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Bequest or 
Irving Kane Pond 


Oa/- fjtJT 

The House of Hohenzollern 


The Hapsburg Monarchy 

Original^ published in 

The New York Evening Post and 
The New York Nation 


Published by 
The New York Evening Post Co. 

Copyright 1917, New York Evening Post Co. 



r. The House of Hohenzollem .... 5 


BismiEirck's Neglected PoKcies • . • 23 
t The Vision of a Central Europe . . 33 

Austria's Opportunity 59 

The Future of Bohemia 67 

Hungary and the Fall of Tisza • . • 81 
The Poles of Austria 95 

The House of HohenzoUern 

[From The New York Nation, March 22, 1917.] 

T N all discussions of the fate of Ger- 
-*- many in case of her ultimate defeat, 
the question of the attachment of the 
people to the HohenzoUern dynasty plays 
an important part. That Prussian loyalty 
will be equal to almost any test admits 
scarcely of doubt, but the question natur- 
ally suggests itself, Will other subjects 
of the Empire, notably South Germans, 
remain unshaken in their devotion to a 
dynasty that is responsible, as all Germans 
must eventually recognize, for the most 
disastrous war in history? It is difficult to 
make predictions at the present time, with 
the fortunes of war still trembling in the 
balance. One may safely say, however, 
that from the establishment of the present 
Empire to the outbreak of the war, every 
non-Prussian has been, first of all, a 
Saxon, Bavarian, Wiirttemberger, etc., 
and only secondarily a German. We have 
on this point the highly instructive cor- 

roboration of so excellent an authority as 
Prince Bismarck. He says, in the thir- 
teenth chapter of his "Recollections": 

Never, not even at Frankfort, did I 

doubt that the key to German politics was 
to be found in princes and dynasties, not 
in publicists, whether in parliament and 
the press or on the barricades. ... 
In order that German patriotism be 

active and effective, it needs dependence 
on a dynasty. Independent of dynasty, 
patriotism, as a practical matter, rarely 
reaches its full height. . . . It is as 
a Prussian, a Hanoverian, a Wiirttem- 
berger, a Bavarian, or Hessian, rather 
than as a German, that he is disposed to 
give unequivocal proof of patriotism. 
The German love of the Fatherland has 
need of a prince on whom it can concen- 
trate its attachment. Suppose that all the 
German dynasties were suddenly deposed ; 
there would then be no likelihood that the 
German national sentiment would suffice 
to hold all Germans together, from the 
point of view of international law, amid 
the friction of European politics, even in 
the form of federated Hanse towns and 
imperial rural conmiunes ( "Reichsdorf - 
er") . The Germans would fall a prey to 

nations more closely welded together if 
they once lost the tie which rests in the 
sense of the common importance of their 

Bismarck was never imder any illusions 
as to the feeling of non-Prussian Germans 
towards the HohenzoUern dynasty. After 
the war of 1866 he labored hard to con- 
vince King William that it would be a 
serious mistake to punish Bavaria by 
forcing her to give up Anspach and Bay- 
reuth to Prussia, just as it would be to 
compel Austria to give up part of her 
possessions. "I gauged," he wrote, "the 
proposed acquisitions from Austria and 
Bavaria by asking myself whether the in- 
habitants, in case of future war, would 
remain faithful to the King of Prussia 
after the withdrawal of the Prussian of- 
ficials and troops and continue to accept 
commands from him; and I had not the 
impression that the population of these 
districts, which had become habituated to 
Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would 
be disposed to meet HohenzoUern predi- 

All this is well known. South-German 
dislike of Prussian ways is as old as the 
history of the Electors of Brandenburg 
and as recent as the present war, with its 
acknowledged friction between Prussian 
and non-Prussian commanders of the 
Central armies. The Hohenzollerns have 
ever ruled with a heavy hand, in peace as 
in war, and they do not go out of their 
way to enlist the sympathies of non-Prus- 
sians.. Nor is it in politics and in warfare 
only that the antagonism between the 
Prussians and the people of other parts 
of Germany has found expression. Ger- 
man literature gives abundant proof that 
the Hohenzollern dynasty and the liberal 
sentiment of Germany have ever been far 
apart. None of the rulers of the house of 
Hohenzollern befriended German poets, 
with the single exception of the ill-starred 
Frederick III (while still Crown Prince) , 
unless their verses glorified Prussian 
deeds. The greatest of Prussian rulers 
ignored contemptuousljr the greatest of 
German poets, and Les^ing^ and Heine had 
as little cause to look kindly upon Berlin 


as Goethe. Goethe visited the Prussian 
capital with Karl August of Weimar in 
May, 1778, and his impressions of Berlin 
life and of the surroundings of the King 
were far from favorable. "I have got 
quite close to old Fritz," he wrote, ^'having 
seen his gold, his silver, his statues, his 
apes, his parrots, and heard his own curs 
twaddle about the great man." The King 
and the poet had nothing in common. 
Frederick's judgment of Goethe's "Gotz 
von Berlichingen" was as follows: "Voili 
un Goetz de Berlichingen qui parait siu* 
la scene, imitation detestable de ces mau- 
vaises pieces anglaises, et le parterre ap- 
plaudit et demande avec enthousiasme la 
repetition de ces degoutantes platitudes." 
Frederick the Great cared only for French 
savants; he made one President of the 
Academy of Sciences, another Librarian. 
Gk)ethe was not at all in sympathy with 
Frederick's plan of putting the federation 
of German sovereigns on a strong military 
basis. He feared not so much Prussia as 
the Prussian King, who had no considera- 
tion for small states like Saxe- Weimar. 

In the summer of 1780 he spoke in the 
Aristophanic little play "Die Vogel," of 
"the Black Eagle with his ever-ready 

Under Frederick's successors the state 
of affairs in Prussia was even less to 
Gk)ethe's liking, Frederick William II 
discouraged the development of science 
and free speech by every means in his 
power. Kant barely escaped being de- 
prived of his professorship. The next 
King, Frederick William III, and his 
Queen, ostentatiously ignored Goethe on 
their visits to Weimar. 

Schiller did not fare so ill in his rela- 
tions with the Hohenzollerns, but he was 
not spared by the Berlin bureaucracy. In 
the last year of his life he wished for a 
wider sphere of activity than was afforded 
him in Weimar and Jena. He visited 
Berlin in May, 1804, and Queen Luise 
was seemingly anxious to have him settle 
there. On his return to Weimar he wrote 
to the royal Cabinet Counsellor Beyme 
that, while he found himself unable to 
leave Weimar permanently, he should be 


willing, under certain conditions, to spend 
a few months every year in Berlin, but 
no answer to his letter was vouchsafed him. 
Lessing had at various times gone to 
Berlin in the hope of finding there some 
suitable position. At one time, in 1765, 
he seemed to have some prospect of get- 
ting the royal librarianship. He was pro- 
posed to the King by one of his French 
favorites, Colonel Guichard, but Freder- 
ick, who had become prejudiced against 
Lessing through Voltaire's version of a 
previous quarrel between the two, refused 
to consider the suggestion. The position 
was oflFered to Winckelmann, but he de- 
clined it on account of the low salary, and 
Lessing's name was once more brought 
forward by Guichard. Frederick there- 
upon declared with vehemence that a 
Frenchman would get the place, and so a 
Frenchman did. Lessing felt the disap- 
pointment keenly. He wrote to his father 
later on: "I left Berlin after the only 
thing that I had so long hoped for and 
that had long been held out to me was 
denied me." It is safe to say, however, 


that Frederick would never have found in 
Lessing a pliant employee, such as he liked 
to have near him. Lessing had previously, 
in 1764, declined the offer of a professor- 
ship of rhetoric in the University of 
Konigsberg because of the condition that 
he was to deliver annually a eulogy of 
the King. 

It is interesting to contrast with these 
experiences of Lessing in Prussia the at- 
titude of the Austrian authorities towards 
contemporaneous men of letters. Lessing 
wrote to Nicolai: "Let some one dare to 
write in Berlin as freely as Sonnen- 
fels is writing in Vienna." As early 
as 1711 Emperor Charles VI had made 
Leibnitz an Aulic Councillor and a baron 
of the Empire, and when the philosopher 
came to Vienna in 1718 and submitted to 
the Emperor a draft of the Peace of 
Utrecht, he received an annual pension of 
2,000 florins, which Charles offered to 
double if Leibnitz agreed to settle in the 
Austrian capital. 

The hst of literary men who suffered 
from Prussian reactionism is a long one. 


Bome, Herwegh, and Hoffmann von 
Fallersleben, among others, showed that 
there was mutual dislike, but no one em- 
bodied his hatred of Prussia in such flam- 
ing words as Heine ; witness the preface to 
his "Franzosische Zustande," After speak- 
ing of Mettemich's cynical but open de- 
fiance of liberalism and the mulish con- 
sistency of the Emperor Francis, he pro- 
ceeded : 

As regards Prussia we may speak in a 
different tone. Here at least we are not 
restrained by respect for the sacredness of 
the head of the German Empire. The 
learned minions on the banks of the Spree 
may dream of a great Emperor of the 
house of Borussia and proclaim Prussian 
hegemony, with all its glorious lordliness, 
but thus far the long fingers of the Hohen- 
zollem have not yet succeeded in grasping 
the crown of Charlemagne and dump- 
ing it into the same bag with so many 
Polish and Saxon jewels. . . . 

It is true that recently many friends of 
the Fatherland have desired the enlarge- 
ment of Prussia and hoped to see in the 
kings the masters of a united Germany. 


They have held out a bait to patriots and 
talked of Prussian liberalism, and the 
friends of liberty have begun to look con- 
fidingly towards the Linden of Berlin, 
but as for me, I have never shared their 
confidence. On the contrary, I watched 
with anxiety the Prussian eagle, and while 
others spoke with so much warmth of how 
this bold eagle turned his eye toward the 
sun, I watched all the more carefully his 
claws, I did not trust this Prussian, this 
tall and canting white-gaitered hero, with 
his wide mouth and his rapacious stomach 
and his corporal's stick, which he first 
dipped in holy water before laying it on. 
I disliked this philosophic military despot- 
ism, its mixture of small beer, lies, and 
sand. Repulsive beyond expression was to 
me this Prussia, this stiff, hypocritical 
Prussia, this Tartuffe among the nations. 

Heine allowed himself in his verse to 

go even further in denouncing Prussia 

and the house of HohenzoUem, but 

though as a poet and as a wit he abused 

his double license, he but over-emphasized 

the grievances of liberal Gtermany. There 

is perhaps in all literature no similar in- 


stance of a dynasty incurring such fierce 
hatred on the part of one of the greatest 
writers of the nation. 

Whatever concessions any ruler of the 
house of HohenzoUem, since the days of 
Frederick the Great, made to liberal ideas 
were wrung from him by bitter political 
necessity. The humiliating peace of Til- 
sit forced Frederick William III to adopt 
the reform plans of Stein and Harden- 
berg, but the stifling period of reaction 
that followed the War of Liberation, in 
the latter reign of the King and that of his 
successors, Frederick William IV and the 
Prince Regent (afterwards William I), 
was unrelieved, down to the Revolution 
of 1848, by any breath of freedom. Prus- 
sia was ready for Bismarck. From the 
outset there was no thought in his mind 
of making Prussia great in order to make 
her free. He sounded the keynote of his 
future policy in a speech in the Prussian 
Diet on December 8, 1850, when he said: 
"According to my conviction, Prussian 
honor does^not consist in Prussia's play- 


ing the Don Quixote all over Germany 
for the benefit of mortified parliamentary 
celebrities, who consider their local con- 
stitution in danger. I look for Prussian 
honor in Prussia's abstinence before all 
things from every shameful union with 
democracy/' Bismarck's ideal was a 
great Prussia and only incidentally a 
great Grermany; a liberal Prussia or a 
liberal Germany was never a part of his 
programme. In 1868, shortly after his 
accession to the Prussian Ministry of 
State, he wrote to Count von der Goltz, 
his successor as Ambassador to France: 

"The pursuit of the phantom of popular- 
ity in Germany, which we have been car- 
rying on for the last forty years, has cost 
us our position in Germany and in 
Eiu*ope, and we shall not win it back by 
allowing ourselves to be carried away by 
the stream, persuaded that we are direct- 
ing its course, but only by standing firmly 
upon our legs, and being first of all a 
Great Power and a German Federal 
State afterwards." 


Bismarck remained true to his policy 
throughout his rule, yet when all its fruits 
had been garnered in, and he was surveying 
the past from his retreats at Friedrichsruh 
and Varzin, a gnawing doubt as to the 
permanency of the structure he had erect- 
ed overcame him. "History shows," he 
wrote, "that in Germany it is the Prussian 
stock whose individual character is most 
strongly marked, and yet no one could 
decisively answer the question whether, 
supposing the Hohenzollem dynasty and 
all its rightful successors to have passed 
away, the political cohesion of Prussia 
would survive. Is it quite certain that 
the eastern and western divisions, that the 
Pomeranians and Hanoverians, the na- 
tives of Holstein and Silesia, of Aachen 
and Konigsberg, would then continue as 
they now are, armed together in the indis- 
soluble unity of the Prussian state?" 

Many a G^erman student of history who 
ponders at the present time the doubt as 
to the stability of the HohenzoUern dy- 
nasty expressed by Bismarck will recall 
the voice of a far-sighted German, the his- 


torian Gervinus, who, when the unifica- 
tion of Germany was an accomplished 
fact, wrote an open letter to the Prussian 
King, "An das Preussische Konigshaus" 
(published posthumously in 1872), in 
which he impressively argued that the an- 
nexation of G^erman lands by Prussia 
after the war of 1866 had disgraced the 
house of Hohenzollem, and that it car- 
ried the seeds of future evil with it. All the 
glories of the war of 1870 did not blind 
Gervinus to the dangers threatening a 
Germany founded on militarism and not 
on justice and fair dealing. He foresaw 
with dread the creation of a military state 
such as the world had not seen even when 
Napoleon was at the height of his power. 
"We have,'* he wrote, "as regards power 
y^' taken the place of France, but we shall 

draw upon ourselves all the hatred that 
France incurred." The following words 
have acquired an added impressiveness 
through the events of the past two years: 
"Is it not a fact that, at the time of the 
Luxemburg complications, when the 
secret treaties of alliance between Prussia 


and the South German states were made 
public, the anger and suspicion of all Gov- 
ernments were aroused when it was shown 
that one day before the Peace of Prague 
a principal article of the Treaty had been 
violated? Can we ignore the fact that the 
new doctrine, 'Might before right,' sur- 
rounded as it is by all the halo of a bril- 
hant statesmanship, has greatly under- 
mined the hitherto prevailing principle of 
non-intervention among English states- y 
men of the old type?"' 

Developments within the Grerman Em- 
pire since 1871 have justified the appre- 
hensions of those who, like Gervinus, saw 
in the overshadowing importance of Prus- 
sia an ominous menace to the smaller Ger- 
man states. Their privileges as compon- 
ent parts of the German Empire have be- 
come a mere mockery under a Constitu- 
tion which vests the Imperial succession in 
the house of HohenzoUem, with its heredi- 
tary right in the Presidency of the Feder- 
ation, the casting vote of Prussia in case 
of a tie in the Federal Council, a perma- 
nent Prussian majority in the Reichstag, 


and the prerogative of the King of Prus- 
sia as German Emperor in calling, ad- 
journing, and proroguing the Reichstag, 
Parliamentary government in the real 
sense of the word has become impossible 
under a system which leaves the Imperial 
Ministers independent of the will of the 
Reichstag and relegates the Chancellors 
of the Empire to the position of mere tools 
of a Hohenzollern King. A further ex- 
pansion of Prussia could only take place 
with a corresponding loss of prestige on 
the part of the smaller states. What, 
these states must have asked themselves 
more than once since the outbreak of the 
war, will be our gain if Prussian general- 
ship triumphs? It is not too early to 
N/' raise the question as to whi^t will be their 
portion if Prussian supremacy ends in 
military disaster. 

In any case, the day camiot be far dis- 
tant when the intrinsic rights of Prussia 
to the part within the Empire she has 
arrogated to herself will be seriously ques- 
tioned by descendants of those German 
stocks which contributed so largely to the 


power of the old Germanic Empire during 
the thousand years of its existence, 
Franconians, Saxons, Luxemburgs, ^ 
Hohenstauf en, as well as Hapsburgs, fur- 
nished the great rulers of the Holy Roman 
Empire long before a HohenzoUem was 
dreamed of as a possible Emperor, In 
these days of dynastic upheavals in other 
countries the experience of G^ermany as an 
hereditary monarchy within less than fifty 
years cannot be thrown into the scales as 
against the history of an elective Empire 
of a thousand years, 

Prussia's supremacy as the German 
Kulturstaat far excellence has been too \/ 

long assumed by militarists and Junkers, 
and too easily acquiesced in by the rest y 
of Germany, Even in a purely military 
sense, Prussia, according to Bismarck 
himself, has long ceased to be as produc- 
tive of great talents as was the case in the 
time of Frederick the Great, "Our most 
successful commanders," he wrote in his 
Memoirs, "Bliicher, Gneisenau, Moltke, 
Gtoeben, were not Prussians originally, 
nor, in the civil administration, were Stein, 


Hardenberg, Motz, and Grolman." The 
list of great Germans in other fields who 
were not Prussians by birth is endless. The 
names of Leibnitz, Liebig, Bopp, Grimm, 
Hegel, Gauss, Ehrenberg, Bach, Wag- 
ner, of Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and 
many others of similar eminence, leap to 
the mind at once. And Diirer and Hol- 
bein, the South Germans, marked the 
climax of all German art long before the 
Mark Brandenburg had become the King- 
dom of Prussia. 

Bismarck's doctrines and Hohenzol- 
lern principles are now being tried in the 
furnace of a world war. Not all that can 
be said, and must justly be said, of Prus- 
sian leadership in the intellectual and ma- 
terial development of Germany can ob- 
scure the patent failure of the Hohenzol- 
V lern dynasty. Prussian hegemony may 
have fed the German mind and body, but it 
has starved the German soul. 





Bismarck's Neglected 


[From The New York Evening Post, April 14, 1917.] 

OINCE the outbreak of the war the 
^^ question has often been asked. What 
would Germany's policy in 1914 have been 
if Bismarck had been alive? Would there 
have been any war at all? In the first 
flush of victory the German people in- 
voked the name of Bismarck as that of a 
patron saint blessing their arms and re- 
joicing in the fruits of his wisdom. Later 
on less was heard of Bismarck's share in 
preparing Germany for this war, and to- 
day his achievements are beginning to be 
viewed in a different light. History is 
not only being made but rewritten. His- 
toriographers ask themselves. Can the 
fame of the man who brought about Ger- 
man unity after three successful wars sur- 
vive unscathed the prodigiously imsuccess- 
ful one that was their result? 


The thought of a powerful military at- 
tack on Germany often haunted Bis- • 
marck in his retirement. The forestalling 
of a coalition against Germany was to be 
the crowning work of his diplomacy. Any 
means to that end seemed proper to him. 
He brought about the Triple Alliance, not 
because he considered Austria-Hungary 
and Italy natural or particularly desirable 
allies of Germany, but because he felt that, 
with any two strong military countries 
backing Germany, she could withstand a 
possible coalition of any other two of the 
great Powers against her. Much as he 
had disliked and distrusted Austria all his 
life, he preferred her, on the whole, to 
Russia as an ally against France. But be- 
fore definitely concluding the Triple Al- 
liance, he carefully weighed in the balance 
all the possible combinations against Ger- 
many. Austria's help being assured, he 
felt reasonably safe against an attack by 
both France and Russia. "I should not 
consider,'* he reasoned, "a simultaneous 
attack by our two great neighbor Em- 
pires, even though Italy were not the third 


in the alliance, as a matter of life and 
death,'' but the situation appeared to him 
much more serious if Italy were to threaten 
Austria's possessions on the Adriatic, 
"In that case," he wrote, "the struggle, 
the possibility of which I anticipate, 
would be unequal." And imagining 
France and Austria in a league with 
Russia, "no words," he said, "are needed 
to show how greatly aggravated would be 
the peril of Germany." In other words, 
he could conceive of an attack on Ger- 
many by three Powers as being literally 
a matter of life and death. And reason- 
ing thus, he made sure, as he thought, of 
the friendship of both Austria and Italy. 
Events have proved not so much Bis- 
marck's wisdom as the folly of his suc- 
cessors. It would never have entered his 
mind to create a situation like that which 
confronts Germany to-day, with fourteen 
countries, including the United States, ar- 
rayed against her. He certainly did not 
foresee the possibility of Germany and 
Austria jointly declaring war on Russia 
and France and bringing England into 


the conflict, while forcing Italy to break 
with her partners in the Triple AUiance. 
Bismarck presupposed that Germany 
and Austria would cultivate peace with 
Russia, and judged that their alliance 
"would not lack the support of England/' 
In concluding the alliance with Austria- 
Hungary, Bismarck was under no illusion 
as to the difiiculties inherent in such a 
partnership, Ofiicial statements nowa- 
days overflow with assurances of the most 
complete harmony between the two em- 
pires, Bismarck did not take such an 
idyllic view of an alliance promoted by 
him solely as the result of cold-blooded 

In point of material force — ^he wrote in 
his Memoirs.— ^I held a union with Russia 
to have the advantage. I had also been 
used to regard it as safer, because I placed 
more reliance on traditional dynastic 
friendship, on commimity of conservative 
monarchical instincts, on the absence of 
indigenous political divisions, than on the 
fits and starts of public opinion among the 
Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic popula- 
tion of the monarchy of the Hapsburgs. 


Complete reliance could be placed upon 
the durability of neither union, whether 
one estimated the strength of the dynastic 
bond with Russia, or of the German sym- 
pathies of the Hungarian populace. If 
the balance of opinion in Hungary were 
always determined by sober political cal- 
culation, this brave and independent peo- 
ple, isolated in the broad ocean of Slav 
population, and comparatively insignifi- 
cant in niraibers, would remain constant to 
the conviction that its position can only be 
secured by the support of the German ele- 
ment in Austria and Germany. But the 
Kossuth episode, and the suppression in 
Himgary itself of the German elements 
that remained loyal to the Empire, and 
other symptoms showed that among Hun- 
garian hussars and lawyers self-confidence 
is apt in critical moments to get the better 
of political calculation and self-control. 
Even in quiet times many a Magyar will 
get the gypsies to play to him the song 
"Der Deutsche ist ein Hundsfott" ("The 
German is a blackguard"). 

Glermany, as Bismarck was well aware, 
was not loved either in Russia or in 
Austria-Hungary. "Could anti-German 
rancor," he asked, "acquire in Russia a 



keener edge than it has among the Czechs 
in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of 
the provinces comprised within the earlier 
German Confederation, and the Poles in 
Galicia?" Nor did Bismarck consider the 
stability of the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
archy as assured beyond doubt. "The 
factors which must be taken into account," 
he wrote, "are as manifold as is the mix- 
ture of her populations, and to their cor- 
rosive and occasionally disruptive force 
must be added the incalculable influence 
that the religious element may from time 
to time, as the power of Rome wakes or 
wanes, exert upon the directing personal- 
ities." He foresaw that not only Pan- 
Slavism and the Bulgarian, Bosnian, Ser- 
vian, Rumanian, the Czech, and the Polish 
questions, but also the Italian question in 
the Trentino, in Trieste, and on the Dal- 
matian coast, might become dangerous not 
merely as affecting Austria, but as pre- 
cipitating a European crisis. What has 
been so often asserted and as often official- 
ly denied, as to the friction between the 
Gterman- Austrians and the Czech soldiery, 




is clearly foretold in Bismarck's state- 
ment: "In Bohemia the antagonism be- 
tween Germans and Czechs has in some \^ 
places penetrated so deeply into the army 
that the officers of the two nationalities in 
certain regiments hold aloof from one an- 
other, even to the degree that they will not V 
meet at mess." 

Bismarck did not shrink from war if it 
suited his purpose of aggrandizing Grcr- 
many and, above all, Prussia, but he never 
sought war needlessly. "During the time 
that I was in office," he wrote, "I advised 
three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian, and 
the French; but every time I first made 
clear to myself whether the w,ar, if suc- 
cessful, would bring a prize worth the 
sacrifices which every war requires, and 
which are now so much greater than in the 
last century." He considered Germany 
as perhaps the single great Power in 
Europe which had nothing to gain by pro- 
voking war. "We ought to do all we 
can," he said, "to counteract the ill-feeling 
which has been called out through our 


growth to the position of a really great 
Power, by honorable and peaceful use of 
our influence, and by convincing the 
world that a German hegemony in 
Europe is more useful and less partisan 
and also less harmful to the freedom of 
others than that of France, Russia, or 
England." He stated emphatically that 
Germany required no increase of contigu- 
ous territory, and that her only object 
should be to convince other nations of her 
peaceful intentions. "I have followed my 
own prescription," he remarked, "not 
without some personal reluctance, in my 
course towards Spain in the question of 
the Caroline Islands and towards the 
United States in that of Samoa." 

How was it possible, it will be asked, 
that German statesmen of to-day, know- 
ing all about Bismarck's misgivings as to 
the sincerity of the friendship between 
Austria and Germany, and about his 
dread of embroiling the two countries in 
a useless war against France and Russia, 
could enter so light-heartedly upon their 
stupendous venture? The answer is to 



be sought not only in their natural ignor- 
ance of their own limitations, but in the 
example of unscrupulous selfishness and, v 
if need be, cynical, brutality set them by 
their great protagonist during the entire 
course of his career. Lacking his intel- 
lectual force and his unrivalled resource- V/ 
fulness, they thought themselves safe in / 

adopting his tactics and improving upon / (/ 
them. Was it not Bismarck's principle 
that all contracts between great states 
cease to be unconditionally binding as soon 
as they are tested by the struggle for ex- 
istence, and that no great nation will ever 
be induced to sacrifice itself on the altar 
of fidelity to contract? Starting with this 
premise, what could be more logical than 
the invasion of Belgimn, with all that fol- 

Bismarck had no diplomatic scruples of 
any kind, but he knew how to guard his 
diplomatic secrets. His occasional sincer- 
ity in disclosing the past was his best asset 
in making future deceit possible. It is 
quite clear that he never foresaw the pos- 
sibility of a war between the United States 


and Germany, but had he foreseen it he 
never would have resorted to such devices 
as were employed by his successors, the 
agile Biilow and the ponderous Bethmann- 
Hollweg. Biilow was puerile enough to 
imagine that a Deutsch-Amerikanischer 
Nationalbund would forever solidify the 
sentiment of German- Americans against 
their adopted coimtry, and Bethmann- 
HoUweg allowed the ingenious Zimmer- 
mann to concoct his little Mexican-Jap- 
anese scheme. Not such, with all its ter- 
giversations, was Bismarck's foreign 
policy. Woe to the German people that 
they have chosen to disregard its strength 
and to cling to its weakness! 


The Vision of a Central 


[From The New York Nation, December 14, 1916.] 

T^E W polemical books written during the 
'^ present war have called for serious 
criticism. When passion shrieks, reason can 
only be silent. Friedrich Naumann's 
* *Mitteleuropa' ' ( Central Europe. Trans- 
lated by Christabel M. Meredith, Lon- 
don: P. S. King & Son), however, stands 
in some respects in a class by itself. A 
fervent economic plea for Germany's 
future expansion, it is but indirectly con- 
cerned with the present clash of arms and 
ignores international hatreds. The book, 
which has had an extraordinary vogue 
throughout Germany and Austria-Him- 
gary, is now obtainable in an English 
translation (faithful, though by no means 
flawless) to which Prof. W. J. Ashley has 
written an introduction. He speaks of it 
as "far and away the most important book 
that has appeared in Germany since the 


world-conflict began." Such a success 
challenges thought, even aside from the in- 
trinsic merits of the work. It will there- 
fore not be superfluous to examine in de- 
tail the arguments that have made so 
powerful an appeal to German and Aus- 
tro-Hungaridn readers. 

Herr Naumann is a member of the 
Reichstag and author of a number of 
books. His career shows strange muta- 
tions of principle — ^reUgious, political, and 
economic. Originally a Lutheran pastor 
and SociaKstic evangelist, he abandoned 
the pulpit for journalism and politics. He 
founded Die HilfCj and through this 
journal and his book on "Demokratie und 
Kaisertum" attempted to reconcile the 
tenets of Social-Democracy with the pre- 
vailing furore for naval and colonial ex- 
pansion. The National- Socialist party 
being unable to obtain representation in 
the Reichstag, Herr Naumann allied him- 
self with the VoUesparteij which derived 
its strength mainly from the middlcrclass 
radicals of southern G^ermany. As an 
ardent free-trader and advocate of certain 


definite legislative measures, he succeeded 
in gaining a seat in the Reichstag, where 
he attempted to fuse several minor radical 
groups into a wing of the Liberal party. 
In a book written at that time, his "Neu- 
deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik," he predicted 
the political and social regeneration of 
Germany through unrestricted intercourse 
with other coimtries. Such was Herr 
Naimaann's past political philosophy ; what 
is his present creed? 

Briefly speaking, Naumann advocates, 
one may say he foretells, as in a prophetic 
vision, a combination — it is nowhere di- 
rectly called an alliance — between the Ger- 
man Empire and the Hapsburg Mon- 
archy, offensive and defensive, economic 
and military, into which as many neutral 
states as possible may and should, as a mat- 
ter of self-interest, eventually enter. The 
adhesion of Turkey and the Balkan states 
is taken for granted. The advantages of 
such a superstate to the neutral countries 
which are to join their maritime front to 
the territory of the Central Powers, spe- 
cifically to Holland, Greece, Rumania, 


and the Scandinavian countries, are but 
vaguely alluded to — for prudential rea- 
sons dictated by the war. The main pur- 
pose of the formation of this "Central 
Europe" is, as frankly admitted by the 
author, the greater good of the two prin- 
cipal countries, Glermany and Austria- 
Hungary. Without committing himself 
to any definite plan for the organization of 
this vast state, Herr Naumann tentatively 
puts forth a progranmae which he says 
statesmen of the future may modify at 
their pleasure. This includes common re- 
cruiting laws, mutual military inspection, 
a joint committee for foreign affairs, joint 
boards for the control of railways and of 
river navigation, common coins and meas- 
ures, common banking and commercial 
laws, common military expenditures, mu- 
tual liability for national debts, equality of 
customs tariffs, joint collection of customs, 
equal laws for the protection of labor, 
equal laws of association and trust laws, 
etc. There may or may not be eventually 
free trade between Germany and the 
group of states that are to join her, but 


the bond of cohesion between them will 
primarily be a political one. Economic 
considerations will adjust themselves to 
their common political interests. 

In the programme thus outlined the 
need of permanent preparedness for war is 
repeatedly emphasized. Hence regulation 
of the storage of grain becomes a matter 
of paramount importance. This and similar 
measures Herr Naumann would entrust to 
several commissions, which he proposes to 
locate as follows: Budapest is to be the 
grain centre, Prague the centre for all 
treaty matters, Hamburg the centre of the 
maritime trade, Berlin the exchange cen- 
tre, and Vienna the legal centre. But it 
is only after peace has been declared that 
it will be possible to formulate a definite 
programme, and the gist of such a pro- 
gramme can, in Herr Naumann's opinion, 
be simimed up in two words: "better or- 
ganization." It was Prussian organiza- 
tion that paved the way for the successes of 
this war, and if, says he, the opponents of 
Germany like to label the intrinsic con- 
nection between the works of peace and 


those of war as "German miUtarism," they 
are welcome to it. The wholesome effect 
of Prussian military discipline pervades, 
in his view, the whole of Germany from 
top to bottom. 

Enthusiastic to the point of rhapsody as 
Herr Naumann is over his project, he does 
not wholly ignore the difficulties of its exe- 
cution. He realizes that the Government 
of Austria-Hungary may have to be 
argued and cajoled into a partnership in 
which that country is bound to be the 
weaker member. Germany will have to 
make it clear that there is no thought of 
interfering with the internal affairs of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy, and that the deli- 
cate questions of race and language which 
have so long agitated that country would 
be let alone by the Gtermany of Central 

What is to be the geographical extent 
of this powerful congeries of states? It 
is Herr Naumann's ambition to see Cen- 
tral Europe comprise about 5,000,000 
square miles, that is to say, one-tenth of 
the inhabited surface, of the globe. He 


arrives at his estimate by a series of daring 
steps. Starting with the 450,000 square 
miles of Germany and Austria-Hmigary, 
he adds, first, the 900,000 square miles of 
"a number of neighboring European 
states," and then "claims" all of European 
and Asiatic Turkey, thereby swelling the 
figures to 2,500,000 square miles. Add 
the colonies of the German Empire and 
you have 4,000,000 square miles, and "if 
we venture to count in the overseas pos- 
sessions of neighboring states which have 
not yet joined us, we may arrive at ap- 
proximately 5,000,000 square miles" — ^a 
figure which he admits is "somewhat arbi- 
trary." The population of this Central 
Europe, beginning with the 116,000,000 
inhabitants of the German Empire and 
Austria-Hungary, will, in the manner de- 
scribed, mount up to about 200,000,000, 
or, roughly, one-eighth of the population 
of the globe. 

Fantastic as this programme seems to 
be, it is undeniable that Herr Naumann's 
teachings are spreading, and will have 
to be reckoned with in the future. 


Already Austrian and German trade 
unions have given their adhesion to the 
plan, and even councils of German and 
Austrian Socialists have approved of it. 
So conservative a German economist as 
Professor von SchmoUer is arguing that 
the present time urgently calls for close 
tariff arrangements with Austria-Hun- 
gary, and that "the leading men of nearly 
all classes and parties are gradually meet- 
ing under this flag." Naumann himself 
foresees certain objections within Ger- 
many itself. He fears that his scheme 
will be viewed with suspicion by Prussian 
nobles, the conservative, powerful, and 
domineering (herrschaftsstarke) Old 
Prussian, as well as the "Liberal capital- 
ist," who, though for opposite reasons, 
equally distrusts Austria-Hungary. To 
these two types must be added the "Great- 
er-Germans," whose ideal is a purely Ger- 
manic state, and who are already groaning 
under the burden of the Poles, Danes, and 
French Alsatians of the Empire. 

Herr Naumann, furthermore, realizes 
that the Magyars are not in love with the 


Germans, but he relies on their keen desire 
to retain their supremacy over the Slavs, 
and reasons that they will grasp at any- 
thing Germany may offer them to attain 
their ends. From a purely economic point 
of view, Austria-Himgary and the other 
members of the Central European com- 
bination are to be won over by a system of 
mutual tariff preferences which shall pro- 
tect the industrially weaker countries. 

Herr Naumann, it must be admitted, 
presents his case with considerable skill. 
He writes picturesquely and, in the main, 
clearly and forcibly. His occasional senti- 
mental outbursts, and the studied vague- 
ness to which German writers are so prone, 
but enhance the interest of the book in 
German eyes. He is careful not to burden 
his readers needlessly with statistics. These 
and certain dry historical facts are relegat- 
ed to a separate chapter at the conclusion 
of the book. 

While Naumann's thesis is apparently a 
simple one, he finds it necessary to bolster 
it up with assertions and prophecies of 
various kinds. We meet at the outset with 


the statement that there is no room, at the 
present time, for France in the new Cen- 
tral Europe. Having chosen to ally her- 
self with England, she will, unfortunately 
for her, "in the near future become a 
greater and better Portugal." Yet 
even for her Herr Naumann would 
leave a door open, perhaps only in a 
distant future, for, like so many 
Germans, he professes to harbor no 
ill-feelings towards France. Italy, too, he 
does not consider, for all time to come, nec- 
essarily ineligible to partnership in Central 
Europe, though he cautiously adds, "the 
armies on the Isonzo have the first word." 
Germany's present ally, Turkey, being 
"antiquated" and separated from Central 
Europe, both geographically and national- 
ly, is not hailed with delight as a future 
partner. But Central Europe will eventu- 
ally determine the conditions of its own 
existence. Though Herr Naumann care- 
fully refrains throughout his book from 
speaking harshly of any of the belligerent 
nations, there is an unmistakable Bis- 
marckian flavor in some of his arguments. 


All participants in the Great War must 
feel that neither now nor in the future can 
small or even moderate-sized countries 
have any voice in world politics, "Our 
conceptions of size have entirely changed, 
only very large states can assert their in- 
dividuality, all the little ones live by profit- 
ing from the quarrels of the great, and 
must first ask their permission if they 
would make an unusual move." The world 
thinks, as Cecil Rhodes says, "in contin- 
ents/' A generation, Herr Naumann sur- 
mises, will be required for the task of es- 
tablishing Central Europe, even if peace, 
declared on the basis of victory of the Grcr- 
man- Austrian arms, seals the permanent 
solidarity of the Hapsburgs and Hohen- 
zollems, A shade of doubt as to this soli- 
darity — ^hardly as to the victory itself — 
enters even Herr Naimiann's mind. "The 
question will arise : Are the Ambassadors 
from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest going 
to leave the hall of the National Peace 
Congress as open and honest friends or as 
secret opponents?" If peace is only to 
pave the way for future misunderstand- 


ingSy Europe will face another Vienna 
Congress of 1815. "In that case, for what 
shall we have sacrificed our sons and the 
mutilated Hungarians their limbs?" A 
perplexing question, indeed! As danger- 
ous as the admission that after the conclu- 
sion of peace "we all shall be more careful 
than hitherto to suppress frivolous pretexts 
for war and to strive for a mutual under- 
standing between nations." 

For Herr Naumann, as for every Ger- 
man and Austro-Hungarian, the war be- 
gan "purely as a defensive one," though in 
the same breath he tells us that "in the 
German Empire two ideas had always been 
present in the minds of the people and the 
Government: that sooner or later a break 
with the Czar was bound to come, and that 
some time there would have to be a fight 
with England for the control of the seas. 
The only unexpected thing was that all 
came together with a rush — ^the war in 
France, the war in the East, and the naval 


Leaving aside Herr Naumann^s specula- 
tions as to the origin of the war, it is worth 


while to raise some doubts as to the feasi- 
bility of his plans after its conclusion. 
Economic considerations are certainly 
powerful factors in the development of 
modern nations, but all statesmen must 
reckon with the facts of human nature. 
Nations and races will go on with their in- 
born or cultivated likes and dislikes after 
the war as before. It becomes necessary 
to remind those who so glibly assume Aus- 
tria-Hungary willingness to listen to 
Germany's siren voice after the war 
that the mutual jealousies of Austria and 
Prussia are of very long standing, and 
have not been wholly interrupted by the 
present war. It was Frederick II who in- 
augurated the systematic policy of weaken- 
ing Austria in order to strengthen Prussia. 
Conversely, Joseph II sought to recover 
Austria's prestige by isolating Prussia and 
regaining new territory, whether in the 
East or in the West. Thenceforth there 
was mutual distrust between the two coun- 
tries, though Joseph II, immediately after 
Frederick's death, thought for a moment 
of burying old animosities and founding 


an Austro-Prussian alliance which would 
guarantee the peace of Europe. Prussia, 
however, soon emphasized her antagon- 
ism to Austria by her machinations with- 
in the German Empire, at Mainz and 
Worms, while Joseph II turned to Russia 
as the natural friend of Austria. Under 
Metternich's regime the mutual jealousies 
were accentuated. He rejected contempt- 
uously Stein's plan of dividing the over- 
lordship of Austria and Prussia in Ger- 
many along the lines of the Main. Met- 
ternich was shortsighted enough to think, 
even after the disappearance of the Holy 
Roman Empire, that Austria might guide 
the destinies of both Germany and Italy, 
and he called the Congress of Vienna to- 
gether with this end in view. Prussia never 
ceased to watch her opportunities, and 
knew how to bide her time. 

Bismarck, who is generally credited 
with the authorship of the plan for a Cen- 
tral Europe, tells us in his "Gedanken und 
Erinnerungen" that he never thought, in 
the days of the German Bund, while advo- 
cating the union of all Germany on a 


dualistic basis, of anything but Prussian / 

hegemony. He frankly told Count 
Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador, in 
1862 : "Our relations must either improve 
or grow worse. You will learn to deal with 
us (Prussia) as a European Power." 
Throughout his career Bismarck never lost 
his contempt for Austria, though after the 
war of 1866, foreseeing the Franco-Ger- 
man War of 1870, he shrewdly insisted on 
treating Austria leniently in order to se- 
cure at least her passive attitude towards 
Germany later on. Austrians still remem- 
ber Silesia and Sadowa, and they have not 
grown fonder of Prussia during the pres- 
ent war. Both Austrians and Himgarians 
complain, as Herr Naimiann admits, of 
the German, and especially the Prussian, 
want of consideration, of their overbearing 
manners, etc. "Modern Germans," he 
says, "are almost everywhere bad German- 
izers." "Why is it," he naively asks, "that 
we Germans of the Empire are during this 
war so little liked by the rest of the world?" 
The question which he leaves unan- 
swered was discussed at some length dur- 


ing the Franco-Prussian War in an edi- 
torial article in the Nation (Oct. 20, 1870: 
"Popular Notions of Prussia.") at a time 
when the Nation, like the rest of the most 
thoughtful orgaiis of public opinion 
throughout the United States, was strong- 
ly on the side of Germany. Its remarks 
are pertinent at the present time : 

As to Prussia's habitual want of popu- 
larity, it is one of the most curious phe- 
nomena in modern history. Prussia has 
invariably been disliked, not only by her 
enemies, but by her very friends and allies. 
The Poles, of course, hate her (and who 
would blame them for that?) , but even the 
Russians dislike her, notwithstanding the 
intimacy and relationship of the two sov- 
ereigns. So do the Austrians, so did the 
Bavarians and Wiirttembergers, the 
Dutch and the Danes, the English and the 
Italians, and their dislike seems to have 
nothing to do with political jealousies or 
grievances. Nor do the French form an 
exception to the rule, although it is but 
fair to say that before the war at least 
there was nothing personal even in their 
chauvinism. There must, of course, be 
some real and tangible reason for all this. 
It is natural enough that, when once a 


prejudice exists against a country, the 
stranger who visits or traverses it can 
rarely be in a proper condition of mind for 
steering clear of difficulties and scrapes, 
and these difficulties will enhance rather 
than correct his prejudices. But we can 
hardly call prejudice a natural aversion to 
what must appear forbidding and ungenial 
to everybody not rendered callous by life- 
long habit. The bureaucratic hardness of 
Prussian officials, and the rigid compulsory 
method with which Prussia enforces the 
acceptance of her gifts and her protection, 
as well as of her burdens, are certainly not 
calculated to beget good will, and w:e can 
hardly wonder if Prussia enjoys the 
strange distinction of being disliked by a 
good many of her own people, who would 
willingly allow themselves to be educated, 
vaccinated, taxed, and drilled, but who 
either object to the official modus operandi 
or are anxious to sell their obedience for a 
fair measure of constitutional rights. 

Herr Naumann quotes the experience 
of the North-G^erman Confederation, be- 
fore 1870, in its dealings with South Ger- 
many, as an example of how easy it was 
to overcome the scruples of Bavaria, 
Wiirttemberg, Baden, etc., concerning a 


closer union with Prussia; but he has to 
admit that they had maintained before the 
Franco-German War an attitude of dis- 
trust towards Prussia which even now has 
not wholly disappeared. "The Berliner 
was in their eyes long an alien, and is 
so in part even to-day." If Grermany is 
defeated, Prussia will be less an object of 
veneration in South Grcrman eyes than 
ever before; but even if she is victorious, 
will the feeling between South Germans 
and Prussians be all that may be desired? 
Will there be unmixed mutual respect and 
due appreciation of what each has accom- 
plished to bring about victory? Prussia's 
preponderance in Central Europe will be 
far greater than her present dominance in 
Germany. What will Bavaria, Wiirttem- 
berg, and Baden have gained to compen- 
sate them for sinking into positions of re- 
latively greater inferiority than they had 
been chafing under before the war? Herr 
Naumann sees only a benign thought in 
the "controlling concept (Oberbegriff) of 
a Central Europe dominating over Ger- 
mans, French, Danes, and Poles in the 


German Empire, over the Magyars, Ger- 
mans, Rmnans, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs 
in Hmigary, over Germans, Czechs, Slo- 
vaks, Poles and Southern Slavs in Aus- 
tria." All these will "of their own accord 
(von selbst)" speak German — as though 
Naiunann had never heard of bloody riots 
in Bohemia over the question of using the 
dual languages in schools, in law courts, 
etc., and as though Prussia had not, ac- 
cording to Prince Biilow, failed utterly in 
her attempts to impose the German lan- 
guage with an iron hand on the recalci- 
trant school children of Posen. Nothing, 
however, appears difficult to the senti- 
mentalist in politics. In Herr Naumann's 
eyes it is the easiest thing in the world 
for Vienna and Berlin to supplement each 
other, with great advantage to both. 
"We," he says, addressing himself to Aus- 
trians, "have more horsepower, and you 
more music. We think more in terms of 
quantity, the best of you rather in terms 
of quality. If we can fuse our respective 
abilities, then and for the first time what 
is harsh in modem German civilization will 


acquire through your assistance the touch 
of charm which will make it tolerable to 
the outside world." How simple a process 
this fusion ( "zusammengiessen" ) appears 
to be in the delightful vagueness of Herr 
Naumann's pages ! 

And even if Austrians and Germans al- 
low themselves to be carried away by such 
glittering phrases, the sober-minded Hun- 
garians may in due time be trusted to look 
at the situation after the war with a keen 
eye to their own interests. The Magyars 
have never fully relished the union with 
Austria, and, no matter what their present 
attitude may be, they will never allow the 
Dual Monarchy to enter into any scheme 
that may threaten to interfere with their 
future freedom of action. Herr Naiunann 
assimies that under German influence the 
plains of Hungary will become much 
more productive. They may, indeed, but 
how will that influence be exerted without 
wounding the susceptibilities of the proud 
Magyars ? Already we hear of fierce pro- 
tests in the Hungarian Diet against the in- 


Solent interference of German purchasers 
of Hungarian farms. Will the Hun- 
garian peasantry be less resentful after the 
war? Count Szechenyi, "the greatest 
Magyar," as he is sometimes called by his 
countrymen, said in the Diet of 1848: 
"How does a nation come to possess the 
force and virtue necessary for its political 
action? If the majority of the individuals 
composing it are to fulfil humanely and 
honorably their appointed task, they must 
acquire, above all, the art of pleasing, the 
faculty of attracting and absorbing the 
neighboring elements. Is it likely that a 
people will possess this faculty who will 
not respect in others that which it insists 
on having respected in itself? It is a great 
art to know how to win men's hearts.'* 
Unless the Prussians of Central Europe 
shall draw the Magyars to their hearts 
more easily than they have drawn to them- 
selves their South-German brothers, the 
future of Central Europe must remain du- 

A mere hint at the numberless problems 
which would confront the Slavs of Hun- 


gary and Cisleithania un^der the scheme of 
a Central Europe must suffice. A 
strengthening of German influence, in 
whatever shape, and however disguised, 
must inevitably entail a weakening of 
Slavic power, and such a scheme will there- 
fore arouse suspicion and resentment 
among the Slavs within Central Europe. 
The mutual relations of other nationalities 
that will be asked to join Grcrmany, Herr 
Naumann conveniently ignores. Rumania, 
for instance, may or may not disappear 
from the map of Eiu*ope as a consequence 
of the war; in either case, will the Rinnans 
of Hungary be better satisfied to remain 
under Magyar rule, with Grcrman over- 
lordship, than they have been hitherto? 
Will the Magyars themselves be more 
kindly disposed towards them? Will the 
Ruthenes of Galicia dislike the Poles 
less, and love the Teutons more, in a new 
superstate? But everything seems to fit 
into Herr Naumann's scheme. Yet, 
though Bulgarians and Serbs may be only 
Slavs to him, and therefore destined to be 
thrown into a conmion melting-pot, their 


national characteristics and diflferences will 
outlast the war. The Bulgarians are a 
practical and energetic people, not given 
to boasting of their ancestry, like the 
Serbs. They may, or may not, have made 
a mistake in casting in their lot with the 
Teutons, but their future still lies largely 
in their own hands. They may desert 
Germany, as they have deserted Russia. 
What will be the feeling of the Serbs of 
Hungary towards Germany? Each Bal- 
kan race will survive the war at least to 
the extent of being able to plague its 
neighbors. And who can foretell whither, 
in the readjustment of Europe after the 
peace, the force of a former Pan-Slavism 
will tend? Will Poles, Serbs, and Bui- 
gars fraternize under the common aegis 
of a Central Europe? A stroke of the 
pen has resuscitated the ancient Kingdom 
of Poland — ^with the status of Galicia and 
Posen still undefined — ^but the fortunes 
of war may wipe it off the scrap of paper 
on which the two Emperors signed their 


So far the war has settled nothing, 
though what the rule of blood and iron 
can accomplish, Germany imder Prussian 
rule has accomplished. Prussian generals 
have won new glory for Prussian military 
efficiency. But in proportion as they have 
succeeded, they have sown the seeds of 
envy and dislike in the rest of Germany 
and in Austria-Hungary. Political prog- 
nostications of writers and statesmen and 
even Imperial rescripts have turned out 
poor prophecies before this. Naumann 
sees in the Germany of to-day a "half- 
finished product," but Central Europe is 
to develop somehow the fairest flower of 
modern civilization — "a type of man in- 
termediate between Frenchmen, Italians, 
Turks, Russians, Scandinavians, and 
Englishmen" — and all this is to "grow 
around Teutonism." Such is the fabric of 
his dream. 

At bottom, stripped of all its fine 
phrases, Herr Naumann's gospel of the 
great transformation is the old familiar 
one of coercion — friendly coercion, by open 
flattery and half-veiled insinuation, but still 


coercion. He admits that for Austria- 
Hungary to enter the Central European 
combination will involve "a certain sacri- 
fice — ^not to be regarded lightly — of econo- 
mic independence and of her rights as a 
free state" (her "staatsrechtliche Unge- 
bundenheit" ) , but, he finally says in cold 
blood, "the transaction is necessary, ac- 
cording to all teaching of history, to the 
further continuance of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Dual Monarchy." 

And the continuance of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy is in doubt because in the chain 
of his reasoning the continuance of wars 
is impliedly assumed as axiomatic. Free 
as he is from the chauvinism of a Bern- 
hardi or a Reventlow, there is no proof, in 
his plea for a Central Europe, that he be- ^ 
lieves in the march of political progress, 
in the humanizing and liberalizing in- ^ 
fluences that are already at work in other 
coimtries to make further wars impossible, i 
or at least more difiicult than hitherto. He 
no more reads the thought of the best ele- 
ments of Germany than he understands the 
inmost feelings of Austria-Hungary — ^not 


to speak of England, France, and 
America. But though the mmd of Prussia 
may remain unchanged after the war, 
must we assume that the soul of German- 
Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs is bound 
to undergo a complete transformation? 


Austria's Opportunity 

[From The New York Evening Post, March 31, 1917.] 

VT EVER before in the troubled history 
-^^ of the Monarchy have the perplexi- 
ties of the Hapsburg rulers been so great 
as now. Internally and externally, Aus- 
tria-Hungary is beset by apparently in- 
soluble problems. In all parts of the Em- 
pire there is distress, dissatisfaction, 
divided council. To cap the climax, the 
question of a break with the United States 
now looms up portentously. In Cisleith- 
ania the subject is being approached with 
the caution imposed by the censor; in Hun- 
gary, however, there is greater freedom 
of speech. Magyar papers have repeated- 
ly pointed out the folly of antagonizing a 
country which plays so large a part in 
Hungary's economic life. In thousands of 
Hungarian homes the only means of sus- 
tenance comes from the United States. 
It is safe to say that more than fifty mil- 
lion dollars is sent annually by Austro- 
Hungarian subjects and naturalized 


Americans of Austro-Hungarian birth to 
relatives in the Empire, twenty-five mil- 
lions alone coming from Slovak miners in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere. How can 
Austria under present conditions face the 
cessation of such a revenue? And this 
question opens up the larger one of the 
origin and the issue of the war. 

More and more frequently, in Austria 
as in Hungary, people are asking, what 
have we to gain by continuing the war? 
The promises held out by the Hohenzol- 
lem to the Hapsburg before the fatal ulti- 
matimi to Servia, have long since lost their 
potency. The new Emperor and his ad- 
visers are disillusioned, the people weary 
and half-starA'^ed. The political outlook in 
all the Austrian crown lands, with the 
possible exception of Galicia, is dreary 
in the extreme. Every semblance of 
constitutional government has disap- 
peared in the Austrian half of the 
Empire. The Vienna Reichsrat has 
not been convoked in three years. The 
Czechs, whom the Emperor had hoped 
to conciliate by the appointment of Count 


Clam-Martinitz as Austrian Premier, 
branded the Minister as a renegade; in 
Hungary the opposition to the pro-Ger- 
man policy of Tisza is becoming more and 
more pronounced. The Hungarian Pre- 
mier is held responsible, jointly with the 
German Chancellor, for the disastrous 
failure of the German peace proposal. 
Count Andrassy, the leader of the Consti- 
tutionalists ; Counts Apponyi and Karolyi, 
the leaders of the two Independence par- 
ties ; ex-Premier, Dr. Alexander Wekerle, 
and other influential men — some in the 
ranks of the Democratic party — ^are un- 
dermining the position of the formerly all- 
powerful Tisza, and with his fall Hohen- 
zollern influence in the councils of the 
Hapsburg monarchy will have received a 
deadly blow. 

Throughout the war Germany's efforts 
to Teutonize Hungary have been keenly 
resented by the proud Magyars. In the 
Diet the insolence of Gterman purchasers 
of Hungarian estates has provoked bitter 
discussion and the propagandist visits of 
two leading German politicians, Herr 


Bassennann and Count Westarp, to the 
Hungarian capital, have been sarcastical- 
ly commented upon by the Budapest press. 
Thus the N^pszava said: "German Kul- 
tur is sufficiently well represented in Hun- 
gary to make it unnecessary to found 
any fresh associations for its dissemina- 
tion." Conversely, German newspapers 
have complained of the intolerant attitude 
of the Himgarians. The Munich Neueste 
Nachrichten deplores the inability of the 
Magyars to appreciate the purely cultural 
efforts of Germany, and revives the old 
charge of Magyar oppression of other 

The fact is, the Hungarians are, as they 
have always been, an intensely practical 
people, and they will not compromise their 
future for the sake of pleasing either 
Hohenzollem or Hapsburg. The bait of 
becoming the guardians of the grain em- 
porium in the post-bellum Central Eu- 
rojpe has been spurned by clear-sighted 
Magyar statesmen, and though Hungary 
has gone far enough in following German 


leadership, there are indications that she 
will not go the full length of Hohenzollem 

Least of all will the Germans of Cis- 
leithania be entrapped into approval of the 
last mad scheme of Hohenzollern states- 
manship — open defiance of the United 
States. During the fifty years that have 
elapsed since the Compromise with Hun- 
gary the balance of power within Cis- 
leithania has inclined, now to the German 
elements — liberal or conservative — ^now to 
the Czechs or Poles; but through it all 
Vienna has remained the centre of the Em- 
pire. German- Austria still rules the rul- 
ers, if not the Monarchy. The new Em- 
peror reflects, like Francis Joseph, the 
feeling of Vienna, and this is, and ever has 
been, antagonistic to Berlin. Vienna, 
even before the war, retained much of its 
old dislike of Prussian ways, and Berlin 
reciprocated this feeling. What an acute 
student of Kulturgeschichte, Wilhelm 
Heinrich Riehl, wrote half a century ago 
concerning the relations of Vienna and 
Berlin is still largely true: 


"As regards mutual depreciation and 
lack of understanding, North and South 
Germans stand on the same level. There 
are enough educated people in the North, 
travellers in many lands, who almost glory 
in the fact that they have never seen Vi- 
enna; just as there are such in the South 
who are proud of having always avoided 
going to the capital on the Spree." 

In Gterman literature, down to compara- 
tively recent days, depreciation of Aus- 
trian writers was the rule rather than the 
exception. "Grillparzer," wrote a North 
German critic, "is an Austrian poet who 
happens not to have written in the Magyar 
or Czech tongue, but in German. His 
works cannot be considered as manifesta- 
tions of the German spirit." In a sense 
this was true enough, for Grillparzer was 
an Austrian in every fibre, and disliked 
Prussian arrogance and pedantry intense- 
ly. Nor was the dramatist the only Ger- 
man-Austrian writer thoroughly repre- 
sentative of the Austrian spirit as dis- 
tinguished from the Prussian. Lenau, 
Raimund, Rosegger, and Anzenzruber 


are notable instances of this in literature, 
as were Mozart, Schubert, Haydn, and 
Johann Strauss in music, and Schwind in 

Vienna and Berlin, though ostensibly 
united, are in reality far apart. Austria 
has not forgotten the series of humiliations 
suffered for a century and more at the 
hands of the Hohenzollerns. Bismarck's 
policy, from the beginning to the end of 
his career, was one long, carefully 
wrought-out plan for destroying Austrian 
influence, first in the German Federation, 
and then in all Europe. A hundred frank- 
ly cynical pages in his Memoirs bear this 
out. And only two years ago one of Bis- 
marck's successors labored hard to barter 
away some of Austria's fairest provinces 
for Italy's promise to keep out of the war. 

As was Austria, so were Bavaria, 
Saxony, and other German states but 
pawns in Prussia's game. Bismarck had 
them all in mind when he wrote, in 1859, 
to Minister von Schleinitz of that "infirm- 
ity of Prussia's" which could only be 
healed ferro et igni. Fire and sword are 


once more the motto of Prussian states- 
manship, but Prussia, now the arbiter of 
the fate of all Germany, has still to reckon 
with her "faithful ally." Austria stands 
at the parting of the ways. Her alliance 
with the Hohenzollern, forced upon her 
by fancied political necessity, is not based 
on inner kinship in thought and feeling, 
not on ancient historical tradition, nor on 
community of future interests. It is a hol- 
low pretence, rife with the seeds of future 
dissension. When the break between 
Hohenzollern and Hapsburg will come, it 
would be rash to predict, but that the pres- 
ent union will not outlast the war is cer- 
tain. The tone of the last Austrian note 
to our Government portends unmistakably 
a change in the relations between the Teu- 
tonic Powers. Whatever Germany may 
decide upon in her delusion, Austria can- 
not risk the severance of her relations with 
the United States. 



The Future of Bohemia 

[From The New York Evening Post, May 16, 1917.] 

Bohemia is declared to be in a state of 
siege. What does the news portend for 
the future of the kingdom and the entire 
Hapsburg monarchy? Are the prospects 
of peace brought nearer by tiiis emphatic 
evidence of civic strife in the most import- 
ant crownland of Cisleithania? A possible 
answer to such questions concerning the 
future may be sought in a retrospect of 
the past. 

"Whoever is master of Bohemia is mas- 
ter of Europe," said Bismarck. He had 
in mind, not the nominal rulership, but 
the mastery of problems which from the 
time of the fall of the great Moravian em- ^ 
pire, about the year 900, have never ceased 
to trouble Europe. Throughout her per- 
turbations Bohemia has within the past 
centmy grown economically to a com- 
manding position in Austria and Europe. 
Agriculturally and industrially highly 
productive, with enormously rich coal de- 


posits and the most famous mineral 
springs in the world, Bohemia, "the pearl 
in the crown of St. Wenceslas,"' enjoys in- 
deed a proud preeminence. For centuries, 
too, Bohemia has been prominent in the 
arts of peace. The Czech nation gave 
Comenius (Komensky) to the world, and 
in more recent times Bohemia has been 
one of the artistic centres of Europe. 
Gluck conducted his first operas in Prague 
and Mozart's Don Juan first saw there the 

Down to the close of the eighteenth 
century Europe was but little concerned 
in the destinies of Bohemia. Since then 
the awakened national aspirations of the 
Czechs, amid the general revival of Slav- 
dom, have drawn the attention of foreign 
observers to a long-neglected subject. And 
now the note of the Entente Powers, with 
its implied promise of the restoration of 
the realm of Bohemia, which came to an 
end in 1620, fixes the gaze of all the world 
upon the Austrian province seemingly 
destined to play an important part in the 
final settlement of the war. "A great em- 


pire, like a great cake," says Franklin, 
"is most easily diminished at the edges." 
Naturally enough, certain Czech pa- 
triots and agitators have sought by every 
means at their command to use the pres- 
ent opportunity to undermine the hold of 
the Hapsburgs on their North Slavic do- 
minions. The realm of St. Wenceslas is 
to be restored, but how is the dream to be 
realized? The advocates of the plan 
picture to themselves a country consisting 
of Bohemia proper, Moravia, and Silesia, 
plus the Slovak districts of northern Hun- 
gary, the whole to comprise about 50,000 
square miles, and to contain about 12,- 
000,000 inhabitants. The English trans- 
lation of the Entente note spoke of the lib- 
eration of the "Czecho-Slovaks," instead 
of the "Czechs and Slovaks" (as the 
French original had it), but the resusci- 
tation of Bohemia as an independent na- 
tion, with "Slovakia" as an integral part, 
has not in any quarter been clearly form- 
ulated. In a matter of such importance 
the details are everything.. "Slovakia" 
has had no political existence since the 


tenth century, and its present limits, hav- 
ing reference only to the regions of Hun- 
gary where Slovaks predominate, are not 
easily defined. It is admitted by those 
who favor the incorporation of Slovakia 
that not all her children in Hungary can 
return to the fold. The fate of the Slo- 
vaks in other parts of Hungary than those 
which are to be merged in the new Bo- 
henua is left in doubt; nor do we get the 
slightest hint as to the status of the Mag- 
yars who will fijid themselves incorporated 
in the new state, together with the Slovaks. 
The forced consent of the Hungarian 
nation to the cession of their northern ter- 
ritory is, of course, assimied, just as is the 
consent of the Government of Cisleithania 
to the liberation of all Bohemia. What 
is to be the form of government to be 
adopted for the new state? On the 
whole, a monarchy seems to be preferred, 
though some advocates of total separation 
from Austria incline to a republican form 
of government. 

Prof. T. G. Masaryk, formerly of the 
University of Prague, and now an exile 


in London, passes lightly over the ques- 
tion of the constitution of the new Bo- 
hemia. Writing in the New Europe, 
shortly before the establishment of the 
present Government of Russia, he says : 

The dynastic question is left to the de- 
cision of the Allies, who might perhaps 
give one of their own princes. There 
might be a personal union between Servia 
and Bohemia, if the Serbs and Bohemians 
were to be neighboring countries. A per- 
sonal union with Russia or with Poland, 
if the latter were to be quite independent, 
has also been suggested. (German and 
Austrian princes must co ipso be ex- 
cluded.) The Bohemian people are thor- 
oughly Slavophile. A Russian dynasty, in 
whatever form, would be most popular, 
and, in any case, Bohemian politicians de- 
sire the establishment of the kingdom of 
Bohemia in complete accord with Russia. 

This is equalled in vagueness only by 
the suggestion that "so far as the Ger- 
man minority is concerned, I should not 
be opposed to a rectification of the politi- 
cal frontier; parts of Bohemia and Mo- 
ravia, where there are only a few Czechs, 
might be ceded to G^erman Austria." We 


must remember that in present Bohemia 
the proportion of Grermans to Czechs is 
as thirty-seven to sixty-three, and that 
the German minority, so nonchalantly to 
be disposed of, contains most of the me- 
-^hanical and technological skill, enterprise. 


and wealth, that Bohemia boasts. More- 
over, there is nothing in the history of the 
kingdom, remote or recent, to warrant the 
assumption of future harmony between the 
conmion people and the aristocracy — ^a 
very important consideration in the case 
of a country where noble f amiUes have per- 
haps greater power and influence than has 
any other aristocracy in Europe. The 
feudal nobility of Bohemia has never 
identified itself with the people — Grerman 
or Czech — as has the Magyar aristocracy 
v> with the masses of Hungary. The Princes 
Schwarzenberg own one-thirteenth of the 
land; the Lobkowitzes, Clam-Martinitzes, 
and many other noblemen ranged on the 
side of the feudalists are scarcely less in- 
fluential than the Schwarzenbergs. Gen- 
erally opposed to the feudalists in political 
matters involving the equality of the 


Czech and German languages, but equally 
aloof from the masses, are the Princes 
Auersperg and other German-speaking 
landed proprietors, whom the new Bo- 
hemia will find it anything but easy to 
dispossess or expatriate. And not only 
Bohemian noblemen of both nationalities 
have hitherto been attached to the house 
of Hapsburg, but the bulk of the Czech 
people have been distinctly loyal on vari- 
ous critical occasions. That a cataclysm 
Kke the present war has led to something 
like revolt, both in the army and in civil 
life, is explainable enough on purely 
economic grounds. Up to the outbreak 
of the war the most fervent of Czech 
nationalists have acquiesced in the over- 
lordship of the Hapsburgs, and clamored 
only for an autonomy of Bohemia like 
that which Hungary enjoys, within the 
monarchy^ That the Hapsburg regime, 
with rare exceptions, has on the whole 
consistently opposed the political and 
literary aspirations of Czech leaders has 
not disturbed the vision of those among 
them clear-sighted enough to recognize 


that an independent state of Bohemia 
would mean a Bohemia exposed to the 
ambitions of neighboring states and the 
entanglements of European polities. 

The principal spokesman for Czech 
aspirations in the last century, the his- 
torian, Francis Palacky, a patriot of great 
renown, is credited with the authorship 
of the dictima that "if Austria did not 
exist it would have to be invented/' 
Palacky wrote as late as 1865: "To pre- 
tend that the resources of so vast an Em- 
pire are to be devoted entirely to the 
service of one or two favorite peoples, 
while the others who contribute equally to 
the might of the whole estate are to be 
content with what may be allowed them, 
is equal to saying: 'We are the masters 
and you are the servants/ *' It is true, 
Palacky's argument was directed against 
the Germans of Bohemia, but he was too 
good a logician not to know that his 
reasoning could be turned both ways. 
"The Slavs,'' he declared, "desire the 
prosperity of the monarchy, on condition 
that they are given guarantees for their 


normal development." He feared — ^not 
hoped — ^that the Dualism established in 
1867 portended the eventual dismember- 
ment of the monarchy. 

Another fallacy in the reasoning of those 
who would identify Pan- Slavic aims with 
present Czech aspirations is the assump- 
tion that Bohemians have always been 
wishing to throw in their lot with the 
kindred races of Austria and other 
countries. The truth is that the Czechs 
of Bohemia have had but a tempered 
sympathy with the aspirations of other 
Slavic .peoples. The idea of a Pan-Slavic 
union occurred to KoUar, generally con- 
sidered the father of the movement, mainly 
for literary purposes. He first advanced 
the plan in 1881, and, of course, from 
that the step to a furtherance of political 
aims was a natural one. During the revo- 
lution of 184,8 the Bohemians, while tak- 
ing the leadership in the Slavic movement 
which then seemed to promise success, 
were far apart from several of their Slavic 
brethren. The general Slavic congress 
convoked by Palacky at Prague resulted 


in a split into two camps. The Czechs de- 
clared in favor of the Austrian Govern- 
ment, as did the South-Slavic Croats and 
Serbs. The Poles, who had learned to 
see in the Russians their natural oppres- 
sors, espoused the cause of Hungary. 
Pan-Slavism is to day as little of a practi- 
cal fact as it was during the revolution of 

It never entered Palacky's mind that the 
revival of the Czech language meant the 
creation of a Czecho-Slovak state. Up to 
about 1850 he and a few scholars like 
Schafarik represented all that there was 
in Czech literature, in the creation of which 
he was chiefly interested. It is told of 
him that when he and a small number of 
his friends gathered at his house on one 
occasion he remarked jestingly: "If the 
roof should now fall, the whole of Czech 
literature would be buried in its ruins." 
Nevertheless, the stimulus given to Czech 
aims by the present war is not surprising, 
and, properly expressed and led into prac- 
tical channels, it may lead to important 
results. Austria is on the verge of ex- 


haustion, and after laying her heavy hand 
on Czech "rebels'' like Dr. Kramarsch, the 
Government may even before the conclu- 
sion of peace be forced to gentler measures 
in dealing with her recalcitrant subjects 
in Bohemia. Possibly the leaders of the 
present movement among the Czechs, as 
well as the European statesmien eventually 
charged with peace negotiations, may 
come to the conclusion that an autonomous 
Bohemia within the Empire may be a 
stronger guarantee of future peace to all 
concerned than a nominally free Bohemia 
without. One thing, at all events, is cer- 
tain. The Czechs of Bohemia will never 
lend a willing ear to Pan-Gterman bland- 
ishments. They may make peace, in their 
own interest, with the Hapsburgs but they 
will never cease to distrust the Hohenzol- 
lerns. They still feel towards Grerman 
chauvinism as they did in the day when 
Ladislas Rieger, Palacky's son-in-law and 
the most eloquent spokesman of his peo- 
ple, said in a famous discourse : "You al- 
ways talk of German science and civiliza- 
tion. How often have these idols been held 


up to us for our admiration! One never 
hears any one talk of French science and 
civilization, but 'Deutsche Wissenschaf t' is 
such a mouth-filling morsel 1" 

It is to be hoped that at the conclusion 
of peace the Czechs, like the Poles, may 
be masters of their destinies, but it is pre- 
mature to forecast their decision. Austria 
in her strength and her weakness — ^her di- 
versified German ahd non-German ma- 
terial and intellectual interests, as well as 
her hopeless internal dissensions-is to-day 
the greatest stumbling block in the path of 
Germany's single-minded ruthlessness. 
Pan-Germanism, always confined in 
Lower Austria to a handful of noisy dema- 
gogues, has made no converts since the 
war. Vienna is not yet ready to sink to 
the level of a lesser Berlin. And all Aus- 
tria will long remember that Prussia lured 
her into the present war and, when hos- 
tilities were scarcely begun, brought every 
pressure to bear upon her to make her 
relinquish some of her fairest provinces 
for the sake of keeping Italy from joining 
the Allies. Such an alliance in arms has 


taught Austria what to expect in a future 
partnership in "Central Europe." It will 
be the task of wise statesmanship among 
the Allies to reconcile the claims of the 
Czechs with the position of Austria as an 
important factor in eventual combinations 
that shall bring about peace and save the 
world from future aggression on the part 
of Germany. 


Hungary and the Fall of 


[From The New York Nation, May 31, 1917.] 

T^ HE resignation of the Tisza Ministry 
is an event the significance of which 
will be felt on all the battlefields of Eu- 
rope. Exactly fifty years after the re- 
gained autonomy of Hungary was sealed 
by the coronation of Francis Joseph at 
Budapest, his successor to the crown of 
St. Stephen parts with the services of the 
Premier who has been the most powerful 
advocate of the alliance between the 
HohenzoUems and the Hapsburgs. Count 
Tisza had staked his fate on the unshaken 
continuance of that alliance, and he has 
fallen. Ostensibly he resigned because the 
Emperor Charles refused to approve of 
his attitude concerning the reform of the 
franchise in the Hungarian kingdom, and 
it may well be that the voice of the various 
nationalities who are clamoring for a juster 
share in the Govemment than the Magyars 


have hitherto accorded them can no longer 
be suppressed; but more serious problems 
are confronting both halves of the mon- 
archy to-day than even the question of uni- 
versal manhood suffrage in Hungary. 

Public opinion in Hungary is divided 
on the question of continuing the war. 
We have heard of Count Kdrolyi, the 
leader of a branch of the Independence 
party, strongly urging the need of peace 
and repudiating aU ideas of conquest; and 
of such influential papers as the Pesti 
Hirlap and the Pesti Naplo (once famous 
as the organ of Francis Deak) ranging 
themselves on the side of the opposition to 
Tisza. Finally, there came the cable news 
of a bitter attack of the Pesti Naplo on 
Count Reventlow and of the Sociahst 
organ, Nipszava, on Tirpitz, while three 
members of the Chamber of Deputies were 
quoted as condemning the present subma- 
rine warfare. 

Little has been heard during the war of 
the once powerful Kossuth party. Its 
very name has been merged in that of other 
groups, but that its principles will revive 


after the war is as certain as that the spell 
of that famous leader has not forever lost 
its potency. How will his teachings com^ 
port with the new order of things in Hun- 
gary if the Pan-Germanists and advocates 
of a new Central Europe have their way? 
Can Magyars ever forget his fierce detes- 
tation of the Hapsburgs, his glowing ad- 
miration for Anglo-Saxons? "It is the 
Anglo-Saxon race alone," he said, in an 
address in this country on March 6, 1852, 
"that stands high and erect in its inde- 
pendence. . . . And inviolability of 
person and the inviolability of property 
are English principles. England is the 
last stronghold of these principles in Eu- 
rope." And contrast with this his remark 
about Prussia, on a similar occasion: 
"What would the petty princes of Ger- 
many have been in 1848 without Prussia? 
And what was Prussia, when her capital 
was in the hands of the people, without 
the certainty of the Czar's support?" 

Tisza, who returned to power as Premier 
in 1918, after having been in the Cabinet 
from 1908 to 1906, has been the subject 


of bitter opposition both before and since 
the outbreak of the war. He resumed 
office after Prime Minister Lukacs had 
introduced, in 1912, a franchise bill the 
provisions of which would have doubled 
the electorate, but which still left the fa- 
vored classes with so many privileges that 
the Radical party and the Socialists raised 
a fierce outcry against the Government's 
proposal. Tisza, who was then President 
of the Chamber, was the principal target 
of abuse, and after he became Premier he 
had to face a new Opposition party, or- 
ganized by Count Andrassy, who was, and 
has since been, committed to the reform of 
the franchise. Tisza declared universal 
suffrage to be a national danger. He not 
unnaturally feared that the political equal- 
ity of the various nationalities of Hungary 
would threaten Magyar hegemony. But 
the exigencies of war lead to strange 
avowals and disavowals. Tisza recently 
seemed to experience a sudden change of 
heart and professed in Parliament his af- 
fection for the non-Magyar races. ''No- 
where in the world," he said, "is the prin- 


ciple of nationality applied so liberally as 
in the two states of the Dual Monarchy." 
These idyllic conditions have not always 
prevailed either in Cisleithania or in Hun- 
gary. Few modern Magyar statesmen 
have consistently adhered to the principles 
of Deak and Eotvos, who labored honestly 
for a conciliatory policy towards non- 
Magyar nationalities and respected their 
languages and customs. Their enlight- 
ened views gave way in the seventies to 
the ruthlessly chauvinistic policy of the 
elder Tisza, and the Magyarization of the 
state has since gone on apace. The in- 
tolerance of the Government towards Par- 
liamentary representatives of other races 
may be illustrated by an incident which 
occurred last February. A well-known 
Slovak Deputy, Father Juriga, who had 
suffered imprisonment for his nationaUst 
principles, discussed a bill before the 
Chamber designed to perpetuate the mem- 
ory of the heroes who had fallen in battle. 
In the course of his remarks he requested 
the House to permit him to read a letter 
written in the Slovak language by a sol- 


dier who had thanked the Minister of Edu- 
cation for having allowed, during the war, 
the study of the Slovak language in 
secondary schools. But after violent in- 
terruption on the part of the Opposition 
leaders, the Chamber ruled that not a 
single Slovak word could be spoken by 
any Deputy, and Juriga desisted from his 
purpose with the quiet remark: "I do 
not wish to create a scandal, and theref or6 
content myself with pointing out that in 
this House quotations may be read in 
EngUsh and French, the languages of the 
enemy, but not in some of the languages 
of our own country." 

The Germans within the liroits of Hun- 
gary have on the whole bowed more meek- 

y ly to the rule of the Magyar than the other 

nationaUties. Indeed, their outward trans- 

, ' formation into Magyars — the Saxons of 
Transylvania alone excepted — ^has in the 
large towns been rapid, and as they had no 
separatist aspirations, there has been little 
political friction between them and the 
dominant race. German names of places 
have disappeared from school geographies, 


and in many instances German patrony- 
mics have been gladly exchanged by their 
bearers for more sonorous Magyar ones. 
Yet the war has not drawn Magyars and 
Teutons closer to each other. OflScially 
they may fraternize, organically they do 
not fuse. Hungarian and Austrian gene- 
rals bore a distinguished part in the early 
battles, when German armies came to the 
rescue of their hard-pressed allies in the 
Carpathians and elsewhere, but the names 
of Kovess and Boehm-Ermolli are never 
mentioned when Germans sing the praises 
of Hindenburg and Mackensen. Nor 
have the South Slavs of the monarchy 
learned during the war to look with friend- 
lier eyes on BerUn and Vienna than before. 
With the fate of Servia as a warning ex- 
ample before them, the loyalty of Serbo- 
Croats to the Hapsburgs and their wil- 
lingness to place themselves under the aegis 
of the Hohenzollems have been sorely 
tried. The Croats and Magyars have al- 
ways been at daggers drawn. It may be 
taken as axiomatic that what the Magyar 
desires the Croat opposes. Croatia has 



never concealed its bitter discontent with 
Dualism, and Hungarian politicians have 
fully reciprocated the feeling of the Croats. 
Recent utterances of the newspapers of 
Agram and Fiume that occasionally find 
their way to this country reflect the dis- 
satisfaction of the people with prevailing 
economic conditions — a feeling which ex- 
tends to the political situation as well. 

Tisza had originally not been particu- 
larly friendly to the German designs on 
Austria-Hungary, which have found ex- 
pression in the plan of a "Mitteleuropa." 
He opposed the economic federation be- 
tween the Central Powers and those Eu- 
ropean states which Germany was espe- 
cially anxious to place under her wings. 
In truth, he distrusted more than one 
partner in the future Central Europe, and 
like all Magyar statesmen of the present 
day, who seek in every political combina- 
tion solely the interest of their own race, 
he thought of the future, while the states- 
men of Vienna thought chiefly of the pres- 
ent. Whether his dismissal from ofiice 
now is due to his own recognition of the 


fact that the alliance between Hapsburgs 
and Hohenzollems is tottering, or whether 
the Emperor Charles wishes to have a free 
hand in movements which might find in the 
fiery Hungarian a dangerous opponent, 
Tisza's fall presages in any case an un- 
mistakable change in the relations between 
Gtermany and Austria-Hungary. The fact 
is that, though the two countries have been 
politically united since the outbreak of the 
war, they have in their military activity 
since their early common successes been 
gradually drifting apart. Germany is 
fighting her battles in France alone, as 
Austria is fighting hers in the Trentino and 
the Coast Districts, The fate of the Mon- 
archy is nearer to the heart of its ruler 
than the future of his German ally. As 
for his subjects, they are skeptical, and 
they were long forced to remain silent. 
Previous experiences in their history have 
taught all the peoples of the Empire not 
to build their hopes too firmly on military 
victories. In 1866 Austria himabled Italy 
in the sea-fight at Lissa, and was com- 
pelled to give up Venetia to her. She was 


crushed at S^adowa by Prussia, and Hun- 
gary gained her autonomy and Cisleithania 
a liberal Constitution. And to-day, with 
the fortunes of war still in the balance, 
Slavs, Rumans, and others look expectant- 
ly to a future that shall bring them, some- 
how, through some turn of affairs at home 
or abroad, their coveted self-government. 

Whoever may be Tisza's successor, an 
element of unrest is now workmg in the 
Empire which is certain to influence the 
course of affairs. Vienna has served notice 
on Budapest that it intends to become 
once more the centre of political gravity, 
but whether the Gk)vernment, with or with- 
out the sanction of the representatives of 
the people — ^it is reported that for the first 
time in more than three years the Reichs- 
rat has been convened — ^will be able to 
strike out into new paths, internally as well 
as externally, remains to be seen. Too lit- 
tle is known of the new Emperor to war- 
rant the assumption that he intends to rule 
with the help of the liberal Grcrmans of 
Austria, but he certainly cannot perma- 
nently ignore them. Though ever since 


the fall of the Auersperg Ministry, in 
1879, they have been out of power, they 
are a factor to be reckoned with. Their 
voice is bound to be heard again, and its 
echoes will reach Berlin. The Austrian 
Grermans will not forever follow whither 
Prussia shall lead. Once more, as so often 
in the past, the inherent antagonism be- 
tween Austrians and Prussians manifests 
itself. The Grermans of Lower and Upper 
Austria, of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, 
the Tyrol, and other Crown lands, who are 
mostly of purer Teutonic stock than the 
Prussians, are beginning to ask unpleas- 
ant questions. They are getting tired of 
being called Germanic brethren when it 
suits Prussian advantage to claim them, 
and to be repudiated when the wind blows 
from another quarter. As in politics so 
in literature. For many long years there 
seemed to be, in Grillparzer's words, a con- 
spiracy against Austrian writers in Ger- 
many. She looked askance at the gKat 
dramatist himself, though she gradually 
learned to adopt him and other Austrians, 


just as she has adopted Swiss writers like 
Gottfried Keller and Konrad Ferdinand 

It must be said, in all fairness, that 
since the elder Andrassy's death, no Aus- 
trian statesman except Tisza has made it 
his task to promote a genuine alliance be- 
tween Hapsburgs and HohenzoUems. 
Count Aehrenthal, the only Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in recent years who has 
left his impress on Austrian politics, was 
concerned purely with the aggrandizement 
of his own country — ^though in ways that 
proved disastrous in the end — and did not 
y ask for Germany's consent to the annex- 
' ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But he 

fashioned his course closely after her ruth- 
less RealpoUtik. Austria has since chosen 
to identify herself still more completely 
with Prussia's foreign policy, heedless of 
the warning given to the Hapsburgs, years 
^go, by so stanch a defender of Prussian 
principles as Professor Delbriick. He 
wrote {Preussische Jahrbucher^ Vol. 180) : 
"The conception of nationality has at- 
tained in the nineteenth century through- 


out the world a power which it is abso- 
lutely useless to contend against. We 
have seen in the case of Prussia how little 
even a state of its gigantic strength can 
accomplish against a few million scattered 
Poles. The sooner G^rman-Austrians 
make up their minds to recognize the 
equality of all nationalities, even the small- 
est, and the more willing they show them- 
selves to make all the practical sacrifices 
inherent in such a recognition, the better 
it will be for them and for the German 
cause everywhere. The hope for such a 
consummation lies in Austria's relations to 
Hungary and in her foreign poUcy.'' 

The task of Tisza's successor in the in- 
ternal affairs of Hungary is clear enough 
— there can be no retreat from the principle 
of the equality of her nationalities; as to 
the future foreign policy of Austria, that, 
as well as the foreign policy of Germany, 
will be shaped by the issue of the present 


The Poles of Austria 

[From The New York Nation, July 5, 1917.] 

Appointment of a stop-gap Ministry 
gives Emperor Charles a breathing spell 
before grappling definitely with a serious 
crisis. Czech Deputies are rebellious, as 
Czech regiments have long been, and the 
Poles are clamoring for more emphatic 
recognition in the government of Austria. 
All parties in Galicia have been watching 
events in Russia closely, and the course of 
the Poles in national affairs will be shaped 
by international developments. 

On the whole, ever since the ruthless 
suppression of the peasant rising in 
Galicia, in 1846, the Austrian Government 
has shown distinct partiality and a cer- 
tain skill in its dealings with the Poles, 
favoring the nobility without actively an- 
tagonizing the rural population, and 
granting concessions to the national spirit 
which were at times galling enough to 
Germans and Ruthenes. In 1868 Polish 
became the vehicle of instruction in the 


University of Cracow, as it became some- 
what later in the University of Lemberg, 
and Polish officials replaced German ones 
thoroughout Galicia. Von Grocholski en- 
tered in 1871 the first Austrian Cabinet 
as Minister for Galicia, and Polish influ- 
ence has since made itself felt both in the 
Ministries and in the Reichsrat. Polish 
patriots have risen to leadership in the 
Austrian Parliament. Francis Smolka, 
who had been condemned to death for 
treason before 1848, became in 1881 Presi- 
dent of the Lower House of the Vienna 
Reichsrat, and in more recent times an- 
other Galician Deputy, the Armenian 
Abrahamowicz, occupied the same place. 
Such distinctions, however, were not won 
ivdthout resort to sknful parliamentaiy 
tactics, and sometimes to obstinate opposi- 
tion to the methods of Germanizing poli- 
ticians. The Compromise of 1867 was at 
first a sore trial to the Poles. Dualism, 
with Magyar preponderance, was as little 
to their liking as Federalism, with Bohe- 
mian autonomy, would have been. The 
fifty-seven Polish Deputies, whose votes 


could decide important parliamentary 
issues, withdrew from the Reichsrat. As 
in the case of the Czechs, the policy of 
abstention proved successful in the long 
run, and the Poles have to the present day 
been better able to maintain their ground 
in the coimcils of the Empire than any 
other of the Slavic races of Austria. 

The relations between the Polish aris- 
tocracy and the Austrian Government 
were badly strained in 1908, in conse- 
quence of the Russian propaganda, carried 
on among the Ruthene peasantry of Ga- 
licia. To this Count Szeptycki, the 
United-Greek Archbishop of Lemberg, 
who was subsequently taken into Russian 
captivity, but has since been released by 
the Provisional Government, lent his will- 
ing aid. The Poles, as ever opposed to 
Ukrainophile pretensions, were hostile 
alike to the efforts of Austria and Russia 
to strengthen their hold on the Ruthenes — 
the former through agents of the Catholic 
Church, the latter through those of the 
Orthodox-Greek. The tension, which led 
to the assassination of the Governor, 


Count Potocki, by a Ruthene student, re- 
sulted in the appointment, for the first 
time in the annals of Galicia, of a non- 
aristocratic Pole, the historian. Dr. Bo- 
brzynski, to the Governorship. He en- 
deavored to mediate, not with conspicuous 
success, between Poles and Ruthenes. The 
breach between them, in fact, widened 
when, in March, 1918, the Governor at- 
tempted to carry through the Galician Diet 
a bill for electoral reform intended to 
effect a compromise. He was forced to 
resign, and through his successor. Von 
Korytowski, a Polish nobleman, the ruling 
classes of Galicia were once more brought 
closer to the Vienna Government. Since 
then, however, developments in the Aus- 
tro-German alliance have wrought a 
change in the attitude of Polish and Ru- 
thene leaders toward each other and to- 
ward the Government. The Poles, 
through their spokesman, Coimt Stanilas 
Tamowski, president of the Cracow 
Academy of Sciences, had charged the 
Ukrainists as early as March, 1914, in the 
Galician Diet, with close affiliation with 


the Pan-German Ostmarken-Verein, an 
association notoriously bent on destroying 
the Polish nationality. The Ruthenes 
then plainly showed themselves susceptible 
to German influence. It was generally 
believed by them that the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, under instructions 
from Berlin, favored the establishment of 
a Ukraine state, to whose rule the children 
of his morganatic marriage might suc- 
ceed. The war has ended this dream, 
though it has not allayed the restlessness 
and mutual jealousies of Poles and Ru- 

The question of the resuscitation of the 
ancient kingdom of Poland, which has 
now come to the front, has overshadowed 
the narrower Pohsh question in Austria. 
Since the issuing of the proclamation to all 
the Poles by Grand Duke Nicholas, in 
August, 1914, there has been constant 
interchange of thought between the Polish 
leaders of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 
Sienkiewicz, among others, called on his 
compatriots everywhere to identify them- 
selves with the cause of the Russian peo- 


pie, and Count Wielopolski, the president 
of the Pohsh Club of the Duma that 
assembled at the outbreak of the war, has 
stood for a compromise between Russians 
and Poles which was first advocated by his 
namesake, the Marquis Wielopolski, after 
the revolution of 1880. 

The occupation of Galicia by the Rus- 
sians introduced a new element of imcer- 
tainty into the situation. Attached as 
many of the prominent Poles were to the 
house of Hapsburg, and much as they 
resented the arrogance and brutality of the 
Russian Governor, Count Bobrinsky, who 
kept Lemberg imder the heel of Russian 
autocracy, they yet felt their Polish senti- 
ment enlisted by the liberal stirrings of 
Warsaw. The fortunes of war have ren- 
dered the hope of all Poles for a restora- 
tion of their ancient kingdom not entirely 
illusory. Apparently, Germany encour- 
ages the plans of Austria. It has been as- 
serted that the Archduke Charles Stephen, 
whose sons-in-law. Prince Radziwill and 
Prince Czartoryski, bear names famous in 
the history of Poland, has been selected 


for the throne of the restored kingdom; 
but whatever faith Galieian Poles may put 
in Austrian promises, they will look long 
before they leap into a HohenzoUem trap. 
Their position in the Hapsburg dominions 
during the last fifty years has been by no 
means intolerable, and it is now more than 
ever within their power to strengthen their 

The plan of a restored Poland under 
Hapsburg rule has been mooted before, 
and even Mettemich was not wholly insin- 
cere in proposing it at a time when an 
alUance with France and England agair^st 
Russia seemed feasible. Napoleon III., 
too, had his plan for restoring Poland and 
placing it under the rule of an Austrian 
archduke. Bismarck took notice, during 
the Crimean War, of similar ideas of 
various European diplomatists, but dis- 
missed them as fantastic. But whatever 
he thought of Austria as a possible ruler of 
Poland, he never deceived himself (as lit- 
tle as did his successor. Prince Biilow) as 
to the hopelessness of any attempt on the 
part of Prussia to gain Polish favor. 


"The love of the Poles of Galicia for the 
German Empire," he wrote in his Recol- 
lections, "is of a fitful and opportunist 
nature," and he recognized that Austria 
had at all times a stronger hold on Polish 
sympathies than Germany. He admon- 
ished Germans not to look upon Poles in 
any other light than that of enemies, and 
remarked that Austria could the more 
easily come to terms with the Polish move- 
ment because, notwithstanding the mem- 
ories of 1846, she still retained more of the 
sympathy of Polish nobles than either 
Prussia or Russia. 

The world cataclysm has changed noth- 
ing in the relations of Prussia toward her 
Polish subjects, but a new Russia makes 
a new appeal to hers. At all events^ there 
is no place in a future Poland for Hohen- 
zollern influence, no matter what the role 
of the Hapsburgs may be in the nation 
that is to arise from the ashes of the pres- 
ent war. 


The Nation's Staff of 

The Nation may well be proud of its 
StaflF of Contributors. Started in 1865 
by Edwin Lawrence Godkin and Wen- 
dell Phillips Garrison, who showed re- 
markable discrimination in selecting 
writers with special knowledge and 
with a command of style, this Staff has 
been perpetuated in the spirit of its 
founders. Instead of turning to the 
facile publicist for discussions of out- 
standing questions, The Nation has 
found that a thorough knowledge of a 
given subject such as its experts possess 
does not prevent the full-hearted utter- 
ance which these grave times require. 

Some of the topics treated in recent 
issues are the following: 

The Avatar of the Hun, The Recent 
Crisis in Spanish Neutrality, The Sub- 
marine, Peace Without Annexation, 
Overhauling the Machinery of Empire, 


The Aesthetic IdeaUsm of Henry 
James, The Sham Argument Against 
Latin, Russian Thought and the Revo- 
lution, The WeU-Paid CoUege Pro- 
fessor, The American Tradition and 
the War, China's Coming of Age, The 
Intellectual Mobilization of France, 
The Problem of the New Russia, Italy's 
War of Emancipation, Nationalist 
Ireland — The Case for Home Rule, 
Chili and the World War, The Position 
of Brazil, Why Idealists Quit the 
Socialist Party, The Virtuous Vic- 

To give some idea of the great diver- 
sity of interests embraced by its staff 

of contributors, The Nation selects from 
a list of more than three hundred the 

following names: 

Prof. C. M. Andrews, History, Colonial Period 

to 1766. 
Prof. Irving Babbitt, Rousseau — Literary 

Prof. Hiram Bingham, South America. 
Prof. J. H. Breasted, Egypt. 
Viscount Bryce, South America — The Near 

East — ^Asia Minor. 
Prof. C. J. Bullock, Taxation. 


Ma j •-Gen. W. H. Carter, Riding Horses — 

Prof. G. H. Chase, Greek Art. 

Prof. W. W. Comfort, Mediaeval Literature, 
France and Spain. 

Prof. A. C. CooHdge, Russia and Siberia. 

Mr. Kenyon Cox, Italian Art. 

Dr. G. W. Crile, Surgery. 

Prof. W. M. Davis, Physical Geography. 

Prof. F. H. Dixon, Railways. 

Prof. J. M. Dixon, Japan. 

Prof. E. Emertpn, Church History, 

Prof. W. S. Ferguson, Greek and Roman His- 

Mr. Henry T. Finck, Music. 

Prof. O. W. Firkins, Contemporary Poetry. 

Prof. Warner Fite, Philosophy. 

Mr. W. C. Ford, Early American History. 

Dr. Fabian Franklin, Economic Theory. 

Prof. H. N. Gardiner, Psychology. 

Prof. F. H. Giddings, Sociology. 

Prof. G. L. Goodale, Botany. 

Prof. T. D. Goodell, Metrics. 

Admiral C. F. Goodrich, The Navy. 

Prof. C. H. Grandgent, Romance Languages. 

Dr. L. H. Gray, The Aryan East. 

Prof. A. D. F. Hamlin, Architecture. 

Prof. S. N. Harper, Russian History. 

Prof. C. H. Haskins, Spanish Inquisition — 
Normans — Palaeography. 

Prof. F. H. Herrick, Biology. 

Prof. E. W. Hopkins, Sanskirt. 

Prof. W. H. Howell, Physiology. 

Prof. J. A. Jaggar, Geology. 

Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., Babylonia and 


Prof. A. G. Keller, Sociology. 

Prof. J. F. Kemp, Metallurgy. 

Prof. C. J. Keyser, Mathematics. 

Mr. F. £. Leupp, Social and Political Remini- 

Dr. Jacques Loeb, Artificial Production of Life. 

Prof. A. O. Lovejoy, Philosophy — ^Academic 

Prof. William MacDonald, American Political 

Prof. F. J. Mather, Jr., Art. 

Dr. Paul E. More, Literature. 

Prof. W. B. Munro, Government. 

Mr. A. D. Noyes, Finance. 

Prof. G. R. Noyes, Russian Language and Lit- 

Prof. R. M. Pearce, Scientific Features of 
Modern Medicine. 

Mr. I. R. Pennypacker, Civil War Campaigns. 

Prof. J. B. Pratt, Ethics — Religions of Modern 

Prof. G. M. Priest, German History and Gov- 

Mrs. G. H. Putnam, French Literature and 

Prof. E. K. Rand, The Classics in Relation to 
Modern Literature. 

Miss G. M. A. Richter, Archaeology, Greece and 

Dr. Edward Robinson, Greek Art. 

Prof. F. N. Robinson, Irish and Welsh. 

Dr. George Sarton, History of Science. 

Prof. H. R. Seager, Economics — Social Insur- 

Prof. S. P. Sherman, Modem English Litera- 


Prof. Paul Shorey, Greek Literature and Phil- 

Prof. Munroe Smithy German History. 

Prof. E. C. Stowell^ International Law. 

Dr. E. G. Tabet, Syria— Turkey. 

Prof. F. W. Taussig^ Economics^ Tariff. 

Mr. W. R. Thayer, Italian History. 

Prof. Lynn Thorndike — ^Mediaeval Culture — 

Prof. David Todd, Astronomy. 

Prof. A. M. Tozzer, Central and South Ameri- 
can Archaeology. 

Prof. E. R. Turner, European Political History. 

Prof. A. G. Webster, Electricity — General 

Mr. F. Weitenkampf, Etchings and Prints. 

Prof. J. R. Wheeler, Greek Sculpture. 

Prof. J. H. Wigmore, Criminal Law. 

Lieut.-Col. C. de W. Willcox, The Army. 

Prof. F. W. Williams, China. 

Mr. T. F. Woodlock, Socialism — Railways. 

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