How Bull Run battle was lost ; The Ball's Bluff massacre ; Department of the West-- Fremont

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' HOW BULL EUN BATTLE WAS LOST.
THE BALL'S BLUFF MASSACRE.

DEPAETMENT OF THE WEST-FEEMONT.

BUIili RUN.

The Joint Committee on the Condact of the War
Buhmit the following report, with accompanying tes-
timony, in relation to the Battle of Bull Eun, in
July, 1861:

So long a time has elapsed, and so many impor-
tant events have occurred in the progress of tbe
war, since tbe campaign which ended with the bat-
tle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your Committee
do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail
in their report. The testimony they submit here-
with is very voluminous, and fully covers all the
points of interest connected with that campaign.
They therefore sobmit a brief report, confining tlieir
attention principally to the causes which kd to the
defeat of our army in that battle.

That which now appears to have been tbe great
error of that campaign was the failure to occupy
Ceatreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria
was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas
controlled tbe railroad communication in all that
section of country. The forces which were opposed
to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collect-
ed and brought to Manassas during the months of
June and July. The three months men could have
made the place eas)ly defensible against j^ny force
tbe enemy could have brought against it; and it is
not at all probable that the Rebel forces would have
advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had
Manassas been occupied by our troops.

The next cause of disaster was the delay ia pro-
ceeding against the enemy until the time of the
three months' men was so nearly expired. In that
respect the movement was made too late rather tbaa
loo soon, and the enemy were a lowed lime to col-
lect thiir forces at Manassas and to strengthen the
position by defensive works. The reason why
the movement was so long delayed is shown, to
Bome extent, by the testimony, to which 7our Com-
mittee would direct the attention of those who de-
sire to examine that point.

And when the movement was finally decided upon,
much was needed to render the troops efficient.
There had been but little time devoted to discipin-
ing the troops and instructing them, even as regi-
'ments; hardly any instruction had been given them
in reference lo brigade movement, and none at all
as divisions. When Gen. McDowell reviewed eight
regiments together — the only instance previous to
the battle, as the evidence shows, that even that
number ot troops were maneuvered in one body — lie
was charged witi deeiring to make a show.

Gen. AlcDowell was iustrucled, verbally, by Gen.
Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of opeiaiions
against tbe enemy at Manassas. This plan was con-
siuered in Cabinet meeting, and agreed to; and the
9th of July was fixed upon by Gen. Scott as the day
whentne army should move.

The plan of Geu. McDowell was to move out ia
the direction of Centreville, and endeavor to turn
the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and
destroy bis communicaoion by railroad with Rich-
mond. He asked that a certain number of troops be
giv«a itiia, to ojperate against the force wbica it was

estimated that EeatiTCgard had nnrleT his comttand.
He was assuied that the enemy below should be
kept occupied by Gen. Butler, wno was ia command
at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under
Jobnstoa, in the Winchester Valley, should be held
there by Gen. Patterson. Some cays before the
battle, upon expreesing some fears in regard to the
force under Jollnston being detiiiued by Patterson,
be was assured by Gen. iScott tliut " \f Johnston
joined Beauregard', he slioald nave Patterson on hia
iieels."

The movement did not commence until the 16tli of
July, a week later tban the- time first decided upon.
The transportation was deficient, and Gen. Mc-
Dowell bad to depend upon others to see that sup-
plies were forwarded to him in time. Tlie marcii
was slow, one reason being that, tince the afi'airat
Vienna, near Alexandiia, and at Big Bsthel, near
Fortress Monroe, a fear of f masked batteries "
caused hesitation in regard to advancing upon points
concerning which there was a want of inibrmation.
There was some delay, on the march, m cousequtnce
of the want of comyiete discipJine among some of
the troops. They were not suiiicieutly under con-
trol of olfieers to be pte»euted from leaving the raake
ami straggling.

The arfair at Blackburn's Ford on Tbnrsdny, the
18th, being more extem-ive than Gen. JUcDowell
had ordered, drew the atteution of the enemy to
tliat point; and, in consequence of the preparilions
they made there to meet any attempt of Gen. Me-j
Doweil to turn their position in that direciion, it
became necessary to adopt another line of opera-
tions. Gen. McDowell oeterujiued to make the at-
tempt to turn their risiht;, and steps were taken to
secure the necessary information. It was not until
Saturday that tbe information which Geu. McDow-
ell desired was obtained.

He then issued orders for the troops to move the
next morning, the 21st. some at 2 o'clock and 80m»
at half-past is. Tbe division of Gen. Tyler was itt
the advance, and was ordered to proceed directly
out to Stone Bridge, and take up position there.
Geu. Hunter's and Gen. Ileintzeluiau's divisions
were to follow, and when they reached a road lead-
ing to tbe rifebt, aljout a mile in advance of Gen.
T^ler s camp, they wtre to lurn otf and proceed in
the direction of fciudlKy s Church, and eujeavor to
tarn the enemy's leit. The movement to the right
was intended to be m^.ile under cover of Gen. 'A'y-
iei's force at Si one Biiuge.

But there was mncii delay in tbe movements of
the troops that mornirjg. Tj;ler's (livjiiiou did m't
pass the poiut, whera Hunter's ana Keintzp'-"
divisions w^re to turn otf, until after th'-
nated. Some of the trooris were de^ -
hours, affording time to the enemygg^.-
moveaieiit and make preparaiioCs Iv-nUitti
Notwithstanding these disauvantagts,
were sufcjssfal curing the fore part ot '
though Beauregard bad bee i re-cniorcer
Johnston's forces from Winchester,
were very muca fatigued. Tha cay wf
warm, the roads were daety, and 1
8ome hours longer on the march tba
ticipated. lu the afternoou additir

mentB arrived from Jolmeton's army, and enddeoly
Attacked our right and threw it into disorder.

About the eame time two of our batteries (Eick-
ett'8 and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, and
our entire force began to fall back in great confus-
ion. In regard to the capture of the batteries, it
appeals by the testimony that they were ordered to
take an advanced and exposed position, and were
not sufficiently supported. Not long after they
were placed in position, a Rebel regiment appeared
in their immediate vicinity. Capt. Griffin slates
that he took them to be Rebels from the first, and
directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them
\Fith canister. But Major Barry, Chief of Artillery,
coming up just at the time, told him that they were
some of oar own troops coming to the support of the
batteries, find directed him not to fire upon- them.
The battery was accordingly turned in another di-
rection, an3, almost immediately after, this regiment
of the enemy opened fire upon it, disabling the
horses, and killing and wounding most of the men
at the guns. That completed the discomfiture of our
troops, and the day which bad opened upon our buc-
GOSB closed upon a defeated and retreating army.

A division, under Col. Miles, had been stationed
Bt Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve,
and partlj»to guard against any flank attack. The
enemy did attempt a movement upon our left, but
■were promptly met and checkad by our forces there.

The principal cauee of the defeat on that day was
the failure of Gen. Patterson to hold the forces of
Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah. He had
a force of about 23,000 men ; while the force of the
enemy opposed to him, according to the beet evi-
dence your Committee could obtain, did not exceed
from 12,000 to i,'i,<'iOO men. Gen. Patterson testifial
that he -w»t satisfied thiwit, Johnston had from 35,000
to 40,000 men, and over tO ^i uns. He also states
that a large number of his troops wGre anxious to
return home; that their time had about expired, ar"l
he could not persuade tbem to remain. There is
considerable testimony to show that the troops be-
came dissatisfied, and refused to remain, only when
they learned that their movement' from Bunker Hill
on the 17th of July was a retreat, and not an ad-
vance upon the enemy; that while they supposed
they were beiug led to the attack, little, if 'any,
complaint was mcide, and they were in excellent
^ upiritB,

In reference to the orders given to Gen. Patter-
son, and the obiect to be accoaiphshed by his opera-
tions, there seems to be no question. That object
was to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard
before Gen. McDowell could have an opportunity to
attack the forces under the latter. The character of
the orders is indicated by the following telegram of
the 13th of July (Satnrdayj from Gen. Scott to Gen.
Patt^aon :

I telegraphed yon yesterday, if Jiot strong enough to beat
the enemy oaily uoxt week, make demonatiationa 60 as to de-
tain him ia the valley of VViiichestor. But if he retreais in
force toward Mauassas, and it be liazaraouB to follow liim, then
consider the route via Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg, tc.

Gen. Scott had, the day before, conveyed to Gen.
Patterson the intimation that Gen. McDowell would
commence hia movement on the 16th ol July, and on
the 15th Gen. Patterson advanced from Martinabtirg
to Bunker Hill, remaining there the 16th.

On the 17tJi Gen. Scott telegraphs to Gen. Patter-
sou:

I have nothiD? official from yon since Sunday, but am glad
to lesm from Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do
jjoHet the enemy amuse and delay yoa with a small force iu
"bije he re-enforces the Junction with Ms main body.
first day's work has driven the enemy beyond
•House. The Junction will probably be carried

is no evidence at what time that dispatch

ved. Bui, it could not have been received

movement from Bunker Hill to Charles-

nade by Gen. Patterson, for that move-

'mced very early in tne morning of the

e of the dispatch:

h Gen. Scott telegraphs:

'y been expecting you to beat the enemy. If

i felt him :itron2ly, or at least had occupied

d domonetratious. You have been at least

ippp8», bis sgpetjor in numbsj. H»» be pot

(tolen a march, and sent r«-enforcementi toward MaUMsaa
Junction? A week is euough to win a victory.

To this Gen. Patterson repUes on the same day:

The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him
actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissanco in
force, caused him to be le-euforced.

Gen Patterson testifies as follows:

Qneetion. During all this time you knew that Gen. Scott
expected of you that you should either engage and beat John-
ston, or detain him in the valley of Winchester ; or in the
event that he should come down by a route where you conld
not foUo w him, that you sbouid toilow him via Keyes's Ferry
and Leesburg ?

Answer. Yes, Sir.

Question. And yet, when yon were at Cbarlestown, yon
found yourself not in a condition to do either. Now, my
question la: Why did vou not communicate that fact to Oen.
Scott?

Answer. There was no occasion for it, in my judgment. He
knew my condition, and to have added to the information he
already had would have been a waste of time and paper. I
had informed him of my condition, and it was his business
to order me what to do. I had asked him : " Shall I attack V
It was not my business to say anything beyond that.

When asked if the telegram of the 18th, Irom Gen.
Scott, did not show tbat he still deemed it waa of
the first importance that he (Patterson) should de-
tain Johnston there, Gen. Patterson replies:

I looked upon that telegraph, and so did every gentleman
npon my staff, as nothing more nor less than an exhibition of
bad temper. ^.

Gen. Patterson also testifies:

Question. You say you could have attacked on the 18tb if
ordered to do so. You knew the necessity of detaining John-
ston, and you must have inferred from the telegraph of Gen.
Scott that he expected or required of you that you should do
something in that direction. Why did you not do all that
you could to detain him without an order ?

Answer. Because 1 coul<i not go up there without fighting,
as I could not fall back asrain. 1 had no reason to believe that
that telegram was uot written in the morning in reply to mine
of that morning, [1.3J a. m., asking " Sliall 1 attack ?"J Gen.
Scott ^id not light that day. and there was no more occasion
for my going up and periling my men without an order, than
of doing anything entirely uncalled for — not the slightest oc-
casion for it. * * * * * * *
If Gen. Scott did not fiK^t, and saw the necessity for m J act-
ing 1 repeat it was hia business to give the order.

Ill ai^tilier place he testifies:

Question, ''."hen you found y-u were in condition to de-
tain Johnston, was it vnt aU impcrfitiit that that fact should
have been communicated to Gen. Soctt ; uot the '""M that you
could not fight Johnson, but that you could not detain him.
that your strength was ins-jfiacient for that, and that he could
not rely upon his being kept back?

Answer. I never supposed, for a moment, -that Gen. Scott
believed for the filty-fiith part of « eecoud that I could hold
faim.

Gen. Patterson farther testifies:

Question. You were not threatening Johnston at Charlas-
town so as to prevent his joininz Beauregard at Manassas?

Answer. No, Sir. I remained there because I was ordered
to remain in front of him until he left.

Question. You knew at that time that yon were not oGTering
any obstacl* to his going down to Manassas?

Answer. Perfectly: I knew I had not the means to do It.

Question. Why did you not communicate that fact to Oen
Scott immediately ?

Answer. I did communicate my condition, and where I Wai.

Question. When ?

Answer. On the 16th I wrote him in detail from Bunker
Hill. On the 17th I wrote again. And on the lath I gave him
all the information necessary. And it was his b»sine;s to or-
der me, and uot my business to make any further sugge^stiona
to him.

Question. Did you communicate to him by telegraph ?

Answer. Certainly, I eeut three telegrams to him on the
«ame day.

Question. On what day ?

Answer. On the lilth, at IJ in the morning, I telegraphed
him my condition, and asked him if I should attack. To have
sentluither information to hira would have been rather im-
pertinent, and ho would have so considered it. * * * *

Question. Why did you not inform hira that you were not
then in a condition to oifer any obstacle to Johnston's joining
Beauregard ?

Answer. I would have considered it rather o reflection on
him to have told him so. Ue knew my condition.
Gen. Scott testifies:

But, although Gen. Patterson was never specially ordered
to attack the enemy, he was certainly told and expected, even
if with inferior numbers, to hold the Kebel army iu his front
on the alert, and to prevent it from re-enforcing Manassas
Junction, by means bf threatening maneuvers and demon-
strations— results often attained in war with balf numbers.

instead of doing this, however. Gen. Patterson
came down to Bunker Hill, remained there over the
day when he had been given to understand the ad-
vance would be commenced by Gen. McDowell;
and early the next morning, without waiting to hear
how far Gen. McDowell had advanced, or whether
he had advanced at all, left tho neighborhood of

\\ iucbester, where the enemy was, and turned off
to Cbai'Iestown, where, as be bimeolf says, he had
no means to offer any oostiicle to Johnston's joining
Beauregard whenever he chose. Jobnstou at once
took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded
him, and re-enforced Beauregard in season to inliict
defeat upon our forces at Bull Hun.

Johnston started the greater portion of his forces
from Winchester on the 18th; some of the testimony
stiows that a portion started on the afternoon of the
17tb. Gen. Patterson, though only some twenty
miles distant from Winchester, and nnder orders to
prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Beauregard, did
not discover tbat Johnston had left Winchester until
two days afterward, when he telegraphed, on the
20ih, to Geu. Scotc, that re-enforcciueutB had left
there.

In reference ta deferring the attack upon Beaure-
gard, when the arrival of Johnston's forces had be-
come known, Gen. McDowell says that the infor-
mation tbat be received was too indefinite, mere ra-
mor, and he could not tell hQW mu(;h credit to give
to it. The arrival of the cars duiiog tbe night pre-
ceding tbe battle was not certain evidence of the ar-
rival of Johnston's forces; for it was expected that
regnforcements would be hurried up to the enemy
from every direction possible. And he had been as-
sured that "if Johnson joined Beauiegaid, Patlersoa
should be on his heels."

Gen. Scott testifies on that point:

As connected with this subject, I Cope I may b« permitted
to notice the charge m ide agamst me on the floors of Congress,
that I did not stop Brig.-Gea. McDowell's movement apon
Manassas Junction after 1 had been iufotmf;d of the re-eu-
Ibrcementa sent thither from Wiache»t8r, tiiough urged to do
60 by one or more members of the Cabiuet. i^■iow, it was, at
the reception of tbat news, too late to call off the troops from
the attack. And. beside, though opposed to the luoveuient at
first, we liad all become animated and eauguiue of success.
And it is not true that 1 was urged by anjbociy iu aiUhoiicy to
stop the attack which was commenced as early, I thinii, as tbs
18th of July. E. F. WADE, Chairaian.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War
submit the following report, with tbe accompany-
ing testimony, in relation to the battle of Ball's
Bluff:

On tbs momlDg of Satnrday, the 19tli of October,
1S61, Gen. McUall, commandius a divieion in ibe vi-
cinity of Wasbington, moved his entire command,
under orders fi'ona Gen. McClellan, to Drainesville
and its immediate neighborbood. A portion of his
force was moved some miles beyond Drainesville
and within eight or ten miles of Leesburgi but was
recalled to Drainesville, by order of Gen. McClellan,
about sunset of tbat day. 'rhe entire division of Gen,
Wm. F. Smith was also sent out within Bupporting
distance of Gen. McCall.

Gin. McCall testifies that he was directed to mako
reconnoisiances in _ all directions for three or four
miles from Drainesville, noting particularly the cbnr-
acter of the country. About 10 o'clock on Sunday
moriiing, he informed Gen, McClellan that he should
not be able to get through his work tbat day, and
received in reply, " If you finish iu the morninij;, re-
turn."

On Sunday, the 20tb, Gen. McClellan directed a
telegram to be sent to Gen. Stone, at Poolesville, of
which the following is a copy furnished your Com-
mittee:

Rpceivea Oct. 20, 1861, from Camp Griffin.

Gen. McCleliai: desires me to inform you tljat Gen. MoCaU
occupied Drainesville yesterday, and is still there; will send
ont lieavy reconnoissacces to-day in all directions from that
point. The General desires thut you keep a good lookout
npon Leesburc, to see if this movement has tha effect to drive
them away. Perhaps a sligiit demonbtration on your part
would have the effect to prove them.

A. V. COLB0RN, iUsistant Adjutant-GeueraL

Brig.-Gen. Stone, Poolesville.

On Sunday afteruoon Gen. Stone moved some
forces to the banK of the river at Edwards's Perry,
and crossed over one or two companies to the Vir-
ginia side, but very soon recalled them.

Col. Dovens of the 15th Massi^chugettB testifies
• hat he leceived from Gen. stone, about 1 o'clock on

mday, the following order:

Hbadquarters Corps op Obskrvatiow, )

PooLESViLiK, October 20, 18fil. 5
CotosKI.: You will please send orders to the canal to h«r»
the two new flat-boats no .V there opposite the island (Hoi-
riaon's) transferred to the river ; and will, at 3 o'clock, p. m.,
have the island re-enforced by all of your regiment now on
duty at the canal and at the New-York battery. Tbe picketn
will be J oplaoed by the companies of the 19cb Massachusetts
there. Very respectfully, your ob8di6;.,t servant,

CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.
Col. Crarlfs Devsns, Commanding 15th Eegimeut Masaa-
chusetts Volunteers.

About dark a verbal order was eent to Col.
Devens to send Capt. Philbrick, of his regiment,
with a small party, across the river &om
Harrison's Island, with directions to push out to
within a mile of Leesburg, if possible, without
being discovered, and then return and report. Capt.
Philbrick accordingly crossed, with, perhaps, 15 or
20 men, at a place where he had crossed some time
previously, when he bad discovered that the river
at that point was not picketed by the enemy. He
landed at the foot of the bluff, opposite Harrison's
Island, known as Ball's Bluff, ascended by a path
that led to the top, and proceeded to reconaoiter as
directed.

Before Capt, Philbrick returned, Gen. Stone sent
the following; dispatch to Gen. McClellan, a copy of
which was furnished your Committee:

Heabquaktkrj Akmt op the Potomac, i
Received Washington, Oct. 20, 1861, from Poolesville. 5

Made a feint of crossiug at this place this afternbon. and at
the same [time] started areconnoitering party towards Leei-
burg from Harrison s Island. Enemy's pickets retired to In-
trenchments. Report of reconnoitering party not yet received.
I have means of ciossing 12^ men over in 10 minutes at eacb of
two points, Kiver falling slowly.

C. P. STONE, Brlg.-GeB.

Maj.-Oen. McClellan.

Capt, Philbrick pushed ont some distance from the
bluff, and then returned and reported that they had
discovered a email camp of the enemy that did not
appear to be very well guarded. This rejjort was
sent to Gen. Stone.

Col, Devens reports that about midnight he re-
ceived the following order from Gen. Stone:

Heaeqcarters Corps op Observation, >
Poolesville, Oct. 20, 1861— 10§ p. m. 5

Special Order, No. — .—Col. Devens will land opposite
Harrison's Island with five companies of his regiment, and
proceed to surprise the eamp of the enemy discovered by
Capt. Philbrick, in the direction of Leesburg. The l&cding
and march will be effoctsd with silence and rapidity.

Col. Lee, 20th Massachusetts Volunteers will, immediataly
after Col. Devens's departure, occupy Harrison's Island wit^
four companies of his regiment, and will cause the four-oareS^
boat to ba taken across the island to the point of departure of
Col. Dsvens. One company will be thrown across to occnpy
the hights on the Virginia shore, afier Col. Deveos'i depart.
ure, to cover his return.

Two mountain howitzers will he taken silently up the tow-
path and carried to the opposite aids of tbe island, under the
orders of Col. Lee,

Col. Devens will attack the camp of th« enemy at daybreak,
and, having routed, will pursue them as far as he deems pru-
dent, and will destroy tlie camp, if practicable, before
returning. He will make all the observations possible on the
country ; will, under all circnmstances, keep his command
well in band. »ud not saciifice tbam to any supposed advant.
age of rapid pursuit.

Having accomplished this duty. Col. Devens will rfttnm to
his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia
side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until
le-enforced, and one which can be successfully held against
largely superior numbers. In such case he will hold on and
report. CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-GeneraL

Great care will be used by Col. Devens to prevent any
unnecessary injury of private property; and any officer or
soldier straggling from the command for curiosity or plunder
' will bs iuitautly shot.

OH AS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.

Col. Devens commenced crossing bis force between
12 and 1 o'clock at night, and about 4 o'clock J
morning had crossed his five companiea. He pro-
ceeded up the bluff and formed his command on the
top of the bluff and remained there until it was light
enough to find his way. Col. Lee also crossed with
about 100 men, and took position upon the bluff.
Col. Devens sent out scouts to the right and left,
who reported that they could find no enemy.

At the first dawn of" light. Col. Devens moved hia
command out in the direction of the supposed c^mp.
Upon reaching the pohit to which the reconnoiterinfif
party of the nigbt before had proceeded, it was dis-
covered tbat wliat bad bceo faben for a camp was a
single low of trees, the dim li^ht of the moou ehining

between tbem, below the branches, presenting the
appearance of a row of tenta. ''^

Col. Devens had advanced with his force to within
about a mile of Leesburg; he halted his men there,
and proceeded to examine the coantry about his
positioa as far as practicable. He eent word to
Gen. Stone that there had been a mistake about the
camp of the enemy ; that he was well posted in a
wood and concealed, and waited further orders.

Not far from 7 o'clock in the moruing a body of
Kebel riflemen was discovered to the right of Col.
Devens's position, in the direction of Conrad's
Ferry; Capt. Pbilbrick with his company advanced
toward tbciii, when they fell back until they reached
a ditch, under cover of which they halted and
openfed fire upon our men; they were soon driven
out of the ditch into a corn-field where they ob-
tained cover behind some stacks of corn. Another
company was ordered by Col. Devens to the support
of Capt. Philbrick; but before they reached mm
some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance
from the direction of Leesburg. The two com-
panies were then ordered to fail back to the main
body.

About 8 o'clock Col. Devena determined to fall
back to the bluff, where Col. Lee was, which was
done in perfect order. He then reconnoitered the
woods to his right and left, and discovering no ap-
pearance of the enemy, moved forward to hjs
former position.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock the messenger of Col.
Devens returned from Gen. Stone with lustruct'ons
to him to remain where he was, and he would be
supported. Col. Devens testifies that it was either
' then or soon after that he was told that Col. Baker
was to come over and take command. He sent
word to Gen. Stone that he was discovered by the
enemy, but could still hold his old jiosition. About
10 o'clock the messenger returned with this message:
*' Very well; Col. Baker will come and lake coja-
mand."

Col. Devens states that while awaiting^urther in-
strnctions he directed his adjutant to abcertuin tbe
amount of the force with him ; the report was 28
officers and 625 men. He eent once or twice to the
river to ascertain if re-enfoicemeuts were coming,
and what he was to do, but he received no further
order or message.
About 12 or 1 o'clock an attack was made upon
ffuoh Devenb's rforce, which las'.ed some 10 or 15
minutes. Receiving no orders or message from the
river, he fell back about 60 yards, reformed his line
and made dispositions to retire still fui ther if ueces-
eary. And in perhaps an hour he fell back to the
field just in front of tue bluff, where the main action
afterward took place. There he met Col. Baker,
who congralulated him upon the manner in whicli
bis men had conducted themselves.

In relation to the orders to Col. Baker, Gen,
Stone testifies:

I can give you all the early orders to Col. Bater. I sent him
•n order, about midnight on the 2CUi, to seijd the California
Regiaieut to Conind's Ferry, aud have tliem there at day-
break, to awult orders there ; to have the re-
mainder of his brigade roused early ; have a
comiurcable hreakfaat, and be in readiness
to move at 7 o'clock in the moniiD?. Late in the night — it
might have been between 2 and J o'clock in toe morLi^g — I
Bent a cautionary order to Col. Baker, knowing that voluntsers
make too much uoibr sometimes, to have that regiment niarcti
with silence and vvitU unloaded guus. i<'i'om that time I ieot
him no order. •

Gen. Stone testifies that between 8 and Oj o'clock,
when Col. Baker was with him, and they had dis-
cuEseci the whole matter for some time, he save him
s written order to take the entire command of the
jight at Ball's Bluff. That order, witli a communi-
cation from Gen. Stone to Col. Baker, sent some
lime later, was found upon his body after he was
killed. The two papers are as follows:

" HEABQUAKTERS COKPS OP Observatiost. \ .

•• Edwabds's Fkkey. Oct. 2i. 1851. J
" Cot-ONEL: In Cise ol^eavy iijins; in front of Harrison's
Island you v.ill advacce the Cahfornia regiment of your
brigade, or retire the rtgimenls under Cols. Lee and Devena
now on the Virciaia side of the river, at your diacietioa, as-
•liming command on arrival.
" Verv respec'fnl'V, Comoei, your most obedient servant,
"'CHaKLES p. STOXlL, Bii^r.Geo. <;omiaaudiug.
" Ccl. £. D. BaksKi CofiuuouiUug jBrisade."

" Ebadqtjartbxr CoBPg OF Obskrvahow, >
" liDWARDs'g Fbrrt, Oct. 22. 1861—11:50. 5
" CotoNEl: I am informed that the force of the enemy ll
about 4.000, all told. If you can push them you may do so,
BS far ea to have a strong position near Leesburg. if you can
keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If they pass
Leesburg, and take the Gum Spring Road, you will not follo<7
far, but seize the first jood position to cover that road. Their
design is to draw us ou, if ttey are oblieed to retreat, as far as
Goose Creek, where they can be re-enforced from Maneaaas
and have a strong position.

" Report frequently, so that when they are pushed Oorman
can come in on their flank.

" Yours respectfully and truly,
" CHARLES p. STONE. Brig.-Gen. Commanding.
" Col. £. D. Bakeb, Commanding Brigade."

Col. Baker proceeded to Harrison's Island, and
finally concluded to send over troops to re-enforce
Col. Devens and Col. Lee. One of the witnesses
states that Col. Baker was in doubt for a time
whether to recall the troops already over, or to re-
enforce them; but, upon hearing some one on the
Virginia shore call out that they needed assistance,
as the enemy were coming, he determined to re-
enforce tbem, and proceeded himself to the Virgjinia
side, and assumed command. Col. Baker directed
the forces to cross at the point where Col. Devens
and Col. Lse had crossed with their forces.

The means of transporting troops at Ball's Bluff
was exceedingly limited. Between the Maryland
shore and Harrison's Island were only thr<.e flat-
boats or scows, all together capable of cross^ing about
125 men at a time. On the Virginia si^e of the island
there were at first only a Francis metallic life-boat
and two small skiffs, together incapable of carrymg
from 25 to 30 men at a time. Alter a time, one of
the scows, or flatboats, was takeu from the Marj«
land to tbe Virginia side of the island.

The landing on the Virginia side was at the foot
of a very steep bluff, up which a narrow path, wid-
ening toward the top, wound its way; and on the
top of the bluff was a cleared space or field, bor-
dered by woods, which afforded a cover to tbe enemy
until within a short distance of where our troops
were formed.

Col. Baker, according to the testimony, arrived on
the field betw^een 1 and 2 o'clock, and proceeded at
once to form a line of battle upon the field at the
top of the bluff. Tbe amount of the force engaged
upon our side was between 1,700 and 1,800 men,
consisting of about one half of the 15th Massachu-
setts Eegiment, under Col. Devens; a portion (317
men) of toe 20th Maesachusetts, under Col. Lee; the
Tammany Refiiment, under Col. Cogswell; and the
California llegiment, under Lient.-Col. Wiatar. The
enemy's forces were about 4,000 men.

The enemy began the attack — some of the wit-
nesses say between 2 and 3 o'clock, others at 3
o'clock — at first heavily, on the right of our line,
then moving along toward the center and left,
where tbe hardest fighting took place.

Your Committee do not deem it necessary to go
into tbe details of the action. It continued for over
two hours, our troops contending most bravely
a.eainst greatly superior numbers. Col. Baker fell
between 4 and 5 o clock, having been most couspic-
nous for his bravery aud almost recKless daring.
When he fell the line began to waver, and some por-
tions of it gave way before the destructive fiie of
the enemv.

After the death of Col. Baker, the command de-
volved upon Col. Cogswell of the Tammany K«rgi-
ment, who proposed to attempt to cut through to
Edwards's Ferry, which was assented to by the
other regimental commanders. Upon attempting a
movement in that direction, they were met by a
Mississippi regiment coming from below, which
opened a must destructive fire upon them. Our
troops gave way, and retreated down tbe bluff
toward the river. This was about dusk, so that oiur
troops were somewhat concealed by the bushes on
the side of tbe bluff. The enemy continued to fire
upon them from the top of the bluff. The men at-
tempted to escape to the island in the boats and by
ewimming, being exposed all the time to the fire of
the enemy. The flat-boat was soon riddled and
sunk, th« life-boat drifted down the stream, and the
skiffs were lost. Many were shot while in the
water; others suceeededinswimoiingto the island;

■ome few, under cover of the darkness, siicceeded in
esoaping aloDg the bank of the river, and finally
reached our lines. But the greater portion were
killed or taken prisoners.

In relation to the operations at Edwards's Ferry,
under the supervisiou of Gen, Stone and the imme-
diate command of Gen. Gorman, as there was no
serious fighting there, it may not be necessary to go
much into detail. The crossing was commenced
abont daybreak by the forces under Col. Dana of
the 1st Minnesota Regiment, and was continued
until some 2,500 men were crossed over that day.
The means of crossing were very limited, a6 at Har-
rison's Landing, consisting of tbreo or four flat-boats
or Bcows, propelled acroes by poles. The place of
lauding was very good, and covered by our artillery
on the Maryland side. There were no important
demonstrations made by our forces on tbe Virginia
side of Edwards's Ferry. Some rebonnoiseances
were made tor a short distance, and one regiment of
the enemy seen, probably the Mississippi regiment
that arrived on the field at Ball's Bluff, near the
close of the action there.

Gen. McCall's division had remained at Draines-
ville all ot Sunday and Sunday night. Gen. Mc-
Call testifies :

" At 6 o'clock on Monday morning I reported to him (Gen.
McClellan) that the engineers whom I haa consulted reported
to me that they would finish their work in two hours. I Bent
that express to Gen. McCleildU at 6 o'clock, and got his reply,
dated 8 o'cIock, telling me to return aa soon as the work was
finished. I got bis answer between 9 and 10 o'clock. I oi-
dercd the troops then to be ready to move, and as aoon as the
work was hoished 1 returned to my camp under ordere."

Both Gen. McClellan and Gen. McCall testify
that tbe movement to Drainesville was for the pur-
pose of reconnoitering the country in that direction.
But Gen. Stone received no intimation of the object
of the movement. On the contrary, the language of
the dispatch of Sunday might well lead him to be-
lieve that the movement had reference to driving
the enemy from Leesburg. The dispatch contained
no intimation that Gen. McCall was to be soon
withdrawn from Drainesville. He was directed
" to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg to see if
this movement has the effect to drive them (the ene-
my) away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your
part would have the effecc to move them." Gen.
Stone made demonstrations both at Edwards's Ferry
and at Ball's Bluff, and promptly notified Gen. Mc-
Clellan of what he had done. He sent that inform-
ation on Sunday night, and he testifies that he re-
ceived no ifltiuiation from Gen. McClellan as to
what he should do, whether to continue the demon-
strations or not; and received no intimation that
Gen. McCall was not close at hand to come to his
assistance until about 11 o'clock on Monday night.
It was a very general impression ayiong the officers
and men at Edwards's Ferry during Monday 'that
Gen. McCall would come to their assistance; and
Gen. Stone testifies that he cautioned his artillery
about firing upon any troops that might show them-
selves in that direction, lest they might lire upon
our ovrn forces.

lu regard to that matter, Gen. McClellan testifies
as follows:

•' Question. Do you remember whether or not you informed
bim (Gen. Stone) of the withdrawal of Smith and McCall to
their former positions?

" AusW'-r. 1 tnink I did,"

Gen. Stone (FeD. '27, 1863), after stating that upon
hearing of the death of Col. Bviker he proceeded to
Bali's Bluff, where he learned the full extent of the
disaster, and at once determined to withdraw the
troops at Edwards's Ferry, testifies as follows:

" And then, kDowicg that 1 could go niyf elf quicker than
anybody I could send, I turned ray horse and galloped down
to withdraw my troops at Edwards's Kerry Duck to me Mary-
land ehoie. I supposed at that time that I had about 2,5U0
njen across the river; and tiie reports 1 had heard oppasito
Ball's Biutf were that the enemy had been lari^ely re-enforced,
and they were then about 10,0(10 strong. I saw that there was
great dauger of Gorman bolne overwhelmed at Edwards's
Ferry. I did not know whether McCall would be there to as-
bist him or not. 1 was in utter ignorance iu reference to him
or bis position.

" 1 at cnco commenced retiring my troops as quietly but as
rapidly as 1 could, taking the precaution to have my artillery.
on the Maryland side so placed as to cover the troops on the
Vii'giiiia side. The ground on tbo Maryland shore comicjinii*

perfectly the ground on tbe Virginia shore, >nd it would be aa

exceedingly dangerouB thing for troops to advance and attac):
any body of men on the Virginia shore, directly at Edwards'*
Ferry, wljile the Maryland shore was well held by artillery.

Tiie moment 1 had given the order for the retiring of those
troops, I reported by telegitfph to Gen. McClellao, at Wash-
ington that we had met with a repuUe on our right but I
was doing the best I could to secure the left, and to retrieve.
I am not quite sure now whether 1 telegraphed to Gen. Mc-
Clellan, before I went up to Harriiou's Island, that Col, Ba-
ker had been killed, or whether I put thit in the same dis-
patch in which I informed him of the reunlse.

Having sent that information to Gen. McClellan, I con-
tinued withdrawing the troops, watching caretuUy, so aa
to use the artillery for their protection if necrssary. After
some time— I cannot tell hotv long, for one takes but little
note of time under such circumstances, but apparently aa
socn as a mesiage coald go to Washington and an answer be
returned (being carried by a courier on horseback four milea
each way from the telegraph station to Edwards's Ferry)— I
received orders from Gen. McClellan to this effect; "Hold
all the ground you now have on the Virginia shore if your
men will fight, intrenching, if n»ce^sary. You will be re-
enforced." Perhaps the words "if your men will fight"
came before the rest of the dispatch; and my impression is,
though I will not be positive, that the words " at all hazards"
were used in the dlrecUon to hold all the ground on the Vir*
ginia shore.

I am sorry that I have not possession of a single paper, tel-
egraph or otherwise, of the records connected with my di-
vision. You know the way in which I was removed from my
command. I was ordered to report myself here, in Wash-
ington, at once ; and having not the slightest suspicion of why
I was required here. I left all my papers as I would have done
had I been going out for a two nour»' ride; and from that
time to this I have never seen a single paper of any kind I
then left behind me. I make this explanation to show why
it is that I cannot speak posirively about the language of dis-
patches received and sent ; why I canuot, perhaps, give their
exact words.

I saw all the danger in which my troops were on the Vir-
ginia side, but 1 supposed at that time that Gen. McCall was
very near there, and I took it for granted when Gen. McClel-
lan telegraphed me to hold my position on the Virginia side at
'all liaziir is, and that I should be re-enforced, that be had the
means of immediatelv securing me.

I cannot state positively when it was that I telegraphed to
Gen. Banks. F.ut my impression now is that just as 1 started
to go up to Ball's Bluff, when the news of Col. Baker's death
reached me, I telegraphed to Gen. Banks, requesting him to
send up a brigade. When I got to Harrison's Island, and be-
fore I returned to Edwards's Ferry, I dispatched a messenger
to meet whatever brigade Gen. Banks might send, and con-
duct it to Conrad's Ferry, instead of to Edwards's Ferry, from
which my dispatch to Gen. Banks was sent.

And my lnip_re6sion is that when 1 returned to Edwards's
Ferry, and ti-legranhed to Gen. McClellan the fact of the re-
pulse at Ball's Bluff, I sent another telegram to Gen, Banks
that he had better brins up his whole division. I know 1 sent
Gen. Banks such a telegram ; but at what time X will not be
positive.

Some time was lost in communicating with Gen. McClel-
lan, by my receiving a dispatch, in cipher, of which I had not
the key, from him or from his Chief of Staff. What the con-
tents of that dispatch were, I have never learned. I iaime-
diately responded to it : "I have received the box, but have
no key." What that dispatch was, I have no knowledge of
whatever; but I presume that the dispatches which came af-
terward covered the same ground.

I cannot sate now. after so long 6fn interval of time, at
what hour I telegraphed to Gen. McClellan. urging that the re-
enfurcements should be sent to Goose Creek, on the Virginia
side, supposing all the time that Gen. McCall was not far off.
The response to tliat, which I thick I received about 11
o'clock on Monday night, was the first intimation I ever re-
ceived toat McCall had not all the time been near me. That
dispatch informed me that no reenforcemeuts could reach ma
from the Virginia side, but that Gen. BmjkB would reeuforce
me from the Maryland side.

Question. Uow far was Gen. Banks from you ?

Answer. He was about 14 miles in my rear.

Question. Did that first dispatch from Gen. McClellan,
promising you reeuforcements, contemplate that they should
come from Gen. Banks'?

Answer. Yes, Sir, I suppose so; but at the time my idea
was that McCall was close by me. And I was led into sa
error, late in the evening, by receiving a dispatch frem
Gen. McClellau's headquarters, whether signed by him or
his chief of staff, I do not now recollect, asking me if there
was a road from " Darnesville " to Edwards's Ferry. Now,
there is no snch place as " Darnesville;" but ther2_Ja_^
" Drainesville." And havinj in my mind that McCiilwas at
Diainesville, I took it for granted that the operator had made
a mistake, and had meant Drainesville instead of "Darnes-
town," which was the name of a place in Maryland, and
which proved to bo the place meant. I replied to that dis-
patch to tbe best of my rwcollection, that there was a good
road from Drainesville to Edwards's Ferry. I presume that
that caused some misconception at Iieridquarters, because
they undoubtedly had "Darnestown" in their minds when
they telegraphed "Darnesville;" just as I had " Draiues-
yille" in my mind when 1 saw " Darnesville" in the dis-
patch. But that is not very important, only to show how
errors will creep in.

1 think that by this statement I must remove any unpleas-
ant impression with retard to my improperly exposing troops
to disaster at Edwards's Fert^, since I acced under the in-

BttnctioBfof my inperioroffieer; andalaoundei: the Impres-
eion that oar force* under Geo. McCall were near us on the
Vir£inia side of Edwards's Ferry.

Question. How happened it that you failed to make this
■tatement, concerning those orders, on your former examina-
tion?

Answer. Because I did not deem it proper to give any of
the orders of my superior officer which he had not himself
previously published or authorized me to use. The morning
that I came before your Committee I was inatrncted at Gen.
McClellau's headquarters that it was the desire of the General
that officers giving testimony before the Committee should
not state, without his authority, anything regarding his plans,
his orders for the movements of troops, or his orders concern-
ing the position of troops. That covered this case.

Question. Did you understand that to apply to past orders
and tranaactions as well as those to be executed in the future ?

Answer. I did ; because I could not know, and did not
know, what orders to others were given coteojporaneous
with those I received, and I might create wrong impressions
by giving the orders I had received from my commanding
General, unless there were at the same time produced cotem-
poraneous orders given to other Generals. And 1 presume
that the Chairman will remember that I stited, when giving
my testimony^before, that I could not give any orders from
my commanding General except such as he himself had made
public.

Question. Did Gen. McClellan approve of the crossing at
Edwards's Ferry end Ball's Bluft', on the 2l6t of October,
1861 ?

Answer. I received a dispatch from Gen. McClellan in
reply to onn which I had sent him, informing him of the
crossing of Gen. Gorman and Col. £ater. That dispatch to
me commeuced with these words: " I congratulate you and
your command." I took that congratulation, on the fact of
lay having ciossed. as an approval of the crossing; and as I
had received no information whatever concerning Gen. Mc-
Call, iu my own mind I supposed tiiat it was but a simple
thiug of Gen. McClellan in connection with any other move-
ments he might be making.

Question Was Gen. McClellan informed of your means of
traueportation for crossing troops ?

Answer. Some time during the day— and I think it was in
the same dispatch in which he atfced me for inlormatiou of
the enemy, and 1 shonld think that that dispatch must have*
reached nie about noon — Gen. McClellan asked what means
of transportation I had. I replied to him by telegraph, slat-
ing the number and character of the boats at each crossing —
at Edwards's Ferry and at Harrison's Island.

Gen. McClellan testifies ia reference to the cross-
ing of Gea. Stone's forces into Virginia:

I have no recollection of any order which justified the pas-
sage uf the tiTer in force. I am sare that I had no inten-
tion that he should do that. ,

The events that occnrred subsequently to the
operations of Monday— the arrival of Gen. Banks
with hia forces, the arrival of Gen. McClellan,
and the final withdrawal of all our forces to the
Maryland side of the river — are fully set forth in the
teetioiouy herewith submitted, and your Com'Jiittee
do not deem any comments by them to be necessary.
In connection with the battle of Ball's Bluff, two
points remain to be considered: I'irst, whether a
croesiog was jusiifiable nnder any circumstances,
considering the very insufficient means of transporta-
tion at the command of Gen. Stone. Second, whether
the forces under Col. Baker could, and should, have
been, reenforced from the Virginia side of Euward'a
Ferry, when it was known tbat the troops under his
command were engaged with the enemy.

In regard to tbe first point, all tbe testimony goes
t© prove that the means of transportation were very
inadequate. The testimony of Gen. Stone would
eeem to indicate that, while he was inclined to deem
it suflicient, under what he nnderetood to be the cir-
cumstances under which tbe movement was made,
he left much to tbe judgment of others; and this
much can be said for him, that he received no inti-
mation that a movement across the river would be
expected from him, or would be justified, until the
day before (Sunday) it was actually made. And the
' "TgSSDirt-iuai he had for supposing that other forces
were within a short distance to render him assistance
are set forth in the previous portion of this report.

In reference to re-enforcing Col. Baker, the testi-
mony is very conflicting. There is no question that
it was known that the forces at Ball's Blulf were
engaged with the enemy. The firing or musketry
was distinctly heard »t Edward.s's Ferry, on both
sides of the river. The only question is wneiher re-
enforcements should have been sent under the cir-
cumstances, and wnether there was any sufiicient
reason whv they were not eent. Gen. Stoue testi-
fies tliat he received no intimation irom Col. Baker
that he needed re-enforcemeals; that he received lit-

tle, if any, information from Col. Baker in refer-
ence to the condition and progress of afFaira at BaU'B
Blufi'; and he also testifies that, even if re-enforce-
ments had been needed, they could not have been
sent up on tbe Virginia side; that the enemy had
earthworks and batteries between Edwards's Perry
and Ball's Bluff, which would have made- it ex-
tremely hazardous, if not impossible, to have sent any
re -enforcements by that route. Some of the other
witnesses testify to the same effect. Others testify
most positively that, so far as they were able to
judge, there was no obstacle whatever in the way of
ourtroope passing up on the Virginia side from Ed-
wards's Ferry.

It cannot be denied that had re-enforcements
promptly arrived at Ball's Blviff from Edwards's
Perry, the result of the battle there would, in all
probability, have been greatly to our advanta£;e,
instead 'of being a most melancholy disaster. The
evidence is so veiy contradictory that your Commit-
tee retrain from expressing any positive opinion
upon that point, but allow each one to form his own
conclui-ion from the testimony they have been able
to obtain.

One other subject remains to be considered before
closing this report — the arrest and imprisonment of
Gen. Stone. Your Comroittee would bave made no
reference to that subject, but have submitted the
testimony without comment upon their part, had it
not been for tbe efforts that have been made by
many to hold them responsible for all that has taken
place in reference to the arrest of Gen. Stone.

In the course of their investigation concerning the
causes of tbe disaster at Ball's BluiF they obtained
•testimony, most unexpectedly to them all, which,'
without explanation, seemed to impeach the military
capacity and the loyalty of Gen. Stone. That testi-
mony, as in every other instance that they deemed
of iniDorlance, was brought to the attention of the
proper authorities here, and the War Department
was informed that, in the opinion of the Committee,
a prompt investigation should be instituted. First,
Secretary Cameron, and afterward Secretary Stan-
ton, were informed that the testimony before your
Committee was of such a character that some ex-
planation by Gen. Stone was required.

Gen. Stoue was called to this city, and on the 3lBt
of Janudry, 1862, appeared :hefore your Committee,
at thj instance of Gfen. McClellan, and stated that
he had been informed that certain testimony before
this Committee affected him in such a way as to
require his explanation. He was informed that
tbere was testimony which might appear
to impeach his conduct in the Ball's Bluff
■ affair ; to show that he had had undue inter-
course with the enemy, both by letter and by per-
sonal intercourse with their officers; and also that
he had permitted the enemy to erect formidable for-
tifications and batteries within reach of his guns,
and which he could have prevented. The statement
was made in general terms to Gen. Stone, and with-
out ir.dicatmg who were the witnesses who had tes-
tified, in order that they should not be called to ac-
count by their commanding general for statements
made before a commit; ee of Congress.

In reply to this general statement upon the part
of your Committee Gen. Stone proceeded to make an
explanation in general terms. ' They then reported
to the Secretary of War that the testimony upon the
points to which his attention had been called was
conflicting. They made no recommendation as to
what should be done, one way or the other; merely
reported to him that tbe testimony was conflicting.

Not long afterward they learned through the press
that Gen. Stone had been arrested, and sent to Fort
Lafayette. The immediate cause of his arrest they
did not know. Thev were satisfieid that tbe informa-
tion which they had furnished to the department had
in all probability furnished some of the grounds upon
which his arrest had been made; but they did not
learn until more than a year afteward what was the
immediate cause of his arrest at the time it was
made.

Gen. Stone was arrested on the 8th of February,
1862. On the 28th of February, 1863, Gen. Mc-
Clellan testified before your Committee as follows;

About ten days or two weeks before Gen. Stone was actually
arrested, the Secretary of War gave me a written order to ar-
rest Gen. Stone, for the reason that he had heen informed by
the members of the Committee pa the Conduct of the War
that they had taken testimony /iJ'jiiig to show that Gen. Stone
had been guilty of conduct iiot'consistent with loj-alty. Gea.
Stone was removed from hii> Command, and, I uudecetood, ap-
peared before this Committee.

Finally, on the very oay of his arrest, a written report was
made to me of the cxamiuation of a refugee from Leeaburg,
which, so far as e jch a thing could, tended to corroborate some
of the charges made against Gen. Stone. I satisfied my own
mind of the sincerity of this refugee by personal examination,
and then showed the statement to the Secretary of War, upon
which he directed me to give the order to arrest Gen. Stone
immediately, and to send him under guard to' Fort Lafay-
ette. The order was carried into execution the saine even-
ing.

Since the release of Gen. Stone he has been per-
mitted by your Committee, in consideration of the
peculiar circumstances attending his arrest, to exam-
ine all the -testimony -which your Committee have
taken in reference to the administration of his de-
partment, and to make as full a statement to the
Committee as he considered necessary. That state-
ment, togethel" with all the testimony, is herewith
submitted.

It is due to Gen. Stone that your Committee
should state that it appears, from the documents be-
fore your Committee, that immediately upon his ar-
rest be demanded that he should be furnished -with a
copy of the charges against him, and be allowed the
opportunity of promptly meeting them; -why his
request was not granted your Committee have
never been informed. B. F. Wade, Chairman.

SEPARTiarENT OF TW.M TVE»T.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War
submit the following report, with the accompanying
testimony in relation to the Department of the West:

Your Committee have been unable to take all the
testimony necessary to enable them to present a com-
prehensive report in relation to the administration of
a.fairs in the Department of the West, more partica-
lurly while under the command of Gen. John C.
Fremont. Compelled to remain in attendance upon
Congress during its sessions, they were unable to
visitthe Department in order to take the teatiniony
of witnesses there. And they did not feel willing
to call from so great a distance the witnesses whose
testimony was , necessary to fully elucidate all the
facts, as their services were constantly required in
the field. Throughout their investigations your
Committee have strictly adhered to the rule adopted
by them from the first, to ask the attendance of
those in the military service only when no detri-
ment to the public interests would result from a
temporary absence from their command. When
Congress closed its session last Summer,
many of those who had been most
actively engaged in the operations to which
your Committee desired to direct their attention had
been ordered to other parts of the country; some
were in Tennessee and Mississippi, some in Arkansas, '
some in the Army of the Potomac, and others in the
Department of the South under Gen. Hunter. Such
testimony as was within reach your Committe, have
taken. Bat they are fully aware that their investi-
gation upon that subject has been far trom complete ;
and they, therefore, present bdt a brief report,
toi^ether with siicU testimony as they have obt-aiaed.

When the R-?b«llion commenced Missouri was one
of the most turbulent among those States which tbe
itebel leaders sought to gain over to their cause by
the connivance and treachery of the State authori-
ties, and by the presence of armed forces to operate
upon the fears of the people. The number of Fed-
eral troops in that regiou was very small ; a great
portion of our troops, siutioned in the Territories and
at oar military posts upon the Western frontier, had
been basely surrentiered by Twiggs to the Rebpis in
Texas. St. Louin, the great commercial "emporium
of the State, was preserved from falliug into Rebel
control only by 'Jie prompt and fearless course pur-
sued by General, then Captain, Lyon, who, not
waiting for orders or authority, occupied th'^ United

States arsenal, 'when threatened by the traitor Gov-
ernor of the Ctate, and dispersed the Rebel troops
who were collected under the specious name of State
Guards, in a camp of iustruction near SI. Louis.

The difficulty under which our commanders there
labored in obtaining supplies of arms, clothing, &.c.,
for volunteers, was far greater than was telt in any
other part of the country. Distant from all the
principal depots, at a time when the ability of the
Government was taxed to the utmost to arm and
equip the large number of volunteers called into the
field, those who were, from time to time, placed in
charge of that department, were compelled to act
under the greatest disadvantages.

Just previous to the appointment of Gen. Fremont
to th^ command of that Department, the state of
affairs in Missouri had become very alarming. In
every portion of the State the Rebel forces had ap-
peared and assumed the offensive; all through the
State they were committing their depredations, and
Jackson, the Governor, had appeared with a large
force of troops furnished by the Rebel aathorities
from Arkansas and Texas, in addition to those he
had been able to collect in Missouri. Pillow and
other Rebel Generals had collected a large force
from Tennessee, Kentucky, &c., and were threaten-
ing the south-western portion of the State and Cairo
at the mouth ot the Ohio. Gen. Lyon, who was the
highest oflicer in command after the removal of Gen.
Harney, had, with his limited means, been most ac-
tive, and had taken the field for the purpose of p?e-
ventiug Jackson, with his superior forces, from get-
ting possession of the northern portion of the State.

In July, Gen. Fremont was assigned to that com-
mand. He proceeded to New- York City, wbere he
spent some days, endeavoring to arrange for supply-
ing his Department with the arms, &c., which were
absolutely requisite. He reached St. Louis on the 25tb
of July. Gen. Pope, who had been assigned the
command in Northern Missouri, was calling for
troops to enable him to take the field ; Gen, Lyon,
In the south-western portion of the State, had been
calling for re-enforcements for some time; Gen.
Prentiss, at Cairo, was also asking for re-enforce-
ments. Gen. Fremont first re-enforced Cairo, as
being the most imDortant point, situated, as it was
at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, and con-
trolling the navigation of those two rivers. The
number of troops that he could obtain for that pur-
pose was small ; but the enemy were led to believe,
by the large number of steamboats that went down
from St. Louis that the re-enl'orcement was far
greater than it really was; and PiUow, who
had 'a force estimated at 12,000 men, was de-
terred from making the attack he had contemplated.

Cairo being re-enforced, Gen. Fremont at once
took steps to send troops to Gen. Lyon. The num-
ber of the enemy opposed to Gen. Lyon was almost
overwhelmmg. It was supposed by many that he
would retire before them until he should meet sup-
ports. He himself seems to have contemplated such
a movement, for, after the affair of Dug iJpriugs, he
retired to Springfield ; and Gen. Sturgts testifies that
at that time. Gen. Lyon expressed his convictions
that re-enforcements could not be sent to him.

Upon reaching Springfield, Gen. Lyon halted his
forces, and, alter waiiiug there some four or five
days, announced his intention to march out and at-
tack the enemy. What reasons influenced him in
forming that determination are not well establiished
by the testimony. Some of the officers liave ex-
pressed their conviction that he apprehended that
the enemy, should ho retire further from them,
would fall upon bis rear and cripple him, or foi(^\r^
him to fight a battle under great disadvantages, iiia
brave spirit, doubtless, led him to meet the jemy he
had gone so far to reach, and endeavor to inflict such
a blow as would lead them not to press very closely
upon him. Whatever his reasons msy have been,
he determined upon the attack. The battle was
fought at Wilson's Creek, on the 10th of August,
and, though the enemy outnumbered our forces four
to one, our army was eminently successful.

Gen. Lyon fell leading on a regiment to the attack.
His loss at that tipae was most deeply felt. Dying

a< a brave soldier wonld wish to die, fighting for the
cause of hiB country against those who were seeking
-its destruction, his example has exercised its influence
upon those who have since won the glorious victories
Which have made onr armies in the West so iUus-
tnons.

After that battle our forces retired to Rolla, the
enemy beiug so severely punished that they followed
only at a distance. At Rolla they were joined by
the troops that had been started to their relief, but
had been delayed for want of transportation.

In September, Col. Mulligan, who had been npon
an expedition ia the northern part of the State, was
obliged to fall back before the forces of the enemy
advuncing against him under Gen. Price. Col. Mul-
ligan made a stand at Lexington, and prepared to
resist them, sending for re-enforcements. Gen.
Fremont, upon hearing of Col. Mulligan's situation,
made arrangements to send troops to his assistance;
but from various causes they were unable to reach
him, and the enemy succeeding in cutting off hie
supply of water, he "was compelled to surrender.

Snortly after this, Gen. Fremont determined to
take the 'field m person, with all the forces he could
collect together. He was deficient in transporta-
tion; BO much 80 that the Adjutant-General of the
army reported to the Secretary of War that Gen.
Fremont would be unable to move. He did move,
however, and by Nov. 1 succeeded in reaching
Springfield. The enemy, some 2,000 strong, had
been driven from Ihatjplace by Major Zagonyi, who,
with barely 100 cavalry, made the most brilaant
charge of ttie war.

Preparations were made to engage the enemy,
who were understood to be in force in the immediate
neighborhood of Springfield. The day was fixed,
and the order of the attack determined npon. Just
then Gen. Fremont was removed from the com-
mand, and Gen. Hunter appointed as his successor.

Gen. Hunter testifies that he became satisfied that
the enemy were not bo near as Gen. Fremont had
supposed. He determined, therefore, to withdraw
to St. Louis, which was done, and active operations
in the State were suspended for some time.

In relation to the administration of Gen. Fremont,
much has been said about the high prices paid by
him for arms and other supplies; the unnecessary
fortification of St. Louis; "delay in re-enforcing
points threatened by the enemy; undue assumption
of authority, &.c. Year Committee can but briefly
notice those dtflferent points, on account of their ina-
bility to obtain full evidence in relation to them.

This much, at least, appears to be established:
.Gen. Fremont, upon takiug the command, was
clothed with the most ample authority, and the ex-
igencies of the Department were such that much
ehould be pardoned in one comoelled to act so
promptly, and with so little ai bis command.
Whether that authority was exercieed, in all re-
spects, as it should have been — whether Gen. Fre-
mont was justifieii ia all that he did by the circuin-
Btanbes UDder which he was called upon to act —
your Committee do not undertake to express a pos-
itive opinion.

In relation to the purchase of arms, ' &.C., it ap-
pears that the Department was very destitute of
BOpplies of all kinds;. the demand was most pres-ing,
and the Government was unable to supply it. Some
■ of the arms engaged by Gen. Fremont for the sol-
diers in his department were diverted to the Army
of the Potomac — the primary object of the Govern-
inept then being to collect and equip an army at
Washington as soon as could possibly be doue. This
^"■"jendered it the more important tbat other arms
8h\)iJcl be '"btaiiied. Yet with all that Gen. Fre-
mont deemed it proper to do, his department long
felt the want of adequate supplies.

In reference to the fortifications about St. Louis,
Gen. Fremont but carried out what Gen. Lyon be-
fore him had deemed nece<jsary. In reference to
the manner in which it was doue — as the Govern-
ment has had its agents to examine the contracts
for that work, as well as other contracts, your Com-
mittee forbear expressing an opmion.

In regard to re-enforcing promptly those points
threatened by the enemy, ao far as your Committee

have the evidence berore them, they believe thai-
Gen. Fremont acted with energy and promptness.
He was peculiarly situated. The first call — that of
Gen. Lyon — was pressed upon him so soon after
he took command of the department, and
he was compelled to act so hastily, without
time for fully surveying the 3eld berore him, and
ascertaining the extent of the re?'>nrces at his com-
mand, that even if he failed to do all ."lat one under
other circumstances might have done, still yoni
Committee can discover no cause of censure against
him. But in regard to both Gen. Lyon and Col. Mulli-
gan, your Commitree have discovered no evidence
of any disregard for the public interest, or want ol
energy or inclination npon the part of Gen. Fre-
mont. Troops were collected by him as soon aa
could be done, and they were promptly sent where
the exigencies of the 8er\'ice demanded. Some ol
them were diverted to other purposes than those for
which Gen. Fremont desittned them. The Govern-
ment Citiiod upon him lor troops to be sent to the
east, at a time when he was most earnestly engaged
in procuring forces for »,;•»• assistance rff Col. Mulli-
gan. Thqfie that were left were sent promptly, and
only failed to render the assistance needed from
causes over which Gen. Fremont had no control.

Gen. Fremont early turned his attention to the
building of gunboats tor oar Western rivers. Who-
ever is entitled to the credit o'' originating the idea
of employing such means of warfare in that section
of country, it is not to be denied that Gen. Fremont
perceived the advantage to result from them. Our
brilhant victories in tuo West will bear enduring
testimony to the correctness of his judgment in that
respect. _

Bat that feature of Gen. Fremont's administration
which attracted the most attention at the time, and
which will ever be most prominent among ihe many
points of interest connected with the history of that
Department, is his Proclamation of Emancipation.
Wiiatever opinion may be entertained in relerence
to the time when the po icy of Emancipation should
have been inaugurated, or by whose authority it
should have been promulgated, there can be no doui>t
that Gen. Fremont at that early day rightly judged
in regard to the most effective means of subdumg
this lie hellion. In proof of that it is only necessary
to reter to the fact that his successor, when trans-
ferred to another department, issued a proclamation
embodying the same principle. And the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has
applied the same principle to all the rebellions
States, and few will deny that it must be adhered
to until the last vesiige of treason and rebellion is
destroyed.

Tne administration of Gen. Fremont was eminent-
ly characterized by earnestness, ability, and the
most unquestionable loyalty. In the exercise ol
the almost unlimited power delegated to him. there
was no evidence of any tenderness toward treason,
<sr any faduie to fully assert the dignity and power
of the Government ox which he was the represent-
* alive.

The manner in which that power was exercised
was to be judged by the resul s, and the policy of
continuing him in command wa3 a matter for the
authorities above him to determine.

In order to pronounce a final judgment upon all
the affairs in the Western Department, much more
information is necessary than is in the possession of
your Committee. They have undertaken merely to
state what seems to be borne out by such testimony
as they have been able to obtain.

B. F. WADE, Chairmtn.
Z. CHANDLER,
JOHN COVOUK,
GEO. W. J LILIAN*

As the testimony which the Committee submit in
relation to the Western Department is so incom-
plete, the testimony of so many witnesses, deemed
material by the wtiole Committee, _ being wanting,
the undersigned decline to concur in th«» above re-
port, and, for themselves, prefer to submit the testi-
mony without comment.

D. W. GCOCH,
M. F. ODb:.LL.

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