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Y 4. W 36; 103-79
H R. 2229. Free TraJe Uitk CobJ dot...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 17, 1994
Serial 103-79
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
H.R. 2229, FREE TOADE WllH CUBA ACT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 17, 1994
Serial 103-79
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-044880-8
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
DAN ROSTENKOWSKI, Illinois, Chairman
SAM M. GIBBONS. Florida
J.J. PICKLE, Texas
CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
ANDY JACOBS, Jr., Indiana
HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
BARBARA B. KENNELLY, Connecticut
WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL A. ANDREWS, Texas
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington
GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JOHN LEWIS. Geor^a
L.F. PAYNE, Virginia
RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
PETER HOAGLAND, Nebraska
MICHAEL R. McNULTY. New York
MIKE KOPETSKI, Oregon
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
BILL K. BREWSTER, Oklahoma
MEL REYNOLDS. Illinois
BILL ARCHER, Texas
PHILIP M. CRANE. Illinois
BILL THOMAS, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida
DON SUNDQUIST, Tennessee
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
FRED GRANDY. Iowa
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
WALLY HERGER, California
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana
MEL HANCOCK, Missouri
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DAVE CAMP, Michigan
Janice Mays, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
PHIUJP D. Moseley, Minority Chief of Staff
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures
CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York, Chairman
L.F. PAYNE, Virginia MEL HANCOCK, Missouri
RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts DON SUNDQUIST, Tennessee
PETER HOAGLAND, Nebraska JIM McCRERY, Louisiana
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York DAVE CAMP, Michigan
MIKE KOPETSKI, Oregon
ANDY JACOBS, JR., Indiana
Subcommittee on Trade
SAM M. GIBBONS,
DAN ROSTENKOWSKI, Illinois
ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
BARBARA B. KENNELLY, Connecticut
WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
L.F. PAYNE, Vii^nia
RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
PETER HOAGLAND, Nebraska
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
Florida, Chairman
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois
BILL THOMAS, Cahfomia
E. CLAY SHAW, JR.. Florida
DON SUNDQUIST, Tennessee
NANCY L. JOHNSON. Connecticut
(11)
CONTENTS
Page
Press releases announcing the hearing 2
WITNESSES
U.S. Depari-ment of State, Michael M. Skol, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Inter-American Affairs 89
U.S. Department of the Treasury, R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of
Foreign Assets Control 96
AT&T, Randolph C. Lumb 295
Alexander, Hon. Bill, a Former Representative in Congress from the State
of Arkansas 74
American Public Health Association, Carlos W. Molina 335
Austin Group, Inc., Hon. Jose S. Sorzano 364
Blyth, T. Peter, Carlson Companies, Inc 262
Cambio Cubano, Eloy Guttierez Menoyo, and Rafael Huguet 225
Canosa, Jorge Mas, Cuban American National Foundation 199
Carlson Companies, Inc., T. Peter Blyth 262
Cibrian, David J., San Antonio, Tex 253
Cuban American Committee Research and Education Fund, Alicia M. Torres . 237
Cuban American National Foundation, Jorge Mas Canosa 199
Cuban Committee for Democracy, Marcelino Miyares 227
Deutsch, Hon. Peter, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida .. 42
Diaz-Balart, Hon. Lincoln, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida 73
Dominguez, Jorge I., Harvard University 327
Ebbers, Bernard J., LDDS Metromedia 289
Elliott, Kimberly A., Institute for International Economics 345
Feinsilver, Julie M., American University 282
Fontaine, Roger W., Report from America 360
Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 9
Gunn, Gillian, Georgetown University 349
Huguet, Rafael, Cambio Cubano 225
Jackson, Rev. Jesse L., National Rainbow Coalition 191
Kopetski, Hon. Michael J., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Oregon 12
LDDS Metromedia, Bernard J. Ebbers 289
Lumb, Randolph C, AT&T 295
McLaughlin, John, The McLaughlin Group 195
Meehan, Deborah T., SH&E, Inc 266
Menendez, Hon. Robert, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New Jersey 47
Menoyo, Eloy Guttierez, Cambio Cubano 225
Miller, Hon. George, a Representative in Congress from the State of Califor-
nia 18
Miyares, Marcelino, Cuban Committee for Democracy 227
Molina, Carlos W., American Public Health Association 335
National Rainbow Coalition, Rev. Jesse L. Jackson 191
Payne, Hon. Donald M., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New Jersey 303
Polyconomics, Inc., Irene Philippi 314
(HI)
IV
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida 35
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ver-
mont 76
Serrano, Hon. Jose E., a Representative in Congress from the State of New
York 37
SH&E, Inc., Deborah T. Meehan 266
Smith, Wayne S., Johns Hopkins University 370
Sorzano, Hon. Jose S., Austin Group, Inc 364
Torres, Alicia M., Cuban American Committee Researdi and Education Fund 237
Torres, Hon. Esteban Edward, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California 20
Torricelli, Hon. Robert G., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New Jersey 26
Zimbalist, Andrew, Smith College 210
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
U.S. General Accounting Office, JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, International
Trade, Finance, and Competitiveness, General Government Division, state-
ment 387
Airline Brokers Co., Inc., Miami, Fla., Vivian Mannerud, statement 398
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Jay
Mazur, statement 405
Anmesty International USA, James CDea, letter and attachments 407
Aruca, Francisco, Marazul Charters, statement 441
Bermudez, Eduardo G., Business for Cuba Foundation, San Juan, P.R., letter 428
Buffalo, City of. Common Council, resolution (forwarded by Charles L.
Michaux III, City Clerk) 427
Business for Cuba Foundation, San Juan, PJR., Eduardo G. Bermudez, letter . 428
Cagan, Leslie, National Network on Cuba, statement 446
Colorado Cuba Information Project, Ltd.; Colorado Hands Off Cuba Coalition;
Colorado Institute for the Improvement of Inter-American Relations, Inc.;
and Havana-Denver Friendship/Sister City Project, Harry K. Nier, Jr., joint
letter 430
Cuba Research Associates, East Lansing, Mich., Donna Rich Kaplowitz, let-
ter 431
De Hechavarria, Alberto Fernandez, Unidad, Coral Gables, Fla., letter and
attachments 451
Gonzalez, Hon. Henry B., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, statement 435
Hartley, Theodore, RKO Pictures, New York, N.Y., sUtement 449
Havana-Denver Friendship/Sister City Project, Harry K. Nier, Jr., joint letter 430
Higginbotham, Jay, Society Mobile-La Habana, Mobile, Ala., statement 450
Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims, David W. Wallace, statement ... 438
Kaplowitz, Donna Rich, Cuba Research Associates, East Lansing, Mich., let-
ter 431
Lastennet, Bernard, Otis Elevator Co., Latin American Operations, Farming-
ton, Conn., letter 447
Latin American Studies Association, resolution 440
Londe, Sol, M.D., National Council of Senior Citizens, West Side Chapter,
Los Angeles, Calif., letter 445
Mannerud, Vivian, Airline Brokers Co., Inc., Miami, Fla., statement 398
Marazul Charters, Francisco Aruca, statement 441
Mazur, Jay, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations, statement 405
Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Section, Linda Shelly, statement 13
National Council of Senior Citizens, West Side Chapter, Los Angeles, Calif.,
Sol Londe, M.D., letter 445
National Network on Cuba, Leslie Cagan, statement 446
Nier, Harry K., Jr., Colorado Cuba Information Project, Ltd.; Colorado Hands
Off Cuba Coalition; Colorado Institute for the Improvement of Inter-
American Relations, Inc.; and Havana-Denver Friendship/Sister City
Project, joint letter 430
O'Dea, James, Amnesty International USA, letter and attachnients 407
Page
Otis Elevator Co., Latin American Operations, Farmington, Conn., Bernard
Lastennet, letter 447
Reich, Hon. Otto J., Washington, D.C., statement 355
RKO Pictures, New York, N!Y., Theodore Hartley, statement 449
Shelly, Linda, Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Section, statement 13
Society Mobile-La Habana, Mobile, Ala., Jay Higginbotham, statement 450
Unidad, Alberto Fernandez De Hechavarria, Coral Gables, Fla., letter and
attachments 451
Wallace, David W., Joint Corporate Committee on Cuban Claims, statement .. 438
H.R. 2229, FREE TRADE WITH CUBA ACT
THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 1994
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, and
Subcommittee on Trade,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittees met, jointly, pursuant to notice, at 10:15
a.m., in room 1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Charles
B. Rangel, chairman of the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Meas-
ures, presiding.
[The press releases announcing the hearing follow:]
(1)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PRESS RELEASE #19
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1994 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE
MEASURES
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1102 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-1721
THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RAN6EL (D., N.Y.), CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES, AND
THE HONORABLE SAM M. GIBBONS (D., FLA.), CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ANNOUNCE A JOINT HEARING ON B.R. 2229,
THE FREE TRADE WITH CUBA ACT
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel (D., N.Y.), Chairman,
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, and the Honorable
Sam M. Gibbons (D., Fla.), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee
on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, announced today
that the Subcommittees will hold a joint hearing on H.R. 2229, the
"Free Trade With Cuba Act," on Thursday, March 17, 1994, beginning
at 10:00 a.m., in room B-318 Rayburn House Office Building.
In announcing the hearing. Chairman Rangel stated: "The purpose
of H.R. 2229 is to move toward normalization of relations with Cuba
by lifting restrictions on trade, travel and communications, and by
restoring the availability of the foreign tax credit with respect to
Cuba. I am particularly interested in receiving testimony on the
implications of the provisions of the bill for U.S. relations with
Cuba, U.S. trade policy in the Caribbean, and business opportunities
for U.S. firms. "
Oral testimony will be heard from invited witnesses only .
Any individual or organization, however, may submit a written
statement for consideration by the Subcommittees and for inclusion in
the printed record of the hearing.
BACKGROUND :
H.R. 2229 was introduced by Chairman Rangel, Mr. Coyne,
Mr. McDermott, Mr. Kleczka, Mr. Kopetski, et al, and was referred
jointly to the Committees on Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, Energy
and Commerce, and Post Office and Civil Service. The bill would
terminate the denial of the foreign tax credit for companies that do
business with Cuba. In addition, the bill would remove all
restrictions on U.S. trade with Cuba, except in arms, under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Trading With the Enemy Act, and
the Export Administration Act of 1979. Additional provisions in the
bill include the repeal of the Cuban Democracy Act, notably its
prohibitions on trade by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and
restrictions on landing rights in U.S. ports by vessels engaged in
trade with Cuba. The bill would also urge the President to take
necessary steps regarding the settlement of U.S. claims and the
protection of human rights in Cuba.
DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS ;
Persons submitting written statements for the printed record of
the hearing should submit at least six (6) copies by the close of
business on Thursday, March 31, 1994, to Janice Mays, Chief Counsel
and Staff Director, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, 1102 Longworth House Office Building, Washington,
D.C. 20515. If those filing written statements for the record of the
printed hearing wish to have their statements distributed to the
press and the interested public, they may provide 100 additional
copies for this purpose to the Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee
office, room 1105 Longworth House Office Building, before the hearing
begins .
FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS ;
Each «l»l« ii»w H priifd to prinbng ID th»
•** NOTICE -- CHANGE IN LOCATION **•
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1994
PRESS RELEASE #19 -REVISED
SX7BC0MMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE
MEAStlRES
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1102 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-1721
THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL (D., N.Y.), CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES, AND
THE HONORABLE SAM M. GIBBONS (D., FLA.), CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ANNOUNCE A CHANGE IN LOCATION FOR THE JOINT HEARING ON
H.R. 2229, THE FREE TRADE WITH CUBA ACT
The Honorcible Charles B. Rangel (D., N.Y.), Chairman,
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, cind the Honorable
Sam M. Gibbons (D., Fla.), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
today announced a change in location for the hearing on
H.R. 2229, the "Free Trade with Cuba Act." The hearing, scheduled
for Thursday, March 17, 1994, in room B-318 Raybum House Office
Building, now will be held in the Conmittee's m a-in ho^ iring room.
1100 Longworth House Office Building .
All Other details for the hearing remain the same. (See
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures press release #19, dated
Friday, February 25, 1994.)
Chairman Rangel. The Subcommittee on Select Revenue Meas-
ures and the Subcommittee on Trade meet this morning for a joint
hearing on H.R. 2229, the Free Trade With Cuba Act.
I introduced H.R. 2229 almost 1 year ago, in an effort to move
toward normalization of relations with Cuba, by lifting restrictions
on trade, travel and communications, and by restoring the foreign
tax credit with respect to Cuba.
Additionally, the bill addresses important issues of financial
claims by U.S. citizens and corporations against the Grovernment of
Cuba and the crucial matters of human rights and democracy.
I do know that there are strongly held views on both sides of this
issue, but it is my hope that these hearings will help move the de-
bate forward. As a member of the Ways and Means Committee, I
have been involved in crafting the Caribbean Basin Initiative and
other legislation affecting the Caribbean and Latin American re-
gions.
As Chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics, I have been
intimately involved in stopping the flow of illegal drugs from and
through countries in that region.
Knowing Cuba's importance not only in the area of drug addic-
tion, but potentially as a contributor to the economic development
of the region, I have long been dismayed by our policy of isolation,
rather than integration, a feeling which is shared by our friends in
the region. But it was not until the fall of 1992, and an unfortu-
nately brief debate over the act generally known as the Torricelli
bill, a bill introduced by my dear friend and colleague, Robert
Torricelli, that I was thrust into the role of an active player in the
debate which we are addressing today.
Ironically, I had been asked by the previous administration to
help them to oppose the so-called Torricelli bill. But, as you know,
after certain political developments in the Presidential election
campaign, the Bush administration changed its position to one of
supporting the bill. Despite that turnaround, I was nevertheless
surprised by the strong level of support in the Congress against the
bill. I was even more surprised by the subsequent emergence of a
chorus of voices from the Cuban-American communities in Miami,
New Jersey and other parts of the country in support of a policy
of normalization.
That is how I was introduced to the issue and that is why I was
moved to introduce the Free Trade With Cuba Act last spring.
There are many reasons for changing our policy toward Cuba. As
an American and as a Member of Congress, I believe it is my re-
sponsibility to speak out for what is best for America, as a moral
nation and as a model for democracy and fairness around the
world.
If we are going to live up to that standard as relates to Cuba,
we should lift the embargo. Seeking normalization of relations,
rather than confrontation and isolation, would first take us out of
the indefensible position of contributing to the suffering of the
Cuban people.
There is no argument but that the collapse of the Cuban econ-
omy is due to the failure of the Communist's economic system. But
to the extent that our embargo limits to any degree the donation
or sales of foods desperately needed, medicines and medical equip-
6
ment, it cannot make us proud as Americans to be a part of that.
Once and for all, we must abandon that road of confrontation that
makes the United States a convenient scapegoat for the failure of
communism.
I want to commend our President and fully support his goal of
defending democracy and human rights, not only in Cuba, out in
Haiti and in China and elsewhere around the far reaches of the
world. It is a goal that, as Americans, we all share, and a banner
that I proudly carried on the plains of North Korea, where I was
wounded by the Communist Chinese, as a foot soldier representing
the United States and the United Nations in the Korean conflict.
Not only do I support the President's goal of promoting freedom
and democracy in Cuba, but I urge him, as I have in the past, to
try another tactic, to bury the hatchet, to open the door of negotia-
tion and to persuasion, and to a process of influence through mas-
sive communication, cultural exchange, travel and trade.
We must never give up our principles. I ask that we find a way
to allow our principles to work. Thirty-four years of embargoes
have not worked. The President, in his wisdom, has taken exactly
that kind of step in Vietnam, a very, very bold decision to drop the
barriers of trade to a country where American blood of 60,000 serv-
icemen and -women was spilled. It was a step that overcame not
only the bitter memories of war, but nearly two decades of shame
and despondency over our only loss in any military conflict. It was
a step that was unopposed by the American people or the Congress,
who were grateful to bring to closure one of the saddest periods in
our history.
It was an action, too, that signified the end of the cold war in
Southeast Asia, in a region where the great conflict ahead will be
in the competition for economic markets. The cold war is over
around the world. We have won. We have smashed the Iron Cur-
tain in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We have
reached an accommodation with China, while demanding, as we
should, that we remain vigilant to the defense of the rights of citi-
zens of those countries, and also now is the time to end the cold
war in this hemisphere.
The administration has made it clear that trade will be the hall-
mark of our foreign policy, our moral goals for democracy and
human rights will be carried out by using wisely the leverage con-
tained in our ability to import and export American goods and in-
vestment by U.S. business.
It is a policy that makes sense in an era where global economic
competition will determine national ascendancy in the world. Our
actions in the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and a host of
other countries whose governments may be offensive to us have re-
mained, or will become, enthusiastic trading partners.
We should be mindful that the policy so well articulated by Presi-
dent Clinton is the same policy being carried out by our competi-
tors, as well. That fact is nowhere better proven than in Cuba.
While we stand by blocking our own companies from competing, in-
vestors from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Italy and many, many other
countries have begun a fast march to capture business opportuni-
ties in Cuba. And it is ironic that, even after we ratified the North
American Free Trade Agreement, our two partners in that pact do
lucrative business with Cuba, the country we insist must remain
ostracized by friend and foe alike.
While we trumpet our commitment to building up the economies
of our friends in the Caribbean with the CBI agreement, we then
threaten them with exclusion from future free trade agreements,
because, as a sovereign nation, they choose to do business with
Cuba. While we call upon the international community and the
United Nations to work as partners in our global enterprises, we
grimly dismiss its condemnation of our international embargo pol-
icy against Cuba.
I would not be so presumptuous as to claim any expertise in
Cuban issues. That is the job of the diplomats. But my position, as
exemplified by this bill, is the position of many of the human rights
and religious leaders in Cuba who have visited me in Washington
since I have introduced the bill.
Prominent and unquestioned leaders in the human rights move-
ment in Cuba, the Catholic bishops in Cuba, the Protestant and
Jewish leaders have all told me that the embargo hurts them and
is doing nothing to promote their goals for freedom and human
rights in their country. I speak for them in appealing to my Presi-
dent and to this Congress to support their heroic efforts for demo-
cratic change in Cuba.
The witnesses you will hear from today will cover the full range
of opinion on this very sensitive and emotional issue. And I am
proud that we in the Congress and this subcommittee have been
able to assemble them in Washington. Many of these voices will be
heard for the first time, because they have been silent in the face
of intimidation by better organized and financed opposition. So, for
their courage in coming today, I commend them.
There are many voices in the American business community,
which has taken a greater role, better than ever before, in being
a salesman for democracy and for our country. The ideas in this
bill will give them a chance to do best in Cuba, as they have done
in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and now in Vietnam,
to sell the best that America has to offer.
I wish to extend a special welcome to our witnesses from the
Cuban-American community, some of them legitimate heroes in
their own right, and now thev wish to enlist our support in doing
what is best for the land in wnich they were bom, and where many
of their families still reside. I welcome them, as I welcome all of
you.
Now, we have a very, very long list of scheduled witnesses, and
we are going to hear from each and every one of them. But to make
certain that the members have an opportunity to ask them ques-
tions, we are going to ask them, as we did inform them before we
accepted their invitation to testify, to restrict their oral testimony
to 5 minutes, with the understanding that, by the unanimous con-
sent of the committee members, their full written statements will
be entered in the record.
I pause now to ask whether any of the members of the Sub-
committee on Trade, as well as the Subcommittee on Select Reve-
nue Measures, have any opening statements.
The Chair yields to Representative Crane of Illinois.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
8
I want to thank the witnesses for coming today to review the
controversial issue of U.S. policv toward Cuba. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc cut Cuba off from large amounts
of subsidized trade, upon which it greatly depended. Unless Cuba
joins the civilized world and renounces dictatorship and State con-
trol, its economy and society will likely collapse.
Enacting a more liberal policy toward Cuba, while the repressive
Castro regime remains in power, would only serve to shore up a
dictatorship which has been our sworn enemy for nearly 35 years.
I oppose H.R. 2229, because it would violate a longstanding biparti-
san policy to isolate the Government of Cuba, until control passes
to leaders who are willing to work constructively with the United
States to promote democracy and free market reforms.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today's testimony.
Chairman Rangel. Is there any other member seeking recogni-
tion? Mr. Shaw?
Mr. Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have always known that you are a man ahead
of your time. I think you are that with H.R. 2229. I would much
prefer this committee to be talking about a post-Castro Cuba, rath-
er than talking about opening up the relationship with Cuba as it
exists today.
As you can see by the lineup of witnesses, Mr. Chairman, in my
home State of Florida, this is a very, very important issue to many
of my constituents and constituents of surrounding districts.
When Cuba finally opens, it is going to be a great economic boon
to South Florida, the Miami-Palm Beach-Fort Lauderdale area.
However, until Castro is gone and his government has collapsed,
there is no place for us. It would send out some very bad signals
for the United States to change our policy toward Cfastro's Cuba.
I learned long ago that when you have your foot on the neck of
a snake, you do not let it up, and particularly when we have the
situation in Cuba where they are no longer the surrogate for the
Soviet Union, which has collapsed. Cuba is without the support
needed to keep it together; The glue that holds the terrorist govern-
ment together is now gone, and I am convinced the "fat lady" is
about to sing in Havana. Until we hear the fat lady sing and Cas-
tro is gone, I would hope we would stand fast by the policy that
is in place and has been in place for over 30 years.
Whether we should have gone down there 30 years ago is not
under debate here. What is under debate is whether the existing
policy of the United States will be the fall of Castro in Cuba, and
I think the answer is a resounding yes. Until Castro and all of his
group are gone and all of the heavies are out of Havana, there will
be no freedom for the Cuban people. That is our goal and should
remain our goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. I want to thank the panel of legislators, an
outstanding number of Members of Congress, and certainly my
friend Bob Graham from the Senate. You can see by the quality of
the Members' interest in this and other issues, we have got quite
a list of Members. We will be starting off with Senator Bob Gra-
ham. We will be hearing from Congressman Kopetski, Congress-
man George Miller, Congressman Torres, Congressman Torricelli,
Congressman Payne, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, Congressman
Serrano, Congressman Sanders, Congressman Deutsch, Congress-
man Diaz-Balart, and former Congressman Bill Alexander.
So I want to thank the entire panel for the quality of information
that you will be sharing with us. And we will start off with the
Senator from Florida, my friend Bob Graham.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF FLORTOA
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the leadership that you are providing in so many
areas of the national debate, and particularly appreciate the invita-
tion to share in this important hearing this morning.
Mr. Chairman, 16 months ago, with the leadership of our friend
and colleague Congressman Torricelli, the Congress restated and
elaborated U.S. policy toward Cuba in the Cuban Democracy Act.
The Cuban Democracy Act enjoyed widespread bipartisan support
in the House, in the Senate, by then President Bush and by then
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton. I believe that the Cuban De-
mocracy Act is an effective tool now, as it was then, in providing
a blueprint for post-Castro Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, the Cuban Government continues its blatant dis-
regard of basic human rights. Last week, John Groth, a U.N. ob-
server, reported that harassment, repression, and imprisonment
are the Cuban (government's daily endemic weapons against dis-
sidents and human rights activists. "It should be said," Mr. Groth
added, "that the Cuban economy's unproductive and inefficient sys-
tem is the principal cause of the present situation, not the embargo
itself."
Havana continues to refuse to cooperate with human rights com-
missioners, and Castro continues to violently crush every reform
movement that threatens his rule. But three decades of totalitarian
government have not quelled the desire of Cubans to be free. The
Cuban people are the ones suffering from Castro's intransigence,
and yet they overwhelmingly say "maintain the embargo."
On March 11 of this year, the Miami Herald, in an article,
quoted Angel Tomano, who had just arrived to America on a raft
from Cuba. Mr. Tomano said, "Lifting the embargo or blockade, as
it is called in Cuba, would only help Fidel Castro stay in power."
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit these comments as part of
the Miami Herald article entitled "Most Exiles Want Pressure on
Castro," to be part of the record of this hearing.
Chairman Rangel. Without objection.
[The article referred to follows:]
10
IDEAS FOR CHANGING CUBA
Most ejciles want pressure on Castro
■y ALFONSO CHARDY
OpponenU or the trade embaiBO on
Cuba are urging Preadent Clinton to
lift it, arguing it hurts the people more
than Fidel Castro.
But nuny reoentiy arrived Cuban
refugees say (hey wholeheartedly sup-
port the umbargo. The sufTering, they
say. i( well worth the possible outcome:
the downrall of (he Castro regime.
"It may hurt the people, bu( thaCs
the price we have to pay fOr the libera-
tion of Cuba," said Angd Tamayo,
who fled by raft last week. ''Lifting the
embargo, or blockade as it's called in
Cuba, would only help Fidel Castro
suy in power."
Taraayo's ooraments reflect the Feel-
iiV of many Cuban refugees in Sooth
Florida, those reoentiy arrived and
thoK who have been here for decades.
All but one of 33 recently airtved
Cubans interviewed last week aid they
want the embatgo maintained. Some
actually want it toughened so that Cas-
tro gets the message desriy: It's tinne to
Debate over the embai^, always
heated in exile Miami, has mlensifted
in (he two weeks since Qinton lifted
the embarao on Vietnam.
Next Thursday, the 99th anniver-
sary of the start of Cuba's war of inde-
EMBilfMO. fflOM 1A
pendeocc. thousands of
Cuban exiles from Miami and
oUier US. cHies will oonveiie on
Washingum, D-C for a rally at
the Capitol to urge amton to
iJ^d nrm and not scrap the
arrived felugtes yieU.c« «» ^^'i^J
dtfrerent outlook. |
Only '"'
■^S^ihrw Cuban-American
nembers of Congress -- Rgs-
rS^iaiart of Flooda and Rob-
^ Mcncndcr of New Jerwy —
Friday circulated a letter o«&p-
ilol Hill inviting fellow iawmak-
cn to participate m the pnxm-
bargo rally. . ^
^4cxl month, the anti-cmbaiio
(digious oTganixation PMlors for
SSr. wiU 1^ its third enter-
SSaAiSSrottoCubafrom
^ 1 1 c diics ai a part of a strat-
32 «nbaiio. In •*irt»?nvl;«5:
iSL^Snin CoBSiesa in M«rt
y^Kgislatioo wntten by
Ray Charles Range!, IW^.Y..
5S*woddlMmtaie»heliaingof
^''r^S other emb-n^^fo-
bdieve momentum crMted by
SS^iTHftlng the CulS;
"^^JVinMi.mWed-*
day. speskcfs said the embaigo
must inbecanae the Cuban peo-
^ aiTgoing hungry and the end
Sf ihe^old War nadeis the
U.S-Cuba conftirt «n«?*»»°«J^
Yet, interviews with recently
newWamvenraugK
I bTlTte H«»»d said
lifting the —^ -.. .
foodand fud shortages. Andbe
«iU felt that keeping »• ««"S
,ws a good strategy against Cat-
-It's a terrible daemm«.«J
Pedro Freyre, who "n*^ J5™
SSiSMbtotolweek^
, makes people sulfei-jjo
hungfvTNo ilucsUojabout tteL
Butuniw t may hdp Jhe gov-
!S„;iS« and the pcoP^c donH
^nTThe <«ctato«hip. What to
do? I ha^-e not >'et resolved the
issue in my own mino.
Pablo Fieyrc however, has no
-ICeep the embargo.
"If they take «n«*«2;!Si^
Fidd wiU not falLHeT" ««'»««•
rafter Fiaociico Mo««oa
SomeoftbefaftenuigBd
be til
qaea. "OAmi gsw*"""**""!:
whatever diey want not the pej^
r^Wtet cant it be more fiwr
2S JuToir everything to cveiy-
bodyr
11
Senator Graham. No scientific surveys have been conducted, but
the informal ones have been conclusive. Thirty-two of the 33 re-
cently arrived Cubans interviewed last week said that they want
the embargo maintained. The Cuban people are willing to make the
sacrifices necessary for the fall of Castro. We must support their
efforts.
The Cuban Democracy Act had several objectives. It was de-
signed to isolate the Castro regime, politically and economically. It
was designed to facilitate contact with the people of Cuba and to
outline a course of U.S. action to assist the restoration of demo-
cratic institutions and market economies in a post-Castro Cuba.
The embargo explicitly permits the United States to send hu-
manitarian supplies to the suffering people of Cuba. And since the
passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, the Federal Government has
licensed $8.5 million worth of humanitarian donations through reli-
gious, social and professional groups, as well as private individuals.
Contrary to many arguments, the Cuban Democracy Act is not a
draconian punishment of the common people of Cuba. The citizens
of Cuba are provided with humanitarian aid from friends and fami-
lies.
Mr. Chairman, there have been some comparisons drawn re-
cently between our policy in Vietnam and that in Cuba. In my
opinion, those comparisons underscore the appropriateness of con-
tinuing our present Cuban policy. The U.S. position on Vietnam re-
mained clear and consistent for over two decades. We did not vacil-
late our international posture through changes of administration or
changes in the Congress.
Similarly, the Cuban Democracy Act reestablishes with greater
specificity a policy we have maintained for over three decades. We
must follow the example of our Vietnamese policy and focus on the
long-term overall U.S. objective of democracy in Cuba. The Govern-
ment of Vietnam knew what conditions it had to meet to end the
U.S. embargo. Cuba is also aware of what steps it must take for
normalcy of our relations.
Vietnam met its human rights and POW-MIA disclosure obliga-
tions. Castro, however, has made no attempt to fulfill his respon-
sibilities. Castro's lack of action has given the United States no
reason to alter its position. Answering Castro's call for increased
contact with the United States, in the absence of human rights and
political freedom, will only perpetuate the repression in Cuba.
The United States has shown its willingness to alter its policies
when totalitarian countries meet their obligations. The fate of the
Cuban people lies not in the U.S. action, but in Castro's intran-
sigence. Castro can no longer rely on the $6 billion a year in Rus-
sian aid to subsidize his misguided economic policies.
For the crisis that he has caused, Castro continues to blame ev-
erything and everybody but himself. It is absurd to blame Cuba's
economic turmoil on the embargo. We must remain consistent in
our policies to retain the most effective framework to facilitate our
goal, democracy and prosperity for the people of Cuba.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Will you be able to stay with us, or do you
have to return to the Senate?
12
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I am going to have
to leave at 10:45.
Chairman Rangel. Let me thank you for the contribution that
you made. I know the business that takes you to the Senate, so
whenever you have to leave, certainly we understand.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Kopetski from Oregon.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL J. KOPETSKI, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Kopetski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. Before I proceed with
my own testimony, I ask that the statement from the Mennonite
Central Committee be made a part of the record. It is a statement
in support of lifting the embargo.
Chairman Rangel. Without objection.
Mr. Kopetski. Thank you.
[The statement referred to follows:]
13
O
Mennonite
Central
Committee
Peace Section
US.
Washington Office
no Maryland
Avenue, N E
Wasfiingion, D C
20002
Tel:
(202)544-6564
Fax:
(202) 544-2820
SUMMARY SUBMISSION FOR JOINT HEARING ON H.R. 2229,
THE FREE TRADE WITH CUBA ACT
Witness: Linda Shelly
Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Mennonite Central Committee
Memionite Central Committee (MCC) is an agency of the Mennonite and Brethren in Christ
Churches in North America. For seventy-five years, MCC has provided relief and development
aid and technical assistance in over 40 countries around the world. MCC currently has 900
volunteers working worldwide.
In the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, MCC has personnel working in eleven
countries. MCC does not at this time have workers resident in Cuba. Mennonites missionaries
began working in Cuba in the 1950's. At the time of the revolution there were several small
house church fellowships established in the region of Villa Clara. All foreign missionaries left
in 1962 due to the imposition of the embargo. For a number of years there was little contact
between Mennonite churches in the United States and in Cuba.
During the past several years MCC has had renewed contact with the churches in Cuba. MCC
has supported the Martin Luther King Jr. Center in Havana, a peace education center of the
protestant churches. In 1993, MCC received a license to ship medical supplies to Cuba from the
U.S. Commerce Dept. These were distributed through the Cuban Ecumenical Council. MCC
also sent some food aid to Cuba in response to the storm in mid-1993, cooperatively with
Church World Service. In 1992, in response to the Cuban Democracy Act, MCC adopted a
resolution calling for the lifting of the embargo against Cuba. The statement is attached.
In November 1993, I was able to visit Cuba with a religious visa and to spend some time with
the Mennonite church groups in the area of Villa Clara. There are now nine groups, some of
which are small family groups while others are a large as fifty people. They meet together
regularly for Bible studies and prayer services. The visiting delegation was able to stay in
homes and to visit privately with elderly people who were a part of the original church groups as
well as with younger persons who had joined more recently.
The elderly people talked openly of the rough times they had passed through. One man said,
"There was a time when we couldn't tell anyone we were of the Lord. Now we invite anyone
and everyone to our church services. "
The delegation heard much talk about the economy. Much of the people's time and energy goes
into basic living. I stayed in a home that showed clear signs of better times: a washing machine,
TV and VCR. Yet the family was going out daily to trade household items for food. They
were using charcoal due to a lack of fuel for cooking. They were without electricity and water
most of the time I was there. It was clear to me that the failing economy in Cuba impacts both
rich and poor.
At the same time, I did not hear anyone calling for Castro to be removed. Rather I heard, "My
parents were illiterate and poor, my children are university graduates." People in Cuba are
proud of what the revolution has achieved in education and health. They did not hide the errors
of the past (suppression of religion, fighting in foreign wars, etc.), yet feel their country is
changing. They would like to see the changes continue but in order to do so they need access to
markets and goods. The people I spoke with are proud to be well-educated, and feel that if
given a chance they would be able to design an economy that is neither purely socialist not
purely capitalist but takes the best from both. They are rural evangeUcal folks; none are
members of the Communist party.
Our delegation asked one of the house church groups what message they had for the people of
the U.S. "Greetings, many greetings and may God bless." And what message for Bill Clinton?
The voice of an elderly man rang out, "Stop the embargo."
14
Mr. KOPETSKI. Like so many of my colleagues, I believe it is time
for a ftindamental reassessment of our Cuba policv. At the heart
of this, in my judgment, is letting the bright light of American com-
merce shine into Cuba, and, therefore, I support lifting the trade
embargo and am an original cosponsor of Chairman Rangel's legis-
lation to do so.
When we discuss the Cuban embargo, my colleagues, we are dis-
cussing an antiquated policy of the cold war. As such, it is very
thinly linked, if at all, to the reality of the world we live in today.
No longer are national security issues the unchallenged focus of
the global agenda. No longer is military capability the cornerstone
of America's international commitment. No longer are U.S. inter-
national economic initiatives, such as the World Bank and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, motivated solely by geo-
politics and by security concerns alone. No longer is the inter-
national environment defined by the struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
No longer important are our respective efforts to expand our
spheres of influence to include countries like Cuba. Traditional se-
curity concerns, such as regional conflicts and nuclear nonprolifera-
tion, remain important. But the central reality of the post-cold war
is the primacy of economics in foreign policy.
As a lover of peace, I welcome the new importance of inter-
national trading and financial relationships, because I feel very
strongly that the fabric of peace is strengthened by today's rapid-
paced interweavings of international commerce. Simply put, war,
whether hot or cold, is not healthy for business. This provides a
built-in lobby for peace.
The new global competition is in business, not territory, the goal
of which is to advance prosperity, not ideology. In China and Viet-
nam, and now in Cuba, opening the way for American trade means
opening the way for peaceful relations with previously unfriendly
countries.
I believe that the foundation for the fall of communism in East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union stemmed from its final erosion
as an economic and social system to meet the needs of people living
under it. We have the chance, in lifting the embargo, to let Amer-
ican companies shine the light of prosperity on Cuba. We should
seize this opportunity. It will pay off for both American industry
and for those of us who ardently defend and promote democracy,
human rights and individual liberties.
Mr. Chairman, I visited Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1989, where
a border guard told me that exposure to the Western World, to a
different standard of living and individual freedoms made the dif-
ference, whether the exposure came from trade contacts or even
from West German television. Vaclav Havel once said, "Com-
munism was not defeated bv military force, but by life, by the
human spirit, by conscience, by the resistance of being and man to
manipulation." He was right, and he would recognize we have a
chance, even an obligation, to make an important difference in the
future of the Cuban people.
Were I Castro, I would not want America to lift the embargo. He
knows from watching the fall of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Po-
land that pent-up force for economic justice, when unleashed, will
15
roll through his country, propelling wdth it the ideals of individual
freedoms in the marketplace of liberties. It will be only a matter
of time that a new revolution, probably and hopefully peaceful, will
overcome the totalitarian regime in Cuba.
Let me also take a moment to raise another issue for my col-
leagues to consider in this post-cold war era, as Congress and the
administration revisit American foreign policy toward Cuba.
It seems only fitting to reassess the need for a preferential treat-
ment given to Cuban nationals. I recently introduced H.R. 3854, to
repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. This legislation would
level the playingfield as regards our immigration policy.
In 1981-82, a total of 10,851 Cuban nationals adjusted to perma-
nent resident status, in addition to 7,900 Cuban refugees for the
same period. The number of Cuban nationals who adjusted under
the act exceeds the total number of refugees in the same period
from Cambodia, El Salvador, Romania, Somalia, the former Yugo-
slav Republic and, of course, Haiti.
Passage of this bill will not mean Cuban nationals seeking asy-
lum are given substandard treatment. On the contrary, with the
repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act, they will be given the same
opportunity to gain asylum as any other foreign national.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate my support for a fundamental
rethinking of our Cuba policy, to include both the lifting of the
trade embargo and a repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act. I com-
mend you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue.
Let me also take a moment to commend Mr. Serrano, my col-
league from New York. He has been a great leader on so many is-
sues, social issues, especially for people in pain in this country and
throughout the world. I have become a friend of his and know that
it is a tragedy that, in our country, Mr. Serrano is a victim of
threats and intimidation for his views on these and many other is-
sues. In a nation that prides itself on debate and its aversion to
threats and change in government by force, I think Mr. Serrano is
a true leader and ought to be commended for his leadership and
his gutsiness, as we like to say out West.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
16
TESTIMOMY OF
THE HONORABLE MIKE KOPETSKI
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OH WAYS AND MEAMS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE
March 17, 1994
Thank you, Chairman Range!, members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify. Like so
many of my colleagues, I believe it's time for a fundamental reassessment of our Cuba policy. At the heart
of this, in my judgement, is letting the bright light of American commerce shine into Cuba, and therefore, I
support lifting the trade embargo, and I am an original cosponsor of Chairman Rangel's legislation to do so.
When we discuss the Cuba embargo, my colleagues, we are discussing an antiquated policy of the
Cold War. As such, it is very thinly linked, if at all, to the reality of the world we live in today.
No longer are national security issues the unchallenged focus of the global agenda. No longer is
military capability the cornerstone of America's international commitment. No longer are U.S. international
economic initiatives, such as the World Bank and the Ganeral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
motivated solely by geopolitics, and by security concerns.
No longer is the international environment defined by the struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, and our respective efforts to expand our spheres of influence to include countries like Cuba.
Traditional security concerns such as regional conflicts and nuclear non-proliferation remain important, but the
central reality of the post-Cold War is the primacy of economics in foreign policy.
And, as a lover of peace, I welcome the new importance of international trading and financial
relationships, because I believe very strongly that the fabric of peace is strengthened by today's rapid-paced
interweavings of international commerce. Simply put, war, whether hot or cold, is not healthy for business;
this provides a built-in lobby for peace. The new global competition is in business, not territory; the goal of
which is to advance prosperity, not ideology. In China, and Vietnam, and now in Cuba, opening the way for
American trade means opening the way for peaceful relations with previously unfriendly countries.
I believe that the foundation for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
stemmed from its final erosion as an economic and social system to meet the needs of people living under it.
We have the chance, in lifting the embargo, to let American companies shine the light of prosperity on Cuba.
We should seize this opportunity; it will pay off for both American it.dustry and for those of us who ardently
defend and promote democracy, human rights and individual liberties.
I visited Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1989, where a border guard told me that exposure to the
western world, to a different standard of living and individual freedoms made the difference, whether the
exposure came from trade contacts or even from West German television. Vaclav Havel once said:
'Communism was not defeated by military force, but by life, by the human spirit, by conscience, by the
resistance of Being and man to manipulation." He was right, and he would recognize we have a chance,
even an obligation, to make an important difference in the hiture of the Cuban people.
Were I Castro I would not want America to lift the embargo. He knows from watching the fall of
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland that the pent up force for economic justice when unleashed will roll
through his country propelling with it the ideals of individual freedoms in the marketplace of liberties. It will
be only a matter of time that a new revolution, probably peaceful, will overcome the totalitarian regime in
Cuba.
But I also want to raise another issue for my colleagues to consider. In this post-Cold War era, as
Congress and the Administration revisit American foreign policy towards Cuba, it seems only fitting to
reassess the need for a preferential immigration status for Cuban nationals.
I recently introduced legislation, H.R. 3854, to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. This
legislation would level the playing field as regards our immigration laws.
17
The Cuban Adjustment Act allows Cuban nationals who have been living in the U.S. for one year-
under any circumstances to become permanent residents of the United States. In practical terms, the Act
creates an exception to our immigration laws for Cubans which is not available to persons of any other
nationality.
Normally, the U.S. accepts asylum seekers for basically three reasons: family reunification, desirable
economic benefits to the U.S., and humanitarian concerns (primarily political oppression). We turn many,
many people away who have sympathetic cases, but do not fit these descriptions. In the case of Cuba,
however, we accept virtually aM asylum seekers, with extremely few exceptions, and literally no questions
asked (except whether the person is a Cuban national).
In 1991-92, a total of 10,851 Cuban nationals adjusted to permanent resident status (in addition to
7,911 Cuban refugees for the same period). The number of Cuban nationals who adjusted under the Act
exceeds the total number of refugees in the same period from Cambodia, El Salvador, Romania, Somalia, and
the former Yugoslavia.
Passage of H.R. 3854 will not mean Cuban nationals seeking asylum are given substandard
treatment; on the contrary, with the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act, they will be given the same
opportunity to gain asylum as any other foreign national . That's the entire purpose of H.R. 3854.
And so, white much of my bill is intended to improve our immigration policy in terms of consistency,
there is an undeniable foreign policy aspect inherent in repealing the Cuban Adjustment Act.
When passed in 1966, the Act was designed to be a temporary measure responding to a presumed
temporary regime, and was needed to create a legal status for 165,000 Cuban political refugees already in
the U.S. Nearly thirty years later, Fidel Castro is still in power in Cuba while many of those who oppose
him now reside permanently in this country. Currently, Cuba's desperate economic situation drives much of
the new migration, a fact I'm certain resonates with members of this subcommittee. Some would argue that
the Act, by facilitating Cuban relocation to the U.S., has artificially prolonged the Castrs regime.
The Cuban Adjustment Act creates not only the perception of unfairness, but the realKy as well.
The Cuban Adjustment Act is indefensible, given the flight of so many people fadng desperate situations, and
should be repealed.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate my support for a fundamental rethinking of our Cuba policy, to
include both the lifting of the trade embargo and the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. Thank
you.
18
Chairman Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Kopetski.
Senator, could I just ask one question before you leave? Do you
have any objections to any type of broadening exchange between
the United States and Cuba in the cultural or the education area,
as opposed to just trade?
Senator Graham. As I suggested in my remarks, I believe that
one of the keys to our success in Vietnam, as well as in Central
Europe, was the consistency of our position. I believe that position
was stated in greater specificity than in the past in the Cuban De-
mocracy Act, which was adopted less than 18 months ago. I believe
that we should follow the standards of the Cuban Democracy Act.
I believe that that combination of isolation of regime, opening up
to increased people-to-people contact, and laying out a roadmap for
post-Castro Cuba relations with the United States, those are the
fundamental principles and we should stick with them.
Chairman Rangel. I understand that under existing law there
are many Cuban -Americans that are allowed to return to Cuba
under our law, because they have families in Cuba, and that many
of them are involved in taking advantage of new business opportu-
nities, for exploring them in Cuba, to the disadvantage of Cuban-
Americans and other Americans that do not have families and ac-
cess to travel in Cuba. Do you know this to be true?
Senator Graham. I am not aware of any particular specifics, and
I would think that would be contrary to the conditions upon which
that right to travel was authorized.
Chairman RANGEL. Thank vou.
Mr. Shaw. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just 1 second. I want to con-
gratulate Senator Graham on a very, very fine statement. I am in
full accord with his view of Cuba and our policy toward Cuba.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Congressman George Miller will be heard.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MELUER, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to begin by strongly associating myself with
your opening remarks and to applaud you for pulling together this
hearing, and commend you and Mr. Serrano for your leadership on
this issue.
The hearing that you are holding today would have been un-
thinkable just a few short years ago. Obviously, the times have
changed and U.S. policy toward Cuba should change, as well.
I am pleased to join a growing number of individuals, organiza-
tions and nations in supporting an end to the U.S. embargo of
Cuba. I support your legislation and believe that it should be
adopted by this committee as a step toward opening the political
environment within Cuba, improving the lines of Cubans and the
Cuban-Americans, and providing important business opportunities
for American companies. In addition, many argue that lifting the
embargo would avert possible chaos in Cuba, resulting in a flood
of tens of thousands of new Cuban immigrants to the United
States.
The embargo against Cuba and the effort to prevent other coun-
tries from doing business with Cuba has been harmful to the
19
Cuban people and to their families now living outside the country.
But it has also been ineffective in bringing about political change
on the island. In fact, I would argue tnat the embargo has pre-
vented the opening of the political climate in Cuba. Fidel Castro
has successfully used the embargo and U.S. hostility toward him
and his government to embolden his power, reinforcing the mes-
sage that the United States has been the true enemy of the Cuban
people.
The embargo against Cuba is a completely disproportionate re-
sponse with regard to the danger posed by Cuba and the goals of
the United States. It is also a disproportionate response compared
to our policy toward other nations. The Cuban Grovernment today
poses no threat to the United States. It no longer is an ally of the
Soviet Union. It is not engaged in wars in Ajigola or in Central
America.
The embargo is the confusion of a personal vendetta with a na-
tional policy interest. It is a relic of the cold war and it is not in
the interest of this country to maintain it.
My colleagues and I who support your bill, Mr. Chairman, are
not alone in our view that U.S. policy toward Cuba must change.
The United Nations has repeatedly voted for the United States to
end the embargo. The Rand Corp., the 20th Century Fund, the
Inter-American Dialog, United Technologies Corp. and other Amer-
ican businesses, and the editorial boards of the Washington Post,
the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Boston Globe
have all endorsed lifting the embargo, or at least taking initial
steps to increase humanitarian, political and economic contact be-
tween the two countries.
And for the first time, there is now an increasing number of
voices within the Cuban and the Cuban-American community call-
ing for change in U.S. policy. At least two moderate Cuban-Amer-
ican organizations and five leading Cuban dissident organizations
have all called for the outright lifting of the embargo or easing of
tensions between the United States and Cuba.
U.S. -Cuban policy, unfortunately, is not the result of constant re-
view and examination by the appropriate elements of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The policy has been under the control of a special interest
in the United States that does a disservice to the democratic proc-
ess of open dialog in our own country. The Cuban American Na-
tional Foundation has held U.S. policy toward Cuba a captive child,
with its notorious purse strings and bullying tactics. The St. Pe-
tersburg Times put it best, when it said in an editorial last year:
'The Cuban American National Foundation has always been less
interested in liberating Cuba than in holding Washington hostage
to its whims."
The foundation has been the main voice in support of the contin-
ued U.S. embargo, and it is the main reason the Congress has ap-
proved $17 million a year for TV Marti, broadcasting American
ideas and culture into Cuba, despite the finding that the trans-
missions are routinely blocked by Cuba and that virtually no Cu-
bans see the programming.
If American television is going to bring about the downfall of
Castro's Cuba, as the foundation claims is its goal, wouldn't it
make more sense to end the ban on telecommunications between
20
the two countries and fill Cuban TV sets with the faces and voices
of Peter Jennings and the Simpsons, and programming from the
Cuban-American community in this country?
Finally, I would like to remind this committee, on a more serious
note, that the CIA has warned the Clinton administration that it
could face a major policy crisis in Cuba "at any time," because of
the severity of economic conditions in Cuba, and we ought to take
note of that and understand the possible ramifications.
U.S. policy must be reexamined and changed. Lifting the embar-
go and allowing free and open exchange of ideas and reunification
of families and the examination of business claims against the
Cuban Government is the course that we should follow. Again, I
want to applaud you for holding these hearings.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that you would excuse me. I am in the
process of chairing a hearing in the Natural Resources Committee.
I want to thank your committee for this time and my colleagues
here in support of this legislation.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you for taking the time from your com-
mittee to share your views with us.
The Chair recognizes Congressman Ed Torres.
STATEMENT OF HON. ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES, A REP-
RESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-
committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you on the impor-
tar;t issue of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. We know that Cuba has
always been a peculiarly emotional issue in our U.S. foreign policy.
Past U.S. interests with regard to Cuba were of a security nature
and had more to do with Washington's global rivalry with Moscow
than with Cuba itself In the early 1960s, U.S. officials maintained
that it was not the Socialist nature of the Cuban system which
drove U.S. opposition, rather, it was our Government's concern
with Cuba's interventionist foreign policy and its military ties to
the former Soviet Union.
The Carter administration added to this list its demands that
Cuba demonstrate greater respect for human rights. As recently as
5 years ago, U.S. oarriers to improved relationships with Cuba
were still conditioned by Cuba's commitment to the export of armed
revolution and its close ties to the Soviet Union. For 33 years, the
primary U.S. policy initiative, responding to our criticisms of
Cuba's foreign policy, has been to maintain an economic embargo
against Cuba.
In one form or another, this U.S. economic embargo against Cuba
has been the policy of the last nine U.S. Presidents — count them,
nine U.S. Presidents. Given the longevity and the consistency of
U.S. economic policy toward Cuba, I feel that we ought to be able
to examine now whether the embargo has furthered U.S. policy
goals. In terms of the stated U.S. security concerns, we observe the
following: Cuban troops are out of Africa; Cuba no longer is sup-
porting revolutionary movements; and its military ties to Russia
are virtually nonexistent and certainly not a threat to the United
States. How ironic that Russia is in our sphere of foreign aid as-
21
sistance today. So if the intent of our embargo was to guarantee
certain U.S. security interests and these concerns have been met,
why did we recently pass the Cuban Democracy Act, which tight-
ened the effects of our 33-year-old embargo, and ironically provided
Fidel Castro with fresh reasons for showing how, as Congressman
Miller just pointed out, President Castro can point to his nation's
economic problems as not being his fault?
I would maintain that U.S. policy interests toward Cuba are no
longer based on security issues, but, rather, are attempts to affect
internal changes in Cuba. If the United States is now seeking in-
ternal political and economic changes in Cuba, does the existing
embargo serve these ends? Certainly, 33 years of economic embargo
have not toppled the Castro regime. There has been a renovation
of the top political leadership. The Grovernment appears to have
been able to impose severe economic restrictions, because most Cu-
bans, in spite of their hardships, have adjusted successfully. The
State's security forces remain loyal and effective. Compensation for
U.S. property seized has not been reached. Cuba has not been iso-
lated internationally, and the U.S. embargo, particularly the enact-
ment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, gave Cuban leaders a
vehicle for mobilizing patriotic support to elicit the sacrifice nec-
essary to make the economic adjustments. As I mentioned earlier,
Mr. Chairman, this act provided the Cuban Government with a
target for blaming the U.S. Government as a cause of Cuba's many
calamities.
For a moment, let us suppose that the U.S. trade embargo were
to be lifted tomorrow in its entirety. What would be the effect on
Cuba's economy in the short run? It is quite probable that not
much would happen immediately to the Cuban economy. Cuba
could not export more sugar, because it does not produce it. Cuba
could not import more goods, because it lacks the foreign exchange
to pay for them. Cuba's principal product, sugar, is oversupplied
worldwide, and it is traded internationally at low prices in a resid-
ual market.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommit-
tee, that the U.S. trade embargo policy is assisting the continuation
of the Castro government and the miseries of its people. I trust
that others here will speak today to the suffering which has visited
on the Cuban people by our outdated trade embargo.
I maintain that it is time for a new vision in U.S. policy toward
Cuba. And as a part of this new vision, I would make the following
three short suggestions: That the Clinton administration should
outline and define its U.S. interests in Cuba in simple and clear
terms. Washington should consult with our democratic Latin Amer-
ican allies in reshaping our own policy toward Cuba, and our policy
should include the following elements.
Yes, continue to call upon Cuba to foster a respect for human
rights and a transition to a pluralized democracy. Two, it should
make clear that the United States has no intention of invading
Cuba, and to condemn violent actions by exiled groups. And, three,
to facilitate the flow of international information into Cuba, and
this should include continuing the facilitation of telecommuni-
cations between our two countries, facilitate direct mail, promote
22
cultural and academic exchanges, establish news bureaus, and
allow travel bv U.S. citizens to Cuba.
Four, in oraer to make credible U.S. claims that our objection is
to Cuba's Grovernment and not to hurt its people, the United States
should indicate its readiness to remove the embargo, if Cuba opens
up its politics in specified ways. In this way, the United States
would signal its desire to respond to changes that the Cuban Grov-
ernment chooses to adopt on its own.
And fifth, to remove all punitive measures from the Cuban De-
mocracy Act which interfere with the normal exercise of sovereign
jurisdiction by other countries. Our economic relationships with
Canada, with Mexico and the European Community are of vital im-
portance and outweigh any remaining objectives the United States
may have toward Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, our current U.S. -Cuban policy provides a window
of doubt for other governments to question U.S. ability to provide
creative leadership in the post-cold war world.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to quote Dr. Jorge
Dominguez, who I understand is here with us today. He is a profes-
sor of government at Harvard University, and I quote: "Immobility
in U.S. policy helps the Cuban Government remain politically im-
mobile. Continuing change in U.S. policy along the lines that are
becoming visible holds the promise of fostering change within Cuba
better than the alternatives that have not and remain unlikely to
work."
Mr. Chairman, your bill, H.R. 2229, is clearly a move in the di-
rection of change. It is clearly a move to begin to reduce the ten-
sions, so that we can begin to talk to the people of Cuba and bring
lasting peace in this hemisphere.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
23
TESTIMONY BY
RKPRESENTATIVE ESTEBAN E. TORRES fP-CA^
••THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA"
before the Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures
March 17, 1994
10:00AM Rm. 1100
Washington, D.C.
Chairman Rangel, and distinguished members of the Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, I appreciate the
opportunity to speak before you on the important subject of the
U.S. embargo on Cuba.
Cuba has always been a peculiarly emotional issue in U.S. foreign
policy. Past U.S. interests with regard to Cuba were of a
security nature and had more to do with Washington's global
rivalry with Moscow than with Cuba itself.
In the early sixties, U.S. officials maintained that it was not
the socialist nature of Cuba's system which drove U.S. opposition
rather it was our government ' s concern with Cuba ' s
interventionist foreign policy and its military ties to the
former Soviet Union.
The Carter administration added to this list its demands that
Cuba demonstrate greater respect for human rights. As recently
as five years ago U.S. barriers to improved relationships with
Cuba were still conditioned by Cuba's commitment to the export of
armed revolution and its close military ties to the Soviet Union.
For thirty-three years the primary U.S. policy initiative
responding to our criticisms of Cuba's foreign policy, has been
to maintain an economic embargo against Cuba.
In one foirm or another this U.S. economic embargo against Cuba
has been the policy of the last_niae U.S. Presidents. Given the
longevity and the consistency of U.S. economic policy towards
Cuba, I feel that we ought to be able to examine now whether this
embargo has furthered U.S. policy goals. In terms of the stated
U.S. security concerns we observe the following: Cuban troops
are out of Africa; Cuba is no longer supporting revolutionary
movements, and its military ties to Russia are virtually
nonexistent — and certainly, not a threat to the U.S. So, if
the intent of our embargo was to guarantee certain U.S. security
interests, and if these concerns have been met, why did we pass
recently the Cuban Democracy Act — which tightened the effects
of our thirty year old embargo, and ironically, provided Fidel
Castro with fresh reasons for showing how his nation's economic
problems are not his fault?
24
I would maintain that U.S. policy interests towards Cuba are no
longer based upon U.S. security issues, but rather are attempts
to effect internal changes in Cuba. If the U.S. is now seeking
internal political and economic changes in Cuba, does the
existing embargo serve these ends? Certainly, thirty-three years
of economic embargo have not toppled the Castro regime; there has
been a renovation of the top political leadership; the government
appears to have been able to impose severe economic restrictions
because most Cubans, despite the hardships, have adjusted
successfully; the state's security forces remain loyal and
effective; compensation for U.S. property seized has not been
reached; Cuba has not been isolated internationally; and the U.S.
embargo — particularly the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, gave Cuban leaders a vehicle for mobilizing patriotic
support to elicit the sacrifice necessary to make the economic
adjustment. And, as I mentioned earlier, this Act provided the
Cuban government with a target for blaming the U.S. government as
a cause of Cuba's many calamities.
For a moment, let us suppose that the U.S. trade embargo were to
be lifted tomorrow in its entirety. What would be the effect on
Cuba's economy in the short run? It is quite probable that not
much would happen immediately to the Cuban economy: Cuba could
not export more sugar because it does not produce it. Cuba could
not import more goods because it lacks the foreign exchange to
pay for them. Cuba's principal product sugar, is over-supplied
worldwide and is traded internationally at low prices in a
residual market.
The major impact of removing the embargo would be political: the
Cuban government would be held responsible for the nation's
economic problems. It seems to me that the U.S.'s trade embargo
policy is assisting the continuation of the Castro government —
and the miseries of its people.
I trust that others will speak to the suffering which has been
visited on the Cuban people by our outdated trade embargo. I
maintain that it is time for a new vision in U.S. policy toward
Cuba. As part of this "new vision" I would make the following
suggestions: the Clinton administration should define U.S.
interest in Cuba in simple and clear terms.
Washington should consult with our democratic Latin American
allies in shaping our own policy toward Cuba. Our policy should
include the following elements: 1. To foster a respect for human
rights and a transition to pluralized democracy; 2) to make clear
that the U.S. has no intention of invading Cuba and to condemn
violent actions by exile groups; 3) To facilitate the flow of
international information into Cuba: this should include
continuing the facilitation of telephone communications between
25
our two countries; facilitate direct mail, cultural and academic
exchanges, establish news bureaus, travel by U.S. citizens to
Cuba; 4) in order to make credible U.S. claims that our objection
is to Cuba's government, and not to hurt its people, the U.S.
should indicate its readiness to remove the embargo if Cuba opens
up its politics in specified ways. In this way, the U.S. will
signal its desire to respond to changes that the Cuban government
chooses to adopt on its own; 5) to remove all punitive measures
from the Cuban Democracy Act which interfere with the normal
exercise of sovereign jurisdiction in other countries.
Our economic relationships with Canada, Mexico and the European
Community are of vital importance, and outweigh any remaining
objectives the U.S may have toward Cuba. Furthermore, U.S.-
Cuban policy provides a window of doubt for other governments to
question U.S. ability to provide creative leadership in the post
Cold War world.
In closing, I would like to quote Dr. Jorge Dominguez, Professor
of Government, Harvard University: "Immobility in U.S. policy
helps the Cuban Government remain politically immobile.
Continuing change in U.S. policy, along the lines that are
becoming visible, holds the promise of fostering change within
Cuba better than the alternatives that have not and remain
unlikely to work."
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
26
Chairman Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Torres.
The Chair and the subcommittee are honored to have Chairman
TorricelH to come here to share his views with us today. Certainly,
as a member and senior member of that outstanding, it has been
your hearings and your thoughts and your views that have helped
us in the Congress to formulate our views as to how we can make
a better world and what leadership role our country can play.
I think for all Communist nations that do not enjoy the liberty
that we do here, that they should take note as to how people can
disagree on some points and at the same time work together in ex-
tended debate, so that we can have a better understanding of these
complex problems that face our world.
Certainly, no one has worked more toward the answers and the
solution of those problems than you, and we welcome the contribu-
tion you make today.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, A REPRESENT-
ATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
Thank you for having this hearing, for inviting me, and for your
very kind remarks. Indeed, the cooperative way in which we have
worked together on issues like the crisis in Haiti and the civility
with which we approach our differences on issues like Cuba is an
example to all that you have suggested about how the process
should operate.
Mr. Chairman, my interest and involvement in Cuba has
spanned many years, but it is best explained by perhaps a single
incident. Only 2 years ago, in Miami, in meeting a variety of
Cuban-Americans, a man approached me and said that it was nice
to see me again. I inquired as to where we had met. He said that,
on November 24, 1988, we had met in a prison in Havana. I asked
him how he could possibly remember the day. He said he would re-
member it all of his life, because the day before I visited the prison,
for the first time in the 19 years of his confinement, the metal
sheath had been taken off the windows of his cell and he had seen
daylight and smelled fresh air.
Luis Zuniga is here with us today, Mr. Chairman. He is seated
behind me. And in his story, more is told about the reality of Cuba
today than most of what you will ever hear in the political debate
in America today. This is Cuba today, Mr. Chairman: 5,000 Cubans
killed, executed by Fidel Castro in the years of his regime; 61,000
children who are today confined in prisons, in labor camps in Cuba;
2,000 students who have been expelled from schools in the last 6
months because they have expressed displeasure with the regime
or desire to travel. This is Cuba.
There is nothing romantic. There are no reforms. There is noth-
ing progressive about it. It is a dictatorship. Simply because it is
a dictatorship of the left makes it no different than all the fights,
Mr. Chairman, that you and I have waged together with the dicta-
torships of the right, from Salvador to Chile. It looks the same, it
smells the same, and it hurts the same to all the values that you
and I hold dear. Plain and simple, that is all there is to it.
Eighteen months ago, as Democrats and Republicans, Greorge
Bush and Bill Clinton alike, by an overwhelming vote, we estab-
27
lished a new American policy that we would take a stand against
the reality of this dictatorship. That product is the Cuban Democ-
racy Act. It responded to the opportunity that the collapse of the
Soviet Union presented, with a denial of $5 billion of Soviet aid.
It stood against the fiction that the former American embargo had
any meaning, while $300 or $400 million of American trade sub-
sidized the Cuban dictatorship.
The American embargo is not 30 years old. It is not even 2 years
old. It is 18 months old, and it is working. Now that the economy
is deteriorating, a third of the Cuban security forces have lost their
uniforms and their guns have been retired. The Cuban Air Force
and Navy are largely not operating, giving for the first time some
opportunity for new institutions to operate. For the first time, the
Catholic church has become a second institution of organization
and delivery within the country.
I cannot tell you that we are on the verge of freedom, but I can
tell you that, for the first chance, the fingers of dictatorship are be-
ginning, at least beginning to take their hands off the throat of
Cuban freedom.
Mr. Chairman, if it weighs on the conscience of Members of this
Congress and of the American peqt^e that the Cuban people are
suffering, believe me it weighs on me, as well. I did not come to
this Congress to participate in hurting anybody, contributing to
suffering or to have people starve. But I also understand the reality
that the greatest crime is to do nothing and to allow another gen-
eration of Cuban children to live in freedom. That is our goal. To
have them suffer would be the greatest crime, and that is the alter-
native. Because to do nothing means that Fidel Castro 10 years
from now or 20 years from now will still deny any opportunity of
expression or any form of pluralism in society. And this 5,000 will
be 15,000 or 20,000. That is the alternative.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Castro's excuses that the embargo is provid-
ing suffering, that all would be right in Cuba if it were not for the
United States, rings hollow. That is believed nowhere except in the
United States. The Cuban people know that they are suffering not
from the embargo, but because of communism. It is the betrayal of
their own revolution by Fidel Castro. It is the substitution of the
ideals of the revolution for communism that has caused their suf-
fering, their death and their destruction.
The Cuban Democracy Act is a strategy based on that reality.
Ironically, it includes much of what Mr. Torres just suggested as
the real answer. He says that the embargo should be lifted, if
democratic elections are held. We do not even require that. Under
the Cuban Democracy Act, the embargo ends, not the day there is
an election, not the day an election is scheduled. The day the
Cuban dictatorship promises a free and fair election, there is no
American embargo. An American President can certify it, and the
embargo ends.
But the Cuban Democracy Act also is not just an embargo. It in-
cludes exactly what Mr. Torres has said our policy should be, to
open communication. We make a unilateral offer to the Cuban Gov-
ernment, end restrictions on mail, open telephone communications,
the liberalization of some travel. In its original draft, it even pro-
posed opening news bureaus.
28
Because it is built on the Eastern European experience, we will
not bring down this dictatorship by embargo alone. Our greatest
weapon is ideas. We seek to flood Cuba with information and free
communication, knowing that it inevitably will spark a desire for
freedom and for pluralism.
Finally, because we do not want the poorest of the poor to suffer,
contrary to what you have heard here today, we have opened, not
restricted, donations of food and medicine. Before the Cuban De-
mocracy Act, less than $1 million of assistance in food and medi-
cine was flowing to Cuba. Last year alone, that number was nearly
$9 million. The Catholic church alone this year will send 2,000 tons
of food and medicine, unbelievably making Cuba, if you include pri-
vate donations, one of the largest recipients of food and medicine
from the United States in Latin America.
That is the reality of the Cuban Democracy Act, not just an em-
bargo, but a balanced approach to making clear to the Cuban peo-
ple that we have no quarrel with them, we will give food and medi-
cine, making clear that we will not dictate the form of the Govern-
ment of a future Cuba. We have no favorites on who will rule
Cuba. We simply want a free election at last promised.
Mr. Chairman, the issue li^re today, however, does not simply
seem to be the Cuban embargo, but the very concept of embargo,
whether it is a legitimate tool of American foreign policy. Perhaps
this confuses me the most, because the history of the last 20 years
in contemporary American foreign policy has been to recognize that
economic embargoes are a legitimate means of American foreign
policy to obtain legitimate ends.
It is a substitute for armed conflict. It is an extension of diplo-
matic means, and it has worked. It worked in Rhodesia. It worked
in South Africa. It applied pressure on the Soviet Union. It is being
applied today in North Korea. It is being used in Libya. It is being
used in Iraq. And it is being used in Cuba, for the same means.
Who here today would argue that the cause of human rights is
any less offended in Cuba than it is in Libya. Does Fidel Castro
have less political prisoners? Has he killed less opponents than
have been killed in those nations? On the contrary. According to
the United Nations, Fidel Castro today per capita has more politi-
cal prisoners than any one of those nations.
This institution is joined together, indeed people on this panel,
in each of those causes, as I have indeed even today on Haiti, in
believing that it is an answer and it speaks the best to what we
try to do.
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if the real cause is that we do not be-
lieve that embargoes are a legitimate expression of our foreign pol-
icy, then let us amend this amendment, let us lift the embargo on
all those nations, because they must similarly offend the things
that we hold dear.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is argued here today that with the cold
war over, we have no quarrel with Cuba, and indeed the embargo
is not necessary because our own security is threatened. On the
contrary, America's fight for human rights, our belief in pluralism,
the things that we achieve through the Cuban Democracy Act did
not begin with the cold war. They predate it. They predate this
29
generation. They predate this century. It is the oldest fight of
America, for human rights and for pluralism.
I did not begin opposing Fidel Castro because he was allied with
the Soviet Union. I do not oppose what he did, because he brought
socialism to Cuba. I do not care what economic form he chooses for
his country. I care about human rights. What he does offends ev-
erything America stands for. And when the last Communist regime
has left this planet, I still believe this embargo makes sense and
is justified, because of our fight for pluralism in this country.
Last week, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations passed a resolu-
tion, on March 9, which language speaks volumes about why it is
the United States needs to stand firm. The special rapporteur on
arbitrary arrests, beatings, imprisonment, harassment, threats, in-
cluding the loss of employment, human rights debases everything
the U.N. Charter stands for. The United Nations has taken this
statement. They have not had the strength and conviction to follow
it by believing in embargo. We have, and we have reason to be
proud of it.
Mr. Chairman, a generation unborn of Cubans will look at the
nations of the world and judge us in whether or not in this moment
that tested Cuban history stood for Cuban freedom, whether we
stood with them or idly by. We will be tested on where we were
on that issue. I believe we can be proud of this embargo. I know
your hesitation. I know of your concern because of suffering in
Cuba. Believe me, I share it too.
But with my own eyes, I have seen people who have floated in
rafts, lost their own children, and stood across from me and said
we have suffered, we have died, but the embargo must stand, lest
we lose another generation, stand firm.
Mr. Chairman, if they can say that to me, I can say it to you.
We are on the right policy. We will be proud of it. I understand
your concern. We have no choice, we must stand together for
Cuban freedom.
I know that you have been liberal with the time. I know that you
have the burden of a lot of speakers today. I thank you for holding
this hearing and for giving me this opportunity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
statement of Rep. Robert G. Torricelli
before the
Subcommittees on Select Revenue Measures and Trade
House Committee on Ways & Means
1100 Longworth House Office Building
March 17, 1994
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to speak to you today on American policy regarding
Cuba.
I have read a great deal recently about a supposed internal
debate within the United States government, and divisions both in
Congress and in the Cuban American community, with regard to the
embargo and current American policy. These are interesting
articles. They are provocative. They are a good subject for
discussion this morning. However, they have the distinct
disadvantage, in my judgement, of largely being without foundation.
I believe that both in the Cuban-American community and in
this Congress, as well as in the body politic at large, there is a
view that Fidel Castro has had opportunities presented by
successive American administrations to reform, to change, to
respond to stimuli, and he has failed. And while hope always
springs eternal in Washington that deep within each beating heart,
there is someone who would be a Jeffersonian Democrat if only given
the chance, Fidel Castro has provided more than ample evidence that
such is not his beating heart.
Indeed, Castro need be taken only in his own words. Yes, he
will have a few restaurants open in Havana and yes, there will be
shoe-shine kids and there will be some small entrepreneurs on
street corners. But the fundamental nature of the regime will not
change .
And not only is there not political liberalization. The
Castro regime is, indeed, a significantly more repressive regime
today than it was 12, 24 or 36 months ago. Some of the people who
were communicating with me during the writing of the Cuban
Democracy Act, by telephone or mail, are today imprisoned. Some of
the voices that have arisen have joined them. The regime, no
matter how much we would hope to the contrary, is not lessening its
grip.
In large measure, the Cuban Democracy Act was written in
response to a series of Congressional visits and a conversation
that I had four or five years ago. During that visit, Castro —
face to face — made clear to me that in his judgement, any opening
of political opposition, any move toward democratic elections, any
pluralism introduced to any extent at all would lead to a Ceaucescu
example in the collapse of the Rumanian state.
31
The Cuban example was different from liberalization that was
taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe, He would not have it.
He understood where it would lead and he disabused me of any
illusions to the contrary.
The strategy that set out from that day has several
components. It is not simply an extension of an American embargo,
no matter how many times people write to the contrary. It had
several elements. The first was to tighten the embargo by
extending it to affiliates of American corporations, to deny Castro
the foreign exchange that he would need to compensate for the loss
of Russian aid. We did it. And it is working.
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 tightened the economic
situation so that Castro would have to make some basic choices
about the organization of his economy and his foreign relations
with Western democracies. He is having to make those choices.
But that is not all we did. We also made a unilateral offer
on communications. From that point forward, notwithstanding
blocked accounts, we would encourage American telecommunications
companies to restore phone communication.
We recognized that would mean increased foreign exchange for
Cuba. We decided to take the gamble. It is worth giving him the
money if every Cuban-American calls every night to talk about
political change and the quality of life in Cuba. We made that
offer. Castro has said that he will not agree to it because of his
differences with AT&T and the blocked accounts. He may have been,
until very recently, the last person in this hemisphere to notice
that AT&T is not the only telecommunications company in the long-
distance telephone business.
We have attempted to liberalize communications in a variety of
other ways. We would expand direct mail contacts, if indeed he
would respond, reciprocate. He will not. Now, we are in the
process of liberalizing some visa requirements to allow, in my
hope, human rights activists, people with political agendas, people
who have a contribution to make to the debate to also visit Cuba.
I doubt that will result in much of a change.
Third, contrary also to much of what I have been reading, we
wanted from the start to make clear that our argument was not with
the Cuban people. It is with the Castro regime. We, therefore,
loosened the prohibitions on humanitarian donations. They have
been liberalized. There has been a six-fold increase in the
legitimate distribution of food and medicines to the poorest of the
poor in Cuba. Since the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, $8.5
million worth of humanitarian aid has reached the Cuban people.
All that the Cuban Democracy Act requires is that there be a
license granted by the United States government to provide such
aid. And this was not an arbitrary judgement. We were finding
that within hours of delivery of food and medicines to Havana, if
the Cuban government was doing the distribution, those medicines
were showing up in tourist hotels for sale, or hard-currency
stores, or if they were items of technology, for re-export. We are
not allowing people to donate food and medicines so that they can
be sold to Canadian tourists. People donate food and medicines to
help the people in need.
The so-called Pastors for Peace, who have been making
donations contrary to the law, can claim that they want to help
people. Well, the people they are helping are tourists. On the
other hand, the Archdioceses of Boston and New York have found
internal means of distribution and are helping the people of Cuba,
thousands of them, within the law.
Finally, we are asked all the time how we feel about the fact
that people are suffering because of the embargo. Lives may be
lost. The poor are hungry. The economy is in a downward spiral.
I didn't come to Congress to hurt anybody. I don't like being
the author of an embargo which might lead to death or suffering.
But, in my mind, economic embargoes are a legitimate, often used,
well-tested and sometimes successful means of bringing change to
repressive regimes.
I would agree that embargoes are not the best alternative.
The best alternative is by logic and simple persuasion to convince
despotic regimes to respect human rights and introduce pluralism.
We have tried that. The United States tried it for 30 years. It
is the ultimate triumph of hope over reality to believe that at
this late date we will convince Fidel Castro, by simple persuasion,
to follow that route. It isn't going to happen. And so we try
economic pressure, knowing that the only other alternative is that,
inevitably, there is going to be armed conflict, insurrection, or
civil war in Cuba.
If we do nothing, then the next alternative is another 20
years or 30 years of a regime that has only brought economic
suffering to Cuba. Because in the final analysis it is communism,
not the embargo , that has led to economic collapse in Cuba. And,
also, another generation where no dissent, no contrary views, no
political rights, are recognized at all.
That is the alternative to the embargo, not nirvana. That is
why we introduced it. That is why it continues to be a sound
American policy. It will bring results.
33
I know, as Americans we are not a patient people. The ink is
no sooner dry than people are saying that the embargo has not
worked. In truth, the American embargo against Cuba is now 16
months old, not 30 years. It must be dated from that confluence of
time when Russian aid ended and the foreign affiliates of American
corporations were brought in.
I realize there are American companies that feel they are
being placed at a disadvantage in regard to Cuba. It is true.
American companies are not given the same right as European
companies to trade with Cuba. They do not have that same right as
their foreign competitors.
Why these companies would want to invest in Castro's Cuba is
beyond me. Any current venture is an investment at risk, because
significant political change is likely to come, to the disadvantage
of those companies that had business dealings with Fidel Castro.
But even if you disagree with my economic judgement, I think
we can agree on one particular political point. Even if America
must stand alone in this embargo, there is reason to be proud of
the fact we are doing so. Other nations may seek to do business
with a regime which per capita has the most political prisoners in
the world; which has done less than all but a few regimes on this
earth to introduce political pluralism. Our country will not.
That says a great deal about those governments who do, and volumes
about our government which will not.
I am much prouder of our position than I believe anyone in
Paris or Ottawa can be of theirs. And, I believe that when change
inevitably comes to Cuba, a generation of Cubans will remember that
the United States stood with them when no one else did — in their
fight for freedom.
I know that many of my colleagues distinguish between what we
are doing in Cuba and what we do now in Iraq or did in South Africa
or in a host of other countries. I do not. Whether dictatorships
find their ideological foundations on the left or the right,
fascism or communism, is of no consequence to me. They are
dictatorships just the same. And if you are in a political prison,
I suspect it would not make a great deal of difference to you
either. I do not want to be part of that distinction.
I am told the embargo is wrong because the Cold War is over.
America's security is not threatened by the island nation and,
therefore, there is no reason to continue a confrontation with
Fidel Castro.
I did not know that America's objectives in the world were
only measured by the Cold War. No one ever told me that we only
confronted regimes because they were either a security threat to
the United States or allied to the Soviet Union. I thought, from
South Africa, to North Korea, to Libya, to a host of other
34
countries, we took a stand on human rights because we believe in
human rights. We took a stand against tyrannical governments
because of the threat they represented to our values and their own
people, not because of the threat to our people.
I see nothing in the end of the Cold War that changes American
policy towards Fidel Castro, nor do I see any evidence in
Washington that that policy is going to change. Somebody is going
to blink, somebody is going to reform their policy. And it is
going to be in Havana, not Washington.
We are going to see this policy through, and when it is done,
perhaps we alone in the world are going to be very, very proud of
what we have accomplished. When that day comes, we Americans will
be making no apologies to a new democratic government in Havana. A
government comprised of a new generation of Cubans who waited a
long lonely time to join the international community in this new
wave of freedom.
Thank you very much.
35
Chairman Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. I can-
not think of any Member of the House that has more eloquently,
openly shared her love for Cuba and her quest that democracy
reaches her beloved land. Yet, in fighting to maintain the embargo,
I have never found anyone that I disagreed with that has been so
agreeable in sharing her view.
I want to thank you for your patience with me. The Chair recog-
nizes you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first of all express my deep appreciation for you and for
your committee for granting me the honor to speak before your
subcommittee on the issue that, as you know, is of utmost impor-
tance to the Cuban community, both inside and outside the island.
I come before you today to express my very strong opposition to
your bill, H.R. 2229, the Free Trade With Cuba Act.
I wish that my brothers and sisters in Cuba would have the op-
portunity to freely discuss ideas, as we have here today. The lib-
erties that we take here so lightly in the United States are un-
heard of and unpracticed in my native homeland.
Mr. Chairman, it is universally acknowledged that Cuba stands
presently as one of the most oppressive, if not the most oppressive
regime in the world. The Castro regime has since its inception in
1959 systematically violated the Cuban people's human and politi-
cal rights. And although the cold war may be over for some, nobody
has bothered to inform the Cuban people of this.
As the most recent State Department human rights report states:
"The Government" — that is the Cuban Government — "sharply re-
stricts basic political and civil rights, including freedom of expres-
sion, of association, of assembly, of movement, as well as the right
to privacy, the right of citizens to change their government, and
worker rights. Authorities neutralize dissent through a variety of
tactics designed to keep activists off balance, divided, and discred-
ited by labeling them mentally disturbed social misfits or hostile
agents of foreign nations."
The systematic human rights violations have also been acknowl-
edged by other human rights organizations, such as Amnesty Inter-
national, Americas Watch, Freedom House, and others. Most re-
cently, the U.N. Human Rights Commission approved a resolution
condemning once again the Castro regime for its human rights vio-
lations.
Mr. Chairman, proponents of lifting the embargo against Cuba
seem to be intoxicated by Castro's recent rhetoric promising eco-
nomic reforms. They point to the increase in foreign investment
which has entered the island as a sign of the changing Cuban re-
gime's ways.
But these reforms, Mr, Chairman, are nothing but cosmetic
changes which do not substantially alter the highly centralized bu-
reaucracy, which has governed the Cuban economy for four dec-
ades. Having lost the billions of dollars in annual subsidies which
it received from the former Soviet Union, the Cuban regime has
36
been brought to its knees, as the people have been forced by Castro
to live with his failed economic policies. As a result, the Cuban re-
gime has begun an international campaign of attracting foreign in-
vestments to the island in order to maintain itself above water.
However, absolutely no changes in the State controlled political
system or improvement in human rights violations have followed
this new strategy.
The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that the regime is desperately at-
tempting to maintain itself above water, while continuing to main-
tain full tyrannical rule over the island. The lifting of the embargo
would throw a life preserver which would only serve to aid the con-
tinuation of Castro's tyranny, and would give away the LFnited
States' primary leverage in bringing about political pluralism to
the island.
Furthermore, the increased foreign participation in the country's
economy is not designed to help the Cuban people, but, rather, to
help the Communist Party's elite obtain the resources necessary to
maintain its political control over the island. A perfect example is
the tourist apartheid which exists in Cuba today. Foreign visitors
bask in the glow of hotels and stores filled with all kinds of prod-
ucts, the same products that the Cuban people struggle to obtain
for their basic survival. South Florida is reminded daily of the
Cuban people's struggle to survive, as our shores receive new
Cuban rafters who risk their lives in the ocean, in order to escape
the hell in which they find themselves.
The Cuban regime has also begun a well orchestrated inter-
national campaign to pressure the United States into listing the
embargo, portraying it as the cause and effect of Cuba's economic
ills. However, we should make it clear that it has not been the em-
bargo which has created this situation. It has been the intran-
sigence of the Cuban regime to accept any type of political or eco-
nomic openness. Their most recent farce in order to prove their
nonexistent flexibility has been to call for a dialog between the re-
gime and Cuban exiles. However, only those that they invite can
attend, and only those issues which they approve of can be dis-
cussed. Of course, these do not include such issues as human rights
or political pluralism.
I am baffled by the logic of those who wish to see an end to the
embargo. No evidence exists that Castro would liberalize the politi-
cal system, if the embargo is lifted. On the contrary, if there is one
thing that we have learned about Castro, it is that his only goal
is to maintain absolute control over the island and its people.
Mr. Chairman, we should not lift the embargo at a time when
it is most effective. On the contrary, we should be working toward
internationalizing the embargo against Castro. We should ask
those countries which act as accomplices to Castro's tyranny to join
us, so that we can finally bring about the disappearance of this
ruthless regime.
If there is an embargo to be lifted, let Castro lift the embargo to
be lifted, let Castro lift the embargo that he places on the freedom
of assembly, on the fi-eedom of speech, on the freedom of religion.
Let Castro lift the embargo on the fi-eedom of the press and the
freedom of the Cuban people to freely decide their political destiny
and choose their leaders. Let Castro lift the embargo on the Cuban
37
people's lives and allow them to freely conduct themselves, without
having to worry about being continuously monitored and face bru-
tal reprisals from his regime. That is the embargo which must be
lifted, the embargo on freedom for self-determination for the Cuban
people.
Mr. Chairman, as you all probably know, like millions of other
Cubans, I was a refugee brought to this great country by my par-
ents who fled the Communist regime which took over control in
Cuba. My parents came to this country, because it offered us the
opportunity to live in freedom, which was denied in our native
homeland.
The same freedoms that my parents desired for our family is still
desired by the Cuban people today. Let us not, after 35 years, send
the Cuban people a message that the United States no longer
stands by their side, that in order to satisfy the self-serving inter-
ests of some, we will compromise our principles of freedom and lib-
erty. The United States holds the moral high ground on this issue.
Let us not abandon the 11 million Cubans who for decades have
looked to democracies like ours as their only light in an otherwise
dark struggle against oppression.
To borrow lines from friends of democracy, when we say, "Castro,
tear down this Communist wall," the cruel dictator says, "No, no,
no, no."
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you for sharing your views with us,
and also for your willingness to at least keep the issue on the table
so that we can continue to discuss it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your openness.
Chairman Rangel. For the panel's knowledge, that is a quorum
call vote that is on, and it appears as though we will have 15 min-
utes before the next vote.
Let me thank my friend and fellow New Yorker, Congressman
Serrano, for coming to share his views today. I do not think that
anyone has had more courage, in view of the threats that have
been made against him, for consistently saying that he is going to
do what is morally right, even though there is no political advan-
tage at all that he would share in obtaining the removal of the em-
bargo.
There was some concern as to whether or not you should even
be invited as a witness, but I am glad that you were and I am glad
that you accepted.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSE E. SERRANO, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your concern about whether or not to invite me,
in view of the political atmosphere that exists against me and my
reelection challenge from the Miami community. My conscience is
clear, however, on this issue. I sleep well at night, and I want this
issue to be resolved for the benefit of both of our countries and both
the Cuban and the American people.
38
It is with great pleasure that I testify before this subcommittee
today in support of an essential piece of legislation introduced by
my esteemed colleague, Charles Rangel.
Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you, because I do not real-
ly know if you fully understand what you have accomplished here
today. This audience, these many cameras, these many inter-
national and national reporters, this turnout by Members of Con-
gress indicates that, no matter the result of these hearings, and no
matter whether this bill gets to the floor of the House, tnere is no
turning back on this issue. You have put it forth in a way where
the conscience of this country will not be called into question, and
we will deal with this issue like we never have dealt with it in the
past.
There is, I repeat, no turning back, and we will deal with this
issue, rather than ignore it. We nave proven that, for over 30 years
now, the United States has maintained a completely ineffectual
embargo on Cuba. The original intent of this embargo was to bend
President Castro to our will, to our way of government. It should
be clear by now that the Cubans are perfectly willing and able to
resist our pressure and to suffer the consequences.
The big lie that is put forth in this country, by a particular group
of people, and the one that troubles me the most is that people re-
siding in Cuba want us to continue with the embargo. Think of
this, if you will, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: A
mother this evening trjang to figure out how she is going to feed
a family, calling or sitting down to write a letter to her relatives
in Miami, or interrupting them by phone at dinnertime, taking
them away from their steak dinner, to tell them, "Keep the embar-
go coming, I'm hungry, but this is a political decision." That to me
is the big lie.
When you think about the thousands of children that are suffer-
ing from malnutrition and treatable diseases, you must question
the morality of a policy tolerant of the death and suffering of chil-
dren, all in the name of a political difference. The embargo is a
useless relic of antiquated U.S. foreign policy. If we cannot find the
human compassion to lift the embargo to save life in Cuba, perhaps
then we can be motivated by considerations of U.S. foreign policy.
Now, today you are going to hear, as you have already, a lot of
comments about political conditions in Cuba. I submit to you that
if our foreign policy was the same with every country in the world,
then those comments would carry a lot of weight. But it is not the
same. We treat people differently, depending on our needs and not
theirs.
The world has changed since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. We
won the cold war. I ask you, what is the difference between the po-
litical situation in Cuba and the political situation in China that
allows us to grant most-favored-nation status to one, and refuse to
deal with the other?
The United States is able to lift the sanctions against Vietnam,
a country which caused the loss of many American lives during the
Vietnam War, a war that still divides this society and whose con-
sequences we still see on the streets of our cities in this country.
We are able to extend most-favored-nation trade status to China,
regardless of our philosophical differences. However, we maintain
39
the embargo against Cuba. This, Mr. Chairman, is a poHcy of dou-
ble standard. This is rank hypocrisy.
Even the depth of our belief in the justification for our policy is
suspect. Though we claim to maintain the embargo to protect the
political rights of Cubans, our own interest section in Cuba, our
Government officials in Cuba presented a document to the Central
Intelligence Agency stating that the majority of the people who
want to leave Cuba as refugees right now do so because of the dete-
riorating economic situation, and not because of political oppres-
sion. This fact is supported by a report completed by the U.N,
Human Rights Commission last January, which states:
"The main cause of immigration is the lack of opportunity and
options."
There is no moral or factual basis to continue supporting the em-
bargo against Cuba. It is time to negotiate with Cuba, to begin to
discuss a peaceful, mutually beneficial relationship acceptable to
both.
Mr. Chairman, many people will tell you that the true embargo
is the one placed by President Castro on his own people, that it is
his failings and inability to lead his country that have caused the
problems in Cuba.
Well, that is the biggest argument for lifting the embargo. If in-
deed it is not the embargo that has created the problems for the
people, then for God's sake lift it and show that, in fact, it was his
shortcomings and not ours.
Another of the criticisms that I personally get, and I know you
have, Mr. Chairman, is that this is not an issue for anyone else,
that this is a Cuban-American issue. With all respect to the Cuban-
American community, it is the Torricelli bill that imposes an em-
bargo on Cuba. The Torricelli bill is an act of Congress. I am a
Member of Congress. Therefore, it is as much my issue as it is any-
body else's issue.
The problem is that we have a foreign policy toward Cuba arising
out of Dade County, foreign policy dictated by a small group of peo-
ple. Some people opposed negotiating with Cuba. Well, maybe nego-
tiating would bring about changes from within Cuba. That is not
in the best interests of some people who would like to return to
form part of a government. Perhaps the government should come
from the people in Cuba.
You know, Mr. Chairman, pretty soon you and I will not have to
do much on this issue any more, because the great victory today
and the great victory for the last 6 or 7 months is the number of
Cuban-Americans who are lifting their voices in opposition to the
embargo. People who before were in one way or another not able
to speak, now are able to speak, raise funds, support candidates,
and do the same things that other people have been doing. This is
healthy and this will help us in a long way.
Let me just take 2 seconds here, Mr. Chairman, to do two things
that may appear to some people to be melodramatic, but it will
show you perhaps why I think the way I do. This is a very small
picture. It was given to me, sent to me by mail by a group called
the Cuban Institute for Friendship with other people or other coun-
tries. It is a picture of Cuban children in school frolicking in front
40
of the camera the way children do. They look happy. They look in-
nocent.
These children will some day, if not already, be hungry. These
children some day, if not already, will not have medicine to treat
a disease. I can sustain the attacks, because I go to sleep at night
knowing that I am doing nothing to hurt these children. I am try-
ing in fact to help these children.
Last, but not least, I will submit for the record the words I read
now very quickly in Spanish, and then I will translate them. The
great Puerto Rican poet Lola Rodriguez de Tio wrote: "Cuba and
Puerto Rico are two wings from one bird, they received flowers and
bullets in one heart."
If not as an American Congressman, if not as a human being,
then certainly as a person bom on the island of Puerto Rico, I look
over to the island close to us, and I certainly do not want to go to
sleep at night thinking that I had anything to do with bringing
misery to a people that are very much a part of my blood.
Let us end the embargo now. Let us talk to the Cuban people
and let us create for these children a better future than the one
we may participate in giving them now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
41
STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN JOSE E. SERRANO
ON H.R. 2229, THE FREE TRADE WITH CUBA ACT,
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
MARCH 17, 1994
It is with great pleasure that I testify before this joint
hearing today in support of an essential piece of legislation
introduced by my esteemed colleague, Charles Range 1 .
We have proven that for over 30 years now, the United States
has maintained a completely ineffectual embargo on Cuba. The
original intent of this embargo was to bend President Fidel
Castro to our will - to our way of government. It should be
clear by now that the Cubans are perfectly willing and able to
resist our pressure and to suffer the consequences.
I do not believe that Cubans, residing in Cuba, want us to
continue with the embargo, notwithstanding what the Cuban exile
community wants us to believe. When you think about the
thousands of children that are suffering from malnutrition and
treatable diseases, you must question the morality of a policy
tolerant of the death and suffering of children, all in the name
of a political difference.
The embargo is a useless relic of antiquated U.S. foreign
policy. If we cannot find the human compassion to lift the
embargo to save life in Cuba, perhaps we can be motivated by
consideration of United States foreign policy.
The world has changed since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.
We won the Cold War. I ask you: What is the difference between
the political situation in Cuba and the political situation in
China that allows us to grant Most-Favored Nation status to one
and refuse to deal with the other?
The United States is able to lift the sanctions against a
country which caused the loss of many American lives during the
Vietnam War, even without knowing the whereabouts of our P.O.W.s.
We are able to extend Most-Favored Nation trade status to China
regardless of our philosophical differences. However, we
maintain the embargo against Cuba.
This is a policy of double standard. This is rank
hypocrisy.
Even the depth of our belief in the justification for our
policy is suspect. Though we claim to maintain the embargo to
protect the political rights of Cubans, our Interests Section in
Cuba presented a document to the Central Intelligence Agency
stating that the majority of people who want to leave Cuba as
refugees do so because of the deteriorating economic situation
and not because of political oppression. This fact is supported
by a report completed by the United Nations Human Rights
Commission last January which states that "the main cause of
emigration is the economic situation with its lack of opportunity
and options. "
There is no moral or factual basis to continue supporting
the embargo against Cuba. It is time to negotiate with Cuba to
begin to discuss a peaceful, mutually beneficial relationship
acceptable to both.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before
the subcommittees today.
42
Chairman Rangel. Thank you for your very moving and inform-
ative testimony.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, might I comment on Mr. Serrano's
testimony?
Chairman Rangel. Yes.
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Serrano, I just want to commend you on your
testimony and your care for children in the world, be they in New
York City; Salem, Oreg.; or Havana, Cuba.
There is something you said I want to highlight, and that is we
do have a foreign policy that we hope looks at each nation dif-
ferently. But the striking fact is that we have changed our policy
with respect to China with the new administration, and it is one
in which we are trying to engage in a comprehensive fashion the
Chinese and the people of the People's Republic of China, and part
of that goal is to bring them into the world community and having
an impact on human rights conditions within China for those indi-
viduals.
Yet, here just 90 miles off of our shores, we are saying no, we
want to continue to isolate, that we do not want to engage, and
that for some reason this will be a better approach to Cuba than
what we think will occur and hope to occur in China.
Having been in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, I remember
this Nation and President Bush, and maybe the CIA, did not un-
derstand what was going on there, and did not predict the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism. It is because, I think,
they did not understand the power and the force of those people
having been engaged through tourists, through television airwaves,
through discussions and listening to West German television,
through seeing that there is another standard of living. The break-
throughs, the alliances that were occurring economically through
bits of capitalism that came in; all of a sudden it blossomed and
mushroomed, and there was a tidal wave that swept so fast people
could not believe it actually happened.
So I think you are right on point in this testimony that you have
given this morning.
Chairman Rangel. The Chair would want to hear from Con-
gressman Peter Deutsch. That will be followed by Congressman
Robert Menendez, and we also have with us Congressman Lincoln
Diaz-Balart. So if you would move up to the panel.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER DEUTSCH, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to join my colleagues in thanking the Chairman for
both having this committee, but also for his work in the Congress
that I have had the opportunity to observe as a non-Member of
Congress and now as a Member of Congress and have known to re-
spect and appreciate that ability for many, many years.
I have an extensive statement that I am not going to read, that
I will submit for the record.
Chairman Rangel. Without objection.
Mr. Deutsch. One of the things that it does is it points out a
number of the independent human rights groups, including the
U.N. Human Rights Commission, including Ambassador Gross'
43
statements and comments about the conditions in Cuba today. And
I think Congressman Torricelli truly pointed that out in a very dra-
matic way in some of his testimony. But I would like to add that,
from my own perspective, as a Member of Congress whose district
is closest to Cuba, as many of you know, I represent the district
from Palm Beach to Key West. When I am in Key West, Fla., I am
closer to Havana than I am to Miami.
From a perspective of where I sit and what I see, there is a proc-
ess going on right now in Cuba in terms of a struggle for freedom
that is historical in world history, a process that each of us in the
world, when the history is finally closed, when the book on the Cas-
tro dictatorship is finally ended and we have a perspective of time,
there will be tens of thousands of heroes, some whom we know
their names and many whom we will never know, because they
have perished in the seas between Cuba and South Florida, and in
prisons, as well.
But almost every day — and I repeat that, almost every day — in
South Florida we see heroes. Almost every day, people who arrive
on our shores, most of who actually physically land in my district
or who are picked up off the shores of my district arrive in South
Florida almost every day. In fact, I am going to submit for the
record a copy of yesterday's Miami Herald, a story that picked out,
again almost every day, Tuesday, 32 Cubans were picked off 40
miles off Miami, 15 Cubans were picked off in two boats off of Key
West. Already this year, there have been 632 Cubans picked up off
the seas or have arrived on our shores in South Florida.
One of the things that we know and have only been computer
models about this, and to describe some of these vessels as rafts
is an overstatement. Some of them are actually on display today
and have been on display in this building. They are not rafts. They
are innertubes, they are pieces of scrap metal. And we see them
sometimes in South Florida in my district washed on shore without
any people in them. We do not know if ten times the number of
people die on their way to our shores, if it is four times, but it is
clearly a very large number of people who do not make it ashore.
I have had the opportunity to meet and to speak with several
hundred people, each one of them a hero who have risked their
lives to come to our shores, infants who had no choice, taken by
their parents, people in their seventies, and every range in be-
tween. And as I talk to them and I hear their stories — I also had
the opportunity to visit the American naval station in Guantanamo
in Cuba, and when I was there, it was also an interesting experi-
ence.
I had the opportunity to meet about seven or eight young men.
In this particular case it was only men. It was really a variety. But
several young men, about seven or eight of them who had either
walked across minefields, swam through what are literally shark-
infested waters to reach Guantanamo Bay and reach freedom.
Again, for those people, statistically they know, because the sol-
diers that work at that base hear the explosions of the minefields,
hear the shooting incidents of people who are trying to leave Cuba
who are shot in terms of that effort to get to that location and free-
dom.
44
I had the opportunity to talk to those people and asked them a
variety of questions and talk to them about a variety of things.
That experience, over several hundred people that I have had tne
opportunity to personally talk to — and I welcome you to my district
on any occasion to visit the transit house where about 80 percent
of those people travel through Stock Island in the Keys, almost
every day, not a sample, not a selected group of people, and ask
them about their conditions, ask them about what their lives are
like.
Universally, the conditions of inhumane treatment are beyond
our comprehension in this country. And they are verified by inde-
pendent agencies. I think to get a perspective of what Cuba is like
today, it is a dictatorship, it is an inhumane system on par with
the worst in world history. What we see happening is an embargo
that has been in effect 18 months, is starting to tighten the noose
around the dictator. Castro has done things in the last 18 months
that were unheard of, and we see that continuation.
If I can add not just what those who have risked their lives to
come to our shore ask us to do and plead with us to do, that we
will see the day in the not too distant future when that country
will be free and these types of conditions will end. But what we
should not be talking about is eliminating the embargo. What we
should be talking about is enforcing it and continuing it, is to get
our allies around the world, as we nave done on other embargoes,
like the embargo in place today in Haiti, like the embargo that was
effective in changing the regime in South Africa, like the embargo
in terms of issues related to Russia and the issue of Soviet Jewry
there.
That is what the debate should be about, how to get our allies
to join us in this effort, which clearly the path is toward success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
45
TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN PETER DEUTSCH
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON SELECT REVENUE AND TRADE
MARCH 17, 1994
I would like to thank Chairmen Range! and Gibbons for the opportunity to testify
before the subcommittees on select revenue and trade on the issue of the Cuban embargo.
While I find many other issues on which I agree with my colleague Mr. Rangel, I can not
support this most current effort which I believe is altogether misguided.
Over the last year, the three decade long Cuban embargo has been ceaselessly
targeted by its opponents. Why now? What has changed to cause this newfound
attention? It is only recently that the Castro dictatorship has begun to suffer under the
weight of its own policies. The regime, in trying to deflect its responsibility for Cuba's
situation, has attempted to focus the spotlight on the United States' embargo of the
island.
While the embargo has been in place for three decades, it has only recently been
given the opportunity to work. We owe many thanks to Congressman Bob Torricelli who
introduced the Cuban Democracy Act which passed in 1993. It is this legislation which
closed the gap in U.S. Cuban embargo law making it more than just a rhetorical tool.
In addition, the demise of the Soviet Union has brought harsh realities to bear on
the Castro regime. Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, who was able to sustain his regime and
consolidate power through Soviet subsidies and assistance, is now floundering without
them. With the end of the Soviet government, the Castro dictatorship has progressed into
a severe economic decline.
In an effort to reverse this growing economic disaster, the Castro regime
announced that it would now be legal for Cubans to possess American dollars. Indeed,
there has always existed in Cuba an enormous blackmarket demand for American
currency. In fact, this blackmarket trade was one of the only industries that Castro was
unable to squelch. Now, the near collapse of his economy has forced him to legalize this
once vilified industry.
The last year has clearly brought suffering to the Castro regime. It is only now that
Mr. Castro shares the same misery that he has inflicted on the Cuban people for 34 years.
The cause is a combination of world events and improved United States policy. And, to
lift the Cuban embargo at this time would be to offer this withering regime, a ragime that
abuses its people and denies them basic freedoms, a crutch and a victory. Lifting the
embargo now would only benefit the regime that has brought agony to Cuba.
For years the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has condemned
the Castro regime as one of the world's worst human rights violators. Conditions are so
frightful that Cuba is among the few nations for which a special rapporteur is appointed to
investigate human rights abuses. Predictably, the special rapporteur. Ambassador Carl
Johan Groth, receives no cooperation from the Castro government.
Only two weeks ago. Ambassador Groth presented yet another chronicle of the
Castro regime's dismal record to the Rights Commission. Sadly, Groth's findings echo
dozens of other reports brought before the Commission over years of investigations. The
most recent report is punctuated by further findings of disgraceful prison conditions, mob
action against dissenters, arbitrary arrests, and the murder of Cubans trying to flee the
nightmare that has become the life of the Cuban people.
It is these individuals, who have fled Cuba, with whom I have had the most
contact. Last year, 3900 of these individuals arrived in my congressional district many
barely alive on rafts made of scrap material. They arrive young and old, grandparents in
their 70's and newborn babies. They leave, some to begin, others to end their lives free of
fear and in freedom. But of the many Cubans who arrive safely in South Florida, it is
estimated that only one in ten survives the journey across the Florida straits.
This in itself is a testament to the horror that exists today, in Cuba. To see the
many who risk their lives to live where they need not be concerned with random reprisals,
arrests and beatings is chilling. It is nearly unimaginable to me, as an American, that
46
people must still choose between the only home they have ever known and the most basic
freedoms which we take for granted.
Of those who remain in Cuba and speak out for freedom, democracy, and in
support of the embargo, all are plagued by constant arrests, violence and detention. '[The
Cuban Democracy Act] contributes to the democratization of our country," said Dr. Omar
del Pozo. Political prisoner Pablo Reyes is quoted as saying, "The great majority of Cubans
preoccupied with the destiny of Cuba desire that the Congress look kindly upon the
Torricelli initiative and understand that any economic gains in Cuba will not be repaid to
the people " Pablo Reyes and Omar del Pozo remain jailed for their outspokenness and
their work.
Another Cuban political prisoner. Carmen Arias has said, "We support
Representative Torricelli in his project to strengthen the economic embargo against Cuba
as this would be a factor of great importance in successfully effecting a decisive change
for Cuba." Any aid to the regime, said Arias, would be "oxygen. ..given to the dying who
have already been diagnosed a clinical death." Ms. Arias also remains In a Cuban prison
for her activities.
These individuals speak with the authority of a life committed to freeing Cuba from
the oppressive grip of Fidel Castro. Their commitment to freedom and democracy is one
that they have made with their entire beings, and their message is clear. Now is not the
timg XQ I'ft thg Cgb^n gmbgrqQ.
On February 14, 1994, Cuban Foreign Minister Robert Robaina announced that a
conference between the Castro government and 200 Cuban exiles would be held. The
conference, slated for April 22-24, will focus on normalizing relations. While Mr. Robaina
marketed the event as a significant attempt to reach out to the exile community, he later
admitted that only those whose sympathies were with the revolution would be welcome.
By only inviting those individuals who agree with the regime, Castro can insure a back-
slapping, cigar-smoking good time but certainly not the dialogue which the government's
rhetoric promises.
While the Castro regime attempts to borrow from the principles of democracy by
hosting this "dialogue," it must realize that it can not borrow selectively. For 34 years, the
regime has worked to stifle free expression. It has harassed, jailed, harmed and forced out
those who have tried to express a different opinion. It has leveled fierce criticism against
the United States, democracy and capitalism. Now, the Castro regime seeks to feign
openness in order to work toward normalized relations.
A free exchange of ideas is the hallmark of a democratic system, a system which
allows all opinions to be heard, a system which clearly does not exist in Cuba. And when
the regime ostensibly initiates a discussion with only one side represented, it is a sham.
Normalized relations in plain terms means getting the United States to lift the Cuban
embargo. So the Castro regime has conveniently stricken embargo supporters from its
guest list.
There is an old Cuban saying that when you have three Cubans in a room, you have
at least four opinions. Cubans are no strangers to open discussion and free expression.
And, many would like to see a Cuba where this type of freedom is institutionalized.
Instead, Mr. Castro's remedy is a reunion for Cuba's so-called revolutionaries.
It is clear that Castro has no intention of making any kind of sweeping reforms. He
himself has admitted that there will be few changes in Cuba. It is Mr. Castro's intention to
hold the people of Cuba hostage to a system that he knows can not work.
Castro is solely responsible for the suffering of the Cuban people and the collapse
of a once flourishing island economy. Lifting the embargo allows him to abdicate this
responsibility and makes American citizens accomplices to the abuse. Permitting American
business to help prop up the Castro regime is an affront to the principles of democracy and
free expression. Fidel Castro is like a boot at the throat of a dying Cuba. At the very
least, it is the duty of the United States to not be a party to the oppression of an entire
people.
47
Chairman Rangel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Menendez, from New Jersey.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to tes-
tify about this particular topic, the U.S. embargo on the Castro dic-
tatorship. I welcome the opportunity, as a Member of Congress, as
an American of Cuban descent who has family in Cuba, and who
knows that the overwhelming sentiment of that community here in
the United States is in favor of our present policy. And I come from
New Jersey, not from where some believe all policy is made on this
issue or that is of a unique thought on this issue.
First, let me state that to understand Castro's Cuba, we have to
imagine a different kind of reality, a reality where the government
in power, the Castro regime, does not play by the rules of democ-
racy, but, nevertheless, wants to be seen and judged by others as
if it were a democracy.
The Cuban dictatorship tries through propaganda to appeal to
the sensibilities of individuals who live and breathe in a democracy
and debate in a democratic context. Through this hearing, it no
doubt hopes to appeal to our democratic and humanitarian sen-
sibilities.
So I hope that we would keep this in mind today, as we evaluate
our Government's policy toward the Cuban dictatorship. Let us con-
sider that this hearing could not possibly occur in Castro's Cuba.
I want to begin by citing a few basic facts about the embargo.
Despite revisionist claims to the contrary, the U.S. embargo on
Cuba is not an arbitrary punitive measure in response to Castro's
radical political orientation. Nor is it an instance of American
interventionism in Latin American affairs, as, unfortunately, other
policies indeed have been.
The U.S. embargo was first put into effect in 1962 by Executive
order of the late President John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy
did so in response to the Castro dictatorship's expropriation of U.S.
citizens' property with a value at that time of $1.8 billion, without
compensation and in violation of international law. That illegally
confiscated property now is valued at close to $6 billion.
President Clinton, another Democrat, right now can lift Presi-
dent Kennedy's embargo with the stroke of a pen. But like his
seven predecessors, he sees no reason to do that, given the lack of
any movement by Castro toward substantive political or economic
reform or settlement of U.S. claims. And I applaud the President
and support his principled stance, and am confident that he will
maintain his firm position.
In respect to Cuba, our foreign policy objective is to promote de-
mocracy, human rights, and eventually prosperity in a country just
90 miles from our snores. We look forward to the day that relations
between our two countries are constructive and based on mutual
respect. But at the moment there is one obstacle which stands in
the way, the dictator, Fidel Castro, and not U.S. policy, as some
would claim.
The Castro regime is now in its 35th year of unelected, oppres-
sive tyranny. If one accounts for the Batista dictatorship which pre-
48
ceded Castro, the Cuban people have not voted in a democratic
election in 42 years. It is high time that the Cuban regime agreed
that people have a right to vote in a fair and free election.
Sadly, it is unlikely to happen any time soon. Fidel Castro,
Cuba's maximum leader, controls Cuba with an iron grip. He deter-
mines all of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies, controls her mili-
tary, her legislature, her council of ministers, the Council of State,
her single political party, her judiciary, her budget and economy.
All of society, every institution and every individual must answer
to him.
In Latin America and in Caribbean history, only Gen. Alfredo
Stroessner of Paraguay, who served from 1954 to 1989, has ruled
as a dictator longer. The Chilean dictator Gren. Pinochet served 17
years, less than half as long as Castro. Due to heavy international
pressure, he had to agree to a plebiscite on his rule, to which a ma-
jority of his countrymen voted no, and soon thereafter the people
elected a democratic government. This February, Chileans enjoy
their first democratic transfer of power in two decades.
As American legislators, we need to ask ourselves what is the
best policy approach toward the Cuban dictatorship. Is lifting the
U.S. trade embargo on the Cuban dictatorship immediately and un-
conditionally, as you suggest, Mr. Chairman, in the best interests
of the United States? I believe unequivocally that it is not.
I suggest that your approach is wrong, just as it would be wrong
now to lift the U.S. component of a comprehensive international
embargo on the Haitian dictatorship, despite the clear suffering
and pain that the embargo inflicts on the Haitian people. I believe
the Chairman agrees with me on the Haitian embargo, although
we are all certainly aware of the recent report by Harvard Univer-
sity that states that maybe up to 1,000 children may be dying in
Haiti daily as a result of the embargo.
Support for economic sanctions on Haiti and on South Africa,
based on opposition to an illegitimate dictatorship in Haiti, or a
hateful race-based regime in South Africa is consistent with sup-
port for an embargo to a similarly illegitimate tyranny in Cuba.
Our policy of economic sanctions worked in South Africa. I was
glad to sponsor an amendment that the Congress passed last ses-
sion to the South Africa Democratic Transition Support Act. The
amendment, which was adopted unanimously, stated that economic
sanctions were essential to ending apartheid and to moving South
Africa toward a nonracial democracy in South Africa.
As economic sanctions worked in South Africa, and to a lesser ex-
tent have to date in Haiti, our policy of economic sanctions toward
Cuba, as strengthened by the Cuban Democracy Act, is clearly
working.
We should have faith in our policy. In eflFect, it has been an em-
bargo truly only since 1989, when Castro lost the free ride provided
him by nearly $6 billion annually in Soviet subsidies. When Castro
had available that $6 billion a year from the former Soviet Union,
U.S. sanctions had a limited and symbolic effect on Communist
Cuba. Therefore, it is illogical to argue that the embargo has failed
for 32 years. The embargo's opponents seek to end a policy which,
following the collapse of communism, has been very successful, not
a failure.
49
During the time when he received Soviet subsidies, Castro did
not use that $6 bilHon to put food on Cuban tables or to create ag-
ricultural reform or to improve production. Rather, he used it for
building the third largest military in the Western Hemisphere, and
for exporting his revolution abroad. And despite the huge resources
available to Castro for three decades, the Cuban people, at least
those outside of the privileged Communist Party elite, have had
their food rationed, despite receiving $6 billion a year.
Castro's limited exercise in foreign capital investments, as well
as his inability for foreign adventurism and reduction of the army
are all due to, and not despite the U.S. embargo. The embargo re-
veals Castro's true facade.
Cuban rights leader Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, a dissident
known for his conciliatory views, has said that measures such as
the legalization of dollars were acts of desperation, not of genuine
reform. When Gk)rbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika to
the USSR, Castro rejected such limited openings, biting the hand
that fed him nearly $6 billion a year.
During the 1980s, Castro briefly gave farmers a limited oppor-
tunity to sell for profit crops
Chairman Rangel. Could you share with the Chair how long
your statement is? Because we do have a severe problem this
morning.
Mr. Menendez. I just have 2 minutes left to finish, Mr. Chair-
man.
Chairman Rangel. It has far exceeded what we had hoped, you
know, with the rest of the Members that we have, but the Chair
will allow you to summarize.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my complete state-
ment be made a part of the record.
Chairman Rangel. Without objection, all the statements will be
received in the record.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, some of us waited very long to
be here on a very important hearing, and we were not told that
there is a limitation on time.
Chairman Rangel. There are other Members who have been
here since 10 o'clock this morning.
Mr. Menendez. The fact of the matter is I am happy to summa-
rize it for you, Mr. Chairman. We know that what we are saying
is not necessarily in line with your views, but let me just simply
say that this is a Ways and Means Committee hearing. If we are
talking about business, $40 billion that Cuba owes throughout the
world is unpaid; $6 billion it now owes to the United States. Is the
United States willing to be part of the slave labor that goes on in
Cuba, where Cuban workers are exploited by foreign companies?
The Government is paid a significant amount and they are paid a
misery. I would wonder what the U.S. labor movement would say
about that.
Mr. Chairman, I think there is imminent concern thg^t in fact we
continue the embargo. If we stand for freedom and democracy, if
we want to restore that as one of our pillars of foreign diplomacy,
then in fact it should continue as it relates to Cuba. If not, then
in fact our position of being in favor of human rights and promot-
50
ing democracy is not a pillar of our foreign policy, and in fact would
crumble if we are to remove the embargo.
I ask as part of my request to include my statement in the
record, since I have been asked to abbreviate it, a list of 600 new
political prisoners that was obtained by me from a European par-
liamentarian while he was in Cuba, so that you can consider the
consequences of dealing with such a dictatorship.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
51
Testimony of Conqresaman Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
before the House Ways and Means Committee
hearing on the U.S. T r-aHa TC mbargo on Cuba
March 17, 1994
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sun glad to appear before you
today. I welcome the opportunity to testify about this
particular topic, the U.S. embargo on the Castro dictatorship.
First, let me state that to understand Castro's Cuba, we
have to imagine a different kind of reality: a reality where the
government in power - - the Castro regime - - does not play by the
rules of democracy, but nevertheless wishes to be seen and judged
by others as if it were a democracy.
The Cuban dictatorship tries through propaganda to appeal to
the sensibilities of individuals who live and breathe in a
democracy and debate in a democratic context. Through this
hearing, it no doubt hopes to appeal to our democratic and
humanitarian sensibilities. So, I hope that we would keep this
in mind today as we evaluate our government's policy toward the
Cuban dictatorship. Let us also consider that this hearing could
not possibly occur in Castro's Cuba.
I want to begin by citing a few basic facts about the
embargo. Despite revisionist claims to the contrary, the U.S.
embargo on Cuba is not an arbitrary punitive measure in response
to Castro's radical political orientation. Nor is it an instance
of American interventionism in Latin American affairs, as
unfortunately other policies indeed have been.
The U.S. embargo was first put into effect in 19 62 by
Executive Order of the late President John F. Kennedy. President
Kennedy did so in response to the Castro dictatorship's
expropriation of U.S. citizens' property with a value of $1.8
billion -- without compensation and in violation of international
law. That illegally confiscated property now is valued at close
to $6 billion.
President Clinton, another Democrat, right now can lift
President Kennedy's embargo with the stroke of a pen, but like
his seven predecessors he sees no reason to do that, given the
lack of any movement by Castro toward substantive political or
economic reform or settlement of U.S. claims. I applaud the
President, support his principled stance, and am confident that
he will maintain his firm position.
In respect to Cuba, our foreign policy objective is to
promote democracy, human rights, and eventually prosperity in a
country just 90 miles from our shores. We look forward to the
day that relations between our two countries are constructive and
based on mutual respect. But at the moment there is one obstacle
52
which stands in the way: the dictator, Fidel Castro -- and not
U.S. policy, as some claim.
The Castro regime is now in its 35th year of unelected,
oppressive tyranny. If one accounts for the Batista dictatorship
which preceded Castro, the Cuban people have not voted in a
democratic election in 42 years. It is high time that the Cuban
regime agreed that the people have a right to vote in a free and
fair election.
Sadly, it also unlikely to happen anytime soon. Fidel
Castro, Cuba's Maximum Leader, controls Cuba with an iron grip.
He determines all of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies,
controls her military, her legislature, her Council of Ministers,
her Council of State, her single political party, her judiciary,
and her budget and economy. All of society -- every institution
and every individual -- must answer to Fidel Castro.
In Latin American and Caribbean history, only General
Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, who served from 1954 to 1989, has
ruled as a dictator for longer. The Chilean dictator. Gen.
Augusto Pinochet, served 17 years -- less than half as long as
Castro. Due to heavy international pressure. General Pinochet
agreed to a plebiscite on his rule, to which a majority of his
countrymen voted "No". Soon thereafter, the people elected a
democratic government. This February, Chileans enjoyed their
first democratic transfer of power in two decades.
In Ibero- American history, as the Spanish consider it, only
Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who was in power from 1939 to
1975 --36 years -- has served longer than Castro. It seems
Castro is bent on breaking both of those infamous records .
As American legislators, we need to ask ourselves what is
the best policy approach toward the Cuban dictatorship? Is
lifting the U.S. trade embargo on the Cuban dictatorship
immediately and unconditionally, as Mr. Rangel suggests, in the
best interests of the U.S.? I believe unequivocally that it is
not.
I suggest that Mr. Rangel ' s approach is wrong, just as it
would be wrong now to lift the U.S. component of the
comprehensive international embargo on the Haitian dictatorship,
despite the clear suffering and pain that the embargo inflicts on
the Haitian people. I know that the Chairman agrees with me on
the Haitian embargo, although he is certainly aware that a recent
report by Harvard University states that 1,000 children may be
dying in Haiti daily as a result of the embargo.
Support for economic sanctions on Haiti and on South Africa
based on opposition to an illegitimate dictatorship in Haiti or a
hateful race-based regime in South Africa, is consistent with
53
support for an embargo to a similarly illegitimate tyranny in
Cuba.
Our policy of economic sanctions worked in South Africa. I
was glad to sponsor an aimendment which the Congress passed last
session to the South Africa Democratic Transition Support Act.
The amendment stated that economic sanctions were essential to
ending Apartheid and to moving South Africa toward a non- racial
democracy in South Africa.
As economic sanctions worked in South Africa, and to a
lesser extent in Haiti, our policy of economic sanctions toward
Cuba, as strengthened by the Cuban Democracy Act, is clearly
working.
We should have faith in our policy. In effect, it has been
an embargo only since 1989, when Castro lost the free ride
provided him by nearly $6 billion annually in Soviet subsidies.
When Castro had available that $6 billion a year from the former
Soviet Union, U.S. sanctions had a limited and symbolic effect on
Communist Cuba. Therefore, it is illogical to argue that the
embargo policy has failed for 32 years. The embargo's opponents
seek to end a policy which following the collapse of Communism
has been very successful -- not a failure.
During the time when he received Soviet subsidies, Castro
did not use that $6 billion to put food on Cuban tables, or to
create agricultural reform or to improve production. Rather, he
used it for buj Iding the third largest military in the Western
Hemisphere, and for exporting his revolution abroad. Despite the
huge resources available to Castro for three decades, the Cuban
people --at least those outside of the privileged Communist
Party elites -- have had their food rationed.
Castro's limited exercises in foreign capitalist
investments, as well as his inability for foreign adventurism and
reduction of the army, are all due to - - and not despite
-- the U.S. embargo. The embargo reveals Castro's true facade.
Cuban human rights leader, Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, a
dissident known for his conciliatory views, has said that
measures such as the legalization of dollars are acts of
desperation, not of genuine reform. When Gorbachev introduced
Glasnost and Perestroika to the U.S.S.R, Castro rejected such
limited openings -- biting the hand that had fed him $6 billion a
year.
During the 1980 's Castro briefly gave farmers a limited
opportunity to sell for profit crops in excess of state quotas.
It was a success. More food was available for the Cuban people.
Small profits rewarded the farmers' labor. But it was too
successful. Castro couldn't control it, so he stopped it. Once
54
again, he denied the Cuban people opportunity.
While under Soviet patronage, Castro ridiculed the U.S.
embargo, boasting that Cuba would prosper in spite of it.
Absent Soviet patronage, Castro now derides the embargo as the
single source of his many troubles and notable failures.
He could not be further from the truth. Unlike Haiti and
South Africa, which experienced comprehensive international
sanctions, Cuba is sanctioned only by the United States. Were
Castro's Cuba able to stand on her own two feet economically,
like all other countries have to, Cuba could buy food and
medicine from anywhere else in the world, from the many countries
that still trade with him -- France, Spain, Mexico, and Italy,
for example. The United States is not the world's only producer
of food and medicine.
But suppose that the unlikely happens. Suppose the U.S.
were to lift the embargo tomorrow, who would invest in a country
which owes billions of dollars in claims due to illegal
expropriations? Who would benefit? Would U.S. businesses
benefit? How could they if the Cuban regime cannot get the money
to buy our goods and services or to make U.S. investment in Cuba
profitable. Cuba owes about $40 billion dollars in international
debt, not a penny of which has been paid back since 1986. We are
not even counting the property compensation issue, which somehow
will have to be solved, as it has been in Central and Eastern
Europe .
Current international investors must be getting nervous
about a lack of return on their investments in Cuba. In fact,
Cuba's situation is so bad that the world's main credit -rating
agencies do not even list Ciiba on their books.
According to Cuban government officials, the Cuban economy
has shrunk by 50 percent in the last four years since the Berlin
Wall came tumbling down. Imports are down 75 percent. Exports
are down from $8 billion in 1989 to just $1.7 billion in 1993.
In sum, Cuba's present misery is due to unproductive and
irrational economic policies, to the loss of Soviet aid and East
Bloc trade, and to Castro's refusal to enact any substantive
reforms. Castro's policies keeps the Cuban people hungry -- not
our embargo.
This does not mean that there will not be a time and place
for the lifting of the Cuban embargo. In my bill, the "Free and
Independent Cuba Assistance Act", which outlines an assistance
program to a transitional government, we ask that the embargo be
lifted once the President determines that a democratic government
exists in Cuba. However, the bill we discuss today curiously
asks the U.S. to reward Cuban inaction, intransigence, and
55
stepped-up repression with gratuitous concessions.
Castro's human rights record is abysmal and one of the worst
in the world. Severe violations began in 1959, when Castro's
henchmen executed thousands of Cubans. Castro's human rights
record -- that is, based on what we are able to obtain --
documents a horror story of systematic abuse and violations of
the fundamental human rights of the Cuban people.
The only human rights monitors in Cuba are Castro's security
thugs. But they do not monitor human rights. They monitor and
beat, imprison, and torture the brave defenders of human rights.
Some of these thugs may be in this hearing room today.
Freedom House's 1993 Annual Review lists Cuba as aunong the
10 worst offenders of human rights in the world. The United
Nations and the Organization of American States, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, and other reputable human rights groups continue to
equally denounce Castro. Yet, since none have been to Cuba, none
of them really knows how many thousands of political prisoners
today languish in Castro's brutal jails. Mr. Chairman, with your
approval, I would like to have inserted into the record a list of
607 additional political prisoners that was smuggled out of Cuba
by a European Member of Parliament, who handed it to me last
fall. Castro cannot deny the truth on this list.
Every year, the U.N. Commission on Hioman Rights censures
Cuba for its gross violations of human rights - - and every year
the Cuban Government responds by refusing to grant a visa to the
U.N. -appointed Special Rapporteur on Human Rights ir Cuba. I ask
my colleagues: should we reward this behavior with gratuitous
concessions?
On the national security front, the United States needs to
be concerned about Ciiba's effort to finish building the Juragua
nuclear power plant, near Cienfuegos. We certainly don't need
another Chernobyl 90 miles from the U.S. Nor would we like the
former Soviet spy station in Lourdes, Cuba to continue to
intercept U.S. communications -- especially in the wake of the
Ames espionage case.
If that were not enough cause for concern, it is probable
that the Cuban government is pursuing the means to develop
biological and chemical weapons in Cuba, through their
biotechnology industry.
As a nation, we need to look beyond the Castro regime and to
a time when Cuba will once again join the democratic nations of
the world. To that end, I introduced H.R. 2758, the "Free and
Independent Cuba Assistance Act", which details a plan of
assistance and cooperation to a post-Castro government in Cuba.
56
Under the plan, emergency economic and humanitarian assistance
and military adjustment assistance would be granted to a
transitional government pledged to democracy and moving to a
democratically- elected government .
Assistance to a democratic government would include
developmental aid and insertion of Cuba into the international
financial community to ease the transition to democracy. The
bill provides for negotiations to include Cuba in the Caribbean
Basin Initiative and in a potential free trade agreement, and
offers the return of Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
Under the proposed bill, the president must submit to
Congress a plan of assistance for Cuba within 180 days of its
passage. Prior to any assistance program, the president must
certify that a transition government committed to free elections
exists in Cuba.
Our message to the Cviban people and to the world community
is one of solidarity. With you we can begin a new era for a
free and independent Cuba.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given the dubious record of the
Castro regime, I believe we should not take any steps to prolong
the life of this odious dictatorship especially at a time
when the clock is ticking on its final hour.
57
Chairman Rangel. Did you intend to read those 600 names into
the record?
Mr. Menendez. No, I did not. I ask you to include it, as well
Chairman Rangel. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
58
Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress • Washington, D.C. 20540
Trarulation • Spanith
CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
ANNUAL REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISONERS IN CUBA
AUTHOR: Aida M. Valdfes Santana
Introduction
On December 10, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the guiding document for international agencies, organizations and
governments in guaranteeing the individual rights of the citizens of the world.
The celebration of this date in 1992, in our country, became one more day of struggle, since
a repressive escalation took place against human rights activists.
On this day there was harassment at residences of activists, who were held for several days,
with neither relatives or friends being able to help those besieged; beatings; affronts; summons
by police agencies; threats and arrests.
In this way Cuba celebrated International Human Rights Day.
We consider it necessary, as a tribute to our incarcerated brothers and the true defenders of
human rights, to release an approximate list of the current political prisoners in Cuba, data
obtained with difficulty, since it reached us through relatives, close friends and lists sent by
the prisoners themselves.
This modest work of homage serves all the true strugglers in the world for the noble cause of
human rights.
59
Last namcw, first name Arrest Charges
Abad Flamand, Marcos. A. -
Abreu Ascuy, Roger 5/07/83
Abedaflo Conejo, Roberto ~
Abren HernAndez, Manuel F. —
Acevedo Blanco, Amaldo
Acosta Dorga, Humberto
Agrego Blanco Roberto —
Aguila Chac6n, Alberto ~
Aguilera Elstrada, Ren6 ~
Aguilera Guevara, Alberto 3/24/91
Aguilera ..., Raymundo —
Aguilar L6pez, Eli6cer A. —
Alarc6n Martinez, Juli&n —
Alba Castelldn, Aurelio ~
Alem&n Almeida, Angel L. ~-
Alfonso Gonz&lez, Gustavo ~
Alfonso Molina, Manuel —
Alfonso Rubio, Hermes 1/22/92
Alfonso Aguilar, Jorge H. 7/16/92
Almaguer, Rodriguez, Alis —
Almeida Barrera, Alba J. 04/06/92
Almendares P6rez, Rey —
Alpizar San Martin, Regino M. -
Alvarez Blanco, Alfredo —
Alvarez Leiva, Alfredo —
Alvarez L6pez, Juan C. ~
Alvarez L6pez, Julio C. 4/19/92
Alvarez Martinez, Pedro J. 11/15/89
Alvarez Montes de Oca, Carlos A. ~
Alvarez Pedroso, Pedro —
Alvarez Salcegarra, Hector ~
Alvarez Trisna, Juan 11/04/90
Alvarez ..., Freddy ~
Alvarez Prieda, F61ix 4A5/90
Alvariflo P6rez, Jos6 T. 12/12/90
Ampido Herrera, Pedro E. 04/02/89
Ampidio Pferez, Pedro —
Angulo Fleitas, Albefio —
Angulo Fleitas, Luis —
Anido Padilla, Miguel V. —
Antunez Mora, Luminado 5/30/89
Aparicio Rodriguez, Maria E. 2/19/92
Arcos Bergnes, Sebasti&n 01/15/92
Aranda Rodriguez, Manuel 06/13/91
AraAa Rosaine, Dr. JuliAn F. —
Arias I^esias, Carmen J. 07/10/92
Sentence
Enemy propaganda and disobedience 16 years
Infiltration 30 years
Disobedience
IDC (nieg. departure fm. country)
Enemy propaganda 3 years
IDC and disobedience 3 years
~ 3 years
Common w. incident and
unlawful association 3 years
Terrorism 30 years
Enemy propaganda 3 years
Unlawful meeting/conspiracy
Enemy propaganda
IDC 4 years
Enemy propaganda 10 years
Enemy propaganda 6 yrs, 6 mos.
Disobedience lyr,6 mos.
Enemy propaganda —
Enemy propaganda —
Enemy propaganda, terrorism
and theft 10 years
Theft 7 years
Sabotage and enemy propaganda —
Other acta agst. state sec. 1 yr., 6 mos.
Enemy propaganda
Enemy propaganda 3 years
Revel of secrets of Min. of Inter. 17 years
Enemy propaganda 3 years
IDC and disobedience —
Acts against state security —
Enemy propaganda —
~ 4 years
Rebellion —
Enemy propaganda & sabotage 5 years
Sabotage 5 years
Enemy propaganda —
Enemy propaganda —
IDC -
Theft 15 years
Unlawful association 8 years
Enemy propaganda 4 yrs, 8 mos.
Acts against state security 8 yrs.
Terrorism 8 years
Revelation of secrets, rebellion 7 years
Arias .... Roberto
_
_
Ariszala, Arozco, Ramiro
_
IDC
_.
Ayarde Herrera, Raiil
12/17/90
10 years
Bacallao GonzAlez, Raiil
_
Sabotage, enemy propaganda
8 years
Bagur Hello, Vladmimir
06/13/91
Acts against state security
4 years
Bacs Viamonte, Juan C.
_
Enemy propaganda
_
Balmaseda Martell, Jos^ R.
_
Disobedience
_
Banegas Barroso, Yunler A.
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Barra Tejeda, Alexis
12/01/90
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Barreras Rivera, Rafael
01/19/91
IDC
_
Barrosa Enrique, Roberto
_
IDC, disobedience
_
Baster Avila, Rolando R.
_-
Enemy propaganda/espionage
_
Basulto Pimentel, Alexander
—
Sabotage
_.
Bedra Hem&ndez, Manuel
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Bellos Dfaz, Francisco
_
Sabotage
_
Benftez ..., Jos^ R.
01/22/92
Disobedience
_
Benftez Hem&ndez, Manuel
11/29/90
Enemy propaganda
6 years
Benftez Jorge, Dami6n R.
04/27/90
Terrorism
9 years
Bergel Hem&ndez, Eulogio
—
IDC
Betancourt ..., Reynaldo
10/09/91
Elicit clandestine
association
3 years
Betancourt Elscdona, Juli&n
—
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Betancourt Montenegro, Orfilio 06/13/91
Acts against state security
6 years
Betancourt S&nchez, Angel
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Binmonte Le6n, Carlos J.
_
Sabotage
10 years
Bientz Saab, Dr. Julio Z.
~
Terrorism
13 years
Bisel Sambonel, Angel
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Blanco Gonz&lez, Martha
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
Boguie Smith, Nelson
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Both ..., Ther
—
Disob. Chief Comm.
Brage Borges, Rogelio
09A1/90
Sabotage
5 years
Bren Tznaga, Pedro A.
_
IDC
_
Brocart Galas, Hemes
_
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Bruno V&zquez, Juan
—
Enemy propaganda
4 years
Bonilla Fonseca, Ernesto
04/04/90
Subversive oral propaganda
3 years
Cnhflilero GonzMez, Ra6l
04/21/90
Espionage
_
Cabrera Alvarez, Elpidio
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Cabrera Cruz, Alejandro
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Cabrera Gonz&lez, Joel
—
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Cabrera Martin, Benigno
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Calzada Valle, L6zaro
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Campos M&rquez, L4zaro
—
Enemy propaganda
~.
Camejo Moeliro, Ivelise
01/06/90
Terrorism
15 years
Camper Lugones, Humberto
—
Theft
6 years
Campos Mufiiz, Guillermo
01/03/90
Terrorism
8 years
Cantero ..., Silvio
—
Sabotage
18 years
Cancio Vazco, Pedro R.
_
Disobedience
_
Cardo Leonardo, Osvaldo
—
Workers' strike
6 years
Cardo Hemtodez, Daniel
08/25/80
Rebellion
30 years
61
Caldoso Companioni, Iv4n
Carmen ArisB, Luis
Carraaco ..., Angel
Carrazana Varela, Ideliso
Casanova Ponce, Miledys
Caraballo V&zquez, Norge
Carsiiles Ibarra, Rigoberto
Castafteda Mufloz, Antonio M,
CastaAeda Mufloz, Julio C.
Castillo Espino, Rai^l
Castillo ..., Leosvani
Castillo Ferrer, Pedro A.
Casto Hecbevarria, Oscar E.
C^spedes Chdvez, Oscar
Cisneros Silva, Nivardo
Cisneros Silva, Orlando
Collazo Peregrino, Ernesto
Concepci6n Granada, Ren6
Contreras Hil&n, Jesi^s
Cordova Garcia, Lenfn
Cordovf ..., Norma
Corona L6pez, Enrfquez
Corzo ..., Ulises
Corzo Rodriguez, Alexis
Curra Lusson, lelana
Curra ..., Ivan
Cuetra Mustelier, Angel
Cucalo Santana, Bienvenida
Crespo Diaz, Jorge A.
Cruz Martinez, Anibal
Cruz Delgado, Alibal
Cruz Reyes, Angel L.
Cruz Varela, Maria E.
Chinea F^jo, Marcial
Chamber Ramirez, Jesi^s
Chapelle Rojas, Francisco
Chavez GonzAlez, Gonzalo
Delgado Cruz, Alberto F.
Delgado ..., Julio C.
Diaz Aguero, JesiiB
Diaz Cabrera, Manuel
Diaz E^hemendia, Francisco
Diaz Estrada, B&rbaro
Diaz, G6mez, Hector
_
IDC
_
Enemy propaganda
...
_.
Enemy propaganda
7 years
05/31/89
Theft
10 years
—
Theft
15 years
_
Enemy propaganda
5 years
—
Disobedience
—
Disob. comm. in chief
_.
03/24/91
Enemy propaganda, attack
9 years
_
IDC
08/27/92
Enemy propaganda
5 years
08/14/89
Sabotage, propaganda, theft
6 years
05/25/87
Espionage and enemy propaganda 14 years
_
Sabotage
...
~
Sabotage
_.
—
Sabotage
_.
—
Enemy propaganda
...
01/22/90
Enemy propaganda
6 years
_
Theft
15 years
—
Enemy propaganda
—
~
Enemy propaganda
._
—
IDC
...
01/11/90
Enemy propaganda
8 years
07/16/92
Enemy propaganda
._
07/16/92
Enemy propaganda
_.
_
Sabotage
._
~
Enemy propaganda
3yeart
_
Enemy propaganda/disobed.
15 years
10/09/91
Clandest. unlawful
association
2 yrs,3 mos
10/09/91
Clandest. unlawful
assn.
3 years
—
IDC
_.
_.
Unlawful association
2 years
—
Sabotage
_.
_
Enemy propaganda
Enemy propaganda
10 years
-
Enemy propaganda
-
~
Act against state
security
1 year, 6 mos.
09/92
Enemy propaganda
_.
~
Acta against, state
security
._
11/09/80
Infiltration
30 years
08/09/90
Enemy propaganda/sabotage
Enemy propaganda
20 years
06/01/89
Theft
12 years
62
Dfaz, Gonz&lez, Miguel A.
_
IDC
_
Dfaz Leiva, Azael C.
06/13/90
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Dfaz Rodriguez, Ram6n
02/06/82
Sabotage
30 years
Dfaz Romero, Jood L.
06/02/82
Sabotage
30 years
Dfaz Rodriguez, LAzaro
08/02/90
Enemy propaganda
2 years
EMaz Rodriguez, Ezequiel
02A0/92
Sabotage
30 years
EMaz Sim6n, Alfredo V.
_
Disobedience
_.
Dfaz Villal6n, Guillermo
—
Enemy propaganda
_
THaz Villamar, F61ix
01/07/89
E^ionage
15 years
IMaz Trujillo, Recardo B.
12/82
Treason and espionage
20 years
Dfaz Villamor, F^lix
08/22/88
E^ionage
15 years
Dobao Aragbn, Orestes
01/24/90
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Domfnguez de la Coba, Orlando 04/15/83
Sedition
30 years
Domfnguez Sardinas, Julio
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Dueftaa Martfnez, Joel
12/31/91
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Duran ..., Adolfo
09/21/92
Enemy propaganda
_
Duarte Morio, Osmanl
_
Disobed.,Comm. in Chief
„
Durga Acosta, Israel
~
IDC
~
Echenique GonzAlez, Orlando 01A3/90
Sabotage, enemy propaganda
10 years
Ek:hevarria Marrero, Miguel
—
Enemy propaganda
4 years
E>:hevarria Revafleche, Hector ~
Enemy propaganda
_
E. ...Figueredo, Jo86
—
Enemy propaganda
4 years
Enriquez Hern&ndez, Rafael
—
Disobedience
Enrique E^pinosa, Luis
—
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Enrique Garcfa, Juan
—
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Escobar ... Dr. Vladimir
_
_
—
EspinoRA P^rez, Juan E.
—
Theft
10 years
Esporsa Procard, Fernando
~
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Estrada Leiva, Ezequiel
_
Arson
Estrada Rivero, Luis
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
Felipe Pino, Ewer
03/13/90
Enemy propaganda
2 yrs, 6 mos
Felix Garcfa, Angel
—
Sabotage
_
Fem&ndez ..., Juan F.
—
Unlawful assoc/
failure of duty to report
„
FemAndez Adier, Jorge
04/26/90
Terrorism and propaganda
7 years
FemAndez Crespo, Miguel A.
—
Terrorism
15 years
Fem&ndez Dfaz-Silvera, Jorge 04/92
Enemy propaganda
_
Fem&ndez Mapule, Julio
12/91
—
_
FemAndez P6rez, Santiago E
,. —
Disobed. Comm. in Chief
„
Fem&ndez Saliey, Alfredo
—
IDC
_
Feria Cao, Aurea
01/22/90
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Ferrer Venegas, Pedro C.
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Angulo Fleites, Luis
_
—
_
Figueroa Castro, Ratil
—
Theft
4 years
Fones P6rez, Frank
—
IDC
Fonseca Garcfa, JosA
_
Destruction fm. fire
_
Fonseca Reyes, Enriquez
—
Enemy propaganda
_
63
Fuentes Vald«8, Jorge L.
—
Enemy propaganda
._
Fumero Carrado, Angel
—
IDC
-~
Galanea Galvez, Carlos E.
_.
IDC, enemy propaganda
...
GAlvey Contreraa, Tom&s
01/i»0
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Garay Callejas, Jos6
_
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Garda .... Jorge W.
08/02/90
Sabotage
6 years
Garcia .... Caridad
02/92
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Garda Alosca, Rigoberto
_.
Enemy propaganda
10 years
Garda Aguilera, Juan
_
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Garda Bello, Maria C.
—
Sabotage
18 years
Garda Bello, Maria del C.
11/13/88
Sabotage
13 years
Garda Ramos, Uzaro E.
02/92
Enemy propaganda
6 years
Garda Cruz, Juan E.
_
Enemy propaganda
1 yr., 6 mos.
Garda Diaz, Carlos
04/29/82
Sabotage
30 years
Garda P^rez, Idalberto
_
IDC
—
Garda Jim6nez, Eduardo
_
Espionage
15 years
Garda Figueredo, Luis E.
01A9/91
IDC
-„
Garda Garda, Miguel
_
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Garda HemAndez, Gladys
_
Espionage
8 years
Garda Mejfas, Guillermo
_
Enemy propaganda, sabotage
...
Garda Moreno, Jos* A.
—
—
_.
Garda Navarro, Nestor
_
EJspionage
8yr8
Garda P«rez, Idalberto
—
Espionage
_
Garda Ortiz, Ram6n A.
—
Enemy propaganda
~
Garda P6rez, Luis J.
—
Enemy propaganda
8 yrs, 7 mos
Garda P6rez, Jorge L.
_
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Garda Vald^s, Maria M.
_
Terrorism
8 years
Garda Saldivar, Jadae
_
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Gavil&n Garda, Jorge
08/02/90
Sabotage
_.
Gil Olmas, Rub6n
_
Dif. heroes and martyrs
—
Gdmez..., Rodolfo
_
Enemy propaganda
6 years
Gonz&Iez Ogra, Luis
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
G6mez Cruz, Napole6n
_
Enemy propaganda
5 years
GiSmez Delgado, Aguedo
12A9/89
Sabotage
G6mez Estevez, Alexix
07/16/92
Sabotage
_.
G6mez Gonz^ez, Fray
_-
Enemy propaganda
2 yrs, 7 mos
G<&mez Madas, Ibalde
—
Enemy propaganda
_
G6mez EHas, Ibraim
10/28/90
Sabotage
7yr8
GonzAlaz ..., Juan
—
Theft
15 years
Gonz&lez AlemAn, Genovevo
_
Sabotage
_
Gonzalez Bello, Maria del C.
_
Sabotage
18 years
Gona&lez Segud, Jennie A.
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Gonzidez LaHita, Rosalina
03/10/87
Theft
30 years
GonzAlez Vel&zquez, Agustfn
—
Enemy propaganda
4 years
Gonz&lez Legr6, Luis E.
_
Enemy propaganda
_
Gonz&lez Leiva, Israel
_
Enemy propaganda
10 years
GonzAlez L6pez, Rolando
_.
Sabotage
3 years
Gonz^ez Marichal, Jos*
08/17/89
Sabotage/enemy propaganda
5 years
64
Gonz^ez Mateo, Emilio E. —
Gonzalez P6rez, Yaamani —
GonzAlez Specks, Lino 09/01/82
Gonzalez V&squez, Agustbi —
Gonz&lez Veguero, Nicol&s —
Gonzalez Valencia, Marcos 04/09/91
G6mez ..., Maria —
Gorrin Verdecia, Ricardo —
Grave de Peralta, Roberto —
Grave de Peralta, Murrelli L. 02/13/92
Graveran Piloto, Juan —
Graveran Piloto, Tomds —
Guerra Blanco, Jesils —
Guero Rosales, Senen —
Guerra Jimenez, Eduardo 06/11/79
Guerrero Garcfa, Emigdio —
Guerrero Martinez, Faustino —
Guerrero Scheweyer, Alfredo 03/08/87
Guillen Zalduva, Jos6 —
Golobo Quinones, Ricardo —
Gutierrez ..., Angel M. —
Gutierrez Martinez, Giullermo A. —
Gutierres Ramos, Rodolfo —
Gutierres Sosa, Jos^ L. —
Granda Oveido, Alain —
Hem&ndez, Reyes, Sanvel 12/09/80
Hemtodez Tesis, Orlando —
Hernandez ..., Eduardo —
Hem&ndez Gonz&lez, Alcides —
Herndndez Garcia, Marcos A. —
Hem&ndez Hem&ndez, Juan —
Hem&ndez Morales, Yosvani —
Hem&ndez Luaces, Omar —
Herrera Macuran, Pastor —
HemAndez Oviedo, Alain 10/19/90
Hem&ndez Toledo, Gelazio —
HemAndez Viera, Alberto —
Hidalgo Gato, Armando —
Herrera Macuran, Pastor —
Herrera Ramirez, Ibrahin —
Hidalgo Labrada, Rigoberto —
Hoyo Ruiz, Rub^n ~
Huerre Peraza, Carlos —
Ibafiez, SAnchez, Pablo —
Ibarra Tejeda, Elexis —
Infante Estrada, Victor R. ~
Enemy propaganda
_
IDC
_
Sabotage
30 years
Enemy Propaganda
—
Enemy propaganda
Enemy propaganda
I
Enemy propaganda
—
Rebellion
13 years
Enemy propaganda
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Enemy propagsuida
_
Espionage
15 years
IDC and acts rep. sabotage
5 years
Sabotage
_
Espionage
12 years
Sabotage
1 year
Sabotage
~
Theft
3 years
IDC
Rebellion
_
Disobedience
—
Attempted asylum
25 years
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Enemy propaganda
—
Espionage, sabotage
Enemy propaganda
20 years
Enemy propagtmda
_
Theft
3 years
Enemy propaganda
Sabotage
5 years
Theft
Enemy propaganda
2 years
Enemy propaganda
Enemy propaganda
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Enemy propaganda
6 years
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Enemy propaganda
_
Enemy propaganda
—
Revelation secrets Min. Int.
8 years
65
Isaac NuAez, Francisco
Izquierdo Cannona, Esteban
_
Enemy propaganda
Espionage
15 years
Jimenez Le6n. Rafael
Jimenez Ramos, David
Jimenez Ramos, Gerardo A.
Jimenez Rivero, Francisco
Jimenez Trujillo, Enerido
Jorrin Verdecia, Ricardo
12/09/80
12/09/80
07/03/90
09/09/90
Enemy propaganda
Attempted asylum
Attempted asylum
Espionage
Disobedience
Enemy propaganda
5 years
25 years
10 years
2 years
3 years
Kerr Michel, Jorge
_.
~
„.
Licourt Medina, B&rbaro
Labrada ..., Rafael
Ledesma Quyano, Isidro
Lamothe Teras, Emilio
LAzaro Domfnguez, Manuel
Lazo Martinez, Anders
Le^n AlemAn, Ren6
Le6n Le6n, Luis
Le6n de la Rosa, Abrah&n
Leiva ..., Ekluardo
Leiva Trista, Osmani G.
Leiva Balado, Liliana
Leiva Leivs^ Croniel
Leiva Miguel, Orlando
Licour Medina, B&rbaro
Linancero Martinez, Luis E.
Lino Cardoso, Hector
L6pez Beltr&n, Martfa
L6pez Contreras, Leopoldo
L6pez Contreras, Ram6n L.
L6pez Estevez, Carlos
L6pez Estevez, Valeriano
L6pez Jimenes, Leonardo
L6pez L6pez, Rub^n
L6pez Martin, Manuel
L6pez Miranda, Diego
L6pez Novegil, Nelson
L6pez Quinta, Jos6
L6pez Rodriguez, Luis J.
L6pez de la Rosa, Andres
L6pez Torres, Luis A.
L6pez Torres, Luis A.
L6pez Gonz^ez, Gilberto
Lucio Rodriguez, Ernesto
llanes M&rquez, Wilfredo
Llyh Ojeda, Radl
_.
Sabotage
_.
11/02/89
Rebellion
3 years
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
_.
Enemy propaganda
8 years
„
Enemy propaganda
._
12/12/90
Rebellion
._
_
Theft
4 years
—
Acts against state secur.
._
—
IDC, enemy propaganda
„
—
Enemy propagnada
5 years
—
Enemy propaganda
...
_
Enemy propaganda
3 years
I
Sabotage
Enemy propaganda, sabotage
I
01/10/90
Terrorism
15 years
~
Sedition
30 years
03/23/79
Ex-milit.
IDC, enemy propaganda.
25 years
worker strike
6 years
E
Transportation strike
Enemy propaganda
IDC
6 years
_
Sabotage
15 years
~
Enemy propaganda
Enemy propaganda
—
07/23/92
Enemy propaganda
—
12/90
Rebellion
_
—
Enemy propaganda
8 years
_.
Enemy propaganda
6 years
~
IDC
Sabotage, enemy propaganda
I
12/12/90
Sabotage
IDC, enemy propaganda
—
11/21/90
„
_
„
Enemy propaganda
„.
—
Rebellion
_.
Mates S&nchez, Huber L.
_
Unlawful and clandestine
association, printing
1 yr., 4 mos
Maestre Sahnrit, Alexis
06/18/90
Enemy propaganda
12 years
Magdalena Morales, Jorge D.
_
Disobedience
~
Manasa Elyah, Ham
—
Disobedience, comm. in chief
_
Maragoto Martfa, Juste
~
Enemy propaganda
—
Marichal, Onllana, Waldo M.
—
Attack, disobedience
_.
Marin Ramirez, Victer O.
_
Disobedience, comm. in chief
„
Marlote Triana, Felix
—
Theit, rebellion
3 yrs, 9 mos.
MArquez Medina, Rolando
_
Other acts
_
Marrero Martinez, Lie. Jorge
01/14/85
Espionage
15 years
Marti Callejas, Bom&n
09/18/90
Espinage
12 years
Marti Rivas, Rom&n
09/18/90
Espionage
8 years
Martin Callejas, Ruperte R.
—
Sabotage
12 years
Martin Roca, Pedro S.
_.
Enemy propaganda
—
Martin Roca, Pedro
12/22/90
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Martin Roca, Aurelio
~
Enemy propaganda
_.
Martin Terras, Gabriel
_
_
10 years
Martinez Alonso, Pablo
_.
Enemy propaganda
_
Martinez Benavides, Reinaldc
> ~
Enemy propaganda
—
Martinez ..., Francisco R.
„
_
_
Martinez Bustamante, Bienvenido —
—
_
Martinez Garcia, Angel D.
02/06/92
Sabotage
_
Martinez Garcia, Angel D.
_
Enemy propaganda
20 years
Martinez G6mez, Luis M.
—
Theft
_.
Martinez Machado, Jesiis
—
IDC, disobedience
—
Martinez Martin, Maria T.
_
Enemy propaganda
—
Martinez Martinez, Luis E.
03/23/90
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Martinez Vidal, Jo86 L.
_
Terrorism
15 years
Matiendo Borrote, Jos6 A.
—
Enemy propaganda
—
M9tos Colombie, Rodolfo
02/07/91
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Mates S&nchez, Hubert L.
_-
_.
.„
Maure Justiz, Roberte
—
Enemy propaganda, assault
~
Mayo M6ndez, Juan
01/90
Enemy propaganda
4 years
Mayo G6mez, Rafael
—
Sabotage
2 years
Mena P^rez, Ad&n
—
Sabotage
10 years
Medina Corzo, Santiago
06/27/92
—
4 years
M6ndez Rafful, Juan P.
_
Enemy propaganda
20 years
M6ndez Montesinos, Ren6
—
Enemy propaganda
—
M^ndez Fernando, Juan
—
Enemy propaganda
6 years
M6ndez Kenol, Manuel
—
Disobedience, Comm. in chief
—
M6ndoz Veloz, Anibal
_.
IDC
_
Mendoza Marrero, Maria
02/20/92
Theft
10 years
Merino Guerra, Luciano
_
Enemy propaganda
~
Mesa Hem&ndez, Mario
01/07/90
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Miero Diaz, Jorge R.
_
IDC
_.
Mojena Aqjeris, Jos6 M.
01/19/91
IDC
—
Moiyer Quintana, Eduardo
_
Sabotage
—
Montes Prendes, Reinaldo
—
Economic espionage
~
67
Montes de Oca ..., Rend
_
Disobedience
Montes de Oca Cancio, Ronaldo de la C.
IDC
„.
Monteagudo Rodriguez, Luis
„
Attempt Span. Embas.
asylum
4 years
Montero HemAndez, Alfredo
„
IDC
_.
MontesinoB Arguellea, Sara
_.
Theft
_.
Montoya Gonz&Iez, Jesiis
~
Sabotage
10 years
Morales Viort, LAzaro L.
02/03/90
Enemy propaganda
4 years
Martfnez Hem&ndez, Mario
—
Disobedience
Moral Veliz, Martfn
_
IDC, disobedience
._
Morales Beltr&n, Omar
_
Possible sabotage
_.
Morales Cantero, Silvio A.
_.
Sabotage
18 years
Morales ..., Pedro J.
_
Enemy propaganda
_-
Morales Gerrero, Ariel
~
Sabotage
_
Morales Rodriguez, Pablo
—
Unlawful assoc. group
~
Morales Tnijillo, Fredy
_.
Sabotage
20 years
Moreno Reyes, Juan J.
11/21/92
Enemy propaganda
„
Morej6n, Rodriguez, Felipe A.
, 11/21/89
Enemy propaganda
-_
Moreno Tapia, Juan P.
—
Disobedience
3 years
Murez Justiz, Roberto
03/24/91
Enemy propaganda, assault.
disobedience
6 years
Mufloz L6p€z, Pedro R.
„
Disobedience, comm. ir
I chief
...
Mufloz Rodriguez, Guillermo
_.
IDC
2 years
Napoles FemAndez, Raidel
„
Enemy propaganda
2 years
Naranjo Ramfrez, Eladio
._
Disobedience, defamation of
heroes and martyrs
...
Naraiyo Fonseca, Josfe M.
—
Probable sabotage
_.
Naaco Marrero, Ares
01/13/90
Terrorism
8 years
Nogueras N&poles, Julio
01/19/92
IDC
_
Noto Barrios, Agustin
_.
_
—
NufSez L6pez, Pastor
_.
Sabotage
—
Nufiez Nuflez, Mart{n
_
IDC
_.
Nuflez Cos, Ariel A.
_.
Enemy propaganda
._
Nuflez Villegas, Alcides
-
Disobedience
1 year, 6 mos
O'Farrill Victor, Felix
Sabotage
2 years
Orme Caballero, Carlos C.
—
Rebellion
7 years
Ortega Hunt, Leandro A.
_
Disobedience, comm. ir
1 chief
_
Orunda Montejo, Fernando
_-
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Osorio Pupo, Merquiades
._
Sabotage
_.
Osorio Sierra, Ram6n
—
Sabotage
_
Oviedo Hermida, Ala
10/15/90
Sabotage
_.
Pairal Diaz, Omar
Sabotage
3 years
Pantoja Flores, Fidel
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
Pacheco Victori£^ Luis
~
Enemy propaganda
._
Pantoja Rodriguez, Antonio
„
Enemy propaganda
_
Pasarin Siro, Rom&n
„
_
Pascual Hello, Rodolfo
—
Sabotage
5 years
Pages Navarro, Rolando C.
_
Unlawful association
1 year
Pelegrin Campbell, Osmani
12/20/89
Sabotage and propaganda
_
Pelegrin Ramirez, Raymundo
—
Sabotage
—
Pena Ruiz, Mario
—
Acts against state security
~
Peraza .... Carlos
—
Enemy propaganda
5 years
Peraza Cabrera, Eduardo
10/21/88
Sabotage
15 years
Perdomo Feria, Rafael
—
Sabotage
—
P6rez ...,Omar
—
Enenqr propaganda
2yea™
P6rez de Agreda Gdmez, Ricardo L.
Disobedience, comm. in chief
P6rez Parrera, Pedro
—
Enemy propaganda
2 years
P6rez Batista, Fidel
—
P6rez Cardoso, Osvaldo
—
Enenqr propaganda
Tyears
P6rez Fuentes, N6rida
—
Falsific documents
8 years
P6rez HemnAndez, Jorge 0.
—
IDC
~
P6rez Manso, Benito S.
—
IDC
—
P6rez Martin, Juan
02A)9/90
Enemy propaganda
—
P^rez Martinez Justo
—
Sabotage
_
P6rez Martfnez, Manual F.
—
Disob., commander in chief
_
P6rez Miranda, Ariel 0.
—
Disobedience
-.
P6rez Morales, Omar
03/22/90
Enemy propaganda
2 years
P6rez Piilido, Osvaldo
—
Enemy propaganda
2 yeara, 6 mos
P6rez Rodriguez, Victor L.
—
IDC
_-
P6rez Smith, Angel M.
—
Other acts against st. sec.
5 years
P6rez Trueba, Carlos
—
Enemy propaganda
5 years
P6rez Vidal, Ldzaro
—
—
—
Pino Gonz^ez, Ram6n I.
—
Sabotage
2 yrs, 6 mos
Pintado Vitier, Armando
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Pita Santos, Luis A.
05/01/90
Unlawful assn/disobedience
5 years
Piris Piyd, Fernando
03/24/91
Assault
6 years
Placencia ..., Gonzalo
—
Disobedience
2 yrs, 6 moa
Poinet Hem&ndez, Omar
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Poll Ramos, Jorga
01/24/90
Enemy propaganda
8 years
Pulido Valdivia, Juana M.
—
Disobed^ Comm. in chief
—
Polanco V^uez, Reynaldo
12/10/89
Sabotage/eneny propaganda
_
Pomar ..., Jorge
—
Unlawfiil association
2 years
Portal Artiles, Armijail
—
Disobedience
2 yrs., 6 mos.
Portuondo Rodriguez, Rafael
—
Enenqr propaganda
—
Poso Marrero, Dr. Omar
—
Revelation secrets Min. of Int.
15 years
Pomar Montalvo, Jorge A.
—
—
—
Prendes Montes, A. Jaime
—
Economic espionage
_
Pridas ..., Eduardo
—
Sabotage
15 years
Prio Ayala, Rafael A.
—
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Prieto M6ndez, Angel
12/26/91
Disobedience
—
PuigVald6s, Rolando
—
Other acts agnst state secur.
—
Pujol Irizar, Jos6 L.
02/92
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Puentes Valdez, Jorge L.
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Pruno Isaac, Alberto
—
Ehiemy propaganda
—
Quesada Femtodez, Carlos
Quesada Femtodez, Juan P.
IDC
IDC
Quesada Garda, Roberto
_.
Bearing firearms
~
Quiala Parra, Vismark
_
Sabotage
~.
Quiala Parra, Jorge S.
_
Sabotage
_.
Quinta L6pez, Josi
_.
Enemy propaganda
...
Quintana Silva, Jorge
_
Alleged disobedience
_.
Quiflones .... Raiil
—
—
4 years
Quifiones Estrada, Luis E.
01/19/91
IDC
.„
Quiriello Echevarria, Mirian
07/23/87
Enemy propaganda
-~
Ramfrez P6rez, Eduardo
Theft
15 years
Ramirez Terrero, Frank
08/24/87
Asylum attempt
4 years
Ramirez ..., Mario
~
_
._
Ramos Andreu, Pedro R.
_.
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Ramos Carrateala, L&zaro
07/10/92
Sabotage
„.
Ramos Lechuga, Aroelio
02A8/72
Ex-military
36 years
Ram6n Llorens, Juan
_
Enemy propaganda
1 yr., 6 mos
Ramos Martinez, Donato
03/18/87
Theft
13 years
Ramos Rodriguez, Tom&s
_
Terrorism and rebellion
20 years
Ramos Rojas, Domingo
_
—
...
Restano Diaz, Ro.ando
„.
Rebellion
10 years
Reyes Martinez, Pablo
_
Enemy propaganda
...
Reyes L6pez, Ricardo
_
—
._
Reyes S&nchez, Jesi^s A.
05A5/90
Assault
20 years
Risco Herrera, Ram6n
01/19/91
IDC
...
Rivas HemAndez, Celestino
_
~
_.
Rivera Guti6rrez, Jos6
~
Enemy propaganda
_
Rivero Betancourt, Martha L. 04/06/91
Theft
3 years, 6 mos
Rivero Rodriguez, Pablo
_
Enemy propaganda
6 yrs., 10 mos
Ricardo ..., Aurelio
Rodriguez Abreu, Oar
01/05/90
Sabotage/enemy propaganda
5 years
Rodriguez ..., Tomfis
—
IDC
—
Rodriguez Alonso, Cecilio
—
Enemy propaganda
-.
Rodriguez Benitez, Jos^ R.
—
Enemy propaganda
„
Rodriguez Carrillo, Juan
—
IDC
._
Rodriguez Campos, Jacinto
_-
Sabotage
10 years
Rodriguez Castillo, Carlos M. 11/22/89
Theft
8 yrs, 6 mos
Rodriguez Castillo, Manuel C
Theft
7 yrs, 7 mos
Rodriguez HemAndez, Amaldo P. ~
Enemy propaganda
_.
Rodriguez Herrada, Jos^
_
Hyacking
12 years
Rodriguez Le6n, Luis
—
Enemy propaganda
_.
Rodriguez Fuentes, Humberto ~
—
_.
Rodriguez Leiva, Robier
_
Rebellion
_
Rodriguez Martinez, Israel C.
_
Disob. Comm. in chief
._
Rodriguez Martinez, Jos* A.
12/05/91
—
_.
Rodriguez P6rez, Alne
_
Enemy propaganda/sflhotage
9 years
Rodriguez Placencia, Wlater 08/90
Theft
3 years
Rodriguez Pupo, Ram6n
—
Sabotage
30 years
Rodriguez Ramirez, Jaquin F
. —
Enemy propaganda
4 yrs, 6 mos
Rodriguez Rangel, Ramiro
04/15/83
Sedition
30 years
70
Rodriguez Rivero, Librado
_
Disob. comm in chief
._
Rodriguez Rodriguez, Armando 03/21/91
Ehiemy propaganda
4 years
Rodriguez Rodriguez, Bernardo —
Espionage
14 years
Rodriguez Rodriguez Orelvia
—
Theft
15 years
Rodriguez Rodriguez, Raudel
01725/80
RebeUion
30 years
Rodriguez Roque, Alexis
—
Enenay propaganda
2 years
Rodriguez Simon, Jorge
—
Disobed. comm in chief
_
Rodriguez Soaa, Gustavo
01Aiy91
Rebellion
18 years
Rodriguez Villavicencio, Julio
—
IDC
—
Rodriguez Cal&, Alberto
—
Theft
_
Rodriguez Fonseca, Alberto L
. —
Theft
—
Romero FemAndez, Carlos
—
IDC
_
Rom&n Pasarin, Gabriel
3/24/91
Enemy propaganda/assault
4 years
RomAn Pasarin, Giro
3/24/91
Elnemy propaganda/assault
11 years
De la Rosa, Garda, Nelson
—
Theft
17 years
Rosa Mendoza, Juan A.
—
IDC
_
Rosado Torres, Francisco
01/06/90
Terrorism
10 years
Rosario Carballo, DamiAn
—
—
_
Royo Estrada, Carlos
02/92
Enemy propaganda
_
Ruiz Columbia, Arquimides
—
RfibelUon
10 years
Ruiz D{az, Rafael
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Ruiz Matosos, MAximo O.
—
Disobed., IDC, desertion
20 years
Ruiz Echevarria, Jorge
—
Sabotage
—
Ruiz Varela, Antonio
_
IDC
_
Ruiz Varela, Daniel
—
IDC
—
Ruiz Vincent, Maurilio
—
Sabotage
20 years
Saez Alvarez, Gregorio
_
_
_
Sainz Castro, Roberto
Disobedience
_
Salvia Ricardo, Ismael
_
Grouping
^
S&nchez, Alexis
—
Enemy propaganda
lyear
S&nchez Echevarria, Julio
—
Sabotage
S4nchez Figueredo, Pedro
01/12/90
Enemy propaganda
_
S&nchez Olivares, Luis
—
Enemy propaganda
—
Santana Luis, Joak
—
Enemy propaganda
_
Santos D&vila, Guillermo
01704/90
Other acts agnst. state secur.
3 years
Sarmientos HemAndez, Jos6 0. 03/31/81
Ex-militaiy Batista
30 years
or 09/18/80
Santovenia FemAndez, Daniel —
Other acts agnst. state secur.
_
Seibanes Padrdn, I^iis
04/28/90
Terrorism and propaganda
13 years
Sierra Guerra, Albetto L.
—
IDC
—
Sierra P6rez, J. Carlos
—
Terrorism
15 years
Simon Poll, Sergio
—
—
2 years
Sixto L6pez, Alberto
—
Enemy propaganda
9years
SocarrAs L6pez, Alberto T.
12/12/90
Sabotage
Soto Morell, Marco A.
Sotolongo Rodriguez, Ram6n
3/90
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Speck GonzAlez, Lino
09/07/92
Sabotage
30 years
Stenenso Betancourt, Arturo
—
Enemy propaganda
—
71
SiiArez Cao, Wilder
_
Enemy propaganda
_
Su&rez FernAndez, Julio
06/08/90
~
5 years
Su&rez P6rez, Felipe
12/24/90
Sabotage
_
Su&rez Taboada, Jos*
_
_
8 years
SuArez Ramos, Arturo
05/10/87
Theft
30 years
Tamayo Mojena, Luis L.
Sabotage
Tapanes Tapanes, Regla
03/14/92
Enemy propaganda
_
Tejeda^ Rodriguez, Angel
_
Sabotage
—
Tenrreiro ..., Abelardo
—
Enemy propaganda
2yrs, 6i
Tobal SAnchez, Roberto
—
Disob., comm. in chief
_
Toledo Lugo, Timoteo
—
Rebellion
30 years
Toledano Rodriguez, Jaime A. lV22m
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Torres ..., Juan G.
—
IDC
4 years
De la Torre Calero, Reidel
03/06/92
Possible sabotage
_
Torre Jimenez, Lorenzo
04/28/90
Terrorism/enemy propaganda
7 years
Torres Llourdano, Bislan
83
Sabotage
30 years
Torres Santana, Adhil
_
Sabotage
7 years
Trujillo Cervantes, Rafael
_
Disobedience
3 years
Trujillo Graber6n, Jos6
„
Enemy propaganda
3 years
Valenzuela Tab6n, Luis
Valenzuela Tab6n, Pedro F.
Valdez Baro, Fidel
Vald^ Medina, Antonio
Vald6s Semanat, Ismael
Varona Betancourt, Virgilio
Valladares Efigenio, Jos*
Disob., comm. in chief
Disob., comm. in chief
Enemy propaganda
Disob., IDC
Sabotage
Other acts agnst. state sec.
Other against aginst. st. sec/
enemy propaganda
72
SUMIilARY
Total number of political prisoners (approxiniate) 607
Men 680
Women 27
Broken down according to cases:
Enemy propaganda 276
Sabotage 89
niegal departure from country (with enemy propaganda) 68
Theft»* 32
Disobedience 43
Terrorism 19
Elspionage 20
Acts against state security 16
Rebellion 15
Unlawful association 14
Attempted asylum 5
Revelation of secrets 4
Ebc-military 4
Sedition 4
Assault 3
Infiltration 2
Worker strike 2
Treason 1
Defamation of heroes and martyrs 1
Just a short comment to point out the increases in the charges of enemy propaganda, contempt
and unlawful association, which shows the growing need for the people to express themselves
freely, their feelings and their deep desires for change in search of the sacred ri^t to live in
a world where individuality and freedom of opinon and expression are respected, as established
in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Ri^ts.
Aida M. Vald6s Santana
•• Translator's note: The term "piraterfa" can be translated as theft or piracy. When combined
with 'a^rea' it means hijacking. The translation theft is used here, but the word could refer to
one of the other crimes.
Translation provided by CRS - Language Services, April 12,
73
Chairman Rangel. The Chair now recognizes Congressman Lin-
coln Diaz-Balart of Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman and members, the commercial
embargo maintained by the United States against the brutal dicta-
torship that has oppressed Cuba for 35 years is a manifestation of
solidarity with the people of that suffering island, intended to as-
sist that people in obtaining its freedom.
No one is pleased that the embargo is necessary. But in the same
fashion, no one with an elemental human sensitivity or basic sense
of dignity can favor the continuation of the Communist dictatorship
in Cuba.
I wish the embargo could be lifted, but I wish even more that
Cuba be free. And for Cuba to be free, it is necessary before lifting
the embargo to break the chains that currently weigh so heavily
upon the Cubans.
It is wrong to seek an end to the embargo, without demanding
free internationally supervised elections in Cuba. The real question
is not embargo yes or embargo no. It is free Cuba or enslaved
Cuba, freedom of tyranny. That is the real question. Disguising the
question by focusing it upon the embargo, instead of focusing upon
the nightmare of oppression that the Cuban people continue to
live — the executions, the political prisons, the acts of repudiation,
the historically unparalleled State vigilance and control of all as-
pects of life — seeking to divert attention toward the embargo and
away from the real question, a few no doubt even unknowingly are
contributing to the continuation of the oppression suffered by the
Cuban people.
Invariably, those who oppose the U.S. embargo against the
Cuban dictatorship, usually citing examples of our policy toward
China or other distant lands, support here in the Caribbean the
embargo against the 2-year-old Haitian dictatorship. The support-
ers of so-called constructive engagement with the tyranny of Cas-
tro, one of the five worst human rights violators in the entire
world, according to the U.N. Human Rights Commission just a few
days ago, vehemently oppose that same policy in Haiti, as they op-
posed it with regard to Apartheid South Africa. That double stand-
ard is as hypocritical as it is immoral and unacceptable.
I challenge those who seek to hand Castro his No. 1 priority, the
lifting of the U.S. embargo against his dictatorship, to join us in
demanding immediate and free elections in Cuba, with participa-
tion by all Cubans, without exclusions nor discrimination of any
type, with the release of all political prisoners and the legalization
of all political parties.
Today, in his desperation, the Cuban dictator is selling Cuba
cheap to all those who will collaborate with him, if only for a few
dollars. And there are those who would like to see U.S. policy
changed, because they view their private commercial interests as
converging with those of the Cuban dictatorship. Some in the busi-
ness community are clearly tempted by the slave labor available in
Cuba, by the total lack of labor rights, by the prohibition against
74
labor unions and the absolute ban on strikes and collective bar-
gaining.
But to collaborate with the Cuban dictatorship is not only a brit-
tle and risky investment, it manifests a racist attitude toward the
Cuban people. It is a racist attitude, because the tyrant that op-
presses Cuba is the son of a Spanish soldier of the army of colonial
occupation at the end of the last century, the army that oppressed
the Cuban people. At that time, the United States helped that peo-
ple achieve its freedom. The most ruthless of the colonial rulers
was Valeriano Weyler, known to the Cubans as the butcher of the
reconcentration of the peasantry. The father of the Cuban tyrant
of today was a soldier of the butcher Weyler, and his son, who pro-
foundly hates the Cuban people, has become the butcher of the Cu-
bans in the 20th century. It is a historical embarrassment that
today there are still collaborationists of the brutality being commit-
ted against the Cubans, just as they existed yesterday, and just as
they existed when Hitler massacred the Jews in the crematoriums.
I want the embargo to be lifted, but before we do that, the chains
that enslave the Cubans must be broken. I want free elections now
for Cuba, and an end to the hypocrisy, to the collaborationism with
the dictatorship and to the racism directed against the noble people
of Cuba.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you very much.
I would ask the former Congressman Bill Alexander from Arkan-
sas to join the panel. Let me thank the members and colleagues for
returning. We know how valuable your time is, but we may have
some questions, and I really appreciate the fact that you are con-
cerned enough and willing to stay.
Congressman Alexander.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL ALEXANDER, A FORMER REP-
RESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS
Mr. Alexander. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members
of the committee, my former colleagues.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today and to ap-
pear on this important issue. I wish to congratulate the Chairman
and the members of the committee for providing leadership in this
post-cold war era, where you and other world leaders are focusing
on jobs, trade, regional economic alliances and globalization, and
advocating the cause of human rights by the adroit use of economic
forces during this post-cold war era.
Mr. Chairman, I come here today in a new role as a private at-
torney in Washington, but I am wearing an old hat, as many of you
know, with whom I have worked over the years on the subject of
trade and other reforms that were intended to assist our country.
Until 1960, following the last Cuban revolution, one of the larg-
est purchasers of rice for Arkansas farmers was Cuba. Some of you
know that Arkansas is the Nation's largest rice producing State
and is in the midst of one of the largest rice producing regions in
the world.
I recall one experience just a few years ago, talking to the owner
of a rice mill in Arkansas, in a place called Stuttgart, who told me
75
that before the Cuban revolution that his only customer was Cuba.
So I began to wonder how much was lost in markets because of the
Cuban revolution, and I asked my friend Dr. John Caminarides,
who is the head of the Economics and Trade Department of Arkan-
sas State University, to conduct an economic analysis. And while
the data is somewhat dated, it is still valid.
The conclusion reached by Dr. Caminarides was that Arkansas
lost, in 1987 dollars, $80 million a year in lost rice markets, and
about $20 million in lost poultry markets, so generally around $100
million a year. There are other farm products that are also lost
that were of important trade value to the United States, including
wheat, soybeans and other feed gn^ains, dairy products, cotton and
com. And I have not conducted any current analysis of those data,
but the data collected back in 1987 was about $300 million annu-
ally, Arkansas losing the bulk of that.
Gentlemen, today we have heard a lot of conversation and talk
about values, and specifically the freedom that we have in the
United States and the great amount of value that we place upon
our personal freedom.
I had the privilege of serving in the Congress during the Bicen-
tennial years, from 1974 until just last year, during which we cele-
brated the Bicentennial, and I had over 20 years to reflect upon the
values that made this country great. We are indeed blessed as
Americans to have the freedom to come here and express our differ-
ing views, and it is something we all cherish.
The American farmer is asking for his freedom to sell his prod-
ucts that he produces in international trade, in order that he might
be free to earn the kind of living that he knows how to earn, if only
he is free to sell his products in world commerce during this time
of global change and globalization and regional alliances and eco-
nomic change. The American farmer is just asking this Congress
for the same freedom that is expressed today by those who are con-
demning repression and dictatorship practiced in Cuba.
I recall very well in 1979, when I joined a trade delegation to the
People's Republic of China to promote the sale of products in that
Communist nation. We heard the same cries in 1979 that we are
hearing today: We should not change our policy toward China, be-
cause it is Communist, it is a dictatorship, it violates human
rights. And while China is still guilty of some of those violations,
we are making progress in changing those practices in China, be-
cause our leaders had the wisdom back in 1979 to change its policy
toward China.
I realize that the U.S. embargo against Cuba is a unifying politi-
cal force with enormous gravity in some sectors of this Nation. I
realize that it is an emotional issue among Cuban-Americans espe-
cially. But I would point out that communism has collapsed, and
that only the embargo is keeping communism alive in Cuba at the
expense of the freedom of the American farmer to sell his products
in international trade, and at the expense of creating American
jobs during a time when we are struggling to emerge from this per-
sistent recession, and during a time when our trade deficit contin-
ues to mount, last year an increase of about 43 percent over the
previous year, costing precious jobs in our economy.
76
What the Nation needs, along with conserving our values and
preserving our freedom, is new markets in order to carry those val-
ues into other fora, so that the force of our values, along with the
strength of our economics, can bring about needed change in those
countries.
I thank the Chairman and the members of this committee again
for your leadership. It is time for Congress to realize and to join
the post-Communist era.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. We thank you for your contribution.
The Chair recognizes Congressman Sanders. Bemie, we went
past our time on this, but your entire statement will be entered in
the record. We welcome your contribution you can make to this
panel, as we wrap it up.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you for holding this important and timely, if not con-
troversial hearing. I think, basically, as you have heard all morn-
ing, this is the year 1994, the cold war is over and it might be ap-
propriate for us to acknowledge that reality and to move forward
by ending the punitive trade embargo that we have imposed on
Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the passage of H.R. 2229, the Free
Trade With Cuba Act, will finally recognize that the cold war is
over. And a point that has been made earlier, if the United States
and if people in the Congress can talk about most-favored-nation
status with China, an enormously powerful entity, a Communist
country, a dictatorship, then I think we can begin to talk about
ending the embargo with a tiny island 90 miles away from us.
The reason, as I am sure you have been hearing all morning, is
twofold: No. 1, the embargo is doing disaster to Cuba. The children
are now hungry, they have established over the years, as you
know, an excellent record to try to end child hunger, one of the best
records in all of Latin America. With the destruction of com-
munism, the end of their trade relationship with the Soviet Union,
their children are hungry. Their children are lacking the pharma-
ceuticals that they need. And I think the humane thing is to recog-
nize that and for us to change our policies.
But as you have also heard, ending the embargo with Cuba is not
only positive for the Cuban people, it is positive for the people of
the United States. Many people here in the United States would
like to be able to freely visit Cuba. Farmers would like to be able
to sell their products to Cuba. Businesspeople would like to take
advantage of the Cuban market.
It is no secret that since the end of the embargo with Vietnam,
you have had major corporation after major corporation running
there trying to establish business. My strong suspicion is that
many of these same corporations would like to open up trade with
Cuba.
77
Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have heard from many people, and
I would iust like to add my voice to those who say the cold war is
over, lets end the embargo, it is good for America, it is good for
Cuba.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:!
78
BERNARD SANDERS co»«,tti,!
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TESTIMONY OF REP. BERNARD SANDERS
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
AND SUBCOMMTITEE ON TRADE
MARCH 17. 1994
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by thanking you for holding this timely
hearing. I believe that the time has come to acknowledge the fact that the Cold War is over
and that we are doing a tremendous disservice to both the people of Cuba and to the people
of this country by maintaining the punitive trade embargo that we have imposed on Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the passage of H.R. 2229, the Free Trade with Cuba Act,
will fmally bring us beyond the Cold War mentality that has shaped the debate on this issue
for 34 years. Our relations with other former adversaries throughout the world reflect a new
spirit of cooperation and positive engagement. The President has lifted the trade embargo on
Vietnam; U.S. businesses are eageriy investing in Eastern Europe and the countries of the
former Soviet Union; there is a considerable U.S. business presence in communist China. It
is time that we adopted a similar approach with regards to Cuba. H.R. 2229 would not
confer Most Favored Nation status on Cuba; it would simply bring our economic and
political relations with that country into the reality of the post-Cold War world.
The time for hard line confrontation has passed. Opening channels for information, for
commerce, and for the free movement of people will expedite the economic and political
opening of Cuba. Our continuing efforts to isolate Cuba have reflected very poorly upon the
U.S. and have compromised our relations with our Latin American allies. We must move
forward in our relations with our Latin American neighbors; the passage of H.R. 2229 will
enable us to shed our outdated intransigence and display a new spirit of cooperation.
There is no doubt that the time is ripe for a change. The loss of many heavily
subsidized commodities which the Soviet Union used to supply has had a devastating impact
on the Cuban economy. Cuba is facing its most severe economic crisis since the revolution:
the Cuban economy declined an estimated 40% between 1989 and 1992. The number of
cases of severe malnutrition has skyrocketed. Worse yet, because of the ban on exporting
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, human lives are threatened by readily-treatable
Mr. Chairman, Cuba desperately needs foreign investment to revitalize its crumbling
economy. The trade embargo and the recent Cuban Democracy Act serve only to exclude
American companies and their subsidiaries from the considerable business oppwrtunities in
Cuba. By maintaining the embargo we are denying American businesses access to Cuba's $6
Billion market and her highly-educated population. Members of the Cuban religious and
dissident communities have noted that removing the embargo and increasing trade would do
the most to foster democratic change in Cuba.
Mr. Chairman, the most disturbing effect of the trade embargo is the severe costs it
imposes on the children of Cuba. Cuba presently has the lowest infant mortality rate in
Latin America. Yet the Cuban Democracy Act, banning trade with Cuba by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, has had the perverse effect of dramatically curtailing the
availability of vaccines, medical supplies and equipment, and pharmaceuticals. This has
occurred at a time of rising low birth weights and increased malnutrition, increasing the
danger to infants and children. Mr. Chairman, our moral authority as a nation is called into
question when we sacrifice the health of children for an outdated conflict.
Mr. Chairman, the time has come for us to take a bold step forward and lift the punitive
trade embargo. The passage of H.R. 2229 will help to end a confrontational chapter in our
history and recognize the changing realities of the post-Cold War world.
Thank you.
79
Chairman Rangel. Let me thank you for making it here, and
thank this entire panel.
I would like to start off with Congressman Serrano. We heard
this morning about the overwhelming vote that the Cuban Democ-
racy Act received. As I recall, the vote was actually taken on a day
that there was no debate at all on the bill, and that the debate on
the bill was taken on a day that no votes were taken in the House
of Representatives. Is my recollection correct?
Mr. Serrano. At the expense of going on record as having had
a bad memory, my recollection is the same, that it was on a sus-
pension type situation, and it was taken
Chairman Rangel. Does suspension of the rules mean that a
noncontroversial bill is on the calendar?
Mr. Serrano. A suspension of the rules means that a controver-
sial bill can get on the calendar as a suspension, and it only be-
comes controversial if any Member feels that it is controversial. At
that time, it is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that so many people
thought it was an ongoing embargo on Cuba, that many people did
not understand what the debate about a new embargo was, which
is interesting, because today you have heard on this panel that,
with the stroke of a pen. President Clinton can lift the embargo on
Cuba.
The fact of life is that Secretary of State Christopher has been
quoted recently as saying, when he was asked why are we dealing
with Vietnam and not with Cuba, he said we are governed by a
law, and that was his answer to the question.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Chairman, if I might intrude upon this
discussion
Chairman Rangel. Certainly.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing!. Having been there also and re-
membering the debate which did take place, the discussion on that
day, on that very important day for the cause of the liberty of the
Cuban people, the Torricelli bill, the so-called Cuban Democracy
Act was, as you know, a bill that was very controversial from the
beginning. It was not a stealth bill. It was not a stealth amend-
ment. It was quite an open discussion throughout the process.
On the day that we officially filed the bill, there was a big press
conference on that day. The press covered it. The debate that took
place in the various subcommittees or the committees, people had
the opportunity to discuss it. It was a free and open debate, as I
pointed out in my statement, a free and open debate which unfor-
tunately is not available to my Cuban brothers and sisters.
On the date of the vote, I would be embarrassed, as a Member
of Congress, to say that there was any discussion on a bill that I
did not know about, that there was not the opportunity, if a Mem-
ber wanted to, to discuss the bill. Just as you are open enough and
fair enough to give us all the discussion to debate it, the amend-
ment was presented, people who wanted to debate it were able to
do so.
There are a number of controversial and noncontroversial bills
all the time on suspension. We wish that it would just be non-
controversial ones. But, as you know, controversy is in the eye of
the beholder. To us, to many of us, it was not controversial in na-
ture. However, the free and openness and the availability for dis-
80
cussion was always there, as it is in any democracy, as I hope will
be for your bill, as well.
Chairman Rangel. What I think the gentlelady is saying is that
the Cuban Democracy Act was in fact a controversial bill. It was
then, as it is now.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I say that your bill is controversial, as well.
The Torricelli bill was controversial, as well. An abortion bill is
controversial. There are many
Chairman Rangel. My point is that the Torricelli bill
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But a vote did take place, Mr. Chairman. In
a democracy, we were able to discuss it. Just because something is
controversial does not mean that we should not debate it.
Chairman Rangel. No, no, no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And we are here debating your controversial
bill.
Chairman Rangel. Please.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. A vote did take place, and two-thirds of the
people present decided that that was the correct policy for the
United States.
Chairman Rangel. I am just asking you one question. I think I
am not making myself as clear as I would like. The bill came up
on what we call in the Congress on the suspension calendar, which
means that the bill was debated on a day that no votes were taken
and, therefore, Members of the Congress knew that their presence
was not required on the floor. It was listed as a noncontroversial
bill, came up on the suspension calendar, under the rules that it
could not receive more than 40 minutes debate, 20 minutes for and
20 minutes against. And even the debate, the vote was actually
taken on a day that no debate was allowed at all on the bill.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I believe that the Chairman doth protest too
much. Perhaps you are trying to justify why it became the law of
the land, and perhaps your vote was not there or your voice was
not heard.
Chairman Rangel. No, no. All I am
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I know that my vote was there and my voice
was heard very strongly in favor of it, as it would be today, as I
hope on the day we get to debate and vote on your bill. Perhaps
if our side were able to control the legislative agenda and control
which items get placed or not placed on the suspension calendar,
perhaps things would change. I do not know if that is true.
Chairman Rangel. OK.
Ms. Ros-Lehtenen. I know that it was listed, it was complied
with, with all the public records and laws. This was not a stealth
bill. It was not a stealth amendment. And I think that the vote was
very clear. The people who did not like the bill voted no. There was
an actual vote taken. Democracy ruled. The democracy that does
not exist in my homeland ruled. Two-thirds of the U.S. Congress
decided that the Cuban Democracy Act was worthwhile U.S. policy.
Votes were taken. Debate took place. I know my vote was in favor
of it, as it would be today.
Chairman Rangel. You are one of the most eloquent members
we have in the House, and I just want to thank you for supporting
the Chair's position that the bill did come up on the suspension cal-
endar, that the bill was voted on, on a day that no debate was
81
taken, that your eloquent voice was heard in support of the bill on
the dav that there were less than a handful of Members on the
floor of the House of Representatives.
So I just want to say that, even though the vote was overwhelm-
ing, it was only a few votes short of having been defeated, since a
two-thirds vote was required for this extraordinary procedure.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Chairman, we would gladly bring it up
today for a full vote, on any day, at any time. We would know that
we would be in favor of it, we would be voting that way, and we
think that we would have once again the support of the majority
of the U.S. Congress. The vote was very clear, 276 Members of
Congress said yes, we are in agreement that we need to tighten up
the embargo. It was a full democratic process, a process which, as
you know, is controlled by the Speaker of the House. And if per-
haps another process should be in place, perhaps we should take
it up with Speaker Foley.
Chairman Rangel. I was merely addressing myself to the over-
whelming vote which certainly on the question of suspension was
not — but since we do have 110 new Members of Congress, I think
that I a^ee with you that the more debate we have on these im-
portant issues, the better, and I think the debate should be when
the full Congress is in full session, and not on the suspension cal-
endar.
My question to you is, since we all basically want democracy and
free trade and certainly the protection of political rights all over
the world, and certainly with neighbors, is there anything that you
think could be done now to expand exchanges in culture and edu-
cation short of removing the embargo? Do you think that might as-
sist in removing the dictatorship of Fidel Castro?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. As you know, Mr. Chairman, since Fidel Cas-
tro has such total control over the Cuban people, any movement to-
ward democracy he surely can control. Ariy movement toward es-
tablishing better communications, more freedom, more democracy,
all of that is in his court. If there is one person who has been to-
tally opposed to any kind of movement toward democratic reforms,
it has been the dictatorship himself. He uses the embargo as one
of the propaganda tools to tell the Cuban people you are suffering
not because of my failed policies, but you are suffering because of
the U.S. trade embargo.
Chairman Rangel. So you would not allow any broadening of
any type of exchange until you see
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I see no movement on Fidel Castro's part to
walk the plank toward democratic reforms. He is the first one to
say that he will not put these reforms into action.
As Congressman Menendez pointed out, when there was a great
fervor of democracy throughout the world for perestroika and
glasnost, if there was one speech daily that Castro would make to
the Cuban people, it was saying why that is not the correct step
for Cuba. And he made it very clear, there is no opening, there is
no movement toward democratic reforms. He is the stumbling block
for democracy, not the United States.
Chairman IIangel. Mr. Diaz-Balart, I did not get the point that
there is some racist attitude toward the Cuban people.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Those who collaborate with Castro, yes.
82
Chairman Rangel. Are racist?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes. Yes, because a people in its majority of
rich racial diversity that are being oppressed
Chairman Rangel. But you are saying that those who collabo-
rate with Castro are basically racist?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Basically, yes.
Chairman Rangel. Are racist?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, because it is a people in its majority of
rich racial diversity that are being oppressed by the son of a soldier
of Weyler's Spanish colonial army, who profoundly hates the Cuban
people.
Chairman Rangel. How would you describe his predecessor.
President Batista in these terms? Would he be considered a civil
rights activist?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No. And we can get into a discussion about the
history of the Republic.
Chairman Rangel. I have heard a lot of things, but this is some-
thing new to me.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. One thing that I do say is that there were
problems before Castro took power 35 years ago, no one will dis-
agree with. But to try to justify the crimes of Castro, based on mis-
takes either by Batista or anybody during the pre-Castro times, to
say that because there were mistakes in the Republic, one should
justify the crimes of Castro, that is unacceptable.
Chairman Rangel. I certainly do not believe that the crimes of
Castro should be justified, just your description.
Mr. Menendez, since the goal is really to try to get democracy
into Cuba and protection of human rights, and since you believe
the embargo is the best way to go, what would you believe the ulti-
mate goal of the embargo, assuming the embargo becomes far more
successful than we ever thought it would be, how would that bring
about the democracy as you and I know it? How do you see that
playing out, just in the hypothetical, really?
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, first of all, we would hope that
in fact if Fidel Castro really cares for the people of Cuba, that if
he truly believes that our embargo is the one that is creating all
of the ills, despite the fact that he can purchase goods, food and
medical supplies anywhere in the world, he just needs the economy
to do it, that he would ultimately move on. And if he refuses to do
that, which is probably unlikely, then the question would be, as we
see today, signs within Cuba of human rights activists like Paula
Valiente, an Afro-Cuban dissident, and many others who I believe
are here today, and many others, movements that we never saw
before.
Chairman Rangel. You are talking about a revolution.
Mr. Menendez. I recently had a conversation with the Director
of the U.S. Interests Section, who told me that we see movements
within Cuba in civil society seeking to create change. As we saw
throughout a lot of Eastern Europe, we would hope that people who
come to understand that the only person who is creating difficulty
for them on the island is the one that needs to be removed.
Chairman Rangel. What would they do? They will not be able
to vote for somebody. So assuming that the embargo is everything
that you dreamed that it would he, and you want democracy in
83
Cuba and you want protection of human rights, and forgetting
what Castro thinks or does not think, the embargo works, we will
say for purpose of getting an answer from you, how would you see
the transition?
What would be the next move? Will the poor and the hungry up-
rise against Castro and cast him aside? Or would there be an elec-
tion, because the embargo has been so effective that a party would
rise and then Castro would step aside? How does this happen?
Mr. Menendez. We would hope to see the continual movement
of activists within Cuba who would seek to create enough clamor
in both international
Chairman Rangel. I will give you the activists and the
clamor
Mr. Menendez. Can I give you an answer?
Chairman Rangel. Listen, in a hypothetical, the embargo has
worked, the activists are now organized, there is a lot of clamor,
and they still are seeking democracy. Please do not believe I am
badgering you. I haven't tne slightest idea, in a country like Cuba,
to see how we get to what you and I want.
Now, you are just going to have to take mv word for it, I want
democracy there. Please be kind enough and generous enough to
share with me some way that it could happen, not that you know
how it is going to happen. But if the embargo works, the people are
concerned because they know that the Communist system has
failed, they are thankful that America has placed the embargo
there to let Castro know that he will never get any new life. What
do they do now?
Mr. Menendez. We could either have international pressures
generated by the activism within Cuba that would seek to bring
the pressure upon the Castro government to change, to call for
international presence. We could have an election
Chairman Rangel. Do you mean an
Mr. Menendez. We could have an election called within Cuba,
with multiple parties in which international supervisors would be,
and very possible that the civil community would move against the
Government in search of freedom and democracy, as it did in East-
ern Europe, in Poland and many other places. Those are all among
the possibilities that could exist.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Serrano, I did not understand any of
that. Could you explain it to me?
Mr. Serrano. I have too much respect for my friend Bob
Menendez to try to explain what he may want to say. I can only
tell you what my feelings are.
There are some people in this country, some people, not all, who
want the embargo in place only to bring about a chaotic political
situation in Cuba which comes from a chaotic economic situation,
to allow for a change in government which is to their benefit, not
necessarily to the benefit of democracy loving people.
Second, and most importantly, there are people in this country
who will tell you that they are for elections in Cuba, and it would
be nice if they could all come before this panel and you were to ask
them if they would accept an election which under our system
would be considered fair and proper and democratic, where either
Mr. Castro or his brother would be candidates for the Presidency.
84
And a lot of them will answer that they will only accept an elec-
tion, when Mr. Castro and his brother are not candidates or, for
that matter, any members
Chairman Rangel. Would anyone accept
Mr. Serrano. I am suggesting that some of those people that
would have that feeling may not be on this panel at all.
Chairman Rangel. I just want to know, when you talk about
open elections, certainly anyone, Castro could be one of the people
that would be a candidate, right? I am asking.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I believe in the legalization of all political par-
ties. I am convinced that, as in the Spanish situation, though,
when Franco was in power 40 years, that situation required the
elimination from the scene of Franco, and Carerro Blanco, his
hand-picked successor, before there was a democratic transition.
Chairman Rangel. You agree with him that Castro
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I do not foresee a situation where Castro ac-
cepts any sort of political situation as there was in Spain.
Mr. Serrano. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is a question of de-
mocracy. I think we have to be clear. Jf there was an election and
anyone was elected President, anyone, and Jimmy Carter and some
other people I respect came to me and said the election was fair
and so-and-so was elected, it would be my duty to tell my govern-
ment that we should recognize that government. There are people
in this country who want to dictate to the people of Cuba.
What I want to see is the embargo lifted and involvement, in-
volvement from the Cuban people as to where they want to go. If
indeed the embargo is not working, then let's find out what will
happen after we lift it.
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. How can the Cuban people decide or show
their trend, if you will, Mr. Serrano, without an election?
Mr. Serrano. The same way that the Russian people showed
that trend before there was an election, the same way that we are
allowing the people in Vietnam to show a trend, and the same way
we are going to allow China. My President, whom I respect and
love very much, as you know, Mr. Chairman, said on a TV show
in one of those town hall meetings, he was asked about China. And
his answer was unacceptable to me. My President, who is a friend
to me, said: That China is too big to avoid, we have to engage it.
What does that mean, Cuba is too little, we have to step on it?
Chairman Rangel. Are there members who are seeking recogni-
tion? Mr. Shaw from Florida.
Mr. Shaw. Mr. Chairman, I have heard the gentleman from Ver-
mont, and now the gentleman who just spoke, make the compari-
son with China.
Look at what has happened in China over the last 30 years.
Now, I am not defending China as being a great resource of human
rights. They have got a long way to go. I know that, and everybody
in this room knows that. But when you look at what has happened
in 30 years in China, you can definitely see a trend, even though
the last few years have been rather stormy. China is much freer
today than 30 years ago. I believe very strongly that China is a lot
freer than Cuba.
85
Castro and his hoodlums and gangsters are going out and finding
people in the water and throwing handgrenades at them. What is
going on in that country is absolutely abominable.
Mr. Serrano. Mr. Shaw, the trend is not in China. The trend is
on Wall Street. Just yesterday, either the Washington Post or the
New York Times said the top ex-diplomatic leaders, including Mr.
Kissinger, and many businessmen have said go easy, Mr. Presi-
dent, don't push China, we need the trade.
All I am suggesting is that we should be fair in how we deal. I
cannot be a hypocrite on this issue.
Mr. Shaw. Let me ask you this: Do you see
Mr. Serrano. I do not support any embargo, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I
do know this very well, that it hurts children. I do not support, I
repeat, any embargo.
Mr. Shaw. As the gentleman knows, I have the time, so I wish
you would please let me address you and ask you a question. Do
you see or can you possibly show me any situation where Castro
has gotten any better or where the people ruling Cuba today are
any better than 30 years ago?
Mr. Serrano. As I said in my statement when you were not
here, that would be a subject for today's hearing, if our policy was
universal across the board. Since it is not, that is really not an
issue for today. The fact of life is that I would rather live here than
in Cuba. You may laugh at that comment, but it is true.
Mr. Shaw. I am not laughing at it. I am amazed by it.
Mr. Serrano. If we were demanding from China or Vietnam the
same thing we are demanding from Cuba, then your statement
would be correct, we would have to look at every step Castro has
taken before we deal with that government. But we are not looking
at every step China has taken. You cannot in all honesty be proud
of the Chinese Communist system, and you cannot be proud of the
Vietnam Communist system.
Mr. Shaw. Of course not.
Mr. Serrano. But we are dealing with them, and I am suggest-
ing that the best way to find out what is in the future of Cuba is
to engage them. If we do not engage them, there is a possibility of
chaos that we will have to pick up the tab for.
Because Cuba is so close to our shores, Mr. Shaw, and I say this
with all due respect, that if there is chaos in Cuba, we would feel
responsible in a way and have to be involved. Whether that in-
volvement would be military or that involvement would be eco-
nomic, it would cost the American people. Why go that far? Why
not try this for a while, our suggestion, Mr. Rangel's and mine?
Maybe it will work. Maybe it will not work, and we will admit to
you that it has not worked,
Mr. Shaw. We have a genuine disagreement as to the policy of
the United States and what is going to change things in Cuba. How
can we reward Mr. Castro at this time by lifting the embargo,
when we have seen absolutely nothing happen? We have seen no
movement toward human rights, no movement toward human free-
doms. In fact, we have seen the reverse. They are washing up on
my shores every day of the week.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Shaw, if I could interrupt 1 second,
when Congressman Serrano says maybe it will work and maybe it
86
will not work, I am sorry, but the Cuban people are not the play-
things of either Congressman Serrano or anyone else in the U.S.
Congress.
Mr. Serrano. But maybe the Cuban people should be given
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This is not an experiment. This is not an ex-
periment to be toyed with. The freedom and democracy and justice
in my native homeland is not a social experiment for the U.S. Con-
gress.
Mr. Shaw. Your point has been very well made. In fact, I think
all the points have been pretty well made with this panel at this
particular point, so I will yield back my time.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Kopetski.
Mr. Kopetski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we have to keep in mind that the issue before us is
whether the embargo is the effective means as part of our foreign
policy to create change for individual liberties within Cuba. That
is the issue: Whether this is the best means for us to use. None
of us disagree that we want to see positive human rights change
in that country for those people.
It seems to me that if you look at two very recent examples, one
being the Eastern European countries, the reason that freedoms
came there was not because we shut them down, but because the
door opened up. And once that door was opened, yes, a rush of
trade, but also ideas and democracy flowed in and, fortunately, a
peaceful revolution occurred.
As Mr. Shaw indicated in terms of the changes within China,
probably more within the last 15 years or even 6 years, more
progress has occurred not because China closed its doors and kept
them closed, but because they were opened. They opened them, and
others came in. We have 40,000 students from China in the United
States today learning in our institutions, living under our system
of government, who will go back and be leaders, whether in govern-
ment or in business. And that is a powerful force.
Mr. Diaz-Balart, the question I have for you, therefore, is why,
if we have seen it work a few years ago in Eastern Europe, we see
it slowly working in China, too, why you do not think that ap-
proach will work in Cuba?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Kopetski, if you have a better instrument
to propose for change in Cuba, then I believe the issue should
Mr. Kopetski. The Chairman has introduced the bill that I think
is the better means.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That is the first public priority of Castro. The
first priority, according to Castro, is the elimination of the U.S. em-
bargo. If, for example
Mr. Kopetski. You are not suggesting that we are collaborating
with him by cosponsoring this bill?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. What I know and have said
Mr. Kopetski. You are not suggesting that, I hope?
Mr. Dl\z-Balart. What I know and have said is that the first
priority in foreign policy of the Cuban dictatorship is the elimi-
nation of the U.S. embargo. So what I am trying to say in answer
to your question is if there are other ways to effect change — for ex-
ample, I have heard with regard to the Haitian situation, some
have proposed that the United Nations should send in the blue hel-
87
mets to help the Haitian people eliminate the dictatorship and re-
store the democratically elected President. That is one possible so-
lution for ending the Haitian crisis.
Now, to say with regard to the Cuban situation, which is just a
few miles away, a 35-year-old dictatorship there, that instead of
that we should do precisely what Castro wants, which is his pub-
licly announced
Mr. KOPETSKI. Well, that is not my question.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuingl. First priority, that is not an in-
strument for change.
Mr. KOPETSKI. That is not my question.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. In Europe, Mr. Kopetski, in Europe I do not
share your view of what happened, what we did to encourage
change. What I saw that we did was to require the Soviet Union
to match us in a military buildup, that they were not able to main-
tain, and that their economy blew up, exploded. That is what I
saw, Mr. Kopetski, that we did with regard to Europe.
Mr. Kopetski. I am not talking about the Soviet Union. I am not
talking about Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. What happened very simply was once the
Eastern European people saw that their previous master, the head
of the Kremlin, was not willing to kill, they ended Soviet domina-
tion. It was because the Communist system was not able to main-
tain its power, once the people perceived the Communist leaders
were not willing to kill. It is very simple, Mr. Kopetski.
Mr. Kopetski. You do not agree with Vaclav Havel's analysis of
what happened then?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I do not agree with your analysis, sir.
Mr. Kopetski. All right.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you, Mr. Kopetski.
I thank this panel. First of all, we are going to have to agree that
name calling is not going to help us in trying to resolve what is
in the best interests of the United States and what our national
policy is going to be. I think that we all have to agree, this is an
issue that the people of Cuba are going to have to decide. And the
United States, with Cuba, as the rest of the world, will be using
our foreign policy in order to reach the objectives that we think is
in the best interests of the Cuban people.
Now, those of us that believe that opening up the doors, having
exchanges, really challenging a dictatorship with the free market
system — ^you say we may be wrong, and for those who think it is
hypocritical to say that in a country like Haiti, where we have been
responsible for dictatorships there for scores of years, where we fi-
nally assisted in having a democratic election, where we saw the
military overthrow that Gk)vernment, and where we provided exile
and asylum for the President, where we as the leader of the free
world told the entire world that we will restore democracy and we
will restore the President to that country, and now see fit to com-
promise with the military and try to do something other than that,
I say that, yes, I think that you can see your way clear to say that
we should try an embargo there, but for God's sake I hope I am
never around to see that we would do it for 33 years.
I think embargo is a tool. I am not against it, and I think the
people in the State Department are the specialists to determine
88
what tools are available. The questions that we have, and perhaps
you have the answers, is that if it does hurt the Cuban people so
that they do not want Castro, who will they get? Who follows Cas-
tro? Is he worse? Is he or she better? Where do we go? Where does
the American influence go? Where does the Miami Cuban-American
influence go?
Everybody from the Cuban community that believes that there is
a different way to go, do they have to be an enemy of Cuba? Do
they have to be an ally of Castro? I do not think we have to reach
those conclusions, and the purpose of this bill is not to dramatically
change anything. It is to expand the debate and see where we can
go, and to let Castro know that we do not accept that type of gov-
ernment, that we are a democracy. But I do believe that my faith
in capitalism is such that if we cannot challenge that little govern-
ment that they have there in Cuba, then I have just mistakenly
placed my faith in something.
We are not here to shore up Castro. But I do hope that you
would continue to allow debate to continue, because it happens, no
matter what the country is, whether it is Haiti, whether it is Viet-
nam, whether it is China, whether it is the Soviet Union. And I
said in the opening, I do not think many people have spilled as
much blood as I have in fighting communism, but I do hope that
we can come together with something that causes less pain and
bring forth a lot of democracy.
I respect the sincerity and emotion that you feel, especially those
that know Cuba better than I. But I look forward to working with
you to see whether we can come together as a nation with some-
thing that works.
I thank you for the great contribution you made to this hearing.
The Chair will take a 10-minute recess, so that the Members will
be able to vote. When we come back, we will have the pleasure of
listening to outstanding public servants from the State Depart-
ment, Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Skol, and I believe we
have the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Richard
Newcomb, from the Treasury Department.
We will resume our hearing before 1 o'clock.
[Recess.]
Chairman Rangel. The subcommittee will be in order.
The committee has the pleasure of having testify for the State
Department an old friend, Michael Skol, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Latin American Affairs, former Ambassador to Ven-
ezuela.
We look forv^ard to your testimony. Your entire written state-
ment will be entered in the record, without objection.
We also have Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, representing the Department of the Treasury.
Thank you for taking your time to share your views with us.
Ambassador, you may proceed.
89
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL M. SKOL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER- AMERICAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to be here to be able
to talk about the administration's view of the Cuban embargo and,
indeed, about the whole of our Cuba policy.
Before I begin, I would like to join many of the members of the
earlier panel this morning in congratulating you for holding this
hearing. It is very important that this issue be debated, because
there is a great deal of misconception about what policy is, why the
policy should be continued in our view, what the Cuban Democracy
Act is and what it is not. And I think it is very useful to have this
kind of discussion.
Chairman Rangp:l. Thank you.
Mr. Skol. Rather than read my statement, I ask that it be en-
tered into the record.
May I just make some basic comments about our Cuba policy?
No. 1, our policy with regard to Cuba is very much consistent with
our overall hemispheric policy on democracy. It is the same policy,
essentially, taking into account differences in countries that we
have vis-a-vis Haiti or 2 years ago with regard to the uprisings
against Venezuelan democracy, or, more recently in relation to the
attempt against Guatemalan democracy, exactly the same policy.
We resist dictatorship, we marshal! all the tools, including co-
operation with other countries in the hemisphere and beyond, to
pressure, to cajole, to persuade, to move toward democracy and
away from dictatorship. It has been successful at times. It has not
been successful, yet, on other occasions.
But I would suggest that removing the embargo on Cuba is no
more logical or viable than removing the embargo on Haiti, or not
having joined with our Organization of American States' colleagues
to pressure the regime in Guatemala to reverse its "auto golpe," its
self coup against democracy in Guatemala not so long ago. It is
consistent. It is the same policy. Our Cuba policy is not the odd
person out. The odd person out in this hemisphere today is Cuba.
Another point I would like to emphasize is the question of what
would be the effect of the elimination of the embargo on the per-
formance of the Cuban regime. I would suggest that it is not an
academic issue. It is not an intellectual issue, where we wonder
what would happen if there would be an opening on the part of the
United States unilaterally applied to Cuba.
It is not academic, because it has been tried repeatedly. Most
countries of the world have legal trade and diplomatic relations
with Cuba. And I can personally recall over the years country after
country initiating or reinitiating diplomatic relations or trade rela-
tions, claiming that that very act would loosen up things in Cuba,
would change the Castro regime's political attitude and perform-
ance on human rights, on democracy. But it has in fact failed every
single time.
Opening up of trade, of economic relations is very unlikely to
change the political situation in Cuba, because demonstrably it has
not happened over the years when other countries have tried it. We
know that Fidel Castro does want to have the embargo lifted.
There is no question about that. It is not part of the diplomacy or
90
the foreign policy of the Cuban regime to want to have the excuse
of being able to blame the embargo for the hunger and all the prob-
lems that the Cuban people suffer.
We know, partly because it has been said repeatedly by the Cu-
bans, publicly and privately, that they need the embargo to be lift-
ed in order for the Cuban regime to survive. We therefore believe
very strongly that lifting the embargo would, on the one hand, not
result in a loosening of the political climate there, and, on the other
hand, would result in increased funding, resources for the Cuban
regime which it could use, would use, to ensure its survivability.
Let me turn quickly to the Cuban Democracy Act. Chairman
Torricelli, for whom the Act is rightly named, went into some detail
this morning. I think that was a very useful presentation. I would
suggest that many people do not really know everything that is in
the Cuban Democracy Act, and perhaps fewer know what the ad-
ministration is doing aggressively to implement the Cuban Democ-
racy Act.
Most people know about the embargo. It stiffens the embargo. It
is designed to make that tool more useful in pushing the Cuban re-
gime toward democracy, toward respect for human rights. Put the
Cuban Democracy Act very specifically says just how and when
that embargo can be lifted. One phrase is significant. It says that
the United States should be ready to reduce the sanctions in care-
fully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba.
This is a serious directive of the law, and the administration will
follow it.
Let me turn finally to that other part of the Cuban Democracy
Act which is misunderstood or not well enough known and deserves
to be well known. We have informally called it the "second track"
of the Cuban Democracy Act. It is a remarkable element of the leg-
islation aimed at doing certain things that I think almost everyone
in this room would agree should be done, must be done, to reach
out to the Cuban people. On the one hand, we are isolating and
continuing to isolate and pressure the Cuban regime. And this sec-
ond track of the Cuban Democracy Act is designed to reach out to
the Cuban people. It is extraordinary what is in fact in this act.
It calls for expanded telecommunications between the United
States and Cuba. We are pursuing this. It is very interesting that
this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is being broadcast live on Radio Marti.
I personally will be very interested tomorrow or the next day to
hear just what parts of it, or if all of it, has been jammed by the
Cuban regime.
It is the intention of the administration, it is the intention of the
Cuban Democracy Act, to communicate with the Cuban people. In
this hearing, for example, that communication because of Radio
Marti, would include both sides, several sides, of the arguments
about the Cuban embargo. We hope the Cuban people today, right
now, are listening to it.
Track two, as we call it, includes the increased flow of informa-
tion and private humanitarian assistance. Chairman Torricelli
quoted a figure of near $9 million so far in licensed humanitarian
assistance which have gone from the United States to Cuba since
the Cuban Democracy Act was passed. The act also eliminates re-
91
strictions on donations of food and allows the export of medicine
under certain conditions.
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that one of the things we are not
talking about here is starving Cubans. We are not talking about
Cubans who do not have access to medicine, to food, because of
something the U.S. Government, the U.S. Congress, has done. That
is a false description of U.S. policy.
To sum up, we believe rather strongly that the logic of the situa-
tion demands that a powerful proven tool, the embargo, be contin-
ued to be used to press the Cuban Government to change, to re-
form, and, not coincidentally, to prevent it from having those kinds
of resources which will allow it to survive and continue its anti-
democratic, antihuman rights behavior in Cuba.
But at the same time, at the very same time, blessed by the
same law, we want to reach out to the Cuban people in all kinds
of ways, to see that they suffer least from the results of what their
own Government is doing to them. Our goal in Cuba is a demo-
cratic Cuba, a Cuba which we can help then reinsert into the inter-
American system and into a trade relationship with the United
States.
We would like to see that achieved nonviolently. We are not look-
ing for revolution or blood spilled in Cuba. We are looking for Cuba
to join with the United States and the other countries of this hemi-
sphere, not for a one-way reward to Cuba, without any reciprocal
action on its part, which would be unwise diplomacy, in our view.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement follows:]
92
THE U.S. EMBARGO OH CUBA
MICHAEL SKOL
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTABT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR IBTER-AMERICAH AFFAIRS
SUBCCnOIITTEE OH SELECT REVENUE MEASURES
AND THE SUBCGHKETTEE OH TRADE OF TEC
HOUSE COMMITTEE OH NAYS AHD MEAHS
HOUSE OF REPRESEHTATIVES
MARCH 17, 1994
Chairman Rangel, Chairman Gibbons, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss H.R. 2229, and the implications of
unilaterally lifting our economic embargo on Cuba, including
the impact it would have on our objective of promoting
democracy in this hemisphere.
Democracy, good governance and human rights are
centerpieces of our hemispheric policy. In recent years we
have seen nation after nation among our neighbors move from
authoritarian regimes to freely elected governments. We
welcome the spread of renewed respect for such basic human
rights as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom
from arbitrary arrest and detention. Simply stated, we want
for our neighbors what we want for ourselves - a chance to be
free, independent, democratic and prosperous.
In keeping with this vision, we must be careful not to blur
our focus by sending contradictory messages about our
commitment to democracy. The democratic nations of this
hemisphere have stood together in the face of challenges to the
elected governments of Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela and
elsewhere. We should resist accepting a much lower standard
with respect to Cuba. To lift the embargo now - with neither a
guarantee nor an expectation of any reforms in return - would
bestow a gift on the regime which would be viewed with
incomprehension by those who have long struggled for hiunan
rights in Cuba. It would undermine our ability to deal
seriously with Latin America on this key issue.
Eighteen months ago. Congress passed the Cuban Democracy
Act. It provides what this administration believes is an
excellent framework for U.S. policy towards Cuba. It
emphasizes that our disagreement is with the government of
Cuba, not the people. The CDA confirms that Congress shares
the administration's view that the U.S. must maintain the
embargo "on the Castro regime so long as it continues to refuse
to move toward democratization and greater respect for human
rights." The CDA shows that both Congress and this
administration believe we should be ready to "reduce the
sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive
developments in Cuba." Finally, it states that we should take
steps to lift the embargo, provide emergency relief and help
Cuba reenter international organizations and financial
institutions once it holds free and fair elections under
international observation and shows respect for the human
rights of its citizens.
This Administration intends to maintain the embargo against
the Cuban regime until fundamental democratic reforms are
enacted. Cuba must also recognize its international
obligations to compensate U.S. citizens for their property. We
are also prepared, as the CDA outlines, to respond to positive
developments in Cuba. Sadly, however, there have been no
meaningful steps towards freedom which would justify improving
relations, much less lifting the embargo.
In addition to strengthened embargo provisions, the Cuban
Democracy Act calls for a "second track." Under the CDA, we
are reaching out to the people of Cuba through expanded
telecommunications, an increased flow of information, and
private humanitarian assistance. Since passage of the CDA, the
Federal Government has licensed more than 8.5 million dollars
worth of humanitarian donations to non-governmental
organizations. The CDA also eliminates restrictions on
donations of food and allows the export of medicine under
certain conditions. We stand ready to work with responsible
groups interested in delivering aid specifically licensed by
Treasury to individuals and non-governmental organizations in
Cuba and we are working with the relevant agencies to
streamline these procedures.
Negotiations for "efficient and adequate" telecommunications
are underway between U.S. companies and the Cuban government.
Our goal is to facilitate communications between our two
peoples without allowing excess accumulation of
currency by the Cuban government. A few U.S. companies have
signed contracts with the Cuban government which include
surcharges which we advised the companies were not acceptable.
We expect to be able to approve contracts which are fully
consistent with the objectives of the CDA.
With regard to other forms of contact with Cuba, books,
films and other informational materials remain exempt from the
embargo. Among the 27,000 Cubans who obtained nonimmigrant
visas at our Interests Section last year were hundreds of Cuban
academics coming to give lectures and attend conferences,
journalists, sports teams and folkloric performers. We have
been working with academics to expand legitimate scholarly
travel. We have, for instance, allowed longer stays by Cuban
academics, permitted several Cuban seminary students to come
for religious training, authorized U.S. undergraduates doing
senior thesis research to visit Cuba and begun to issue "J
visas" for academic exchange.
94
In addition, we are prepared, as part o£ the review
prompted by Congressman Berman, to allow reciprocal news
bureaus to be established. To meet the hunger for information
in Cuba we are stepping up our donations of books to Cuban
institutions. We continue to broadcast objective and timely
reports to the people of Cuba over Radio and TV Marti.
These are the two tracks of our policy, a strong embargo
coupled with humanitarian concern and an expanded flow of
information. Together, they afford us our best opportunity to
foster a peaceful democratic change in Cuba. To focus
exclusively on one track or the other would unbalance our
policy and weaken our leverage.
It has been said that by establishing dialogue with the
regime, we could somehow bring it around and promote democracy
on the island. Several countries, particularly in Latin
America, have reestablished relations with Cuba over the past
several years, all with this laudable goal. Yet, there have
been no results. There has been no democratization,
no permanent improvement in respect for human rights, as a
result of enhanced contacts and trade with democratic
countries. There is no evidence that contact with Cuba will
motivate the government to change its 35-year policies of
totalitarian control.
There is evidence, however, that Castro will change when he
has no alternatives. He has said it clearer than I could.
Just six weeks ago, he referred to some hesitant economic steps
Cuba has undertaken when he said, "We have been forced to adopt
certain measures we would never have adopted, save for this
special period we are enduring." Castro took these hesitant
steps towards economic liberalization because he had no
choice. One month before that, he said, "If we do something
today, it is with the unquestionable purpose of saving our
socialism." Castro is not looking for a way to bring
prosperity and freedom to his people. He is looking for a way
to save his regime.
It is sometimes said that U.S. policy towards Cuba is a
relic of the Cold War. We disagree. Before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, U.S. policy was to be a friend of democracy and a
supporter of human rights. Our policy today is to be a friend
of democracy and a supporter of human rights. It is the Cuban
government and its profoundly anti-democratic policies which
are the real relics of the Cold War. It is Cuba's policies
that need to be changed.
95
What are these anti-democratic policies that concern us?
Let me review them for you briefly.
Cuba has not had a presidential election in more than
35 years. There has been one legislative election, a year ago,
which had only one candidate for each vacancy, carefully vetted
by Communist Party functionaries. Only one party, the
Communist Party, is allowed to function. The media are owned
by the government and opposing viewpoints cannot be aired.
Those who speak out in favor of democratic change are harassed,
arrested and imprisoned, and made objects of "acts of
repudiation," which are attacks on dissidents by
government-organized mobs. Independent observers estimate
there are more than 2,000 political prisoners in Cuba. There
is a three-year prison sentence for insulting Fidel Castro.
Any assembly of more than three persons, even in a private
home, is punishable by up to three months in prison and a
fine. Construction of new churches is prohibited. Religious
holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, have been outlawed
since 1969. No domestic or international human rights group is
permitted to function legally. Strikes are forbidden by law.
In sum, the democratic and human rights situation in Cuba
is so contradictory to our values as a people and as a nation,
that the notion of upgrading our ties and providing economic
benefits is simply unacceptable. We cannot ignore the plight
of the Cuban people, or do anything other than stand with them
in their demands for basic civil liberties.
Thirty years ago, the Cuban regime bet that the largesse of
the Soviet Union would provide it with the economic support its
inefficient economic policies could not provide and that it
could no longer earn in trade with the world. It accepted —
and squandered — close to 100 billion dollars in aid, an
unparalleled amount for a country of 11 million people. Until
1990, Soviet aid poured in at the rate of almost $700,000 per
hour. What happened to that money? Why don't the Cuban people
have the same per capita GNP as Spain and Italy, as they did in
1959? Instead of investing that money in ways that would free
the creative talents of the Cuban people, it was squandered on
military adventures abroad and an enormous security apparatus
at home, an apparatus designed to deny the Cuban people
virtually every basic human right.
Mr. Chairman, the United States needs to keep faith with
the Cuban people. We need- to reach out to them through private
humanitarian assistance and improved communications. We also
need to make it very clear that we intend to keep our distance
from the hemisphere's most repressive regime, in the hopes that
Cuba may some day soon join the democratic community of
nations. For all these reasons, the administration opposes
H.R. 2229, the "Free Trade With Cuba" Act.
Thank you.
96
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Mr. Newcomb.
STATEMENT OP R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
Mr. Newcomb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the embargo against
Cuba. As you know, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreigji
Assets Control is responsible for executing and enforcing economic
embargoes and sanctions programs, including, since 1963, the U.S.
embargo against Cuba.
In performing our mission, we rely principally on the President's
broad powers under the Trading With the Enemy Act and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to prohibit and reg-
ulate commercial or financial transactions involving specific foreign
countries. The implementation of economic embargoes and sanc-
tions by the President is an important aspect of the foreign policy
of the tjnited States. Any restrictions on the President's authority
to impose, modify, or lift sanctions diminishes the effectiveness of
this important tool.
The Cuban embargo, as it existed before the Cuban Democracy
Act, prohibited all commercial, financial and trade transactions
with all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, which includes U.S.
citizens and permanent residents, wherever they are located, all
people and organizations physically located in tne United States,
and all branches and subsidiaries of U.S. organizations throughout
the world.
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, which implement the em-
bargo contained certain limited licenses or exemptions for specified
types of transactions, such as limited family remittances, certain
travel transactions, trade in informational materials, and trade by
U.S. foreign subsidiaries. It was within this context that the Cuban
Democracy Act was enacted. The original program, as I have just
outlined, remains in effect, except where it was altered by the
Cuban Democracy Act.
Since the passage of that act, the U.S. Government has licensed
over $8.5 million worth of humanitarian donations from a wide va-
riety of religious, social and professional groups and individuals.
We stand ready to work with all organizations interested in help-
ing the Cuban people in this time of need.
As you are aware, informational materials, including such things
as school texts. Bibles, books, records, and tapes are not subject to
prohibitions contained in the regulations, and, therefore, require no
authorization. Moreover, the Cuban Democracy Act deregulates the
exportation of donated food to Cuban individuals and nongovern-
mental organizations. For this reason, qualifying donations of food
may be exported without applying for a license.
As to medicines and medical supplies, the Cuban Democracy Act
states that all exports of medicine and medical supplies must be
done pursuant to a specific license issued by the U.S. Grovernment.
Authorization requires that certain conditions be satisfied, such as
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the intended export will
97
not be used for torture or human rights abuses, that there is a rea-
sonable likehhood that the intended export would not be reex-
ported, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the intended
export would not be used in the production of a biotechnological
product.
In addition to satisfying the requirements listed above, commer-
cial shipments of medicine and medical supplies to Cuba must also
satisfy requirements for U.S. Government verification that the ex-
ported goods will only be used for the purpose for which they were
exported, and will be used for the benefit of the Cuban people.
We have received many inquiries in this regard, but to date we
have issued only three licenses to U.S. -owned foreign subsidiaries
who have filed applications. Others have shown an interest, but
have not applied.
In the spirit of the Cuban Democracy Act provisions for support
of the Cuban people, we have adopted a policy of licensing trans-
actions incident to travel by persons requesting to accompany and
deliver licensed donated goods to the intended recipients. We have
issued licenses to over 130 persons traveling for this purpose.
With regard to telecommunications, an area of great interest be-
tween the United States and Cuba, prior to enactment of the
Cuban Democracy Act, telecommunications service, including
phone, telex and telegraph service, was authorized on a very highly
regulated and restricted basis by licenses which we issued. These
licenses insured that the vast majority of payments owed to Cuba
would be placed in blocked accounts in the United States. Service
and transfer of new telecommunications technology has also been
limited consistent with the purposes of the embargo.
The Cuban Democracy Act provision dealing with telecommuni-
cations directs the Goveriiment to address telecommunications is-
sues outside the prior system of laws and regulations that make up
the Cuban embargo. Thus, it permits services between Cuba and
the United States, notwithstanding any of the other restrictions
relevant to the embargo.
This policy specifies that new service proposals must be capable
of full implementation within 1 year, and must be limited to equip-
ment and services necessary to deliver a signal to an international
telecommunications gateway in Cuba, that new services cannot
transit a third country, and new modes of service must be approved
in advance. It also provides that payments to Cuba will be made
pursuant to a license, and that full or partial settlement could be
permitted. However, no debits firom blocked accounts will be al-
lowed.
As a first step in implementing the telecommunications policy,
we have issued licenses to 15 telecommunications companies au-
thorizing travel to Cuba for the purpose of negotiating an agree-
ment to provide telecommunications services between the two coun-
tries. We are also licensing travel transactions incident to import-
ing or exporting informational materials under certain cir-
cumstances.
In the past few years, we have faced several organized, well-pub-
licized challenges to our embargo program. These challenges have
taken the form of protests involving unlicensed travel transactions
and the unlicensed export of goods.
98
The most recent challenge, for example, was just this month,
March 9, when a group called the Pastors for Peace made an export
of humanitarian goods to Cuba through the port of Laredo, Tex.
This export consisted of medicines, food, clothing and other goods,
all destined for the Martin Luther King Memorial Center and the
Ebemezer Baptist Church, both located in Cuba. Inspection by U.S.
Customs and Foreign Assets Control personnel at the scene re-
vealed other items intended by this group for export that were not
authorized for export to Cuba without a license.
Pursuant to current regulations and policy, items whose export
was contrary to U.S. foreign policy and regulation were not per-
mitted to be exported and were returned to this group. We have
opened a dialog with this group and many other groups interested
in exporting humanitarian goods to Cuba, with an attempt to work
together to facilitate licensed exports of acknowledged humani-
tarian items to the Cuban people.
It is the aim of Foreign Assets Control and the Treasury Depart-
ment to expeditiously process for export those items which can be
exported, while at the same time fully enforcing the law, and deny-
ing export of any of those items clearly prohibited for export.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement follows:]
statement of R. Richard Newcomb
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control
Department of the Treasury
before the
Committee on Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Subcommittee on
Select Revenue Measures Trade
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
March 17, 1994
I. Introduction
Chairman Rangel; Chairman Gibbons; members of the
subcommittees .
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the embargo against
Cuba. As you know, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control ("FAC") is responsible for executing and enforcing
economic embargoes and sanctions programs.
In performing its mission, FAC relies principally on the
President's broad powers under the Trading With the Enemy Act
("TWEA") and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("lEEPA") to prohibit or regulate commercial or financial
transactions involving specific foreign countries. The
implementation of economic embargoes and sanctions by the
President is an important aspect of the foreign policy of the
United States. Any restrictions on the President's authority to
impose, modify, or lift sanctions diminishes the effectiveness of
this important tool.
FAC has enforcement, regulatory and operational
responsibilities. These include rulemaking, licensing, criminal
enforcement, civil penalties, compliance, the blocking of foreign
assets in the United States, and the authority to require
recordkeeping and reporting.
In implementing and enforcing economic sanctions and embargo
programs, FAC maintains a close working relationship with
numerous other federal departments and agencies to ensure that
the FAC mandate is properly implemented and effectively enforced.
Among these agencies are: the State Department for foreign
policy guidance in promulgating regulations and on sensitive
cases; the Commerce Department on issues regarding exports; the
National Security Council staff on significant policy questions
and regulatory changes; the Customs Service for assistance in the
many enforcement matters involving exports, imports,
transportation, and travel; and the bank regulatory agencies to
assure bank compliance with financial restrictions.
II. The Provisions of tbe Cuban Democracy Act
The Cuba embargo, as it existed before the Cuban Democracy
Act ("CDA"), prohibited all commercial, financial, and trade
transactions by all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, which
includes U.S. citizens and permanent residents, wherever they are
located, all people and organizations physically located in the
U.S., and all branches and subsidiaries of U.S. organizations
throughout the world.
100
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR" ; the
"Regulations") which implement the embargo contained certain
limited licenses or exemptions for specified types of
transactions in the following areas: limited family remittances,
certain travel transactions, trade in informational materials,
and trade by U.S. foreign subsidiaries. It is within this
context that the CDA was enacted. The original program remains
in effect, as altered by the provisions of the CDA.
Since the passage of the CD^ , the U.S. Government has
licensed over $8.5 million worth of humanitarian donations from a
wide variety of religious, social, and professional groups and
individuals. We stand ready to work with all organizations
interested in helping the Cuban people in their time of need.
As you are aware, informational materials, including school
texts. Bibles, economic books, records, tapes, etc., are not
subject to the prohibitions contained in the Regulations, and
therefore, require no authorization to export. Furthermore, the
CDA at §1705 (b) deregulates the exportation of donated food to
Cuban individuals and non-governmental organizations. For this
reason, qualifying donations of food may be exported without
applying for a license.
a. Medicines and Medical Supplies
Section 1705 (d) (2) of the CDA states that all exports of
medicine and medical equipment must be made pursuant to a
specific license issued by the U.S. Government. Authorization
for exportation requires that certain conditions be satisfied.
Section 1705 (c) of the CDA provides that such exports shall not
be restricted except to the extent that:
• the intended export is restricted by §5 (m) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 or §203 (b) (2) of lEEPA;
• there is a reasonable likelihood that the intended
export will be used for torture or human rights
abuses;
• there is a reasonable likelihood that the intended
export could be re-exported; and '.
• there is a reasonable likelihood that the intended export
will be used in the production of any biotechnological
product.
In addition to satisfying the four requirements listed
above, commercial shipments of medicine and medical supplies to
Cuba as well as donations to individuals and non-governmental
entities, must also satisfy requirements for U.S. Government
verification that the exported goods will only be used for the
purpose for which they were exported and that they will be used
for the benefit of the Cuban people. While we have received
inquiries from companies regarding the sale of medicine and
medical supplies, only 3 foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
have filed applications and obtained licenses in this category.
In the spirit of the CDA provisions for support of the Cuban
people, we have adopted a policy of licensing transactions
incident to travel by persons requesting to accompany and deliver
licensed donated goods to the intended recipients. We have
issued licenses to over 130 persons traveling to Cuba for this
purpose .
b. Telecommunications
An area of great interest has been telecommunications
between the U.S. and Cuba. Prior to the enactment of the CDA,
telecommunications service, including phone service, telexes, and
telegraph service, was authorized on a highly regulated and
restricted basis by licenses issued by FAC. These licenses
insured that the vast majority of payments owed to Cuba would be
placed in blocked accounts in the United States. Service and
transfers of new telecommunications technology have also been
limited consistent with the purposes of the embargo.
101
The CDA provision dealing with telecommunications directs
the Government to address telecommunications issues outside the
prior system of laws and regulations that make up the Cuban
embargo The CDA permits telecommunications services between
Cuba and the United States, notwithstanding other restrictions on
transactions with Cuba.
After a review conducted by the State Department in
consultation with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
Treasury, and other agencies, as well as discussions with
telecommunications companies, state sent a policy guidance letter
to the FCC outlining the scope of new services to be allowed
■ • State's policy guidance specifies that new service proposals
must be capable of full implementation within a year; must be
limited to equipment and services necessary to deliver a signal
to an international telecommunications gateway in Cuba; the
service cannot transit a third country; and new modes of service
(e.g., fiber optic cable) must be approved in advance. The
letter contains some technical requirements as well.
The CDA specifically provides that payments to Cuba will be
made pursuant to a license. Payments may be licensed for full or
partial current settlement with Cuba; however, the CDA prohibits
debits from blocJced accounts. Under section 1710 of the CDA,
the Secretary of the Treasury must ensure that activities to
support the Cuban people, newly permitted under the CDA, are
carried out only for the purposes set forth in the Act, and not
for the purpose of the accumulation by the Cuban Government of
excessive amounts of U.S. currency or the accumulation of
excessive profits by any person or entity.
As a first step in implementing the CDA telecommunications
policy, we have issued licenses to telecommunications companies
authorizing transactions incident to their travel to Cuba for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement to provide for
telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba.
We have issued travel licenses to 15 telecommunications companies
so far; 4 pending requests will be licensed soon.
Although not derived from a CDA provision we are also
licensing travel transactions incident to importing/ exporting
informational materials under certain circumstances.
III. Challenges to the Cuba Embargo
In the past few years we have faced several organized
challenges to the embargo. These challenges have ta)cen the form
of protests involving unlicensed travel transactions and the
unlicensed export of goods.
The most recent challenge was on March ?, 1994, when the
group. Pastors for Peace, made an export of humanitarian goods to
Cuba through the port of Laredo, Texas. This export consisted of
medicines, food, clothing, and other goods, all destined for the
Martin Luther King Memorial Center and the Ebenezer Baptist
Church, both located in Cuba. Inspection by U.S. Customs and FAC
personnel at the scene revealed other items intended by the
Pasters for export that were not authorized for export to Cuba
without a license. These items included a satellite dish
antenna, a vehicle, computers, and various electrical office
supplies. Pursuant to current regulations and policy, items
whose export was contrary to U.S. foreign policy were not
permitted to be exported and were returned to the Pastors.
FAC has opened a dialogue with the peverend Lucius Wal)cer,
the spo)cesman and head of the group, in an attempt to work
together to facilitate the licensed export of ac)cnowledged
humanitarian items to the Cuban people. It is the aim of FAC to
expeditiously process for export those items which can be
exported; li)cewise FAC will and does enforce the law in denying
export of those items clearly prohibited for export.
Thank you.
102
Chairman Rangel. Thank you, gentlemen.
So what you are saying is at the present time there are U.S.
businesses that are doing business with Cuba under the existing
law?
Mr. Newcomb. I am sorry?
Chairman Rangel. Are U.S. businesses conducting any legal
business right now with Cuba?
Mr. Newcomb. There are a few foreign subsidiaries that are li-
censed to provide exports from third countries to Cuba based on
grandfathered provisions of the old third country goods subsidiary
shipments to Cuba, but these are very limited, a very major de-
crease. The basic answer to your question is no.
Chairman Rangel. The basic answer is yes, but it is very lim-
ited.
Mr. Newcomb. Very limited, that is right.
Chairman Rangel. Now, can a U.S. company or individual invest
in a second country and that country invest in Cuba?
Mr. Newcomb. If it is a direct investment into a third country
for the purpose of investing in Cuba, the answer is no.
Chairman Rangel. Well, can a U.S. company or individual make
a secondary market investment in such a company, provided the
investment does not result in control, in fact, of the third country
by the U.S. investor?
Mr. Newcomb. If such investment is intended to put the U.S.
company in a position where it has title or some interest of prop-
erty in which Cuba has an interest, that would be prohibited by the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations and the Trading With the
Enemy Act.
Chairman Rangel. Exactly what would not be prohibited?
Mr. Newcomb. This is about as broad of an economic embargo
as we have and have had in place.
Chairman Rangel. I understand that.
Mr. Newcomb. Virtually all transactions are prohibited.
Chairman Rangel. I understand that. What is it you can do that
is not prohibited under this broad economic type embargo?
Mr. Newcomb. I have outlined the basic categories that are per-
mitted, limited family remittances, limited travel transactions, in-
formational materials, but investment is prohibited.
Chairman Rangel. A U.S. company can invest in a Third World
company that has commercial dealings with Cuba. That is the
question, and I think the answer to that is yes, with certain restric-
tions, isn't it?
Mr. Newcomb. If a foreign company has incidental investments
in Cuba as part of its portfolio of international investments, a U.S.
company may have a participation. However, if the company is pre-
dominantly directed toward Cuba, the major investment is Cuba or
it is principally Cuba oriented, it cannot.
One important point here, if there is a joint venture for the spe-
cific purpose of going into Cuba, that would be prohibited. They
would be specially designated nationals, and all trade with that
company, economic transactions with that company are prohibited.
The bottom line is that transactions are to be severely limited, inci-
dental, and not a part of the nature of the relationship, and with
no U.S. person involvement. It is very restrictive.
103
Chairman Rangel. Now, with the communications industry, isn't
that a httle more liberal, where we can invest in communications
with Cuba?
Mr. Newcomb. Because of the Cuban Democracy Act, tele-
communications between a point in the United States to a point in
Cuba, providing the signal from one country to the other, has been
permitted. According to the guidelines which I have outlined in my
testimony, assuming those criteria are met, telecommunications
signals can be given. We have licensed 15 companies to travel for
negotiations. We have four more on deck looking to go to Cuba to
negotiate the possibility of conveying that signal.
Chairman Rangel. Does Castro really want this type of agree-
ment to succeed?
Mr. Newcomb. Let me defer on that.
Chairman Rangel. It takes two parties, so
Mr. Skol. We believe that because the new telecommunications
rules as outlined in the Cuban Democracy Act for the first time
would allow limited funds to go to the regime, we believe that that
is what has persuaded the Cuban regime to negotiate with several
American companies.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Secretary, I am merely asking does this
dictator Castro want this capitalistic deal to go through? Does he
want it?
Mr. Newcomb. If I might answer that, Mr. Chairman, as a part
of
Chairman Rangel. The reason I am asking this is because the
Secretary said that Castro wanted the embargo removed, and so,
therefore, we would never do anything that he would want, because
this would cause his regime to survive. So I am just putting my
question on the table, does this Communist dictator want the com-
munications agreement to succeed, in order to get the cash cur-
rency?
Mr. Skol. We believe that the Cuban regime needs the cash so
badly that it is willing to enter into these negotiations.
Chairman Rangel. And so it either has to be yes, he does, and
so do we, in other words?
Mr. Skol. That is correct. I am saying that this agreement
Chairman Rangel. So it is possible, it is remotely possible that
maybe one day we may want the same thing. And just because he
wants it, it does not mean that we are going to refuse to do it.
Mr. Skol. That is exactly true, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. I just knew that is what you meant, when
you say we cannot remove the embargo because he wants the em-
bargo removed. We will remove the embargo when we want it re-
moved, no matter what he believes.
Mr. Skol. What I was saying about whether Fidel Castro wants
the embargo removed had more to do with why he wants the em-
bargo removed.
Chairman Rangel. Well, people before you were almost saying
that those who wanted the embargo removed, that Castro wanted
it removed, so, therefore, you are supporting Castro, and I knew
our State Department never had that view, even though the words
came out almost the same. I just wanted the record to indicate
104
Mr. Skol. I would not accuse anyone here that I have heard so
far as being pro-Castro in any way.
Chairman Rangel. Now, you are a career officer and you have
served in so many capacities. You have served our country and our
State Department in a very professional way, and I cannot think
of anyone offhand that knows more about Latin America and the
Caribbean.
In the last administration, the State Department did not always
support the Cuban Democracy Act, did they?
Mr. Skol. In the process, as I understand it, of talking with the
Congress about various provisions in the Act, there was a debate,
as there often is, and that is the reason for hearings like this one.
But the act itself as it exists today we believe is an extraordinarily
useful tool, both to pressure the government of Castro and to make
sure that it does not have the cash sufficient to extend its exist-
ence, and to reach out to the Cuban people
Chairman Rangel. You are going to have to be patient with me,
Mr. Secretary, because I am not framing my questions correctly,
because you have made it abundantly clear that you support the
Torricelli bill, as we have come to know it.
Mr. Skol. Yes.
Chairman Rangel. So that is abundantly clear. My question
was, or I wanted it to be, was that always the position of the pre-
vious administration?
Mr. Skol. I am not speaking for the previous administration, Mr.
Chairman. All I can say right now is that we support the Cuban
Democracy Act. It is not only the law, it is an extraordinarily use-
ful tool for the pursuit of our democratic policies with regard to
Cuba.
Chairman Rangel. Let me join with you and hurriedly add that,
whether we agree or disagree on this law, as long as it is the law,
you and I can depend on the fact that we will be working together
to enforce the law. So it is clear that any feeling I may have had
about this has nothing to do with trying to change the law's en-
forcement.
But it really would not affect your professionalism in represent-
ing this administration, for me just to ask, as an expert in this
field, is it your recollection that in the last administration they did
not always officially support the Torricelli amendment? As a mat-
ter of fact, did they not in fact oppose Torricelli, that old adminis-
tration, not this brandnew exciting dramatic one? I mean the old
one, when you were a career officer, didn't they at one time oppose
the Torricelli amendment?
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, as I recall and as you recall, I was in
Venezuela at the time and I really cannot speak about the intricate
negotiations between the old administration and the Congress.
Chairman Rangel. Well, one of the things that I have learned
to really admire, coming down here to Washington, is the profes-
sionalism of the State Department, because really it does not make
any difference what they believe. When the President of the United
States establishes our foreign policy, then it is abundantly clear
that the State Department personnel are so trained in such a pro-
fessional way, it is that policy which they are going to support to
the best of their ability.
105
When you change Presidents, you just changed whatever hap-
pened in the previous administration. I appreciate that, because
most of the things I got for being against TorricelH I got from one
of your predecessors who is no longer with the State Department,
so that makes sense.
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, it is traditional for ad-
ministrations, the executive branch, to resist micromanagement of
foreign policy affairs specifically country-by-country, and I would
suggest that this is part of what was going on with the debate over
the Torricelli bill.
Chairman Rangel. Probably it was, but the micromanagement
has now become a solid force for democracy in this hemisphere as
we know it. That is all right.
Let me ask this: Since we all want change in administration, as-
suming that this embargo really and truly works, and based on
your knowledge as to how other embargoes have been effective, be-
cause you have to use things, how does it reallv work in this sce-
nario? What happens, when we make certain that we do not give
anything to Castro to survive, that we just want to pump the juice
of democracy and protection of human rights? Under what scenario,
what happens?
You have heard me ask this question of my colleagues in the
Congress. I do know where all of a sudden the activists against
Castro come together and form a political party and then get shot
down by the dictator, or whether they just make an appeal to him
and say things are rough, please step aside, or whether there is
someone over there that we know or do not know that has leader-
ship ability, and he or she just comes out and says, enough already,
we want an election. What happens?
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, the first thing to say is that anyone
who believes that what the U.S. Grovernment or Congress does is
the dominant element in what will happen in Cuba is exaggerating
our influence. We often make the mistake of believing that what
we do determine automatically what will happen in other coun-
tries.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Secretary, I am going to assume that we
are 100 percent right and further assume that it is working. Forget
the 33 years, it is working now, it is this time in our history that
we should never remove it, because it is just about to work. So
what happens?
Mr. Skol. Let me answer that question directly. Your scenario
is that the embargo is working and it is about to bear fruit.
Chairman Rangel. Exactly.
Mr. Skol. That means that it will have been successful in not
allowing the Cuban regime to last any longer than it would have,
given the economic deterioration, the rising opposition to Fidel Cas-
tro and his regime, and the weakening of the regime itself.
Chairman RANGEL. Now it crumbles.
Mr. Skol. Pardon?
Chairman Rangel. It crumbles now.
Mr. Skol. It crumbles, and it does not take any longer to crum-
ble because we provided resources to the Cuban regime. That is
how I would define the success of the Cuban embargo.
Chairman Rangel. You would not?
106
Mr. Skol. The Cuban embargo is not of itself going to cause the
fall of the Castro regime.
Chairman Rangel. Assuming, Mr. Secretary, that all of the
other things that could help this to happen occur, and now the only
one thing that would allow it to survive would be the removal of
the embargo. So all of the strategists and the pundits and the State
Department people, they get together and they say, for God's sake
do not remove the embargo now, because
Mr. Skol. That is exactly what we are saying.
Chairman Rangel. Exactly what you are saying, do not do it
now, because everything else is working, keep it right in there.
Now, assuming all tnose things work and you, of course, are
right, and the thing just crumbles. What happens? I mean how
does it crumble, Castro quits and tries to get into Miami? What
happens?
Mr. Skol. Miami is an unlikely destination for Fidel Castro.
Chairman Rangel. What happens? Will we have elections in
Cuba? Is there somebody that we believe could replace Castro? I
mean are there leaders there in prisons, like Mandela, that come
out and they negotiate with Castro? I know that you people have
been thinking about this for a long time, but you have kept it a
secret. Will you share that with us? Where do you want the embar-
go to go?
Mr. Skol. The success of the embargo would also mean that
Fidel Castro would be continually forced to open up the system in
order for him to survive, and which we hope would produce civic
groups, the Catholic church, human rights activists and others to
help to begin to create the kind of civil society that is roughly, very
roughly parallel to what happened in Eastern Europe.
The tragedy of Cuba today and for the past decades is that the
very actions of the Cuban regime have helped to prevent the
growth of this kind of civil society.
Chairman Rangel. In other words, we are not encouraging a rev-
olutionary over there.
Mr. Skol. We are not encouraging a bloody revolution, by any
means.
Chairman Rangel. Look, you have answered me
Mr. Skol. We are encouraging change.
Chairman Rangel. So what you are basically saying is that you
hope that, with all the other things that are happening, that there
will be enough pressure in Cuba so that Castro would open up?
Mr. Skol. Yes, sir.
Chairman Rangel. Is there anything at all that you have seen
in the last 1, 2, 5 years that moves in the direction in terms of
what you mean by open up? Has the Castro regime done anything
that could be considered as moving toward opening up?
Mr. Skol. There have been some minor moves in those areas.
Chairman Rangel. What are those minor things?
Mr. Skol. For example, the allowance of free dollar convertibil-
ity, the circulation of the dollar, the allowance for certain cat-
egories of Cubans to operate in the private sector. I have to empha-
size that we do not believe that these measures do anything at all
to change the basic economic structure of Cuba, but there are signs
that because of pressure and the need for cash, the Castro regime
107
is in fact being forced to make certain economic changes. But in the
political sphere, nothing is happening.
Chairman Rangel. But even though it is short of nothing, is it
the type of things, if more is done, that may become something. I
mean you name these things and you say that is nothing, so politi-
cally he has done nothing.
Mr. Skol. Yes.
Chairman Rangel. I accept that. I am just trying to find out
what type of things would be considered something as a signal
maybe that they are moving in the right direction. What is opening
up? What can Castro and his gang of people do so that it will be
considered opening up?
Mr. Skol. Well, there are many things. In the field of human
rights
Chairman Rangel. What are the main things?
Mr. Skol. The respect for human rights, the release of political
prisoners
Chairman Rangel. Do we have a list of prisoners that we could
say, and how many would it be, so that we can say, look, these are
the types of things that the United States of America demands,
and he says what. We say here is the list of people, we want these
people released and we would consider this a little better than
nothing, but it would be less than something?
Mr. Skol. We not only have figures, we have lists, we have
names, the United Nations has names
Chairman Rangel. I know that, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Skol. And we have told the Cubans, the Cubans know what
is necessary.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Secretary, I know that you are talking to
the Cubans. This is a public hearing. Can't you share with us some
of the exchanges that are taking place, so that everyone would
know that we are
Mr. Skol. We have a U.S. interest section in Havana. We very
definitely talk to them. There is no lack of communication.
Chairman Rangel. Are these talks secret or public? Could you
share anything, without violating any laws or regulations as to
what is the extent of our communication directly with the Cuban
Government or the private sector of the Cuban Government, or
whatever we call them, the Cubans who are in charge?
Mr. Skol. We have a list of things that we have told the Cuban
Government would be steps toward democracy and respect for
human rights.
Chairman Rangel. Could you share that list with us publicly, so
that
Mr. Skol. Yes, we will. We will place it in the record.
Chairman Rangel. I mean now. Listen, these are public hearings
not to change foreign policy. That is the executive branch, and it
is true that in many cases the Congress has been able to be influ-
ential. But since we all want democracy in our hemisphere, and
certainly with small countries in the Caribbean so close to the
United States, it would seem to me that if you could say, listen,
you want democracy, we do, too, now this is what Castro should
do if he wants democracy.
108
Mr. Skol. Let me quote from the list: Free and fair elections
with international observation, the release of political prisoners,
the end to rules which prohibit outward travel of Cubans to the
United States or elsewhere, the dismantling of one of the most re-
pressive States in the world in terms of the control of the daily
lives of individuals, a much more profound freeing up of rules as
to where Cubans can work, how they can work, for whom they
work, whether or not they can engage in private activity without
suffocating regulations.
There are a number of things, and beyond the specifics of the
names of the people in Cuban jails, these are the same kinds of de-
mands that are made throughout the world. These are the same
kinds of things we ask of the Haitian and other regimes.
Chairman Rangel. Let me ask this: Are these the same things
we are really asking of China and Vietnam and these other coun-
tries? Are these the same type of things? I certainly wish all coun-
tries would do what you suggested, and I certainly will do every-
thing I can to influence them to do that as the right thing. But it
seems as though what you have just suggested for Cuba was really
in more detail and broader than demands that we make with other
trading partners.
Mr. Skol. Each country obviously is different. The reasons why
in our law and policy sanctions and embargoes are imposed are dif-
ferent in different cases. The Vietnam embargo was imposed for
very specific reasons having to do with U.S. soldiers missing in ac-
tion. And when there was progress in that area, President Clinton
decided that a reciprocal gesture was in order, on exactly the same
theory that
Chairman Rangel. What about the open trade and the elections
and all of these things in controlling how they treat their — cer-
tainly in China, I was hurt and insulted for this country to tell the
United States of America that political prisoners was an internal
matter. And then I understood — and I hope I am wrong — that the
Secretary of State said it was not an internal matter, it was a mat-
ter concerning the free world, and the United States of America,
but you can report to us how you handle it, rather than the stand-
ards that we set. That surprised me.
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, there are specifics. What we are de-
manding of Cuba and what will be the characteristic of what Cuba
would have to do in exchange are specifically pointed out in the
Cuban Democracy Act.
Chairman Rangel. Well, I will tell you how specific it sounds to
me.
Mr. Skol. Although, as you have pointed out, I am said to be an
expert in Latin American Caribbean affairs, not in Chinese or Viet-
namese matters, but the fact is that
Chairman Rangel. That is not fair. You are an expert in any of
these areas, and you know it, and they are principles. But I do not
want to make
Mr. Skol. I was nonetheless going to go on to talk about China
and Vietnam.
Chairman Rangel. I do not want to debate this. This is what I
am asking you, Mr. Secretary: First of all, the way you lay out
what you want the Castro regime to do is almost like stating what
109
the voting qualifications would be for minorities in the South 30
years ago, because they are so broad and so vague, that you always
can find reasons that it did not meet the standards that we have
in the United States. I am not knocking those standards.
What I am saying is this: For those of us that sincerely want to
set tests to test the lack of sincerity of Castro, to see whether or
not he has any concern for democracy. It is almost unfair to give
those broad generalities.
I think what we should do, much like if it is not in the bill, is
to say, these are the things that have to be done, if you want to
talk with the United States. Sure, we could call the positive moves,
but I think we can be more specific. Because it is embarrassing to
see that we are asking something of them that we would not even
bring to the table with another country. There have to be basic
things that we are just not going to talk to any country about, un-
less those things are respected.
I think human rights is an ideal place for us to start. To me, it
might be that if we have a list of people that believe in democracy,
that were jailed just because they were trying to express their
views, that we should have those names. And those of us who do
not believe the embargo is the right thing to do should tell every-
body, wait until we see movement that these people are released.
And it should not be iust private talks. The reason for these hear-
ings is to make it public talk.
Mr. Skol. Mr. Chairman, I will submit the list of possible
changes, the list of political prisoners to you forthwith after this
hearing.
[The following was subsequently received:]
no
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Rangel:
I am writing to you following the testimony of Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary Skol before your subcommittee on
March 17 to explore further the issue of human rights in our
bilateral relations with Cuba.
We share your concern for the human rights situation in
Cuba, and your desire that the Cuban people can soon choose
their leaders in free and fair elections. We also understand
your concerns regarding the embargo. We believe, however, that
the next step in our bilateral relations is up to Cuba.
In order for there to be an improvement in our relations, there
first must be concrete and irreversible improvements in the
human rights situation on the island. This policy is outlined
in the Cuban Democracy Act, which confirms that we should be
ready to "reduce the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in
response to positive developments in Cuba."
This policy is both public and clear and, we believe, is
well known to the Cuban government; we will continue to
reiterate our position at every available opportunity.
In addition, Colombia, Spain and the European Parliament, in
particular, have recently been active in pressing the Cuban
government to adopt democratic reforms. From the Cuban side,
however, we see reiterated demands that the embargo be lifted,
yet absolutely no movement on basic human rights concerns. We
therefore seek your assistance in passing on to the Cuban
government our message that they must first act on human rights
before there can be progress in our relationship.
As Ambassador Skol promised you on March 17, enclosed
please find the following:
— a list of possible human rights improvements that Cuba could
undertake;
— a list of political prisoners in Cuba (compiled by Aida
Valdes, a prominent human rights activist in Havana);
— a list of prominent human rights cases of particular concern;
The Honorable
Charles Rangel,
House of Representatives.
Ill
— a copy of the report of the United Nations Commission for
Hunan Rights' Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Cuba. Section VI lists the eight improvements that
he recommends that Cuba undertake to bring its observance of
human rights up to minimum international standards; and,
— our 1993 Country Report on human rights practices in Cuba,
published in January 1994.
As you know. Radio Marti broadcast live the hearing you
chaired on March 17, providing the Cuban people the novel
opportunity to hear real public debate on an important issue.
Assuming the broadcast was not jammed by the Cuban government,
what they heard will have assured them that, while there may be
different opinions on what U.S. policy should be, U.S.
congressional leaders and administration officials share a deep
concern for the well-being of the Cuban people.
I hope we have been responsive to your concerns. Please
contact us if we may be of assistance in any way.
Sincerely,
Wendy R. Sherman
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
Enclosures:
List of possible hiunan rights improvements in Cuba.
List of political prisoners in Cuba.
Prominent human rights cases of concern.
Report of the UNHRC Special Rapporteur on Cuba.
1993 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Cuba.
112
POTENTIAL HUMAH RICHTS IMPRQVEMEWTS IH CUBA
1. Release prominent human rights activists such as Rodolfo
Gonzalez, Sebastian Arcos, Yndamiro Restano and Omar del Pozo,
and drop charges against Elizardo Sanchez;
2. Allow the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Cuban jails;
3. End attacks by government-sponsored mobs on activists;
4. Allow the UN Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur
to visit Cuba (Iran, Iraq & Cuba are the only countries that do
not cooperate with the UN on human rights);
5. Allow international human rights groups £ree access to Cuba;
6. Abolish the 3 month prison term for unauthorized assemblies
of over 3 persons;
7. Amend the penal code to prohibit forced labor;
8. Initiate a dialogue with human rights groups, independent
labor unions and other independent organizations;
9. Legally recognize these groups;
10. Reform the penal code to abolish political crimes such as
"dangerousness" (defined as "the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in manifest
contradiction of socialist norms), "rebellion," "enemy
propaganda," "contempt for authority" (disparaging government
officials), etc.;
11. Abolish the re-entry visa requirement (Cubans abroad are
required to obtain a visa prior to traveling home);
12. Abolish controls on churches and religious activities (for
example, churches are not allowed to undertake any activity
outside the church walls; all churches must be registered with
and approved by the state; religious holidays have been
abolished; churches are denied access to the mass media);
13. Free all political prisoners;
14. Abolish the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CDR's), the neighborhood spy committees;
15. Amend the constitution to remove the courts from under the
authority of the National Assembly and the Council of State;
16. Allow workers the right of association and collective
bargaining;
17. Allow independent media (TV, radio, newspapers), and
abolish other legal restrictions on freedom of expression;
18. Allow the formation of political parties;
19. Hold free and fair elections under international
observation.
113
PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES INVOLVING ARREST
As Of March 1994
Sebastian Arcos is serving 56 months for "enemy propaganda."
Evidence against him consisted of an unsigned letter that was lost
prior to his trial in a fire in Interior Ministry files;
Maria Elena Cruz Varela, head of the activist group Criterio
Alternativo and winner of Cuba's national poetry prize, is in
Havana, suffering from damage to her eyesight from her 18 months in
prison for felonious association and slander. For four of those
months, she had 8 bright lights shining on her 24 hours a day. This
form of torture is called "circadian deprivation." Winner of the
"Liberty Prize" from the Liberal International, in 1991, Cruz
Varela 's home was ransacked by a mob of 200. She was dragged down
four flights of stairs by her hair; the mob stuffed copies of her
poems into her mouth to force her to eat them;
Norberto Fuentes, author of the best-seller "Hemingway in Cuba" and
winner of Cuba's highest literary prize, was released after 20 days
detention in November. He had tried to leave Cuba on a raft;
Felipe Lorens of the Marti Youth Organization is serving four years
in prison for "dangerousness, " defined in Cuba's penal code as "the
special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated by his
conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms."
Bay of Pigs hero and founder of Castro's air force Alvaro Prendes is
being prevented from leaving Cuba, in violation of Cuban and
international law. In December 1992, he called for democratic
change and an economic opening, becoming the first ranking military
figure in Cuba to declare unity with human rights activists. He was
subsequently stripped of his pension, rank, decorations and home;
Harmony Movement president Yndamiro Restano is a pacifist serving
10 years for "rebellion." At his trial, diplomats and journalists
were turned away, though the law requires trials to be open. The
Government's three key witnesses recanted on the stand, retracting
statements attacking Restano because these were made under coercion
by state security. The Government was unable to give any evidence
linking Restano with violent activities; both prosecution and
defense witnesses testified to that effect. The prosecutor noted
the "dangerous" effect Restano 's group would have if not stopped,
comparing him disparagingly with Gandhi;
Pablo Reyes Martinez, vice president of the National Civic Union, is
serving 8 years in prison for tape recording interviews with Havana
residents that were subsequently played over Miami radio stations;
Elizardo Sanchez, president of the Committee for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation, is out on bond for "contempt," after
resisting a police beating during the December 10, 1992, UN Human
Rights Day crackdown. That day, his home was surrounded by a rock-
throwing mob. Police broke into his garage office and ransacked
files. Sanchez was not home. Police later found him at a friend's
house, broke down the door and assaulted him. He suffered cracked
ribs, severe bruises, and a possible broken jaw. Sanchez' home was
sealed off. His elderly mother and relatives received food through
the windows of an adjacent building for several days.
114
PMCCATCaiA
S^hartlaan Azoos Btagaam
Bo Iq^orta oum — t a ac bi smi la pvaria
Id. <m« M IwU* ataBude d* oaaUgpBt
may oaiii'Ub tadLvnteito da ai Mtzalla
7 dxMfio da ai aapixlto*
115
INTOODTICCTCM
El dfa 10 d« dlol«BA>re de 1948, la Aoanblea Genaoal de las Nadooes Utal -
das, mprcM la Deolaxaal&i T]liivexaal de los Barachos Hamm oa, dooumanto -
rector para Organliaoa, OrgaslBaolanes y Gobiemos intexnaedonalea en pxo
a garantlsar los dere^ios indlvldualea de los dndadanos del I^usdo,
La oalebraoL&i da asta tecba. en 1992, en xaestxo pafs, se oonvirtl6 ea un
Ifa oAi da Ittfltaa ya qpe se prodaoa vna eaoalada represiva oootra los ae •>
ti-vlstas da los dmrocboB hiirwnos.
Oourren esta d£a, aooso a xeaidenoias de aotlTlataa, <v» s« BantleDe poor
varies dfas, no permltlendose nl a fanlllaxes nl anLsos aooorrer a los cd
tladosi golpiBasf vejaoloinesi dtadon e a i>or drganos poliolalesi aoena -
zas 7 dr'c en olo ne B,
Se esta foaan. en Cuba se eelebr5 91 Sfa InteoamoloDal de los Dereehos Ba->
CooslderBBias neoesaxloy eosno trilnxto a nuestros hnnnnnow encaroelados j a
los vexdaAeros def «3sores de los dsredios ynmBnoB, dar a oonooer voa lis >
tado aprdidjoado da los presos pdf tlcoe aotdalaB en Guba^ datos obtenidos
de forma df fiollt 7a qtis noe Ueeo a travte da HBnlliaxes, amleos ceroa -
nos 7 Ustados eofiados por los pxoplos pr e aos .
Slrva este awdasto tzalmjo de bomBoaje a todos loa vexdadaroe luehadore^
en ^ mando poa; la noble oauea de loa Deireoboa Hmaan oe.
116
Nombrea y kotHlLdea Dgtendfa Caxam Saadfe
15
Abxoa itteajp Bogn 07-05-83 Inf l lt aaaKb 30
AbedaB* Caamio, Boberte —
Abzou HflXBBideSy Mw i iuwl . ?• •—
Aoeredo Blanoo» iisisldo 22-01-92 Tzopaeaada wnwitga 3
Acosta Soxsa, Btad>erte — S.I.F, 7 dasaoato 3
Agreeo Blaitoo Bflberto — — >
Asoila Oiaefa, Alberto — Ccmfn oon lBeia c a>»
cda 7 aaoelao. Uf
dta 3
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AeuUexa Gnavaza* Alberto 24-03-91 Pzopa«BBda enanlea 3
Agullera » BaTnuDdo — Rooxifan llfolta 7
Asollax Ltfpo>» EUaoar A. — — —
Al a io dn KartlBas* Julian — Paaoyagnniia soaBdea —
Alba Caaiellda, AxseUo — S^J>, 4 aOoa
Aleooai Alaelda, Aaeel L* — Propaeaada aBantga 10 afloa
Alfonao flenwileii, Ooatacfo ^ Propaeaada eauodga 6 aSos 7
Alfomao Molina, Maznal — Beaaoato 1 aSo 7
Alfonso Sobio, Eeniiea 22^X-92
Alfooao A0illar, Joxse E. 16-07-92
10
Almeida Baxrera, Alba J. 06-04-93 PlxataxU 7
Alnandaraa Pfaes, Bfl7
Alpiaar San Martin* Bagino H. — Otxos aotos S^ 1
6
Al-vaxes Blanoo, AlA»do — —
Alyaxez LaiTa» Alfiwdo — PropceBoda aneodga
Alvaxes L^pas, Joan C. — Fzopa«Bnda aneoLsa 3
Alvaxes L^pea, JUlo C« 19-04-92 Reniael6a. aacoeatoa
del tamss 17
Alvaxes Martines, Fedzo J. 13-11-89 Pzopaganda enani«a 3
Alvaras Hontaa de Ooa» OaxloB A. — Sa.P« 7
117
UoBJoaeu T AytiniAom
DeteneAfc
Alvazes Pedzoao« Padzo
Alvares SaloasBZXR, Haetor
Alvares Ixiana* Jnan
A1t8Z«s » RMdAjr
AlvaxM FxLadA, MLiz
AlvBZiao PAces, Jos< ?•
Aarpidio E«xx«Ea» Padiso E.
•~ Aetoa eoBtza la w
gnrldad dal estadlp
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1^-04-90
12-13i^
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5
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—
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SJ^.
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30-05-89
nxatada
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19-02-92
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13-06-91
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B an e eaa Baxxoao, Xaattae A.
Bazra Tejada, Alexia
Bazrexaa BtTarOf Ba£aal
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Baster AvUa, Holanrto B.
Baaulto PiiMntal, tlaxantlar
Bedra Hamindaa, Maaiial
Belloa Dfasy FranaJaoo
118
Nombroa y AT»elliaoa Betanelfa Cargoe
BenitM , Joai E. 23-01-92
BenltM HexniBdM, Vaxxaal 2^11-90 Pxpaeaaea aBendga 6 aBoa
Bonltea Jarg»» Daalan H. 27-04-90 T«rrorl«Do 9 aSoa
Bergel Hexnindas, Enlosio — SJ[,P, —
Betanoourt , Heynaldo 09-10-91 Aaooiaolin ilfolt*
it. de iiqp. 3
Betaoooort Bioalona, Julian — Pippaganrta aaaandga 3
Betancourt Montenagro, OrflUo I3-O6-9I iotoa oontia aaguil
dad dal aetado 6
Betancourt Saiuiin, An«al — Propa«Bid» anandga
BlajBonta Lads* Carloa J, — Sabotaija 10
Bleats Saab, Sr. Jolio Z, — Terrorliww 13
Blael Samhanwl , Ansel —
Blanoo Gonsala*, Martha —
Bogule Ssdth, Helaon — Fxopaganda enendga
Both « Qiee — Deaanato Qadte Jefe
Brage Boxgea, Bagello 11-09-9© Sabotaja
Bxen Isnaga, Pedro 1« — S.I*P.
Brocart Galea, Hemaa —
Bruno TaxqoM, Juan —
Bonllla Toaaeoa, Smeato 04-04-90 Propaganda oral sub
8 aSaa
4 aflas
CabaUero Gonaalea, Baal 21-04-90 Bajdonaje —
Cabrera Alvarea, Klpldlo — Propaganda Enendga —
Cabrera Crua, Alejandro — Propaganda enemlga —
Cabrera Gonxales, Joel — Propaganda enenlga 8 afloB
Cabrera Martin, Benlgoo — Pro^iaganda enendga —
Cnlitft/^fi Valle, Laaaxo — Propaganda anemlga —
Campoa Hartiaas, Lanxo — Propaganda enendga —
Caaejo Moellro, IreUae O6-OI-9O TerroriaK) 15 eBoa
Camper Logones, Huniberto — Plraterla 6 aSoa
Campoa sufils, GulUexBo O3-OI-9O Terrorlamo 8 aflea
Cantero , SIIyIo — Sabotage 18 aSoa
Canoio Taseo, Pedro E. — Doaaoato —
Caxdo Leonardo, Oaivalde — Hnelga obrexa 6 aSea
Caxdo Eezn^ndes, Daniel 23-08-80 BebeU&i 30 aBoa
Caldoao Coapanlani, Ivan — S*I.P. "-
Caxoan Azlaa, Lola — Propaganda enandga —
Caxrasoo , Angel — Propaganda enendga 7 a^io"
119
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Carrawma Vkxvla, Zdellao 51-03-89 PlzsUrU 10 tOo*
Caaaxum. Pcnoc^ KUadjra — Flzatarla "^ 13 aSos
Oucaballe Yas^pxas, SoEg* — ^— —
CaanlllMfltezxa, Bigobaxto — FropaeBad* «uadl«a 3 alloa
Caotafieda Mnflos, iatanlo M. — Saoaoate —
CastaBada. Nofios* Julio C, — Dasaoato Ost. en Jef« —
Caatillo Bqiliio, Baal 24^3.91 FrspasaDOa anandca
J atantado 9 aSoa
Caatillo • iMoivanl — S^^. — >
CasUllo VacME, Padxo A., 27-08-92 Pzopaeaada enoal«a 5 aSos
Casio EadMTazrU, Oaear E. 14^.4)8-89 Sabotaja* jTopaffm
da r plsatocLa 6 aBam
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CLanexoa Silm» BLvaasdo <— Sabotaja —
Ciaaazoa aU-va, Orlando — Sateteja —
Collaso ParogElno, Smoarto — Sabotaja —
Conoapel&i teanado, Baa< — PxopaeazidA
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CezAovta Gaxoiav LaolB — FlxataxlA 13
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11-01-90
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8
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Cuzra , iTsa
16-07-92
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Qioalo Saatana, Bianvanida
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yd««u>«to
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^
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CSu^alla Bojaa^ Pzaaolaoo — Pzopaganda ananlga
Aavaa Gooaalas* Gcoaalo — Propagaada eoaoiga
120
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1 aSo 9
6 MMM
30 «See
3 aaae
30 aSoe
30 oSoa
2 aaos
30 afSoa
Jefe —
Eobaniqae Gonzales* Orlando 13^1-90 Sabotaja, prcpagaada
aaenlcpa 10
■Bdbmvasxia. Mazxero* MLgnal — Pxopa«BQda enendga 4
Eohsxazrla Ba'van.eeba, Hector — Pxopa«aBda anmlga
E. Flgoaredo, Joatf — Fxt^aganda eneadga 4
Bozlqaes Hemibdes, Bafasl — Seaaoato
Boxlaae Boptnoaa, Lois — Propaganda enamlga 5
Enxlqae GaxoLa* J\ian — Propa«eB>da enenlga 8
Eeoobax Dr. Vladimir — —
Eaplnoaa P&ws, Juan E. — Fizatezla 10
Delgado Crui, Alberto F.
—
Aeto oontra segrd.
del estado
Belgado » Jilio C,
09-92
Propaganda enendga
Sfas AgaaiD, Jans
—
Aoios eootra segar,
del estado
I) 'fas Cabrera, Manaal
09-11-80
In£Lltxaol&x
Sfas EobemeDdla, Tranolsoo
O9-O8-9O
Prppaganda enendga
ysabitaje
Sf as Estrada, Birbazo
—
Prcvaganda Enemlga
Sfas G«Bes, Eeotor
01-06-89
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—
saj».
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13-06-90
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Qfas Rodslgaes, Baii&i
06-02-82
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06-02-82
Sabotage
Sfas BodrLgoM, lasaro
03-08-90
Propaganda enemiga
Bfas Eodrlgues, Esequiel
10-02-92
Sabotaje
Dfas SiiB&i, Alfredo V.
—
Deoaoaio
Dfas Vlllal&i, GuLllcTBo
—
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Sfas Villaoar, Felix
07-01-89
Espionage
Dfas Trujillo, Heoardo B.
12-82
!Eraloldn y eepiona
je
Dfas VJllamor, Telix
22-08-88
Espionage
Dobao Aza«dn, Orestes
24-01-90
Propaganda enendga
Domingaes de la Coba, Orlando
15-04-83
Sedid&i
—
Propaganda en«dga
DoeSas Martlnes, Joel
31-12-91
Propaganda eneodga
Duran , Adolf
21-09-92
Propaganda enendga
Duarte Morlo, Oamanl
—
Deaaoato Qote, en J
Durga AcoflU, Israel
—
S.I.P,
121
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15-03-90
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2
6
?ellz Gorofa, Aagel
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~—
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26-04-90
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04-92
12-91
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15
?ei3i£adeB FAms, Soatlaeo E.
—
Saaaoato Got. aa Jefe
Fozn&ides Sallajr, Alfredo
—
SJ.*f,
Fada Cao, isrea
22-01-90
Propa«anda anaolea
5
Ferrer Teaasu, Pedxo C.
—
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isgulo Fleltas, Udm
—
FLgaeroa Caatxo, Baal
—
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4
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saj?.
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Garofa Ballo, Mazfa C*
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—
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enaaLga
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3
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oa-08090
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5
02-92
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5
—
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10
—
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8
—
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18
13-11-88
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15
02-92
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6
29-04-82
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1
6
30n
—
sa.p.
122
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Oarafa H.sa«r«do, Luia E. 1J-01-91 SJ.P. —
Gaxofa Gaxofa, Migual — Propaganda enemlga 5 aSoa
Gazofa HwiiAmIot, Gladys — Bsplooaje 8 aSea
GarQ£a Mejfaa, GolllexiDo — Pzopaeanda
aabotaja
5arafa Moreno, Jo8< A* — —
Gazofa Bsvazro, Beator — Eaplonaja
Gaza£< Ortls, BaaJbA.. — Pzopaeaada
Garofa P&ras, Idalbarto — Bapianik^
Gazo& Vim, l,vi» J. — Propaganda eBfladfa 8
7
Gazofa V6r*M, Joxgo L« — Pxopa«mda ananLea 5
Gazofa Taldas, Hazfa M. — TezzozlsBo 8
Gazofa SaUlTar, Jadaa — Pzopaeanda anendea 3
GarLlin Gazofa, Jozgo 02-08090 Sabota^
Gil Olnaa, Bnban — DLf * haroae y oazw
Uzoa
G&aes « Bodolfo — Pxopaeaada a niwi lga 6
Gonsales Ogra, Lnia — Fx^aganda aaemtga
G6nas Cms, B^>oleoa — Pzopagaada onaolea 5
G6bbz Salgado, Agoedo 19-12^^9 Satete^
GSaam Estanraa, Aleodx 16-07-92 Sabot»
G^nas GcDsalas* ftagr — Pzopagaada anandga 2
G&nas Maofaa, Dnlda — Pzogpasnda anamlgft
G^mes Sfaa, IbaiM 28-10-90 Sabotaj* 7 '
Gonsalas « Joan — Flzaiasia 1$ J
Gonaalas AIm^ GanoirsTO — Sabotage
Gonzalas Ballo, Nazfa dal C. — Sabota;)* 16 <
GcQEalas Sacoai, Jaonia A« — Pzopagaada
Gonaalas laffLta, Boaallaa
Gonsalas Talas^nas, Agnstln
Gonsalas £egs<, Luis S«
Gonsalas Lai-va, lazaal
Gonsalas l4pas, Holando
Gonsalas Maziotaal, Jos<
Gonzalos Hatae, EmiUo E.
Gonsalas Pfoes, Taaoaol
10-03-87
PizBtaxU
50
—
Propacanda anandga
A
—
Pzopasanda ananiga
—
Propaganda anasdga
10
—
Sabotaja
3
17-08-89
Sabotaja 7 prpaganda
5
—
Propaganda ananLga
—
SJJ>.
01««9-82
Sabotaja
30
123
Honbres y Apallidoa Detenddp Caagoe
Gonzales Vaxques, AgoBiixi — Proygiinila
Gonzaira Teguaaso, Nleolas — Pxopaeajoda encolga
Gonzales TalemsUi, MaxooB 09-04-91 — —
GoB«s , Maacf a " — — •
GorrlD T«zdMl«y Bioaxdo — Pxopaeanda aiMBilSft
Grave de Pexalta, Rol>earto — Pxopa«Bsda ■nandga
Grave de Feralta, MoxxeUl L. 1>0a-92 Rt/btHlSa
Graraxan Flloto, Jubd •— Pxopa«anda
Gxaveian Plloto, Tanas
Guexxa Blanoot JaBos
Guexo Bosalos, Senoi
Guaxra Jlmanes, Bdnaxdo 11..06-.79 EsploDaj* 1^
Guexxero Garofa, Qolsaio — S.I J>. 7 aotos rep,
sebota^ 5
Guerrero Martines, Faaatino — Sabotajo
Guexxexo SotwwejreXy AlAredo 08-0^-87 Bsplonaje 12
CTiiUen Zaldsva, Jomi —■ Salioiaje 1
Golobo »nonan, Bioaxdo <— Sabotage
Gutiexrez • Angel K« — Plxatcxla 3
Gatlexxes Hartines, Guillexmo A. — S.I,P.
GuUexxss BasxM, Bodolfo — Rebellda
Gatiezres Sosa, Joat L. — Saaaoaio
Gxanda O«l«do, Alain — — >
Heso&des Beyes, Sazzral 09-1&>W Intanto de aallo 2^
Eeoi&ides Teals, Orlando — Propaganda enanlga ^ .
Eexn^sdes ■ Sduaxdo ^— Psopaflanda aofloilfla 3 '
H em A i d e s Gonzales, Aleldea — Propaeaada aaanlga
Hezn&ides Gaxofa, Maxeoa A.
Hexnindss Hezn^odes, Joan
Propaganda
Eesi^j^es Moxalea, Toevanl
—
Pliaterla
Eem^ndes Luaoea^ Obbx
—
Propaganda
Bexrexa Marnrren, Pastor
—
—
Hezn&odes Orledo^ Alals
19-10-90
Sabotage
Haaa&Qdes toledo, Gelaalo
—
3,1 ,P,
Bex3Q&>des Wexa, Alberto
..
PiratexU
Hidalgo Gato, Axoando
—
Propaganda
124
Hombre y ApelUdow
DetaoolAi
j^sasss.
f^«nrHAn
Eexreza BaoLxas, Ilnahln
Hidalgo Labrada, Bigob«rto
Eoyo Enls, Bobon
Hoexra Paxaxa, Cadoa
6 afloa
3 aSoa
IbaSes Sanabam, FaUo
Ibazxa Tejeda, Alexiz
Infant* Eatxada, Tlotor B.
Isaac ma»m, Rnmolaoo
Izqrilexdo Carwona, Eatabaa
Jlmeoas Lacn, BaSaal
Jinienaz Bamoa, Savld
Jlmsnas Baaoa, Gaxazdo !.•
Jimsnas Blvazo* Franolsoo
Jlmanas amjlllo, Butddo
Jorrln Vaxdaola, Bioaxdo
— Propaganda aaanLsa
— Rrapaeanda anooLea
— > BaralaeL&i saoratoa
— BspioDftja
09-12-80 Intanto aalle
09-12-80 Intanto aallo
03-07-90 Saplonaja
09-09-90 Propaganda
Eerr Mldhal, Joxga
Lloourt Madina, B fe ba ip
Labxada , Baf aal
Ledeema Qiiijanoy laldzo
Laootba TeraSfEDiUi,o
Lazaro Booingnas, Manual
lAso Martlnas, Andr4a
Leon Aleaan, Bana
Leda Le6a, Lola
Ledn da la Boaa, Abxaban
Lelva
— Sabotaja
02-11-89 Beball&i
■>- Propaganda anemlga
12-12-90
BabaU&i
— Pirataxia
— Aotoa oontza la a«g«
dal aatado
— S.I J>„ propaganda a
Lelva Tdsta, Oaaanl G.
Lelva Balado, LlUaaa
Lelva Lelva, Cranial
Lelva Mlgoal, Orlando
Llooor Medina, BtfAaro
Llnanoaro Martlnes, Luis E*
Lino Cardoso, Eaortor
L6;sz Bsltzsn, Msrtln
— Sabotage
— Propaganda enamlga
aabotajs
10^1-90
— Sadlel&x
2>C3-79 EMilllts:
125
?«g«tfr
LJp«s Cantraras, L*9poldo — S^,P.» pxopaeanda •-
—
SJJ,
—
SabotkJ*
15
—
I>zspi«>iid« .aMdea
~
Propi«Bid& si«t«a
25-07-92
Fxopaciada «ii«Lga
13-90
^Mll&
—
Fxqpaemda eanlca
e
—
Pa>pa«>Dda •nsmiea
6
—
SJJ",
—
Sabot«J«« pxopa«Bi>t
I.6p«s Cootrvxaa, Baa&i L. — BoaleR d* txaaaparU 6
LJpas BrUm, Gaxloa ^ Pxapaend* «a«niea
Ii4pes Estews, Talcziano
L6p9* JIbcms, Lsooazdo
Ljpcz Ldp«>« Bnb«n
LdpM Martin, MuhmI
L6pes Hixaoda, Siago
L6pes HovagUv Balson
L^n ^linta., Job<
ZSv* BodzlgoM, Lcdfi J«
I>5p«s d* la Boaa, Aadx^a
L6p«b Toxxas, Lola A.
L6pM Tocras, Lvla A. 12-12-90 Sabotaja
Loaca Gonaalas, GUbaxio — S.Z.P., pxQpaean
da ananlea
Ludo Bodrl goaa, Enwsto 21-11.90 —
Liases Maxqoas, VLlfiwdo — Pzopaeaads ananlga
10^ Ojeda, BaA — Sabali&i
N&toa Sanebas, Baber L. — ABoolaal&i llfolta 1
7 nlimdairt. lapxaaoa 4
Maeatxa Sahorlty Alexia 16-06-90 I>xopa«aada coaBlga 12
Magdalena Morales, Jorga S. — Dasaoate
Maaasa Elijah* Baa — Sesaeato Odta en Jefe
Nazagoto Mart&i, Jnsto — Fzofpagaada enaad^
Marlchal, Ortllana, Waldo M. — Atentade, desaoaio
Marfn Baadzaa, 'Vlotor 0* — Desaeaio Odte en Jefe
Marlote Trtaaa, ?ellx
—
Plxateria, xebaU&i
3
9
Mar(iaes Medina, Bolando
—
OtroB aotos
Mazrero Martlnas, Uo. Jorge
14.01-85
Bsplonaja
15
Marti CaUejaa, Boan
I8-O9-9O
Bsplonaja
12
MarU BLvas, Bonan
18-09-90
Eaplona>
8
Martin Callejas, Bnperto B.
—
Sabotage
12
Martin Beoa, Pedro S.
—
Fzopa«ands anaadga
Maartln Boea, Padzo
22-13-90
FxopaeaDda eosBlga
3
Martin Boea, Anrelie
—
Pzapa«n>da enaodga
Martin Terras, Gataxiel
~.
10
Martlnes Alenao, Pablo
—
Propaganda enei^sa
126
HBrtloss BenasrldM, Halnaldo — Propagmda enanilga —
Martlnes t BranolBOo R. — — "~
Hartines Bu0taiiiant«« Bianvenldo — — ""
Martlne* GaxoU, Angrt. D, 06-02-92 Sabotage —
Hartlnes Garo£», Angel D, — Propi«and» enenlga 20 aOoB
Martine* Goaaes, Ltile M. — Plrateiia —
Martine* Mwdiado, Jeans — SJIJ*., deaaoato —
Marilnes Martin, Vaxfa. T, — Pwjpagmda aoanlga —
Martlne. MarUnaa, Luia E. 25-OJ-90 Propaganda enamiea 5 "ao"
Martina* Tidal, Joa< L. — Tertortaao
Itotiendo Borroto, Joa« A. — Propagmda anaaiga
Matoa Colombia, Hodolfo 07-02-91 Propaganda anamlga
Hatoa Sanohas, Hubert L. — "-""
Matira Jtlatla, Eoberto — Pr^aganda enaEilga
atantado
15
Mayo Mfadea, Joan •
01-90
Propaganda anamlga
4
Mayo Caws, Ha£ael
—
Saboiaja
2
Mena P«ra», Adan
—
Sabotage
10
Medina Corao, Santiago
27-06-92
4
Mendes Bafful, Juan P.
—
Propaganda anwidga
10
Hendes Montaainoa, Rma*
—
Pzopaganda aneniga
-
Mendea Fernando, Juan
—
Propaganda aneniga
6i
Mendes Kenol, Manuel
—
Basaoato Qste en Jefe
Mendes Veloa, Anlbal
—
sa^.
Mendosa Marxero, Marfa
20-02-92
PlratarU
10
Merino Cueira, Luelano
—
Propaganda anamlga
Meaa Eeznfndas, Mario
01-07-90
Propaganda anamlga
5
Miero Sfas, Jorge B.
—
saj*.
•■
Mojena Anjerla, Jo8< M.
19-01-91
saj".
•"
Monjar (^tlntana, Btoardo
—
Sabotaja
—
Hontea Prendea, Helnaldo
—
Eaplonaja aoonAalco
•
Montea da Ooa , Hana
—
Daaaeatk
—
Montea da Ooa Oanolo, Booaldo de la C.
S^^.
-
Montaagndo Bodngoas, Lola
—
Intanto aallo enba).
Espafla
4
Montero Hemindas, Alfredo
—
SJJ>.
MonteainoB ArgoallM, Sara
—
PlratarU
Montoya 8on»ale«, Jeaus
—
Sabotage
10
Morales Tlort, Lasaro L. 03-02-90 Propaganda
Martlnes HemAides, Mario — Deaaoato
Moral yells, Martin — s=t,p., d«««*to
127
Haahr> y koaU liem Detcpcl&i Caxmm f^'^T—
Manlw Baltrm, Onur — Poalbl* nbotaj* ->
Moxalsa Ouit«zo, Silvio A. — SabotaJ* ia-aSos
Hoxalw , P«dio J. — Prop««M>faa «nanil«» —
MexalM Oncmzo, lxl«l — Sabotej* —
HoTBlM Bodxleau, Pablo -- i>Boo, Ilfalta, agmp.
fl/r —
Moxalea Trajillo, Predjr — Sabotaja 20 aSos
Moreno Bi7«e, Joan J. 21-11-92 Pxopa«axida anaadea —
Horaj&i BodtUnas, FaUpe A. 21-11-89 Pxapacands anaodga —
S^pla, Jaan P, — Saaaaato 7 ailaa
Muxas Jturtls^ Roberto 24-03-91 Pxo^aeaada anandea
ataortadOf daaaaato 6 afloa
Mnfios LJpas, Podro E. — Saaaeato Gkrta an Jafe —
Mnfios Bodzlgnas, GuUlaxmo — S^.P. 2 afioa
Hapoles Pexxi&idas, Baldal •> Propaganda uaalga 1 aSo
Nazanjo Baidxas, ELadlo — Seaaoaio* dlfaaaol&a
hfeoaa 7 aartlxaa —
Naxanjo Tdnaaoa, Joa4 M. — Probablo aabeiaja —
Baaoo Hazraro, Azaa 1>OV90 T arr o rl ano 8 alioe
Hogaezaa Itfpolea, Jolio 19^V92 SJ[J>. —
Hoto Bairloe, tgwttn — — —
HnSes LJpas, Paator — Sabota> —
NuBes Hofias, Martin — SJJ>. —
NoBas Coa, Axial A. — Pzcpacanda anaai^. —
Hufias ViUagas, Aloida* — Saeaoato 1 aSo
6 nasa
O'gfcrrm Tiotor, falls — Sab«ta> 2 aSea
Oaaa Caballaro* CBdoa. C. — Babali&i TaaSoa
Ortaga Bnnt, Laanftro A* — Saeaoato Oat* an Jafe —
Omnda Mooted, Poznando '— Pxepaganda enaniea 5 •Ba*
Oaozlo Pnpo« Har^adaa — Sabota^ —
Oaorlo Siazxa, BaaAn — Sabotage — >
OTiedo Hezadda, Ala 13-10-90 Sabotage —
Palzal Sfas, Omt — Saboiaja 5 afiea
Pantoja n.oraa, Xldal — Pzepasaada anaadfa —
Faobaoo TlotoxiJi* Lola — Pzi^acnda aoaaiga ->
Pantoja Sodzigaas^ intonio — Pzovagmda viaaiga —
Paaozfn Slzo, Bonaa — Propaganda anaidea
aabotaja —
128
Hombre y ApwlTliloH Petanolda CargoB
Paseual Bello, Bodolfo
Pages Novaxxoy Rolando C«
Pelegrlo flaoipb*!!, Oanani
Pelegrln Baailroc, BaTmmdo
Feaa Bnls, HarLo
Fexaza , Carlos
Peraca Cabrezaf Bdnozdo
PexdoBo Ferla, Rafael
Pdres , Ooar
PSrex d« Agreda G^doe, Blcardo L.
P^xez Barreza, Pedro
F^rez BaUsta, Sldel
P^rez Cardoso, Osvaldo
P&rez Faentes, NAd.da
P^rez Eeznindes, Jorge 0.
P^rez Maosof Banlto S«
P^rez Mart&x, Joan
P^rez Hartinei, Jusio
P^rez Martinez, Mannel F.
P«rez MlrandA, Ariel 0.
P^rez Morales, Onar
P&eez PtHldo, Osntlde — Propaganda enendga 2 aSos j
P^rez Bodrigaes, Tlortor L.
Pdrez Smith, Angel M.
P&rez Truel>a, Carlos
Pfoez Vldal, Laaaxo
Pino Gonzales, Baa&i I*
Pintado ViUer.
Pita Santos, Luis A.
Piris Piyd, Fernando
Plaoenoia , Gonzalo
—
Sabotage
5
—
Asoolaoi&i ilfoita
1
20-12-89
Sabotage y propaganda
—
Sabotage
—
Aotos contra la aegr,
del estado
—
Propaganda enendga
5
21-10-88
Sabotaje
15
—
Sabotaje
—
Propaganda enendga
2
—
Oesaoato Odte Bi Jefe
—
Propaganda enemiga
2
—
—
—
Propaganda enemiga
3
—
FalaifiLoaeidn Sooum.
8
—
S.I.P.
—
saj*.
09-02-90
Propaganda enemiga
—
Sabotage
—
Desaoato Cdte en Jefe
—
Besaoato
22-03-90
Propaganda enemiga
2
—
Propaganda enemiga
2
6
_
S.IJ>.
—
OtroB aotos contra la
sag. del estado
5
—
Propaganda enemiga
5
—
—
—
Sabotage
2
6
_ —
Propaganda oaemiga
01-05-90
Asooiaei&i ilfvita y
desaoato
5
24-03-91
Atentado
6
—
Desaoato
2
6
Poinst Eemdndes, Omar — Propaganda enemiga
Poll Bamos, Jorga 24-01-90 Propaganda enemiga
Pulido Valdivia, Jnana M. — Besaoato Qnte en Jefe
129
Polanoo YmMqwn, TBayaaiAo 10>1d-89 SaboteJ* j psapaflsnda
PeoK , Jons* — iaodaeljh llfdia 2
Portal ArtUw, Iznl^ail — D M aoa t o 2
D
PoBO Mazx«ro, Dr. Obbt — BcfvlafldLAa Moxvtoa
Pooar MontalvDt Jcxgt A« «• —
Preodaa Moniw, JU Jala* -> Saplona^
PrLdas , Etaazde — SAetaJ* 15
PxLo iyalA, Ba£Ml A. — Fxopaenda «MBi«a 3
Frleto Mfadas, ins^
Ptdg TaldaBf Bolanflo
Pujol iTJaar, Job4 L.
Poantaa TaU«a« Jors* !••
Pmne laaae, Alboarto
i^usaiia Pwrnfadaa, Oudoe
OTonniln Fam^Bdaa* Jnan P*
Qieeada Gaxola, Boberto
^<gi» Pazxa^ TLanaa^
Qnlala Pazsa, Joes* S*
QplnU Ldpas, Jeat
»1ntana SUva, Jorgt
qpiSaam Sstxada, Lola E. 19-01^1 S.Z.P.
Qntrlello Sflbevazria, HLxIa 23-07-92 Pzapa«aBda aaanLea
BaBd.z«s Ptfraa, sanarOo — Plratwla 15
Basdzvs Tcrraxo, nssdc 24-08-87 Zntanto asilo 4
Haooa Andzau, Padzo R« —>
Baaofl CBxratala, Lasaro 10-07-92 Sabotaja
Baooa Ladxuea, Areallo 18-02-72
Bao&i Lleorana, Jtaaa — Pxopa«Kida anawlga 1 aOe 7
Euoa Martinas* Saaaio 18-03-87
Bo^« Domingo
130
Hoabr* y ApwnirtoH Jetmol&i Oaraoa SanoKa
Restaao Cfas, Bolsndo — Rebali&n 10 sBo*
Eeyes Martlnw, Pablo — Propaganda enemlBa —
Heyaa l4p«s« Elcardo — — —
Beyes Sasbhes, Jmrib A.
Blaoo Eerroza, Baai&i
Blraa Eeznibdos* Calostlno
Blveza Gatl«xx«s« Job<
Blvero Batanooort, Narttaa L.
Blvexo Bodrtgnw, Pablo
aioaxdo t Aozello
Eodrlguas Abreu, Onar
15-05-90
Ateatado
20aaoa
19-01-91
SJJ".
—
__
PTopa«anda anenlga
_
06-04-91
Piratari*
3 aSoa y
—
Propaganda oienlga
6tfIo«y
05-01-90
Sabotaje y pzopeganda
anamiga
5«So«
—
S.IJ',
—
—
Pxopa«anda enendga
—
—
Propa«aada eaandea
—
—
S.I.P.
—
—
Sabotajo
10 alios
22-11-89
Plrataria
eaSoay
Bodxlgaex
Bodzlgues Alonso, Ceolllo
Eodzigoes Banltea, Jostf B«
^odrLgoas Canlllo, Joan
BodxlgaaB Caopoa, Jadnto
Bodzlgaas Castillo^ Caxloa M.
b
Bodziguac Castillo, Mamwl C. — Pizateila 7 sBos
Bodzlgasx Hamfadea, Amaldo P. — PropagRnda anaalfla —
BodrlgaeB Eerrada, Jas< — Flzatarla 12 aSos
BodzigaAS La^ Lois — Pzopagazida anandga —
Bodzlgaas Poentas* Bonberto — — —
Bodzlguaa Lalva, Bobier — Babali&a —
Bodxlguas Kartlnas, lazaal C. — Saaaoato Qite an Jafa —
Bodrlgaaa Hartinas, Jos< A. 05-12-91 —
Rodzlgaas P&ras^ Alna ^ Propaganda eneadga y
sabotaja 9 >£^
BodziguaB Plaoenoia« Walter - O8-9O Plzatezia 3 sBos
Bodzigaas Pupo, Baa&i — Sabotaja y> aflos
Bodzlgiiss Bamiras, Jaqnin F. — Propaganda ananiga 4 sBos
BodzlgaoB Bangel, Banlro 15-04-83 SadloLda 30 aSos
BodziguaB BlTaxo, Librado — Saaaoato Qsta an Jaf :a —
BodzlgaaB Bodzigaas, «nniuido 21-03-91 Propaganda eaaiDlea 4 aSos
Bodzlgaas Bodzi^ias, Bazoazdo — Baplonaja 14 aSos
Bodzigaas Bodxiguas, Orel-vis — Pizatada 15 aSos
131
y ATXtniflofi l)»tapol6a Careoe Sandfa
Bodxigiws Bodxlsnes, Bsudel 25-01-60
Rodxlgues Boqaa, Alexia —
BodxLgora Siaen, Joirg* —
Bodzlgu«B Soaa, Oasteero 11-01-9 1
Bodzlgaes VUlsvioanoLo, Julio —
Bomaeaexa Cal^ Alberto —
Bodxisaei Tooseoa, Alberto L. —
Bcnero Fernandas, Carlos —
Gabxial 24-03-91
Bebell&i
30
Propaganda eiua>dg&
2
Besaoato Qnte «n Jef a
BebeUdb
18
SJ.^,
PliaterU
PlraterU
SJJ.
FxopagBBida CDendeB
ateotado
4
Frop8«aiida onendga
ataniade
11
PlratacU
17
SJCJ.
10
Boman Pasaxin, Giro 24-03-91
De la Boaa Gartala, Halaoa —
Bosa Mandoaa, Juan A« —
Bosado Toxxaa, Rsnolaoo 06-01-90
Bosaxlo Carballo, Saadan — —
Boyo Estrada, Carlos 02-92 Propaganda enenlga
Hois ColqmbK, Arqulnldas — BabaliAi
Bulz Dfaz, Bafaal — Propaganda anemlga
Bulz HatoBos, Mbdoo 0. — Basaeato, S^ J>. de
aarel&i
Bofz Echevaxxfa, Jorga — Sabotage
Bnfs Taxala, Antoolo — S,U>,
Bofs Tarala, Banlal — SJi^P,
Buf s Tlnantf Maarllle — Sabotaja
Saes AlTBras, Cregozlo — —
Salnz Caatro, Boberto — Beaaoato
Salvia Bieardo, lamaal — Agrupaol&i c/x
Sanohes , Alexis — Propaganda enendga
San^ez Eoharazxla, Julio — Sabotaje
Sanchez Slgaerado, Pedro 12-01-90 Propaganda enendga
Sanohez Ollvaras* Luis —
Sa n ta na Lois, Joad — Pxopagania
Santos B^vlla, GulUerBio 04-01-90 Otxas aotos eontra la
sagrd, del astado 3
Samdeatos Ham^Ddas, Joei 0. ' 31-03-81 Sx>-ad.lltar Batista 30
6 18-09-80
Santoveola Jarnfcdaa, Banlal — Otxos aetoa oontxa la . ..,..
sagrd* dal astado
Selbanes Padr&i, Luis 28-04-90 Tarrarisao y propaganda 13
Sierra Gueira, Albetto L. — SJ J",
132
Ncmbre y Ap^THdoB
Sierra P<ro«, J. Carlos
Slmoa Poll, SozsLo
Sixto LSpn Alberto
Sooazz^ LJpes, A11>erto T.
Soto Hozell* Mazoo A«
Sotolongo Bodxlgass, Ban&i
Spedc Gonsales, Uno
Steaeoso Betaoooart* Aztuzo
Suazes Cao, Vllldez
Suarei Fexn&idm, Jvllo
Suazes Pfaes, TeUpe
Suaxez Taboada, Jostf
Suazes BamoSf Artuzo
_^EBSS-
Sanol&t
12-12-90 Sabota^
08006-90
24-12-90 Sabotage
1CM)5-87 PiratarU
—l^ afSoa
2 aSoa
9 aao*
JO afloe
3 aSee
8 aaoa
30 aBoa
lanayo Mojena, Lula L.
Tapanes Tapanea, Bagla
Tejeda Bodzieaas, Angel
Tsnzrelzo * Abelazdo
Tobal SancbeSf Roberto
Toledo Loeo, TLmoteo
Toledano BodzLgoas, Jaime A.
Torrea » Juaa C.
Be la Tozre Calezo, Beidel
Tozre Jioianes, Lorenzo
Torres Llouzdanot
Torres Santana, Adhll
Trujillo Cervantes, Bafael
Trujillo Graberon, Job6
—
Sabotajo
14-05-92
Pzopaeanda eneBdga
—
Sabotaje
-
Pj^aganda enemlga
2
6
__
Besaoato Ctate en Jefe
—
Babell«i
30,
2a-11-90
Propaganda onesiLga
5
—
saj.
4
06-03-92
Poaible sabotad*
2S-04-90
Tezroriaao 7 propaganda
7
83
Sabotaja
30
—
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7
«.
Besaoato
3
— Propaganda eneudga
Valenzuela labon, Lula
Valenzaela Tabon, Pedro ?•
Valdes Baro, Sldel
Valdea Medina, Antonio
Valdea Semanat^ lamael
Varona Betanoourt, "Tirgllio
Valladares StLgenio, Job<
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— Besaoato Ctete ad Jefe
9, S^.P.
— Sabotaj*
— Otzoa aatos contra la
segozd, itH astado
.. Otzos aotes oontra la
aegrl. dal astado r -
HombrM y Ap«ni«1ow Detgaddn OBaraoe Sandda
Valladaxve Bodxlgaes, Osvaldo —
7asqu0s Ctfrdenii, ELio
Taxiuei Cabxerft, Joe< L. .
Vaxiiuei n6a&9%t Jorge
Velasquas Medina, Titmrnnio
Venegas GBslnosa, Eueenlo
Vega Alonsot Olegarle
7ega Cabrera, HaMha
Vergara Unaxes, HLgLnio
Velar Vaaoonoele, Baal
Vera Oirabajo, Bafael
Vlalort Dal Valla, Molaea A.
Vldal Franeo, Bdnaxde
Vila Llnaxea, Ildel
Vlllar Sidxoa, ?allx
Vlfiaa Bedoodo, Qarloa — Propaganda enamlga
Wlllan Garola, Jorge IB.O9-90 SabotaJ*
Yalln Moralea, Enxlq^ia — PropagaDda enemlga
Yaalo PahsB, Afaned — Sesaoato Gmte on Jefe
Yolses Naxrsro, Alfredo — Pxopagasda anendga
Zaragoxa, Blrera, Mamal — Propegaada ooemlga
—
SJJP.
—
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5
—
Saboiaje
2
—
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—
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5
—
Aaoolaol&i llfolta
2
—
Sesaoato Qnte en Jefe
-.
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—
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3
05-05-74
EzMBllltar
50
—
_
—
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06-01-90
TerrorlsDo
6
—
Propaganda enemlga
6
22-03-90
Propaganda enemlga
5
29-0a-84
Plxaterla
20
134
^tal d« joraeos polftlooB (aprazlBado) 607
Hcaibxw 560
Mnjer«e 27
Ses^oeadoe segAi eaaaast
^xopegBOodM, flnaaisa 275
Sabot«J« 89
SfildA llAgBl del pais (ooD pawpa^Bifta ww—lgB) 56
PlzateriA 52
SesBosto 45
TBrroriiwio 19
Gsplanaj* 20
AotoB oontra la seearldBd d«l estado 16
Bebeli&i 15
^sooLaul&i ilfoLta 14
Intento do aallo 5
iBTttlaoi&i da aeocratoa 4
Es-DdUtaxae 4
Sadioidb 4
Atantado 5
InfUtnMt6a 2
Bual0a ObKOEa 2
TEBloida 1
BifBaaalAi s hfaoas y airtizaB 1
S^lo tn brwe oonentczlo paxa daetaciaap al Inora— itoa da les oaaasoa da »
pzopa^snda maaalsf^ dacaeato j aaooLaaLSa IXf elta* lo qoa danaiaatxa la •»
oraolanta aaoasldad dol pnaUo da a j^pn aa ar a a lltoaaMBtay aos aantiolvntos
paxeoar 7 aoa analaB da aajoMag en poa del aagpado daxedio a Tifir an uw
iDundo donda sa xaopate la Indi-vldualldad 7 la llbaartad da opliil&i 7 msxn
aidn odno a9 eataUaoa an al artf oolo 19 da la SaolaxBal&i QaiTaxsal da S
135
UNITED
NATIONS
Economic and Social
Council
Distr .
GENERAL
E/CN. 4/1994/51
24 January 1994
EKGLISH
Original :
COMMISSION ON HVMAN RIGHTS
fiftieth session
Item 12 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMEITTAL FREEDOMS
IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD. WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLCNIAL
AND OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
Report on the aituation of human rights in Cuba, p repared by
the Special Rapporteur. Mr. Carl-Johan Groth. in accordance
with Commisgion resolution 1993/63
INTRODUCTION
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
A. Legal and constitutional framework
B. Moot frequent patterns of violations and
specially vulnerable groups
C. The right to enter and leave the country . . .
CONDITIONS IN THE PRISONS
CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
INFORMATION RICEIVED FROM INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS BASED IV CUBA IN ACCORDANCE WITH
CURRENT LEGISLATION
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO.MMF3JDATIONS
Letter aated 24 August 1993 front thfi Special KappoiLcui-
addtessed to th» Permanent Represencative of Cuba to
the Unit»<1 Nations Office at Geneva
Statement mad* on J9 November 1>S3 by the rcrmansnt
Roprefs^ntative of Cuba to the Unitsd Nations during the
forty-elg)iLli session of th9 npneral Assembly
Paraqraohg Page
136
I . IKTRODUCTIOK
X. At its forty-ninth session, the Coraroission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 1993/63, entitled "Situation of human rights in Cuba", on
10 March 1993. In that resolution, the Commission decided to extend for
another year the mandate conferred on the Special Rapporteur under resolution
1992/61 of 3 March 1992, whereby Mr. Carl-Johan Groth had been appointed
Special Rapporteur.
2. In resolution 1993/63, approved by the Economic and Social Council in its
decision 1993/274, the Special Rapporteur was requested to submit a report to
the Commission at its fiftieth session, as well as an Interim report which was
submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session (A/48/562) . For
its part, the General Assembly adopted resol^ution 48/142 entitled 'Situation
of human rights in Cuba", in which it decided to continue the consideration of
the question at the forty-ninth session, ifee present report is basically an
update of the interim report.
3. In resolution 1993/63, the Cotnnission also requested the Special
Rapporteur to maintain direct contact with the Government and citizens of
Cuba, and, noting that the Government of Cuba had failed to cooperate with the
Special Rapporteur, called on it to pemdt him the opportunity to carry out
his mandate in full, in particular by allowing him to visit Cuba.
4. Pursuant to his mandate, the Special Rapporteur, on 24 August 1993,
addressed a letter to the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the
united Nations Office at Geneva requesting the collaboration of the Cuban
Government and an opportunity to visit the country. To date, there has been
no answer to the letter, which is reproduced in appendix I to this report.
5. Also pursuant to his mandate, the Special Rapporteur tried to obtain
information from a wide variety of sources, and expressed his willingness to
receive any person or group wishing to meet him. For that purpose, and
bearing in mind that most of the sources of information on the situation of
human rights in Cuba are in the United States of America, he travelled to
New York and Washington from 15 to 22 September 1993, where he had the
opportunity to meet individuals and representatives of the following
organizations and groups: the Cuban Connittee for Human Rights, the Committee
to Support the Human Rights Movement in Cuba, the Cuban Women's Foundation,
the Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Freedom Bouse, the Cuban Workers
Trade Union, Americas Watch. Areito Review, the Cuban-American Committee of
New Jersey, the Cuban Christian Democratic Party, the World Federation of
Cuban Political Prisoners, the Cxdsan Human Rights Party, the Centre for Human
Rights, the Cuban Committee against the Bloc)cade, the Puerto Rican Group
against the Blockade and Inter -American Dialogue. The Special Rapporteur also
had a working session in Madrid on 24 September, where he had occasion to meet
representatives of the Association for Continental Peace (ASOPAZCO) , the Cuban
Liberal Union and a group of 13 former Cuban prisoners exiled in Spain.
During the current year, the Special Rapporteur also had an opportunity to
meet representatives of the Coordinating Body for Human Rights Organizations
in Cuba, and received written material - in addition to that received from the
137
aaove-meuLioned ocurceo - from such Ponrces as the Intornvation Bureau of the
Cuban Human Righrs Movement and Amnesty InteniaLional , as well ae a numh^r of
communications sent to the Special Happortour by Cuban citizens residing In
Cuba.
II. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGKT.«;
6. In aaalysina the intormatlon received regarding the Bituation of human
rights, the special Rapporteur hac ta>.«n as a point of reference the relo/'ant
iutevnational inecrument? and in particular wishes to Keep in mind eom«
paragrapb.9 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action aHopted by tne
World eonterente on Human Rights on 25 Jiin*-. 1993. 1/ Firstly, in paragraph 1
of part I of the Declaration, the Conference reaffirmed "the aolemn commitrnftnt
of all States to fulfil theii obligationo to promote universal respect for,
and observance and protection of. all human rights and rundamental freedome
for all in accordance with tne Charter of the United Nations, other
instruments relating to human rightc, and international law. The universal
uature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question".
7. for Its part, paragraph 5 states tViat:
"All human rights arc univcreal, indivisible and interdependent tuvl
interrelated. The international community must treat hutixan righto
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, an<1 with the
same emphasis, while the significanc« of national and reqional
particularitiec and various historical, cultural and religious
baclcgronnds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of stat««, regardless
Ot their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect
all human rights and fundamental freedoms . "
iAStly, paragraph e readc:
"uemocracy, development and racpect for human riqnts and
fundamental fr««doms arf. interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
Democracy is based on the fiecly expressed will of the people to
determine their own political, «conomir, social and cultural sybtema and
their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the conteict
of the above, the promotio;i and protection of human rights and
rundameutal freedomo at the national and international levels should be
universal and ronducted without conditions attached- The international
community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy,
development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedome in the
•ntire world. "
e. On the basis of th<=>ae provisions, Che Special Rapporteur arrived at the
following conclusions. No matter what form it takes, a country's political
system cannot be maintained if it means that the human rights and fundamental
freedome of eitiz-ns defined in international instruments are b»ing
systematically violated. Moreover, the interpretation of tnese rights oaju->ot
be the sole prerogative of the authorities of the State or of monolithic
Governments which control the Channelling of the alleged inrerests Of various
sectors of society. The special Rapporteur is also Ot the opinion that
advances in the sconomir and social tield consLiuuce e conctructive baci.s for
138
advances in the field of civil and political rights. As stated in the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, advances in one area of human rights,
specifically economic and social rights, cannot serve as justification for
serious shortcomings in the protection and promotion of another category of
rights, namely civil and political rights. Given their indivisibility,
advances in the two areas must be parallel, otherwise the rights to which
priority has been given might in the long term be diminished by the rights
formerly minimized.
A. l,eqal and constitutional framework
9. Certain provisions of the current Constitution are crucial to an
understanding of the background to civil and political rights. Article X
proclaims that "Cuba ie a socialist State of workers", and article S declares
that "the Communist Party of Cuba, inspired by Jos6 Marti and Marxist-Leninist
in nature, the organized vanguard of the Cuban nation, is the supreme leading
force in society and the State, organizing and guiding the common efforts
towards the noble goals of building socialism and progressing towards the
communist society". According to article 62, "none of the freedoms which are
recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to what is established in
the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of
the socialist State, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism and cocmiunism. Violations of this principle are punishable" .
10. While the Constitution contains several provisions aimed at guaranteeing
such basic rights as freedom of speech and freedom of the press (art. 53),
freedom of assembly, freedom to demonstrate and freedom of association
(art. 54), and the right to file complaints with and send petitions to the
authorities (art. 63) , it is obvious that those rights may be exercised only
when, in the eyes of the authorities, that would not involve any challenge to
the status quo or to the official ideology.
11. In this connection, mention should also be made of the constitutional
precepts governing mass organizations. Article 6 declares that "the union of
Commijnist Youth, an organization of Cuban youth in the vanguard, is recognized
and encouraged by the State in its primary task of promoting active
participation by the young masses in the building of socialism". Likewise,
article 7 stipulates that "the Cuban Socialist State recognizes and encourages
the mass social organizations (...] which con^srise various sectors of the
population, represent the specific interests of the same and involve them in
the tasks of building, consolidating and defending socialist society". These
precepts establish beyond all dotibt the ideological framework within which new
associations may be formed. Any association which, in the opinion of the
authorities, fails to meet that standard will have its application for
registration denied or, as happens more often in practice, ignored.
12. A logical corollary to those constitutional precepts is the punishment of
any act that can in any way be contrary to the status quo. The 1987 Penal
Code thus has among its objectives "helping to develop among all citizens an
awareness of the need to respect the socialist legal order, do their duty and
properly observe the norms of socialist coexistence" (art. 1). The Code also
specifies that "the purpose of the penalty is not only to punish the offence.
but also to provide re-education in the principles ... of respect for the
139
norms of sncialist coexistence" (art. 27) . The Code goes on to Identify a
number of aces as offencec againsr r.he incemai security of the ec«t«,
stipulatina heavy pr J eon sentences. In aadicion, under artidfi 44. tne COUI L
may, ar its discretion, oiucr confiscation of property as puniShmeuL for
oftences against the oecurity of r.he State, some of those offcnoes. e.g.
rebellion and se'i'ir.ion, involve the use of violence or forc«» of arms. Others,
howovftr, such as enemy propaganda, do not involve the use of any vriolent
means. Anwjng those liable to punishment is any peison who, by maans of
spoken, written or any other torro of propaganda, incites ftthers to taKe attion
against the social order or the cooialist State, or who produces, distributes
or possesses auch propaganda. Furthermore, in the context of offenrfts against
the ecourity of the State, preparatory acts are punishable under article 12
Article 72 of the Code deals with the concept of "dangerous state", which it
defines as "a pereon'e .special proclivity to commit offences as demonstrated
by eonducr that is manifestly contrary- to the norma of socialist morality"; it
provides that any peroon who might develop a proclivity to commit offences,
because of connections or relations with peraonc who are potentially dangert>us
to the social, economic and political order of the socialist State, shall be
warned by the police authorities. It also states that preventive security
meaeures involving, i nter alia , supervioion by Npfional Revolutionary Police
bodies may be taken againct a person declared to be in « dangerouo ctate.
13. The Penal Code-s definition of other acts as offences - e.g. unlawful
association, assembly and demon? t ration (arcs. i08 and 203, which lay down
penalties for associate or arfillate meiKbera, ao well as promoters or
directors of unregistered organisations) , possession or illegal printed matter
(art. 210) or contempt (art 144) - is also likely to be applied to conduct
which in any way implies the expression of opinions critical oi the offiuial
ideology or of the actions of the authorities.
14. To illustrate this pyint, the Special Rapporteur would like to mention
the provisional conclusions reached by the prosecutor in the October I9'i2
trial on the charge of enemy propaganda of Sebaeti4n Ajrco<5 Eergnes, a leadina
member of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights, 2/ in order to show what type
Ot action may be punichable :
"Sebastian Aa-cos Bergnes, without regard for the law, gent
Inforroation to stations based outside the country, for the purpose OI
contributing to the campaign to dieoredit Cuba.
"In breach of the disciplinary code of the Comhinado del Este
Prison, he gave handwritten notes to counter-revolutionary inmates, with
the aim of helping to incite opposition to the Cuban Gocial system.
"Duriua a search at the Combinado del Este Prison on
11 December Ipcti . . . pieces ol paper with handwriting in ink . . . were
found on the prisoner, on one piece of paper ... the accused,
SebasLiaii Arcoa Eergnes. had written, and I quote; 'We are making
continual demands for democratic changcc to the regime, and we are trying
to develop the necessary national consciousness so as to be able to bring
about those ch3nges through peaceful, but firm, civil resistance among
the population. That Is out main tack, our educational task, our present
140
task ... then demand lunch, transport, private car; then amnesty, freedom
of expression, freedom of association and, finally, democracy!' In other
words, use systematic propaganda to promote action against our social
system. "
15. The Special Rapporteur does not consider it part of his mandate to
express opinions about the ideological principles embodied in the
Constitution. His coiwtients relate to the restrictions which the
interpretation and in?)lementation of those principles by the authorities may
place on the basic rights of the population.
B. Most frequent patterns of violation s and soeeiallv
vulnerable groups
16. On the basis of direct testimony, contacts with analysts of the Cuban
experience and abundant written documentation, the Special Rapporteur has been
able to note the excessive control exerted over the population via the
institutional machinery. This has resulted in a systematic violation of,
inter alia , the principle of non-discrimination on political grounds and the
right to freedom of opinion and expression. This control is applied in the
day-to-day life of every citizen - in the workplace, at educational
institutions and even at the neighbourhood level. Education itself also has
an ideological orientation, to judge from the Constitution, article 36 of
which states that parents have a duty to contribute actively to the all-round
education and training of their children as useful citizens prepared for life
in a socialist society, whereas article 3S stipulates that the State bases its
educational and cultural policy on Marxist ideology, and promotes patriotic
education and communist training of the new generations.
17. According to the information received, the so-called "cumulative school
record* and "employment record" make it possible to monitor the ideological
integration of individuals virtually throughout their lives, by including not
only purely academic or employment- related material, but also information
regarding their membership in mass organizations, functions performed in such
organizations, level of activism, ideological features of family members,
misconduct, etc. Often individuals are expelled from educational
institutions, dismissed from their jobs or subjected to some form of
discrimination for expressing, in some way, views inconsistent with the
official ideology.
18. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation, considered some of
these questions in connection with the application of Convention No. ill
concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation, ratified by
Cuba in 1965, in the light of comments made by non-governmental organizations
alleging discrimination loased on political opinion, in access to education,
training and employment. Since this Committee is a body with which the
Govenunent has maintained a dialogue, the Special Rapporteur considers it
important to make full reference to its consideration of the case of Cuba.
19. Among other comments, the Committee of Experts pointed out in 1992 that
the Regulations for the Application of Employment Policy, like the Labour
Code, defined the labour record as a document that contains data and
141
particulars of each worker' s Job and LhaC the employing agency is und^r an
obllgaclon to pteparc, update and maintain th«> rp.cord. Yet accoraing CO
resolution Mo. 590/19«n of the State Commictee on l«iiivui a«d social Cccurity
(CETSS) , distinctions which do uoL constitute q labour merit, but which are
conferred b/ such bodice ac maec organizations or official institutions and
which expracs Ch« "revolutionary attitude malncaiucd by the worker outcida his
work centre" may be included in the labour record. The Commi r.r.ee of Experts
considcxcd that those provisions wer» nnr. in conformity with the provisions of
the Convention concerning the Elimination of any Discx-imination Saced on
Political Opinion and cIwl die inclusion in the labour record of distinctions
conferred for a "revolutionary attitude" outside the labour enviioiiment might
constitute discrimination. 3/
20. In ito 1993 report, the Committee ot Experts tooX noLc of the information
ev'pplied by the Government to uhc effect that the Ministries e<f Education ana
higher Tiaiiiing had undertaken studies wir.h a view to removing from the
student's school rpcord elements wnich did not iuvolvc academic matters »r>A
that discussions were beiuy held on a draft regulation fnr the application Of
employment policy, which defined th«! content of tne cumulative labour record
and would indicate clearly tnat it could no longer contain information on
merits or demerits. The Government alco indicated that resolution
Nu. SSO/1900 had been repealed, and that the Government vat. conducting an
inquiry on the internal rules that had been eatabliched by some eT>t-.erprises
with a view to cslitrdnating from files all information relative to moral
attitudcc or social conduct of workers, which were cAttaneoua to the
ftmployment relationship. ±/
21. With regard to the communications media, the above-mentioned article S3
of tne constitution states that material conditions for the exercise Ot
freedom of opeech and of t>i«". press are created by the f auL that the prcec ,
radio, television, cinema and othei mass media are State-owmed or social
property and ccui in no case be privately owned. On this basis, there is no
doubt that the authorities exercise strict control over the media and that
censorship is practised systematically. The Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventione and Recommendations also referred in its 19S3
report to possihie discrimination against journalists on ideological groLmd."!.
stating m particular:
"In previous direct requesLs, the Committee had noted r.hat
section 3 of resolution No. SO, of 21 September 1987, respecting the
parameters for evaluating the performance of workers in joumaliem
includes the political and ideological ocope of the work performed. Tne
CoroiiiLLce noted that the outcom* of the evaluation affects the wage level
of the worker.^; in Question since an evaluation that ic not 'positive' ha.<5
the effect of lowering the worker' e wages . Section 28 provides that
as a result of a non-popi tive biennial evaluation tlie employment
relationship of tne person concerned may bo terminated. The Committee
notes the Government's reply that journalists' performances are evaluaLcd
oolely on the ba«i.<5 of their gualif ications and the resultc of their
work. Given, however, that the text of this resolution makes reference
to ideological emd political elements which may affect both access to,
and securiry of, employment and conditions of employment, the Committee
asKs the Goveriuiicut to provide information, in its next report, on tne
142
measures taken or envisaged to remove these elements from the criteria
for evaluation of journalists, set forth in resolution Mo. 50, so as to
bring it into line with the stated practice of judging performance on the
sole bases of qualifications and results.' ^/
22. Another form of social and political control is exercised by the direct
harassment of security agents, or through arrest and sentencing in the courts
for offences defined by law. Here, the most vulnerable sector is the one made
up of individuals belonging to groups that have emerged, without formal legal
recognition, for the purpose of defending human rights or labour union rights
and in some cases for a political purpose. The Special Rapportexar sees these
groups as characterized above all by their zeal to use only peaceful means to
achieve their ends. In many cases, they have applied to the authorities for
inclusion in the Ministry of Justice's register of associations, although the
requests have as a general rule remained unahswered. At the present time,
there seem to be about 100 such association^! and groups, according to a list
recently received by the Special Rapporteur,' each of them varying in their
number of members, date of establishment or orientation.
23. As for the right to establish and join trade union organizations, the
Special Rapporteur mentioned in his previous report to the Connission on Human
Rights 6/ that the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International
Labour Organisation had examined a complaint relating, inter alia , to the
impossibility of establishing independent trade unions and the monopoly
exercised in that regard by the Central Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC) ,
the official trade union, and that the Committee had formulated provisional
conclusions on the case. As part of its recommendations, the Committee urged
the Government to send precise observations on the failure of the Ministry of
Justice to reply to the request for registration and recognition of legal
personality submitted by the General Onion of Cuban Workers (UGTC) . In the
course of its May 1993 session, the Committee took up the complaint again in
the light of the reply furnished by the Government and reached the following
conclusions :
'280. As regards the allegation concerning the Ministry of
Justice's failure to reply to the request for registration and
recognition of legal personality submitted by the General Union of Cuban
Workers (tXiTC) (its rules and a list of some of the members' names had
been enclosed by the complainant organization) , the Connittee notes the
observations made by the Government according to which a request for
registration had not been submitted, merely a request to the Ministry of
Justice for a 'certificate of recognition' that there »«6 no association
of workers with the same name in that department and that, subsequently,
Mr. Gutierrez asked the Ministry to discount the aforementioned request
for registration. In the Committee's' opinion, it seems that 'certificate
of recognition' was requested by Mr. Gutierrez with the express aim of
being able subsequently to request 'legal registration' for the new trade
union, and he thus seemingly embarked on a procedure obviously with the
143
aim of registering a new crade uiiiuu body. The Coinmitt«« obs»rves,
moreover, chat from the documentation inc5nd«d by the Government iL seems
that, although Mr. Guti*rrez in ettect asKed for the UCTC regiccration
application to be discounted, this was merely due to eh« fa<?r that he
wished to chan«jc the name of tha acBocijiirion to the 'Union o£ Cuban
workers (UGTC) ' .
"281. In the circumctaneas, the Coinmittee concludes that the
General Onion of Cvihan Workers was set up over a year and a half ago
(arrording to the Govenuocnc, it is now oallad the Union of Cufcan WorkeiS
(OSTC) ) , and has otill not be«n r«igi6tered. Furthernore, Although it
notec that the. Qovemment' 6 declaracions concerning the OCTC's lack Of
representatlvlty, the Committee must point out that the tact that ait
or^jaiiization hac only a sm;)!! number ot members in uot a good enough
raacon for refusing registratlou. In the ciroumatances. the Committee
once again uiyes the Go-'cmm«nt to maVe an immediate pronouncement on the
registration of the R*>neral Union of Cuban Wotkera (UOTC) (which
according to the GovemmeiiL is now called th« Onion of Cuban Workers
(USTC) ) , Leaving in mind that, v.«n(1er Article 2 Of Convention No. 07,
workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, chall h»ve the
right to establish aud, subject only to th^ rules of the organization
couuerned, to join organ! z<>r. ions of their choosing without previous
authorization. The Committee requests the Covemmant to keep it intormed
Of any measures adopted in thia regard . " 2/
31. A great many ot the conplaints received by the Sp«oial Rapporteur concetn
persons, in some way linked to human rights, trade union or political groups,
who indicate that they were visited by State security agents at their homes or
workplsoes and threatened with loss ©f employment, prosecution or so-called
"acts of repudiation" on the part of the "rapid response biigades" and, in
some caoee, ware assaulted in the Street by unknown pereonc or warned to leave
thft country. Examples iuclude the caeos of AiHa Rosa Jim6nez and Asalia
aallestei. Cintas, of tha Democratic Civic Party; Rol«uido Oons&lcs Llanac, of
the Human Rights Party in Guines, who was beaten by mambers of the police on
24 August 1&&3; and Rene Contrerae Slanch, of the CuDan Human Riyhts Party,
who was beaten on 16 March 1993 in the centre of Havana by members of the
police nnd suffered head Injuiies. On IE January 1<»<J4. the police staked out
the homes of Rcn6 del Poco and Vladjmiro Roca. Of the socialist Movement, in
order to prevent a meeting from being held. In the view of the .<;pecial
Rapjvjrteur. the idea of allowing groupc of persons without legal Identity or
responsibility to "adreinieter justice" is something that cannot be accepted in
any society.
25. In other cases, the persons concerned aie summoned to appear before the
police where they are warned oi held in euctody for a short period and
interrogated. Threats of reprisals! against tne family ate also frequent, as
well ae house searches. For example, the case was reported of
Robert Trobaio HernAnde^, Secretary of Cuba's General Union Of workers in
Havana province and member of the National Commission of Independent Trade
Onions, who was arrested on b March 1993 in the Gaira de Helena district and
taken to tne police ttation at 6an Antonio de los Bancs, where lie was held for
four days before being transferred to the I>epar tiiient of Technical
Investigations (DTI) at San Jose dc las Lajae, wh^re he remained for
144
three more days. It was also reported that he was told he would be prosecuted
for the crime of enemy propaganda if he continued to oppose the regime and
that he had lost his job as a result of the arrest. Rolando Roque Malherbe, a
member of the Socialist Democratic Movement, was warned on 23 September 1993
not to hold in his home a meeting planned for the following day and remained
in custody until 27 September: at the meeting, which was held anyway, there
was an act of repudiation in which about 300 persons took part, including some
State Security officials, and some of the participants in the meeting, most of
them linked to human rights groups, were threatened. In connection with those
incidents F61ix Antonio Bonne Carcasses, coordinator of the Cuban Civic
Movement, was summoned on 27 September 1993 to the police station at
Rio Verde, Rancho Boycros municipality, and later taken to the DTI detention
centre at the intersection of 100 and Aldab6.
26. Other cases reported are the following: various members of the
National Council for Civil Rights in Cuba and the Cuban Human Rights Party
(L5zaro FemAndez Hidalgo-Gato, Enrique L.6pez Vald6s, Pedro Pablo GuzmSn
Cabrera, Sergio Rodriguez Valle, Sergio Llanes Martinez, Alcides Aguilar) ,
were arrested in early November 1992 at San Antonio de los BaAos .
Omar Moists Ruiz Hem&ndez was interrogated for three days in July 1992 at the
Santa Clara State Security headquarters in connection with complaints that had
been sent abroad concerning Cuba's problems. Carlos Cordero PSez, a member of
the National Council for Human Rights, was arrested on S October 1992 when, at
the entrance to the Havana Provincial Court where the trial against Sebastifin
Arcos Bergnes was to be held, he displayed a placard with the words "Freedom
for SebastiSn Arcos"; he was beaten and taken to the police station at the
intersection of Cuba and Chac6n, released at about 11 p.m., once the trial had
ended. Ana Daisy Becerra, a member of the Committee of Mothers for Granting
Amnesty to Political Prisoners, was arrested on 13 December 1992 and taJcen to
the Picota police station in Old Havana and was threatened with prosecution
for enemy propaganda because complaints about human rights violations in the
Combinado del Este Prison had been found in her home. Paula Valiente,
President of the Association of Mothers for Dignity, was interrogated several
times in 1992 and 1993 and threatened because of her activities in connection
with political prisoners and for reporting human rights violations abroad;
other members of her organization such as Hilda Cabrera, Berta GalSn and
Victoria Cruz and members of her family have also been threatened and
interrogated: Maria Valdis Rosado, coordinator of Democratic Civic Action,
and Alicia Suirez, of the Cuban Christian Democratic Movement, were arrested
in Havana on 7 May 1993 and released two days later. Caridad Duarte G6mez, of
the 0rgani2aci6n Juveail Martiana, was interrogated for several hours on
4 August 1993 at the municipal police station of Old Havana and on 19 May 1993
at the Picota and Paula station. Vivian P^rez Medina and Gisela Est^vez
Martinez, of the Cuban Foundation for Human Rights, were arrested on
5 August 1993, in San Jos4 de las Lajas and held for several hours at the
police station where they were threatened and forced to sign waimings.
Raul Valderrama Martinez, Secretary-General of the Foundation for
Human Rights, was arrested on 17 November 1993 in San Jos6 de las Lajas and
taken to the municipal police station, where he was interrogated in connection
with an interview he had given to a foreign journalist a few days earlier,
accused of spreading false news and threatened; he was released two days
later; he had already been arrested on 15 July 1993 and released three months
later. L4zara Herrera Portel, wife of the Democratic Civic Front member.
145
Eugenie nodrxguaz Chiple. was arrestefl In Kavdna on 53 Hov«nvb»r 1993 and
tak»n to the polic* scatiun in Capri, whero ch» »-«»maine<l tor 72 houiA:
on 2 uecembei 1933, Mr. Rodriguo? rhaple himsell was Uueotencd and be^t^n up
in the 3tre«c by persons who took his IdeuLicy card away from him; where a few
w^alrs earlier, he had been a victim of an attempt to run him flown by pcroonc
driving p^st in a vehiela who "shouted threats ac him. Carloa Goieslea.
Manuel S4neh«r. Argelio Reyes and Leonardo Calvo, m«mb»r« of the Socialls'.
DemocratlC MOvemenL, were eummonad to police stations on 12 January 1994 and
received warninga in ecpn<».ction with their political activiciae.
27. In anothei group of oasee th» persons concerned wexe Cried and eontenred
tu priaon terms of v»ryino lengths. Accoxding to reportc, during the tirst
8Cag« of the investigation, the detainee ie oft»n held on Security police
premises for several months. BoiT>«>rimes in sealed cells from which ho is t.aken
only to be ropeateHly interrogated at any time of day or night, with extremely
limit'-fl access to visits from his family or lawyer. The Special Rapporteur
received i»iformation recently on the following specific caoec, 6om« nf which
occurred in 19'*7:
(a) Pablo Rayes Martinez, a member oC the National Civic Union, was
eantanc*'? in October 1<>92 by the Havana Provincial Court to eight yeaxs of
imprisonment and cenfieoation of all his property fox the crime of anemy
propaganda b«caus»», according to the vexdlct, he had an3ag<>d in "the
diasnminacion of false information about alleged human rights violations in
LMba and other economic aspwrte, reflecting negatively on th» maes»s. which
had baon provided to him by various disconcencod p»ople and not verified by
the accused, and were clearly doeign»ri to discredit the woxk of the
revolution, and the presnige of its leaderw, and ultimately to undermine the
economic, political and social foundations of our system";
(b) Luis Enrique Grave de CeralUa Morel, a former professor ot physics
who wa.q expelled from the Orientc University for having left Che cotrar.uniot
party, and Arqulmedec Ruii Columbia, P.Obier Rodxlofuee Leiva and
Carloo Orua Cabal lero. researchers of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, weie
arrested on 13 Februaxy 1992 in Cantiago de Cuba in connection with the
establishment of a political movement called "New Oeneratien" that was
critical of government policy. For the crime of rebellion they were later
sentenced to 13, 8, 10 and 8 years of imprisonment, respectively;
(r) Barbara Celia Guuziler Toledo, a qualified economist and public
accountant, was convicted of contempt on lb July 1992 by the Ciego de Avila
Pirovincial Court and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment and loss of
employment tor haviny ejcpresacd critical views in private about the country's
leadexs ;
(d) Juan JoBc Moreno Reyes, Luis Reyes Reynosa, Benigno Raul
Bcnoit Pupo, Eduardo Ouzm4n Fornaris, Eniigue Chamberlays Soler.
Lorenzo Cutino BStrzaga, AOolfo Durin Figueredo, Wiltredo Galaiio Mates,
Ratael Rivera Matos, Maricia Santos Resell, IUm6u Mariano Pena Escalona and
Ram6n remSndez Francisco were sentenced to prison terms of between 5 and
13 yoars for crimes of lebellion and oth»r acts against state security in
March 1993 by the fiajiciagri He Cuba Provincial Court. The acts for which they
146
were charged involved holding meetings and printing and distributing flyers in
various municipalities of Holguin province criticizing the Government. Seven
other people received sentences of between one and two years in relation to
the same incidents, -
(e) Juan Francisco FernSndez Gonzalez, a doctor, was arrested
on 18 March 1992 in Havana and tried for the crime of enemy propaganda.
During the trial, held on 15 December 1992, the charges were changed to
rebellion and he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. In the course of
one year, the place of detention was changed no less than six times. In the
eame case, the Havana Provincial Court also sentenced Eduardo Prida, a
qualified psychologist, and Mario Godinez, an electrician, to 15 and 12 years
of imprisonment, respectively;
(f) Amador Blanco HemSndez, President of the Jos6 Marti National Human
Rights Commission, was arrested on 10 December 1992 at his home at Caibarien,
Villa Clara, and taken to the State Security Department at Santa Clara. He
was charged with enemy propaganda along with Joel Mesa Morales, Vice-President
of the Commission, who was arrested on 26 January 1993, and they were
sentenced in September 1993 to eight and seven years of imprisonment,
respectively, by the Villa Clara People's Provincial Court. In his
provisional conclusions, the prosecutor mentioned among the charges that the
accused "had been engaged in a propaganda campaign in order to discredit the
Cuban revolution through the collection of numerous false complaints,
consisting of alleged maltreatment and physical attacks, persecution, injuries
and threats to various persons and prisoners by members of the Ministry of the
Interior in general and military and rehabilitative personnel at the
penitentiary centres in particular, sent through different channels to
different subversive outlets". In 1982, Mr. Blanco HemAndez had been
dismissed from his post as professor at the Central University of Las Villas
for having been critical of government policy;
(g) Angel Prieto Mendez, a retired Cubana de Aviaci6n pilot and
founder of the Marti Association for Opposition to the Regime, was
arrested on 26 December 1991 and accused of enemy propaganda and contempt.
On 6 January 1993, he was tried and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. At
present, he is serving his sentence in Guanajay Prison;
(h) Alfredo Garcia Quesada, electrician and student at the
University of Camag\ley, was arrested on 23 April 1993 in the
Guayabal district. Las Tunas, for distributing flyers reading "Down with
Fidel* and for painting those words on the body of a white horse. He is now
serving a five-year term in the prison at TIpico de Las Txjnas;
(i) Adriano GonzSlez Marichal, of the Pacifist Solidarity and Peace
Movement, was arrested on 6 January 1992. During the trial held in
September 1993, he was accused primarily of maintaining contacts with Cuban
organizations abroad and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for enemy
propaganda ;
147
(j) i.iiia Felipe Lorens Nadal, Presiaenc of che urganlzaclOn Juvenil
Marciana, was arreeLcd on 22 September 1333 in Havana. A few daye later, he
was brought to trial and cttntenced to four yesrs' imprisonment for antisocial
behaviour, having been accused ot inciting the worKers at the Comocoibd Hotel
and of not working. At present, he is serving hio oencenoe in Co^d:^i^ado del
Bate Prioon.
28 . The Special Rapporteur was aloo informed of th» following c«se« of
peroone who wer» formally accused of enemy propaganda or similar crimes who at
the time tne infortnatlon was receivtsd, were being held in custody pending
trial; Luis Gustavo OomXnguez Cutiirraz, from th* grovip Peace, Progress and
Liberty, j»rrueed of enemy propaganda because he sent a letter to the
Government in which he renounced the medals awarded to him for hie
participation in th« Angola campaign; Periro Armentero Lazo, imprisoned in the
Combinado del EsCe Prison; Orfilio Garcia Quesada, held in El Guoyabol
district, victoria de las Tunas, in May 1992 for having participated in a
proooee of collecting signatures calling for political Change; Roberto
Alvarez San Martin, a well-)cnown writei and journalist, banned from practiEing
hie profession in February- 1992; Domiciano Torres, a fomr-.r professor of
architectur<? , who was expelled from his department at che Armando Mestrc ue
Guanacacoa Technological InsLituue in 1992, and vice president of tha
Democratic Civic Party, arroctad on 13 Aygusr 199:? and taken to the State
Secxirir.y offices at Villa Marista, where he was held for 42 days; at the time
or his arrest, he is alleged to have been brutally baaeon; later, h* was
tra«cf erred to the Havana P«yrhiatric Hospital: the latest information
received indicated that he was awaiting ttial in El Pitirre Prison in
Smi Miguel del Padr6n district, Havana City.
29. Tne special Rapporteur was also informed that, in 1993, a graat many
persons were sentenced to one to four years' ■imprisonment under the provisions
on ant i- social behaviour, particularly young persons accused of involvement in
disturbances of public order. It was also reported that the trials in such
cases did not offer minimum guar?nrpps of the right of defence and that the
accused were sentenced almost systematically in tiials held only a few days
after Lhcir arrest had taken place. Mewepapar sources infi-irat«d that, from
late August to »a'-ly November 1993. about 2,500 persons had been sentenced on
such qrounds. 8/
30 Tn connection with proceedings in cases with political connotations, the
special Rapporteui received information on the role of attorneyc Kfar.ing that
their baeic duty is not to defend the interests of their clients, as these are
subordinated to the interests of the system. Persons who had been ocntenoed
for political offences told the Special Rapporteur that, they met their defence
attorney only at the rime of their oral hearing and that the defence consisted
only ot presenting some standard udcigating circumstaneec rather than proving
the innocence of the accused, who could always be certain in advance that he
would b» r.onvicted. They also said that, in a large jiumbcr of cases, neither
the person concerned nox his family received a copy of tha verdict and
sometimes not even the accusation, so rhar.. at the time ot tne trial, the
accviped had only the oral version given by the ijivcstigatinj authority, that
is, under the Cub«ui procedural system, the police, with r^snwct to the legal
ebaracterijation of th» offences he was accused ot . Similarly, articles l«0
and 161 of the Code of criminal Procedure, which refer to the form in which a
148
statement by the accused is to be taken during the preparatory phase of the
procedure in the appropriate police unit, do not give the accused the right to
make a etacement in the presence of a defence counsel, whether of his choice
or assigned.
31. On a number of occasions, the Special Rapporteur received complaints
about the way in which trials for offences against State security are
conducted: discriminatory treatment of the witnesses for the defence and the
prosecution, an excessively aggressive attitude on the part of the prosecutor
and an obvious lack of impartiality by the judge in the conduct of the
hearings seem to be habitual practices.
32. In addition to the measures referred to above, loss of employment is also
common, often accompanied by threats and campaigns to discredit the victim.
This measure creates particular problems for' people who are unable to find any
other work corresponding to their qualifications, because the State is the
sole employer; the entire family unit then Offers the consequences. The
following are some of the cases communicated to the Special Rapporteur:
(a) Rolando Diaz Acoeta, expelled in October 1992 from his post in
Jos€ Marti National Library, in 10 October District, for being one of a group
of intellectuals who signed a letter to the Heads of State and Government at
the Second Ibero-American Summit in which they drew attention to the need for
changes in the country. For the same reason, he was also evicted from the
house where he lived;
(b) Guillermo Fernandez Donates, expelled in October 1992 from his
civil engineer's post in Construction Project Company No. 2 in Havana for
revealing his membership in the Corriente CIvica and the Cuban Committee for
Human Rights; in February 1993, he was also expelled from Havana University
where he was a law student and from the sports centre he frequently visited.
His wife, Euridice Sotolongo Losada, was forced to resign from the same
technical centre;
(c) Heriberto Alejandro Bario Lorences, expelled from his engineer's
post at the Havana Institute for Sugar Projects in June 1992 for sending
information abroad concerning the arrest of his colleague, Mariano Gort, on a
charge of disseminating enemy propaganda;
(d) Leonardo Jos6 Rodriguez P4re2, expelled from his research post at
the Havana Centre for Metallurgical Research in January 1993 for signing the
above-mentioned letter to the Ibero-American Sunmit.
33. The Special Rapporteur also received information on the following cases
of university professors expelled under Decree-Law No. 34/1980, which enables
the heads of the Municipal Departments of Local People's Power Organizations
to dismiss staff menvbers from institutions of higher learning on the grounds
of activities contrary to socialist morality and the ideological principles of
society:
(a) Reinaldo Cosano A16n was expelled from his teacher's post in the
-J^sus SuSrez Gayol ' faculty of Guanabo in Havana in September 1992 for his
work with the Cuban Committee for Human Rights. In the official document
149
confirming his expulsion, Mi. Cosono'o 3ctiviti»s are rated inappropi iace fcr
the work of an educator eince thpy may have serious icpercussionc on th»
training o£ Cuban children and young i^eople;
(b) R«ni6n Rodr£guei »?os lost his teacher "s post at a cantr" in
3an Antonio So los Banos and was ycnerally dicqualif ipH from the teachiny
prnfeesion in 1»&2 alter it wac confirm»H, accordinq to the lesolutionc on
expulsion, that "h© was 3 full member ol a huii>an righto group", this beinq
deemed "contrary to (Socialise morality and th« principles ot our society" i
(c> Tclix Diaz cSceres, a physical education teacher *r. Pinar del Klo,
wac axpelled from his post in May 1992 £or openly opposing the expulsion of a
group or unlveieity profocoore from their posts because they had written a
declaration of principles in which they asked for political changes, ^/
on 3 August 1992, he was summoned to State Security premises "here he wae
interrogated about tho "Open letter or Cuban piofesaionalc to the
Ibero -American Summit"; in September, he wac arresf^d and spent 16 days in the
State Security Depaxtment at Pinar d?] Rio on Charges of disseminating enemy
propayanda .
34. It Is the opinion of the Sporial Rapporteur thaL these reoont expulsions
ate not in kaaping with what was Indicated by the Committee of Experts on the
Application ot Conventions and Rceommandat ions of the intemaLional Labour
Office iu its invectigation of the apolicatloti of Convention Mo. Ill
(Diaeriminacjrin in resoecc Of Employment and Occupation) . included in its
1992 report:
"The Committee takes note of the Government's declatation whereby
the provisions of docree-law No. 34/1^60 ... do not have practical
application today. The coitjnittee hopes that, as indicated by the
Government, these piovioionc will be harmonized with the Convention at
the time revision of the above laws Is beyon. Furthermore, the Committee
again asks the Government to supply the text of attached resolution
Ko. 2, dated 20 December 19S9, from the Ministries of Education and
Hiyher Education dealing with the relnsLdtement of workor.s in the
teaching field to whom deciee-law No. 34/19«0 was applied". 10/
111 its 1992 report, the Committee again letjuested the Government to provide a
copy of resolution No. 2, dated 30 Deeemher 1989. 1.1/
C . T he right to enter and leav^ hhe coun try
35. According to information received, in recent yearc the Cuban authorities
have relaxed the restrictlona on foreign travel by Cuban citizens, fcr example
by lowering to 20 the minimum age for travel; however, many limitations still
remain. Generally speaking, the right to leave and return to one's own
country, embodied in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
is not recognized. All pcrenns wishing to leave the country, either
temporarily or permanently, are icquired to obtain an exit permit fxom the
Ministry c£ r.he interior, a permit which is issued on a discretionary bs?is.
150
36. With regard to cases of family reunification, the wives and children of
ordinary citizens who leave the country temporarily, but subsequently remain
abroad, normally obtain authorization to join their relatives. However, in
the case of citizens who occupied posts regarded as sensitive or who have been
openly critical of the system, their families are frequently refused such
authorization. In this connection, reports have been received of the cases of
Nydia Cartaya Medina and her four daughters , who have been refused exit
permits ever since her husband, a former serviceman, obtained asylum in the
tJnited states in 1985; similar cases include those of Dalgis Nelson Ginarte
and her daughter, Indira LSzara Martinez Nelson, from Santiago de Cuba, who
have visas to join their husband and father in the United States, and
Marelis Hena Garcia and her daughter Marel Franquiz Mena, the wife and
daughter of a nuclear physicist.
37. Even in cases where persons do obtain permission to emigrate, they are
frequently subjected to reprisals as a result of their application, such as
dismissal from their job, demotion, expulsion from educational institutions or
confiscation of their ration book. In addition, the property of the persons
in question, such as housing, furniture and cars, is taken over by the State.
38. Apart from these situations, there are others in which human rights
activists - some of them in prison - are harassed by the authorities to leave
the country. In this connection, reports have been received of cases such as
those of SebastiSn Arcos Bergnes and Yndamiro Restano, mentioned later,
Rodolfo Gonzfilez Gonzilez of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and
F61ix Fleyta Posada of the Free Art Association, who is serving a sentence
in Aguiea prison. In the case of Francisco Chaviano Gonz51ez of the
National Council for Civil Rights in Cuba, authorization for his children -
who hold visas for entry to the United States - to leave the country has been
made conditional on Mr. Chaviano' s leaving the country also.
39. The stream of people trying to leave the country illegally by any means
continues unabated. According to some sources, approximately 25 people a day
make the attempt; as a rough estimate, only one in four succeeds; two,
facing physical danger or arrest, are forced to return; and one is killed in
the atten^jt. According to another estimate, 2,500 people reached the
United States coast in this way in 1992 and about 3,000 in 1993. The sources
consider that, although political reasons have some significance, the main
cause of this emigration is the economic situation, with its concomitant lack
of opportunity and options. As a result, during the past few years, the
number of people attempting to emigrate has risen significantly. In view of
the enormous risk to life which this entails, the Special Rapporteur does not
favour people abroad encouraging Cubans to attempt this method of leaving the
country .
40. Reports have also been received of Cuban coastguard patrols firing
repeatedly on people trying to reach the United States naval base at
Guantinamo by sea, and sometimes even by land, in order to seek asylum,
as in the case of Ismar Torres Perez, a young man who was shot dead on
8 August 1993. According to those sending in the reports, this policy should
be all the more strongly criticized because the use of force is both excessive
and unnecessary when arrest is the only purpose. Cases of excessive force
used at other points on the coast against people trying to leave the country
151
by their own mcano have also been r°po'-r»»rt, along with cases of boaCS arriving
from abroad and approaching Che LAiban coast in ordei lo jjicK up Cuban
CiCizens. Thus, oa l July 1993, frontier guardc ehot doad Alfredo Fvftl io
Caballin Mar£n, Loamis ConzAl^z Manzini, aged Ifi . and Mario Horta while,
togp.r.hftr with other persons, they were trying Lo icach a United Statco boat
oft the coast «L Cojimar. On 15 October 1993, Luis O^evedo Remolina. aged 23,
waa killed whan be was caught by frontier guards wniie, together with eeven
other young men, he was trying to leave Uie country in e raft at Begla,-
according to the report, death wac caucad by the many blows he received
iimiadiataly aft»T- hie arrest; the men were also Shot at when they were
noticed .
41 . Persons arrested waiie trying to leave the coujitry continue to be
prosecuted undei article 21C of the Criminal Coda. Moreover, the act of
accvimulating ovar time material to be used for leaving Che country and
transferring it to a prearranged place i» coueidered a crime. £ome of thase
cases wctc lepotted to the Bpccial Rapporteur, for ••.xample, that of
Alejandro Joaguin Fi)prres Garcia, sentenced on 10 May 1992 to five years-
deprivation Of liberty for illcydl exit by the provincial court of Santa Clara
«fLer a trial at which hie defending artomey was not present. At the time of
his arrest by security agents or Santa Clara State, he was severely beaten,
suttering, among othci things, kidney damage and reduced vision in one eye.
43 Lastly., the Special Rapporteur considexs positive the action taken by th»
Cxiban authuiities to increase the number of Cuban citizens residing abroad who
can vieit the country. Although in the past only S»0 visas pei week have been
granted, apart from the huroanitaiieui visas granted in eaeee of grave illn«Rfi
or death in the family, under the new measures announced at the end of
July 1993, the Cuban authorities may issue j.00 tourist day visas to Cubono
who letC the country more than five years ago.
III. OJHUlTlOSS IN THE PRISONS
43. It ie reported thi»r the food and hygiene situation and the lock of
medical attention continue to be alanrdng and have created many health
problems affecting the pricon population, tnaemia, diarrhoea and skin and
parasite diB»a<:es as a result ot contaminated watez seem to be common ailmente
in most prisons and, in some, like those of Kanaeae and Combinado del Este.
cases of tubcrculoeia have been r*.corded. This situation has caused the death
of som<> prisoners, incluainq: Alcldes P6rei Rodriguez, imprieoned before
trial In Ariza piovincial prison, who died on 5 March 1993 in Cienfuegos
provincial hospital ae a r<».»nilt of a generalized infection; Juan Enrique
Olano P6rez, who was serving a two-year term in OuivioSn prison and who di»H
In Metuioiios Ameijeiras hoopital, to which h» was taken when he was already
i» a critical eonriition; and Junior Flores Diaz, a l7-year-old inmate in
Valle Grande prison in Kavajia, who died on 12 Deoembar 1993 aft»r having been
refused medical attention and having been beaten and kept in a punishment
eell.
44. Prieonere who have protested in some way against their ticatment or who
have refused re-education, meaning - accoi-ding to the information received -
political and ideological inetruction, hava j>1 bo been subjected to reprisals
euch as beating?, confinement in punishment cells (which ore extremely email,
152
have sealed doors and in which the prisoner can remain for months without
seeing daylight), transfer to another prison, usually far from his family's
place of residence, suspension of family visits or denial of medical
treatment. Thus there are cases such as those of Luis Alberto Pita Santos,
President of the Association for the Defence of Political Rights, held in
Kilo 8 prison in Camaguey, who was struck repeatedly to force him to wear the
uniform and chained for long periods to the bars of his cell; before hie
transfer to that prison, early in 1993, he had been in Boniato prison in
Santiago de Cuba, where he appears to have spent several months in punishment
cells and was beaten in December 1992, as a result of which his arm was
fractured. Hie cell-mate, JesQs Chambes Ramirez, was also beaten in the same
incident, suffering a broken cheek-bone and bruising to several parts of his
body. It has also been reported that some prisoners have been transferred
or confined to punishment cells because written conplaints about prison
conditions had been discovered, as in the case of Arturo SuArez Ramos, a
member of the Oiban Committee for Human Rights, who was transferred from
Combinado del Este prison to Boniato and confined to a punishment cell for
complaining about the condition of the prisoners. Carlos Alberto Aguilera
Guevara, Roberto Mures, Luis Grave de Peralta, JesOs Chambert, IbrSn Herrera
Ramirez, Enrique Gonzalez, Rodolfo Guitifirrez and Robier Rodriguez were held
in Boniato prison, beaten and transferred to Kilo 8 maximum security prison
in Camaguey on 12 February 1993 for engaging in a hunger strike in protest
against their ill-treatment. In early October 1993, Carlos Aguilera,
Jesus Chambert, Rodolfo Gutierrez and Roberto Mures were severely beaten
for protesting about prison conditions and kept in solitary confinement.
Reports have also been received of the cases of Tom5s C6rdova and
Hibrain Odelln Hardin, inmates in Micro 4 prison in Alamar, Havana City,
who were brutally beaten by several guards on 30 October 1993, as a result
of which Mr. Odelln suffered a perforated eardrum; and the case of
Junior Flores Diaz, a 17-year-old inmate in Valle Grande prison in Havana,
who died on 12 December.
45. The Special Rapporteur has received material complaining of the use of
psychiatry for other than strictly medical purposes, but does not have enough
solid information to state that this takes place. On the other hand, the
Special Rapporteur, in his conversations with former prisoners, observed that
a fear of being subjected to this kind of treatment seems to exist among the
prison population.
46. The number of persons serving sentences for political offences is
difficult to estimate. Some sources place the number between 2,000 and
5,000 persons, including those sentenced for illegal departure. The Cuban
Committee for Human Rights gave the Special Rapporteur a list of €02 prisoners
who were serving sentences in 1992 for political offences. Of those, 342 were
sentenced for the offence of disseminating enemy propaganda, 83 for sabotage,
31 for piracy, 52 for contempt, 15 for terrorism, 14 for espionage. 14 for
offences against State security, 16 for rebellion, 15 for illegal association
and the remainder for miscellaneous offences. A small number of prisoners
were released in 1993 on condition that they leave the country. Others, such
as SebastiSn Arcos Bergnes, who is serving a sentence of four years and
eight months in Ariza prison, Cienfuegos, and Yndamiro Restano, President of
the Harmony Movement, who was sentenced to 10 years, have refused the offer.
153
IV. CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
47. The report of the group of ambassadors who visited Cuba pursuant co
Commiesion on Human Rights decision 1988/106 sums up the comments made by
representatives of the Government of Cuba on the enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights in that country. The Special Rapporteur duly recalls some
of those comments:
'The Minister of Labour explained to the group that the State
guaranteed to all Cubans the right to work. There was no unen5>loyment
in Cuba and the social security system protected mothers, children and
elderly people and looked after people who were temporarily or
permanently sick or injured.
"In his meeting with the group, the President of the Council of
State said that the achievements of the Revolution in the social sphere
had been outstanding and that, as a result of the efforts made by the
regime in the areas of preventive medicine, mother and child care, and
nutrition, his Government had over the last 30 years saved the lives of
approximately 300,000 children who would not have survived if substantial
changes in Ctoban social policy had not been introduced. He compared the
experience of Cuba in this area with that of other countries of the third
world, where as a result of the unjust international economic order many
children were dying of starvation every day.
"The Minister of Health said that average life expectancy was
currently 74.6 years (as compared with 58 years in 196S and 52 years in
1959) , which placed Cuba on a level comparable with that of many
developed countries . He mentioned that other achievements in the area
of public health were the treatment of contagious diseases, advemces in
the area of nutrition and the eradication of malaria, diphtheria,
tuberculosis, polio, meningitis and tetanus in children and other common
infantile epidemics, with a consequent drastic reduction in infant
mortality. ... He also mentioned that those efforts with respect to
health would have failed if adequate attention had not been paid to the
training of future doctors, nurses and specialized technical staff.
Other indications of the efforts being made by the regime in the area of
health was the current encouragement to applied scientific research,
especially in the spheres of genetics and tropical diseases, and
--•' >,._»;„„ ,^f medical eouioment.
154
•With regard to university education, the «ini«ter -sf Higher
Education informed the group that th«r« had been 15,000 viiversicy
student* in Cuba in 1359, 35,000 in i»7i and 85,000 in is 76; the currwit
figure was 310, ooo, or 3 per cent of the total populatior." i^/
48. Certain etatiBticB in the Human Develogment Report isy g ijeued by the
united Nation* Development Programme (UNDP) eonfirm some of th«. data given by
the Cuban authorities:
{«) Life expectancy at birth for 1S90 waa 7$. 4 years as against 63.8
in I960;
(b) Infant mortality {f«T 1,000 live births) was 14 inMnts in 1991 as
against €S in i960: ',
J
(e) the percentage of the populatioa jwith access to hea. th services
(1987'I990} was 100 per cent, In both urbaa Xnd rural areas;
(d) The number of inhabitants per doctor (1984-19t9) wai 530;
(e) The adult literacy rate for 1990 was 94 per cent as against
87 per cent in 1970;
(f ) The eonbined primary and secondary school -enrolment rate
(1987-1990) was 95 per cent as against 7C j^er cent in 1970.
49. A report prepared and sent to the Special Rapporteur by c^.e Cuban
Christian Democrat Party (FDC) abroad takes stocJc of the aehievjments of
recent decades in the social sector, which most of the populatii^n see as a
positive factor.
50. In the educational sector, the report mentions that the Cvban Sovemment
has managed in 33 years to set up an educational infrastructure. Day-care
centres, schools, secondary schools, pre-univereity institution.!, technical
institutes and universities exist throughout the country. Teacjers have been
trained in large numbers, and a series of lavs have been put in place that
foster education as one of the basic tasks of the Oovemment- Airthermore .
education is virtually free of charge.
51. In the health sector, the POC report indicates that the C^ban Oovemmeat
has created a country-wide infrastructure, as eonoems not only hospitals but
also the training of doctors, nurses and all health personnel. However, many
©e the achievements, such as the low infant-mortality rates, th>: high life
expectancy and the eradication of diseases, are being severely ^mpromised by
the economic crisis in Cuba. Surgical e^J^pment is one of the -,teas meet
affected. Only emergency operations are being carried out and -.here ie a
shortage of medicines and laboratory materials. The shortage ©■; medicines and
poor nutrition are producing vitamin deficiencies and serious n itritional
deficiencies.
52- la the social security sector, the report recalls the adoRCion in
Jaauary 1980 of Act Ko. 2«, which set up the social security sy.tem,
consisting of two parts: the social security system and the social welfare
155
syar.o'". Th« forw«r offers procectiuii co workers in case r.f ordin«r • or
on-tn«-j06 Illness or aeeiH>r<t. mac«rnicy, di««felli«.y and oia aga. It a
worker dieo, hii family Ic protected. Th« «Ar:<*l welfare oyatem gi- -.t sp«ci<il
protecr.ioTi to th« •Idvrly, persons ir.cavable or worxins. and in gtn- ral all
whose aesenciai n«tds are nor •n»ur«d or who need piotticLion b«cau8<' of tMlr
living or health couJitlcns. aomt et th« benefir* 9<tabli«had inclido;
(a) Old-adt Mnslon, to whi'rh men sra entlclod at the aue of 60 and
woman at S(;
(b) Diaablllcy pansion;
(e) Death benefit.- to vhieh are antitlad widowa, widowers «vi>-r 60 or
ineapaeitated vidowera who ware dicendtnt on thi ^♦eaaaad worker, okildren,
including adopted children, under l") , pdieuts, includlnc) adoptive ps.renr.A;
(d) X« to women's benefits, iH-vaeic paid racemir.y leave eseibliehed by
iaw for working inothere.
53. Tha aame report indicates uhat, as the cubaji authorities state. , the
social eacurity system has remainod unchanged despite uh- preseat eonomic
crisis.
94. The Spacial K&pporteur heli^vec that the observations cuii^alnau in both
tho report e£ tha visiting mission to Cuba in ISSB snc* the report of the
Christian V>emoerat Party genorolly convey the feelings of a iar^a pa.X of «"•>>»
population, which recogniies char, in the last 30 years the Oovemnion has maa«
effortc and achieved aubaLajiuial progress In promoting and protoctin;
economic, socia] and cultural rights. The economic u^i^iis the countiv is
e3q>eviein;iug at this time miOht unfortunately K« a factor in determining
w>>»rher the progreos can be euatained. The Government's political w; H ro
prasarve tna people's social w*U«re benefitc ooeno to be »teadr<M(c; however,
the lack of adequate resources Mkes it a real possiblliry that tha . ycaem
will nor. Vw> able to continue functioning as hoi^ej.
55. The reforms in the Cli1j«ji economy introduced primarily during th-i past
year include thft promotion of direct foreigr. investnie:jL, the lncreas< a
coopeicuivization of aqriculture. permission to engage in amall prive.re family
busineesoB, and the possibility of receiving and usinq foreign curr-^r ry.
These measures are inr.on/i^d te strangtKe.T the balance of payiuciit* anc to
increase the supply of goods ana services for tha popviaiion as a whclo.
56. Addlclonai measures on the sama lines arc essontial and appear .-.c* b«
under way, with a view to developing an economy cspaMe of meetiag th » basic
needs of the popularion.
57. In the present eircumatanees, the ^(aiallel economy which has ar. san
primarily through the free mov<»m«n« of eurrancy and the tourist secto.-r is
eouaing substantial changes In the distribution of inoomas. niv»n thi Cuban
pattern of relative e<juality in the econoir.ic and suvial sphera duriner the paar.
few decades, this undoubtadly involunrary effect of th© eeonoirie prog .-ainnm ,
together with growing uij«i«ployment, could give rise to social t&anion
156
58. The economic rsforms are being curbed by ideological and | olitical
factors, in particular by deep suspicion of anything that entai:.s limitation
of governmental control. In addition, the ecenoraie, commercial and financial
embargo maintained by the Dnited States is curbing greater libe ralization of
the economy. J^art from impeding and dramatically increasing tie cost of the
reforms, the embargo against Cuba is creating political barriers to more
far-reaching action and more immediate results, at a time when r.he urgent
reactivation of the economy is necessary from a humanitarian stindpoint and,
in th« final analysis, from a human rights perspective. The guvistiens
relating to the effects of the embargo from the standpoint of ijtematioaal
law were dealt with by the 0«neral Assembly of the United Katio^s in its
resolution 48/16 entitled 'Necessity of ending the economic, oc.-amercial and
financial embargo imposed by the United States of America againijc Cuba'.
V. IKFORMXTION RJECSIVBJ FROM INSTITUTIONS AND 0RGANi;,AT10NS
BASED IN CUBA IK ACCORDANCE ItlTX CURRENT LBOISLATI^ON
59. Th« Special Rapporteur received letters from a number of ,^>rganisations
and institutions inside Cuba commenting on various aspects of tcbe human rights
situation there and on the content of the report submitted by t-ie Special
Rapporteur to the Comnission on Huinan Rights at its forty-nintt' session.
These letters are summarized below.
60. The Cuban National Union of Jurists stated, with regard t-) the
above-mentioned report, that the entirety of the Uhiversal Declaration on
Human Rights had not been taken into account when analysing th«.- non-fulfilment
of its provisions in Cuba. Of its 30 articles, only those relating to the
right of everyone to freedon of movement and to leave and enter the country ;
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the sight to freedets
of opinion and expression; and the right to freedon of asaembl; and peaceful
association, as well as conditions in the prisons, were considered. However,
the analysis of human rights in any country must cover them alL; otherwise Che
conclusions reached are incoirplete and do not adequately reflect reality.
Furthermore, the focus used for analysing fulfilment of the af<:resaid
rights was applied without regard for the climaca of hostility ^^hieh the
United States has been io^osing on Cuba for the last 34 years, the economic
embargo being the fundamental reason for the adverse living cojiiJitions
experienced by the Cuban people, and taking as valid unreliable information
sources or sources based on rumours and speculation by the Kiai-:ii -based media
hostile to Cuba or others which are supposedly based in Cuba, : lut have no
legitimacy, credit, membership or prestige.
61. The Special Rapporteur also rae«iv«d a letter froa Cuba iirom the
so-called relix Varcla Centre, commenting that the Rapporteur' i report made no
mention of the historic context within which the Cuban political system
em«rged and developed and, in particular, the continued United: States
aggression over 35 years. Cuban intransigence could thus be explained by the
people's rejection of the idea of a possible lose of their independence and
restoration of the former status quo. This organization wonde:.-s what
legitimacy can attach to a policy which, in the name of "resteciag' the Cuban
people's civil and political rights, decides to deprive them e! their
ocbnomic, social and cultural rights and whether it would not ^e more
appropriate to free the people from all outside pressure and jA^e them, with
157
full respect ror their oalf-daterminatlon. the aacsrlal ana splrltu:i
assietanoa whereby thay e4n mty» their o«n choiao. Tho Special Rap{>rtour'e
r«porc. £*r from contributing to human right* in Cuba, fosters theii violation
in tvo vnYn: uv«rall, bec«ub« U Ju«» tiui d«nounc« the Unl;«d State j policy
ot 9«nocide agAinet th* Cuban p«opl« and, in individual eae«a. fe«aav ca it
encouragas rejection and intolerance, thereby iwieing mora difficult :h«
climAte c£ cvancfuillity needad for any axavciac «£ selt-ciiticisn.
63. The Cuban Movement for feace and sovereignty of Peoples stated that, as
far ac civil and political right* ara e«neemad, the Cuban raveluti<.) has
created a d«ep*roct«d an«i wjd»»r«»>gjng damorrary haiiiairl on th" dira/jt anrf
systeatatie participation of all ^he people in maxing and intplementirj
decisions and in electing leaders at all levels, from the almeet 14, '900
Ai at Tier, ^-(^pre3entatives. nominated and elected at the grass roots, :o the
members of the national Assembly o( Peuple's Fuvvr aiiO Lh« cit)ait« oi uhe
State. In Cuba, thara is no pcliea raprae«ion. or paramilitary gan;'*, or
person* imprieoned without ftaviuQ oeen triea ane sentencea ny conoevsnt courts
on the basis of laws pi-omuljated before the offeaeea are eowsitted, »nd not
including any chat raOora ro r>«1ir.ir«1 idfia? or religiou* beljnfK. vjhile
tortura, assassinations, disappearances, etc. are rife thro\:ghout tr i world,
ia Cuba net a oinglo ease can ba cited of an ace of that Xiad haviac eecurrad
ever swre than three decades of revolution Mor is there a single tvase o{
discrioiination in Cuba ua suy ^luuiiOs. Puithai'nK'i.e, ona characteiiicic of the
revolutionary process it tb« effort towards aoeial. eeononic and cultural
development, aimed at attaining tfiat ouaiitv ox lire repeatedly refirred to by
Lhe Otiueial Assembly in its analysis o£ the ri^bc to devclepmsnt. Ill
attempts at development are ha»y«red by rh» oror.ft-ilr. r.r«d(= and fjnfi«<a3
emoar^o imposed on cube by the united states for more than jc years and
eondoaajed by the Writed Katioas General Ascombly ao well ac by inaay
flAvcmsifinra and such bodies as the European Parliament, the Juropear. Economic
Commualty, the Latin Amerlcaa Ojouu uf lijiiiL dJtd the Third Itero-Amt ctcaa
Conference of Keade of Etaea and Cov«rnn>ant.
63. The FadaxaLloii uf Cuban Homen also refeired to the embargo. no':lng that
it has oaMBod stringent food ratienin-; and » ehcrrag*> of prrj»iirr.« ft r ftlAaning
*nd personal use that serioueiy t::ect the daily lives or C^ian rsrOlies. The
liiCluiioji *f such sensitive catejcries as food ar-.d mcdieinco ora-.-clj impairs
the p*eple'« levels ef healf>i a-'i «ori*l wall-fcaing. Another aspect from
vnicr. to judge the efrects or tr.e embargo is the refusal oC vij(«i,-. on aiouy
oeeaevons, members of the Fodorstion irrvitad to the country b-/ va-.ivi pt itjes
and women's groups and organizations have been refused entr/ rv tse
Onit«d States Guv«xJimcijt .
64. Tfte Solioarity organization or the Peoples of ATrica, Asia and latin
America sent the Special Rapporteur a letter giwinj a brief bieeory o£ the
Uh5r«Ml «tj»r.n* ficonomie embargo against Cuba, an embargo which they claim has
causei the Cuban people material li>asc» or mere than 40 billion dolJars, and
inclwiding referonceo to acta of military aggraasion. terrorism and c Cher
«rlm«fi- The latter also referred to the lollowisg aspects or the
acooe55li8hments of tUe i.Tolution in Cuba, the right to life is on".rante«d,
eo much CO that if Cuban public health sr»nd»rHs wnra to prevail in Latin
America, the lives o: soo.ooo children a year ceroid be eavad. Cuba has mere
ceac^Csss per capita than any other country in the world. Kiaety-fi' « per eenc
158
of children h«v« been inwuftiztd. Disaases «uch as pelicnt/elieiu, diphtheria,
tetanus, whooping cough, ace, have been aradicated aad tubarcu.'osis
conaiderably reduced. The social security eyscem guarantees reivirad persons
the right to a decent old age. Illiteracy has been viped out. The education
budget Is 20 times larger cban in the previous period and Che pi'.blic health
budget so times larger than before the revolution. Zn all the l.'iatory of the
revolutionary period in Cuba, there has been no case of torture or forced
disappearance. Voting is not compulsory, but nevertheless 99 p<.r cant of the
voters take part in the elections. Voaen make up 40 per cent o:. the country's
workers and SO per cent of RiediuiB and higher-level technicians. Nov that
Cubans have been made the owners of their houses, evictions have been
eliminated in the towns and, now that the peasants own their la^d.
dispossession has been eliminated in the countryside. Zt took the
United States 69 years to raise life expectancy from SO to 70 y>ar8; Cuba,
thanks to revolution, did it in less than half the tine, attaining a
life-expectancy of 7« years for Cubans.
VI. COHCLUSIOKS WD l^COHHQiDATZOMS
65. The Oovemnienc of Cuba still refuses to accept the Commisc ion on Human
Rights decision to continue monitoring human rights coaditions r'ti that country
and rejects all cooperation with the Special Rapporteur. In th:f8 connection,
appendix II contains the statement made by the Pennanent Represi.atative of
Cuba to the Oniced Nations on 29 November 199J during Che forty'eighth secsion
of the General Assembly. The Rapporteur once again calls upon i;he Government
of Cuba CO modify this stance and to enter into an open and direct dialogue on
the circumstances and specific cases described and presented in his reports
and on any other aspect of the human rights issue. Be also eai::s on the
Government to afford him the opportunity to visit the country, is is customary
for those fulfilling the mandates of the Comission on Human Rights.
66. The Special Rapporteur, however, received during 1993 eotrnifonications from
organizations asd institutions based in Cu^s in accordance with current
legislation. The basic content of the communications is includ'vd in this
report (paras. $9-64) . The statcmenCB of these organisations freus on
successes achieved in the social and educational sector, but ali.'o refer to the
united States economic, coimtercial and financial embargo en Cubi. as the
fundamental reason for the economic shortfalls and lack of room for political
reforms.
67. The present report concentrates forevost on analysing repcrts received
concerning conditions in the areas of civil and political righti- and describes
specific cases ©f violations and some matters relating to the e( nstitutional •
and legal framework. In connection with the latter, the Speeiar. Rapporteur
observes that the Constitution in force in Cuba is based, as st);ted In its
preamble, on the political and social ideas of Marx, Engels and Xenin. Like
Cuba, many other countries have constitutions formulated on a mi.re or less
clearly defined ideological basis. It is not, however, the tas!. of the
Special Rapporteur to express opinions on this question,- his ma:^date is
confined to analysing the consequences for human rights and fun'^amental
freedoms of the interpretation and in^lementation of the Consti.ution by the
authorities ?. ia this ease Cuban. In this connection, the erit:cism is based.
159
primarily, on the lack of opportunity for citizens to channel and defend their
interests and opinions in cases in which the lacter do not coinci<"e with the
line authorized and maintained by the forces in power.
66. The report also refer.? in detail to the investigation carriijd cut by the
ILO Committee of Experts on the ;^plication of Conventions and Recommendations
and the Committee on Freedom of Association concerning the implem^*ntaticn of
different conventions in Cuba, not only because of their fundamen':al
relevance, but also because they are organs with which the Govern tent has
maintained a dialogue. In addition, some economic and social dev>>lopment
data, based on information supplied to the United Hations by gove;aiment
sources, have been collected: the most recent Human Development Icport
compiled by the United Nations Development Programne, reports frca
non-governmental sources and communications from Cuba transmitted by the
above-mentioned institutions.
69. Taking into account all the foregoing, the Special Rapporteur considers
it necessary to recommend to the Government of Cuba that it shouJid adopt
measures to:
(a) Ratify the principal human rights instruments to whidy Cuba is not
a party, in particular, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with its
additional protocols and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
(b) Cease persecuting and punishing citizens for reasons 'relating to
freedom of peaceful expression and association;
(c) Repeal all those legal provisions which entail discri^nation
between citizens on political grounds, in particular in the labour and
education sectors, and redress as far as possible abuses committ^id in this
area in the past, for example, by re -employing persons who have jeen dismissed
in their former posts;
(d) Permit legalization of independent groups, especially those seeking
to carry out human rights or trade union activities, and allow t/'iem to act
within the law, but independently;
(e) Ensure greater respect for the guarantees of due process, in
accordance with the provisions of the relevant intematioisal in«;viruments,
adopting in particular the measures necessary to facilitate eff«ctive access
CO legal assistance for all persons put on trial without any tyj s of
discrimination;
(f ) Ensure greater transparency and guarantees in the prison system, so
as to prevent excessive violence and physical suffering from be;ng inflicted
on prisoners. In this connection, it would be a major achievemijit to renew
the agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross and to allow
independent national groups access to prisons;
160
(g) Relea«« *11 tha«e persons ««rving eent«nees Jor ofliene«» having
political connotations and for trying to leave the country unlawfully;
(h) Eliminate the existing administrative barriere to ttparture from
the country and to the entry of Cuban eitisena resident abroad
70. In early September 1993, the bishops of Cuba published «;leng pastoral
letter analysing different aapeete of the eoimtry's social, ecnomie and
political situation. In addition to the letter, the Special Rapporteur
received a document signed by several groups considered dissicint within CXiba,
that had joined forces. Both the letter and decuntcat make a a^rlea of
proposals, listed below, which were presented to the Goverrvmex.: . The Special
Rapporteur felt It was Important to ta)ce note of these texts, since they are
the products of real-life experiences and actual day-to-day ecitact with the
realities of Cuban life. '
71. The pastoral letter contains, inter alia , the following passage :
"It seems to us chat, concomitant with certain ecoi-jomic changes in
the life of the country new beginning to be put into praisciee, aeme of
the irritating policies should be eradicated because it '^ould generate
unquestionable relief and a source of hope in the national soul.
"(1) The exclusive and ubiquitous presence of the off ieial
ideology, accompanied by identification of tr-ms that cannot
be construed as unambiguous: fatherland and .socialism, State
and Govemaent, authority and power, legality and morality,
Cuban and revolutionary. This centralist am; ideologically
all-embracing role of the State generates a .feeling of
fatigue caused by constant repetition of grui'-^ace and
instrucciens:
"(2) Limitations imposed not only on the exercise of certain
freedoms, which could be occasionally jxistif >able, but also
on freedom Itself. A significant change in <;his policy would
guarantee, inter alia , administration of an {jidepandent
judiciary which would lead ue, based en stab;.e foundations,
towards consolidation of the rule of law;
• (3) Excessive control by the State security ageniiies which at
times reaches even into the strictly private; lives of
individuals. That explains fear, the origin^ of which is
poorly understood, but felt as though it wer > caused by
something ungraspable under a v«il;
*(4) The large number of persons imprisoned for «ctivlciaa which
might be decriminalised or reco.nsidered as S; way to free many
of those serving sentences for economic, political or other
similar reasons;
161
"(51 Dlscriamttion for phlle«Ar^^''3l- r^lici^a^ »' reli'.iou*
Wli*r». Llic «£rec-clv« •llminacion ot which would ailcouragt
pBrcicipaelon of all Cubano, wicheuc dlscinction, ir the llf«
Of Che MCion.*
7a. Th« di90ld«nt er0«Bit4ti0n« group, £or ic* p»rc, opeaHe ot a eejmen
platrorm: amaosty lox political eriioners, restoration of the £reed<Mn» of
aaoociaclen, ap«ech, ascambly ajid peaceful demonacvacioii, the pr«tf», Lr«U«
uninnH«m. An<i r.h* rHgKt to -nt-r and laave the eouncryr er^dicariOB <£ *ay
fom of toclal aad policleal aitcrimiiution, eat«eruaraing th« nacioni 1
Ideaeicy, ind«pcBdenee «ad sovaraigney. In addition, these organ! zav ion*,
diatiuguished by their paaeeful mnrfna onoT-onrfi . have demorutrated cK« ir
willingness to begin a dialogue with the authorities vitnin tha law.
73. The Special Rapporteur dees not have aufficient infontvation r.n .n'rprnun an
opinion on whether or not Che cuiieni. »jr*i.ciii eujuyw the support of tie
nwjorlr.y nf t><* population. He n«verthele«t coneidare that the elain that
this support hAf been broadly expressed in recent elections is not vi;lid,
eineo, given tho eenditione in which those elections were held, the vXactorate
was never gives a genuine choice. Only Afr.nr r.h«» rciiitiems for guaranteeing
Lhe right eC opinion and expression have been created would it be potSlble CO
obtain a claar idaa et tKa electorate 'c proferencco with regard to vt^rlous
opCionG.
74. In tba opinion of Ch« Special Sapporteut, eh* most conctruetive. meacuree,
in an international context, tor :,nprevin9 cne huinan rights situatioi. in Cuba
should stare by elinvinaeing, as soon a* possible, the vestiges of th< cold war
An T.hf.y r*1ar.« m CMhw, whi1» »r rh» eam"? tim* ♦nd«»V(^uring t«> promot s the
country's return to the regional ana world system ot cooperation and
eettlement of oonflietc. The Rapporteur has the impresaion that a t*.y tltaid
Steps are now starting to be taken towards greater confidence becweer Cuba and
its noi^libouia, p«iLicul«iljr \.ht UiiiUed Su«l.o». this may h«v„ a favcjrable
raparcussion in the matter of human rights -
75. Cuba's x-ole in the cold v»v has vanished, along with tha •cojio.iilu
«si«isranT« it received frws th« former Soviet Union, rundamental ehi .tges in
the way the domestic economy operates are more effective than anv ocr ir
fKOQourc in anebling the nation to provide for its ©wt> eitisens. To « void
traujnatic and costly disruption*, thefln change.* .<hfl\jld he tnarf(» wirhrn/ *)«lay.
The international community must encourage a reform prograirene design* i Co
iirprov« productivity and efficiency in the economy. Such rafoxwe wov Id
naturally assume a greater area for market forces to operate and gre»;«r
entiepveneuiial freedom. The apecjal^^ftBfeyj.^-'^.i "'' c<«i»-ide£s^*g .■i i^j^'-^"*"^ ''^'
at the very leas^. a pel iey wfi t gh duna -iigfSKTgVUgt' ehs.nfjiS llirtSf*^ ^f^^
»y«tem, ratThe'r 'chan'Vffl9J^*^T'?xt€fB'ar coaijit^^^^^^ are' TffeI y"'tb"3roduee
rof ormo tcnd^g towaxd«_.li£&j:,;^lig'inq nai^-OaiV .tiJ.V. £e$ao!?^ >'*fc .ale» l.^l^tical
life. This opinion is not shared by all those concerned about Cuba'i Tur.nfe,
but tb« arguments in favour of wnding the enibazyu «ie yaiiiiua sx^ouxid, not only
ia industrial, aoonomie mad soademie eirela*. but also in polltieal <:,iroleo
where there is concern about the Cuban people and the tuture of the « juntry.
162
Appendix I
LSTTEB DATED 24 AUGUST 199) FROM THE SPSCZAL MPfOT^rVJk
AZARSSSIO TO THE PSRMAKEKT RSPRESEKIATXVE OF CUBA '.0
THE WZTED RATIONS OFFICE AT GEK5VA
Z have Cb« honour to x^tez ce resolution 1993/63 adopted :^3y the
CoiRQleaion on Human Rights on 10 March 1993 entitled *Sicuatiei: of hunan
righce in Cuba'. As you )caow> this resolution was endorsed by the Economic
aad Sooial Couacil in its decision 1991/274, thereby conClzmint- the extension
of th« Special Rapporteur's mandate for another year.
Zn paragraph 3 of resolution 1993/(3, the Co«iinla»ien calla upon Cba
Govamment of Cuba to permit the Special Rapporteur the opportx nity to carry
out his inandate in full, in particular by allowing him to visiv Cuba, and, in
paragraph 7, it requests the Special Rapporteur to maintain diitct contact
with the Govtronent and the citizens of Cuba. In accordance w: eh these
provisiona, it is ray duty to writs to you to request your Ooveinmanfa
cooperation in the discharge of my mandate, including an opportunity to visit
Cuba. In order co verify the human rights situation firsthand.
( Sitmsd l Carl-Johan QROTE
Special Rapporteur on th-i Situation
of Human Right* i.n Cuba
163
StATSmin MftDS OS J J NOVTWER iSJJ »T IW PSRflANKKT PiPRESEKI/. f IVl
or CUBA TO THK UMITKD KATIOHC DURING TH£ FORTY- IIGHTH fiSECION
or TOE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Mr. President,
Thirty five year* ago Cuba w*s a n«o-coloay of the United »t«ci;# ©f
America, and & r6pr«««ive r«flim«. with th* full taewledg* and tupper- of th»
Oovemment ©t tlac co;intry, brutally violated the human rights at ou.- people.
The deseini«s o£ Cuba w«r« decld«d upon in the United Statea ffnObaaey ejtd more
th«n 50,000 C»>Vu«n^ were murder*d or mad* to diaappear. with the a««i..tane« of
United Stact* instructors.
This wte ch« r«sult of a century of geo-political manoeuvrino tnd ot
£iv« iiiiliuazy interventions by the United States. National independence ,
reep«ct for humaA rightg. eh« "stBbllehmanr r>f » d-mnrratHr «y«r...m » -.A r.h«
i.mpitm«ntation ot a development proiect that responded to the hopes ■•t the
Cuban people were only achieved through a much needed popular rcvolu ion
in 1959.
During th« past three dooidco. the TJhitod 6tac«e hao maintain«<' a policy
e\f hosr.jlity and aagrassion against Cuba, aimed at subverting and
dastablllzing Cuban society in urd«r tu Ue^ti>e uui. ^eu^le, o^ico a^a'.ii, o£
their right to exeroiea their scvaraienty, their liberty and nationa .
independence, and to rastora its previous domisatioa ot our country.
This policy, which is in violstion of rh" <"hnrr.«r of r.hft llnir.e<- Nations
and iBtsrnationai law, has included: unceasing efforts to economtca .ly
atrongle Cxiba from abroad through the econemie, oorrfliarcial and finan :i«l
blockade wViirh i« »r.in in place and has even been strensthanedi mer lanary
Rlllcary agjrasslon that wss at the Lbnu. JeroaueJ. and a continuous lilitary
threat, compounded by the illegal presanca of a milie«ry batf in CvO> .n
territory; aoonomic sabotage and terrorist actions, including numerous
attemplK at «9aassiiiatiil9 Cuban leaders, illejal end subversive radi • and
television broadca«tt beamed *5ain»t out p«nplfl vith the futile aim .)f
promoting sucversion; and continuous dlsinrcrmation and propaganda c.rcpaigr.s
with the puvpoee of aoving confusion in. world public opinion.
Cuba has axpreesad its readiness to wuzk. Cvt uwiwal relations <:jid
cooperatioR with all eeatee without exception and hae daraonat rated t-iat it is
prepared to aagaga in dialogue in the context ot respect and soveraljn
equality.
Heverceeiest, now chat the cold war has coma to aii etiU, the un:Ued states
has redoubled its anti-Cuban polio>- obviouely obeelete, fraught with double
standardn stnA moc1«».«« in its purpose of breaking the vxxi ot tne cuflin people
CO resist.
The fact cannot be ignorad that during the past tnrae decades, and even
at present, our national llXc has been influenced by the exceptional
circumstance of having to face th- •xr.remely powerful threat to our ixiiter.ce
164
repr««enc«d by United States policy •g*iB«t cub*. The only th-^ng that
explAina that, under those conditions, the Cuban revolution h«i been able to
continue is the support and participation of the iimnenae major.ty of our
people in this effort of national reslstaitea.
That is why today the Cuban Oovemmant and people can shi.w the world,
with legitimata satisfaction, that they arc involved in a tita.iic effort to
preserve our enormous achieveaeats in the field of human rights and not only
of economic, social and cultural rights, which few would dare ;e question, but
also of the deepening and expansion of democratic particlpacio i in the
governance of the country and the aajoyment of civil and political rights.
The rights to life, work, education, health and social security arc
guaranteed to all citi2ens without distinction. Cuba can show a clean record
of full enjoyment of human rights and social development index ts that are
aniong the highest in the world.
Prevailing new international circumstances and the reins'rtion of the
Cuban economy into the world loarlcet have led us to a deep and >old process of
transformation.
The opening of different sectors of the economy to forcipn investment,
the expansion of the private sector, the free circulation of foreign currency,
the increase of cooperatives in agriculture and steps geared a-: government
reorganization are significant changes carried out in the past few years.
in the political sphere, these changes have been aceottpai ied by a reform
that expanded the rights enshrined in the Cuban Constitution approved In a
referendum by 97 per cent of all Cubans. A new Electoral taw /as promulgated,
establishing free and direct elections to elect the Parliament through
candidates directly nominated by the electorate.
In 1993, the most open elections in Cuban history were h-:ld, and with the
highest participation, in the presence of thousands of guests, joumaliats and
foreign tourists, in which 99 par ee=t of the electorate parti -lipaeed.
Kinety- three per cent of them ratified, with their free and serret ballot,
which was justly tamed a true plebiscite by the press agcncie.t, their support
for the Cuban national undertaking.
The manipulation of the hunan rights issue for political ends and the
slander campaign aimed at presenting a situation of violation 5f human rights
in Cuba are a recourse of United States policy aimed at compelling internal
change by force, favouring subversion and destabilization, and creating an
latemational climate conducive to an Intensif ieacion of the strangling of ny
country. All this is carried out without discarding a number »f preposterous
studies and apocalyptic recoiaoendations made by institutions of. the Oovemment
of the United State regarding the creation of a scenario propi-.iouc for a
so-called humanitarian intervention in the face of alleged civil strife and
internal disorder in Cuba, much sought by them.
The actions taken by the Government of the United States en the pretext
of its concern for human rights are nothing but another facet :>f the
aggressive and hostile policy with which it intends to subordi;:iate and
165
«mpuc«ce our nation*i identity. Th«.o» »r« th« roal Mscono uj>d«rlyin t thexr
actions and no one »lic>ulJ b« reeled wnat ia r«»lly und«c att«ek in r. i« vAry
•xlar.Anr* e»f Cuba as a nation.
Ono« a9«in th« Unit«d >«Ai,ioii» is compel lad to carry out a «terii e
exarein* rpsulfing from th« inaist«noe by the United States iu a »l«ij:«i«u»
rasolucion on an ambiguous and gr«y raport of a sA-rjiUed Spaeial bap/^rtour-
Tht allA^eH «ir.ii*Men of human rights in Cu^, in all histoiic*:. truth,
*«* orchestrated as a censeguanca ci political manipulatiftn* earriad . ut by
the oovemmenc e£ the o&itad States, which in^uBad in Geneva ch« cpee.al
monitorins meehaniam of human righta appliad a^aiaet my efr^mtry in a . «l«eeive
and diaci.iniiuaLwry maumar.
A< IS well known, this machanism was p<>rv«rted iron ice origine. aineo it
ia the raault o£ a flagrant, viuiation of all existing proceaures. of : he undue
and difthonnsr via» of precadantc regarding other oitufttiona, and ot th«
diaragard for the aetivicias carried out regarding this eaon hy rh« p- rtinaat
ynitad Maticne bodico . Thue. we are faced witli a touilly artificial 4 nd
illegitimate scenario, which C^iha c^nsidars null and void in all iea i spacta-
Th« tru^h ia that Co achieve their objective of manipulatiny the human
riqftts mechanians and procedures of th«« :rnir.*^ Wations and of traaaf o: eiing
them in a weapon of tlici* jjulicy vifl-a-vit C'UBa, the united States hai.
fnl lowed the tortuous path of sueeascive and dcliberata steps that ha^ e
Increastnjly contravened the principles and norms gnvaming the functioning of
thia Orgaalaacien- Thoae etape, in all c«s«v, have had no basis vhati sever
and have nor. b#>«n justified by the facts, as Cuba had eyotematieally c enounced
on every occasion.
Aa faany liave appreciatfid, tM» report c^i the so-called Rapporteur and hia
lukowarm ^£c9-iitation before chi$ Committee do not retlect, and cannot in any
way refloat, a situation of human rights violations that does not «a1> -> .
Nevertheless, the report is ver>- far from Cuba'n r».»lSty, while tha r« solution
which is now being impoaeU is, «l Ujw same time, vary tar from the situation
dAAf^riVi^c! in the said raport. By chic means, the delogacion of the
united States once again taxes pride in continuing those manipulationf. to
which it has accussemed us, aimed at aitificidll/ tutxbering this isevs.
Cuba declares that it does not recognize nor will it recognixe a.iy
spurious, salaecivo and dieerimisatory procedures is, the field of Uuina i
riqhtS; at the sane time, it commits its already r.raHi r^onal ee>oparati« with
all nechasiamji and proceOut^a applied to all States in the field of tt.i
promotion of human rights; and it rsiteratae ite readlneos to diseuas iny
issue in that regaro in the appropriate forums and en the basis of cov ♦reign
equality and of the principles of cociprehexisivantaa, ujii»ersality,
interdependence anrt Inr.orr^latJership of »11 human rights, as enshrine 1 in the
vi«nna Declaracioa.
166
My country has noching to fear or to be ashamed of in thn field of human
right*, but it dees not agree, and will in no way agree to sul.Jeet its
sovereign Constitution. it» own legal order and the political, social and
economic organization chosen by it» peopla to the illegitimate, and unjustified
scrutiny of a major Power.
My people has struggled for more than a century, hae faciad serious
dangers and is today facing sufferings to preserve the nation s independence.
When independence has been earned, it is not giv«n away chrou<.h dubious
political settlements precisely with those who attenpt to ign<:re it.
The Ooverflment of the United states, promoter of the fasce that gave rise
to the so-called Special Rapporteur and hie report, has no moi;al nor political
authority whatsoever to set itself up as ju%lge and jury of hu>JAn rights in
Cuba. And the reason is not only that it is- a confirmed viel^.tor of human
rights in its own territory and that it ha^isupported all mili'tary
dictatorships and repressive regimes which lave existed in thi' post-war era.
but also, and very particularly, the fact that it has maintaiued. without any
justification, the economic connercial and financial blockade against my
country, which constitutes a cruel and inhuman measure, flagr.-ntly violating
the human rights of my people and ignoring the will of the Sei^eral Assembly,
which has condemned it as a clear violation of the Charter an<:: of
international law.
If Che extraordinary circumstances faced by my country v'are to be
modified, if hostility and strangling ware to be replaced by . constructive
attitude, if the path of transfonnations we have sovereignly • hosen were not
hindared, a qualitativaly new and favourable situation would -emerge, from aay
honest point o£ view, for the fullest enjoyment of human righ s.
lA any case, and in spite of those accusing us today, o\.r people will
continue to be faithful to the example set by Joe< Marti and o his thinking,
when he enunciated the idea which, from our sovereign Constit .tion, presides
over our independent Republic: "With all, and for the benef i . of all*.
Thank you very much.
Kfftes
1/ A/coMi-.isT/aa.
2/ Throughout this report the names of groups and their pleats are used as
transmitted to the Special Rapporteur by non-governmental sou;:c«s .
2/ International Labour Organieation, 79th session. 1992., Report III
(Part «A) . Ranert of yhe Commit tee of &:perta en the APPlicat/.fia-gl
CeT )Yflptlona and Rec ommends tiona (Oeneva. 1992), p. 410-4H.
i/ Ibid.. 80th session, 1993, pp. J61-362.
i/ Ibid., p. 364.
167
i/ E/CN.*/1>S3/3S, y«i-». J?.
2/ lnc«m*tion»l L»b««r Office. 387th report or t^« CiAimitte* o\ Frsedom
eC Aauoeiaejnn, 27-29 May ly>J {08.256/1/18) .
J/ rwi thifl eaao, e*« S/CK. «/1993/39. para. S4 (b) .
10 / Intarnational Labour Conference, seventy-ninth ««eeien. 1912, ...
p. 409.
Ai/ Ibid., eightieth ««i«inn. 1993. p. 3«>J.
11/ S/cv 4/1985/4C, paras. 124. 138, 130, 143 and 14«
168
1993 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RI GHTS PRACTICES
CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by President Fidel
Castro, who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First
Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the
armed forces. President Castro has sought to control all
aspects of Cuban life through a network of directorates
ultimately answerable to him through the Communist Party, the
bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Party is
the only legal political entity and is headed by an elite group
whose membership is ultimately determined by Fidel Castro. The
Party controls all government positions, including judicial
offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is
a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and
professional advancement.
The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state
security and totalitarian control. It operates border and
police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations, determines
whether to recognize nongovernmental associations, investigates
nonconformity, regulates migration, and maintains pervasive
vigilance through a series of mass organizations and
informants. It is charged with suppressing opposition and
dissent of any kind. The Ministry is under the de facto
control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which in turn are
directed by Fidel Castro's brother Raul. The mass
organizations attempt to extend government and Communist Party
control over each citizen's daily activities at home, work, and
school. Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDR's) mobilize citizens, impose ideological
conformity, and report suspicious behavior.
The economy remained highly centralized despite some changes
during the year, most notably decriminalization of hard
currency possession and legalization of some types of
self -employment . The Government, however, continued to control
the means of production and remained virtually the sole
employer. The economy continued to decline dramatically,
reflecting the collapse in Cuba's relationship with the former
Soviet Union. An annual $4-5 billion in Soviet aid has ended.
Total foreign trade was one-fourth the 1989 level. The
Government continued its austerity measures known as "the
special period in peacetime," which call for draconian efforts
toward economic self-sufficiency.
The Government sharply restricts basic political and civil
rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly,
and movement, as well as the right to privacy, the right of
169
citizens to change their government, and worker rights.
Authorities neutralize dissent through a variety of tactics
designed to keep activists off balance, divided, and
discredited by labeling them mentally disturbed social misfits
or hostile agents of foreign nations. To a lesser extent than
in the past, the Government used "acts of repudiation," which
are attacks by mobs organized by the Government but portrayed
as spontaneous public rebukes of dissident activity. The
Government also metes out exceptionally harsh prison sentences
to activists whom it considers a threat to its control.
In March the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) passed a
resolution endorsing the report of the UNHRC "s Special
Rapporteur, which made a strong and detailed criticism of
Cuba's systematic violations of human rights. The report
concluded with seven steps Cuba must take to bring its human
rights practices up to minimum international standards. The
Government for its part continued to refuse the new Special
Rapporteur, like his predecessor, permission to visit Cuba.
While there were no systemic changes improving human rights,
the Government did release several imprisoned human rights
activists and reduced the number of acts of repudiation. The
overall human rights situation remained poor, almost as
oppressive as in 1992.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Law enforcement officers were responsible for several
extrajudicial killings. Five policemen arrested and handcuffed
Jesus Acosta Ramos of Manicaragua in Villa Clara province on
February 5 and brutally beat him in front of eyewitnesses.
Acosta died later that day; his autopsy certified that he had
died of a heart attack, failing to mention the injuries
sustained. Rogelio Carbonel Buevara died on March 7 in a
police holding cell after being beaten near his home by three
policemen from the Malecon unit in Havana's Vedado district.
Carbonel 's widow was told days later that his death was due to
natural causes. Police officer Cariel Gonzalez shot and killed
13-year-old Simon Heredia Alvarez in Cespedes in Camaguey
province during a May 1 celebration, reportedly after Heredia
complained to Gonzalez that he should not mistreat people who
were waiting in line. This led to disturbances involving a few
170
hundred o£ the town's inhabitants, who chased Gonzalez to the
police station. They were finally dispersed upon a show o£
force by police. In addition, there were several confirmed
incidents in which border patrols killed people trying to leave
the country (see Section 2.d.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees and
prisoners. However, police and prison officials frequently
employed- beatings, neglect, isolation, and other abuse in
dealing with detainees and prisoners convicted of political
crimes (including human rights advocates) or those who persist
in expressing their views. State security officials often
subjected dissidents to systematic psychological intimidation
in an attempt to coerce them to sign incriminating documents or
to collaborate. The UNHRC Special Rapporteur found prison
conditions, especially habitual beatings, severe overcrowding,
and the lack of food and medical care, in violation of Cuban
law. Dissidents are often placed in cells with common
criminals.
The Government claims that prisoners have guaranteed rights,
such as family visitation, adequate nutrition, pay for work,
the right to request parole, and the right to petition the
prison director. However, according to human rights activists,
these purported rights are often and capriciously withdrawn,
especially from political prisoners. There has been no
indication that authorities investigated reports of abuse or
took disciplinary action against the agents responsible. Among
the many reported cases of brutality by prison guards and
police was that of human rights activist Luis Alberto Pita
Santos, whose arm was broken during a severe beating by prison
guards in Boniato prison in January after refusing to wear a
prison uniform. Ten guards handcuffed and severely beat
activist Juan Carlos Aguiar Beaton in front of other prisoners
at Guanajay prison in July.
Human rights activists and political dissidents are
systematically harassed, beaten, and otherwise abused in public
and private by police and state security officials as a means
of intimidation and control. Three plainclothes policemen in
171
December 1992 accosted Nelson Eduardo Cruz Cabeza, an activist
with the group Edad de Oro, and told him to stop his
activities; they then beat him, causing an injury to his head
which required six stitches.
Authorities continued to use acts of repudiation to intimidate
activists and as a pretext for their arrest, though to a lesser
extent than in 1992. Crowds of people are amassed outside
homes of activists to harass them, yell insults, and vandalize
property. At times, the targeted activist is forced through
the crowd by police and physically beaten or abused. During
such acts, police often arrest activists "for their own
protection," and later charge them with counterrevolutionary
activity, resulting in prison terms.
d. -Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention are commonplace. The Law of
Penal Procedures requires police to file charges and either
release a detainee or place him before a prosecutor within
96 hours of arrest. Authorities are also legally required to
provide suspects access to a lawyer within 10 days of arrest.
These procedures are routinely denied to those detained on
state security grounds. The Constitution states that all civil
liberties can be denied anyone opposing the "decision of the
Cuban people to build socialism." Authorities invoke this
open-ended article to justify lengthy detentions of activists
on the grounds they constitute "counterrevolutionary
elements." The UNHRC Special Rapporteur found that the legal
system lacks laws and institutions needed to afford due process,
According to human rights activists, there were between 1,500
and 2,000 Cubans incarcerated for illegal exit and at least
another 2,000 imprisoned for various political crimes. The
Penal Code contains several articles prohibiting
"counterrevolutionary" activity. Activists are often
imprisoned for "enemy propaganda," "illicit association,"
"contempt for authority" (usually for criticizing Fidel
Castro), "clandestine printing," or the broad charge of
"rebellion." The latter is brought against advocates of
peaceful democratic change.
The Penal Code also includes the concept of "dangerousness, "
defined as "the special proclivity of a person to commit
crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in manifest contradiction
of socialist norms." Government authorities continue to
intimidate activists by threatening prosecution under this
172
article. If the police decide a person exhibits such behavior,
the offender may be brought before a court or subjected to
"therapy" or "political reeducation" for 1 to 4 years. in late
1993, there was a sharp increase in the number of convictions
for dangerousness as several hundred people, possibly more in
the Havana area alone, were sentenced to prison. Some were
human rights activists such as Felipe Lorens, head of the Marti
Youth Organization, who was sentenced to 4 years in prison in
October.
Reports of arbitrary arrests of human rights monitors continued
unabated. On June 22, plainclothes police picked up Maria
Celina Rodriguez, president of the opposition group "Liberty
and Faith," and her 6-year-old son and took them to a nearby
house, where they were interrogated for 7 hours regarding her
human rights activism. Police detained Roberto Pintado of the
"Marti Youth Organization" in June and told him to stop his
dissident activities or be tried on charges of "illicit
association" and sentenced to 2 or 3 years in prison. The
Government also preempts dissident activity by arbitrarily
prolonging prison sentences by bringing new charges against
detainees for human rights activities allegedly committed
during imprisonment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Cuban law and trial practices do not meet international
standards for fair and impartial public trials. Almost all
cases are tried in less than 1 day. Although the Constitution
provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates
them to the National Assembly and the Council of State, which
is headed by Fidel Castro. Judges are elected by the
rubberstamp National Assembly and its lower level counterparts.
The judiciary's independence is also compromised by the
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party. There is no
known case in which a court has ruled against the Government on
any political or security matter.
Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and Supreme Court
levels. All are presided over by panels composed of a mix of
professionally qualified and lay judges. Military tribunals
assume jurisdiction for certain "counterrevolutionary" cases.
Most trials are public; however, trials are closed when state
security is allegedly involved. Testimony from a CDR member
may be introduced on behalf of a defendant and may contribute
to either a shorter or longer sentence. The law recognizes the
right of appeal in municipal courts. In provincial courts.
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some cases are appealable, such as those involving maziinum
prison terms or the death penalty. The law requires that an
appeal be filed within 5 days of the verdict.
Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases of human
rights activists, are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the
sole evidence provided, particularly in political cases, is the
defendant's confession. It is usually obtained under duress
and without legal advice or knowledge of a defense lawyer.
Defense lawyers often are not allowed to meet with defendants
until the day of the trial. Several activists who have served
prison terms say they were tried and sentenced without counsel
and were not allowed to speak on their own behalf.
The law provides an accused the right to an attorney, but the
latter 's impartiality and independence are compromised by the
absence of an independent bar association and by ideological
controls exerted over members of the state-controlled lawyers'
collectives, especially when defending persons accused of state
security crimes. Observers have reported reluctance among
attorneys to defend those charged in political cases.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Constitution provides for inviolability of one's
home and correspondence, official intrusion into private and
family affairs remain one of the most repressive and pervasive
features of Cuban life. Party-controlled mass organizations
permeate society. The State has assumed a virtual right of
interference into the lives of citizens, even those who do not
actively oppose the Government. These intrusions aim
ostensibly at "improving" the citizenry but are calculated to
encourage ideological conformity.
Authorities possess a wide range of social controls. The
educational system teaches that the State's interests have
precedence over all other ties and commitments. Teachers,
selected in part for their ideological commitment, emphasize
Communist doctrine in the classroom and may penalize students
whose families question orthodox opinion. Teachers are
required to evaluate students' ideological character, which is
noted in records carried by students throughout their education
and which affect their future prospects.
The Interior Ministry employs an intricate system of informants
and neighborhood security committees (CDR's) to monitor and
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control public opinion. Guardians of social conformity, the
80,000 CDR's are tasked with closely monitoring the daily lives
of residents. Participation in them is described as voluntary;
it is, in fact, obligatory. CDR's report suspicious activity,
such as reception of foreign radio or television broadcasts in
the home, conspicuous consumption, unauthorized meetings,
including with foreigners, and attitudes toward the Government.
Activist Sergio Seco Cordero, for example, was denounced in a
report by his CDR as "disaffected" because of his "active
participation against our Socialist system." Such people are
often harassed and fired from their jobs (see Section 2. a.).
Cubans do not have the right to receive publications from
abroad. Their international correspondence is often read by
state security. Overseas calls are difficult to make and are
monitored; conversations with foreigners are reported.
Activists, diplomats, and foreign journalists report
surveillance by security agents, though this seems to have
decreased.
Authorities regularly search people's homes without probable
cause for purposes of intimidation and harassment. Police
broke into the home of activist Carlos Negrin on February 3 and
seized three pairs of foreign-made shoes. They told Negrin
that his mother-in-law had accused him of illicit economic
activity. Negrin and his wife were arrested, taken to the
police station, and placed in a holding cell. Negrin's wife
had a miscarriage and was taken to a hospital; though doctors
ordered bed rest, she was returned to the station, where she
and Negrin were held for 5 days. They were both released after
paying a fine equal to 1 month's salary.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government does not allow criticism of the revolution or
its leaders. Laws are enforced against antigovernment
propaganda, graffiti, and insults against officials. The
penalty is 3 months to 1 year in prison for contempt. If Fidel
Castro or members of the National Assembly or Council of State
are the object, the sentence is 1 to 3 years. Rosa Campos
Hernandez, for example, was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment
because she allegedly made defamatory statements about Castro
and other ministers while standing in the door of her Havana
home. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of speech by monitoring and
reporting dissent or criticism (see Section l.f.).
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The Constitution states that electronic and print media are
state property and "cannot become, in any case, private
property." The media are controlled by the Communist Party and
operate under its guidelines. They faithfully reflect
government views and are used to indoctrinate the public. No
other public forura exists. TV Marti and Radio Marti, which
broadcast from the United States, are often jammed; however,
other foreign broadcasts are not. Police and Interior Ministry
officials frequently confiscate foreign newspapers from members
of the Independent Journalists' Association (APIC) and human
rights activists. The Government also circumscribes artistic,
literary, and academic freedoms. Education is the exclusive
prerogative of the State. Schools follow Marxist-Leninist
precepts as interpreted by the Government.
Beyond the Government's tight control over media, other forms
of expression are rigidly monitored. The Government often
arrests people for the crimes of "enemy propaganda" and
"clandestine printing." Dissidents are physically attacked and
intimidated if they try to report on incidents. APIC head
Nestor Baguer called one of his contacts abroad in July with
news about a large-scale disturbance near Havana. The next day
two men posing as telephone company employees beat him in his
home and destroyed his telephone. On August 6, three men
severely beat APIC member Jorge Casanovas Crespo just outside
the offices of the Communist Party's Central Committee as he
was heading to an APIC meeting. Casanovas required six
stitches; vision in one eye was severely affected.
Academic publications and research may not conflict with
government or party policy. On January 26, Leonardo Jose
Rodriguez Perez, a researcher at the Center for Metallurgic
Research, became the latest of several fired from their jobs
after signing the "open letter from Cuban professionals to the
second (1992) Ibero-American summit."
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution does not provide for freedom of assembly or
association, nor are these freedoms permitted. Any assembly of
more than three persons, even in a private home, is punishable
by up to 3 months in prison and a fine. Though not universally
enforced, this is often used as a legal pretext to harass and
imprison human rights advocates. Even activists who act
respectfully towards authority are subject to continuous
harassment and persecution. Organizers of "illicit or
176
unrecognized groups" may be sentenced to up to 9 months. The
authorities have never approved a public meeting of a human
rights group.
The Penal Code forbids "illegal or unrecognized groups." The
Justice Ministry, in consultation with the Interior Ministry,
decides whether to recognize organizations. Apart from
"recognized" churches and a few carefully monitored groups such
as the Masonic Order, small human rights groups represent the
only associations outside the State and party. Authorities
continued to ignore numerous applications for legal recognition
by human rights groups, whose members were often jailed for
"illicit association" or became the targets of reprisals.
Human rights activists were fired from their jobs for such
reasons as being "connected to counterrevolutionary groups" or
being a "focal point for political deviation" with "ideas very
contrary to those of our revolution."
Because of such restrictions, public demonstrations by
opposition groups are extremely difficult to organize.
Activists Juan Guarino and Paula Valiente were arrested on
April 30 by state security after planning a May Day march
outside a Havana church. The following day, 150-200 persons
gathered for the march; when activists unfurled the Cuban flag,
the police moved in and began beating people with blunt
instruments. Several were arrested. Guarino and Valiente were
convicted of "inciting public unrest" on May 18 and released on
parole, an uncharacteristically lenient sentence. Since their
release, however, both have been harassed by state security and
kept under tight surveillance (see Section 2.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion
In recent years, the Government has made legal changes which
eased somewhat the harsher aspects of its suppression of
religious freedom. In 1991 it allowed religious adherents to
join the Communist Party, while in 1992 it amended the
Constitution to prohibit religious discrimination and remove
references to "scientific materialism," i.e., atheism, as the
basis for the Cuban State. Such actions were praised by the
Protestant Ecumenical Council, but the Catholic Church stated
its concern over the gap between the Government's rhetoric and
actions. The Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter calling
for national reconciliation and dialog. Although harshly
critical of the letter, the Government did not directly
retaliate against the Church.
177
Despite these changes, religious persecution continues.
Members of the armed forces are prohibited from allowing anyone
in their household to observe religious practices. Elderly
relatives are exempted if their beliefs do not influence their
spouses or children and are not "damaging to the revolution."
The Government continued to use the Penal Code to persecute
Jehovah's Witnesses and, to a lesser extent, Seventh-Day
Adventists. Jehovah's Witnesses were often convicted of
clandestine printing if a search of their home revealed
religious materials or illicit association for having religious
meetings. They have also been found guilty of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, of "not complying with duties
related to respect and love of country," and of "abuse of the
freedom of religion" when, out of religious conviction, they
refuse to honor symbols of the Cuban State. Because the
Government considers them "active religious enemies of the
revolution," Jehovah's Witnesses and Adventists are watched and
often harassed by the CDR's, who also maintain surveillance
over "spiritualists who give consultations," in addition to
such categories as "counterrevolutionary ex-convict" and
"common criminal."
Church attendance has grown rapidly in recent years, despite
government and party efforts to restrict and control church
activities. Churches and other religious groups must register
with the Government and be officially recognized. Authorized
religious organizations may hold activities only at designated
places of worship. Construction of new churches is prohibited,
forcing many churches to meet in individuals' homes. Religious
holidays were eliminated in 1961. No religious processions
outside of church grounds are permitted, and churches are
denied any access to mass media.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on domestic travel, other than
a restricted zone near the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanarao.
Persons who are found to be HIV-positive are restricted to
sanatorium communities and allowed to leave those communities
only on highly restricted conditions. The Government now
allows persons over 20 years of age to apply for permission to
travel abroad. The vast majority of persons who qualify for
immigrant visas or refugee status are allowed to leave;
however, the Government continues to delay or deny exit permits
in certain cases, often without explanation. These often
include professionals who have tried to leave and who have
178
since been banned from working in their occupational field.
Others are refused permission because the Government considers
their cases sensitive. Dissident scientist Rolando Roque
Malherbe, for example, had been refused an exit visa since 1990
and had been unable to attend conferences abroad. The
Government finally permitted Roque to leave in December for a
teaching position in Spain. President Castro's daughter, Alina
Fernandez, slipped out of the country in disguise, after being
refused an exit visa for years. The Government also has coerced
some people, mostly activists, into leaving the country. Paula
Valiente, head of Mothers for Dignity, was constantly harassed
by state security officials to emigrate. Threats were made that
her 17-year-old son would be imprisoned on trumped-up charges.
To avoid that, Valiente left Cuba with her son in November.
The Government also permitted hundreds of former political
prisoners to emigrate, including several prominent activists
who had previously been denied exit visas. Most notable was
Mario Chanes de Armas, a former Castro comrade, who was allowed
to emigrate in July. Chanes was released in 1991 after serving
a 30-year prison sentence; he had been the longest serving
political prisoner in the Western Hemisphere. Nydia Cartaya,
wife of Joaquin Movrino Perez, an ex-army officer who defected
in the mid-1980's, was also granted an exit visa after having
been denied one since 1985. Activist Jose Luis Pujol, who had
originally applied in 1986, was allowed to depart. Activists
Elizardo Sanchez Santacruz and Rolando Prats were granted exit
visas to make extensive trips abroad during the summer and were
allowed to return to Cuba, even though Sanchez is out on bond
pending trial on charges of contempt for resisting a beating by
police in December 1992.
The Government continues to use aggressive, often violent,
means to prevent citizens from emigrating without its
permission. For example, on July 1, border guards in Cojimar
opened fire on a boat carrying at least 15 unarmed Cubans who
were trying to flee to the United States. Three were killed
and at least 10 injured. Guards and police reportedly refused
to assist those wounded in the water or allow others to do so.
According to numerous accounts, this led to rioting by several
hundred inhabitants. In October border guards killed Luis
Quevedo Remolino after he tried to leave in a raft. Though the
Government stated that he had been shot trying to depart
illegally, Quevedo' s family and friends assert he was beaten to
death. Quevedo's cousins, who were involved in the escape
attem.pt, were also beaten, though not as seriously. The
incident led several thousand people to march in a funeral
179
procession on October 14 in Regla near Havana; Quevedo's family
reportedly diverted the hearse to the police station and
removed the body from the coffin, to show that it was covered
with deep bruises and had no bullet wounds. Despite the
dangers involved, a record 3,656 Cubans made it to the United
States in rafts. It is not known how many perished en route.
In five incidents witnessed by U.S. military personnel in late
June, border guards used hand grenades and rifle fire against
unarmed swimmers trying to escape to the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo in southeast Cuba. In response to U.S. protests
over the use of excessive force, the Government denied the
reports, calling them "slanderous." Over 30 Cubans are known
to have died while attempting to seek asylum at the Base,
either shot by Cuban soldiers or killed by Cuban mines, while
821 made it safely.
There is no right of repatriation. Exit permits for temporary
travel specify that the person must return within 30 days,
although extensions are available. Cubans who live abroad must
apply for permission to return for visits. A quota of 10,000
visits per year by those who left between 1959 and 1980, as
well as a general ban on the return of those who left after
1980, were greatly liberalized in August.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Cubans have no legal right to change their government or to
advocate a change. The Constitution states that the only
political organization allowed is the Communist Party. A small
group of leaders select members of its highest governing
bodies — the Politburo and Central Committee.
In February the Government permitted direct elections to the
national legislature for the first time since it was created in
1976. Before nomination, however, every candidate had to be
screened by a "candidacy commission" composed of members of
party-controlled "mass organizations." Only one candidate per
seat was allowed; voters could either vote "yes" or leave the
ballot blank; there was no space even to check "no." These
procedures were designed to ensure that only those who follow
the government line would be on the ballot. Formation of
political parties, campaigning, and the making of campaign
promises was forbidden.
180
Leadership positions in Castro's Government have been dominated
by white males since its inception; there are very few women or
minorities in positions with policy responsibility in the Party
or the Government. There are 3 women on the 25-member
Politburo; the country's first female provincial party
secretary was not chosen until 1993. Though blacks and
mulattoes make up over half the population, they comprise only
4 of the 25 Politburo members and only 15 percent of over 200
members of the Central Committee.
The Government has ignored calls for democratic reform and
labeled activists who proposed them "worms" and traitors
working to undermine it. Any change judged not compatible with
the revolution is rejected, as are proposals by Cubans who seek
nonviolent political change or open debate about the political
system. The Government retaliates against those who have
peacefully sought political change.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No domestic or international human rights group is recognized
by the Government or permitted to function legally. As noted
above, domestic human rights monitors are subject to intense
intimidation and repression. In violation of its own statutes,
the Government refuses to consider applications for legal
recognition submitted by human rights groups. The main
domestic human rights monitoring groups are the Cuban Human
Rights Committee, the Cuban Pro-Human Rights Party, the
National Council for Civil Rights, and the Cuban Commission for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation. In addition, the
Cuban Democratic Convergence, the Cuban Coalition, and the
Civic Democratic Alliance are umbrella organizations including
a number of smaller human rights groups.
The Government has steadfastly rejected international human
rights criticism. In 1991 Cuba's U.N. Representative stated it
would not recognize the UNHRC mandate on Cuba and would not
cooperate with its Special Rapporteur, even though Cuba is a
UNHRC member. In March, after the UNHRC passed a resolution
condemning human rights violations in Cuba by the largest
margin ever, Cuban Ambassador Jose Perez Novoa said the
resolution was the result of a "political vendetta" and
maintained that "there are no large-scale and flagrant human
rights violations in Cuba." Cuba continues to ignore repeated
requests by the UNHRC s Special Rapporteur to visit Cuba to
meet officials and citizens.
181
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a majority of black and
mixed racial ancestry. The Constitution forbids discrimination
based on race, sex, or national origin, although evidence
suggests that racial and sexual discrimination occurs.
Women
The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and
responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children,
maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. The Maternity Law
provides 18 weeks of maternity leave and grants working women
preferential access to goods and services. About 40 percent of
all women work. They are well represented in the professions,
although few are in positions with policy responsibility.
Information from human rights groups and other sources
indicates that domestic violence and sexual assaults occur, but
no statistics are available. Violent crime is rarely reported
in the press and, due to cultural traditions, victims of
mistreatment are reluctant to press charges. However, the law
establishes strict penalties for rape, and it appears to be
enforced. Prostitution has increased greatly in the last few
years, especially around tourist areas.
Children
The Constitution states that the Government will protect
"family, maternity, and matrimony." It also states that
children, legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law
and notes the duties of parents to protect them. Education is
free and is based on the ideology of Marx and Jose Marti, and
state organizations and schools are charged with the "integral
formation of childhood and youth."
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Information about racial discrimination is not readily
available. Many blacks have benefited from the social changes
of the revolution. Nevertheless, there have been numerous
instances of police harassment against blacks, including black
foreigners and diplomats who were mistaken for being Cuban.
Many black activists report being singled out for harassment.
Officials have told them during interrogations that they are
"ungrateful" for not appreciating what the revolution did for
them and insulted them with racial epithets.
182
People with Disabilities
There have been few known cases of discrimination based on
disability. There are laws to provide for the disabled, but no
laws mandating accessibility.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution gives priority to state or collective needs
over individual choices regarding free association or provision
of employment. Decisions and choices of workers are
subordinate to the "demands of the economy and society." The
law does not permit strikes, nor are any known to have occurred
in 1993. Established labor organizations are not trade unions
in any real sense and do not act as a voice for worker rights,
including the right to strike. Labor is organized under the
control of the State and party through one umbrella group, the
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) .
Although a constitutional amendment removed reference to the
CTC and its Secretary General's participation in the Council of
Ministers, the CTC's union monopoly is reflected in the
explicit reference to it that remains in the Labor Code. The
CTC serves primarily as a state instrument to enforce political
and labor discipline, to encourage productivity and extended
hours of "voluntary" labor, to hold down labor costs, and to
conserve raw materials. However, some CTC organizations have
served as debating forums for a narrow range of labor issues,
such as safety or working conditions.
Despite Cuban disclaimers in international forums, in.dependent
unions are explicitly prohibited. In 1992 the International
Labor Organization (ILO) concluded that independent unions "do
not appear to exist" and ruled that Cuba violated ILO norms on
freedom of association and the right to organize. In May the
ILO Governing Body rejected the arguments of the Justice
Ministry for failing to reply to the General Union of Cuban
Workers* (UGTC) request for registration and legal recognition
and requested the Government to make an immediate pronouncement
on registration.
Those who attempt to engage in union activities face government
persecution and harassment. In February state security
officials again arrested Rafael Gutierrez Santos, president of
the fledgling independent trade union USTC, and detained him
183
without making formal charges. He was released in August,
pending trial. In February police raided the home of
independent unionist Juan Guarino during a meeting of the
National Council of Independent Unions. After searching the
house for 7 hours, police confiscated union materials and
newspapers and then arrested eight union members, telling them
they would be "crushed like cockroaches" if they continued
their union activities. They were released several hours
later. In March police arrested UGTC executive member Roberto
Trobajo and detained him for a week due to his union activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for
Work and Social Security sets wages and salaries for the state
sector. Because the CTC is a government instrument, antiunion
discrimination is only relevant as it applies to government
repression of attempts to form independent unions. There are
no known export processing zones in Cuba.
The Government in September relegalized self-employment, which
had been abolished in 1968, by allowing people to apply for
licenses to work in over 100 different occupations, from
hairdresser to muleteer. However, the regulations exclude
university graduates, employees in sectors determined to be
government priorities, or any state employee whose work is
ruled necessary. They also exclude those who do not show
proper "labor discipline" (a category which includes
dissidents), among others. Furthermore, permission to work
outside the state sector can be revoked if the State decides
the worker's services are again needed.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code prohibit forced
labor. The Government maintains "correctional centers" where
people are sent for crimes such as illegal departure. They are
forced to work on farms or building sites, usually with no pay
and inadequate food. Internees who do not cooperate are often
imprisoned.
Special groups of workers, known as "microbrigades, " on loan
from other jobs, are employed on special building projects.
They have increased importance in the Government's efforts to
complete tourist and other facilities that have priority
attention. Workers who refuse to volunteer for these often
risk discrimination or loss of their jobs. Microbrigade
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workers, however, are reportedly rewarded with priority listing
for apartments, a strong incentive for such work.
The ILO's Conunittee of Experts criticized Cuba for violating
ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labor) based on allegations in a
report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) that "voluntary labor is, in practice, forced labor
under the terms of the Convention, since refusal to do such
labor results in the loss of certain rights, benefits, and
privileges." In response, the State Labor Committee in January
repealed a 1980 resolution, thereby eliminating merits and
demerits from workers' labor records. In June the ILO
conference committee expressed hope that this marked the first
step toward complete elimination of any form of coercion
involved in voluntary labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age is 17. The Labor Code exempts
15- and 16-year-olds to let them obtain training or fill labor
shortages. However, students over age 11 are expected to
devote 30-45 days of their summer holiday to farm work up to
8 hours per day. "Voluntary labor" by student work brigades is
still used extensively in the farming sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage is supplemented by free medical care and
education and subsidized housing and food. Even with these
subsidies, however, a worker must earn far more than the
average wage to support a family. The minimum wage is less
than $200 (200 pesos) per month (which is about $3 at the black
market rate). Moreover, most basic necessities, like food,
medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, are rationed and in very
short supply, if available at all. This has worsened
dramatically in the past 3 years.
The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays in
hazardous occupations such as mining. To save energy, the
Government reduced workdays to 5 hours in many institutions.
Worker safety and pollution control provisions are usually
inadequate. Effective control and enforcement mechanisms to
ensure worker safety are lacking. Industrial accidents
apparently are frequent.
185
Chairman Rangel. But we would not be damaging or hurting
these people, if we published it, would we? Is the State
Department
Mr. Skol. Not these people. These are people who have been
jailed specifically because they have gone public to protest the
human rights treatment that they have received.
Chairman Rangel. We could move the debate forward, if the
State Department would say: For those of you who are so naive to
believe that the human rights of Cubans are not being violated,
why don't you take a look at these people, they have been in jail
for X number of years, and ask those people in Cuba what they in-
tend to do about either releasing them or explaining why they are
detained. Every time somebody is arrested and they have family in
the United States, we should know who they are, so that people
can really point out where we want to go, instead of just saying
that we have made up our mind that there is nothing that can be
done.
Because we do not know really, even now as we talk, what could
possibly happen, if the regime collapsed and we did not know what
would replace it.
Mr. Kopetski.
Mr. Kopetski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Skol, I view the embargo as a means to an end, and not as
an end in itself The feeling I get with some of the previous wit-
nesses is that the embargo is just that, an end in itself and, regard-
less of the arguments, people want it to continue.
Could you draw the distinction for me between our various poli-
cies. In Eastern Europe, change came from within that country, not
because it was shut down, but because it was opened up even a
smidgen, and then the door widened and communism fell. In
China, where our policy, though bumpy, to say the least, is one, as
Mr. Lord portrays it, of comprehensive engagement, the goal is
more change, more change in terms of human rights. Yet, in terms
of Cuba, the policy is to shut it down, to close it out. Why the dis-
tinction between success in Eastern Europe, a plan of operation
going on now with our foreign policy in China, and yet in Cuba we
have a totally different policy? Why this distinction?
Mr. Skol. Mr. Kopetski, it is because the country situations are
different and the legal situation is different in each country.
If there were political responses from Cuba to either the Cuban
Democracy Act or the existing embargo, or to the repeated calls of
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and so many others for
change in Cuba, we could here be debating those responses. We
would be asking "Well, isn't this enough? Mr. Secretary, they have
done this, isn't that enough?" But there is nothing to debate about
how far Cuba has gone in the political areas, the key areas of de-
mocracy, of human rights, of opening up society. That is the point,
nothing has happened, there is nothing to debate.
In the case of other countries, one could debate, for example,
what Vietnam did. One could reasonably reach different conclu-
sions. But what Vietnam actually did with regard to the reasons
for the imposition of the embargo, the issue of the missing in ac-
tion — movement, clear movement — was sufficient for the President
of the United States to make a decision.
186
With regard to China, the jury is still out. But the fact is that
there has been movement, there has been change, there is a trend
of change,
Mr. KOPETSKI. That is my point, not because we closed them off,
but because we opened the door. In Eastern Europe, none of these
kinds of negotiations or demands were going on with respect to Po-
land and Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Skol. The Vietnam situation, the change and the
embargo
Mr. KoPETSKl. I am not talking about Vietnam. I am asking you
about Eastern Europe and China, where you have clear success.
Mr. Skol. What happened in China and, what has happened in
Eastern Europe, are results of a variety of factors of which the U.S.
presence or nonpresence had relatively little to do.
In Cuba, we must consider the ability of the Cuban regime to
survive. If I were part of a policy of the U.S. Government which
consciously provided resources to a regime like that of Fidel Castro,
and later I could be accused of having helped that regime survive,
I think that I could be accused of bad policy, bad diplomacy and
bad
Mr. KOPETSKI. Well, you could make that argument about China
today. By maintaining trade, by encouraging trade, we are encour-
aging that regime to survive. I do not buy that argument.
Let me ask you a final question
Mr. Skol. Congressman, if this were a hearing about China, you
would have someone else before you, obviously, but there would be
a debate about what is happening in China, about what movements
have occurred, what do they mean for the U.S. interest, how do you
balance the U.S. interests.
This is a debate about Cuba, and there is no one on this panel
or anywhere else who can talk about any change, politically, demo-
cratically, or with regard to human rights that can be debated. We
would be delighted, if something would happen next week, that we
could have another hearing and say, Mr. Secretary, Fidel Castro
has called for elections, or the Cuban regime has said anybody can
leave Cuba, or the Cuban regime has dismantled its repressive ap-
paratus, it has freed political prisoners, Mr. Secretary, is that
enough for you? We would have a real debate. But there is no such
thing that has happened there.
It would be bad diplomacy, bad negotiation and bad policy for us
to say, all right, nothing has happened, therefore, we will change
our policy and give you the wherewithal to continue this "nothing
happening" well into the future. I think that would be irrespon-
sible.
Mr. KoPETSKL Well, if you look at what happened in Eastern Eu-
rope, the State Department, the CIA, the President of the United
States, they were caught unaware. I mean this was dramatic and
fast and almost overnight, with very little bloodshed. It happened
from within, and it was a tidal wave once it got going.
What I am suggesting is that we are prohibiting that tidal wave
from happening in Cuba because of the embargo.
Mr. Skol. Of course, I take issue with that. I believe we are
doing the opposite. I believe we are at the very least rot providing
the conditions that would assume that change would not take
187
place. If there were a tidal wave tomorrow and peaceful democratic
change occurred in Cuba, the administration would be the first to
applaud it and seek ways to support it.
Mr. KoPETSKi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Mr. Hancock.
Mr. Hancock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have some questions which do not specifically relate to this bill,
but do relate to our underlying goal of freedom and democracy in
Cuba which I think is where we are heading or wanting to head.
The provision of the Cuban Democracy Act, which I supported in
1992, permitted the establishment of telecommunications services
between the United States and Cuba. This provision makes sense
to me in that providing lines of communication between residents
of the two countries will give us a much better understanding of
the conditions in Cuba, and communication in general will, in my
opinion, help move Cuba closer to democratization.
With this in mind, I was somewhat disturbed to learn the State
Department has recently rejected proposals of telecommunications
interests who have been negotiated to provide service between
Cuba and the United States. While I understand every effort must
be made to prevent the flow of excessive hard currency to the Cas-
tro government, there must be some common ground that can be
reached so these telecommunications services could be offered be-
tween the two countries.
Specifically, can you tell me where that common ground might
be, a higher accounting rate, a lower surcharge, or some combina-
tion of the two?
Mr. Skol. Let me explain for those who may not know as much
as you do about what is going on. The administration very much
supports and has encouraged that part of the Cuban Democracy
Act which calls for the establishment of much better direct tele-
communications, telephone and other kinds of service between
Cuba and the United States.
At the same time, the Cuban Democracy Act directs that this
take place without providing excess profits to the Cuban regime. So
we are faced with the problem, the opportunity, of not giving excess
cash to the Cuban regime, but at the same time establishing tele-
communications which would result in the passage of some re-
sources to the Cuban regime.
So you are absolutely right, there must be a balance. We under-
stand that, and toward that end, guidelines were published, work-
ing up by the administration on how to do this, guidelines on a fair
balance between resources that are going to the Cuban Govern-
ment and our interest in establishing these telecommunications.
The contracts to which you refer have not come to us formally
for acceptance or rejection. That will come in due time. But when
we were told by companies that a certain surcharge was to be part
of the contract with the Cuban regime, an alarm bell went off, and
the decision was that the surcharge as presented in the package
represented an excess profit to the Cuban regime. Considering sur-
charges and accounting rates around the world, that simply went
beyond the guidelines and beyond the express direction in the
Cuban Democracy Act.
188
Now, not being an expert in telecommunications, I cannot finish
the answer to the question and tell you just exactly what would be
the best compromise in this area. I can tell you that when the
packages come in to the administration, they will be looked at with
due regard to both of our interests, preventing excess profits on the
one hand and establishing telecommunications on the other. We do
want the communications to be established.
Mr. Hancock. And your position is that the excess profits per se
would end up providing hard cash for the Castro government?
Mr. Skol. Yes, and that is what we are specifically enjoined not
to do in the Cuban Democracy Act.
Mr. Hancock. Yet, I understand the telecommunications indus-
try says this is about the minimum for which we can do this.
Mr. Skol. I might just point out that the specific surcharge that
we have been presented is the highest in the world, with one excep-
tion.
Mr. Hancock. Thank you.
Chairman Rangel. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen is not a mem-
ber of this committee, but I certainly want her to know that she
enjoys as a courtesy the opportunity to ask any questions that she
may want to ask this panel or any other panel.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to participate in this.
Just a quick comment, that I agree with Mr. Skol's testimony to-
ward the end when I came in, that there has been no noticeable
letup whatsoever in the oppression of the free expression of ideas
in the past 35 years, no letup on the crackdown on dissidents, no
letup in the constant repression of all freedoms in Cuba.
I voted several times against the granting of most-favored-nation
status to China, and will proudly do so again in just the coming
weeks. I hope we have the opportunity to express our thoughts on
this important issue once again. I support the Haitian embargo. I
was against the lifting of the embargo on Vietnam, and wrote to
President Clinton several times in very clear terms urging him to
do so.
1 agree with you that, at least in other countries, not in Haiti,
but in China and Vietnam, as strongly as I feel about them, I at
least acknowledge that those on the other side with whom I so very
strongly oppose, at least they have some sort of argument, they
have some sort of cover, they have some sort of room for debate,
as you call it.
But Castro makes it so very hard for those who call for the lifting
of the embargo in Cuba, because he is so absolutely inflexible, that
he does not even play the pretend game. He does not even bother
to spin it. I just think that it makes it so uncomfortable for those
who want to continually apologize and to somehow seek cover,
when he does not even bother to do so.
I thank you for your testimony and I look forward to continuing
to work with the Clinton administration, as we work on this impor-
tant issue of the embargo.
Thank you as always, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you.
Let me thank you publicly for trying to explain this to me, this
question of U.S. business trying to enter into a contract with this
189
Communist government, which we have no objection to, except
when the profit appears to be too much going toward the survival
of the Communists. But we will go for any fair contract, where the
profit in our opinion is not too much for Castro. I did not get all
of this in Business 101, but this clears up the question I was trying
to ask earlier.
Since the whole idea in response to this question is to make cer-
tain that we do not get enough money into Castro's hands so that
he could survive, even though there are things we have to do. With
the North American Free Trade Agreement, in a sense we are now
going into business with Mexico. Trade agreements with Mexico,
Central and South America, increase their trade with the United
States and increase their profit, and they are now going into uni-
lateral agreements and bilateral agreements with Cuba. They get
benefits from us and then this money goes to Castro, and this
again helps Castro survive, does it not? Would that be a reason to
vote against NAFTA?
Mr. Skol. I am glad you asked it that way. It would not in my
opinion be a reason to vote against NAFTA. The fact is that, as you
described it, the benefit to the Castro regime would very likely be
absolutely minimal.
Most important, the rules of origin that govern free trade agree-
ments such as the NAFTA and any future trade agreement are
such that the possibility is nil that Cuban goods, let us say, would
enter Mexico and enter the United States, or that deals between
Mexico and the United States or Mexico and the United States and
Canada would result in profit for Cuba. We believe that the safe-
guards inherent in the NAFTA instruments are sufficient to pre-
vent that from happening, and it is the intention of the administra-
tion to prevent that from happening, and the Government of Mex-
ico certainly understands that.
Chairman Rangel. Well, we do not have any sanctions, if Mexico
wants to do business with Cuba, right? Mexico can do business
with Cuba, without any problems from us, right?
Mr. Skol. We would prefer that no country on earth trade with
Cuba
Chairman Rangel. I understand that.
Mr. Skol [continuing]. But we have no authority to tell Mexico
not to trade with Cuba.
Chairman Rangel. How about with the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, do we have authority to tell Caribbean countries in the area
that we do business with not to trade with Cuba?
Mr. Skol. Well, the Caribbean Basin Initiative does not include
Cuba.
Chairman Rangel. No, no. I know.
Mr. Skol. It is specific to certain countries and it will not include
Cuba.
Chairman Rangel. The Caribbean Basin Initiative means we do
not do business with Cuba. I am having a problem with my ques-
tion. My question is that we have a trade agreement with the Car-
ibbean countries. Can these Caribbean countries have trade with
Cuba?
Mr. Skol. The essential issue, and it is the issue as outlined in
law, is subsidized trade. In other words, if the trade between a cer-
190
tain country and Cuba is subsidized, if it is in effect hidden assist-
ance — the way the Soviet purchase of sugar for so many years from
Cuba was a thin front covering vast assistance — that we would ob-
ject to.
Chairman Rangel. So there is no
Mr. Skol. Although we do not like it, we cannot
Chairman Rangel. There should be no sanction against any
country that we have a trade agreement with in the Caribbean,
they can do business with Cuba and receive no sanctions from the
United States?
Mr. Skol. The administration is not proposing any extension of
the sanctions along those lines.
Chairman Rangel. I thought there were existing sanctions to
countries that we have treaties with, if they in fact do business
with Cuba. Do you mean it is safe for me to tell our friends in the
Caribbean that this is our problem with Cuba, but you can do what
you want?
Mr. Skol. You would be doing your friends in the Caribbean a
favor, if you would point out to them that should they include
Cuba, under present circumstances, in a free trade agreement cre-
ated within the Caribbean, then that free trade agreement, that re-
gional block will not be eligible for any kind of free trade or other
special privileges from the United States.
Mr. Newcomb. For this debate, Mr. Chairman, I should also
point out that goods of Cuban origin incorporated into products
manufactured in those countries would not be permitted entry into
the United States under the Trading With the Enemy Act.
Chairman Rangel. Some people do believe that, and while we
have this unilateral embargo, that some of our friends do not have
it, they even think so little of our friendship that they condemn us
in the Organization of American States and the United Nations,
and they are in there investing in Cuba, while we have this embar-
go-
When Castro falls and democracy is there, I do not know wheth-
er there will be any opportunity for investment, but I thought we
could really go down both of the paths at the same time, open the
doors, insist on human rights and push for democracy. I am certain
that one of the most eloquent people in support of that policy will
be you, once President Clinton sees it that way. [Laughter.]
Mr. Skol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rangel. Thank you very much.
Now we have a panel: Rev. Jesse Jackson, president and founder
of the Rainbow Coalition. He recently visited with President Castro
and provided a way for his daughter to leave Cuba. He is a human-
itarian known around the world.
And certainly internationally known, John McLaughlin, one time
a high official in previous administrations, an old friend, someone
who is internationally known, as I said, and he is the executive
producer of the McLaughlin Group.
On this same panel, even though all of the members of the panel
will not be able to stay at the same time, we will have Jorge Mas
Canosa, the president of the Cuban National Foundation, a person
whose conviction about Cuba is well known. He is a fighter for free-
dom and liberty in Cuba, who agreed to share his views with this
191
panel. And Professor Andrew Zimbalist, from Smith College, in
Northampton, Mass.
Because the previous panels have taken more time, Reverend
Jackson is going to start off, and Mr. McLaughlin will follow. Let
me thank the entire panel for your patience. We thought that the
previous panels would have moved a lot faster than they have. But
we are very anxious to hear your testimony, and because of the
spiritual nature of the relationship that Reverend Jackson has to
an authority much higher than I have in this Congress, I yield to
the reverend to share his views with us.
STATEMENT OF REV. JESSE L. JACKSON, PRESmENT AND
FOUNDER, NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION
Reverend Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished
members for hearing this particular appeal, and member panelists.
This is one of the critical issues of our time in our hemisphere.
I make very clear my concern, as I appeal for engagement for
human rights, we reunite Cuban families, that we have essentially
three options. One is military, which represents the failure of diplo-
macy. One is disengagement, which is a withdrawal from diplo-
macy. The other is to engage and try to make an impact.
My observation while there a second time was a significant num-
ber of Cubans who want to get out, but have been held up by the
U.S. screening process, in a real way of keeping them locked in.
I am further convinced, Mr. Chairman, democratic forces toe-to-
toe with dictatorial forces can prevail, if they are not afraid to en-
gage. I am here to speak in favor of lifting the U.S. embargo
against Cuba, in support of Congressman Rangel's H.R. 2229.
Over this past Christmas, along with members of my family, I
spent 5 days in the country of Cuba, on the invitation of the Ecu-
menical Ministers Council of Cuba. I preached sermons in two
churches, one in the Baptist church on Christmas Eve, and one an
Episcopalian service on Christmas morning. I spent time walking
the streets of Cuba and talking with the people there, a number
of Cuban Government officials, including Fidel Castro, and had the
opportunity to observe the Cuban Parliament in session.
I last visited Cuba in 1984, and our relations with that island
nation were imprisoned in the grim ice of the cold war. In each in-
stance, I sought to renegotiate the freedom of people trapped in po-
litical circumstances in Cuba. I was successful in 1984, and again
successful this past Christmas. That great global contest has now
passed away, the cold war. This past Christmas week, I returned
to a Cuba still suffering from a costly, cruel, systematic U.S. siege
of embargo and blockade. Rather than using our power to further
democracy and freedom in Cuba, the U.S. Government is using its
superior power, size and resources to starve the Cuban people into
submission. I saw firsthand the bitter fruit of U.S. policy, the chil-
dren of Cuba, who had no lights on Christmas Eve and no presents
on Christmas morning, farmers plowing their fields pulled by oxen,
tractors without parts. These are the real victims of U.S. policy, ci-
vilians who lack food and medicine and basic necessities, because
the United States continues to fight a war that is over.
The objectives of a moral humanitarian foreign policy toward
Cuba must be threefold: One, our foreign policy must seek to har-
192
monize relations among nations and pursue humanitarian aims;
two, we must protect our national security; and, three, we must
seek to reunify families. Our outdated policy toward Cuba accom-
plishes none of these and harms our own Nation economically. It
is a relic of the cold war that demands to be changed.
The justification for the embargo, which was first imposed in the
missile crisis, has shifted through the years. Originally it was to
get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. That happened. Then it was
to force out the Soviets. The Soviets are long gone. It was to force
the Cubans to withdraw from intervention in Latin America. They
are long withdrawn. It was to force them out of Angola, when in
fact the intervention was primarily responsible for repelling apart-
heid South Africa's aggressions, when no one else would. They are
gone from there, too.
The cold war is over. Our justifications are gone, but the embar-
go remains. In fact, the U.S. embargo has been reinforced and
tightened by the Torricelli amendment.
The leaders of the Cuban Government are well aware of these
shifting goalposts, these constantly changing 
