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Full text of "Humanitarian problems on Cyprus : hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, second session"

HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS 




HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS 
CONNECTED WITH EEFUGEES AND ESCAPEES 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 



SEPTEMBER 26, 1974 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




DOCS 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
41-207 WASHINGTON : 1974 



>earcL. franklin pierce l/\w center 



Drary — concord, New Hampshire 3 3 0.1 

ON DEPOSIT ^M/T6 



HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS 



HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PEOBLEMS 
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 



SEPTEMBER 26, 1974 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




VDOCS 

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
41-207 "WASHINGTON : 1974 



FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER 

.IDrSry ^. concord, New Hampshire 0330.1 

*' " " ■ DEPOSIT ^M/r6~ 



Boston ^'!b??c Lflirafy 
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 



JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana 
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota 
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virs;inia 
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California 



ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii 
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
STROM THURMOND, Somh Carolina 
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky 
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland 
EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida 



Subcommittee To Investigatj: Problems Connected With Refugees and 

Escapees 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman 



JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 



HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii 

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland 



Dale S. de Haan, Staff Director 
Jerry M. Tinker, Staff Consultant 

(II) 



CONTENTS 

statement of: P»^« 
Dennis Skiotis, Assistant Professor of Ottoman and Modern Greek 
and Turkish History, Harvard University, and Member, Sub- 
committee's Study Mission to Cyprus 4 

Hon. Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, De- 
partment of State, accompanied by: Russell S. McClure, Foreign 
Disaster Rslief Coordinator, Agency for International Development 23 

APPENDIX 

I. Military Aid Cut-Off to Aggressor Recipients of Foreign ^Military 

Assistance, a Lil^rary of Congress Study 37 

II. Documents Relating to Cyprus, including Treaty of Guarantee 47 

III- Statement of Senator Kennedy on Humanitarian Problems on 

Cyprus, and introduction of J. Res. 110 55 

IV. Ameridment of Senator Kennedy providing relief assistance to 

Cyprus 57 

V. A Series of Reports on the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, by 

Stanley Karnow 63 

VI. Selected Press Reports and Commentaries on the Crisis in Cyprus 77 

(III) 



IV 




HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1974 

U.S. Sexate, 
Subcommittee ox Refugees axd Escapees, 

OF THE Committee ox the Judiciary, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 
4232, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
[chairman] presiding. 

Present: Senators Kennedy and Fong. 

Also present: Dale S. deHaan, staff director; Jerry M. Tinker, 
staff considtant; and Joanna Reagan, secretary. 

Senator Kexxedy. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Today's hearing resumes the subcommittee's public inquiry into 
the Cyprus refugee problem and United States policy toward recent 
developments in the eastern Mediterranean. 

Opexing Statemext 

Since the outbreak of violence in mid July, the subcommittee has 
closely followed developments on the island. An earlier hearing was 
held on August 20, and shortly thereafter a fact-finding mission 
traveled to Cyprus on behalf of the subcommittee. Just a few days 
ago the studv mission returned to Washington, and we shall hear 
their report this morning. 

The Turkish invasion and occupation of C^^prus has turned the 
island into shambles. In political terms, it violated the integrity of an 
independent state. In economic terms, it shattered the island's flour- 
ishing development. And in human terms, it brought personal traged}^ 
to thousands of families — and a nightmare of death and horror and 
grief. 

A drive along the roads of C\^prus quickly tells the tragic tale of 
the Cj^priot people — of the human consequences of an armed invasion, 
of bombing and napalm, of cease-fire violations, of military occupa- 
tion, and man's inhumanity to man. 

In the occupied territory only a small percentage of the population 
remains — including some 8,000 Turkish refugees bombed out of their 
homes. Desolation and destruction mark many areas. Wliole villages 
and towns and cities are emptv of people, who fled their homes in 
fear of advancing Turkish forces. The 15,000 to 20,000 Greeks who 
remain are being held as virtual hostages — often without adequate 
food and water and medical care. And some 500 are being cruelly 
detained in Kyrenia's Dome Hotel. 

(1) 



Government-controlled areas have been inundated with refugees 
from the north. Over 200,000 men, women, and children — at least a 
third of the population — have been seeking shelter wherever they 
can find it — in open fields, under trees, along the roadsides, and in 
schools, monasteries, and public buildings. Onh' in the last 2 or 3 
weeks have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities, 
and clusters of tents are beginning to sprout around towns and cities 
in Government-controlled areas of the island. But food, blankets, 
medicines, and other relief goods are still in short supply. And with. 
the approach of ,the rainy season and the winter cold, the condition 
of the people A\-ill deteriorate mdess adequate relief measures are 
taken now, or a political settlement is accomplished, which will 
permit the refugees to return to their homes. The overwhelming 
majority of needy ])eople in Government-controlled areas are Greek 
Cypriots. But significant numbers of Tiu'ks — including some 10,000 
refugees — also command our help and concern. 

A great deal has been said over America's role in the crisis, and over 
the apparent complicity of our Government in the human and political 
tragedy of Cyprus. 

We are told by our Government that we must be practical in our 
approach to the crisis. We must imderstand what has happened. And 
we must accept the new realities on the island. 

But what are these new realities? And what are we being asked to 
understand and accept? 

Are we to condone the invasion and occupation of Cyprus? Are we 
to condone cease-fire violations and the nibbling away of an inde- 
pendent state? Are we to condone the human traged}-^ brought about 
%\ath American-supplied weapons, and stand silent in the face of 
these realities? 

I believe the American people expect more of their Government. 
'And I call on the President and members of the administration to 
give some greater eA'idence of concern and action over the tragedy of 
Cyprus, and over the needed diplomacy to restore the island's ter- 
ritorial integrity, and the right of the Cypriot people, working to- 
gether, to determine their owii destin}'. We must do all in our power 
to accomplish this end, including the allocation of foreign military 
assistance to Turkey. Important first steps must include a strength- 
ened United Nations presence on the island, the orderly mthdrawal 
of Turkish Forces, and the return of refugees to their homes. 

With such goals in mind, we should also strengthen our support of 
relief and rehabilitation efforts by the Cyprus Govermnent, the 
Turkish Cypriot administration, the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Red. Cross, and 
others. We should lend our diplomacy to the reopening of the Nicosia 
Airport, which would greatly facilitate the work of the international 
relief agencies. 

We should lend our diplomacy to help guarantee the free access of 
these agencies, for humanitarian purposes, to all parts of the Turkish- 
occupied area. 

And we should increase our contributions to the U.N. High Com- 
missioner and the other programs for the relief and rehabilitation of 
the refugees and other Cypriots in distress. I have introduced an 
amendment for this purpose to the pending foreign assistance bill.^ 

' For the text of the amendment, see app. IV. 



And I am extremely hopeful that, given the very urgent human needs 
in Cyprus and so many other areas of the world, the amendment will 
be adopted by the Senate, and the foreign assistance legislation will 
be expedited toward enactment. 

STUDY MISSION REPORT 

Our first witness this morning, Dr. Dennis Skiotis, is assistant 
professor of Ottoman and modern Greek and Turkish history at 
Harvard University. He was a member of the subcommittee's study 
mission to Cyprus — an invaluable member of the team, speaking 
fluent Greek and Turkish — and he has had long experience and study 
in the region, living both in Greece and Turkey. 

Professor Skiotis recently served as the director of the Harvard 
University program under the National Defense Education Act at 
the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He has published numerous 
studies and research papers on Greek and Turkish history. 

We welcome him this morning for the very special and knowledge- 
able perspective he can bring to the current crisis on Cyprus. So we 
want to welcome you, Professor. We again want to express the great 
appreciation of the members of this committee for your willingness, on 
very short notice, to spend the time that you did with our team in this 
area. 

As you are well aware, this committee has been concerned about 
humanitarian problems in all parts of the world. So often, as we have 
seen, time and time again — whether we are talking about Vietnam or 
the Bangladesh problem or the Biafran refugees — ^it is the people who 
-come last in terms of political decisions. This despite the great pro- 
testations by political leaders that it is people who have their first 
interest. Yet, the}^ are always the ones, as I am sure 3'ou will relate to 
this committee this morning, and as I have seen in my visits to war- 
torn areas of the world, as well as to areas which have experienced 
natural disasters, it is always the people, the young and the veiy old, 
who suffer the cruelest fate in these situations. And it has always been 
my belief that concern for refugees and for the weak and the old and 
the children are verA' much a part of our heritage in this country and 
should be one of the strongest interests that we have. 

So your willingness to help and assist us in trying to point out ways 
that we in the Congress and the Senate can respond to these needs, 
will, I know, be of great value, and I want to indicate at the outset, 
personally, how much I appreciate 3"0ur willingness to undertake this 
responsibilit}'. 

Before we start, we want to recognize the Senator from Hawaii, 
Senator Fong, who is an extremely active member of this subcom- 
mitte and who alwaj^s takes a very keen interest in its workings and 
has worked very closely with me and other Members of the Senate 
in trying to make sure that we have a responsible policy toward ref- 
ugees in all parts of the world. 

Senator Fong. Thank 3-ou, Mr. Chairman. 

I have nothing to say except that I am glad that you have called 
this hearing so that we can review the Cyprus question. 

Senator Kennedy. Thank you ver}^ much. 

Professor Skiotis, you ma}^ proceed. 



STATEMENT OF DENNIS SKIOTIS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOE OF OTTO- 
MAN AND MODERN GREEK AND TURKISH HISTORY, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE'S STUDY MISSION 
TO CYPRUS 

Dr. Skiotis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senator 
Fong. 

By way of introduction, I would Hke to note briefly the activities 
of the study mission team on Cyprus. We visited the island during the 
first week of September, traveling extensively in refugee areas on 
both sides of the ceasefire line. In the government-controlled area in 
the south, we spent almost 3 full days in the region where the great 
bulk of the Greek Cypriot refugees are located. We had unrestricted 
and free access to all areas, and the Government of Cj^prus was fully 
cooperative. We chose where and when we wanted to stop, and we 
spoke with hundreds of refugees. 

ACTIVITIES OF THE STUDY MISSION 

We also spent 2 days in the Turkish occupied areas, visiting Turkish 
Cypriot refugees in Nicosia, and traveling north to Kyrenia ami 
Bellapais, and to the port of Famagusta in the east. We were received 
cordially by the Turkish Cj^priot administration. However, we had 
only restricted access to military occupied areas, which now comprise 
some 40 percent of the island — perhaps more. There are frequent 
checkpoints, and travel arrangements must be cleared with local 
Turkish commanders. This appUed as much to the Turkish Cypriots 
as it did to us. 

During our stay on Cj^prus, we met twice Avith acting President 
Clerides, and conferred with members of his government, with relief 
officials, as well as representatives of the Cypriot Red Cross. On the 
Turkish side, we met with Mr. Rauf Denktash, the constitituional 
Vice President of C^^prus and the head of the Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity, with members of his administraCion and with relief officials 
of the Red Crescent Society. In addition, we met with the representa- 
tives of the international committee of the Red Cross, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations 
Forces in Cyprus — UNFICYP. Traveling to and from Cyprus, we 
met with foreign ministry officials in Ankara and Athens and London. 
In Athens, in particular, we met with Mr. Dimitrios Bitsios, who was 
then acting Foreign Minister; and in Ankara conferred with senior 
diplomats, including Mr. Sukru Elekdag, soon to be the Secretary 
General of the Foreign Ministry. 

In Geneva we met with officials of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. In London we visited with the President of C3'^prus, Arch- 
bishop Makarios, and held discussions with British Foreign Office and 
relief officials. 

ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS ON CYPRUS 

The new American Ambassador to Cj^prus, William Crawford, 
and his staff, extended every courtesy to us. In fact, c^uite by coinci- 



ilence, we traveled with the Ambassador enroute to C^yprus and ap- 
preciated learning his views. I should note at this point, Mr. Chairman, 
that the Department of State and the Embassy had originally expressed 
concern over our mission, concern over security and over the dangers 
arising out of strong anti-American feelings in Cyprus. I think there 
was some surprise, therefore, when we — as representatives of this 
subcommittee and carrying your expression of personal concern, Mr. 
Chairman — received a very warm reception in the refugee areas. We 
were actualh^ cheered and applauded — all signs of the great apprecia- 
tion felt by the people of Cyprus at this first public expression of 
American concern over the tragedy of Cyprus and particularly-, of 
-course, the plight of the refugees. 

refugees: pawns in a political struggle 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, refugees have become pawns in a 
political struggle between two sides. Once again we are being treated 
to a heartless numbers game of how many refugees — if any — will be 
permitted to return to their lands and their homes. New frontiers, 
new schemes for new constitutional structures are being bruited 
constantl3^ In the meantime, the refugees wait, and they suffer. 
The picture on Cyprus, on the fabled island of Aphrodite, could not 
be grimmer, and fear and frustration have gripped 90 percent of the 
population — Greeks and Turks alike. 

To explain full^^ how all of this came to pass, one would have to 
go back in history for perhaps 1,000 years; for, unfortunately, Greek- 
Turkish antagonism has lasted that long. In a more extensive report 
that we will provide to this subcommittee, we will furnish more of 
this background, but perhaps today in the limited time that I have 
available, I will begin with what might be called the events of the 
•day before j^esterday. 

SCENARIO OF THE CRISIS 

The whole tragic story began on Jidy 15, when the legitimate 
government of President Makarios in C3"prus was overthrown in a 
coup led b}^ Greek officers, mainland Greek officers, on instructions 
from the military junta ruling in Athens. Nikos Sampson was the 
puppet installed by the junta in Athens as President and despite a 
flurry of diplomatic activity, Turkey launched an invasion of the 
island 5 days later — ostensibly to protect the island's 18 percent Turkish 
minority; to protect it from the threat of enosis, union of Cyprus with 
Greece. 

The Turkish landings were resisted stubbornl}^ b}" the Greek 
Cj'priots and in that same week, July 20, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted the first of a number of strongly worded resolutions 
railing for an immediate ceasefire; urging an end to foreign interven- 
tion and withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island; and request- 
ing the guarantor powers of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain to 
start negotiations for a settlement. 

A shaky cease-fire went into effect shortly thereafter — with the 
Turkish Army steadily expanding the width of their corridor from 
K3^renia to Nicosia. But efforts to work out a settlement in the second 



6 

round of the Geneva peace talks collapsed on August 14 after Turkey- 
refused to allow the Greek and Greek Cj^priot delegations a 36-hour 
delay to confer with their respective governments on new Turkish 
proposals. 

TURKISH LIKES THE END OF INVASION'S 1st PHASE 
(prior to Aug. 13, 197i+) 




from Tne Economist 



Before dawn, the Turkish Army, heavily reinforced with armor and 
enjo3dng total air superiority, slashed across Cyprus toward both 
east and west. In 3 da3's, this overwhelming military thrust sliced 
off at least 40 percent of C3"prus which was slightl}- more than the 
Turks had been demanding in the Geneva talks. The rapid and 
effortless Turkish militar}^ advance on Cyprus had both a profound 
repercussion at the international level and a devastating effect on the 
population of the island. 

EVENTS IN GREECE 

At the international level, Greece, headed since Jul}^ 23 b}' the 
civilian government of Constantine Karamanlis — who had been 
recalled to Greece as a result of the junta's blunder on C3^prus— 
briefly considered war with Turkey; rejected that option, but with- 
drew militaril3' from NATO. This was done in reaction to U.S. 
polic3" which was widel3' reported as having first tilted toward the 
junta and the Sampson coup and then, after the first invasion, toward 
Turkey. 

Indeed, U.S. polic3r at ever3'- crucial stage of the C3^prus crisis 
seems to have been one of hastA^ improvisation, coldly calculated to 
minimize disturbances within NATO. Not only did it achieve the 
opposite result in the end, but more importantl3^, in human terms, it 
failed the defenseless people of Cyprus. 



For whatever the merits or dubious legality of the initial Turkish 
landings, the second phase of the Turkish Army's so-called ''peace 
operation" on the ishmd — particularly after the Sampson regime had 
given way to the moderate and constitutional leadership of Glafkos 
Clerides — was an unjustifiable violation of the independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus. In fact, Mr. Chairman, in simple 
language, it was aggression. 

WHAT SHOULD U.S. POLICY HAVE BEEN? 

Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you here, Professor, what do you 
think the United States could have done to have prevented it? 

Dr. Skiotis. Mr. Chairman, in 1963 and in 1967, when there were 
two previous crises on the island, the United States was able, through 
diplomatic means, to defuse the issue and to avoid the consequences 
we are facing on the island today. It is difficult to begin to enumerate all 
the kind of activities that the United States might have been able to 
undertake to insure that this situation did not develop. 

We could start, I think, by saying that a high level emissary, on 
the precedent of the 1968-64 and 1967 crises, could have been sent, 
before things got out of hand, to Ankara and to Athens, to draw the 
attention of these governments to the threat to world peace. This 
was done before but done too late this time. 

We know that the Greek Government, the U.S. Government, the 
Govenmient of C} i)rus, and the Government of Turkey were all 
aware that a coup against Makarios was being planned. And it seems 
to me that a much stronger American representation could have been 
made to the Athens junta before it all happened, so that, in fact, 
these consequences v/oidd not have occurred. 

Secondh'-, when the Sampson government came into power, the 
United States could have repudiated that regime in the strongest 
terms. I do not think that this was done. 

Third, at the Geneva peace talks, the United States could have 
acted in a much more ])ositive and constructive manner and used its 
great influence over both countries — both members of NATO at that 
time — to bring about a negotiated settlement. The Turks at that time 
had a small but firm beachhead on the island of Cyprus, and they 
would have been able to see to it that the legitimate grievances of the 
Turkish Cypriot minoritj^ w^ould have been met in any new arrange- 
ments, diplomatic arrangements that would be worked out. 

I also think, finalh^, that the second phase of the Turkish militar}- 
operations on the island was something that could have been avoided 
with significant and active American diplomatic activity, in the course 
of the Geneva talks and after. 

We are now, as you know, engaged in speculation and discussion 
about what the United States can do at this point in time to bring 
about a negotiated, just, and lasting settlement to this problem, but I 
think that a lot of opportunities were passed up in this regard 
previously. 

4 CURRENT SITUATION ON CYPRUS 

When one goes to C3qDrus, one is overwhelmed with impressions. 
But I think the other members of the study mission would agree with 
me that there were two stark realities, however, that stand out above 



8 

all others. One is the presence of an army of occui)ation, of 40,000 
troops, that command 40 percent, perhaps a little bit more, of the 
territory of C3q:)rus. And the second is the tremendous humanitarian 
crisis confronting something like half of the ])opulation of the island, 
most of whom are refugees. Others are civilian detainees; others are 
])risoners of war; others are in need of relief assistance. And these 
l)eople are present on both sides of the uncertain cease-fire line. We 
saw literally thousands of refugees and spoke to hundreds of them, 
Greeks and Turks. And in order to facilitate our understanding, the 
understanding of the subcommittee, regarding the ])roblems they 
faced, we tended to separate them into categories [see table 1]. 

Table 1. — Humaiiitariait problems in Cyprus^ 

I. Refugees: 

1. In Government controlled areas: 

Greek Cypriot refugees 194, 000 

Post-cease-fire refugees (from Athna and other areas 

along cease-fire line) 20, 000 

Turkish Cypriots displaced or cut off 34, 000 

2. In Turkish-occupied areas: 

Greek Cypriots displaced or cut off 20, 000 

Turkish Cypriot refugees 8, 000 

II. Prisoners and detainees, lioth sides 6,000 

Total • 2S2, 000 

^ Based upon statistics of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and tlie International Committee of 
the Red Cross, as of Sept. 15, 1U71. 

GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES 

The first, and by far the largest and the most serious category, are 
the Greek Cypriot refugees in the Government-controlled areas in 
the south. There are probably close to 200,000 refugees of this sort, 
who fled prior to the cease-fire, from Turkish-occupied areas; and 
there are probably another 20,000 post-cease-fire refugees who fled 
from Turkish areas due to continued cease-fire violations. 

These refugees are everywhere present. Driving along the roads in 
the southern portion of the island is really to drive through an endless 
refugee camp. They were imder the trees, along the roadsides — under 
small lean-to huts, awaiting more permanent shelter. Public buildings 
and accommodations are crammed \vith refugees; schools, churches, 
monasteries, civic buildings are also filled with them. District towns 
have doubled and tripled in size; unemployment rolls are being swelled. 

A typical situation was that in the town of Ormidhia, whose popula- 
tion has jumped as a result of the refugee influx by some 300 percent. 
An empt}'' soccer field was being turned into a refugee city of tents; 
tents that were originally designed to hold 6 people now hold 2 families 
with 14 women and children huddled together. 

PROBLEMS FACING REFUGEES 

The problems facing the refugees of Cyprus are the classic problems 
which confront refugees everywhere. This includes the need for 
shelter, for blankets, for food, for the necessities of life. Everywhere 
we went, everything was in short supply. Many of these items were 
unavailable. In particular, there was a desperate need for blankets. 



9 

There was promise that bUmkets were on tlie way, but our owii personal 
observation showed that at the present time this was a crisis of great 
proportion. Tlie refugees in areas that have a roof over their heads are 
sleeping on cold concrete, damp floors. Food supplies were rapidly 
dwindling. And although relief officials were hoping to expand the 
ration program to include protein foods — milk and other supphes — 
this woidd only be possible if— and this is a big "if"— if supplies arrived 
on schedule from abroad before government stocks became depleted. 

POST-CEASEFIRE REFUGEES 

While w^e were on Cyprus and during our tour of these refugees in 
the Greek-controlled southern zone, the Turks were engaging in what 
the United Nation's officials described to us as "armed reconnaissance 
in force" along the ceasefire-line. These land grabs, or "salami tactics," 
as they are often referred to in the press, were creating a second type 
of refugee problem — refugees leaving the areas, leaving their homes 
and their lands after the initial ceasefire agreements had been signed. 

Whether real or imagined — and it is probably real — the fear of the 
Turkish military on the island is widespread. The Greek Cypriots 
flee at the moment they hear the shghtest rumor that the Turkish 
Army is on the move, or as soon as they catch a glimpse of the 
advancing Turkish troops. Stories of rough, sometimes brutal, treat- 
ment of civilians by Tiu'kish forces in Kyrenia after the first phase 
of the invasion had spread over the island like wildfire. Thus, after 
the second phase began, Greek Cypriots did not wait around to find 
out whether, in fact, there were Turks advancing on their village or 
not; the}" would flee if they thought this was even a possibility-. 

As I said, we saw direct evidence of this while we were on Cyprus. 
The area of the Athna Forest, which borders the British Base Area 
of Dhekelia, was being inundated with a stream of refugees approach- 
ing from the village of Athna. Most of theni were driving into the 
base. They had baskets, mattresses, pot and pans — whatever they 
could fill up their cars with or the buses that w^re transporting 
them into the base. And they were settling there in the forest vvith 
no tents, no blankets, no water. Just seeking security'- from the 
advancing forces. Many of these refugees have moved two or three 
times. 

BRITISH BASES AND THE REFUGEES 

The polic}' of the British, Mr. Chairman, is to do the minimum 
possible for the refugees who seek refuge on their base. A British 
colonel, who was in charge of a modest field kitchen which com- 
prised the British relief effort told us ciuite candidly that the 
British did not want to accept the refugees and only did so in the 
beginning because thev were seeking sanctuarv from actual combat. 
Now that a ceasefire had been declared, they wanted them off the 
base. 

TURKISH CYPRIOTS IX GOVERXMEXT-COXTROLLED AREAS 

A third category of refugees and persons in duress are the 
Turkish Cypriots in government controlled areas. All told, there 
are probably 34,000 Turks in this category, of which, perhaps 



10 

10,000 — mostly at the Akrotiri British base — can be classified 
refugees. In almost every way, their plight is the same as that of their 
Greek Cypriot counterparts. 

In addition, there are several thousand Turkish Cvpriots cut oflP 
or isolated either by choice or circumstance in Turkish villages or 
in Turkish quarters of the larger towns. These beleaguered villages 
and quarters in the towns are under the observation and protection 
of United Nations Forces in Cyprus and are receiving relief assist- 
ance from the ICRC or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 

We also visited one mixed village — a mixed village, that is to say, 
including both Greeks and Turks — where the Turkish quarter has 
not been disturbed, having hoisted a white flag above the mosque 
as a signal it had no hostile intentions. We did not see any harm being 
done to these Turkish Cypriots. However, there can be no doubt 
that other villages feel beleaguered and isolated. As one United 
Nations official put it to us: "Objectively nothing has changed in 
these Turkish villages, but there is a fear there now that something 
has changed." And in the context of random violence and mass kill- 
ings, the apprehension that conditions may change for the worse 
from minute to minute does not serve to reassure Cypriots in enclaves 
on whatever side of the cease-fire line they find themselves at their 
present time. 

TURKISH CYPRIOT REFUGEES 

The last category of refugees and persons in need are those in the 
Turkish occupied area, involving some 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees 
and an estimated 20,000 Greek Cypriots cut off by the advancing 
Turkish forces. 

The Turkish Cypriot refugees are those who could have been 
displaced during the conflict, such as those around the old city of 
Famagusta, and those who have fled from the south to the north. 
We visited two schools in the Turkish sector of Nicosia where such 
refugees were located. The few we saw appeared to be in good condi- 
tion, with no overcrowding, and adequate relief assistance from the 
Turkish Red Crescent Society. 

However, Mr. Chairman, the refugees the Turks most often men- 
tion are not those from the current conflict, but rather from the 
1963-64 intercommunal violence, when some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots 
were displaced. We visited one such area bordering Nicosia called 
Omorphita, which is a symbol of the neglect the Turks feel the Greek 
Cypriots and others paid to their needs 11 years ago. 

GREEK CYPRIOTS CUT-OFF IN THE NORTH 

The second type of refugee problem in the Turkish occupied areas 
is that of the Greek Cypriots isolated in Kyrenia and Bellapais, and 
an uncertain number of villagers cut off and isolated in the so-called 
panhandle, Karpasia, estimated at 15,000 people. We were unable 
to arrange a visit to this cut-off area, but we are very concerned about 
what is going on there. Reports from the U.N. indicate that the 
people there are in increasingly desperate straits— running out of 
food and other supplies. To date, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees has been unable to freely deliver relief supplies or to have 



11 

unrestricted access to refugees in the Turkish occupied areas. Until 
this is done, the world ^vill not know the full tragedy of Cyprus, 
nor will we be able to provide all the help we can. And until the 
Turkish policy of isolating inhabitants of Karpasia ends, the world 
must assume they have something to hide. This policy, Mr. Chairrnan, 
contrasts sharply with the free access enjoyed by the United Nations 
and the Red Cross throughout the Govermnent-controlled area in 
the south. 

PRISONERS AND DETAINEES 

Finally, there is the humanitarian problem of releasing prisoners of 
war and ci\'ilian detainees — some 6,000 on both sides. Considerable 
and very encouraging progress has been made in this area, resulting 
from the recent talks, under U.N. auspices, between President Clerides 
and Vice President Denktash. Two prisoner exchanges have been made, 
and more are promised next week. But, according to a brief radio 
announcement that I heard this morning, it seems that these talks are 
now jeopardized once again, and I think that this underscores the 
tremendous importance and fragility of these discussions now going 
on between local Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders on Cyprus. 

Senator Kennedy. Did you ^dsit any detainees? 

Dr. Skiotis. We visited Turkish detainees, or prisoners of war — the 
terms are blurred, as you can well imagine in a situation of intra- 
communal conflict — in Limassol. They were kept in a school. They 
were under U.N. protection, as well as Greek Cypriot and National 
Guard protection. And they seemed to have adequate facilities — food, 
medical attention, and so forth. The ICRC had free access. 

In the northern zone — that is under Turkish control — we visited 
detainees at the areas of Bellapais, where they were mostly women, 
children, and men, old men over the age of 65 or 70. The men of 
military age had been taken away by the Turks to unknown destina- 
tions, as far as their families knew, perhaps to Turkey, we were told 
later; perhaps to Turkish confinement areas in Nicosia. 

This breaking up of the families by arresting the men of military 
age was one of the important factors in assuring that Greek families 
iled united in the second phase of the Turkish operation, because the 
families that stayed behind in the first phase had this separation of 
men from the rest of their families. So, in the second phase there was a 
mass exodus. 

We also visited detainees in the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia. There 
were approximately 450 Greeks there, and they were confined to the 
hotel and were being guarded by Turkish Cypriot police from the 
Turkish Cypriot administration, as well as by the Turkish Army. At 
that time they had not been released, and most of them, of course, 
wanted to go back to their homes in Kyrenia or areas nearby. 

On the question of detainees in Turkey — it is our understanding 
that there were two prisoner of war camps and that Red Cross 
officials had \asited these areas infrequently. 

economic consequences of the invasion 

The economic consequences of the invasion are, of course, very 
•difficult to quantify. Within so short time after the invasion and the 



12 

Turkish Army's control of the northern part of Cyprus, movement is 
restricted. So, it is very hard to find out what is going- on. But for a 
state as small as Cyprus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
economic consequences have been catastrophic. 

There is relatively minimal structural damage caused by the 
invasion, except for the areas in the Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave and 
right around the borders of the enclave, which was the site of the 
original Turkish landings and the staging ground for their further 
advance into phase two. But there has been considerable looting in 
many areas. Kyrenia, for example, has been looted beyond description. 
And we, in our tours of the Turkish section of Cyprus, saw firsthand 
two military trucks loaded with miscellaneous pieces of furniture 
being carted to some unknown destination down the road from 
Famagusta. 

The new city of Famagusta — the "Miami Beach" area kno^\^l as 
Varosha — is the major exception to the problem of looting. Care 
has been taken by the Turkish authorities to seal off this city from 
all potential looters. But it is totally empty and is a symbol of what 
has happened to the economy of Cyprus. This once bustling city of 
40,000, a key element in the island's tourist industr}', is now a ghost 
town. We walked down the main street, John F. Kennedy Boulevard, 
amid high rise hotels and apartments and expensive shops, and could 
see only a few stray dogs and cats and a lonely contingent of Swedish 
U.N. troops. An entire metropolitan area has become a refugee. 

ECONOMIC LOSSES 

Since the Turkish invasion, the Government of Cyprus estimates 
that the country is losing some $4.5 million in economic production 
every day. The vast citrus industry in the Morphou area rots on the 
trees. The fields of wheats which should now be planted, lie fallow. 
Unknown numbers of livestock and cattle are dead because of the lack 
of food and water. The mines and light industry lie idle. And not a 
single tourist remains on the island. It will not be too many months 
before the foreign exchange crisis becomes critical — a fact that has 
only been delayed temporarily by the action of Greece in providing 
some $17 million each month in financial support of the Government 
of Cyprus. 

There can be little doubt, Mr. Chairman, that the damage to the 
economy of Cyprus will only serve to heighten the plight of the 
people, and make the life of the refugees all the more precarious. With 
each passing day, the economic situation grows worse, as will the 
condition of the refugees, if something more is not done very soon. 

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT 

A significant international relief effort is now unde^rwa3^ The Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees have both begun fund drives. Thev have 
made api)eals for contributions, but they have both only received 
token amounts to date. The United Nations High Commissioner has 
said, for exam])le, that his goal is $22 miUion, and he has only received 
$4.5 million of that. Greece has given considerable bilateral aid to 



13 

Cyprus; and the United St^ites has ])ledged $3 million to the U.N. 
High Commissioner's program and has provided approximately $5 
million in cash and kind to date. But there are still massive relief 
needs to be met. 

Blankets and tents are required on an urgent airhft basis. In addi- 
tion, the medical situation, which is ]H'etty stable now, will surely 
deteriorate as refugee camps become crowded and as the rains come. 
A World Health representative told us that medical requirements are 
needed to head off epidemics. 

EFFECTIVE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT RELIEF PROGRAIM 

We were very impressed, Mr. Chairman, at the capacity of the 
Government of Cyprus to undertake relief programs and absorb relief 
assistance under the most difficult of circumstances. They have the 
talent, the energy, the infrastructure, the education, and luost of all, 
the concern, to cany forth a meaningful and significant relief effort — 
if they are given the tools and the resources to help them help them- 
selves. This we and the international community cannot fail to do. 

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION 

The i)olitical consequences of the invasion can be said to be wdtliout 
a doubt the destruction of the constitutional framework and political 
structure of the Government of Cyprus as established in 1960. 

The future of Cyj^rus will be a future governed by a new and dif- 
ferent governmental and political structure. Most frequently men- 
tioned m this connection is some form of territorial separation of the 
two communities on the island — of the geographic segregation of 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, thus creating a Turkish majority area 
on Cy])rus. 

To an outside observer, it may seem possible and even easy to 
work out some kind of new biregional arrangement on either side of 
the present cease-fire line. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not beheve that 
any Greek Cypriot Government can be found that would accept a 
set^^tlement imposed by the force of arms, and predicated on the 
nonreturn of two out of five of its people. If that solution is, in fact, 
forced upon the Greek Cypriots, there can be little doubt that they 
will be left with no alternative but guerrilla war — with all that that 
implies for the future peace and stabihty of the easteiTi Mediter- 
ranean. The very likely outcome of a prolonged stalemate would be 
de facto partition; in effect, double enosis — the political, or at the 
very minimum, administrative and economic union of the two separate 
parts of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey. In the process, Cyprus 
would cease to exist. 

IMPACT OF PARTITION 

Senator Kennedy. Are you suggesting that if there is some kind of 
a partition with a variation of where those lines are now, \yhere the 
Turkish military forces are now, and requiring a rather significant 
movement of people, the movement of Turkish Cypriots from the 
southern part up to the north, and the movement of the Greeks from 
the north to the south — you think that there would be the kind of 
result that you have outlined here? 

41-207—74 2 



14 

Dr. Skiotis. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the figures here are very interesting. We have more Greek 
refugees disphiced from the northern section that is presently con- 
trolled by the Turkish Army than there are Turks on the island as a 
whole. We have more 

Senator Kennedy. Do they want to leave the north, or would 
the}' rather stay? What would be their attitude if they knew that 
there was going to be Turkish control of that area? 

Dr. Skiotis. The Greek Cypriots of the northern sector would not 
retimi to the Turkish zone if the Turkish Army was there in force. 
And there is still some doubt in my mind whether they would even 
return with United Nations protection. 

The cost of partition would be massive in human terms — in 
population terms. In economic terms, it would be disastrous. And the 
legacy of bitterness — it is hard to conceive of any Greek Cypriot 
living in peace in the south and not feeling that he had been deprived 
of his land, his home, his well being, his economic sustenance. I think 
it would be the ripest kind of ground for tension and terrorism. 

TURKISH government's GOALS ON CYPRUS 

Senator Kennedy. It seems that that is really what the Turkish 
Government is holding out for, though, is it not — partition? As far 
as their opening position in Geneva. 

Dr. Skiotis. There is no question in my mind that that is what the 
Turkish Government wants. 

Senator Kennedy. And you think that barring a military force 
there, of Turkish occupation, that it could not probably hold together 
if you had the partition? And even with a military occupation, you 
will also run into the kind of guerrilla activity and violence you 
have described? 

Dr. Skiotis. That is correct. 

The Greeks form 80 percent of the population of Cyprus, and it 
is hard to conceive of a situation where they w^ill be deprived of 40 
percent of the land on Cyprus and about 70 percent of the economic 
resources and not wish to do something about that injustice. Without 
the presence of the Turkish Ai'my in the northern sector, I do not 
think that this would be a feasible arrangement. 

Senator Kennedy, I understand. 

Dr. Skiotis. On this question of the consequences of partition, 
the Turks have proposed the so-called Attila line. This line was 
first proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in 1964, 
and was raised again this past July by Turkey during the Geneva 
talks. 

origin of the attila line 

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell me, as a matter of history, where 
the name came from, Attila line? Does it have any 

Dr. Skiotis. It refers to the famous Hun conqueror, and the 
Turks have a racial and linguistic affinity with the Huns. To the 
Turkish people Attila is a national hero. 

Senator Kennedy. Wliat was the line? Is that the extent of his 
conquests, or was it just named after him? 



15 

Dr. Skiotis. No, it was not the extent of his- 



Senator Kennedy. It has no mihtary significance, I guess, in 
terms of the mountains and geographic area; it had no past historical 
reference? Just a name? 

Dr. Skiotis. That is correct; yes. 

Senator Kennedy. All right, please continue. 

IMPACT ON POPULATION PATTERNS OF ATTILA LINE 

Dr. Skiotis. This line, which runs from the northwest of Cyprus 
through Nicosia to Famagusta, is considerably less than the area 
presently held by the Turkish Army. The point is, no matter where 
the line is finally drawn, aii}^ artificial division of the island will 
bring immense economic problems as well as massive population 
-■dislocation. 



16 




17 

The population dislocation that would come with partition is every 
l)it as serious and disruptive as those which have already come about 
with the Turkish mihtary invasion, which has, in effect, turned the 
island upside down. ]\Iost severely affected is the Greek Cypriot 
community, which comprises 80 percent of the population. Drawing 
a line somewhere \\ill mean moving nearly one-half of the total 
population of the island and resettling them elsewhere on a permanent 
basis. Based on the 1972 population estimates, this would amount 
to moving about 50,000 Turks — 44.6 percent of the total Turkish 
Cypriot population — from the southern part to the northern part. 
In turn, this would require moving out of that northern area at least 
150,000 Greek Cypriots, who, until the invasion, lived there. 

Government of Cyprus estimates indicate that this would reduce 
the density of the population in the northern zone from 185 to onl}" 
76.9 persons per square mile. Yet, at the same time, it would force 
the population density in the Greek area to jump from 181 to 202.6 
persons per square mile. In short, drawing a line will require a drastic 
rearrangement of existing population patterns, rearrangements that 
cannot help but be painful and probably inequitable to the Greek 
C^'priots. 

PARTITIOX AXD LAND OWNERSHIP 

The impact upon land owTiership would be no less severe, and will 
obviously be a major stumbling block in any partition plan. The 
cpiestion is compounded with the different statistics that are being 
advanced by both sides as to how much land each owns on the island — 
and even assuming that that could somehow be resolved, a'ou have a 
problem with the kind of land, where it is located, its level of develop- 
ment, its crop, land distribution patterns, and so forth. How does one 
exchange land in the north, of a different kind, for land in the south. 
The problem of the actual technical agreement on land exchanges 
would be enormously difficult to work out. 

FUTURE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION 

As for the future impact of partition on the economy, Cyprus, be- 
ing a relatively small island, of necessit}^ has an integrated, homoge- 
neous economv. It is a fragile and developing economic sj^stem. 
And it has worked and prospered and grown because it has been able 
to do so as a whole. If the Attila line forms the basis of partition, it 
will include many of the principal foreign exchange earning portions 
of the economy on the Turkish side. It will include the cooper mining 
region in the Morphou Bay area, the whole of the highly developed 
agricultural Morphou Plain — including the mostly Greek citrus 
industry — all of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia Mountain Range, 
most of the irrigated plain of the eastern Mesaoria — commonly re- 
ferred to as the breadbasket of Cyprus — large areas of citrus groves 
in the Serrakhis River Valey, large forest areas in the Kyrenia region^ 
although two-thirds of these forests were burned during the invasion — 
many of the best tourist resorts, and portions of Famagusta, including 
the largest port facilities on the island. 

In comparison, the Greek-controlled area, although retaining a 
:sizable portion of the fertile Mesaorian Plain, would contain a high 



18 

proportion of imcultivable mountainous and forested terrain — the- 
Troodos Mountain area — and undeveloped land. 

The effects on agriculture, on tourism, on forestry, on mining, 
on industry — all significant and productive areas of the Cypriot 
economy — would be grievous. Over the past decade, the economy 
of Cyprus has grown at a remarkable rate, and it has become one 
of the most dependable members of the International Monetary 
Fund, and one of the highest rated recipients of United Nations 
Development Program funds. Indeed, Cyprus has prospered and 
developed economically at a far better rate than its neighbors, in- 
cluding Turkey and even Greece. It has one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the area — its economy is often compared to that of Israel — 
and the per capita income of the Cypriots is three times that of 
Turke}^ 

PARTITION OF AN INTEGRATED ECONOMY 

However, this prosperity and this economic performance has been 
based upon the integrated economy of the whole island. What political 
partition will do to Cyprus will be compounded by what economic 
partition would do, even if the intention is not, as Turkey now seal's 
it is not, to divide the island's econoni}^. But how a political partition 
line can be drawn without also dividing or disrupting the economy 
of the island is clearly one of the most troubling questions confronting- 
negotiations over the fate of Cyprus. 

The results of the Turkish invasion have alread}^, in less than 3 
months, wreaked havoc with the economy of Cj^prus. As I have 
already noted, the losses from physical damage and dislocation,^ 
caused by the military activity since July, have already run into 
the millions of dollars. But as serious as the economic effects of 
Turkish occupation have been to date, consequences of partition 
may be even more damaging. Every indicator suggest that Cyprus 
could not easily recover economically from a permanent poUtical 
partition — certainl}^ not in the near future, and perhaps not for man}'' 
years to come. 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make a few concluding notes at 
this point. 

CYPRUS: FOCUS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 

Ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus has led. and 
will lead inexorably in the future, to confrontation between Greece- 
and Turkey. Britain, as a guarantor power, is also immediately 
involved. All this in turn, gives rise to problems within the Western 
Alliance — NATO — and automatically draws the United States into the 
picture. Intense United States and NATO activity in the eastern Medi- 
terranean tends to bring about the reaction of the So^det Union and 
the issue thus reaches the level of world politics invohdng the stakes 
of global war and peace. Finally, C3^prus membership in the United 
Nations and her ties with the nonaligned nations bring an additional 
factor to bear on the power equation around this small island. This, 
in fact, has been the general pattern and complexit}^ of international 
crises surrounding the Cyprus question since 1963-64, in 1967, and 
now again, in 1974. 

Considering this extremely complex network of conflicting interests; 
involving Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United States, NATO, the; 



19 

Soviet Union, the United Nations, and most important of all, the 
divided people of Cyprus, the only way of reconciling most of these 
interests is to maintain and preserve a truly independent, democratic 
Cyprus. Viewed in this perspective, the Greek junta's engineered 
coup on Cyprus in Jul}^ was a clear attempt to impose an unacceptable 
solution. So, too, however, was the military intervention of Turkey 
which now threatens partition. 

CYPRUS AND DETENTE 

Sureh', Mr. Chairman, one of the most important lessons of this 
latest Cyprus crisis is that the much-touted concept of detente has 
degenerated to a mechanical nonaggression agreement among the 
great powers, while an^" smaller power which feels strong and deter- 
mined enough to strike can defy both Washington and Moscow, as 
well as the United Nations. Nobody can claim that the people of 
Cyprus have benefited from detente. Their suffering is ignored, 
and their legitimate interests are forgotten. 

It is to the end of restoring the independence and territorial in- 
tegrity of Cyprus that the United States should now turn its full 
energies. The Cyprus crisis will not go away as we "tilt" — or perhaps, 
more accurately, as we "slide" — from one side to the other in an 
unsuccessful policy of drift that is called being neutral. Active, 
imaginative diplomatic approaches are needed urgently. 

CONCESSIONS TO THE TURKISH COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS 

Needless to say, anj" negotiated settlement will have to provide- 
the Turkish Cypriot community on Cyprus, which has legitimate 
and serious grievances, with an enhanced degree of security, au- 
tonomy, and participation in the economic life of the country. How 
this is achieved, and within what constitutional framework, is, of 
course, a matter for creative diplomacy and negotiations to define. 

In this connection, the talks now taking place between President 
Clerides and Vice President Denktash are crucial and must be actively' 
supported. 

RETURN OF REFUGEES 

However, we can foresee no viable solution to the crisis on Cj-prus 
unless a substantial number of refugees are permitted to return to their 
lands and their homes. Some movement and transfer of population 
may be necessary and, indeed, desirable. But no plan that perpetuates 
what military conquest has brought about can Ions survive 

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

U.S. diplomacy should be carefully orchestrated with peace initia- 
tives advanced by the United Nations. Only within the context of a 
U.N. solution will the Soviet Union, which has legitimate security 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean, accept the final disposition of 
the Cyprus issue. 

The United Nations has a long and constructive record of involve- 
ment in Cyprus. But its presence and its peacekeeping capability on 
the island were severely tested in this latest crisis. In fact, the credi- 



20 

"bility of its peacekeeping functions has been gravely impaired. Tlie 
United States should support a new and strengthened mandate 
for UNFICYP to enable it to perform its peacekeeping mission 
satisfactorily. 

The longer the time needed to achieve a resolution of the crisis, 
the greater will be the suffering and tragedy of the people of Cyprus. 
Political postures cannot be allowed to freeze into inflexibility, as 
the}^ have been in a number of similarly related crises in the Middle 
East. The need of the people of Cyprus is urgent and it must be a 
priority before the international community. 

Thank you. 

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. That is a ver}" com- 
prehensive statement, Professor, and I know we have a much more 
detailed report before the Subcommittee which goes into great detail 
on many of the different parts which 3"ou have outlined here. 

I just have a few questions for you. 

CANTONAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE? 

You spelled out a very grim picture, as I see it; but I think that is 
a veiy accurate and realistic one. I am interested in a few points. 
One is what 3'ou think the political realities are of some kind of 
cantonal arrangement. This has been talked about in previous testi- 
mony. First, whether 3'ou think it is politically realistic to expect 
that the military forces of Turkey, which have 35 to 40 percent of 
the land, \\ill give that up — whether 3^ou can expect this as a possible 
alternative. Is it an alternative to partition, and is it realistic to expect 
that there could be anj^ hope for that kind of an arrangement under 
the present circumstances? 

Dr. vSkiotis. The canton arrangement is sometliing that the Greek 
CA^priot side and the Greek Government would now probabh^ accept. 
I do not think that the Turkish Government will at this point accept 
a canton arrangement as a disposition of the C^'prus question. 

There may be some ground for compromise there, but my best 
judgment at tliis point is that the Turkish Government is interested 
solely in a biregional, bicommimal Cyprus, that has an almost ex- 
clusive Turkish majority in the northern section, wherever the line 
is ultimately drawn, and an almost exclusively Greek majority in 
the southern sector. 

But the idea of the so-called zonal SA'stem, of cantons or any other 
kind of similar arrangement, A\'ould not be acceptable to the Turks 
now. They have gone too far to turn back. So I do not think that this 
is a realistic diplomatic option unless the Turkish position is changed. 

POSSIBLE PHASE 3 OF TURKISH INVASION 

Senator Kennedy. Do you, as a student of history, and as an 
observer of recent events, think that there is any possibility that there 
may be phase 3 if Turkey is unable to work out these arrangements 
in terms of the control of the north? What would be the restraining 
force to Turkey sa^dng, "all right, Ave will take 3 or 4 more days 
and take over the whole island, and then we will work out a canton 
arrangement for the Greek Cypriots," turning it the other way 
around. Is tliis a real possibility? 



21 

Dr. Skiotis. I think it is a real possibility. I think the clanger of yet 
another Turkish operation is very real. I think the information we 
received from the field bears this out without the slightest doubt. 
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, it is real to the Greek Cj'priot refugees who 
have already fled, some of them, as I have stated, once or twice before 
from advancing Turkish forces. To say that they are terrified of A*et 
further Turkish military operations would be an understatement. 

There is also a good deal of public opinion pressure in Turkey regard- 
ing the plight of the Turkish Cypriot minorit}^ in the south which could 
give rise in Turkey to a policy of undertaking yet another oflfensive,, 
either to move militarily into areas that contain substantial Turkish 
minorities and thus bring them, under the umbrella of the Turkish 
Army, or to conduct hit-and-run type rescue missions in further 
removed parts of Cyprus which, again, have Turkish Cypriots there. 

There is, as you know, a good deal of pressure now being put on 
the British Government regarding the 10,000 or so Turkish Cypriot 
refugees in the Akrotiri-Episkopi Sovereign Base Area. The British 
Government is being asked to return these refugees to mainland 
Turkey," from wliich point, presumabl}", they would be sent back to 
the northern part of Cyprus, wliich has been denuded, at this point, 
of population. It has only approximately^ 15 percent of the total 
population of C3^prus occupying 45 percent of the territory. 

It is an interesting statistic, perhaps, that there is one Turkish 
soldier in the northern sector for every one and a half Turkish Cypriot 
inhabitants. 

TURKISH DENIALS OF A PHASE THREE? 

Senator Kennedy. Have you noticed or seen any statements by 
Turkish leaders that could give us any sense of hope that this phase 
three is not in their bag of alternatives? Have they made any strong 
representations in the United Nations or in Geneva or Ankara that, 
as far as they are concerned, the military aspect has been ended? 

Ai"e there any statements we can look to, that we can get any hope 
that this might not be a realistic alternative? 

Dr. Skiotis. I can think of no statements that one could look to to 
get reassurance in this regard. Indeed, the record, I think is very 
disturbing; because there have been numerous very strongly worded 
United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cease-fires. 
But, the Turks, in this particular crisis, have a record of deliberately 
violating cease-fire agreement after cease-fire agreement, whether 
it was agreed to by the United Nations or some other form of talks — 
in Geneva, for example. 

So, the mere fact that there is now one further cease-fire in effect at 
this point in Cyprus is not, I would think veiy reassuring if tb.e Turkish 
Government felt that it was in its interests to engage in further 
military operations. I would like to think that this would not be the 
case, but I cannot say that I am sanguine on the point. 

U.N. ACCESS IN TURKISH SECTOR 

Senator Kennedy. Has the United Nations had free access to the 
northern sector? 



22 

Dr. Skiotis. The United Nations, as I stated in mj report, has 
total and free access in the Government-controlled southern part of 
the island. They are, therefore, very effectively protecting the Turkish 
community, and seeing to it that relief, food, medicines, and so forth, 
get to the isolated Turkish Cypriot pockets on that part of the island. 
Their freedom of movement in the north, however, is severely ham- 
pered and limited by the ,Turkish military. The same holds true for 
the freedom of movement of other relief agencies, such as the Inter- 
national Red Cross. 

I think the members of the study mission feel very strongly that 
one of the beneficial areas where the United States could appl}^ its 
diplomatic muscle would be to insure that the humanitarian and relief 
agencies are given free access to the northern zone, to look into this 
question of what is happening to the people there. 

OPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT 

May I also add, in this connection, a related point, and that is that 
the airport of Nicosia, the international airport, which is ^the only 
civilian airport of any size on the island, has been closed since the 
fighting, and it is not available for the landing of relief planes from 
the outside world. Whatever airborne relief is provided is provided 
now through the use of the British RAF base at Akrotiri. It goes 
without sa3dng that another airport would greatly facilitate the flow 
•of relief on an urgent basis to the people of Cyprus. 

Tliere also seemed, in this connection, to be problems with the use 
of the sea lanes to the island of CA^prus. Much of the Greek relief, 
which, as I stated, has been substantial, has been provided by ship 
to the port of Limassol. Because the area — that is to say the sea 
around Cyprus — has been unilaterally declared a war zone b}^ the 
Turkish Government. Thus, the risk that ships take when they pro- 
vide relief to Cyprus, and the question of insurance which has to be 
paid, is a very serious one; so that, again, efforts to change this desig- 
nation as war zone would greatl^^ facilitate the flow of relief. 

Senator Kennedy. I think that is a worthwhile point to consider, to 
insure that both the sea lanes and the air lanes are open. And I'm 
sure there are a number of other steps that could be taken almost 
immediately that would have a really important impact in terms of 
relief to refugees on the basis of humanitarianism, without even 
getting to the question of political negotiations. 

Dr. Skiotis. I agree. 

Senator Kennedy. We will be interested in finding out what the 
iidministration is doing about these problems. 

I hope you will stay for the rest of our hearing this morning, as we 
hear from the Department of State. 

Dr. Skiotis. I will. Thank you. 

Senator Kennedy. Very good. Thank you veiy much. 

Our ne.xt witness is the Honorable Arthur Hartman, who is Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Chairman of the 
Department's Task Force on Cyprus. We appreciated his testimony 
before the subcommittee on August 20, and we welcome his appear- 
ance here today. 



23 

I also want to indicate liow much we appreciate all the help and 
lassistance given to our study mission. I hope you will tell the Depart- 
ment, and I will write to the Secretary myself. They said all the way 
through the trip, the Department extended every courtesy, and gave 
every degree oi" cooperation and assistance. This has become some- 
thing that we, both in the trips of our subcommittee to Southeast 
Asia, and in other parts of the world, ^\'hich has become very charac- 
teristic, and I just wanted to indicate to the Department how much 
we appreciate the enormous help. And we are glad you are here. 

The full committee has just called me, and I have to go dow^istairs 
for one minute to make a quorimi, and then we will start \\ith you. 

[A brief recess was taken.] 

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Hartman, Me welcome you. I apologize for 
the brief recess. Perhaps you would make some opening comments, 
and then I could ask some qu.estions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AETHUR HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPA- 
NIED BY RUSSELL S. McCLURE, FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF COOR- 
DINATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. Hartman. I have no formal statement to the committee. I 
would like to express my appreciation for meeting with you, and also 
hearing the report of Professor Skiotis. I do not think that we would 
differ with his description of the serious difficulties that are faced in 
finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. I think we ma}^ have some 
minor differences of assessment in terms of the actual numbers of 
refugees and the requirements in the future. But it is clear to us that 
the general description that he gives of the refugee situation is an 
accurate one. 

We would perhaps have a lower figure for the number of Greek 
Cypriots in need of assistance in the southern area, but it is still a very 
sizable ligiu'e. Our figure is something like 163,000, and he used the 
figure of 194,000. It is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate, 
mainly because man}' of the people who have come south have either 
gone in with families or relatives, or perhaps into some of the cities of 
the south, and not necessaril}- into the camps that have been set up. 
But some of those may still require assistance. So that you cannot 
even take the numbers that are actually physically in camps as being 
the total numbers of refugees in need of assistance. 

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO UNHCR 

Mr. McClure has just come back from Nicosia, where he has talked 
to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and to 
the Cypriot Government authorities and also to the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities in the northern part of Cyprus. We also received a visit 
recently from the Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Mr. Mace. I believe he also talked with the subcommittee staff. Their 
estimate, through the end of the year, for the requirements from 
September 1 until the end of the year, is $22 million. We have alread}?- 
made a pledge of $3 million. This is in addition to $3.2 million we made 
-available during the summer. 



24 

But that is still not up to one-third of the requirement which would 
normally be expected of us, and we are examining now the resources 
we would have available, to come closer to the share that would be 
expected of the United States. I am disappointed myself in the response 
from other donor countries. During these U.N. sessions, when we are 
meeting with foreign ministers, particularly from the European 
countries, we are making the point to them that there is a large re- 
quirement here. We believe that greater efforts will have to be made 
by them in order to meet this very serious situation. We have urged 
the U.N. High Commissioner to take steps to bring this to the atten- 
tion of the European governments — the need for an additional con- 
tribution. 

USES OF CONTINGENCY FUND 

We are now in the process of examining our resource situation. The 
contingency fund, as I understand it, will permit us to fund part of 
that $3 million pledge, and we are now looking at the question of 
whether or not we should now transfer, under the transfer authority 
in the Foreign Assistance Act, amounts of mone\'" from the $10 million 
that we have the possibility of transferring for refugee matters to the 
pledge that we would make for assistance to the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for use in Cyprus. I think that with that amount of money,, 
we could probably get close to the total of $7.3 million, which would be 
our one-third share of this $22 million requirement. 

This, of course, only takes us to the end of the year. My under- 
standing is that by the end of the year, the contingency fund itself" 
will be exhausted. And therefore, we have to all think seriousl}^ about a 
replenishment of that fund, or some special provision that would have 
to be made in order to meet requirements that might extend beyond 
January 1. 

Senator Kennedy. How do we get that now? Are you going to 
get that money from some existing account, or do we need it in the 
foreign aid bill? 

Mr. Hartman. I would like to come back to you on that. My 
understanding is we are all right through the end of the year, and the 
U.N. has not yet made any estimates beyond the first of the year. 
When I saw the Deputy High Commissioner, I said to him, I do not 
think it is realistic at all for you to be talking only about this period 
from September 1 through December 31, because you cannot expect 
to talk to these governments now and come around to them again 
sometime in December and say, look, we have a new requirement now 
for 1975. Wliile none of us want to give the impression that we think 
tliis is a problem that is not going to be solved by negotiation, I think 
it is only wise and prudent to project further ahead. 

Senator Kennedy. What will not be solved b}' negotiation? 

Mr. Hartman. We do not wish to give the impression that we think 
the refugee problem on Cj^prus will not be significantly changed or 
altered during the course of negotiations between the two communities. 
But I think it is only realistic to see that this problem is certainly going 
to extend into 1975, and that we ought to be thinking now about the^ 
contingenc}^ funding of requirements in 1975. 



25 

PLANNING FOR THE WORST ON CYPRUS 

Senator Kennedy. How can you make a plan if you do not know 
what the pohtical situation will be, or have we got some idea of when a 
poUtical settlement is going to be achieved? I suppose if there is some 
hope that we are going to soon resolve the Cyprus crisis through 
political negotiations, then humanitarian needs would be a good deal 
different than if there is going to be a complete lack of negotiations 
and the refugees remain where they are. I suppose if I were the High 
Commissioner, I would be probably looking at it the same way. I do 
not know how you make such long-term projections unless the 
administration feels that there is very little hope that you are going 
to reach any negotiations over the period of this year. 

Mr. Hartman. As Mr. McClure suggested, the best thing to do is 
hope for the best and plan for the worst. My own feeling is that under 
the best circumstances, the situation will not be significantly different 
by the first of the year, in terms of the refugee problem; because I 
would think that even if negotiations proceed with good Avill on all 
sides toward a solution, one of the last matters to be dealt with will 
be the very serious and difficult political problem of the movement 
of populations. 

As Professor Skiotis said, if the final arrangement involves some 
kind of zonal system, he is quite right in saying that the current 
Turkish position is that there should be a large movement of popula- 
tion. The Turkish authorities see separation of the two communities 
as the only way to assure stability on the island, whereas the position 
of the Greek Cypriot authorities is that that will just prolong the 
problem into the future, cause difiiculties into the future; and it would 
be very unfair in terms of what the equities of the situation are, 
where the people have lived in the past and made their livelihood. 

If the Greek Cypriots were to accept a zonal system, they would 
hope that the final solution would provide for perhaps some voluntary 
movement of populations, but not a massive required movement 
of populations. That will probably be one of the most difficult issues 
to settle in the negotiation. I do not see that kind of negotiation ending 
successfully in a short time. 

Therefore, I think we have to plan for further requirements on the 
refugee side, extending into next year. 

U.S. ONE-THIRD COMMITMENT TO UNHCR 

Senator Kennedy. But at least, with regard to this year, could you 
give us an assurance that the United States is prepared to meet its 
one-third obligation? 

Mr. Hartman. I think we could come very close. I think we were 
saying this morning that there might be a gap of $800,000 or $900,000. 
But what really worries me is the lack of response from others. We 
still have that other two-thirds to be met. 

Now, the Greek Government has made some provision. It is un- 
certain whether they have agreed to the amount that Professor 
Skiotis mentioned. 



26 

OTHER DONORS BEING ENCOURAGED? 

Senator Kennedy. What efforts have been made in the Depart- 
ment to get other countries to contribute? 

Mr. Hartman. We have sent an instruction to our missions in 
Europe, particular!}^, to make approaches at a high level in each 
government, saying what we are doing, what we understand the 
requirements to be, and urging them to make their contributions to 
the funds that have been established bv the U.N. High Commissioner. 

As the Secretary of State meets with the foreign ministers during 
this U.N. session, he, too, is mentioning this to them as a serious 
problem, which in terms of all of our interests in seeing the political 
negotiation process underway, is really an essential imderpinning 
for the success of those talks. If the situation deteriorates among the 
refugees, it will certainh' make it much more difficult for the communal 
talks to proceed. 

OPENING NICOSIA AIRPORT 

Senator Kennedy. One of the relief bottlenecks, of course, has been 
the thing which Professor Skiotis mentioned this morning that 
should be done immediately and which would have little relationship 
to the immediate military situation- — is the ojiening of the Nicosia 
airport and the sea lanes around the island, permitting greater 
humanitarian assistance to come to Cyprus. What direct diplomatic 
efforts are being made in these areas to provide some immediate 
action, and what kind of reaction are you getting from the Turks? 

Mr. Hartman. In terms of the Nicosia airport, when I was in 
Nicosia, and later in a series of approaches that we have made, both 
to the Turkish authorities and to the Cypriot Government, we have 
urged that the airport be opened for this very purpose. It is c[uite 
difficult now. There is tremendous traffic that has to go through the 
sovereign base area. We also felt that the o])ening of the air])ort 
would begin to show that a more normal existence was returning, 
as well as being much more economical in terms of getting assistance 
into the area. 

We understand that this has figured in the communal talks, and 
are urging, we have told both Denktash and Clerides that we thought 
this ought to be one of the first things that they could agree to. 
The difficulty seems to be centered on what kind of assurances could 
be given, that the airport, once reopened, will not- be used for the 
purposes of resupplying forces on either side. The Turks believe that, 
since they do not control the airport, perhaps it could be used for 
resupply of Greek forces on the island. We think that some arrange- 
ments could be worked out ^vith U.N. control continuing on the air- 
port itself to prevent that sort of thing from happening. 

My understanding of the present state of those discussions is 
that both sides have expressed some concern about the opening of 
the airport, and have put forward some conditions for the opening 
of the airport. But we are going to continue to press to have that one 
of the first items of business that they try to reach agreement on. 

purpose of continued MILITARY AID TO TURKEY 

Senator Kennedy. What can you say, jNIr. wSecretar}^, we have 
really gained by the continuation of military assistance to Turkc}"? 



27 

I asked you about this some month or so ago, when you were here ^ 
about reconsidering the decision not to cut off mihtary aid. You said 
then we have rejected it for the moment, because our feehng is to 
get these parties back to the negotiating table, you have to have the 
greatest influence on all parties concerned. 

Can you tell us, over the period of the last month or so, what we 
have been able to achieve by maintaining that position, in opposition 
to both the rule of the law, and the obvious will of Congress, that 
military aid to Turke}' be terminated? 

Mr. Hartman. Our feeling has been that the only solution to this 
problem will come through negotiation by the parties. We have seen 
in our talks with both the Turkish and Greek Governments that we 
can, by making suggestions, by trying to show them areas where we 
think agreement is possible, have some influence on the movement 
toward negotiations, both between the communities on the island 
and, eventually, in creating a framework within which a broader 
negotiation is possible. 

Now, I think where we have differed with those who felt that assist- 
ance should be cut off immediately to Turkey is that we feel that 
is an ulthnate steji when 3'ou have really given up trjnng to exercise in- 
fluence on one of the parties. We recognize that the legal require- 
ments may force us to this. That situation is being discussed with the 
President. We have noted the action taken yesterday" in w^hich a vote 
on the continuing resolution required the administration not to use 
any of that assistance, until such time that the President could certify 
that progress is being made in the negotiations. 

As I say, we have opposed that action. We may, of course, be forced 
to accept it, if that is the will of the Congress. 

RULE OF LAW AND CONTINUED TURKISH MILITARY AID 

Senator Kennedy. Are you not forced — is it not the rule of the law 
itself — that will force you to terminate it now, under the specific 
language of the law? 

Mr. Hartman. That situation is being examined by the Secretary 
and the President to see what the exact status of that is, and the re- 
quirement that it puts on the administration. 

Senator Kennedy. Well, I do not see how, myself, how there could 
be much question in the minds of, I would think, the legal counsel of 
the Department. The provision says explicitly: any country which 
uses defense articles furnished under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 
as amended, in violation of the provisions of this chapter, shall be 
immediately ineligible for further assistance. 

Certainly, the Libraiy of Congress legal opinion ^ says that U.S. 
military aid is intended for the sole purpose of permitting beneficiaries 
to defend themselves from aggression, wdiether from internal or ex- 
ternal oiigin. Use of articles and services for other than defensive 
])urposes, for aggressive purposes, is barred by law. So I am just 
wondering what jiossible legal rationale is being advanced mthin the 
Department to suggest that these provisions, which are a part of the 
law, should not be complied with immediately? 

' For full text, see app. I. 



28 

Mr. Hartman. Well, I think the question is — the intent of those 
]:)rovisions was presumably to get the individual recipients, if they 
violated those understandings, to come back into compliance with the 
law. 

Senator Kennedy. It does not say that. It does not say you get one 
crack at it and then if you rescind your aggressive acts you are OK; it 
does not say that at all. 

Mr. Hartman. I do not have that provision in front of me, but 
self defense is not the only provision of that paragraph. It talks about 
international agreements, I believe, and there are some other words 
used. I am not saying that this is justified or that our conclusions 
do not agree with the conclusion reached in the study you refer to 
from the Library of Congress. But I say it is a matter of study, and 
the President is going to be discussing this; and in fact, I think he is 
this morning discussing this with congressional leadership. 

HOW TO CHARACTERIZE TURKISH ACTION IN CYPRUS? 

Senator Kennedy. Well, how would you characterize the Turkish 
action in Cyprus, if it is not aggression? Would you call it aggression 
or what? 

Mr. Hartman. You are speaking of their action as of today? 

Senator Kennedy. Phase one, phase two; take j^our pick. 

Mr. Hartman. As I said, I think, in my statement when I was 
here before, the action that they took immediately after the coup 
in Cyprus was justified by the Turkish authorities under the Guaran- 
tee Treaty of 1960.^ 

I would not personally want to justify any further actions that 
they took after that — or even attempt to do so — under those agree- 
ments or, indeed, the resolutions that were voted by the Security 
Council — in fact, the United States voted for all of those resolutions 
in the Security Council, and the last resolution was a condemnation 
of the Turkish action. And the difference that we have now is what 
are the chances of moving the parties toward a negotiated solution, 
and what is our assessment. 

At the moment, we are still hopeful; and on the basis of the con- 
versations we have had this week in New York — and we will continue 
to have next week, with both the Turkish and Greek foreign min- 
isters — we have hope that our influence will help to move them toward 
a negotiated solution to this problem. 

But, as I say, the administration will be talking with the Congress 
about the specifics of the aid situation, both with respect to the 
provision in the continuing resolution, and also the provisions of 
the Foreign Assistance Act. 

Senator Kennedy. Well, I was not really asking so much about 
how Turkey justified its action, but how we viewed it. And, of course 
part of that Guarantee Treaty which they have relied upon calls 
for consultations with the other guarantors. 

Mr. Hartman. That is correct; and, indeed, beyond consultation. 
In 1960, when the original agreements were signed, we gave permis- 
sion to the Turkish authorities to bring certain of the weapons onto 

' For the full text of the Treaty, see app. II. 



29 

the island, which is permitted to the President to do. We certainly 
did not do that this time. Therefore, there is a recognition in the 
background of this problem that some kind of permission, at least, 
Avas required in 1960. And it was not sought this time. 

CURRENT REVIEW OF LEGALITY OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY 

Senator Kennedy. Well, is there any question in your mind that 
given the action that Turkey has taken, that U.S. military aid has 
to be terminated according to the law? 

Mr. Hartman. The specific response to that question, Mr. Chair- 
man, I would much prefer to come from the consultations taking 
place and the Secretary's decision — how he is going to approach this 
A\ith Congress — because he has not made a determination so far as 
I know; but he has discussed it with the President and they are 
deciding now, and in consultation with the Congress, what the next 
step should be. 

Senator Kennedy. I am glad he is talking ^vith the Congress. 
However, I do not understand what you mean "in consultation Avith 
Congress." I do not know of any Member of Congress who will be 
able to say very much other than what the law states on this question, 
and that, \vithout the immediate termination of Turkish military aid, 
there is a violation of it. I am just trying to find in my ovm. mind what 
possible basis there could be for the Secretary of State not obeying it. 

Mr. Hart.man. I mil agree to give you further information. I am 
a little hindered now because I know it is being discussed this morning 
and I do not know myself. 

Senator Kennedy. Between whom and whom? 

Mr. Hart.man. I am not even sure with whom. There is a meeting 
this morning with congressional leaders. 

Senator Kennedy, Somewhere there is a meeting and someone is 
talking about it. 

Mr. Hartman. No; between the President, the Secretary, and 
congressional leaders, but I do not know who is involved. 

Senator Kennedy. You can provide more on this later. 

We vnW recess for 5 or 10 minutes. A matter has come up. Excuse me. 

[Discussion off the record.] 

rationale for continuing military aid if legal 

Senator Kennedy. Let me just ask a few more questions because 
the hour is getting late. 

If there is a determination that continued military aid to Turkey 
is not a violation of the law in the technical sense — how one could 
reach that opinion is beyond me — but if there is such a determination, 
what is the attitude within the Department about the efficacy for 
continuing military assistance? 

Mr. Ha^rtman. Well, as I tried to say, Mr. Chairman, what we want 
to do now is to try to get this negotiating process started and started 
as quickly as possible. 

To do this requires that if we are going to have influence on the 
situation, we maintain that influence. Whatever influence we have 
with the Turkish government, I do not believe that a delay in the 

41-207—74 3 



30 

negotiations, a hardening of the position anj^ further than it has 
akeady been hardened on one side or the other is going to help us 
get an early negotiation started. Our entire efforts now are to get 
that process started as soon as possible because the longer the status 
quo remains the more difficult it will be to reach a settlement. The 
real question is: Does that action by us hasten the process of ne- 
gotiation? 

Now you can say that in the end cutting off aid will have its effects 
and eventuall}^ you will have a better negotiation. That is not our 
assessment. Unless this negotiating process gets started now and gets 
to the real issues, the very difficult issues — the longer it drags on— the 
more difficult it is going to be to solve. 

As I say, the legal question is being studied and discussed, and I 
am not saying to you that there is a justification for its continuance. 

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS 

Senator Kennedy. Could you tell us what the status is of the 
negotiations now? 

Mr. Hartman. At the moment the two communities have some 
discussions underway. Thev mainly relate to the hmnanitarian 
situation, the exchange of prisoners and the refugees. But my under- 
standing is that there is also some discussion of the political issues. 

The important thing now is to get support for a greater discussion 
in those talks of the political issues. That is dependent upon the 
attitudes both in Ankara and in Athens. We are attempting to use 
our influence with both parties to give the support necessary so that 
these discussions can proceed. And we are continuing. The Secretary 
met with both the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign 
Minister in New York, and he intends to meet with them again 
Sunday and Monday to see if there is any help we can give to this 
process. And we also talked to the British Foreign Minister, the third 
of the guarantor powers. 

Then, of course, there is the political situation on both sides that 
needs some clarification. There will be elections in Greece, which also 
further complicate the general situation as it exists today. 

There is a political complication in Turkey in that they are now in 
the process of forming a new government. All of that does not make 
the negotiating process any easier. 

WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS 

Senator Kennedy. Is it our position that there is going to have to be 
a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus? 

Mr. Hartman. Well, let me state what the last agreed position of 
the parties was. 

On July 30 thej^ agreed to a declaration in Geneva calling for the 
phased withdrawal of forces. The 1 960 agreement did provide, as part 
of the guarantee mechanism, that there would be certain forces on the 
island. 

Now, when j' ou say total withdrawal, it seems to me that is linked 
-with the negotiations in the sense that the final outcome of these 
negotiations will have to include some kind of guarantee. 



31 

Now, whether that guarantee will agam call for forces from Greece 
and Turkey on the island, whether it would be in the form of an 
international agreement with no foreign forces on the island, it seems 
to me that is something that will have to come out of the negotiations. 

So I would say we do not have a position on whether a total with- 
drawal of all forces should be the final outcome. 

Senator Kennedy. Well, should not 

Mr. Hartman. They both agree there should be a phased \\dthdrawal 
of forces. Clearly, 40,000 Turkish troops on the island is not 

A GESTURE FROM TURKEY? 

Senator Kennedy. Should there not at least be some gesture on the 
part of the Turks? 

Mr. Hartman. As an aid to the negotiating process? 

Senator Kennedy. That is right. 

Mr. Hartman. Yes, and I think, as a matter of fact, that gesture 
might be more difScult if they thought they were being called upon 
to do that under pressure. I think their reaction would be to decline 
to make a gesture of reduction, to perhaps reconsider that now so that 
it does not look as if they are doing it under pressure. 

Senator Kennedy. Are not the Greeks under a lot of pressure, too? 
What about the pressure of all those refugees? People cannot go home. 
That is pressure on them. 

Mr. Hartman. That is right. 

Senator Kennedy. They are being pressured, too, every day they 
are denied the right to go home or see their friends. That is why I 
do not understand. Pressure is a one-way street, evidently. 

We are reluctant to say very much about the Turkish action. We 
have refused to call it aggression, as it really is — clearly and blatantly 
it is. 

Mr. Hartman. Well, it may not have been called aggression, but we 
voted for the Security Council resolution which condemned the 
Turkish action. 

Senator Kennedy. Well, what would jou call it? Do we just vote it 
or do we call it something? 

Mr. Hartman. I do not have the resolution before me. I do not 
believe it used the word "aggression," but it condemned their 
militar}^ action. 

Senator Kennedy. Well, are we calling on the Turks to make a 
gesture? Wliat are we caUing on them to do? You say on the one hand 
that it may very well be advantageous for us to continue our military 
assistance to them because then we have some degree of influence. 
What are we trying to influence? 

Rather than the general kind of vague hopefulness for fruitful 
negotiations that you say will help resolve the conflict. Other than 
those generalities, what do you expect? Wliat can we look forward 
to? What have we asked them to do? 

turkey and geneva negotiations 

Mr. Hartman. It seems to me that we must start with what the 
parties themselves are now prepared to discuss, and that is changing 
as time goes on. 



32 

I can remember when I was in Geneva at the second phase of the 
Geneva Conference. There was a rehictance to even discuss the 
possibility of a federal solution. Now, just a few weeks later, public 
statements have been made by all of the parties that they are 
prepared at least to examine a federal solution as the possible out- 
come of these negotiations. I consider that some progress toward 
reaching common ground. 

The real questions that must be decided in the negotiations, and 
we are discussing these with all parties, are the question of the 
degree of separation of the communities with the Turkish Govern- 
ment taking the position that it should Be almost a complete 
separation. 

I do not like to call it partition because they also say that they 
believe that there should be a federal arrangement witliin a sovereign 
independent state. I think there is a distinction to be made between 
having two separate zones, if that is the final agreement, and parti- 
tion, which implies that part of the island goes to Turkey and a 
part of the island goes to Greece, which both parties, again, have 
agreed is not what they desire. 

Senator Kennedy. What is the difference between the separation 
they seek and partition? If all of the parties agree on that, what is 

really the 

Mr. Hartman. The distinction is that you have an independent 
administration in the areas controlled by the Turkish Cypriot com- 
munity and the Greek Cypriot community, but you have a federal 
structure over those two independent administrations. 

And another significant issue in the negotiations will be: what are 
the powers of the federal authority if they move toward a federal 
solution? 

EEFUGEES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE 

The refugee question will be one of the most important issues, and 
here again you have a difference of view as to whether or not there 
shoukrbe a major movement of population to accomplish tliis virtual 
separation of the populations of the communities or whether it should 
be voluntary with some people going north or some people coming 
south, but not a completely exclusive two zonal concept with no 
Greek Cypriots in the north and no Turkish Cypriots in the south. 

So the issues in the negotiation are the form of government, and 
territorial agreements, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the guar- 
antee for the eventual outcome. 

Those are really the four major issues and what we are talking to the 
parties about is trying to find out what their positions are and whether 
we can see any common ground that can be suggested. That has been 
the purpose of our talks with all of the parties. 

Senator Kennedy. I understand that the talks have broken down 

today. 

Mr. Hartman. They have had their difficulties in the past. I cer- 
tainly hope they have not broken down completely. I do not have 
information on exactly what was discussed today. 



33 

FURTHER TURKISH MILITARY ACTION? 

Senator Kennedy. What possibilities do you see of further Turkish 
mihtar}^ action— a phase 3? Is that a possibihty? Is it a remote pos- 

sibihty? 

Mr. Hartman. Well, it is a danger. We have made our view very, 
very clear, indeed, that this is something which will not only set back 
the efforts to reach a settlement, but something that we would have, 
to totally oppose. 

Senator Kennedy. In what way? 

Mr, Hartman. Well 

Senator Kennedy. Would you cut off military aid then? 

Mr. Hartman. The Turkish Government is going to have to make 
its decision on whether or not it seeks a negotiated solution. We have 
tried to paint the picture of what we think the future will look like if 
they do not seek a negotiated solution, and it is a rather bleak picture, 
we think. 

We believe that up until now the Turkish authorities have said that 
they are interested in negotiations. They are talking about these 
issues. We think the positions of the two parties are still very far 
apart. 

Our efforts have been to try to see whether there is any common 
ground at all to be found. 

"leverage" with TURKEY 

Senator Kennedy. What is our real leverage with Turkey if they 
decide on phase 3? 

Mr. Hartman. Well, in the end I think that you have to, at least 
we have been going on the assumption that there is a rational tview 
and we have been painting what we think is an accurate picture of 
what the future would hold if they decide that the only solution is 
one which is going to be by force of arms. We have seen enough 
situations like this around the world where people might think that 
for awhile at least arms can produce a solution, but it is a very tem- 
porary phenomenon and in a few years' time people who think that 
usually find they have brought themselves a much bigger problem. 

Senator Kennedy. Do you think the fact that we have continued 
military aid to Turkey increases or decreases the possibility of a 
military phase 3? 

Mr. Hartman. I do not think that that would be the significant 
factor in their minds in deciding whether or not to continue. I think 
they reahze that — we hope that they realize on the basis of all of the 
talks — that tliis would have a very detrimental effect in their rela- 
tionship not onh^ with us but with a lot of other people. 

Senator Kennedy. So it really does not make very much difference? 

Mr. Hartman. Well, our conclusion in July was that the choice 
for us, if we wished to stop this action, was the use of force by the 
United States. We rejected that. We had had an earlier experience 
with the Turkish Government of threats to cut off assistance because 
of their decision on opium growing and they were not deterred from 
making the decision to grow opium again because of that threat. 



34 

Their action was something that was taken for internal political 
reasons. We have, however, in talking to the Turkish authorities, 
succeeded in getting them to make a decision on this issue of opium, 
which we think will lead to a control of this production. But that was 
•done through negotiation and talk and through the use of U.N. 
pressures, which we think have now been successful. They have 
agreed to use a new process which the U.N. authorities believe will 
enable them to have the best chance at any rate of controlling the 
traffic in opium. 

But the threat of cutting off military assistance did not deter 
them. 

U.S. RELATIONS WITH GREECE 

Senator Kennedy. Wliat efforts are we making towards the Greek 
Government, if any, to try to restore some relationship with them? 

Mr. Hartman. We have instructed our Ambassador to have talks 
with the Greek Government. He has just arrived there. The Secretary 
met with Foreign Minister Mavros in New York 2 days ago and will 
be meeting with him again Sunday evening. We are asking them 
what their views are on some of the other problems they face because, 
after all, Cyprus is not the only issue the new Government faces. We 
assured them of our support for the democratic regime which has 
been estabhshed in Athens, and we will be discussing with them any 
needs and concerns that they have, not only on the Cyprus situation 
but in other areas as well. 

ROLE OF THE CIA IN SAMPSON COUP 

Senator Kennedy. Can you tell us what, if any, is the role of the 
CIA in the Athens-inspired coup in Cyprus, and the emergence of 
Mr. vSampson and the disposition of President Makarios? 

Mr. Hartman. I can tell you that there was no role of the CIA 
in the coup against Archbishop Makarios. We have said that to 
Archbishop Makarios. Archbishop Makarios himself has recognized 
that at least on two other occasions, on one occasion mth which I 
am familiar, we had warned him of coup plotting against him by 
Greek Army people on the island. 

We heard coup rumors ourselves and, in fact, Ambassador Davies 
discussed this situation with Archbishop Makarios the Friday before 
the coup. Archbishop Makarios gave us the impression that while 
lie, too, had heard of these rumors, he was not as concerned as we 
thought perhaps he should be. And perhaps we were all lulled by 
that. 

But in any case he did not feel in that conversation with Ambassador 
Davies that there was an immediate threat. But Ambassador Davies 
deliberately did raise this. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS 

Senator Kennedy. Well, we thank you for your testimony and we 
would like to stay in close touch with you about this whole problem. 
As we see time and again before this subcommittee — as in the situa- 
tion with Biafra, Bangladesh, and Vietnam — ultimately, in all of 



35 

these problems of hundreds of thousands, even miUions of refugees 
that you have, the most effective way to do something about them is 
to resolve the political problems that created them. 

And I hope that in the meantime we can work closely with the 
Department of State and AID in the development of your programs 
to deal mth the special needs of the refugees on all sides, the Turkish 
refugees in the south as well as the Greek Cypriot refugees in the 
north and in other areas. But also that we can recognize that until 
we get a political solution to this, it is going to be extremely difficult 
over the long term to meet those needs of the refugees. 

But I would hope, as you can well understand, that our government 
will consider the pressure on these refugees when the Administration 
is considering what our public posture is going to be — that their 
interests and their well-being will be put high on the roster of priorities 
in terms of any of these negotiations. 

I can think of no more important item on any agenda than the 
well-being of the people of Cyprus who have been absolutely dev- 
astated and, in many respects, decimated, on that island. 

vSo we appreciate your appearance this morning and apologize 
for the interruptions earlier today. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hartm AN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Kennedy. The subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene 
subject to the call of the Chair.] 



APPENDIX I 

Military Aid Cutoff to Aggressor Recipients of Foreign Military 

Assistance 

(A Study by the Library of Congress) 

Military Aid Cutoff to Aggressor-Recipients 

Reference is made to your inquiry requesting information on the above matter. 
Specificall^y, you ask whether statutes limit extending U.S. military aid to nations 
which employ same for aggressive purposes inimical to world peace and domestic 
interests. 

That U.S. military aid is intended for the sole and exclusive purpose of per- 
mitting recipients to defend themselves against aggression, whether from in- 
ternal or external sources, seems to permeate the laws governing this matter. 
Title II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, relating to the exten- 
sion of military assistance, rests on the congressional finding that "the efforts of 
the United States and other friendly countries to promote peace and security 
continue to require measures of support based upon the principle of effective self- 
help and mutual aid." Accordingly, it is the purpose of this title "to authorize 
measures in the common defense against internal and external aggression, in- 
cluding the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries 
and international organizations." Taking note of the dangers to world peace and 
national security posed by international communism, and so-called wars of liber- 
ation. Congress declares that "in the administration [of title II] priority shall be 
given to the needs of those countries in danger of becoming victims of active 
Communist or Communist-supported aggression or those countries in which the 
internal security is threatened by Communist-inspired or Communist-supported 
internal subversion." 

That the principal purpose of U.S. military aid was intended for defensive 
rather than aggressive purposes is clearly implied by various other statements 
contained in Title II's statement of policy. Thus, Congress states that the fur- 
nishing of miUtary assistance notwithstanding, "it remains the poUcy of the 
United States to continue to exert maximum efforts to . . . control weapons of 
mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including 
armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying countries against 
violation and evasion." Elsewhere, Congress declares that "[i]n enacting this 
legislation, it is" its "intention ... to promote the peace of the world and the 
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an 
improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the 
ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if neces- 
sary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression, facilitating arrange- 
ments for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to main- 
tain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in 
the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, 
and poHtical progress." § 501; 22 U.S.C. 2301. 

The operative provision of the Act are if anything more explicit regarding the 
exclusively defensive purposes of the military aid authorized title II. Thus, 
section 502 provides, in relevant part, that — "Defense articles and defense serv- 
ices to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate 
self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective 
arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, 
or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures 
requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security, or for the purpose of assisting foreign military 
forces in less developed friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of 
the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to construct public 

(37) 



38 

works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social develop- 
ment of such friendly countries. . . , " § 503, 22 U.S.C. § 2302. 

In authorizing military assistance to friendly foreign countries and inter- 
national organizations, Congress wrote into the Act the express requirement that 
the President has to find that the extension of such assistance will strengthen the 
security of the United States and promote world peace. § 503; 22 U.S.C. § 2311. 

In order to be eligible for defense articles on a grant basis, an applicant country, 
inter alia, must agree, "that ... it will not, without the consent of the Presi- 
dent . . . use or permit the use of such articles for purposes other than those for 
which furnished . . . ." § 505(a)(1)(c); 22 U.S.C. § 2314(a)(1)(c). Similarly, 
Congress enjoined the President from furnishing defense articles on a grant basis 
to any country at a cost in excess of $3,000,000 unless he determines "that such 
country conforms to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; that 
such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its 
own defensive strength, and the defensive strength of the free world; . . ." 
§ 505(b) (1), (2); 22 U.S.C. 2314(b) (1), (2). 

Any doubt regarding the mandatory (as distinguished from directory) nature 
of the aforementioned restrictions on foreign military assistance authorized by the 
1961 Act should have been dispelled bv a significant amendment which was added 
one year later. Pubhc Law 87-565, Pt.' II, § 201(a), 76 Stat. 259 (1962) 22 U.S.C. 
2314(d). That amendment which added section 505(d) provides that use by any 
recipient nation of materials in violation of the terms and conditions contained 
in this and related laws, past and present, "shall [render it] . . . immediately in- 
eligible for further assistance." Section 505(d) reads as follows: 

"Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished 
such country under this chapter, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, 
or any predecessor foreign assistance Act, in substantial violation of the provisions 
of tWs chapter [§§ 2311-2320] of this title or any agreements entered into pursuant 
to any of such acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance." 

The substance of section 505(d) was proposed in the House version of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1962, H.R. 11921, § 201. The House Report that accompanied 
the bill (H. Kept. No. 1788, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 26-27) states, in relevant 
part, that — 

"Section 201(a) amends Section 506 [subsequently renumbered section 505], 
relating to conditions of eligibility, by adding a new subsection (c) [subsequently 
redesignated (d)] providing that any country which hereafter uses defense articles 
or defense services furnished such country under this act, the Mutual Security 
Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign assistance act in violation of 
any of the provisions of this chapter or any agreements entered into pursuant to 
any of these acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance under this 
chapter. 

"The present act requires that military assistance furnished either through 
grants or sales shall be solely for the purposes of internal security, legitimate self- 
defense or the participation in collective arrangements or measures consistent 
with the United Nations Charter or as requested by the United Nations for 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security. It also provides for 
certain conditions of eligibility which include the reaching of agreements as to the 
use, observation, protection, and disposition of the assistance furnished. 

"This amendment will provide the positive penalty not now contained in the 
law for the future violation of the requirements of this chapter or agreements 
under which the equipment or services are furnished. 

"The committee believes that such a i^enalty is necessary and will serve notice 
or agreements as having little or no effect. It is not intended that every small 
disagreement between the United States and recipient countries on the deploy- 
ment of units or uses of equipment would serve to make such countr}' ineligible 
for further assistance. However, where a country actually undertakes an act of 
aggression or refuses to allow continuous observation of the equipment, diverts 
substantial quantities of the items furnished, or otherwise violates the terms of 
its agreements, further assistance under this chapter would be prohibited by this 
Amendment." 

The conference appointed to iron out differences in the measure as passed by the 
Senate and the House, accepted the hitter's recommendation relative to condi- 
tions of eligibility with the addition of the qualification that the violation must be 
substantial in order for the prohibition to apply. The conference report (H. Kept. 
No. 2008, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 17-18) states, in relevant part, that— 



39 

"Section 201 fa) of the House Amendment provided that any country which 
hereinafter used defense articles or defense services furnished such country under 
this act, the Mutual Securit.y Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign 
assistance act, where such use was in violation of the provision of the military 
assistance chapter or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of such acts, 
should be immediately ineligible for further assistance. 

"The Senate bill contained no comparable provision. 

"The committee of conference accepted the House provision with an amend- 
ment which provided that in order for the section to become operative there must 
be a 'substantial' violation of the provisions of the military assistance chapter 
or applicable agreements. The purpose of this amendment is to make clear that 
minor instances of diversion or improper uses would not work to make countries 
ineligible for further military assistance." 

In keeping with traditional practice, the apparent absolute prohibition contained 
in section 505(d) is subject to the President's special waiver authority in section 
614(a), 22 U.S.C. 2364(a), which reads, in relevant part, that — 

"The President may authorize . . . the use of funds made availal^le for 
use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance . . . without regard 
to the requirements of this chapter or any other law, any relating to receipts 
and credits accuring to the United States, anj^ Act appropriating funds for use 
under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in 
furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines 
that such authorization is important to the security of the United States , , . " 
See H. Rept. No, 1788, supra, at p. 18. 

That military aid under title II is Intended for defensive purposes exclusively^ 
seems be3'ond debate. As noted, such assistance was conceived as operating hand 
in glove with economic aid by enabling recipients to defend themselves suffi- 
ciently to allow improvement in economic circumstances which in turn would 
make communism a less appealing alternative. Use of articles and services for 
other than defensive purposes, i.e., for aggressive purposes, is barred bv law. 
However, neither the Act nor its legislative history make clear what kinds of 
activities separate defensive from aggressive purposes. Similarly, aside from 
the noted statement that a substantial violation which makes section 505(d)'s- 
prohibition applicable is not intended to apply to minor violations. Congress- 
provided little or no guidance for clearly distinguishing between the two. It 
is not unlikely that Congress had common sense standards in mind, i.e., general 
notions of the differences between offense and defense. 



The Library of Congress 

congressional research service 

Waiver Authority Under Section 614(a), Foreign Assistance Act or 1961, 

AS Amended, 2 U.S.C. 2364(a) (1974). 

(By Raymond Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, 

September 20, 1974) 

A recent report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of 

Congress states: "That U.S. military aid is intended for the sole and exclusive 
purpose of permitting the recipients to defend themselves against aggression, . . . 
seems to permeate the laws governing the matter." Accordingly, the report con- 
cludes that U.S. military aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, "is 
intended for defensive purposes exclusively seems bej^ond debate." Further, that 
use of U.S. militarv supphes and services "for other than defensive purposes . . . 
is barred by law." See 22 U.S.C. 2314(d). 

At the same time the report cautions that "neither the Act nor its legislative 
history makes clear what kinds of activities separate defensive from aggressive 
purposes." It further notes that Congress provided no clear cut guidelines for 
ascertaining a "substantial violation" of the prohibition against use of U.S. 
military aid for other than defensive purposes which makes the violator "immedi- 
ately inehgible for further assistance." That these terms raise important threshold 
questions which must be resolved before the letter and spirit of the 1961 Act, as 
amended, can be applied in a given context is dramaticallj^ brought home by a 
preemptive strike, such as that undertaken by Israel against Egyj^t which resulted 



40 

in destruction of the latter's air arm. Other illustrations depicting the frequently 
murky area between offensive and defensive operations can be conjured up. 
Indeed, it is a virtual axiom that in many, if not most, cases, the best defense is a 
good offense. In brief, save in clear-cut situation of overt aggression or static 
defense, a decision to terminate military aid to any country for violating the 
prohibition against use of such aid for aggressive purposes may involve the ex- 
'ercise of a substantial judgment. 

As noted in the earlier report, the prohibition in section 505(d) against using 
military assistance for aggressive purposes just referred to was added by a 1962 
amendment to the 1961 law. Section 505(d) was part of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee 1962 Foreign Assistance proposal. The report on the bill (H.R. 11921, 
87th Congress, 2d Session) states, in part, that — 

This amendment will provide the positive penalty not now contained in 
the law for the future violation of the requirements of this chapter [Act] or 
agreements under which the equipment or services are furnished. 

This committee believes that such a penaltjr is necessary and will serve 
notice on recipient counties who may view these conditions or agreements 
as having little or no effect. It is not intended that every small disagreement 
between the United States and recipient countries on the deployment of units 
or uses of equipment would serve to make such country ineligible for further 
assistance. However, where a country actually undertakes an act of aggression 
or refuses to allow continuous observation of the equipment, diverts sub- 
stantial quantities of the items furnished, or otherwise violates the terms of 
its agreements, further assistance under this chapter would be prohibited by 
this amendment. House Report No. 1788, 87th Congress, 2d Session. 
The report concludes in this regard with the observation that the "President'e 
waiver authority contained in section 614(a) of this act may be used to waive ths 
requirements of this subsection. "Ibid. Section 614(a) which formed part of the 
original 1961 enactment then read as follows: 

The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made 

available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance under 

section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed $250,000,000 and 

the use of not to exceed $100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under 

this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this 

chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, 

an Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual Defense 

Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such 

Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is important 

to the security of the United States. Not more than $50,000,000 of the funds 

available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country in any 

fiscal year. 

Since 1961, section 614(a) has been substantively amended once. In 1966, the 

Congress added a new sentence at the end of the section providing that the 

$50,000,000 limitation on the allocations of funds to any country in any one fiscal 

year shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or 

Communist-supported aggression. Section 301(f), 80 Stat. 805(1966). The specific 

language of the new matter added to section 614(a) is — "The limitation contained 

in the preceding sentence shall not applj^ to any country which is a victim of 

active Communist or Communist-supported aggression." 

Notwithstanding the clear statement in the Committee report noted above 
which seemingly disposes of the matter, a question has arisen as to whether the 
authority contained in section 614(a) permits the President to waive the prohi- 
bition in section 505(d). As noted, the former generally authorizes the President to 
waive with respect to $250 million and $100 million of local currency otherwise 
applicable restrictions in a variety of laws, including "the requirements of this 
Act." (Note that the phrase "this Act" was changed to "this chapter" when the 
provision was written into the Foreign Relations Code.) The waiver authority 
delegated by the section is tied to a presidential determination "that such authori- 
zation is important to the security of the United States." However, it is asserted 
that this "is not the onl}^ decision the President must make. He must also deter- 
mine that the furnishing of such assistance must be in furtherance of any of the 
purposes of such Acts." 120 Congressional Record, S16366 (daily edition, Septem- 
ber 11, 1974), The "acts" in question, in addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, include (1) any acts appropriating funds for the purposes of 
this act, including interim or temporary appropriations as well as regular appro- 
priation acts and amendments thereto; (2) any law relating to receipts and credits 



41 

accruing to the United States and amendments thereto: (3) Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act of 1951, and amendments thereto. See House Report No. 
851, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 8400, Mutual Security Act of 1961. 
Accordingly, it is said that "the President of the United States can waive the pro- 
visions of the Foreign Assistance Act which require him to cut off aid to a violating 
nation, but that waiver must also further the purposes for which the United States 
provides mihtary assistance [viz: self defense and collective security arrange- 
ments].". 120 Congressional Record, S. 16366 (daily edition, September 11, 1974). 

Although a quick reading of the section in question seems to offer plausible 
support for such an interpretation, a more deliberate reading thereof suggests 
otherwise. As will be observed, the wording of section 614(a) effectively provides 
that the waiver thereby conferred may be exercised, "in furtherance of any of the 
purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is 
important to the security of the United States." That the prepositional phrase 
comprising the first part of the quoted material constitutes a limitation on the 
exercise of presidential authoritj' seems clear. However, the limitation is not so 
broad as to unavoidably compel the exercise of the waiver authority in a manner 
consistent with the restriction in section 505(d) If the underlined words in the 
quote were not a part of the phrase, the latter view might be the only one literally 
allowed by section 614(a). In other words, if the phrase instead of its present 
language read "in furtherance [ ] of the purposes of such Acts", the President 
would appear to be foreclosed from waiving the restriction on future aid to re- 
cipient aggressors notwithstanding that such waiver is supported by a presidential 
determination that it is important to the national interest. However, as written, 
the requirement reads so as to permit literal compliance therewith if waiver 
furthers "any" (cf. "all") the purposes of the specified acts. Briefly, while waiver 
invariably requires the President to determine that the authorization of aid be 
important to the national security, it may be exercised notwithstanding it serves 
some, though not all purposes of the aforementioned laws. 

Although the legislative history of section 614(a) leaves much to be desired 
insofar as definitively resolving the present issue, events surrounding attempts 
to amend that and a related section strongly suggest that the general under- 
standing of the waiver authority contained in the former supports the broader 
view that the President can disregard some or all of the fundamental purposes 
of specified individual enactments. In the House an unsuccessful effort was made 
to amend present section 614(a) in order to eliminate the President's authority 
to disregard the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, more familiarly 
referred to as the Battle Act. As is generally known, it was part of the general 
policy of that Act that "no mihtary, economic or financial assistance shall be 
supplied to any nation unless it a])plies an embargo on such shipments to any 
nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, 
including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its 
domination." 107 Congressional Record 16287(1961). 

Rep. Adair who moved in the House to eliminate the Battle Act from that 
section assiuned that exercise of the waiver with respects thereto included total 
waiver thereof. Relevant portions of his remarks follow: 

Mr. Chairman, this proposed amendment is the one which relates to the Battle 
Act. If my amendment is adopted, the President, under the special authority 
given him by section 612, would not have the authoritj' to waive the Battle Act. 
It would remove from him that power. 

Here was a law passed to insure the security of the United States. If we leave 
in this legislation the words which I have asked to be stricken, the President of 
the United States may waive with respect to $250 million and $100 million of 
local currency those salutary restrictions which are there for the protection and 
preservation of the United States of America. 

Mr. Chairman, we still give to the President under this section considerable 
authority to waive other provisions of law. He can waive the provisions of this 
bill and the amendments thereto; he can waive any act appropriating funds for 
the purposes of this act, including interim or temporary appropriations as well 
as regular appropriation acts and amendments thereto; and he can waive any 
law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States and amendments 
thereto. 

Therefore, I point out to the Members of this House that we would leave 
ample authority in the hands of the President to waive restrictions with respect 
to this title — involving possibly $350 million. We owe it to our Nation and we 
owe it to the citizens of this country to retain the provisions of this act which 



42 

was passed in 1951, the so-called Battle Act. It is designed to prevent the strength- 
ening of the Communist countries, to prevent the strengthening of those countries 
which would d(i us injury and which are the potential enemies of our country. 

In opposition to the Adair amendment, Rep. Zaljloclci argued that notwith- 
standing his general agreement with the purposes of the Battle Act, circumstances 
might arise which required obviating or circumventing its prohibitions. Further, 
in allowing presid<^ntial waiver of that act Congress would be following precedents 
whereby earlier Presidents were allowed to disregard it whenever the national 
interests so required. His comments in point follow : 

Mr. Chairman, the authority given the President to use $2.50 million within 
his discretion, notv/ithstanding the Battle Act, is not new legislation. President 
Eisenhower had that authority and, in mj^ opinion, used it effectively. At this 
time, when we are in a crisis in Berlin, when we are hoping to effectively fight 
communism, it is in our national interest to give the President the authority and 
the flexibility to meet developments. 

In the past it appeared that we reacted only when the Communists would 
take a step. The critics charged that in effect, the Communists were dictating 
our foreign policy. Under this authority the President can, when he deems it 
advisable to, take positive action and move in. We know that the Soviets move in 
to overthrow governments. The Communists never hesitate to infiltrate, subv-ert, 
and overthrow governments. For example, they moved into Cuba and we became 
very much alarmed when they succeeded. 

Tlike to compare the fight against communism to putting out a fire. Naturally 
fire can be extinguished by pouring gaUons of water on it, and if enough water is 
poured long enough the fire may be put out. But the most effective way to put 
out a fire is to try to get at the cause of the fire. It is common practice to break 
into the roof, enter through the side, front door, or back door in order to get 
inside and put out the fire. In effect this is just what we are authorizing the 
President to do, permitting him to do what the Soviets are doing. 

The Communists are most adept at infiltration. Their successes to a great 
deoree are due to their use of this method. It would be most unfortunate at this 
time, in my opinion, if the special authority granted to past President Eisenhower 
should noAV be denied to President Kennedy. 

Subsection 612 provides: ,, , , ., , , 

The President mav authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds made available 
under this bill and' the furnishing of assistance under section 510 of this biU 
both in an amount not to exceed $250 million. 

The amount of money which mav be allocated to any one country under this 
authority is limited to $50 miUion. This requirement prohibits the use of funds to 
furnish assistance, pursuant to Presidential waiver, directly to any country of 
a value exceeding $50 million in any fiscal year. 

If there was a sudden development in an African country or m hast Germany 
or in East Berhn, the President could not react if this authority vvill be denied. 
112 Congressional Record 16287-16290 (1961) 

During Senate consideration of the proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
Senator Dodd introduced an amendment banning aid to the USSR and named 
Communist-controlled nations "notwithstanding the provisions of section^ 614 
or anv section of an Act appropriating funds for use under this Act. . . . In 
response to a question whether he would modify his amendment to omit the 
specific reference to section 614, Senator Dodd made clear that such a step was 
contrary to his proposal since it was his purpose not to allow waiver of the re^ 
strictiohs on assisting Communist nations. His remarks in this regard— which 
foUow hereafter— like those of House members in connection with the Adair 
amendment, assume that the President, pursuant to section 614, could waive 
the Battle Act as such irrespective of its purposes. ^, , ^r. t, -j * i^ 

The heart of our difference is I fear that under section 614 the President could 
waive every other provision of the bill and take the $250 million and do what he 

pleased with it. , . t 

That is precisely why I wrote that language into my amendment 1 am sure 
the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Cominitte^, 
will not mind my saving this. He wrote to me and offered to accept my amend- 
ment if I would delete reference to section 614. I said in essence, That 1 cannot 
do, because it is the heart and soul of this amendment." , ., , , 

That is the difference. That is why I cannot accept the substitute of my 

colleague. , , -x t j +„^ 

I do not want to repose in any President any such authority. I am very dev oted 

to our President, and I do not want my words to be in any way construed as 



43 

my not having tha greatest of trust and faith in him. That is not the point. We 
are always talking aljout this country being a nation of laws. Indeed it is. This is 
the Congress which makes those laws. I do not want any President, any frail 
human being, to have the power to take our money and give it away to a Com- 
munist country. 112 Congressional Record 16150 (1961) 

The language of section 614(a) allows the President to waive relative to $250 
million and $100 million of local currency restrictions otherwise applicable thereto 
whenever it is important to the security of the United States. In addition, the 
act of waiver and the consequent extension of aid is to be in furtherance "of any" 
of tht. purposes of the laws specified in that section. The literal wording of the 
section does not condition waiver on satisfying all of the purposes of such laws. 
Such a conclusion seems to be borne out bj' statements in support of amendments 
designed to insure that none of the purposes of one of the specified acts could be 
io-nored, viz: the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. Additional 
support for this view also may be adduced from the provisions in section 617 of 
the 1961 Act whereby the Congress, inter alia, provided that "[a]ssistance under 
any provision of this chapter mav, unless sooner terminated by the President, be 
terminated by concurrent resolution." 22 U.S.C. § 2367(1974). 

The annexed appendix contains other passages from the legislative materials on. 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relative to section 614(a). 



ANNEX 



Waiver Authority Under Section 614(a), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

AS Amended, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a). 

Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assitance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 
2364(a). reads as follows: 

(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds 
made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance 
under section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed $250,000,000 
and the use of not to exceed $100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing 
under this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of 
this chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United 
States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes 
of such Acts, Vv'hen the President determines that such authorization is 
important to the security of the United States. Not more than $50,000,000 
of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one 
country in any fiscal year. The limitation contained in the preceding sentence 
shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or 
Communist-supported aggression. 
Since its adoption in 1961, section 614(a) has been substantively amended on one 
occasion. On that occasion, the Congress added the concluding sentence providing 
that the $50,000,000 hmitation on the allocations of funds to any country in any 
one fiscal year shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Com- 
munist or "Communist-supported aggression. Section 301(f), 80 Stat. 805 (1966). 
Therefore, as adopted and written into the Foreign Relations Code, section 
614(a) provided that — • 

(a) The President may authorize in each fiscal year the use of funds 
made available for use under this chapter and the furnishing of assistance 
under section 2318 of this title in a total amount not to exceed $250,000,000 
and the use of not to exceed $100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under 
this chapter or any other law, without regard to the requirements of this 
chapter, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, 
any Act appropriating funds for use under this chapter, or the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, in furtherance of any of the purposes 
of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization is im- 
portant to the security of the United States. Not more than $50,000,000 of 
the funds available under this subsection may be allocated to any one country 
in any fiscal year. 
As such, the language of the section follows closely that of the bill reported by 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Designated section 612(a) at that time, 
it read in relevant part as follows: 

Sec. 612 Special Authorities. — (a) The President may authorize in each 
fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under this Act and the 



44 

furnishing of assistance under section 510 in a total amount not to exceed 
$250,000,000 and the use of not to exceed $100,000,000 of foreign currencies 
accruing under this Act or any other law, without regard to the requirements 
of this Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United 
States, any Act appropriating funds for use under this Act, or the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in further- 
ance of any of the purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that 
such authorization is important to the security of the United States. Not more 
than $50,000,000 of the funds available under this subsection may be allocated 
to any one country in any fiscal year. 
In its report on the bill, the Committee described that section as follows : 

Section 612. Special authorities 

Subsection (a) provides that the President may authorize in each fiscal year 
the use of funds made available under this bill and the furnishing of assistance 
under section 510 of this bill both in an amount not to exceed $250 million, and 
the use of not to exceed $100 million of foreign currencies accruing under this act 
or any other law, without regard to the requirements of the following laws, when 
such authorization is in furtherance of any of the purjaoses of such laws, including 
Public Law 480 and the President determines that it is important to the security of 
the United States : 

1. This bill and amendments thereto. 

2. Any acts appropriating funds for the purposes of this act, including 
interim or temporary appropriations as well as regular appropriation acts 
and amendments thereto. 

3. Any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States 
and amendments thereto. 

4. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and amendments 
thereto. 

The amount of money which may be allocated to any one country under this 
authority is limited to $50 million. This requirement prohibits the use of funds to 
furnish assistance, pursuant to Presidential waiver, directly to any country of a 
value exceeding $50 milUon in any fiscal year. The committee also believes this 
limit should apply to international organizations. 

The authorization to use foreign currencies accruing under this act or any 
other law, not to exceed the equivelent of $100 million, is not only intended to 
permit drawing on foreign currencies to that amount to meet emergencies as they 
may arise. The purpose is, primarily, to make possible the use of such currencies 
for humanitarian purposes in countries where substantial amounts of foreign 
currencies have been or are being de]>osited for U.S. use. The object is to permit 
the initiation of projects which will contribute directly and immediately to 
alleviating the living and working conditions of the people. 

It is anticipated that this authority will not be used to finance grandiose or 
long-term projects. 

It is hoped that utilizing foreign currencies not required for the more usual 
development programs carried out under the Act for International Development 
would encourage people opposed to communism to continue their struggle and 
would give to the discontented in less-developed countries an alternative to the 
promises of Communist propaganda. 

Assistance under section 510, referred to above, is the new authority given to 
the President in this bill to order defense articles from Department of Defense 
stocks and defense services for military assistance purposes, in the maximum 
amount of $400 million in any fiscal year, if he determines that it is vital to the 
security of the United States, subject to subsequent reimbursement from sub- 
sequent appropriations for military assistance. 

In section 451 of the existing law the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act 
of 1951, and amendments thereto, is not included by name but is covered by the 
following language: "or any other Act for which funds are authorized by this 
Act." Section 613, therefore, is more specific as to the laws whose requirements 
may be Waived. 

Section 201(b) of this act prohibits the use of the authority of section 612 to 
waive the requirements of title I (development loans). 

This bill makes available for use under the provisions of section 612 $250 
million of the funds authorized for use under this act. The present law (sec. 451) 
jjrovides for such use $150 million of any funds authorized under the ^lutu'il 
Security Act and, in addition, $100 million of the $150 million authorized to be 



45 

appropriated for the contingencj^ fund. In this bill there is a separate provision for 
the contingency fund (sec. 451). 

In addition, the former Mutual Security Act (sec. 4.51) provides for certain 
types of assistance to escapees or selected persons from Communist-dominated or 
occupied areas and proclaims the hope that such captive peoples shall again enjoy 
freedom. The provisions concerning escapees and captive peoples are not retained 
in this bill because they are covered in H.R. 8291 pending before the House 
Judiciary Committee. House Report No. 851, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on 
H.R. 84(30, Mutual Security Act of 1961, at pages 71-72. 

The comparable provision in the Senate bill was designated section 614(a) 
and provides as follows : 

Sec. 614. Special Authorities.^ — (a) The President may avithorize in 
each fiscal year the use of funds made available for use under thi:^ Act and 
the furnishing of assistance under section 510 in a total amount not to exceed 
$250,000,000 without regard to the requirements of this Act, any Act ap- 
propriating funds for use under this Act, or the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance of any of the 
purposes of such Acts, when the President determines that such authorization 
is required by the national interest. 
As will be observed, the above section which appeared in the original, reported 
and Senate-passed versions differs from the House measure in three particulars: 
First, th^re is no express reference to or authority for expending "foreign 
currencies accruing under this Act or anj'' other law" for military assistance; 
second, there is no express provision permitting the exercise of the authority 
delegated by the section without regard to "any law relating to receipts and 
credits accruing to the United vStates"; third, there is no provision comparable 
to that placing a $50,000,000 limitation on the allocation of funds to any country 
in any one fiscal year. 

Effect of Rosenthal Amendment on Section 505(d), Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961, as Amended 

The following is submitted in response to a variety of inquiries dated October 1, 
1974, requesting information on the above. 

As you know, section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
22 U.S.C. 2314(d) effectivel^y provides that use by any recipient nation of defense 
articles or services in violation of the terms and conditions contained in this and 
related laws, past and present, "shall [render such nation] . . . immediately 
ineligible for further assistance." Among the various terms and conditions im- 
posed by the law is the requirement that defense articles and services authorized 
in other provisions "shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate 
self-defense" and for similar nonaggressive purposes. 22 U.S.C. 2302 (Supp.). 
That the disqualification imposed b}- section 505(d) was intended to enforce 
compliance with the requirement of purelv defensive use of U.S. military assistance 
mandated by section 503, 22 U.S.C. 2320 (Supp.) is clearly supported by the 
House Committee Report (No. 1788, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.) that accompanied 
the bill which, inter alia, added section 505(d) to the Foreign Assistance Act 
a^dopted the previous year. The report states, in relevant part, that "where a 
country actually undertakes an act of aggression or refuses to allow continuous 
observation of the equipment, diverts substantial quantities of the items furnished, 
or otherwise violates the terms of its agreement, further assistance under this 
chapter would be prohibited by this Amendment." 

On Tuesday, September 24, 1974, the House adopted an amendment to H. J. 
Res. 1131, making further continuin.L; appropriations until sine die adjournment 
of the 93d Congress, which admendmcnt provides that — 

"None of the funds herein made available shall be obligated or expended 
for military assistance, or for sales of defense articles and services (whether 
for cash or by credit, guaranty, or other means) to the Government of Turkey 
until the President certifies to the Congress that substantial progress toward 
agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus." 
It is clear from remarks made by the principal spokesman for what is generally 
described as the Rosenthal Amendment that one of its chief purposes is to send 
a "signal to the Government of Turkey that they cannot have militaiy equipment 
to continue and maintain this kind of aggressive action [in Cyprus]." 120 Congres- 
sional Record H. J. 482 (dailj^ ed. Sept. 24, 1974). It is equally clear from the 

41-207—74 4 



46 

debate on the Amendment that its proponents feel that Turke.v has used U.S. 
mihtary assistance to commit aggression on Cyprus in violation of the law; 
they have despaired of Administration taking effective steps to enforce such laws 
either by cutting off assistance to Turkey or by waiving the requirements of section 
505(d) as seems possible under section 614(a), 27 U.S.C. 2364(a) ; and that legisla- 
tion in the form of the Rosenthal Amendment is needed to fill the void. 

The operation of the amendment was descriVied as follows: "It is not irrevocable. 
It suspends militarj' aid until such time as the President certifies to the Congress 
that substantial progress is being made." Id., at J. 9483. Elsewhere in the debate, 
the Amendment was explained as "represent[ing] a useful statement of congres- 
sional concern over the continued substantial presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus 
without impeding the ability of the President to influence a settlement. ... It 
sends a signal but does not tie the President's hands." Id., at H. 9490. 

From these and other statements, one receives the impression that the Rosenthal 
Amendment is "carefully" drawn to permit sending the requisite signal to Turkey 
while simultaneously allowing the President discretion to continue or to resume 
aid to that country by certifying to Congress that "substantial progress toward 
agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus." Accordingly, the 
question arises as to the effect of the enactment of the Amendment on section 
505(d). 

As noted, the Rosenthal Amendment does not address itself to section 505(d). 
As such, it does not expressly amend that provision of existing law. Nor, in our 
judgment, does the Amendment effect an implied repeal of the existing law. As the 
Supreme Court recently observed: there exists "the 'cardinal rule . . . that re- 
peals by implication are not favored'." Morton v. Mancari, Nos. 73-362 and 73- 
364 (June 17, 1974), 42 LW4933 (June 18, 1974). *Additionally, as j^ou know, the 
provision of House Rule XXI forbidding in any general appropriation bill a "pro- 
vision changing existing law" is construed to mean the enactment of a proposition 
for repeal of existing law. VII Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives 
§ 1403. Accordingly, it may be assumed that had opponents of the Rosenthal 
Amendment viewed it as something other than an admissible limitation on an 
appropriation bill, they would have raised at point of order against it. 

The amendment appears to conform to the requisites of a limitation which pro- 
vides that no part of an appropriation under consideration shall be used for a 
certain designated purpose. Id., at § 1581 et seq. As such, and because of the nature 
of the legislation in which it appears, the Amendment seems to supersede section 
505(d) for purposes of the moneys appropriated thereby. 

Raymond J. Celada, 
Senior Specialist in American Public Law. 



APPENDIX II 
Documents Relating to Cyprus, Including Treaty of Guarantee 

(From Documents on International Affairs, 1959, Edited by Gillian King, Oxford 

Universitj^ Press, London, 1953) 

1. DOCUMENTS REGARDING CYPRUS SIGNED AND INITIALLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE, 

LONDON, 19 FEBRUARY 1959 ^ 

(a) Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus 

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the 
President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal 
suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively. 

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and I'urkish. 
Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up 
and promulgated in the two official languages. 

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour 
chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic 

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and 
Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus. 

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek 
and Turkish national holidays. 

4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of five 
years. 

In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President 
and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President 
of the House of Representatives respectively. 

In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall 
take place within a period of not more than 45 days. 

The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of 
Representatives, before which thc}^ shall take an oath of loyalty and respect 
for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet 
within 24 hours after its constitution. 

5. Executive authority shaU be vested in the President and the Vice-President. 
For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven 
Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated 
respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shaU appoint them 
bj' an instrument signed by them both. 

The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives. 

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority. 

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the 
Vice-President by publication in the official gazette. 

However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final 
veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under 
the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of 
Representatives. 

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected 
for a i^eriod of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately 
in the proportion of 70 per cent, for the Greek community and 30 per cent, for 
the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical 
data. (N.B. — The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement 
between the communities.) 

' The agreement on Cyprus was approved by the Greek Parliament on 28 February, by 170 votes to 118, 
by the Tmkish Parliament on 4 March, by 347 votes to 138 with 2 abstentions, and by the House of Commons 
on 19 March, with no division, after an opposition amendment criticizing the Government's policy since 
1954, had been defeated by 299 votes to 246. On 10 November 195ii agreement was reached on the question of 
executive authority in the new constitution. On 13 December Archbishop Makarios was elected first President 
of the future Republic of Cyprus; he received 70 per cent of the votes. The state of emergency on the island 
ended on 4 December 1959. 

(47) 



48 

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other 
than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a 
conflict of authorit}^, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed 
jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be 
president of the Court. 

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a 
simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 
days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsidera- 
tion as provided in Point 9 below. 

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be 
modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and "two- 
thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives. 

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of anj^ law relating 
to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a 
simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representa- 
tives taking part in the vote and considered separately. 

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may 
exercise their right to return it to the House of Rej^resentatives, if in their 
judgment any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its 
decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal 
to the Supreme Constitutional Court. 

8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointh% shall 
have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, 
except the i^articipation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations 
and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turke}^ both participate, or concerning 
defence and security as defined in Annex I. 

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately 
and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned 
to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for 
reconsideration. 

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter 
so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President 
and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within 
the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions. 

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President 
to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, 
or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in 
part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Consti- 
tutional Court or, where it has been returned, the House of Representatives 
has taken a decision on it. 

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number 
of representatives which it shall itself determine. 

The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on 
members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies 
and institutions under their supervision. 

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, 
cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status. They shall 
exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely 
communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and 
associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, 
created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. 
{N.B. — It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be 
interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal 
institutions where the inhabitants desire them.) 

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, 
M'hich shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to 
the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also 
exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed 
of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic 
shall apply, shall be sujiervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers. 

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the 
institutions, establishments, or mimicipalities mentioned in the two preceding 
paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised 
by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment 
or municipality in question. 



49 

1 1 . The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent, of Greeks and as to 
30 per cent, of Turks. 

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practic- 
able in all grades of the Civil Service. 

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority 
approaching 100 per cent., the organs of the local administration responsible to 
the central administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that 
community. 

12. The deputies of the Attorney- General of the Republic, the Inspector- 
General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong 
to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be 
appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in 
agreement. 

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie 
and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of 
the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where 
the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the 
other. 

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of 
the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. 

Cj^prus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 percent shall be Greek 
and 40 percent Turkish. 

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 
men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President 
and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 percent of 
Greeks and as to 30 percent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percent- 
age may be raised to a maximum of 40 percent of Turks (and consequently re- 
duced to 60 percent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving 
in the police, apart from the auxiliary police. 

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic in- 
habited, in a proi)ortion approaching 100 percent, by members of a single com- 
munitv, shall belong to that community. 

16. A High Court of Justice shall be estabHshed, which shall consist of two 
Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the 
Vice-President of the Repubhc. 

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes. 
This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, 
promotions of judges, etc.). 

17. Civil disputs, Avhere the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same 
community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that 
community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the 
composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High 
Court of Justice. 

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status 
and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Com- 
munal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging 
to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall 
be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and 
they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber. 

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same 
community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, 
the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the 
High Court of Justice. 

IS. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the 
right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective com- 
munities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the con- 
victed persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy 
shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. 
In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy 
is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment. 

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to 
persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners. 

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out 
on payment of a jiist and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the 
tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action. 

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the ex- 
propriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners. 



50 

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus 
by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However :; — 

(a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall 
supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself 
with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall 
each be composed of two members chosen bj^ the Greek municipalities, 
two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen 
by agreement between the two municipalities. 

(b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within four years 
the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five 
largest towns shall continue. 

With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitu- 
tion of munici]jal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional 
representation for the two communities. 

21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitu- 
tion of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Repubhc of 
Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance 
shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph 
shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.) 

22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any 
other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus {i.e., the partition of Cyprus 
into two independent States), shall be excluded. 

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to 
Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature. 

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus 
and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded 
to the United Kingdom. 

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise 
institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their re- 
spective communities. 

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary 
number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its institutions, 
the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly 
necessary to meet their needs. 

25. Oiie of the following Ministries — the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Defence or the" Ministry of Finance — shall be entrusted to a Turk. 
If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a 
system of rotation. 

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties 
shall be established as quicldy as possible and within a period of not more than 
three months from the signature of the Treaties. 

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitu- 
tion of Cyprus. 

E. A.-T. F. R. Z. 

S. L. 
t A. M. F. K. 

Annex I 



The defense questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are 
as follows: — 

(a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them. 

(b) Apjiointments and promotions. 

(c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives. 

(d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries. 
The Security questions subject to veto are as follows: — 

(a) Appointments and promotions. 

(b) Allocation and stationing of forces. 

(c) Emergency measures and martial law. 

(d) Police laws. 

(It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or deci- 
sions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and 
gendarmerie.) 



51 

(b) Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United 
Kingdom and Turkey 

The Republic of Cjqirus of the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and 
Turkey of the other part: — 

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, 
territorial intcgritj^ and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and 
regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest; 

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensvire that the provisions of the aforesaid Con- 
stitution shall be respected; 

Have Agreed as Follows: 

Article 1 

The Republic of Cyprus imdertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independ- 
ence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. 

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic 
union with an}' State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending 
to promote directlj'^ or indirectly either union or partition of the Island. 

Article 2 

Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings 
by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the 
independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and 
also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution. 

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity 
having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the 
Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island. 

Article 3 

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the 
United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to 
making representations, or taking the necessar}^ steps to ensure observance of 
those provisions. 

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the 
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of 
re-establishing the state of affairs established bj^ the present Treaty. 

Article 4 

The present Treaty shall enter into force on signature. 

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register the present Treaty at the 
earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter. 

E. A.-T. S. L. F. R. Z. 

t A. M. F. K. 

(c) Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey 

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their 
common defense and undertake by this Treatj^ to consult together on the problems 
raised by this defence. 

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, 
direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of 
the Republic of Cyprus. 

3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfil the above purpose a tripartite 
Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. 

4. Greece shall take part in the Headquarters mentioned in the preceding 
article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers 
and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting 
in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce 
the Greek and Turkish contingents. 

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the 
training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus. 



52 

6. The command of the tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation 
and for a period of one year each by a Cj'proit, Greek and Turkish General 
Officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and 
hy the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. 

E. A.-T. S. L. F. R. Z. 

fA. M. F. K. 

I (d) Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom, 17 February 1969 

Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom 

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Re- 
public of Cyprus, comprising the Basic Structure for the Republic of Cj'prus, 
the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drawn up and approved by 
the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 
1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 
16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom 

Declare: 

A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B 
below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of 
Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem 
•of {Cyprus. 

B. That, with the exception of two areas at 

(a) Akrotiri — Episkopi — Paramali, and 

{b) Dhekelia — Pergamos — Ayios Nikolaos — Xylophagou, which wiU be 
retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty 
over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following 
conditions : — 

(1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Govern- 
ment as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used 
effectively as military bases, included among others those rights indicated 
in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by 
Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas 
retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the 
United Kingdom of the rights referred to above; 

(2) that provision shall be made by agreement for: — 

(i) the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various 
communities in Cyprus ; 

(ii) the protection of the interests of the members of the public 
services in Cyprus ; 

(iii) determining the nationality of persons affected by the 
settlement ; 

(iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate 
obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the 
settlement of claims. 

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of 
Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Re- 
public of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common 
defence of Cyprus. 

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shaU come into force and 
the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall 
take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty wiU be 
transferred to the Republic of Cyprus. 

Selwtn Lloyd. 

Alan Lennox-Boyd. 
E. A.-T. F.R.Z. 

t A. M. F. K. 

Annex 

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained 
under British sovereignt}^: — 

(a) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing 
small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete 
control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and 



53 

to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom 
Government ; 

(6) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of 
personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-men- 
tioned areas and sites; 

(c) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta; 

(d) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric 
power, &c.) ; 

(e) to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified for, 
troop training; 

(/) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and 
facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered 
necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military 
aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational 
control of air traffic; 

(g) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction; 

(h) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with 
that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces 
of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, in respect of certain ofifences com- 
mitted within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus; 

(i) to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of 
Cvprus ; 

"(j) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as 
the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary 
for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus. 

(c) Additional article to he inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee 

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus 
undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty 
of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and 
guarantee the use and enjoyment oy the United Kingdom of the rights to be 
secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the 
declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom. 

S. L. E. A.-T. ^ ^^ F. R. Z. 

t A. M. F. K. 



APPENDIX III 

Statement of Senator Kennedy on Humanitarian Problems on 
Cyprus, and Introduction of Joint Resolution Calling for 
Withdrawal of Foreign Troops 

(From the Congressional Record, Senate, August 8 and 13, 1974) 

Senate 

humanitarian problems on cyprus 

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. President, events on Cyprus have been a source of deep 
concern for many Americans and people around the world. But after days of in- 
tense violence and political turmoil, reports now suggest some hopeful signs that 
at least the violence is subsiding — and that additional efforts will now be made 
Ijy all parties concerned to effect a meaningful separation of forces imder United 
Nations auspices. Hopefully, as well, new efforts to resume negotiations on a 
political settlement of the conflict will be diligently pursued — and will not only 
restore the security of civilians and constitutional rule of all of Cyprus, but also 
the island's territorial integritj^ and full independence. 

In pursuing these objectives, however, the parties concerned — and all men of 
good will — should not lose sight of the human tragedies which have hit the people 
of Cyprus. Regrettably, their situation has taken second place to the military 
and political issues at stake — and to the special interests of those who have much 
to lose, or to gain, by the outcome of the conflict. But the civilians of Cj^prus — 
both Greeks and Turks — also have interests. And for many thousands, apparently 
especially among the Greek population in the Turkish salients — recent weeks 
have been a nightmare of death and horror and grief. 

Reports from the area — including ofl^cial reports to our own Government and 
elsewhere — fully confirm the human tragedy of Cyprus. Tens of thousands of 
women and children have been forcibly expelled from their villages — especially in 
Turkish occupied areas — or have fled their homes as refugees. Thousands of 
able-bodied men have disappeared — and some apparently have l)een deported to 
camps or prisons in southern Turkey. Refugees tell of "much suffering" and 
"systematic" arson, looting, murder, and rape. And civilian casualties — both 
wounded and dead — number in the hundreds, if not the thousands. 

Mr. President, I do not rise to offer any magic solution for meeting the immedi- 
ate political and humanitarian problems of Cyprus. But I do rise to express a deep 
personal concern over the plight of C.vpriot civilians — and especially over the 
continuing violations of human rights and the rules of common human decency 
which are evidenced in Turkish occupied areas. A spokesman for our own Govern- 
ment suggests that "some very rough stuff" continues. This is a dei)lorable 
situation, and I appeal to the Turkish Government and all parties involved to 
make every effort in behalf of bringing peace and relief to Cj^prus. 

Apart from securing a meaningful separation of forces and a political settlement 
at the conference table in Geneva, there are three items of immediate concern to 
me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees: 

First, the emergency relief needs of refugees and others in distress — including 
food, water, shelter, medicine, and protection; 

Second, the condition, treatment, and release of civilian detainees — including 
those who may have been deported to Turkej' or other areas; and 

Third, the free movement of international relief convoys and humanitarian 
personnel from the United Nations or the International Committee for the Red 
Cross — ICRC — including the free access of Red Cross personnel to detention 
centers on both sides. 

The United Nations and the ICRC are the primary international agencies 
charged with the care and protection of Cypriot civilians. Reports from the U.N. 

(55) 



56 

and elsewhere suggest, however, that difficulties continue in all three areas of my 
immediate concern — especially in the Turkish salients of the country. 

The humanitarian services cf the U.N. and the ICRC have been indispensable 
in helping to bring peace and relief in many areas of the world. And today in 
Cyprus the services of these organizations deserve the full support of the parties 
to the conflict, our own Government, and others as well. 

In conclusion, let me express some concern over the course of U.S. pollcv 
toward Cyprus. We have heard a great deal about the travels of our diplomats 
to the area, but we have heard very little about the substance and objectives of 
American policy toward developments on Cyprus and related issues. 

I fully appreciate the immense difficulties in the Cyprus issue. It is a complex 
matter for diplomats and humanitarians alike. But should not our Government 
give more evidence of concern? What are American policy objectives? What is 
the substance of our activities? What have we done to help restrain Turkish forces? 
And how are we responding tf help meet humanitarian needs among the Cypriot 
civilians who are refugees or detainees on either side? 

The American people and their representatives in Congress deserve some 
answers, and should not be in the dark over United States policy toward Cyprus. 
I am extremely hopeful, Mr. President, that the administration will finally give 
some additional evidence of a verj^ active concern over the needed efforts to bring 
peace and relief to the people of Cyprus. 



[From the Congressional Record— Tuesday, August 13, 1974] 

Senate 

senate concurrent resolution 110 submission of a concurrent resolu- 
tion relating to the situation in cyprus 

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.) 

Mr. Kennedy submitted the following concurrent resolution: 

S. Con. Res. 110 

Resolved by the Senate {the House of Representatives concurring), 

Whereas a settlement of'the present conflict in the Republic of Cyprus is vital 
to peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean and is in the best interests of 
world peace and stability ; and 

Whereas a settlement depends upon the right of the Cypriot people to determine 
their own destiny and the efforts of the United Nations to act as a negotiating 
body; and 

Whereas Resolution 2077 (xx) adopted by the General Assembly on December 8, 
1965, "calls upon all states ... to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any inter- 
vention directed against it"; and 

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus undermines the 
ability of the Cypriot people to resolve their own crisis and the efforts of the 
United Nations to restore peace; and 

Whereas Resolution 3.53 adopted by the Security Council on July 20, 1974, 
"demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of 
Cyprus" and requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus 
of foreign mihtary personnel present otherwise than under the authority of inter- 
national agreements . . ."; and 

Whereas the declaration on Cyprus signed by the foreign ministers of Britain, 
Turkey, and Greece, in Geneva on July 30, 1974, calls for a "timely and phased 
reduction of the number of armed forces" from Cypriot soil; and 

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus violates inter- 
national agreements and United Nations resolutions, threatens the independence 
and territorial integrity of the island, jeopardizes peace and stability in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and imperils the very existence of NATO; Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate (the House oi Representatives concurring), 

That all foreign troops currently involved in Cyprus be withdrawn immediately 
so that the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
may be permitted to restore peace to the island, and to guarantee the protection 
and civil rights of all persons and communities and the right of the Cypriot people 
working together to determine their own destiny. 



APPENDIX IV 

Amendment of Senator Kennedy Providing Relief Assistance 
to Cyprus (and Africa and Bangladesh) 

(Adopted in the Senate, October 2, 1974; introduced on September 17, 1974) 

[From the Congressional Record— Tuesday, September 17, 1974] 

Senate 

foreign assistance act of 1974 — -amendment 

Amendment No. 1878 

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.) 

Mr. Kennedy (for himself and Mr. McGee) submitted an amendment in- 
tended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (S. 3394), supra. 

Relief and Rehabilitation Funds for Africa, Bangladesh, and Cyprus 

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. President, I am submitting today an amendment to S. 
3394, the pending Foreign Assistance authorization bill. The amendment provides 
special funds for disaster relief and rehabilitation programs in the drought- 
stricken areas of Africa, for flood reUef in Bangladesh, and for refugee assistance 
in Cyprus, 

The amendment authorizes the use of existing funds — an estimated $119,000,000 
available under scheduled loan repayments administered by AID — to permit our 
Government to respond to* the massive human tragedies in these areas, and to 
possible disasters in other parts of the world. 

The current crisis in Cyprus, the massive flooding in Bangladesh, and the 
spreading drought and famine in Africa, are only the latest links in the chain of 
ravaged populations which have circled the globe in recent years. Such humani- 
tarian crises have always brought forth an immediate response from the American 
people^in fufillment of our Nation's longstanding leadership in helping, to the 
extent we can, all people in need. Just last spring the Congress responded to the 
famine needs of Africa, and the disaster relief requirements of Pakistan and 
Nicaragua, by enacting the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act. And, during con- 
sideration of the foreign assistance bill last year, the Congress enacted section 
639B, which provided substantial famine and disaster relief to the African Sahel 
for the first time. 

The amendment I am introducing today continues our country's record of 
concern for our fellow man, and the longstanding support of Congress for disaster 
relief overseas. The amendment was prepared in very close cooperation with 
AID, and carries with it the support of the Ford administration. 

For the people of Cyprus, Mr. President, this is especially a perilous time — 
as it is also for the renewal of democracy and freedom in Greece, and for the 
future of peaceful relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regrettably, the plight 
of Cypriot civilians has taken second place to the military and political dimen- 
sions of the Cyprus problem — and to the special interests of those who have much 
to lose or to gain bj^ the outcome of the conflict on the island. But the civilians 
of Cyprus — both Greeks and Turks— also have interests. And for tens of thou- 
sands, the past weeks have been a nightmare of death and tragedy and grief. 

1. CYPRUS 

This week I received a preliminary report from a special study mission to 
Cyprus, which visited the area on behalf of the Subcommittee on Refugees, which 
I serve as chairman. The study mission visited refugees in all parts of the island, 
including the Turkish occupied areas. The study mission met with both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot leaders and United Nations relief officials, and also held 

(57) 



58 

extensive conversations on humanitarian and related problems with officials in 
Ankara and Athens. 

The study mission reports that nearly 300,000 Cypriots— mostly Greeks — are 
now refugees. Thej^ fled the advancing Turkish Army, leaving their homes and 
nearly all of their belongings behind. This is close to half the island's popula- 
tion — without sufficient food and medicine, with little shelter, with few clothes 
and blankets, and with increasingly little hope for an early return to their vil- 
lages and homes. 

A drive along the highways of Cyprus, especially in the southern zone, quickl.v 
tells the tragic tale of the events of July and August — of the human consequences 
of an armed invasion, of constant cease-fire violations, of mihtary occupation, 
and of man's inhumanity to man. 

Refugees are still fleeing doAvn the roads of Cyprus. During the team's re- 
cent visit some 20,000 people fled the to\vn of Athna, in advance of what the 
Turkish Army calls "armed reconnaissance in force"^ — ^or what simple language 
would label a cease fire violation. These thousands of refugees, like the tens of 
thousands before them, are todaj^ seeking protection and safety in the towns 
of southern Cyprus, swelling the local population in some areas by at least .^OO 
percent. They are seeking shelter wherever thoy can find it — in open fields, 
under trees, along the roadsides, and in schools, churches, and civic buildings. In 
the first days they had no shelter, and few blankets. And only in the past 2 weeks 
have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities, and clusters of tents 
are beginning to sprout around towns and cities in the government controlled areas 
of the island. The overwhelming majoritj' of those in need are Greek Cypriots, but 
significant members of Turks also command our help and concern. 

The economy and life of Cyprus has been shattered by the Turkish invasion, 
with some 80 percent of the economic base located in the occupied areas which 
now have less than 10 percent of the population. The vast citrus industry rots 
on the trees. Farms on the plain lie idle, as cattle and other livestock die from 
lack of food and water. The tourist center of Kyrenia has been looted bej^ond 
recognition, and the city of Famagusta — a city of over 40,000 people— is now a 
ghost town, with empty streets, houses, and hotels. The population of whole 
cities have become refugees. 

For many refugee families, the tragedy is still too fresh, their flight to safety too 
recent, for them to realize fully what has happened. And few in the international 
communitjr have recognized the full tragedy of Cyprus, Our Government's role 
during the crisis — our early silence and later vacillation toward the pohtical and 
rnilitarjr problems of the island — must not characterize our Nation's attitude or 
response to the escalating human crisis which has gripped all of Cyprus. 

The study mission reports that important relief efforts have now been under- 
taken, in cooperation with Cypriot authorities, b}^ the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
among others. But these initiatives, and programs for humanitarian relief in 
Cyprus, are just getting off the ground and need the immediate support of the 
United States — support which this amendment will provide. It is estimated that 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will alone need some $22 
million for emergency relief through the end of tliis year, and that an additional 
sum will be required for returning the sefugees home or resetthng them elsewhere 
on the island. Our Government must be in a position to actively encourage and 
generously suppost this important humanitarian work of the United Nations and 
the Cypriot authorities. Peace and relief for all Cypriots in need must be our goal 
on Cyprus. 

2. BANGLADESH 

In Bangladesh, there can be no doubt today that great tragedy has once again 
hit the Bengali people. A recent hearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees 
indicated that flood refugees number in the millions, as the worst floods in over 
20 years have inundated the land and people of Bangladesh. Crops have been 
destroyed, and food reserves have been lost. Housing, schools, health cUnics and 
other facihties have been swept away. And all reports confirm that this latest 
disaster seriously compounds existing economic and social problems brought 
about by the dislocations of the 1971 war for independence. 

In testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee recent travelers to the area 
report that there is more human suffering than ever before, that the country 
stands on the brink of starvation, and that epidemic and disease threaten the 
well-being and lives of miUions, and, perhaps, the nation as a whole. In purely 



59 

human terms, there is great suffering today in Bangladesh wliich must call forth 
a greater response from the United States — out of humanitarian concern, as well 
as concern for the stability and peace of South Asia. The United States cannot 
assume the full responsibility for meeting the massive human needs in Bangladesh. 
The United Nations and other governments must help. But we, too, must do what 
we can with what we have. 

3. AFRICA 

And in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, the food situation continues to 
deteriorate as famine conditions spread across the continent. Contrary to our 
Government's general optimism over the past year, recent reports, even within 
the government, tell of catastrophic consequences from the Sahelian drought, 
and that the situation among the people is precarious in some areas. The number 
of famine refugees is growing. Relief camps are over-burdened. Last year's 
logistical bottlenecks and administrative delays in the movement of food and 
relief supplies continues. ]\Ialnutrition and disease still threaten the lives of many 
thousands, and unless something more is done the death rate will continue to 
climb. 

Mr. President, it is the purpose of this amendment to make available already 
appropriated funds to support international relief and rehabilitation programs 
in Cjqirus, Bangladesh, Africa, and other areas of possible need over the coming 
year. This amendment authorizes the Agency for International Development — 
AID — to use 50 percent of the fiscal year 1975 scheduled loan repaj^ments, which 
now revert to the Treasury, to be used for the relief, rehabilitation, and recon- 
struction purposes mandated in the amendment — especially in Cvprus, Bang- 
ladesh, and Africa. Current estimates by AID suggest that some $119 million is 
immediateh^ available. And by using the loan repaj-ments, under specific Congres- 
sional authorization, it will not be necessary to appropriate a new obligational 
authority this fiscal year. 

The humanitarian concerns today — in Cj^prus, Bangladesh, and Africa^illus- 
trate once again that those foreign policy variables involving people are crucial 
elements in our foreign policy. Little will be achieved in building a structure of 
peace unless governments place a higher priority on the welfare and real-life 
problems of people — whose neglect fosters instability and spawns conflict around 
the globe. 

Political wisdom and simple humanity demands of our country that we do more 
to help the critical humanitarian needs in today's world. The extraordinary needs 
in Cyprus and elsewhere demand that we take extraordinary^ steps to utilize 
all readily available sources of funds — including those scheduled loan repayments 
which will revert to the Treasury, unless Congress and the administration act to 
use them for humanitarian purposes in the interest of world stability and peace. 
The amendment I introduce today will help accomplish this end. 

IMr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment, as 
well as a section-by-section analysis of its provisions, be printed at this point in the 
Record. 

There being no objection, the amendment and analysis^ were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows : -^ 

Amendment No. 1878 
At the end of the bill, add the following new section: 

RECONSTRUCTION, RELIEF, AND REHABILITATION 

Sec. 33. (a) Section 203 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by 
inserting immediately after "of this part." the following: "The balance of such 
receipts for fiscal vear 1975 is authorized to be made available for the purposes 
of sections 639B, 639C, and 639D of this Act." 

(b) Section 639B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding 
at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restric- 
tions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish 
assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for reconstruction 
and economic development programs in the drought-stricken nations of Africa. 
Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 
203 of this Act to carry out this section." 



60 

(c) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 
639B a new section 639 C as foUows: 

"Sec. 639C. Relief and Rehabilitation in Bangladesh and Cyprfs. — (a) 
The Congress finds that the recent flooding in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 
and the civil and international strife in the Republic of Cyprus, have caused 
great suffering and hardship for the peoples of the two Republics which cannot 
be alleviated with their internal resources. The President shall make every effort 
to develop and implement programs of relief and rehabilitation, in conjunction 
with other nations providing assistance, the United Nations, and other concerned 
international and regional organizations and voluntary agencies, to alleviate 
the hardships caused in these two nations. 

"(b) Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any 
other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation, and related 
programs in the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of Cyprus. 
Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 
203 of this Act to carry out this section." 

(d) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking after section 
639C, as added by subsection (c) of this section, the following new section: 

"Sec. 639D. Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation. — Notwithstanding any 
prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is 
authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may deter- 
mine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation and related programs in the case of disasters 
that require large scale relief and rehabilitation efforts which cannot be met 
adequately with the funds available for obligation under section 451 of this 
Act. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under 
section 203 of this Act to carry out this section." 

(e) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 
6391), as added by subsection (d)of this section, the following new section: 

"Sec. 639E. Internationalization of Assistance. — Assistance for the pur- 
poses set forth in Sections 639A, 639B, 639C, and 639D shall be distributed 
wherever practicable under the auspices of and bj^ the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, other international organizations or arrangements, multi- 
lateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies." 

Section-by-Section Analysis op the Amendment 

The purpose of this amendment is to permit the President to respond to the 
disasters in Cyprus and Bangladesh, to have the authority to respond to future 
disasters of a like nature, and to permit him to complement disaster relief for the 
drought-stricken nations of Africa with long-term development and reconstruc- 
tion assistance which will facilitate a reorientation of the Sahelian and Ethiopian 
economibs and will halt the advance of the desert. Absent such efforts, the African 
nations are likely to endure a perpetual and ever-growing disaster. 

This amendment also directs that both reconstruction and relief assistance be 
undertaken with, other donors, international organizations, and voluntary agencies. 

Subsection (a): This subsection provides a funding source for the Sahelian and 
Ethiopian development authority, the Bangladesh and Cyprus relief aut!ioriza- 
tions, and future large scale disasters which other portions of this amendment 
create. Presently, A.I.D. may use 50% of the scheduled loan repayments for new 
loans under its regular development accounts. The balance reverts to the Treasury. 
This subsection makes the 1975 balance available for loans or grants for the 
purposes set forth below. A.I.D. estimates that this balance will total 119 million. 
Although only 1975 receipts will be used, the funds need not be used during this 
fiscal year but will remain available for use as multilateral programs for the 
Sahel, Bangladesh and Cyprus develop. By using the loan repayments, it will not 
be necessary to appropriate new obligational authority. 

Subsection (b): Last year the Congress enacted Section 639B which urged the 
Executive to develop, in conjunction with other donors and international or- 
organizations, long-range development plans in the drought-stricken African 
nations. Congress indicated its belief that the short-range reaction to the disaster 
(authorized by Section 639A) must be followed by reconstruction and develop- 
ment that will halt or reverse the advance of the desert, if the inhabitants of the 
area are ever to overcome their misfortune and participate in a self-sustaining 
economy. This subsection complements that directive by authorizing the President 
to furnish such assistance. There are some restrictions in the Act that will work 



61 

against this effort, however. One example is the 25% local participation require- 
ment of Section 110(a). The drought-stricken regions of Africa are confronted 
with such enormous problems that their scant resources cannot provid's even 25% 
of the cost of reconstruction. For this reason, the language "notwithstanding any 
prohibitions or restrictions. . ." is included. The amendment's sponsors believe 
that this authorization will greatly facilitate the executive Branch's attempts to 
involve other nations and organizations in development plans by showing the 
seriousness of our commitment. 

Sxihsection (c); This subsection responds to the misfortunes of the people of 
Cyprus and Bangladesh. In both cases, events beyond the control of the local 
populace — armed conflict in one case and devastating flooding in the other — have 
caused great suffering and hardship to the respective populations. Emergency 
relief and rehabilitation in large but still undetermined amounts is needed in 
both situations. The Congress recognizes this need and authorizes and encourages 
the President to make every effort to work in concert with other concerned nations 
and organizations to provide assistance to these two areas. As in subsection (b), 
a waiver of the restrictions of the Act is necessary. Such restrictions as sections 
620(a) (3) and (n), which prohibit assistance to countries whose ships carry cargoes 
to Cuba and North Vietnam respectively, must be overcome. Other disaster relief 
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act contain similar language which permit 
the Act's prohibitions to be overridden. 

Subsection (d): Rather than reacting to disasters some time after they occur, 
this subsection will give the President the authority to respond quickly to large- 
scale disasters the nature and consequence of which cannot yet be foreseen. 
Drawing on the same funding source as the other portions of this disaster oriented 
provision, this subsection will be available for efforts beyond those possible under 
the Contingency Fund of Sec. 451. This section will allow response when disasters 
are so serious and on such a large scale that an extensive effort will be needed. 
The funds allocated under Sec. 451 are authorized primarily for disaster relief 
purposes, but are limited to $30 million under current authorizations. This sub- 
section makes it possible for the U.S. to respond promptly to the Sahtis, Cypruses 
and Bangladeshes of the future without obtaining new authorizing and appro- 
priating legislation. Since this subsection does focus on a need that vvill transcend 
normal policy restrictions, this provision includes a waiver of the restrictions of 
this and other laws. Such a waiver is consistent with the other disaster relief 
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

Subsection (e); Stipulates that the assistance provided under all the above 
sections "shall be distributed wherever practicable under the auspices of and by 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies, other international organizations 
or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies." 



41-207—74- 



APPENDIX V 
A Series of Reports on the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean 

(By Stanley Karnow, from The New R,epTiblic magazine) 
[The New Republic, Sept. 7, 1974.] 

FouL-up IN THE Mediterranean 

In A World Resiored, a book that contains many clues to his diplomatic conduct, 
Henry Kissinger described the challenge that confronted Metternich and Castle- 
reagh in 1821, when the Greeks suflFered atrocious reprisals after revolting against 
their Turkish overlords. European liberals of the period were appalled and Tsar 
Alexander of Russia, defender of the Greek Orthodox faith, planned action against 
Turkey. Bat Mjtternich and Castlereagh exerted all their influence to prevent 
intervention on the grounds that it would .jeopardize European stability. As 
Kissinger put it, the}' insisted that "humanitarian considerations were subordinate 
to maintaining 'the consecrated structure" of Europe," and therefore, while thoy 
criticized the Turkish repression, they worked to preserve the social order at the 
expense of Greek lives. Not long afterward, however, their policy crumbled, and 
Greece, with British and Russian support, gained its independence. 

Although history doesn't repeat itself precisely, Kissinger's handling of the 
present crisis in the eastern Mediterranean bears a striking resemblance to the 
way Metternich and Castlereagh behaved more than a century ago. His main 
objective has been to protect the power balance in the region, and, as a con- 
sequence, he h:is tiltad toward strength. He tolerated the ouster '^f President 
Makarios of Cyprus by the Greek military junta then in control in Athens because 
he sought to avoid a threat to the US bases in Greece. Later, after failing to 
dissuade the Turks from invading Cyprus, he did little to prevent them from 
taking over the most important sectors of the island. But, in contrast to Met- 
ternich and Castlereagh, whose strategy endured for at least a few j-r ars, Kissinger 
has met with immediate setbacks that are likely to unsettle the Mediterranean 
for many years. 

By leaning toward the Turks he has alienated the new civilian governn:ient in 
Athens, and Premier Constantine Karamanlis, responding to a wave of anti- 
American sentiment, has withdrawn Greece from military participation in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This has not only shattered the southern 
flank of the NATO alliance but the current prospect is that the Greeks will close 
down US military facilities in their cf)untry. The most imjjortant of these are the 
Athenia Air Field, vital for resupplying Israel, and a missile- tiring range on the 
island of Crete. By permitting the crisis to deteriorate, Kissinger also has brought 
the Greeks and Turks into conflict for the first time in years, and even though 
their dispute may not erupt into war, it will destabilize the area. This offers a 
distinct advantage to the Russians, who have long been seeking to reinforce their 
sway in the Mediterranean and are already- advancing themselves by backing 
the Cireeks dijilomatically. Kissinger's unwillingness to step into the situation at 
an early stage contributed as well to the devastation of Cyj^rus, where hostilities 
have left some 200,000 people homeless and where political tensions between the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots are bound to continue. The new President of Cyprus, 
Glafkos Clerides, warned recently that the Greek Cypriots might trigger a guerrilla 
war against the Turkish forces occupying the northern tier of the island. Such a 
war, if it erupts, would probably lead to a conflict between Greeks and Turks on 
the mainland and, in the process, ignite the Balkan powder keg. 

Replying to criticism, Kissinger said the other day that the US cannot stop 
"every local war between smaller nations," and his aides argue that the Turks 
could not have been restrained except l^y the intrusion of American forces. It 
seems to me, however, that the US had several oj)])ortvmities to influence events 
without running the risk of direct i)ivoivement. For example Kissinger could bavo 
sent a special emissary to Atheii-^ in lat^^^ June to advise the Greek miJitar}^ junta 

(63) 



64 

against overthrowing Makarios. After the fall of Makarios, he could have issued a 
statement denouncing the appointment as President of Cyprus of Nicos Sampson, 
the thug whose elevation to power by the Athens junta convinced the Turks that 
invasion was their only option to head off Greek domination of the island. Kissinger 
could later have threatened to curb US aid to Turkey in order to compel the 
Turks to reach a compromise at the short-lived Geneva conference, and he could 
have wielded the same weapon to bar them from launching an offensive on Cyprus 
in the middle of August. It is possible that none of these efforts would have worked, 
.vet they were worth trying if only to demonstrate to the world that the US is as 
concerned with the well-being of smaller nations as it is with peace among the 
big powers. In this respect the contention that America is not a global policeman 
lacks credibility. To treat an aggressor and a victim impartially is to side with 
the aggressor— which is what Kissinger did when he leaned first toward the Greek 
junta and later toward the Turks. 

On the Washington scene, meanwhile, the fallout from the crisis may be serious. 
In the first place it could aggravate the differences that were already developing 
over other issues between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James" Schlesinger, 
whose preoccupation with the future of NATO has led him to voice misgivings 
about the State Department's approach to the Mediterranean problem. At the 
same time numbers of Greek Americans are currently mobihzingto protest against 
US policy, and if they turn into a lobby as strong as that organized bv the Jewish 
community on behalf of Israel, they will give the Ford administration a political 
headache. With all this, though, it appears that Kissinger has vet to learn that 
the world has changed since the days of Metternich and Castlereagh. 



[The New RepubUc, Sept. 14, 1974.] 

Thb Indispensable Man? 

an interview with makarios 

(By Stanley Karnow) 
London 

I anticipated as I went over to see Archbishop Makarios at his hotel here 
the other day that I would encounter a bitter, disspirited exile. For although 
several foreign governments still officially recognize him to be president of 
Cyprus despite his ouster from the island in July in a coup d'etat engineered 
by the Greek military junta then in charge in Athens, nobody at the moment 
is really doing much to return him to his former position of authority. The new 
Greek civilian regime, which expressed its support for him soon after coming 
into office six weeks ago, is too weak to translate whatever hopes it may have 
into reality. The Turks, who initially backed him when he was a victim of the 
Greek generals, have apparently estimated that his presence on Cyjarus now 
would undermine the strong position they have built up there following their 
offensive last month. His British hosts, who continue to regard him formally as 
the chief of state of Cyprus, are too preoccupied with their domestic troubles 
to do more than pay lip service to his status. The Russians, who recently called 
for an international conference on Cyprus as a way of restoring his power, -xre 
at the same time pursuing a policy carefully contrived to avoid alienating the 
Turks. And the US, which has long favored the partition of Cyprus into 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones and currently perceives such a pattern to be 
emerging, plainly prefers the present evolution of events to having Makarios in 
control of an independent island. 

Yet with all these cards stacked against him Makarios seemed to me to be 
surprisingly cheerful and occasionally even casual. Moreover he struck me as 
being unusually confident, at least for the long-term future. I should insert here, 
however, that he is not an easy man to interview, for he is a truly Byzantine 
figure whose manner is often elliptical. But if I interpreted him correctly, his 
essential strategy is to wait and watch in the expectation that the Cyprus situa- 
tion will s(ioner or later become so desperately hopeless that everyone concerned, 
both on the island and elsewhere around the world, will finally acknowledge that 
he is the only person capable of straightening out the muddle. In other words, 
it appears to me, he has calculated that time is on his side and that there is no 
reason for him to rush back to a mess in Cyprus that, at this stage, is probably 
beyond .<i.nv immediate solution. 



65 

"I have greater support from the people of Cyprus than I have ever had," 
he asserted to me, contending that even the Greek Cypriot "extremists" who 
formerly opposed him now admit that they were wrong to have done so. That 
assessment of his popularity is echoed, incidentally, by his sympathizers on Cyprus 
who claim, as one of them put it last week, that half of the island's population 
would show up on the beach to welcome him. Makarios insisted during our talk, 
therefore, that he could return whenever he wished. He explained, though, that 
he has not done so because his appearance there now would "aggravate" tensions 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, whose efforts to reach some kind of 
accommodation have been going badly. So Makarios made it clear to me certain 
conditions must be fulfilled before he would consider going back. In other words, I 
inferred from his remarks, he wants to return to Cyprus with something concrete 
rather than jeopardize his reputation in the tangled discussions currently being 
held between Glafkos Clerides, the acting president of the island, and Rauf 
Denktash, the spokesman for the Turkish Cypriot community. 

In the first place, Makarios said, he would not involve himself in any serious 
negotiations until the Turkish forces that invaded the island in July are with- 
drawn to the positions they held on August 9, when representatives of Greece and 
Turkey agreed on a cease-fire that soon afterward collapsed. At that time the 
Turks' occupied about five percent of Cyprus while now, in contrast, they control 
roughly 30 percent of the island's territory and 80 percent of its resources. "The 
Turks would be talking from a position of strength if we negotiated before a 
withdrawal of their forces," Makarios said, "and I have no intention of going to a 
conference to sign a meaningless piece of paper." 

Secondly, he went on to say, he wants the Turks to permit the Greek Cypriot 
refugees to return to areas occupied by Turkish troops. Estimates of the number 
of refugees run as high as 200,000, and httle is being done to alleviate 
their suffering. 

Makarios' third condition for returning is that the Greek oflRcers appointed by 
the Athens junta to command the Cyprus national guard be puUed out of the 
island. These officers, acting on instructions from the Greek junta, tried to 
assassinate Makarios in July. Many are still on Cyprus, and they are believed to 
be cooperating with the Greek Cypriot terrorists whose organization, known as 
EOKA-B, opposed Makarios' policy of stalhng on union between the island and 
Greece. The new civihan government in Athens is no longer encouraging the 
terrorists, but they are heavily armed and are likely to constitute a chronic 
problem, as their "apparent attempt to murder one of Makarios' close friends 
the other day demonstrated. 

But if Makarios is not about to return to Cyprus until his conditions are ful- 
filled, he claims to be playing an important role in the situation there. He told me, 
for example, that Clerides could not survive without "my support." Makarios 
also said that he is in "constant contact" with Clerides, thereby indicating that he 
is managing the situation on a daily basis. As far as I know, Clerides has not 
claimed to be in constant contact with Makarios. He has said that he has not 
placed "any restrictions" on Makarios' return, and that statement, issued a 
couple of weeks ago, was though to denote a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the 
Archbishop's comeback at this time. I cannot judge the vahdity of that analysis 
until I get to Cyprus, which I plan to do within the next two weeks. 

Looking back on the events that led up to the coup against him, Alakarios 
conceded that he may have been mistaken in not having worked more effectively 
over the years for an agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. But 
had he done so, he says, the Greek junta in Athens would have moved against 
him sooner than it did, and so he figured that like Penelope, who defended herself 
until the return of Ulysses by weaving an endless fabric, he could stave off the 
inevitable attack by prolonging the talks between the island's two ethnic com- 
munities. By early summer, however, he expected that the junta would try to 
assassinate him, as it had on two earlier occasions, but he was not sure of its 
precise plans. It was for that reason, he said, that he did not sound alarm.ed 
when he saw Roger Davies, the American ambassador who was killed in C^-prus 
last month. Davies reported to Washington at the time that Makarios was in 
no imminent danger, and the State Department has referred to the dispatch to 
bolster its argument that it was as surprised as Makarios by the crisis. 

As I listened to Makarios, it seemed to me that his subdued, prudent remarks 
were deliberately tailored to fit his wait-and-see strategy. For he needs to make 
friends rather than to create enemies, and thus he is taking a charitable approach 
to almost everyone. He had words of praise, for instance, for the civilian Greek 



66 

government headed by Constantine Karamanlis, and he voiced the doubtful 
view that the Turks might tolerate his return to C^qorus. 

He absolved the United States of anj^ responsibility for his difficulties, saying 
that "I do not think the American government or anj^ American agent was in- 
volved in the coup against me." And I found him to be relatively kind toward 
Secretary of State Kissinger. Makarios saw Kissinger in Washington shortly after 
the Cj^Drus crisis erupted. They met for more than an hour and, according to 
Makarios' account, Kissinger said that the United States continued to recognize 
him as president of Cj'prus. Kissinger never said that publicly, however, and his 
failure to do so left the impression in many quarters that the United States 
recognized the regime of Nicos Sampson, the thug who succeeded Makarios 
:for a brief period. That position by Washington is said to have prompted the 
Turks to invade Cyprus. Makarios was reportedlj^ upset by the American position 
at the time, but now, speaking to me, he dismissed it as unimportant because, I 
think, he wants to leave the door open to future dealings with the United States 
and does not want to say anything that might annoy Kissinger. He did tell me, 
though, that during a later meeting with Kissinger he complained that the United 
States was not doing enough to restrain the Turks. As Makarios relates it, Kissinger 
replied that he was working behind the scenes to mediate the crisis. To which 
Makarios answered, according to his version, "I don't know what you're doing 
behind the scenes, but whatever you're doing I don't like the results." Makarios 
addfd that the Russians have been "more constructive from my viewpoint," 
indicating that he approves of their proposal for an international conference on 
Cyprus. There is some suspicion here that Makarios himself put the Kremlin up 
to making that proposal. 

Makarios' hope that a deteriorating situation in Cyprus will make him indis- 
pensable hf'.s obvious limitations. A guerrilla war waged by the Greek Cypriots 
against the Turks, for example, would throw the island in turmoil and make his 
reti^rn precarious. For that reason, as he told me, the idea of guerrilla acti\'ity 
is "premature" and should not be initiated except in desperation. He is still 
counting on diplomatic possil^ilities, therefore. But for all his confidence it still 
remains to be seen whether he is another Prince Sihanouk, doomed to permanent 
exile, or another Charles de Gaulle, on the brink of a triumphant comeback. 

[The New Republic, Sept. 21, 1974] 

Greece in Transition 

a. passel of problems to be solved 

(By Stanley Karnow) 
Athens 

The many officials, politicians, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, students and 
diplomats I have seen in this talkative capital within the past w-eek have, alm.ost 
without exception, reacted with either scorn or skepticism to Secretarj^ of State 
Kissinger's recent pledge that, despite "some misunderstandings and disagree- 
ments," the United States intends "to restore and to deepen" its friendship with 
Greece and do its "utmost" to support the new civihan government headed by 
Premier Constantine Karamanlis. One member of the Karamanlis cabinet, a 
studious gentleman educated in the United States, described Kissinger to me as "a 
cynic whose so-called realpolitik shows immoral disregard for people," and other 
comments I have heard have been similarly passionate. This rage against Kissinger 
not only reflects Greek displeasure with his handling of the Cyprus crisis, which has 
propelled the Turks into a dominant position on the island but it also represents 
an outburst of hostility against the United States for having propped up the 
cruel and inept military regime that governed Greece for seven years until its 
collapse during the summer. In my opinion these complaints are largely justified. 
For the Cyprus issue, which arouses the kind of emotions among Greeks that the 
question of Alsace-Lorraine once evoked in the French, could probably have been 
capped had the United States and the other Western powers intervened in the 
first instance to stand by Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot president ousted 
by the Greek junta, or failing that, exerted pressure on Turkey not to extend its 
presence over the island. 

To a large degree, however, these diatribes against Kissinger and the United 
States underline a significant trait in the Greeks. Inhabitants of a small, poor 
geographically vulnerable land, they have developed a sense of reliance on outside 



67 

assistance even though to bolster their self-esteem, they constantly proclaim their 
sovereignty. The British, who helped them to gain freedom from the decrepit 
Ottoman Emprie in the 19th centurj^ remained an influence here until after 
World War II, and Lord Byron, who championed their cause, is still a national 
hero. The United States nioved in during the civil war against the Communists, 
establishing a modern-day protectorate in which American dii)Iomats, military 
officers and Central Intelligence Agency operatives, many of them of Cireek 
origin, functioned inside the Greek administration and army almost as colonial 
advisers. The Greeks for the most part welcomed this dependent arrangement, 
so much so that an Athens landmark is a statue of President Truman, whose 
celebrated doctrine turned them into US clients. The link has been reinforced over 
the years, moreover, by the fact that some three million Greek-Americans in the 
United States have retained close ties with the "old country." Thus, it seems 
to me, the Greeks are currently denouncing the US with extraordinary stridency 
because they feel disappointed, even betrayed, that their principal defender should 
have let them down in the midst of a bitter dispute v>ith their traditional enemy, 
the Turks. 

One of the interesting aspects of US policy here is that different branches of the 
American government often squabbled over how to deal with Greece, and those 
squabbles still persist. Back in the spring of 1967, for example, when the US 
mission in Athens learned that two separate Greek military groups were preparing 
a coup d'etat to head off a likely election victory hy George Papandreou's left-of- 
center part}^, the CIA recommended that the election be rigged in favor of the 
conservatives in order to deprive the army of a pretext for a takeover. According 
to my source, who was involved in planning the maneuver, the idea was rejected 
by the American ambassador, then Phillips Talbot, on the grounds that the US 
should not interfere in Greece's domestic affairs, and it was spurned by American 
military commanders in the region who preferred a junta with which they could 
do 'ousiness. As a result. Col. George Papadopoulos seized power, and until his 
upset last November b}^ Brig. Gen. Demetrios loannides, he was pampered by 
Ambassador Henry J. Tasca, whose loyalty to the regim.e was such that he barred 
his staff from criticizing it in cables to Washington. 

As myopic as Tasca v\-as to the realities of Greece, the present effort to blame 
him for failing to avert the Cyprus crisis seems to me to be misplaced. From what 
I gather, he did advise loannides through CIA channels before the coup that the 
US disapproved of any designs against Makarios. Afterward, when he learned 
that Kissinger was not going to take decisive action to prevent the Turkish in- 
vasion of the island, Tasca resorted to a desperate measure. He sent a message to 
the Pentagon urging that the Sixth Fleet be deployed in the Aegean Sea to dis- 
courage the Turks. A copy of the message of course reached Kissinger, who fired 
back a cable to Athens accusing Tasca of having become "hysterical" and warning 
him against attempting another end ru.n. Tasca, whose career is shattered, is due 
for recall soon. Despite their lack of respect for him, many diplomats here believe 
that his suggested naval tactic might have worked. 

In any case nearly everyone I have talked with here agrees that the client 
relationshii:) that tied Greece to the United States is now finished, or at least will 
never be the same again. And except for a few diehard Americans, everyone regards 
this change as healthy. But it clearly occurred at the worst possible moment and in 
the woi-st possible manner for the Greeks. For the Karamanlis government, which 
is dedicated to a policy independent of American tutelage, has come into office 
confronted by enormous problems. Karamanlis has taken it upon himself to set 
up an effective democracy, and he must also win an acceptable settlement of the 
Cyprus mess, and these two tasks are related. The Cyprus tangle, which the 
Greeks essentially perceive to be a new chapter in a milleniimi of conflicts with 
Turkey, impinges on the domestic political situation to the extent that Kara- 
manlis"^ cannot concede to a solution that dissatisfies Greek national pride without 
courting the risk of unleashing attacks from the left wing or prompting the army 
to try to resurrect a military regime or perhaps driving both these factions into 
an unholy alliance against him. Hence his internal challenge is aggravated by an 
external challenge. 

If any Greek is qualified to grapple with this dilemma it is Karamanlis. He is a 
tough, honest conservative in his late 60s who, after serving as preniier for eight 
j'-ears, chose exile in Paris in 1963 rather than compromise with his adversaries. 
He returned here at the end of July under circumstances that, for the present, 
give him considerable strength. 



68 

The situation during the last week of July was chaotic. The Turks had landed in 
Cyprus and were threatening to invade Greece, and the loannides regime had 
simply evaporated. The country's niilitarj^ leaders, virtually on the verge of panic, 
appealed to Gen. Phaedon Gizikis, the figurehead president, to create a civilian 
government that could extricate them from the predicament. On the afternoon of 
July 23 Gizikis brought the army, air force and navy commanders together with 
nine or 10 prominent politicians from rival parties, and by evening they had de- 
cided on a government under Panayotis Canellopoulos, a conservative ex-premier, 
with George Mavros, a liberal, as his deputy. Following further bargaining, how- 
ever, the politicians and generals changed their minds and reached the conclusion 
that Karamanlis was more popular with the public and had greater prestige with 
the armed forces. They then telephoned him and invited him to come back from 
Paris. The point of this story is that Karamanlis did not make a bid for power but 
returned here in response to a plea. Accordingly he made no deals with the military 
leaders but accepted, as one of his associates put it, their "unconditional sur- 
render." 

Many of his critics argue that Karamanlis is being too soft on the old regime, and 
by way of evidence they point out that Papadopoulos is still living comfortably in a 
seaside villa belonging to Aristotle Onassis and that lonnides was gently retired last 
week with the rank of major general. The premier's spokesmen acknowledged the 
truth of this evidence, but, they reply, Karamanlis must proceed slowly at a time 
when the danger of war with Turkey still exists and he cannot afford a wholesale 
purge of the Greek military establishment. His caution is plainly motivated as well 
by his fear that the armed forces may attempt to stage a comeback if their officers 
are harassed, and another coup d'etat is more than Greece could stand. Neverthe- 
less he has reshuffled the country's top military command, elevating to the senior 
post Gen. loanis Davos, who played an important part in the overthrow of the 
junta in July. Karamanlis has also begun to clean up the security apparatus 
through which the junta controlled the population. But, his aides explain, the 
big job lies ahead. There are 40,000 Greek officials spread throughout the prov- 
inces, and screening them all will be a vast operation. Besides it will require im- 
mense labor to separate those who were guilty of criminal conduct from those who 
collaborated with the junta out of passivity. Except for a few extremists, one of 
whom just returned here from the US, I found surprisingly little clamor for 
revenge. 

Karamanlis considers his government to be merely temporary, and his first 
objective is to hold elections as soon as possible, probably within the next six 
months. His primary purpose is to win himself legitimacy, and with that, to 
establish a new political system, since the present structure is a mishmash. The 
junta deposed King Constantine and proclaimed a republic, but Karamanlis 
regards that move as having been illegal. Unless he intends to restore the mon- 
archy, which is unlikely, he must somehow contrive to retire the king formally. 
Although nobody has said so bluntly, I suspect that he hopes to set up a sort of 
GauUist presidency, partly because he knew and admired de Gaulle and partly 
because he believes that Greece needs a strong executive. This was signaled to 
me the other day when one of his close colleagues noted that the only slogan that 
was popular during the period of junta rule was the one that condemned the 
old parhamentary system, which in many respects resembled the French Fourth 
Repubhc. 

Another page that Karamanlis took out of the French book was his decision to 
pull Greece out of military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion. This was an extremely shrewd move from a domestic political viewpoint, 
since it deflated opponents, particularly on the left, who thought that they could 
tarnish him as a lackey of the US. The move was also justifiable since the alliance, 
despite its official claim to safeguard democratic traditions, did nothing to curb 
the dictatorship here. Nor was NATO of much help to Greece during the Cyprus 
crisis, when it was either unable or unwilling to mediate a fight between two of 
its members. So, the Greeks say, they quit NATO because NATO abandoned 
them. It strikes me, though, that Karamanlis might have been wiser in tactical 
terms had he threatened to withdraw from NATO in order to impel the United 
States and the Europeans to exert pressure on Turkey to show restraint in Cyprus. 
That is obviouslj^ what he is doing now in respect to the US military installations 
here, and the Greeks stress it is precisely because Karamanlis dropped out of 
NATO that his threat to close down the American facilities is credible. 

The extent of the American involvement in Greece — and a key reason successive 
administrations in Washington have paid so much attention to the country — is 



69 

mirrored in the number of US military operations going on here. The naval bases 
are the most apparent fixtures, but they are the least important parts of the 
machinery. Far more vital to the United States are the Iraklion air stations on 
the island of Crete, a secret installation that monitors Soviet movements in the 
Mediterranean, the US air force facility near the capital, a key link to the Middle 
East, and a number of places throughout Greece at which tactical nuclear weapons 
are deployed. To shift these activities would not only entail huge costs, but it is 
not entirely certain where they could be relocated. Turkey is considered out of 
range for certain intelligence surveillance of the Balkans, and Italy is regarded as 
too unstable politically for a massive investment in militarj^ real estate. Against 
this background the Greeks know that they are in an enviable bargaining posture, 
and their negotiations on the US presence here may explain Kissinger's softer 
tone toward them. The Greeks are aware, however, that they cannot jettison the 
Americans without weakening their own security. 

Politicall}^, meanwhile, the new Greek government is striving to return to the 
European fold, and George Mavros, the foreign minister, went to Paris, Bonn 
and Brussels last week with that in mind. The French, who are seeking to displace 
US influence here, have been especially cordial to the Greeks and are promoting 
their efforts to join the European Common Market, which would have nothing 
to do with the junta. Besides perking up Greek morale, membership in the Com- 
mon Market would help the countrj^'s sagging economy, which has been suffering 
from the highest inflation rate on the continent. 

With all this, though, the crucial ingredient in the future stability of the 
Karamanlis government or any other civilian regime here is going to be the Cyprus 
issue. His aides admit that Greece was originally responsible for the crisis because 
of the junta's action against Makarios, and they express the wish that the Turks 
would cease exploiting their blunder. At the same time, however, they know 
that they cannot expect much generosity from Turkey as long as Turkish Premier 
Ecevit needs to appease his military supporters. The best they can hope for is a 
loose federation of etlinic cantons under a central Cypriot authority. Getting 
that kind of settlement is bound to be snagged by Turkish insistence on keeping 
troops on the island. What worries the Greeks more is that the Turks will press 
for a partition of Cyprus in which they consolidate their control of the richest 
part of the island they now hold. Such an accommodation would, by putting 
numbers of Greek Cypriots either under Turkish authority or leaving them to 
rot in refugee camps, mean another Palestinian problem in the Mediterranean. 

Plagued as it is by both domestic and foreign problems, Greece is searching 
for a role in an area that has lost its equilibrium. Mvich of its trouble can be 
attributed to the fact that, partly because of its own inadequacies and partly as 
a result of its strategic location, it became a virtual pawn of the US, which has 
sacrificed Greek interests for the sake of its own aims. The lesson to be drawn 
from this episode, then, may be that it is tragic to be a small nation in a Kissinger 
world— or in any world. 

(The New RepubUc, Sept; 28, 1974] 

Shambles 

report from cyprus 

(By Stanley Karnow) 
Nicosia 

One afternoon last week a pair of Turkish jet fighter planes appeared over this 
city, darting across the azure sky like silver birds, and although they flew oflf 
within a matter of minutes, their impact was electric. Offices emptied, merchants 
quickly shuttered up their shops, and those who could motored into the nearby 
hills amid rumors that the aircraft were reconnoitering for a fresh offensive by the 
Turkish forces, which already occupj^ the northern tier of the island. Nothing of 
course occurred, and a day later all was again calm. Yet the moment of ])anic 
dramatized the extreme nervousness of the Greek Cypriots, who vastly outnumber 
the local Turkish minority. Their apprehension is understandable for the invasion 
of Cyprus by Turkey that followed the ouster of President Makarios 10 weeks ago 
has been devastating. Hundreds of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been killed, 
often in atrocious circumstances, and new tales of slaughter, rape and jiillage are 
detailed nearly every day by one ethnic group in an effort to impugn the other. 
More than one third of the island's population has been driven into refugee camps 
in the southern sector, and the touristy northern coast, now controlled by the 



70 

Turldsh army, is a scene of desolation. Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, 
and Rauf Denktash, his Turkish counterpart, are meanwhile trying under United 
Nations auspices to negotiate an accommodation. Thej^ showed a bit of progress 
a few days ago when, with much fanfare, some sick and disabled civilian prisoners 
were exchanged. But even though the two men are old friends, their attempts to 
reach a substantive settlement have been fruitless. Denktash cannot accede to a 
compromise that is unacceptable to Turkey, and Clerides is operating under the 
shadow of Greece as well as under pressure from Makarios, who has been sitting 
in London since July. Both Cypriot leaders are therefore pawns in a conflict be- 
tween Greece and Turke}- that dates back a thousand years, and thus their task 
is being complicated by outside factors. The prevailing view here, consequently, 
is that the horrors of the past two months maj^ be repeated. 

People who know Cyprus well suggest that its portrayal by Lawrence Durrell, 
while marvelous prose, is somewhat romantic. Durrell's picture of the island is 
largely one of ethnic harmony shattered in the late 1950s by the struggle against 
British colonial rule waged mainly by the Greek Cypriots. In fact, I am told, the 
two principal ethnic grou])s more or less coexisted until then only because the 
Greek majority, which makes up more than 80 jjercent of the population and has 
commanded the island's resources, was able to keep the less dynamic Turks down. 
In other words the situation resembled that of our own South, where peace reigned 
as long as whites dominated blacks. So potential tensions have for years simmered 
below the surface of this pluralistic society, and they began to emerge during the 
fight for independence, when the British, distrustful of Greek Cypriots, recruited 
Turks as ]3olicemen and administrative officials. After independence, the Greeks 
led by Makarios took revenge against the Turks by excluding them from economic 
development projects and generally treating them as second-class citizens. The 
friction created by this behavior eventually sparked an outbreak of clashes in 
1964 that, in reverse, seemed to be a rehearsal for the present ruction. In that 
uprising, the Greek Cypriot movement known as EOKA-B ruthlessly persecuted 
Turks, dislocating them in much the same way that the Turkish army has, on a 
broader scale, now displaced Greeks. The fallout from that period also plunged 
Cyprus into political confusion. On the one hand Makarios came under assault 
from the Greek Cypriot extremists and their military supporters in Athens, who 
favored enosis, or union, between Cj^prus and Greece. At the same time, both he 
and his Greek adversaries were opposed by the Turks, who sought a stronger 
voice in running the island. The overthrow of Makarios by agents of the Athens 
junta raised the specter of immediate evosis, and Turkey, either genuinely scared 
by that prospect or merely seeking a pretext to intervene, invaded Cyprus. Since 
then the Turks have extended their hold over nearly half of the island, and their 
bargaining position is \'ery solid indeed. They have territory, and they have 
turned some Greeks into refugees. 

It was ol^vious to me as I went into the northern zone the other day that, 
dei:)ending on the settlement they can impose, the Turks intend to transform this 
region into a separate Turkish state, an autonomous Turkish area within a 
Cyprus federation, or an appendage of Turkey. The natural beautj^ of the coast is 
extraordinary. Rugged mountains form a backdrop to hills sloping down to the 
sea, and villages nestled in the landscape afford spectacular perspectives of the 
scene. But this canvas is currently suffused with death and destruction. Wrecked 
tanks and armored cars litter roads, and tourist spots with names like "The 
Mermaid Hotel" and "Charisma Villas" are in ruins. The only people I saw in 
the picturesque port of Kyrenia were a Turkish army patrol and a waiter hosing 
down a cafe terrace for customers who would never arrive. Turkish soldiers were 
the onljr human beings visible along the coastal road, where entire Greek villages, 
their buildings charred or in shambles, have lost all their inhabitants. 

Turkish officials in the area are not only effacing the Greek presence by painting 
out the Greek letters on road signs and store windows, Init they plan to repopulate 
the region with Turkish Cypriots and perhaps with Turks from mainland Turkey. 
A lonely Turkish police officer I encountered in Lapithos, a lovely hillside town 
oveilooking the Mediterranean whose 6000 Greek inhabitants had fled south, 
explained to me that the departed population will be replaced by Turkish families 
that were driven out of the place by Greeks during the disturbances of 10 years 
ago. He further explained that since the homes of the returning Turks were 
destroyed a decade earlier, they would be lodged "temporarily" in the houses of 
the Greeks who had escaped. "They did it to us and now we're doing it to them," 
the policeman imi)lied. The only other person I found in the ghostly town was an 
elderlj^ English doctor by the name of Wilkinson who had retired there 14 years 



71 

ago. He complained of lacking electricity and water, but when I asked why he 
remained, he stared at me with piercing ej^es and replied: "This, young man, is my 
home." 

Apparently as part of their strategy the Turks are also using refugees and cap- 
tives as bargaining counters. They are holding numbers of j'oung Greek Cypriots 
as hostages in Adana, a city in southern Turkey, and the,y have about 800 Greeks 
bottled up in Bellapais, the arty C3q3rus village made famous by Durrell. I 
visited another group of Greeks being held in the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia. Denktash 
has described this group as "hotel guests," but they consider themselves to be 
something less pleasant. One of them, a Kyrenian businessman called Theodore 
Yavropoulos, expressed uncertainty about his status. "What kind of prisoner am 
I?" he asked me. "Am I a prisoner of war? Am I protected by the Gene\a Con- 
vention? Who will know if I am taken out and shot?" A plan is now underway to 
permit him and 400 other Dome Hotel "guests" to enjoy limited freedom in 
K^a-enia. But as I understand it they will not be allowed to roam beyond the 
town. 

The Turkish C.ypriots in the south are in a predicament similar to the Greeks 
in the north. They fear for their lives in a Greek environment, and for that reason 
some 8000 displaced Turks refuse to leave a camp on a British base incongrously 
called "Happy Valley." Turkey has tried to persuade Britain to send them to 
the Turkish mainland, but the British, suspecting that these people will promptly 
be used to fill the population vacuum in the north, have refused. About 10,000 
Greek refugees are also encamped in another British base, and they are clinging 
to the area out of fear that the Turks may move down to occupy the rest of the 
island. These refugees are not impoverished Vietnamese or Palestinians, but 
middle-class citizens, many of whom fled in their automobiles, and it is not un- 
common to see, as I did the other day, an uprooted family clustered around its 
Mercedes. 

The climate is mild at the moment, and many of the Greek Cyi^riot refugees 
harbor the illusion that the present mess will soon be solved and that they will 
return home. But as the weather grows colder and the mess gets messier their 
expectations are bound to decline sharpl.y, and it is thought that the camps could 
Ijecome enlistment centers for terriorists and guerrillas desperate to confront the 
Turks. A resistance movement, should it take shape, would ]>robably bring the 
Turkish army down through all of Cyprus and turn the island into a battlefield. 
Hence the refugee issue requires urgent handling. It is being dealt with on a 
humanitarian basis bj' the Red Cross, the United Nations, special American 
experts and others. But it cannot be really settled as long as the political configrira- 
tion of Cyprus is not worked out — and that question is not going to be cleared 
up soon. Turkey plainly intends to carve out the northern zone for the Turks, and 
laartition in one way or another is certain to be explosive. 

It seems to me that if the case of Cyprus illustrates anything it is that the plight 
of small states ought to be resolved by international diplomacy. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union have a responsibility in this instance, largely to pre- 
vent the island from becoming an arena for big power rivalries. The Greek junta 
that formerly ruled in Athens should have been stopped from toppling Makarios. 
Now the Turks, who have the upper hand, should be persuaded to adopt a more 
conciliatory posture. I have no idea what the Russians are doing, bixt I gather that 
Secretary of State Kissinger is talking to the Turks yet not leaning on them 
strongly. Given their current nationalistic fervor, the Turks are unlikely to respond 
to words alone. In the meantime, this handsome island continues to suffer — as it 
has periodicalh^ for centuries. 

[The New Republic, Oct. 5, 1974] 

Tough Turkey 

PREMIER RCEVIT's PERSPECTIVE ON CYPRUS 

(By Stanley Karnow) 
Ankara 

It seems paradoxical that Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, the first war this 'com- 
plex country has waged since it became a republic more than a half-century ago, 
should have been undertaken bj^ Bulent Ecevit. For Ecevit, who has yet to con- 
solidate his authority since he recently emerged as premier following a turbulent 
period of army rule, is hardly a belligerent figure. On the contrary, he is a quiet. 



72 

'fearnest intellectual who writes poetry and has translated such poets as Eliot and 
Ezra Pound, and he hopes to steer Turkey toward a sort of Scandinavian social 
democracy. While conceding that the war has strengthened his popularity because 
of its appeal to Turkish chauvinism, he nonetheless denies any desire to wear the 
laurels of a "national hero," contending instead that his political career ought 
to repose on his "communion with the people." Sitting in his large office under a 
huge portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, whose mantle he has inherited, Ecevit 
speaks in measured tones as he stresses his intention to modernize Turkey, as 
Ataturk tried to do, through long-range social and economic programs. 

With all this, however, the evidence is clear that Ecevit not only directed the 
Turkish thrust into Cyprus in July and ordered his troops to expand their control 
over the island a few weeks later, stubbornly defying rather weak American and 
British remonstrances in the process, but he currently shows no signs of adopting 
a softer stance toward the Greeks, his foes in the crisis. Thus he may be a reluctant 
hawk, but in my view he was seeking an opportunity to bear down on his Greek 
adversaries, even though by doing so he courted the risk of upsetting the equi- 
librium of the eastern Mediterranean. 

Consider, in the first place, that Turkey and Greece were on a collision course 
months ago over the the question of oil rights in the Aegean Sea. The Greeks, 
whose eastern most islands lie within spitting distance of the Turkish shore, believed 
that the Aegean was their lake, and they had on that basis been awarding drilling 
concessions to foreign firms. But late last year, in a challenge to the Greek theory, 
the Turks encouraged other companies to explore areas claimed by Greece, and 
that move touched off a sequence of alarums and excursions. In the spring, 
ignoring a Greek protest, the Turks sent two bomber aircraft out on target practice 
over the central Aegean without permission from either Greece or the North 
Altantic Treaty Organization, to which both nations belonged. After the Greeks 
retaliated by withdrawing from a NATO naval exercise, the Turks put a survey 
ship into the region to test Greek reactions further. The Greeks threatened to 
sink the vessel, but finally backed away, leaving the Turks with the impression 
that Greece, then governed by an mept junta, was too feeble to menace Turkey in 
the event of a showdown. Therefore, months before the Cyprus affair erupted, 
the Turks were already estimating" the solidarity of the Greek regime in the ex- 
pectation that a confrontation might be in the offing, and consequently, when 
the crisis came, they knew that the junta was as flimsy as a house of cards. 

Turkish receptivity to an external adventure was undoubtedly reinforced by 
the fact that Ecevit's government was, at the time, far from solid. Unable to 
win a majority in the elections last fall, Ecevit had formed a bizarre coalition 
with a crude religious party, and their relationship was wobbly. It foundered 
when Ecevit, circumventing the Parliament, pushed a bill through the Supreme 
Court granting amnesty to political dissenters imprisoned by the army. His 
government toppled as a result, and at this writing, he is working to create a 
new caretaker coalition that will prepare for elections. Hence the Cyprus crisis, 
while not originally of his making, offered him a chance to bolster himself against 
his parliamentary rivals. And, I think, Ecevit must have calculated as well that 
he had to act tough in order to convince the Turkish military establishment, 
which wields considerable political influence and which had doubts about him, 
that he was worthy of support. 

The Turks also felt less constrained to submit to American sway, for a couple 
of reasons. They bitterly remembered an episode that occurred in June 1964, 
when during an earlier roil over Cyprus, Lyndon Johnson warned them in his 
blunt manner that the United States would drop them if they invaded the island, 
as they were planning to do. They desisted, but the "Johnson letter", as it has 
come to be known here, was taken by the Turks as an affront of the highest magni- 
tude, and they were determined not to be humiliated again. Although they have 
remained within the Western Alliance, they have improved their ties to the So- 
viet Union — so much so that during the Middle East war last fall they permitted 
the Russians to fly over their territory en route to Egypt but refused to allow 
American supplies destined for Israel to pass through Turkish bases. So, when the 
latest Cyprus crisis broke out, the Turks were ready to resist American pressure, 
and at one point in the affair, as I will elaborate below, they even ijulled a reverse 
of the Johnson tactic and warned that they would drop the United States if 
Washington attempted to lean on them heavily. 

It should be added that the Cyprus business has revealed some deep-rooted 
traits of the Turks. One, which I have tried to emphasize in other articles from 
this region, is their attitude that they cannot, for the sake of their own self- 
respect, surrender to the Greeks. This attitude stems in part at least from their 



73 

resentment over the fact that while the Greeks are fully included in the Western 
community they, because of their Islamic heritage, their marginal geographic 
location and tlieir terrifying historical reputation, are not totally accepted as 
Europeans. Their real or imaginary sense of remoteness is aggravated, too, by 
their awareness that they are an unknown quantity in comparison to the Greeks 
who have migrated far and wide and who, as Ecevit put it the other day, can 
muster votes in New York and London. Their perception of how others relate 
them to the Greeks is, rightly or wrongly, all the more galling to the Turks be- 
cause, with a population of nearly 40 million, they are more than four times bigger 
than Greece, and as they insist with a certain amount of justification, their demo- 
cratic institutions are far more stable. 

At the same time that they argue their case, however, the Turks fall back on the 
theme that nobody understands them anyway and that their concern for world 
opinion is futile. So, they say, they intend to go their own way without regard 
for their image, and I suspect that this feeling that they had nothing to lose ex- 
plains to a large extent why they pushed ahead in Cyprus despite American and 
British efforts to dissuade them. A senior Turkish army officer capsulized the 
feeling: "The world would have hated us even if we had fired roses instead of 
bullets." 

Given this background — and there may be other elements that elude me — it 
seems that the diplomatic efforts by the Turks to avert military involvement in 
Cyprus were halfhearted at best, and perhaps even deliberately designed to meet 
with failure so that their invasion could be carried through. The key question 
here, then, is whether the United States could have behaved more forcefully than 
it did to prevent the Turkish drive. Looking back at the series of events, it strikes 
me that Secretary of State Kissinger had occasions in which he might have tem- 
pered the Turks. These occasions were lost, presumablj^ because he was unwilling 
to gamble on the possibility that the American military installations in Turkey, 
which include an airfield, a naval base and an assortment of intelligence operations, 
could have been jeopardized. Thus this crisis, like so many others, again demon- 
strates the degree to which the United States can, because of its obsession with 
military real estate, be manipulated or at least outmaneuvered by a client. Much 
of this has come out in the talks I have had with Turkish officials and Western 
diplomats here within the past few daj's. 

According to everj^ source I have seen, Ecevit had pretty much decided to 
launch an invasion of Cyprus within a day after the ouster on July 15 of Arch- 
bishop Makarios and his replacement as president of the island by Nicos Sampson. 
For not only was Sampson known to have personally killed a number of Turkish 
Cypriots but, in Ecevit's eyes, his elevation as a stooge of the Athens junta signified 
that Cyprus would be united to Greece, and that was intolerable. My sources 
submit that Ecevit might have been deterred from military action or perhaps 
delayed had the United States quickly disavowed Sampson and called for a return 
to the status quo ante. But the State Department spokesman issued an even- 
handed statement on the subject, and it was interpreted by the Turks to mean 
that the United States accepted the situation. Ecevit therefore ordered the 
Turkish army to prepare for landings, yet anxious to give diplomacy a chance, he 
flew to London on July 17 to sound out the British, who along with Greece and 
Turkey were guarantors of the 1960 treaty that created an independent Cyprus. 

In London he presented British foreign secretary James Callaghan with four 
proposals: that Sampson be removed, that the 650 Greek officers who had led 
the coup d'etat against Makarios be sent back to Greece, that Cyprus be given 
a new federal system respectful of Turkish Cypriot rights, and that negotiations 
to create such a system begin immediately between Glafkos Clerides, the Greek 
Cypriot leader, and Rauf Denktash, his Turkish counterpart. According to my 
informants, the wind could probably have been taken out of Ecevit's sails, at 
least temporarily, by a British pledge to persuade the Athens regime to with- 
draw the Greek officers from Cyprus. But Callaghan stalled, evidently to await 
the American L'ndersecretarj- of State Joseph Sisco, then arriving from Washing- 
ton. The proposals were put to Sisco. He promised to communicate them to the 
junta in Athens and deliver an answer to Ecevit in Ankrar later in the week. But 
Sisco ran into two snags. The Greek junta, theoretically commanded ])y Gen. 
D( metrios loannides, had virtually evaporated, and Sisco squandered precious 
time as he searched for someone of authority in Athens; and when he did find 
somebody all he could obtain was an offer to replace rather than pull out the 
Greek officers in Cyprus. Sisco carried this offer to Ankara on the afternoon of 
July 19, and, when Ecevit predictably rejected it as inadequate, he went back to 
Athens to persuade the Greeks to do better. They refused, and he returned to 



74 

Ankara the same night to plead with Ecevit to give him another 48 hours. Back- 
ing up his envoy, Kissinger meanwhile had 11 separate telephone conversations 
with Ecevit, but to no avail. At four o'clock on Saturday morning, Ecevit in- 
structed the Turkish forces lying off the coast of Cj-prus to land in what the Turks 
now refer to as "phase one" of their operation. 

Reconstructing the discussions that went on during that frantic day, one of 
Ecevit's close associates disclosed to me that the Turkish premier advised Kissin- 
ger against the land of pressure Lyndon Johnson had exerted in 1964 and warned 
him that >uch a tactic would mean the permanent "loss" of Turkey to the Western 
Alliance. By that, the associate explained, Ecevit meant that Turke^y would 
quit NATO completely if an attempt was made to stop its drive into Cyprus. 
This account may be overdrawn, but I gather from other sources that the Turks 
were in no mood to brook interference. In any case American diplomacy failed 
on two counts at that stagt . It was unable to compel the Greek junta, despite 
years of pampering by the United States, to meet Ecevit's proposals with an offer 
that A\duld have at least deprived him of the pretext to invade Cyprus. And it 
was unable to convince Ecevit, whose use of American military equipment for 
the inyasion violated Turkey's aid agreements with the United^ States, to post- 
pone the landings. That Ecevit may have really been relieved by Greek intran- 
sigence and American softness was mirrored in the remark he reportedly made to 
Sisco after the invasion began: "Now you have 48 hours in which to find a 
solution." 

American commanders who observed the performance of their Turkish allies 
in CyiDrus must have been appalled. The Turks sank one of their own ships, their 
IDara troop drops were badly off target, and their coordination was so poor that 
they had to cancel a landing on the eastern shore of the island that was scheduled 
to coincide with their north coast invasion. Nor was their offensive on Cyprus 
easily accomplished. By the end of the month, when they begrvidingh' agreed 
with the new Greek civilian government to a ceasefire, they had only managed to 
open a precarious corridor from Kyrenia to Nicosia, and that uncomfortable 
position would largely contribute to their conduct during the negotiations that 
began on August 8 in Geneva. 

The Turks went to Geneva in sweet-and-sour style, carrying a proi)Osal for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem but making it clear that rejection of their sugges- 
tions would provoke renewed military action on the island. As they tell it, they 
passed on their proposals privately through the British foreign secretary, James 
Cailaghan, in order to spare the Greeks from having to respond publicly. Their 
initial idea was for a federal system under which the Turkish Cypriots, who com- 
prise 18 percent of the island's population, would have separate administration 
in a zone covering 38 percent of Cj-prus. When the Greeks spurned that, the Turks 
came back with a plan for a cantonal sj^stem, under which the Turkish Cypriots 
would occupy several areas. The Greeks considered this even worse. The}'^ asked 
for a 36-hour adjournment of the conference, and Cailaghan, perceiving that the 
meeting might colUipse, urged the Turks to be "generous." American diplomats, 
backed up bj' telephone calls from Kissinger, also counseled flexiljilit}'. Unce 
again, however, the United States not only refrained from putting any real pressure 
on Turkey, but bj^ issuing a statement gratuitously expressing support for greater 
autonomj^ for the Turkish Cypriots, the State Department seemed to be tilting 
toward the Turks. Ecevit therefore rejected the Greek request for an adjournment, 
and with the Geneva conference in disarra.y, he ordered his forces on Cyprus to 
take the offensive, and within a matter of days thev held 40 percent of the island, 
the area they now control. 

Turkish officials here say that "phase two," as the offensive started in the 
middle of August is called, was undertaken Vjecause their forces considered their 
military position to have been insecure. That was probably true in part. But 
Ecevit's foreign affairs adviser, Haluk Ulman, sul)mits more plausibly that the 
real reason for the push was diplomatic. In the first place, he told me the other 
day, the Turks wanted to improve their bargaining posture, and consequently 
the}- were simply adhering to the thesis that they could not win at the conference 
table what they had not won on the battlefield. Secondly, and in my estimation 
more significantly, they feared that the United States might shift its stance during 
the Geneva meeting iwid apply strong leverage to prevent them from a second 
military drive. This apprehension was fueled by the fact that the British, who 
maintain sovereign bases on Cj^prus, reinforced them with a battalion of Gurkhas 
and also sent in a squadron of Phantom jets to help a contingent (jf United Nations 
troops defend the Nicosia airport against possible Turkish attack. Ulman's 



75 

explanation, I think, undermines the official American argument that the United 
States could not halt the Turks. It indicates as well that Kissinger may have 
miscalculated the effect of the pressure he could have applied on Turkey. 

The Turks now assert that their military actions are finished and that they 
are prepared to negotiate seriously with the Greeks. As I understand it, they have 
been warned by the United States that a move to take over the entire island 
would prompt the Ford administration to stop American military aid, which 
amounts to $150 million per year. [Last week the House voted to cut off military 
aid to Turkey until "substantial progress" has been made to effect a Cyprus 
agreement. The Editors] But many diplomats here envisage situations that might 
lead the Turks to actions less dramatic than a com]3lete occupation of Cyprus 
but nevertheless brutal. One possibility is that they may inflict severe reprisals 
against the Greek Cypriot population for attacks against the Turks by Greek 
Cy]:iriot terrorists or guerrillas. 

Ecevit is sticking to the same formula his representati^-es put forth in Geneva 
in August : Cy])rus must be divided between Greek and Turkish C^'priot zones, 
with the Turks getting roughly one-third of the island. The Turkish zone would 
be the richer northern part now occupied by Turkish troops, and it would include, 
according to Ecevit, the port of Famagusta, which with its skyscraper hotels 
resembles a miniature Miami Beach. Since the Turkish Cypriot population is 
insufficient to fill this region, the Turks talk about migration from Turkey, citing 
the dubious statistic that some 250,000 Turks of Cypriot origin A\iiG have settled in 
Turkej- since the 1920s could be transferred to the island. Turkish officials here 
strenuously rebuff the idea that, if their proposal for federal structure fails to 
carry, Turkey might annex the northern sector of the island. They point out that 
such a move would automatically incorporate a part of Cyprus into NATO and 
thereby offend the Russians. That, among other reasons, is why Cyprus is so 
important. Like Taiwan, it is intrinsically an inconsequential bit of terrain, but its 
location has made it disproj^ortionately vital to the international scene, and thus 
its future transcends its own problems of ethnic harmony. 

There is much more to say about ^Turkey than its preoccupation Avith Cyprus. 
It has a thriving economy, and despite generals in the wings, its commitment to 
democracy is genuine. But the Cyprus issue is the main topic of conversation 
here, and I have focused on it at length because, within the content of the current 
crisis, it illustrates the dilemma of a major power like the LTnited States when 
confronted by choices. To contend, as Kissinger has in respect to this situation, 
that America is no longer the world's policeman is a facile but hollow .-nrgument, 
especially \Ahen he did not shy av.ay from intervention in Chile and continues to 
bulwark the regime in Saigon. Therefore, in my opinion, the real question is not 
whether the United States plaj's a role in the world, but its judgment in deciding 
what role it a\ ill play in what area. In this instance, I believe, it made the wrong 
decision for the wrong motive, and for that reason, I would venture to predict 
we have not heard the end of the Cyprus business and its implications for this 
corner of the globe. 



APPENDIX VI 
Selected Press Reports and Commentaries on the Crisis in Cyprus 

1. PRESS REPORTS ON EVENTS IN CYPRUS 

[From The Economist (London), Aug. 10, 1974] 

An island coming apart at the seams 

The attempt to work out the political future of Cyprus got under way in 
Geneva on Thursday, by the skin of its teeth; but the Greeks were dropping 
threats that they would walk out of the conference if the Turkish army kept on 
advancing. In fact Cyprus's future is less likely to be decided by the negotiators 
at Geneva than by the facts on the ground; and both sides — but especially the 
Turks — have been ruthlessly creating facts in the past week. By Thursday the 
growing Turkish enclave in the north seemed to extend to a point about 10 miles 
west of Kyrenia. On both sides of the new dividing line new refugees have been 
thrown out of their homes. This will powerfully influence the future political 
configuration of the island. 

On Tuesday the Turkish government claimed that more than 21,000 Turkish 
Cypriots — nearly a fifth of the total— had fled, or been expelled from, the places 
where they had lived. About 6,000 got to a British base in the south; in Famagusta, 
a fair number gained relative security by pouring into the old city with its pro- 
tective Venetian ramparts. Elsewhere, large numbers of Turks fled (or tried to 
flee) in panic from one village to another, but some went back again. The result is 
that the fighting has brought about some degree of concentration of the Turkish 
population of the island. But the majority of Turkish C^ypriots appear to be where 
they were on July 20th, when the Turkish invasion started — except that they are 
now prisoners, or hostages, of the Greeks. 

In a telegram to the Secretary- General of the United Nations on Sunday, Mr. 
Clerides had already submitted the Greek side's allegation: that 20,000 Greek 
Cypriots in the Turkish-held Kyrenia enclave had been driven from their homes. 
Some fled eastward, to relative security, at the start of the fighting; others were 
reported to have got to Nicosia. Whatever settlement is reached in Geneva, if 
any is, it is hard to set these Greeks ever settling again in Kyrenia. 

All this has a bearing on what the politicians are talking about. If the Turkish 
army had been alile to establish several predominantly Turkish cantons under its 
control, or even to advance as far west as Tylliria, the issue would be clearer. But 
even as it is the Turkish-held enclave is probably extensive enough to absorb a 
large proportion of the Turkish refugees — if they are willing to make the trek to 
the north. Already the Turkish government, in collaboration with the Turkish 
Cypriot administration, is planning to turn Kyrenia into Cyprus's second capital: 
a deep-water port is to be built (which will not be easy), oil and water pipelines 
are to link Kyrenia to the Turkish mainland, and a small airfield is to be con- 
structed. The Kyrenia enclave is getting very close to being Turkey's 68th 
province. 

Of course, this is not admitted by the Turkish government. Or not quite.^'On 
Sunday the prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, said that Turkey's idea of a "federal" 
solution was based on no more than the principle that Turkish Cypriots were 
the rightful owners of 30 percent of Cyprus's real estate. Last week the Turkish 
Cj'^priot leader, Mr. Denktash, went rather further: he talked about the Kyrenia 
enclave being an "autonc mous republic within a general republic", whatever that 
means. And then on Wednesday Professor Ulman — Mr. Ecevit's key adviser in 
foreign affairs, who may play an iinportant role in Geneva — reportedly used the 
word "confederation". Cj^prus, he said, shoidd consist of two separate, autonomous 
republics theoretically subordinate to some nebulous central authority in Nicosia. 

Mr. Mavros, the Greek foreign minister, has on two occasions in the past week 
ruled out both partition and federation. On Wednesday evening, however, in an 
interview with the BBC, he categorically excluded only partition. The signs are 

(77) 
41-207—74 6 



78 

that the Greeks, with precious few cards in their hands, are now prepared to 
accept the federal concept. The trouble is that the Greeks still want 'a .strong 
central government in Nicosia, so that Cj'prus should continue to be, in theory 
at least, a "unitary" state. Between that and the very loose form of con- 
federation — not verj' different in practice from a sort of partition — which the 
Turks want, there is still a gulf. 

THE BLOOD-DEBT 

The ceasefire ordered 1)}' the first round of the Geneva talks on July oOth has 
achieved almost nothing. It has not brought an end to the bloodshed on Cyprus. 
It has not in any way diminished the mutual fears of the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities. And it has not deterred the Turkish army, which invaded 
Cyprus on July 20th and which has been reinforcing itself ever since, from ex- 
tending its tentacles in the strategic mountain range west of Kyrenia and from 
doing, it seems, some brutal things in the process. 

On August 4th, the acting president of Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, sent a 
message to all heads of state. This said that the Turkish army had indulged in 
rape, arson and cold-blooded murder, that it had expelled civilians from their 
homes and had systematically looted and plundered i:)roperty. There is enough 
evidence from reporters on the spot, together with the guarded statements by 
United Nations officers, to suggest that Mr. Clerides's charges may be sub- 
stantially true. 

It requires firm control by officers to prevent soldiers looting from abandoned 
shops and houses; this clearly did not e.xist in the Turkish units that occupied 
Kyrenia. Some Greek Cypriots who escaped from the Kyrenia area have told of 
acts of V)rutality by Turkish soldiers in the presence of their officers. These include 
raiie at gimpoint, the shooting of male civilians and acts of even more savage 
murder. 

Counter-charges of brutality by Greek C.ypriots against the Turkish Cypriot 
community followed from Ankara. On August 5th the Turkish foreign minister 
told a press conference that Greeks had plundered and burned the Turkish village 
of Biscaya and had destroyed 50 Turkish houses in Limassol. The next day the 
information ininister, Mr. Birgit, said hundreds of Turkish villagers had been 
massacreed, and that in the Turkish Cypriot town of Lefka 500 civilians taking 
refuge in a school had been gunned down, onlj' 19 women escaping. Independent 
evidence corroborates instances of Turkish Cypriot civilians being killed by the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard, but there must be serious dcubt about the scale 
of the Lefka massacre. A correspondent from Le Monde, writing in the issue of 
August 7th from Lefka, reported that the Turkish Cypriot leader there told him 
that in the town itself six people had been killed, 13 had died in two neighbouring 
villages and seven women and children had been shot in a third village. 

United Nations officials have confirmed that the Turkish army has been 
forciVjly removing Greek Cypriots from the Kyrenia area. On August 4th soldiers 
brushed past UN soldiers guarding some 650 Greek Cyjjriots who, together with 
a number of British civilians, had taken refuge in Kyrenia's Dome hotel, and took 
away all the Cypriot men. Later the Cypriot women and children were removed 
by bus and taken to Nicosia where they made their way to the Greek sector. 
Similar action is reported to have been taken by the Turkish army in Bellapais, 
Karmi and Trimithi. 

There has been no news of the men taken away, but they are thought to be in 
camps in the Turkish-controlled area outside Nicosia. They are being held as 
hostages against the safety of the Turkish Cypriot men whom the National 
Guard hold as virtual prisoners. Mr Birgit alleged that 35,882 people from 80 
villages were held hostage by the Greek Cypriots and that another 21,157 in 
60 villages had been surrounded. 

Reports of the fighting have been no less contradictory than reports of atrocities 
but Turkish units ha\'e certainly advanced beyond tlie positions they held west 
of Kyrenia on July 30th. The villages of Karavas and La])ithos on the coast road 
have been regularly shelled and by mid-week the Turks, already firmly established 
on th" hills to the south, were rejjorted to have taken both villages. On (he other 
side of the mountain range attacks have Ijcen made against the villages of Larnaca 
and Agridhaki from Mount Ky])arissovouno, captured on August 2nd. 

On Wednesday, the day before the second Geneva meeting, fighting continued 
in the coastal area and there were reports that the Turks had pushed as far as 
Vasilia. Their intention would seem to be to control all the strategic points over- 



79 

looking their beachhoad at Ayios Ycoryios. In Famagiista, Turkish Cypriots 
from the old walled city, now numbering 10,000 moved out of the citadel to occupy 
points overlooking the harliour. TIN officers failed to persuade them to pull 
back. This action was clearly designed to prevent the Greeks from using the 
harbour. 

The Greek-Turkish-British supervisory commission, which was to define the 
ceasefire line and determine the buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot forces, has made little progress. It has so far proved impossible to define 
a military line as the lighting continues west of Kyrenia. It needs more than three 
men in a helicopter to do that. 

[From The Economist (London), Aug. 10, 1974] 
Greece — The Dissenting Voice Off-Stage 

Ten years ago — even ten weeks ago — it would have seemed wildly unlikely 
that leaders of the Gre';k Communist party, outlawed 26 years ago, would be 
holding news conferences in Athens and issuing press statements. That is what 
they are now doing, almost every day. Greece's left wing has resurfaced after 
two decades of harassment and seven years of persecution. 

It is now thought likely that the 1948 ban on the Greek Communist party will 
be lifted, and that the Communists will be aUowed to operate in the open after 
working underground for 2.1 years. Mr. Karamanlis almost promised this when, 
in his first policy statement, he undertook to give the country "a genuine and 
progressive democracy in which there shall be room for all the Greeks". An 
indication of his intentions was the inclusion of Communists in the amnesty, 
and he has since let them resume party activity and publish their two newspapers. 
In return Mr. Karamanlis has obtained from the Communists a vote of tolerance 
for his government until he can consolidate his hold on the country. 

The two branches of the outlawed Communist party have both held press 
conferences in Athens to explain their positions. Mr. Tony Ambatielos, a member 
of the Politburo of the Moscow-leaning branch, said that although the Karamanlis 
government was no more than an unsatisfactory change of facade on the American- 
managed stage of Greece the nation was now facing the threat of the Cyprus 
crisis and it was the duty of all democratic forces to unite. Mr. Haralambos 
Drakopoulos, secretary of the comnmnist group which broke away from the main 
party in 1968, described the Karamanlis government as a "first step towards 
democracy" and urged his followers to support the government during the Cyprus 
emergency. 

The breakaway grou]) — the "Greek Communist party of the Interior" — 
made a dramatic api^arent change of policy last year, when it declared that it 
had renounced marxist revolution as a means of gaining power, and pledged respect 
for )iarliamentary methods. This attitude gives it a better chance than its older 
brother of being allowed fully back into Greek politics. 

Even warmer support for Mr. Karamanlis has come from Mr. Elias Eliou, 
the chief parliamentary spokesman of the United Democratic Left, the party 
whicii pulled in the Communist vote in Greece from 1950 onwards, when it hnd 
nothing to vote for directly. Mr. Eliou, who had a 20-minute talk with Mr. 
Karamanlis, has publicly expressed his bitterness at the exclusion of the left from 
the government, but has spoken of the "imperative need" to hel)) Mr. Karamanlis. 
Even Mr. Mikis Theodorakis, the enormously popular composer whose i)olitical 
influence among Greek youth should not be underestimated (and who is now a 
dissident Communist planning to set up his own party) said Mr. Karamanlis 
had his fullest backing. It is an impressive litany of encouragement for the new 
prime minister. 

Nearer the centre there are many new-left radicals who found some sort of 
common identity in opposing the dictatorshi]). It will be some time before they 
sort out where they stand, but the hope is that some of them may form a social 
democratic party which might fill a long-unoccupied place in the Greek political 
spectrum. Such a party is ne(-dt!d if voters are to be discouraged from drifting to 
the extreme lef i . 

This is where the future of IN'r. Andreas Papandreou becomes important. Mr. 
Pai)andreou, the son of the old liberal leader, is the only pt)litician to have rejected 
the Karamanlis government as a creature of Nato and the onlj^ expatriate leader 
not to have returned to Circece. His extremely radical views aroused much emo- 
tional support among Cireeks \\hen they were broadcast from Germany during 



80 

the colonel's rule. The question today is whether Mr. Papandreou and his ideas 
could still awake the feame response from a people who have had time to think 
about their newly regained freedom. Mr. Papandreou seems to be keeping his 
head down until the Cyprus crisis is no longer an obstacle to his purposes. He 
probably hopes that humiliations over Cyprus will imdermine the popularity of 
Mr. Karamanlis. But many Greeks trust that by then the prime minister, who is 
already moving swiftly to repair the ravages of seven years of government by 
improvisation, will have done enough to make the Greeks less susceptible to- 
demogogy. 

[The Eronomist (London), Aug. 17, 19741 

The Russians are Coming Out of it Laughing 

(From our Athens Correspondent) 

"Whether the Greeks and Turks choose to go for each other's throats or fight a 
war by proxy in Cyprus," a western ambassador said in Athens at the peak of this 
week's crisis, "I can see only one winner. The Russians must be laughing their 
heads off." 

Greece's decision on Wednesday to pull out from the military organisation of 
the Nato alliance reflects the jumble of emotions that hit Mr. Karamanlis's 
government when the Geneva talks broke down on Wednesday morning and 
Turkey resumed its offensive in Cyprus. Most western diplomats in Athens seem 
convinced that Greece will resume its military role in Nato once the Cyprus crisis 
is over. They could be AVTong. It is a bad sign for Nato and the west that the 
Karamanlis government felt it had to take this action to placate Greek opinion. It 
will be an even woise one if the Soviet Union ends its opposition to enosis (the 
union of Cy])rus with Greece) now that (Jreece has poked a finger in Nato's eye. 

Even before the Geneva peace talks collapsed there was growing disillusionment 
in Greece over the attitude of the western powers. Conspiracy-minded Greeks 
have been running two campaigns: first, an effort to make people beUeve that 
Britain had positively helped the Turks in their invasion of Cyprus; second, the 
assertion, from a wide number of sources, that the United States had arranged the 
whole crisis in pursuit of its aim to bring a partitioned Cyprus into the Nato 
alliance. 

True, this is in line Avith the Greeks' age-old instinct to blame others for their 
own mistakes. But the fact remains that the Greeks are blaming Britain and the 
United States for not stopping the Turkish invasion, or preventing Turkey's 
Mr. Gunes from walking out of Geneva this week. A minister in the new govern- 
ment put it this Avay: "The Americans managed to turn the Turks back in 1964 
with a simple letter from President Johnson to Ismet InonQ. They could have 
halted them just as easily this time." The Greeks are not concerned Avith the price 
that the Turks made the Americans pay for that "sim]3le letter", which the Turks 
still regard as an affront to their national j^ride and which has added a dim.ension 
of defiance to their dealings with foreign powers. It is a measure of Greek bitter- 
ness that one newspa])er claimed that the Americans had sold out Cyprus in 
exchange for a Turkish pledge to reimpose the ban on growing opium poppies. 

The possibility of Greece quitting Nato to become non-aligned was often 
discussed by the Greek politicians now in power during the daj^s of the military 
dictatorship — whose survival they generally attributed to the United States. 
But that Greece should side with the Soviet Union, or even seek its military help, 
was unthinkable except by the far left. It is all the more striking that last week 
Estia, the most rabidly anti-comnumist daily in Athens, could write: "If the 
Soviet Union can guarantee [our territorial integrity] let us even go with Russia." 

The Karamanlis government is alarmed bj' the extent of this swing in public 
opinion. Its concern is all the greater because it recognises that it has nothing to 
thank the Russians for either; it has got sweet words ))ut no action. The govern- 
ment felt that the Russians could have put pressure on the Turks either by a few- 
reminders about their array of missiles, as Khinishchev did in his time, or by moving 
some of their divisions in the Caucasus nearer to the Turkish frontier. 

In fact the Russians clambered onto the fence in mid-crisis. Although they were 
right about what was going to happen in Cyprus, they, like others, had not 
taken into account the subsequent political changes in Greece. Their tacit support 
for the Turkish invasion reflected a shrewd political judgment so long as Greece 
was governed by military men who were lending the country to dangerous, and 
senseless, adventures. But once the Karamanlis government took over, and the 



81 

chances of Archbishop Makarios's return to Nicosia dwindled, the Russians 
were caught on the wrong foot. They barricaded themselves behind the Security 
Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but never said 
which troops. 

The Russians are not expected to come out from behind this barricade and 
intervene directly. Militarily, they are in a position to do so. They control the 
Bulgarian army, they keep at least seven battle-ready divisions in the Crimea, and 
they have air bases in Syria. Their Mediterranean fleet is a bit thin but three 
destroyers were rushed down to the Dardanelles on Wednesday. Yet most western 
observers rule out the possibility of Soviet intervention. So, for doing more or 
less nothing, the Russians have been rewarded with the bonanza of Greece's 
withdrawal from Nato — the best news they have had in the 25-year history of the 
alliance. 

The Greeks themselves were faced with the agony of choosing between war 
and going back to Geneva to negotiate a capitulation. If it was to be war, there 
was again a choice. The first possil)iUty was a direct engagement on the mainland 
frontier with Turkey. But here the Greeks are outnumbered nine to five by the 
Turks in fighting men. Short of a miracle, the odds against Greece were too high. 
The second was war by proxy. Greece could send troops from Crete to Cyprus: 
but that would mean asking Britain, as a guarantor power of Cyprus's independ- 
ence, to provide adequate air cover. 

What other way out is there? As the Greek government sees it, it can return to 
the Geneva table only if it looks like having the chance to secure an honourable 
agreement on Cyprus. For only thus can the survival, and prestige, of the Kara- 
manhs government be ensured. And the restoration of democracj' in Greece needs 
that. 

EASTWARD HO 

Within two hours of the breakdown of the Geneva talks, X'^irkish forces moved 
into action to take by force the 30 percent of the island they had so far failed to 
get at the bargaining table. As in the earlier fighting, Turkey's tough professional 
arm}', hugely outnumbering and outgvmning the remnants of the Greek Cypriot 
.National Guard, achieved its objectives — but probably behind schedule. 

By Wednesday night it had broken through the Greek positions around the 
Turkish-held Kyrenia triangle, all but surrounded Nicosia, and pushed its 
armoured columns to within 10 miles of Famagusta. Turkish jets struck targets 
throughout the island — with good accuracy and perhaps with better control than 
before, although they did destroy a clearly-marked United Nations jeep near 
Larnaca, killing three Austrian soldiers, and again damaged Nicosia's mental 
hospital. 

In last month's fighting Turkey's air support had lacked co-ordination; this 
problem now seems to have been largely overcome. But the army's methodical 
advance was not fast enough to throw, and keep, the Greeks off balance. They 
fought hard from several strongpoints between Mia Milea and Asha, slowing the 
Turk's advance and denying them Famagusta on the first day. Regrouping during 
W^ednesday night, the Greeks put together a determined if ineffective resistance 
at the gates of Famagusta. 

Early on Thursday morning the Turks launched powerful artillery and air 
attacks against the port area and the western suburbs of Famagusta, where the 
Greek defences were concentrated. The Greeks put up unexpectedly heavy anti- 
aircraft fire, both from the port area and from the Boghaz naval installations to 
the north. Later in the day two Turkish destroyers joined the fighting, bombarding 
the Boghaz base and the fortifications near Trikomo. By noon on Thursday 
Turkish tanks were fighting in Famagusta itself, and by the afternoon the Greek 
defence had been reduced to action by isolated groups. 

At the outset the United Nations forces, under the command of an Indian 
soldier, Major-General Prem Chand, withdrew from the obviously indefensible 
buffer zone around the Turkish area. But the UN troops controlling Nicosia 
air port had a different mission, and remained stubbornly in position throughout 
Wednesday, eventually becoming involved in an exceptionall}- confused firefight 
there which left 17 Finnish soldiers wounded. They retained control of the landing 
area itself; it is probably the single most important piece of real estate on the 
island, since both sides would have liked it for flying in supplies and reinforcements. 

On the western front, clearly second in importance to the Turks, the attack 
does not seem to have got under way until late on Wednesday morning. But by 
Thursday night the demarcation line that the Turks had proposed at Geneva — 
running from Lefka to Famagusta via Nicosia — had been reached in most sectors. 



82 

WASTE OF WORDS 

Mr. Callaghan tried, all right. He hauled the antagonists off to dinner partie?:, 
and went without sleep, and pulled out all the conventional stops of diplomatic 
persuasion. But given the way the Turks wei'e plajing it he may have been doomed 
to failure from the start. At 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning the Geneva con- 
ference on Cyprus collapsed. The delegates — the foreign ministers of Britain, 
Greece and Turkey, plus Mr. Clerides for the Greek Cyi)riots and Mr. Denktash 
for the Turkish Cypriots — had had five days of talking about talking, and waiting 
to talk about talking, rather than real negotiation. 

It was a conference where few things happened on time; for example, the 
plenary session scheduled for 10 o'clock on Tuesday morinng finally started at 
6:40 in the evening. Yet the Turks were watching the second-hand of the clock; 
they claim they issued no ultimatum, Ijut they arrived in Geneva determined to 
railroad through a federal settlement for Cyprus while their army was firmly 
installed in the Kyrenia enclave and the Greek Cypriots were still stunned by 
the fact of the invasion. It was a fairly typical Turkish performance; and what 
happened in Cj'prus within a few hours of the conference's end was not un- 
t.ypical either. 

The thing began on Thursday evening, August 8th. By Friday night there 
seemed to be a flicker of hope, when the six-page agreement spelling out the terms 
of the supposed ceasefire — the thiid since the Turkish invasion — was signed in 
Nicosia. This conspicuouslj^ imperfect document even encouraged speculation that 
the Turks had renounced the temptaticjn to enlarge their Kyrenia enclave. But 
on Saturday morning it was back to par for the course. Mr. Gunes, the Turkish 
foreign minister, promptly walked out (followed by Mr. Denktash) because he 
did not like the name-cards that gave Mr. Clerides the predominant position in 
Cj^prus. Mr. Callaghan got round that — no namecards at all — and the session 
eventually began, seven hours late. Sunday's schedule went similarly awry; the 
three foreign ministers were to have met in the morning, but ]\Ir. Gunes asked for 
two postponements on suddenly discovering other engagements. 

The atmosphere was slightly sweetened by the Greeks' announcement on 
Sunday that they were about to start handing over prisoners, and withdrawing 
their forces from Turkish areas occupied in the early stages df the fighting. At 
the same time Britain announced that 600 Gurkhas were l^eing flown to C.yprus, 
and that the withdrawal of a battalion of Fusiliers, and 12 RAF Phantoms, had 
been cancelled. The Turks interpreted that as evidence of British bellicosity, but 
it did Britain no good with the Greeks: on Saturday the Greek Cypriot newspaper 
Agon — which usually reflects Mr. Clerides's views — vehemently denounced 
Britain for having failed to prevent the Turkish invasion. 

The real crisis t0(_)k shape on Monday and Tuesday, when it became obvious 
that a gulf remained between the two sides. The Turks spelled out their proposi- 
tion: Cyprus wold remain an independent reputjlic, but it would consist of two 
autonomous regions — equal in status — within a federal framework. The Turkish 
area must amount to 30 percent of the island. This figure seems to have been 
derived from the 1960 constitution, in which the Turks were allotted 30 percent 
of the posts in the civil service, although they numl)er only 18 percent of the 
population. The curious thing is that the Turks now argue that the 1960 constitu- 
tion is defunct, whereas the Greeks maintain that it is still legally operative. 

And then a rather better Turkish offer emerged, in a statement from Mr. 
Denktash. Instead of one consolidated Turkish autonomous province in the north 
of the island, covering about a third of the total area, there could be six autono- 
mous "cantons," the largest by far being the area around Kyrenia occupied by 
the Turkish army: it seemed clear, however, that this would be expanded beyond, 
the ceasefire demarcation line agreed to on August 9th. Where would the other 
five Turkish cantons be? The Turkish population is scattered all over the island. 
There are (or at least there were on July 20th, when the Turkish invasion force 
landed) sizeable Turkish enclaves in the Tylliria district, in Famagusta old town, 
in Larnaca, Limassol and Pajihos- Kotima. 'Turks from other areas could conceivably 
be moved into these districts, but Mr. Denktash did not say explicitly that they 
should be. Some Turkish Cvpriots have said that they would prefer to see those 
Turks who have been made homeless since July 20th move into the Kyrenia 
enclave. 

This cantonal solution does not seem to be all that different from the ideas that 
_Mr. Callaghan put out for discussion in Geneva. But the Greeks would not have 
it. On Tuesday Mr. Clerides urged an adjournment of a day or two, in order to 
talk to his colleagues in Nicosia; Mr. Alavrus, the Greek foreign minister, wanted 



83 

to confer with his government in Athens. Mr. Calhighan duly put this proposal 
to the Turlvs, but it was brusquely rejected. 

The two sets of Greeks have been negotiating at pistol point. On the eve of the 
conference Mr. Mavros seemed to be veering towards acceptance of the federation 
idea. Mr. Clerides indicated his willingness at least to consider a cantonal solution. 
But his own proposal, reportedl\- ]3ut forward in Geneva on Tuesday, did not 
seem to go greatly bej'ond what he has suggested in the past: that Cjq^rus should 
have a strong central government (whether he would be willing publicly to call 
it "federal" is still unclear), and that the Turkish areas should hav^e extended 
local-authority powers in such things as education and religion. 

The Greeks had still not explicitly abandoned the belief that Cyprus could 
remain a unitarj^ state, which in constitutional language means a non-federal 
one. This had been the insuperable obstacle in the Clerides-Denktash talks over 
the past six years. Mr Clerides, a realist, knows very well that the Turks have 
now changed the situation. That he was even prepared to consider a cantonal 
solution was a significant shift. But he could not see his way to signing an agree- 
ment in the time span the Turks set. And so the Geneva conference collapsed. 



[from The Economist, September 14, 19741 

Greece — Greece, c'est moi 

(From Our Athens Correspondent) 

The sooner elections can be held in Greece the better it will bo for the prime 
ministei', Mr Karamanlis. Until now the government has held that its first priority 
must be to solve the Cyprus problem, but unless this can be done soon, which 
seems exceedingly unlikely, it would be to Mr Karamanlis's advantage to switch 
priorities and to hold elections first. He could then jjut the blame for the Cypiiis 
mess firmly on the fallen military junta and take credit for averting a disastrous 
Avar with Turkey. An early election would also give the prime minister and the 
eonservati\'e elements in his government the advantage of denying the left 
sufficient time to get ready for the fight. No social democratic party has ever 
tried its hand in a Greek election, and the last time the Communists entered the 
lists was in 1936. 

Mr Karamanhs is now seeing his greatest aspiration coining within his grasp: 
to imite all Greeks under his leadership. Today this unity is a reality, but it is 
unlikely to survive once people realise that the danger of the tanks rolling back 
into the streets, and bringing another lot of cc>lonels A\ith them, has jjassed. Po 
Mr Karamanlis has to try to consolidate the support events have given him. His 
wish is to form a de Gaulle-style political movement spanning the widest possible 
range of Greek political 0]jinion. Having got that movement elected to power, 
he could then set about liquidating Greece's Algerian prol)lem — C^-prus — and 
set the nation on a course of rapid economic and social develojDment. 

The present government line-u]j is likely to become the liasis of Mr Karamanlis's 
new movement. It would comprise the old right (which is so reformed that it is 
unfair to label it a.s such), the centre-left led by Mr George Mavros, whose 
])erforma,nce as foreign minister has greatly increased his standing, and the non- 
professional politicians, such as Mr Pesmazoglou and Mr Mangakis, who have a 
special appeal for the intellectual left. 

This broad coalition, Avhich Avould have the advantage of having proved itself 
in office, would provide formidable opposition to Mr Andreas Papandreou, who 
still needs time to persuade Greek voters to accept his ideas of socialism. The 
]jrogramme Mr Papandreou put foward last week is so radical that it makes 
the policies of the splintered Greek Communists sound like Sunday sermons. 
But the Communists have the organisation that Mr Papandreou lacks, and for 
this reason he may try to work a\ ith them. For their part, they might welcome the 
the idea of an alliance of the left to disguise their own divisions. 

After so ma.nj^ years of political stagnation, it is anj^body's guess which way 
the Greek electorate will turn. It is generally thought that, Avhoever wins the elec- 
tion, the abolition of the monarchy will be accepted. It is also expected that if 
Mr Karamanlis wins the day he will introduce a gaullist-style presidential 
republic and then seek election as president. The stage would then be set for him 
to introduce the drastic reforms of Greek political and economic life which he 
was thwarted from implementing by his election defeat in 1963. 



84 

Turkey — He Must Wait 

Turkey's prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, would also profit from an early general 
■election. With his reputation high after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, he would 
stand a good chance of winning an absolute majority, thus dispensing with his 
present coalition partners, the rightwing National Salvation party. But the 
Turkish constitution does not allow for a premature election unless a majority 
of the National Assembly agrees — and parliamentarians, especially those who 
have taken four-j^ear leases on apartments in Ankara, are reluctant to incur the 
expenses of an election until they have to. So, instead, Mr. Ecevit is making plans 
changing coalition partners. 

He seems to be preparing to get rid of the National Salvation party. Whether 
he will actually do so depends on the attitude of other smaller parties in the 
Turkish parliament; his own Republican People's party has only 185 seats of the 
assembly's 450. But Mr Ecevit's patience with the Islamic enthusiasms of the 
NSP has worn so thin that he is now actively seeking support elsewhere. He has 
made approaches to the small right-wing Democratic party, which in return for 
a spell in government might vote for an election next spring. 

The partnership between Mr Ecevit's social democratic ReiDublican People's 
party and the National Salvationists, patched together with difficulty in January 
after the election in October, always looked precarious. It almost fell apart in 
March when the National Salvationists opposed an amnesty for ])olitical prisoners. 
The latest breach is over Cyprus. The National Salvation leader, Mr Erbakan, 
has openly shown his jealousy of Mr Ecevit's growing popularity. He has allowed 
himself to be proclaimed as "Erbakan the conqueror" at party rallies, and his 
party new^spapers have been alleging that Turkey would never have invaded 
Cyprus at all but for him. 

There are indeed deep differences between the coalition parties on their Cyprus 
policies. Whereas Mr Ecevit has been insisting that Turkey has no intention of 
partitioning the island permanently, and wants a federal solution, Mr Erbakan 
has been openly advocating partition. If Mr Ecevit can get rid of his hard-line 
partners he may feel freer to take a more conciliatory line. But his new reputation 
as Turkey's national hero has been built (jn his toughness and if he is to win the 
next election, whenever that is, he cannot afford to start looking too reasonable. 

Greece and Nato: St.\rting to Bite 

Greece has now taken concrete steps to limit its Nato involvement. Not much 
was done when Greece first announced its withdrawal from the military side of 
the alliance on August 14th, but after Greece advised Nato at the end of the 
month that the decision was final things began happening. The Greek part of the 
Nato Air Defence Ground Environment (Nadge) network cut down the amount 
of information it sent to the rest of the system. The Nato communications circuits 
that go through Greece to Turkey became unusable. And, more important, the 
United States was told to stop using Greek bases for routine operations. 

This denial to the Americans of Greek bases is beginning to bite. There is a lot 
of Nato and American equipment in Greece that needs American maintenance and 
supervision. This includes missile batteries in the north, some special longrange 
radar and communication facilities, and nuclear weapons for both American and 
Greek use in wartime. 

The major loss will be at Suda Bay in Crete. This is the main supply point 
for the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Its airfield is vital 
for the aircraft-carriers operating there. Some of the weapons held in Crete are 
not duplicated anywhere else in Europe. By reducing, and changing, their opera- 
tions the Americans can get along without any of this. But it will be expensive, 
and Nato will lose in effectiveness. 

The Americans have not publicised the Greek actions, apparently hoping 
that the problem can be solved })efore anything worse is done. The repeated 
assurances l^y the Greek foreign minister, Mr. Mavros, that the decision to leave 
the military "side of Nato is irrevocable do not make this seem very likely. Yet 
there are one or two very curious things. Greek officers are still on duty at Nato 
headquarters. Nothing has yet been said about the squadron of American de- 
stroyers based in Elefsis, west of Athens. Nor, the other way around, has any- 
thing yet been said about Amei'ican military credits to Greece, which totalled 
more than £25m in the year ending on June 30th. 



85 

[From the Economist, Sept. 21, I974] 
Turkey — All Out 

Mr. Ecevit, who on Wednesday resigned from his job as Turke.y's prime minister,, 
has acted just as decisively to get his way at home as he did over Cj'prus. His 
purpose is to break up the coalition between his Republican People's party and 
the traditionalist National Salvation party, led by Mr Erbakan — and cash in 
on the popularity he has won over Cyprus. 

There is no doubt that Mr Ecevit will be asked by President Koruturk to 
form another administration. His problem is how to force an early election. 
Under the consitution he can do so if he is defeated three times within three 
months, and he may form a minority government in the hope of this happening. 
Alternatively, he may join up with the right-wing Democratic party, which would 
give him, just, the necessary parliamentary majority to call for an election. 
The sooner the election is held the better will be Mr Ecevit's chance of gaining 
an absolute majority. 

Cyprus — Still Talking, Just 

IMr Ecevit's attempt to take more power for himself in Turkey makes the busi- 
ness of getting negotiations going again about Cj'prus no easier. Britain is still 
trying to persuade everyone concerned to resume the Geneva talks. But the 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots are pinning their hopes on the United Nations 
General Assembly that started this week. Archbishop Makarios, who intends 
to present the Greek Cypriot case in New York, left London on Wednesday 
for Cairo, Algiers and Belgrade in a bid to rustle up support. But Turkey has 
already let it be known that it thinks the archbishop has no right to speak for 
Cj'prus as a whole, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Denktash, may ask 
to be heard by the UN as well. 

The one glimmer of hope is that Mr. Denktash and the acting president of 
Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, are still on talking terms. They have agreed to a limited 
exchange of elderly or woiinded prisoners : 24.5 were set free on Monday. But even 
this minor question is barbed with difficulties. The Turkish side insists that 
released prisoners should be allowed to go to the part of the island occupied by the 
Turkish army. The Greek Cypriots maintain that they should go back where they 
came from. This argument is at the core of the dispute over the 8,000 Turkish 
Cj^priots who took refuge in the British base area at Episkopi. The Turkish 
government wants to take them back to Turkey, and thence to the Turkish- 
controlled part of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots say that if Britain agrees it will be 
tantamount to British acceptance of the division of the island. So for the time 
being these refugees stay where they are. 

Although Mr. Clerides cannot possibly admit it yet, the signs are that he 
realises that Turkey will accept nothing less than a geographical separation of the 
two Cypriot communities. The best he may feel he can work for is a federal 
government with strong powers and a reduction in the size of the Turkish area. 
The return of the Greek part of Famagusta, the Morphou area and the industrial 
zone of Nicosia would go some wa}^ to mollify the Greek Cypriots. 

If Mr. Clerides eventually has to sell tht; idea of a divided Cyprus to the Greek 
Cypriots he will need the wholehearted backing of Archbishop Makarios. The 
archbishop is keeping his options open. In one interview last week he said he 
could not accept any geographical separation of the two communities, but would 
agree to an autonomous Turkish community controlling groups of Turkish 
villages; he was also careful not to be specific about when he might return to 
Cyprus. Butf then Le Monde reported him this week as saying that he would go 
back to the island next month. 

There is a tendency among Greeks, as others, to tell their superiors what they 
believe they want to hear. Archbishop Makarios is ver,y likfly being told he has 
more supporters in Cyprus than ever. But his presence on the island would 
deepen the divisions within the Greek Cypriot community and stiffen Turkish 
resolve to make as few concessions as jaossible. Mr. Clerides has enough to contend 
with already. 



86 

[From The Economist (London), Sept. 21, 1974] 

The Empty Third 

(From Our Special Correspondent) 

For the "liberated" Turkish Cypriots life behind the Turkish Hne in Cyprus is 
a strange and uncomfortable business. For the visitor the first impression is one 
of eerie emptiness — natural enough when one realises that the area has been 
depopulated of 75 per cent of its former inhabitants. In the twin towns of Karavas- 
Lapithos, which had a joint population of about 7,000, there now lives a single 
British couple determined to protect their house from looting. "Even the sparrows 
have pushed off," says Geoffrej^ Brierley. 

But where, one asks, are the Turkish Cypriots? One does not meet many on 
the roads, because petrol has been strictly rationed (food for civilians is also in 
short supply because, like petrol, it now has to be shii:)ped from Turkey and not as 
before bought from arms and orchards just down the road). But the main reason 
for the missing human element is the finely-meshed security net that has been 
fastened down over the Turkish-occupied area. The r(.ad from Nicosia to Fania- 
gusta is about 35 miles long but on it one is checked at least 25 times at road 
blocks manned by Turkish soldiers, whose shaven heads, high cheek-bones 
and coincal helmets bring the cold breath of the steppes of central Asia into the 
warmth of the Levant. The frustration of foreigners at this interminable checking 
is mitigated only by the realisation that Turkish Cypriots have to endure it too ; in 
what is supposed to be their own country they have to book in and out of their 
villages or towns, give their names and destination and, sometimes, their reason 
for travel. 

The Turkish Cypriots brought this army control down on themselves by giving 
in to the temptation of looting. The network of checks, the Turkish army ex- 
plains, is for police purposes rather than military security in order to stop looting 
bv Turkish civilians. Famagusta was saved from looting only because the army 
promptly sealed the Turkish Cypriots into the walled city. Houses in Kyrenia 
are still being picked over for small objects that can be pocketed, and disappointed 
looters are now turning to vandalism with things being smashed and slashed — a 
Turner canvas in one house miraculously escaped. A Union Jack on the door no 
longer jarovides protection, and when one British boat owner tried to hoist the 
Red Ensign on his yacht in the harbour he was promptly ordered to haul it down 
by a Turkish sergeant. With animals and pets running wild it is now true, modify- 
ing the Rubaiyat, that the donkey and the lizard keep the villas where John Smith 
idled and drank deep. 

On the other side of the line, the Greek Cypriot community is in a sorry emo- 
tional state, deeply wounded in its philot'imo, the Greek concept of self-respecting 
honoin-. Large numi^ers of the middle class are simply running away from a country 
that perhaps gave them too much prosperity too quickly (in the National Guard 
most of the hard fighters were village boys). Belatedly, the Cyprus government 
announced over the weekend that there would be restrictions on lea^•ing the 
island, and, in particular, on taking money out. Certainly, if the panicky Greek 
Cypriots do not pick up enough courage to go back to their homes, they will be 
inviting Turkish replacements, especially from mainland Turkey. 

The Turkish government is already working towards that replacement. Since it 
has now ))een estimated that there are only 45,000 Turks in the Greek area (not 
60,000 as claimed by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash) they could be that 
much more easily "moved to the under-populated Turkish area. But one great 
difficultv in any exchange of population is that Cyprus, though small, has a very 
varied crop pattern. Turkish vinegrowers from the south and west would be moving 
into northern areas where there "are very few vineyards; Greek tol^cco growers 
would be inished into areas where no tobacco has ever been grown. 

Both Cypriot communities have been ravaged l)y events. So has their natural 
environment and the economic infrastructure on which both equally depend. For 
no good reason the Turkish air force burnt down hundreds of acres of cedars and 
pine trees on the Troodos hills, which were far from any fighting. Immolated in 
the flames were 500 of the 600 moufflon, the rare mountain goat that is the national 
svmbol of Cyprus, which had just been saved from extinction. The unwatered 
fruit orchards in the Turkish-held area are on the point of dying and hundreds of 
thousands of livestock are already dead. For the Greeks this is the rake of war; 
for the Turkish Cypriots it is the result of their supposed liberation. 



87 

[From The Economist, September 28, 1974] 

Cyprus— People as Pawns 

Turke}' looks to be in for another long spell of political uncertainty. On Tues- 
day Mr. Ecevit, its prime minister, failed in his bid to patch together another 
coalition government and it is now unlikely that he will be given a mandate to 
form a minority government. This hiatus in Ankara brings one possible bonus: 
it gives the Greek prime minister, Mr. Karamanlis, breathing space to organise 
his own country's election. The Greeks could go to the polls in November and, 
whatever the complexion of the government that emerges, it will be in a stronger 
position to reach an agreement with Turkey than Mr. Karamanlis's present 
interim administration. 

But the delay strikes harshljr ?t the Cj'priot people. At least a third of the 
population has been uprooted and many of them are living in refugee camps 
unsuitalile for winter shelter. Although Air. Clerides, the interim president, and 
jNIr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, agreed on September 20th to exchange 
all prisoners, and let them choose where they wanted to go, they made no prog- 
ress on the future of the refugees. And even the prisoner exchange showed signs 
of breaking down on Thursday when the Turks suddenly objected to Greek 
prisoners electing to go back to their homes in the Turkish-held zone. 

This is the problem at the root of the imjoasse over the refugees. The Turks 
insist that only a limited number of Greeks should be allowed to return to their 
homes in the north. At the same time the Turks are adamant that all Turkish 
Cypriots in the Greek zone, and there are more there than in the northern part 
of the island held by the Turkish army, should l)e allowed to move to the north, 
where they would occupy abandesned Greek houses and lands. 

Last weekend the Turks tried a ne\\' tack in their campaign to force the British 
government to agree that the 8,000 Turkish Cypriots who took refugee in the 
British base area of EiDiskopi should be shipped to Turkey — and 
return to the north of Cyprus. The refugees were encouraged to mount demonstra- 
tions against the British and to threaten damage to the installations. Yet is is 
far from certain that all, or even most, of them want to move to the north; many 
make daily visits to their villages near the base. 

The British line is that the question of where these refugees should go must 
be decided in the context of a general settlement of the refugee problem by the 
Greek and Turkish C.vpriot leaders. The Greeks happen to have a fairly strong 
card to play against the British government if it shows signs of weakening to 
Turkish pressure: the road betv/een the two British bases, ;it Dhekelia (which is 
the supply depot for both the British and the UN) and Episkopi, is in Greek 
hands. But, quite apart from this, there is another argument against Britain's 
giving in to Turkish demands at this stage. 

If it becomes inevitable that the Greek and Turkish communities are to be 
divideid geographically, it is important for the future of Cyprus that the zones be 
equitably divided. This will not be so unless the Turkish army withdraws from 
some of the land it now holds; areas that could go back to the Greek Cypriots 
include the Greek part of Fainagusta, the Morphou area and the section of 
Nicosia that the Turks occupied in August. The refugees at Episkopi, who are 
better off than most of the other Cypriot refugees, should remain where thej^ are 
until some plan along these lines is evolved — or until there is a settlement of the 
whole refugee question. 

[From The Economist (London), Sept. 7, 19741 

Why Would They? 

it's time to puncture the continuing greek accusation that the AMERICANS 

COOKED UP THE CYPRUS CRISIS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES MR. KARAMANLIS, 

PLEASE READ ON 

Somebod}''s got to try to persuade the Greeks it isn't so. There is hardly a 
Greek who does not believe that the Americans not only failed to do anything 
very energetic to discourage the Turks from occupying part of Cyprus in July 
and August — which is probably true — but actuallj' organised the whole crisis 
for their own purposes, which is a very different business and almost certainly 
not true. The Greeks are genuinely angry. Look at the letters on page 6; the 



88 

interview with the Greek foreign minister, Mr Mavros, in this week's Time 
magazine; the article by Professor Devletoglou in Monday's Times. 

It is true that in these matters the Greeks are the Arabs of Europe: in poUtics 
they tend to beUeve what their emotions make them want to believe, and that 
makes them great hunters for scapegoats. In 1967 Nasser almost persuaded the 
Arabs that the American and British air forces were to blame for his defeat. Still, 
this is one of the few occasions when what people believe really is almost as 
important as the truth. The Greek's anger has made even the conservative 
government of Mr Karamanlis say it is pulling out of the military side of Nato, 
although that may not mean very much; and on Tuesday Mr Papandreou, who 
wants to be leader of a Tony Benn sort of party of the Greek left, said that his 
country- should go neutral all the way. 

Part of the trouble with the Greek theory about the Americans is that there 
is virtually no evidence to support it. The rumors about an American threat to 
shoot down Greek planes heading for Cyprus,' and even about British hel]} for 
the invading Turks, were flatly denied and have now died away. The only mildlj^ 
curious thing of any substance that this paper knows about is the fact that 
Mr. Kissinger's press conference on July 22nd gave a pretty good hint that 
Greece's military dictatorship was about to be overthrown, just before it actually 
was ; but even that proves no more than that Mr. Sisco, who had been Kissingering 
in Athens the day before, had been talking to the right Greeks — the ones who saw 
that the Cyprus fiasco was their chance to throw the junta out — and had reported 
this back to Washington. That isn't all. The other major weakness of the Ameri- 
can conspiracy theory is that those who believe it cannot make up their minds 
what they think the Americans could have been trying to achieve. The accusing 
Greeks have been suggesting three quite different — and mutually exclusive — 
American aims: 

(1) That the Americans helped the junta in Athens to organise the coup 
against Archbishop Makarios because they wanted Cyprus, united with Greece 
through the coup, to become a good, solid, Greek-junta-run military base; 

(2) On the contrary, that the Americans were fed up with the difficulties the 
Athens junta had been making about the bases the Americans already have in 
Greece, and the American fly-in of supplies to Israel during the Middle East 
war last October, and wanted a new government in Cyprus — but one quite 
separate from Greece — that would offer them an alternative to the Greek bases; 

(3) On the contrar.y again, that the Americans knew the Cyprus coup would 
fail, and that their chief aim was to bring about the overthrow of the Athens 
junta as a result of its failure, so that they could get the credit for the restoration 
of civilian government in Greece. 

All three of these arguments have been coming out of Athens in the past month. 
The fact that all three of them cannot possibly be true does not mean, of course, 
that one of them may not be. But, again, no supporting evidence has been pro- 
duced; and the fact that furious Greeks have so easily jumbled the three together 
is verjr revealing. 

The Greeks are the latest victims of the confusion which so many people who 
live in small countries feel about what big powers such as the United States can 
do with their power. There are plenty of small nations that simultaneously, and 
with equal passion, want the Americans to be less interventionist in general and 
more interventionist when it suits that particular sniall nation; and they all 
exaggerate what either American action, or nonaction, is capable of doing. The 
closer one looks at the sequence of events in Cyprus after the July 15th coup 
against Makarios, the greater the limitations on American, or British, power 
seem to have been. 

NEITHER THE POWER NOR THE MOTIVE 

Neither the Americans nor the British — who have come in for some of the abuse 
the Greeks have been throwing at America — were in a position to stop the thing 
at the very beginning by putting Makarios back in power. The Americans had 
no troops on the island and no claim to intervene under the 1960 treaty of guaran- 
tee. The British, who had both the treats' rights and the troops on the spot, were 
not at all sure that the 2,6J0 fighting men they had in Cyprus were enough to take 
on the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and were frightened for the safety of the 
thousands of British dependants scattered around the island; and anyway the 
issue was settled for them within 36 hours because INIakarios had left Cyprus. 
From then on the British were out of it: they certainlj^ did not have enoughu 
troops in the Mediterranean to fight the Turks. 



89 

The Americans might have blocked the next stage of the proceedings, the 
Turkish invasion on July 20th, by putting the Sixth Fleet between the mainland 
and Cyprus; but at that time most people were arguing that the Turks, as co- 
guarantors of the 1960 treaty, were entitled to intervene against an apparent 
attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece. And then, once the Turks had got their 
Kyrenia bridgehead, the Americans too Ijegan to lose their power to control 
events. They might ha\-e tried harder to discourage the second Turkish attack, 
on August 14th, by threatening to cut off military aid, but discouragement is 
all it would have been : the Turks already had enough men on the island for the 
one-day blitz that finished their campaign. Nobody could have stopped that dead. 

These are the raw facts of what it was in anybody's power to do. It is true that 
the Americans have interests in the eastern Mediterranean. It is their interest to 
have airfields and harbours they can use, both for what they want to do in the 
Middle East and for the defence of western Europe. It is their interest, and that 
of their European allies as well, that the Russians should not acquire the use of 
airfields and harbours in that region for themselves. But on July 15th there was 
no evident American desire for new bases, and no evident danger that the Russians 
were about to acquire bases of their own in Cyprus, urgent enough to make the 
Americans set out on a course of action that would split an island and lose them 
an ally. The causes of the Cyprus trouble lie in Cyprus itself, in the old rivalry 
between Greece and Turkey, and in the fact that Turkey is the stronger of the 
two. When the Greeks look at it coolly, they will recognise that. 



[From The Economist (London). Sept. 7, 1974] 
The Numbers Game of a Broken Island 
(From Our Special Correspondent in Cyprus) 

The old men stiU sit under the Tree of Idleness in the square outside the abbey 
at Bellapais and in the cafe across the road sit the women and cliildren. No tea 
or coffee is served, except to the Turkish soldiers, and there are no young or 
middle-aged men around. It was their disappearance, and all the other things 
which the Turkish invaders did in and around Kj^renia, that produced the 
massive refugee problem which is now the crux of the C5'prus issue and Mill 
determine whether there will be peace at all on the island. 

In those first few days of the Turkish invasion in late July many of the Greek 
Cypriots of the Kyrenia area did not run away. The Turks got them, moving by a 
very simple stratagem. They began rounding up all men between the ages of 1.5 
and 65 for "interrogation", and many of the women, left on their own, accepted 
the Turkish "invitation" to be transported to Nicosia. The Turks still refuse to 
reveal to anyone, including the Red Cross, the number of these civilian detainees 
or where they are held. Indeed, they are still playing a cat-and-mouse game of 
releasing some, rearresting others and moving them about from camp to camp. 

In addition to this breaking up of families there was some rape and random 
gunning-down of civilians, mostly by Turkish troops, and looting of shops and 
homes, mostly by Turkish Cypriots. This is still going on by night in Kyrenia 
even while by day the new Turkish "owners" spruce up their shops, restaurants 
and hotels. To the credit of the Turkish army it needs to be said that there was 
little looting in Varusha, the Greek Cypriot area of Famagusta, and practicall}- 
none at all in Morphou, the other large occupied town. 

The Cyprus government claims that there are 191,000 "refugees"; but this 
figure is not strictly accurate, because the word refugee is being applied imprecisely 
to cover four different groups of homeless people. The first, in tinie and importance, 
were those expelled from the original area occupied by the Turkish army around 
Kyrenia. They were followed by displaced persons escaping from the fighting that 
then took place west of Kyrenia and east of Nicosia. It was the stories brought out 
by the expellees that produced the largest group — the refugees proper, who fled 
before the advancing Turks. The fourth and rapidly increasing group may be 
called the "bolters", who are people now moving into towns because they feel 
apprehensive in their villages near the Turkish line : -strictly speaking, these are 
not refugees at all. 

The total for the first three groups of homeless people must be somewhere 
around the 140,000 mark. The figure for Turkish Cypriot refugees, 30,000, very 
largely consists of bolters. Even at the lower figure, the number of refugees 
represents at least a quarter of the entire Greek Cj^priot community. No Greek 



90 

Cypriot go\'ernment can accept any political settlement predicated on the non- 
return to their homes of one in four of its people. The Cyprus economy would 
founder, because the refugees represent a good portion of the solid middle-class 
spine of the Greek community which has been cracked across the Turkish knee. 

Where do these people fit into the constitutions and frontiers that were discussed 
in August at the now-stalled Geneva negotiations? The more moderate of the two 
plans put forward on the Turkish side — the idea of six Turkish Cypriot cantons, 
that would form the Turkish part of a Cyprus federation — would exclude Varusha 
and Morphou. The tougher plan for a two-section federation very nearly coincides 
with the present di\i ling line on the island. The Greek Cypriots are still prepared 
to consider the six-(\..;ton plan, trading tei-ritory for a return of the Greek popula- 
tion to their homes. But President Cleridos feels he cannot go back to Geneva 
without an initial conciliatory Turkish gesture, fie could start talking again if, 
for instance, Greeks were allowed to return to Varusha, to Morphou and to the 
villages east of Nicosia which are in territory not included in either of the Turkish 
plans. 

Once the negotiations start again, everj'thing will turn on a heartless numbers 
game of how many Greeks will finally be allowed to return home. In the areas 
now under Turkish occupation there used to be 162,000 Greeks and 71,000 Turks. 
So the return of all the refugees Vv'ould mean that the Turkish administrators of 
their autonomous region would be ruling over a Greek majority. At one point 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership accepted fhis possibility, but not any longer. Even 
a substantial Greek minority is being ruled out. Even if the 60,000 Turkish 
Cypriots living in other areas — the "potential refugee's", as the Turkish Cypriot 
leader Mr. Denktash calls them — move into the region it would still have a 
Turkish population of only 131,000. Since it is estimated that about 26,000 Greeks 
have remained on the Turkish side one cannot see th(- Turks allowing manj' more 
than another 2."),000, if that many, to go back home. 

Thus if the Turks, for racial or security reasons, insist on a safe Turkish majority 
in their area at least 100,000 Greeks are going to remain homeless. There are 
already disturbing stories of mainland Tur]<s, being brought in to change the 
population balance in the north of the i-land. and if the area is not to remain 
underpopulated some such scheme of colonisation l:)eccnnes an evil necessity. The 
analogy of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the early 
1920s does not apply because in C3'prus there will be a land frontier, not the 
sundering safeness of the Aegean sea. 

Can some ingenious constitutional formula offer a way out of the dangerous 
cul de sac of racial separation? Two years ago Greece and Turkey agreed on a 
Turkish proposal for functional federation with two island-wide administrations 
but Archbishop Makarios rejected the idea. President Clerides revived this 
cumbersome but sensible plan at Geneva but now the Turks will have none of it. 
Perhai^s, instead of one single Tvirkish area, v/ith its distortion of so manj^ people's 
lives, the main i^revious Turkish areas could be connected in a large number of 
spvav/ling tentacular blobs — 10 or even l.'j subcantons. The main obstacle is the 
apparent Turkish ambition to have a large slice of Cyprus in which the 18 percent 
minority seeks to convert itself into a substantial majority through largescale 
jjopulation transfers. If that in fact is thrust on the Greek Cypriots, then they may 
feel left vv-ith no alternative but guerrilla war. 

As one travels through the Turkish-occujjied areas of Cyprus, the heavy- 
handed presence of mainland Turkey is S(t omni])resent that one gets the impre.-.sion 
that these neo-Ottomans are establishing a colony in which the subjects will be 
not the Greeks but the Turkish Cypriots, who are quite different in temperament 
and behaviour from their simpler and rougher Anatolian brethren. One small, 
sinister face: official signboards which formerly were all trilingual are now in 
Turkish only. The ghost towns and villages of this area, enijjty but reasonably 
intact, are like so many sleeping beauties awaiting the a\\akening kiss of Prince 
Charming. ?Ias Mr. Ecevit, that most improbable second Ataturk. poet as well as 
prime minister of Turkey, cast himself for this rt)mantic part? 



But Where's That Guerrilla War? 

The guerrilla campaign against the Turkish army in Cyprus that has been 
confidently in-edicted for the past three weeks has not happened yet. No doubt 
that is partly because there is still a possibility of a negotiated settlement. Turkey 



91 

has said the amount of territory its troops hold at present is negotiable, and that 
it is prepared to withdraw its entire army under certain conditions. A guerrilla 
campaign would be likely to derail any talks, so the Greek government and the 
Greek Cypriot leaders are holding the potential fighters in check. But that is not 
the only reason. 

The second — and vastly more important — reason why the guerrillas are not 
fighting yet is the w:iy Cyprus is s]Dlit. There is no shortage of potential recruits 
for a guerrilla war. Many of the remnants of the Greek Cypriot National Guard 
have filtered back into the Troodos mountains, the traditional stronghold of the 
island's resistance movements. They have been ioined by a mixed bag of Enka 
toughs, some Greek army officers and a few wild-eyed young "patriots". They 
tend to roar around the roads in civilian cars and talk about the struggle to come. 
But the Troodos is outside the Turkish zone; the Turks have no reason to attack 
them there, and it would l)e exfremely difficult for Greek Cypriot guerrillas to 
get behind the Turkish lines in any strength. 

In the entire Turkish-held area there remain oiily about 26,000 Greek Cypriots, 
most of them carefully controlled l^y the Turkish army or watched by Turkish 
Cypriots. So the would-l)e guerrillas cannot count on much help from them: 
they do not amount to a Mao-style sea guerrillas can swim in. And there is no 
question that Turkish retribution against anyone caught aiding a guerrilla attack 
would be swift, brutal and bloody. 

These things alone would not stop some groups of irregulars from laimching 
some attacks somewhere. But the absence of any really good guerrilla countryside 
behind the Turkish lines — relatively inaccessible terrain that has plenty of 
vegetation or other concealment — would make it a chancy business indeed. 
The only reasonable hiding places are in the Kyrenia mountain range. But even 
here the guerrillas wo'ild have to dig holes and camouflage them, as the cover 
is mostly scrub and would not conceal much from searching helicopters. Turkish 
tanks and troopcarriers can get into most parts of these hills. And the Greeks 
would have to carry in all their supplies; there is some water in the area, but 
little else. All this adds u]) to a difficult and dangerous time for i\ny guerrillas, 
and a near impossibility for large groups of them — more than five or six men — to 
stay behind Turkish lines for more than a few days at a time. 

But although even a medium-si /ed guerrilla campaign does not seem to be 
on the cards for the Greek Cypriots, they could well carry out ambushes and 
terrorist attacks. These too would be risky and hard to do, in an area where 
virtually the entire population actively supports the occupying army. But there 
is a long tradition of violence and terror in Cj'prus. If a reasonably satisfactorj^ 
settlement is not reached soon, such things will come. 



[From The Economist (London), July 27, 19741 
The Seven Lean Years are Over 

(From our Athens correspondents) 

To many people in Athens — who like to look at things that way — the past ten 
daj's' events have seemed so methodical that it v.-as as if a giant hand were moving 
pawns to prearranged positions. The mastermind behind the plan, whether it was 
that of the gods or of Mr. Kissinger, appeared to be determined, at one blow, to 
solve the Cyprus problem and bring the Greek dictatorship to a painless end. 

In .\thens a government of nationfil unity, under that grand old man of Greek 
politics Mr. Constantino Karamanlis, has taken over from, the army after seven 
years of dictatorship without one nose })eing bloodied. In Nicosia, Mr. Glafkos 
Clerides, a moderate and concifiator}' leader trusted by the Turks, has token over 
from the extremist Mr. Nicos Sampson. And .Archbishop Makarios, whose dog- 
matic attitudes have been partly responsible for blocking an agreement oii Cyprus 
for the past six years, is out of the picture — at any rate for the moment. 

It might have worked out differently and disastrously. The escalation of the 
crisis between Greece and Turkey — first over oil in the Aegean, then over Cyprus — 
seemed to be leading inexorabl.v to a confrontation, .\fter Turkey invaded Cyprus 
and Greece mobilised its forces the Greek junta was faced with the choice of either 
declaring war on Turkey, despite all the risks, or backing down and svrjdlowing 
its pride. And the preservation of pride has been, on ever.v previous issue, its 
prime concern. Either alternative damned the military men. So on Tuesday they 
gave the whole thing up. 



92 

In the event, mobilisation turned out to be a blessing. By the time the news 
of the regime's collapse was known Greece's most active young men had been 
corralled into the discipline of military service; the danger that uncontrolled 
enthusiasm — or political orders — might have led to violence had been contained. 
Mr. Karamanlis's homecoming, after 11 years of self-exile, was cheered by at 
least half a million people who spent Tuesday night in the streets of Athens to 
catch a glimpse of him. It was a measure of the relief the Greeks felt in knowing 
that the country would be led by known and experienced politicians instead of 
soldiers playing at politics. 

On Wednesday afternoon Mr. Karamanlis announced the main members of 
his government. Mr. George Mavros, the leader of the Centre Union party and a 
man who suffered at the hands of the military government by being exiled to the 
prison island of Yiaros, becomes foreign minister, and will lead the Greek delegation 
at the Geneva conference on Cyprus. The ministry of defense, a key post in view 
of the ever-present possibility that the army might try to come back into politics, 
goes to Mr. Evangelos Averoff, who was foreign minister in Mr. Karamanlis's 
government when the original Cyprus settlement was negotiated in 1959. Although 
he was twice arrested by the military regime that began in 1967, he is a man who 
the army knows has no sympathy for the left. Another man who suffered at the 
hands of the Papadopouios regime, Mr. John Pesmazoglou, formerly a deputy 
governor of the Bank of Greece who negotiated Greece's association agreement 
with the EEC, takes over finance. 

The new government now has to pick up the Greek-Turkish mess from where 
it has been left. Since no member of the new team bears any responsibility for the 
events of the past two weeks, it can aflford to negotiate terms which the pride of 
the military men and the weakness of their political mouthpieces would have 
precluded. And yet Mr. Mavros, at a news conference on Wednesday, did not 
appear to be in a compromising mood over Cyprus. 

He accused Turkey of breaking the cease-fire and of trying to improve the 
Turkish position on the island before the conference opened. This was a cold 
response to the fulsome message of congratulation and praise the Turkish prime 
minister had just sent to Mr. Karamanlis. The new Greek foreign minister also 
made it clear that his government still regarded Archbishop Makarios as the legal 
president of Cyprus. And he suggested that the Geneva talks should be limited to 
sorting out the constitutional position on the island, and to security matters. This 
is not quite how Turkey sees it. 

On the home front Mr. Karamanlis acted quickly to disperse any suspicion that 
he was under orders from Greece's former military leaders. An amnesty was de- 
clared for all political prisoners (these include some 200 students arrested in 
November, and perhaps as many as 45 people detained on Yiaros), and Greek 
citizenship and Greek passports are to be restored to all those who had been de- 
prived of them. One of the first to return was Mr. Mikis Theodorakis, the compo- 
ser; another was Mr. Panayiotis Lambrias, a journalist living in exile in London, 
who is now in charge of Greek press affairs. 

Although some sections of the crowd outside the Grande Bretagne hotel, where 
Mr. Karamanlis talked with his ministers, were calling for vengenance against the 
military junta, the general mood in the capital is more relaxed. Brigadier loanni- 
dis, the head of the military police and the military government's strong man since 
November, is said to be under house arrest in an army officers' rest camp, and ex- 
President Papadopouios and his wife are rumoured to have fled the country. But 
it is most unlikely that Mr. Karamanlis is in any position to take really vigorous 
action against the men who turned out the politicians in 1967. 

For all the support he commands in these euphoric early days, there are a sub- 
stantial number of people on the left of Greek politics, and some on the right, who 
will not be content to see a smooth evolution to a democratic constitutional order. 
They want revolution, or a return to the uniformed order of the past seven years. 
Mr. Karamanlis's political skill, which is said to have gathered no dust during his 
years of retreat in Paris, will be taxed to the limit if he is to steer a course success- 
JFuUy between the two extremes. His partners from the Centre Union, and especially 
those on its left, will come under great pressure from outsiders such as Mr. Andreas 
Papandreou, who will be seeking to take advantage of every opening to further 
their own cause. 

Mr. Karamanlis, faced by grave foreign and domestic problems, is expected to 
move quickly to elections for a constituent assembly which would hammer out a 
new constitution. The same assembly might answer perhaps the most dedicate 
question of all — whether Greece wants its king back. 



93 

[From the Economist (London), July 27, 1974] 
We did it! 

The Turks are satisfied that their military and poUtical objectives in invading 
Cyprus on Julj^ 20th have been achieved. The government claims credit both for 
getting rid of Mr. Nicos Sampson in Nicosia and for the downfall of the military 
regime in Athens. The Turkish prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, said in parliament O'^^ 
Tuesday that the military operation not only attained but exceeded its three-day 
target; military sources say that the outcome was exactly as planned bj^ the gen- 
eral staff. 

There were contingency plans should the Greeks join the battle, but the initial 
three-day plan was to establish a strong military presence in the major Turkish 
enclave that runs from the Turkish quarter of Nicosia along the central road 
(which has long been under Turkish Cypriot control) to the outskirts of K,yrenia. 
Government spokesmen flatly deny foreign suggestions that Greek resistance was 
stronger than expected and that because of this their forces failed to achieve all 
their planned targets. The minister of information told your correspondent that, 
for the first three days, there was no plan to occupy any other area or to take over 
Nicosia airport. The sole objective, he said, was to put the airport out of action, 
and this — he claimed— was done. 

The first military aim was to establish a bridgehead at Kyrenia which could act 
as a revolving door for Turks and Turkish Cypriots to enter or leave the island. 
The second was to establish "a northern triangle" with its apex in Nicosia and its 
bast along the coast. The third was to swell the Turkish military presence and to 
provide greater safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community and rectif}^ the 
balance between Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus. 

The primary political purpose was to make the union of Cyprus with Greece 
impossible. Once this was attained, Turkey's military presence on the island would 
strengthen its negotiating position both in demanding the withdrawal of Greek 
officers and in longer-term talks about the future of Cyprus. Not least, the Turks 
set out to prove that Turkey means what it says and no longer needs to bow to 
foreign pressures. 

Mr. Ecevit may also have had the motive, which is now being claimed with 
hindsight, of provoking a change of regime in both Cyprus and Greece. In all the 
statements that he made after the invasion the prime minister voiced the hope that 
this action would eventually benefit Greek Cypriots as well as their Turkish 
compatriots, and that civilian democratic governments would takt over in both 
Cyprus and Greece. With Mr. Clerides in Cyprus and Mr. Karamanlis in Greece, 
both of whom are regarded in Ankara as moderates, the Turkish government is 
optimistic about a Cyprus settlement — and hopes that the dispute over Greek and 
Turkish rights in the Aegean sea can be resolved. 

The decision to invade Cyprus was not imposed on the government by Turkey's 
military men. The government was in favour of invasion from the moment of the 
coup against Archbishop Makarios on July 15th. The deciding factor in Mr. 
Ecevit's mind was his conclusion, after his talks with Britain's Mr. Callaghan and 
America's Mr. Sisco, that nothing else would oblige Greece to withdraw its officers 
from Cyprus and its support of Mr. Sampson. The government believed that if 
immediate action were not taken there would be nothing to prevent the union of 
Cyprus and Greece. And the Turks were encouraged by a pledge from the United 
States that this time round it would not twist the screws as Lj-ndon Johnson did 
in November, 1967, when Turkej' was preparing for, but prevented from, an 
invasion of Cyprus. 

Turkey's immediate concern now is to see that the cease-fire is maintained and 
to keep a sizeable military force in Cyprus until a settlement is reached. Mr. 
Ecevit is not thinking in terms of partitioning Cyprus, although his coalition part- 
ner, the leader of the National Salvation i^arty, seems to be. Mr. Necmettin 
Erbakan declared on Tuesday that the only permanent solution was partition. The 
prime minister is resolved that Cyprus should be an independent federal state. 

THE BATTLE 

Turkey's well-polished and carefullj'-limited invasion plan was executed not 
brilliantly but with competence. Its troops, whose fire discipline is probably 
the best of all the Nato forces, faced the Greek Cj'priot National Guard, number- 



41-207—74- 



94 

ing at least 11,000 men with some armour and light artillery. The Guard's officers 
are mostly regulars seconded from the Greek army, and there is some evidence 
that reinforcements were flown in from Greece after the coup on July 15th. The 
Turks had to assault this force without the benefit of surprise. Their only clear-cut 
monopoly was their air power. 

The invasion itself involved one of the most complicated operations a modern 
army can be asked to perform: a co-ordinated airborne and amphibious assault 
on an area defended b}'' superior numbers equipped with armour. At dawn on 
July 20th the Turks began their naval and air bonibardment of the invasion 
beach five miles west of Kyrcnia. Parachutists were dropped into the area between 
Nicosia and the mountains, and troops landed from helicopters in the hills. The 
beach landing met stiiT resistance, including mortar and artillery fire from the 
hills above the coastline. The Turkish air force provided close support to the in- 
vasion force, and to the big Turkish Cypriot enclave between Nicosia and KjTenia ; 
it also raided Nicosia airfield. 

The Turks advanced slowly throughout Saturday. Their main effort was the 
attempt to consolidate their beachhead at Kyrenia and to get supplies and equip- 
ment into the Turkish Cypriot areas along the central road to Nicosia, which had 
already come under attack from the National Guard. The paratroops dropped 
near Nicosia stiffened the Turkish Cypriot forces there. 

On Sunday the main battle took place. This was in the triangle formed roughly 
bj' Five-Mile Beach, Boghaz and Kyrenia. The Turkish drive was against Kyrenia 
but it was stalled about three miles away by National Guard troops and armour, 
much of which had come down the eastern road during the night. Turkish Cypriot 
forces, supported by a few scattered air strikes, attacked Greek positions in the 
hills south-east of Kyrenia, but were unable to cut the eastern road. To the south 
Turkish troops from the beach-head managed to link up with the parachutists. 

The battle spluttered on most of the night as the Turks steadily put more troops 
on to the invasion beach and the air force and navy poured fire into National 
Guard positions. Nicosia airport, despite repeated attacks, remained in Greek 
hands, and in service. During that night several Greek transport planes were 
reported to have landed, bringing Greek troops and equipment. 

On Monday the cease- tire was arranged for 4 pm. Turkish pressure on Kyrenia 
was gradually squeezing the Greeks into the town itself, and the Turkish forces 
continued to reinforce the Turkish Cypriot enclave all the way to Nicosia. Fight- 
ing continued in the triangle right up to the cease-fire; Kyrenia itself fell to the 
Turks shortly after it, and Turkish troops entered Nicosia on Monday night. 
Later that night Turkish armoured forces near Nicosia airport had a sharp but 
brief fight with the National Guard. The UN forces on the scene stopped the 
fighting and took over the airport themselves. This was probably the last battle 
involving regular Turkish troops. 

An early assessment suggests that the Turkish army achieved its objectives, 
with the possible exception of capturing the airport, but that the performance of 
its air force operations was spotty. Observes reported bold tactics and individual 
instances of extremely accurate close-support bombing. But co-ordination was 
poor. Air-support operations appear to have been sporadic even in the Kyrenia 
triangle, and far less effective in support of Turkish Cypriots in other parts of the 
island. The bombing of a hospital for the mentally ill, and of the Salaminia Tower 
and other hotels on the seafront of Famagusta, was undoubtedly a major error. 
An even worse mistake was the sinking by Turkish bombs of a Turkish warship 
off Cyprus's western coast on Sunday. This seems to have been a small ship, per- 
haps a destroyer. Some 42 survivors were later picked up by an IsraeU ship. 

Turkish casualties, particularly in the fighting around Kyrenia, were heavy, 
although not unreasonably so far an amphibious assault. Turkey has given a figure 
of 57 dead, 184 wounded and 242 missing. This is surely an understatement. Even 
if all those listed as missing were in fact killed, this hardly accounts for more men 
than are likely to have been lost on the sunk warship. The Turks made their 
initial attacks with 7,000 men. Given the scale of the fighting in the Kyrenia 
triangle and the loss of that ship, and cutting by half the Greek claim of the 
number of aircraft shot down, it is hard to see how Turkej' could have had fewer 
than 700 casualties. 

Greek casualties are even harder to estimate. Not only was the National Guard 
engaged in more places than the Turkish army — it was fighting, or at least shoot- 
ing, in Nicosia and several other cities and villages — but there is no reliable figure 
of how many reinforcements came in from Greece. Since the National Guard 
eventually lost the major battle — for the Kyrenia triangle — and was pounded 
heavily by aircraft and naval gunfire, its casualties may well have been between 
two and three times greater than those of the Turkish forces. 



95 

THE BODIES HAVE YET TO BE COUNTED 

When the bodies are counted and the dead are identified, it could be found that 
even more Cypriots were killed by their fellow-countrymen than by the Turkish 
invaders. And a high proportion of the civilian casualties are likely to be Turkish 
Cypriots. Ever since inter-communal violence erupted in Cyprus in December, 
1963, it has been accepted that one of the strongest deterrents to a Turkish 
invasion was the fact that a large number of Turkish Cypriots would be at risk 
the moment a Turkish soldier put foot on Cypriot soil. The Greek Cypriots 
regarded the Turkish community as their hostage against a Turkish invasion. 

The stories now coming out, admittedly many of them from overwrought 
Turkish Cypriots returning to London after being caught up in the fighting while 
on holiday, suggest that the hostages did indeed suffer. There have been no 
reports of Greek Cypriot revenge from Nicosia, where the largest Turkish com- 
munity on the island lives in comparative safety behind the Green Line that 
divides the city and is patrolled by the UN, or from the walled city of Famagusta, 
which is a well-guarded ghetto. But from Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos, Polls and 
two Turkish villages, Kophinou and Mari, there have been eye-witness accounts 
of Greek Cypriot groups shooting down Turkish Cj^priot civilians and setting fire 
to their houses. 

Many of these stories may be deliberately or accidentally exaggerated. But 
those that are found to be true will aflfect the peace talks at Geneva. The Turkish 
government will come under great pressure to insist on a settlement that is 
certain to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the community is 
scattered throughout the island (see the map on page 18) the mechanism for doing 
this will be a very complicated one. 

During the internal violence in Cyprus in 1963-64, and again in 1967, Arch- 
bishop Makarios and his government condemned all attacks against Turkish 
Cypriot civilians and did their best to ensure that the Greek Cypriots — the 
National CUiard and armed civilians — did not take such actions themselves. But 
after ^Nlakarios's overthrow discipline may well have broken down. 

One reason for this ^\ould be that after the coup the security forces were bitterly 
divided among themselves into factions for and against Makarios. There have been 
reports, unconfirmed and probably as embellished as those coming from Turkish 
Cypriots, that Mr. Sampson's supporters took quick and ruthless measures to sup- 
press the archbishop's most powerful follo^^'ers. There was certainly fighting and 
killing within the police force; many people were arrested and some fled for safety 
to foreign embassies. 

The Turkish invaders also have much to answer for. The bombing of five 
Famagusta hotels just before the ceasefire on Monday, which caused the death of 
20 Greek Cypriots and the wounding of 200 others, had no military value. Nor is 
the announcement that the Turkish army has taken 600 Greek Cypriot prisoners 
back to Turkey, on the doubtful argument that there is nowhere to hold them in 
Cyprus, at all helpful. It looks as if Turkey wanted its own hostages to hold 
against the fate of the Turkish Cypriots who are surrounded by Greek Cypriot 
forces throughout the island. The fate of the prisoners and hostages should top the 
Geneva agenda. 

THE MEN CLERIDES HAS TO DEAL WITH 

Mr. Clerides, the interim president of Cyprus, gave no hint at his press con- 
ference on Wednesday about the composition of his new cabinet or about where he 
stands in relation to the political forces on the island, including the supporters of 
Archbishop Makarios. He did, however, sa_v that he would not advise the arch- 
bishop to return to the island "at the moment". That can be an elastic phrase, and 
it seems to ])ut Mr. Clerides closer to the Turkish government's point of view 
about Archbishop Makarios than the Greek foreign minister's (see page 16).^ 

For the time being the ministers chosen by Nicos Sampson (or by the Greek 
officers behind him) have not been publiclj^ removed from office. Not aU of these 
are the sort of ^^11d men one would associate with Mr. Sampson. A few are reputable 
lawyers; all share an intense hatred of Archbishop Makarios. Mr. "Dimmy" 
Dimitriou, the Sampson foreign minister, is a member of a prominent Anglophile 
family; Mr. Panayotis Dimitriou, Mr. Sampson's minister of education, is the 
leader of the right wing of the so-called Unified party, which was supposed to be 
the archbishop's vehicle in parliament. 

The Unified party, which is the largest poUtical group in Cyprus, has been 
presided over, rather than led, by Mr. Clerides himself. At the last election to the 
House of Representatives in 1970 it won 15 out of the 35 seats. Its policy then was 



96 

pro-Makarios ; now it will presumably be pro-Clerides, even if Mr. Clerides formally 
drops his party functions. 

The mainspring behind the Unified party since 1970 has been Mr. Tassos 
Papadopoulos, the deputy speaker of thg House of Representatives. He and Mr. 
Clerides are both friends and rivals. He is deeply disUked by many of the leaders of 
the Eoka-B guerrillas who support union with Greece because of his close links 
with the archbishop. He was reported to have been imprisoned immediately after 
the coup, but to have been released when the Turks invaded. 

The Conmiunist party of Cyprus, Akel, has also supported Archbishop Ma- 
karios, if only for tactical reasons. Leaders of the party are believed to have sought 
refuge in east European embassies immediately after the coup: large numbers of 
rank-and-file communists are likely to have been killed in the fighting on 
July loth and 16th or temporarily imprisoned, Mr. Clerides, who was once left-of- 
centre himself, may release those who are still in jail — unless, despite the changes 
in Athens, he is still under the thumb of the Greek officers of the National Guard. 
Akel might then swing behind him, particularly if Makarios stays out of Cyprus. 

The one certainty is that the Cypriot communists will support the independence 
formula, which would keep Cyprus outside the orbit of Nato. Mr. Clerides's long 
negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot Mr. Denktash, which aimed to preserve 
that independence, may earn him Akel's support. But he can return their embrace 
only at the risk of antagonising the still militant right. 

RESCUE 

On Sunday morning the British forces in Cyprus began their major rescue oj^era- 
tion to take stranded foreigners into the safety of the sovereign bases. That day, 
40 army vehicles escorted 1,000 private cars with some 4,000 passengers in a 
convoy from Nicosia to Dhekelia. Other smaller convoys collected families of 
British servicemen and tourists from Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Troodos. 
Bj^ Wednesday, 27,000 foreign civilian refugees had been accommodiated at the 
bases. About 16,000 of these were dependants of British servicemen who came in 
by road; nearly 2,000 were tourists who had been collected ]:)y helicopter and lavuich 
from beaches near Kj^renia on Tuesday and then brought to Akrotiri by ship. 
Thousands of Cypriots, mainly Turks, weie also given sanctuary in the bases. 

Several foreign governments helped their own citizens to escape the fighting: 
Swedish troops from the United Nations force escorted 800 Scandinavian tourists 
from Famagusta to Dhekelia; American helicopters lifted 350 American tourists 
from Dhekelia to an aircraft-carrier 20 miles offshore and France sent four planes 
to evacuate French tourists. Britiain offered its relief facilities to all. By the end of 
this week the RAF A\'ill have flown more than 8,000 people, of 40 nationalities, to 
Britain. 

The one British agency which some of its own citizens complained about was 
British Airways: after the coup its planes were still flying back to Britain with 
as many as 100 empty seats while anxious tourists waited for transport at Nicosia 
airport. The explanation: these were charter passengers and therefore ineligible 
for commercial flights. 

[From the Economist (London), July 27, 1974] 

Bt Courtesy of the RAF 

Fortunately for those of us trapped and then held hostage in the Ledra Palace 
hotel the stupidity of the Cypriot National Guard was more than matched by the 
courage of the UN and British soldiers who rescued us. For 30 hours from da\Mi 
on Saturday a National Guard platoon blazed away into the Turkish sector, which 
starts at the bottom of the hotel's back garden. The guardsmen used every sort 
of weapon, from shotgims to 3-inch mortars; their shooting was the amateur sort 
aimed at no particular target. The din alone was enough to give most people the 
impression that heavy fighting was going on around the hotel — which was not so. 

We advised the guardsmen to save their ammunition, imploring them not to 
draw retaliatory fire on to the hotel wheie many women and children were trapped. 
"Go talk to your Turkish friends," they shouted back. Some of us had, and the 
Turks, showing great restraint, fired back at the Ledra only four times, killing one 
person and wounding three. On Sunday morning, in warning, they lobbed in two 
very accurate mortar shells. At this point our protests to the soldier-diplomats of 
the UN produced an agreement by which the guards at the hotel would fire back 



97 

only if fired on. This arrangement held, more or less, until we left in mid-afternoon: 
without it we could not have been rescued. 

All through that Saturday night the Canadian UN unit across the road, which 
took six casualties, had been trying to enforce a ceasefire. With rising anger and 
in strange Quebecois accents the sergeant bellowed reprovingly at both front lines 
through a bull-horn. By mid-morning on Sunday we discovered that we had 
become political hostages as well as a human firescreen. The Guard commander 
shouted instructions that nobody was to leave the hotel because "we have some- 
thing cooking for tonight". More guards appeared, more ammunition and, for the 
first time, bazookas were stacked in the lobby in preparation for a night attack, 
all behind the cover we provided. There were some exceptions to the ban on 
leaving; Americans and Israelis were allowed to go. 

The worst moments came after the rescuing convoy, British vehicles under the 
UN flag, arrived in the forecourt. Then, at the last minute, we were refused 
permission to board because the National Guard would not allow people of several 
nationalities to leave until their embassies had received permission from the Cyprus 
foreign ministry. This was apparently an attempt to enforce recognition of the 
Sampson regime — and to compel those embassies which had given asylum to its 
opponents to hand them over. The UN, in the person of a young British lieu- 
tenant, said firmly that it either evacuated all civilians or none. The ensuing 
deadlock was eventually resolved when the British high commissioner made it his 
personal responsibilitj^ that the offending nationals should leave the hotel. Stout 
fellow. As the convoy pulled away the National Guard fired their last bullets over 
our heads. Judging by the "Ledra battle", the new Cj^prus government is going 
to have problems in disbanding and disintoxicating these misled youngsters after 
their brief hours of swaggering glory. 

The disembarking area on the sports fields of the Dhekelia base looked like a 
race meeting; lines of brightly-coloured cars and groups of women in summery 
dresses sitting on the grass. It was, in fact, a gathering of refugees. The hospitality 
was cheerful and thoughtful. We were documented, allotted rooms, givtn camp 
beds and asked to pay the modest sum of 80p for board and lodging. IDinner was 
standard British army corned beef stew, but after 30 hours without food it was 
glorious. Registration began immediately for the onward flight to Britain because 
each wave had to move on to make way for the next, particularlj- since the base 
was very short of water. 

The Hercules C-130 is not meant to be a comfortable plane and is a verj- noisy 
one. But on the short ferry flight to the RAF base at Akrotiri the children became 
the special care of the cabin crew, who fed them chocolates and, in mid-flight, 
produced pieces of water melon, carefully wrapped in cellophane. Again at Akrotiri 
we were met with thoughtful efficiency. But there was a surprising setback when, 
at the last check-through desk, Scandinavians, Arabs, Jugoslavs and Spaniards 
were told that they could not leave C.yprus without the same special permission 
as had been demanded the day before. 

When we eventually arrived at Lyneham RAF base in Britain, it took no 
more than half an hour to process our batch of about 80 people. We were offered 
food and clothing, overnight accommodation, medical care, financial assistance 
and travel guidance; even those who had lost their passports were admitted. 

There were not many countries, I said to an American coUeagaie, that could 
mount such a rescue operation. Still fewer, he replied, who would have bothered 
to take the trouble and responsibility. And he was right. The United States took 
off its own citizens plus the Canadians. The Russians and French looked after 
their own. Britain took everyone else. My anti-colonialist colleagues confessed 
that they would never again be able to look coldly at a Union Jack. MiHtary 
bases in foreign countries often prove unnecessarj^, but some bases are clearly less 
base than others. 



[From Washington Post, Aug. 19, 1974] 

Turks Grip Peninsul.\ 
(By John Saar, Washington Post Staff Writer) 

AYIOS THEODHOROS, Cyprus, Aug. 18 — Turkish troops occupying the iso- 
lated Cyprus panhandle are looting homes and stores and intimidating Greek Cypriot 
villagers. 

Extending 50 miles into the Mediterranean, the narrow peninsula is a fertile 
grain-growing region. Greek cypriot officials allege that the Turks have forced 



98 

most Greeks to leave their homes and farms and are deHberately making life 
difficult for those who stayed. 

In an area where Greek Cypriots normally outnumber 18,000 to 6,000, most of 
the Greek villages are deserted except for Turkish sentries. Doors to most of the 
Greek stores and homes are broken open and drawers and closets have been 
ransacked. A Turkish army officer said this resulted from a military search for 
fugitive members of the Cypriot National Guard. 

The few Greek-Cypriots who could be found in a visit to the area were plainly 
nervous about speaking in the presence of an armed Turkish information officer. 
Nevertheless, they complained they were short of food and said their sheep and 
cattle were dying of thirst and hunger because of Turkish rules restricting resi- 
dents to their homes and villages. 

On the main street of Trikomo, an all-Greek village of more than 2,000 people in 
normal times, 8 to 10 Greek men, young and old, were walking in a tight group under 
the guard of an impassive Turkish soldier. They seemed almost joyful to see the 
Turkish information officer and eagerly extended slips of paper which they said 
the local Turkish command issued to permit them to leave their homes to buy 
food. The officer ordered the soldier to back off, but when the group moved on 
again the soldier was again striding purposefully behind them. 

(One of the men, a 70-year-old retired chef, said: "We have been given passes to 
leave our houses to get bread but always there are these soldiers pointing their 
guns at us and I thought they were going to shoot us." 

Sweat broke on the man's brow as he made his complaint in the presence of a 
Turkish officer. 

"They came in our houses searching and they broke everything," he said. "The 
peojjle who have gone, their houses have been broken into." Then he looked di- 
rectly at the officer and said, "I am telling it because it is the truth.") 

The looting and intimidation of the Greeks occurred in circumstances of such tight 
military discipline that they could not be dis7nissed as the acts of unruly individuals. 
Turkish soldiers were driving civilian cars and motorcycles and getting gas at unat- 
tended filling stations. One soldier obstructed traffic while he dragged a rebellious cow 
through a narrow village street with ttvo calves skittering ahead. Other Turks loaded 
sacks of corn from a Greek Cypriot granary into a truck. Two truckloads of commandos 
paused beside a drugstore long enough for a few of the men to force their way in and 
return with sodas and ballpoint pens. 

A truck which headed west through Ayios Theodhohos village in midafternoon 
was loaded with cooking stoves. 

Civilian Turkish Cypriots emerged from a Greek Cyjjriot house with armfuls 
of clothing while jeeploads of Turks passing bj^ appeared net to notice. It was as 
though the Greeks had abruptlj^ disappeared, leaving the land to the Turks and 
their Cypriot-born brothers. 

Only three Greeks could be found in Ayios Theodhoros, sleepy village normally 
populated bj^ 805 Greeks and about 20 Turks. One was an old man of 83 who said 
his mind wasn't what it used to be and raised his hand in a feeble reflexive salute 
each time a Turkish patrol went b3^ 

Another old man and his wife said the Turkish soldiers told them, "If yoxi 
stay here we won't do you any harm and we will give j-ou food." But it was 4:30 
p.m. and tlaoy said they had been given nothing to eat since the previous day, and 
all the village stores were closed. 

In the nearby village of Patriki, the headman said that while 400 or so villagers 
had fled, 200 remained in their homes without interference from the Turks. He 
kept saying "everybody's happy," but the faces of the other villagers indicated 
otherAvise. They were relieved to see a non-Tuikish foreigner and said so. 

The villagers were worried about their own food sup])ly, but more so about 
their precious livestock. Tavo oxen and two sheep died from lack of water .yester- 
day, the headman said. The villagers are keeping the animals close to their homes 
for safety. 

When told of the situation in the panhandle, a Greek Cj'priot spokesman for 
the Cypriot government commented: "I think it is intentional. The Turkish 
government wants the Greeks to flee so Turks living in other areas of the island 
can be transferred up her to take the land." 



99 

[From the Times (London), Aup. 19, 1974] 

Nearly Half the Greek Population of Cyprus Are Refugees 
(From Paul Martin, Nicosia, Aug. 18, 1974) 

The repercussions of the Turkish occu]3ation of Greek Cypriot territory are 
only beginning to be felt. The refugee problem is enormous. Between a third and 
a half of the island's Greek Cypriot majority have been uprooted from their 
homes in the path of the occupiers and put to flight. 

In the British base area of Dhekelia alone there are 60,000 refugees from Fam- 
agusta and towns around Larnaca. By their thousands they are camped along 
the main road through the base and in the Athna forest. Food is desperately short. 
There is no sanitation and no medical facilities. 

They have left behind all their belongings. They fled with a few bare essentials. 
Only the lucky few were able to bring mattresses and Ijedding strapped to the 
roofs of their cars. 

Most of the 24,000 Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Famagusta poured out of the 
port town when the Turkish jets struck in the heart of the city. Cars, sometimes 
packed with two families, poured out of the city for the Dhekelia base. Fruit 
lorries carried women and children in their dozens, bewildered and pathetic looking. 

The southern towns of Limassol and Larnaca were alread.y full of refugees fiom 
the first Turkish assault, more than 40,000 from the Kyrenis range and surrounding 
areas. Others headed for the mountains to the safety of Troodos and Platres. 
Now the latest Turkish push bringing the tanks to the Nicosia-Larnaca road has 
caused a new exodus from Nicosia and Larnaca. 

Already there are the warning signs of a serious food problem throughout the 
country. With as manj^ as 60,000 Greek Cypriot men called to arms, battling 
along the receding defence lines, farms have been left untended, meat and vege- 
tal)le markets have come to a virtual stand still and distribution is in chaos, If the 
Turks close the ring of armour around Nicosia, the city will be starved into sub- 
mission. 

No attempt has been made to count the dead and wounded. But every Greek 
Cypriot one talks to has lost a father, l:)rother, son or some relation in the month 
of war. The list of missing is in the thousands. The Turks have done nothing to 
relieve Greek Cypriot anguish. They have so far withheld lists of Greek Cypriot 
men captured in the fighting or rounded up from villages that fell into their hands. 

That is the human side of the Greek tragedy. The economic one is no less black, 
The invasion has left them in economic ruin. The creation of the Attila Line has 
robbed the Greek Cypriots of most of the sources of their wealth. Indeed, it has 
been estimated that the Turks have grabbed as much as four-fifths of the island's 
wealth. 

Tourism, which accounted for 30 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, was 
snatched by the Turks when the.y grabbed Kyrenia and Famagusta, the two 
touristic jewels. They also control the biggest port, Famagusta. Likewise with 
the grain producing area in the Mesaoria plain and the citrus growing centre at 
Morphou. The copper mines in the west are also now in Turkish hands. 

More than 120 Greek Cypriot villages are now at the mercy of the Turks. 
The areas they seized north of the Attila Line between Morphou and Famagusta 
M^ere almost entirely Greek, with a sprinkling of small Turkish Cypriot villages. 

The problem of resettlement is enormous. That of creating jobs in the less 
privileged two-thirds of the island left in Greek hands is even greater. 

On the Turbish side of the island partition is now being openly discussed. The 
Turks in Ankara and their clients in Nicosia appear to be merely paying lip service 
to the idea of a federated independent state. Turkish Cypriot leaders make it clear 
that the area taken by force of arms bj^ the Turkish Army will remain in their 
hands. 

Nicosia, Aug. 18.— Six young Greek Cypriot girls claimed on television here 
tonight that they were raped by Turkish soldiers ever}- day for a week before being 
freed yesterday. 

The Cyprus Government arranged the television interviews, but no medical 
evidence was offered. 

The girls said they had been among 287 men, women and children held in a 
mud-brick sheep pen four miles north-east of Nicosia since the Turkish invasion 
of the island on Julv 28. 



100 

A statement by the British High Commission at the base of Dhekeha said today 
that a middle-aged British woman had complained that she was raped at the town 
of Bogaz in northeast Cyprus. The High Commission said it was taking the matter 
up with the officer commanding Turkish troops in the Famagusta area, and with 
Turkish authorities in Ankara. — Renter. 



[Washington Star-News, September 12, 19741 

More Cyprus Talks — Refugee Accord Lacks Specifics 

(By Andrew Borowiec, Star-News Special Correspondent) 

Nicosia.— On paper, the most recent agreement between Cyprus' Greek and 
Turkish communities looks good and optimists feel that it will enhance further 
dialogue on the island's future. 

Yet the propaganda war between the two camps continues with the same 
intensity and rumors persist that the Turks plan a military thrust to reach the 
Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the southern portion of the divided country. 

Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denk- 
tash met yesterday to implement last week's decision to free the young, the old, 
the infirm and sick now held behind the barbed wires of Cyprus. 

The two officials have also decided to free students and allow teachers to return 
to their jobs. 

Dates and more concrete details are expected to be announced tomorrow 
when the two men meet again. The United Nations and the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross participate in these negotiations. The most important 
thing, however, is that Denktash and Clerides have continued private discussions 
on "humanitarian questions." 

Although the communiques on the refugees can be considered encouraging, few 
concrete acts could be cited to boost the island's morale. 

The refugees are receiving new tents and blankets — an ominous spectacle 
reminiscent of other mass movements in the turbulent history of this country. 
Ships are unloading foodstocks in the parts of Limassol and Larnaca. The main 
highway south of Nicosia is jammed by trucks carrying supplies to some 190,000 
homeless Greek Cypriots. 

The Turkish occupied sector is still a wasteland, with the exception of the 
main Turkish enclave north of Nicosia and the former resort town of Kyrenia 
which was the center of the July 20th Turkish invasion. 

Some cafes have reopened in Kyrenia — called by the Turks Girne — and floral 
wreaths have been heaped around the newly unveiled statue of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, founder and hero of modern Turkey. 

The main street is still barred to civilians and all Greeks are incarcerated in the 
waterfront Dome Hotel. Teams of Turkish soldiers have swept the debris and 
garbage trucks have gone to work. The post office has reopened and several foreign 
residents have returned to their looted homes. 

West of Kyrenia, along the coastal road to Morphou, all is silence and devasta- 
tion. Only an occasional rumble of heavy Turkish army vehicles breaks the 
oppressive silence. 

Travelling some 50 miles southwest through the Turkish sector, I saw aban- 
doned villages where hungry donkeys brayed piteously. Here and there rabbits 
and chickens darted across the empty road. 

In Morphou itself, once a town of 8,000, only steelhelmeted Turkish soldiers 
patrolled the deserted streets. The town's 163 Turks have remained in their homes 
and some 100 Greeks who have not fled are kept under guard. 

The poUcy of the Turkish military authorities toward the Greek Cj-priots is 
simple: As long as the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to talk of a possible 
guerrilla war, the Greeks will not be allowed to return to their homes. The Turks 
feel that without support of a friendly population, no guerrillas could operate in 
their territory 

Thus it would appear that Greek threats are self-defeating. Meanwhile the 
economy of the richest part of the island continues to stagnate, despite some 
rather pathetic Turkish appeals to foreign businessmen for "continued confidence 
and investments." 



101 

New York Times, Oct. 2, 1974 

Makarios, at U.N., Rejects A Federation for Cyprus 

(By Paul Hofmann, Special to The New York Times) 

United Nations, N.Y., Oct. 1 — Archbishop Makarios, the exiled President of 
Cyprus, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly todaj', sternly 
denounced Turkey as an "aggressor," and rejected geographical federation as a 
means for bringing peace to the island. 

The Archbishop declared that Turkey had made clear at the Geneva conference 
on Cyprus in August that she wanted a federation of geographically distinct ethnic 
Greek and Turkish areas on Cyprus. Such a separation would be "not only 
artificial but also inhuman," the Archbishop said, because it would mean large- 
scale resettlement of inhabitants. 

KISSINGER SEES PROGRESS 

The Archbishop's speech followed suggestions by Secretary of State Kissinger 
that progress was being made in defining the positions of Greece and Turkey 
toward the Cyprus problem. 

Mr. Kissinger is conducting talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Minis- 
ters on the issue. 

An American official said he did not know whether the Secretary of State was 
planning to meet with Archljishop Makarios. 

In his appearance at the United Nations, the Archbishop, speaking unemo- 
tionally in English, likened the methods employed by Turkey in her intervention 
on Cyprus to those of Attila and Hitler, 

Archbishop Makarios has been living abroad since a coup last July 15 forced 
him to flee Cyprus. He has been touring countries around the Mediterranean and 
elsewhere to seek support. 

The United Nations recognizes Archbishop Makarios as head of state of a 
member nation. 

This afternoon, delegates rose when the Cj^priote leader was escorted into the 
Assembly Hall according to the ceremony for visits by heads of state and 
government. 

Many delegates, including those from Communist and African countries 
applauded. Arab delegates seemed generally cool. The seats reserved for the 
Turkish delegation were empty. 

The Archbishop recalled in his address that he had appeared before the United 
Nations Security Council to protest the coup in Cyprus. 

The coup, he said, was instigated "by the military junta then ruling Greece." 
He asserted that the plotters had been seeking his death. 

The Archbishop welcomed the collapse of the military regime in Athens. This 
allowed Greece, he said ,to find again "its way to democracy and national dignit.y." 

The evil of the coup in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios declared, was followed by 
another evil when Turkey seized the opportunity to intervene militaril3^ 

The treaty that created Cyprus as an independent state in 1960, under the 
guarantee of Britain, Greece and Turkey, did not give Turkey the right to 
intervene, the Archbishop declared. He added that Turkey "has embarked upon 
destroying what she herself has guaranteed" — the independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus. 

Charging that the Turkish forces on Cyprus had committed atrocities, the 
Archbishop asserted that "the victims of this aggression were in proportionate 
terms greater than the victims of many j-ears in Vietnam." 

SEES RISK OF ANNEXATION 

A geographic federation would be tantamount to partition of Cyprus, the 
Archbishop said. He added that this would lead to annexation of one part of the 
Island by Turkey and of the other by Greece. 

"This will be the end of Cyprus as an independent state," he said. 

"Such a development maj^ perhaps be favored by certain powers for their own 
interests." 

The Archbishop did not specify which countries he had in mind, but he said that 
Cyprus's strategic position had in the past often caused the island to fall victim 
to "foreign interests." 



102 

In what sounded like an allusion to secret contracts, the Archbishop remarked 
that "some who appear as realists" were counseling negotiation on the basis of 
geographic federation, suggesting that Turkey might be flexible. 

There has been some talk, he said, that Turkey may be amenable to reducing 
the area occupied by her forces from, at present, 40 percent of the island, to 
"something below 30 percent." 

The Archbishop said he was opposed to such proposals, even if the alternative 
was to be Turkish occupation of all the island. 



[Christian Science Monitor, Tliursday, September 12, 19741 

Turkey Promotes Cyprus Policy 
(By Sam Cohen Special to The Christian Science Monitor) 

Istanbul Turkey has launched a big diplomatic offensive to win support for its 
Cyprus policy and legalize its military gains on the island. 

Turkish officials are confident that the current worldwide campaign to win 
friends and influence people will pay off. They say that already Turkey's Cyprus 
policy is understood and supported in many parts of the world, and predict a 
Greek defeat at the United Nations if Greece asks the General Assembly to 
condemn Turicey and demands Turkey's withdrawal from the Mediterranean 
island. 

"Our position in the international diplomatic arena is as strong as our position 
in Cyprus itself," a member of the government said. "Greece's hope after the 
military operations that Turkey would lose the diplomatic battle has not ma- 
terialized." 

Turkish officials point out that Turkey's foreign relations have not suffered 
from the Cyprus situation, whereas Greece's decision to withdraw its forces from 
NATO have weakened its ties with the West, and particularly with the United 
States, without providing any significant benefit from other sources, such as the 
Soviet bloc. 

SUPPORT ANTICIPATED 

The Turks now seem assured of wide support from many governments and a 
large portion of world public opinion on a basic point in their Cyprus policy: 
the principle of setting up a federal system in Cyprus, with separate Turkish and 
Greek autonomous administrations in geographically divided regions. 

Turkish diplomats, politicians, officials, intellectuals, businessmen, labor and 
youth leaders have been mobilized to propagate this view throughout the world. 
Several officials and delegations are now touring various countries in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa, and the feeling here is that the Turkish view, particularly con- 
cerning the readiness to negotiate a peaceful solution on the basis of an inde- 
pendent, federal Cyprus state, with Greece and Britain and the two Cypriot 
communities, is receiving good attention and sympathy. 

"The Greeks will finally understand that resorting to international forums 
will not solve the problem, and sooner or later they will have to return to the 
conference table," the Turks say. 

But Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit has warned that undue delay in taking 
action for a solution might make "double enosis" inevitable. This would mean 
the partition of the island into two regions, with each region uniting with the 
"motherland" — Greece and Turkey — thus ending the island's independence. 
This is not a solution favored by Turkey, but Ankara might eventually accept 
it if it sees no other solution in sight. 

NEW CONFERENCE URGED 

The Turks hope that international efforts will lead to a new conference in the 
near future. However there is concern in foreign diplomatic circles here that the 
current diplomatic efforts deployed particularly by the U.S. and Britain might 
be wrecked by new tension on the island as a result of the disclosure of massacres 
and atrocities, which could lead to new military action by Turkey. 

Mr. Ecevit has repeatedly stated that Turkey's aim is not to conquer the island, 
not to occupy it, but he has also warned that if the Turkish Cypriots' security is 
threatened, the government will not hesitate to take "the necessary effective 
measures." These "measures" would include a "limited" military action in areas 



103 

outside Turkish control, without holding them under Turkish occupation, or air 
attacks against given targets, according to military sources here. 

Such new action might turn friendly nations and world public opinion against 
Turkey, and Turkish leaders seem aware of this. Mr. Ecevit is known to want to 
maintain a friendly dialogue with the U.S. in particular and with other Western 
and nonaUgned countries in general. Indeed U.S. -Turkish relations, strained over 
the Turkish decision to lift the ban on cultivation of the opium poppy, have 
considerably improved in recent weeks. 

Turkish public opinion seems satisfied with the U.S. stand on Cyprus. Even 
the leftists are talking about the existence of "two kinds of Americans — the ugly 
and the handsome Americans" — and list Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger 
at the head of the latter. 

Mr. Ecevit said that if Greece's withdrawal from NATO's militar.y setup would 
cause a void in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turke_y could play a larger part to 
fill it. This would not necessarily mean to grant the U.S. or NATO new military 
bases but to give the Turkish armed forces a greater role in the defense of this 
region, in close cooperation with other NATO forces. 

Turkish relations with the Soviet Union do not appear to have suffered as a 
result of the crisis, despite Moscow's limited overtures to Athens. The Turkish 
Government has sought to reassure Moscow that the Turkish military action is 
not intended to end Cyprus's independence — which seems to be the Soviets' 
main concern. The Soviet note suggesting an international conference was handled 
with utmost care, and the Turkish reply, although it rejected the proposal, was 
written in a friendly st3'le. 

[From Baltimore Sun, Aug. 17, 1974] 

2- Way Autonomy Sought on Cyprus 

Ankara (AP) — Premier Bulent Ecevit of Turkey said yesterdaj^ that Turkey s 
victories on Cyprus "laid the foundation for a federated Cj^prus state with two 
separate autonomous regions, one for the Greek Cypriot majority and one for 
the Turkish minority." 

Mr. Ecevit indicated at a news conference that Turkey would be inflexible in 
its demand for Turkish autonomy in at least one-third of the island, a demand 
supported by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. 

Mr. Ecevit said he would be willing to return to the Cyprus peace talks at 
Geneva, which broke down Tuesday night, "as soon as possible." He also said 
he would be willing to meet with the Greek prime minister, Constantine G. 
Caramanlis, at a place and time chosen by the Greek leader. 

"given up our empire" 

When asked whether Turkey would be willing to give up anj' of the land 
captured by Turkish troops on the island, Mr. Ecevit answered: "This can be 
discussed later. I cannot say aiij'thing now." 

"We do not have irredentist ambitions," the premier said. "We could have taken 
the whole island. But we have giv^en up our empire for good." 

He was referring to the Ottoman Empire which collapsed after World War I. 
It held Cyprus from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century. 

But Mr. Ecevit said Turkey would not give up the eastern port of Famagusta, 
where Turks have been Uving in the enclosed old city ever since the island became 
a British crown colony in 1925. 

"We had no outlet to the sea before. We had no port facilities," he said. 

The inaccessibility to ports has been the Turkish minority's most persistent 
complaint. Turkish troops now also control the small port of Kj^renia on the 
northern coast. 

Mr. Denktash said possibly as many as a fourth of Cyprus's 120,000 Turkish 
residents are outside the zone now controlled by Turkish troops. There are 520,000 
Greek Cypriots on the island. 

"now feel secure" 

But Mr. Ecevit said]Turkey was not contemplating a third military advance to 
the south. ^■■ 

"Why should we resort to force? We now feel secure in Cyprus," he said. 



104 

He ruled out a new outbreak of fighting even if possible third-round negotiations 
in Geneva failed to produce results. 

Mr. Ecevit did not elaborate on a federal state. But he said Turlcey did not in- 
tend to enforce a population displacement by moving thousands of Turkish 
Cjrpriots north and Greek Cypriots south. 

The Greeks can stay in Turkish areas and the Turks in Greek areas, he said. 
"One will be the guarantee of tlae other." 

But Mr. Denktash said of Turlcs living in the south that they "have no choice 
but to move." 



[From the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 14, 1974] 
Turks Defied Red Cross 
(By Martin Walker) 

What is potentially the most important single document concerning the bloody 
and tragic events in Cyprus is now languishing, unpublished, in the plush head- 
quarters of the International Red Cross in Geneva. 

According to sources within the IRC, the Turkish Government officially wrote 
to the Red Cross, renouncing the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war shortly 
before the great attack on Famagusta on August 15. The Turkish Government 
stated explicitly that in its view, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the 
actions and behaviour of its troops in the island. 

The Greek Information Ministry, to which this story has also been leaked via 
Geneva, is now preparing a major propaganda campaign on this issue. Its theme 
will be that the Turldsh Government was effectively giving its troops a free hand 
in their conduct towards civilians on the island, and by implication, that this 
Turkish action was responsible for many of the atrocities and much of the misery 
that have ravaged the miserable isle. 

On July 21, the day after the Turkish invasion of Cj^prus, the International Red 
Cross wrote to the Turkish Government reminding the Turks that they were 
signatories to the Geneva Conventions, and that, moreover, standing committees 
of the IRC had been at work extending and elaborating the Protocols (in particular, 
the Protocols under Article 3 of the Convention, which applies primarily to the 
behaviour of armed forces towards civiUans). These extended Protocols, the IRC 
wrote, were to be noted and applied by Turkish forces. 

The Turkish reply to the IRC said that the Turks did not recognise that the 
Geneva Conventions appUed to Cyprus. In Turkey's view the miUtary operations 
on Cyprus were an internal affair, and essentially a peace-keeping operation. The 
writ of Geneva did not run. Fortj' per cent of the population of Cj^prus, who are 
now refugees, may choose to differ from this ingenious line. 

The IRC has traditionally not released correspondence of this kind, and has 
only released reports of its own investigations in special circumstances. It holds 
that the credibility and good standing of the IRC depends upon its maintaining a 
discreet and official relationship with all governments, in which the findings and 
views of the IRC are made known on a confidential basis. 

The best known case of the IRC going pubUc was when the Greek Government 
of the Colonels misleadingly edited an IRC report on conditions in Greek prisons. 
The I RC then published its damning report in full, to the Colonels' embarrassment 
This precedent is now being cited by Greek diplomats as part of their attempt to 
persuade the I RC to release the Turldsh letter. 



IFrom the Baltimore Sun, Aug. 18, 19741 

War Scars Cypriot Economy 

Nicosia, Cyprus — "Everything is in an absolute shambles," Stellies Garanis, 
chairman of the Cyprus Employers Federation, said. 

He was describing the state of the island's economy and the efifect on the life of 
this eastern Mediterranean island, a tourist paradise with a high standard of living 
only five weeks ago. 

"We haven't even got a rough estimate of the total damage yet, but it must be in 
the hundreds of miUions of dollars," said the minister of finance, Caundreas Pat- 
salides. 



105 

"We are faced with an immense task of reconstruction that is Hkely to take 
years to accomphsh." he added. "But first of all we have the most urgent basically 
humanitarian problem of taking care of tens of thousands of refugees — more than 
a fifth of the total population. We have tried to feed them, house them, provide 
jobs for them, restore their dignity." 

Nor could officials provide an estimate of the casualties since the Turkish Army 
invaded the island Juh^ 20. 

"Hundreds, thousands who knows?" asked a health ministry official. "We 
haven't had time to count them. The fighting only ended yesterday. Hundreds of 
people are missing, and we don't know what is going on in the area occupied by the 
Turks." 

The urgency of the task facing the government was underlined yesterday by the 
first decision of the government of President Glafcos Clerides after the cease-fire 
went into effect. 

A special broadcast on Cyprus radio decreed that henceforth everyone on the 
island — civil servants, shopkeepers and workers — must work seven full days a 
week. 

Estimates of losses and reconstruction needs are further complicated by the 
uncertainties of the political situation in the aftermath of the war. 

The Turkish Army controls 34 percent of the 3,752 square mile island, but the 
Turkish area incorporates installation and resources amounting to four-fifths of 
the economy, according to George Eliadis, director general of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. 

Most of the island's wheat granary in the Mesaoria plain and the orchards and 
citrus plantations around Morphou — representing a Gi'eek Cypriot investment of 
millions of dollars whose export in money terms amounts to one-fifth of the 
island — are all within the Turkish occupied area. 

Much of the southern part of the island, the part left to the Greeks, used to be 
lush mountainpine forests. But even the potential exploitation of this timber 
wealth has been wrecked by the war. As much as 90 percent of the forests, with 
an estimated value of $600 million, was burned to cinders in the Turkish bombing 
raids, the director of the Cyprus Forestry Department said. 

Two-thirds of the island's hotels — overwhelmingly Greek-owned and most of them 
luxury buildings erected in the economic boom of the jpcbst five years — also he in the 
Turkish belt. 

The Turkish government already has stated that the Greek Cypriots who fled 
the occupied area would be welcome to return to their homes and businesses. 

But many Greeks are unwilling, through fear or political considerations, to 
live under a Turkish administration. 

Many of the Turks in the Greek part of the island would like to move to the 
far more prosperous sector overrun by the invasion forces. 

The desire of the Turkish community in the south to move north is evident at 
Larnaca, a quietly old-fashioned seaport south of Nicosia. Early last week Greek 
national guardsmen pulled out of the Turkish part of Larnaca, leaving the United 
Nations peace-keeping force in control. 

Reporters who visited the Turkish quarter were told emphatically by Turkish 
political leaders that they wanted to move out lock, stock and barrel. 

"We are happy to see the Greeks leave, but we are still not secure. We never will 
be until we are protected by the Turkish Army," Dr. Halouk Aini, a Turkish 
member of the Cyprus Parliament, said. 



[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 15, 1974] 

Cyprus Losing $5.2 Million a Day 

(By G. Jefferson Price III) 

Nicosia, Cyprus. — These are depressing and frustrating days for Andreas 
Patsalides, the Greek Cypriot finance minister who has been among the leading 
architects of the economic boom this island was enjoying until two months ago. 

Each day the Harvard-educated economist mulls over the wounds to the island's 
economy, not certain how widespread the damage has been, but calculating that 
there will continue to be a loss of about $5.2 miUion a day, and anticipating that 
in the event of a political settlement it will take a lot of foreign aid to bring the 
once-independent economy back to life. 

41-207—74 8 



106 

Not far from Mr. Patsalides's office, across the "Green Line" that separates the 
Greek and Turkish communities, there has been a steady flow of visitors from 
Ankara, high-ranking Turkish officials surveying the territory they have taken 
since invading the island July 20, and planning to put industry and agriculture 
back into operation. 

The Greek Cypriots scoff at the idea of the Turks being able to establish a 
viable economy on their part of the island Avithout help from the Greek community. 

The Turks insist they can go it alone with the help of mainland Turkey and are 
already in the process of planning for factories, businesses and hotels and to cul- 
tivate the farmlands now under their control. 

The Turks are now in control of 40 per cent of the island, but that area is esti- 
mated to produce between 75 and 80 per cent of the island's economic output. 
With the July invasion and the additional gains of the push in August, the Turks 
new control two ports: Famagusta and Kj-i-enia; practically all of the island's 
tourist industry; the areas where citrus is grown; and the plains where the island's 
grain crops grow, and much of the livestock is raised. 

The Greeks are left with the port of Larnaca, Limassol, with the island's 
major oil refinery, the island's electric power plant, the fruit crops of the south, 
and the vinejards of the south. The Greeks also till control all of modern Nicosia, 
the island's capital. 

Simple logic would seen to point out that one side cannot survive without the 

other, unless the Turks expect to import from the mainland the very goods and 

services that are available to them on the island itself, under Greek control. 

Thus economists on both sides agree that any political settlement for the i-^land 

wou ddo well to facihtate trade between the two sies. 

But as each day passes without a settlement, the economy deteriorates and the 
prospect of reviving it to its pre-war status seems more remote. 

The immediate physical damage of the war, by some estimates, would have been 
enough to set back the economj^ 10 years even if both sides already were co-operat- 
ing in trjdng to put it back together. 

Mr. PatsaUdes contends that the citrus crojD, worth miUions of dollars in exports, 
may have been totally lost because the war disrupted the irrigation process in 
the areas where the citrus is grown. He also saj^s that at the time the war broke 
out there were vast quantities of fruit waiting to be shipped from Famagusta, 
another source of export income possibly lost. 

About 100 square miles of pine forests were destroyed by fires during the battles 
here, and it would take "up to 50 years to restore the forests to their pre-invasion 
position." Also under Turkish control is land where about $20 million worth of 
livestock grazed, and their fate is uncertain. 

Meanwhile the tourist hotels in K5'renia and Famagusta are empty, and both 
towns are under martial law. Tourism, a boon to the island's economy in the last 
two years of drought, is out of business for the time being and it may be a long 
time before any tourist wants to return, no matter which side is running the hotels. 

Economists here were predicting a growth rate of G to 7 per cent in the island's 
gross national product this year over last year's level of about $910 million, 
but those figures have been thrown out the window now. 

So has the expectation that the average per capita income would reach more 
than $2,000 a year. Under the present circumstances with the Turks, who make 
up about 20 per cent of the population, controlling approximately 75 per cent of 
the island's productivity, the rate of unemployment and underemployment, 
usually between 1 and 2 per cent, may go as high as 10 per cent. 

[Frorn the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 15, 1974] 
Turkish Jets Sweep Low at Cyprus 

Nicosia, Cyprus (AP) — Two Turkish warplanes flew over the Greek Cypriot 
z(jne of Cyprus yesterday for the first time since the August 16 cease-fire, prompt- 
ing a government protest to the United Nations peace force. 

The Phantom jets skimmed over the capital and the Greek Cypriot city of 
Larnaca on the east coast. Independent military sources said the planes were 
unarmed. 

Presiaent Glafcos Clerides protested to the U.N. force that the flights were 
violations of the island's airspace. The Turkish command said the planes were 
"reconnoitering Turkish positions." 



107 

International efforts were reported on several fronts to end the crisis that 
followed the July 15 ouster by Greek-ofRcered national guardsmen of the Cyprus 
president, Archbishop Makarios. 

Leonid Ilichev, deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, arrived in Athens 
after talks in Ankara with Turkish leaders. Mr. Ilichev made no statement at 
the Greek airport. He heads for Nicosia tomorrow. 

In London, the Sunday Times reported that President Zultikar Ali Bhutto of 
Pakistan is leading secret international efforts to bring Greece and Turkey into 
dh-ect negotiations on the future of Cyjjrus. 

The Times said high-level exchanges already were under way with the approval 
of Britain and the United States. 

Greek Cj'priot residents of Nicosia, nervous over persistent rumors about a 
renewed Turkish offensive, again packed their belongings and headed south 
yesterday as the Turkish jets flew over. Such panic flights have occurred fre- 
quently since the Turks invaded Cyprus in July. 

A government statement Friday saying, "It is generally calm all over the 
island — the public is urged to remain calm," appeared to add t(j the tension 
instead of relieving it. 

"It has been quiet for the past 24 hours, with no unusual military movements 
reported," said the U.N. spokesman, but he added that "for days, both' sides 
have been strengthening their positions." 

Greek Cypriots have been leaving Cyprus by the hundreds since the fighting 
ended a month ago, fearful that hostilities might resume. Many lost their homes 
or jobs when the Turkish invasion force captured 41 percent of the island. 

To slow the exodus, the Clerides government has restricted exit permits. An 
announcement said permits would be given only to children and citizens over 50, 
travelers needing medical care, university students, businessmen promoting the 
ecoiiomy, and a few other categories. 

With Nicosia airport damaged by bombs and closed for the last two months, 
travelers have been jjacking 400 to 800 at a time aboard ships leaving Limassol 
for Greece, and some sailed to Lebanon. 

The Red Cross reported that recent prisoner lists showed 5,G93 POW's, detain- 
ees and hostages still held on both sides of the cease-fire line, 3,366 of them Turkish 
Cypriots and 2,327 Greek Cypriots. 

The two sides are to start exchanging sick and wounded prisoners tomorrow. 
President Clerides and Turkish Cj^priot Vice President Rauf Denktash had not 
yet accepted a Red Cross plan for exchanging all prisoners, detainees and hostages, 
the Red Cross official said. 



[From the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 31, 1974] 

Clerides — The Tightrope Act 

(By Eric Silver) 

Glafkos Clerides is plajing it long, slowly consolidating his authority over the 
Greek Cypriot community, and defusing the opposition. Last week's assassination 
of the American Ambassador in Nicosia pointed to the limits of Clerides's control. 
It did not prove him to be a man of straw. Clerides has never been anyone's stooge. 

There is no evidence that he is now. He assumed office, after the Turkish 
invasion, with the advantage of legitimacy. Under the 1960 Constitution, Cyprus 
had a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President. It specified, however, that 
if the President was absent, the Vice-President did not step into his shoes. That 
would have given too much to the Turkish minority. 

Instead the (Greek) President of the House of Representatives was to fulfill 
the duties of President. The Constituticm did not call him acting President, but 
merely said that he should do the job. Clerides was President of the House and 
duly took over. 

The transition from Nicos Sampson to Glafkos Clerides enabled fcjreign Govern- 
ments to treat with a Greek Cypriot leader other than the exiled Makarios. This 
was critical in the aftermath of defeat when the community had little but inter- 
national opinion to faU back on. 

vSampson said in his resignatif)n s]3eech that the situation required a different 
kind of leader and that Clerides had the appropriate skills. Clerides's task since 
then — one month and one more Turkish offensive later — has been to convince 
the Greek Cypriots that Sampson \\ as right, that they must trust him and follow 
him. They could not be expected to do so by instinct alone. 



108 

Although Clerides was the leader of the biggest single party in the House, the 
party itself was a loose conglomeration with no ideological or emotional care. 
Clerides had a reputation for slyness and selfseeking. He was a little too British — 
Bomber Command, Graj-s Inn, pipe-smoking — for some tastes. 

His strategy has been to let the enormity of the Greek humiliation sink in. 
Eventually there will have to be talks with the Turks but before that he wants his 
people to appreciate just how few cards they have. At the same time he is carefully 
strumming local sentiment. He visits refugee cami^s, he tells the press (to enthusi- 
astic applause from Greek Cypriot reporters) that he will not accept Turkish 
dictation "anywhere in this world or the next world." 

Nicosia newspapers of all hues appeal daily for a closing of ranks. Clerides is 
exploiting the mood. For the time being at least, he has coaxed the Church out of 
politics. The three "rebel" bishops removed by Makarios a year ago are back in 
their sees, cheek-by-jowl with the three "loyalists" who replaced tkem. Whatever 
is going on in the bishoprics, none of the bishops are fighting in public. 

The Communists are bewildered by the speed of events end the lack of guidance 

from Moscow. Dr. Vassos Lyssaredes, the exiled President's left-wing confidant, is 

. content to keep the Makarios flag flying high without actually challenging Clerides. 

The enigma, as always in this isle of furtive fantasy, is EOKA-B. Its bearded 
guerrillas are armed and organising. Almost certainly the}' killed the American 
ambassador. But hew powerful are they? Foreign diplomats here estimate that 
before the coup their full-time fighters numbered berween 500 and 1,000. Perhaps 
another 4,000 could be counted as reserves, men who would rally to the cause if 
the}' felt the moment was ripe. 

Of these, many are now neutralised by service in the National Guard (though 
there would be nothing new in Cyprus about a man fighting in two uniforms at 
the same time). 

It was EOKA-B, the heir of George Grivas, which precipitated the crisis. The 
archbishop discovered that the movement was directed by Greek officers, posted to 
command the National Guard. He demanded their withdrawal, and the sequence 
of the past seven weeks followed with the inevitability of a classical tragedy. No 
one can be sure how much of an appeal EOKA's death-or-glory ideas make at this 
stage, though I suspect the Clerides style of reahsm is percolating through. 

But the most significant change is that EOKA-B no longer enjoys even the tacit 
support of Athens. The Karamanlis Government is working in tandem with the 
Cj'priot leadership, not against it. A new commander has been appointed by 
Athens to the National Guard, a new Greek Ambassador has presented his creden.- 
tials. Both are men trusted by the democratic regime. 

The National Guard still has some of the mainland Greek officers who stage- 
managed the coup, but their influence is being eroded. Clerides in turn is fostering 
the Athenian connection. His attitude towards the Turks has tended to be slightly 
more flexible than that of Karamanlis and Marvos, the Greek Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister. 

He has not insisted on a return to specific positions on the ground. But Clerides 
had never strayed from under their umbrella. Like them, the Cypriot leader treads 
delicately. The forces that brought them to power — in Athens as in Nicosia — 
could just as quickly push them off again. 



2. ASSESSMENT OF THE MAKARIOS YEARS 

J[From the Economist (London) , July 20, 1974] 

Cyprus — The Makarios Years 
(By Ken MacKenzie) 

A ST.^TE, BtJT NOT A NATION 

Cvuru^ has been the victim of geography for 3,000 years— and history has always 
lent i hurt ul hand, too. This predominantly Greek island is only 50-odd miles 
f?om the Turkish mainland, but it is 600 miles from Athens. It may look only a 
sueck on the map, l^ut contemporary geopolitical factors give it a strategic signifi- 
cance mt of al/ proportion ti its size. Arguably, no country so minuscule has 
nr Wded the word's press with more headUnes, usually a arming ones, over the 
past 20 vears Privately, the Cypriots, spontaneous, volatile, theatrical, have 
rather enjoyed it — up to now. 



109 

At the outset it is important to understand what Cyprus is not. It is a state, but 
not a nation. Indeed, to talk about the Cypriots generically is ahnost misleading. 
The population is made up of some 520,000 Cypriot Greeks, and some 120,000- 
Cypriot Greeks, and some 120,000 Cj^priot Turks (plus a few thousand Armenians 
and British). After 14 years as a sovereign, independent state, Cyprus still does- 
not have a national anthem; and the pallid Cyprus flag is significantly absent on 
occasions of national fervour. It is the blue and white colours of Greece or the 
blazing crimson of Turkey that dominante political gatherings. 

In 1960 the hope was that the two communities would live in partnership, 
and that the hybrid state, hatched at the Zurich and London conferences of the 
previous year, would form a bond of friendship, rather than an apple of discord, 
between Athens and Ankara. This illusion was brutally shattered during Christmas 
week, 1963, when savage fighting in Nicosia between Greek and Turkish armed 
bands turned the tourist islant of Aphrodite into a cauldron of hatred. (The 
Greek Cypriots, as the Turks are always eager to point out, were much the more 
heavily armed and better prepared, and the Turks inevitably were battered — 
but not subjugated.) After a great international flurry, a United Nations peace- 
keeping forc( was rushed to the scene, with a mandate for three months. Today, 
over 10 years later, it is still there, and looks like being there permanently. 

There are, in fact, now six different armies (or armed contingents) on the 
island, M'hich for a place much less than half the size of Wales seems a dispropor- 
tionate concentration of military manpower: the Greek Cypriot National Guard, 
the Turkish Cypriot Fighting Force, the official Greek (mainland) contingent, a 
corresponding Turkish contingent, the British garrison at the sovereign bases 
and the UN force. And, for good measure, there are sill one or two private 
armies (very small in size but potentially dangerous politically), plus the para- 
military Police Tactical Reserve, which was the strong arm of President 
Makarios's government. The wry comment that every Cypriot regards a gun 
rather as an Englishman regards his umbrella is as valid as ever. 

Nevertheless, the island, believe it or not, has been an oddly happy place. If 
that claim seems the ultimate in irrationality, it is another way of saying that 
any student of politics who is attracted by the paradoxical will find Cyprus a 
subject of inexhaustible fascination. A country where the head of the church has 
also been the head of state — and in tactical alliance with the communists — plainly 
does not conform to accepted political norms. 

Yet for a small third-world state Cyprus can boast able administrators (one of 
the better by-products of British colonial rule) and a plethora of talent in the 
commercial field. Its citizens may be volatile, but — as thousands of toursits can 
testify — its hosi^italitj- is overwhelming. If it sorted itself out politically, it could 
go places. Alas, this is a big "if". Perhaps, in time, a sense of Cypriot nationhood 
will emerge; but many sound judges are sceptical about that. Meanwhile, the 
prevalent idea is that, despite the bloody events of the past few days, the island 
should remain an independent, sovereign state — enjoying and exploitiing its 300 
da}rs of sunshine evf ry year. This is one tourist brochure claim that cannot be 
falsified. 

ANOTHER KIND OF MARATHON 

During his brief visit to Nicosia in May for talks with Mr. Gromyko, his Soviet 
opposite number, Mr. Henry Kissinger is said to have told local journalists that, 
although we had been quite prei)ared to take on Vietnam and the Middle East, 
he would never tackle the Cyprus question. (The Cypriots took this as a compli- 
ment.) He was doubtless l)eing facetious; but clearly if there were a solution to the 
Cyprus problem somebody would have thought of it long ago. Negotiations to 
work out a definitive settlement have been going on in Nicosia, the '"intercom- 
munal talks". The troul)le is that they began six years ago (which must almost 
qualify them for the "Guiness Book of Records"), and are no nearer success 
today than they were in 1971 or 1972. Nevertheless, as always, jaw-jaw is better 
than war-war. 

This week, the basic problem — the atavistic antagonism between the Greeks as 
a whole and the Turks — has been overshadowed by the coup in the Presidential 
Palace; but, though the eyes of the world are focused on the vendetta within the 
Greek community, the reaction of the Turks in the coming days could conceivablj^ 
determine the island's fate. For a long time. President Makarios regarded Turkish 
opposition as an "artificial" factor, created bj^ the British in a spirit of divide-and- 
rule. Latterly, he began to revise his ideas; but he has also been responsible for 
much intercommunal distrust which, historicallj^, tarnishes his claim to statesman- 
ship in other fields. 



no 

Understandabh^, the Turks make great play with the fact that, as they are ont- 
numl^ered by four to one, they are physically at the mercy of the Greeks. Four to 
one is a tricky and, indeed, ci-ucial ratio ; if the Turks numbered about 35 percent 
of the population, they would have a strong case for being treated as an equal and 
separate community. If they totalled only about 10 percent they would have no 
'ciaim to anything more than the ordinary minority rights. Eighteen percent, the 
actual percentage, is in between; and what matters, anyway, the Turks say, is 
the essential separateness of their cultural and religious traditions. They insist 
that they constitute a separate community; but in the equally adamant Greek 
view they are merely a minority. United Nations officials have suggested that 
the Turks should be described as a "minority community"; but this semantic 
'Compromise does not appeal to either side. Semantics, it needs hardly to be added, 
is always of paramount importance in Cyprus politics. 

At the root of the Turks' craving for separatism is a deep-seated fear that, if they 
become a mere minority within a unitary state, they will be treated as second-class 
citizens. For tactical reasons, they have made great propaganda out i)f the cxecsses 
perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot armed bands during the onslaught of Decem- 
ber, 1963. Yet basically it is the Greek assimiption of moral and cultural superi- 
ority as much as the fear of physical persecution that sustains the Turkish Cypriots' 
determination to go their own way. This is what raises the hackles of the educated 
Turkish leaders, who regard themselves as the peers of their former Greek col- 
leagues. For their i^art, the Greeks argue that they are indisputably the more 
dynamic people and that their ancestors ran the island centuries before the Turks 
ever set foot in it. (And the Greeks produce al)Out 90 percent of the wealth.) 

In terms of the island's political configuration, the net result todaj' is a bizarre 
ethnic montage, which cries out for rationalisation on social and econom.ic grounds. 
Nicosia is almost as divided a capital as Berlin. During the last few years the Turks 
have begun to cross the artificial frontier that runs through the city- — the so- 
caUed "Green Line" — for business purposes or for shopjjing, and hundreds of them 
used to go daily to work in the Greek part of Nicosia; but the Greeks are still not 
allowed into the Turkish zone. The 17-mile road from Nicosia to Kyrenia, the 
island's most picturesque holiday resort, is under tight Turkish Cypriot control, 
the Greeks being permitted to use it only under the ])rotection of a United Nations 
convoy. In the other main towns, notably Limassol and Famagusta, the sense of 
division is less pronounced, but by and large there is little intermingling of the two 
communities. In the north-west, around the town of Lefka and the hamlets of 
Kokkina and Mansoura, the Turks are jjenned into tightly controlled (and eco- 
nomically straitened) enclaves, which, of course, no Cireek dares enter. On the 
outskirts of Nicosia there is a Turkish refugee centre, by now something of a tow n- 
ship, wiiich provides tolerable living conditions for 10,000 of the people who were 
driven from their homes in the fighting of 1963-64. 

Over the last few years, President Makarios offered occasional inducements to 
the refugees to resettle in their former homes, but on the whole his policy was to 
leave the Turks to stew in their own juice. He clearly believed that time was on 
his side, and that Turkish resistance would crumljle under the pressure of economic 
hardship. But there is very little sign of this at the moment; and the Turkish govern- 
ment seems prepared to go on subsidising the Turkish Cypriots, to the tune 
of £12m a year, rather than let them come under Greek Cypriot rule. It is 
arguable that, with every passing day, the de facto partition of the island simply 
hardens. 

Can these conflicts and contradictions yet be resolved w-ithin the framework of 
a new constitution? The marathon intercommunal talks have been conducted by 
two able and likeable men who have known each other for years and who, on the 
face of it, ought to be able to do a deal with each other: on the Greek side, Mr. 
Glafkos Clerides (who as speaker of the House of Representatives was President 
Makarios's deputy), and on the Turkish side Mr. Rauf Denktash, who is both 
the leader of his community and the vice-president of Cyprus in accordance with 
the 1960 constitution (wliich is theoretically still operative). They have the 
assistance of two constitutional advisers from Greece and Turkey, and the special 
UN representative on the island is always at hand to provide his good offices. 

It was— and is — argued that if Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash was left to 
themselves, they would hammer out a settlement. Unfortunately, nothing in 
Cyprus is as simple as that. Today, Mr. Denktash is more adamant than ever 
that the Turkish Cypriots must have the maximum degree of separatism; and 
his attitude has been supported by the new Turkish government. To the surprise 
of many observers, Mr. Ecevit, who became prime minister in Ankara in January 



HI 

of this year, promptly came out in favour of "federation" as the liest sohition for 
C.vprus. This marked a reversion to the Turkish attitude of the mid-1960s. 

"Semantics are at large again. To the Greek Cypriots, the word "federation" 
is anathema, for rightly or wrongly they equate it with partition and with the 
concomitant spectre of Turkish mainland troops and officials installing themselves 
on Cypriot soil. Over this issue President Makario.'s came close this April to 
breaking off the negotiations once and for all. After a minor international contre- 
temps, the talks were resumed in June, but in an unpropitious atmosphere. The 
atmosphere is worse now. 

Of course, Mr. Clcrides and Mr. Denktash could harldy have been talking 
away for six years without accomjilishing something. By late 1971, or there- 
about, the outline of a compromise had emerged. For example, the Turks agreed 
to relinquish the special veto rights (in defence and budgetary matters) that 
had been accorded them in the 1960 constitution; and broad agreement was 
reached on the composition of the new legislature (60 Greeks and 15 Turks, 
in accordance with the population ratio) and about the powers and functions 
of the executive and judiciary. But as the quid pro quo for relinquishing their 
veto rights at the top, the Turks wanted broader powers at the bottom, so to 
speak; hence their emphasis on regional autonomy, dressed up in the formula 
of "functional federation". (In plain language, this means separate Turkish 
street-sweepers and separate Turkish policemen.) The Greeks will have none 
of this; to all of them, it is inconsistent with the concept of a unitarj^ state, on 
which they insist. If a new regime in Nicosia can resolve this dilemma, the world 
will be in its debt. But it is hard to see in the new circumstances anyone reaching a 
compromise with the Turkish leaders. 

Even before this week's events, two dangers loomed. The first was that the 
talks would break down for good. Many western diplomats in Nicosia regarded 
the whole operation as a charade, and wondered how long it could be kept going; 
fortunately, neither side wanted to incur the odium of causing a final rupture. If 
the talks do finally end in failure, the more chauvinistic elements in the Greek 
camp would almost certainly clamour for a domestic economic blockade of the 
Turkish community (the Greeks imposed such a blockade during 1964) ; and that 
could mean the start of further trouble. 

The second danger is more subtle, and more distant. If the present crisis should 
be resolved, the talks might yet be successful — but the end-product might be a 
constitution which, although meticulously fair on paper to both sides, would be 
so complicated as to be unworkable. Indeed, the amount of horsetrading which has 
already taken place over legnl and constitutional minutiae is mind-boggling. The 
1960 settlement produced a Frankenstein monster of a constitution which was 
patently unfair to the Greeks; the new constitution, if it ever is completed, will 
not make that mistake, but it could be of equally intolerable complexity. Even 
without the events of the past week, the experience of having to operate a second 
unworkable constitution would probably make most Cypriots despair of the whole 
concept of independence. 

All this, however, is negative speculation. Conceivably, in Cyprus's peculiar 
fashion, the talks will be resumed and drag on, and on. But the recent comment 
of a senior UN official is apposite: "I can't see a settlement, because I don't 
think that either community wants one at the present moment." In other words, 
each side believes that time is on its side. And, after Monday's dramatic upset, 
further speculation about the talks seems academic now. 

INSOUCIANCE WAS NOT ENOUGH 

If Archbishop Makarios was reluctant to put his signature to another Cyprus 
settlement that rules out enosis, there were good psychological reasons for his 
hesitation. The signing of the Zurich and London agreements in February, 1959, 
was a traumatic experience for him. For the previous four years the Eoka guerrilla 
movement, inspired by Colonel (as he then was) Grivas, had fought for the ideal 
of enosis; this is what the bombs and bullets in Ledra Street were all about. At 
the twelfth hour, the archbishop, in Grivas's view, signed the Hellenic birthright 
awajr for a bowl of insipid pottage called independence. The fact that he did so 
under duress (mainly from the Greek government, although the British did their 
bit of armtwisting) did not mitigate his apostasy in the ej'es of Grivas and his 
fanatical followers. By July, 1959, Grivas was denouncing the archbishop as a 
traitor, and a new chapter in the Cyprus saga had begun. 



112 

To give him credit, Makarios faced the continuing threat from Eoka B (the 
new version of Eoka formed by Grivas on his return to the island in 1971) with 
apparent insouciance, fortified by pride in his remarkable capacity for survival 
over 20 years. Since 1960, Greece (the supposedly stable parent power which 
under the 1960 settlement was empowered to keep a wary eye on the rumbustious 
Cypriots) has suffered two military coui:)s and one abortive counter-coup; and 
Turkey (similarly empowered under the Zurich agreement) has had one full coup 
and the so-called mini-coup of 1971. Up to this week, Cyprus had had many 
alarms, but parliamentary government was preserved — though there is no short- 
age of cynics who wiU teU you that it was all a facade. The archbishop himself 
had a narrow squeak in March, 1970, when the helicopter in which he was travel- 
hng was shot down a few moments after taking off from Nicosia; he emerged 
shaken but unhurt. After that, he greatly strengthened his personal bodyguard, 
composed of his most trusted followers; but — apart from aquiring a healthy dis- 
trust of helicopters — he displayed remarkable confidence in his own inviolability, 
and in his capacitj' to outmanoeuvre his enemies: too much confidence, perhaps. 

It is facinating to speculate on what he might have become had he not entered 
the priesthood at an early age — conceivably, a smooth, London-educated lawyer, 
with a penchant for esoteric litigation. What is incontestable is that his position 
as head of the Church gave him his political base. As plain Michael Mouskos (his 
real name) Makarios would have started off as just one more politician (though 
a very skillful one). 

At the same time, the support of the mass of the God-fearing peasantry has 
proved a diminishing asset, for the gradual emeroence of anti-clerical feeling has 
been a significant jjolitical phenomenon in Cyprus in the past few years. Indeed, 
criticism of the chiu'ch's involvement in the affairs of this world is now openly 
expressed Ijy many pro-Makarios partisans. To outside observers it is astonish- 
ing that, under the 1960 consitution, the church is wholly exempt from paying 
tax. How much of the island the church actually owns is hard to assess, but 
monuments to its affluence exist, for example, in at least three of Cyprus's luxury 
hotels. The archbishop did not help matters by his recent acquisition of 13 acres 
of land in the Seychelles, a transaction which has become a major cause celehre 
in coffeeshop politics. (Asked whj' he chose of all places the Seychelles — to which 
he was deported bj^ the British in 1956 — he replied: "For sentimental reasons.") 
The archbishop has always had his sense of humour. What kind of leadership will 
emerge in the coming weeks is a baffling conundrum. The flamboj'ant Mr. Nicos 
Sampson was nominated president on Monday, but he is a maverick, Mr. Clerides, 
Makarios's heir apparent, is an able and perceptive man, admirably equipped to 
take on the burdens of the presidency if it were ever offered to him. (His record 
includes distinguished wartime service in the Roj-al Air Force.) But, like many 
able and perceptive men, he lacks a broad political power base; and the Unified 
party, which he leads, must be about the most inappropriately named organisa- 
tion in contemporarj' politics. It is certainly not unified and it is doubtful whether 
it is a party; rather it is a loose coalition, or front, of diverse centre or right-of- 
centre factions. It came out on top at the last general election in 1970, although 
it won only 1.5 out of the 35 Greek seats in the House of Representatives. 

After Mr. Clerides, the most prominent figure in the Unified party is Mr. Tassos 
Papadopotilos, a brilliant lawyer who proved a highly callable minister of labour 
when still in his twenties. His ambitions are a subject of much speculation; bj^ 
and large, he has contrived to keep in step with Makarios's policies during the 
vicissitudes of the past few years. A score of other names might be mentioned as 
possible future presidents, if democratic government is reestablished, not least 
that of Mr. Nicos Dimitriou, the able ambassador in Washington. Btit at the 
moment everything is in the melting pot. Cj'prus may be undergoing a revolution 
of historic proportions. To many perceptive people, Makarios's position as head of 
church and head of state was becoming an anachronism. 

POLITICS OF POLARISATION 

How strong is Eoka B? This is the teaser which men of the intelligence services — 
who seem to be deployed in droves all over the island — find unanswerable. Until 
recently, the accepted theory was that, after Grivas's death in January of this year, 
Eoka B lost its inspiration and its momentum; and, in the early spring, the arch- 
bishop seemed serenely confident that he was the master of the island's destinies. 
B.v early July, he had changed his tune; Eoka had fallen under the control of 
Greek officers, and the threat to the president was greater than ever. But he 



113 

continued to believe that, somehow, he could outmanoeuvre his enemies. Ironi- 
cally, if Grivas were alive today, Makarios would probabl}^ be more happily 
placed than he is now. 

At the same time, Grivas himself remains a living legend. It is hard to imagine 
a man with a Chaplinesque gait and a Groucho Marx moustache possessing 
charisma, but Grivas had it in abundance; the thousands who make the pil- 
grimage to his grave in Limassol testify to it still. Moreover, he was imbued with 
a sense of messianic mission — to unite C.yprus with Greece — and he instilled 
into his followers an almost religious devotion to the concept of enosis. 

That there was some effective central direction of Eoka after Grivas's death 
seemed apparent to all perceptive observers. Without such control, the local 
Eoka warlords would certainly have unleashed a wave of impromptu attacks 
on government targets; in fact, during the past few months Eoka has been a reason- 
ably disciplined force. It may have had only 50-70 "paid-up" guerrillas in the 
mountains, as Makarios claimed, but it almost certainly had armed cells in 
all the main towns and man}' of the villages. In an undergrovmd movement 
of this kind, numbers are not necessarily very important. The archbishop certainly 
had the support of the great majority of his compatriots, but this was offset by 
the intensity of the hatred which his enemies bore him. And by repeatedly plaj^- 
ing down Eoka as a minuscule, fanatical movement — a line which he unfailingly 
sold to visiting correspondents — the archibishop onl,y enraged his enemies further. 

Yet, until the coup on Monday the archbishop for several years displayed 
remarkable skills in holding the disparate Greek Cypriot factions tobether, and 
in maintaining Cyprus's status as an independent sovereign state. For a country 
of its size, it played a relatively significant role in the affairs of the third world 
and of the Commonwealth. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the archbishop aspired to 
play a role on a larger stage — but the outbreak of the intercommunal fighting in 
1963 killed these ambitions; he could hardly tell other nations how to conduct their 
affairs when his own country was in such disorder. During the past few years, he 
traveled extensively in Europe, Africa and Asia, solely with an eye to enlisting 
support for the Greek Cypriot case at the United Nations and elsewhere. His 
latest trip was to China in May of this year, to "balance out" his visit to Russia 
in 1971. Only last week he announced his intention to visit five of the east European 
countries. (This move probably contributed to the upheaval, for to the Athens 
junta it was intolerable that he should be currying favour with communist 
countries and simultaneously demanding the expulsion from Cyprus of Greek 
officers.) His enemies cannot gainsay that as leader of his country he had a 
presence — and for a small third-world state that was no smaU asset. 

There was another remarkable achievement of the Makarios years. Despite the 
bitterness of the 1950s, relations between the Cyprus government and the British 
were remarkal^ly harmonious. After being Britain's enemy, he became Britain's 
friend. 

His biggest diplomatic failure — though nobody saw it in these terms at the 
time — was to fall foul of a coterie of Greek officers who served in Cyprus in the 
1960s. One of these was a relatively unimportant captain, called loannidis; he is 
now Brigadier loannidis, the strong man of the Greek junta, and the jserson who 
probably gave the signal for the attack on Makarios. 

Under constant pressure from the right, the archbishop, not surprisingly, 
turned to the left. There are few more law-abiding communist parties in the 
world than the Akel party of Cyprus. (Akel is an acronym for the Greek words 
meaning "Progressive Party of the Working People".) Indeed, it is the only 
significant political group in the island which has never resorted to violence. But 
there were signs that the left was anxious to infiltrate the controversial Police 
Tactical Reserve units, the paramilitarj' ogranisation which President Makarios 
built up as a counterforce to the National Guard. The strong-arm methods of the 
PTR were an ominous portent; there is little doubt that it resorted to torture in its 
grilling of Eoka suspects. 

In the 1970 election to the House of Representatives, Akel, for tactical reasons, 
put up only nine candidates for the 35 available seats; all nine were easily elected. 
If it had put up 15, probablj' all 15 would have been successful. As it was, the 
•communists' share of the total poll came to over 40 percent. Yet the total paid-up 
membership of the Akel party is only around 12,000. The secret of its success lies 
in its cohesion and superior organisation. 

At the moment, the communists are both stunned and enraged by this week's 
•events. They would get short shrift from a new regime. More than any other 
political group, Akel wants the intercommunal talks to succeed, for this would 



114 

keep Cyprus an independent, non-aligned republic, outside the orbit of Nato. 
At the same time, the communists are careful never to on record as opposing enosis 
in principle; when they adopted an anti-enosis posture in the late 1940s they lost 
ground to the Nationalists, and they are not going to make the same mistake again. 

The communists' greatest source of strength lies in the trade unions. They 
wholly control the main workers' movement, the Pan-Cyprian Federation of 
Labour (PEO), which has over 40,000 members (though not all are paid-up). 
Its secretary, Mr Andreas Zhiartides, is respected throughout the island, and 
indeed internationally, for his moderation and skill as a negotiator. Paradoxically, 
it is the right-wing, pro-enosis workers' organisation, the SEK, that has set the 
pace in labour militancy, primarily with the objective of harassing the Makarios 
government. Its membership has increased remarkably in the last few years, and 
and it has the services of some dedicated men, but it still lags behind the PEO in 
the techniques of labour-management relations. 

Behind all these complexities and contradictions, there is a fundamental trend 
toward polarisation in Greek Cypriot politics. Inevitably, the enosis-versus- 
independence argument is crystallising into a right-versus-left conflict, on con- 
ventional European lines, the right being spearheaded by the National Council 
and Eoka and the left by Akel. There is an element of oversimplification in this 
theory, but it as a basic validity. The joker in the pack has been Makarios him- 
self. During the past two years, with the Greek officers breathing down his neck, 
he became more and more beholden to the left. The communists, after all, were 
amongst his most vociferous supporters when Eoka B first posed its challenge in 
1972. Some of his closest counsellors were men of pronouncedly left-wing views, 
without being members of Akel. The most notable was Dr Vassos Lyssarides, the 
archbishop's personal physician. Basically, however. President Makarios never 
wanted Cyprus to go communist ; during his presidency, his aim always was to play 
one faction off against the other, walking the tightrope and riding the tiger at the 
same time. 

THOSE DIFFERENT HISTORY BOOKS 

Cyprus not merely has no national anthem, it has no universitj'. It is an ex- 
traordinary lacuna for a country whose inhabitants, in cultural terms, can claim 
to be superior to much of the third world. Bright young Greeks flock to Athens 
or London — mainly the Inns of Court — for higher education; the Turks to Ankara 
and Istanbul (and London, too). Despite the bitterness of the late 1950s, the 
Cypriots still look to Britain as a shrine of cultural values. (In fact, because of the 
authoritarian nature of the present regime in Athens, an increasing number of 
Greek Cypriots want to study at British universities.) 

There has been speculative talk about founding a national university in the 
island, through the possible help of one or two benefactors, but it is hard to see 
this happening in the foreseeable future. And what kind of university would it be? 
An institution where Greek and Turk youths mixed freely together, absorbing each 
other's values, could contribute enormously to the growth of a sense of "natif;n- 
hood". But, by the nature of things, it would be dominated by the Greeks, and 
would accentuate the ethnic division within the island. 

In many ways the present system of school education is harmful ]3olitically. 
Through latitude or folly, British colonial administrators permitted the educatic>nal 
structure to be almost a carbon copy of that in Athens, with the result that gen- 
erations of schoolchildren have absorbed Hellenic values; to them the central 
date in history is 1821 — the start of the Greek War of Independence. Many of 
the teachers come from Athens, or have been educated there. Schoolchildren 
played an extraordinarily militant role in the first Eoka rebellion, as tension- 
raisers, and General Grivas used them astutely. Today, teachers and pupils are 
usually in the van of pro-enosis demonstrations and at the end of June President 
Makarios had to dismiss 62 primary school teachers who were noted for their right- 
wing views. In slightly less pronounced fashion, the Turks' schools follow the 
educational guidelines of Ankara and Istanbul; and because of the rigid separation 
impused by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot Administration, a generation of 
Turkish youth is emerging which has never had any contact with the Greeks. 
Education in itself rarely solves political problems ; but until the scholastic system 
in each community sheds its nationalist overtones — and this applies particularly 
to the teaching of history — the concept of Cypriot nationhood will remain a 
distant dream. 



115 

OIL AND WATER 

Some people may argue that the convulsions of the past week are based on 
a political illusion; and that Cyprus's real fate will be determined by the tidal 
wave of inflation, now engulfing the world. The Cypriots — and more particularly 
the Greek Cypriots — are beginning to feel the pinch, like everybody else. Inflation 
is currently running at a rate uf 14 or 15 per cent a year. Some jjessimists forecast 
that before long it will be about 20 per cent — which, one is told, is the level at 
which democracy becomes inoperable — but these prophecies are i:)robably too 
alarmist. Through the medium of the central bank, the government in March im- 
posed severe restrictions on borrov.ing; and for many local entrepreneurs it is a 
distasteful experience to be refused easy credit. 

Cyprus was not directly affected by the Arab's oil embargo, and supplies of 
crude oil have continued to arrive from Saudi Arabia and Iraq (via the Sidon and 
Tripoli pipelines) at a satisfactory rate. But as nearh^ every urban Greek Cypriot 
family has its car, the fourfold rise in oil prices has taken a heavy toll. A gallon 
of petrol after tax now costs about 570 mils (about 70p in sterling) ; only two years 
ago it was about a third of this price. A wide range of industries dejjendent on 
petroleum derivatives has been hard hit; and the cost of food and drink has soared. 
The days when the visitor could dine agreeably for around £1 are gone for good. 
This is the sort of inflation which might keep tourists away. 

All this has caused considerable anguish to the man in the street and, more 
positively, considerable heart-searching among the ministers and officials con- 
cerned with the economy. As a result, an embryonic prices and incomes policy was 
initiated at the start of this year, under the aegis of an "advisory prices com- 
mittee", which includes representatives from the government, employers, and the 
trade union federations. This is a voluntary system, based on the pious hope that 
the local manufacturei's and iinporters will not increase prices unless this is ab- 
solutely necessary and that the workers will show a sense of responsibility in sub- 
mitting pay claims. So far it has worked moderately well, but these are early days. 
The possibility of introducing a statutory s^^stem has not been ruled out, altho ugh 
officials are reluctant to talk about it. For the moment, the coup attempt has 
obliterated all else. 

Linked with the prices and incomes policy is a new cost of living bonus system 
which is claimed to be something peculiar to Cyprus but which is not so verj- dif- 
ferent from what is now happening in Britain. Every three months the salaries and 
wages of pu'ulic servants and all employees covered by collective agreements are 
statutorily reviewed against a price index, the basis of which (reckoned as 100) is 
the cost of living average for 1973. By May the index had risen to 115, and a large 
section of the labour force found itself entitled to a 6.9 per cent bonus in wages in 
June. This no doubt brought smiles to many faces, but it has not brought a check 
to the inflationary spiral. 

The basic problem with Cyprus's economy, however, is that it rests on a slightly 
wobbly tripod: agriculture, tourism and revenues derived from the British bases. 
The experts in the ministries of commerce and finance, who, by third-world stand- 
ards, are capable men, know this only too well. Over the past year, agriculture has 
given them the worst headaches, because of the appalling droughts in 1972 and 
1973. This year providence has been kinder, but the rainfall has still not been 
enough to replenish the reservoirs. The net result is that the growth rate in agri- 
culture has been virtually nil since 1971. This in turn has affected the total growth 
rate, which last year was 6.5 per cent instead of the 7.4 per cent forecast in the 
present five-year plan (1972-76). In the process, the government had had to subsi- 
dise the drought-stricken farmers to the tune of around £5m annually. 

What can be done to provide more water? Arguabl}', the government should 
have tackled the prolilem more energetically some years ago, but strenuous efforts 
are now being undertaken to make up for lost time. Backed by the World Bank, a 
£36m water development project, the biggest of its kind in Cyprus, is now under 
way in the Paphos district. With luck, this should boost the jDroduction of citrus 
fruits, grapes and bananas over much of the west of the island. There is also talk of 
building a desalination plant, probablj?- near Larnaca, similar to the one already 
operating in the British base at Dhekelia ; but desalination is a costly business. A 
more intriguing suggestion is that fresh water should be piped to Cyprus from the 
gushing streams of southern Turkey, onlj^ 50-odd miles away. This solution was 
mooted as long ago as 1901 by the UN special adviser on Cyprus's economy, Mr. 
Willard Thorp, but for political reasons the Greek Cypriots have always resisted 
it. They do not wish to depend on Turkey for something as essential as water, and 
they even conjure up nightmares of the tap being turned off in times of crisis. 



116 

'With agriculture in the doldrums, the government's planners are wisely turning 
"their attention more and more to the development of light industries; indeed, the 
files of the ministry of commerce bulge with memoranda about fertiliser plants, 
asbestos o-oods, hygienic equipment and the Uke. But the essential aim is to pro- 
mote those industries with some export potential, diverting capital and effort from 
the production of "saturation" commodities, such as footwear and furniture. For 
mew overseas markets, Cyprus is looking hopefully to Africa. Already countries 
like Libya and Tanzania are showing more than a modicum of mterest m its light 
'industrial o-oods. (Both countries were visited officially by President Makarios.) 
All this implies a sensible diversification of Cyprus's trade pattern, though it is 
hard to see Africa replacing Britain and western Europe as its most important 

The island needs all the commercial openings it can get, for its trade deficit 
has risen appreciably in the last two years. There is cause for concern but prc)^^)- 
ably not for alarm. Foreign exchange reserves stand at the reasonably healtliy 
total of £105m, some £l.^m less than at this time last year but nevertheless 
enough to cover imports for the next eight or nine months. Other third worl^ 
countries might be happy to be in such a position. 

IN THE STEPS OF APHRODITE 

"The philosphy underlying our policy is that tourism should Complement our 
national life and should "not destroy its good qualities". This unexceptionable 
sentiment is the motif of a prolix review by the government of Cyprus's tourist 
prospects during the current five-year plan; and any future Cyprus government 
must trust that the troubles will be quickly forgotten by potential visitors. In 
terms of the economy as a whole, tourism has become one of the leading sectors 
and the plan is that it should earn about £42m gross between 1972 and 1976. At 
peak levels, tourist revenue could wipe off the trade deficit, and offset the financial 
losses that would be incurred if the British decide to withdraw from their two 
bases on the island. 

The figures for 1972 and 1973 were encouraging; performance surpassed the 
target growth rate of 20 per cent. But it will be a different story this year. Quite 
apart from the fighting, potential visitors from Britain and western Europe do 
not have the money to spend. A modest growth rate may be achieved, but for a 
small country which has staked its future largely on tourism it may not be good 
enough. 

The island has an immense amount to offer. It is one of the few places where 
in the spring one can ski in the morning and swim in the early afternoon. Or so 
the brochures say. The basic issue is what sort of place the tourist planners want 
Cyprus to be. At the moment, they give it the image of having a bit of everything. 
The variety of Cyprus's attractions does, indeed, appeal to many holiday-makers. 
But, by and large, the local entrepreneurs, backed by foreign capital, have moved 
in too fast ; and in particular Famagusta — which has the best beach on the island — 
has been turned into a hideous rash of neon-lit cement. The Germans and the 
Scandinavians flock there, and it is the west Europeans whom the Cyprus Tourist 
Organisation is particularly anxious to attract. This is now reflected in the menus 
of the leading hotels and restaurants. 

What pains most Cyprus-lovers is the possibility that Kyrenia will go the same 
•way as Famagusta. Paradoxically, Kyrenia's essential beauty was saved in the 
1960s by the outbreak of intercommunal fighting, which teinporarily scared off 
the property developers. After seven years of relative peace, its picturesque har- 
bour is walled in by high-rise flats and hotels. A kind of Clovelly transplanted 
to the eastern Mediterranean, it has long been the haven of the retired British; 
a faintly pro-consular sniff used to be in the air, and there used to be much good 
conversation about more leisurely days. 

Now, at the height of the package tourist season, the sniff is of eggs and chips, 
and the golden covers on either side of the town look like being converted into 
plages, which sounds distasteful if not actually hideous. But it all makes for 
invisible earnings and the Cyprus government needs the revenue. There is good 
potential in the western sector of the island, particularly around Paphos, which 
because of its distance from Nicosia tends to be the least visited; and a local 
entrepreneur who is about to launch a direct air-service could be on to a good 
thing. 

But tourism, like other sectors of the economy, revolves around oil and water. 
With an inadequate public transport system, many tourists want to hire cars, and 
the cost is now becoming prohibitive to many ordinary holiday-makers. The 



117 

continuing drought means that water-supplies at the height of summer are liable 
to be cut off; and it is not much fun pajing for comfort and excellent service in a 
first-class hotel if one cannot get a shower. 

But this may seem carping criticism. The fascination of the island lies in its 
life-style, which is neither easy to harness by a government department nor open 
to convincing description in a brochure. It is epitomised in the sip of an Anglias 
in a Troodos coffee-shop, or in the hilarity of Lemonias's tavern, in Nicosia, 
whose owner (once a Lieutenant-Quartermaster in the Cyprus Regiment) is a 
Hellenic Jove with the frame of a Vulcan and a laugh that reverberates around 
the island like thunder. Whatever the regime, people like Lemonias are 
indestructible. 

BASELINE 

If Kyrenia is a Mediterranean Clovelly, Episkopi — the British Near East head- 
quarters — is a Mediterranean East-bourne. The essential point about the two 
British leases (Episkupi-Akrotiri and Dhekelia) is that they are as British as the 
Isle of Wight, being sf)vereign British territorjr. In 1960, after a marathon negotia- 
tion between President Makarios and Mr. Julian Amery (then Under-Secretary 
at the British Colonial Office), it was finally agreed that the British sovereign 
area should comprise 99 square miles. (It has never been absolutely clear to 
observers which sovereign state, Britain or Cyprus, owns the Salt Lake near 
Dhekelia; but, as its use for military purposes is problematical, to say the least, 
no dispute arises.) 

The relationship between the British and the Greek Cypriots has long been a 
curious love-hate affair. If British colonial administrators made mistakes — as all 
colonial administrators do — the chickens came home to roost with uiaexpected 
ferocity on Ajjril 1, 1955. All-Fools' Day marked the start of General Grivas's 
guerrilla war to drive the British out — and to unite Cyprus with Greece. There 
followed nearly four years of Ulster-style terrorism, during which excesses were 
committed by both sides and the hatred between Briton and Greek could be cut 
with a knife. (The Turks were to some extent on the sidelines, but were basically 
pro-British.) The Greeks vehemently alleged, and still allege, that successive 
British governments deliljerately favoured the Turkish community. Historically, 
that is at the root of the Cyprus problem. More recentlj^, all has been sunshine — or 
almost. 

After trying to kick the British out, most Greek Cypriots want the British who 
are left (mainly in the bases) to stay. It is not, of course, entirely a matter of 
.sentiment, though sentiment enters into it. The basic factor is economic. Revenue, 
one way or another, from the bases is a pillar of the island's economy; last year 
it totalled over £30m. (The Makarios government, for understandable reasons, 
put the figure nearer £27m, but the exact total is hard to quantifJ^) Limassol, 
in particular, would become almost a ghost town if the British should quit Episkopi 
and Akrotiri, for one quarter of Limassol's population (around 55,000) is composed 
of British service families or civilians connected with the nearby base. For the 
Cypriots — Greeks and Turks alike — the bases mean jol)s; clerical jobs, labouring 
jobs, catering jobs and so on. Even the police force within the two bases is com- 
posed of C3q5riots, whose relations with the British authorities are harmonious. 

It is a mark of the astute restraint of Mr. Zhiartides, the union leader, that he 
has never pushed the communist line on the bases to crisis point. Ideologically, 
he wants the British to cjuit — and that is the declared aim of the Akel party. But 
realistically, Mr. Zhiartides and the other communist leaders know that, if the 
British do leave, thousands of their compatriots would come on the labour market, 
and Mr. Zhiartides did not want to embarrass the archbishop. So the communists 
were prepared to impose on themselves a self-denying ordinance; in the new 
situation the communists' tactics may change. 

With the British defence review still uncompleted, the future of the Cyprus 
garrisons is still in doubt. It is one thing to quit Singapore, and another thing to 
quit the Mediterranean, especially at a period of crisis in the Middle East. In the 
present explosive situation a hasty British withdrawal would create a dangerous 
vacuum in the island. Under the terms of the Cyprus treaties of 1960, the sovereign 
bases are to revert to the government of Cyjirus in the event of a British evacuation. 
But the Turks have let it be known that they want at least part of the 99 square 
miles ; and in this understandable claim there is the hint of a nasty new twist to the 
Cyprus problem. One possibility, obviously, is that the two bases might eventually 
be telescoped into one (Episkopi- Akrotiri), but this does not appeal to Britain's 
service chiefs, who claim that there are not really enough training grounds in the 
United Kingdom. 



118 

During the past decade, the Dhekelia base has served another extremely useful 
purpose; it has become the logistic centre for the United Nations peace-keeping 
force (Unficyp). Food and equipment for the 2,000-odd UN troops (who consist of 
British, Canadians, Danes, Finns, Swedes, Austrians and Irish) are sentjthrough 
Dhekeha, and all the repairs are done there. As a result, the UN operation in 
Cyprus has run on oiled wheels, and UN officials are the first to admit it. Indeed, 
the facility with which the British have donned their blue berets has been one of 
the pleasanter aspects of the Cyprus story, expecially after the acrimony between 
Britain and the UN secretariat during the Congo troubles in 1961. Ov'er the past 
10 j^ears (March, 1964-March, 1974) Cyprus has cost the UN $350m. Arguably, 
it is money well spent; but one wonders what greater use it could have been put 
to, in development aid, if the Cypriots had settled their affairs. 

The Americans have argued that Unficyp could be reduced to a mere obser- 
vation force, although, j^robably, it is too small as it is to be effective militarily 
(if fighting should break out again between the two communities). Again, this 
sends shivers down the spines of Cypriot traders and restaurant-owners; for the 
free-spending UN troops, like the British troops in the bases, boost Cyprus's 
invisible earnings substantially. The element of artificiality which this introduces 
in the island's economy is all too obvious. 

ON A SEE-SAW 

It is almost impossible to draw the contradictory strands of Cj'priot history 
into a rational pattern, as the past week has amply demonstrated. Cj-prus is a 
captive of its geography, as well as of ethnic compulsions. To the Turks, it is 
their off-shore island. At the same time, the Greek connection has dominated its 
history, and will continue to do so. 

However hard the Cypriots try to assert their independence, relations between 
Greece and Turkey will decisively sway the island's future. Even before ]Monday 
the strains between Athens and Ankara were acute; the prospect of sizeable oil 
deposits in the Aegean Sea has provoked a bitter dispute over continental shelf 
jurisdiction; the matter is being argued at the current international law of the sea 
conference in Caracas, but is unlikely to be resolved there. 

Tension between the parent powers automatically has repercussions in Cyprus ; 
the Greeks somehow become more Greek, and the Turks more Turkish. Even the 
Akel party has rccentlj^ come out on the side of the Athens junta over the oil 
dispute, although the island's communists whisper privately that it is the inevitable 
result of "commercial imperialism". 

On the face of it, the friction between Greece and Turkey seems to knock on the 
head, at least for the time being, the prospect of an imposed Athens — Ankara 
solution of the Cyprus problem. Such a deal has long been the aim of the Turkish 
government, and of the Turkish Cypriots, who feel that their destiny can be 
entrusted to their masters in Ankara. (President Makarios never felt any such 
sentiment towards successive Greek governments.) What is just conceivable, 
but unlikely, is that, instead of going to war, Greece and Turkey might jnit 
their heads together and make a package deal on all their contentious issues, 
Cyprus being the most important. The Makarios supporters bitterly resist this 
idea. 

But would an imposed solution of Cyprus work? It was tried at Ziirich in 1959, 
and four years later the settlement fell to pieces. On paper, there is a lot to be said 
for "double enosis" (which is a euphemism for partition). But the harsh reality 
was that President Makarios would not have it; and Cyprus has now had a 
history of 14 years as a sovereign independent state. The best minds in the Greek 
foreign ministry fully perceive this; and as a result Greece has continued to support 
the intercommunal talks designed to preserve Cyprus's independent status. 

The 14 years of Makarios's presidency are a curious mixture of achievement 
and confusion. History will pronounce its verdict upon him; but to have remained 
president for so long was in itself a singular accomplishment. And the Greek 
Cvpriots prospered economically. 

"What is incontestable now is that the politics of the whole eastern Mediter- 
ranean have never been more complex, and possibly never more explosive. Greece 
is at loggerheads with Cvprus and Tiu-key; Turkey is at loggerheads with Greece 
and Cyprus ; and Cyprus is at loggerheads with Turkey and Greece. If there were 
a triangular conflict, baffled observers wonder who would be on whose side. The 
answer is clear; the Greeks would close ranks — temporarily — against their 
"traditional" enemy. Such is the strength of nationaHsm. 



119 

Meanwhile, the island has blundered along, under a quixotic form of de facto 
partition. President Makarios periodically asserted his view that "enosis is desir- 
able, but not feasible" (which in fact probably summed up his own inner thinking). 
The implied ambivalence in this statement infuriated the Turks, who somehow 
still detect enosis implications in every word uttered by the Cyprus government, 
not least during the present crisis. 

During his i^residency, Makarios came to the conclusion that Cyprus should 
stay as it is. That may sound defeatist, but he had one current of events pulling 
his way; and time has its way of altering the configuration of political problems. 
For all its troubles, the island was a happj^ place. 

3. EDITORIALS & COMMENTARIES ON THE CRISIS IN CYPRUS 

[From the Times, Sept. 24, 1974] 
(By Lord Caradon) 

L^N Should Act to Stop Drift to Disaster in Cyprus 

Earlier this month a few of us who lo\e Cyprus and her people came together 
to form the Friends of Cyprus. We at once received support from members of all 
political parties in this country, and we were anxious from the start to make it 
clear that our aim was wholly impartial ; it was to help, if we could, to bring succour 
and peace to all the people of Cyprus. 

We sent Brigadier Michael Harbottle, who was at one time Chief of Staff of 
the United Nations Force in Cyprus, to the island to Ijring us the most up to date 
information on the present situation with special reference to the urgent and 
desperate need for relief. He will be back to report to us soon. 

At the same time, I was asked to go at once to New York and Geneva to report 
on United Nations endeavours to stop further bloodshed, bring relief and search 
for a peaceful settlement. 

In addition to discussions with those concerned at L^nited Nations headquarters 
in New York and in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Geneva, 
I was able during the week to have talks in the United Kingdom Mission to the 
United Nations in New York, and in the United States State Department and 
with members of the Congress in Washington. 

I came back to report to Friends of Cyprus with several strong impressions in 
my mind. 

First, the extent of the tragedy. The accounts of ruthless and senseless violence 
are fresh in our minds. But what is not adequatel}^ realized is the extent of the 
suffering of countless innocent people both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
There are far more Turkish Cypriots south of the line than north of the line, and 
far more Greek Cypriots north of the line than Turkish Cypriots. It is a disaster 
for all the people of the island and with ever}' week that passes things get worse 
with winter approaching; sometliing like a third of the whole population has 
been uprooted from homes and livelihood. Industries stop, crops are lost, animals 
die of neglect, the means of survival rapidly diminish. 

M3' second impression is that I see no early escape from the disastrous drift. 
True Glavkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Raouf Denktash for the Turkish 
C\priots, old and wise friends, have shown compassion and courage in the agree- 
ments on exchange of prisoners, but no one I have consulted exjjects the Turkish 
Government to agree to an early withdrawal from the line of division, except 
perhaps for a token withdrawal in Famagusta. It would obvioush^ be difficult or 
even impossible for the Turkish Prime Minister, having stirred the enthusiasm of 
his people by the decision to invade, to withdraw unilaterally before the Turkish 
elections. Equally impossible for the Greek Government, also facing elections, to 
accept in effect a partition of the island. So no early advance to a settlement 
seems possible. Indeed the danger is that deadlock will lead to new conflict. 

It follows that the suffering of a quarter of a million refugees wiU become much 
worse in the winter and the New Year. 

What then can be done to escape from the danger of fresh conflict and the 
l^rospect of escalating economic ruin and widespread and prolonged and growing 
human feeUng. 

The Secretary General of the United Nations has not underestimated the 
challenge. Though comparativel}' small in the scale and numbers, this is the 
greatest test for the United Nations. The situation he said "calls in question the 
very essence of the United Nations Charter, weighing upon the credibility of the 



120 

organization and its future effectiveness". He says that the hopes of the world 
are centered on the Securitj' Council and that he trusts that "we shall not fail in 
our duty". 

Nothing less than a unanimous resolution of the council will provide the basis 
for a settlement. The elements of agreement are alread.y there in the hurried 
resolutions passed by the council while the confusion of the conflict continued. 
What is surely needed now is a new initiative setting out a comprehensive plan 
first for dealing with the constitutional necessity to give the Turkish Cypriots 
communal security and local autonomy. We know that ])roposals to those ends 
were well advanced before the coup. Now the assurances and the guarantees must 
be strengthened. There must also be urgent provision for dealing with the humani- 
tarian need to let people go safelj^ back to their homes. There must be a new 
mandate for the United Nations Force. There must be new guarantees ensuring 
the future independence and sovereignty of the island. There must also be con- 
firmation of the unanimous calls already made for a phased withdrawal of all 
Greek and Turkish troops from the republic. 

Such an initiative should come not from the United Nations General Assembly 
but from the Security Council where unanimity can add strength to the resolution. 

On behalf of the Friends of Cyprus I have urged that the British Government 
should take the initiative. We in this country have had a long association with 
Cyprus; we still have bases in the island; we have obligations under the 190O 
agreements. We have a uniqiie opportunity to put forward a full plan for future 
action, a plan which it would be difficult for other powers — including the super 
powers — to propose but which all could accept. 

The dreadful damage which has been done and the even greater dangers which 
threaten cry out for such a new initiative. 

I have had a long association with Cyprus. I first acted as Governor during the 
Second World War. At that time, relations between the Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots were easy and friendly. There were officials, judges, members 
of the E.xecutive Council from both communities, and both served in the same 
military units. Much later, I returned in bad times but when I left in 1960 as the 
last Governor of Cyprus I paid mj^ respects to both Archbishop Makarios and Dr. 
Kutchuk (the leader of the Turkish Cypriots at that time). We had worked 
together with trust and confidence for inore than a year to establish in harmony 
an independent sovereign Cyprus. 

I am convinced that cooperation and conciliation are possible. There is no need 
for the beautiful island to be torn apart in hate and bloodshed. The drift to 
disaster must be stopped. There must be an alternative to violent confrontation. 

Glavkos Clerides and Raouf Denktash are setting an example. We are all 
deeply. thankful for their lead. Now we must surely do all we can to see that they 
are not hindered but encouraged and assisted. 

[From the New York Times, Aug. 18, 19741 

The Mad Honey op Pontus 

(By C. L. Sulzberger) 

TRABZON, Turkey — When Xenophon's Ten Thousand hacked their way out 
of the Ciscaucasian Mountains east of here 2.5 centuries ago, they screemed: 
"Thalassa, Thalassa" as thej' sighted the sullen Black Sea and stumbled down to 
the slate-colored rollers. Shortly afterward they were devastated by the famous 
"^mad" honey distilled by frenzied bees from the azalea of this Pontus region. 

The mad honey still exists. It is garnered in villages but not sold in the towns 
where city folk fear its effects. Yet, judging by events, it would seem to have been 
lavisiilj^ consumed by the successor governments of Pontus — now the Turkish 
republic in Ankara — and of the Xenophon — the Greek regime in Athens. Their 
recent behavior shows signs of being inflamed by the same exalted unreason for 
which the Pontic nectar was renowned. 

I came up here to find out Avhether people feared that nearby Rvissia, which 
occupied Truljzon before the Czarist collapse in World War I, might again intrude 
amid the confusion of the Czarist crisis. Late one night in Trabzon a voice from 
Ankara, sounding over the dilapidated telephone system like the faint squeal of 
a worm, informed me things were going from bad to worse with Greece. 

But residents of this area were less concerned Avith the immediacy of a potential 
Russian threat than the legacy of an ancient Greek quarrel. "We are used to 
Russia," said the acting governor. "When you're close to the fire you get accus- 
tomed to it." More urgent in the public mind — although there seemed a strange 
tranquility — was Greece. 



121 

Trabzon was the capital of a Greek Byzantine state, ruled by the Grand' 
Comnenus, that fell to the Turks eight years later than Constantinople (Istan- 
bul). Greeks lived here for immemorial times. When the Czar's armies with- 
drew after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysanthos 
sought to re-create an independent Pontus. This endeavor collapsed during the 
mass population exchange following the Asia Minor war, half a century ago. 
Chrysanthos had to shepherd out 164,000 Pontic Christians. None are left. 

Unfortunateh^, all these old disputes come to mind when modern crises explode. 
During the Cyprus talks the present Athens foreign minister comj^ared the loss of 
Kyrenia — a tiny Greek Cypriote town not even governed by Athens — with that 
of Constantinojile in 14.53 and Smyrna (Izmir) in 1923 (largely Greek inhalnted 
but ruled by the Turks for generations save for a brief period after World War I). 

The Turks, for their part, sometimes speak of the "generosity" of Kemal 
Ataturk, who defeated Greece and created the new Turkish Republic, in not 
having demanded sovereignty over his birthplace, Salonika, and over the Greek 
islands off Turkey's coast. 

Cyprus is a symbol of all this. Ten years ago this month Greek and Turkish 
Cypriotes were at it hammer and tong; the United Nations was voting cease- 
fires and Greece had announced it was withdrawing military forces from NATO. 
Aegean history repeats itself like a broken phonograph disk. 

Now, it would seem, the rupture may last long. NATO is broken; the Turk.s 
appear unconcerned about the Soviet danger, which was why they joined the 
alliance originally; the allies don't know what to do. Henry Kissinger is trying 
to get Greece fully back into NATO. He was planning official visits here and to 
Athens in October. Now it might prove perhaps an unpropitious time. 

I have talked at length ^\ith the principal leaders concerned in this dangerous- 
argument — Greek Premier Caramanlis and Defense Minister Averoff; Turkish 
President Koroturk, Premier Ecevit and Defense Minister Isik. They are intelli- 
gent, reasonal^le men on all subjects but one — C3^prus. 

Ankara has a very legitimate claim to protect the Turkish Cjqariote minority, 
which for long was badly treated by Archbishop Makarios and unofficial Greek 
Cypriote gangs. It also has justifiable concern about the island's stragetic im- 
portance — Ijdng just off Turkey's coast. 

But the Greeks have every right to be furious about Ankara's high-handed 
ultimatum diplomacy, ignoring every sentiment of the new Athens democracy 
and endangering its existence, using the excuse of the previous military junta's 
mistakes to invade and partition Cyprus. This might risk ultimately destroj-ing 
Premier Caramanlis — from the right, or from the left. It has already torn apart 
NATO. 

Was the substitution of armed might for diplomacy worth these results to 
Ankara? That, I cannot believe. Meantime the entire Western alliance has 
suffered a crippling wound. It is time to stop tasting the mad Pontic honej', 
which seems so to impair the judgment of statesmen. 

(From Commonweal, Sept. 6, 1974] 

Cypkus — Three-Dimensional Program 

(By Richard C. Hottelet) 

If the tragedy of Cyprus hammers home one lesson it is this: time alons does 
not heal. 

Cyprus is a part of the age-old struggle between Turk and Greek, burdened 
with the rancid heritage of a Kulturkampf fought in song and story, in open war 
and private blood. In a way, ingrained for a longer time, it is more intractable than 
the conflict between Jew and Arab in the Middle East. Nothing could be more 
wrong than to treat the Cyprus question as a local affair, resolvable by some quick 
stroke of pen or sword, or otherwise to be wrapped up and put away for calmer 
times and cooler tempers. 

Ten years ago, when the first effort at solution came unstuck, a United Nations 
force (UNFIC YP) was devised to do what heavy water or graphite do in a nuclear 
reactor: to separate the radioactive components of the pile and keep them from 
coming together in a critical mass. The hope was that a reduction in the level of 
violence, the onset of what could be accepted as normality, would develop from 
day to day a habit of peaceful interaction between the Greek majority and the 
Turkish minority inside the framework of a single state, a sovereign meml:)er of 
the United Nations. Some j^ears before, the UN had been enlisted in similar, 
neater fashion, to man a clear frontier line between Israel and Egypt. But in 1967, 

41-207 — 74— — 9 



122 

the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East was swept away at Nasser's com- 
mand. In 1974 UNFICYP fovind itself elbowed aside by a Turkish army landing 
on Cyprus. Each time the UN had helped to ]3rovide ten years of breathing space 
but the statesmen who should have used the opportunity to settle the essential 
dispute found it impossible. 

One reason is that — as far as Cj^prus is concerned — the problem is three dimen- 
sional. The tension between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus is 
chxsest to home. It is, however, inseparable from the background of friction be- 
tween Greek and Turk, which began long before the fall of Byzantium. Above them 
both is the NATO factor, the strategic considerations which flow from Greece 
and Turkey's membership in the western alliance. This last touches on such sensi- 
tive points as Turkey's control of and Moscow's never entinguished lust for the 
Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It affects the balance of power in the Eastern 
Mediterranean — not so much through the sovereign British bases on Cyprus 
itself as through bases and other facilities in Greece and Turkey of interest to the 
United States. 

Those who incline to think that the United States coddled the successive mili- 
tary regimes of Greece simply in order to satisfy some geopolitical appetite of the 
Pentagon may reflect on the events of September 1970. When the radical Pales- 
tinian guerrilla groups forced a life or death showdown with King Hussein of 
Jordan and when an armored force from Syria crossed the border into Jordan to 
su])port them, the United States saw the fragile chance of political settlement in 
the Middle East in danger of being swept away. Washington together with Israel, 
decided as a last resort openly to intervene on Hussein's side. The Israeli air force 
was only minutes away but the U.S. airborne contingents which would have gone 
into Amman — ostensibly to evacuate American citizens — had to be drawn from 
the United States and Germany. NATO would have no part of the oi^eration. The 
soldiers from Germany were not allowed to overfly France l)ut had to be flown 
around Europe to the only land base available for the final push, the Greek island 
of Rhodes. Whatever might have been the risk of this intervention, the fact that 
it was possible nuiy in the end have made it unnecessary. Syria withdrew the 
tanks; Hussein prevailed. 

United State commitment in the Greco-Turkish area is older and broader. 
President Truman, in March 1947, enunciated the doctrine that the U.S. would 
help Greece and Turkey defend themselves against open or covert Soviet aggres- 
sion. jNIoscow had been supporting a civil war in Greece and had been pressing 
Turkey to turn over not only a base on the Bosporus but also the eastern prov- 
inces of Kars and Ardahan. Britain, drained by World War II, could not continue 
its traditional role in Greece. Without the Truman Doctrine, Greece and Turkey 
might well have succumbed. Later, in order to spread and more widely to in- 
stitutionalize the American responsibility, both countries were brought into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Great Britain, which held Cyprus from 1878 to 1959, when it gave the island 
independence, is intimately concerned with the local problem. Britain, together 
with Greece and Turkey, is a guarantor power of the painfully contrived con- 
stitution with which Cyprus became a sovereign state. This constitution, pro- 
viding elaborate legal safeguards for the distinct life of the Turkish community 
on the predominantly Greek island, was set aside by the President of Cyprus, 
Archbishop Makarios, at the end of 1963. He found it — with its Turkish vetoes 
in matters of taxes, defense and foreign a8"airs, as well as the ethnic proportions 
prescribed for the army, police and civil service — an insuperable barrier to ef- 
ficient government. The ethnic Turks saw their existence in danger. Intercom- 
numal fighting flared up beyond the capacity of Britain or NATO to control. 
UNFICYP, the UN force, was dispatched to keep the lid on. 

Turkey had been ready to intervene at once but was dissuaded by what Dean 
Achesonlater called "the most vigorous representations from the government of 
the United States." Again in June 1964, after new and increased violence, Turkey 
prepared to send a force to Cyprus — only to be told by President Lyndon Johnson 
that the US Sixth Fleet would intervene, if necessary, to stop it. This was long 
before tha colonels seized power in Greece. The warning, which latterly an- 
tagonized Turkey, was the price the LT.S. was willing to pa\' to avert the nightmare 
of a NATO war.' 

In 1974 that nightmare threatened to become reality. Cyprus had been quiet 
for years, as regards Greeks and Turks. It was inside the Greek camp that pro- 
ponents of enosis (vmion with Greece), led by the guerrilla gangs of EOKA-B in 
the tradition of the late Gen. Grivas, intensified their violent protest against 
Markarios' policy of status quo sovereignty. Assuming, probably correctly, that 



123 

EOKA-B worked hand in glove with the Greek officers who had run the C.vprus 
National Guard since 1964, Makarios asked Athens to order them home. The 
regime in Athens replied by overthrowing Makarios. 

Several things combined to tvu!i this Greek quarrel into a Greek-Turkish 
crisis. Firstly, Athens and Ankara had been on each other's nerves over the ex- 
ploitation of newly discovered oillields in the Aegean Sea. Secondly, the man who 
replaced Markarios, Nicos Samj^son, was a red cloth to the Turkish bull — charac- 
terized by Ankara as a thug and murderer in earlier violence against the Turkish 
community. Thirdly, although Sampson immediately disavowed enosis, Turkey 
assumed that he would give the enosis movement new impetus, especially since a 
success of that sort would greatly strengthen the Athens regime of Brigadier 
loannides. Fourthly, the Turks' pent up frustration of 1964 — which, incidentally, 
had been aggravated in almost exactly the same way in 1967 — could not tolerate 
a new defeat. The government uf Prime Alinister Bulent Ecevit was weak. It 
would not have been able, even had it wanted, to keep the Turkish army from 
landing on Cyprus. 

The U.S. saw the impossibility of restraining the Turks and concentrated, at 
first, on persuading the Greeks not to indulge in the folly of attacking Turkey. 
In a few days, the high point of crisis seemed over. Sampson had been replaced 
on Cyprus by the moderate Glafkos Clerides. In Athens, the colonels were out and 
constitutional government restored under Constantine Caramanlis. Both changes 
were welcomed in Ankara. However, it was soon clear that they made no difference 
to a Turkish government which was determined not to allow Cyprus to return 
■even to the status quo of 1960. The Turks declared that they intended to keep a 
military presence on the island as protection for their kinsmen and to accept noth- 
ing less than federation as the new political structure of Cyprus. The Greeks see 
federation as a euphemism for partition. 

On the island, the Turkish army took little notice of calls for cease fire by the 
UN Security Council or by the Geneva Conference of the Guarantor Powers. 
UNFICYP was pushed aside as the Turks enlarged the territory they controlled 
and roughly expelled the Greek Cypriot population. When the Geneva negotia- 
tions did not give Turkey the political solution it sought, a loose bi-communal 
federation, the Turks moved ruthlessly to cajjitalize on their strategic advantage. 
They broke out of the Kyrenia beachhead to cut off the entire northeastern third 
of the island. 

The U.S. and Britain had tried to persuade the Turks not to go too far, arguing 
that concessions could still be achieved for the Turkish community through 
negotiation. Ankara would not listen. Anglo-American leverage is limited. NATO 
needs Turkey almost as much as Turkey needs NATO. Another argument which 
Ankara disregarded was that inflicting too deep a humiliation on the Greeks 
would be counter-productive. Greece is prepared to swallow a great deal. Too 
much would put the new government under patriotic pressure — not from the right, 
which is bankrupt, but from the left. On Cyprus, Clerides, who is by far the 
best the Turks will find to deal with, could be swept awaj^ by Ankara's intransi- 
gence and replaced by men who would wage guerrilla war against the Turkish 
community and the Turkish army. Since Cyprus is 80 percent Greek and the 
Turkish army's performance so far has not earned it military laurels, this could 
open a new and fateful chajiter of the Cyprus story. London and Washington are 
now trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table, where a certain measure 
of compromise might lead to a modus vivendi and avert the worst. 

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, follows events closely. Excluded from the Geneva 
Conference, it would like to see the authority of the UN Security Council — in 
which Moscow has a loud voice and a definitive veto — imposed on the Cyprus 
negotiations. Its purpose would be to preserve Cyprus as a sovereign, nonaligned 
^tate with NATO forces withdrawn, a bone of contention between Greece and 
Turkey and a perennial source of domestic discord in them both. So far, Moscow 
has tried not to offend Turkey yet to hold open doors to the new government in 
Athens. It has strongly endorsed Archbishop Makarios as the legitimate President 
of Cyprus, while Britain has tipped its hat to him and Washington has looked 
the other way, ready to accejit him too if he brought stability Init very much 
doubting that he could. Makarios, for his part, is waiting in London for whatever 
inay come. 

One res]X)nse of the world community at the outset of the crisis was to enlarge 
UNFICYP and agree to make it a buffer around the zone of Turkish control on 
Cyprus. The new function has now been overtaken by events, together with the 
original mandate of 1964. If a Cyprus settlement is not found, UNFICYP would 



124 

find itself the international guarantor of the Turkish fait accompli, or caught in a 
guerilla war, or simply floundering on the sidelines — each clearly unacceptable. 
Experience has made one thing abundantly clear: UN peace forces do not solve 
problems; vide Kashmir and the Middle East. They only buy time for settlement. 
If governments do not use that time it can become an explosive rather than a 
healing force. 

[From the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1974] 

Foreign Affairs — The Cyprus Test 

(By C. L. Sulzberger) 

Athens. — If Henry Kissinger can first obtain at least some concessions from 
Turkey, Greece is prepared to regard the Secretary of State as a valid mediatfir 
in the unhappy Cyprus affair, despite contradictory statements by politicians 
contesting this country's first free election in years. But something tangi))le must 
be secured; also Washington should make public its private acknowledgment that, 
even if recent policy was not "mistaken," it contained "omissions." 

This, in a nutshell, may be considered the basic position of Athens with respect 
to both the U.S.A. and, utimateh', NATO. If Washington takes a diplomatic 
initiative, relations between this country and the United States as well as those 
between this country and NATO should improve appreciably after the November 
balloting creates a normal parliamentary government. 

The Greeks are a proud, emotional people and ardently embrace positions 
unusual for other nations. Their Government is fully aware of NATO's flabby 
Mediterranean posture and how this weakens Greece. It also fears that after 
Tito's death Moscow may press Yugoslavia l)ack into the Soviet fold and seek 
to revive the former idea of a South Slav federation, including claims on Greek 
Macedonia. 

But it is argued that, despite these disturbing prospects, if forced to choose 
between security and honor, honor comes first. Such certainly was the case in 1940 
when Greece spurned an Italian ultimatum and in 1941 when it spurned a German 
ultimatum. 

This is romance, not realpolitik; yet it lies at the heart of Greece's contemporary 
thinking. And it will remain there after the voting because Premier Caramanlis, 
today's national strongman, will almost certainly retain that position next month 
and one knows his o])inions on the above matters. 

Like most of his countrymen, he considers it an American responsibilitj^ to get 
Greek-Turkish talks on Cyprus moving by successfulh^ pressing for some pre- 
liminary Ankara gesture; but he diffeis from many others in believing this proced- 
ure could ultimately produce a satisfactory settlement. 

Today Greece feels let down by the American Government and immensely 
bitter. One leader comments: "Aristotle wrote that bitterntss between brothers 
is the most acute; because the Greeks were so pro-American, they feel particularly 
hurt. Britain had a treatj^ responsibility to intervene in Cyprus as a guarantor 
and based troops there. But the people trusted America above all. Therefore you 
are the scapegoat." 

Nevertheless, the problem of Greek relationships with the United States and 
the grand alliance is not irremediable. Although Mr. Caramanlis ordered with- 
drawal from NATO's militarj^ commands. Greece has proceeded with exceptional 
deliberation in implementing this decision. 

Meanwhile, U.S. naval vessels quietl.y continue to use Greek facilities, al)ove 
all vital Suda Bay in Crete. The background of friendship lemains. If Washington 
moves visibly to alleviate Greece's psychological distress, old bonds may be- 
restored. 

America has privately explained that "omissions" in handling the Cyprus crisis 
occurred because our Government was overwhelmed at the time In' Watergate's 
final denouement. Yet, such implied apologies have not been publicized and the 
Greek jjeople, not just their statesmen, are enraged. They need to know. Washing- 
ton must openly clarify its position and take the initiative in persuading Turkey 
to help pros])ects for valid settlement by concrete gestures of compromise. 

As for NATO, there is specific disgruntlement in additi(m to pique at alliance 
inability to put the brakes on Turkey- when — unlike its first Cyprus landing after 
the dying Athens junta staged a coup there — Turkey invaded a second time, 
unprovoked, in the middle of Geneva peace talks. 

I)uring the consequent crisis, Greece requested NATO's Secretary General 
Luns to summon the alliance council. But Mr. Luns, according to Athens, was on 
holiday and refused to interrupt his vacation. 



125 

It is now believed there are "signs of change" in United States poUcy but these 
remain to be made public. If that is done — and if Mr. Kissinger pursues an initia- 
tive with the Turks — the American and NATO alliances might regain meaning 
and the storm could blow away. 

Yet we are still far from that point. Moreover, those in charge here insist that if 
an acceptable Cyprus solution is not achieved "in time," there will be a dramatic 
deterioration. Mr. Caramanlis, a ])ragniatic leader, not a demagogue, acknowledges 
limits on his ability to calm his volatile people. 

And without an agreed settlement, Cyprus will erupt again. Another explosion 
could shake the entire Mediterranean, Middle East and Balkan area. The next 
move, says Athens, is Uncle Sam's; he had better move soon. 



[From the N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1974] 

JjOOKing Into an Aegean Crystal Ball 
(By C. L. Sulzberger) 

Athens. — The solution of the Cyprus crisis is essentially predicated on three 

things: continuation of a Caramanlis regime in Greece; maintenance of some kind 

'of cogent government in a confused Turkish political situation; and a successful 

American diplomatic intervention that produces tangible evidence of a desire for 

compromise on Turkey's part. 

The two communal leaders in Cyprus itself, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denk- 
tash (representing Greek-speakers and Turkish-speakers) have kept their own 
bilateral talks going against great odds and achieved ssime success. And Arch- 
bishop Makarios, whose return might touch off trouble, has been persuaded to stay 
away from the island — at least for a while. Thus the kej- problems are all external 
to Cyprus itself. 

Premier Caramanlis is likel.y to gain a majority in next month's elections here 
'(the first in a decade) thus reinforcing his position ; otherwise he will lead a coali- 
tion. The Turkish outlook is less clear; but the army there always remains the 
ultimate power force and its leadership must be persuaded. Can Washington 
achieve that? 

Strangely, the Greek situation seems more stable tliis moment, which is a 
tribute to the leadership of Premier Caramanlis who took over in emergency 
circumstances from the despotic junta. He led the nation away from a potential 
military disaster and has now prepared for restoration of parliamentary govern- 
ment. The likelihood is his firm guidance will avert hysteria over C^'prus. 

Although Mr. Caramanlis bitterl\' resents the second (August) Turkish invasion 
of that island because it was aimed at his policies, he has kept his cool. (The first 
Turkish invasion, in July, was aimed at the junta which sponsored a Cypriote 
coup.) Mr. Caramanlis would probably even ignore the hysterical prejudice 
against a "federal solution" and accept a reasonable Cyprus federation if the Turks 
show moderation. 

But the Greeks are skeptical enough to doubt the Turks own instincts for 
reason. They count on American pressure and in this respect Mr. Caramanlis is 
twisting Washington's arm by threats to undermine the U.S. strategic position. 
The Premier was an avid student of de Gaulle's diplomatic blackmail techniques. 

Right now, the woid "Cyprus" symbolizes all Greece's problems: inflation, a 
shaky economy, uneasiness about potential officer plots, the monarchy-versus- 
republic question, constitutional reform and widespread public demands for a 
purge of junta leaders and their nastiest tools. 

If Cyprus can be pacified, under a new accord acceptable to Athens and Ankara 
(as well as their Cypriote clients), much of the pressure here will be relieved. The 
Greeks now seem to favor total demilitarization of an independent Cyprus, removing 
not only all Greek and Turkish troops but also British bases. The Soviet bloc and 
the Arabs both favor this approach. Since London is trying to save defense 
farthings everywhere, this idea should prove a winner. 

Mr. Caramanlis has his own team working on economic problems. Solving 
them, of course, depends on what happens in the whole Western world; but he 
seems to reckon that with discipline and restraint, the Greek picture can be sub- 
stantially improved within two or three years. 

The gravest internal concern is the twinned problem of restoring discipline in 
the armed forces while at the same time satisfying popular demands for a purge. 



126 

The army was carefully politicized during the colonels' seven-j^ear rule and most 
of the officers retired to make way for junta appointees are too old or no longer 
qualified for commands. 

The new Government has prudently attacked the question piecemeal, removing, 
retiring or sequestering key military opponents without risking the flare-up of a 
sizable revolt. Many junta appointees who violently opposed King Constantine's 
return now seem to favor it — hoping he might save them from a purge. This is 
silly ; if the King is voted back b}^ referendum (which is impossible) he will first 
be deprived of any real power. 

My own guess, when regarding the clouded Greek looking-glass, is that Mr. 
Caramanlis will come back even stronger, that a republic will be established 
with strong presidential authority, that he will be elected to that ofRce, and that 
there will be a limited jjurge of principal junta officials, a purge conducted under 
regular legal procedures at a time when public passions have subsided. 



IFrom The New York Times, Aue. 19. 1974] 

Next Steps on Cyprus 

Greece's rejection of American inediation in the Cyprus disaster and the 
xinwillingness of either Athens or the Greek Cypriote Government to enter new 
negotiations with Turkey are entirely understandable. But these refusals cannot 
justify diplomatic time-marking either by the United Nations or by the United 
States, which bears heavy responsibility for the Cyprus tragedy. 

An effort must be launched without delay bo bind u]3 the wounds, both physical 
and psychological, and to prepare a climate for new negotiations at the earliest 
feasible moment. For a beginning, Washington might take the lead, either at the 
United Nations or through the International Committee of the Red Cross, in 
raising funds for the vast job of relief and resettlement of refugees that will be 
required. The Red Cross estimates that 100,000 Greek Cypriotes and many 
thousands of Tiirkish Cypriotes have been displaced by the militar}^ action. 

Beyond relief, resettlement and aid for economic recovery, however, Washington 
must exert its best efforts to persuade Turkey — as a means of bringing Greece and 
the Greek Cypriotes back to the negotiating table — to withdraw from some of the 
Cyprus areas its troops have overrun. In the first forthright statement to come out 
of official Washington, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said yesterday that 
Turkey's advance on Cyprus "has gone beyond what any of its friends or sym- 
pathizers is prepared to accept." 

If Secretary of State Kissinger agrees with Mr. Schlesinger, he should be able 
to use the political capital he built up Avith Premier Ecevit during the Turkish 
aggression to persuade Ankara to order the territorial and troop withdrawals that 
could make meaningful negotiation possible. Mr. Ecevit was as full of praise for 
what he called Mr. Kissinger's "objective" conduct during the last week as the 
Greek Government was outraged by it. 

Turkey has long had legitimate complaints about the treatment of the 120,000 
Turkish Cypriotes and a good case to make for granting them a greater measure 
of local autonomy. And Turkey had every reason to regard the putsch of July 15 
against President Makarios, ordered by the squalid military dictatorship in Athens, 
as the prelude for an attempt to force enosis — the union of Cyprus with Gieece — 
probably with Washington's approval. 

Had Turkey halted its forces after the modest initial intervention of July 20, 
aimed at protecting Turkish Cypriotes and prexenting enosis, it would have been 
in a strong bargaining position with the support of nearly all the NATO allies. The 
coup on Cyprus had backfired Avith a blast that blew the Greek junta out of power 
and brought in a civilian government headed by Constantine Caramanlis, who 
had enjoyed excellent relations with Turkey. 

But the temptation for Ankara to achieve bj^ force its long-sought partition of 
Cj'prus Av^hile a ncAV Athens Government was still feeling its Avay proved too strong. 
As Mr. Schlesinger said yesterday, "the spillover of Turkish forces has gone beyond 
anything contemplated and has caused great distress." 

What might help most in this situation is a quiet approach to Ankara by 
President Ford, acknowledging the case for greater autonomy for the Turkish 
Cypriotes but emphasizing the importance of renewing negotiations and suggesting 
that Turkey should b(3 Avilling to give up some of the tc./ifcory it now occupies on 
Cyprus in order to get them under way. 



127 

[From The Times, London, Sept. 2. 19741 
Soviet Cooperation Could Strengthen UN Hand in the Aegean 

(By Niches E. Devletoglu) 
The author is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Athens 

A GREEK view OF THE INTERNATIONAL MANEUVERING OVER CYPRUS 

The charges made here by Professor Devletoglou have been vigorously denied, and 
there is no evidence of American intervention against Greece. Indeed, 14 Greek trans- 
port aircraft flew troops to Nicosia on July 21. We are publishing Professor 
Devletoglou'' s article because he does reflect important Greek opinion. In a situation 
such as Cyprus beliefs, even those without foundation, can be as powerful as proven 
facts. Professor Devletoglou is known for his conservative views, but he is voir wel- 
coming cooperation with the Soviet Union, including the presence of Warsaiv Pact 
troops in a peace-keeping force. 

In the aftermath of the disastrous past fcAV weeks in Cyprus, it is with an added 
sense of shock that I find myself comi:)elled to comment on the un-American ac- 
tivities of the American Secretary of State in that area. Ah'eady, it is becoming 
clear that the tragedy of Cyprus is pointing toward Henry Kissinger's Waterloo 
in Europe. 

The view in Athens is that the Sixth Fleet of the United States, which Greece 
has been harbouring largely at her own expense for some time now, had received 
explicit instructions from Washington to obstruct any Greek attempts to send 
reinforcements to Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of the island. It is also 
believed that the Turkish military onslaught against the independence of the 
miniature replublic of Cyprus on July 20 was surreptitiously supported by Wash- 
ington, following the latter's failure to gain control of Cyprus by means of the 
coup it has organized five days earlier against Archbishop Makarios through the 
now defunct Greek junta. 

These facts have been personally confirmed to me bj' reliable and authoritative 
sources both in Washington and in Athens. 

Greeks are convinced that under Dr. Kissinger's high auspices and personal 
instructions, the Turkish Army assaulted and illegalh^ occupied 40 per cent of 
Cyprus and more than 70 per cent of the island's resources creating by now some 
250,000 refugees — nearly 50 per cent of the island's Greek population. These 
innocent people have now left their land panic-stricken. As it happens, too, their 
homeland was endowed with most of the island's water, and covered extensive 
cereal-growing and citrus plantations. Official sources in Cyprus further confirmed 
to me that in the Lefka region, the Greek people have thus lost some 60 per cent of 
their mineral resources (such as copper) as well as the lime quarries of Kythrea. In 
Kyrenia and Famagusta they have further lost their flourishing tourist centres, 
and in the Nicosia/Famagusta industrial area they have lost some of the largest 
and most advanced factorie in Cyprus. 

According to the latest estimates Cyprus is forfeiting over if2m worth of 
production a day. Exports are alreadj' down by some 60 per cent compared with 
last year, and prospects for the immediate future will be still bleaker if, in addition, 
perishable resources such as the citrus plantations in the north continue to be 
left without water. I was also given to understand that as a result of the fighting 
about 20 per cent of the island's main national forests have been burned down. 
And, in fact, the devastation has been so widespread that mereh' to replant these 
forests would cost about i3m. What is more, the cost of repairing buildings, such 
public works as roads, irrigation and water supply networks, and effectively 
financing loans to individuals in both personal and commercial distress must be 
well over ^glOOm. 

If only by virtue of its perverse nature, which has recklessly challenged the rule 
of law in the community of nations, the Turkish attitude has by now fermented 
an explosive international problem. Only this week Mr. Denktash, the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, defied world opinion tlu-eatening to establish an "independent 
Turkish Republic of Cj^prus", if, as he put it, Greece were to raise the Cyprus 
problem in the United Nations General Assembly. This alone explains why 
even though the Russian call for a broader international conference on Cyprus — 
involving possibly the permanent members of the Security Council, the war- 
waging party and Greece — may carry a certain propaganda element, it is never- 
theless a move in the right direction. Turkey, as expected, has politel.y rejected 
this plan. It has been said, too, especially by the British, that it is difficult, if 



128 

not impossible, to visualize "grandoise" conferences and multi-national initiatives 
making much impact. It has even been said that Russia, groping for so long in 
pursuit of an initiative of its own, is now merely being cleverly obstructive. 
Neither contention is true. 

It was personally indicated to me in Geneva just over two weeks ago, that 
Russia was only being discreet and passively helpful in the hope that so deep- 
cutting a human problem might soon be resolved in an honourable manner within 
the Western alliance. But nothing of the kind has happened. Nor, of course, is 
Greece — alread.y in the process of disengaging itself from Nato — ever likely to 
be returning to anything approximating last month's Turkish "victory" rally 
in Geneva. 

Much as expected, too, Russia has been drawn inextricably into what amounts 
to a timely and basically moral proposal — already accepted in principle by Greece, 
but for the moment rejected by Turkey and naturally proving anathema to the 
deeper Kissingerian design of forcibly establishing an American base in Cyprus. 
Despite this opposition, however, the Russian plan is bound to mature 
into some ultimately acceptable form and thus possiblj^ create in the end an 
operational United Nations force by including Warsaw Pact troops. If, indeed, 
it should gather the momentum it deserves (and mounting EEC interest spear- 
headed by France increases this likelihood), resolutions of the United Nations 
would not merely produce paper tigers for aggressors to ignore. Quite on the 
contrary, as in this case, where the international community were to rule that 
Turkej" had to be called to order in a particular manner (militarily and otherwise), 
it would naturally be in the position of putting into effect its decision physically 
dislodging, if necessary, the Turkish army from where it should not be. For 
far too long the United Nations has been little more than a kind of Greek chorus 
■explaining the world's human dramas rather than positivelj^ affecting them. 
By contrast, a joint Nato Alliance- Warsaw Pact international force along the 
proposed Greco-Russian lines could be paving the wa.v toward the establishment 
■of a decisively humanitarian role for the United Nations. 

It is in this context that the dramatic new relationship between France, Greece 
and the Soviet Union Avill perhaps bring peace to Cyprus and much deserved 
normality to both the Turkish and Greek conununities in the island. The sugges- 
tion of a Avider Conference which this sudden entente has produced can clearlj?- 
■enhance the authority of the international community — not only by means of 
establishing a workable new constitution in order to uphold the independence of 
the RepubUc of Cyprus but also by enforcing the observance of such a constitu- 
tion. Turkey chose to invade a sovereign state, and America chose not to stop 
that invasion. Neither was unaware of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations which reads (naturally less idly than both of these countries might have 
•expected) as follows. "All members shall refrain from the threat or the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." 

This, too, is why the restoration and maintenance of a fully independent and 
united Repulilic of Cyprus should now become the immediate goal of all future 
action within the community of nations. Together with a clear and equitable 
definition of the requirements and strategy for a permanent settlement under a 
new constitution, the proposed conference or some variant of it will probably 
produce in the end a global effort free to build upon the embryonic attempts 
already undertaken on a local level between the two communities. 

With the massive and commanding authority of such an international body at 
work, widespread "liberation" initiatives based on guerrilla warfare in Cyprus 
will simply have to stop dead in their tracks, and those legitimate and long-term 
aspirations of the Turkish minority to play a decisive role in shaping a new 
Cyprus will undoubtedly materialize. . 



[Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 20, 1974] 
Cyprus and U.S. Policy 

It can hardly be said that the American policy of "hands off" on Cyprus has 
proved effective. Greece lies humiliated and a wave of anti- Americanism is sweep- 
ing the country. The new government in Athens has angrily pulled its troops from 
NATO. The headstrong Turks, initially advancing with Washington's merely mild 
•disapproval, are still pressing their military advantage on the island. And now 
United States Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies has been assassinated during 
a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in a dreadful act of vengeance against the 
United States. 



129 

Washington clearly saw some benefits to be gained from Turkey's unrestrained 
resort to force. 

Archbishop Makarios, who dallied with the Communists, has been removed 
from the scene, Cyprus has come more firmly under the aegis of Turkey, which is 
more important to the NATO alliance than Greece, and Turkey's redress of the 
militarj^ balance on Cyprus has laid the basis for a better political solution there. 

But the price of letting events take their course has been high. As the situation 
worsens, Washington is getting tougher in its diplomatic stance. It has sent 
conciliatory messages to Athens, and Defense Secretary Schlesinger has warned 
the Turks against using their superioritj^ to drive the Greeks "into a corner," 
indicating also the U.S. will reassess its provision of military and economic aid 
to Turke}^. 

Whether there is bite behind the growl remains to be seen. While it is doubtful 
that a cut-off of aid to Turkey at an earlier stage would have done any good, we 
nonetheless believe that strong sanctions are in order. 

The urgent imperative is to get all parties back to Geneva to start negotiating. 
Greece, with its wounded pride, refuses to return in a weak bargaining position, 
and because the U.S. has lost its credit in Athens it is onlj^ in a position to pressure 
the Turks, who now have Cyprus at their mercy. 

Washington should exert its influence to induce Ankara to give up some of the 
territory seized on C^^Drus as a gesture to the Greeks. Presumably the Turks are 
pressing forward with a view to yielding the new land grabs as a concession in 
Geneva and still keeping their earlier gains. It must be impressed on them that 
thej^ cannot cling to everything because this would only plunge Cj^prus into a 
tragic guerrilla war. 

By its gentle diplomacy as Turkish forces slashed across the top third of Cyprus, 
the United States has gained political leverage in Ankara. It is to be hoped that 
leverage will now be full}- exploited. 



[From The Times (London), Aug. 19, 1974] 
Means Which Defeat the End 

There is a growing discrepancy between Turkey's stated aims in Cyprus and the 
methods used to attain them. The former are or were admitted by a wide con- 
sensus of international opinion to be not unreasonable. Since 1963 the Turkish 
Cypriots had not enjoyed the rights promised to them under the basic articles of 
the Constitution which Turkey, with Greece and Britain, had guaranteed. Western 
diplomats who succeeded in dissuading Turkey from intervening in 1963 and in 
the various crises which followed were willing to admit that her grievances against 
the regime of Archbishop Makarios were at least partlj- justified. Consequently 
when Turkey did take the plunge of intervention last month after the final provo- 
cation of the loannides-Sampson coup, it would have been unreasonable to 
expect her to withdraw without seeing those earlier grievances put to rights. 
For whatever reason the Turkish troops went in on July 20, it was not for the 
pleasure of seeing Archljishop Makarios restored to unfettered power over Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots alike. 

Legalistically their aim to restore "constitutional order" in Cyprus could have 
been interpreted as meaning that they wanted the letter of the 1960 Constitution 
to be re-enforced — with a Turkish vice-president, and Turkish re]>resentation at 
all levels in the state from the government downwards, but still in the context of a 
unitary state. But many impartial observers of the events of 1963 shared the 
Turkish view that that formula had proved unworkable, and that Turkish Cypriots 
needed some more tangible form of securitj'. In practice they had taken this 
for ten years by barricading themselves inside a number of territorial encla\es, 
but at the price of accepting restrictions on their movements and forgoing any 
share in the general conduct of their country's affairs. 

The events of last month appeared to offer a chance to negotiate a new and 
better constitution, in which these enclaves would be preserved (and probably 
enlarged) not as military ghettos but as the territory of the Turkish state or canton 
within a bi-national federation. By the beginning of last week Mr. Clerides, 
representing the Greek Cypriots at the Geneva talks, was apparently willing to 
accept this principle, although of course he could not com]3ly with the Turkish 
government's demand that he accept their proposal in all its territorial exorbitance 
without even taking thirty-six hours to consult his colleagues. 



130 

The Turkish government still assert that this is their aim. They still disclaim 
any desire to partition Cyprus, still less to annex it. (In this they are probablj' 
sincere, for annexation would saddle them with the problem of governing a hostile 
Greek Cypriot population, while partition would enable Greece to establish a 
military base in Turlcey's rear.) They still say that they want Cyprus to remain 
united (though not unitary) and independent. They still see themselves, and wish 
others to see them, as liberators and not conquerors. 

That cannot change the fact that what they have actually done is to send three 
army divisions to Cyprus and occupy more than one third of its territory, clearly 
against the wishes of the majority of the population. Even for the Turkish Cypriots 
their action has been at best a mixed blessing. No doubt it has brought joj' to 
many of the 66,000 who Hve north of the "Attila Line". But what of the 44,000 
who live south of it? Their sufferings since July 20 have been abundantly pul:)li- 
cized by Turkish propaganda, and are not likely to cease now — unless the Turks 
allow themselves to be provoked into occupying the whole island, which is pre- 
cisely what they say they do not want to do. 

It is clear that the "independence" of Cyprus, if it is to mean auA'thing, is not 
compatible with the permanent occupation of one third of the island by Turkish 
troops. Nor can the Turkish Cypriots find true security under the permanent 
protection of Turkish baj^onets. Turkej-'s aim must be to obtain conditions which 
will enable her to withdraw her troops, and which will enable the Turkish Cypriots 
to live in security after they have left. Those conditions can only be obtained by 
negotiation; negotiation between Turks and Greeks, but more especially between 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. They will be much more difhcult to obtain 
now than they would have been a week ago. But the effort still has to be made, 
and it is in the interest of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to make it. 

The Greeks will be strongly tempted to take an "Arab" attitude, and refuse to 
negotiate on the basis of a fait accompli. The Turks may be equally tempted to 
take an "Israeli" attitude — that is, one so inflexible as to make any negotiation 
an almost impossible humiliation for their opponents. But the historj^ of that other 
Middle Eastern conflict hardly suggests that either side would have anything to 
gain by following its example. 

[London Times, Sept, 11. 19741 

Prisoners and Refugees in Cyprus 

A small glimmer of light has appeared in the Cyprus crisis with the re-establish- 
ment of some sort of working relationship between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash. 
Their meeting last Friday was a limited success and today they are meeting again, 
two days ahead of schedule, with a good prospect of reaching agreement at least 
on the release of sick and wounded prisoners and of those under the age of eighteen. 
Much of the credit for this must go to the UN special representative, Mr Luis 
Weckmann. 

Even so, the chances of making much further progress in these "humanitarian" 
discussions remain uncertain, because the humanitarian aspect of the problem is 
not really separable from the political one. If it could be assumed that prisoners 
of war once released would simply return to their former homes, agreement on 
that might be reached quite easily. But Mr Denktash argues that the Turkish 
Cypriot prisoners will not want to go back to their homes in the south of Cyjorus, 
since there they would once again be at the mercy of the hostile Greek Cypriot 
majority. Under the Geneva Convention thejr must have the right to go to the 
place of their choice and this, he says, will normally be the area occupied by the 
Turkish army. 

For Mr Clerides, however, it is clearly intoloral)le that these Turkish Cypriots 
should be encouraged to go and settle in that area so long as the Greek Cypriot 
refugees whose homes are there are not allowed to return. Since Greek-owned 
shops and cafe> in that area are already reopening under Turkish management, 
his attitude is understandable. 

The same problem arises over the Turkish refugees in the British Sovereign Base 
Area at Episkopi. Thej' entered the base of their own free will and are therefore 
refugees, not prisoners. The Turkish government has offered to transfer them to 
the Turkish mainland, obviously intending to transfer them from there to the 
Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus. Normallj^ speaking the response to this offer 
would be something for the refugees themselves, as free men and women, to 
decide. Yet if they want to accept the offer, and if Britain allows them to do so, 



131 

they too will soon be taking over Greek Cypriot property and pre-empting a 
political solution to the conflict. (Mr Denktash, by giving notice that Greek 
Cypriot property will be taken over and Greek smaliholdings leased to Turkish 
Cj'priots, has hardly helped to unravel the political and humanitarian aspects.) 

The truly humanitarian solution would surely be for both Greek and Turkish 
Cj-priots to return to their original homes under UN protection (and for this 
protection to be given also to the Greek Cypriot population which has remained 
in the Turkish-occupied zone, about whose safety Mr Clerides is understandably 
anxious) . Only when all those displaced have been given the chance to go home in 
safety can voluntarj^ migration be fairly allowed. Political negotiations, in what- 
ever forum they are resumed, are now almost certain to end in agreement on the 
principle of an autonomous Turkish Cypriot zone. But the Turks can hardly 
expect a negotiated settlement so long as they appear to be imposing their own 
solution unilaterally and by force. 



[From The Times, (London). Sept. ?5, 19741 
The Need to Let Cypriots Go Home 

The exchange of prisoners of war in Cyprus, agreed on last Friday by Mr. 
Clerides and Mr. Denktash, appears to be going ahead smoothly, though it will be 
ten or twelve daj^s before all five thousand of them are freed. It was possible to 
negotiate this exchange only by presenting it as a "humanitarian" problem. But 
it is far from being without political significance. 

The majority of the prisoners have their homes in the areas where they were 
being held: Greek Cypriots mainly in the area occupied by the Turkish army, and 
Turkish Cypriots almost exclusively in the sovithern zone where the writ of the 
Greek Cypriot administration still runs. They are therefore being offered a choice: 
to return to their homes, thus remaining under "enemy" rule, or to go to the areas 
controlled by their kith and kin, thus becoming in some sense refugees. The 
majority, it appears, are opting for the latter alternative. An important step is thus 
taken towards that "voluntary" redistribution of the population which alone can 
make sense of the Turkish demand for a federation composed of two geographically 
defined autonomous zones. 

The word "voluntary" needs to be put in inverted commas because in reality 
the choices have been largely pre-em]3ted by acts of violence and force. This is 
obvious enough in the case of the Greek Cj^priots. Thejr would certainly want to 
return to their homes if that did not mean being isolated in an area occupied Ijy 
foreign troops, without even the protection of United Nations forces. For the 
Turkish Cypriots there is at least the possibility of UN protection if they return to 
their homes in the south. But UN protection was found tragically wanting for a 
number of their compatriots during the terrible days of July and August. Under- 
standably many of them now feel that, UN or no UN, they can never again live in 
safety in the midst of the Greek Cypriot population. And even those who might 
be willing to take the risk are clearly under strong pressure from the leaders of 
their own community to fall in with the Turkish plan. 

If ]\Ir Clerides accepted such a one-sided "voluntary" solution to the prisoner- 
of-war problem it was no doubt because the number of people involved was 
relatively small. It will clearly he nuich more difficult for him to let the same 
])rinciple apply to the refugee problem. This is in effect what the Turks are asking. 
They want to turn the Turkish Cypriot refugees in the British base at Episkopi 
into a "humanitarian" problem (by describing them as "hostages"), while insist- 
ing that the Greek Cypriot refugees who fled from the Turkish occupation consti- 
tute a political problem. Thus in their view the Turkish Cypriot refugees should 
be allowed to go straight away, not to their homes (where they are free to go any- 
way) but to the Turkish-occupied zone, before the Greek Cypriot refugees are 
allowed to return to their homes which are in that zone. 

That will hardly do. Refugees are, of course, both a political and a humanitarian 
problem. Their humanitarian need is, as Lord Caradon so succinctly put it in his 
article yesterday, to "go safely back to their homes", and it is the task of politi- 
cians on both sides, as well as benevolent third parties, to make that possible. It 
will not be possible so long as Turkey persists in her aim of incori^orating the homes 
of the Greek Cypriot refugees into a new Turkish CjqDriot economj^ closely in- 
tegrated into that of mainland Turkey. It will only be possible when the one- 
sided protection of Turkish troops is replaced by the two-way protection of a much 
stronger United Nations force, with the political backing of a Security Council 
Resolution. 



132 

{From Human Events, Sept. 14. 1974| 
How Kissinger Dropped Ball in Cyprus Crisis 

In a recent article Human Events gave Secretary of State Henry Kissinger higlr 
marks for his handling of the Arab-Israeli negotiations — while noting that his 
performance had left a lot to be desired in his various confrontations with the 
tough-minded negotiators of Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. But the international 
reputation he won for himself as a diplomatic broker through his handling of the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations has been seriously tarnished bj^ his total inability to 
bring his diplomatic talents to bear in the Cyprus crisis. 

It is now obvious that the Cyprus crisis has resulted in a disastrous diplomatic, 
political and military defeat for the United States and NATO, affecting their 
entire position in the Mediterranean and in Europe. Greece is out of NATO — and 
the American naval units and other units of the American Armed Forces now 
stationed in Greece will shortly be forced out of that country. 

The Soviets have been able to present themselves to the Greek people as the 
defenders of Greece against the machinations of the American-Turkish im- 
perialists. And, against the background of this propaganda, Andreas Papandreou, 
a Soviet sj^mpathizer of many years standing, has emerged as one of the most 
prominent and most charismatic figures on the Greek political scene. According 
to some estimates, the Greek Socialist party, whose formation Papandreou re- 
cently announced, may already have the backing of more than a third of the 
Greek electorate. 

NATO's entire southern flank has become a shamliles — and there is reason 
to fear that the crisis will aggravate and accelerate the Soviet machinations 
armed at the total subjugation of the Balkan peninsula. 

Kissinger has excused his failure to act effectively in the Cyprus crisis with a 
plaintive assertion that the United States cannot be expected to solve all the 
world's problems. Certainly the United States did not encourage the coup which 
overthrew the government of Arch]:)ishop Makarios in Cyprus. But before the 
coup took place, was there anything the United States could have done that could 
have avoided the consequences of the supine, maladroit and disastrous policy 
Kissinger has thus far pursued? 

There is reason for believing that we could have done much better — had our 
policy been based on adequate intelligence and foresight and an understanding 
of the forces at work in the area, but so inept has been our policy that it almost 
suggests a total failure of intelligence and a total failure of comprehension oa 
Kissinger's part. 

Had we had adequate intelligence — and it is difficult to believe that on this one 
point we did not have adequate intelligence — we could and should have moved to 
head off the Greek army coujj which overthrew the Makarios regime. 

Had we had adequate intelligence, we should have realized that the Greek coup 
was bound to trigger a Turkish invasion of Cyprus — and that once they had 
landed on Cyprus, the Turks would continue to push until they had effected a de 
facto partition of the island on terms highly favorable to the Turkish minority. 

Had we had any kind of foresight, we should have understood that the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus was bound to trigger the downfall of the Greek military junta — 
and the return of parliamentary government, replete with a large left-wing move- 
ment led by Andreas Papandreou. 

Had we had foresight, we would not have been surprised by Prime Minister 
Karamanlis decision to withdraw from NATO but we would have understood that 
under the circumstances any pro- Western politician who wished to survive had to 
take this action in order to save the country from an immediate takeover by the- 
Papandreou forces. 

Had we had foresight, we wovild have anticipated the perfidious expansionist 
role which the Soviet Union has played in the Cyprus crisis and we would not have 
been surprised by the recent Izvestia article which charged: "In order to achieve 
these aims the imperialist circles do not scorn any means. They inspired 
and organized a military revolt against the government of the country, which was 
legally elected by the people. When the revolt failed, they moved to open military 
intervention." 

The Makarios government was guilty of failing to respect many of the rights 
guaranteed to the Turkish minority under the terms of the Cyprus settlement. 
Turkey and the Turkish minority had legitimate grievances. 

There was much to be said, in view of the irreconcilability of the two parties, ia 
favor of an enforced partition of the island into a Turkish sector and a Greek sector. 
followed by a federation of the two sectors. But we should have made up our minds 



133 

in advance that whatever measures we might advocate, a Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus was something we could no more tolerate than the Greek coup which 
overthrew the Makarios government. We could not tolerate it for the simple 
reason that once Turkish forces went into Cyprus the basic events that have since 
transpired would become utterly inevitable. 

What could we have done then? 

Makarios knew that a coup was in preparation and we must have known that a 
coup was in preparation, too. Armed with this information, we might have let the 
Greek junta know that any such military intervention in C3'prus bv agents of the 
Greek government could not be tolerated and that it was bound to ])rovoke a 
Turkish reaction which would result in disaster for Greece and for NATO. 

On the Turkish side, we might have enhanced our influence by moving to assure 
the Turkish government that we understood and sj-mpathized with the grievances 
of the Turkish minority on Cyprus and that we were prepared to use our influence 
to correct this situation. 

And we might have thrown our weight behind an enforced partition of the island 
into a Tia-kish sector and a Gi'eek sector for the purpose of avoiding the kind of 
murderous comnmnal conflict which is today going on in the island. 

If despite such warnings, the Greek military junta persisted in carrj'ing through 
Avith the coup against Makarios, there would then have been only one way to 
pre-empt the Turkish invasion of Cyprus — and that would have l)een to pre-empt 
the invasion by announcing that we considered his overthrow and the installation 
of the extremist anti-Turkish Sampson government an imminent danger to the 
peace of the area, and by moving ourselves to depose Sampson and reinstall, if not 
Makarios, at least a leader acceptable to the Turks as well as to the Greeks. 

Further than this, we might have moved to dissuade the Turkish government 
from deploying its military forces for action against Cyprus by ])atiently exploring 
with them the many dangers that confront the free world in the Balkans and in the 
Mediterr;uiean and the even greater dangers that were bound to result from an 
actual invasion of Cyjjrus by Turkish forces. 

The Turks could have been presented with a carefully prepared intelligence 
memorandum covering the many evidences of Soviet expansionist intentions in the 
Balkans. Apart from the hard evidence of a Soviet plan to move into Yugoslavia 
in the event of Marshal Tito's death, there have been two other parallel disturbing 
developments over the past six months. At thf Bulgarian Communist party Con- 
gress in March, Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian prime minister, surprised many of 
his own followers by speaking about the possible eventual incorporation of Bulgaria 
into the Soviet Union. 

Shortly after this incident, Marshal Yakubovsky, the Soviet commander of 
the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, visited Rumania for discussions with Ru- 
manian leaders. As the Christian Science Monitor reported, the Rumanians let it 
be known that Yakubovsky had asked for a land corridor for the Red Army 
through Rumania to Bulgaria to which the Rumanians had at this juncture re- 
plied that the Soviet Union had no need for such a land corridor because it had a 
direct sea route from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria. 

It could also have been patiently explained to the Turks that a Turkish in- 
vasion of Cj'prus was bound to result in Greek withdi'awal from NATO with all 
this implies for the security of Turke}* itself, and that it was also bound to result 
in the return of Andreas Papandreou to Greece and in the emergence of a powerful 
movement under his leadership, committed to a pro-Soviet position. 

Indeed, so violent are the passions that have been aroused in Greece by the 
Invasion of Cyprus and so cleverly are the Russians exploiting the militant anti- 
American sentiment that has emerged in the wake of this invasion, that the pos- 
sibilitj' of a Communist Greece in the near future certainly cannot be ruled out. 

And a Soviet Greece and an even more Sovietized Bulgaria would soon make 
any kind of independence, even the very limited independence which today 
exists, quite untenable for either Yugoslavia or Rumania. 

Kissinger's handling of the Cyprus crisis was beyond simple bungling and lack 
foresight. If there was any possibility at all of keeping Greece in NATO and the 
American naval bases in Greece, this possibility became completely forfeit when 
Kissinger decided to tilt toward Turkey. Kissinger, of course, has denied ttiat he 
did tilt. But how else were the Greeks to interpret his statement when, after 
Turkey had broken the initial cease-fire and was aggressively moving its army 
forward. Kissinger said that he was prepared to suspend military shipments to 
both Turkey and Greece? And how were they to interpret his attitude when he 
virtually repudiated Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's warning that the Turks 
had exceeded the limits of the permissible? 



134 

Things have now developed to the point in Cyprus where it would require al- 
most a miracle of diplomacy to pull our chestnuts out of the fire. On the liasis of 
his performance to date in the Cyprus crisis, there is, unfortunately, little reason 
for hoping that Henrj^ Kissinger is capable of such a miracle. 



[From National Review, October 11, 10741 

Out of the Barrel op A Gun 

(By James Burnham) 

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT 

Turkey's military force on Cyprus is overwhelmingly superior to sniy other 
military force on the island. The population of Turkey is four times that of Greece 
and their comparative total military strengths are in about the same ratio. Neithei 
the United States nor any other nation. Western or Communist, pro]50ses direct 
military intervention in Cyprus, Turkey, or Greece. These are the controlling- 
realities from which any estimate of the Cyprus situation must start. 

There are other than military realities. Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus do not 
occupy a sealed off planet. They must take into account not merely the local 
military balance but their own diverse needs, desires, hopes, and fears in relation 
to the nations around them, and to their international commitments. 

This necessity permits some hope that the troubles provoked by the anti- 
Makarious coup might be, not solved — since even the terms of a permanent solu- 
tion are almost impossible to formulate — but tranquilized. The diplomacy of the 
major West Europeean governments, as of the United States, is working activel}- 
and on the whole tactfully to that purpose. Even a temporary cooling off would 
give a chance to repair the damage to NATO and to the relations between the 
Western nations and the three embroiled states. 

LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY 

Since Greece (along with the Greek Cypriote) has lost this round, and lost it 
in a humiliating manner, it is Greece that requires and is getting the most at- 
tention. Everyone sings the praise of the new Greek government, but with Wash- 
ington in the Greek doghouse for the moment, it is Bonn that annoimccs a big 
credit to Athens, France that offers jet fighters, and the European Economic 
Community instead of the U.S. Export-Import Bank that discusses an $800- 
million development program with Karamanlis. Meanwhile Washington keeps 
quiet, the old ambassador slips out of Athens, and the U.S. ships, sailors, and 
airmen based in Greece try to stay invisible. 

Though the local power balance, then, is not the only operative factor, it would 
be an error to suppose that diplomatic therapy, trade deals, and UN palaver can 
do more than moderate its influence. Since the Turks won this round, the political 
result is going to reflect their victory, and will not be pleasing to the Greeks or the 
Greek Cypriots, who lost. 

During the 700 vears since the Turks rsached the eastern Mediterranean lit- 
toral, there have been many precedents in their history for their present-day 
Cyprus problem. In fact, there are two rather close analogies in the history of the 
modern Rei^ublic of Turkey that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created out of the ruins 
of the Ottoman Empire. 

In the preliminary settlement after World War I, Groece was assigned rule 
over a sizable region of western Anatolia in which many of the inhabitants were 
ethnic Greeks. A Greek army went in and based itself on the major Aegean port, 
Smyrna. But in 1922 Kemal won a crushing victory over the Greek army. In 
1923 the Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkish sovereignty over all Anatolia. 
The problem of relations between the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities 
was solved by a massive exchange of populations: more than a million Greeks of 
western Anatolia were shipped to Gre^k national territory, and hundreds of 
thousands of Turks living in Greek Thrace and Macedonia were shipped to 
Anatolia. Smyrna was renamed Izmir. 

There are closer parallels with the Hatay affair in the 1930s. Hatay is a district 
just south of Anatolia along the Mediterranean coast. Its principal city was the 
l)ort of Alexandretta. The World War I settlement had included Hatay in France's 
Syrian mandate. Like all the region, it has been part of the Ottoman Empire. Its 
poiJidation when France took it over included about the same proportion of Turks 
as in Cyprus today. 



135 

Kemal set his course to regain Hatay for the Republic. Turki.sh'settlers were 
sent in. Successive census takings reclassified more and more inhabitants as Turks. 
(The blood of the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean is much intermingled. 
The Turks themselves enjoy stressing their Hittite component, thus pushing 
their presence back to 1500 b.c.) Pressures on the French, who were rather casual 
about their mandate, led in 1936 to a change of Hatay's status to nominal in- 
dependence, imder which regime the Turks rai)idlv expanded their numbers and 
power. In 1939 Ilatay was made a Turkish province. Alexandretta was renamed 
Iskanderun. 

IS IT LIKKLY? 

Let us return to Cyprus. The Turkish army controls the northern 40 per cent of 
the island, in which are located the best of its land and other resources. In thQ,t 
zone three months ago there were 165,000 Greeks and 70,000 Turks. Today about 
25,000 Greeks are left; 140,000 have fled south or are dead. Is it likely that (1) the 
Turks will let the zone revert to Greek-dominated rule? (2) the Turks vrill let the 
refugee Greeks return, or even half of them, and thereby reduce the Turks back 
into a minority, confronting a Greek majority that would become the sea in which 
Greek Cypriot guerrillas from sanctuaries south of the zone could swim? Even if 
all or most of the 60,000 Turkish Cypriots living south of the zone shift inside, 
it seems probable that the Turks will insist that the Greeks remain henceforth a 
minoritv'. 

Meanwhile it is reported that Turkish settlers are crossing from the mainland, 
and that Greek Cypriots are leaving for Greece. Is it inconceivable that a replay 
of the Hatay scenario of 1936 is taking place, and that few yeais from now a 
federated or partitioned Cyprus will wake up one morning as — once more — a 
Turkish province? 

Smyrna-become-Izmir is today the base of the U.S. 6th Tactical Air Force. 
Alexaudretta-become-Iskenderun is a major supply base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. 
Is it excluded that a few years from now a squadron of the Sixth Fleet will be 
operating from the harbor — the Turks are already upgrading it — of Kj-renia 
become whatever the new name will be? 

[From Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 31, 1974, p. 7] 
Wreckage of an Island 

Andreas Petsalides is sorely perplexed. He knows that the Turkish concjuest of 
Northern Cyprus has devastated the economy which he has tended for the past 
six years as Minister of Finance. 

But until the big political questions have been answered, he cannot know either 
the shape or the scale of his problem. Will Cyprus have one economy or two? How 
many of the 200,000 Greek refugees will be able to return home? Will their jobs 
and businesses still be there for them? 

Petsalides, an economist who studied at the London School of Economics and 
Harvard, can only hope for the best and plan for the worst. Sipy:)ing sweet black 
coffee in his office within earshot of the Nicosia Green Line, we surveyed the 
wreckage of Greek Cj-priot prosperity. 

The Turks, Petsalides said, had taken 40 percent of the island but something 
nearer 70 percent of its laroductivt resources. The North had most of the water, 
cereal-growing land, and citrus plantations. In the Lefka area, the Greeks had lost 
60 percent of their mineral deposits — copper and copper pyrites — as well as the 
stone and lime quarries of Kythrea. 

In Kyrenia and Famagusta, they had lost their most lucrative tourist centres. In 
the Nicosia industrial zone and Famagusta, they had lost some of the biggest 
factories. The Minister estimated that Cyprus w as forfeiting £2 millions worth of 
production a day because of the occupation and the disruption. Severe unemploy- 
ment was inevitable for a community that had not seen more than 1.2 percent out 
of work for seven years. 

The standard of living would drop. "If the situation remains unchanged," 
Petsalide's predicted, "if there is no foreign assistance, no settlement, and no 
change in the present arrangements, average income could be cut by half. It is 
alreadj^ clear that it will be down by half this year, even with a peaceful first six 
months. If the situation continues, it will get Avorse and worse." 

Greek Cypriots earned the equivalent of £600 a head last year, but the division 
l^etween peasant and business economies meant that the townspeople lived rather 
more affluently than the statistics suggest. 



136 

In 1973 Cyprus had a small payments deficit of about £6 millions, its first for 
many years. Petsalides is reconciled to a hugf shortfall in 1974. Cyprus does have a 
monetary cushion, but one that Avill wear thin before long. The Banli of Cyprus 
has enough foreign currency to pay for seven months' worth of imports on the old 
scale. Imports will probably go down, but not necessarily in dramatic proportions. 

Petsalides discerned two opposing tendencies. Spending power would be re- 
duced, so that there would be less demand for foreign consumer goods. But Cyprus 
would also need to import to replace lost production at home. 

Even if there is some kind of political settlement, it maj^ be too late for Cyprus's 
more perishable resources. If, for instance, the citrus plantations around Morphou, 
Karavas, and Lapithos are left without water, the trees may be permanently 
destroyed. It takes between 10 and 15 years to bring a tree to full fruit. 

Where then can Petsalides begin? First, the Government is tackling the im- 
mediate problem of refugees — food, water, sanitation — as best it can and with 
what help it can muster. 

It is trjing to find out how many there are, what they need, and how many 
have homes to return to. Then Ministers will need money to provide work and re- 
vive economic activity-. Petsalides will be seeking up to ^^60 millions in foreign 
aid tUl the end of this year alone.