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Walsh
Philosophy
Collection

PRESENTED /ort.

LIBRARIES of the

UNIVERSITY o/TORONTO

A Holiday with a Hegelian

A Holiday with
a Hegelian

Francis Sedlak

London

A. C. Fifield, 13 Clifford's Inn, E.G.

1911

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD.
PRINTERS, PLVMOUTH

Contents

Chapter
I.

What is Thought ?

Page

II.

God is ...... .

III.

Tears and Laughter .....

IV.

The Problem of Post-mortem Existence

An Introduction to the Science of Logic .

VI.

First Act of Thought (First Cycle) .

VII.

Second Act of Thought (Second and Third
Cycles) .......

VIII.

Comments ......

IX.

Third Act of Thought (Fourth Cycle) .

Fourth Act of Thought :

A. Fifth Cycle ....

Fourth Act of Thought :

B. Sixth Cycle .....

XII.

Fifth Act of Thought (Seventh Cycle)

103

XIII.

Sixth Act of Thought :

A. Eighth Cycle .....

XIV.

Sixth Act of Thought :

B. Ninth Cycle .....

127

XV.

Seventh Act of Thought (Tenth Cycle)

142

XVI.

The Meaning of Planetary Distances .

162

XVII.

Our Destiny ......

179

A Holiday with a Hegelian

CHAPTER I
WHAT IS THOUGHT?

/^NLY a short time ago, a pretence to the knowledge
of absolute Truth would have seemed to me foolish.
Nothing appeared more evident than that our knowledge
must needs remain only relative, and that every endeavour
to transcend facts of observation can result only in a web
of subjective fancies. Not that I was a confessed disciple
of some notable thinker. I read what came to hand, but I
never attached much importance to labels, preferring above
everything else to remain in close touch with sound common-
sense. The various authors I read were to me simply con-
tributors of material to be moulded by my own mental
spontaneity. This may seem conceited ; but let me say
that I have never troubled myself as to whether my en-
deavour to stand on my own legs might strike others as
arrogant or not. Nevertheless, I myself came to realise on
what tottering legs I was trying to steady myself.

I spent my last holiday in an out-of-the-way place in
i\Ioravia. I hired a room in the most decent house in the
\-illage Tetchitse, arranged for my meals in the public-
house, and looked forward to making acquaintance with
the routine and mental horizon of the sturdy Czech popula-
tion. It so happens that I am thoroughly at home in
Russian (as I have frequently occasion to visit Russia), and
once one knows one Slav language, the rest is compara-
tively easy.

8 A Holiday with a Hegelian

The village nestled at the foot of an extensive wood,
covering the slopes of a range of hills. Eastward from the
northern end, there stretched a valley, the recesses of which
roused my exploring instincts the very next morning of my
stay. The valley twisted after a bit slightly towards the
south, and shortly after there disclosed itself on the oppo-
site slope a little cottage. At first sight I thought it might
be the abode of the gamekeeper, and as it was barely seven
o'clock, I decided to wait about on the chance of catching
him starting for his round, as an opportunity to learn some-
thing about the local poachers, or, at least, to learn my way
about.

It was a beautiful morning, and I enjoyed pacing up and
down along the cart-road opposite to the cottage. When-
ever I find myself in some secluded place on the Continent,
I feel as if my whole being were renewed. People who spend
their life in the same rut can never have an idea what a
vivifying effect even a short stay among a strange people
exercises on all one's faculties. It is not so much change of
scenery that appeals to me ; in this respect I am unlike
most Enghshmen. I like to experience vividly a change of
manners, language, temperament, religion— a change, in
short, in mental horizon. When I realise that what in one
country is considered a matter of course, if not a sine qua
non, of hfe — say, the carrying of sleeping garments with us
— is of no consequence in another, I feel strangely free.
_ In watching the cottage and the waving forest on either
side of that remote valley, I could not help musing how
narrow, after all, is individual life. Up till now I had been
quite obHvious of the very existence of these parts. So far
as I was concerned, all has come to be only now. Yet, in
spite of my obhviousness, human hearts were throbbing
here with joy and distress, with hope and despair.

Of course, this goes without saying. Who does not know
that he is not the measure of universal life ? But, then,
why should a vivid realisation of this common reflection
strike one so wondrously ? Why should one start with sur-
prise at the idea that something could happen or exist in
seeming independence of one's own existence and interest ?

Surely, the fascination exercised over our imagination by

What is Thought ?

old castles and remnants of the historic past is at bottom
due to the thrilling wonder that people lived and suffered
even before our birth. One may have passed a particular
place a hundred times in complete indifference ; let it,
however, become known to one that the place was once a
Roman camp or cemetery, and with what interest will one
gaze at it ! Imagination tries to conjure up the dead past.
The idea suddenly presents itself that the place existed
long, long ago when one was not, and one cannot help
feehng astonished again and again, as though the thought
had struck one just for the first time.

In my endeavour to analyse and voice the something
pressing within me for expression, I became quite oblivious
of my surroundings, and did not notice steps approaching
from behind until a pleasant voice roused me from my
self- absorption. " Dobre jUro" (good morning), it was
saying, and, looking up, I saw a man of about forty years
of age, tall as I (six feet), clothed in an easy grey summer
suit, head covered by a wide-brimmed straw hat, from
under which I saw a pair of most sympathetic eyes beaming
at me. The lower portion of his face was covered by a
most luxuriant growth of blonde beard, without hiding
a well-cut mouth. So little prepared was I for this meeting
that I fell into talking English.

" Ah, you are an Englishman ! " exclaimed my new
acquaintance in fluent English. " Perhaps you were
seeking me. Well, if I can be of any use to you, pray
dispose of me. My name is Joseph Veverka."

He was evidently under the impression that I was di-
rected to him as the one person in the neighbourhood with
whom I might converse in my own language. Having
learned of my stay in the village, and the reason of my
pacing up and down before his cottage, he remarked
genially :

" Well, the fact is, my cottage was originally a game-
keeper's abode. Though, however, fate has made me its
occupant, this need not mean your forgoing a ramble
through the wood. Only you will have to do without the
anticipated information about the local poachers. I have
no knowledge of them."

10 A Holiday with a Hegelian

" This is indeed a very fortunate coincidence," said I,
after our preliminary remarks about the weather and a
few nothings. " I had not dreamt of uttering a single
English word for the next month."

" I dare say it must seem astonishing that the very
first person you come across in this seemingly forlorn valley,
far from your country, should speak English," assented
Mr. — or let me say at once, Dr. — Veverka. " But we
Slavs learn languages easily. Moreover, it so happens
that I spent a few months in England some time ago.
And if I am right in guessing, the object of my stay there
was pretty much the same as the object of your stay here."

" I am sure I said nothing to make you guess the reason
of my stay here," I said. " I am curious what you suppose
it to be."

" Well, if you were an admirer of mere scenery," Dr.
Veverka proceeded, " you would have gone to Switzerland,
Tyrol, Norway, or anywhere but here. Hence, your
object is rather to study a strange people."

" Perfectly true," I exclaimed. " And you went to
England to study our character ? It would be interesting
to compare our notes by and by. I am most interested in
knowing what impression we make on others."

" Well, your countrymen do not seem to travel about
with your intention," remarked Dr. Veverka, smiling
suggestively. " I suppose I shall have to correct my
impressions. You, at any rate, like to go beyond mere
particularities of observation."

" If you say anything more," I protested somewhat
shamefacedly, " I shall infer that you are a thought-
reader."

" Oh, I am drawing simple inferences from the avowed
object of your stay here," retorted Dr. Veverka. " A man
cannot have a liking for the study of a strange people unless
he feels himself universal. But suppose even that I could
read thoughts, why should that seem surprising ? "

" Surely, it is not an every-day experience," I replied.
" I read much about it, but to tell the truth, I have been
hitherto rather sceptical on the point."

" Why, pray ? " exclaimed he with vivacity. " You

What is Thought ? 1 1

see we have to talk about something, and since you care
for mere scenery about as much as I do, we may as well
indulge in a philosophical discussion."

" I cannot pretend to being a scholar," I remarked,
" but I undoubtedly like to inquire into metaphysical
problems. And I am, indeed, most interested in the
subject of Thought. I have not yet been able to account
for its raison d'etre satisfactorily. Can you tell me what it is
exactly ? "

" Your question suggests that you are accustomed to
view Thought as though it were an objective thing. So
long as you entertain such an external standpoint towards
it, you cannot, of course, grasp its nature."

" But then, surely. Thought must have some cause ? "
I insisted.

" First of all ask yourself on what authority you make
this assertion," was the reply.

" Well, is it not sheer common sense to suppose that
everything must have a cause ? "

" What do you mean by sheer common sense ? " asked
Dr. Veverka calmly.

" That which everyone recognises as true at first sight,"
I answered.

" And how am I to know that everyone, even were the
experiment of asking everyone feasible, would bear out
what you happen to assert in the name of sheer common
sense ? " Dr. Veverka asked further, with humour.

I felt puzzled. " Do you mean that the assertion that
everything has a cause is questionable ? "

" No, not exactly. I only wish to draw your attention
to the fact that nothing is easier than to elevate any sub-
jective assumption to the rank of sheer common sense.
Such is invariably the case when the criterium of a truly
common-sense standpoint amounts to a more or less naive
expectation that everyone would unhesitatingly accept
our assertion at first sight. This is just what remains to
be proved."

This was fair. I did not know what to say,

" It so happens," proceeded Dr. Veverka, in his genially
serene manner which somehow forced me down to the

12 A Holiday with a Hegelian

position of a learner without intention on his part, " that
the assertion that everything has a cause is quite safe
as regards things, though you could not assert it otherwise
than as a generally accepted verity which j'ou would be
puzzled how to prove to a sceptic. Well, suppose I were to
question it," he added with a twinkle in his eyes, in response
to a somewhat abrupt movement of mine, " what would
be your line of defence ? "

At first sight nothing seemed easier than to confute
the supposed sceptic. On second thoughts, ho^^■ever,
all I had to say amounted, indeed, to a naive expectation
that since the assertion seemed to me self-evident, it
was bound to appear so to everyone else. And as Dr.
Veverka said, this was just what was wanted to be proved.
The assertion had with me only the strength of subjective
certainty.

My companion gave me time, and it was not until he had
rolled a cigarette and smoked a third of it that I inter-
rupted the silence : " Our knowledge can deal only with
the relation between facts, and since these are infinitely
many, our knowledge cannot be more than a limited record
of those which have been already observed. All our asser-
tions are bound to remain open to modification or denial."

" That is to say, you yourself have turned into a sceptic
towards the very assertion which you had to defend,"
Dr. Veverka resumed his good-humoured cannonade of
my position. " I find that you have based your scepticism
on the assumption that our knowledge must needs have the
character of a mere peep at the curtain of the Unknowable,
the veil of Isis. Are you aware that you have thus implied
that Truth is beyond reach ? "

" Such, indeed, is my present conviction," I assented.

" A subjective conviction, of course, open to denial ? "
went on my companion mercilessly''. " You see, your
argument cuts both ways. In the end, j'ou are only
confessing that your standpoint is purely subjective. All
you are justified in asserting is simply this : This or that
seems to me certain or doubtful, but, really, I cannot say
why I hold this view rather than another ; I understand
nothing at all."

What is Thought ? 13

I felt irritated— but at myself, not at Dr. Veverka. As
to him, there was not the faintest suggestion of superiority
in his manner. His words were directed, not to me as a
man, but to the standpoint I had assumed in my argu-
ment ; and it vexed me that I should be such a poor match
for him.

" Well, perhaps j^ou are right," I admitted at last,
reluctantly. " It is no good to pretend to know when one
does not. Nevertheless, I am curious to hear how you
would confute him who would question that everything has
a cause."

" A full proof would consist in a circumstantial realisa-
tion of mental self-development, as is embodied, for in-
stance, in Hegel's Science of Logic, " replied Dr. Veverka.
" This, of course, is at present out of the question. But it
may be pointed out that the category Cause presupposes
a state of things which is not to vary from individual to
individual ; namely, the fact that everything is funda-
mentally a contradiction of seeming self-subsistence and
relativity. In order, then, to advance beyond a naive
trust in common sense, we must realise all that is necessarily
implied in the thought of an actual tiling. You cannot
assume that the nature of Thought varies subjectively;
hence, to prove an assertion, one must show that it is
founded in the very nature of Thought."

" And what if I question whether the nature of Thought
is one and the same for every individual ? " I suggested
inquiringly.

" Then you simply condemn yourself to isolation and
silence," rephed Dr. Veverka, with a shrug of shoulders.
" What use would be any further discussion ? "

" I spoke thoughtlessly," I readily admitted. " Still,
is it not rather one of the most prominent facts that no
two men hold identical views ? Indeed, did not Kant
prove that every endeavour to transcend the region of
facts leads to a cul-de-sac ? "

" By no means," Dr. Veverka replied imperturbably.
" Kant certainly established the fact that argumentation
runs up against contradictions, but that is no cul-de-sac
for our knowledge of truth."

14 A Holiday with a Hegelian

" How not so ? " I exclaimed. " Can Truth be com-
patible with contradiction ? "

" Ah, of course, j^ou take your stand on the law of
Identit5^" retorted my opponent, as if set musing by a
recollection. " You hold that Truth is safeguarded
properly only so long as one confines oneself to statements
like these : A tree is — a tree, God is — God, etc. Did it
ever occur to you to find out what people think of such a
way of speaking the truth ? "

" Well, I myself hold that it amounts to saying just
nothing at all," I hastened to voice what Dr. Veverka
himself implied to be sound common sense. " But since
this is the only way to speak absolute Truth, am I not
justified in saying that whenever one really does commit
oneself to a positive judgment, one at once becomes
subjective ? "

" Not so quick ! " laughed Dr. Veverka. " You imply
that the only way to secure agreement with everyone else
is to say just nothing at all ! "

" I own that I am no match for you," I admitted ruefully.
" But if you are not bored, I should like you to draw my
attention to some of my prepossessions. To get rid of one-
sidedness is my profoundest desire. What do you say is
the cardinal prejudice ? "

" This is hardly a question to be answered in a cut and
dried manner," he replied meditatively. " Prejudices form
really a system, so that each imphes all the rest of them.
Their detection ensues properly only when one has reached
the knowledge of absolute Truth : until then, one is only
exchanging one mental bias for another. If, however,
your question has the sense of what is the cardinal obstacle
to the gaining of mental Freedom, then the reply would
point to instinctive Ego-ism ; that is to say, to that
attitude in which one is swayed by personal considerations
or selfish interests without being even aware of it.

" To make my meaning clear I must add that to get rid
of this instinctive Egoism, it is not enough to profess
altruism. In speaking of an instinctive Egoist, I do not
mean a morally inferior creature, but refer even to a saint,
so far as conduct goes, if his object is merely personal

What is Thought ? 15

holiness. What is wanted is, first of all, to ask oneself,
' What am I ? ' The ' I' is felt as something most sub-
stantial, certain, positive : well, what I mean by instinctive
Egoism is the propensity to allow oneself to be controlled
by this feeling of self without the least attempt to penetrate
it intelligently : to raise it into rational self-realisation,
into Self-knowledge ! "

" And do you mean to say that the answer which people
would give themselves would be ultimately identical ? "
I asked further.

" Ultimately — you say well : ultimately — yes ! No
agreement could be expected in the immediate answers,
as everyone would try to define the Ego in a purely sub-
jective manner, in terms of what would seem subjectively
most fundamental in connection with its existence. The
fact remains, however, that we feel at bottom universal
and free from spatial and temporal restrictions. When
people knock at a door and hear the question, ' Who is it ? '
everyone says instinctively, 'I,' and only afterwards
mentions his name, often with a curious sense of reluctance.^
The Ego is, then, penetrated with the sense of its uni-
versality, and the question, ' What am I ? ' therefore, is
not answered satisfactorily so long as one answers it in
terms of something phenomenal on which the Ego is made
dependent."

" All that falls into the sphere of phenomena," Dr.
Veverka went on after a short pause ; " the ' Not-I ' is,
after all, known only through the ' I.' Hence, the assertion
that the ' I ' stands opposite to something radically
different from it — a something of which it only gets an
idea, but which is taken to be substantially independent
of it — invites doubt and ultimate denial. There is no
getting away from the fact that a radically different ' Not-
I ' presents itself to us as an absolute blankness of every
thinkable determination."

" Perfectly true ! " I exclaimed enthusiastically. " How
simple it all is — I mean the solution of this puzzle which

^ It is, indeed, owing to this sense of reluctance that I have
omitted to mention that my name is Richard Broadway, junior
partner of Broadway and Co., corn merchants, London.

i6 A Holiday with a Hegelian

has for so long exercised my brains : the existence of the
' Not-I ' ! Of course, were it radically different from the
Ego, all that could be said of it would be that it is not.
And to think that Kant did not realise it ! "

" It certainly seems amazing that a mere Nothing
should cause so much worry," continued my companion.
" But, after all, this Nothing is the threshold to Truth,
and so it is well that it should present itself in the shape
of a realm where finite knowledge cannot penetrate.
So far, Kant was in a sense right. His error lay in the
preconception that Thought is per se empty. And this,
again, was due to his omission to trace out the spontaneous
nature of the Ego. Had he tried to find out how categories
are connected in Thought, instead of taking them for
granted as a ready-made content of mind, he would have
realised that his postulated Thing-in-itself is unknowable,
for the simple reason that there is nothing to be known in
it : seeing that it is to be the Not of every determination
of Thought ! In short, he would have discovered that the
Ego is ultimately the very principle of Thought, in cor-
roboration of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum.

" And now you may see the reason of your inability to
account satisfactorily for the raison d'etre of Thought. You
have sought the answer in terms of the ' Not-I,' when
yet the Ego and Thought are one and the same principle.
The only way to answer ' What am I ?' is by answering the
question, ' What is Thought ? ' And the only way to
realise what Thought exactly is, is to think. Now, is this
not a mere platitude ? "

I said nothing, but I seemed to hear the old Thought-
world of mine crushing down into ruin.

CHAPTER II
GOD IS

TT may be that Dr. Veverka realised intuitively that
solitude suited best my mood just then. We had
arrived at a crossing of roads, and, after giving me a plain
instruction about my way back to the village, he excused
himself and departed. " I shall see you before long,"
he remarked, smiling in his charming manner. " For
I take my meals in the same place as you."

And so I found myself alone. My mind seemed to be
at first blank : in any case, I appeared to myself incapable
of a clear thought. I looked mechanically at my watch,
but put it back in its place without having noticed the
time. Presently I tried to shake off my dazed condition.
" The deuce ! What is the matter ? " I murmured.
" What has happened to me ? " A feeling came over me,
as if I had just come into existence, and I was curiously
amazed to find myself alive. Yes, there was a wood about
me. The sun was shining through the leafy roof. I stared
at the trees in an absent-minded mood. Something seemed
to have vanished from my memory, and, try hard as I
would, I could not recollect myself. All that I saw appeared
as a kind of phantasmagoria wrested from the context of
my experience. Only a sense of intense wonder pervaded
me. Was I awake, after all ?

But now there flashed on my mental vision the radiant
smile on Dr. Veverka's face. A wave of a strange joy
welled up in my heart. It was as if I had found the key
that would unlock every mystery. I sighed with relief.
" What a marvellous man ! " I kept on repeating, under
the vivid impression of a mj^sterious something that
surrounded his person, radiated from his eyes, thrilled

B 17

1 8 A Holiday with a Hegelian

in his voice. " Just look at him," I sohloquised, " and
can you help wishing to be with him always ? " I have
not yet been in love ; but if it is true that a mere remem-
brance of the beloved being suffuses everything around
with glory, then I must have fallen in love with Dr. Veverka
— and fallen in love at first sight ! His very presence
appeared like a guarantee of eternal life.

I felt now thoroughly alive and full of joyous energy.
" To think that I could have overlooked such a simple
thing," I went on, reflecting on my past attitude towards the
Unknowable. " Is it not perfectly plain that no one knows
anything about it just because there is nothing in it ? It
is not ! Of course, it is not ! What can you say of it,
if you must not apply to it anything that you can think
of ? Ah, you wish to pretend that it is something, only
a something that cannot be grasped. But look here, you
silly ass," I apostrophised myself merrily, " cannot you
see that you must not speak of the Unknowable even as a
something ? Something is perfectly knowable, a deter-
mination of your own thinking ; and how can you, then,
speak of the Unknowable as a something, if it is to be
altogether outside the pale of your thinking ? After all,
you have even no right to speak of it as Nothing ; for this,
too, is thought. Do we not say that Nothing is ? Do
we not ask, ' What is nothing ? ' That is to say, do we
not acknowledge that Nothing falls within the pale of our
thinking ? But just for that reason, your notion of the
Unknowable is not even a Nothing ! You must not even
ask what it is. What sense is in the question, * What is
the Unknowable ? ' But, then, what is it really ? "

I stopped abruptly, and then burst out laughing. " What,
I am telling you that it is absurd to ask what it is, and you
reply by asking what, then, it is really ? By Jove, you
have got yourself into a nice corner ! Rack your brains,
my dear fehow, as much as you like : this is not a matter
of opinion ! You would not believe it ? Ah, very well,
then, perhaps you will kindly point out him who can
explain what the Unknowable is, if it is to be something
else than a baseless, illogical, altogether inadmissible
monstrosity of thoughtlessness ! "

God Is 19

Suddenly a thought struck me. " Now, is not this
very insistence on reahsing what the Unknowable is, in
spite of a plain and irrefutable demonstration of the
senselessness of such an insistence, only an evidence that
Thought is absolutely all-embracing ? But heavens, how
is it possible that I have ignored all this ? And not I alone,
but people of some repute as Thinkers ? Just think of
Kant, Spencer, Schopenhauer, Haeckel, and crowds and
crowds of people who cannot be called idiots ! Why has
it never occurred to me to challenge boldly the generally
accepted standpoint that Thought is only a kind of ap-
pendage to a solid world of tangible and absolutely self-
subsistent things ? "

But I had only to recall Dr. Veverka's reference to in-
stinctive Ego-ism, and I could now see for myself that the
explanation of the obtuseness which thus caused me no
end of surprise lay truly in a purely instinctive exercise of
reason. " For instance, look at these trees. My first
impression is that they are perfectly independent of mj^self.
I feel myself in a body, and this body is in no direct con-
nection with them, except when I touch them one by one ;
and then I appear only to prove to myself that I am not
a tree. So arises, then, the distinction of the ' I ' and the
' Not-L' But what is the authority for the assumption
that the ' Not-I ' is radically different from the ' I' ? At
best onl}' the first impression that an external object does
not respond directly to my will. As regards my body, I
easily forget its externality, so far as it directly embodies
my will ; and even when it is not quite amenable to my
control, its resistance is not felt by me in the same manner
as the resistance of an external object. It is, then, certainly
a fact that I am less a tree than I am my body : but am I
on that account absolutely different from a tree ? This
could be only the case if the tree were entirely outside the
pale of my being ; but, then, do I not at least see it ?
Is not my sight a connecting link between me and an ex-
ternal object ? Or do I not hear the clanging of bells even
when I cannot see them ? Or do not flowers betray their
presence to my sense of smell ? In analysing the way in
which I know of things, I get simply conceptions of what

20 A Holiday with a Hegelian

I feel, I smell, I taste, I hear, I see ; and however external
things may be, the fact remains that to me they are simply
an array of predicables which are no less mine than theirs.
On what, then, can I base the assumption that apart from
these predicables there is still something in objects which
is beyond my reach ? Knowledge is surely unthinkable
apart from a subject, the knower ; hence, nothing can be
known of an absolutely self-subsistent ' Not-I,' because
such an object cannot have a subject or knower without
ceasing to be absolutely self-subsistent. But just for that
reason it is absurd to talk, as if such an object of No-
knowledge, of Ignorance, were the very substance of things.
The absurdity of such a standpoint can be ignored only
when one refuses to penetrate intelligently the first im-
pression of things, and obstinately insists on treating their
apparent foreignness to us as the most fundamental fact.
Nevertheless, this can be done only so long as one is so
absorbed in a mere staring out that one remains blind to
the reflection that this very foreignness of things is itself
only an impression of the ' I ' which there must be to
begin with."

The more I pondered this point, the more stupefying it
seemed to me that the most glorified advance of modern
science consists just in a wholesale endorsement of such
a grotesque perversion of the very A B C of Self-knowledge.

" On what authority can it be asserted, in sufficient
answer to the question, ' What is Man ? ', that he is a
developed animal ? Is it not plain that the basis is thus
a postulated ' Not-I ', which, although it cannot properly
be even said to be a something, is yet elevated to the rank
of supreme Reality ? The basis is thus truly sought in
Ignorance ! Protoplasm ? Matter ? Why, are not these
terms the result of man's endeavour to understand the
nature of things as they appear to him ? Yet he promptly
leaves this obvious fact out of the question, and converts
himself into a developed monke}^ : allows himself to be
swallowed up by a silly conception of his, raises his own
product to the rank of his God ! A shoemaker might just
as well trace his origin to the boot he had just finished !
No wonder that truth appears to be beyond reach, if it is

God Is 21

to be reached from such an absurd premise. Of course,
how could it be reached by those who elevatej absolute
thoughtlessness, the ' Not-I ', to the rank of the most
fundamental fact of knowledge ? If there is anything
absolutely certain, it is the fact that I cannot think of
myself as if I were not. I cannot possibly experience my
own Non-being ; hence, if I wish to stand on solid facts,
I must in no case postulate a radically different ' Not-I ',
as a warranted premise of sound reasoning. Yet what
a crowd is there of would-be free-thinkers, who thought-
lessly repeat such a blunder, and triumphantly pooh-pooh
the belief in our immortality as a degrading superstition !
Ah yes, we, English people, hate Popery — unless the Pope
is called a man of science ! The orthodox believer views
himself at least in the image of God, the free-thinker
prefers to put in the place of God a mere figment of
his finite mind."

" But wait a bit, old chap ! " I suddenly checked myself
in my elation. " What about the existence of this world ?
Surely, you do not mean to say that it is only a creation
of your mind, a feat of sub-conscious imagining ? After
all, did not Kant, too, realise that aU we know of things
is what we label them ? There is the fact that the world is
mighty httle concerned about what I think of it. I am
not the world : there is no getting away from that. My
dear friend," I remarked, thinking of Dr. Veverka, " we
shall have to talk about that ! After all, one must keep
a cool head on one's shoulders. I am not so quick in
swaHowing everything and anything as all that." ■■ •

" Not so quick ! " I seemed to hear Dr. Veverka's good-
humoured laughter. Did he not use the very words as a
damper to my self-assurance ? Just a moment ago I was
calling myself an empty-headed idiot, and behold me now,
suddenly claiming that I am not quick in swaUowing
non-sense ! Ah, well, Rome was not built in a day, and a
youth cannot become a philosopher in a moment, although
he is ever ready to think so.

It was half-past ten, and I thought it was time to wend
my way towards the vihage. My elated mood returned.

" True, there are points on which I am in the dark.

22 A Holiday with a Hegelian

But this in no wise invalidates the fact that there is no
unknowable ' Not-L' On that point at least, there is not a
shadow of doubt possible — or, rather, rationally admissible,
for I myself have doubted it. If you still doubt," I ad-
dressed myself to an imaginary opponent, " well and good :
doubt just as much that j-ou are alive, or that 2 + 2 = 4 ! "

I felt light, like a bird. What a glorious thing it is to
live, and to know that the universe can have no impene-
trable mystery as to its origin and purpose ! The know-
ledge made me feel, as if I had been born for the second
time.

" Up till now," I was saying to myself, " I have been
only like a worm burrowing in the ground, or like a chry-
salis awaiting emergence into full life : but henceforth I
shall flutter my wings in glorious Freedom ! Truly, truly,
the ' Truth will make you free ! ' "

But suddenly I received, as it were, a stunning blow.
Whilst repeating to myself the oft-quoted scriptural
saying, I realised in a flash, and with terrific intensity,
that God exists for the very reason that I exist : and there
issued from my heart a wave of such an overpowering emo-
tion, mingled with such a heartrending anguish (for in that
very same flash of intuition I also experienced a paralysing
horror at my past, loudly voiced unbelief in, and even
ridicule of, God) that tears swamped my eyes, and, as if
endeavouring to sink into the ground, I threw myself down.

" God be merciful to me a sinner ! " was the only thought
I could formulate, lost in immense grief and choked with
convulsive sobs. But (such is the complexity of our nature
when we acquire the habit of introspection !) the next
moment I seemed to be floating on the crest of my emotion,
and there ensued a regular duel between me and the
abandoned wretch at my feet.

" Get up, old chap ! " I said irritably. " What an actor
you are to be sure ! 'Tis only your wretched self-pity,
you know ! "

But the prostrate self retorted by a still greater flood of
tears.

" You heartless brute ! " he interjected between his
sobs. " Cannot you stop your ridicule, even in this most

God Is 23

solemn hour of my life ? May God have mercy on your
cynical soul."

" What stuff and non-sense ! " was the reply. " The idea
of God taking the slightest interest in your hysterical self-
conceit ! The truth is, you like to cut a pathetic figure in
your own eyes : ' Behold me, crying for mercy — now, is this
not most marvellous ? Am I not like one of the Saints ? '
Oh, shut up, you snivelling idiot ! It is absolutely ridiculous !
Get up, I say : suppose anyone were to see you ! "

I felt a stream of hot blood flooding my cheeks, and the
next moment up I was, looking round anxiously, and
hastily endeavouring to banish every evidence of my
emotion. Yet my heart felt sad. I felt ashamed of crying,
but no less ashamed of the cynicism which some demon
whispered in my ear. But the fear of being surprised by
the game-keeper with my eyes red with weeping overbore
for the moment everything else, and with an effort I
resumed the bearing of self-control on which an Englishman
prides himself most.

" This will have to be looked into ! " I said to myself,
and lighting a cigarette, stepped out quite composedly
towards the village. Indeed, I started humming a merry
song, and when my heart murmured in an undertone,
" You humbug ! " I smiled, as if to say, " Oh well, we shall
see about that ; have no fear ! "

CHAPTER III
TEARS AND LAUGHTER

f^N finding myself once again with Dr. Veverka, I
^^ soon cut short the flow of casual conversation by
asking him as to the why of tears and laughter. "It is
no good saying," I said, " that we laugh because we are
merry, or cry because we suffer pain. I should like to
know how these moods fit in with the true nature of the
Ego."

" Ah yes, I see," nodded Dr. Veverka, stroking his
magnificent beard, whilst his eyes assumed an absent
expression. After spending some little time in this self-
absorption, he replied slowly :

"I see perfectly what you mean, and I am pleased to
find that you endeavour boldly to transcend the stand-
point of mere observation. On the other hand, however,
I must warn you that the answer to your question is still
beyond your grasp, because it implies a thorough ac-
quaintance with the dialectical nature of Thought, not
only in itself, but also in its otherwiseness. All I can do,
so far, is to indicate barely the way towards the full
explanation."

Lest the reader should credit him with a propensity to
patronage, let me emphatically deny that his manner
implied any such attitude. Words conveyed in black and
white often produce a diametrically opposite impression
to that which they give when spoken — and spoken, to boot,
by such a man as he ! What he said was not so much
addressed to myself as it was of the nature of a perfectly
impersonal comment on the matter in hand, which was
made difficult of elucidation by my imperfectly developed
philosophical understanding.

Tears and Laughter 25

" My dear Dr. Veverka," I said, profoundly impressed
by the benevolence which formed a so to speak tangible
background to his words, " I am ashamed of boring you,
but if you knew how I appreciate your kindness . . ."

" Tut, tut," he interrupted me, with a quaint air of self-
depreciation. " Did I not tell you that Philosophy is my
hobby ? You have suggested an interesting problem, and
to tackle problems is my special vice. After all, understand
that I am only a student of Hegel's works, and if anything
I might say appears to you original and profound, I must
ask you to regard me as a mere echo. It would pain me
to usurp, even for a moment, to a stranger, the place of
my great teacher."

He bowed with involuntary reverence in uttering the
last words, and I was startled by the suggestion of deep-felt
humihty in his voice. Ah, yes, Hegel — the deuce ! How
was it that Hegel, for all I knew of him, might have never
existed ?

We were walking slowly through the valley after our
midday meal. The sun was shining brilliantly, and
although the road was shaded by trees, walking seemed
tiring. Dr. Veverka invited me to come and see his
cottage ; but for the time being a rest on soft, green moss,
of which there was abundance, appeared most inviting.
Shortly afterwards I pressed my foot against the trunk
of the tree in front of me, and with hands clasped behind
my head, stared straight up into the leafy shelter above,
leaving the words of my new friend to play on my ears
like an infinitely tender caress of soul. Ah, how my heart
throbs at the memory of that afternoon ! I was far from
my country, but when did I feel so thoroughly at home ?
Well, if I did not then appreciate that time, as it now seems
to me I ought to have done, the reason is due to my
absorption in the subject of our discussion.

" That a philosophical explanation of laughing or crying
presupposes a full grasp of the true nature of the ' I ' is
obvious ; for tears and laughter are particular modes of its
expression. First of all, then, it is necessary to clarify
the notion of the ' I ' from a philosophical standpoint. I
have explained to you already that there is no such thing

26 A Holiday with a Hegelian

as an unknowable ' Not-L' But I am not sure how far
you have succeeded in penetrating intelhgently my remark
that the * I ' is essentially Thought. No term is used more
thoughtlessly than Thought, and I dare say you will be
surprised to hear that it is not Imagination, nor even the
intellectual capacity to formulate statements of facts, or
to solve mathematical problems. To think means to
bear witness to the ideality of every conceivable distinction ;
to be merged in the eternally self-begotten Now ; to be
no longer conscious as an inert ' I ' opposed to an external
world, but to be the all-embracing totality in its absolute
Freedom from subjection to anything but its own self-
revelation ; in short, to be one with God. Unless this is
at least adumbrated, the denial of there being an un-
knowable ' Not-I ' translates itself very easily into the
apparent only alternative that the world is merely a
pageant of subconscious imagining."

" Well, 5'ou know," I exclaimed, " that is the very thing
which has worried me all this time ! The way you can lay
your finger on every weak spot in my mental attitude to
objectivity is simply astounding."

I sat up : this was certainly worth a cigarette.

" Ah, it did worry you ? " smiled Dr. Veverka. " Good,
that shows that you are mentally alive. The fact is, that
unless one has subjected oneself to a most rigid training
in strictly logical thinking, one cannot help remaining under
the sway of the most stupid preconceptions. The pos-
tulated Unknowable is only a confession of the impossi-
bility to comprehend the world through the exercise of
mere imagination. In this case one truly deals only
with appearances : not, however, because the world is a
mere phantasmagoria of imagination, but simply because,
so far, one fails to think it. Imagination can never explain
how the world comes to be, because it seizes on what seems
the ready-made material of the Universe, and is satisfied
with that, whilst Thought is self-regulative even when its
subject-matter is the external world. You have only to
eliminate every subjective assumption and realise what is
strictly logical, what must be admitted as a purely spon-
taneous flow of Thought when beginning has been made

Tears and Laughter 27

with a perfectly universal premise, and you will gradually
establish the raison d'etre of all the distinctions which
constitute the inner and outer world. In this case, it is
not you as the ordinary ' I ' that formulates _ a shaky
theory of the universe, but you as merged in, and identified
with, the very essence of God as the creator and preserver
of all that is ; as the universal 'I.'

" That which Nature forces on the attention of the man
of science : the recognition of a law over which the fanciful
' I ' has no controlling power, which asserts itself for its
own sake, and is nothing but a manifestation of its own
self — this law is the mainspring of logical thought ! Begin
with the least that can be thought at all by anyone, and
if you wish to remain strictly logical, the rest is taken out
of your hands. You cannot begin the system of strictly
logical thinking by sketching in advance a plan of its
structure. You find yourself in the grip of a power which
insists on going its own way with absolute necessity and in
just that way guarantees Absolute Truth on its formal side.
The fanciful ' I ' is, then, truly only a figment of fancy.
Thought, as it were, estranged from itself, or, rather, only
its attempt to estrange itself from itself : which attempt,
however, reveals only its own futility — the futility of
Thought-lessness !— and so is, as to its existence, only a
longing to return !

" That which comprehends all that is, is not the ordinary
' I,' but the T ' which is Thought or God. The ordinary
consciousness fancies an unknowable ' Not-I ' only as a
reflex of its own chnging to a thought-less 'I.' It does not
penetrate to the very essence of the world, because it does
not realise its own focus in Thought ; and so it appears to
itself only as floating on the surface of the Unknowable,
which is its counter for Thought. A philosophical ex-
planation of facts is, therefore, not carried from the stand-
point of the ordinary consciousness, but from that of
strictly logical thought which begins, not with the ' I,' but
with the simplest determination of itself, namely, the notion
of pure Being, since all that can be said of this is Nothing.
The next step consists in the realisation of this unity of
pure Being and Nothing, which no one can help thinking

28 A Holiday with a Hegelian

if he tries to grasp what pure Being is. But so one thinks :
Becoming, which admits only of the distinction of a
Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be, and tliese, in turn, must
be further recognised as resulting in an equilibrium as
Presence ; and so on, quite apart from the likes or dislikes
of the fanciful, whimsical, arbitrary, self-willed, thought-
less ' I.'

" Now, were it feasible to reproduce the system of philo-
sophical Thought at a sitting, we should arrive in due
time at the notion of Sensibility, as the form of the dull
and as yet unconscious existence of the Soul in its healthy
fellowship with the life of its bodily part. That is to say,
we should realise the raison d'etre of Sensation as a transient
aspect of the psychic life. The distinction which Thought
gives itself in its spontaneous activit3^ and which distinction
is at first only as pure Being and Nothing, presents itself
now under the aspect of two spheres of feeling : one,
where what is at first a corporeal affection is inwardised,
and another, where what is at first an inner mood is out-
wardised or embodied. The equilibrium resulting from
the transition of these two spheres into one another is
next grasped in the notion of the soul as a reflected totality
of sensations.

" Since the psychic life is a manifestation of Thought
at a particular stage of its self-determination, the principle
of systematisation for the sensations is to be found
in the characteristic moments of a cycle of thought,
implying generally a simple notion which determines
itself into a pair of opposites and as a contradiction
presses restlessly for its solution in the conclusion. Accord-
ingly the system of external sensations falls under the
three heads of firstly, physical Ideality (seeing and hearing),
secondly, real Difference (smell and taste), and thirdly,
earthly Totality (feeling or touch). As regards the inwardly
originating sensations, their corporisation takes place in
the system of bodily organs corresponding to (a) simple
Sensibihty, (&) Irritabihty, (c) Reproduction.

" Well, now, the reason for laughing or crying lies in the
further necessity also to get rid of the inner sensations, in
connection with the regaining of the total feeling of their

Tears and Laughter 29

transiency. This means that the sensations are to be
embodied in a purely transient way, as the most adequate
expression of their fundamental nature. Such an ex-
pression is procured in Sound, which is generally a purely
transient immediacy. The conscious ' I ' articulates its
content in language, but as Thought, at the stage of psychic
hfe, is as j'et unconscious of itself, its utterance can
betoken only generally the dialectical nature of the voiced
feeling. The shutting out of every contradiction from
itself is voiced by the reflected totality of sensations (i.e.
Soul) in a forcible and intermittent ejection of breath, and
the abstract nature of the regained totality is further em-
phasised by an increased shining of the eyes, the organ of
purely ideal relation to objectivity — there results Laughter.

" We laugh readily at a victim to a perplexity which is
transparent to us or which remains purely external to us.
He who is not interested in anything substantial laughs
at everything that surpasses his own trivial concerns, and
much laughter indicates truly inner emptiness, the lack
of a content capable of or worth articulate expression.
But there is also the case of felt contradiction, when,
namely, the reflected totahty of sensations or the sensient
soul becomes itself entangled in a transient sensation, and
so experiences within its own self that very incongruity
which otherwise would make it laugh. What is voiced
in this case is a feeling of inner disruption, of a tension
which presses for its removal and finally gives way in a fit
of crying when the emotion actually materialises itself and
flows away. The fact that tears form themselves in the
eyes outwardises the suspension of a purely ideal relation-
ship towards objectivity which the soul undergoes during
an inner conflict.

" And just because such a suspension appears also as a
relapse into an inferior condition, a fit of crying awakens
readily a sense of shame, so far as the soul resents its
former entanglement in a limited content as unworthy of
itself as a totality of sensations. So it vindicates its own
essential Ideahty and, once again regaining its unruffled
self-complacency, it finally even jokes at its own expense
by turning its own grief into something ridiculous."

30 A Holiday with a Hegelian

" Perfectly true," was my only comment, although I did
not think it necessary to explain the real background of
the remark — my experience of the morning.

Dr. \^everka, too, seemed to ponder for a while some
experience of his own, but at last he got up, saj'ing apolo-
getically :

" I am afraid my explanation was not as lucid to you
as I wished it to be. But I warned you of the difficulty of
plunging straight away into the heart of things. Com-
prehension comes slowly. . . . Well, let's go."

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF POST-MORTEM
EXISTENCE

AS Dr. Veverka had told me before, his cottage was
"^ originally a gamekeeper's abode. He was only
renting it for the summer, having learned that owing to
the recent removal of its former tenant to another estate,
it was temporarily unoccupied. " I used to spend my
vacations in travelling," he remarked, " but too much dis-
traction exasperates me now." He was a professor of
mathematics in Briinn, the capital of Moravia, and, as he
explained to me, was in the habit of spending his vacations,
lasting from July to October, in some quiet retreat in the
country.

" It is a very nice situation, indeed," I said, looking
about when we arrived at the cottage. " The effect of
sunshine on the forest opposite is simply wonderful."

" Yes, there are few places I have got to like so much.
It is beautiful, and above everything else, quiet. I hate

noise."

There was a httle garden attached to the cottage, but
the ground was, of course, uncultivated. The cottage
itself was most simple in its plan. On the one side of the
entrance passage were two rooms, of which one had to
serve as kitchen, whilst on the other side was a store-
room. Absence of an upper storey was in keeping with the
general style of houses in the country. Dr. Veverka had
to furnish the rooms, and so I was not surprised to find in
them only what was necessary for a short stay. A woman
might have complained of the bareness of the walls ; but
I perfectly agreed with his opinion that provided one has a

32 A Holiday with a Hegelian

bed to sleep in and a table to sit at, one may very well do
without all unnecessary bric-a-brac. The only unnecessary
article was a photo of a beautiful woman on the table
close to the window, on a little stand beside some paper-
covered volumes of Hegel's works, I should have liked
to have known who the woman was, but a feeling of
delicacy restrained me. Noticing, however, that I observed
the photo. Dr. Veverka anticipated my desire. " This is
the photo of my wife," he said simply.

" Ah, so you are married ? " I exclaimed, showing re-
newed interest in the sweet, though rather melancholy
face.

" Yes, married — but a widower," was the reply, and
something in Dr. Veverka's voice touched me to the quick.

" My dear Dr. Veverka ! " I exclaimed, whilst my heart
was thrilling with sympathy. To think that he should
have reason to grieve quite shocked me. Unconsciously I
seized him by the hand and pressed it mutely.

" Thank you," he said, and his face shone with dreamy
tenderness. " Yes, I have been a widower these six years.
Sufficiently long to get accustomed to it. Ah, well, joy
is good, and pain is good. To live means to experience

both "

e*.This grand simplicity in accepting the facts of life
only raised my admiration for him. I should have liked
to say something worthy of the occasion, but racked my
brains in vain. I have never been in love, much less
married : what, then, could I know of how a man feels in
remembering his well-beloved, departed wife ? Moreover,
Dr. Veverka was a philosopher, and his next remark bears
witness to the curious mixture of ordinary human nature
and superhuman detachment with which philosophers
regard those painful personal experiences they share
with the rest of mankind.

" To tell the truth," he said, falling into his easy and
genial manner, " but for the death of my wife, I should
hardly have turned my attention towards Philosophy.
The pain of losing her was in a sense the most useful shock
administered to my instinctive Egoism. So long as one is
happy, one little desires to know oneself, and so remains

Post-mortem Existence 33

merged in one's instinctive nature. The law of growth
does not, consequently, permit of life-long happiness.
Of course, we grumble when grief comes to us, but sooner
or later the comprehension comes that all is for the best.
What is grief, after all, but an entanglement of the soul
in a limited content which is to be transcended ? We feel
our freedom instinctively^ and grief is only the means
of regaining our birthright with full consciousness. In
looking back at my despair when my wife died, I appear to
myself to have been downright impious. Well, I do not
say that I am positively glad of being a widower, but ' Tis
better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at
all ! ' to use the words of your Tennyson."

I indulged in a little private cogitation, staring out of the
window. The sun was just disappearing behind the forest
on the opposite slope of the valley, and the cottage would
soon be enveloped in the receding shadow. Dr. Veverka
was rolling a cigarette absent-mindedly, and so for a time
there was silence.

" If you do not mind," I said at last, " I should like you
to explain to me your view of the post-mortem existence.
I confess that hitherto I have been rather sceptical on this
point. After our discussion this morning, the subject
appeared to me in a different light. I realised that it is
absurd to wish to interpret ourselves in terms of an un-
knowable ' Not-I,' as is done by the current evolutionary
theory, and so it seemed to me quite logical to credit the
* I ' with immortality. Your further explanation, however,
that the 'I,' too, is properly only a figment of fancy, has
again shifted my ground, so that I do not know what to
think."

" Let me emphasise to begin with," answered Dr.
Veverka, " that the statement as to the ' I ' being only a
figment of fancy concerns the ' I ' as credited with definite
existence, apart from all content. In this case, the ' I '
is obviously the same as pure Being ; that is to say, the
same as Nothing. You have only to take your stand by
a simple self-analysis, to realise that the ' I ' is de facto
used only as a subject of definite experience ; and philo-
sophy maintains the same standpoint ; only as the ' I ' is

34 A Holiday with a Hegelian

to be realised in this case in its truth, it is defined in terms
of pure Thought.

' ' Comprehension must always be sought in the system
of strictly logical Thought. And here one learns that there
are three kinds of Being in such an inseparable unity, that
each implies the other two, and is j'et also distinguished
from them. This is a contradiction, but instead of quarrel-
ling whether such a contradiction is at all possible, it is
more in place to try to realise that our very existence is
an illustration thereof.

"When we say One, we naturally think of a particular
thing among the totality of things. But it is obvious that
we cannot think of /\ll-Oneness, i.e. of that Oneness which
is Thought, in the sense of a One, used in counting up
things. We cannot really even think of it as one heap,
composed of all the separately existing things, because we
would thus exclude the bond of perfect unity which is
familiar to us in our Self-feeling. Does not our body
appear to consist of many separate organs and members ?
Yet, are not all these parts felt by us as one body ? And
since Thought (or All-oneness) contains all that is, must it
not equally contain this kind of Oneness which we are
with respect to our bodily existence ?

" We have, then, only to take ourselves as we actually are,
to realise that the existing manifoldness of distinctions
does not clash with the postulated Oneness in Thought.
All perplexity in this connection arises only from inter-
preting All-oneness in the sense of a mathematical unit,
instead of in the sense of our own living Oneness, as a
flux of arising and vanishing distinctions. The doctrine
of Trinity is, after all, nothing but a record of the true
nature of All-oneness : its presumable absurdity is simply
a consequence of the intellectual clinging to the inert,
mathematical One. There could be no clearer illustration
of intellectual absent-mindedness (of the ordinary pro-
pensity simply to stare out and handle appearances without
giving the least thought to him who thus stares out : to
one's own self !) than the vehement pooh-poohing of an
assertion which is demonstrated by our very self-feeling.

" So far as Thought is spontaneously active, it must needs

Post-mortem Existence 35

discern itself within itself. Thinking cannot be realised
otherwise than as a breaking-up of simple Identity into a
Distinction which is next again reconciled in a richer notion.
If it, then, seems that at first one deals only with immediate
Being, the course of spontaneous dialectic proves before
long that the immediate Being is de facto an untenable
contradiction, having its reconcihation in the second kind
of Being, that of Reflection, or in Essence, And since this is
found to have been practically presupposed from the very
beginning, the two kinds of Being are finally realised as
forming truly a negative (i.e. self-active or living) unity
which is the third kind of Being, that of the Notion.

" Since, now, the philosophical treatment of the ignorant
conception of the Ego, as a figment of fancy (as nothing
but an image of the mathematical oneness), in no way
implies a denial of the actuality of a living Individual
who experiences the contradictory nature of Thought,
each of the three kinds of Being is related to a corres-
ponding aspect of our Self, Hence the threefold distinction
of Body, Soul, and Spirit, Bodily or physical Existence
concerns our Experience of the dialectic of the immediate
Being, whilst post-mortem Existence is a compulsory
Experience of the second kind of Being. The third kind
of Being is experienced properly only on reaching full
mental Freedom, from the standpoint of which the dis-
tinction of this and the other world is suspended in the
Eternal Now, or grasped in its true meaning as an eter-
nally arising and vanishing Illusion,

" So long as one remains under the sway of the mathe-
matical conception of Oneness, one naturally identifies the
soul with the body, and denies the post-mortem existence
(whilst the term Spirit appears to stand for no Being at
all). And if a man becomes, so to speak, incapable of
conscious thinking (owing to an exclusive devotion to the
analysis of external facts), every argument concerning the
Soul as also distinct from the Body is wasted on him.
Still, truth does not depend on a " consensus gentium."
Once one awakens to the obvious fact that we are such a
Oneness that it is a flux of spontaneously arising and
vanishing distinctions, one cannot help making the dis-

36 A Holiday with a Hegelian

tinction of the Body and Soul. After all, everyone de
facto does the same thing, whenever he speaks of his body.
In any case, the body often aches, and this it could not
were it not also distinguishable from the soul. Onlj' an
utter tyro in self-analysis cannot realise as much.

" So far as this world is the totality of distinctions only
from the standpoint of the senses, and we know very well
that sensuous objects are reproducible by our imagination,
and so equally may exist imaginatively, it suggests itself
at first sight that there ought to be a counterpart of this
world. And this suggestion is confirmed by the Science of
Logic. In any case, when we realise that Truth exists only
as a flux of distinctions, and that we are founded in Truth —
that we are the truth — ^we must infer that our faculties
have equally a universal aspect. All-oneness, Thought, or
God implies all there is in us, and so, in our faculties, we
only share what must needs have equally a universal
significance. Otherwise, All-oneness would be a meaning-
less word. As a matter of fact, do not our senses presuppose
the world of sense ? And is the universal correspondence of
our capacities to apply only to our senses, i.e. to the lowest
grade of manifested Intelhgence ? By virtue of which
logical principle can it be denied that there is equally
a world of Imagination, i.e. a world of the second kind of
Being, and finally a world of Actuality, or of the third
kind of Being ? Only the mentally stultified calls all that is
beyond this ^^'orld a problem. The belief in another world
is as old as the hills, and it is to be grasped that an instinc-
tive religious belief has a surer basis than a purely in-
tellectual theory : the former arises from the sense of
our full Self, or is founded in our instinctively logical
nature, whilst the latter is always only a matter of eccentric
reasoning, a matter of sophistry, so far as sophistry means
reasoning from absurd premises.

" Can we experience our own annihilation ? Very well,
men of science boast of basing their reasoning on facts of
Experience, yet, as regards our immortality, they assume
absurdly, as if the experience of our annihilation were the
most sohd of all facts. What becomes of the whole problem
when one grasps that we absolutely cannot experience

Post-mortem Existence 37

Unconsciousness, simply because Experience implies
Consciousness ? Undoubtedly we go daily to sleep, but
do we experience our unconsciousness in deep sleep ? Do
we not, after all, only infer that we lose consciousness on
the strength of having seen somebody asleep, i.e. appar-
ently unconscious ? All we are justified in inferring is
that we periodically cease to be aware for some time of
this world. When we cannot remember what we were
doing at a particular time in the past, do we jump to the
conclusion that we were then unconscious ? We are
certain to have been doing something or other, because
we were then alive : very well, is there less certaint}^ that
we are all through our sleep, even when we do not remem-
ber how we spend the time in the other world ?

Our deepest unconsciousness cannot mean a destruction
of our universal Self because this is just this : to make
abstraction from every possible phenomenal distinction !
The blankness of our memory concerning the state of deep
sleep is readily intelligible as a fit of complete self absorp-
tion, as is the case in deep thinking. Being cannot be
thought away, because thought cannot think away its
own Being. Thought itself is. We cannot experience
our beginning or end simply because we, our true Being,
is eternal. Everything apparently unconscious or dead
has for its background a conscious Ego : him who points it
out ! Unconsciousness is not, therefore, a fact of ex-
perience, but an Illusion ; and so far as this illusion counts
as the most solid fact in the sphere of empiricism, men of
science are, to that extent, mere sophists.

" Seeing that All-oneness exists only as a flux of self-
produced distinctions, and we share its nature, we must
live alternately in this and the other world. In a sense, we
live in the other world even whilst living in this world,
so far as we always exercise our imagination. But so long
as we live in this world, we do not reahse the nature of the
other world objectively, because our attention is claimed
by the things of this world. Imagination and Thought
appear, so far, only as an appendage to the life in this
world. Still, we find, even here, that imagination and
thought are equally distinct spheres from that of sense.

38 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Fancy is no less creative than receptive, and pure thinking
is actually quite independent from any sensuous material,
since its object is its own nature. Now, since this sub-
jectively realised distinction between the spheres of our
aspects points to their universal counterpart, our death
in this world means an awakening in the world of imagina-
tion. The Eastern conception of Reincarnation refers to
an alternation between the two worlds (to the Essential
Relation, dealt with in the doctrine of Essence), as a con-
dition of our progress towards full Self-knowledge.

" Of course, this is a very superficial account of all that
may be said on this subject. As you see, all comes back to
the system of strictly logical thought, and before you have
some knowledge of the latter, I can only put before you a
few general conclusions. As the Ego has meaning only
through a content, the realisation of all possible Content
in its truth, i.e. the Science of Logic, obviously must
contain the answer to every possible query as to the Ego.
But, of course, in order to get the answer, the Ego must
be identified with a particular content. Thus instead
of asking vaguely : ' Shall I live after death ? ' one
must ask, ' What is the Body, Soul, Consciousness,
Nature, etc. ? ' Questions which bring the Ego to the
front, as something to be dealt with per se, i.e. apart
from a definite content, are irrational. But just because
thoughtless people are for ever in majority (even
among the professors of philosophy), Hegel appears to
them to have denied the existence of the Ego. Hence
the outcry against him ; hence the pooh-poohing of the
Science of Logic as a string of empty abstractions of no
subjective significance ! And it is, as a rule, in the name
of truth that this grandest revelation of the nature of
God is derided ! But, then, thoughtless people (and the
more letters after a name, the greater, as a rule, the
thoughtlessness !) are given to the naive conceit that
Truth depends on their sanction ! And thus it is not
surprising that every puny whipster fancies himself per-
fectly qualified to discourse glibly on Hegelian fallacies."

CHAPTER V

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE
OF LOGIC

T T was natural that I should desire to make acquaintance
with the system of strictly logical thought, and Dr.
Veverka declared himself willing to give me as many
lessons as I cared to have.

Strictly speaking, thought is always logical. The reason
that people arrive at different conclusions from the same
premises is simply due to carelessness in maintaining pure
continuity of thought, or also to a hazy grasp of the pre-
mises with which beginning is made. Indeed, so long as a
premise is chosen at random in some conception of a com-
plex nature, it cannot be expected that everyone should
grasp identically all that is thus implied in the starting
point. And if it is not clearly realised that purely con-
tinuous thinking must refrain from introducing any further
material from outside, but depend purely on its own spon-
taneity, termed shortly Logic, it is not surprising that
the ordinary reasoning admits only too easily more than is
implied in its premise. It is in this way, then, that the
door is left open to an infinite variety of inferences from
professedly identical premises. The S37stem of pure
thought, or the Science of Logic, is, therefore, necessarily
bound, not only to record pure spontaneity of thought,
i.e. to exclude all falling back on ready-made material
in the sphere of facts, but to begin with a premise which
must needs be thought exactly alike by everyone. So
comes it then, that the Science of Logic begins with pure
Being. The very fact that all that can be said of this is
Nothing, proves that in this way we begin by taking
nothing for granted. However plain the necessity of such

40 A Holiday with a Hegelian

a beginning appeared to me at first sight, I seemed to
grasp it thoroughly only after Dr. Veverka had thrown it
into relief as the final outcome of the ordinary pursuit of
knowledge :

" No matter how long one may be content to take oneself
simply for granted, and spend one's life in an instinctive
exercise of the faculties which are the common heritage
of every man, one awakens sooner or later from this initial
self-indulgence and asks : ' What am I ? ' That is to say,
one comes to realise that it is not enough simply to be,
but that human dignity consists properly in Knowing what
one is. This deepening of self-consciousness is, after all, only
the climax of our attitude to the world in which we live,

"We are not satisfied simply to take notice of things, but
cannot help trying to discover what they are. The least
we must do is to describe their appearance, and the de-
scription records then the result of our comparison of them
in various respects. In this respect, things are alike ; in
another respect, they differ.

" So far, things are credited with independence of us. It
is only we who seem to connect them together in our
consciousness, whilst they themselves appear indifferent
to any relationship. External comparison involves only
that which presents itself in them immediately to view ;
they are compared, first of all, only as regards their colour,
sound, smell, taste, and external shape.

' ' Nevertheless, things are credited also with co-relatedness
in their own self. The next step in our attitude to them
consists in an endeavour to fathom the nature of this their
essential relatedness. Thus we observe the way in which
things act and react on one another. The primary external
comparison of their appearance is succeeded by empiricism,
meant to establish the laws governing their action and
reaction.

"It is plain, however, that, so far, it is overlooked that
the attitude to things is man's attitude to them, and,
consequently, that if the In-itself of things is to be dis-
covered, the share of the experimentor in this research
must not be left out of the question. Things have no labels
attached to them ; whatever is predicated of them is due

The Science of Logic 41

just as much to us as to them. Hence, it is indispensable
that we awaken, sooner or later, from the so-to-speak
absent-minded attitude to things, and include our mental
behaviour in the field of our search for knowledge. But
whilst we thus reach the climax of the external attitude to
things, we still perpetuate the same attitude to the Ego.
Even when already realising that the Ego, too, is at least
a Thing-in-itself, we begin our ascent towards Self-
knowledge by an external observation of the Ego.

" This is the sphere of empirical Psychology. Self-
knowledge amounts here only to a certain measure of
insight into the peculiarities of our character under various
circumstances. The pure nature of the Ego is still hidden,
or has only the form of an hypothesis, the Ego passing as a
rule for a Thing. For this reason, empirical psychology is
incapable of establishing laws of consciousness. Whatever
law is erected concerning the working of the latter, refers
only to a particular mode of consciousness, and conse-
quently lacks the characteristic feature of a law, i.e. the
In-itself of an appearing content.

" For instance, Weber's so-called Law that Stimulation
must increase in geometric proportion in order that
Sensibihty may advance in arithmetical proportion,
concerns properly, firstly, subconsciousness — if con-
sciousness is understood to imply relatedness to an ex-
ternally subsistent objectivity ; and, secondly, even if
Sensibihty could be viewed as a mode of consciousness
proper, said Law would still be quite external to it, because
it expresses only a ratio between the magnitude of stimu-
lation and sensibility, and Magnitude is on the whole an
unessential feature of sensibility, since the latter depends
essentially, not merely on external stimulation, but also
on the presence of a working Soul, and its healthy fellowship
with the hfe of its bodily part.

" The search for the laws of consciousness in the shape
of ratios is abandoned when it dawns on us that the proper
meaning of the Law is in this respect the essential nature of
the Ego. And, when we thus realise ourselves as the Centre
of the universe, we proceed to inquire into the relationship
between the Ego and Things.

42 A Holiday with a Hegelian

" There are things, and the Ego first of all only appre-
hends them by means of the senses, thus acquiring a
figurate Conception of them. But they are next also
examined with respect to their mutual relatedness. The
result of this examination is no longer merely a figurate
Conception, but the grasping of the Essence of things ;
that which cannot be derived simply by means of the
senses, but the ascertainment of which is a matter of
Understanding or Intellect, i.e. the Notion of things.
The Notion is the In-itself of the Ego, as well as of things,
and the essential nature of things is, therefore, not foreign
to the Ego, but identical with its own nature. The pre-
sumably unknowable Thing-in-itself is not a positive con-
tent, setting bounds to our knowledge, but only a Nothing
credited with self -subsistence. So far as the Thing-in-
itself is referred to a cognising Ego, it has a positive sense
only as a circle of existing circumstances which are per-
fectly knowable. And so far as it seems to be just possible
that the Ego does not exhaust the whole content of things
by acquiring the Notion of their properties, this Possibihty
refers to no actual content.

" The apparent cul-de-sac, reached at the critical stage
of Self-knowledge (embodied notably in the Kantian
Philosophy), lands one at the very threshold of true know-
ledge : this takes nothing for granted, and the unknowable
Thing-in-itself is truly Nothing ! All that is required to
enter the realm of pure Thought is to brush off the assumed
self-subsistence of the Nothing, and to think it as the
tabula rasa of all development.

" The negation of the unknowable Thing-in-itself is here
the outcome of a perfectly common-sense attitude to things,
so far as this attitude insists on basing itself on actual
facts. It is a fact that all that we know of things is just
as much proper to them as to the Ego. It is a fact that
even the unknowable Thing-in-itself is only our own
notion ; and since this notion is to imply nothing of what
can enter either in figurate Conception or in Thought, the
assumption of unimaginable and unthinkable properties
can be urged only in the name of abstract Possibility, which
argues just as much absolute Impossibility of the Un-

The Science of Logic 43

knowable. In disposing of this preconception, we directly
emphasise that the Ego or Thought is essentially one and
the same content with things or generally Being. It is a
fact that the Ego has an innate intuition of its universality
and expresses this intuition in its very attitude to things,
treating them instinctively as its Property. From the
standpoint of the essential relatedness of things, it is
equally a fact that their properties are cognised only by
means of categories which the Ego finds within itself a
priori. Space and Time are themselves only moments of
Thought, and it is, in fact, impossible to point out anything
at all without implying an act of Thought.

" We cannot help thinking. To think is our very deter-
minateness as men. But we think, first of all, only in-
stinctively. Conscious thinking refers to the standpoint
which has already superseded the antithesis between
Thought and Being, and, consequentl5^ no longer seeks
Knowledge through an inquiry into the nature of given
things, but directly by means of an examination of the
nature of Thought qua Thought. Things appear to imply
more than Thought ; but the more which Things have
against Thought is only an unessential content : all that
which appeals to senses, which, however, amounts per se
to pure Nothing. Indeed, this unessential content counts
for Nothing in Empiricism itself, so far as the latter aims
at the discovery of natural Laws. Cognition is concerned
with what Things are in themselves, not with a simple
record of the way in which they appeal to our senses. And
since essential properties of Things are in any case a matter
of Thought, an inquiry into the nature of Thought is
eo ipso equally an inquiry into the nature of Being.

" Hegel's Science of Logic is the most thorough inquiry
into the nature of Thought that has ever been published.
The term Logic may seem to be used in various senses,
but these senses amount really to a modification of the
same fundamental meaning pari passu with the stages of
mental development discussed above. Thus, so far as
Logic is supposed to deal only with the formal Laws of
Thought, the standpoint occupied with respect to Thought
is that of a purely external attitude to Things, Thought and

44 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Being being treated as radically different even whilst they
are manifestly also co-related. So far as the purely external
attitude to Things goes, next, over into Empiricism, Logic
is, secondly, taken as ' the science of the operations of the
understanding, which are subservient to the estimation of
evidence' (Mih's Logic, Intr.). This standpoint plainly
aims at harmonising Thought with facts or Being, Thought
being still, however, treated as an appendage to Things
rather than as their true In-itself, In other terms, this
standpoint still ignores that Things are cognised through
the use of categories given in our mind a priori. This point
is recognised in Kant's Transcendental Logic, where a
distinction is made between the general and particular use
of the understanding, the former being again either pure
or applied, so far as empirical conditions under which the
understanding is exercised are either abstracted from or
retained. The Applied Logic has been recently elaborated
into a whole system by Prof. Baldwin, but it is plain that
Thought remains thus still only as what is found ready to
hand : the principle of a systematic co-relation is not yet
sought directly in Thought's own spontaneity, but in
psychologic or utilitarian interest. Full recognition of the
unity of Thought and Being is only the starting-point of
Hegel's Science of Logic.

" Any objections to this standpoint amount simply to a
relapse into one of the preliminary attitudes to objectivity.
So far as the unity of Thought and Being appears as
assumed, attention is to be drawn to the circumstance that
this assumption has the vahdity of a statement of fact.
As Hegel himself says in his Introduction to the Science of
Logic, the only justification of which its premise is capable
before its proper substantiation within the Logic itself, is its
necessary appearance in Consciousness. Since the Science
of Logic expounds the nature of Thought in its purity, its
beginning must take up the final result of the development
of Consciousness, and this result amounts to a recognition
of the unity of Thought and Being as a fact of Conscious-
ness. Prof. Baldwin's objection that Hegel unjustifiably
anticipates the nature of ' Reahty ' is, therefore, untenable.

" Even were the object of the Science of Logic traced

The Science of Logic 45

simply to a capricious resolve to dog the dialectic which
unfolds the nature of Thought in its spontaneity, its
beginning would still have to be sought in the simplest
notion, or rather in an attempt to think this simplest notion,
because, as will be reahsed, the simplest notion of the
unity of Thought and Being is already the outcome of the
first act of Thought. In this attempt we should have
to abstract from everything that admits of a distinction
between definite Content and Form. For otherwise, we
would begin with something analysable, or the beginning
would already embody a more or less concrete form of
Thought, whilst it yet should imply no progress made in
knowing, no achieved act of Thought. Hence, the beginning
must be the beginning of the very first act of Cognition :
and before anything else we must clearly think, first of all.
Being qua Being, i.e. pure Being. And as we must think
pure Being because of our determination to make an
abstraction from all determinateness, pure Being is
avowedly the same vacuity of content as pure Nothing.

" To decry this unity of Being and Nothing as something
taken quite gratuitously for granted is obviously most
unfair. Hegel is thus taken to task, as a common conjurer,
for doing what he plainly must do : what must be done by
everybody who wishes to perform the very first act of
Thought ! In taking up the final result of our ordinary
attitude to objectivity, we start ^^ith the notion of the
unity of Thought and Being ; that is to say, with the notion
of Truth. But since this notion is to receive its full import
only by a dialectic consideration of the nature of Being,
the task of the verification of the notion of Truth must
begin with an attempt to think pure Being or Nothing.

" This may be also stated thus : An exposition of
absolute Truth must take Nothing for granted ; and so far
as the exposition amounts immediately to an inquiry
into the nature of Being, Being must be in the beginning
only another word for Nothing : hence, pure Being. An
objection to this synonymy would have sense only if
Nothing and Being had a concrete meaning, which, how-
ever, they expressly have not. The distinction between
them is, consequently, purely nominal : the same vacuity

46 A Holiday with a Hegelian

of content is named twice necessarily, because the notion
of Truth imphes distinction. Distinctions there mani-
festly are ; hence, the notion of Truth is unthinkable as
a pure Oneness, and so it happens that the very vacuity
of all content, or the very attempt to think the simplest
notion, gives rise to the nominal distinction of Being and
Nothing.

" But even when one fully realises the rational necessity
of the beginning with pure Being or Nothing, one is far
from finding the dialectical development of Thought easy.
Hegel's discourse from paragraph to paragraph appears,
at first sight, to be couched in so strange a language that a
beginner is quite at a loss to realise what he aims at. As
a matter of fact, the discourse is perfectly lucid and
admirably simple. The first volume of the Science of Logic
was revised by Hegel just before his death in 1831 ; and
it may be safely taken for granted that he was by then
fully competent to say just what he wished to say : and to
say it, too, in the simplest possible way, especially as a
so-to-speak paternal anxiety to make himself intelligible
to his students characterised him all through his career
as a lecturer.

" The difficulties connected with the study of the
Science of Logic must be traced simply to the fact that the
student does not feel at once at home in the realm of pure
Thought. So far, he has been accustomed to think pic-
torially, and now finds himself staring, as it were, into
utter emptiness, as the absence of figurate conception in
pure thinking is bound to appear at first. No wonder,
then, that many a student who has been accustomed to
a comparatively easy success in his studies, so far as these
depended chiefly on good memory, begins by being amazed
at the seeming impenetrability of Hegel's discourse, and
ends by inferring that the Science of Logic must be non-
sense : for the very reason that he finds it incomprehen-
sible 1 Such at least appears to be Prof. Wm. James' way
of saying that Hegelian grapes are sour, so far as he con-
fesses freely his inability to follow Hegel's dialectic, but
nevertheless has no hesitation in denying its rationality :
Hegel was presumably a man of unusually impressionistic

The Science of Logic 47

mind, only unfortunately his method and expression were so
non-sensical ! {Hih. Journ., January, 1909).

" The absence of figurate conception has, of course, its
reason in this, that the object of pure Thought is Thought
itself. This means that all habits of Reflection based on
the ordinary attitude to objectivity must be left behind :
all that remains over of the form of objectivity is Names.
Unlike Imagination, Thought simply names itself. We
think in names. When speaking of Essence, Cause,
Judgment, Syllogism, etc., we do not speak of something
capable of visualisation, but imply a content which is
understood only by being thought.

" Names generally convey a meaning independently of
figurate conception even when they refer to an objective
existence. For something given in space and time acquires,
by being named, the peculiar characteristic of existing only
as superseded. To explain :

" Since all that appeals merely to sense amounts, from
the standpoint of Thought, to Thought's own Otherwise-
ness, the exercise of the senses is fer se a thoughtless
activity, having the significance of a protracted attempt to
think that Nothing which is the beginning of Wisdom : a
verity acknowledged one-sidedly by those who trace mental
development to sensuous impressions. The first step to-
wards the removal of this one-sidedness — consisting, firstly,
in the ignoring of the fact that Being and Thought are in
such negative unity that neither is apart from the other,
and, secondly, in an unawareness that Thought against
Being is the positive — is figurate conception, which is the
inwardising of external manifoldness and, therefore, con-
stitutes the middle between that state of Intelligence in
which it finds itself immediately subject to modification,
and that state in which it is in its Freedom, or as Thought.
Just because Imagination begins from Intuition, the
ready-found material still continues to affect its activity
and Intelhgence appears, consequently, still dependent.
Since, however, Thought is the Truth of Being, said
appearance of dependency is truly only a challenge pro-
voking Intelligence to embody objectivity in conformance
with its fundamental nature as Thought. Now, as figurate

48 A Holiday with a Hegelian

conception cannot be said truly to be, just because it
remains conditioned by contrast witli the world of sense,
and this latter is to acquire that Immediacy which belongs
to it as what is thought : Intelligence finally embodies
objectivity in Language, thus giving it that existence
which belongs to sensation, intuition and conception in
Thought's ideational realm. The Name alone, if we
understand it, is the unimaged, simple conception. One
has no need of ever having seen the sea, to understand
what it means. Intelligence works up figurate conceptions
into species, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short, into
Categories, thus indicating that the given material does not
get the Truth of its Being except in these thought-forms :
and so far as Intelligence explains things out of its cate-
gories, it understands them, i.e. it puts itself in their place
or stands under them as their neutral basis.

" But so Intelhgence functions, first of all, only as
Understanding or Intellect. What remains still to be
achieved before it truly returns into itself is to remove the
immediacy which notions have in its ideational realm.
In other terms, Intelligence must bring its categories into
a system, the principle of which lies in the very nature of
Thought as infinite negativity. As spontaneously active,
Thought must needs discern itself within itself, and the
tracing out of the how it builds up the system of its cate-
gories by its own dialectical potency constitutes the task
of pure thinking.

" This makes plain that a study of the Science of Logic
becomes fruitful only after Thought has ceased to be
viewed as a life-less abstraction. Until one has come so far,
one cannot get rid of the suspicion as though Hegel's dia-
lectic were just Hegel's, i.e. a subjective dialectic which
might possibly admit of a different turn from individual
to individual. For instance, to Prof. Eucken, ' the so-
called " oppositions " as logical thought handles them,
are essentially self-made ; they exist only so long as thought
forbears to use the category that is adequate to reconcile
them. Once this category is brought into play, the op-
positions magically vanish, and the thinker finds himself
at a point of view from which the universe appears in-

The Science of Logic 49

finitely rational and right. And the moral which consistent
intellectualism draws from tliis victory over these opposi-
tions (or contradictions, as it significantly calls them) is
that the truth, the whole and perfect truth, is already
present in the universe, but is sealed from the gaze of all
who cannot make use of that mysterious key — the right
logical category.' ^

" It is plain that Prof. Eucken entirely ignores the nature
of thinking, as an immaculate Self-begetting of Intelhgence,
or else it would have struck him that categories must form
a system which is perfectly independent of any subjective
disposition for sophistic trickery. His incapacity of
crossing the threshold of pure Knowledge is demonstrated
by his resentment of the philosophical (and, indeed, quite
current) notion of Truth as what is eternal, hence eo ipso
also already now present. Considered closer, this resent-
ment springs simply from the ordinary attitude to ob-
jectivity, according to which Thought and Being are
opposed in such wise, that the former is treated either as
purely formal, or as an appendage of the latter. The
principle of development is in this manner sought in
subjective experience, in the sphere of figurate conception,
whereby the infinite negativity of Thought comes to appear
only as a growth in Time and the notion of Eternity is
degraded into that of an infinite progress in a straight line :
heedlessly of the fact that this line, just because it is
straight, and therefore only a reference to self, is actually
a return into self, i.e. a circle having no beginning nor end.
It is, therefore, not surprising to find Prof. Eucken laying
special stress on his conviction ' that the possibilities of the
universe have not yet been played out, as hoary-headed
wisdom would have us believe, and that our spiritual life
still finds itself battling in mid-flood, with much of the
world's work still before it ' — as though Hegel asserted
that the possibilities of the universe could ever play them-
selves out !

" He who would penetrate into the realm of pure Thought
cannot be cautioned strongly enough against the stand-
point of the ordinary consciousness with its illusory sound-
1 Boyce, Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, p. i;jS.
D

50 A Holiday with a Hegelian

ness. It is comparatively easy to transcend the first or
descriptive stage, but the standpoint forming the next
higher background of the external attitude to things, i.e. the
simple certainty of self called the Ego constitutes a veritable
stumbling block to the final return of Intelligence into
itself as pure Knowing, The Ego is the notion in its
immediacy in such wise that its immanent content appears
also externally as the Universe. Owing to this delegation
of its spontaneous activity to a seemingly self-subsistent
objectivity, the Notion remains on the side of the Ego as an
empty form of the Universal. But just because Thought
or the Notion is fundamentally in negative unity with the
apparent Universe, the Ego cannot maintain itself except
as a Recovery of its true meaning. Nevertheless, until
Thought ceases to be viewed as a lifeless abstraction, the
Ego clings to Self-feeling — ^^'hich is, indeed, all that
preserves its illusory independence — and in this manner
obstinatelv refuses to surrender its eccentricitv."

CHAPTER VI

FIRST ACT OF THOUGHT

AT the end of his discourse, Dr. Veverka gave me the
■^ following paper for my private study :

FIRST ACT OF THOUGHT
First step : Pure Being

0. Reahsation of the meaning of taking nothing for
granted.

Second step : Being, Nothing

1. Being is the indeterminate Immediate, is in fact
Nothing.

2. Nothing is the same absence of determinateness as
pure Being.

Third step : Becoming

3. What is the truth is neither Being nor Nothing, but
that Being — does not go over — but is gone over into
Nothing, and Nothing into Being : Becoming.

Fourth step : Coming-to-be, Ceasing-to-be

4. Being and Nothing sink down from their immediately
conceived self-subsistence into moments which are still dis-
tinct, but at the same time suspended.

5. Grasped in this their distinctiveness, each is in unity
with the other.

6. Becoming is in this manner in double determination :
as Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be.

7. Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be interpenetrate each
other, or, rather, each suspends itself through its own
nature, because it is in itself its own contrary.

8. Owing to the interpenetration or equilibrium of its

52 A Holiday with a Hegelian

distinct moments, the Becoming itself collapses as well into
peaceful unity.

9. So far as becoming is the disappearing of that very
distinctiveness on which alone it rests (the distinction of
Being and Nothing), it is self-contradictory, and therefore
untenable.

10. The result of its suspension is Being : but the Being
of the peaceful unity of Being and Nothing.

11. Such a Being is called Presence : that Being which
there is.

Fifth step : Presence

12. Presence appears as a First with which beginning is
made.

13. According to its Becoming, Presence is generally
Being with a Non-Being in such wise that the unity of both
simply is : the Non-Being stands, so far, only for the
Determinateness as such (not yet for another Being).

14. In referring to another Being, however, we anticipate
what belongs properly to the dialectical development still
before us : it is most important not to allow pure continuity
of thought to get disturbed by anticipations of what must
yield itself dialectically.

15. True, just because Presence is no longer pure Being,
there must needs spring up in it several determinations,
embodying distinct relations of its moments.

16. Nevertheless, at first sight, Determinateness has not
yet detached itself from Being.

17. As thus wholly simple and immediate, Determinate-
ness is Quality.

Sixth step : Reality, Negation

18. In the distinct character of Being, Quality is Reahty ;
as fraught with negativity. Quality is Negation as such.

19. These two moments of Quality pass for being dis-
tinct : but each is immediately the other.

Seventh step : Being-within-self

20. In that the distinction in Quahty is just as much
suspended, Quality is not at all separated from Presence.

First Act of Thought 53

21. The suspendedness of the distinction is a deter-
minateness within Presence, which latter is thus Being-
within-self or Something.

Dr. Veverka explained to me that this paper formed a
part of his own digest of the Science of Logic, in which he
condensed every paragraph of Hegel's discourse, so far as
the latter concerns the dialectical movement proper, to
a simple statement, with the view of getting a compre-
hensive grasp of the whole subject-matter.

" Of course," he remarked, " I could reproduce the
whole theme in my own words. But, then, you will not
be always with me, and I am thinking of your future study
of the Science of Logic itself. I am sure that my digest, if
you care to copy it out for yourself, will prove very useful
to you. The chief difficulty of a student of the Science of
Logic consists in his inability to keep his bearing through
the maze of dialectic, and my digest is meant to remove this
difficulty by drawing attention to the central idea of every
paragraph belonging to the dialectical movement proper
(that is to say, when prefatory and independent Remarks
are left out of the question) from the standpoint of pure
continuity of Thought.

" But my digest is more than this. You will find that
I take no notice of Hegel's own subdivision of the subject-
matter in question, but introduce a subdivision of my own.
Not that I find fault with Hegel's arrangement of the
Science of Logic. My departure from it is simply due to
the fact that I proposed, in my Digest, to test the objec-
tivity of Hegel's dialectic from the standpoint of the
necessary anticipation which arises in mind at the end of
the first act of Thought, as I am aboutto explain.

" Namely, when one begins simply to think purely, one
finds that the first act of Thought is properly achieved only
in the notion of Being- within-self or Something. It is only
here that pure Thought admits of a pause, because Becoming
is thought only as an unrestful unity of Being and Nothing
and thus not as a result. True, at first sight it would seem
that the first act comes to its full stop in the notion of
Presence, which has accordingly been characterised as
' a First with which beginning (the beginning of the second

54 A Holiday with a Hegelian

act) is made ' (§12). But what is the notion of Something
but Presence reahsed in its character as the result of the
first act of Thought ? The term Presence simply dis-
tinguishes Being as a result of Becoming from its initial
connotation as pure Being. So far as we bring home its
present connotation, as the peaceful unity of Being and
Nothing in the form of Being (and, therefore, by anticipa-
tion, only in a one-sided form, since the peaceful unity
may evidently be equally thought in the no less one-sided
form of Nothing, as is the case in the not of Something, i.e.
in something else or an Other), we record this its char-
acteristic meaning in Determinateness as such. But this
tenii stands still only generally for the result of Becoming,
i.e. for all that is become, not as yet distinctly for the
simplest or first result of Becoming : this is recorded pro-
perly in Quality. And the very fact that this is the concluded
first act means that Quality is to be grasped as a suspended
distinction of Being and Nothing, i.e. of Reality and
Negation. This its meaning must clearly be still included
in the first act, because the distinction of Reality and
Negation is not yet the distinction of a Quality from
another Quality, of Something from an Other, but a purely
abstract distinction within the Quality as such. Reality
cannot be opposed to Negation as to another Quality,
because Quality has meaning only as a direct or immediate
unity of Reahty and Negation.

" Besides, is not the very obstinacy of ordinary con-
sciousness, to substitute Something, i.e. a Quahty (a
definite Being) for the pure Being, and thus to repudiate
the direct unity of Being and Nothing, an instinctively
logical evidence that the first act of Thought goes as far
as the notion of Something ? Just because the ordinary,
only instinctively logical consciousness does not concern
itself with an abstract analysis of the moments implied
in every act of thought, it begins at least with the result
of its first act : with Something which as a Presence is, of
course, at once opposed to another Presence (as will be
found in the second act of thought).

" Of course (to complete this digression), just because
the ordinary consciousness insists on beginning with the

First Act of Thought 55

result of the first act of Thought, it must needs also pre-
suppose that very unity of Being and Nothing which it
pooh-poohs with such vehemence : Becoming. Why,
this is precisely why it is exercised as to the Origin of all
that is ! The perplexing question as to the Why : what is
it but the way in which the instinctively logical nature
forces on our attention that Something is the beginning
of the second act of Thought, consequently a Being having
Becoming (Origin, Decease) at its back ! On the strength of
the first act of Thought it is already plain what is to be
thought of the presumable insolubility of this question :
the insolubility amounts to an obstinate refusal (or utter
incapacity) to think pure Being ! And thus it may be
anticipated that all argumentation as to the thinkableness
of a beginning, on the part of the ordinary consciousness,
is simply a tissue of sophistry. For instance, so far as
Kant proposes to prove indisputably that the world has a
beginning, he assumes a given moment, as though the
beginning itself were not a given moment. And so far as he
professes to prove indisputably the contrary, he assumes
a time before the beginning : remaining all through
unaware that the beginning is the Becoming degraded
to a mere conception of Time and arriving, on the contrary,
at the conclusion that just because Reason (presumably)
supplies an indisputable proof of contradictory assertions,
it is incapable of discovering the truth !

" Now, in saying that the conundrum of the Origin of
all that is, is already solved through the analysis of the
very first act of Thought, I am voicing the afore-mentioned
necessary anticipation as regards the nature of Thought,
namely, that Thought reveals itself in its every complete
act as a whole of the same typical moments ; or, in other
terms, that the very first act bears already a witness to the
substantial nature of Thought in its most comprehensive
sense. That Hegel himself is quite aware of these typical
moments of every act of Thought becomes obvious in
connection with the dialectic of the One. ' The moments
of the development of this notion,' he says, ' are by
anticipation : (i) Negation in general, (2) Two Negations,
(3) consequently two such that they are the same tiling,

56 A Holiday with a Hegelian

(4) and directly opposed to one another, (5) Identity as
such, (6) negative reference and yet to self.' He does not
mention the seventh moment, but its presence is self-
understood.

" The steps of mediation could be equally characterised
thus : (i) Premise, (2) Difference, (3) Abstract middle
term, (4) Antithesis, (5) Identity of the opposites or the
concreted middle term, (6) Self-contradiction, (7) Con-
clusion. And if they are traced directly to the Notion
(the just stated characterisation referring to the stand-
point of the Essence), their intelligible whole amounts to a
definition of the true, seeing that the true is a matter of
pure thinking, hence definable only in terms of the typical
moments of every act of Thought. As a matter of fact,
Prof. Bolland, the enthusiastic Hegelian at Leyden, defines
the true to be this : ' To distinguish itself within itself,
to establish the other of its own self in order to arrive in
it (the other) at its own self : to convert it and thus to be
for itself.' ^

" Although we are, so far, extending the result of the
analysis of the first act of Thought over the whole dialectic
by means of which Thought verifies to itself its own unity
with Being, we are justified in doing so on the strength of
the unity of Thought and Being as a fact of consciousness.
Still, what is thus quite justifiably anticipated, is yet to
be verified philosophically. And as this verification is not
to set aside the result of the analysis of the first act of
Thought, but only to justify the correctness of our present
application of it, we shall establish this correctness on
finding that the whole dialectic of the Objective Logic
actually does form seven main subdivisions, the first of
which is to be identified with the first act of Thought.
We may, therefore, say that the task before us consists
in a verification whether the dialectical whole which,
according to Hegel, is meant to establish philosophically
that unity of Thought and Being which he postulates to

^ " Het ware is dit, zich in zichzelf te onderscheiden, van zichzelf
het andere te stellen, om daarin tot zichzelf te komen, het te ver-
keeren en voor zich te zijn." — Zuiverc Rede en hare Weykclijkheid,
Leiden, A. H. Adriani, 1909 (2d. ed.)-

First Act of Thought 57

begin with as a fact of consciousness, forms truly seven
acts of Thought. Further, so far as the second, fourth, and
sixth steps of mediation of the first act are dual, it is to be
seen equally whether the second, fourth, and sixth acts of
Thought are similarly dual. The One dialectical whole
of the Objective Logic ought to be by anticipation, properly
a whole of ten dialectical wholes, which wholes, in dis-
tinction from the septenary subdivision, may be called
arbitrarily Cycles. You see, then, that in proceeding to
subdivide the dialectical movement by means of which
Thought proves its unity with Being in the stated manner,
we are giving ourselves the satisfaction of testing the
adequacy of Hegel's rendering of purely continuous think-
ing in a purely objective or impersonal manner."

CHAPTER VII

SECOND ACT OF THOUGHT

'T'HE subject-matter of the second act of Thought was
subdivided by Dr. Veverka as follows :

A. SECOND CYCLE

1. Something as such

22. Something is the first Negation of the Negation,
as the simple Being of reference to self.

23. Something is thus equally the mediation of itself
with itself.

24. As, however, this mediation has, so far, no concrete
determinations to its sides, Something is estabhshed
primarily only as simply maintaining itself in its reference
to self, and its negative (the Negation of which it is the
first Negation) is now equally a Quality, but at first only
an Other in general.

2. Something, Other

25. Something and Other are both, in the first place.
Presence or Something.

26. Secondly, each is equally an Other : the dis-
tinguishing and fixing of the one Something is a subjective
designating, a matter of choice.

27. But since there is no Presence that is not without
another Presence and thus not itself an Other ;

28. And since, further, the identity of the Other with
Something falls only into the external comparison of both :

29. The Other is to be taken, thirdly, equally in reference
to its own self : as the Other as such.

Second Act of Thought 59

30. But so we have before us, a self-identical Something :
since the Other as such is the Other in its own self, hence the
Other of its own self, or the Other of the Other, the dis-
tinction of Something and Other is suspended.

3. Something and Other in one Reference, or

Altering

31. Something is essentially one with the Other, and just
as essentially not one with it.

32. So far as Something is one with the Other, and the
Other is, nevertheless, also not one with it, it refers to
another, or its Being is Being-for-other (Being as and in
the Other).

SS- And so far as Something (or Other) refers to itself
against its reference to something else, or against its
Being-for-other, its Being is Being-in-itself.

4. Being-in-itself, Being-for-other

34. Being-in-itself and Being-for-other are the names
for Something and Other, as moments of one and the same
reference, of one and the same Something.

35. Or, rather, they embody the present sense of the
original distinction of Being and Nothing,

36. Being-in-itself records that Being is not simply
negative reference to Non-Being, but that it has Non-Being
also in it : that it is the Not of Being-for-other.

37. Similarly, Being-for-other records that Non-Being is,
not simply negative reference to Being, but that, just by
being the Not of Being, it itself also is as against Being,
i.e. that it points to the Being-in-itself as to a Being re-
flected within its own self.

38. So far, then, as Something (or Other) is in itself
and for another :

39. The distinction of Being-in-itself and Being-for-other
is also null or suspended ; or Something has in it v;hat it is
in itself : it is in itself what it is for another.

40. From this it follows that Being-in-itself loses all
meaning, if abstraction is made from all Being-for-other

6o A Holiday with a Hegelian

(as is the case in connection with the current conception of
the Thing in-itself).

41. And it is equally plain that Being-for-other would
lose all meaning were it opposed to Being-in-itself without
implying it ; but this distinction involves the result of the
doctrine of Being — the established Being — and therefore
falls properly into the sphere of Essence.

5. Determination or the In-itself

42. The identity of the Being-in-itself and the Being-for-
other in the form of the In-itself is Determination.

43. This is the present meaning of Determinateness as
such, or also of Something as such.

44. Determination is the affirmative Determinateness,
with which Something, in its Presence, remains congruous
against its involution with Other by which it might be
determined, maintaining itself in its equality with itself,
and making it good in its Being-for-other.

45. The distinction between Determinateness as such
and Determination has, for instance, with respect to Man,
the meaning of Thought as such (pure Thought) and of
thinking Reason.

6. Determination, Constitution

46. So far as Being for other is equally distinguishable
from its identity with the Being-in-itself, yet the dis-
tinction must remain purely qualitative (§41), the Being-
for-other acquires the sense of Constitution.

47. To have a Constitution, i.e. to be involved in ex-
ternal relationship, is, therefore, not a mere contingency
attaching to Something, but its very Quality.

48. At first sight it would seem that Something alters
only externally, or only in its Constitution, since Deter-
mination is its affirmative Determinateness.

49. But that this cannot be so is plain from the fact
that Determination and Constitution are distinct sides of
one and the same Something : they have their simple
middle in Determinateness as such and their distinction is,
therefore, equally suspended.

Second Act of Thought 6i

50. But this means that there is before us such a dis-
tinction that its sides are one and the same Something :
the Other is now estabhshed to be the Being-within-self
of the Something itself : Alteration converts the first
Negation of Negation into another, second one.

7. Ceasing-to-be-an-Other or Non-Being-for-
Other

51. There are now two Somethings, each of which refers
itself to itself by means of the suspension of the Other,
so that reference to self is now equally a Ceasing to be an
Other, or an estabhshing of the Non-Being-for-Other.

52. There is One determinateness of the two Somethings
which is as well identical with their In-itself (so far as this
latter is Negation of the Negation, §44), as it also (so far
as these Negations are against one another as other Some-
things, §50) concludes them out of their own self : the One
determinateness in question is called Limit.

B. THIRD CYCLE

I. Limit as such

53. The development of this notion manifests itself
rather as entanglement.

54. So far as the Limit is primarily the Non-Being of the
Other, yet the Other is itself a Something, the Limit is
the Non-Being of the Something in general.

55. Since, however, the Non-Being of the Other has now
the sense of the established Being of the Something, the
Limit is, at the same time, itself only the Being or Quality
of the Something.

56. The Limit is, therefore, the mediation whereby
Something and Other each as well is and is not.

2. Limit, Presence

57. Thus, however, the Limit is also as the Third to
Something and Other which have their Presence on the
other side, the one from the other, of their Limit.

58. This is the side from which Limit is approached

62 A Holiday with a Hegelian

primarily by Conception and which is to be found specially
in things of space.

59. Since, then, Something has its Presence only in the
Limit, and the Limit and immediate Presence are, at the
same time, each the negative of the other : the Something
which is only in its Limit just as much sunders itself from
its own self and points beyond itself to its Non-Being,
enunciating it as its own Being and so passing over into it.

60. This conclusion has its illustration, firstly (as regards
the one determination that something is what it is in its
Limit) in the Point, Line and Plane, so far as they are
elements or principles of the Line, Plane and Volume re-
spectively ; secondly (as regards the immediate unity of
Limit and Presence as self-contradiction) in the current
conception that Line originates through the movement of
a Point, Plane through that of a Line and Volume through
that of a Plane.

3. FiNITUDE

61. Something with its immanent Limit, estabhshed as
the contradiction of its own self, through which contra-
diction it is what is not, is the Finite.

62. The Finite is, therefore, the Negation fixed in itself
and so eternal.

63. Were, however, the Finite not to pass away in the
affirmative, we should be again back at that first, abstract
Nothing which is long since passed.

64. Finitude is thus a higher restatement of Becoming.

65. We have now to see what moments are contained in
its notion.

4. Limitation, Ought-to-be

66. The proper Limit of the Something, established by it
as a negative which is at the same time essential, is not
only Limit as such, but Limitation ; whilst the In-itself,
as the negative reference to its own self as Limitation is
what ought to be.

67. In order that the Limit which is in the Something
generally, be a Limitation, the Something must at the same

Second Act of Thought 63

time transcend it within its own self, and thus transcend
equally its own self.

68. The Ought-to-be is, therefore, directly united with
the Limitation as well as distinct from it.

69. Only the Limitation is established as the Finite.

70. What only ought to be is the Determination es-
tablished as it is de facto ; namely, at the same time only
a Determinateness (§13).

71. The In-itself reduces itself, therefore, to what ought
to be when Being-for-other is established as Something's
Limitation.

72. Thus the Ought-to-be transcends the same deter-
minateness which is its negation.

73. As the Ought-to-be, consequently, the Something
is raised above its Limitation, but even as so raised it
nevertheless remains limited through its reference to its
Finitude.

74. Owing to this its self-contradictory nature, the Finite
suspends itself and goes over into the Infinite, i.e. into the
Other as such of finite Being.

5. Infinitude

75. The Infinite is the true Being, reached through the
rising superior to the Limitation.

76. It does not, however, arise externally to the Finite :
this latter is only this, to convert itself into its Other, the
Infinite, through its own nature.

77. Thus the Finite is swallowed up in the Infinite, and
that which truly is, is the Infinite.

6. Alternation of the Finite and the Infinite

78. As only immediate, the Infinite appears, however, still
opposed to the Finite.

79. As against the circle of determinatenesses or realities,
the Infinite is the indeterminate blankness, the Beyond of
the Finite.

64 A Holiday with a Hegelian

80. This is the bad Infinite, the Infinite of the Intellect,
to which it has the value of the highest, of absolute truth.

81. From this standpoint there are two determinate-
nesses or worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in their
reference the Infinite is only a Limit of the Finite, i.e.
only a determinateness, finite Infinitude.

82. The Finite stands as the Presence on this side,
w^hile the Infinite, in spite of being the In-itself of the
Finite, is pushed, as a Beyond, into a dim, inaccessible
distance, out of which the Finite finds itself and remains
on this side.

83. But in that each is, in its own self and from its own
determination, the establishing of the other, they are
inseparable, although their unity remains hidden in their
qualitative otherness.

84. Each arises immediately in the other, and their
relation is only an external one.

85. Transcendence is made beyond the Finite into the
Infinite, but the latter immediately relapses into the Finite
which is again transcended — and so on ad infinitwn.

86. There is present an alternating determination of the
Finite and the Infinite.

87. Presenting itself as the Progresses ad Infinitum, this
alternation passes in many forms and applications for the
ultimufn which cannot be transcended.

88. This bad Infinitude is in itself the same thing as the
perennial Ought-to-be : it is indeed the negation of the
Finite, but it cannot in truth free itself therefrom, because
it is only as in reference to the Finite, which latter being
other to it,

89. The Finite has thus the determination of a Presence
which perennially regenerates itself in its Beyond, ever
assuming a different aspect.

Second Act of Thought 65

90. In the indicated hither and thither of the alternating
determination of the Finite and the Infinite, their truth is
already in itself present :

91. There lies in each the determinateness of the other
whether they are taken with reference to one another or
without any reference at all.

92. Both modes of consideration give one and the same
result :

93. The decried unity of the Finite and the Infinite.

94. But in that they are abo to be taken as different, the
Infinite is a finitised Infinite, the Finite the infinitised
Finite.

95. Intellect falsifies this double unity in assuming the
sides as not negated,

96. This falsification is due to forgetting what the notion
of these moments is for the intellect itself.

97. In both cases it is only the negation which suspends
itself in the negation.

98. What is, then, present in both is the same negation of
the negation which is in itself reference to itself, or affirma-
tion, but as return to itself.

99. A simple reflection shows that this conclusion is
established in the infinite Progress.

100. The Finite is here found to have gone together
with itself, or to have in its Beyond only found itself again :
whether it be taken as simple, consequently as separate
and only successive, or as in reference.

loi. The same is the case with the Infinite.

102. They are thus results, not, consequently, that
which they are in the determination of their beginning.

103. Their distinction is only the double sense of the
true Infinite.

66 A Holiday with a Hegelian

7. Ideality

104. The true Infinite is not simply a unity of the Finite
and the Infinite, but rather essentially only as Becoming :
but Becoming now further determined in its moments.

105. As Being-returned-into-itself, this Infinite is Being
having the affirmation of Presence in it : its image is the
line which has reached itself, which is closed and quite
present, without beginning and end : the Circle as against
the straight line of the infinite Progress.

106. The true Infinite which, as Presence, is established
affirmatively against the abstract negation, is Reality in a
higher sense than the former one determined as simple
Reality : Reality has obtained a concrete content.

107. The Negation against which it is the affirmation is
the Negation of the Negation. Reality has thus acquired
the concrete meaning of Ideahty : of Reality opposed to
that Reality which finite Presence is.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMENTS

f DO not say that I found the second act of Thought
easy to follow. Still, I managed to force my way
through it much easier than I expected. I had only to
view the import of the dialectic movement in the light of
ordinary common sense to satisfy myself that it agrees with
our ordinary attitude to Something.

We postulate an Other along with Something, and this
Other is taken in the same sense as the Something. The
distinction of Something and Other is, therefore, treated,
at first sight, as purely nominal, that is to say, as a matter
of subjective choice (§26). If one of two things is called
Something, then the other thing is the Other ; but since
either of them is Something, either is equally an Other.
Hence, the Other as such has the same meaning as Some-
thing as such (§30). And because either term is only a label
applicable indifferently to one of two things, the Being
designated in this way is necessarily a Being-for-other
(§§31. 32).

If I call a chair an article of furniture, then since this
designation fits equally well a table, the Being of a chair
is designated, not as what is absolutely unrelated, but as a
related Being ; and it is clearly this relatedness of Some-
thing that Hegel calls Being-for-other. And so far as I
draw a distinction between a chair and a table, I distin-
guish in an article of furniture two sides : as what it is
for other and as what it is in itself.

These two sides are to be found in connection with every-
thing. Hence, Being is no longer taken as pure Being,
because Non-Being is now a Being-for-other ; instead of
pure Being we have, then, Being as a not of Being-for-other ;

68 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Being-in-itself (§35). And if we, therefore, try to isolate
Being-in-itself or Being-for-other, we find that either loses
all meaning apart from the other. They are definable only
in terms of one another (§§36-37). That Something is in
itself what it is for other is obvious because it is the
immediate unity of these two sides : Determination, This
term is a further restatement of the Being-within-self,
so far as its two sides are no longer simply Reality and
Negation, but Being-in-itself and Being-for-other. Deter-
mination is thus equally a higher or more pointed restate-
ment of Determinateness as such : the latter connotes the
Being of the simplest unity of Being and Nothing, the
former the Being of the simplest unity of Being-in-itself
and Being-for-other, and therefore refers to a Presence.
Everything implies Determinateness in its Determination,
just as a species implies a genus. Our determinateness is
Thought, as the genus Man ; but Thought is in us as
thinking Reason, which latter is, therefore, our Deter-
mination or vocation.

Determination may be also defined as Being-for-other
taken up in a unity with Being-in-itself in such wise, that
the concrete whole is in the one-sided form of Being-in-
itself, or as the In-itself. The In-itself or Determination is,
therefore, opposed to the same concrete whole under the
form of Being-for-other. So the Something is to be taken
also as involved in external influence, as having a Con-
stitution, Along with our vocation to think, we also
receive impressions from outside, and are constituted
accordingly. Whether or not a chair fulfils its determina-
tion depends on its Constitution. The same applies to the
State and to everything. And so it is at once plain that
Determination and Constitution cannot be torn apart ;
that they are only aspects of one and the same thing.
The conception that Something alters only in its Con-
stitution has its place only at first sight (§48), For although
Determination and Constitution are distinct sides of
Something (§49), their distinctiveness is equally suspended.
External impressions influence our mental development,
and our mental attitude influences, in turn, our Constitu-
tion, So far, then, as Determination and Constitution are

Comments 69

distinct as well as self identical, they must be taken in the
sense of a duplicated unity of both : there are now two
Somethings (§51), conjoined and disjoined in one deter-
minateness called Limit (§52).

The dialectic of Limit amounts to saying that since
Limit at once conjoins and disjoins two Somethings and so
is at once their Being and Non-Being, it has truly the sig-
nificance of a higher restatement of Becoming (§64). The
definition of the Finite (§62) refers to the contradictory
nature of a limited Something, as being not this, not that,
not anything else, because no sooner is it this than it has
turned already in that. The Not is the Negation fixed in
itself. The addition ' hence eternal ' puzzled me at first,
but it became obvious to me that the eternity of the Finite
is founded on its direct unity with the Infinite. The
Finite as such is the established Other as such, and therefore
its endless alteration is a going-together-with-self : a
Being-returned-into-self called Ideality. No matter what
the Finite is, it always ought to be something else ; and
since every limit assigned to it is to be transcended, there
is only a question of Limitation. And it is equally plain
that the Ought-to-be and Limitation are directly con-
vertible into one another. The Infinite is simply the
positive basis of this restless alternation. The distinction
of a finitised Infinite and an infinitised Finite is a return
to the original empty distinction of Being and Nothing.
The Infinite emphatically is, the Finite emphatically is not :
but the is and not simply refer to the nature of the true
Infinite as Becoming, which Becoming goes over into
Ideality.

Dr. Veverka's praise of this my rendering of the second
act of Thought was not unqualified. " I must draw your
attention to the fact," he remarked, " that the chief point
in the study of the Science of Logic is to think the transition
from one step of mediation to the next. In satisfying
yourself that we actually do postulate an Other along with
Something ; that we actually do conceive Something only
as against something else and therewith equally at once
treat Something as hmited and eo ipso as a Finite which is
immediately also contrasted with the Infinite : you have

70 A Holiday with a Hegelian

converted the import of the dialectic unfoldment of the
notion Something into a statement of facts to be found in
our ordinary consciousness. Yet the real object of the
second act of Thought is to explain why we postulate an
Other along with Something ; why Something must
alter and become an endless negation of every Quality
assigned to it ; why the true Being is sought beyond the
sphere of Finitude. The answer to these and similar
questions lies, of course, already in the premise of the
Science of Logic ; but this premise has itself so far only
the validity of a fact of consciousness which is to be
verified within the Science. For this reason, then the
first act of Thought takes Nothing for granted, and the
unity of Being and Essence is to be proved by the mediation
of Thought by and with itself. This mediation begins in
its second step with the result of the first step ; and so
far as the chief interest in the study of the Science of Logic
lies in a verification, not of its correctness as a statement
of familiar facts of consciousness, but of its truth as a
matter of comprehending (or speculative) thought, we must
make abstraction from all that is not implied in the first
act of Thought. Hence, Something must not be identified
at once with a conception of, say, an article of furniture,
but thought as a Being-within-self. Now, since the answer
to the question, ' What is Something ? ' must be sought
in the notion of Being-within-self, as the suspendedness of
Reality and Negation, Something is the first Negation of
the Negation. So far, further, as the Negation is at this
stage quite abstract, not yet a Qualit}', opposed to another
Quality called Reality, Something simply maintains itself
as a reference to self, or is a mediation with self. In
framing these definitions of the notion of Something, we are
only restating more circumstantially the result of the first
act of Thought. The Negation, of which Something is
the first Negation, is only an abstract moment of Qualit5\
We have realised that Quality is immediately a unity of
Reality and Negation, and that, consequently, the Nega-
tion as such, that is to say, as sundered from Reality, has
the meaning of pure Nothing. The notion of Quality has,
therefore, the Negation within itself, or else the Negation

Comments 71

is not qualitative ; and so far as Quality negates the
Negation as such, in that it is only by means of the Nega-
tion, it is at once a mediation with Negation as its own
moment (a mediation with self or a simple reference to self)
as well as the first Negation of the Negation : Something.
But, now, just because Something is the first Negation of
the Negation, as a mediation with self, it maintains itself
in its reference to self as against the negated Negation as
such : that is to say, as against the Negation, not as pure
Nothing, but as in unity with Reality : as a second
Negation of the Negation as such, hence as another Some-
thing.

" As you see, the arising of an Other along with Something
is explained through the double meaning of Suspension :
(i) as doing away with, (2) as preserving — a duplicity
based on the impossibility of thinking Being and Nothing
isolatedly. So far as Something is the first Negation of
the Negation, and the Negation, of which it is the Negation,
necessarily is, and then necessarily is itself a Negation of
the Negation, a second one. Something is unthinkable
without an Other.

" And this explains why the second act of Thought has
two subdivisions. The two subordinate cycles develop the
two principal moments of the first act of Thought : Be-
coming and Presence. In the second cycle. Something is
realised as an untenable contradiction, i.e. its Presence
is realised to have the sense of Becoming which is established
in Finitude. In the third cycle, we have a higher restate-
ment of the transition of the two sides of Becoming —
under the name of the Ought-to-be and Limitation — into
the true Being or Infinitude.

" So far as the dialectic of the alternating determination
of the Finite and Infinite might, and indeed mostly does,
appear unnecessarily long-\\inded, I have subdivided it
into a supplementary cycle of mediation ; in order to show
that the extended treatment is not a chaotic re-iteration
of repetition, but has the nature of deliberately planned
recapitulation of the whole act of Thought. So far as
subject-matter calls for an extension of treatment pari
passu with dialectic progress, the middle steps of mediation

72 A Holiday with a Hegelian

will have hence regularly the form of supplementary cycles.
' Everything depends upon not taking for the Infinite
what bears the stamp of a particular and finite in its very
determination. For this reason we have bestowed a greater
amount of attention on this distinction : the fundamental
notion of Philosophy, the true Infinite, depends upon it.'
{Enc. §95)."

CHAPTER IX

THE THIRD ACT OF THOUGHT

npHE reader is aware that the third act of Thought
* counts equally as the fourth cycle :

1. Being-for-self as such

io8. In its Immediacy, as the Quahty of Infinitude,
Ideality is Being-for-self.

2. Being-for-self, Being-for-one

109. Presence is now bent back into the infinite unity of
the Being-for-self and the moment of Being-for-other is,
therefore, reduced to Being-for-one.

no. The Idealistic is necessarily for One, but not for
another One : the One for which it is, is only its own self.

3. The One

111. Being-for-self and Being-for-one are, therefore,
not different meanings of Ideality, but essential moments
of the same.

112. Being-for-self is thus Something- for-self : and in
that, in this Immediacy, its inner import disappears, it is
a purely abstract Limit of itself — the One.

113. The moments of the development of this notion are
by anticipation : (i) Negation in general (2) Two Negations,
(3) consequently two such that they are the same thing, (4)
and directly opposed to one another, (5) Identity as such,
(6) negative reference and yet to self.

4. Repulsion, Attraction

114. In its own self, the One is unalterable.

115. There is no Other to which to go : a direction out

74 A Holiday with a Hegelian

from it is immediately turned round, and so has returned
into itself.

ii6. There is Nothing in it : but Nothing, established as
in the One, is Emptiness, which is thus the Quality of the
One in its Immediacy.

117 So far, now, as the One is, Nothing as Emptiness
is also different from it : outside it.

118. In that the Being- for-self determines itself in this
manner as the One and Emptiness, it has again recovered
Presence.

119. The Being-for-self of the One is, nevertheless,
essentially Ideality, or the Being returned in the Other into
self : hence, the One and Emptiness is rather a Becoming
of Many Ones.

120. Properly, however, this Becoming, as a negative
reference of the One to itself, is Repulsion.

121. Repulsion floats primarily before Conception only
as a mutual keeping-off of presupposed, already present
Ones : it is to be seen how Repulsion as such determines
itself to this external Repulsion, or Exclusion.

122. The One repels only itself from itself, therefore
becomes not, but already is.

123. The becoming estabhshed of the Ones is thus im-
mediately suspended.

124. That is to say, they are equally pre-established, or
their reference is again the previously established Empti-
ness.

125. The manifolding of the One is thus the Infinitude
as an unconcernedly recurrent contradiction.

126. This is why Repulsion finds also that immediately
before it which is repelled, thus acquiring the significance
of Exclusion.

127. Repulsion becomes thus a common reference of the
Ones as present in the Void.

Third Act of Thought 75

128. And this means further that the Being-for-one is
degraded to a Being-for-other.

129. This degradation is, however, directly negated :

130. We have only to compare the present Ones in both
of their determinations as Presences— as regards the Being-
in-itself and Being-for-other— to find that they form one
affirmative unity.

131. This unity is, indeed, established equally in their
very co-relatedness, because they themselves are only
so far as they negate one another and at the same time
negate this their negating.

132. The negative relation of the Ones to one another
is consequently a Going-together-with-self.

133. This establishing of themselves, on the part of the
many Ones, as one One is Attraction.

134. The IdeaUty present in Attraction has in it still
also the determination of the negation of its own self, i.e.
of Repulsion or Exclusion.

135. But along with this their immediate unity, At-
traction and Repulsion are also distinguished.

136. The All-embracing One imphes thus a mediation
of Attraction and Repulsion :

137. Their as yet indeterminate unity has to yield
itself more definitely.

138. Repulsion, as the ground-determination of the One,
appears first and immediate ;• as, similarly, Attraction,
against the Ones that are, has the side of an immediate
Presence, affecting them externally.

139. Repulsion is, however, essentially Reference —
the negative Reference of the One to itself — and Reference
is here identical with Attraction (§132).

140. So far, then, as Repulsion and Attraction are held
to be different determinations, each has its presupposition
in the other.

76 A Holiday with a Hegelian

141 According to this determination, they are in-
separable as the Ought-to-be and Limitation.

142. From this it follows further that each pre-estabhshes
or pre-supposes only its own self :

143. The Many Ones, presupposed by Repulsion, are
its own establishedness : are the Repulsion itself ;

144. And since Attraction presupposes the Many Ones
in the sense of the Being-for-one (§§130, 131), it equally
at once presupposes only its own self.

145. And this pre-estabhshing of self is, at the same
time, an establishment of self as the negative of self (§141).

146. The relative suspending of Repulsion and Attrac-
tion proves itself in this way to go over into an infinite
reference of mediation which, in the vacuousness of its
moments, collapses into simple immediacy — Quantity.

5. Quantity

147. Quantity implies (a) Being, (/3) Presence, (7) Being-
for-self.

148. Attraction, as a moment of Quantity, is Continuity.

149. Continuity is thus the moment of Equahty with
self in the Being-out-of-one-another.

150. Repulsion, as a moment of Quantity, is Dis-
creteness, in distinction from which latter Continuity is
only Constancy : the continuity of a constant One.

6. Continuous and discrete Magnitude

151. As an immediate unity of Continuity and Dis-
creteness, Quantity is primarily in the form of Continuity :

152. Quantity is thus Continuous Magnitude.

153. It has, next, also to be taken in the form of its other
moment :

154. In this respect, Quantity is established as Discrete
Magnitude.

7. Quantum

155. Discrete Magnitude is the Being-out-of-one-another
of the plural One : but as of the equal or constant One.

Third Act of Thought 77

156. Discrete Magnitude has, then, firstly, the One for
its principle ; secondly, it is a manifoldness of the Ones,
and the Ones are, thirdly, essentially constant.

157. The real discrete Quantity is in this manner a
present Quantity : Quantum.

158. The One is now Limit in the Continuity as such,
and the distinction of Continuous and Discrete Magnitude
becomes thus indifferent.

I was now able to appreciate Dr. Veverka's objection
to my tendency to treat the dialectic development of
Thought as a mere statement of facts of consciousness.
Our ordinary way of thinking appears to be quite out of
harmony with the true attitude to the One and Many, and
so, by clinging to the ordinary attitude, one becomes
incapable of reconciling the fact of the existing manifoldness
of the Ones with the all-embracing Oneness. Of course,
even the ordinary consciousness must bear witness to
truth, but it does this only instinctively, and thus fails to
realise consciously its own corroboration of the verities
which it pooh-poohs. For instance, we realise ourselves
only as a flux of existing distinctions, and consequently
nothing should be more familiar to us than the notion of
Ideality. Indeed, we do postulate fundamental Oneness
of all that is, and thus imply that the Many Ones — be
they called as they may — are only a Being-for-one ; that
their Presence is ideational. Yet such is our eccentricity
of judgment that we, at the same time, treat the existing
manifoldness as a primary datum and convert the all-
embracing Oneness into an insoluble mystery. The present
act of Thought is of interest because it supplies the solution
of this mystery. If one takes nothing for granted, one
must admit that Being and Nothing are truly Becoming ;
that Becoming goes over into Presence ; that Presence
is immediately Qualitj^ ; that Quality becomes Some-
thing and Other ; that Something and Other are con-
joined and disjoined in Limit ; that they thus assume
the significance of the Finite, hence of what only ought
to be and what, therefore, is only as Limitation ; that
this distinction is a ceaseless alternation of the Finite and

78 A Holiday with a Hegelian

the Infinite and for that very reason also a Being-returned-
into-self or Ideahty ; that Being-for-other becomes thus
Being-for-one ; that even the Being-for-one is suspended
in the One ; that the One is consequently utterly empty ;
that the distinction of the One and Emptiness at once is
and is not valid ; that the two are, therefore, only moments
of a Becoming ; that, however, the Becoming of the One
is properly its Repelling of itself from itself ; that the
origin of the Many Ones lies thus in the contradictory
nature of the One as what is directly both identical with
and distinct from Emptiness ; that the present Ones
expHcate only the side according to which the One and
Emptiness are distinct ; that just because the One is
the Being returned in the Emptiness into itself, the arisen
Being-for-other in connection with the present Ones is
in the same breath negated ; and that the One remains
thus one One all through its endless multiplicity.

The terms Repulsion and Attraction appeared to me at
first sight unsuitable in connection with the Becoming of
the Many Ones and their Establishing as the one One.
But Dr. Veverka drew m}' attention to the fact that these
terms are used currently also in connection with beauty
and ugliness. And even were thej^ used only in the sphere
of Physics, the negative reference of the One to itself is
just as much the notion of the origin of material mani-
foldness as of idealistic self-exclusion.

It is important to notice that Attraction does not
attach to the present Ones, but presupposes already that
their Being-for-other is truly a Being-for-one. Were this
not so, each of the present Ones would insist on all the rest
being for it, and at the same time refuse to be for others —
and just for that very reason equally lose the right to be at
all. The true meaning of Attraction is acknowledged in
Religion, so far as Love of one's neighbour is traced, not
to the natural man, but to his universality as one with
God.

The third act of Thought reproduces on the whole the
first act of Thought, so far as beginning is made, no longer
with pure Being, but with Being-for-self : the Quality of
the Infinite. Any difficulty in connection with its subject-

Third Act of Thought 79

matter is traceable to a relapse into the standpoint of the
ordinary attitude to objectivity. There is now presupposed
the notion of Ideality ; and as the meaning of Ideality is
to be grasped already at the end of the second act of
Thought, it is properly superfluous to repeat at this stage
that Idealitj^ must not be treated as something outside
and beside realistic Presence, but thought in its universal
sense as the Presence of the true Infinite.

Henceforth I shall quote my version of Dr. Veverka's
comments directly in connection with the paragraphs
which thej'^ are meant to elucidate. If, however, even his
comments should not render the study of his Digest quite
easy, the reader must be reminded that the Digest is meant
to be primarily only a help in the study of the Science of
Logic itself, not, perhaps, to take its place altogether.^

^ True, there is as yet no translation of the Science of Logic to
be had (a fact which ought to make every intelligent Englishman
blush with shame) : but were everyone interested in the present
work to clamour for it, the chief obstacle to its publication, the
alleged absence of interest in pure thinking, on the part of the
English people, would be removed. The subject-matter of the
Science of Logic runs into about 400,000 words (about six times
the size of the present work), so that it could be published at a
price not exceeding one guinea. The first two volumes (the Doctrine
of Being and Essence, or the Objective Logic) are ready for publica-
tion, and the third volume, the Subjective Logic, will be ready by
the end of 191 1. Let those willing to subscribe communicate with
the author (at White way, near Stroud, Gloucestershire).

CHAPTER X
FOURTH ACT OF THOUGHT:

A. FIFTH CYCLE.

1. Number as such

159. Quantity has a Limit whether it be continuous
or discrete Magnitude, i.e. it is Quantum.

160. The Limit remains, however. One of Quantity.

161. This One is, therefore, (a) self-referent Limit, {(3)
enclosing Limit, (y) other-excluding Limit.

162. Completely established in these determinations,
Quantum is Number.

Note. — Quantum is the concluding notion of the fourth
cycle, and thus corresponds to the Being-within-self of the
first cycle. Number is a definite Quantum ; hence, no
longer generally a quantative Limit, symbolised by a or b,
i.e. by an algebraical magnitude, but by a magnitude
embodying a distinct Amount, i, 2, 3.

2. Unity, Amount

163. Discreteness is in the Number, Amount, Continuity,
Unity.

164. The Amount consists of many Units, but it is
equally the Unity of the Units composing it.

Note. — The term consists lays emphasis on the fact that
the many units composing a particular Number are equally
distinguishable from their Ideality in the one Number,
in which case, of course, they correspond to the many
Ones as against the one One. Hence, a Number is the
Ideality of units which are also mutually excluding and
therefore themselves numbers.

Fourth Act of Thought 8i

3. Numerical One

165. The Quality of Number is, therefore, to consist of
Numbers, tlie distinguishing of which falls only into the
comparing external Reflection.

Note. — So the distinguishing of the present Ones was
seen to fall only into the comparing external Reflection.
Since, however, the present Ones are now moments of a
Number, and these moments, as Ones of Quantity, are
themselves also Numbers, the distinguishing acquires
the sense of Annumeration : of an Adding of a One to itself,
or of an external colligation of units because it rests on a
thoughtless repetition of one and the same empty thought,
the One. The numerical One has, therefore, no qualitative
Being of its own, or its Quality is to have no Quality.
For this reason, figures acquire meaning only when they
are applied to something. Their meaning can be only
shown — on fingers, bullets, apples, etc. In their own self,
they are only an empty figure of thought.

4. Extensive and Intensive Quantum

166. Constituted with its Limit as what is numerous in
its own self, Quantum is extensive magnitude.

Note. — Everj^ number, i.e. Quantum, is the One of
Quantit}^ or such a Limit that it consists of manj^ units —
hence, every number, or generally Quantum, is extensive
magnitude.

167. Extension is Continuity as a moment of every
Number, so far as the latter is a Unitj' (Ideality) of present
units (ones).

168. From this it follows, however, directly, that the
externality of the units is suspended.

169. Quantum is thus properly intensive magnitude
or Degree.

170. That is to say, Degree is Number as suspended
Amount, as an ordinal number.

171. As thus estabhshed. Number excludes from itself
the indifference and externality of the Amount and is
Reference to self as Reference through its own self to an
external.

82 A Holiday with a Hegelian

172. Accordingly, Degree is simple qualitative deter-
minateness among a severality of such intensive magnitudes
that they are singly simple references to self, hence different,
yet at the same time in essential reference to one another.

173. But since the determinateness of the simple Degree
consists in its reference to other Degrees out of it (§171),
Degree also contains an Amount.

Note. — The term contains is meant to remind us that
Degree shows forth the very same character which belongs
to qualitative Something : its determinateness is identical
with the qualitative In-itself and, consequently, we are
finding that Quantum, as Degree, is no longer a purely
empty figure of thought. The distinction of degrees is,
indeed, no longer a matter of purely external reflection on
our side, but belongs also to the nature of things. This is
why temperature is measurable by a thermometer, etc.
And so far as Degree is qualitative In-itself, it implies
in its own self its own negation, i.e. the Degrees out of
it, or is in one also extensive :

174. So far, then, as Degree suspends its own Amount,
it is extensive magnitude.

5. Identity of Extensive and Intensive Mag-
nitude.

175. Extensive and Intensive Magnitudes are one and
the same determinateness of the Quantum.

Note. — The numerical One is only an empty figure of
Thought (and consequently arts of Reckoning may even
be performed by a machine). The present conclusion
confirms, on one hand, the already made reflection that
number acquires meaning only through application ; but,
on the other, it is borne in upon us that the association of
numbers with something properly exemplifies externally
the very 'notion of Quantum, so far as Quantum is
itself the In-itself of qualitative Something. The dia-
lectical movement itself brings in here qualitative Some-
thing, because the distinction of Extensive and Intensive
Quantum concerns the Quality of Quantum, as a Reference
to self in its own otherwiseness (§171), Quality being

Fourth Act of Thought 83

the simplest Being of the unity of Being and Nothing.
At the same time it is to be reahsed that Something
has here the significance of Being-in-itself : it is the
quahtative character of Quantum, as the identity of
intensive and extensive magnitude, that is, so far,
covered by the term Something ; or it is only an abstract
self-recovery of Quality in Quantity that is under our
notice.

6. Quantitative Progress " ad infinitum "

176. With the Identity of Extensive and Intensive there
enters qualitative Something : the suspended distinction
constitutes the Quality of the Quantum.

177. Quantum is thus established in its contradictory
nature.

178. That is to say, it is now established that Quantum
must alter.

Note. — The impulse which prompts us to exceed every
quantitative determinateness (enough has been wittily
defined as meaning : a little more !) is nothing than the
notion of the Quantum, as a moment of our logical nature.
Counting is indeed a matter of annumeration, but even
the thoughtless adding of a unit to itself is, after all, an
establishing of the notion of Quantum (§i6i).

179. Quantum must by its own nature force itself be3'ond
itself and become another, to increase or decrease.

180. The Limit which it is keeps on suspending itself ad
infinitum.

181. Thus, however, so far as it is determined for itself,
it is rather determined in another ; whilst, conversely, it is
the suspended determinedness-in-another, as an indifferent
Being-for-self.

182. Quantum is, therefore at once finite and infinite :
finite, firstly, as what is hmited in general and, secondly,

84 A Holiday with a Hegelian

as what is determined in another ; infinite, firstly, as what
transcends every hmit and, secondly, as what returns in the
other into itself.

183. From this it follows that the quantitative Finite
does not continue itself into its Infinitude only in itself,
as is the case with the qualitative Finite, but in it, i.e.
without becoming qualitatively other.

Note. — Qualitative Finite and Infinite appear at first
sight also qualitatively distinct (§83) because they have
not the notion of Ideality at their back, but ahead of them.
Since the Quality of Quantum lies in the identity of ex-
tension and intension. Quantum does not become quali-
tatively other.

184. The alternate determination of the quantitative
Finite and Infinite is the Quantitative Infinite Progress.

185. So far, the Infinite is recurrently produced without
becoming positive and present.

186. The continuity of the Quantum into its other leads
to the union of both in the expression of the infinitely
great or of the infinitely small.

187. This Infinitude is, however, to be designated as the
bad quantitative Infinite.

188. The bad quantitative Infinite is simply an image of
figurate conception which, on closer consideration, shows
itself to be idle mist.

189. Quantum continues itself into its Non-Being,
because it has in the latter its very determinateness.

190. The quantitative infinite progress establishes, there-
fore, the notion of Quantum.

191. There is present in it the suspending of the Quantum
as well as of its Beyond : consequently the Negation of the
Quantum as well as the Negation of this Negation.

7. Quantitative Relation or Ratio

192. There is thus arisen Quantum determined according
to its notion : once again qualitative^ determined.

Fourth Act of Thought 85

193. The quantitative Infinite is de facto nothing else
than QuaHty.

194. Quantum as such is suspended Quahty, and its
going out beyond itself is, therefore, in itself the Negation
of the negated Quality, i.e. its Restoration, but as the
Being-for-self (by" virtue of the implied quantitativity).

195. Quantum is therewith established as repelled from
itself, whereby there are two Quanta, as moments of one
Unity : Quantitative Relation.

Note. — This is clearly the present correspondence of the
Limit, of two Somethings conjoined and disjoined in One
determinateness. As has been pointed out (§175. note),
Something has now the sense of the In-itself of Quantum,
not yet of something present objectively. Quality is,
therefore, so far, restored only with respect to Quantum,
and not yet with respect to its own Presence.

CHAPTER XI

FOURTH ACT OF THOUGHT:

B. SIXTH CYCLE

I. Direct Ratio

196. In the quantitative Relation, which is immediately
direct, there is only One determinateness, or Limit, of the
two sides : the Exponent.

197. The Exponent is a qualitatively fixed Quantum,
each of whose moments appears as a distinct Quantum.

198. The Exponent is thus, firstly, the Amount of a
Unity, which latter is itself a numerical One ; secondly,
the qualitative element of the sides.

Note. — Accordingly |=C may be written A=BC.
The notion of the Exponent advances Counting from
simple Annumeration (Addition and Subtraction) to the
Addition of one and the same number a fixed amount of
times, i.e. to the Multiplication of a number by another
number. A is the result of this Multiplication.

199. But as the sides constitute, so far, moments of
One Quantum, each is distinctly only as one moment and,
for that reason, in itself negative of the other moment.

Note. — A and B in |=C or A=BC are not inter-
changeable. So far as they are distinct Quanta, each
implies Amount and Unit}^ ; but when they become
moments of the direct Relation in either of its forms, A
stands only for a fixed Amount (C) of B, B only for an
arbitrary Unity contained a fixed amount of times in A.
And since then, the significance of either side of the
Relation is not interchangeable with the significance of the
other, each is in itself negative of the other. But so far

Fourth Act of Thought 87

as Something is in itself what it has in it and the quahtative
element of the sides has the character of Something, we are
forced logically to admit that the sides must be equally
interchangeable, because each implies also the significance
of the other side. This correction, however, of the one-
sidedness discovered in the direct Ratio amounts to a
dialectical transition into the Inverted Ratio.

200. Established with this their negation, the sides
are in Inverted Relation.

2. Inverted Relation (Inverse Ratio)

201. Whereas the Exponent of the direct Ratio is a
fixed Amount,

202. The Exponent of the Inverted Relation (Inverse
Ratio), while being equally an immediate Quantum, as-
sumed as fixed, is not a fixed Amount of the Unity in the
Relation.

Note. — That is to say, the Exponent has now mathe-
matically the significance of a fixed Product of two factors.
So far, then, as we illustrate the notion of the inverse
Ration by A=B C, we must not fancy that this is connected
with the previous illustration of the direct Ratio. The
sides of Ratio are now B and C, whilst A is the Exponent.
The transition from the direct to the inverse Ratio must
be effected dialectically, and there is therefore no mathe-
matical connection between the former and the present
significance of A=B C.

203. The Exponent is now negative against itself as a
moment of the Ratio and has therefore acquired the sig-
nificance of qualitative Limit.

Note. — The Exponent of the direct Ratio is not yet a
qualitatively established Limit, because it does not dis-
tinguish itself qualitatively, i.e. both affirmatively and
negatively, from itself as a moment of the Ratio (the
amount A in •^=C). A is so far a fixed amount of B,
i.e. A=B C, no matter what value is given to B. So far.

88 A Holiday with a Hegelian

however, as A has the significance of a fixed Product of
B and C, it has the character of quahtatively estabhshed
Limit, because it is not only in itself identifiable with either
of its moments, but also negatively distinguished from
them. The amount which A is now of either B or C depends
on the numerical value assigned to either of them. That is

to say, C=gand B=^.

204. There is, herewith, before us, firstly, the \A'hole as
a present, affirmative Quantum (A), which, being at the
same time Limit, is, secondly, distinguished into two
Quanta (B, C) and, thirdly, forms their negative unity
as the Limit to their mutual limiting (A=B C).

205. Accordingly, each moment of the Ratio continues
itself negatively into the other.

206. By virtue of this continuity, each is at once the
whole Exponent and only as a moment of the Ratio.

207. The affirmatively present Exponent (the fixed
amount A), is, therefore, equally an inaccessible Beyond
of an infinite approximation to it, on the part of the sides
of the Relation, whereby the bad Infinitude of quantitative
progress (§§184-188) is now established as it is in truth :
only as pure negativity, as the Negation as such.

Note. — A is the maximum to which B or C cannot be-
come equal de facto, though each of them implies it in
itself, being determined by its means (B=^, C=g). They

can, therefore, only infinitely approximate to it as the
reached Limit (mathematically, A stands for the differen-
tial coefficient of B and C, as functions of one another).
And thus we have here at once quantitative progress
ad infinitum, and its true meaning as an approximation
to a qualitatively determined Quantum (§192). The
true Infinitude of quantitative progress restores Quality
from its immediate suspendedness in Quantity, and this

Fourth Act of Thought 89

conclusion of the fifth Cycle is now established. And since
the bad Infinitude of approximation is now established
as an Ideahty of the aflirmatively present Exponent, i.e.
as a Being-for-one, it is per se, or on its own account, only
as pure negativity, only an image of figurate conception
(§188).

208. Herewith, however, the Inverted Relation has
acquired another determination than that which it had
at first sight.

209. Qualitativity is now present, not merely as Fixed-
ness of a Quantum (§202), nor as the negativity of this
Quantum of itself as a moment of the Ratio (§203), but
as the negation of this negativity : as a conclusion of the
fixed Quantum in its self-external otherwiseness (the
progress ad infinitum of the sides of the Ratio) with itself.

210. Owing to this involution of the otherwiseness, the
Relation is now an involved one.

3. Involved Relation and its transition into

Measure

211. Estabhshed as returned into itself, as being im-
mediately itself and its otherwiseness, the Quantum as-
sumes the significance of Power.

212. Power is the Exponent of quantitative Relation
established as wholly qualitative.

Note. — The relation is now symbohsed by a^=a.a or -=«.

And so far, then, as the involved Relation or the Relation
of Powers {PotenzenverJidUniss) is already implied in the
grasp of the Exponent as the reached (affirmatively present)
Limit of two Quanta in inverted relation, i.e. of two
Quanta such that they are functions of one another, we
find that the answer to Hutchinson Stirling's query as to
the connection between the differential coefficient and
Power {The Secret of Hegel, p. 593) presents no difficulty.
Power establishes the true meaning of the differential
coefficient.

90 A Holiday with a Hegelian

213. Involution, as an external alteration of Quantum,
is thus seen to embody that which Quantum is in itself :
its qualitative character.

214. In the direct Relation, the Quahty of the Exponent
(the qualitative Quantum) lies only in the Fixedness of
a Quantum as the Amount of an arbitrary unity ; in the
inverted Relation, the qualitativity amounts onl}- to the
first Negation; in the involved relation, however, the
qualitativity has the nature of the second Negation,
because the Exponent is present in the distinction as of
itself from itself.

215. And in this way we have now fully estabUshed the
return of Quantity into Quahty.

216. Quality has been realised to go over into Quantity,
yet Quantity is now found to return into Quality : owing
to this double transition, Quality is now established as
resting on Quantity.

217. We have before us Quantum as that whereby
Something is what it is : Measure.

Note.— So far as external reflection, i.e. that reasoning
which does not raise itself to the standpoint of pure
thought, chngs to the notion of Quantum in its primary
abstract sense, as a limit which is no qualitative Limit, the
stated transition of the Quantum into Measure— and
generally every purely dialectic transition — naturally
appears undeduced, unjustified or illegitimate, to use Prof.
MacTaggart's favourite terms in his Commentary on Hegel's
Logic. Yet no transition could be, after all, more self-
evident. Quantity presupposes Quality or Something
from the very first ; Quantum has per se no meaning, but
receives meaning onTy through application, for which
reason counting is de facto teachable only by means of
bullets, fingers, etc. ; the handling of mathematical formula
depends on memory, not on thinking. Now, so far as Quan-
tum is declared to be that whereby Something is what it is,
we only assert that the application of Quantum to some-
thing is not only an external counting of something, but
that everything, just because it admits of quantitative
determination, implies Quantum as a moment of its own

Fourth Act of Thought 91

self. But for this verity, of what consequence would be
measuring ? The inability fo realise the true sense of the
present transition of Power into Measure is obviously due
to an insistence on treating Quantum as still only suspended
Quality after its character, as the Exponent of the in-
volved Relation, as Power, is realised to have become
wholly qualitative by means of the suspension of the bad
quantitative Infinitude.

4. Quantitative Relation as Measure (Real-
istic Measure)

218. Measure is primarily an immediate specific Quan-
tum.

219. Every Presence has a magnitude belonging to its
very nature.

220. This magnitude has, however, no absolute Standard
except through agreement.

Note. — That is to say, the unit of measure — the length of
a yard, a pint, etc., is arbitrary. Hence the existing
variety in measures in various countries and counties.
The One is empty Thought, hence, not to be fixed by
means of Thought. Of course, the nature of something
may be equally determined as a system of measures from
the standpoint of pure thought whenever the something
under consideration has its organising principle in pure
thought alone, as is, for instance, the case with the plane-
tary distances from the Sun, or, to take the nearest example,
with the dialectical movement itself. But in these cases
we deal only with comparative numbers, not with the
magnitude of a unit in the sense of a specific Quantum.

221. Since i\Ieasure is no longer a purely quantitative
Limit, its alteration, as of a specific Quantum, has only
a limited range of alteration.

222. That is to say, everything is liable to ruin through
quantitative alteration.

223. This fact was exhibited in popular examples
already by the ancients.

92 A Holiday with a Hegelian

224. Such examples are truly products of consciousness
concerned with facts of thought,

223. The ruination of something through quantitative
alteration, which, at first sight, does not seem to affect its
Quality, should warn us not to fall into the trap set for us
by the Notion in the preconceptions of our ordinary con-
sciousness.

226. The two sides of specific Quantum have also
different existence.

227. So far, now, as the magnitude belonging to one
side serves as unity against the Quantum existing in the
other different side, it forms the Rule or Standard.

Note. — The foUowing footnote on page 89 of Prof. Mac-
Taggart's Commentary on Hegel's Logic may serve as a
single instance of his comprehension of Hegel : "In the
EncyclopcBdia Hegel seems to use Rule to indicate a
Measure in which the Quantity does not pass the limits
which involve a change of Quality [Enc. 108). This is
different from the use of Rule in the Greater Logic (cp.
above, Section 79)." Looking up this Section, one finds
that Prof. MacTaggart fancies (in fact, all his comments
appear purely fanciful) that the Rule is to stand, from
Hegel's standpoint in the Science of Logic, for the limiting
temperatures of liquid water (o'-ioo" C. or 32°-2i2° F.),
simply because " the dialectic has now passed beyond mere
Quantity to Measure, where a change of Quantity brings
about a change of Quality." But Prof. MacTaggart for-
gets (or does not seem to be at all aware of) the distinc-
tion between what is only in itself and what is already
established. The change of Quality, owing to the change
of Quantity, is not yet established at the stage of the
third moment of the present supplementary cycle, even
though it be anticipated from the very first. This antici-
pation must be first of all verified by a dialectic considera-
tion of Measure in its own self, and the Rule stands just
only for the immediate unity of the two sides of the
specific Quantum, their relatedness having yet to be
mediated. But, then, Prof. MacTaggart calls this mediation

Fourth Act of Thought 93

" the unjustified and useless loop which stretches from Rule
to Elective Affinity in the Greater Logic " (p. 90). To
intercept all his fancies would be too tedious.

228. Having in it also the moment of Being-for-other,
Measure is open to external alteration.

229. Owing, however, to its character as the specific
Quantum, it specifies the arithmetical amount of alteration
received from outside : it is a specifying Measure.

230. The specifying JMeasure implies thus the taking up
of an immediate magnitude of alteration in another
amount.

231. There arises, hence, in this respect, a Relation of
Quanta having for its Exponent the qualitative element
itself which specifies the external amount of alteration :
an involved Relation.

Note. — The fact that external alteration, to which the
something of Measure is subjected (by heat, pressure or
faUing), is taken up by it in an involved relation, demon-
strates the effect of the realised transition of the Quantita-
tive Relation into jMeasure. We bear witness to the logical
necessity of this transition, so far as we take for granted
that the result of mathematical operations has objective
validity. The result reached by the Calculus is con-
firmed by the changes in measured relations of things,
because the specifying Measure has the sense of an objective
embodiment of that relationship between two functions
which is the subject-matter of the Calculus.

232. Since, now, the external Quantum is itself the
Quantum of another Measure, the Relation of the two
sides is properly a quantitative Relation of two specifying
Measures.

233. This form of Measure may be called Realistic
Measure.

234. And this relationship establishes the true meaning
of the variable magnitude in Higher Mathematics.

94 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Note. — Hegel circumstantially discusses the notional
meaning of the Differential and Integral Calculus in lengthy
Remarks which, although introduced at the end of the
fifth cycle, i.e., at the end of the second main sub-
division of the doctrine of Being, Quantity, anticipate
the present result of the dialectic of Measure, and, indeed,
become fully intelligible only after a thorough assimilation
of the whole sixth cycle. That this is so, is acknowledged
by him in the last paragraph of his prefatory comment
on the subject-matter of the Quantitative Relation :
" As to the nature of the following Relations," he says,
" much has been anticipated in the foregoing Remarks
concerning the Infinite of Quantity, i.e. its Quahtativity ;
all that remains, therefore, for discussion is the abstract
Notion of these Relations." And, as has been repeatedly
pointed out above, the dialectic of Measure establishes
said abstract Notion in its Presence, i.e. as embodied
realistically in specified ]Measures.

235. The sides of the realistic Measure have, therefore,
according to their abstract nature as Qualities in general,
some particular significance (e.g. that of Space and Time).

236. Amount attaches to the extensive element, Unity
to the intensive. (Spaces covered by a falling body are pro-
portional to the squares of Time.)

Is[oTE. — The sixth step of mediation concerns the alter-
nating determination of the two sides of the fourth step.
Now, the fourth step of the present supplementary cycle
establishes simply that the specificity of Something as
Measure shows itself with respect to the amount of its
external alteration as an involved Relation, so far as the
Quantum of alteration which is received from outside, e.g.
temperature, pressure, movement, is not taken on im-
mediately but in another amount. So far, we have before
us only a single instance of the Quantitative Relation of
two Qualities. The sixth step of mediation generalises the
single instance into a flux of external alteration — a flux
which has its mathematical embodiment in the theory of
Functions.

Fourth Act of Thought 95

237. So far, then, the quahtative moment, or Specificity,
of the Relation of specified Measures concerns only their
quantitative determinateness.

Note. — This may remind us of the fact that the alter-
nating determination of the two sides of realistic Measure
comes under the head of the fourth main moment of the
sixth cycle and, consequently, the conclusion of the present
supplementary cycle of mediation establishes only the
immediate Identity of the two abstract Qualities in
Relation. The alteration of realistic Measure is still ex-
ternal ; the two sides do not j'et go over into one another :
this kind of mediation falls under the head of the sixth
main step in the present cycle. So far, each Quality
specifies only the immediate amount of the alteration
received from outside, without being affected in its own
immediate subsistence, or without affecting the other side
with respect to its qualitative persistence. Things specify
the amount of temperature in the air without ceasing to be :
their specificity as realistic Measures shows itself only with
respect to their quantitative determinateness. As a matter
of fact, things are affected also qualitatively by an external
alteration, and indeed also cease to be — this has been
already implied in itself under the second main step, but
the fourth main step does not yet establish the full import
of said anticipation, but goes only as far as the stated
relation of specified Measures : without concerning their
liability to ruin through quantitative alteration !

5. Abstract Being-for-self in Measure

238. As the sides of the realistic Measure are to be taken
only in the sense of immediate Qualities, their involved
Relation is equally only a direct Relation of the im-
mediate Quanta belonging to them.

239. The Exponent of this Relation has the significance
of abstract Being-for-self in Measure, and is, therefore,
an empirical coefficient.

Note. — As has been already pointed out, the dialectic
of Measure concerns generally the subject-matter of the

96 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Calculus. And so far as the dialectic of Measure comes
under the head, firstly, of the quantitatively qualitative
Relation of Measures, called shortly realistic Measure, and,
secondly, of the qualitatively quantitative Relation of
]\Ieasures, which Relation, it will be found presently, yields
the Nodal Line of real Measures, the quantitatively
qualitative Relation refers mainly to the Algebraic function,
the qualitatively quantitative Relation to the Exponential
function. The present step is the middle of the two kinds
of Relations, and so comes it that both the algebraic and
exponential function imply a constant term. Thus
~.=a, or x = b e'^^ (Wilhelmy's lav/ for the velocity of
chemical reactions, according to which the amount of
chemical change in a given time is directly proportional to
the quantum of reacting substance present in the system.)
"If in any physical investigation we find some function,
say <}i, varjdng at a rate proportional to itself (with or
without some constant term), we guess at once that
we are dealing with an exponential function " (J. W. Mel-
lor's Higher Mathematics for Students of Chemistry and
Physics, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 56).

240. But just because the sides of the direct Relation in
question are equally in involved Relation, the reached
Being-for-self in Measure is not abstract, but real : the
Something of realistic Measure is not an immediate
Measure as a Being-for-other, but as Something-for-self —
and, therewith, equally a Repelling of itself into distin-
guished Self-subsistences.

Note. — The preceding two paragraphs concern primarily
only the Identity of the two sides of realistic Measure and
thus only their direct Relation. So far, the Being-for-self
in Measure is still only in itself. Now emphasis is laid on
the concrete meaning of the Identity in question, which
concrete meaning is, however, yet to be properly es-
tablished. The significance of the transition from
the immediate to real Being-for-self in Measure is, of
course, to involve also the Qualitativity of the sides of
realistic Measure in their mediation with one another
(§236) : to make the alteration concern also their quaUta-

Fourth Act of Thought 97

tive determinateness. Or rather, it is logically necessary
to raise the immediate Qualities involved in the Relation
of specified Measures to the rank of present Ones, but of
Ones which are Measures and then are the Self-repulsion
of the real Being-for-self in Measure (§§119, 120 : the One
is now Measure-for-self). From the standpoint of the
former correspondence of the fourth act of Thought with
the second act, we have now restated the dialectic of the
immediate Infinite, and are about to restate the dialectic
of the alternating determination of the Finite and Infinite
in terms of Measure.

6, Qualitatively quantitative Relation of

Measures

241. The real Being-for-self in Measure is immediately
again only a direct Relation of its sides, but the Amount
attaches to the intensive side, the Unity to the extensive.

Note. — The inversion of the significance attaching to the
sides of the reahstic Measure at this stage is due to the fact
that the real Measure is to be no longer subject only to
purely external alteration, but to enter into a relation with
other Measures also qualitatively. Hence, the amount of its
alteration must now concern its intensive side. The direct
relation now under discussion may be illustrated on
specific gravity : the relation of the Weight of a Mass to
its Volume. But it is to be remarked that a real Measure
is not necessarily a material thing ; it applies equally,
for instance, to the number of vibrations (measured ar-
bitrarily) in a tone, or to the mentioned limits of tempera-
ture of a Hquid (§227, Note). Unless one is aware that
Measure does not necessarily apply to physical Matter
(we have not yet developed the notion of Matter or of
Thingness resting on material Properties), one easily
credits everything measurable with physical materiality,
and thus proceeds to imagine, for instance, that planets and
generally celestial bodies must be of the same nature as
this Earth.

98 A Holiday with a Hegelian

242. Seeing, now, that the specific determinedness-in-
itself of a real Measure exhibits itself immediately as an
immediate Quantum, it is determinable only in comparison
with other real Measures,

243. To compare, however, means now to combine ; and
so far as the something of real Measure is with respect
to its Combinations, degraded to a Being-for-Other, its
alteration remains still only external.

Note. — Thus we are predicting (i.e. realising on purely
logical grounds) that a mixture of two substances affects the
volume, not the weight of its constituents.

244. Nevertheless, the specific determinedness-in-itself
too shows itself as alterable :

245. The Exponent of a freshly formed Combination is
itself only a Quantum.

246. Hence, the something of real Measure distinguishes
itself truly by a peculiar series of Exponents, i.e. of the
Amounts which it, taken as Unity, forms with other such
self-subsistences, when combined with them.

247. Now, two (or several) self-subsistences, forming
different series of Exponents with the same series of
opposite self-subsistences, must be comparable, and this
they can be only if the members of the different series of
Exponents maintain a constant relation inter se.

Note. — We are predicting that, when for a kah, taken as
unity, the series of comparative amounts of acids, re-
quired for its saturation, has been determined, then for
every other kali this series is to be taken in a certain
amount all through.

248. Thus, each self-subsistence is, firstly, Unity in
general against the opposite series ; secondly, one of the
amounts or exponents for each member of the opposite
series ; and thirdly, a comparative number to the rest of
the members on its own side.

249. Its Affinity, therefore, is not merely a matter of
external Combination, but rather founded in its own nature:
Elective Affinity.

Fourth Act of Thought 99

250. The term Elective Affinity is taken from the sphere
of Chemistry, but the notion which it is meant to embody
exhibits itself also in other spheres, for instance, in Har-
mony.

Note. — Or in the principle of Perturbation, added by
Newton to Keplerian Laws. This taking of the names for
speculative notions from empirical sciences is usually
viewed as a defect of Hegel's exposition, as though it were
his fault that current language uses the same terms for pure
notions and their concrete instances. Prof. MacTaggart
begins at once by objecting to the term Becoming ; Prof.
Rosenkranz objected to the term Life, and a crowd of
other terms, being treated as logical categories — and so
most exponents are pleased to demonstrate their superiority
to Hegel's own supreme grasp of the scope of the Science of
Logic by suggesting trivial improvements on his ter-
minology. As though names were not per se empty sounds !
And as though the living genius of languages — Thought —
had to beg the permission of these would-be Hegelians for
its identification of pure notions with their particular
embodiments ! Were one to remove from the Science of
Logic every term recalling concrete facts, there would
remain no terminology at all to fall back upon for the
recording of pure notions. Objectivity cannot be separated
from the Notion ; and so far as the Science of Logic
includes, in its terminology, terms current in the sphere of
empirical sciences or in ordinary life, it simply establishes
their exact meaning : the notion which they record in
their ordinary usage ! And we have, then, to realise that
Elective Affinity stands for the logically necessary inference
that real Measures do not stand in a purely external or
arbitrary relationship, but that they relate themselves
to one another owing to their own nature.

251. At first sight it would seem that Elective Affinity,
as a firmer holding together of one Combination against
other possibihties of Combination, is only a matter of
intensity : but so the qualitative element which dis-

100 A Holiday with a Hegelian

tinguishes Elective Affinity from simple openness to any
combination would be still left out of the question.

Note. — This concerns the blunder of separating the
intensive magnitude from the extensive and consequent
trying to explain in terms of the intensive magnitude
what altogether transcends mere quantitative distinction.
To account for Elective Affinity in degrees of Affinity
means to interpret it still only externally : we record thus
only the result of our comparison without accounting for
the foundation of this result in the affinity itself.

252. The fact remains, however, that Elective Affinity
brings about only a break in the simple Affinity : it fixes
a particular Combination in the quantitatively continuous
series of Exponents representing the specific determined-
ness-in-itself of a real Measure : there is, then, before us
a series of Relations which are now mere Affinities, now
Elective Affinities.

253. Still, as regards its reference to other Neutralities,
the excludent elective affinity involves no further principle
of specification : it exemplifies simply the Separability
of its moments, as of self-subsistent somethings which are
in simple affinity to any other member of the opposite series.

Note. — Just as the Identity of the intensive and
extensive Quantum establishes the alterableness of the
Quantum as such (§178), so Elective Affinity amounts to
an establishing of the background (to be named further on
the Substrate) of the previously discussed openness of a
real Measure to any combination.

254. As against its externalness and consequent alter-
ableness, the excludent elective Affinity is a permanent
Substrate reaching over the specification of its quantitative
side.

255. Thus we have before us a Nodal Line of Measure
Relations in one and the same Substrate.

256. The Substrate is the inner specifying unity entering
into Presence in the Nodal Line of Measure Relations, every

Fourth Act of Thought loi

newly arisen Something being distinct from the previous
one only quantitatively.

Note. — So far as empiricism traces the Identity of
material self-subsistences to an ^Ether endowed with all
the properties of Matter, it conceives the inner specifying
unity, not as only entering into Presence, but as already
fully entered into Presence, The blunder is in this respect
of the same kind as that occurring in connection with the
search of the quantitative Infinite in the guise of a Quan-
tum : only of an infinitely great or small one ! To account
for Matter, one postulates thus — Matter : only infinitely
refined ! We shall realise, however, that this postulated
Matter — iEther — is Illusion pure and simple.

257. The transition from one self-subsistent something
into another is, therefore, a Leap.

Note. — Yet empirical science holds that Natura non
facit saltum. Just because self-subsistent somethings
are the inner specifying unity on the spring into Presence,
they enter into Presence as only quantitatively distinct,
consequently in the same way as Numbers which, while
being in principle purely continuous, are j'et as regards their
Presence (a) self-referent, (/3) enclosing, and (7) other-
excluding. Of course, when the inner specifying unity,
which stands for the Ideality of the self-subsistent some-
things, is itself degraded to the rank of realistic Presence,
all change is conceived only by degrees : only then there
is no accounting for the qualitative change along with the
quantitative progress. In truth, the qualitative change
rests onl}^ on Quantum : but the Quantum is now the
quantitative Presence of the inner specifying unity !

258. The Excludent Measure (Elective Affinity) remains
affected by the moment of its quantitative Presence, and is,
therefore, driven beyond itself into the Measureless, getting
ruined through the mere alteration of its Magnitude.

Note. — Here, then, we have established the anticipated
nature of Measure (§222).

I02 A Holiday with a Hegelian

259. Thus there is estabhshed an infinite progress of
alternation of Self-subsistences with one another, both
as mere Affinities and Elective Affinities.

260. This going over of Quahtativity and Quantitativity
into one another takes place on the ground of their unity,
the sense of this process being nothing else than to show
or estabhsh that there lies at the bottom such a Substrate.

7. Ideality as a State of Being

261. Alteration is now realised to be only an othering
of a State of Being, and the transient is established as
remaining therein one and the same Being.

262. And thus we see that the dialectic of Measure is
just as much its progressive determination to what is for
itself as its degradation to what is merely in itself.

Note. — It is now plain that the fourth act of Thought is
truly a higher reproduction of the second : so far, namely,
as Something and Other have acquired, from the stand-
point of Ideality, the significance of Quality and Quantity.
The third act of Thought takes up Ideality in corres-
pondence to pure Being, and results in Quantum in cor-
respondence to Being-within-self. The Other is now at
first only another Quantum ; but, in correspondence to the
Limit, Quantum is established, at the end of the fifth
cycle, as Quantitative Relation, whilst the sixth cycle
ends in a restatement of the conclusion of the third cycle.

Ideality has been asserted from the very first to be the
all in all, and this assertion may be viewed as having been
put to the test by the dialectic of the third and fourth act of
thought. And thus, from the standpoint of the Objective
Logic, as One act of Thought, we have arrived at its fifth
step : the notion of Being as the Identity of the Being-for-
self and Being-in-self : of the Being-in-and-for-self — of a
Being which is at once the totality of all Being and only a
transient Being, or self-degraded to the rank of immediate
Being.

CHAPTER XII
FIFTH ACT OF THOUGHT

SEVENTH CYCLE

1. Absolute Indifference

263. So far as all the determinatenesses of Being (Quality,
Quantity and Measure) are now a simple unity, mediated
through their negation, Being may now be called Absolute
Indifference.

264. But just so Being ceases to be only a Substrate, but
is within its own self Mediation,

265. And it is now to be seen, how this Mediation is
established in it.

2. Absolute Indifference as Mediation within

ITSELF

266. As regards its determinateness, the Indifference is,
then, primarily the Substrate.

267. The distinction in it being thus at first purely
quantitative, the Indifference is, so far, the Sum of two
Quanta in Inverted Relation.

Note. — The Indifference does not itself enter into the
Mediation as its moment, so far as the Mediation is within
it purely quantitative. Remaining, then, a mere Sub-
strate of the Mediation, the Indifference acquires the
significance of a mere Sum of every quantitative distinction
made in it. And so far as the sides of the distinction are
the sides of a Mediation, they are in inverted Relation.
A mathematical illustration of the present stage is found in

103

I04 A Holiday with a Hegelian

the differential coefficient of a function of two variables,
or also in the principle of the mutual independence of
different reactions, lying at the base of physical and
chemical dynamics. " When a number of changes are
simultaneously taking place in any system, each one pro-
ceeds as if it were independent of the others ; the total
change is the sum of all the independent changes." So
far as empirical sciences presuppose the totality of Being
only in the sense of Substrate, we may now understand why
iEther appears to be their last word. But, at the same
time, we are able to censure the tendency to trace to an
.^ther phenomena which presuppose, in their notion,
a higher significance of the present totality of Being
than that of a Substrate. This is the case, for instance, in
the current undulatory theory of Light. But, then, until
men of science will awaken to the realisation that their
theories are based on a logically untenable attitude to
objectivity, our censure is likely to give rise to supercilious
smiling ; and Newtonian fallacies will continue to blind
all disciples of scientific popes to what is, after all, sheer
common sense (s. Goethe's Farbenlehre) against inferences
based on experimental trickery. Still, magna est Veritas et
prevalebit !

268. Seeing, however, that each of the sides is in itself
the whole, the distinction is equally qualitative : each
side contains two Qualities, of which the one or the other
only preponderates quantitatively.

269. Each side is thus in its own self an inverted Relation
and, whilst being qualitatively continuous with the other,
is also estabhshed against it as the whole Indifference.

270. We have thus before the Indifference as such, as
indifferent to itself as developed determinateness, i.e.
to itself as self-degraded to the whole-in-itself.

271. Consequently (a) distinctions in it (the Indifference
as such) on the whole simply stand out, i.e. show them-
selves in it in a purely immediate manner or groundlessly.

Fifth Act of Thought 105

272. (/?) The mode of their subsisting in it (the quanti-
tative determinateness of the sides as sums of two Quanta
in inverted Relation) is equally determined only externally.

273. (7) Since, however, in distinction from this their
Presence, the sides are in themselves the totality of In-
difference, neither of the two Qualities into which the
quahtative moment disrupts itself is, at the same time,
restricted by the quantitative Limit.

Note. — According to (a) Absolute Indifference is iden-
tified with its immediate Presence ; and because it is
equally indifferent to this its own Presence, the quantitative
determination in this latter respect (/3) concerns only the
external reflection or empiricism ; and the finding of the
latter (y) is, at the same time, negated by the fact that the
quantitative distinction does not truly concern the Sub-
strate in its own self, i.e. the finding does not throw any
light on its true nature. The distinctions are many —
infinitely so — single instances of Becoming or entering into
the Presence on the part of the Substrate. Their arising
is a leap. In Biblical language, they are created from
Nothing : the Nothing having the significance of the
present totality of Being as the all in all, to be called
ultimately the Notion, To realise clearly — to comprehend —
the process of Creation is the object of the rest of the
Science of Logic : at present we are only in a position to
deny the conception of it as a kind of fashioning of some
primordial stuff — a conception endeavouring to explain
the arising of Qualities only by a gradual quantitative
change, not as a leap.

274. On the ground of their qualitative Identity, then,
a More of the one Quahty, i.e. quantitative distinction of
the sides, is out of the question : the sides are in Equi-
librium.

275. But, seeing that the Presence of the sides rests only
on the inequahty of their Quantum, their Equilibrium is
equally out of the question, as regards their Presence.

276. Hence, their Presence is an all-sided Contradiction.

io6 A Holiday with a Hegelian

277. Absolute Indifference proves itself to be de facto
absolute Negativity.

3. Essence

278. The determining and becoming determined is,
therefore, not a going over, nor an external alteration, nor
a standing out of determinations in the Indifference, but
its own referring to itself, its own repeUing of itself from
itself.

279. Determinations, as such repelled ones, are as
moments — firstly, as belonging to the totality of Being
as it is in itself, secondly, as immanent to it as it is for
itself.

Note. — The firstly refers to the sides, the secondly to the
Indifference as the all in all.

280. Being is in this manner determined to be simple
Being through the suspending of all Being : this Being-in-
and-for-itself is called Essence.

4. Reflection or Essential Becoming

281. Essence is, however, the Being-in-and-for-itself
only as the first Negation of the sphere of Being and has,
therefore, the Immediacy opposite to itself as such an one
from which it has become, and which, in its suspendedness,
has preserved and maintained itself.

282. Being and Essence are in this manner still in the
mutual relation of Others in general : as the Non-essential
and the Essential.

283. Still, this distinction concerns the Essence only as
relapsed into the sphere of Presence.

284. In truth, the Essence is absolute negativity of
Being ; and the Immediate, still distinguished from it, is,
therefore, not merely an unessential Presence, but in and
for itself null : a No-thing or Illusion.

285. The Being of Illusion consists solely in the sus-
pendedness of its Being : in its Nullity.

Fifth Act of Thought 107

286. So far as it appears to have still an immediacy apart
from the Essence, the immediacy stands for the other-
wiseness as the Negation as such.

287. It is, then, only to be shown that the determinations
distinguishing it from the Essence are determinations of
the Essence itself ; and that this determinateness of the
Essence which is the Illusion is suspended in the Essence
itself.

288. Now, since Being is essentially Non-Being, the
Immediacy of this Non-Being is the own absolute Being-in-
itself of the Essence : the Immediacy proper to the Essence
itself.

289. There is not before us an Illusion of Being in the
Essence, or an Illusion of the Essence in Being, but the
Illusion of the Essence itself.

290. That whereby the Essence presents itself as its own
Illusion is the fact that it is immanently determined and
thereby also distinguished from its absolute Unity : but in
such wise that the determinateness of Being is just as much
directly suspended in its own self.

291. The Illusion is, therefore, a negative having a Being,
its Immediacy being the reference of the Negative, of the
Non-self-subsistent, to itself.

292. This Negativity which is identical with the Imme-
diacy, and thus the Immediacy which is identical with the
Negativity, is an essential Becoming.

Note. — The Illusion stands for the German ' Schein,'
whilst the essential Becoming is my rendering of
' das Scheinen des Wesens in sich selbst ' — literally, the
shining of the Essence in its own self. Light is an objective
illustration of this shining as a self-suspending immediacy.

293. In its self-movement, the Essence is Reflection.

294. The Illusion is the Null, or the Essence-less, as a
moment of the absolute Reflection.

295. This self-to-self-referent Negative is directly the
Negating of its own self.

io8 A Holiday with a Hegelian

296. Primarily, then, Reflection is a Going over as a
Suspending of the Going over : a Movement from Nothing
to Nothing.

297. Its Immediacy is only the Return of the Negative
into itself and, therefore, purely only as Determinateness
or as self-suspending Immediacy.

Note. — Determinateness as such is the simple Being of
the unity of Being and Nothing, and the Being, therefore,
directly is and is not. The first act of Thought lays stress
on the ' is,' whilst, as a result of the foregoing dialectic of
Being, the accent falls now on the ' not.'

298. Reflection is thus, as regards its immediacy, at once
establishing and pre-establishing.

Note. — This its nature has forced itself on our attention
already in the third act — clearly, because this act deals
with the Immediacy of the Ideality and thus must needs
anticipate what becomes properly established only when
the notion of Ideality is grasped in the present sense.

299. The Reflection is pre-establishing, so far as its
arriving at its own self is its suspending of itself ; and it is
establishing, so far as its repelling of itself from itself is its
arriving at its own self.

300. The reflective movement is to be taken as an
absolute Rebound on itself.

301. For, only thus the suspending of the Negative is a
going together with itself, a fusion with self.

302. But so the Reflection is equally determined, starting
from the Immediate as its own Other : taken in this sense,
it is the external Reflection.

303. This is the pre-establishing Reflection as against
the establishing Reflection.

304. The pre-establishedness counts to the external
Reflection, not as an Illusion, but as an immediate starting-
point (in the sense of Quality).

305. The external Reflection concludes in this manner
the two moments of the absolute Reflection (§298) by
means of the determined Immediac3^

306. For, the Immediate is, on one side, determined by it,

Fifth Act of Thought 109

the external Reflection, as its other and, on the other, only
pre-established : in determining the Immediate as its
Other, the external Reflection determines its own self,
as its Other and is, therefore, the Determining Reflection.

Note. — Of course, the ordinary consciousness stops
only at the sense of the Immediate as the Other as such —
just as it equally takes the Repulsion of the One from
itself only in the sense of Exclusion. The determining Re-
flection is the present meaning of the Ideality of the present
Ones.

307. The Determining Reflection is generally the unity
of the establishing and external Reflection.

308. The Immediate of the external Reflection is now
the established Being ;

309. An Other : but in such wise that the equality of
the Reflection with itself is directly maintained.

Note. — So far as the establishing had from the very
first the sense of putting explicitly what is at first only in
itself, the Being-in-itself suggested the notion of Essence
already in §41.

310. The Establishedness is not, however, simply the
middle concluding Presence with Essence, or vice versa : it
is an absolute Pre-establishedness of the external Reflection,
hence, a Determination of Reflection.

311. The Estabhshedness fixes itself into a Determination
of Reflection, because the Reflection is, in its negatedness,
equality with self.

312. Owing to the fact, however, that this equality of
the Reflection with itself is lost in its negatedness. Deter-
minations of Reflection appear as free Essentialities,
floating in the void without mutual Attraction or Re-
pulsion.

Note. — Philosophy of Nature identifies free Essentiali-
ties in fixed Stars. There is no Attraction nor Repulsion
between them, because an Essentiality is not for another,
nor for self, as a present One, but as an Illusion pure

no A Holiday with a Hegelian

and simple. Stars are only points of Light, the essential
Illusion.

313. The determination of Reflection is, then, firstly,
an Establishedness or the Negation as such ; secondly,
the Refiection-within-self :

314. It bends the reference to another back into itself,
and is that Negation which is equal to itself, which is
the unity of itself, and of its Other, and only thereby
Essentiality.

5. Essential Identity.

315. As equal to itself in its absolute negativity, the
Essence is simple Identity with self.

316. It is not that equality with self which the Being,
or also the Nothing, is, but that equahty with self which
suspends Being and all its determinatenesses, thus being
the Being of the essential Becoming : essential Identity.

317. That is to say, the Identity is generally still the
same thing as the Essence.

318. As absolute Negation, it is an immediately self-
negating Negation, or a distinguishing whereby nothing is
distinguished : absolute Distinction.

319. Distinction is, however, absolute, so far as it is
not the Identity : so far as it is absolute Non-Identity ;
hence, the Identity is in its own self absolute Non-Identity.

320. And so far, then, as the Identity is equally Reflec-
tion-within-self, establishing its own self as its own Non-
Being (in which it is the return into self), it is also deter-
mined, as the Identity against the absolute Distinction
or Non-Identity.

6. Essential Distinction

321. The Distinction is the negativity contained within
the Identity itself.

322. It is the Distinction in and for itself ; hence,
simple or absolute Distinction.

323. It is it itself and the Identity.

Fifth Act of Thought 1 1 1

324. But so it is equally determined within itself :
the determined Distinction-in-and-for-self :

325. Difference or Diversity.

326. The Identity breaks up in its own self into Difference
because, being absolute Distinction within itself, it estab-
lishes itself, as the negative of itself, and yet remains
essentially identical.

327. Difference constitutes the otherwiseness as such
of the Reflection.

328. Its moments are not determined against one
another : the determinateness to be only Identity, or only
Distinction, is suspended.

329. This determinateness, is, then, purely a matter of
the external Reflection.

330. The Difference is the One Reflection, of the Identity
and Distinction, within itself ; but so far as this Reflection-
within-itself is at first only in itself, its two moments
are established externally.

331. Identity becomes thus mere Equality : an Identity
which is not in and for itself, but only as an establishedness ;
just so Inequality is the Distinction falling outside the
unequal.

332. The determined Distinction being the negated
absolute Distinction, its moments are referred to the
Reflection-within-self as to a Third.

333. In the self-estranged (external) Reflection, Equality
and Inequality fall asunder, each referring itself only to
itself.

334. But this very self-reference, on the part of each, is
the Equahty of both.

335. The external Distinction proves itself to be in its
own self negativity of itself.

336. So far, however, as the Equalitj^ as which the sides
of the external Distinction prove themselves to be in their
separate self-reference, is equally as their Third (the Com-

112 A Holiday with a Hegelian

parer, the Reflection-within-itself), and the sides, con-
sequently, are separately also unequal with this Third,
each is established as a negative unity of both.

337. Instead of Difference, we have thus before us
Opposition or Antithesis :

338. The completed determined Reflection,

339. As the sides of the external Reflection are now
established as a negative unity of both in opposition to
their One negative unity, i.e. in opposition to the Being-
in-and-for-itself, their establishedness is a simple Being,
their non-estabhshedness a Non-Being.

340. Each is in its determinateness the whole, containing
as it does its other moment : but this other is an in-
different Being, so that each is the whole (or Reflection-
within-self) only as essentially referent to its Non-Being.

341. This immanently reflected Equality with self
which contains within itself the reference to the Inequality,
is the Positive ; in turn, the Inequality containing within
its own self the reference to its Non-Being, the Equality,
is the Negative.

342. Each is a reference to its Non-Being, as a suspending
of this Otherwiseness within itself : but since the es-
tablishedness is now (in opposition to the Being-in-and-for-
itself) a Being, each is equally only so far as its Non-Being
is.

343. The Positive and Negative are, therefore, firstly,
absolute moments of the Antithesis, so far as their subsisting
is inseparably One Reflection.

344. They are, secondly, also merely different, each
being of the kind that it may be taken as well positively
as negatively.

345. And, thirdly, their reference to one another in one
unity as which they themselves are not (their significance
as absolute moments of the Antithesis) is taken back into
each as what is in its own self positive and negative.

Fifth Act of Thought 113

346. Each is thus a unity with itself independently of the
other : the Positive as the Non-opposed : as the suspended
Antithesis, while j'et remaining its side,

347. Conversely, the Negative is the Opposed subsisting
for itself against the Non-opposed : the whole Antithesis,
opposed to its own self-identical establishedness,

348. The Positive and Negative are thus positive and
negative, not only in themselves, but in and for themselves.

349. They are independent determinations of Reflection.

350. But now, each thus excludes the Other out of itself
while containing it.

351. That is to say, each excludes in its self-subsistence
its own self-subsistence : this is self-contradictory.

352. The Contradiction which the Distinction in general
is in itself (§326), is now established in the Excluding
Reflection.

353. The Excluding Reflection is the establishing of the
Positive, as what excludes the Other in such wise that this
estabhshing is immediately an establishing of the Other
which excludes it.

354. And since the establishing of both is One Reflection,
the absolute Contradiction of the Positive is immediately
also the absolute Contradiction of the Negative.

355. Nevertheless, the Contradiction is properly es-
tabhshed in the Negative, because this is identical with
itself against the Identity (which latter, as the Positive,
is only in itself the absolute Contradiction).

356. Now, so far as the Identity, against which the
Negative is identical with itself, is its own Identity, the
excluding of this Identity out from the Negative does away
with the whole Antithesis.

357. The Contradiction has vanished.

358. At first sight the result of the restless disappearing
of the Opposites in their own self appears to be the Zero.

114 A Holiday with a Hegelian

359. It must, however, be remembered that the self-
excluding Reflection is at the same time the establishing
Reflection.

360. The Self-exclusion is truly a Self-conversion into
a reference to the Negative : to that verj' Negative which
M'as to be suspended !

361. And thus there is before us the Self-subsistence
as a suspending Self-reference.

7. The Finding of the Ground

362. Seeing, then, that the Self-subsistence makes itself
in the Antithesis, as the self-excluding Reflection, to an
Establishedness by means of the suspending of this its
Establishedness, the Antithesis is truly a Return into its
unity with itself.

363. This its returning unity with itself is the notion
of the Ground.

364. The Ground is the established Identity of the simple
Essence with itself in its own Negativity : the completed
Self-subsistence of the essential Becoming.

Note. — The so-called Laws of Thought, the maxims of
Identity, Difference, the excluded Middle and the sufficient
Ground (there should be also the maxim of Contradiction)
are simply the corresponding categories in the form of
abstract propositions ; and it is now plain that it is wrong
to treat these propositions as absolutely valid apart from
their dialectical connectedness.

The task of the Objective Logic, to vindicate the premise
of the Science of Logic, or rather of Philosophy in general,
as absolute Idealism, is now advanced to that stage, at
which the immediate Being has a raison d'etre only as the
established Identity of the simple Essence with itself.
That is to say, the unity of Being and Essence is now
practically proved through the self-evolution of Thought
itself. All that remains still to be done is to explicate, to
establish, the nature of the already in itself established
essential Identity as a negative reference in the Other
(Being) to self : lest it be grasped only in the sense of an
inert background of all that is !

CHAPTER XIII

SIXTH ACT OF THOUGHT:

A. EIGHTH CYCLE

I. Absolute Ground

365. Presence has now the significance of an Estabhshed-
ness which presupposes essentially a Ground as the Non-
established.

Note. — Unless Presence is grounded, it is mere Illusion
or the Null, No doubt the reader was at first startled by the
declaration that the sphere of Presence is the sphere of
what is in and for itself null (§284). The declaration smacked
too much of purely subjective Idealism. But it has been
since corrected : the Illusion is the Null only so far as it is
credited with independent subsistence per se, or as against
the Essence : for Being is thus obviously Essence-less, hence
mere Illusion. And we have, or ought to have, realised that
such a conception of Being — materialism — is due to the
one-sidedness of the External Reflection before its grasp of
itself as the Determining Reflection (§306). And by means
of the dialectic of the determining Reflection, we are now
in a position to remove the first impression, as though the
sphere of Being were to be taken simply in the sense of
subjective Idealism : represented notably by the Christian
Science. Henceforth, we shall have to view Presence as
objectively real, and so far as the sense of mere Illusion is
now to be corrected into that of the essential Illusion, of
such an Illusion that it, as Presence, is the Return of the
Essence into itself, that it, in short, is grounded, not merely
ground-less, we shall use for it the term Form : a form of
the Essence itself !

366. The Determinateness (Presence) of the Essence, as

ii6 A Holiday with a Hegelian

the Ground, becomes thus the double one : of the Ground
and the Grounded : the distinction of the Essence in
general (the Positive) and its Mediation within itself
(the Negative).

367. And in this latter respect the Essence is distin-
guished from its simple Identity as Form.

Note. — Presence being now established essentially —
as the Identity of the sides of the essential Becoming, called
the Ground, the raison d'etre — Determinateness is an
immediate unity, not simply of Being and Nothing, as is
the case in the first act of thought, but of the Ground and
the Grounded, these being the present sense of Being and
Nothing, as a result of the foregoing five acts of thought.
And it is plain that the Form is the present sense of
Quality.

2. The Ground and the Grounded

368. The Essence as such is one with its Reflection and
undistinguishably its movement itself : the Essence as
Ground is the determined Essence : Form.

369. To the Form belongs on the whole all that is deter-
mined as an Establishedness distinguished from that
of which it is the Form.

370. That is to say, the Form, as the completed whole of
the Reflection (§367), contains also the determination of
the same to be as suspended (as an antithesis).

371. Now, although that which is distinguished from
the Form, is truly the Essence itself : so far as the Essence
is determined as the formless Identitj^ its proper name
is Matter.

372. Matter is the proper basis or Substrate of the Form.

373. And consequently something utterly abstract or
groundless.

Note. — Of course, being the formless Identity of the
Essence in opposition to its essential Identit}', Matter as
such is mere Illusion. But, in connection with the Note
to §365, it is plain that Matter as such is not to be identified

Sixth Act of Thought 117

with that which appeals to the sense of touch in things.
Matter as such is not even visible : it is the Null, and the
existence with which this Null is credited has simply the
rank of figments of fanc}', e.g. /Ether in the West or Akasa
in the East (§256, Note). What the tangible truly is
will be realised as we go along.

374. Nevertheless, Matter as such does contain the
Form in itself (being definable only in its terms), hence,
it must be grasped as formed ; just as the Form, too,
must materialise itself.

375. This amounts simply to saying that their separate-
ness from one another is an Illusion which suspends itself.

376. So far as they, firstly, pre-estabhsh (or presuppose)
one another, they simply bear witness to the nature of the
one essential Identity as a negative reference to self.

377. So far as, secondly, the Form necessarily suspends
itself and thus becomes Matter, it remains essential Identity
with itself.

378. Or, conversely, the agency of the Form whereby
Matter as such is determined, is just as much the Movement
proper to the Matter itself.

Note. — This Movement has its logical exposition in the
very dialectic of the fifth act of thought, so far as this
establishes the truth of the Substrate in the Ground ;
or generally, in the whole dialectic of the sphere of Being.

379. In short, the externality of the relation, both for the
Form and Matter, is simply due to the fact that each, or
rather their primary unity, the absolute Ground, is in its
establishing also a pre-establishing.

380. Thirdly, therefore, the Doing (agency) of the Form
is distinguished from the Movement or Becoming of Matter
only in this, that the former is the negativity as established
(as the Negative), the latter the negativity as a determina-
tion in itself (as the Positive) (§355).

ii8 A Holiday with a Hegelian

381. Matter is, then, the Ground of its determinations
only so far as it is not merely an inert basis for the Form,
but the absolute unity as the Essence and Form ; and the
same applies to the Form.

382. As this established unity of Matter and Form — in
the formed Matter or materialised Form — the Ground
acquires the meaning of the essential Content.

Note. — Having drawn an analogy between the absolute
Ground and Determinateness as such, and correlated the
Form with Quality, we may now see that Matter and Form
are essential restatements of Reality and Negation and
the Content that of the Being-within-self. But, so far as
the sixth act of thought is more properly grasped as the
final restatement of the second act, the stated purely
abstract correspondence had better be shifted by correlating
the absolute Ground with Something as such, Matter and
Form with Something and Other, and the Content with the
Other as such. But, then, this kind of correspondence is
obvious from the cyclical arrangement of the dialectical
movement and calls for no comments, these being, in any
case, merely an external after-thought.

383. As Content, that which was previously the self-
identical — first of all, as the Ground, then as the Form, and
finally as Matter — comes under the sway of the Form
and is again one of its determinations.

384. Content has, firstly, a Form and a Matter which are
essential only as belonging to it, or are its Form as mere
establishedness.

385. But the Content is, secondly, the negative reflection
of the determinations of its Form within themselves, so that
they have also a material, indifferent subsistence.

386. Consequently, the Ground which has at first sight
vanished in the Content (§383) is truly returned in the
latter into its unity with itself.

Sixth Act of Thought 119

387. Therewith, the Ground has converted itself, as a

whole, into the determined Ground and thus is to be dis-
tinguished, firstly, as regards its Form, secondly, as regards
its Content.

3. The formal Ground

388. So far as the Ground is distinguished only formally,
its Content is determined as an indifferent, positive unity
against the mediation of the Form.

389. The Form refers itself, however, in its mediation,
through its own self to the determined Content, as to its
own positive, mediating agency.

390. Consequently, so far as the determined Ground is
considered on two sides, once as Content (Ground), another
time as Form (the Grounded), the Content (the whole
Ground) itself is just as much a moment of the Form.

391. There is nothing in the Ground which is not in the
Grounded, and likewise nothing in the Grounded which is
not in the Ground.

4. The real Ground

392. The determined Ground is thus present only as
pure Form, not yet really determined in its two sides, or
also as regards its Content : the reference of the Ground
and the Grounded does not, so far, concern the Content ;
or it (the reference) is only formal.

Note. — The formal Ground is, therefore, nothing
but a tautology : one and the same content is simply
presented under another name, and explaining amounts
thus to an exercise of empty reflection. Such way of
explaining facts as would not satisfy an ordinary rustic
is considered to be scientific par excellence. At one time,
it was the term God which was given in reply to every
query as to the why of facts : now it is tenns like
Electricity, ^ther. Vibration, etc., that have superseded
the vain use of the name God. That is to say, the emptiness
of scientific explanations of the world we live in simply

120 A Holiday with a Hegelian

illustrates that mere words explain nothing. What is
required is to use words, and then especially the word
God, as a vehicle for Thought, not simply as a label for
vague impressions of the beyond of facts. Of course, so
long as men of science do not realise that they put empty
words in the place of Thought, they cannot realise that
Hegel does the very reverse : for his explanations must
needs appear mere logomachy to those who seek fulness
of meaning only in Thought's own otherwiseness.

393. But, then, the Content is the Identity of the
Ground and the Grounded — the primary unity of the
Ground with itself in the sense of an established unity
of Form and Matter — and, consequently, the reference of
the Ground and the Grounded applies equally to the
Content itself.

394. It is plainly only so far as the Content becomes
different with its Form, i.e. accordingly as it has the sense
of the Ground or of the Grounded, that the reference of the
Ground and the Grounded ceases to be an empty tautology.

Note. — It is to be kept in mind that Difference converts
the essential Identity or absolute Distinction into the
Equality and Inequality of the external Reflection (§328}.

395. In its difference from the Ground, the Grounded
(or Form) appears to have also a pecuhar Content of its
own in addition to the Content of the Ground, i.e. the
Grounded appears as an immediate unity of a twofold
Content,

396. The One of the Something which constitutes this
unity of the Ground and of the peculiar content beside
the essential Content, is, therefore (the unity being im-
mediate) only an external tie.

Note. — The peculiar content is, as against the essential
Content or the Ground, non-essential and therefore mani-
fold. The meaning of the One of the Something is that
the manifold content to be found in anything includes
equally, in its manifold determinations, that one which

Sixth Act of Thought 121

constitutes the Ground of the rest : but there is, so far,
no clue as to which particular determination is to have
this rank. The tracing of the rest to a particular deter-
mination of the One of the Something, as to their Ground,
would result only in the assignment of a formal Ground,
because the distinction of the Ground and the Grounded
would not as yet concern the whole content of the One
of the Something under consideration. Or the reference
of the Ground and the Grounded would only appear to be
real. In order to become real, the Ground and the One
of the Something must become different contents. And
that they are different contents is implied in the very
fact that the One of the Something is an external tie
which does not contain the unessential manifold content
as a moment of the Ground-reference. Hence, the next
paragraph proceeds :

397, The two references, the essential Content, as the
simple, immediate Identity of the Ground and the
Grounded, and the One of the Something, as the reference
(immediate unity) of the distinguished (twofold) Content
are two different bases.

398. Which of these two different bases is the Ground
and which the Grounded becomes a matter of external
reflection and the Ground is thus real.

Note. — This means that none of the determinations of
something is per se the Ground of the rest. So far as any
of them is assigned this value, and the assignment is not to
appear to be purely arbitrary, all that one can do in support
of its validity is to point out that the twofold content in
question is to be found equally in something else. But even
though the Other, which is immediately the same unity
of the twofold content, is multiplied ad lib., the Ground
remains a matter of external reflection : it is still only an
external Ground which does not concern the raison d'etre,
but rests on mere famiharitj^ with facts. Of course, the
inadequacy of real Grounds to lead to the knowledge of
what things are in themselves is obvious to everyone who

122 A Holiday with a Hegelian

has the sHghtest ghmmer of the meaning of taking nothing
for granted.

399. But the real or external Ground is thus directly
also only formal, because it is only an absolute reference
of the two determinations of Content and their com-
bination.

400. The arisen unity of the formal and real Ground
represents the complete Ground or the total Ground-
reference.

401. So far as the sides of the complete Ground are a
double Content, the distinction concerns only the mode of
reference between the two determinations of one and the
same content.

402. The two determinations are once (on the side of the
Ground) found in an original unity, another time (on the
side of the Grounded) they are given the relation of the
Ground and Grounded because they are to be found also
in an original unity (in another Something).

Note. — " The conclusion is that because in a Something
the determination B is in itself joint with the determination
A, B is also joint with it in another Something, when the
latter implies immediately only the one determination A.
In the second Something there is not only this second
determination mediated, but it is also mediated that its
immediate determination is the Ground : to wit, owing to
its original reference to B in the first Something. This
reference is therefore the Ground of the Ground A,
and the whole Ground-reference is in the second Something
as established or grounded " (Hegel's Werke, 4 : 103).

403. The real Ground shows itself, then, as the self-
external or pre-establishing Reflection of the Ground :
Something is Ground as an original reference of immediate
determinations : hence as reference to its negation : the
Ground as what rests on an original combination pre-
estabhshes its own suspendedness.

Note. — Explanations derived from facts can never
account for the facts themselves !

Sixth Act of Thought 123

404. Thus the total Ground-reference has determined
itself to the conditioning mediation.

5. Condition

405. The Immediate to which the Ground refers itself
as to its own pre-established Otherwiseness, or as to its
essential presupposition, is the Condition.

406. The Condition is, therefore, firstly, an immediate,
manifold Something which, secondly, is not to be in-
differently for itself, nor generally for another, but, thirdly,
to constitute that material for the Ground which is the
sine qua non of the total (complete) Ground-reference, i.e.
to constitute the unconditioned In-itself of the Ground.

Note. — This significance of an immediate, manifold
Something — of the sphere of Being — lies at the back of our
inability to remain satisfied with what we find immediately
before us : we ask why ? and have an ineradicable tendency
to co-relate immediate findings, to trace everything to a
Ground, because the sphere of Being is realised by our
logical nature to be an essential presupposition of all
reasoning from grounds. It is this realisation that con-
stitutes the platform of empiricism. But, of course, this is
not yet the true standpoint towards objectivity, and as
Philosophy has for its object truth alone, it must con-
stantly draw attention to the shortcomings of empiricism,
even while justifying its raison d'etre as one of its own
Conditions.

6. The conditioning Mediation

407. As against the content of the Condition (as an
immediate material to which the reference to a Ground is
external, while it yet equally constitutes the latter's
unconditioned In-itself), the content of the Ground is
essentially formed, and therefore equally unconditioned :
the Condition is not its Ground !

408. Condition and Ground are thus, on one side, in-
different and unconditioned, on the other, also mediated.

124 A Holiday with a Hegelian

409. They are primarily an essential Becoming, each
having its own peculiar Content apart from their essential
Identity.

410. Seeing, however, that Presence is in its own self
only this, to suspend itself and, in coming to the Ground,
to become the Ground : the Form whereby Presence is
Condition is not external to it : and the Condition is, there-
fore, the whole Form of the reference to the Ground.

411. Similarly, the Ground-reference is just as much
the whole itself because the Condition, as to its moment
of both Being-in-itself and Immediac}^ is its own moment.

412. There is thus present only One whole of the Form,
and just as much only One whole of the Content.

413. This One whole is the true Unconditioned : the
first Cause,

414. The first Cause conditions itself and places itself
opposite to its Conditions as the Ground {raison d'etre) : its
reference of itself to its Conditions is thus an essential
Becoming ; or, in referring to its Conditions, it communes
purely with its own self.

415. The sphere of Being (Presence) is not determined as
Condition and used as Material by a radically different
Being : its very Becoming is now realised to be the essential
Becoming of the first Cause and this means, then, that the
immediate Being converts itself through its own self into
a Condition.

Note. — This conclusion has been anticipated already in
connection with the dialectic of Finitude. As we go along,
we keep on restating what has been implied in the very
first results of pure thinking ^^'ith the difference that the
all-embracing significance of what lies now at our back is
becoming increasingly clearer. At first sight, on entering
on the study of the Science of Logic, it is most difficult to

Sixth Act of Thought 125

attend wholly to the subject-matter in hand, because of
its very simplicity ! We are instinctively so alive to the
fulness of thought that we cannot help rebelling against
inner emptiness, and for that reason find it most difficult to
exclude deliberately every concrete content from our mind
and begin with pure Being. It is this instinctive abhorrence
of the void, of annihilation, that bars the entrance to philo-
sophy to most people. Those who have been able to over-
come sufficiently this instinctive clinging to Egoism (to the
fulness of external reflection) to enter on, and to proceed
with, the study of Logic, will find now little difficulty
in answering the questions which as a rule present them-
selves to every student until he feels at home in the
realm of pure thought. Nothing seems at first more
unlikely than the fulfilment of the promise made on behalf
of the Science of Logic : to reveal the nature of God as He
is in His very essence, to solve every perplexity as to the
Creation of the World ; to awaken in us the Knowledge of
Absolute Truth ! Yet behold, how every further Cj'cle
brings us nearer and nearer to the central focus of every
mj^stery ! As the subject-matter of the dialectical move-
ment is taking an ever-deepening hold of our mind, we are
gaining a correspondingly keener realisation of its universal
sway. \Mien we look now around and contemplate the
sphere of immediate Being, we are able to declare with full
conviction that its unity-less manifoldness is the side of
Conditions of the first Cause and only for that reason has
the Form of formless Being. If we are asked why there
should be such a manifoldness of Beings, differing as to
Quality, Quantity, Measure, Grounds, we have only to fall
back upon the preceding dialectic to find the required
answer : the first Cause conditions itself and the side of
Conditions embraces, or displays, all that comes under the
head of Quality, Quantity, Measure, etc. ! Have we not
grasped the very principle of the ordinary attitude towards
the objective world, so far as things are, first of all, simply
described as to their quality and quantity ; so far as one
seeks, further, for their mathematical principles and, still
further, for their essence and raison d'etre ? And is it
indeed by means of mere words that we find our per-

126 A Holiday with a Hegelian

plexities solved ? Those who have truly digested, who have
truly realised the logical force of the preceding dialectic,
can only smile at the charge of mere logomachy levelled at
Hegel. Of course, those who will not think, must go on
living in conceited ignorance of truth and finally die in
stupidity !

416. The movement of the first Cause to become es-
tablished, on one hand, through its Conditions, on the
other, through its Ground, amounts truly to the dis-
appearing of the illusion of the mediation.

417. The mediation between Conditions and the Ground
is a tautological movement of the first Cause in its own
self.

7. The Entrance of the first Cause into
Existence .

418. As unified with Conditions, the first Cause is
immediately present.

419. But so far as Presence is now groundless and
unconditioned, it is Existence.

Note. — A further deepening of our view of the sphere of
Being : it is not simply a material ready to hand for all
manner of purposes (so it is only the unconditioned In-
itself of the Ground, which latter is therefore also something
else), but it is the very Presence of the first Cause itself
(which therefore does not dwell in some other world beyond
reach, but is here and now). In other words, we are now
ratifying what has been anticipated from the very first,
i.e. that the question as to the Origin of all that is concerns
only the standpoint of dualism in our ordinary conscious-
ness. The Origin hes in truth in the first Cause as the
essential Becoming of the Groimd and Condition : Exis-
tence is therefore groundless and unconditioned.

CHAPTER XIV
SIXTH ACT OF THOUGHT:

B. NINTH CYCLE

1. Existence as such

420. Existence is, first of all, only an immediate deter-
mination, distinguished from the qualitative Something
by the present significance of Immediacy, as the Reflection
of the mediation within itself : the existing Something is a
Thing.

421. So far, then, as a Thing is distinguished from its
Existence, the distinction is not a transition, but properly
only an analysis : the Existence as such contains this
distinction itself in the moment of its mediation, — the
distinction of the Thing-in-itself and of the external
Existence.

2. Tpie self-external Existence

422. The Thing-in-itself is the essential Immediate,
the mediated Being of which is an immanently manifold and
external Presence.

423. As the simple reflectedness of the Existence within
itself, the Thing-in-itself is not, therefore, the Ground of
the unessential Presence, but only its inert Basis : this is
why the Reflection, as the Presence which mediates itself
by means of something else, falls out of the Thing-in-itself,
or is an external Reflection.

424. The difference is, therefore, present as the reference
of an Other to the Thing-in-itself : but this Other is nothing
subsisting for itself.

127

128 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Note. — This Other is nothing subsisting for itself be-
cause it stands for the sphere of immediate Being as against
the Thing-in-itself. So far, then, as the latter is the simple
reflectedness of the Existence within itself and thus is
the present significance of the Being-in-and-for-itself, the
Other, as the Presence which mediates itself by means of
another Presence, is the present re-appearance of the
Illusion. And from this it follows that Existence must not
be simply identified with the determinations of immediate
Being, that is to say, with Quality, Quantity, and Measure.
These determinations are proper to the Thing-in-itself
in the same way in which Illusion is proper to the Essence :
the Thing-in-itself cannot be grasped by means of them
because they concern onl}^ its external Immediacy and on
further inquiry vanish : simply because an exhaustive
inquiry amounts in this respect to a recapitulation of
the dialectic of Being ! This realisation points subjectively
to an impossibility of getting at the essence of things by
means of our senses : these must needs deal only with the
unessential side of Existence. The Thing-in-itself cannot
even be reached by means of the Reflection as to the
Grounds and Conditions : all explanations of this kind are
simply the work of external Reflection, in which the
Thing-in-itself remains purely self-external, leaving itself
out of the question, and thus failing to grasp itself. This
self-externality of the Thing-in-itself has its most appro-
priate illustration in the scientific attitude towards the
world we live in, and we are now realising that this attitude
is due to a self-discernment of the first Cause in its im-
mediacy.

425. The unessential Reflection collapses in its own
self outside the Thing-in-itself, and the resulting essential
Identity is the Other as such of the Thing-in-itself.

426. And thus the Thing-in-itself becomes many things-
in-themselves :

427. Its own reference to itself as to an Other constitutes
its Determinateness :

428. Property.

429. As against Quality, or the Negation whereby Being

Sixth Act of Thought 129

is Something, Property is the negativitj' of the Reflection,
whereby Existence is generally something existing : a
Thing (the present One of the Thing-in-itself).

430. Property is, then, firstly, the side of the estabhshed-
ness (of the external immediacy) of the Thing-in-itself, so
far as, secondly, the Thing remains, in its estabhshedness,
in itself, i.e. liberated from alteration :

431. There is only One Thing-in-itself which relates
itself in the external Reflection to itself : owing to this
its essential existence, its external immediacy is an es-
tablishedness-in-itself.

432. And this means, then, that Property constitutes
that whereby a thing exists essentially : apart from its
Property (or Properties), a thing is only an unessential
extent and external aggregate.^

433. Instead of being simply the middle of separately
existing things. Property, as the essential thingness, is
truly One Reflection and One Continuity of the same,
apart from which they disappear as subsisting extremes.

434. And as that whereby things subsist, Property has
the significance of self-subsistent Matter.

435. This transition of Property into Matter is the
familiar transition which Chemistry makes, in that it
seeks to ehminate the Property of Colour, Smell, Taste,
etc. ; as a Pigment, odoriferous Matter, Salt, etc., or just
only assumes other stuffs (caloric, electric, magnetic) and
therewith is convinced of having got hold of the Property
in its truthfulness.

1 This means to say that the abstract distinction of the Thing-
in-itself and of that which constitutes its Determinateness, or its
external Immediacy, is untenable : we have arrived at the point
where the established Being is opposed to the In-itself, not as
a simple Determinateness (as the Being-for-other of §41), but as a
Being-for-other which is itself an establishedness-in-itself. Instead
of mere Constitution we have now Property : the external im-
mediacy of the Thing-in-itself! The Thing-in-itself is thus, on one
side, distinguished from the Property (or Properties, since the
external immediacy implies manifoldness) as from its unessential
side, yet, on the other side, it exists essentially in this its very
unessentiality (and therefore is, as will be seen, Appearance).

130 A Holiday with a Hegelian

436. But, firstly, seeing that the Property is self-
sutJsistent Matter only so far as the distinction of things
has suspended itself (§433), its Self-subsistence is, as this
negative unity, the restored Thing-in-itself, which latter,
owing to this its return in every thing into itself, is now,
secondly, immediately before us as this (every and any)
Thing,

437. And, of course, the restored Thing-in-itself, as a
manifoldness of things which have no separate existence
(since that whereby they exist is only the manifoldness of
their essential Identity, or the Illusion of Many in their
essential Oneness), exists, thirdly, in the element of Non-
essentiahty (§432).

438. There is before us the distinction of the simple,
identically self-to-self-referent Self-subsistent (of this
Thing) against its own manifoldness (Matters).

439. This Thing consists of self-subsistent Matters
which are indifferent to their reference in it, as to a purely
unessential connection ; and the distinction of things
rests thus only on the amount of particular Matters, con-
tained in them in varying measure-relations.

440. Matters circulate unceasingly into or out of this
Thing, just because it is an external tie of what is essen-
tially one :

441. Hence, this Thing is such a reference of Matters
that this and that Matter subsist within it together (as co-
existences, each of which at the same time subsists) only
so far as the other does not subsist.

442. Existence has thus reached its truth in this Thing :
its immediate self -subsistence reveals itself as what is
in itself self-contradictory, hence, null — an Appearance.

443. Appearance subsists in its negativity : its self-
subsistence, as this Thing, is the existence of the essential
Illusion.

Sixth Act of Thought 131

Note. — Existence is the immediacy of the first Cause,
so far as this is identical with the sphere of its own Con-
ditions. For this reason, Existence is Groundless and
unconditioned. But, on the strength of its dialectic, we
must now realise that its immediacy is not for that reason
(as what is groundless and unconditioned) absolutely self-
existent, but only an Appearance : only the self-suspending
establishedness of Matter. Just because Existence is the
external immediacy of the first Cause, so far as the latter
is identified only with its self-pre-establishedness, its dia-
lectic must needs expose this one-sidedness and thus
amount at bottom to a recapitulation of the transition from
the sphere of immediate Being into that of Essence.
Appearance is thus the present restatement of the im-
mediate Being as it is to be viewed in the sphere of Essence,
i.e. as an immediacy which is only as a Return of the Null
into itself. The Null stands, of course, for the realised
nature of Matter as an all-sided contradiction. So far,
then, as Existence simply affirms the identity of Being and
Essence with the accent on Being, Appearance corrects
this one-sidedness by laying the accent on Essence.

444. And so far as Appearance is not the Illusion in a
Self-subsistence, but an Illusion only in Illusion, the positive
Identity, contained immediately in this negative mediation,
has the sense of the essential Identity.

445. The self-contradiction of the Appearance, as what
subsists so in the other that it is at the same time only in
its Not, comes to the Ground : the Establishedness of the
One is also the Establishedness of the Other.

446. There is before us the essential Content in its com-
plete determinateness : One Subsistence discerned into a
Different, mutually indifferent Content : the Law of
Appearance.

3. The Law of Appearance

447. The Law is the Positive of the mediation of the
Appearance, as of the unessential Existence.

448. Accordingly, the Law is, firstly, opposed to the

132 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Immediacy which belongs to the Existence as the Non-
essential subsisting in its Nullity ; but the Law is opposed
to this simple Immediacy as to its own Reflection-within-
itself and thus, secondly, established as the Essential and
truly Positive against the Non-essential.

449. Thirdly, then, the Appearance and Law have one
and the same Content : their Difference concerns only the
Form of the identical Content.

450. This Content constitutes, herewith, the Basis of the
Appearance : the positive side of the Essentiality, whereby
Existence is Appearance,

451. The Existence as such goes back into the Law as
into its Ground : the realm of Laws is the quiescent image
of the existing or appearing World, or rather, both is One
Totality.

452. But so far as the Identity of the Law with its
Existence is at first only immediate, the Law is, firstly,
indifferent to its Existence ; hence, secondly, opposed to
the Form and its movement as such, contained in the
Appearance, and the Content of the Law is thereby,
thirdly, at first only a different one, i.e. devoid of the self-
moving Form,

Note, — In the Law, the recapitulation of the dialectic
of the preceding cycles advances as far as the formal Ground.
The unity of Thought and Being is, as has been pointed
out in the conclusion of the fifth act, estabhshed in itself
already in the notion of the essential Identity. The last
two acts of thought have for their object to restate all that
precedes in its proper significance from the standpoint of
the essential Identity which deepens, pari passu with this
restatement, into the fully established conclusion of the
Objective Logic. Thus we have realised already that the
sphere of immediate Being is the external Immediacy
of the first Cause ; and so far as the first Cause is thus
embodied in everything, every Thing is a congeries of all
that is imphed in the first Cause, i.e. in the conclusion of the
eighth cycle. And we may now fancy ourselves as putting
this inference to the test — that is to say, so far as we
assume simply the position of onlookers towards the dia-

Sixth Act of Thought 133

lectical movement which, of course, goes its own way
with perfect disregard of preconceived aims on the part of
the external Reflection. The student may be interested
to learn that the Law has its natural illustration in Elec-
tricit}^

4. This and the other World

453. The Appearance is in its changes also a Persisting,
and the Law, as this simple Identity of the Appearance
with itself, is only the inert basis of the same, and, so far,
also an Appearance.

454. Seeing, however, that the Law is also an Appear-
ance, it has the Reflection of the Appearance in its own self
and thus is not only its identical Basis, but the Other of
the Appearance as such : its negative Reflection as into
its Other.

455. Or the Law considered merely for itself, the sides
of its Content are indifferent to one another as one and the
same Content, and as they are, therefore, just as much
suspended, the subsisting of each is also the not-subsisting
of its own self : each is not only the establishedness of itself,
but also of the other.

456. The Law has acquired therewith equally the lacking
moment of the Negative Form of its sides : the imman-
ently reflected Appearance is now a World which discloses
itself over the appearing \\'orld as a World-in-and-for-
itself.

Note. — The " Dust thou art and to dust thou shalt
return " obviously concerns only the fate of our body, as an
Appearance. We are also the essential Other of our body :
the Soul ; and the coming to the Ground of the Body does
not affect this our positive essentiality. Death is also
said to be the gate of Life. Our coming to the Ground
in the appearing World means our entrance into the
World-in-and-for-itself which is not merely the Basis —
the formless and therefore groundless Self-Identity — but
the self-recovered Ground after its own suspension in the
appearing World.

134 A Holiday with a Hegelian

457. The realm of Laws contains only the simple, change-
less, or different content of the existing World : in being
now the total Reflection of the later, it also contains
the moment of its unessential manifoldness,

458. The supersensuous World — as the World-in-and-
for-itself is also called, so far as the existing World is deter-
mined as sensuous, namelj^ as such that it is a matter of
Sense-consciousness — has equally immediacy, but as a
reflected, essential Existence : it is only as belonging to
another, supersensuous World that Things are established,
firstly, as truthful existences, and, secondly, as the True
against that which simply is.

Note. — As against the sensuous Perception of the
existing World, the supersensuous World is perceived
clairvoyantly : it is the so-called Astral Plane of the Theo-
sophists and Rosicrucians. Yet, according to Bosanquet
(' Introd. to Hegel's Phil, of Fine Art,' p. xv.) : " The
things not seen of Plato or of Hegel are not a ' double ' or a
' projection ' of the existing world. Plato indeed wavered
between the two conceptions in a way that should have
warned his interpreters of the divergence in his track of
thought, but in Hegel at least there is no ambiguity. The
world of spirits with him is not a world of ghosts."

459. In that, now, the World-in-and-for-itself is in its
own self the absolute negativity of Form, its Reflection-
within-itself is negative reference to self : just because it is
the totality of Existence, it is also only as one side of the same
and constitutes in this determination a Self-subsistence
that is different from the appearing World.

460. It is further not only generally the Ground of the
appearing World, but its determined Ground as its Nega-
tion : as an opposite World to the same.

461. The identical connection of the two Worlds is, at
the same time, determined as Opposition, because the
Form of the appearing World is the Reflection into its
Other\viseness and, therefore, is truly so returned into its

Sixth Act of Thought 135

own self in the World-in-and-for-itself that this latter is
the reverse of the appearing one.

Note. — Accordingly the things of this World are seen
clairvo5^antly as if in a mirror, and this is indeed how Mme.
Blavatsky excuses her mistakes in copying figures, seen
clairvoyantly in books lying far away in different libraries,
from right to left. The opposition between the two worlds
is, of course, all round, not simply confined to the appear-
ance of things but to the whole of experience :

462. What in the World of Appearance is positive,
is in the World-in-and-for-itself negative, and vice versa :
thus what appears as an evil, misfortune, etc., is in and for
itself, good, luck, etc.

Note. — Accordingly, pleasant dreams of future events
are popularly interpreted to mean the very reverse, so far,
that is, as there is still any belief left in the connection
between dreams and the other World.

463. In effect, just in this antithesis of both worlds,
this distinction has vanished, and what was to be the
World-in-and-for-itself is itself the appearing World,
and this latter, conversely, in its own self the former.

464. The distinct Self-subsistence of each is, therefore,
now established in such wise, that it is an essential refer-
ence to the other and has its self-subsistence in this unity
of both.

465. The Law is determined only in itself in such wise,
that the establishedness of one of its sides is the established-
ness of the other side : now, however, the Law is realised.

466. The Law is thus Essential Relation.

Note. — " The essential Relation is not yet the true
Third to the Essence and Existence ; nevertheless, it
already contains the determined unification of both. The
Essence is so realised within it, that it has for its subsisting
independent existences ; and these are gone back from
their indifference to their essential unity, having only this
latter for their subsisting. The reflective determinations
of the Positive and Negative are equally reflected within

136 A Holiday with a Hegelian

themselves only as reflected into their Opposite, but they
have no other determination than this their negative unity.
On the contrary, the essential Relation has such for its
sides that they are established as self-subsistent totalities.
It is the same antithesis as that of the Positive and Nega-
tive : but, at the same time, as a reversed World. The
side of the essential Relation is a totahty which, however,
as essential, has an Opposite, a Beyond of itself. It is only
an Appearance : its Existence is rather not its own, but
that of its Other. It is, therefore, as what is broken in its
own self ; but this its suspendedness consists in this,
that it is the unity of its own self and of its Other ; hence,
the Whole having just on that account self-subsistent
Existence and being essential Reflection within itself."
(Hegel's Werke, 4 : 156).

467. The essential Relation is at first the Relation of
the Whole and Parts, so far as its two sides— the negative
unity or reflected Self-subsistence and the immediate unity
or positive Self-subsistence — are connected by the Also,
each being the Basis of the Other.

468. The Whole is the Self-subsistent, Parts being only
moments of this unity ; but Parts are just as much also
the Self-subsistent, their reflected unity being only a
moment ; and each is in its Self-subsistence directly the
Relative of its Other.

469. The Whole is a Relative, because that which con-
stitutes it is rather its Other, Parts : it consists of Parts
in such wise that without them it is nothing.

470. Conversely, without a Whole there are no Parts ;
and the Whole is not merely an external moment of their
immediate self-subsistence because they collapse in their
own self, as a manifold existence, and thus subsist truly
in their Other, the Whole.

471. Hence, the Whole and Parts condition themselves
reciprocally, and the whole Relation is, owing to this
reciprocity, the return of the Conditioning into its own self :
the not Relative, the Unconditioned.

Sixth Act of Thought 137

5, The self-excluding Totality

472. There is present only One Identity of the Whole and
Parts, as of two self-subsistent existences which are in-
different to one another :

473. The Whole is equal to the Parts and the Parts to
the Whole.

474. The Whole is, however, in the Parts, equal only to
itself ; or the equality of the same and of the Parts ex-
presses only the tautology : the Whole as a whole is equal,
not to the Parts, but to the Whole.

475. And since Parts are conversely, in the Whole,
equal only to the latter's manifold determinations, their
equahty with the Whole amounts to the same tautology :
Parts as Parts are equal, not to the Whole as such, but
within it to their own self : to Parts.

476. Now, since the two sides are equally One Identity,
the indifferent self-subsistence which each has for itself,
is rather the negation of its own self : each has its self-
subsistence in the other, as its pre-established Immediate
that ought to be a First and its beginning ; but this First
of each is only such that it is not First, but has its beginning
in the other,

477. The truth of their Relation consists, then, in the
Mediation in which just as much the reflected as the present
immediacy are suspended.

478. In this determination, the Relation is no longer that
of the Whole and Parts : as a mediated immediate transi-
tion of the sides into one another, the Relation is that of
Force and its Expression.

6. Force and its Expression

479. Force has in it, firstly, the moment of the present
Immediacy, and so far as it, as this establishedness, has the
Thing — an existing Something — essentially for its pre-
supposition, for its First, it appears as what is externally
bound up with, or forced into, the Thing by a foreign
Power.

480. As this immediate subsisting, Force is a peaceful

138 A Holiday with a Hegelian

determination of the Thing in general, and is, therefore,
also designated as Matter : instead of the magnetic, electric,
etc., Force, there is assumed magnetic, electric, etc.,
Matter ; or instead of the famous attractive Force, a fine
Ether, which holds everything together.

Note. — It is especially Occultism that designates
Forces in this way, because the reflected Existence has
equally a self-subsistence of its own which is clairvoyantly
visible. The visible is, however, as such, immaterial,
because seeing is a purely ideal relationship to things.
Occult Matter is the stuff of which dreams are made :
Illusion.

481. The Thing, however, in which Force ought to
subsist, has here no longer any meaning : the Force itself
is rather the Establishing of the externality which appears
as Existence.

482. As the self-from-self-repellent contradiction, Force
is, secondly, active, becoming out of itself the existent
external manifoldness.

483. But, thirdly, Force is so far only in itself (or im-
mediately) Activity, because it is the reflected unity and
just as essentially the negation of the same, as of an Im-
mediacy external to it.

484. But, then, the Activity of the Force is conditioned
by its own self as by the Other to its own self : by a Force.

485. It is Forces that stand in Relation, and in Essential
Relation : but the unity of their Relation is, at first, only
the inner unity, the unity-in-itself.

486. The externaUty present for the Force is its own pre-
establishing Activity itself, estabhshed primarily as another
Force.

487. This Pre-establishing is, further, reciprocal.

488. The Pre-establishing being thus directly also the
suspending of the other Force, the Force converts its
negation to a mere Shock which only stirs it up as its own

Sixth Act of Thought 139

doing : its doing consists in the suspending of the exter-
nahty of said Shock, by estabhshing it as the own repelhng
of itself from itself, as its own Expression.

489. The one of the two Forces in Relation becomes
soliciting, the other solicited.

490. But, the one Force is sohciting only so far as it
is solicited by the other to be soliciting ; conversel}', it is
solicited only so far as it itself solicits the other to solicit it.

491. The pre-establishing Reflection, to which the con-
ditionedness of the Force and the Shock belong, is, therefore,
immediately also the self -returning Reflection, and the
Activity is essentially reacting against its own self.

492. What Force expresses in truth is this : that its
Externality is identical with its Internality

493. The distinction of self-subsistent Forces is an empty,
transparent distinction : an Illusion, but so that this
Illusion is the Mediation which is the self-subsistent
Subsisting itself.

494. The Inner is determined as the Form of the re-
flected Immediacy, or of the Essence, against the Outer, as
the Form of Being.

495. The holding fast of the Form is, however, on the
whole, the side of Determinateness.

496. The Outer and Inner are the Determinateness so
established that each of these both determinations not only
presupposes the other and goes over into it as into its
truth, but that it, so far as it is this truth of the other,
remains established as Determinateness pointing to the
totality of both which their mediation still lacks.

7. One Absolute Totality

497. The first of the considered Identities of the Inner
and Outer (§492) is the Identity as Content, the second
(§496) is the Identity as pure Form : but these both
Identities are only the sides of the One Totality.

40 A Holiday with a Hegelian

498. Thereby, conversely, the distinctions of the Form,
the Inner and the Outer, are each estabhshed in its own
self as the Totality of itself and of its Other.

499. Consequently, Something is what it is quite in its
externahty, and its Appearance is not only the Reflection
into something else, but into itself, as the absolute Identity
of the Inner and Outer, mediated through the deter-
minateness with its own self.

500. In this Identity of the Appearance with the Inner,
or the Essence, the essential Relation has determined
itself to Actuality.

Note. — The dialectical movement has now returned to
its very Beginning, for the unmediated Identity of the Form
(§496) presents itself in the pure Being, as what is im-
mediately gone over into Nothing. " On the whole," says
Hegel (4 : 175), " everything real is in its beginning such
an only immediate Identity ; for, in its beginning, it has the
moments not yet as opposed and developed ; it has not yet,
on one hand, recollected itself from its externality, nor,
on the other, externahsed and produced itself from its
internahty by its own activity : it is, hence, only the Inner,
as Determinateness, against the Outer, and only the Outer
as Determinateness against the Inner. Consequently, it is,
partly, only an immediate Being, partly, so far as it is
just as much the negativity which is to become the activity
of development, it is as such at first only an Inner. Every
natural, scientific and spiritual development in general
bears this out, and it is essential to realise that the First
(in that Something is, at first, only inner or also in its
Notion) is just on that account only its immediate passive
Presence. . . . Thus the sphere of Being in general is, at
first, only that which is plainly only Inner and which, con-
sequently, is the sphere of the present Immediacy or of
Externality. — The Essence is, at first, only the Inner and,
therefore, also taken in the sense of a quite external,
system-less community : we speak of public instruction
(Schulwesen), press {Zeitungswesen), and understand thereby
something common, arrived at by an external taking to-
gether of existing objects, so far as they are without any

Sixth Act of Thought 141

essential connection, without organisation. — Or in concrete
objects, the germ of a plant, a child, is at first only an inner
plant, an inner man. But, as germ, a plant or man is only
something immediate, external which has not yet given
itself negative reference to its own self : something passive,
exposed to otherwiseness. — Thus also God in His im-
mediate Notion is not Spirit : the Spirit is not the
Immediate, the Opposed to mediation, but rather the
Essence, as eternally establishing its Immediacy and
eternally returning from it into itself. Immediately, there-
fore, God is only Nature. Or Nature is only the inner God,
not actual as Spirit, and therefore not the true God. —
Or God is in the thinking, as first thinking, only pure
Being, or also the Essence, the abstract Absolute : not
God as absolute Spirit, as which alone is the true nature of
God."

CHAPTER XV

SEVENTH ACT OF THOUGHT:

TENTH CYCLE

" '"pHE simple substanced Identity of the Absolute is
undetermined, or, within it, all determinateness
of the Essence and Existence, or of the Being in general as
well as of Reflection, has rather resolved itself. So far, the
determining of what the Absolute is falls out negatively,
and the Absolute itself appears only as the negation of all
predicates and as the Empty. But in that it just as much
must be enunciated as the position of all predicates, it
appears as the most formal contradiction. So far as said
negating and this establishing belong to the external
Reflection, this is a formal, unsystematic dialectic which has
no difficulty in taking up, here and there, various deter-
minations, and in demonstrating with equal ease that they
are, on one hand, finite and merely relative, and, on the
other, yet equally apply to the Absolute, since the Absolute
floats before it as the totality of all determinations, even
though it, the external Reflection, does not know how to
raise these position and negations to their true unit3\ — The
object is, however, to establish what the Absolute is :
which establishing cannot be a Determining, nor a matter
of the external Reflection — the Absolute would be thus
treated as a Becoming — but is the Exposition, and the own
Exposition, of the Absolute, and only a Demonstration of
that which it is " (Hegel's Werke, 4 : 179).

I. The Absolute as such
501. The Absolute is neither only the Outer or Being,
nor only the Inner or Essence : as the absolute unity of
both, it is that which constitutes the Ground of the essen-
tial Relation.

142

Seventh Act of Thought 143

2. The Exposition of the Absolute, negative
and positive

502. From this it follows that the determination of the
Absolute is, to be the absolute Form, having for its mo-
ments the complete Content ; or, conversely, the absolute
Content, having in its indifferent manifoldness the negative
reference of the Form, whereby its manifoldness is only
One substanced Identity.

503. There is no Becoming within the Absolute as such,
for it is not the Being ; nor is it the self-reflective Deter-
mining, for it is not the Essence determining itself only in
itself ; and neither is it an Expressing of itself, for it is the
absolute Identity of the Inner and Outer : thus the move-
ment of the Reflection stands opposite to its absolute
Identity and, as the preceding whole of the logical move-
ment, constitutes the negative Exposition of the Absolute.

504. The positive side, contained by this negative
Exposition, is not so much the positive Exposition of the
Absolute itself as rather only the positive Exposition of the
determinations of Being and Essence : a demonstration
that they have the Absolute for their Abyss as well as for
their Ground ; or that that to which they owe their sub-
sisting, as a transparent Illusion, is the Absolute itself.

505. Although, therefore, this positive side of the Ex-
position is itself only an essential Becoming which returns
into the Absolute, it still begins with a determination ex-
ternal to the Absolute : with a NulHty which the Exposition
assumes from outside.

Note. — Surely, no objector to Hegel's beginning with
pure Being or Nothing could be better aware of the proper
value of this beginning than Hegel himself ! We have
here a clear demonstration of the true source of all such
objections : our Identity with the true Absolute, with the
Notion, by virtue of which we instinctively shrink from
identifying ourselves with a Nullity which he who would
truly learn what Being or Essence is, must begin by
assuming from outside. Would that every objector had

144 A Holiday with a Hegelian

patience enough to close the circle of the Objective Logic
and thus to acquire a clear estimate of the value of his
objections in the light of Thought that knows itself as
Thought !

506. In effect, however, the negati^'e Exposition of the
Absolute is its own Doing, which begins by itself and
arrives at itself : the Absolute which is only an absolute
Identity is only the Absolute of the external Reflection —
not the absolute Absolute, but the Absolute in a Deter-
minateness : Attribute.

507. The Absolute is, however, not only the Attribute,
because it is the Object of the external Reflection : just
by being external to the Absolute, Reflection is equally
internal to it ; and it is, therefore, only its own absolute
Form {§502) which determines the Absolute to the Attribute.

508. The Attribute is the relative Absolute, i.e. the
Absolute as a determination of Form in such wise, that this
determination, say, the World or Force, has, per se, the
rank of Illusion.

509. The Attribute has the Absolute for its Content and
Subsisting : its formal determination, whereby it is an
Attribute, is, therefore, also established immediately as
mere Illusion.

510. The Reflection, in that it, as inner Form, deter-
mines the Absolute to an Attribute, does not penetrate
the Absolute, but its Expression simply disappears.

511. The Form whereby the Absolute should be an
Attribute is mere Kind and Manner : a Mode of the
Absolute.

512. The Mode is the Out-of-itselfness of the Absolute :
its Being-gone-over into the Opposite without any return
into itself.

513. But so the Mode is the Illusion as Illusion, or the
Reflection of the Form within itself : hence, the very
Identity with self which the Absolute is.

Seventh Act of Thought 145

514. The Mode is, then, not only the extremest ex-
ternahty, but also the self-resolving Reflection, as which
the Absolute is absolute Being.

515. Its true significance is that of the own movement
of the Absolute from within outward, but in such wise that
this Outwardness is just as much its Inwardness.

516. When, therefore, it is asked after the Content
of the Exposition — as to what the Absolute shows ? —
the answer is, that the distinction of Form and Content
is within the Absolute resolved : the Content of the
Exposition is the Exposition itself.

517. The Absolute, as this self-sustained movement
of the Exposition, as the Kind and Manner which is its
absolute Identity with itself, is an Expression, not of an
Inner, nor against an Other, but only as an absolute
Manifesting of itself for itself : Actuality.

Note. — " As the Manifestation which is nothing besides
and has no Content other than that of being the manifesta-
tion of itself, the Absolute is the absolute Form. Actuality
is to be taken as this reflected Absoluteness. The Being
is not yet actual : it is the first immediacy ; its Reflection
is, therefore. Becoming and Transition into something
else ; or its immediacy is no Being-in-and-for-itself. The
Actuality stands also higher than Existence. True, this
latter is the immediacy issued out of the Ground and
Conditions, or also out of the Essence and its Reflection.
It is, therefore, in itself that which the Actuality is :
real Reflection ; but it is not yet the established unity
of the Reflection and Immediacy. Existence goes hence
over into Appearance, in that it develops the Reflection
which it contains. Appearance is the Ground come to
the Ground ; its determination is the restoration of the
same, in which way it becomes essential Relation, and
its last Reflection is that its Immediacy is established as
the Reflection-within-itself, and vice versa. This unity
in which Existence or Immediacy, and the In-itself (the
Ground or the Reflected), are directly moments, is now
Actuality " (Hegel's Werke, 4 : 194).

146 A Holiday with a Hegelian

3. Contingency or

Formal Actuality, Possibility and Necessity

518. Actuality is formal, so far as it is viewed, first of
all, as an immediate unreflected Actualitj^ ; hence, only
as a moment of the absolute Form in contrast with its
concrete unity : only as Possibility.

519. PossibiHty is the reflection-into-self of the formal
Actuality, w'hich reflection is, herewith, on the whole, only
the determination of the Identity with self or of the In-
itself in general.

Note. — Possibility is the unmediated Identity of the
Form of §496, (S. equally §500, Note.)

520. Possibility contains, therefore, the two moments :
firstly, the positive, that it is reflected within itself ;
secondly, the negative, that it is reduced, in the absolute
Form, to a moment, hence to something defective, point-
ing to an Other and completing itself in it.

521. According to the first, merely positive side, Possi-
bility is a relation-less, undetermined receptacle for every-
thing in general : Everything is possible that does not
contradict itself.

522. Thus, however, Nothing is said, just as by the
formal statement : A is A.

523. The Possible contains, however, more than the
merely identical proposition : it is the Identical directly
as the Ought-to-be of the totality of Form ; and, according
to this its negative side, Possibility is in its own self Im-
possibility.

524. This contradiction makes itself noticeable primarily
with respect to the Content which Possibility has in it as
a Form-determination established as suspended : so far
as the Content is only a possible one, it is an In-itself
which is at the same time its own opposite, and Possibility
is, therefore, the referring ground that just because A =A,
also -A- -A.

525. As this contradictory reference must suspend itself
and its determination is to be the self-suspending Reflected,
it is therewith also the Immediate and hence becomes
Actuality.

Seventh Act of Thought 147

Note. — So far as Possibility is self-contradictory, the
suspension of its contradictory nature coincides with its
own determination as the self-suspending Reflected, i.e.
as a moment of the absolute Form. As has been pointed
out, Possibility is Actuahty degraded to the unmediated
Identity of the Form : hence, its dialectic must needs lead
back to the notion of Actuality (s. §§496-500). Since the
suspension of Possibility is its own self-suspending Re-
flection, it remains what it is before as after, and is there-
with also the Immediate, mediated through the determin-
ateness with its own self — Actuality.

526. This Actuality is not the first, but the reflected
one, estabhshed as unity of itself and of Possibility : seeing
that the Actual is, as such, possible, and that Possibilitj'
has determined itself as onty Possibility, the Actual, too,
is determined as only a Possible.

527. Possibility or Actuality is at this stage only Being
or Existence in general.

528. This unity of Possibility and Actuality is Con-
tingency or Chance : mere Being or Existence, but es-
tablished to have the value of an establishedness or
possibihty.

529. The Contingent offers, therefore, the two sides :
firstly, it has the Possibility immediately in it and is,
therefore, immediately actual ; or it has no Ground.

530. The Contingent is, however, secondly, the Actual
as an only Possible which has its true Reflection-within-self
in an Other : it has a Ground.

Note. — The two sides refer to the immediate positive
Identity of Actuality and Possibility and to the estab-
hshed unity of both.

531. The Contingent has, then, no Ground just because
it is contingent ; and it just as much has a ground just
because it is contingent.

532. It is the established, unmediated alternation of
the Inner and Outer : established by this, that Possibility
and Actuality have each this determination in their own
self, owing to their being moments of the absolute Form.

148 A Holiday with a Hegelian

533. But just because each immediately veers round
into the opposite one, it rather goes in the latter just as
much directly together with its own self : this Identity
of the one in the other is Necessity.

534. The Contingent is necessary, just because the
Actual is determined as possible, its immediac}^ being thus
suspended and repelled into the Ground or In-itself and
into the Grounded (§530), as also because this its Possibihty,
the Ground-reference, is directly suspended and established
as Being (§529).

Note. — The impossibihty of separating Possibility,
Contingency and Necessity from one another is, of course,
due to the fact that the intermediating process has vanished
to a mere tautology already in the essential Relation. The
distinctions by means of which the one identical Content,
the Absolute, continues its positive exposition are, per se,
empty abstractions. The mediation reveals itself now
to be a mere play, because every distinction has been
already overcome and dissolved in the fundamental unity
of Refiectedness-within-self or Essence and Being. As
a matter of fact, the mediation has been a play all through
the sphere of Being and Essence, only we were not aware
of it. Why ? Because in order to demonstrate the unit}'
of Essence and Being, we had to begin by crediting the
determinations of Being or Essence with that sort of
distinctiveness which is familiar to the standpoint of the
ordinary understanding. Or, rather, it was the Notion
itself that imposed upon itself such limitations ; that thus
pre-estabhshed itself, in order to demonstrate to itself
its own depth. So far, then, as the seventh act of Thought
makes us realise already in its second step of mediation
that the dialectic of Being and Essence constitutes the
negative Exposition of the Absolute (§503), and we now
occupy the standpoint that Being and Essence are mere
Attributes, or Modes of the Absolute itself, their determina-
tions are found to have a ground only so far as they have
no Ground : the mediation is now the positive Exposition
of the Absolute ; and, as this its own display, the media-
tion also appears as a mere play — a manifesting having no

Seventh Act of Thought 149

other object than this manifesting. For the Absolute is
no Becoming, simple or essential — in spite of all that
superficial objectors urge against Hegel's presumable
view of God as a Becoming — hence, all mediation must
now only bear witness to absolute Self-activity. What
was at first Being, is now mere Possibility ; what was
the Essence is now only Contingency, and the Absolute,
as the Ground of these its formal distinctions, is Necessity —
at first, equally only formal Necessity. Or, just because
these distinctions are purely formal Actuality, Possibility
may be equallj^ viewed as the present restatement of
Essence, Contingency as that of Being ; just as either
of them may be equally given the significance of a unity
of the other two, Necessity standing both for Being and
Essence. What is possible, is contingent and equally
necessary. The contingent is both possible and necessary ;
and the necessary, in turn, both possible and contingent.
If the third step of mediation of the present act of Thought
appears unduly complex, the reason lies in said insepara-
bihty of the distinctions implied in the formal Actualitj'.

4. Relative and Absolute Necessity

535. Seeing that the immediate unity of the determina-
tions of Form constitutes the Content of Actuality, and
the Content, as indifferent Identitj^ contains also the
Form as indifferent and thereby is a manifold content in
general, Actuality is real.

536. What is actual can act, i.e. it reveals itself by that
which it produces, its relating to another being neither a
going over, nor an appearing, but a manifesting of itself.

537. The real Actuality is, at first, in one of the de-
terminations of Form — only the immediate unity of itself
and Possibility — hence, it is also distinguished from its
own In-itself.

538. As the In-itself of real Actuality, Possibihty is
itself real.

539. This real Possibility is no longer an unre-

150 A Holiday with a Hegelian

fleeted Actuality, as is the case with the formal Possibility,
i.e. no longer only as the abstract Identity that Something
is not self-contradictory, but the present manifoldness of
circumstances, referring to the really possible :

540. The whole of Conditions : an Actuality, determined
to be the In-itself of its own self as an Other and to have
to return into itself.

Note. — The Actuality which constitutes the possibility
of a thing is not its own Possibility, but the In-itself of
another Actual : it itself is the Actuality destined to be
suspended, i.e. the formal Actuality or only Possibility —
Actuality in one of the determinations of Form and, there-
fore, distinguished from the other (§537).

541. So far, then, as the really Possible is the In-itself
as one determination of Form, it is a self-identical Content
in Contradiction with its own self.

Note. — The distinction between the Conditions and
Ground is already transcended in Existence, as what is
Groundless and Unconditioned ; and as the Ground is
now the Absolute itself, the immediate Actuality depends
on Conditions only so far as this dependency bears wit-
ness to its nature as the self-contradictory Self-Identity.
The Actual acts just because it is immediately self-con-
tradictory, for Activity — Actuality — is nothing than an
establishing of the Identity of the Outer with the Inner.
Contradiction is the spring of all movement — thus when
the Notion is given the significance of mere (pure) Being,
this its immediate Contradiction becomes the source of the
foregoing dialectic movement. We are now simply realising
why the Objective Logic must be a circle.

542. Now, that which suspends itself in the self -suspend-
ing real Possibility is, firstly, its formal Actuality, as the
sphere of Conditions — the Actuality as the In-itself of
another Actual which Other is, however, the really Possible
itself ; secondly, its moment of the In-itself, as formal
Possibihty — the Possibility of the other which is its own
self.

Seventh Act of Thought 151
3.

543. The Negation of the real Possibihty is, therefore,
its Identity with itself ; and, as the real Possibihty is,
in its suspending, the rebound of this suspending on
itself, it is the real Necessity.

544. What is really necessary, cannot be otherwise,
because it is not generally, but really possible.

Note. — It is only from the standpoint of formal Possi-
bility that the very reason for which a thing exists is the
referring Ground that its contrary also exists. When,
however, a thing is conditioned, i.e. really possible, it can
no longer be otherwise. Only one thing is necessary under
stated conditions ; but, then, this one thing is, as a content-
full reference, as the really necessary, indifferent to the
distinction of Form and for that very reason comes itself
equahy under the sway of the Form. What is really
necessary, cannot be otherwise : not in the sense that
in these circumstances either this or that can happen, but
in the sense that it does not matter which of the two
alternatives happens. That which is necessary in these
circumstances is indifferently this or that, because it is,
as to Form, identical with both : a formal Identity of the
Possible and Actual.

A-

545. Seeing, however, that the really Possible becomes
necessary owing to the ascertained fact that the Other of
which it is the In-itself is immediately its own self, the
real Necessity is, at the same time, relative, the pre-
estabhshing and the self-returning movement being still
separate.

546. The Content being at first the indifferent Identity
against the Form, hence distinguished from it and a
determined Content in general, the real Necessary is some
kind of limited Actuahty which is, on account of its
limitedness, also only a Contingent.

547. Nevertheless, the Contingency is contained also
in the Form of the real Necessity, so far as the real Possi-
bility is only in itself necessary, being the return-into-self

152 A Holiday with a Hegelian

from the restless Otherwiseness of the Actuahty and
Possibihty against one another.

548. The present unity-in-itself of Necessity and Con-
tingency is to be called absolute Actuality ; namely :

549. The real Necessity is determined Necessity : its
Determinateness consists in this, that it has in it its negation.
Contingency.

550. Seeing, however, that this determinateness is, in its
first simplicity. Actuality, the determined Necessity is
immediately actual Necessity, i.e. necessary or absolute
Actuality.

Note. — This means equally immediately that Con-
tingency, too, is absolutely necessary — a verity ignored
by the Calculus of Probability. " Pour une intelligence
(omnisciente)," says Liagre, " tout evenement a venir
serait certain ou impossible " {Higher Mathematics, J. W.
Mellor, p. 492). Accordingly, " the terms ' chance ' and
' probability ' are nothing but conventional modes of
expressing our ignorance of the courses of events as
indicated by our inability to predict the results." " The
problem of science, "says Hegel {Enc, §145, Note, Wallace's
translation), " and especially of philosophy, undoubtedly
consists in eliciting the necessity concealed under the
semblance of contingency. That, however, is far from
meaning that the contingent belongs to our subjective
conception alone, and must therefore be simply set aside,
if we wish to get at the truth. All scientific researches
which pursue this tendency exclusively, lay themselves
fairly open to the charge of mere jugglery and an over-
strained precisionism." In short, were there no con-
tingency in the real Necessity, Freedom would be an empty
word. In any case, we should not be able to realise it even
on the grade of option or free choice, since this latter is its
form of contingency.

551. This Actuahty is an empty determination, i.e.
mere Possibility of being determined just as much as
Possibility as Actuality, which Possibility is, therefore,
equally absolute and, as this Indifference to its own self,
is estabhshed as an empty, contingent determination.

Seventh Act of Thought 153

552. So the real Necessity contains Contingency not only
in itself, but this latter also becomes in it, and the Becoming
is not only immediate, but essential.

Note. — The real Necessity contains Contingency only
in itself, so far as it is relative or determined Necessity.
But since the determined Necessity is absolute Actuality,
i.e. an empty determination, the Contingent from which
it starts as its presupposition becomes in it, and thereby
is its own establishing. The pre-establishing and the self-
returning movement (§545) are no longer separate.

553. It is hence it itself which determines itself as
Contingency.

554. So the Form has in its reahsation interpenetrated
all its distinctions and made itself transparent, being as
absolute Necessity only this simple Identity of the Being
in its Negation, or in the Essence, with itself,

555. The absolute Necessary is only because it is, or also
because it is : as Being it has no condition, nor ground ;
as Reflection, it has only its own self for its condition and
ground.

556. Absolute Necessity is thus the Reflection or Form
of the Absolute : simple Immediac3^ which is absolute
Negativity : an Other having Actuahty in the Being is
determined to be absolutely only Possible, because all
mediation-by-another is now out of the question.

557. This manifestation of that which Determinateness
is in truth is the transition of the Actual into the Possible
as a going-together-with-self.

558. This Identity of the Being in its Negation (or
Essence) with itself is Substance.

Note. — " The Absolute, expounded first of all by the
external Reflection, expounds now, as an absolute Form,
or as Necessity, its own self : this Exposition of its own
self is its Self-establishing, and it is only this Self-
establishing. — Just as the Light of Nature is not Something,

154 A Holiday with a Hegelian

nor a Thing, but its Being is only its shining, so the mani-
festation is the self-equal absolute Actuality " (Hegel's
Werke, 4 : 211).

5. The Relation of Substantiality

559. The Substance is the immediate Actuality itself,
as absolute Reflectedness-within-itself, as a Subsisting-
in-and-for-itself, which Subsisting is the immediate
vanishing and becoming of the absolute Illusion within
itself : Accidentahty.

Note. — In the Attribute, the Absolute appears only in
one of its moments, so far as it is only the Absolute of the
external Reflection {§506). Accidentahty is the self-
estabhshed Absolute : that which the Attribute is in truth,
i.e. the immediate vanishing and becoming of the totality
within itself : a distinguishment of the Absolute in a
Relation, the sides of which are Totalities, hence equally
absolutely illusory, the Relation being, consequently,
absolute or none at all : no longer the external Reflection.

560. The movement of Accidentahty expresses, there-
fore, in each of its moments the essential Becoming of the
totahty of Being and Essence.

561. This movement of the Accidentahty is the Self-
activity of the Substance as a peaceful arising of its own
self.

562. Accidentahty is the whole Substance itself : the
differentiation of this latter into the simple Identity of
Being and into a vortex of Accidences is a Form of its
Illusion.

563. Whereas the simple Identity of Being is the form-
less Substance of Conception, to which the Illusion has
not determined itself as Illusion, the vortex or sequence of
Accidences is the Substance as absolute Might : as creative
Might, through its translation of the Possible into the Ac-
tual, or as destructive Might, through the reduction
of the x\ctual back into the Possible, the one being self-
identically the other.

564. Accidences as such — and there are several of them,
severality being one of the determinations of Being —

Seventh Act of Thought 155

have no Might over one another : so far as an Accidental
appears to exercise Might over an Other, the Might is that of
the Substance.

Note. — The Illusion of an independent subsistence of
things and forces is now fully realised, hence all that is and
happens is traced to one total Subject. The Substance
stands already for the Notion in its immediate character
as the almighty Creator, Destroyer and Preserver of all
that is.

565. In this first determination, as immediately identical
within the Accidences, with itself, the Substance is not yet
manifested in its whole notion : it is to be also dis-
tinguished as the self-identical Being-in-and-for-itself, from
itself as the Totahty of Accidences, when it is, as Might,
that which mediates,

6. The Relation of Causality

566. In determining itself as Might, the Substance
immediately suspends this detennining in such wise that
the Determined, from which it seems to start, becomes
by means of its returning-into-itself, or is the Effect of its
own self as the Cause.

567. As the Cause, Substance is no longer merely the In-
itself of its Accidence, but is also estabhshed as this In-itself ,
or is the actual Substance : a self-subsistent Source of the
Bringing forth out of itself.

568. The Cause is Cause only so far as it produces an
Effect ; conversely, the Effect, so far as its Cause has
vanished, is no longer an Effect, but an indifferent Actual.

569. In this Identity of the Cause and Effect, the Form
whereby they are distinguished, as the In-itself and as the
Establishedness, is suspended : the Causahty gone out in
the Effect is an Immediacy that is indifferent to the
relation of Cause and Effect and has it externally in itself.

570. Cause and Effect are, consequently, established as

156 A Holiday with a Hegelian

different, the Form as against the Content being a Caus-
ahty that is only immediately actual or contingent.

571. Further, the Content is here also only the finite
Substance (the Causahty gone out in the Effect), hence a
different Content in its own self, and Cause and Effect are,
consequently, not merely the formal, but the determined
relation of Causality.

572. The determined relation of Causality has a given
Content, and takes its course as an external distinction in
this Identical (as what is different in its own self).

573. Owing to this Identity of the Content, the finite
Causality is an analytical proposition, e.g. Rain makes
wet, or Gravitation is the Cause of the movement of Fall.

574. So far as the Cause has also another Content be-
sides its Effect, this further Content is a contingent by-
essence which does not concern Causality.

575. And neither must a Cause be identified with a
single moment belonging to the circumstances of Possibility.

576. The relation of Causality is misapplied whenever
that which is called the Cause shows itself to have another
Content than the Effect, e.g. Food and Blood.

577. True, the determination of Form is also a deter-
mination of Content, and Cause and Effect are, therefore,
also another Content : but the different Content is con-
nected externally with the Cause and with the Effect, with-
out entering itself into the Causation and its Relation.

578. This external Content is, therefore, relation-less :
an immediate existence having manifold determinations
of its Presence, among others, also this, that it is, in a
particular respect, a Cause or also an Effect.

579. Its Causahty consists in this, to refer itself nega-
tively to itself as to an establishedness constituted by the
Causahty itself, seeing that it itself is (i) an estabhshedness
to which (2) Causality is external.

580. As causal Substance, then, a thing suspends its
externality, so far as this latter is constituted by another
Cause, and restores its abstract originality.

Seventh Act of Thought 157

Note. — This is only an explication of the substantial self-
determination as Might (§566). The Cause is the Might of
the Substance in its truth, as an establishing of the nature
of Accidentality in its very Becoming — the Accidentality
being, namely, the immediate vanishing and becoming
of the absolute Illusion within itself. The Cause establishes
the Substance as the Source of every Accidentality : as
being absolutely original, and as remaining the whole
Substance all through the vortex of Accidences. So far,
then, as a thing produces an Effect, or acts as a Cause, its
Causality is not due to its immediate actuality, but must
be traced to the mighty Substance. Since, however, the
Cause is, at the same time, identical with an immediate
actuality, this latter, as causal Substance, bears witness
to the notion of Causality as a negative reference to self :
hence ' ' it starts from an Other, liberates itself from this
external determination, and its return into itself is the
maintenance of its immediate existence and the suspension
of its established Causality, and therewith of its Causality
in general." Thus the Causality of a thing appears as a
getting rid of a determination which is foreign to its original
Identity with itself, and which has, therefore, been forced
into it or imposed on it bj^ an Other : in acting as a Cause,
a thing is a returning into itself by means of the removal
of its establishedness by another Cause. A clock goes until
the effect of the \\inding-up is removed.

581. The just considered determinateness of Causality
concerns the Form of the self-external Causality, as the
Originality that is just as much in its own self Established-
ness or Effect : this union of the opposite determinations in
a present substrate constitutes the infinite Regression from
Cause to Cause.

582. The infinite Progress from Effect to Effect is the
same thing as the infinite Regress from Cause to Cause.

Note. — So far as start is made from an Effect, this
latter has a Cause, which has again a Cause, and so forth.
Or if start is made from a Cause, this is immediately the
effect of another Cause, which is again the Effect of another
Cause, and so forth. Although the unity of both is here

58 A Holiday with a Hegelian

equally established, it remains unnoticed so long as atten-
tion is riveted to the different Content which is connected
externally with the Cause or with the Effect. But in this
case, the ordinary consciousness remains unaware that
the different Content is connected with Cause and Effect
externally : that, in calling something a Cause, we do not
name a thing, but only apply to it the notion of Causality
as it is in our mind a priori. The infinite Regression from
Cause to Cause, or the infinite Progression from Effect to
Effect, is nothing but a protest on the part of our in-
stinctively logical nature against the simple identification
of the first Cause with an immediate actuality. Such an
identification yields, after all, only the notion of Existence
which, as has been realised, is immediately onh^Appearance.
And since we have now advanced to the true Ground of all
appearances in absolute Might, in the Substance as the
absolute Mediation in its own self, the first Cause acquires
its true meaning as the absolute Self-activity, the proper
name of which is the Notion. — Everything is caused :
but the great thing is to grasp that Cause enters into
Existence through its own self, through Thought ! And
this not merely in the sense that the correlation of
Cause and Effect is only our way of classifying objective
happenings, but in the sense that the first Cause itself is
Thought ! The very objection that things would remain
as Causes and Effects even did we not attempt to trace out
the nature of their relationship, takes for granted that
things are essentially constituted in a thinkable manner :
just because it is only on the ground of our thinking
nature that we are prompted to remove the first im-
pression of our sense-consciousness of an apparent un-
connectedness of things. As has been asserted already by
Kant, the relationship of Cause and Effect is not a result,
but rather the sine qua non of experience. Experience is
possible only on the ground of the unity of Thought and
Being, which unity has now fully verified itself through
the self-development of Thought itself.

583. So far, the Cause has indeed an Effect and is,
at the same time, itself the Effect ; or the Cause not only
has a Cause but also is a Cause : the Effect, however,

Seventh Act of Thought 159

which the Cause has and the Effect which it is — just so
the Cause M'hich an Effect has and the Cause which it is —
are different.

584. The movement of the determined relation of
Causahty has, however, brought about this, that the
Cause not only goes out in the Effect, and therewith also
the Effect (as in the formal Causahty), but that the Cause,
in its going out, in the Effect, re-becomes ; that the Effect
disappears in the Cause, but in it just as much re-becomes.

585. Causahty is pre-estabhshing Doing : the sub-
stantial Identity, in which the formal Causality disappears,
is the Cause so far as it has restored itself in the determined
Causahty by means of the Negation of itself,

586. This Cause is the negative Might over its own self
as the passive Substance :

587. Violence — the Appearance of Might.

588. In suffering Violence, the passive Substance is
established as what it is in truth, i.e. as an Establishedness
constituted by the Causahty itself (§579).

Note. — The passive Substance is the Identit5^-in-itself
of Cause and Effect as against the restored substantial
Identity, as the active Substance. The passive Substance
is, therefore, the immediate actuality which is, firstly,
an establishedness to which, secondly. Causality is external
and which, consequently, is acted upon by the active
Substance or suffers Violence. But in suffering Violence,
the passive Substance loses, firstly, its immediate es-
tablishedness, secondly, its externality to the active
Substance, i.e. it becomes established as an Established-
ness constituted by the Causality itself : it becomes that
negative reference to its own self which is its own Causality
— in suffering Violence, it suffers through its own Doing
or receives only what is its due. Let the reader ponder
that this conclusion does not simply apply to things, but
also to our own self ! Or, rather, that it is to be particularly
applied to our own suffering, since we are the true em-

i6o A Holiday with a Hegelian

bodiment of the substantial Identity, as the estabhshed
truth of the passive Substance ! " We may note in pass-
ing," says Hegel in a Note to §147, Enc. (Wallace's transl.),
' ' how important it is for any man to meet everything
that befalls him with the spirit of the old proverb which
describes each man as the architect of his own fortune.
That means that it is only himself after all of which a
man has the usufruct. The other way would be to lay the
blame of whatever we experience upon other men, upon
unfavourable circumstances, and the like. And this is
a fresh example of the language of unfreedom, and at
the same time the spring of discontent. If man saw, on
the contrary, that whatever happens to him is only the
outcome of himself, and that he only bears his own guilt,
he would stand free, and in everything that came upon
him would have the consciousness that he suffered no
wrong. A man who lives in dispeace with himself and his
lot, commits much that is perverse and amiss, for no other
reason than because of the false opinion that he is wronged
by others. No doubt, too, there is a great deal of chance
in what befalls us. But the chance has its root in the
' natural ' man. So long, however, as a man is otherwise
conscious that he is free, his harmony of soul and peace
of mind will not be destroyed by the disagreeables that
befall him."

589. Owing to this conversion of the passive Substance
itself into the Cause, there is, firstly, the Effect suspended
in it : therein consists its Reaction in general.

590. Secondly, the Reaction goes against the first acting
Cause which, owing to said suspension of its Effect, loses
its Causality and thereby becomes itself the passive Sub-
stance against the reacting Cause.

591. Accordingly, the infinite Progress of the finite
Causality is now bent round and becomes a self-returning
acting : infinite Reciprocity or Action and Reaction.

7. Reciprocity or Action and Reaction

592. Reciprocity contains, firstly, the disappearing of
the original Persisting of the immediate substantiahty,

Seventh Act of Thought i6i

secondly, the originating of the Cause and therevidth the
Originahty as a mediation with itself through its Nega-
tion.

593. The Cause not only has an Effect, but stands, in
the Effect, in a reference with its own self as Cause.

594. Therewith, Causahty has returned back to its
absolute Notion and, at the same time, arrived at the
Notion itself, at Freedom.

595. Necessity becomes Freedom by manifesting its
still inner Identity (§548).

596. The inner, the outer and the substantial Identity
are now established as One and the same Identity, called
indifferently the Universal, the Particular or the Singular —
the three moments of the Notion.

CHAPTER XVI

THE MEANING OF PLANETARY DISTANCES

TT was merely on account of the little time at our dis-
posal that Dr. Veverka did not dilate on the Sub-
jective Logic. Yet it is there, as he told me, that thought
displays itself in its fullest plasticity, as may be easily
understood, seeing that the Objective Logic has essentially
the significance of a verification of the final result of the
development of the ordinary consciousness and therefore
forms only a preliminary stage of fully self-conscious
thinking.

All through the Objective Logic the student finds it
more or less difficult to limit his mind to the matter in
hand, because the subject-matter consists of abstractions,
and thus does not admit of a full display of our instinctively
logical nature. It seems, then, as though one were com-
pelled to let go one's sense of wholeness and plunge into
a void. But this sense of compulsory limitation gradually
disappears, and finally it is realised that the beginning
with pure Being is an inevitable condition of thinking self-
realisation. It is only at the end of the Objective Logic
that every hesitation as regards the truth of the premise
of pure thinking is overcome and one is properly prepared
to taste the joys of fully self-conscious thinking in its
element of untrammelled freedom.

" The Notion," thus opens Hegel's doctrine of the
Notion, £'nc., §i6o, " is the principle of Freedom, the power
of substance self-realised. It is a sj^stematic whole, in
which each of its constituent functions is the very total
which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one v/ith
it. Thus in its self-identity it has original and complete
determinateness." The next paragraph continues : " The

162

Meaning of Planetary Distances 163

onward movement of the notion is no longer a transition
into, or a reflection on something else, but Development.
For in the notion, the elements distinguished are without
more ado at the same time declared to be identical with
one another and with the whole, and the determinateness
of each is a free being of the whole notion."

Thus is it, then, that the dialectic within the Subjective
Logic no longer deals with Being as such or Essence as
such, but amounts to a perfectly free self-exposition of the
Notion. It is here that all questions suggested by the
study of the Objective Logic, receive a fully adequate
answer. The Objective Logic may be said to deal with
Thought only as a fact. So far, one only takes notice,
how Being is Thought, not yet why it is thus thought ;
or the why is answered only from the standpoint of essen-
tial Reflection. Consequently, there still remains room
for a sense of limitation to our knowledge : a sense having
its origin in the already arising need of full comprehension.
And to satisfy this need is just the object of the doctrine
of the Notion. True, the dialectic must needs continue
to imply self-limitation ; but just because the limitation
is a spontaneous self-hmitation, it no longer produces the
sense of a more or less artificial paralysis of one's instinctive
clinging to one's fulness. One retains all through the
sense that the turns of dialectic — the development —
although of universal validity, are yet also of one's own
free making. This realisation of what is logically necessary
as a manifestation of one's own Freedom means just that
one realises oneself truly identified with the nature of
God as He is in His own essence : as the Creator, Destroyer
and Preserver of all that is. And so comes it, then, that,
in his Remark to §i6i, Enc, Hegel asserts that " the
movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon
merely as play."

But, as already said, time did not admit of a detailed,
not even of a cursory, exposition, on the part of Dr.
Veverka, of the Subjective Logic. It will be easily under-
stood that the mere copying of the seven acts of thought
was enough to swallow the greatest part of my holiday.
And thus I shall conclude this report of my most remark-

164 A Holiday with a Hegelian

able experience with a transcription of Dr. Veverka's
last discourse from my shorthand record of it, leaving the
reader at liberty to draw his conclusions.

" You are aware," said Dr. Veverka the last evening
of our stay together, " that astronomers have as yet
failed to erect a satisfactory law of planetary distances
from the Sun. Hegel himself appears to have taken for
granted that this law concerns only empiricism ; but
as one of his most notable followers at present times,
Prof. Bolland, at Leyden, says in his Zuivere Rede en hare
Werkelijkheid (p. 320), we are here, and generally in Nature,
in face with ' de berekenbaarheid, die in berekenbaarheid
niet opgaat,' i.e. with calculableness admitting of no formula.
Is it, then, to be inferred that the distances in question
are pure contingencies ? I infer quite the contrary,
namely, that their problem does truly concern Philosophy,
not Empiricism.

" True, Contingency plays quite a legitimate role in
Nature, which latter, being in its very notion the Other-
wiseness of the Idea (as the Notion is called at the end
of the Subjective Logic), is impotent of preserving notional
distinctions in their pure form, but allows them to fall
asunder and thus to assume the form of manifold being.
To track this manifoldness in all its contingent variety
of unessential distinctions — contingent, just because their
determination can be only a matter of external reflection,
thus requiring a relapse of the Notion into the sphere of
its negative exposition, i.e. of mere facts — is, of course,
no business of Philosophy. It is, however, questionable
whether the distances of the planets from the Sun are
simply such a manifoldness of purely contingent dis-
tinctions. Bode's law, with all its limitations, is surely
a sufficient evidence that there is at bottom an organising
principle.

" Indeed, if one grasps that Nature is in a sense an objec-
tive illustration which the Idea is eternally giving itself of
its own negative self-exposition in the doctrine of Being
and Essence ; and that Nature admits, therefore, of being
systematised by means of this dialectic (when, of course,
the logical categories concerned assume the significance

Meaning of Planetary Distances 165

of natural forms, pure Being standing for pure Space,
Quality for the forms of Space, Ideality or Being-for-self
for Time, Quantity for the science of pure mathematics,
Quantitative Relation and Measure for Movement, etc.),
one recognises easily in Bode's law the natural correspon-
dence of the Substrate of the Nodal Line of Measures.

" According to §235 of my Digest, the sides of the realistic
Measure have, according to their abstract nature as
Qualities in general, some particular significance. In
the dialectical development of the Philosophy of Nature,
this particular significance is identified with Space and
Time, so far as the former occupies in the systematic
exposition of Nature the same position as Quality in the
system of the Objective Logic, and the latter the same
position as Quantity. Hence realistic Measure has its
representative natural exemplification in the movement
of a falling body, so far as the law of this movement implies
an inverted relation of Space and Time, Amount attaching
to Space, Unity to Time (§236). Although, however,
Spaces covered by a falling body are proportional to the
squares of Time, Space and Time remain still equally
only immediate Qualities, because the relation of specified
Measures concerns only their quantitative determinate-
ness (§237). Along, then, with being quantitatively in
inverted relation, they are qualitatively in direct relation,
the exponent of which latter has the significance of the
empirical coefficient of the law of a falling body Q^ = a).
But the inverted and direct relation co-exist ; hence, the
empirical coefficient stands truly for the real Being-for-self
in Measure (§§238-240). And so far as Nature is, according
to her Notion, as the Idea's own Otherwiseness, an objective
illustration of the dialectical nature of Thought, there must
exist necessarily a natural form which embodies eniincnily
the notion of the real Being-for-self in Measure,

" I lay emphasis on the word eminently, because the
dialectic of the real Measure may be illustrated mani-
foldly, for instance, in connection with the chemical
process. But in this case, we do not get a representative
illustration of the dialectic of real Measure, because this
dialectic is, at the stage of the chemical process, sub-

1 66 A Holiday with a Hegelian

ordinated to a higher dialectical standpoint. Namely,
we deal in this case properly with the transition from
physical Matter into Life, in illustration of the concluding
portion of the ninth cycle of Thought (the dialectic of the
essential Relation). At the stage of Measure, or of the sixth
cycle, we deal with purely abstract Matter, only with its
abstract notion, i.e. with that significance of it which it
has as the still formless Form of the Essence (§§369-373).
Physical Matter is an illustration of the essential Content
(§382). And thus it is plain that the naturally representa-
tive illustration of the real Measure must be sought in such
a natural existence which does not come under the head of
physical Matter.

" Let me draw your attention to the fact that the realistic
Measure^ too, is in its natural existence independent of the
properties of physical Matter. These properties appeal to
the senses, but that which determines the law of a falling
body is a pure relationship of Space and Time. So far, then,
as the naturally representative illustration of the real
Measure is to be sought in such a natural existence that it
does not imply phj'sical Matter — something tangible — this
does not by any means mean that we are asked to relin-
quish our hold of existing things after a handling of them
already in connection with the illustration of the realistic
Measure in the law of a falling body. This law has still a
purely immaterial existence, just because it illustrates
only the abstract Being-for-self in Measure. What the
falling body is physically is, so far, of no consequence, and
the handling of a thing is in this connection an external
circumstance, the disappearance of which, in connection
with the representative illustration of the dialectic of the
qualitatively quantitative relation of Measures implies

^ Notice the distinction between the meaning of reaUstic and
real : reaHstic Measure is meant to stand for the purely quantita-
tive relation of two specifying Measures (§232), real Measure for
the qualitatively quantitative relation of self-subsistent Measures
(§240). In short, the distinction is meant to be parallel to the
distinction between the idealistic and ideal. Current language
does not emphasise it, but for philosophical purposes it is permis-
sible to utilise it in such wise that the ending ' -istic ' is taken to
stand for a mere adumbration (or vision) of the fundamental true
root-meaning.

Meaning of Planetary Distances 167

that this illustration refers to a higher rather than to a
lower natural form than that implied in the law of a falling
body. Namely, the empirical coefficient ceases to stand
merely for the abstract Being-for-self in Measure and,
acquiring the significance of an objectively fixed Self-
subsistence, stands for an objectively fixed distance — or
rather for many objectively fixed distances (real Measures).

" If we have properly grasped the trend of the dialectic of
Measure, we realise that we seek a natural illustration of
the degradation of Quality, Quantity, and Measure to the
rank of mere moments of that Being-in-and-for-itself which
is the first Negation of the sphere of immediate Being. That
is to say. Space, Time and their unity or Movement (the
notion of Heaviness) must present themselves in the
required illustration as a mere entering into Presence of an
inner specifying unity, the proper name of which is Essence.
The immediately manifold real Measures are truly a matter
of Essential Becoming ; and so far as they are connected
with existing bodies, these latter must present themselves
as what is in its immediacy the Null, No-thing or Illusion.
It is for this reason that the dialectic of the real Measure
does away, in its representative natural illustration, even
with that presence of a thing which constitutes an external
circumstance in connection with the law of a falhng body.
The relation of real Measures affects the Quality ; the
dialectic has in this respect for its object to demonstrate
that the relation of Measures, does not concern merely their
quantitative determinateness, but that it involves also
their qualitative ceasing-to-be ; that the relation is not
the relation of truly self-subsistent things, but of purely
illusory bodies.

' ' And now you need not be surprised to hear that the
Philosophy of Nature identifies the representative natural
illustration of the dialectic of real Measure with the starry
heaven. But, perhaps, I had better first of all remove from
your mind the impression, as if Spectroscopy disproved
Hegel's view of celestial bodies, as of immaterial exis-
tences. It should be enough to point out that the only
reliable test of physical Matter is to be found by means of
practical relationship to it, by means of the actual hand-

1 68 A Holiday with a Hegelian

ling of it, whilst the testimony to the ph3'sical materiality
of celestial bodies by means of Spectroscopy is, after all,
only a matter of optical phenomena. But so long as
optical phenomena and simple seeing are interpreted as
a matter of practical relationship to the visible, it is
necessary to enter deeper into this question. Thus prepare
yourself for a more or less lengthy digression from my
main theme.

" Although the first rule for the making of hypothesis
ought to be, according to Newton or Herschel, simplicity of
conception, such a simplicity is, as a rule, conspicuous by its
absence in scientific theories. The scientific interpretation
of seeing is only one instance of the way in which men of
science pit themselves against sound common sense, i.e.
against our instinctively logical nature. We see presum-
ably as a result of the impact of the ethereal waves, stirred
up by the vibrations of the visible, on the retina. In this
way, then, seeing is made dependent on physical Matter
(as indeed Ether has been recently credited with all the
known properties of Matter). Our eyes are presumably
only intercepting ethereal waves, and we see only when such
waves strike the retina. Yet, as a matter of fact, the
visibility of objects across somebody else's visual rays is not
affected, although, if the waves propagate a material im-
pulse in a material medium, they should interfere with one
another — and presumably actually do interfere ! Still,
everyone is familiar with the fact that we see also during
our dreams, or that we may see what is not there. Granted,
one is in such a case a victim to hallucination ; the fact
remains that every hallucination is a protest against the
tracing of visibility to the agency of physical Matter.

" That which is only seen, is not necessarily a thing. The
very art of painting confirms this obvious statement. St.
Thomas did not believe in the physical actuality of Jesus
until he touched his body. Seeing by itself gives no clue to
the materiality of the visible ; hence, it is inadmissible
to make seeing dependent on an impact of the ethereal
waves, sent out by the visible, on the retina. Such a
standpoint is simply an evidence of the absent-mindedness
characteristic of the ordinary consciousness, so far as it

Meaning of Planetary Distances 169

makes itself dependent on the ' Not-I ' and thus delegates
its own activity to an external source instead of to the
Notion. FaiHng yet to grasp itself in pure Thought, it
credits the external world with independent self-subsistence
and comes to fancy that things are there to begin with
and that its own impressions of them are caused by their
activity, whilst it itself is nothing than a more or less
contingent receptacle of them. So comes it, then, that a
material ether is postulated : the true connection between
things and the Ego — the element of Thought — becomes
degraded into a mere conception of an externahy existing
link (which yet does not exist empirically) ; and when the
absurdity of such a conception is pointed out, one finds
the whole scientific world supremely contemptuous of every
criticism of its self-complacent infallibility. Behold, Hegel
should know better than Newton or Lord Kelvin ! And
yet, Hegel has on his side the whole weight of sound
common sense and Religion !

"Seeing, then, that the scientific theory of Sight and
Light rests on an absurd premise, it is inevitable that the
interpretation of optical phenomena should be equally
absurd. Unless one has secured oneself against the sway
of thoughtless assumptions by a thorough logical training,
it is practically impossible to observe a phenomenon in a
state of plastic receptivity to ah its details. And so it
must needs happen that the very thing which calls at first
sight for an explanation in connection with a phenomenon
is often passed by in silence. This is the case, for instance,
in connection with the scientific explanation of the so-
called Refraction of Light. According to this explanation,
the bottom of a basin filled with water should logically
appear at its true distance only directly under the eye,
the rest being brought gradually nearer to the surface, and
so assuming a concave shape. Or a stick submerged per-
pendicularly should appear broken when viewed sideways.
That is to say, so far as the law of Refraction is expressed
in terms only of the sines of the angle of incidence and
refraction, the truly characteristic feature of the whole
phenomenon, the rising of the bottom of the basin, is left
entirely out of the question.

lyo A Holiday with a Hegelian

" The rising is that which is noticeable at first sight,
and if it is ignored, then a perpendicular incidence ray
suffers (by inference from the scientific law of Refraction)
no modification whatever, whilst a stick submerged per-
pendicularly should appear broken when viewed sideways.
And at the same time it remains a mystery why the per-
pendicular incidence ray should be exempted from re-
fraction, since it, too, passes from one medium into another.
On the contrary, when the deviation or alteration of the
direction of a ray of vision is realised as a simple conse-
quence of the apparent raising of every spatial point
under water, the interpretation of the so-called (since there
is no) Refraction of Light consists in the answer to this
question : What is that which is seen (the whole pheno-
menon being a matter of seeing), when the bottom of a
basin appears to be raised under water ?

" Well, what is there to be seen in this case ? The bottom
appears raised when the basin gets filled with Water :
what else, then, is here to fall back upon for an explanation
than the fact of seeing Water ? That which is under
Water is not seen in the same wa}^ as if there were no
Water above it : so far as it is visible at all, the water is
transparent ; but so far as it appears where it is not
physically, the transparency must really imply also the
visibility of some property of water. And this property can
be only its Density or Gravity. The rising of the bottom is
therefore a pictorial illustration of the meaning of Gravity
as a spatial altering. The bottom of a water-bucket
appears raised, because it checks or negates the tendency
of the water to fall. Similarly, the submerged end of a
uniformly thick stick appears broken towards the surface
and thicker with depth, because the replaced volume of
water is thus seen as a negative reflection of the increasing
density of water with depth. And just because the visi-
bility of water consists in making everything material
appear raised towards the surface, its visibility in the case
of an immaterial ray must show forth the latter's negation
of the appearance of rising. Hence, a ray of Light appears
refracted towards the actual position of the thing (under
water) , at the image of which it aims.

Meaning of Planetary Distances 171

" I have dealt with the so-called Refraction of Light in
order to make you adumbrate that spectral analysis
concerns analogously the seeing of the prism and variously
specified light (called then also stars). Although there is an
analogy between the spectrum of chemical substances and
that yielded by the stars, spectral analysis supplies no
proof of the fabled physical constitution of celestial bodies
for the same reason for which mere spatial measureableness
does not imply necessarily that the measurable is a physical
thing. After all, the spectrum is always traceable to the
passage of Light through a prism, so that the fact that the
Light is given out by a solid body heated to white heat
is in this respect an external circumstance which does
not concern the Light given out by stars, since this Light
illustrates the Essential Reflection, as the prototype of
the idealisation which finite, physical Matter undergoes
in the process of combustion (in illustration of the en-
trance of the first Cause into Existence). In short, the
inferences based on spectral analysis imply a reduction of
the universal processes of Nature to the level of the con-
ditions obtaining in laboratories, in which ^^•ay freely
existing facts are vitiated in the image of their finite
counterparts. And yet Hegel's view of the celestial bodies
as witnesses to the eternal spontaneity of the Notion is
objected to as a kind of belittling of the grandeur of the
universe ! To conceive the source of their light in the
image of a furnace is presumably a higher tribute to God
than to identify this source with God's own eternal Essence
and its Reflection ! The irony of the scientific talk of the
grandeur of the universe ! Take, for instance. Prof.
Lowell's account of the Martians in his Mars as the Abode
of Life. Five-eighths of Mars is presumably an arid
waste. The dying process which brought it to its present
pass must go on to the bitter end, until the last spark of
Martian life goes out and all that will remain will be a dead
world rolling through space, its evolutionary career for
ever ended. And the extraordinary interest of the
spectacle which meets the gaze of the astronomer is pre-
sumably that it is the prefiguration of the fate of the earth.
' The outcome,' says the author, ' is doubtless yet far off,

172 A Holiday with a Hegelian

but it is as fatalistically sure as that to-morrow's sun
will rise, unless some other catastrophe anticipate our end.
It is perhaps not pleasing to learn the manner of our death.
But science is concerned only with the fact, and Mars we
have to thank for its presentment ! '

" Here you have an eloquent instance of scientific bank-
ruptcy as regards the profoundest instincts of every in-
telhgent (and eo ipso religious) man. We and our whole
destiny are just at mercy of contingent catastrophes. At
best, we shall die out. Truth ? Freedom ? God ? From
Prof. Lowell's standpoint these are merely chimeras. Be-
cause Schiaperelli discovered some extraordinary marks
on Mars some twenty years ago and photographs have
since proved beyond peradventure that the marks are
there : the fact that Mars is inhabited admits of no doubt !
The marks are surely canals, and how could there be
canals on Mars were it uninhabited ? Besides, does not
photography equally prove that water vapour does exist
in the spectrum of the atmosphere of Mars ? Finally, does
not the greater part of its surface show to the powerful
telescope as an ochre or reddish expanse ? And do 5'ou
not know that ochre or red is the colour of deserts on earth ?
Surely it is time that men of science should realise that,
as it is the mind that frames theories, its manner of handling
facts ought not to be ignored ! A closer study of the Sub-
jective Logic will make you realise that all the talk of
habitable planets or manifold solar systems has the nature
of mere analogies with the conditions obtaining on Earth,
so far as this latter is ignorantly degraded to the rank of
a mere planet. In truth, the solar system, the starry
heaven in general, is a moment of this One Earth ;
and there is only One Earth because there is only One
universal Subject in Nature. In short, the Earth as
we know it, as the substrate of Nature and Life, stands
for the premise of the tenth cycle of Thought, for the
Absolute.

" Let me now return to my original theme. I repeat that
the dialectic of the real Measure has its representative
natural illustration in the starry heaven, and my main
object is to indicate to you broadly that the connection

Meaning of Planetary Distances 173

between Bode's law and the Substrate of the Nodal Line
of Measures is no mere fancy.

" Now, in illustration of the transition from the immediate
real Measure and its specific determinedness (the two series
of which latter clearly refer to the two streams of stars
recently discovered) to Elective Affinit}', we must postulate
a s^'stem of stellar distances in the sense of a kind of peri-
phery to an inner specifying unit3^ And such a system
is surely the system of planetary distances from Mercury,
i.e. beginning with the first step of the inner specifying
unity into Presence. So far as the entering of the Substrate
into Presence gives rise to purely quantitative distinctions
in such wise that the distinctions become immediately also
quahtative, the Substrate has been said to estabhsh the
Being-for-self in Measure in the sense of the differential
coefficient as against the empirical coefficient standing for
the abstract Being-for-self in Measure. Of course, the
differental coefficient is that of the law of a faUing
body ; hence, twice the empirical coefficient. Pure
continuity of the dialectic under discussion leads, then,
to the inference that the law of planetary distances
from Mercury has the form of 2a, so far, however, as a
stands generallj' for a real Measure in the sense of the
distance from Mercury to another planet. Since a, as the
real Being-for-self in Measure, implies severality, it is
not to be identified simply with the distance from Mercury
to Venus, but with the distance from Mercury to any other
planet, and the meaning of 2a is, then, that the distance of
every further planet is twice the distance of the preceding
planet from Mercury. This is precisely the meaning of
Bode's law, so far as the distance of the planets from the
Sun is left out of the question.

' ' The successive duplication appears to clash with the
significance of the differential coefficient of the law of a
falhng body as Acceleration. But so far SLS~ = 2a is taken
in this latter sense, we deal with it (the differential co-
efficient) only abstractly. That is to say, we only an-
ticipate its real meaning as the Substrate of the Nodal
Line of Measures. Just as the empirical coefficient of the
law of a falling body is not objectively fixed, but has the

174 A Holiday with a Hegelian

sense of the Exponent of a direct Relation (the quaUty
of which still lacks an objective fixation) , so the Acceleration
^ too, remains, so far, a matter of an externally made dis-

tinction. In fact, it does not refer to a natural existence,
but to an invented existence, traceable to an identification
of the analytical treatment of the law of a falling body
with its actual existence. A falling body does not increase
in velocity in a jerky fashion with every unit of time ;
consequently, its Acceleration, however useful in calculating
the final velocity, has de facto no existence. Yet the
Substrate does enter into Presence by leaps, and it is, there-
fore, only when the differential coefficient stands for the
natural illustration of the Substrate that the Acceleration
acquires an objective significance. But as it then ceases
to refer to a falhng body, its establishing as it is in truth
disposes of its meaning as Acceleration : its truth is to be
the law of the nodal line of real Measures.

"By viewing next the system of universal gravitation
from the standpoint of Absolute Indifference, we get at
the rationale of Keplerian laws. The elliptical shape of
the planetary orbit has its explanation in the Indifference
as a sum of two Quanta in inverted relation. The sides of
the latter have, of course, the meaning of Space and Time,
i.e. of the natural correspondences of the two moments of
Measure ; and they figure in the law of planetary move-
ment (^ = «) as Powers, because the sides of Indifference
are each in itself the whole. Therefore, Space must imply
in itself the notional meaning of Time, and this latter that
of Space. Now, Time is the Ideality of Space established
for itself against its developed determinateness (§257,
Enc). Hence, the implicitness of Time in Space gives
the notion of one Space, i.e. of a Volume, which, with
respect to the specific Quantum of a planet in its spatial
immediacy, its distance (now) from the Sun, is the Cube
of this distance. Conversely, the impHcitness of Space
in Time stands for the truth of Quantity, the Square. The
opposition, then, of the Indifference as such to itself
as developed determinateness means the opposition of the
universal centre of gravity to a system of planets revolving
round it according to the Keplerian laws, in demonstration

Meaning of Planetary Distances 175

of the all-sided contradiction attaching to the Indifference
in its Presence.

" And we need not stop at the standpoint of Indifference.
In fact, in order to account for the distances of planets
from the Sun, we must ascend to the standpoint of the
Notion. We are free to do so because Philosophy of
Nature has the Science of Logic already at its back. This
is why Hegel does not present his thinking consideration
of Nature as a plain re-embodiment of the dialectic of
Being and Essence, but seeks the organising principle
directly in the Notion. The dialectical whole of Nature
remains even thus a whole of seven subdivisions corre-
sponding distinctly to the seven acts of thought in the
Objective Logic, only the correspondence drops then out
of sight or forces itself on attention as an after- thought.
And then every subdivision is realised to stand at the
same time for the dialectical whole of the Objective Logic,
just because it is the realised Notion that thus subdivides
itself. When, therefore, Space is said to stand for Quality,
i.e. the second act of thought, or Time for Quantity as far
as the notion of Quantitative Relation, etc., each of these
subdivisions implies in itself the dialectic of the whole
Objective Logic and goes over into the next main sub-
division by means of this dialectic. In a summary sys-
tematisation of Nature, there is, however, no need to repro-
duce the whole of this dialectic in a so to speak pedestrian
fashion, but it is sufficient to indicate it merely in its
main moments. For instance, Hegel sums it up with re-
spect to Space as follows :

" Being in itself the Notion, Space contains its dis-
tinctions, which {a), with respect to spatial immediate
indifference, form the merely different, quite undetermined
three Dimensions (§255).

" {b) The distinction is, however, essentially determined
or qualitative. The distinction is thus (a) first of all the
Negation of the Space itself because the latter is an
immediate, distinctionless Asunderness — the Point. {(3)
Because, however, the Negation [the Point] is the Negation
of the Space, it is itself spatial ; the Point, as essentially
this reference, i.e. as a process of self -suspension, is the

176 A Holiday with a Hegelian

Line, the first othenviseness, i.e. spaciousness of the Point ;
(7) the truth of otherwiseness being the Negation of the
Negation, the Line goes over into the Plane, which is, on
one side, a determinateness against the Line and Point,
hence Plane as such, on the other, however, the suspended
negation of the Space, consequently a restoration of the
spacious totality, but so that this totahty contains now
the negative moment in its own self, whereby the Plane
acquires the significance of an enveloping Surface sur-
rounding a single whole Space [a Volume] (§256).

" (c) Now, the Negativity which refers itself as the Point
to the Space, developing in it its determinations as Line
and Plane, is in the sphere of Asundemess equally for
itself. Its determinations are thus established in the
sphere of asunderness, whilst it itself (the Negativity)
appears at the same time to be indifferent to their peaceful
side-by-side. As thus estabhshed for itself [as the Ideality
of spaciousness], the Negativity is Time (§257).

"Were it, however, our object to develop a detailed
dialectic of the notion of Space — Philosophy ot Geometry —
we should have to dog a geometrical illustration of the
whole Objective Logic. The first act of thought would
then concern the transition from pure Space to the mathe-
matical Point, which would be next, by virtue of the
dialectic contained in the second cycle, realised as a spatial
Limit and thus go over, at the end of the third cycle, into
the process of self-suspension or a self-referent Line. This
line would acquire further, through the dialectic of the
fourth cycle, the significance of circumference described
round a central point and the circle, grasped as the identity
of the extensive and intensive magnitude, yield the notion
of Plane, as a relationship of two dimensions. This rela-
tionship ultimates in the Square, whilst the relation of
specifying Measure has its geometrical illustration in the
relation of the Square to its Base. The Pythagorean
theorem embodies the notion of Elective Affinity, the geo-
metrical locus of right-angled triangles on the same hypo-
tenuse, the nodal line of Measures, the hypotenuse standing
thus for the Substrate, etc.

" My remarks on the Bode's law fall in the Philosophy of

Meaning of Planetary Distances 177

absolute Mechanics, so far as one attempts to elaborate it
systematically in a similar manner. The law of the distances
from Mercury stands for the Substrate or the conclusion of
the sixth cycle within this Philosophy, the Keplerian laws for
the seventh cycle. The import of the remaining three cycles
is shortly the realisation that the system of universal
gravitation illustrates the self-actualisation of the Notion
at the stage of Indifference. And, therefore, in order to
remove the shortcomings of the Bode's law, we must view
the distances of the planets from the Sun as an outward
embodiment of those distinctions w^hich are essential
moments of every act of Thought, In short, we arrive
at the conclusion that the system of planetary distances
from the Sun must bear witness to the definition of the true.
And they can bear such a witness only so far as they are taken
in the sense of ordinal numbers of logical categories with
respect to their order in the Objective Logic (§220, Note).

"Well, now, the mean distance of Mercury (35,392,000
miles or 3-87 for i = 9,143,000 miles) refers to Becoming ;
that of Venus (7-23) to Quahty ; that of Earth (10) to
Being-within-self ; that of Mars (15-22) to Being-for-other
or Being-in-itself ; that of Planetoids (22-34) to the dia-
lectic of the Finite and its Transition into the self-repellent
One ; that of Jupiter (52-03) to the estabhshing of the
bad Infinitude as it is in truth (§207) ; finally, that of
Saturn (96) to absolute Actuality.

" Leaving for the time being the distances of Uranus and
Neptune out of the question and taking notice that the
distances of Mercury and Venus point to the tw'o main
moments of the first act of Thought, we find that the
intelligible whole of the notions singled out by the distances
of Earth, Mars, Planetoids, Jupiter and Saturn does,
indeed, embody the already familiar definition of the
true. Earth stands for the true in the sense of Something
as such. Mars for the distinguishment of the true within
itself. Planetoids for the other as such which the true
establishes of its own self, Jupiter for the conclusion of
the true in the Other with its own self (for its arriving in
the Other at its own self) , Saturn for the final self-actualisa-
tion of the true in and for itself.

178 A Holiday with a Hegelian

" Notice that the fifth and sixth acts of Thought are not
represented in the definition of the true. This is obviously
due to the fact that the mediation whereby the Notion
verifies to itself its own Freedom is practically concluded
in the dialectic of the inverted Relation. Determination
of Reflection relates itself to the Other in its own self
(§313), hence, so far as the definition of the true em-
phasises the Becoming of Otherwiseness, i.e. its arising
(in the Being-for-other), fixing (in the Finite, the fixed
Negation) and suspending (in the affirmatively present
Beyond of the inverted relation), it takes no account of
Reflection, but connects the conclusion of the inverted
Relation at once with the conclusion of the Objective
Logic.

" Turning now our attention to Uranus and Neptune,
their distances ought to exemplify the notional meaning
of Saturn. Saturn stands for the conclusion of the Ob-
jective Logic ; hence, for the actually established nature
of the Notion, so far as it is established as Possibility, Con-
tingency and Necessity whilst remaining in this distinction
one and the same whole. The moments of the Notion
fall, however, in Nature apart from one another. Saturn
stands, therefore, properly only for one moment of the
Notion, or it is followed by two further planets. These
two planets must needs be only formally distinguished
from Saturn and the formal distinction can have here
only the meaning of numbering. That is to say, the
distances of Saturn, Uranus and Neptune should, on
logical grounds, form the series i, 2, 3. And such indeed
is the case."

CHAPTER XVII
OUR DESTINY

A VAILING myself of a pause on Dr. Veverka's part,
■^~*' I asked him Avhether he could explain also the
meaning of the number of days in planetary years or of
the comparative sizes of planetary diameters.

" Well," he said, " I have got reason to assert that the
intelligible whole of the number of days in planetary yea.Ys
amounts to a negative version of the definition of the true.
On the whole, however, it is in this respect as in mathe-
matics : it is easy to explain simple operations, but the
explanation of complex formulae loses itself, as it were, in
the element of fancy. And since the proper object of
Philosophy is Truth, its interest vanishes pari passu with
the coming of figurate and fanciful conceptions to the
front. Moreover, Contingency, too, must have its legiti-
mate play in the solar system (§550, Note).

" It is, however, necessary to realise that in thus giving
up the pretence to explain problems which particularly
appeal to the ordinary consciousness. Philosophy is far
from confessing its impotence to penetrate to the very
bottom of things. That which Philosophy gives thus up
concerns simply the standpoint of external Reflection
alone : the determination of mere Appearance which is
of no philosophical interest ! A problem set up by the
external Reflection invariably implies a giving up of the
standpoint of the Notion, a degradation of the true Infinite
to the bad Infinite, and Philosophy refuses to let pass
such a degradation, and to entangle itself in a problem
which is ab initio irrational. Conception would like to
see how the World is created ; how the Infinite limits itself
to the Finite ; how Matter and Life enter into Existence,

179

i8o A Holiday with a Hegelian

how this Earth looked a milhon or a biUion of years ago
and how it will look a million or a billion of years hence,
etc. ; but Philosophy is concerned with the eternal Now,
with the eternal self-actuahsation of the Idea ; hence, the
problems of Conception do not exist for it. Or it realises
in them only a striving, on the part of Conception, to return
into the properly human element, that of Thought, since
Thought is man's determinateness.

"As I have pointed out to you on the very first day of
our acquaintance, Thought opposes itself only to its own
self, not to things as they appear to the ordinary conscious-
ness. So far, then, as the ordinary Ego asks for the Origin
of things, or wishes to account for the how they come to be
there, it voices only its premonition of the standpoint of
the Notion which continues to sway it all through its fit
of rational self-obhvion, just because Thought mediates
itself in its otherwiseness with its own self and bears wit-
ness to its own nature in our instinctively logical nature.
The Idea is eternal self-activity, absolute negativity, self-
discernment and self-recollection, or self-paralysis and
self-actualisation ; and so far as it is eternally a self-
pre-establishing activity, there is no beginning and no
end to its phenomenological display. It is an eternal
reproduction of its own self, and, therefore, transcends
mere duration in Time.

"The evolution in Nature and human Life is, therefore,
only one-sidedly a matter of Time. From the standpoint
of Finitude there is Progress, but the Progress is eternally
bent back to its beginning, amounting to the alternating
determination of the Finite and Infinite. The end of
evolution is perfect Self-knowledge ; but that which comes
thus to be known is realised to have been the first, to have
only revealed its own depth, to have only examined its
own eternal self. Whereas we, at first, argue that the
Eternal is because the Finite is : ultimately we realise
that the Infinite alone is the true Being ; that our develop-
ment amounts to the mediation, by means of which
Thought verifies to itself its own unity of Being and
Essence. Subjectivity and Objectivity appear to us, first
of all, as an irreconcilable antithesis — o\ving to the

Our Destiny i8i

eternally arising Judgment (self-disparting) of the Idea ;
but the antithesis comes to the Ground, and the Ground
is realised to be rather the Non-established which establishes
itself in the course of evolution. Caught in the circle of the
Conditions constituting the real PossibiHty of the Actual
(which is in itself the Notion), Time looms large on our
mental horizon, but ultimately our temporal experience
appears only as the Idea's pastime : the play in which
it eternally disports itself ! When one reaches the true
standpoint, one feels as though one had known it always :
its arising under such or such conditions does not affect
the sense of having been it from the very first ! In looking
back, one brings home to oneself that one's development
amounted only to an awakening to the knowledge of what
one truly is, and that the very forgetfulness of this know-
ledge was incidental to the carrying out of an originally
self-imposed task : the task of verifying to oneself one's
Freedom. What a student of the Science of Logic does
deliberately, that very thing is done by everyone in the
course of his phenomenal and intellectual development,
to which development, it must be understood, one remains
subjected even when one has already mastered the Science
of Logic. For Space and Time, and the Necessity which
presses hard on the ordinary man, are not wiped out
through the knowledge of absolute Truth. On the con-
trary, it is this knowledge that makes one reahse the
clearer that the ordinary life with all its limitations is a
necessary presupposition of true Self-consciousness. Where-
as, however, the ordinary man hankers after purely sub-
jective Freedom and allows himself to be oppressed by
adverse circumstances, the true philosopher, in sharing
the common fate as regards his phenomenal embodiment,
the earning of his livehhood, etc., reahses in adverse cir-
cumstances a call to train himself to the point when his
knowledge and comprehension of life will become the
guiding principle of all his actions.

"Truth is sought, primarily, for its own sake ; and, in
this respect, the study of the Science of Logic is the last.
But the Idea voluntarily reveals its depth in the sphere
of Space and Time and makes itself concrete only by means

1 82 A Holiday with a Hegelian

of its return from its own otherwiseness. And although
the study of the Science of Logic amounts already to this
return of the Idea into itself, its established concreteness
implies also that one sliould equally experience its self-
reduction to its manifested actualisation. For this reason
the Knower of absolute Truth must consciously realise
his knowledge also as the first, as the beginning of con-
sciously rational life. Hence, the attainment to the
knowledge of Truth is phenomenally also the beginning
of a training in the practice of the attained knowledge
concerning Nature and human life. The goal is, after all,
to live Truth ; to embody it, so to speak, in one's instincts ;
to manifest consciously what one knows to be true. The
knowledge of Truth, too, is first of all only in itself, and,
consequently, is to be established (s. §500, Note).

" The accomplishment of our destiny, as the Idea returned
into itself, implies, therefore, also a direct experience of
the external World, as a moment of our omu true Self.
And such a direct experience can be reached pheno-
menally only by the development of faculties which, from
the ordinary standpoint, appear utterly abnormal, but,
on second thoughts, are our ordinary faculties established
adequately to their notion. Just as Logic is, at first, only
instinctive with us, but, ultimately, to be studied in its
purity, apart from all sensuous content, so the instinctive
use of our faculties. Perception, Imagination, Associa-
tion of ideas. Memory, etc., is, too, to give way finally
to their conscious exercise independently of the limitations
attaching to their instinctive use.

' ' To give an illustration : A cubical block of 27 variously
coloured cubes is apprehended normally only in one of the
24 positions, in which it may be presented to view. If,
however, we train ourselves in visualising every position
at a moment's notice, then, in visualising ultimately the
24 distinct positions in a restless succession, we shall get
the impression, as though the block of 27 cubes were
observed from every side at the same time. It is this result
that led Mr. Hinton to postulate a Space of four dimen-
sions ; and such a postulate springs up in the ordinary
consciousness only because it does not grasp Intelligence

Our Destiny 183

as the subject and the potentiahty of the objectivity.
Mr. Hinton's experience simply brings home the notional
meaning of Representation, as the recollected or in-
wardised Intuition, when the Intelligence itself is as Atten-
tion its Time and also its Space. At the stage of simple
Perception, Intelhgence identifies itself with its objectivity
by means of the ordinary five senses, giving to things an
apparent self-subsistence in Space and Time. But since
the world of Appearance is Intelligence's own self-pre-
establishing, it recollects itself in the scattered manifoldness
of its immediate In-itselfness and, in advancing to the
Representation of the external objectivity, demonstrates
itself as a night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world
of infinitely many images and representations without
being in consciousness. ' Such a grasp of intelligence,'
saj^s Hegel in a note to §453, Enc, ' is from the one point
of view the universal postulate, which bids us treat the
notion as concrete, in the way we treat, e.g. the germ
as affirmatively containing, in virtual possibility, all the
qualities that come into existence in the subsequent
development of the tree. Inabihty to grasp a universal
like this, which, though intrinsically concrete, still con-
tinues simple, is what led people to talk about special
fibres and areas as receptacles of particular ideas. It was
felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things
have a local habitation peculiar to itself. But whereas
the reversion of the germ from its existing specialisations
to its simplicity in a purely potential existence takes place
only in another germ, — the germ of the fruit ; intelligence
qua intelligence shows the potential coming to free exist-
ence in its development, and yet at the same time collecting
itself in its inwardness. Hence from the other point of
view intelligence is to be conceived as this sub-conscious
mine, i.e. as the existent universal in which the different
has not yet been realised in its separations. And it is
indeed this potentiality which is the first form of univers-
ality offered in mental Representation.'

"As you see, this characterisation of Representation fits
in with all that may be said on the subject of Clairvoyance.
All that is necessary to identify Remembrance with

184 A Holiday with a Hegelian

consciously practised Clairvoj^ance is to give prominence
to the factor of universality in the doing of Intelligence
at this stage. Similarly, the psychometrical faculty is the
full manifestation of the ordinary Association of Ideas,
or the materialising or dematerialising capacity that of
productive Fancy. Although, however, I greet in these
so-called occult faculties the manifestation of the Might
of the Notion, I am far from encouraging their development
previous to sound logical training, because they can be
developed in this case only at the price of mental stulti-
fication, if not at a direct risk of imbecility. Of course, it
is another thing when the occult faculties are developed,
or rather manifest sua sponte, subsequently to a sound
logical training. In this case, one only experiences what
one already fully understands ; and occult development
becomes only then a necessary moment of full self-realisa-
tion. In short, the attainment to the knowledge of absolute
Truth must be put before mere phenomena-mongering.
" And, of course, I am all the time implying that the ac-
complishment of our destiny necessitates Reincarnation.
I have already referred to this notion the very first day of
our acquaintance. But it is only now that you may be
better able to appreciate its logical background. Needless
to say, I do not refer to Transmigration of a ready-made
Soul. What has in this respect philosophical interest con-
cerns, in Hegel's words {History of Philosophy, in connection
with the discussion of Pythagoras, 2, d, 3) : ' " the
eternal Idea " of the Metempsychosis, as the inner all-
pervading Notion ; the oriental unity w'hich is the principle
of all formation.' In Transmigration, ' we have not this
sense ; at most only its adumbration. As to a definite
soul migrating through all forms as a Thing, it must be
pointed out, firstly, that the Soul is not a " Thing " in the
image of the Leibnitzian Monad, which becomes, perhaps,
as a bubble in a cup of coffee, a sentient, thinking Soul ;
secondly, such an empty identity of the Soul as Thing
would have no interest with respect to Immortality.'
The Reincarnation I am speaking of is, indeed, the eternal
Idea of Metempsychosis. I — and Hegel — identify human
spirit with the Idea returned from its Otherwiseness in

Our Destiny 185

Nature into itself. Nature, as I have already made you
understand, is an objective illustration of the dialectic
whereby the Idea establishes its own Freedom, after having
freely assumed the disguise of natural forms. Just as the
Objective Logic is ultimately realised as a presupposition
of the positive self-exposition of the Notion in the Sub-
jective Logic : so Nature, too, culminates in the return of
the Idea from its self-begotten Otherwiseness into itself ;
and the Idea thus returned into itself is the existing Notion :
the Ego. Our development is the development of the
Notion in the Subjective Logic.

" Just as natural forms may be presented as an objective
counterpart of the system of the Objective Logic, so our
own constitution and interests are a faithful objective
counterpart (or existence) of the spontaneously developing
Notion. The necessity for such counterparts lies in the
very nature of Thought as what discerns itself within itself,
establishes itself as an Other, returns in this Other into
itself and thus is for itself. So far as the Science of Logic
is not only the last, but also the first of the philosophical
sciences, the Objective Logic has equally the significance
of the second step of mediation in the whole system of the
Idea (the first step referring to the development of the
ordinary consciousness), the Subjective Logic of the third
step. Nature of the fourth step, the Subjective Spirit of the
fifth step, the Objective Spirit of the sixth step, and the
Absolute Spirit of the seventh step. Thus the thinking
consideration of our own nature as individuals is a concrete
restatement of the first part of the Subjective Logic. All
that concerns our body, soul and spirit or Reason illustrates
nodes of the free exposition of the Subjective Notion with
the same exactness as is the case with Nature, as an
illustration of the nodes of the Objective Logic. We are the
Idea in its immediacy as the Subjective Notion, and, in this
way, presuppose, in our development, Nature as a moment
of our own Self.

" Nature as such is, as it were, a disbandment of what is
held by our Self in an organic unity : in us, Nature reaches
her truth ; apart from us she is the Null ! She is created
from Nothing ; the self-subsistence of her forms is a Mode

1 86 A Holiday with a Hegelian

of the Notion which is We. In communing with her, we
commune with our own self, so far as this self is at the same
time self-estranged, self-oblivious. The Knower alone is
clearlj;' aware of what Nature truly is and consequently
recognises in her forms his own self-pre-establishing
activity. He knows what it is to see, to hear, to smell, etc. ;
he knows what it is to remember, to imagine ; hence, to him
alone Nature is unveiled and deposed from her supposed
grandeur to the rank of a more or less grotesque refraction
of his own self — as is the case in a nightmare or an absurd
dream. True, there is a rational skeleton at the bottom
of her forms, but this skeleton is covered with rags of
empty reflection, of thoughtlessness. Spirit feels at home
in the realm of pure Thought alone ; hence, the sphere
of the thoughtless disbandment of spiritual autonomy, of
self-abandonment, has no attraction for it. One can get
enthusiastic over Nature only so long as one does not
comprehend the meaning of the saying that God must
be worshipped in Spirit and Truth alone. The true
worship of God is to think, and in order to know
what thinking means one must study the Science of
Logic.

' ' Now, the Science of Logic proves that there is a super-
sensuous World, and that this and the other World are
in Essential Relation. In connection with the dialectic
of the Substance we learn that its subsisting-in-and-for-
itself is such a subsisting that it is the immediate vanishing
and becoming of the absolute Illusion within itself, or
Accidentality. And the movement of Accidentality ex-
presses in each of its moments the essential Becoming of the
totality of Being and Essence, as a peaceful arising of the
total Substance. And since we come certainly at least under
the head of Accidentality, you may realise already on the
authority of the Objective Logic that every Ego must bear
witness to the essential Becoming of the totality of Being
and Essence. The Subjective Logic presupposes the Ob-
jective Logic as the own negative self-exposition of the
Notion, and this presupposing means, with respect to our
development, that we establish our Freedom only by means
of the experience of the essential Becoming of the totaUty

Our Destiny 187

of Being and Essence (of this and the other World), which
experience impHes Reincarnation.

" ' Tlie process of spiritual self-reahsation,' says Hegel
himself in the close of his Phenomenology , ' exhibits a linger-
ing movement and succession of minds, a gallery of images,
each of which, equipped with the complete wealth of mind,
only seems to linger because the Self has to penetrate and
to digest this wealth of its Substance. As its perfection lies
in coming to know what its substance is, this knowledge
is its self-involution in which it deserts its outward existence
and surrenders its shape to recollection. Thus self-involved,
it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness : but in that
night its vanished Being is preserved, and that Being, thus
in Idea preserved — old, but now new-born of the Spirit —
is the new sphere of Being, a new World, a new phase of
Spirit. In this new phase it has again to begin afresh, and
from the beginning, and again nurture itself to maturity
from its own resources, as if for it all that preceded were
lost, and it had learned nothing from the experience of the
earlier minds. Yet is that recollection a preservation of
experience : it is the quintessence and in fact a higher form
of the substance. If, therefore, this new mind appears to
count on its own resources, and to start quite fresh and
blank, it is at the same time on a higher grade that it starts.'

" True, this passage was not \\Titten expressly in support
of the idea of Reincarnation, but the idea is there all the
same. So far as it is objected that Hegel did not commit
himself openly to a belief in Reincarnation, no, nor to
that in post-mortem existence, the reply is that it is quite
thinkable that he himself did not penetrate the full depth
of all that he propounded in the Science of Logic and else-
where. According to §163, Enc, ' it is not we who frame
the notions. The Notion is not something which is
originated at all. ... It is a mistake to imagine that the
objects which form the content of our mental ideas come
first and that our subjective agency then supervenes, and
by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and by colligating
the points possessed in common by the objects, frame
notions of them. Rather the Notion is the genuine first ;
and things are what they are through the action of the

1 88 A Holiday with a Hegelian

notion, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them.
In religious language we express this by saying that God
created the world out of nothing.' That is to say, we are
only the mouth-piece of the Idea, and, consequently, it is
one thing to voice the Nature of Thought, as is done in
the Science of Logic, and another thing to realise the full
meaning of what the Notion thus reveals of itself. The
standpoint of absolute Idealism is already implied in
Kant's Criiic of Pure Reason — in his Unity of Apperception
— yet it has taken Fichte and Shelling, before the standpoint
was consciously grasped by Hegel. Even illiterate people
say often things which would do honour to the deepest
philosopher. To grasp what the Notion is revealing of
itself in the simplest mind is precisely the task of Philo-
sophy. For this reason, the study and even a passable
comprehension of the import of the Science of Logic is
also only the beginning of a subsequent endeavour to
reconsider carefully every otherwise already quite familiar
turn of dialectic in its bearing on the most trivial ex-
periences. Those who fancy that a ready grasp of the
Science of Logic means a full stop to all further development,
that henceforth one has nothing to do, are very much
mistaken. There is no beginning and no end to the
infinite mediation of the Notion through itself and with
itself. One need not be afraid of ever being reduced to
dolce far niente. By losing one's personal life, one enters
Life eternal. And so you see it is no depreciation of Hegel's
depth to say that he himself left very much unsaid and
even unnoticed — even though it be implied in his very
words ! To bring to the front all he omitted to recognise
or discuss is just the work of those who follow in his steps.
The Spirit of the Age does not permit a single individual
to outstrip its phenomenal stage of maturity ; and although,
therefore, pure Thought is within reach at all times, the
gauging of its full depth has a limit in a man bounded by
the phenomenal self-limitation of the Idea, which latter
has equally its cycle of Re-births in the successive
Civilisations.

" Let a man deny Reincarnation or post-mortem existence
and he pits himself against the very nature of Thought.

Our Destiny 189

What becomes then of the moment of mediation, without
which there is no Immediacy ? How is the objector to
account for his own particular stage of development,
especially if he already has the need of pure Knowledge ?
If it is asserted that an individual simply reaps the result
of his ancestors' experience without any subjective con-
tinuity, one degrades human spirit to animal level. We
realise ourselves as one and the same individual through the
changes filhng our phenomenal existence. We speak of
those changes as our experience, our growth, and thus
acknowledge that the principle of Metamorphosis is our
very self ; that our progress is not a passage from nothing
to nothing, but rather the peaceful arising of Self-know-
ledge. Consequently, it is mere thoughtlessness to view
our subjectivity from the standpoint of an animal, i.e. to
degrade ourselves to a subjectivity which has not ^-et
reached the level of the subjective Spirit, and therefore
does not yet assert itself as the principle of Metamorphosis.
The Idea is thus denied the right to individualise itself,
whilst yet it de facto is individuahsed in us. And it passes
equally unnoticed that, from such an inhuman standpoint,
W'e are simply what we are, i.e. that personal wish for
development is absurd, since it amounts to an assertion of
one's Self as the principle of growth. There is then a
yawning chasm between God and man, and the talk of our
human destiny, of our rights and duties, loses all sig-
nificance (and, as a matter of fact, is treated as mere
chatter by modern fatalists !). If the Idea chooses to step
forth — as Self-knowledge — in this man, leaving the rest to
die in stupidity, that is its own concern ! In short, the
Idea is thus presented in the light of the capricious God
of old. Our Freedom, the significant feature of Christianity,
is denied and the status of slaves by birth is again to the
front. It is an impossible standpoint, and it is to be de-
plored that Hegel is often, by some strange misunderstand-
ing, used as a peg for it. Hegel whose fundamental
category is Freedom !

" Let me conclude with the following beautiful passage
from the Philosophy of Religion : ri^^^.

" ' Whatever excites our doubts and alarms, all grief and

190 A Holiday with a Hegelian

all anxiety, all that the petty fields of finitude can offer
to attract us, we leave behind on the shoals of time : and
as the traveller on the highest peak of a mountain range,
removed from every distinct view of the earth's surface,
quietly lets his vision neglect all the restrictions of the
landscape and the world ; so in the pure region of faith
man, lifted above the hard and inflexible reality, sees it
with his mind's eye reflected in the rays of the mental sun
to an image where its discords, its lights and shades, are
softened to eternal calm. In this region flow the waters of
forgetfulness, from which Psyche drinks and in which she
drowns all her pain : and the darknesses of this life are here
softened to a dream-image, and transfigured into a mere
setting for the splendours of the Eternal.' "

The End

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