  and  smoke  shot  up  to  the  sky  ; 
the  earth  rocked  and  the  deafening  noise  and 
earth  vibrations  carried  the  news  far  over  the 
Flemish  plain  to  the  North  Sea.  Below,  south- 
west of  Wytschaete  the  side  of  the  Hill  seemed 
to  be  rent  asunder  as  if  the-door  of  some  huge 
blast  furnace  hail  been  flung  outwards  with  its- 
molten  contents.  The  Spanbroekniolen  mine, 
opposite  L'Enfer  Hill  when    fired    created    a 


SMASHED    GERMAN    TRENCHES. 


[Canadian  oflicta*  photograph. 


In  some  instances  hardly  waiting  for  the 
smoke  to  clear  away  our  men  went  over  the 
parapet.  As  it  cleared  away  the  Australians 
saw  in  front  of  them  a  vast  crater,  some  60  feet 
deep  and  90  yards  broad — littered  with  a 
tangle  of  barbed  wire  and  smashed  concrete, 
broken  weapons  and  human  remains.  Round 
the  edges  of  the  crater,  south  of  St.  Eloi,  there 
tumbled  thick  slabs  of  concrete  scattered  about 
from  riven  fortified  defences.  At  one  point 
there  stood  a  solitary  pill-box  among  the  ruins, 
whether  missed  by  the  explosion  or  flung  there 
by  it  none  could  say.  The  "dead,  distorted 
occupants  within  could  tell  no  tale. 

Such  was  the  scene  at  but  two  spots.     To  the 


Morning  Post.  June 


1917. 


crater  140  yards  in  diameter  and  70  feet  deep, 
a  huge  cavity  which  would  have  held  a 
cathedral. 

Scarcely  had  the  echoes  of  the  explosions  died 
away,  while  the  19  columns  of  smoke  and  debris 
were  beginning  to  disperse,  than  the  back- 
ground of  the  British  lines  was  lit  up  with 
thousands  of  lightning  flashes  of  our  guns 
accompanied  by  a  volume  of  deafening  sounds 
which  became  amalgamated  into  one  continuous 
roar  as  they  began  to  pour  a  concentrated- 
fire  of  the  most  intense  and  rapid  character  on 
the  position  where  the  German  lines  had  stood 
before  the  explosion,  and  on  the  support 
trenches  farther  back.  To  the  nerve-shattered 
Germans,   the  air  appeared   to   be  alive  with 


94 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


myriads  of  shells,  their  bursts  standing  out 
against  the  pale  morning  sky,  while  above, 
behind,  before  them^  to  left,  to  right,  spraying 
them  with  liquid  fire  or  molten  metal,  choking 
them  with  poison  gas,  smashing  concrete  into 
atoms  or  raining  shrapnel  upon  steel  helmets, 
crushing  all  courage  out  of  the  few  who  had 
survived  the  terrible  explosion,  fell  the  awful 
rain  of  projectiles.  A  bank  of  smoke  and 
fumes  rapidly  settled  down  over  the  battle- 
field from  Mt.  Sorrel  to  the  Douve  ;  and 
behind  rose  the  sun,  flushing  the  sky  with  an 
angry  red.  On  both  sides  of  the  fog  com- 
pounded of  mist  and  the  smoke  of  battle  rose 
captive  balloons,  while  thousands  of  feet 
above  them  squadrons  of  our  aeroplanes  darted 
and  wheeled,  here  descending  to  observe  the 
effect  of  the  bombardment,  there  passing 
swiftly  on  to  pepper  with  bombs  and  with  their 
Lewis  guns  the  enemy's  reinforcements  hurrying 
up  the  roads  leading  to  the  ridges.  Others 
went  on  to  bomb  aerodromes,  bridges,  railroads, 
and  batteries.  Few,  if  any,  aviators  of  the 
Germans  ventured  to  ascend,  but  the  sky  was 
dotted  with  the  puffs  of  bursting  shrapnel  dis- 
charged by  their  anti  aircraft  guns.  Still  some 
of  the  enemy  clung  to  parts  of  the  shattered 
ridge,  and  the  ceaseless  rat-tat-tat  of  their 
machine-guns    showed    they    were    trying    to 


carry  out  the  orders  they  had  received  to  cling 
at  any  cost  to  the  Messines-Wytschaote  position. 

Onward  through  the  still  clinging  gas  fumes 
wont  our  men,  some  held  up  for  a  brief  time  by 
their  poisonous  effects,  but  always  trying  to 
follow  close  on  our  artillery  barrage. 

The  feats  performed  by  the  men  in  the 
reeking,  smoke-and-gas-laden  atmosphere  can 
be  but  briefly  outlined.  East  of  the  Ypres- 
C'omines  canal  the  tremendous  explosions  in 
the  Hill  60  region  caused  a  veritable  panic 
among  the  Germans  Below  Mt.  Sorrel  and 
Armagh  Wood  groups  of  Wurtembergers  and 
Jaegers  rose  from  dug-outs  and  with  out- 
stretched hands  implored  mercy  of  the  English 
troops.  Some  were  found  cowering  half-dazed 
at  the  bottom  of  the  smashed  concrete  obser- 
vation posts.  Hill  60  itself  was  secured  with 
little  difficulty,  and  our  losses  on  the  extreme 
left  were  trifling,  one  English  battalion  reaching 
its  goal  with  only  three  dead  and  seven 
wounded.  Another  battalion  had  a  death-roll 
of  less  than  thirty. 

On  the  eastern  and  western  banks  of  the 
canal  there  was  a  different  tale  to  tell.  The 
Londoners  were  held  up  by  machine-gun  fire 
from  the  two  spoil  banks.  One  of  these 
they  stormed,  but  the  other  put  up  a  spirited 
resistance.     The  troops,  therefore,  paused  and 


\ Australian  official  phokgraph. 

BRITISH    SIEGE    ARTILLERY    MANNED    BY    AUSTRALIANS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


95 


BRITISH    TROOPS    MOVING    FORWARD    OVER 

waited  until  their  comrades  west  of  the  canal 
had  stormed  Battle  Wood,  the  White  Chateau 
and  the  eastern  end  of  the  Damm  Strasse. 

The  rest  of  the  Londoners,  rushing  in  the  half 
light  along  the  western  bank  of  the  canal,  at 
first  carried  everything  before  them.  They 
entered  Battle  Wood,  crossed  the  end  of  the 
Damm  Strasse — smashed  out  of  recognition  by 
our  artillery — and  assaulted,  the  chateau, 
which  was  defended  by  a  company  and  a  half 
of  German  infantry.  They  were  met  by  volleys 
of  bombs,  yet  managed  to  penetrate  the  ruins, 
only,  however,  to  be  driven  back.  In  nowise 
deterred  by  this  rebuff  our  gallant  men  swung 
round  its  flanks,  tossing  incendiary  bombs 
for  nearly  an  hour  into  the  cellars.  At  last 
the  garrison  emerged  into  the  open  with  their 
hands  up.  The  stables,  outhouses  and  orangery 
were  next  attacked  and  reduced  ;  450  prisoners 
were  captured  as  a  result  of  the  fighting. 

The  lake,  which  was  nearly  dry,  was  seamed 
at  its  edges  with  tunnels  and  dug-outs.  Some 
time  elapsed  before  these  were  cleared  of  their 
defenders,  and  the  stream  connecting  the  lake 
with  canal  traversed.  All  through  the  morning 
and  the  early  afternoon  the  Londoners  were 
engaged  in  putting  out  of  action  the  numerous 
strong  points  in  tliis  neighbourhood  which 
remained  to  be  taken.  In  Battle  Wood  they 
also  rendered  valuable  help   to  the  Southern 


lOgicial  photograph. 

SHELL-PITTED    GROUND 

English  troops  struggling  with  the  Prussians 
for  Ravine  Wood,  west  of  it. 

On  the  night  of  June  6  the  Southerners  had 
occupied  the  trenches  south  of  St.  Eloi  opposite 
the  Mound,  which,  like  Hill  60,  had  been 
blown  up  when  at  3.10  a.m.  the  charges  were 
fired.  The  hummock  disappeared  and  a  chasm 
took  its  place.  With  ringing  cheers,  wave 
after  wave  of  riflemen  and  bombers  swept  for- 
ward, capturing  the  dazed  defenders  and 
passing  to  the  right  and  left  of  or  between  the 
craters.  Beyond  loomed  the  formidable  Damm 
Strasse  which,  under  the  heavy  fire  of  high 
explosive  shells  directed  against  it,  was  seen 
to  be  crumbling  to  pieces.  Struggling  up  the 
broken  embankment  and  casting  bombs  into 
the  few  "  pill-boxes "  left  intact,  the  men 
cleared  this  obstacle  and  joined  hands  with 
the  Londoners  in  Battle  Wood.  Hundreds  of 
prisoners  were  taken. 

Descending  from  the  Damm  Strasse,  the 
Southerners  moved  against  the  Ravine 
Wood  on  the  top  of  the  slops  and  down  the 
Rodzebeek  valley,  the  lower  and  eastern  end 
of  which  was  being  occupied  by  detach- 
ments of  the  Londoners.  At  this  moment 
from  the  In  de  Sterkie  inn  our  men 
were  struck  by  a  torrent  of  machine-gun 
bullets.  Taking  cover,  they  opened  fire  with 
their   rifles,    silenced    the    machine-guns,    and 


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THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


97 


then  advancing   bayoneted   the   few  surviving 
gunners. 

Fresh  waves  of  English  troops  arrived  on  the 
scene  and  Ravine  Wood  was  assaulted.  Among 
the  broken  down  and  entangled  branches  a 
long  and  severe  combat  ensued.  Companies 
of  the  German  35th  Division  counter-attacked 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  They  were  met 
by  Kentish  troops,  and  the  morning  sun 
gleamed  on  the  crossing  bayonets.  It  was  but 
for  an  instant.  "  Fighting  liko  lions,"  as  an 
officer  present  described  it,  "  the  British  thrust 
and  stabbed  to  death  their  adversaries." 
Tanks  joined  the  victors,  and  helped  to  expel 
or  kill  the  few  Prussians  left  in  the  wood. 

While  the  fortified  zone  from  the  eanal  to 
the  eastern  outskirts  of  Oosttaverne  was  being 
stormed,  the  great  assault  on  the  Wytschaete- 
Messines  ridge  at  right  angles  to  it  had  been 
delivered.  On  the  northern  slopes  of  the 
ridge  was  the  Grand  Bois.  It  was  attacked 
from  the  west  by  Welsh  and  from  the  north  by 
.  West  Country  troops.  The  entrenchments 
running  eastward  from  it  across  the  Ypres- 
Armentieres  high  road  were  carried  by  other 
Westerners. 

Tho  Welsh,  a  large  proportion  of  whom  were 
miners,  mustered  at  the  opening  of  the  battle 
round     Hollandscheschuur     Farm.       Between 
them  and  the  wood  were  strong  points,  under- 
neath   which    were    British   mines.     Like    the 
others  these  were  exploded  at  3.10  a.m.,  and 
the    Welshmen    went    over    the    top    of    their 
assembly  trenches  against  them.     Skirting  the 
edges  of  the  huge  craters,  they  made  for  the 
works  just  in  front   of   the  wood,  bayoneting 
and  bombing  their   occupants.     Entering   the 
wood,  after  much   heavy  fighting  they  reached 
the    farther    edge.     The    wood    bristled    with 
numerous    machine-gun    emplacements.     East 
of  the  wood  the  Welshmen  paused  and  waited 
for     reinforcements.     When     these     appeared 
the    advance    was    resumed,    and     "  Obvious 
Trench  "  and  "  Obvious  Alley,"  just  over  the 
edge  of  the  crest,  were  secured.     Twelve  guns 
and  two  trench  mortars  were  captured  there. 
The  ruins  of  the  farm  building,  North  House, 
were   next    stormed,    Oosttaverne    Wood   was 
slowly  threaded,  and  tho  assault  on  Oosttaverne 
itself   begun.     By   3.45   p.m.    the   village   was 
finally   carried.     The  Welsh   troops   halted   in 
Oosttaverne,    the   miners   rapidly    entrenching 
the  village  and  its  environs. 

Simultaneously  with  the  advance  on  Oostta- 
verne of   the  Welsh  and  West-Country  troops 


over  the  northern  shoulder  of  the  ridge,  tho 
South  Irish  Division  moved  on  Wytschaete. 
To  reach  the  crumbled  village  they  had  lo 
traverse  Petit  Bois  and  the  Bois  de  Wytschaete. 
The  former  wood,  garrisoned  by  a  company, 
had  been  mined,  and  at  3.10  a.m.  it  was  wiped 
off  the  map  by  an  explosion  so  violent  that  it 
broke  timbers  even  in  our  own  dug-outs. 
Singing 

And  if  perchance  we  do  advance 

To  Wytschaete  and  Messines 
They'll  know  the  guns  that  strafed  the  Huns 

Were  wearing  o'  the  green, 

the  Irish  swept  round  the  Petit  Bois  and  raced 
for  the  larger  wood.  "  I  have  heard,"  said 
an  astonished  German  officer  who  was  taken 
prisoner,  "  that  the  Irish  were  great  fighters, 
but  I  never  expected  to  see  anyone  advance 
like  that."  At  their  head  was  John  Redmond's 
brother,  Major  Willie  Redmond,  M.P.,  who, 
well  over  military  age,  had  joined  the  Army 
on  the  outbreak  of  war.  After  gallant  service 
in  the  trenches  he  had  been  appointed  to  the 
Staff,  but  on  this  day,  which  was  destined  to 
be  his  last,  he  had  insisted  on  accompanying 
his  old  battalion.  Scarcely  had  he  got  out 
of  the  trenches  than  he  was  struck  by  a 
fragment  of  a  shell  and  mortally  wounded. 
An  Ulster  ambulance  carried  him  to  the  rear, 
where,  after  lingering  for  a  few  hours,  he  died, 
lamented  by  Irishmen  of  every  party  and 
admired  throughout  the  British  Empire. 

The  fall  of  Redmond,  wliich  signified  so 
much  to  them,  roused  his  comrades  to 
their  fullest  fury.  Machine-guns  played  on 
them  through  webs  of  uncut  wire,  but  notliing 
could  stop  their  ardour :  in  a  moment  Wyt- 
schaete Wood  was  rushed  by  the  enraged 
soldiery.  The  cries  of  bayoneted  Germans, 
the  explosions  of  grenades,  the  rattle  of  mus- 
ketry, all  told  that  the  beloved  commander  was 
being  grimly  avenged.  Soon  only  one  machine- 
gun,  isolated  in  a  defence  of  wired  trunks  in 
the  centre  of  the  wood,  continued  firing.  Sal- 
voes of  rifle  grenades*  speedily  killed  the  little 
garrison,  and  Wytschaete  Wood  was  won. 
Still  a  German  non-commissioned  officer  hero- 
ically rcmainod  at  his  post  up  a  tree  signalling 
to  the  guns.     He  was  not  at  first  observed, 

*  A  section  of  each  platoon  carries  these  weapons. 
They  consist  of  a  grenade  on  a  long  stem  (a  species  of 
ramrod)  which  is  fired  from  the  rifle  by  a  special  cart- 
ridge with  a  small  charge.  Fired  at  a  high  angle  they 
come  down  into  the  point  aimed  at.  Thus,  when  troops 
are  held  up  for  want  of  artillery  and  are  not  near  enough 
to  throw  hand-grenades  they  can  by  the  rifle  grenades 
bomb  out  the  defenders. 


98 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


and  it  was  not  till  later  that  he  was  disco verod 
and  brought  down 

The  sun  was  well  above  the  horizon  when 
the  Irish,  issuing  from  the  wood,  poured  across 
the  open  ground  and  assaulted  the  northern 
and  western  faces  of  Wytschaete.  In  the 
meantime  the  Ulstermen  to  their  right,  assisted 
by  the  panic  caused  among  the  Germans  by 
the  explosion  of  the  gigantic  Spanbroekmolen 
mine,  had  reached  L'Enfer  Hill  and  the  southern 
side  of  the  village  at  5.30  a.m.  They  had  on 
the  way  taken  over  1,000  prisoners. 

Before  noon  Wytschaete,  turned  on  the  east 
by  the  Welshmen  descending  on  Oosttaverne, 
was  ours.  The  leading  companies  of  South 
Irish  and  Ulstermen  had  at  first  been  checked, 
but,  when  the  supports  arrived,  machine-gun 
posts  and  redoubts  were  soon  reduced.  A 
strong  point  in  the  centre  of  the  village  alone 
offered  any  serious  resistance.  It  was  stormed, 
anil  the  Irishmen,  crossing  the  Ypres-Armen- 
tieres  road,  commenced  to  move  down  the 
eastern  slopes  of  the  ridge  in  order  to  protect  the 
flank  of  the  Welshmen  preparing  to  assault 
Oosttaverne. 

Between  L'Enfer  Hill  and  Messines  the 
fighting  on  this  day  was  exceptionally  hard. 


The  English  troops  on  the  right  of  the  Ulster- 
men  had  here  a  broader  fortified  zone  to  cross. 
The  valley  of  the  Steenebeek  lay  before  them, 
and  they  had  to  advance  down  its  long  exposed 
western  slope  under  fire  of  numerous  machine 
guns*  hidden  in  the  eastern  face  of  the  hollow. 
When  the  English  got  across  the  little  brook 
running  along  the  bottom  of  the. valley,  they 
had  in  front  of  them  the  succession  of  obstacles 
described  at  p.  80. 

From  the  Kruistreat  trenches  to  the  summit 
of  the  Wytschaete-Messines  ridge  was  some 
2,000  yards  in  a  straight  line.  The  actual 
distance  the  troops  had  to  traverse  was  con- 
siderably longer.  The  English  were  about 
to  meet,  not  troops  dispirited  by  bombard- 
ment, but  the  3rd  Bavarian  Division,  which 
arrived  after  a  forced  march  to  relieve  the  40th 
Saxon  Division  during  the  night  of  June  (j-7. 

The  charge  of  the  English  was  preceded  by 
a  daring  feat.  During  the  evening,  the 
Cheshires  near  Wvilverghem  entered  No  Man's 
Land  and  dug  a  trench  4  ft.  6  in.  deep  and 
1,050  yards  long  for  their  jump -off  line  the 
next  day.     As  this  trench  would  not  be  likely 

*  The  day  before  26  more  of  these  weapons  had,  it 
was  known,  been  brought  up  and  posted  on  the  slope. 


THE    GRAVE    OF    MAJOR    W,    REDMOND,   M.P. 


[Official  photograph 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


99 


to  be  marked  on  the  enemy's  maps,  it  was 
hoped  that,  if  the  Cheshires  started  from  it, 
they  would  escape  the  German  barrage  which 
would  be  naturally  directed  more  to  the  west. 
When  the  hour  approached  for  the  opening  of 
the  battle,  the  Cheshires,  who  had  returned  to 
our  lines,  slipped  into  this  trench  and  there 
awaited  the  explosion  of  the  mines.  At  3.10 
a.m.  the  Spanbroekmolen  mine  and  the  other 
mines  north-east,  north,  and  south-east  of  it 
went  up  and  immediately  afterwards  the 
Cheshires  and  the  other  English  troops  picked 
their  way  through  the  smoke  and  fumes  down 
the  slopes  to  the  Steenebeek,  crossed  this  stream, 
and  in  waves  began  the  ascent  of  the  ridge. 
The  trench  which  curved  round  Hell  Farm  and 
the  trenches  in  front  of  it  had  been  obliterated 
by  our  guns.  On  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  in 
Hell  Wood,  the  south-west  corner  of  which 
was  entered  by  the  Cheshires,  hand  to  hand 
fighting  began.  A  company  of  Bavarians 
attacked  our  men  in  flank,  but  an  officer  whipped 
round  two  machine  guns  and  sprayed  them  with 
bullets.  Almost  all  who  escaped  were  bayo- 
neted. The  Cheshires  captured  14  machine 
guns  and  50  prisoners.  The  Saxons  and  their 
relieving  Bavarians  were  driven  back  with 
severe  loss,  Hell  Farm  and  Styx  Farm  were 
stormed  by  the  same  troops,  who  then  dug 
themselves  in. 

From  Hell  Farm  it  was  no  great  distance  to 
the  Ypres-Armentieres  road  before  which  lay 
October  Trench  with  Middle  Farm  attached  to 
it  and,  beyond  it,  October  Support  Trench. 
The  Cheshires  resuming  their  advance  and 
moving  on  October  Trench,  got  ahead  of  the 
time  table.  An  officer  suddenly  realized  that 
they  would  be  caught  by  the  British  barrage. 
He  ordered  the  men  to  take  refuge  in  shell 
craters.  The  barrage  crept  over  them,  inflict- 
ing some  few  casualties. 

Meanwhile  the  other  troops  of  the  Division, 
linking  up  with  the  Ulstermen  on  L'Enfer  Hill, 
prepared,  like  the  Cheshires,  to  assault  October 
Trench.  A  broad  belt  of  uncut  wire  barred 
approach  to  it.  A  couple  of  companies  of 
troops  farther  south  turned  the  position,  while 
our  men  smashed  their  way  through  the  wire  as 
best  they  could  Bleeding  and  torn  the 
survivors  stormed  Middle  Farm,  round  which  a 
few  minutes  later  lay  300  German  corpses. 

There  was  now  a  pause  while  fresh  troops 
arrived  to  storm  October  Support  Trench.  In 
long  unbroken  waves  they  lined  up  beyond  the 
groups  of  wounded  men.     The  German  last  line 


on  the  ridge,  already  turned  by  the  Ulstermen 
in  Wytschaete,  was  speedily  carried  after  sharp 
fighting  and  the  Cheshires  captured  Despagne 
Farm,  repulsing  a  violent  counter-attack  from 
the  direction  of  Gapaard  up  the  shallow 
valley.     The  Bavarians  retiring  over  the  ridge 


[Swain*- 

MAJOR    W.    REDMOND,    M.P. 

melted  away  under  the  fire  of  machine-guns  and 
rifles  and  never  even  reached  the  Cheshires' 
improvised  trenches. 

Long  before  the  October  Support  Trench  and 
Despagne  Farm  were  carried,  the  New  Zea- 
landers,  with  Australians  in  support,  had 
expelled  the  enemy  from  Mossines  and  Fanny's 
Farm,  north-east  of  it.  Under  heavy  shell  fire 
the  New  Zealanders  went  forward  through  the 
dense  clouds  of  smoke  caused  by  the  mines  and 
shells  into  the  valley  of  the  Steenebeek,  and 
ascended  the  southern  end  of  the  ridge.  At 
4.20  a.m.  the  red  dome  of  the  sun  began  to  rise 
and  some  23  British  aeroplanes,  fired  at  by 
shrapnel,  droned  overhead.  At  5.8  a.m.  the 
skyline  of  the  crest  of  the  ridge  appeared  out  of 
the  haze  and  smoke.  Near  the  northern  end  of 
the  humps  and  hummocks,  which  showed  the 
position  of  Messines,  the  figures  of  the  English 
and  a  Tank  could  be  perceived.  South  of  the 
village  the  New  Zealanders  were  slowly  pro- 
ceeding towards  the  site  of  the  church  and  the 
square.  By  7  a.m.  the  Germans  in  Messines 
were  all  killed,  wounded  or  captured.  The  New 
Zealanders  at  once  proceeded  to  dig  a  trench 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A    DUCK-BOARD    BRIDGE. 


[Official  phoivgraph. 


along  the  whole  of  the  position  they  had  taken, 
while  the  Australians  came  up  and  carried  on 
the  work  of  thrusting  the  enemy  off  the  ridge. 
The  redoubt  at  Fanny's  Farm,  north-east  of 
Messines,  for  a  time  held  up  their  advance,  but 
the  Tank  referred  to  came  forward  and  with  two 
or  three  shots  forced  the  garrison  to  surrender. 
Hard  by,  in  a  hedge,  was  found  one  of  the 
batteries  of  anti-Tank  guns,  which  had  been 
smashed  before  our  machine  came  on  the  scene. 

Messines  and  its  hill  were  not  the  most 
southerly  points  attacked  by  Sir  Herbert 
PI  inner.  If  Messines  Hill  were  captured  it 
would  have  to  be  protected  from  counter- 
attacks delivered  up  its  south-eastern  slopes. 
Beyond  the  Douve  towards  St.  Yves  other 
Australian  troops  had,  therefore,  been  detailed 
to  advance  our  line,  and  then  cross  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  stream  and  assist  their  comrades 
and  the  New  Zealanders.  Against  the  Aus- 
tralians were  the  forces  forming  the  extreme 
right  of  the  German  6th  Army,  the  northern 
wing  of  which  rested  on  the  rivulet.  The 
Uouve  at  this  point,  it  will  be  remembered,  is 
only  some  three  or  four  yards  wide.  "  Duck- 
board  "  bridges,  resembling  wooden  tables,  had 
been  prepared  and  were  carried  by  the 
Australians. 


The  operation  was  skilfully  carried  out.  Our 
men  got  tlirough  the  German  barrage,  placed 
the  bridges  and  passed  over  them  to  the 
northern  bank  under  fire  from  the  ruin  called 
Grey  Farm.  A  young  Australian  officer,  with 
his  company,  crawled  through  a  hedge  and  set 
fire  to  the  combustible  materials  in  this  redoubt. 
The  garrison,  driven  into  the  open,  were  shot 
down.  Farther  to  the  north,  Huns'  Walk,  on  the 
road  to  Messines,  held  out.  The  wire  round  it 
had  been  uncut.  A  Tank  crawled  along  the 
entanglement,  flattened  it,  and  shelled  the 
Germans  into  submission.  Other  machine-gun 
emplacements  were  reduced  in  similar  fashion 
and  the  enemy  expelled  from  the  area  between 
the  slopes  of  the  Wytschaete-Messines  ridge  and 
the  Douve.  Taken  on  the  whole  the  progress 
of  the  attack  all  along  the  line  had  been  mar- 
vellously rapid  and  our  final  objectives  on  both 
flanks  were  reached,  except  at  a  few  places,  early 
in  the  afternoon.  These  were  at  the  eastern 
end  of  Battle  Wood  and  in  strong  points  in  the 
spoil  banks  of  the  Ypres-Comines  canal.  In  the 
centre  our  line  advanced  to  within  400  to  800 
yards  of  tho  German  Oosttaverne  line  and 
parallel  to  it. 

The  guns  needed  for  the  further  attack  on 
this  portion  had  now  been  brought  up,  while  tho 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


10L 


troops  and  Tanks  detailed  to  take  part  in  the 
new  movement  were  steadily  arriving.  Mean- 
while our  long-range  artillery  shelled  the 
bridges  and  roads  leading  out  of  the  triangle 
formed  by  the  Lys  and  the  Canal.  The  final 
attack  of  the  day  was  about  to  be  delivered. 

By  3  45  p.m.  the  Welshmen  finally  got 
possession  of  Oosttaverne. 

At  4  p.m.  troops  from  the  northern  and 
western  English  Counties  entered  the  Oostta- 
verne line  east  of  the  village  and  captured  two 
batteries  of  Cerman  field  guns.  Tliis  line  was  a 
m;le  to  the  east  of  the  Warneton  line  and  was 
the  last  of  the  three  fortified  zones  between 
the  British  anil  the  Lys  eastward  of  Freling- 
hien.  Half  an  hour  later  other  English  batta- 
lions broke  through  this  line  farther  north. 
The  enemy  was  becoming  demoralized  at  this 
point,  he  had  suffered  very  heavy  casualties 
and  his  .men  were  surrendering  freely. 

The  capture  of  the  main  ridge  had  enabled 
our  guns  on  it  to  fire  down  at  the  Germans  in 
the  Oosttaverne  line  and  to  enfilade  that  portion 
of  it  between  the  southern  outskirts  of  Oostta- 
verne and  the  Ypres-Comines  canal.  This  had 
materially  aided  the  final  assault.  By  sunset 
the  Oosttaverne  line  had  been  taken,  and  our 


objectives  in  that  part  of  the  field  had  been 
gained.  During  the  night  the  captured  posi- 
tions were  consolidated,  and  Tanks  patrolled 
to  the  east  and  south  between  the  Oosttaverne 
and  Warneton  lines  and  assisted  to  repulse 
a  counter-attack  of  the  Germans  made  up  the 
Wambeek  Valley.  This  act  of  the  battle 
has  been  graphically  described  by  Mr.  C.  E.  W. 
Bean,  the  official  correspondent  with  the 
Australian  Forces.  Mr.  Bean  watched  the 
struggle  from  a  spot  at  its  southern  end.  He 
wrote  : 

It  was  about  three  in  the  afternoon  that  the  shelling 
suddenly  became  heavier  to  the  right  of  Messinr-. 
It  was  both  British  and  German.  It  suggested  that 
the  Germans  were  preparing  the  way  for  a  counter- 
attack,  and  we  knew  that  within  a  few  minutes  the 
Australians,  who  were  moving  beyond  and  through  the 
New  Zealanders  and  the  British,  were  to  attack  farther 
along  the  wholo  of  the  south  of  the  line,  while  the  British 
advanced  along  all  the  lino  to  the  north  of  them. 

At  a  little  past  three,  parties  began  to  move  up  the 
open,  past  the  farthest  Australian  line.  They  seemed,, 
at  the  first,  too  small  for  the  great  distance  they  had  t<» 
go.  But  it  was  only  a  preliminary  move.  Afew?ninutes 
later  there  moved  up  near  to  them  two  "  Tanks,"  a  third 
following  at  a  short  distance.  As  the  "Tanks  "  parsed 
whore  the  front  of  the  infantry  had  been,  the  whole- 
hill  slope  suddenly  swarmed  with  men.  "  Tanks  "  and 
men  moved  together  over  the  crest,  the  "Tank  "  guni 
flashing  continually.  The  German  shells  were  falling 
thick,  again  and  again  blotting  out  all  sign  of  the 
adva-ice  in  dust  and  smoke.     But  whenever  the  dust. 


LOADING    SHELLS    ON    A    LIGHT    RAILWAY. 


[Ofiiciat 


102 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


cleared  you  could  see  the  "Tanks"  and  the  infantry 
still  going.  The  '"Tanks"  stood  still  on  the  crest  for 
a  moment,  firing  heavily,  but  a  moment, later  moved 
towards  a  nest  of  German  trenches  hidden  bv  the  trees. 
With  them  went  the  infantry.  For  a  few  minutes 
men  could  still  be  seen  going  beyond  the  crest.  Then 
the  battle  passed  out  of  view.  The  farthest  objective 
where  we  could  see  it  had  certainly  been  gained. 

A  quarter  of  an  hour  later  a  grey  shape  appeared 
around  those  far  trees,  followed  shortly  by  another. 
It  was  the  "  Tanks  "  returning,  their  duty  done.  One 
of  the  two  was  on  fire  ;  the  roof  of  it  could  be  seen  blazing. 
But  it  still  continued  to  work  its  way  out.  For  several 
minutes  it  stopped,  and  the  onlookers  thought  it  des- 


the  total  loss  was  probably  not  far  short  of 
50,000  men  and  many  weapons  were  buried 
beneath  the  falling  earth.* 

Our  losses  were  about  10,000  killed  and 
wounded,  including  Brigadier-General  C.  H.  J. 
Brown,   D.S.O.,   of   the  New   Zealand   Forces. 

No  description  of  the  battle  would  be 
complete  without  an  account  of  tJiie  great 
assistance  given  to  the  British  attack  by  the 
aeroplanes.     We  have  seen  in  previous  pages 


[Belgian  official  photograph. 

THE    BELL    OF    WYTSCHAETE    CHURCH. 
Found  by  the  British  troops  amid  the  ruins  of  the  Church,  this  bell  was  presented  by  General  Plumer 

to  the  King  of  the  Belgians. 


troyed.  But  presently  it  veered  and  found  another  way 
down  the  hill.  For  25  minutes,  with  that  fire  blazing 
from  the  roof  of  it,  it  made  its  track  down  the  hill  to 
safety.  The  "  Tanks "  came  back,  but  the  infantry 
stayed. 

At  4  a.m.  on  June  8  the  British  captured  a 
small  portion  of  trench  near  Septieme  Barn 
where  the  Germans  had  managed  to  hold  out 
against  our  first  attack. 

Plumer  had  decisively  defeated  Sixt  von 
Armin.  Some  7,200  prisoners,  67  guns,  94 
trench  mortars,  and  294  machine  guns  had 
been  taken  by  the  British.  The  total  loss  of 
men  and  material  suffered  by  the  Germans 
has  never  been  made  known.  How  many 
Germans  and  German  guns  had  vanished  in 
the  mine  explosions,  it  is  difficult  to  say,  but 


what  they  had  done  before  the  assault  in  the 
way  of  reconnaissance,  how  they  had  located 
the  enemy's  battery  emplacements  and  bombed 
his  communications,  shelters,  and  ammunition 
dumps.  But  on  the  day  of  battle  they  sur- 
passed all  their  former  deeds.  Working  hard 
through  the  night,  they  had  poured  destruction 
on  the  Gentian   aerodromes  and   other  points 

*  Among  the  trophies  in  this  part  of  the  field  was  the 
fossil  remains  of  a  mammoth.  It  was  discovered  in 
certain  digging  operations,  and  with  it  were  flint  imple- 
ments used  either  to  kill  the  beast  or  to  cut  it  up.  The 
process  of  exhumation  was  not  complete,  indeed  had 
hardly  begun  at  the  time  of  the  attack  though  it  had 
gone  far  enough  to  show  that  it  was  an  unusually  good 
specirnen,  and  was  handled  with  due  scientific  care. 
The  countrv  where  it  was  found  is  rich  in  remains  of 
prehistoric  man. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


103 


[Official  photograph. 


A    BRITISH    HEAVY    BATTERY. 


at  which  aeroplanes  were  congregated.  As 
day  broke  their  audacity  increased  ;  they  came 
down  to  quite  short  ranges,  often  not  over 
500  ft.  above  their  target,  braving  anti-aircraft 
shells,  machine-gun,  and  rifle  Are.  One  airman 
discovered  a  four-gun  battery  moving  up  to 
the  front.  Coining  down  almost  on  top  of  it 
he  poured  on  the  teams  a  stream  of  bullets 
from  his  Lewis  gun.  His  next  move  was 
against  an  infantry  battalion.  Swooping  over 
it  he  shot  a  blast  of  bullets  among  the  men 
and  sent  them  helter-skelter  to  seek  the  shelter 
of  the  nearest  woods  and  ditches  they  could  find. 
German  anti-aircraft  guns  were  volleyed  on 
and  machine-guns  in  more  or  less  open  positions 
shattered  by  their  fire.  Like  hawks  they  went 
for    groups    of    Germans    sheltering    in    shell- 


craters,  and  far  back  wrought  havoc  among  the 
lorries  and  motor  care  bringing  men  or  muni- 
tions to  the  front.  One  pilot  swept  so  close 
to  a  motor  car  that  the  driver  lost  his  head  and 
overturned  car  and  passengers  into  a  ditch 
beside  the  road  it  was  moving  on. 

Another  aviator,  flying  over  the  back  roads  of 
the  German  lines,  spotted  an  aerodrome.  No 
sooner  seen  than  he  went  for  it.  A  macliine  gun 
was  fired  at  him  and  this  he  silenced  with  his 
own,  then,  turning  his  attention  to  the  aeroplane 
sheds,  he  proceeded  to  bomb  them  and  sweep 
them  with  his  machine-gun  fire.  It  is  astonish- 
ing to  learn,  and  shows  the  demoralization  that 
a  daring  attack  can  create,  that  he  made  his 
way  back  in  safety,  though  on  his  return  journey- 
he  lost  his  left  elevator. 


A  uS'rfl/i  in  iifficutl  phott 

AUSTRALIANS    MARCHING    THROUGH    A    VILLAGE    NEAR    YPRES. 


104 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A      BRITISH      "CAMEL"     (SOPWITH 
BIPLANE)    CHASING    AN    ENEMY. 

It  was  not  one  but  many  airmen  who  per- 
formed such  deeds,  firing  on  troops  in  their 
trenches  and  forcing  them  to  rush  for  safety 
into  their  dug-outs.     Trains  bringing  up  troops 


were  so  bombed  and  deluged  with  machine-gun 
fire  that  the  Germans"  in  them  abandoned  them 
to  seek  for  better  shelter.  This  audacity,  in  fact, 
so  greatly  damaged'  the  moral  of  the  enemy's 
aviator*  that  they  made  no  serious  attempt  to 
dispute  the  mastery  of  the  air  with  ours. 
Thus  it  was  that  our  flying  men  could  locate  and 
send  back  to  our  artillery  such  accurate  infor- 
mation as  to  German  gun  positions  that 
approximately  300  hostile  guns  were  reduced  to 
silence. 

The  results  wh'ch  were  obtained  on  this  day 
showed  what  might  be  expected  in  the  future 
when  really  large  numbers  of  powerful  aero- 
planes were  employed  in  war.  At  present  this 
arm,  if  no  longer  in  its  infancy,  had  certainly 
not  yet  emerged  from  childhood. 

So  severely  had  the  enemy  been  handled  at 
the  Battle  of  Messines  that,  apart  from  the 
feeble  counter-attack  above  narrated,  he  made 
practically  no  attempt  on  June  7.  Nor  was  it 
till  seven  in  the  evening  of  the  8th  that  a 
serious  attempt  to  recover  his  lost  positions  was 
made.  Covering  the  movement  by  an  intense 
bombardment,  Sixt  von  Armin,  whose  army  had 
meanwhile  been  heavily  reinforced,  made  a  not 
very  severely  pushed  effort  to  capture  the  line 
we  had  gained,  but  was  bloodily  repulsed. 

Consolidation  of  our  line  and  the  establish 


A    BIG    WATER    DEPOT. 


[Official  photograph. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE     WAR. 


105 


ment  of  advanced  posts  continued  during  the 
four  following  days.  The  Australians  seized 
La  Potterie  Farm,  south-east  of  Messines,  and 
Gapaard,  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  east  of 
Messines  between  Oosttaverne  and  Warneton  on 
the  Ypres-Warneton  road. 

Our  progress  on  the  right  of  the  battle  front 
had  made  the  enemy's  positions  in  the  neck 
of  ground  between  the  Lys  and  St.  Yves 
untenable.  The  right  wing  of  the  German  6th 
Army  therefore  gradually  evacuated  this  area 
until  it  rested  on  the  Lys  at  La  Basse  Ville. 


When  these  consolidation  steps  had  been 
taken  and  our  defensive  position  thoroughly 
secured  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  turned 
his  attention  to  his  main  offensive  north  and 
east  of  Ypres.  To  carry  this  out  effectively  a 
re-arrangement  of  our  battle  front  was  necessa  1  y . 
In  the  first  place  the  French  troops  holding  the 
line  from  St.  Georges  to  the  sea  were  replaced  by 
British  units,  and  the  change  was  completed  by 
June  20.  The  Fifth  Army  was  brought  from 
the  British  right  centre  and  took  up  ground 
from    Observatory    Ridge    to    Boesingho    on 


New  Zealand  official  photcgraph. 

TROPHIES    FROM    MESSINES    INSPECTED    BY    THE    DUKE    OF    CONNAUGHT 


Our  patrols  kept  touch  with  the  enemy  and  by 
the  evening  of  June  14  the  Warneton  line  had 
been  abandoned.  On  that  evening  we  again 
attacked  on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Comines 
canal  in  the  direction  of  Hollebeke  and  south 
and  east  of  Messines.  The  attack  was  com- 
pletely successful,  and  our  line  was  advanced  on 
practically  the  whole  front  from  the  river 
Waniave  to  Klein  Zillebeke. 

By  this  operation  the  Second  Army  front  had 
pushed  forward  as  far  as  Sir  Dodglas  Haig  then 
thought  desirable,  and  on  this  portion  of  our 
line  our  efforts  were  limited  to  strengthening 
our  new  defences  and  establishing  forward  posts 


June  10.  The  French  First  Army  under 
Genera]  Anthoine  extended  the  British  left 
flank  beyond  Boesinghe  and  relieved  the 
Belgian  troops  who  had  hitherto  kept  the  front 
from  that  point  to  Nordschoote. 

While  these  movements  were  in  hand  the 
communications  behind  the  front  and  the  left 
flank  of  our  main  force  were  undergoing  the 
same  improvements  which  had  been  carried 
out  before  the  Vimy-Ypres  operations  had 
been  undertaken.  The  further  offensive  more 
northerly  will  be  dealt  with  later. 

In  accordance  with  their  usual  practice,  as 
soon  as  they  had  been   beaten  the  Germans  set 


106 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


to  work  to  belittle  or  explain  away  the  results 
of  the  fighting  Their  official  report  of  June  8 
ran  as  follows  : — 

Front  of  Crown*  Prince  Rupprecht. — On  the 
coast  and  on  the  Yser  front  the  fighting  activity  still 
remains  slight. 

The  attacks  of  the  English  delivered  between  Ypres 
and  Ploegsteert  Wood,  north  of  Armentieres,  after 
days  of  strong  destructive  fire,  were  repulsed  to  the 
south-east  of  Ypres  by  Lower  Schleswig  and  Wiirtem- 
berg  Regiments.  We  also  fought  successfully  on  the 
southern  wing  of  the  battlefield. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  succeeded,  as  the 
result  of  numerous  explosions,  in  penetrating  into  our 
positions  at  St.  Eloi,  Wytschacte,  and  Messines,  and  in 
advancing,  after  stubborn  variable  fighting,  via  Wyt- 
schaete  and  Messines. 

A  strong  counter-attack  by  Guard  and  Bavarian 
troops  drove  the  enemy  back  in  the  direction  of  Messines. 
Farther  north  ho  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  fresh 
reserves. 

Later  our  regiments,  who  were  fighting  bravely, 
were  withdrawn  from  the  salient  protruding  towards 
the  west  into  a  prepared  position  between  the  bend  of 
the  canal  to  the  north  of  Hollebeke  and  the  Douve 
basin,  two  kilometres  (about  1J  miles)  to  the  west  of 
Warneton. 

On  the  Arras  front  the  artillery  duel  was  of  great 
intensity  in  several  sectors. 

Evening. — To-day  the  English  were  unable  to 
continue  the  battle  in  Flanders  with  the  forces  which 
they  employed  for  the  attack  yesterday.  A  local 
advance  to  the  east  of  Messines  was  repulsed. 

The  official  proclamation  was,  of  course, 
backed  up  by  various  semi-official  utterances  in 


different  German  newspapers.  Some  reported 
the  battle  as  a  surprise,  and  seeined  to  think 
we  had  taken  an  unfair  advantage  of  them 
Others  stated  boldly,  following  the  official  lead, 
that  the  conquered  positions  had  only  been  held 
lightly  and  that  the  troops  were  intended  from 
the  first  to  retire  into  a  prepared  position 
between  Hollebeke  and  Warneton.  If  this 
were  the  case,  why  were  the  troops  in  the  front 
line  ordered  to  hold  on  to  the  last,  as  we  have 
previously  seen  on  page  82  ?  Why,  moreover, 
were  such  elaborate  measures  taken  for  rein- 
forcing the  front  and  for  counter-attack  to 
regain  it  if  lost  ?  Plainly  it  was  thought,  and 
quite  rightly  thought,  that  the  front  position, 
with  its  command  of  view  and  fire  over  the 
ground  to  be  crossed  by  our  troops,  was  of  the 
highest  value.  When  the  superior  fighting 
power  of  our  men  turned  them  out  of  it  the 
Germans  had  resort  to  the  meanest  subterfuges 
and  silliest  falsehoods  to  cover  their  defeat. 
Their  reserves  were  used  to  re-establish  the 
battle,  but  failed  to  do  so. 

Take,  again,  the  question  of  gun  Josses. 
The  Germans  claimed  that  the  whole  of  the 
large  number  lost  had  been  previously  rendered 
useless.     This  is  entirelv  without  foundation. 


[Official  photosrapk. 

GEKMAN    PRISONERS    CAPTURED     IN    THE    MESSINES    BATTLE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


107 


..     ..  . 


_ 


' 


BATTLE    SCENE    AT    PILKEM. 


[Official  photograph. 


Many  of  the  German  heavy  euns  had  been 
withdrawn  before  the  assault  took  place  because 
von  Armin  was  afraid  of  losing  them.  Some 
were  destroyed  by  our  fire,  but  not  deliberately 
by  their  own  det  achments,  and  many  guns  of  all 
calibres  were  captured,  and  as  considerable 
dumps  of  ammunition  were  found  they  were 
turned  on  their  late  possessors. 

Two  novelties  were  employed  at  this  battle. 
Our  own  incendiary  shells,  which  contained  a 
large  amount  of  highly  inflammable  liquid. 
These  were  "lobbed"  over  into  the  German 
trenches  and  caused  hideous  havoc.  The 
other  was  a  Cerman  one — the  anti-tank  gun 
which  has  been  described  in  the  foregoing 
pages  Of  course,  if  a  shell  of  any  size  pene- 
trates a  Tank  it  destroys  it.  But  on  the  whole 
the  special  German  batteries  created  to  stop 
the  Tanks  obtained  little  success  The  reason 
is  a  plain  one  :  they  were  in  fixed  positions,  or 
at  any  rate  were  kept  stationary,  and  they 
were  not  behind  solid  cover.  Consequently 
they  were  detected  and  snuffed  out  either  by 
our  airmen  or  by  our  artillery.  The  fire  of 
our  guns  was  astonishingly  accurate,  as  indeed 
it  had  been  for  a  long  time  past.  A  good  proof 
of  it  was  shown  at  one  part  of  our  line. 

Passing  over  No  Man's  Land  a  narrow  strip 


of  almost  unhurt  grass  was  to  be  seen  It  was 
a  narrow  ribbon  of  green  where  no  shells  fell 
between  the  two  wide  brown  streaks  of  the 
opposing  lines.  In  it  the  grass  was  rank, 
high  and  full  of  flowers.  Then  some  20  yards  on 
this  side  of  the  German  front  line  came  the  area 
where  our  shells  fell,  and  gave  wonderful  evidence 
of  the  accuracy  of  our  fire.  The  line  was  clean 
cut  and  ran  for  miles.  On  one  side  of  the 
line  was  deep  green  grass  and  on  the  other 
was  chaos — nothing  but  a  mere  wilderness  of 
interlocking  shell  holes,  in  which  the  German 
barbed  wire  lay  heaped  in  twisted  knots.  The 
ohaos  continued  to  where  the  German  front-line 
trench  had  been,  but  which  was  now  mere  shell 
holes,  where  no  man  could  walk  more  than  a 
few  yards  continuously.  It  was  the  same  over 
all  the  network  of  the  second  line  and  support 
and  reserve  and  commimication  trenclit-s. 
Coming  down  the  gentle  slope  of  the  Ridge 
was  a  tumbling  progression  from  shell-hole  to 
shell-hole,  climbing  out  of  one  and  sliding 
down  into  another;  and  everywhere  «w  the 
wreckage  of  dugouts  and  once  solidly  built 
machine-gun  emplacements. 

Modem  artillery  fire  is  an  affair  of  science. 
Meteorological  conditions  are  taken  into  con- 
sideration at  intervals  during  the  day,  because 


108 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Official  photograph. 

HAULING    OUT    A    CAPTURED    GERMAN    GUN    NEAR    MESSINES. 


temperature  and  barometric  pressure  affect 
the  products  of  explosion  of  the  propellant 
The  gunner  rarely  lays  in  his  opponent  over  his 
gun-sights,  but  from  a  hidden  position  shoots 
on  his  target  and  regulates  his  fire  by  the  reports 
of  the  forward  observing  officer  and  the  infor- 
mation of  the  aviators.  In  this  he  is  aided  by 
a  map  divided  into  squares,  so  that  the  in- 
formation enables  him  to  place  accurately 
the  point  he  wishes  to  fire  on  Results 
such    as    described    above  are   only    possible 


when  fire  is  conducted  by  modern  scientific 
methods,  but  so  certain  are  these  that  our 
infantry  could  follow  in  behind  the  artillery 
barrage  in  perfect  safety  while  the  latter  moves 
on  at  regular  intervals  of  time,  sweeping  away 
opposition,  destroying  constructions  and  blow- 
ing to  pieces  men  and  guns. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  war  artillery  had 
made  greater  progress  than  it  had  done  in  the 
whole  period  from  the  introduction  of  rifled 
cannon  to  the  outbreak  of  the  hostilities  in  1914. 


CHAPTER  CCXXV. 


INDIA  DURING  THE  WAR. 


India's  Internal  Lines  or  Cleavage — Nationalism  Before  the  War — The  Morley-Minto 
Reforms — Lord  Hardinge  as  Viceroy — Situation  in  1914 — German  Intrigues  against 
India — German  Trade — The  Employment  of  Indian  Troops — India's  Remoteness  from 
the  War — Loyalty  and  Patriotism — Lord  Chelmsford  as  Viceroy — Mesopotamia — Reform 
Schemes — Indian  Delegates  to  Imperial  War  Conference — Indian  War  Loan — Compulsory 
Service — The  Russian  Revolution — Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Montagu — British  Policy 
in  August  1917 — Material  Prosperity — Finance  and  Industry — More  German  Plots — 
Conspiracy  Trials — The  Singapore  Mutiny  in  1915 — The  Neutrality  of  Afghanistan — 
The  North-West  Frontier. 


IN  no  part  of  the  Empire  are  the  effects  of 
the  war  more  complex  and  difficult  to 
appraise  than  in  India.  Though  we 
speak  of  India  as  one  country,  and  our 
centralized  system  of  administration  as  well  as 
the  increasing  diffusion  of  English  as  the  lingua 
franca  of  the  western-educated  Indians  from 
the  Himalayas  to  Cape  Comorin  has  produced 
a  somewhat  artificial  appearance  of  unity,  this 
great  sub-continent,  with  its  315,000,000  inhabi- 
tants— one  fifth  perhaps  of  the  human  race — 
still  remains  a  vast  congeries  of  peoples  of 
different  stocks,  different  creeds,  different 
languages,  different  customs  and  traditions, 
different  stages  of  civilization.  Though  the 
great  social  religious  system  of  Hinduism,  which 
claims  to  embrace  two-thirds  of  the  whole 
population  and  has  exercised  a  permanent 
influence,  sometimes  negative  and  sometimes 
active,  on  millions  who  are  nominally  outside 
its  pale,  has  no  doubt  been  in  the  main  a 
unifying  force  of  resistance  against  successive 
tides  of  foreign  invasion,  the  dominant  insti- 
tution of  caste,  which  is  the  cornerstone  of  the 
system,  has  created  and  perpetuated  internal 
lines  of  cleavage  as  immutable  in  all  essentials 
as  they  are  profound.  There  are  50,000,000 
Vol.  XV.— Part   186 


of  backward  people  who  count  as  Hindus  and 
whose  ambition  it  is  to  climb  on  to  even  the 
lowest  rungs  of  the  Hindu  social  ladder,  but 
who  are  still  called  and  treated  as  "  untouch- 
able "  by  all  other  Hindus  within  the  recognized 
pale,  whilst  the  Brahmin,  in  virtue  of  his  mere 
birth  into  the  highest  caste  of  all,  still  reigns 
hierarchically  supreme  over  all.  Besides 
various  small  and  quite  distinct  communities, 
such  as  Sikhs  and  Jains  and  Parsees  and  the 
remnants  of  the  followers  of  Buddha,  whose 
religion  about  2,000  years  ago  went  near  to 
superseding  Hinduism,  the  Mahomedans  form 
another  fifth  of  the  population,  and  between 
them  and  the  Hindus  the  antagonism  bred  of 
centuries  of  conflict  lies  deep  and  fierce  beneath 
the  surface  of  all  temporary  compromises. 
Politically  the  Native  or  Feudatory  States,  with 
a  total  area  more  than  a  third  and  a  population 
nearly  a  fourth  of  the  Indian  Empire,  have 
retained  a  varying  but  always  very  considerable 
measure  of  autonomy  under  their  own  here- 
ditary rulers  and  constitute  so  many  enclaves 
outside  the  sphere  of  ordinary  British  adminis- 
tration, enjoying  special  but  often  ill-defined 
relations  with  the  supreme  Government  which 
the    late    Sir    William    Lee-Warner    described 


109 


110 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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INDIA    AND    HER     FRONTIERS. 


not  inaptly  as  relations  of  subordinate  alliance. 
Different  climatic  conditions  quite  as  much  as 
differences  of  descent  and  tradition  have  pro- 
duced yet  another  broad  and  by  no  means 
arbitrary  distinction  between  the  fighting  and 
the  non-fighting  races  of  India,  the  former 
belonging  for  the  most  part  to  the  plains  of 
Northern  Hindustan  and  the  lower  slopes  and 
valleys  of  the  Himalayas. 

It  was  the  anarchy  let  loose  amongst  all 
these  discordant  elements  by  the  decay  of  the 
Mogul  Empire  during  the  eighteenth  century 
that  compelled  the  East  India  Company  to 
extend  its  authority  reluctantly,  but  irre- 
sistibly, north  and  south,  east  and  west,  from 
its  original  small  trading  settlements  on  the 
coast  and  to  build  up  the  vast  Indian  Empire 
which  was  finally  placed  directly  under  the 
British  Crown  in  1858  after  the  expiring  con- 
vulsion of  the  Mutiny.  Under  British  rule  a 
highly  efficient  system  of  administration  brought 
India  a  measure  of  peace  and  justice,  of  good 
government  and  prosperity  such  as  had  never 
oeen  known  in  the  whole  course  of  her  long 


history,  and  all  the  old  forms  of  internal  strife 
were  damped  down.  But  the  western  educa- 
tion it  had  imported  into  India  was  destined 
to  produce  a  new  form  of  unrest  which,  though 
in  itself  inevitable  and  by  no  means  altogether 
unhealthy,  has  taken  on  at  times  a  very 
dangerous  character,  and  has  rendered  the  task 
of  British  rulers  on  the  accustomed  lines 
of  a  paternal,  if  benevolent,  despotism  more 
and  more  difficult.  Western  education  long 
ago  outstripped  the  objects  which  Macaulay 
had  immediately  in  view  when  he  urged  its 
introduction  into  India  more  than  eighty 
years  ago  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  sub- 
ordinate indigenous  agency  required  for  the 
administration  of  the  country.  Appealing  at 
first  almost  exclusively  and  still  mainly  to  the 
same  priestly  and  clerical  castes  of  Hinduism 
that  had  always  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  such 
learning  as  existed  in  earlier  times,  it  spread 
rapidly  in  all  the  larger  Indian  towns,  and 
began  to  find  favour  with  other  sections,  too, 
of  the  urban  communuies.  Fed  largely  on 
English    history   and    English    literature,    the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Ill 


youth  of  India  who  passed  through  the  new 
colleges  and  universities  we  had  founded  were 
bound  to  be  affected  by  the  new  British  ideals 
of  freedom  and  the  British  conceptions  of 
government  thus  set  before  them.  Out  of  this 
ferment  there  grew  up  at  first  a  wholesome 
reaction  against  the  barbarous  superstitions 
and  cruel  customs  which  degraded  their  own 
social  system,  and  the  most  enlightened  leaders 
of  the  western-educated  classes  seemed  for  a 
time  to  realize  that  far-reaching  social  reforms 
could  alone  form  a  fitting  preparation  for  those 
changes  in  the  political  relationship  between 
the  rulers  and  the  ruled  for  which  the  more 
immature  spirits  were  already  beginning  to 
agitate.  When  the  'Indian  National  Congress 
was  founded,  in  1885,  to  give  an  organized 
expression  to  the  aspirations  of  the  new 
western-educated  classes,  it  was  hoped  that 
the  social  reform  movement  would  receive  a 
great  impetus,  as  the  many  delicate  religious 
and  social  questions  which  such  a  movement 
was  bound  to  raise  were  just  those  with  which 
the  Indians  themselves  rather  than  their  alien 
rulers  were  best  qualified  to  deal.  But  unfor- 
tunately on  these  very  questions  the  most 
acute  differences  were  soon  shown  to  prevail 
amongst  even  western-educated  Indians,  and 
the  social  reform  movement,   browbeaten  by 


the  reactionary  forces  of  Hindu  orthodoxy, 
subsided  into  the  background  to  make  room 
for  a  more  facile  agitation  in  favour  of  political 
reforms.  The  Indian  National  Congress  be- 
came a  platform  for  the  ventilation  of  racial 
grievances  anil  for  the  assertion  of  political 
rights  based  upon  the  theories  of  British 
democratic  government,  for  which,  in  the  eyes 
of  her  rulers  and  of  the  bulk  of  Indian  opinion 
outside  the  small  western-educated  classes, 
India  was  still  utterly  unripe.  A  considerable 
enlargement  of  Indian  representation  on  tho 
Imperial  and  Provincial  Legislative  Council, 
under  Lord  Lansdowne's  Viceroyalty  in  1892, 
was  a  distinct  concession  to  the  Congress 
agitation,  but  it  gavo  the  Indians  no  real 
power  and  no  real  responsibility,  and  it  served 
mainly  as  a  jumping-off  ground  for  further 
demands.  Various  causes,  amongst  which  per- 
haps not  the  least  potent  was  the  increasing 
familiarity  of  many  Indians  who  had  been  to 
Europe  with  the  seamy  side  of  western  civili- 
zation, tended  to  produce  a  new  school  of 
Indian  thought  which,  harking  back  to  the 
more  or  less  mythical  legends  of  a  golden 
age  when  India  was  free  and  wealthy  and  wise 
beyond  the  wisdom  of  all  the  rest  of  the  world, 
resented  not  only  a  system  of  administration 
entirely    controlled    by    aliens,    but    the    as- 


DELHI:    MAHOMEDANS    AT    PRAYER. 


186-2 


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112 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


113 


cendancy  of  an  alien  civilization  and  the  very 
fact  of  alien  rule.  The  South  African  war, 
in  which  the  two  small  Boer  republics  held  the 
whole  forces  of  the  British  Empire  so  long  at 
bay,  and  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  which 
showed  even  an  Asiatic  people  to  be  capable 
of  defeating  a  great  European  Power,  gave  a 
tremendous  stimulus  to  the  new  creed  of  Indian 
nationalism.  At  this  juncture  the  Partition 
of  Bengal  and  Lord  Curzon's  Education  Act, 
which  even  the  more  moderate  amongst  the 
western-educated  classes  chose  to  construe  as  a 
direct  challenge  to  them,  gave  the  Extremists 
a  welcome  opportunity  for  inflaming  political 
passions  and  racial  prejudices  to  white  heat. 
A  campaign  of  unprecedented  violence  on  the 
platform  and  in  the  Press  led  to  a  series  of 
dastardly  murders  and  outrages,  of  which  the 
victims  were  not  only  Englishmen,  but  even 
more  often  Indians  in  the  service  of  Govern- 
ment. However  hostile  the  Indian  Nationalist 
might  be  to  western  civilization,  he  never 
hesitated  to  import  into  India  the  latest  and 
most  approved  methods  of  western  anarchism. 
These  methods  nevertheless-  had  one  good 
effect.  They  gave  pause  to  some  of  the  more 
sober  Indian  politicians  who  had  at  first  been 
almost  carried  away  by  the  rising  tide  of  Ex- 
tremism ;  and  thanks  mainly  to  the  firm 
stand  made  by  the  late  Mr.  G.  K.  Gokhale 
and  Sir  Pherozshah  Mehta,  an  attempt  by  the 
Extremists  to  capture  the  Congress  at  Surat 
at  the  end  of  1907  collapsed,  though  the  meet- 
ing had  to  be  dissolved  amidst  scenes  of  wild 
confusion  which  discredited  it  for  several 
years.  Government,  which  had  lamentably 
failed  to  foresee  the  storm  or  to  appreciate  at 
first  its  significance,  realized  once  more,  though 
again  very  late  in  the  day,  that,  whilst  the 
forces  of  disorder  had  to  be  met  by  repression, 
it  was  equally  necessary  to  rally  to  the  cause 
of  order  the  moderate  elements  in  India  by 
some  generous  political  concessions.  The 
Indian  Councils  Act  of  1909,  better  known  as 
the  Morley-Minto  reforms,  marked  a  consider- 
able step  in  the  direction  of  giving  to  Indians 
a  larger  share  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs. 
Its  most  notable  feature  was  the  appointment 
of  Indians  to  the  Executive  Councils  of  the 
Viceroy  and  of  the  Provincial  Governors,  and 
to  the  Secretary  of  State's  Council  at  the  India 
Office.  For  the  rest  it  was  .practically  an 
extension  of  the  Act  of  1892,  for  it  provided 
for  a  greatly  enlarged  Indian  representation 
on  an  elective  basis  in  the  Imperial  as  well  as 


in  the  provincial  Legislative  Councils,  though 
in  the  former  an  official  majority  was  still 
retained  intact.  The  inherent  weakness  of 
these  reforms  was  that,  whilst  they  gave  the 
Indian  opposition  vastly  increased  oppor- 
tunities for  discussion  and  criticism,  they  still 
gave  it  no  real  power  and  no  real  responsibility. 


SIR    PHEROZSHAH    MEHTA, 
An  opponent  of  "  Extremism." 

The  satisfaction  which  they  afforded  to  Indian 
sentiment  proved,  therefore,  short-lived.  They 
helped,  indeed,  to  rehabilitate  the  more  con- 
stitutional methods  of  agitation  for  which  the 
Congress  claimed  to  stand  and  they  stemmed 
the  epidemic  of  anarchist  outrages.  Th?y  also 
prepared  the  way  for  the  visit  of  the  King 
Emperor  and  his  Consort  to  India  at  the  end 
of  1911,  which  evoked  a  great  and  genuine 
outburst  of  Indian  loyalty  to  the  person  of 
the  Sovereign  The  bomb  thrown  at  Lord 
Hardinge  whilst  he  was  making  his  state 
entry  into  Delhi  on  the  first  anniversaiy  of  the 
Imperial  Durbar  at  which  it  had  been  pro- 
claimed as  the  new  capital  of  India,  showed 
however,  that  if  anarchism  had  been  scotched, 
it  was  not  yet  killed,  and  the  subsequent 
Delhi  conspiracy  trials  revealed  a  widespread 
network  of  sedition  and  crime,  the  full  extent 
of  which  was  only  disclosed  during  the  war. 
In  Bengal,  too,  the  continuance  of  "  political  " 


114 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


dakoities  perpetrated  by  youths  of  the  better 
classes  proved  how  persistent  were  the  effects 
of  the  poison  with  which  students  and  school- 
boys had  been  inoculated,  even  by  so-called 
moderate  leaders  like  Mr.  Surendranath 
Banerjee,  during  the  anti-partition  campaign. 


VISCOUNT    MORLEY.   O.M., 
Secretary  of  State  for  India,   1905-1910. 

I.ord  Hardinge,  who  had  succeeded  to  Lord 
Minto  as  Viceroy  in  November,  1910,  had  not 
been  slow  to  realize  that  the  Morley-Minto 
reforms  could  only  mark  a  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Indian  political  institutions.  In  a 
statesmanlike  dispatch  the  new  Viceroy  pro- 
pounded, on  August  25,  1911,  a  scheme  of  pro- 
vincial autonomy  with  a  large  devolution  of 
powers  by  the  Central  Government  which,  had 
Ix>rd  Crewe,  then  Secretary  of  State,  endorsed  it, 
and  been  ready  to  carry  it  promptly  into  effect, 
rnignt  have  deflected  Indian  political  activities 
into  safer  paths.  The  appointment,  in  1912,  of 
a  Royal  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Indian 
Public  Services  was  designed  also  to  meet  the 
growing  demand  of  the  western-educated 
classes  for  a  larger  share  in  the  actual  adminis- 
tration of  the  country.  But  whilst  Indian 
opinion  recognized  Lord  Hardinge's  sym- 
pathetic attitude  towards  a  progressive  policy 


and  was  touched  by  the  fortitude  and  absence 
of  any  vindictiveness  which  he  displayed  after 
the  Delhi  outrage,  he  owed  his  unprecedented 
popularity  amongst  Indians  chiefly  to  the 
courage  with  which  he  was  known  to  have  on 
several  occasions  championed  Indian  rights 
and  interests,  even  in  opposition  to  Whitehall, 
notably  in  regard  to  the  treatment  of  British 
Indians  in  South  Africa.  But,  whilst  many 
thoughtful  Indians  were  disposed  once  more  to 
turn  aside  from  the  barren  field  of  politics  to 
that,  of  social  service  or  at  least  to  follow  the 
lead  given  by  Mr.  Gokhale  when,  without 
abandoning  the  political  arena,  he  founded  and 
devoted  a  large  share  of  his  energies  to  his 
Servants  of  India  Society,  the  more  advanced 
parties  were  successfully  exploiting  the  general 
disappointment  with  the  practical  results  of 
the  Minto-Morley  reforms  in  order  to  revive  the 
Nationalist  movement,  or  at  any  rate  to  pres* 
for  a  radical  transfer  of  power  from  the  British 
administrators  to  the  self-styled  representatives 
of  the  Indian  people.  The  Congress  which  had 
been  always  inclined  to  play  the  part  of  an 
Indian  Parliament,  though  a  Parliament  en- 
tirely divorced  from  responsibility,  recovered 
no  little  of  the  influence  which  it  had  lost 
after  (he  scandalous  scenes  at  Surat  and  still 
more  on  the  enlargement  of  the  Indian  elemeiit 
in  the  Legislative  Councils  which  at  first  seemed 
to  dwarf  its  importance. 

Moreover,  a  considerable  change  had  taken 
place  in  the  attitude  of  a  certain  section  at 
least  of  the  Mahomedan  community  towards 
the  Congress.  For  many  years  the  Mahome- 
dans  held  entirely  aloof  from  the  Congress  and, 
acting  upon  the  advice  of  their  great  leader 
Sir  Syed  Ahmed,  they  preferred  to  rely  solely 
for  the  protection  of  their  social,  political  and 
religious  interests  on  the  justice  and  imparti- 
ality of  their  British  rulers.  They  had,  how- 
ever, been  seriously  alarmed  as  time  went  on 
by  the  growing  influence  of  the  Congress,  which 
was  essentially  a  Hindu  organization,  and  they 
had  founded  in  1905,  as  a  counterpoise  to  it,  an 
All-Indian  Moslem  League,  whose  first  achieve- 
ment was  to  secure  from  Government;  the 
special  representation  of  Mahomedan  interests, 
in  the  Morley-Minto  reforms  scheme.  Mean- 
while there  was  growing  up  a  younger  genera- 
tion of  Mahomedans  whom  western  educa- 
tion had  brought  into  closer  touch  with  the  more 
advanced  school  of  Hindu  politicians  and  whose 
feelings  towards  their  rulers  had  been  very 
unfavourably  affected  by  the  unfriendly  policy, 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


115 


as  they  read  it,  of  Great  Britain  towards  the 
Mahomedan  Powers  outside  India,  and 
especially  towards  the  greatest  of  them, 
Turkey.  In  the  occupation  of  Egypt,  in  the 
recognition  of  French  ascendancy  in  Tunis  and 
in  Morocco,  in  the  Anglo -Russian  Convention 
with  regard  to  Persia,  and  in  the  pressure 
constantly  brought  to  bear  upon  Turkey  for 
the  benefit  of  the  Christian  races  under  the 
Sultan's  rule,  they  detected  evidence  of  a 
settled  purpose  to  destroy  what  remained  of 
Mahomedan  independence  and  power.  The 
Italian   invasion   of   Tripoli   in    1911,  and   the 


Balkan  wars  in  1912-13,  strengthened  their 
belief  in  a  conspiracy  of  the  Christian  Powers 
against  Islam  to  which  Great  Britain  was  a 
party,  and  some  of  the  "  young "  Maho- 
medan leaders  who  went  to  Constant  inople 
in  charge  of  Indian  Bed  Crescent  missions 
and  came  there  into  personal  contact  with 
"young".  Turkey,  returned  to  India  with 
their  hearts  full  of  bitterness.  The  re -par- 
tition of  Bengal  in  1911,  which  was  held  to 
favour  the  Hindus  at  the  expense  of  the 
Mahomedans,  had  also  caused  much  bad 
blood.     Even    so    paltry    a    question    as    that 


DELHI:    STATE    ENTRY    OF    LORD    HARDINGE,    DEC.    23, 
On  which  occasion  he  was  injured  by  a  bomb. 


1912, 


116 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


which  arose  at  Cawnpore  out  of  the  demolition 
of  an  outlying  building  belonging  to  a  mosque 
to  make  room  for  a  new  road,  whereas  the  road 
had  been  deflected  in  another  part  merely 
to  spare  a  Hindu  shrine,  revealed  a  dangerous 
feeling  of  irritability  which  was  not  confined 
merely  to  the  local  Mahomedans,  but  spread 
to  those  of  other  provinces  and  into  the 
Native  States.     Lord  Hardinge  even  thought 


[FMiott  &  Fry. 

LORD    HARDINGE,    K.G., 
Viceroy  of  India,  1910-1916. 

it  advisable  to  take  the  matter  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  Local  Government  and  settle  the  dispute 
by  his  own  personal  intervention  on  the  spot. 
The  compromise  served  to  assuage  Mahome- 
dan  feeling,  but  it  did  not  disarm  the  hostility 
of  the  "  young "  Mahomedan  party,  who 
allied  themselves  more  and  more  closely  with 
the  advanced  Hindu  party  in  the  Congress  on 
the  basis  of  a  common  nationalism. 

Thus  when  the  Great  War  broke  out  in  the 
summer  of  1914  the  internal  situation  was  not 
indeed  dangerous  but  difficult.  The  Morley- 
Minto  reforms  had  ceased  to  satisfy  the  demands 
of  even  the  moderate  Indian  politicians, 
whilst  the  Extremists  were  endeavouring  to 
give  a  more  and  more  definite  interpretation 
to  the  vague  aspirations  towards  colonial 
self-government  which  the  Congress  had  on 
various  occasions  publicly  encouraged.  The 
breach  was  widening  between  the  western- 
educated   classes,    who    claimed    to    voice    the 


wishes  of  the  people'of  India,  and  the  British 
administrators,  who  stoutly  denied  that  claim 
with    the    tenacity    of    official    conservatism 
and  also  with  a  strong  sense  of  responsibility 
for  the  welfare  of  the  Indian  masses,  holding 
that  they  were  themselves  in  far  closer  touch 
with  the  real  interests  and  desires  of  the  vast 
agricultural  population  than  lawyers  and  pro- 
fessors and  journalists  born  and  bred  in  a  few 
large  urban  centres,  which  had  little  in  common 
with     the    rural     districts.     Very     few,     even 
amongst    educated    Indians,    had    taken    any 
sustained  interest  in  European  politics.     The 
Congress,    taking    its    cue    from    the    Radical 
Party  in  England,  had  from  time  to  time  pro- 
tested  against  military   expenditure   in  India 
and  against  the  Indian  Exchequer  being  saddled 
with    any  part    of    the    costs   of    the   various 
military  expeditions  outside  India  in  which  the 
Indian  Army   had   been,   much  to   its    credit, 
employed.     Some  of  the  Extremists  had  occa- 
sionally hinted  with  unconcealed  glee  at  the 
possibility    of    grave    European    complications 
which   might   give   India   her   opportunity    to 
shake  off  the  British  yoke.     But  Indians  and 
Europeans  alike — and  especially  the  soldiers — 
had  been  taught  for  so  many  decades  to  regard 
Russia  as  the  one  European  Power  capable  of 
threatening  our  Indian  Empire  that  the  growth 
of  Germany's  world -ambitions  and  the  signi- 
ficance of  her  activities  in  the  Near  and  Middle 
East  had  never  been  more  than  dimly  appre- 
hended.    Lord  Hardinge  knew,  for  he  had  been 
one  of  the  first  British  diplomatists  to  realize 
the  German  danger,  and  had  played  an  impor- 
tant part  in  bringing  about  the  rapprochement 
first  with   France   and  then   with  Russia,   by 
which    it    was    hoped    to    keep    the    vaulting 
ambitions  of  the  Emperor  William  II.  within 
bounds.     The     Government     of     India     were 
fully  acquainted  with  the  whole  story  of  the 
Kaiser's     pilgrimages     to     Constantinople,    of 
German  economic  and  political  ascendancy  in 
Turkey,    of    German    railway    penetration    in 
Asia  Minor,  of  the  great  B.B.B.  line— Berlin- 
Byzantium-Baghdad — of   German   intrigues  in 
the  Persian  Gulf,  already  recounted  at  length  in 
Chapter  LIT.  of  this  history.     But  the  Govern- 
ment  of   India   have   never   thought    it   their 
duty  to  enlighten  or  to  guide  Indian  opinion, 
and  even  British  Ministers,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, deemed  it  often  wiser  to  mislead  than 
to  lead  public  opinion  at  home  with  regard  to 
the  true  inwardness  of  Anglo-German  relations. 
Nor  can  Lord  Hardinge,  with  his  diplomatic 


THE    TIMES-  HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


117 


experience,  have  overlooked  the  choice  which 
Germany  insisted  on  making  of  picked  diplo- 
matists   to    discharge    the    modest    functions 
of    German   Consul -General    in    India,    or   the 
number   of   military    officers   attached   to   the 
German  Consulate-General,  or  the  large  suite 
of   experts   whom  the   German   Crown   Prince 
brought  in  his  train  during  his  Indian  tour, 
or   the   mysterious   visit   which   Count    Wolff- 
Metternich   paid    to    India    in    company    with 
a  military   nephew  just  after   he   had  retired 
from  the  post  of  German  Ambassador  in  London 
That     Germany     had    encouraged     the     Pan- 
Islamic  propaganda  which  had  spread  to  the 
frontiers    of    India,    and    to    a    lesser    extent 
into  India  itself  in  the  days  of  Abdul  Hamid, 
and  had  been  prosecuted  on  still  more  aggres- 
sive   lines   by    the    "young"    Turks,    was   no 
secret,    even    before    Prince    Biilow    cynically 
disclosed  in  his  memoirs  the  sinister  purpose 
with   which    the   Kaiser   posed   as   the   friend 
of  Turkey  and  the  special  protector  of  Islam 
If  William  TI.  reckoned  upon  Turkey  adding 
10    army    corps    to     the     German    legions    in 
the  event   of   war  he  reckoned   with  scarcely 
less    confidence    on    the    indirect    support    of 
the   Mahomedan   populations   outside    Turkey 
as     soon     as     the     Ottoman     Khalif     should 
unfurl  at  his  behest  the  Green  Banner  of  the 
Prophet.     Nor  was   it   the   loyalty   of   Indian 
Mahomedans   only  that   he   hoped   to  tamper 
with.     Even  before  the  war  Berlin  was  in  close 
touch  with   the  centres  of  Hindu  sedition  in 
Europe,  and  one  of  the  officials  of  the  German 
Consulate  in  Zurich  was  intimately  associated 
with  a  dangerous  group  of    Indian  anarchists 
who  had  made  Switzerland  their  headquarters. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  either  that  the  large 
German  commercial  community  as  well  as  the 
host   of   German  missionaries   in  India  acted, 
as  in  every  other  country,  as  zealous  agents  of 
German  policy.     Though  the  Indians  themselves 
were,  for  the  most  part,  in  favour  of  protection 
for  Indian  industries,  the  British  Government 
maintained    their   own    free    trade    system    in 
India,  and  German  merchants  had  taken  full 
advantage  of  it  to  develop  of  late  years  a  grow- 
ing import  and  export  trade,  which  in  1913-14 
had  exceeded  that  of  any  other  foreign  country. 
In    the   import   trade   German   travellers   had 
pushed    their    cheaper    manufactured    articles 
with  their  customary  energy,  being  more  ready 
to  adapt  themselves  to  the  requirements  and 
taste  of    native   purchasers,  and    at  one  time 
they  were  undoubtedly  helped  by  the  boycott 


movement  against  British  imported  goods 
which  the  Extremists  started  in  support  of 
their  political  agitation.  One  of  the  most 
notorious  Extremist,  leaders  boasted,  for  in- 
stance, publicly  that  his  newspaper  was  not 
printed  on  British  imported  paper,  but  only 
on  paper  brought  from  Germany  and  Austria. 
It  was,  however,  in  the  export  trade  of  raw 
materials  for  her  own  industries,  such  as  hides, 


[Vandyk. 

THE    MAHARAJAH    OF    BIKANIR, 

One  of  the  Indian  Members  of  the  Imperial  War 
Conference,   1917. 


118 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF-    THE    WAB. 


Malabar  copra,  manganese  ore,  •  wolfram  or 
tungsten  from  Burma,  that  Germany  had  made 
the  most  determined  and  successful  endeavours 
to  capture  the  Indian  market.  In  accordance, 
toov  with  her  universal  policy  of  economic 
penetration,  she  had  set  herself  to  acquire  a 
footing  in,  and  sometimes  commanding  control 
of,  mercantile  and  industrial  firms  that  were 
regarded  as  wholly  British.  As  to  the  wide- 
spread diffusion  of  German  influence  through 
missionary  channels,  it  may  be  enough  to  quote 
the  statement  of  the  Society  for  the  Propaga- 
tion of  the  Gospel  that  in  1914  in  the  Chota 
Nagpur  district  of  Orissa  alone  there  were 
32  German  missionaries  in  charge  of  over  300 
schools,  with  42  native  pastors,  449  catechists, 
477  school  teachers,  and  a  total  flock  of  about 
100,000  native  Christians. 

When  the  storm  broke  Lord  Hardinge  was 
able  to  measure  at  once  the  magnitude  of  the 
struggle  to  which  the  British  Empire  was 
committed,  though  even  he  may  not  have 
foreseen  its  duration.  He  realized  that  great 
risks  would  have  to  be  taken  if  India  was  to 
answer  worthily  to  the  military  call  of  the 
Empire,  and  he  was  prepared  to  take  them 
because  he  felt  he  could  rely  personally  on  the 
confidence  and  affection  of  the  Princes  and 
people  of  India.  As  the  Maharajah  of  Bikanir 
testified  three  years  later  at  the  Mansion  House 
Banciet,  which   he    attended    as    one    of   the 


Indian  delegates  to-  the  Imperial  War  Con- 
ference :  "  We  Indians  often  wonder  whether 
it  is  fully  realized  in  Great  Britain  how  for- 
tunate it  was  in  every  way  for  the  Empire  that 
a  statesman  of  Lord  Hardinge's  sagacity,  sym- 
pathy and  broad-mindedness  was  representing 
the  Sovereign  in  India  when  the  storm  burst." 
It  required,  indeed,  not  merely  a  knowledge  of 
the  military  necessities  of  the  Empire,  but 
profound  confidence  in  the  essential  loyalty 
of  India  to  denude  her  without  the  slightest 
hesitation  of  almost  all  her  British  garrison  as 
well  of  her  Indian  troops  and  to  throw  all  her 
military  resources  into  the  melting  pot  in  order 
to  fill  the  gaps  in  our  fighting  line  in  France, 
which,  owing  to  our  own  unpreparedness  and 
the  still  greater  unpreparedness  of  the  Dominions 
for  a  great  war,  could  not  have  been  filled  from 
any  other  quarter  during  the  supremely 
critical  period  when  the  Germans,  having  failed 
to  reach  Paris,  were  making  their  great  effort 
to  break  through  to  Calais  and  the  French 
Channel  coast. 

The  dispatch  of  the  Indian  Expeditionary 
Force  to  France  and  the  important  part  played 
by  it  in  the  winter  campaign  of  1914-15  have 
been  fully  dealt  with  in  Chapter  LXI.  Indian 
troops  bore  their  share  also  in  many 
other  stricken  fields,  in  Mesopotamia,  in  Egypt, 
at  the  Dardanelles,  in  East  Africa,  and  in 
cooperation  with    our  Japanese    Allies  in  the 


INDIAN    EXPEDITIONARY    FORCE:    GURKHAS    DETRAINING    TO    GO    ABOARD    THE 

TRANSPORTS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


119 


A    STREET    IN    MADRAS. 


Far  East.  But  it  was  the  crucial  decision, 
due  to  Lord  Hardinge's  insistency,  to  send  her 
sons  straight  to  the  chief  battle  front  in  the 
West  to  face,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the 
British  and  the  Dominion  troops,  the  flower 
of  the  German  hosts  that  roused  a  feeling  of 
intense  war-like  pride  throughout  India  and 
ensured  her  loyalty.  The  consciousness  of 
brotherhood  in  arms  seemed  to  obliterats 
suddenly  all  racial  differences  and  to  unite 
India,  as  never  before  under  British  rule, 
in  one  great  impulse  of  loyalty  to  a  common 
Empire  and  a  common  cause.  Many  of 
the  Indian  princes  proffered  and  rendered 
personal  service  at  the  front  All  placed 
the  resources  of  their  States  at  the  disposal 
of  Government.  The  great  landlords  and 
gentry  of  British  India  responded  equally 
to  the  call.  The  great  bulk  of  the  Maho- 
medans  vied  with  the  Hindus  in  their  assurances 
of  devotion.  The  battle  spirit  stirred  not  only 
Rajputs  and  Sikhs  and  all  the  old  martial 
races  that  form  the  backbone  of  the  Indian 
Army,  but  many  others  who  had  not  hitherto 
been  wont  to  seek  military  service.  The 
educated  classes,  who  pride  themselves  on 
having  assimilated  something  of  the  demo- 
cratic spirit  of  the  West,  rallied  to  the  Empire's 
cause  as  the  cause  of  freedom,  and  even  the 


most  bitter  critics  of  the  British  raj  were  for 
the  nonce  converted  to  its  merits  by  the  far 
more  intolerable  menace  of  German  dominion, 
to  which  the  raid  of  the  Emden  and  the  half- 
dozen  shells  she  fired  into  Madras  lent  momen- 
tary reality.  At  the  Congress  session  in  the 
last  3ays  of  1914,  the  President,  Mr.  Bhupen- 
dranath  Bose,  declared,  amidst  general  applause, 
that  that  was  "  not  the  time  to  deal  with 
matters  on  which  we  may  differ.  We  must 
present  to  the  world  the  spectacle  of  a  United 
Empire."  Both  Government  and  the  Indian 
opposition  in  the  Legislative  Councils  agreed 
that  during  the  war  there  should  be  a  truce 
to  political  controversies.  The  Tndian  members 
of  the  Imperial  Council  gave  a  remarkable 
proof  of  their  sincerity  by  passing  in  a  single 
day,  on  March  18,  1915,  on  a  mere  assurance 
from  Lord  Hardinge  that  it  was  a  necessary 
war  measure,  the  Defence  of  India  Act, 
modelled  on  the  British  Defence  of  the  Realm 
Act,  notwithstanding  their  repugnance  to 
some  of  its  more  drastic  provisions  ;  and,  as 
it  were,  in  return,  the  Viceroy  was  able  a  few 
months  later,  on  September  22,  to  confirm 
the  new  sense  of  India's  partnership  in  the 
Empire  by  announcing  that  he  was  authorized 
by  the  British  Government  to  accept  a  reso- 
lution introduced  by  a  distinguished  Punjabi 

186  —  3 


120 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Mahomedan,  Mr.  Mohammed  Shafi,  to  the 
effect  tliat  India,  like  the  Dominions,  should 
have  her  own  representation  in  any  future 
Imperial  Conference.  Further  satisfaction  was 
given  to  Indian  sentiment  by  another  announce- 
ment which  Lord  Hardinge  was  in  a  position 
to  make  before  leaving  India.  He  had  obtained 
the  sanction  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the 
abolition  of  Indian  indentured  labour  in  the 
Colonies — a  system  productive  of  grave  abuses 
and  terrible  social  evils. 


there  was  little  to  bring  home  to  the  Indian 
people  the  realities  of  war.  Considerable  as 
had  been  the  total  contingents  furnished  by 
India,  they  were,  when  compared  with  the 
huge  levies  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  in  the 
Dominions,  small  for  her  total  population  and 
only  drawn  for  the  most  part  from  small 
sections  of  that  population.  The  number  of 
Indians  who  had  kith  or  kin  or  close  personal 
friends  at  the  front  was,  therefore,  very  small, 
and    smallest    of    all    amongst    the    educated 


INDIAN    CYCLISTS    IN    FRANCE. 


[Official  photograph. 


Lord  Hardinge's  tenure  of  office,  which  would 
normally  have  expired  in  November  1915, 
was  renewed  for  a  further  six  months,  to  the 
intense  satisfaction  of  Indian  public  opinion. 
But  even  before  he  left  India  there  were  only 
too  many  indications  that  the  first  great  wave 
of  enthusiasm  had  spent  itself.  The  war 
was  dragging  on  much  longer  than  people 
in  India  had  anticipated.  Interest  in  the 
military  operations,  as  endless  apparently 
as  they  were  often  disappointing,  began  to 
flag.  Except  in  the  Bombay  Presidency, 
where  most  of  the  sick  and  wounded  were 
landed  from  Mesopotamia,  and  in  a  few  other 
centres  where  hospitals  had  to  be  provided  to 
meet    the    requirements    of    increasing    losses. 


classes,  for  whom  the  Indian  Army  provided 
no  career,  and  soldiering,  it  was  generally 
believed,  offered  in  itself  very  little  attrac- 
tion. The  most  poignant  element  of  personal 
interest  which  made  the  war  bulk  so  large  in 
the  daily  hopes  and  anxieties  of  almost  every 
family  in  Britain  was  seldom'  present  to 
the  people  of  India,  who,  for  the  most  part, 
were  quite  incapable  of  visualising  the  remote 
and  unknown  scenes  amidst  which  the  actual 
operations  of  war  were  carried  on.  From  all 
the  immediate  terrors  of  war  India  was  prac- 
tically immune,  and  for  a  long  time  even  from 
its  financial  burdens.  In  fact,  after  a  first 
spasm  of  economic  depression,  the  war  brought 
her  a  steady  increase  of  material  prosperity 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


121 


There  was  a  mistaken  notion  that.  Indian 
opinion  would  take  alarm  if  the  strain  of  war 
were  allowed  to  cause  any  very  marked  depar- 
ture from  the  ordinary  official  or  even  social 
life  of  the  European  community.  The  keenness 
of  the  younger  members  of  the  public  services 
to  volunteer  for  the  front  was  systematically 
discouraged,  whilst  the  military  authorities 
continued  to  treat  the  reserve  of  Indian  Army 
officers,  drawn  mostly  from  the  Anglo-Indian 
commercial  class,  with  their  customary  frigidity, 
and  every  public  department  adheied  as 
closely  as  possible  to  its  usual  routine.  Thought- 
ful Indians,  reading  public  speeches  about  the 
life  and  death  struggle  in  which  the  Empire  was 
engaged,  were  puzzled  by  this  official  attitude 
of  seeming  indifference  which  extended  equally 
to  suggestions  made  by  Indians  themselves 
for  a  fuller  utilization  of  Indian  resources, 
both  of  men  and  materials,  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  Upon  others  the  increasing  horrors 
of  the  European  war,  the  successive  "  methods 
of  f rightfulness  '  imported  into  it  by  a  nation 
that  prided  itself  upon  being  above  all  others 
the  chosen  exponent  of  European  culture,  and 
the  concentration  of  the  whole  energies  and 
resources  of  the  western  world  on  the  mere  work 
of  destruction,  produced  a  not  unnatural  revul- 
sion against  the  vaunted  superiority  of  our  civi- 


lization. On  the  other  hand,  the  bulk  of  the 
western-educated  classes,  whose  mind  had  been 
so  long  steeped  in  politics,  dwelt  chiefly  on 
the  generous  and  almost  excessive  praise 
lavished  in  the  British  Press  and  by  responsible 
Ministers  themselves  on  the  loyalty  of  India. 
Whilst  they  indignantly  repudiated  all  idea  of 
claiming  a  reward  for  loyalty,  they  interpreted 
the  promise  of  a  "  changed  angle  of  vision  " 
as  foreshadowing  nothing  leas  than  the  speedy 
concession  of  all  the  political  demands  they  had 
hitherto  pressed  for  in  vain.  The  Nationalists 
read  into  every  declaration  of  the  Allies  that 
the  war  was  being  waged  in  support  of  demo- 
cratic ideals  and  to  secure  the  right  of  every 
small  nation  to  shape  its  own  destinies  a  justi- 
fication of  their  own  theories  of  Indian  nation- 
hood. There  were  some,  moreover,  amongst 
the  Extremists  who  had  perhaps  swung  rather 
reluctantly  to  the  inflowing  tide  of  loyalty,  and 
who,  less  squeamish  in  their  views  as  to  the 
real  obligations  of  loyalty,  were  not  prepared 
to  allow  its  reward  to  be  deferred  until  the 
restoration  of  peace  conditions  might  possibly 
diminish  its  marketable  value.  Anyhow  they 
drew  a  broad  distinction  between  loyalty  to 
the  Crown  itself  and  loyalty  to  those  who 
represented  the  Crown  in  India,  and  did  not 
hesitate  to  resume  their  subversive  agitation 


[Official  photograflt. 


INDIAN    CAVALRY    IN     FRANCE. 


122 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


against  British  administration,  though  it  was 
bound  to  render  the  ordinary  task  of  govern- 
ment far  more  difficult  in  war-time  than  in 
times  of  peace.  The  old  ferment  was  at  work 
again,  and  when  the  Congress  met  in  Bombay 
for  its  next  annual  session  at  the  end  of  1915,  the 
atmosphere  was  very  different  from  that  of 
the  previous  session  at  the  end  of  1914.  It 
required  all  the  ability  and  prestige  of  Sir  S. 
Sinha,  who  occupied  the  Presidential  chair 
on  this  occasion,  to  restrain  the  advanced  party 
and  to  defeat  the  aggressive  tactics  advocated 
by  Mrs.  Besant,  who,  having  lost  a  good  deal 
of  the  influence  she  had  originally  acquired 
as  a  Theosophist  vessel  of  spiritual  enlighten- 
ment with  the  more  conservative  and  sober 
leaders  of  Hinduism,  was  seeking  to  gain  new 
popularity  with  the  younger  generation  by 
constituting  herself  the  impassioned  champion 
of  the  most  extreme  Indian  Nationalism. 
Sir  S.  Sinha,  speaking  with  the  experience  he 
had  learnt  as  the  first  Indian  member  of  the 
Viceroy's  Execvitive  Council,  pleaded  with  the 
utmost  earnestness  and  force  for  patience  and 
moderation,  and  declared  emphatically  that 
though  the  goal  to  keep  before  them  was 
ultimate  self-government,   India  was   not   yet 


ripe  for  it.  His  audience  listened  grudgingly 
to  this  language  of  sane  patriotism,  for  Mrs. 
Besant  had  already  adroitly  launched  the  catch- 
word of  Home  Rule  for  India,  against  which 
Lord  Hardinge  vainly  uttered  his  own  grave 
warning  in  his  farewell  speech  to  the  Imperial 
Council  at  Delhi  on  March  24,  1916. 

Lord  Chelmsford,  who,  in  obedience  to  the 
call  of  patriotism,  had  already  spent  over  a 
year  in  India  during  the  war  as  an  ordinary 
Territorial  officer,  landed  in  Bombay,  after  a 
short  visit  to  England,  on  April  4,  1916,  to 
take  over  the  Viceroyalty  from  Lord  Hardinge, 
who  sailed  on  the  same  day,  after  unprecedented 
demonstrations  of  gratitude  and  affection  from 
the  Ruling  Princes  as  well  as  the  people  of 
India.  In  his  very  first  speech  in  reply  to  an 
address  of  welcome  at  Bombay  Lord  Chelms- 
ford pledged  himself  to  continue  his  prede- 
cessor's policy.  But  for  a  time  his  attention 
had  to  be  largely  diverted  to  the  grave  mili- 
tary problems  in  Mesopotamia  with  which 
the  fall  of  Kut  almost  at  once  confronted 
him.  Evidence  had  been  accumulating  for 
some  time  past  that  Army  Headquarters 
in    India,    had    failed    to    rise    to    the    emer- 


INDIAN    TROOPERS    IN    FRANCE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


128 


INDIAN    MACHINE-GUN    IN     FLANDERS. 


gency  created  by  the  first  serious  reverse 
which  our  arms  had  encountered  on  the 
Tigris— namely,  at  Ctesiphon  in  November 
1916  The  lack  of  river  transport  and  the 
neglect  to  supplement  it.  by  the  construction 
of  a  military  railway  had  hampered  all  opera- 
tions for  the  relief  of  Kut,  and  ever  since 
the  retreat  from  Ctesiphon  harrowing  stories 
had  reached  India  of  the  sufferings  of  our 
sick  and  wounded  which  showed  a  lament- 
able breakdown  of  the  medical  field  service 
as  the  result,  in  part  at  least,  of  inadequate 
transport.  Lord  Chelmsford  had  himself 
been  on  the  point  of  proceeding  to  Meso- 
potamia, on  a  mission  of  inquiry  which 
Lord  Hardingo  had  asked  him  to  undertake, 
when  he  had  to  change  his  plans  on  his 
appointment  to  the  Viceroyalty.  That  mission 
was  subsequently  entrusted  by  Lord  Hardinge 
to  Sir  William  Vincent,  afterwards  Home 
Member  of  the  Government  of  India  with 
whom  were  associated  Major-General  Bingley, 
and  later  Mr.  E.  A.  Ridsdale.  Their  report, 
ultimately  made  public  with  the  Report  of 
the  Parliamentary  Commission  on  the  Meso- 
potamian  Expedition,  reached  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  after  Lord  Chelmsford  had 
assumed  office,  and  confirmed  him  in  the 
opinion  that  sweeping  changes  were  imperatively 
required  both  at  Army  Headquarters  in  India 
and  in  the   higher   command  in  Mesopotamia. 


The  Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Beauchamp  Duff, 
had  proved  himself  an  able  administrator  so 
long  as  no  excessive  strain  was  thrown  on  to 
the  military  machine  of  which  he  was  in  charge, 
and  he  had  deserved  and  received  great  credit 
for  the  prompt  dispatch  of  the  large  expe- 
ditionary forces  sent  from  India  to  France  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  the  far-reaching 
changes  in  the  system  of  Indian  Army  Adminis- 
tration effected  in  1906  at  Lord  Kitchener's 
instance,  when  he  held  the  post  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  Tndia  with  Sir  Beauchamp  Duff' 
as  his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  had  borne  the  fruits 
which  Lord  Curzon  had  at  the  time  vainly 
insisted  they  were  bound  ultimately  to  bear. 
For  they  combined  in  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  the  twofold  functions  of  executive  and 
administrative  head  of  the  Indian  Army. 
Even  in  peace  time  such  a  combination  could 
only  succeed  with  a  man  of  Lord  Kitchener's 
own  masterful  personality  and  indomitable 
energy.  Under  the  stress  of  war  its  failure 
was  inevitable.  Sir  Beauchamp  Duff  was 
tied  to  his  Department  by  the  increasing 
pressure  of  administrative  work,  which  he  was 
perhaps  too  reluctant  to  delegate  to  others, 
and  though,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  he  ought  to 
have  been  able  at  least  occasionally  to  see 
things  with  his  own  eyes — especially  when 
things  were  obviously  going  wrong — he  had 
never  found  a  day  to  spare  during  nearly  three 


124 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


years  of  war  to  emergo  from  the  seclusion  of 
his  office  at  Delhi  or  Simla.     In  July,    1917, 
he  was  recalled  to  England  to  give  evidence 
before  the  Mesopotamian  Commission,  and  Sir 
Charles    Monro,    who    had    held    with    great 
distinction  an  important  command  in  France, 
was  sent  out  to  succeed  him  as  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and  at  once  proceeded  to  Mesopotamia 
to  take  the  measure  of  the  military  situation 
for  himself.     Equally  important  changes  had 
meanwhile  taken  place  in  the  higher  commands 
in  Mesopotamia,  and  notably  the  supersession 
of    Sir    Percy    Lake,    formerly    Chief    of    the 
Staff  to  Sir  Beauchamp  Duff — -whose  appoint- 
ment early  in  1917  to  the  supreme  command 
in  Mesopotamia  had  been  much  criticized  at 
the  time — by  Sir  Stanley  Maude,  the  brilliant 
general  who  was  so  soon  to  retrieve  the  whole 
situation   by   the   conquest   of   Baghdad,    and 
then    again    so    soon    to    be    arrested    by  the 
"hand  of  death  in  his  splendid  career  of  victory. 
Even  before  these  changes  had  relieved  the 
new    Viceroy    from    the    grave    military    pre- 
occupations of  his  first  few  months  in  India 
he   had  found   himself   compelled  to   take  up 
the   difficult  problem   of   political   reforms,   to 
which  his  predecessor  had  already  given  much 
attention.     In  close  consultation  with  the  mem- 
bers of  his  Executive  Council,  Lord  Chelmsford 
devoted  his  first  summer  in  Simla  to  the  pre- 
paration of  an  extensive  scheme  for  submission 
to  the  Secretary  of  State.  But  the  new  Viceroy's 
natural    reserve,    from    which,    moreover,    he 
could   hardly    have   departed   so    long   as   the 
scheme  had  not  obtained  the  sanction  of  the 
British  Government,  was  soon  skilfully  exploited 
by  the  advanced  party  to  cast  doubts  upon  his 
"  sympathy    for    Indian   aspirations "    and    to 
stimulate   the   growing   impatience    of    Indian 
politicians.     The  extremists  did    not  hesitate 
to  denounce  him  as  the  reactionary  nominee 
of  a  reactionary  Secretary  of  State  (Mr.  Austen 
Chamberlain),  and,  as  a  newcomer,  he  had  not 
yet  had  time  or  opportunity  to  acquire  public 
confidence  sufficiently  to  counteract  the  insi- 
dious campaign  directed  against  him.     During 
the    autumn    session    of    the    Viceroy's    Legis- 
lative    Council     nineteen     Indian     "  elected " 
members    submitted    a    written   memorandum 
containing  a  list  of  measures  which,  in  their 
opinion,    constituted    a    minimum    instalment 
of   the   changes   which   India   was   entitled   to 
demand  from   "  the  new  angle  of  vision  "   at 
home.     The    memorandum    had    been    hastily 
prepared,  and    at.  once    provoked    expressions 


of  dissent   from   other  Indian  representatives 
who  had  been  ignored  by  the  signatories  as 
mere    "  nominated "    members.     Whilst    some 
of  its  demands  were  quite  reasonable,  such  as 
the  repeal  of  the  Indian  Arms  Act,  and  the 
granting    of    Amiy    commissions    to    Indians, 
which    had    long    been    overdue,    the    consti- 
tutional   reforms,    as    far    as    their    meaning 
was   intelligible,    seemed    calculated    either    to 
aggravate    the    defects    of    the    Morley-Minto 
reforms  by  increasing  the  power  of  the  Indian 
opposition     to     criticize     and     obstruct     the 
action    of    the    Fxecutive   without    having    to 
bear  any  corresponding  responsibility,  or  else 
to    involve    a    revolutionary    change    in    the 
entire    system    of     Indian    government,    only 
conceivable  if  India  were  endowed  with  really 
representative     institutions.     However     crude 
this  document  was,  the  Government  of  India 
would  perhaps  have  done  better  not  to  ignore 
it  completely.     Their  silence  played   into  the 
hands    of    the   extremists,    who    captured    the 
Indian  National  Congress  at  its  next  annual 
session    held     in    Christmas    week,     1910,    at 
Lucknow.     Mrs.    Besant,    whose    mischievous 
activities  had  led  to  her  exclusion   from   the 
Bombay  Presidency  and  some  other  provinces, 
and    Mr.    Tilak,    the    great    Deccan    agitator, 
who  reappeared  for  the  first  time  on  the  scene 
after    having    served    his    six    years'    term    of 
transportation  to  Mandalay  for  sedition,  were 
the  heroes  of  the  session.     After  many  impas- 
sioned   orations,    in    which    the    most    fervid 
Nationalists  had,  as  usual,  to  declaim  against 
"  alien  "    misrule    in    an    "  alien  "    tongue,    as 
English    is    the    one    language    they    have    in 
common  and  the  one  practical  bond  of  national 
unity  between    them,   the    Congress  passed  a 
series    of    resolutions    claiming    for    India    the 
status  of  a  self-governing  State,  with  complete 
financial,  legislative,  and  administrative  auto- 
nomy, and,  as  a  first  step,  the  election  of  half 
the   Government   of  India  by  the  non-official 
Indian  members  of  the   Viceroy's   Legislative 
Council,  and   other   reforms  of   a   similar   and 
even   more   drastic    character   for    the    Indian 
Provincial  Governments.    Lord  Chelmsford  had 
delivered  in  advance  during  a  visit  to  Calcutta 
an  earnest  warning  against  such  "  cataclysmic 
changes,"  and,  in  reply  to  an  address  presented 
to  him  a  few  weeks  later  by  a  body  of  Indian 
journalists  who  demanded  the  repeal   of    the 
Press    Act,    he    pointed    out,    with    abundant 
quotations    from    the     extremist    press    and, 
in  particular,  from  Mrs.  Besant's  own  organ, 


[I  anlyk. 


LORD    CHELMSFORD,    G.C.M.G., 
Appointed  Viceroy  of  India,   1916. 


125 


126 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


New  India,  the  dangerous,  if  not  actually 
criminal,  lengths  to  which  political  agitation 
was  being  carried.  Unfortunately,  whilst  the 
Viceroy's  admonitions  were  so  much  breath 
wasted   on   the    extremists,    he   was  not   in   a 


[Elliott  &  Fry. 
SIR    JAMES     S.     MESTON,    K.C.S.I., 

Lieutenant-Governor  of  Agra  and  Oudh,  1912-1917, 

One  of  the  representatives  of  India  in  the  Imperial 

War  Conference  of  1917. 

position  to  rally  the  moderates  to  his  support 
by  any  definite  enunciation  of  policy,  as  the 
Government  of  India  were  still  engaged  in  a 
protracted  exchange  of  views  with  the  Secretary 
of  State.  Nor,  indeed,  did  there  seem  to  be 
any  fixity  of  purpose  or  uniformity  of  policy 
at  Delhi.  Whereas  the  Home  Rule  agitation 
was  spreading  all  over  India  and  assuming 
the  character  of  an  unmistakably  All-Indian 
movement,  the  Government  of  India  shrank 
from  the  responsibility  of  dealing  with  it 
themselves,  and  left  it  to  the  Provincial 
Governments  to  take  such  measures  as  they 
might  deem  necessary  under  their  own  authority. 
The  result  was  a  deplorable  lack  of  uniformity, 
which  produced  merely  an  impression  of  irre- 
solution and  weakness — i.e.,  the  most  fatal 
impression  possible  in  any  Oriental  country. 

The  appointment  of  three  delegates  to  repre- 
sent India  at  the  special  Imperial  War  Con- 
ference held  in  London  in  the  spring  of  1917 
temporarily  eased  the  situation.  It  was  a 
generous  fulfilment  of  the  pledge  which  Lord 


Hardingo  had  been  authorized  to  give  twelve 
months  before.  Besides  Sir  James  Meston, 
Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  United  Provinces, 
well  known  for  his  warm  sympathy  with  all 
legitimate  Indian  aspirations,  the  Maharajah 
of  Bikanir,  an  Indian  Ruling  Prince  of  an- 
cient lineage  and  great  parts,  and  Sir  S. 
Sinha,  an  able  leader  of  moderate  Indian 
opinion,  who  had  been  the  first  Indian  member 
of  the  Viceroy's  Executive  Council  in  Lord 
Minto's  time,  and  had  presided  over  the  Indian 
National  Congress  of  1915,  proceeded  to  England 
to  speak  for  India  for  the  first  time  in  the 
united  counsels  of  the  whole  Commonwealth 
of  British  nations  with  an  authority  worthy 
of  the  share  she  had  borne  in  the  great  war. 
The  splendid  reception  given  to  them  by  their 
colleagues  from  the  self -governing  Dominions, 
as  well  as  by  the  British  Government  and  the 
British  people,  made  a  great  impression  in 
India  and  went  far  to  counteract  an  organized 
campaign  of  suspicion  and  ill-feeling  against 
the  Dominions,  for  which  the  treatment  of 
Indian  settlers  in  South  Africa  and  the  whole 
very  difficult  and  delicate  question  of  Indian 
immigration  into  British  colonies  had  often 
afforded  good,  or  at  least  specious,  grounds. 

In  the  calmer  atmosphere  thus  created,  the 
Government  of  India  were  able  to  introduce  two 
important  measures  connected  with  the  prose- 
cution of  the  war  which  received  at  first  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  support  from  Indian 
opinion.  One  was  an  undertaking  to  contribute 
£100,000,000  as  India's  share  of  the  Empire's 
war  expenditure  and  the  issue  of  an  Indian  loan 
to  cover  a  first  instalment  of  that  contribution. 
Many  Indians  had  themselves  expressed  their 
regret  that  the  Empire  had  not  made  a  larger 
appeal  to  Indian  patriotism,  and  the  share 
India  had  hitherto  borne  of  the  financial 
burdens  of  the  war  had  been  scarcely  appre- 
ciable, as  it  was  only  in  the  Budget  of  1916  that 
a  slight  increase  of  taxation  had  taken  place, 
and  the  Imperial  Exchequer  continued  to 
defray  all  the  extra  costs  involved  by  the  em- 
ployment of  Indian  troops  in  the  various 
theatres  of  war  outside  India.  It  must, 
however,  be  .remembered  that,  whilst  the 
Dominions  had  spent  very  little  before  the 
war  on  Imperial  defence,  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  revenues  of  India  had  always 
been  devoted  to  the  Army,  and  she  had 
thus  been  in  a  position  to  place  a  large  and 
well-equipped  force  in  the  field  at  an  early 
and   critical   stage   of   the  war   well   ahead  of 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


127 


the  Dominion  contingents.  The  Indian  War 
Loan  was  launched  with  very  general  approval, 
even  from  leading  extremists,  and  ultimately 
produced  a  sum  of  nearly  £40,000,000,  which 
was  four  times  as  much  as  the  Finance  Member, 
Sir  William  Meyer,  had  ventured  to  anti- 
cipate. 

The  other  measure  was  an  Act  to  impose 
a  restricted  form  of  compulsory  military 
training  and  service  on  the  European  com- 
munity, and  to  arrange  for  the  voluntary 
enrolment  of  Indians  in  a  special  military 
force  to  be  raised  for  the  war  in  all  parts  of 
India.  It  was  a  measure  which  might  with 
advantage  have  been  taken  as  soon  as  the 
war  broke  out,  and  the  European  Volunteer 
Corps  would  then  have  welcomed  it  heartily, 
whereas  the  manner  and  the  season  of  the  year 
in  which  the  new  Act  was  put  into  operation, 
just  at  the  beginning  of  the  hot  weather  of  1917, 
caused  a  great  deal  of  unnecessary  hardship  and 
heartburning.  It  was  none  the  less  loyally 
carried  into  effect.  The  appeal  to  Indians 
was  less  successful.  At  first  it  also  received 
general  support  from  Indian  public  men, 
who  seemed  to  realize  how  valuable  such 
an  experiment  might  prove  for  the  future 
organization  of  an  All -Indian  army  on  territorial 
lines.  Moreover,  a  good  many  young  Indians 
of  the  educated  classes  had  set  an  excellent 
example  by  volunteering  during  the  early  stages 
•of  the  war  for  active  service  as  doctors  and  in 
the  Ambulance  Corps,  and  had  acquitted  them- 
selves very  creditably  in  France  and  in  Meso- 
potamia. A  double  company  of  Bengalis  had 
also  been  voluntarily  raised  as  a  combatant 
unit  under  special  authority  granted  in  response 
to  the  insistent  wishes  of  the  people  of  Bengal. 
But  the  larger  movement  which  Government 
was  now  endeavouring,  again  rather  tardily,  to 
encourage  was  blighted  by  political  distrust. 
The  conditions  in  regard  to  pay  and  status, 
though  similar  to  those  under  which  our  own 
Territorials  had  been  recruited  at  home,  were 
keenly  attacked  by  the  extremists  as  conveying 
some  slur  of  racial  inferiority ;  and  within  tliree 
months  Government  had  to  give  public  expres- 
sion to  its  disappointment  in  a  resolution 
stating  that  only  300  Indian  recruits  had  so  far 
come  forward  in  the  whole  of  India  instead  of 
tho  5,000  asked  for  by  the  military  authorities. 
•Not  the  least  potent  of  the  infliftinces  which 
favoured  a  recrudescence  of  political  unrest  was 
the  Russian  Revolution.  It  created  a  profound 
imoression  all  over  India,  and    the  extremists 


hailed  in  it  above  all  the  downfall  of  a  tyrannical 
bureaucracy  with  which  for  many  years  past 
they  had  been  wont  to  comparo  the  Anglo- 
Indian  bureaucracy,  and  always,  of  course,  to  the 
latter's  disadvantage.  A  powerful  impetus  was 
again  given  to  the  extremist  propaganda  by  the 
publication  of  the  Mesopotamian  Report,  which 
was  construed  into  a  scathing  indictment  not 
only  of  Indian  military  administration,  but  of 
the  whole  system  of  Indian  Government,  civil 
as  well  as  military ;  and  the  language  used  in  the 
course  of  the  Parliamentary  debates  on  the 
Report  by  Mr.  Edwin  Montagu  a  very  short 
time  before  he  was  appointed  to  the  India 
Office   lent   itself,  unfortunately,  to   a   similar 


' 


i 


\Ogkial  pkotoerapk. 

INDIAN  CONTINGENT  IN  MESOPOTAMIA. 

Sepoys  cleaning  reserve  bombs  for  front  line 

trench. 

interpretation.  Tins  was  all  the  more  unfor- 
tunato  as  the  internment  of  Mrs.  Besant 
(June  19)  by  tho  Government  of  Madras  had 
given  the  extremists  an  opportunity  to  raise  a 
storm  of  indignant  protests  and  to  threaten  a 
campaign  of  "  passive  resistance."  Many 
moderate  Indians  regarded  the  action  of  tho 
Madras  Government  as,  to  say  the   least,   ill- 


128 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


IN    MESOPOTAMIA:    INDIAN    MOUNTAIN    GUN    SECTION. 


timed,  and  futile  into  the  bargain,  as  it  merely 
meant  the  transfer  of  that  lady's  activities, 
with  very  slight  restrictions,  from  her  own 
headquarters  at  Adyar,  just  outside  Madras,  to 
Ootacamund,  the  summer  headquarters  of 
Government,  which  she  herself  selected  out 
of  the  various  alternatives  offered  to  her  for  her 
enforced  residence.  The  Government  of  India 
continued  to  maintain  a  sphynx-like  attitude 
of  silent  reserve,  though  the  agitation  which 
centred  more  and  more  round  Mrs.  Be3ant  had 
spread  throughout  political  circles  all  over 
India.  The  appointment  of  three  new  Indian 
members  to  the  India  Council  in  Whitehall  — 
one  of  whom,  Mr.  Bhupendranath  Bose,  had 
presided  over  the  Indian  National  Congress 
with  marked  ability  and  moderation  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war — was  one  of  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain's last  acts  before  ho  left  the  India  Office  ; 
but  he  got  little  credit  for  it  in  the  over-heated 
atmosphere  of  Indian  politics,  and  hi3  resig- 
nation on  July  12,  followed  by  the  announce- 
ment that  Mr.  Montagu  had  been  selected  to 
succeerl  hirci,  was  welcomed  as  foreshadowing 
a  repudiation  by  the  British  Government  of  the 
reactionary  policy  so  mischievously  but  suc- 
cessfully imputed  to  him  and  to  the  Viceroy 
appointed  during  his  tenure  of  the  India 
Office. 

What   actually    happened    had    a    very    dif- 


ferent meaning.  Mr.  Montagu  realized  perhaps 
more  fully  than  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  done 
the  importance  of  allaying  the  political  excite- 
ment in  India  by  a  prompt  declaration  of 
policy,  but  the  declaration  which  he  made  on 
behalf  of  the  British  Government,  and  in  full 
agreement  with  the  Government  of  India, 
was  itself  the  result  of  the  prolonged  exchange 
of  views  that  had  already  taken  place  between 
Mr.  Chamberlain  and  the  Viceroy.  The  an- 
nouncement made  by  Mr.  Montagu  on  August 
20,  1917,  marks  so  important  a  stage  in  the 
evolution  of  British  rule  in  India  that  its 
terms  deserve  to  be  quoted  in  full : 

The  policy  of  his  Majesty's  Government,  with  which 
the  Government  of  India  are  in  complete  accord,  is  that 
of  the  increasing  association  of  Indians  in  every  branch 
of  the  administration,  and  the  gradual  "development  of 
self-govorning  institutions,  with  a  view  to  the  progressive 
realization  of  responsible  government  in  Tndia  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  British  Empire.  They  have  decided 
that  substantial  steps  in  this  direction  should  be  taken 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  that  it  is  of  the  .highest  importance 
as  a  preliminary  to  considering  what  these  steps  should 
be  that  there  should  be  a  free  and  informal  exchange 
of  opinion  between  those  in  authority  at  home  and  in 
India.  His  Majesty's  Government  have  accordingly 
decided,  with  his  Majesty's  approval,  that  I  should 
accept  the  Viceroy's. invitation  to  proceed  to  India  to 
discuss  these  matters  with  the  Viceroy  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  India,  to  consider  with  the  Viceroy  the  views 
of  local  governments,  and  to  receive  with  him  the 
suggestions  of  representative  bodies  and  others.  I 
would  add  that  progress  in  this  policy  can  only  be 
achieved  by  successive  stages.  The  British  Government 
and  the  Government  of  India,  on  whom  the  responsibility 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


129 


lies  for  the  welfare  and  advancement  of  the  Indian 
peoples,  must  be  the  judges  of  the  time  and  measure  of 
each  advance,  and  they  must  be  guided  by  the  coopera- 
tion received  from  those  upon  whom  new  opportunities 
of  service  will  thus  be  conferred,  and  by  the  extent  to 
which  it  is  found  that  confidence  can  be  reposed  in  their 
sense  of  responsibility.  Ample  opportunity  will  be 
afforded  for  public  discussion  of  the  proposals,  which 
will  be  submitted  in  due  course  to  Parliament. 

It  was  perhaps  too  much  to  expect  that  even 
so  clean-cut  and  far-reaching  a  pledge  of  our 
determination  to  set  the  feet  of  India  in  the 
path  of  self-government  would  disarm  an 
agitation  which,  if  not  openly  directed  against 
the  British  overlordship  of  India,  had  behind 
it  some  dangerous  forces  bent  on  paralyzing 
the  whole  system  of  Indian  administration. 
The  Government  of  India,  anxious  to  restore  a 
happier  atmosphere  in  view  of  Mr.  Montagu's 
arrival  in  India,  prevailed  upon  the  Madras 
Government  to  rescind  the  order  for  Mrs. 
Besant's  internment,  and  would  have  extended 
the  same  indulgence  to  the  Mahomedan 
extremist  leader,  Mr.  Mahomed  Ali,  had  he 
not  refused  to  give  a  promise  of  good  behaviour 
during  the  war  in  the  form  not  unreasonably 
laid  before  him  for  signature.  The  election 
of  this  "young"  Mahomedan,  who  before  his 
internment  had  never  made  any  secret  of  his 
sympathies  with  the  "  Young  "  Turks,  to  the 
Presidency  of  the  All-India  Moslem  League 
was  merely  an  empty  demonstration,  as  he 
remained  interned,  but  it  was  no  less  significant 
of  an  irreconcilable  temper  than  that  of  Mrs. 
Besant  herself  to  the  Presidency  of  the  Indian 
National  Congress  at  the  annual  session  of 
those  two  assemblies  held  at  Christmas  1917, 
in  Calcutta.  How  artificial  was  the  "  national  " 
unity  for  which  they  professed  to  stand  had 
been  once  more  shown  only  a  few  weeks 
before  by  an  unusually  violent  explosion  of 
those  racial  and  sectarian  passions  which 
even  the  strong  arm  of  the  British  ruler  cannot 
always  keep  under  restraint.  In  the  western 
districts  of  Bihar,  adjoining  the  United  Pro- 
vinces, widespread  disturbances,  in  which  a 
number  of  educated  Hindus  played  a  shameful 
part,  broke  out  between  Hindus  and  Maho- 
tnedans,  and  considerable  military  forces  were 
required  to  put  them  down,  not  without  loss 
of  life  and  only  after  the  Hindus  had  indulged 
in  a  veritable  orgy  of  looting  and  arson  and 

violence,    in    which   even    Mahomedan  women 

« 

had  not  been  spared.  Nevertheless,  the  Con- 
gress and  the  League  agreed  to  pass  resolutions 
to  the  effect  that  nothing  would  satisfy  India 
short  of  Dominion  Home  Rule  within  10  years 


and  the  immediate  adoption  of  the  extreme 
programme  embodied  in  their  resolutions  of 
Christmas  1916.  Such  demands',  to  which 
Mrs.  Besant's  Presidential  Address  had  im- 
parted a  very  minatory  tone,  were  not  only 
in  themselves  extravagant,  but  they  deliberately 
flouted  that  part  of  the  British  Government's 


HON.    EDWIN   S.    MONTAGU.  M.P., 
Secretary  of  State  for  India,   1917. 


180 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


declaration,  reserving  to  their  own  judgment 
the  time  and  measure  of  each  advance  towards 
the  ultimate  goal  of  Indian  self-government. 

Happily  there  was  a  considerable  body  of 
Indian  opinion  far  less  noisy  and  more  sober, 
which  Mr.  Montagu,  who  wisely  kept  his  own 
counsel,  had  ample  opportunity  of  eliciting 
during  his  progress  through  India  in  company 
with  the  Viceroy.  Moderate  Indians  may 
seem  at  times  to  be  carried  away  or  submerged 
by  the  rising  tide  of  extremism,  but  whilst  it 
would  be  unwise  to  ignore  the  dangerous  forces 
at  work  behind  the  Indian  Home  Rule  move- 
ment in  its  more  extravagant  forms,  the 
methods  to  which  they  resorted  at  a  time 
when  the  whole  Empire,  including  India,  was 
engaged  in  a  life-and-death  struggle  failed 
to  affect  the  substantial  and  steady  support 
which  India  as  a  whole  continued  to  the 
prosecution  of  the  war — a  support  which 
even  the  extremists  themselves  always  pro- 
fessed, at  any  rate  publicly,  to  endorse 

Material  prosperity  is  always  a  steadying 
factor,  and  of  material  prosperity  during  the 
war  India  enjoyed  a  more  abundant  share 
than  any  other  part  of  the  Empire.  If  we 
take  in  the  first  instance  the  histoiy  of 
Indian  finance  during  the  period  1914-1917, 
we  find  it  to  have  been  a  strange  record  of 
surprises,  but  of  surprises  which  led  up  to 
unexpectedly  satisfactory  results.  The  broad 
cliaracteristic  of  Indian  finance  is  that  the 
country  has  large  obligations  to  discharge 
in  England  every  year,  estimated  at  approxi- 
mately £20,000,000.  It  has  in  India  a  large 
unfunded  debt,  chiefly  deposits  invested  in 
Post  Office  Savings  Banks ;  an  extensive 
note  circulation  entirely  managed  by  Govern- 
ment ;  and  a  token  currency  whose  sterling 
exchange  value  is  guaranteed  and  buttressed 
by  a  Gold  Standard  Reserve  maintained 
almost  entirely  in  London.  In  order  to 
ensure  financial  equilibrium  it  is  necessary  to 
preserve  a  substantial  balance  of  trade  in 
favour  of  the  country,  and  it  was  always  assumed 
that  in  timet  of  crisis  there  would  be  a  great 
demand  for  sterling  exchange,  which  Govern- 
ment would  have  to  meet  from  the  Gold 
Standard  Reserve  if  the  financial  policy  in- 
augurated in  1893  and  consummated  in  189S, 
directed  mainly  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
sterling  value  of  the  rupee,  was  not  to  collapse. 
Furthermore,  in  India,  owing  to  the  shyness  of 
capital    and     the     undeveloped    condition    of 


banking  institutions,  Government  has  to  stand 
behind  the  principal  banks  in  time  of  crisis, 
not  only  by  the  use  of  its  credit,  but,  by  the 
provision  of  actual  cash. 

It  was  fortunate  for  India  that  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  found  the  country  in  an  excep- 
tionally strong  finaucial  position  The 
Treasury  balances  in  England  and  India  were 
£1,500,000  in  advance  of  the  estimated  value, 
the  gold  holding  was  £23,500,000,  and  tho 
Presidency  banks,  the  principal  financial  in- 
stitutions in  the  country,  were  unusually  well 
provided  with  funds.  Fortified  by  these 
resources,  the  Government  was  able  to  meet 
the  first  shock  to  credit  with  success.  This 
shock  took  the  form  which  was  generally 
anticipated — an  immediate  demand  for  sterling 
exchange,  which  was  not  satisfied  until  gold 
bills  on  London  of  the  value  of  £8,750,000  had 
been  sold.  This  process  automatically  trans- 
ferred a  corresponding  amount  of  the  Gold 
Standard  Reserve  from  London  to  India,  and 
it  was  fortunate  that  this  was  so  There  was 
an  immediate  rush  on  the  Post  Office  Savings 
Banks,  which  induced  the  withdrawal  of 
£7,000,000  and  a  demand  for  the  encashment 
in  bullion  of  currency  notes  to  the  extent  of 
£4,000,000.  By  borrowing  from  the  Gold 
Standard  Reserve  the  Government  was  able 
readily  to  meet  the  demands  on  the  Savings 
Banks,  whilst  confidence  in  the  paper  cur- 
rency was  speedily  restored  by  increasing  the 
facilities  for  encashment  throughout  the 
country. 

So  far  Indian  finance  and  currency  had 
pursued  the  anticipated  course  ;  thereafter  it 
assumed  forms  entirely  upsetting  all  calcu- 
lations and  arrangements.  Trade  rapidly 
adjusted  itself  to  the  new  conditions,  and  by 
the  close  of  March,  1915,  it  had  found  a  fresh 
equilibrium.  The  very  large  demand  for  tho 
chief  products  of  India,  such  as  jute,  cotton, 
oilseeds  and  hides  and  skins,  coupled  with  the 
reduced  import  of  manufactured  goods  arising 
from  the  closure  of  the  chief  Continental 
markets  and  the  reduced  productive  power  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  brought  about  an  in- 
creasing balance  of  trade  in  favour  of  India. 
A  further  factor  of  strength  was  introduced 
when  the  Indian  Government  began  to  spend 
very  largely  in  India  on  account  of  the  Home 
Government  for  the  maintenance  of  the  forces 
in  Mesopotamia,  East  Africa,  and  Egypt ; 
this  expenditure  amounted  to  an  indirect 
remittance     from    London    to    Calcutta    and 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


331 


INDIANS    ON    THE    WESTERN    FRONT: 
COOKING    CHUPATTIES. 

Bombay.  The  result  of  these  forces  was  to 
make  the  chief  embarrassment  of  Government 
not  the  provision  of  sterling  remittances  from 
India,  but  the  provision  of  rupee  remittances 
from  London  ;  not  to  find  sterling  resources 
from  the  Gold  Standard  Reserve,  but  to  meet 
in  India  an  almost  insatiable  demand  for  rupee 
currency. 

This  necessitated  a  number  of  expedients 
The  ordinary  sale  of  Council  Bills  on  India  in 
London  was  reduced  to  Rs.  80  lakhs,  and  then 
to  Rs.  60  lakhs  per  week  ;  Government  took 
entire  control  of  the  imports  of  gold  and  silver  ; 
and  with  the  price  of  silver  soaring  above  the 
fixed  ratio  of  the  rupee  to  the  sovereign — 
namely,  15  to  1 — it  raised  the  rate  of  exchange 
to  Re.  1-5,  approximately  at  that  time  gold 
point,  taking  into  account  the  increase  in 
freight  and  insurance.  Towards  the  close  of 
1917  small  notes  of  the  denomination  of  one 
rupee  and  R3.  2-8-0  were  introduced  to  econo- 
mize the  use  of  silver.  None  of  these  ex- 
pedients  would  have  availed,  in  face  of  the 
very  heavy  expenditure  on*  account  of  the 
Home  Government,  if  the  borrowings  in  India 
had  not  been  on  an  unprecedented  scale      In 


AT    DINNER. 


[Official  photograph. 


normal  years  the  Government  of  India  esteems 
itself  fortunate  if  it  is  able  to  borrow  in  the 
Indian  market  £2,000,000.  In  1916  a  con- 
version  loan  yielded  £4,250,000,  and  in  1917 
a  special  effort  to  raise  a  "  Loan  of  Victory  " 
brought  to  the  exchequer  the  relatively  large 
sum  of  £39,000,000.  In  the  closing  months  of 
1917  Treasury  Bills  were  issued  for  the  first- 
time  in  India  and  freely  taken  up.  1 

The  interaction  of  all  these  forces  produced 
in  India  conditions  of  great  prosperity  and  con- 
siderable strength.  All  the  manufacturing 
and  producing  industries  of  India  were  passing 
through  halcyon  days,  and  the  prosperity  of 


132 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the  export  trade  was  only  limited  by  the  amount 
of  freight  available  for  export.  The  banks 
were  full  of  money,  and  a  feeling  of  optimism 
was  abroad.  It  was  fairly  claimed  that  the  cur- 
rency system  of  India  had  stood  the  shock  of  war 
better  than  the  currency  system  in  any  other 
country  in  the  world.  India  had  not  altogether 
escaped  additional  taxation.     In  the  first  year 


f Lafayette. 

SIR    THOMAS    H.    HOLLAND,    K.C.I.E., 
President    of    the    Indian    Industrial    Commission, 
1916,  and  of  the  Board  of  Munitions,  India,  1916. 

of  the  war,  acting  in  the  belief  that  the  war 
would  be  of  short  duration  and  it  was  un- 
necessary to  look  far  ahead,  it  was  arranged  to 
meet  the  estimated  deficit  by  new  borrowings. 
In  1916-17  additional  revenue  amounting  to 
£3,600,000  was  raised  by  increasing  the 
customs  tariff,  the  salt  duty  and  the  income 
tax  ;  in  15)17-18  a  super-tax  was  imposed  for 
the  first  time,  and  the  customs  duties  were 
further  raised,  including  the  duties  on  cotton 
piecegoods,  despite  the  vehement  protests 
of  the  Lancashire  industry.  Simultaneous^' 
India  rendered  valuable  contributions  to  the 
financial  strength  of  the  Empire.  She  dis- 
charged all  her  floating  debt  in  London,  and 
invested  large  sums  of  the  Paper  Currency 
Reserve  and  the  Gold  Standard  Reserve  in 
British  securities,  and  finally,  in  1917,  assumed 
the  sole  responsibility  for  interest  and  sinking 
fund  on  £100,000,000  of  the  Imperial  war- 
expenditure. 

VVhilHt  even  reproductive  State  expenditure 
had  to  be  severely  curtailed  in  many  directions, 


as,  for  instance,  important  railway  extensions 
and  irrigation  works,  the  lessons  taught  by 
the  War  proved  invaluable  for  the  future 
development  of  Indian  economic  resources. 
For  the  war  showed  just  where  the  old  policy 
of  laisser  /aire,  laisser  alter  had  failed  in  the 
past.  It  showed  'how  far-reaching  German 
methods  of  commercial  penetration  had  be- 
come. It  showed  how  important  it  is,  even 
in  the  interests  of  the  Empire,  to  promote 
the  growth  of  Indian  industries  and  to  make 
them  self-contained  and,  in  case  of  need, 
independent  of  reinforcement  from  home.  The 
appointment  of  an  Industrial  Commission  to 
investigate  these  matters  was  an  earnest  of  the 
new  interest  taken  in  them  by  Government, 
though  its  fruitful  labours  had  to  be  inter- 
rupted in  order  to  allow  its  energetic  chair- 
man, Sir  Thomas  Holland,  to  undertake  the 
still  more  urgent  task  of  organizing  the  special 
war  industries  of  India.  Industrial  labour 
never  before  received  such  high  wages.  Yet, 
whilst  more  liberal  conditions  of  service  and 
generous  treatment  of  men  who  had  returned 
disabled  from  the  front  and  of  the  families  of 
those  who  had  fallen  gave  a  fresh  stimulus 
to  recruiting  amongst  the  old  fighting  races, 
it  was  found  possible  to  raise  at  the  same 
time  very  considerable  labour  corps  for  Meso- 
potamia and  France.  Above  all,  agriculture, 
which  must  always  remain  the  greatest  of 
Indian  industries,  was  favoured  by  a  suc- 
cession of  bounteous  rains-  and  abundant 
harvests.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
population  of  India  ask  for  nothing  more. 

If  on  the  whole,  and  in  spite  of  an  unfortunate 
recrudescence  of  political  unrest,  British  rule  in 
India  stood  the  test  of  the  world-war  with 
unimpaired  and  even  increasing  strength,  there 
were  from  time  to  time,  both  within  and  beyond 
the  frontier,  insidious  attempts  to  disturb  the 
peace  of  India,  which  only  the  vigilance  and 
firmness  of  Government  turned  to  the  con- 
fusion of  the  German  plotters  who  engineered 
them.  As  soon  as  war  broke  out  the  chief 
Indian  seditionists  in  Europe  and  some  who  had 
set  up  their  headquarters  in  America  and  in 
Japan  proceeded  to  Berlin,  where  they  were 
organized  into  an  Indian  political  department 
working  under  the  orders  of  the  German 
Foreign  Office  and  War  Office.  A  few  of  them 
were  young  Indians  of  considerable  attain- 
ments, such  as  Har  Dyal,  a  Hindu  who  had  been 
formerly    a   Government   of    India   scholar   at 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


183 


Oxford  ;  Chattopadhya,  also  a  Hindu,  who  had 
been  refused  admission  to  tho  English  Bar  after 
the  assassination  of  Sir  Curzon  Wyllie  in 
London  ;  Barkut  Ullah,  a  Mahomedan  who  had 
been  editor  of  an  anti -British  newspaper,  Islam 
Fraternity,  published  in  Japan  ;  and  Ajit  Singh, 
a  Sikh,  who  had  been  deported  from  India  in 
1 907,  at  the  same  time  as  Lajpat  Rai,  on  sus- 
picion of  tampering  with  the  loyalty  of  Indian 
troops.  Herr  von  Oppenheim,  familiar  to 
many  Englishmen  when,  as  a  peripatetic 
member  of  the  German  Consular  service,  he  had 
his  headquarters  in  Cairo,  where  he  was  a 
persona  grata  with  the  Egyptian  Nationalists, 
and  spent  even  more  of  his  time  on  mysterious 
journeys,  professedly  of  exploration  and  archaeo- 
logical research  in  Northern  Arabia,  Syria  and 
other  Arab-speaking  regions,  was  placed  in 
charge  of  this  Indian  department.  Its  primary 
objects  were  to  work  up  revolutionary  move- 
ments in  India  itself  and  to  stir  up  trouble  in  the 
borderlands.  Amongst  its  minor  activities  it 
endeavoured,  with  very  scant  success,  to  induce 
Indian  prisoners  of  war,  especially  Mahomedans, 
to  take  service  against  us  with  the  Turks,  and  it 
composed  a  series  of  wonderful  fables  about  the 
state  of  India,  partly  to  cheer  the  German 
public,  but  still  more,  no  doubt,  for  consump- 
tion in  Turkey  and  other  Oriental  countries 
where  fairy  stories  always  obtain  ready  credence. 


At  one  time  it  was  the  Nizam  of  Hyderabad  who 
hac!  been  rleposed  by  his  Mahomedan  subjects 
because  of  his  loyalty  to  tha  British  Crown. 
On  another  occasion  it  was  a  mythical  Hindu 
rajah  who  was  heading  a  combined  insurrection 
of  Brahmins,  Buddhists  and  Mahomedans. 
Then  again  it  was  a  tale  of  grave  disorders  at 
Bombay,  Madras  and  half  a  dozen  other  places, 
where  rebels  had  prevented  the  departure  of 
troops  for  Europe  and  had  seized  the  arsenals 
and  barracks. 

Hard  as  the  Indian  Bureau  in  Berlin  un- 
doubtedly worked,  and  large  as  were  the  sums 
which  it  expended,  its  actual  achievements  were 
on  a  much  more  modest  scale,  and  in  com- 
parison with  its  ambitions  proved  lamentable 
failures.  None  tho  less  credit  is,  however,  due 
to  the  Criminal  Investigation  Department  of  the 
Government  of  India,  whoso  agents,  under  tho 
direction  of  Sir  Charles  Cleveland,  tracked  and 
mastered  successively  all  the  elaborate  rami- 
fications of  a  German  organization  which, 
from  its  Berlin  base,  extended  across  America 
to  all  the  neutral  countries  in  the  Far  East, 
especially  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  Siam,  and 
China,  where  it  had  its  instruments  ready  to 
hand  in  every  German  settlement.  It  con- 
trived even  to  secure  a  strong  secret  foothold  in 
Japan  amongst  a  disaffected  section  of  the  large 
bodv  of  Indian  students  who  had  flocked  for 


INDIANS    IN    FRANCE    AT    THEIR    DEVOTIONS. 


184 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


some    time    past    to    its  universities   and   col- 
leges. 

It  was  to  British  Columbia  and  California 
that  the  attention  of  the  Germans  was  in  the 
first  place  directed  by  their  chief  adviser, 
Har  Dyal,  who  bad  been  engaged  there  for 
some  years  before  the  war  in  organizing  a 
revolutionary  movement  known  as  the  Ghadr, 
or  Mutiny — the  name  given  also  to  a  newspaper 
he  published  in  the  Urdu  and  Gomukhi  lan- 
guages, which  are  respectively  the  chief 
Mahomedan  and  Sikh  vernaculars  in  Northern 
India.  This  movement,  which  had  it«  head- 
quarters in  California,  was  to  secure  the  com- 
plete overthrow  of  British  rule  in  India  by 
means  of  another  rising  on  the  lines  of  the 
1857  mutiny;  and  Har  Dyal  openly  preached 
by  word  of  mouth  as  well  as  in  his  organ  a 
gospel  of  wholesale  murder  and  massacre, 
based  upon  fierce  racial  hatred,  which,  how- 
ever, did  not  prevent  the  Germans -from  wel- 
coming him  as  a  friend  and  ally.  The  dis- 
abilities imposed  upon  Indian  immigrants  on 
the  Pacific  slope  had  helped  to  embitter  many 
of  the  Indian  settlers,  largely  Sikhs,  and  Har 
Dyal  and  other  Indian  anarchists  had 
thus  found  a  fruitful  soil  on  which  to  scatter 
the  seeds  of  sedition.  Har  Dyal  himself  had 
foretold  in  a  public  speech,  as  early  as  May, 
1914,  the  imminence  of  a  war  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain,  which  would  be  India's 
opportunity  to  shake  off  the  British  yoke.   Just 


about  the  same  time,  one  Gurdit  Singh,  a  Sikh, 
deliberately  chartered  a  Japanese  steamer,  the 
Komagata  Maru,  to  take  over  several  hundred 
Indian  labourers,  mostly  Sikhs  from  the  Punjab, 
to  Vancouver  and  land  them  there  in  defiance  of 
the  laws  of  British  Columbia.  He  and  his 
fellow  conspirators  knew  that  this  attempt 
was  foredoomed  to  failure,  and  the  ignorant 
coolies,  embittered  by  their  treatment,  were 
easily  duped  into  venting  their  wrath,  not  upon 
the  real  authors  of  their  misfortunes,  but  upon 
their  British  rulers,  who  had  done  their  best 
to  mitigate  the  hardships  of  their  case  and, 
indeed,  defrayed  the  costs  of  their  repatriation. 
A  number  of  agitators  took  passage  with  them 
on  their  enforced  return  to  India,  feeding  them 
constantly  with  seditious  harangues  and 
promises  of  an  early  and  successful  insurrection 
all  over  India.  Details  of  dacoities  and  plans 
for  suborning  the  native  troops,  looting  the 
Government  treasuries,  and  seizing  the  chief 
armouries  in  the  Punjab  were  worked  out, 
and  parties  were  "landed  at  Hong  Kong,  Singa- 
pore, Ponang  and  Rangoon  to  seduce  the 
Indian  garrisons.  The  main  body,  numbering 
329,  reached  the  Hooghly  in  the  Komagata 
Maru  at  the  end  of  September  1914,  where 
they  were  landed  at  Budge-Budge,  near  Cal- 
cutta. There  had  been  abundant  information 
that  their  arrival  would  mean  trouble,  and 
the  Government  of  the  Punjab  had  sent  down 
agents  to  persuade  the  men  to  return  peace- 


DELHI,    THE    NEW    CAPITAL    OF    INDIA,    WITH    THE    JUMMA    MUSJID. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


185 


fully  to  their  homes  and,  if  necessary,  to  issue 
the  requisite  orders  under  the  Ingress  into 
India  Ordinance  recently  promulgated.  The 
measures  taken  by  the  Government  of  Bengal 
proved  entirely  inadequate  to  prevent  grave 
disturbances.  Only  02  of  the  men  agreed  to 
get  quietly  into  the  special  trains  provided  for 
them,  and  the  rest  set  out  in  defiance  of  the 
authorities  to  march  by  road  to  Calcutta.  A 
force  of  police  and  some  troops  hastily  called 
out  succeeded  in  barring  their  way  and  turning 
them  back  to  Budge-Budge.  But  they  still 
refused  to  entrain,  and  when  hustled  by  the 
police  constables  present  they  opened  fire 
upon  them  with  guns  and  pistols  they  had 
secreted.  The  »mall  police  force  was  over- 
powered, and  when  troops  arrived  to  quell  the 
riot  a  small  pitched  battle  ensued,  and  consider- 
able loss  of  life,  before  the  majority  of  the 
rioters  surrendered,  only  a  small  number,  in- 
cluding, however,  the  ringleader,  Gurdit  Singh, 
making  good  their  escape. 

This  was  but  the  forerunner  of  much  more 
widespread  trouble  in  the  Punjab  itself. 
Fresh  arrivals  of  disaffected  elements  from 
Canada  and  the  United  States  and  from  the 
ports  of  the  Far  East,  where  the  local  police 
forces  for  the  European  settlements  had  for 
many  years  past  been  largely  recruited  amongst 
Punjabi  Sikhs,  filtered  steadily  into  India, 
and  whilst  a  good  many  were  dealt  with  under 
the  Ingress  Ordinance  and  interned,  enough 
got  through  to  carry  on  their  nefarious  propa- 
ganda in  India,  and  very  shortly  a  regular 
campaign  of  murder  and  dacoity  was  started  in 
the  Punjab.  A  rising  was  actually  planned 
for  February  19,  1915,  with  the  object  of 
seizing  the  Government  arsenals  at  Lahore 
and  Ferozepur, '  whilst  continuous  endeavours 
had  been  made  to  seduce  the  Indian  troops 
in  those  cities  as  well  as  at  Meerut,  Wilsonpur 
and  other  smaller  cantonments  in  Northern 
India.  An  attempt  was  actually  made  to 
blow  up  tho  Doraba  bridge  at  Ambala  by 
means  of  a  bomb,  and  in  the  Ferozepur  dis- 
trict a  sub-inspector  of  police  and  one  of  his 
men  were  shot  dead  in  broad  daylight  on  the 
public  road.  But  the  Punjab  Government 
were  fully  alive  to  the  danger,  and  it  had  at 
its  head  in  Sir  Michael  O'Dwyer  a  Lieutenant- 
Governor  who,  like  the  Lawrences  and  Ed- 
wardes  of  the  old  Mutiny  days,  had  won 
the  complete  confidence  of  the  law-abiding 
population  of  his  province  by  the  keen  interest, 
he  had  personally  taken  in  their  welfare  and 


by  his  accessibility  and  frankness  as  well  as  by 
his  keen  sense  of  justice.  Like  his  great  pre- 
decessors 60  years  before,  he  was  also  pre- 
pared to  strike  fearlessly  when  necessary.  The 
well-to-do  classes  showed  no  sympathy  with  the 
revolutionary  doctrines  and  anarchical  methods 
of  tho  conspirators,  and  in  the  villages  as  Well 
as  in  the  towns  the  people  rallied  whole- 
heartedly to  the  cause  of  law  and  order.     In 


SIR    MICHAEL    O'DWYER,    G.C  I.E., 
Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab. 

several  cases  it  was  the  villagers  themselves 
who  turned  upon  the  outrage-mongers  and, 
having  seized  them,  turned  them  over  to  tho 
police.  A  large  number  of  offenders  had  soon 
been  laid  by  tho  heels,  and  whilst  the  majority 
were  summarily  dealt  with  by  the  ordinary 
courts,  the  worst  criminals  were  committed  for 
trial  by  a  special  tribunal  at  Lahore. 

These  trials  disclosed  for  the  first  time 
publicly  tho  part  which  Germany  had  played 
in  fomenting  the  trouble.  The  evidence 
showed  that  the  revolutionary  propaganda 
amongst  the  Indians  in  America  had  been 
steadily  engineered  by  the  two  men  Har  Dyal 
and  Ajit  Singh,  who  had  proceeded  to  Beilin 
as  soon  as  the  war  broke  out  to  organize  rebel- 
lion in  India  under  the  auspices  of  the  German 
Foreign  Office.  Their  programme  specifically 
included,  as  soon  as  the  rebellion  started,  the 
murder  of  all  civilian  Europeans,  the  wreck- 
ing of  trains  and  railway  bridges  and  a  sudden 
attack    on    and    the    killing    of    all    European 


186 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


troops.  That  the  conspirators  would  have 
fully  carried  out  this  sanguinary  programme  had 
they  been  given  the  chance-  was  abundantly 
shown  by  the  cold-hlooded  brutality  they  dis- 
played in  the  perpetration  of  the  crimes  brought 
home  to  thorn  against  their  own  innocent  fellow- 
countrymen.  One  of  the  conspirators  described 
an  interview  they  had  with  a  German  Consul  in 
the  Far  East  who,  whilst  anxious  not  to  commit 
himself  to  any  definite  engagements,  impressed 
upon  them  the  necessity  of  hastening  on  the 
revolution,  as  India  would  never  have  a  better 
opportunity,  and  he  promised  to  secure  them 
from  any  harm  from  the  Emden,  which  was  just 
then  successfully  sinking  our  merchant-ships  in 
Indian  waters.  Another  witness,  who  had  gone 
across  from  America  to  Europe  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  stated  that  he  had  been  told  by  the 
German  Consul  at  Geneva  to  go  and  see  Har 
Dyal  in  Berlin.  He  visited  him  there  with  other 
Indians  connected  with  the  Ohalr  movement, 
and  their  meetings  were  attended  by  German 
officials  and  other  Germans  who  knew  India, 
and  at  some  of  them  Herr  von  Oppenheim 
presided  and  Har  Dyal  delivered  lectures. 
Anti-British  pamphlets  were  prepared  and 
printed  at  a  Government  press. 

Barely  had  this  revolutionary  conspiracy  been 
nipped  in  the  bud  than  serious  disorders,  due, 
however,  mainly  to  economic  causes,  broke  out 
in  another  part  of  the  Punjab.  The  Maho- 
medans,  who  form  the  bulk  of  the  population  in 
the  backward  North-Western  districts  around 
Multan,  took  advantage  of  the  panic  caused  by 
plague  and  the  flight  of  many  Hindu  shop- 
keepers and  moneylenders  in  the  villages  to 
start  a  sudden  campaign  of  looting  and  violence 
against  their  "  capitalist "  rivals.  It  spread 
like  a  prairie  fire,  and  troops  as  well  as  police  had 
to  be  called  out,  and  it  took  them  a  whole  month 
to  restore  order.  Though  it  was  in  its  origin 
little  more  than  an  unusually  severe  explosion 
of  the  bitter  hatred  ever  latent  between  Maho- 
medans  and  Hindus,  it  was  certainly  aggravated 
by  mischievous  reports  about  the  war  and 
German  successes  which  induced  the  belief  that 
British  power  was  waning.  Very  significant 
was  the  evidence  given  during  the  trial  of  the 
ringleaders  at  Multan  that  two  of  the  worst 
called  themselves  "  the  big  German  "  and  "  the 
little  German,"  and  professed  to  represent  the 
Kaiser  and  the  Crown  Prince,  from  whom  they 
had  received  special  authority  to  loot  the 
Hindus  ! 

Fresh    light    was    thrown    upon    Germany's 


connexion  with  the  Qhadr  movement  by 
the  trial  at  Mandalay  in  1916  of  another 
batch  of  disaffected  Sikhs  who  had  selected 
Siam  and  Burma  for  their  operations.  At 
the  same  time  as  one  body  of  revolutionists 
were  making  their  way  direct  to  India  in 
the  Komagata  Maru  another  stream  turned 
off  to  Manila  and  Siam.  So  long  as  the 
United  States  remained  neutral,  Manila  was  a 
very  convenient  base  for  the  conspirators,  arid 
the  German  Consul  gave  them  abundant 
encouragement  and  assistance.  They  were  even 
promised  the  cooperation  of  300  Germans  who 
were  to  be  collected  there  "  for  the  Siamese 
affair."  A  Sikh,  called  Jadh  Singh,  who  had 
been  sent  over  to  America  from  Berlin  by 
Har  Dyal,  was  the  prime  mover,  and  two  Ger- 
man agents,  Jacobsen  and  Boehm,  whom  he 
met  in  Chicago,  had  told  him  that  men  were 
being  sent  to  Siam  to  fight  for  Germany  and 
a  military  expedition  was  to  be  directed  from 
there  against  India.  Bangkok  became  the  head- 
quarters of  this  branch  of  the  Ghadr  movement, 
which  had  already  made  a  good  many  recruits 
amongst  the  Sikhs  who  had  settled  in  consider- 
able numbers  in  Siam,  and  some  of  the  bolder 
spirits  extended  their  propaganda  into  Burma, 
both  by  sea  to  Rangoon  and  by  the  longer  land 
route  up  the  Menam  Valley  to  the  Upper  Bur- 
ma frontier.  Others  tried  to  link  up  with  Ger- 
man agents  in  Shanghai  through  the  Chinese 
province  of  Yunnan  and  the  Yangtse  Valley  An 
approver  stated  that  he  was  to  have  met  German 
officers  in  Yunnan,  and  the  capture,  on  another 
part  of  the  frontier  early  in  1917,  of  important 
German  officers  who  had  come  across  the 
Pamirs  with  large  sums  of  money  from  Peking, 
showed  this  statement  to  have  been  by  no 
means  improbable.  After  lengthy  preparations 
which  were  repeatedly  disturbed  by  the  vigi- 
lance of  the  British  authorities,  the  "  military 
expedition "  against  India  resolved  itself 
into  two  small  parties,  loaded  up  with  Browning 
pistols  and  explosives  and  an  abundance  of 
Ghadr  literature.  Some  of  them  were  promptly 
arrested  on  reaching  Burma  by  men  of  a 
native  mountain  battery  whom  they  tried  to 
seduce,  and  a  few  escaped  back  to  Siam. 
If  the  Germans  built  more  upon  "  the  Siamese 
business  "  and  gave  it  more  direct  assistance 
and  support  than  to  "  the  Punjab  business." 
it  collapsed  even  more  miserably.  But  it 
fully  justified  the  judicial  pronouncement 
that  "  Germany  has  consistently  encouraged 
the  Ghadr  movement,  has,  in  some  instances, 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


137 


financed  it,  has,  in  part,  assumed  the  direction 
of  its  activities,  and  has  been  prepared  to 
act  in  concert  with  the  revolutionists  and 
to  use  them  for  her  own  ends  in  the  war, 
and  that  the  revolutionists  have  eagerly  asso- 
ciated themselves  with  Germany."  More- 
over, after  the  United  States  joined  in  the 
war,  judicial  investigations  were  conducted 
under  Federal  authority  into  the  Ghadr  con- 


during  his  State  entry  into  Delhi  on  the  first 
anniversary  of  the  Imperial  Durbar.  The 
Benares  conspiracy  trial  at  the  end  of  1915 
disclosed  the  existence  of  a  murder  organiza- 
tion, in  which  the  prime  mover  was  Rash 
Behari  Bose,  an  educated  Hindu,  at  one 
time  in  Government  service,  who  had  figured 
prominently  in  the  Delhi  proceedings,  but 
successfully  eludod  arrest.     One  of  the  religious 


ON    THE    WESTERN     FRONT: 


A    SIRHIND    BRIGADE 
RAID. 


BACK     FROM 


lOgic  ill  pkilegrapk. 

A    SUCCESSFUL 


spiracy  which  had  until  then  continued  its 
activities  in  California,  and  the  indictments 
ultimately  returned  included  the  names  of 
the  former  German  Consuls  at  San  Francisco, 
Chicago.  Honolulu,  and  Manila,  as  well  as  of 
officials  of  the  German  Embassy  in  Wash- 
ington. 

But  if  the  Berlin  plotters  pinned  their  faith 
principally  upon  the  Ghadr  movement,  in  which 
a  small  section  of  the  Sikhs  were  their  chief 
dupes,  they  certainly  did  not  lose  sight  of  the 
group  of  Hindu  revolutionists  with  whom 
Har  Dyal  always  remained  in  close  touch,  and 
who  had  first  introduced  the  bomb  as  a  political 
weapon  into  India.  Their  most  notorious 
exploit  had  been  the  attempt  to  kill  the  Viceroy 


rites  performed  by  the  conspirators,  whose 
favourite  deity  was,  as  apparently  with  all 
Hindu  revolutionists,  the  goddess  Kali,  con- 
sisted in  cutting  up  white  pumpkins  which 
represented  the  heads  of  the  European  victims 
to  be  sacrificed  to  her.  Rash  Behari  had 
brought  rifles,  revolvers  and  explosive  sub- 
stances from  Calcutta,  and  he-  taught  his  adepts 
that  whatever  they  did  was  done  by  God,  and 
that  they  should  not  therefore  be  held 
responsible  for  their  deeds.  Their  only  duty 
was  to  be  ready  to  die  for  their  country, 
and  the  hour  had  come,  as  risings  were 
imminent  all  over  the  United  Provinces. 
Bengal,  too,  was  a  province  to  which  the 
Germans    naturally     turned     their    attention. 


188 


THE    TIMES    HISTOEY    OF    THE    WAR. 


ON    THE    MESOPOTAMIAN    FRONT:    INDIAN    OX-CARTS    BRINGING    UP    STORES. 


F'or  ever  since  the  troublous  years  1905-1910 
there  had  been  a  good  deal  of  seditious  lawless- 
ness amongst  the  younger  generation,  chiefly  in 
the  shape  of  political  dacoities,  i.e.,  looting  by 
organized  bands,  who  do  not  even  shrink  from 
murder.  Government  got,  on  the  track  of 
certain  remittances  from  Germany,  and  towards 
the  end  of  1915  information  was  received  that 
German  agents  in  Batavia  were  collecting  arms 
and  ammunition  to  be  dispatched  in  a  neutral 
vessel  and  landed  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  for 
distribution  to  a  party  of  Bengalee  conspirators 
who  were  to  raise  the  standard  of  rebellion  on 
Christmas  Day.  This  plot  ended  in  a  complete 
fiasco,  for  the  neutral  vessel  was  unable  to  run 
the  gauntlet  of  the  British  naval  patrols,  and 
the  police  were  waiting  for  the  revolutionists 
and  received  effective  help  from  the  local 
peasantry  in  laying  them  by  the  heels.  Never- 
theless the  anti-British  propaganda  and  the 
constant  dissemination  of  adverse  rumours 
concerning  the  war  kept  the  embers  of  Bengalee 
disaffection  smouldering,  and  an  increasing 
number  of  political  outrages,  which  in  1915  in- 
cluded five  murders  and  seven  dacoities  in 
Calcutta  itself,  necessitated  the  vigorous  use 
of  the  preventive  powers  conferred  upon  the 
authorities  by  the  Defence  of  India  Act,  and 
the  internment  of  several  hundred  suspicious 
characters. 


Whilst  in  India  itself  the  endeavours  of 
Indian  seditionists  to  tamper  with  the  loyalty 
of  the  native  troops  rarely  met  with  any  suc- 
cess, and  only  in  the  case  of  a  very  few  in- 
dividuals, whom  their  comrades  were  generally 
prompt  to  denounce,  there  is  evidence  now 
to  show  that  they  had  a  hand  in  the  serious 
Singapore  mutiny  which  broke  out  on  Feb- 
ruary 15,  1915 — i.e.,  almost  on  the  same  date 
on  which  the  general  rising  in  India  was  to 
have  started  in  the  Punjab.  The  Fifth  Light 
Infantry  Regiment  was  on  the  point  of 
embarking  for  Hong  Kong,  and  had  only 
that  morning  been  satisfactorily  inspected 
by  the  general  officer  commanding,  when 
at  3  p.m.  a  shot  fired  at  the  Regimental 
Guardroom  at  the  Alexandra  Barracks 
proved  the  signal  for  an  outbreak  which 
was  only  quelled  after  several  days'  sharp 
but  intermittent  fighting  and  considerable 
loss  of  life.  The  British  officers  of  the 
regiment,  several  of  whom  were  brutally 
murdered  by  their  men,  were  taken  com 
pletely  unawares,  and  no  one  in  Singapore, 
where  the  large  Chinese  community  was  cele- 
brating the  Chinese  New  Year  with  the  usual 
festivities  and  daylight  fireworks,  appears  to 
have  anticipated  any  trouble.  European 
civilians  and  ladies  who  were  taking  their 
usual     afternoon     drives     were    struck     down 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


189 


without  any  warning.  The  only  military 
forces  at  once  available  were  very  small, 
and  the  loyalty  of  the  mountain  battery  of 
the  Malay  States  Guides  stationed  at  Alexan- 
dra Barracks  was  at  least  open  to  suspicion. 
But  a  landing  party  from  H.M.S.  Cadmus  and 
the  European  Volunteer  force  gallantly  held 
up  the  mutineers  and  occupied  the  most 
important  pointa  for  the  protection  of  the  city 
and  the  harbour  until  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments from  French,  Japanese,  Russian  and 
further  British  warships  summoned  by  wire- 
less. Within  a  week  ordor  was  completely 
restored,  and  614  mutineers  had  been  captured 
or  surrendered.  The  circumstances  which 
determined  or  precipitated  the  outbreak 
remained  obscure.  But  it  is  known  that 
emissaries  of  the  Ghidr  movement  had  landed 
at  Singapore  on  their  way  from  America  to 
India,  and  some  of  those  subsequently  con- 
cerned in  "  the  Siamese  business  "  had  actually 
been  in  Singapore  when  the  mutiny  broke  out 
The  mutineers  themselves  lost  no  time  in 
throwing  open  the  gates  of  a  German  prisoners- 
of-war  camp  near  the  barracks,  and  tried  to 
demonstrate  their  friendly  intentions  by  shak- 
ing hands  with  the  prisoners,  but  the  latter  were 
at  first,  it  is  said,  too  terrified  to  respond,  and 


only  some  hour?  later  did  a  few  of  them  avail 
themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  escape,  and 
most  of  them  were  easily  recaptured.  According 
to  the  official  report,  there  were  no  signs  of  any 
organized  plan  of  action  amongst  the  mutineers, 
or  of  any  real  leadership.  Nor  did  the  whole 
regiment  mutiny.  A  body  of  80  men  came  ovtr 
almost  at  once,  and  soma  other  hutches  soon 
gave  themselves  up.  The  worst  mutineers 
seemed  to  be  dazed  after  their  first  excesses, 
and,  though  for  some  hours  Singapore  was 
almost  at  their  mercy,  they  took  no  advantage 
of  their  opportunity.  After  the  second  day 
they  were  mainly  on  the  defensive,  and  mere 
fugitives  thereafter.  Those  who  camo  in  and 
gave  themselves  up  at  an  early  stage  were 
afterwards  given  an  opportunity  of  redeeming 
their  reputation  in  Africa,  and  they  made 
good  use  of  it. 

It  was  to  the  Indian  Mahomedans  far 
more  than  to  the  Hindus  that  Germany,  as 
we  know,  had  for  some  time  past  looked  to 
overthrow,  or  at  least  to  paralyse,  British 
power  in  India,  if  she  could  only  succeed  in 
dragging  Turkey  after  her  in  a  war  against 
Great  Britain,  and  the  German  Press  did  not 
conceal  its  exultation  when  Turkey  actually 
joined    the    Central    Powers    on    October    31, 


SIAM  :    THE    KING  HEADING    A    PRO-WAR    PROCESSION    IN    BANGKOK. 


140 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OE    THE    WAR. 


WITH    THE    FORCES    ACTING     AGAINST    THE    GERMANS    IN    EAST    AFRICA, 
Indian  Troops  entraining  on  the  Uganda  Railway, 

1914.     For  the  entry  of  such  a  great  Maho- 
medan   Power  into   the   war  in  alliance   with 


Germany  was  bound  to  distress  and  disturb 
the  Mahomedans  of  India,  who  already  dis- 
liked the  idea  of  fighting  on  the  same  side 
as  Russia,  whom  they  regarded  as  the  sworn 
foe  of  Islam.  The  Viceroy  lost  no  time  in 
issuing  a  full  statement  of  the  British  case, 
and  a  subsequent  announcement  that  Great 
Britain  would  not  interfere  with  the  holy 
places  of  Arabia  or  with  the  port  of  Jeddah, 
in  the  Red  Sea,  which  serves  Mecca,  so  long 
as  the  pilgrim  traffic  was  not  molested  by  the 
Turks,  went  far  to  reassure  the  Mahomedan 
community,  whose  loyalty  to  the  raj  never 
seriously  wavered,  even  under  so  severe  a 
strain  upon  their  religious  allegiance  to  the 
Sultan  as  Khalif.  Only  a  section  of  the 
"  young "  Mahomedan  politicians  who  had 
been  in  close  contact  with  the  "  young " 
Turks  showed  signs  of  restiveness,  and  some 
of  the  newspapers  they  controlled  were  so  little 
able  to  conceal  under  a  thin  veneer  of  lip 
loyalty  their  sympathy  with  the  Turks  and 
their  admiration  for  Germany  that  Govern- 
ment had  to  suppress  their  organs,  and  two  of 
thnir  most  mischievous  leaders,  Mahommed 
Ali,  the  editor  of  The  Comrade,  and  his  brother 
Shaukat  Ali,  were  interned  by  Lord  Hardingo 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Defence  of  India 
Act  Aft<-r  that  there  was  no  reason  to 
doubt  the  absolute  failure  of  the  hopes  enter- 


tained by  Germany  that  the  unfurling  at  her 
behest  of  the  Prophet's  flag  at  Constantinople 
and  the  proclamation  of  a  Jehad  or  Holy  War 
against  the  Allies  would  shake  the  staunch 
allegiance  of  Indian  Mahomedans  to  the 
British  Crown.  The  revolt  of  the  Sherif  of 
Mecca  against  the  Sultan  produced  an 
unfavourable  impression  on  Mahomedan 
opinion,  but  chiefly  in  its  religious  bearings, 
whilst  the  increasingly  close  co-operation  of  the 
Moslem  League  and  the  advanced  Mahomedan 
politicians  who  control  it  with  the  Congress 
Extremists  continued  to  be  regarded  with 
distrust  by  the  bulk  of  the  Mahomedans,  and 
especially  by  the  conservative  land-owning 
classes  and  by  the  religious  teachers  of  the 
community,  to  whom  the  orthodoxy  of  the 
"  young  "  Mahomedan  Indians  was  as  suspect 
as  that  of  the  "young"  Turks,  who  ex- 
ploited Pan-Islamism  for  their  own  political 
purposes.  A  few  very  rare  cases  of  desertion 
from  Mahomedan  regiments  at  the  front,  or 
of  attempted  mutiny  in  India  itself,  cannot 
for  a  moment  weigh  in  the  scale  against  such 
overwhelming  proofs  of  unalterable  loyalty 
as  were  given  by  the  Mahomedan  soldiers 
who  form  a  large  proportion  of  the  Indian 
Army,  in  every  field  and  not  least  against  the 
Turks  themselves,  as  well  as  by  the  rulers 
of  the  great  Mahomedan  Native  States,  Hy- 
derabad, Bhopal,  and  others,  and  indeed 
by    the     vast    majority    of     the     66    million 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


141 


Mahomedans   owning  allegiance  to   the  King- 
Emperor. 

It  was  on  and  beyond  the  borders  of  India 
that   the   results   of   Turkey's   entry   into   the 
war  were  at  times,   or  threatened  to  be,   far 
more     serious.     What     German     and     Turkish 
agents  and  the  roving  bands  they  enrolled  and 
the  direct  pressure  of  Turkish  armies  on  the 
western  frontier  of  Persia  tried  to  achieve,  or 
temporarily  achieved,  in  the  Shah's  dominions 
has  already  been  recounted.     But  these  hostile 
activities  were  not  confined  to   Persia.     They 
spread     from     Persia     into     Afghanistan     and 
directly  or  indirectly  contributed  not  a  little 
to     the     frequent     disorders    which     we     had. 
to  repress  by  force  along  a  great  part  of  the 
north-western   frontier   of    India.      Since    the 
Afghan    campaigns    of     1878    and     1879    our 
relations    with    Afghanistan    had     always    re- 
mained amicable,  though  they  were  at  times 
rendered    difficult    by    the    traditional    Asiatic 
rivalry    between    Russia    and    Great    Britain. 
The  Ameer  Abdurrahman,  who  had  ruled  for 
20  years  with  a  rod  of  iron,  and  transformed 
Afghanistan  from  a  feudal  into  a  despotically 
centralized   military   State,    died   in    1901  and 
bequeathed  to  his  eldest  son  Habiballah,  who 
succeeded    him,    not    only    his    unquestioned 
authority    throughout    Afghanistan,    but    also 
his  policy   of   friendship   towards   the   British 
Empire  and  the  British  rulers  of  India  whom 
he  had  learnt  to  trust.     The  new  Ameer  re- 
mained faithful   to  that  policy,  and   from  the 
visit  he  paid  to  India  in  1906  he  brought  back 
with  him  both  the  recognition  of  a  royal  title 
which  flattered  his  amour-propre  and  a  very 
shrewd   appreciation  of  British  power  and  of 
India's   military   resources.      Moreover,   whilst 
the     Anglo-Russian      Convention      specifically 
guaranteed  the  position  of  Afghanistan  and  the 
rights  of    the  Ameer,  it  destroyed  the  possi- 
bility, upon  which  Afghan   rulers  had  always 
reckoned,   of  being  able  on   occasion  to  play 
off   their    two    formidable    neighbours    against 
one  another.     The  Ameer  never  consented  to 
acquiesce  formally  in  the  Convention,  though 
Great   Britain    had   undertaken   to   obtain   his 
assent,   but   he   knew   what  it  meant  and   he 
tacitly      accepted      the      consequences.      The 
Government  of  India   controlled  under  treaty 
the  foreign  relations  of  Afghanistan,  and  when 
war  broke  out  in  1914  the  Ameer  was  at  once 
advised  to  maintain  complete  neutrality  and 
to  exert  himself  to  preserve  order  on  both  his 


Indian  and  Russian  frontiers.  To  this  he 
readily  agreed.  But  when,  after  Turkoy  went 
to  war,  he  was  urged  to  take  steps  to  arrest 
any  religious  effervescence  amongst  his  turbu- 
lent tribes,  his  own  position  became  one  of 
considerable  difficulty,  as  fanaticism  is  strong 
amongst  Afghans  and  tho  country  was  gradually 
overrun  with  Germans  and  Turks,  who  made 
their  way  in  through  Persia  and  were  reinforced 
by  German  and  Austrian  prisoners  of  war 
escaped  from  Russian  Turkestan.  The  wildest 
rumours  were  spread  abroad  that  the  German 
Emperor  had  turned  Mahomedan  and  that 
large  Turoo-German  armies  were  on  the  march 


IN     PALESTINE:    GURKHA     RIFLEMAN 
FIRING    A    LEWIS    GUN. 

to  overthrow  the  British  and  to  restore  the 
supremacy  of  Islam  in  Asia.  In  the  early 
summer  of  1915  a  large  party  of  Germans  and 
Turks,  giving  themselves  out  to  be  a  Special 
Embassy  from  the  Kaiser  and  the  Sultan, 
crossed  over  from  Khorassan  into  the  province 
of  Herat  and  were  sent  on  by  the  Afghan 
Governor  to  Kabul,  where  the  Ameer  kept  them 
at  arm's  length.  Whilst  treating  these  un- 
welcome guests  with  formal  courtesy  and  hos- 
pitality, he  renewed  to  the  Viceroy  his  assurances 
of  friendship  and  his  desire  to  maintain  neu- 
trality. That  a  large  proportion  of  his  subjects 
and  some  of  his  most  influential  Sirdars  were 
anxious  to  see  Afghanistan  espouse,  as  they 
called  it,  the  cause  of  Islam  there  can  be  no 
doubt.     His  next  brother,  Nasrullah  Khan,  who 


142 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


had  always  rallied  round  him  all  the  elements 
of  more  or  less  latent  disaffection  and  especially 
those  of  Mahomedan  fanaticism,  was  believed 
to  be  at  the  head  of  the  hostile  faction,  whilst 
a  younger  brother,  Mahommed  Umar  Khan, 
who  enjoyed  over  his  elders  the  advantage  of 
royal  descent  through  his  mother  as  well 
as    through     his    father,    sat    on     the     fence 


[Official  photograph. 

INDIAN     RIFLE     CORPS     SIGNALLER    IN 
PALESTINE. 

waiting  for  developments,  though  holding 
ostensibly  with  the  Ameer  rather  than  with 
Nasrullah.  The  bulk  of  the  Afghan  people,  who 
ever  look  down  with  lustful  eyes  from  their 
inhospitable   mountains    on   to    the   rich    and 


fertile    plains    of    Hindustan,    thought    their 
opportunity  had  eome  to  harry   and  plunder 
them  again  as  in  the  good  old  days  of  Indian 
anarchy.     The   Ameer's    zeal   for   his   religion 
had   been  suspect  with  a  good  many  of  his 
people   since  his    journey  to  India,  where  he 
was  known  to  have  joined  freemasonry  at  Lord 
Kitchener's    instance,  and,   though    there    are 
many    freemasons    amongst    Mahomedans    in 
India  and  in  other  parts  of  the  East,  it  still 
savours  of  infidelity  with  the  Afghans.     The 
Ameer  also  commonly  wore  European  clothes, 
and  he  had  adopted  many  European  fashions 
and  new-fangled  inventions,  such  as  motor-cars, 
electric  light  and  even  golf,   which  were  not 
wholly  atoned  for  by  the  regularity  with  which 
he  performed  his  daily  prayers  and  attended  the 
mosque  on  Fridays.     His  manner  of  handling 
disaffection    was    less    ruthless    than    was    his 
father's,  and  he  felt,  perhaps  rightly,  that  he 
must  rely  on  the  methods  of  Oriental  statecraft 
rather  than  on  those  of  Oriental  despotism  in 
order  to  hold  his  own  against  the  combination 
of   adverse   forces   that   confronted   him.     He 
allowed  anti-British  sentiment  to  let  off  steam 
in   the   fiery   articles   of   the    only   newspaper 
tolerated   in  Kabul,  which,  strangely  enough 
for  an  organ  of  Mahomedan  fanaticism,   was 
edited  by  a  Hindu  seditionist  who  had  taken 
refuge  in  Afghanistan,  and  to  the  arguments 
put   forward   sometimes   in   his   own   Council, 
urging  him  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  Turkey  and 


CHANDNI    CHAUK,    DELHI  :    FRUIT    AND    TOY    STALLS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF  .  THE    WAR. 


148 


Germnnv,  he  seem*  penernllv  to  have  returned 
a  soft  answer,  counselling  prudence  and  delay, 
and  reminding  his  hot-headed  advisers  that, 
unlike  them,  he  had  been  in  India  and  seen 
for  himself  the  might  of  the  British  raj.  At 
the  same  time  he  knew  how  to  impress  upon 
the  Government  of  India  the  valuo  of  his 
support,  and  obtained  from  them  in  the  autumn 
of  1915  an  increase  by  two  lakhs  of  his  annual 
subsidy.  The  Russian  retreat  and  the  British 
reverses  in  Mesopotamia,  followed  by  the  fall 
of  Kut,  magnified,  of  course,  tenfold  by  the 
hostile  agencies  established  in  Afghanistan, 
exposed  the  Ameer  to  renewed  pressure  from 
the  forward  party  as  well  as  from  the  frontier 
tribes  on  the  Indian  border,  who  looked  to 
him  to  lead  them  against  the  infidel.  But 
his  temporising  policy  was  not  to  be  shaken. 
In  due  course  the  Turco-German  "  Embassy  " 
received  a  significant  hint  that  the  climate  of 
Kabul  might  prove  too  trying  for  them  if 
their  stay  was  prolonged,  and  they  were  politely 
sent  about  their  business,  only  a  certain  number 
of  Austrian  prisoners  of  war  being  allowed  to 
remain  in  Kabul  in  a  sort  of  honourable  intern- 
ment. The  resumption  of  our  offensive  in 
Mesopotamia  and  the  occupation  of  Baghdad 
dealt  a  severe  blow  to  the  anti-British  party 
to  which  it  was  doubtful  whether  the  military 
collapse  of  Russia  after  the  Revolution  would 
afford  a  sufficient  offset. 

The  Ameer's  loyalty  not  only  preserved  the 
neutrality  of  Afghanistan,  but  contributed  very 
largely  to  avert  a  general  conflagration  along 
the  north-western  frontier,  the  great  moun- 
tainous no-man's-land  which  lies  beyond  the 
boundary  of  direct  British  administration  and 
equally  beyond  effective  reach  of  the  Ameer's 
authority  The  fierce  but  poverty-stricken 
tribes  that  inhabit  this  region  are  fanatical 
Mahomedans,  but  since  the  creation  of  a 
separate  North-West  Frontier  Province  by 
Lord  Curzon  they  had  been  successfully  bound 
over  to  keep  the  peace,  though  with  occasional 
lapses,  by  a  judicious  admixture  of  force  and 
persuasion  in  the  shape  of  allowances  dependent 
upon  good  behaviour.  At  first  the  war  aroused 
very  little  excitement  amongst  the  more  lawless 
tribes,  whilst  a  fine  example  of  loyalty  was  set 
by  the  more  remote  but  important  chieftains 
of  Khelat  and  Chitral  and  Hunza  and  Nagar,  as 
well  as  by  the  great  tribes  of  the  Khyber  and 
Swat  and  Tochi.  Even  at  the  beginning  of 
1915  the  Waziiis  assured  the  Government  of 
India  that  they  could  safely  withdraw  all  their 


troops,  as  *h«  tn'fioomon  th'"TTi0«*'v«,s  would 
guarantee  the  maintenance  ot  peace  and  order. 
But  when  the  news  of  Turkey's  entry  into  the 
war   slowly  filterod  into  these  distant  regions 


LIEUT.-COLONEL   SIR    GEORGE    ROOS 
KKPPEL,    G.C.I.E., 
Chief    Commissioner    and    Agent    to    Governor- 
General,    North-West    Frontier    Province,    India, 
since  1908. 

some  of  the  most  fanatical  Mullalis,  whose 
influence  is  always  formidable  in  times  of  crisis, 
began  to  preach  the  Holy  War.  As  far  back  as 
1898  it  was  the  echo  of  the  Turkish  victories 
over  the  Greeks  in  the  preceding  year  that 
resounded  in  the  general  frontier  rising  which 
brought  about  the  Tirah  campaign.  The  out- 
break of  hostilities  between  the  British  and  the 
Turks  in  alliance  with  a  great  European  nation 
whose  War  Lord  was  alleged  to  liave  embraced 
Islam  was  a  still  more  potent  stimulus  to  their 
ignorant  fanaticism.  The  Mohmands  began 
to  raid  into  the  Peshawar  district,  first  in 
November  1914,  and  then  in  January  1915, 
and  in  April,  encouraged  by  letters  falsely  pro- 
fessing to  proceed  from  the  Ameer  and  pro- 
claiming a  Jehad,  a  lashkar  about  6,000  strong, 
consisting  partly  of  Afghans,  entered  British 
territory  and  had  to  be  dispersed  at  Shabkadr 
by  a  strong  force,  which  lost  three  British 
officers  killed  and  one  wounded  besides  some 
60  other  casualties  In  January  1915,  and 
again  two  months  later,  the  Khoslwalis  tried  to 


m 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


raid  in  force  into  Tochi  and  were  only  dispersed 
after  heavy  fighting  by  the  Banu  movable 
column  and  part  of  the  North  Waziristan 
Militia.  In  August  the  Swatis  attacked  a 
British  camp  at  Chakdava  and  the  Bunerwalis, 
joined  by  some  of  the  Hindustani  fanatics, 
whose  stronghold  in  Buner  had  become  a 
regular  Alsatia  for  Hindu  seditionists  from  all 
parts  of  India  as  well  as  for  disaffected  Ma- 
homedans,  made  repeated  attempts  to  invade 
British  territory  by  the  Ambela  Pass.  The 
Mohmands  too,  in  spite  of  the  Ameer's  warnings, 
resumed  hostilities  at  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember at  the  instigation  of  the  notorious 
Baba  Mullah,  who  collected  10,000  followers, 
recruited  from  different  clans.  They  were 
beaten  back  near  Hafiz  Khor  on  September  5, 
but  they  received  considerable  reinforcements 
from  Afghan  territory,  and  a  succession  of  raids 
into  the  Peshawar  district  culminated  in  an 
attack  in  December  on  Charsada,  where 
nearly  the  whole  bazaar  was  burnt  down. 
During  the  cold  weather,  however,  the  economic 
blockade  of  the  Mohmand,  Bunerwali  and 
Upper  Swat  valleys  and  retaliatory  measures 
taken  against  the  tribesmen  within  British 
territories  who  were  suspected  of  aiding  and 
abetting  the  raiders,  proved  sufficiently  effective 
to  induce  the  refractory  tribes  to  ask  for  terms 
and  pay  a  heavy  fine  before  the  return  of  the 
hot  weather  in  April  1916.  Nevertheless,  the 
turbulent  spirit  of  the  Mohmands  had  not  yet 
been  quelled,  and  by  the  autumn  they  had  again 
collected  a  Ioshkar  6,000  strong,  which  was 
finally  broken  up  on  November  14,  when 
aeroplanes  were  for  the  first  time  used  by  us  in 
frontier  warfare,  to  the  terrified  amazement  of 
the  tribesmen.  The  blockade  continued  to 
exhaust  their  powers  of   resistance,  and  they 


finally  made  their  submission  in  August  1917. 
Meanwhile  a  still  more  serious  outbreak  had 
taken  place  in  the  Mahsud  country,  and  in 
March,  April  and  May  large  bands  attacked 
British  detachments  with  no  small  measure  of 
success,  and  on  one  occasion  surprised  and 
overwhelmed  a  British  convoy  with  very  slight 
losses  to  themselves.  In  June  operations  on  a 
large  scale  were  undertaken  with  several 
brigades  advancing  from  Tank,  in  which  aero- 
planes again  played  a  conspicuous  part.  The 
Mahsuds  hastily  retired,  and  when  pursued  into 
their  own  country  they  sued  for  an  armistice 
and  finally  took  the  oath  of  submission  on 
August  10,  1917.  Peace  was  at  length  restored  all 
along  the  frontier,  but  the  whole  of  those  two 
and  a  half  years  were  a  period  of  great  anxiety 
for  the  Government  of  India,  whose  military 
resources  had  been  drained  to  dispatch  and 
maintain  the  large  Indian  forces  sent  to  Franco 
and  Mesopotamia  and  other  theatres  of  war. 
Fortunately  the  outbreaks,  which  could  in 
every  case  be  traced  to  the  fanatical  preachings 
of  individual  Mullahs  of  great  local  influence 
and  reputed  sanctity,  had  remained  more  or 
less  isolated  movements,  and  the  powerful 
Afridi  tribe  around  the  Khyber,  without 
whose  cooperation  no  frontier  rising  can 
acquire  homogeneity,  had  never  wavered 
in  their  loyalty.  This  result  was  largely 
due  to  the  extraordinary  personal  influence 
with  the  Afridis  of  that  distinguished 
Pathan,  the  Nawab  Sir  Abdul  Qayyum, 
Indian  Political  Assistant  to  the  Com- 
missioner of  the  North-West  Frontier  Province, 
and  to  the  sagacity  and  experience  of  Sir 
George  Roos  Keppel  himself,  who  had  long 
been  successful  Warden  of  the-  Marches  from 
Peshawar. 


CHAPTER    CCXXVI. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  JERUSALEM. 

Review  of  Palestine  Operations  July-December,  1917— General  Allenby's  Plans — ■ 
Turks'  Defensive  Preparations — Minor  Operations — British  Offensive  Opened — Bom- 
bardment of  Gaza — Beersheba  Captured — Stiff  Fighting  on  the  Hebron  Road — Outer 
Defences  of  Gaza  Captured — Turkish  Centre  Smashed  at  Sheria — Gaza  Evacuated  by 
the  Enemy — Turkish  Army  in  Retreat — Yeomanry  Charge  at  Huj — Through  the  Land 
of  the  Philistines — Battle  of  El  Mughar— Turkish  Forces  Cut  in  Two — Yeomanry  Charge 
at  Abu  Shusheh — Joppa  Captured — Advance  into  Judean  Hills — Enver  and  Falkenhayn 
at  Jerusalem — Germans  Leave  the  City — Nebi  Samwil  Ridge  Won — Heavy  Enemy  Counter- 
attacks— The  Welsh  Horse  at  Beth  Horon — British  Advance  Resumed — Hebron  and 
Bethlehem  Occupied — Northern  Defences  of  Jerusalem  Captured — Flight  of  the  Turks 
to  Jericho — Surrender  of  the  Holy-  City — General  Allenby's  Official  Entry — Freedom 
for  all  Faiths — Turco-German  Attempts  to  Discount  Loss  of  Jerusalem — Gratitude  of 
the  Arabs — Effect  on  the  Jews — Attitude  of  the  Vatican  and  of  German  Catholics. 


GENERAL  ALLENBY  opened  the 
campaign  which,  in  seven  weeks, 
resulted  in  the  surrender  of  Jeru- 
salem by  an  attack  on  Beersheba  on 
October  31,  1917.  Since  the  failure  of  the 
Egyptian  Expeditionary  Force  to  capture  Gaza 
in  the  spring  of  1917  there  had  been  little  fight- 
ing on  the  Palestine  border,  but  on  both  sides 
great  preparations  had  been  made  for  the 
coming  contest. 

The  military  situation  in  the  autumn  of  1917 
in  the  outlying  provinces  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
was  not  favourable  to  the  Ottomans.  They  had 
lost  Baghdad  in  March,  1917,  and  had  since 
suffered  serious  reverses  both  on  the  Tigris  and 
Euphrates  ;  the  Russian  Army  of  the  Caucasus, 
though  inactive,  still  held  Armenia,  while  the 
forces  of  the  Grand  Sherif  of  Mecca,  who  had 
proclaimed  his  independence  in  the  summer  of 
1916,  had  advanced  to  the  south-eastern  borders 
of  Syria.  In  these  circumstances  the  Turks 
were  compelled  to  defend  Palestine  to  the 
utmost  of  their  ability,  and  in  the  six  months 
Vol.  XV.— Part   187.  145 


between  the  second  battle  of  Gaza  and  the  open- 
ing of  General  Allenby's  offensive  they  had 
constructed  most  formidable  defences  on  the 
Gaza-Beersheba  front.  Strategic  railways  were 
built,  the  garrison  of  Southern  Palestine  was 
largely  reinforced  and  provided  with  powerful 
artillery ;  the  air  service  was  enlarged  and 
rendered  very  efficient.  In  all  these  measures 
the  Turks  had  the  active  help  of  the  Germans, 
who  were  concerned  for  the  preservation  of 
their  own  interests  in  the  Near  East.  General 
von  Falkenhayn  had  been  sent  to  Syria  as 
military  adviser  of  the  Turks  and  from  his 
headquarters  he  watched  developments  both 
on  the  Mesopotamia  and  Palestine  fronts. 
If  the  Turks  succeeded  in  holding  the  British 
at  Gaza  and  Beersheba,  von  Falkenhayn  was 
credited  with  the  intention  of  endeavouring  to 
recapture  Baghdad.  The  Turks,  however, 
failed  to  hold  their  lines  in  Palestine. 

Beersheba  was  captured  the  same  day  it  was 
attacked,  and  during  the  next  few  days  the 
enemy  line  was  crumpled  up  and  the  Turks 


,46 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


driven  from  their  positions  between  Beersheba 
and  the  Mediterranean,  Gaza  itself  being  taken 
on  November  7.  The  swiftness  with  which 
General  Allenby  followed  up  these  first  successes 
completely  disorganized,  for  a  time,  the  Turkish 
Army.  The  British  made  rapid  progress  across 
the  Plain  of  Philistia,  seized  the  junction 
of  the  Jerusalem-Damascus  railways,  cut  the 
enemy  forces  in  two,  and  on  November  17 
occupied  Jaffa  (Joppa).  The  disorder  into 
which  the  Turks  had  been  thrown  enabled 
General  Allenby's  troops  to  penetrate  the  gorges 
of  the  Judean  Hills  from  the  west  with  com- 


The  Turkish  Army,  which  had  now  recovered 
its  moral,  took  up  very  strong  positions  a  few 
miles  north  and  east  of  Jerusalem.  The  loss  of 
Jerusalem,  next  to  Mecca  and  Medina  the  most 
sacred  of  cities  to  Moslems,  was  a  severe  blow 
to  Ottoman  prestige,  and  a  serious  effort  was 
made  to  recapture  it.  For  this  attempt  the 
Turks  were  reinforced  by  a  considerable  part 
of  two  German  divisions.  A  determined 
attack  was  made  on  the  British  lines  on 
December  27.  It  failed,  and  the  British 
in  a  counter-attack  captured  positions  which 
rendered      Jerusalem      secure       against      any 


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SOUTHERN    PALESTINE    AND    PHILISTIA. 


parative  ease,  and  on  November  21  the  Nebi 
Samwil  ridge,  five  miles  north-west  of  Jerusalem, 
was  seized.  On  December  4  an  advance  was 
made  from  the  south  through  the  hill  country, 
and  Hebron  was  occupied  on  the  6th.  There 
had  meantime  been  severe  fighting  in  the  Nebi 
Samwil  district,  but  as  the  force  from  the  south 
got  nearer  Jerusalem  the  troops  at  Nebi 
Samwil  advanced  (December  8).  The  next 
morning  the  troops  from  the  west  gained 
positions  astride  the  road  running  north  to 
Shechem,  and  those  from  the  south  reached 
on  the  east  the  road  to  Jericho.  The  Turks 
had  already  fled,  and  Jerusalem,  thus  isolated, 
was  surrendered  (December  9)  by  its  mayor. 
Two  days  later  General  Allenby,  on  foot, 
made  his  formal  entry  into  the  city. 


surprise  attack.  Meantime  the  forces  of  the 
King  of  the  Hedjaz  (the  Sherif  of  Mecca)  had 
become  increasingly  active  on  the  left  flank  of 
the  Turks  and  by  the  beginning  of  February  1918 
had  established  themselves  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  Dead  Sea.  The  capture  of  Jericho  by 
General  Allenby  on  February  21  practically 
completed  the  conquest  of  Southern  Palestine. 

General  Allenby,  when  he  took  over  the 
command  of  the  Egyptian  Expeditionary  Force 
from  Sir  Archibald  Murray  (June  28,  1917),  had 
instructions  to  report  upon  the  conditions  in 
which  offensive  operations  might  be  undertaken 
in  the  autumn  or  winter.  After  visiting  the 
front  and  consulting  Sir  Philip  Chetwode,  the 
commander  of  the  Eastern  Force,  he  submitted 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


147 


[H.  Walter  Batntll,  photovapK 

GENERAL    SIR    EDMUND    ALLENBY,    G.C.M.G.,    K.C.B., 
Commander-in-Chief  Egyptian  Expeditionary  Force  operating   in    Palestine. 


proposals  in  the  second  week  of  July.  They 
received  the  approval  of  the  War  Cabinet.  His 
plan  was  to  strike  the  main  blow  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  Turkish  line  and  thus  obtain  an  open 
flank  against  which  to  operate.  General 
AHenby  put  on  record  that  this  plan  w:u  based 
on  General   Chetwode's   "  appreciation  of   the 


situation  and  on  the  scheme  which  he  put 
forward  to  me  on  my  arrival  in  Egypt."  And 
to  General  Chetwode's  "  strategical  foresight  and 
tactical  skill,"  added  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
"  the  success  of  the  campaign  was  largely  due." 
Much  had  to  bo  done  before  the  plan  was 
ready  to  be  executed  ;    fortunately  the  period 

187—2 


148 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  preparation  included  the  summer  months, 
when  the  heat  is  so  great  in  the  Sinai -Palestine 
borderlands  that  campaigning  is  usually  avoided 
— though  the  Turks  in  1916  had  invaded  Sinai 
in  August,  the  very  hottest  season.  For  the 
purposes  of  the  offensive  two  striking  forces 
were  formed  out  of  the  troops  of  the  Eastern 
Force  ;  one,  which  General  Chetwode  personally 
directed,  was  to  operate  at  the  eastern  or 
Beersheba  end  of  tho  front.  The  other,  with 
.Major-General  E.  S.  Bulfln,  C.B.,  in  local 
command,  was  on  the  western  or  Gaza  side. 
Major-General  Sir  H.  Chauvel  commanded  the 
mounted  troops,  composed  of  Yeomanry, 
Australian  Light  Horse,  New  Zealand  Mounted 
Rifles,  and  Indian  cavalry.  The  infantry 
divisions  chiefly  employed  were  the  53rd 
(Welsh),  which  was  with  Chetwode,  and  the 
54th  (Lowland),  with  Bulfin.  The  Imperial 
Camel  Corps  was  with  the  Beersheba  force. 
Major-General  L.  J.  Bols,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  was 
Chief  of  Staff  to  General  Allenby  and  performed 
"  brilliant  work."  * 


*  Other  officers  whom  General  Allenby  specially 
mentioned  were  Major-General  J.  Adye,  Deputy  Adjutant 
General,  Major-General  Sir  Walter  Campbell,  Deputy 
Quartermaster-General,  and  Brevet  Lieut. -Colonel  G.  P. 
Dawnay,  Brig. -General,  General  Staff.  Chetwode,  Bulfin 
and  Chauvel  all  held  the  temporary  rank  of  Lieut.  -General. 


The  decision  not  to  make  the  main  attack 
at  ths  Gaza  end  of  the  line  was  fully  justified 
by  tho  character  of  the  Turkish  defences. 
Gaza  had  been  made  into  "  a  strong  modern 
fortress,  heavily  entrenched  and  wired,  offering 
every  facility  for  protracted  defence."  Beyond 
the  immediate  environs  of  Gaza,  following 
roughly  the  road  to  Beersheba,  the  Turks 
had  constructed  a  series  of  works  known  as  the 
Sihan  group,  the  Atawina  Ridge  works,  the 
Baha  group,  and  the  Hareira-Sheria  group. 
By  the  end  of  October  these  works  had  been 
joined  up,  and  formed  a  practically  continuous 
line  from  the  Mediterranean  to  a  point  south 
of  Sheria.  Then,  after  a  gap  of  some  4  J  miles, 
were  the  defences  covering  Beersheba.  Beyond 
Beersheba  was  a  considerable  desert  area  where 
the  Turks  had  no  troops.  The  forces  they 
had  still  farther  west,  to  the  south  of  the  Dead 
Sea  and  along  the  line  of  the  Hedjaz  railway, 
took  no  part  in  the  campaign  ;  they  had  enough 
to  do  to  meet  the  attacks  of  the  Hedjaz  Arabs. 

Including  the  gip  between  Sheria  and  Beer- 
sheba the  Turkish  front  was  about  30  miles 
long.  The  enemy's  communications  were  good 
and  any  threatened  point  of  his  line  could  be 
easily  reinforced.  Beersheba  was  connected 
by   railway  with   Sheria  and   the   north,   and 


GAZA:    A    STRONG    TRENCH    WELL    PROTECTED    WITH    CACTUS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


149 


CAMEL    AND    CATERPILLAR    IN    THE    DESERT. 


another  railway  crossing  the  Plain  of  Philistia 
came  to  Beit  Hanun,  only  five  miles  north  of 
Gaza.  A  short  branch  line  served  Huj,  a 
place  nine  miles  north-west  of  Sheria  and  8J 
miles  north-east  of  Gaza,  where  the  Turks 
had  a  huge  depot.  Roads  fitted  for  motor 
traffic  connected  several  of  the  defence  systems. 
The  Turks,  too,  had  the  great  advantage  of 
occupying  fertile,  well-watered  land.  With 
the  British  it  was  otherwise.  The  Egyptian 
Expeditionary  Force  was  in  the  desert,  or 
at  best,  near  the  Gaza  end,  "in  the  strip  with 
verdure  strown,  which  just  divides  the  Desert 
from  the  Sown."  Its  front  extended  for 
22  miles,  from  the  sea  south  of  Gaza,  more  or 
less  along-  the  line  of  the  Wadi  Ghuzze  to 
Gamli,  some  15  miles  west  of  Beersheba,  and 
10  miles  from  the  nearest  point  of  the  Turkish 
defences.  Except  in  the  small  sector  near 
Gaza,  where  only  a  mile  or  so  separated  the 
Turkish  and  British  trenches.  General  Allenby 
was  not  able  to  get  within  effective  striking 
distance-  of  the  enemy  until  his  very  elaborate 
preparations  were  complete.  These  included 
a  supply  of  water  sufficient  for  a  week  or  more 
to  the  troops  which  were  to  operate  in  the 
desert.*  * 

*  The  first  attack  on  Gaza,  when  success  was  in  sight, 
had  to  be^abandoned  through  lack  of  water. 


The  difficulties  to  be  overcome  to  maintain 

the   Expeditionary   Force   in  the  desert   were 

dealt  with  in  the  chapter  on  the  first  battles  of 

Gaza    (Vol.    XIV.,    Chap.    CCXVI.).       These 

difficulties  did  not  become  less  as  time  passed  : 

Practically  the  whole  of  the  transport  available  in 
the  Force*  (wrote  General  Allenby),  including  30,000 
pack  camels,  had  to  be  allotted  to  one  portion  of  the 
Ea-tern  Force  to  enable  it  to  be  kept  supplied  with 
water,  food,  and  ammunition  at  a  distance  of  15  to  20 
miles  in  advance  of  railhead. 

In  consequence  of  the  deep  sand,  and  the 
steep  banks  of  the  wadis  which  scored  tho 
ground  behind  the  British  front,  little  use 
could  be  made  of  motor  transport — there 
was  not  a  good  road  in  all  the  lines  of  commu- 
nication. What  could  be  done  by  extending 
tho  railways  was  done.  From  Khan  Yunus  a 
branch  line  had  been  built  to  Shellal.  It  was 
now  carried  on,  as  rapidly  as  material  could  be 
brought  by  the  overburdened  main  line  from 
Egypt,  towards  Karm — a  place  midway 
between  Shellal  and  B;ersheba.  Another  line 
was  begun  from  Gamli  to  El  Buggar,  a  spot 
somewhat  nearer  Beersheba  than  Karm. 

While  preparing  for  the  offensive  a  number 

of  minor  opf  rations  were  carried  out. 

On  the  night  of  July  20-21  a  raid  was  made  on  the 
trenches  south-west  of  Gaza,  the  Turks  losing    102  in 

*  That  is,  the  whole  army  in  Egypt. 


150 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


killed  and  17  in  prisoners,  besides  a  machine-gun  and 
trench  mortar.  In  another  night  raid  later  in  July  20 
Turks  were  killed.  Again,  on  the  night  of  August  8—9, 
British  patrols  had  a  lively  bayonet  fight  with  the 
enemy,  whose  losses  were  between  30  and  40,  the  British 
casualties  being  22.  Then,  after  several  more  raids, 
on  August  30,  the  British  line  south-west  of  Gaza  was 
advanced,  with  very  slight  loss,  on  a  front  of  800  yards, 
despite  heavy  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire.  And 
throughout  this  period  of  preparation  the  -Turkish 
positions  at  Gaza  were  kept  under  fire  ;  many  direct 
hits  on  guns  and  emplacements  being  obtained. 


On  their  part  the  Turks  kept  observation  on 
the  British  lines  mainly  by  Aeroplane,  but 
occasionally  mounted  patrols,  chiefly  from  the 
Beersheba  end  of  the  front,  were  sent  out,  their 
object  being  to  interfere  with  railway  con- 
struction. On  July  19  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  advanced  to  El  Buggar  but  were  driven 
back  to  Beersheba ;  in  September  other 
cavalry  raids  were  made  by  the  Turks. 

Towards  the  end  of  October  arrangements 
for  the  offensive  were  completed.  Every  endea- 
vour, was  made  to  induce  the  enemy  to  expect 
the  chief  attack  at  the  western  end  of  his  line, 
and  with  this  object  a  violent  bombardment 
of  the  Gaza  defences  was  begun  on  October  27 
by  the  land  batteries — in  the  matter  of  artillery 
the  British  were  at  length  ahead  of  the  Turks. 
On  October  30  the  French  warship  Requin  and 
monitors  and  other  ships  of  the  British  squadron 
under  Rear-Admiral  T.  Jackson  joined  in  the 
bombardment. 

General  Chetwode's  force  had  meantime 
begun  to  make  for  its  objectives.  Its  blow  was 
to  be  struck  against  the  left  flank  cf  the  main 
Turkish  position — that  of  Sheria-Hareira.    But 


BEERSHEBA. 

before  that  position  could  be  attacked  in 
flank  "  the  capture  of  Beersheba  was  a  neces- 
sary preliminary,  to  secure  the  water  supplies 
at  that  place  and  to  give  room  for  the  deploy- 
ment of  the  attacking  force  on  the  high  ground 
north  and  north-west  of  Beersheba  "  (General 
Allenby).  As  in  the  days  of  Abraham  and 
Isaac,  Beersheba  still  had  wells  and  water,  but 
it  was  an  outpost  on  the  desert's  verge,  and 
beyond  it,  on  the  British  side,  was  a  parched 
and  thirsty  land. 

Beersheba  is  built  in  a  hollow  in  the  hills,  the 
Wadi  es  Saba,  a  tributary  of  the  Wadi  Ghuzze, 
running  by  its  southern  side,  and  it  was  pro- 
tected on  the  west  and  south  by  works  three 
to  five  miles  distant.  These  works  were  in  hilly 
country,  were  well  made,  heavily  wired,  ade- 
quately manned  and  provided  with  many  field 
and  machine  guns.  There  were  other  defences 
immediately  east  of  Beersheba,  but  on  the 
south-east  the  Turks  trusted  to  the  desert  for 
protection.  They  were  prepared  for  a  frontal 
assault,  but  they  had  not  calculated  upon  what 
happened.  General  Chetwode  attacked  Beer- 
sheba not  only  from  south  and  south-west,  but 
his  mounted  troops  made  a  wide  flanking  move- 
ment and  attacked  the  place  from  the  east. 
This  flanking  operation  decided  the  fate  of 
Beersheba. 

The    Bavarian    officer,    Kress   von   Kresscn- 
stein,  who  still  commanded  the  Turkish  Army 
in    Southern    Palestine — Djemal     Pasha,     the 
Commander-in-Chief    in    Syria,    was    then    at  , 
Damascus — had  not  guessed  General  Allenby's 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


151 


plans,  but  he  was  apprehensive  about  the  exten- 
sion of  tho  British  railway  towards  Sheria  and 
Beersheba,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  October  the 
enemycavalry  were  repeatedly  sent  out  to  recon- 
noitre. The  Turkish  cavalryman  was  no  mean 
foe.  "  A  fine  horseman,  a  fine  shot,  especially  at 
long  ranges,  his  drill  and  discipline  are  perfect, 
and  you  have  to  get  up  very  early  in  the  morning 
to  catch  him  out  "  (Captain  Lord  Apsley,  M.C.). 
These  cavalrymen  now  pushed  reconnaissances 
12  and  15  miles  into  the  desert.  Thus  on 
October  23  a  squadron  of  Gloucester  Yeomanry, 
taking  up  an  outpost  line  south-east  of  El 
Sha'uth  just  before  dawn,  encountered  a 
strong  enemy  patrol  and  had  a  sharp  skirmish. 
On  another  occasion  a  regiment  of  Turkish 
cavalry  was  pushed  out  to  enable  certain  staff 
officers,  who  followed  in  motor  cars,  to 
reconnoitre  from  a  high  hill.  As  it  hap- 
pened, Yeomanry  had  been  sent  to  seize 
the  same  hill.  There  was  a  lively  little 
fight,  the  Turjts  being  driven  from  the  hill 
"  before  the  generals  at  tha  top  had  more 
than  five  minutes  to  look  around."  Apart 
from  diversions  such  as  these  the  Turks,  just 
before  the  British  offensive  opened,  made  one 


reconnaissance    in     forco,    thus     described     by 
General  Allenby  : 

On  the  morning  of  October  27  the  Turku  made  a 
strong  reconnaissance  towards  Kurm  from  the  direction 
of  Kauwukah  [Sheria  sector],  two  rogitnonts  of  cavalry 
and  two  or  threo  thousand  infantry,  with  [12]  guns, 
being  employed.  They  attacked  a  line  of  outposts  near 
El  Girheir,  hold  by  Home  (London]  Yeomanry,  covering 
railway  construction.  One  small  post  was  rushed  and 
cut  up,  but  not  before  inflicting  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy  ; 
another  post,  though  surrounded,  held  out  all  day,  and 
also  causci  the  enemy  heavy  loss.  The  gallant  reels' 
tance  made  by  the  Yeomanry  enabled  the  53rd  (Welnh) 
Division  to  come  up  in  time,  and  on  their  advance  the 
Turks  withdrew.  [The  British  casualties  wero  under 
100.] 

These  enemy  activities  did  not  disarrange 
General  Chetwode's  movements.  The  attack 
on  Beersheba  had  been  fixed  for  October  31, 
and  by  the  previous  evening  his  troops  were 
concentrated  in  positions  of  readiness.  They 
wers  to  make  a  night  march,  deploy  and  attack 
at  dawn.  There  were  two  movements,  that  of 
tho  troops  which  were  to  make  the  frontal 
assault,  and  that  of  the  mounted  men  who  wero 
to  make  the  flanking  movement.  The  first 
body  consisted  of  two  divisions,  infantry  and 
dismounted  Yeomanry,  with  the  Imperial 
darnel  Corps  and  a  cavalry  regiment  to  guard 


DJEMAL    PASHA    AT    HIS     HEADQUARTERS    IN    PALESTINE, 
With  German  officers  in  attendance. 


152 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the  flanks.  This  force  moved  in  an  inner 
circle,  and  was  transported  by  rail  as  far  as  pos- 
sible. The  mounted  troops,  Australian  Light 
Horse,  New  Zealand  Mounted  Rifles  and 
Yeomanry,  started  on  the  night  of  October  27 
from  their  bases  at  Sha'uth  and  Shellal  and 
rode  south  and  east  to  Khalasa  and  Asluj,  oases 
where  the  water  supplies  had  been  developed. 
Here  they  had  a  brief  pause  before  the  last  stage 
of  the  desert  ride. 

The  infantry  marched  during  the  night  in 
accordance    with    the    arranged    programme, 


guns  themselves  cjeverly  concealed.  But  the 
troops  advanced  with  great  spirit.  Bombers 
sprang  into  the  trenches  through  gaps  in  the 
wire,  and  where  the  wire  had  not  been  broken 
the  men  tore  it  down  with  their  hands.  Within 
an  hour  the  fight  was  over  and  all  the  enemy 
positions  south  of  the  Wadi  os  Saba  captured. 
Later  in  the  day  (7.30  p.m.)  the  enemy  works 
north  of  the  wadi  were  also  seized.  During 
this  last  stage  a  Lewis  gun  detachment  charged 
and  captured  a  Turkish  field  battery. 

Meanwhile  the  mounted  troops  had  played 


ENGINEERS    BORING    FOR    WATER. 


every  unit  reaching  its  appointed  place  by 
the  assigned  hour.  The  action  began  at 
daybreak,  and  after  a  brief  bombardment 
London  Territorials  stormed  Hill  1070,  on 
which  were  the  enemy's  advanced  works. 
Among  the  90  prisoners  taken  was  a  German 
machine-gun  crew.  Field  guns  then  methodi- 
cally bombarded  the  enemy's  main  works, 
partially  destroying  the  wire  entanglements. 
Clouds  of  dust  raised  by  the  Khamseen  (the 
wind  from  the  desert)  from  time  to  time  com- 
pelled the  British  gunners  to  pause,  and  to 
this  cause  may  be  attributed  the  survival 
of  part  of  the  enemy's  wire.  At  12.15  p.m. 
the  assault  was  ordered.  In  moving  to  their 
positions  the  troops,  London  Territorials  and 
dismounted  Yeomanry,  suffered  a  good  deal 
from  the  hostile  artillery,  the  firing  of  the 
Turkish    guns    being    very    accurate    and    the 


their  part.  They  left  Khalasa  and  Asluj 
in  the  evening  of  October  30  on  their  great 
ride,  and  by  5  a.m.  on  the  31st  had  reached  their 
positions  east  of  Beersheba,  some  high  hills 
immediately  east  of  the  Wadi  Khasim  Zanna. 
The  troops  from  Khalasa  had  covered  25  and 
those  from  Asluj  35  miles.  "  The  column," 
said  an  officer  with  the  Khalasa  force,  "  was 
15  miles  long.  Our  wallets  were  full  of  corn 
tor  the  horses.  We  rode  through  endless 
dust — a  full  moon,  but  the  dust  so  thick 
you  could  not  see  five  yards."  No  enemy  was 
encountered,  the  wide  sweep  into  the  void 
served  its  purpose,  and  when  the  horsemen 
appeared  on  the  hills  overlooking  Beersheba 
the  surprise  of  the  Turks  was  complete.  The 
Yeomanry  took  up  positions  around  Khasim 
Zanna,  acting  as  the  reserve  force,  while  the 
Australians    and    New    Zealanders    went    into 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


158 


fiction.  Between  Khasini  Zanna  and  Beer- 
sheba was  an  almost  flat  plain  commanded 
by  rising  ground  to  the  north  and  flanked  by 
'I'd  es  Saba,  a  hill  some  1,000  feet  high,  beneath 
which  lay  a  village  of  the  same  name.  Saba 
hill  and  village,  and  the  hills  to  the  north, 
through  which  runs  the  road  to  Hebron,  were 
garrisoned  by  the  enemy,  who  also  had  trenches 
immediately  east  of  Beersheba.  General  Chay- 
tor,  in  command  of  the  Anzac  Division,  sent  a 
force  of  Australian  Light  Horse  north  to 
secure  positions  on  the  Hebron  road.  This 
force  was  engaged  by  Turkish  cavalry  through- 
out the  day,  but  achieved  its  object  and  kept 
the  enemy  well  in  check.  Another  force,  of 
Australians  and  New  Zealanders,  attacked, 
dismounted,  Tel  es  Saba.  The  hill  had  been 
strongly  fortified,  and  was  held  in  considerable 
strength ;  moreover,  it  could  only  be  approached 
from  the  south  by  crossing  the  steep  banks  of 
the  Wadi  es  Saba.  Here  there  was  stiff  fighting 
for  several  hours,  but  late  in  the  afternoon  the 
hill  was  captured. 

Various  attempts  had  been  made  by  small 
parties  of  Australians  and  New  Zealanders  to 
cross  the  open  plain  and  reach  Beersheba. 
Hitherto  they  had  not  succeeded,  but  in  a 
dismounted  attack  the  village  of  Saba  was 
taken,  soon  after  the  fall  of  the  redoubt  on  the 
hill.  Evening  had  fallen,  the  moon  was  again 
up  and  Beersheba  was  not  yet  taken.     Some 


a  ixiety  began  to  be  felt,  and  at  7.30  p.m.  the 
Yeomanry  in  reserve  at  Khasim  Zanna  received 
orders  to  attack  the  place.  They  moved  out, 
but  the  work  assign/i  I  them  was  already  done. 
Half  an  hour  earlier  the  4th  Australian  Light 
Horse  had  settled  the  matter.  They  had 
cleared  some  houses  held  by  theonemy.  Then 
mounting  their  horses  they  charged  straight 
for  the  town.  They  galloped  over  two  trachea, 
each  8  feet  deep  and  4  feet  wide,  using  their 
fixed  bayonets  as  lances  against  the  Turks  who 
filled  them,  and  rode,  cheering,  into  Beersheba, 
where  the  enemy  soldiers  still  in  the  place 
promptly  surrendered.  A  very  strong  position 
was  thus  taken  with  slight  loss,  and  the  Turkish 
detachment  at  Beersheba  almost  completely 
put  out  of  action.  Some  500  dead  Turks  were 
found  on  the  battlefield  and  about  2,000 — ■ 
funong  them  some  Germans — -were  taken 
prisoners.  The  total  British  casualties  were 
fewer  than  the  number  of  prisoners.  The 
Turks  had,  at  the  last  moment,  endeavoured 
to  destroy  their  'military  stores,  but  they 
had  not  time  to  complete  their  task.  The 
British  captured  13  guns  and  a  large  quan- 
tity of  corn,  clothing,  and  equipment  of 
all  kinds.  A  direct  hit  from  a  heavy  gun 
on  the  railway  bridge  over  the  wadi  had  pre- 
vented the  removal  of  the  rolling  stock  ;  a  train 
was  found  standing  in  the  station  loaded  with 
goods. 


EARLY    ARRIVALS    AT    BEERSHEBA    STATION,    NOVEMBER    1,    1917. 


154 


THE    TIMES    HISTOEY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Beersheba  was  more  famous  than  beautiful,* 
had  more  mud  huts  than  substantial  buildings, 
but  it  was  in  Palestine.  The  British  troops  for 
nine  months  had  been  gazing  at  the  Promised 
Land  ;  now  they  had  set  foot  in  it.  But  if 
Beersheba  was  in  general  a  poor  place  there 
was  plenty  of  evidence  that  tho  troops  had 
been  well  eared  for  ;  the  Germans  had  seen  to 
that.  There  were  excellent  dug-out  quarters 
for  man  and  bea3t,  shell-proof  except  from 
direct  overhead  bombing.  Though  the  Turks 
left  in  a  hurry  they  found  time  to  set  many 
booby-traps — engines  and  trucks  mined  so 
that  they  blew  up  when  moved,  bridles  hung 
on  the  walls  attached  to  bombs,  and  so  on. 
The  famous  wells  "  which  our  father  Abraham 
digged  "  were  there,  and  many1  others.  They 
had  all  been  mined,  but  the  ever  resourceful 
Engineers  coped  with  that  difficulty,  and  a 
pipe  supply  of  water  was  found  uninjured. 
Nevertheless,  the  water  available  was  not  so 
abundant  as  had  been  anticipated,  while  the 
transport  arrangements  proved  unexpectedly 
difficult. 

Complete  success  had  attended  the  opening 
move  of  the  campaign,  but  a  brief  pavise  had  to 
be  made  before  General  Chotwode  could  launch 
his  attack  on  the  Sheria-Haroira  position.  In 
the  interval,  both  to  prevent  Kress  von  Kressen- 
stoin  sending  reinforcements  to  Sheria  and  to 
draw  the  hostile  reserves  to  the  Gaza  sector,  it 
had  been  determined  to  make  an  assault  on  a 
section  of  the  defences  of  that  city  in  the  early 
morning  of  November  2.  The  bombardment  of 
Gaza  had  been  going  on  continuously,  and  not. 
only  of  Gaza  but  of  the  railway  north  of  the 
town,  and  all  military  establishments  which 
could  be  reached  by  the  guns  of  warships. 

The  work  of  the  Allied  squadron  attracted 
little  attention  at  home,  but  it  was  extremely 
valuable,  and  was  not  performed  without  loss. 
On  November  1  the  enemy  gunners  obtained 
several  hits  on  the  French  warship  Requin,  killing 
9  and  wounding  29  of  her  crew.  The  damage 
to  the  vessel  was  comparatively  slight  and  the 
Kequin  continued  in  action.  Two  British  ships 
were  less  fortunate.  A  destroyer  and  a  small 
monitor  were  torpedoed  and  sunk  by  a  German 
U-boat,  33  lives  being  lost. 

The  part  of  the  Gaza  defences  which  it  had 
been  decided  to  attack  extended  from  a  height 

*  The  phraic  from  "  Dan  to  Beersheba  " — respectively 
the  northern  and  southern  limits  of  Palestine — is  a" 
old  ai  the  times  of  Samson  (who  was  of  the  tribe  of 
Dan). 


on  the  eastern  side  of  Samson's  Ridgo  known  as 
Umbrella  Hill  (2,000  yards  south-west  of  Gaza) 
to  Sheikh  Hasan,  on  the  Mediterranean  (2,500 
yards  north-west  of  the  town).  The  front  of 
the  attack  was  about  6,000  yards,  Sheikh  Hasan, 
the  most  distant  objective,  being  over  3,000 
yards  from  the  advanced  British  line.  The 
intervening  ground  consisted  of  sand  dunes,  in 
places  150  feet  h'gh  ;  the  sand  very  deep  and 
heavy  going.  Owing  to  the  considerable  dis- 
tance between  the  British  trenches  and  the 
Turkish  positions  the  attack  was  made  before 
daylight,  and  as  Umbrella  Hill  flanked  the 
enemy  trenches  farther  west  it  was  chosen  as 
the  first  objective.  In  the  evening  of  Novem- 
ber 1  very  heavy  concentrated  fire  was  poured 
for  a  short  time  upon  Umbrella  Hill.  Then  at 
11  p.m.  the  hill  was  stormed  by  a  part  of  the 
52nd  (Lowland)  Division.  Directly  the  Turks  at 
Gaza  learned  that  Umbrella  Hill  was  lost  they 
bombarded  it  and  the  British  front  line.  Ap- 
parently they  thought  they  had  to  deal  with  a 
local  affair  only,  for  after  two  hours  the  bom- 
bardment ceased,  "  in  time,"  said  Sir  E.  Allenby, 
"  to  allow  the  main  attack,  which  was  timed  for 
3  a.m.  (on  Nov.  2)  to  form  up  without  inter- 
ference." The  attack  was  made  by  Scottish 
and  East  Anglian  troops,  and  a  composite  force 
consisting  of  West  Indian  and  Indian  troops  and 
detachments  from  the  French  and  Italian  con- 
tingents.* They  were  helped  by  a  number  of 
Tanks,  which,  though  they  found  some  difficulty 
in  getting  over  the  heavy  sand,  proved  of  value. 
The  Turk  fought  well  but  was  defeated,  the 
British  gaining  nearly  all  their  objectives, 
including  Sheikh  Hasan.  The  enemy  had  suf- 
fered severely  from  the  preliminary  bombard- 
ment and  his  losses  in  the  action  were  heavy. 
Some  of  his  trenches  were  almost  full  of  dead. 
Among  the  450  prisoners  were  over  50  officers — 
the  prisoners  stated  that  one  of  their  divisions 
lost  33  per  cent,  of  its  effectives  and  had  to  be 
replaced  by  a  division  from  the  general  reserve. 
The  British  losses  were  also  considerable  but 
"  not  in  any  way  disproportionate  to  the  results 
obtained "  (General  Allenby).  The  Italian 
troops  of  the  composite  battalion  had  some  warm 
fighting,  and  showed  great  gallantry. 

The  demonstration  against  Gaza  had  attained 

*  These  contingents  were  themselves  composite,  and 
included  Regulars,  Territorials,  and  Africans.  Some 
of  the  French  troops  had  been  at  Verdun,  and  had 
enjoyed  a  six  months*  rest  at  Beni  Sela,  a  village  near 
Khan  Yunus.  The  district  had  a  particular  interest 
for  the  French,  for  here  Napoleon  in  his  Syrian  cam- 
paign narrowly  escaped  capture. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


155 


its  object.  Nevertheless  Kress  von  Krossen- 
stein,  fully  alive  to  the  clanger  which  threatened 
his  lines  by  the  capture  of  Beersheba,  at  once 
employed  all  his  immediately  available  reserves 
in  a  counter-stroke,  seeking  to  draw  a  consider- 
able body  of  British  troops  north  of  Beersheba  ; 
that  is,  into  the  exceedingly  rough  and  hilly 
country,  with  very  scanty  water  supplies, 
leading  to  Hebron.  Had  this  scheme  succeeded 
General  Chetwode  would  have  been  left  with 


Sheria  and  occupied  Abu  Irgeig,  while  the  53rd 
(Welsh)  Division  and  the  Imperial  Camel  Corps 
moved  due  north  of  Beerehoba — 12  or  13  miles 
in  excessive  heat — and  mounted  troops,  Yeo- 
manry, Australians  and  New  Zealandors,  wore 
sent  along  the  Hebron  road.  Tho  object  of  the 
movement  north  of  Beersheba  was  to  secure  the; 
right  flank  of  the  British  during  the  Sheria 
offensive,  but  it  fitted  in  with  the  enemy's 
plan.     There  was  a  good  deal  of  fighting  in  the 


'TANK"    AT    THE    GATES    OF    GAZA. 


forces  too  weak  to  break  the  enemy's  centre  at 
Sheria-Haroira — "  in  which  case  Beersheba 
would  only  have  been  an  incubus  of  a  most 
inconvenient  kind."  At  first  circumstances 
seemed  to  favour  the  Turks.  As  already  stated, 
the  water  and  transport  difficulties  at  Beersheba 
proved  greater  than  had  been  anticipated,  and 
the  attack  on  the  Sheria  works,  first  planned  for 
November  3  or  4,  had  to  be  put  off  for  a  day  or 
two.  Flank  positions,  necessary  for  this 
attack,  were,  however,  seized.  On  November  1 
Irish  troops  moved  direct  along  the  road  to 


hills  on  November  2  and  3  ;  by  the  evening  of 
the  3rd  it  was  ascertained  that  the  Turks  were 
entrenched  along  the  line  Ain  Kohleh-Tel  el 
Khuweilfeh  (i.e.,  between  Sheria  and  the 
Hebron  road).  The  enemy  forces  in  this  sector 
were  being  increased,  and  on  November  4  and  5 
several  determined  attacks  were  made  on  the 
mounted  troops. There  were  then  on  this  front  the 
19th  Turkish  Division,  the  remains  of  the  27th 
Division  (which  had  held  Beersheba),  part  of  the 
16th  Division,  the  majority  of  his  cavalry  and 
infantry  ("  depSt "  troops)  drawn  from  Hebron. 

187— :i 


156 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


AN    INDIAN    RIFLE    BATTALION    ON    THE    PALESTINE    FRONT. 
A  Company  in    reserve. 


All  the  Turkish  attacks  were  broken,  but  the 
fighting  was  of  a  severe  and  apparently  con- 
fused character.  The  country  itself,  though  it 
had  open  and  cultivated  patches,  was,  as 
one  officer  aptly  put  it,  more  fitted  for  Bersaglieri 
than  cavalry.  For  every  hill  top,  almost,  there 
was  a  struggle. 

We  had  another  scrap  the  other  day  (wrote  a  yeo- 
manry officer) ;  we  took  a  hill  and  held  it  for  two  days 
under  rather  trying  conditions.  It  was  very  hot,  there 
being  a  south  wind  all  the  time,  and  we  had  no  water  for 
man  the  second  day,  or  beast  either  day  ;  also  we  had 
Turks  on  three  sides,  and  were  shot  at  and  shelled  from 
front  and  both  flanks.  On  the  evening  of  the  second 
day  we  were  attacked  by  about  1,800  cavalry  and 
infantry,  supported  by  their  guns,  but  beat  them  off. 
My  squadron  did  not  come  in  for  this — a  squadron  of 
Worcesters  relieving  us.  A  squadron  of  the  Warwicks 
had  to  beat  them  [the  Turks]  off  one  place  with  the 
bayonet. 

Another  picture  of  this  campaigning  in  the 

hills  was  given  by  a  brother  officer. 

We  had  (he  wrote)  to  gallop  across  a  couple  of  miles 
of  country  under  their  machine  guns,  but  with  a  wide 
extension  you  get  very  few  men  hit,  and  we  got  across 
with  only  one  ox  two  casualties.  That  afternoon  we 
held  an  outpost  line,  and  my  squadron  [of  Gloucester- 
shire Hussars]  was  sent  on  to  take  up  a  night  line- — it 
was  a  rather  difficult,  anxious  job  as  I  hadn't  seen  the 
country  by  daylight.  Awful  country,  all  rocks,  and  I 
soon  got  rid  of  my  horse  as  I  got  **  on  the  floor  "  twice, 
and  finished  the  night  on  foot.  Next  morning  we 
hoped  we  should  be  relieved,  but  had  to  hold  the  line 
all  day.  It  was  very  difficult  to  keep  touch  with  the 
units  on  my  flank  as  mounted  patrols  could  only  move 
•it  a  walk  in  the  bad  ground,  and  dreadful  country  to 
keep  direction  in.^  At  3.30  we  were  relieved  [but]  just 
M  we  were  going  off  to  Beersheba  we  were  rushed  back 
as  the  Turks  had  counter-attacked.  It  fizzled  out  after 
an  hour,  but  we  had  two  officers  hit  and  a  good  many  men. 
At  'J  I  was  definitely  relieved  by  New  Zealanders.  .  .  . 
After  a  1 2-rnile  march  we  got  to  water  ;  neither  men  nor 
horses  ha:i  bad  a  drop  for  42  hours,  and  the  horses  had 
had  loads  on  the  whole  time.     I've  been  pretty  thirsty 


once  or  twice,  but  never  like  that.  We  had  had  a 
Khamseen  blowing  all  day,  and  had  had  a  hard  day  and 
night. 

In  one  instance  Turkish  infantry,  with 
bayonets  fixed,  advanced  to  attack  a  hill  held 
by  New  Zealand  Mounted  Rifles,  but  were 
caught  by  machine-gun  fire  and  dispersed  after 
suffering  some  300  casualties.  The  work  of 
the  men  behind  the  front  was  equally  strenuous, 
and  if  the  water  supply  was  scanty  it  was  not 
for  lack  of  effort  on  the  part  of  the  engineers. 
The  difficulty  was  not  so  much  the  absence  of 
water  as  its  inaccessibility.  The  wells  were 
fairly  numerous  but  generally  deep,  and  gear 
was  lacking. 

You  cannot  imagine  what  it  is  (said  an  officer  writing 
home)  when  you  start  to  try  and  water  perhaps  5,000 
horses  (at  one  well  150 '  feet  deep)  that  have  had  no 
water  for  24  or  48  hours  and  the  only  goar  you  have  is  a 
canvas  bucket  at  the  end  of  a  rope  !  The  wells  are 
good  enough  to  supply  the  villages,  but  a  Cavalry 
Division  soon  dries  them  up. 

Mr.  W.  T.  Massey,  one  of  the  two  Press 
correspondents  with  the  British  force,  writing 
on  November  4  told  how  General  Allenby, 
visiting  the  front  line,  saw  Australian  Engineers 
preparing  a  water  supply.  "Some  men  were 
working  stripped  to  the  waist,  others  were 
quite  naked.  The  General  was  told  that  these 
soldiers  had  worked  for  24  hours  on  end  in 
order  to  get  a  good  flow.  He  thanked  them 
personally." 

The  spirit  of  these  Australian  Engineers  was 
typical  of  the  whole  force,  and  in  the  fighting 
in  the  hills  north  of  Beersheba  the  Welsh 
infantry  and   the  Imperial    Camel    Corps    had 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


157 


borne  a  full  share.  The  net  result  of  the  four 
days'  contest  was  that  the  British  had  held 
what  they  had  gained,  but  were  threatened 
by  a  superior  and  highly  mobile  enemy. 
Kress  von  Kressenstein's  manoeuvre  to  entangle 
the  British  in  the  hill  country  between  Beersheba 
and  Hebron  appeared  to  have  succeeded. 

General  Allenby,  however,  had  not  swerved 
from  his  original  intention.  If  the  troops  iu 
the  hills  had  not  been  able  to  make  the  progress 
at  first  hoped  for,  they  formed  a  sufficient  pro- 
tection for  the  right  flank  to  justify  the  attack 
on  Sheria,  and  the  Irishmen  and  London 
Territorials  now  at  Abu  Irgeig  were  ready  on 
the  left  flank.  The  moment  for  striking  the 
main  blow  had  come. 

It  was  decided  to  give  battle  on  November  6. 
The  principal  enemy  works  were  on  a  two-mile- 
long  ridge  known  as  Kauwukah.  some  10  miles 
west  of  Beersheba,  and  immediately  east  of  the 
railway  to  Sheria.  Abu  Irgeig  was  five  miles 
south-east  of  Kauwukah.  The  plan  of  battle 
was  for  dismounted  yeomanry  to  attack  the 
extreme  east  of  the  Kauwukah  works,  and  the 
London  and  Irish  troops  the  south-east.  On 
the  right  flank  the  53rd  Division  was  to  attack 


Tel  el  Khuweilfeh,  II  miles  north-east  of 
Beersheba,  and,  the  enemy's  resistance  being 
broken,  the  mounted  troops  were  to  sweep 
westward  behind  Sheria.  The  battle  proved 
to  be  the  decisive  action  of  the  campaign. 
Before  nightfall  the  enemy  was  beaten,  Gaza 
had  been  rendered  untenable  and  the  whole 
Turkish  line  had  to  give  way. 

By  dawn  the  dismounted  yeomanry  had 
taken  up  positions  opposite  the  eastern  end  of 
Kauwukah  and  as  soon  as  it  was  light  they 
advanced  to  the  attack.  The  enemy  works, 
two  deep  trenches  3,000  yards  apart,  connected 
by  a  series  of  strong  points,  were  stubbornly 
defended,  but  the  yeomen  stormed  the  first 
trenches  with  great  dash  and  by  one  o'clock 
had  possession  of  the  second  line  also.  Most 
of  the  British  casualties,  slight  in  comparison 
with  those  of  the  enemy,  were  sustained  by 
the  yeomanry  in  the  early  hours  of  the  day. 
During  the  afternoon  the  same  troops  captured 
several  detached  works  along  the  line  of  the 
railway  and  reached  the  Wadi  es  Sheria. 
While  they  were  thus  "  making  good "  the 
London  and  Irish  regiments  brought  forward 
their  guns  to  wire-cutting  range  and  bombarded 


^Palestine  official  pholcgrmph. 

SPRING    AT    SOLOMONS    POOL. 
The  photograph  shows  a  canvas  trough  for  watering  animals. 


158 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the   south-eastern   face   of   Kauwukah.        Mr. 

Massey,  who  witnessed  the  battle,  wrote  : — 

From  a  high  hill  I  saw  Kauwukah  being  torn  by  a 
tornado  of  high -explosive  shells.  The  lower  slopes  showed 
traces  of  early  grass,  and  this  slight  grateful  colouring 
was  unharmed  by  the  gunfire,  but  the  higher  yellow 
slopes,  which  hid  the  Turks  in  the  trench -scarred  surface, 
were  bruised  and  battered  every  few  seconds.  Behind 
our  line  miles  deep  were  columns  of  transport  and 
ammunition,  raising  dust  in  clouds  of  great  height. 
The  swift  eddies  of  the  wind  lifted  woolly  puffs  of  sand 
and  sent  them  whirling  across  ridge  and  flat,  resembling 
waterspouts  in  tropical  seas,  an  illusion  which  th» 
mirage  accentuated. 

Soon  after  midday  the  Londoners  and  Irish 
went  forward  to  the  assault,  which  was  com- 
pletely successful.  They  followed  this  up  by 
the  capture  of  the  Rushdi  system,  between 
Sheria  and  Hareira,  and  by  5  o'clock  had 
occupied  Sheria  railway  station.  Troops  sent 
farther  to  the  left  reached  as  far  as  Hareira 
redoubt,  where  the  Turks,  though  isolated, 
still  held  out.  Australian  and  New  Zealand 
mounted  troops  held  in  reserve  at  Beersheba 
had  meantime  been  sent  west  of  the  railway  to 
pursue  the  large  masses  of  the  enemy  retreating 
towards  Huj. 

Away  in  the  hills  north-west  of  Beersheba  the 
53rd  Division  had  captured  Tel  el  Khuweilfeh, 
but  the  sweeping  movement  behind  Sheria 
which  was  to  have  followed  could  not  be  carried 
out.  A  vivid  impression  of  what  "  capturing 
Khuweilfeh  "  meant  was  conveyed  in  a  letter 


written  by  Father  Kavanagh,  and  published  in 
The  Tablet.  The  padre,  who  was  a  few  weeks 
later  mortally  wounded,  was  invited  by  the 
colonel  "  to  see  the  scrap,  it's  tho  chance  of  a 
lifetime."  The  troops  then  held  a  hill  opposite 
Khuweilfeh. 

I  pushed  to  the  top  of  our  hill  (wrote  Father  Kavanagh) 
and  lay  down  in  the  firing  line  ;  then  we  crawled  on  our 
bellies  to  the  sky-line,  over  which  bullets  were  spat- 
tering at  long  range.  *'  Now,  lads,"  said  the  officer  in 
command,  "prepare  for  a  move."  And  a  moment 
after  we  all  pelted  over  the  top  together,  then  down  and 
down  a  steep  and  stony  descent,  and  ten  minutes  later 
found  ourselves  lying  panting  and  bewildered  in  a  gully 
at  the  foot.  The  sergeant-major  stood  up  and  shouted, 
"  I  want  six  men  to  go  forward  ;  then  another  six."  I 
ran  with  the  third  lot,  and  we  rushed  down  that  gully, 
then  up  another,  and  began  to  climb  a  most  precipitous 
hill,  banded  every  few  yards  with  courses  of  alluvial 
rock,  and  just  behind  which  the  enemy  were  waiting. 
Presently  an  aeroplane  swooped  down  on  us,  discharging 
a  machine-gun,  which  knocked  out  several  of  our 
fellows.  I  got  to  the  top  and  lay  down  amongst  them 
behind  the  sky-line,  over  which  bullets  were  pouring. 
Just  before  we  got  there  the  colonel  was  wounded, 
through  the  chest. 

The  Turks,  who  were  in  much  superior 
strength,  counter-attacked  and  drove  the 
infantry  from  one  hill,  but  the  Welshmen, 
determined  to  avenge  the  heavy  losses  they  had 
suffered  in  the  second  battle  of  Gaza,  reattacked 
and  again  carried  the  hill.  They  next  seized 
another  height,  which  improved  their  position 
a  good  deal.  This  was  the  beginning  of  a  con- 
test which  lasted  all  day. 

The  infantry,  said  a  War  Office  report,  in  conjunction 


BRITISH    TRENCHES    AND    SAND-BAG    DEFENCES    BEFORE    GAZA. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


159 


AMMUNITION    CAMELS    SHELTERING    IN    A    WADI    NEAR    GAZA. 


with  mounted  troops  were  heavily  engaged  in  beating 
oft  repeated  counter-attacks  made  by  at  least  two  hostile 
divisions*  with  tho  object  of  cutting  us  off  from  our 
water  supply  at  Beersheba,  and  thereby  stopping  our 
turning  movement.  Our  troops,  which  included  Welsh 
and  English  county  regiments,  behaved  splendidly,  and 
the  Turkish  casualties  were  enormous. 

In  this  manner  General  Chetwode's  right  wing 
frustrated  the  strongest  effort  made  by  the 
Turks  on  November  6  and  enabled  the  main 
attack  to  develop  without  interference.  Its 
work  on  November  2-6  "  paved  the  way,"  as 
General  Allenby  said,  "  for  the  success  of  the 
attack  on  Sheria."  The  troops  concerned  had 
"  drawn  in  and  exhausted  "  the  Turkish  re- 
serves. As  an  example  of  the  severity  of  the 
enemy  losses,  and  of  the  valour  with  which 
they  fought,  General  Chotwode  reported  that 
in  front  of  one  position  alone  tho  Welshmen 
buried  500  Turks. 

.The  Hareira  redoubt  was  taken  very  early  on 
November  7,  and  Sheria  itself  was  captured  by 
London  Territorials  by  a  bayonet  charge  at 
4  a.m.  The  Turks  there  had  four  field  guns  in 
action.  A  battalion  commander  at  the  head 
of  a  party  of  volunteers  charged  the  foe, 
bayoneted  the  gunners  and  captured  all  the 
guns.  A  bridgehead  was  then  formed  over  the 
Wadi  Sheria.  The  Turks  made  several  unsuc- 
cessful counter-attacks  on  the  Londoners,  who 
in  the  evening  pushed  forward,  their  lino  to  high 
ground  a  mile  north  of  the  town.     During  the 

« Those  were  known  as  the  Lightning  and  Tempest 
Divisions. 


day  the  mounted  troops,  who  now  included 
Yeomanry,  in  moving  on  Huj  and  Jemmameh 
also  met  with  strong  opposition  from  rear- 
guards. The  cause  of  this  stubborn  resistance 
was  the  decision  taken  by  Kress  von  Kressen- 
stein  on  the  news  of  the  fall  of  the  Sheria  works. 
The  centre  of  his  line  was  gone,  irretrievably  as 
he  knew,  and  Gaza  was  in  danger.  He  there- 
fore resolved  to  draw  back  his  whole  army.  The 
movements  of  the  main  force  had  to  be  masked 
as  far  as  possible  by  rearguards. 

Gaza  was  evacuated  on  the  night  of  Novem- 
ber 6,  and  so  skilfully  that  "  though  a  certain 
amount  of  movement  on  the  roads  north  of  Gaza 
was  observed  by  our  airmen  and  fired  on  by  our 
heavy  artillery  [there  was]  nothing  indicating  a 
general  retirement."  By  this  prompt  retreat 
von  Kress  avoided  a  battle,  for  another  attack 
on  Gaza  was  the  natural  sequel  to  the  Sheria 
battle,  and  an  attack  had  been  ordered  for  the 
night  of  November  6-7.  The  attack  was  to  be 
from  Outpost  and  Middlesex  lulls  on  the  south 
and  east  to  the  sea  on  the  west.  Small  garrisons 
had  been  left  at  Outpost  and  Middlesex  hills  by 
the  Turks.  They  offered  but  slight  opposition 
to  the  attacking  force,  West  Country  regiments 
and  Indians,  while  by  the  coast  East  Anglian 
troops  on  the  morning  of  November  7  found 
none  to  bar  their  way.  Patrols  pushed  forward 
reported  the  enemy  gone.  AH  Muntar  and  the 
other  defences  were  occupied,  and  the  old  capital 
of  the  Philistines,  before  which  the  British  had 
been  held  up  for  nine  montlis,  was  now  won. 


160 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


The  troops  as  they  marched  over  the  battle- 
fields of  March  and  April  found  many  evi- 
dences of  those  combats — wreckage  of  all  kinds, 
and  many  unburied  bodies.  In  some  instances, 
however,  decent  burial  had  been  given  by  the 
Turks  to  fallen  foes.  The  fate  of  many  men 
who  had  been  posted  as  "  wounded  and  miss- 
ing "  was  now  made  clear;  among  those  who 
it  was  ascertained  had  been  killed  in  the  second 
battle  of  Gaza  was  Lieutenant  C.  J.  Law, 
K.O.S.B.,  the  second  son  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  the 
Chancellor  of  tho  Exchequer. 

Gaza  had  fallen,  but  from  Beit  Hanun,  five 
miles  north,  and  from  the  Atawina  works  to  tho 
east,  Turkish  artillery  fired  sullenly  on  the  lost 
city,  making  a  special  mark  of  Ali  Muntar, 
against  which  12  hours  earlier  the  British  guns 
had  been  firing  heavily.  That  the  Turks  would 
try  to  hold  Atawina  long  enough  to  give  time 
for  their  army  to  retreat  was  clear,  and  an  effort 
was  made  to  cut  off  the  rearguards  holding  it 
and  neighbouring  trenches  known  as  the  Tank* 
system.  The  effort  failed,  for  once  again  the 
enemy  slipped  away- — during  the  night  of 
November  7.  Many  scattered  parties  of  Turks 
and  much  booty  were,  however,  captured,  and 
by  the  morning  of  November  8  the  whole  of  the 
original  Turkish  front  was  in  possession  of  the 
British. 

Unlike  Beersheba,  Gaza  was  an  objective 
worth  gaining  in  itself,  or  rather  as  the  key  of 
Syria,  giving  an  open  way  into  the  Plain  of 
Philistia. 

Of  the  five  chief  cities  of  the  Philistines  (wrote  a 
correspondent)  Gaza  alone,  through  all  the  ages,  had 
retained  its  importance.  This  had  been  recognized  by 
the  Germans,  who  had  established  schools  there,  schools 
which  they  regarded  as  the  most  distant  outpost  of 
Teutonic  Kullur.  These  schools  had  been  closed,  and  life 
in  the  town  was  not  pleasant.  The  townsfolk,  mainly 
Arabs,  were  in  no  favour  with  the  Turks.  Early  in 
March  the  mufti,  a  member  of  the  venerated  Husseini 
family,  had  been  arrested,  taken  to  Jerusalem,  and 
hanged  outside  the  Jaffa  gate  for  alleged  treason.  '  Later 
most  of  the  civilians  were  deported.  Houses  were  ruth- 
lessly plundered  for  the  furnishing  of  dug-outs  and  the 
lining  of  trenches.  Our  troops  found  sandbags  made  of 
rich  silks.  And  on  evacuating  Gaza  the  Turks  did  what 
further  damage  they  could — in  particular  choking  all 
the  wells.  When  the  British  entered  the  town  through 
the  orchards,  palm  trees  and  cactus,  which  formed  a 
deep  fringe  of  green  around  it,  there  was  disappointment 
that  such  a  famous  place  presented  so  poor  an  appear- 
ance. But  there  was  evidence  of  former  greatness  in 
the  marble  used  to  beautify  modern  buildings — columns 
and  slabs  taken  from  ancient  temples  and  churches. 
Relics,  too,  of  the  Crusades  were  found.  The  west  end 
of  the  town,  an  intricate  maze  of  narrow,  dirty  streets, 
was  promptly  dubbed  Belgravia  by  the  soldiers,  all  of 


•  Prom  one  of  the  British  tanks  burnt  out  in  the 
April  battle.  Its  wreck  stood  on  a  sand  dune  right  on 
the  skyline. 


whom  seemed  to  ma*ke  a  point  of  climbing  Ali  Muntar 
("the  watch  tower"),  to  which,  according  to  tradition, 
Samson  carried  the  gates  of  the  city. 

Major  (temporary  Lieut.-Colonel)  W.  D. 
Kenny,  Royal  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  was  ap- 
pointed military  governor  of  Gaza,  and  the 
clearing  of  the  wells  and  the  sanitation  of  the 
town  was  taken  in  hand.  The  extension  of  the 
main  railway  from  Egypt,  which  then  ended 
at  Deir  el  Belah,  some  10  miles  south  of  Gaza, 
was  also  begun  at  once — one  of  the  most  urgent 
problems  confronting  the  Expeditionary  Force, 
as  the  area  of  operations  extended  north, 
was  that  of  transport.  The  weather  had 
broken  in  the  Judean  Hills  and  the  roads  were 
already  much  worn  by  the  Turks  in  their 
retreat. 

Whatever  the  difficulties,  immediate  ad- 
vantage was  taken  of  the  enemy  retreat. 
Hardly  had  Gaza  been  entered  than  Indian 
cavalry  pressed  towards  Beit  Hanun,  which 
place,  as  the  terminus  of  the  Gaza  railway, 
had  been  the  headquarters  of  von  Kress. 
The  Turks  held  Beit  Hanun  all  day  on  Novem- 
ber 7,  but  at  nightfall  their  rearguard  withdrew. 
Already  the  enemy  line  of  retreat  was  threatened, 
for  Scottish  troops  were  north  of  Beit  Hanun. 
General  Bulfin,  to  whose  "  determination  in 
attack,  and  dash  and  drive  in  pursuit "  was  due, 
said  General  Allenby,  "  the  swift  advance  to 
Jerusalem,"  had  sent  these  Scots,  Highlanders 
and  Glasgow  men,  north  as  soon  as  Gaza  was 
in  his  hands.  After  an  exhausting  march 
through  the  sand  dunes  lining  the  coast  they 
crossed  the  Wadi  Hesi  by  5  p.m. — towards 
dusk.  A  bayonet  charge  by  the  Glasgows 
secured  some  high  ground  north  of  the  wadi  ; 
the  enemy  made  several  attempts  to  retake 
the  position  but  could  not  dislodge  the  Scots. 
The  enemy  rearguards  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  Turkish  Army  were  thus  doing  their 
best  to  delay  the  British  advance,  and  more 
to  the  centre  the  defenders  of  the  Atawina  and 
Tank  positions  were  able,  as  already  stated, 
to  get  away  during  the  night  of  November  7. 

But  the  rout  of  the  enemy  was  soon  com- 
plete. November  8  was  a  great  day  for  the 
British.  Both  from  the  Gaza  and  Sheria  sectors 
they  struck  hard  at  the  Turks.  A  smart  action 
was  fought  near  Beit  Hanun,  where  Indian 
Imperial  Service  Cavalry  captured  many 
prisoners  and  a  heavy  howitzer,  and  the 
Scottish  infantry  at  the  Wadi  Hesi  greatly 
distinguished  themselves.  Field  and  heavy 
artillery  had  been  drawn  through  the  ankle- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


161 


deep  sand  from  Gaza,  and  a  ridge  overlooking 
Deir  Sineid  was  seized.  Deir  Sineid  was  the 
starting  point  of  the  short  branch  line  to  Huj, 
along  it  the  Turks  were  bringing  back  guns  and 
stores,  and  they  made  great  efforts  to  stave  off 
its  capture.  Four  times  the  Turks  drove  the 
Scots  off  the  ridge,  and  four  times  the  Scots 
retook  it.  A  fifth  attack  by  the  Turks  failed 
and  the  Scots  were  left  in  possession  of  a 
position  which  commanded  the  railway. 

On  the  Sheria  sector  November  8  was  marked 
by    equal,    if    not    greater,    success.      On   this 


whelming  odds  at  Katia  and  were  not  loath  to 
have  the  chance  of  getting  their  revenge  on 
the  Turk.  The  charge,  made  by  the  advance 
party,  ten  troops  of  Worcesters  and  War- 
wicks,  was,  said  General  Allenby,  "  at  once 
carried  out  in  face  of  heavy  gun  and  machine- 
gun  and  rifle  fire  with  a  gallantry  and  dash 
worthy  of  the  best  traditions  of  British  cavalry." 
At  the  first  sign  of  the  approach  of  horsemen 
the  enemy  gunners,  who  were  covering  the 
retreat  of  their  infantry,  turned  their  fire  on 
the  yeomanry.     These  gunners  wore  Austrians 


CAPTURE    OF    A    TURKISH    HOWITZER    BY    YEOMANRY. 


sector  the  chief  honours  fell  to  London  Terri- 
torials and  a  yeomanry  brigade.  The  Lon- 
doners, whose  marching  wai  wonderful,  thrice 
drove  back  the  enemy,  and  prisoners,  guns, 
ammunition  and  stores  fell  into  their  hands. 
Meanwhile  the  yeomanry  on  their  right  had 
come  up  and  the  last  position  held  by  the 
Turk  rearguards  covering  Huj  wa.?  reached. 
The  Turks,  who  had  not  had  time  to  remove 
half  their  stores  from  Huj,  were  blowing  up  or 
setting  on  fire  what  they  had  to  leave  behind. 
The  officer  commanding  the  Londoners,  recon- 
noitring the  position,  saw  a  considerable  body 
of  the  enemy  on  the  march  about  2,500  yards 
away.  He  ordered  the  yeomanry  to  chargo 
the  retiring  enemy.  The  yeomanry,  consist- 
ing of  Worcesters,  Warwicks  and  Gloucesters, 
wished  for  nothing  better.  They  remembered 
their  gallant,  but  hopeless,  stand  against  over- 


and  they  stuck  to  their  guns  to  the  last.  The 
yeomen,  in  open  ranks,  swept  forward,  raced 
down  a  slope,  crossed  a  flat,  took  the  final 
rise  at  a  great  pace  and  then  made  straight 
for  the  guns.  There  were  twelve  pieces,  three 
5-9  howitzers  and  nine  field  guns.  The  crew*, 
fired  as  fast  as  they  could  load,  and,  as  the  foe 
drew  near,  set  their  fuzes  at  zero  so  that  the 
shells  should  burst  at  the  mouth  of  the  gun. 
But  nothing  stopped  the  yeomen  and  every 
one  of  the  Austrians  was  sabred  at  his  gun. 
Then  riding  on  again  the  Warwicks  and 
Worcesters  captured  three  macliine  guns  which 
had  been  firing  upon  them.  These  machine 
guns  wereat  once  turned  on  the  retreating  Turkish 
infantry,  who  were  now  too  far  off  for  pursuit. 
In  this  charge  the  yeomanry  casualties  were 
about  40,  including  two  squadron  leaders. 
Lieut. -Colonel    Wiggin,    D.S.O.,    who    led    the 


162 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


charge,     was    wounded.     Two    squadrons     of 

Gloucesters,    which    galloped    up    in    support, 

arrived  just  as  the  engagement  ended. 

The  battlefield,  wrote  one  of  the  officers,  was  exactly 
like  what  one  has  always  pictured  it  would  look  like — 
men  and  horses  lying  all  around  ;  one  horse  was  lying 
across  the  trail  of  a  gun.  I  shall  always  regret  my  bad 
luck  not  being  in  it ;  it  was  a  most  splendid  and  gallant 
show.  Their  casualties  are  heavy.  I  put  the  squadron 
on  to  pick  up  wounded,  and  dug  two  big  graves  with 
my  men  and  Turk  prisoners,  a  horrible  job. 

Huj  and  Jemmameh  were  captured  and  the 

mounted  troops  established  contact  with  the 

forces    advancing    from    Gaza.     The   evidence 


had  not  been  serious,  but  to  guard  against 
surprises  the  Imperial  Camel  Corps  was  sent 
to  a  position  (Tel  el  Nejile)  where  it  would  be 
on  the  flank  of  any  further  counter-stroke 
from  the  hills.  The  British  business  was  for 
the  time  with  the  plain, 

November  9,  10  and  11  were  days  of  very 
great  activity,  much  hardship,  many  minor 
enterprises,  but  no  big  actions.  The  enemy, 
meantime,  had  come  to  a  halt,  and  had  strung 
out  his  forces,  or,  as  General  Allenby  said, 
"  all  the  remainder  of  the  Turkish  Army  which 


GAZA. 


showed  that  the  Turkish  Army  had  been 
thrown  into  considerable  disorganization,  and 
orders  were  therefore  issued  to  the  cavalry 
on  November  9  directing  them  "  to  press  the 
enemy  relentlessly."  The  objective  given  was 
the  point  where  the  railway  from  Beersheba 
going  north  to  Damascus  crossed  the  railway 
to  Jerusalem.  With  this  junction  seized  the 
Turks'  Jerusalem  Army  would  be  cut  off  from 
that  under  von  Kress.  The  one  direction 
whence  there  might  be  a  threat  to  the  British 
was  from  the  hill  country  north  of  Beersheba, 
where  the  53rd  Division  still  held  Khuweilfeh. 
On  November  8  the  enemy  force  there — 4,000 
to  5,000  strong — had  withdrawn  towards 
Hebron,  but  it  returned  on  the  9th,  and  on  the 
10th  made  a  demonstration,  not  against 
Beersheba,  but  towards  Arak  el  Menshiye,  a 
place  north-east  of  Huj.  The  demonstration 
proved  futile  and  the  Hebron  Turks  again 
retired.     This  threat  to  the  British  right  flank 


could  be  induced  to  fight  " — estimated  at  not 
more  than  20,000  rifles — in  an  effort  to  stop 
the  British  before  they  could  reach  the  junction 
station  of  the  Beersheba-Jerusalem  railways, 
to  which  came  his  main  supplies  from  the  north. 
The  new  Turkish  front  extended,  some  20  miles, 
in  a  semi-circle  from  the  village  of  El  Kubeibeh 
— south-west  of  Ramleh — on  the  north,  by  El 
Mughar,  some  five  miles  west  of  the  railway 
junction,  and  then  south-east  to  about  Beit 
Jebrin.  From  Beit  Jebrin  the  line  was  loosely 
continued  to  Hebron.  This  line,  as  far  as  Beit 
.Jebrin,  General  Allenby  arranged  to  attack  on 
November  13. 

In  bringing  the  British  forces  up  to  the 
new  Turkish  line  the  problem  had  become  one 
of  supply  rather  than  manoeuvre,  the  provision 
of  water  and  forage  being  particularly  difficult. 
Some  of  the  horses  were  without  water  for 
84  hours  ;  the  troops  also  suffered  much  from 
thirst,  but  they  were  men  "  whom  no  danger 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


163 


RUINS    OF    ASCALON. 


or  hardship  could  daunt,"  and  they  pressed 
toward  the  mark,  overrunning  in  their  course 
the  Land  of  the  Philistines. 

The  advance  was  made  by  the  52nd  Division, 
Indian,  and  other  troops  along  the  coast, 
cavalry  screens  going  ahead  ;  by  the  Londoners 
and  Yeomanry  more  to  the  centre,  and  by 
Australian  and  other  mounted  troops  on  the 
right.  The  Welshmen  (53rd  Division)  remained 
at  Khuweilfeh  on  guard  along  the  Hebron 
road.  The  Scottish  troops,  who,  always  ahead 
of  the  railway,  had  marched  the  whole  weary 
way  across  the  desert  from  the  Suez  Canal, 
performed  marvels.  In  four  days  and  nights 
they  made  three  bayonet  charges  and  advanced 
25  miles.  The  day  after  their  capture  of  the 
railway  by  Deir  Sineid  (on  November  8)  in  their 
march  north  they  passed  parallel  to  Ascalon, 
which  once  famous  city  of  the  Philistines  and 
later  the  chief  port  of  Palestine  is  now  desolate 
— though  its  magnificent  ruins  testify  to  its 
former  greatness.  But  it  is  inhabited  and  was 
held  by  a  small  body  of  Turks.  As  the  Scots 
could  not  tarry,  eight  or  nine  mounted  men, 
an  officer  and  some  grooms,  dashed  off.  made 
a  brave  show,  and  received  the  submission  of 
the  enemy.  Later  in  the  day  infantry  and 
guns  moved  into  Ascalon,  examining  with 
interest  the  ruin  wrought  by  Saladin  and 
Bibars  and  remembering,  perhaps,  that  here 
Richard  the  Lion  Hearted  made  his  last 
conquest.  Meantime  a  small  party  of  horsemen 
had  galloped  on  to  Mejdel,  on  the  railway  some 
miles  inland,  secured  it  and  prevented  the 
Turks  there  from  blowing  up  a  big  ammunition 
dump.     The    Scots  .came    up    to    the    Wadi 


Sukerier  on  November  10,  near  Beit  Duras,  and 
found  Australian  Light  Horse  ahead.  The 
Sukerier,  one  of  the  rivers  transverse  to  the 
British  line  of  advance,  has  steep  banks,  and 
the  Turks  were  showing  some  disposition  to 
make  a  stand  by  it.  A  charge  by  Glasgow  men 
cleared  the  high  ground  north  of  Beit  Duras 
and  the  Turks  gave  way.  The  mounted  troops 
then  pushed  on  to  Ashdod  (Esdud),  where  in 
the  time  of  the  Judges  the  Ark  of  the  Covenant 
had  been  brought  into  the  temple  of  Dagon. 
The  crossing  of  the  Sukerier  at  Jisr  Esdud  was 
forced  on  the  11th,  and  by  the  morning  of 
November  12  the  52nd  Division  and  the  other 
troops  of  the  British  left  wing  were  in  touch 
with  the  new  line  which  the  enemy  was  hastily 
strengthening. 

The  Londoners  by  November  12  had  also 
come  within  striking  distance  of  the  enemy. 
Some  infantry,  moving  in  support,  covered 
29  miles  in  one  day  on  one  bottle  of  water. 
On  the  edge  of  the  mountains  of  Judea,  on 
the  right  of  the  infantry,  Yeomanry  pushed 
forward  to  Gath — they  seem  to  have  made  no 
difficulty  in  identifying  the  city  of  Goliath 
with  the  ruins  at  Tel  es  Safi — where  the 
Gloucesters  were  unexpectedly  attacked  by 
2,000  to  3,000  Turks  who  had  been  brought  by 
rail  from  the  Bamleh  junction  station  to  hold 
up  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible.  With  odds 
of  10  to  1  against  them  tha  Gloucesters 
held  out  until  the  infantry  were  able  to  take 
over  the  line.  The  advance  was  delayed  but 
a  few  hours.  A  little  farther  east  the  Australian 
Light  Horse  did  very  good  work  and  took  up 
a  wide  front.     Their  advanced  troops  were  also 


161 


THE    TIMES    H1ST0BY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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THE    APPROACHES    TO    JERUSALEM. 


counter  attacked  on  November  12,  and  driven 
back  a  short  distance,  but  the  enemy  did  not 
press  farther  forward. 

For  five  days  the  British,  in  an  area  covering 
600  square  miles,  had  been  pursuing  the  Turks. 
From  Beersheba  and  from  Gaza  the  enemy 
had  removed  nearly  all  the  civilians,  but  in 
their  flight  they  left  behind  many  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  other  towns  and  villages  :  as 
many  able-bodied  men  as  they  could  they 
pressed  into  their  service.  The  natives  every- 
where welcomed  the  British  troops,  and  that 
the  great  majority  were  glad  to  be  rid  of 
Ottoman  rule  there  was  no  doubt. 

It  is  an  extraordinary  sight  (wrote  an  officer)  following 
up  a  defeated  arniy.  The  amount  of  stuff  the  Turks 
left  behind  was  marvellous — many  thousands  of  rounds 
of  ammunition,  guns,  carts,  railway  material,  every- 
thing. Near  Gath  alone  we  got  £3,000  worth  of  engi- 
neers' stores,  besides  any  quantity  of  gun  ammunition. 
The  men  love  collecting  the  loot  and  wearing  Turkish 
clothes,  etc.  Dead  bullocks  and  horses  were  every- 
where. It  was  only  lack  of  water  for  our  tired  horses 
that  stopped  us.  Many  died,  many  had  to  be  evacuated 
to  mobile  veterinary  stations.  .  .  .  Our  horses  are 
nearly  done,  men  hungry  and  tirod,  but  cheerful  as 
usual  ;  half  rations  yesterday,  none  to-day.  .  .  . 
Open  rolling  country,  rather  hot,  flies  bad  round  the 
villages.  The  Turks  bum  as  much  of  their  stuff  as  they 
can. 

Such  were  some  of  the  incidents  of  the 
pursuit.     In  the  new  battle  for  possession  of 


the  vital  railway  junction,  the  chief  attack  was 

to  be  in  the  plain  south-west  of  Ramleh.     At 

dawn  on  the  12th  cavalry  pushed  considerably 

north  of  the  Sukereir  ;   Burkah  was  also  seized 

and  the  right  flank  of  the  Turks  was  almost 

turned.    The  enemy's  effort  to  guard  this  flank 

led  to  stiff  fighting.     On  the  British  side  the 

troops  engaged  included  the  Lowlanders  (the 

52nd  Division),  West  of  England  Regiments, 

Indians  (horse  and  foot)  and  a  brigade  of  Berks, 

Bucks  and  Dorset  Yeomanry. 

Two  Edinburgh  and  two  Rifle  Battalions  (wrote  Mr. 
Massey)  attacked  Burkah,  an  extremely  difficult  position 
prepared  beforehand,  consisting  of  two  lines  of  perfectly 
sited  trenches.  The  first  had  to  be  attacked  up  a  glacis, 
then  1,000  yards  of  absolutely  flat  ground  to  another 
glacis.  The  Riflemen  made  a  stirring  advance,  swept 
tho  Turks  out  of  the  first  line,  and  then,  supported  by 
most  accurate  artillery  fire,  carried  the  second.  The 
.'Edinburgh  troops  were  counter-attacked  on  "  Brown 
Hill."  They  were  driven  off,  but  came  -back,  supported 
by  Gurkhas,  and  retook  the  hill.  The  Turks  left  a 
large  number  of  dead. 

The  attempt  to  prevent  the  British  taking 
up  advantageous  ground  thus  ended  in  failure 
and  on  November  13  the  general  attack  on 
the  Turkish  position  was  made.  The  British 
were  now  some  35  miles  north  of  their  railhead, 
and  the  Gaza  railway,  though  now  in  their 
hands,  was  of  little  immediate  use  ;  it  was  of  a 
narrow  gauge,  and  had .  been  badly  damaged 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


165 


by  the  fire  of  the  British  warships  during  the 
previous  weeks.*  Yet  supplies  and  ammuni- 
tion and  guns,  including  two  heavy  batteries, 
were  brought  up  in  time. 

The  country  over  which  the  attack  took  place  (wrote 
General  Allenby)  is  open  and  rolling,  dotted  with  small 
villages  surrounded  by  mud  walls,  with  plantations 
of  trees  outside  the  walls.  The  most  prominent 
feature  is  the  line  of  heights  on  which  are  the  villages 
of  Katrah  [199  feet]  and  El  Mughar  [236  feet],  standing 
out  above  the  low  flat  ground  which  separates  them 
from  the  rising  ground  to  the  west,  on  which  stands  the 
village  of  Beshshit,  about  2,000  yards  distant.  This 
Katrah-El  Mughar  line  forms  a  very  strong  position, 
and  it  was  here  that  the  enemy  made  his  most  deter- 
mined resistance  against  the  turning  movement  directed 


side  of  El  Mughar.  With  the  Lowlanders  in 
front  and  the  Yeomen  on  their  right  flank  the 
Turks  surrendered.  Both  El  Mughar  and 
Katrah  were  won.  "  A  most  dashing  charge," 
was  General  Allenby's  verdict  on  the  Yeomen's 
exploit,  and  the  whole  operation  was,  he  said, 
"  a  fine  feat  of  arms."  The  Turks  had  fought 
hard  ;  they  left  400  dead  at  Katrah  alone,  while 
between  them  the  Lowlanders  and  Yeomanry 
took  1,100  prisoners,  3  field  and  16  machine 
guns. 

Farther  south  there  had  been  a  fierce  struggle 
near  the  village  of  Yasur. 


CAMEL    TEAM    DRAWING    A    CABLE-LAYING    CHARIOT. 


against  his  right  flank  [which   rested  on   the  Mediter- 
ranean]. 

El  Mughar  and  Katrah  were  attacked  by  the 

52nd  Division  and  Yeomanry.   The  Lowlanders 

got  on  to  the  ridge  upon  which,  divided  by  the 

Wadi    Surar,    the    villages    lie.      The    Turks, 

entrenched  behind  thick  hedges  of  cactus  and 

among  clumps  of  cypress  trees,  were  dislodged, 

but  twice  regained  the  ridge.     A  third  attack 

was  made  and  the  Scots  got  close  to  the  enemy 

trenches.     When  the  fight  was  at  its  hottest 

West  of  England  infantry  made  an  opportune 

thrust  at  the  Turks'  left,  and  a  charge  by  the 

Berks,   Bucks  and  Dorset   Yeomanry  Brigade 

settled  the  issue.   For  two  miles,  the  whole  time 

under  heavy  fire,  they  galloped  across  the  open 

plain,  then  breasted  a  ridge,  dismounted  and 

attacked  the  enemy  trenches  on  the  northern 

*  Nevertheless  some  help  was  derived  from  this  line. 
"  We  caught  three  of  the  Turkish  railway  engines," 
said  a  niomher  of  the  force,  "  and  it  was  rather  amusing 
getting  them  going  and  turning  them  to  our  own  use." 


The  Turks  here  had  dug  trenches  and  gun  pits  on 
a  small  eminence.  Territorials,  part  of  a  Scottish 
battalion  (which  had  gained  distinction  in  tho  fight  of 
November  2  at  Gaza),  rushed  the  mound  in  the  face  of 
murderous  machine-gun  fire.  Tho  Turks  in  a  strong 
counter-charge  drove  back  their  opponents.  The  Scots 
reformed,  and  again  attacked.  With  bayonet  and 
clubbed  rifle  they  won  the  position.  Sixty  of  the  enemy 
lay  dead  on  the  ground,  several  with  their  skulls 
smashed. 

On  the  right — eastern — flank  of  the  British 
the  fighting  had  not  been  so  severe,  and  after 
the  loss  of  El  Mughar  the  enemy  resistance 
weakened  on  the  whole  line.  By  the  evening  the 
Turks  were  in  general  retreat,  part  of  the  beaten 
force  going  north  and  part  east  towards 
Jerusalem.  The  British  line  extended  from 
Et  Tineh  on  the  east  by  Katrah  and  Mughar  to 
Yebnah  and  the  sea.  Yebnah,  the  Jabneel  of  ' 
Joshua,  had  been  taken  by  the  Yeomanry 
before  their  attack  on  Mughar.  Et  Tineh  had 
been  captured  by  Australians.  Situated  at  the 
junction  of  the  Gaza  and  Beersheba  railways. 


166 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


and  only  a  few  miles  south  of  the  junction  of 
the  Beersheba  and  Jerusalem  railways,  it 
contained  large  depots  of  ammunition  and  other 
stores.  These  at  the  last  moment  the  Turks 
themselves  began  to  rifle.  The  looters  were 
disturbed  by  an  armoured  motor  car  which 
dashed  up  with  its  machine  guns  busy  ;  over 
200  Turks  were  killed  or  wounded  and  many 
prisoners  made. 


[Russell. 

CAPTAIN    NEIL    PRIMROSE,   M.C.,  M.P., 

He  had  held  the  appointments  of  Under-Secretary 

to  Foreign  Office  (1915),  Military  Secretary  to  the 

Ministry    of    Munitions   (1916),    and    Chief   Whip 

(1916-17). 

The  Turkish  army  was  being  split  up,  but 
one  more  effort  was  made  by  von  Kress  to  keep 
control  of  the  railway  connecting  Jerusalem ' 
with  the  north.  Infantry  ■  sent  forward  to 
"  Junction  Station,"  as  the  British  called  it,  met 
with  some  opposition  and  were  held  up  for  the 
night.  Early  on  November  14,  however,  it  was 
found  that  the  Turks  had  vanished.  The  station 
was  occupied*  and  a  solid  wedge  of  troops 
thrown  in  cut  in  two  the  enemy  army.  The 
eastern  or  Jerusalem  part  was  isolated  from  the 
portion  in  the  coast  sector.  Only  on  a  line  con- 
siderably farther  north  could  the  two  fragments 
unite,  and  to  effect  that  union  would  involve, 
so  it  seemed,  the  abandonment  of  Jerusalem. 
A  definite  stage  in  the  advance  had  been 
reached  and  General  Allenby  thus  summarized 
the,  results  attained  : — 

In  15  days  our  force  had  advanced  BO  miles  on  its 
right  and  about  40  on  its  left.  Tt  had  driven  a  Turkish 
Army  of  nine  infantry  Divisions  and  one  Cavalry 
Division  out  of  a  position  in  which  it  had  been  en- 
trenched for  six  months,  and  had  pursued  it,  giving 
battle  whenever  it  attempted  to  stand,  and  inflicting 
on  it  losses  amounting  probably  to  nearly  two-thirds  of 
the  enemy's  original  effectives.     Over  9.000  prisoners. 


about  80  guns,  more  than  100  machine  guns,  and  very 
large  quantities  of  ammunition  and  other  stores  had 
been  captured.* 

From  this  point  Allenby's  chief  concern  was 
Jerusalem.  First,  however,  it  was  necessary  to 
clear  up  the  situation  on  his  left  flank,  the  flank 
resting  upon  the  Mediterranean,  and  to  this 
end  the  occupation  of  the  country  up  to  Joppa 
(Jaffa)  was  essential.  The  Turkish  forces 
which  had  gone  north  soon  showed  that  they 
were  not  negligible.  They  had  retreated  but 
five  miles  and  enemy  guns  were  shelling  their 
lost  Junction  Station.  During  November  14, 
however,  the  mounted  troops,  followed  hard  by 
the  infantry,  prossed  towards  Ramleh  and 
Lydda.  Ekron  (Akir)  the  last  of  the  five  chief 
cities  of  the  Philistines  was  gathered  in  and  the 
Jewish  colony  at  New  Akir  found  uninjured. 
Most  progress  was  made  by  the  New  Zealanders, 
who  advanced  west  of  the  Ramleh  line  to  Ayun 
Kara,  only  six  miles  south  of  Joppa.  Upon 
them  the  Turks  made  a  strong  counter-attack. 
"  Running  very  quickly  behind  a  somewhat 
strong  gun  fire,  the  Turks  got  to  within  15  yards 
of  our  line,  attacking  with  bombs  and  rifles, 
when  the  whole  line  of  Auckland  troops,  with 
some  Wellington  Mounted  Rifles,  rushed  for- 
ward with  the  bayonet.  The  Turks  broke  and 
fled,  leaving  over  400  dead  as  a  result  of  the 
bayonet  charge  alone."     (Mr.  Massey.) 

On  the  next  day,  November  15,  there  was 
another — the  fourth — of  those  brilliant  charges 
by  mounted  troops  which  marked  the  campaign. 
Covering  the  main  road  from  Ramleh  to  Jeru- 
salem, and  flanking  the  advance  of  the  British 
to  Ramleh,  a  ridge,  756  ft.  high,  stands  up 
prominently  out  of  the  low  foot  hills.  This  is 
the  site  of  the  ancient  Gezer,  once  a  royal  city 
of  the  Canaanites  and  given  to  the  King  of 
Egypt  as  a  dowry  to  his  daughter  on  her 
marriage  to  Solomon.  Near  the  ruins,  in  the 
village  of  Abu  Shusheh,  a  Turkish  rearguard 
had  established  itself.  Infantry  attacked  the 
ridge,  from  the  west,  while  the  Berks,  Bucks 
and  Dorset  Yeomanry  moved  to  the  south. 
At  first  the  Turks  fought  stoutly,  but  seeing 
the  movement  of  the  yeomanry  endeavoured 
to  retire.  It  was  too  late.  Sweeping  over  the 
level  ground  at  a  great  pace  the  yeomen 
galloped  up  the  ridge  and  got  among  the  Turks 
with  the  sabre.     The  rout  of  the  enemy  was 


•The  Flying  Corps  in  bombing  raids  on  this  junction 
had  obtained  some  60  direct  hits. 


•  By  Decomber  9  the  guns  captured,  apart  from 
machino  guns,  had  increased  to  over  100,  and  more  than 
20,000,000  rounds  of  rifle  ammunition  and  250,000  rounds 
of  gun  ammunition, had  been  seized.  Over  20  aeroplanes 
had  been  destroyed  by  British  airmen  or  burnt  by  the 
enemy  to  avoid  capture. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


167 


complete.  Four  hundred  and  thirty-one  dead 
Turks  were  counted  on  the  ground,  and  360 
prisoners  and  one  gun  were  taken.  Thus 
twice  in  two  days  the  Berks,  Bucks  and 
Dorset  Yeomanry  had  charged  mounted  and 
on  each  occasion  had  won  their  objec- 
tives. -  They  suffered  losses,  among  the  killed 


The  capture  of  Abu  Shusheh  marked  the  end, 
for  a  few  days,  of  the  Turkish  resistance  in  the 
coast  region.,  Ramleh,  which  had  been  the 
main  enemy  headquarters,  was  occupied  on 
the  afternoon  of  November  15,  and  Lydda, 
the  reputed  birthplace  and  burial  place  of 
St.    George,    the    Patron    Saint    of    England, 


IN    PALESTINE:    BRINGING    IN    A    CAPTURED    GERMAN    AEROPLANE. 


being  Captain  Neil  Primrose,  M.C.,  M.P. 
(Royal  Bucks  Hussars.),  younger  son  of  Lord 
Rosebery.  Mr.  Primrose  was  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  of  the  younger  generation  of  politicians, 
and  thrice  during  the  war  had  held  important 
offices  in  the  Ministry.  But  preferring  his 
military  duties  he  had,  after  service  in  France , 
gone  to  Egypt  early  in  1917.  He  was  buried 
in  the  garden  of  the  Frejich  convent  at  Ramleh.* 

*  Major  E.  A.  de  Rothschild,  a  brother  officer  in  the 
Bucks  Yeomanry  and  a  cousin  of  Mr.  Neil  Primrose,  was 
mortally  wounded  and  died  on  November  17. 


before  the  night  fell.  At  Lydda  300  Turks 
surrendered  and  at  both  towns  were  large 
quantities  of  abandoned  material.  The  remains 
of  five  aeroplanes  were  discovered.  Neither 
town  had  suffered  greatly  and  the  inhabitants 
showed  much  hospitality  to  the  victors.  The 
advance  from  Lydda  to  Joppa  met  with  no 
resistance.  Australians  and  New  Zealanders  rode 
quietly  into  the  seaport  of  Jerusalem  on  the 
evening  of  November  16.  Of  the  genuineness 
of    the    welcome    given    the    British    by    the 


168 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


townsfolk  there  was  no  doubt.  Within  a 
few  days  several  of  the  Jewish  inhabitants 
who  had  been  forcibly  deported  the  pre- 
vious March  and  had  hidden  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood returned  to  the  town.  None  of 
the  buildings  of  Joppa  had  been  injured, 
but  the  magnificent  orchards  around  it  had 
been  thinned,  and  some  entirely  destroyed, 
by  the  cutting  down  of  the  famous  orange 
trees  for  fuel. 

General  Allenby  pushed  a  few  miles  north 
of  Joppa  across  the  Plain  of  Sharon  to  get  a 


Jerusalem,  it  gave  a  new  shock  to  the  Turkish 
High  Command.    , 

Until  it  happened,  the  Turkish  Headquarters 
staff,  and  their  German  advisers,  had  not 
believed  that  the  British  could  break  through 
the  Gaza-Beersheba  defences  and  the  rout  of 
their  army  created  the  utmost  alarm.  Im- 
mediately it  happened  councils  of  war  were  held 
in  Jerusalem  to  devise,  if  possible,  means  for 
its  defence.  Both  Turks  and  Germans  knew 
the  loss  of  prestige  which  would  follow  its 
abandomnent.     Enver   Pasha,  hastening   from 


JOPPA,    WITH    AN    ITALIAN    CRUISER    IN    THE    ROADSTEAD. 


defensible  front  for  his  left  flank  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Auja  river  and  was  then  free  to 
concentrate  his  efforts  against  Jerusalem,  and 
secure  his  centre  from  possible  incursions 
from  the  hills  of  Judea  and  Samaria.  For  the 
advance  on  Jersualem  it  was  necessary  to 
pause  till  railway  communications  were  more 
forward ";  meantime  at  Ascalon,  Joppa  and 
other  places  along  the  coast — when  weather 
permitted — stores  were  landed,  warships  guard- 
ing against  submarine  attacks.  To  make  secure 
the  position  in  the  centre  it  was,  however, 
necessary  to  act  at  once,  and  accordingly  on 
the  day  after  the  occupation  of  Joppa  yeomanry 
were  sent  from  Ramleh  into  the  Judean  hills 
Though  this  was  in  reality  a  defensive  measure 
and  did  not  indicate  an  immediate  attack  on 


the  Imperial  Headquarters  at  Constantinople, 
reached  Jerusalem  on  November  12  and  went 
on  to  Hebron,  but  he  departed  "  as  suddenly 
and  silently  as  he  had  come."*  The 
tyrannical  Djemal,  the  organizer  of  massacres, 
who  two  months  before  had  been  the  Kaiser's 
guest  at  Berlin,  started  from  Damascus,  by 
the  Hedjaz  railway.  The  train  in  which  he 
travelled  was  blown  up  (November  11)  by  the 
Arabs  and  Djemal  had  a  narrow  escape,  mem- 
bers of  his  staff  being  killed.  Djemal  returned 
north,  whence  he  issued  orders  for  the  forcible 
deportation,  which  meant  death,  of  300 
Armenian  families  from  Jerusalem. 

*  This  account  of  events  in  Jerusalem  during,  the 
last  days  of  Turkish  rule  is  based  in  part  on  an  article 
in  The  Times  of  February  4,  1918. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


169 


A  greater  figure  arrived.  General  von 
Falkenhayn  came  from  Aleppo  to  see  if  he 
could  reorganize  the  Turkish  Army.  He  was 
in  the  city  during  the  battle  at  El  Mughar 
and  stayed  till  November  16,  when  he  departed 
by  road  for  Shechem.  The  Turks  were  left  to 
their  own  devices — with  the  assurance,  how- 
ever, that  reinforcements  would  be  sent.  Ali 
Faud  Pasha,  the  commander  of  the  force  in  the 
Jerusalem  district,  and  Izzet  Bey,  the  governor 
of  the  city,  determined  that  they  would 
not  abandon  the  town  without  a  struggle, 
and  the  defence  they  put  up  shamed  the 
Germans.  They  (the  Germans)  had  been  the 
first  to  give  the  signal  to  evacuate  Jerusalem. 
When  the  news  reached  Jerusalem  on  Novem- 
ber 9  that  the  British  were  at  Huj  they  began 
to  leave. 

The  Germans  and  Austrian*  were  even  now  (said  the 
correspondent  of  The  Times)  preparing  to  evacuate 
the  Holy  City.  During  the  next  few  days  lame  or 
exhausted  Turks,  wounded  and  stragglers,  whom  the 
German  motor-lorry  drivers  refused  to  pick  up,  and 
Turkish  officers  shaken  into  truthfulness  by  the  extent 
of  their  defeat,  brought  news  of  the  victory.  Turkish 
officials  at  once  began  to  leave  the  city  with  their 
families.  The  German  depots  were  hurriedly  emptied 
of  unessential  supplies,  such  as  sugar,  which  were  sold 
for  a  song.  Munitions  and  essential  stores  were  then 
sent  north  to  Shechem,  or  east  to  Jericho.  From  the 
high  towers  of  the  city  and  from  the  Mount  of  Olives 
one  could  see  a  great  double  wall  of  dust  along  every 
road  each  day,  and  on  a  clear  day  one  could  see 
lorries,  carts,  and  pack  animals  streaming  up  and  down. 
Owners  of  the  few  horse  carriages  left  asked  for  and 
obtained  £10  a  seat  from  fugitives  who  were  making  for 
Shechem. 

Ali  Faud,  relieved  of  the  presence  of  Falken- 
hayn, further  purged  the  city.  The  Latin, 
Greek,  Armenian  and  Coptic  patriarchs  and 
Jewish  notables  suspected  of  Zionism  were  sent 
off  to  Shechem  (November  19).  The  inhabitants 
of  Jerusalem  were  warned  that  street  fighting 
was  to  be  expected  and  that  in  it  they  would 
have  to  aid  the  soldiery.  The  city  was  to  be 
defended  to  the  last.  Moreover,  Ali  Faud 
strung  out  a  thin  line  of  troops  through  the  hills 
to  regain  touch  with  the  dismembered  part  of 
the  army  north  of  Joppa.  By  the  railway 
through  Central  Palestine  and  by  the  Shechem 
road  reinforcements,  including  field  guns  and 
many  machine  guns,  were  poured  down  from 
the  north  by  Falkenhayn  and  Djemal,  and  the 
new  troops  were  some  of  the  finest  in  the 
Turkish  Army.  Thus  the  beaten  host  was 
reinvigorated,  and  on  November  21  the 
Yeomanry  which  had  advanced  into  the  hills  of 
Judea  received1  a  distinct  check.  Hope  of  saving 
Jerusalem  revived. 

As  already  stated  this  first  advance  into  the 


mountains  was  intended  primarily  to  protect 
the  British  forces  in  the  plain  from  precisely 
such  a  danger  as  developed — the  bringing  up  of 
enemy  reinforcements  and  a  flank  attack  from 
the  east.  At  the  same  time  the  advance  brought 
the  British  close  to  Jerusalem.     Palestine  is  a 


GENERAL    VON    FALKENHAYN, 
German    Military  Adviser   of  the    Turks. 

small  country,  and  from  Ramleh,  at  the  foot  of 
the  hills,  to  Jerusalem  is  but  24  miles  in  a  direct 
line.  To  get  to  Jerusalem  only  two  main  roads 
were  available  to  the  British — that  from  the 
south  from  Beersheba  through  Hebron  and  that 
from  the  west  from  Joppa  via  Ramleh.  Strategic 
reasons  compelled  General  Allenby  to  attack 
Jerusalem  from  the  west ;  an  advance  by 
Hebron  being  intended  in  the  later  stages  of 
the  campaign.  The  Turks  had  the  use  of  other 
roads,  one  east  to  Jericho  and  the  Hedjaz 
Railway,  a  second  going  north  to  Shechem 
(Nablus).  Since  they  had  lost  command  of  the 
Jerusalem  railway  it  was  by  the  Shechem  road 
that  they  kept  up  communication  with  Northern 
Syria.  Hence  the  first  objective  of  the  British 
advance  into  the  mountains  was  to  get  a  hold 
on  that  road. 

To  penetrate  the  mountains  was  no  easy 
task.  Some  of  the  difficulties  are  indicated  in 
the  following  passage  of  General  Allenby's 
dispatch  : — 

The  west  side  of  the  Judamn  range  consists  of  a  series 


170 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  spurs  running  east  and  west,  and  separated  from 
one  another  by  narrow  valleys.  These  spurs  are  steep, 
bare,  and  stony  for  the  most  part,  and  in  places  preci- 
pitous. Between  the  foot  of  the  spur  of  the  main  range 
and  the  coastal  plain  is  the  low  rajige  known  as  the 
Shephelah. 

On  our  intended  line  of  advance  only  one  good  road, 
the  main  Jaffa-Jerusalem  road,  traversed  the  hills  from 
east  to  west.  For  nearly  four  miles,  between  Bab  el 
Wad  [the  Gate  of  the  Pass]  and  Saris,  this  road  passes 
through  a  narrow  defile,  and  it  had  been  damaged  by 
the  Turks  in  several  places.  The  other  roads  were  mere 
tracks  on  the  side  of  the  hill  or  up  the  stony  beds  of  the 
wadis.  .  .  .  Throughout  these  hills  the  water  supply  was 
scanty  without  development. 

Up  the  side  tracks  north  of  the  main  road 
mounted  Yeomanry  began  to  move  on  Novem- 
ber 17,  the  given  objective  being  Beeroth  (in 
Arabic  El  Bireh  =  the  wells),  a  town  on  the 
Shechem  road  nine  miles  north  of  Jerusalem. 
The  advance  was  begun  so  soon  after  the  defeat' 
of  the  Turks  at  Mughar  that  the  disorganized 
enemy  bands  first  met  did  not  offer  great 
opposition.  The  hills  themselves  were  greater 
obstacles.  After  a  short  distance  it  was  found 
that  the  tracks  were  impossible  for  any  vehicle 
on  wheels,  and  a  little  later  the  horses  had  to  be 
sent  back — it  was  a  desolate  region,  fitted 
perhaps  for  goats,  but  not  for  cavalry.  "  I 
cannot  see,"  said  one  man,  "  why  the  people 
in  the  Bible  made  such  a  rattle  about  the 
country." 

By  the  evening  of  the  18th  one  party  of 
Yeomanry  had  reached  Beth  Horon  the  Lowei 
(in  Arabic,  Beit  ur  el  Tahta).  They  were 
traversing  country  which  had  been  a  battle- 
ground for  thirty  centuries  ;  it  was  at  Beth 
Horon  that  Joshua  in  the  fight  with  the  five 
kings  of  the  Amorites  uttered  the  famous 
invocation :  "  Sun,  stand  thou  still  upon 
Gibeon,  and  thou,  Moon,  in  the  valley  of 
Ajalon."  Striking  north  from  this  spot,  on  the 
20th  the  Yeomanry  were  only  four  miles  from 
the  Shechem  road  when,  near  Beitunia,  they 
met  with  strong  opposition.  Next  day,  however, 
they  succeeded  in  pushing  forward  another  two 
miles.  After  heavy  rain  the  weather  had  become 
bright  and  cold. 

On  November  19,  two  days  after  the 
Yeomanry  had  entered  the  mountains,  General 
Bulfin  sent  the  52nd  Division,  London  Terri- 
torials, West  Country  Regiments,  and  other 
infantry  from  Ramleh,  along  the  main  Joppa- 
Jerusalem  road,  Australian  mounted  troops 
moving  on  their  right  flank.  Latron  and  Amnas 
(Emmaus*)  were  taken  without  difficulty,  the 
critical   part  of   the  advance  came  when   the 


*  Nt>.    the    Emmaus  whore  Christ   "  talked  with  tho 
disciples  on  tho  way." 


troops  entered  the  narrow  defile  by  the  Bab  el 
Wad,  the  picturesque  pass  well  known  to 
travellers  by  road  to  Jerusalem.  The  steep 
sides  of  the  pass  are  crowned  by  rocky  heights 
clad  with  wild  olive  and  other  trees.  Here  the 
Turks  had  strong,  well  organized  rearguards, 
but  the  gallantry  of  the  Somerset,  Wiltshire  and 
Gurkha  regiments — to  whom  was  given  the 
honour  of  the  attack — prevailed,  and  by  the 
evening  they  had  cleared  the  defile  and  the 
British  were  at  Saris.  Having  thus  got  through 
the  most  dangerous  part  of  the  road  the  march 
was  continued  on  the  20th  to  Kuryet  el  Enab 
(only  six  miles  from  Jerusalem),  which  was 
cleared  of  the  enemy  by  a  bayonet  charge. 

From  this  point  a  modification  in  what  was 
the  obvious  line  of  advance — straight  forward — 
was  made.  It  was  the  .desire  of  the  British  to 
avoid  any  damage  to  the  sacred  sites  of  Palestine 
and  "  in  order  to  avoid  any  fighting  in  the 
close  vicinity  of  •  the  Holy  City "  the  main 
body  of  the  infantry  were  turned  north  towards 
Bireh.  Somerset  and  other  West  Country 
regiments,  climbing  a  path  so  steep  that  no 
wheeled  traffic  was  possible,  came  under  shell 
fire,  but  secured  (November  21)  a  footing  on 
the  ridge,  nearly  3,000  ft.  high,  on  which 
stands  Nebi  Samwil,  a  tomb  mosque,  supposed 
to  mark  the  burial  place  of  the  prophet  Samuel, 
and  held  in  special  veneration  by  Moslems.* 
The  mosque  itself,  a  transformed  Crusaders' 
church,  fell  to  the  British.  The  British  had 
carefully  avoided  injuring  the  mosque,  but  the 
Turks,  with  their  indifference  to  Islam,  shelled 
it  as  soon  as  it  passed  from  their  hands.  From 
Nebi  Samwil  Jerusalem,  five  miles  away  to  the 
south-east,  was  clearly  visible.  While  the 
main  force  secured  this  commanding  position 
the  troops  left  at  Kuryet  el  Enab  captured 
Kustil  ridge,  two  and  a  half  miles  farther  east. 

The  position  on  the  evening  of  November  21 
was  thus  apparently  very  favourable  to  the 
British.  Infantry  held  Nebi  Samwil  and 
Kustil  and  Yeomanry  were  but  two  miles  west 
of  the  Shechem  road  at  Bireh.  The  next  two 
days  showed,  however,  that  this,  was  the  limit 
of  their  advance  for  the  time.  On  the  22nd 
the  Yeomanry  were  heavily  attacked  by  the 
Turks  (whose  reinforcements  had  arrived)  and 
were  compelled,  after  bitter  fighting,  to  fall 
back  three  miles,  to  Beth  Horon  Upper  (Beit  ur 

*  A  War  Office  communique  described  Nebi  Samwil 
as  "  the  ancient  Mizpah,"  but  it  is  not  the  Mizpah  of 
tho  covenant  "  the  Lord  watch  between  me  and  thee." 
Mizpah  is  a  common  name  in  Palestine,  donoting  a 
watch  tower  or  observation  post. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


171 


el  Foka).  On  the  same  day  the  Turks  made  two 
strong  assaults  on  the  British  positions  on  Nebi 
Samwil.  They  were  repulsed,  and  on  Novem- 
ber 23  and  24  determined  and  gallant  attacks 
were  made  on  the  Turkish  positions  west  of  the 
Shechem  road.  But  both  attacks  failed.  The 
enemy  was  able  to  support  his  infantry  by 
artillery  fire  from  guns  mounted  on  the  hills, 
while,  said  Oenoral  Allcnby,  "  our  artillery, 
from  lack  of  roads,  could  not  be  brought  up 
to  give   adequate   support   to   our   infantry." 


and  new  roads,  along  which  heavy  and  field 
artillery  were  hauled,  built.  Ammunition  and 
supplies  were  brought  up  and  the  water  supply 
greatly  developed.  Naturally  Ali  Faud  Pasha 
did  not  let  the  British  complete  their  prepara- 
tions without  interruption.  The  whole  period 
was  one  of  severe  local  fighting  in  which  the 
Turks  were  constantly  on  the  offensive — and 
during  this  fortnight  the  citizens  of  Jerusalem, 
who  had  thought  their  deliverance  at  hand, 
gave  themselves  up  to  despair. 


CAMEL    AMBULANCES. 


In  these  circumstances   orders  were   given  to 

consolidate  the  positions  gained  and  prepare 

for  relief. 

Summing  up  the  results  of  this  first  advance 

into  the  mountains  General  Allenby  wrote  : — 

Though  these  troops  had  failed  to  reach  their  final 
objectives,  they  had  achieved  invaluable  results.  The 
narrow  passes  from  the  plain  to  the  plateau  of  the 
Judsean  range  have  seldom  been  forced,  and  have  been 
fatal  to  many  invading  armies.  Had  the  attempt  not 
been  made  at  once,  or  had  it  been  pressed  with  less  deter- 
mination, the  enemy  would  have  had  time  to  reorganize 
his  defences  in  the  passes  lower  down,  and  the  conquest 
of  the  plateau  would  then  have  been  slow,  costly,  and 
precarious.  As  it  was,  positions  had  been  won  from 
which  the  final  attack  could  be  prepared  and  delivered 
Mith  good  prospects  of  success. 

It  was  10  days  before  all  reliefs  were  com- 
pleted and  another  four  days  before  the  advance 
could  be  resumed.  In  that  fortnight  the 
Engineers  performed  miracles.  Existing  roads 
and  tracks  were  improved  out  of  knowledge, 


From  November  27  to  November  30  the 
Turks  delivered  a  series  of  attacks  directed 
against  the  left  flank  of  the  British  position 
from  Beth  Hbron  Upper  to  the  Nebi  Samwil 
ridge  and  El  Burj,  a  position  south-west  of 
Nebi  Samwil.  There  was  particularly  heavy 
fighting  between  El  Burj  and  Beth  Horon 
Upper,  but  the  Yeomanry  (Shropshire,  Cheshire 
and  Welsh  Regiments)  and  Scottish  Lowland 
troops  successfully  resisted  all  attacks  and 
inflicted  severe  losses  on  the  enemy.  At  Beth 
Horon  Upper  one  company  took  300  prisoners. 
At  El  Burj  on  November  30  a  battalion 
attacked  the  British  position  and  was  repulsed. 
Then  in  a  counter-charge  Australian  Light 
Horse  virtually  destroyed  the  battalion,  taking 
200  prisoners,  and  killing  a  much  larger  number. 

All  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  recapture  the 
Nebi  Samwil  ridge  failed  before  the  unshakable 


172 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


'  resistance  of  London  Territorials,  who  had 
relieved  the  West  Country  troops.  Their 
attacks  cost  the  Turks  very  dearly.  "  We  took 
750  prisoners  between  November  27  and  30, 
and  the  enemy's  losses  in  killed  and  wounded 
wore  undoubtedly  heavy."* 

One  incident  of  this  fortnight's  defensive 
fighting  was  specially  noteworthy.  At  Beth 
Horon  Upper  the  opposing  lines  were  very 
close,  the  Turks  holding  the  village,  which  is 
perched  on  a  steep  conical  hill.  A  dismounted 
company  of  Welsh  Horse  was  ordered  to  take 
the  village.  Working  their  way  behind  they 
got,  in  the  dusk  of  evening,  to  the  top  of  the  hill 
from  the  Turkish  side  : — 

In  the  village  (wroto  Mr.  Massey)  they  found  500 
Turks  with  a  Gorman  officer.  Tho  enemy,  laid  down  their 
arms,  and  when  the  Yeomen  got  into  the  tiny  village 
souare  they  saw  them  standing  to.  The  German  officer 
began  running  about,  shouting  *'  Start  fighting.*'  Some 
of  the  enemy  picked  up  their  rifles  and  began  fighting 
and  others  followed.  Thoy  w.'ra  too  late.  The  Yeomen, 
seeing  the  Turks  had  not  surrendered,  fired  into  tho  mass, 
and  for  five  minutes  there  was  a  desperate  battle  in 
the  small  enclosure  and  the  narrow  streats  leading 
therefrom,  the  range  seldom  exceeding  10  yards.  The 
German  officer  was  bayoneted  and  killed,  as  were  many 
.  Turks.  The  remainder  then  gave  in.  They  outnumbered 
our  force  by  four  to  one. 

The  Yeomanry  officer  decided  not  to  hold  the  village, 
but  to  escort  the  prisoners  to  the  British  lines.  The 
enemy  in  the  failing  light,  took  this  large  party  to  bo  the 
British  attacking  tho  hill,  and  shelled  them.  In  the 
confmion  some  Turks  got  away,  but  the  Yeomen 
brought  in  eight  officers  and  99  men,  moro  than  twice 
tho  number  of  our  force. 

Ali  Faud  Pasha,  aided  by  his  reinforcements 
from  Northern  Syria,  had  done  his  best  to  keep 
the  British  from  Jerusalem,  and,  as  Sir  Philip 
Chetwode  said,  "  certain  Turkish  divisions,  as 
always,  fought  like  tigers."  The  enemy  offen- 
sive in  no  way,  however,  affected  the  positions 
taken  up  by  the  British  on  November  22,  nor 
did  it  impede  the  progress  of  General  Allenby's 
preparations.  These  completed,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  fixed  December  8  for  the  attack  on 
Jerusalem.  There  was  to  be,  if  possible,  no 
fighting  close  to  the  city  and  no  injury  to  any  of 
its  buildings.     General  Allenby's  plan  was  to 

*  As  became  good  strategists  the  Turks  did  not  confine 
thiir^offensivo  to  the  hill  country,  but  demonstrated 
against  the  British  left  by  Joppa.  On  November  25 
the  British  advanced  posts  north  of  th^  Auja  were  driven 
across  the  river,  and  in  the  succeeding  days  the  Turks 
availed  the  front  protecting  Joppa.  In  an  attack  on 
the  night  of  November  29  an  enemy  party  150  strong 
penetrated  the  outpost  line  north-east  of  the  port, 
but  next  morning  the  whole  hostile  detachment  was 
surrounded  and  captured  by  Australian  Light  Horse. 
This  was  not  the  only  retaliatory  move  of  tho  British  ; 
40  men  from  an  East  County  Regiment  attacked  a  post 
on  the  Auja  held  by  over  100  Turks,  killed  50,  and 
brought  back  prisoners. 


push  his  troops  on  the  Nebi  Samwil-Beth  Horon 
line  north-east  astride  the  Jerusalem-Shechem 
road,  while  other  troops  coming  from  the  south 
were  to  strike  east  between  Jerusalem  and 
Jericho.  If  this  plan  succeeded  the  Holy 
City  would  be  cut  off  from  help.  The  plan 
did  succeed,  but  the  Turkish  forces  with- 
drew before  the  net  round  Jerusalem  was 
complete. 

The  Jerusalem  operations  proper  began  on 
December  4.  Since  their  famous  fight  at 
Khuweilfeh  on  November  11  the  53rd  (Welsh) 
Division  had  not  budged  from  their  position 
some  11  miles  north  of  Beersheba.  Now 
they  were  employed  for  the  turning  movement 
against  Jerusalem  from  the  south.  With  some 
Home  County  troops  and  a  cavalry  regiment 
they  moved  from  their  camp  on  December  4 
northward.  The  region  into  which  they  moved 
was  eminently  suitable  for  defence,  but  the 
Welsh  troops  found  that  the  Turks  had  with- 
drawn, and  on  December  6,  without  opposition, 
they  entered  Hebron,  the  city  of  Abraham,  and 
David's  capital  before  he  conquered  Jerusalem. 
By  the  evening  of  the  6th  the  head  of  the 
column  was  10  miles  north  of  Hebron.  It  was 
scheduled  to  reach  Bethlehem  on  the  7th  and 
the  southern  outskirts  of  Jerusalem  by  dawn 
on  the  8th,  and  so  careful  was  General  Allenby 
that  nothing  should  be  done  to  injure  any 
sacred  site  that  the  column  was  instructed  that 
•no  troops  were  to  enter  the  city.  On  Decem- 
ber 7,  however,  the  weather  broke,  and  for 
three  days  rain  was  almost  continuous.  The 
hills  were  covered  with  mist,  the  roads  rendered 
almost  impassable.  In  these  circumstances  the 
progress  of  the  column  was  delayed,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  8th  it  was  still  some  distance 
south  of  Jerusalem.  The  delay  was  not  alto- 
gether due  to  the  weather,  but  to  the  deter- 
mination not  to  injure  the  place  where  Christ 
was  born.  Bethlehem  had  been  chosen  by  the 
Turks  as  their  advanced  southern  line  and  they 
had  posted  their  guns  in  such  a  position  that 
counter -battery  work  would  have  endangered 
the  village ;  consequently  the  British  were 
shelled  without  being  allowed  to  reply.  But 
in  the  end  they  drove  back  the  enemy,  and 
found  the  village,  sacred  by  so  many  asso- 
ciations, uninjured. 

Despite  rain,  mud,  mist  and  intense  cold,  and 
the  delay  to  the  southern  column  (which  now 
constituted  Allenby's  right  flank)  the  attack  on 
the  enemy  positions  guarding  the  Shechem 
(Nablus)    road   was    delivered  on   the   8th   as 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


173 


JERUSALEM    FROM    THE    MOUNT    OF    OLIVES. 


arranged.  It  was  a  day  calculated  to  try  the 
stoutest  troops.  Observation  from  the  air  was 
quite  impossible,  and  some  of  the  roads  had 
become  such  quagmires  that  the  guns  could  not 
be  brought  up.  The  Turks,  too,  had  placed 
their  best  troops  in  the  field,  organized  storming 
companies,  equipped  with  the  best  German 
skill.  And  these  Turks  put  up  so  stout  a 
resistance  that  all  the  troops  and  officials  left  in 
Jerusalem  were  able  to  get  away — not  north- 
ward  to   Shechem,   but   eastward   to   Jericho. 


The  day's  fighting  is  thus  described  by  General 
Allenby  : — 

The  troops  moved  into  positions  of  assembly  by 
night,  and,  assaulting  at  dawn  on  the  8th,  soon  carried 
their  first  objactives.  They  then  -pressed  steadily 
forward.  Tho  mere  physical  difficulty  of  climbing  tho 
stoep  and  rocky  hillsides  and  crossing  the  deep  valleys 
would  have  sufficed  to  render  progress  slow,  and  the 
opposition  encountered  was  considerable.  Artillery 
support  was  soon  difficult,  oning  to  the  length  of  the 
advance  and  the  difficulty  of  moving  guns  forward. 
But  by  about  noon  London  troops  had  already  advanced 
over  two  miles,  and  were  swinging  north-east  to  gain 
the   Nablus-Jerusalem  road  ;    while  the  Yeomanry  had 


174 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


captured  the  Beit    Iksa    spur,  and  were    preparing  for 
a  further  advance. 

As  the  right  column  [that  from  Hebron]  had  been 
delayed  ...  it  was  necessary  for  the  London  troops 
to  throw  back  their  right  and  form  a  defensive  flank 
facing  east  towards  Jerusalem,  from  the  western  out- 
skirts of  which  considerable  rifle  and  artillery  firo  was. 
being  experienced. 


[Swaitte. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR  L.  J.  BOLS,  K.C.M.G., 
Chief  of  Staff  to  General  Sir  Edmund  Allenby. 

This  delayed  the  advance,  and  early  in  the  afternoon 
it  was  decided  to  consolidate  the  line  gained  and  resume 
the  advance  next  day,  when  the  right  column  would  be 
in  a  position  to  exert  its  pressure.  By  nightfall  our 
line  ran  from  Nebi  Samwil  to  the  east  of  Beit  Iksa, 
through  Lift  a  to  a  point  about  H  miles  west  of  Jeru- 
salem, whence  it  was  thrown  back  facing  east.  All 
the  enemy's  prepared  defences  west  and  north-west  of 
Jerusalem  had  been  captured,  and  our  troops  were 
within  a  short  distance  of -the  Nablus-Jerusalem  road. 

The  London  troops  and  Yeomanry  had  displayed 
great  endurance  in  difficult  conditions.  The  London 
troops  especially,  after  a  night  march  in  heavy  rain 
to  reach  their  positions  of  deployment,  had  made  an 
advance  of  three  to  four  miles  in  difficult  hills  in  the 
face  of  stubborn  opposition. 

During  the  day  about  300  prisoners  were  taken  and 
many  Turks  killed.     Our  own  casualties  were  light. 

In  Jerusalem  it  was  a  day  of  great  tension — 
the  inhabitants  and  the  Turks  filled  with 
alternate  and  contrary  hopes  and  fears. 

Towards  dusk  (says  the  correspondent  of  The  Timet 
already  quoted)  the  British  troops  were  reported  to 
have  passed  Lifta,  and  to  be  within  sight  of  the  city. 
On  this  news  being  received  a  sudden  panic  fell  on  the 
Turks  west  and  south-west  of  the  town,  and  at  five  in 
the  afternoon  civilians  were  surprised  to  see  a  Turkish 
transport  column  galloping  furiously  citywards  along  the 
Jaffa  road.  In  passing  they  alarmed  all  units  within 
sight  or  hearing,  and  the  wearied  infantry  arose  and 
fled,  bootless,  and  without  rifles,  never  pausing  to  think 
or  to  fight.  Some  were  flogged  from  behind  by  officers 
and  were  compelled  to  pick  up  their  arms  ;  others 
staggered  on  through  the  mud,  augmenting  the  confusion 
of  the  retreat. 

After  four  centuries  of  conquest  the  Turk  was  ridding 
the  land  of  his  presence  in  tho  bitterness  of  defeat, 
and  a  great  enthusiasm  arose  among  the  Jews.  "  The 
Turks  are  running,"  they  called  ;  "  the  day  of  dolivorance 
is  come."  The  nightmare  was  fast  passing  away,  but 
the  Turk  still  lingered.  In  tho  evening  he  fired  his 
guns  continuously. 


About  midnight  the  governor,  Izzet  Bey,  went 
personally  to  the  telegraph  office,  discharged  the  staff, 
and  himself  smashed  the  instruments  with  a  hammer. 
At  2  a.m.  on  Sunday  (December  9)  tired  Tttrks  began 
to  troop  through  the  Jaffa  gate  from  the  west  and  south- 
west, and  anxious  watchers,  peering  out  through  the 
windows  of  tho  grand  now  hotel  to  learn  the  meaning 
of  the  tramping,  were  cheered  by  the  sullen  remark  of  an 
officer,  "  Gitmaya  rnejbooruz  "  (We've  got  to  go),  and 
from  two  till  seven  that  morning  the  Turks  streamed 
through  and  out  of  the  city,  which  echoed  for  the  last- 
time  their  shuffling  tramp. 

Thus  when  early  on  December  9  the  British 
advance  was  resumed  the  London  troops  and 
Yeomanry,  driving  back  weak  rearguards,  had 
no  difficulty  in  securing  the  Shechem  road. 
They  occupied  strong  ground  astride  the  road 
four  miles  north  of  the  city.  Meantime  Welsh 
and  Cheshire  troops  swinging  north-east  from 
the  Bethlehem  direction  got  across  the  Jericho 
road,  a  little  while  after  the  main  Turkish 
force  had  passed  in  its  flight  eastward. 
Some  companies  had  been  left  on  the  Mount 
of  Olives  to  cover  the  enemy  retreat  and 
these  shelled  the  British.  But  their  guns 
were  silenced  and  they  were  driven  from  the 
Mount  by  Welsh  troops.  That  was  the  end  of 
the  fighting. 

Izzet  Bey,  the  last  civil  official  to  leave 
Jerusalem,  had  left  behind  a  letter  of  surrender, 
"  which  the  mayor,  as  the  sun  rose,  set  forth  to 
deliver  to  the  British  commander,  accompanied 
by  a  few  frightened  policemen  holding  two 
tremulous  white  flags.  He  walked  towards  the 
Lifta  Hill,  and  met  the  first  armed  deliverers 
on  a  spot  which  may  be  marked  in  the  future 
with  a  white  stone  as  the  site  of  an  historic 
episode."  It  was  the  2072nd  anniversary  of  the 
day  on  which  Judas  Maccabeus  had  recaptured 
the  Temple  from  the  Selusids. 

The  King  rightly  interpreted  the  general 
feeling  when,  on  receiving  news  that  Jerusalem 
had  been  captured,  without  injury  to  any  of  the 
Holy  Places,  he  declared  that  "  he  joined  with 
his  people  throughout  the  British  Empire  in 
welcoming  the  joyous  tidings  of  this  memorable 
feat  of  British  Arms."  For  his  service  General 
Allenby  was  awarded  the  G.C.M.G.— a  specially 
appropriate  honour  for  the  soldier  who  had 
hoisted  the  Union  Jack  over  the  tomb  of  St. 
George — and  rewards  were  bestowed  on  his  chief 
lieutenants.*  Particular  care  was  taken,  how- 
ever, to  demonstrate  that  the  campaign  was  not 
directed  against  Islam,  but  for  the  liberation  of 
all  the  peoples  of  Palestine — Christians,  Jews 
and  Moslems  alike — from  the  tyranny  of  the 

*  Generals  Bulfin  and  Chetwode  received  the  K.C.B., 
General  Bols  tho  K.C.M.G. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


175 


Osmanlis,  and  that  Franco  and  Italy  fully  asso- 
ciated themselves  in  this  policy.  Borton  Pasha, 
a  high  British  official  in  the  Egyptian  service, 
was  at  once  appointed  military  governor,  order 
restored  in  the  city  and  the  safety  of  the  sacred 
sites  secured. 

General  Allenby  made  his  official  entry  into 
Jerusalem  on  Tuesday,  December  11.  This 
liistoric  ceremony  was  marked  by  studied 
simplicity  ;  in  violent  contrast  to  the  theatrical 
entry  of   the   Emperor   William  into  the   city 


(which  he  hail  not  conquered)  19  years  pre- 
viously. The  procession  was  wholly  on  foot. 
A  little  before  noon  a  guard  of  100  men  was 
drawn  up  on  either  side  of  the  Jaffa  gate,  whose 
iron  doors  are  rarely  opened.  Every  man  of 
this   guard   had   been   carefully   chosen — they 


[Palestint  **u\ai  p.ucg.aph. 

THE    ENTRY    OF    GENERAL   ALLENBY    INTO  JERUSALEM    BY    TUb.  JAEEA    GATE, 


176 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


177 


represented  England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  Wales, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  India,  France,  and 
Italy.  At  midday  came  General  Allenby,  accom- 
panied by  a  few  members  of  his  staff  and  by 
Col.  Picot,  head  of  the  French  Political  Mission, 
the  commanders  of  the  French  and  Italian 
detachments  and  by  the  military  attaches  of 
France,  Italy,  and  tho  United  States.  The 
small  company  was  met  by  Borton  Pasha,  and 
passing  under  the  Jaffa  gate  turned  to  the  right 
into  the  Armenian  quarter — the  ancient  Zion — ■ 
and  halted  at  the  Citadel,  built  on  the  site  of 
David's  palace.  On  the  steps  of  the  Citadel, 
by  the  base  of  the  Tower  of  David,  the  pro- 
cession halted  and  a  proclamation  addressed 
"  To  the  inhabitants  of  Jerusalem  the  Blessed 
and  the  people  dwelling  in  the  vicinity  "  was 
read  in  Arabic,  Hebrew,  English,  French,  Italian, 
Greek,  and  Russian.  It  announced  the  estab- 
lishment of  martial  law,  but  "  lest  any  of  you 
should  be  alarmed  by  reason  of  your  experience 
at  the  hands  of  the  enemy  .  .  .  every  person 
should  pursue  his  lawful  business  without  fear 
of  interruption."  The  proclamation  pro- 
ceeded : 

Furthermore,  since  your  City  is  regarded  with  affection 
by  tho  adherents  of  three  of  the  great  religions  of  man- 
kind, and  its  soil  has  been  consecrated  by  the  prayers  and 
pilgrimages  of  multitudes  of  devout  people  of  these  three 
religions  for  many  centuries,  therefore  do  I  make  known 
to  you  that  every  sacred  building,  monument,  Holy  spot, 
shrine,  traditional  site,  endowment,  pious  bequest,  or 
customary  place  of  prayer,  of  whatsoever  form  of  the 
three  religions,  will  be  maintained  and  protected  accord- 
ing to  the  existing  customs  and  beliefs  of  those  to  whose 
faiths  they  are  sacred. 

This  charter  of  freedom  for  all  Faiths  having 
been  read,  the  company  walked  up  Zion  Street 
to  the  barrack  square,  where  General  Allenby 
received  the  heads  of  the  civil  communities 
and  other  notables  and  deputies  of  the  deported 
leaders  of  the  various  Christian  confessions.  The 
mayor  and  the  mufti,  the  sheikhs  in  charge  of 
the  mosques  of  Omar  and  Aska,  representatives 
of  the  Jewish  committees  and  of  the  Anglican, 
Latin,  Orthodox,  Greek  Catholic,  Armenian, 
Syrian  and  Coptic  Churches,  and  the  Abyssinian 
Bishop  were  all  presented,  and  finally  the 
Spanish  Consul,  who,  as  almost  the  only  neutral 
diplomatic  personage  in  Jerusalem,  had  charge 
of  the  interests  of  most  of  the  belligerents.  The 
presentations  over,  General  Allenby  returned  to 
the  Jaffa  gate.  Not  until  he  was  outside  the 
walls  did  he  mount  his  horse.  The  simplicity 
and  sincerity  which  had  marked  the  whole 
ceremony  created  a  deep  impression  on  the 
inhabitants     of     Jerusalem,      an      impression 


heightened  by  the  measures  enforced  for  the 
protection  of  the  Holy  Sites.  While  other 
Christian  and  Jewish  sacred  sites  were  placed 
under  guards  belonging  to  those  faiths,  tho 
hereditary  Moslem  custodians  of  the  Church  of 
the  Holy  Sepulchre  were  asked  to  take  up  their 
accustomed  duties  "  in  remembrance  of  the 
magnanimous  act  of  the  Caliph  Omar,  who 
protected  that  Church." 

Thus  Jerusalem  passed  from  under  the 
military  domination  of  the  Germans  and  the 
Turks.  And  having  lost  the  Holy  City  by 
arms,  they  immediately  set  on  foot  a  campaign 
of  words,  to  deprive  the  liberators,  if  possible, 
of  the  moral  results  of  their  achievement. 

"  Jerusalem  has  been  evacuated,"  the  German 
wireless  announced  on  December  12.  "  The 
most  important  reason  for  the  decision  to 
evacuate  it  voluntarily  was  the  fact  that  no 
nation  in  the  world  which  believes  in  God  could 
wish  its  sacred  soil  to  be  the  scene  of  bloody 
battles.  The  keeping  of  a  town  which  is 
worthless  from  a  military  point  of  view  was  of 
no  importance  in  comparison  with  this  con- 
sideration." 

Notwithstanding  their  protestation,  the 
enemy,  as  has  been  shown,  had  done  their  best 
to  "  dismantle  "  Jerusalem  from  the  religious 
point  of  view  by  deporting  the  Patriarchs  of 
the  several  Christian  confessions,  as  well  as 
selected  notables  from  the  Christian  and 
Jewish  communities.  Without  incurring  the 
odium  of  destroying  the  sacred  edifices,  they 
believed  that  they  could  in  this  way  paralyse 
the  religious  life  that  centred  in  them  and 
interrupt  the  maintenance  of  the  several 
rites. 

This  action  on  the  part  of  the  Turco-German 
military  authorities  was  supplemented  by 
propaganda  in  the  German  Press  A  "  Catholic 
Theologian"  in  the  Cologne  Gazette  developed 
the  thesis  that  the  earthly  Jerusalem  had  no 
"  religious  value  "  for  Christians,  and  implied 
that  the  heavenly  Jerusalem — "  which  no  vile 
Englishman  could  conquer  " — was  still  within 
Germany's  Maclttsphdre.  Herr  Naumann,  the 
gifted  author  of  "  Mitteleuropa,"  took  a  senti- 
mental line.  "  The  real  Jerusalem,"  he  argued, 
"  the  place  where  Jesus  died,  the  place  whence 
proceeded  the  Holy  Spirit,"  had  been  preserved 
in  the  sympathetic  atmosphere  of  Turkish 
rule.  But  now  Jerusalem  was  to  be  included 
in  the  modern,  technical,  commercial,  capitalist, 
English-international     system,     and     "  under 


178 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


English  guidance  would  be  improved  in  the 
Western  sense." 

The  instinctive  perception  that  the  Turco- 
German  rigime  was  not  destined  to  return 
was  an  interesting  symptom  in  the  case  of  a 
historian  of  Herr  Naumann's  intuitive  power  : 
but  from  the  beginning  of  the  British  occupation 
his  characterization  of  the  change  that  had 
occurred  was  belied  by  the  course  of  events 
in  Jerusalem  itself.  Ottoman  rule  in  Jerusalem 
was  just  four  centuries  old  ;  Germany  did  not 
begin  to  cast  her  shadow  there  till  the  Kaisers 
visit  in  1898  ;  both  were  passing  incidents  in 
the  city's  political  history,  and  in  her  religious 
history  they  had  not  counted  at  all. 

The  Turks  ruled  Jerusalem  politically  by  the 
right  of  the  sword.  They  had  no  religious 
footing  there  except  through  their  adherence 
to  Islam,  which  they  shared  with  the  majority 
of  the  native  Arabic-speaking  population.  But 
under  the  reign  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress,  and  especially  during  the  military 
dictatorship  of  Djemal  Pasha  since  the.  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  they  had  repudiated  the 
religious  bond  in  favour  of  a  violent-handed 
nationalism,  and  employed  their  political  power 
to  assail  their  Arab  co-religionists  with  a  racial 
war.     As    at    Damascus    and     Beirut,    so    in 


Palestine,  Djemal  singled  out  his  victims 
among  the  Arab  leaders,  and  it  is  easy  to 
understand  thejr  relief  at  the  removal  of  the 
Turkish  menace. 

The  Moslem  custodians  cf  the  Holy  Places 
likewise  expreused  their  satisfaction  with 
General  Allenby's  dispositions,  and  the  safety 
of  the  Mosque  of  Omar  was  at  once  assured  by 
the  detailment  of  a  guard  of  Indian  Moslems 
from  the  123rd  Outram's  Rifles.  The  departure 
of  the  self-styled  "  Turanian  "  Turks  thus  made 
no  interruption  in  the  Moslem  tradition  of 
13  centuries,  and  the  gratitude  of  the  Arab 
nation  was  promptly  expressed  on  December  15 
by  a  joint  Moslem-Christian  delegation  from 
the  Syrian  and  Palestinian  colonies  in  Great 
Britain  to  the  War  Cabinet.  This  delegation 
expressed,  in  its  address,  "  the  hope  and 
assurance  that  His  Majesty's  armies  and  the 
French  and  Italian  contingents  would  continue 
their  victorious  march  for  the  deliverance  of 
the  populations  they  were  freeing  from  the 
despotism  of  Turkish  rule"  ;  and  the  King  of 
the  Hedjaz,  the  acknowledged  representative 
of  the  Arab  risorgimento,  declared  his  appre- 
ciation of  "  the  care  and  solicitude  shown  to 
the  Holy  Places,"  and  ascribed  the  victory  to 
the  justice  of  the  British  cause. 


[la.rstiit  official  photograph. 

THE  SCENE  ON  THE  STEPS  OF  THE  CITADEL  AT  THE  FOOT  OF  THE  TOWER 

OF  DAVID. 

The  officer  holding  a  paper  in  his  hands  is  reading  the  Proclamation  in  English. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


17U 


[Official  photograph 

GENERAL    ALLENBY    RECEIVES    THE    CITY   NOTABLES   IN   THE   BARRACK  SQUARE. 


The  liberation  of  Jerusalem  meant  still 
more  to  the  Jews,  for  while  it  is  only  the  third 
in  sanctity  of  the  Moslem  Holy  Places,  it  is 
the  peculiar  shrine  of  Judaism  in  the  sense 
in  which  Mecca  and  Medina  are  of  Islam.  The 
British  advance  freed  not  only  the  most  sacred 
places  of  ancient  Jewry,  but  the  site  marked 
out  for  the  future  Jewish  university,  and  also 
about  20  out  of  the  40  and  more  agricultural 
colonies  founded  by  Jewish  immigrants  in 
Palestine  during  the  last  generation. 

This  Jewish  colonizing  movement  has  been 
described  in  Chapter  CCXVII.  The  British 
advance  over  the  territory  in  which  the  more 
•southerly  colonies  are  situated  was  so  rapid 
that  the  Turks  had  no  time  to  lay  them  waste 
Buildings,  plantations  and  public  works  were 
found  practically  intact ;  only  the  live-stock 
and,  unhappily,  a  large  proportion  of  the  able- 
bodied  male  population  had  been  commandeered. 
These  colonies  offered  an  invaluable  nucleus  for 
the  process  of  reconstruction,  and  before  many 
weeks  had  passed  a  Zionist  Commission,  headed 
by  the  President  of  the  English  Zionist  Federa- 
tion, Doctor  Weizmann,  was  dispatched  to 
Palestine  with  the  authorization  of  the  British 
Government.  Their  task  was  to  reconstruct 
the  ruins,  not  of  three  years,  but  of  eighteen 
and  a  half  centuries,  for  Jewry  had  lain  in 
ruins  in  Palestine  since  Titus  destroyed  Jeru- 


salem in  the  year  70  a.d.  For  the  first  time 
since  that  catastrophe,  conditions  in  Palestine 
had  become  favourable  for  the  rebuilding  of 
Jewish  society  there. 

The  Germans  realized  how  this  beneficent 
effect  of  the  British  success  would  influence 
Jewish  sympathies  all  over  the  world,  and  were 
anxious  to  make  some  counter -move — little 
prospect  though  they  had  of  reversing  facts  by 
propaganda.  But  the  susceptibilities  of  their 
Turkish  allies  were  grievously  in  the  way.  The 
avowed  war  aims  of  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress  were  the  integrity,  centralization, 
and  "  Turcification  "  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
They  could  not  forgive  the  Germans  for  having 
left  them  militarily  in  the  lurch,  and  their  anger 
grew  as  they  watched  the  German  Government 
appropriating  for  itself  vast  territories  in 
Europe  at  the  expense  of  Russia.  Talaat  was 
demanding  German  military  aid,  and  until  that 
was  forthcoming  he  did  not  see  why  he  should 
disavow  his  party's  war  aims  in  order  to  enhance 
Germany's  popularity  with  the  Jews.  It  was 
therefore,  not  surprising  that  when  Talaat  was 
induced  to  grant  an  interview  on  the  subject  of 
Zionism  to  the  correspondent  of  the  Vosiische 
Zeitung  at  Constantinople,  his  statements  should 
not  prove  felicitous  from  the  German  point  of 
view.  In  this  interview  Talaat  dismissed  Mr. 
Balfour's  letter  as   "  an  imposture,"   enlarged 


180 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


(somewhat  tactlessly,  considering  the  recent 
Djemal  regime)  on  past  favours  shown  to  Jews 
by  Turks,  talked  of  the  limited  capacity  of 
Palestine  for  colonization,  insisted  that  all 
Jewish  colonists  must  become  naturalized 
Ottoman  subjects,  and  repeated  several  times 
that  Jews  could  be  given  no  special  privi- 
leges over  and  above  those  enjoyed  by  other 
Ottoman  citizens — an  ominous  charter  of 
rights,  since  it  exposed  Jews  under  Turkish 
dominion  to  the  same  fate  as  Arabs,  Greeks  and 
Armenians. 

Talaat's  statement  was  criticized  severely  by 
the  Jewish  Press,  which  pointed  out  that  the 
good  faith  of  the  British  Government  was 
guaranteed  by  the  offers  of  territory  for  Jewish 
colonization  at  El  Arish  and  in  East  Africa  long 
before  the  war,  as  well  as  by  the  prompt  assent, 
after  the  deliverance  of  Jerusalem,  to  the 
dispatch  of  a  Zionist  Commission.  Turco- 
German  propaganda  was  equally  unsuccessful 
in  trying  to  create  trouble  between  England  and 
France.  The  French  interests  in  Syria  were 
admitted  by  the  whole  world  (except,  of  course, 
by  the  Turks  and  Germans  themselves),  and  it 
was  no  secret  that  France  had  at  one  time 
regarded  Palestine  as  falling  within  the  Syrian 
sphere.  But  it  was  a  naive  supposition -that  the 
Allies  had  embarked  on  the  Palestinian  cam- 
paign without  having  arrived  at  a  common 
political  programme.  On  February  9  a  Zionist 
representative,  M.  Sokoloff,  was  officially 
informed  at  Paris  by  M.  Pichon  that  "  the 
understanding  between  the  French  and  British 
Governments  was  complete  concerning  the 
question  of  the  establishment  of  the  Jews  in 
Palestine."  The  simple  announcement  of  an 
obvious  fact  was  sufficient  to  bring  enemy 
propaganda  in  this  direction  to  an  end. 

The  significance  of  the  liberation  of  Jerusalem 
for  Turks  and  Germans,  Arabs  and  Jews,  has 
now  been  described,  but  the  survey  would  not 
be  complete  without  some  account  of  its 
reception  by  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
Throughout  the  war  the  Vatican  preserved 
scrupulous  neutrality  as  a  political  power,  but 
only  the  Pope's  enemies  accused  him  of  being 
indifferent  towards  the  moral  issues  which  the 
War  raised,  or  towards  events  in  which  his 
Church  was  affected  as  a  religious  and  an 
international  society.  The  transference  of  the 
Christian    sanctuaries    at    Jerusalem    from    an 


exclusively  Moslem  rule  to  a  regime  in  which 
none  of  the  religions  to  which  Jerusalem  was 
holy  was  to  have  political  precedence  over 
another,  was  naturally  a  cause  of  satisfaction 
to  His  Holiness  as  the  religious  head  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  on  December  13 
the  Cardinal  Vicar  accordingly  published  a 
proclamation  announcing  a  thanksgiving  service 
in  the  Basilica  of  Santa  Croce  in  Gerusalemme 
for  the  Sunday  following.  The  official  organ  of 
the  Vatican,  the  Osservatore  Romano,  com- 
mented that  "  the  entry  of  the  British  troops 
into  Jerusalem  had  been  received  with  satisfac- 
tion by  all,  and  especially  by  Catholics,"  and 
added  that  "  the  conceptions  of  liberty  and 
fair-mindedness  which  inspire  the  acts  of 
England  "  created  confidence  that  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  Catholic  Church  would  be 
respected  in  Palestine  under  the  change  of 
regime. 

The  Miinchner  Neueste  Nachrichten  chose  to 
represent  the  Vatican's  attitude  as  inconsistent 
with  political  neutrality,  and  the  German 
"  Catholic  Theologian,"  whose  article  in  the 
Cologne.  Gazette  has  been  referred  to  above, 
roundly  declared  that  "  for  us  German  Catholics 
the  possession  and  fate  of  Jerusalem  are  a 
purely  political  question  .  .  .  and  in  this 
political  question — let  it  be  said  aloud — we 
German  Catholics,  as  a  matter  of  course,  stand 
absolutely  on  the  side  of  our  country.  We 
represent  German  interests."  This  theologian 
at  Cologne,  like  his  "  Turanian  "  allies  at  Con- 
stantinople, was  ready,  in  his  intemperate 
nationalism,  to  sacrifice  the  unity  of  the 
religious  society  to  which  he  belonged.  His 
point  of  view,  however,  was  not  shared  by  the 
majority  of  Catholics  in  Central  Europe,  and 
especially  in  Austria-Hungary.  It  was  rumoured 
that  the  Pope  was  definitely  opposed  to  any 
attempt  to  recover  Jerusalem  for  the  Turks  on 
the  part  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  that 
pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  Govern- 
ments by  Catholic  influence  to  obey  his  wishes. 
Such  rumours  are  by  their  nature  incapable  of 
verification,  but  whether  or  not  this  one  was 
correct,  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  found  a 
ready  reception  in  the  irritated  minds  of  the 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress.  It  was, 
indeed,  not  improbable  that  the  liberation  of 
Jerusalem  had  led  to  the  first  serious  rift 
between  Berlin,  Vienna  and  Constantinople. 


CHAPTER     CCXXVII. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES 
TO  THE  THIRD  BATTLE  OF  YPRES. 

The  Fighting  in  June  and  July,  1917 — Situation  Before  Verdun — German  Concentration — 
Attack  on  June  28 — Slight  German  Gains — French  Attack,  July  17 — Moronvilliers  : 
General  Gouraud  in  Command — French  Attack  in  Mt.  Cornillet  Sector,  June  21 — Further 
Operations  .Under  Gouraud — The  Craonne -Reims  Area — Analysis  of  the  Fighting — 
Kaiser  and  Crown  Prince — The  British  Front — Preparations  for  Third  Battle  of  Ypres 
— General  Allenby  Leaves  for  Palestine — Haig's  Demonstrations — British  Operations 
Near  Lens — July  8  :  German  Success  on  the  Yser. 


THE  Battle  of  Messines.  described  in 
Chapter  CCXXIV.,  was  the  last  act 
in  the  manoeuvres  preliminary  to  the 
offensive  in  Flanders,  undertaken  by 
the  British  Fifth  and  Second  Armies  combined 
with  the  French  First  Army,  which  began  on 
July  31,  1917.  But  while  the  final  preparations 
for  this  new  attack  were  being  completed  the 
Battles  of  ■  Vimy-Arras,  Craonne-Reims  and 
Moronvilliers  were  renewed  on  a  smaller  scale. 
Beyond  the  extremities  of  the  zone  in  question 
the  Germans  were  able  to  inflict  a  slight  reverse 
on  the  British  in  front  of  Nieuport  and  tem- 
porarily to  recover  some  of  the  ground  lost  by 
the  Crown  Prince  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Battle 
of  Verdun. 

This  chapter  will  deal  with  these  various 
encounters,  viz.,  in  the  Verdun  region,  the 
actions  on  the  Moronvilliers  and  Chemin  des 
Dames  ridges,  the  combats  south  and  north  of 
the  Scarpe  in  the  regions  of  Lens  and  Ypres, 
and  the  struggle  round  Lombartzyde  on  the 
coast  of  the  North  Sea  between  Nieuport  and 
Ostend. 

The  German  success  north  of  Verdun  preceded 
the  great  French  victory  gained  by  General 
Guillaumat  on  August  20  north  of  Verdun, 
Vol.  XV.— Part   188 


while  the  desperate  struggles  on  and  west  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  ridge  were  preliminary  to 
the  decisive  Battle  of  Malmaison  won  by 
General  Maistre  on  October  23  The  remainder 
of  the  operations  to  be  described  were  fraught 
with  no  important  consequences.  The  French 
did  not  descend  the  northern  slopes  of  the 
Moronvilliers  hills,  nor  did  the  British  advance 
eastward  from  the  Scarpe  or  the  Vimy  heights. 
Neither  did  the  enemy  attempt  to  follow  up  the 
advantage  he  had  gained  at  Lombartzyde  nor 
seek  to  push  farther  forward  in  the  Verdun 
region. 

Before  these  various  encounters  are  described 
the  reader  should  be  reminded  that,  after  the 
failure  of  General  Nivelle.  in  April  1917,  to 
burst  his  way  through  the  German  lines  into 
the  plain  of  Laon,  there  had  been  a  radical 
change  in  the  strategy  of  the  Allies.  The 
French  reverted  to  the  plan  of  limited  objectives, 
and  their  offensive  on  the  right  and  centre  was 
no  longer  of  so  aggressive  a  character,  while  the 
original  plan  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  which  had 
been  for  a  time  suspended  to  enable  him  to 
support  the  French,  was  now  reverted  to.  The 
main  British  effort  was  henceforth  to  be 
directed  north  of  the  Lys,  and  it  was  to  be 


181 


ls-2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


supported  by  a  French  Army  in  Flanders. 
For  Generals  P6tain  and  Foch,  who  took  over 
the  direction  of  the  French  forces  at  the  end 
of  April,  had  decided,  in  view  of  the  losses 
suffered  at  the  Battles  of  Craonne-Reims  and 
Moronvilliers,  that  this  course  was  better  suited 
to  the  situation.  The  rapid  dissolution  of  the 
Russian  Army — even  the  Russian  contingent 
which  had  fought  at  Craonne-Reims  had  be- 
come disaffected — induced  them  to  adopt  this 
more  modest  part,  and  they  determined,  there- 
fore, to  await  the  arrival  of  the  American  forces 
before  committing  themselves  to  operations  on 
a  great  scale.  They  were  content  to  finish  off, 
as  it  were,  the  Battles  of  Craonne-Reims  and 
Moronvilliers,  and,  but  for  the  German  offen- 
sive west  of  the  Meuse  and  north  of  Verdun  on 
June  29,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  they 
would  have  embarked  in  1917  in  any  consider- 
able battle  in  Lorraine.  That  Petain  and  Foch 
had  read  the  European  situation  rightly  was 
shown  by  the  complete  failure  of  Brussiloff  and 
Korniloff  in  July  to  galvanize  the  Russian  Army 
into  action  against  Germans  and  Austro-Hun- 
garians,  and  also  by  the  unexpected  collapse 
in  November  of  a  part  of  the  Italian  Army  in  the 
Julian  Alps.  On  the  German  side  also  there 
was  for  a  time  a  distinct  tendency  to  adhere  to 


defensive  tactics  which  were  dictated  by  the 
defeats  of  Arras- Vimy,  Craonne-Reims,  Moron- 
villiers and,  above  all,  Messines. 

In  Chapter  CLXVI.  the  concluding  phase  of 
the  First  Battle  of  Verdun  was  described.  At  the 
opening  of  that  gigantic  struggle  the  French 
line  had  run  from  just  south  of  Boureilles,  on 
the  eastern  edge  of  the  Argonne  forest  land, 
north-eastwards  between  the  Bois  de  Mont- 
faucon  and  the  Bois  de  Malancourt  to  Forges 
and  the  glen  from  Forges  descending  to  the 
Meuse.  On  the  west  side  of  the  river  it  covered 
the  Cheppy  and  Avocourt  Woods,  the  villages 
of  Malancourt  and  Bethincourt  to  their  east, 
Hill  304,  which  rises  midway  between  those 
villages  to  their  south,  the  Mort  Homme  (Hill 
295)  between  Hill  304  and  the  Meuse,  and 
RegneVille  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  The 
Bois  de  Forges,  north  of  Forges,  was  in  the 
possession  of  the  enemy.  From  Forges  to 
Verdun  as  the  crow  flies  is  a  distance  of  some 
nine  miles. 

Crossing  the  Meuse,  which,  unlike  the  Lys, 
is  a  fairly  wide  river,  the  French  line  proceeded 
almost  due  eastwards  b<  tvveen  Consenvoye  and 
Brabant-sur-Meuse  over  the  heights  of  the 
Meuse  to  Ornes  on  their  eastern  slopes.     From 


WRECKED  GERMAN  GUNS  AT  CRAONNE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


188 


HILL    304    FROM    ESNES. 


Ornes  it  struck  down  south-eastwards  below 
the  Twins  of  Ornes — a  name  given  to  two 
hills  a  little  higher  than  the  Mort  Homme — 
into  the  wooded  and  water-patched  plain  of 
the  Woevre,  passing  just  west  of  Etain  and 
Buzy.  It  then  ran  sharpiy  back  to  the  Meuse 
Heights  ;  going  round  east  of  Fresnes  and 
descending  those  heights  to  the  southern  en- 
virons of  Les  Eparges.  Thence  it  descended 
south-soutn-eastwards  to  the  Meuse,  which  it 
crossed  north-west  of  St,  Mihiel.  Curving 
west  of  St.  Mihiel,  it  recrossed  both  the  Meuse 
and  the  Meuse  Heights  and  again  entered  the 
Woevre.  From  St.  Mihiel  to  Verdun  is  a 
distance  of  some  20  miles,  from  Verdun  to  the 
furthest  French  outpost  in  the  Woevre  was 
14  miles  or  so. 

Verdun,  traversed  by  the  Meuse,  is  in  a 
hollow.  The  Heights  ot  the  Meuse,  a  cultivated 
and  wooded  plateau  rather  than  a  range  of 
hills,  on  an  average  some  500  feet  above  the 
stream  and  five  or  six  miles  broad,  are  the 
natural  defences  of  Verdun  on  the  east  and 
north.  Low  hills  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
House  lie  between  Hill  304  and  Verdun.  South 
of  Hill  304  and  of  the  Avocourt  and  Cheppy 
Woods  is  the  great  Foret  de  Hesse,  extending 
from  the  Argonne  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the 
city. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  at  the  Battle  of 
Verdun  the  Germans  forced  the  French  to 
withdraw  from  the  piain  of  the  Woevre  to  the 
Meuse  Heights,  and  that  they  fought  their  way 
southwards  along  those  heights  to  the  south 
of  Fort  Vaux,  reaching  a  point  less  than  five 
miles  from  Verdun  itself.     On  the  west  bank 


of  the  Mouse,  however,  though  the  French  had 
been  obliged  to  evacuate  Forges,  Bethincourt, 
Malancourt  and  Regneville,  they  had  retained 
the  southern  slopes  ot  Mort  Homme  and  Hill 
304  and  the  village  of  Avocourt,  and  their  line 
thence  to  the  Argonne  passed  between  the 
Avocourt-Cheppy  Woods  and  the  Hesse  forest. 
The  south-eastern  end  of  the  Avocourt  Wood, 
with  the  celebrated  Avocourt  Redoubt,  re- 
mained in  their  possession. 

On  the  left  (west)  bank  of  the  Meuse  the 
situation  had  become  stationary  by  June  1916  ; 
on  the  right  bank  the  stationary  stage  of  the 
battle  had  not  been  reached  till  December  17. 
On  October  24,  General  Mangin  had  recaptured 
the  Village  and  Fort  of  Douaumont,  north  of 
Fort  Vaux,  and  on  November  1  the  Germans 
retired  from  the  latter  fort.  The  village  of 
Vaux,  north  of  it,  was  retaken  on  the  5th. 
Some  days  later,  on  December  15-17,  Mangin 
completely  defeated  the  Germans  north  of  Fort 
Douaumont,  taking  11,300  prisoners  and  re- 
captiiring  Vacherauville  on  the  Meuse,  the 
Poivre  Hill,  Louvemont,  Bezonvaux  and  Har- 
daumont  with  part  of  the  Bois  des  Caurieres. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  French,  despite 
their  victories  in  October  and  December,  had 
on  neither  side  of  the  Meuse  recovered  the  line 
originally  organized  by  General  Sarrail  during 
and  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  The  enemy 
from  Fresnes  northwards  to  Bezonvaux  were 
at  or  close  to  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Heights 
of  the  Meuse  and,  north  of  the  line  Bezonvaux- 
Vacherauville,  they  were  firmly  entrenched  on 
them.  From  Vacherauvillo  to  Verdun  is  but 
some   five   miles.     Considering,    too,   that   the 

188—2 


184 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Germans  south  of  Verdun  in  the  St.  Mihiel 
salient  were  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse, 
the  position  from  the  French  standpoint  was 
still  unsatisfactory. 

Under  these  circumstances,  General  P6tain 
and  General  Guillaumat,  the  Commander  of 
the  French  2nd  Army  entrusted  with  the  defence 
of  Verdun,  could  not  but  view  with  apprehension 
any  renewed  activity  of  the  enemy  west  and 
ea~t  of  the  Meuse  in  the  Verdun  district.  On 
June  15,  1917,  a  German  detachment  advanced 
to  reconnoitre  the  French  lines  near  Hill  304, 
and  the  same  day  another  party  of  the  enemy 


(June  9),  the  abdication  of  King  Constantino 
on  June  12,  and  the  safe  arrival  in  France  on 
June  26  of  the  first  American  contingent,  ren- 
dered it  desirable  for  the  Crown  Prince  to  wipe 
out  the  memories  of  his  failures  by  a  victorious 
offensive  which  was  to  be  executed  by  General 
von  Gallwitz. 

Accordingly  some  500  guns  were  secretly 
concentrated  opposite  the  French  lines.  Those 
lines  ran  from  the  south-eastern  end  of  the 
Avocourt  Wood,  in  which  our  Allies  still  held 
some  strong  points,  by  the  western  and  southern 
slopes  of  Hill  304,  across  a  valley  to  the  southern 


THE    DEFENCES    OF    THE    MORT    HOMME    AND    HILL    304. 


was  detected  approaching  the  trenches  of  our 
Allies  in  the  Bois  des  Chevaliers  on  the  Heights 
of  the  Meuse.  Both  reconnaissances  were 
promptly  dispersed  by  the  fire  of  the  French 
guns.  Four  days  later,  on  the  19th,  the 
Germans  vainly  attempted  to  rush  some  small 
posts  near  the  Calonne  trench,  south-west  of 
Les  Eparges,  the  southern  pivot  of  the  Verdun 
salient.  On  the  25th,  the  enemy  attacked  on  a 
minor  scale,  from  the  St.  Mihiel  salient. 

The  movements  in  the  Bois  des  Chevaliers, 
near  Les  Eparges,  and  in  the  St.  Mihiel  salient 
were  feints  to  conceal  the  real  objective  of  the 
German  Crown  Prince,  which  was  on  the  west 
of  the  Meuse  between  the  Avocourt  Wood  and 
the  Mort  Homme.  The  political  crisis  in  Ger- 
many, which  ended  on  July  14  with  the  sub- 
stitution of  Herr  Michaelis  for  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  as  Chancellor,  the  depression 
caused  in  Germany  by  the  Battle  of  Messines 


slopes  of  Mort  Homme.  Between  Avocourt 
Wood  and  Hill  304  there  was  a  slight  depression, 
forming  a  saddle  known  as  the  Col  de  Pom- 
merieux.  Over  it  ran  the  Malancourt- Verdun 
road  to  the  ruined  village  of  Esnes.  From  Esnes 
another  road  proceeded  northwards  along  the 
valley  between  Hill  304  and  the  Mort  Homme 
to  Bethincourt,  which  village  was  connected  by 
a  cross  road  with  Malancourt.  If  the  Germans 
gained  the  Col  de  Pommerieux  and  the  support- 
ing benches  behind  it  they  would  secure  exten- 
sive views  of  the  French  position  in  front  of 
Esnes,  and  they  would  be  able  to  attack  from 
the  rear  the  French  on  the  western  and  southern 
slopes  of  Hill  304.  The  German  10th  Reserve 
Division  was  held  in  readiness  for  the  operation, 
and  some  of  the  French  trenches  on  the  slopes 
of  Hill  304  were  facsimiled,  shock  troops  being 
carefully  trained  in  the  appropriate  methods  for 
storming  such  obstacles. 


THE    TIMES    HISTOHY    OF    THE    WAR. 


185 


[Manuel. 

GENERAL    GUILLAUMAT, 

Commanded  the  French  Second  Army  at 
Verdun,  1917. 

Thh  last  precaution,  as  it  happened,  pre- 
vented the  attack  from  being  a  complete  sur- 
prise to  our  Allies.  A  French  airman  circling 
behind  the  enemy's  lines  on  a  photograph- 
ing expedition,  perceived  copies  of  French 
trenches,  recognized  that  the  trenches  copied 
were  some  of  those  on  Hill  304,  and  promptly 
informed  General  Guillaumat  of  his  dis- 
covery. 

In  the  afternoon  of  June  28,  1917,  the  Crown 
Prince  launched  his  attack.  It  was  preceded 
by  a  short  but  violent  bombardment  from  the 
">00  German  guns.  Most  of  the  shells  fired  were 
of  a  heavy  calibre.  The  front  assaulted  was 
bisected  by  the  Malancourt-Esnes  road  and 
was  some  2,200  yards  in  length.  At  6.30  p.m. 
shock  troops  followed  the  German  barrage  and 
effected  a  lodgment  on  the  Col  de  Pommerieux, 
penetrating  as  far  as  the  supporting  tronches 
behind  the  first  line  But  a  blockhouse  in  the 
region  of  Avocourt  Wood  and  other  strong 
points  were  not  30  easily  carried.  The  garrison  of 
the  blockhouse  beat  off  no  fewer  than  10  assault* 
and,  after  12  hours  of  uninterrupted  fighting, 
only  retired  when  a  formal  order  to  retreat 
reached  them.  Every  survivor  of  the  company 
was  wounded ;  many  were  badly  burned,  but  not 
a  single  prisoner  was  left  in  the  enemy's  hands. 

On  the  west  of  Hill  304  the  French  artillery 
had,  meanwhile,  been  pounding  the  enemy  who 


had  gained  a  footing  in  the  French  front  line 
At  3.45  a.m.  on  June  29  an  attack  by  the 
Germans  east  of  Hill  304  was  repulsed,  but  about 
the  same  time — according  to  the  enemy's 
communique — a  Wiirtemberg  regiment  in  the 
Avocourt  Wood  stormed  300  yards  of  trenches. 
In  the  afternoon  the  French  counter-attacked 
west  of  Hill  304  and  recovered  some  trenches, 
while  the  Germans  assaulted  the  French  lines 
on  a  front  of  1J  miles  between  the  eastern 
slopes  of  Hill  304  and  the  western  slopes  of 
Mort  Homme. 

A  squadron  of  40  dismounted  Breton 
Dragoons,  holding  a  narrow  salient  protruding 
into  the  German  trench-system  on  the  east 
side  of  Hill  304,  put  up  a  heroic  and  successful 
resistance.  Their  works  had  escaped  serious 
damage  during  the  bombardment  preceding 
the  attack,  but  their  communication  trenches 
had  been  blotted  out,  and  they  were  practically 
isolated.  When  the  Germans  charged,  tin- 
lieutenant  commanding  them  was  carried  away 
in  the  rush  and  killed  or  captured.  The  com- 
mand devolved  on  a  non-commissioned  officer 
of  24  years  of  age,  who  had  been  righting  since 


GENERAL    VON    GALLWI1Z, 

Conducted  the  German  offensives  pgainst 
Verdun,  1917. 


186 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


August  1914  The  doom  of  him  and  his 
troopers  seemed  certain.  The  French  trenches 
on  the  left  were  swarming  with  the  enemy,  and 
in  the  gradually  waning  light  throe  squads  of 
pioneers  armed  with  flame-throwers,  the  squads 
twenty  paces  apart,  were  perceived  advancing 
to  the  attack  Behind  the  pioneers,  through 
the  intervals,  were  seen  three  groups  of  bombers, 
and  behind  these  was  a  continuous  line  of  men 
with  rifles  and  spades.  Bringing  up  the  rear 
a  fourth  line  of  soldiers  with  supplementary 
supplies  of  grenades  and  also  sandbags  made 
its  appearance  Two  companies  of  the  finest 
German  shock  troops  were  being  thrown  at 
40  French  cavalrymen. 

No  sooner  was  the  formidable  and  orderly 
mass  of  the  enemy  seen  than  the  Bretons 
opened  on  it  with  their  automatic  rifles 
Visibly  thinning,  it  continued,  however,  to 
advance  as  if  on  parade.  When  the  pioneers 
were  50  yards  from  the  salient  they  discharged 
from  the  machines  they  carried  dense  clouds 
of  a  dirty,  poisonous  smoke,  which  immediately 
hid  them  and  their  comrades  in  the  rear  from 
view.  Fortunately  the  French  barbed-wire  en- 
tanglements were  still  intact,  and  the  Dragoons, 
firing  over  or  through  them  into  the  smoke, 
killed    or    wounded    the    bombers    striving   to 


burst  their  way  to  the  trenches.  The  pioneers 
were  mostly  killed  or  wounded,  and,  the 
smoke  dissipating,  a  litter  of  corpses  was  seen 
round  the  entanglements.  Pioneers,  bombers, 
riflemen  were  in  full  retreat. 

The  frontal  attack  had  failed.  The  German 
leader  now  marched  his  men  round  to  the  end 
of  the  French  trench  and  tried  to  work  up  it. 
This  manoeuvre  had  been  noticed  by  the  non- 
commissioned officer  of  Dragoons.  At  each 
traverse  of  the  trench  he  posted  two  bombers 
and  three  men  to  supply  them  with  grenades. 
For  hours  in  the  darkness  a  terrible  struggle 
ensued.  At  the  first  traverse  three  Dragoons 
were  put  hors  de  combat,  but  their  two  com- 
panions, though  wounded,  managed  to  hold 
it.  Beyond,  the  Germans  broke  into  the 
trench  and  fought  their  way  along  it  for  some 
two  hundred  yards.  The  remnants  of  the 
little  band  of  heroes  retreated  into  the  head  of 
a  communication  trench,  where  they  prepared 
to  sell  their  lives  dearly  Suddenly  the  non- 
commissioned officer  observed  that  the  enemy 
was  slackening  his  efforts.  He  rallied  his  men 
and  ordered  a  counter-attack.  The  trench  was 
recovered  and  the  two  Dragoons  at  the  first 
traverse  were  rescued.  Half  of  the  Bretons 
were  killed  or  wounded,  but  none  had  been  cap- 


[Frtnch  official  phoUgrcpk, 

GKNERAL    GUILLAUMAT    INSTRUCTING    HIS    OFFICERS    BEFORE    THE 

ATTACK    ON    HILL    304. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


187 


SUPPORTS    ON    THE    CHEMIN-DES-DAMES    AWAITING    THE    ORDER   TO    ATTACK. 
Stretcher  bearers  also  are  seen  in  readiness. 


tured  ;    they  had  taken  four  prisoners  and  put 
out  of  action  large  numbers  of  the  enemy. 

At  most  other  points  the  Germans  were 
repulsed,  but  on  the  western  slopes  of  Mort 
Homme  they  gained  slightly.  For  their  small 
successes  in  the  combats  of  the  28th  and  29th 
they  had  had  to  pay  a  heavy  price.  Some 
companies  of  the  10th  Reserve  Division  had 
been  reduced  to  50  or  60  men. 

On  the  30th  the  Germans  made  several 
ineffective  efforts  to  debouch  from  the  captured 
posts  on  the  western  slopes  of  the  Mort  Homme, 
where  one  point  was  lost  and  recovered  five 
times  by  the  French.  It  was  finally  abandoned 
by  both  parties,  the  entrenchments  and  refuges 
having  been  swept  away  or  filled  in  by  the 
bombardment.  An  attempt  of  the  enemy  to 
storm  the  Avocourt  Redoubt  was  broken  up 
by  the  fire  of  the  French  guns.  Towards 
2.30  a.m.  on  July  3,  the  Germans  fruitlessly 
assaulted  the  south-eastern  corner  of  Avocourt 
Wood  on  a  front  of  about  500  yards,  and  the 
next  day  three  successive  attacks,  accompanied 
by  gusts  of  liquid  fire,  against  the  French 
trenches  south-west  of  Hill  304,  were  repulsed 
On  July  6  the  French  batteries  searched 
thoroughly  the  enemy's  defences  north  and 
west  of  that  eminence  ;  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse  there  were  patrol  encounters  on 
the  northern  edge  of  the  Poivre  Hill  towards 
Louvemont. 

The  French  had  been  temporarily  thrown  on 
the  defensive  west  of  the  river.     During  the 


night  of  July  7-8  General  Guillaumat  began  the 
series  of  brilliant  offensives  which  by  the  end  of 
August  almost  restored  the  French  front  north 
of  Verdun  to  what  it  had  been  on  February  21, 
1916.  After  a  brief  bombardment  his  troops 
captured  a  strongly-organized  salient  west  of 
the  Mort  Homme  and  two  others  south-west  of 
Hill  304.  German  counter-attacks  were  beaten 
off  on  the  8th  and  9th,  and  the  French  guns  dis- 
persed bodies  of  the  enemy  endeavouring  to 
surprise  advanced  posts  on  the  Meuse  Heights. 
This  was  a  preliminary  step  to  a  more 
important  operation.  General  Guillaumat  had 
ordered  General  Lebocq  to  retake  the  whole  of 
the  position  wrested  from  the  French  on 
June  28  between  the  Avocourt  Wood  and 
Hill  304.  Under  the  almost  daily  bombard- 
ment the  German  10th  Reserve  Division  had 
lost  half  its  effectives.  The  48th  Division, 
which  had  arrived  from  Russia,  was  so  demora- 
lized that  only  parts  of  it  could  be  employed 
to  replace  the  shattered  elements  of  the  10th 
Reserve  Division.  The  29th  Division,  which 
had  suffered  severely  at  the  Battle  of  Moron- 
villiers  and  was  resting  behind  the  lines  near 
Tahure,  was  now  brought  east  of  the  Argonne. 
With  certain  units  of  the  48th,  the  29th  was  in 
process  of  relieving  the  10th  Reserve  Division 
when,  on  July  17,  Lebocq  struck  his  blow.  Bad 
weather  had  thrice  delayed  it. 

Lebocq's  preparations  for  the  forward  move- 
ment left  nothing  to  be  desired.  General 
Guillaumat    had    given    him    a    sufficiency    of 


18S 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


W 

s 

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W 
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aeroplanes  to  secure  losal  command  of  the- 
a;r.  This  was  attained  36  hours  before  tho 
attack  was  launched.  Unhampered  by  enemy 
machines,  the  French  aviators  were  able  to- 
direct,  with  almost  mathematical  precision,  tho 
fire  of  the  numorous  guns  detailed  for  the 
operation.  Parapets  and  entanglements  disap- 
peared under  the  rain  of  shells  ;  battery  after 
battery  of  the  Germans  ceased  to  fire — the 
pieces  had  been  dismounted  or  the  gunners 
killed  by  the  gas  from  asphyxiating  shells.  So 
perfect  was  the  long-distance  bombardment 
that  the  roads  leading  back  from  the  German 
lines  became  impassable.  A  battalion  sent 
forward  from  Vilosne-sur-Meuse  through  Malan- 
court  took  24  hours  to  traverse  a  couple  of 
miles.  The  convoys  were  brought  to  a  stand- 
still, reserves  annihilated  or  dispersed. 

The  51st  and  87th  French  regiments,  re- 
cruited respectively  in  the  St.  Quentin  and 
Beauvais  districts,  supported  by  a  couple  of 
battalions  of  the  97th  Division  and  a  battalion 
of  the  73rd  commanded  by  Colonel  Rozier, 
were  the  infantry  employed  in  the  combat 
against  those  elements  of  the  German  10th 
Reserve  Division,  and  29th  and  48th  Divisions, 
which  happened  to  be  in  position  at  dawn  on 
July  17. 

At  6.15  a.m.  the  infantry  went  "over  the 
top,"  issuing  on  the  left  from  the  Avocourt 
Wood  and  on  the  right  from  the  salients  re- 
covered on  July  7-8.  A  feeble  attempt  at  a 
barrage  was  made  by  the  German  guns,  but 
only  one  machine-gun  fired  at  the  troops 
advancing  from  the  Avocourt  Wood.  Its 
detachment  was  destroyed  before  they  had  fired 
20  rounds.  Save  for  a  handful  of  snipers,  here 
and  there  scurrying  away,  the  ground  in  front 
of  the  French  seemed  scarcely  to  be  occupied. 
In  half  an  hour  all  the  objectives  were  reached 
and  the  Col  de  Pommerieux  was  once  again  in 
French  hands.  Passing  ovor  the  crest,  our 
Allies  pushed  down  the  northern  face,  gaining  a 
perfect  viow  of  the  Bois  de  Malancourt  and  the 
northern  slopes  of  Hill  304.  Tho  whole  of  the 
first  German  line  had  been  captured,  and, 
shortly  afterwards,  the  second  line,  where  more 
resistance  was  encountered,  was  taken.  In 
depth  the  French  had  progressed  some  700  yards, 
and  their  front  now  ran  from  the  south-eastern 
corner  of  the  Avocourt  Wood  well  north  of  the 
Col  de  Pommerieux  through  the  little  Bois 
Camard  to  the  western  slopes  of  Hill  304.  In 
the  afternoon  several  counter-attacks  wore 
repulsed   with   hoavy  losses   to  the   Germans. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


189 


The  French  casualties  were  insignificant ;  one 
company,  for  instance,  lost  but  a  couple  of  men. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  left  behind 
them  520  prisoners,  including  eight  officers. 

Enemy  counter-attacks  the  next  day  were 
complete  failures,  as  was  an  attempt  east  of 
the  Meuse  to  surprise  the  Calonne  trench  near 
Les  Eparges.  On  the  19th  the  enemy  tried 
by  a  sudden  attack  to  enter  the  French  lines 
in  the  Douaumont  region.     During  the  night 


1916.  The  Crown  Prince  hail  not  succeeded 
in  dislodging  the  French  from  the  whole  of  the 
Avocourt  Wood,  or  from  the  Col  de  Pom- 
merieux  and  the  western  slopes  of  Hill  304, 
or  from  the  western  and  southern  slopes  of  the 
Mort  Homme  On  the  heights  of  the  Meuse 
he  had  regained  none  of  the  positions  lost  by 
him  in  the  battles  of  October  and  December 
of  the  previous  year. 

His  failure  at  Verdun  was  uncompensated 


GENERAL    LEBOCQ,    COL.    ROZIER,    AND    A    GROUP    OF    FIGHTERS 
FROM    AVOCOURT    WOOD. 


of  July  20-21,  and  on  July  22,  German  raids 
against  the  Bois  des  Chevaliers  were  repulsed, 
and  another  raid  near  the  Bois  Bouchot  was 
beaten  off.  On  July  28,  after  an  intense 
bombardment,  the  enemy  again  attacked 
between  the  Avocourt  Wood  and  Hill  304. 
His  infantry,  met  by  accurate  and  intense 
shell-fire,  scattered,  leaving  behind  them  heaps 
of  dead  and  wounded.  About  the  same  time 
an  attempted  attack  at  the  foot  of  the  heights 
of  the  Meuse  east  of  Verdun  in  the  Moulain- 
ville  region,  resulted  in  a  sanguinary  check  for 
the  Germans.    > 

At  the  end  of  July  1917,  the  situation  at 
Verdun  on  both  banks  of  the  Meuse  remained 
what  it  had   been  at  the  end   of    December 


by  any  successes  in  June  or  July  at  Moronvilliers 
or  north  of  the  Aisne.  In  spite  of  violent 
counter-attacks  made  by  the  Germans,  our 
Allies  continued  to  hold  and  also  slightly  to 
enlarge  the  positions  gained  by  them  at  the 
Battles  of  Moronvilliers  and  Craonne-Reims 
described  in  Chapters  CCX.  and  CCIX. 

On  June  9  General  Anthoine  handed  over 
the  command  of  the  4th  Army  on  the  Moron- 
villiers Heights  to  General  Gouraud,  "  the 
lion  of  the  Argonne,"  and  set  out  for  Flanders, 
where  he  was  followed  by  the  French  1st 
Army  in  the  middle  of  the  month.  Two 
days  later  (June  11)  the  Germans  recon- 
noitred towards  the  French  lines  at  Mt    Cor- 


190 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


nillet  and  Mt.  Blond.  They  were  easily  repulsed 
and  some  prisoners  taken.  This  demonstration 
of  the  enemy  showed,  however,  to  General 
Gouraud  that  his  positions  between  the  two 
hills  needed  to  be  improved.  The  Germans, 
though  driven  from  the  summits  of  Mt.  Cor- 
nillet  and  Mt.  Blond,  still  retained  the  Flens- 
burg  Trench  on  the  intermediate  saddle,  and, 
behind  it,  a  trench  which,  under  the  names  of 
Blonde  Trench  and  Nouvelle  Trench,  ran 
eastwards  from  the  western  end  of  the  Flens- 
burg  Trench  across  the  road  to  Nauroy  and 
along  the  northern  slopes  of  the  saddle  and 
Mt.  Blond.  As  the  French  during  the  Battle 
of  Moronvilliers  had  pushed  down  the  northern 
face  of  Mt.  Cornillet  in  the  direction  of  Nauroy, 
they  were  able  to  turn  from  the  west  both 
trenches,  which,  if  not  captured,  would  have 
afforded  an  excellent  starting  point  for  a 
German  offensive  designed  to  penetrate  the 
French  lines  on  the  crest.  While  the  enemy 
maintained  himself  on  the  saddle,  he  had, 
moreover,  good  views  of  most  of  the  southern 
slopes  of  the  Moronvilliers  Hills,  and  the  pre- 
parations for  any  advance  down  them  into  the 
low  ground  to  the  north  could  be  observed 
by  him. 

To  break  through  and  turn  the  Flensburg 
and  Blonde  Trenches  became,  therefore,  a 
matter  of  great  importance  to  General  Gouraud 
The  General  of  the  132nd  Division,  entrusted 
with  the  defence  of  the  Mt.  Cornillet  sector, 
consulted  with  his  staff  and  examined  the 
aerial  photographs  of  the  two  trenches.  Lieu- 
tenant d'Hauteville  and  Sergeants  Portat  and 


Pellerin  of  the  Grenadiers  were  ordered  to 
make  a  detailed  reconnaissance.  On  the  even- 
ing of  June  19  and  the  early  morning  of  the 
next  day  this  was  successfully  accon  pushed. 
The  obstacles  that  would  be  encountered 
were  precisely  located  and  a  plan  of  attack 
prepared.  It  was  approved  by  the  Colonel  of  the 
166th  Infantry  Regiment,  which  was  to  furnish 
the  bulk  of  the  troops  engaged,  and  by  the 
General  of  the  Division.  Though  the  numbers 
engaged  were  small  the  plan  is  worth  detailed 
notice,  because  it  allows  the  reader  to  see  what 
careful  preparations  had  to  be  made  before 
even  a  small  forward  movement  was  attempted. 

The  detachment  told  off  for  the  operation 
consisted  of  48  bombers  accustomed  to  the 
use  of  rifle  grenades,  of  24  soldiers  armed  with 
automatic  rifles,  and  of  16  bombers  of  the  132nd 
Division.  Supporting  them  were  to  be  five 
sections  of  the  166th  Regiment  and  20  men 
carrying  reserve  bombs  to  assist  in  holding 
the  ground  when  captured.  With  these  were 
to  march  10  pioneers  whose  business  was  to 
construct  communication  trenches  between 
the  new  and  old  front.  Out  of  the  above 
elements,  numbering  about  360  all  told,  five 
columns  of  assault  were  formed.  Their  objec- 
tives will  be  gathered  from  the  accompanying 
plan. 

The  first,  under  Sergeant  Borel,  moving  west 
of  the  road  to  Nauroy  from  the  sap-head  A, 
was  to  break  in  to  the  western  end  of  the 
Flensburg  Trench  and  to  capture  the  strong 
point  F.  The  second  column,  under  Sergeant 
Langeron,    advancing   from   the    sap-head   B, 


»-.  \       French  Trenches  shown  , 
German     «  n  = 


Scale  of  Feet 

O      100   200  300*00  500  I00O 

Heights  in  Metres  .(IOMetres-3Z-8  Feet) 


x  **«$** 


OPERATIONS    OF    JUNE    21    BETWEEN    MONT    CORNILLET    AND 

MONT    BLOND. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


191 


just  east  of  the  Nauroy  road,  was  to  carry  the 
redoubt  at  M.  Automatic  rifle-fire  from  B  was 
to  be  directed  simultaneously  on  the  portion 
of  the  Flensburg  Trench  from  M  to  R,  at  which 
latter  point  a  communication  trench  ran  back 
to  the  Blonde  Trench.  The  column  of  Langeron 
had  orders  not  to  attack  until  the  third  column 
had  entered  the  Flensburg  Trench.  This,  the 
third  column,  under  2nd  Lieutenant  Leger, 
as  soon  as  the  column  on  its  right  had  secured 
the  redoubt  at  R  was  to  storm  tho  Flensburg 
Trench  between  M  and  R.  The  fourth 
column,  commanded  by  2nd  Lieutenant  Aligne, 
was  to  storm  the  eastern  end  of  the  Flensburg 
Trench,  the  above  mentioned  redoubt,  e.nd  the 
communication  trench  going  northward  to  the 
Blonde  Trench  at  O.     The  Leger  and  Aligne 


CARRYING    SOUP    TO    A     FRONT 

TRENCH  AND   DODGING    SHELLS 

ON   THE   WAY. 

detachments  were  directed  by  Lieutenant 
d'Hauteville  and  were  to  attack  under  cover  of 
a  fusillade  from  automatic  rifles  directed  against 
the  communication  trench  and  the  section  of 
the  Blonde  Trench  east  of  O  as  far  as  P.  When 
Leger's  column  had  carried  the  redoubt  at  R 
and  entered  the  communication  trench,  the 
fifth  column,  under  2nd  Lieutenant  Mangin, 
on  its  right  was  to  make  for  the  Blonde  Trench 
between  O  and  P. 


GENERAL    GOURAUD, 

Took   over   the  command  of  the  French   Fourth 

Army,  June  1917. 

The  operation  was  to  commence  with  Aligne's 
4th  column,  storming  the  R  redoubt.  When 
he  had  done  so,  Leger  was  to  burst  into  the 
Flensburg  Trench  west  of  it,  and  immediately 
afterwards  Langeron  and  Borel  were  to  attack 
the  M  redoubt  and  the  remainder  of  the  trench 
as  far  as  its  junction  with  the  western  end  cf  the 
Blonde  Trench,  which  was  at  the  same  time  to 
be  assaulted  by  Mangin  between  O  and  P. 
Four  sections  of  machine-guns  and  three  "  37  " 
guns  posted  on  the  north-west  slopes  of  Mt. 
Blond  were  to  assist  the  infantry  by  firing  on 
the  communication  trench,  the  Blonde  Trench 
between  O  and  P  and  the  wooded  ground  to 
its  north.  Two  sections  of  machine-guns 
stationed  on  the  eastern  face  of  Mt.  Cornillet 
were  simultaneously  to  open  on  tho  same  points 
so  that  the  Germans  should  be  under  a  cross 
fire.  Beyond  the  point  where  the  western  ends 
of  the  Flensburg  and  Blonde  Trenches  met,  a 
section  of  Antoine  May's  company  of  the  366th 
Regiment,  which  had  sapped  eastward  almost 
to  the  Nauroy  road,  was  directed  subsequently 
to  cross  that  road  and,  in  conjunction  with  the 
bombers,  if  they  had  succeeded  in  storming  the 
redoubt  at  F,  to  enter  from  the  north  the 
Blonde  Trench.  Lower  down  the  northern 
slopes  of  Mt.  Cornillet,  some  bombers  of  the 
166th  Regiment  had  orders  to  keep  the  Flens- 
burg Trench  under  fire  with  their  rifle  bombs  ; 

188—3 


192 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


when  it  was  taken,  they  were  to  turn  their 
attention  to  the  Blonde  Trench.  It  was  further 
arranged  that  rockets  were  to  signal  back  to 
the  guns  behind  the  French  trenches  when  they 
were  to  place  a  barrage  of  shells  behind  the 
Blonde  Trench  and  on  the  Trench  Nouvelle,  its 
continuation  eastwards  north  of  Mt.  Blond. 

As  originally  intended  the  action  was  to  have 
begun  at  9  p.m.  on  June  20,  but  it  was  postponed 
till  3.50  aon.  on  June  21.  Just  before  dawn  it 
would  be  easier  for  the  hand-bombers  to  get 
close  to  the  enemy's  works  and,  after  the  sun 
rose,  the  movements  of  the  enemy  who  would 
inevitably  counter-attack  could  be  better 
observed.     At  9  p.m.,  too,  the  darkness  would 


>  *■■■■           \/          S                      '  ^Bb  ' 

'  1                           11^  'Z&ipM 

W^^e&tet-  '      9 

GRENADE-THROWERS. 

prevent  the  machine-guns  on  Mt.  Cornillet 
and  Mt.  Blond  and  the  "  37  "  guns  on 
Mt.  Blond  from  firing  with  accuracy  at  their 
objectives. 

There  was  another  reason  for  the  postpone- 
ment. The  Germans,  anticipating  an  attack, 
had  barraged,  all  through  the  20th,  the  southern 
slopes  of  Mt.  Cornillet  and  Mt.  Blond,  and  at 
9  p.m.  the  number  of  bombs  available  was 
discovered  to  be  insufficient  for  a  prolonged 
combat.  Some  idea  of  the  vital  part  played  by 
munition-workers  in  the  hew  warfare  may  be 


gathered  from  the  fact  that  in  this  small  affair 
about  10,000  rifle  and  hand  bombs  were  used  by 
the  French. 

During  the  night,  thanks  to  the  courage  and 
activity  of  the  reserve  battalion  of  the  166th 
Regiment,  the  stock  of  grenades  was  finally 
brought  up  to  the  amount  considered  necessary. 
In  the  evening  the  bombers  and  the  soldiers 


OBSERVATION  POST  IN  AN   ADVANCED 
TRENCH. 

with  automatic  rifles  were  assembled  in  a  sub- 
terranean chamber.  Some  hours  earlier  the 
Germans  with  bombs  had  attacked  the  barrier 
erected  by  the  French  in  the  trench  leading  to 
redoubt  R,  on  the  capture  of  which  by  Aligne's 
column  depended  the  success  of  the  operation. 
Grenadiers  of  the  166th  Regiment  had  been 
ceaselessly  fighting  at  the  traverse.  They  were 
now  relieved  by  a  party  of  the  bombers  who 
were  to  take  part  in  the  attack.  At  9  p.m.,  the 
hour  originally  fixed  for  the  advance,  the  enemy 
again  assaulted  at  this  point  but  were  beaten 
off  with  incendiary  bombs.  The  rest  of  the 
French  bombers  at  1  a.m.  on  June  21,  left  their 
underground  shelter  and  were  distributed, 
according  to  the  plan  already  described,  in 
five  columns — Borel  on  the  extreme  left,  then 
Langeron's,  Leger's,  Aligne's,  with  Mangin's 
on  the  extreme  right,  nearest  Mt.  Blond. 

The  important  Flensburg  salient  was  de- 
fended by  a  German  battalion  shaken  by  the 
previous  fighting.  Realizing  that  the  French 
were  about  to  attack,  the  German  Commander 
sent  up  two  fresh  companies  into  the  threatened 
area,  and  the  enemy's  artillery  covered  the 
ground  in  front  of  the  Flensburg  Trench,  and 
the  French  first  line  and  communication 
trenches,  with  shells  from   their   "150"   and 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


198 


"  105 "  guns.  At  3  a.m.  on  June  21  the 
Germans  violently  assaulted  the  barrier  in  the 
trench  opposite  the  redoubt  R.  The  heads  of 
Leger's  and  Aligne's  detachments  kept  them 
at  bay,  but  Aligne  himself  and  two  non-com- 
missioned officers  were  burned  seriously  by  the 
phosphorus  of  the  incendiary  missiles  flung  at 
them.  Without  waiting  till  the  time  fixed  for 
the  assault  arrived,  Aligne  at  3.30  a.m.,  with 
his  and  Leger's  columns,  assaulted  the  Flens- 
burg  Trench.  The  Germans  were  driven  from 
the  barrier ;  the  R  redoubt  was  carried. 
Leger's  column  then  installed  itself  between  the 
strong  points  of  R  and  M.  From  the  former 
Aligne  proceeded  down  the  communication 
trench  towards  the  Blonde  Trench.  Meanwhile 
Mangin  on  his  right,  in  spite  of  two  counter- 
attacks delivered  from  the  Nouvelle  Trench, 
had  entered  the  Blonde  Trench.  About  4  a.m. 
Mangin's  and  Aligne's  columns  joined  hands 
at  O,  where  the  communication  trench  entered 
the  Blonde  Trench. 

On  the  left  of  Aligne's,  Lager's  column,  ex- 
posed to  a  hail  of  maelrine-gun  fire  from  the  M 
redoubt,  was  in  difficulties.  Grenades  ran  out 
and  fresh  supplies  could  not  be  brought  up  across 
the  crater-pitted  ground  by  the  men  charged 
with  that  duty.  Fortunately  Lieutenant 
d'Hauteville,  who  was  directing  the  move- 
ments of  Aligne's  and  Leger's  columns, 
succeeded  in  substituting  for  them  other  soldiers, 


and  Leger's  men  were  provided  with  the  so 
sorely  needed  ammunition.  At  this  moment 
Aligne  appeared  on  the  scene,  took  command 
of  the  detachment  and  flung  it  at  the  M 
redoubt,  which — with  its  environs — was  being 
bombed  from  both  sides  of  the  road  to  Nauroy 
by  the  heads  of  Langeron's  and  Borel's  columns. 
The  gunners  of  two  machine-guns  near  it  had 
been  already  put  out  of  action  with  grenades. 

The  Blonde  Trench  between  P  and  O 
having  been  secured  by  Mangin,  redoubt  R 
and  the  communication  trench  by  Aligne,  and 
Leger's  column,  now  under  Aligne,  being  close 
to  the  M  redoubt,  the  order  was  given  to  Lan- 
geron  and  Borel  to  charge.  The  two  detach- 
ments carried  everything  before  them.  Seized 
by  a  panic  the  Germans  abandoned  the  rest  of 
the  Flensburg  Trench,  together  with  the 
redoubt.  The  fugitives,  caught  by  the  fire  of 
the  machine-guns  and  "  37  "  guns  of  Mt.  Blond, 
and  of  the  machine-guns  on  the  eastern  slopes 
of  Mt.  Cornillet,  endeavoured  to  escape  through 
the  barrage  of  French  shells.  Only  a  few  suc- 
ceeded in  clearing  the  Blonde  Trench  and  reach- 
ing the  Nauroy  Wood.  Here  and  there  groups 
still  resisted,  but  these  were  speedily  disposed 
of.  In  the  course  of  these  isolated  comb"ts 
the  gallant  Aligne  was  shot  in  the  chest. 

The  enemy's  losses  amounted  to  several 
hundreds,  and  among  the  booty  were  six 
machine-guns.     A  section  of  French  machine- 


IN    AN    UNDERGROUND    CHAMBER. 


104 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY     OF    THE    WAR. 


guns  promptly  arrived  at  M  and  was  later 
shifted  to  F  redoubt,  the  point  of  contact  on 
the  west  of  the  Flensburg  and  Blonde  Trenches. 
Communication  trenches  were  rapidly  made  by 
the  pioneers  between  the  old  French  lines  and 
the  Flensburg  Trench.  A  counter-attack  at 
3  p.m.  by  the  two  German  companies  held  in 
reserve  was  severely  repulsed. 

On  June  22,  about  9  p.m.,  the  enemy  sought 
to  revenge  his  discomfiture  of  the  day  before 
by  assaulting  400  yards  of  trenches  on  the 
crest  of  and  east  of  the  Teton,  the  most  easterly 
of  the  northern  hills  forming  the  Moronvilliers 
massif.  After  a  severe  artillery  preparation 
his  infantry  entered  the  French  outpost  posi- 
tions but  were  at  once  expelled  from  them. 

Desultory  fighting  on  the  heights  continued 
during  the  next  fortnight.  On  July  5,  the 
French  repulsed  an  attack  west  of  Mt.  Cornillet 
and  on  the  6th  reduced  a  small  salient  to  its 
east  and  another  on  Mt.  Haut.  Four  attempts 
to  recapture  these  points  by  the  enemy 
failed. 

The  action  on  June  21  had  deprived  the 
Germans  of  all  posts  for  direct  observation  of 
the  southern  face  of  the  Moronvilliers  Heights, 
with  the  exception  of  those  on  the  saddle 
between  Mt.  Blond  and  Mt.  Haut,  and  one  on 
the  western  side  of  Mt.  Haut  a  few  yards  from 
the  French  lines.  From  the  east,  by  means  of 
a  periscope,  he  could  obtain  occasional  and  pre- 
carious glimpses  of  the  French  movements.  Ex- 
pecting that  General  Gouraud  would  try,  sooner 
or  later,  to  clear  him  out  of  these  points,  the 
German  Commander  concentrated  in  the  Moron- 
villiers region  the  19th  Hanoverian  Division, 
and  the  7th  and  23rd  Reserve  Divisions.  The 
number  of  German  guns  was  greatly  augmented, 
and  the  19th  Hanoverian  Division  elaborately 
rehearsed  an  attack  on  the  heights  from  Mt. 
Cornillet  to  Mt.  Haut,  the  two  other  Divisions 
preparing  to  assault  the  Casque  and  the  Teton 
and  also  to  work  their  way  through  the  wooded 
district  towards  Mt.  Sans  Nom  and  Auberive. 
As  the  Germans  had  not  been  thrust  down  to 
the  northern  foot  of  the  hills,  and  they  were  in 
many  places  not  20  yards  from  the  French 
trenches,  the  project  of  recovering  the  crest  line 
seemed  a  reasonable  one 

Unhappily  for  the  German  leader,  his  inten- 
tions were  divined  by  General  Gouraud.  On 
July  12,  the  French  artillery  began  a  systematic, 
wide,  and  deep  bombardment  of  the  enemy's 
position?  For  two  days  shells  rained  on  the 
spots  where  the  three  German  divisions  were 


trying  to  hide,  and  also  on  the  treiiehes  which 
G ouraud  had  decided  to  capture.  The  Germans 
doubtless  suspected  which  these  were,  but  the 
breadth  of  the  bombardment,  which  might 
have  been  the  prelude  to  an  effort  to  pierce 
the  whole  of  the  enemy's  front,  forced  them  to 
extend  their  own  barrage,  and  waste  large 
quantities  of  ammunition. 

As  it  happened  the  objectives  of  Gouraud 
were  strictly  limited.  He  proposed  to  expel 
the  Germans  from  their  elaborately  protected 
observatories  on  the  saddle  between  Mt. 
Blond  and  Mt.  Haut,  and  simultaneously  to 
extend  the  French  lines  on  the  Teton,  the  hill 
nearest  to  the  road  running  from  Nauroy 
through  Moronvilliers  to  the  Suippe  at  St. 
Martin  l'Heureux.  The  attacks  were  to  be 
delivered  on  fronts  of  800  yards  and  600  yards 
respectively,  and  were  not  in  either  case  to 
be  pressed  farther  than  300  yards  from  the 
starting  points.  These  distances  may  seem 
insignificant  on  the  map,  but  represented 
in  reality,  considering  the  obstacles  to  be 
overcome,  undertakings  of  considerable 
difficulty. 

July  14,  the  anniversary  of  the  taking  of  the 
Bastille  in  1789,  the  National  Fete  Day, 
was  the  date  chosen  by  Gouraud  for  his 
attacks.  In  Paris  it  had  been  marked  by 
the  assembly  of  detachments  from  most  of 
the  regiments  of  the  French  Army  which  had 
particularly  distinguished  themselves  in  the 
war.  These  marched  through  the  densely 
thronged  streets  to  the  Place  de  la  Nation. 
The  enthusiasm  of  the  crowds  who  saw  them 
defile  added  to  the  impressive  nature  of  the 
spectacle.  To  see  the  men  who  had  done  so 
much  for  France  raised  a  spirit  among  both 
troops  and  spectators  which  presaged  well  for 
further  efforts  in  the  struggle  for  liberty. 

A  week  before,  on  the  night  of  July  6-7,  a 
daring  feat  by  the  French  aviators  had  also 
aroused  enthusiasm.  While  83  French  aero- 
planes were  bombing  Troves,  Coblenz,  and 
Ludwigshafen,  losing  only  two '  machines  in 
the  enterprise,  Sergeant  Gallois,  a  hardware 
merchant  beforo  the  war,  had  flown  up  the 
valley  of  the  Moselle  past  Metz  and  Treves, 
struck  the  Rhine  at  Coblenz,  and,  steering  by 
compass  and  moon,  circled  oyer  Essen  at 
a  height  of  6,000  feet.  There,  in  a  sky  alive 
with  bursting  shells,  ho  had  dropped  10  bombs 
on  brilliantly  lighted  munition  works.  Re- 
peatedly fired  at  on  his  roturn  journey,  he  had 
escaped  without  injury,  and  safely  reached  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


195 


aerodrome  from  which  he  had  started.  This 
achievement  was  a  happy  augury  of  future 
aerial  attacks  against  the  country  which  had 
set  the  example  of  attacking  open  towns  of 
no  military  importance. 

On  the  groyish-white,  crater-pitted  slopes  of 
the  Moronvilliers  Heights,  on  which  a  few  black 
stumps  alone  now  indicated  where  woods  and 


copses  had  once  stood,  the  great  attack  was 
about  to  begi'i.  At  4.30  p.m.  a  side  wind  began 
to  blow,  so  fiercely  that  The  Times  correspondent 
in  rear  could  scarcely  hear  the  firing  of  the  guns 
and  explosions  of  the  shells.  Yet  hundreds 
of  French  and  German  pieces  were  in  action, 
and  the  crest  line  seemed  one  long  line  of 
volcanic   eruptions.     At    7.30   p.m.    Gouraud's 


DEFENDING    A    POSITION    ON    THE    CHEMIN-DES-DAMES    AGAINST    A 
GERMAN    COUNTER-ATTACK.. 


196 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


men  went  over  the  top  and  directly  afterwards 
rockets,  bursting  into  many  coloured  stars, 
ascended  from  the  German  trenches,  summon- 
ing up  supports  to  the  threatened  parts.  Far 
over  to  the  east  the  T6ton  was  a  mass  of  smoke 
pierced  by  flashes  of  flame. 

In  about  six  minutes  the  French  infantry 
had  secured  their  objectives  on  the  Teton 
and  the  saddle  between  Mt.  Blond  and  Mt. 
Haut,  and,  some  20  minutes  later,  seven 
sausage  balloons  appeared  to  the  north  of  the 


crests.  It  was  visible  evidence  that  the  two 
operations  were  successful.  Nearly  400  pri- 
soners had  been  captured. 

The  enemy  promptly  counter-attacked,  and 
throughout  the  night  his  troops  endeavoured 
to  regain  the  lost  ground.  Two  waves  were 
mown  down,  and  one  only  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  French  lines.  At  the  T6ton  the  Germans 
were  beaten  back,  but,  by  sheer  weight  of 
numbers,  they  managed  to  retake  the  position 
on    the    saddle.     The    French    again    charged 


THE    NATIONAL    FETE    IN    PARIS,  JULY   14,  1917:    SALUTING    THE    WOUNDED. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


197 


A  GERMAN  "BLOCKHAUS"  ON  THE  CREST  OF  THE  TETON. 


and  recovered  possession  of  the  disputed 
trenches.  On  the  17th  the  enemy,  suffering 
very  heavy  losses,  regained  a  footing  at  certain 
points  north  of  the  Teton. 

Five  days  afterwards,  in  the  night  of  July 
22-23,  he  transferred  his  attentions  to  the 
French  trenches  l.orth-west  of  Mt.  Cornillet. 
His  successive  waves  of  attack  were  completely 
repulsed.  On  the  evening  of  the  25th,  after  an 
intense  bombardment,  the  Germans  again 
attacked  ;  this  time  Mt.  Haut  was  their  objec- 
tive. The  struggle  lasted  till  dawn  ;  but  the 
enemy  made  no  progress.  Five  successive 
assaults  on  the  26th  and  a  surprise  attack 
east  of  Auberive  by  the  Germans  met  with 
a  like  fate. 

By  the  last  days  of  July,  General  Gouraud 
had  virtually  completed  the  work  begua  by 
General  Anthoine  on  April  17,  1917.  Between 
the  Germans  and  the  great  plain  of  Chalons 
stood  a  new  fortress  on  the  Moronvillisrs 
Heights,  the  guns  of  which  raked  the  western 
end  of  the  enemy's  fortified  zone  stretching 
from  the  east  bank  of  the  Suippe  at  Vaudesin- 
court  to  the  Argonne.  Neither  at  Verdun 
nor  at  Moronvilliers  had  the  German  Crown 
Prince  succeeded  in  reducing  the  heavy  balance 
against  him. 

On  the  battle-field  of  Craonne-Reims  during 
June  and  July  he  was  still  more  unfortunate. 
A  series  of  violent  offensives  procure-'  no 
appreciable  results  and  their  failure  shook  the 


moral  of  the  German  troops  and  prepared  the 
way  for  General  Maistre's  great  victory  in  the 
following  October. 

The  ineffective  counter-attacks  of  the  Ger- 
mans on  the  Chemin-des-Dames  plateau  have 
been  narrated  up  to  June  3.  From  that  date 
onward  to  June  20  little  occurred  worth 
recording.  An  almost  continuous  bombard- 
ment from  the  guns  on  both  sides  was,  however, 
occasionally  varied  by  infantry  combats.  On 
June  20  the  Germans  endeavoured  to  penetrate 
the  western  end  of  the  French  positions,  which 
now  extended  to  the  Ailette  north  of  Vauxaillon. 
Here  the  opposed  lines  crossed  Mont-des-Singes 
a  mile  east  of  Vauxaillon  and,  passing  south 
near  Moisy  Farm,  turned  east  just  before  the 
ruins  of  the  mill  were  reached.  At  the  north 
end  of  Mont-des-Singes,  which  rises  rapidly 
from  the  environs  of  Vauxaillon,  the  two 
trenches  nearly  approached  each  other,  and  the 
French  had  dug  a  trench  to  the  summit  of  the 
hill  and  established  a  post  on  it.  Thence  they 
had  the  command  of  view  over  the  valley  of 
the  Ailette,  and  over  the  ravine  through  which 
ran  the  railway  from  Soissons  to  Laon.  After 
very  violent  artillery  preparation,  regiments  of 
the  78th  Prussian  Division,  which  three  weeks 
before  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  eastern 
front,  advanced  at  dawn  on  a  mile  and  a  half 
front  between  the  Ailette  and  the  Laffaux  mill. 
On  the  Mont-des-Singes    they    were  preceded 


198 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


by  shock-troops  in  shirt  sleeves  armed  with 
grenades.  They  captured  the  post  on  the  hill 
and  their  comrades  following  them  descended 
the  slopes  and  got  behind  the  first  French  line, 
which  was  abandoned  by  our  Allies.  The 
shock-troops,  having  accomplished  their  tasks, 
retired.  Within  50  minutes  the  French 
counter-attacked,  and  recovered  all  the  trenches 
on  the  right.  On  the  left,  owing  to  the  steep- 
ness of  the  hill,  they  were  less  successful.  The 
Germans,  holding  the  trench  along  the^edge  of 
the  height,  were  able  to  drop  their  bombs  on 
the  heads  of  their  assailants.  In  the  afternoon 
the  French  advanced  from  the  right,  and  for 
an  hour  and  a  half  a  bombing  combat  pro- 
ceeded. The  Germans  stood  on  the  parapet 
to  meet  their  opponents  but  had  to  give 
ground.  Night,  however,  fell  with  the  enemy 
still  on  the  edge  of  the  Mont-des-Singes. 
During  the  night  the  German  guns  put  up  a 
terrific  barrage  of  gas  shells.  The  next  morning 
our  Allies  recaptured  almost  the  whole  of  the 
position.  About  the  same  time  they  assaulted 
the  enemy  who  had  established  himself  the 
previous  day  at  places  in  the  Moisy  Farm  sector. 
The  Germans  were  driven  out  of  most  of  the 
trench  captured  ;  all  that  they  retained  was  a 
salient  north-east  of  the  farm 

On    June    22,    Saxon    troops    east    of    Fort 


Malmaison  tried  to  advance  on  the  Hog's  Back 
itself,  on  a  front  of  a  mile  and  a  quarter  between 
the  Royere  Farm  and  the  Epine  de  Chevregny. 
In  the  centre  they  stormed  a  salient ;  elsewhere 
they  were  heavily  repulsed. 

On  the  night  of  the  22nd-23rd  the  fighting 
went  on  in  the  Vauxaillon  and  Royere  Farm 
sectors,  the  Germans  extending  the  front  of 
their  attack  from  the  east  of  the  Chevregny 
spur  to  the  Froidmont  Farm.  The  assaulting 
waves  melted  under  the  French  fire  and  no 
progress  was  made  by  them.  East  of  the  Hog's 
Back,  beyond  Craonne  in  the  Chevreux  region, 
and  south  of  the  Aisne  to  the  east  of  the  Cavaliers 
de  Courcy,  north-north-west  of  Reims,  other 
attempts  of  the  enemy  also  failed.  On  the 
24th  the  French  recaptured  the  greater  part 
of  the  salient  still  occupied  by  the  Germans 
north-east  of  Moisy  Farm. 

It  was  now  the  turn  of  the  French  to  take  the 
offensive.  Our  Allies  in  the  battle  of  Craonne- 
Reims  had  secured  most  of  the  summit  of  the 
Hog's  Back  from  the  Chevregny  spur  to  the 
California  plateau  above  Craonne.  In  this 
sector  from  Courtecon,  which  remained  in  the 
enemy's  hands,  the  second  position  of  the 
Germans  was  not  upon  the  Hog's  Back 
but  ran  backwards  to  the  Ailette,  which  it 
crossed,   to  Chamomile,  where  it  turned   east- 


CHAVONNE,  AT  THE  FOOT  OF  THE  CHEM1N-DES-DAMES  RANGE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    Ol<     THE    WAR. 


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ON    THE    MONT    DES    SINGES:     THE   FRENCH   COUNTER-ATTACK    ON    THE    CREST. 


wards  parallel  with  the  Chemin-des-Dames 
plateau  by  Neuville,  Chermizy,  Bouconville, 
connecting  up  with  the  defensive  system  of  the 
enemy  in  the  low  ground  north-east  of  Craonne. 
The  valley  of  the  Ailette  was  thus  divided  into 
two  compartments,  one  west,  the  other  to  the 
east,  of  the  line  Courtecon-Chamouille.  Approach 
to  the  valley  in  the  eastern  sector  was  difficult 
because  the  Germans  still  retained  Cerny  and 
Ailles  on  the  northern  slopes  of  the  Hog's  Back. 
The  spur  of  La  Bovelle  which  juts  out  between 
Cerny  and  Ailles  had,  however,  been  gained  by 
the  French,  but  on  June  16  they  had  been  dis- 
possessed of  the  spur  to  the  north-west  of 
Hurtebise  Farm,  called  the  "  Hurtebise  Finger." 
This  spur  was  an  important  tactical  point 
on  the  ridge,  since  it  was  its  highest  point 
(about  650  feet)  and  commanded  the  Vauclerc 
plateau  to  the  east.  If  the  French  were 
dislodged  from  that  plateau,  it  was  hardly 
probable  that  they  would  be  able  to  retain  the 
Casemates  and  California  plateaux  beyond,  for 
those  plateaux  could  easily  be  attacked  from 
the  north  through  the  still  densely  wooded 
Foret  de  Vauclerc. 

Unless,  then,  the  French  were  prepared  to 
sacrifice  the  gains  made  by  them  in  the  first 
week  of  May,  it  was  imperative  that  they 
should  once  more  eject  the  enemy  from  the 
"  Hurtebise  Finger."  The  task  was  pecu- 
liarly difficult  because  beneath  it  was  an  im- 
mense cavern,  the  Dragon's  Cave,  consisting 
of    a    string    of    limestone    grottoes.     At    the 


Battle  of  the  Aisne  it  had  been  occupied  by 
the  French,  but  early  in  1915  the  Germans 
by  a  lucky  shot  had  closed  the  only  entrance 
to  the  south  and  captured  in  it  two  companies. 
The  northern  part  was,  in  June  1917,  garrisoned 
by  the  Germans,  who  had  built  a  loopholed 
wall  across  the  middle  directly  under  the 
trenches  overhead  on  the  spur  The  cavern 
was  300  yards  long,  100  yards  wide,  and  at 
one  place  60  feet  high.  The  southern  part  was 
damp  and  inconvenient  for  the  French  who 
had  forced  their  way  into  it.  From  the 
roof  to  the  surface  of  the  spur  and  wall 
within  their  lines  the  Germans  had  made  a 
number  of  shafts  up  and  down  which  machine- 
guns  could  be  hauled.  Near  the  northern 
entrance  were  the  beds  of  the  garrison,  a  hos- 
pital, and  a  small  cemetery.  With  what  the 
British  mines  had  accomplished  at  Messines 
still  fresh  in  their  memories,  the  French 
could  not  afford  to  be  content  with  merely 
capturing  the  summit  of  the  spur ;  for  the 
Germans  could  have  accumulated  high-explo- 
sives in  the  cave  and  blown  them  sky-high 

The  operation,  therefore,  consisted  of  a 
fight  below  and  a  fight  above  ground.  Hard 
by  the  monument  to  commemorate  Napoleon's 
victory  at  Craonne  in  1814  was  a  machine- 
gun  emplacement  of  the  Germans.  It  was  so 
near  to  the  French  trenches  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  smash  it  with  explosive  shells, 
the  back  action  of  which  would  have  taken 
effect   on   the    French   trenches.     Liquid   fire, 


200 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


FRENCH    SOLDIERS    EXAMINING    THE    PROPERTY    OF    DEAD    GERMANS 

IN    A    CAPTURED    FARM. 


the  French  Commander  decided,  should  be 
employed  to  put  the  machine-guns  out  of 
action.  Before  the  attack  the  heavy  guns 
shelled  the  roof  and  the  entrances  to  the 
cavern.  Holes  were  thus  made  in  the  roof, 
and  its  main  northern  entrance  was  blocked 
up. 

On  June  25,  after  a  short  but  violent  artil- 
lery preparation,  detachments  of  Gaucher's 
Division  on  the  summit  advanced  in  three 
bodies  at  6.2  p.m.  The  liquid  fire  from  the 
flame -projectors  just  failed  to  reach  the 
machine-gunners.  These,  however,  stifled  by 
the  smoke  and  blistered  by  the  heat,  took 
refuge  in  the  cavern  only  to  find  it  filled  with 
poison  gas.  On  the  right  80  men  who  had 
volunteered  for  the  dangerous  work  passed  in 
two  groups  through  the  enemy's  trenches  and 
established  a  couple  of  posts  on  the  edge  of 
the  spur  commanding  a  wide  view  of  the  valley 
of  the  Ailette,  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  north. 
Three  companies  in  the  centre  carried  the  first 
three  German  lines,  but  the  troops  on  the  left 
after  gaining  their  objectives  were  so  heavily 
counter-attacked  that  four  hours  later  they 
retired,  leaving  the  centre  and  the  right 
exposed  to  a  flank  fire.  The  moment  was  a 
critical    one.     Officers    rallied    the    men,    and 


with  a  wild  cheer  they  again  rushed  forward 
and  drove  the  enemy  over  the  crest  of  the 
spur.  The  "  Hurtebise  Finger  "  had  once  more 
passed  into  the  possession  of  the  French. 

Some  150  half-dazed  Germans  were  dis- 
covered in  the  Dragon's  Cave.  The  total 
loss  to  the  enemy  amounted  to  close  on  1,000- 
killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  Chasseurs  and 
troopers  of  Nevers,  Macon,  and  the  Vosges 
had  the  credit  of  this  eminently  successful 
operation. 

During  the  night  of  June  28-29  the  enemy 
again  took  the  offensive.  An  intensive  bom- 
bardment west  of  the  Hurtebise  region  preceded 
the  charge  of  a  Westphalian  regiment  in  the 
Cerny  region.  North-east  of  Cerny  the  West- 
phalians  penetrated  the  French  lines,  but  were- 
speedily  ejected.  They  renewed  their  attacks 
on  the  morning  of  the  29th  with  some  slight 
success.  At  nightfall  the  struggle  was  renewed 
on  the  summit  of  the  La  Bovelle  spur.  Sup- 
ported by  flame-throwers  they  dug  themselves, 
in  in  a  salient  south  of  La  Bovelle  Farm 
which  had  been  completely  flattened  out  by 
the  bombardment.  On  July  1  a  Lippe  batta- 
lion east  of  Cerny  on  a  front  of  550  yards 
traversed  by  the  Ailles-Paissy  road,  occupied 
the  site  of  a  line  of  French  trenches.     Attempt- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


•2(11 


Rig  to  advance  farther  they  were  severely 
hammered  by  our  Ally's  batteries.  Great 
havoc  was  wrought  in  their  ranks  and  they 
were  brought  to  a  standstill.  Towards  evening 
the  French  counter-attacked  and  recovered 
their  original  line.  The  ground  was  covered 
with  German  corpses 

Simultaneously  with  the  offensive  between 
Cerny  and  Ailles,  on  June  29,  several  Bavarian 
battalions,  preceded  by  shock-troops,  attacked 
in  the  plain  at  the  foot  of  the  eastern  end  of 


the    Hog's    Back      They    endeavoured     time- 
after   time   to    carry    a   salient   south-east    of 
Corbeny  on  both  sides  of  the  Laon-Reims  road. 
The  waves  of  assault  caught  by  the  French  bar- 
rages failed  to  reach  the  trenches  at  any  point. 
There  was  also  fighting  the  same  day  north- 
west of  Reims  of  a  desultory  character,  and  on- 
the  30th  between  Reims  and  the  Moronvilliers- 
massif  the  Germans  ineffectually  attacked  east 
of  Fort  de  la  Pompelle  and  north  and  north-east. 
of  Prunay. 


ENTRANCE  TO  THE  DRAGON'S  CAVE. 


202 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


On  July  2,  at  6.30p.m.,  the  Germans  delivered 
another  series  of  violent  attacks  east  of  Cerny, 
on  both  sides  of  the  Paissy-Ailles  road.  The 
fight  swayed  to  and  tro  throughout  the  night 
of  the  2nd-3rd  and  ended  with  the  complete 
defeat  of  the  enemy. 

Undeterred  by  the  series  of  reverses  suffered 
by  him  north  of  the  Aisne  since  April  16,  the 
Crown  Prince,  at  7.30  p.m.  on  July  3,  delivered 
battle  on  a  front  of  some  12  miles  from  a  point 
on  the  plateau  dominated  by  Fort  de  Mal- 
maison  to  the  Chevreux  Woods,  just  below  the 
crest  aDove  Craonne.  General  von  Bohm  was, 
as  before,  the  German  local  commander.  In 
von  Bohm's  intention  the  battle  was  to  be  a 
surprise,  and  only  half  an  hour  was  allowed  for 
the  artillery  to  play  on  the  French  trenches. 
The  infantry,  preceded  by  shock-troops,  this 
time  with  knapsacks  on  their  backs,  an  indication 
that  victory  was  expected,  advanced  from  their 
cover  at  8  p.m.  The  main  efforts  were  made 
east  of  Froidmont  Farm,  west  and  soutn-east 
of  Cerny,  round  Ailles  and  on  the  Casemates  and 
California  plateaux.  Von  Bohm's  design  was 
to  dislodge  the  French  from  the  whole  of  the 
summit  of  the  Hog's  Back  and  to  drive  them 
back  along  the  spurs  or  down  the  valleys  leading 
to  the  Aisne. 

Five  or  six  divisions,  totaling  about  50,000  to 
60.000  men,  were  employed  in  the  attack.  One 
of  these  had  just  arrived  from  the  Russian 
front,  a  tact  revealed  to  the  French  leader  by 
a  deserter.  This  caused  him  to  anticipate  an 
immediate  assault  and  to  take  the  necessary 
precautions  for  meeting  it.  He  himself  was  in 
the  front  line  to  encourage  his  men  ;  one  of  his 
colonels  of  artillery  the  day  before  went  to  the 
trenches  to  regulate  the  fire  of  the  gun*  when 
the  battle  opened.  Consequently  Von  Bohm's 
surprise  did  not  succeed.  A  minute  or  so  after 
the  German  hurricane  bombardment  began  it 
was  answered  by  an  even  more  violent  tornado 
of  shells  from  the  French  guns.  The  barrage 
and  counter-battery  work  of  our  ally's  artillery 
was  a  masterpiece,  and  in  the  region  of  Cerny 
and  on  the  California  plateau  the  waves  of 
Germans  were  almost  literally  annihilated.  At 
a  few  points  they  managed  to  penetrate,  but 
they  were  speedily  bombed  or  bayoneted.  Four 
battalions  which  had  emerged  from  the  Forest 
of  Vauclerc  and  had  gained  three  small  salients 
were  driven  out  almost  immediately  by  the 
Bretons  on  the  Casemates  plateau.  An  enemy 
group  held  ready  in  a  trench  with  fixed  bayonets 
did  not  tlare  to  emerge  irurnf  .their  cover  and 


were  killed  or  wounded  by  French  grenadiers, 
who  flung  down  700  bombs  at  them.  At  10  p.m. 
the  fighting  died  down.  Piles  of  corpses  and 
numbers  of  mutilated  but  living  men,  some  of 
them  boys  of  19,  lay  before  the  French  parapets 
The  next  day,  July  4,  Von  Bohm's  guns  again 
opened,  but  his  infantry  was  not  sent  forward. 
The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  carried  a  salient 
east  of  Cerny,  strongly  held  by  the  enemy. 

For  the  next  few  days  the  weather  was 
stonily  and  the  Hog's  Back  became  coated 
with  a  thick  layer  of  glutinous  mud.  This 
assisted  the  French  wherever  they  held  the 
northern  crest  of  the  ridge,  as  the  slopes  descend- 
ing to  the  Ailette,  up  which  the  Germans  had  to 
come,  became  slippery  and  impassable. 

Von  Bohm  under  the  circumstances  deter- 
mined to  strike  his  next  blow  on  the  wider  Mal- 
maison  plateau.  From  the  ruins  of  the  fort  and 
from  those  of  the  water-tower  of  Les  Bovettes  to 
its  east  the  Germans  had  excellent  views  towards 
the  Aisne  Valley.  Between  the  fort  and  the 
water-tower  was  a  mound  called  the  Pantheon, 
after  the  long-disappeared  farm  of  that  name. 
Manure  and  rubbish  heaps  and  the  foundations 
of  buildings  alone  showed  where  the  farm  had 
once  been.  The  French  lines  here  formed  a 
salient,  and  Von  Bohm  decided  to  carry  it  as  a 
preliminary  to  clearing  the  French  off  the  whole 
of  the  Malmaison  height.  To  mystify  his 
enemy,  he  arranged  that  just  before  the  assault 
on  the  Pantheon  a  feint  should  be  made  north 
and  east  of  Laffaux  Mill  towards  Mennejean 
Farm  by  storm-troops  from  Nassau  and  West- 
phalian  battalions.  On  a  two-mile  front 
between  the  Pantheon  and  the  environs  of 
Froidmont  Farm  he  concentrated  the  Lower 
Saxon,  Thuringian,  Bhineland  and  West- 
phalian  storm-troops  borrowed  from  a  neigh- 
bouring army,  and  a  dozen  or  so  battalions  of 
fresh  men.  These  were  provided  with  light 
trench-mortars,  machine-guns,  entrenching 
tools,  barbed  wire  and  everything  needed  to 
organize  a  position  against  counter-attacks. 
The  frightful  losses  incurred  in  the  last  battle 
from  the  French  guns  in  the  half-hour  whick 
preceded  the  attack  led  him  to  order  the 
infantry  to  advance  the  moment  the  German 
artillery  opened  fire. 

On  the  night  of  July  7  all  was  ready  and  at 
3.45  a.m.  on  Sunday,  July  8,  the  main  attack 
was  launched.  A  few  minutes  earlier  the 
fighting  had  begun  north  and  east  of  Laffaux 
Mill. 

At  the  Pantheon  the  French  garrison  was 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


•20:  J 


composed  of  chasseurs  In  the  dim  light  they 
perceived  small  columns  of  storm-troops  moving 
forward  by  the  Epaulette,  Pantheon  and 
Eeouvillon  communication  trenches.  Behind 
them  surged  a  thick  wave  of  infantry.  To  left 
and  right,  lines  of  Germans,  marching  shoulder 


and  shot  10  of  them.  Bombers  in  his  wako 
killed  or  wounded  the  incursionists  and  the 
trench  was  recovered.  At  9  a.m  a  second 
attack  was  delivered  ;  the  Germans,  however, 
were  scarcely  able  to  reach  the  barbed  wire. 
In  the  afternoon,  at  4  p.m.,  the  enemy,  heavily 


t  From  a  German  photog'aph. 

GERMAN    SHOCK-TROOPS    PREPARING    TO    STORM    A    POSITION. 


to  shoulder,  moved  to  encircle  the  salient. 
These  masses,  though  thinned  by  the  French 
shells,  flung  themselves  on  the  outnumbered 
chasseurs,  who  with  bombs  and  bayonets  put 
up  a  fierce  resistance.  On  the  right  two  French 
machine-guns  enfiladed  the  enemy.  One  jammed 
but  the  other  continued  firing  until  the  Ger- 
mans beat  a  retreat.  On  the  left  their  com- 
rades managed  to  enter  the  Meche  trench.  A 
chasseur  with  an  automatic  rifle  ran  forward 


reinforced,  once  more  renewed  his  assaults. 
Three  were  repulsed,  but  the  fourth  seemed 
about  to  succeed.  The  chasseurs  had  run  out  of 
bombs  and  their  rifles  were  choked  with  mud. 
Punching,  kicking  and  knifing  their  assailants, 
they  just  managed  to  hold  the  position.  Night 
fell,  supplies  of  bombs  arrived,  and,  when  at 
10  p.m.  the  enemy  again  advanced  he  was  met 
with  showers  of  grenades  which,  bursting,  blew 
holes  in  his  solid  masses.     The  wearied  chas- 


•204 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


GERMAN    OBSERVATION  -  POST    OF    CONCRETE,    OVERTURNED    BY    FRENCH 

ARTILLER1. 


=seurs  remained  masters  of  the  blood-stained 
•position.  They  had  lost  heavily,  but  not  so 
■heavily  as  the  foe  they  had  defeated. 

Meanwhile  between  the  ruins  of  Les  Bouvettes 
■and  the  Chevregny  spur  the  enemy  had  been  a 
little  more  fortunate.  He  had  secured  a  section 
of  the  French  trenches,  but  only  for  a  few  hours. 
On  Monday,  July  9,  our  Allies  counter-attacked 
with  admirable  dash,  and  recovered  1,600  yards 
of  them.  Against  his  great  casualties  von 
Bohm  could  set  nothing  but  the  gain  of  a  trifling 
scrap  of  ground. 

On  July  19,  when  the  German  counter- 
•offensive  in  the  East,  which  eventually  ended 
in  the  defeat  and  dissolution  of  the  Russian 
armies,  commenced,  the  Crown  Prince  again 
set  von  Bohm's  army  in  motion.  The  5th 
Division  of  the  Prussian  Guards  were  flung 
in  thick  waves  against  the  French  position 
between  Hurtebise  Farm  and  the  north-east 
of  Craonne.  Von  Bohm  hoped  by  storming  the 
Vauclerc,  Casemates  and  California  plateaux, 
that  the  French  on  the  centre  of  the  Hog's 
Back,  with  their  left  threatened  by  the  enemy 
round  Fort  de  la  Malmaison,  would  be  forced 
to  retire  on  the  Aisne,  and  a  great  victory 
<co\ild  then  be  claimed  by  the  Germans. 
Alarmed  at  the  preparations  being  made  by 
Sir   Douglas   Haig   and    General    Anthoine    in 


Flanders,  the  German  Higher  Command  did  not 
hesitate  to  sacrifice  divisions  in  the  Craonne 
region,  trusting  that  a  success  there  might 
reduce  Petain  and  Haig  to  the  defensive  during 
the  autumn. 

For  six  continuous  days  the  battle,  which 
began  on  the  19th,  raged  in  its  very  circum- 
scribed area.  On  a  front  of  just  over  three 
miles  300  or  more  German  guns  were  concen- 
trated, and  all  the  other  pieces  within  range 
from  the  valley  of  the  Ailette  eastwards  across 
the  Laon-Reims  road  to  Berrieux  and  thence 
southwards  through  Juvincourt  to  the  Aisne 
east  of  Berry-au-Bac  were  turned  upon  the 
narrow  plateaux,  i.e.,  upon  a  space  of  less  than 
a  square  mile.  Seldom  had  the  endurance  of  t  ho 
French  been  so  severely  tested.  The  Casemates 
and  California  plateaux  were  only  some  .TOO 
yards  broad.  The  troops  on  them  had  to  fight 
in  whirlwinds  of  rocks,  shrapnel  and  shell-frag- 
ments. The  situation  of  the  Germans  was  no 
better.  The  French  heavy  and  field  artillery 
deluged  the  northern  slopes  with  high-explosive 
and  shrapnel.  Barriers  of  bursting  shells  out- 
side the  battle-field  showed  where  the  French 
and  German  gunners  were  mutually  trying  to 
put  out  of  action  the  batteries  opposed  to  them. 
Overhead  the  aeroplanes  moved  in  conflict  amid 
showers  of  anti-aircraft  shells. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


205 


On  the  19th  abovit  noon  five  regiments  of  the 
Prussian  Guard,  preceded  by  shock-troops, 
mounted  bravely  through  the  French  barrage 
and,  after  frightful  losses,  reached  the  crest  of 
the  Hog's  Back.  They  wore  hurled  backwards 
from  the  Vauclerc,  Casemates  and  California 
plateaux,  but  Brandenburgers  managed  to 
■cling  to  700  yards  of  French  trench  between 
the  two  last-mentioned  table-lands.  At  8.30 
p.m.  the  assaults  were  renewed  by  the  Guards 
and  Brandenburgers,  and  the  struggle  continued 
till  an  advanced  hour  of  the  night.  The  French 
defended  themselves  with  magnificent  valour. 
When  day  broke  the  situation  was  unchanged, 
but  the  northern  slopes  and  the  crests  were 
covered  with  the  dead  and  dying.  On  the  20th 
and  21st  the  Germans  between  Fort  de  la  Mal- 
maison  and  the  Hurtebise  Farm  attacked, 
north  of  Braye,  south-west  and  south-east  of 
Cerny,  and  south  of  Ailles.  At  the  first  of  these 
points  they  were  speedily  repulsed,  and  south- 
west of  Cerny  the  assault,  supported  by  flame- 
throwers, failed.  South-east  of  Cerny,  however, 
the  enemy  twice  penetrated  the  French  first 
trench  on  a  front  of  300  yards.  On  each  occa- 
sion a  vigorous  counter-attack  sent  him  flying. 
South  of  Ailles  two  assaults  were  repulsed  by 
bombing. 


Sunday,  July  22,  saw  a  renewal  of  the  battle 
for  the  Vauclerc,  Casemates,  and  California 
plateaux.  The  Prussian  5th  Reserve  Division 
and  the  15th  Bavarian  Division  had  boon 
brought  up  to  support  the  Guards.  At 
4  a.m.  a  furious  bombardment  opened,  and 
an  hour  later  the  Guards,  with  the  Prussian 
troops  on  their  left  and  Bavarians  on  their 
right,  mounted  to  the  assault.  The  atmosphere 
that  day  was  remarkably  clear,  and  the 
French  artillery  wrought  terrible  execution 
among  the  clearly  defined  masses  struggling 
upwards.  Between  Hurtebise  Farm  and  the 
Casemates  plateau  the  German  waves  were 
literally  torn  to  pieces  as  soon  as  they  left 
their  cover.  On  the  Casemates  and  California 
plateaux  the  French  flung  back  the  enemy 
with  bayonet  and  grenade  ;  but  still  charge 
succeeded  charge  through  the  long  summer's 
day,  and  well  into  the  night.  The  enemy  was 
finally  expelled  from  the  Casemates,  though 
on  the  California  plateau  he  secured  a  footing 
in  the  northern  trench.  All  attempts,  however, 
to  enter  the  French  support  trenches,  were 
bloodily  repulsed,  some  of  the  Prussian  regi- 
ments losing  half  their  effectives. 

The  next  day  (Monday,  July  23)  there  was  a 
lull  in  the  infantry  fighting,  but  the  bombard  - 


[French  official  pkolt  grafh. 

ENTRANCE    TO    A    GERMAN    SUBTERRANEAN    STRONGHOLD. 


206 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


*J 

* 

• 

A    FRENCH    RAID    ON    THE    CHEMIN-DES-DAMES :    "OVER    THE   TOP." 


inent  of  the  plateaux  continued  with  unabated 
violence.  The  bare  top  of  the  ridge  was  swept 
by  a  continuous  tempest  of  heavy  shells  from 
both  sides.  On  the  morning  of  the  24th 
Touraine  and  Marne-et-Loire  troops  were  sent 
forward  and,  in  spite  of  the  desperate  resistance 
made  by  the  Germans,  recaptured  all  the  lost 
ground  on  the  California  plateau  with  the 
exception  of  a  small  and  completely  wrecked 
work,  and  ejected  the  enemy  from  the  Case- 
mates plateau  and  its  environs.  Several 
counter-attacks  were  repulsed  on  that  and  the 
next  day,  when  at  5  a.m.  an  ineffective  assault 
on  the  California  plateau  failed.  The  six  days' 
battle  for  the  Vauclerc,  Casemates,  and  Cali- 
fornia plateaux  had  resulted  in  a  decisive  victory 
for  our  Allies. 

While  this  battle  was  ending  the  enemy  again 
turned  his  attention  to  the  section  of  the  Hog's 
Back  between  the  Vauclerc  plateau  and  Fort 
de    la    Malmaison.     On    the    23rd    he    twice 


ineffectually  attacked  north-west  of  Braye 
The  next  morning  he  advanced  between 
Cerny  and  Ailles  only  to  be.  repulsed.  At 
7  p.m.  on  the  25th  a  whole  division  was  launched 
in  successive  waves  Detween  Ailles  and  the 
eastern  environs  of  Hurtebise  Farm,  while 
another  division  supported  the  attack. 

During  the  night  and  the  next  day,  the 
26th ,  the  struggle  continued.  Round  Hurtebise 
Farm  the  enemy  was  mowed  down  by  the 
French  guns,  but  south  of  Ailles  some  progress 
was  made  by  the  Westphalian  regiments.  On 
the  night  of  the  27th-28th  the  Germans  attacked 
on  the  entire  Braye -Che  vregny  spur  front 
and  in  the  Hurtebise  region.  They  were 
everywhere  beaten  back  with  heavy  losses. 
At  nightfall  on  July  28  they  vainly  assaulted 
the  French  position  west  of  Hurtebise  Farm 
on  a  front  of  650  yards.  The  next  day  at 
dawn  our  Allies  counter-attacked  between 
the  west  of  Ailles  and  Hurtebise  Farm.     At  all 


itfi 


i 


r 


A    FRENCH    RAID:     THE    RAIDEKS    PASS    THE    WIRE    ENTANGLEMENTS. 
A  wounded  man  is  seen  returning  to  the  trenches. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


207 


points  they  made  progress.  In  the  afternoon 
at  3  p.m.  another  German  assault  in  the 
Hurtebise  region  was  frustrated  by  the  French 
artillery  and  infantry  fire. 

So  far  then  from  having  reversed  the  decision 
of  the  Battle  of  Craonne-Reims,  the  Crown 
Prince  and  General  von  Bohm  in  June  and 
July  1917  had  suffered  on  the  Chemin-des- 
Dames  ridge  a  succession  of  bloody  defeats, 
costing  them,  perhaps,  100,000  men  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured.  That  no  successes 
of  the  least  importance  had  been  gained 
north  of  the  Aisne  was  evidenced  by  the  fol- 
lowing telegram  sent  on  July  27  by  the  Kaiser 
to  Hindenburg : 

From  the  battlefields  of  Galicia,  where  my  troops, 
in  their  unresting  advance,  have  won  fresh  laurels, 
I  recall  with  a  grateful  heart  tho  unforgettable  deeds 
of  my  armies  in  the  West  in  repelling  the  enemy  with 
tenacious  perseverance.  Above  all,  I  think  of  my 
brave  troops  in  Flanders,  who  have  for  weeks  been 
the  target  of  the  most  violent  artillery  fire,  and  who 
dauntlessly  await  future  assaults.  My  confidence, 
like  that  of  the  Fatherland,  whose  frontiers  they  are 
defending  against  a  world  of  enemies,  is  in  them.  May 
God  be  with  us. 

Had  the  Crown  Prinee  been  winning  it  is 
Unlikely  that  his  father  would  have  forgotten 
to  bracket  his  victory  with  those  undoubtedly 
gained  against  the  Russians.  On  June  21 
when  reviewing  troops  on  the  Western  Front 
he  said  : 

I  express  to  the  troops  gathered  here  my  fullest 
appreciation  of  their  conduot  and  my  firm  confidence 
that  they,  as  hitherto,  and  wherever  they  may  be 
employed,  will,  trusting  in  God,  do  their  duty  and 
succeed  in  gaining  the  peace  for  the  Fatherland  which 
we   need   for  its   further   development. 

The  Kaiser  concluded  : 

I  am  especially  delighted  to  be  able  once  more  to  con- 
gratulate my  well-tried  Dragoon  Regiment  of  Bayreuth 
of  Hohenfriedberg  fame.  When  in  the  late  summer  of 
1916  I  sent  the  Borecke  squadron  to  Rumania  I  gave  it 
on  the  way  ray  order  to  maintain  at  all  costs  the  old 
tradition  wherever  it  might  be,  and  to  gain  fresh  laurels 
if  possible.  The  regiment  fulfilled  the  expectations  of 
its  Supreme  War  Lord,  and  accomplished  deeds  which 
will  please  Old  Fritz  up  there  in  the  Elysian  Fields. 
May  it  remain  so.  We  shall  not  loose  our  hold  until  a 
happy  peace  is  gained.* 

That  Frederick  the  Great  would  have  been 
equally  pleased  with  the  butchery  of  the 
Prussian  Guards  on  the  siopes  oi  the  Vauclere, 
Casemates,  and  California  plateaux  seems 
hardly  probable. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  recount  the  proceedings 

*  The  Battle  of  Hohenfriedberg  was  fought  on  June  4, 
17  4").  Ten  squadrons  oi  the  Bayreuth  Dragoons 
(1,500  men)  charged  through  a  gap  in  the  Prussian 
line  and  drove  back  tho  wavering  Austrian  infantry  with 
great  loss. 


on  the  left  wing  of  the  Allies  in  the  periotl 
between  the  Battle  of  Messines  and  the  opening 
of  the  Third  Battle  of  Ypree. 

King  George  and  Queen  .Mary  paid  the  soldiers 
a  visit  in  the  early  part  of  July,  and  were 
received  with  great  enthusiasm.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  such  visits  did  a  great  deal 
to  hearten  up  the  troops.     Before  they  arrived 


[OJjkial  photograph. 

THE    KING'S    VISIT   TO    FRANCB. 
Bidding  farewell  to  General  Petain. 

General  Allenby  had  handed  over  the  Third 
Army  to  Sir  Julian  Byng  and  set  out  for 
Palestine  to  take  command  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force  destined  at  the  end  of  the  year 
to  capture  Jerusalem.  It  may  here  be  not  out 
of  place  to  recall  to  the  reader  the  services  and 
career  of  this  distinguished  officer. 

General  Sir  Edmund  Henry  Hynman  Allenby 
was  born  in  1861  ana  was  gazetteu  as  a  lieu- 
tenant to  the  Inniskilling  Dragoons  in  May 
1882,   in   which   he  passed   all    his   regimental 


208 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


THE    ALLIED    LINE    IN    JUNE    1917. 

service  until  he  reached  the  rank  of  major. 
Proceeding  with  his  regiment  to  South  Africa 
he  first  saw  active  service  in  the  Bechuanaland 
Expedition  of  1884-5  under  Sir  Charles  Warren. 
Promoted  captain  on  January  10,  1888,  he 
assisted  at  the  suppression  of  the  rising  in 
Zululand.  From  March  1889  to  March 
1893  he  was  adjutant  of  his  regiment.  In 
May   1897  he  became  a  major. 

The  South  African  War,  when  he  com- 
manded his  regiment  from  April  1900  to 
January  1901  gave  Allenby  a  wider  oppor- 
tunity of  showing  that  he  was  a  daring  and 
resourceful  officer.  In  the  latter  month  he  was 
given  the  command  of  a  column,  and  distin- 
guished himself  in  the  operations  round  Coles- 
berg.  When  Roberts  dispatched  French  to 
relieve  Kimberley,  Allenby  accompanied  the 
latter.  He  was  present  at  the  Battle  of 
Paardeberg  and  at  the  actions  of  Poplar  Grove, 
Dreifontein,  Karee  Siding  and  Sand  River. 
After  Pretoria  was  captured  he  was  with  the 
army  which  drove  Kruger  into  Portuguese 
territory.  Under  Kitchener,  who  had  replaced 
Roberts,  Allenby  was  constantly  employed, 
serving  with  French  and  Babington  against 
De  la  Key  in  the  last  days  of  1900.  In  Novem- 
ber  of  that  year  he  had  been  given  the  brevet 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel.  The  next  year 
(1901).   French    assigned    to    him    one    of    the 


columns  operating  in  the  Eastern  Transvaal 
(January  to  April).  In  June  he  was  transferred 
to  the  Western  Transvaal.  During  September 
he  and  his  column  were  railed  to  Dundee  in 
Natal  to  help  oppose  Botha.  After  Botha's 
retreat  from  Natal,  Allenby's  column,  consisting 
of  480  Scots  Greys,  550  Carabiniers,  and  "  O  " 
Battery  R.H.A.,  four  guns,  one  pom-pom  (E 
Sect.),  was  sent  to  Standerton  and  placed  under 
General  Bruce  Hamilton.  Allenby  took  a 
prominent  part  in  the  campaign  (March-April 
1902)  against  Botha  just  previous  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace.  By  the  end  of  the  war  he  had 
been  three  times  mentioned  in  dispatches,  was 
made  a  brevet  colonel  and  received  the  Com- 
panionship of  the  Bath.  Although  the  fighting 
was  not  of  a  very  serious  character,  still  the 
varied  experience  in  South  Africa  was  of  great 
value  in  training  for  the  command  of  still  larger 
forces  in  his  next  campaign. 

On  August  2,  1902,  Allenby  received  the 
substantive  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  on  being 
posted  to  the  5th  Lancers,  which  he  commanded 
till  1905,  when  he  became  a  substantive  colonel 
in  the  army  and  was  given  (as  Brigadier-general) 
the  4th  Cavalry  Brigade  in  the  Eastern  District. 
In  April  1910  he  was  made  Inspector  of 
Cavalry,  having  been  promoted  to  Major- 
general  in  September  1909. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  1914  he  went  to 
France  with  the  cavalry  and  became  an  Army 
Corps  Commander  in  October.  He  was  then 
made  a  temporary  Lieutenant-general  and 
received  the  substantive  rank  on  January  1, 
1916.  In  1915  he  was  made  a  K.C.B.,  and  he 
was  subsequently  given  the  command  of  the 
Third  Army,  and  in  1917  selected  for  the  com- 
mand of  the  Egyptian  Expeditionary  Force. 

On  June  10  Sir  Hubert  Gough's  Fifth  Army, 
the  left  wing  of  which  had  been  engaged  in  the 
combats  round  Bullecourt  described  in  Chapter 
CCXXIIL,  came  into  line  on  the  left  of  the 
Second  Army,  occupying  the  trenches  from 
Observatory  Ridge  to  Boesinghe.  It  was 
destined  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  Third 
Battle  of  Ypres.  Simultaneously  with  the 
transfer  of  Gough's  forces  from  the  devastated 
region  to  Flanders,  the  Fourth  Army,  com- 
manded by  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson,  moved  north- 
wards, its  place  west  and  north-west  of  St. 
Quentin  being  taken  by  the  French,  and  the 
Third  Army,  still  commanded  by  Allenby, 
extended  its  right  wing  in  the  direction  of 
Cambrai.     Ten  days  later  (June  20)  the  British 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    W AH. 


209 


relieved  the  French  between  St.  Georges  and 
the  North  Sea,  and  on  J  une  15  General  Anthoine 
with  the  French  First  Army  replaced  the  Bel- 
gians holding  the  line  from  Boesinghe,  the 
extreme  left  of  Gough's  Fifth  Army,  andNord- 
schoote,  south  of  Dixmude,  on  the  Yperlee  Canal. 
To  mask  as  far  as  possible  the  complicated 
movements  connected  with  the  shifting  of  these 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  troops,  Sir  Douglas 
Haig,  while  the  preparations  for  his  great  offen- 
sive at  Ypres  were  being  finished,  maintained 
an  offensive  attitude  at  various  points  between 
Ypres  and  St.  Quentin.     On  June  12,  in  the 


north-east  to  south-west  across  and  south  of 
the  canal  before  Hollebeko.  German  counter- 
attacks on  the  15th  for  the  recovery  of  the 
earthwork  and  these  trenches  broke  down. 

The  enemy  in  these  combats  had  lost  over 
150  prisoners,  one  howitzer,  four  field  guns,  and 
seven  machine-guns. 

Simultaneously  we  continued  to  press  t  he- 
Germans  in  the  salient  between  St.  Yves  and 
the  Lys.  South-east  of  Arras,  at  about  7.:i0 
a.m.  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Scottish  and 
Eastern  County  troops,  without  a  preliminary 
bombardment,   attacked   on  a   front   of    some 


FRENCH    TROOPS    ENCAMPED    PENDING    A    CHANGE    OH    SECTOR. 


morning,  our  line  was  slightly  advanced  south 
of  Lens  astride  the  Souchez  River,  17  prisoners 
and  three  machine-guns  being  captured,  and  a 
counter-attack  of  the  Germans  delivered  after 
dark  was  repulsed.  In  the  night  of  the  12th- 
1 3th  we  raided  the  enemy's  front  north-west  of 
St.  Quentin  at  Le  Verguier,  south-east  of 
Bullecourt,  at  Lagnicourt,  in  the  La  Bassee 
salient  and  north-east  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  On 
the  night  of  the  14th  the  small  oval  earthwork 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Ypres-Comines  canal, 
which  had  resisted  the  efforts  of  the  Londoners 
at  the  Battle  of  Messines,  was  at  last  reduced, 
together  with  certain   trenches  running  from 


three-quarters  of  a  mile  and  carried  the  high- 
ground  east  of  Monchy-le-Preux,  known  as  Infan- 
try Hill,  capturing  175  Bavarians,  two  officers, 
and  a  couple  of  machine-guns.  The  survivors 
of  the  German  garrison  fled  down  the  communi- 
cation trenches  to  the  Vert  and  Sart  Woods.  At 
night  and  during  the  morning  of  the  15th  the 
Gentian  positions  were  raided  east  of  Loos  and 
north-west  of  Bullecourt,  where  a  strong  point 
was  captured  and  retained.  Early  on  the  m  >rn  - 
ing  of  the  18th  shock-troops  dislodged  the  Scot- 
tish and  Eastern  Count  ies  men  from  parts  on  the 
edge  of  Infantry  Hill,  the  summit  of  which,  how- 
ever, remained  in  the  possession  of  the  British- 


210 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


The  sultry  weather  was  now  broken  by  a 
series  of  violent  thunderstorms,  accompanied 
by  gales  of  wind  which  uprooted  trees  and  over- 
turned wagons,  thus  interfering  with  Sir  Douglas 
Haig's  preparations  for  the  Ypres  offensive. 

During  the  next  few  days  there  was  little  to 
report.  We  raided  on  the  night  of  the  18th-19th 
the  German  lines  south-east  of  Le  Verguier 
and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Bapaume- 
Cambrai  chaussee  and  gained  some  ground 
south  of  the  Cojeul  and  n^rth  of  the  Souchez 
rivers.  We  also  recovered  the  posts  lost  on 
the  edge  of  Infantry  Hill.  The  Germans  four 
times  counter-attacked  ineffectually  in  the 
Souchez  region.  Raids  of  the  enemy  east  of 
Epehy  and  at  Guillemont  Farm  hard  by,  were 
repulsed  on  the  night  of  the  21st-22nd  ;  ours 
south-east  of  Queant  and  in  the  Neuve  Chapelle 
and  Armentieres  regions  were  successful. 
The  next  evening  Portuguese  troops  *  south  of 

*  The  Portuguese  troops  have  been  dealt  with  to  a 
large  extent  in  Chapter  CXLVI.  Their  presence  on  the 
battlefields  of  France  was  a  gallant  proof  of  Portugal's 
adherence  to  her  old  ally,  England,  and  recalled  the  days 
of  the  Peninsular  War,  when  Portuguese  troops  had 
fought  so  well  in  Wellington's  Army.  Their  uniform  was 
cut  in  the  English  fashion,  but  the  colour  was  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  French  "  bleu  d'horizon,"  resembling  the 
French  grey  of  the  old  Indian  Light  Cavalry  regiments. 


Armentieres  killed  or  captured  the  whole  of  a 
German  patrol ;  the  enemy's  positions  north  of 
Gavrelle  were  entered  and  a  successful  operation 
near   Warneton   was   carried   out   by   us.     On 


GERMAN    OFFICERS    TESTING    A 
MACHINE-GUN    AT    OSTEND. 

the  morning  of  the  24th  parties  of  the  enemy 
approaching  our  trenches  south-east  of  Armen- 
tieres and  south-east  of  Gavrelle  were  caught 
by  our  guris 


[Official  plioUfrapll. 


ON    THE    CANAL    NEAR    BOESINGHE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


211 


BOESINGHE: 


['JJfiCiOt  p.Hotrgtaph. 

ARTILLERY    PASSING    AN    OLD    COMMUNICATION    TRENCH. 


The  night  of  the  24th-25th  and  the  day  of 
June  25th  were  distinguished  by  a  number  of 
minor  operations  on  our  part  between  Hooge 
and  Epehy  Below  the  Messines  ridge  the 
British  established  posts  on  the  Warneton 
road,  almost  a  mile  above  the  village  imme- 
diately in  front  of  the  Warneton  line.  The 
anxiety  of  the  Germans  in  this  quarter  was 
evidenced  by  the  fires  of  destruction  burning 
in  Comines.  East  of  Vermelles  a  raiding  party 
captured  two  mine-throwers,  and  remained 
some  two  hours  in  the  German  line,  bombing 
dug-outs  and  communication  trenches.  Near 
Roeux  on  the  banks  of  the  Scarpe  five  Germans 
were  captured,  while  south  of  the  Scarpe  our 
raids  near  Bullecourt  and  Epehy  gave  useful 
results.  Close  to  the  canal  side  at  Vendhuille 
the  garrison  of  a  redoubt  was  annihilated. 

It  was,  however,  on  the  outskirts  of  Lens 
that  the  most  successful  action  was  fought. 
A  stroke  at  Lens  was,  perhaps,  the  movement 
best  calculated  to  mystify  Prince  Rupprecht 
as  to  the  region  selected  for  the  coming  Anglo- 
French  offensive.  General  Home's  troops 
were  already  north,  west,  and  south  of  Lens, 
and  it  might  well  be  expected  that  the  British 
would  endeavour  to  eject  the  Germans  out  of 
that    important    mining    centre    before    they 


attempted  to  make  a  further  advance  north 
of  the  Lys. 

To  protect  Lens  the  enemy  had  been  busy 
blowing  up  the  roads  on  its  south  side  in  the 
Avion  area,  and  he  had  flooded  the  flat  land 
between  Lens  and  Avion  south  of  the  Souchez 
river.  A  lake  half  a  mile  broad  and  a  mile 
long  had  been  formed,  out  of  which  rose 
the  ruins  of  the  industrial  suburb  known  as 
"Cite  St.  Antoine.  The  immense  railway  yards 
there  were  under  water. >  Almost  every  build- 
ing in  the  Cite  du  Moulin,  the  western  suburb 
of  Lens,  had  been  levelled  to  the  ground  to 
give  the  garrison  of  the  city  a  good  field  of 
fire.  Similar  levelling  had  been  done  at  other 
points,  and  Lens  now  was  but  the  husk  of  a 
city. 

To  the  west  of  Lens  rose  a  hillock,  Hill  65, 
the  key  to  the  defences  on  that  side.  It  was 
strongly  fortified  above  and  below  ground, 
and  the  dug-outs  and  trenches  were  held  by 
detachments  of  the  Prussian  56th  Division, 
recruited  in  the  Rhineland.  On  Sunday, 
June  24,  in  the  evening  our  heavy  guns  deluged 
this  eminence  with  huge  shells.  After  two 
hours'  bombardment  South  Midland  troops 
wont  "  over  the  top,"  and,  meeting  with  little 
or  no  opposition,  seized  Hill  65.     In  vain  the 


212 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Canadian  War  Recoids. 

GERMAN    CONCRETE    EMPLACEMENTS    IN    LENS    SMASHED    BY 
CANADIAN    ARTILLERY. 


Rhinelanders  were  incited  to  counter-attack. 
They  were  promised,  if  they  were  successful, 
to  be  at  once  relieved,  but  their  moral  had  been 
sliaken  by  weeks  of  shell -induced  tension, 
and  they  could  not  be  prevailed  upon  to  do  so. 
The  loss  of  Hill  65  obliged  the  enemy  to 
withdraw  a  considerable  distance  south  of 
the  Souchez.  Soon  after  7  a.m.  on  the  25th,  in 
the  wake  of  a  violent  barrage,  our  troops 
stormed  the  brewery  on  the  Arras-Lens  road, 
and  to  the  southward  pushed  up  along  the 
railway  line.  Before  noon  they  were  less  than 
half  a  mile  south  of  Avion.  During  the  26th 
La  Coulotte,  a  village  on  the  Arras-Lens 
highway  due  west  of  Avion  between  the  Souchez 
and  Avion,  was  occupied  by  the  British. 
Thtis  the  enemy's  positions  astride  the  river 
on  a  front  of  two  miles  and  to  an  average 
depth  of  a  thousand  yards  had  been  secured. 
Meantime,  south  of  the  Scarpe  at  midnight  on 
Monday,  June  25,  some  500  yards  of  trenches 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  Sensee,  in  front  of 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles,  had  been  captured  by 
the  Durhams  after  a  heavy  bombardment 
and  gas  barrage.  A  battalion  of  Westphalians 
counter-attacked  while  the  North  Countrymen 
were  digging  themselves  in.  The  Durhams 
had  no  time  to  seize  their  rifles,  but  with 
uplifted  spades  felled  the  Westphalians,  most 
of  whom  were  lads  of  18  or  19,  inflicting  terrible 
wounds.  Storm  troops  were  brought  up  to  the 
support  of  the  cowed  Westphalians,  but  the 
Durhams    shot    them    down.     Later    a    third 


counter-attack  was  repulsed  by  shell-fire.  West 
of  Oppy  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  we  raided 
successfully,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  27th 
we  beat  off  a  German  party  south  of  Rcaux 
on  the  marshy  banks  of  the  Scarpe. 

The  operations  west  and  south  of  Lens 
caused  Prince  Rupprecht  to  imagine  that  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  set  great  store  on  immediately 
capturing  the  city.  In  the  German  communiqui 
of  June  27  it  was  stated  that  the  British  were 
"  attacking  the  Lens  salient."  On  June  28 
General  Home  in  the  evening  made  elaborate 
demonstrations  to  give  the  impression  that 
this  was  so.  On  a  12 -mile  front,  from 
Hulluch  to  Gavrelle,  gas,  smoke  and  thermit 
were  discharged  and  a  number  of  small  raids 
were  made,  together  with  real  attacks  on  a 
two  and  a-half  mile  front  astride  the  Souchez  and 
on  a  2,000  yards'  front  opposite  Oppy.  Further 
to  mystify  the  enemy  the  war  correspondents 
after  the  event  were  permitted  to  state  that 
there  were  "  four  simultaneous  but  disjointed 
minor  operations,"  a  statement  scarcely  likely 
to  take  in  the  masters  of  the  art  of  deliberate 
falsehood;  but  nevertheless  the  following  passage 
from  the  German  communiqvi  of  the  29th  seems 
to  prove  that  Prince  Rupprecht  was  completely 
deceived  by  General  Home's  demonstration. 

In  the  salient  west  and  south-west  of  Loos,  which 
had  long  since  been  abandoned  by  us  as  a  battle-ground, 
an  attack  by  strong  English  forces  was  launched  early 
in  the  morning  along  the  road  to  Arras.  It  proved  to 
be  a  thrust  in  the  void. 

In    the    evening,    after    drumfire,    several    divisions 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


213 


attacked  between  Hulluch  and  Mericourt,  and  from 
Fresnoy  to  Gavrelle.  Near  Hulluch,  as  well  as  between 
Loos  and  the  road  to  Lens  and  Li6vin,  the  enemy  were 
driven  back  by  our  fire,  and  as  a  result  of  our  counter- 
thrust.  West  of  Loos,  after  violent  fighting  with  our 
advanced  troops,  a  new  enemy  attack  was  not  carried 
out.  Near  Avion  a  first  assault  was  launched  with 
extraordinary  energy,  but  failed  completely.  The 
enemy  attacked  here  again  after  bringing  up  reinforce- 
ments. This  attack  also  was  frustrated  by  our  fire 
and  counter-thrust.  Between  Fresnoy  and  Gavrelle 
the  enemy  fed  with  a  continual  stream  of  fresh  troops 
his  storming  waves,  which  at  first  collapsed  with  heavy 
losses  under  our  artillery  activity. 

After  fierce  close-quarter  battles,  the  British  estab- 
lished themselves  between  Oppy  and  the  windmill  of 
Gavrelle  in  our  foremost  lines. 

Our  troops  fought  admirably.  The  enemy  suffered 
bloody  losses  against  our  well-organized  defence  and 
in  the  hand-to-hand  fighting. 

The  bombardment  began  soon  after  7  p.m. 
and  was  crushing  in  its  effect.  A  thousand 
guns  suddenly  opened  and  the  earth  trembled 
with  their  reverberations,  while  a  crown  of 
bursting  shells  was  formed  round  Lens. 
Directly  afterwards  heaven's  thunder  mingled 
with  that  of  the  guns.  The  day  had  been 
threatening  and  the  sky  was  overcast.  A 
violent  thunderstorm,  accompanied  by  tropi- 
cal   rain,    burst,    and    the     jagged     lightning 


illuminated  the  scene.  Through  storm,  smoke 
and  gas  the  British  advanced.  North  of  Lens, 
in  the  Loos  region,  English  troops  stormed 
certain  trenches  in  the  Cite  St.  Laurent  area. 
Here  the  men  of  the  Prussian  8th  Division 
fought  stubbornly  and,  as  the  attack  was  not 
intended  by  General  Home  to  be  pressed  home, 
it  soon  ended. 

Astride  the  Souchez  river  the  advance  was 
no  feint.  Early  in  the  morning  the  Canadians, 
south  of  the  river,  had  pushed  forward  on  the 
Arras-Lens  road  as  far  as  the  hamlet  of  Eleu 
dit  Leauvette,  below  that  point  had  entered 
the  southern  fringe  of  Avion,  and  farther  south 
had  occupied  a  trench  defended  by  detachments 
of  the  5th  Prussian  Grenadiers  beyond  the  rail- 
way. Above  Leauvette  the  Germans  had  de- 
stroyed the  bridge  across  the  Souchez.  With 
English  troops,  including  South  Midlands, 
north  of  the  river,  the  Canadians  in  the  drench- 
ing rain  resumed  their  forward  movement. 
The  South  Midlands  punished  severely  units 
of  the  11th  Reserve  Division,  which  had  relieved 
the  56th  Division  and  were  endeavouring  to 
reach  the  Cite  du  Moulin.     As  for  the  Canadians 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

HIDDEN    TREASURE    RECOVERED    AT    SOUCHEZ. 

The  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Souchez  are  carrying  away  money  whioh  had  been  buried  when 

the  inhabitants  fled  before  the  Germans. 


B5 

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t/i 
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a 

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z 

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a- 

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as 
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THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


215 


they  burst  into  Avion  and  bombed  and 
bayoneted  the  Germans  in  the  southern  and 
western  streets.  On  their  right  the  pit-heads 
of  Fosse  4  and  4  Bis  ds  Lievin  defended  by 
machine-guns  held  them  up.  They  swung  to  the 
left  of  these  and  established  themselves  on  a 
diagonal  line  striking  north-west  and  south-east 
through  the  wrecked  houses  of  Avion.  But  the 
pitheads  at  dawn  were  still  untaken.  Some 
prisoners  and  12  machine-guns  had  been 
secured  ;  on  a  front  of  four  miles  we  had 
advanced  in  depth  a  mile. 

Simultaneously  English  troops  from  the  East 
Midland  (among  them  the  Royal  Warwicks)  and 
Northern  counties  had  attacked  the  trenches 
west  and  south  of  Oppy.  They  were  held  by 
the  5th  Bavarian  Regiment,  which  offered  a 
stubborn  resistance.  Nevertheless,  all  were 
carried  and  240  prisoners  taken. 

On  June  30  heavy  rain  fell,  but  in  the  night 
north  of  Souchez  a  further  advance  was  made 
on  a  front  of  half  a  mile  west  and  south- 
west of  Lens.  During  July  raids  similar  to 
those  in  June  were  made  by  the  British  between 
Ypres  and  St.  Quentin,  and  the  Germans 
attempted  several  times  to  penetrate  our  lines 
In  most  of  the  combats  we  maintained  the 
upper  hand.  For  example,  in  the  small  hours 
of  July  23  the  Canadians  on  a  front  of  about 
fiOO  yards  south  of  Avion  reached  tho  high 
embankment  of  the  Avion-Mericourt  railway 
and  attacked  the  dug-outs  in  it.  As  the  enemy 
had  been  employing  gas  shells  on  the  previous 
afternoon  the  Canadians  wore  gas  masks 
After  bombing  the  dug-outs  and  capturing  60 
prisoners  they  returned  to  their  lines. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  were  success  - 
ful  on  a  few  occasions.  Thus  on  July  25,  in  the 
early  morning,  after  a  heavy  bombardment,  with 
the  assistance  of  flame-throwers  they  drove  in 
some  advanced  posts  on  Infantry  Hill.  But, 
taken  as  a  whole,  they  got  much  the  worst  of 
the  exchanges,  except  in  one  instance  now  to 
be  narrated. 

It  has  been  seen  that  on  June  20  the  British 
relieved  the  French  between  St.  Georges  and  the 
North  Sea.  Their  presence  round  Lombartzyde 
in  the  Dunes,  nine  miles  from  Ostend,  appears 
to  have  puzzled  Prince  Rupprecht  and  his  staff. 
They  may  have  imagined  that  they  would  act 
in  conjunction  with  some  force  to  be  landed  on 
the  coast  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  British 
fleet.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  German  leaders 
decided  to  drive  our  men  back  into  Nieuport 
and  across  the  canalised  Yser. 


We  were  in  a  difficult  position  The  front 
was  a  narrow  one,  our  backs  were  to  the  canal  j 
no  proper  trenches  or  dug-outs  could  be  made, 
water  being  so  close  to  the  surface  ;  and  our  only 
defences  were  breastworks  and  barbed  wire. 
A  dyke,  the  Geleede  Creek,  ran  perpendicularly 
aiross  our  front,  entering  the  Yser,  south-west 
of  Lombartzyde,  dividing  it  into  two 
sections.  If  the  bridges  over  the  creek  were 
smashed,  the  troops  in  the  left  section  could  not 
reinforce  those  in  the  right  and  vice  versd  .  if 
the    bridges    over    the    Yser    were    destroyed 


1988) 


Miles. 

0      iil Z 

r    ~t — i 1 


THE    GERMAN    SUCCESS    ON    THE 
YSER:     JULY    8,  1917. 

the  British  garrison  in  this  bridge-head  would 
be  isolated  At  first  sight  it  would  hav<=- 
seemed  good  policy  to  have  withdrawn  our 
men  from  so  exposed  an  area,  but  to  have 
done  so  would  have  meant  our  losing  control 
of  the  machinery  regulating  the  Yser  inunda- 
tions. Moreover,  if  the  Third  Battle  of  Ypres 
resulted  in  a  crushing  victory  for  the  Allies, 
the  possession  of  the  bridge-head  would  be 
of  great  value  to  us  when  pursuing  the  enemy 
should  he  evacuate  Ostend. 

On  the  evening  of  July  8  the  Germans  began 
a  systematic  and  heavy  bombardment  of  the 
British  position.  The  bridges  over  the  Geleede 
Creek  and  the  Yser  were  destroyed,  the  wire 
entanglements  torn  into  fragments,  and  the 
breastworks  levelled  to  the  ground.  At  7.45 
p.m.  on  July  10  German  Marines  and  other 
troops  were  sent  forward.  The  brunt  of  the 
attack  was  borne  by  the  King's  Royal  Rifles 


•21 G 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


■ 

*  +»LuJ/L 

«    li  mP^H.oHIkI 

»                                    T^rl                   wit       Jv  >^Mk 

^  JMk  & 

1 '  tt«                     EStf 

BjJjr^^Ef'    mmg^ 

FRENCH    TROOPS    LEAVING    THE    NIEUPORT    SECTOR 
On  being  relieved  by  the  British,  some  of  whom  are  seen  looking  on. 


holding  the  coast  end  of  the  line  with  the  North- 
amptons  on  their  right.  Six.  to  seven  hundred 
yards  behind  them  was  the  canal.  For  more 
than  an  hour  the  British  kept  the  Marines  at 
bay.  Most  of  them  died  fighting,  a  few  swam 
the  Yser  and  escaped.  The  enemy  had  cut 
of*  the  western  end  of  our  position  on  a  front 
of  1,400  yards  and  reached  the  right  bank  of 
the  Yser  near  the  sea,  but  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Geleede  Creek  he  was  driven  back. 

Such  was,  in  the  language  of  the  German 
communique  of  July  12,  "the  great  and  mag- 
nificent success"  of  July  10.  The  enemy 
claimed  to  have  captured  1,250  prisoners, 
including  27  officers,  but,  amongst  these,  were 
doubtless  counted  very  many  who  were  dead. 
On  the  13th  he  attempted  to  complete  his  plan 
by  attacking  south  of  Lombartzyde,  but  was 
repulsed.     The    attempt    was    again    repeated 


on  the  1 9th  with  the  same  result.  Tho  southern 
section  of  the  British  line  on  the  coast  covering 
Nieuport  remained  in  British  hands,  when  the 
Third  Battle  of  Ypres  opened. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  operations 
described  in  this  chapter  were  none  of  them  com- 
manding in  results.  But  regarded  as  a  whole 
they  were  not  unimportant.  Many  valuable 
points  were  seized,  and  the  moral  of  the  Allied 
troops  had  shown  itself  superior  to  that  of  their 
opponents.  The  Germans  had  lost  heavily  in 
killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  considerably  in 
material,  and  to  some  extent  in  terrain.  They 
had  never  been  able  to  follow  up  any  of  their 
minor  successes,  and  in  nearly  every  instance 
where  they  had  gained  ground  temporarily  they 
had  been  driven  out  of  it  again.  It  may  fairly 
be  said  that  the  result  of  the  fighting  in  June  and 
July  had  been  advantageous  to  the  Allies 


CHAPTER   CCXXV1II. 

VICTORIA  CROSSES  OF  THE  WAR. 

.     (iv.) 

Number  of  Awards — The  System  op  Announcement — Crosses  for  Skippers — The  Affairs 
of  Drifters  and  a  Smack — Naval  Awards — Captain  Bishop's  Glorious  Am  Deeds — Decora- 
tions for  Canadians — Batches  of  Awards — Single-Handed  Exploits — Guardsmen's  Bravery 
— Brigadier-General  Coffin — Individual  Hauls  of  Guns  and  Men — A  Faithful  Messenger 
— Cases  of  Extreme  Endurance — Grenadiers  and  Bombers — A  Stokes  Shell  Episode — 
Honours  for  Recipients  of  the  Cross — A  Captain's  Valiant  Defence — Similarity  of  Cases — ■ 
"  Extraordinarily  Good  Work  " — Attacks  on  "  Pell-Boxes  " — A  Colonel's  Cross — A 
Machine-Gunner's  Heroism — Thirty  Seconds'  "  Reckless  Bravery  "■ — More  Fine  Individual 
Deeds^-The  Australian  Imperial  Force — A  Hand-to-Hand  Fight — A  Carrier  of  Bandoliers 
— Bayonet-Charge  by  a  Highlander — Devotion  of  a  Tank  Leader — Posthumous  Awards — 
A  Corporal's  Fate — Fearless  Leadership — Cavalry  Dash — The  Victoria  Cross  Warrants. 


PARLIAMENT,  at  the  end  of  October 
1917,  passed  a  memorable  vote  of 
thanks  to  the  Navy  and  Army  for 
their  war  services.  In  the  House  of 
Lords  the  resolution  was  moved  by  Earl 
Curzon,  who,  in  dealing  with  the  work  that  the 
naval,  military  and  air  forces  had  done  spoke 
of  the  extraordinary  valour  of  all  ranks.  He  said 
that  to  the  Army  301  Victoria  Crosses  had 
been  awarded,  and  two  bars  to  the  Crosses  ; 
and  28  Crosses  had  been  awarded  to  the  Navy. 
These  honours  were  included  in  a  list  of  awards 
which  justified  the  speaker  in  declaring  that 
some  of  the  deeds  for  which  they  were  given 
were  almost  past  belief,  and  as  time  went  on 
would  be  enshrined  in  legend  and  form  lessons 
to  be  taught  to  the  future  generations  of  our 
race. 

It  was  remarked  in  Chapter  CLI.  (Victoria 
Crosses  of  the  War. — I.)  that  the  new  system 
of  warfare  had  produced  new  types  of  fighters 
— the  airman,  the  submarine  man,  the  bomber, 
the  trenchman,  doers  of  "  things  unattempted 
yet  in  prose  or  rhyme,"  and  that  statement 
held  good  for  all  the  period  during  which 
Vol.  XV.— Part  189.  217 


the  great  honour  of  the  Cross  was  conferred. 
Modern  war's  appalling  forms  had  evolved  a 
race  of  heroes  whose  acts  had  no  rivals  out  of 
the  realms  of  mythology ;  the  very  Sagas 
paled  before  the  glamour  of  the  tales  of  deeds 
for  which  the  Cross  was  charily  awarded. 

Every  fresh  development  had  given  British 
fighting  men  the  chance  to  show  that  they  were 
fully  qualified  to  meet  and  master  it  when 
victory  was  needed  ;  and  now  there  was  to 
come  the  hero  of  the  drifter,  the  smack,  the 
"  pill-box  "  and  the  tank.  It  was  all  wonderful 
and  varied  to  the  point  of  numbing  receptivity 
and  understanding  ;  yet  what  even  to  imagina- 
tion seemed  impossible  proved  achievable 
through  British  enterprise  and  courage 

The  announcements  of  the  awards  were 
made  for  the  most  part  in  considerable 
batches,  and  in  a  few  cases  the  official  story 
was  of  unusual  length ;  but  there  were 
instances  when  nothing  was  added  to  the  bare 
statement  that  the  Cross  had  been  given  for 
certain  special  work,  these  being  invariably 
in  connexion  with  naval  operations.  While 
expediency    undoubtedly    justified    the    with- 


218 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Official  photograph. 


A    DRIFTER    FLEET    AT    SEA. 


holding  of  details  in  such  cases  it  was  difficult 
to  understand  the  official  method  of  consistently 
using  the  term  "  enemy."  The  system  was 
well  enough  adapted  to  earlier  days  of  the 
Cross,  when  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  the 
identity  of  the  opponent,  but  it  no  longer 
applied  to  the  very  greatly  altered  circumstances 
of  the  war,  and  it  was  impossible  to  suppose 
that  the  use  of  the  word  "  German "  could 
have  conveyed  information  of  any  value  to  the 
foe.  If  a  British  fighter  slew  and  captured 
Germans  wholesale  in  straightforward  conflict 
— and  British  fighters  did  both — no  one  knew 
the  humiliating  fact  sooner  or  better  than  the 
Germans  themselves,  and  no  official  craft  in 
employing  the  expression  "  enemy "  could 
conceal  the  knowledge  from  them.  Yet 
"  enemy "  was  persistently,  tediously  and 
unilluminatingly  employed,  and  it  was  left  to 
the  reader  to  choose  from  the  German,  Austrian, 
Turkish  or  Bulgarian  forces ;  the  selection 
being  a  matter  of  personal  knowledge  or 
inference. 

It  was  not  until  the  war  had  entered  upon 
its  fourth  year  that  a  Victoria  Cross  was 
bestowed  upon  a  member  of  that  vast  a,rmy  of 
auxiliaries  who  swept  and  patrolled  the  seas 
in  such  small  craft  as  steam  trawlers  and 
drifters.  For  the  most  part  the  crews  of  these 
vessels  were  fishermen,  and  they  had  done 
inviiluable  service  in  sweeping  the  seas  clear 
of  mines,  in  hunting  and  capturing  submarines, 
and  in  patrol  and  other  work.  These  services 
had  involved  constant  peril  and  hardship,  with 
inevitable  heavy  losses      There  had  been  many 


meetings  with  the  enemy,  encounters  in 
near  and  distant  waters,  and  in  all  these 
fights  the  toilers  of  the  deep  sea  had  upheld 
their  splendid  reputation  for  courage  and 
endurance. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  fights  of  all  was 
that  in  the  Straits  of  Otranto  on  the  morning 
of  May  15,  1917.  The  circumstances  were  very 
unusual,  the  forces  very  unequal,  and  the  odds 
heavily   in   favour  of  the   enemy     The  Allied 


SKIPPER    JOSEPH    WATT. 

drifter  line  was  attacked  by  Austrian  light 
cruisers,  one  of  which,  at  about  100  yards 
range,  hailed  the  drifter  Gowanlea  and  ordered 
the  skipper,  Joseph  Watt,  to  stop  and  abandon 
her.  The  Gowanlea  was  a  typical  drifter,  with 
a  length  of  keel  of  less  than  90  feet,  a  depth  of 
less  than    10  feet,   and  a  breadth   of   18  feet 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE     WAR. 


219 


SECOND    HAND    T.   W.   CRISP 

Returning  from  the  Palace  wearing  his  own  D.S.M. 

and  his  father's  V.C.  and   D.S.C. 

(5  inches.  She  had  as  crew  a  mere  handful  of 
men,  and  as  armament  one  gun  that  was 
almost  toy-like  in  appearance.  The  size 
and  power  of  the  Austrian  cruiser  were  not 
stated,  but  at  her  stone's-throw  distance 
she  must  assuredly  have  towered  above  her 
tiny  prey. 

It  was  one  thing  for  an  Austrian  to  give  an 
order  to  a  British  fisherman  turned  fighter,  but 
a  very  different  thing  for  that  stanch  seaman 
to  obey.  So  far  from  heeding  the  enemy, 
Skipper  Watt,  though  instant  destruction 
seemed  certain,  ordered  full  speed  ahead  and 
called  upon  his  crew  to  give  three  cheers 
and  fight  to  a  finish.  The  very  audacity 
of  the  defiance  might  well  have  taken 
the  Austrian  aback  ;  at  any  rate,  fire  was 
opened  on  the  cruiser.  Then  began  a  short . 
sharp,  curious  fight.  Anything  in  the  shape 
of  a  cruiser  should  have  had  a  very  easy  and 
simple  task  in  destroying  the  drifter,  but  the 
Austrian  found  his  opponent  so  little  to  his 
liking  that  he  was  content  to  maintain  a 
running  fight,  the  running  on  his  part  being 
towards  the  safest  part  of  the  battle-area.  One 
round  only  had  been  fired  from  the  drifter's 
gun  when  the  weapon  was  disabled  at  the 
breech.  The  gun's  crew,  however,  in  spite  of 
heavy  fire,  tried  to  work  the  gun.  Luckily  for 
the  Gowanlea,  the  cruiser  passed,  and  then 
Skipper  Watt,  not  content  with  what  he  had 
done,  and  disregarding  his  own  damage,  took 
his  little  ship  alongside  another  drifter,  the 
Floandi,  which  was  in  worse  case  than  his  own, 
and  helped  to  remove  the  dead  and  wounded. 
It    was    for    his    gallantry    on    this    strenuous 


occasion  that  Skipper  Watt  received  the 
Victoria  Cross,  the  announcement  being  inado 
on  August  29,  1917. 

That  affair  of  drifters  in  the  Adriatic  showed 
the  sterling  quality  of  the  fishers'  mettle  :  it 
was  an  episode  which  appealed  with  special 
force  to  the  public  at  home,  but  there  was  soon 
to  be  given  the  story  of  another  fisher  V.C. 
hero  which,  in  some  respects,  made  an  even 
deeper  appeal,  for  it  contained  the  elements  of 
splendid  tragedy  and  sacrifice.  This  was  the 
story  of  Skipper  Thomas  Crisp,  a  fisherman  of 
Lowestoft.  The  tale  was  first  told  in  the 
House  of  Commons  by  the  Prime  Minister,  who 


-    SKIPPER    THOMAS    CRISP. 

was  paying  a  glowing  tribute  to  the  loyalty  and 
courage  of  the  fishermen  ;  on  November  2  the 
London  Gazelle  announced  the  posthumous 
grant  of  the  Cross  to  Crisp  and  the  award  of  the 
Distinguished  Service  Medal  to  his  son.  Second 
Hand  Thomas  William  Crisp.  The  details 
which  were  published  were  unusually  full. 

One  August  afternoon,  shortly  before  three 
o'clock,   the  smack  Nelson,   of  which  Skipper 

189—2 


220 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Crisp  was  in  command,  was  on  the  port  tack, 
with  her  trawl  down.  The  skipper  was  below, 
packing  fish,  and  one  hand  was  on  deck,  cleaning 
fish  for  next  morning's  breakfast.  The  skipper 
came  on  deck  and  seeing  an  object  on  the 
horizon  he  examined  it  closely  and  sent  for  his 
glasses.  What  he  saw  caused  him  to  shout 
almost  instantly,  "  Clear  for  action  !  Sub- 
marine !  "  He  had  scarcely  uttered  the  words 
when  a  shot  fell  on  the  smack's  port  bow,  only 
about  100  yards  away.  Thereupon  the  motor 
man  got  to  his  motor,  the  hand  on  deck  dropped 
his  fish  and  went  to  the  ammunition-room,  and 
the  other  hands,  at  the  skipper's  orders,  let 
go  the  warp  and  put  a  "  dan  "  on  the  end  of 


LIEUT.    CHARLES    G.    BONNER,    D.S.C., 
R.N.R. 

it — the  "  dan  "  being  the  buoyed  flag  which 
trawlers  use  to  locate  shoals  of  fish  or  other 
objects.  The  gunlayer — the  Nelson  had  only 
a  three-pounder  as  armament — held  himself 
in  readiness  until  Crisp  said,  "  It's  no  use 
waiting  any  longer  ;  we'll  have  to  let  them 
have  it !  "  Brave  words  indeed,  worthy  of  the 
deep  sea  man  and  the  name  of  the  smack  which 
he  commanded.  Meanwhile  the  submarine, 
which  was  in  the  distance,  in  almost  absolute 
security,  was  shelling  the  smack.  The  earlier 
of  the  shots  missed  their  target,  but  the  fourth 
shell  went  through  the  port  bow,  just  above 
the  water-line.  "  Then  the  skipper  shoved 
her  round."  Again  the  shells  screamed,  but 
there  was  no  confusion,  not  even  when  the 
seventh  shell  came,  passed  through  the  skipper's 
side,  and  out  through  the  deck  and  the  side  of 
the  smack.  That  terrible  missile  ended  the 
life  of  the  skipper  and  his  vessel,  for  while  he 


fell  to  the  deck  with  shattered  body  the  smack 
was  sinking  rapidly.  Undaunted  by  what 
seemed  like  certain  fate,  the  mortally  wounded 
man's  son,  who  was  second  hand,  or  mate,  of 
the  Nelson,  took  charge,  the  firing  contimiing 
and  the  vessel  being  dragged  down  by  the  sea 
that  surged  into  her. 

The  gunlayer  went  to  his  skipper  to  see  if 
he  could  help  him  with  first  aid ;  but  the 
gallant  Crisp  knew  that  he  was  far  beyond  the 
well-meant  help.  "  It's  all  right,  boy,  do  your 
best,"  he  said.  Then,  with  the  ruling  passion 
of  duty  strong  in  death,  he  said  to  his  son,  who 
also  had  gone  to  him,  "  Send  a  message  off." 
Obedient  to  the  order,  the  words  were  sent : 
"  Nelson  being  attacked  by  submarine.  Skipper 
killed.  Send  assistance  at  once."  That  having 
been  done,  the  skipper  spoke  again  to  his  son, 
"  Abandon  ship.  Throw  the  books  overboard." 
As  a  forlorn  hope,  the  son  asked  his  father  if 
they  might  lift  him  into  the  boat,  but  the  dying 
skipper  knew  too  well  how  futile  such  an  effort 
at  salvation  would  be,  and  his  only  answer  was. 
"Tom,  I'm  done.  Throw  me  overboard." 
And  so,  on  the  shattered,  reddened  deck  on 
which  he  was  breathing  his  last,  they  had  to 
leave  him.  They  took  to  the  small  boat,  and 
in  15  minutes  the  Nelson  went  down,  taking 
her  commander  with  her.  During  that  day 
and  night  and  the  next  day  and  night  until 
morning  broke  the  survivors  rowed  and  were 
blown  about  in  the  little  craft ;  then  they  were 
saved,  and  the  story  of  the  Nelson  and  her 
skipper  was  made  known. 

Many  valiant  men  and  lads  had  won  the 
Cross  on  land  and  sea  and  in  the  air,  but  there 
had  been  no  more  splendid  exhibition  of  true 
loyalty  and  courage  and  resource  than  Skipper 
Thomas  Crisp's.  There  was  not  and  could  not 
be  for  him  the  fierce  joy  of  ordinary  battle,  or 
the  exultation  of  a  skiltul  sea  or  air  combat  ;  he 
was  trapped  to  death,  there  was  no  hope  of 
escape  or  rescue — yet  knowing  all  that  full  well 
he  died,  refusing  even  to  have  his  maimed  body 
taken  away  from  his  sinking  vessel,  lest  it 
should  delay  and  hamper  his  son  and  the  rest 
of  his  crew. 

The  official  story  of  Crisp's  achievement  did 
not  indicate  the  means  by  which  his  message 
was  sent ;  but  an  explanation  was  afforded 
subsequently  in  The  Times,  in  a  short  article 
describing  how  fighting  men's  lives  had  been 
saved  by  homing  pigeons.  It  was  pointed  out 
that  the  work  of  the  Government  pigeons  was 
sometimes  literally  a  matter  of  life  and  death 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


221 


to  our  fighters,  many  of  whom  owed  their  lives 
to  the  speed  of  the  birds.  Skipper  Crisp  was 
given  as  a  notable  instance — a  bird  flew  away 
with  his  appeal  for  help  for  the  crew. 

Simultaneously  with  the  award  of  the  Cross 
to  Skipper  Crisp  there  was  announced  the  award 
of  the  same  honour  to  Lieutenant  Charles 
George    Bonner,    D.S.C.,    R.N.R.,    and    Petty 


SETTING    OUT. 

Officer  Ernest  Pitcher.  No  details  were  given 
in  Bonner's  case  beyond  the  general  statement 
that  the  decoration  was  conferred  for  services 
in  action  with  enemy  submarines  ;  while  in  the 
case  of  the  petty  officer  it  was  stated  that  he 
had  been  selected  by  the  crew  of  a  gun  of  one 
of  H.M.  ships  to  receive  the  Cross  in  accordance 
with  the  Warrant  of  1856.  The  honours, 
decorations,  and  medals  which  were  awarded  at 
this  time  were  an  indication  of  the  persistent 
and  successful  war  which  had  been  waged 
against  enemy  submarines.  A  very  interesting 
item  in  the  list  was: — "Second  bar  to  the 
D.S.O. :— Captain  G.  Campbell,  V.C  ,  D.S.O. 
R.N." 

The  first  Cross  to  be  announced  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  war  was  to  an  airman,  a  distin- 
guished member  of  the  force  which  had  become 
known  as  the  "  cavalry  of  the  air,"  and  whose 
exploits  appealed  with  special  force  to  a  people 
who  above  all  things  valued  and  admired  dash 
and  enterprise  in  unfamiliar  circumstances — 
though  even  desperate  conflicts  high  in  the  air 
were  becoming  com  mon  happenirgs.  This  re 
cipient  was  Captain  William  Avery  Bishop, 
Canadian  Cavalry  and  Royal  Flying  Corps, 
who,  like  the  lamented  young  hero,  Captain 
Albert  Ball,*  had  already  won  the  D.S.O.  and 
the  M.C.  Here  again  was  a  case  exemplifying 
such  astounding  daring  and  success  that 
without  the  bare  official  facts  to  prove  it  the 

•  Chapter  CCV.,  p.  362. 


story  would  have  been  incredible  ;  for  Bishop, 
single-handed,  attacked  enemy  aerodromes, 
engaged  the  enemy  against  overwhelming  odds, 
did  much  material  damage,  and  finally  returned 
in  safety  to  his  station.  Bishop  had  been  sent 
out  to  work  independently.  First  of  all  he 
flew  to  an  aerodrome,  but  finding  no  machine 
about  he  flew  on  to  another  aerodrome  some 
three  miles  south-east,  which  was  at  least  twelve 
miles  on  the  other  side  of  the  line.  On  the 
ground  were  seven  machines,  some  with  their 
engines  running.  From  a  height  of  only  about 
50    feet   the    captain    attacked    them,    and    a 


CAPTAIN    W.    A.    BISHOP, 
Canadian  Cavalry  and  R.F.C. 

mechanic  who  was  starting  oae  of  the  engines 
was  seen  to  fall.  One  of  the  machines  got  off 
the  ground,  but  at  a  height  of  60  feet  Bishop 
fired  fifteen  rounds  into  it  at  very  close  range 
and  it  crashed  to  the  ground.  His  action 
apparently  goaded  the  enemy  into  further 
effort,  for  a  second  machine  got  off  the  ground. 
This  aeroplane  had  little  better  luck  than  its 
predecessor — Bishop,  at  a  range  of  150  yards, 
fired  30  rounds  into  it,  and  the  machine  fell 
into   a   tree.     Twu   more   machines   then   rose 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


from  the  aerodrome,  and  at  a  height  of  1,000 
feet  Bishop  engaged  one  of  them,  emptying  the 
rest  of  his  drum  of  ammunition  with  such  good 
effect  that  the  machine  crashed  300  yards 
from  the  aerodrome.  The  captain  had  now 
accounted  for  three  machines  ;  into  the  fourth 
he  emptied  a  whole  drum  of  ammunition  ;  then, 
and  not  till  then,  he  made  for  his  station.  The 
demoralizing  effect  upon  the  enemy  of  this 
single-handed,  skilful  and  inflexible  onslaught 
was    such    that    although    four    hostile    scouts 


THE    KING    PRESENTING    HHR 
HUSBAND'S    V.C.    TO    MRS.    ACKROYD. 

were  about  1,000  feet  above  Bishop  for  some- 
thing like  a  mile  of  his  return  journey,  "  they 
would  not  attack."  These  gallant  achieve- 
ments aroused  the  Canadian  people  to  en- 
thusiasm, and  this  they  showed  in  October 
1917,  when  Bishop,  who  had  been  promoted 
major,  was  married  in  Toronto. 

In  passing  it  may  be  noted  that  at  the  end 
of  1917  7,000  decorations  had  been  conferred 
on  members  of  the  Canadian  Expeditionary 
Force  for  valour  in  the  field  and  outstanding 
war  service,  these  awards  including  19  Vic- 
toria Crosses — seven  to  officers  and  twelve 
to  men. 


CAPTAIN    (Temp.  Lieut.-Colonel)    BERTRAM 
BEST-DUNKLEY, 
Lancashire  Fusiliers. 

Before  being  killed  in  action,  Temporary 
Captain  Harold  Ackroyd,  M.C.,  M.D.,  R.A.M.C, 
attached  to  the  Royal  Berkshire  Regiment, 
saved  the  lives  of  many  wounded  officers  and 
men,  his  courage  being  shown  in  circumstances 
of  the  greatest  peril,  for  he  worked  in  the  open, 
under  heavy  fire  from  artillery,  machine  guns, 
and  small   arms.     The  announcement  of  Ack- 


SECOND    LIEUT.  (Acting  Captain)  THOS. 
COLYER-FERGUSSON, 
Northamptonshire  Regiment. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


223 


royd's  Cross  was  made  known  on  September  0, 
1917,  and  with  it  were  published  eight  other 
awards.  Of  this  total  of  nine  no  fewer  than 
five     were     posthumous     honours,     Ackroyd's 


SERGEANT    ROBERT    BYE, 
Welsh  Guards. 

fallen     comrades    being   Captain    (T.    Lit. -Col.) 
Bertram   Best-Dunkley,   Lancashire     Fusiliers, 
Second    Lieutenant    (acting    Captain)    Thomas 
Riversdale     Colyer-Fergusson,      Northampton- 
shire    Regiment,     Corporal    James    Llewellyn 
Davies,    Royal    Welsh    Fusiliers    (Nantymoel, 
Glamorgan),     and    Private    Thomas     Barratt, 
South       Staffordshire       Regiment       (Tipton). 
Lieutenant-Colonel      Best-Dunkley,      by      his 
bravery  and  devotion  to  duty  while  in  com- 
mand of  his  battalion,  added  to  the  already 
great  reputation  which  the  Lancashire  Fusiliers 
had     won     in     the     war.     Colyer-Fergusson's 
conduct    was    an    "  amazing    record    of    dash, 
gallantry  and  skill,  for  which  no  reward  can 
be  too  great,  having  regard  to  the  importance 
of  the  position  won."     In  his  case  great  skill 
and  bravery  were  shown  when  plans  had  gone 
wrong,    and    the    tactical    situation    had    de- 
veloped contrary  to  expectation.     Confronted 
with  serious  difficulties,  he  rose  to  the  situation 
with  an  energy  and  ability  which  saved  it,  and 
he  .performed   many   acts   of   personal   valour 
before  he  was  killed  by  a  sniper.     Davies  was 
another    example    of    single-handed    exploits 
He  fought  successfully  with  the  bayonet,  then, 
wounded   though   he   was,    he   led   a   bombing 
party    in    an    assault    on    a    defended    house, 
killing  a  sniper  who  was  harassing  his  platoon. 
The  corporal  was  so  severely  wounded  that  he 
subsequently  died.     Barratt  also  did  fine  work 


against  hostile  snipers,  some  of  whom,  at  close 
range,  he  stalked  and  killed.  He  had  safely 
regained  our  lines  when  he  had  the  misfortune 
to  be  killed.  Barratt  <vas  a  fine  marksman, 
and  his  accurate  shooting  caused  many  casual- 
ties to  the  enemy  and  prevented  their  advance. 
He  was  an  orphan  who  belonged  to  the  little 
parish  of  Tipton.  Some  of  his  early  years 
were  spent  in  the  workhouse,  and  in  that 
institution  his  father  died.  Running  away 
from  it,  the  boy  was  cared  for  by  his  grand- 
mother, who  at  the  time  of  his  death  made  her 
living  by  selling  fruit  in  a  poor  district. 

A  Welsh  Guardsman — Sergeant  Robert  Bye 
(Penrhiwceiber,  Glamorgan)  showed  the  "  most 
remarkable  initiative."  He  saw  that  two 
enemy  blockhouses  were  causing  a  good  deal 
of  trouble,  and  rushing  at  one  of  them  he  put 
the  garrison  out  of  action  ;  then  he  rejoined 
his  company,  and  went  forward  to  the  assault 
of  the  second  objective.  When  the  troops  had 
gone  forward  to  the  attack  of  a  third  objective, 
and  a  party  was  detailed  to  clear  up  a  line  of 
blockhouses    which     had     been    passed,    Bye 


CORPORAL    JAS.    LLEWELLYN    DAVIES, 
Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers. 

volunteered  to  take  charge  of  the  party.  He 
accomplished  his  object  and  took  many  pri- 
soners ;  and  he  made  more  prisoners  when  he 
afterwards  advanced  to  the  third  objective. 
In  all  his  operations  he  gave  invaluable  help 
to  the  assaulting  companies.  f 

A  Coldstream  Guardsman — Private  Thomas 
Witfaam  (Burnley) — also  very  greatly  dis- 
tinguished himself  during  an  attack  and  was 
the  means  of  saving  many  lives  and  helping 
the  whole  line  to  advance.     An  enemy  machine 


224 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


gun  was  enfilading  the  battalion  on  the  right. 
and  Withani,  on  his  own  initiative,  immediately 
worked  his  way  from  shell  hole  to  shell  hole 
through  our  own  barrage,  and  rushed  the  gun 
and  captured  it,  with  an  officer  and  two  other 
ranks. 


PRIVATE    THOS.    WITHAM, 
Coldstream  Guards,  shows  bis  Victoria  Cross. 

A  Gordon  Highlander — Private  George 
Mcintosh  (Buckie,  Banffshire) — being,  with 
his  company,  under  machine-gun  fire  at  close 
range,  unhesitatingly  rushed  forward  under 
heavy  fire,  and  reaching  the  emplacement  threw 
a  Mills  bomb  into  it,  killing  two  of  the  enomy 
and  wounding  a  third.  Entering  the  dug-out 
afterwards,  he  found  two  light  machine  guns, 
which  he  carried  back  with  him. 

Corporal  Leslie  Wilton  Andrew,  Infantry 
Battalion,  New  Zealand  Force,  completed  this 
list  of  nine.  In  his  case  the  objective  was  the 
very  unattractive  one  of  a  machine-gun  which 
had  been  located  in  an  isolated  building.  On 
leading  his  men  forward  he  unexpectedly 
encountered  a  machine-gun  post  which  was 
holding  up  the  advance  of  another  company 
Immediately  attacking  this,  he  captured  the 
gun  and  killed  several  of  the  crew  ;  then  ho 
turned  his  attention  to  the  isolated  building 
and  took  this  post,  killed  several  of  the  enemy, 
and  put  the  rest  to  flight. 

That  self-sacrificing  hero,  Captain  Noel 
Godfrey  Chavasse,*  headed  a  list  of  11  recipients 
of  the  Cro«s  whose  acts  were  recorded  in  the 
Londm  Gazette  of  September  14.  1917.  That 
list  ivlso  contained  the  name  of  another  officer 

•  Chapter  CLXXXV.,  p.  170  ;    Chapter  COV.,  p   is94. 


who  was  to  be  added  to  the  higher,  ranks  of 
the  roll.  This  was  Lieut.-Col.  (T.  Brig.-Gen.) 
Clifford  Coffin,  D.S.O.,  R.E.  A  conspicuous 
feature  of  this  award  was  the  absence  of  any 
special  exploit  or  act  such  as  those  for  which 
the  Cross  had  been  usually  given  :  there  was 
no  hand-to-hand  encounter  to  record,  no 
dashing  assault  on  a  "  pill-box  "  or  a  band  of 
Germans — the  record  was  one  of  calm  consistent 
bravery  under  the  heaviest  fire  from  both 
machine-guns  and  rifles,  and  in  full  view  of  the 
enemy.  Brigadier-General  Coffin  showed  an 
utter  disregard  of  personal  danger.  He  walked 
quietly  from  shell  hole  to  shell  hole,  "  giving 
advice  generally,  and  cheering  the  men  by  his 
presence."  His  was  one  of  the  notable  cases 
of  stedfast  courage  and  unconquerable  cheerful- 
ness on  the  field  of  battle,  and  it  was  "  generally 
agreed  that  Brigadier-General  Coffin's  splendid 
example  saved  the  situation,  and  had  it  not 
been  for  his'  action  the  line  would  certainly 
have  been  driven  back." 

Extraordinary  bravery  and  persistence  were 
shown  by  Lieut.  John  Reginald  Noble  Graham, 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  attached 
Machine  Gun  Corps,  who  was  four  times  wounded 
before  loss  of  blood  forced  him  to  retire.  He 
accompanied  his  guns  across  open  ground 
under   very    heavy   fire,    he    helped    to    carry 


CORPORAL    (afterward  Sergeant)   LESLIE 

W.   ANDREW, 

Infantry  Battalion,   New  Zealand  Force. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


225 


ammunition,  ho  disabled  his  gun  so  that  it 
should  be  useless  to  the  enemy,  and  he  brought 
a  Lewis  gun  into  action  with  excellent  effect 
until  all  the  ammunition  was  finished.  His 
courage  and  skilful  handling  of  his  guns  held 
up  a  strong  enemy  attack  which  threatened  to 
roll  up  the  left  flank  of  the  brigade. 

A  remarkable  case  was  that  of  Second 
Lieut.  Denis  George  Wyldbore  Hewitt,  Hamp- 
shire Regiment,  who,  while  waiting  for  the 
barrage  to  lift,  was  hit  by  a  piece  of  shell,  which 
exploded  the  signal  lights  in  his  haversack  and 
set  fire  to  his  equipment  and  clothes.  Hewitt 
extinguished  the  flames,  then,  in  spite  of  his 
wound  and  the  severe  pain  he  was  suffering,  he 
led  forward '  the  remains  of  a  company  and 
captured  and  consolidated  his  objective.  This 
gallant  young  officer  was  subsequently  killed 
by  a  sniper  while  inspecting  the  consolidation 
and  encouraging  his  men. 

Seven  machine  guns  and  45  prisoners  were 
captured  in  a  blockhouse  which  was  assaulted 
in  the  most  courageous  manner  by  Sergeant 
Edward  Cooper,  King's  Royal  RifleCorps  (Stock- 
ton). From  the  blockhouse,  which  was  only  250 
yards  away,  machine-guns  were  holding  up  the 
advance  of  a  battalion  on  the  sergeant's  left 
and  causing  serious  loss  to  his  own  battalion. 
Cooper,    with   four   men,   immediately   rushed 


THE    KING    DECORATING    PRIVATE 
GEORGE    MclNTOSH, 

Gordon  Highlanders. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL    CLIFFORD    COFFIN    LEAVING    BUCKINGHAM    PALACE 
AFTER  RECEIVING    THE   VICTORIA    CROSS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SERGEANT    EDWARD    COOPER 
Receives  his  V.C.  from  the  King. 

towards  the  blockhouse,  though  heavily  fired 
on,  and  having  got  within  about  100  yards  of 
it  he  ordered  his  men  to  lie  down  and  fire  at 
the  blockhouse.  This  firing  failing,  the  sergeant 
wasted  no  further  time  he  rushed  straight 
at  the.  machine  guns  and  fired  his  revolver  into 
an  opening  in  the  blockhouse,  whereupon  the 
machine-guns  ceased  firing,  the  garrison  sur- 
rendered and  the  intrepid  sergeant  and  his 
little  band  were  to  the  good  to  the  extent  of 
the  seven  weapons  and  45  captives  mentioned. 
Though  three  times  wounded  in  two  days, 
Sergeant    Alexander  Edwards,   Seaforth    High- 


ATTACK    ON    A    BLOCKHOUSE. 

landers  (Lossiemouth),  showed  the  coolness, 
resource,  and  bravery  which  won  for  him  the 
Cross.  He  located  a  hostile  machine-gun  in 
a  wood,  and  leading  some  men  against  it  with 
great  dash  and  courage  killed  all  the  team  and 
captured  the  gun.  Having  done  this,  and 
though  badly  wounded  in  the  arm,  he  crawled 
out  to  stalk  a  sniper  who  was  causing  casualties, 
and  killed  him  also;  then,  when  only  one 
officer  was  left  with  the  company,  the  sergeant 
led  his  men  on  until  the  farthest  objective,  on 
which  the  success  of  the  operation  depended, 
was  captured.  Edwards,  while  continuing  his 
brave  and  most  useful  work,  was  twice  wounded 
on  the  following  day. 

"  Extraordinary  courage  and  boldness " 
were  credited  to  Sergeant  (acting  O.Q.-M.S.) 
William  H.  Grimbaldeston,  King's  Own  Scottish 
Borderers  (Blackburn),  whose  conduct  resulted 
in  his  capturing  36  prisoners,  six  machine-guns 
and  one  trench  mortar,  and  enabled  the  whole 
line  to  continue  its  advance.  This  Borderer  saw 
that  the  unit  on  his  left  was  held  up  by  machine- 
gun  fire  from  a  blockhouse.  He  was  wounded, 
but  he  collected  a  small  party  to  fire  rifle 
grenades  on  the  blockhouse  ;  then  he  got  a 
volunteer  to  help  him  with  rifle  fire.  After 
these  preliminaries  he  pushed  on  towards  the 
blockhouse  and  in  spite  of  very  heavy  fire 
reached  the  entrance,  from  which  he  threatened , 
with  a  hand  grenade,  the  machine-gun  teams 
inside.  One  after  another  these  defenders  were 
forced  to  surrender,  leaving  to  the  sergeant's 
credit  the  heavy  total  which  has  been  men- 
tioned. 

Very  similar  to  this  achievement  was  the  act 
of  Sergeant  Ivor  Rees  (Llanelly),  who  gave  to 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


227 


SERGEANT  (Acting  C.Q.M.S.) 

W.  H.  GRIMBALDESTON, 

King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers. 


SERGT.    ALEX.     EDWARDS, 
Seaforth  Highlanders. 


SERGEANT    IVOR    REES, 
South  Wales  Borderers. 


the  South  Wales  Borderers  another  Cross. 
Having  worked  up  to  about  20  yards  from  a 
machine-gun  which  was  doing  a  great  deal  of 
damage,  the  sergeant  rushed  forward  towards 
the  team,  shot  one,  bayoneted  another,  then 
bombed  the  large  concrete  emplacement,  killing 
five  men,  taking  30  prisoners,  including  two 
officers,  and  capturing  an  undamaged  machine- 
gun. 


coming.  Single-handed,  Skinner  bombed  and 
took  the  first  blockhouse  ;  then,  leading  his  six 
men  towards  the  other  two  blockhouses,  he 
skilfully  cleared  them,  taking  no  fewer  than 
60  prisoners,  three  machine-guns,  and  two 
trench  mortars. 

Corporal  (L.-Sgt.)  Tom  Fletcher  Mayson, 
Royal  Lancaster  Regiment  (Sileeourt,  Cumber- 
land), did  not  trouble  to  wait  for  orders  when  a 


SECOND    LIEUT.    D.    G.    W.    HEWITT, 
Hampshire  Regiment. 

Blockhouse  operations  also  gave  opening  for 
the  display  of  uncommon  valour  and  resource 
by  Sergeant  (Acting  C.S.-M.)  John  Skinner. 
King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers  (Pollokshields, 
Glasgow).  This  non-commissioned  officer's 
deeds  were  in  perfect  keeping  with  those  of  his 
brother  Borderer,  Urimbaldeston.  Skinner  was 
wounded  in  the  head,  but  he  collected  six  men 
and  resolutely  worked  round  the  flank  of  three 
blockhouses  from  which  machine-gun  fire  was 


LIEUT.    J.    R.    N.    GRAHAM, 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders. 

machine-gun  was  barring  the  attack  of  his 
platoon,  but  instantly  made  for  the  weapon  and 
bombed  it  ovit  of  action.  He  wounded  four  of 
the  team,  and  the  remaining  three  fled.  The 
sergeant  followed  them  to  a  dug-out,  and  there 
he  killed  them  with  his  bayonet.  Later,  single- 
handed,  he  tackled  a  machine-gun  and  killed  six 
of  the  team,  crowning  his  work  by  taking  charge 
of  an  isolated  post  and  holding  it  until  ordered 
to  withdraw,  his  ammunition  being  exhausted. 

189—3 


228 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A  private  from  Leeds — Wilfrid  Edwards, 
King's  Own  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry,  and  one 
from  Sheffield — Arnold  Loosemore,  West  Riding 
Regiment — completed  this  list  of  September  14  ; 
both  cases  being  specially  noticeable  because 
of  the  brilliant  success  of  individual  effort. 
Edwards  showed  his  uncommon  courage  when 
under  heavy  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  from  a 
strong  conciete  fort.  Having  lost  all  his 
company  officers,  he  dashed  forward  at  great 
personal  risk,  bombed  through  the  loopholes, 


CORPORAL    (L..Sergt.)    T.    F.    MAYSON, 
Royal  Lancaster  Regiment. 


PRIVATE    ARNOLD    LOOSEMORE, 
West  Riding  Regiment. 


SERGEANT  (Acting  C.S.M.)  JOHN  SKINNER, 
King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers,  receives  his  Cross. 

surmounted  a  fort,  and  waved  to  his  company 
to  advance.  His  fine  example  "  saved  a  most 
critical  situation  at  a  time  when  the  whole 
battalion  was  held  up  and  a  leader  urgently 
needed."  It  was  more  than  brilliant — it  was 
uncommonly  successful,  for  Edwards  took 
three  officers  and  30  other  ranks  prisoner  in  the 
fort.  Subsequently  he  did  most  valuable  work 
as  a  runner,  and  guided  most  of  the  battalion 
out  through  very  difficult  ground. 

The  "  Havercake  Lad,"  Loosemore,  as  reck- 
less of  personal  safety  as  his  fellow  Yorkshire 
fighter,  crawled  through  partially  cut  wire, 
dragging  his  Lewis  gun  with  him,  and  single- 
handed  he  dealt  with  a  strong  party  of  the 
enemy,  of  whom  he  killed  about  20.  Imme- 
diately afterwards  his  Lewis  gun  was  blown 
up  by  a  bomb,  and  three  of  the  enemy  rushed 
him  ;  but  he  shot  them  all  with  his  revolver. 
Several  more  snipers  were  shot  by  him,  though 
he  was  each  time  exposed  to  heavy  fire.  Then 
Loosemore  performed  one  of  the  acts  for  which 
alone  the  Victoria  Cross  had  been  frequently 
awarded — on  returning  to  his  original  post  he 
brought  back  a  wounded  comrade  under  heavy 
fire  and  at  the  risk  of  his  life. 

Of  nine  recipients  of  the  Cross  whose  awards 
were  announced  in  the  London  Gazette  of 
October  17,  1917,  one,  Sergeant  Frederick 
Hobson,  Canadian  Infantry  Battalion,  was 
killed  in  the  fighting  which  gave  him  his  honour, 
and  two  died  of  wounds — Temporary  Second - 
Lieutenant  Hardy  Falconer  Parsons,  Glouces- 
tershire Regiment,  and  Private  Harry  Brown, 
Canadian  Infantry  Battalion.  Though  Hob- 
son  was  not  a  gunner  he  rushed  from  his  trench 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


229 


on  seeing  that  a  Lewis  gun  was  buried  by  a  shell 
and  that  with  the  exception  of  one  man  the 
crew  had  been  killed.  He  dug  out  the  gun 
and  got  it  into  action  against  the  enemy,  who 
were  advancing  down  the  trench  and  across  the 
open.     The  gun  jammed,  but  Hobson,  in  spite 


PRIVATE    WILFRID    EDWARDS, 
King's  Own  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry. 

of  wounds,  left  the  gunner  to  correct  the  stop- 
page and,  single-handed,  rushed  at  the  enemy 
with  bayonet  and  clubbed  rifle  and  held  them 
back  until  he  was  killed  by  a  rifle  shot.     His 
courage  and  resource  enabled  the  gun  to  be  got 
into  action  again,  and,  reinforcements  arriving, 
the   enemy   were   beaten   back.     Parsons   also 
greatly  distinguished  h'm.elf  in  a  single-handed 
exploit,  his  conduct  being  specially  noteworthy 
because  it  was  in  connexion  with  a  night  attack. 
A   strong   enemy   party   attacked    a   bombing 
post  which  was  held  by  the  subaltern's  com- 
mand.    The  bombers  holding  the  block  were 
forced  back,  but  Parsons  remained  at  his  post, 
and,  alone,  although  badly  scorched  and  burned 
by  liquid  fire  he  "  continued  to  hold  up  the 
enemy  with  bombs  until  severely  wounded." 
Private  Brown  must  be  added  to  the  very  small 
band  of  V.C.  heroes  whose  faithful  delivery  of 
all-important  messages  won  for  them  the  greatest 
honour.     He  and  another  soldier  were  ordered 
to  deliver  a  message   at  headquarters,   at  all 
costs.     A  position  had  been  captured,  and  the 
enemy    had    massed    in    force    and    counter- 
attacked.    The    situation    was    very    critical, 
all  wires  being  cut ;    and.it  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  get  word  back  to  headquarters. 
Brown's   comrade   was   killed   in   obeying   the 
orders,  and  Brown's  arm  was  shattered  ;    but, 


loyal  and  determined,  he  continued  his  way 
on  through  an  intense  barrage  until  he  reached 
the  close  support  lines  and  found  an  officer. 
Exhausted,  he  fell  down  the  dug-out  steps,  but 
was  able  to  hand  over  his  message  and  to  say, 
"  Important  message  !  "  Then  he  became 
unconscious  and  in  the  dressing-station  a  few 
hours  later  he  died. 

Three  cases  of  extreme  endurance  were 
furnished,  two  by  Irish  Guardsmen,  Lance- 
Sergeant  John  Moyney  (Rathdowney,  Queen's 
County)  and  Private  Thomas  Woodcock  ( Wigan). 
and  the  other  by  Corporal  Sidney  James  Day, 
Suffolk  Regiment  (Norwich).  The  cases  of  the 
Guardsmen  were  obviously  closely  related  to 
each  other.  Moyney  was  commanding  15  men 
who  formed  two  advanced  posts,  and  in  spite 
of  being  surrounded  by  the  enemy  and  having 
no  water  and  little  food,  he  held  his  post  for 
four  days  and  four  nights.  On  the  morning 
of  the  fifth  day  a  large  force  of  the  enemy 
advanced  to  dislodge  him.  Moyney  ordered 
his  men  out  of  their  shell  holes  and  taking 
the  initiative  he  bombed  the  advancing  enemy, 
while  he  used  his  Lewis  gun  with  great  effect 
from  a  flank.  On  seeing  that  he  was  surrounded 
by  superior  numbers  the  lance-sergeant  led 
his  men  back  in  a  charge  through  the  enemy 
and  reached  a  stream  which  lay  between  the 


TEMP.   SECOND   LIEUT.    H.    F.   PARSONS, 
Gloucestershire  Regiment. 

posts  and  the  line.  Here  he  instructed  his 
party  to  cross  at  once,  while  he  and  Private 
Woodcock  remained  to  cover  their  retirement. 
It  was  not  until  the  whole  of  his  force,  unscathed, 
had  gained  the  south-west  bank  that  the  lance- 
Bergeant  himself  crossed,  and  this  he  did  undar 


i>80 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


a  shower  of  bombs.  Woodcock  was  one  of  a 
|K>st  commanded  by  Moyney  which  was  sur- 
rounded by  the  enemy  ;  but  he  also  held  out 
for  96  hours.  After  that  remarkable  feat  ho 
was  crossing  a  river  and  heard  cries  for  help. 
He  returned  and  waded  into  the  water  and 
amid  a  shower  of  enemy  bombs  rescued  another 
member  of  the  gallant  little  band.  Day's 
acliievement  began  with  killing  two  machine- 


exploded.  Establishing  himself  in  an  advanced 
position  he  remained  for  66  hours  at  his  post, 
under  intense  hostile  shell  and  rifle-grenade  fire. 
Much  resourcefulness  had  been  shown  by 
several  winners  of  the  Cross  in  dealing  with 
grenades  and  bombs  ;  but  there  had  not  been 
any  exact  parallel  to  the  deed  of  Sergeant 
John  Carmichael,  North  Staffordshire  Regi- 
ment (Glasgow).     He  was  excavating  a  trench 


LANCE-SERGEANT    JOHN    MOYNEY    AND    PRIVATE    THOMAS    WOODCOCK, 

IRISH    GUARDS. 

when  he  saw  that  a  grenade  had  been  unearthed 
and  had  begun  to  burn.  Rushing  to  the  spot 
and  shouting  to  his  men  to  get  clear,  the  sergeant 
put  his  steel  helmet  over  the  grenade,  and  not 
content  with  that  he  stood  on  the  helmet. 
The  grenade  exploded,  and  Carmichael  was 
blown  out  of  the  trench  and  seriously  injured. 
The  courage  of  his  act  and  the  swiftness  of  his 
decision  will  be  realized  when  it  is  borne  in 
mind  that  he  could  have  thrown  the  bomb 
out  of  his  trench,  but  that  would  have  endan- 
gered the  lives  of  the  men  who  were  working 
on  top. 

Fit  companion  to  Carmichael  was  Private 
William  Boynton  Butler,  West  Yorkshire 
Regiment  (Hunslet,  Leeds)  who  was  picking 
up  a  Stokes  shell  which  was  accidentally  fired 
in  an  emplacement.  Butler  rushed  to  the 
entrance,  and  having  urged  a  party  of  passing 
infantry  to  hurry,  as  the  shell  was  "  going  off." 
ho  turned  round,  placed  himself  between  the 
party  and  the  shell  and  so  held  it  until  they 
were  out  of  danger.  Then  the  private  threw 
the  shell  on  to  the  parados  and  took  cover  in 
the  bottom  of  the  trench.     Almost  as  soon  as 


CORPORAL   S.    J.    DAY, 
Suffolk  Regiment. 


[Uassxiio 


gunners  and  taking  four  prisoners  when  ho  was 
in  command  of  a  bombing  section  and  clearing 
the  enemy  out  of  a  maze  of  trenches.  A  stick 
bomb  falling  into  a  trench  which  was  occupied 
by  two  oflicers,  one  of  whom  was  badly  wounded, 
and  three  other  ranks,  Day  seized  the  missile 
and  threw  it  over  the  trench,  where  it  instantly 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


231 


it  had  left  his  hand  the  shell  exploded  and 
greatly  damaged  the  trench,  Butler,  by  extra- 
ordinary good  luck,  being  only  bruised. 

This  list  of  nine  was  completed  by  the  case 
of  Acting  Lance-Corporal  Frederick  G.  Room, 
Royal  Irish  Regiment  (Bristol),  who,  while  in 


PRIVATE    W.    B.    BUTLER, 
West  Yorkshire  Regiment. 

charge  of  his  company  stretcher-bearers,  worked 
continuously  under  intense  fire,  dressing  the 
wounded  and  helping  to  remove  them.  He  was 
the  means  of  saving  many  of  his  comrades'  lives. 
For  a  considerable  period  after  the  war 
began  the  established  method  of  announcing  the 
award  of  the  Cross  was  adhered  to,  but  gradu- 
ally certain  improvements  were  made,  and 
amongst  these  none  was  more  successful  and 
welcome  than  the  statement,  so  far  as  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  were  concerned, 
of  the  city,  town  or  village  to  which  they 
belonged.  For  example,  Southsea,  Notting- 
ham, Old  Trafford  (Manchester),  Merthyr 
Tydvil,  Flemington  and  Kirriemuir  were  men- 
tioned in  connexion  with  winners,  the  names 
of  the  places  being  added  to  the  names  of  the 
regiment.  In  this  way  fellow-townsmen  were 
able  to  share  in  the  honour  which  had  been 
conferred,  and  in  many  instances  they  took 
prompt  steps  to  show  their  satisfaction  very 
practically.  There  was  a  feeling  that  in  some 
respects  this  custom  of  adding  to  the  honour 
of  the  Cross  by  making  presents  of  plate  or 
money,  or  both,  was  overdone,  and  that  it  was 
not  altogether  desirable,  as  the  distinction  of 
the  decoration  itself  was  enough,  without  the 
addition  of  any  other  gift  whatsoever.  It  was 
not  possible,  either,  to  establish  an  equality  of 
recognition,  and  so  it  happened  that  while  one 


man  might  receive  as  much  as  £1,500,  another 
would  not  get  a  penny  beyond  the  allowance 
which  went  with  the  award.  In  January, 
1918,  it  was  announced  that  the  Mayor  of 
Coventry's  Fund  on  behalf  of  Corporal  Hutt, 
Coventry's  first  V.C.,  was  nearing  £1,000  ;  in 
addition  Hutt  had  received  £200  from  another 
source,  and  his  former  employers  had  given 
him  War  Bonds  of  the  value  of  £250. 

In  the  earlier  days  of  the  awards  there  had 
been  substantial  presentations  to  recipients  of  the 
Cross,  but  there  had  been  a  period  of  quiescence 
in  this  respect ;  when,  however,  names  of  places 
were  officially  given  there  was  something  of  an 
epidemic  of  grateful  recognition,  and  in  one 
month  alone,  at  the  end  of  1917,  appreciation 
was  shown  of  the  valour  of  soldiers  ranging 
from  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  to  private. 
The  people  of  Darlington,  justly  proud  of 
their  Brigadier-General  Bradford,*  who  was  a 
fellow-townsman,  opened  a  national  fond  to 
commemorate  his  career ;  tho  villagers  of 
East  Haddon,  Northamptonshire,  subscribed 
for  a  gold  watch  and  chain,  which  was  pre- 
sented to  Captain  H.  Reynolds,  of  the  Royal 
Scots  ;  a  gold  hunter  watch,  inscribed  with  the 
St.  Pancras  borough  arms,  was  presented  to 
Sergeant  Burman,  of  the  Rifle  Brigade  ;  War 
Bonds  were  given  by  the  people  of  Tiverton  to 
Private  T.   H.    Sage,   a   native   of   the   town. 


ACTING  LANCE-CORPORAL  F.  G.  ROOM, 
Royal  Irish  Regiment. 

From  the  top  of  the  tank  which  visited  Bir- 
mingham in  connexion  with  the  War  Savings 

•Chapter  CLXXXV.,  p.  174.  Bradford's  doath  was 
made  known  on  December  5,  1917.  Ho  was  only  25 
years  of  age.  Twice  during  1917  ho  was  reported 
wounded. 


282 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


campaign  the  Lord  Mayor  presented  a  framed 
and  illuminated  address,  which  had  been  voted 
by  the  City  Council  to  Birmingham's  fifth  V.C. 
hero,  Sergeant  A.  J.  Knight,  of  the  King's 
Royal  Rifle  Corps.  Seamen,  too,  came  into 
their  own,  townspeople  of  Swanage  presenting 
a  silver  salver  and  67  war  saving  certificates 
to  First-Class  Petty  Officer  Ernest  Pitcher. 

The  system  of  indicating  a  recipient's  native 
town  or  place  of  residence  occasionally  meant 


dark  by-ways  from,  the  station,  he  reached  his 
home  while  the  deputation  still  held  possession 
of  the  station.  Subsequently,  when  the  skipper 
was  publicly  presented  with  a  testimonial,  and 
when  it  seemed  that  he  was  fairly  captured 
and  must  at  last  utter  a  few  words,  however 
haltingly,  he  again  circumvented  his  friends' 
intentions,  for  he  got  someone  else  to  rise  and 
acknowledge  the  gift  on  his  behalf. 

Another  batch  of  nine  Crosses  was  announced 


PRESENTATION  OF  AN    ILLUMINATED  ADDRESS   TO    SERGEANT  A.  J.  KNIGHT,  V.C., 
BY   THE    LORD    MAYOR    OF    BIRMINGHAM. 


a  double  recognition,  for  the  regiment  itself 
would  be  moved  to  bestow  honour  on  its 
member,  apart  from  anything  which  a  town 
had  done.  Almost  invariably  a  winner  of  the 
Cross  found  it  harder  to  face  an  audience  than 
to  confront  an  enemy  in  overwhelming  force. 
A  case  in  point  was  afforded  by  Skipper  Watt, 
of  Adriatic  fame.  He  was  due  home  on  short 
leave,  and  his  proud  fellow-townsmen  of  Fraser- 
burgh took  steps  to  welcome  him  officially. 
A  civic  reception  was  prepared,  with  a  deputa- 
tion at  the  station  ;  but  the  man  who  had  so 
valiantly  faced  deadly  odds  at  sea  had  no 
pluck  for  this  sort  of  meeting,  and  by  travelling 
in  a  train  by  which  he  was  not  expected,  and 
pursuing    a    policy    of    masterly    pilotage    by 


in  the  London  Gazette  of  November  8,  1917, 
two  of  the  awards  being  posthumous.  These 
cases  again  proved  the  amazing  personal 
courage  of  the  recipients  of  the  honour  and  the 
performance  by  them  of  almost  incredible  deeds. 
Well  was  it  said  of  the  officer  whose  name  was 
given  first  in  the  list  that  he  showed  exceptionl 
devotion  to  duty.  This  officer  was  Captain 
(acting  Major)  Okill  Massey  Learmouth, 
Canadian  Infantry,  who  had  already  won  the 
Military  Cross.  His  company  having  been 
temporarily  surprised  during  a  determined 
counter-attack  on  our  new  positions,  Learmouth 
instantly  charged  and  personally  disposed  of 
the  attackers  ;  after  which  he  carried  on  "a 
tremendous  fight  "  with  the  advancing  enemy. 


THE    TIMES    HISTOBY    OF    THE    WAR. 


283 


He  was  mortally  wounded  and  under  intense 
barrage  fire,  yet  he  stood  on  the  parapet  of  the 
trench,  and  while  he  continuously  bombed  the 
enemy  he  inspired  his  men  to  keep  up  a  gallant 
resistance.  This  conduct  itselt,  on  the  part  of 
a  man  whose  hours  were  numbered,  compelled 
deep  admiration,  but  to  add  to  its  merit  he 
"  actually  caught  bombs  thrown  at  him  by 
the  enemy,  and  threw  them  back."  This 
valiant  defence  and  glorious  example  Captain 
Learmouth  maintained  until  his  wounds  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  carry  on  ;  yet,  even 
when  so  helpless,  he  refused  to  be  carried  out 
of  the  line,  and  continued  to  give  instructions 
and  invaluable  advice  to  his  junior  officers, 
finally  handing  over  all  his  duties  before  he 
was  taken  to  hospital,  where  he  died. 

The  Colonies  furnished  the  second  case  also 
of  the  posthumous  award,  the  recipient  being 
Second  Lieutenant  Frederick  Birks,  Australian 
Imperial  Force,  who  showed  most  conspicuous 
bravery  when,  in  attack,  accompanied  only  by 
a  corporal,  he  rushed  a  strong  point  which  was 
holding  up  an  advance.  A  bomb  wounded  the 
corporal,  but  Birks  went  on  alone,  killed 
the  rest  of  the  enemy  who  held  the  position, 
and  captured  a  machine  gun.  Having  done 
this,  the  subaltern  organized  a  small  party  and 
attacked  another  strong  point  which  was 
occupied  by  about  25  of  the  enemy.     Of  that 


defensive  party  many  were  killed  and  an 
officer  and  15  men  were  made  prisoners. 
During  the  whole  of  the  dangerous  and  impor- 
tant work  he  carried  out  Birks  showed  wonder- 
ful coolness  and  courage,  and  he  performed  that 
best  of  all  tasks — keeping  his  men  in  splendid 


MAJOR    O.   M.    LEARMOUTH, 
Canadian  Infantry. 


SECOND    LIEUT.    FREDERICK    BIRKS, 
Australian  Imperial  Force. 

spirits.  It  was  his  fate  to  be  killed  at  his  post 
by  a  shell  while  trying  to  extricate  some  of  his 
men  who  had  been  buried  by  a  shell. 

There  was  strong  similarity  in  the  cases  of 
Second  Lieutenant  Hugh  Colvin,  Cheshire 
Regiment,  Second  Lieutenant  Montagu  Shad- 
worth  Seymour  Moore,  Hampshire  Regiment, 
Company  Sergeant -Major  Robert  Hanna, 
Canadian  Infantry,  Sergeant  James  Ockenden, 
Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers  (Southsea),  and  Sergeant 
Alfred  Joseph  Knight,  London  Regiment 
(Nottingham).  Each  of  these  bold  fighters 
showed  a  personal  courage  amounting  to 
recklessness,  yet  it  was  only  by  the  display  of 
such  valour  that  their  acts  were  possible,  for 
without  exception  they  fought  against  very 
great  odds,  and  fairly  threw  themselves  into 
positions  which  invited  death. 

Colvin  took  command  of  his  own  and  an- 
other company  when  both  had  suffered  severely , 
and  with  great  dash  and  success  he  led  them 
forward  in  attack,  under  heavy  machine-gun 
fire.  Seeing  the  battalion  on  his  right  held  up 
by  machine-gun  fire,  he  led  a  platoon  to  their 
help,  then  he  went  on  with  only  two  men  to  a 
dug-out.  Leaving  the  men  on  the  top,  he 
entered  the  dug-out  alone  and  brought  up 
14  prisoners.  Then  he  proceeded  with  his  two 
men  to  another  dug-out  which,  with  rifle  and 


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234 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


235 


machine-gun  fire  and  bombs,  had  been  holding 
up  the  attack.  This  dug-out  was  reached, 
and  the  crew  were  either  killed  or  captured 
and  the  machine  gun  was  taken.  The  lieu- 
tenant was  then  attacked  from  another  dug- 
out by  15  of  the  enemy  under  an  officer,  and 
one  of  his  men  was  killed  and  the  other 
wounded.     Undaunted    still,    Colvin    seized    a 


and  men.  Moore's  position  was  entirely 
isolated,  as  the  troops  on  the  right  had  not 
advanced  ;  but  he  dug  a  trench  and  throughout 
the  night  he  repelled  bombing  attacks.  Forced 
to  retire  a  short  distance  next  morning,  at  the 
earliest  moment  he  reoccupied  his  position. 
Most  of  his  men's  rifles  had  been  smashed, 
but  he  re-armed  his  little  force  with  enemy 


SECOND    LIEUT.   M.   S.   S.   MOORE, 
Hampshire  Regiment. 

rifle  and  shot  no  fewer  than  five  of  the  enemy, 
then,  using  another  as  a  shield,  he  forced  most 
of  the  survivors  to  surrender.  Such  was  the 
courage,  quickness  and  resource  of  this  young 
officer  that  he  cleared  several  other  dug-outs 
alone  or  with  one  man,  taking  in  all  about 
50  prisoners.  He  then  skilfully  consolidated 
his  position,  and  personally  wired  his  front 
under  heavy  close-range  sniping  in  broad 
daylight,  "when  all  others  had  failed  to  do  so." 
Official  credit  was  given  to  Colvin's  leadership 
and  courage  for  the  complete  success  of  the 
attack  in  this  part  of  the  line. 

Second  Lieutenant  Moore's  exploit  was  in 
connexion  with  a  fresh  attack  on  a  final  objective 
which  had  not  been  captured.  He  unhesita- 
tingly volunteered  for  the  duty,  and  dashed 
forward  at  the  head  of  about  70  men.  Heavy 
machine-gun  fire,  by  the  time  the  objective, 
some  500  yards  on,  had  been  reached,  had  so 
severely  punished  the  lieutenant's  party  that 
he  had  on'y  a  sergeant  and  four  men  left  ;  but 
undismayed  he  immediately  bombed  a  large 
dug-out  and  took  28  prisoners,  two  machine 
guns  and  a  light  field  g  in.  Gradually  the 
half-dozen  assailants  were  strengthened  to  a 
force  of  about  60  by  the  arrival  of  more  officers 


SECOND    LIEUT.   HUGH    COLVIN, 

Cheshire  Regiment. 

rifles  and  bombs  and  with  these  he  beat  off 
more  than  one  counter-attack,  the  enemy,  not 
for  the  first  time  by  many,  having  been  in 
this  .way  hoist  with  his  own  petard.  For 
36  hours  the  gallant  subaltern  held  this  post 
under  continual  shell  fire,  although  out  of  six 
officers  and  130  men  who  had  started  the 
operation  only  10  were  available.  When  at 
last  ho  was  able  to  withdraw  under  cover  of 
a  thick  mist  he  did  not  do  so  without  getting 
his  wounded  away — thus  crowning  his  gallant 
deed. 

It  was  in  attack  also  that  Hanna  distinguished 
himself.  His  company  had  met  with  most 
severe  resistance  and  all  the  officers  had 
become  casualties.  The  attack  was  against  a 
strong  point  which  was  strongly  protected  by 
wire  and  held  by  a  machine-gun.  It  was  "  a 
most  important  tactical  point,"  and  no  fewer 
than  three  assaults  by  the  company  had  been 
driven  off  with  serious  losses.  These  desperate 
conditions  gave  to  Hanna  that  opportunity  of 
personal  distinction  and  determination  which 
had  marked  so  many  of  the  achievements  of  the 
Canadians.  He  calmly  set  about  the  task  of 
collecting  a  party  of  men,  and  having  got  it 
together  he  headed  a  rush  against  the  strong 


236 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


objective,  and  so  successful  was  he  that  he  won 
through  the  wire  and  personally  bayoneted 
three  of  the  enemy  and  brained  a  fourth,  the 
result  being  that  the  point  was  captured  and 
the  machine  gun  was  silenced.  It  was  due 
to  Hanna's  outstanding  courage  and  resolute 
leading  that  a  desperate  situation  was  saved. 

Sergeant  Ockenden  was  acting  as  company- 
sergeant-major  in  attack  when  he  saw  the 
platoon  on  the  right  held  up  by  an  enemy 
machine  gun  ;    whereupon  he  instantly  rushed 


in  a  shell  hole  ;  and,  unsupported  though  he 
was,  he  bayoneted  two  men,  shot  a  third,  and 
scattered  the  rest.  This  terrific  plyer  of  the 
bayonet,  the  weapon  which,  at  close  quarters, 
the  German  justly  dreaded,  was  forced  by 
oppressive  circumstance  to  change  his  tactics 
and  fall  back  upon  his  faithful  rifle,  another 
arm  against  which  so  often  the  enemy  could 
not  make  a  stand  successfully.  An  attack  was 
being  made  on  a  fortified  position  and  it 
happened   that   the   sergeant  was    "  entangled 


SERGT.    JAS.   OCKENDEN,     CO.-SERGT.-MAJOR   R.   HANNA,     SERGT.   A.   J.   KNIGHT, 
Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers.  Canadian  Infantry.  London  Regiment. 


the  weapon  and  captured  it,  killing  the  crew, 
with  the  exception  of  one  man,  who  escaped — 
but  only  for  the  time,  for  the  sergeant  followed 
him  and  "  when  well  in  front  of  the  whole 
line  "  killed  him  and  returned  to  his  company. 
This  in  itself  was  a  deed  worthy  of  the  famous 
Fusiliers  to  which  the  sergeant  belonged ; 
but  his  work  was  only  partly  done,  for  having 
accounted  for  both  gun  and  crew  he  led  a 
section  to  the  attack  on  a  farm.  Rushing 
forward  under  very  heavy  fire  he  called  upon 
the  garrison  to  surrender.  The  enemy,  however, 
continued  to  fire  upon  him,  and  the  sergeant 
in  turn  opened  fire  so  hotly  and  effectively 
that  four  of  the  defenders  of  the  farm  were 
killed  and  the  rest,  numbering  16,  surrendered. 
Even  more  dramatic  was  the  achievement  of 
Sergeant  Alfred  Joseph  Knight.  The  sergeant 
began  his  "  extraordinarily  good  work "  by 
showing  exceptional  bravery  and  initiative 
when  his  platoon  was  attacking  an  enemy 
strong  point  and  camo  under  a  machine-gun's 
very  heavy  fire.  He  rushed  through  our  own 
barrage,  bayoneted  the  enemy  gunner  and 
single-handed  took  the  position.  Whetted  to 
his  work  by  this  success  he  subsequently  rushf  d 
forward,  alone,  upon  a  dozen  of  the  enemy, 
who,  with  a  machine  gun,  had  been  encountered 


up  to  his  waist  in  mud."  He  rose  superior  to 
the  situation,  however.  Seeing  a  number  of 
the  enemy  firing  on  our  troops,  he  instantly, 
nearly  buried  though  he  was,  opened  fire,  and 
with  so  much  coolness  and  precision  that  he 
killed  six  of  them.  Having  now  10  of  the  enemy 
to  his  credit,  Sergeant  Knight  got  clear  of  the 
mud  and  was  ready  for  further  calls  upon  his 
valour.  A  fresh  demand  was  made  upon  him 
when  he  noticed  that  the  company  on  his  right 
flank  was  held  up  in  an  attack  on  another 
farm.  He  collected  some  men  and  took  up  a 
position  on  the  flank  of  this  farm,  which,  as 
a  result  of  the  heavy  fire  he  brought  to  bear, 
was  captured.  Of  the  inspiring  acts  of  this 
member  of  the  London  Regiment  it  was 
remarked  that  all  the  platoon  officers  of  the 
company  had  become  casualties  before  the  first 
objective  was  reached,  and  that  he  took 
command  of  all  the  men  of  his  own  platoon 
and  of  the  platoons  without  officers.  Knight's 
individual  exploits,  performed  under  heavy 
machine-gun  and  rifle  fire,  saved  a  great  many 
casualties  and  he  was  the  direct  cause  of  the 
objectives  being  captured. 

A  "pill-box"  figured  in  the  conspicuous 
bravery  for  which  the  Cross  was  awarded  to 
Temporary    Captain    Henry    Reynolds,    M.C., 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


237 


Royal  Scots  In  attack,  and  when  approaching 
their  final  objective,  having  suffered  heavily 
from  machine-gun  fire  and  the  "  pill-box " 
which  had  been  passed  by  the  first  wave, 
Reynolds  reorganized  his  scattered  men,  and 
then  proceeded  alone  by  rushes  from  shell- 
hole  to  shell-hole.  When  near  the  "  pill-box  " 
he  threw  a  grenade,  intending  that  it  should 
go   inside ;     but   this   purpose   was   frustrated 


TEMP.   CAPTAIN    H.    REYNOLDS,   M.G., 
Royal  Scots. 

through  the  enemy  having  blocked  the  entrance. 
Determined  to  fulfil  his  desperate  enterprise, 
the  captain  crawled  to  the  entran.ce  and  forced 
a  phosphorous  grenade  inside  the  "  pill-box." 
This  weapon  set  the  place  on  fire  and  caused 
the  death  of  three  of  the  enemy  and  the 
surrender  of  the  survivors,  seven  or  eight,  with 
two  machine  guns.  Afterwards,  though 
wounded,  Reynolds  led  his  company  against 
another  objective  most  successfully,  for  he 
took  70  prisoners  and  two  more  machine  guns. 
These  brave  deeds  were  done  under  continuous 
heavy  machine-gun  fire  from  the  flanks. 

The  old  yet  ever  new  and  moving  tale  of 
succouring  the  wounded  under  fire  was  told 
of  the  other  member  of  that  noble  band  of 
nine — Private  Michael  James  O'Rourke,  Cana- 
iian  Infantry.  He  was  a  stretcher-bearer, 
and  for  three  days  and  nights  he  strove  un- 
ceasingly to  bring  the  wounded  into  safety, 
dressing  them,  and  getting  them  food  and 
water.  During  those  prolonged  operations 
O'Rourke  worked  in  an  area  which  was  swept 
by    shell,    machine-gun    and    rifle    fire  ;     and 


several  times  he  was  knocked  down  and 
partially  buried  by  enemy  shells.  He  rescued 
a  comrade  who  had  been  blinded  and  was 
stumbling  about  ahead  of  our  trench,  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy,  who  were  sniping  him  ;  he 
brought  in  another  comrade  under  heavy  fire, 
and  on  a  third  occasion  he  brought  in  a 
wounded  man  "  under  very  heavy  enemy  fire 
of  every  description."  Neither  fire,  nor  exces- 
sive work,  nor  exhaustion  deterred  him  from 
persisting  in  his  humane  work,  which  was  very 
rightly  acknowledged  by  the  award  to  him  of 
the  highest  recognition  that  can  be  made  of 
devotion  to  the  helpless  on  the  battlefield. 

Of  twenty  Crosses  gazetted  on  November  26, 
191 7,  no  fewer  than  six  were  awarded  for  gallant 
attacks  on  "  pill-boxes,"  and  it  was  significant 
of  the  danger  attending  the  assaults  on  these 
strong  structures  that  the  only  two  posthumous 
honours  in  the  list  were  given  to  members 
of  the  half-dozen.  Both  of  these  belonged 
to  the  Australian  Imperial  Force.  These 
recipients  were:  Sergeant  Joseph  Lister, 
Lancashire  Fusiliers  (Reddish,  Stockport), 
Sergeant  Lewis  McGee,  Australian  Imperial 
Force,  Lance-Sergeant  John  Harold  Rhodes, 
Grenadier  Guards  (Tunstall,  Staffordshire), 
Lance-Corporal  William  Henry  Hewitt,  South 
African  Infantry,  Private  Patrick  Bugden, 
Australian  Imperial  Force,  and  Private 
Frederick  George  Dancox,  Worcestershire  Regi- 
ment (Worcester). 

Sergeant  Lister's  conduct  was  remarkably 
prompt  and  courageous  and  was  most  helpful  in 
enabling  our  line  to  advance  almost  unchecked 
and  to  keep  up  with  the  barrage.  His  company 
was  advancing  to  the  first  objective  when  it 
came  under  machine-gun  fire  from  the  direction 
of  two  "  pill-boxes."  The  sergeant  saw  that 
the  galling  fire  would  hold  up  our  advance  and 
prevent  our  troops  keeping  up  with  the  barrage. 
He  dashed  ahead  of  his  men  and  found  a 
machine-gun  firing  from  a  shell-hole  in  front 
of  the  "  pill-box "  Lister  shot  two  of  the 
enemy  gunners,  a  swift  act  which  induced  the 
rest  to  surrender  to  him.  Having  done  this, 
he  went  on  to  the  "  pill-box  "  and  shouted  to 
the  occupants  to  surrender.  This  call  they 
obeyed,  with  the  exception  of  one  man,  whom 
Lister  shot  dead.  The  sergeant's  intrepid 
conduct  and  his  obvious  determination  to  rout 
the  enemy  at  all  costs  compelled  about  100  of 
the  enemy  to  come  out  of  shell-holes  farther  to 
the  rear,  and  surrender. 

Sergeant  McGee's  exploit  was  single-handed 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


STRETCHER-BEARERS    UNDER    FIRE. 


and  he  was  armed  only  with  a  revolver  when  he 
showed  the  valour  which  was  rewarded  with 
the  Cross  and  was  the  prelude  to  his  subsequent 
death  in  action.  In  the  advance  to  a  final 
objective  his  platoon  was  suffering  severely 
and  machine-gun  fire  from  a  "pill-box" 
stopped  the  company's  advance.  It  was  then 
that  the  sergeant,  alone,  rushed  the  post  and 
by  shooting  some  of  the  crew  and  capturing 
the  rest  enabled  the  advance  to  proceed. 
Coolly  and  deliberately  he  reorganized  the 
remnants  of  his  platoon,  he  was  foremost  in 
the  rest  of  the  advance  and  he  did  splendid  work 


in  consolidating  the  position,  contributing 
largely  to  the  success  of  the  company's  opera- 
tions. 

Rhodes,  the  Grenadier,  belonged  to  the 
enterprising  band  of  V.C.  heroes  who  in 
addition  to  showing  the  highest  personal  courage 
and  capturing  prisoners  managed  also  to 
secure  valuable  information.  He  was  in  charge 
of  a  Lewis  gun  section  covering  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  right  front  company  and  in  carrying 
out  his  task  he  accounted  for  several  of  the 
enemy  with  his  rifle,  as  well  as  by  Lewis  gun 
fire.     Seeing  three  enemy  leave  a  "  pill-box," 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


289 


he  went  out  alone  through  our  own  barrage 
and  hostile  machine-gun  fire  and  performed 
the  dangerous  exploit  of  entering  the  "  pill-box  " 
Having  done  this,  he  captured  nine  of  the 
enemy,  amongst  whom  was  a  forward  observa- 
tion officer  who  was  connected  by  telephone  with 
his  battery.     Rhodes  brought  these  prisoners, 


[Basstwo. 


PRIVATE    MICHAEL    J.    OROURKE, 
Canadian  Infantry. 

"  together  with   valuable  information,"   back 
with  him. 

Hewitt's  attack  on  a  "  pill-box  "  was  of  the 
most  desperate  and  determined  nature.  With 
his  section  he  assaulted  his  objective  and 
tried  to  rush  the  doorway  ;  but  the  garrison 
very  stubbornly  resisted.  In  his  efforts 
the  lance-corporal  was  severely  wounded ; 
nevertheless  he  held  on.  Foiled  in  one  direction 
he,  like  a  skilful  and  resourceful  fighter,  tried 
another  which  might  promise  more  encourage- 
ment. Turing  from  the  inhospitable  doorway, 
he  daringly  made  his  way  to  the  loophole  of 
the  "  pill -box  "  and  did  his  best  to  put  a  bomb 
into  it.  Again  he  was  wounded,  in  the  arm  ; 
but  neither  wounds  nor  failures  daunted  him. 
He  at  last  got  a  bomb  inside,  and  this  missile 
dislodged  the  occupants,  of  whom  it  was 
significantly  recorded  that  "  they  were  success- 
fully and  speedily  dealt  with  by  the  remainder 
of  the  section." 

To  the  lasting  fame  of  Private  Patrick 
Bugden  it  was  told  of  him  that  he  was  always 
foremost  in  volunteering  for  any  dangerous 
mission  and  that  it  was  during  the  execution 
of  one  of  them  that  he  was  killed.  His  deeds 
were  of  the  sort  which  were  specially  associated 
with  the  many  Australians  who  had  won  the 
Cross.     Twice   he   distinguished  himself   when 


our  advance  was  held  up  by  strongly-defended 
"pillboxes."  In  the  face  of  "devastating 
fire  from  machine  guns  "  he  led  small  parties 
in  assaults  on  these  strong  points  and  silenced 
the  guns  with  bombs  and  captured  the  garrison 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  At  another  time, 
when  a  corporal  had  been  made  prisoner  by  the 
enemy  and  was  being  taken  to  the  rear, 
Bugden,  single-handed,  rushed  to  his  rescue, 
shot  one  of  the  enemy,  bayoneted  the  other 
two,  and  so  released  his  comrade.  Five  times 
he  rescued  wounded  men  under  intense  shell 
and  machine-gun  fire,  constantly  showing  the 
greatest  contempt  of  danger. 

One  of  a  party  of  about  10  men  de- 
tailed as  "  moppers-up,"  Private  Dancox 
and  his  comrades  found  it  very  difficult  to 
work  round  a  flank,  owing  to  the  posi- 
tion of  an  enemy  machine-gun  emplace- 
ment on  the  edge  of  our  protective  bar- 
rage. The  emplacement  was  of  concrete 
and  the  gun  had  caused  many  casualties  and 
considerably  hampered  our  work  of  consolida- 
tion. In  spite  of  the  difficulties  of  the  situation 
Private  Dancox  gallantly  worked  his  way  round 
through  the  barrage  and  entered  the  "  pill- 
box "  from  the  rear,  threatening  the  garrison 
with  a  Mills  bomb.     Soon  afterwards  he  "  re- 


SERGEANT    JOSEPH    LISTER, 
Lancashire  Fusiliers. 

appeared  with  a  machine-gun  under  his  arm, 
followed  by  about  40  enemy."  The  weapon 
was  brought  back  to  our  position  by  Danoox. 
who  kept  it  in  action  throughout  the  day  The 
picture  suggested  of  this  resolute  and  cheerful 
soldier  "  with  a  machine-gun  under  his  arm. 
followed  by  about  40  of  the  enemy  "  was  ealuu- 


240 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


lated  to  have  upon  his  comrades  precisely  the 
effect  which  it  exercised,  for  their  moral  was 
maintained  "  at  a  very  high  standard  under 
extremely  trying  circumstances." 

The  Germans  made  a  boast — one  of  many — 
that  when  a  new  device  was  used  against  them 
in  the  field  by  the  British  they  found  a  means 
of  overcoming  it.  This  they  specially  claimed 
to  have  done  in  relation  to  the  Tanks  ;  but 
there  was  no  record,  even  in  the  German 
statements  of  claims,  that  they  ever  succeeded 


LANCE-CORPORAL    W.    H.    HEWITT, 
South  African  Infantry, 

in  finding  a  remedy  for  the  unconquerable  daring 
which  alone  made  possible  such  deeds  as  those 
of  Private  Dancox  and  his  gallant  comrades  who 
beat  and  battered  at  the  doors  and  loopholes 
of  "  pill-boxes  "  until  their  urgent  call  was 
heard  and  obeyed. 

A  field  officer  who  had  been  already  awarded 
the  D.S.O.  was  included  in  the  score.  This  was 
Major  (Acting  Lieut. -Colonel)  Lewis  Pugh 
Evans,  D.S.O. ,  Royal  Highlanders,  command- 
ing a  battalion  Lincolnshire  Regiment.  It  was 
recorded  of  this  officer  that  he  took  his  battalion 
in  perfect  order  through  a  terrific  enemy  bar- 
rage, personally  formed  up  all  units  and  led 
them  to  the  assault.     Again,  a  case  arose  of  a 


machine-gun  emplacement  causing  casualties 
and  giving  an  opening  for  the  display  of  fine 
courage  and  resource.  While  these  losses  were 
being  sustained  and  the  troops  were  working 
round  the  flank,  the  colonel  rushed  at  the 
emplacement  and  forced  the  garrison  to 
capitulate  by  the  effective  means  of  firing 
his  revolver  through  the  loophole.  He 
was  severely  wounded  in  the  shoulder  after 
capturing  the  first  objective  ;  but  he  refused 
to  be  bandaged,  and  re-formed  the  troops, 
pointed  out  all  future  objectives,  and  once 
more  led  his  battalion  forward.  Colonel  Evans 
was  again  badly  wounded,  yet  he  held  on  to  his 
command  until  the  second  objective  had  been 
won  and  consolidated  ;  then  he  collapsed  from 
loss  of  blood,  but  as  there  were  many  casualties 
he  refused  help,  and  his  indomitable  spirit 
enabled  him  at  last  to  reach  a  dressing  station. 
The  East  End  gave  two  more  Londoners  to 
the  Roll  of  the  Cross.  These  were  Sergeant 
William  Francis  Burman,  Rifle  Brigade  (Step- 
ney), and  Lance -Corporal  Harold  Mugford, 
Machine  Gun  Corps  (East  Ham).  Burman 
distinguished  himself  in  an  attack  when  his 
command  was  held  up  by  machine-gun  firing 
at  point-blank  range.  Shouting  to  the  men 
next  to  him  to  wait  a  few  minutes,  he  went  for- 
ward alone.     Death   seemed   certain,   but   the 


PRIVATE    F.    G.    DANCOX, 
Worcestershire  Regiment. 

sergeant  showed  such  dash  and  resolution  that 
he  killed  the  enemy  gunner  and  then  carried  the 
gun  to  the  company's  objective,  where  he 
subsequently  used  it  with  great  effect.  Through 
this  "exceptionally  gallant  deed"  the  progres< 
of  the  attack  was  assured.  Sergeant  Burman 
had  already  done  great  things,  but  he  was  very 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


241 


ATTACKING    A    GERMAN    BLOCKHOUSE. 


soon  to  surpass  them.  About  15  minutes  later 
it  was  seen  that  the  battalion  on  the  right  was 
being  impeded  by  about  40  of  the  enemy,  who 
were  enfilading  them.  The  sergeant,  this  time 
with  two  other  men,  ran  forward  and  got 
behind  the  enemy,  killing  six  and  capturing  two 
officers  and  29  other  ranks. 

Mugford  also  showed  uncommon  daring  in 
handling  a  machine-gun  under  intense  shell 
and  machine-gun  fire.     In  spite  of  these  diffi- 


culties, he  got  his  gun  into  a  forward  and  much 
exposed  position,  and  from  this  point  he  was 
able  to  deal  most  effectively  with  the  enemy, 
who  were  massing  for  counter-attack.  The 
corporal's  No.  2  was  killed  almost  immediately, 
and  he  was  himself  severely  wounded  at  the 
same  moment.  Mugford  was  then  ordered  to 
a  new  position  and  told  to  go  into  a  dressing- 
station  BS  soon  as  the  position  was  occupied. 
He,    however,    refused,    and    insisted   on    con- 


242 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SERGT.    W.    F.    BURMAN,     LANCE-CORP.   H.    MUGFORD, 

Rifle  Brigade.  Machine  Gun  Corps. 


CORP.  E.  A.  EGERTON, 
Notts  and  Derby  Regiment 


turning  on  duty  with  his  gun,  with  the  result 
that  he  severely  punished  the  enemy.  So  far 
this  machine  -gunner  had  covered  himself  with 
glory,  he  had  won  an  enviable  renown  by  his 
consistent  bravery,  and  it  seemed  as  if  he  could 
not  do  more  ;  yet,  as  so  often  happened  with 
the  officers  and  men  who  won  the  Cross,  he 
excelled  even  his  own  gallant  preliminary  per- 
formances. Soon  after  he  had  refused  to  go 
to  a  dressing-station  Mugford  was  again 
wounded — this  time  terribly,  for  both  of  his 
legs  were  broken  by  a  shell.  Even  now,  a  hero 
among  heroes,  he  remained  with  his  gun,  and, 
thinking  only  of  his  comrades,  he  begged  them 
to  leave  him  and  take  cover.  But  he  had  no 
option  in  the  matter  ;  he  was  no  longer  able  to 
refuse  to  be  removed,  and  so  he  was  taken  to  a 
dressing-station,  where  he  was  again  wounded, 
in  the  arm.  For  the  third  time,  therefore,  this 
non-commissioned  officer  had  been  wounded, 
and  it  was  not  until  he  was  absolutely  helpless 
that  he  allowed  his  shattered  body  to  be  carried 
from  the  field  of  battle.  Well  indeed  was  it  put 
on  record  concerning  this  lance-corporal  of  the 
Machine  Gun  Corps  that  his  valour  and  initiative 
were  instrumental  in  breaking  up  the  enemy's 
impending  counter-attack. 

There  had  been  frequent  assertions  that  on 
many  occasions  the  enemy  had  become  de- 
moralized in  the  presence  of  the  British  and 
that  they  had  collapsed  under  the  amazing 
audacity  of  some  of  the  minor  assaults  of  British 
units.  These  declarations  were  substantiated 
by  several  of  the  records  of  deeds  which  won 
the  Cross.  Swift  and  successful  was  the  act  of 
Corporal  Ernest  Albert  Egerton,  Nottingham- 
shire and  Derbyshire  Regiment  (Longton), 
whose  "  reckless  bravery  "  relieved  in  less  than 
30  seconds  an  extremely  difficult  situation.  Fog 
and  smoke  had  obscured  visibility  during  an 


attack,  and  consequently  the  two  leading 
waves  of  the  attack  passed  over  some  hostile 
dug-outs  without  clearing  them.  From  these 
dug-outs  rifles  and  machine-guns  caused  heavy 
casualties  amongst  the  advancing  waves.  When 
volunteers  were  called  for  to  help  to  clear  up  the 
situation,  Egerton  at  once  jumped  up  and 
dashed  for  the  dug-outs  under  heavy  fire,  at 
short  range.  "  He  shot  in  succession  a  rifleman, 
a  bomber,  and  a  gunner,  by  which  time  he  was 
supported,  and  29  of  the  enemy  surrendered." 

A  swift,  smart  piece  of  work  was  also  credited 
to  Private  Albert  Halton,  King's  Own  Royal 
Lancaster  Regiment  (Carnforth),  who,  after  the 
objective  had  been  reached,  rushed  forward 
about  300  yards  under  very  heavy  rifle  and 
shell  fire  and  captured  a  machine-gun  and  its 
crew  which  was  causing  many  losses  to  our  men. 
The  private  then  went  out  again  and  brought  in 
about  a  dozen  prisoners,  showing  the  greatest 
disregard  of  his  own  safety  and  setting  a  fine 
example  to  those  around  him. 

It  was  officially  told  of  Acting  Corporal  Filip 
Konowal,  Canadian  Infantry,  that  he  alone 
killed  at  least  sixteen  of  the  enemy  ;  and  of 
Lance-Corporal  Walter  Peeler,  Australian  Im- 
perial Force,  that  he  "  actually  accounted  for 
over  30  of  the  enemy."  Konowal  was  in  charge 
of  a  section  in  attack  and  to  that  section  fell  the 
difficult  task  of  "  mopping  up  "  cellars,  craters 
and  machine-gun  emplacements.  His  direction 
was  so  successful  that  all  resistance  was  over- 
come and  heavy  casualties  were  inflicted  on  the 
enemy.  These  "  mopping-up  "  enterprises  in- 
volved many  desperate  encounters  with  an 
enemy  at  bay,  and  in  all  sorts  of  odd  holes  and 
corners,  at  unexpected  times,  there  were 
meetings  which  inevitably  meant  death  to  at 
least  some  of  the  combatants.  That  these 
encounters  were  not  shirked  by  British  fighters, 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


24b 


ACTING    CORPORAL    F. 

KONOWAL, 

Canadian  Infantry. 


PRIVATE    A.    HALTON, 
King's  Own  Royal  Lancaster 
Regiment. 


LANCE-CORPORAL    W. 
PEELER. 

Australian  Imperial  Force. 


and  indeed  especially  appealed  to  their  com- 
bative and  sporting  instincts,  was  shown  by 
such  cases  as  that  of  this  Canadian  Infantryman. 
In  one  cellar  he  himself  bayoneted  three  enemy 
and  attacked,  single-handed,  seven  others  in  a 
crater,  killing  them  all.  When  the  objective 
was  reached  the  corporal  found  that  a  machine- 
gun  was  holding  up  the  right  flank  and  causing 
many  casualties.  Rushing  forward,  he  entered 
the  emplacement  and  having  killed  the  crew 
brought  the  gun  back  to  our  own  lines.  Such 
was  the  one  day's  toll  of  Corporal  Konowal . 
The  next  day,  still  single-handed,  he  again 
attacked  another  machine-gun  emplacement, 
killed  three  of  the  crew,  and  destroyed  the  gun 
and  emplacement  with  explosives.  The  exact 
total  to  his  credit  was  not,  apparently,  known 
with  certainty  ;  but  there  were  at  least  the 
sixteen  mentioned — and  the  corporal  carried  on 
continuously  during  the  two  days'  actual 
righting  until  he  was  severely  wounded. 

Of  Lance-Corporal  Walter  Peeler  the  story 
was  told  in  the  London  Gazette  that  when,  with 
a  Lewis  gun,  he  was  accompanying  the  first 
wave  of  an  assault  he  encountered  an  enemy 
party  sniping  advancing  troops  from  a  shell- 
hole.  The  position  was  immediately  rushed  by 
Peeler,  who  accounted  for  nine  of  the  enemy  and 
cleared  the  way  for  the  advance.  Twice  after- 
wards he  performed  similar  acts  of  valour, 
accounting  each  time  for  a  number  of  the  enemy. 
Being  directed  to  a  position  from  which  an 
enemy  machine-gun  was  being  fired  on  our 
troops  he  located  and  killed  the  gunner,  and  the 
rest  of  the  enemy  party  ran  into  a  dug-out  which 
was  near.  They  were,  however,  dislodged  from 
the  shelter  by  a  bomb,  and  10  of  the  enemy  ran 
out.  "  These  he  disposed  of,"  was  the  cold  official 
explanation    of    their    fate.     In    the    manner 


described  the  lance-corporal  "  actually  ac- 
counted for  over  30  of  the  enemy,"  thus 
adding  to  a  list  of  exceptional  perfor- 
mances. 

Another  member  of  the  Australian  Imperial 
P'orce,  Sergeant  John  James  Dwyer,  Australian 
Machine  Gun  Corps,  distinguished  himself  in 
connexion  with  machine-gun  fighting.  He  was 
in  charge  of  a  Vickers  machine-gun  and  went 
forward  with  the  first  wave  of  the  brigade. 
When  he  reached  the  final  objective  he  rushed 
his  gun  forward  in  advance  of  the  captured 
position,  so  that  he  could  obtain  a  commanding 
spot.  Seeing  an  enemy  machine-gun  firing  on 
our  right  flank  and  causing  casualties,  Dwyer 
unhesitatingly  rushed  his  weapon  forward  to 
within  30  yards  of  the  enemy  gun  and  by 
firing  point  blank  put  out  of  action  and  killed 
the  crew.  Snipers  from  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
position  made  a  strong  effort  to  destroy  Dwyer, 
but  totally  ignoring  them  he  seized  the  gun  and 
carried  it  back  across  the  shell-swept  ground  to 
our  front  line  :  then  he  established  both  this  gun 
and  the  Vickers  gun  on  the  right  flank  of  our 
brigade.  The  sergeant  now  commanded  these 
guns  with  much  coolness  and  gave  great  help  in 
repulsing  counter-attacks.  Next  day,  when  the 
position  was  heavily  shelled,  Dwyer  took  up 
several  positions.  His  Vickers  gun,  with  which 
he  had  done  so  much  useful  work,  was  blown  up 
by  shell  fire  ;  but  he  conducted  his  gun  team 
back  to  headquarters  through  the  enemy 
barrage,  and  having  secured  one  of  the  reserve 
guns,  rushed  it  back  without  delay  to  our 
position. 

So  far  in  this  batch  of  20  four  members  of 
the  Australian  Imperial  Force  have  been  dealt 
with  ;  there  remains  a  fifth — Private  Reginald 
Roy  Inwood,  who  showed  the  greatest  courage 


244 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


during  an  advance  to  a  second  objective. 
Alone  he  moved  forward  through  our  barrage 
to  an  enemy  strong  post,  and  this  he  captured 
with  nine  prisoners,  killing  several  of  the  enemy  s 
During  the  evening  Inwood  volunteered  for  a 
special  all-night  patrol,  which  went  out  600 
yards  in  front  of  our  line,  and  there  his  coolness 
and  sound  judgment  enabled  him  to  secure  and 
send  back  some  very  valuable  information  as  to 
the  enemy's  movements.  In  the  early  morning 
of  September  21  Inwood  located  a  machine-gun 
which  was  causing  several  casualties.  Again 
acting  alone,  he  bombed  the  gun  and  team, 
killing  all  but  one,  and  that  man  he  brought  in 
captive  with  the  weapon. 

A  hand-to-hand  fight  characterized  the 
exploits  for  which  the  Cross  was  given  to 
Sergeant  John  Molyneux,  Royal  Fusiliers  (St. 
Helens).  There  were  in  this  little  affair  the 
elements  of  a  stirring  drama.  There  was  a 
house,  and  a  trench  in  front  of  it,  and  from  that 
trench  a  machine-gun  was  doing  grievous  mis- 
chief to  our  men  in  an  attack.  The  assault  was 
being  held  up  by  the  weapon  This  was  the 
sort    of    opportunity    for    which    the    British 


[Bassino. 

SERGEANT    J.    J.    DWYER, 
Australian  Machine  Gun  Corps. 

fighter  longed,  and  when  it  came  he  took  it. 
'■  Sergeant  Molyneux  instantly  organized  a 
bombing  party  to  clear  the  trench  in  front  of  the 
house.  Many  enemy  were  killed,  and  a 
machine-yun  captured."  The  Fusilier  had 
opened  his  work  well  ;  he  promptly  finished  it. 
This  perilous  ob  tade  having  been  cleared,  he 


jumped  out  of  the  trench  and,  calling  for  some- 
one to  follow  him,  he  rushed  for  the  house. 
The  sergeant  was  ahead  of  his  gallant  followers, 
and  by  the  time  they  arrived  he  was  "  in  the 
thick  of  a  hand-to-hand  fight."  This  combat 
was  brief  and  very  decisive — the  enemy  sur- 
rendered,  and   in   addition   to   the   dead   and 


ACTING    CORPORAL    F.    GREAVES, 
Notts  and  Derby  Regiment. 

wounded  between  20  and  30  prisoners  were 
taken.  The  achievement  in  itself  was  brilliant  ; 
it  irresistibly  appealed  to  the  British  fighter  and 
aroused  in  him  all  that  was  best  of  his  sporting 
qualities,  but  more  than  that  the  affair  was 
important  because  it  prevented  a  slight  check 
from  becoming  a  serious  block  in  the  advance, 
and  saved  many  lives. 

Another  stirring  example  of  initiative  and 
leadership  in  non-commissioned  and  lower 
ranks  was  afforded  by  the  case  of  Acting 
Corporal  Fred  Greaves,  Nottinghamshire  and 
Derbyshire  Regiment  (Balborough).  Machine- 
gun  fire  from  a  "  concrete  stronghold  "  tem- 
porarily held  up  his  platoon,  and  the  platoon 
commander  and  sergeant  were  casualties- 
Seeing  this,  and  realizing  that  unless  this  post 
was  quickly  taken  his  men  would  lose  the 
barrago.  Greaves,  followed  by  another  non- 
commissioned officer,  rushed  forward,  reached 
the  rear  of  the  building,  bombed  the  occupants, 
killed  or  captured  the  garrison,  and  took  no 
fewer  than  four  machine-guns  It  was  solely 
due  to  his  personal  pluck  and  initiative  that 
the  assaulting  line  at  lus  point  was  not  held  up 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


246 


and  that  our  troops  escaped  serious  casualties. 
A  most  critical  stage  of  the  battle  arose  later 
in  the  afternoon,  when  the  troops  of  a  flank 
brigade  had  temporarily  given  way  under  a 
heavy  counter-attack  and  all  the  officers  of  the 
company  were  casualties.  Quickly  grasping 
the  situation.  Greaves  threw  out  extra  posts 


"  pill-box  "  or  man-handling  an  enemy  group  ; 
it  was  an  exhibition  of  sheer  calm  pluck  and 
disregard  of  personal  danger  which  was  specially 
noticeable  even  in  the  annals  of  the  Crosses  of 
the  war. 

There  was  more  of  the  joy  of  adventure  and 
the  thrill  of  action  in  the  case  of  a  member  of 


PRIVATE  GHAS.   MELVIN, 
Royal  Highlanders. 


CORP.    J.    B.    HAMILTON, 
Highland  Light  Infantry. 


SERGT.  JOHN    MOLYNEUX, 
Royal  Fusiliers. 


on  the  threatened  flank  and  opened  up  rifle 
iind  machine-gun  fire  to  enfilade  the  advance. 
It  was  recorded  of  the  corporal  that  the  effect 
of  his  conduct  on  his  men  could  not  be  over- 
estimated, and  that  those  under  his  command 
gallantly  responded  to  his  example. 

A  display  of  perfect  coolness  in  circumstances 
of  the  utmost  danger  was  rewarded  with  the 
Cross  in  the  case  of  Private  (Acting  Lance- 
Corporal)  John  Brown  Hamilton,  Highland 
Light  Infantry  (Lanarkshire).  In  this  incident 
there  were  wanting  those  thrilling  surround- 
ings which  marked  the  honours  that  have  been 
already  dealt  with  ;  yet  his  bravery  was  of  the 
highest  character.  One  of  those  crises  had 
arisen  in  which  there  was  great  difficulty  in 
supplying  small-arm  ammunition  to  the  front 
and  support  lines.  The  supply  had  reached 
a  seriously  low  ebb  and  Hamilton  on  several 
occasions,  on  his  own  initiative,  carried  bando- 
liers of  ammunition  through  the  enemy's  belts 
of  fire  to  the  front  and  support  lines  ;  then, 
passing  along  these  lines  in  full  view  of  the 
hostile  snipers  and  machine-gunners,  at  close 
range,  he  distributed  the  ammunition  to  the 
men.  This  courageous  conduct  not  only 
ensured  the  steady  continuance  of  the  defence 
by  rifle  fire,  but  the  moral  effect  of  the  lance- 
corporal's  example  inspired  and  heartened  all 
who  saw  him.  There  was  not  in  this  case  any 
of   the   glamour   or   excitement   of   rushing   a 


another  North  Country  regiment.  This  was 
Private  Charles  Melvin,  Royal  Highlanders 
(Kirriemuir),  whose  conduct  added  lustre  to  the 
famous  Black  Watch.  His  company  had 
advanced  to  within  50  yards  of  the  front-line 
trench  of  a  redoubt ;  they  were  then  forced  to 
lie  down,  owing  to  the  enemy's  intense  fire, 
and  await  reinforcements.  Delay,  however, 
was  not  to  the  liking  of  Private  Melvin,  and  he 
rushed  on  alone  over  ground  that  was  swept 
from  end  to  end  by  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire 
Halting  when  he  reached  the  enemy  trench,  he 
fired  two  or  three  shots  into  it  and  killed  one 
or  two  of  the  enemy.  This  warning  failing  to 
scatter  the  enemy,  who  went  on  firing  at  him, 
the  Highlander  jumped  into  the  trench  and 
attacked  the  foe  with  his  bayonet  in  his  hand, 
for  he  had  not  been  able  to  fix  it  on  his  damaged 
rifle.  So  resolute  and  gallant  was  this  single- 
handed  assault  that  most  of  the  enemy  fled  to 
the  second  line  ;  but  not  before  the  private  had 
killed  two  more  and  disarmed  eight  unwounded 
and  one  wounded  opponents.  True  to  the 
British  tradition  of  humanity,  he  attended  to  the 
hurts  of  the  wounded  man  and  then,  "  driving 
his  eight  unwounded  prisoners  before  him,  and 
supporting  the  wounded  one,  he  hustled  them 
out  of  the  trench,  marched  them  in  and 
delivered  them  over  to  an  officer."  This  might 
have  satisfied  most  men,  but  Melvin  was  not 
content  until  he  had  provided  himself  with  a 


246 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OE    THE    WAR. 


load  of  ammunition  and  returned  to  the  tiring- 
line,  where  lie  reported  himself  to  his  platoon 
sergeant.  The  valour  of  these  acts  was 
heightened  by  the  fact  that  all  were  performed 
under  intense  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire,  and 
that  the  whole  way  backMelvin  and  his  party 
were  exposed  to  a  very  heavy  artillery  barrage 
fire. 

Completing  the  score  was  Private  Arthur 
Hutt,  Royal  Warwickshire  Regiment  (Earlsdon, 
Coventry),  who  distinguished  himself  greatly 
both  as  a  leader  and  a  fighter.  When  all  the 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  No.  2 
Platoon  hail  become  casualties  he  took  command 
of  and  led  forward  the  platoon.  Being  held 
up  by  a  strong  post  on  his  right,  he  at  once 
ran  forward  alone  in  front  of  the  platoon  and 
shot  the  officer  and  three  men  in  the  post, 
causing  between  forty  and  fifty  others  to 
surrender.  Finding  that  he  had  pushed  too 
far.  he  withdrew  his  party,  personally  covering 
the  withdrawal  by  sniping  the  enemy  and 
killing  a  number.  He  then  carried  back  a 
badly  wounded  man  and  put  him  under 
shelter.  Having  organized  and  consolidated 
his  position,  and  learning  that  some  wounded 
men  were  lying  out  and  were  likely  to  become 


prisoners  if  left,  no  stretcher-bearers  being 
available,  Hutt  went  out  and  carried  in  four 
men  under  heavy  fire. 

Standing  well  out  in  a  list  of  ten  awards 
made  known  on  December  18,  1917,  was  a  Tank 
leader  whose  devotion  cost  him  his  life.  This 
was    Second    Lieutenant    Clement    Robertson, 


SECOND   LIEUT.  CLEMENT   ROBERTSON, 

Royal  West   Surrey  Regiment,  S.R.  (Temporary 

Lieutenant,  Acting  Captain,  Tank  Corps.) 


[Bassano. 


PRIVATE    ARTHUR    HUTT, 
Royal  Warwickshire  Regiment. 

Royal  West  Surrey  Regiment,  S.R.,  Temporary 
Lieutenant,  Acting  Captain,  Tank  Corps.     Here 
again   was   one    of   the    cases    in   which    V  C. 
awards  indicated  the  remarkable  developments 
of  the  methods   of  modern  warfare,   and   the 
success  of   a  purely  British  invention.     Robert- 
son was  leading  his  Tanks  in  attack  under  heavy 
shell,  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire,  and  his  course 
lay  over  ground  which  shell-fire  had  heavily 
ploughed.     He  knew  to  the  full  how  great  was 
the  risk  of  the  Tanks  missing  their  way,  yet 
he  continued  to  lead  them  on  foot,  "  guiding 
them    carefully    and    patiently    towards    their 
objective,  although  he  must  have  known  that 
his    action  would  almost   inevitably  cost    him 
his  life."      Such,  indeed,  was   the   end  of  the 
brave  captain,  who  was  killed  after  his  objective 
had  been  reached  ;    but  death  did  not  come 
until  his  skilful  leading  had  assured  successful 
action.  To  appreciate  fully  this  officer's  devotion 
to  duty  it  is  only  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  the 
desperate    enterprises    on    which    Tanks    were 
sent,   the   uncommon   perils   into  which   these 
land -forts  were   driven,   and   the   considerable 
protection    which    was    lost    by    a    man    who 
voluntarily  left  the  shelter  of  the  metal  structure 
and  coolly  exposed  himself  to  the  intense  mixed 
fire  with  which  a  Tank  was  invariably  greeted 
by  the  enemy  when  at  close  quarters. 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAIL 


247 


There  were  three  more  posthumous  awards 
in  this  particular  list  ;  making  no  fewer  than 
four  out  of  a  total  of  ten.  These  awards  were 
to  Major  'Alexander  Malius  Lafone,  Yeomanry  ; 
Captain  Clarence  Smith  Jeffrie*,  Australian 
Imperial  Force,  and  Corporal  William  Clamp, 
Yorkshire      Regiment     (Flemmgton).      Major 


CORPORAL    WILLIAM    CLAMP, 
Yorkshire  Regiment. 

Lafone's  was  one  of  the  very  rare  cases  in  which 
enemy  cavalry  were  mentioned,  and  the  details 
indicated  one  of  the  engagements  which  appealed 
with  exceptional  force  to  a  man  of  Lafone's 
resource  and  righting  power.  For  more  than 
seven  hours  he  held  a  position  against  vastly 
superior  enemy  forces,  his  task  being  made  the 
harder  because  heavy  shelling  of  his  position 
made  it  very  difficult  to  see.  In  one  attack 
enemy  cavalry  charged  his  flank  :  but  the 
major  drove  them  back  with  heavy  losses.  In 
another  charge  the  enemy  left  15  casualties 
within  20  yards  of  the  major's  trench,  Lafone 
himself  bayoneting  one  man  who  reached  the 
trench.  The  time  came  in  this  desperate 
affair  when  all  Lafone's  men  except  three 
had  been  hit  and  the  trench  was  so  full  of 
wounded  that  it  was  difficult  to  move  and 
fire  ;  then  the  major  ordered  those  who  could 
walk  to  move  to  a  trench  slightly  in  the  rear, 
and  from  his  own  post  he  maintained  '*  a 
most  heroic  resistance."  When  at  last  he 
was  surrounded  and  charged  by  the  enemy 
he  stepped  into  the  open  and  went  on  fight- 
ing until  he  was  mortally  wounded  and  fell 
unconscious. 

Captain  Jeffries  showed  liis  high  courage  and 
inspiring  example  in  an  attack  when  his 
company  was  held  up  by  enemy  machine-gun 
fire  from  concrete  emplacements.     In  the  first, 


having  organized  a  party,  he  rushed  an  em- 
placement and  captured  four  machine-guns  and 
35  prisoners,  after  which  he  led  his  company 
forward  under  extremely  heavy  enemy  artillery 
barrage  and  enfilade  machine-gun  fire  to  the 
objective.  Later  he  again  organized  a  success  - 
ful  attack  on  a  machine-gun  emplacement,  this 
time  capturing  two  machine-guns  and  'M>  more 
prisoners,  so  having  to  his  credit  six  machine- 
guns  and  no  fewer  than  t>5  prisoner^.  The 
gallant  Jeffries  was  killed  during  the  second 
attack,  but  it  was  entirely  due  to  his  courage  and 
initiative  that  the  centre  of  the  attack  was  not 
held  up  for  a  lengthy  period. 

The  fate  which  had  befallen  not  a  few  V.C, 
men  from  snipers'  bullets  overtook  Corporal 
William  Clamp  when  he  had  shown  very  great 
bravery  in  attacking  concrete  blockhouses. 
Intense  machine-gun  fire  from  these  and  from 
snipers  in  ruined  buildings  checked  an  advance  ; 
but  the  corporal  with  two  men  dashed  forward 
and  tried  to  rush  the  largest  blockhouse.  The 
two  men  having  been  knocked  out,  Clamp's 
brave  effort  failed  ;  but  instantly  collecting 
some  bombs  and  calling  upon  two  men  to  follow 
him,  he  again  dashed  forward.  The  corporal 
was  the  first  to  reach  the  blockhouse,  anil 
hurling  in  the  bombs  he  killed  many  of  the 
occupants.  Then  he  entered  and  brought  o  ut  a 
machine-gun  and  about  20  prisoners,  whom  he 


MAJOR    ALEXANDER    M.    LAFONE, 
Yeomanry. 

took  back  under  heavy  Are  from  neighbouring 
snipers.  This  was  one  of  the  critical  situations 
which  so  often  arose  and  with  which  men  like 
Corporal  Clamp  so  successfully  dealt.  In  this 
case  he  again  went  forward  and  encouraged  his 


248 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


men,  cheering  them  and  rushing  several  snipers' 
posts.  This  high  courage  and  cheerful  example 
the  corporal  maintained  until  a  sniper's  bullet 
killed  him. 

Fearless  leadership  under  most  difficult  con- 
ditions, in  darkness  and  in  an  unknown  country, 
was  recognized  by  the  award  of  the  Cross  to 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Arthur  Drummond  Borton, 
D.S.O.,  London  Regiment.  In  these  most 
unfavourable  and  dangerous  circumstances  he 
deployed  his  battalion  for  attack,  and  at  dawn 
led  his  attacking  companies  against  a  strongly 
held  position.  The  colonel  showed  an  utter 
contempt  of  danger  when  a  withering  machine- 
gun  fire  checked  the  leading  waves,  and  under 
heavy  fire  he  moved  freely  up  and  down  his 
lines.  He  reorganized  his  command  and  lead- 
ing his  men  forward  captured  the  position.  At  „ 
a  later  stage  of  the  fight  Colonel  Borton  led  a 
party  of  volunteers  against  a  battery  of  field 
guns  in  action  at  point-blank  range,  capturing 
the  guns  and  the  detachments.  It  was  re- 
corded of  him  that  his  fearless  leadership  was  an 
inspiring  example  to  the  whole  Brigade. 

The  dash  and  daring  of  our  cavalry  whenever 
it  was  possible  for  the  mounted  arm  to  act  was 
shown  by  the  conduct  of  Lieutenant  Henry 
Strachan,  M.C.,  Canadian  Cavalry.  The  squad- 
ron leader  was  killed  while  galloping  towards 
the  enemy  front  line  and  Strachan  took  com- 
mand.    He    led    the    squadron    through    the 


LIEU  1  EN  ANT  HENRY   STRACHAN,   M.C., 
Canadian  Cavalry, 


LIEUT.-COLONEL  A.  D.   BORTON,  D.S.O., 
London  Regiment. 

enemy  line  of  machine-gun  posts,  then,  with  the 
surviving  men,  he  led  the  charge  on  the  enemy 
battery,  killing  seven  of  the  gunners  with  his 
sword.  This  valiant  personal  example  re- 
sulted in  all  the  gunners  being  killed  and  the 
battery  silenced  ;  then  Strachan  rallied  his 
men  and  fought  his  way  back,  at  night,  through 
the  enemy's  line,  not  only  bringing  in  all 
unwounded  men  safely  but  also  15  prisoners. 
The  result  of  this  uncommonly  gallant  opera- 
tion was  the  silencing  of  an  enemy  battery,  the 
killing  of  the  whole  battery  personnel  and  many 
infantry,  and  the  cutting  of  three  main  lines  of 
telephone  communication  two  miles  in  rear  of 
the  enemy's  front  line. 

Within  a  month  of  the  announcement  of  the 
award  to  Captain  Strachan  there  was  a  large 
gathering  in  Bo'ness  (Linlithgowshire)  Town 
Hall  on  the  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  a 
sword  of  honour  to  him.  A  very  interesting 
feature  of  the  report  of  the  ceremony  which 
appeared  in  The  Times  was  the  statement  that 
the  Cross  was  awarded  to  Captain  Strachan 
"  for  his  daring  leadership  of  cavalry  at  the 
break  through  at  Cambrai."  Lord  Rosebery 
was  present,  and  in  a  characteristic  speech  he 
said  he  was  proud  to  congratulate  Captain 
Strachan  on  the  honour  he  had  brought  to  his 
native  town  and  the  county.  It  was  not  a  bad 
thing,  he  added,  when  the  war  lumbered  slowly 
along,  that  they  should  receive  occasionally  the 
encouragement  of  feeling  that  they  had  a  hero 
of  their  own 

Another  Canadian  officer — Lieutenant  Robert 
Shankland,  Canadian  Infantry — showed  great 
courage     and     resource     under     critical     and 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


249 


adverse  conditions  and  gave  to  all  ranks  that 
inspiration  which  was  so  invaluable  in  times 
of  special  stress.  Shankland  had  gained  a 
position  in  action  and  then  rallied  the  remnant 
of  his  platoon  and  men  of  other  companies  and 
disposed  them  to  command  the  ground  in 
front.  The  lieutenant  inflicted  heavy  casual- 
ties upon  the  retreating  enemy,  and  later  ho 
dispersed  a  counter-attack  and  so  enabled 
supporting  troops  to  come  up  unmolested. 
Shankland  having  shown  his  grit  as  a  fighter, 
displayed  first-rate  qualities  as  an  intelligence 
officer,  for  he  personally  communicated  to 
battalion  headquarters  an  accurate  and  valu- 
able report  as  to  the  position  of  the  brigade 
frontage,  after  which  he  rejoined  his  command 
and  carried  on  until  he  was  relieved.  It  was 
owing  to  his  courage,  skill  and  splendid  example 
that  a  very  critical  position  was  undoubtedly 
saved. 

"  He  bayoneted  fifteen  of  the  enemy,"  "  he 
led  the  final  assault  with  the  utmost  skill," 
"  this  gallant  non-commissioned  officer  re- 
peatedly went  out  under  heavy  fire  and 
brought  wounded  back  to  cover,  thus  saving 
many  lives,"  he  was  "  conspicuous  in  rallying 
and  leading  his  command  " — these  were  things 
said  of  the  conduct  of  Acting  Corporal  John 
Collins,  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers  (Merthyr  Tydvil), 
who  provided  yet  one  more  instance  of  extra- 
ordinary courage  and  leadership  in  the  lower 
ranks  in  the  Army.  The  corporal's  conduct 
was  the  more  noticeable  because,  after  deploy- 
ment before  an  attack,  his  battalion  was  forced 
to  lie  out  in  the  open  under  heavy  shell  and 
machine-gun  fire  which  caused  many  casualties. 
Destructive  fire  and  uncut  wire  were  powerless 
to  restrain  him,  great  odds  melted  before  his 
powerful  plying  of  the  bayonet,  and  after  that 
exploit  with  the  steel  he  pressed  on  with  a  Lewis 
gun  section  beyond  the  objective  and  most 
effectively  covered  the  reorganization  and  con- 
solidation, although  isolated  and  under  fire  from 
guns  and  snipers. 

The  same  cool  leadership  and  inspiring  ex- 
ample characterised  the  acts  of  Sergeant  Harry 
Coverdale,  Manchester  Regiment  (Old  Trafford, 
Manchester),  who  in  attack  on  enemy  strong 
points,  and  when  close  to  his  objective,  killed  an 
officer  and  took  two  men  prisoners,  the  three 
being  snipers  ;  then  he  rushed  two  machine- 
guns,  killing  or  wounding  the  teams.  Later  he 
reorganized  his  platoon  in  order  to  capture 
another  position  ;  but  after  getting  within  100 
yards  of  it  he  was  hold  up  by  our  own  barrage 


and  forced  to  return,  having  sustained  nine 
casualties.  Subsequently  he  again  went  out 
with  five  men  to  capture  this  position,  but 
seeing  a  considerable  number  of  the  enemy 
advancing  he  withdrew  his  detachment  man  by 
man.  He  was  the  last  to  retire  and  was  able  to 
report  that  the  enemy  were  forming  for  a 
counter-attack. 

This  list  of  10  was  completed  with  Private 


ACTING    CORPORAL    JOHN    COLLINS, 
Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers. 

Thomas  Henry  Sage,  Somersetshire  Light 
Infantry  (Tiverton),  whose  act  was  the  result  of 
great  promptness  and  presence  of  mind,  and 
nearly  cost  him  his  life.  He  and  eight  other 
men  were  in  a  shell-hole.  One  of  the  men  was 
shot  while  throwing  a  bomb.  The  bomb  fell 
into  the  shell-hole,  and  Sage  immediately 
threw  himself  on  it,  "thereby  undoubtedly 
saving  the  lives  of  several  of  his  comrades, 
though  he  himself  sustained  very  severe 
wounds." 

The  Victoria  Cross  Warrants  had  been  so 
framed  that  it  was  possible  for  civilians  to  win 
the  decoration,  and  there  were  three  well-known 
instances  of  civilian  recipients — Mr.  Thomas 
Henry  Kavanagh,  Mr.  Ross  Lowis  Mangles  and 
Mr.  William  Fraser  McDonell,  all  members  of 
the  Bengal  Civil  Service ;  and  all  three  of 
whom  were  awarded  the  Cross  for  acts  of  bravery 
in  the  Indian  Mutiny  in  1857.  The  original 
Warrant  of  January  29,  1856,  expressly 
ordained  that  the  Cross  should  only  be  awarded 
to  those  officers  or  men  who  had  served  in  the 


250 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


presence  of  the  enemy,  and  that  "  neither  rank, 
nor  long  service,  nor  wounds,  nor  any  other 
circumstance  or  condition  whatsoever,  save  the 
merit  of  conspicuous  bravery  "  should  be  held 
to  establish  a  sufficient  claim  to  the  honour. 
It  was  undoubtedly  open  to  civilians  to  win  the 
( 'ross,  but  no  such  award  had  been  made  since 
the  days  of  the  Mutiny,  nor  had  there  been  any 
clear  understanding  as  to  the  position  of  women 
with  regard  to  the  decoration  ;  and  with  the 
purpose  of  getting  information  on  this  most 
interesting  point  a  question  was  asked  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  December  3,  1917,  by 
Sir  A.  W.  Yeo,  the  member  for  Tower  Hamlets, 
Poplar.  In  reply  Mr.  Ian.  Macpherson, 
Under-Secretary  for  War,  said  •  "  When  a  case 
arises  in  which  a  woman  performs  an  action  in 
the  circumstances  contemplated  by  the  Victoria 
Cross  Warrant  consideration  will  be  given  to  an 


extension  of  the  .conditions.  At  present  the 
warrant  would  not,  I  think,  admit  of  a  grant." 
As  a  matter  of  fact  neither  the  original  Warrant 
nor  the  subsequent  Warrants  of  1867,  1881  and 


PRIVATE    THOMAS    H.    SAGE, 
Somersetshire  Light  Infantry. 

1911  provided  for  such  a  case  as  that  which  had 
been  mentioned,  and  only  time  was  to  show 
whether  one  or  more  members  of  the  army  of 
women  who  had  enrolled  for  war  work  would 
have  the  unparalleled  honour  of  being  awarded 
the  Cross. 

That  noble  clause  which  has  been  quoted 
from  the  original  Warrant  of  the  Cross — that 
conspicuous  bravery  only  should  establish  a 
claim  to  the  honour — was  thoroughly  exem- 
plified by  details  which  were  given  from  time 
to  time  relating  to  the  personality  of  the 
winners.  All  classes  alike  were  in  equal  fellow- 
ship ;  even  more  than  that  there  was  the 
man  from  the  lowest  depths  who,  given  the 
chance  of  redemption,  found  and  took  it  on  the 
field  of  battle.  Such  a  case  was  mentioned  by 
a  well-known  criminal  lawyer,  who  wrote  : — 
"  One  of  the  most  notorious  of  pre-war  criminals 
gave  his  life  for  his  country  in  a  deed  of 
gallantry  that  won  for  him  the  posthumous 
honour  of  the  V.C." 


SERGEANT    HARRY    COVERDALE, 
Manchester  Regiment. 


The  following  awards  of  the  Victoria  Cross 
were  announced  between  August  and  the  end 
of  December  1917  : — 

Ackroyd,  Temp.  Capt.  Harold,  M.C.,  M.D., 
R.A.M.C,  attached  R.   Berkshire  Regt. 

Andrew,  Corpl.  Leslie  Wilton,  Infy.  Bn.,  New 
Zealand  Force. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


251 


Barratt,  Pte.  Thos.,  South  Staffordshire  Regt. 

(Tipton). 
Best-Dunkley,   Capt.   (Temp.  Lieut. -Colonel) 

Bertram,  Lancashire  Fusiliers. 
Birks,   2nd   Lieut.   Frederick,   Australian   Im- 
perial Force. 
Bishop,    Capt.     Wm.     Avery,     D.S.O.,    M.C., 

Canadian  Cavalry  and  R.F.C. 
Bonner,  Lieut.  Charles  George,  D.S.C.,  R.N.R. 
Borton,    Lieut. -Colonel    Arthur    Drummond, 

D.S.O.,  London  Regt. 
Brown,  Pte.  Harry,  Canadian  Inf.  Bn. 
Bugden,    Pte.    Patrick,    Australian    Imperial 

Force. 
Burman,  Sergt.  William  Francis,  Rifle  Brigade 

(Stepney,  E.). 
Butler,  Pte.  William  Boynton,  West  Yorks. 

Regt.  (Hunslet,  Leeds). 
Bye,   Sergt.    Robt.,   Welsh   Guards    (Penrhiw- 

ceiber,  Glamorgan). 

Carmichael,  Sergt.  John,  North  Staffordshire 

Regt.  (Glasgow). 
Clamp,  Corpl.  William,  Yorkshire  Regt.  (Flem- 

ington). 
Coffin,    Lieut. -Colonel    (Temp.    Brig. -General) 

Clifford,  D.S.O.,  R.E. 
Collins,    Acting-Corpl.    John,    Royal    Welsh 

Fusiliers  (Merthyr  Tydvil). 
Colvin,  2nd  Lieut.  Hugh,  Cheshire  Regt. 
Colyer-Fergusson,  2nd  Lieut.  (Acting  Capt.) 

Thos.   Riversdale,  Northamptonshire   Regt. 
Cooper,    Sergt.    Edward,    King's    Royal    Rifle 

Corps  (Stockton). 
Coverdale,   Sergt.    Harry,   Manchester   Regt. 

(Old  Trafford,  Manchester). 
Crisp,  Skipper  Thomas,  R.N.R. 

Dancox,  Pte.  Fk.  Geo.,  Worcestershire  Regt. 
(Worcester). 

Davies,  Corpl.  James  Llewellyn,  R.  Welsh  Fusi- 
liers (Nantymoel,  Glamorgan). 

Day,  Corpl.  Sidney  James,  Suffolk  Regt.  (Nor- 
wich). 

Dwyer,  Sergt.  John  Jas.,  Aus.  M.G.  Corps,  Aus. 
Imp.  Force. 

Edwards,  Sergt.  Alexander,  Seaforth  High- 
landers (Lossiemouth). 

Edwards,  Pte.  Wilfrid,  King's  Own  Yorks  L.I. 
(Leeds). 

Eoerton,  Corpl.  Ernest  Albert,  Nottingham- 
shire and  Derbyshire  Regt.  (Longton). 

Evans,  Major  (Acting  Lieut. -Colonel)  Lewis 
Pugh,  D.S.O.,  Rov-il  Highlanders,  command- 
ing a  Battalion  Lincolnshire  Regt. 


Graham,  Lieut.  John  Reginald  Noble,  A.  and  S 

Highrs.,  attached  M.G.C. 
Greaves,  Acting  Corpl.  Fred,  Nottinghamshire 

and  Derbyshire  Regt.  (Balborough). 
Grimbaldeston,     Sergt.      (Acting     C.Q.M.S.) 

Wm.  H  ,  K.O.  Scottish  Bord.  (Blackburn). 

Halton,  Pte.  Albert,  King's  Own  Royal  Lan- 
caster Regt.  (Carnforth). 

Hamilton,  Pte.  (Acting  Lee.  Corpl.)  John 
Brown,  Highland   Light   Inf.   (Lanarkshire) 

Hanna,  Coy.  Sergt.-Major  R.,  Canadian  Inf. 

Hewitt,  2nd  Lieut.  Denis  Geo.  Wyldbore, 
Hampshire  Regt. 

Hewitt,  Lee.  Corpl.  William  Henry,  South 
African  Inf. 

Hobson,  Sergt.  Frederick,  Canadian  Inf.  Bn. 

Hutt,  Pte.  Arthur,  Royal  Warwickshire  Regt. 
(Earlsdon,  Coventry). 

In  wood,  Pte.  Reginald  Roy,  Australian  Imperial 
Force. 

Jeffries,  Capt.  Clarence  Smith,  Australian 
Imperial  Force. 

Konowal,  Acting  Corpl.  Filip,  Canadian  Inf. 
Knight,  Sergt.  Alfred  Joseph,  London  Regt. 
(Nottingham). 

Lafone,  Major  Alexander  Malius,  Yeomanry. 
Learmouth,  Capt.  (acting  Major)  Okill  Massey, 

M.C.,  Canadian  Inf. 
Loosemore,  Pte.   Arnold,   West  Riding  Regt. 

(Sheffield). 
Lister,    Sergt.    Joseph,    Lancashire    Fusiliers 

(Reddish,  Stockport). 

McGee,  Sergt.  Lewis,  Australian  Imp.  Force. 
McIntosh,    Pte.    Geo.,    Gordon    Highlanders, 

Buckie,  Banffshire. 
Mayson,   Corpl.    (Lee.    Sergt.)   Tom   Fletcher, 

R.  Lancaster  R.   (Silecourt,  Cumberland). 
Melvin,     Pte.     Charles,     Royal     Highlanders 

(Kirriemuir). 
Molyneux,  Sergt.  John,  Royal  Fusiliers  (St. 

Helens). 
Moore,  2nd  Lieut.  Montagu  Shadworth  Sey- 
mour, Hampshire  Regt. 
Moyney,  Lee.  Sergt.  John,  Irish  Guards  (Rath- 

downey,  Queen's  County). 
Mugford,  Lee.  Corpl.  Harold,  M.G.  Corps  (East 

Ham). 

Ockenden,  Sergt.  James,  Royal  Dublin  Fusi- 
liers (Southsea). 
O'Rourke,  Pte.  Michael  James,  Canadian  Inf. 


25-2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Parsons,  Temp.  2nd  Lieut.  Hardy  Falconer, 

Gloucestershire  Regt. 
Peeler,  Lee.  Corpl.  Walter,  Australian  Imperial 

Force. 
Pitcher,  Petty  Officer  Ernest. 

Rees,    Sergt.    Ivor,    South    Wales    Borderers 

(Llanelly). 
Reynolds,  Temp.  Capt.  Henry,  M.C.,  Royal 

Scots. 
Rhodes,   Lee.   Sergt.   John  Harold,  Grenadier 

Guards  (Tunstall,  Staffordshire). 
Robertson,  2nd  Lieut.  Clement,  Royal  West 

Surrey   Regt.,    S.R.    (Temp.    Lieut.,    Acting 

Capt.,  Tank  Corps). 


Room,  Pte.  (Acting"  Lee.  Corpl.)  Fk.  G.,  Royal 
Irish  Regt.  (Bristol). 

Sage,  Pte.  Thos.  Hy.,  Somersetshire  Light  Inf. 
(Tiverton). 

Shankland,  Lieut.  Robt.,  Canadian  Inf. 

Skinner,  Sergt.  (Acting  C.S.M.)  John,  King's 
Own  Scottish  Borderers  (Pollokshields,  Glas- 
gow). 

Stra'chan,  Lieut.  Hy.,  M.C.,  Canadian  Cavalry 

Watt,  Skipper  Joseph,  R.N.R. 

Witham,  Pte.  Thos.,  Coldstream  Guards  (Burn- 
ley). 

Woodcock,  Pte.  Thos.,  Irish  Guards  (Wigan, 
Lancashire). 


CHAPTER  CCXXIX. 

FOOD  CONTROL  AND  RATIONS 
IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


Abundance  during  Two  Years  op  War — Appointment  of  Food  Controller  at  End  of  1916 — 
Causes  of  Shortage — The  Runciman  Public  Meals  Order — Lord  Devonport — Lord 
Rhondda's  Appointment — Purchasing  Power  of  the  Sovereign — Mr.  J.  R.  Clynes — A 
Standard  Ninepenny  Loaf — Maximum  Prices — Local  Committees — Sugar  Cards — Individual 
Registration — "  Voluntary  "  Rations — Shortage  of  Fats — Queues — Meat  Prices — Meat 
Shortage — The  Meat  Rationing  Scheme  Explained — First  Effects  of  Rationing — German 
Experience — Lord  Rhondda's  Success. 


IT  was  almost  a  commonplace  before  the 
war,  among  certain  schools  of  political 
and  economic  thought,  that  an  island 
country  which  was  not  self-supporting 
in  food  would  be  in  danger  of  starvation  soon 
after  the  outbreak  of  an  armed  conflict  with 
any  large  maritime  Power.  Like  so  many  of 
the  other  prophecies  which  were  widely  be- 
lieved in  those  days  this  unpleasant  forecast 
was  completely  falsified  by  events.  The  out- 
standing feature  of  the  food  situation  as  it 
developed  in  Great  Britain  was  the  insignifi- 
cance of  the  interference  of  military  and  naval 
operations  with  the  provisioning  of  the  civilian 
population  during  the  first  two  years  of  hostili- 
ties. Except  for  a  gradual  and  sustained  up- 
ward movement  of  the  prices  of  most  of  the 
articles  of  common  consumption  there  was  no 
food  problem  in  the  country  until  the  nations 
hail  entered  on  the  third  year  of  war.  Up  to 
this  point  the  people  of  the  United  Kingdom 
were  in  the  happy  position  of  being  spectators 
at  a  distance,  and  not  always  perhaps  with  a 
clear  vision,  of  the  food  troubles  of  enemy 
countries,  and  regarded  with  little  more  than 
academic  interest  the  elaborate  schemes  of 
rationing  by  which  the  enemy  Governments 
sought  to  overcome- those  troubles. 
Vol.  XV.— Part   190 


But  the  situation  underwent  a  perceptible 
change  in  the  closing  months  of  1916,  and  for 
a  variety  of  reasons,  which  will  be  examined 
more  closely  later,  the  problems  of  supply 
and  distribution  began  to  thrust  themselves 
on  the  attention  of  the  people  and  the  Govern- 
ment. To  many  who  had  been  lulled  into 
security  by  two  years  of  plenty,  the  possibility 
that  their  daily  bread  and  the  rest  of  the  things 
they  ate  might  not  continue  to  reach  them  by 
the  same  almost  automatic  process  as  in  normal 
times  came  with  a  little  shock,  and  when  they 
found  it  difficult  to  get  two  or  three  articles  of 
food  in  the  quantities  to  which  they  had  been 
accustomed,  they  exercised  the  Englishman's 
prerogative  and  made  a  noise  about  the  matter. 
It  has  to  be  recorded  that  when  first  a  scarcity 
of  butter,  margarine,  meat,  bacon,  cheese  and 
tea  caused  inconvenience  and  some  actual 
hardships  among  the  poorer  classes,  the  dis- 
content which  arose  was  rather  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  burden  which  the  people  had 
to  carry.  Lord  Rhondda.  who  was  then  the 
Food  Controller,  in  a  speech  made  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Aldwych  Club,  told  the  "  grousers " 
quite  bluntly  that  what  they  were  speaking  of 
as  famine  would  be  regarded  as  luxury  in  Ger- 
many.    Even  in  the  forty-fourth  month  of  the 


263 


254 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


war  the  Prime  Minister  was  able  to  say  that 
there  was  less  hunger  in  this  country  than  there 
had  been  before  the  war  began. 

To  some  extent  the  discontent  was  not 
seen  in  its  true  perspective.  Resentment 
was  created  and  fed,  not  so  much  by  the  diffi- 
culty in  getting  accustomed  foods,  as  by  a 
belief  among  the  working  people  that  unfair 
distribution  enabled  the  wealthy  to  get  sup- 
plies without  trouble  to  themselves  while  the 
poor  were  deprived  of  their  share.  This  im- 
pression rested  on  very  slender  foundations, 
but  it  was  fostered  and  spread  by  men  and 
women  with  pacifist  leanings,  and  also  quite 
honestly  by  less  flabby  speakers,  who  believed 
that  the  disparity  they  described  existed,  and 
whose  solo  wish  was  to  remedy  a  supposed 
injustice.  Complaints  would  have  been  fewer 
if  the  scarcity  had  come  earlier  in  the  war. 
The  pinch  was  suddenly  felt  at  a  time  when 
the  strain  of  three  years  of  unremitting  toil, 
the  draining  of  the  man-power  resources  of  the 
country,  and  the  losses  in  the  field  which  left 
few  people  untouched,  had  "  dulled  the  enthu- 
siasm for  sacrifice "  and  created  a  sense  of 
weariness.  It  was  not  a  weariness  that  brought 
the  nation  to  any  thought  of  peace  without 
victory,  but  it  made  life  less  buoyant,  and  men 
and  women  less  able  to  take  up  an  addition 
to  their  cares. 

Out  of  the  situation  as  it  developed  there 
arose  a  popular  cry  for  rationing  which  gave 
the  necessary  impetus  to  a  demand  con- 
sistently advanced  much  earlier  by  those  who 
realized  how  vital  an  influence  the  food  question 
might  have  in  turning  the  balance  between 
victory  and  disaster.  It  was  not,  however, 
until  the  beginning  of  1918  that  the  Govern- 
ment definitely  sanctioned  the  putting  into 
operation  of  a  national  scheme  to  restrict  and 
regularize  the  consumption  of  foods  of  which 
a  scarcity  had  arisen.  Even  then,  in  spite  of 
vague  assurances  given  and  repeated  at  fre- 
quent intervals  of  the  existence  of  a  carefully 
thought-out  plan,  the  machinery  for  rationing 
was  not  ready,  or  had  not  got  beyond  the  stage 
of  experiment,  and  the  national  system  had 
to  follow  upon  the  gradual  fusion  and  extension 
of  local  schemes  started  in  industrial  areas 
where  a  dearth  of  supplies  and  labour  pressure 
had  compelled  the  authorities  to  take  action. 

The  reluctance  of  the  Government  to  resort 
to  rationing  may  have  been  partly  prompted 
by  a  desire  to  avoid  encouraging  the  enemy 
in    hopes  of   success  for   his   "  ruthless "   sub- 


marine campaign,  but  it  was  also  an  outcome 
of  the  great  achievement  of  the  Navy  and 
the  British  Mercantile  Marine  in  maintaining 
month  after  month,  and  year  after  year,  the 
transport  of  meat  and  grain,  oils  and  fats,  tea 
and  sugar,  from  all  parts  of  the  world,  to 
British  ports.  Many  fine  ships  and  much 
valuable  food  went  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea, 
but,  in  a  greater  degree  than  these  losses, 
it  was  the  world  shortage  due  to  diminished 
harvests  and  decreased  production  that 
brought  men  to  take  thought  of  the  danger 
that  the  people's  bread  might  fail.  The  scar- 
city of  butter  and  margarine,  and  the  sudden 
diminution  of  the  meat  supplies — two  things 
which  made  rationing  inevitable — had  their 
origin  more  in  the  exigencies  of  war  policy 
and  mistakes  in  the  exercise  of  food  control 
than  in  the  attacks  of  the  German  submarines. 
Had  the  duration  of  the  war  been  less  pro- 
longed, and  the  means  of  defence  against  the 
development  of  the  submarine  more  effective, 
the  triumph  of  our  seamen  would  have  been 
complete.  Although  the  United  Kingdom  in 
the  days  of  peace  produced  only  a  little  over 
a  third  of  the  food  necessary  for  the  existence 
of  the  population,  and  the  closing  of  the  sea 
would  have  meant,  as  the  theorists  had  told 
us,  starvation  and  surrender  within  a  period 
measured  by  months,  the  outstanding  fact 
of  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  was  that  a 
scarcity  of  food  was  not  felt  at  all,  and  that 
the  working  classes,  with  higher  wages,  actually 
enjoyed  better  and  more  substantial  meals 
than  they  had  been  able  to  obtain  in  normal 
times.  When  at  length  certain  shortages 
developed,  they  were  felt  severely,  but  through 
the  skilful  use  of  the  available  tonnage  tho 
actual  fall  in  imports  late  in  1917  compared 
with  peace-time  figures  was  only  4  per  cent. 
If  it  is  stated  that,  apart  from  supplying  the 
needs  of  the  civil  population  at  home,  the 
shipping  problem  included  the  service  of  our 
armies  in  many  theatres  of  war,  and  the  partial 
provisioning  of  our  Allies,  the  extent  of  the 
national  indebtedness  to  the  men  who  guarded 
or  sailed  the  seas  may  in  some  sense  be  measured. 
Notwithstanding  this,  the  Government  cannot 
be  acquitted  of  blame  for  carrying  optimism 
to  the  extent  of  deferring  even  effective  organi- 
zation for  rationing  the  nation  until  rationing 
was  practically  thrust  on  them  by  industrial 
areas  wherj  the  food  situation  had  become 
acute.  There  was  probably  a  third  cause 
influencing    the    hesitation    and    distrust    with 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


255 


which  the  Government  viewed  rationing  pro- 
posals. Great  Britain  is  a  democracy,  and  a 
democracy  "  peculiarly  intolerant  of  precise 
regulations  in  the  home."  Ministers  feared  the 
possible  effect  of  any  official  interference  with 
the  nation's  habits.  A  bureaucracy  like  Ger- 
many could  ignore  what  is  known  as  public 
opinion,  and  develop  its  plans  accordingly. 
In  Great  Britain,  a  Government  nervous  about 
the  way  in  which  the  public  might  regard  the 
inconvenience  and  difficulties  of  rationing, 
once  again  trailed  unwillingly  in  the  rear  of 


De  dealt  with  merely  by  the  making  of  speeches 
urging  national  economy.  On  November  17 
of  that  year  wide  powers  were  conferred  on  the 
Board  of  Trade  for  the  control  of  the  manu- 
facture, sale,  and  use  of  food,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  these  powers  Mr.  Runciman  issued 
on  November  20  a  Milling  Order  which  made 
obligatory  a  76%  extraction  of  flour  from 
wheat.  This  very  modest  step  was  followed 
on  December  5  by  the  first  Public  Meals  Order, 
which  put  a  limitation  on  the  number  of  courses 
that  might  be  served  at  luncheon  and  dinner 


DEMONSTRATION    OF    MANCHESTER    WORKERS    IN    FAVOUR    OF    COMPULSORY 

RATIONING     JANUARY    26,    1918. 


that  opinion,  and  had  suddenly  to  recognize 
that  people  demanded  that  they  should  be 
rationed.  Several  months  were  then  occupied 
in  building  the  foundations  on  which  national 
rationing  might  be  based,  and  in  developing 
a  scheme  out  of  the  pioneer  experiments  tested 
locally. 

Food  control  in  Great  Britain  did  not  take 
definite  form  until  the  end  of  1916.  In 
Chapter  CXCII  it  was  shown  that  Mr.  Asquith's 
Government,  shortly  before  its  fall,  was  com- 
pelled, "  largely  as  the  result  of  a  Press  cam- 
paign," to  recognize  that  a  situation  which 
was  beginning  to  cause  uneasiness  could  not 


in  hotels,  restaurants  and  clubs.  Then  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  became  Prime  Minister,  and  made 
the  establishment  of  a  Food  Controller  one  of 
his  first  actions.  He  chose  Lord  Devonport 
for  the  position  and  gave  him  what  at  the 
time  was  regarded  as  a  comparatively  free 
hand  to  seek  a  solution  for  the  problem  which 
had  arisen.  Lord  Devonport  held  office  foi 
about  five  months.  Soon  after  his  appoint- 
ment the  position  in  regard  to  the  national 
reserve  of  cereals  became  acute  and  people 
of  foresight  began  to  urge  the  advisability  of 
compulsory  rationing.  It  was  announced  that 
the  necessary  machinery  for  rationing  would 

190—2 


250 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


AGRICULTURAL    SCHOOL    FOR    SOLDIERS. 

The  Food  Production  Department   of  the   Board  of  Agriculture   opened    a    school    for   soldiers   of  low 

medical  classification,  many  of  whom  had  seen  service  at  the  front. 


be  prepared,  but  neither  the  machinery  nor  a 
plan  for  rationing  ever  reached  such  a  stage 
under  the  first  Food  Controller  that  details 
could  be  made  public.  The  policy  of  the 
Department  was  more  effectively  directed  to 
checking  the  consumption  of  wheat  by  increas- 
ing the  extraction  of  flour  from  the  grain, 
making  an  admixture  of  flour  milled  from  other 
cereals  compulsory,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  new 
bread,  and  similar  measures.  At  the  same 
time  an  appeal  was  made  for  the  voluntary 
observance  of  a  rationed  scale  of  consumption 
of  bread,  meat  and  sugar,  and  a  Food  Economy 
Campaign,  organized  by  Mr.  Kennedy  Jones, 
M.P.,  carried  this  appeal  through  the  country, 
with  the  result  that  a  good  many  people, 
chiefly  of  the  upper  and  professional  classes, 
regulated  their  housekeeping  on  the  basis 
suggested  to  them.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
the  really  heavy  eaters  of  bread — men  engaged 
on  industrial  and  agricultural  work — made 
any  attempt  to  economize,  either  in  food  or 
anything  else  which  increased  earnings  brought 
within  their  reach.  The  inherent  weakness  of 
the  scale  was  that  it  imposed  a  flat  rate,  so  that 
a  worker  accustomed  to  eating  eight  to  ten 
pounds  of  bread  in  a  week  regarded  the  sug- 
gestion that  he  should  cut  down  his  consumption 
to  four  pounds  as  stupid,  and  ignored  the  appeal 
altogether. 

Later  the  appeal  took  the  form  of  a  request 


that  everybody  should  reduce  the  consumption 
of  bread  by  one  pound  a  week,  but  by  this  time 
it  was  fairly  well  known  that  the  reserves  of 
grain  had  been  considerably  augmented  and 
that  real  danger  had  for  the  time  been  averted, 
Lord  Devonport  did  not  add  greatly  to  his 
reputation  by  his  service  as  a  Minister  and  his 
resignation  of  office  caused  few  regrets.  But 
much  of  the  work  he  did  was  good.  His  busi- 
ness knowledge  and  energies  were  chiefly 
centred  on  supply,  and  by  exerting  pressure  on 
the  Government  to  provide  shipping  to  bring 
more  food  into  the  country,  encouraging  pro- 
duction at  home,  and  taking  various  measures 
to  get  all  the  bread  possible  from  the  wheat 
which  could  be  sent  to  the  mills,  he  removed 
the  threat  of  a  bread  famine,  prepared  the  way 
for  the  bountiful  potato  harvest  lifted  in  the 
autumn  of  1917,  and  saw  the  stocks  of  cattle 
and  sheep  raised  to  a  reassuring  figure. 

These  were  achievements,  however,  of  which 
the  public  at  the  time  had  little  knowledge, 
and  meanwhile  Lord  Devonport  and  the 
Government  in  the  spring  of  1917  had  become 
the  targets  for  sharp  criticism  arising  out  of 
resentment  at  the  inflation  of  the  price  of 
many  articles  of  food.  There  was  a  widespread 
conviction  that  the  steadily  rising  cost  of  meat, 
vegetables,  bread  and  other  essentials  could 
be  attributed  to  the  taking  of  unreasonable 
profits  by  the  producers,  wholesale  dealers  or 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


257 


retailers,  through  whom  food  reached  the 
consumer.  Lord  Devonport  made  one  or  two 
rather  timid  attempts  to  stem  the  upward 
rush  of  prices,  but  his  experiments  were  either 
made  too  late — as  in  the  days  of  a  dearth  of 
potatoes — or  lacked  boldness.  At  a  time  when 
popular  dissatisfaction  over  "  profiteering " 
had  become  so  marked  that  it  could  not  be 
ignored  by  the  Government,  Lord  Devonport 
resigned  his  post. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  describe 
the  gradual  development  of  the  situation  whicli 
led  to  the  adoption  of  compulsory  food  rationing 
and  to  deal  with  the  experiments  in  local  ration- 
ing which  were  the  foundation  of  a  national 
scheme.  For  this  reason  it  must  be  concerned 
with  the  activities  and  policy  of  the  second 
Food  Controller,  Lord  Bhondda,  rather  than 
the  first,  and  no  more  need  be  said  of  Lord 
Devonport  except  that  his  one  constructive 
contribution  to  rationing  was  a  revised  Public 
Meals  Order  which  substituted  for  Mr.  Runci- 
man's  limitation  of  the  number  of  courses 
which  could  be  served  in  an  hotel  or  restaurant 
a  well-thought-out  system  of  rationing  by  bulk. 
The  details  of  this  system  and  some  account  of 
other   orders   put   into    operation    while   Lord 


Devonport  held  office   were  given  in  Chapter 
CXCH. 

For  some  time  after  Lord  Devonport  had 
asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  office  there  was 
considerable  doubt  as  to  who  would  be  his 
successor.  The  task  to  be  taken  up  was  a 
difficult  and  a  thankless  one  ;  it  promised  no 
reward,  and  ambitious  politicians  showed 
no  eagerness  to  compete  for  a  position  which  ( 
might  lay  upon  them  the  fetters  of  failure. 
Even  Labour  fought  shy  of  the  appointment, 
although  the  War  Emergency  Workers'  National 
Committee — a  body  representing  the  various 
sections  of  the  Labour,  Cooperative  and 
Industrial  Women's  Movement — had  on  May  1 2 
published  a  comprehensive  "  draft  "  policy 
on  the  question  of  food  supply,  fn  a  modified 
form  much  of  this  policy  was  carried  into  effect 
later  in  the  year  by  a  "  capitalist  "  peer.  The 
things  demanded  were : 

GOVERNMENT  POLICY. 

(a)  The  purchase  of  all  essential  imported  foodxtuifs. 

(ft)  The  commandeering  or  controlling  of  all  home- 
grown food  products  such  as  wheat,  meat,  oats,  barley, 
potatoes,  and  milk. 

(c)  The  commandeering  of  ships  and  the  control  of 
transport  facilities. 

(d)  The  placing  on  the  retail  markets  of  all  supplies 
so  obtained  and  controlled    at  prices  which  will  secure 


ETON    BOYS    AT    WORK    IN    THE     POTATO    FIELD. 


258 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY     OF    THE    WAR. 


the  full  benefit  of  Government  action  to  the  consumer ;  ami 
the  proportional  regulation,  on  a  family  basis,  of  tho  salo 
of  any  foodstuffs  in  which  there  is  a  shortage  of  supplies. 

(e)  The  selling  of  bread  and  flour  for    the  period  of 
the  war  and   six  months  afterwards  at  a  price  not  ex- 
ceeding 6d.  per  quartern  loaf,  any  loss  so  involved  to  be 
met  as  a  portion  of  the  general  cost  of  the  war. 
MUNICIPAL  POLICY. 

Powers  to  be  given  to  municipal,  urban,  and  other 
local  authorities  to  set  upuspecial  food  control  committeos, 
to  which  shall  be  co-opted  representatives  of  Labour, 
cooperative  and  industrial  women's  organizations,  for 
the  purpose  of  supervising  the  registration  of  consumers, 
the  equitable  local  distribution  of  foodstuffs,  and  tho 
institution  of  municipal  food  services. 


for  nearly  six  months,  and  by  his  energy  and 
freedom  from  "departmentalism"  had  raised 
that  Department  to  a  high  pitch  of  efficiency. 
Before  joining  the  Government  he  was  Managing 
Director  of  the  Cambrian  Combine  and  other 
colliery  companies  in  South  Wales,  and  was 
regarded  as  a  business  man  first  and  a  House  of 
Commons  man  afterwards.  At  the  time  of 
his  change  of  office  it  was  said  of  him  in  The 
Times  (June  16,  1917)  :  "  He  is  a  believer  in 
direct  methods  and  may  be  trusted  to  bring 


["  Times  "  photograph. 

LORD    RHONDDA    AT    HIS    DESK    AT    THE    MINISTRY    OF    FOOD. 


One  of  the  men  invited  by  the  Prime  Minister 
to  become  Food  Controller  was  Mr.  Robert 
Smillie,  President  of  the  Miners'  Federation 
of  Great  Britain,  an  able  Labour  leader,  but  a 
bitter  critic  of  the  Government.  Mr.  Smillie 
was  assured  that  if  he  took  the  post  he  would 
have  full  power  over  the  distribution  and  over 
the  fixing  of  prices  of  food,  but  he  refused  to 
accept  the  responsibility  of  constructive  work. 
Eventually,  on  June  15,  Mr.  Bonar  Law 
announced  in  the  House  of  Commons  that 
Lord  Rhondda  had  consented  to  go  to  the 
Food  Ministry.  Lord  Rhondda  had  then 
been  President  of  the  Local  Government  Board 


to  the  uneasy  task  of  food  control  not  only 
wide  understanding  of  commercial  and  business 
conditions,  but  energy  and  freedom  from  pre- 
conceived ideas."  Experience  of  his  adminis- 
tration showed  that  Lord  Rhondda  added  to 
this  equipment  a  sense  of  humour,  a  knowledge 
of  how  to  handle  men,  readiness  to  receive  and 
weigh  the  advice  of  others,  and  what  he  him- 
self would  have  called  a  "  thick  skin."  He 
made  it  quite  clear  when  he  consented  to  be- 
come Food  Controller  that  he  did  so  only  at 
the  pressing  request  of  the  Prime  Minister,  but 
having  committed  himself  to  the  work  he  set 
out  vigorously  to  carry  his  ideas  into  effect.   The 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


259 


intentions  with  which  he  assumed  office  can  be 
summarized  from  a  statement  made  on  June  1 7  : 
I  have  been  given  very  ample  authority  by  the 
Government  to  deal  with  the  whole  situation.  I  am 
empowered,  should  I  find  it  necessary,  to  take  over 
the  food  supplies  of  the  country  and  to  adopt  strong 
measures  to  check  all  speculation  in  the  necessities  of 
life.  .  .  .  My  first  action  will  be  directed  towards  securing 
a  reduct  ion  in  tho  price  of  bread.  This  I  consider  to  be 
the  urgent  need  of  the  moment.  I  intend  to  be  as  fair 
as  the  conditions  of  war  will  permit,  but  frankly  my 
sympathies  are  with  the  consumer.  I  want  the  help 
of  local  authorities  in  the  matter  of  distribution,  and  I 
confidently  count  on  tho  advice  and  active  help  of  the 
cooperative  societies  and  other  distributing  agencies. 

This  was  followed  a  week  later  by  an  official 
statement  which  gave  an  indication  of  the 
lines  on  which  Lord  Rhondda  intended  to  work 
in  seeking  to  reduce  the  existing  high  prices. 
The  declaration  was  in  the  following  form : 

Lord  Rhondda  has  decided  that,  in  order  to  limit 
further  rises  in  the  prices  of  the  more  important  food- 
stuffs and  as  far  as  possible  to  roduce  the  present  level 
of  prices,  it  will  be  necessary  to  institute  much  stricter 
and  more  complete  measures  of  control  in  the  industries 
engaged  in  the  production  of  foodstuffs.  Maximum 
prices  require  to  be  enforced  by  strict  control  through 
the  producer  and  the  retailer,  with  the  object  of  limiting 
profits  at  every  stage  of  production  and  distribution  to 
a  fair  remuneration  for  sorvices  rendered. 

The  first  step  is  to  determine  the  costs  of  production 
and  handling.  For  this  purpose  the  Food  Controller 
has  already  taken  stops  to  set  up  a  Costings  Department 
in  the  Ministry  of  Food,  consisting  of  highly  skilled 
accountants,  who  will  have  full  powers  to  examine  books 
and  obtain  all  particulars  which  may  assist  him  to  arrive 
at  accurate  figures  as  to  costs.  The  object  of  control 
will  be  to  fix  prices  by  reference  to  actual  costs  with  the 
addition  of  the  normal  pre-war  rate  of  profit  independent 
of  market  fluctuations  in  the  manner  which  has  already 
enabled  the  Army  authorities  to  purchase  many  of  their 
essential  supplies  at  prices  considerably  below  the 
market  prices  ruling  for  civil  consumption. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  to  the  public 

mind  than  that  the  new  Food  Controller  should 

devote   himself   to   the   consideration    of   food 

prices.     A    man    at    this    period    would    have 

needed  to  be  deaf  and  unable  to  read  to  escape 

the  conclusion  that  people  of  all  classes  were 

looking  to  Lord  Rhondda  to  give  them  cheaper 

food.     The  following  table  shows  the  rise  in 

the  cost  of  living  up  to  July  1,  1917,  and  the 

reduced    purchasing    power    of    the    sovereign 

spent  on  food  in  the  large  towns  of  the  United 

Kingdom  during  the  war  : 


1904     ... 

1914. 
July 
August  8 
August  29 
Soptembor  12 
September  30 
October  30 
December  1 


Cost  of  one 
week's  food 
for  family. 
.    s.     d. 
..     22     6     . 


25 
29 
27 
27 
28 
28 
29 


Percentage 

increase  above 

July  1914. 


16  per  cent. 
11    ..      ., 
11    „      „ 
13    „      „ 
13    „      „ 

17  ,.      .. 


Purchasing 

power  of  a 

sovereign 

spent  on 

food. 

s.    d. 


20 
17 

18 
18 
17 
17 
17 


1915. 

s. 

d- 

s.    d. 

January  1 

.     29 

9     . 

19  per  cent. 

..      16   10 

February  1 

.     30 

9     . 

■      23    „      „ 

..      16     3 

March  1 

.     31 

6     . 

.       26    „      „ 

..      15   10 

April  1 

.     31 

6     . 

.       26    „      „ 

..      15   10 

May  1 

.     32 

0     . 

.       28    „      „ 

..      15     7 

June  1               i 

.     33 

9     . 

.       35    „      „ 

..      14  10 

July  1 

.     33 

0     . 

•       35    „      „ 

..      14   10 

August  1 

.      34 

0     . 

.       36    „      „ 

..      14     8 

September  1    . 

.     34 

3     . 

■       37    „      „ 

..      14     7 

October  1 

.      35 

6     . 

•       42 

..      14      1 

November  1     . 

.      35 

9     . 

•       43    „      „ 

14     0 

Decembor  1 

.     36 

0     . 

•       46    „      „ 

..      13     8 

1916. 

January  1 

.      37 

0     . 

•       48    „      „ 

..      13     6 

February  1 

.      37 

3     . 

•       49    „       „ 

..      13     5 

March  1 

.      37 

9     . 

•       51    „       „ 

..      13     3 

April  1 

.     38 

0     . 

•       52    „       „ 

..      13     2 

May  1 

.     39 

9     . 

•       59    „       „ 

12     7 

June  1 

.      40 

6     . 

-       62    „      „ 

..      12     4 

July  1 

.     41 

3     . 

.       65 

..      12     1 

August  1 

.     40 

6     . 

.       62 

..      12     4 

September  1     . 

.     42 

0     . 

•       68    „      „ 

..      11   11 

October  1 

.     42 

9     . 

.       71 

..      11     8 

November  1     . 

.     45 

3     . 

81    „      „ 

..      11     0 

December  1 

.     46 

9     . 

87    „      „ 

..      10     8 

1917. 

January  1 

.     47 

9     . 

.       91 

..      10     5 

February  1 

.     48 

3     . 

•       93    „      „ 

..      10     4 

March  1 

.     49 

3     . 

.       97 

..      10     2 

April  1 

.     49 

9     . 

•       99    „      „ 

..      10     0 

May  1 

.     50 

6     . 

.     102 

9   11 

June  1 

.     51 

6     . 

•     106    „      „ 

..9     8 

July  1 

.     52 

3     . 

•     109 

..9     6 

While  the  advance  in  prices  applied  to  nearly 
every  article  of  general  consumption — luxury 
foods,  chiefly  owing  to  the  fall  in  the  demand, 
alone  escaped  the  increase — popular  unrest 
mainly  arose  out  of  the  heavy  cost  of  bread 
and  meat.  In  the  summer  of  1917  the  price 
of  the  quartern  loaf  had  risen  to  one  shilling 
compared  with  a  normal  price  of  6d.  The 
advance  in  meat  prices  is  shown  in  the  following 
figures,  contrasting  the  wholesale  prices  pre- 
vailing at  the  London  Central  Markets  on 
June  25,  1914,  with  the  quotation  on  June  24, 
1917.     The  prices  were  per  stone  of  8  lb.  : 


Beef — 

Scotch  sides 

English     ... 

American — 
Forequarters, 
chilled  . 
Mutton — ■ 

Scotch 

English     ... 

Australian 
Lamb — 

English     ... 

Scotch 

Australian 


1914 


4s.  6d.  to  5s.  2d. 
4s.  2d.  to  4s.  5d. 


1917 

10s.  8d.  to  lis.  Id. 
10s.  3d. 


2s.  2d.  to  2s.  4d. 

...  6s.  V  -.  %.  4d. 
...  3s.  <K.  /j  4s.  Od. 
...  2s.  2d.  to  2s.  8d. 

...  5s.  8d.  to  6s.  8d. 
...  6s.  Od.  to  7s.  Od. 
...  3s.  6d.  to  4s.  Od. 


7s.  3d. 

lis.  5d. 

lis.  Id. 

6s.  Id. 

lis.  0.1. 

12s.  o,l. 

7s.  Od. 


To  enable  him  to  deal  with  speculation  and 
profiteering  wherever  it  was  established  that 
these  evils  existed,  Lord  Rhondda,  soon  after 
he  had  taken  office,  obtained  by  Order  in 
Council  powers  similar  to  those  already  possessed 
by  the  Army  Council,  the  Admiralty  and  the 


260 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


Ministry  of  Munitions,  for  the  requisitioning 
of  supplies  and  the  control  of  prices.  These 
powers  as  exercised  by  the  Departments  named 
had  resulted  in  extensive  economies  of  public 
money.  As  applied  to  food  supplies  they 
enabled  Lord  Bhondda  to  requisition  the  whole 
or  part  of  the  output  of  any  factory  and  to 
apply  a  price  based  on  the  cost  of  production, 
with  the  addition  of  a  reasonable  pre-war  rate 
of  profit,  without  regard  to  the  price  ruling  in 
the  open  market.  Authority  was  given  to 
the  Food  Controller  to  examine  books  and  to 
ascertain  such  particulars  as  to  output,  cost, 
and  rate  of  profit  as  might  be  required  for 
fixing  a  reasonable  price.  Mr.  U.  F.  Wintour, 
C.B.,  C.M.G.,  who  as  Director  of  Army  Con- 
tracts had  been  concerned  with  the  practical 
application  of  such  a  system,  was  appointed 
Permanent  Secretary  to  the  Ministry  of  Food, 
and  Mr.  E.  F.  Wise,  who  had  had  charge  of  the 
section  of  the  Army  Contracts  Department 
which  dealt  with  the  control  of  raw  materials 
required  for  clothing  and  equipping  the  Army, 
was  also  brought  in  as  an  assistant  secretary. 

Early  in  July  Lord  Rhondda  secured  as 
Parliamentary  Secretary  to  the  Ministry  of 
Food,  Mr.  .1.  R.  Clynes,  the  Labour  M.P.  for 


North-East  Manchester.  In  this  way  the 
Labour  movement-  became  directly  associated 
with  food  control,  and  in  Mr.  Clynes  gave  one 
of  its  soundest  and  most  efficient  representatives 
to  the  task.  Within  the  limitations  of  his 
subordinate  office,  Mr.  Clynes  from  the  first 
did  valuable  work,  and  not  only  as  an  adminis- 
trator, but  as  a  moderating  influence  in  the 
councils  of  his  own  working-class  organizations, 
he  served  his  country  well.  A  slightly-built, 
delicate,  studious  man,  passionately  but 
sanely  concerned  with  the  interests  of  the 
masses  of  the  people  and  the  betterment  of 
their  conditions  of  life,  he  talked  little,  but 
worked  incessantly  to  render  what  good  he 
could  to  his  fellows.  As  a  member  of  the 
Government  he  achieved  a  rare  success  ;  he 
retained  the  confidence  of  Labour  and  gained 
the  ardent  loyalty  and  admiration  of  the 
permanent  officials — some  of  them  conservative- 
minded  Civil  Servants — who  came  under  his 
control.  This  he  did  through  his  transparent 
sincerity  and  natural  ability.  He  had  no  use 
for  official  "  eyewash,"  and  at  the  same  time 
he  showed  scanty  toleration  for  the  rhetorical 
excesses  of  men  who  sought  to  exploit  the  diffi  - 
culties  of  the  food  situation  to  foment  class  anta- 


GIRL    MILLERS    AT    NOTTINGHAM. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


261 


gonisms.  More  than  once  lie  had  to  face  the  task 
of  qviieting  at  Labour  Party  and  Trade  Union 
conferences  a  sense  of  uneasiness  and  doubt 
aroused  by  glib  but  ill-informed  speakers  who 
had  tried  to  convince  the  delegates  that  the 
poor  and  the  workers  were  suffering  through 
the  selfishness  of  the  rich  and  the  class  bias 
of  the  Government.  He  never  failed  to  upset 
the  artificial  case  of  the  extremists  by  his  quiet 
but  unassailable  statements  of  facts.  He  took 
office  because  he  "  was  satisfied  that  genuine 
and  drastic  measures  would  be  tried  to  save 
the  situation  "  as  the  situation  existed  when 
he  joined  the  Ministry,  and  he  found  congenial 
but  abundant  work  in  helping  to  shape  and 
direct  those  measures. 

Before  the  end  of  July,  Lord  Rhondda  had 
sufficiently  developed  his  policy  to  announce 
that  from  an  early  date  he  would  standardize 
the  price  of  flour  in  such  a  way  as  would  enable 
bread  to  be  sold  at  9d.  the  quartern  loaf.  This 
standardizing  was  effected  some  weeks  later 
by  the  grant  of  a  State  subsidy,  the  cost  of 
which  was  estimated  at  £40,000,000  a  year. 
In  agreement  with  the  Army  Council,  he  had 
also  arranged  that  the  maximum  prices  for 
live  cattle — usually  only  partially  fattened — 
for  the  Army  should  be  reduced  to  74s. 
per  cwt.  in  September,  72s.  in  October, 
67s.  in  November,  and  60s.  in  January.  The 
prices  represented  considerable  reductions  on 
those  ruling  at  the  time,  and  they  were  later 
made  the  basis  in  fixing  maximum  wholesale 
prices  for  meat  for  civilian  consumption. 
From  the  first  the  scale  was  attacked  by  those 
interested  in  agriculture,  and  events  as  they 
developed  showed  that  the  decision  to  proceed 
on  a  falling  schedule  had  a  serious  effect  on 
the  meat  supplies  of  the  country  ;  eventually 
the  necessity  for  a  revision  of  prices  was 
realized,  but,  as  will  be  shown  later,  the  rushing 
into  the  markets  of  immature  cattle  and  the 
reluctance  of  farmers  to  fatten  stock  which 
would  have  to  be  sold  at  a  rate  regarded  as 
unremunerative  had  created  a  scarcity  which 
called  for  very  drastic  restriction  of  con- 
sumption. So  far  as  Lord  Rhondda's  respon- 
sibility is  concerned,  it  should  be  said  that  he 
stated  to  a  deputation  of  the  Central  Chamber 
of  Agriculture  that  he  would  have  preferred  to 
have  fixed  a  flat  price  from  September  onwards 
and  to  have  compensated  farmers  who  lost 
money  because  of  the  high  price  they  had  paid 
for  store  cattle,  but  he  was  advised  that  this 
was  impracticable.    At  the  time  the  prices  were 


fixed  no  danger  of  a  dearth  of  meat  seemed 
imminent.  A  meatless  day  in  public  eating 
places  had  been  revoked,  the  meat  rations  in 
force  in  the  restaurants  permitted  the  con- 
sumption of  no  less  than  5\  lbs.  a  head  a  week 


['Tmiks"  photograph. 

MR.    J.    R.    CLYNES. 
Parliamentary  Secretary  to  the  Ministry  of  Food. 

if  customers  cared  to  have  it,  and  the  voluntary 
meat  ration  for  households  of  2J  lbs.  a  head  a 
week  proposed  by  Lord  Devonport  remained 
unchanged. 

The  duties  of  the  Food  Controller  during  the 
war  were  to  economize  and  maintain  supplies, 
to  restrict  high  prices  and  excessive  profits, 
and  to  secure  equality  of  distribution  where 
scarcity  was  found  to  exist.  Public  interest 
in  the  third  summer  of  the  war,  however, 
when  the  tension  in  regard  to  the  wheat 
reserves  had  been  temporarily  relieved  and  the 
Director  of  Food  Economy,  Mr.  Kennedy 
Jones,  M.P.,  after  a  few  months'  work,  had 
resigned  his  position  and  described  his  work 
as  done,  was  centred  not  on  supplies  or  even 
distribution,  but  on  prices,  and  the  Government 
and  Lord  Rhondda  were  concerned  above 
everything  else  in  taking  steps  to  allay  the 
discontent  caused  by  the  high  cost  of  living. 
For  a  period  a  large  proportion  of  the  orders 
issued  by  the  Minister  of  Food  were  solely 
concerned  with  price  fixing  and  securing  the 
control  over  supplies  which  made  fixed  prices 
possible.     Eventually  there  were  scarcely  any 


262 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


foods,  except  vegetables,  the  retail  cost  of 
which  was  not  regulated.  The  following 
schedule  gives  the  maximum  prices  which 
prevailed  early  in  1918  for  some  of  the  con- 
trolled articles : 


4  lb.  loaf 
2  lb.  loaf 
I  lb.  loaf 

Per  14  1b. 


BREAD. 


FLOUK. 


d. 
9 

n 


Thick  flank  steak  . 

Chuck  steak 

Gravy  beof 

Minced  boef 

Sausage  to  contain  not  less  than  50  per  cent,  of 

meat 
Sausage,  67  per  cent.     ... 

Bones        ...  ...         ...         ...         ... 

Mutton  and  Lamb  : 
Leg,  whole 
Loin,  whole 
Best  end 
Loin  chops,  not  trimmed 
Saddles 


per  lb 
s.  d. 
1   10 


1     6 


1  3 
1  6 
0     2 


1  7 
1  a 
1  8 
1  10 
1     5 


GIRL    LAND-WORKERS    IN    THE    LORD    MAYOR'S    SHOW,    1917. 


MEAT. 
Beef: 

Topside  of  round 
Silversido,  with  bono 
Thick  flank  

Best  cut 

Knuckle  end    ... 
Aitch  bone 
Sirloin 

Thin  flank  

Leg  and  shin 

Suet  

Forcribs    ... 

Wing  ribs,  four  bone*    ... 

Long  ribs 

Back  ribs 

Top  ribs   ... 

Brisket 

Clod  and  sticking,  with  bone 

Hump 

Rump  steak,  boneless    ... 

Fillet  steak 

Buttock  stoak      


per  lb. 

pot  lb 

s.   d. 

s.  d. 

1     8 

Shoulders... 

1     5 

1     6 

Neck,  whole 

1     2 

1     7 

Best  end 

1     C 

1     8 

Scrag    

0  11 

1     6 

Best  neck  chops... 

1      8 

1     0 

Broasts,  whole 

0   11 

1     7 

Cut,  best  end  ... 

1     0 

1     0 

Suet           

1     2 

0     8 

Pork  : 

1     6 

Legs,  whole 

1     G 

1     6 

Middle 

1    10 

1     8 

Hind  loin,  whole. . 

1     8 

1     4 

Foro  loin  or  griskin  or  spare  rib,  without  blade 

1     3 

bone 

1     8 

1     3 

Loin,  ex  back  fat 

1     8 

1     0 

Best  end 

1     9 

1     0 

Neck  end 

1     7 

1     8J 

Shoulder,  without  hock... 

1     6 

2     2 

Blade  bone 

1     0 

2     2 

Belly         

1     7 

2     0 

Chops  or  steaks  ... 

1   10 

THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


268 


Pork — Continued  : 

Head)?,  including  tongue 

Tongues    ... 

Chaps 

Hocks 

Feet  ...  : 

Tenderloin,  without  bono 

Pork  bones,  excluding  factory  bono  ... 

Sausage,  to  contain  not  less  than  60  per  cent. 

pork 
Sausage  meat,  to  contain  not  less  than  50  per 

cent,  pork        ...  ...  ...  ...  ...      1     4 

Pickled  pork  could  be  sold  at  Id.  per  lb.  above  fresh 

pork  prices,  but  must  not  be  sold  as  bacon. 


XT 

ii, 

8. 

d. 

0 

9 

1 

4 

1 

2 

0 

8 

0 

4 

1 

11 

0 

3 

1     6 


Rabbits,  skinned,  each 

1     9 

Per  lb 

0  10 

FISH 

Whole  fish. 

Cuts, 

per  lb. 

per  lb. 

s.    d. 

s.    d. 

Bream  (fresh  and  salt  water) 

...      1     0 

— 

Brill 

...      2     6 

3     3 

Carp  ... 

...      1     4 

1    10 

Cod 

...      1      3 

1   10 

Dabs              

...      1     3 

— 

Dogfish  (skinned  or  filleted) 

...      1     0 

— 

John  Dory   ... 

...      1     3 

— 

Eels  (freshwater)    ... 

...      2     0 

— 

Eels  (conger) 

...      1     0 

1      4 

Flounders 

...      1     3 

— 

Grayling 

...      1      4 

— 

Gurnards 

...      1     0 

— 

Haddock 

...      1     3 

1    10 

Hake 

...    i   a 

1     9 

Halibut         

...     2     6 

3     3 

Herrings  (fresh) 

...      0     8 

— 

Ling 

...      1      2 

1     8 

Mackorel 

...     0     8 

— 

Mullet,  Red              

...      3     0 

— 

Grey          

...      1     6 

— 

Perch 

...      1     0 

— 

Pike  or  Jack 

...      1     4 

1   10 

Pilchards 

...     0     8 

— 

Plaice 

...      1    10 

— 

Salmon  (including  grilse)  ... 

...     3     0 

4     0 

Skate  (Wings)          

...      1     4 

1     6 

Soles  and  Slip* 

...     3     6 

— 

Soles  (Lemon) 

...      2     0 

— 

Sprats 

...     0     6 

— 

Tench 

...      1     4 

— • 

Trout    (fresh    and    saltwater 

after 

February  2) 

...     3     0 

4     0 

Turbot          

...     2     6 

3     3 

Whiting 

...      1      3 

— 

Smoked  Cod 

...     2     0 

— 

Smoked  Haddock   ... 

...      2     0 

— 

Kippered  Herrings 

...      1     0 

— 

Bloatered  Herrings... 

...     0   10 

— 

Frozen   Salmon 

...      2     2 

2     9 

Butter,  per  lb. 

.     2     6 

Margarine,  per  lb.  ... 

1     Oto  1     4 

Government  cheese,  per  lb. 

1     4 

Milk,  per  gallon 

.     2     8 

Tea,  per  lb.  ... 

.      2     8 

Coftee  (roasted),  per  lb. 

..:        ...  1     6  to 

Chocolate,  per  oz.  ... 

.     0     3 

Potatoes,  per  stone  of  14  lb. 

7d. 

to    1     5 
por  lb. 

Onions,  British 

.     0     3 

Lentils 

.     0     8 

Maize 

.     0     3J 

Oatmeal 

... 

.     0     4} 

Rice  ... 

.     0     4 

Peas,  blue  and  green 

.     0     9 

White  haricot  beans 

.     0     6 

Large  butter  beans... 



.     0     8 

[„■ 

lb. 

8. 

d. 

0 

H 

0 

H 

0 

9 

0 

10 

0 

10} 

0 

11 

0 

in 

1 

0 

Sugar  : — 

Cubes  and  chips  ... 

Granulated,  crystals,  dry    white  sugar,  West 
Indian  crystals,  etc.   ... 
Jam  : 

Plum  and  apple  ... 

Gooseberry 

Blackberry  or  greengage 

Raspborry  and  red  currant 

Raspberry 

Apricot,  black  currant,  strawberry,  or  cherry 

It   has    been   mentioned   that   the    9d.    loaf 
could  be  made  possible  only  by  a  Government 
subsidy.     A  further  subsidy  was  required  to 
give    the    farmers    a    guaranteed    price    of    £6 
to   £6   10s.   a  ton   for  the    1917   potato   crop. 
After  the  failure  of  supplies  in  the  spring  of  the 
year    the    Government    sought    to    persuade 
growers  to  put  all  the  land  they  could  under 
potatoes,  and  as  an  inducement  gave  a  pledge 
that  the  selling  price  should  not  fall  below  a 
certain    level.     The    intention    was    that    the 
public  should  pay  this  guaranteed  price,  but 
the  crop  was  so  heavy  that  the  supply  exceeded 
the  demand,  and  the  farmers  could  not  dispose 
of  their  stocks  at  the  official  minimum  rate. 
To  avoid  waste  the  Food  Controller  undertook 
to  supply  bakers  with  potatoes  to  be  used  with 
flour  in  the  manufacture  of  bread  at  a  price 
of  £3  10s.  a  ton,  and  made  up  the  difference  to 
the  growers.     The  subsidy  was  also  given  in 
respect  of    other    sales   under    the  guaranteed 
rates.     In  many  ways  the  procedure  was  not 
satisfactory,  and  when  in  1918  it  again  became 
desirable    that    the    largest    possible    crop    of 
potatoes  should  be  raised  a  fresh  arrangement 
was  made.     The  chief  objection  to   the    1917 
scheme    was    that    while    it    guaranteed    the 
farmer  a  certain  price  it  did  not  guarantee  a 
certain  market,  but  exception  was  also  taken 
to  the  fixing  of  a  flat  rate  which  did  not  take 
into    account    quality,    the    place    where    the 
potatoes  were  grown,  or  the  time  when  they 
were  delivered.     Under  Lord  Rhondda's  plan 
freedom  in  the  matter  of  price  was  left  to  the 
farmer    until    the     beginning    of    November. 
After  November  1  the  Food  Controller  was  to 
take  over  the  whole  of  the  remaining  crop  in 
Great  Britain  at  a  price  to  be  assessed  on  the 
basis  of  the  yield,  the  quality  of  the  potato,  the 
district  where  it  was  grown,  and  the  time  of 
delivery ;    and  which  would  ensure  that  the 
average  price  for  the  lowest  quality  would  not 
fall   below    £5    15s.    per   ton   in   England    and 
£5  5s.  per  ton  in  Scotland.     For  better  varieties 
a  proportionate  increase  in  price  was  promised, 
and  for  potatoes  grown  on  acreage  in  excess 

190—3 


264 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  the  total  acreage  under  potatoes  on  any 
fann  in  1916  specially  attractive  prices  were 
offered. 

Some  indication  of  the  activity  of  the 
Food  Controller's  Department  may  be  gathered 
from  the  fact  that  during  1917  over  180  orders 
and  general  licences  were  issued  by  Lord 
Devonport  and  Lord  Rhondda,  and  of  these 
more  than  130  remained  in  force  or  were  coming 
into  force  at  the  end  of  the  year.  Even  before 
Lord  Devonport  gave  up  office  it  had  become 
apparent  that  the  duties  of  the  Ministry  were 
too  numerous  and  too  general  for  food  control 
to  be  efficiently  exercised  by  a  central  body 
acting  alone.  The  task  of  ensuring  that 
the  ever-growing  volume  of  regulations  were 
properly  applied  and  observed  called  for  local 
administration.  At  the  Local  Government 
Board  Lord  Rhondda  had  shown  himself 
to  be  a  firm  believer  in  decentralization,  and 
before  he  had  been  Food  Controller  many  weeks 
the  Government  had  decided  to  entrust  to 
local  authorities  important  duties  in  connexion 
with  the  distribution  and  prices  of  foodstuffs 
and  with  the  maintenance  of  national  economy 
in  their  consumption.  In  thus  decentralizing 
food  control  work  Lord  Rhondda  had  to  choose 
between  appointing  local  committees  himself 
and  entrusting  their  appointment  to  such  bodies 
as  borough,  urban,  and  rural  district  councils. 
He  took  the  latter  course,  largely  because  it 
allowed  of  a  considerable  measure  of  popular 
control  over  the  appointment  and  proceedings 
of  the  committees.  While  avoiding  any 
dictation  to  local  authorities  in  detail  of  the 
lines  on  which  the  committee  should  be  chosen, 
he  gave  them  a  strong  lead  in  policy  in  the 
circulars  he  issued. 

It  will  be  the  first  duty  o£  the  Committee  Lhe  wrote] 
to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  consumers,  and  this 
should  be  borne  in  mind  at  the  time  of  its  appointment. 
It  will  be  provided  that  the  Committee  must  include  at 
least  one  representative  of  labour  and  one  woman. 
The  local  authority  should  also  consider  the  desirability 
of  taking  full  advantage  of  the  experience  and  advice 
of  representatives  of  cooperative  societies  and  other 
traders  in  their  area. 

In  another  circular  he  said  : 

Lord  Rhondda  regards  it  as  of  the  greatest  importance 
that  food  control  committees  should  secure  at  the 
outset  the  full  confidence  of  the  public  in  their  aroas 
and  he  urges  that  the  interests  of  the  consumer  should 
bo  the  first  consideration  to  be  borne  in  mind  by  local 
authorities  when  appointing  them. 

Rather  unexpectedly,  keen  controversy  arose 
over  the  appointment  of  the  committees. 
In  many  districts  attempts  were  made  to 
include  among  the  members  a  number  of  local 


traders,  and  as  it  was  understood  that  the 
committees  would  have  considerable  powers 
in  dealing  with  food  prices  strong  objection 
was  taken  to  the  election  of  grocers,  butchers, 
and  other  shopkeepers,  who  might  naturally 
be  supposed  to  have  an  interest  in  keeping 
prices  at  a  high  level.  In  some  towns  the 
protests  led  to  changes  in  the  constitution  of 
the  committees,  and  to  meet  the  general 
feeling  that  the  situation  required  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Ministry,  Lord  Rhondda 
announced  that  if  it  could  be  shown  that  any 
Food  Control  Committee  failed  in  its  trust 
and  that  the  local  authority,  notwithstanding 
this,  declined  to  consider  an  alteration  of  its 
membership,  he  would  be  prepared  to  inter- 
vene. At  the  same  time  he  called  for  a  return 
showing  in  detail  the  membership  of  all  the 
committees,  and  gave  an  undertaking  to  make 
inquiries  into  any  case  in  which  the  interests 
of  the  private  trader  seemed  to  be  unduly 
represented.  The  chief  fault  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  committees  was  that  they  repre- 
sented in  nearly  every  district  the  grouping 
of  parties  or  interests  as  represented  on  the 
local  councils.  Before  the  war  Labour  had 
obtained  only  a  small  representation  on  these 
councils,  and  a  system,  therefore,  which 
repeated  on  a  reduced  scale  the  constitution 
of  the  responsible  local  authority  could  hardly 
fail  to  cause  disappointment  and  some  bitter- 
ness among  the  working  classes.  Eventually 
the  agitation,  having  partly  effected  its  purpose, 
died  down,  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  months 
the  committees,  to  the  number  of  nearly  2,000, 
were  doing  their  work  smoothly,  if  with  varying 
degrees  of  energy  and  thoroughness.  When 
towards  the  end  of  the  year  it  became  apparent 
that  rationing  could  no  longer  be  postponed, 
and,  in  the  continued  absence  of  a  national 
plan,  the  local  committees  were  invited  to  put 
into  operation  schemes  of  their  own  devising, 
sanction  was  given  to  an  increase  in  the 
membership  of  the  committees  so  that  addi- 
tional Labour  representatives  could  be 
appointed. 

Concurrently  with  the  decision  to  decen- 
tralize food  control  work  the  Government 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  a  scheme  for  the 
better  distribution  of  sugar  must  be  put  into 
force.  From  the  first  days  of  the  war  there 
had  been  a  scarcity  of  sugar,  "  due  chiefly," 
as  has  already  been  shown,  "  to  the  shutting 
off  of  imports  from  enemy  sources,"  and  the 
position    instead    of    improving    had    steadily 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


265 


become  worse.  Expedients  to  secure  an 
equitable  sharing  out  of  the  available  supplies 
had  not  been  entirely  successful,  and  eventually 
it  was  recognized  that  only  by  a  form  of 
rationing  could  fairness  be  secured.  The 
sugar  distribution  scheme  may  be  regarded 
as  the  first  real  test  of  food  rationing  in  Great 
Britain.  Before  it  came  into  operation  on 
December  31,  1917,  a  few  food  control  com- 
mittees had  found  it  necessary  to  ration 
tea,  butter,  and  margarine  in  their  own  dis- 
tricts, but  these  local  schemes  at  that  time 
covered  a  very  small  percentage  of  the  popu- 


tered  customers  whose  cards  had  been  deposited  with 
him. 

(c)  Caterers  of  all  kinds  wore  to  have  their  supplies 
regulated  after  consideration  of  the  number  of  meals 
ordinarily  served  and  the  sugar  they  normally  used. 

(d)  Institutions  would  have  their  supplies  of  sugar 
regulated  in  accordance  with  the  number  of  residents 
or  the  number  of  meals  served. 

(e)  Manufacturers  would  have  their  supplies  of  sugar 
regulated  according  to  any  restrictions  imposed  on  their 
use  of  sugar. 

(/)  Registered  retailers  were  to  have  their  supplies 
of  sugar  regulated  in  accordance  with  the  number  of 
their  registered  customers  and  the  quantities  of  sugar 
any  caterers,  institutions,  or  manufacturers  were 
authorized  to  buy  from  them. 

((/)  Wholesalers  were  to  have  their  supplies  regulated 
in    accordance    with    the    quantities    which    registered 


INDEXING    APPLICATIONS    FOR    SUGAR    CARDS    AT    THE    IMPERIAL    INSTITUTE. 


lation.  Five  months'  preparation  was  needed 
to  set  up  the  machinery  of  sugar  rationing, 
and  even  then  controlled  distribution  had  to 
be  started  with  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
people  unaware  that  rationing  with  its  res- 
trictive regulations  and  obligations  was  to  bo 
introduced.  The  main  featvires  of  the  scheme 
as  it  was  originally  drawn  up  were  as  follows  : 

(a)  No  sugar  was  to  bo  sold  retail  except  by  rotailers 
registered  by  a  local  Food  Control  Committee. 

(6)  Every  household  was  to  obtain  from  the  local 
foot!  office  a  sugar  registration  card  to  cover  all  members 
of  the  household  not  in  receipt  of  Government  rations. 
A  portion  of  this  card  was  to  be  deposited  by  the  house- 
holder with  the  registered  retailor  he  selected  for  the 
purpose,  /rhe  retailer,  when  the  scheme  came  into 
operation,  would  be  required  to  give  preference  to  regis- 


retailers,  caterers,  institutions,  and  manufacturers 
or  other  wholesalers  were  authorised  to  obtain  from 
them. 

Application  forms  for  sugar  cards  were 
sent  out  to  householders  about  the  end  of 
September.  The  system  then  contemplated, 
as  indicated  in  paragraph  (6)  above,  was  one 
of  family  registration  and  family  tickets. 
One  sugar  registration  card  was  to  be  issued 
by  the  local  food  office  in  response  to  every 
valid  application,  and  was  to  cover  the  number 
of  persons  named  in  the  application.  The 
application  forms  were  duly  filled  in,  except  by 
a  considerable  minority  of  the  population, 
which,  in  spite  of  newspaper  announcements 


26G 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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and  the  lavish  display  of  posters  on  hoardings, 
appeared  to  have  no  knowledge  of  the  scheme, 
and  towards  the  end  of  October  the  registra- 
tion cards  were  distributed  to  those  people 
who  had  succeeded  in  filling  up  the  forms 
accurately.  An  amazing  number  of  the  forms, 
however,  were  useless  as  returned,  owing  to 
the  failure  of  householders  to  understand 
what  they  were  required  to  do.  Thousands  of 
applicants  instead  of  writing  their  own  address 
on  the  line  indicated  for  the  purpose  copied  a 
fictitious  address  printed  en  posters  or  leaflets 
as  a  guide  to  the  public.      Further  thousands 


gave  no  address  at  all,  and  every  possible 
variety  of  error  or  omission  that  could  be 
imagined  was  perpetrated.  If  the  public 
blundered,  the  Department  added  its  own 
share  to  the  confusion.  When  the  con- 
sumers, the  retailers,  and  everyone  else 
had  grown  accustomed  to  the  idea  of  the 
family  card,  the  system  was  suddenly  thrown 
over  in  favour  of  individual  registration, 
and  individual  cards  or  ration  papers.  The 
mistake  did  not  lie  in  the  decision  to  adopt  a 
more  complicated  but  more  efficient  system, 
but   in   the   time   and.  money   wasted   in   the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


267 


preparation  for  distribution  through  the  tamily 
and  not  the  individual.  For  some  time  the 
officials  were  at  no  pains  to  make  it  clear  that 
a  sweeping  change  had  been  decided  upon. 
It  was  announced  that  people  who  had  not 
obtained  cards  must  apply  through  the  Post 
Office  for  sugar  ration  papers,  and  it  was 
indicated  that  those  who  removed  must  also 
exchange  an  individual  card  for  a  ration  paper 
with  coupons.  What  was  partially  obscured 
for  some  time  was  that  the  first  scheme  had 
been  "  scrapped,"  that  new  application  forms 
had  to  be  obtained,  additional  information 
given  to  the  food  control  committees,  and  a 
separate  card  obtained  for  each  member  of 
the  household.  When  the  adoption  of  this 
new  plan  was  realized  sharp  criticism  was  heard 
of  the  Department,  and  while  some  of  the 
strongest  abuse  had  a  political  motive  and  was 
aimed  at  the  Government  as  a  whole  rather 
than  the  Food  Ministry,  a  general  impression 
prevailed  that  the  discovery  that  the  family 
system  of  registration  would  prove  ineffective 
might  have  been  made  earlier  if  more  care 
had  been  given  to  the  consideration  of  the 
matter.  When  the  merits  of  the  family  and 
the  individual  cards  respectively  were  examined, 
the  latter  at  once  appeared  sounder  and  more 
flexible.  The  one  question  asked  was  why 
Lord  Rhondda's  officials  had  taken  so  long  to 
realize  how  much  the  better  it  was  of  the  two 
systems. 

The  advantages  of  individual  registration 
were  really  more  marked  than  could  be  sus- 
pected by  those  who  were  unaware  of  the  full 
importance  of  the  information  demanded  on 
the  new  application  papers.  Many  people 
were  puzzled  to  know  why  the  authorities 
must  be  told  the  day,  month,  and  year  of  birth 
of  each  member  of  a  family.  Women  resented 
what  they  called  the  "  impertinence  "  of 
questions  which  required  them  to  disclose  their 
age,  and  an  assurance  had  to  be  given  that 
the  information  would  be  regarded  as  strictly 
confidential  and  would  be  used  only  for  official 
purposes.  The  date  of  birth  supplied  on  the 
forms  enabled  the  authorities  to  make  use  of 
an  ingenious  form  of  index  of  the  cards  issued, 
so  that  quick  reference  could  be  made  to  a  card 
at  any  moment.  The  system  made  fraud 
easy  to  detect ;  certain  discovery  awaited  any 
attempt  to  put  in  duplicate  applications. 
A  staff  of  800  girls  was  installed  at  the  Imperial 
Institute  to  compile  the  index,  send  out  ration 
papers,  and  deal  with  removals  and  births  and 


deaths.  Every  application  after  it  had  been 
dealt  with  was  filed  according  to  the  day  of 
birth  and  the  first  letter  of  the  surname,  and 
this  had  the  effect  of  bringing  each  paper  into 
a  bundle  which,  on  the  average,  did  not 
include  more  than  220  forms. 

In  spite  of  the  labour  involved  by  the 
eleventh  hour  change  of  plans,  the  work  was 
carried  through  with  such  expedition  that  on 
the  day  appointed  sugar  rationing  came  into 
effect.  Large  numbers  of  people  at  the  time 
had  not  received  either  cards  or  ration  papers, 
but  a  start  with  the  way  only  three-parts 
prepared  was  regarded  as  better  policy  than 
delay  in  the  hope  of  achieving  perfection. 
Events  justified  the  decision  to  go  ahead. 
Against  the  temporary  inconvenience  caused 
to  a  minority  and  a  busy  period  during  which 
the  position  of  the  people  without  cards  had 
to  be  regularized,  must  be  set  the  undoubted 
fact  that  the  complicated  machinery  of  the 
scheme  worked  with  comparative  smoothness 
from  the  first  week.  For  this  the  section  of  the 
Ministry  of  Food  which  carriod  through  the 
work  should  be  given  the  credit  it  undoubtedly 
earned.  The  ration  of  sugar  allowed  for 
each  member  of  a  household  was  half  a 
pound  a  week  and  this  quantity  was  success- 
fully distributed.  Before  the  scheme  came 
into  force  no  one  could  be  sure  of  obtaining 
in  any  week  so  much  as  half  a  pound  of 
sugar.  Some  people  got  more  ;  some  got  less. 
With  distribution  controlled  from  the  importer 
to  the  consumer,  everyone  was  quickly  assured 
of  his  equitable  share  of  the  supplies. 

When  a  scheme  for  sugar  rationing  was  first 
announced  there  was  no  indication  that  a 
scarcity  of  other  foods  was  imminent.  By 
the  end  of  November  of  1917,  however,  the 
distribution  of  butter,  margarine,  and  tea  had 
partially  broken  down  and  all  over  the  country 
people  were  finding  it  necessary  to  hunt  around 
to  get  even  a  part  of  the  supplies  of  these 
articles  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed 
At  this  time  a  new  Director  of  Food  Economy — 
Sir  Arthur  Yapp,  the  efficient  and  resourceful 
secretary  of  the  Y.M.C.A. — had  undertaken  at 
the  request  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  organize  a 
second  campaign  to  secure  a  reduction,  by 
voluntary  determination,  of  the  consumption 
of  cereals,  fats,  and  meat. 

A  new  scale  of  voluntary  rations,  calculated 
on  scientific  lines,  and  ostensibly  based  on  the 
available  or  visible  supplies  of  the  rationed 
articles,  had  been  drawn  up  and  submitted  for 


2tis 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


8       0 


general  observance.  The  scale  differed  very 
materially  from  that  put  forward  in  the  first 
months  of  the  year  by  Lord  Devonport,  and 
was  in  the  following  terms  : 

Weekly 
Ration. 
BREAD. 

lb.  oz. 
Men  on  heavy  industrial   work  or  agricultural 

work 
Men    on    ordinary    industrial    or   other   manual 
work 

Men  unoccupied  or  on  sedentary  work 

Women  on  heavy  industrial  or  agricultural  work 
Women    on    ordinary     industrial    work    or    in 

domestic  service  ... 
Women  unoccupied  or  on  sedontary  work 

OTHER  FOODS. 
(For  all  adults.) 
Cereals,  other  than  bread  ... 

Meat  

Butter,  margarine,  lard,  oils,  and  fats    ... 
Sugar 

No  definite  scale  was  at  first  laid  down  for 
children,  but  it  was  suggested  that  they  should 
receive  "  reasonable "  rations.  Mothers, 
puzzled  to  know  how  much  to  order,  generally 
interpreted  "  reasonable  "  as  being  the  quantity 
required  to  satisfy  fully  the  appetities  of  their 
growing  boys  and  girls,  and  the  broad  tendency 
of  the  scheme  was  to  increase  considerably  the 
total  authorized  consumption  of  bread.     The 


7 

0 

4 

8 

S 

0 

4 

0 

I 

8 

0 

12 

2 

0 

(1 

10 

0 

8 

new  scale  served  the  purpose  of  "  tiding  over 
an  interval,"  and  as  a  considered  experiment 
furnished  useful  guidance  when  compulsory 
rationing  plans  had  to  be  prepared.  The  scale 
was  published  on  November  13.  By  the  end 
of  the  month  the  majority  of  the  people  were 
finding  difficulty  in  getting  fats  even  in  smaller 
quantities  than  the  10  oz.  a  head  laid  down  as 
the  voluntary  weekly  ration.  Butter  and 
margarine  queues  were  reported  in  The  Times 
of  December  1  not  only  in  the  poorer  districts 
of  London  but  in  the  middle-class  suburbs  as 
well.  From  the  industrial  districts  of  South 
Wales  came  accounts  of  women  standing  in 
queues  for  four  and  five  hours  to  get  supplies  ; 
the  situation  was  equally  serious  in  the  North. 
On  December  4  a  deputation  of  women  from 
all  parts  of  the  country,  headed  by  Mrs. 
Drummond,  waited  on  Lord  Rhondda  to  urge 
the  necessity  of  compulsory  rations.  Lord 
Rhondda  in  his  reply  said  that  the  decision 
whether  there  should  be  compulsory  rationing 
or  not  did  not  finally  rest  with  him,  but  it  is 
certain  that  at  this  time  rationing  had  come 
within  the  circle  of  practical  politics,  and 
officials  of  the  Ministry  were  giving  serious 
attention  to  the  question. 


BLENDING    AND    PACKING    MARGARINE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


269 


A    BUTTER    QUEUE    AT    TONYPANDY    IN    THE    WINTER    OF    1917. 


The  shortage  of  fats  took  the  country  by 
surprise,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  Food 
Control  Department  was  also  unprepared  for 
the  situation  as  it  showed  itself.  Otherwise 
a  voluntary  fat  ration  of  10  ounces  weekly  for 
each  person  would  never  have  been  sanctioned 
on  the  eve  of  the  scarcity  being  felt,  and 
considered  measures  rather  than  expedients 
would  have  been  available  to  meet  the  danger 
of  the  queues.  The  shortage  was  due  to  several 
causes.  Submarine  activity  temporarily  held  up 
supplies  of  margarine  from  Holland  ;  our  block- 
ade of  Germany  involved  interference  with  the 
supply  of  feeding  stuffs  for  Scandinavian 
cattle,  with  the  result  that  the  export  of 
agricultural  produce  from  the  Northern  coun- 
tries had  to  be  reduced  ;  British  farmers  were 
able  to  obtain  only  limited  quantities  of  feeding 
stuffs  for  their  own  stock;  and  British  margarine 
factories  were  too  few  in  number  to  yield  an 
output  which  would  make  up  for  the  falling  off 
in  imported  fats  and  the  decrease  in  the  home 
manufacture  of  butter.  By  the  middle  of 
December  the  available  supplies  from  all 
quarters  were  barely  sufficient  to  provide 
four  ounces  of  margarine  and  one  ounce  of 
butter   a   week   per   head   of    the   population. 


Unequal  distribution  and  the  determination 
of  the  greedy  to  get  more  than  their  share 
resulted  in  many  families  failing  to  obtain 
either  butter  or  margarine,  even  in  the  smallest 
quantities.  During  the  weeks  before  Lord 
Rhondda  took  action  to  check  the  evil  the 
only  alternative  to  going  without  these  foods 
was  to  stand  for  hours  outside  the  provision 
shops.  In  The  Times  of  December  17,  1917, 
it  was  pointed  out  in  a  leading  article  that 
over  and  above  the  vast  collective  loss  of  time 
and  energy  which  the  weary  waiting  repre- 
sented, the  queues  were  obviously  a  fertile 
source  of  grumbling  and  discontent.  "  We 
see  that  Lord  Rhondda  attributes  them,"  the 
article  continued,  "  to  the  shortness  of  certain 
articles  of  consumption !  If  that  were  the 
whole  story,  we  can  oidy  say  that  they  provide 
the  most  complete  argument  for  compulsory 
rationing  in  these  particular  articles,  though 
his  attitude  hardly  suggests  that  he  realizes  it. 
But  in  point  of  fact  the  queue  is  sometimes  at 
least  as  much  the  consequence  of  failure  in 
distribution  as  of  failure  in  stocks.  In  certain 
communities  the  stocks  are  there  in  bulk  and 
the  money  is  there — in  the  pockets  of  would-be 
purchasers — to  pay  for  them.     What  is  lacking 


270 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


COMMANDEERING     MARGARINE    FROM     A     MULTIPLE     SHOP     FOR     DISTRIBUTION 

BY    OTHER    RETAILERS. 


is  the  ordinary  channel  from  one  to  the  other, 
the  result  of  the  calling  up  of  shop-assistants, 
the  absence  of  storage  accommodation  in  small 
shops  and  the  general  curtailment  of  all 
facilities  for  transport.  Half  the  trouble 
would  be  at  an  end  in  these  cases  if  the  existing 
stocks  could  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  larger 
number  of  dealers,  and  if  there  were  machinery 
for  bringing  them  from  these  dealers  to  the 
homes  of  the  people." 

A  few  days  later  Lord  Rhondda  acted  on 
this  suggestion  to  the  extent  of  making  an 
Order  which  gave  powers  to  the  local  food 
committees  to  control  supplies  of  margarine 
in  their  areas,  and  arrange  for  equitable 
distribution  to  the  shops.  The  chief  home 
manufacturers  of  margarine  consented  to 
ration  their  shops  according  to  the  Food 
Controller's  estimated  requirements,  and  to 
allocate  the  surplus  to  competing  retailers 
in  the  same  area.  Where  this  was  insufficient 
the  local  committees  made  use  of  their  powers 
to  requisition  the  surplus  from  any  shop  which 
had  excessive  supplies  in  relation  to  the  accom- 
modation it  was  able  to  provide  for  the  sale 
of    margarine,    and    to    transfer    the    surplus 


to  other  shops.  By  this  procedure  the  queues 
were  split  up,  but  the  remedy  only  touched 
the  fringe  of  the  trouble,  and  large  numbers 
of  people  continued  to  obtain  more  than  their 
share  at  the  expense  of  others.  The  queues 
were  very  much  abused.  Women  sent  out 
children — sometimes  four  or  five  from  one 
household — to  stand  in  the  lines  and  buy  for 
them.  At  one  period  a  firm  with  hundreds 
of  branch  shops  served  out  margarine  in  2  lb. 
parcels,  and  persistent  persons  in  the  queues 
were  able  to  get  six,  eight,  or  more  pounds  in 
one  day.  A  business  was  made  of  buying 
margarine  to  sell  at  a  good  profit  to  those  who 
through  illness  or  unwillingness  to  waste 
time  would  not  join  f>  queue.  These  "  experts  " 
devoted  the  whole  day  to  roaming  from  queue 
to  queue,  or  if  the  conditions  were  favourable, 
to  rejoining  a  queue  to  get  a  second  supply 
from  one  shop.  Another  evil  of  the  queues 
was  their  dangerous  psychological  effect. 
The  sight  of  a  line  of  people  waiting  to  buy 
an  article  emphasized  in  the  minds  of  others 
the  fact  that  there  was  a  food  scarcity,  with 
the  result  that  there  was  a  rush  to  obtain 
supplies,    and    the    queues    were    lengthened. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


271 


Generally  the  waiting  people  were  cheerful, 
but  tho  seed  of  discontent  was  in  them,  and 
each  time  the  queue  had  to  be  used  by  ordinary 
decent  people  to  make  purchases,  the  incon- 
venience and  waste  of  time  were  more  deeply 
felt.  There  is  evidence,  too,  that  agitators 
and  people  who  sought  to  persuade  the  country 
to  conclude  a  premature  peace  were  only  too 
ready  to  use  the  discontent  as  an  instrument 
to  serve  their  purpose. 

Rationing  by  this  time  had  really  become 
inevitable,  and  failing  national  action  some  of 
the  more  enterprising  municipal  authorities 
determined  to  put  local  schemes  of  their 
own  devising  into  operation.  The  first  direct 
move  was  made  by  the  Birmingham  Corpora- 
tion, and  out  of  a  deputation  which  waited 
on  Lord  Rhondda  on  December  12  there  came 
the  system  which  was  ultimately  to  lead  not 
only  to  a  wide  development  of  similar  local 
plans  in  all  parts  of  the  country  but  to  general 
compulsory  rationing.  The  deputation,  which 
included  the  Lord  Mayor  and  other  represen- 
tatives of  tho  Birmingham  Food  Control 
Committee,  a.skod  for  and  obtained  permission 
to  put  into  local  operation  a  scheme  "  to 
improve  the  methods  of  distributing  essential 


food  commodities."  The  proposal  was  that 
each  household  should  be  supplied  with  a  card, 
tying  him  to  a  particular  retailer  and  entitling 
him  to  prescribed  rations  of  tea,  butter,  and 
margarine.  The  sugar  card  was  to  be  adopted 
as  the  basis  of  supply,  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
no  retailer  would  be  allowed  to  register  a 
larger  number  of  customers  than  his  staff 
or  premises  would  permit  him  to  serve  with 
reasonable  promptitude.  It  was  a  tradition 
in  Birmingham  that  if  the  municipality  set 
ita  hand  to  a  task,  that  task  should  bo  carried 
through  with  energy,  enthusiasm,  and  efficiency, 
and  within  less  than  three  weeks,  in  spite  of 
the  enormous  work  involved,  rationing  had 
been  applied  to  a  population  of  over  1,000,000 
people.  The  scheme,  of  course,  was  no 
brought  into  operation  without  a  certain 
amount  of  confusion.  Thousands  of  people 
during  the  first  week  or  10  days  were  unable 
to  buy  rationed  foods  because  they  were  without 
the  necessary  cards.  They  had  neither  regis- 
tered their  names  with  retailers  for  the  supply 
of  sugar  nor  made  application  for  a  sugar- 
ration  paper,  and  as  the  Birmingham  scheme 
was  based  on  the  sugar  card,  their  dilatoriness 
or  ignorance   deprived   them   temporarily  not 


SUPPLYING  COMMANDEERED  MARGARINE  TO  A  SMALL  DAIRY  FOR  DISTRIBUTION 


272 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


only  of  sugar,  but  of  tea  and  margarine  as 
well.  Women  presented  themselves  at  the 
Birmingham  Food  Office  and  with  transparent 
truthfulness  told  the  clerks  that  they  liad 
never  heard  anything  about  a  sugar  card. 
The  inquiries  dealt  with  by  the  Food  Com- 
mittee's officials  in  six  days  numbered  more 
than  50,000.(  In  innumerable  cases  women 
had  lost  their  sugar  cards,  and  beyond  this 
in  the  short  period  of  10  days  1,000  or  so 
people  had  actually  lost  their  tea  and  mar- 
garine cards.  There  were  further  complica- 
tions caused  by  domestic  servants  changing 
their  situations,  lodgers  moving  into  fresh 
apartments,  and  other  problems.  Still  another 
difficulty  arose  through  the  very  large  number 
of  small  retailers,  who,  with  a  limited  business, 
had  been  in  the  habit  of  getting  supplies  from 
two,  three,  or  even  more  wholesalers.  Returns 
made  during  a  period  of  eight  weeks  showed 
that  in  that  time  one  shopkeeper  sold  19  lb.  of 
tea  taken  from  five  wholesale  firms,  and  there 
were  dozens  of  similar  instances  of  a  lack  of 
coordination  and  regulation  in  distribution. 
It  must  be  said  that  the  Birmingham  authorities 
grappled  with  all  these  difficulties  with  a 
great  measure  of  success,  and  by  the  end  of 
January  the  scheme  was  working  smoothly. 

The  rations  in  Birmingham  were  4  oz.  of 
butter  or  margarine  and  1  oz.  of  tea  a  week  for 
each  man,  woman,  or  child,  and  this  scale 
was  adopted  by  other  municipalities  which 
decided  to  put  local  rationing  schemes  into  force. 
Among  the  pioneer  cities  and  towns  were 
Chesterfield,  Sheffield,  Nottingham,  Gravesend, 
Pontypool,  Preston,  and  the  Cleveland  group 
of  boroughs  in  north-east  Yorkshire.  In 
Preston  an  experiment  was  tried  of  distributing 
tickets  allowing  purchases  to  be  made  only  at 
certain  specified  hours,  but  this  broke  down 
in  practice  and  the  local  committee  had  to 
turn  to  other  methods.  To  prepare  the  way 
for  local  rationing  in  Sheffield  and  Nottingham 
a  kind  of  census  of  the  resident  population 
was  taken.  The  task  in  both  cities  was 
carried  through  by  school  teachers,  and  useful 
preliminary  work  was  done  by  explaining  to 
the  children  the  purpose  of  the  census  and 
the  information  which  the  parents  would  be 
asked  to  supply.  This  interesting  numbering 
of  the  people  had  to  be  organized  in  a  hurry, 
and  was  of  a  rough-and-ready  character.  For 
this  reason  it  produced  its  own  difficulties, 
but,  as  was  very  properly  pointed  out  at  the 
time,  the  country  was  indebted  to  every  local 


authority  which  had  the  initiative  and  courage 
to  undertake  experirnents  in  the  endeavour 
to  arrange  an  equitable  distribution  of  food 
supplies.  In  an  appreciation  of  the  value  of 
local  effort  which  appeared  in  The  Times  it 
was  stated  that  if  the  Food  Committees  would 
only  avail  themselves  to  the  full  of  their 
new  authority — an  order  which  enabled  the 
committees  to  enforce  schemes  for  controlling 
the  distribution  and  consumption  of  any  article 
of  food  in  their  areas — there  should  at  least 
be  an  end  henceforth  of  the  scandal  and  misery 
of  unnecessary  queues,  and  the  country  would 
be  projected,  inevitably,  and  as  the  need  in 
each  case  arose,  into  a  system  of  compulsory 
rationing  for  the  staple  foodstuffs. 

While  in  a  rather  irregular  way  rationing 
schemes  were  being  prepared  in  isolated 
districts,  the  demand  for  general  rationing 
grew  steadily  in  volume.  On  the  last  Satur- 
day of  the  year  an  important  National  Labour 
Convention  in  London  passed  a  strongly 
worded  resolution  protesting  against  the  pro- 
longed delay  of  the  Government  in  organizing 
an  equitable  system  of  distribution  of  the 
supplies  of  food,  and  demanding  compulsory 
rationing  to  ensure  equal  sharing  of  the 
available  food  among  all  families,  without  dis- 
tinction of  wealth  or  class.  On  January  1, 
1918,  Lord  Rhondda  issued  a  memorandum  to 
local  committees  outlining  a  model  scheme 
of  food  distribution.  The  suggested  system 
followed  closely  on  the  lines  of  the  plan  which 
on  that  day  was  put  into  operation  in  Birming- 
ham. It  was  recommended  that  every  customer 
should  be  registered  with  one  shop  for  the 
purchase  of  a  particular  foodstuff  and  not 
allowed  to  buy  elsewhere  ;  that  the  shopkeeper 
should  be  required  to  divide  his  weekly  supplies 
in  fair  proportion  among  all  customers  registered 
with  him ;  that  the  supplies  of  any  particular 
article  should  be  distributed  among  the 
retailers  in  a  district  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  customers  registered  with  them,  and 
a  limit  fixed  to  the  quantity  of  the  article 
which  any  particular  class  of  customer  might 
obtain ;  and  that  distribution  should  be 
regulated  by  cards  containing  spaces  to  be 
marked  up  each  week  as  the  holder  purchased 
supplies.  There  was  a  further  recommendation 
that  committees  whose  areas  formed  one 
district  for  the  purpose  of  food  distribution 
should  act  in  close  consultation  in  any  scheme 
which  they  prepared.  This  memorandum 
served   the   purpose   of   spurring   slow-moving 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


27a 


committees  to  take  steps  to  deal  with  the 
queue  problem  and  gave  them  a  definite  founda- 
tion on  which  to  build.  Draft  schemes  began 
to  arrive  at  the  Ministry  of  Food  for  approval 
in  increasing  numbers.  At  the  same  time  large 
tracts  of  country — some  of  them  agricultural 
where  the  food  pinch  had  not  been  felt,  but 
some  also  industrial  districts  where  the  com- 
mittees stubbornly  set  themselves  against  any 
local  ventures  in  rationing — continued  to  hold 
aloof,  and  it  was  not  until  a  scarcity  of  meat 
in  an  aggravated  form  suddenly  introduced  a 
new   factor   into   the   situation  that   the   next 


that  the  butchers  should  be  limited  to  75  per 
cent,  of  their  previous  sales.  He  was  asked- 
by  the  Board  of  Agriculture  not  to  do  this  as 
it  would  cause  a  good  deal  of  discontent  among 
the  farmers.  Right  through  to  Christmas 
there  was  an  abundance  of  meat,  and  few 
people  except  the  dealers  and  butchers  realized, 
that  this  appearance  of  plenty  was  caused  by 
the  sale  and  slaughter  of  immature  stock. 
From  the  time  when  it  was  announced  that 
wholesale  beef  prices  would  gradually  be 
reduced  until  a  bottom  figure  of  7s.  4d.  a  stone 
of  8  lbs.  was  reached  in  January   1918,  the 


PREPARING    BIRMINGHAM'S    900,000    MEAT    CARDS    IN    THE    COUNCIL    HOUSE. 


important    move    towards    general    rationing 
was  taken. 

Warnings  that  the  meat  supplies  would  fail 
during  the  winter  months  were  continually 
uttered  in  the  autumn  of  1917  by  those  who 
spoke  for  the  agricultural  industry ;  con- 
sumers, however,  regarded  the  warnings  as  an 
attempt  by  the  farmers  to  hold  to  the  profits 
which  the  falling  scale  of  maximum  prices 
instituted  by  Lord  Rhondda  threatened  to 
take  from  them,  and  paid  little  attention  to  the 
ominous  forecasts  which  were  circulated. 
Lord  Rhondda  himself  in  October  saw  that 
cattle  were  being  killed  too  rapidly  and  proposed 


farmers  pursued  a  policy  of  rushing  to  the 
markets  bullocks  which  were  not  fully  fattened. 
Revisions  of  the  scale  which  postponed  the 
final  reduction  first  until  July  1918,  and  then 
until  July  1919,  might  have  checked  the  prac* 
tice,  but  the  position  had  been  made  worse  by 
the  fact  that  the  absence  of  fixed  live  weight 
prices  tempted  butchers  to  offer  for  cattle- 
exorbitant  rates  which  bore  no  proportion  to 
the  dead  meat  schedules.  When  maximum 
wholesale  and  retail  prices  for  meat  were  fixed 
by  the  Ministry  of  Food  it  was  believed  that  the- 
traders  would  adjust  their  methods  so  as  to- 
render   further   intervention  unnecessary,    but 


274 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


a  period  of  senseless  competition  ensued  that 
led  to  a  premature  exhaustion  of  reserves 
which  under  better  regulated  conditions  would 
have  been  kept  back  and  marketed  in  smaller 
graded  consignments. 

No  part  of  Lord  Rhondda's  administration 
aroused  more  criticism  than  his  regulation  of 
prices  for  meat,  and  when  the  time  came  that 
supplies  fell  away  in  the  markets  Lord  Chaplin 
in  the  House  of  Lords  introduced  a  motion 
declaring  that  the  Food  Controller  must  be 
regarded  as  largely  responsible  for  the  shortage, 
and  that  any  powers  vested  in  his  Department 
by  which  the  production  of  food  could  be 
affected  should  be  transferred  to  the  Board 
of  Agriculture,  and  be  subject  to  the  control 
of  that  Board  alone.  In  an  indictment  of  what 
he  called  "  the  mania  for  fixing  prices,"  Lord 
Chaplin  contended  that  250,000  lean  cattle 
had  been  slaughtered.  Lord  Rhondda  in  his 
reply  showed  that  on  July  1,  1917,  the  price  of 
beef  stood  at  232  as  compared  with  100  before 
the  war,  while  mutton  on  the  same  date  had 
risen  142  per  cent,  beyond  the  pre-war  rates. 
When  he  took  office,  he  said,  there  was  seething 
discontent  among  large  masses  of  the  people, 
which,  had  it  been  allowed  to  continue,  would 


not  only  have  seriously  embarrassed  those 
to  whom  had  been  entrusted  the  conduct  of 
the  war,  but  would  have  rendered  victory  for 
the  Allies  well-nigh  impossible.  The  reports 
of  the  Industrial  Commissioners  showed  that 
the  unrest  was  chiefly  caused  by  the  high  food 
prices.  Had  the  law  of  supply  and  demand 
been  allowed  to  continue,  prices  would  have 
increased  several  fold,  and  essential  articles 
would  have  been  placed  beyond  the  reach  of 
millions  of  the  poorer  classes  of  the  community. 
His  policy  had  been  •  one  of  fixing  prices  at 
every  stage  from  the  producer  to  the  consumer, 
based  on  the  cost  plus  a  reasonable  profit. 
It  was  a  mistake  to  think  that  prices  had  been 
fixed  haphazard.  They  were  fixed  after  con- 
sultation with  expert  advisers,  whose  services 
he  had  utilized  to  the  fullest  extent.  With 
regard  to  the  descending  scale  of  prices  for 
cattle,  Lord  Rhondda  stated  that  these  were 
recommended  by  a  committee  set  up  by  the 
Board  of  Agriculture  before  he  came  into  office, 
and  that  so  far  from  being  responsible  for  it 
he  had  endeavoured  to  alter  it.  He  met  the 
suggestion  that  prices  should  be  fixed  by  the 
Board  of  Agriculture  by  a  claim  that  the 
existing     arrangements     were     working     satis- 


MR.    FROTHFRO,    LORD    RHONDDA,    AND    LORD    CHAPLIN    AT    CAXTON    HALL, 
Where  they  spoke  at  an  important  meeting  of  Farmers,   February  1,   1918. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


•275 


WAITING    FOR    THEIR    SUNDAY    JOINT    AT    SMITHFIELD    MEAT    MARKET. 
The  absence  of  the  usual  rows  of  carcases  is  a  noticeable  feature  of  this    photograph. 


factorily.  It  was  wide  of  the  mark,  he  added, 
to  say  that  prices  were  fixed  so  low  that  farming 
could  not  be  made  to  pay.  Notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  prices  had  been  fixed  months 
previously  for  fat  cattle,  farmers  were  still 
prepared  to  pay  what  appeared  to  be  extrava- 
gant prices  for  store  cattle. 

What  happened  in  1917  was  that  2,632,000 
cattle  were  slaughtered  as  compared  with 
2,522,000  in  1916.  The  increase,  however, 
took  place  entirely  in  the  last  three  months 
of  the  year,  and  apart  from  Army  slaughtering 
was  between  10  and  12  per  cent,  over  the  figures 
of  the  corresponding  period  of  the  previous 
year.  The  net  result  was  that  the  number  of 
cattle  in  the  country  in  December  was  5  per 
cent,  less  than  in  December,  1916.  While  the 
normal  aggregate  of  cattle  was  not  seriously 
reduced,  what  remained  when  the  shortage 
became  felt  were  mostly  young  lean  stock 
and  breeding  animals  quite  unfit  for  slaughter 
as  they  stood.  The  action  which  suddenly 
denuded  the  markets  of  beasts  was  the  fixing 
of  live  weight  prices  and  the  introduction 
of  a  system  of  grading,  but  even  without 
this,  the  reckless  sending  of  cattle  to  the 
slaughter  yard  could  not  long  have  continued 


on  the  scale  followed  in  the  autumn  months  of 
1917.  The  live  weight  prices  arranged  were 
as  follows  : 

HULLS,  BULLOCKS  AND  HEIFERS. 


Yielding  meat, 

per  cwt. 

Grade. 

per  cent. 

9.   d. 

1st       ... 

56  and  over 

75     0 

2nd      ... 

52  to  56       

70     0 

3rd      ... 

48  to  52       

COWS 

65     0 

1st       ... 

52  and  over 

70     0 

2nd      ... 

46  to  52       

62     0 

3rd       ... 

42to  46       

53     0 

These  rates  came  into  operation  on  December 
27,  1917.  The  effect  was  immediate.  At  Lin- 
coln on  January  1,  1918,  less  than  one-sixth  of 
the  usual  number  of  beasts  were  offered  for  sale. 
At  the  Leeds  cattle  market  there  was  a  demand 
for  600  cattle  and  only  14  were  offered.  On  the 
following  day  at  Leicester  41  beasts  came  to 
the  market  instead  of  the  usual  400  ;  at  Wolver- 
hampton there  were  95  instead  of  400,  and  a 
similar  state  of  affairs  prevailed  throughout  the 
country.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  an 
abnormally  large  show  of  sheep  everywhere, 
sheep  at  this  time  not  having  been  made  subject 


^76 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


+0  live  weight  prices.     The  mutton,  it  may  be 
said,  disappeared  very  promptly  when  a  few 
days  later  sheep  were  made  subject  to  the  same 
regulations    as    cattle.     Lord    Rhondda    next 
found  it  necessary  to  fix  the  retail  price  of 
rabbits  at  2s.  each  with  their  skins,  or  Is.  9d. 
each  without  the  skins,  and  then  the  rabbits 
in  their  turn  vanished  from  the  shops.     With  a 
general  scarcity  prevailing,  meat  queues  were 
added  to  the  margarine  queues,  and  there  were 
•extraordinary    week-end    scenes    in    London. 
Outside   the   retail   shops   near  to   Smithfield 
Market  as  many  as  4,000  people  gathered  in 
-one  queue  and  the  customers  began  to  assemble 
as  early  as  two  o'clock  in  the  morning.     In  the 
market  itself  retail  butchers  had  to  line  up  in 
long  queues  to  get  meagre  supplies  for  their 
shops.     It  was  suggested  at  first  that  farmers 
were   deliberately   withholding   stock   because 
they  resented  the  fixing  of  prices  and  the  intro- 
duction of  the  grading  system.     At  the  Ministry 
of  Food  experts  gave  repeated  assurances  that 
the  contraction  of  supplies  would  be  temporary, 
and  that  in  a  few  days,  or  weeks,  or  months, 
the  situation  would  come  nearer  to  the  normal. 
On  January  7,   1918,  however,  it  was  stated 
bluntly  in  The  Times  that  the  whole  country 
was    confronted   with   a   meat   famine.     Com- 
pulsory rationing  of  meat  had  become  impera- 
tive,  but  as  this  could  not  be   brought  into 
operation  by  a  wave  of  the  hand,  other  expe- 
dients were  adopted  to  ease  the  situation,  while 
a  practical  scheme  of  rationing  was  being  pre- 
pared.    By   an   Order   made   on   January    12, 
1918,    butchers'    supplies   were   cut   down   to 
50  per  cent,  of  those  returned  for  the  previous 
October.     Steps  were  taken,  though  they  were 
not  at  the  time  enforced,  to  enable  the  Govern- 
ment to  requisition  cattle.     The  plan  provided 
for    the    organization    of    the    farmers    into 
groups,    one   for   each   market   district,  which 
could    be    called    upon    by    the    Live    Stock 
Commissioners    of    the    Ministry    of    Food   to 
produce  for  slaughter  a  stated  quota  of  cattle 
each  month 

Another  measure  was  the  drastic  revision  of 
the  Public  Meals  Order.  This  increased  the 
quantity  of  bread  which  could  be  eaten,  but 
severely  limitod  the  permitted  consumption  of 
meat,  and  included  fats  for  the  first  time  among 
the  rationed  foods.  The  new  scale  provided 
that  the  meat,  flour,  bread,  sugar  (except  in 
the  case  of  continuous  residents  who  were 
entitled  to  one  ounce  a  clay),  butter  and 
•margarine  and  other  fats  served  should  be  in 


accordance  with  the  following  average  quanti- 
ties per  meal : 

Butter, 

Margarine, 

Meat.     Sugar  Bread.  Flour       and 

other 

Fats. 

Oz.         Oz.       Oz.       Oz.         Oz. 

Breakfast Nil       Nil         3         Nil  J 

Luncheon  (including 

midday  dinner)...      3  If  2  1  J 

Dinner       (including 
supper  and   meat 

toa)         3  )  3  1  } 

Tea  Nil       Nil         1J       Kil  J 

It  has  been  shown  that  under  the  Public 
Meals  Order  made  by  Lord  Devonport  the 
consumption  of  meat  allowed  in  each  week 
was  5£  lbs.  ;  Lord  Rhondda  reduced  the  quan- 
tity to  six  ounces  a  day  and  instituted  two  com- 
pulsory meatless  days,  so  that  the  weekly  con- 
sumption was  cut  down  to  1  lb.  14  ozs.  The 
traditional  character  of  the  Englishman's 
breakfast  was  shattered  by  the  disappearance  of 
bacon  from  the  meal,  and  the  heavy  meat  tea 
favoured  in  the  Northern  counties  became 
impossible.  The  only  class  of  eating-place 
excluded  from  the  new  regulations  was  that 
which  did  not  serve  meals  exceeding  Is.  2d. 
in  price.  The  saving  clause  was  intended  to 
enable  the  working  man  to  get  his  meals  in  the 
usual  way. 

At  the  time  when  the  scarcity  of  meat  lent 
additional  urgency  to  the  problem  of  the  queues 
a  scheme  of  local  rationing  was  being  prepared 
for  application  to  ten  million  people  living  in 
London  and  the  counties  of  Middlesex,  Herts, 
Essex,  Kent,  Surrey  and  Sussex.  It  had  been 
intended  that  in  the  early  stages  of  its  operation 
the  scheme  should  chiefly  be  directed  to  the 
prevention  of  the  margarine  queues,  but  pro- 
vision was  made  for  the  extension  of  the 
rationed  distribution  to  other  foods,  the  con- 
sumption of  which  it  might  become  desirable 
to  regulate.  Within  10  days  of  the  first  publi- 
cation of  the  details  of  the  scheme  Lord  Rhondda 
had  asked  the  representatives  of  the  food  com- 
mittees to  include  the  rationing  of  meat,  as 
•well  as  of  butter  and  margarine,  in  their 
arrangements,  and  when,  on  February  25,  the 
system  was  put  into  force  meat  cards  formed  a 
part  of  the  machinery  The  London  scheme 
was  by  far  the  most  important  of  the  local 
experiments  in  rationing  which  preceded  the 
national  enforcement  of  the  principle,  and  with 
the  possibility  that  in  the  event  of  successful 
working  being  obtained  the  plan  in  its  main 
outlines  would  become  the  foundation  for  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


277 


[By  spaial  permission  of  the  proprietors  of  "  Punch." 
OUT    OF     CONTROL. 

Lord  Rhondda  :  "My  next  illusion,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  is  the  one-and-ninepenny  rabbit.     I  now  drop 
that  sum  into  the  hat,  and  in  its  place  the  rabbit  will "  [Rabbit  disappears. 


expected  general  scheme,  food  committees  in 
other  parts  of  the  country  took  it  over  bodily 
for  application  to  their  own  districts. 

The  preliminary  work  necessary  to  bring 
rationing  into  operation  had  to  be  carried 
through  with  almost  excessive  rapidity  in 
London,  but  the  borough  food  committees 
devoted  themselves  to  the  task  with  com- 
mendable energy,  and  if  the  way  had  not  been 
made  perfectly  smooth  by  February  25  the 
scheme  was  launched  with  much  less  confusion 
than  the  pessimists  had  predicted  as  inevitable. 


The  first  step  was  the  circulation  of  application 
forms  for  cards  to  all  the  heads  of  households. 
The  method  of  distribution  was  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  committees  and  the  plan  generally 
adopted  was  to  send  out  the  form  by  post  on 
the  basis  of  the  sugar  registrations,  and  then 
supply  cards  in  accordance  with  the  returns 
which  were  made.  The  one  fault  of  this  pro- 
cedure was  that  it  resulted  in  delay  through 
the  inability  of  people  to  furnish  correctly  the 
comparatively  simple  information  required. 
The  muddle  of  the  sugar  applications  in  fact 


278 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


was  repeated.  Applicants  failed  to  give  their 
addresses  or  did  not  state  the  retailers  with 
whom  they  intended  to  register.  These,  and 
other  omissions,  made  it  necessary  either  to 
send  back  the  forms  for  correction  or  to  wait 
until  the  people  concerned  came  to  the  food 
offices  to  find  out  why  they  had  not  received 
their  cards.     A  few  of  the  committees  foresaw 


THE    KING'S    MEAT    CARD. 

the  situation  which  would  arise,  and  took 
effective  measures  to  avert  the  trouble.  At 
Bethnal  Green,  where  the  position  was  com- 
plicated by  the  large  number  of  aliens  living 
in  the  district,  a  "  Food  Card  Sunday  "  was 
arranged.  The  head  of  every  household  in 
the  borough  had  to  take  his  completed  form  to 
the  nearest  school.  There  the  form  was 
scrutinized  by  voluntary  clerks,  errors  were 
put  right  and  the  applicant  received  on  the 
spot  the  cards  to  which  his  family  were  entitled. 
As  about  27,000  applications  had  to  be  dealt 
with  and  some  220,000  food  and  meat  cards 
issued,  the  committee  had  set  themselves  a 
serious  task,  but  an  appeal  for  voluntary 
clerks  brought  over  2,000  helpers,  and  the 
plan  was  carried  through  with  gratifying 
success.  In  another  London  borough — Wands- 
worth—  the  application  forms  had  also  to  be 


taken  by  the  householder  or  his  representative 
personally  to  one  of  a  number  of  local  centres 
for  scrutiny  and  possible  correction  of  inaccu- 
racies, and  here,  too,  confusion  was  avoided. 
The  issue  of  cards  to  the  householders  began 
on  February  5,  and  by  February  18  the  majority 
had  been  sent  out.  In  some  parts  of  the  area 
delay  caused  by  an  inadequate  supply  of  cards 
led  to  anxious  enquiries  during  the  last  week 
before  rationing  came  into  operation,  but 
there  were  comparatively  few  families,  except 
those  from  which  inaccurate  forms  had  been 
returned,  which  were  not  provided  with  the 
essential  tickets  on  "  the  appointed  day." 

It  is  probable  that  no  law  or  regulation 
affecting  the  domestic  habits  of  the  people  of 
this  country  ever  aroused  more  general  interest 
than  the  rationing  of  food.  For  days  before 
the  scheme  came  into  force  its  details  were  a 
daily  subject  of  conversation  alike  in  the  home 
and  in  public  places.  There  were  people  who 
argued  that  rationing,  or,  at  any  rate,  meat 
rationing,  must  inevitably  break  down  in 
operation,  and  others  who,  with  irrepressible 
optimism,  found  in  the  use  of  cards  and  coupons 
the  solution  of  the  whole  problem  of  the  queues 
and  the  equitable  distribution  of  reduced 
supplies.  Officials  and  others  who  had  steadily 
urged  the  advisability  of  compulsory  rationing 
expected  a  formidable  outcrop  of  difficulties 
and  complexities,  but  believed  that  within  a 
few  weeks  the  great  majority  of  people  would 
make  themselves  familiar  with  the  machinery 
of  the, scheme,  and  that  with  a  little  goodwill 
and  patience  smooth  working  was  not  only 
possible,  but  was  assured.  The  essential 
features  of  the  scheme  at  the  time  of  its  in- 
auguration may  be  summarized  in  the  following 
way  : 

Two  cards  were  issued  to  each  person,  a  food  card  and 
a  meat  card.  The  food  card  had  to  be  used  if  butter 
or  margarine  was  required,  and  the  meat  card  when 
purchases  of  butchers'  moat,  poultry,  game  or  rabbits 
were  made. 

Butter,  margarine,  and  meat  could  be  bought  only 
from  the  retailers  with  whom  the  consumer  was  regis- 
tered.    The  cards  were  valid  for  twenty  weeks. 

In  each  week  J  lb.  of  butter  or  margarine  could  be 
bought  by  each  person  ;  the  meat  ration  was  estimated 
to  average  1}  lb.  a  week. 

The  meat  card  had  80  coupons  attached,  four  of  which 
could  be  used  in  any  one  wsek.  Only  three  out  of  the 
four  were  available  for  fresh  beef,  mutton,  or  pork  ; 
the  fourth  was  intended  for  the  purchase  of  bacon, 
poultry,  game,  and  cooked  meats. 

For  the  purpose  of  getting  butchers'  meat  the  coupons 
had  a  currency  value,  each  one  enabling  the  customer 
to  mako  purchases  to  the  value  of  5d.  If  used  for 
buying  other  meats  a  weight  value  was  substituted. 
All  the  coupons,  if  desired,  could  be  used  to  obtain 
poultry  and  similar  articles. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAX. 


279 


"Times"  photograph. 

A    SITTING    OF    THE    CONSUMERS'   COUNCIL,    MARCH    20,     1918. 

Left  to  right  :  Mrs.  Reeves,  Messrs.  Watkins,  Wilson,    Syrett,  Hyndman,    Bartle,  Sexton,  Chard,   Col. 

Weigall,    Messrs.    Coller,    Bramley,    Carmichael    and   Dudley,   the    Countess   of  Selborne,    Sir    William 

Ashley,  Mr.  Stuart-Bunning,  Lord  Rathcreedan,  and   Mrs.    Cottrell.     Five   members   were   not   present 

at  this  sitting. 


The  coupons  could  also  be  used  to  obtain  meat  meals 
in    restaurants. 

Special  cards  were  issued  for  children  under  10  years 
of  age.  These  were  available  for  the  full  ration  of  butter 
or  margarine,  but  only  half  the  quantity  of  meat  could 
be  supplied  on  them. 

When  butter  or  margarine  was  purchased  the  retailer 
had  to  cancel  a  square  on  the  food  card.  When  moat 
was  bought  the  butcher  or  other  trader  detached  the 
necessary  number  of  coupons  from  the  meat  cards. 

Meat  rationing  presented  difficulties  owing  to 
the  decision  to  combine  currency  and  weight 
values    for    the    coupons.     This    decision    was 
largely"  influenced  by  the  wishes  of  the  Con- 
sumers' Council,  a  body  set  up  by  Lord  Rhondda 
to  keep  the  Ministry  of  Food  in  direct  touch 
with  the  people  on  matters  affecting  rationing, 
distribution,    and    prices.     Mr.    J.    R.    Clynes 
presided    over   the   meetings    of    the    Council, 
and  the  members  included  representatives  of 
the   Parliamentary   Committee   of   the  Trades 
Union  Congress,  the  War  Emergency  Workers' 
National  Committee,  the  Parliamentary  Com- 
mittee of  the  Co-operative  Congress,  and  the 
Women's  Industrial  Organizations.     The  view 
taken  by  the  Council  in  regard  to  meat  was 
that  if  the  coupons  were  made  valid  for  pur- 
chases up  to  a  certain  price  those  people  who 
wanted  the  best  cuts  of  beef  and  mutton  would 
have   to   be   satisfied   with  smaller   quantities 
than  could  be  had  if  cheaper  joints  were  selected. 


The  principle  could  not  be  extended  to  poultry 
or  game,  however,  as  on  a  price  value  20  or  more 
coupons  would  have  been  required  for  a  single 
fowl.  A  way  out  was  found  by  arranging  a 
scale  of  equivalent  weights,  and  the  scheme 
as  first  put  into  operation  provided  that  with 
each  full  coupon  the  amounts  of  meat  set  out 
below  could  be  obtained  : 

1.  Fivepennyworth  of  uncooked  butcher's 
meat,  including  pork  or  offal. 

2.  The  following  weights  of  other  uncooked 
meats  : 

12  J  oz.  of  poultry  or  any  bird,  uncooked,  without 
feathers,  but  including  offal,  or  9  oz.  without  offal. 

10  oz.  of  rabbit  or  hare,  uncooked,  without  skin 
but  including  offal ;   or  7J  oz.  without  offal. 

6  oz.  of  venison  or  horseflesh  with  bone,  5  oz.  without 
'bone. 

4  oz.  of  uncooked  ham  or  bacon  with  bone  ;  3  oz. 
without  bone. 

6  oz.  of  first-quality  uncookod  sausages  containing 
not  less  than  67  per  cent,  of  butcher's  meat,  including 
pork  or  offal. 

3.  The  following  weights  of  cooked,  canned, 
preserved,  and  miscellaneous  meats  : 

3J  oz.  butoher's  meat  (including  pork)  or  offal,  cooked 
with  the  usual  bone  ;    2\  oz.  without  bone. 

6  oz.  of  any  cooked  bird. 

fi  oz.  of  cooked  rabbit  or  hare. 

4  oz.  of  venison  or  horsotiesh,  cooked  with  the  usual 
bone  ;    3  oz.  without  bone. 

3  oz.  of  cooked  ham  or  bacon  with  bone ;  2}  oz. 
without  bone. 


■NO 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


PREPARING    FOOD    CARDS    AT   CAMBERWELL. 


2J  oz.  of  canned,  preserved,  and  potted  meats  of  any 
kind  in  tin,  glass  or  other  container,  according  to  the 
estimated  weight  of  the  actual  meat  without  the  con- 
tainer. 

2J  oz.  of  meat  pies*,  cooked  sausages,  sandwiches,  and 
similar  articles,  according  to  the  estimated  weight  of 
the  meat. 

4  oz.  of  prosorved  sausages,  according  to  the  estimated 
weight  of  the  actual  meat. 

Practical  experience  of  the  scheme  in  opera- 
tion did  not  suggest,  at  any  rate  during  the 
first  month,  any  grave  flaws  in  its  constitution. 
A  beginning  was  not  possible  without  some 
groaning  of  new  and  untested  machinery, 
but  the  initial  hitches  were  not  very  serious. 
The  one  formidable  rock  ahead  was  the  possi- 
bility that  industrial  workers  who  had  been 
led  by  a  long  course  of  platform  speeches 
to  believe  that  the  rationing  of  food,  would 
give  them  a  larger  share  of  the  available 
supplies  might  allow  disappointment  over  the 
inevitable  collapse  of  false  hopes  to  breed 
resentment  and  opposition  to  the  system.  On 
the  day  that  rationing  came  into  force  this 
serious  warning  was  given  in  a  leading  article 
in  The  Times  : — 

Rations  will  not  give  more  food  to  most  people, 
but  rather  less  ;  and  the  chief  danger  about  them  at 
the  momont  is  the  disappointment  of  those  who  were 
misled  into  believing  that  tho  rich  wore  getting  abundant 
supplies  of  meat  and  butter  while  the  poor  were  going 
►  hort.     But    the   compulsory  equality   of  the   rationing 


system  should  take  the  sting  out  of  the  disappointment 
and  we  do  not  anticipate  any  serious  consequences 
from  it. 

So  far  as  the  hard  manual  worker  was  con- 
cerned, Lord  Rhondda,  in  sanctioning  the 
introduction  of  a  rather  hastily  prepared  plan, 
had  not  lost  sight  of  the  possibility  that  for 
this  class  the  meat  ration  was  not  really 
sufficient,  and  before  the  first  protest  could  be 
made  he  let  it  be  known  that  not  only  was  the 
question  of  a  supplementary  ration  for  men 
engaged  on  heavy  manual  work  under  con- 
sideration, but  that  he  also  hoped,  in  pre- 
paring a  system  of  general  national  rationing, 
to  grade  the  population  as  far  as  possible  on 
a  basis  of  occupation  and  to  arrange  the  scale 
of  rations  in  accordance  with  this  grading. 
With  this  threatened  source  of  troubles  foreseen 
and  forestalled,  the  minor  problems  that  arose 
out  of  the  operation  of  the  scheme  could  be 
dealt  with  as  they  appeared,  and  in  the  main 
they  proved  to  be  matters  of  detail  which  could 
bo  disposed  of  better  by  local  administrative 
action  than  by  central  decisions.  Perhaps  the 
most  unexpected  among  the  points  which  first 
called  for  attention  was  the  almost  unanimous 
determination  of  people  who  had  to  take 
meals  in  restaurants  and  clubs  in  London  not 
to   eat  meat  away   from  home.     With  a  few 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


281 


exceptions  confined  to  the  cheaper  and  more 
popular  type  of  public  eating  places,  the 
restaurants,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  coupons 
of  the  meat  cards  could  be  used  in  halves, 
decided  that  for  any  meat  dish  served  at  least 
a  whole  coupon  must  be  given  up.  Most  men, 
and  particularly  those  of  small  households, 
found  that,  if  a  joint  of  meat  was  to  be  bought 
at  the  week-end,  and  a  little  bacon  obtained 
for  breakfast,  no  coupons  could  be  spared  for 
meals  in  restaurants.  The  result  of  this  was 
that  thousands  turned  to  fish  and  egg  dishes, 
and  towards  the  end  of  the  week  caterers  found 
they  were  holding  stocks  of  beef  and  mutton 
for  which  there  was  no  demand.  To  avoid 
waste,  local  food  committees  had  to  give 
dispensations  for  the  disposal  of  the  meat 
without  the  surrender  of  coupons,  and  the 
restaurant  cooks  were  warned  to  reduce  the 
estimates  of  their  requirements  when  they 
prepared  their  next  application.  Another 
development  was  that  the  sale  of  butcher's 
edible  offals,  such  as  sweetbreads,  kidneys, 
liver,  and  hearts,  fell  away  to  nothing,  and 
poulterers  and  game  dealers  found  it  equally 
difficult  to  sell  fowls,  ducks,  plover  and  hares. 
In    some    districts    it    became    necessary    to 


remove  these  articles  temporarily  from  the 
list  of  rationed  foods,  and  in  addition  the 
scale  of  equivalent  weights  was  revised  so  that 
it  became  possible  to  get  a  chicken  weighings 
three  pounds  with  three  coupons  or  a  hare 
weighing  six  pounds  with  nine  coupons.  The 
poulterers  asked  for  further  concessions  and 
in  some  quarters  the  suggesti  n  was  put  forward 
that  birds  and  game  should  not  be  rationed. 
It  was  believed,  however,  and  there  were 
reasons  to  justify  the  belief,  that  people  would 
be  ready  to  buy  poultry  if  the  prices  were 
reduced.  Durirg  January  and  February  when 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  obtain  butcher's 
meat  without  standing  in  queues  outside  the 
shops,  unreasonably  high  prices  were  easily 
obtained  for  chickens,  hares  and  other  meat  for 
which  maximum  rates  had  not  been  fixed. 
Roasting  chickens  went  up  to  3s.  6d.  a  lb.,  and 
hares  cost  as  much  as  15s.  each.  The  dealers 
once  having  secured  such  prices  showed 
reluctance  in  reducing  them  whon  the  demar  d 
slackened,  and  it  was  chiefly  because  of  this 
attitude  that  their  stocks  found  few  purchasers 
after  rationing  had  equalized  the  distribution 
of  beef  and  mutton. 

There   was   a   tendency   to   abuse   the    pro- 


SOLDIERS    AND    SAILORS,    HOME    ON    LEAVE,    APPLYING     FOR    "EMERGENCY 

RATION    CARDS,    CAMBHRWELL. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


vision  in  the  rationing  schemes  which 
made  possible  the  sale  without  coupons 
of  perishable  goods  in  danger  of  spoiling. 
Reports  which  reached  the  Minister  of  Food 
showed  that  traders  sold  without  obtaining 
the  necessary  licence  from  the  local  committee, 
obtained  unnecessarily  large  stocks  of  highly 
perishable  goods,  or  sold  goods  which  were 
not   immediately   liable   to   perish.     Within   a 


FOOD   CARD. 

London     nnd      Homo     Countlot. 


D.3. 


Customer'!  N»me_ 
Add ret* 


is 
H 


1 

2 

3 

4  |  5  |  6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14  |  15  J  16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

1 

2  1  3  i  4  |  5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12  J  13  1  H  1 15  |  16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

1' 

18 

19 

20 

1 

2 

3 

4  1  5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14  j  15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

o. 

Shopkeeper's  Name: 


Shopkeeper's  Nome: 


Shopkeeper's  Name : 


A.    Butter   and    Margarine. 

Shopkeeper'*  Name: 


ShophMp** 


FOOD    CARD. 

Originally  available  for  Butter  and  Margarine,  but 
with  provision  for  the  supply  of  other  goods. 

fortnight  of  the  scheme  coming  into  operation 
firm  measures  had  to  be  taken  to  bring  these  sales 
under  strict  control,  and  one  of  the  steps  taken 
was  to  give  local  committees  power  when  they 
granted  a  licence  for  the  disposal  without 
coupons  of  any  foodstuffs  to  fix  maximum 
prices  at  which  the  articles  might  be  sold. 
Another  problem  which  had  to  be  settled  was 
the  position  under  rationing  of  people  who 
kept  their  own  poultry,  shot  or  trapped  rabbits, 
or  in  other  ways  supplied  themselves  with  meat 
without  going  for  it  to  a  retailer. 

A  committee  was  appointed  with  Lord 
Somerloytown  as  chairman  to  go  into  the 
question.  The  committee  reported  that  in  their 
opinion  the  restriction  of  consumption  imposed 


by  any  rationing  scheme  must  extend  to  pro- 
ducers of  food,  and  should  be  enforced  by 
requiring  them  to  produce  cards  or  coupons  to 
their  Food  Control  Committees  to  cover  their 
consumption  of  their  own  produce.  They 
recommended,  however,  that  as  in  all  foreign 
rationing  schemes,  actual  producers  of  certain 
foods,  and  their  dependents,  should  be  granted 
larger  rations  of  these  foods  than  they  could 
buy  on  their  cards,  and  that  so  long  as  there 
was  no  general  prohibition  of  private  transport 
of  rationed  food  by  post  or  rail,  the  producers 
should  be  allowed  to  supply  their  households, 
wherever  resident,  with  their  own  produce  at 
the  special  ration  calculations.  The  scale  of 
rations  suggested  was  as  follows  : 

Cattle  and  Sheep. — No  extra. 

Pios. — Double  the  normal  weight  of  meat  to  the 
coupon  for  the  flesh  of  the  first  pig  killed  in  each  half- 
year,  and  one-half  more  than  the  normal  weight  to  the 
coupon  for  other  pigs  ;  offal  and  lard  to  be  outside  the 
ration  for  self-suppliers. 

Venison. — No  extra 

Wild  Rabbits,  Hares,  Wood  Pioeons. — Ration  free. 

Tame  Rabbits. — Ration  free. 

Poultry. — No  extra. 

Game  Birds. — One-half  more  than  the  normal  weight 
to  the  coupon. 

Butter. — One-half  more  than  the  normal  weekly 
ration. 

Such  difficulties  as  have  been  described 
weighed  little  in  the  balance  against  the  remark- 
able improvement  in  food  distribution  which 
rationing  effected.  The  butter  and  margarine 
queues  disappeared  from  the  streets,  and 
although  at  first  Saturday  customers  of  the 
butchers  had  to  line  up  in  some  districts,  this 
was  chiefly  attributable  to  the  general  post- 
ponement of  shopping  to  the  last  day  of  the 
week  and  to  the  considerable  time  occupied 
in  the  process  of  calculating  what  meat  could  be 
served  on  the  number  of  coupons  the  customer 
was  prepared  to  use.  Experience  of  the  working 
of  the  system  quickly  reduced  the  waiting. 

It  had  been  intended  that  meat  rationing 
on  the  lines  of  the  London  and  Home  Counties 
scheme  should  be  extended  to  the  whole  country 
on  March  25,  but  a  postponement  of  a  fortnight 
was  found  necessary  to  enable  Lord  Rhondda 
to  complete  his  plans  for  allowing  a  supple- 
mentary ration  for  industrial  workers.  The 
only  essential  difference  in  the  national  scheme 
compared  with  that  in  operation  in  London  was 
that  a  consumer  could  register  at  separate  shops 
for  butchers'  meat  and  pork.  Provision  for  this 
double  registration  was  made  because  in  the 
country  and  particularly  in  the  North  of  England 
the  sale  of  pork  and  pork  products  was  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  a  distinct  trade.    As  in  London, 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


283 


the  local  administration  of  the  scheme  was  en- 
trusted to  the  local  food  control  committees. 

Before  concluding  this  survey  of  the  coming 
into  operation  of  rationing  a  few  words  must  be 
added  about  the  development  of  food  hoarding , 
influenced  in  some  degree  through  a  desire  to 
forestall  rationing  by  the  formation  of  reserves, 
which  in  the  first  weeks  of  1918  was  exposed 
by  a  large  number  of  raids  on  private  houses 


and  by  prosecutions.  The  Order  prohibiting  the 
hoarding  of  food  was  made  by  Lord  Devonport 
and  came  into  effect  on  April  9,  1917.  It 
provided  that  no  person  should  "  acquire  any 
article  of  food  so  that  the  quantity  of  such 
article  in  his  possession  or  under  his  control 
at  any  one  time  exceeded  the  quantity  required 
for  ordinary  use  and  consumption  in  his  house- 
hold or  establishment."     For  several   months 


LADY    RHONDDA    OPENING    A    "  GOVERNMENT    INFORMATION     BUREAU." 

At    these    bureaux  which  were  erected  in  the  large  retail  stores,  the  stations,  and   other   places,    leaflets 

and  books  explaining  the  food  regulations  could  be  obtained. 


•2M 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the  regulation  was  not  stringently  applied,  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  many  households 
were  unpleasantly  surprised  when  the  searching 
out  of  culprits  began.  During  January  of  1918 
the  defendants  brought  before  the  magistrates 
included  some  well-known  people,  and  heavy 
penalties  were  imposed  in  a  majority  of  the 
cases.  While  the  whole  country  approved  the 
prosecutions,  and  the  punishment  of  the 
offenders,  a  stage  eventually  was  reached  when 
the  thrifty  housewife  found  herself  becoming 
nervous  over  the  modest  contents  of  her  store 
cupboard,  even  when  hoarding  could  never  have 
been  charged  against  her.  Fears  were  ex- 
pressed that  the  officials  of  the  Food  Depart- 
ment intended  to  ransack  dwelling  houses 
indiscriminately  and  to  force  everybody  "  to 
purchase  incessantly  in  very  small  quantities." 
Although  search  warrants  were  not  issued  on 
idle  reports  and  action  in  any  case  was  taken 
only  after  careful  consideration  and  inquiry, 
there  was  some  danger  of  the  growth  of  a  sys- 
tem of  domestic  or  neighbourly  espionage 
which  would  have  been  entirely  foreign  to 
British  traditions.  For  these  reasons  and  for 
the  still  more  serious  one  that  people  who  had 
large  illicit  stocks  of  food  were  believed  to  be 


destroying  their  excess  supplies,  an  announce- 
ment made  on  February  6  granting  a  con- 
ditional indemnity  to  people  who  had  rendered 
themselves  liable  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Hoarding  Order  was  well  received.  It  was 
provided  that  during  the  week  beginning 
February  11  members  of  the  public  might 
report  excess  stocks  to  the  local  food  com- 
mittees with  a  view  to  their  voluntary  surrender 
for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  Persons  report- 
ing and  surrendering  their  supplies  in  these 
circumstances  were  indemnified  against  pro- 
secution. Publication  of  the  terms  of  the 
amnesty  resulted  in  an  urgent  demand  for  a 
definition  of  hoarding,  but  the  Minister  of  Food 
would  not  give  a  more  explicit  explanation 
than  that  a  fortnight  to  three  weeks'  supply 
of  any  of  the  staple  articles  of  food  was  not 
excessive,  and  that  home-produced  food  like 
bacon,  jam,  bottled  fruit,  and  preserved  eggs 
did  not  come  under  the  Hoarding  Order.  This 
statement  reassured  many  people,  but  it  was 
too  vague  to  be  entirely  satisfactory,  and  food 
committees  all  over  the  country  were  worried 
by  people  with  trivial  reserves  who  came  seek- 
ing advice  as  to  their  position.  Serious  con- 
fessions   of    hoarded    food    were    exceedingly 


POTATOES    IN    PLACE    OF    FLOUR. 
Mrs.  Weigall  gives  a  demonstration  of  the  uses  of  the  potato  as  a  flour  substitute. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAE. 


285 


A    COMMANDEERED    FOOD    HOARD. 
In  this  particular  case  nearly  a  ton  of  food  was  removed,  and  a  fins  of  £90,  with  £28  7s.  costs,  was  inflicted. 


few  in  number,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  during 
the  surrender  week  hospitals  received  hundreds 
of  anonymous  gifts  of  tea,  sugar,  flour,  rice 
and  other  articles  from  people  who  chose  this 
way  of  disposing  of  their  stores  rather  than 
admit  their  possessions  to  the  authorities. 

When  the  probability  that  compulsory 
rationing  would  have  to  be  adopted  in  this 
country  was  first  seriously  discussed,  an  article 
was  published  in  The  Times  from  its  Correspon- 
dent formerly  in  Berlin  describing  the  blunders 
through  wliich,  in  the  development  of  State 
distribution,  the  German  authorities  groped 
their  way  to  comparative  wisdom.  It  was 
then  noted  that  the  German  Government's 
lack  of  foresight  concerning  the  probable 
duration  of  the  crisis  had  governed  the  whole 
situation,  and  that  if  they  could  retrace  their 
steps,  the  enemy  authorities  would  undoubtedly 
begin,  first,  by  planning  their  whole  policy  to 
cover  a  long  period  of  time  ;  and,  secondly, 
by  dealing  at  the  outset  with  the  whole  range 
of  consumption.  "  If  I  may  venture  to  suggest 
some  rough  conclusions  from  German  experi- 
ence," The  Times  Correspondent  said,  "  they 
are  these  :  The  whole  object  of  rationing  should 
be  to  reduce  consumption  generally  and  over 


a  long  period  of  time.  Measures  should  be 
taken  to  ensure  the  widest  possible  control  of 
supplies,  including  the  supplies  of  foods  which 
appear  to  be  abundant,  and  foods  which  are, 
or  may  become,  '  substitutes '  for  staple 
foods.  Both  in  collection  and  distribution  the 
fullest  use  should  be  made  of  existing  agencies, 
and  the  large  agencies,  without  too  much  official 
interference,  should  deal  with  the  small  pro- 
ducer. The  system  of  '  lists  of  customers ' 
should  be  applied  to  the  retail  trade  ;  Germany 
found  it  to  be  the  remedy  for  the  intolerable 
'  waiting  '  at  food  shops  of  queues  of  customers 
who,  having  placed  no  orders,  had  to  take  their 
chance  of  finding  food  to  buy.  There  should 
be  as  little  interference  as  possible  with  prices, 
and  the  proper  point  for  interference  is  pre- 
vention of  retail  profiteering  by  checking 
the  difference  between  wholesale  cost  and  retail 
prices.  Maximum  prices  must  not  be  allowed 
to  check  production.  The  proper  remedy  for 
profiteering  on  the  part  of  producers  is  taxation, 
and  ultimately  the  proper  remedy  for  want, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  due  to  high  prices,  is  relief.  ..." 
These  suggestions  were  made  in  May  1917, 
and  in  the  same  article  the  following  quotation 
was  given  from  a  circular  issued  by  Herr  von 


286 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Wife  of  Profiteer : 


By  special  permission  oj the  Proprietors  of  "  Punch.' 
'Er— can  you  tell  me  if— er — really  nice  people  eat  herrings?" 


Batocki's  Press  Bureau  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year  : 

Already  the  English  and  P'rench  have  to  accustom 
themselves  to  the  idea  of  copying  our  system  of  State 
distribution,  which  they  have  ridiculed  so  freely ;  it 
remains  to  be  seen  whether,  in  face  of  the  approaching 
crisis,  they  will  be  able  by  mere  feeble  imitation  to  supply 
the  equivalent  of  the  experience  and  habit  which  we 
have  gained  in  two  and  a  half  years  of  war  economics. 

Rationing,  as  has  already  been  shown,  was 
started  in  this  country  only  after  much  hesita- 
tion and  reluctance,  but  it  cannot  be  charged 
against  Lord  Rhondda  that  he  descended  to 
the  "  feeble  imitation  "  which  Herr  von  Batoeki 
expected.  If  we  "  groped  our  way  "  towards 
rationing,  the  groping  was  done  in  accordance 
with  our  own  methods.  Lord  Rhondda,  in 
shaping  his  policy,  avoided  as  far  as  possible 
any  rough  riding  over  British  habits  and  preju- 
dices ;  some  of  the  criticism  which  fell  upon  him 
arose  out  of  the  very  caution  with  which  he 
negotiated  those  prejudices.  Even  the  delay  in 
getting  rationing  into  operation  that  caused 
local  authorities  to  embark  on  their  own  experi- 
ments had  its  rseful  as  well  as  its  regrettable 
side,  although  this  was  no  adequate  compensa- 
tion for  the  dilatoriness  of  the  Government  in 
preparing  for  rationing.  Local  application  of 
rompulsory  economy  in  food  gave  the  people, 


through  men  of  their  own  selection,  a  voice  in 
making  the  regulations  to  which  they  had  to 
conform,  and  with  this  there  was  a  realisation 
that  rationing  was  a  self-determined  remedy 
to  meet  a  situation  which  had  become  danger- 
ous. When  eventually  arrangements  for 
national  and  uniform  rationing  were  made  in 
the  case  of  meat,  local  schemes  had  to  be  fitted 
into  the  general  system,  but  local  administration 
was  maintained  The  one  way  in  which  Ger- 
man procedure  was  followed  was  in  beginning 
rationing  with  only  one  or  two  staple  foods. 
Fortunately,  so  far  as  could  be  seen  in  March, 
1918,  the  consequences  were  not  likely  to  be 
the  same  in  England  as  they  had  been  in 
Germany.  But,  as  has  been  shown,  our 
supplies  were  comparatively  abundant,  and 
time  alone  would  show  whether  the  country 
would  have  reason  to  regret  the  waste  of  foods 
to  which  consumption  was  diverted  from  the 
one  or  two  staple  foods  which  were  rationed 
at  first. 

Germany's  first  experiments  were  with  butter 
tickets ;  the  first  foods  after  sugar  to  be 
rationed  in  Great  Britain  were  butter  and 
margarine,  though  meat  cards  quickly  followed. 
By  the  late  summer  of   1916   Germany  had 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


287 


rationed  bread,  potatoes,  sugar,  milk,  meat, 
butter  and  fats,  cheese,  coffee,  cocoa,  tea.  rice, 
macaroni,  and  other  articles.  In  Great  Britain, 
in  the  spring  of  1918,  national  rationing  had 
been  extended  only  to  sugar  and  meat.  Local 
rationing  of  butter  and  margarine  became 
almost  general  except  in  the  agricultural  dis- 
tricts, but  the  need  to  ration  tea,  which  led  to 
this  article  finding  a  place  in  the  earliest  among 
the  local  schemes,  soon  disappeared  Although 
some  anxiety  was  felt  about  bread,  Mr.  Clynes 
on  March  14  was  able  to  say  in  the  House  of 
Commons  that  with  care  in  consumption  ration- 
ing might  be  indefinitely  postponed.     It  was 


and  it  abolished  rather  than  created  queues 
outside  the  food  shops.  A  direct  effect  of  the 
introduction  of  the  London  and  Home  Counties 
scheme  was  to  reduce  the  number  of  people 
joining  food  queues  in  the  Metropolitan  police 
district  from  an  average  for  Saturday,  the  popu- 
lar shopping  day,  of  600,000  to  25,000.  As  for 
the  point  that  there  should  be  "  as  little  inter- 
ference as  possible  with  prices,"  it  has  been 
shown  that  Lord  Rhondda  became  Food 
Controller  under  conditions  which  made  the 
fixing  of  food  prices  imperative.  Production, 
or  at  any  rate  supply,  may  have  been  checked 
by  the  limitation  of  the  cost  to  the  consumer, 


Jan  28 


Food  Queues  in  Mefropo/zfan  Po//ce  District 


Mar>#th 


800,000 


toqooo 
.  /oqooo 


CHART  showing  the  estimated  number  of  persons  attending  food  queues  in  the  Metropolitan 

Police  District  on  each  day  from  January  28  to  March  9,  1918 — i.e.,  four  weeks  before 

and  two  weeks  after  the  introduction  of  rations. 


found  advisable  in  the  distribution  of  milk 
to  institute  a  scheme  which  gave  priority  to 
invalids,  children  and  nursing  mothers,  but  this 
was  controlled  by  the  local  committees  without 
recourse  to  rigid  rationing  regulations.  So  far 
as  the  other  foods  were  concerned,  cheese  was 
the  only  article  mentioned  at  this  period  as 
likely  to  be  brought  within  the  operation  of  the 
food  cards. 

The  contention  that  "  the  whole  object  of 
rationing  should  be  to  reduce  consumption 
generally  and  over  a  long  period  of  time  "  was 
one  which  found  no  divergence  of  opinion  at  the 
Ministry  of  Food,  and  it  can  equally  be  said  that 
Lord  Rhondda's  policy  aimed  at  the  "  widest 
possible  control  of  supplies."  Rationing  in 
Great  Britain  from  the  first  was  arranged  on  a 
basis  of  registration  of  customers  with  retailers, 


but  the  Food  Controller  had  to  stand  within 
this  danger  in  turning  to  what  appeared  to 
be  the  less  of  two  evils.  To  impartial 
observers  it  seemed  that  when  in  the  future 
a  considered  judgment  could  be  passed  the 
policy  pursued  would  be  regarded  as  fully 
justified.  Whatever  mistakes  or  miscalcula- 
tions he  made,  Lord  Rhondda,  after  holding 
a  difficult  and  highly  responsible  office  for 
nine  months,  was  still  Food  Controller  and 
remained  in  office  with  the  goodwill  and 
approval  of  the  majority  of  the  population. 
Compulsory  rationing,  with  its  complexities  and 
restrictions,  aroused  very  little  of  the  irritation 
that  had  been  expected,  and  during  the  period 
which  followed  the  introduction  of  rationing 
regulations  there  was  probably  less  grumbling 
about  the  food  situation  than  had  been  heard 


288 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A    TRACTOR    PLOUGH. 
The  Government  placed  a  number  of  tractors  at  the  disposal  of  farmers  in  order  to  facilitate  the 

ploughing  up  of  uncultivated  land. 


at  any  time  during  the  preceding  twelve  months. 
After  the  trials  with  the  queues,  the  inconve- 
niences of  limited  consumption  were  regarded 
complacently  and  were  a  subject  of  jest  rather 
than  of  complaint  When  the  nation  could 
laugh,  and  with  no  trace  of  bitterness  behind 
the  mirth,  over  an  unaccustomed,  if  still  a 
very  mild,  restraint  of  its  freedom,  there  was 
obviously  little  resentment  threatening  the 
position  of  the  Minister  who  had  found  it 
essential  first  to  sanction  and  then  to  compel 
rationing.  It  could,  on  the  contrary,  almost 
be  said  of  the  second  Food  Controller  that  he 
became  popular,  except  with  the  farmers  and 
some  of  the  produce  merchants,  and  his  rela- 
tions with  the  agricultural  industry  were  really 


better   than    some    of    the    spokesmen    of    the 
industry  suggested. 

Within  the  limits  of  a  survey  mainly  devoted 
to  the  progressive  control  of  the  available  food 
supplies  and  the  gradual  evolution  of  rationing 
on  a  national  basis,  it  is  not  possible  to  deal 
with  many  of  the  measures  by  which  the  British 
people  received  their  food  during  the  first  three 
and  a-half  years  of  war.  The  world-wide 
activities  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Wheat 
Supplies,  the  loyal  help  and  self-sacrifice  of 
America  in  provisioning  the  Allied  larders,  and 
the  extraordinary  development  of  food  produc- 
tion in  Great  Britain,  are  interesting  topics 
which  cannot  be  dealt  with  in  the  present 
chapter. 


CHAPTER    CCXXX. 

GERMANY  :    AUGUST,   1 9 1 6— 
FEBRUARY,   19 18. 

Political  Situation  at  end  of  1910 — Rumania — American  Intervention — Bethmann 
Hollweg's  Speeches — Promises  of  Internal  "  Rfforms  " — Prussian  Franchise  Rescript — 
The  "  Erzberger  Crisis,"  July,  1917 — Fall  of  Bethmann  Hollweg — His  Record — 
The  Michaelis  Chancellorship — The  Reichstag  "  Peace  Resolution,"  July  19 — Minis 
terial  Changes — Kuhlmann  becomes  Foreign  Secretary — The  "  Wilhelmshaven  Mutiny  " 
— Fall  of  Michaelis — Count  Hertlino  becomes  Chancellor — Hertling's  Career  and 
Policy — Progress  of  the  Socialist  "  Split  " — Majority  and  Minority — The  Stockholm 
Conference  Plot — Its  History  and  Failure — Strikes  in  April,  1917,  and  January,  1918 — 
Economic  Situation— Food — Finance  and  Industry — Public  Opinion — The  Growth  of 
Chauvinism — Texts  of  Pope's  Peace  Note  and  Replies. 


EARLIER  chapters  have  sketched  the 
main  course  of  events  in  Germany 
during  the  first  two  years  of  war. 
It  has  also  been  seen  how  the  German 
"  peace "  campaign  of  December,  1916,  was 
the  preface  not  to  peace  but  to  "  unrestricted  ' 
submarine  warfare  and  war  with  the  United 
States,  and  in  that  connexion  some  account 
has  been  given  of  the  first  stages  of  the  now 
regime  which  was  inaugurated  under  Hinden- 
burg  and  Ludendorff  in  the  autumn  of  1916, 
after  the  intervention  of  Rumania  and  the 
Italian  declaration  of  war  on  Germany.* 
The  present  chapter  is  a  review  of  German 
affairs  from  the  beginning  of  the  third  year  of 
war  down  to  February,  1918.  It  was  a  period 
of  tremendous  events,  during  which  the  incal- 
culable weight  of  the  United  States  was  thrown 
into  the  balance  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  Empire  passed 
through  Revolution  into  chaos  and  from  chaos 
to    speedy    humiliation    and    disruption,    with 

•See  V<, I.  IX.,  Chapter  CXLVH.  :  "Germany's 
fcoooud  Year  of  War";  and  Vol.  XI.,  Chapter  CLXXX.  : 
"The  German  Peace  Campaign  of  Deeembor,  1916." 

Vol.  XV.— Part  191.  289 


the     immediate     result     that     tiie     European 
War  threw  its  shadows  ever  wider,  and  threat 
ened    not    only    the    Farthest    West    but    the 
Farthest  East.     The  war  had  become  a  "  world 
war  "  indeed. 

In  Germany  itself  all  these  great  events 
were  accompanied  by  incessant  disputing  and 
debating.  When  once  the  veto  upon  dis- 
cussion of  German  "  war  aims "  had  been 
removed,  and  the  "  peace "  proposals  ot 
December,  1916.  had  been  made,  a  German 
political  offensive  ran  parallel  with  the  Geiman 
military  effort.  This  political  offensive,  be- 
cause it  was  directed  against  the  great  demo- 
cracies of  the  West,  necessitated  a  pretence 
not  only  of  reasonableness  in  the  settlement 
of  the  war  but  of  readiness  to  reform  Germany 
from  within.  Thus  general  discussion  of  the 
constitutional  and  political  structure  of  the 
German  Empire  became  inevitable,  and  all 
parties  took  a  hand  in  it  There  were  repeated 
"  crises,"  of  a  kind  familiar  enough  to  those 
%vho  had  studied  German  politics  before  the 
war,  but  bewildering  and  misleading  to  the 
world     at     large.     Even     leading     statesmen. 


290 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR, 


in  England — still  more,  perhaps,  in  the  United 
States — for  a  time  believed  seriously  tliat  the 
Russian  Revolution,  which  was  hailed  with 
delight  at  Potsdam,  threatened  Germany  with 
"'  infection.  '  At  some  moments  it  was  seriously 
supposed  that  the  militarist  domination  of 
(Sermajpry  was  menaced,  or  even  that  the  spirit 
of  I'russia  could  be  changed  and  purified  by 
the  inspired  wisdom  of  the  Reichstag.  Brief 
Labour  troubles,  again,  were  in  many  quarters 
exaggerated  and  misunderstood.  In  reality 
autocracy  and  militarism  emerged  ever  stronger 
from  their  harmless  ordeals.  They  showed 
their  new  strength  by  the  overthrow  of  the 
fifth  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg,  in  July,  1917,  and  they  destroyed, 
for  the  time,  all  serious  opposition  by  their 
dictation  of  "  peace  "  to  Russia. 

The  first  months  of  the  third  year  of  war 
were  very  anxious  and,  upon  the  whole, 
depressing.  The  intervention  of  Rumania 
produced  an  impression  which  was  too  easily 
forgotten  afterwards,  when  the  Bolshevist 
betrayal  led  to  the  Rumanian  tragedy.  In 
the  decision  of  Bukarest  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  Berlin  read  the  judgment  of  the 
world — the  cool  and  considered  judgment 
that  Germany  would  be  defeated,  and  that, 
in  particular,  her  ambitions  in  the  East  and 
South-East  would  be  wrecked      In  the  Italian 


declaration  of  war  Berlin  read,  similarly,  the 
cool  and  considered  judgment  of  the  world 
that  the  Triple  Alliance  would  never  rise 
again  Meanwhile,  in  spite  of  all  German 
promises,  the  Battle  of  the  Soimne  went  on 
and  on,  putting  an  apparently  intolerable 
strain  upon  German  man-power  and  material 
resources.  Yet,  faced  by  the  final  defection 
of  two  former  Allies,  Germany  was  preparing 
to  make  in  the  United  States  a  new  and  mighty 
enemy,  whose  action  must  inevitably  sway  the 
whole  neutral  world — outside  the  range  of 
Germany's  immediate  neighbours,  who  were 
hostile  but  helpless  The  near-sighted  diplo- 
matists of  the  Wilhehnstrasse  still  clung  to 
the  hope  of  a  miracle.  *'  Wilson  must  mediate," 
they  would  say  to  American  visitors.  And  in 
their  most  sanguine  moments  they  perhaps 
believed  that  the  Asquith  Government  would 
stay  in  power  and  would  be  unable  to  refuse 
such  mediation.  At  the  end  of  November, 
191(),  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  mild-mannered 
Foreign  Secretary,  retired.  The  pace  was 
getting  too  hot  for  him  It  was  characteristic 
of  the  time  that  the  North  German  Gazette 
published  an  astonishing  panegyric  of  Jagow — 
pretty  evidently  from  the  pen  of  the  Chancellor 
himself — applauding  his  tireless  energy,  adroit- 
ness, vigilance,  and  "  wise  advice."  It  would 
have  been  more  pertinent  to  congratulate 
him  on  his  happy  escape  into  obscurity. 


STREET  VENDORS    IN    MUNICH    ON    A    "  VICTORY-DAY." 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


291 


As  has  been  seen  elsewhere,  Herr  von 
Jagow's  successor,  Herr  Zimmermann,  was 
full  of  wild  schemes  of  adventure,  and  thought 
he  could  meet  the  intervention  of  the  United 
States  by  an  alliance  with  Japan  and  Mexico  ! 
In  reality  German  diplomacy  was  now  utterly 
in  the  iron  grip  of  the  Army  leaders.  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg  was  repeating  the 
experiences  of  July,  1914.  Reluctant,  even 
outwardly  recalcitrant,  he  was  calling  "  peace  " 
but  being  driven  the  way  that  the  General 
Staff  meant  him  to  go.  When  Tirpitz  had 
tried  to  drive  the  Government  into  "  ruthless  " 
submarine  warfare  and  war  with  the  United 
States,  Bethmann  Hollweg  had  been  strong 
enough  to  overthrow  him.  When  the  Army 
led  the  campaign,  in  the  name  of  Hindenburg, 
but  with  the  whole  weight  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism and  industrialism  and  the  Prussian 
autocracy  behind  it,  the  Chancellor  was  over- 
powered. Moreover,  he  was  himself  marked 
down  for  sacrifice,  in  punishment  of  his  reluc- 
tance, and  in  due  time,  as  will  be  seen,  he  fell. 
His  repeated  protests  that  his  objections  to 
"  ruthless "  submarine  warfare  had  always 
been  only  temporary  and  opportunist  damaged 
his  reputation  abroad  without  availing  him 
anything  at  home. 

Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg's  speeches  in 

and   after   the   autumn   of    1916   reflected   his 

endless    oscillation    between    militarism    and 

sham  democracy.     At  the  end  of  September  he 

was  still  railing  at  England  : 

Our  existence  as  a  nation  is  to  bo  crushed.  Militarily 
defenceless,  economically  crushed  and  boycotted  by  the 
world,  condemned  to  lasting  sickliness — that  is  the 
Germany  which  England  wants  to  see  at  her  feet. 
Then,  when  there  is  no  German  competition  to  be 
feared,  when  France  has  been  bled  to  death,  when  all 
the  Allies  financially  and  economically  are  doing  slave 
work  for  England,  when  the  neutral  European  world 
must  submit  to  every  British  order,  every  British  black 
list,  then  upon  an  impotent  Germany  the  dream  of 
British  world  supremacy  is  to  become  a  reality. 

A  few  days  later  the  Government  summarily 
dismissed  the  Reichstag  for  a  long  vacation, 
in  order  to  avoid  a  public  debate  on  submarine 
warfare.  Early  in  November,  when  proceed- 
ings were  confined  to  the  secrecy  of  the  Main 
Committee,  the  Chancellor  reverted  to  the 
origins  of  the  war.  "  No  honourable  critic," 
he  declared,  could  deny  that  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  always  been  on  the  defensive  against  the 
"  aggressive  character  "  of  the  Triple  Entente  ; 
"  not  in  the  shadow  of  Prussian  militarism 
did  the  world  live  before  the  war,  but  in  the 
shadow  of  the  policy  of  isolation  which  was 
to  keep  Germany  down  "     So  far  from  opposing 


a  League  of  Nations  Germany  was  ready  to 
place  herself  at  the  head  of  it  ! 

The  first  conditions  for  the  development  of  inter- 
national relations  by  means  of  an  arbitration  court  and 
the  peaceful  liquidation  of  conflicting  antagonisms 
would  be  that  henceforth  no  aggressive  coalitions  should 
bo  formed.     Germany  is  ready  at  all  times  to  join  the 


HERR    VON    BETHMANN     HOLLWEG, 
German  Imperial  Chancellor  1909-1917. 

union  of  peoples,  and  even  to  place  hersolf  at  the  head  of 
such  a  union  which  will  restrain  the  disturber  of  the 
peace. 

Then  came,  in  quick  succession,  the  "  peace 
offer,"  the  declaration  of  "  unrestricted  "  sub- 
marine warfare,  and  the  break  with  the  United 
States  and  other  Powers.  These  subjects 
have  been  dealt  with  so  fully  that  it  is  not 
necessary  here  to  do  more  than  note  one  or 
two  of  the  official  utterances  of  the  Chancellor. 
On  January  31,  1917,  he  read  to  the  Reichstag 
the  German  Note  on  submarine  warfare,  and 
said  : 

No  one  among  us  will  close  his  eyes  to  the  seriousness 
of  the  step  which  we  aro  taking.  That  our  existence 
is  at  stake  everyone  has  known  since  August  4,  1914, 
and  this  has  been  brutally  emphasized  by  the  rejec- 
tion of  our  peace  offer.  When,  in  1914,  wo  had  to  seize 
and  have  recourse  to  the  sword  against  the  Russian 
goneral  mobilization,  wo  did  so  with  the  deepest  sense 
of  responsibility  towards  our  people  and  conscious 
of  the  resolute  strength  which  says,  "  We  must,  and 
therefore  we  can."  Endless  sti-eams  of  blood  have 
since  been  shed,  but  they  have  not  washed  away  the 
"  must  *'  and  the.-"  can." 

191—2 


202 


THE    TIMES    HISTOBY    OF    THE    WAR. 


In  now  deciding  to  employ  the  best  and  sharpest 
weapon,  we  are  guided  solely  by  a  sober  consideration 
of  all  the  circumstances  that  come  into  question,  and 
by  a  firm  determination  to  help  our  people  out  of 
the  distress  and  disgrace  which  our  enemies  contemplate 
for  them.  Success  lies  in  a  higher  hand,  but  as  regards 
nil    that    human    strength    can    do    to    enforce    success 


war,  the  Chancellor  did  all  he  could  to  explain 
away  the  crimes  at  sea  and  to  promote  a  sham 
display  of  "  democratization."  On  February  27 
he  made  another  long  and  argumentative  speech 
in  the  Reichstag  about  submarine  warfare  and 


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for  the  Fatherland  you  may  be  assured,  gentlemen, 
that  nothing  has  been  neglected.  Everything  in  this 
respect  will  be  done. 

During  the  two  months,  February  and  March, 
which  intervened  between  the  rupture  of  diplo- 
matic relations  and  the  American  declaration  of 


about  the  "  friendly  relations  "  with  America 
which  Bismarck  had  once  called  "  an  heirloom 
from  Frederick  the  Great."  He  was  full  of 
"  regret  "  for  "  the  rupture  with  a  nation  which, 
by  its  history,  seemed  to  be  predestined  to  work 
together  with  us,  not  against  us,  for  common 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


293 


ideals.  '  But  there  could  be  no  "  going  back," 
since  Germany's  "  honest  desire  for  peace  had 
only  encountered  hostile  ridicule  on  the  part  of 
her  enemies." 

On  March  29  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg 
made  one  more  attempt.  He  said  to  the 
Reichstag  : 

In  a  few  days  the  representatives  of  the  American 
people  meet  to  decide  on  the  quostion  of  war  or  peace 
between  the  American  and  the  German  people.  Germany 
has  never  had  the  smallest  intention  of  attacking  America, 
and  has  nono  to-day.  Germany  has  never  desired 
war  with  America,  nor  has  she  any  desire  for  war  to-day. 
We  have  more  than  once  told  the  United  States  that 
we  renounced  the  unrestricted  use  of  submarine  warfare 
in  the  expectation  that  England  would  be  brought  to 
observe  in  her  blockade  policy  the  laws  01  humanity 
and  international  agreements.  England  has  not  only 
maintained,  but  continually  intensified,  her  illegal 
and  indefensible  blockade  policy.  She  has,  in  common 
with  her  allies,  scornfully  rejected  our  peace  offer,  and 
announced  war  aims  which  amount  to  the  annihilation 
of  ourselves  and  our  allies.  For  this  reason  we  resorted 
to  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  ;  for  this  reason  we 
were  forced  to  resort  to  it.  Does  the  American  people 
see  in  this  any  reason  for  declaring  war  on  the  German 
people,  with  which  it  has  lived  at  peace  for  more  than 
a  hundred  years  ?  Does  it,  for  this  reason,  desire  to 
increase  the  bloodshed  *  It  is  not  we  who  bear  the 
responsibility  for  such  a  result. 

A  few  days  later  Germany  and  the  United 
States  were  at  war.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact 
that,  although  he  remained  in  office  for  three 
and  a-half  months  longer,  Herr  von  Bethmann 
Hollweg  never  again  mentioned  the  United 
States  in  a  public  speech  and  seldom  spoke  of 
the  submarine  war.  In  his  last  speech  in  the 
Reichstag  (May  16)  he  said  : — "  Our  submarines 
are  operating  with  increasing  success.  I  will 
not  employ  any  fine  words  about  them.  The 
deeds  of  our  submarine  men  speak  for  them- 
selves. I  think  that  even  the  neutrals  will 
recognize  this.  As  far  as  is  compatible  with  our 
duty  towards  our  own  people,  who  come  first, 
we  take  into  accotint  the  interests  of  the  neutral 
States."  That  was  all.  This  time  there  was 
not,  as  in  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg's  famous 
speeeh  of  August  4,  1914,  on  the  invasion  of 
Belgium,  any  public  admission  of  "  the  wrong  " 
that  Germany  had  committed  and  he  had 
authorized.  But  the  Chancellor's  silence  was 
significant. 

In  point  of  fact  it  soon  became  the  deliberate 
policy  of  Germany  to  keep  the  United  States 
as  far  as  possible  out  of  the  public  view  of  the 
war.  The  rapid  adoption  of  compulsory  service 
was  a  shock  to  Germany,  but  a  long  period  of 
preparation  must  precede  effective  military 
action  by  the  United  States,  and  the  German 
Press  was  content  to  conceal  the  future  and 
merely  to  encourage  the  German  public  with 


occasional  ridicule  of  the  American  effort  and 
some  abuse  of  President  Wilson,  who  wa3 
regarded  much  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been 
regarded  in  the  first  year  of  the  war.  The  Army 
leaders  had  little  desire  to  provoke  discussion  of 
America's  real  military  resources ;  the  poli- 
ticians hoped  against  hope  that  American 
idealism  could  be  brought  into  some  sort  of 
antagonism  to  British  and  other  Allied  aims 
and  interests.  At  the  same  time  it  was  of 
great  importance  to  prevent  simple  German 
minds  from  being  assailed  at  one  and  the  same 
time  by  the  collapse  of  Russian  autocracy  and 
the  rising  against  Germany  of  American 
democracy. 

In  any  case  Germany's  main  business  was  for 
the  present  with  Russia,  where  the  outbreak  of 
the  Revolution  had  preceded  by  three  weeks  the 
intervention  of  the  United  States.  It  has  been 
said  that  the  Revolution  was  hailed  with  joy 
at  Potsdam.  But  until  the  failure  of  the 
Russian  offensive  in  July  it  was  not  certain 
that  the  first-fruits  of  the  Revolution  would 
fall  to  Germany,  and  nearly  a  year  was  to  pass 
before  they  actually  ripened  into  a  German 
"  peace."  Meanwhile  Germany  passed  through 
a  series  of  mild  convulsions.  Unfortunately 
they  were  without  any  real  result  except  to 
strengthen  the  reaction  when  it  came,  and  they 
seriously  darkened  counsel  in  the  countries  of 
the  Allies.  On  the  one  hand,  Germany  continued 
the  "  peace  offensive  "  ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  German  Government  endeavoured  to  meet 
the  apparently  rising  tide  of  democracy  by  more 
or  less  innocuous  domestic  "  reforms."  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  for  his  part,  was  not 
entirely  insincere.  He  had  always  feared  the 
extreme  rigidity  of  Prussia,  Prussian  bureaucrat 
and  Junker  though  he  was  to  the  bone,  and  he 
knew  enough  of  western  civilization  to  believe 
that  Prussia -Germany  could  retain  its  stability 
only  with  the  help  of  considerable  constitutional 
changes.  In  the  Prussian  Diet  on  March  14 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  declared  that  unity 
could  be  secured  only  by  granting  the  people  in 
general  equal  cooperation  in  the  administration 
of  the  Empire,  and  he  exclaimed  : — i 

Woe  to  the  statesman  who  does  not  recognize  the 
signs  of  tho  time  ;  who,  after  this  catastrophe,  the  like 
of  which  the  world  has  nevor  seen,  believes  that  ho  can 
take  up  the  work  whore  it  was  interrupted. 

But  in  the  Reichstag  on  March  31  he  again 

urged  delay  even  in  the  reform  of  the  Prussian 

franchise  : — 

I  admit  that  it  would  bo  most  congenial  to  me  if  I 
could   carry   out   the    reform    to-morrow.     But   at   this 


294 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


moment,  when  the  war  has  reached  its  crisis,  when  it  is 
a  question  of  bringing  all — even  our  last  ounce  of 
strength— -to  bear,  I  must  consider  very  soberly  whether 
the  advantages  of  attempting  such  an  action  are  greater 
than  the  disadvantages  which  are  inevitably  bound 
up  with  it.  .  .  .  Since  I  am  compelled  to  bring  forward 
these  serious  considerations,  I  must  say  that  the  stake 
at  issue  in  this  war  is  far  too  great  for  us  to  allow  our- 
selves to  be  earrit#  away  by  our  opinions.  If  I  am 
forced  to  hold  thisvicw,  it  is  wrong  and  unjustifiablo 
to  reproach  me  with  pursuing  a  policy  of  stagnation. 

Meanwhile  Germany  was  professing  an  almost 
disinterested  benevolence  towards  the  Russian 
Revolution.  It  was  insisted  that  she  would  do 
nothing  that  could  interfere  with  the  internal 
affairs  of  Russia,  and  that  the  Russian  people 
need  have  no  fear  of  any  meddling.  In  reality, 
of  course,  whatever  may  have  been  the  confused 
hopes  of  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  for 
"  reform  "  in  his  own  country,  it  was  obviously 
to  the  interests  of  Germany  to  allow  the  disinte- 
gration of  Russia  to  continue  undisturbed,  pro- 
vided that  Germany  herself  could  be  kept  safe 
from  revolutionary  infection.  In  these  circum- 
stances, and  under  cover  of  "  democratic  "  dis- 
plays, the  German  Government  embarked  upon 
an  ingenious  scheme — the  attempt  to  organize 
an  International  Socialist  Conference,  at  the 
apparent  instance  of  the  Russian  revolution- 


aries, but  at  the  real  instigation  of  the  German 
Government,  acting  through  the  "  tame " 
German  Socialists.  If  the  conference  could  be 
arranged,  Germany  would  have  secured  what 
she  had  failed  to  secure  by  her  direct  "  peace 
offer  "  in  December  ;  if  the  Western  Powers 
refused  to  be  entangled,  their  refusal  could  be 
turned  to  good  account  in  Russia. 

It  will  be  necessary  to  return  to  this  subject 
later,  and  to  disentangle  other  outstanding 
features  of  the  complicated  history  of  the  next 
few  months — especially  the  labour  troubles, 
which  first  made  their  appearance  on  a  con- 
siderable scale  in  April,  the  development  of  dis- 
sensions among  the  Socialists,  and  the  reception 
of  a  "  peace  "  Note  from  the  Pope.  Meanwhile 
let  us  trace  the  main  events  which  led  to  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg's  fall.  They  turned 
throughout  upon  the  definition  of  German  policy 
at  home  and  abroad,  upon  "  reform  "  and  "  war 
aims,"  upon  the  choice  between  positive  action 
in  either  sphere  or  both,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  "  stagnation  "  at  home  while  the 
war  was  pushed  to  a  purely  military  conclusion. 
On  April  7,  notwithstanding  his  hesitating 
speech  a  week  before,  Herr  von  Bethmann  Holl- 


FEEDING    BERLIN:    THE    SOUP    CARTS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


295 


POOR     BERUNERS     FETCHING     THEIR     TEN-PFENNIG    DINNERS     FROM     THE     RED 

CROSS    FOOD    KITCHEN. 


weg  was  able  to  publish  what  became  known  as 
the  Easter  Rescript.  It  was  addressed  by  the 
Kaiser  as  King  of  Prussia  to  himself  as  Minister 
President  of  Prussia,  and  ran  : 

Never  has  the  German  people  shown  itself  so  firm  as 
during  this  war.  The  knowledge  that  the  Fatherland 
is  acting  in  bitter  self-defenco  has  exorcised  a  wonder- 
fully reconciling  power,  and  in  spite  of  all  sacrifices  of 
blood  on  the  battlefield  and  severe  privations  at  home, 
the  resolve  has  remained  unshakable  to  stake  the 
utmost  for  a  victorious  issue.  National  and  sociai 
spirit  have  understood  each  other  and  become  united 
and  given  us  enduring  strength.  Everyone  has  felt 
that  what  has  been  built  up  in  the  course  of  long  years 
amid  many  internal  struggles  was  worthy  of  defence. 

Brilliant  before  my  eyes  stand  the  achievements  of 
the  entire  nation  in  battle  and  distress.  The  expe- 
riences of  this  struggle  for  the  existence  of  the  Empire 
introduce  with  sublime  solemnity  a  new  age.  It  falls 
to  you,  as  the  responsible  Chancellor  of  the  German 
Empire  and  the  First  Minister  of  my  Government  in 
Prussia,  to  help  to  fulfil  the  demands  of  this  hour  by 
the  right  means  and  at  the  right  time.  On  various 
occasions  you  have  laid  down  the  spirit  in  accordance 
with  which  the  forms  of  our  political  life  must  be  con- 
structed in  order  to  make  room  for  the  free  and  willing 
cooperation  of  all  members  of  our.  people.  The  princi- 
ples which  you  have  developed  in  doing  so  have,  as  yo\i 
know,  my  approval.  1  feel  conscious  of  remaining  thus 
in  the  path  taken  by  my  grandfather,  who,  as  King  of 
Prussia  in  the  sphere  of  military  organization,  and  as 
P^mperor  of  Germany  in  the  sphere  of  social  reform, 
gave  a  pattern  of  the  fulfilment  of  the  duties  of  a  monarch 
and  laid  the  foundations  which  will  enable  the  German 
people  in  united  and  stern  perseverance  to  overcome 
these  bloody  times. 

The  maintenance  of  the  fighting  iorce  as  a  true  people's 
army,  and  the  promotion  of  the  social  progress  of  the 
people  in  all  its  classes,  have  been  my  object  from  the 
beginning  of  my  reign.     Anxious  as  I  am,  while  strictly 


preserving  the  unity  of  people  and  Monarchy,  to  serve 
the  interests  of  the  whole,  I  am  resolved,  so  soon  as  the 
war  situation  permits,  to  set  to  work  on  the  building 
up  of  our  internal  political,  economic,  and  social  life. 

Millions  of  our  fellow-countrymen  are  still  in  the  field, 
and  still  the  decision  of  the  conflict  of  opinions,  which 
is  inevitable  in  a  far-reaching  change  of  the  Constitution 
must,  in  the  highest  interests  of  the  Fatherland,  be  post- 
poned until  the  time  of  the  return  of  our  warriors 
comes,  and  they  themselves  can  in  counsel  and  action 
cooperate  in  the  progress  of  the  new  era.  But  in  order 
that  after  the  successful  ending  of  the  war,  which,  I 
confidently  hope,  is  no  longer  far  off,  whatever  is  neces- 
sary and  appropriate  in  this  respect  may  be  done  at 
once,  [  desire  the  preparations  to  bo  carried  out  without 
delay. 

The  reform  of  the  Prussian  Diet  and  the  liberation 
of  the  whole  of  our  internal  political  life  from  this 
question  is  particularly  near  my  heart.  At  the  very 
beginning  of  the  war  preparations  for  the  alteration 
of  the  franchise  for  the  Prussian  Lower  House  were 
undertaken  at  my  suggestion.  I  now  charge  you  to 
lay  before  me  the  definite  proposals  of  the  Ministry, 
in  order  that  on  the  return  of  our  warriors  this  work, 
which  is  fundamental  for  the  internal  construction  of 
Prussia,  may  be  carried  out  rapidly  by  means  of  legis- 
lation. 

After  the  gigantic  accomplishments  of  the  whole 
people  in  this  terrible  war,  there  is,  in  my  opinion,  no 
room  left  in  Prussia  for  th?  class  franchise.  The  Bill 
will  further  have  to  provide  for  the  immediate  and 
secret  election  of  deputies. 

The  services  of  the  Upper  House  and  its  permanent 
importance  for  the  State  no  King  of  Prussia  will  fail  to 
recognize.  But  the  Upper  House  will  be  better  able  to 
do  justice  to  the  gigantic  demands  of  the  coming  time 
if  it  unites  in  its  midst,  to  a  greater  degree  than  hitherto, 
leading  men,  marked  out  by  the  respect  of  their  fellow- 
citizens,  from  all  classes  and  callings  of  the  people. 

I  act  according  to  the  traditions  of  great  ancestor* 
when,  in  renewing  in  important  respects  our  firmly 
planted  and  storm-proved  Constitution.  T  show  to  a  loyal 


296 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


brave,  efficient,  and  highly  developed  people  the  con- 
fidence it  deserves.  I  charge  you  to  make  this  edict 
known  forthwith. 

Thus  legislation  was  still  to  be  postponed 
until  "  after  the  war."  The  Rescript  satisfied 
nobody.  The  Conservatives  were  given  warn- 
ing that  the  Prussian  tHWe-class  franchise, 
based  upon  the  qualification  of  wealth,  was 
to   be   abolished,   and   that   voting   would    be 


HERR    ERZBERGER, 

The    Centre    Party    Deputy     who     provoked    the 

"Chancellor  crisis"  in  July,   1917. 

direct  and  secret,  instead  of  indirect  and 
open.  But  in  a  speech  from  the  Throne  in 
1909  the  Kaiser-King  of  Prussia  had  made 
similar  promises  and  broken  them,  and  the 
Rescript  confirmed  the  suspicions  of  the 
Chancellor's  most  powerful  enemies  without 
gaining  him  new  friends.  Moreover,  while 
the  monstrous  anachronism  of  the  medieval 
Prussian  franchise  was  traditionally  the  great 
test  question  in  German  politics,  no  genuine 
"  reform "  was  possible  in  Germany  with- 
out changes  in  the  Imperial  Constitution 
which  would  give  the  Reichstag  some  real 
power  and  introduce  Ministerial  responsibility 
to  Parliament.  The  Imperial  Government 
showed  no  serious  intention  of  effecting  any 
real  reforms  whatever.  The  Reichstag  set 
up  a  "  Constitution  Committee."  Its  pro- 
ceedings were  at  first  widely  advertised  for 
the  benefit  of  "pacifists"  all  over  the  world, 
but  they  rapidly  became  a  mere  farce — ham- 
pered  at  every  turn  by  the  official  in  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Herr  Lewald,  whom 
the  Government  had  selected  to  control  thorn  ! 
What  of  the  Chancellor's  "  war  aims  "  and 


"  peace  "  policy  ?  After  prolonged  Party  and 
Press  controversies  he  made  a  speech  in  the 
Reichstag  on  May  15.  He  was  now  fighting 
hard  for  his  own  position,  and  assumed  a 
Prussian  militarist  pose,  banging  his  fist  on 
the  table,  grasping  his  sword  hilt,  and — as 
the  Berliner  Tageblatt  observed — delivering 
his  principal  passages  in  a  "  tone  of  command." 
A  few  quotations  will  suffice  : 

I  thoroughly  and  completely  understand  the  passionate 
interest  of  tho  people  in  our  war-aims  and  the  conditions 
of  peace.  I  understand  the  demand  for  a  precise 
statement.  But  in  a  debate  on  war-aims  tho  only 
guiding  lino  for  mo  is  an  early  and  satisfactory  conclusion 
of  the  war.  Beyond  that  I  cannot  do  anything,  and 
cannot  say  anything.  If  tho  general  situation  obliges 
me  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  reserve,  as  is  the  ca.se  at 
present,   I   will  maintain   this  reserve.  .  .  . 

Shall  I  immediately  give  our  enemies  an  assurance 
which  would  enable  them  to  prolong  the  war  indefinitely 
without  danger  of  losses  to  themselves  ?  .  .  .  Shall  I  nail 
down  the  German  Empiro  in  all  directions  by  a  one-sided 
statement  which  comprises  only  one  part  of  the  total  peace 
conditions,  renounces  the  successes  gained  by  the  blood  of 
our  sons  and  brothers,  and  leaves  everything  elsein  a  state 
of  suspense  !     No,  I  reject  such  a  policy.  .  .   . 

Our  military  position  has  never  been  so  good  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  .  .  Time  is  on  our  side.  In 
full  confidence  we  can  trust  that  we  are  approaching 
a  satisfactory  finish.  Then  the  time  will  come  when 
we  can  negotiate  with  our  enemies  about  our  war-aims, 
regarding  which  I  am  in  full  harmony  with  the  Army 
Command.  Then  we  shall  attain  a  peace  which  will 
bring  to  us  liberty  to  rebuild  what  the  war  has  des- 
troyed, in  unimpaired  development  of  our  strength, 
so  that  from  all  the  blood  and  all  the  sacrifices  an  ftmpire, 
a  people,  will  rise  again  strong,  independent,  unthroatened 
by  its  enemies,  a  bulwark  of  peace  and  of  work. 

That  was  the  conclusion  of  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg's  last  Reichstag  speech.  The 
Reichstag  adjourned,  and  when  it  met  again 
at  the  beginning  of  July  a  "  crisis  "  immediately 
developed. 

The  formal  issue  before  the  Main  Committee 
of  the  Reichstag  when  it  met  on  July  5  was  the 
voting  of  new  war  credits,  and  the  first  sign  of 
trouble  was  the  Committee's  decision  to  post- 
pone the  vote  until  after  a  political  debate.  On 
July  6  Herr  Erzberger,  a  member  of  the  Catholic 
Centre  Party,  made  a  sensational  speech. 
Although  all  reports  of  the  proceedings  were 
suppressed,  it  soon  became  known  that  he  had 
violently  attacked  the  Government.  He  had 
accused  Ministers  of  misrepresenting  the  military 
situation,  and  he  had  insisted  upon  the  fact 
that,  when  "  unrestricted  "  submarine  war  was 
proclaimed  at  the  end  of  January,  the  naval 
authorities  had  promised  that  in  six  months 
England  would  be  forced  to  make  peace. 
Now  that  the  six  months  had  passed,  he 
challenged  the  Government  to  tell  the  truth. 
In  view  of  the  situation  which  he  had  described, 
he    urged    that    immediate    action    must    be 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


297 


taken  for  the  reform  of  the  Prussian  franchise, 
and  that  the  Reichstag  and  the  Government 
should  agree  upon  a  "  war  aims "  formula, 
which  would  strengthen  Germany  at  home, 
impress  neutrals,  and  increase  "  pacifism  "  in 
enemy  countries,  especially  in  Russia.  Erz- 
berger  had  for  years  been  regarded  as  a  sort  of 
enfant  terrible  of  the  Centre  Party.  Some- 
times his  actions  were  purely  irresponsible  ; 
sometimes  he  was  employed  by  the  Party 
leaders  as  an  agent  whom  it  was  easy  to 
disavow ;  all  the  time  he  was  an  intriguer, 
equally  ready  to  accept  inspiration  from 
Munich,  Vienna,  or  Rome,  or  to  carry  out  an 
international  mission  on  behalf  of  the  Prussian 
Government.  The  present  plot  was  skilfully 
laid,  and  in  a  few  days  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
found  himself  deserted  and  alone.  On  July  7 
he  appeared  before  the  Committee,  and  refused 
the  demands  of  Erzberger  and  the  Socialists. 
The  Centre  Party  then  openly  supported 
Erzberger,  and  the  Radicals  joined  the  oppo- 
sition, while  the  National  Liberals — whose 
only  object  was  to  overthrow  Bethmann  in 
the  interests  of  their  annexationist  policy — 
displayed  a  sudden  passion  for  "  reform." 
On  the  same  day  the  Kaiser,  Hindenburg, 
and  Ludendorff  arrived  in  Berlin,  and  there  were 


long  discussions  with  the  Chancellor.  On 
July  9  a  Crown  Council  was  held,  at  which  the 
Chancellor  appears  to  have  secured  with 
difficulty  approval  of  his  "  reform  "  proposals. 
On  the  following  day  he  utterly  refused  to 
inform  the  Reichstag  Committee  of  the  Crown 
Council's  decisions.  On  July  11  a  second 
Crown  Council  was  held,  this  time  in  the  presence 
of  Bethmann's  old  enemy,  the  Crown  Prince, 
who  had  been  summoned  to  Berlin  for  the 
purpose.  The  immediate  result  was  the  fol- 
lowing rescript,  addressed  by  the  Kaiser  as 
King  of  Prussia  to  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg 
as  Minister  President  of  Prussia  : 

Upon  the  report  which  my  Government  made  to  me, 
in  obedionco  to  my  decree  of  April  7  of  the  current  yoar, 
I  herewith  decido,  in  order  to  supplement  the  same, 
that  the  draft  Bill  dealing  with  the  alteration  of  the 
electoral  law  for  the  Hous?  of  Deputies,  which  is  to  be 
submitted  to  the  Diet  of  the  Monarchy  for  decision,  is 
to  be  drawn  up  on  a  basis  of  equal  franchise. 

The  Bill  is  to  be  submitted  in  any  caso  early  enough 
lor  the  next  elections  to  take  placo  according  to  the  new 
franchise. 

I  charge  you  to  make  all  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  this  purpose. 

At  the  same  time  it  became  known  that  it 

was  proposed  to  create  a  sort  of  State  Council, 

consisting    of    Parliamentary    representatives, 

to  cooperate  with  the  Imperial   Government. 

Suddenly   Herr   von   Bethmann   Hollweg   dis- 


FUNERAL    OF    COUNT    ZEPPELIN    AT    STUTTGART,    MARCH    12,    1917. 
The  King  of  Wurtembsrg  is  prominent  behind  the  coffin. 


'298 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


covered  that  his  fate  was  in  reality  sealed. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Bayrische  Staatszeitung, 
the  official  organ  of  the  Bavarian  Government, 
declared,  on  July  12,  that  Bavaria  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  "  Ministerial  responsibility  " 
to    the    Reichstag,    and    that    all    Mtomr~    to 


HERR  GEORG  MICHAELIS. 
German  Imperial  Chancellor  July-October,  1917. 
graft  a  Parliamentary  system  on  to  the  German 
Constitution  must  be  condemned  absolutely 
as  an  encroachment  on  the  foundations  of  the 
federal  character  of  the  Empire.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Crown  Prince  entered  into  direct 
communication  with  the  leaders  of  all  the 
Reichstag  parties,  and  was  able  to  assure  his 
father  that  Bethmann  enjoyed  no  support 
and  could  well  be  dismissed  at  once.  On 
July  13  the  Kaiser  offered  the  post  of  Chan- 
cellor to  Count  Hertling,  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Bavaria,  who  had  undoubtedly  contributed 
greatly  to  Bethmann' s  overthrow,  both  by 
the  Bavarian  resistance  to  "  reform  "  and  by 
his  own  immense  influence  with  the  Centre 
Party,  of  which  he  had  for  many  years  been 
the  leader  in  the  Reichstag.  "  After  serious 
consideration  " — Hertling  disclosed  these  facts 
five  months  later  in  the  Prussian  Diet — he 
refused  the  post,  and  on  the  same  day  the 
Kaiser  "  accepted  the  resignation  "  of  Bethmann 
Holl  weg,and  appointed  an  almost  unknown  Prus- 
sian official,  Herr  Georg  Michaelis,  to  be  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  Minister  President  of  Prussia. 

Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  had  been  in 
office  for  exactly  eight  years  ;  he  had  succeeded 
Prince    Biilow    on    July     14,     1909.     For    the 


second  time  the  Kaiser  announced  the  dis- 
missal of  his  chief  servant  on  the  anniversary 
of  the  fall  of  the  Bastille.  He  did  so,  he  wrote, 
"  with  heavy  heart,"  but  he  added  only  per- 
functory words  of  recognition  and  the  minor 
favour  of  the  "  Cross  of  Grand  Commander  of 
the  Order  of  my  House  of  Hohenzollern."  As 
in  the  case  of  Prince  Biilow,  the  Centre  Party 
had  arranged  the  Parliamentary  setting.  But 
it  was  the  Crown  Prince,  inspired  by  Hinden- 
burg  and  Ludendorff,  who  compassed  Beth- 
mann's  fall.  Upon  Biilow,  in  1909,  the 
Emperor  had  taken  revenge  for  the  humiliation 
to  which  he  had  been  subjected  in  the  matter 
of  the  famous  Daily  Telegraph  interview. 
Upon  Bethmann  the  Crown  Prince  took  revenge 
for  the  humiliation  which  he  had  suffered  in 
the  autumn  of  1911,  when  he  had  made  a  public 
demonstration  in  the  Reichstag  of  his  dis- 
approval of  the  Morocco  treaty  concluded 
with  France.  Thus  the  Crown  Prince  paid  off 
an  old  personal  score,  but  his  action  repre- 
sented the  triumph  of  the  militarists  and 
reactionaries,  and  the  Kaiser,  the  Crown 
Prince,  the  Army  leaders,  and  the  Junkers, 
industrialists  and  Clericals  all  joined  hands. 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  in  spite  of  the 
stubbornness  with  which  he  had  clung  to  office, 
proved  in  the  end  an  easy  victim."  He  was  a 
man  of  great  industry  and  limited  ability, 
whose  good  intentions  bore  no  fruit.  He  had 
attempted  to  arrive  at  agreements  with  Great, 
Britain  in  the  years  before  the  war,  and  had 
made  the  British  declaration  of  war  inevitable. 
He  it  was  who,  in  the  act  of  admitting  tho 
"  wrong "  that  Germany  was  doing  in  the 
invasion  of  Belgium,  told  the  Reichstag  thr.t 
"  necessity  knows  no  law,"  and  who,  in  his 
last  conversation  with  the  British  Ambas- 
sador, defined  an  international  treaty  as  "a 
scrap  of  paper."  He  had  resisted  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare,  only  to  consent  to  it  and 
to  make  the  American  declaration  of  war 
inevitable.  He  had  displayed  an  apparent 
moderation  without  showing  the  least  ability 
to  give  effect  to  his  policy,  and  he  had  preached 
internal  "  reform  "  without  showing  the  least 
ability  to  practice  it.  After  three  years  of 
war,  during  which  he  had  assumed  the  respon- 
sibility for  greater  crimes  than  any  civilized 
Power  had  yet  committed,  he  disappeared 
unwept  and  unsung. 

As  has  been  seen,  Count  Hertling — for  the 
present— declined    the    succession,    and    Beth- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


299 


mann's  victorious  enemies  seem  to  have  been 
in  some  little  doubt  as  to  what  they  should  do 
next.  They  did  not  venture  to  go  the  length 
of  perfecting  the  military  dictatorship  by 
making  Hindenburg  himself,  or  some,  other 
general,  Imperial  .Chancellor,  and  they  decided 
to  select  some  Prussian .  bureaucrat  as  their 
figure-head.  .The  choice  fell  upon  Michaelis 
because  he  had  chanced  to  acquire  a  certain 
prominence  during  the  past  few  months  in  the 
reform  of  the  food  control,  and  could  be  put 
forward;  as  an  embodiment  of  Prussian  effi- 
ciency. At  the  beginning  of  the  war  Michaelis, 
after  an  uneventful  bureaucratic  career,  had 
reached  the  position  of  an  Under-Secretary  in 
the  I'russian  Ministry  of  Finance.  Early  in 
1917  he  had  made  proposals  for  the  reform  of 
the  food  control  organization,  had  himself 
been  appointed  to  the  new  post  of  Prussian 
State  Commissary,  and  had  shown  himself  a 
vigorous  and  determined  official.  He  was 
sixty  years  of  age,  entirely  innocent  of  any 
experience  in  foreign  affairs,  and  an  utterly 
unknown  figure  in  domestic  politics.  His 
appointment  was  a  contemptuous  rebuff  to 
the  Reichstag.  "  The  leaders  of  the  Reichstag 
parties,"  remarked  the  Berliner  Tageblatt, 
"  were  told  nothing  about  this  appointment. 
Whether  Herr  Michaelis  is  merely  a  severe  and 
strictly  matter-of-fact  bureaucrat  or  a  demo- 
cratic reformer,  whether  he  recognizes  the 
necessity  of  '  parliamentarizing  '  the  method 
of  government  in  the  Empire,  or  is  hampered 
by  quite  different  tendencies  and  sympathies, 
the  fact  is  that  he  is  sent  down  to  the  people 
and  the  representatives  of  the  people  from  the 
heights  of  Olympus,  whence  in  quite  ancient 
times  fate  came  to  mankind." 

What  remained  of  the  "  crisis "  provoked 
by  Erzberger,  except  the  fact  that  Bethmann 
had  been  overthrown  ?  Only  the  second 
Rescript  concerning  the  Prussian  franchise — to 
which  it  will  be  necessary  to  revert  later — and 
the  proposal  that  there  should  be  some  agreed 
declaration  about  war  aims.  While  Beth- 
mann's  fate  was  being  settled  outside,  the 
Reichstag  proceeded  with  the  drafting  of  a 
Resolution.  On  July  13  representatives  of 
the  Centre  Party,  the  Radicals,  and  the  Majority 
Socialists  had  a  conference  on  the  subject  with 
Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff,  and  on  July  14 
there  was  a  second  conference,  at  which 
Michaelis,  the  new  Chancellor,   was    present.* 

*  The  part  played  by  the  military  authorities  was 
kept  secret  until  January,  1918,  when  the  facts  were 
disclosed  by  the  Radical  Freisinnige  Zeilung. 


The  Resolution  ultimately  took  the  following 
form,  and  on  July  19  it  was  adopted  by  the 
Reichstag  by  212  votes  against  126  : 

As  on  August  4,  1914,  so  on  the  threshold  of  the 
fourth  year  of  war,  the  word  of  tho  Speech  from  the 
Throno  holds  good  for  the  German  people  :  "  We  are 
not  impelled  by  lust  of  conquest."  For  tho  defence 
of  her  freedom  and  independence,  for  the  integrity  of 
her  territorial  possessions  (terribiriales  Bestizntandea), 
Germany  took  up  arms. 

The  Reichstag  strives  for  a  peace  of  understanding 
and  of  permanent  reconciliation  of  tho  peoples.-  With 
such  a  peace  forced  acquisitions  of  territory  and  political, 
economic,  or  financial  oppressions  are  incompatible. 

The  Reichstag  also  rejects  all  schemes  which  aim  at 
economic  barriers  and  hostility  between  the  peoples 
(Absperrung  und  Verfeindnng)  after  the  war.  The 
freedom  of  the  seas  must  be  made  secure  (sichergestclU 
werden).  Only  economic  peace  will  prepare  the  ground 
for  a  friendly  intercourse  among  the  nations. 

The  Reichstag  will  actively  promote  the  creation  of 
international  law  organizations. 


MARSHAL    VON     HINDENBURG    IN    1917. 

So  long,  however,  as  the  enemy  Governments  do  not 
accept  such  a  peace,  so  long  as  they  threaten  Germany 
and  her  Allies  with  conquest  (Eroberung)  and  oppression 
(Vergewaltigung),  tho  German  nation  will  stand  together 
like  one  man,  and  unshakably  hold  out  and  fight  until 
its  own  and  its  allies'  right  to  life  and  development  is 
secured  (ge&ichert).  The  German  nation  is  invincible 
in  its  unity.  Tho  Reichstai?  knows  that  it  is  at  one  in 
this  statement  with  the  men  who  in  heroic  fights  are 
protecting  the  Fatherland.  The  imperishable  gratitude 
of  the  whole  people  is  assured  to  them. 

Comparison  of  the  final  text  with  drafts 
which  had  previously  been  published  show 
how  the  military  authorities   had  stiffened  it. 

)91— a 


800 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


The  phrase  "  territorial  possessions "  was 
substituted  for  words  (Besland)  which  would 
have  meant  the  German  Empire  alone.  The 
reference  to  the  Speech  from  the  Throne  in 
August,  1914,  was  made  explicit — in  order 
to  disavow  Bethmann's  famous  admjgsions 
and  pledges  about  Belgium,  in  his  ReTcTistag 
speech  of  August  4,  1914.  The  references  to 
H  freedom  of  the  seas  "  and  economic  "  hos- 
tility "  were,  greatly  strengthened.  Finally, 
the  whole  sense  of  the  original  Resolution  was 
altered  by  the  substitution  of  the  words  "  the 


with  the  Government  and  with'  the  military 
leaders,  who  had  entirely  controlled  the 
"  crisis."  The  facts  were,  indeed,  perfectly 
clear.  And  yet  the  ruse  had  a  remarkable 
success.  For  months  the  "  Reichstag  Peace 
Resolution,"  as  it  was  called,  affected  foreign 
opinion,  and  it  was  of  the  utmost  value  to  the 
German  Government  throughout  the  whole 
period  leading  up  to  the  dictation  of  terms  to 
the  Bolshevists. 

Herr  Michaelis  remained  Chancellor  for  three 
and  a  half  months — from  the  middle  of  July, 


SHORTAGE    OF    PAPER    IN    BERLIN  :   COLLECTING    WASTE    PAPER. 


German  nation  will  .  .  .  fight  until  its  own 
and  its  allies'  right  to  life  and  development  is 
secured,"  for  the  words  "  the  German  people 
is  determined  ...  to  hold  out  for  the  defence 
of  its  own  and  its  allies'  right  to  life  and  develop- 
ment." 

The  minority  which  voted  against  the 
Resolution  consisted  of  57  Conservatives,  5 
members  of  the  Centre  Party,  42  National 
Liberals,  and  22  Minority  Socialists.  Herr 
Haase,  the  lender  of  the  Socialist  Minority, 
explained  very  fully  that  the  Resolution  was  a 
meaningless  piece  of  hypocrisy,  and  that,  the 
Reichstag  was  in  reality  conniving  once  more 
at    the    policy    of   annexations,   in   conspiracy 


1917,  to  the  end  of  November.  Ho  we^s  utterly 
unfit  for  his  post.  His  ignorance  of  affairs, 
his  tactlessness,  and,  above  all,  the  fact  that 
he  had  merely  accepted  office  in  obedience  to 
orders,  as  a  soldier  accepts  a  command,  were 
very  clearly  shown.  "  Michaelis  and  I,"  said 
the  Kaiser  on  one  occasion,  "  must  become 
Siamese  twins,  like  Hindenburg  and  Luden- 
dorff."  But  that  partnership  was  never 
realized,  and  "  the  old  fox,"  as  Count  Hertling 
was  admiringly  described  in  Bavaria,  had  not 
long  to  wait  for  the  high  office  which  he  had 
momentarily  refused.  Michaelis's  failure  was 
the  more  remarkable  because  circumstances 
really  favoured  him.     The  hopelessness  of  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


301 


SHORTAGE    OF    WOOL    IN    GERMANY:    MAKING    BLANKETS    OF    NEWSPAPERS. 


Russian  offensive  showed  itself  immediately 
after  his  appointment,  and  in  Germany  there 
were  no  such  acute  difficulties  as  had  troubled 
Bethmann's  last  days.  The  only  important 
diplomatic  development  during  his  chancel- 
lorship was  favourable  to  German  schemings — 
the  Peace  Note  which  the  Pope  addressed  to  all 
belligerent  Powers  in  August.  But  Michaelis 
made  blunder  after  blunder,  and  was  at  no 
time  likely  to  establish  his  position.  When 
a  bungled  Government  conspiracy  brought 
him  into  conflict  with  the  German  naval 
authorities,  there  was  no  doubt  about  the 
result. 

Michaelis  met  the  Reichstag  on  July  19. 
Concerning  the  Prussian  franchise,  he  briefly 
stated  his  acceptance  of  the  Second  Rescript, 
of  July  11,  and  the  subject  did  not  seriously 
arise  again  during  his  chancellorship.  Con- 
cerning the  government  of  the  Empire,  he 
proposed  the  mild  measure  of  "  calling  to 
executive  positions  men  who,  in  addition  to 
their  personal  qualification  for  the  post  con- 
cerned, possess  ejso  the  full  confidence  of  the 
great  parties  in  the  popular  representative 
body."  "  I  will  not,"  he  boldly  affirmed, 
"  permit  the  conduct  of  affairs  to  be  taken 
from  my  hands."  The  "  conduct  of  affairs  " 
was  in  the  hands,  not  of  Michaelis,  but  of  his 


military  masters,  and  it  was  they  who  dictated 
the  following  passage  of  his  speech  : 

In  the  first  place,  tho  Fatherland's  territory  is  in- 
violable. With  an  enemy  who  approaches  us  with  the 
demand  to  take  from  us  German  territory  {Reichfjcbiel) 
we  cannot  negotiate.  When  we  make  peace  we  must 
primarily  achieve  that  the  frontiers  of  the  German 
Empire  shall  be  secured  for  all  time.  We  must  by 
way  of  agreement,  and  bargaining  guarantee  the  vital 
conditions  of  the  German  Empire  on  tho  Continent  and 
overseas.  The  peace  must  provide  the  basis  for  a 
lasting  reconciliation  of  the  nations.  It  must,  as  your 
resolution  puts  it,  prevent  the  further  creation  of 
hostility  among  the  nations  by  economic  barriers.  It 
must  provide  a  guarantee  that  the  armed  alliance  of 
oxir  enemies  shall  not  develop  into  an  economic  offensive 
alliance  against  us.  These  ends  are  attainable  within 
the  limits  of  your  resolution  as  1  understand  it. 

"  Your  resolution  as  I  understand  it  !  " 
Such  was  the  contemptuous  attitude  of  the 
Government  and  the  Army,  after  all  the  hag- 
gling and  argument.  Even  the  Reichstag 
majority  could  not  in  decency  refrain  from 
protest,  and  for  weeks  to  come  there  was  futile 
wrangling  about  the  Government's  attitude 
a.nd  the  degree  to  which  it  had,  or  had  not, 
endorsed  the  "  Peace  Resolution." 

At  the  beginning  of  August  the  Ministerial 
changes  were  announced.  Five  Prussian 
Ministers  who  in  the  Crown  Council  of  July  11 
had  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
reform  of  the  Prussian  franchise,  now  retired  ; 
they  were  Herr  von  Beseler,  Minister  of  Justice 


802 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Herr  von  Trott  zu  Solz,  Minister  of  Education, 
Baron  von  Schorlemer,  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
Herr  Lenze,  Minister  of  Finance,  and  Herr  von 
Loebell,  Minister  of  the  Interior.  A  few- 
reactionary  deputies  were  given  minor  offices, 
and  the  Food  Controller,  Herr  von  Bfttocki — 
with  whom  Michaelis  had  had  many  quarrels — 
gave   place   to   Herr  von   Waldow.     More   in- 


HERR    VON    KUHLMANN, 
Appointed  German   Foreign   Secretary  July,  1917. 

teresting  was  the  removal  of  Herr  Zimmermann 
from  the  Secretaryship  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  the  appointment  of  Herr  von 
Kiihlmann  to  succeed  him.  Kuhlmann  had 
been  for  many  years  before  the  war  Counsellor 
of  the  German  Embassy  in  London,  and  he 
had  undoubtedly  been  very  largely  responsible 
for  the  policy  which  led  to  the.  war.  Clever, 
ambitious  and  unscrupulous  to  a  degree,  he  had 
hitherto  taken  care  to  avoid  full  responsibility  ; 
he  was  now  to  play  a  very  prominent  part  in 
the  diplomacy  of  the  war,  and  much  more  will 
be  heard  of  him  in  these  -pages.  He  had  for  a 
time  been  German  Minister  at  The  Hague — a 
convenient  post  for  observation  of  England, 
and,  since  November,  1916,  he  had  been  German 
Ambassador  in  Constantinople. 

The  Michaelis  Chancellorship  was  essentially 
a  period  of  transition,  during  which  Kiihlmann 
was  feeling  his  way  in  foreign  policy,  while 
Russia  was  unhappily  going  from  bad  to  worse. 


Michaelis,  in  so  far  as  he  had  any  policy  of  his 
owrn,  was  more  reactionary  than  Bethmann 
Hollweg,  and  if  he  had  been  able  to  establish 
his  position  ho  would  pretty  certainly  have 
been  disposed  to  rely  upon  Conservative  sup- 
port. When  he  paid  his  official  visit  to  Vienna 
in  August,  the  Austrians,  according  to  the 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  observed  with  relief  that 
he  "by  no  means  justified  the  fears  aroused 
by  the  firmness  of  his  countenance  ;  instead  of 
appearing  as  an  iron-eater  and  a  man  of  extreme 
severity,  he  .  .  .  declared  an  honourable  peace 
by  agreement  to  bo  the  best  thing  to  aim  at." 
But  after  a  few  weeks'  experience  the  Conserva- 
tives wore  pretty  confident  that  Michaelis  was 
on  their  side.  At  the  end  of  August  Count 
Schwerin,  President  of  the  Lower  House  of  the 
Prussian  Diet,  described  Michaelis  as  a  "  good 
Prussian  "  and  "  a  fighter  by  nature,  who  would 
never  lose  sight  of  his  fixed  goal."  The  new 
Chancellor  apparently  intended  to  get  round 
tho  terms  of  the  franchise  rescript,  and  his 
general  point  of  view  was  accurately  explained 
by  Count  Schwerin  as  follows  : — 

As  a  result  of  the  horrible  pessimist  campaign  of 
Erzborger,  Scheidemann  and  others,  which  Bethmann 
did  not  know  how  to  oppose  effectively,  the  Reichstag 
majority  had  succumbed  to  a  complete  nervous  collapse. 
In  these  circumstances  the  new  Chancellor  had  to  avoid, 
at  any  rate,  the  worst  impression  which  this  pusillanimity 
on  tho  part  of  the  Reichstag,  although  it  by  no  means 
corresponded  with  feeling  in  the  country,  was  bound 
to  produce  abroad.  Whether  he  liked  it  or  not,  the 
hew  Chancellor  had,  therefore,  to  satisfy  himself  with 
making  the  manifestation  as  harmless  and  unimportant 
as  possible.  But  ho  was  entitled  to  say  to  himself 
that  after  a  few  weeks — after  new  successes  for  German 
arms,  and  when  the  greatest  food  difficulties  had  been 
overcome — feeling  in  tho  country  would  of  itself  prove 
to  be  quite  different  from  tho  feeling  which  Erzborger 
and  Scheidemann  had  described  in  the  Reichstag  ;  and 
so,  in  view  of  Germany's  military  achievements,  the 
Reichstag  demonstration  would  soon  be  forgotten. 

After  a  conference  with  the  Emperor  and  tho 
military  authorities,  Herr  Michaelis  proceeded 
at  the  end  of  August  to  set  up  a  so-called  "  free 
committee,"  consisting  of  seven  members  of 
the  Reichstag  and  seven  members  of  the 
Federal  Council,  which  was  to  be  consulted  on 
broad  issues  of  policy,  especially  concerning 
war  aims,  and  to  be  advertised  as  a  movement 
towards  "  democratisation."  This  committee 
was  actually  consulted  to  some  extent  concern- 
ing the  reply  to  the  Pope's  Peace  Note,  but  it 
soon  disappeared,  and  the  innovation  had  no 
practical  effect  whatever.  The  reply  to  the 
Pope  was  described  by  Herr  von  Kiihlmanii,  in 
a  speech  in  the  Main  Committee  of  the  Reichstag 
on  September  28,  as  "  a  well-cemented  structure 
in  which  stone  is  so  fi.  m!y  clamped  to  stone  that 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


303 


any.  attempt  to  break  out  a  single  stone,  or,  in 
other  words,  to  make  detailed  comment,  would 
only  weaken  its  effect."  The  object,  as  Herr 
von  Kiihlmann  more  truly  observed,  was  "  to 
create  atmosphere."  German  policy  was  once 
more  surrounded  with  a  cloud  of  vague  generali- 
ties, combined  with  an  impudent  eulogy  of  tho 
Kaiser's  devotion  to  peace  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  his  reign.* 

By  the  beginning  of  October  reports  began 
to  appear  in  Pan -German  journals  that  the 
Chancellor's  "  health "  was  unsatisfactory. 
His  fall  was  imminent,  and  although  he  re- 
mained in  office  for  another  month  it  was  only 
on  sufferance.  It  was  not  understood  at  the 
time  in  England  and  other  Entente  countries 
that — so  far  from  any  real  change  of  spirit, 
taking  place  in  Germany — reaction  and  militar- 
ism were  more  powerful  than  ever.  The 
Michaelis  "  crisis  "  arose  immediately  from  tho 
fact  that  the  Pan-Germans  and  Junkers,  more 
arrogant  and  confident  than  they  had  been  at 
any   time   since   the   first   stages   of   the   war, 

*  The  text  of  the  Pope's  Note,  of  the  German  reply, 
of  a  separate  reply  which  was  sont  by  Bavaria,  and  of 
President  Wilson's  reply,  are  printed  in  full  at  the  end 
of  the  prosent  chapter.  The  Governments  of  the 
Allies,  while  associating  themselves  informally  with 
President  Wilson's  action,  left  the  Pope's  Note  unan- 
swered. 


selected  this  moment  for  a  general  assault  on 
the  "  Peace  Resolution  "  policy  of  the  Reichstag 
and  upon  the  Socialist  Minority — the  only 
genuine  democratic  force  in  the  country. 
Michaelis  lacked  the  necessary  experience  and 
ability  for  dealing  with  such  a  situation.  He 
was  incapable  even  of  expressing  himself 
clearly  in  the  Reichstag  ;  on  several  occasions 
his  speeches  had,  after  delivery,  to  be  altered 
for  publication,  and  on  at  least  one  occasion 
the  foreign  telegraph  service  had  to  be  sus- 
pended in  order  to  prevent  transmission  of  his 
indiscretions.  During  the  first  week  in  October 
the  Reichstag  debated  the  subject  of  Pan- 
German  propaganda  in  the  Army.  It  wan 
shown  that,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Father- 
land Party,  to  which  further  reference  will  be 
made,  the  Pan-Germans  were  rapidly  obtaining 
control  of  the  whole  organization  of  lectures  and 
entertainments  for  the  troops,  and  were  spread- 
ing the  most  violent  forms  of  military  doctrine 
and  denunciation  of  Parliament — -the  "  rabble  " 
and  "  traitors  "  who  in  the  Reichstag  dared  to 
talk  of  "  peace."  Criticism  was  largely  directed 
against  Herr  Helfferich,  the  very  unpopular 
Vice-Chancellor.  Instead  of  making  such  easy 
concessions  as  would  have  satisfied  the  wounded 
pride  of  the  Reichstag,  Herr  Michaelis  allowed 
himself  to  be  involved  in  an  absurd  attempt 


HINDENBURG'S    SEVENTIETH     BIRTHDAY,    OCTOBER     1,    1917. 
School  children  scattering  flowers  in  the  path  of  the  Field-Marshal. 


304 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


to  turn  the  tables  upon  the  Socialists,  and  to 
represent  "  revolutionary  "  propaganda  in  the 
Xavy  as  far  more  serious  than  any  Pan- 
German  propaganda  in  the  Army.  On  October 
9  a  Minority  Socialist  named  Dittmann  raised 
the  question  of  violent  measures  which  had. been 
adopted  by  the  naval  authorities  for  tnff  sup 


HERREN     SCHEIDEMANN     AND     EBERT, 
Leaders  of  the  Socialist  Majority. 

pression    of    Socialist    opinion,    and    he    asked 

whether  it  was  true  that  many  sailors  had  been 

sentenced  to  long  periods  of  penal  servitude, 

and  that  sailors  had  even  been  shot  "  because 

they  held  Socialist  opinions."     Thereupon  the 

Chancellor,  after  a  warm  defence  of  patriotic 

propaganda  in  the  Army,  called  upon  Admiral 

von  Capelle,  Tirpitz's  successor  as  Secretary  of 

State  for  the  Navy.     Capelle  made  the  following 

statement : — 

I  mast  inform  you  of  the  lamentable  fact  that  the 
Russian  Revolution  has  turned  the  heads  of  some  few 
people  on  board  our  fleet,  and  swollen  revolutionary 
ideas  within  them.  The  crazy  plan  of  these  few  people 
w&i  to  win  confidential  agents  on  all  ships  in  order  to 
mislead  the  whole  crew  into  disobeying  orders,  and, 
in  this  way,  in  case  of  necessity  with  the  use  of  force, 
to  cripple  the  fleet  and  compel  and  enforce  peace.  It  is 
the  fact  that  those  people  had  relations  with  tho  Inde- 
pendent Socialist  Party.  (Uproar.  Dittmann  :  "  Prove 
it.")  It  is  established  by  documents  that  the  chiof 
agitator  explained  the  plans  here  in  the  Reichstag 
building  in  the  rooms  of  the  Independent  Social-Demo- 
cratic Party  to  the  deputies  Herron  Dittmann,  Haase, 
and  Vogtherr,  who  approved  of  them.  (Tumultuous 
shouts  of  "  Shamo  !  "  from  the  Right.)  (Uproar  on  the 
extreme  Left,  shouts  of  "  Transparent  swindle "  and 
"  Incredible")  The  deputies  pointed  out  tho  dangers 
of  such  procedure  and  advised  the  greatest  caution, 
but  promised  their  full  support  by  the  supply  of  seditious 
material  for  tho  incitement  of.  the  fleet.  (Repeated 
shouts  of  "-Shame!"  from  Right.)  In  view  of  this 
situation,  itlfas  my  first  duty  to  prevent,  as  far  as  was 
in  my  power,  that  the  promised  material  should  find 
access  to  the  fjeet.  I  therefore  instructed  the  naval 
authorities  concerned  to  prevent  by  all  means  the  circu- 
lation of  this  material.  (Applause.)  As  regards 
subsequent  ocotfrrmces  in  tho  fleot  I  can  make  no 
statement  here.  A  few  unprincipled  and  disloyal 
persons  who  committed  a  severe  offence  havo  met  tho 
fate  they  deserved,  but  nevertheless  I  want  to  stale 
from   a   public   platform    that    the   rumours    which   are 


current,  and  naturally  also  came  to  my  knowledge, 
are  immensoly  exaggerated.  The  preparedness  of  the 
fleet  was  not  in  doubt  a  single  moment,  and  thus  it  shall 
continue  to  be.     (Applause.) 

The  truth  was  that  the  Government  had 
seized  the  opportunity  to  exploit,  for  its 
apparent  political  advantage,  some  compara- 
tively insignificant  disturbances  which  had 
taken  place  at  Wilhelmshaven  at  least  six 
weeks  previously.  Marvellous  stories  were 
published  of  a  wide-spread  "  mutiny,"  in  which 
many  German  officers  were  supposed  to  have 
been  murdered ;  lurid  details  were  freely 
borrowed  from  the  terrible  experiences  in  the 
Russian  Baltic  and  Black  Sea  fleets.  The  only 
established  facts  were  that  two  German  sailors 
had  been  convicted  respectively  of  mutiny  and 
incitement  to  mutiny.  One  of  them,  named 
Reichnitz,  was  sentenced  to  death  on  August  30 
and  shot  on  September  5.  It  may  be  added 
that  the  naval  authorities,  so  far  from  taking 
the  view  of  the  "  mutiny  "  which  Capelle  now 
thought  fit  to  take,  had  been  chiefly  concerned 
to  conceal  the  execution  of  the  unfortunate 
Socialist  sailor,  and  it  was  only  by  accident 
that  his  parents  were  informed  of  his  fate. 

Even  the  Government  soon  discovered  that 
it   could  not  carry  through  its  political  con- 


^F/^EH/  I 

^^•\^5 

) 

\          '  Of 

\ 



-_a- . 1 

[From  "Der  WdtS} inert." 
HAIG-SISYPHUS. 
A  German  view  of  the  British  offensives. 

spiracy,  and  that  the  attempt  to  convict  the 
whole  Socialist  Minority  of  high  treason  was  a 
failure.  The  Chancellor  let  it  be  said  that 
Admiral  von  Capelle  had  exceeded  his  instruc- 
tions, and  it  was  announced  that  Capelle  had 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


305 


sent  in  his  resignation.  But  it  was  Michaelis, 
not  Capello,  who  was  to  be  sacrificed.  For  tho 
second  time  the  Kaisor  offered  tho  Chancellor- 
ship to  Count  Hertling.  Hertling,  according  to 
his  own  subsequent  account  (see  \>.  298), 
regarded  tho  political  situation  as  "  extremely 
complicated,"  and  the  circumstances  as  "  still 
more  difficult  "  than  when  he  had  refused  office 
in  July.  He  asked  time  for  consideration,  and 
then  made  his  acceptance  conditional  upon  his 
ability  to  reach  a  modus  vivendi  with  tho 
Reichstag  Majority.  Hertling  knew  very  well 
that  the  Reichstag  Majority  only  desired  to 
save  its  face,  and  his  chief  difficulty  was  to 
reconcile  any  bargaining  with  the  Reichstag  at 
all  with  his  own  reactionary  convictions  and 
tho  reactionary  basis  tipon  which  he  meant  to 
build  his  policy — whatever  "  Liberal  "  facade 
he  might  find  it  necessary  to  put  upon  tho 
structure.  "  All  my  life  long,"  he  said  in 
defending  himself  against  subsequent  Conserva- 
tive criticism,  "  I  have  been  a  decided  Monarch- 
ist, and  as  a  Monarchist  I  will  die.  I  repudiate 
just  as  absolutely  tho  suggestion  that  I  am 
giving  my  hand  to  the  exercise  of  any  influence 
upon  the  federal  character  of  the  Empire."  As 
a  matter  of  fact  Hertling's  negotiations — 
although  prolonged,  and  ultimately  concluded 
only  by  the  intervention  of  Herr  von  Kiihlmann 
— were     extremely     successful.     While     Herr 

Michaelis  was  still  in  office,  the  Centre  Party, 
National     Liberals,     Radicals     and     Majority 

Socialists,  addressed  the  following  commu- 
nication   to    the    Kaiser,     through     his    Civil 

Cabinet : — 

Should  His  Majesty  tho  Kaiser  dotermine  upon  a 
change  of  Chancellors,  it  is  of  service  to  the  highest 
interest  of  the  State  that  a  complete  guarantee  should 
be  provided  for  tranquil  development  of  domestic 
policy  until  the  end  of  tho  war.  Only  so  can  the  soli- 
darity be  established  which  is  imperatively  needed  by 
the  people  in  arms  and  at  home.  The  way  to  this 
goal  is  a  sincere  agreement  about  the  foreign  and  domestic 
policy  of  tho  Empire  until  the  end  of.  the  war.  Tho 
domestic  difficulties  of  reC3nt  months  must  bo  attributed 
to  tho  lack  of  such  an  agreement.  Wo,  therefore,  pray 
His  Majesty  tho  Kaiser,  before  arriving  at  his  decision, 
to  instruct  the  personage  selected  for  the  Chancellorship 
to  enter  into  conversations  with  tho  Reichstag. 

To  the  timid  German  politicians  this  mild 
prayer  seemed  to  be  action  of  unparalleled 
audacity,  and  the  letter  was  carefully  concealed 
for  somo  months.*  What  it  really  meant  was 
that  the  Reichstag  was  quite  ready  to  give 
binding  pledges  of  good  behaviour  for  the  whole 
duration   of  the   war,   in   return   for   perfectly 

*  Tho  document  was  published  by  the  Radical  leader, 
Herr  Conrad  Haussmann,  in  January  1918.  (Frank- 
Jurttr  Zeilung,  January  7,  1918.) 


harmless  concessions.  Naturally  tho  Kaiser 
and  Hertling,  while  displaying  reluctance, 
accepted  the  proposals.  The  terms  of  the  bar- 
gain were  clear.  On  tho  one  hand — although 
the  Reichstag  Resolution  of  July  19  was  not 
openly  disavowed ;  it  still  had  its  uses  in 
enemy    countries — Hertling    pledged    himself, 


ADMIRAL    VON    CAPELLE, 

Tirpitz's  successor   as    Secretary   of  State  for   the 

Navy. 

not  to  the  Reichstag  Resolution,  but  to  the 
vague  generalities  of  the  German  reply  to  the 
Pope.  Secondly,  he  consented  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  Herr  Friedberg,  a  chauvinist  National 
Liberal,  to  be  Vice-President  of  the  Prussian 
Ministry,  and  of  Herr  von  Payer,  the  Wiirtem- 
berg  Radical  leader,  to  be  Vice-Chancellor. 
Oh  the  other  hand,  the  Reichstag  Majority 
formally  agreed  to  prevent  all  serious  debate  on 
foreign  or  domestic  affairs,  to  confine  itself  to 
brief  statements  in  support  of  Count  Hertlinsr's 


30f> 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


COUNT    HERTLING, 
Appointed   Imperial  Chancellor  November  1,  1917. 


policy,  and  then  to  vote  supplies  with  the  utmost 
possible  speed.  Any  parties  which  might 
attempt  to  go  outside  the  agreed  programme 
were  to  be  voted  down  "  until  after  the  war." 
Finally,  the  next  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  was 
"  to  display  to  foreign  countries  and  to  Ger- 
many   a    picture    of    national     unity."     The 


Reichstag  had  been  effectually  muzzled,  and 
on  November  1  Count  Hertling  was  formally 
appointed  Imperial  Chancellor  and  Minister 
President  of  Prussia. 

Thus  for  the  second  time  in  the  history  of 
the    German   Empire   the   offices    of    Imperial 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


307 


DR.     FRIEDBERG, 

Vice-President    of   the    Prussian     Ministry     under 

Hertling. 

Chancellor  and  Minister-President  of  Prussia 
were  filled  by  a  Bavarian.  Prince  Hohenlohe, 
when  he  succeeded  Caprivi  in  1894,  was  75 
years  of  age ;  Count  Hertling,  the  seventh 
Chancellor,  was  in  his  75th  year.  There  was 
a  great  difference  between  the  circumstances 
and  meaning  of  the  two  appointments.  Hohen- 
lohe had  regarded  the  creation  of  the  German 
Empire  as  a  liberal  gain,  and  to  the  best  of 
his  ability  had  represented  "  South  German 
Liberalism  "  against  the  Prussian  Junkers  and 
their  firm  ally,  the  Catholic  Centre  Party. 
Hertling  had  for  years  been  the  leader  of  the 
Centre  Party  in  the  Reichstag,  and  he  had 
fought  all  his  life  against  "  Liberalism  " — even 
in  opposition  to  South  German  Catholicism. 
Hertling  was  born  at  Darmstadt  in  1843,  and 
for  13  years,  from  1867  to  1880,  he  was  a  mere 
Privatdozent  at  Bonn  University,  his  promotion 
admittedly  being  impeded  by  his  strongly 
ultramontane  views.  In  1880  he  became  a 
Professor  at  Munich.  He  had  then  already 
been  a  member  of  the  Reichstag  for  some  years, 
and  he  succeeded  Dr.  Lieber  as  chairman  of 
the  Centre  Party,  which  he  dominated  until 
1912,  when  he  became  Minister  President  of 
Bavaria.  Hertling  had  an  unrivalled  know- 
ledge and  experience  of  German  politics  and 
German  intrigue  ;  but  above  all  he  had  for 
nearly  40  years  been  the  chief,  although  un- 
official,   representative    of    Germany    at     the 


Vatican.  For  a  generation  he  had  conducted 
every  important  German  negotiation  with  the 
Pope.  His  appointment  to  the  Chancellorship 
was,  in  the  existing  situation,  very  natural. 
He  had  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  foreign  affairs 
to  avoid  elementary  blunders  and  to  speak  with 
at  least  an  appearance  of  authority  ;  the  selec- 
tion of  a  Bavarian  was  congenial  to  the  non- 
Prussian  States  ;  and,  most  important  of  all, 
he  could  command  the  Centre  Party  in  the 
Reichstag  and  so  make  it  pretty  certain  that 
in  all  circumstances  the  Government  should 
command  a  Parliamentary  majority.  Accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  he  could  either  keep 
together  the  so-called  "  Reichstag  Majority," 
which  consisted  of  practically  the  whole  Reich- 
stag except  the  Conservatives  on  the  extreme 
Right  and  the  Socialist  Minority  on  the  extreme 
Left  :  or,  if  it  appeared  desirable  to  drive  the 
Radicals  and  Majority  Socialists  into  opposition, 
he  could  rely  upon  the  Centre  Party,  Conserva- 
tives and  National  Liberals.  In  the  event, 
Hertling  had  not  the  slightest  difficulty,  during 
the  period  reviewed  in  this  chapter,  in  keeping 
the  "  Reiclistag  Majority  "  together.  Every- 
thing combined  to  ease  the  situation.  First 
the  striking  military  success  of  the  invasion  of 
Italy,  and  then  the  collapse  of  Russia,  the 
dictation   of    "  peace "    in   the   Ep.st,   and   the 


HERR    VON    PAYER, 
German  Vice-Chancellor  under   Hertlintf. 


808 


THE    TIMES    HlnTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


proparation  for  a  great  onslaught  upon  tho 
Western  Powers,  favoured  reaction  in  Germany. 
The  controversies  which  remained  from  the 
Bethmann  "  crisis  "  in  July  and  the  Michaelis 
"  crisis "  in  October  lingered  on.  But  such 
trouble  as  there  was  was  superficial  arntaiinreal. 


[From  "  Lustige  Biallx." 

"THE    TOBOGGAN." 

The  Reichstag  which,  while  the  outlook  was 
anxious  and  uncertain,  had  clamoured  so  loudly 
for  a  share  in  the  determination  of  policy,  had 
no  share  in  the  policy  ultimately  pursued  by 
Kiihlmann  and  tho  Army  leaders  against  Russia 
— no  share  except  to  approve  and  to  apjjlaud. 
Yet  incessant  debates  served  to  keep  up 
democratic  appearances,  and  to  provide  material 
for  "  pacifism  "  in  enemy  countries. 

As  for  the  interminable  Prussian  franchise 
question,  the  Government  at  the  end  of  Novem- 
ber introduced  three  "  Reform "  Bills  in  tho 
Prussian  Diet.  First,  a  Franchise  Bill  fulfilled, 
in  the  letter,  the  Kaiser's  promises  of  a  secret, 
direct  and  universal  franchise,  although  the 
franchise  was  carefully  hedged  about  and  there 
was  to  be  no  redistribution  of  seats.  Secondly, 
the  franchise  concession  was  balanced  by  an 
extraordinarily  reactionary  Bill  concerning  the 
composition  of  the  Upper  House,  carefully 
devised  to  secure  and  entrench  Junkor  domina- 
tion. A  third  Bill  went  still  farther,  by  enabling 
the  LTpper  House  to  interfere  in  tho  control  of 
finance.  These  measures  provided  the  politi- 
cians and  the  Press  with  harmless  occupation 


during  the  winter.  Their  progress  was  blocked 
and  hampered  at  every  turn,  and  little  progress 
was  made  with  them,  although  it  became  clear 
that  the  Government  intended  ultimately  to 
obtain  legislation  of  some  sort — postponing  it 
as  long  as  possible,  in  order  in  the  end  to  grant 
it  as  a  gracious  reward  to  a  "  victorious  " 
people. 

In  his  first  Reichstag  speech,  on  November 
29,  Count  Hertling  was  able  not  only  to  dilate 
upon  the  successes  against  Italy  but  to  announce 
the  Bolshevist  proposal  of  an  armistice  and  a 
"  general  peace."  He  stated  his  policy 
thus : — 

Our  war  aims  from  the  first  day  onwards  were  the 
defence  of  the  Fatherland,  the  inviolability  of  its  territory, 
nndthe  freedom  and  independence  of  its  economic  life.  On 
that  account  we  could  greet,  cheerfully  the  peace  appeal 
of  the  Pope.  The  spirit  in  which  the  answer  to  the 
Papal  Note  was  given  is  still  alive  to-day,  but  this 
answer  signifies  no  licence  for  a  criminal  lengthening  of 
the  war.  For  the  continuation  of  the  terrible  saughtor 
and  the  destruction  of  irreplaceable  works  of  eivilizatior, 
for  the  mad  self-mutilation  of  Europe,  the  enemy  alone 
bears  the  responsibility,  and  will  have  also  to  bear  tho 
consequences.  .  .  . 

The  German  watchword  must  be — to  wait,  to  endure, 
to  hold  out.  We  trust  in  God,  our  righteous  cause,  our 
great  army  leaders.  We  trust  in  our  fighters  on  the 
land,  on  the  sea,  and  in  the  air.  We  trust  in  the  spirit 
and  the  moral  strength  of  our  people  at  home.  The 
Army  and  the  country,  in  harmonious  cooperation,  will 
win  victory. 

At  the  end  of  January,  1918,  Hertling  em- 
barked upon  an  elaborately  hypocritical  reply 
to  a  speech  in  which  President  Wilson  had 
sketched  "  fourteen  points  "  of  peace  policy. 
He  expressed  amiable  devotion  to  the  principle 
of  open  diplomacy  and  abolition  of  secret 
agreements,  a  readiness  to  discuss  limitation  of 
armaments  "  after  the  war,"  and  a  positive 
enthusiasm  for  "  freedom  of  the  seas  " — especi- 
ally if  "  claims  to  strongly  fortified  naval  bases 
on  important  internp.tional  routes,  such  as 
England  maintains  at  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Aden, 
Hong-Kong,  on  the  Falkland  Islands,  and  at 
many  other  points,  wore  renounced  "  !  For  the 
rest,  it  will  suffice  to  record  Hertling' s  insolent 
statements  concerning  Russia,  Belgium  and 
Franco : — 

The  Entente  States  having  refused  to  join  in  the 
negotiations  within  the  period  agreed  upon  by  Russia 
and  the  four  allied  Powers,  I  must  decline,  in  the  name 
of  the  latter,  any  subsequent  interference.  The  question 
here  involved  is  one  which  alone  concerns  Russia  and 
the  four  allied  Powers.  I  cherish  the  hope  that,  under 
the  conditions  of  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  self- 
determination  for  the  nations  within  the  western 
boundaries  of  the  former  Russian  Empire,  it  will  be 
possible  to  be  in  good  relations  with  these  nations 
as  well  as  with  the  rest  of  Russia,  for  whom  we  urgently 
wish  a  return  of  guar  mtees  which  will  secure  a  peaceful 
order  of  things  and  the  welfare  of  the  country  .  .  . 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


309 


As  far  as  the  Belgian  question  is  concerned,  it  has 
been  declared  repeatedly  by  my  predecessors  in  office 
that  at  no  time  during  the  war  has  the  forcible  annexa- 
tion of  Belgium  by  the  German  Empire  formed  a  point 
in  the  programme  of  Gorman  politics.  The  Belgian 
question  belong.*  to  a  complexity  of  questions,  the 
details  of  which  will  have  to  be  regulated  during  the 
peace  negotiations.  As  long  as  our  enemies  do  not 
unreservedly  adopt  the  attitude  that  the  integrity  of 
the  territory  of  the  Allies  offers  the  only  possible  founda- 
tion for  peace  negotiations  I  must  adhere  to  the  stand- 
point which,  up  to  the  present,  has  always  been  taken, 
and  must  decline  any  discussion  of  the  Belgian  question 
until  the  general  discussion  takes  place.  .  .  .    • 

The  occupied  parts  of  France  are  a  valuable  pawn 
in  our  hands.  Here  also  forcible  annexation  forms  no 
part  of  the  official  German  policy.  The  conditions 
and  mode  of  the  evacuation,  which  must  take  into 
c.m^ideration  the  vital  interests  of  Germany,  must  be 
agreed  between  Germany  and  France.  I  can  only  once 
again  expressly  emphasize  that  there  can  never  be 
any  question  of  the  separation  of  the  Imperial  Pro- 
vinces. We  will  never  permit  ourselves  to  be  robbed 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  our  enemies  under  the  pretext 
of  any  fine  phrases- — of  Alsace-Lorraine  which,  in  the 
meantime,  has  become  more  and  more  closely  allied 
internally  with  German  life,  which  is  developing  more 
and  more  economically  in  a  highly  satisfactory  manner, 
and  where  more  than  87  per  cent,  of  the  people  speak 
the  German  mother  tongue. 

It  was  at  this  time  a  feature  of  the  policy 
of  the  Central  Powers  to  allow  Austria-Hungary 
to  employ  tones  milder  than  those  of  Berlin, 
and  Count  Czernin,  the  Austrian  Foreign 
Minister,  speaking  on  the  same  day  as  Hertling, 
and  in  collusion  with  him,  expressed  sentiments 
which  were  thought  to  be  to  some  extent  more 
attractive  to  the  Allien  and  especially  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson.  But  the  intrigue  was  too  obvious, 
aid  although  the  exchange  of  speeches  con- 


tinued incessantly,  the  real  situation  remained 
unchanged  at  the  end  of  three  and  a  half  years 
of  war. 

As  has  been  said,  the  German  Government 
made  a  great  effort  during  the  summer  of  1917 
to  promote  an  International  Socialist  Confer- 
ence. After  the  rejection  of  the  official  Ger- 
man "  peace  offer  "  at  the  end  of  1916,  it  was 
the  policy  of  Berlin  to  reach  enemy  countries 
through  any  or  every  "  international  "  channel 
— Socialist,  religious,  humanitarian,  or  even 
financial.  The  object  was  to  create  "  peace 
atmosphere,"  to  promote  peace  talk,  and  to 
weaken  the  enemy's  "  home  front."  There 
were  many  attractions  about  the  idea  of  a 
Socialist  conference.  There  was  a  genuine 
desire  in  honest  Labour  circles  everywhere  to 
keep  alive  the  idea  of  the  international  solidarity 
of  Labour.  Secondly,  it  was. well  known  in 
Berlin  that  British  and  French  opinion  was 
deeply  sympathetic  to  the  liberation  of  Russia, 
so  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  counter  any 
German  plan  which  could  be  pursued  in  the 
name  of  the  Russian  Revolution.  Again,  it 
admirably  suited  the  German  Government 
to  conceal  its  aims  and  policy  behind  an 
apparently  open-minded  cooperation  with 
Labour.  In  the  German  Socialist  Majority  the 
German  Government  had  an  .excellent  and 
trustworthy  tool. 

It  has  been  seon  (Vol.  IX.,  p.  374)  that  in 


ELEPHANTS     FROM     THE     BERLIN     ZOOLOGICAL     GARDENS     AT    WORK     FOR    THE 

FATHERLAND 


310 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


vas»t 
sfher 


March,  1916,  there  was  an  open  "split"  in 
the  Socialist  Party,  and  that  18  influential 
Socialists,  led  by  Herr  Haase,  broke  away  and 
formed  the  "  Social  Democratic  Labour  Union." 
The  popular  success  of  this  movement  wasj 
once  considerable,  especially  in  Berlin  and  i 
large  towns,  and  all  efforts  to  reunite  the  Party 
failed.  In  September,  1916,  a  conference  of  all 
the  Socialists  was  held  in  Berlin,  the  "  Labour 
Union "  taking  part  under  protest,  and  the 
official  party  adopting  a  resolution  in  favour  of 
continued  support  of  Germany's  "  defensive 
war."  The  official  leaders  then  proceeded  to 
annex  for  the  purposes  of  their  policy  practically 
the  whole  Socialist  Press,  which  had  hitherto, 
for  the  most  part,  adopted  the  attitude  of  the 
"  Labour  Union  "  ;  the  Berlin  Vorwdrts,  for 
example,  rapidly  became  hardly  distinguish- 
able from  any :  ordinary  organ  of  the  Gorman 
Government.  In  January,  1917,  the  "Labour 
Union "  held  a  rival  conference  in  Berlin, 
and  adopted  resolutions  which  denounced 
German  Socialist  policy  since  the  outbreak 
of  war  and  demanded  international  cooperation 
in  the  interest  of  "  a  peace  by  agreement,  in 
which  there  shall  be  neither  victors  nor  van- 
quished." The  official  party  committee  there- 
upon announced  that  the  members  of  the 
"  Labour  Union  "  had  "  separated  themselves 
from  the  Socialist  Party  "  ;  in  fact,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  "  Labour  Union  "  were  formally 
expelled.  The  gulf  between  the  two  groups 
then  widened  rapidly.  The  "  Labour  Union  " 
members  of  the  Reichstag  drew  up  an  inde- 
pendent political  programme,  which  they 
presented  to  the  Reichstag,  in  the  form  of  a 
motion,  at  the  end  of  March.  During  the 
first  week  in  April  the  "  Labour  Union " 
convened  a  conference  at  Gotha,  and  the  new 
party  was  then  formally  constituted  under  the 
name  of  "  Independent  Social  Democratic 
Party  of  Germany."  The  old  party  and  the 
new  party  were,  however,  commonly  known  as 
"  the  Majority  "  and  "  the  Minority  " — without 
regard  to  their  actual  strength  in  the  country. 
The  future  alone  could  show  whether  the 
"  Minority  "  Socialists,  led  by  Haase,  Bernstein, 
Ledebour  and  Kautsky,  could  establish  any 
really  effective  opposition  to  the  German 
Government.  During  the  period  now  under 
review  the  new  party  formed  a  not  unimportant 
rallying  point  for  what  remained  of  genuine 
Socialism.  But  events  for  the  time  favoured 
the  militarists,  and  the  Socialist  Majority,  under 
Ebert    and    Scheidemann,    having    seized    the 


whole  machinery  of  the  old  Socialist  Party, 
and  enjoying  the  thinly  veiled  support  of  the 
Government,  was  able  to  continue  its  support 
of  the  war  without  shedding  the  last  pretence 
of  cherishing  "  international  "  ideals.  A  sham 
Socialism  could  continue  to  be,  in  a  phrase 
of  Herr  Bernstein's,  "  the  Government's  train- 
bearer."  And,  unfortunately,  there  were  al- 
ways some  dishonest  minds  at  work  abroad 
ready  to  represent  to  the  Entente  peoples  that 
Herr  Scheidemann's  base  coins  were  really 
hard  cash. 

Almost  from  the  beginning  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  the  "  Government  Socialists " 
cherished  the  idea  of  profitable  contact  with 
the  Revolutionaries.  They  were  greatly  as- 
sisted by  the  fact  that,  during  April,  1917, 
strikes  broke  out  among  munition  workers  in 
Berlin  and  other  large  centres.  To  some  extent 
the  movement  was  due  to  the  "  infection  "  of 
events  in  Russia,  but  the  chief  cause  of  trouble 
was  shortage  of  food,  and  the  Government 
deliberately  made  the  situation  worse  by  a 
sudden  reduction  of  the  bread  ration,  which 
was  subsequently  found  to  have  been  quite 
unnecessary.  The  strikes  were,  in  any  case, 
a  mere  demonstration,  and  they  were  stopped 
at  once  by  drastic  military  threats.  But  they 
served  as  an  additional  excuse  for  the  Russians 
to  enter  into  relations  with  their  "  German 
brothers."  The  introductory  negotiations  were 
conducted  by  a  Danish  Socialist,  M.  Borgbjerg, 
who  conveyed  messages  and  suggestions  from 
Herr  Scheidemann  and  his  fellow  conspirators 
to  M.  Kerensky  in  Petrograd.  The  subsequent 
proceedings  were  conducted  under  the  auspices 
of  a  Dutch-Scandinavian  Committee,  the  lead- 
ing parts  being  played  by  the  Dutch  Socialist, 
Mr.  Troelstra,  and  M.  Camille  Huysmans,  who, 
although  a  Belgian  subject,  preferred  his  office 
as  Secretary-General  of  the  defunct  Socialist 
Internationale  to  the  more  obvious  duties  of  a 
Belgian  citizen.  On  the  other  hand,  the  desiro 
for  peace  and  the  desire  to  restore  the  inter- 
national solidarity  of  Labour  won  the  sympathy 
of  the  Ententophil  Swedish  Socialist,  M. 
Branting,  and  the  movement  was  greatly 
assisted,  in  their  various  ways,  by  Mr.  Arthur 
Henderson  in  England  and  M.  Albort  Thomas 
in  France — to  say  nothing  of  the  "  pacifist  " 
leaders  in  all  countries.  Here,  however,  we 
are  concerned  only  with  the  actual  course  of 
events,  chiefly  in  its  bearing  upon  German 
policy. 

By    the    middle    of    May    the    "  Stockholm 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


811 


[By  special  perm*ss%on  of  the  proprietors  oj  "  Putch." 

THE    REAL    VOICE    OF    LABOUR. 

Tommy:  "So  you're  going  to  Stockholm  to  talk  to  Fritz,  are  you?     Well,   I'm   going  back   to   France 

to  fight  him." 


Conference "  idea  was  fully  launched,  and  it 
remained  one  of  the  great  political  factors 
during  the  whole  period  down  to  the  Bol- 
shevist submission  to  Germany.  Early  in 
July  Herr  Scheidemann  gave  an  illuminating 
account  in  the  Vorwarts  of  M.  Borghj  erg's 
first  conversations  with  the  Soviet : 

The  first  quostion  which  was  put  to  him  by  the 
Russian  comrades  was  whether  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
was    in    agreement    with    our    declarations.     It    then 


appeared  at  once  how  incredibly  wrongly  people  abroad 
are  informed  about  the  position  of  the  German  Social 
Democracy.  Borgbjerg  explained  very  thoroughly  to 
the  Russian  comrades  that  we  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  Chancellor,  and  that  we  are  neithor  a  Government 
Party  nor  a  Majority  Party.    . 

A  further  question  put  by  the  Russians  was  whethor 
other  parties  are  of  the  same  opinion  as  ours.  Borgbjerg 
replied  that  beyond  doubt  not  inconsiderable  sections 
of  the  German  people  thought  just  as  we  did. 

The  Russians  asked,  further,  whother  there  would  bo 
a  revolution  in  Gormany  in  the  near  future,  and  whether 
it  was  safe  to  reckon  upon  that.     Borgbjerg  replied  that 


812 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


according  to  his  conviction,  there  would  quite  certainly 
bo  no  revolution  in  Germany  during  the  war.  .  .  .  He 
said  that  for  the  Western  States  only  a  social  revolution 
could  be  in  question. 

Nevertheless  the  Soviet  informed  M.  Borg- 
bjerg  that  "  his  mission  had  succeeded  ! " 
Invitations  to  Stockholm  were  then  duly  issued, 
and  the  Allied  Governments  were  faced  by  the 
question  whether  they  would  permit  their 
subjects  to  attend.  At  the  end  of  May  the 
French  Socialists  decided  in  favour  of  accepting 
the  invitation  to  Stockholm,  where  representa- 
tives of  both  the  German  Majority  and  German 
Minority  had  already  arrived.  But  M.  Ribot, 
who     was     then     Prime     Minister,     promptly 


National  Seamen  and  Firemen's  Union  decided 
that  no  British  ship  should  carry  British  dele- 
gates, and  the  Union's  efficient  organization 
actually  captured  Mr.  MacDonald  and  Mr. 
M.  W.  Jowett  at  the  port  from  which  they 
-Hoped  to  sail,  and  sent  them  back  to  London. 
It  was  only  in  the  middle  of  August,  after 
"  Stockholm  "  had  produced  a  political  crisis, 
and  Mr.  Henderson  had  resigned  office,  that 
the  British  Government  definitely  announced  a 
final  refusal  to  grant  passports,  and  the  final 
decision  of  Great  Britain,  France,  the  United 
States  and  Italy  that  peace  terms  should  not 
be  discussed  with  the  enemy  until  they  could 


NEUTRAL    ORGANIZERS    OF    THE    STOCKHOLM    CONFERENCE,    1917. 
Silting,  left  to  right:  Van  Kol,  Troelstra  (Netherlands),  Albarda  ;    standing,  Stauning  (Denmark) 

and  Branting  (Sweden). 


announced  in  the  Chamber  that  the  French 
Government  would  refuse  passports.  "  No," 
he  said,  "  peace  can  come  only  through  victory. 
All  our  energies  must  be  directed  towards 
hastening  victory."  The  British  Government, 
hampered  by  many  considerations,  but  espe- 
cially by  the  fact  that  Mr.  Henderson  was  at 
the  moment  in  Petrograd  with  almost  ambas- 
sadorial powers,  hesitated,  and  had  actually 
given  a  passport  to  Mr.  Ramsay  MacDonald  for 
a  journey  to  Petrograd — not,  indeed,  to  Stock- 
holm, but  Stockholm  was  on  the  way.  The 
situation  was  saved  by  the  British  seamen, 
who  had  suffered  more  than  any  other  single 
class    or    calling    from    German    crimes.     The 


be    discussed    by    the    representatives    of    the 
whole  nation. 

Meanwhile  the  "  Stockholm  Conference " 
had  dwindled  down  to  a  series  of  meetings 
between  the  Dutch-Scandinavian  .  Committee 
and  the  delegations  from  the  various  Socialist 
parties  and  groups  in  the  countries  of  the 
Central  Powers.  The  German  "  Majority " 
prodviced  a  memorandum  as  full  of  amiable 
generalities  as  any  Imperial  Chancellor's 
speech,  and  distinguished  by  an  emphatic 
refusal  to  restore  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France. 
The  German  object  was  perfectly  clear,  and 
the  German  Press  had  been  too  excited  to 
conceal  it.     In  August,  when  it  seemed  for  a 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


813 


moment  that  British  labour  had  been  captured, 
the  Vorwarts  exclaimed  triumphantly  : 

According  to  the  utterances  of  Henderson  and  others, 
the  English  were  to  go  to  Stockholm  only  to  champion 
the  cause  of  the  Entente,  to  shatter  Germany's  moral 


RUBBER    SHORTAGE    IN    GERMANY. 
Steel   springs  as  substitutes  for  rubber  tyres. 

power  of  resistance,  and  to  facilitate  the  final  victory. 
But.  the  air  of  a  peace  conference  is  unhealthy  for  inten- 
tions of  such  a  kind,  and  the  opponents  of  participation 
were  right  from  their  point  of  view  when  they  expressed 
the  opinion  that  he  who  says  A  must  also  say  B,  and 
that  he  who  goes  to  a  peace  conference  will  not  find  it 
i'asy  to  come  out  of  it  as  the  apostle  of  war  which  he  was 
before. 

Or,  as  an  inspired  Government  writer  put .  it 
in  the  Frankfurter  Zeilung  at  an  earlier  stage 
of  the  German  intrigue  : 

One  must  not  overestimate  the  immediate  importance 
■of  the  Stockholm  conversations  between  Labour  leaders 
of  the  Central  Powers  and  Labour  leaders  from  Russia, 
and  perhaps  from  other  Entente  countries.  This 
Conference  cannot  arrive  at  decisions  which  will  be 
politically  binding.  It  could,  however,  affect  feeling 
among  the  masses  in  a  manner  which  will  compel 
consideration  on  the  part  of  the  Governments. 

Nor  was  any  secret  made  of  the  fact  that  it 
was,  above  all,  the  British  masses  that  the 
German  Government  and  its  "  Socialists " 
were  determined  to  "  affect." 

The  whole  labour  situation  in  Germany  was 
most  clearly  illuminated  by  the  events  which 
occurred  at  the  close  of  the  period  under 
review.  At  the  end  of  January,  1918,  strikes 
again  broke  out  in  Berlin  and  in  various  parts 
of  Germany — but  not,  it  is-  important  to  ob- 
serve, in  the  principal  centres  of  the  munitions 
industries,  which  held  almost  entirely  aloof. 
This  time  the  movement  was  continued,  at  any 
rate  in  Berlin,  for  more  than  a  week,  but  the 
Government  was  mainly  responsible.  The 
strikes  were  doubtless  promoted  by  the  Socialist 
Minority,  and  they  were  sufficiently  popular 
for  the  Majority  leaders  to  hesitate  about  their 
attitude — or  'rather,    after   a   little    hesitation, 


to  decide  that  they  should  assume  control  of 
the  strikes,  with  a  view,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
improving  their  Socialist  prestige,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  gaining  fresh  credit  with  the 
Government  by  putting  a  speedy  end  to  the 
disturbance  of  war  work.  Meanwhile  the 
Trade  Union  authorities  formally  declared 
their  "  neutrality  " — -which  meant  that  there 
would  be  no  "  strike  pay,"  and  that  prolonged 
cessation  of  work  would  be  impossible.  In 
Bavaria,  and  even  at  Cologne,  for  example, 
the  authorities  gladly  accepted  the  Socialist 
leaders'  help,  and  easily  arranged  matters. 
Berlin,  however,  preferred  to  give  a  display  of 
militarist  "  firmness."  The  Chancellor  and 
other  Ministers  refused  to  receive  deputations, 
the  police  closed  the  strikers'  headquarters  and 
drove  them  into  the  street,  and  the  utmost, 
ruthlessness  was  shown  in  suppressing  such 
slight  disorders  as  were  the  natural  results. 
Consequently  the  whole  trouble  was  quite 
unnecessarily  prolonged,  and  was  triumphantly 
ended  by  the  machinery  of  martial  law.  Once 
more  the  whole  world  rang  with  foolish  stories 


\trom  "  Simpliti^imus.'* 

"JOHN    BULL'S    UNRULY    DOGS" 
John   Bull :    "  Damn  it  1     The  more  dogs  on   my 
leash  the  less  respect  they  seem  to  have  for  me." 

of  impending  revolution  in  Germany.  Once 
more  it  was  proved  that  German  Socialism  was 
impotent  as  well  as  insincere. 

In  so  far  as  the  strikes  had  a  political  mean- 
ing, they  were  due  to  the  belief  that  the  German 
Government's  method  of  negotiating  with  the 
Bolshevists    at    Brest-Litovsk   was   imperilling 


814 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


TO  SAVE  SHOE-LEATHER:  BOYS  ON  THE  WAY  TO  SCHOOL  BAREFOOTED. 


the  much  desired  peace.  Innocent,  ignorant, 
and  also  some  dishonest,  people  in  Allied  coun- 
tries hastened,  therefore,  to  declare  that  the 
German  people  was  exhibiting  its  hostility 
to  "  annexations  and  indemnities."  What 
happened  ?  The  German  Government  and  the 
German  militarists  pursued  their  course.  They 
parleyed  with  the  Bolshevists  until  a  deadlock 
was  reached.  Then  they  again  hurled  the 
German  forces  against  helpless  Russia,  and 
dictated  an  annexationist  peace,  to  the  delight 
of  the  whole  German  nation.  The  Socialist 
Vorwarts  led  the  chorus  of  denunciation  of  the 
Bolshevists  and  all  their  principles  and  actions, 
and  Herr  Erzberger,  chief  engineer  of  the  crisis 
and  "Peace  Resolution"  of  July,  1917, 
declared  in  February,  1918,  that  the  whole 
political  operation  had  been  carried  out  accord- 
ing to  plan  ! 

So  much  has  been  said  in  earlier  .chapters 
about  the  development  of  the  economic  situation 
in  Germany  during  the  war  that  it  is  not  neces- 
sary here  to  discuss  in  detail  the  progress  of 
the  country's  privations.  The  third  winter 
of  the  war  was  extremely  severe,  and  suffering 
was  intense.  The  hard  weather  made  matters 
much  worse,  and,  in  particular,  produced  a 
transport  crisis.  Diminished  man-power  and 
worn  out  railways  meant  shortage  of  coal  and 


the  addition  of  cold  to  hunger.  But  during 
1917  the  situation  as  regards  food  reached  a  sort 
of  dead  level,  prophecies  that  Germany  would 
not  be  able  to  hold  out  until  the  new  harvest 
were  completely  falsified,  and,  if  anything, 
life  in  Germany  as  a  whole  became  rather  more 
tolerable.  The  mild  winter  of  1917-18  was  an 
immense  boon  to  Germany.  Bad  though  the 
whole  situation  was,  the  sufferings  of  the 
people  did  not  become  an  effective  factor 
which  could  be  capable  of  upsetting  the  calcu- 
lations of  the  Army  Command  and  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Government.  The  result  of  the 
Government  control  was  that  the  burden  of 
suffering  was  thrown  upon  the  shoulders  of  the 
poorest  classes  in  the  largest  towns,  who  were 
least  able  to  bear  it,  but  also  least  able  to  rebel. 
It  was  the  deliberate  policy  of  the  Government 
to  provide  first  for  the  Army,  then  for  the 
munitions  and  other  "  war "  industries,  and 
to  leave  the  municipal  authorities  to  provide 
as  best  they  could  for  the  ordinary  population 
of  the  towns  ;  meanwhile  the  power  of  the 
agrarians  always  prevented  a  really  exhaustive 
control  of  food  production  at  the  source.  In 
the  winter  of  1917-18  the  food  control  broke 
down  badly.  The  municipalities  were  forced 
themselves  to  break  the  law  and  to  engage 
largely  in  secret  trading — buying  supplies 
wherever,  and  at  whatever  prices,  they  could 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


815 


be  obtained,  and  so  playing  into  the  hands  of 
the  profiteers.  A  secret  memorandum  pre- 
pared by  the  municipal  authorities  of  Neukolln 
(Berlin)  at  the  end  of  1917  shed  much  light 
on  the  prevailing  chaos.  "  The  same  state  of 
things,"  it  observed,  "  is  to  be  found,  in  greater 
or  less  degree,  in  every  municipality  and  in 
every  industrial  district.  A  competition  is 
taking  place  between  the  industries  and  the 
municipalities,  and  it  is  ruthlessly  exploited 
by  the  profiteers.  The  profiteers  have  the 
special  advantage  that  the  parties  concerned 
hide  their  methods  from  one  another,  because 
they  are  illegal." 

Indeed,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  develop- 
ments was  the  general  collapse  of  public  and 
private  morality.  During  the  fourth  winter 
of  the  war  crime  increased  enormously,  and 
in  Berlin  and  most  other  large  towns  the  police 
had  to  be  reinforced  by  a  regular  service  of 
military  patrols.  Everybody  was  trying  to 
make  as  much  as  possible  out  of  the  war,  and 
the  murderers  and  burglars  vied  with  the  more 
respectable  profiteers.  The  bureaucracy  be- 
came more  and  more  corrupt,  the  postal  and 
railway  services  more  and  more  insecure.  As 
a  competent  economic  writer,  Herr  Heinz 
Potthoff,  wrote  in  Die  Hilfe  in  January,  1918  : 

The  chief  of  the  crooked  paths  is  bribery.     Throughout 


nroad  ai*eas  of  our  economic  life  bribery  of  employees 
has  become  a  recognized  trade  custom,  without  which 
it  is  impossible  to  obtain  either  an  order  or  the  delivery 
of  goods.  A  second  method  is  embezzlement  or  theft. 
I  should  not  like  to  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  embezzlement 
and  theft  are  already  recognized  as  a  trade  custom,  but 
anybody  can  see  that  respect  for  the  property  of  others 
has  been  badly  shaken.  If  a  wagon  is  left  for  a  slmrt 
time  unguarded  in  the  street  or  on  the  railway,  it  is 
certain  to  be  half  plundered.  Consignments  of  food, 
fuel,  and  all  necessities  of  which  there  is  a  shortage  are 
reckoned  as  "fair  game." 

The  results  of  the  first  four  German  war 
loan  issues  have  already  been  stated — the 
total  being  £1,825,705,000.  (See  Vol.  IX., 
p.  384.)  The  fifth  loan,  issued  in  September, 
1916,  produced  subscriptions  to  the  total 
amount  of  £532,000,000.  The  sixth  and  seventh 
war  loans,  which  were  issued  in  the  spring 
and  autumn  of  1917,  together  produced 
£1,281,500,000.  Thus  the  nominal  amount  of 
the  war  loan  subscriptions  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war  down  to  the  end  of  1917  was 
£3,639,205,000.  For  propaganda  purposes  great 
stress  was  laid  upon  the  apparent  consolidation 
of  over  75  per  cent,  of  the  German  war  debt. 
But  even  in  Germany  there  were  a  few  critics 
honest  enough  to  admit  the  total  failure  of  the 
German  Empire  to  devise  any  effective  system 
of  taxation  or  to  show  any  prospect  of  putting 
the  finances  of  the  Empire  on  a  sound  basis  ; 
everything    depended    on    the    restoration    of 


REPAIRING    BOOTS    WITH    WOOD. 


316 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


credit  by  "  winning  the  war "  and  forcing 
enemy  countries  to  accept.  German  commercial 
dictation.  The  economic  clauses  of  the  "  peace  " 
treaties  concluded  with  the  Ukraine  and  with 
the  Bolshevists  were  eloquent  enough,  and 
after  the  conclusion  of  "  peace  "  in  the  East 
German  statesmen  again  began  to  talk  openly 
of  the  extortion  '  of  indemnities  in  the 
West, 

It  has  been  seen  that  in  the  course  of  1916 
the  value  of  the  mark  declined  in  neutral 
countries  by  about  30  per  cent.  The  fluctuations 
in  1917  were  extraordinary.  They  really 
depended  upon  the  variations  in  the  military 


throughout  the  period  under  review.  Germany 
was  labouring  incessantly,  in  order  to  throw 
her  whole  combined  strength,  financial,  in- 
dustrial and  commercial,  into  the  softies  on  the 
very  day  after  the  conclusion  of^ho  war.  A 
remarkable  development  in  1917  was  the 
passage  of  the  Bill  for  the  Restoration  of  the 
Mercantile  Marine.  It  amounted  to  the  direct 
grant  to  the  ship-owning  companies  of  the 
sums  necessary  for  rebuilding  Germany's 
merchant  navy.  Government  representatives 
candidly  stated  that  this  procedure  was  pre- 
ferred to  the  establishment  of  a  direct  State 
monopoly,  in  order  to  preserve  the  apparent 


FOOD    SHORTAGE    IN    BERLIN  :     QUEUE    AT    A     MUNICIPAL    POTATO    DEPOT 


fortunes  of  the  Central  Powers.  Bottom  was 
touched  in  October,  1917,  and  there  was  then  a 
sharp  recovery  as  the  result  of  the  successes 
in  Italy  and  the  negotiations  with  Russia. 
The  following  interesting  table  shows  the  values 
of  the  mark  in  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Swit- 
zerland respectively  : 


100 

100 

100 

florins. 

kronen. 

francs. 

.July  14,  1914      ... 

169 

11215 

81-30 

December  31,  1916 

239 

163-25 

117 

March  31,  1917 

248 

170-25 

123-50 

October  31,  1917 

315 

230-25 

157 

November  #0,  1917 

290 

220-25 

158-62 

December  22,  1917 

226 

170-25 

125-62 

Capitalist    and    industrialist    concentrations 
and  fusions  continued  on   a  remarkable  scale 


independence  of  the  companies  with  a  view  to 
international  negotiations.  The  legislation 
caused  great  activity  in  the  shipbuilding 
industry,  and  many  new  yards  were  estab- 
lished. Germany  proposed,  so  far  from  paying 
the  penalty  of  her  piracies  and  murders,  to 
recommence  competition  on  the  most  advan- 
tageous terms  for  the  carrying  trade  of  the 
world  1 

As  has  been  shown,  German  opinion  as  a 
whole  was  characterized  during  the  period 
under  review  by  a  great  increase  of  militarist 
chauvinism.  "  Unrestricted  "  submarine  war 
brought  Germany  a  host  of  new  enemies,  but 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


817 


it  relieved  her  of  the  need  to  make  further 
pretence,  and,  so  long  as  the  new  enemies 
were  unable  to  alter  the  military  situation,  a 
position  of  defiant  isolation  was  stimulating. 
The  overthrow  of  Russia,  Germany's  most 
powerful  neighbour,  exercised  a  tremendous 
effect  upon  German  opinion.  Again,  heavy 
blows  were  struck  at  Italy,  one  of  the  former 
Allies  by  whom  Germany  had  been  deserted, 
and  the  other  delinquent,  Rumania,  was 
crushed  as  Belgium  and  Serbia  had  been 
crushed.  The  result  of  it  all  was  an  intoxi- 
cating sense  of  power,  which  found  expression 
in  countless  schemes  of  conquest,  east  and 
west,  north  and  south. 

The  Pan-German  propaganda  assumed  ex- 
traordinary proportions — leagues  and  associa- 
tions of  all  sorts,  politicians  of  every  colour, 
from  Conservative  and  National  Liberal  to 
Majority  Socialist,  poured  out  endless  plans 
for  a  German  domination  of  the  world.  The 
most  remarkable  organization,  perhaps,  was  a 
so-called  Fatherland  Party,  which  was  headed 
by  the  former  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Navy, 
Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  and  backed  by 
unlimited  funds.     It  was  the  centre  of  a  vast 


scheme  of  Pan-German  bribery  and  corruption, 
built  by  the  Junkers  and  industrialists  upon 
their  huge  profits  from  the  war.  They  bought 
many  newspapers  and  bribed  many  others  by 
means  of  industrialist  advertisements,  and  they 
carried  on  a  powerful  propaganda  in  all  parts 
of  the  country.  They  advocated  German 
expansion  and  penetration  in  all  parts  of  the 
world,  but  concentrated  especially  upon  the 
destruction  of  Russia,  the  annexation  of 
Belgium,  the  seizure  of  a  large  colonial  empire, 
and  the  overthrow  of  British  naval  supre- 
macy. 

The  whole  militarist  campaign  was  per- 
sistently based  upon  idolization  of  Hindenburg 
and  Ludendorff,  which  assumed  forms  ever  more 
extravagant.  Occasionally  the  Kaiser  was 
brought  forward  out  of  the  seclusion  to  which 
he  was  relegated  whenever  German  fortunes 
seemed  doubtful.  Take,  for  example,  the 
productions  of  a  certain  Herr  Max  Bewer, 
who  in  the  autumn  of  1917  was  presented  to 
the  public  as  "  the  German  poet."  Bewor's 
avowed  ambition  was  to  do  for  the  Kaiser 
what  Goethe  had  failed  to  do  for  Frederick  the 
Great,  and  to  perpetuate  the  life  of  the  German 


FOOD    DISTRIBUTION    BY    THE    MILITARY    IN    A    BERLIN    SUBURB. 


818 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


heroes  in  terms  worthy  of  Homer,  the  Northern 
Skaals,  or  the  Bible  ! 

Hindenburg  and  Lxidendorff,  Maekensen,  the  Bavarian 
I.ion  of  Arras,  the  heroes  in  the  air  and  on  the  sea, 
ascended  like  a  wreath  of  stars  about  our  Kaiser's  head. 
When  I  saw  him  at  the  Great  Headquarters,  he  was 
encircled  by  iron  crosses  and  airmen's  crosses,  flashing 
and  scintillating  on  uniforms  of  field -grey  and  sea-blue. 


["  SimpluissimuSf"  Oct.  16,1917. 

"ENGLAND'S    ANSWER   TO    THE    POPE'S 

NOTE." 
John    Hull:    "It  is    not  an    Angel  of  Peace  but  a 
Devil  of  Death  that  we  want  to  send  to  Germany." 

To  look  upon  the  Kaiser  is  like  looking  upon  a  wonderful 
autumn  day.  Think  of  fields  and  woods  in  all  their 
brown  fulness,  while  up  above,  on  the  tops  01  the 
mountains,  there  is  the  first  bright,  clean,  white  snow, 
and  above  the  snow  the  flashing,  blue  sunny  sky  of  a 
wonderful  day.  There  from  the  hand  of  Nature,  you 
have  the  faithful  picture  of  the  Kaiser  as  he  looks  with 
his  great,  blue,  flashing,  but  still  good-natured,  eyes 
upon  a  life  that  has  ripened  in  fulness  of  work,  and  looks 
blameless  into  the  mists  of  the  war. 

The  full  snowy  hair  is  parted  boyishly ;  in  freely 
curling  waves  it  moves  as  if  the  sea  wind  from  the 
Kaiser's  cruises  on  the  seas  and  at  regattas  were  still 
playing  in  it.  The  forehead  is  broad,  free  and  high, 
and  burnt  in  the  field  up  to  a  line  where  helmet  and 
field  cap  have  left  the  lighter  shading.  Through  the 
brown  cheeks  often  passes  a  healthy  rosy  colour.  The 
lips  arc  fine  and  firm,  not  too  full  and  not  too  thin,  and 
the  moustache  is  clipped  somewhat  shorter  than  in  time 
of  peace.  The  powerful  cut  of  the  cheeks  and  an  ener- 
getic  chin,  adorned,  however,  with  an  attractive  dimple, 
complete  this  Kaiser  head,  beautiful  as  a  picture,  which, 
side  by  side  with  the  patriarchal  heads  of  Charles  the 
(iroat  and  Barbarossa,  will  preserve  for  ever  in  Gorman 
Kliser-rustory  its  young-Germanic  type. 

What  this  remarkable  Byzantine  did  for  the 

Kaiser,  Herr  Dernburg,  forgetful  of  his  record 

of  espionage  and  intrigue  in  America,  attempted 

about  the  same  time  to  do  for   the  German 

people : 

Steadfastness  and  righteousness  are  the  qualities 
which  the  German  people  values  in  the  highest  degree, 


which  it  has  tried  to  develop  most  thoroughly,  and 
which  have  brought  it  a  good  and  honourable  reputation 
in  the  whole  world.  Thus  those  arts  do  not  fit  us  which 
enjoy  high  appreciation  in  the  war — lies  and  deception, 
ambiguity  and  hypocrisy,  intrigue  and  loj^cuuniiig. 
When  we  make  experiments  in  these  thingswe  suffer 
hopeless  and  brutal  failure.  Our  lies  are  coarse  and 
improbablo,  our  ambigxiity  is  pitiful  simplicity,  and  our 
intrigues  are  without  salt  and  without  grace.  The 
history  of  the  war  proves  this  by  a  hundred  examples. 
That  is  the  very  least  that  must  be  said  of  our  employ- 
ment of  these  immoral  weapons  which  are  foreign  to  our 
character. 

When  the  war  broke  out  and  our  enemies  poured  all 
these  things  upon  us  like  a  hailstorm,  and  when  we 
convinced  ourselves  of  the  effectiveness  of  such  tactics, 
the  tactics  rose  in  our  estimation,  and  we  tried  to 
imitate  them.  But  these  tactics  will  not  fit  the  German. 
We  are  rough  but  moral,  we  are  credulous  but  honest, 
we  are  adroit  but  inexperienced.* 

Herr  Dernburg's  article  was  one  of  many 
indications  that  the  Germans,  having  exhausted 
every  resource  of  crime  and  cunning  during 
the  war,  were  preparing — as  a  German  traveller 
in  Switzerland  observed — to  "  organize  sym- 
pathy." When  they  talked  of  "  peace  by 
tinderstanding,"  they  meant  a  peace  which 
would  merely  throw  a  thin  veil  over  an  actual 
German  victory.  A  well-known  Socialist 
deputy  in  the  Reichstag,  Dr.  Paul  Lensch, 
writing  in  Die  Glocke  in  the  autumn  of  1917, 
candidly  observed  that  the  Central  Powers 
"  will  be  counted  the  victors  if  they  succeed  in 
preventing  any  diminution  in  the  extent  of 
their  former  frontiers,  in  keeping  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  the  colonies,  and  Trent  and  Trieste, 
and  in  refusing  their  enemies  any  indemnity." 
And  he  added  : 

The  consequences  which  such  a  peace  would  have  for 
English  world-power  we  have  often  explained.  It 
would  be  for  Great  Britain  the  greatest  defeat  in  its 
history  and  the  beginning  of  its  ruin.  It  is  just  because 
people  in  England  are  well  aware  of  that  that  they  are 
resolute  for  the  war  and  will  hear  nothing  of  a  peace  by 
understanding.  .  .  .  For  that  very  reason,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Central  Powers  will  and  can  press  all  the  more 
persistently  for  such  a  peace.  .  .  .  Germany  will  have 
won  the  war  if  /the  does  not  lose  it,  but  England  will  have 
lost  the  war  if  she  does  not  win  it. 

So  much  for  the  prolonged  German  "  peace  " 

intrigues,  which   loomed  so  large  in  the  period 

from  the  autumn  of  1916  to  the  spring  of  1918. 

They  failed,  but  German  successes  in  the  East 

increased    German    appetites    and    ambitions, 

and  the  battles  for  the  freedom  of  the  world 

were  resumed  on  a  still  more  gigantic  scale. 


The  Pope's  proposals  for  peace  were  addressed 

from   the   Vatican,   August    1,    1917,    "  to   the 

Heads     of     the     Belligerent     Peoples."     The 

following  is  a  translation  of  the  French  text  : — 

Since    tho    boginning    of    our    Pontificate,    amid    the 
horrors   of   the   terrible   war   let   loose   on   Europe,   we 

*  From  Deutsche  Politik,  September  28,  1917. 


PREPARING    FOR    AN    AIR    RAID    ON    ENGLAND. 


[From  German  photographs. 


319 


820 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


have  kept  in  mind  three  things  above  all  :  to  main- 
tain perfect  impartiality  towards  all  the  belligerents, 
as  become*  him  who  is  the  common  father  and  who 
loves  with  equal  affection  all  his  Children  ;  to  strive 
constantly  to  do  to  all  the  greatest  possible  good,  with- 
out exception  of  persons,  without  distinction  of  nation- 
ality or  religion,  as  is  enjoined  upon  us  both  by  the 
Universal  Law  of  charity  and  by  the  supreme  spiritual 
charge  confided  to  us  by  Christ ;  finally,  as  our  paci- 
fying mission  equally  requires,  to  omit  nothing,  as 
fsr  as  might  be  in  our  power,  that  could  help  to  hasten 
the  end  of  this  calamity,  by  essaying  to  bring  the 
peoples  and  their  Heads  to  more  moderate  counsels 
and  to  the  soreno  deliberations  of  peace — a  peace 
*' ju^t  and  lasting." 

Whoever  has  followed  our  work  during  the  three 
sad  years  just  elapsed  has  been  able  easily  to  recognize 
that,  if  wo  have  been  ever-faithful  to  our  resolve  of 
absolute  impartiality  and  to  our  beneficent  action, 
we  have  never  ceased  to  exhort  the  belligerent  peoples 
and  governments  to  resume  their  brotherhood,  even 
though  all  that  we  have  done  to  achieve  this  most  noble 
aim  ha*  not  been  made  public. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  first  year  of  war  we  addressed 
to  the  nations  in  conflict  the  liveliest  exhortations, 
and  pointed  out,  moreover,  the  path  along  which  a 
peace,  stable  and  honourable  for  all,  might  be  attained. 
Unfortunately  our  appeal  was  not  heeded,  and  the  war 
went  on  desperately,  with  all  its  horrors,  for  another 
two  year.j  ;  it  even  became  more  cruel,  and  spread,  on 
land,  on  sea — nay,  in  the  very  air ;  upon  defenceless 
cities,  quiet  villages,  and  their  innocent  inhabitants, 
desolation  and  death  were  seen  to  fall.  And  now  none 
can  imagine  how  the  sufferings  of  all  would  be  increased 
and  intensified  wero  yet  other  months,  or  still  worse, 
other  years,  added  to  this  bloody  triennium.  Shall, 
then,  the  civilized  world  be  nought  but  a  field  of  death  ? 
And  shall  Europe,  so  glorious  and  flourishing,  rush,  as 


though    driven    by    universal    madness,    towards    the 
abyss,  and  lond  her  hand  to  her  own  suicide  ? 

In  a  situation  so  fraught  with  anguish,  in  the  presence 
of  so  grave  a  peril,  wo,  who  have  no  special  political 
aim,  who  heed  neither  the  suggestions  nor  the  interests 
of  either  of  the  belligorent  parties,  but  aj^imnolled 
solely  by  the  feeling  of  our  supreme  duty  as  the  common 
father  of  the  people,  by  the  prayers  of  our  children, 
who  implore  from  us  intervention  and  our  word  of 
peace,  by  the  very  voice  of  humanity  and  of  reason, 
we  raise  again  a  cry  for  peace,  and  renew  a  pressing 
appeal  to  those  in  whoso  hands  lie  the  destinies  of 
nations.  But  in  order  no  longer  to  confine  ourselves 
to  general  terms,  such  as  wore  counselled  by  circum- 
stances in  the  past,  we  desire  now  to  come  down  to 
more  concrete  and  practical  proposals,  and  to  invite 
the  Governments  of  the  belligerent  peoples  to  agree 
upon  the  following  points,  which  seem  as  though  they 
ought  to  bo  the  bases  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace,  leaving 
to  their  charge  the  completion  and  the  more  precise 
definition  of  those  points. 

First,  the  fundamental  point  should  be  that  the 
moral  force  of  right  should  replace  the  material  force  of 
arms ;  hence  a  just  agreement  between  all  for  the 
simultaneous  and  reciprocal  diminution  of  arma- 
ments,  according  to  rules  and  guarantees  to  be  established, 
to  the  extent  necessary  and  sufficient  for  the  maintenance 
of  public  order  in  each  State;  then,  in  the  place  of 
armies,  the  establishment  of  arbitration  with  its  exalted 
pacifying  function,  on  lines  to  be  concerted  and  with 
sanctions  to  be  settled  against  any  State  that  should 
refuse  either  to  submit  international  questions  to 
arbitration  or  to  accept  its  awards. 

The  supremacy  of  right  once  established,  let  every 
obstacle  be  removed  from  the  channels  of  communica- 
tion betweon  peoples,  by  ensuring,  under  rules  likewise 
to  be  laid  down,  the  true  freedom  and  common  enjoy- 
ment of  the  seas.     This  would,  on  the  one  hand,  remove 


BELLS    OF    A    BERLIN    CHURCH    TO    BE    MELTED     DOWN    FOR    MUNITIONS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


821 


SHORTAGE    OF    LABOUR    IN     BERLIN. 
A  Count  and  his  family  clearing  snow  from  the  road. 


manifold  causes  of  conflict,  and  would  open  on  the  other, 
fresh  sources  of  prosperity  and  progress  to  all. 

As  to  the  reparation  of  damage  and  to  the  costs  of 
war,  we  see  no  way  to  solve  the  question  save  by  laying 
down  as  a  general  principle,  complete  and  reciprocal 
condonation,  which  would,  moreover,  be  justified  by 
the  immense  benefits  that  would  accrue  from  dis- 
armament ;  all  the  more,  since  the  continuation  of 
such  carnage  solely  for  economic  reasons  would  bo 
incomprehensible.  If,  in  certain  cases,  there  exist, 
nevertheless,  special  reasons,  let  them  be  weighed  with 
justice  and  equity. 

But  these  pacific  agreements,  with  the  immense 
advantages  they  entail,  are  impossible  without  the 
reciprocal  restitution  of  territories  now  occupied. 
Consequently  on  the  part  of  Germany  there  must  be 
the  complete  evacuation  of  Belgium,  with  a  guarantee 
of  her  full  political,  military,  and  economic  indepen- 
dence towards  all  Power*  whatsoever ;  likewise  the 
evacuation  of  French  territory.  On  the  part  of  the 
other  belligerent  partios,  there  must  be  a  similar  resti- 
tution of  the  German  colonies. 

As  regards  territorial  questions  like  those  at  issue 
between  Italy  and  Austria,  and  betwoen  Germany 
and  France,  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  in  considera- 
tion of  the  immense  advantages  of  a  lasting  peaco  with 
disarmament,  the  parties  in  conflict -will  examine  them 
in  a  conciliatory  spirit,  taking  account,  in  the  measure 
of  what  is  just  and  possible,  as  we  have  before  said, 
of  the  aspirations  of  the  peoples,  and,  as  occasion 
may  offer,  co-ordinating  particular  interests  with  the 
general  weal  of  the  great  human  society. 

The  same  spirit  of  equity  and  justice  must  reign 
in  the  study  of  the  other  territorial  and  political  questions, 
notably  those  relating  to  Armenia,  the  Balkan  States, 
and  to  the  territories  forming  part  of  the  ancient  Kingdom 
of  Poland,  to  which,  in  particular,  its  noble  historical 
traditions  and  the  sufferings  endured,  especially  during 
the  present  war,  ought  justly  to  assure  the  sympathies 
of  nations. 


Such  aro  the  principal  bases  upon  which  we  believe 
the  future  reorganization  of  peoples  should  be  founded. 
They  arc  such  as  to  render  impossible  a  return  of  similar 
conflicts,  and  to  prepare  the  solution  of  the  economic 
question,  so  important  for  the  future  and  the  material 
welfare  of  all  tho  belligerent  States.  Therefore,  in 
laying  them  before  you,  who  guide  at  this  tragic  hour 
tho  destinies  of  the  belligerent  nations,  we  are  inspired 
by  a  sweet  hope — the  hope  of  seeing  them  accepted 
and  thus  of  seeing  fmded  at  the  earliest  moment  the 
terrible  struggle  that  appears  increasingly  a  useless 
massacre.  Every  one  recognises,  moreover,  that,  on 
the  one  side  and  on  tho  other,  the  honour  of  arms 
is  safe.  Lend,  therefore,  your  ear  to  our  prayer,  accepl 
the  paternal  invitation  that  wo  address  to  you  in  the 
name  of  the  Divine  Redeemer,  the  Prince  of  Peace- 
Think  of  your  very  heavy  responsibility  before  God 
and  men  ;  upon  your  resolves  depend  the  repose  and  the 
joy  of  innumerable  families,  the  life  of  thousands  of 
youths,  in  a  word,  the  happiness  of  the  peoples  to  whom 
it  is  your  absolute  duty  to  assure  these  boons.  May  the 
Lord  inspire  in  you  decisions  in  accord  with  His  most 
holy  will.  May  Heaven  grant  that,  in  deserving  the 
plaudits  of  your  contemporaries,  you  will  gain  al^o 
for  yourselves  the  name  of  peacemakers  among  future 
generations. 

As  for  us,  closely  united  in  prayer  and  penitence  with 
all  faithful  souls  who  sigh  for  peac3,  we  pray  that  the 
Divine  Spirit  grant  you  light  and  counsel. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  sent  the 
following  reply  to  the  Pope  ;  it  was  published 
on  August  30,  1917  : — 

Every  heart  that  has  not  been  blinded  and  hardened 
by  this  terrible  war  must  be  touched  by  this  moving 
appeal  of  his  Holiness  the  Pope,  must  feel  the  dignity 
and  force  of  the  humane  and  generous  motives  which 
prompted  it,  and  must  fervently  wish  that  we  might  take 


823 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


STARS,    ORDERS  AND    MEDALS    OF    THE    ENTENTE     POWERS    OFFERED    FOR    SALE 
IN    BERLIN    ON    BEHALF    OF    THE    GERMAN    RED    CROSS. 


the  path  of  peace  ho  so  persuasively  points  out-  But 
it  would  be  folly  to  take  it  if  it  does  not  in  fact  lead  to 
the  goal  ho  proposes.  Our  response  must  be  based 
upon  the  stern  facts  and  upon  nothing  else  ;  it  is  not  a 
mere  cessation  of  arms  he  desires  ;  it  is  a  stable  and 
enduring  peace.  This  agony  must"  not  be  gone  through 
with  again,  and  it  must  be  a  matter  of  very  sober 
judgment  what  will  insure  us  against  it. 

His  Holiness  in  substance  proposes  that  we  return 
to  the  status  quo  ante  bellum,  and  that  then  there  can  be 
a  general  condonation,  disarmament,  and  a  concert  of 
nations  based  upon  an  acceptance  of  the  principle  of 
arbitration  ;  that  by  a  similar  concert  freedom  of  the 
seas  be  established  ;  and  that  the  territorial  claims  of 
France  and  Italy,  the  perplexing  problems  of  the 
Balkan  States,  and  the  restitution  of  Poland  be  left  to 
such  conciliatory  adjustments  as  may  be  possible  in  the 
new  temper  of  such  a  peace,  due  regard  being  paid  to 
the  aspirations  of  the  peoples  whose  political  fortunes  and 
affiliations  will  be  involved. 

It  is  manifest  that  no  part  of  this  programme  can  be 
successfully  carried  out  unless  the  restitution  of  the 
status  quo  ante  furnishes  a  firm  and  satisfactory  basis  for 
it.  The  object  of  this  war  is  to  deliver  the  free  peoples 
of  the  world  from  the  menace  and  the  actual  power  of  a 
vast  military  establishment  controlled  by  an  irresponsible 
Government,  which,  having  secretly  planned  to  dominate 
the  world,  proceeded  to  carry  the  plan  out  without 
regard  either  to  the  sacred  obligations  of  treaty  or  the 
long -established  practices  and  long-cherished  principles 
of  international  action  and  honour ;  which  chose  its 
own  time  for  the  war  ;  delivered  its  blow  fiercely  and 
suddenly  ;  stopped  at  no  barrier  either  of  law  or  of 
mercy  ;  nwopt  a  whole  continent  within  the  tide  of 
blood,  not  the  blood  of  sol  fliers  only,  but  the  blood  of 
innocent  ^women  and  children  also  and  of  the  helpless 
poor  ;  and  now  stands  balked  but  not  defeated,  the 
enemy  of  four-fifths  of  the  world.  This  power  is  not 
the  German  people.  It  is  the  ruthless  master  of  the 
German  people.  It  is  no  business  of  ours  how  that 
great  people  came  under  its  control  or  submitted  to  its 
temporary  zest,  to  the  domination  of  its  purpose  ;  but 
it  U  our  business  to  see  to  it  that  the  history  of  the  rest 
of  the  world  is  no  longer  left  to  its  handling. 

To  dual  with  such  a  power  by  way  of  peace  upon  the 
p'an  proposed  by  his  Holiness  the  Pope  would,  so  far  as 
we  can  see,  involve  a  recuperation  of  the  strength  and 
renewal  of  the  policy  ;  would  make  it  necessary  to 
create  a  permanent  hostile  combination  of  the  nations 
against  the  German  people,  who  are  its  instruments  ; 
would  re-mlt  in  abandoning  the  new-born  Russia  to  the 


intrigue,  the  manifold  subtle  interference,  and  the  certain 
counter-revolution,  which  would  be  attempted  by  all 
the  malign  influences  to  which  the  German  Government 
has  of  late  accustomed  the  world.  Can  peace  be  based 
upon  a  restitution  of  its  power  or  upon  any  word  of 
honour  it  could  pledge  in  a  treaty  of  settlement  and 
accommodation  ? 

Responsible  statesmen  must  now  everywhere  see,  if 
thoy  never  saw  before,  that  no  peace  can  rest  securely 
upon  political  or  economic  restrictions  meant  to  benefit 
some  nations  and  cripple  or  embarrass  others,  upon 
vindictive  action  of  any  sort,  or  any  kind  of  revenge 
or  deliberate  injury.  The  American  people  have 
suffered  intolerable  wrongs  at  the  hands  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government,  but  they  desire  no  reprisal  upon 
the  German  people,  who  have  themselves  suffered  all 
things  in  this  war,  which  they  did  not  choose.  They 
believe  that  peace  should  rest  upon  the  rights  of  peoples, 
not  the  rights  of  Governments,  the  rights  of  peoples, 
great  or  small,  weak  or  powerful,  their  equal  right  to 
freedom  and  security  and  self-government,  and  to  a 
participation  upon  fair  terms  in  the  economic  oppor- 
tunities of  the  world,  the  German  peoples,  of  course, 
included,  if  they  will  accept  equality  and  not  seek 
domination. 

The  test,  therefore,  of  every  plan  of  peace  is  this  : 
Is  it  based  upon  the  faith  of  all  the  peoples  involved 
or  merely  upon  the  word  of  an  ambitious  and  intriguing 
Government  on  the  one  hand  and  of  a  group  of  free 
peoples  on  the  other?  This  is  a  test  which  goes  to  the  root 
of  the  matter  ;  and  it  is  the  test  which  must  be  applied. 

The  purposes  of  the  United  States  in  this  war  are 
known  to  the  whole  world — to  every  people  to  whom  the 
truth  has  been  permitted  to  come.  They  do  not  need 
to  be  stated  again.  We  seek  no  material  advantage  of 
any  kind.  We  believe  that  the  intolerable  wrongs 
done  in  this  war  by  the  furious  and  brutal  power  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government  ought  to  be  repaired, 
but  not  at  the  expense  of  the  sovereignty  of  any  people 
— -rather  in  vindication  of  the  sovereignty  both  of  those 
that  are  weak  and  of  those  that  are  strong  Punitive 
damages,  the  dismemberment  of  empires,  the  establish- 
ment of  selfish  and  exclusive  economic  leagues,  we  deem 
inexpedient,  and  in  the  end  worse  than  futile,  no  proper 
basis  for  a  peace  of  any  kind,  least  of  all  for  an  enduring 
peace.  That  must  be  based  upon  justice  and  fairness  and 
the  common  rights  of  mankind. 

We  cannot  take  the  word  of  the  present  rulers  of 
Germany  as  a  guarantee  of  anything  that  is  to  endure, 
unless  explicitly-supported  by  such  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  German  people  themselves 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


323 


ha  mo  otrk-r  peoples  of  the  world  would  be  justified  in 
accepting.  Without  such  guarantees,  treaties  of  settle- 
ment, agreements  for  disarmament,  covenants  to  set  up 
arbitration  in  the  place  of  force,  territorial  adjust- 
ments, reconstitutions  of  small  nations,  if  made  with 
the  German  Government,  no  man,  no  nation,  could 
now  depend  on.  We  must  await  some  new  evidonce 
of  the  purposes  of  the  great  peoples  of  the  Central 
Empires.  God  grant  it  may  be  given  soon,  and  in  a 
way  to  restore  the  confidence  of  all  peoples  everywhere 
in  the  faith  of  the  nations  and  the  possibility  of  a  cove- 
nanted peace. 

The  German  Imperial  Government  sent  the 
following  reply,  dated  from  Berlin  on  September 

19:— 

IKit  Cardinal,  your  Eminence  has  been  good  enough, 
with  your  letter  of  August  2,  to  transmit  to  the  Kaiser 
and  King,  my  most  gracious  master,  the  Note  of  his 
Holiness  the  Pope,  in  which  his  Holiness,  filled  with 
grief  at  the  devastations  of  the  wor'd  war,  makes  an 
emphatic  appeal  for  peace  to  the  heads  of  the  belli- 
gerent peoples. 

The  Kaiser  and  King  has  deigned  to  acquaint  me 
with  your  Eminence's  letter  and  to  entrust  the  reply 
to  me. 

His  Majesty  has  been  following  for  a  considerable 
time  with  high  respect  and  sincere  gratitude  his  Holi- 
DMs'fl  efforts  in  a  spirit  of  true  impartiality  to  alleviate 
as  far  as  possible  the  sufferings  of  the  war  and  to  hasten 
the  end  of  hostilities.  The  Kaiser  sees  in  the  latest 
step  of  his  Holiness  a  fresh  proof  of  his  noble  and  humane 
feelings,  and  cherishes  a  lively  desire  that  for  the  benefit 
of  the  entire  world  the  Papal  appeal  may  meet  with 
success. 

The  effort  of  Pope  Benedict  XV.  to  pave  the  way 
to  an  understanding  amongst  the  peoples  might  the 
more  surely  reckon  on  a  sympathetic  reception  and 
whole-hearted  support  from  his  Majesty,  seeing  that 
the  Kaiser,  since  taking  over  the  Government,  has 
regarded  it  as  his  principal  and  most  sacred  task  to 
preserve  th^  blessings  of  peace  for  the  German  people 
and  the  world.  In  his  first  speech  from  the  throne  at 
the  opening  of  the  German  Reichstag  on  June  25,  1888, 
the  Kaiser  promised  that  love  of  the  German  Army  and 
his  position  towards  it  should  never  lead  him  into  the 
temptation  to  cut  short  the  benefits  of  peace  unless 
war  were  a  necessity  forced  upon  us  by  an  attack  on 
the   empire   or   its   allies.     The    German    Army    should 


safeguard  peace  for  us,  and,  should  j>eaco  nevertheless 
be  broken,  be  in  a  position  to  win  it  with  honour.  The 
Kaiser  has,  by  his  acts,  fulfilled  the  promise  he  then 
made  in  20  years  of  happy  rule,  despite  provocations 
and  temptations.  In  the  crisis  which  led  to  the  present. 
world-conflagration  his  Majesty's  efforts  were,  up  to 
the  last  moment,  directed  towards  settling  the  conflict 
by  peaceful  means.  After  war  had  broken  out.  against 
his  wish  and  desire,  the  Kaiser,  in  conjunction  with 
his  high  allies,  was  the  first  solemnly  to  declare  his 
readiness  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations. 

The  German  people  supported  his  .Majesty  in  his 
efficacious  desire  for  peace.  Germany  sought  within 
her  national  frontiers  free  development  of  her  spirit  mil 
and  material  possessions,  and  outside  imperial  territory 
unhindered  competition  with  nations  enjoying  equal 
rights  and  equal  esteem.  The  free  play  of  forces  in  the 
world  in  peaceable  wrestling  with  one  another  would 
have  led  to  the  highest  perfecting  of  the  noblest  human 
possessions.  A  disastrous  concatenation  of  events  in 
the  year  1914  absolutely  broke  off  the  hopeful  course 
of  development,  and  transformed  Europe  into  a  bloody 
battle  arena. 

Appreciating  the  importance  of  the  declaration  of  his 
Holiness,  the  Imperial  Government  has  not  failed  to 
submit  the  suggestions  contained  in  it  to  earnest  and 
scrupulous  examination.  The  special  measures  which 
the  Government  has  taken,  in  the  closest  contact  with 
the  representatives  of  the  German  people,  to  dfoeUBS 
and  answer  the  questions  raised  prove  how  earnestly 
it  desires,  in  unison  {Einklang)  with  the  desire  of  his 
Holiness,  and  with  the  peace  resolution  adopted  by  the 
Reichstag  on  July  10,  to  find  a  practical  basis  for  a 
just  and  lasting  peace. 

The  Imperial  Government  welcomes  with  especial 
sy mpat hy  t he  leadi ng  ideas  of  t  he  peace  appeal,  i n 
which  his  Holiness  clearly  expresses  his  conviction 
that,  in  xhe  future,  the  material  power  of  arms  must  be 
superseded  by  the  moral  power  of  right.  We  also  are 
convinced  that  the  sick  body  of  human  society  can  only 
be  healed  by  the  fortifying  moral  strength  of  right. 
From  this  would  follow,  according  to  the  view  of  his 
Holiness,  the  simultaneous  diminution  of  the  armed 
forces  of  all  States,  and  the  institution  of  obligatory 
arbitration  in  international  disputes.  We  share  tbe 
view  of  his  Holiness  that  definite  rules  and  certain  safe- 
guards for  the  simultaneous  and  reciprocal  limitation  of 
armaments  on  land  and  sea  and1  in  ihe  air,  as  well  as 
for  the  true  freedom  and  community  of  the  high  seas 


THE    BUREAU    FOR    THE    PURCHASE    OF    GOLD    AT    HANOVER. 


324 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


are  the  things  in  treating  which  the  new  spirit  that  in 
future  should  prevail  in  international  relations  should 
find  its  first  hopeful  expression.  The  task  would 
then  immediately  arise  of  deciding  international  diffe- 
rences of  opinion  as  they  emerge,  not  by  the  use  of 
armed  forces,  but  by  peaceful  methods,  especially  by 
way  of  arbitration,  the  great  peace -producing  effect 
of  which  we,  together  with  his  Holiness,  fully  recognize. 
The  Imperial  Government  will,  in  this  respect,  support 
every  proposal  which  is  compatible  with  the  vital 
interests  of  the  German  Empire  and  people.  Germany, 
owing  to  her  geographical  situation  and  her  economic 
requirements,  has  to  rely  on  peaceful  intercourse  with 
her  neighbours  and  distant  countries.  No  people, 
therefore,  has  more  reason  than  the  German  people  to  wish 
that,  instead  of  universal  hatred  and  battle,  a  con- 
ciliatory and  fraternal  spirit  should  prevail  between  the 
nations. 

If  the  nations,  guided  by  this  spirit,  will  recognize  to 
their  salvation  that  the  important  thing  is  to  lay  more 
stress  upon  what  unites  them,  than  upon  what  separates 
them  in  their  relations,  they  will  also  succeed  in  settling 
individual  points  of  conflict  which  are  still  undecided 
in  such  a  way  that  conditions  of  existence  which  will 
■be  satisfactory  to  every  nation  will  be  created,  and 
thereby  a  repetition  of  the  great  world -catastrophe  would 
appear  to  be  impossible.  Only  on  this  condition  can  a 
lasting  peace  be  founded  which  will  promote  a  spiritual 
rapprochement  and  a  return  of  human  society  to  economic 
prosperity. 

This  serious  and  sincere  conviction  encourages  our 
confidence  that  our  enemies  also  may  see  in  the  ideas 
submitted  for  consideration  by  his  Holiness  a  suitable 
basis  for  approaching  nearer  to  the  preparation  of  a 
future  peace  under  conditions  corresponding  to  the 
spirit  of  reasonableness  and  to  the  position  of  Europe 
(die  Lage  Europas). 


The  King  of  Bavaria  sent  the  following 
separate  reply,  dated  from  Munich  on  Septem- 
ber 21  :— 

Most  holy  Father  !  Your  Holiness,  in  your  Note  of 
August  2  of  the  current  year,  addressed  a  solemn  appeal 
to  the  heads  of  the  States  of  the  countries  at  war,  with 
the  object  of  ending  the  horrors  of  this  fearful  war  by 
a  just  and  lasting  peace  and  of  restoring  peace  to 
the  world.  Your  Holiness  has  shown  me  the  high 
favour  of  allowing  this  deeply  significant  document  to 
reach  me  also,  for  which  I  beg  to  tender  my  most  sincere 
thanks. 

I  read  the  words  of  your  Holiness  with  the  deepest 
emotion.  In  every  sentence  of  this  Note,  dedicated  to 
the  preparation  of  peace,  there  speaks  the  burning  and 
earnest  zeal  of  your  Holiness,  as  the  representative  of 
-the  divine  Prince  of  Peace,  to  restore  to  suffering  humanity 


the  blessings  of  peace.  In  this  way  your  Holiness*  is 
crowning  in  the  noblest  manner  the  work  which  your 
Holiness  ha9  set  before  yourself  from  the  first  day  of 
your  pontificate ;  namely,  by  all-embracing  fatherly 
love  and  impartiality  as  far  as  possible  to  shorten  the 
horrors  of  this  conflict  of  the  peoples  and  to  mitig 
the  sufferings  of  the  war.  Your  Holiness  may  eertaTI 
count  on  the  everlasting  thanks  of  all  humanity  for  this 
indefatigable  noble  work.  Every  step  which  your 
Holiness  has  undertaken  for  the  preparation  of  a  peace 
lasting  and  honourable  for  all  parties  has  been  followed 
with  the  most  heartfelt  sympathy  by  me  and  by  His 
Majesty  the  German  Kaiser  and  King  of  Prussia,  and  all 
the  other  German  Federal  Princes,  as  by  the  whole 
German  people.  History  proves  that  the  German 
nation,  since  the  founding  of  the  German  Empire,  has 
had  no  other  and  no  more  eager  wish  than  to  cooperate 
in  peace  and  honour  in  the  solu^on  of  the  highest 
tasks  of  human  culture  with  all  its  might,  and  to  dedicate 
itself  to  the  unhindered  development  of  its  economic 
life.  Nothing  could  lie  farther  from  the  peace-loving 
German  nation  and  its  Government  in  pursuing  tins 
task,  than  the  thought  of  an  attack  on  other  nations 
and  the  effort  to  extend  its  territory  by  violence.  For 
no  victory  and  no  gain  of  territory  could  in  its  eyes, 
even  in  the  most  distant  degree,  counterbalance  the 
fearful  horrors  of  a  war  and  the  annihilation  of  etliical 
and  economical  values  necessarily  connected  with  it. 
The  policy  of  the  German  Kaiser  and  of  the  Imperial 
Government,  conducted  in  entire  agreement  with  the 
German  Federal  Governments,  which  always  had  in 
view  the  preservation  and  assurance  of  peace  often 
to  the  very  limit  of  what  was  compatible  with  German 
interests,  therefore  met  always  with  the  fullest  approval 
of  the  German  nation  and  its  chosen  representatives. 
Not  until  Germany  was  obliged  to  consider  her  very 
existence  threatened,  when  the  German  nation  saw 
itself  with  its  loyal  allies  attacked  on  all  sides,  there 
was  no  other  choice  but  to  fight  with  the  exertion  of 
all  its  forces  for  honour,  liberty,  and  existence. 

But  even  during  this  unexampled  war  which  was 
forced  on  us,  and  which  has  now  been  raging  for  more 
than  three  years,  the  German  Government  has  given 
unequivocal  proofs  of  its  readiness  for  peace,  and, 
indeed,  quite  especially  by  the  solemn  challenge  addressed 
to  our  enemies  in  union  with  our  allies  as  long  ago  as 
the  end  of  the  year  1916,  to  enter  on  peace  negotiations. 
If  this  first  serious  attempt  at  making  an  end  to  the 
horrors  of  war  failed,  the  responsibility  for  the  failure 
falls  on  our  enemies,  who  entirely  refused  to  consider 
the  proposal.  All  the  more  earnest  are  the  wishes 
which  I,  as  well  as  the  German  Kaiser,  and  as  well  a* 
the  whole  German  nation,  cherish  for  the  success  of  the 
step  now  undertaken  by  your  Holiness,  so  that  by  it  a 
lasting  peace,  honourable  for  all  parties,  maybe  prepared 
in  the  interests  of  the  whole  world.  I  have  the  honour 
to  sign  myself  the  entirely  obedient  son  of  your  Holiness. 


CHAPTER   CCXXXI. 

THE  THIRD  BATTLE  OF  YPRES  (I.). 

Preparations  for  the  Combined  Allied  Offensive — Air  and  Counter-Battery  Work — 
The  New  System  of  Defence — "  Pill-Boxes  "  and  Craters — Gough's  Fifth  Army — The 
German  Front  from  the  Lys  to  Steenstraat — The  French  Front — Opening  of  the  Battle 
on  July  31,  1917 — Initial  Gains — Pilkem  Captured — St.  Julien — Pommern  Redoubt — The 
Second  Army's  Attack — Results  of  First  Day — Bad  Weather — Further  Operations  to 
August  15 — The  Threat  to  Lens — Hill  70. 


BY  the  middle  of  July,  1917,  the 
arrangements  for  the  Allied  advance 
from  their  left  flank,  in  which  British, 
French  and  Belgian  troops  were  to 
cooperate,  were  nearing  completion.  The  pre- 
liminary steps  which  were  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  offensive  advance  were  therefore  begun. 
The  first  of  these  was,  as  usual,  to  overwhelm 
the  lines  to  be  assaulted  by  artillery  fire.  For 
under  modern  conditions  it  is  impossible  for 
infantry  to  carry  by  frontal  attack  the  enemy's 
trenches  unless  the  access  to  them  has  been 
cleared  of  the  wire  entanglements  placed  before 
them  and  his  artillery  fire  has  been  largely 
diminished.  Both  these  tasks  need  accurate 
and  destructive  fire.  The  modern  artillery 
position  is  not  an  open  one  from  which  the 
gunner  lays  his  gun  directly  on  the  target ;  it 
is  a  covered  one,  defiladed  from  view,  so  that 
the  guns  are  not  directly  exposed  to  hostile  fire. 
Guns  in  such  positions  must,  to  correct  their 
fire,  know  exactly  where  each  projectile  falls. 
Forward  observing  positions  on  the  ground 
may,  if  circumstances  be  favourable,  do  some- 
thing to  help  the  gun-layers.  But  obviously 
the  number  of  such  positions  must  often  be 
relatively  small.  The  country  will  not  always 
afford  sufficient  of  them,  and  they  are 
liable  to  be  snuffed  out  by  hostile  fire.  But 
in  the  aviator  modern  artillery  possesses  a 
coadjutor  who  is  far  better  than  any  groundling 
Vol.  XV.— Part    192 


observer.  The  man  in  the  aeroplane  has  a 
purview  which  embraces  a  wide  range  of 
country,  and  looking  down  on  the  hostile  guns 
he  can  note  their  position,  and  even  if  they  are 
silent  nearly  always  ascertain  their  emplace- 
ments from  various  indications  which  clearly 
disclose  them  to  the  trained  observer.  He  can 
watch  the  fall  of  the  shells  from  his  own  side's 
guns  and  by  wireless  telegraphy  send  back  in- 
formation as  to  range  and  deflection  which  will 
enable  the  gun-layers  to  correct  their  aim. 

This  alone  will  enable  the  latter,  in  the 
words  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  "  to  carry  out 
successfully  a  methodical  and  comprehensive 
programme."  But  before  all  this  can  bo 
undertaken,  the  enemy's  aeroplanes  must  be 
mastered  to  a  large  extent,  so  as  to  allow  our 
own  fairly  free  passage  over  the  hostile  lines. 
This  task  was  successfully  accomplished,  and 
so  effective  did  it  make  our  fire  that  the 
Germans  commenced  to  draw  many  of  their 
guns  back  to  more  retired  positions  of  greater 
safety.  And  it  must  be  remembered  that 
every  retirement  of  this  kind  reduces  the 
efficacy  of  the  fire  of  the  guns,  for  they  cannot 
so  well  act  in  support  of  their  infantry  from 
the  increased  ranges. 

July  25  had  been  originally  selected  for 
the  assault.  To  give  the  opportunity  to 
our  airmen  to  locate  exactly  the  German  new 
gun    positions    and    also    allow    time    for    our 


325 


8-26 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


artillery  to  bring  their  weapons  to  closer,  and 
therefore  more  effective,  ranges,  a  delay  of 
three  days  was  granted.  But  unexpected 
difficulties  arose  in  bringing  some  of  the 
artillery  forward,  and  fcv  some  days  the 
visibility  was  so  bad  as  to  interfere  materially 
with  aerial  observation.  The  opening  day  for 
the  infantry  was  therefore  postponed  till  the 
31st.  During  this  time  the  enemy  was  freely 
subjected  to  raids  and  to  extensive  gas  attacks. 
On  July  27  our  airmen  engaged  till  dark  in 
very  earnest  fighting  and  obtained  many 
successes.     With   a  loss   to   ourselves   of   only 


railways,  and  an  ammunition  depot  were  suc- 
cessfully bombed.  July  29  was  not  favourable 
to  work  in  the  air  after  10  a.m.,  when  a  severe 
and  sudden  thunderstorm  prevented  further 
flying  Nevertheless,  four  German  aeroplanes 
were  shot  down  and  two  others  were  seen  to 
fall  out  of  control.  But  many  of  our  aviators 
were  caught  in  the  storm  and  six  of  our  machines 
failed  to  return,  of  which  four  owed  their  fate 
to  the  weather.  The  next  day  there  was, 
owing  to  atmospheric  conditions,  very  little 
work  done  in  the  air.  Still,  on  the  whole,  we 
had  accounted  for  67  aeroplanes  and  20  obser- 


BELGIAN    ANTI-AIRCRAFT    MACHINE-GUNS    ON    THE 


I  Belgian  official  photograph. 

DUNES. 


three  machines,  15  of  the  Germans  were  driven 
headlong  to  the  ground  and  16  more  were  seen 
to  descend  out  of  control.  During  the  night 
important  railway  stations  and  two  aerodromes 
were  bombed.  During  daylight  a  number  of 
bombing  raids  were  carried  out  and  much 
photographic  and  observing  work  for  the  artillery 
accomplished.  Ths  aerial  combat  was  continued 
without  interruption.  Sixteen  of  the  enemy's 
aeroplanes  and  two  observation  balloons  were 
destroyed  and  14  more  driven  to  the  ground  out 
of  control.  On  the  other  hand,  13  of  our 
machines  failed  to  come  back.  During  the 
night  operations  were  carried  on  behind  the 
German  lines.     An  aerodrome,  two  important 


vation  balloons,  incurring  a  loss  of  22  of  our 
own  machines. 

Raids  also  had  been  continuously  and 
successfully  carried  on  during  the  period  of 
preliminary  bombardment.  On  July  25 
the  German  headquarters  reported  that 
the  artillery  fire  had  increased  to  the  greatest 
intensity.  Under  its  cover  on  the  previous 
day  four  British  raids  brought  in  114  prisoners. 
On  the  25th  further  raids  at  many  points 
brought  a  considerable  number  more. 
Against  this  the  Germans  could  only  set  off  the 
capture  of  a  few  advanced  posts  on  Infantry 
Hill,  east  of  Monchy.  The  26th  was  marked  by 
a   successful    raid    near   Armentieres    and    the 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAIi. 


827 


capture  of  La  Basso  Ville  near  Warneton,  in 
which  29  prisoners  were  taken.  But  a  counter- 
attack of  the  Germans  against  the  last  named 
point  compelled  our  advanced  detachments  to 
retire  to  their  old  positions.  The  village  was 
not  definitely  captured  by  us  until  the  forward 
movement  of  the  31st.  On  the  27th  and  28th 
there  was  considerable  British  raiding  activity, 
especially  around  Ypres  and  in  the  Hindenburg 
line  south  of  the  Scarpe.  Near  Roeux  30 
prisoners  were  captured.  Altogether  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Ypres  over,  200  German 
prisoners  were  taken  during  the  .week.  July  29 
saw  a  raid  near  the  Belgian  coast  and  some 
patrol  encounters  near  Arras.  The  minor 
operations  were  slacking  off  to  make  room  for 
the  great  endeavour  which  was  to  begin  on 
July  31. 

During  the  preliminary  measures,  careful 
observation  was  kept  on  the  Germans  lest 
they  should  endeavour  to  withdraw  to  a  rear- 
ward position  before  the  Allies  had  delivered 
their  stroke  against  their  front  line.  The 
object  of  the  Allied  Commanders  was  not 
merely  to  occupy  an  abandoned  position  but  to 
kill  and  capture  the  enemy  in  it  before  he  could 
evade  the  blow. 

On  July  27  it  was  discovered  that  he  had 
given  up  a  portion  of  his  forward  defences 
opposite  the  northern  end  of  the  Fifth  Army 
front  and  behind  the  Yser  Canal,  either  becauso 
they  afforded  but  feeble  shelter  from  our 
artillery   or   because   he   feared    that   we   were 


again  going  to  move  our  armies  against  him. 
British  Guards  and  French  troops  were  there- 
fore pushed  forward  over  the  canal  and  took 
firm  hold  of  the  enemy's  first  line  and  its 
support  trenches  on  a  front  of  about  3,000  yards 
east  and  north  of  Boesinghe.  The  German 
counter-attacks  all  failed  and  our  troops  were 
able  during  the  night  to  complete  17  bridges 
over  the  canal,  which  rendered  it  easy  to 
reinforce  our  troops  holding  the  newly  con- 
quered position  and  greatly  simplified  any 
further  advance,  ensuring  the  easy  passage  of 
the  canal,  which  had  hitherto  been  a  formidable 
obstacle. 

The  German  lines  at  the  section  to  be 
attacked — viz.,  from  the  valley  of  the  Lys  across 
the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Messines-Wytschaete 
l'idge  to  the  Yser  canal,  a  distance  roughly  of  15 
miles — were  mostly  constructed  on  a  different 
system  from  that  with  which  our  troops  had 
hitherto  had  to  deal.  The  result  of  the  righting 
during  1910  and  the  first  six  months  of  1917 
was  held  by  the  Germans  to  prove  the  vulner- 
ability of  the  method  of  placing  their  dug-outs 
for  the  garrisons  of  the  front  trenches  imme- 
diately under  the  parapets.  One  of  two  things 
constantly  happened  ;  either  they  were  des- 
troyed by  the  preliminary  artillery  fire  when 
not  deep  down,  or,  if  they  were  not,  they 
formed  mere  traps  for  the  men,  who  often  would 
not  come  out  of  them  to  man  the  parapets  and 
were  subsequently  taken  prisoners.  Nothing 
is    more    common    in    the    description    of    our 


FRENCH    OBSERVATION    BALLOON    PREPARING    TO    ASCEND. 


192     2 


82S 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


rssauHs  th<\n  the  account  of  some  dug-out 
from  which  part  of  the  garrison  came  out  with 
hands  up  while  the  rest  who  did  not  surrender 
were  destroyod  by  bombs  thrown  down  among 
them. 

The  deductions  made  from  their  experience 
by  the  German  Commanders  were  embodied  in 
an  Army  Order  published  on  June  30.  It 
began  by  laying  down  as  a  general  principle 
that  the  value  of  the  defences  depended  largely 
on  success  of  the  precautions  taken  to  cover 
them  from  observation,  especially  by  the  hostile 
aviators.  In  place  of  the  old  system  of  con- 
tinuous lines  which  clearly  marked  out  the 
position,  it  was  laid  down  that  the  ground  held 
should  be  organized  in  a  deep  zone  of  several 
lines,  the  most  advanced  of  which  was  to  be 
broken  up  into  sections  with  spaces  between 
them.  It  was  to  be  based  on  the  shell  craters 
or  other  unobtrusive  cover,  affording  little 
centres  of  resistance,  in  which  were  ensconced  a 
few  men  with  machine-guns.*  It  was  thought 
that  these  were  not  so  open  to  view  as  a  trench 
line,  and  being  disposed  more  or  less  chequer- 
wise would  form  a  number  of  points  from  which 
not  only  direct  but  also  a  flanking  fire  could  be 
brought  to  bear  on  hostile  troops  attempting  to 

*  In  German  these  are  called  Trichternoster — i.e. 
crater  nests. 


penetrate  between  them.  These  organizations 
might  be  extended  to  a  depth  of  a  thousand  to 
two  thousand  yards.  The  front  of  this  portion 
of  the  German  position  was  to  be  covered  by  a 
continuous  and  powerful  wire  entanglement  of 
irregular  form,  and  this  was  also  constructed 
in  parts  of  the  line  of  defence  in  directions 
more  or  less  perpendicular  to  the  front,  so  as 
to  check  troops  breaking  through  the  front 
obstacle  and  compel  them  to  move  in  directions 
in  which  they  would  be  exposed  to  fire.  Any 
existing  shelters  were  to  be  made  use  of  to 
cover  infantry  intended  to  act  as  supports  or 
to  be  used  for  counter-attacks.  Where  no 
shelters  were  available  these  troops  were  to 
find  cover  in  shell  craters,  woods,  and  hollows, 
or  in  any  place  which  would  give  them  cover 
from  view. 

The  Germans  appear  at  this  time  to  have 
made  the  discovery  known  in  England  since  the 
War  of  1870  that  villages  were  not  suitable  for 
obstinate  defence.  They  form  easily  visible 
targets,  while  their  comparatively  solid  struc- 
tured houses  of  brick  or  stone  are  excellent  for 
ensuring  the  bursts  of  high  explosive  shells  with 
percussion  fuses.  The  Germans  hoped  that 
their  advanced  line  of  defended  shell  craters 
would  serve  to  split  up  the  Allies'  assaults  and 
render    easy    the    concentration    of    counter- 


1 


OLD    GERMAN    LINE    IN    A    CANAL    BANK. 


[French  official  photograph. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


329 


*J 


TYPES    OF    GERMAN    CONCRETE    DEFENCES. 


attacks  against  the  divided  party.  But  it  did 
not  constitute  their  main  line  of  resistance. 
This  was  to  be  composed  of  at  least  three  lines 
of  continuous  trenches  roughly  about  500  yards 
or  somewhat  less  apart,  established  whenever 
possible  on  the  reverse  slope  of  the  crest  line 
occupied  by  the  advanced  line.  The  front  of 
the  whole  of  this  organization  was  to  be  pro- 
tected by  a  deep  and  powerful  wire  entangle- 
ment with  intervals  here  and  there  to  allow  the 
reserves  to  come  up  through  them  for  counter- 
attack. Of  the  three  lines  of  trenches  the  first 
was  only  provided  with  shelters,  shallow  in 
character  and  at  fairly  wide  intervals,  for  about 
one-sixth  of  the  garrison.  In  the  second  and 
third  lines  the  dug-outs  were  to  be  more 
numerous  and  much  deeper.  This  threefold 
line  of  trenches  formed  a  strong  position  for 
the  troops  holding  it  and  served  to  cover  the 
artillery  stationed  behind  it.  If  thought 
necessary,  a  second  similar  position  might  be 
established  still  farther  back,  in  case  the  Germans 
were  driven  out  of  the  first  one.  This  system 
of  defence  was  largely  employed  in  Flanders 
and  there  were  found  scattered  along  the 
threo  lines  those  "pill-boxes"  which  formed 
security  for  machine-guns  and  which,  so 
long  as  they  were  not  destroyed,  constituted 
formidable  points  difficult  to  be  dealt  with  by 
infantry  alone. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  new  system  was  based 
mainly  on  the  idea  that  it  was  not  well  to  depend 
on  a  highly  organized  rigid  front  line,  which 
experience  showed  was  always  annihilated  by 
artillery  fire,  but  to  employ  a  plan  which  would 


break  up  the  attacking  force  when  it  was 
advancing  into  separated  masses  and  then  over- 
whelm these  by  counter-attacks  of  superior 
number  before  our  troops  had  time  to  organize 
the  position  won  for  defence. 

The  whole  system  was  not  very  successful 
and  the  reason  is  clear.  Once  the  wire  entangle- 
ments which  covered  the  lines  of  held  craters 
were  destroyed  the  little  groups  in  the  latter 
were  not  likely  to  offer  any  prolonged  resistance. 
Numbers  give  a  feeling  of  confidence  and  the 
small  pockets  of  men  were  often  too  much 
engrossed  with  their  own  safety  to  offer  the 
determined  resistance  expected  of  them.  More- 
over, the  advanced  line  troops  had  very  little 
cover  from  fire  even  if  they  had  fair  cover  from 
view,  and  a  heavy  shrapnel  fire  thrown  over 
the  zone  they  occupied,  and  which  was  certain 
to  be  more  or  less  revealed  to  the  Allied 
artillery  by  the  observing  aeroplanes  and 
balloons,  generally  sufficed  to  take  the  heart 
out  of  them. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  advanced  line 
garrison  was  therefore  killed  or  wounded  and  in 
fact  became  incapable  of  great  resistance.  It 
was  a  difficult  thing  for  the  Commanders  of  the 
main  line  to  judge  when  to  send  up  reserves  to 
counter-attack  ;  when  they  did  they  were 
liable  to  the  heavy  losses  involved  in  moving 
over  open  ground.  If  they  did  not,  the  arrival 
of  the  demoralized  refugees  from  the  advanced 
line  did  not  tend  to  improve  the  moral  of  the 
troops  who  witnessed  the  arrival  of  the  defeated 
units.  General  Haig's  observation  on  their 
new  method  of  defence  was  that  early  in  the 


880 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF     THE    WAR. 


autumn  (he  Germans  had  already  recognized 
its  failure  find  "  were  endeavouring  to  revert  to 
their  old  practice  of  holding  their  forward 
positions  in  strength.''  It  was  doomed  to 
failure  from  the  first  because  it  assumed  that  a 
small  part  of  the  infantry  would  suffice  to  stop 
the  assault,  whereas  it  is  certain  that  to  beat 
off  an  attack  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
employ  superior  rifle-power,  whether  this  be 
obtained  from  rifles  or  machine-guns. 


•w*  Trenches 

****  BarbedWireEntanglemt* 

©  Craters 

V  M.G.Emplacements 
ID    Small  Shelters 
—!-•  Large  Shelters 


Strong  i  Deep  Shelters 

Pillbox 

Supports 
kj-u   Batteries 
...^/  Line  of  advance  of 
(counter-attacks 


PLAN    OF    GERMAN    DEFENSIVE 

ORGANIZATION 

As  carried  out  in   Flanders. 

The  assailant  to  win  must  drive  the  enemy 
out  of  his  position  and  hold  it.  This  can  only 
be  done  by  infantry.  No  matter  how  great 
the  effect  of  the  artillery  fire  is,  there  always 
comes  a  time  when  the  infantry  must  crown  the 
fire-engagement  by  its  own  power.  This  can 
only  be  done  by  superior  numbers.  From  first 
to  last  in  all  fighting  it  is,  in  the  language  of 
Sii  Charles  Napier, "  the  stern  determination  to 
dose  with  the  bayonot  "  which  finally  settles 
the  issue  of  the  fight.  The  theory  of  the 
Germans  sounds  plausible  because  if  it  were 
successful  it  would  have  been  less  costly  in  life. 
It  was,  however,  a  failure  because  men  are  men 


and  not  automata,  and  when  our  troops  obtained 
their  initial  success,  the  counter-attacks  were 
rarely  strong  .enough  to  stop  them.  The 
assaulting  troops  had  the  advantage  of  first 
blood  and  were,  to  use  a  colloquialism,  "  bucked 
up  "  by  it ;  the  counter-attacking  troops  had  to 
retrieve  a  defeat  and  were  therefore  not  so 
eager  in  the  fray  and  were  often  employed  too 
late  to  do  much  good.  It  requires  a  very  wise 
Commander  to  feel  the  pulse  of  battle  so  accu- 
rately as  to  be  able  to  seize  the  exact  psycho- 
logical moment,  to  pass  from  the  defensive  to  the 
offensive.* 

The  sketch  given  herewith  shows  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  position  for  defence  theoretically. 
It  will  be  observed  that  not  all  the  shell  craters 
were  garrisoned.  When  unoccupied  they  were 
usually  girdled  with  entanglements  of  barbed 
wire  to  render  it  impossible  for  the  attacking 
troops  to  find  shelter  in  them.  Local  supports 
were  kept  close  up,  available  at  once  to  deal 
with  the  on-coming  assailants.  Other  reserves 
(not  shown  on  the  map)  were  kept  farther  back. 
Briefly  put,  the  organization  was  in  depth  to 
allow  of  repeated  counter-attacks,  on  which  the 
main  strength  of  the  defence  was  to  rest.  It 
was  also  intended  to  hide  as  much  as  possible 
from  our  aviators  the  position  held  by  distin- 
guishing its  front  elements  as  little  as  possible 
from  the  aspect  of  No  Man's  Land. 

The  "  pill-box,"  of  which  mention  has 
already  been  made  in  Chapters  CCIX.  and 
CCXXIV.,  was  destined  to  play  a  much  larger 
part  in  Flanders  than  it  had  in  previous  opera- 
tions. In  a  country  where  water  was  found  so 
close  to  the  surface,  deep  trenches  were  very 
often  impossible,  and  the  flanking  constructions 
which  wore  so  constantly  seen  on  the  ridges 
near  the  Ancre  could  not  be  constructed. 
Recourse  was  therefore  had  to  the  so-called 
pill-box,  a  structure  of  concrete  (some  of 
reinforced  concrete),  with  wide  horizontal  loop- 
holes, which  swept  the  ground  to  the  front  and 
to  the  sides.  Of  considerable  thickness  on  the 
sides  liable  to  attack,  and  with  soil  drawn  up 
almost  to  the  level  of  the  loopholes,  they  formed 
scarcely  visible  objects  which  were  difficult  for 
the  artillery  to  hit.  Their  domed  roofs  would 
deflect  many  shells,  and  although  it  was  true 
that  a  direct  hit  from  a  large  shell  would 
demolish  them  or  sometimes  overturn  them 
when  small,  still  shells  of  small  calibre  had 
very  little  effect  on  the  larger  structures. 

*  The  greatest  exponent  of  this  difficult  tactical 
operation  was  undoubtedly  the  Duke  of  Wellington. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


831 


GERMAN    CONCRETE    "PILL-BOX"  IN    FLANDERS,    WITH     NARROW    HORIZONTAL 
LOOP-HOLE    GIVING    A    WIDE    FIELD    OF    FIRE. 


But  another  point  militated  against  these 
erections — viz.,  that  even  the  garrisons  of 
the  larger,  when  exposed  to  really  heavy 
artillery,  were,  when  still  alive,  often  terribly 
demoralized  by  the  heavy  concussions  of 
the  impinging  shells.  In  the  smaller  struc- 
tures they  suffered  more  than  in  the 
bigger.  The  high  explosive  shells  inflicted 
such  terrible  blows  that  the  garrisons  were, 
after  a  prolonged  period  of  successive  hits,  so 
unnerved  that  they  could  no  longer  work  their 
machine-guns  and  were  often  found  lying  about 
with  expressionless  faces,  bleeding  from  nose 
and  ears. 


The  plan  of  one  of  the  larger  structures  is 
given  below. 

In  practice  the  pill -boxes  were  not  found  to 
be  so  impregnable  as  the  Germans  hoped. 
They  were  often  put  out  of  action  by  artillery 
fire  and  were  not  very  difficult  to  capture  by 
parties  of  good  marksmen,  stalking  them  and 
keeping  up  an  accurate  and  rapid  rifle-fire  on 
the  loopholes,  while  others  worked  round  to  the 
rear  and  bombed  through  the  bolt  holes 
provided  in  them.  But  they  had  to  be  taken 
when  so  placed  that  they  flanked  the  British 
lines  of  approach  as  they  stopped  the  advance 
till  this  was  done.     On  the  other  hand,  when  the 


Elevation. 


PLAN     AND     ELEVATION     OF     A     GERMAN     "PILL-BOX''     OF     THE    TYPE     REPRE- 
SENTED    ABOVE. 


MAP    OF    THE    COUNTRY    AROUND     YPRES. 


332 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


{Official  photograph. 


YPRES    IN    1917. 


German  counter-attacks  came  up,  the  accurate 
fire  of  the  British  infantry  constantly  told 
with  such  effect  that  their  formations  were 
dissolved  and  beaten  back  before  they  were 
able  to  close,  and  this,  too,  often  without  the 
Bid  of  an  artillery  barrage. 

The  German  artillery  was  also  reorganized,  to 
meet  the  new  methods.  Numbers  of  emplace- 
ments were  constructed  in  addition  to  those 
primarily  occupied  by  the  guns,  to  which  the 
latter  could  be  moved  during  the  fighting,  or 
which  served  for  batteries  brought  up  from  the 
rear. 

The  proportions  of  the  various  guns  employed 
were  approximately  as  follows  : 


Horse  ok  Tractor  Batteries. 

Per  cent 

15  cm.  howitzers 

53 

21  cm.  mortars 

...      20 

10  cm.  guns  ... 

17 

12  cm.      „      

3 

13  cm 

4 

15  cm 

3 

Position  Batteries. 

15  cm.  howitzers 

53 

21  cm.  rnortars 

..    •      ...      20 

10  cm.  guns  ... 

8 

12  cm 

8 

13  cm 

3 

15  cm.      ,,      .v. 

10 

Long  Range  Batteries. 

Howitzsrs  or  mortars 

25 

Guns  ... 

75 

It  will  be  observed  how  large  a  proportion  of 
the  first  two  categories  consists  of  15  cm.  (5' 9  in.) 
howitzers,  which  have  so  often  come  into  notice. 
It  fires  combined  shell,  i.e.,  one  which,  to  some 
extent,  plays  the  part  of  both  shrapnel  and  high 
explosive  common  shell.  Of  the  long  range 
batteries  no  such  precise  details  can  bo  given  ; 
they  were  composed  of  many  descriptions  of 
heavy  weapons  up  to  those  of  16-in.  calibre. 

For  each  1,000  yards  of  front  to  be  defended 
the  High  Command  should  have  had  at  its  dis- 
posal an  average  of  between  five  and  seven 
batteries  for  barrage  purposes,  several  of  these. 


if  possible,  being  composed  of  hoavy  guns,  and 
between  four  and  six  heavy  battories  (one  or 
two  of  which,  at  least,  were  to  be  long-rango 
gun  batteries),  for  purposes  other  than  that  of 
the  barrage.  This  worked  out  at  about  one 
gun  to  every  20  yards.  The  front  given  to  the 
infantry  division  (roughly  10,000  men)  was 
one  of  2,500  to  3,500  yards,  or  between  three  and 
four  men  per  yard  for  active  defensive  purposes. 
The  duties  of  German  artillery  were  defined 
as  follows  when  an  attack  was  anticipated  : 

(1)  Counter-battery  work  throughout  the  period  of  the 
artillery  preparation. 

(2)  Sniping  fire  every  night  during  the  same  period  on 
roads,  railways,  camps,  etc, 

(3)  On  the  last  night  but  one  before  the  supposed  day 
of  the  attack  heavy  fire  of  gas  shells  on  certain  groups  of 
batteries. 

(4)  On  the  morning  of  the  attack  very  heavy  counter- 
preparation  fire  for  half  an  hour  on  the  trenches  where 
the  attacking  troops  were  assembled. 

In  the  case  of  the  fighting  in  Flanders  the 
German  practice  did  not  come  up  to  German 
theory  ;  they  failed  to  hold  our  batteries,  which 
obtained  a  distinct  superiority  and  kept  down 
by  their  fire  that  of  their  opponents. 

In  the  following  pages  the  descriptions  given 
will  show  the  German  system  under  the  test 
of  action. 

The  total  front  to  be  attacked  by  the  Allies 
measured  some  15  miles,  and  stretched  from  the 
River  Lys  opposite  Deulement  northwards  to 
Steenstraat.  But  the  whole  of  this  line  wes 
not  equally  strongly  attacked ;  the  main 
assault  was  the  task  allotted  to  the  Fifth  Army 
along  the  line  from  the  Zillebeke-Zandvoorde 
road  to  Boesinghe  inclusive.  This  front 
measured  seven  and  a  half  miles,  and  to  deal 
with  it  General  Sir  Hubert  Gough,  who  com- 
manded the  Fifth  Army,  was  given  four  Army 
Corps— viz.,  the  XlVth,  the  XVIIIth,  the 
XlXth  and  the  Ilnd. 


334 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Born  on  August  12,  1870,  Sir  Hubert  was 
turning  47  years  of  age.  He  came  of  a  fighting 
family,  the  most  illustrious  member  of  whom 
had  been  Field  -Marshal  Viscount  Gongh, 
the  Peninsular  veteran  and  conqueror  of  the 
Punjab.     He    himself   was   the    eldest    son    of 


[Official  photograph. 

THE    KING    OF    THE    BELGIANS    AND 

GENERAL    GOUGH 

At  the  entrance  of  an  old  German  dug-out. 

General  Sir  Charles  John  Stanley  Cough,  an 
eminent  Anglo-Indian  soldier  who  had  fought 
in  the  Sikh  War  of  1848-9  at  the  desperately 
contested  Battles  of  ChillianwallahandCoojerat, 
and  who  in  the  Indian  Mutiny  had  gained  the 
V.C.,  served  in  the  trenches  before  Delhi  and 
assisted  at  the  capture  of  Lucknow.  Subse- 
quently Sir  Charles  Gough  had  distinguished 
himself  in  the  Bhootan  Expedition  of  1864-5 
ami  the  Afghan  War  of  1878-80.  Educated 
al  Bton,  Sir  Hubert,  like  his  brother  John, 
adopted  his  father's  profession.  Having  passed 
through  Sandhurst,  he  joined  the  16th  Lancers 
in  1889.  Jt  was  natural  that  he  should  be  a 
cavalryman.  His  father  in  the  Indian  Mutiny 
had    won    the    V.C.    for    leading    two    daring 


cavalry  charges  and  engaging  in  personal 
combat  with  the  leaders  of  the  rebel  horsemen. 
Appropriately  enough,  Sir  Hubert  first  saw 
service  in  the  field  in  India.  Promoted 
Captain  in  1894  he  was  attached  to  Brigadier- 
General  Gaselee,  commanding  the  2nd  Brigade 
of  the  1st  Division  of  the  Tirah  Field  Force 
during  the  campaign  of  1897-8.  He  was 
present  at  the  capture  ofthe  Sampagha  and 
Arhanga  Passes  and  in  the  operations  against 
the  Khani  Khel  Chamkanis  and  the  Afridis 
of  the  Bazar  Valley. 

When  the  South  African  War  broke  out, 
Gough,  still  a  captain,  proceeded  to  the  seat 
of  war  as  a  Special  Service  Officer.  He  took 
part  in  the  actions  of  Colenso  and  Spion  Kop. 
A  few  days  after  Buller's  failure  at  the  last- 
named  position,  Gough  was  given  the  com- 
mand of  a  regiment  of  Mounted  Infantry. 
Ho  fought  in  the  actions  of  Vaal  Kranz,  the 
Tugela  Heights,  and  Pieter's  Hill.  Scouting 
ahead  of  Dundonald  he  was  one  of  the  first  to 
enter  Ladysmith  when  it  was  relieved.  Sub- 
sequently he  accompanied  Buller  in  his  advance 
through  Natal.  He  and  his  mounted  infantry 
were  engaged  in  the  actions  of  Laing's  Nek 
(June  6-9,  1900),  and  of  AUeman's  Nek  two 
days  later,  which  led  to  our  forces  from  Natal 
entering  the  Transvaal  a  week  after  Roberts 
had  occupied  Pretoria.  At  the  beginning  of 
1901  Cough's  mounted  infantry,  280  strong, 
formed  part  of  Brigadier-General  Dartnell's 
column,  one  of  the  five  columns  operating 
under  French  against  Botha  in  the  Eastern 
Transvaal.  Increased  to  600,  his  regiment  in 
tho  summer  was  attached  to  Colonel  Bullock's 
column.  During  September  he  was  brought 
back  by  General  Lyttelton  from  Ivronstad 
to  the  Natal  frontier  at  De  Jager's  Drift.  At 
this  moment  Botha  was  threatening  to  make  an 
incursion  into  Natal. 

On  September  17,  1901,  Gough  attempted 
to  surprise  a  body  of  Boers  at  Blood  River 
Poort.  When  tho  surprise  seemed  certain 
to  succeed,  he  was  suddenly  attacked  by  500 
Boers  who  had  lain  concealed.  They  galloped 
across  the  British  front,  gained  open  ground, 
wheeled  and  charged  down  upon  the  flank 
and  rear  of  Cough's  right-hand  company. 
Cough  lost  his  guns.  Six  officers  and  38  men 
were  killed  or  wounded,  and  six  other  officers 
and  235  men  were  taken  prisoners.  "  This," 
observes  Mr.  Amery  in  The  Times  History  of 
the  War  in  South  Africa,*  "  was  the  first  occasion 

•Vol.  V..  pp.  340-1. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


S3f) 


F+WmKKm 


-  [Official  photograph . 

AMMUNITION    GOING    UP    TO    THE    GUNS    THROUGH    THE     OLD     GERMAN     LINES 

IN     FLANDERS. 


on  which  the  Boers  of  the  Eastern  Transvaal 

used  their  new  charging  tactics  with  decisive 

effect." 
• 
Gough,  who  had   been  severely  wounded  in 

the  course   of   the    campaign,  was   mentioned 

four  times  in  dispatches  for  his  services  and 

received    the    Queen's    medal    with    five    and 

King's  medal  with  two  clasps.     On  returning 

home  he  was  appointed  Brigade-Major  of  the 

1st  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  at 

Aldershot.     In  1904  he  became  an  Instructor 

at  the  Staff  College.     Two  years  later  (1907) 

he   succeeded   to   the    command   of   the    16th 

Lancers.     In  1911  (January  1)  he  received  the 

command  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Brigade  at  the 

Curragh,  where  he  diligently  trained  his  troopers 

for  the  exigencies  of  European  warfare.     His 

name  was  prominently  before  the  public  during 

the  Home  Rule  crisis  immediately  preceding 

the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  August  1914. 

When   the   Expeditionary   Force   landed   in 

France  Gough  was  at  the  head  of  his  Brigade. 

During   the   retreat   from   Mons    he   routed   a 

column  of  German  cavalry  led  by  the  Uhlans 

of  the  Prussian  Guard.     Before  the  Battle  of 

the  Marne  he  was  given  the  command  of  the 

3rd    and    5th    Cavalry    Brigades.     Thencefor- 


ward his  promotion  was  rapid.  At  the  Battle 
of  Loos  the  1st  Corps  was  under  him  and  at  the 
Battle  of  the  Somme  he  directed  the  5th 
Army,  which  in  May  1917  had  the  onerous  task 
of  assaulting,  in  company  with  Allenby's  right 
wing,  the  enemy's  positions  round  Bullecourt. 

Gough's  Fifth  Army  was,  in  the  operations 
now  under  consideration,  to  be  supported  by 
General  Plumer's  Second  Army,  composed  of 
the  Xth,  the  IXth  and  the  Hnd  Anzac  Corps. 
Its  task  was  limited  ;  it  was  only  to  advance 
a  short  distance,  but  by  doing  so  it  would 
shield  the  right  flank  of  the  Fifth  Army,  and 
by  lengthening  the  line  attacked  by  the  British, 
would  render  it  more  difficult  for  the  enemy 
to  determine  where  the  main  blow  was  to  be 
delivered.  It  would  weaken  the  artillery  fire 
against  the  Fifth  Army  by  causing  the  Germans 
to  divert  part  of  it  to  deal  with  the  Second 
Army. 

The  objective  of  the  opening  attack  was 
intended  to  be  the  crest  of  the  high  ground  east 
of  Ypres,  which  would  form  a  strong  position 
for  the  flank  in  subsequent  operations  and 
would  cover  the  bridges  over  the  Steenbeek. 
The  French  First  Army  was  to  advance  on 
the  left  of  the  British  Fifth  Army,  and  in  close 

192—3 


836 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


contact  with  it,  thus  protecting  it  from  counter- 
attack from  the  north.  This  operation  in- 
volved a  prolonged  movement  over  difficult 
country  and  would  involve  the  capture  of  the 
whole  peninsula  lying  between  the  Yser  Canal 
and  the  flooded  country  of  the  St.  Jansbeek  and 
Martje  Vaart.  The  advance  of  the  British 
Fifth  and  the  French  First  Armies  was  to  be  by 
a  series  of  bounds  from  one  defined  line  to 
another,  having  regard  to  the  lines  of  German 
defences  and  the  configuration  of  the  ground. 

The  front  held  by  the  French  before  the 
attack  only  extended  some  five  miles  from  the 
north  of  Nordschoote  to  Boesinghe.  The 
ground  to  the  north  of  this  formed  an  impassable 
morass  which  had  been  made  by  the  Belgians 
as  described  in  Volume  III.,  Chapter  LXIII. 
The  pavod  chaussio  of  Reninghe-Nordschoote- 
Drie  Grachten  ran  on  a  bank  which  kept 
above  the  water  level.  Into  this  marsh  ran 
the  Kemmelbeek,  the  Yperlee,  and  the  Martje 
Vaart.  Betwesn  Nordschoote  and  Maison  du 
Passcur  the  hostile  lines  were  a  considerable 
distance  apart,  being  separated  from  one 
another  by  ground  which  was  mostly  under 
water.  At  the  Maison  du  Passeur  there  was 
an  outpost  on  the  east  side  of  the  Yser  Canal 
connected  with  the  west  bank  bv  a  footbridge. 
From  this  point  to  Steenstraat  the  hostile 
trenches  were  about  200  to  300  yards  apart. 
From  Steenstraat  to  Boesinghe  the  canalized 
Yser,  running  from  Yprcs,  formed  the  dividing 


line.  Here  the  German  trenches,  although 
constructed  on  fairly  dry  ground,  were  but 
little  above  the  water  level.  Hence  the 
parapets  had  had  to  be  constructed  entirely 
as  epaulements.  Nor  was  it  possible  to  con- 
struct the  shot-proof  observation  stations 
from  which  to  regulate  the  fire  to  the  front. 
The  position  was,  therefore,  one  which  was 
peculiarly  liable   to  surprise. 

Facing  the  British  attack  the  Crown  Prince 
Rupprecht  had  the  4th,  6th  Reserve,  the 
10th  and  the  16th  Bavarian  Divisions,  the 
3rd  Guard,  the  23rd  Division,  and  seven  others, 
including  the  25th  (Hessian)  Division  and  tho 
235th. 

During  July  30  the  weather,  which  had 
hitherto  been  fine,  broke.  After  heavy 
thunderstorms  in  the  morning,  rain  fell  almost 
continuously  during  the  day,  and  at  night 
there  was  still  a  slight  drizzle  at  intervals.* 
When  the  troops  advanced  there  was  a  thick 
mist  and  an  overcast  sky  which  obscured  the 
landscape.  At  the  appointed  moment  the 
rj-tillery,  which  had  died  down  somewhat, 
redoubled  its  fury,  and  a  continuous  bomba.rd- 
ment  was  carried  on  over  a  long  stretch  of 
country  by  no  means  limited  to  the  actual 
length  attacked.  The  incessant  flashes  and 
the  fire-light  from  the  bursting  shells,  the 
coloured  rockets  and  flares  thrown  up  by  the 

*  There  was  only  one  fine  day  between  July  30  and 
August  6,  and  that  was  misty. 


BURSTING    SHELLS,    ROCKETS,    AND    FLARES." 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


887 


BRITISH    TROOPS    CROSSING    A    CANAL    IN    FLANDERS. 


[Official  photograph. 


enemy  feverishly  demanding  reinforcements, 
gave  a  pale  and  flickering  illumination  over 
the  scene.  The  attack  was  timed  to  commence 
at  ten  minutes  to  four  on  the  morning  of 
July  31,  but  before  the  troops  started  a  volley 
of  oildrums  and  thermit  to  set  them  on  fire  was 
discharged  against  the  first  German  line,  while 
an  accurate  artillery  barrage  covered  the 
assaulting  infantry.  Little  difficulty  was  met 
with  in  carrying  the  defended  craters,  which 
presented  no  great  obstacle  to  a  determined 
attack.  Occasionally  it  was  found  that  some 
had  been  inadvertently  passed  by,  and  that 
when  our  troops  had  moved  on  the  machine- 
gunners  in  them  would  take  the  assaulting 
troops  in  rear.  It  was  as  a  rule  neither  a  long 
nor  difficult  matter  to  snuff  these  out. 

To  the  north  of  Ypres  French  and  British 
troops  carried  the  whole  German  first  line 
without  a  check,  and  then  pushed  on  towards 
the  enemy's  second  line  in  accordance  with 
orders.  At  this  part  of  the  line  the  advance 
was  complicated  by  the  Yser  Canal  which 
had  to  be  passed.  But  on  the  27th,  as  we 
have  seen,  it  had  become  possible  to  occupy 
the  far  bank  of  the  canal,  and  in  the  next 
two  days  the  French  threw  39  and  the 
English  17  bridges  over  it,  many  of  them 
under  fire.  Passing  over  these  the  French, 
with  the  British  Guards  and  the  Welsh  regi- 
merifa  en  their  right,  hardly  hindered  by  the 
swampy  low-lying  ground  which  seriously 
hampered    the    men,   carried    Steenstraat  and 


the  German  first  line  with  little  difficulty  and 
then  moved  forward.  The  Guards  aimed  at 
Pilkem  and  its  defence  to  the  north,  the  Welsh 
regiments  advanced  against  the  south  and 
south-west  of  the  village. 

The  village  of  Pilkem  was  a  position  of 
considerable  strength.  Outside  it  there  was  a 
trench  10  feet  wide  and  12  feet  deep,  with  solid 
concrete  shelters  of  a  very  powerful  kind,  while 
the  wreckage  of  the  village  had  been  trans- 
formed by  concrete  into  strong  works  which 
afforded  considerable  shelter  even  from  heavy 
shells,  and  in  which  were  collected  largo  supplies 
of  ammunition  for  the  use  of  the  garrison. 
South  of  the  village  and  connected  with  it 
by  trenches  were  two  advanced  posts  known 
as  Gallwitz  Farm  and  Mackensen  Farm. 
East  of  Pilkem  was  another  called  Zouave 
House.  All  these  points  were  strongly  held 
and  heavily  fortified  and  their  capture  was 
no  light  task. 

The  garrison  of  Pilkem  consisted  of  the  Guard 
Fusilier  regiment  with  some  other  units.  All 
three  battalions  of  the  Guard  Fusiliers  were  in 
the  village — the  first  in  the  front  line,  the 
second  in  support,  and  the  third  in  reserve 
behind.  They  had  only  been  in  two  days  and 
were  fresh,  yet  the  two  foremost  battalions 
were  completely  crushed  by  our  guns  and  by 
the  Welsh  attack  and  offered  scarcely  any 
resistance.  The  third  did  little  better.  Of  the 
630  prisoners  whom  the  Welshmen  took,  over 
500  were  "  Cockchafers,"  the  nickname  for  the 


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THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


88i> 


<Juard  Fusilier  Regiment.. the  remainder  coming 
chiefly  from  the  9th  Grenadiers -and  the  3rd 
battalion  of  the  Lehr  Regiment,  with  a  few  from 
other  units. 

Two  Welsh  battalions,  one  of  the  Welsh 
Fusiliers,  attacked  from  the  south  and  south- 
west,  while  another  of  the  Welsh  regiment  was 
on  the  right  of  the  Fusiliers.  More  to  left  of 
this  attack  the  British  i  Guards  moved  to  the 
attack  of  the  defence  of  Pilkem,  springing  from 
the  north  of  the  village.  The  attack  was  made 
with'great  vigour,,  and  being  of  a  somewhat 
encircling  nature,  the  Germans  found  the 
Welshmen  spreading  round  their  flank  and 
rear,  thus  -  threatening  their  line  of  retreat. 
The  •  artillery  barrage  guided  the  men -in  the 
semi-darkness.  At  Mackensen  Farm  they  cap- 
tured some  prisoners  and  a  large  store  of  ammu- 
nition, rockets,  Verey  lights,  and  trench  mortars. 
On-tho  left  the  Welsh  Fusiliers,  fighting  along 
the  south  side  of  the  railway  lino  to  Thorout, 
found  some  resistance  but  captured  the 
"  Zouave  House "  and  took  a  few  prisoners. 
Hut  there  was  no  really  serious  check  all  the 
way  to  Pilkem  village,  wliich  was -itself  cap- 
tured without  great  difficulty. 

The  actual: number  of  the  Guard  Fusiliers  in 
action  was  probably  about  2,400  men  or  a  few 
more -and  a  fifth  of  its* strength  was  taken. 
The  losses  in  killed' and  wounded  of  such  a, 
crack  corps,  bent  on  acting  up  to  its  traditions, 
must  have  been  greater,  and  probably  not  more 
than  500  or  600  of  the  whole  regiment  remained 
upright  at  the  end  of  the  day.  It  was  a  very 
heavy  defeat  for  the  Kaiser's  pets.  The 
regimental  headquarters  also  were  captured, 
but  the  Colonel  and  his  staff  made  good  their 
escape. 

The  British  Guards  engaged  comprised 
parts  of  all  the  five  regiments  composing 
them.  They  went  forward,  keeping  touch  with 
their  countrymen  on  the  right  and  with  the 
French  on  their  left.  Their  advance  was 
continued  without  much  hindrance,  carrying 
point  after  point,  including  the  defences  north  of 
Pilkem,  and  capturing  GOO  prisoners.  Three 
linos  of  German  trench  positions  were  taken 
and  eventually  the  line  of  the  Steenbeek  was 
reached.  The  French  had  kept  level  with  our 
men  and  even  gone  beyond  the  zone  they  had 
been  ordered  to  take,  seizing  Bixschoote  and 
carrying  Kortekeer  Inn,  which  formed  the  point 
of  junction  with  the  British  troops.  The 
Welsh  regiments  which  had  taken  Pilkem 
pushed  on  to  the  right  of  the  Guards  on  tho 


Steenbeek.  The  infantry  was  supported  by 
some  of  our  field  batteries,  which,  notwith- 
standing the  difficulty  of  the  soddened 
ground,  managed  to  come  up  into  line.  A 
counter-attack  in  considerable  force  was  made 
against  the  northern  part  of  the  Steenbeek  line 
in  the  forenoon,  but  it  was  driven  back  with 
heavy  loss. 

This  manoeuvre  was  evidently  in  accordance 
with  the  idea  previously  alluded  to,  that  the 
soul  of  German  defence  was  to  be  found  in  the 
counter-attack  after  the  assaulting  troops  had 
been  broken  up  in  their  efforts  to  push  through 
the  line  of  defended  craters.  But  the  Allies 
had  been  allowed  to  penetrate  too  far  and  the 
Germans  did  not  properly  carry  out  their  plan. 
or,  what  is  more  likely,  could  not  persuade 
their  troops  to  do  it.  The  German  official 
account  of  the  fighting  was  that  the  English 
Army  had  been  repulsed,  adding,  however,  that 
"  after  varying  and  bitter  fights  on  a  large 
scale  the' enemy,  who  attacked  with  superior 
forces  many  ranks  deep,  had  to  content  himself 
with  the  possession  of  a  crater  position  in  our 
defensive  zone."  This  shows  that  on  this  day 
we  had  to  deal  with  a  German  position  of  the 
new  style.  From  the  ease  with  which  our 
troops  carried  it  and  from  the  failure  of  most  of 
the  counter-offensives  it  may  not  unfairly  be 
deduced  that  .the  •  system  was  not  the  success 
that  had  been  hoped  for. 

The  position  gained  by  the  French  on  the  left 
of  the  line  was  not  a  strong  one  from  the 
defensive  point  of  view,  consisting  largely  of 
craters  half  full  of  water,  any  attempt  to 
connect  which  simply  resulted  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  rivulet  of  liquid  mud.  Commu 
nications  to  the  rear  were  extraordinarily 
difficult,  for  they  had  to  pass  over  ground  which 
was  a  large  chess-board  of  holes,  many  of  them 
wide  and  some  of  great  depth.  The  men 
holding  tho  front  had  brought  provisions  for 
four  days  with  them  and  contrived  to  make  hot 
coffee,  which  with  a  little  wine  and  brandy  and 
the  hard  food  served  them  to  keep  body  and 
soul  together. 

The  Germans  knew  the  ground,  knew  how 
poor  must  be  the  newly  occupied  crater  position, 
and  thought,  not  unnaturally,  that  a  strong 
flank  attack  might  turn  the  French  out  and 
throw  back  the  Allies  from  the  Steenbeek.  A 
division  of  the  Prussian  Guard  was  therefore 
brought  through  the  Forest  of  Houthulst, 
without  being  informed  that,  it  was  being 
taken   into    action.     Believing   that   it   was   a 


:540 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


mere  practice  march  the  men  went  forward. 
What  was  their  surprise  to  learn  when  they 
emerged  from  the  wood  and  could  hear  the  roar 
of  battle  and  see  its  smoke  that  they  were  now 
to  attack.  As  they  neared  the  point  where  they 
were  to  deploy  their  courage  began  to  fail, 
gradually  the  men  slowed  down  and  began' to 
seek  refuge  in  any  available  cover.  A  prisoner 
taken  from  this  force  stated  that  in  his  company 
of  about  150  men  hardly  50  reached  attacking 
distance,  and  of  those  who  did  so  the'majority 
took  refuge  in  shell-holes,  only  a  mere  handful 
being  left  to  attack.  A  counter-stroke  con- 
ducted in  this  fashion  was  doomed  to  failure, 
and  the  French  drove  it  back  with  loss  and  the 
capture  of  some  prisoners. 

In  the  central  attack  of  the  Fifth  Army  the 
obstacles  in  the  path  of  our  men  were  greater 
than  on  the  left.  The  ground  was  more  cut  up, 
the  soil  was i  nearly  everywhere  water-logged. 
The  German  defences  from  Shrewsbury  Forest 
through  Inverness  Copse  and  Glencorse  Wood 
were  strong  and  protected  a  good  deal  from 
artillery  fire  by  their  position.  The  left  flank 
was  supported  by  the  village  of  Zandvoorde 
and  the  whole  system  formed  a  formidable 
position.     It  was  rendered  more  so  from  the 


fact  that  the  rain  prevented  our  troops  from 
seeing  the  German  movements  behind  the 
ridge,  while  the  same  cause  stopped  our  aviators 
from  making  their  usual  reconnaissances  and 
spotting  for  our  guns.  Thus,  beyond  a  simple 
barrage  covering  tho  advance  of  the  infantry, 
our  artillery  was  not  able  to  render  much  assist- 
ance during  the  battle,  and  even;  this  not 
always.  It  was  true  that  our  heavy  guns 
kept  under  fire  the  roads  along  which  tho 
enemy's  supports  had  to  come  up.  Never- 
theless, these  contrived  to  assemble  behind 
this  portion  of  the  field  in'  suchxnumbers, 
moving  slowly  across  the  fields,  as  to  accumu- 
late a  very  considerable  force  for  counter- 
attack. 

The  German  resistance  was  a  determined  one, 
especially  in  front  of  the  Inverness  Copse  and 
Glencorse  Wood,  but  in  both  cases  the  Germans 
were  ousted  from  their  trenches  by  Territorials 
and  Highland  units,  though  not  without 
strenuous  efforts  and  considerable  loss.  North 
of  Glencorse  WTood  (on  the  road  to  Becelaere 
from  Ypres)  the  advance  was,  however,  con- 
tinued without  waiting  for  the  fall  of  these 
points,  and  Westhoek  was  taken  and  held  for  a 
time.     In  Shrewsbury  Forest  the  enemy  clung 


[Ojftcial  photograph. 


IRISH    GUARDS    WEARING    GERMAN     BODY-ARMOUR. 

Examining  a  captured  German  machine-gun. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


341 


[Official  photograph. 

LOOKING    TOWARDS    INVERNESS    COPSE    AND    GLENCORSE    WOOD. 


to  a  strongly  organized  work,  nor  was  he  turned 
out  of  it  till  the  morning  of  the  next  day. 

On  the  left  of  our  central  attack  the  Hertford- 
shire Territorials  with  other  troops  of  the  same 
class  led  the  way  towards  St.  Julien,  extending 
the  assault  of  Welshmen  and  Guards  against 
Pilkom  and  the  Steenbeek  beyond.  The  regi- 
ment pressed  gallantly  on  towards  Alberta 
Farm  till  it  was  brought  up  by  an  uncut  wire 
entanglement.  Fortunately  a  tank  had  accom- 
panied the  movement  and  it  at  once  proceeded  to 
flatten  out  the  obstruction  and  forced  the 
enemy  in  position  behind  it  to  fall  back  on  the 
farm  itself.  Once  more  the  tank  came  to  the 
rescue,  and  pushing  its  way  into  the  farm  soon 
induced  the  garrison  to  bolt  or  surrender. 
Sixty  prisoners  were  the  result.  The  Terri- 
torials now  found  the  way  to  St.  Julien  fairly 
open  to  them,  and,  pressing  onward  with  troops 
of  other  battalions,  captured  the  viltage.  Here 
were  several  German  5-9-in.  howitzers,  which 
fell  into  their  hands,  and  a  considerable  dump  of 
ammunition.  The  enemy  when  once  he  saw 
the  village  was  lost  turned  a  heavy  artillery 
fire  on  to  it,  which,  besides  damaging  the  village 
and  causing  considerable  losses  to  our  men, 
blew  up  an  ammunition  dump,  which  did 
further  mischief  to  the  village  and  its  defenders. 


Incidentally,  a  good  many  German  prisoners 
were  killed  and  wounded. 

In  spite  of  the  German  barrage  the  Hertfords 
and  the  battalions  associated  with  them 
pressed  on  beyond  against  another  enemy 
trench.  In  front  of  this  was  a  considerable 
length  of  uncut  wire  placed  below  the  trench, 
in  which  were  many  machine-guns.  Pushing 
and  cutting  their  way,  part  of  the  gallant  men 
got  through  and  went  straight  for  the  Germans, 
while  others  worked  round  their  flanks. 
Finally  they  captured  the  position.  While 
some  of  the  men,  who  had  lost  nearly  all  their 
officers,  set  to  work  to  consolidate  their  holding, 
others  went  forward  to  receive  a  further  number 
of  Germans  who  had  held  up  their  hands  in 
token  of  surrender.  But  the  advance  had 
been  too  rapid  and  not  in  sufficient  force,  the 
flanks  were  quite  tmprotected,  and  some 
machine-guns  had  even  got  in  rear  of  our  men. 
The  rattle  of  these  gave  fresh  courage  to  the 
Germans — the  lately  captured  prisoners  rose 
and  struggled  with  their  captors,  while  the 
party  which  had  tlirown  down  its  arms  in 
token  of  surrender  snatched  them  up  again 
and  opened  fire.  However,  these  were  soon 
shot  down  in  sufficient  numbers  to  stop  their 
endeavours,     while     the     prisoners     who     had 


34-2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Official  photograph 

THE    THIRD    BATTLE    OF    YPRES :    A     BIG     BATCH     OF    PRISONERS    ON    THE    WAY 

TO    RAIL-HEAD. 


attacked  their  guards  were  disposed  of  by  shot 
or  bayonet.  But  a  still  more  formidable  foe 
had  to  be  dealt  with.  A  considerable  counter- 
attack was  led  against  our  gallant  men  from 
the  supporting  troops  which  had  been  brought 
up  for  counter-attack.  It  was  beaten  off ; 
but  the  position  was  untenable,  and  in  the 
afternoon  the  troops  holding  it  cut  their  way 
back  to  St.  Julien,  their  retreat  being  facili- 
tated by  troops  sent  up  to  help  them.  This 
village  had  also  to  be  abandoned  owing  to  the 
severe  counter-attacks  and  heavy  artillery  fire 
brought  against  it.  But  we  maintained  a 
bridge-head  over  the  Steenbeek,  just  north  of 
the  village,  which  was  retaken  on  August  3, 
with  the  exception  of  an  insignificant  portion 
of  the  eastern  end.  The  prisoners  taken  at  and 
about  St.  Julien  amounted  to  over  a  thousand, 
in  addition  to  which  the  Guards  had  captured 
some  six  hundred. 

While  all  this  was  happening  fighting  had 
been  going  on  to  the  south  of  St.  Julien,  on  the 
right  of  the  Territorials.  Here  a  number  of 
Lancashire  battalions  had  advanced  from  the 
neighbourhood  of  Wieltje  against  the  German 
position  from  Pommern  Castle  to  the  south, 
along    tho    Hannebeek    brook.     The    defences 


here  were  very  strong,  and  had  been  by  no 
means  entirely  crushed  by  our  artillery  fire. 
The  ground  was  extremely  cut  up,  undulating, 
and  covered  in  parts  with  the  remains  of  woods 
and  liberally  endowed  with  concrete  defences. 
The  numerous  farm  houses,  or  rather  their 
shattered  remains,  had  been  used  as  bases, 
and  on  them  had  been  reconstructed  very 
powerful  redoubts.  These  were  protected  by 
extensive  wire  entanglements.  In  advance  of 
these  points  the  Germans  had,  as  usual,  had  a 
first  line  of  shell  craters  and  light  trenches, 
and,  as  usual,  had  been  driven  out  of  them 
by  our  artillery.  But  the  supporting  points  of 
this  line  were  still  more  or  less  intact,  and  it 
was  a  by  no  means  easy  matter  to  deal  with 
them. 

It  may  here  be  well  to  allude  especially  to 
the  work  done  by  the  tanks  in  aiding  the 
attack  on  these  defences.  The  ground  they 
had  to  traverse  could  not  have  been  worse. 
Some  of  them  got  stuck  fast  in  the  mud  or 
became  temporarily  embedded  in  the  German 
defences,  but  not  until  they  had  driven  well 
beyond  the  first  line,  and  even  then  they  con- 
tinued to  render  valuable  service  to  the  infantry 
they  supported,  although  they  suffered  some 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


343 


casualties  ;  but  they  had  immensely  aided  the 
advance. 

It  had  been  no  light  matter  to  bring  them 
up  into  the  front  of  action,  where  they  took  up 
their  positions  for  the  advance.  In  places  the 
crews  had  to  pilot  them  in  the  darkness.  They 
had  come  through  miles  of  roadside  camps 
filled  with  sleeping  men,  threading  their  way  in 
and  out  through  long  lines  of  lorries  taking 
ammunition  and  stores  to  the  front.  Their 
progress  was  not  unmarked  by  incident.  One 
tank  did  not  notice  some  wagons  standing  on  a 
railway  siding  it  had  to  cross,  and  passed 
through  the  train  as  though  it  had  been  a 
sheet  of  paper,  doing  much  damage.  Another 
showed  its  strength  in  equally  disconcerting 
fashion.  It  came  upon  a  lorry  ditched  at  the 
side  of  the  road  and  tried  to  pull  it  out.  Chains 
were  adjusted,  and  the  tank  heaved  slowly  on. 
The  lorry  was  emerging  from  the  ooze  when  a 
sudden  jerk  showed  that  the  tank  had  pulled 
free  the  forward  axle  of  the  lorry  and  the 
engine,  but  left  the  rear  half  still  sticking  ! 

But  little  incidents  like  these  did  not  in  any 
way  diminish  the  ardour  of  the  tankmen  or 
even  much  disturb  those  upon  whom  they 
had  acted  with  such  vigour.     At  Plum  Farm 


and  Apple  Villa,  and  in  stronger,  more  elaborate 
fortified  points,  liko  the  Frezenberg,  Pommern 
Castle  and  Pommern  Redoubt,  the  enemy's 
machine-gunners  held  out  when  everything 
about  them  was  chaos  and  death,  and  poured 
volleys  of  bullets  on  our  advancing  men. 
Platoons  and  half -platoons  attacked  them  in 
detail  at  a  great  cost  of  life,  without  gaining  any 
considerable  success.  In  such  cases  the  tanks 
rendered,  as  we  shall  see,  invaluable  aid  in 
disposing  of  obstacles  which  infantry  alone 
could  hardly  have  tackled,  and  which  the 
weather  had  prevented  the  artillery  from 
destroying. 

The  country  over  which  the  Lancashire 
lads  had  to  advance,  starting  from  Wieltje, 
against  a  succession  of  trenches  to  the  south 
of  St.  Julien  and  left  of  Frezenberg,  was  dotted 
with  concrete  forts  covering  German  machine- 
gunners.  Many  of  these  had  been  destroyed 
by  artillery  fire,  but  many  were  still  left. 
Whenever  our  line  was  checked  by  machine- 
gun  fire  from  one  of  them  it  had  to  be  taken 
before  the  advance  could  proceed.  So  the 
attack  became  a  succession  of  petty  sieges,  in 
which  our  men  had  developed  consummate 
skill  and  showed  the  utmost  hardihood.     Some 


[Official  photograph. 
THE    THIRD    BATTLE    OF    YPRES:    WEARY    PRISONERS    GET    A    WELCOME    REST. 


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344 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


845 


timo3  L,ewis  gunners  would  pour  in  such  a 
fire  through  the  loopholes  that  the  Germans 
could  not  fire  their  machine-guns.  At  others 
the  samo  result  would  he  obtained  by  the  fire 
of  expert  marksmen.  Then  a  bomber  would 
wriggle  up  until  he  reached  a  point  where  the 
machine-gun  could  not  hit  him,  and  then  throw 
bombs  into  the  pill -box.  Or  a  party  would 
contrive  to  get  round  to  its  roar  and  throw 
bombs  through  the  bolt  holes.  In  this  way 
two  strong  points  were  taken,  even  while  the 
assaulting  men  suffered  from  the  enfilade  firo 
from  another  fort  till  this  was  rushed  and  over 
a  hundred  prisoners  taken. 

In  these  conditions  the  Lancashire  men  had 
gone  forward.  Nothing  stopped  them  for 
long,  though  they  suffered  severely.  They 
reached  each  point  of  their  advance  within  the 
time  allotted  them,  as  they  went  along  methodi- 
cally. There  were  certain  points  in  the  second- 
line  trenches,  strongly  fortified  and  stoutly 
held,  which  were  reduced  by  the  first  attacking 
troops.  Five  batteries  of  German  field  guns 
fired  upon  our  men  until  they  w  ere  within  close 
range.  But  the  gunners  W3ro  shot  down  and 
our  men  went  through  the  guns  in  perfect 
order  just  as  though  on  a  field  day.  Then  othor 
Lancashire  men  camo  along  and  carried  on 
the  good  work,  and  not  only  went  on  to  the 
ultimate  limit  of  tho  general  advance  but  even 
beyond  it.  Some  went  beyond  the  Steenbeek 
as  far  as  Wurst  Farm. 

It  was  not  possible  to  hold  these  forward 
posts.  The  Germans  concentrated  a  very  heavy 
artillery  fire  against  them  and  counter-attacks 
in  strength  developed,  so  that  it  was  necessary 
to  withdraw,  but  the  withdrawal  was  effected 
fighting  every  inch  of  the  way.  As  the  German 
waves  came  on  these  men  inflicted  casualties  on 
them  far  exceeding  their  own  numbers. 

But  the  attack  had  exponded  its  force 
and  had  its  northern  flank  exposed  beyond 
the  Hertfords*  at  St.  Julien.  Against  it  the 
enemy  developed  a  powerful  attack  from  his 
accumulated  reserves.  Preceded  by  a  powerful 
artillery  fire  the  strength  employed  was  suffi- 
cient to  drive  the  Lancashire  men  back.  An 
attack  on  their  right  was  not  so  successful. 

At  Pommern  Castle,  which  was  also  attacked 
by  Lancashire  men,  the  tanks  did  very  woll. 
This  strongly  built  work,  with  Pommern 
Redoubt,  formed  one  system  of  defence  behind 
the    Hannebeek,    a    little    south    of    Fortuin. 

*  The  Hertfordshire  and  Herefordshire  regiments  were 
Territorials  not  forming  part  of  an  infantry  regiment. 


Our  men  were  fighting  hard  for  the  castle  and 
suffering  loss.  The  tanks  advancing  on  the 
Pommern  group  had  to  cross  this  brook,  which 
had  banks  of  soft,  clinging  mud.  They 
moved  steadily  on  while  machine-gun 
bullets  rattled  on  their  heads  and  flanks, 
and  anti-tank  guns,  directed  by  observers 
behind  the  redoubt,  tried  to  get  a  direct  hit. 
One  tank,  which  had  cleaned  up  the  wreckage 
of  a  farm,  came  upon  Pommern  Castle  from 
the  west.  The  German  soldiers  did  not  like 
the  look  of  their  visitor,  which  was  firing  hard, 
and  fled  to  the  cover  of  the  Pommern  Redoubt 
beyond.  The  tank  worked  its  way  through  the 
Castle,  and  the  occupants  of  Pommern  Redoubt, 
seeing  a  tank  threatening  them  from  the 
rear,  ran  back  into  the  Castle,  and  actually 
retook  it  from  our  men.  But  our  men  fighting 
round  about  called  to  the  tank  to  help  them  ; 
it  came  back,  with  the  infantry  on  its  flanks, 
and  made  another  assault,  so  that  the  enemy 
fled  again.  Pommern  Redoubt  was  attacked 
in  the  same  way,  with  good  help  from  the 
tank. 

The  Highlanders  attacked  somewhat  farther 
south  than  the  Lancashire  battalions.  They 
also  had  in  front  of  them  well  fortified  farms, 
woods,  and  concrete  defences  of  every  kind. 
At  one  of  these  the  men  holding  it  in  front 
got  round  behind,  and  so  broke  in.  At  another 
the  bayonet  served  the  purpose.  There  was 
one  farm  where  the  Scotsmen  got  1 30  unwoum  lei  I 
prisoners.  The  Scotsmen  still  pressed  on,  but 
eventually,  owing  to  the  forward  movement 
of  the  Lancashire  men  leaving  a  gap  on  their 
right,  they  had  to  retire  before  a  German 
attack  delivered  against  it.  However,  they 
fought  their  way  up  to  the  Frezenberg  Redoubt, 
coming  under  a  blast  of  machine-gun  fire  from 
a  neighbouring  farm  until  they  captured  its 
garrison  and  then  they  went  against  two  other 
German  redoubts. 

Two  tanks  which  had  been  aiding  the  advance 
had  the  misfortune  to  get  stuck  in  soft  ground 
near  Frezenberg.  Believing  they  were  helpless 
the  Germans  tried  to  capture  them,  but  the 
tanks  turned  all  their  guns  on  the  line  of 
grey  figures  moving  towards  them,  and, 
Scottish  infantry  coming  up,  the  combined 
effect  of  cold  steel  and  fire  beat  back  the 
enemy.  Tanks  more  than  once  were  brought 
to  a  standstill  on  such  ground,  and  on  several 
occasions  their  crews  brought  out  the  machine- 
guns  into  the  open  and  used  them  against  the 
enemy. 


846 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A    SCENE    ON    CAPTURED    GROUND    NEAR    HOOGE. 


[Official  photograph. 


The  Scottish  troops  below  the  Langemarck- 
Zonnebeke  road  were  attacked  in  the  after- 
noon and  their  line  of  advanced  posts  gradually 
withdrew.  At  six  o'clock,  after  a  furious 
machine-gun  fire,  the  enemy  slightly  pene- 
trated the  line,  driving  the  Scots  back  a 
hundred  yards  ;  but  a  body  of  the  Cameron 
Highlanders  came  up  and  the  sight  of  the  new 
men  made  the  Germans  hesitate.  Then  the 
Camerons  went  for  them  shouting.  The  Ger- 
mans did  not  wait  for  the  shock  and  fled 
back  before  it  reached  them.  The  Highlanders 
advanced  again  and  the  whole  force  once  more 
occupied  the  line  from  which  they  had  fallen 
back. 

The  troops  attacking  towards  Hooge  and 
Westhoek.  had  to  deal  with  a  strong  point 
known  as  Stirling  Castle,  formed  of  massive 
concrete  works  erected  on  the  ruins  of  a  stately 
chateau.  The  trenches  in  front  of  it  were  taken 
by  Scottish  and  North  English  troops,  and 
eventually  the  castle  itself  was  captured  by 
Manehesters  and  Royal  Scots.  Against  it  a 
powerful  counter-attack  was  delivered,  chiefly 
by  young  Corman  troops,  who  fought  well. 

The  capture  of  Hooge  and  the  trenches  round 
the  chateau  did  not  prove  a  very  difficult  task, 
•us  the  artillery  had  bombarded  them  out  of 


existence.  But  the  garrisons  had  retreated 
into  a  chain  of  strong  posts  on  the  east  side  of 
Bellewairde  Lake.  It  took  the  Sherwood 
Foresters  and  Northamptons  some  time  to 
master  these,  but  in  less  than  an  hour  the  Ger- 
man support  trench  had  been  captured  and 
there  our  troops  established  themselves.  The 
position,  however,  was  difficult.  Owing  to 
the  weather  there  was  not  sufficient  artillery 
support,  and  our  men,  therefore,  did  the 
correct  thing,  and  dug  themselves  in  and  occu- 
pied shell  craters.  The  Germans  recaptured 
a  part  of  the  ground  we  had  taken  by  Clapham 
Junction  and  Inverness  Copse,  and  thus 
secured  for  a  time  the  German  line  running 
back  by  Westhoek. 

North  of  this  part  of  _  the  field  the  troops 
concerned  in  this  central  attack  had  also 
severe  fighting.  They  had  the  serious  obstacle 
of  the  Bellewaarde  Lake  and  also  some  woods, 
of  which  part  were  standing,  to  go  through, 
before  getting  at  the  Germans  on  the  Westhoek 
ridge.  Here  the  Sherwood  Foresters  and  the 
Northamptons  did  good  service.  There  was  a 
good  deal  of  actual  hand  to  hand  fighting,  for 
the  nature  of  the  ground  allowed  the  assaulting 
troops  to  get  rapidly  up  to  their  opponents' 
positions.     The  Northamptons  drove  the  Ger- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


847 


mans  out  of  one  trench  with  their  bayonets, 
taking  nearly  100  prisoners,  while  40  more 
were  captured  when  a  concrete  fort,  built  on 
the  remains  of  a  country  house,  fell  into  their 
hands.  A  similar  erection  when  stormed  by 
the  Northamptons  yielded  40  more  German 
soldiers  who  preferred  captivity  to  death. 

Connecting  these  troops  with  the  Scottish 
moving  against  Frezenberg  were  men  from  the 
Knglish  Midland  Counties,  and  these  were 
sent  against  the  railway  embankment  running 
towards  Roulers  which  had  been  made  into  a 
formidable  work  by  means  of  concrete  machine  - 
gun  emplacements.  They  made  a  considerable 
advance,  and  while  their  right,  joining  on  to 
the  Sherwood  Foresters  and  Northamptons, 
moved  on  with  them  in  the  direction  of  West- 
hoek  their  left  kept  connection  with  the  Scottish 
troops  marching  on  Frezenberg.  The  railway 
bank  was  taken.  The  left  of  this  attack  had  a 
more  difficult  task  after  the  first  phase,  when  it 
was  continued  against  Westhoek.  Sieben  Home 
proved  to  be  a  serious  obstacle,  a  heavy  mass 
of  concrete  powerfully  armed  with  machine- 
guns.  But  the  British  managed  to  surround 
it    and    the    fire   they    brought    to    bear    from 


rifles,  machine-guns,  and  bombs,  convinced 
the  garrison  that  further  resistance  was 
inexpedient.  Forty  live  men  surrendered, 
and  besides  these  there  were  many  killed  and 
wounded. 

A  further  advance  by  the  British  to  the 
outskirts  of  the  village  of  Westhoek  was  now 
made.  Tn  the  latter  there  was  a  strong  point 
round  what  had  been  a  public-house,  now 
concrete  covered  ;  this  was  carried  and  40 
prisoners  taken.  Tt  was  not,  however,  found 
possible  to  do  more  than  cling  to  the  outer 
skirts  of  the  village,  and  the  men  had  to  be 
content  with  holding  a  line  of  shell  craters 
half  filled  with  water.  Here  they  were  severely 
handled  by  the  German  artillery  and  by  several 
counter-attacks.  When  day  broke  the  Germans 
were  seen  to  be  assembling  for  fresh  counter- 
attack, this  time  in  force.  They  were  seen 
emerging  from  Polygon  Wood  while  others 
were  observed  moving  down  from  Zonnebeke. 
The  great  attack  was  delayed  till  after  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  although  a  certain 
amount  of  artillery  fire  had  been  previous! y 
brought  to  bear  on  the  British  infantry.  For 
some  unexplained  reason  our  artillery  did  not 


[Ofliciil  photograph. 

ON    THE    HEELS    OF    THE    ENEMY:    CROSSING    A    PONTOON    BK1DGE. 


848 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


begin  the  barrage  till  after  the  commencement 
of  the  counter-stroke,  and  thus  the  infantry- 
was  left  to  its  own  resources.  But  with  the 
help  of  machine-guns  our  men  managed  to 
irush  it,  as  they  did  subsequent  attempts.  But 
in  these  our  guns  took  part. 

The  attacks  of  the  Germans  from  Frezenberg 
down  to  Westhoek  were  stopped.  But  as  has 
been  already  mentioned  they  had  managed  to 
cling  on  to  Clapham  Junction  and  Inverness 
Copse,  which,  with  the  village  of  Westhoek, 
still  formed  a  barrier  to  our  further  ad- 
vance. 

The  men  who  attacked  over  ground  to  the 
east  of  Zillebeke  had  a  rough  time.  It  was 
almost  pitch  dark,  for  daybreak  was  dull, 
when  they  went  forward,  and  because  of 
this  fact  and  the  nature  of  the  ground,  the 
troops  lost  order.  Moreover,  the  barrage, 
doubtless  regulated  by  time,  went  ahead 
of  them,  so  that  they  had  to  struggle  onward 
unsupported  by  its  fire,  while  the  Germans 
took  them  in  front  and  on  their  flanks.  Two 
lines  of  trenches  were  captured  without  much 
difficulty  as  far  as  the  enemy  was  concerned, 
about  80  prisoners  being  taken  in  them,  but 
with   enormous   difficulty   on    account   of   the 


boggy  ground.  The  men,  loaded  with  packs 
and  rifles  and  often  carrying  sandbags  and 
shovels,  slipped  continually  into  the  frequent 
shell  craters,  which  were  full  of  mud,  water, 
and  wire.  Some  stopped  to  help  their  com- 
rades, but  were  dragged  in  by  them.  It  took 
them  three-quarters  of  an  hour  to  get  over  two 
lines  of  almost  abandoned  trenches,  whole 
platoons  getting  stuck  in  them  or  slipping  back 
when  they  tried  to  climb  out.  Thus  it  was 
that  two  and  a  half  hours  were  taken  to  get 
to  the  second  objective  in  Sanctuary  Wood, 
and  the  enemy's  riflemen  who  had  been  firing 
at  close  range  then  ran  back. 

The  Menin  road  from  Ypres  runs  through  the 
high  ground  and  the  Wood.  It  was  here  that 
the  hardest  time  came  for  our  troops  becausa 
of  the  machine-gun  fire  which  struck  them  in 
front  and  on  the  flanks  from  positions  which 
could  only  be  located  imperfectly  by  the  fire 
emanating  from  them.  There  was  a  tunnel 
under  the  Menin  Road.  An  officer  sent  up  by 
the  Brigadier  to  ascertain  the  exact  position, 
gathered  together  a  number  of  men  and  found 
the  western  end  of  it.  He  captured  the. only 
Germans  whom  he  found  there,  four  in  number, 
and    as    the    eastern   end    of   the    tunnel    had 


<jj.t.hii  p>, 


REPAIRING    A    LOCK. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


349 


already  been  cleared  the  whole  was  now  in  our 
possession. 

The  tanks  had  a  hard  task  in  the  wooded 
tracts  on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road. 
In  the  largest  of  these  patches  the  trees  were 
still  thick  and  it  was  defended  by  numerous 
machine  guns.  When  the  tanks  and  infantry, 
having  captured  the  German  redoubt  in  front 
of  it,  advanced  on  both  sides  they  woro 
received  by  a  heavy  fire.  Although  this  patch 
and  another  fragment  of  woodland  near  it  were 
oeyond  the  line  now  taken  up  by  our  troops,  it 
was  undesirable  to  leave  them  in  the  hands  of 
the  Germans,  to  whom  they  afforded  shelter 
for  counter-assaults.  The  tanks,  therefore, 
went  on,  and  searched  out  its  hidden  de- 
fences with  their  guns.  Before  the  German 
artillery  put  the  tanks  out  of  action  by  direct 
hits  the  woods  were  full  of  dead  and  wounded 
Germans,  and  prisoners  stated  that  the  casual- 
ties had  been  very  severe. 

Severe  fighting  had  been  going  on  all  day  on 
the  right  of  the  British  attack  past  Hollebeke, 
and  over  the  ground  between  Oosttaverne  and 
Warneton.  Here  the  Second  Army  was  taking 
part  in  the  struggle.  Opposite  Hollebeke  the 
assault  was  made  by  English  county  troops. 
In  the  darkness  it  was  impossible  to  locate 
accurately  all  the  craters  occupied  by  the 
German  machine-gunners  ;  some  of  these  lay 
quiet,  and  when  our  troops  had  passed  by 
opened  fire  on  their  rear.  But  they  were 
discovered  soon  after  daylight  broke  and  were 
appropriately  dea'.t  with. 

The  ruins  of  Hollebeke  were  full  of  concrete- 
covered  strongholds  held  by  the  Germans,  who, 
however,  offered  very  little  resistance.  Without 
much  difficulty  our  men  bombed  them  out, 
and  then  proceeded  to  capture  the  railway 
that  ran  by  the  Comines  Canal  and  down  from 
Battle  Wood — this  had  been  strongly  fortified 
with  many  concrete  posts.  But  these  too 
were  stalked  by  some  Middlesex  bombers,  and 
captured,  and  the  ground  north  of  the  bend  of 
the  Ypres-Comines  Canal  and  east  of  Battle 
Wood  secured.  Below  Hollebeke  there  were 
two  streams,  the  Roozebeek  and  the  Warnbeek, 
divided  by  a  spur  on  which  Oosttaverne  is 
situated.  Against  the  wooded  spurs  between 
these  two  streams  the  Australians  advanced 
with  the  New  Zealanders  on  their  right.  The 
formor  after  a  very  severe  struggle  made  good 
a  considerable  advance.  La  Basse  Ville  was 
also  captured  by  the  New  Zealanders  as  the 
result  of  smart  fighting. 


No  further  advance  was  attempted  on  this 
wing  ;  it  was  intended  by  Sir  Douglas  Haig  to 
be  more  in  the  nature  of  a  demonstration. 

During  the  night  of  the  31st  and  the  next 


[Official  photograph. 
A    MUDDY    ROAD. 

following  days  the  enemy  delivered  many 
counter-attacks,  some  pressed  with  great 
vigour,  others  without  any  serious  effort.  His 
main  endeavours  were  made  with  a  view  to  dis- 
lodge our  troops  from  the  commanding  ground 
north  of  the  Menin  road  stretching  up  to  the 
Steenbeek  ;  especially  did  he  seek  to  recover 
his  second  lino  system  between  Frezenberg 
and  St.  Julien.  But  his  attempts  were  made 
entirely  in  vain,  the  sole  success  being  our 
withdrawal  from  St.  Julien,  as  already  alluded  to 
(ante  p.  342). 

The  description  of  the  first  day's  fighting 
would  be  incomplete  without  some  account 
at  the  work  of  our  airmen.  We  have  seen  that 
the  weather  had  put  a  stop  to  effective  recon- 
naissance and  to  observation  of  the  result  of 
our  artillery  fire.  But  this  did  not  prevent 
our  gallant  aviators  from  rendering  excellent, 
if  more  limited,  services  in  the  preceding 
fighting  and  during  the  battle.  The  following  is 


850 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Official  photograph. 

A    GERMAN    AEROPLANE    BROUGHT    DOWN    BY    OUR    FIRE    IN    FLANDERS. 


extracted     from 
August  3  : 


The     Daily     Tekf/raph      of 


These  airmen  of  ours  attacked  the  German  troops  on 
the  march  and  scattered  them,  dropped  bombs  on  their 
camps  and  aerodromes,  flying  so  low  that  their  wheels 
skirted  the  grass,  and  were  seldom  more  than  a  few 
yards  above  the  tree-tops.  The  narrative  of  one  man 
begins  with  his  .flight  over  the  enemy's  country,  crossing 
canals  and  roads  as  low  as  30  feet,  until  he  came  to  a 
German  aerodrome.  The  men  there  paid  no  attention, 
thinking  this  low  flier  was  one  of  theirs,  until  a  bomb 
fell  on  the  first  shed.  Then  they  ran  in  all  directions 
panic  stricken.  The  English  pilot  skimmed  round  to 
the  other  side  of  the  r.hed  and  played  his  machine-gun 
through  the  open  doors,  then  soared  a  little  and  gavo 
the  second  shed  a  bomb.  He  flew  round  and  released 
a  bomb  for  the  third  shed,  but  failed  with  the  fourth, 
because  the  handle  did  not  act  quickly  enough.  So  ho 
spilt  his  bomb  between  the  shed  and  a  railway  train 
standing  sti'l  there.  By  this  time  a  German  machine- 
gun  had  got  to  work  upon  him,  but  he  swooped  right 
down  upon  it,  scattering  the  gunners  with  a  burst  of 
bullets,  and  flew  across  the  shods  again,  firing  into  them 
at  20  feet.  His  ammunition  drum  was  exhausted,  and 
he  went  up  to  a  cloud  to  change,  and  then  came  down 
actually  to  the  ground,  tripping  across  the  grass  on 
dancing  wheels,  and  firing  into  the  sheds  where  thi 
mechanics  were  cowering. 

Then  he  tired  of  this  aerodrome  and  flew  off,  overtaking 
two  German  officers  on  horses.  He  dived  at  them  and 
the  horses  bolted.  He  came  upon  a  column  of  200 
troops  on  the  march,  and  swooped  above  their  heads 
with  a  stream  of  bullets  until  they  ran  into  hedges  and 
•litches.  Ho  was  using  a  lot  of  ammunition,  and  went 
up  into  a  cloud  to  fix  another  drum.  Two  German 
aeroplanes  came  up  to  search  for  him,  and  he  flew  to 
meet  them  and  drove  one  down  so  that  it  crashed  to 
earth.     German    soldiers    gathered    round   it,   and    our 


fellow  came  down  to  them  and  fired  into  their  crowd. 
A  little  lower  he  flew  over  a  passenger  train  and  pattered 
bullets  through  its  windows,  and  then,  having  no  more 
ammunition,  went  home. 

Another  pilot  went  up  in  a  rainstorm.  He  saw  a 
German  motor-car  with  two  officers  and  gave  chase. 
He  saw  it  turn  into  side  roads,  and  followed.  Then  he 
came  low  and  used  his  machine-gun.  One  of  the 
officers  fired  an  automatic  pistol  at  him,  so  our  boy 
thought  that  a  good  challenge  and,  leaving  go  of  his 
machine-gun,  pulled  out  his  own  revolver,  and  there  was 
the  strangest  duel  between  a  boy  in  the  air  and  a  man 
in  a  car.  The  aeroplane  was  50  feet  high  then,  but 
dropped  to  20  just  as  the  car  pulled  up  outside  a  house. 
The  young  pilot  shot  past,  but  turned  and  saw  the  body 
of  one  officer  being  dragged  indoors.  He  swooped  over 
the  house  and  fired  his  machine-gun  into  it,  and  then 
sent  a  Verey  light  into  the  car,  hoping  to  sot  it  on  fire. 
Presently  he  was  attacked  by  a  bombardment  from 
machine-guns,  "Archies,"  and  light  rockets,  so  he  mm 
high  and  took  cover  in  the  clouds.  But  it  was  not  the 
last  episode  of  his  day  out.  He  saw  some  infantry  cross, 
ing  a  wooden  bridge  and  dived  at  them  with  rapid 
bursts  of  machine-gun  fire.  They  ran  like  rabbits 
from  a  shot-gun,  and  when  ho  came  round  again  he  saw 
four  or  five  dead  lying  on  the  bridge.  From  the  ditches 
men  fired  at  him  with  rifles,  so  he  stooped  low  and  strafed 
them,  and  then  went  homo  quite  pleased  with  himself. 

The  weather  during  the  first  four  days  of 
August  was  extremely  bad,  rain  coining  down 
without  a  stop  during  the  whole  period.  The 
condition  of  the  ground  which  our  men  held 
was  almost  unendurably  bail.  The  whole 
surface  of  the  ground  became  one  vast  quag- 
mire,    unpassable     except    by     a     few    well- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


351 


defined  tracks  swept  by  artillery  fire.  To 
move  on  these  was  dangerous,  to  leave  them 
meant  very  often  death  by  suffocation  in 
the  mud.  ]n  these  circumstances  no  general 
offensive  was  possible,  and  the  British  Com- 
mander-in-Chief had  to  wait  till  the  ground 
dried  before  he  could  go  on  with  large-scale 
operations.  To  this  unfortunate  fact  was  due 
1  he  failure  to  secure  what  might  have  been  a 
very  important  victory.  As  at  Arras,  the 
delay  caused  by  the  weather  was  of  enormous 
advantage  to  the  Germans.  Their  troops  had 
time  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  defeat  ; 
they  were  ablo  to  bring  up  fresh  men,  more 
guns  and  much  ammunition  to  replace  the 
wear  and  tear  of  the  fighting. 

But  our  men  were  still  able  to  do  something, 
and  their  energies  were  directed  to  strengthen 
the  line  they  had  captured  and  to  a  few  small 
tactical  successes  to  improve  it.  Thus  we 
retook  St.  Julien  on  August  3,  and  so  con- 
nected our  line  below  it  with  our  line  on  the 
Steenbeek  farther  north.  A  week  later  West- 
ho?k  was  completely  cr  ptured.  The  French,  too, 
captured  a  number  of  fortified  houses  lying  in 
front  of  their  position  near  Kortekeer  Cabaret. 

On  the  whole,  the  results  were  satisfactory. 
The  depth  of  our  advance  was  between  three 
thousand  and  four  thousand  yards      The  Fifth 


Army  front  had  carried  the  German  front  line 
south  of  Westhoek.  At  this  village  they  held 
only  the  outskirts.  But  otherwise  they  had 
won  the  whole  ridge  aimed  at,  and  thus  pre- 
vented the  enemy  overlooking  the  Ypres 
plain.  North  of  this  the  German  second  line 
had  been  taken  as  far  as  St.  Julien  ;  beyond 
this  they  had  passed  through  the  German 
second  line  and  held  the  line  of  the  Steenbeek 
to  the  French  right  at  Kortekeer  Cabaret. 
The  French  had  been  equally  successful, 
their  advance  had  been  rapidly  carried  out, 
and  with  slight  loss.  German  prisoners  to  the 
number  of  6,100,  including  133  officers,  had 
been  taken  by  us  alone,  with  25  guns  and  much 
other  booty.  To  this  our  Allies  had  added 
more. 

^'e  had  taken  exactly  what  we  aimed  at,  and 
the  result  confirmed  what  the  fighting  on  the 
Somme  and  the  Ancre,  at  Vimy  and  Messines 
had  already  shown — viz.,  that  there  was  no 
position  which  the  Germans  chose  to  hold  and 
fortify  which  our  men  could  not  take,  even  by 
frontal  attack,  when  the  guns  had  exercised 
their  full  power  in  the  preparatory  stage  of  the 
battle. 

The  Germans  had  fought  well,  and  this  must 
be  largely  attributed  to  their  iron  discipline. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  at  the  opening 


"?■"■'& 


*?fce 


NEW  ZEALANDERS  ON  THE  ROAD  TO  THE  TRENCHES. 


Ojfii-iil  photograph. 


352 


THE    TIMES    HISTOBY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  the  battle  many  were  in  a  state  which  was 
not  conducive  to  hard  fighting,  as  the  following 
extracts  from  the  diary  of  a  well -educated 
prisoner  of  the  ~455th  Infantry  Regiment  show. 
On  Monday,  July  30,  twenty -four  hours  before 
the  advance,  he  wrote  : 

At  last  we  arrived  in  the  second  line.  Scarcely  had 
yre  got  in,  about  half  past  six  in  the  morning,  when  a 
middening  drumfire  was  opened  by  the  English.  An 
airman  had  observed  the  movement  in  our  trench. 
The  worst  of  it  was  that  our  artillery  perpetually  fired 
short.     One    gun    fired    into    our    trench    continually. 


fire  on  the  roads.  The  barrage  prior  to  the  attack 
absolutely  prevented  the  Germans  from  manning  their 
tranches,  and  they  had  to  remain  in  their  dug-outs, 
where  our  men  found  them.  Four  non-commissioned 
officers  of  the  Lehr  Regiment,  who  had  served  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  have  admitted  that  the  British 
bombardment  before  and  during  the  attack  was  the 
worst  they  had  ever  had  to  endure.  While  the  majority 
of  the  prisoners  are  still  extremely  bitter  against  their 
own  gunners  for  not  giving  them  better  support,  many 
of  them  realize  that  it  was  not  due  to  lack  of  desire  but 
to  opposition  which  they  could  not  overcome. 

The  experience  of  the  crew  of  the  seventh  battery  of 
one  field  artillery  regiment,  which  was  sent  up  to  take 
over  four   77's  near   St.   Julien   on  the   Sunday   night 


[Official  photograph, 

GREAT  SERVICE  HELD  TO  MARK  THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  FOURTH 

YEAR  OF  WAR. 


What  a  disgrace  to  ba  compelled  to  sit  still  in  the  middle 
of  our  own  artillery  fire  !  Many  of  my  company  have 
cleared  out  or  have  never  come  into  the  line  at  all. 
The  only  sergeant  left  in  the  company  has  reported  sick. 
Everybody  does  his  utmost  to  get  out  of  the  way. 
The  rations  will  last  till  to-morrow  morning,  but  food 
and  coffee  cannot,  of  course,  be  wannod  up  in  the  midst 
of  all  this  artillery.  When  there  is  nothing  left  to  eat 
I  shall  go  back  on  my  own  responsibility. 

On  the  same  day  another  soldier  wrote  :  "Wo  have 
the  same  filth  and  drill  until  we  are  crazy.  Every 
morning  I  have  a  painter's  breakfast.  You  know  what 
that  is,  Burely.     It  is  a  cigarette  and  coffee." 

A  German  corporal  of  the  29th  Machine-gun  Marksman 
Detachment  wrote  in  an  unposted  letter:  "Matters 
have  come  to  such  a  pass  that  our  artillery  moves 
forward  in  the  night  and  lets  loose  some  thousands  of 
gas     hill-  and  retires  lM-for '  the  dawn." 

Prisoners  from  the  region  of  St.- Julien  made  a 
number  of  interesting  statements  about  the  completeness 
of  our  barrage,  No  food,  water,  or  munitions,  they 
said,  reached  the  front  line  for  three  days  owing  to  our 


before  the  attack,  is  worth  noting.  They  found  all  the 
ammunition  buried  in  the  earth,  and  our  shells  dropping 
all  round  the  gun  pits.  They  took  cover  in  some 
concrete  dug-outs,  where  our  infantry  found  them,  and 
the  battery  in  question  was  unable  to  fire  a  single  shell 
from  the  time  the  crew  reached  the  position  until  they 
and  their  guns  were  captured. 

The  quality  of  the  fare  served  to  the  German  troops 
at  present  is  shown  by  the  following  scale  of  rations 
of  one  battalion  in  the  Sixth  Bavarian  Reserve  Regiment : 
Breakfast,  coffee  and  dry  bread;  mid-day,  one  litre  of 
soup  with  boiled  or  cold  tinned  meat,  no  potatoes  and 
no  vegetables  ;  evening,  dry  bread  and  cheese,  or 
broad  and  butter,  or  bread  and  jam.  They  also  have  a 
drink  of  brandy  now  and  then.  The  daily  bread  ration 
was  750  grammes,  and  the  bread  was  of  poor  quality. 
The  meat  was  served  in  generous  slices.  The  same  faro 
was  served  in  the  front  line  trenches  when  it  was  possible 
to  bring  it  up,  save  that  an  additional  quantity  of  cheese 
was  substituted  for  the  soup.  The  men  received  two 
cigarettes  and  two  cigars  daily  and  about  25  grammes  of 
tobacco    a    month.     A    captured    officer    of    the    221st 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


353 


Division  thought  our  men  more  cheerful  and  "wide- 
awake" than  the  German  troops,  who  are  "now  very 
tired  of  the  war  and  who  have  by  no  means  the  same 
enthusiasm  that  they  had  even  a  year  ago."  • 

On  Saturday,  August  4,  in  spite  of  the  wet 
and  stormy  weather,  the  French  and  British 
continued  to  progress.  Anthoine's  troops 
pushed  east  of  Kortekeer  Cabaret  and  occupied 
a  couple  of  farms  west  of  the  road  from  Steen- 
straat  to  Woumen.  Meantime  Gough's  left 
established  some  more  posts  across  the  Steen- 
beek  stream  between  St.  Julien  and  the  road 
from  Pilkem  to  Langemarck,  Gough's  next 
objective.  In  the  afternoon  the  rain,  which 
had  had  such  untoward  consequences  on  the 
Allied  operations,  diminished  to  fitful  showers. 
At  n-'ghtfall  it  vanished  in  a  drizzle. 

Anticipating  that  the  cessation  of  the  rain 
preluded  fine  weather,  during  which  the  ground 
would  dry  and  the  Allies  be  able  to  resume 
their  advance,  Sixt  von  Armin  promptly  counter 
attacked.     At   11  p.m.  a  large  number  of  his 
batteries  concentrated  their  fire  on  the  ruins 
of  Hollebeke,  and  for  six  hours  a  deluge  of  gas 
and   other   shells   descended   on   the   steaming 
tangle   of   shattered   buildings.     To   mask   his 
intentions,    the   bombardment   extended    from 
the  Ypres-Comines  Canal  to  Messines.     About 
5  a.m.  on  Sunday,  August  5,  rockets  went  up 
from  Hollebeke  signalling  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  along  the  western  bank  of  the  canal. 
So  murky,  however,  was  the  atmosphere  that 
the  stars  from  the  rockets  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  perceived  by  our  gunners.     At  all  events, 
detachments   of   the   German    207th   Division, 
which  had  been  badly  punished  at  Bullecourt, 
got  ahead  of  our  barrage  and,  slipping  and  stag- 
gering through  the  mud,  entered  the  village, 
and  our  garrison  had  to  retire. 

The  autumn  sun  shone  fitfully,  drawing 
up  mist  from  the  soppy,  blood-stained  ground. 
Preparations  were  made  for  a  counter-attack. 
The  morning  mist  had  become  a  malodorous 
fog  which  was  torn  into  wisps  by  the 
torrents  of  bursting  shells  discharged  at 
Hollebeke  by  our  guns.  Headed  by  their 
officers,  the  British  on  receiving  the  order 
charged  forward.  There  was  a  brief  struggle 
and  the  ruins  were  again  ours.  Some  German 
prisoners  were  captured.  When  in  the  evening 
Sixt  von  Armin  launched  a  second  attack, 
it  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  the  British 
artillery.  An  assault  on  our  positions  at 
West  hock,   on   August   5,  met  with   the  same 

*  Morning  Post,  August  8. 


fate.     In  the  course  of  the  day  five  German 

aeroplanes   had    been   put   out   of   action   and 

three  others  driven  down  out  of  control.    Only 

one  of  our  machines  was  reported  to  be  missing. 

August   5   was   the   first   day   of  the  fourth 

year    of     the    war.     In    an    Army    Order    Sir 

Douglas  Haig,  with  the  recent  battles  of  Anas- 

Vimy,  Messines  and  Ypres  in  his  mind,  voiced 

the  feelings  of  his  men. 

"  To-day,"  he  said,  "  we  enter  the  fourth  year 

of  war  with  a  firm  confidence  based  on  what  we 

and    our    gallant    Allies    have    already    done. 

This  recollection  of  the  past  three  years  can 

leave  no  doubt  in  our  minds  that  the  British 

Armies    in   France    and    the   workers    in    the 

Empire,    upon   whom   they   depend,   have  the 

power  and  will  to  complete  the  task  which  they 

have  undertaken,  and  that  they  will  continue 

it  until  their  labours  are  crowned  by  certain  and 

definite  victory." 

The  terse  and  confident  words  of  Sir  Douglas 

mr,y    bo    contrasted    w.th    the    more    boastful 

language    of    the    following    telegram    sent    by 

Hindenburg  to  the  German  Chancellor  on  the 

same  day  : 

At  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  war  year  I  groet  your 
Excellency,  looking  back  on  a  time  full  of  inec  mparable 
achievements  by  the  nation,  the  Army,  and  the  Fleet. 
with  deep  gratitude  for  all  the  sacrifices  made  for  the 
protection  and  honour  of  the  Fatherland.  These 
sacrifices,  which  cannot  be  appreciated  enough,  have 
not  been  in  vain.  Firmly  consolidated  in  the  interior 
and  unshaken  on  all  tho  fronts,  Gormany  braves  the 
exasperated  thrusts  of  her  old.  and  new  enemies.  Tho 
German  Army  is  fighting  far  in  the  enemy's  country 
and  is  marching  with  unbroken  strength  to  new  successes. 
It  enters  the  fourth  year  of  war  supported  by  confidence 
as  firm  as  a  rock  that  our  home  spirit  of  union  and 
perseverance  will  remain  alive,  which  is  the  guarantee 
of  victory  and  honourable  peace  to  our  nation. 

The  German  hero  forgot  to  observe  that  most 
of  "  the  incomparable  achievements  "  of  the 
German  nation,  Army  and  Fleet  were  the 
result  of  methods  which  had  disgraced  them 
for  all  time,  and  that  another  was  the  "  incom- 
parable "  nature  of  "  the  strategic  retreat " 
of  Hindenburg  when  he  had  been  forced  back 
by  British  troop.".. 

August  6  and  7,  apart  frcm  artillery  and 
aeroplane  activities,  were  in  Flanders  un 
eventful.  Dense  white  fog  shrouded  t  he  surface 
of  the  ground  and  it  was  not  till  the  after- 
noon of  the  7th  that  it  was  pierced  by  the 
sun's  rays.  That  day  our  aeroplanes,  one 
of  which  was  lost,  flew  40  miles  behind  tho 
German  lines,  bombing  railways,  sidings  and 
trains.  Heavy  rain  again  fell  on  the  8th,  when 
the  French  progressed  north-west  of  Bixschoote, 
as  they  also  did  on  the  following  day.     Though 


354 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAN. 


CROSSING    THE    STEENBEEK.     UNDER    SHELL-FIF  E. 


a  strong  westerly  wind  and  thick  clouds 
impeded  our  airmen  on  the  Oth,  they  managed 
to  wreck  five  German  aeroplanes,  drive  down 
as  many  more  out  of  control,  and  to  destroy 
■and  damage  six  ohservation  balloons.  Our 
losses  in  these  operations  were  four  machines. 
After  sunset  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  took 
a  hand  in  the  struggle  for  the  Belgian  Coast. 
The  naval  aviators  bombed  Ghistelles  aero- 
drome, near  Ostend,  set  fire  to  the  railway 
sidings  at  Zuidwege,  a  station  between  Bruges 
and  Thourout,  and  bombed  the  junction  at 
Thourout,  which  was  also  attacked  by  gun-fire 
from  the  air. 

Climatic  conditions  having  improved  and  the 
soil  being  less  sodden,  Generals  Anthoine  and 
Gough  decided  to  resume  the  offensive.  The 
law  operation  was  to  prepare  the  way  for  the 
capture  of  the  bridge-head  of  Drei  Grachten 
(just  north  of  the  confluence  of  the  Steenbeek 
aial  Ysor  Canal),  Langemarck,  and  the  German 
positions  from  Langemarck  through  Zonnebeke 
to  Gheluvelt.  Accordingly,  at  daybreak 
i August  10),  the  French  from  the  Bixschoote 
region  pressed  forward  between  the  Yser  Canal 
and  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Steenbeek.  The 
west  hank  of  the  flooded  region  was  secured 
and.  al  places,  the  Steenbeek  was  crossed. 
r'iw-  guns  abandoned  by  the  enemy  were 
captured.  With  the  French  in  the  vicinity  of 
Merekein  and  over  the  Steenbeek  in  the  St. 
Janshoek  region,  the  German  hold  on  Drei 
Grachten  and  Langemarck,  which  was  now  being 
turned  from  the  north-west,  became  precarious. 


Simultaneously  on  a  front  of  about  3,000 
yards — (not  five  miles  as  the  Germans  alleged) 
— between  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway  and  the 
Ypres-Menin  road  Gough  had  thrust  eastwards 
in  the  direction  of  the  Passchendaele  Ridge. 
All  through  the  sultry  night  the  German  gunn 
and  ours  had  been  churning  up  the  ground 
on  both  sides  of  that  highway  so  celebrated 
for  the  feats  performed  on  it  by  the 
"  Old  Contempt  ibles  "  in  the  First  Battle  of 
Ypres.  At  4.45  a.m.  our  artillery  increased  its 
fire,  until  the  incessant  reports  produced  that 
sound  which  has  been  compared  by  the  Germans 
to  the  continuous  rolling  of  drums.  On 
the  left  Lancashire  Fusiliers,  East  Lanca- 
shires,  and  Cheshires  awaited  the  order  to 
complete  the  capture  of  Westhoek  and  to 
storm  the  ridge  of  that  name.  To  the  Bedfords 
and  Queen's  West  Surreys  had  been  assigned 
the  task  of  clearing  the  enemy  from  the 
straggling  piece  of  woodland  known  as  Glen- 
corse  Wood,  or  Sehloss  Wood,  as  the  Germans 
called  it,  which  crowned  the  highest  part  of  the 
eastern  spur  of  the  ridge.  Since  the  ground 
here  was  30  feet  higher  than  that  at  its  east 
end  it  formed  the  key  of  this  part  of  Sixt 
von  Armin's  position.  It  had  been  carefully 
rewired,  and  regiments  of  the  54th  Reserve 
Division  had  been  inserted  into  Nonne  Bosche 
raid  Polygon  Woods  to  its  north  and  Inverness 
Copse  to  its  south  ready  to  counter-attack,  if 
Glencorse  Wood  were  lost. 

The  hurricane  bombardment  moved  forward 
about  5  a.m.,  and  our  men,  following  at  the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


355 


heels  of  the  barrage,  advanced.  The  Germans 
in  the  concreted  cellars  of  Westhoek  fought 
stubbornly.  Amid  the  explosions  of  grenades 
the  British  shot  and  stabbed  the  brave  de- 
fenders. Round  the  "  pill-boxes  "  which  had 
been  missed  by  our  guns  knots  of  Lancastrians 
could  be  seen  flinging  bombs  at  the  doors  and 
Bring  with  rifle  and  machine-gun  through  the 
narrow  embrasures  of  these  concrete  works. 
One  at  the  southern  end  of  the  ridge  held  out 
for  three  hours.  Finally  it  was  stormed  by 
detachments  of  East  Lancashircs  and  Lan- 
cashire Fusiliers,  but  not  till  it  had  been 
si verely  shaken  by  trench  mortars  hastily 
brought  up. 

While  the  North  Countrymen  were  securing 
Westhoek  and  its  ridge,  Glencorse  Wood  on  the 
spur  jutting  eastward  from  it  was  the  scene  of 
a  stern  and  bloody  action.  The  Bedfords  and 
Queen's  West  Surreys  had  at  first  carried 
everything  before  them.  They  traversed  the 
shattered  wood,  smashing  their  way  through 
the  uncut  wire  and  reducing  the  nests  of  snipers 
and  machine-gunners.  Emerging  from  the 
eastern  outskirts  they  cleared  the  ground  for 
200  yards  beyond.  Unfortunately  their  com- 
rades astride  the  Ypres-Menin  road  had  not 
made  a  corresponding  advance.  Bedfords  and 
West  Surreys  were  left  in  the  air.  Upon  them 
descended  a  tornado  of  shells,  and  wave  after 
wave  of  the  German  27th  Infantry  Regiment 
counter-attacked  them  from  the  Polygon  and 
Nonne  Bosche  Woods  and  from  Inverness 
Copse.  Gradually  our  men  were  forced  back 
into  the  wood.  The  recapture  of  a  part  of 
Glencorse  Wood  was  a  solitary  success  for  the 
Germans.  No  less  than  six  counter-attacks 
were  delivered  by  the  enemy  between  dawn  and 
10  p.m.,  the  most  violent  of  them  in  point  of 
artillery  preparation  being  that  at  6.40  p.m., 
but  the  remainder  of  Westhoek  Ridge  and  the 
ruins  of  the  village  remained  in  our  possession. 
We  had  captured  240  prisoners  and  inflicted  as 
well  as  received  heavy  losses. 

During  August  10,  for  the  first  time  for 
over  ten  days,  a  full  day's  flying  was  possible. 
Ten  German  machines  wore  destroyed,  and 
six  others  driven  down  out  of  control. 
Our  losses  amounted  to  12  machines,  but 
against  such  losses  had  to  be  set  the  fact  that 
our  airmen,  in  addition  to  winning  some  10 
duels,  had  dropped  (iV  tons  of  explosives  on 
aerodromes,  ammunition  depots,  and  other 
points  of  military  importance,  and  also 
engaged  enemy  infantry  with  machine-gun  fire 


and  taken  a  large  number  of  photographs. 
After  sunset  the  French  aeroplanes  went  up  and 
bombed  enemy  barracks  north  of  the  Forest  of 
Houthulst  and  the  railway  stations  of  Corte- 
marck  and  Lichterwelde.  At  the  latter  plaee 
a  fire  and  violent  explosions  were  observed. 

The  presence  of  the  British  in  Glencorse 
Wood  and  on  the  Westhoek  Ridge  endangered 
the  hold  of  Sixt  von  Armin  on  the  southern  em\ 
of  tho  Passchondaele  Ridge.  Acting  in  accord- 
ance with  the  best  Prussian  traditions,  he  did 


[French  Official  photograph.] 

A    FRENCH    LINE    OF    DEFENCE    IN 
FLANDERS. 

not  hesitate  to  make  desperate  efforts  for 
the  recovery  of  the  lost  positions.  Every 
battery  within  range  was  turned  on  the  West- 
ho  k  region.  The  wide  and  deep  belt  of  fire 
flung  by  the  German  guns  impressed  even  those 
who  had  witnessed  the  battles  of  Arras-Viiny 
and  Messines.  Nevertheless,  our  heroic  in- 
fantry stuck  to  their  improvised  shelters. 
When,  in  the  morning,  the  first  of  Sixt  von 
Armin's  five  counter-attacks  on  Saturday, 
August  11,  was  delivered,  the  Germans  were 
beaten  back  except  in  Glencorse  Wood,  where 
they  made  some  further  headway.  At  midday 
our  aeroplanes  saw  a  great  gathering  of  enemy 
troops  in  the  Nonne  Bosche  and  Polygon 
Moods.  The  news  was  at  once  sent  back  to 
our   artillery.     Guns   and   howitzers   promptly 


856 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


discharged  an  avalanche  of  shells  of  all  descrip- 
tion from  15  ins.  downwards.  Hundreds  of 
Germans  lying  in  the  craters  wero  killed. 

A  British  airman  flew  to  see  the  result 
of  the  salvoes.  He  perceived  nothing  but 
mangled  or  dismembered  corpses,  mixed  up 
with  fragments  of  rifles  and  spades.  Some  of 
the  grenades  and  ammunition  carried  by  the 
dead  or  wounded  men  were  still  exploding. 
Yet — -such  is  the  force  of  tradition  and  dis- 
cipline^—  the  German  infantry  again  and  again 
responded  to  the  calls  of  their  officers.  At 
cbout  6  p.m.  bodies  of  the  enemy,  estimated 
at  two  battalions,  were  reported  to  be  mustering 
opposite  the  Westhoek  Ridge  in  the  depression 
down  which  flows  the  streamlet  of  the  Hanne- 
beek  on  its  way  to  St.  Julien.  Our  barrage 
this  time  did  not  catch  the  Germans  in 
masses,  but  in  waves  marching  up  the  slopes. 
When  the  storm  of  shells  burst,  the  lines  of 
the  enemy  flung  themselves  flat  on  their 
faces  or  melted  into  craters.  Few  escaped 
death  or  wounds. 

The  net  result  of  the  desperate  fighting  in 
which  both  sides  displayod  amazing  courage 
was  that,  though  we  were  pressed  back  to  the 
western  edge  of  Glencorse  Wood,  the  rest  of 
our  gains  on  the  10th  were  retained.  Six 
guns  had  been  taken  by  us,  and  the  total 
prisoners  captured  in  the  action  amounted  to 
454,  among  whom  were  nine  officers.  One  of 
them,  who  before  the  war  had  been  the  partner 
of  an  English  business  man,  expressed  his 
astonishment  at  the  quality  of  the  New  Armies. 
"  Were  we  fighting  together,"  he  said,  "  wo 
— England  and  Germany — should  be  masters 
of  the  world  !  " 

Against  our  slight  reverse  in  Glencorse  Wood 
was  to  be  set  an  advance  near  the  Ypres-Staden 
railway  between  the  Steenbeek  and  the  southern 
environs  •  of  Langemarck.  The  next  day, 
Sunday,  August  12,  the  weather  again  became 
wet  and  stormy.  A  strong  westerly  wind 
blew,  which  favoured  the  enemy's  aircraft. 
Notwithstanding,  we  brought  down  three 
and  drove  down  four  machines  at  a  cost  of 
five  of  our  own.  In  the  e.fternoon,  so  far  as 
visibility  was  concerned,  the  weather  improved. 
From  points  in  the  British  lines  the  sand  dunes 
around  Ostend  and  the  belfry  of  Bruges  could 
be  easily  seer;.  The  forward  movement,  how- 
ever, had,  for  a  time,  degenerated  into  a 
g'gantic  gun  duel,  which  was  not  ended  till 
August  16,  when  the  second  phase  of  the 
battle  opened.     Two  days  before  (August   14) 


Sixt  von  Armin  had  attacked  our  line  east  of 
Westhoek,  but  his  troops,  meeting  with 
heavy  artillery  and  rifle  fire,  were  repulsed. 
We  improved  the  same  day  our  positions  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Steenbeek.  On  the  15th 
General  Anthoine  moved  forward  north-west 
of  Bixschoote,  and  German  raids  east  of  Klein 
Zillebeke  and  against  our  positions  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  Pilkem-Langemarck  road  were 
beaten  off. 

In  the  interval  between  the  12th  and  the 
16th  the  aircraft  on  both  sides  had  been  active. 
Seven  German  aeroplanes  were  wrecked  on  the 
13th  and  two  driven  down  out  of  control,  we 
in  our  turn  losing  but  two.  On  the  14th  there 
was  severe  fighting,  in  the  course  of  which  nine 
German  machines  were  brought  down,  and 
five  others  driven  down  out  of  control.  We 
lost  seven,  two  of  which  were  overtaken  by  a 
violent  storm  when  working  over  the  enemy's 
lines. 

While  the  first  phase  of  the  Third  Battle  of 
Ypres  was  in  progress,  and  up  to  the  eve  of  the 
second  phase,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  kept  tapping 
at  the  German  lines  between  the  Lys  and  the 
Upper  Somme.  Considering  the  compara- 
tively narrow  front  on  which  the  great  battle 
was  being  delivered,  it  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  rein- 
forcing Sixt  von  Armin  with  guns  and  men. 
To  keep  him,  therefore,  fully  employed  in  other 
sectors  was  correct  strategy.  Although  these 
minor  sections,  with  the  exception  of  that  at 
Lens  of  August  15-16,  subsequently  to  be 
narrated,  may  appear  to  the  reader  to  be 
insignificant,  they  must  not  be  overlooked,  as 
they  formed  an  essential  part  of  the  plan  of  the 
British  leader.  The  story  of  them  should  be 
followed  attentively  on  the  map. 

The  first  of  these  minor  actions  occurred  on 
the  evening  of  the  opening  day  of  the  battle 
itself.  It  consisted  of  a  successful  raid  east  of 
Bois  Grenier  and  south  of  Armentieres.  This 
might,  though  it  did  not,  portend  that  the 
battle  front  would  be  extended  south  of  the 
Lys.  The  next  night  (August  1-2)  parties  of 
our  men  broke  into  the  enemy's  trenches 
north-east  of  Gouzeaucourt — i.e.,  south-west 
of  Cambrai — inflicting  heavy  casualties.  Early 
on  the  night  of  August  2-11  the  enemy  in  his 
turn  took  the  offensive  east  of  Arras.  After 
a  heavy  bombardment  of  our  positions  on 
Infantry  Hill,  German  troops,  estimated  at  a 
battalion  strong,  attacked  on  a  front  of  about 
half  a  mile  and  entered  our  trenches.     Within 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


857 


24  hours  all  the  intruders  had  been  evicted, 
killed,  wounded,  or  captured.  On  Saturday, 
August  4,  we  raided  the  enemy's  lines  east  of 
Yermelles.  The  next  day  troops  of  Home's 
Army  advanced  slightly  west  and  south-west 
of  Lens. 

So  far  the  British  threats  had  been  directed 
south  of  the  battlefield  of  Ypres,  but  on  the 
night  of  August  7  one  of  oifr  detachments 
attacked  near  Lombartzyde,  on  the  Belgian 
coast,  capturing  a  few  prisoners  and  a  machine- 


the  same  day  British  troops  on  a  wide  front 
east  of  Monchy-le-Preux  burst  into  the  enemy's 
trenches  and  blew  in  his  dug-outs.  Severe 
casualties  were  inflicted  on  him  and  a  counter- 
attack was  repulsed,  two  machine-guns  and  80 
prisoners  being  captured.  The  German  version 
of  this  action  was  as  follows  : 

During  the  evening  the  English,  in  deep  nxaMes, 
attacked  from  the  Monchy-Pelves  road  as  far  as  the 
Arras-Cambrai  road.  Our  destructive  fire  fell  with 
overpowering  effect  at  the  points  where  they  had 
assembled ;      the    advancing    storming    waves,    which 


LIEUT.-GENERAL    SIR    A    CURRIE,    K.C.M.G.,    COMMANDING 

FORCES    IN     FRANCE. 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

THE    CANADIAN 


gun.  How  this  feint  against  Prince  Rup- 
precht's  extreme  right  was  regarded  by  the 
enemy  may  be  surmised  from  the  German 
communique  of  August  8.  "  On  the  coastal 
sector,"  ran  the  communique,  "  the  British, 
after  drumfire,  pressed  forward  with  strong 
forces  from  Nieuport  in  a  northerly  and  north- 
easterly direction."' 

At  daybreak  on  the  9th  Home  carried  out 
several  successful  raids  in  the  Lens  region. 
Our  troops  poured  into  the  enemy's  positions 
at  all  points  attacked,  and  after  destroying 
his  dug-outs  and  wrecking  his  defences  returned 
to  their  posts.  The  British  losses  were  slight, 
those  of  the  Germans  heavy.     At  nightfall  on 


suffered  the  most  severe  losses  under  our  defensive  fire 
and  in  the  hand-to-hand  fighting  with  our  experienced 
regiments,  were  everywhere  repulsed. 

Evening:  The  strong  attacks  of  the  English  delivered 
this  morning  in  Flanders  between  the  Ypres-Roulers 
Railway  and  Holiebeke  have  failed. 

It  was  the  old,  old  story.  A  raid  from  which 
the  assailants  naturally  retire,  when  they  have 
gained  their  object,  as  wc  had,  was  counted 
oa  a  German  victory. 

On  the  night  of  August  11-12  there  was 
some  fighting  for  the  possession  of  a  mine 
crater  east  of  Givenchy-Ies-La  Bassee.  Our 
troops  established  themselves  on  the  rear  lip 
of  the  crater  and  drove  off  a  counter-attack. 
A   German    raid   a   few   hours    later   south   of 


358 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR, 


Annentieres  was  repulsed  by  the  Portuguese 
with  bombs  and  rifle-fire. 

The  moment  was  now  fast  approaching 
when  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  General  Anthoine 
were  to  make  their  second  attempt  in  the  Yprea 
salient.  Our  activity  between  the  Lys  and 
the  Somme  consequently  became  more  in- 
tense. On  the  night  of  the  13th  14th  we 
raided  two  points  east  of  Vermelles,  Mousing  a 
few  prisoners,  and  entering  the  German  lines 
north-east  of  Gouzeaucourt.  Hostile  raids 
east  of  Laventie  and  Neuve  Chapelle  were 
repulsed. 

The  feint  of  Sir  Douglas  on  Wednesday. 
August  15,  more  nearly  resembled  a  battle  thru 


Sallaunnnes 
fun"'' 


LENS     AND     SURROUNDING     COUNTRY 

a  minor  action.  For  a  feigned  attack  calculated 
to  immobilize  German  reserves  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
could  have  chosen  no  better  objectivo  than  Hill 
70 — the  Hill  70  of  the  Battle  of  Loos— and  the 
northern  suburbs  of  Lens.  Since  the  Battle  of 
Arras-Vimy  the  troops,  of  Home's  First  Army 
had  been  pushing  forward  into  the  southern  anil 
western  suburbs  of  the  city.  A  blow  from 
the  north  might  well  mean  that  the  British, 
content  with  their  successes  achieved  east  of 
Ypres,  had  decided  to  resume  the  offensive  in 
Artois  by  the  reduction  of  Lens.  Now  the 
importance  to  the  Germans  of  Lens  for  pur- 
poses of  defence  or  offence  could  scarcely  be 
overestimated.  The  Hindenburg  line  was 
pivoted  on  it.  Its  subterranean  galleries. 
ISO  or  70  ft.  below  the  roofless  houses,  afforded 
an    admirable    assembly    place    for    an    army 


seeking  to  break  out  between  La  Bassee  and 
the  Scarpe.  Layers  of  concrete  15  ft.  or  so 
thick  had  been  superimposed  upon  the  remains 
of  the  former  buildings.  Beneath  such  a  mass 
of  concrete  the  Germans  were  secure  from 
gunfire.     The  streets  were  barricaded,  and  the 


[New  Zealand  official  photograph. 

A    LEWIS    GUN. 

public  squares  were  dotted  with  low  redoub'ts 
almost  level  with  the  pavement.  At  the 
Battle  of  Arras-Vimy  we  had  proved  what  an 
advantage  it  was  to  an  assailant  to  muster  his 
forces  in  the  caves  of  a  large  city.  Lens  at 
some  future  date  might  be  to  the  Germans 
what  Arras  had  been  to  the  British.  If  Lens 
were  menaced  the  Bavarian  Crown  Prince 
would  be,  therefore,  likely  to  keep  his  reserves 
in  Artois  rather  than  to  send  them  to  Sixt 
von  Armin's  assistance  in  Flanders.  That  the 
British  Higher  Command  attached  peculiar 
significance  to  the  capture  of  Hill  70  had  been 
proved  by  our  efforts  to  take  it  at  the  Battle 
of  Loos  in  September  1915. 

To  the  Canadian  Corps  was  deputed  the 
Very  difficult  task  of  storming,  on  a  front  of 
4,000  yards,  Hill  70,  the  whole  of  Bois  Rase, 
the  western  half  of  Bois  Hugo  (east  of  the 
load  from  La  Bassee  to  Lens),  and  the  mining 
suburbs  of  Cite  St.  Elizabeth,  Cite  St.  Kmile, 
and  Cite  St.  Laurent.  These  villages  and  the 
summit  of  Hill  70  had  become  subterranean 
.mazes,  in  comparison  with  which  the  Laby- 
rinth of  the  Battle  of  Artois  (April,  1915),  would 
have  seemed  childishly  simple.  Moreover,  it 
had  been  resolved  that  the  preliminary  bom- 
bardment was  to  be  short,  if  heavy.  The 
Canadians  were  to  be  asked  to  reach  their 
objectives  at  one  rush. 

A  thin  crescent  moon  was  fading  in  the  sky 
when,  towards  4  a.m.  on  Wednesday,  August  15, 
guns,  howitzers,  and  trench  mortars  fired  at 
the  German   positions.     Oil   drums  discharged 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


859 


cataracts  of  flame  over  the  holes  up  which  tho 
enemy  were  likely  to  ascend  with  their  machine- 
guns,  rifles  and  grenades.  The  German  artil- 
lery soon  responded,  and  a  fresh  south  wind 
blew  clouds  of  mnoko  over  the  ridge  aud 
stumps  of  villages.  At  4.25  a.m.  the  Canadians 
went  over  the  top.  Above  them  one  of  the 
German  "  Travelling  Circuses  "  was  battling 
hard  and  ineffectually  with  our  airmen.  At 
Hill  70  the  garrison  consisted  of  young,  raw 
troops  who  put  up  a  poor  fight.  Elsewhere 
the  enemy  fought  stubbornly,  but  the  first 
trench  system  was  speedily  carried,  and  the 
Canadians  advanced  a  mile  up  to  the  western 
defences  of  Cite  St.  Auguste.  From  Hill  70 
they  looked  straight  along  the  valley  to  the 
heights  of  Sallaumines  and  beyond.  On  the 
western  face  of  Cite  St.  Auguste,  however,  a 
deep  chalk  cutting  swarming  with  Germans 
and  machine-guns  kept  them  from  moving  into 
that  suburb. 

Between  1  and  2  p.m.  the  Canadian  outposts 
opposite  the  cutting  saw  masses  of  Germans 
forming  up  in  the  ruins  of  Cite  St.  Auguste. 
The  4th  Prussian  Guards  Division  had  been 
ordered  at  all  costs  to  recapture  Hill  70. 
Suddenly  from  them  a  wave  of  men  emerged 
and  breasted  the  ridge.  It  was  destroyed  by 
the  Canadian  artillery  and  machine-guns. 
Immediately  afterwards  a  second  wave  appeared, 
officers  shouting  to  the  men  in  front  of  them  to 
go  forward.  Shell  and  rifle  fire  blasted  the 
line  and  the  few  survivors  fled  back.  The 
third  wave,  thinning  rapidly,  broke  some 
70  yards  from  the  Canadians.  Later  in  the  day 
the  latter  resumed  their  advance  and  descended 
into  the  chalk  cutting,  where,  after  a  hideous 
melee,  90  prisoners  were  captured  Two  more 
German  counter-attacks  were  repulsed.  Nearly 
300  prisoners  (including  15  officers)  had  been 
taken.  The  triumph  of  the  Canadians  was, 
of  course,  not  communicated  by  the  German 
leaders  to  the  German  public.  The  official 
account  in  the  German  communique  of  August  1 6, 
a  travesty  of  what  had  really  occurred,  reads 
as  follows : 

In  Artois  the  English  attacked  yesterday  morning 
between  Hulluch  and  Lens  with  four  Canadian  divisions. 
After  the  strongost  fire  they  forced  their  way  into  our 
first  position  and  sought,  by  the  continual  bringing  up 
of  fresh  forces,  to  deepen  the  gap  created  on  both  sides 
of  Loos.  According  to  orders  found,  the  objective  of 
their  attack  was  the  village  of  Vendin-le-Vieil,  which  is 
situated  four  kilometres  [2|  miles]  behind  our  front. 

In  desperate  fighting  lasting  all  day  our  troops,  by 
means  of  counter-attacks,  pressed  back  beyond  the 
third  line  of  our  first  position  the  enemy  troops  who 
had  broken  into  our  lines.     The  English  gain  is  small. 


In  fresh  attacks,  which  were  repeated  as  many  as 
11  times,  the  stubborn  enemy  again  tried  his  fortune 
in  the  evening.  The  enemy  storming  waves  collapsed 
before  our  battle  line. 

South  of  Hulluch  and  west  of  Lens  the  attacker,  who 
had  suffered  extremely  heavy  losses  at  all  points  of  the 
battlefield.  «rta  r»pnUe*l, 

On  Thursday,  August  16,  when  the  second 
phase  of  the  Third  Battle  of  Ypres  opened,  the 
German  220th  Division  was  sent  to  the  support 
of  the  Prussian  Guards.  It,  too,  was  repulsed. 
On  the  evening  of  Friday,  August  17,  another 
effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  at  the  north 
west  of  Lens.     Our  positions  were  deluged  with 


[Canadian  War  Records. 
NOT    SORRY    TO    BE    CAPTURED: 
A  young  German  officer  taken  prisoner  at  Hill  70. 

eas  shell  and  a  number  of  pioneers  with 
flame-throwers  preceded  the  charging  masses  of 
Germans.  The  Canadians,  with  rifles  and 
Lewis  guns,  shot  down  the  pioneers  and  riddled 
the  surging  crowds  behind  them.  Later  in  the 
night  Cite  Emile  was  assaulted  and  a  deter- 
mined attack  was  made  on  the  Canadians  in 
the  Bois  Hugo.  All  these  attempts  and  another 
one  at  1.30  a.m.  on  Saturday,  August  18,  failed. 
The  positions  captured  on  the  15th  had  not  been 
wrested  from  our  trans  atlantic  countrymen. 
The  Germans  had  suffered  very  heavy  losses 


360 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

GERMAN    PRISONERS    CAPTURED    BY    THE    CANADIANS    ON    HILL    70. 


and  1,120  prisoners,  including  22  officers,  from 
three  of  Prince  Rupprecht's  Divisions  had  been 
secured. 

The  persistence  of  the  enemy  and  the  violence 
of  his  counter-attacks  were  excellent  evidence 
that  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  judged  correctly 
when  he  selected  Hill  70  and  the  northern 
suburbs  of  Lens  as  the  scene  for  the  chief 
feints  before  his  and  Anthoine's  renewal  of  the 
Third  Battle  of  Ypres.  The  result  of  the 
action,  in  which  the  Canadian  losses  were  light, 
was — to  use  Sir  Douglas's  own  words — that 
"  the  threat  to  Lens  itself  was  rendered  more 
immediate  and  more  insistent,  and  the  enemy 
was  prevented  from  concentrating  the  whole  of 
his  attention  and  resources  upon  the  front  of 


the  Allied  main  offensive."  The  victory  of  the 
Canadians  was  the  more  gratifying  because  it 
occurred  a  week  after  the  arrival  in  Paris  of 
M.  Basly,  the  Mayor  of  Lens.  This  Labour 
Deputy,  who  had  been  repatriated,  had  pointed 
out  on  one  occasion  to  the  German  local  com- 
mander, a  certain  Major  Klotz,  that  the  Hague 
Convention  forbade  some  of  his  enactions. 
"  The  Hague  Convention,"  answered  Klotz,  "  is 
for  us  and  not  for  you."  One  day  Klotz  had 
complained  that  a  German  soldier  had  been 
wounded,  not — as  was  the  fact — by  a  British 
bullet,  but  by  a  shot  fired  at  him  by  an  unknown 
citizen  of  Lens.  In  vain  M.  Basly  had  pro- 
tested. "  The  town,"  Klotz  said,  "  is  fined 
£800." 


CHAPTER    CCXXXII. 

THE  THIRD  BATTLE  OF 
YPRES.     (II.) 

Anthoine  and  Gough  Attack  in  the  North,  August  16,  1917 — The  German  "  Field  Forts  " 
— The  Drie  Grachten  Bridge-head — The  French  Advance-tSBritish  Advance  on  Langemarck 
— Misfortunes  and  Their  Causes — Preparations  tor~Attack  on  Wider  Front — Minor 
Actions  during  August — The  Fighting  near  Ypres  on  August  22 — Inverness  Copse  and 
Glencorse  Wood — The  Fighting  near  Lens — Work  of  the  Canadians — Operations  on  the 
French  Front. 


THE  Canadians  of  General  Currie's 
Corps  who,  as  described  in  the  last 
chapter,  had  on  August  15,  1917, 
wrested  Hill  70  from  the  Germans, 
were  entering  the  outskirts  of  Lens  itself  when, 
at  4.45  a.m  on  Thursday,  August  16,  Anthoine's 
and  Gough's  troops  again  struck  at  the  en- 
trenched zone  between  the  confluence  of  the 
Yperlee  and  Steenbeek  on  the  left  and  the 
Ypres-Menin  road  at  Inverness  Copse  on  the 
right.  This,  the  second  phase  of  the  Third 
Battle  of  Ypres,  was  preceded  as  usual  by  a 
very  intense  bombardment. 

The  impossibility  of  making  deep-mined  dug- 
outs in  soil  where  water  was  often  only  a  couple 
of  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  ground  had  led 
the  enemy  to  erect  a  number  of  redoubts  of 
reinforced  concrete.  This  was  often  of  con- 
siderable thickness,  up  to  as  much  as  10  feet, 
constructed  round  cages  of  iron  bars,  about 
half  an  inch  in  diameter  and  divided  from  each 
other  by  varying  distances,  sometimes  no  more 
than  7  inches.  The  entrance  door  was  of  steel 
sufficiently  thick  to  stop  rifle  or  machine-gun 
fire  or  ordinary  bombs.  Their  shapes  varied 
considerably  and  were  made  to  suit  the  needs 
of  each  situation,  though  a  good  many  were  of 
the  ordinary  pill-box  shape.  These  "  field 
forts,"  as  Sir  Douglas  Haig  calls  them,  were 
Vol.  XV.— Part  193. 


heavily  armed  with  machine-guns  and  manned 
by  picked  men.  Only  direct  hits  from  our 
heavy  guns  or  howitzers  were  capable  of 
battering  them  to  pieces,  and  the  garrisons  were 
quite  secure  from  any  attack  by  tanks. 

In  the  earlier  fighting  we  had  reached  the 
outer  edge  of  the  formidable  chain  of  con- 
crete redoubts  which  formed  the  backbone 
of  Sixt  von  Armin's  defensive  system.  We  had 
now  to  fight  our  way  through  it,  opposed  by 
furious  counter-attacks,  on  which  the  Germans 
had  eome  to  place  their  chief  reliance.  Many 
British  successes  had  shown  the  enemy  that  his 
infantry  were  unable  to  hold  the  strongest 
defences  when  these  were  suitably  attacked,  and 
that  increasing  the  number  of  his  troops  in  his 
forward  zone  merely  added  to  his  losses. 
He  had  therefore  adopted  a  more  elastic 
scheme  of  defence,  in  which  forward  trenches 
were  held  only  in  sufficient  strength  to  dis- 
organize the  Allied  attack,  while  the  bulk  of 
the  German  troops  were  kept  in  reserve,  ready 
to  deliver  a  powerful  and  immediate  blow  which 
might  recover  the  positions  overrun  by  our 
troops  before"  we  had  time  to  consolidate  them. 
This  systfm,  which  was  described  in  detail  in  the 
last  chapter,  had  been  used  on  the  German  front 
attacked  on  July  31  and  subsequent  dates 
and  had  been  partially  successful.    On  August  16 


361 


362 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


these  winter-attack  tactics  were  again  employed 
and  under  favourable  conditions  which  gave 
them  some  further  gojd  results. 

Bad  weather  hampered  our  aviators  ;  they 
were  often  unable  to  observe  the  movements  of 
the  German  troops,  with  the  result  that  no 
warning  was  received  of  the  German  counter - 


GROUND    ROUND    DRIE    GRACHTEN, 
Showing  inundations. 

attacks.  The  same  reason  rendered  it  impossible 
to  assist  the  ranging  of  the  artillery,  so  that  our 
infantry  obtained  but  little  help  from  the  guns 
while  contending  against  the  masses  hurled  at 
them  when  assaulting  the  line  of  German  posts. 
But  still,  on  tb.3  whole,  the  new  German  method 
was  not  a  success,  as  documents  captured  on 
October  4  showed  that  the  German  Higher  Com- 
mand at  that  date  was  endeavouring  to  revert  to 


the  old  practice  of  holding  the  forward  positions 
in  strength.  But  on  August  16  the  new  tactics 
were  still  adhered  to. 

The  French  on  Cough's  left  operating  in  or 
on  the  edge  of  the  inundated  region  between 
the  Noordschoote-Luyghem  road,  which  crossed 
the  Yperlee  at  Drie  Grachten,  and  the  south  of 
St.  Janshoek,  a  hamlet  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Steenbeek,  north  of  Bixschoote,  had  a  some- 
what easier  task  than  the  British. 

Fully  to  appreciate  what  had  been  and  was 
to  be  accomplished  by  the  French  and  British 
struggling  to  break  out  from  the  Ypres  salient, 
one  must  remember  that,  difficult  as  had  been 
the  task  when  Joflre  and  French,  in  the  third 
week  of  October  1914,  had  contemplated  a 
thrust  through  Thourout  on  Ostend,  Bruges, 
and  Ghent,  it  had  become,  by  August  1917,  an 
infinitely  more  complicated  problem  for  the 
Allies  to  advance  in  the  Belgian  plain.  Foch's 
judicious  employment  of  the  information  given 
him  by  the  Belgian  authorities  and  the 
resulting  inundations  had  largely  contributed 
to  the  favourable  result  of  the  Battle  of  the 
Yser.  The  Germans  in  their  turn  had  resorted 
to  similar  methods.  With  further  inunda- 
tions they  had  secured  as  far  as  was  possible 
their  right  flank  between  Dixmude  and  Bix- 
schoote. In  addition  to  these  they  had  con- 
structed a  system  of  fortifications  calculated  to 
stop  an  adversary  endeavouring  to  traverse 
or  circumvent  the  flooded  area.     The  bridge- 


SCENE    NEAR    LUYGHEM. 


Belgian  official  photograph. 

■     ■ 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


363 


PLAN    OF    THE    WORKS    AT    DRIE    GRACHTEN,    PHOTOGRAPHED    FROM    AN 

AEROPLANE. 


head  of  Drie  Grachten  formed  an  important 
point  in  these  works,  constructed  largely  by 
forced  labour,  to  render  the  German  front 
impregnable.*  It  blocked  the  Noordschoote- 
Luyghem  road  where  it  crossed  the  Yperlee  Canal 
just  north  of  its  junction  with  the  flooded 
Steenbeek,  which — after  it  receives  the  waters 
of  the  Kortebeek — is  called  the  St.  Jans- 
beek.  :  From  Luyghem  a  road  ran  south- 
eastwards  to  Verbrandemis  and  the  chaussee 
which  proceeded  from  Zudyschoote  and  Lizerne 
over  the  Yperlee  at  Steenstraat  to  Dixmude.  To 
secure  Luyghem  and  Merckem  and  reach  the 
cliaussee  was  necessary  for  the  French  if  any 
attempt  was  to  be  made  by  them  to  reduce  the 
vast  fortress  of  the  Forest  of  Houthylst  lying 
south  of  Dixmude  and  north  of  Langemarck. 

The  bridge-head  of  Drie  Grachten  also  gave 
the  Germans  the  power  of  debouching  over 
the  canal  if  they  wished  to  counter-attack 
across  it.  By  August  15  the  French  from 
Noordschoote  to  its  south-west  and  from  Bix- 
schoote  to  its  south-east  were  facing  this 
bridge-head. 

West  of  the  Yperlee  Canal  it  consisted 
of  a  semi-circular  work  which,  from  the 
nature  of  the  soil,  water  being  found  imme- 
diately below  the  surface,  had  to  be  built  above 
ground.  It  was  mainly  composed  of  reinforced 
concrete  shelters  connected  by  a  raised  trench 
composed  of  concrete,  earth,  and  fascines, 
with  a  communication  trench  leading  back  to 
another  shelter,  where  the  commander  of  the 

*  Drie  Grachten  means  three  ditches,  i.e..  the  three 
catehwater  drains  which  served  to  carry  off  the  water 
drained  into  them  from  the  Poldar  land  through  which 
they  ran. 


post  was  located.  Some  hundred  yards  in  front 
of  this  wo.-k,  on  the  causeway,  was  a  small 
blockhouse  joined  to  the  work  by  a.  communica- 
tion trench  dug  in  the  north  side  of  the  road. 
Barbed  wire  entanglements — both  standing 
out  above  the  water  and  below  it — extended 
in  front  of  post  and  blockhouse.  The  post 
and  blockhouse  were  athwart  the  road  from 


DRIE    GRACHTEN    BRIDGEHEAD. 

Noordschoote  to  Luyghem.  To  the  north  of 
them  was  a  redoubt,  called  "  TEclusette " 
Redoubt,  and  another  on  the  south,  both  west 
of  the  Yperlee.  These  redoubts  corresponded 
with  the  ends  of  the  defences  on  the  eastern 
bank  of  the  canal,  anrl  flanked  them.  They 
were  identical  in  shape,  being  bastions  7  ft. 
above  the  inundations.  Platforms  aa,  bb  (see 
plan  on  p.  364)  permitted  the  machine-guns  to 
command  a  wide  arc  over  the  ground  in  front. 
The  platforms  had  for  their  foundations  bases  of 

193  -2 


364 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


reinforced  concrete  in  which  were  two  cham- 
bers ;  one  to  contain  the  machine-gun  and  its 
cartridges,  the  other  stores  of  grenades. 
Behind  were  two  dug-outs,  ce  (see  plan),  for 
the  garrison.  They  contained  bunks,  etc., 
and  were  connected  by  tunnels  with  the  cham- 
bers and  the  platforms.  The  sides  of  these 
tunnels  were  wattled,  their  floors  covered  with 
mattresses. 

Across  the  Yperlee  on  its  eastern  bank  was  a 
rampart  of  concrete  or  reinforced  concrete 
running  behind  and  parallel  with  the  canal 
from  a  point  opposite  the  Eclusette  work  to 


through  the  floods,  one  to  the  north,  the  other 
to  the  south,  of  the  road.  On  the  causeway 
the  Germans  had  constructed  a  light  tramway, 
which,  in  places,  ran  through  a  tunnel  made  in 
the  foundations  of  the  road.  Every  35  to  50 
yards  were  traverses  with  reinforced  concrete 
shelters,  as  refuges  against  fragments  of  burst- 
ing shells.  Elaborate  ■  as  all  its  arrangements 
were,  it  fell  without  very  great  difficulty  on 
August  16. 

The  German  redoubts  in  this  part  of  the 
field  were,  indeed,  better  defined  targets  for  the 
French  guns  than  those   in  the  morasses   and 


L'ECLUSETTE"    BLOCKHOUSE    AT    DRIE    GRACHTEN. 


the  redoubt  south  of  the  blockhouse.  The  canal 
formed,  as  it  were,  a  ditch  to  this  rampart. 
At  both  ends  and  in  the  centre  were  a  number 
of  footbridges  over  the  canal.  The  inner 
side  of  the  rampart  was  every  few  yards  pro- 
vided with  steps  leading  to  the  parapet,  and 
its  terreplein  was  a  concrete  platform  on  which 
the  garrison  stood  when  firing  over  the  parapet. 
At  intervals  hollow  traverses,  formed  by  low- 
pitched  concrete  cabins,  covered  with  earth, 
ran  back  from  the  rampart  to  protect  it  from 
enfilade  fire.  It  was  impossible  to  burrow  in 
the  water-logged  soil  :  while  to  have  raised 
the  walls  of  the  cabins  higher  would  have 
rendered  them  a  conspicuous  mark  for  the 
French  gunners. 

The  communications  between  this  concrete 
rampart  and  the  defences  of  the  Luyghem 
peninsula  consisted  of  the  raised  road  from  Drie 
Grachten  to  Luyghem,  and  of  two  footbridges 


woods  from  the  south  of  St.  Janshoek  across  the 
Ypres-Staden  and  Ypres-Roulers  railways  to 
the  road  from  Ypres  to  Menin,  and  more  easily 
destroyed  as  they  were  almost  entirely  above 
ground.  Owing,  moreover,  to  the  floods  the 
enemy  had  difficulty  in  mustering  his  reserves 
near  the  threatened  points,  and  the  country 
being  more  open  than  it  was  opposite  the 
British  the  French  aircraft  were,  notwith- 
standing the  weather,  able  to  observe  the 
position  and  during  the  night  of  the  15th-16th 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  to  bomb  them, 
and  the  German  bivouacs  and  cantonments 
north  and  east  of  Houthulst  Forest  as  well  as 
Lichtervelde  railway  station,  12  miles  east  of 
Dixmude.  While  the  battle  proceeded  they 
and  their  Belgian  colleagues,  flying  at  a  very 
low  altitude,  attacked  with  bomb  and  machine- 
gun  fire  enemy  troops,  railway  trains  and 
aviation     grounds.     Two     German     machines 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


:;•;.-, 


RUINS    OF    NOORDSCHOOTE. 


[Belgian  official  photograph. 


were  brought  down  and  two  driven  down  by 
the  French ;  one  was  brought  down  by  a 
Belgian  airman  over  the  Houthulst  Forest. 
It  was  in  that  very  considerable  mass  of  still 
intact  woodland  that  Sixt  von  Armin  had 
concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  reserves  between 
Dixmude  and  Langemarck.  Naturally,  the 
French  long-range  guns  gave  particular  atten- 
tion to  the  forest.  So  effective  was  their  fire 
that  only  driblets  of  German  infantry  succeeded 
in  debouching  from  it  against  Anthoine's  right 
and  Gough's  left. 

Anthoine's  objectives  were  the  Drie  Grachten 
bridge-head  and  the  whole  triangular  spit  of 
land  between  the  Lower  Steenbeek  and  the 
Yperlee  Canal.  His  right  was  to  cross  the 
Steenbeek  and,  in  touch  with  Gough's  left, 
to  assist  the  British  to  clear  the  enemy  from 
his  positions  north-west  of  Langemarck  and 
south  of  the  Broenbeek  stream,  which  joins 
the  Steenbeek  just  south  of  St.  Janshoek. 
The  Steenbeek  at  this  point  was  some  seven  feet 
broad  and  five  feet  deep.  It  widened  and 
deepened  in  the  reach  between  St.  Janshoek 
and  the  Steenstraat -Dixmude  road,  and  from 
the  Martjewaart  reach  to  the  Yperlee  Canal  it 
was  some  20  feet  broad  and  13  feet  deep. 

The  French  had  already  crossed  the  Yperlee 


a  little  to  the  north  of  the  Drie  Grachten 
bridge-head,  and  N.W.  of  Bixschoote  had 
driven  the  Germans  out  of  a  part  of  the  marshy 
Poelsele  peninsula,  but  numerous  pill -boxes — 
mostly  in  the  ruins  of  farmhouses — had  yet 
to  be  reduced.  North  and  north-east  of 
Bixschoote  the  ground  sloping  to  the  Steenbeek 
was  sprinkled  with  redoubts.  A  third  of  a 
mile  west  of  the  junction  of  the  Broenbeek 
and  Steenbeek  was  a  steel  and  concrete  fort, 
"  Les  Lilas,"  and  in  the  angle  between  the  two 
streams  was  "  Mondovi,"  a  similar  obstacle. 
The  French  artillery,  which  had  for  some  days 
previous  to  the  attack  bombarded  the  Drie 
Grachten  bridge-head,  had  reduced  it  to 
impotence,  the  exposed  concrete  works  being 
easily  rendered  untenable.  Our  Allies,  on  the 
16th,  waded  through  the  submerged  area  and 
established  themselves  in  the  ruined  works. 
In  the  Poelsele  peninsula  the  enemy  gave  more 
trouble  but  by  nightfall  had  been  dislodged 
from  all  their  strong  points.  The  wes,t  bank  of  the 
Martjewaart  reach  of  the  Steenbeek  was  thus 
gained.  North  and  north-east  of  Bixschoote 
the  French  also  arrived  at  the  west  bank  of  the 
St.  Janshoek  reach,  but  the  garrison  of  the 
Les  Lilas  fort  continued  to  hold  out,  though 
surrounded  on  all  sides. 


366 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


The  Upper  Steenbeek  was  crossed  by  the 
French  between  a  point  west  of  Wydendref  t  and 
a  bend  in  the  stream  south-west  of  St.  Janshoek. 
Keeping  in  line  with  Gough's  extreme  left, 
they  advanced  to  the  south  bank  of  the 
Broenbeek.  The  fort  of  Mondovi,  however, 
at  sunset,  was  still  firing.  Pivoting  on  it, 
the  Germans  counter-attacked  during  the  night 
in  the  hope  of  penetrating  between  the  French 
and  British.  The  attack  completely  failed, 
and  the  next  morning  the  French  and  our  men 
lay  side  by  side  looking  across  the  narrow 
valley  of  the  Broenbeek.  Apart  from  the 
resistance  of  the  Les  Lilas  and  Mondovi  forts, 


the  French  had  achieved  their  objects  on  the 
16th  without  much  difficulty.  There  had,  in- 
deed, been  some  hard  fighting  at  Champaubert 
Farm  and  Brienne  House,  two  isolated  groups 
of  ruins,  but  the  French  guns  were  promptly 
turned  on  them.  Brienne  House  at  once, 
Champaubert  Farm  shortly  afterwards,  hoisted 
white  flags.  The  day's  take  of  prisoners 
amounted  to  over  300  (including  four  officers). 
Numerous  guns,  trench  mortars  and  machine- 
guns  had  been  captured  by  our  Allies.  During 
the  night  of  August  16-17  French  airmen  set 
fire  to  the  railway  station  buildings  of  Corte- 
marck,  10  miles  east  of  Dixmude.     On  Friday, 


YPRES,    LANGEMARCK.    AND    COUNTRY    ROUND. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


367 


August  17,  Anthoine  completed  his  operations. 
The  Les  Lilas  and  Mondovi  forts,  against  the 
concrete  sides  and  roofs  of  which  the  lighter 
shells  burst  ineffectually,  were  not  reduced 
until  heavy  howitzers  were  brought  up.  These 
opened  fire  in  the  morning  and  by  nightfall 
both  of  these  strong  points  were  breached  and 
then  were  surrendered  by  their  garrisons. 
Some  23  Germans  and  two  officers  were  captured 
at  Les  Lilas.  The  total  of  prisoners  now 
exceeded  400  and  some  15  German  guns  had 
been  taken.  * 

From  the  southern  edge  of  the  inundations 
and  stretches  of  treacherous  swamp  between 
Dixmude  and  Drie  Grachten  the  French  line 
had  been  pushed  forward  to  the  western  bank 
of  the  Steenbeek  as  far  as  the  south  of  St. 
Janshoek.  South  of  the  Mondovi  fort  the 
Steenbeek  had  been  crossed  and  the  extreme 
right  of  Anthoine's  army  had  swung  northwards 
to  the  south  bank  of  the  Broenbeek.  Con- 
sequently Gough's  left  wing  was  no  longer 
in  danger  of  being  taken  in  reverse.  Anthoine 
by  his  handling  of  his  troops,  guns  and  aircraft 
had  further  enhanced  his  great  reputation. 
He  had  shown  that  he  could  manoeuvre  in  the 
marshes  of  Flanders  as  skilfully  as  he  had 
manoeuvred  on  the  hills  of  Moronvilliers.  An 
especial  tribute  must  be  paid  to  the  French 
engineers.  Under  heavy  shell  fire,  in  swamps 
and  morasses  they  had  repaired  roads,  bridged 
streams  and  constructed  wire  entanglements. 

Simultaneously  with  the  French  advance  to 
the  Lower  Steenbeek  and  the  Broenbeek,  the 
British  5th  Army  was  set  in  motion.  On  the 
extreme  left  English  troops  abreast  of  the 
French  stormed  the  hamlet  of  Wydendreft, 
reached  the  southern  bank  of  the  Broenbeek 
and  assisted  their  comrades  on  the  right  to 
storm  Langemarck.  The  German  214th  Divi- 
sion retired  before  them.  In  Langemarck 
on  the  Ypres-Staden  railway  and  its  environs 
the  German  79th  Reserve  Division  put  up  a 
fair  resistance.  The  troops  of  this  division 
had  been  terribly  tried  by  the  preliminary 
bombardment  during  the  night  of  the  15th-16th. 
The  202nd  and  261st  Regiments  belonging  to 
it  had  been  ordered  to  drive  us  back  over 
the  Steenbeek.  But  neither  of  them  could 
be     induced     to     face     the    British     barrage. 

*  French  communiqui  of  August  17.  The  British 
communique  of  the  same  date  stated  that  "  24  German 
guns,  including  a  number  of  heavy  guns,  had  been 
captured  by  the  Allies."  See  the  map  in  the  last 
chapter  for  th3  general  lie  of  the  country. 


With  grim  satisfaction  the  Rifle  Brigade,  the 
Somerset  Light  Infantry,  Cornish  and  other 
English  county  battalions,  who  had  silently 
crossed  the  bridges  over  the  Steenbeek  and  were 
lying  in  the  muddy  and  water-logged  region 
beyond,  watched  the  ceaseless  ram  of  shells 
from  our  guns.     During  the  night  the  air  was 


[French  official  phou  graph. 

PRUSSIAN    GUARDS    OFFICERS    RECEIVE 

THEIR    BREAD    RATION    AS     PRISONERS 

OF    WAR. 

clear  and  dry  and  the  explosions  of  the  pro- 
jectiles lit  up  the  foreground  and  threw  into 
relief  the  hummocks  of  cUbris  which  marked 
the  site  of  Langemarck,  the  shattered  farms  in 
its  vicinity,  and  the  squat,  ugly,  concrete 
redoubts  established  over  the  water-logged 
countryside.  At  intervals  gusts  of  German 
shells  burst  among  our  men,  churning  up  the 
mud,  and  poisoning  the  atmosphere  with  gas. 
Towards  dawn  of  the  16th  a  heavy  mist 
came  up  and  obscured  the  view.  Then  began 
the  final,  the  intense  bombardment,  and  the 
British,  rising  to  their  feet,  and  slipping  or 
wading  at  every  step,  moved  forward  behind 
the  creeping  barrage.  "  It  was  a  grand 
barrage,"  said  a  Gloucester  man  who  took 
part  in  the  advance.  "  The  shells  were  laid 
out  just  in  front  of  us  as  though  a  man  was 
dropping  them  from  a  basket  as  he  walked." 
Excellent,  however,  as  was  the  artillery  pre- 
paration in  this  sector  of  the  battlefield,  the 
physical  and  moral  effort  that  was  needed  for 


368 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


[Officiat  photograph. 

CUTTING    UP    TREES    FELLED    BY    SHELL-FIRE    NEAR    ZILLEBEKE. 
The  timber  was  used  to  strengthen  trenches,  make  roads,  etc. 


the  reduction  of  Langemarck  was  extraor- 
dinary. The  approaches  to  the  village  were 
bogs  or  ponds.  In  some  places  the  fields  were 
flooded,  and  the  roads  had  disappeared  in  the 
waste  of  shell-craters.  P'loundering  in  the  mud 
which  clung  to  boots  and  leggings,  our  troops 
visibly  melted  away  under  the  jets  of  bullets 
fired  from  innumerable  machine-guns. 

Near  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Steenbeek  was 
a  broad,  drab  mass  of  reinforced  concrete, 
ironically  named  "  Au  Bon  Gite  "  (The  Good 
Shelter),  on  the  site  of  an  erstwhile  estaminet 
for  the  refreshment  of  peasants  returning  from 
Langemarck  railway  station  to  their  farms. 
A  huge  shell  had  failed  to  smash  in  the  sides  of 
this  redoubt,  which  still  kept  tip  firing  at  our 
men.  The  steel  door  was  fast  bolted  and 
nothing  could  be  done  but  to  fire  at  the  slits 
in  the  walls.  A  group  of  our  men  encircled 
the  work  and  kept  up  a  fusillade,  waiting  to 
bomb  the  garrison  if  by  chance  the  door  were 
to  be  opened.  Beyond  the  "  Bon  Gite  "  the 
remainder  of  the  English  wave  perceived  on 
their  left  a  similar  fort,  Reitres  Farm,  com- 
manding all  the  ground  between  the  Steenbeek 
and  the  village.  It  rose  in  front  of  a  patch 
of    green    water,    the    lake    of    a  >  demolished 


chateau.  Farther  to  the  left,  from  gun  pits  on 
both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Staden  railway,  and 
from  Langemarck  railway  station,  German 
machine-gunners  were  firing  with  frantic  haste 
at  the  left  flank  of  their  foes  approaching 
Reitres  Farm.  Away  to  the  right  two  lines 
of  blackened  trunks  marked  where  the  road 
from  Pilkem  through  Langemarck  to  Poel- 
cappelle  had  once  run.  Sinking  up  to  their 
thighs  in  mud,  our  surviving  men  steadily 
pressed  on.  One  of  them  with  a  Lewis  gun 
crawled  up  to  the  redoubt  and  managed  to 
thrust  the  muzzle  through  a  loophole  and  fire. 
Shrieks  and  oaths  followed  the  discharge, 
and,  immediately  afterwards,  through  another 
hole  fluttered  a  strip  of  white  cloth.  The 
Prussian  garrison  surrendered,  and  Reitres 
Farm  was  ours.  In  the  meantime  the  defenders 
of  Bon  Gite,  feeling  themselves  isolatod,  had 
opened  its  steel  door  and  attempted  to  escape. 
Bombs  flung  in  the  doorway  had  killed  several 
of  them,  and  the  rest,  wounded  or  unwounded, 
had  been  taken  prisoners. 

The  advance  on  Langemarck  had  begun  at 
4.45  a.m.  The  ruins  of  the  village  church, 
the  gun  pits  along  the  railway,  the  station 
and  other  strong  points  were  not  secured  till 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


869 


[French  official  photograph, 

FRENCH     FIRST-AID    STATION     ESTABLISHED    IN    A    CAPTURED     GERMAN     BLOCK- 
HOUSE. 


8  a.m.  The  English  troops  on  the  right  of 
the  French  having  stormed  Wydendreft  had 
attacked  gun  pits  and  station  from  the  north, 
while  their  comrades  round  Reitres  Farm  were 
assaulting  them  from  the  south.  The  next 
step  was  to  attack  the  trench  system  running 
crescent-wise  behind  the  village.  To  the 
support  of  the  disordered  79th  Reserve  Division 
was  being  sent  the  24th  Wiirtemberg  Division, 
a  body  of  tough  and  seasoned  troops.  The 
Somersets  advanced  along  the  road  towards 
Schreyboom,  a  hamlet  on  the  northern  of  the 
two  roads  connecting  Langemarck  with  Poel- 
cappelle.  At  Pont  Point  were,  along  the  side 
of  the  road,  two  redoubts  with  loopholes  and 
steel  doors.  A  lieutenant  with  20  men  made 
for  the  first.  He  reduced  it  with  bombs 
and  captured  30  prisoners.  Though  only  six 
unwounded  men  were  left  with  him,  the 
lieutenant  proceeded  to  assault  the  second  of 
the  strong  points.  He  flung  two  grenades 
through  the  loopholes  but  the  garrison  still 
resisted.  Then  he  threw  his  bombs  at  the 
steel  door.  They  failed  to  explode.  Beating  at 
the  door  with  his  fists  he  shouted  "  Come  out, 

you  ,   come  out !  "     To  his  surprise  the 

door  opened  and  42  Germans  with  a  Yorkshire- 


man  whom  they  had  taken  emerged,  holding 
up  their  hands.  It  is  pleasant  to  relate  that 
the  Yorkshireman  had  been  well  treated  by  his 
captors.  A  third  blockhouse  armed  with 
eight  machine-guns,  which  worked  on  a 
hydraulic  lift,  was  then  reduced,  and  the 
lieutenant,  firing  with  his  automatic  pistol, 
chased  a  number  of  the  enemy  up  the  road. 
He  and  his  men  went  on  and  joined  a  group  of 
Somersets,  King's  Own  Yorkshire  Light  Infantry, 
and  Rifle  Brigade  men.  This  was  but  one 
of  the  many  heroic  incidents  which  resulted 
in  the  transfer  to  the  British  of  the  whole  of  the 
crescent-shaped  defensive  system  behind  Lange- 
marck with  the  exception  of  a  short  length  of 
trench  north-east  of  the  village.  Two  counter- 
attacks of  the  Germans  on  August  16  were 
easily  repulsed. 

The  capture  of  the  line  of  the  Lower  Steen- 
beek  and  the  Broenbeek  and  of  Langemarck 
by  Anthoine's  right  and  Gough's  left  wing 
secured  the  British  from  the  danger  of  being 
attacked  in  the  rear  while  they  were  engaged  in 
dislodging  the  enemy  from  the  Passchendaele 
Ridge.  That  danger  had  been  a  very  real  one, 
for  under  cover  of  the  Forest  of  Houthulst  it 
was  possible  for  Sixt  von  Armin  to  assemble 


870 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


large  forces  without  being  perceived  and,  as  the 
Germans  had  done  at  the  Second  Battle  of 
Ypres,  to  launch  them  through  Bixschoote  and 
Langemarck  on  Ypres.  The  French  position 
stopped  this.  So  far,  then,  the  operations  of 
August  16  were  a  distinct  success  for  the  Allies, 
as  along  the  left  half  of  the  battlefield  they  had 
been  almost  everywhere  victorious.  Unhappily 
between  the  eastern  environs  of  Langemarck, 
across  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway  to  the  road 
from  Ypres  to  Menin,  the  day  went  badly  for 
Gough.  It  was  here  that  the  British  were  faced 
by  the  network  of  large  concrete  forts  before 
referred    to    and    were    also    exposed    to    the 


M  ustralian  official  photograph. 

THE   GATEWAY  OF   THE   BATTLEFIELD. 

heaviest  shell  fire.  Sixt  von  Armin,  not  being 
attacked  that  day  by  Plumer's  Second  Army, 
was  able  to  concentrate  against  Gough's  centre 
and  right  wing  a  vast  number  of  guns  and  to 
employ  extra  battalions  in  counter-attacks. 
Consequently  Gough,  despite  the  courage  and 
dash  of  his  men,  on  the  centre  and  right 
suffered  a  decided  reverse.  West  Lancashire 
Territorials  and  troops  from  other  English 
counties,  indeed,  managed  to  advance  1,000 
yards  east  of  Langemarck  and  to  establish 
themselves  on  a  line  running  from  the  old 
German  third  line  due  east  of  the  village  to  the 
north  of  St.  Julien,  thereby  protecting  our 
garrison  in  and  around  Langemarck  from  a 
flank  attack.  Incidentally  they  stormed  a 
powerful  work  near  the  road  from  Ypres  to 
Poolcappelle.    another    pill -box    farther    north 


near  Koorselaere,  and  a  third  one  700  yards 
or  so  east  of  St.  Julien.  But  the  enemy  on  the 
Mt.  du  Hibou,  in  Triangle  Farm  to  its  south,  in 
Winnipeg  Farm  on  the  Langemarck-Zonnebeke 
cross-road,  and  in  Wurst  Farm  north  of  the 
latter  strong  point,  counter-attacked  very 
violently.  Though  these  regiments  took  400 
prisoners  and  materially  assisted  the  Cornish, 
Somersets,  and  Rifle  Brigade  in  their  reduction 
and  retention  of  Langemarck,  they  were  unable 
to  turn  the  very  strong  position  to  their  right, 
against  which  the  Ulster  and  South  Irish  troops 
were  dashing  themselves  in  vain. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  Ulster  and 
South  Irish  Divisions  had  particularly  dis- 
tinguished themselves  in  the  fighting  at  Mes- 
sines,  where  Major  Willie  Redmond,  M.P.,  lost 
his  life.  Severely  as  they  had  been  tested 
on  June  7,  it  was  a  far  sterner  task  they  were 
set  on  Thursday,  August  16.  They  were  con- 
fronted by  the  new  German  elastic  system  of 
defence  in  its  most  perfect  form  and  the  enemy 
opposed  to  them — Bavarians — had  not  had 
their  nerves  shaken  by  the  explosion  of  mines 
of  unprecedented  magnitude.  Deployed  between 
Fortuin  (south-south-east  of  St.  Julien  on  the 
road  from  Ypres  to  the  northern  outskirts  of 
Passchendaele)  and  the  Ypres-Roulers  Railway 
south  of  Frezenberg,  the  Irish  objective  was  the 
Langemarck-Zonnebeke  road  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  reached  and  crossed  by  the  English 
troops  on  their  left  to  the  west  of  the  Ypres- 
Poelcappelle  road  but  not — nearer  the  Irish — 
between  the  south  of  Koorselaere  and  Winnipeg 
Farm.  The  Ulster  Division  was  on  the  left, 
the  Inniskillings,  Dublin  Fusiliers  and  Royal 
Irish  Rifles  of  the  South  Irish  Division 
were  on  the'  right  in  the  order  named.  The 
Royal  Irish  Rifles  were  to  work  up  the  Ypres- 
Roulers  railroad  to  the  western  edge  of 
Zonnebeke. 

The  undulating  ground  in  front  of  the  Irish 
was  sodden  with  rain,  pitted  with  craters  and 
defended  by  many  pill -boxes.  Clay  and  earth 
had  been  piled  up  round  the  edges  of  the 
craters,  which  were  fitted  with  wooden  plat- 
forms and  high  steps  for  the  machine-gunners 
in  them.  Here  and  there  barbed  wire  entangle- 
ments had  escaped  the  British  bombardment. 
The  Haanebeek  and  Zonnebeke  streams,  both 
swollen  by  the  rain  in  places,  ran  across  the  line 
of  advance.  The  Zonnebeke  north  of  Frezenberg 
entered  our  lines  south-west  of  Fortuin  and  then 
turned  northwards  and  at  St.  Julien  received 
the     Haanebeek,     flowing     down     from     the 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


371 


Passehendaele  Ridge  ;  west  of  St.  Julien  the 
two  conjoined  streams  were  called  the 
Steenbeek. 

At  4.45  a.m.  the  Ulstermen  set  out.  They 
speedily  ejected  the  handful  of  Bavarians  in  the 
first  crater  line,  but  then  their  troubles  began. 
Close  to  their  starting  point  an  old  battery 
position  had  been  converted  into  a  nest  of 
machine-guns,  and  beyond  rose  the  solid 
concrete  structure  of  Pond  Farm  redoubt,  with 
its  chain  of  deep  dug-outs.  With  bayonet  and 
bomb  the  Ulstermen  gradually  overpowered  the 
tenacious  foe  and  resumed  their  advance.  But 
from  Hill  35,  south  of  the  Langemarck-Zonne- 
beke  road,  torrents  of  bullets  poured  down  on 
them  ;  they  were  enfiladed  from  the  Uallipoli 
redoubt  and  held  up  by  a  broad  entanglement 
of  barbed  wire.  While  cutting  their  way 
through  this  they  were  mown  down  in  heaps. 
They  succeeded  in  taking  a  post — "  The 
Caserne " — near  Border  Farm,  but,  fiercely 
counter-attacked,  were  obliged  to  relinquish  it. 
Step  by  step  they  were  forced  back  and  at 
nightfall  the  Pond  Farm  was  again  in  the  hands 
of  the  Bavarians.  The  experiences  of  the  South 
Irish  Division  were  very  similar.  The  Innis- 
killings  crossed  the  Zonnebeke,  captured  two 
redoubts,  and  temporarily  gained  the  summit 
of  Hill  37,  but,  unsupported  on  both  flanks, 
they  too  were  forced  to  retire.  The  Dublin 
Fusiliers   to   the   right   were   held   up   by   the 


machine-guns  of  the  Bremen  redoubt,  while 
the  Royal  Irish  Rifles,  who  had  worked  up  the 
Ypres-Roulers  railway  as  far  as  the  level 
crossing  and  endeavoured  with  details  of  the 
Dublin  Fusilio-s  to  carry  Hill  35  from  the  east, 
were  in  their  turn  flung  back  by  masses  of 
Germans  advancing  from  the  direction  of 
Zonnebeke.  By  the  end  of  the  afternoon  the 
attack  between  Fortuin  and  the  Ypres-Roulers 
railway  had  been  bloodily  repulsed. 

The  reverse  suffered  by  Gough's  centre 
between  Fortuin  and  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway 
was  not  counter- balanced  by  successes  in  the 
wooded  region  south  of  the  railroad.  There 
the  weather  conditions,  rendering  aeroplane 
observation  very  difficult,  told  most  heavily 
against  the  British,  for  the  woods  east  of 
Westhoek  enabled  Sixt  von  Armin  to  conceal 
preparations  for  counter-attacks  better  than 
in  the  open  country  from  Langemarck  to 
Zonnebeke,  although  parts  of  the  wood  had  been 
reduced  to  tree  stumps  by  our  gun-fire. 
To  retain  the  Nonne  Boschen,  Polygon  and 
Glencorse  Woods  ami  Inverness  Copse  was 
rightly  considered  by  the  German  com- 
mander to  be  a  matter  of  vital  importance. 
If  Gough  from  the  Westhoek  ridge  drove  the 
Germans  eastwards  through  the  Nonne  Boschen 
and  Polygon  Woods,  he  would  not  only  menace 
Zonnebeke  from  the  south  but  he  would  be 
on  the  edge  of  the  Passehendaele  Ridge.     Were 


ZONNEBEKE. 


'■.man  official  photograph 


193-3 


872 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Glencorse  Wood  and  Inverness  Copse  lost  by 
the  Germans,  their  hold  on  Herenthage  Chateau, 
Dumbarton  Lakes  and  Shrewsbury  Forest 
would  become  precarious,  and  Veldhoek, 
Gheluvelt  and  Zandvoorde  might  ultimately 
have  to  be  abandoned.  The  Battle  of  Messines 
had  secured  the  Allies  from  a  thrust  at  their 
communications  west  of  Ypres.  The  chances 
of  a  successful  German  drive  at  Ypres  from 
the  north  were  now  small ;  during  the  day 
they  had  become  smaller ;  consequently  a 
counter-offensive  against  Ypres  from  the  east 
on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  was 
the  last  move  left  open  to  Sixt  von  Armin,  if 
he  wished  by  active  measures  to  prevent  the 
Allies  moving  on  Thourout  and  Roulers.  He 
had,  therefore,  massed  the  bulk  of  his  guns  and 
reserves  on  the  line  Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt- 
Zandvoorde.  In  front  of  them  the  34th 
Division  in  the  woods  north  of  the  Ypres-Menin 
road  was  ordered  at  all  costs  to  defend  the  pill- 
.  boxed  zone. 

Along  the  Westhoek  ridge  from  the  Ypres- 
Boulers  railroad  to  the  road  to  Menin,  Gough 
had  deployed  English  county  and  London 
regiments  for  the  attack.  The  Londoners 
were  in  the  centre  and  their  objectives  were  the 
Glencorse,  Nonne  Boschen,  and  Polygon  Woods. 


Their  comrades  on  the  left  in  touch  with  the 
Royal  Irish  Rifles  were  to  descend  the  ridge 
and  gain  the  west  bank  of  the  Haanebeek  ; 
Inverness  Copse  was  to  be  stormed  by  the 
troops  on  the  right  of  the  Londoners. 

At  4.45  a.m.,  in  successive  waves,  the  English 
county  and  London  battalions  moved  slowly 
forward  through  the  woods  and  morasses. 
They  had  been  out  all  night  in  the  wet  mud 
under  heavy  fire.  At  first  it  seemed  that  the 
Londoners  would  be  successful.  Disregarding 
machine-gun  fire  from  Inverness  Copse,  they 
broke  through  Glencorse  Wood.  A  powerful 
German  barrage  fell  upon  them  as  they  struggled 
northwards  along  the  west  side  of  Nonne 
Boschen  Wood,  which,  owing  to  the  floods, 
was  mostly  under  water.  At  the  northern  end 
of  the  woodland  they  found  a  redoubt  tucked 
away  among  shattered  trees.  It  was  reduced 
by  bombing,  as  also  was  another  pill-box 
beyond  it  on  the  road  from  Zonnebeke  to 
Veldhoek,  which  skirts  the  east  of  the  wood. 
From  the  western  edge  of  Polygon  Wood  many 
machine-guns  played  on  the  now  disordered 
men.  Yet  groups  of  Londoners  waded  through 
the  Nonne  Boschen  Wood,  others  proceeded 
north  of  it  on  the  drier  ground,  while  detach- 
ments managed  to  cross  the  open  space,  enter 


[French  official  photograph. 


RESULTS    OF    ARTILLERY    FIRE    IN    FLANDERS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


873 


AT    BAY    IN    A    SHELL-CRATER:     HOLDING    UP    A    COUNTER    ATTACK    WITH 

LEWIS    GUNS. 


the  belt  of  trees  and  bombing  and  bayoneting 
to  arrive  at  the  great  racecourse  in  the  centre 
of  Polygon  Wood.  There  they  halted  and 
waited  for  reinforcements  to  resist  counter- 
attacks. 

Unluckily  the  reinforcements  did  not  arrive. 
They  were  kept  off  by  the  enemy's  barrage 
of  shells,  while  the  failure  of  the  troops  on  the 
left  to  advance  and  those  on  the  right  to 
capture  Inverness  Copse,  left  the  Londoners 
exposed  to  flank  attacks.  The  only  assistance 
they  received  was  from  the  air.  One  of  our 
daring  battle  'planes  hovered  over  the  main 
street  of  Zonnebeke  and  above  Polygon  Wood, 
scattering  the  Germans  mustering  for  counter- 
attacks. Other  aeroplanes  with  their  machine- 
guns  peppered  the  approaches  to  the  wood, 
dropped  bombs  on  the  concrete  redoubts 
defending  its  flanks,  silenced  batteries,  and  dis- 
persed a  column  of  the  enemy  on  the  Menin  road. 

At  2  p.m.  counter-attacks  commenced  from 
all  sides.  The  Germans  poured  over  the  ridge 
south  of  Zonnebeke,  issued  from  Inverness 
Copse  and  Herenthage  Wood,  from  shell 
holes  and  from  Polygon  Wood  itself.  The 
Londoners  fought  stubbornly.  Their  position 
may  be  gathered  from  the  following  message 
signalled  by  a  Middlesex  officer  commandirg 
one  of  the  groups.  "  Am  in  shell  hole,  before 
second  objective,"  it  ran,  "  and  two  strong 
points  held  by  the  enemy.  Have  ten  men 
with    me.     We    are    surrounded,    and    heavy 


machine-gun  fire  is  being  turned  on  us.  Regret 
no  course  but  to  surrender.  Can't  see  ftny  of 
our  forces."  Some  of  our  small  advanced 
bodies  were  more  fortunate,  and,  cutting  their 
way  through  the  encircling  foe,  re-entered 
Nonne  Boschen  and  Glencorse  Woods  and 
reached  our  lines  in  safety. 

The  second  phase  of  the  Third  Battle  of 
Ypres  had  resulted  in  another  success  for 
Anthoine  and,  between  the  Broenbeek  and 
St.  Julien,  in  a  success  for  Gough.  But,  in 
the  words  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  "  except  for 
some  small  gains  of  ground  on  the  western 
edge  of  Glencorse  Wood  and  north  of  Westhoek 
the  situation  south  of  St.  Julien  remained 
unchanged."  Against  the  severe  losses  sus- 
tained by  the  Ulster  and  South  Irish  Divisions 
and  the  English  County  and  London  regiments 
fighting  on  their  right  was  to  be  set  the  fact 
that  in  the  course  of  the  day  the  Allies  had 
captured  over  2,100  prisoners  and  some  30  guns. 
The  German  official  report  of  the  fighting  was 
characteristic.  It  falsely  alleged  that  Gough's 
troops  had  entered  Poelcappelle  and  been 
expelled  f  rom  both  that  village  and  Langemarck ; 
also  that  Plumcr's  Second  Army  had  taken 
part  in  the  battle.  As  a  specimen  of  German 
mendacity,  the  report  deserves  to  be  reprinted  : 

Front  of  the  Crows  Prince  Rcpprecht. — The 
second  great  fighting  day  of  the  Flanders  battle  has 
been  decided  in  onr  favour,  thanks  to  tho  bravery  of  all 
arms,  thanks  to  the  never-failing  attacking  strength  of 
our  incomparable  German  infantry. 


374 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


On  the  morning  of  August  15,  after  an  hour's  drum- 
fire, the  flower  of  the  English  Army,  accompanied  by 
French  forces  on  the  northern  wing,  burst  forward, 
dreply  echeloned,  to  the  attack. 

On  a  front  of  30  kilometres  (18}  miles),  from  the 
Yser  as  far  as  the  Lys,  the  battle  raged  throughout 
the  day.  Our  advanced  posts  on  the  Yser  Canal  near 
Drie  Grachten  were  overrun.  The  enemy  also  captured 
the  ground  before  the  battle  position  of  the  Martje 
Vaart,  north  and  east  of  Bixschoote,  which  was  yielded 
step  by  step  by  our  protecting  troops. 

The  English  penetrated  our  lines  near  Langemarck, 
and  by  means  of  reinforcements  pushed  forward  as  far 
as  Poelcappelle.  At  this  point  they  were  met  by  a  counter- 


had  brought  down  15  and  driven  down  11  of 
the  enemy's  machines.  One  German  obser- 
vation balloon  had  been  sent  to  the  ground  in 
flames  ;  hostile  aerodromes,  which  were  now 
roofed  with  bullet-proof  steel,  had  been  cleared 
with  machine-gun  fire  from  a  height  of  a  few 
score  feet,  and  6J  tons  of  bombs  had  been 
dropped  on  enemy  aerodromes,  railway  stations 
and  billets.  During  the  day  73  hostile  batteries 
were     silenced     and     subsequent     observation 


[Official  photograph. 


MAKING    A    ROAD    UNDER    SHELL  FIRE. 


attack  on  the  part  of  our  fighting  reserves.  In  an  irre- 
sistible assault  the  foremost  enemy  troops  were  over- 
powered and  his  rear  echelons  were  thrown  back.  By 
the  evening,  after  tough  fighting,  Langemarck  and  our 
lost  position  was  again  in  our  hands. 

Also  near  St.  Julien,  and  at  numerous  points  farther 
south  as  far  as  Warneton,  the  enemy,  whose  shattered 
attacking  troops  were  continually  reinforced,  penetrated 
into  our  new  battle  zone.  In  all  other  sectors  of  the 
extensivo  battlefield  the  English  assault  collapsed  before 
our  entanglements. 

In  spite  of  heavy  sacrifices,  the  English  have  accom- 
plished nothing  !  By  this  repulse  we  have  gained  a 
full  victory.  Unshaken,  with  high  spirits,  our  front 
stands  ready  for  new  battles  ! 

As  we  have  seen,  our  airmen,  though,  owing 
to  the  weather,  they  had  often  been  unable  to 
detect  preparations  for  counter-attacks,  had 
rendered  on  August  16  good  service.  The 
Cennan  aviators  had  had  10  days'  rest; 
they  had  been  reinforced  with  one  or  more  of 
their  circuses  ;  and  a  strong  west  wind  made  it 
difficult  for  damaged  British  and  French 
machines  to  regain  their  lines.  Nevertheless, 
with   the    loss    of    11    aeroplanes,    the    British 


showed  that  21  gun -pits  had  been  entirely 
destroyed  and  35  others  badly  damaged. 
Further,  18  ammunition  dumps  were  exploded 
and  15  considerable  fires  caused.  Our  men  had 
flown  a  total  of  1,784  hours  in  the  24  hours 
ending  at  6  p.m.  on  the  16th.  In  addition  to 
the  aerial  incidents  already  related,  some 
others  which  occurred  on  the  16th  are  well 
worth  recording.  One  aeroplane,  going  through 
our  barrage  several  times,  attacked  the  "  Au 
Bon  Gite  "  redoubt,  others  fired  on  German 
troops  entering  or  leaving  Langemarck.  A 
British  airman  flew  off  at  4.45  a.m.,  attacked  an 
aerodrome  with  his  machine-guns,  fired  500 
rounds  at  three  Albatros  machines  on  the 
ground  and  into  the  billets  of  their  crews. 
Proceeding  above  a  main  road,  he  shot  the 
horses  of  a  transport  wagon,  at  a  railway 
crossing  killed  or  wounded  a  German  sentry, 
and  a  little  farther  on  stampeded  a  horse 
transport.     All    this   was   accomplished   in   an 


TtiK     TIMES     tilSTOlt\      OF     THK     WAH. 


37  a 


NIGHT    SCENE    AT    AN    AVIATION    STATION: 


[French  official  phoUgrapli. 

A    MACHINE    ABOUT    TO    START. 


hour  at  a  height  of  less  than  100  feet.  Another 
of  these  brave  men  bombed  seven  machines  at 
a  German  aerodrome,  crossed  a  railway  line, 
saw  a  train  on  a  siding  and  fired  at  it.  Visiting 
another  aerodrome  he  set  a  hangar  on  fire. 
Afterwards  he  engaged  a  railway  engine. 
Still  one  more  airman  flew  in  the  darkness  over 
a  German  aerodrome,  bombed  the  hangars 
and  a  railway  siding,  which  was  crammed 
with  troop  trains,  attacked  and  destroyed 
two  Albatross  machines,  silenced  a  machine- 
gun  and  wounded  or  killed  many  of  the  enemy. 
Two  more  examples  of  the  daring  displayed 
by  our  airmen  may  be  given.  One  of  our  men 
in  his  aerial  journey  found  a  machine  just 
about  to  rise  from  the  ground,  so  he  dived  and 
fired  into  and  wrecked  it,  then  circled  round 


and  continued  to  shatter  the  wreckage.  He 
made  a  tour  of  the  aerodrome,  firing  into  the 
sheds  from  below  the  level  of  the  roof,  but  as 
no  one  appeared,  he  went  away  and  found  a 
German  battery  in  action.  He  stooped  at  it, 
fired  along  the  line  of  guns,  and  silenced  them. 
Then  he  flew  over  the  battery  for  five  minutes 
lest  it  should  recommence  firing,  but  as  it 
did  not  he  returned  home  and  used  the 
remainder  of  his  ammunition  on  enemy  trenches 
in  passing.  The  second  incident,  also,  shows 
the  efficacy  of  aircraft  under  varying  aspects. 
Here  the  aviator  attacked  an  aerodrome, 
circling  round  at  a  height  of  20  feet,  firing  into 
every  shed  and  setting  one  on  fire.  A  two- 
seater  machine  was  being  got  out  when  he 
arrived,  so  he  wrecked  that  and  used  all  the 


I Official  photograph. 

ON    THE    FLANDERS    FRONT:    A    SCENE    IN    ONE   OF    THE    CAPTURED    VILLAGES 
A  shell-crater  in  the  road  has  been  611ed  with  sand-bags. 


J.  1XUUU 


I  I  I  ■  ■  I   ■■  '  t  I    I 


f r      ill. 


[Official  photograph. 


PACK    MULES    GOING    TO    THE    FRONT    WITH    SHELLS. 


rest  of  the  ammunition  he  eould  spare  flying 
up  and  down  a  railway  train  full  of  troops  in 
a  siding,  firing  into  it  through  the  roofs  and 
the  windows. 

Remembering  that  the  above  feats  had  to 
be  performed  in  the  face  of  the  fire  of  machine- 
guns  and  anti-aircraft  guns  of  the  latest  and 
most  powerful  design,  and  that  at  any  moment 
our  men  might  be  pounced  upon  by  enemy 
aviators  from  the  sky  above  them,  the  courage 
and  ability  displayed  were  marvellous.  Before 
the  war  flying  had  been  regarded  as  a  most 
hazardous  occupation!  Few  would  have  then 
imagined  that  by  1917  thousands  of  men 
would  be  unconcernedly  risking  their  lives  in 
the  air  under  circumstances  so  infinitely  more 
nerve-racking.  Nor  was  the  Royal  Naval  Air 
Service  inactive  on  the  16th.  It  bombed 
Ostend  and  Thourout  railway  stations  and 
sidings,  arid  Ghistelles  aerodrome.  Aerodromes 
and  road  transport  at  Uytkerke,  a  mile  inland 
from  Blankenberghe,  and  at  Engel,  half-way 
between  Ghistelles  and  Thourout,  were  attacked 
by  naval  aeroplanes,  but  harmlessly.  • 

Tin;  formidable  character  of  the  German 
fortified  zone  between  the  Ypres-Comines 
canal  and  the  Ypres-Roulers  railroad  and  the 


methods  of  Sixt  von  Armin's  system  of  elastio 
defence  were  now  fully  evident  to  Sir  Douglas 
Haig,  Sir  Hubert  Gough,  and  Sir  Herbert 
Plumer.  To  penetrate  that  zone  an  attack  on 
a  wider  front  would  be  required.  In  view  of 
the  counter-attacks  which  had  been  directed 
against  the  flank  of  the  Londoners  and  English 
county  battalions  from  the  woods  south  of  the 
road  to  Menin,  the  region  thence  to  the  Ypres- 
Roulers  railway  could  not  safely  be  treated  as 
an  independent  sector.  The  next  great  blow 
would  have  to  be  struck  on  both  sides  of  the 
road.  A  question  arose  whether  or  not  it 
should  be  struck  by  Gough  with  his  right  wing. 
If  it  were  to  be,  that  wing  would  have  to  be 
prolonged  southward  to  the  Ypres-Comines 
canal.  The  5th  Army,  however,  had  borne  the 
brunt  of  the  fighting  since  July  31  and  its 
losses  had  been  considerable.  The  numbers  at 
Sir  Douglas  Haig's  disposal  in  France  did  not 
justify  him  in  weakening  Home's,  Byng's, 
and  Rawlinson's  Armies  to  reinforce  Gough's 
four  corps.  The  campaigns  in  Palestine 
and  Mesopotamia  competed  with  that  in 
France  for  such  forces  as  were  being  newly 
raised.  Every  day  the  situation  in  Russia 
was  becoming  worse,  and  the  possibility 
or    probability    that     Ludendorff    might,     in 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


877 


his  turn,  take  the  offensive  on  the  Western 
Front  had  to  be  reckoned  with.  Against 
that  eventuality  it  was  necessary  to  keep  a 
mass  for  manoeuvre  in  reserve  ;  for  the  district 
in  which  Ludendorff  might  attack  was  uncer- 
tain. Sir  Douglas  had,  therefore,  no  option 
but  to  continue  the  operations  in  the  Ypres 
salient  with  the  5th  and  2nd  Armies,  and  as 
Plumer's  troops,  backed  by  the  Wytschaete- 
Messines  ridge,  were  in  a  stronger  position 
than  Cough's,  and  had  had  since  the  Battle  of 
Messines  the  easier  work  to  perform,  it  was 
clearly  more  advisable  to  extend  Plumer's  left 
than  Gough's  right.  Accordingly,  the  attack 
upon  the  whole  of  the  high  wooded  ground 
crossed  by  the  Ypres-Menin  road  was  entrusted 
to  Sir  Herbert  Plumer.  That  able  soldier 
had  shown  at  Messines  that  he  was  peculiarly 
fitted  to  carry  out  an  operation  of  the  kind 
contemplated. 

At  the  same  time  a  modification  of  our 
artillery  tactics  to  meet  the  situation  created 
by  the  change  in  the  enemy's  methods  of  defence 
was  made.  Sixt  von  Armin's  front  being  only 
lightly  held,  our  gunners  would  henceforth 
have  to  bestow  more  attention  on  the  back- 
ground of  the  battle.     This  involved  the  guns 


being  brought  nearer  to  our  first  lines,  which 
meant,  to  quote  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  that  "  the 
long  preparatory  bombardment  had  to  be 
conducted  from  a  narrow  and  confined  space, 
for  the  most  part  destituto  alike  of  cover  and 
protection  and  directly  overlooked  by  the 
enemy.  As  our  infantry  advanced,"  continued 
Sir  Douglas,  "  our  guns  had  to  follow,  at  the 
cost  of  almost  incredible  exertion,  over  groiuid 
torn  by  shell  fire  and  sodden  with  rain.  When 
at  length  the  new  positions  had  been  reached, 
our  batteries  had  to  remain  in  action,  practically 
'  without  protection  of  any  kind,  day  after  day, 
week  after  week,  and  even  month  after  month, 
under  a  continuous  bombardment  of  gas  and 
high  explosive  shells." 

In  connexion  with  the  above  quotation  it 
will  be  noted  that  the  German  Higher  Command 
by  its  Order  of  June  30  had  immensely  increased 
the  difficulties  of  our  artillerymen  and  also  of  our 
aeroplane  observers.     (See  last  chapter,  p.  328). 

The  extension  of  Plumer's  left  wing  and  the 
steps  in  connexion  with  the  modification  of 
our  artillery  tactics  delayed  the  renewal  of  the 
offensive  on  a  large  scale.  The  weather,  too, 
again  became  wet  and  did  not  improve  until 
the     beginning    of    September.     During    the 


[Official  photograph. 


BRIDGING    A    STREAM. 


S7S 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


remainder  of  August,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Fourth  Battle  of  Verdun,  which  was  begun 
on  August  20,  only  minor  actions  were  fought 
on  the  Western  Front. 

The  day  after  the  Battle  of  Langemarck, 
as  the  second  phase  of  the  Third  Battle  of 
Ypres  was  currently  called,  the  aviators  of 
Anthoine's  army  were  active.  During  the 
night  of  the  17th-18th  they  bombarded  the 
railway  stations  of  Ostend,  Cortemarck,  Lich- 
tervelde,  Thourout  and  Cambrai  and  hutments 
in  the  Forest  of  Houthulst.  The  railway 
station  at  Thourout  had  been  visited  the  night 
before    (August    16-17)    at    midnight    by    our 


north  of  St.  Julien.  The  enemy  thought  our 
infantry  was  about  to  attack.  Up  went 
rockets  bursting  into  white  and  coloured  stars 
and  the  tired  garrisons  of  redoubts  and  craters 
rose  wearily  to  repel  the  attack.  A  succession 
of  German  barrages  was  flung  between  Koorse- 
laere  and  St.  Julien.  The  minutes  passed  and 
no  movement  could  be  detected  in  the  British 
lines.  German  observers  strained  their  eyes 
through  the  mist.  The  German  guns  were 
notified  that  a  false  alarm  had  been  given. 
Suddenly  at  dawn  some  1 2  tanks  were  perceived 
crawling  up  towards  the  Triangle  Farm,  Mt. 
du  Hibou  and  Cockcroft  redoubts  which  barred 


LONDON    MOTOR    OMNIBUSES    ON    THE    ROADSIDE. 


!  Official  photograph  ■ 


Royal  Naval  Air  Service,  when  fires  had  been 
caused,  an  ammunition  dump  hit  and  the 
railway  damaged.  On  Friday,  August  17, 
strong  westerly  winds  again  prevailed  in 
Flanders,  but  our  airmen  succeeded  in  bringing 
down  12  enemy  machines,  in  driving  down  18 
others,  out  of  control,  in  obtaining  an  unusually 
large  number  of  photographs,  and  in  bombing 
and  harassing  with  machine-gun  fire  the 
German  positions  and  infantry.  But  12  of  our 
machines  were  missing,  two  of  which  collided 
during  a  fight  and  fell  within  the  enemy's  lines. 
The  next  day,  Saturday,  August  18,  we,  however, 
lost  eight,  and  brought  down  only  three,  while 
four  German  machines  were  driven  down  out 
of  control. 

Sunday,  August  19,  was  also  the  date  of  the 
first  of  the  minor  operations  in  the  Ypres 
salient  above  referred  to.  Soon  after  midnight 
our  guns  violently  shelled  the  German  positions 


the  road  from  St.  Julien  to  Poelcappelle  and 
had  resisted  all  our  efforts  on  the  16th.  Rockets 
again  shot  up  and  the  German  gun  I  flung  gusts 
of  shells  at  the  iron  monsters.  It  was  too  late  ; 
they  were  already  encircling  the  redoubts. 
Bullets  pattered  against  the  sides  of  the  tanks  ; 
grenades  exploded  above  and  below  them. 
The  crews  with  their  guns  blew  holes  in  the  steel 
doors  or  fired  their  machine-guns  through  the 
slits.  The  garrisons  of  the  redoubts  surrendered 
or  fled  and  our  infantry  came  up  and  established 
themselves  in  the  captured  strong  points. 
One  tank  had  its  machinery  put  out  of  order. 
The  crew  destroyed  its  vitals,  slipped  out  and 
with  Lewis  guns  helped  the  infantry.  Our 
casualties  were  30  and  we  had  advanced  our 
line  500  yards  on  a  front  of  about  a  mile. 
There  was  no  more  fighting  during  the  day,  but 
in  the  air  hostile  aeroplanes  working  in  large 
formations    struggled   to   prevent   our   airmen 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


379 


[.4  ustralian  official  photograph. 


SCENE  NEAR    THE    MENIN    ROAD. 


bombing,  photographing,  and  observing.  Two 
German  machines  were  brought  down,  four 
others  driven  down  out  of  control,  and  one 
shot  down  by  anti-aircraft  guns.  An  enemy 
train  was  wrecked,  and  damage  done  to 
aerodromes,  dumps  and  stations.  About 
midnight  (August  19-20)  the  Royal  Naval  Air 
Service  dropped  tons  of  bombs  on  Middelkerke 
dump,  near  Ostend,  and  on  the  Brugeoise 
works.  On  the  20th,  French  aircraft  bom- 
barded the  railway  stations  of  Thourout,  Staden, 
Roulers  and  Gits — a  station  north  of  Roulers — 
and  our  airmen,  losing  four,  brought  down  nine 
and  drove  down  out  of  control  seven  German 
machines.  The  next  day  (August  21)  we  were 
not  so  relatively  successful.  Twelve  of  our 
aeroplanes  were  missing — two  had  collided 
during  a  bombing  raid — as  against  as  many 
brought  down  and  five  others  driven  down  out 
of  control. 

On  Wednesday,  August  22,  a  vigorous  action 
was  fought  east  and  northeast  of  Ypres.  In 
the  forenoon  of  that  day  the  Kaiser  addressed 
in  Flanders  deputations  from  Sixt  von  Armin's 
troops.  He  thanked  them  for  their  gallantry 
and  contrasted  the  German  with  the  Anglo- 
French  view  of  the  world  !  The  grandson  of 
Queen  Victoria  then  proceeded  to  pour  out 
his  spleen  on  the  British  troops  : 

It  is  in  God's  hands  when  He  will  give  us  victory. 
Hi-  has  taught  our  Array  a  hard  lesson,  and  now  we 
are  going  to  pass  the  examination.  With  the  old 
German  confidence  in  God  we  will  show  what  we  can 
do.  The  greater  and  mightier  the  problem  the  more 
gladly  will  we  grapple  with  it  and  solve  it.  We  will 
fight   and   conquer  until   the  enemy  has   had   enough. 


In  these  struggles  all  the  Germans  have  realized  who 
is  the  instigator  of  this  war  and  who  tho  chief  enemy- 
England. 

Everybody  knows  that  England  is  our  most  spiteful 
adversary.  She  spreads  her  hatred  of  Germany  over 
the  whole  world,  steadily  filling  her  Allies  with  hatred 
and  eagerness  to  fight.  Thus  everybody  at  home 
knows  what  you  know  still  better,  that  England  is 
particularly  the  enemy  to  be  struck  down  however 
difficult  it  may  be.     Your  relatives  at  home,  who  have 


[Australian  official  photograph. 

WATER-CARRIERS     FOLLOWING     THE 
TAPE    TO    THE    FRONT    LINE. 

made  great  sacrifices  too,  thank  you  through  me.  A 
difficult  struggle  is  in  front  of  us.  When  England, 
proud  of  her  stubborn  resistance,  believes  in  her  invin- 
cibility, you  will  show  that  you  can  do  better,  for  the 
price  of  the  war  is  the  German  people's  freedom  to 
live,  freedom  at  sea  and  freedom  at  home.  With-  God's 
help  we  will  see  the  struggle  through  and  be  victorious. 

It  was  no  doubt  a  consolation  to  the  British 
to    see    that    even    the    Kaiser    thought    the 


3>0 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A    WORKING    PARTY    GOING    FORWARD    NEAR    YPRES. 


[Official  photograph. 


decision  of  the  contest  between  might  and 
right  lay  in  God's  hands.  They  could  well 
afford  to  leave  it  there. 

Two  attacks  were  launched  by  the  British 
Army,  one  north  and  east  of  St.  Julien,  the 
other  astride  the  Ypres-Menin  road.  Both 
were  preceded  by  a  long  and  searching  in- 
tensive bombardment.  The  first  of  these 
attacks  was  the  consequence  of  the  success 
gained  by  the  tanks  on  the  morning  of  the 
19th.  The  capture  of  the  Triangle  Farm, 
Mt.  du  Hibou  and  Cockcroft  redoubts  on 
or  along  the  road  from  St.  Julien  to  Poel- 
cappelle  had  enabled  us  to  turn  from  the 
north-west  the  very  strong  position  which  on 
the  10th  had  defied  all  the  efforts  of  the  Ulster 
and  South  Irish  Divisions.  The  Ulsterrnen  had 
been  replaced  by  Midland,  the  South  Irish 
by  Scottish  troops,  opposed  to  whom  were 
Bavarians.  Pivoting  on  the  three  captured 
redoubts,  the  aim  of  the  British  was  to  swing 
their  line  towards  or  to  the  Langemarek- 
Zonnebeke  road.  They  wf;re  already  across  this 
road  from  near  the  Mt.  du  Hibou  redoubt  to 
Langemarck.  Their  advance  south-eastwards 
down  it  was  blocked  by  two  strong  points, 
the  Winnipeg  and  Schuler  Farm  redoubts  and 
the  various  strongholds  on  and  about  Hills  37 
and  '.',:>  which  had  balled  the  Ulsterrnen  and 
South  Irish.  Tanks  assisted  in  the  advance, 
which  ended  in  our  pushing  our  line  forward 


on  a  front  of  two  and  a  half  miles  to  a  depth, 
in  one  place,  of  over  half  a  mile. 

On  the  22nd  fighting  of  considerable  im- 
portance occurred  near  Tnvernoss  Copse, 
Glencorse  Copse  and  Herenthage  Chateau.  The 
two  adversaries  here  occupied  a  front  line  of 
shell  craters  (most  of  them  half  full  of  water) 
and  the  hostile  positions  were  separated  by  a 
quagmire,  the  result  of  the  swaying  move- 
ments of  the  combatants,  combined  with  the 
continual  shell-fire. 

Along  both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  the 
struggle  was  very  bitter.  Our  line  ran  from 
opposite  Glencorse  Wood  on  the  left  past. 
Stirling  Castle,  which  was  in  our  possession, 
then  crossing  the  Ypres-Menin  road.  It  was  the 
comparatively  high  ground  which  our  men 
occupied  that  formed  the  German  objective, 
while  the  intention  of  the  British  Commander 
was  to  push  the  Germans  still  farther  back  and 
occupy  the  whole  of  the  line  which  ran  along 
past  Polygon  Wood,  thrusting  the  enemy  down 
the  reverse  slope  of  the  hill. 

In  front  of  the  British  troops  was  Inverness 
Copse,  a  thousand  yards  in  length  and  about 
five  hundred  in  depth,  strengthened  with  many 
concrete  blockhouses  and  other  defences  and 
difficult  to  penetrate  owing  to  the  fallen  trees 
which,  half  blown  away  and  tangled  up  with 
tree  stumps,  formed  an  exceedingly  difficult 
obstacle  to  our  troops. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


381 


South  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  were  the 
ruins  of  Herenthage  Chateau,  an  old  chateau 
which  had  been  transformed  into  a  formidable 
work  by  the  usual  concrete  constructions. 
North  of  Inverness  Copse  the  Germans  had 
three  lines  of  trenches  which  still  afforded  them 
some  shelter  though  they  had  been  severely 
handled  by  our  guns.  There  were  also  threo 
blockhouses  which  were  intact  and  strongly 
garrisoned. 

At  7  a.m.  the  Duke  of  Cornwall's  Light 
Infantry  on  the  left  and  the  Somerset  Light 
Infantry  on  their  right  started  to  take  the 
German  line,  preceded  by  an  artillery  barrage 
and  supported  by  other  infantry  units  and  by 
some  tanks.  The  Cornishmen  when  they  went 
forward  were  at  once  met  by  blasts  of  machine- 
gun  fire  from  the  pill-boxes  ;  but,  in  despite  of 
these,  they  pressed  forward  and  forced  an  entry 
into  Inverness  Copse  and  began  to  attack 
these  concrete  blockhouses.  Round  one  of 
these  our  men  swarmed,  but  although  they 
managed  to  keep  down  its  fire  by  discharging 
their  rifles  through  the  loopholes,  they  could  not 
beat  in  the  entrance  door.  The  word  was  passed 
back  for  the  sappers  to  come  up  with  gun 
cotton.     They    did    so    and    the    steel    door 


was  immediately  blown  in  and  the  few  of 
the  garrison  who  remained  were  killed  fighting. 
On  the  left  of  this  regiment's  attack  the 
men  were  held  up  by  machine-gun  fire 
from  Glencorse  Copse  and  by  a  pill-box 
north  of  Inverness  Copse.  But  a  gallant  and 
determined  charge  of  the  Cornishmen  con- 
quered both  those  obstacles  and  the  blockhouse 
itself  was  entered  and  the  garrison  killed. 
Meanwhile  the  Somerset  Light  Infantry,  moving 
on  the  right  of  the  Duke  of  Cornwall's,  had 
stormed  Herenthage  Chateau.  The  combat  was 
a  severe  and  bloody  one,  but  the  Germans  were 
outfought  anil  their  post  captured,  only  one  of 
the  garrison  surviving.  Our  troops  then  pro- 
ceeded to  establish  themselves  in  front  of  the 
Chateau  and  on  the  enemy's  edge  of  Inverness 
Copsf. 

Unfortunately  the  left  of  the  attack  by  these 
two  regiments  had  not  been  so  successful. 
Here  the  enemy  held  ground  to  the  east  of 
Clapham  Junction,  where  there  was  a  strongly 
fortified  farm  with  six  machine  guns.  Progress 
was  impossible,  and  men  were  dropping  fast 
when  fortunately  a  tank  came  up  and  took  up 
a  position  close  to  the  German  work.  The  fire 
from  its  guns  and  machine-guns  was  so  vigorous 


[Australian  official  photograph. 

MATERIAL    FOR    ENTANGLEMENTS    BROUGHT    UP    DURING    THE    BATTLE    OF 

MENIN    HEIGHTS. 


882 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


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o 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


383 


that  the  fire  of  the  garrison  slackened.  Tho 
Coniishmen  then  went  on  again,  burst  through 
the  defences  and  disposed  of  the  whole  of  the 
garrison  with  their  bayonets.  It  was  now 
10  o'clock  and  the  contest  had  lasted  three 
hours.  The  Somerset  and  the  Cornwall  Light 
Infantry  and  the  other  troops  acting  with  them 
had  suffered  heavy  losses  and  were  hanging  on 
to  the  positions  they  had  so  hardly  won  with 
numbers  which  were  scarcely  equal  to  the 
situation.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the 
Germans  counter-attacked.  A  hurricane  of 
shells  swept  through  the  captured  position  of 
Inverness  Copse,  and  behind  this  barrage,  which 
was  flung  on  the  line  from  every  gun  the 
Germans  could  bring  to  bear,  there  came 
from  the  east  of  Inverness  Copse  and  from  the 
south  of  it  masses  of  storm-troops  bent  on 
re-establishing  the  German  line  on  the  ground 
held  before  the  recent  fighting. 

A  first  attack  we  drove  back  and  then  a 
second,  but  a  third  came  on  in  even  greater 
strength.  The  Somersets,  depleted  as  they 
were,  sent  back  to  say  they  were  being  turned  on 
either  flank  and  could  not  hsld  on,  and  proposed, 
therefore,  to  retire  half-way  back  through 
Inverness  Cops  3.  A  few  supports  from  the 
Light  Infantry  Division  reached  them,  but  only 
sufficient  to  enable  the  retiring  line  to  fall  back 
more  slowly.  The  Cornish  Light  Infantry 
formed  a  defensive  flank  to  cover  the  left  of  the 
rearward  movement,  and  these  new  dispositions 
sufficed  to  beat  back  once  more  the  German 
attack.  Another  assault  was  delivered  by 
the  enemy  at  noon  and  was  stopped  by  our 
infantry  and  machine-gun  fire.  Two  hours 
later  a  fifth  attempt  was  made,  this  time  to 
turn  our  left  flank,  but  the  massing  of  the 
assailant's  troops  had  been  observed  and  re- 
ported to  our  artillery  in  rear  and  the  fire  of  our 
guns  was  so  destructive  that  the  assault  was 
blown  away  before  it  had  really  come  forward. 

There  was  now  a  pause  in  fighting  probably 
due  on  both  sides  to  exhaustion,  and  in  the 
evening  the  position  we  held  was  roughly  what 
it  had  been  in  the  afternoon.  Our  men  held 
ground  to  the  east  of  Stirling  Castle  and  part  of 
Inverness  Copse,  and  there  they  passed  the 
night  in  great  discomfort  but  with  courage 
undiminished.  Artillery  fire  was  kept  up  on 
th  m  from  one  in  the  morning  with  great  vigour 
and  about  half-past  three  became  very  intense. 
It  was  the  prelude  to  another  attack,  this  time 
the  lead  be'ng  given  to  the  enemy's  flame- 
throwers.    For    a    short    space    the    Duke    of 


•Cornwall's  men  fell  back  before  the  flames,  but 
it  was  only  a  step  to  the  rear  before  two  steps 
forward.  Then  they  turned  on  their  foes,  and 
rifle  bullets  and  flashing  bayonets  proved 
better  than  burning  flames.  As  our  men  went 
forward  they  saw  several  of  the  flame-throwers 
fall  down  before  their  fire,  and  in  doing  so  let 
their  flames  in  several  instances  fall  on  their 
own  men  who  were  seen  to  burn  briskly, 
doubtless  fed  by  the  escaping  liquid  they  carried 
from  the  cases  penetrated  by  British  bullets. 
It  was  a  terrible  sight  to  see  these  human 
torches  writhing  in  the  agony  they  had  hoped 
to  inflict  on  the  British.  Once  more  the 
baffled  Germans  fell  back  before  the  calm 
courage  of  our  infantry  and  abandoned  further 
attempts  for  the  night.  Our  men  still  held 
their  line. 

The  German  version  of  the  fighting  was  as 
usual  a  travesty  of  fact.  The  Crown  Prince  of 
Bavaria  reported  that  his  troops  had  wrested 
from  us  the  gains  made  in  the  recent  fighting 
south  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  and  that  the  lost 
trenches  had  been  recaptured  and  held.  He 
also  reported  that  on  the  22nd  the  English  lost 
21  tanks  which  lay  destroyed  before  the  German 
front.  Some  of  the  occupants  who  had  not 
been  killed  were  made  prisoners.  We  know  the 
truth  about  the  trenches  ;  some  tanks  wero 
disabled,  but  not  even  the  German  Commander- 
in-Chief  had  the  face  to  claim  the  capture  of 
any  one  of  them.  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  state- 
ment that  we  had  carried  the  British  line  on  the 
Ypres-Menin  road  some  500  yards  farther 
forward  on  a  front  of  a  mile,  thus  gaining  an 
important  position  for  observation  over  the 
ground  to  the  east  (wliich  accounts  for  the 
desperate  counter-attacks  of  the  Germans)  and 
had  established  a  position  in  the  western  part 
of  Inverness  Copse,  gives  the  true  position. 

One  solid  fact  can  be  claimed  by  the  Allies, 
viz.,  that  up  to  August  22,  since  the  beginning 
of  April  1917,  when  the  year's  campaign 
opened  with  the  Battle  of  Arras,  they 
had,  on  the  Western  Front,  captured  90,000 
German  prisoners  besides  a  huge  mass  of 
machine-guns  and  many  pieces  of  artillery 
in  addition  to  considerable  gains  in  reconquered 
territory. 

On  the  23rd  a  strong  attack  made  on  our 
position  east  of  Langemarck  was  stopped  by 
machine-gun  fire.  On  the  24th  the  enemy 
attacked  again  with  great  strength  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  and 
forced  back  our  troops  from  some  of  the  ad- 


384 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


vanced  posts  we  had  won  on  the  22nd.  The 
struggle  was  one  of  great  intensity,  and  the 
combat  swayed  backwards  and  forwards,  but 
the  net  result  was  that  along  this  road  we  had 
to  give  up  some  of  the  ground  won  on  the  22nd. 
At  the  same  time  our  troops  were  heavily 
engaged  in  the  Inverness  Copse  and  Glencorse 
Wood  and  continued  fighting  late  into  the  night. 
Our  artillery  played  an  important  part  in  this 


[Canadian  Wat  Records. 

AN  OLD  GERMAN  TRENCH  NEAR 
THE  MENIN  ROAD. 

struggle,  and  several  times  its  fire  alone  dis- 
persed troops  assembled  for  assault. 

The  25th  saw  but  little  done  on  this  sector,  but 
on  the  26th  the  Germans  again  made  another 
desperate  bid  to  regain  the  ground  they  had 
lost,  with  the  aid  of  a  severe  artillery  fire  and  an 
infantry  attack  preceded  by  flame-throwers. 
They  succeeded  in  reoccupying  the  north-west 
corner  of  Inverness  Copse,  but  were  at  once 
counter-attacked  and  driven  out  and  our  troops 
occupier!  the  line  they  had  held  in  the  morning. 
On  this  day,  too,  after  some  smart  fighting,  our 
line  was  advanced  a  little  north  of  St.  Julien. 

In  the  week  ending  August  21  our  airmen  had 


destroyed  128  gunpits  and  caused  321  explosions 
behind  the  enemy  lines.  They  had  dropped 
nearly  36  tons  of  bombs,  including  about  100 
of  between  200  lb.  and  300  lb.  in  weight,  and 
had  fired  over  30,000  rounds  of  ammunition 
at  troops  on  the  ground  from  low  altitudes. 
Sixty-eight  German  aeroplanes  had  been  de- 
stroyed and  90  others  driven  down  out  of 
control.  ■  The  weather  had  been  stormy,  with 
a  good  deal  of  rain  falling  for  the  last  few  days, 
and  was  of  the  same  character  on  the  27th. 
There  was,  therefore,  not  so  much  aerial  activity 
as  usual,  yet  during  the  week  from  the  22nd 
a  good  deal  of  work  was  done.  On  the  23rd 
we  destroyed  12  and  forced  down  out  of 
control  six  others,  while  we  only  lost  two. 
On  the  25th  the  weather  was  bad,  and 
consequently  there  was  little  activity  in  the 
air  ;  but  in  the  evening,  when  it  improved,  in 
addition  to  useful  work  for  the  artillery,  three 
German  aeroplanes  were  disposed  of  and  four 
others  forced  down.  We  lost  two.  On  the 
26th,  in  spite  of  the  weather,  some  fighting  took 
place  in  the  air.  Seven  German  aeroplanes  were 
destroyed  or  driven  down,  while  we  lost  two. 
On  the  27th  rain  fell  nearly  all  the  day, 
but  in  the  fine  intervals  our  airmen  fought 
with  great  activity  and,  with  a  loss  of  only  two 
machines  missing,  destroyed  four  of  the  Ger- 
mans besides  forcing  down  three  more  out  of 
control. 

August  27  saw  another  determined  effort  of 
the  enemy  to  recover  the  positions  he  had  lost 
about  Inverness  Copse  and  along  the  Ypres- 
Menin  road,  but  without  success.  Two  sepa- 
rate attacks  were  delivered,  commencing  at 
8  p.m.,  against  the  British  positions  in  Inverness 
Copse  a,nd  on  the  Ypres-Menin  road.  In  both 
cases  his  efforts  failed  completely.  The  ground 
was  made  very  difficult  by  the  rain  and  mud, 
the  attacks  were  detected  in  their  initial  stage 
and  heavy  artillery  fire  brought  to  bear  on 
them,  while  the  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire 
completed  what  the  artillery  had  begun.  But 
we  made  important  progress  astride  the  St. 
Julien-Poelcappelle  road,  east  and  north  of 
Langemarck,  the  centre  of  the  advance  being 
about  Koorselaere.  Our  troops  advanced  our 
line  after  heavy  fighting  for  about  2,000  yards, 
penetrating  in  places  a  further  portion  of  the 
German  third  line.  Some  fortified  farms  and 
redoubts  were  taken,  with  40  prisoners  and 
several  machine-guns.  Our  attack  began  at 
2  p.m.  with  a  heavy  barrage.  The  ground  over 
which  the  troops  had  to  advance  was  in  a  ter- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


885 


[Official  photograph. 
PART    OF    THE    CAPTURED    GROUND    ON    THE    MENIN     ROAD. 


rible  condition  with  the  constant  rain  which 
had  fallen  lately  and  which  continued  nearly  all 
the  day,  while  the  wind  blew  a  severe  gale. 
Every  shell-hole  was  full  of  water,  so  that  the 
heavily  laden  infantry  stuck  at  every  step.  The 
enemy  concrete  redoubts  were  mostly  placed 
along  the  line  of  the  Zonnebeke-Poelcappelle 
road,  and  not  a  few  of  them  were  stood  in  the 
middle  of  water.  The  German  machine-gun 
fire  from  the  uninjured  redoubts  was  heavy,  and 
there  was  severe  fighting  round  many  of  them, 
especially  round  a  considerable  work  built  on 
some  ruined  houses  known  as  Vieilles  Maisons, 
near  Koorselaere,  but  still  our  men  pushed  on 
and  drove  the  enemy  back.  It  was,  considering 
the  conditions,  a  notable  success. 

Notwithstanding  the  heavy  rain  and  high 
wind  our  aviators  maintained  contact  with 
our  infantry  throughout  the  advance,  and  not 
only  did  good  service  by  engaging  the  enemy's 
infantry  with  machine-gun  fire  from  a  low  eleva- 
tion, but  created  a  considerable  amount  of  havoc 
among  his  transport  by  the  same  means. 

It  has  more  than  once  been  pointed  out  that 
an  essential  feature  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  plans 
during  the  Battle  of  Flanders  was  to  maintain 
a  menacing  attitude  towards  the  enemy  between 
the  Lys  and  the  Upper  Somme.  "  In  order  to 
meet  the  xirgent  demands  of  battle,"  he 
remarks  in  his  dispatch  of  December  25,  1917, 


"  the  number  of  Divisions  in  line  on  other 
fronts  has  been  necessarily  reduced  to  the 
minimum  consistent  with  safety."  To  conceal, 
as  it  were,  this  unpleasant  fact  from  Luden- 
dorff's  observation,  the  soundest  course  was 
not  to  confine  the  troops  of  Home,  Byng 
and  Rawlinson  to  a  passive  defensive.  Whether 
or  not  the  British  feint  at  Lens  and  the  raids  in 
the  second  half  of  August  prevented  Prince 
Rupprecht  from  reinforcing  Sixt  von  Armin 
may  be  a  moot  point.  But  events  certainly 
seem  to  prove  that  the  Lens  feint  and  those 
raids  induced  the  Bavarian  Crown  Prince  and 
his  advisers  to  believe  that  the  British  lines 
were  much  more  strongly  held  than  was  the 
case.  At  all  events,  it  was  not  till  the  Second 
Battle  of  Cambrai  (December  2)  that  the 
Germans  made  any  serious  effort  to  break 
through  the  British  front. 

In  the  previous  chapter  the  fighting  at  Lens 
down  to  the  evening  of  Saturday,  August  18, 
was  described.  The  violent  counter-attacks  of 
the  enemy  had  been  in  vain,  and  Currie's 
Canadians  remained  masters  of  Hill  70  and 
their  other  gains.  On  Sunday,  August  19,  ths 
fighting  died  down  to  an  artillery  duel  and  on 
the  20th  there  were  only  patrol  encounters 
This  minor  action,  which  might  almost  be 
dignified  with  the  name  of  a  battle  and  would 
have  been  described  in  the  nineteenth  century 
as  a  very  great  battle,  recommenced  on  Tuesday, 


386 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


August  21,  when  General  Currie  assaulted  the 
outskirts  of  Lens  from  the  direction  of  Cite 
St.  Emile  and  Cite  St.  Elizabeth  on  the  north 
and  Cite  du  Moulin  on  the  west,  capturing  200 
prisoners.  Both  artilleries  had  been  hard  at 
work  during  the  preceding  night. 

An  autumn  mist  clung  to  the  earth  and 
blurred  the  twilight  when  at  dawn  the  Cana- 
dians charged.  Their  main  objective  on  the 
north  was  the  spot  where  the  road  from  La 


of  bursting  shells,  the  noise  from  the  explosions 
drowning  the  cheers  and  cries  of  the  antago- 
nists. The  relative  value  of  two  opposite 
systems  of  tactics  was  again  being  tested  just 
as  it  had  been  in  the  second  century  B.C.  at 
Cynoscephalae  and  Pydna,  in  the  fourteenth 
century  a.d.  at  Crecy  and  Poitiers,  and  a 
hundred  years  ago  at  Waterloo.  Would  this 
time  the  open  order  or  the  mass  attack 
triumph  ?     If    bayonets    had    been    the    only 


Heights  in Hletrei.(IONetres=3Z  8  feet) 


MAP    OF    THE    COUNTRY    AROUND    LENS. 


Bassee  joins  the  road  from  Bethune.  Thence 
a  network  of  streets  led  to  the  Cathedral 
Square  and  the  heart  of  Lens.  The  Canadians, 
following  on  the  trail  of  their  barrage,  suddenly 
jxsrceived  that  it  was  greatly  enlarged.  The 
Germans  were  apparently  shelling  the  same 
points.  Our  barrage  went  forward  and  the 
waves  of  Canadians  passing  tlirough  the 
German  barrage,  which  was  moving  north- 
ward now  noticed  in  the  mist  masses  of 
Germans  advancing  towards  them.  It  had  so 
happened  that  by  a  coincidence  the  enemy's 
commander  was  also  launching  an  offensive. 
In  a  few  seconds  Germans  and  Canadians  were 
grappling  with  one  another  between  two  walls 


weapons  employed  there  would  have  been 
little  doubt  of  the  result.  But  many  of 
the  enemy  were  provided  with  grenades,  all 
with  automatic  pistols,  and  they  were  in 
numbers  greatly  superior. 

At  first  it  seemed  that  weight  must  tell 
The  first  thin,  dotted  waves  of  Canadians,  made 
up  of  little  parties  of  men,  straggling  out  singly 
or  in  twos  and  threes,  had  to  hold  up  the  almost 
solid  line  of  the  attacking  Germans.  However, 
they  held  them.  Bitter  hand-to-hand  fighting 
went  on,  every  Canadian  having  ,  several 
Germans  against  him.  But  the  enemy  front  had 
been  penetrated  and  the  impetus  of  the  German 
charge  lost.    As  they  fought,  other  thin  waves 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


887 


of  Canadians  came  up,  and  yet  others.  The 
Germans  offered  a  plucky  resistance,  and  their 
officers,  who  did  not  spare  themselves,  tried  to 
make  them  stand.  It  was  in  vain.  The  battle, 
which  had  raged  in  the  middle  of  No  Man's 
Land,  gradually  receded  towards  the  enemy 
lines.  He  was  pressed  back  towards  the  trenches 
he  had  left,  where  his  reserves  were  waiting  to 
follow  up  the  first  attack.  New  ranks  of 
Germans  came  out,  only  to  be  hurled  back,  till 
the  first  line  of  the  German  trenches  was 
reached.  Here  the  enemy  was  in  great  strength, 
the  trenches  being  full  of  other  masses  of 
reserve  troops  ready  to  go  forward.  The 
Canadians,  driving  the  defeated  Germans  in 
front  of  them,  charged  the  trenches,  flinging 
themselves  upon  them  with  the  utmost  fury. 
It  was  a  formidably  fortified  line,  protected  with 
two  belts  of  wire,  and  the  Canadians  had 
already  advanced  some  hudreds  of  yards,  while? 
the  defenders  of  the  trench  were  fresh.  For  a 
period  the  combat  raged  up  and  down  the  whole 
length  of  trenches.  It  was  savage  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  without  interference  by  the  artillery, 
for  the  guns  of  neither  side  dared  to  fire  on  the 
spot  where  the  combatants  were  locked.     But 


our  mon  in  the  end  scrambled  up  the  parapet 
and  flung  bombs  into  the  crowded  ways 
beneath.  Parties  of  Germans  sought  to  retreat 
down  the  communication  trenches,  which  also 
were  full  of  troops.  When  the  tumult  died  away 
the  Canadians  were  in  possession  of  the  whole 
line  of  trench,  which  was  literally  heaped  with 
German  dead. 

While  the  Canadians  on  the  left  of  this 
attack  were  fighting  with  rifles  and  bombs 
until  their  ammunition  was  exhausted  and 
they  had  no  weapons  left  but  the  bayonet  and 
butt-end,  those  on  the  right  were  engaged  in 
the  houses  of  the  northern  outskirts  of  Lens. 
Some  rushed  up  so  close  to  the  walls  that  the 
machine-guns  were  firing  over  their  heads. 
The  enemy  dropped  bombs  upon  them  through 
the  loopholes  and  sandbagged  windows  and 
fired  rifle-grenades  at  them.  Into  one  house  our 
men  burst  their  way.  It  was  crammed  with 
bombs.  At  the  same  time  the  Canadians 
attacking  from  the  Cite  du  Moulin  on  the  west 
of  Lens  were  engaged  in  furious  fighting  along 
the  railway  embankment,  which  had  been 
converted  into  a  long  machine-gun  emplace- 
ment, and  among  the  colliery  sidings  between 


{Canadian  War  Reco 

GERMAN    OFFICERS    CAPTURED    BY    THE    CANADIANS    ON     HILL     70. 


888 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


the  ruined  houses  and  shops.  On  the  farther 
side  of  the  Cite  du  Moulin,  the  Germans,  on 
the  south  side  of  the  railway  line,  had  a  very 
formidable  line  of  trenches  and  defensive 
works,  running  by  Fosse  St.  Louis  and  Cite  St. 
Antoine,  and  the  last  formal  barrier  before  the 
inner  city.  That  line  was  the  scene  of  fierce 
fighting,  during  w7hich  we  penetrated  into 
part  of  the  city  itself.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the 
Germans  contested  every  yard  of  progress  with 
every  conceivable  advantage  of  defence  among 
the  battered  streets  and  blocks  of  workmen's 
dwellings. 

Undeterred  by  his  heavy  losses,  the  German 
Commander  refused  to  admit  his  defeat. 
Some  six  enemy  divisions,  it  is  believed,  had 
been  already  hurled  at  Currie's  Corps.  The 
Prussian  4th  Guard  Reserve  Division  was  now 
sent  in,  and  during  the  remainder  of  the  day 
counter-attack  succeeded  counter-attack.  The 
troops  mustering  for  these  desperate  ventures 
were  frequently  dispersed  by  the  British  artil- 
lery. For  example,  our  aeroplanes  on  one 
occasion  reported  that  a  mass  of  Germans 
was  forming  up  in  one  of  the  Lens  squares. 
Instantly  field  guns,  heavy  guns  and  howitzers 


deluged  them  with  shells.  The  enemy  infantry 
scurried  off  to  cellars  and  tunnels,  but  hun- 
dreds were  blown  to  pieces  or  wounded. 
In  all  there  were  eight  counter-attacks,  the 
chief  of  which  was  made  after  mid-day,  in  the 
northern  suburbs  of  Lens,  by  the  5th  Guards 
Grenadier  Regiment.  Each  counter-attack 
was  preceded  by  a  violent  bombardment 
with  high  explosive,  shrapnel  and  poison-gas 
shells. 

The  Grenadiers  in  swarms  issued  from  the 
cellars  and  tunnels  of  the  city.  Some  of  them 
carried  nothing  but  stick-bombs,  which  they 
had  slung  round  their  bodies.  They  rushed 
up  the  communication  trenches  and  flung 
their  grenades.  After  repeated  efforts  they 
drove  back  the  left  wing  of  the  Canadians. 
Our  men  on  the  right,  who  for  the  time  being 
had  beaten  off  the  enemy,  sent  support  to 
their  comrades.  The  charge  of  the  Prussian 
Grenadier  Guards  was  temporarily  stopped, 
but  ammunition  was  fast  running  low.  Owing 
to  the  German  barrage  it  had  been  with  the 
utmost  difficulty  that  any  cartridges  and 
bombs  had  been  passed  through  to  the  Cana- 
dians on  the  left.     At  last  the  order  was  given 


[Canatlian  War  Records. 
GERMAN    STRONGHOLD    IN    A    BREWERY    CAPTURED    BY    CANADIANS. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


389 


A    LENS    SUBURB: 
The  scene  of  heavy  fighting. 

to  the  Canadians  to  retire  to  a  trench  farther 
back.  Heaping  earth,  rubble  and  concrete  in 
the  communication  trenches  to  delay  the 
pursuit  of  the  Prussians,  the  Canadians  slowly 
fell  back.  The  "  Heines,"  as  the  Canadians 
somewhat  inappropriately  called  their  oppo- 
nents— for  Heine  was  a  Gallicized  German  Jew 
— had  paid  dearly  for  the  recovery  of  the 
ground,  and  that  success  was  incomplete. 
Currie's  troops  had,  north  of  Lens,  indeed  failed 
to  advance  materially  their  line,  but  Hill  70  was 
still  theirs,  while  west  of  Lens  the  enemy's 
counter-attacks  had  been  swept  away  by 
machine-gun  fire. 

Two  incidents  of  this  struggle  so  glorious  in 
Canadian  history  may  be  given  on  the  authority 
of  a  Times  Correspondent  who  observed  the 
action  and  questioned  survivors : 

Certain  men  of  a  British  Columbia  Battalion  did 
some  heroic  fighting.  There  were  40  of  them  in  an 
advanced  position,  among  a  litter  of  shell-holes,  ruined 
walls,  and  ploughed-up  railway  embankment.  Through 
the  d&brix  the  Germans  kept  flinging  attack  after  attack, 
and  several  times  they  surged  up  to  this  advanced  post, 
so  that  there  was  hand-to-hand  fighting,  the  Western 
men  meeting  the  enemy  body  to  body,  using  their 
bayonets  and  rifle  butts  or  grappling  the  Germans  by 
their  throats  and  hurling  them  back.  When  supports 
came  up  and  took  over  the  post  over  120  dead  Germans 
lay  before  it. 

The  Canadians  also  tell  of  an  exploit  of  one  of  their 
number,  who  is  a  Russian  by  birth.  He  crept  out  and 
installed  himself  in  a  position  among  ruins  where  ho 
commanded  a  section  of  enemy  trench,  taking  with 
him  a  number  of  hand-bombs.  Whenever  two  or  three 
of  the  enemy  gathered  together  in  the  trench  he  flung 
a  bomb,  and  the  Germans  seem  never  to  have  dis- 
covered where  the  bombs  eamo  from.  Afterwards 
in  the  loop  of  trench  which  he  commanded  there  were 
found  28  dead.  These  things  are  horrible,  if  heroic, 
and  it  is  significant  of  the  qualities  which  this  war  calls 
out  in  men  that  it  is  said  that  this  Russian  was  normally 
one  of  the  gontlest  of  creatures  who  would  hurt 
nobody . 

f 

Wednesday,  August  22,  was,  comparatively 

speaking,  a  day  of  rest.     The  enemy  heavily 


[French  official  photographs. 

PIT    SLAG-HEAPS, 

Which  abound  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lens,   and 

formed  points  of  vantage  to    the  troops  occupying 

them. 

shelled  Lievin,  Angres  and  Avion,  and  there 

were  occasional  affairs  of  outposts.  Night 
closed     on     the    battlefield,     and     aeroplanes 

ascended.  They  flew  over  the  villages  behind 
the  lines,  and  flashes  and  roars  told  where 
bombs  had  fallen.  Searchlights  groped  in  the 
sky  for  the  raiders,  and  the  heavens  were 
criss-cr03sed  by  their  lines  of  light,  while  shells 
from  anti-aircraft  guns  were  exploding  round 
the  machines.  From  the  perimeter  of  Lens 
rockets  rose  in  clusters,  and  for  a  second  or  two 
No  Man's  Land  was  vividly  visible.  A  dump 
suddenly  went  up,  and  the  clouds  above  it 
became  scarlet.  All  the  while  the  British  and 
German  guns,  singly  or  in  groups,  continued 
the  thunder,  while  the  rat-tat-tat  of  machine- 
guns  showed  to  the'  listening  onlooker  where 
fighting  was  still  in  progress.  Just  before  3 
a.m.  on  Thursday,  August  23,  the  bombard- 
ments south  of  Lens  awoke  to  extreme  violence, 
and  the  ceaseless  rattle  of  the  machine-guns  in- 
dicated that  a  serious  struggle  had  commenced 
again  there. 

The  Germans  through  the  previous  fighting 
had  been  wedged  into  an  area  of  ruined  build- 


890 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


ings,  measuring  roughly  1,100  yards  from  west 
to  east,  and  900  yards  from  north  to  south. 
But  these  ruins  were,  in  effect,  one  vast  fort  ; 
every  street  was  barricaded,  every  cellar  had 
been  enlarged  and  concreted.  Tunnels  con- 
nected the  cellars,  and  the  muzzles  of  machine- 
guns  protruded  from  the  thousands  of  loop- 
holes in  the  exterior  line  of  defence.  Currie 
was  thrusting  at  the  southern  edge  of  this 
fortress.  At  3  a.m.,  before  dawn,  the  Cana- 
dians attacked  a  group  of  slag  heaps 
and  colliery  ruins  beside  the  Souchez 
river,  which  had  been  dammed  up  by 
the  Germans  and  had  overflowed  its  broken 
banks.  In  front  of  the  floods  was  a  heap  of 
mine  refuse,  the  Green  Grassier,  overlooking 
the  central  railway  station  of  Lens,  only  300 
yards  to  the  north  of  it.  The  shapeless  mound 
of  rubbish  had  taken  years  to  accumulate.  It 
lay  between  three  goods  yards  of  the  railway. 
The  Germans  could  move  to  the  Green  Crassier 
from  the  cellars  of  Lens  by  dry  subterranean 
passages,  whereas  the  Canadians  would  have 
to  wade  through  filthy  mud  and  water  to  reach 
it.  Adjoining  the  Green  Crassier  on  the  west 
was  the  St.  Louis  colliery  with  a  strip  of  railway 
embankment  at  its  side.  The  ground  there  was 
covered   with  the  remains  of  workmen's  cot- 


tages ;    it  was  full  of  broken  cellars  and  pits, 
some  of  them  of  great  depth. 

Pivoting  on  their  lines  before  the  St.  Louis 
colliery,  the  Canadians,  under  cover  of  the 
darkness,  crossed  the  Souchez,  deployed  and 
waded  forward  on  a  front  of  about  700  yards. 
From  the  east  of  the  colliery  they  were  enfiladed 
by  powerful  machine-gun  fire.  Many  dropped 
dead  or  wounded,  but  their  comrades  pressed 
on.  The  Green  Crassier  was  ascended,  and  the 
work  of  bombing  and  bayoneting  the  garrisons 
of  the  dug-outs  in  its  sides  began.  Prussians  of 
the  99th  and  190th  Regiments  resolutely  dis- 
puted the  possession  of  this  bastion  on  the  south 
of  Lens.  At  daybreak  enemy  aeroplanes  came 
up  to  assist  the  Prussians  They  swooped  down 
and  fired  at  our  men.  One  machine  hit  by  a 
shell  descended  in  flames  ;  another  came  crash- 
ing to  the  ground.  Right  through  the  day  and 
into  August  24  the  conflict  raged.  It  was 
particularly  bitter  at  the  mouth  of  a  tunnel 
whence  four  machine-guns  swept  the  Canadians 
with  lead.  After  several  attempts  a  group  of 
the  latter  managed  to  put  the  machine-guns  out 
of  action  and  to  capture  the  survivors  of  their 
crews.  The  result  of  the  fighting  was  that  we 
got  a  footing  on  the  Green  Crassier  and  secured 
trenches  to  the  north-west  of  it. 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

TRANSPORTING    WOUNDED    CANADIANS    TO    THE    BASE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


391 


In  a  message  to  General  Currie,  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  summarized  the  results  of  the  struggle 
round  the  northern,  western,  and  southern  out- 
skirts of  Lens  : 

I  desire  (said  Sir  Douglas)  to  congratulate  you  per- 
sonally on  the  complete  and  important  success  with 
which  your  command  of  the  Canadian  Corps  has  been 
inaugurated.  The  divisions  you  employed  on  August  15 
totally  defeated  four  German  divisions,  whose  losses 
are  reliably  estimated  at  more  than  double  those  suffered 
by  the  Canadian  troops.  The  skill,  bravery  and  deter- 
mination shown  in  the  attack  and  in  maintaining  the 


of  Hulluch.  The  German  support  line  was 
reached  and  many  casualties  inflicted  on  the 
garrison.  This  stroke  was  designed  to  deceive 
Prince  Rupprecht  into  believing  that  the  Cana- 
dian capture  of  Hill  70  portended  a  second 
Battle  of  Loos.  Further  to  mystify  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria,  on  the  night  of  the  18th- 19th 
our  men  entered  the  German  positions  between 
Havrincourt  and  Ep6hy,  west  of  the  canal 
joining  the  Scheldt  and  Somme.     They  inflicted 


' 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

A    GERMAN    CONCRETE    GUN-PIT    USED    AS    Y.M.C.A.     HUT. 


positions   won  against  repeated  heavy   counter-attacks 
were  in  all  respects  admirable. 

Sir  Douglas  Haig's  praise  of  the  Canadians 
was  well  deserved.  Every  hundred  yards 
gained  had  been  won  by  desperate  fighting 
and  held  against  repeated  counter-attacks  of 
picked  troops,  supported  by  gigantic  bom- 
bardments. Only  An  one  sector,  the  northern, 
had  the  enemy  been  able  to  win  back  lost 
ground,  and  that  lost  ground  did  not  include 
Hill  70. 

The  lunge  at  Lens  was  the  greatest  but  not  the 
only  feint  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig  in  the  second  half 
of  August  1917.  The  day  after  the  second 
phase  of  the  Third  Battle  of  Ypres,  on  August 
17,  the  British  raided  the  enemy's  trenches  west 


heavy  casualties.  The  next  morning,  after  a 
bombardment,  they  captured  enemy  trenches 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Gillemont  Farm,  south- 
east of  Epehy.  A  German  attempt  to  regain 
the  lost  trenches  was  repulsed  on  the  night  of  the 
19th-20th  after  sharp  fighting.  The  attempt 
was  renewed  in  the  course  of  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  but  the  enemy,  caught  by  our  guns,  were 
dispersed  ;  about  the  same  time  a  German  raid 
east  of  Armentie  .-es  was  beaten  off.  As  a  reward 
for  his  pains,  the  enemy  secured  two  British  sol- 
diers. On  Tuesday,  August  21,  a  third 
attempt  by  the  Germans  to  regain  the  trenches 
near  Gillemont  Farm  was  made.  It  was 
completely  repulsed  and  simultaneously  the 
British  east  of  Epehy  raided  the  German  lines. 


392 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


on  a  wide  front  in  the  direction  of  the  Scheldt- 
Somme  Canal.  They  returned  with  several 
prisoners.  The  reader  will  not  forget  that  the 
same  day  General  Currie  once  more  struck  at 
Lens.  In  the  night  of  the  23rd-24th  the  Portu- 
guese baffled  two  raids  north-west  of  La  Bassee. 
Our  next  raid  was  on  the  coast  east  of  Nieuport. 
During  the  night  of  the  24th-25th  we  gained  a 
post  with  a  few  prisoners  and  a  machine-gun 
west  of  the  Oeleide  creek  and  south-west  of 
Lombartzyde.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the 
25th  the  Germans  heavily  bombarded  our  posi- 
tions south-east  of  Epehy  and  attempted  to 
recover  Gillemont  Farm.  It  was  attacked  on  two 


neighbourhood  of  the  Peronne-Cambrai  chaus- 
see.  During  the  night  of  the  30th- 3 1st  the 
enemy  systematically  shelled  our  forward  posi- 
tions north  of  Arleux-en-Gohelle,  five  miles 
south-south-east  of  Lens,  and  ineffectually  raided 
them  in  the  early  hours  of  Friday,  August  31. 
Simultaneously  he  attacked  east  of  Gouzeau- 
court,  Hargicourt,  and  Epehy.  His  sole  success 
was  the  capture  of  an  isolated  knoll  north  of 
Gillemont  Farm,  which  we  were  forced  to 
evacuate. 

The   engagements   along   the    French    front 
between  the  openings  of  the  Third  Battle  of 


[Canadian  official  photograph. 

A    CANADIAN    PIPE    BAND    PRACTISING     BEHIND    THE     LINES. 


sides,  but  its  garrison  held  the  enemy  at  bay, 
although  a  small  portion  of  the  trenches  to  its 
north-east  was  lost  by  us.  Later  in  the  day  this 
was  regained  by  the  British,  and  during  the 
night  of  the  25th-26th  a  German  counter-attack 
was  repulsed,  as  was  an  enemy  raiding  party  by 
the  Portuguese  south-east  of  Laventie.  To- 
wards dawn  of  Sunday,  August  26,  we  attacked 
on  a  front  of  over  a  mile  the  enemy's  positions 
east  of  Hargicourt  (north-west  of  St.  Quentin) 
and  west  of  the  Scheldt-Somme  Canal.  Our 
troops  stormed  the  strong  points  of  Cologne  and 
Malakoff  Farms  and  penetrated  to  a  depth  of 
half  a  mile.  Over  130  prisoners  were  captured. 
A  few  hours  earlier  the  post  west  of  the  Geleide 
Creek  had  been  retaken  by  the  enemy.  On  the 
night  of  the  28th-29th  the  British  again  raided 
the  German  trenches  in  the  Hulluch  region  and 
also  those  north-east  of  Gouzeaucourt.  in  the 


Ypres  and  the  Fourth  Battle  of  Verdun,  which 
began  on  August  20,  will  now  be  narrated. 
The  offensive  in  Flanders  had  had  the  same 
effect  on  the  German  strategy  as  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme  had  had  the  year  before.  Just  as 
the  Battle  of  the  Somme  caused  the  enemy 
to  relax  his  efforts  at  Verdun,  so  the  Third 
Battle  of  Ypres  caused  him  to  relax  them,  in 
August  1917,  on  the  French  front. 

Our  Allies,  it  will  be  recollected,  had  extended 
their  line  to  the  north  of  St.  Quentin  when 
Gough's  5th  Army  had  been  transferred  to 
Flanders.  On  August  10  the  French  were 
attacked  north  of  St.  Quentin  in  the  region  of 
Fayet.  This  attack  on  a  front  of  1,000  yards 
succeeded  in  the  centre  and  failed  on  the 
wings.  At  3  p.m.  the  enemy  attempted  to 
storm  the  Mennechet  Mill  and  Cepy  Farm,  but 
were  repulsed.     The  French  on  the   11th  and 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


393 


SHELL    EXPLODING    NEAR    NIEUPORT. 


[Belgian  official  photograph. 


12th  recovered  all  the  ground  lost  by  them  in 
the  Fayet  region.  On  the  16th  the  Germans 
deliberately  set  fire  to  the  Cathedral  of  St. 
Quentin  and  very  characteristically  debited 
this  new  outrage  to  the  French  artillery.  Apart 
from  the  above  engagements,  there  was  rest 
along  the  hostile  fronts — if  the  word  rest  may  be 
used  when  every  day  men  were  killed  or  wounded 
by  shells  or  shot — between  the  north  of  St.. 
Quentin  and  the  banks  of  the  Ailette. 

There  was  greater  but  very  diminished 
activity  on  the  old  battlefield  of  Craonne- 
Reims.  During  the  night  of  the  day  before  the 
Third  Battle  of  Ypres  the  French  at  8.15  p.m. 
(July  30),  attacked  von  Bohm's  troops  on  the 
Chemin-des-Dames  hog's  back  south  of  La 
Royere,  and  west  of  the  Chevregny  ridge. 
They  gained  all  their  objectives,  and  captured 
over  210  prisoners.  The  advanced  trenches  of 
the  enemy  were  full  of  German  corpses.     At 


11  a.m.  the  next  morning  (July  31)  the  enemy 
counter-attacked  ineffectually.  The  same  day, 
after  an  intense  bombardment,  with  three 
regiments  he  assaulted  the  French  positions 
east  of  Cerny  on  a  front  of  about  1,600  yards. 
The  French  counter-attacks  drove  him  back. 
Von  Bohm  next  tested  the  strength  of  the 
French  lines  west  of  Cerny.  On  August  1  he 
attacked  more  than  once  but  was  beaten  off. 
The  next  day  (August  2)  two  German  attacks 
east  of  Cerny  were  also  repulsed.  During  the 
preceding  night  our  Allies  in  the  region  of 
Allemant,  south-east  of  Vauxaillon,  had  cap- 
tured 34  prisoners  and  a  machine-gun,  and  east 
and  south-east  of  Reims  had  repulsed  two  raids. 
Von  Bohm  persisted  in  his  efforts  round  Cerny. 
East  and  south  of  that  village  and  during  the 
night  of  August  2-3  his  guns  opened  a  hurricane 
bombardment  and  his  infantry  attacked  several 
times  on  a  front  of  1,600  yards.     The  Germans 


[Canadian  War  Records. 

CANADIAN    TROOPS    PUTTING    OUT    A    FIRE    CAUSED    BY    GERMAN    SHELLS. 


894 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


were  beaten  back  and  the  ground  was  strewn 
with  heaps  of  their  dead  and  wounded.  On 
August  3  a  surprise  attack  was  tried  by  the 
enemy  east  of  Cerny.  It,  too,  was  repulsed. 
On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  about  2  p.m.,  the 
attempt  was  twice  repeated.  Both  attacks 
were  broken  by  the  French  fire.  During  the 
next  night  (August  4-5)  small  German  forces 
trying  to  dislodge  the  French  from  their  exterior 
line  on  the  Casemates  Plateau  met  with  the 
same  fate.  At  12.30  a.m.  on  August  5  von 
Bohm  made  (between  Craonne  and  the  Aisno) 


the  Germans  in  vain  twice  tried  to  recapture  it. 
On  the  13th  they  again  on  several  occasions 
returned  to  the  charge  only  to  be  beaten  off 
with  heavy  losses.  They  also  attempted 
without  success  to  raid  the  Vauclerc  Plateau 
on  August  15.  A  few  hours  later  (August  16) 
our  Allies  took  the  offensive  south  of  Ailles  and 
in  the  region  of  the  Hurtebise  Monument.  In 
ths  former  losality  they  secured  a  thousand 
yards  of  trench  system  and  repulsed  four 
counter-attacks,  taking  120  prisoners.  At 
nightfall    the    Germans,    after    a    preparatory 


[French  official  photograph. 


RUINS    OF    ALLEMANT. 


a  violent  assault  on  the  French  trenches  to  the 
south  of  Juvincourt.  Lower  Silesian  and 
Posen  regiments  carried  a  trench  but  were 
promptly  expelled. 

From  August  5  to  10  the  fighting  on  the 
<  'hemin-des-Dames  ridge  was  almost  entirely 
confined  to  artillery  duels,  but  at  4  a.m.  on  the 
l(»th  the  Germans  violently  attacked  from  the 
Pantheon  Farm  to  the  Chevregny  Spur.  Three 
battalions,  assisted  by  nine  companies  of 
storming  troops  and  two  parties  with  flame 
throwers  were  employed.  The  operation  at 
first  met  with  some  measure  of  success.  After 
a  fierce  hand-to-hand  combat,  however,  the 
French  flung  back  the  enemy,  who  lost  heavily 
in  this  engagement.  Over  100  prisoners  were 
captured  by  our  Allies,  who  on  the  11th  seized 
a  German  trench  south  of  Ailles.   The  next  day 


bombardment,  attacked  from  the  Vauclerc  Mill 
to  the  eastern  end  of  the  California  Plateau. 
They  were  mown  down  by  the  French  artillery 
and  never  reached  the  French  trenches.  The 
same  day  a  surprise  attack  west  of  Braye-en- 
Laonnois  was  easily  frustrated.  During  August 
18  various  German  raids  north  of  the  Aisne  were 
repulsed,  as  were  those  on  the  19th  north 
of  Braye-en-Laonnois  and  in  the  regions  of 
Bermericourt,  north-west  of  Reims,  and  of 
La  Pompelle,  south-east  of  that  city. 

Between  the  battlefield  of  Moronvilliers  and 
the  Argonne  on  August  10  the  Germans,  after 
artillery  preparation,  assaulted  the  French 
trenches  to  the  east  of  Maisons  de  Champagne. 
On  both  wings  they  were  repulsed,  but  in  the 
centre  they  gained  a  temporary  footing.  A 
counter-attack,  however,  drove  them  out.    The 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


895 


fighting  had  been  of  the  fiercest  description. 
The  next  day  (August  11)  after  sunset  the 
enemy  several  times  assaulted  the  French 
positions  on  the  Moronvilliers  heights  at 
Mt.  Cornillet,  Mt.  Blond  and  Mt.  Haut.  He  was 
at  all  points  completely  defeated. 

Nothing  particularly  noticeable  happened  in 
the  Argoilne  or  between  the  south  of  Verdun 
and  Belfort  during  the  three  weeks  under 
review,  but  in  the  region  of  Verdun  every  sign 
betokened  that  another  great  battle  was  about 
to  be  fought  on  the  banks  of  the  Middle  Meuse. 

Before  the  Battle  of  Flanders  opened  it  had 
been  arranged  between  the  British  and  French 
Commanders-in-Chief  that  the  French  were 
(hiring  the  battle  to  assist  Sir  Douglas  Haig  by 
carrying  out  such  offensives  on  their  own  front 
as  they  might  be  able  to  undertake.  After  the 
inconclusive  result  of  the  British  fighting  in  the 
Ypres  salient  on  August  16,  the  desirability  of 
preventing  guns  and  men  being  shifted  from 
the  German  Crown  Prince's  Army  to  Flanders 
had  becoms  more  than  ever  apparent.  General 
Guillaumat  had  by  then  already  made  his 
preparations  for  fighting  a  fourth  Battle  of 
Verdun,  a  battle  needed  not  only  to  keep  the 
Crown  Prince's  reserves  away  from  Flanders 
but  also  to  render  the  Verdun  salient  more 
secure  against  another  German  inroad. 

Despite  General  Guillaumat's  brilliant  re- 
covery of  the  Col  de  Pommerieux  in  July  (see 
Chapter  CCXXVII,  p.  188),  the  situation  in 
the  Verdun  region  was  still  unsatisfactory. 
With  the  Bois  de  Cheppy,  the  Bois  de 
Malancourt,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Bois 
d'Avocourt,  the  summits  of  Hill  304  and  the 
Mort  Homme,  Cumieres  and  the  wood  named 
after  that  village  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
the  communications  of  Verdun  west  of  the 
Meuse  with  the  Argonne  were  in  jeopardy.  Up 
the  valley  of  that  river  the  Germans  wers 
entrenched  round  the  loop  which  the  Meuse 
makes  between  Begneville  and  Vacherauville, 
their  outposts  here  being  only  some  five  miles 
from  Verdun  itself. 

On  the  east  bank  of  the  Meuse  the  enemy 
retained  all  the  ground  in  the  above-mentioned 
loop  and  the  Talou  Hill  at  its  base  ;  and  his 
front  ran  over  the  Meuse  heights  to  the  northern 
outskirts  of  Bezonvaux.  South  of  the  line 
Vacherauville-Bezonvaux  he  had,  it  is  true, 
been  expelled— generally  speaking — from  those 
heights,  but  he  was  still  at  thoir  foot  and  in  a 
few  places  between  Verdun  and  St.  Mihiel 
held  them. 


As  the  hilly  and  wooded  region  between  the 
Meuse  and  the  plain  of  the  Woevre  is  but  six 
or  seven  miles  in  width,  the  danger  of  a  thrust 
at  Verdun  from  the  West  was  for  the  moment 
small.  The  weak  points  of  the  French  line  were 
north  of  the  city.  That  the  Germans  had  not 
abandoned  their  intention  of  moving  on  Verdiui 
from  this  direction  had  been  evidenced  by  their 
abortive  effort  to  seize  the  Col  de  Pommerieux. 

During  the  first  fortnight  of  August  General 
von  Gallwitz  again  struck  at  the  French  lines 
north  of  Verdun  between  Avocourt  and  Bezon- 
vaux. On  August  1  in  the  morning  he  attacked 
between  the  Avocourt  Wood  and  Hill  304, 
seeking  to  recover  the  Col  de  Pommerieux.  His 
troops — Baden  battalions — secured  some  ad- 
vanced posts  and  vainly  endeavoured  to  press 
forward  during  the  night  of  the  2nd-3rd.  The 
next  night  the  attempts  were  renewed,  and 
efforts  were  made  then  and  on  the  6th  to  eject 
the  French  from  their  hold  on  the  south-eastern 


FRENCH    GRENADE-THROWERS 
ADVANCING    TO    ATTACK. 


890 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


finl  of  the  Avocourt  Wood.  Two  days  later 
other  Baden  troops  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
lleuae  raided  the  Bois  des  Caurieres,  in  the 
Bezonvaux  region,  and  on  August  10  Baden 
storm-troops  penetrated  the  French  lines 
north  of  Vacherauville.  Two  surprise  attacks 
on  the  Caurieres  Wood  and  at  Bezonvaux  were 
repulsed  by  the  Fieneh  on  the  12th,  as  was 
another  one  west  of  Avocourt  delivered  about 
the  same  time.  With  the  exception  of  a  success- 
ful raid  on  August  9  north  of  Vaux-les-Palamoix, 
in  the  region  of  Les  Eparges,  the  French  had 
remained  on  the  defensive. 

On  Sunday,  August  12,  however,  the  German 
communique  reported  that  "  on  both  banks  of 
the  Mi-use  the  artilleries  were  fighting  each 
other  with  more  intensity  than  had  been  usual 
lately."  From  that  date  to  the  morning  of 
Monday,  August  20,  the  French  artillery 
pounded  the  region  about  to  be  attacked.  The 
German  guns  replied,  and  on  the  evening  of 
the  16th  von  Gallwitz,  with  Baden  troops, 
violently  attacked  the  French  east  of  the 
Meuse  between  the  northern  part  of  Caurieres 
Wood  and  Bezonvaux.  The  Badeners  entered 
the  French  lines  at  several  points,  but  were 
promptly  ejected  from  nearly  all  of  them.  Two 
days    later    (August    18)    a    brilliant    counter- 


attack by  our  Allies  gave  them  back  the 
remainder  of  the  lost  ground. 

Meantime  the  French  aircraft  exhibited  great 
activity  west  and  east  of  the  Meuse.  For 
example,  during  the  day  of  August  17  and  the 
night  of  August  17-18  the  French  bombarding 
aeroplanes  carried  out  many  flights  over 
the  enemy's  lines.  One  hundred  and  eleven 
machines  took  part  in  various  flights,  in  the 
course  of  which  28,600  lbs.  of  projectiles  were 
dropped  on  the  enemy's  establishments.  The 
aviation  grounds  of  Colmar,  Frascati  and 
Habsheim,  just  east  of  Mulhouse,  and  the 
aviation  camp  in  the  region  of  Chambley,  14 
miles  south-west  of  Metz,  the  railway  stations 
of  Freiburg -im-Breisgau,  Longuyon,  Montmedy, 
Pierrepont,  seven  milts  south  of  Longwy,  of 
St.  Juvin,  Grand  Pre,  Challorange — the  last 
three  south-west  of  Dun-sur-Meuse — and  of 
Dun-sur -Meuse,  were  also  bombed,  while  the 
bivouacs  of  the  Spincourt  Forest,  about  17  miles 
north-east  of  Verdun,  were  copiously  showered 
with  projectiles.  .  Many  explosions  on  the 
objectives  were  observed  and  several  fires  broke 
out.  Only  two  French  machines  were  lost  in 
these  extensive  raids. 

These  operations  marked  the  preliminaries  to 
the  Fourth  Battle  of  Verdun. 


CHAPTER  CCXXXIII. 

THE  ITALIAN  OFFENSIVE  OF 
JULY-SEPTEMBER,   191 7. 

Fighting  in  the  Settb  Comuni  and  Adamello  Sectors — Political  Events — Italian  Protec- 
torate of  Albania — "  Pacifist  "  Propaganda — Military  Effects  of  Russian  Collapse — ■ 
Paris  Conference  of  July  25,  1917 — The  Pope's  Note — Effect  on  the  Army — Italian 
Offensive  Opens — The  Isonzo  Crossed — Advance  on  the  Bainsizza  Plateau — Monte  Santo 
Carried — End  of  the  First  Phase — Fierce  Fighting  for  San  Gabriele — The  Austrian 
Defence — Carso  Battles — Italian  Gun  Shortage — Eve  of  the  Austrian  Counter-Stroke. 


THE     four    weeks'     struggle    on    the 
Middle   Isonzo   and   the  Carso,   des- 
cribed    in     Chapter     CCXXI.,    was 
quickly    followed,    in    other   sectors, 
by    two    minor     Italian    offensives,    of    which 
only  a  brief  account  need  be  given. 

Of  these  the  first  and  most  important 
was  an  attempt  to  improve  the  line  north 
of  Asiago,  in  the  uplands  of  the  Sette  Comuni. 
The  Austrian  offensive  of  May  and  June. 
1916,  had  left  the  invaders  in  possession  of 
very  strong  positions.  When  they  were  pushed 
hack  by  General  Cadorna's  counter-attack 
and  lost  the  main  part  of  their  gains,  they  had 
held  on  to  a  mountain  system  which  appeared 
absolutely  impregnable  to  frontal  attacks. 
The  northern  part  of  the  Seven  Communes 
may  be  described  as  a  sector  of  a  huge  amphi- 
theatre— the  outer  wall  dropping  abruptly  to 
the  valley  of  the  Brenta.  Within  this  wall 
lies  a  wild  and  barren  tableland  that,  slopes 
southwards  towards  Asiago,  and  in  its  lower 
stretches  is  cut  into  mountain  ridges  by  valleys 
that  run  almost  due  north  and  south.  The 
mass  of  the  outer  wall  is  more  than  5,000  feet 
above  the  Brenta,  and  it  is  battlemented  with 
peaks  that  rise  another  1,000  or  1,500  feet. 
Asiago  itself,  the  centre  of  the  amphitheatre, 
lies  3,280  feet  above  the  sea. 
Vol.  XV.— Part    1P4 


West  of  the  Passo  dell'  Agnella,  10  miles 
due  north  of  Asiago,  the  Austrians  held  the 
outer  wall.  And  they  held  the  ridge  that 
runs  down  southward  of  the  pass — from  Monte 
Ortigara  by  Monte  Forno  to  Monte  Zebio, 
which  divides  the  Val  de  Nos  from  the  Val 
Gahnarara.  In  this  mountain  system  the 
enemy  occupied  a  great  wedge  thrust,  forward 
between  the  Val  Brenta  and  the  Val  d'  Assa, 
which  not  only  opposed  a  formidable  obstacle 
against  any  Italian  advance,  but  made  the  way 
easier  for  a  possible  renewal  of  an  offensive 
on  their  own  part.  It  gave  them  a  downhill 
road  to  Asiago  from  the  north  as  well  as  from 
the  west.  The  Italian  effort  was  directed  to 
reducing  this  wedge. 

On  June  10,  after  an  accurate  bombardment, 
the  Italians  launched  three  separate  attacks. 
The  main  effort  was  against  the  outer  wall, 
where  columns  of  Alpini  occupied  the  Passo 
dell'  Agnella  and  stormed  one  of  the  Ortigara 
summits,  the  peak  known  as  Hill  2101.  The 
task  was  difficult  enough  under  any  conditions, 
for  the  terrain  is  altogether  favourable  to  the 
defence.  It  is  a  waste  of  stony  steeps.  "With 
the  exception  of  the  Carso  it  is  the  most  bleak, 
desolate,  and  rocky  of  the  Italian  battlefields. 
It  is  like  another  Carso  stretched  nearer  to  the 
skv,   but   not   nearer  to   the   sun.     Rains   and 


:!!I7 


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a: 
w 
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H 

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:f!»8 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


3<J9 


mist  shroud  it  most  of  the  year,  and  wind- 
storms are  numerous  and  perilous.  Tufts 
of  rank  grass  in  the  interstices  of  the  rock,  and, 
at  rare  intervals,  some  scrubby  pine  which 
by  its  loneliness  adds  to  the  sense  of  desola- 
tion, are  the  only  vegetation."*  The  Alpini 
had  to  climb  up  bare  slopes  of  rock  and  shale, 
and  their  difficulties  were  increased  by  the 
appalling  weather.  There  was  a  very  high 
wind,  and  the  rain  swept  down  in  solid  sheets 
of  water.  Farther  to  the  south  the  attacks 
were   not   pushed    home,    but   useful    progress 


nor  did  a  further  attempt,  in  the  early  morning 
of  June  15,  have  any  effect  against  the  deter- 
mined resistance  of  the  Alpini.  After  some 
10  hours'  fighting  the  enemy  columns  with- 
drew in  disorder,  leaving  behind  them  a  number 
of  prisoners. 

During  this  week  the  Alpini  were  put  to  a 
very  hard  test.  The  storm  which  had  burst 
just  before  their  advance  beat  upon  them  for 
tliree  days  with  unceasing  violence.  They 
had  no  shelter  from  the  cruel  weather  or  from 
the  crueller  storm  of  shells  that  was  rained  on 


AN    ENCAMPMENT    ON    MONTE    ZEBIO. 


was  made  on  the  slopes  of  Monte  Forno, 
and  just  under  the  crest  of  Monte  Zebic, 
where  the  enemy  lost  several  important 
trench  systems.  The  weather  interfered  greatly 
with  the  work  of  the  artillery,  and  the  action 
had  to  be  limited  to  a  diversion  which  should 
keep  the  enemy  anxious  regarding  the  Forno- 
Zebio  line. 

The  Austrians  hurried  up  reserves  to  all 
the  threatened  sectors,  and  on  the  night  of 
June  12-13  they  attempted  a  surprise  attack 
upon  the  Italian  positions  on  the  Ortigara. 
The  surprise  failed,  but  the  attack  was  renewed 
with  greater  forces.     It  met  with  no  success, 

*  The  Times  Special  Correspondent.  June  30. 


them  by  the  enemy.  It  was  difficult  to  keep 
them  supplied  with  the  necessary  minimum  of 
ammunition,  food,  and  water,  for  to  reach 
them  the  supply  trains  hail  to  pass  directly 
under  the  enemy's  lines,  in  full  view  of  numerous 
machine-guns.  As  soon  as  the  weather  cleared 
the  enemy  counter-attacks  came,  and  they 
were  very  determined.  But  the  Alpini  held 
firm,  and  gave  tirao  for  trench  mortars  to  be 
brought  up  and  placed  in  readiness  for  a  fresh 
attack. 

This  came  on  June  19.  The  Italian  guns 
and  trench  mortars  had  prepared  the  way  by 
a  tremendous  pounding,  which  drove  the 
enemy  into  his  caverns,  and  the  attack  went 
forward  so  ouickly  that  many  of  the  Kaiser- 

194-2 


400 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


jiiger  and  other  mountain  troops  who  held  the 
line  were  caught  before  they  could  begin  to 
fight.  By  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  the 
attacking  troops — Alpini,  Bersaglieri,  and 
detachments  of  the  Piedmont  Brigade  of 
infantry — had  captured  the  highest  point 
of  Monte  Ortigara  (Hill  2105)  and  the  system 
of  trenches  which  linked  it  up  with  the  next 
ridge  to  the  south.  Nearly  a  thousand  prisoners 
were  taken,  belonging  to  a  number  of  picked 
mountain  units,  and  the  proportion  of  officers 
was  very  large — no  fewer  than  74  being  cap- 
tured, mostly  in  the  caverns.  A  feature  of 
the  action  was  the  work  of  the  Italian  aero- 
planes.    Altogether  145  planes  went  out  over 


CIMA    DODICI. 

the  enemy  lines,  and  400  large  bombs,  weighing 
altogether  five  and  a  half  tons,  were  dropped 
on  the  enemy  artillery,  on  the  roads  leading  to 
the  scene  of  battle,  and  on  various  "  points  of 
concentration." 

The  action  was  a  brilliant  local  success, 
but  the  enemy  still  held  all  the  advantage 
of  position.  Monte  Ortigara  was  completely 
dominated  from  the  west,  from  the  still  higher 
rock  wall  tliat  runs  up  to  Cima  Undici  and 
Cima  Dodici,  and  the  Austrians  were  massing 
reserves,  both  of  guns  and  men.  To  construct 
trenches  on  these  rocky  heights  requires 
weeks  of  work  with  drills.  The  enemy  had 
no  intention  of  allowing  the  necessary  time. 


The  counter-attack  came  on  the  morning  of 
June  25,  and  after  two  days'  fighting  it  suc- 
ceeded. A  great  weight  of  artillery  fire  was 
concentrated  on  the  bare  slopes  where  the  new 
Italian  line  was  precariously  stretched.  Very 
heavy  loss  was  caused  before  the  enemy  infantry 
came   into   action,   and   furious   assaults   were 


SUMMIT    OF    ADAMELLO. 

then  launched  against  the  Passo  dell'  Agnella 
and  the  ridges  of  the  Ortigara.  The  enemy 
attacked  with  masses  of  picked  mountain 
troops,  backed  by  numerous  infantry  reserves 
which  had  arrived  shortly  before  from  Galicia. 
After  a  desperate  struggle,  both  sides  of  the 
Passo  dell'  Agnella  were  held,  but  the  Italians 
were  swept  off  the  summits  of  the  Ortigara, 
though  they  succeeded  in  maintaining  their 
hold  on  part  of  the  mountain.  The  proportion 
of  casualties  among  the  defending  troops  was 
very  high  indeed,  the  fire  of  the  enemy  guns 
causing  terrible  havoc.  It  was  only  after  their 
battalions  were  broken  in  pieces  that  the 
Alpini  gave  ground.  A  considerable  number  of 
men  were  cut  off  by  the  enemy  infantry 
attack,  and  finally  surrendered. 

In  spite  of  the  brilliant  initial  successes  it 
seems  clear  that  the  Ortigara  action  ought 
not  to  have  been  attempted.  This  at  least 
was  a  common  opinion  in  the  Italian  Army. 
The  officers  in  command  of  the  Alpini,  veteran 
mountain  fighters,  were  opposed  to  the  attempt. 
The  general  who  planned  and  directed  the 
attack  did  not  understand  the  mountains 
as  they  did,  and  over-rode  their  counsel. 
A  study  of  the  positions  would  seem  to  indicate 
that  the  taking  of  the  Ortigara  could  lead  to 
nothing,  and  must  leave  its  captors  practically 
at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy.  This  was  the 
objection  urged  before  the  action,  and  events 
showed  that  the  fear  was  well-founded.  Th<- 
Alpini  put  up  a  magnificent  resistance,  but 
they  were  literally  hammered  to  pieces.     Both 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


401 


officers  and  men  felt  sore  about  the  action. 
The  Alpini  had  shown  many  times  that  they 
were  quite  ready  to  attempt  the  impossible, 
if  there  were  a  reason  for  the  attempt.  In 
this  case  they  could  not  see  the  reason.  They 
felt  that  they  had  been  mishandled,  and  that 
their  losses  were  not  only  needless  but  useless. 

Meanwhile  another  "  Group  "  of  Alpini  had 
been  renewing  its  astonishing  exploits  on  the 
Adamello  glacier.  In  Chapter  CXXXIX.  a 
■description  was  given  of  the  attack  which  led 
to  the  capture  of  almost  the  whole  glacier 
system  that  lies  east  of  the  main  Adamello 
peak.  Subsequent  to  this  attack  the  Austrian 
main  line  of  defence  ran  in  the  form  of  an  arc 
from  Menicigolo  by  Monte  Coel  to  Care  Alto, 
but  from  the  southern  end  of  this  line  there 
projected  northward  into  the  glaciers  a  rock 
ridge  that  was  still  in  Austrian  hands — the 
southern  part  of  the  ridge  that  divides  the 
Lares  and  the  Fumo  glaciers.  The  Italians 
had  occupied  the  greater  part  of  this  ridge, 
from  the  Crozzon  di  Fargorida  to  the  Passo  di 
Cavento,  in  the  attacks  of  April  and  May, 
1916,  and  they  had  also  seized  the  Crozzon 
del  Diavolo  (Devil's  Crust),  that  bounds  the 
Lares  glacier  on  the  north,  but  Corno  di  Cavento 
(The  Horn  of  the  House  of  the  Wind)  and 
Monte  Folletto  were  still  Austrian.  From 
Corno  di  Cavento  a  line  of  redoubts  cut  in  the 
ice  and  joined  by  galleries,  also  cut  in  the  ice, 
ran  eastward  to  Monte  Coel  across  the  Lares 
glacier,  to  face  the  Italians  on  the  Devil's  Crust. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  June  1 5  the  Italians 
attacked  the  Corno  di  Cavento.  Little  columns 
of  white-clad  Alpini  on  skis  came  down  from 
the  Devil's  Crust  and  swept  through  the  line 
of  redoubts,  while  two  other  columns  attacked 
from  the  western  side  of  the  Cavento  ridge. 
One  climbed  up  between  the  Corno  and  Monte 
Folletto,  while  another  came  along  the  jagged 
crest  from  the  Passo  di  Cavento.  The  enemy 
held  till  these  columns  were  close  upon  them, 
and  kept  up  a  brisk  fire,  but  by  this  time 
Alpini  of  the  ski  column  were  threatening  them 
from  behind.  The  Austrians  fled  eastward 
across  the  glacier,  leaving  many  dead.  A 
dozen  machine-gunners  resisted  to  the  last 
and  then  surrendered.  Two  field  guns,  a 
trench  mortar,  four  machine-guns,  and  a  great 
store  of  supplies  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Italians.  And  they  found  there  great  pre- 
parations for  action  on  a  larger  scale.  The 
House  of  the  Wind  was  tunnelled  and  galleried 
for  guns  that  had  not  yet  arrived. 


This  was  only  a  little  fight,  but  it  deserves 

special  mention,  for,  in  the  words  of  The  Times 

Special     Correspondent,     who     witnessed     the 

attack,    the   sector   where    it   took   place    "  is 

certainly  uniquo  in  the  story  of  battles.     Since 

the  world  began  men  never  made  war  under 

such    conditions.     The    mere    getting    to    the 

scene  of  the  battle  of  Corno  di  Cavento  presents 

such  a  series  of  difficulties  to  overcome  as  to 

leave    the    beholder   mute    with   amazement." 

After    describing   the    journey   in    "  a   newly 

constructed  mountain  automobile,  short  and 

squat,"  up  winding  precipitous  roads  to  "  the 

first  teleferica,"  the  Correspondent  goes  on : 

Ascending  by  several  teleferiche  in  an  iron  basket 
across  ugly  chasms,  suspended  on  a  frail  wire,  always 
climbing  up  from  one  precipice  to  another,  at  two  hours 


ALPINI    ON    SKIS. 

after  midnight,  under  the  clear  stars  of  a  perfect  night 
we  found  dogs  and  sledges,  which  carried  us  across  a 
sea  of  ice  rimmed  round  with  ghostly  peaks  .  .  . 
Across  this  glacier,  whose  crevasses  have  been  sounded 
for  2,000  feet  without  touching  soil,  we  pushed  on  to  a 
mountain  formed  entirely  of  boulders  thrown  together, 
one  would  say,  by  Titans.  Op  this  we  painfully  crawied 
for  an  hour  and  a  half,  until  we  saw  spread  before  us  the 
field  of  battle.  The  dazzling  glittering  wastes  were 
only  broken  by  jagged  and  fantastic  rock  elevations 
rising  here  and  there  to  great  heights,  measuring  their 
awful  impassibility  against  the  yielding  and  uncertain 
snow. 

The  month  of  June  saw  much  fighting  on 
the  Italian  front,  and  it  saw  also  a  recurrence 
of   political   difficulties   at   homo.     The   origin 


402 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  the  difficulties  lay  a  long  way  back — in  the 
composition  of  the  "  National  Government " 
which  came  into  being  on  the  fall  of  the  Salandra 
Government.  Baron  Sonnino,  Signor  Orlando, 
and  Signor  Bissolati,  Signor  Boselli's  three 
chief  lieutenants,  represented  tendencies  of 
thought  and  habits  ot  action  so  widely  divergent 
that  the  compromises  necessary  to  the  smooth 
working    of   the    Cabinet    were    very    difficult 


Those  who  disagreed  with  his  methods  and 
feared  their  consequences,  but  trusted  his 
ability  and  character,  combined  to  avoid  a 
crisis. 

Everyone  felt  that  a  crisis  had  only  been 
deferred,  but  when  it  came  its  manner  was 
unexpected.  The  Interventionists  of  the  Left 
had  become  increasingly  anxious  about  Signor 
Orlando's     home    policy — slight    disturbances 


[lis  ian  official  plaioirapk. 


UNLOADING    MUNITIONS    AT    2,800    METRES. 


of  attainment.  For  a  long  time  it  had  been 
felt  by  the  "  Interventionists  of  the  Left," 
and  not  by  them  alone,  that  the  methods 
adopted  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  to  deal 
with  the  subterranean  anti-war  influences, 
which  were  at  work  in  Italy  as  in  every 
Allied  country,  showed  a  lack  of  firmness  and 
severity.  Signor  Orlando  had  come  in  for 
much  criticism. 

The  harmony  of  the  Cabinet  was  further 
disturbed  by  the  fact  that  Baron  Sonnino 
had  entirely  disappointed  the  hopes  of  those 
who  ha<l  expected  that,  he  might  break  with 
the  habit  of  years  and  talk  more  freely— at 
least  to  his  colleagues.  His  parliamentary 
position  at  the  end  of  the  spring  session  had 
been  very  uncertain.  There  was  talk  among 
his  closest  supporters  of  a  "  conspiracy " 
against  him.  It  would  be  truer  to  say  that 
there   was   a   conspiracy    to    prevent    his   fall. 


in  Milan  in  May  had  added  to  their  misgivings — 
and  they  were  prepared  to  raise  the  question 
on  the  opening  of  Parliament,  when  Baron 
Sonnino  took  everyone  back  by  a  proclamation 
guaranteeing  the  unity  and  independence  of 
Albania  under  the  protection  of  Italy.  The 
proclamation  which  was  issued  at  Argyro- 
eastro  on  June  3  by  General  Ferrero,  com- 
manding the  Italian  Army  in  Albania,  ran  as 
follows  : 

To  All  the  People  of  Albania. 

To-day,  June  3.  1917,  the  happy  anniversary  of  the 
establishment-  of  Italian  constitutional  liberties,  we, 
Lieut. -General  Giacinto  Forrero,  commanding  the 
Italian  corps  of  occupation  in  Albania,  by  order  of 
the  Government  of  King  Victor  Emmanuel  III., 
solemnly  proclaim  the  unity  and  independence  of 
Albania  under  the  aegis  and  protection  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Italy. 

By  this  act,  Albanians,  you  will  have  free  institutions, 
troops.  Law  Courts,  and  schools  directed  by  Albanian 
citizens  ;  you  will  be  able  to  manage  your  proper- 
ties and  the  product  of  vour  labour  to  your  own  advan- 


THE    TIMES    HISTOBY    OF    THE    WAR. 


403 


tags    and    for   the   ever-increasing    well-being  of    your 
country. 

Albanians,  wherever  vou  may  bo,  whother  already 
freo  in  your  country  or  fugitivos  through  tho  world  or 
still  subjected  to  foreign  domination,  generous  in 
promises,  but  in  reality  practising  violenco  and  pillage  ; 
you  who  belong  to  an  ancient  and  roble  race,  who  are 
bound  by  century -old  momorios  and  traditions  to  the 
civilization  of  Rome  and  Venice,  you  who  are  aware  of 
tho  community  of  interests  of  Italians  and  Albanians  on 
the  seas  which  separate  and  at  the  same  time  unite  j 
you  who  are  men  of  good  will  and  have  faith  in  the 
destinios  of  your  beloved  country,  stand  beneath  tl  o 
shadow  of  the  flags  of  Italy  and  Albania  and  swear 


ARGYROGASTRO, 
Where  the  proclamation  of  Albanian  independence 
was  published, 

eternal  fealty  to  that  which  has  boon  proclaimed  to-day 
in  tho  name  of  the  Italian  Government  for  an  independent 
Albania,  enjoying  the  friendship  and  protection  of 
Italy. 

The  contents  of  the  proclamation  could 
hardly  have  been  displeasing  to  Italian  opinion 
or  to  those  of  Italy's  allies  whose  chief  aim  was 
the  welfare  of  the  Albanians.  The  partition 
of  Albania  could  not  well  find  a  place  in  a 
programme  based  upon  the  principles  fre- 
quently expressed  by  Allied  statesmen.  Yet 
Albania  could  hardly  stand  alone  without 
becoming  once  more  a  fruitful  field  for  inter- 
national jealousies  and  intrigues,  and  for 
the  dangers  that  arise  from  these.  And  of 
all  the  great  allied  nations  Italy  seemed 
indicated  as  the  necessary  protecting  power. 
She  was  nearest,  geographically,  and  her 
special  interests  in  the  country  had  already 
been  acknowledged. 

Yet  the  announcement  given  above,  which 
was  signed  by  General  Ferrero,  but  came  from 
Baron  Sonnino,  was  not  pleasing  to  Italy's 
allies,  and  raised  a  sharp  storm  in  Italy.  It 
was  the  manner  of  the  announcement  that 
gavo  grounds  for  criticism,  for  Baron  Sonnino 
acted  alone.  He  had  reasons  for  his  sudden 
and  surprising  decision,  but  these  reasons 
cannot  well  be  discussed  here.  His  action 
gave  rise  to  a  strong  protest  on  the  part  of  his 
critics  in  Italy,  who  revived  tho  old  chargo  that 
the  Foreign  Minister  was  claiming  the  right  to 


act  as  a  dictator  in  foreign  affairs.  The 
Serolo  in  particular,  speaking  on  behalf  of 
the  Interventionist*  of  the  Left,  was  very 
severe,  and  reinforced  its  contention  that 
Baron  Sonnino's  methods  constituted  a  slight 
to  his  colleagues  by  the  argument  that  they 
endangered  the  cordiality  of  Italy's  relations 
vith  her  allies. 

For'  some  days  it  seemed  as  though  tho 
Government  might  break  up,  but  a  full  and 
frank  discussion  between  the  various  Ministers 
relieved  the  tension,  as  far  as  foreign  policy 
was  concerned.  Signor  Bissolati  and  his 
friends,  however,  took  advantage  of  the  general 
unloosening  of  tongues  within  the  Cabinet  to 
raise  the  question  of  home  policy. 

In  Chapter  CCXXI.  mention  was  made  of  a 
letter  sent  by  General  Cadorna  to  the  Govern- 


BARON    SONNINO, 
Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

ment  on  June  2,  pointing  out  the  danger  to 
the  Army  that  was  caused  by  a  failure  to  check 
anti-war  propaganda.  This  letter  was  fol- 
lowed by  two  others,  and  an  answer  eventually 
came.  But  neither  the  written  word,  nor  the 
action  which  followed,  was  ready  adequate  to  tho 
situation.  When  Parliament  met  on  June  2i>, 
the  date  having  been  delayed  for  six  days  owing 
to  the  crisis  within  the  Cabinet,  tl)'*  main 
question  at  issue  was  no  longer  Baron  Son- 
nino's method  of  conducting  foreign  policy, 
but   Signor  Orlando's   regime  at  the  Ministry 


404 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


of  the  Interior.  If  there  was  any  lingering 
doubt  as  to  the  strength  of  Baron  Sonnino's 
position  it  was  dispelled  by  the  reception  given 
to  his  speech  at  the  opening  sitting  of  the 
Chamber.     The     Foreign     Minister    scored     a 


SIGNOR   ORLANDO, 
Italian  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

notable  success,  and  his  treatment  of  the 
thorny  question  of  Albania  was  generally 
accepted  as  a  complete  and  satisfactory 
explanation. 

On  June  21  the  Chamber  went  into  secret 
session,  and  the  attacks  on  the  Ministry  of 
the  Interior  developed  at  once.  Signor  Orlando 
defended  himself  with  great  skill,  but  he 
did  not  satisfy  his  critics,  who  insisted  that  he 
had  shown  undue  hesitation  in  dealing  with 
difficulties  that  could  have  been  readily  disposed 
of  by  a  stronger  hand.  Further  discussion  led 
to  a  movement  against  the  Premier,  Signor 
Boselli,  who,  it  was  said,  was  no  longer  equal 
to  the  task  of  leading  the  Government,  or  the 
Chamber.  He  had  now  entered  his  eightieth 
year,  and  the  great  physical  strain  of  the 
previous  twelve  months  had  told  upon  him. 
In  the  end  the  Government  received  the  usual 
war  majority. 

The  support  given  to  the  Cabinet  was 
not  inspired  by  any  enthusiasm.  Two  phrases 
occurred  regularly  in  spoken  and  written 
comment — "  a  fear  of  something  worse,"  and 
"  a  leap  in  the  dark."  The  only  Minister  who 
strengthened   his  position  during  the  debatei 


was  Baron  Sonnino.  His  statements  of  policy, 
both  in  public  and  private  sittings,  won 
general  approval,  and  his  refusal  to  be  a  party 
to  the  reconstruction  of  the  Cabinet  desired 
by  the  Interventionists  saved  the  Government. 
But  the  favourable  vote  did  not  mean  a  real 
solution  of  the  Ministerial  crisis.  It  was  in 
effect  a  suspension  of  judgment,  an  expression 
of  hope  that  things  would  go  better  in  future, 
and  an  admission  that  circumstances  made  it 
difficult  to  better  the  existing  Government. 
The  following  estimate  of  the  situation  was 
published  in  The  Times  of  July  3,  and  the 
course  of  time  proved  it  to  be  accurate  : 

The  real  solution  will  depend  on  the  willingness  or 
ability  of  the  Cabinet  to  tighten  up  various  loose  screws 
and  generally  to  show  greater  capacity  for  dealing  witli 
war  problems.  Above  all,  the  future  of  the  Govern- 
ment and,  incidentally,  of  the  country  depends  upon 
the  policy  pursued  by  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 
It  is  understood  that  Signor  Orlando  sees  the  necessity 
of  tightening  his  hand,  but  the  change  will  not  be  an 
easy   one   to    make.     The    present   system   is    not   fair 


SIGNOR    BISSOLATI, 
Socialist  Leader  and  Minister  without  Portfolio. 

to  the  Italian  people,  which  is  almost  at  the  mercy  of 
thoss  who  preach  pacifism,  pro-Germanism,  and  all 
the  other  "isms"  that  are  the  fruit  of  the  unhallowed 
union  between  thes.3  two. 

It  is  impossible  to  speak  too  highly  of  the  patriotism 
and  good  sense  of  the  Italian  people,  which  has  resisted 
the  suggestions  and  insinuations  of  propagandists  to 
an  extent  that  no  one  has  any  right  to  expect.  But  it 
is  felt  now  by  all  who  are  not  opposed  to  the  war  that 
a  further  cheek  must  be  put  on  the  kind  of  sabotage 
that  has  hitherto  been  winked  at.  There  is  a  limit  to 
the  resistance  that  even  good  sense  and  patriotism 
car   oppose  to  false  insinuation,  especially  when  there 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


405 


is    little    counter-propaganda    and    the    conditions    of 
living  grow  more  pinched. 

As  June  drew  to  an  end,  there  was  cause 
for  disappointment  in  the  military  situation. 
The  greatly  increased  artillery  strength  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  extent  to  which  he  was 
able  to  draw  upon  the  Eastern  front  for 
infantry  reserves,  had  altered  the  general 
position  to  Italy's  grave  disadvantage.  There 
was  less  illusion  in  Italy  than  in  England 
regarding  prospects  in  Russia.  All  informa- 
tion went  to  show  that  the  Russian  front 
would  soon  become  a  vast  rest  camp.  Austrian 
prisoners  boasted  openly  that  the  Italian 
successes  would  be  only  temporary — that  the 
entire  effective  strength  of  Austria-Hungary 
would  shortly  be  concentrated  against  Italy. 
News  had  come  that  General  Brusiloff  would 
make  a  move  at  the  beginning  of  July,  but  the 
Italian  command  were  not  confident  of  the 
success  of  such  a  move,  and  their  forebodings 
were  amply  justified  by  the  event.  The 
tragic  flash-in-the-pan  which  came  in  July,  so 
far  from  checking  the  balance  that  was  swing- 
ing against  Italy,  had  the  reverse  effect.  The 
defection  of  General  Brusiloff's  troops,  after 
their  brilliant  initial  successes,  stripped  off 
the  last  veil  of  uncertainty  that  had  shrouded 
the  situation  on  the  Eastarn  front.  Russia 
was  already  out  of  the  game,  as  far  as  the 
role  assigned  to  her  by  the  Allied  plans 
for  1917  were  concerned.  It  was  obvious 
that  even  if  she  could  continue  to  make  a 
show  of  military  activity  the  best  elements 
of  the  German  and  Austro -Hungarian  Armies 
would  bo  able  to  come  westwards. 

The  military  situation  was  upset  by  Russia's 
"  disorganization  " — at  the  moment  there  was 
still  a  hesitation  in  using  a  stronger  word. 
But  the  action  of  those  who  betrayed  Russia 
by  manoeuvres  cloaked  with  the  name  of 
pacifism  had  moro  than  this  direct  result  upon 
the  military  position.  Their  success  encouraged 
those  who  in  fact  formed  part  of  the  same 
machine — the  Pacifist  Socialist  element  which 
dreamed  of  and  schemed  for  "  the  Inter- 
national," and  by  some  twist  of  intellect  or 
other  crookedness  contended  that  its  realiza- 
tion would  be  ensured  if  the  enemies  of  Germany 
and  Austria  ceased  to  fight. 

There  was  cause  for  anxiety  in  the  military 
situation  as  it  appeared  towards  the  end  of 
June  ;  there  was  reason  also  for  congratulation 
and  hope.  The  Army  had  done  magnificently, 
and  had  won  through  a  harder  trial  than  had 


ITALIAN    TROOPS    HAULING    A    GUN 
UP    A    MOUNTAIN. 

been  anticipated  to  results  that  exceeded 
expectation.  The  one  "  regrettable  incident  " 
in  the  fighting  could  be  matched  in  any  of  the 
Armies,  Allied  or  enemy,  the  only  disturbing 
factor  being  that  the  defection  could  be  traced 
to  a  cause  which  might  extend  its  operations. 
The  enemy  had  been  outgeneralled  and  out- 
fought, and  the  course  of  the  struggle  had 
shown  that  a  little  more  weight  and  staying 
power  in  the  artillery  would  have  turned  the 
Austrian  defeat  into  disaster,  and  brought 
Italy  close  upon  the  gates  of  Trieste.  Her 
gallant  infantry  had  gone  very  near  to  breaking 
through  the  enemy  line.  They  had  shown 
that  there  was  a  chance  to  break  through. 
One  chance  had  been  lost  for  reasons  with  which 
no  one  could  justly  find  fault.  The  conditions 
in  Russia  seemed  to  impose  a  review  of  the 
Allied  plans.  Would  a  review  lead  to  prevision  ? 
Would  Francs  and  England  reconsider  the 
question  of  a  joint  offensive  on  the  Italian 
front  ?  Would  they  at  least  send  the  guns 
which  might  of  themselves  suffice  to  give 
Italy  the  fruits  of  her  victories  ? 

Though  the  Allied  conference  which  met  in 


til 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR 


[Italian  official  photograph. 

A    FATIGUE    PARTY    ON    THE    HIGH    MOUNTAINS. 


Paris  on  July  25  was  mainly  concerned  with 
the  situation  in  the  Balkans,  and  particularly 
with  the  position  of  Greece,  it  was  announced 
at  the  close  of  the  sittings,  which  lasted  for 
two  days,  that  the  representatives  of  the  Allied 
Armies  had  held  several  meetings  and 
"  examined  all  the  questions  relative  to 
the   general    conduct   of   operations." 

By  this  time  the  conditions  in  Russia 
had  become  plain  for  all  to  see.  They  thrust 
themselves  at  last  upon  the  most  unwilling 
intelligences.  But  the  immediate  plans  of 
the  Allies  for  the  French  front  could  hardly 
bo  revised  at  this  late  hour.  It  was  now  the 
very  eve  of  the  great  Flanders  offensive 
which  was  to  be  so  gravely  handicapped  by 
t  he  atrocious  weather.  The  moment  for  revision 
had  been  the  end  of  June,  but  at  that  date, 
no  doubt,  the  factors  which  had  governed 
the  earlier  decisions  were  still  thought  to  hold 
good. 

Tim  discussions  which  had  begun  in  Paris 
were  continued  in  London,  and  the  question 
of  a  joint  offensive  on  the  Italian  front  was  once 
mom  raised.  The  idea  brought  forward  by 
General  Albricei  oi  behalf  of  General  Cadorna, 
who  ha<l  returned  to  Italy  from  Paris,  was 
to  delay  the  Italian  offensive  which  was 
already  planned  until  Allied  troops  and  guns 
could  be  spared  to  give  added  weight  to  the 
blows    against    tho    Austrian    line      The    idea 


was  not  at  once  rejected.  It  was  proposed 
that  Allied  reinforcements  should  be  sent  to 
Italy  in  October,  when  it  was  hoped  that  the 
objectives  of  the  Flanders  offensive  would 
have  been  attained.  But  this  meant  losing 
the  most  favourable  season  for  a  "  big  push." 
The  experience  of  the  previous  year  had  shown 
that  tho  work  of  the  artillery  would  probably 
be  seriously  interfered  with  by  the  mist  and 
rain  which  are  apt  to  prevail  on  the  Carso  and 
the  Middle  Isonzo  as  soon  as  the  summer 
breaks.  General  Albricei  feared  that  October 
was  too  late  for  an  offensive  on  the  grand  scale. 
The  weather  might  be  favourable,  but  the  risk 
seemed  too  great.  It  was  decided  to  proceed 
with  the  plans  already  made.  The  Italia-i 
artillery  was  still  superior  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  and  another  half-dozen  batteries  of 
six-inch  howitzers  had  been  added  to  tho 
British  artillery  contingent  on  the  Carso. 

It  had  been  hoped  to  renew  the  Italian 
offensive  towards  the  end  of  July,  but  actio.i 
was  delayed  until  the  close  of  the  discussions 
which  have  been  briofly  indicated.  When  the 
decisions  were  finally  taken,  the  main  prepara- 
tions had  already  been  made,  and  it  only 
remained  to  put  the  finishing  touches. 

The  Italian  Army  and  the  whole  of  Italy 
were  strung  to  the  keenest  tension,  when 
Pope  Benedict  XV.  launched  his  "  cry  for 
peace."     This    is    not    the    place    to    analyso 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE     WAR. 


407 


fully  the  terms  of  tho  Papal  Note  or  the  attitude 
of  the  Vatican  to  the  war  in  general.*  It  is 
enough  to  recall  that  the  Pope's  impartiality 
placed  the  opposing  belligerents  on  exactly 
the  same  level,  to  the  extent  of  balancing  the 
evacuation  of  Belgium  and  the  occupied 
territory  in  France  with  the  restitution  of  tho 
German  colonies  ;  that  he  held  out  hopes  of 
territorial  arrangements  which  would  satisfy 
the    aspirations    of    the    contending    parties  : 

*  The  text  of  the  Pope's  Note  will  be  found  at  the 
oml  of  Chapter  OOXXX. 


and  that  he  stigmatized  the  struggle  between 
the  two  groups  of  peoples  as  a  "  useless 
slaughter." 

The  Note  gave  rise  to  a  furious  polemic 
in  the  Italian  Press.  Only  the  official  Socialists 
and  the  Giolittian  Stampa  ranged  themselves 
with  the  Clerical  newspapers  in  defence  of  the 
Note.  The  Avanti  claimed  that  the  Pope 
spoke  "  the  language  of  Zimmerwald,"  and 
that  "  two  great  armies — the  Catholic  and  the 
Socialist — are  working  together  to  end  the 
horrible    conflict."     The    Stampa    preached    a 


AN    ITALIAN    PATROL    IN    THK    MOUNTAINS. 


194—3 


403 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY     OF    THE    WAR. 


doleful  sermon  on  the  text  "  useless  slaughter," 
and  it  was  this  phrase  that  excited  the  strongest 
comment  of  those  who  felt  that  the  Note 
showed  a  strange  misapprehension  o£  the  issues 
»t  stake.  "  If  the  word  '  useless  '  is  written 
over  the  tombs  of  those  who  gave  themselves 
for  a  more  iust,  a  more  civilized,  a  more  human 
to-morrow  for  their  country  and  for  all  free 
countries,  the  dead  will  shudder  in  their  graves. 
Nothing  in  all  the  world  was  ever  more  sacredly 
useful."  * 

This  was  the  truth,  but  the  unhappy  phrase 
went  out  with  all  the  authority  of  the  Head  of 
the  Catholic  Church,  and  the  rest  of  the  Note 
may  be  said  to  have  led  up  to  that  phrase. 
If  the  assumptions  made'  by  the  Pope  were 
true,  if  the  belligerents  were  equally  respon- 


ciliatory  spirit,"  taking  account  of  "  the 
aspirations  of  the  peoples."  The  Note  was 
vague  enough  in  its  reference  to  these  questions, 


BARON    SONNINO  (on  the  right) 
Leaving  the  Paris   Conference,  July  1917. 

Bible  for  the  war  and  equally  guilty  in  regard  to 
its  excesses,  then  the  sufferings  and  losses  were 
indeed  useless.  They  were  equally  "  useless  " 
in  the  eyes  of  many  people  if,  as  the  Note 
hinted,  there  was  "  reason  to  hope  "  that  the 
enemies  of  the  Entente  were  prepared  to  con- 
sider certain  territorial   questions   "  in  a  con- 


•  CnrrUre  delta  Sera.  August  17. 


POPE    BENEDICT    XV. 

but  the  Clerical  papers  filled  in  the  gaps,  and  the 
impression  conveyed  was  that  the  Papal  Note 
held  out  the  promise  of  Trent  and  Trieste  for 
Italy. 

It  is  idle  to  say  that  Trent  and  Trieste  were 
not  mentioned  by  name,  or  that  the  Pope 
promised  nothing  at  all,  but  only  made  an 
appeal  for  peace.  The  Note  hinted,  if  it  did 
not  promise,  and  those  whose  business  it  was 
to  support  it  took  pains  to  suggest  that  its 
terms  would  probably  be  accepted  as  a  common 
basis  of  discussion. 

To  the  Entente  as  a  whole  the  proposals 
could  offer  no  basis  for  discussion .  The  demand 
for  "  entire  and  reciprocal  condonation  "  seemed 
a  mockery  in  view  of  the  German  crime  against 
Belgium ;  the  first  and  greatest  of  many 
crimes  against  laws  human  and  divine  that  had 
no  counterpart  on  the  other  side.  Serbia  was 
not  even  mentioned  by  name,  but  was  included 
in  the  general  reference  to  "  territorial  and 
political  questions."  Small  wonder  that  a 
first  reading  of  the  Note  led  to  indignant 
comment  by  almost  every  Allied  newspaper 
that  was  not  identified  with  the  Roman 
Church  or  with  an  anti-war  party.  The 
defenders   of   the   Note  were   subsequently  at 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


409 


pains  to  demonstrate  that  its  wording  did  not 
necessarily  imply  the  interpretations  that  were 
at  first  attached  to  it,  but  the  salient  phrases 
could  not  be  explained  away  or  "  interpreted." 
And  their  effect  upon  those  who  had  no  political 
knowledge  and  with  whom  the  Pope's  word 
carried  weight  may  readily  be  imagined. 

The  Note  was  published  on  the  eve  of  an 
immense  effort,  a  greater  effort  than  Italy 
had  ever  made,  and  for  a  moment  parts  of 
the   Army  were   shaken.     The   Socialists    had 


expect  a  better  reward  for  his  avowed  subor- 
dination of  moral  questions  to  his  longing 
for  an  end  to  wholesale  death  and  suffering. 
The  intentions  of  Benedict  XV.  were  praise- 
worthy, but  it  is  not  likely  that  his  famous 
Note  will  be  best  remembered  for  its  inten- 
tions. 

Parts  of  the  Italian  Army  were  shaken  for  a 
moment,  but  it  was  only  for  a  moment.  When 
the  day  of  battle  came,  the  troops  showed  all 
their   old   qualities— bravery,    patience,   endu- 


A    HEADQUARTERS    DUG-OUT    ON    THE    ITALIAN    FRONT. 


preached  that  the  Germans  were  ready  to  make 
peace  ;  the  Pope  seemed  to  repeat  the  sug- 
gestion, and  bis  commentators  insisted  that 
he  would  not  iiave  taken  the  step  unless  he  had 
good  reason  to  believe  it  would  be  successful. 
It  is  known  now  that  his  eager  hope  of  peace 
made  him  a  prey  to  false  assurances  which 
Germany  gave  for  her  own  ends.  He  became, 
in  fact,  the  unwitting  instrument  of  German 
manoeuvres.  It  would  be  unfair  to  suggest 
that  the  Papal  Note  was  inspired  by  anything 
but  the  Pope's  own  passionate  desire  for  an 
end  to  the  horror  of  the  war  and  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  lasting  peace.  The  German 
reply,  when  it  came,  was  a  complete  disillusion 
to   the   Pope,   who  perhaps   had   the  right  to 


ranee — under  the  severest  trials.  This  fact 
was  often  quoted  by  Clericals  as  a  proof  that 
the  Papal  Note  hat!  no  ill-effect,  but  the  argu- 
ment is  false.  There  was  a  moment  of  anxiety 
and  uncertainty,  and  if  that  moment  passed, 
thanks  to  the  essential  soundness  of  the  Army 
as  a  whole,  the  fact  remains.*  The  actual 
dates  pertinent  to  the  argument  are  as  follows. 
A  forecast  of  the  Papal  Note  was  published  on 
August  14.  The  next  day,  the  festival  of  Ferra- 
gosto,  no  newspapers  appeared.  At  midday  on 
August  16  the  text  was  published  in  a  special 

*  The  writer  has  a  very  vivid  recollection  of  the 
language  used  in  regard  to  the  Papal  Note  by  an  Italian 
Army  Corps  commander,  who  knew  how  his  men  had 
been  temporarily  affected. 


410 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


R1ZIA?  * 

PieCro      ?V 

Oortmber\ 


o   typacchiaseila 


O  J*     . 

'NovaVas  Teroniin 
208        ^  '"f<n- 

Jamtsno^l  Comcn 


402 

■7'i  O 
J*abresina 


TRIE  STJ 


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VOLNIK  .' 


jiiappvano 


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ft,V 
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JL 181  ■     ^ 


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■^iow,  VEUK^-S-^,,      ^ ■-  .  ig*   0),,  Scale  of  M.les 

343    '76  ^^Tl^!itfe»^S^'   %9#    Height,  in  Metres  (m*!etreS>32-8nk 


MAJ»    ILLUSTRATING    THE    ITALIAN    OFFENSIVE    ON    THE    ISONZO. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


411 


edition  of  tho  Osservalore  Romano.  At  dawn 
on  August  18  the  Italian  artillery  opened  fire 
along  the  whole  line  from  Monte  Nero  to  the  sea. 

The  battle  that  was  now  to  be  joined  sur- 
passed in  extent  any  that  had  hitherto  taken 
place  on  the  Julian  front.  In  1916  General 
Cadorna  had  dealt  one  short  sharp  stroke 
after  another,  each  time  upon  a  comparatively 
limited  front.  The  actions  in  May,  1917, 
described  in  Chapter  CCXXI.,  were  in  a  measure 
separate,  though  they  were  closely  connected. 
Each  phase  of  the  May  offensive  lasted  roughly 
three  days,  and  in  each  case  the  type  of  action 
was  simply  a  development  on  a  larger  scale 
of  the  previous  year's  hammerings  on  the 
Carso.  In  August  the  whole  proportion  of 
things  was  changed  ;  the  whole  scheme  of  the 
fight  was  on  a  different  scale. 

On  August  18  the  entire  front  went  on  fire 
from  above  Tolmino  right  down  to  the  sea,  and 
the  battle  lasted  for  four  weeks.  The  governing 
idea  of  the  plan  of  action  was  to  attack  all 
along  the  line  in  the  hope  of  rinding  a  weak 
spot,  and  then  to  throw  in  reserves  on  whatever 
part  of  the  long  front  promised  best.  That  is 
to  say,  that  at  the  outset  there  was  no  fixed 
objective  for  a  main  attack  to  which  the  others 
should  be  subservient.  The  sector  for  the 
main  drive  was  to  be  decided  by  the  results 
of  the  early  fighting. 

From  the  first  the  great  movement  went 
with  a  swing.  When  the  main  bombardment 
was  still  in  progress,  on  the  afternoon  of  August 
18,  Italian  columns  moved  north-eastward  from 
the  Plava  bridgehead,  and  seized  the  village 
of  Britof,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rohot  valley, 
which  divides  Monte  Kuk  (611)  from  the  main 
Bainsizza  plateau.  This  movement  was  carried 
out  under  cover  of  a  tremendously  heavy 
tirtillery  fire,  which  must  have  cut  the  com- 
munications of  the  outlying  enemy  trenches, 
for  the  barrage  which  the  enemy  put  over  in 
the  hope  of  crushing  the  attacking  forces  was 
quite  wrongly  directed.  The  whole  Isonzo 
valley  was  seething  with  smoke,  and  the  enemy 
command  clearly  thought  that  the  attack  which 
they  could  hear  round  Britof  had  come  from 
the  far  side  of  the  river.  The  Austrian  guns 
rained  countless  shells  on  both  banks  of  the 
river  below  Anhovo,  where  they  imagined  that 
the  Italians  were  crossing.  But  the  Italians  were 
already  inside  the  barrage,  and  reinforcements 
could  still  come  round  the  southern  end  of  it. 
This  was  only  a  minor  movement,   in   the 


nature  of  a  feint.  The  real  work  began  late 
on  the  night  of  August  18,  when  the  formidable 
task  of  crossing  the  Isonzo  at  a  number  of 
points  between  Tolmino  and  Anhovo  was 
undertaken.  The  wooded  glacis  that  drops 
from  the  Bainsizza  tableland  to  the  Isonzo 
had  the  swift  river  as  a  protecting  moat  all 
the  way  from  below  Santa  Lucia  station  to 
just  above  Plava.  In  most  places  the  banks 
are  precipitous,  dropping  some  30  to  60 
feet  to  the  water,  and  where  it  seemed  as 
though  a  bridge  might  more  easily  be  thrown 
across  the  enemy  had  established  specially 
strong  machine-gun  redoubts.  Most  of  the 
easy  places  were  left  alone,  and  in  many 
cases  the  pontoons  had  to  be  let  down  to 
the  river  by  ropes.  Before  dawn  on  the  19th 
14  bridges  had  been  thrown  across  the  river. 
The  task  of  the  engineers  was  helped  by  a 
thick  curtain  of  smoke  that  blotted  out  the  flow 
of  the  valley  and  by  the  clever  use  of  a  great 
number  of  searchlights,  the  skilful  manipulation 
of  which  completely  blinded  the  enemy  lights. 

Many  troops  were  across  the  river  before 
dawn,  and  before  the  sun  had  topped  the  hills 
to  the  east  large  forces  were  established  on  the 
left  bank.  The  big  trench  mortars  had  done 
their  work  well,  and  the  enemy  defences  near 
the  river  were  smashed  to  bits.  In  the  early 
morning  the  mist  lay  in  the  valley  and  well  up 
the  hillsides  like  a  level  floor,  that  seemed 
scarcely  disturbed  by  the  havoc  of  shell-fire. 
Later  in  the  day  the  levels  broke,  and  the  whole 
vaporous  mass,  thickened  by  the  smoke  of 
innumerable  shell  bursts,  seethed  and  swirled 
like  a  witches'  brew.  Favoured  by  the  mist 
and  by  the  devices  indicated  above,  the  attack- 
ing troops  got  across  the  Isonzo  with  compara^ 
tively  little  loss,  and  along  a  great  part  of  the 
river  front  the  first  rush  took  them  through  the 
battered  remnants  of  the  enemy  trenches. 
The  next  difficulty  began  when  they  came  in 
contact  with  the  so-called  "  redoubt-line  " — 
a  line  of  caverns  and  dug-outs  used  as  machine- 
gun  posts  some  distance  up  the  steep  slopes. 
Across  the  river  from  Anhovo  and  for  some 
little  distance  northward  the  attacking  forces 
were  held  up  by  a  murderous  machine-gun 
fire.  In  front  of  them  lay  the  steep  ridge  that 
dropped  from  Jelenik,  the  centre-point  of  the 
Austrian  defensive  system  in  this  sector, 
whence  a  second  system  of  trenches  radiated 
north-east  and  south-east  to  support  the 
front  line  running  along  the  top  of  the  glacis, 
and   to   protect   the   approaches   to   the  main 


412 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


plain  TO  from  an  attack  pushed  up  the  Avseek 
or  Rohot  valleys.  The  enemy  clung  to  the 
lines  behind  Descla  with  the  utmost  despera- 
tion, and  all  attempts  to  work  up  the  hill  failed. 
But  as  the  day  wore  on  it  was  seen  that  persis- 
tence in  a  frontal  attack  would  not  be  necessary. 
Between  Canale  and  the  mouth  of  the  Avseek 
valley,  by  Loga  and  Bodrez,  the  scene  of  the 
feint  action  three  months  before,*  two  Ber- 
Kaglieri  brigades,  the  First  and  the  Fifth, 
made   light   of    all   obstacles    and   gained   the 


the  Italians  had  enlarged  the  hole  in  the  line 
till  it  extended  from  the  Avseek  valley  to  the 
point  known  as  Kuk  711,  one  of  the  half-dozen 
kuks  that  dot  the  region  of  the  Middle  Isonzo. 
Jelenik,  the  hub  of  the  defence,  was  threatened 
from  the  north  as  well  as  from  the  west 

It  was  two  days  more  before  Jelenik  fell, 
but  in  the  meantime  the  Italians  had  smashed 
clean  through  on  a  sufficiently  wide  front. 
They  were  pressing  eastward  and  rolling  up 
the  enemy  line  from  the  north. 


A    PONTOON    BRIDGE    ON    THE    ISONZO. 


rim  of  the  Bainsizza  plateau  at  the  heights 
known  as  Fratta  and  Semarck,  north  of  the 
village  of  Vrh.  They  had  broken  up  the 
enemy  defences  on  this  line,  and  were  advancing 
southward  and  eastward,  backed  by  a  fresh 
brigade  which  followed  them  through  the  gap 
they  had  made.  One  column  pushed  south- 
eastward above  the  Avseek  valley,  another 
came  southward  along  the  rim  of  the  plateau 
by  Vrh.  Then:  was  very  stiff  fighting,  but  a 
big  gap  had  been  made  in  the  enemy's  third 
line,  and  he  could  not  prevent  its  widening. 
Italian  reserves  came  across  the  river  and  up 
the  woody  slopes,  and  the  Austrians  could  not 
stem    the    steady    pressure.     When   night    fell 


*  8o«  Chapter  CCXXI. 


North  of  the  Avseek  valley,  opposite  Doblar,. 
the  action  began  equally  well.  The  river  was 
crossed  successfully,  and  a  footing  was  gained 
on  the  heights  to  the  eastward.  The  problem 
here  was  especially  difficult.  There  was  no 
possibility  of  extending  the  line  of  the  frontal 
attack  farther  north  than  opposite  Doblar, 
for  the  steep  western  slopes  of  the  Lorn  and 
Kal  plateaux  end,  for  the  most  part,  in  a  sheer 
rockfall  into  the  Isonzo.  The  Lom  heights 
are  divided  from  those  of  Kal  by  the  torrent 
of  Vogercek,  which  drops  abruptly  through 
thick  woods  to  the  river,  but  the  only  real 
access  to  the  two  plateaux  is  from  the  Avseek 
valley,  which  divides  the  Kal  plateau  from  the 
main  system  of  the  Bainsizza.  A  glance  at 
the  map  shows  the  great  importance  of  these 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


418 


positions.  The  Lom  plateau  dominates  the 
junction  of  the  Baca  and  Idria  valleys,  and  the 
southernmost  curve  of  the  Wochein  railway, 
the  sole  good  way  of  access  to  Tolmino  from  the 
east.  It  dominates,  moreover,  the  northern 
part  of  the  Chiapovano  valley,  which  furnished 
the  only  satisfactory  lateral  communication 
for  the  enemy  positions  on  the  Middle  Isonzo. 
The  Lom  plateau  was  one  of  the  main 
bulwarks  of  the  Tolmino  defences,  an  essential 
part    of    them.     The  Kal    plateau  was   in  the 


fighting  the  Italians  succeeded  in  occcupying 
the  western  part  of  the  Kal  plateau,  as  far  as 
a  line  running  north-eastwards  from  Levpo 
to  near  Mesnjak. 

Meanwhile  furious  fighting  was  going  on 
between  Gorizia  and  the  sea,  and  especially 
on  the  Carso.  From  the  morning  of  the  19th 
the  Italian  pressure  all  along  the  line  was  very 
heavy,  and  at  one  point  the  enemy  cracked 
badly.  The  Italian  23rd  Corps  carried  the 
line    between    Korite    and    Selo,    which    had 


BERSAGLIERI    WITH    REGIMENTAL    DOGS. 


nature  of  an  outwork,  interposed  between 
the  main  line  and  the  only  way  of  approach- 
ing it. 

Observation  showed  that  the  enemy  front 
lines  were  well  prepared,  but  information 
regarding  the  rearward  positions  was  frag- 
mentary and  more  of  a  general  than  a  detailed 
kind.  The  country  beyond  the  nearer  ridges 
is  broken  and  thickly  wooded,  so  that  observa- 
tion gave  poor  results.  Other  information 
was  practically  lacking,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
there  had  been  practically  no  contact  between 
the  opposing  troops  in  this  sector.  It  followed 
that  the  task  both  for  troops  and  leaders 
was  exceptionally  arduous,  but  the  first  steps 
were   splendidly   successful.     After   verv   hard 


resisted  so  stoutly  in  May,  and  practically 
destroyed  the  Austrian  12th  Division.  More 
than  four  thousand  prisoners  were  taken  from 
this  division  alone,  and  its  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  were  terrible.  The  12th  had 
won  the  name  of  the  "  Iron  Division  "  for  the 
many  stubborn  fights  in  which  it  had  been 
engaged,  but  it  had  practically  no  chance 
against  the  furious  attack  of  the  Italians, 
in  which  the  Grenadier  Brigade  once  more 
distinguished  itself  greatly,  going  through 
the  village  of  Selo  with  bomb  and  bayonet. 
In  the  Hermada  region  useful  progress  was 
made — the  Italians  reaching  the  line  from 
which  they  had  been  driven  by  the  Austrian 
counter-attack    in    June,    and    taking    many 


414 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


prisoners.  The  attack  in  this  sector  was 
greatly  helped  by  the  enfilading  fire  of  the 
batteries  on  Punta  Sdobba,  a  long  spit  of  land 
thrust  out  into  the  sea  south  of  Monfalcone. 
Hungarian  prisoners  who  were  brought  in  on 
the  evening  of  August  20,  dazed  and  worn  by 


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MAP    ILLUSTRATING     THE    ITALIAN 
ADVANCE   IN  THE   SOUTHERN   SECTOR. 

the  torment  of  three  days'  slaughter  and  thirst, 
could  only  stammer,  "  Sdobba,  Sdobba,"  and 
wave  their  hands  towards  the  guns  that  had 
l*>unded  their  flank.  Very  useful  work  was 
done  by  British  monitors  and  Italian  guns 
mounted  on  pontoons,  which  bombarded  the 
H-rrnada,  especially  the  reverse  slopes  where 
the  enemy  heavy  artillery  was  concentrated, 
and  the  railway  line  that  runs  along  the  coast 
to  Trieste.     Trieste  itself  was  also  shelled. 

On  the  northern  purt  of  the  Carso  little  pro- 
gress was  made.  The  Austrian  resistance  here 
was  perhaps  more  tenacious  than  in  any  other 
sector  of  the  long  front.  The  stairway  of 
peaks  that  rises  from  west  to  east,  and  divides 


the  Carso  plateau  from  the  Vippacco  valley, 
was  of  enormous  importance  to  the  enemy. 
It  was  the  middle,  and  probably  the  most 
important  of  the  three  main  points  of  resistance 
between  the  Middle  Isonzo  and  the  sea,  the 
northern  being  San  Gabriele  and  the  southern 
Hermada.  Here  the  enemy  put  in  line  some 
of  his  best  troops,  and  they  fought  with  doggod 
fury.  But  they  lost  ground.  In  the  first 
day's  fighting  the  Pallenza  brigade  occupied  an 
important  position  south-east  of  Faiti  Hrib, 
and  every  attempt  to  dislodge  them  failed. 
North  and  south  Of  them  the  fight  swayed 
backwards  and  forwards  as  attack  and  counter- 
attack followed  in  quick  succession,  but  the 
Pallanza  held  tightly  to  their  gains. 

In  the  Gorizia  plain,  and  as  far  north  as 
Monte  Santo,  the  activity  of  the  Italians  was 
practically  limited  to  artillery  work  and 
trench  raids.  Experience  had  shown  that  this 
sector  held  less  promise  of  success  in  a  direct 
attack  than  the  Middle  Isonzo  and  the  Carso, 
and  it  may  be  said  that  here  there  was  an 
exception  to  the  governing  idea  of  equal 
pressure  all  along  the  line.  The  artillery  fire 
was  tremendous  and  frequent  raids  were 
carried  out,  but  there  was  no  infantry  attack 
in  force.  The  Austrian  communiques  spoke  of 
"  desperate  fighting "  in  this  sector,  where 
"  the  Italians  did  not  succeed  in  gaining  a 
yard  of  territory."  At  this  stage  there  was 
no  attempt  to  gain  territory  in  the  centre  of 
the  line.  Similar  claims  were  made  in  regard 
to  the  Vodice  sector.  They  were  equally 
unfounded.  The  Italian  troops  in  Kuk  and 
Vodice,  after  a  first  demonstrative  action, 
were  held  back  until  the  movement  farther 
north  should  be  developed. 

For  the  first  day's  fighting  had  found  the 
weak  place,  and  the  results  at  the  end  of  the 
second  day  determined  the  subsequent  course 
of  the  battle. 

The  Austrians  made  a  very  gallant  effort 
to  stem  the  onrush  of  the  Italians  through  the 
gap  that  was  made  in  their  lines  on  the  Middle 
Isonzo.  They  fought  desperately,  taking  every 
advantage  of  the  broken,  difficult  ground. 
But  resistance  was  useless.  Nothing  could  stop 
the  Bersaglieri,  who  pushed  south-eastwards 
and  occupied  the  wooded  heights  of  Ossoinca 
and  Oscedrih,  while  the  supporting  troops, 
among  whom  the  Elba  Brigade  particularly 
distinguished  itself,  spread  out  fanwise  and 
turned    the    Jelenik   positions.      More    troops 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


415 


1  [Italian  Naval  official  photograph' 
ITALIAN    NAVAL    GUNS    ON    A    PONTOON    BOMBARDING    THE    HERMADA. 


poured  through  the  gap  and  pressed  across  the 
plateau,  picking  up  guns  and  prisoners,  in 
spite  of  the  stubborn  fight  put  up  by  the 
enemy  covering  troops.  By  August  22  strong 
forces  were  marching  hard  for  the  eastern  rim 
of  the  Bainsizza  plateau.  The  troops  which 
defended  the  wooded  slopes  below  Jelenik 
.and  Hill  747  still  resisted  every  attempt  to 
dislodge  them,  thovigh  their  line  of  retreat  was 
all  but  cut  off.  Desperate  fighting  still  went 
on  in  the  woods,  but  these  were  slowly  being 
blasted  from  the  grim  slopes.  All  things  green 
were  fading  and  dying  under  the  blight  of  shell- 
fire.  The  battle  had  developed  into  a  battle 
of  movement  as  far  as  the  Middle  Isonzo  was 
concerned.  On  the  Austrian  left,  where  the 
Italian  attack  had  not  yet  been  tlirown  in,  the 
defenders  were  holding  on  anxiously,  but  their 
position  was  becoming  very  precarious.  On  the 
morning  of  August  23,  the  Florence  Brigade 
attacked  up  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Rohot 
valley,  with  the  Udine  Brgaie  on  their  right. 
Before  long  the  Florence  Brigade  were  through 
the  enemy  lines  at  Rutarsce  and  Bavterca,  and 
pushing  up  towards  Kobilek.  They  were 
well  supported,  both  on  left  and  right.  The 
whole  Second  Corps,  which  had  been  held  back 
till  the  movement  on  the  north  should  develop, 
was  launched  against  the  enemy  lines  from 
below  Jelenik  to  the  saddle  that  runs  from 
Vodice  to  Baske.  The  Austrians  were  driven 
back  in  confusion,  and  forced  down  into  the 
Concha  di  Gargaro,  losing  very  heavily,  as  they 
came  under  artillery  fire  near  Slatna,  on  the 
road  leading  down  to  Gargaro. 


Monte  Santo  was  now  threatened  in  reverse, 
and  the  same  day  an  Italian  column  from  the 
south  reached  the  Sella  di  Dol — the  saddle 
which  divides  Monte  Santo  from  Monte  San 
Gabriele.  That  afternoon  a  frantic  telephone 
call  for  orders  from  the  Austrian  garrison  on 
Monte  Santo  was  picked  up  by  the  Italians. 
The  commander  was  evidently  preparing  for 
retreat,  and  asked  anxiously  for  instructions 
as  to  his  movements  and  what  he  was  to  do 
with  his  stores  and  ammunition.  Whatever 
liis  orders  were  he  did  not  succeed  in  retiring 
all  his  men,  or  in  destroying  his  supplies. 
When  Monte  Santo  was  occupied  on  the  follow- 
ing day*  a  number  of  prisoners  were  taken, 
and  its  caverns  yielded  a  great  amount  of 
booty. 

Not  long  before  the  fall  of  Monte  Santo,  the 
Austrians'  best  remaining  observation  post  and 
the  scene  of  prolonged  and  stubborn  fighting  in 
the  previous  May,  would  have  been  hailed  ai  a 
great  and  splendid  triumph.  Its  actual  capture 
receded  in  perspective  in  view  of  the  brilliant 
movement  of  which  it  was  only  a  comparatively 
unimportant  incident.  It  had  resisted  countless 
gallant  attempts  to  storm  its  steep  sides,  and 
when  the  attackers  had  gained  a  footing  on 
its  summit  it  had  poured  forth  men  and 
machine-guns  from  its  many  caverns  and 
driven  the  presumptuous  heroes  from  the 
ruins  of  its  convent.  Yet  at  the  last  it  fell, 
as  a  ripe  pear  falls.  The  chance  of  manoeuvring 
given  by  the  successes  farther  north  did  what 
months  of  hammering  had  failed  to  do.  When 
the  writer  visited  that  sector  of   the  front  the 


116 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


THE     CONVENT     OF     MONTE     SANTO 
AFTER    THE     BOMBARDMENT. 

day  following  its  capture,  it  lay  like  a  derelict 
in  the  scorching  sun.  The  battle  had  passed 
it  by.  Its  battered  hideousness  seemed  to 
mean  nothing  any  more.  Yet  it  came  quickly 
to  life  again.  A  road  crept  along  the  crest  of 
the  ridge  from  Vodice,  and  before  the  road 
came  Italian  mountain-guns. 

A  great  part  of  General  Cadorna's  Second 
Army  was  now  well  on  the  move.  Divisions 
were  marching  across  the  Bainsizza  plateau, 
deployed  as  for  an  old-time  battle.  The 
enemy  rearguard  was  putting  up  a  very  fine 


resistance,  employing  field  artillery  and  machine- 
guns  with  good  effect  and  making  the  best 
use  of  the  wild  and  broken  country.  The 
Italians,  on  the  other  hand,  were  handicapped 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  now  beginning  to 
outrun  their  own  artillery,  except  the  mountain 
guns.  It  must  always  be  remembered  that 
the  first  part  of  the  advance  after  crossing 
the  Isonzo,  was  a  climb  of  2,000  feet,  and  that 
the  upland  of  the  Bainsizza  is  not  flat,  but 
traversed  by  ridges  which  rise  to  a  considerable 
height  above  the  general  level.  Moreover,  its 
western  sector  was  roadless.  Where  the 
Italians  first  broke  through  there  was  not  a 
single  road  between  the  river  and  the  enemy 
gun  positions.  Farther  south  there  was  one 
poor  road  across  the  saddle  from  Baske  to 
Vodice,  and  along  the  eastern  slope  of  Kuk 
(611)  to  near  Paljevo.  In  June  the  Italians 
had  built  an  admirable  road  up  the  western 
side  of  Kuk  to  the  saddle  between  Kuk  and 
Vodice  and  another  between  Kuk  and  Hill  383. 
Half  a  day's  work  linked  up  the  Kuk  road  to 
the  Austrian  road  at  the  hamlet  of  Vodice, 
but  between  the  end  of  the  Austrian  road  east 
of  the  ridge  and  the  Italian  road  past  Hill  383 
there  was  a  gap  of  a  mile.  Till  that  gap  was 
filled  everything  had  to  struggle  up  the  single 
mountain    road   that   ran    from    Plava    across 


ARTILLERY    TRANSPORT    ON    A     NEWLY-MADE    ROAD. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


41 T 


the  saddle  between  Kuk  and  Vodice  and  thence 
across  the  Baske  saddle  to  Ravne,  on  the  main 
plateau.  From  the  Baske  saddle  a  road  ran 
down  to  the  Concha  di  Gargaro.  Another 
led  from  Ravne  to  the  Concha,  and  another 
joined  Ravne  to  the  village  of  Bate,  which 
was  the  centre  of  the  Austrian  communications 
on  the  plateau.  The  position,  in  short,  was 
this  :  that  the  Italians  had  only  one  road  by 
which  they  could  bring  up  guns  and  stores, 
while  the  Aus.trians  had  several  by  which  they 


towards  the  village  of  Ternova.  Water  was"u 
very  serious  problem.  The  supply  on  the 
Bainsizza  upland  is  at  best  very  limited,  and 
the  enemy,  naturally,  had  polluted  the  wells 
wherever  they  had  time  to  do  so.  Some  un- 
touched springs  were  found,  but  the  great  bulk 
of  the  water  for  the  troops  had  to  be  brought 
up  by  road,  where  there  was  a  road,  and  else- 
where in  barrels  on  muleback.  For  a  week 
there  was  fierce  heat,  and  the  soldiers  suffered 
terribly  from  thirst.. 


i  r$  ■     ^  V  ill        I  ^Si 


SERVING    OUT   FOOD    TO    ITALIAN     SOLDIERS. 


could  retreat.  The  one  road,  moreover,  was 
far  south  of  the  point  where  the  gap  was  first 
made,  and  was  not  available  for  the  Italians 
until  the  Austrian  positions  in  front  of  it  were 
actually  turned  by  the  infantry  to  the  north. 
For  the  first  part  of  the  advance  there  was 
no  road  at  all. 

The  advance  across  the  plateau  was  thus 
very  difficult,  on  the  middle  sector  at  least. 
On  the  southern  part,  where  the  rearward 
enemy  positions  were  within  range  of  the 
heavy  guns  and  where  there  was  at  least  one 
road  for  hurrying  up  artillery,  the  Austrians 
were  driven  back  to  the  Chiapovano  valley. 
Italian  forces  crossed  the  mouth  of  it,  where  it 
debouches  into  the  Concha  di  Gargaro,  between 
the  Ternova  and  Bainsizza  plateaus,  and 
established  themselves  on  the  rise  leading  up 


By  August  27,  the  limit  was  practically  set 
to  the  Italian  advance  on  the  plateau.  The 
farthest  point  reached  was  Volnik,  a  hill  that 
rises  about  two  miles  west  of  the  Chiapovano 
valley,  at  the  broadest  part  of  the  plateau. 
North  of  Volnik  a  road  runs  down  to  the  valley, 
and  this  road  was  the  main  avenue  of  retreat 
for  the  Austrian  artillery.  Here,  in  a  wooded 
hollow,  the  pursuing  Italian  infantry  came  up 
with  the  enemy  and  all  but  laid  hands  on  a  great 
column  of  guns  that  was  struggling  eastwards. 
But  the  pursuers  had  outrun  their  own  artillery. 
The  wooded,  broken  country  was  admirably 
suited  to  defence  by  machine-guns,  and  in 
many  places  the  woods  were  wired.  A  desper- 
ate defence  was  made  by  the  enemy.  His 
rearguard  was  sacrificed,  but  its  sacrifice  was 
not  in  vain,  for  the  greater  part  of  the  threatened 


418 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


ITALIAN    MOTOR    TRANSPORT    COLUMN    CARRYING    TROOPS    TO    THE     FRONT. 


guns  were  got  away  in  safety.  If  it  had  been 
in  any  way  possible  for  the  Italian  artillery 
to  keep  pace  with  the  advancing  infantry,  the 
bulk  of  the  enemy  artillery  would  have  been 
caught  north  of  Volnik,  and  an  even  greater 
success  would  have  gone  to  the  credit  of 
Italian  arms. 

Meanwhile  the  fight  north  of  Avscek  valley 
had  not  gone  so  well.  The  forward  movement, 
which  had  begun  admirably  the  first  day,  was 
checked  on  the  second,  and  General  Capello, 
who  commanded  the  Second  Army,  was  not 
satisfied  that  the  check  was  necessary.  The 
general  in  charge  of  the  operations  in  this 
sector  was  relieved  of  his  command,  and 
General  Badoglio  was  sent  north  in  the  hope 
that  his  energy  and  "  drive  "  might  meet  with 
success ;  General  Montnori  taking  over  the 
.Second  Corps,  which  was  still  waiting  till  the 
breach  made  at  Vrh  should  be  widened.  This 
was  the  second  time  in  the  course  of  the  summer 
that  General  Badoglio  had  been  selected  to  take 
charge  of  operations  which  had  already  been 
begun.*     In  May  his  work  was  rewarded  by  the 

•  Sif  Chapter  CCXXI. 


capture  of  Kuk  and  Vodice,  but  on  the  second 
occasion  he  was  unable  to  make  the  headway 
that  was  urgently  necessary.  Perhaps  he 
came  on  the  spot  too  late,  when  the  loss  of  the 
hours  that  mean  everything  to  an  offensive 
had  already  prejudiced  the  situation.  This 
was  the  opinion  of  those  who  thought  that  more 
energetic  action  on  the  second  day  of  the 
battle  might  have  led  to  big  results.  It  is 
certain  that  by  the  time  he  took  over  the 
command  the  enemy  had  strengthened  the 
positions  that  were  already  strongly  held. 
The  Austrians  had  concentrated  a  large  force 
of  artillery  on  the  Lom  plateau,  and  ample 
infantry  reserves  were  quickly  on  the  spot. 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  the  Italian 
attack  could  have  had  much  further  success 
even  if  no  time  had  been  lost.  This  position 
was  all -important  to  the  enemy.  It  was  clear 
that  the  attainment  of  the  Italian  objectives 
would  have  placed  the  Austrians  at  Tolmino 
in  a  practically  impossible  situation.  Their 
defensive  measures  were,  therefore,  very  com- 
plete, and  the  Italian  attacking  strength  was 
not  sufficient.  There  were  not  enough  guns  to 
push   through    this   operation    in    addition    to 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


410 


sustaining  the  battle  along  the  whole  wide 
front  to  the  sea.  Other  sectors  of  the  battle 
line  were  held  to  have  a  prior  claim. 

On  the  morning  of  August  30  the  battle 
seemed  still  so  open  that  cavalry  patrols  were 
sent  forward  in  reconnaissance  from  Britof  to 
the  southern  outlet  of  the  Chiapovano  valley, 
and  southward  towards  the  low  ridge  that  joins 
Monte  San  Gabriele  to  the  Ternova  plateau. 
These  patrols  came  in  touch  with  the  enemy, 
dismounted  and  kept  the  defenders  employed 
till  the  infantry  came  up  and  took  over  the 
work.  The  Italians  soon  found  themselves 
faced  by  wire,  and  the  brief  task  of  the  cavalry 
was  over.  This  was  the  last  day  of  open  fighting. 
The  inevitable  slowness  of  the  advance  over 
the  difficult,  roadless  country  had  given  time 
for  enemy  reserves  to  arrive — well  served  by 
the  roads  which  backed  the  Bainsizza  and  led 
over  the  Ternova  plateau.  It  was  obvious 
that  a  pause  was  due.  The  ground  was  still 
very  favourable  to  the  defence.  Among  the 
woods  and  rocks  of  the  Bainsizza,  wire  and 
machine-guns  could  hold  up  any  advance  that 
was  not  backed  by  a  heavy  weight  of  artillery 
fire.  The  steep  eastern  rim  of  the  plateau 
rises  well  above  the  approaches  to  it,  and  it 
was  strongly  held.  Four  divisions  were  in  line 
here,  plies  the  shattered  remnants  of  two  others 


which  had  left  most  of  their  effectives  on  the 
ground  lost  to  the  Italians.  Reserves  were 
behind  them,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of 
rushing  the  defences  with  tired  troops  and 
insufficient  artillery.  The  Italian  line  was 
straightened  out  by  a  withdrawal  from  some 
of  the  more  advanced  positions  occupied,  and 
once  more  the  two  armies  betook  themselves  to 
the  spade  and  the  rock-drill,  on  the  Bainsizza 
at  least. 

The  first  phase  of  the  battle  was  over,  and 
the  second  phase  which  followed  was  curiously 
different.  The  long  battlefront  suddenly 
narrowed  down  to  one  single  hill,  where  for  a 
long  three  weeks  Italians  and  Austrians  fought, 
out  the  most  determined  struggle  of  the  battle. 
During  this  time  there  was  other  heavy  fighting 
at  various  parts  of  the  front,  but  the  centre 
point  of  interest  was  always  Monte  San 
Gabriele. 

San  Gabriele  was  now  very  closely  beset. 
The  Italians  had  long  been  some  way  up  its 
western  slopes,  hanging  on  under  Santa 
Caterina,  a  spur  that  juts  out  towards  the 
Isonzo.  North  of  Santa  Caterina  they  had 
occupied  Hill  343,  a  similar  spur,  which,  like 
its  neighbour,  had  long  been  reduced  to  a 
hateful  mound  of  debris.  The  fall  of  Monte 
Santo  had  let  them  in  with  a  rush  up  to  the 


M     ^ 

3   m 

y 

%      '     1 

a'Xi       iji       } 

w 

LI                                          _^4 

AN    ITALIAN     GUN     EMPLACEMENT. 


420 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Sella di  Dol,  and  they  hat!  scaled  the  precipitous 
northern  slope  of  San  Gabriele,  and  tucked 
themselves  in  under  shelter  of  the  point  known 
as  Veliki  Hrib,  or  Hill  526,  before  the  Austrian* 
were  well  aware  how  their  flank  had  been 
turned. 

The  ridge  of  San  Gabriele  runs  north-west» 
wards  from  Gorizia  towards  Monte  Santo. 
The  ascent  to  its  highest  point  (Hill  646)  from 
the  Gorizia  plain  is  very  abrupt,  and  thence 
the  ridge  runs  for  about  a  mile  to  Veliki  Hrib 
before  dropping  steeply  to  the  Sella  di  Dol. 
The  eastern  side  is  also  very  steep,  but  on 
the    west    the    rise    is    comparatively    gentle, 


to  face  direct  attack  from  the  west.  But  the 
summit  itself  had  been  turned  into  a  citadel, 
with  rock  trenches  facing  all  ways.  The  task 
of  the  Italians  who  had  occupied  the  northern 
end  of  the  ridge  was  to  push  up  the  gradual 
rise,  and  they  had  the  advantage  of  being  able 
to  use  the  old  defences  as  communication 
trenches  when  they  had  made  good  an  advance 
over  the  open  ground.  But  an  advance  was 
very  difficult.  The  Austrians  had  many 
caverns  on  the  eastern  and  southern  sides  of 
Gabriele  which  gave  cover  against  the  Italian 
shells.  And  all  their  massed  artillery,  on  the 
Ternova  and  San  Daniele.  at,  Oronberg  and  in 


WIRE-CUTTING    BY    SECATEUR    UNDER    PROTECTION    OF    A    STEEL    SHIELD. 


except  for  the  two  spurs  already  mentioned, 
until  immediately  under  the  main  ridge,  which 
rises  very  sharply  for  the  last  500  feet.  The 
total  length  of  the  mainif  from  the  Sella  di 
Do!  to  the  aqueduct  below  the  south-eastern 
corner,  is  little  more  than  2,000  yards,  while 
its  extreme  breadth  from  Santa  Caterina  to  the 
xaddlo  which  divides  it  from  Monte  San  Daniole 
is  a  little  less.  The  widest  part  of  the  main 
ridge,  between  the  steep  drops  on  either  side, 
is  only  about  800  yards.  It  seems  an  im- 
possible battlefield,  but  on  this  narrow  space 
an  appalling  struggle  took  place. 

The  flank  of  the  Austrian  position  was  turned 
by  the  occupation  of  Veliki  Hrib  and  the 
advance  in  the  Concha  di  Gargaro,  for  the 
defences  had  run  along  the  ridge  to  the  summit 


the  Panowitzer  wood,  could  be  trained  upon 
the  battered  hill. 

On  August  30  the  Italians  finally  established 
themselves  firmly  on  Veliki  Hrib,  and  pushed 
forward  to  another  strong  position  on  the  ridge 
known  as  Hill  552.  During  the  next  few  days 
the  Austrians  made  furious  endeavours  to 
drK'e  back  the  invaders  of  their  vital  stronghold, 
but  though  they  often  regained  some  of  their 
lost  ground,  they  could  never  bold  it,  and 
in  the  meantime  preparations  for  a  further 
assault  were  pushed  on.  The  Italians  kept 
extending  their  hold  on  the  ridge.  Their 
splendid  infantry,  backed  by  a  very  heavy 
artillery  fire,  were  slowly  unloosing  the  enemy's 
grip,  finger  by  finger.  Sometimes  by  a  furious 
effort  the  loosened  finger  shut  again,  but   in 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


421 


k^-* 


<*rr» 


?9        mm* 


TXSCITI' 


BOMBARDMENT    OF    SAN    GABRIELE:    SANTA    CATERINA     IN     THE    FOREGROUND. 


the  end  it  became  finally  detached  from  its 
hold.  By  September  2  the  Italians  had  pushed 
along  the  ridge  till  they  were  under  the  last 
sharp  rise  that  leads  to  the  summit,  and  they 
had  extended  their  occupation  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  hill. 

The  fresh  attack — the  first  attack  on  the 
summit — came  on  the  morning  of  September  3, 
when  the  Italians  went  forward  in  three 
columns.  "  One  column  attacked  straight 
along  the  coast,  one  worked  along  the  north- 
eastern slope,  while  the  third  advanced  on 
the  right,  where  the  first  precipitous  fall  of 
the  ridge  meets  the  slope  that  comes  up  from 
Salcano  past  the  jutting  spurs  of  Hill  343  and 
Santa  Caterina.  The  left-hand  column  was 
held  up  south-east  of  Hill  552  by  a  rocky  bastion 
that  juts  out  eastward  from  the  main  massif, 
but  it  kept  the  Austrians  in  this  sector  very 
busy  and  diverted  thoir  attontion  from  the 
flank  of  tho  centre  column.  The  right-hand 
column  got  well  forward  and  performed  the 
same  service  for  the  other  flank  of  the  main 
attack,  which  was  brilliantly  successful. 
.  "  Nothing  could  stop  the  centre  column, 
which  was  made  up  of  volunteer  storming 
troops.  These  broke  down  all  resistance. 
They  stormed  the  machine-gun  positions, 
careless    of    loss,    and    reached    the    caverns, 


where  the  Austrian  reserves  were  caught  like 
rats.  In  less  than  an  hour  the  Italians  were 
in  possession  of  the  main  peaks. 

"  They  had  thrust  a  wedge  into  the  enemy 
position  in  the  mountain,  but  their  own  position 
was  precarious.  The  enemy  still  lay  round  them 
east,  south,  south-west,  on  the  lower  ground 
indeed,  but  for  that  very  reason  half-protected 
from  the  terrific  hail  of  shells  which  had  pounded 
the  crest  to  fragments.  Some  of  the  enemy 
had  remained  literally  underneath  them,  for 
a  group  of  Italians  who  took  refuge  in  a  great 
shell-crater  felt  the  ground  give  way  beneath 
their  feet  till  they  fell  into  a  cavern  occupied 
by  a  company  of  the  enemy.  The  Italians 
wore  tho  first  to  reuovor  frorn  the  surprise, 
and  the  small  detachment  took  the  whole 
company  prisoners. 

"  Altogether  the  centre  column  took  nearly 
1,500  prisoners,  more  than  twice  the  whole 
number  of  the  '  forlorn  hope  '  that  had  stormed 
the  peak.  Think  of  what  they  had  done. 
They  had  rushed  a  steep  glacis  that  rises  about 
300  feet  in  600  yards,  a  glacis  not  more  than 
200  or  300  yards  wide.  At  the  end  of  the  last 
abrupt  rise  they  had  stormed  trenches  cut  in 
the  rock  and  full  of  machine-guns.  By  every 
law  of  fortune  and  rule  of  war  they  had  no 
more  chance  of  succeeding  than  the  men  who 


4±1 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


GENERAL    CADORNA    AND    STAFF    WATCHING    THE     BOMBARDMENT    OF    MONTE 

SAN    GABRIELE. 


stormed  Badajoz  or  Ciudad  Rodrigo — less, 
perhaps,  for  in  those  far-off  days  there  was  no 
such  nearly  perfect  engine  of  defence  as  the 
machine-gun. 

"They  had  done  the  impossible,  and  now 
reserves  came  up  to  sit  down  and  hold  the 
salient,  closely  pressed  by  a  desperate  enemy 
and  smitten  by  all  the  massed  guns,  from  east 
and  sunt  h.  For  the  Austrians  to  prevent  the 
complete  occupation  of  San  Gabriele  was  a 
matter  of  life  and  death.  If  once  it  was 
altogether  gone  the  way  lay  open  to  an  Italian 
advance  east  of  Gorizia  and  the  consequent 
enfilading  of  the  all-important  positions  on  the 
northern  rim  of  the  Carso.  The  enemy  had 
to  sacrifice  anything  in  order  to  gain  time  to 
improvise  a  new  defence  on  the  Ternova 
plateau  and  the  low  ground  that  leads  down 
behind  Gorizia  to  the  Vippacco."* 

The  enemy  did  not  stint  his  sacrifice.  The 
10  days  which  followed  the  Italian  attack  on 
the  summit  saw  one  long-continued  melee  at 
close .  quarters — bomb  and  bayonet,  dagger 
and  clubbed  rifle.  The  fights  swayed  back- 
wards and  forwards  along  the  awful  debris  of 
shattered  rock  and  crushed  bodies.  The 
Austrians  surged  up  from  their  caverns  on  the 
eastern  and  southern  slopes,  and  the  Italian 
line  gave  back  under  the  line  of  the  crest  to 
lei  t  h«-  guns  have  full  play.  Attack  after  attack 
wils  swept  away  by  gusts  of  shell-fire,  and  the 
elastic  Italian  line  returned  to  where  it  had  been. 
.Mure  caverns  full   of  Austrians  were  found 


•  The  Timet,  September  14. 


within  the  area  occupied,  and  some  of  these 
men  refused  to  surrender,  hoping  to  hold  on 
till  they  should  be  freed  by  a  successful  counter- 
attack.    Attempts   to   enter   the   caverns   met 
with   strong    resistance,    and    their   occupants 
had  to  be  bombed  into  silence.     A  remarkable 
feature  of  the  captures  in  this  sector  was  the 
very   large    proportion    of   officers    taken — the 
figures  for  two  successive  days  amounted  to 
112  officers  and  2,100  men.     The  explanation 
lay  in  the  Austrian  system  of  fighting.     The 
men  and  non-commissioned  officers   fought  in 
the  trenches  with  only  a  few  officers,  the  bulk 
of  the  latter  remaining  in  caverns  behind  the 
battle-line.     In  this  way  the  losses   of  killed 
and  wounded  was  proportionately  very  much 
greater  among  the  rank  and  file.     As  a  rule, 
when  the   Italians  broke  through  the  enemy 
lines  it  was  only  the  remnant  of  the  men  who 
fell    into   their   hands,    but    the    officers    were 
picked  out  of  their  "  funk-holes  "  in  batches. 
The  system  of  fighting  does  not  sound  "  sport- 
ing," but  it  was  no  doubt  very  necessary  for 
the  Austrians  to  spare   their  officers   as  long 
as    possible.     And    the    system    worked.     The 
Austrian  resistance  deserved  all  praise. 

On  September  12  General  Boroevic  launched 
masses  of  fresh  troops  against  the  Italian  line 
on  San  Gabriele  and  at  length  succeeded  in 
reducing  to  some  extent  the  salient  that 
terminated  at  Hill  646.  But  his  only  success 
was  the  occupation  of  a  part  of  the  Italian 
advance  lines.  All  efforts  to  push  back  the 
main  line,  which  ran  just  under  the  summit, 
to  the  north  of  it,  and  thence  slantwise  down 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


423 


the  north-eastern  slope,  were  in  vain.  At 
last  there  came  a  comparative  truce  upon  the 
stricken  mountain.  Infantry  fighting  ceased, 
and  though  a  steady  succession  of  shells  fell 
upon  it  for  a  few  days  more,  at  length  the  fires 
which  had  been  alight  for  more  than  a  month 
seemed  to  burn  themselves  out. 

The  original  garrison  of  the  mountain 
fortress  was  perhaps  five  or  six  battalions,  and 
the  fierceness  of  the  fighting  may  be  judged 
fvom  the  fact  that  from  August  27  to  the  middle 
of  September  no  fewer  than  31  fresh  Austrian 
battalions    were    thrown    into    the    struggle. 


sensation  of  the  spectator  was  amazement  at 
man's  capacity  to  resist  the  terrible  engines 
of  his  own  devising."  * 

The  Austrians  claimed  that  the  fight  for 
San  Gabriele  resulted  in  a  decisive  victory  for 
them,  inasmuch  as  at  the  end  of  the  long  and 
tremendous  struggle  they  still  held  half  the 
massif  and  still  blocked  the  Italian  movement 
that  had  seemed  to  threaten  the  Austrian  lines 
east  of  Gorizia.  To  some  extent  their  claim 
is  justified.  Every  credit  must  be  given  to 
the  defenders  for  their  heroic  resistance,  and 
their  successful  effort  to  prevent  the  complete 


[Italian  official  pkotc;raph. 
INFANTRY    DISLODGING    THE     ENEMY    FROM    A     CAVE. 


What  this  meant  may  be  judged  from  the 
dimensions  of  the  mountain  already  given, 
and  from  the  fact  that  the  area  of  the  fiercest 
and  most  prolonged  struggle  is  perhaps  a  little 
larger  than  Trafalgar  Square.  The  losses  on 
both  sides  were  terrible,  for  during  these  three 
weeks  the  fight  raged  almost  without  ceasing. 
Sometimes  the  hammering  of  the  artillery 
died  down  for  a  few  hours  and  let  the  tortured 
ground  lie  bare  to  the  light,  unscreened  by  the 
foul  garments  of  shell  smoke,  but  there  was  no 
real  rest  from  the  battle.  After  eacli  pause 
hell  woke  again  with  unquenched  fires,  and 
weary  men  resumed  their  incredible  efforts. 
The  mettle  of  both  sides  was  tried  to  the  utter- 
most, and  here,   as  so  often,   "  the  prevailing 


capture  of  this  all-important  bulwark  certainly 
saved  General  Boroevic's  great  defeat  from 
developing  into  a  great  disaster.  But  it  would 
be  wrong  to  regard  the  Italian  attack  on  San 
Gabriele  as  an  isolated  action. 

The  attack  had  a  two-fold  object :  first, 
the  possible  capture  of  the  mountain  and  the 
possible  turning  of  the  enemy  positions  east  of 
Gorizia  ;  secondly,  the  gaining  of  time  necessary 
to  consolidate  the  great  stretch  of  new  line  on 
the  Bainsizza  plateau.  The  first  object  was 
not  attained,  but  in  order  to  prevent  its 
attainment  the  Austrians  had  to  use  up  the 
infantry  of  three  divisions   and  concentrate  a 

*  The  Times,  September  10,   1917. 


424 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


great,  force  of  artillery.  The  second  object  was 
fully  gained.  Thanks  to  the  threat  against 
San  Gabriele  and  the  necessity  of  calculating 
upon  its  possible  fall,  the  Austrian*  could  not 
spare  enough  men  or  guns  to  menace  the  new 
Italian  positions  on  the  Bainsizza.  These 
positions  were  certainly  insecure  for  a  time, 
and  strong  Austrian  reinforcements  thrown  in 
during  the  first  critical  period  of  occupation 
might  very  well  have  met  with  success.  It 
takes  a  long  time  to  prepare  a  defensive  line 
among  those  tumbled  hills — about  Madoni 
the  terrain  is  as  naked  and  rocky  as  the  worst 
parts  of  the  Carso — and  there  was  only  the  one 
poor  road  for  the  transport  of  guns,  ammunition, 
water,  food,  and  material  for  entrenchments. 
The  operations  on  San  Gabriele  were  thus  in 
the  closest  connexion  with  the  position  of  the 
troops  farther  north,  and  the  diversion  of 
Austrian  effort  to  this  vital  point  prevented 
any  attempt  to  take  advantage  of  the  lack  of 
Italian  communications  across  the  Bainsizza. 
Every  man  who  could  be  spared  had  to  be 
pushed  into  the  cracking  lines  on  San  Gabriele 
or  held  in  reserve  against  its  fall. 

There  was  another  sector  which  had  caused 
the   Austrians   a  good   deal   of   anxiety — the 


Southern  Carso.  During  the  first  week's 
fighting  the  Italians  had  pushed  up  the  slopes 
of  the  Hermada  till  they  were  above  San 
Giovanni  di  Duino,  and  close  upon  Medeazza. 
Farther  north,  on  the  Carso  proper,  the  drive 
of  the  23rd  Corps  through  Selo,  and  the  hard- 
won  progress  of  the  25th  Corps  on  its  left,  had 
broken  through  the  first  line  of  the  Austrian 
defences  and  brought  the  Italians  to  the  for- 
midable system  known  as  the  Kappa  line, 
which  ran  from  Kostanjevica  across  the  Bres- 
tovica  valley  to  the  northern  summit  of  the 
Hermada.  The  23rd  Corps,  in  fact,  had  passed 
the  Kappa  line  east  of  Selo,  and  in  various  other 
places  the  main  line  was  practically  destroyed 
and  had  become  a  part  of  No  Man's  Land.  For 
nearly  a  week  the  Austrians  had  clung  on  to 
their  advanced  trenches  in  the  Brestovica  valley 
when  the  high  ground  north  and  south  of 
them  had  been  occupied  by  the  Italians.  They 
were  only  there  on  sufferance,  and  a  sudden 
move  of  the  Italians  flattened  the  salient,  and 
took  the  line  forward  some  distance  towards  the 
Kappa  system.  The  enemy  gave  ground  with 
great  reluctance,  making  good  use  of  the  doline 
between  the  trench  lines,  and  being  well  sup- 
ported by  their  artillery.  But  they  lost  a  good 
many  prisoners  and  a  number  of  machine-guns. 


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AUSTRIAN    SOLDIERS    CARRYING    A    WOUNDED    COMRADE  .ON    A   RIFLE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


425 


[Italian  official  photograph, 

DUINO    AND    TRIESTE    FROM    THE    ITALIAN    POSITIONS    ON    MONTE    HERMADA. 


By  the  end  of  August  the  order  was  given  to 

"  systematize  "  the  Italian  line,  though  the  23rd 

Corps  in  particular  and  the  troops  near  Medeazza 

and  San  Giovanni  were  well  placed  for  a  further 

advance.     A  good  many  of  their  guns  had  been 

sent  north  to  increase  the  weight  of  fire  on  what 

had  come  to  be,  for  the  moment,  the  most 

important  sector  of  the  front.     The  Third  Army 

had  to  stop  in  order  to  let  the  Second  Army 

go  on.     No  doubt  the  enemy  became  aware  of 

the  movement  of  guns  to  the  north,  but  it  is 

probable  that  his  counter-attack  would  have 

come  in  any  case.      It  was  delayed  until  the 

action  of  the  Second  Army  was  localized  round 

San  Gabriele,  and  before  that  time  there  was 

# 
heavy  fighting  east  of  Gorizia,  where  Italian 

attacks  near  the  cemetery  and  against  San 
Marco  gained  a  little  ground,  but  did  not  make 
any  real  impression  on  the  situation.  The 
enemy  artillery  in  this  sector  had  been  consider- 
ably strengthened,  and  the  Italians  had  no 
superiority  in  gunfire  between  San  Daniele  and 
the  Carso.  When  this  effort  had  died  away, 
and  all  eyes  were  turned  upon  San  Gabriele,  the 
Austrians  tlirew  in  their  counter-attack  against 
the  Third  Army. 

The  blow  came  on  September  4,  and  at  the 
end  of  a  day's  heavy  fighting  the  enemy  had 
gained  no  advantage  at  all.  In  two  sectors  of 
the  front,  between  Kostanjevica  and  the  sea, 
he    began    well.      Between   Kostanjevica    and 


Korite  the  first  rush  drove  the  Italians  back  for 
some  distance.  For  a  long  time  there  was  give- 
and-take  fighting,  but  at  the  end  of  the  day  the 
Italian  line  was  completely  re-established.  The 
Austrian  left  off  where  he  began.  On  the  foot- 
hills of  the  Hermada  he  won  an  initial  success 
in  the  morning,  but  in  the  afternoon  an  Italian 
counter-attack  regained  all  the  lost  ground. 
There  were  practically  no  trenches  left  in  this 
sector,  except  the  southern  end  of  the  Flondar- 
Duino  line,  which  faced  the  Italians'  right  wing, 
and  which  they  had  never  passed.  On  the 
rocky  foothills  it  was  open  fighting.  Between 
Korite  and  the  Brestovica  valley  the  Austrians. 
made  no  impression  at  all,  though  they  did  not 
give  in  for  two  days.  Their  chief  effort  was 
against  this  sector,  and  they  could  not  set  foot 
even  in  the  most  advanced  Italian  posts.  Their 
storming  columns  were  swept  away  by  the 
accurate  work  of  the  Italians  with  gun,  machine- 
gun  and  bomb.  The  first  three  attacks — there 
were  seven  in  all — got  within  bombing  distance 
but  the  other  four  were  broken  up  by  artillery 
fire  before  they  could  properly  develop.  It  was 
very  hard  pounding.  The  Austrians  showed  the 
most  stubborn  valour,  but  they  were  met  with  a 
resistance  which  mado  it  useless.  On  one  short 
sector  of  the  front,  where  an  entire  regiment  was 
sent  in  against  an  Italian  battalion,  the  de- 
fenders went  out  to  meet  the  attack  with 
machine-guns,  which  they  hid  so  as  to  command 


436 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


A    BRIEF    HALT. 


the  approaches  to  their  line.  At  one  point  the 
nearest  Austrian  was  within  five  yards'  distance 
when  the  machine-guns  opened.  The  attackers 
went  down  like  a  row  of  ninepins,  and  the  corpses 
lay  in  swathes.  Nearly  all  this  regiment  was 
destroyed,  and  the  battalion  which  repulsed  its 
attack  had  only  a  slight  casualty  list. 

In  the  work  of  breaking  up  the  enemy 
counter-attacks  a  British  group  of  six-inch 
howitzers  performed  very  useful  service  and 
received  the  special  thanks  of  the  Italian 
command.  This  was  not  the  first  or  last  time 
that  the  British  gunners  with  the  Third  Army 
were  specially  commended  for  their  services. 
On  many  occasions  they  earned  the  warm 
appreciation  of  those  who  commanded  them 
and  those  who  worked  with  them,  and  the 
tribute  to  their  skill  and  devotion  which  was 
given  so  frequently  and  so  ungrudgingly  spoke 
well  both  for  Italians  and  Englishmen.  Our 
performances  were  worthy  of  recognition,  but 
it  is  seldom  that  recognition  is  given  so  freely. 
The  entire  absence  of  professional  jealousy  in 
I  In    Italian  Army  was  very  remarkable. 

( >n  the  (  arso  itself  the  Austrian  counterblows 
had  no  effect  whatsoever.  On  the  foothills  of 
Hermada  they  were  more  fortunato.  The 
fighting  on  the  morning  of  September  5  ended 
as  it  Inul  done  the  previous  morning — the 
Italians  being  driven  down  to  Flondar  and 
Lokavac,  and  losing  Sun  Giovanni  di  Duino. 
The  general  conunanding  this  sector  was  pro- 


pared  to  retake  the  lost  positions  in  the  after- 
noon, as  on  September  4,  but  the  order  came 
from  Army  Headquarters  to  accept  the  position 
for  the  time  being.  The  Austrian  communiques 
made  great  play  with  this  local  success  and  the 
enemy  is  certainly  entitled  to  the  credit  of 
having  regained  all  the  ground  lost  in  the 
sector.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Italian  Command 
was  probably  well  advised  not  to  persevere  at 
the  moment.  Experience  had  shown  that  the 
positions  half  way  up  the  Hermada  were 
entirely  unsuitable  for  defence,  and  perhaps  it 
may  be  said  that  even  experience  was  not 
necessary  to  this  conclusion.  TIm  lie  of  the 
ground  was  clear  indication  of  thfc  fact.  The 
line  which  the  Italians  had  twice  gained  and 
twice  lost  was  only  fit  to  be  used  as  a  stepping- 
stone  to  a  further  advance.  In  May  the  hope  of 
that  advance  had  to  be  given  up  for  lack  of 
munitions.  In  August  the  line  had  been  reached 
as  a  result  of  the  initial  pressure,  but  the  course 
of  the  battle  had  taken  the  main  effort  elsewhere. 
No  real  push  was  made  against  ths  Hermada. 
It  was  the  intention  of  the  Italian  command  to 
attack  the  Hermada  in  earnest  when  the  Second 
Army  had  finished  its  work. 

On  September  8  General  Cadorna  announced 
that  the  number  of  prisoners  taken  during  the 
offensive  was  30,671,  including  858  officers,  and 
two  days  later  a  list  of  captured  war  material 
was  published,  with  the  reservation  that  the 
count  of  the  booty  was  not  complete.     The  list 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


427 


read  : — 145  guns,  including  about  80  of  largo 
or  medium  calibre,  94  trench  mortars  and  mine- 
throwers, 322  machine-guns,  11,196  rifles. 
Among  the  heavy  guns  were  two  12-inch 
howitzers  with  their  tractors,  which  were  left 
undamaged  on  the  Bainsizza.  These  and  many 
other  guns  had  already  been  turned  against  the 
enemy.  The  offensive  of  the  Second  Army  was 
now  practically  over.  Before  September  came 
to  an  end  there  were  two  successful  local  actions 
on  the  part  of  the  Italians,  which  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  over  2,000  prisoners  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  useful  positions,  but  the  great  effort  was 
finished. 

The  first  of  these  actions  was  on  September  28, 
when  the  Italians  made  a  surprise  attack  upon 
the  Austrian  lines  on  the  flank  of  the  Veliki 
ridge  of  San  Gabriele.  After  the  first  surprise 
the  Austrians  reacted  at  once,  and  for  two  days 
endeavoured  to  win  back  their  lost  positions. 
They  failed  altogether,  and  lost  heavily.  The 
second  action,  on  Septomber  29,  was  on  the 
south-eastern  corner  of  the  Bainsizza  plateau, 
and  its  original  aim  was  a  mere  rectification  of 
the  line.  But  it  began  so  well  that  it  was  found 
possible  to  do  more  than  had  been  intended. 
The  preliminary  bombardment  was  short,  but 
very  intense,  and  the  Italian  infantry  was  very 
quick  off  the  mark.  A  company  of  storming 
troops  quite  upset  the  enemy's  equilibrium,  so 
that  detachments  from  the  Venice  and  Tortona 


brigades  which  followed  them  overran  the 
Austrian  positions,  and  made  short  work  of  all 
attempts  at  resistance.  A  good  many  of  the 
enemy  were  killed  on  the  spot,  and  others  who 
fell  back  down  the  slopes  to  the  Chiapovano 
valley  came  under  heavy  artillery  fire,  and  suf- 
fered considerable  loss.  The  positions  taken 
were  important,  and  the  Austrians  made  several 
gallant  efforts  to  win  them  back.  The  only 
effect  of  these  was  to  add  largely  to  their  losses. 
Effective  artillery  fire  caught  the  advancing 
troops,  and  the  machine-guns  did  the  rest.  The 
Austrian  prisoners,  some  1,500  in  number,  were 
mostly  Poles  and  Buthenians  who  had  recently 
arrived  from  Galicia,  and  had  been  sent  to  the 
Bainsizza  after  eight  terrible  days  on  San 
Gabriele.  They  were  dog-tired  and  very  much 
upset  by  the  kind  of  warfare  with  which  they  had 
suddenly  been  brought  in  contact.  They  had 
come  from  well-made,  comfortable  trenches, 
where  they  lounged  all  day  and  slept  all  night. 
They  had  almost  forgotten  what  fighting  was 
like  until  San  Gabriele  showed  them.  ThVjr 
corner  on  the  Bainsizza  promised  a  chance  of 
rest  till  a  sudden  wliirlwind  of  gunfire  smashed 
up  their  rocky  trenches  and  shook  their  nerves 
anew.  When  the  waves  of  Italian  infantry 
were  flung  at  them  they  were  brought  to 
breaking-point. 

On  September  10  Lord  Derby,  British  Secre- 
tary  of  State  for  War,  arrived  at  Italian  Head 


PREPARING    A    MACHINE-GUN 


[Italian  official  photf graph* 

EMPLACEMENT    ON    THE    CARSO. 


428 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


BaiiiMzza  Plateau. 


Chiapovano  Valley. 


Ternova  Forest. 


THE    CHIAPOVANO    VALLEY. 


ITALIAN    SOLDIERS    REPAIRING    A   BOMB-PROOF   SHELTER    AFTER   BOMBARDMENT. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


429 


quarters.  He  was  accompanied  by  Generals 
Macready  and  Maurice,  and  the  party  spent  five 
days  on  the  front.  As  in  the  case  of  most  other 
visitors  to  the  Italian  "  zone  of  operations," 
what  they  saw  was  a  revelation — a  revelation 
of  difficulties  not  hitherto  understood  and  of 
effort  and  accomplishment  not  fully  appreciated. 
Perhaps  an  earlier  and  a  longer  visit  might  have 
been  fruitful  of  important  results  for  the  Allied 
cause.  Perhaps  it  might  have  induced  a  more 
favourable  consideration  of  the  suggestion  that 
the  Austrian  front  offered  the  chance  of  a  great 


teries  of  medium  guns,  with  an  ample  supply  of 
shells,  would  have  led  to  markedly  better 
results.  A  great  stride  forward  had  been  taken , 
but  at  two  important  points  it  had  been  impos- 
sible to  make  the  effort  that  the  situation  de- 
manded. The  threat  to  Tolmino  and  its  bridge  - 
head  remained  a  threat,  and  the  Austrians  had 
been  able,  by  an  immense  effort,  to  check  the 
movement  which  had  for  its  aim  the  turning  of 
their  positions  east  of  Gorizia.  The  fact  that 
the  Austrian  line  north  and  south  of  the  Bain- 
sizza  still  held  firm  detracted  from  the  value  of 


TRANSPORT    OF    MUNITIONS    BY    OX-CART. 


military  and  political  success,  if  only  the  weight 
of  the  attacking  force  could  be  increased.  In 
any  event,  the  visit  did  do  something  to  bring 
home  to  Italy's  allies  the  comparative  shortage 
of  artillery  upon  the  Italian  front.  It  was  as  a 
result  of  representations  already  made  and  now 
confirmed  that  a  considerable  reinforcement  of 
French  artillery  (26  batteries  of  medium  calibre 
guns)  was  hastily  dispatched  to  the  Italian 
front. 

The  more  important  part  of  the  second  big 
offensive  planned  by  General  Cadorna  in  1917 
had  already  come  to  an  end,  and  it  was  very 
clear  to  those  who  watched  it  that  40  or  50  bat- 


the  Italian  advance  upon  the  plateau.  Indeed, 
the  centre  of  the  Italian  Second  Army  was  now 
too  far  forward  in  relation  to  its  wings,  and  the 
left  of  the  centre  in  particular  was  not  over  well 
placed,  assuming  that  a  halt  had  to  be  called. 
The  Austrian  bridgehead  at  Tolmino  and  the 
Lom  plateau  placed  the  Italians  at  a  disad- 
vantage in  view  of  the  course  of  the  Isonzo  and 
the  relative  poorness  of  their  communications. 
The  actual  line  formed  only  a  slight  projection, 
but  owing  to  the  lie  of  the  ground  it  had  the  dis- 
advantages of  a  much  deeper  salient. 

Once  more  the  fruits  of  a  big  victory  could 
not  be  gathered.     But  once  more  the  Italian 


430 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


soldier  had  won  great  honour  for  the  Army  to 
which  he  belonged.  In  the  crossing  of  the 
Isonzo,  the  breaking  of  the  Austrian  lines  east  of 
the  river,  and  the  open  fighting  on  the  Bain- 
sizza,  he  had  shown  splendid  dash  and  resolution, 
and  a  great  capacity  for  bearing  weariness  and 
hardship.  On  San  Gabriele  the  personal  test 
was  even  more  severe.  The  desperate  struggle 
on  that  battered  hill,  under  an  artillery  fire  that 
had  not  hitherto  been  equalled  for  prolonged 
intensity,  against  an  enemy  who  fought  with  the 


to  follow  up  the  advance  of  th3  Second  Army 
by  an  attack  in  force  upon  the  Hermada,  and  by 
a  further  effort  near  Tolmino.  Preparations 
were  well  advanced  towards  this  second  phase 
when  he  decided  that  he  could  not  afford  to  make 
the  attempt.  Enemy  troops  were  coming  west- 
ward from  the  Russian  front  in  increasing 
numbers,  and  he  had  a  much  stronger  force  to 
cope  with,  both  in  men  and  guns,  than  had  been 
allowed  for  when  his  plans  were  first  made.  His 
own  casualty  list  for  the  summer  had  been  very 


[Italian  official  photograph. 


A    CAPTURED    AUSTRIAN    SEAPLANE. 


most  stubborn  valour,  compelled  an  awestruck 
admiration  for  the  men  who  attacked  anil  held 
in  such  conditions. 

The  Italian  losses  were,  naturally,  very  heavy. 
Including  about  10,000  prisoners,  the  bulk  of 
them  taken  in  the  uncertain  fights  which  swayed 
backwards  and  forwards  between  San  Gabrield 
and  the  sea,  they  totalled  155,000  men.  The 
Austrians  lost  over  34,000  prisoners,  and  their 
killed  and  wounded  eortainly  exceeded  100,000. 
In  this  second  offensive  the  Italian  casualties 
were  considerably  less  than  in  the  May  and  June 
righting.  The  Austrians,  on  the  other  hand, 
lost  still  more  heavily  than  in  the  previous 
battle,  the  counter-attacks  on  San  Gabriele  and 
near  Selo  costing  them  very  dear. 

It  was  part  of  General  Oadorna's  original  plan 


heavy.  Between  the  two  offensives  on  tbe 
Julian  front  and  the  action  in  the  Asiago  High- 
lands the  Italian  losses,  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing,  had  reached  over  350*,000.  The 
Armies  had  been  further  weakened  by  much 
sickness.  The  Second  Army,  in  particular,  had 
suffered  heavily  from  an  intestinal  disease  which 
had  been  very  prevalent  in  the  Natisone  and 
Judrio  valleys,  while  thore  had  been  a  good  deal 
of  malaria  in  the  marshy  ground  near  Mon- 
falcon?.  A  severe  type  of  jaundice  had  also 
made  its  appearance  in  certain  sectors  of  the 
front.  Altogether  the  casualties  for  the  sum- 
mer, including  sickness,  amounted  to  more  than 
700,000.  Taking  into  account  his  own  losses 
and  the  fact  that  the  enemy  was  now  able  to 
dre.w  freely  upon  the  Eastern  front  for  reserves. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


431 


[Italian  Naval  offitial  photigraph. 

MOTOR-CYCLIST    MACHINE-GUN    SECTION. 


General  Cadorna  calculated  that  he  could  not 
hope  for  any  decisive  success.  Nor  could  he 
hope  to  hit  so  hard  as  to  do  away  with  the  possi- 
bility of  an  enemy  counter-stroke.  There  was 
already   evidence    of    preparation    for   such    a 


stroke,  and  he  had  to  consider  the  best  way  of 
meeting  it.  If  he  attacked  and  gained  ground 
he  would  have  to  face  the  counter-attack  in 
unprepared  positions  and  with  an  army  still 
further  weakened  by  the  heavier  losses  which 


A    HEAVY    FIELD    HOWITZER    ON    THE    CARSO. 


[Italian  official  photograph. 


43-2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


fall  to  the  offensive.  There  was  the  added  fact 
that  the  recent  heavy  casualties  had  meant  the 
tilling  up  of  many  units  with  drafts  from  the 
depots  wliieh  were  hardy  fit  as  yet  for  the 
tremendous  test  of  a  big  battle.  The  argument 
has  been  used  thet  the  best  way  to  meet  the 
enemy  offensive  was  to  anticipate  it.  There  is 
much  to  be  said  for  the  theory,  and  in  practice 
it  has  often  worked,  but  in  this  case  the  special 
circumstances  which  have  been  indicated  all 
weighed  against  its  application.  Perhaps  the 
crowning  factor  in  General  Cadorna's  decision 
to  abandon  further  offensive  action  was  his 
conviction  that  Russia  would  soon  be  out  of  the 
war  altogether,  and  that  in  the  spring  he  would 
have  to  be  prepared  for  a  bigger  effort  than  any 
hitherto  made. 

As  a  result  of  General  Cadorna's  change  of 
plan,  which  was  announced  to  the  Allies  towards 
the  end  of  September,  the  French  guns  which 
had  been  sent  to  Italy  were  withdrawn  before 
most  of  them  had  reached  the  sector  assigned 
to  them.  Eleven  of  the  sixteen  British  batteries 
were  also  withdrawn.  There  was  an  unfortu- 
nate misunderstanding  in  regard  to  General 
Cadorna's  change  of  plan  and  its  communica- 
tion to  the  Allies,  which  emphasized  the  draw- 


backs, if  further  emphasis  were  needed,  of  the 
absence  of  a  central  War  Council. 

It  may  be  that  if  a  permanent  Allied  War 
Council  had  been  appointed  in  the  winter  of 
1916-17  the  course  of  the  fighting  in  the  summer 
of  1917  would  not  have  been  altered.  It  may 
be  that  the  claims  of  the  Western  Front  (in  the 
limited  sense  of  the  term)  would  have  prevailed 
over  the  arguments  of  those  who  believed  that 
the  Italian  front  offered  a  great  chance  to  an 
Allied  offensive.  The  reasons  against  making 
the  Italian  front  the  scene  of  a  great  united 
effort  were  certainly  persuasive.  They  have 
been  indicated  shortly  in  Chapter  CCXXI.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  con- 
clusion that  a  permanent  Allied  Council  might 
have  brought  about  a  different  view  of  the 
general  position.  Such  a  Council,  sitting  con- 
tinuously, might  have  realized  sooner  that  events 
in  Russia  were  swinging  the  balance  against 
us  -and  called  for  an  immediate  and  thorough 
review  of  the  plans  which  had  been  made  at  an 
earlier  date.  Such  a  Council  might  even  have 
questioned  the  overworked  theory  that  time 
was  inevitably  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  and 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  time  is  on  the  side 
of  those  who  will  use  it. 


CHAPTER    CCXXXIV. 

THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  (II). 

The  British  Shipping  Situation  in  1917 — Losses  and  New  Construction — Economy  of 
Available  Tonnage — The  Work  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping — An  Important  Law  Cas  — 
New  Requisition  Schemes — Advisory  Shipbuilding  Committee — Appointment  of  Navy 
Controller  —  Demand  for  the  Truth  about  Tonnage — Lord  Pirrie,  Controller  of  Merchant 
Shipbuilding — Publication  of  Figures — Publicity  Campaign — Appeals  to  the  Shipyards — 
Standardization — Fabrication — The  Task  of  the  Yards. 


AN  earlier  chapter  (Vol.  XL,  Chapter 
CLXIX.)  described  the  dilatory  and 
inadequate  attempts  which  were 
made  to  solve  the  British  sliipping 
problem  during  the  first  two  and  a  half 
years  of  the  war,  and  the  account  closed  with 
the  remark  that  early  in  1917  the  problem  was 
being  closely  tackled  in  a  way  that  had  never 
been  attempted  before.  Measures  were  beirg 
actively  adopted  to  ensure  that  more  efficient 
and  effective  use  was  made  of  the  tonnage 
available  for  naval,  military  and  commercial 
purposes. 

It  was  well  that  the  necessary  administrative 
machinery  had  at  last  been  devised,  for  as  time 
passed  the  necessity  for  putting  every  ton  of 
shipping  to  the  best  possible  use  became  ever 
more  imperative.  In  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war  much  had  been  heard  of  the  large  profits 
earned  by  some  shipowners,  and  the  outcry 
against  these  profits  threw  the  main  features 
of  the  sliipping  problem  out  of  perspective. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  many  owners  could 
show  that  in  various  periods  before  the  war 
their  earnings  were  very  meagre,  some  of  the 
profits  realized  in  the  earlier  period  of  the  war 
were  obviously  unmerited.  The  situation  was 
bound  to  cause  criticism  and  ill-feeling.  As  the 
war  progressed  it  became  apparent  to  everyone 
who  gave  any  thought  to  the  subject  that  high 
freights  were  not  the  disease  itself  from  which 
Vol.  XV.— ran   195 


the  nation  was  suffering,  but  merely  the 
symptoms.  Freights  had  risen  because  of  the 
competition  among  traders  for  the  e ver-declinhm 
supply  of  tonnage.  This  wasting  of  the  tonnage 
resources  of  the  country,  brought  about  mainly 
by  the  enemy's  unprecedented  submarine 
warfare,  was  the  real  disease.  But  the  public, 
which  heard  that  freights  had  risen  to  prepos- 
terous levels,  concluded  that,  in  spite  of  such 
excess  profit  taxation  as  was  imposed,  ship- 
owners were  "profiteers"  of  the  basest  kind, 
and  were  almost  the  enemies  of  the  people. 
The  position  was  really  seen  in  its  true  perspec- 
tive at  the  end  of  1917.  Practically  the  whole 
of  British  shipping  was  then  requisitioned  in 
one  form  or  another  by  the  State,  and  the 
movement  of  all  British  tonnage  was  directed 
by  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  so  as  to  get  the 
utmost  service  out  of  the  tonnage  for  the 
Allied  cause.  It  is  necessary  to  use  the  term 
"  Allied,"  for  British  sliipping  had  been  placed, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  at  the  service  of  Great 
Britain's  partnen?  in  the  war  Yet,  while 
British  shipping  was  so  directed,  and  all  profits 
above  the  requisitioned  rates  of  hire  were 
being  taken  by  the  State,  rates  of  freight  were 
advanced  to  levels  to  which  shipowners,  if 
they  had  been  conducting  their  businesses  on 
ordinary  lines  instead  of  working  them  for  the 
State,  would  never  have  felt  justified  in  raising 
them.     It  is  true  that  the  wages  of  the  crews 


433 


484 


THE    TIMES    HIHTOHY    OF    THE    WAR. 


were  advanced  very  considerably,  and  all  other 
working  costs  tended  to  rise,  but  it  was  under- 
stood that  even  after  making  all  due  allowance 
for  these,  very  substantial  amounts  remained 
to  the  credit  of  the  State  as  the  result  of  the 
\oyages.  The  public  could  afford  to  pay  high 
freights,  but  it  suffered  severely  from  the  lack 
of  tonnage  to  bring  supplies  of  foodstuffs  and 
other  essential  commodities.  It  was  this 
inadequate  supply  of  tonnage  which  was 
responsible  for  such  restrictions  on  food  con- 
sumption as  had  to  be  imposed  in  1917.  The 
tact  was  that  Great  Britain  had  been  in  the 
habit  of  importing  the  bulk  of  her  foodstuffs 
in  the  years  of  peace,  and  tins  situation  could 
not  suddenly  be  reversed  when  the  enemy 
instituted  his  submarine  war.  Whether  it  was 
the  lack  of  imported  feeding-stuffs  for  home- 
grown cattle  or  the  serious  diminution  of  such 
an  article  of  consumption  as  sugar  in  the 
dietary  of  the  people,  it  was  all  a  question  of 
shipping.  There  was  plenty  of  wheat  and  meat, 
for  instance,  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
but  lack  of  tonnage  effectually  prevented  its 
being  brought  to  England. 


For  far  too  long  British  shipping  was  regarded 
as  a  kind  of  inexhaustible  widow's  cruse.  The 
public  had  a  vague  idea  that  it  consisted  at  the 
outbreak  of  war  of  many  million  tons,  and  that 
while  it  was  inconvenient  that  the  enemy 
should  go  on  sinking  a  number  of  fine  ships, 
no  serious  impression  could  be  made  on  Great 
Britain's  maritime  resources.  Certain  vital 
facts  were  overlooked.  One  was  that  the 
number  of  ocean-going  vessels  was  strictly 
limited,  and  the  supply  of  vessels  of  large  size 
and  good  speed  much  more  so.  Another  was 
that  something  like  half  the  total  amount  of 
tonnage  was  definitely  allocated  for  the  service 
of  the  fighting  forces,  the  Allies  and  the 
Dominions  Overseas.  As  vessels  which  were 
sunk  while  employed  in  these  services  had  at 
all  costs  to  be  replaced,  the  losses  fell  upon  tho 
tonnage  in  the  service  of  the  civilian  population 
As  this  tonnage  declined,  the  same  amount  of 
shipping  sunk  represented  a  larger  proportion 
of  the  total  available,  and  the  difficulty  of 
providing  the  shipping  for  essential  require- 
ments of  the  nation  gradually  became  more 
and    more    formidable.     The    importation    of 


THE    KING'S    VISIT    TO    THE    CLYDE,    SEPTEMBER    18-21.    1917:     WATCHING    THE 
OPERATION    OF    A    RIVETING     MACHINE. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


485 


THE    KING'S    VISIT   TO    THE    CLYDE,    SEPTEMBER    18-21.     1917:     WITNESSING    A 
LAUNCH    AT    MESSRS.   BOW,  McLACHLAN    &    CO.'S    SHIPYARD. 


many  so-called  luxuries  had  been  prohibited  or 
restricted,  so  that  losses  of  tonnage  in  1917 
meant  reduced  imports  of  what  were  regarded 
as  essential  commodities. 

That  the  limitations  of  the  Mercantile 
Marine  had  not  been  appreciated  was  shown 
by  the  very  serious  reduction  in  sJiipbuilding 
output.  This  was  due,  of  course,  to  the  many 
claims  upon  man  power  and  material.  Skilled 
men  had  left  the  shipyards  under  the  old 
volunteer  system  of  recruiting,  who,  as  time 
showed,  were  badly  wanted  in  the  shipyards, 
and  others  had  gone  into  the  munition  factories. 
The  munition  factories  had  also  for  a  long  time 
the  first  claim  upon  the  steel.  In  a  normal 
year  the  production  of  tonnage  in  Great 
Britain  was  about  2,000,000  tons  gross — in  1918 
it  reached  the  equivalent  of  2,280,000  tons. 
During  the  whole  of  1915  only  650,000  tons 
of  merchant  shipping  were  produced  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  only  541,000  tons  were 
turned  out  in  1916.  Yet  1,100,000  tons  were 
lost  by  enemy  action  and  marine  risks  in  1915, 
and  in  1916  the  losses,  at  about  1,498,000  tons, 
were  nearly  three  times  the  output.  Sir 
Joseph  Maelay,  when  appointed  Shipping  Con- 
troller, saw  the  imperative  necessity  of  under- 


taking a  large  shipbuilding  programme.  Ship- 
owners were  not  in  a  position  to  place  orders 
themselves,  partly  because  they  could  never 
adequately  advance  their  claims  against  those 
of  the  Admiralty,  whose  demands  on  the  private 
shipyards  of  the  country  were  naturally  very 
great.  No  private  persons  could  "  compete  " 
with  the  Government  for  men  and  material.  A 
further  reason  was  that  they  were  not  in  the 
same  position  as  a  Government  Department 
to  come  to  terms  with  the  builders.  The 
adoption  of  a  State  programme  was  naturally 
not  entirely  approved  of  by  owners,  who 
regarded  the  building  of  a  State  Mercantile 
Marine  as  threatening  the  future  of  private 
enterprise  ;  but  in  the  circumstances  it'  v  as 
unavoidable.  Sir  Joseph  Maelay  called  to  his 
assistance  a  committee  of  builders,  and  under 
their  auspices  plans  for  a  large  programme  of 
cargo  tonnage  took  shape.  The  Controller 
and  his  committee  decided  upon  the  con- 
struction of  ships  of  standard  models,  several 
types  being  settled  upon.  Standardization 
had  been  strongly  advocated  in  ,  the  Press, 
and,  while  there  were  those  who  criticized  it, 
the  method  had  for  its  chief  object  rapid  con- 
struction, the  effects  of  which  would  only  be 


486 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


1,400,000 
1  300,000 

1 

i- 

I  200  000 

i 

\ 

1  100  000 

i 
i 

m  1,000,000 
!     900,000 

i 

\ 

r 

\ 

N, 

c     800  000 

N 

o 

t-     700  000 

4V 

600,000 
]     500,000 

3r 

^ 

°     400  000 

*y 

_> 

O     300,000 

A* — — 

— .— ■ 

^-J* 

/ 

200,000 

s 

,' 

t&F2- 

r 

s 

u 

_K._ 

100  000 

0 

jao       4th         /sr        2mo        3f?        4rH         /?r         21?        31°        4th         Ist        2"°        3*°        4™ 
Quarters 


■  1914  1915  1916  1917 

SHIPPING    LOSSES    AND    OUTPUT    OF    THE    UNITED    KINGDOM. 


fully  shown  aftor  the  existing  plant  had  been 
adapted.  The  view  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping 
that  construction  must  be  expedited  was 
strongly  supported  by  the  events  in  the  first 
and  second  quarters  of  1917.  In  the  first 
quarter  of  1915  the  losses  of  British  tonnage 
amounted  to  nearly  216,000  tons ;  in  the 
third  quarter  of  that  year  the  total  was  raised 
to  nearly  357,000  tons  ;  and  in  the  last  quarter 
it  fell  back  to  307,000  tons.  There  was  no 
marker  I  increase  in  the  losses  until  the  fourth 
quarter  of  1916,  when  the  amount  of  British 
tonnage  lost  advanced  to  617,000  tons.  In  the 
first  quarter  of  1917  the  total  jumped  up  to 
noiiriy  912,000  tons,  and  in  the  second  quarter 


to  nearly  1,362,000  tons,  the  losses  due  to 
submarine  action  reacliing  the  highest  total  in 
April.  They  subsequently  fell  back,  as  is 
shown  in  the  following  table,  extracted  from 
a  statement  issued  by  the  War  Cabinet  in 
March,   1918. 

United  Kingdom  and  World's  merchant 
tonnage  lost  through  enemy  action  and  marine 
risks  in  1917  • 


Total  for 

Period. 

British. 

Foreign. 

World. 

First  Quarter 

011,840 

707,533 

1,619,373 

Second  Quarter     .. 

.      1,361,870 

875,064 

2,236,934 

Third  Quarter 

952,038 

541,535 

1,494,473 

Fourth  Quarter     .. 

782,889 

489,954 
2,614,086 

1,272,843 

Total  for  year    .. 

.     4,009,537 

6.623.023 

2,200,000 

i 

i 

• 

2,100,000 

1 

\ 

2,000,000 
1  900  000 

* 

t 

\ 

/ 

\ 

1,800,000 

/ 

\  ■ 

1,700,000 

/ 

\ 

1,600,000 

' 

J 

r 

\ 

1,500,000 

«?/ 

i 

"1,400,000 

\ 

1,300,000 

°/ 

\ 

1,200,000 

> 

1,100,000 

JOi 

,1,000,000 

0/ 

>     900,000 

*/ 

!     800,000 

*/ 

700,000 

/ 
i 

600,000 

f 

,\\  ^ 

500,000 

\ 

m  —  — - 

---"■ 

otf- 

ijj*** 

400,000 

•-. 

\ 

y* 

vy 

0RLI 

i'S 

Qjs^ 

300,000 

V 

.\ 

^* 

y 

20  0,000 

> 

»  ^ 

100,000 

0 

j#c         4'i           ist           pMD          g»o         4r»           isr          2MO          3*°         4th          Ist          2"°          3"D         4T 
Quarters  „ _—,   . __^ __,    ^_ 

191*  1915  19f6  1917 

THE    WORLD'S    SHIPPING    LOSSES    AND    OUTPUT. 


THE    TIMES    HISTOTtY    OF    THE    WAR. 


ffl 


With  losses  on  such  a  scale  if  was  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that,  the  shipping  authorities  saw 
the  necessity  of  hurrying  on  construction  by 
c  very  possible  means,  but  they,  by  themselves, 
could  not  take  all  the  necessary  steps  for  in- 
creasing the  rote  of  output,  especially  as  the  call 
on    man    power    was    insistent    from    various 
quarters,     The  construction  of  mercantile  ton- 
nage  was,   however,  only  part  of  the  problem 
with    wliich    the    authorities    had    to    deal    in 
tackling  the   submarine  menace.     Their  main 
concern  was  with  the  net  amount  of  tonnage 
available.     This   amount   could   be   preserved 
by   curbing   the   enemy's   efforts,    namely,   by 
destroying    his    submarines,    preventing    their 
movements  in  and  out  of  their  nests,  by  safe- 
guarding tonnage  while  afloat,  or  by  building 
ships  to  replace  what  was  lost.     The  first  part 
of   the   problem  was  mainly   the   task   of   the 
Navy,   and  to   carry   out   these   purposes   the 
Xavy  required  a  large  output  of  warships  of 
different  types.     Another  phase    of    the    same 
problem  was  the  importance  of  improving  the 
facilities  for  the  repairing  of  damaged  ships, 
since  it  was  a  far  easier  task  to  make  seaworthy 
again  ships  wliich   had  been  attacked  by  the 
enemy  and  had  reached  port  crippled  than  to 
build    tonnage.     The    building    and    repairing 
of    warships    and    of    mercantile    vessels    was 
therefore  really  part  of  the  same  problem,  and 
it  was  realization  of  this  wliich  prompted  the 
subsequent  transfer  of  responsibility  for  mer- 
chant tonnage  construction  from  the  Ministry 
of  Shipping  to  the  Admiralty. 

It  will  now  be  desirable  to  review  briefly  the 
work  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping.  At  first  Sir 
Joseph  Maclay  had  quarters  at  the  Admiralty, 
but  at  the  end  of  February  1917  the  Minis!  ry  of 
Shipping  moved  into  new  quarters  in  a  building 
recently  erected  in  St.  James's  Park.  The  Trans- 
port Department,  formerly  under  the  Admiralty, 
was  then  incorporated  in  the  Ministry  nt' 
Shipping ;  but  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
Admiralty  would  continue  to  exercise  control 
through  the  Director  of  Transports  and  Ship- 
ping as  regards  essential  naval  work,  the  term 
"  naval  "  being  interpreted  as  including  the 
transport  of  troops  and  such  military  services 
as  formed  an  integral  part  of  joint  naval  and 
military  policy.  Mr.  Graeme  Thomson,  C.B., 
who  had  been  Chief  of  the  Transport  Depart- 
ment of  the  Admiralty,  was  appointed  chief 
executive  officer  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping 
with  the   title   of  Director  of  Transports   and 


Shipping.  The  Control  Committer,  over  which 
under  the  previous  rejime  Lord  Curzon  had 
presided,  became  the  Shipping  Controllers 
Committee,  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Sir 
Joseph  Maclay.  The  members  consisted  of 
Mr.  Thomas   Royden,  Mr.    F.   W.    Lewis  (after- 


SIR   ALAN   GARRETT   ANDERSON,  K.B.E., 
Admiralty  Controller. 

wards  Sir  F.  \V.  Lewis,  Hart.)  and  Sir  Kenneth 
Anderson,  K.C.M.G.  A  large  number  of  ship- 
owners joined  the  Ministry  in  an  advisory 
capacity,  notably  Sir  Percy  Pates,  Sir  Lionel 
Fletcher  and  Mr,  P.  W    Lund. 

By  the  cud  of  1917  the  great  bulk  of  purely 
cargo  tonnage  had  been  requisitioned.  Control 
had  been  exercised  oxer  SO  per  cent,  of  the 
cargo  in  the  North  Atlantic  trade,  and  a 
requisitioning  had  long  been  arranged,  at  the 
instigation  of  owners  themselves,  of  all  the 
refrigerated  space  in  all  the  insulated  steamers. 
This  scheme  had  been  found  to  work  without, 
a  hitch  and  to  ensure,  as  a  consequence,  that 
the  utmost  use  was  made  of  the  refrigerated 
space.  The  great  feature  of  the  work  of  the 
Ministry  of  Shipping  in  1917  was  a  scheme  for 
dealing  systematically  with  the  employment  of 
liners.  It  provided  that  all  the  vessels 
should  be  requisitioned  by  the  State  at  \\  hat 
were  known  as  Blue-book  rates,  that  the  ships 
should  be  employed  in  any  trade  where  their 
services  were  most  required,  that    the  owner* 

195—2 


438 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


should  place  their  organizations  at  home  and 
abroad  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government,  and 
that  all  profits  over  and  above  the  Government 
Blue-book  rates  should  go  to  the  State.  Early 
in  March  a  beginning  with  the  new  method  was 
made  with  vessels  in  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  trades,  than  which  none  probably, 
even  under  the  system  then  existing,  were 
better  organized  or  more  economically  em- 
ployed. Within  a  few  days  the  control  was 
extended  to  the  Eastern  and  Far  Eastern 
services,  and  then  to  the  South  and  East 
African,  South  American,  and  finally  North 
American  trades,  until  every  line  of  service 
was  brought  under  the  new  system.  The 
elaboration  of  the  scheme  involved  much 
labour  and  negotiation.  Committees  of  owners 
for  each  trade  were  appointed,  the  chairman  of 
each  committee  being  the  representative  of 
the  Shipping  Controller.  The  underlying  idea 
was  to  do  away  with  all  overlapping  consequent 
upon  any  semblance  of  competition.  The 
committees  of  owners  were  to  try  to  allocate 
such  vessels  as  were  available  to  the  best 
possible  service  in  the  different  trades.  With 
this  scheme  in  operation  vessels  could  be 
diverted  from  the  long-distance  routes  to  the 


short -distance  trade,  where  they  could  be  used 
best  in  the  interest  of  the  nation,  irrespective 
of  any  personal  considerations  of  the  owners. 
In  carrying  through  this  scheme  owners  un- 
doubtedly sacrificed  much.  The  liner  services 
had  been  built  up  over  many  years  at  heavy 
cost.  Connexions  had  been  built  up  which, 
under  the  new  conditions,  had  really  to  be 
absolutely  or  practically  destroyed.  Beyond 
such  personal  considerations,  the  liners  formed 
the  connecting  links  between  the  different 
parts  of  the  British  Empire  and  between  the 
different  parts  of  the  Empire  and  foreign 
countries.  A  serious  reduction  of  the  liner 
services  meant  heavy  loss  and  discomfort  for 
the  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain  overseas  ;  but 
all  this  was  really  inevitable  as  one  of  the  effects 
of  the  war.  The  scheme  appeared  to  work 
very  satisfactorily,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year 
it  came  prominently  before  the  public  by  reason 
of  the  judgment  given  in  the  famous  case  of 
The  China  Mutual  Steam  Navigation  Company, 
the  head  of  which  was  Mr.  Richard  D.  Holt, 
versus  Sir  Joseph  Maclay.  Mr.  Holt  had 
fallen  in  with  the  scheme,  but  he  had  decided  to 
try  the  question  in  Court  as  to  whether  owners' 
services   could  be   requisitioned.      Mr.   Justice 


THE    KING    AND    QUHEN'S    VISIT    TO    THE     NORTH-EAST    COAST,    JUNE    1917: 
AT    MESSRS.    GRAY'S    SHIPBUILDING    YARD    AT    HARTLEPOOL 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Itt» 


Baiihache,  who  gave  the  decision,  did  not 
question  the  right  of  the  Shipping  Controller 
to  requisition  the  ships.  He  held,  however, 
that  the  Controller  had  no  right  to  requisition 
the  services  of  the  owners.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  scheme  had  three  essential  fea- 
tures : — 

(or)  The  steamers  were  requisitioned  ; 


["  Times"  plujtcgrapk. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  COLLARD,  C.B.,  R.E., 
Director-General  of  Administration,  Department 
of    Controller-General   of   Merchant    Shipbuilding. 

(6)  The  owners  were  to  work  them  exactly 
as  if  they  were  still  running  for  their  own 
account  ; 

(c)  They  were  to  run  them,  in  fact,  for  the 
Government,  accounting  to  the  Government 
for  all  profits  after  deducting  working  expenses, 
hire  of  the  steamship,  and  remuneration  for 
their  services. 

The  Judge  pointed  out  that  the  two  last 
items  were  to  be  settled  by  agreement,  or, 
failing  agreement,  by  arbitration.  The  scheme 
purported  to  be  mandatory  in  all  these  respects. 
It  was  obviously  a  scheme  which  could  only  be 
worked  as  a  whole.  The  scheme  was  ultra  vires 
in  its  second  essential  respect.  After  having 
delivered  judgment  he  made  two  observations. 
One  was  that  if  such  a  scheme  as  the  Shipping 
Controller  desired  was  to  be  carried  out  the  ser- 
vices of  the  owners  must  be  obtained  by  negotia- 
tion and  not  by  command.  The  other  was  that 
he  was  so  impressed  with  the  advantage  of  the 
management  of  lines  of  steamers  remaining 
where  possible  with  the  owners  that  he  trusted 


that  in  the  grave  times  through  which  the 
nation  was  passing  owners  would  fall  in  of  their 
own  free  will  and  on  reasonable  terms  with 
such  arrangements  as  the  Shipping  Controller 
might  think  necessary. 

Much  depended  on  the  terms  of  the  letter 
written  by  the  Controller  to  the  owners. 
Presumably  if  the  wording  of  the  letter  had 
been  slightly  different  and  owners  had  been 
asked  merely  to  continue  to  run  the  vessels, 
which  was  certainly  the  intention,  there  would 
have  been  no  cause  of  action.  Then  followed 
an  interesting  and  important  correspondence 
in  The  Times.  In  the  course  of  a  letter  pub- 
lished on  November  17  Sir  Joseph  Maclay 
wrote  : 

It  has  never  been  claimed  or  supposed  by  myself  or 
by  anyone  in  my  department  that  the  Shipping  Con- 
troller had  the  power  to  requisition  not  only  ships  but 
the  services  and  profits  of  the  shipowners,  and  this  was 
formally    stated    by    the    Attorney-General    in    Court. 


MR.   C.    J.  O.    SANDERS,    C.BE., 
Director  of  Shipbuilding  Work,   Ministry  of  Ship- 
ping ;    Chairman    of    Conference     Committee     of 
Shipbuilding  Employers'  Federation  ;    Joint   Secre- 
tary of  the  Admiralty  Shipbuilding  Council. 

It  has  been  recognised  front  the  outset  that  the  liner 
requisition  scheme  was  one  which  could  not  be  success- 
fully worked  without  the  co-operation  and  goodwill  of 
the  shipowners  themselves,  which,  as  I  am  glad  to 
testify,  has  with  very  few  exceptions  been  shown  in  a 
most  generous  manner.  The  scope  and  details  of  the 
scheme  have  throughout  been  discussed  and  worked 
out  in  close  and  intimate  connexion  with  the  lines  them- 
selves, and  the  negotiations — which  have  been  pro- 
ceeding for  many  months  with  regard  to  the  terms  and 
conditions   on   which   the    lines   are   prepared   to   assist 


440 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OB     THE    WAR. 


8     9 


[I'aurfv*. 

A    SITTING    OF    THE    MERCHANT    SHIPBUILDING     ADVISORY    COMMITTEE. 

1,  Mr.  A.  C.  Ross;  2,  Sir  W.  Rowan  Thomson;  3,  Mr.  A.  R.   Duncan  (Joint  Secretary);  4,  Rt.  Hon. 

Sir  J.  P.  Maclay,  Shipping  Controller  (Chairman);    5,  Mr.  C.  J.  O.  Sanders   (Joint   Secretary);    6,  Sir 

Geo.  J.  Carter  ;  7,  Professor  W.  S.  Abell ;  8,  Sir  Frederick  N.  Henderson  ;  9,  Mr.  James  Marr. 

The  Committee  was  afterwards  incorporated  in  the  Admiralty  Shipbuilding  Council. 


in  carrying  it  out — have  resulted  in  the  settling  of  heads 
■  .I  arrangements  which  have  l>een  accepted  by  a  meeting 
«-t  ilie  Chairmen  of  Liner  Conferences.  These  arrange- 
ment*! are  wholly  voluntary.  Xone  of  the  lines 
have  been  compelled  to  enter  into  them,  or  have, 
in  fact,  entered  into  them  otherwise  than  f>f  their  own 
free  will.  They  wore  the  result  of  the  earnest  desiro 
tif  all  concerned  to  co-operate  with  and  assist  to  the 
fullest  extent  the  .Ministry  of  Shipping  in  its  difficult 
part. 

Sir  Joseph  Maclay  added  that  it  wa.s  the  more 
iiiifortuiiato  that  upon  technical  grounds  the 
intention  of  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  was  de- 
feated, hecause  there  was  never  any  thought  or 
desire  on  their  part  to  assume  powers  which 
they  knew  they  did  not  possess. 

Lord  Jncheape,  who  wrote  as  "  having  had 
the  honour  of  presiding  at  innumerable  meet- 
ings of  the  Chairmen  of  the  various  Shipping: 
Conferences  during  the  past  tliree  years," 
bore  testimony  to  the  statement  of  Sir  Joseph 
Maclay  that  his  scheme  of  general  requisition 
had  been  worked  out  in  close  connexion 
between  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  and  the 
Steamship  Lines,  fie  pointed  out  that  under 
the  scheme  the  shipowners  ha<l  been  freed 
from  all  cliurg.s  of  profiteering,  as  any  profits 
made  on  the  pre-war  rates  of  hire  went  to 
the   Government    and    helped    to   pay    for   the 


war.  Costs  of  running  were  then  graatly  in 
excess  of  what  they  were  three  years  before, 
and  he  thought  that  in  some  cases  the  Blue- 
Book  rates  might  have  to  be  reconsidered. 

There  also  followed  correspondence  from 
Sir  Frederick  Smith,  the  Attorney -General, 
who  had  charge  of  the  Government  case,  and 
sought  to  defend  his  action.  This  correspon- 
dence was  reflected  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
On  November  27  he  was  called  to  account  for 
a  letter  which  he  had  written  to  The  Times  on 
the  subject,  and  h"denied  that  the  letter  reflected 
in  any  way  upon  the  judgment  of  the  Court. 
He  added  that  "  the  spirit  of  reasonableness 
shown  by  the  parties  concerned  in  this  serious 
controversy,  much  assisted  by  the  suggestions 
of  the  learned  Jvtdge,  afford  great  promise  of  a 
settlement  which  will  be  very  much  in  the 
public  interest."  Asked  by  Mr.  Hogge  whether 
he  had  read  and  understood  the  comment  of 
The.  Times  on  his  letter.  "  Certainly  I  did,"  he 
replied  indignantly,  "  and  I  was  astonished  at 
the  ignorance  of  technical  questions  disclosed 
in  that  comment."  The  House,  however, 
showed  by  its  laughter  that  it  was  by  no  means 
convinced  that  the  Attorney-General  had  the 
better  of  the  encounter. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAK. 


411 


The  situation  developed  rapidly.  Four  days 
after  the  delivery  of  the  judgment  owners 
received  a  letter  from  the  Ministry  of  Shipping 
giving  formal  notice  of  the  requisition  by  the 
•Shipping  Controller  of  all  liners  which  were 
affected  by  the  original  requisition  scheme. 
The  letter  pointed  out  that,  "  in  view  of  the 
tenor  from  the  outset  of  the  negotiations 
wluch  have  been  proceeding  between  the 
Controller  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Liner 
Conferences  during  the  last  nine  months,"  the 
Controller  felt  that  he  could  rely  upon  the 
willing  co-operation  of  owners  in  managing 
the  vessels  so  requisitioned.  The  letter  pointed 
out,  however,  that  it  had  "  become  desirable  •'" 
that  the  Controller  should  receive  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  a  formal  assurance  on  this 
point.  On  receipt  of  this  assurance,  the  letter 
explained,  owners  would  be  invited  to  sign,  if 
they  had  not  already  done  so,  the  heads  of 
arrangements,  the  terms  of  which  had  already 
l>een  accepted  by  the  Chairmen  of  the  Liner 
< 'onferences,  with  the  exception  of  Mr.  Holt. 
A  significant  paragraph  then  followed  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  the  Controller  did  not 
anticipate  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  any 
owner  to  take  his  appropriate  share  in  the 
administration  of  the  Liner  Scheme,  but  that, 
in  the  event  of  any  owner  being  unwilling  to 
give  the  assurance,  "  it  is  essential  that  the 
Controller  should  be  informed  at  once  in  order 
that  he,  in  his  position  as  charterer  of  the 
vessels,  may  make  such  alternative  arrange- 
ments as  may  be  necessary."  The  communi- 
cation added  that  "  it  will,  of  course,  be  under- 
stood that  this  letter  is  without  prejudice  to 
any  action  which,  on  further  consideration,  it 
may  be  found  expedient  to  take  for  the  purpose 
of  meeting  the  situation  created  by  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Court  so  far  as  relates  to  the  past." 

In  his  letter  Lord  Inchcape  had  said  that. 
"  while  I  have  no  authority  to  say  so,  I  judge 
that  he  [Mr.  Holt]  is  satisfied  with  the  vindica- 
tion he  has  secured,  and  that  he  will  fall  in  with 
the  agreement  he  has  done  so  much  to  arrange 
and  wluch  his  fellow-shipowners  have  adopted." 
-Mr.  Holt  did,  in  fact,  soon  show  his  determina- 
tion to  continue  to  co-operate  whole-heartedly 
in  the  working  of  the  scheme. 

A  good  deal  of  light  on  the  real  shipping 
position  was  shed  in  a  statement  published  early 
in  August  reviewing  the  work  of  the  British 
.Mercantile  Marine.  This  statement  pointed 
out  that — 

(1)  The  oeean-going  tonnage  on  the  United 


Kingdom  Register  before  the  war  represented 
between  17,000,000  and  18,000,000  tons  gross. 
Of  this  tonnage  over  15,000,000  tons  were 
regularly  employed  in  trade  with  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  remainder  being  engaged  in 
trades  between  foreign  countries,  the  various 
parts  of  the  British  dominions,  etc.,  and 
incidentally  rendering  by  their  earnings  im- 
portant services  to  the  Mother  country.  The 
oeean-going  shipping  on  the  Register  in  August 
was  a  little  over  15,000,000  tons,  of  which 
14,000,000  tons  were  employed  in  home- 
service. 

(2)  Of  the    14,000,000   tons   thus   employed, 


SIR    GEORGE    J.    CARTER,    K.B.E., 

President      Shipbuilding     Employers'     Federation  ; 
Chairman  Merchant    Shipbuilding    Advisory  Com- 
mittee ;  Managing   Director  of  Cammell,   Laird   & 
Co.,   Ltd. 

however,  only  about  one  half  was  available 
for  the  trade  of  the  country.  About  6,500,000 
tons  were  allocated  entirely  to  the  needs  of  the 
Navy,  the  Army,  the  Allies,  and  the  Dominions 
Overseas.  A  further  1,000,000  tons  or  there- 
abouts were  being  used  for  these  purposes  on 
the  outward  voyage,  and  were  therefore  lost 
to  our  export  trade,  although  available  for 
imports. 

The  situation  had  then  reached  a  stage  at 
which  it  hid  become  necessary  to  take  complete 
control    of    all    British    shipping,    in    order    to 


442 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


ensure  the  employment  of  every  vessel  in  the 
maimer  and  on  the  terms  as  to  rate  of  freight 
most  consistent  with  the  national  interest. 
The  statement  pointed  out  that,  apart  from 
the  effect  on  shipping  interests,  the  country 
generally  had  also  had  to  suffer  great  and 
increasing  sacrifices  by  the  short  supply  of 
tonnage  caused  by  war  requirements  end  sub- 
marine losses.  Thus  (1)  The  diversion  of 
liners  from  long-distance  to  short -distance 
trades  inflicted'  injury  upon  many  British 
export    trades   (particularly   those   with   India 


[Vandyk. 
PROFESSOR    W.   S.    ABELL,    M.Eng., 
Chief  Surveyor  to  Lloyd's  Register. 

and  the  Far  East),  and  also  upon  the  interests 
of  the  British  far-distant  exporting  colonies. 
( 2)  A  very  f3r-reaching  programme  of  restriction 
of  importR  had  been  put  into  effect.  Luxuries 
(including  many  commodities  produced  by  our 
colonies  and  our  allies)  had  been  excluded,  and 
the  import  even  of  essential  articles  had  been 
reduced  to  the  lowest  level  compatible  with 
national  security.  (.'{)  The  restriction  of  coasting 
facilities  created  inevitable  hardship  for  coast 
towns  which  had  hitherto  relied  on  sea-borne 
supplies  of  coal  and  other  commodities,  for  the 
railway  services  of  the  country  were  already 
overstrained  and  could  not  wholly  fill  the  place 
of  the  coasting  tonnage  which  had  to  be 
withdrawn. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  one  of  the 
first  acts  of  Sir  Joseph  Maclay  as  Ship- 
ping   Controller    was    to    appoint    an    expert 


Shipbuilding  Council  to  advise  him  on  all 
matters  connected  with  the  acceleration 
of  merchant  ships  under  construction 
and  the  general  administration  of  a 
new  constructive  programme.  This  body, 
acting  under  the  Shipping  Controller,  was 
responsible  for  the  preparation  of  a  large 
programme  of  standard  ship  construction,  and 
it  was  known  that,  subject  to  the  severe 
restrictions  of  labour  and  material  by  which 
they  were  handicapped,  they  estimated  for  an 
output    of    about    1,100,000   tons,    which   was 


IVandyk. 

SIR  WILLIAM   ROWAN    THOMSON,  K.B.E. 
(David  Rowan  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  Glasgow). 

actually  just  the  amount  secured.  Larger 
programmes  were  prepared  which  were  depen- 
dent upon  obtaining  more  men  and  more  ma- 
terial, there  being  at  one  time  a  considerable 
shortage  of  steel.  Speaking  in  the  House  of 
Lords  on  May  10,  Lord  Curzon  said  that  the 
programme  which  the  Minister  of  Shipping 
was  pressing  for  would  work  out  at  3,000,000 
tons  gross  per  annum.  But  if  such  an  output 
was  to  be  realized  it  would  be  necessary  to 
provide  an  additional  100,000  workmen  and 
to  double  the  supply  of  steel  per  week,  while 
allowing  at  the  same  time  the  existing  Admi- 
ralty programme  to  proceed.  Therein  lay  the 
difficulty  of  the  case.  "  While,"  he  added, 
"  this  demand  came  from  the  Director  of 
Shipping,  the  Army,  Agriculture,  Munitions, 
and  the  Timber  Department  all  put  in  demands 
for  men  and  material,  and  the  task  of  adjudi- 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


443 


SIR    HERBERT    ROWELL     K.B.E., 

Chairman  of  R.  &  W.  Hawthorn,  Leslie  &  Co., 
Ltd. 


eating  between  these  rival  claims  was  not 
merely  a  painful  operation  but  an  over- 
whelming duty." 

There  was  inevitably  a  certain  conflict  of 
interests  between  the  demands  of  the  Admiralty 
and  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  for  men  and 
labour.  It  was  largely  with  the  object  of  co- 
ordinating these  demands  that  an  important 
reform  was  brought  about  in  May,  1917,  when 
the  office  of  the  Controller  of  the  Navy  was 
revived.  This  was  part  of  reorganization  at 
the  Admiralty.  The  official  statement  pointed 
out  that  one  of  the  objects  of  the  changes  was 
to  strengthen  the  Shipbuilding  n,nd  Production 


[Colling*. 

SIR  FREDERICK  NESS  HENDERSON,  K.B.E. 

Chairman    and    Managing    Director    of    D.    &  W. 

Henderson   &  Co.,  Ltd.,  Glasgow. 

Department  of  the  Admiralty,  by  providing 
an  organization  comparalJIe  with  that  which 
had  supplied  the  Army  with  munitions. 
Further,  it  was  intended  to  develop  and  utilize 
to  the  best  advantage  the  whole  of  the  ship- 
building resources  of  the  country,  and  so  far 
as  possible  to  concentrate  the  organization 
under  one  Authority.  Sir  Kric  Geddes  hot! 
been  chosen  for  this  position,  and  he  was  to  be 
responsible  for  fulfilling  the  shipbuilding 
requirements  of  the  Admiralty,  War  Office, 
and  Ministry  of  Shipping,  so  far  as  possible, 
by  manufacture  or  purchase,  whether  at  home 
or  abroad.     For  this  purpose  the  staffs  of  the 


MR.    JAMES    BROWN,    C.B.E., 

Director    of   Scott's    Shipbuilding    &    Engineering 

Co.,  Ltd. 


[Lafayette. 

MR.    SUMMERS    HUNTER,    C.B.E., 

Director    of   North-Eastern    Marine     Engineering 

Co.,  Ltd. 


444 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


throe  departments  that  related  to  these  require- 
ment* were  to  be  placed  under  his  control.  As 
the  duties  tor  which  Sir  Erie  Oeddes  was  to  be 
responsible  at  the  Admiralty  would  include  not- 
only  shipbuilding  but  also  the  production  of 
armaments  and  munitions,  he  was  appointed 
a  member  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty.  He 
Was  also  to  be  associated  with  the  Ministry  of 


{Elliolt  &  Fry. 

MR.    A.    C.    ROSS,    C.B.E., 

Director  of  R.  &  W.  Hawthorn,  Leslie  &  Co.,  Ltd., 

Newcastle-on-Tyne. 

Sluppin;?  as  a  member  of  the  Slapping  Control 
Committee. 

Further  information  on  the  subject  was  given 
by  questions  and  answers  in  the  House  of 
Co  lions  on  May  14,  when  the  changes  were 
officially  announced.  In  reply  to  a  question 
as  to  whether  the  duty  of  superintending  or 
supervising  merchant  shipbuilding  woidd  be 
transferred  from  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  to 
the  Board  of  Admiralty  or  whether  the  Ministry 
of  Shipping  would  have  no  further  responsi- 
bility in  the  matter,  Sir  Edward  Carson,  then 
First  Lord,  replied  that  the  Navy  Controller 
would  act  with  the  Shipping  Controller.  In 
reply  to  a  further  question  as  to  whether  the 
Shipping  Controller  or  his  representative  in 
the  House  would  be  answerable  for  merchant 
shipbuilding  problems  or  whether  it  would  be 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  himself,  Sir 
Kchvard  Carson  said  that  it  would  be  the 
Minister  of  Shipping  or  his  representative  there. 
This  reply  explained  why,  when  the  control 
of  merchant  shipbuilding  seemed  to  have 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Navy  Controller, 
questions  as  to  output  were  still  answered 
by  Sir  Leo  Chinzza  Money,  Parliamentary 
Secretary  to  the  Ministry  of  Shipping.  It  is 
to  Sir   Leo'H  credit  that    he  appeared  to  be  at. 


any  rate  one  of  the  first  to  realize  the  desira- 
bility of  publicity,  and  gave  facts  in  Parliament 
which  enabled  members  and  the  public  to  get 
some  inkling  of  the  gravity  of  the  position. 

The  following  appointments,  among  others, 
to  the  Controller's  Department  were  announced 
by  the  Admiralty  on  May  27,  1917,  in  the  fol- 
lowing terms  : 

"  Mr.  Thomas  Bell  (afterwards  Sir  Thomas 
Hell),  late  managing  director  of  Messrs.  John 
Brown  &  Company's  Clydebank  establishment. 
to  be  Deputy  Controller  for  Dockyards  and 
Shipbuilding.  He  will  be  responsible  to  the 
Controller  for  all  matters  relating  to  the  con- 
struction of  warships,  and  the  maintenance, 
alteration,  and  repair  of  warships  and  armed 
merchant  cruisers,  both  at  the  Royal  dockyards 
and  by  contract. 

"Major-General  A.  S.  Collard,  C.B..  R.E., 
Director  of  Inland  Waterways  and  Docks  in 
the  Department  of  the  Director-General  of 
Movements   and    Railways,  to  be  Deputy-Con- 


MR.    JAMF.S     MARR,    C.B.E. 
(J.   L.   Thompson  &  Sons,    Ltd.,   Sunderland). 

troller  for  Auxiliary  Shipbuilding.  He  will 
be  responsible  to  the  Controller  for  all  matters 
connected  with  the  design,  construction  and 
purchase  of  merchant  ships,  transports,  oilers, 
fleet  coaling  vessels,  and  similar  vessels,  and 
of  auxiliary  small  craft  of  all  kinds  required 
by  the  Admiralty  or  other  Government  Depart- 
ments. He  will  also  be  responsible  for  the 
alteration  and  repair  of  all  such  vessels,  except 
at  the  Royal  Dockyards." 

The  appointment  of  General  Collard  did  not 
in  subsequent  months  escape  criticism.  He 
came  to  the  Admiralty  with  a  reputation  for 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


445 


having  reorganized  transport  in  Mesopotamia 
and  lor  having  done  much  valuable  work  as 
Director  of  Inland  Waterways  and  Docks.  He 
brought  great  energy  and  enterprise  to  bear 
on  his  task,  and,  although  he  was  at  a  disad- 
vantage in  not  having  had  a  long  shipbuilding 
experience,  the  re  a!  value  of  liis  work  was  well 
appreciated  by  many  whose  ability  to  form  a 
balanced  opinion  none  could  question. 

It  was  known  that  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Minister  of  Shipbuilding  had  not  always 
approached  the  problem  of  mastering  the 
submarine  menace  from  quite  the  same  angle. 
The  Admiralty  was  concerned  with  the  con- 
struction of  craft  designed  to  destroy  enemy 
submarines  ;  the  Ministry  of  Shipping  was 
concerned  with  building  merchant  ships  to 
replace  those  which  were  sunk.  Naturally, 
each  Department  felt  compelled  to  put  foiward 
its  own  case  with  all  the  force  at  its  command, 
and  hitherto  the  only  authority  which  could 
fully  weigh  the  claims  of  each  and  decide  what 
proportion  of  labour  and  material  should  be 
allotted  to  warships  and  merchant  vessels 
respectively  had  been  the  War  Cabinet.  The 
appointment  of  the  Navy  Controller  simplified 
the  task  of  the  War  Cabinet,  which,  of  course, 
remained  the  final  arbiter,  if  difficulty  arose  in 
harmonizing  the  claims  of  each  Department. 
In    view   of  later  developments,   it   should?  be 


[l'«Wr(. 

MR.    A.    R.    DUNCAN, 

Secretary      Shipbuilding      Employers'      Federation  ; 
Joint  Secretary  to  Admiralty  Shipbuilding  Council. 


[FMiott  ft  Fry. 

SIR    LEO    CHIOZZA     MONEY,     M.P., 

Parliamentary    Secretary     to    the    Ministry  of 

Shipping. 

recorded  here  that  during  the  autumn  and 
winter  months  a  strong  feeling  prevailed  in 
shipping  circles  that  merchant  shipbuilding 
did  not  receive  quite  adequate  recognition. 
The  view  held  was  that  it  wa.s  overshadowed 
by  warship  construction. 

On  July  17,  1917,  Sir  Edward  Carson 
resigned  the  office  of  First  Lord,  and  Sir 
Eric  Geddes  was  appointed  to  succeed  him. 
This  left  the  office  of  Navy  Controller  to  be 
filled,  to  which  Mr.  Alan  Anderson  (afterwards 
Sir  Alan  Anderson,  K.B.E.)  was  appointed. 
Sir  Alan  had  a  wide  knowledge  of  shipping 
from  his  long  membership  of  the  firm  of 
Anderson,  Anderson  &  Co.,  ship  and  insurance 
brokers,  and  joint  managers  of  the  Orient 
Steam  Navigation  Co.,  Ltd.  As  a  director  of 
the  Midland  Kailway  Company  he  had  also 
knowledge  of  another  branch  of  the  transport 
problem.  Since  October,  1916,  he  had  been 
Vice -Chairman  of  the  Wheat  Commission.  He 
was  a  business  man  of  recognized  ability  an  I 
knew  how  to  deal  with  other  business  men. 

The  transfer  of  shipbuilding  to  the  office  of 
t  he  Navy  Controller  caused  a  certain  amount 
of  friction  between  the  members  of  the  Shipping 
Controller's  original  Shipbuilding  Advisory 
Committee  and  certain  members  of  the  new 
Department.  The  truth  was  that  the  members 
of  the  Advisory  Committee  felt  the  loss  of  the 
executive  powers  which  they  hud  hitherto 
held,  and  that  they  were  not  always  treated  in 
the  Department  of  the  Deputy  Controller  for 
Auxiliary  Shipbuilding  with  all  the  considera- 
tion to  which  their  great  services  to  the  country 

1 95  -  i 


446 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


IN    A    SHIPYARD:    THE    MOULDING    LOFT. 


[Official  photograph. 


had  entitled  them.  In  the  early  autumn  there 
was  talk  of  the  resignation  of  certain  members  of 
this  Committee,  and  towards  the  end  of 
November  a  statement  appeared  that  the 
whole  of  the  Committee  had  resigned.  Some- 
thing like  a  crisis  was  precipitated,  and  on 
November  23  the  Admiralty  announced  the 
formation  of  a  Shipbuilding  Council,  under  the 
direct  chairmanship  of  the  Navy  Controller. 
On  this  Council,  it  was  stated,  representatives 
of  the  shipbuilding  and  engineering  trades 
would  be  joined  by  officers  of  the  Admiralty, 
and  problems  of  naval  and  commercial  ship- 
building and  repair  would  be  considered.  The 
statement,  pointed  out  that  the  Council  differed 
from  the  Shipbuilding  Advisory  Committee 
by  the  inclusion  of  Naval  shipbuilding 
in  its  purview,  and  by  being  relieved  from 
certain  executive  functions  in  the  placing  and 
following  up  of  contracts  which  had  been 
undertaken  by  the  Admiralty  Controller  and 
Director  of  Contract*.  All  those  who  served 
on  the  Shipbuilding  Advisory  Committee  and 
who  had  not  since  joined  the  Staff  of  the  Con- 
troll,  r  r:  Department  consented  to  serve  on 
the  Council. 

The  names  were  tbsn  given  of  the  members 
of  the  old  Shipbuilding  Advisory  Committee, 


and  there  were  added  the  following  names  of 
other  members  of  the  Shipbuilding  and  Engi- 
neering trades  who  had  joined  the  Controller's 
Department  and  who  were  to  attend  meetings 
of  the  Council  when  matters  affecting  them 
were  discussed  : 

Major  Maurice  Denny,  partner  of  Messrs.  Denny 
Brothers,  of  Dumbarton. 

Mb.  G.  S.  F.  Edwardes,  late  Director  of  Messrs.  Smith's 
Dock  Company. 

Mr.  H.  M.  Grayson,  of  Messrs.  H.  and  C.  Grayson 
(Ltd.). 

Major  J.  W.  Hamilton,  Chairman  of  Messrs.  W. 
Hamilton  and  Co. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  Lithqow,  Senior  Partner  of 
Messrs.  Russell  and  Co.,  Director  of  Messrs.  Robert 
Duncan  and  Co.,  and  Director  of  Messrs.  Napier 
and  Millar. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  Mitchell  Moncrieff, 
M.Inst.C.E. 

Mr.  Noel  E.  Peck,  Director  of  Messrs.  Barclay,  Curie, 
and  Co.  (Ltd.),  Director  of  Messrs.  Swan,  Hunter 
and  Wigham  Richardson  (Ltd.),  ex-Vice-President 
of  the  Shipbuilding  Employers'  Federation,  ex- 
Chairman  of  the  Clyde  Shipbuilders'  Association. 

Mr.  A.  W.  Sampson,  late  Director  of  Mossrs.  Fairfield 
Shipbuilding  and  Engineering  Company. 

The     non-departmental     members     of     the 

Council,  which  included  members   of  the   old 

Shipbuilding    Advisory    Committee,    consisted 

of  the  following : 

Sir  George  J.  Carter,  K.B.E.,  of  Messrs.  Cammell, 
Laird  and  Co.  (Ltd.),  President  of  the  Shipbuilding 
Employers'  Federation. 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF'  THE    WAR. 


447 


[Official  fthotn&apk. 


IN    A    SHIPYARD:    FRAME    BENDING. 


Sir  F.  N.  Henderson,   K.B.E.,  of  Messrs.  D.  and  W. 

Henderson  and  Co.   (Ltd.). 
.Mr.   James   Marr,   C.B.E.,   of   Messrs.  J.  L.  Thompson 

and  Sons   (Ltd.). 
Mr.  A.  C.   Ross,  C.B.E.,  of    Messrs.  Hawthorn,  Leslie 

and  Co.  (Ltd.). 
Professor   W.    S.    Abell,   Chief   Surveyor   to   Lloyd's 

Register. 
Sir   Herbert    Roweix,  K.B.E.,  of  Messrs.  Hawthorn, 

Leslie  &  Co.  (Ltd.). 
Sir    \V.    Rowan  Thomsok,    K.B.E.,   of    Messrs.    David 

Rowan     and     Co.,     ex-Chairman     of     North-West 

Engineers*  Association. 
Mr.   Summers  Hunter,  C.B.E.,  of  the   North-Eastern 

Marine  Engineering  Co.  (Ltd.),  and 
Mr.  James  Brown,  C.B.E.,  of  Scott's  Shipbuilding  and 

Engineering  Co.  (Ltd.). 
Mr.  C.  J.  O.  Sanders,  formerly  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
and  afterwards  of  the  Shipbuilding  Employers'  Federa- 
tion, and  Mr.  A.  R.  Duncan,  Secretary  of  the  Shipbuilding 
Employers'  Federation,  acted  as  Joint  Secretaries. 

One  of  the  main  causes  of  friction  between 
the  old  Shipbuilding  Advisory  Committee  and 
the  Navy  Controller's  Department  was  known 
to  have  been  the  question  of  the  national  ship- 
yards. The  Admiralty  had  decided  upon  the 
construction  of  three  national  yards,  and  in 
piu-suance  of  this  policy  had  requisitioned 
the  land  and  plant  of  the  Standard  Shipbuilding 
Company,  which  was  organized  in  the  summer  of 
1916  at  Chepstow.  The  Shipbuilding  Com- 
mittee had  strongly  urged  that,  until  all  private 


shipyards  of  the  country  had  been  supplied 
with  all  the  labour  and  material  which  they 
could  take,  it  was  unwise  to  divert  energy  and 
material  to  the  construction  of  new  yards. 
The  first  need,  they  urged,  was  to  supply 
the  existing  yards  with  all  they  could 
want;  the  second  was  to  extend  the  exist 
ing  yards  ;  and  the  third  was  to  build 
new  yards.  The  Committee  argued  that  the 
Government  policy  was  putting  the  third 
course  of  action  out  of  place  in  front  of  the 
others.  Private  builders  had  freely  expressed 
their  dislike  of  the  principle  of  State  shipyards, 
and  it  was  really  natural  enough  that  the  Com- 
mittee, which  contained  representatives  of 
leading  shipbuilding  companies,  should  not 
have  been  enamoured  of  the  proposal.  On  the 
Government  side  there  were  undoubtedly 
strong  reasons  to  be  advanced  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  certain  number  of  State  yards. 
Moreover,  the  private  shipbuilders  had  received 
intimation  that  their  yards  would  come  first 
for  orders,  labour,  and  material.  The  builders 
had  been  assured  by  the  Prime  Minister  that 
the  Government  yards  would  be  entirely  sub- 
sidiary, would  fill  in  the  gaps,  and  would  in 
no  way  compete  with  the  private  yards.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Navy  requires  a 


448 


THE    TIMER    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


DINNER-TIME    AT    A    SHIPYARD: 


WORKERS 
MEAL. 


LEAVING    FOR 


[Official  photograph. 

THEIR    MID-DAY 


very  large  number  of  subsidiary  craft  directly 
supporting  it. 

It  was  really  not  until  the  end  of  1917  and 
the  beginning  of  1918  that  the  nation  began 
to  realize  the  necessity  of  expediting  ship  con- 
struction. No  tonnage  figures  of  losses  had 
been  published  and  no  figures  of  output,  so  that, 
with  everything  vital  obscured,  there  was  no 
means  by  which  it  could  have  learned  the 
truth.  The  public  began  then  to  appreciate 
how  far  short  replacements  fell  of  the 
tonnage  being  destroyed  by  the  enemy. 
On  December  13  the  First  Lord  gave  some 
indication,  although  not  a  very  clear  one,  of 
the  output  for  1917,  comparing  the  results 
with  those  for  1913,  which  "  gave  the  absolute 
peak  of  shipbuilding  of  all  kinds  that  this 
country  has  ever  known."  He  stated  that  in 
1913  the  equivalent  of  2,280,000  gross  tons 
was  launched.  This  was  made  up  of  1,920,000 
tons  of  merchant  shipping,  and  the  equivalent, 
upon  a  converted  figure  of  362,000  gross  tons 
ot  war  vessels.  He  continued,  "  If  we  take  the 
rate  of  output  for  the  months  of  October  and 
November,  and  it  is  fair  to  take  them  as  a 
measure  of  what  we  have  attained,  the  merchant 
tonnage  completed  is  fully  at  the  same  rate  as 
the  merchant  tonnage  output  of  the  year  1913 

that  is,  1,920,000."  The  First  Lord  closed 
a  review  of  the  shipbuilding  position  by 
KUyhiL'.  "  We  must  have  1  he  ships,  and 
more  -hips,  and  still  more  ships."  This 
view    uns    confirmed    on    the    following    day 


by  the  Prime  Minister,  who  declared  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  "  We  need  more  men, 
not  merely  for  the  battle-line  across  the 
seas,  but  for  the  battle-line  in  this  country. 
We,  especially,  need  men  to  help  us  to  solve 
the  problems  associated  with  tonnage.  .  .  . 
Victory  is  now  a  question  of  tonnage,  and 
tonnage  is  victory.  Nothing  else  can  defeat 
us  now  but  shortage  of  tonnage.  The  advent  of 
the  United  States  into  the  war  has  increased 
the  demand  enormously.  Tonnage  must  be 
provided  for  the  transportation  of  that 
gigantic  now  army  with  its  equipment  across 
thousands  of  miles  of  sea.  It  is  no  use  raising 
10,000,000  men  and  equipping  them,  unless 
you  get  them  somewhere  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  foe." 

Some  doubt  had  been  created  by  the  figures 
of  the  First  Lord  given  on  December  13,  but 
the  position  was  made  quite  clear  by  Mr.  Bonar 
Law  in  the  House  of  Commons  two  months  later 
when  he  stated  that  in  1917  the  tonnage  built 
in  the  United  Kingdom  was  1,163,474,  while 
we  secured  in  addition  170,000  tons  abroad. 
The  total  was  put  in  another  form  by  Sir  L. 
Chiozza  Money  on  February  20,  1918,  when  he 
announced  that  200  British-built  merchant 
vessels  of  1,600  tons  and  upwards  were  com- 
pleted, which  aggregated  1,067,696  tons.  He 
added  that  the  net  loss  of  British  vessels  of 
1,600  tons  and  over  during  1917  was  598.  The 
following  figures  of  production  of  vessels  of 
1,600  tons  and  over  in  the  United  Kingdom 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


449 


during  the  last  quarter  of   the  year  were  in- 


cluded : 

Novembrr 
December 
January 


22  ships  totalling    130,375    tons   gross 
21  „  „       115,752 

11  ..  „         55,588 


Total  ...     54         „  „       301,715 

The  gravity  of  the  position  was  indicated  by 
comparing  those  figures  with  the  numbers  of 
British  vessels  of  1,000  tons  and  over  which 
were  shown  by  the  Admiralty  weekly  state- 
ment to  have  been  sunk  within  the  same 
period.  In  November  42  vessels  were  lost,  in 
December  75,  and  in  January  30,  making  a  total 
of  147,  against  54  built  in  the  United  Kingdom. 

A  great  impression  on  the  nation  was  made 
by  a  speech  by  Mr.  Barnes,  the  Labour  Member 
of  the  War  Cabinet,  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
on  February  26.  He  told  the  House  frankly 
that  the  number  of  ships  turned  out  in  Great 
Britain  in  January  was  less  than  half  the 
estimate,  and  that,  so  far  as  he  had  been  able 
to  ascertain,  the  position  in  February  would  be 
no  better.  He  declared  that  America  was 
failing  us  so  far  as  ships  were  concerned.  He 
insisted  that  the  winning  of  the  war  depended 
upon  the  output  of  ships,  and  that  a  far  larger 
number  would  have  to  be  turned  out  than 
before  if  we  were  to  get  through  the  trouble 
of  the  next  few  months. 


The  position  in  February  was  shown  to  be  a 
little  better  by  the  First  Lord  in  a  statement 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  5.  Ho 
pointed  out  that,  whereas  the  average  monthly 
output  of  merchant  shipbuilding  in  the  fourth 
quarter  of  1917  was  roughly  140,000  tons,  it  oiJy 
reached  58,000  tons  in  January.    He  continued  : 

"  It  should  have  been  very  much  larger.  It 
is  true  that  the  weather  was  exceptionally  bad, 
and  delays  were  caused  thereby,  also  that 
January,  due  to  holidays,  is  always  in  peace 
time  a  very  bad  month  for  output  of  ships, 
also  that  I  am  departing  in  this  case  from  my 
contention  that  we  cannot  take  one  week  or 
month  by  itself,  be  it  good  or  bad.  I  must 
admit  that  February  is,  I  think,  going  to  be 
better,  nearly  twice  the  output  of  January 
when  the  figures  are  complete  ;  but  still  only 
about  two-thirds  of  what  the  same  yards,  and 
fewer  men,  have  done  in  a  month.  The 
number  of  vessels  lodged  and  outfitting  is 
higher  than  usual,  and  these  ships  will  be  in 
service  shortly." 

The  First  Lord  then  made  certain  references 
to  labour,  which,  in  view  of  the  criticism  which 
they  aroused,  and  the  good  and  far-reaching 
effect  they  undoubtedly  had,  deserve  to  be 
reproduced  as  follows  : — 

We  were  justified  in  looking  for  a  steady  and  sub- 


[Official  photc  graph. 

A    GROUP    OF    SHIPYARD    WORKMEN,    NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE. 


450 


THE    TIMES    HISTuRY    OF    THE    WAR. 


sin.uial  rise  in  output.  Men,  material,  and  capacity 
mm  all  there.  Instead  of  a  rise  we  have  had  a  serious 
drop.  Why  is  this  ?  Many  reasons  may  be  advanced 
for  it,  but"  the  main  fact  which  was  brought  out  by 
reports,  not  only  from  employers,  but  from  repre- 
sentatives of  the  men  and  representatives  of  depart- 
ments, is  that  whether  due  to  labour  unrest,  due  to 
strikes,  due  to  difficulties  of  whatever  kinds,  the  men 
in  the  yards  are  not  working  as  if  the  life  of  the  couitry 
depended  upon  their  exertions,  nor  are  they  working 
even  as   they  did  in  the   fourth   quarter  of  last   year. 


in  the  United  States,  and  great,  doubtless,  as  the  effort 
of  that  country  is,  there  is  no  doubt,  and  it  is  not  ques- 
tioned in  official  circles  in  America,  that  a  considerable 
time  must  elapse  before  the  desired  output  is  secured. 

Continuing,  the  First  Lord  declared  that  if 
employers  hesitated  to  play  their  part,  or  if 
men  anywhere  "  downed  tools,"  or  went  slow 
for  any  reason,  they  would  do  so  in  the  know- 
ledge  of    the   grievous   extent   to   which   they 


STANDARD    SHIPS 


Employers  also  are  not  perhaps  in  all  cases  doing  all 
that  can  be  done  to  increase  output.  The  long  strain 
of  the  war  must  have  its  offoct  on  the  nerves  of  some 
of  them  as  it  has  on  everyone  else.  Far  be  it  from 
mo  to  suggest  that  the  vast  majority  both  of  employers 
and  of  men  are  not  actuated  by  the  call  of  patriotism  ; 
but  the  serious  unrest  which  existed  in  January  will 
have  its  effect  on  -completions  in  later  months,  and 
the  January  drop  cannot  be  fully  accounted  for  other- 
wise than-  that  it  was  caused  by  unrest  in  its  widest 
interpretation. 

I  am  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  even  at  this  late 
date  the  situation  is  not  fully  realized.  My  right 
hon.  friend  the  member  for  the  Blackfriars  division 
of  Glasgow  (Mr.  Barnes)  has  in  this  House  recently 
appealed  to  the  working  men  of  the  country,  with  far 
greater  authority  than  I  can  claim,  to  put  their  backs 
into  the  work.  I  believe  that  the  individual  piece- 
worker works  as  hard  now  as  he  did  last  year,  when 
he  is  actually  at  work,  but  ho  seems  more  ready  to-day 
to  take  holidays,  and  we  cannot  afford  holidays  while 
there  are  food  queuef.  .  .  .  During  the  critical  period 
that  confronts  us  we  must  rely  in  the  main  upon  our  own 
ships  and  ourselves.  Our  Allies  are  making  every 
effort  to  increase  the  production  of  ships,  but  in  spite 
nl  the  glowing  reports  of  representatives  of  the  Press 


[Official  photograph. 

LAYING     THE    KEEL    PLATES. 

prejudiced  the  vital  interests  of  the  com- 
munity. The  principle  of  one  front  must 
be  recognized  in  the  shipyards  just  as  in 
the  Fleets  and  in  the  trenches.  Every  ship 
which  was  launched  and  fitted  out  was  an 
addition  to  the  food-carrying  power  of  the  Allies. 
The  urgency  of  the  problem  was  dealt  with 
in  a  leading  article  in  The  Times  on  the  following 
day  entitled  "  The  Mystery  of  the  Sliipyards." 
The  article  pointed  out  that:  "What  matters 
is  to  solve  the  mystery  of  the  shipbuilding 
failure.  The  reasons  for  the  unrest  in  the 
yards  must  be  explored,  revealed,  and  removed. 
It  may  be  that  defects  in  the  present  system 
— which  has  largely  substituted  official  control 
for  the  individual  initiative  of  the  shipbuilder 
— are  at  the  root  of  the  visible  flagging  in 
output.  Whether  that  is  the  cause,  or  some- 
thing else,  it  is  plain  that  there  is  deep-rooted 


[Official  photograbh, 

STANDARD    SHIPS  :    AT    WORK    ON    THE    DECK   BEFORE    LAUNCHING. 


STANDARD    SHIPS  :    BETWEEN    DECKS. 
461 


f  Ofliciai  pkotograpti. 


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452 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


453 


inefficiency  somewhere.  The  business  of  the 
Government  is  to  find  it  out." 

It  happened  that  the  annual  meeting  of  the 
reorganized  Chamber  of  Shipping  was  held  on 
that  day  in  the  City,  and  the  leading  owners 
present  seized  the  opportunity  to  urge  the 
vital  need  for  increased  ship  construction. 
Sir  William  Raeburn,  the  President,  declared 
that  there  was  no  mystery  about  the  decrease 
in  production.  The  two  elements  responsible 
were  the  Government  and  the  workers.  "It 
was  quite  unfair,"  he  continued,  "  for  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  to  have  attacked 
the  builders  for  the  reduction.  The  fact  was  that 
the  spirit  of  shipbuilders  had  been  almost 
broken  by  the  interference  of  the  Government 
during  the  last  two  years.  When  Mr.  Barnes 
made  his  serious  statement  on  the  question  of 
.shipbuilding  it  was  a  great  pity  he  did  not 
tell  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 
It  was  high  time  the  country  knew  the  facts, 
and  when  it  did  the  facts  would  open  the  eyes 
of  the  country.  .  .  .  The  Government  would 
be  well  advised  if  they  now  took  the  nation  into 
their  confidence,  and  gave  the  tonnage  of  the 
sinkings  and  the  new  tonnage  added  from 
month  to  month.  A  material  improvement  in 
the  near  future  might  be  looked  for,  but  unless 
the  workmen  put  their  heart  into  their  work, 
and  did  very  much  more  than  they  had  been 
doing,  the  position  was  bound  to  remain 
serious.  .  .  .  They  had  been  told  about  the 
U-boat  menace  being  entirely  overcome  by 
August  next,  but  he  had  a  strong  belief  that 
we  should  never  entirely  overcome  it." 

Lord  Inchcape,  the  in-coming  President,  in 
the  course  of  his  Presidential  address,  declared 
that  there  was  a  curious  lack  of  reality  in  many 
parts  of  the  country  as  to  the  grave  position 
with  which  we  were  faced.  Tonnage  was  being 
sunk  at  a  rate  of  which  the  people  had  no 
conception.  He  thought  that  more  information 
might  be  given  to  the  people  as  to  what  we 
were  really  losing,  so  that  they  might  appre- 
ciate the  gravity  of  the  situation.  He  added  : 
"  I  was  on  the  Clyde  last  Saturday,  and  at 
noon  the  whistle  in  a  large  building  yard 
sounded,  and  the  moment  it  Went  every  soul 
in  the  yard  threw  down  his  tools  and  bolted. 
Not  a  sound  was  heard  in  Clydesdale  after  12 
o'clock  on  Saturday.  It  might  have  been  that 
no  war  was  going  on,  and  that  no  new  ships, 
no  destroyers  to  hunt  submarines,  were  re- 
quired. There  is,  I  admit,  a  limit  to  human 
endurance,  and,  as  Mr.   Bonar  Law  said  the 


other  day,  men  get  tired  ;  but  unless  wo  all 
put  our  hearts  into  the  fight,  whether  we  are 
engaged  in  handicraft  or  in  brain -craft,  we 
shall  all  suffer  alike." 

Sir  Owen  Philipps  proposed  a  resolution, 
which  was  approved,  welcoming  the  entry  into 
the  war  of  the  United  States,  and  said  that, 
while  America  was  sending  a  magnificent  army, 
he  looked  on  the  help  that  the  country  could 
give  by  its  shipbuilding  programme  as  of  even 
more  importance.  He  suggested  that  the  two 
Governments  should  give  them  information  as 
to  how  long  it  took  to  build  a  ship  in  each 


SIR    WILLIAM    RAEBURN, 
President  of  the  Chamber  of  Shipping,  1916-1918. 

country,  and  that  they  should  start  a  compe- 
tition, like  the  competition  aroused  by  the 
tanks  in  raising  war  funds,  between  the  two 
countries  in  the  matter  of  shipbuilding  so  that 
the  greatest  output  should  be  attained. 

Sir  John  Ellerman  proposed  a  resolution, 
also  adopted,  to  the  effect  "  That  this 
Chamber  regrets  that  the  progress  of  commer- 
cial shipbuilding  in  this  country  is  still  far 
from  satisfactory,  and  desires  to  impress  upon 
His  Majesty's  Government  that  it  is  of  vital 
importance  to  secure  the  output  of  tonnage 
foreshadowed  by  the  First  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty." He  maintained  that  the  result  of 
transferring  the  initiative  and  enterprise  in 
shipbuilding  to  the  State  had  been  most  dis- 
appointing. The  fact  that  so  little  had  been 
done  emphasized  the  necessity  there  was  for 
the  resolution.  Had  the  private  owners  boen 
allowed  to  build,  the  output  of  new  boats  would 
have  been  very  much  greater  than  it  was. 
Mr.  A.  Munro  Sutherland,  a  large  North  of 
England    owner,    seconded    the    motion,    and 


454 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


LAUNCH    OF    A    STANDARD  SHIP. 


[OfficMt  photograph. 


attributed  tho  small  output  to  the  increasing  of 
standard  wages,  instead  of  putting  the  men  on 
piece  work  and  giving  them  a  bonus. 

The  comments  of  the  First  Lord  were 
quickly  answered  by  the  Shipbuilding  Em- 
ployers' Federation  and  the  Shipyard  Trade 
Unions.  On  March  7  these  bodies  issued  a 
statement  to  the  effect  that  the  remarks,  so 
far  as  they  reflected  on  employers  and  work- 
men engaged  in  shipbuilding,  had  caused  much 
feeling  in  shipbuilding  districts.  Represen- 
tatives of  the  trades  and  the  employers  had, 
it  was  stated,  met  and  decided  that  the  remarks 
called  for  a  joint  reply.  This  joint  reply  was 
to  be  made  shortly,  and  it  was  suggested  that 
in  the  interests  of  the  nation  and  all  con- 
cerned it  would  be  well  to  suspend  judgment 
till  then.  Meantime  it  was  pointed  out  that 
the  fact  that  a  deputation  of  the  shipbuilding 
employers  and  shipyard  trade  unions  waited 
upon  the  Prime  Minister  in  November  and 
made  joint  proposals  to  the  Government  was 
a  clear  indication  that  they  fully  realized  the 
gravity  of  the  shipbuilding  position.  It  was 
added  that  "  the  desire  of  the  whole  industry 
was,  and  is,  to  strengthen  the  First  Lord's 
hands  in  the  stupendous  task  before  him,  and 


if  nothing  material  has,  as  yet,  resulted  from 
the  interview  with  the  Prime  Minister,  the 
reason  must  be  looked  for  within  the  Govern- 
ment itself." 

The  urgency  of  dealing  with  the  shipbuilding 
problem  was  discussed  daily  in  The  Times,  and 
on  March  8,  in  tho  course  of  an  article  on  the 
desirability  of  taking  curtain  steps,  the  sug- 
gestion was  made  that  more  use  should  be  made 
of  the  great  organizing  ability  of  such  a  leader 
of  the  shipbuilding  industry  as  Lord  Pirrie, 
the  head  of  Harland  and  Wolff.  It  was  pointed 
out  that  Sir  Alan  Anderson,  the  Admiralty 
Controller,  had  tho  complete  confidence  of 
shipbuilders,  and  the  enterprise  shown  in  the 
Department  of  the  Deputy  Controller  for 
Auxiliary  Construction  was  fully  recognized. 
With  the  addition  of  some  further  expeijt 
knowledge  and  organizing  ability,  the  work  of 
the  Departments  would,  the  article  urged, 
probably  proceed  quite  smoothly. 

This  view  was  supported  by  "  a  past  President 
of  the  Chamber  of  Shipping  "  in  a  letter  pub- 
lished in  The  Times  on  the  following  day. 
"  First  and  foremost,"  declared  this  writer, 
"  is  the  absence  of  a  Shipbuilding  Controller  of 
outstanding   ability   and   practical   experience, 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


455 


clothed  with  ample  powers  and  qualified  by 
nature  and  training  to  deal  with  the  whole 
situation,  including  arrangements  with  labour." 
The  writer  continued  : 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  suggestion  made  by  your 
.Shipping  Correspondent  in  to-day\s  issue  of  The  Times 
would  form  a  most  admirable  solution  of  the  difficulty. 
Lord  Pirrie,  the  head  of  the  famous  firm  of  Harlan  d 
and  Wolff,  in  the  building  up  and  control  of  his  huge 
establishments  has  displayed  energy,  organizing  ability, 
and  business  qualities  amounting  to  genius.  If  a  prac- 
tical shipbuilder  of  this  commanding  typa  could  be 
induced  to  accept  the  position  of  Controller  of  Merchant 
Shipbuilding,  armed  with  full  powers  to  deal  with  the 
present  serious  situation,  free  from  the  interference  of 
any  other  Departments,  we  should  soon  see  our  output 
of  merchant  tonnage  going  up  by  leaps  and  bounds, 
and  the  nation  could  feel  sure  that  everything  is  being 
done  which  the  highest  practical  ability  and  experience 
considers  necessary  to  deal  adequately  with  this  important 
question,  which  calls  urgently  for  prompt  and  drastic 
treatment  in  a  broad  and  comprehensive  spirit,  if  we 
are  to  avoid  serious,  if  not  fatal,  consequences  to  the 
country  and  her  Allies.  .  .  .  The  urgent  necessity 
of  the  hour  is  the  rapid  production  of  merchant  ships, 
and  if  this  requires  a  distinct  break  with  existing  pro- 
cedure, under  the  direction  of  Lord  Pirrie,  nothing 
should  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  its  speedy 
accomplishment. 

An  article  which  appeared  in  The  Times  on 
March  11  summed  up  the  situation.  It  was 
headed  "  Need  of  Greater  Publicity.  Defects 
of  Present  Control,"  and  it  began  :  "  It  is  now 


quite  clear  that  the  shipbuilding  situation 
demands  very  firm  handling,  and  that  the 
country  must  be  prepared  for  a  long-sustained 
effort  in  the  production  of  tonnage.  Exami- 
nation of  the  situation  shows  that  certain 
things  require  to  be  done  immediately,  which 
may  be  grouped  under  three  headings :  (1) 
Publicity,  (2)  Removal  of  Labour  Trouble, 
(3)  Reorganization  at  the  top."  As  an  accurate 
review  of  tho  conditions  then  prevailing,  and 
as  an  indication  of  the  steps  which  wore  sub- 
sequently taken,  the  following  extracts  may 
be  put  on  record : 

Much  feeling  has  been  created  by  the  quite  moderate 
strictures  of  Sir  Eric  Geddes  respecting  something 
lacking  in  the  spirit  of  certain  employers  and  certain 
men.  If  the  First  Lord  returns  to  this  subject — and 
it  is  possible  that,  the  rejoinder  of  the  employers  and 
men  may  make  it  desirable  that  he  should  do  so — 
he  may  adopt  one  of  two  courses.  He  may  explain 
that  the  language  employed  did  not  mean  precisely 
what  it  was  intended  to  convey.  The  more  satis* 
factory  course  would  seem  to  be  to  stick  to  his  guns 
and  repeat  that  at  the  time  that  he  was  speaking  "  the 
situation  was  not  fully  realized."  He  could  with 
perfect  truth  add  that  the  fault  did  not  lie  with  either 
masters  or  men.  How  can  men  understand  a  situation 
if  they  are  not  told  what  it  is  ?  Estimates  of  production 
and  curves  of  losses  are  interesting  and  have  their  uses. 
But  after  a  time  they  become  ineffective.  Plain  facts 
always    count.     If    every    employer,     every    foreman 


[Official  photograph. 

STANDARD    SHIPS  :    AT    WORK    ON    DECK    AFTER    LAUNCHING. 


156 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


DV«ry  riveter,  and  every  wife  knew  what  the  facts 
were,  there  would  ho  not  n  minute's  slacking.  Let 
everyone  concerned — in  the  steelworks,  in  the  ship- 
yards  ami  in  the  home* — see  the  precise  figures  of 
the  tonnage  sunk  and  the  amount  of  replacement, 
and  then  anyone  who  slacked  would  he  a  scoundrel. 
There  may  be  traitors  in  the  coxmtry,  but  at  any  rate 
they  are  a  very  small  minority.  As  it  happens  there 
is  probably  nothing  in  th?  figures  which  the  autho- 
rities need  fear  to  disclose.  For  soma  time  pant  the 
quarterly  figures  of  losses  have  boen  on  the  down- 
ward grade,  and  the  figures  of  tiew  construction  have 
been  on  the  upward  grade.  The  lines  do  not  yet  meet, 
and  it  is  the  first  business  of  the  nation  to  make  them 
meet.  Then  it  can.  and  must,  go  on  to  make  the 
figures  of  construction  exceed  the  losses,  for  the  leeway 
is  very  serious.  For  a  time  the  builders  must  continue 
to  pull  against  the  stream,  and  cannot  aflord  to  rest 
for  a  moment  on  their  oars  until  the  tide  turns  in  their 
favour.  If  the™  are  any  international  objections  to 
the  publication  of  the  world's  tonnage  losses  and  replace- 
ment, are  there  any  to  the  publication  of  the  British 
figures  ?  If  the  supreme  effort  will  only  be  forthcoming 
when  these  are  published,  then  surely  there  is  over- 
whelming justification  in  th.3  safety  of  the  countty. 

The  article  urged  that,  apart  from  the  incen- 
tive which  would  be  given  to  sustained  efforts 
by  the  publication  of  the  facts  and  the  resolve 
to  face  them  and  change  them,  there  was  a 
very  great  deal  to  be  said  for  publicity  about 
the  output  of  the  individual  yards.  If  one  yard 
built  a  standard  cargo  vessel  within  five  or  six 
months,    it    was    reasonable    that     the    nation 


should   know  the  fact.     And  if  another  yard 

took  nine  or  ten  months,  was  it  not  right  that, 

the   nation   should   also   know   it  ?     Questions 

might  be  asked  as  to  why  one  yard  could  build 

so    much    quicker    than    another,   but    such 

questions   could   only   do   good.     They   would 

elucidate    the    facts,    and    the    public    would 

demand     that    remedies     should     be     applied. 

Probably  the  discrepancies,  under  the  limelight, 

would  soon  be  reduced. 

Reverting  to  the  suggestion  that  a  practical 

shipbuilder  should  be  appointed  to  take  charge 

of  merchant  shipbuilding,  the  article  pointed 

out  that   "  one  man  of  outstanding  ability  is 

Lord  Pirrie,  the  head  of  Harland  and  Wolff, 

a 
whose  record  for  organization    and    success  is 

certainly  at  least  second  to  none.     A  tribute 

to   his   quite   exceptional  powers   was   paid   in 

The  Times  of  Saturday  by  "  A  Past  President 

of  the  Chamber  of  Shipping,"  who  might  have 

added   that   his   close   grip   of   affairs   extends 

beyond   amazingly   successful    shipbuilding   to 

shipping  companies  and  banking.     He  is  not 

a  young  man,  and  has  nothing  to  gain,  except 

the  further  honour  which  the  country  would 

certainly  pay  him,  by  the  acceptance  of  such  an 


STANDARD    SHIPS  :    FINISHING    ON    THE    WATER. 
A  sister  ship  ready  for  launching  is  seen  in  the  background. 


{Offi.ia '  phot,  graph. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


45? 


LORD    PIRRIE,   KIP., 
Controller-General  of  Merchant  Shipbuilding. 


[FMioll  &  Fry. 


onerous  post.  Tt  might  well  be,  however,  that 
a  sense  of  duty  would  prevail  over  other  con- 
siderations, and  a  partnership  between  such  a 
leader  and  Sir  Alan  Anderson,  a  younger  man, 
should  be  an  exceptionally  happy  one.  The 
public  could  then  believe  that,  with  the  highest 
skill,  enthusiasm,  and  hard  work  at  the  top, 
the  direction  of  construction  would  be  in  very 
strong  hands." 

On  the  following  day  it  was  announced  that 
the   views  of  Lord   Pirrie,  who   hat!  travelled 


up  from  Glasgow  to  London,  hail  been  invited 
by  the  Government,  and  that  he  had  already 
spent  some  hours  in  consultation  with  the 
Prime  Minister  and  other  members  of  the 
Government. 

A  day  later  the  full  reply  was  issued  of  the 
Shipbuilding  Employers'  Federation  and  the 
Shipyard  Trade  Unions  to  the  statement  of  tin- 
First  Lord  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Included 
in  this  statement  was  a  reproduction  of  a 
letter  addressed  by   these  joint  bodies  to   the 


458 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Prime  Minister  on  November  14,  1917,  ex- 
pressing their  satisfaction  "  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  made  arrangements  to  divert  largely 
increased  supplies  of  steel  to  merchant  ship- 
building," and  suggesting  that  a  deputation 
should  be  received  in  order  that  certain  definite 
proposals  might  be  put  forward  for  ensuring 
the  fullest  productive  capacity  from  the 
labour  available.  It  was  recorded  that  at  that 
meeting  the  Federations  and  the  Unions 
proposed  that  a  joint  committee  of  employers' 
and  workmen's  representatives  should  be  set 
up  to  advise  the  Ministry  of  National  Service 
in  the  supply,  distribution,  and  utilization  of 
labour,  and  to  advise  the  Ministry  of  Labour 
on  matters  connected  with  the  policy  or 
administration  of  labour  questions.  These  pro- 
posals not  having  been  accepted  by  the  Govern- 
ment, the  Federations  and  the  Unions  ex- 
pressed their  regret  in  a  letter  dated  January  10, 
and  stated  that  they  had  nevertheless  decided 
to  appoint  a  Joint  Committee,  which  would 
be  in  a  position,  to  speak  authoritatively  "  on 
all  questions  in  which  their  help  and  advice 
may  be  desired,  and  can  be  advantageously 
enlisted."  In  reply,  the  Prime  Minister  had 
stated  that  he  had  told  the  Minister  of  National 
Service  of  his  belief  that  this  Committee 
would  be  of  great  assistance  to  him,  and  that 
he  was  anxious  that  the  Committee  should  meet 
the  Minister.  On  February  12  the  Federations 
and  Unions  wrote  to  the  Ministry  of  National 
Service  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  Prime  Minister's 
reply,  and  on  the  same  date  they  sent  a  similar 
letter  to  the  Ministry  of  Labour.  The  Federa- 
tions and  the  Unions  pointed  out  that  since 
then  the  Joint  Committee  had  not  been  invited 
to  meet  either  department.  They  added  that 
t  hey  were  prepared  in  any  event  to  give  to  the 
Government  their  loyal  support  and  active 
co-operation  "  in  any  steps  which  would  have 
the  effect  of  securing  to  the  nation  the  fullest 
possible  output  of  ships."  Subsequently,  ne- 
gotiations between  these  bodies  and  the  Govern- 
ment authorities  were  opened  up  with  good 
results. 

The  composition  of  the  departments  of  the 
Admiralty  dealing  with  merchant  construction 
continued  to  be  the  subject  of  much  discussion. 
On  March  13  the  resignation  was  announced 
of  Sir  William  Rowan  Thomson  from  the 
position  of  the  Director  of  Auxiliary  Ships' 
Kngines.  The  reasons  which  had  prompted 
this  resignation  were  described  in  a  letter  by 
Sir  William,  published  in  The  Times  of  March  18. 


In  the  meantime  "  a  Past  President  of  the 
Chamber  of  Shipping "  returned  to  the 
charge,  urging,  in  a  letter  to  The  Times, 
that  the  control  of  shipbuilding  should  be 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  industry  itself 
through  the  medium  of  a  shipbuilder  of  out- 
standing ability  and  authority,  who  would 
"  control  with  understanding  and  practical 
sympathy  an  industry  the  most  technical  and 
intricate,  and  a  class  of  workmen  the  most 
efficient  and  hardworking,  but  in  some  respects 
the  most  wayward  and  difficult  to  lead  of  any  in 
the  land."     The  "Past  President"  proceeded: 

Such  a  man  is  Lord  Pirrie,  whom  your  Shipping 
Correspondent  in  a  moment  of  inspiration  mentioned 
recently  in  your  columns.  Lord  Pirrie  is  far  and  away 
the  biggest  man  in  the  shipbuilding  world.  He  has 
done  the  biggest  things.  He  is  noted  for  getting  things 
done.  He  is  one  of  our  greatest  national  assets  at 
this  juncture,  and  it  would  be  nothing  short  of  criminal 
negligence  in  the  present  crisis  not  to  enlist  the  services 
of  such  a  man  in  connexion  with  the  nation's  ship- 
building. If  Lord  Pirrie,  with  his  unrivalled  experience 
and  organizing  genius,  can  be  prevailed  upon  to  come 
to  his  country's  aid  at  the  present  moment  and  to  take 
control  of  the  industry,  free  from  official  interference  of 
any  kind — as  Sir  Joseph  Maclay,  the  Shipping  Con- 
troller, one  of  the  outstanding  successes  of  the  Govern- 
ment, is  free  from  such  control — then  we  shall  succeed 
in  making  good  our  losses  with  the  least  possible  delay. 
But  if  neither  Lord  Pirrie  nor  any  other  practical  ship- 
builder of  outstanding  ability  and  authority  is  given 
full  executive  power  to  handle  the  difficulties  of  tho 
situation  with  insight  and  sympathy,  no  shuffling  of 
the  official  cards,  such  as  has  been  palmed  off  upon  us 
in  the  past,  will  save  the  country  from  a  humiliating 
and  irreparable   disaster. 

A  number  of  important  points  were  raised 
in  the  following  passage  : 

I  refrain  from  entering  into  such  questions  as  to 
whether,  and  to  what  extent,  if  any,  the  introduction 
of  the  so-called  "  standard  ship  "  has  contributed  to  the 
delay  in  output — although  I  may  remark  in  passing 
that  Lord  Pirrie's  firm,  who  had  no  responsibility  for 
the  introduction  of  this  typ3  of  ship,  turned  out  the  first 
standard  ship  in  "  record  "  time  ;  whether  the  altera- 
tion and  roalteration  of  plans  and  specifications  after 
they  had  boen  passed  have  had  a  disturbing  and  demora- 
lizing influence  on  both  shipbuilders  and  their  workmen  ; 
whether  merchant  ships  on  tho  stocks  have  been  starved 
of  men,  while  there  has  been  no^lack  of  labour  for  war- 
ship work  ;  or  whether  labour  which  was  badly  needed 
in  private  yards  to  accelerate  present  output  has  been 
squandered  in  laying  out  and  equipping  the  national 
shipyards,  which,  whatever  they  may  do  in  the  future, 
can  have  no  immediate  effect  on  the  position.  All 
those  and  similar  questions,  which  are  only  phases  of 
tho  main  broad  problem,  would  find  their  true  per- 
spective when  left  to  be  dealt  with  by  a  competent 
practical  Minister  of  Merchant  Shipbuilding  like  Lord 
Pirrie,  who  combines  administrative  capacity,  technical 
ability,  and,  last,  but  not  least,  courago,  and  resource. 
These  are  the  qualities  which  are  essential  at  this  crisis 
in  the  nation's  history. 

On  March  18  it  was  stated  in  The  Times 
that  the  appointment  of  Lord  Pirrie  to  direct 
shipbuilding  in  this  country  would  shortly  be 
announced,  and  an  account  of  his  extraordinarily 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


459 


successful  career  was  published.  The  appoint- 
ment was  officially  announced  by  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  in  a  statement  of  out- 
standing importance  made  in  the  House  of 
Commons  on  March  20.  Lord  Pirrie,  it  was 
explained,  was  to  have  the  title  of  Controller- 
General  of  Merchant  Shipbuilding,  and  was  to 
assume  responsibility  for  the  output  of  merchant 
tonnage.  As  Controller-General  he  was  to  bo 
invited  to  attend  meetings  of  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  and  of  the  Maintenance  Committee 
of  the  Board  when  matters  of  mercantile  ship- 
building were  discussed.  While  the  Controller- 
General  was  to  be  directly  responsible  to  the 
First  Lord,  the  latter  had  asked  the  Prime 
Minister  to  make  it  one  of  tho  terms  of  his 
•  appointment  that  upon  all  questions  in  which  he 
felt  that  the  interests  of  merchant  ship-build- 
ing were  concerned,  he  should  have  direct  access 
to  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  War  Cabinet. 
Shortly  afterwards  the  members  of  the 
Shipbuilding  Advisory  Council  informed  the 
Admiralty  Controller  that,  while  they  desired 
as  leading  members  of  the  shipbuilding  and 
engineering  trades  to  continue  to  place  their 
services  unreservedly  at  the  disposal  of  the 
First  Lord  and  Controller-General  for  Merchant 
Shipbuilding,   they  felt   that  the  existence  of 


the  Council  might  have  the  effect  of  limiting 
Lord  Pirrie's  freedom  of  action.  They  there- 
fore tendered  their  resignations.  The  Admiralty 
publicly  acknowledged  the  great  debt  which 
the  country  owed  to  the  members  for  the 
valuable  advice  and  assistance  they  had  given 
during  the  whole  time  that  the  Council  had 
been  in  existence,  and  they  "  gratefully  ac- 
cepted their  cordial  offer  of  continued  co- 
operation." 

Lord  Pirrie  brought  no  staff  of  his  own  to 
the  Admiralty,  but  (and  this  was  bound  to  be 
much  more  valuable)  just  the  right  combination 
of  keenness,  practical  knowledge  of  the  highest 
order,  and  admitted  great  organizing  abilities. 
While  he  represented  a  great  quickening 
influence,  it  was  understood  that  he  fully 
recognized  the  excellence  of  much  of  the  work 
long  done  by  various  departments  of  the  Ad- 
miralty Controller's  Office,  which  had  been 
called  upon  to  deal  with  many  new,  complicated, 
and  highly  important  problems  arising  out  of 
the  responsibility  for  construction,  and,  in 
dealing  with  them,  had  had  many  difficulties 
to  overcome. 

The  full  statement  of  the  First  Lord  was  in 
accordance  with  a  promise  made  by  the  Govern- 
ment,   in    reply    to    repeated    questions,    that 


A    CONCRETE    SHIP    NEARING    COMPLETION. 


{Official  photograph. 


•ItfO 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


«ctual  figures  of  tonnage  losses  would  be  given. 
The  facts  were  to  be  given  in  order  to  enable 
the  workers  to  realize  that  the  effort  they  were 
called  upon  to  make  was  absolutely  vital  to  the 
country.  The  First  Lord  was  supported  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  March  20  by  the  Prime 


161.674TONS 

-A  RECORD- 


The  Output  of  Merchant  Ship- 
building for  March  amounted 
to  161.674  Tons,  equal  to 

32  SHIPS 

OF     S.OOO     TOJVK 


SHIPYARD    WORKERS 


PREVENT  THE  HUNS  FROM 
STARVING    THE    NATION 


ML 


Mj 


REDUCED    COPY    OF    A    POSTER    FOR 
SHIPYARDS. 

Minister,  and  a  crowded  House  followed  the 
speech  with  anxious  attention.  There  was  no 
doubt  that  the  nation  had  at  last  come  to 
realize  the  supreme  importance  of  the  subject 
which  was  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  First  Lord. 
It  wanted  to  know  the  whole  truth  and  then, 
there  was  no  doubt,  the  maximum  effort  would 
In-  forthcoming.  The  tonnage  question  really 
affected  the  life  ot'  every  man,  woman  and 
child  in  the  country. 

Sir  Kwe  Geddee*8  percentages  were  at  first 
a  little  difficult  to  follow,  but  he  stated  that 
details  would  be  published  in  «.  White  Papers 
This  was  issued  on  the  following  day  and 
contained  a  very  great  ileal  of  information. 
It  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  important 
documents  issued  during  the  war,  and  two 
charts  which  accompanied  it  are  reproduced 
in  this  chapter.  In  the  course  of  his  speech 
the    First    Lord    described    and    defended   the 


work  of  the  Controller's  Department,  and 
laid  stress  on  the  importance  of  repair  work. 
There  had  been  an  enormous  increase,  he 
declared,  in  the  output  of  repaired  tonnage. 
"  A  central  organization,"  he  explained,  "  was 
created  in  the  summer  of  1917,  and  the  increase 
in  the  average  weekly  output  of  repaired 
merchant  tonnage  in  February,  1918,  as 
compared  with  August,  1917,  is  80  per  cent. — 
an  increased  repair  output  of  69  merchant  ships, 
representing  no  less  than  237,000  tons  per  week 
in  the  later  months.  This  repair  figure  cannot 
be  too  clearly  grasped  and  understood.  In 
February  we  completed  repairs  to  merchant 
craft  at  an  average  of  160  ships  per  week, 
representing  more;  than  half  a  million  tons." 
He  pointed  out  that  in  order  to  consider 
correctly  and  adequately  the  tonnage  situation r 
it  was  necessary  to  consider  together  three  main 
factors  :  (1)  Patrol  and  other  craft  to  destroy 
submarines  and  to  safeguard  ships  at  sea  ;  (2) 
salvage  and  repair  to  -damaged  ships ;  (3) 
building  of  new  merchant  ships.  He  recalled 
that  members  in  all  parts  of  the  House,  the 
Press,  and  the  public  had  urged  the  Govern- 
ment to  publish  the  facts,  because  these  were 
needed  to  dispel  ignorance  and  to  quicken 
imagination,  so  that  the  country,  including  the 
masters  and  men,  should  thoroughly  realize 
the  position.  He  announced  that  figures  of 
output  would  be  given  monthly  and  that 
returns  of  tonnage  sunk  would  in  future  be 
published  quarterly. 

The  first  of  the  monthly  statements  showing 
the  progress  of  merchant  shipbuilding  was 
issued  on  April  3,  and  showed  the  tonnage  of 
merchant  vessels  completed  in  the  United 
Kingdom  yards,  and  entered  for  service  during 
the  month  of  March,  1918,  compared  with 
preceding  periods.  This  very  interesting  state- 
ment was  as  follows  : — 


Com  - 

Year 

Com- 

Month. 

pletions. 

ending. 

pletions. 

Oros-, 

Gross 

1917. 

tons. 

1917, 

tons. 

March... 

.      118,099 

March  31 

692,225 

April  ... 

(19.711 

April  30 

749,314 

May     ... 

09.773 

May  31 

773,116 

June   b.i 

1(19.847 

June  30 

833,863 

July    ,..          . 

83,073 

July  31 

865,147 

August 

1(12,060 

August  31 

928,4  70 

September 

63,150 

Septomber  30   .. 

957,185 

October 

148  309 

October  31 

1,045,030 

November 

158,826 

November  30   .. 

1,133,330 

December 

112,486 

December  31     .. 

1,163,474 

1918. 

1918. 

January 

58,568 

January  31 

.      1,173,953 

February 

..      100,038 

February  28      .. 

.      1.194.-540 

March... 

..      161,674 

March  31 

.      1,237,515 

THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAB. 


461 


Tina  statement  was  accompanied  by  a 
little  comment  by  the  Controller-General 
of  Merchant  Shipbuilding,  the  first  official 
statement  to  be  issued  by  Lord  Pirrie,  to  the 
effect  that  the  figures  for  March,  161,074  tons. 
constituted  a  "record,"  and  demonstrated  that 
the  workers  had  taken  to  heart  the  anxiety 
caused  by  the  comparatively  low  output  of  • 
January  and  February.  It  was  added  that 
the  men  in  the  shipyards  were  working  loyally 
to  maintain  the  increased  output  of  tonnage, 

A  regular  campaign   of   publicity  was   then 
organized  by  the  Ministry  of  Information  for   , 
the  Admiralty.     This   took   the   form   of   calls 
to  patriotism  in  the  local  J'ress  and  by  posters 
in  the  shipyard  areas,  by  addresses  at  the  yard 
gates  by  sailors  who  had  taken  part  in  naval 
fights  and  by  Labour  Members  of  Parliament, 
and  stimulating  messages  at  the  cinematograph 
theatres.     A  very  striking  poster   was   issued 
immediately    the    March    output    was    known, 
pointing      out     that    the     output     for    March 
amounted  to  161,674  tons — a  "record,"  and  the 
equivalent  of   32  ships   of    5,000  tons — hut  it 
was   added  that   the   shipyard   workers   could 
and  would  prevent  the  Huns  from  starving  the 
nation.      Another     poster     to     the     shipyard 
workers  reproduced  part  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig's 
famous  Special  Order  to  the  British  Army  in 
France  and  Flanders,  published  in  the  United 
Kingdom  on  April   13,   in  which  he  declared 
that  "  the  safety  of  our  homes,  and  the  freedom 
of   mankind    depend    alike   upon   the   conduct 
of  each  one   of  us   at  this  critical   moment." 
The  poster  pointed  out  "  the  message  applies 
equally  to    the  whole  nation,  each  one  of  us 
included,  you  and  each  one  of  you.     The  very 
existence  of  our  gallant  armies  and  the  very 
ixistenceof  the  nation  itself  depends  on  ships  - 
slips  to  carry  supplies  to  the  Army,  ships  to 
fight  with,  ships  to  bring  food  to  the  nation. 
The  nation  knows  that  you  will  do  your  bit 
and  give  her  the  ships."     Another  innovation 
was  a  decision  to  include  in  the  weekly  pay- 
sheets    photographs    of    scenes    at    the    front, 
similar  to  the  pictures  long  issued  with  certain 
brands  of  cigarettes.     On  the  backs  of  these 
photographs  were  messages  to  the  workers.    One 
such  message  on  the  back  of  a  photograph  of  "  a 
full-time  worker  in  the  trenches  "  read:  "  If  '  full- 
time  '  and  '  a  good  day's  work  for  a  good  day's 
pay'  are  the  watchwords  in  our  shipyards,  the 
Him  pirates  will  be  defeated."     The  adminis- 
tration of  this  highly  important  campaign  was 
placed  in  charge  of  Mr.  Wareham  Smith. 


After  the  opening  of  the  great  German 
offensive  on  the  Western  Front  at  the  end  of 
Man  h  a  direct  appeal  was  made  by  Lord  Pirrie 
to  the  shipyard  workers,  in  which  he  pointed 
out  that  the  offensive  had  thrown  an  increased 
burden  on  the  shipping  resources  of  Groat 
Britain  anil  her  Allies.  Enormously  increased 
numbers  of  men  and  supplies  of  munition-'  had 
to  be  transported  to  Fiance  not  only  from  this 


IF 


Full  Time 

ANO 

A  good 
day's  Work 

FOM    A 

good  day's  pay 

ARE  THE. 

watchwords 

IN   OUR 

Shipyards. 

THE 

Hun  Pirates 

WILL  BE. 

Defeated 


ONE    OF    THE    CARDS    ISSUED    WITH 
PAY-SHEETS    IN    THE    SHIPYARDS. 

country  but  also  from  the  United  States.  In 
these  conditions  the  workers  were  asked  to 
redouble  the  splendid  efforts  already  made 
and  thus  to  take  an  almost  direct  part  in 
countering  the  enemy  offensive 

There  was  a  good  deal  of  discussion  through- 
out the  year  respecting  the  principle  of 
standardization,  and  there  was  some  criticism 
on  the  part  of  builders  of  its  adoption.  The 
case  for  its  adoption  was,  however,  put  very 
strongly  by  Sir  George  Carter  at  a  meeting  of 
the  Institution  of  Naval  Architects  held  in 
London  at  the  end  of  March,  and  by  Sir  William 
Rowan  Thomson  in  a  letter  to  The  Times 
published  on  March  35. 

Sir  George  Carter  pointed  out  that  the 
standard  ships,  though  not  all  of  the  same  type, 
had  many  features  in  common.  For  instance, 
similar  sets  of  engines  could  be  fitted  in  ships  of 
different  types,  so  that  apart  from  the  larger 
number  built  of  each  type,  there  was  a  still 
larger  number  into  each  of  which  a  given  set 
of  engines  could  be  placed.  It  might  happen 
that  either  hull  or  machinery  might  be  com- 
pleted in  one  yard  ahead  of  the  other,  and  then 
the  machinery  originally  intended  for  one  ship 
could   be    transferred   to   another,    no   matter 


46-2 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


SALVAGE    WORK    ON    A    TORPEDOED  STEAMER :     RIGGING    A     PUMP. 


where  she  was  being  built.  Such  re-arrange- 
ments were  of  great  assistance  in  preventing, 
on  the  one  hand,  congestion  of  engine  works, 
and  on  the  other  delays  to  vessels  through  the 
machinery  being  behindhand.  Further,  the 
auxiliaries  and  fittings,  including  forgings  and 
castings,  being  alike  in  vessels  of  each  type, 
could  be  ordered  in  large  numbers  from  the 
same  maker  and  used  in  any  ship  or  ships  ready 
to  receive  them.  Sir  George  pointed  out  that 
the  contention  that  if  builders  had  been  allowed 
to  proceed  in  their  own  way  and  to  their  own 
design  the  output  of  ships  would  have  been 
greater  than  it  was  under  standardization 
would  not  bear  examination  when  the  facts 
were  considered  impartially.  There  was  un- 
doubtedly delay  in  the  production  of  standard 
ships,  the  chief  cause  at  one  time  being  shortage 
of  steel.  [Another  reason  was  the  conversion 
of  a  number  of  vessels  originally  designed  as 
ordinary  cargo  steamers  into  oil-tank  vessels, 
owing  to,  the  First  Lord  had  explained  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  "the  disproportionate 
loss  of  tank  tonnage."]  If,  Sir  George  Carter 
contended,  each  builder  had  been  allowed  to 
proceed  with  his  own  type  or  types  of  ships 
this  delay  would  have  been  greater,  as,  in 
addition   to  not  getting   the  amount  of  steel 


required,  the  multitudinous  sections  necessary 
would  have  caused  great  delay  in  rolling  at 
the  steel  mills,  the  output  of  which  was  much 
increased  by  the  simplification  of  sections  in 
the  standard  ships. 

Sir  William  Rowan  Thomson  declared  that 
to  obtain  the  maximum  rate  of  output  of  any 
article,  even  of  hulls  and  engines,  from  a  group 
of  establishments,  it  was  necessary  that  these 
articles  should  be  exact  duplicates  in  every 
respect,  and  no  deviation  in  detail  should  be 
permitted.  Any  delay  in  the  rate  of  output 
while  the  change  was  being  made  from  indi- 
vidual to  standard  construction  was  only  of 
very  short  duration,  and  applied  only  to  the 
first  of  the  new  series.  Once  the  yards  were 
started  on  a  new  design  they  very  quickly 
overtook  any  such  delay  and  obtained  their 
usual  rate  of  output.  Absolute  fidelity  on  the 
part  of  all  hull  and  engine  builders  in  following 
the  standard  pattern  was,  he  maintained, 
necessary  to  ensure  interchangeability,  for 
even  a  very  slight  deviation  on  the  part  of 
either  the  hull  or  engine  builder  frequently 
interfered  with  this  interchangeability  and 
caused  delay. 

Interesting  facts  became  known  respecting 
the    progress    made    with    the    "fabrication" 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


463 


SALVAGE    WORK   ON    A    TORPEDOED    STEAMER:     THE    VESSEL    PARTLY    RAISED. 

The  salvage  tug  is  seen  alongside. 


of  ships  in  the  Uniteil  Kingdom.  As  supplies 
of  steel  and  labour  increased  and  promised  a 
margin  over  and  above  the  requirements  of 
the  existing  controlled  shipyards,  the  idea 
of  standardization  was  carried  a  stage 
further,  and  fabrication,  or  "  super-stan- 
dardization," was  decided  upon.  As  all 
shipbuilding  yards,  engine  factories,  and 
boiler  shops  were  largely  occupied  with  stan- 
dard ship  work,  the  idea  was  to  make  use  of 
other  industrial  establishments  in  inland  centres 
doing  work  closely  resembling  shipbuilding 
and  marine  engineering.  Among  these  works 
were  the  bridge -building  yards  and  land 
engine  factories.  Every  part  of  the  complete 
ship  could  be  fabricated  in  inland  establish- 
ments near  steel  mills,  and  could  be  trans- 
ported by  ordinary  means  to  the  coast.  With 
all  the  slips  in  private  yards  filled,  it  was 
necessary  to  look  elsewhere  for  sites  for  assem- 
bling yards.  The  national  shipyards  on  the 
Bristol  Channel  were  laid  out  for  this  purpose 
and  private  undertakings  of  the  same  character 
were  projected  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
Admiralty.  The  labour  available,  the  bulk  of 
which  was  unskilled,  was  being  trained  in  the 
use  of  pneumatic  riveters  and  caulking  tools, 


and  was  being  made  sufficiently  expert  to  put 
the  assembled  fabricated  ships  together.  It 
was  maintained  that  in  the  strictest  possible 
sense  of  the  term  the  output  of  fabricated 
ships  was  to  be  additional  to  the  output  of 
ordinary  tonnage,  for  it  involved  no  inter- 
ference either  with  the  contract  industry  or  its 
supplies  of  labour  and  materials.  The  State's 
fabricated  ships  enterprise  increased  the 
tonnage  output  by  tapping  new  sources  which 
were  inaccessible  or  impossible  to  the  private 
shipbuilder.  Another  important  development 
was  the  use  of  reinforced  concrete  for  the 
construction  of  mercantile  tonnage,  much 
progress  being  made  with  the  development  of 
this  idea  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United 
States  and  Scandinavia. 

In  a  speech  on  March  6  the  First  Lord  had 
declared  that  "  to  reach  an  ultimate  produc- 
tion at  the  rate  of  3,000,000  tons  per  annum 
was,  he  was  advised,  well  within  the  present 
and  prospective  capacity  of  the  shipbuilding 
yards  and  engineering  shops,  but  that  these 
results  could  not  be  obtained  unless  th?  maxi- 
mum output  was  given  in  every  shipyard  and 
marine  engineering  shop  by  everyone  concerned." 
This  statement  was  reproduced  in  the  White 


164 


THE     TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


l'ii|K'r.  with  the  qualification  that  the  actual 
maximum  output  would  be  1.800,000  tons. 
It  was  therefore  with  nothing  less  than  this 
amount  and  a  gradual  s|>eeding  up  to  a  pro- 
duction at  the  rate  of  3.000.000  tons  that  the 
country  could  he  satisfied.  It  was  to  this  task 
that  the  shipyards  set  themselves,  and  with 
organization  at  the  top  at  last  obviously 
efficient,  and  with  rf  new  spirit  of  emulation  in 
the  shipyards,  encouraged  hy  the  enthusiasm 
in  the  United  States  to  assist  the  Allied  cause 
by  the  rapid  construction  of  tonnage,  the 
omens  in  the  early  spring  months  were  more 
favourable  than  they  had  ever  been. 

It  was  certain  that  there  was  no  room  for 
anything  but  the  exercise  of  the  utmost  good- 
will on  the  part  of  all  concerned  in  the  building 
of  tonnage  and  the  putting  forth  of  the  greatest 
possible  effort.  So  long  as  the  facts  were 
withheld,  there  was  some  reason  for  the  with- 
holding of  the  supreme  effort.  Kmployeis 
found  their  industry  .State-controlled  in  a  way 
that  must  have  often  seemed  irksome  to 
men  who  had  relied  on  their  own  individual 
judgment  and  enterprise  in  the  past, -mid  had 
been  amply  justified  in  the  results.  Ship- 
building is  laborious,  exposed  and  exhausting 
work,  and  only  the  absolute  necessity  of  the 
nation  could  steel  the  employees,  .who  were 
■able  to  earn  in  fewer  working  hours  far  more 
than  they  had  ever  received  in  time  of  peace, 
to  bearing  the  real  and  prolonged  strain  that 
maximum  production  imposed.  The  Ad- 
miralty point<xl  out  in  the  White  Paper  already 
mentioned  that  as  long  as  the  publication  of 
figures  of  tonnage  losses  and  construction 
would  encourage  the  enemy  and  stimulate  his 
eneigies  in  a  dangerous  direction,  they  had 
not  been  able  to  agree  to  publication.  But  the 
figures  published  in  March,  1918,  would  not, 
they  declared,  encourage  the  enemy,  and  they 
i-eeognized  that  the  policy  of  silence  had  had 
the  serious  defect  that  it  failed  sufficiently  to 
impress  upon  the  people  th'j  vital  necessity  for 
individual  and  united  effort  on  their  part  to 
make  good  the  losses  caused  by  enemy  sub- 
marines. They  asserted  that  the  results  of 
1017  had  shown  the  ability  of  British  seamen 


to  get  upon  terms  with  the  submaiine"menaee 
imd  gradually  to  gain  the  upper  hand, 
although  the  results  had  been  achieved  in 
spite  of  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  a  new  and 
barbarous  method  of  warfare  and  of  a  scarcity 
of  suitable  material.  Our  material  resources 
for  this  form  of  warfare  were,  it  was  pointed 
out,  already  improved  and  were  being  rapidly 
augmented,  while  science  was  placing  at  our 
disposal  means  of  defence  and  offence  of  which 
we  had  been  in  need.  The  recent  produc- 
tion of  new  tonnage  had,  after  making  even 
the  most  generous  allowance  for  weather 
conditions,  fallen  so  much  below  the  output 
in  the  last  quarter  of  1917  that,  if  improvement 
were  not  speedily  made,  the  point  where  pro- 
duction balanced  losses  would  be  postponed  to 
a  dangerous  extent,  and  even  when  that  point 
was  reached  we  should  still  have  to  make  good 
the  losses  of  the  post.  It  was  added  that  a 
rapid  and  continuous  increase  in  the  output 
of  merchant  tonnage  would  inevitably  follow 
the  united  efforts  of  all  engaged  in  merchant 
shipbuilding  in  this  country. 

Signs  were  not  wanting  that  these  efforts 
were  immediately  forthcoming.  The  North- 
East  coast  challenged  the  Clyde  to  com- 
petitions in  rapid  production,  and  the  Ad- 
miralty was  known  to  be  at  work  on  plans  for 
stimulating  output  by  competitive  work. 
Belfast,  with  its  plentiful  labour  resources, 
continued  to  produce  magnificent  results. 
The  competitive  spirit  could  not  fail  to  make 
its  strong  appeal  to  the  sporting  instincts  of 
.  British  men  and  women,  while  colouring  all 
the  competition  between  the  British  centres  was 
the  knowledge  that  the  British  workers  were 
fighting  the  enemy  as  finely  in  their  own  way 
as  the  men  who  attacked  Zeebrugge  on  St. 
George's  Day,  1918,  in  the  dashing  enterprise 
devised  to  block  the  channel  through  which 
German  submarines  passed  in  and  out  of  one 
of  their  principal  nests.  No  one  who  knew 
the  quality  of  the  brains  now  directing  opera- 
tions and  the  stamina  of  the  workers  doubted 
the  effectiveness  of  the  reply  to  be  made  by 
the  British  shipyards  to  the  enemy's  brutal 
and  absolutely  ruthless  campaign  at  sea. 


END  OF  VOLUME  FIFTEEN. 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME    XV. 


Adamello  sector,  Italian  success 
in  June,  1917,  401 

Admiralty  :  changes,  1917,  444  ; 
Controllers  of  the  Navy, 
1917,  appointed,  443,  445 

Afghanistan,  neutrality  of,  141- 
143 

Aircraft  :  Allied  on  Western 
Front,  Aug.,  1917,  364,  365, 
374-376,  378,  384  ;  British 
on  Western  Front,  April, 
1917,  43-45,  Mav,  1917,  66, 
July,  1917,  326,  in  Third 
Battle  of  Yprcs,  350,  353, 
354  ;  British  on  North- 
western Frontier  of  India, 
144  ;  French,  aviators  bomb 
Rhine  towns,  194,  on  Wes- 
tern Front,  Aug.,  1917,  396  ; 
Italian,  on  Monte  Ortigara, 
June,  1917,  400;  Messines, 
Battle  of,  actions  before, 
86,  103,  104 

Ajit  Singh,  revolutionary  acti- 
vities, 132,  135 

Albania,  Proclamation  guaran- 
teeing Italian  Protectorate 
of,  June,  1917,  quoted,  402, 
403 

Albricci,  Gen.,  Italian  Front 
proposals  at  Paris  Confer- 
ence, July  25,  1917,  406 

Ali  Faud  Pasha,  commander  of 
Turkish  force  in  Jerusalem, 
169 

Allenby,  Gen.  Sir  E.  :  bio- 
graphical, 207,  208 ;  dis- 
patches quoted,  154,  161, 
102,  165,  166,  169,  170,  171, 
173,  174 ;  on  Western 
Front,  42,  43  ;  appreciation 
of  Gen.  Bultin,  160;  hands 
over  command  of  Third 
Army  to  Sir  Julian  Byng, 
207  ;  takes  over  command 
of  Egyptian  Expeditionary 
Force,  146  ;  thanks  Austra- 
lian engineers  in  Palestine, 
156  ;  plans  for  capture  of 
Jerusalem,  172;  enters 
Jerusalem,  175,  177 ; 
awarded  G.C.M.G.,  174 

Anderson,  Sir  A.,  succeeds  Sir 
E.  Gcddes  as  Navv  Con- 
troller, July,  1917,  445 

Anhovo,  Isonzo  crossed  at,  411 

Anthoine,  Gen.  :  hands  over 
command  of  French  4th 
Army  to  Gen.  Gouraud,  189 ; 
in  command  of  French 
First  Army,  in  Flanders, 
105,  209,  on  Gough's  left, 
July,  1917,  335,  353  ;  ad- 
vance on  the  Steenbeek, 
365.  367 

Anti-tank  batteries,  German,  at 
Messines,  81,  107 

Argentina  :  Buenos  Aires,  anti- 
German  riots  in.  21  :  econo- 
mic conditions,  1914-1917, 
1013;  Luxburg's  activities 
in,  18-23;  neutrality,  25, 
29  ;  reply  to  Germany's 
declaration  of  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare,  26 

Arleux,  Canadians  take,  53 


Armentieres,  German  raid  south 

of,  repulsed   by  Portuguese, 

358 
Arras     front,      British     attack, 

April  28,   1917,  51 
Ascalon,  British  in,  163 
Ashdod,  British  enter,  163 
Asiago  district,  fighting  in,  1917, 

397 
Auja  River,  British  reach,  168 
Avion,  British  occupy,  212 
Avscek  Valley,   fighting  in   the, 

Aug.,  1917,  412 


B 

Badoglio,  Gen.,  in  charge  of 
northern  sector  of  Italian 
operations,  Aug.,  1917,  418 

Bainsizza  Plateau  :  Italian  ad- 
vance on,  Aug.,  1917,  411- 
419  ;  2nd  Army's  advance 
on,  416,  417 

Ball,  Capt.,  British  aviator,  ex- 
ploits and  death,  66 

Barnes,  Mr.,  on  output  of  ton- 
nage, Feb.,  1918;  449 

Batocki,  Heir  von,  resigns  post 
of  German  Food  Controller, 
Aug.,  1917,  302 

Bavaria,  Crown  Prince  of,  in 
command  on  Ypres-Menin 
road,  Aug.,  1917,  383 

Beersheba :  British  attack  on 
and  capture  of,  150-153 ; 
Turkish  defences  at,  148 

Beersheba  -  Jerusalem  railway 
junction,  British  capture, 
166 

Beit  Hanun,  Turkish  defeat  at, 
160 

Bell,  Sir  T.,  Deputy  Cotroller 
for  Dockyards  and  Ship- 
building, 444 

Bcllewaarde  Lake,  fighting  at, 
1917,  346 

Bernstein,  Herr,  criticism  of 
Majority  Socialists,  310 

Bernstorff,  Count,  on  Canada 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
Oct.,  1914,  5 

Besant,  Mrs.,  activities  in  India, 
122,  124,  127-129 

Beth  Horon,  British  reach,  170, 
fighting  at,  171 

Bethlehem,  British  take,  172 

Bethmann  Hollweg,  Herr  von: 
biographical,  298  ;  attitude 
towards  franchise  reform, 
293,  294,  speeches  in  Reich- 
stag, 1916-17,  quoted.  291- 
296  ;  fall  of,  290,  291,  297, 
298 

Bikanir,  Maharajah  of  :  attends 
1  mperial  War  Conference, 
126;  on  Lord  Hardinge, 
118 

Birdwood,  Gen.,  at  Bullecourt, 
65 

Bixschoote,  French  take,  339 

Boesinghe,  Franco-British  cap- 
ture of  support  trenches  at, 
327 

Bohm,  Gen.  von  :  in  command 
of  German  troops  in 
Craonne- Reims  sector,  202  ; 
attack     on     French     lines 

465 


round    Cerny,    Aug.,    1917, 
3D3,  31)4 

Bolivia,  severs  relations  with. 
<  i(  i  many,  30 

Bols,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  L.  J.  :  Chief- 
of-Staff  to  Gen.  Allenby  in 
Palestine.  148  ;  awarded 
the  K.C.M.G.,  174 

Borgbjerg,  M.,  Danish  Socialist  : 
intermediary  between  Ger- 
mans and  Russians,  310; 
conversations  with  Soviet 
quoted,  311 

Boroevic,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
Austrians  at  San  Gabriele, 
Sept.,  1917,  422,  423 

Borton  Pasha,  appointed  Mili- 
tary Governor  in  Jerusalem- 
after  British  occupation, 
175 

Bose,  Mr.  Bhupendranath  : 
appointed  to  Indian  Coun- 
cil in  Whitehall,  128;  on 
British  and  Indian  unity, 
119 

Boselli.  Signor,  Italian  Premier, 
402,  404 

Branting,  M.,  Swedish  Socialist, 
advocate  of  Stockholm  Con- 
ference, 310 

Braz,  Dr.  Wenceslao,  President 
of  Brazil,  policy  of,  35 

Brazil  :  economic  conditions, 
1914-17,  13-15;  German 
colonies  in,  31,  32  ;  severs 
relations  with  Germany,  35  ; 
takes  possession  of  German 
interned  ships,  35  ;  declares 
war  on  Germany,  36 

Brestovica  Valley,  Italian  ad- 
vance and  fighting  in,  Sept., 
1917.  425 

British  Army :  Batteries  in 
Italy,  1917,  426;  Parlia- 
ment's Vote  of  Thanks  to, 
217 

British  Navy  :  Drifters'  fight  in 
Straits  of  Otranto,  May, 
1917,218,219;  operations 
in  Palestine,  150,  154  -r 
Parliament's  Vote  of  Thanks 
to,  217 

Broenbeek,  French  advance  on 
the,  366-369 

Brown,  Brig.-Gen.  C.  .H.  J., 
killed  during  Battle  of 
Messines,  102 

Bulfin,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  E.  S.  :  in 
command  of  force  in  Pales- 
tine, 148  ;  advance  on  Beit 
Hanun,  160  ;  on  the  Joppa- 
Jerusalem  road,  170  ;  awar- 
ded the  K.C.B.,  174 

Bullecourt :  Battle  of,  60-66  ; 
Australians  at.  59—63,  65, 
66  ;  British  advance  on,  59  ; 
British  capture,  66  ;  "Cock- 
chafers "  at,  65 ;  defences 
of,  59,  60 

Byng,  Sir  Julian,  takes  over 
command  of  Third  Army, 
207 


Cadmus,  H.M.S.,  action  in  Singa- 
pore Mutiny,  1915,  139 


466 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


Cadorna,  Gen.  :  Message  to 
Government  on  anti-war 
propaganda  in  Army,  403  ; 
plans  in  second  Italian 
offensive,  1917,  429-432 ; 
on  captures  during  Italian 
Offensive,  July-Sept.,  1917, 
426,  427 

California  Plateau,  fighting  on, 
202,  204-206 

Canada,  hypothetical  case  of 
German  invasion  and  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  5,  6 

Capelle,  Adm.  von,  statement  on 
Wilhelmshaven  "  mutiny  " 
quoted,  304 

Capello,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
Italian  Second  Army,  Aug., 
1917,  418 

Carso  :  Battles  of  the,  Sept., 
1917,424-426;  heavy  fight- 
ing on  the,  Aug.,  1917,  413 

Carson,  Sir  E.  :  resigns  office  of 
First  Lord  of  Admiralty, 
July,  1917,  445;  on  duties 
of  Navy  and  Shipping  Con- 
troller, 444 

Casemates  Plateau,  fighting  on, 
204,  205 

Cavalry  Farm,  British  take  and 
lose,  48,  49 

Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  black  list 
and  enemy  trading,  12 

Cerny,  German  attacks,  200,  202 

Chamberlain,  Mr.  Austen  :  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  India,  124  ; 
policy  and  resignation.  128 

Chauvel,  Maj.-Gcn.  Sir  H.,  in 
command  of  mounted  troops 
in  Palestine,  148 

Chaytor,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
Anzac  Division  in  Palestine, 
153 

Chelmsford,  Lord  :  succeeds 
Lord  Hardinge  as  Viceroy 
of  India,  122;  policy  of, 
124,  120 

Chemin  des  Dames  :  fighting  on, 
June,  1917,  197-207,  Aug., 
1917,  393,  394;  German 
defeats  on,  207 

Cherisy  :  British  progress,  47  ; 
fighting  at,  55,  57 

Chetwode,  Gen.  Sir  P.  :  Gen. 
Allcnby's  appreciation  of, 
147  ;  in  command  of  attack 
on  Beersheba,  150,  151  ;  at 
Sheria,  159  ;  on  Beth  Horon 
fighting,  172  ;  awarded  the 
K.C.B.,  174 

Chiapovano  Valley,  Austrians 
driven  back  to  the,  417 

Chile  :  British  Government  pre- 
sent submarines  to,  15; 
economic  position,  15,  16; 
neutrality,  24,  25,  breaches 
of,  19,  British  violation  and 
apology,  25 ;  opinion  in, 
3,  4 

Clynes,  Mr.  J.  R.  :  appointed 
Parliamentary  Secretary  to 
Ministry  of"  Food,  260; 
work  at  Ministry  of  Food, 
279 

Cojeul  River,  German  defences, 
49 

Col  de  Pommerieux :  Germans 
gain,  1S5;  French  retake, 
188 ;  (German  attempt  to 
recover,  Aug.,  1917,  :!!!"> 

Collard.  Maj.-Gen.  A.  8.,  Deputy 
Controller      for       Auxiliary 


Shipbuilding,  444,  criti- 
cisms of,  445 

Cuba,  declares  war  on  Germany, 
36 

Currie,  Gen.  :  in  command  of 
Canadians  at  Lens,  385, 
386,  388  ;  congratulated  by 
Gen.  Sir  D.  Haig  on  Cana- 
dian successes  at  Lens,  391 

Curzon,  Lord,  on  number  of 
V.C.'s  and  other  awards 
issued,  Oct.,  1917,  217  ;  on 
tonnage  output,  442 

Czernin,  Count,  in  collusion  with 
Count  Hertling  as  to  reply 
to  President  Wilson,  309 


D 

Damm  Strasse,  78,79;  fighting 
in,  95 

Dernburg,  Herr  :  on  Canada  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  5 ; 
eulogy  of  the  German  people, 
318 

Devonport,  Lord :  appointed 
Food  Controller,  255  ;  resig- 
nation, 257 

Djemal  Pasha,  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  Syria,  150 

Douve,  British  cross  the,  100 

Drie  Grachten  bridgehead  : 
Franco-British  preparations 
to  capture,  354  ;  German 
defences  round,  363,  364 

Drocourt-Queant  line,  Germans 
completing,  42,  59 

Duff,  Gen.  Sir  Beauchamp, 
failure  in  MesopotamiaCam- 
paign,  123,  124 


E 

Ecuador  :    opinion  in,  4  ;  severs 
relations  with  Germany,  30 
Ekron,  British  take,  166 
El  Mughar,  Battle  of,  165 
Enemy  Trading  "  Black  List," 

institution  of  the,  12,  13 
Enver  Pasha,  in  Jerusalem,  168 
Erzberger,  Herr,  German  Social- 
ist :   attack  on  the  Govern- 
ment, July,  1917,  296,  297  ; 
on  political   significance   of 
the  strikes,  Feb.,  1918,  314 
Essen,    French   bomb    munition 

works  at,  194 
Et  Tineh  junction,  Australians 
capture,  165 


F 

Falkcnhayn,      Gen.      von :      in 

Syria,    145  ;     in   Jerusalem, 

169 
Ferrero,    Lieut.-Gen.    G.,   issues 

proclamation    guaranteeing 

Italian   Protectorate  of   Al- 

•   bania,  June,  1917,  402.  403 

Flensburg  Trench.  French  attack 

and  capture,  190-194 
Floandi,     drifter,     in     fight     in 

Otranto  Straits,  May,  1917, 

219 
Foch,  Gen.,  reverts  to  strategy 

of  "  limited  offensives,"  182 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles :      British 

progress,  47  ;   failure  at,  50 


Food  Control  and  Rations  in 
Great  Britain,  253-288 

Fortuin,  British  reverse  near, 
371 

Fresnoy,  British  advance  on, 
53,  attack,  55 ;  Germans 
retake,  66 

Frezenberg,  German  forts  round, 
343 

Friedberg,  Herr,  appointed  Vice- 
President  of  the  Prussian 
Ministry,  305 

Froidment  Farm,  fighting  at, 
202 

G 

Gallois,  Sergt.,  French  aviator, 
exploits  of,  194 

Gallwitz,  Gen.  von  :  in  com- 
mand at  Verdun,  June, 
1917,  184  ;  attempt  to  re- 
cover the  Col  de  Pomme- 
rieux, Aug.,  1917,  395 

Gapaard,  78  ;  Australians  cap- 
ture, 105 

Gath,  British  enter,  163 

Gavrelle,  British  capture,  45,  46 

Gavrelle  -  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 
Battle  of,  41-50 

Gaza:  British  feint  attack  de- 
feated, 1917,  150;  British 
occupy,  Nov.,  1917,  160; 
Turkish  defences  in,  148 ; 
Turkish   evacuation,    Nov., 

1917,  159;  Umbrella  Hill 
attacked  by  British,  154 

Geddes,  Sir  E.  :  appointed  Con- 
troller of  the  Navy,  443 ; 
Member  of  the  Board  of 
Admiralty,  444  ;  succeeds 
Sir  E.  Carson  at  Admiralty, 
July,  1917,  445  ;  discloses 
shipping  output  »"id  losses, 
Mar.,  1918,  460  ;  'on  output 
of  tonnage,  Dec,  1917,  448, 
449  ;  on  shipbuilding  la- 
bour, Mar.,  1918,  449,  450 

George  V.,  King  :  on  capture  of 
Jerusalem,  174 ;  visit  to 
the  Front,  July,  1917,  207 

German  Army :  Artillery,  re- 
organization at  Third  Battle 
of  Ypres,  333  ;  Pan-German 
propaganda  in,  303 

German  Crown  Prince  :  in  com- 
mand at  Verdun,  184, 
attacks,  June,  1917,  185; 
attends  Crown  Council,  July 
11,  1917,  297  ;  part  played 
in  fall  of  Bethmann  Holl- 
weg,  298 

German  Navy,  "  Mutiny  "  at 
Wilhelmshaven,  Aug.,  1917, 
304 

Germany:        Aug.,       1916-Feb., 

1918,  289-324  ;  chauvinism, 
growth  of,  316,  317  ;  crime, 
increase  of,  315  ;  Crown 
Councils  held,  July,  1917, 
297  ;  economic  situation. 
winter,  1917-18,  314-316; 
Fatherland  Party,  activities 
of,  317,  318;  Finance, 
fluctuations  of  the  mark, 
316 ;  War  Loans,  results 
of  first  seven,  315  ;  food, 
control,  breakdown  of  the, 
314,  315  ;  rationing  experi- 
ments, 285-287  ;  reduction 
of  bread  ration,  310;  Im- 
perial* Chancellorship,  Beth 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


467 


maun  Hollweg's  regime  and 
fall,  291-298,  Michaelis's 
appointment,  298,  in  office, 
299-306,  Count  Hertling 
appointed,  Nov.,  1917,  306  ; 
Ministry,  HerrZimmermann 
succeeds  Herr  von  Jagow, 
291  ;  naval  "  mutiny  "  at 
Wilhelmshaven,  Aug.,  1917, 
304  ;  Pan-German  propa- 
ganda in,  317  ;  "  peace 
offensive  "  continued,  293  ; 
peace  policy,  Hertling's 
reply  to  President  Wilson 
quoted,  Jan.,  1918,  308, 
309  ;  Prussian  franchise, 
Easter  Rescript  quoted,  295, 
"  reforms,"  293,  298,  "  Re- 
form "  Bills  introduced, 
Nov.,  1917,  308,  Kaiser's 
rescript,  July,  1917,  quoted, 
297  ;  Reichstag,  "  Consti- 
tutional Committee  "  set 
up,  296,  Erzberger  crisis, 
July,  1917,  296,  297,  Minis- 
terial changes,  Aug.,  1917, 
301,  302,  "  Peace  Resolu- 
tion," July  19,  1917,  299- 
301,  "  Peace  Resolution  " 
policy,  Pan-German  and 
Junker  assault  on,  303 ; 
Russian  Revolution,  atti- 
tude towards,  294  ;  Ship- 
ping, Bill  for  Restoration 
of  Mercantile  Marine  passed, 
316;  Socialists,  Conferences 
held  in  Berlin,  Sept.,  1916, 
Jan.,  1917,  310,  "  Majo- 
rity "  and  "  Minority,"  310, 
"  Minority  "  Socialists' 

alleged  implication  in  naval 
"  mutiny,"  302,  negotiations 
with  the  Russians,  310, 
"split,"  Mar.,  1916,  310; 
strikes,  in  Berlin,  April, 
1917,  310,  Jan.,  1918,  313, 
314 ;  submarine  warfare, 
Bethmann  Hollweg's  Note 
quoted,  291  ;  U.S.A.  inter- 
vention, effect  of,  290 ; 
U.S.A.  declares  war  on,  292, 
293 

Glencorse  Wood :  British  re- 
verse, 356 ;  German  resis- 
tance at,  1917,  340;  fight- 
ing in,  Aug.,  1917,  355,  372. 
380,  384 

Godley,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
II.  Anzac  Corps  at  Mes- 
sines,  91 

Gokhale,  Mr.  G.  K.,  113,  114 

Gonnelieu,  British  take,  39 

Gordon,  Gen.  Hamilton,  in  com- 
mand of  IX.  Corps  at 
Messines,  91 

Gough,  Gen.  Sir  Hubert  :  bio- 
graphical, 334,  335  ;  attack 
at  Bullecourt,  55,  61  ;  5th 
Army  moved  to  Flanders, 
208,  operations  in  Flanders, 
July,  1917,  333,  335  ;  5th 
Army  take  Langemarck, 
367-369 ;  reverse  during 
Third  Battle  of  Ypres,  Aug., 
1917,  370,  371 

Gouraud,  Gen.  :  takes  over 
command  of  4th  Army,  189  ; 
on  the  Moronvilliers  heights, 
194-197 

Qowanlea,  drifter,  fight  in  the 
Straits  of  Otranto,  May, 
1917,  218,  219 


Great  Britain  :  Food,  bread, 
State  Subsidy  for,  261,  263, 
control  and  rations,  253- 
288,  Controllers  appointed, 
255,  257,  258,  hoarding  pro- 
secutions, 283-285,  Milling 
Order  issued,  255,  meat 
and  butter  cards,  278-280, 
meat  rationing  schemes, 
276-278,  Ministerial  ap- 
pointments, 260,  prices, 
rise  in,  256,  257,  259,  Pub- 
lic Meals  Order  issued,  255, 
revised,  257,  276,  queues, 
268-271,  276,  rationing, 
effects  of,  282,  scale  of 
voluntary  rations  (table), 
268,  standardized  ninepenny 
loaf,  261,  263,  sugar  cards, 
264-267  ;  Parliament's  Vote 
of  Thanks  to  Navy  and 
Army,  217 

Greenland  Hill  :  British  eject 
Germans  from,  69  ;  British 
progress,  47  ;  fight  at,  53, 
54 

Guatemala,  severs  relations  with 
Germany,  36 

Guemappe  :  British  take,  45  ; 
retire  from  and  retaki ,  4/ 

Guillaumat,  Gen.  :  in  command 
of  2nd  French  Army  at 
Verdun,  184  ;  counter  of- 
fensives at  Verdun,  July, 
1917,  187  ;  prepares  for 
Fourth  Battle  of  Verdun, 
Aug.,  1917,  395 


H 

Haase,  Herr,  forms  "  Social 
Democratic  Labour  Union," 
310 
Haig,  Gen.  Sir  D.  :  strategy  on 
the  Western  Front,  71,  72; 
plans  for  Ypres  and  Flan- 
ders, 1917,  76 ;  original 
plan  reverted  to  after  Ni- 
velle's  failure,  181  ;  issues 
Army  Order,  Aug.  5,  1917, 
353  ;  dispatches  quoted, 
373,  377,  385  ;  on  air  fight- 
ing on  Western  Front,  43, 
44  ;  on  German  system  of 
defence,  329,  330  ;  on  work 
of  Canadians  at  Lens,  391 

Haiti,  severs  relations  with 
Germany,  36 

Hannebeek  Brook,  fighting  on 
the,  1917,  342 

Hardinge,  Lord  :  Viceroy  of 
India,  113-122;  efforts 
against  German  intrigue  in 
India,  116;  leaves  India, 
122 

Har  Dyal,  revolutionary  activi- 
ties of,  132,  134-136 

Hareira  Redoubt,  British  cap- 
ture, 159 

Havrineourt  Wood,  British  cap- 
ture part  of,  50 

Hebron,  Welsh  troops  enter,  172 

Hedjaz,  King  of  :  see  Mecca, 
Sherif  of 

Helfferich,  Herr,  criticism  of, 
303 

Hell  Farm,  British  storm,  99 

Henderson,  Mr.  Arthur  :  advo- 
cate of  Stockholm  Confer- 
ence, 310 ;  resigns  office, 
312 


Herenthage  Chateau :  fighting 
round,  380  ;  British  storm, 
Aug.,  1917,  381 
Hermada  :  Austrian  attack  on, 
Sept.,  1917,  425;  British 
monitors  bombard,  Aug., 
1917,  414  ;  Italian  pro- 
gress in  region  of,  413, 
414 
Hertling,  Count :  biographical, 
307  ;  refuses  Imperial 
Chancellorship,  July,  1917, 
298  ;  dealings  with  Reichs- 
tag before  accepting  Chan- 
cellorship, 305  ;  appointed 
Imperial  Chancellor,  Nov., 
1917,  306;  policy  of,  308, 
309  ;  peace  policy,  reply 
to  President  Wilson  quoted, 
308,  309 
Hill    60 :     British   capture,    94  ; 

German  defences  of,  78 
Hill  70  (Loos)  :    Canadians  cap- 
ture, Aug.,  1917,  359,  360, 
retain,    385-389 ;     strategi- 
cal importance  of,  358 
Hill  304  (Verdun),  fighting  on, 

June,  1917,  185,  186 
Hindenburg,     Gen.     von  :      at 
Crown  Council,  July,  1917, 
297  ;     telegram   to    German 
Chancellor     quoted,      Aug. 
5,  1917,  353 
Hindenburg  Line  :   British  break 
through     near     Bullecourt, 
63,     65  ;      German    trench 
system  on  the,  59 
Hindenburg    Retreat,    devasta- 
tion after,  38,  39 
Hobbs,    Gen.,    in    command    of 
5th  Australian   Division  at 
Bullecourt,  62 
Holland,    Sir    T.,    Chairman    of 
Indian  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 132 
Hollebeke  :     British   take,   349  ; 
German      counter     attack, 
Aug.,  1917,  353 
Holt,  Mr.  R.  D.,  ship  requisition- 
ing  case,    Holt    v.    Maclay, 
438-441 
Honduras,  severs  relations  with 

Germany,  36 
Hooge,  British  take,  1917,  346 
Home,     Gen.  :     operations     at 
Lena,  211-215;    carries  out 
raids  in  Lens  sector,  Aug., 
1917,  357 
Huj,  Yeomanry  charge  at,  161 
Hummer,    Mr.,   Argentine   Vice- 
Consul    at   Dinan,  shot   by 
the  Germans,  25 
Hurtebise     Farm,     fighting     at, 
199-200  ;      Dragon's     Cave 
captured  by  French,  200 
Huysmans,  M.  Camille,  Belgian 
Socialist,  advocate  of  Stock- 
holm Conference,  310 


Imperial  War  Conference,  1917, 
Indian  delegates,  126 

Inchcape,  Lord  :  President  of 
Chamber  of  Shipping,  1918  ; 
on  Sir  J.  Maclay's  requisi- 
tioning scheme,  440 ;  on 
slackness  in  shinbuilding 
yards,  453 

India  during  the  War,  109-144  : 


46S 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


administration  and  the 
Mesopotamia  Campaign, 
122.  123;  All-Indian  Mos- 
lem League  founded,  114; 
Defence  of  India  Act  passed, 
119;  extremist  activities 
in,  124  ;  financial  and  in- 
dustrial prosperity,  130- 
132;  Finance,  War  Loan, 
1910.  126,  127  ;  German 
intrigue  in,  llfi-l!8;.  Ger- 
man  plots,  132-134;  Ghadr 
movement,  134,  136;  137, 
139  ;  German  encourage- 
ment of,  136,  137  ;  Hard- 
inge  Viceroyalty,  113-122  ; 
Imperial  War  Conference, 
•  1917,  representatives  at, 
126;  internal  situation  at 
outbreak  of  war,  ll(i; 
Lahore  conspiracy  trials. 
135 ;  military  effort  of, 
118,  122;  native  disturb- 
ances in,  134-136  ;  North- 
west frontier  incidents,  143, 
144  ;  Pan-Islamic  propa- 
ganda, 117;  politics  in, 
1 10-116,  121,  122;  reform 
schemes  by  Lord  Chelms- 
ford, 124.  126 ;  Turkish 
declaration  of  war,  effect 
in,  139,  140 

Indian  Expeditionary  Force, 
118,  119 

"  Infantry  Hill  "  :  British  take, 
57,  206,  209  ;  Germans 
capture  advanced  outposts 
at,  July,  1917,  326 

Inverness  Copse  :  British  enter, 
381  ;  fighting  round,  1917. 
346,  380,  Aug.,  1917,  372, 
373,  383,  384  ;  German 
resistance  at,  1917,  340 

Irigoyen,  President  of  Argentina, 
attitude  of,  27-29 ;  reia- 
tions  with  Count  Luxbure, 
21,  22 

Isonzo  :  Battle  on  the,  Aug., 
1917,  411  ;  Italians  cross 
between  Tolmino  and  An- 
hovo,  Aug.,  1917,  41 1 

Italian  Army :  Second  Army"s 
advance  on  Bainsizza 
Plateau,  416;  Third  Army 
on  the  Cargo,  425  ,  "  paci- 
fist "  propaganda  in  the,  403 

Italian  Offensive  of  Julv-Sept., 
1917,  397-432  ;  disastrous 
effects  of  Russian  collapse, 
432;  opening  of  the,  411  ; 
Austrian  defence  on  San 
Gabriele,  Sept.  1917,  420- 
422  ;  Italian  captures,  426, 
427  ;  shortage  of  guns  in, 
429  ;  work  of  British  howit- 
zers during  the,  426  ;  re- 
sults of,  429-432 

Italy  :  Albanian  proclamation. 
June,  1917,  criticisms  of, 
403  ;  military  situation, 
June,  1917,  effects  of  Rus- 
sian collapse  on,  405  ;  pro- 
posal to  Allies  for  joint 
offensive  on  Italian  Front, 
406  ;  "  pacifist  "  propa- 
ganda in,  404  :  political 
situation,  June,  1917,  401- 
404 

Izzot  Bey  :  Governor  of  Jeru- 
salem, 169;  destroys  tele- 
graphic instruments  in  Jeru- 
salem. 174 


Jackson,  Rear-Adm..  in  com- 
mand of  naval  operations 
off  Gaza,  150 

Jagow,  Herr  von,  retires  from 
Foreign  Office,  290 

Jelcnik,  fall  of,  Aug.,  1917,  412 

Jerusalem,  Capture  of,  145-180  ; 
Austro-Gcrman  evacuation 
of,  169 ;  British  advance 
on,  168-174,  enter,  Dec, 
1917,  174;  events  pre- 
ceding British  occupation, 
168,  169  ;  Gen.  Allenby's 
.  .  entry  into,  175.  177  ;  atti- 
tude of  Vatican  and  German 
Catholics  towards  British 
occupation,  180 

Jones,  Mr.  Kennedy,  resigns 
Directorship  of  Food  Eco- 
nomy, 261 

Joppa  (Jaffa),  British  occupy, 
168 

Jowett,  Mr.  F.  W.,  captured 
by    National    Seamen    and 

|         Firemen's  Union,  312 

Judean  Hills,  fighting  in  the, 
169-174 

K 

•  Kaiser,  The  :  publishes  Easter 
Rescript  on  franchise  re- 
form, 295  ;  "  reforms  " 
Rescript  quoted,  297  ;  at 
Crown  Councils,  July,  1917, 
297  ;  eulogy  by  Heir  Max 
Bewcr  quoted,  318;  in- 
trigues in  India,  116,  117; 
message  to  Prince  Rup- 
prechton  Battle  of  Gavrelle. 
Fontaine-lez-Croisilles,  50  ; 
telegram  to  Hindenburg, 
fighting  on  Western  Front, 
July,  1917,  207  ;  addresses 
deputations  from  Sixt  von 
Armin's  troops  in  Flanders, 
Aug.  22,  1917,  379 

Katrah,  Battle  of,  165 

Keppel,  Sir  G.  R.,  144 

Kenny,  Maj.  (temp.  Lieut. -Col.) 
W.  D.,  appointed  Military 
Governor  of  Gaza,  160 

Khuweilfeh,  British  capture,  158 

Korite-Selo  line,  Italians  carry 
Austrian  line,  Aug.  1917, 
413 

Kortekeer  Inn,  French  take,  339 

Kostanjevica-Korite  line,  Aus- 
trian attacks  on  the,  425 

Kress  von  Kressenstein,  Gen.  : 
in  command  of  Turkish 
Army  in  Southern  Palestine, 
150;   evacuates  Gaza,  159 

Kiihlmann,  Herr  von  :  dis- 
avowal of  Count  Luxburg, 
22;  succeeds  Herr  Zim- 
mermann  as  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, Aug.,  1917,  302;  on 
replv  to  the  Pope's  Peace 
Note.  302 

Kuryct  ei  Enab,  British  at,  170 


La  Basse  Ville  :  British  capture 
of  and  German  counter 
attack  on,  July,  1917,  327  ; 
New  Zealanders  capture, 
349 


La  Bovclle  Spur,  fighting  on, 
200 

Laffaux  Mill,  fighting  round, 
202 

Laffert,  Gen.  von,  in  command  of 
German  4th  Corps  in  Flan- 
ders, 82,  84 

Langcmarck,  Battle  of,  367-369, 
strategical  results,  369 

Law,  Mr.  Bonar,  on  tonnage 
statistics,  Feb.,  1918,  448 

Law,  Lieut.  C.  J.,  death  in 
Palestine,  160 

Lebrocq,  Gen.,  launches  attack 
at  Verdun,  187,  188 

L'Enfer  Hill,  Ulstermen  reach, 
98 

Lens  :  British  operations  near. 
June,  1917,  211-213,  215; 
raids  in  region  of,  Aug., 
1917,  357-300;  Canadians 
at,  Aug.,  1917,  386-392; 
fighting  round,  April, 
1917,  37,  Aug.,  1917,  385- 
392 ;  German  communi- 
ques on  operations  round, 
212,  213;  Hill  65  seized 
by  British.  211 

Lensch,  Dr.  Paul,  on  peace  by 
understanding,  318 

Lewald,  Herr,  selected  to  con 
trol  "  Constitution  Com- 
mittee" set  up  by  Reichstag. 
296 

Lloyd  George,  Rt.  Hon.  D., 
appoints  Food  Controller, 
255 ;  on  tonnage  output, 
Dec,  1917,  448 

Lombartzyde,  German  success, 
July,  1917,  215,  216 

Lorton,  Peruvian  vessel,  tor- 
pedoed, 36 

Ludendorff,  Gen.  von,  at  Crown 
Council,  July,  1917,  297 

Luxburg,  Count :  activities  in 
Argentina,  18-23,  dispatches 
quoted,  20-22  :  dismissal 
of,  22  ;  interned  in  Argen- 
tina, 23 

Lydda,  Turks  surrender  at,   167 

Lys,  Germans  driven  back  to 
the,  105 

Lys-Steenstraat  line,  German, 
333 


M 

Mardo,  Brazilian  ship,  torpe- 
doed, 36 

MacDonald,  Mr.  Ramsay,  cap- 
tured by  National  Seamen 
and  Firemen*s  Union,  312 

Maelay,  Sir  J.  :  shipbuilding 
programme,  435 ;  on  re- 
quisitioning of  liners,  439, 
440 

Malmaieon  Fort,  fighting  round, 
202,  204 

Mary,  Queen,  visit  to  the  Front, 
July,  1917.  207 

Mecca,  Grand  Shcrif  of  :  revolt 
of,  140 ;  proclaims  inde- 
pendence, 145 

Mchta,  Sir  Pherozshah,  113 

Mesopotamia.  Vincent- Bingley 
Commission,  123 

Mcssines  :  strategical  impor- 
tance of,  75,  76 ;  see  also 
Wvtschacte- Mcssines  Ridge. 
Battle  of,  93-105;  inter- 
vening   fighting     to     Third 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


469 


Battle  of  Yprcs,  181-216; 
Australians  at,  99,  100 ; 
Mr.  Bean's  description 
quoted,  101,  102 ;  British 
captures  and  losses  during, 
102  ;  disposition  of  British 
forces  at,  91  ;  New  Zea- 
landers  at,  99,  100;  plasti- 
cine model  made,  77 

Messines  Ridge,  preparations 
for  attack  on,  70 

Meston,  Sir  J.,  attends  Imperial 
War  Conference,  1917,  126 

Meuse,  French  line  on,  June, 
1917,  182,  183 

Michaelis,  Herr  Georg :  ap- 
pointed Imperial  Chancellor 
July,  1917,  298;  in  office, 
299-306  ;    fall  of,  305 

Mining  operations  on  Western 
Front,  June,  1917,  86-90; 
explosions,  93 

Monchy-le-Preux  :  British  pro- 
gress at,  47  ;  British  take 
Infantry  Hill  near,  209 

Money,  Sir  L.  Chiozza,  Parlia- 
mentary Secretary  to  Minis- 
try of  Shipping,  444  ;  on 
tonnage  losses  and  produc- 
tion, Feb.,  1918,  448,  449 

Monro,  Sir  C,  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief in  India, 
123 

Monroe  Doctrine,  relation  to 
the  War,  4-6  ;  opinion  in 
South  America,  7-9 

Montagu,  Mr.  E.,  Secretary  of 
State  for  India,  127,  128  ; 
policy,  128-130 

Mont  Cornillet  Sector,  opera- 
tions June,  1917,  190-194 

Mont  des  Singes,  fighting  on  the, 
197,  198 

Monte  Protegido,  Argentine  ship, 
sinking  of,  21,  26,  28 

Montnori,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
Italian  Second  Corps,  Aug., 
1917,  418 

Morland,  Gen.,  in  command  of 
X.  Corps  at  Messines,  91 

Moronvilliers  Heights  :  French 
victories,  June,  1917,  189- 
197  ;  Germans  assault 
French  positions  on,  395 

Mort  Homme,  German  gains  on, 
187 

Miiller,  Dr.  Lauro,  Bra7ilian 
Foreign  Minister  :  attitude 
of,  33,  35  ;  resignation, 
May,  1917,  33  ;  on  sinking 
of  the  Par an d,  35 


N 

Nebi  Samwil  :  British  take 
Mosque,  170;  Turks  re- 
pulsed at  Ridge,  171 

Nelson,  British  smack,  sunk  by 
German  submarine,  219- 
221 

Nicaragua,  severs  relations  with 
Germany,  36 

Nieuport  area,  German  success, 
216 

Nivelle,  Gen.,  failure  in  April, 
1917,  effect  on  Allied  strate- 
gy, 181 

Nonne  Boschen  Wood,  fighting 
at,  372 

Nouvelle  Trench,  fighting  round 
the,  193 


0 

Omignon  River,  French  line 
extended  to,  71 

Oosttaverne  Line  :  British  ob- 
jective, 78,  90  ;  attack  on, 
97  ;    British  take,  101 

Oppenheim,  Herr  von,  in  charge 
of  Indian  Bureau  in  Berlin, 
133,  136 

Oppy  :  fighting  at,  53,  54 ; 
British  take  and  lose,  56 

Oppy-Queant  Line,  38  ;  British 
before  the,  55 

Oriana,  Argentine  ship,  sunk,  28 

Orlando,  Signor,  policy  criti- 
cised, 402-404 

Ortigara,  Monte  :  Italians  gain 
and  surrender,  June,  1917, 
397,  399,  400  ;  criticism  of 
Italian  strategy,  400 

Otranto,  Straits  of,  British 
drifters'  fight  in,  May,  1917, 
218,  219 


Palestine  :  Turks'  defensive  pre- 
parations, 148 ;  Turkish 
retreat,  164 

Panama,  severs  relations  with 
Germany,  36 

Parand,  Brazilian  steamer,  sunk, 
33,  35 

Paris  Conference,  July  25,  1917, 
Italian  Front  proposals,405, 
406 

Passchendaele  Ridge,  German 
positions  threatened,  355 

Passo  dell'  Agnella :  Alpini 
occupy,  June,  1917,  397  ; 
Austrian  assault  against. 
June,  1917,  400 

Payer,  Herr  von,  appointed  Vice- 
Chancellor,  305 

Peace  Notes  :  Papal  Note,  text 
quoted,  318,  320,  321  ; 
Italian  comment  on,  407, 
408.  effect  in  Italy  and  on 
Italian  Army,  406-409  ; 
Bavarian  reply,  text  quoted 
324  ;  German  replv,  text 
quoted.  323,  324;  "U.S.A. 
reply,  text  quoted,  321,  323 

Pe^anha,  Senhor  Nilo,  succeeds 
Dr.  Miiller  as  Foreign  Minis- 
ter in  Brazil,  35 

Pelves,  British  failure  at,  46 

Peru,  severg  relations  with 
Germany,  24,  36 

Petain,  Gen.,  reverts  to  strategy 
of  "  limited  offensives,"  182 

Pilkem :  fortifications  around, 
337  ;  Welsh  attack  and 
capture,  337,  339 

"  Pill  boxes  "  :  in  the  Ypres 
salient,  78,  79  ;  in  Third 
Battle  of  Ypres,  1917,  320- 
331 

Pirrie,  Lord  :  Head  of  Harland 
and  Wolff,  454-457  ;  ap- 
pointed Controller  General 
of  Merchant  Shipbuilding, 
Mar.,  1918,  458,  459  ;  on 
shipbuilding  record  figures 
for  Mar.,  1918,  461 

Plava,  Isonzo  crossed,  411 

Plumer,  Gen.  Sir  H.  :  bio- 
graphicalr  84-86  ;  prepara- 
tions for  Messines  Battle, 
70-72 ;      in     command     of 


Second  Army  at  Messines, 
84 ;  support  on  Gough's 
right  in  Flanders,  Julv, 
1917,  335  ;  attack  on  Ypres- 
Menin  road,  Aug.,  1917,  377 

Poelsele  peninsula,  Western 
Front,  French  take,  365 

Polygon  Wood,  British  in,  373 

Pommern  Castle  and  Redoubt : 
German  resistance  at,  343  ; 
work  of  British  tanks  at, 
345 

Pompclle,  Fort  de  la,  fighting 
at,  201 

Pope  Benedict  XV.  :  Peace 
Note,  text  of,  318,  320,  321  ; 
effect  in  Italy,  406-409, 
replies,  321,  323,  324 

Portuguese  troops,  on  Western 
Front,  210,  392 

Primrose,  Capt.  Neil,  killed  in 
Palestine,  167 

Pueyredon,  Sefior,  Argentine 
Foreign  Minister,  relations 
with  Count  Luxburg,  21 


R 

Raeburn,  Sir  W.,  President  of 
Chamber  of  Shipping,  1916- 
1918,  on  decrease  in  pro- 
duction of  shipping,  453 

Ramleh  :  Battle  of,  166,  167  ; 
British  occupy,  167 

Rawlinson,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  move- 
ments of  4th  Army,  208 

Redmond,  Maj.  W.,  death,  97 

Bequin,  French  warship,  in 
Palestine  operations,  150; 
bombards  Gaza,  154 

Rhondda,  Lord :  appointed 
Food  Controller,  257,  258  ; 
statement  on  appointment 
quoted,  259  ;  appoints  local 
Committees,  264  ;  meat 
administration,  274-276 ; 
memorandum  to  local  Com- 
mittees for  food  distribu- 
tion, 272  ;  policy  of  stan- 
dardized flour,  261  ;  prices, 
fixes  maximum  for  food, 
261-263  ;  success  in  Food 
Ministry,  287,  288  ;  on  food 
restrictions,  253  ;  on  reduc- 
tion of  food  prices,  259 

Ribot,  M.,  announces  refusal  of 
passports  for  Stockholm, 
312 

Riencourt,  Australians  at,  63 

Rceux  :  British  attack  on  and 
failure  at,  46,  54  ;  British 
take  and  lose,  55,  67 

Roman  Catholic  Church,  pro- 
German  influence  in  South 
America,  3,  18,  24 

Root,  Senator,  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  Jan.,  1917,  4 

Runciman,  Mr.,  issues  Milling 
Order,  Nov.,  1917,  255 

Rupprecht,  Prince  :  on  Western 
Front,  37,  42 ;  message 
from  Kaiser  on  Battle  of 
Gavrelle  -  Fontaine  -  lez  - 
Croisilles,  50 ;  attempt  to 
re-establish  Hindenburg 
line,  65  ;  in  command  in 
Flanders,  July,  1917,  336; 
defence  of  Lens,  211  ;  in 
Lens  district,  Aug.,  1917, 
391 


470 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


St.    Julien  :      British    take    and 

lose,  341,  342,  retake,  Aug., 

1917,  351  ;    fighting  round, 

Aug.,  1917,  378,  380 

St.  Pierre  Station,  British  bomb, 

69 
St.  Quentin :    German  devasta- 
tion  round,   39,   40 ;     Ger- 
mans set  fire  to  Cathedral, 
393 
San    Domingo,    severs   relations 

with  Germany,  36 
San   Gabriele,   battle  on,   Aug.- 

Sept.,  1917,  419-427 
Santa  Caterina,  Italian  hold  on, 

Aug.,  1917,  419 
Santo,  Monte,  fall  of,  Aug.,  1917, 

415,  416 
Sart   Wood,   British  attack   on, 

47,  48 
Scheidemann,      Herr,      German 
Socialist    Majority    Leader, 
310 
Selo,    Italians    take    village    of, 

Aug.,  1917,  413 
Sensee,  German  lines  on  the,  42 
Sette   Comuni,    fighting  in   the, 

397,  399 
Shechem  road,   British  occupy, 

174 
Shells,     incendiary,      used      by 
British   on    Western  Front, 
107 
Sheria :      British    attack,     157, 
take,  159  ;    Turkish  centre 
smashed  at,  159 
Sheria-Hebron     Line,     Turkish 

entrenchment  on  the,  155 
Shipping,  433-464  :  Advisory 
Shipbuilding  Committee, 
resignation  of  Members, 
Nov.,  1917,  446;  changes 
at  Admiralty,  444  ;  Labour 
problems,  449,  450,  453,  em- 
ployers and  shipyard  trade 
unions,  deputations  wait 
on  Prime  Minister,  1918, 
454,  457,  458,  slackness  in 
building  yards,  453  ;  law 
case,  Holt  v.  Maclay,  438- 
440 ;  Ministry,  work  of 
the,  437-439  ;  national  ship- 
yards, 447  ;  requisitioning, 
State  scheme,  437-441  ; 
Shipbuilding,  Lord  Pirrie 
appointed  Controller  Gene- 
ral of  Merchant  Shipbuild- 
ing, Mar.,  1918,  458,  459, 
Shipbuilding  Advisory  Com- 
mittee, Members  resign, 
Mar.,  1918,  459,  Shipbuild- 
ing Council  under  Navy 
Controller,  formation  of. 
Members,  446,  447  ;  Ship- 
•ping  Controller's  Com- 
mittee, formation  of,  437  ; 
situation  in  1917,  433  ; 
standardized  ships,  461-463: 
tonnage,  output  and  losses, 
434,  435,  figures,  448-450. 
fir.-t  monthly  statement  is- 
sued, Mar.,  1918,  460 
Shipping  Problem  (II.),  433-464 
Shrewsbury      Forest,       German 

resistance  in,  1917,  340 
Siam,    Ohadr    and    pro-German 

movements  in,  136 
Singapore     Mutiny,     1915.     138, 
13!) 


Sinha,  Sir  S.,  122:    at  Imperial 
War  Conference,  1917,  126 
Sixt  von  Armin,  Gen.  :   in  com- 
mand   of    German    Fourth 
Army,  81  ;   in  Flanders,  83, 
353,  365  j   position  on  Pass- 
chendaele  Ridge  threatened, 
Aug.,    1917,   355 ;     counter 
attack      on      Ypres-Menin 
road,  Aug.,  1917,  370 
Smillie,     Mr.     Robert,     refuses 
position  of  Food  Controller, 
258 
Smith,  Sir  F.   E.,  action  in  law 

case,  Holt  v.  Maclay,  440 
Sonnino,  Baron  :    policy  of  and 
criticism,  402  ;    guarantees 
Italian  Protectorate  of  Al- 
bania,    June,     1917,     402, 
criticism  on,  403 
Souchez  :   Canadians  cross  river, 
Aug.,   1917,   390 ;     German 
withdrawal,  212 
South        America,        1914-1917, 
1-36  ;     "  Black    List  "    ir.- 
stituted  in,  12,  13  ;    econo- 
mic  conditions,    1914-1917, 
9-16  ;    German  propaganda 
and     intrigue     in,     16-20 ; 
German    trade    in,    11-16; 
Monroe    Doctrine,    opinion 
in,      7-9  ;        Pan-American 
policy,  8,  9 
Spanbroekmolen     Mine,      firing 

of,  90,  93,  99 
Steenbeek  :  British  cross,  99  ; 
British  reach,  339  ;  French 
cross,  Aug.,  1917,  354  ; 
French  struggle  on,  365  ; 
strategical  results  of  cap- 
ture of,  369 
Steenstraat,  Franco-British 

carry,  July,  1917,  337 
Stirling  Castle,  British  capture, 

346 
Stockholm  Conference :  idea 
launched,  310,  311  ;  invita- 
tions issued,  312 ;  British 
Seamen  and  Firemen's 
Union  refuse  to  take  British 
Socialists  to,  312  ;  French 
Government  refuse  pass- 
ports for,  312 ;  failure  of, 
312,  313 
Submarine  war,  Count  Luxburg 
and  policy  of  "  spurlos  ver- 
senkt,"  20  ;  see  also  "  Ship- 
ping Problem." 
Sweden,  involved  in  Luxburg 
affair,  20 


Taft,  Mr.,  on  Canada  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  6 

Talaat  Bey,  interview  with 
Correspondent  of  Vossiarhe. 
7.eilwng,  Constantinople, 
179,  180 

Tanks,  British :  at  Messines, 
99,  101  :  in  Third  Battle  of 
Yores,  342.  343,  345  :  on 
Western  Front,  Aug.,  1917, 
378,  380,  381  :  in  Palestine, 
154 

Teton,  French  gains  on,  196,  197 

Thomas,  M.  Albert,  advocate  of 
Stockholm  Conference,  310 

Thomson,  Mr.  Graeme,  C.B., 
appointed  Director  of  Trans- 
ports and  Shipping,  437 


Thomson,  Sir  W.  R.  :    resigna- 
tion from  position  of  Direc- 
tor    of      Auxiliary      Ships' 
Engines,    Mar.,   1918,    458 ; 
on  standardized  ships,  Mar.. 
1918,  461,  462 
Tilak,  M.,  activities  in  India,  124 
Tirpitz,  Grand  Adm.  von  :   head 
of  Fatherland  Party,  317  ; 
policy  of  ruthless  submarine 
warfare,  291 
Tolmino,  Isonzo  crossed  at,  411 
Toro,  Argentine  ship,  sunk,  28 
Trescault,  British  capture,  39 
Troelstra,    M.,    Dutch   Socialist, 
advocate  of  Stockholm  Con- 
ference, 310 
Tubantia,  Bolivian  ship,  sunk,  30 


u 

United  States  :  seoures  Luxburg 
dispatches,  20,  21  ;  effect 
of  intervention  on  Germany, 
290  ;  declares  war  on  Ger- 
many, 292,  293 

Uruguav,  severs  relations  with 
Germany,  30,  31 


Vauclerc  Plateau,  fighting  on, 
204-206 

Veldhoek  Ridge,  British  reverse, 
372,  373 

Venezuela  :  economic  conditions 
in,  15,  16;  neutrality  of, 
29,  30 

Verdun  :  fighting  in  June  and 
July,  1917,  183-189;  situa- 
tion in  Aug.,  1917,  395,  396  ; 
French  capture  1st  and  2nd 
German  lines,  July,  1917, 
188,  189  ;  German  Crown 
Prince's  preparations  before 
June,  1917,  184  ;  attack, 
185 

Vert  Wood,  British  attack  on, 
47,  48 

Victoria  Crosses  of  the  War  (1 V.). 
217-252  ;  list  of  recipients, 
250-252 ;  question  of  wo- 
men receiving,  250  ;  system 
of  announcement,  217,  218  ; 
Ackroyd,  temp.  Capt,  H., 
222,  223  ;  Andrew,  Cpl. 
L.  W.,  224  ;  Barratt,  Pte. 
T.,  223 ;  Best-Dunkley, 
Capt.  (temp.  Lieut.-CoU 
B.,  223  :  Birks,  2nd  Lieut! 
F..  233  :  Bishop,  Capt. 
W.  A.,  221,  222  :  Bonner, 
Lieut.  C.  G.,  221  :  Borton, 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  D.,  248  ; 
Bradford,  Brig.-Gen.,  231  ; 
Brown,  Pte.  H.,  228.  229  ; 
Bugden,  Pte.  P.,  237,  239  ; 
Burman,  Sgt.  W.  F.,  231, 
240,  241  ;  Butler,  Pte. 
W.  B.,  230.  231  ;  Bye,  Sgt, 
R.,  223 ;  Campbell,  Capt. 
G.,  221  ;  Carmichael,  Sgt. 
J.,  230 ;  Chavasse,  Capt. 
N.  G.,  224;  Clamp,  Cpl. 
W.,  247>,  Coffin,  Lieut.- 
Col.  (temp.  Brie-Gen.)  C, 
224  ;  Collins,  act.-Cpl.  J.. 
249  ;  Colvin,  2nd  Lieut.  H., 
233,  235  ;  Colyer-Fergusson, 
2nd  Lieut,  (act.  Capt.)  T.  R. 


THE    TIMES    HISTORY    OF    THE    WAR. 


471 


223  ;  Cooper,  Sgt.  E.,  225  ; 
Coverdale,  Sgt.  H.,  249  ; 
Crisp,  Skpr.  Thomas,  219- 
221  ;  Dancox,  Pte.  F.  G., 
237,  239,  240  ;  Davits,  Cpl. 
J.  L.,  223  ;  Day,  Cpl.  S.  J., 
229,  230  ;  Dwyer,  Sgt.  J.  J., 
243  ;  Edwards,  Sgt.  A., 
226;  Edwards,  Pte.  W., 
228;  Egerton,  Cpl.  E.  A., 
242;  Evans,  Maj.  (act. 
Lieut.-Col.)  L.  P.,  240; 
Graham,    Lieut.   J.    R.   N., 

224  ;  Greaves,  act.  Cpl.  P., 
244,  245;  Grimbaldeston, 
Sgt.  W.  H.,  226;  Halton. 
Pte.  A.,  242;  Hamilton, 
Pte.  (act.  L.-Cpl.)  J.  B., 
245  ;  Hanna,  Co.-Sgt.-Maj. 
R.,  233,  235,  236 ;  Hewitt, 
2nd  Lieut.  D.  G.  W.,  225  • 
Hewitt,  L.-Cpl.  W.  H,  237, 
239  ;  Hobson,  Sgt.  F.,  228, 
229;  Hutt,  Pte.  A.,  231, 
246;  Inwood,  Pte.  P».  R., 
243,  244  :  Jeffries,  Capt, 
C.  S.,  247;  Knight,  Sgt. 
A.  J.,  232,  233,  236; 
Konowal,  act.  Cpl.  F.,  242, 
243;  Lafone,  Maj.  A.  M., 
247  ;  Learmouth,  Capt. 
(act.  Maj.)  0.  M.,  232,233; 
Lister,  Sgt.  J.,  237  ;  Loose- 
more,  Pte.  A.,  228  ;  McGee, 
Sgt.  L,  237,  238;  Mcin- 
tosh, Pte.  G.,  224  ;  Mayson, 
Cpl.  (L.-Sgt.)  T.  F.,  227; 
Melvin,  Pte.  C,  245,  246; 
Molyneux,  Sgt.  J.,  244 ; 
Moore,  2nd  Lieut.  M.  S.  S., 
233,  235;    Moyney,  L.-Sgt. 

'  J.,  229,  230 ;  Mugford, 
L.-Cpl.  H,  240-242;  Oc- 
kenden,  Sgt.  J.,  233.  236; 
O'Rourke,  Pte.  M.  J.,  237  ; 
Parsons,  temp.  2nd  Lieut. 
H.  F.,  228,  229  ;  Peeler, 
L.-Cpl.  W.,  242,  243: 
Pitcher,  P.O.  E.,  221,  232  ; 
Rees,  Sgt.  L,  226,  227; 
Reynolds,  temp.  Capt.  H., 
231,  236,  237;  Rhodes, 
L.-Sgt.  J.  H.,  237-239; 
Robertson,  2nd  Lieut.  G, 
246  ;  Room.  Pte.  (act.  L.- 
Cpl.)  F.  G.,  231  ;  Sage,  Pte. 
T.,  231,  249;  Shankland, 
Lieut.  R.,  248,  249  ;  Skin- 
ner, Sgt.  (act.  Co.-Sgt.-Maj.) 
227 :  Strachan,  Lieut.  H., 
248;  Watt,  Skpr.  J.,  218, 
219,  232;  Witham,  Pte. 
T.,  223,  224;  Woodcock, 
Pte.  T.,  229,  230 


Villtrs-Guislain,   British  capture 

village,  38 
Volnik,     Italians     reach,     Aug., 

1917,  417 


w 

Waldow,     Herr     von,    succeeds 
Herr   von   Batocki   as   Ger- 
man Food  Controller,  302 
Wambeke,   German  defence  of, 

78 
Warneton    Line,    79,    Germans 

abandon,  105 
Weizmann,  Dr.,  President  of 
Zionist  Commission  to  Pale- 
stine, 179 
Western  Front :  British  cap- 
tures, April,  1917,  47,  54, 
May,  June,  1917,  69 ; 
French  Offensive,  June, 
July,  1917,  181-207,  Aug., 
1917,  392-396;  German 
official  report  of  June  8, 
1917,  quoted,  106;  rail- 
way communications  im- 
proved, 77  ;  statistics  of 
German  prisoners  to  Aug., 
1917,  383  ;  strategical  posi- 
tion, June,  1917,  73  ;  trans- 
port, improvement  in,  77 
Western  Offensives  of  1917: 
Bullecourt.  37-72 ;  Mes- 
sines,  73-108 ;  Battle  of 
Messines  to  Third  Battle  of 
Ypres,  181-216  ;  Third  Bat- 
tle of  Ypres,  325-396 
Wcsthoek,    British    take,    1917, 

340,  351 
Westhoek    Ridge  :     fighting   on 
the,    1917,    346-348  ;     Ger- 
man counter  attack,  British 
capture,  and  German  second 
counter  attack,  Aug.,  1917, 
353-355  :      Gough    attacks, 
Aug.,  1917,  372 
Wilhelmshaven,      naval      "  mu- 
tiny," Aug.,  1917,  304 
Wilson,  Pres.,  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 6,  7 
Wydendreft,  British  storm,  Aug., 

1917,  367,  369 
Wytechaete,  strategical  impor- 
tance of,  75,  76 
Wytschaete  -  Messines  Ridge  : 
British  mining  operations 
on,  86,  90,  explosions,  93  ; 
British  preparations  for  at- 
tack on,  81-84  ;  German 
defence  of,  79,  80,  82 


Yapp,  Sir  A.,  appointed  Director 

of  Food  Economy,  267 
Yperlee  Canal,  German  defences 

on,  363,  364 
Ypres  :   rearrangement  of  battle 
front   in    district   of,    105 ; 
strategical  position  of,  June, 
1917,  73-76 
Ypres,  the  Third  Battle  of,  325- 
396  ;    Allied  offensive,  pre- 
parations for  combined,  325, 
326 ;     British   preparations 
for,  209 ;    British  prepara- 
tions  for  attack   on   wider 
front,  Aug.,  1917,  376,  377  ; 
Drie  Grachten  defences,  363, 
364  ;     fighting  and  results, 
July    31,     1917.     337-349; 
Franco-British  troops  take 
German     first     line,     337 ; 
Gen.     Haig     issues     Army 
Order,  Aug.  5,   1917,  353; 
German  Army  Order  on  new 
defence    tactics,    June    30, 
1917,     328;      German     ar- 
tillery reorganization,  333  ; 
German      defence     system, 
327-331  ;      German     "  field 
forts  "  used,  361  ;    German 
prisoners'     diaries     quoted, 
352  ;   German  report  quoted 
373,    374  ;      minor    actions 
during,  356,  357,  378,  379 ; 
use   of   "  pill    boxes,"    329- 
331  ;    Portuguese  troops  in, 
358 ;     second   phase   opens, 
359  ;       weather     interrupts 
offensive,  351 
Ypres-Comines      and      Yperlee 
Canals,    German    positions, 
75,  76 
Ypres-Menin  road  :    British  at- 
tacks on,  Aug.,   1917,  380, 
381,   383  ;    Gen.   Plumer  in 
command   of   attack,    377  ; 
British  reverse,  Aug.,  1917, 
370,  371 
Yser      Canal  :        Franco-British 
bridges  across,  337  ;  Franco- 
British  crossing  and  capture 
of    support    trenches    near 
Boesinghe,     327 ;      German 
success,  July,  1917,  215,  216 


Zimmermann,  Herr :  succeeds 
Herr  von  Jagow  as  German 
Foreign  Secretary,  291  ; 
resignation,  Aug.,  1917,  302 

Zionist  Commission  to  Palestine, 
179 


MAPS    AND   DIAGRAMS. 


America,  South  and  Central  2 

Bullecourt  and  environs...  56 

Drie  Grachten       ...  362-364 

German  Defensive  Organi- 
zation, Flanders       ...  330 
Gorizia  to  Gulf  of  Panzano  414 

India  and  Frontiers         ...  110 

Isonzo,  Italian  Offensive  on  410 


Jerusalem,  Approaches  to       164 

Langemarck,    Ypres,    and 

country  round  ...     366 

Lens  and  environs  358,  386 

Messines  and  environs     ...        74 
Mont   Cornillet  and   Mont 
Blond,    Operations   of 
June  21,  1917  ...      190 

Mort  Homme  and  Hill  304, 

Defences  of    ...         ...      184 


Palestine    (Southern)    and 

Philistia  146 

"  Pill  Box,"  Plan  and  Ele- 
vation of        ...  ...     331 


Shipping  Losses  and  Out- 
put (2)  436 

Ypres  and  country  round      208, 

332,  366 

Yser  Canal  215 


ILLUSTRATIONS    IN    VOLUME    XV. 


PORTRAITS. 


FAQ* 

AMI,  Professor  W.  S.     ...  442 

Allenby,  Gen.  Sir  E.        ...  147, 

175,  179 

Anderson,  Sir  Alan  Garrett  437 

Belgians,  King  of  the      ...  334 

Benedict  XV.,  Pope         ...  408 
Bethmann    Hollweg,    Herr 

von      291,  292 

Bikanir,  Maharajah  of     ...  117 

Bissolati,  Sig 404 

Bols,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  L.  J.  174 

Braz,  Dr.  Wenceslao        ...  3 

Brown,  Mr.  James            ...  443 

Cadorna,  Gen.,  and  Staff...  422 

CapeUe,  Adm.  von            ...  305 

Carter,  Sir  George             ...  441 

Chaplin,  Lord       274 

Chelmsford,  Lord 125 

Clvnes,  Mr.  J.  B 261 

Collard,  Maj.-Gen.            ...  439 

Concha,  Dr.  Jose  Vicente  33 

Connaught,  Duke  of         ...  105 
Consumers'  Council,  March, 

1918 279 

Currie,  Lieut.-Cen.  Sir  A.  357 

Djemal  Pasha        ...          ...  151 

Duncan,  Mr.  A.  R.           ...  445 

Ebert,  Herr           304 

Erzberger.  Herr 296 

Falkenhayn,  Gen.  von     ...  169 

Franco,  Dr.  Manuel         ...  26 

Friedberg,  Dr 307 


PAGE 

Gallwitz,  Gen.  von           ...  185 

George  V.,  H.M.  King     ...  207, 

434,  438 

Gomez,  Gen.          ...         ...  31 

Gough,  Gen 334 

Gouraud,  Gen 191 

Guerra,  Don  Jose  N.  Gu- 
tierrez            ...          ...  33 

Guillaumat,  Gen....         185,  186 

Hardinge,  Lord     ...          ...  110 

Henderson,    Sir    Frederick 

Ness 443 

Hertling,  Count 306 

Hindenburg,  Marshal  von  299, 

303 

Holland,  Sir  Thomas  H....  132 

Hunter,  Mr.  Summers     ...  443 

Irigoyen,  Dr.  Hipolito     ...  16 

Keppel,      Lieut.-Col.      Sir 

George  R 143 

Kleine,  Capt 319 

Kiihlmann,  Herr  von       ...  302 

Laffert,  Gen.  von...          ...  83 

Lebocq,  Gen          189 

Luxburg,  Count    ...          ...  22 

Marr,  Mr.  James  ...          ...  444 

Mary,  H.M.  Queen           ...  438 
Mehta,  Sir  Pherozshali    ...  113 
Merchant  Shipbuilding  Ad- 
visory Committee     ...  440 
Meston,  Sir  James  S.       ...  126 

Michael  is,  Herr  Georg     ...  298 

Money,  Sir  Leo  Chiozza  ...  445 

Montagn,  Hon.  Edwin  S.  120 


PAGE 

Morley,  Viscount  ...         ...     114 

O'Dwyer,  Sir  Michael  ...  135 
Orlando,  Sig 404 

Pan  -  American         Union, 

Council  of,  Nov.,  1916  9 

Pardo,  Sr.  Jose     31 

Payer,  Herr  von   ...          ...  307 

Pecanha,  Sr.  Nilo...         ...  35 

Petain,  Gen 207 

Pirrie,  Lord           ...          ...  457 

Plumer,  Gen.  Sir  H.  C.  0.  87 

Primrose,  Capt.  Neil         ...  166 

Prothero,  Mr 274 

Raeburn,  Sir  William      ...  453 

Redmond,  Maj.  W.          ...  99 

Rhondda,  Lady 283 

Rhondda,  Lord     ...         258,  274 

Ross,  Mr.  A.  C 444 

Rowell,  Sir  Herbert          ...  443 

Rozier,  Col 189 

Sanders,  Mr.  C.  J.  0.  ...  439 
Sanfuentes,  Sr.  J.  Luis  ...  19 
Scheidemann,  Herr  ...     304 

Sixt  von  Armin,  Gen.  von       83 
Sonnino,  Baron     ...         403,  408 
Stockholm  Conference,  1917. 
Organizers  of  ...     312 

Thomson,  Sir  Wm.  Rowan     442 

V.C.'s  218-250 

Viera,  Dr.  Feliciano         ...       26 

Weigall,  Mrs 284 


PLACES. 


Adamello  ... 

...     400 

Alternant    ... 

...     394 

Argyrocastro 

...     403 

Ascalon 

...     163 

Asunci6n,  Paraguay 

25 

Bahia  Blanea 

15 

Bangkok    ... 

...     139 

Beersheba 

150,  153 

Berlin         300, 

316,321 

Boesinghe  ... 

210.211 

Buenos  Aires          5-7.  20, 

Bulleeourt 

...       64 

Caulaincourt  Chateau 

...       41 

C'havonnc  ... 

...      198 

Chemin  des  Dames 

187,  188, 

105,  206 

Chiapovano  Valley 

...     428 

Ci  m  a  Dodici 

...     400 

Clyde  Shipyards   ... 

434. 435 

Craonnc 

...     183 

Delhi         111.  112,  115, 

134,  142 

Duino  antl  Trieste 

...     425 

Runes 

...     183 

Gavrelle  Mill 

...       58 

Oan         148.  155,  158. 

150.  162 

Glencorse  Wood    ... 

Hartlepool  Shipyard 
Hooge 

Inverness  Copse    ... 
Isonzo 


...  341 

...  438 
...  346 

...  341 
398,  412 


Jerusalem  173,  175,  176,  178,179 
Joppa         ...  ...  ...     168 

La  Plata 10 

Lens  ...  38,  54,  212,  389 
London,  Imperial  Institute  266 
Luyghem 362 

Madras       119 

Menin  Road  ...379,  384,  385 

Messines     ...    81,  86,  92,  96,  108 
Monchy      ...         ...  ...       49 

Mont  des  Singes   ...  ....    199 

Monte  Santo  416 

Montevideo           ...  12,  13 

Monte  Zebio  399 

Newcastle-on-Tyne     Ship- 
yard  ...         ...  ...  449 

Nieuport 393 

Noordschoote        ...  ...  365 

472 


Oppy  Wood 

Pilkem 

Rio  de  Janeiro 
Rceux 


.       52 
.     107 

28,  34 

,.        47 


St.  Quentin            ...          ...  43 

San    Gabriele    and    Santa 

Caterina         421 

San  Rafael,  Argentina     ...  32 

Santiago  de  Chile...          ...  30 

Santiago  de  Cuba...          ...  18 

Santos        ...          ...          ...  14 

Scarpe  River         ...          ...  42 

Souchez      213 

Steenbeek  ...         ...         ...  354 

Teton  Crest           197 

Tincourt 55 

Tonypandy             269 

Wancourt  ...          ...          ...  51 

Wytsehaete  Ridge              ...  88 


Ypres 
Yser  Canal 

Zillebekc    ... 
Zonncbcke... 


89,  333,  344.  380 
338 

368 

371 


The  Times,  London.  D 

510 

The  Times  history  of  the  war.   .T5 

t.15 


%(:<• 


'Mir. 


■' ,  I ' 


'     V