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Full text of "Humayun Badshah"

HUMAYUN ON THE THRONE 



HUMAYUN BADSHAH 



BY 

S. K. BANERJI, M.A., PH.D. (LOND.) 

READER IN INDIAN HISTORY, LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

SIR E. DENISON ROSS 

FORMERLY DIRECTOR, SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL 
STUDIES, LONDON 



HUMPHREY MILFORD 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1938 



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

AMEN HOUSE, LONDON, B.C. 4 

EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 

TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN 

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS 

HUMPHREY MILFORD 

PUBLISHER TO THE 
UNIVERSITY 



PRINTED IN INDIA AT THE MODERN ART PRESS, CALCUTTA 



INTRODUCTION 

It was with great pleasure that I accepted Dr S. K. 
Banerji's invitation to write a few words by way of intro 1 
duction to his Life of the Emperor Humayun, seeing that 
it was under my supervision, at the School of Oriental 
Studies, London, that he prepared his PH.D. thesis on the 
early years of Humayun 's reign. During the two years 
that he spent here I had ample opportunity of seeing his 
work and formed a high opinion of his capacity and 
enthusiasm. 

Since his return to India he has become Reader in 
Indian History at the Lucknow University, and he has 
devoted such leisure as his duties permitted him to the 
expansion of his thesis and a continuation of the life of 
Humayun, with a view to producing a full and definite 
history of that gifted but unfortunate monarch. The 
present volume brings the story down to the defeat of 
Humayun at the hands of Sher Shah in 1540 and his 
consequent abandonment of his Empire : the rest of the 
story will be told in a second volume which is under 
preparation. 

The fact that Dr Banerji will now have at his dis- 
posal two important works Dr Commisariat's History of 
Gujerat and Vol. IV of the Cambridge History of India 
goes to prove how great is the activity of scholars in this 
particular field at the present time. 

The materials for the history of Humayun are very 
rich comprising as they do not merely special biographies 
and special Mughal histories like the Akbar-nama but also 
the local histories of kingdoms with which Humayun was 
in contact or conflict. Dr Banerji has, I believe, con- 
sulted every available authority in Persian, Arabic and 
Hindi and has of course made full use of English writers 
on Indian History. The task he seems to have set himself 



( vi ) 

is to supply not merely the facts but also a kind of run- 
ning commentary on all the main events of Humayun's 
life. He delights in weighing in the balance the evidence 
of conflicting authorities and in setting out in tabular form 
the possible reasons for or against whatever action or 
inaction Humayun is responsible for. At the end of 
several chapters he moreover supplies a useful chrono- 
logical summary of the events therein dealt with. 

Especially full are Dr Banerji's chapters on Huma- 
yun's dealings with Sultan Bahadur of Gujrat, and here 
he has had at his disposal a number of texts which were 
not known (or available) to Erskine or Bayley when they 
wrote on this subject. The details of the great battles of 
Chausa (1539) and Qanauj (1540) are well put together 
and are accompanied by carefully prepared sketch plans 
illustrating the progress of the fights. 

I have not yet had the opportunity of seeing more 
than the proofs of this volume, but I feel sure that the 
bibliography will be found complete and if, when the book 
is finished, the index is up to the standard of the text, 
students will have a really comprehensive work of 
reference for this important period. 

In conclusion I wish to congratulate Dr Banerji on 
what he has already achieved and to say how much I look 
forward to the appearance of this volume. 

E. DENISON Ross 
LONDON 
28 December 1937 



PREFACE 

This book on Humayun Badshah has grown out of the 
thesis approved by London University in 1925 for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I have utilized these 
thirteen years to recast the entire thing. The original six 
chapters have been expanded into twenty; faulty or un- 
tenable reasoning has been omitted; useless details have 
been excised; and the conclusions re-sifted. 

This volume deals, primarily, with three great men 
of the period: Humayun the Mughal, Sher Shah the 
Afghan, and Bahadur the Gujrati. Besides dealing with 
their political achievements, I have attempted to assess 
their contributions to Culture and Administration. 
Humayun 's noble mission in founding Din-panah, Sher 
Shah's lofty ideals of government, and Bahadur's solici- 
tude for the well-being of the Gujratis, provide a set-off to 
the narrative of their political exploits or their selfish 
schemes against one another. I have also indicated the 
political relationship of a Muslim king to his Muslim or 
non-Muslim neighbours. 

New light has been thrown on several controversial 
questions: the succession question after Babur's death; 
Humayun's relation with his rival, Mahdi Khwdja, and the 
Khalifa, Babur's minister; Kamran's occupation of the 
Punjab and his relations with Humayun; the strategic 
importance of Humayun's march to Gwalior, to Sarang- 
pur, to Ujjain, and to Mandasor; Sher Khan's behaviour 
on the battlefield at Dadrah; Humayun's continued 
neglect of Sher Khan till July, 1537; Humayun's march 
against Sher Khan to help Mahmud of Bengal; and Sher 
Khan's occupation of Rohtasgarh, and his behaviour 
towards the Raja. Without laying claim to finality of 
views, I may state that my conclusions represent careful 
evaluation of the data available. 



( viii ) 

I would like to mention the two special features of 
this book: (i) the brief description of important towns 
like Chunar, Kalinjar, Gaur, Jaunpur, etc., and (2) at the 
end of most chapters, a list of principal events with their 
dates. 

I have sacrificed manner to matter and have avoided 
prolixity of language as best I could. I have attempted 
to spell correctly and mark diactrically every proper 
name or unfamiliar word. Where there is more than one 
spelling prevalent, I have selected either Mrs A. Beve- 
ridge's spelling in the Babur-nama, or that adopted in the 
Cambridge History of India, Vols, III and IV. In words 
like Shah Jahan, Jahangir, Jalaluddm, I have adopted the 
Indian pronunciation and rejected the spellings Jehan or 
Jelal, prevalent in Iran and hence considered more correct. 

I have always maintained that the study of the 
Mughals is not merely of academic interest : it is intensely 
practical, and, I may add, purposeful. Mughal Culture 
and Civilization filtered through India's mediaeval society; 
Mughal art and architecture enriched India's artistic 
heritage; and Mughal ideas and ideals of government 
influenced the development of Indian polity. Thus our 
present, which has its roots buried in its past, bears an 
unmistakable Mughal impress; and it is the duty of the 
historian properly to assess the Mughal contribution to the 
evolution of our national life. In the next volume, I hope 
to finish the political history of the rest of Humayun's 
reign, and to take up topics like Humayun's religion, 
Mughal painting and literature, Mughal art and architec- 
ture, and the Mughal system of administration. 

I am deeply indebted to Sir E. Denison Ross, 
formerly Director of the School of Oriental Studies, 
London, for making me share in his love for the Mughals, 
for initiating me into the methods of research, for his 
affectionate guidance of my work in London, and for 
helpful discussions on the various problems that arose in 
the course of study. I cannot adequately express my 



gratitude to him for contributing an Introduction to this 
book. It is a melancholy fact that the book could not be 
published in the lifetime of Sir W. Haig at whose sugges- 
tion it was thoroughly revised and to whom I was indebted 
for several valuable suggestions. 

I owe the two pictures, which are photographs of those 
preserved in the Alwar State Library, to the patronage of 
Alwar Durbar. My grateful thanks are due to Major 
Prior, the Prime Minister, and to my esteemed friend, 
Mr Babu Prasad, the Customs and Excise Commissioner 
and Assistant Advisory Minister of the State. 

I am indebted to the editors of the journals who 
published several chapters of my book and permitted me 
to incorporate them in the present work : Indian Culture, 
Calcutta, The Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta, The 
Journal of Indian History, Madras and The U. P. 
Historical Society Journal, Allahabad. 

I must here mention the help I obtained from Mr N. 
Bose and my pupil, Mr K. Mathur, B.A. (Hons.), M.A., 
ex-Fellow of Lucknow University, in revising the manu- 
script. Both of them went patiently through the self- 
imposed task and many improvements in expression and in 
the treatment of the subject are due to them. Mr Mathur 
also read the proofs. My thanks are also due to Dr 
Radha Kumud Mukherji, M.A., PH.D., P.R.S., Professor of 
Indian History, University of Lucknow, for his helpful 
suggestions. I should also like to record the enormous 
patience shown by the Modern Art Press in dealing with 
my numerous corrected proofs. But for the manager's 
interest in its printing, my book would not have been 
published so early. Lastly, I should like to thank the 
Oxford University Press for agreeing to be the publishers 
of my book. 

S. K. BANERJI 

The University 
LUCKNOW 
January 1938 



CONTENTS 



I HUMAYON, THE PRINCE (1508-30 A. D.) ... I 

The birth of the prince, its significance his mother, 
Maham Begam the prince's education study of 
languages administrative and military training 
the battle of Panipat a campaign against the 
eastern Afghans the battle of Khanwah 
governor of Badakhshan sudden return to Agra 
stay in Sambhal the prince's illness Babur's 
illness and death. 

II HVMAYON'S SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE 

(December, 1530 A. D.) ... ... ... 17 

Humayun nominated as successor by Babur the 
Khalifa's dislike for him- choice of Mahdi Khwaja 
for the throne Mahdi Khwaja' s personage and 
career his arrogance and evil intentions the 
Khalifa's rejection of him Mrs Beveridge's sub- 
stitution of Md. Zaman M. for Mahdi Khwaja her 
reasons our difficulties in accepting her arguments 
later history of the Khalifa and Mahdi Khwaja. 

III THE OPENING YEAR OF HUMAYCN'S REIGN- 

EXPEDITION TO KALINJAR (1530-31 A. D.j ... 28 

Humayun's accession to the throne rewards and 
festivities the boundaries and the state of the 
Mughal kingdom the problems for the Mughals 
and their solutions Humayun's campaign against 
Kalinjar its geography and past history end of 
Humayun's campaign terms of treaty with the 
Raja. 

IV HUMAYON'S FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST THE 

AFGHANS (1532-33 A. D.) ... ... ... 37 

Sultan Mahmud Lodl's attempts to fight against the 
Mughals the Afghans in South Bihar their rebel- 
lion against Ibrahim Lodi under Darya Khan Nuham 
and under his son, Sultan Muhammad Shah the 
Sultan's death and accession of his minor son, 
' Jalaluddm Sher Khan, minister and tutor the 
jealousy between Sher Khan and the Nuhanls the 
Ntihani desertion to the ruler of Bengal advent of 



( xii ) 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Sultan Mahmud Lodi to S. Biharthe battle of 
Dadrah Sher Khan's part in the battle Humayun 
at Chunar Sher Khan's wealth and power the 
treaty of Chunar between Humayun and Sher Khan 
Humayun' s return to Agra. 

V HUMAYCN'S EARLY RELATIONS WITH K AMR AN 

(1514-33 A. D.) ... ... ... ... 51 

Kamran, governor of Kabul and Qandahar 
Babur's policy of treating him as almost Humayun' s 
equal At Humayun's accession, Kamran not grant- 
ed any additional territory the prince's attack on 
Lahore and its occupation Erskine's mistaken 
views of Kamran's relations \\ith Humayun 
Kamran' s coins do not support Erskine's views 
Humayun did not resent Kamran's attack on 
Lahore retention of Lahore and Multan by Kamran 
complimentary verses exchanged. 

VI THE FOUNDATION OF DIN-PANAH, July, 1533 

April, 1534 A. D. THE STATE FESTIVITIES ... 58 

The festivities at Agra their effect on Bahadur 
Maham Begam's illness and death her character 
and work the foundation of Din-panah Humayun's 
object in founding the city the ruins of Din-panah 
as seen to-day Masjid-i-Qila-t-kohna and SliPr 
Mandal the 'mystic' feast Hindal's marriage and 
feast Bega Begam's protest against Humayun's 
neglect of his wives. 

VII MUHAMMAD ZAMAN MIRZA'S REBELLION- 
SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE AFGHANS, 
1534 A. D. ... ... ... ... 68 

Muhammad Zaman M. and Muhammad Sultan M. 
their previous history rebellion and capture 
prosperity of the Afghans under Sher Khan his 
policy towards his countrymen his relations with 
the ruler of Bengal and Makhdum-i-Alam, the 
governor of Hajlpur his campaigns against Bengal 
Humayun's march against the Afghans followed 
by a hasty return. 

VIII BAHADUR SHAH OF GUJRAT (1526-37 A. D.) ... 74 

Gujrat its geography, products, industries, and 
past history its rulers Bahadur's career as prince 
in Sultan Ibrahim's camp invited to be king of 



CHAPTER PAGE 

Jaunpur and of Gujrat his choice of the latter 
Bahadur's achievements success against the 
neighbouring Muslim kings, the Portuguese, and 
the Rajputs of Chitor the first siege of Chitor 
followed by a treaty the capture of Ajmer and 
Nagore the second siege of Chitor and its capture 
by the Gujrat king. 

IX SULTAN BAHADUR SHAH OF GUJRAT AND THE 
PRINCELY REFUGEES FROM THE MUGHAL 
KINGDOM (1534 A. D.) ... ... ... 90 

The Afghan refugees in Bahadur's court Alam 
Khan Jighat and Alam Khan Alauddm Lodi Alam 
Khan Alauddin's pretensions to the Delhi throne 
the Mughal refugees Md. Zaman M. the rivalry 
between the Afghan and the Mughal refugees the 
Afghan attacks on the Mughal kingdom the battle 
ol Manclrael and death of Tatar Khan Bahadur 
and Md. Zaman M. 

X THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HUM A YON 
BADSHAH AND SULTAN BAHADUR SHAH OF 
GUJRAT (1534-35 A. D.) ... ... ... 99 

Humayun's first letter requesting Bahadur not to 
harbour fugitives from Delhi Bahadur's first reply 
assuring Humayuri of the fulfilment of his request 
Humayun's second letter protesting against Md. 
Zaman's reception by Bahadur and warning him of 
serious consequences Bahadur's second conciliatory 
reply Humayun's third letter and Bahadur's reply 
Humayun's fourth letter the general question 
of sheltering refugees by a neighbouring king and 
his reference to events in Timur's time Bahadur's 
fourth letter written in a boastful strain other 
stray verses used in the correspondence Mediaeval 
Muslim Diplomacy and the Muslim States' attitude 
towards the Hindu States the political refugees. 

XI HUMAYON'S MARCH TO UJJAIN THE CAPTURE 
OF CHITOR BY BAHADUR SHAH, March, 1535 
A. D. THE BATTLE OF MANDASOR, April, 
1535 A. D. ... ... ... ... 118 

Humayun's march to Sarangpur and Ujjain 
Bahadur's gunner, Rumi Khan Humayun pro- 
ceeded to Mandasor the Mughals besieged the 
Sultan Bahadur's flight to Mandu. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XII THE FLIGHT OF BAHADUR SHAH THE FALL OF 

MANDC, CAMBAY, and CHAMPANIR (1535 A. D) ... 130 

The proposed settlement between Humayun and 
Bahadur sudden attack of the Mughals on Mandu 
and Bahadur's flight the sack of Mandu and its 
consequences Bahadur's flight continued to 
Champanlr, Cambay, and Dm Bahadur and the 
Portuguese Humay tin's capture of Champanir 
completion of the Mughal conquest of Central 
Gujrat. 

XIII HUMAYCN AT CHAMPANIR THE FALL OF 

AHMADABAD THE MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION 

OF GUJRAT (1535 A. D.) ... ... ... 146 

Humayun obtained possession of large wealth its 
distribution among his followers and its conse- 
quences a mad scheme of conquest of the South 
and Humayun' s severe punishment of the ring- 
leaders Humayun remitted land-revenue its conse- 
quences Imad-ul-Mulk's rebellion and defeat the 
distribution of jdgir among the Mughal officers 
Askari was appointed Viceroy Humayun' s stay in 
Malwa. 

XIV THE RECOVERY OF GUJRAT BY SULTAN 

BAHADUR SHAH, AND RETREAT OF HUMAYON 
FROM MALWA (1535-36 A. D.) ... ... 158 

Dissipation among the Mughal officers revolt of the 
Gujraias the Mughal loss of Navasarl, Surat, Broach, 
Cambay and Patan Askari at Ahmadabad flight 
of his foster-brother to Bahadur the Sultan's attack 
on Ahmadabad Askari's retreat first to Champanir, 
and then to Agra Humayun' s evacuation of Malwa 
the defects in Humayun as administrator the 
Rajput recovery of Chitor. 

XV THE DISAFFECTION OF THE MIRZAS (1536-40 A. D.) 169 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza's flight to Sindh and 
Lahore his return to Gujrat his aspiration to 
succeed Bahadur the opposition of the Gujratis 
Muhammad Zaman' s second flight to Sindh recon- 
ciliation with Humayun Muhammad Sultan M. 
genealogy rebellion in Humayun' s absence 
Hindal's victories Muhammad Sultan's flight to 
Biharkunda, 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XVI SHER SHAH'S EARLY CAREER (1472-1536 A. D.) ... 179 

Farid's early days study at Jaunpur eminence of 
Jaunpur Farid's administration in his jdglr his 
principles of administration an estimate of his 
work Farid in Sultan Ibrahim's court at Agra as 
mansabddr quarrel with his brother and neighbour, 
Muhammad Khan Sur Farld with Sultan Muham- 
mad Shah his services to his master Muhammad 
Khan Sur's attempt to deprive him ot his jagir 
Sher Khan's success with the help ot the Mughal 
soldiers Sher Khan befriends Muhammad Khan 
Sher Khan in Babur's court again in Sultan 
Muhammad's service his ministry under Sultan 
Muhammad and his son, Jalaluddm the Nuham 
desertion to Bengal Sultan Mahmud Lodi's arrival, 
defeat, and retirement, Sher Khan's victories 
against Bengal the battle of Surajgarh. 

XVII HUMAYCN'S INVASION AND CONQUEST OF 

BENGAL (July, 1537 August, 1538 A. D.) ... 195 

Humayun's stay in Agra reasons Mahmud Shah, 
king of Bengal his defeats at Sher Khan's hand 
asked the Portuguese for help Sher Khan fore- 
stalled it by an immediate attack Humayun, in 
his turn, attacked the Afghans reasons for his stay 
at Chunar instead of a rapid march to Bengal the 
fall of Chunar Sher Khan's capture of Gaur and 
removal of wealth to Rohtasgarh Humayun's settle- 
ment with Sher Khan not carried out by either 
party Humayun's meeting with Sultan Mahmud of 
Bengal march to Bengal Jalal Khan Sur's opposi- 
tion at Teliagarhi Humayun reached Gaur. 

XVIII HUMAYCN AT GAUR, AND HIS RETREAT TO 

CHAUSA (August, 1538 April, 1539 A. D.) ... 211 

Humayun's first reforms and later neglect of ad- 
ministration his prolonged stay in Gaur, renamed 
Jannatabad his perilous situation HindaTs indis- 
cretion at Agra murder of Shaikh Buhlul Shr 
Khan's capture of Tirhoot, Benares, Kara, 
Bahraich, Qanauj, and Sambhal, Humayun's 
retreat from Gaur in three divisions Askari and 
Muwaiid Beg act as his advisers Humayun's 
march to Chausa further attempt at settlement 
frustrated by a sudden attack on the Mughal camp. 



( xvi ) 



CHAPTER 

XIX THE BATTLES OF CHAUSA, June 26, 1539 A. D., 
AND OF QANAUJ, May 17, 1540 A. D. ... 

The description of the first battle Sher Khan sur- 
prised and surrounded the Mughal camp the battle 
ended in a Mughal rout Sher Khan went to Gaur 
and assumed sovereignty Humayun reached Agra 
made preparations for a second battle Kamran's 
hostility and departure to Lahore Humayun pro- 
ceeded to Qanauj the two armies faced each other 
for several weeks the movements leading to the 
actual battle its description the causes of the 
Mughal defeat and criticism of Haidar Mirza's state- 
ments in the Tdrikh-i-Rasfadl. 

XX THE KING'S FLIGHT TO AGRA AND TO THE 
PUNJAB REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE AS 
KING 

TABLE OF HIJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

APPENDIX I 

APPENDIX II 

INDEX 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS, DIAGRAMS 
AND SKETCHES 

Humayun on the throne ... ... ... Frontispiece 

The genealogy of Sulaiman Mirza ... ... ... 12 

The genealogy of Isan Timur Sultan and Tukhta Bugha Sultan ... 14 

Babur, Humayun and Mirza Hushiyai ... ... facing page 17 

The comparative distance of Bahadur's and Humayun' s camps 

from Ahmadabad, position i ... ... ...119 

The same, position 2 ... ... ... ... 123 

The movements of the Mughal army near Ahmadabad ... 154 

The distribution of jdgir in Gujrat among the Mughal officers ... 155 

The genealogy of Muhammad Sultan Mirza and his sons ... 175 

The Mughal and the Afghan camps at Chausa ... ... 228 

The Afghans attack on the Mughals at Chausa ... ... 229 

The battle of Qanauj, position i ... ... ... 244 

The battle of Qanauj, position 2 ... ... ... 245 

The battle of Qanauj, position 3 ... ... ... 246 



ABBREVIATIONS 

A. A. Abul Fazl: Aln-i-Akbarl, 3 Vols., edited by H. Blochmann and 
H. S. Jarrett. Bibliotheca Indica Series. 

ABBAS Abbas Khan Sarwani: Tuhfa-i-Akbar Shdhi or Tdrikh-i-Sher 
Shdhi. MS. Copy, Or. 164 of the British Museum or the Copy 
of the Allahabad University. 

A. H. G. Abdullah Muhammad bin Omar: The Arabic History of 
Gujrat, edited by Sir E. Denison Ross, J. Murray, London, 1910. 

A. N. Abul Fazl: Akbar-ndma, text and English translation, edited by 
H. Bevendge. Bib. Ind. Series. Persian MS. Copy, Add. 27247 of 
the Br. Museum. 

A. T. W. H. G. Mir Abu Turab Wall: The History of Gujrat, edited 

by Sir E. Denison Ross. Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909. 

BADAUNI Abdul Qadir Badaum: Muntakhab-ut-Tawdrlkh, text and 
translation of the Bib. Ind. Series. Persian text also published by 
Nevval Kishore Press. MS. Copy, Add. 6581 of the Br. Mus. 

BARNES Ernest Barnes: An article on 'Dhdra and Mandu' in the J. R. 
A. S. B. B., 1903, Vol. XXI. 

BIB. IND. The Bibliotheca Indica. 

B. L. H. P. Browne : The Literary History of Persia, 4 Vols. T. Fishei 

Unwin, London, 1908. 

BR. Mus. The British Museum Library, London. 

B. M. A. Bakhtawar Khan: Mirdt-ul-Alam. MS. Copy 23530 of the 
Br. Mus. 

B. N. The Bdbur-ndma, English translation by Mrs Beveridge. Luzac, 

1922. 

CAMPOS Campos: The History of the Portuguese in Bengal. Butter- 
worth, 1919 A. D. 

C. H. I. The Cambridge History of India, Vol. Ill, edited by Sir W. 

Haig. The University Press, Cambridge, 1928. 

COMMISSARIAT Commissariat : The articles on ' A Brief History of 
the Gujrat Sultanate ' in the J. R. A. S. B. B., 1918-19 A. D. 

DANVERS Danvers: The Portuguese in India, 2 Vols. Allen & Co., 

1894- 
BORN Darn: The History of the Afghans, English translation of 

Nimatullah's Mafyhzan-i-Afaghina* J. Murray, 1829. 



( xx ) 

E. H. I. Erskine: The History of India, (Babur and Humayun) 

2 Vols. Longmans, 1854 A. D. 

ELLIOT Elliot and Dowson : The History of India as told by its own 
Historians, 8 Vols. Trubner & Co., 1872. 

FARISHTA Mulla Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah: Tdrikh-i-Fanshta, 
MS. Copy, Add. 6569 of the Br. Mus., another in possession of the 
author. Printed edition of Newal Kishore Press. 

F. D. P. P. Fenshawe: Delhi, Past and Present. J. Murray, 1902. 

GARCIA ' Garcia d'Orta of Bombay/ an article in J. R. A. S. B. B., 
1922-23 A. D. 

G. H. N. Gulbadan Begam: Humdyun-ndwa, edited by Mrs Beveridge, 

Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, 1902. 

H. H. Lachmi Narain Shafiq Aurangabadi : Haqiqathdi-Hmdustdn, MS. 
Copy 93 of Bankipur Oriental Library. 

H. R. T. B.Haft-Risdla-i-Taqwtm-i-Bulddn. MS. Copy, 43 of the 
Imperial Library, Buhar Section, Calcutta. 

IBN BATUTA H. A. R. Gibb: Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa. 
G. Routledge, 1929. 

JAUHAR Jauhar: Tazkirat-ul-Wdqidt, MS. Copy 16711 of the Br. Mus. 
Translation by Stewart, Bangabasi Press, 1904. 

J. R. A. S. B. B. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay 

Branch. 

J. B. O. R. S. The Journal of the Bihar and Onssa Research Society. 
KENNEDY Kennedy: An article on ' Hidaya ' in the /. R. A. S., 1835. 

KHWANDAMIR Khwandamir: Humdyun-ndma, MS. Copy Or. 1762 of 
the Br. Mus. and extracts of the translation in Elliot and Dowson, 
Vol. V, pp. 116-26. 

KH. T. Sujan Rai: Khuldsat-ut-Tawdnkh, MS. Copy 5559 of the Br. 
Mus. 

M. A. S. M. I. Moreland: The Agrarian System of Moslem India. W. 
Heffer, Cambridge, 1929. 

M. R. Mulla Abdul Baqi Nahavandi: Madsir-i-Rahimi. Bib. Ind. 
Series, 1924. 

M. S. Sikandar Khan bin Ahmad: Mirdt-i-Sikandari, several MS. 
Copies, (i) Add. 27253 of the Br. Mus., (2) of the Asiatic Society 
of Bengal, (3) of Alwar State Library. 

M. U. Shah Nawaz Khan : Madsir-.ul-Umard, 3 Vols. Bib. Ind. Series, 
1891. 

QANUNGO Qanungo: Sher Shah. M. C. Sarkar & Co., 1921. 
RAS MALA Forbes: Rds Maid, 2 Vols., edited by H. G. Rawlinson, 
Oxford University Press, 1924. 



R. S. Ghulam Husain Salim : Riydz-us~Saldtln. Bib. Ind. Series, 1890. 

R. T. Tahir Muhammad: Rauzat-ut-Tahirin, MS. Copy Or. 168 of the 
Br. Mus. 

SARAN P Saran: An article on 'The Date and Place of Sher Shah's 
Birth ' in J. B. O. R. S., Vol. XX, Part I. 1934. 

T. A. Nizamuddin Ahmad : Tabaqat-i-Akbari, MS. Copy Add. 6543 of 
the Br. Mus. Printed edition of Newal Kishore Press. 

T. N. Minhaj-i-Siraj : Tabaqat-i-Ndsiri, Persian text or the English 
translation. Bib. Ind. Series. 

T. A. Mulla Muhammad Ahmad and Jafar Beg Asaf Khan: Tdrikh-i- 
Al]\, MS. Copy Or. 465 of the Br. Mus. 

TARIKH-I-DAUDI Abdullah: Tarikh-i-Daudl, MS. Copy Or 197 of the 
Br. Mus. 

TIEFFENTHALER Father Tieffenthaler : Description de I'Inde, printed 
copy (of 1786 A. D.) in the Imperial Library, Calcutta. 

U. R. I. Gauri Shankar Ojha: Udaipur Rdjya ka Itihds, 2 Vols.. 
(in Hindi). Vaidic Press, Ajmer, 1928 



CHAPTER I 
HUMAYUN, THE PRINCE 1508-30 A. D. 

Before the birth of his son, Babur 's career had been 
a chequered one. He succeeded his father, Umar Shaikh 
Mirza, as the ruler of Farghana in 1494 A.D., but imme- 
diately after got involved in a desperate struggle with his 
two uncles. Providence seems to have averted Babur 's 
danger by the spread of an epidemic in the enemy's camp 
and by the removal of his two uncles by death. Two years 
later, he became the ruler of the far-famed Samarqand, 
only to lose it immediately after. Once more fortune 
smiled on him and in 1500 A. D., he became the chief of 
Samarqand. A much more powerful enemy appeared 
now. Shaibani Khan, the head of the Uzbegs, defeated 
Babur at the battle of Sar-i-pul, and drove him out of 
Samarqand (1501-2 A. D.). Three years later (October, 
1504 A.D.), Babur obtained possession of Kabul and 
Ghazni. At Kabul, on March 6, 1508 A. D., his 
eldest son Nasiruddin Muhammad Humayun Mirza 
was born. 1 The birth of the son was of some signi- 
ficance to the father. The Timurids were scattered over 
the whole of Central Asia, and were, one by one, succumb- 
ing to the Uzbeg onslaughts or to domestic foes. The last 
to fall were Sultan Husain Bai-qara (1506 A. D.) and his 
sons (1507 A. D.) and, at the beginning of 1508 A. D., 
Babur was the only Timurid who could pride himself on 
being a chieftain of a considerable area. His rule had 
been popular and he had asserted himself against Muqim 
Arghun and his minister Baqi Chaghaniam. Now, in 
March, 1508 A. D., the birth of a son established his posi- 
tion considerably. He was not to be looked upon as a 
mere adventurer who conquered, established peace and 

1 4th Zul-qada, 913 A. H. 



C 2 ] 

order for a while, and then sank into oblivion. The birth 
of a son ensured the continuity of his line and the principles 
of his government. The occasion was marked by rejoic- 
ings amidst which he assumed the higher title of 
Padshah in preference to that of the Mirza so long used 
by him. Babur himself describes the assumption of sove- 
reignty thus: "All the begs, small and great, brought 
gifts ; such a mass of white tankas was heaped up as had 
never been seen before." The chronograms 1 'Shah-i- 
firuz qadr/ (Shah of the victorious opulence), and 
' Padshah-i-saf-shikan,' (rank-breaking king) indicate the' 
significance of the birth of a son to Babur. 

Mrs. Beveridge misses the connexion between the 
birth of Humayun and his father's assumption of the title 
of Padshah. 2 When she says, "The order of events for- 
bids/' 3 it is not clear to us how she could maintain this 
position and reject the following explicit statement of 
Gulbadan Begam, Humayun 's sister and talented author 
of the contemporary work, the Humdyun-ndma : 'That 
same year His Majesty was pleased to order the Amirs and 
the rest of the world to style him Emperor (Padshah) . For 
before the birth of Emperor Humayun, he had been 
named and styled Mirza Babur... In the year of His 
Majesty Humayun's birth he styled himself padshah.'* 

Humayun 's mother was Maham Begam. Babur 
married her in Herat (1506 A. D.) when he went on a visit 
to Sultan Husain Bai-qara. She was a relation of the 
Sultan and was descended from Ahmad of Turbat-i-Jam, 
a distinguished saint of Khurasan. These two facts indi- 
cate that she was a Shla. 5 The difference of sect did not 



1 Other chronograms were (i) Sultan Humayun Khan, (li) Khush 
bad. Khush bash as given by some, would be wide of the mark by 
nearly 3 centuries. ^^ <Ju* lfcj^ gives only 853. Beveridge proposes 

to add in (he) to make it 913. 

2 See B. tf*. p. 344. 
8 Ibid. no. 2. 

4 p. 90. . 

6 Sultan Husain was an ardent follower of Shlism. See Brown's 
Liter/try History of Persia, Vol. IV, p. 63. 



mar the cordial relations of the husband and the wife ; for 
according to Mrs. Beveridge, 1 she was to Babur what 
Ayisha was to Mahammad. We shall consider Mrs. 
Beveridge's surmises of the ignoble birth of Maham in the 
following chapter. 

We are not given the details of the commencement of 
the prince's study but we know that a Muslim child begins 
its studies at the age of 4 lunar years, 4 months and 4 
days. 2 A scholarly family like that of Babur, would be 
expected to follow the usual custom. Humayun was 
Babur's favourite child. Gulbadan Begam quotes Babur's 
words, ' Maham ! although I have other sons, I love none 
as I love Humayun/ 3 Babur, then, must have paid due 
attention to his son's education. In the Babur-nama we get 
glimpses of his interest in his son's studies, for example, 
when in January, 1526 A. D., before the battle of Panipat, 
he captured Milwat, 4 he presented some of the books of 
Ghazi Kfcan Lodi's library to Humayun. Again, in his 
letter to his son, 5 he criticises the word Al-aman as applied 
by Humayun to his newly-born son, then his last letter, its 
style and spelling, and finally advises him to give up orna- 
mentations which obscure the real meaning. As he says/ 
' In future write without elaboration, use plain clear words. 
So will the trouble to thy readers be less ' ! He sent on 
other occasions 7 some of his own compositions to the 
prince. 

Humayun is supposed to have picked up four different 
languages TurkI, Arabic, Persian and Hindi. Turk! was 
his mother-tongue and spoken by most of his relations, 
male and female, who all had recently migrated from 
Turkistan. The study of Arabic was compulsory for every 



1 G. H. N. f p. 256. 

2 See Law's Promotion of Learning in India, Vol. I, p. 128 and 
Herklot's Islam in India, (Oxford University Press edition), Ch, IV. 

a G. H. N. t fol. i;-a. 

In the Jhelam District. Jarrett calls it Malot, see Vol. II, p. 325. 

5 B. N. t pp. 624-8, written in November, 1528 A. D. 

B. N., p. 627. 

7 e.g.. January, 1528 A. D. 



[ 4 1 

Muslim; in fact, the initiation into studies was made 
through the Arabic Quran. 1 Every child had to learn it 
by rote and recite its verses in religious assemblies. In 
Persian, a diwdn of his has come down to us containing a 
large number of ghazals and rubdis of his composition. 2 In 
several of the Persian works the Akbar-nama? Turab 
Wali's Tarikh-i-Gujrat* Farishta's general history 5 and 
others, may be found stray verses of the prince. He had 
also a taste for mathematics, philosophy, astronomy and 
astrology. 6 

But studies did not form the sole occupation of the 
prince. When Babur undertook a campaign against the 
Lodis of India, Humayun was expected to take his full 
share in it. On the battlefield of Panipat, fought on 
April 20, 1526 A. D., 7 he commanded the right inner wing 
of the army and with him were other tried warriors like 
Khwaja Kalan and Hindu Beg. How the battle was won 
by noon by Babur 's artillery and tactics may. be read 
elsewhere. We shall be content to remark that Humayun 
played a responsible part in the battle. 

After the battle, the prince was sent to take possession 
of the city of Agra, one of the two capitals of the Lodi 
Empire. He reached there on May 4, and finding that the 
enemies Malik Dad Karani, Mill! Surduk and Firuz Khan 
Mewati intended to resist him, he prepared to lay siege 
to the city until Babur arrived. Although the town and its 
treasury were at his disposal, he stayed outside the town 
guarding the roads leading into it and preventing his men, 
who had grown somewhat slack in discipline since the battle 
of Panipat, from plundering the inhabitants. 



1 See Herklot's Islam in India by Crooke, Chap. IV. 

2 One such may be seen in the Bankipore Library. 

3 See pp. 127, 179, 271, 278, 362, 368. 

4 Ross's edition, p. 7. 

6 Newal Kishore Press edition, pp. 243-44. 

6 The subject will be taken up more fully when dealing with his 
character and learning. 

* 8th Rajab, 932 A. H. 



[ 5 ] 

A day or two later, he obtained a victory over Bikra- 
majit of the Gwalior family, the Raja dying on the battle- 
field. The vanquished offered him ' the famous diamond 
which ' Alauddm must have brought/ and which has now 
been identified with the Koh-i-nur. When the prince offered 
it to Babur, the latter generously allowed him to retain it. 
Babur gives the details of the diamond. He says that it 
was 8 misqals in weight and was appraised as equal in value 
to two and a half days' food for the whole world. Accord- 
ing to the Indian weight-measures of his time, which he 
himself gives, 1 the weight of the diamond comes to 3^ tolas. 
When Babur arrived a few days later and the garrison 
surrendered, he at first proposed to inflict capital punish- 
ment on the chiefs of the garrison ; but when others inter- 
ceded for one of them, Malik Dad Karani, Babur in his 
characteristic generosity pardoned them all, restored their 
goods, and took them into favour. Another instance of his 
generosity may be mentioned here. Ibrahim's mother, 
who was also a captive, was granted a pargana worth seven 
lakhs of double dams or 35,000 rupees a year. 

After he had occupied the region commanded by Delhi 
and Agra, he set about to reward his followers. Humayun 
as the eldest son got the highest reward, viz., 70 lakhs of 
dams, an uncounted treasure-house, and the jdgir of 
Sambhal in addition to Hisar Firuza already granted 
during Babur's march through the Punjab to the battle- 
field of Panipat. Since Farishta mentions the same amount 
to be equivalent to 3^ lakhs of rupees, 2 it is clear that Babur 
was counting in double dams. 3 All the other generals and 
soldiers were rewarded according to their ranks and the 
distinctions attained in the battle. But Babur did not stop 
here. After rewarding his immediate followers, he sent 
rewards to his relations in Samarqand, Khurasan, Kash- 
ghar and Iraq, the holy men of Samarqand, Khurasan, 



1 See B. N , p. 517. 

2 N. K. Press edition, p. 206. 

3 For a full discussion of Babur's coin see Erskine, History of India, 
Vol. I, Appendix E. 



[ 6 ] 

Makka and Madina and, as if these were not enough, he 
sent ' one Shdhruktti for every soul in the country-side of 
Kabul and the valley-side of Varsak, 1 man and woman, 
bond and free, of age or nonage.' 2 This extravagance 
earned him, according to Farishta, the title of qalandar or 
dervish, and Babur seems to have accepted it with good 
grace; for at the Ajudhya mosque is inscribed the line: 
' Babur, the qalandar, is well known in the world as king/ 3 
The extravagance was deprecated by the Indian nobles, 4 
and it caused financial embarrassment to the king 2\ years 
later. Babur himself records, 'By this time (October, 
1528 A.D.) the treasure of Iskandar and Ibrahim in Delhi 
and Agra was at an end.' He had to tax the stipendiaries 
to the extent of 30 per cent. The empty treasury was one 
of the chief causes of Humayun's troubles in his reign. 
Humayun never realized his father's mistake and caused 
further depletion of the State resources by generous grants 
to his followers and relations. 

After the battle of Panipat, Humayun undertook an 
eastern campaign against the Afghans. Babur was faced 
with two problems, each demanding his immediate atten- 
tion : one, the Afghan affairs in the east, and the other, the 
Rajput affairs in the south-west. Humayun volunteered 
to undertake a campaign against the Afghans and thereby 
relieved his father considerably. He was given an in- 
dependent command, and he proceeded rapidly to meet the 
enemy who had gathered at Jajmau near Cawnpore under 
Nasir Khan and Ma'riif Farmuli. So serious an account 
was taken of the Mughal valour 5 that at the prince's 



* In BadafchshSn. 

2 B. N., p. 523. There is a description of the arrival of these 
presents at Kabul in Gulbadan's Humdyun-ndma. Farishta points out 

,that one shdhrukhl contained one misgal which is slightly less than half a 
tola of silver. According to Mirza Haidar, one shdhrukhl equals 5 double 
ddms. 

3 See my article Bdbur and the Hindus in the U. P. Historical Society 
Journal, 1936 A. D. for the full inscription. 

* G. H. N.. fol. Qb. 

6 For Sultan Bahadur's opinion see Abu Turab Wall's History of 
Gujrdt, p. 5 and Arabic History of Gujrdt, p. 229. 



C 7 ] 

approach, the Afghans melted away. They behaved in 
such a cowardly manner that Humayun could pursue 
them to a distance of 200 miles or more. 1 At Kharid he 
halted, and retracted his steps to Jaunpur, the Mughal head- 
quarters near the eastern frontiers. He tried to do further 
service by conciliating the Afghan chief Fath Khan Sarwani 
and sending him to Babur in company with Mahdi Khwaja. 
Fath Khan, however, left the Mughals for Mahmud Lodi 
of Bihar. 2 This was because he was not satisfied with the 
title Khan-i-Jahan conferred on him but craved for his 
father's title of Azam Humayun, which Babur was not 
willing to grant because of the anomaly that would arise 
in calling his eldest son Humayun, and a mere Afghan 
nobleman, Azam or the greater Humayun. Other deser- 
tions followed, e.g., Biban, Bayazid and Sher Khan; 
but the specific reasons for their doing so have not been 
mentioned. At least in one case Humayun's success 
may be recorded. He was able to satisfy Jalal Khan 
Jighat's son, Alam Khan, and bring him along with him 
to Agra. 

At the commencement of the new year 1527 A. D., 
Humayun was recalled by Babur to his aid against Rana 
Sanga, who was rapidly approaching the Mughal frontiers 
at Biana. On January 6, he rejoined his father at Agra. 

At the battle of Khanwah (Khanua), he retained the 
chief command of the inner right wing and after the battle, 
he was rewarded with the grant of the ' contents of the 
Alwar treasury/ 

Almost immediately afterwards, the prince was ordered 
to proceed to Badakhshan, which had been acquired on 
the death of his cousin, Wais Khan Mirza, in 1520 A. D. 
During the last seven years, the administration of the 
province had been neglected and now an effort was 
made to remove some of its defects. There were two other 
reasons for Humayun's appointment. Firstly, most of his 

1 From Jajmau to Kharid in Ballia District. 
2. N. f p. 652. 



[ 8 ] 

soldiers who had fought at Khanwah came from the other 
side of the Hindukush and were unwilling to stay in India ; 
hence in order to retain their services, he had to transfer 
their commander. Secondly, Babur always entertained a 
hope for the reconquest of Balkh, Hisar and Samarqand, 
and desired Humayun either to accomplish it himself 1 or to 
wait for his arrival. 

Historians mention a discreditable act done by 
Humayun at Delhi. He opened 'several treasure-houses 
and without permission took possession of their contents/ 
Babur severely reproached him for this unseemly conduct. 
Mrs. Beveridge considers this misconduct to be one of the 
reasons why the KhaUfa 2 began to doubt Humayun 's 
administrative capacities and proposed a change of the 
ruling dynasty at Babur 's death. 3 

Humayun stayed in Badakhshan for more than two 
years 4 (1527-29 A. D.). He tried to introduce orderly 
government and organized an expedition against Samar- 
qand. But his stay there was too short to bring about any 
appreciable success. The raiders and disturbers of peace 
continued to exist. The expedition, too, did not fully 
succeed. Humayun in alliance with the local chiefs, 
Sultan Wais Kulabi and his younger brother Shah Quli, 
collected 40,000 men and captured Hisar and Qabadian, 
both situated on the north side of the Amu river (Jan. 
1529 A. D.). This was probably the northernmost point 
ever reached by a Mughal prince of India. The sub- 
jugation of Central Asia remained a favourite preoccupation 
of the Mughal rulers till Shah Jahan's time; but the success 
achieved by his successors was much less than had been 
secured by Humayun. 

In July 1529 A. D. Humayun left his post and came 
to Agra. Erskine and Mrs. Beveridge accuse the prince of 
desertion and suggest the complicity of his mother Maham 



1 B. N., p. 625. z Babur's chief minister. 

3 This question is discussed later on. 

4 A. N. t p. 114, makes it one year. It is very likely that he spent 
the earlier half of his time in Kabul. 



[ 9 ] 

Begam in this move. They think that Maham wanted 
Humayun's presence at the capital to prevent any plot* or 
intrigue against him. 

First of all, let us take up the question whether he 
exposed the frontier to any risk by his departure. We 
have already seen that he had formed local ties by enlist- 
ing the sympathies of Sultan Wais and his brother in his 
favour. The Sultan's daughter was married to a Mirza 1 
and an extension was made beyond the river Amu, along 
the northern boundary of the Mughal territories. Before 
Humayun crossed the Indus, he had sent Mirza Hindal 
and his tutor Fakhr All as his substitute. Between his 
departure from Badakhshan and Hindal's arrival, there 
was a short interval of a few days only. Fakhr All's 
presence ensured orderly government and so long as Sultan 
Wais was attached to the Mughal cause, no fear was enter- 
tained in that quarter. 

The Akbar-nama mentions an attack from outside 
during Hindal's regime, but it came from an unexpected 
quarter. Said Khan of Kashghar, son of Sultan Ahmad 
M., Babur's maternal uncle and hence his cousin, seeing 
that the province was being ruled by a boy of ten, thought 
of annexing it, and forthwith marched against it. He 
besieged Qila-i-Zafar for three months, and then raised 
the siege in sheer disgust and returned to Kashghar. We 
do not know of any other attack on Badakhshan in 
Babur's reign. Hence it is safe to conclude that Humayun 
did not expose the frontier province to any danger by 
his departure-. 

Next, the question arises whether he had any sound 
reason for leaving his post and going to Agra. At least, 
his mother does not seem to have counselled Humayun to 
come to Agra; for she herself had been away from her 
husband for sometime past 2 and hence had not been in 



1 His daughter Haram Begam was married to Mirza Sulaiman, Wais 
Mirza' s son. 

2 See B. N. t pp. 686-7, where the arrival of Maham is mentioned. 



C 10 ] 

a position to know of the intrigues hatched against 
Htftnayun in the Court at Agra. Haidar Mirza, a con- 
temporary author and relation of Babur, 1 who ruled in 
Kashmir for ten years, gives the following reasons for the 
prince's daparture : ' Babur Padshah recalled Humayun 
Mirza into Hindustan .... He sent for Humayun 
in order that he might have one of his sons (continually) 
by him so that if he were to die suddenly, there would be 
a successor near at hand.' 2 Erskine and Mrs. Beveridge 
disbelieve this statement, because they do not expect a 
wise ruler like Babur to withdraw the governor from a 
frontier province without making adequate arrangements. 
Similarly, relying on Ahmad Yadgar's Tarikh-i-Saldfin-i- 
Afaghina, 3 they disbelieve the statement of Babur's pro- 
tracted illness and give him at least one year's good health 
and activity before his final breakdown and death. The 
first argument we have already refuted. Babur must have 
known that in recalling Humayun and allowing him to 
make some local arrangements he was not running any 
risk. The second argument needs closer attention. When 
did Babur finally break down? According to Parish ta, 4 
Babur had been ill since Rajab 936 A. H. (February, 1530 
A. D.) and died ten months later on 5th Jamadal-awwal 
937 A. H. (26th December, 1530 A. D.). Taking the state- 
ments of Ahmad Yadgar and Farishta together, we may 
allow good health to Babur till February, 1530 A. D., when 
he fell ill and died ten months later. So that in July, 1529 
A. D., when Humayun returned from Badakhshan, Babur 
was in good health. 

Then, had he any reason to send for the prince? 
According to Gulbadan Begam and Abul Fazl, 5 he was 

1 Being son of his mother's sister, Khub-nigar Khanam. See B. N. t 
pp. 21-22. 

a Tdrikh-i-Rashidi, p. 387. Edited by Ellias and Ross. For text 
see Or. 157. (B. M. MSS.). 

3 Elliot, Vol. V, pp. 40, 42, 43. Ahmad Yadgar's father was 
Mirza Askari's minister in Gujrat. The history was written In Jahanglr's 
reign. 

4 Farishta, Newal Kishore Press Edition, p. 211. 
5 . H. N.. fol. i6a; A. N. f p. 115. 



[ II ] 

anxious for Humayun 's return not because of his ill- 
health but because of the death of a favourite son of his 
called Anwar or Alwar. There was also another reason. 
Humayun had in several of his letters referred to his inten- 
tion to 'retire/ and Babur felt annoyed at it and advised 
him to disabuse his mind of any such idea in these words, 
'As for the "retirement," spoken of in thy letters retire- 
ment is a fault for sovereignty; .... retirement matches 
not with rule.' 1 In order to persuade him to give up his 
whim, he desired his return to him. Of course, the 
ostensible reason that he mentioned in his letter was quite 
characteristic of a war-worn and doting father, that he was 
getting weary and infirm and desired the presence of a son 
by his side. Sometimes before the prince's arrival, he had 
already spoken of his intention of abdicating in favour of 
his eldest son. 2 A lifelong adventurer like Babur may be 
excused if the continuous strife for more than 30 years made 
him think of resigning his kingdom to his son who had 
now come of age, being twenty-two. The proposal of 
abdication by the dervish-like Babur should surprise no 
one. Could any other king compose the lines ? 3 

" Though I be not related to dervishes, 
Yet am I their follower in heart and soul. 
Say not a king is far from a dervish, 
I am a king but yet the slave of dervishes." 

The feasts given by the king on the arrival of 
Humayun whom he acclaimed 'an incomparable com- 
panion' is a proof, if any further proof be needed, of 
Babur's approval of his son's return. 

Babur did not neglect the Badakhshan affairs. After 
a while, when his fatherly yearnings were satisfied by the 
prince's stay, he thought, owing to state exigencies, of 
sending back Humayun who had already achieved some 
success and had extended the Mughal territories beyond 

J. N., p. < 

2 G. H. N., fol. I5b. 
See Erskine, Babur, p. 431 and Beveridge, Akbar-ndma, p. 279. 



C 12 ] 

the Oxus. But Humayun refused to go to such a distant 
place and Babur, it appears, willingly accepted the 
refusal. The king's next choice fell on Khattfd Sayyid 
Nizamuddm All, who also refused. Then he adopted the 
only possible solution, viz., of handing over the province 
to Wais Mirza 's son, Sulaiman Mirza. Sulaiman had a 
hereditary claim, going, according to the author of the 
Tarikh-i-RashidiS as far back as 3000 years. 

His immediate ancestry may be indicated thus : 

Shah Sultan Muhammad 
(Shah of Badakhshan) 

I 
Shah Begam = Yunas Khan 

(Khan of the Mughals) 



I " " I " " " I 

Qutluq Nigar Khanam Ahmad Khan Sultan Nigar Khanam 

= Umar Shaikh M. I = Sultan Mahmud M 

I I I 

Babur Said Khan of Wais Khan M 

Kashghar | 

Sulaiman Shah M. 2 

Babur took further action in Sulaiman's interest. He 
rebuked Said Khan of Kashghar for molesting one who 
was a son to both of them and asked him to leave him 
alone. In handing over the province to a relation, he 
still had his old scheme in view, viz., the reconquest of 
Central Asia. He hoped Sulaiman would allow him a free 
passage through his dominions. It is possible that the 
march to Lahore in 1529-30 A. D. mentioned by Mrs. 
Beveridge on the authority of Ahmad Yadgar, was a part 
of this scheme. That he could not carry it out was due 
to reasons which need not be discussed here. 

After a stay for some time with his parents, Humayun 
was allowed to go to his fief in Sambhal. For six months 



1 P. 203. 

2 He claimed to be a Shah from his distant ancestor, Sultan Shah 
Muhammad. He was a Mirza on his father's side; also a Khan through 
his father's mother, Sultan Nigar Khanam. Babur refers to the tradition 
that the family claimed descent from Alexander of Macedon. See B. N., 

p. 22 



C 13 ] 

he remained there at the end of which period he fell 
seriously ill. 

It became imperative to remove him immediately to 
Agra, where the best medical aid was available. He was 
first taken to Delhi, and thence to Agra by boat. On the 
way, at Muttra, he was met by his distracted mother. 1 At 
Agra, the patient was placed under treatment of the 
best physicians of the day, but it was of no avail. Mir 
Abul Baqa, 2 a prominent Fdzil of the day, who was highly 
respected by the king, and later on by his son, suggested 
the giving away in charity of some precious article which 
the prince loved most, meaning, of course, the diamond 
which he had obtained at Gwalior. Babur accepted the 
suggestion ; but instead of the diamond considered himself 
to be the object loved most by his son, and hence proposed 
to sacrifice his own life. 

The actual ceremony by which the malady was 
transferred has been described by the king's daughter. 3 
He walked round the prince's bed while prayers were 
offered to Hazrat AH in words like ' O God ! If a life may 
be exchanged for a life, I who am Babur, give my life and 
my being for Humayun.' From the next day, he began 
to fast in order to make the sacrifice effective; and it is 
said that, shortly after, he felt that his prayers had been 
accepted. Babur fell ill and his malady grew worse and 
worse, while Humayun showed signs of gradual recovery. 
At last he fully recovered and met the king who had been 
lying ill in his bed. 

Babur suffered, if Farishta is to be believed, from a 
protracted illness of ten months which ended in his death. 
The prince, an inexperienced youth of 22, did not take his 



1 Gulbadan describes the meeting as between Jesus and Mary. 

2 Connected with Khwaja Khwand Mahmud (Khwaja Nura) of 
Kashmir. See Tdnkh-i-Rashldi, 478. 

3 Gulbadan must have been then a child of eight years. S. R. Sharma 
has written an interesting article in the Calcutta Review, September, 1936, 
under the heading ' the story of Babur' s death.' 



[ 14 1 

father's illness seriously, and went on an expedition to 
Kalinjar. The following is an inscription on one of the 
rocks there: 

'Muhammad Humayun, Badshah-i-Ghazi, dated the last 
day of the sacred month of Rajab 936 A. H.' 1 

When his father's condition grew worse, he was 
recalled. On his return, he found that the king had grown 
very feeble. Regretting his absence from the king's side, 
he broke down and earnestly requested the physicians in 
attendance to cure his father. 2 

During the few months yet vouchsafed to the king, 
he celebrated the marriages of two of his daughters, 
Gul-rang Begam and Gul-chihra Begam, with Isan Timur 
Sultan and Tukhta Bugha Sultan respectively. The 
genealogy of the Sultans is given below : 

Yflnas Khan 
Ahmad Khan (Ilacha Khan) 

I "~ I 

Aiman Khwaja Khan Isan Timur Tukhta Bugha 

I * Sultan Khan Sultan Khan 

I m. Gul-rang Begam m. Gul-chihra Begam 

Khizr Khwaja Khan 
m. Gulbadan Begam 

These were two of his last acts in the interests of the 
family. Afterwards his malady increased. Realizing that 
his end was approaching, he gathered all his chiefs, Abul 
Fazl specially mentions Khwaja Khalifa, 3 Qambar All 
Beg, Tardi Beg and Hindu Beg placed Humayun on the 
throne in their presence, and desired all to acknowledge 
him as his successor and to be faithful to him. Turning to 
Humayun, he entrusted him with the welfare of his kins- 
folk and people. His last directions were, ' Do naught 
against your brothers, even though they may deserve it.' 4 
Three days later, on December 26, 1530 A. D./ he expired. 

1 30th March, 1530 A. D. 

2 G. H. N., fol. i7-b. 

3 Sayyid Kizamuddin All, Deputy to the King. 
* A. AT., p. 117, 

fi 5th jUvt&dal-awwal, 937 A. H* 



[ 15 ] 

With regard to Babur's sacrifice of his life for the sake 
of his son, the following observations may be made: 

(a) It was a common belief in mediaeval times that a 
malady could be transferred from one person to another 
by prayers and intercessions. This belief still persists in 
some parts of the world. 

(b) Babur besought All's intercession. It shows the 
breadth of his view; for generally a Sunni avoids All's 
selection out of the four early KhaUfds. 

(c) The transference of the malady was a slow process. 
Humayun took several weeks to recover, while Babur 
had suffered for several months before the gravity of his 
disease was realized. 

(d) It was not the prince's malady that was transfer- 
red. He suffered from high fever while Babur's complaint 
was a disorder of the intestines. His physicians considered 
it to be the effect of the poison administered by Sultan 
Ibrahim Lodi's mother, four years back. 

Babur was buried in Char Bagh or Aram Bagh at 
Agra. His corpse was removed, in Sher Shah's reign, to 
Kabul, by the dead king's Afghan queen, Blbi Mubarika. 1 
The tomb now lies in a terraced garden on the slope of a 
hill called Shah-i-Kabul. It is the beauty-spot of the city 
and the rendezvous of holiday-makers. His relations lie 
buried around him. His descendants have embellished the 
burial garden, and Shah Jahan may be specially mentioned 
for having constructed the beautiful mosque in the neigh- 
bourhood. The tomb-stone itself is a low grave-covering, 
not less simple than those of his relations.' The standing 
slab has an inscription put up by Jahangir. 

The chronology of the last 19 months is given below : 

1. Arrival of Humayun from Badakhshan, July, 1529 A. D. 2 

2. The prince's stay in Agra, July and August, 1529 A. D. 

3. The prince repairs to Sambhal, August, 1529 A. D. 

1 B. N. t p. 710. 
a B. N. f p. 687. 



C 16 ] 

4. Stay at Sambhal (Babur at Lahore for a while), 

August to January, 1530 A. D. 

5. The prince falls ill at Sambhal, January, 1530 A. D. 

6. The prince removed to Agra, end of January, 1530 A. D. 

7. Babur's sacrifice, February, 1530 A. D. 

8. Humayun recovers, March, 1530 A. D. 

9. Humayun at Kalinjar, March to August, 1530 A. D. 

10. Humayun recalled to Agra, August, 1530 A. D. 

11. The celebration of Gul-rang and 

Gul-chihra's marriages, September, 1530 A. D. 

12. Humayun nominated as successor, 23rd December, 1530 A. D. 

13. Babur's death, 26th December, 1530 A D. 



Babur, the most important personage in the empire. By 
his long service, good administration and arrangement of 
campaigns and battles, he had made himself indispensable 
to the king. 1 He .possessed the four ranks of Amir, 
Vakil, Sultan and Khalifa. He bore the three family titles 
of Say y id, Khwaja and B arias Turk, all signifying high 
lineage. He was also well-connected; his younger brother, 
Junaid Barlas was married to Shahr-Banu, one of Babur 's 
sisters; his daughter, Gulbarg Begam was married to 
Shah Husain Atghun of Sindh while his son, Muhibb All 
married Shah Husain 's step-daughter Nafiid. 2 The 
Khalifa's prestige and honour may be judged from the 
fact that when he and his wife, Sultanam, visited Gulbadan 
Begam, 3 the latter stood up to receive them. The minister 
invited her to dinner, made a present of 6000 Shahrnkhis 
and five horses, while his wife gave 3000 Shahrukhis and 
three horses. After the battle of Khanwah he received the 

title Of ^ytStaJj *J^oJ|oUju:| ^lkJLJ| o^aaxJlo^ "the 

intimate with the Hazrat Sultan and the prop of the 
Khaqan's empire." 

Unfortunately for Humayun, the Khalifa at first did 
not agree to place the prince on the throne, in spite of his 
avowal at the dying king's bed-side. He nominated 
Sayyid Mahdi Khwaja, Babur's brother-in-law and 
husband of Khan-zada Begam. This would explain the 
delay. 

The KhaUfd must have had very strong reasons for 
the rejection of the prince; for he must have been sensible 
of the risk he was running for the Empire by setting aside 
Humayun's claims. The Mughals had been settled in 
India for five years only and their hold on the outlying 
parjts was insecure and uncertain; a change in the ruling 

1 See the Bdbur-ndma (abbreviated as B. N.), pp. 564-65 and 568 for 
his ability and organisation, e.g., in the battle Khanwah. 

2 G. H. N., p. 37. Nahid was Qasim K6kah ; s daughter. Her mother, 
Haji Begam, had married Shah Husain Arghun. The Atn-i-Akban (abbre- 
viated as A. A.) by Blochmann, p. 420 gives Muhibb All's career. 

3 Then a child of 6 years. 



[ 19 ] 

dynasty, at such a time, might spell disaster. But 
probably the minister was convinced of the prince's worth- 
lessness. There were other reasons also. Humayun's 
plunder of the Delhi treasures, on his way to Badakhshan 
(1527 A. D.) 1 had been to the KhaUfa an unpardonable 
offence; it had been aggravated further in his eyes by the 
knowledge that only recently, on two occasions, i.e., after 
the battles of Panipat and Khanwah, Humayun had been 
lavishly rewarded. 2 Then again, probably, being unaware 
that Humayun had left Badakhshan with the king's per- 
mission, he had accused the prince of dereliction of his 
duties. And also, as the king's deputy, 3 he disliked the 
enormous influence exercised by the Shm Queen, Maham 
Begam on Babur. 4 The Irdni-Turani rivalry, a common 
feature in later Mughal history, is noticeable here in a mild 
form. 5 Other Turk! nobles might have intensified his dis- 
like for the queen. Taking all these reasons together, the 
Khalifa must have satisfied his political conscience that in 
rejecting Humayun he was furthering the interests of the 

State. 

* 

But the KhaKfd Went one step further. He rejected 
not only the eldest son but all the other sons as candidates 
for the throne. 6 Kamran, the next son, was Humayun's 
junior by 6 years, Askari by 8 and Hindal by 10; so 



1 B. N. t p. 5$3- 

2 Ibid. pp. 522, 579. 

3 Vakil. Badauni has 

4 As indicated by her being placed in charge of Hindal, son of 
Dildar Begam, another wife of Babur and sitting on the throne with him. 
In Humayun's reign also she exercised enormous influence. She was a 
relation of the illustrious Sultan Husain Bai-qara and descendant of 
Ahmad Jam Zinda-pil. See the Amal-i-Salih. 

5 Rivalry between Bairam IChan and Maham Anaga in Akbar's reign, 
is only a repetition of this earlier phase. 

* See the Tabaqat-i-Akbari (T. A.) (Newal Kishore Press edition), 

p. 193. The relevant sentences are; &M~. 
>\ Ui J 



[ 20 ] 

except the eldest, the other princes were in their teens. 
Could it not have been possible that one of the younger 
three sons, placed on the throne under his tutelage, would 
have proved to be a good ruler ? The KhaKfa, older than 
Babur, his close associate for the last 35 years 1 and his 
chief adviser in all his Indian campaigns, must have 
appreciated Babur's worth as none else could have; and 
yet he thought of depriving his illustrious house of the 
eminence which was its due. Should we conclude that his 
dislike was wholly personal and that it outweighed all his 
appreciation of the merits of the Baburids? 

The KhaRfd's nominee, as already mentioned, was 
Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi Khwdja Tirmizi, who was the 
husband of Khan-zada Begam, Babur's five-year-older 
sister. He had a distinguished lineage, a record of meri- 
torious service, belonged to the religious House of Tirmiz, 
and was probably related to Maham Begam, Babur's 
queen. As far back as 1510-11 A. D., he had acted as 
Babur's Diwdn-begi and gone to Bukhara with 10,000 men. 
In the Indian campaigns he was always with his master. 
On the battlefields of Panipat and Khanwah, he command- 
ed the left wing and Humayun the right. Immediately 
after the first battle, he was placed in charge of the party 
sent to occupy Delhi, just as Humayun was in command 
of the forces sent to Agra. It is thus clear that he was a 
distinguished nobleman who had attained his present dis- 
tinction by the record of at least 20 years' meritorious 
service. 

Being the husband of Khan-zada, Mahdi Khwdja was, 
again, an eminent personage. Both Khan-zada and 
Maham Begam exercised influence in the palace, and on 
Babur as well as on his kingdom. Being Babur's elder 
sister, Khan-zada's influence was more than that of the 
queen. Mahdi Khwdja, as the husband of one and a rela- 
tion of the other, exercised control over all their actions, 
selfish or unselfish , 

i His name first occurs in B. N t in the year 1494-95 A. D. 



[ 21 ] 

Hence Mahdi Khwaja was a good choice. By lineage, 
service, experience and connexion with Babur's family, he 
was fit to sit on the Mughal throne. Belonging to a 
religious order, he was expected to be as successful as Shah 
Ismail and Shah Tahmasp in Persia ; and his long associa- 
tion with the liberal Babur might be a guarantee for the 
continuance of the enlightened system of Mughal Govern- 
ment. 

How Mahdi Khwdja's candidature was, after all, 
superseded by that of Humayun is given in the Tabaqat-i- 
Akbari 1 and may now be briefly narrated. The author of 
the work obtained the facts from his father, Muhammad 
Muqim Heravi, an eye-witness to most of the particulars. 
The Khattfd passed over Humayun (and his other 
brothers), in spite of Babur's open nomination of him for 
the succession, and chose Mahdi Khwaja, the king's 
brother-in-law, as the candidate. The king had not yet 
expired, but the bright prospects turned the Khwdja's 
head, and he assumed haughty airs. Once when Muham- 
mad Muqim 2 was present in the Khwdja's camp, the 
minister called on him, and had hardly stayed for some 
time when a command for attendance came from the 
king. The Khwaja accompanied him to the door, and 
when out of ear-shot, forgetting the presence of Muqim, 
soliloquized thus, 'God willing, my first act (as king) 
would be to flay you and the other traitors/ 3 After 
the utterance of these words, he recollected the presence 
of some person, turned round, and saw Muqim just 
behind him waiting to pass out. The Khwaja pulled him 
by the ear and cried out, ' O Tajik* it is the red tongue 



1 Corroborated by Abul Fazl also. 

2 His official rank was Diwdn-i-buyutdt, and the acted as the librarian 
to the royal library. 

3 The text is 



4 A term of abuse. Originally, a freed slave who set about as a tiller 
of ground. 



r 22 ] 

that gives the green head to the wind/ 1 meaning thereby 
that if he be wise, he would not wag his tongue, or he would 
suffer death. On obtaining his leave, he straightway went 
to the minister, related all that had occurred and ended by 
saying, ' If in spite of there being a prince like Humayun 
or his able and courageous brothers, you turn your eyes 
from loyalty and desire to place an unknown family on the 
throne, what other results could be expected but these!' 
The minister now realised the danger, sent for Humayun, 
and asked Mahdi Khwdja to retire to his house, where no 
one was to visit him. He was also forbidden admittance 
to the king's durbar. When the king expired, his death 
was kept a secret, and further deliberations took place on 
the question of succession. They were cut short by an 
Indian nobleman named Araish Khan who pointed out the 
dangers of the throne remaining vacant. Humayun 
ascended the throne on December 30, 1530 A. D. 

This is the story in brief, as told by Nizamuddm 
Ahmad, the author of the Tabaqdt, and a trusted warrior, 
as well as Bakhshz of Akbar's reign. He is a person of 
remarkable restraint and has been commended by all 
historians, contemporary or later. The source of the story 
is also unimpeachable because his father had suffered from 
the Khwdja' s rudeness and must have remembered the full 
details. As the whole intrigue went against Humayun, it 
was only Akbar's and Abul Fazl's love of truth that allowed 
it a place in the official narrative, viz. the Akbar-nama. 

Mrs. Beveridge is not satisfied with the details. 
Firstly, she considers Nizamuddin to be a late author, 
being born 20 years after Babur's death and relating the 
story some 60 years after its occurrence. Secondly, it 
seems incredible to her that the KhaKfd alone should be 
planning the rejection of the four princes, passing over all 
the Timurids, and favouring one who was neither the one 
nor the other. Mahdi Khwdja did not belong to any ruling 
dynasty, nor was he personally illustrious. A wise and 

i The text is 



E 23 ] 

experienced minister would not make the mistake of propos- 
ing him for the throne. Thirdly, even the Tabaqdt-i- 
Akbari is not accurate in its description of the Khwdja. 
The appellations of ' ddmdd* and ' jawdn' 1 are inappli- 
cable to him. 

At the same time, she does not reject the whole 
description. What she suggests is, that the author, either 
deliberately or unconsciously, suppresses the name of the 
Khalifa's original candidate, and that the name of Mahdi 
Khwdja, who had nothing to do with the intrigue, has been 
mentioned as the result of afterthought. She regards 
Muhammad Zaman Mirzd, Babur's eldest son-in-law as 
the Khalifa's nominee who, in her opinion, is above the 
last two objections and who was a Tlmurid, next to the 
four sons, closely allied to Babur, also young in age, being 
35 years old. His wife Masuma Sultan Begam was a 
Timurid by double descent, and hence she was useful in 
adding to her husband's rank or dignity. Mrs. Beveridge 
grants him sovereign status after .the Ghagra campaign 
(April, 1529 A. D.), on the evidence of Babur's own state- 
ment. 2 She continues, ' in honouring the Mirzd thus, the 
king's intentions were to leave the son-in-law in charge of 
Hindustan, and himself to move on to Kabul, or to other 
territories further north, i.e., more important parts of his 
empire/ Maham Begam's knowledge of her husband's 
wishes led her to recall Humayun to Agra; and his arrival 
there led Babur to put off, for sometime, the north-west 
campaign as well as the installation of Zaman Mirzd as the 
Viceroy of Hindustan. Humayun's illness, Babur's 
sacrifice, and his declaration of succession in favour of the 
prince, all following one another in quick succession put 
a stop to the consideration of the ddmdd's being a claimant 
to the throne. It is only Nizamuddm's ernng imagination 

1 T. A., p. I93 i. 16. 

2 B. N. f p. 662. The words are, ' He was presented with a royal 
head-to-foot (baropd), a sword, and a belt, a tipuchdq horse and an 
umbrella.' The quotation indicates bestowal of distinguished rank, but no 
sovereign power. When Khurram was given the title of Shah-Jahan by 
his father, he had hardly any sovereign power. 



[ 24 ] 

that invented the name of Mahdi Khwaja, gave him the 
attributes of a bully, and made his own father suffer. 

This, in brief, is Mrs. Beveridge's argument in favour 
of Babur's son-in-law's being the KhaUfas nominee. Her 
scholarly presentation of the case makes it an instructive, 
if not convincing, reading. Our difficulty in accepting her 
suggestion that Muhammad Zaman Mirzd should be read 
for Mahdi Khwdja, arises from the following considera- 
tions : 

(a) No contemporary chronicler suggests the name of 
Muhammad Zaman Mirzd. On what authority, then, 
could a modern writer propose the substitution ? 

(b) Why strain the meaning of the word, ' ddmdd ' to 
such an extent as to demand the substitution of a new 
name for the existing one ? The word ' ddmdd ' is com- 
prehensive enough to include several marital relations, 
e.g., son-in-law, brother-in-law, father-in-law, the true con- 
notation being, as the Bahdr-i-ajam indicates, husband as 
opposed to wife. It would be unscholarly to confine it to 
the restricted sense in which it is used in modern Urdu as 
prevalent in India. There are two writers who explicitly 
mention the exact relationship of the KhaUfas nominee with 
Babur. Gulbadan Begam, the king's daughter, calls him 
' yazna' or brother-in-law, and Khwandamir, in his work, 
the Habib-us-Siyar, mentions that he was married to 
Babur's elder sister, Khan-zada Begam. Both of them 
name the person as Mahdi Khwdja. 

(c) Similarly, we need not be too critical about the 
question: who would fully justify the appellation of 
' jawdn'l Age alone does not make a ' jawdn' ; it makes 
for a ' jawdn/ It is possible that a man of 30 may not 
justify the description, whereas it may eminently become 
a person of 50 or more who possesses sound health, active 
habits, and fresh outlook on life; so it could well be applied 
to Mahdi Khwdja, though he might be on the wrong side 
of 50. 

(d) She emphasises the need of a Timurid for the 
throne of Delhi. Mahdi Khwdja was not, while Muhammad 



Zaman Mirzd was, a descendant of Timur. If this be the 
sole criterion, then, leaving aside prince Humayun, for 
whom the Khalifa had a personal dislike, there were many 
Timurids available. First of all, there were Kamran 
and his two younger brothers. They were too young 
to have played any prominent part in the contemporary 
politics ; and the Khalifa might be supposed to have enter- 
tained no hostile ideas about them. Then there were 
Muhammad Sultan Mirzd and his children, who were all 
Timurids by double descent. What was more, they were 
closely related to Sultan Husain Bai-qara and his brother. 
There were others also, e.g., (i) Muhammad Sulaiman and 
his son Ibrahim Mirzd, (ii) Yadgar Nasir Mirzd, Babur's 
nephew, (iii) Mirzd Sayyidi Ahmed, his son Sultan Ahmed 
and grandson Abdul BaqI and (iv) Kichik Mirzd. 1 Then 
there were the descendants of Sultan Hussain Bdt-qard 
himself. Thus, if a Timurid alone were desired, there were 
many candidates to choose from. Among them Muham- 
mad Sultan Mirzd was undoubtedly the most elderly and 
experienced; he took a prominent part in all the principal 
battles fought in India and was a double-descendant of 
Timur. 2 If a substitution is to be suggested, why not 
prefer this more seasoned and experienced relation to 
Muhammad Zaman Mirzd ? 

But the entire discussion' is based on conjecture and 
hence we leave it at that. We have, therefore, refrained 
from discussing Mrs. Beveridge's statements against 
Humayun's heedlessness, or Mahdi Khwdja's disloyalty 
to Babur. Suffice it to say that we accept Nizamuddm's 
statement in full. We may summarise our reasons : 

(a) He is a straightforward writer whose veracity is 
generally above doubt and unimpeachable. The incident 
is well-authenticated, being related by a responsible official 



1 See B. N. Index. 

2 After the battle of Khanwah, he was given the title, 



[ 26 ] 

of the State, who may be credited with the accuracy of 
statement. 

(b) Mahdi Khwaja was proposed by the Khalifa, 
because (i) he wanted to have nothing to do with the 
Baburids or Timurids ; he desired the accession of one who 
would work with him in close association for the welfare 
of the State; (2) the Khwaja was a Sayyid, belonging to a 
religious order esteemed by the Muslim world, 1 and was a 
noted nobleman with a record of distinguished service to 
his credit. 2 

(c) Mahdi Khwaja was a friend to the Khalifa and 
would counteract Maham Begam's excessive influence in 
the palace himself or through his wife Khan-zada Begam. 

The Khalifa had the best of intentions in proposing 
the change and could not have foreseen the vain conceit 
that would turn his nominee's head. He realised his 
foolishness in time and immediately rectified his mistake by 
supporting Humayun. 

Very little is known of the later history of the KhaKfd, 
or Mahdi Khwaja. It is believed that the former continued 
to be the minister, and found his fears of rough treatment 
at Humayun 's hands to be groundless. His younger 
brother, Junaid Barlds, was for a time governor of Jaunpur 
and other provinces. 3 The Khalifa died in Humayun 's 
reign, and his wife remained a member of the royal house- 
hold and after Humayun's exile made a pilgrimage to 
Makka. His sons, Muhibb All Khan 4 and Khalid Beg 5 
flourished in Humayun's reign. 

Mahdi Khwaja, too, continued to live and, as Khan- 



1 Safavi kings of Persia belonged to another religious order of this 
kind. 

2 The title bestowed on him after the battle of Kh&nwah leads as 



See the Haft Risdla-i- 
Taqwim~i-Bulddn (H. R. T. B.) 

His name in official documents was to precede that of Muhammad 
Sultan Mirzd. 

3 B. N., p. 544. Erskine: Humdyun, pp. 10, 122, 131. 

4 A. A. (Blochmann), p. 420. 
* G. H. k, p. 159 



C 27 ] 

zada's husband, remained a member of the royal family. 
Seven years later his sister, Sultanam, was married to 
Hindal Mirzd, when the Khwdja made large presents which 
are described by Gulbadan Begam in detail. 1 It is believ- 
ed that he died in Kabul and was, shortly after, followed 
by his wife. Both of them lie buried close to Babur's 
grave. 2 

It is pleasant to find that neither of the two personages, 
concerned in the intrigue against the prince, suffered in 
any way, and that their wives and relations were treated 
with genuine kindness and affection by Humayun. 



1 G. H. N., pp. 126-27. 

2 There is an inscription on a marble tablet set up by Mahdi Khwaja 
at Amir Khusrau's tomb at Delhi. There the Khwdja has been called 
1 the Sayyid exalted in dignity and majesty.' See the Eptgraphtca Indo- 
Moslemica, 1915-16, for Beveridge's article on ' Mahdi lhwaja.' 



CHAPTER III 

THE OPENING YEAR OF HUM AVON'S REIGN- 
EXPEDITION TO KALIN JAR 1530-31 A. D. 

Humayun was a young man of 23 when he ascended 
the throne of Delhi (December 30, 1530 A. D.). Like 
most of the mediaeval kings, he signalized his accession by 
a generous gesture towards his subjects by retaining the 
officers of the preceding reign in their respective posts and 
rewarding his ardent supporters by an increment of salary 1 
and conferment of titles. Honours were also bestowed 
upon the high amirs or the princes of his family. Thus, 
Kamran was allowed to remain governor of Kabul and 
Qandahar with a semi-independent status. To Askari, 
the third brother, was transferred Humayun 's own pro- 
vince of Sambhal, 2 and to the youngest, Hindal, was 
granted Babur's favourite retreat of Alwar. The distant 
Badakhshan remained with Sulaiman Mirza, while the 
eastern frontiers were guarded by Sultan Junaid Barlas, 3 
from his headquarters at Jaunpur. 

The event was further marked by joyous feasts and 
bestowal of largesse. On the very first occasion, a boat- 
ful of gold was distributed, the distribution being made in 
large trays. The chronogram ^ ^Lti ' kashti-i-zar,' 
indicates the double significance of the occasion. The other 
chronograms giving the year of accession, 937 A. H. are 

' Humayun bud waris-i-mulk-i-wai ' 



1 The Khulasat-ut-Tawdrikh (Kh. T.) writes: 

* b ll *~ v*!r* - ^^ *** *tf *& c^'J b 

o|j ***. 1 *M~l 



2 At present, a tahsil in the Moradabad District (U. P.). 

3 He had married Babur's sister, Shahr-J>anu Begam. 



[ 29 ] 

andy.jylJl^'khair-ul-muluk/ 1 one asserting Humayun's 
claims to the throne and the other proclaiming him one 
of the best rulers of the country. If they were penned at 
the time of accession, they should be taken as mere 
panegyrics of a courtier. 

At the outset, it would be proper to indicate the 
boundaries of the Mughal kingdom that Humayun inherit- 
ed. On the north-west, the river Oxus defined the 
boundary, and the provinces of Balkh, 
The boundaries Qunduz and Badakhshan former part of 

of the Mughal /i T^ ii_- i ' -j.i_ rr-i_ i /^^ 

kingdom. the Delhi empire along with Kabul, Ghazni 

and Qandahar. The far-famed Herat 
probably belonged to Persia. 

In India proper, the Punjab and Multan had been 
occupied early by Babur. 2 Even before his occupation of 
the Punjab, Babur had considered it to belong to himself, 
he being the lineal descendant of the great Timur. To the 
jurist of modern times, his claims might appear as flimsy, 
but, he himself was serious enough to put them forward. 
The south-western limit of the Mughal kingdom under him 
may be taken to correspond roughly to that of the 
modern Punjab. Thus, while Abohar, Sirsa, Hansi and 
Hisar were included in his territory, places like Ganesh- 
garh, Hanumangarh and Jitpura lay beyond it. 3 To the 
south of Multan lay the extensive kingdom of Sindh, then 
under the suzerainty of the Arghuns, Shah Beg and his 
son, Mirza Shah Husain. 

In order to maintain a strong government, Babur's 
policy had been uniformly to appoint his elder sons to the 
north-west or western regions of his kingdom. Accord- 
ingly, he had appointed Humayun as the governor of 
Badakhshan, Kamran of Kabul, Ghazni and Qandahar, 
and Askari of Multan. As already stated Humayun 
continued his father's policy of allowing Kamran to 

1 According to Persian Abjad, the numerical figures added come to 
937 A. H. 

3 For Babur's conquest of Multan, see Erskine, History of India, 
Vol. I (Babur), p. 398. 

3 Any good map of India would indicate the places. 



E 30 ] 

govern, undisturbed, the territories he possessed; after- 
wards, he strengthened his hands by adding the provinces 
of the Punjab and Multan, which extended his adminis- 
trative sphere as far east as the river Sutlej. As also 
stated previously, the provinces of Sambhal and Alwar he 
made over to Askari and Hindal respectively. Alwar, 
Dholpur and Gwalior and further east, Kalpi, Kalinjar, 
and Benares formed the southern frontiers of the kingdom. 1 
Thus, as we proceed eastward, the Mughal territory, south 
of the river Jamna, decreased in extent, until at Allahabad 
it practically coincided with the river. 

The Dodb between the Jamna and the Ganges, 
commanded by the two capitals, Delhi and Agra, on the 
west, and Allahabad, Chunar and Benares on the east, 
was the prize secured after the victories of Panipat and 
Khanwah. On the north of the Ganges, Sambhal, 
Bahraich, Lucknow, Ajudhya, Gorakhpur and Ballia 
roughly indicated the boundaries. The Mughal control 
over these districts was maintained from their headquarters 
at Jaunpur, where the governor resided. 

The kingdom had been hastily acquired and its 
provinces loosely knit. It is true that there was no 
popular outburst against the new-comers ; yet in the matter 
The state of ^ government, it was not all smooth sail- 
the Mughal ing for them. The administrative system 

kingdom. wag inefficient. 2 Babur's plans were crude 

and a provincial administration consisted of a governor, 
a Diwdn and minor officials like the Shiqddr and Kotwdl 
at its headquarters. As a support to these officials, there 
were the local jdglrddrs 1vho had received jdgirs from the 
State on feudal terms. This simple machinery was all 
that Babur could conceive of. The defect in his system 
was that he never thought of linking the rural areas to the 
Central government. Of the subjects, the Hindus and 
most of the country Muslims had accepted the Mughal 

1 Babur's campaigns against Chancier! (1528 A. D.) and consequential 
territorial arrangements had only an ephemeral importance. 

2 . H. /., Vol. IV, page 21 has, ' the scheme of Government Was 
still saifi (by the sword) not qalamT (t>y the pen)/ 



supremacy as a matter of course; the former, because the 
change of rulers did not affect them; and the latter, 
because the Mughal culture was more welcome to them 
than that of the L5dis. There was, however, one very 
strong element of opposition in the country, viz., the 
Afghans. They had been the rulers of the country since 
the days of Buhlul Lodi and had, in still earlier periods, 
contributed to the military strength of the Government. 1 
Since the establishment of the Muslim rule in North India, 
the Afghans had been able to build up their reputation and 
had set themselves up as a political force in the, country. 2 
They had invited Babur not to rule, but to help them in 
deposing Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, and raising some other 
member from among them as ruler. At first Babur was 
willing to place Ibrahim's uncle, Alam Khan Alauddm on 
the throne of Delhi, but the latter's incompetence made the 
scheme unworkable. The rapid successes that ended in 
his victory at Panipat, the support that he obtained from 
the Indian Muslim nobles like Dilawar Khan, Araish 
Khan, 3 Mulla Muhammad Mazhab, Ismail Jilwani, Malik 
Biban Jilwani, Mahmud Khan Nuham and Shah Muham- 
mad Farmuli and the quiescence of the ryots made him 
change his views and he decided to keep his conquests to 
himself. He had expected that the past record of his 
military prowess and administrative fairness would make 
him worthy of being accepted by the Indians; and his 
expectations were fulfilled except in one quarter. The 
Afghans in India were solidly opposed to him and regarded 
him as a usurper of their ruling privileges. They were a 
selfish group and did not realise that their hereditary 
eminence during the Lodi rule was undermining their own 
character as well as the self-respecting instincts of the non- 

1 Cf. The reigns of Muhammad Shah and Alam Shah of the Sayyid 
dynasty. 

2 Ghiyasuddin Balban (1266-87 A. D.) garrisoned his fortresses that 
guarded the roads to Bengal, with the Afghan soldiers. The earliest 
Muslim conquerors of Bengal were Khaljis, generally included among the 
Afghans. 

. 3 J?. N. t p. 463. Araish Khan's name again occurs at the time of 
deliberation held at Babur 's death. See G. H. N. f fol. 2oa. 



E 32 3 

Afghans. To all efforts of Babur and Humayun 1 towards 
conciliation they showed indifference. They yearned for 
the full privileges of rulership and refused to remain 
content with the favours bestowed on them by the new 
rulers. 

Thus this Afghan antipathy had really started from 
his father's days. It could have perhaps been eradicated 
by the consistent pursuit of a threefold policy of (i) carrying 
on continuous military expeditions against 
'lor Uie blems them, (ii) undertaking prudent administra- 
Mughais. tive measures which would make no dis- 

tinction between the different classes or 
creeds, and (iii) spreading the superior Mughal culture in 
all parts of the kingdom. The Afghan opposition was 
undoubtedly the most serious problem which Humayun 
had to face. There were other political problems, too, call- 
ing for his immediate attention after his accession, of which 
one was the existence of certain potentates on the borders 
of his kingdom, among whom may be mentioned the 
following ; 

(1) Mirza Shah Husain Arghun, who had recently 

subdued the Langas and approached close to 
the Mughal frontiers. 2 

(2) Maharana Ratan Singh who had succeeded his 

father, the far-famed Maharana Sanga. 

(3) Bahadur Shah of Gujrat who had extended his 

territories in all directions and annexed Malwa. 

(4) The minor king Jalaluddin Nuhani and the 

Afghans of South Bihar. The minister of the 
State was Sher Khan, a man of remarkable 
ability and talent. 

(5) Nasrat Shah of Bengal, son of the more famous 

Alauddin Husain Shah. 

Humayun was willing, at least for the present, to leave 
these potentates alone; for he had not the ever-impelling 
instinct of a conqueror. But it was known that some of 

* For a few such efforts, see J5. #., pp. 527, 537, 544. 
'See Erskine; B&bur, pp. 390-91. 



C 33 ] 

them were jealous of his good fortune and would not lose 
any opportunity of creating trouble for him. 

There was yet another political problem which re- 
quired his constant attention. From the princes down- 
wards, everyone loved power and pelf and aimed at auto- 
nomy in the district or the province assigned to him. For 
instance, Kamran would have nothing to do with his elder 
brother except to be under his nominal submission. As the 
guardian of the frontier provinces, he certainly relieved 
Humayun of anxiety, so far as the political relations with 
Persia or Central Asia were concerned; but the semi- 
independent status of the prince made his capitals Kabul 
and Qandahar look like rivals to Delhi and Agra and 
hence, to some extent, divided the resources of the 
Mughals. In later years Askari and Hindal too, at times, 
imitated their elder brother's /ambition and lust for power, 
causing distress and damage to the kingdom. 

But Humayun 's worst enemies were his brother-in- 
law, Muhammad Zaman Mirza, and cousin, Muhammad 
Sultan Mirza, and his large progeny. They were a set of 
high-born, but restless princes, who, proud of their line- 
age, were ever bent on adventure and caused unrest 
everywhere. 

The solution of the problems is not far to seek. A 
constant vigilance on the part of the king was imperative. 
While he should initiate a benign policy towards the loyal 
and the faithful, towards the recalcitrant he must be relent- 
less and cruel and wage a continuous war. Also, he 
should not make any distinction between the rebels, be 
they the Afghans, or his brothers, or other relations. 
Had Humayun followed this judicious course, the unrest 
within the kingdom would have speedily come to an end, 
and his external foes like Bahadur Shah would have dared 
not create any trouble for him. 

But the king himself was so soft-hearted as not to 
be able to punish any of the Mirzas, much less his brothers. 
The Afghans he ignored, either because he considered 
Sher Khan, the ablest of them, to be favourably inclined 



[ 34 ] 

towards the Mughals, or because he himself ruled over 
Afghanistan, their ancestral home and hence, he thought, 
there was nothing to be afraid of them. He failed to realize 
that the Indian Afghans had formed a large community 
of great political importance and that the Afghans of 
Kabul and Qandahar did not owe direct allegiance to him 
but to Kamran. So long as Kamran was indifferent to 
the interests of the Mughal kingdom, Humayun was run- 
ning some risk in neglecting them. 

Humayun's troubles began almost from the commence- 
ment of his reign. Muhammad Zaman Mirza, his brother- 
in-law and husband of his elder half-sister, Masuma Sultan 
Begam, rebelled. 1 The rebellion quickly subsided, because 
Humayun's munificence and Babur's choice of him as 
successor had disposed the nobles in his favour. The 
Mirza submitted and was pardoned. 

Humayun realized that the Khalifa's deliberations and 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza's rebellion indicated dissatisfac- 
tion in some quarters and that it was necessary for him to 
prove his worth to his followers by achiev- 
Tke campaign i n g some striking success. Fortunately, 

against , , , r ,. , . r, 

Kdimjar. he had an easy way of accomplishing it. 

At the end of Babur's reign, he had been 
conducting a campaign against the Raja of Kalinjar. 
Babur's serious illness, which resulted in his death, had 
recalled him to Agra and thus Kalinjar had been out of his 
mind for several months. Now when he had some leisure, 
he thought of renewing the campaign. 

The celebrated fort of Kalinjar stands perched on a 
hill-top in the south-eastern extremity of Bundelkhand. 2 

The hill is isolated from the adjacent range 

of Bindhachal by a chasm or ravine some 
and p%t r hi P story I *20O yards wide. It is 1,200 feet above 
of Kalinjar. the sea-level and several hundred feet high 

from the plains below. The top of the 

1 A. N., p. 123 and the Tdrt1$h-i-Rashidi t Or. 157 (British Museum),, 
fol. 32da. 

3 Today, it is included in the district of Bnda. 



[ 35 I 

hill which forms a plateau is four or five miles in circuit 
and is fortified by a rampart. 1 Just below the rampart, 
the scarp of the rock for sorne 150 feet is nearly perpendi- 
cular, and so an easy access to the summit is by no means 
possible. Numerous rock-cut tanks are to be seen at the top, 
but the quality of their water is not supposed to be good. 

It is a holy place for the Hindus and is supposed to 
have existed in the Satya-yuga under the name of Ratna- 
kuta, in the Treta, of Mahagiri, and in the Dvdpara, of 
Pingalu. The present name, Kalinjara, occurs in the 
Mahabhamta, in Ptolemy's geographical work, and also in 
the Shiva-Purana. The word is supposed to be one of 
Shiva's names, Kalanjara, 'he who causes time to grow 
old/ There are Shiva lingas, Jaina statues, caves and 
inscriptions 2 all over the place. 

In the Muslim period, we see its Chandel ruler fight- 
ing in Jaipal's camp against the ruler of Ghazni in 978 
A. D. and later on, taking part in the battle of Peshawar in 
1008 A. D. Fifteen years later, Mahmud besieged Kalin- 
jar, but failing to capture it, made terms with the Raja, 
Nanda. 3 Prithvi Raj of Delhi defeated the Chandel ruler 
of his time in 1182 A. D., when the latter removed his 
capital from Mahoba to the hill-fortress. Qutbuddm, 
Iltutmish and Nasiruddin Mahmud attacked the place but 
their successes do not seem to have been permanent; for 
the Chandel chief continued to rule till the close of the 
I3th century. The history of the next two hundred and 
thirty years is obscure. 4 

In 1531 A. D. Humayun made a fresh attempt to 
occupy the fort of Kaiinjar. The siege lasted for some 



1 The description would apply to the fort of Chitor or Gwalior also.- 
Mandu fort has a much larger space at the top. 

2 One of the inscriptions reads as : 



The date would correspond to 3oth March, 1530 A. D. 

3 The full description may be read in the Cambridge History of India, 
Vol, III, pp. '21-22. 

4 Much of the account is taken from the Imperial Gazetteer of India 
and Thornton's Gazetteer. 



[ 36 1 

time, when the Raja purchased peace by an offer of 
Humayun's twelve man or 6,720 tolas of gold. 1 The 

campaign against Raja was then made a grandee of the 
Kdhnjar. Mughal kingdom. 2 

A discrepancy between the two official records, written 
about the same time, may be noted here. Abul Fazl, 
followed by most other writers, dates the Raja's submis- 
sion in the Hijra year 937 (1530-31 A.D.), while the Tdnkh- 
i-Alfi post-dates it by two years. The political insignificance 
of the Raja and the express mention in the Tdrikh that the 
siege was of short duration, prevent us from inferring that 
the campaign lasted for two years, and thus reconciling the 
two authorities. We choose to follow Abul Fazl, because 
he is supported by most of the contemporary writers. 

Humayun's gain in the expedition to Kalinjar was 
much greater than the mere acquisition of 12 man of gold 
or 67,200 rupees. 8 However welcome the treasure might 
be to him, it was merely a portion of what he had spent 
on the festivities that were held at the time of his acces- 
sion. But his success had a great political significance. 
The submission of an ancient Rajput family like the 
Chandel added to the dignity and prestige of the victor, 
who could now assume the title of Ghazi 4 " and boast of 
having extended the bounds of the Mughal kingdom. 

The chronology of the reign is as follows : 

(a) Humayun's accession December 30, 1530 A. D. 

(b) Humayun at Agra and Delhi Jan. -June, 1531 A. D. 

(c) Humayun at Kalinjar July-August, 1531 A. D. 



1 Babur's measure of weight as given in B. N. t pp. 517-18 is 14 tolas 
= i seer; 40 seers ^i man or manban. See Mrs. Beveridge's note also. 

2 Or as expressed by Nizamuddln Ahmad in his Tabaq&t-i-Akbari, 
p. 194 4A 



3 Taking one tola of gold equal to ten rupees of modern times, in 
value. 

* i.e., the conqueror. 



CHAPTER IV. 

HUMAYUN'S FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST 
THE AFGHANS (1532-33 A. D.) 

From Kalinjar, Humayun straightway went to 
Chunar, then in the possession of the Afghans. But 
before we deal with his Chunar expedition, it is necessary 
to say a few words about his opponents. 

In the battle of Panipat, where Sultan Ibrahim Lodi 
was defeated and killed, the Afghans suffered a serious 
loss, losing between 15 to 50 thousand of their men, accord- 
ing to different estimates. 1 Ibrahim's brother, Sultan 
Mahmud Lodi, made an attempt to recover the supremacy 
of the Afghans by combining with Rana Sanga, with 
10,000 followers but to no effect. Then he retired with 
the Rana and remained with him hoping to lead another 
expedition against the Mughals. But the Rana's death on 
the 30th January, 1528 A. D. (Samvat 1584), 2 shattered his 
hopes and made him seek shelter elsewhere. 

Meanwhile there had gathered a strong body of the 
Afghans in South Bihar owing to the short-sighted policy 
of Sultan Ibrahim. The death of his brother Sultan Jalal- 
uddin, Minister, Mian Bhua, 3 and Azam Humayun 
Shirvani, ' one of the first nobles and lord of a standard 
and kettle-drum and commander of a force of 30,000 
horse/ 4 produced a sense of insecurity among the Afghan 
nobles and led to the rebellion of a few of them. The 
first to rebel were Azam Humayun Lodi, the governor of 
Lucknow, and Islam Khan, Azam Humayun Shirvani's 

* * See B. N., p. 474. According to the Dora, p. 79, Ibrahim's tomb 
was visited by pilgrims from as distant a place as Narwar or Qananij. 
3 See the Udaipur Rdjya ka Itihds by G. S. Ojha, Vol. I, pp. 583-84 
3 Differently worded by different writers, e.g., C. H. I., Vol. Ill, 
p. 248, calls him Bhoda. 

4 Dorn: History of the Afghans t p. 7^. 



[ 38 ] 

second son. The rebellion was not very successful, but 
Ibrahim's continued tyranny 1 enraged others. Darya 
Khan Nuhani, the governor of Bihar, who was so far loyal, 
Khan Jahan Lodi, Mian Husain Qarmali, raised their 
heads. Darya Khan behaved like an independent prince, 
but out of regard for the solidarity of the Afghan 
State, he assumed no royal titles. After his death (circ . 1521 
A. D.), his son Bahadur Khan succeeded to the governor- 
ship. So long as Ibrahim lived, he followed his father's 
policy and refrained from proclaiming his independence, 
but after the Sultan's death, he called himself Sultan 
Muhammad Shah, struck coins and read khutba in his 
name (1526 A. D.). Thus, in Bihar, the Nuhanis were the 
most important tribe among the Afghans, but there were 
others also, e.g., the Qarmalis and the discontented Lodis. 

Sultan Muhammad died two years later and his son, 
Jalal Khan, succeeded him as Sultan Jalaluddin Shah. As 
he was a minor, he was controlled by his mother, Dudu as 
regent, and Sher Khan, as ataUq and vakil. So long as 
the mother lived, there prevailed unity and harmony in the 
State, cordiality between the Sultan and his minister, and 
between the Afghans of Bihar and Babur. Dudu and 
Jalal saw Babur 2 in May 1529 A. D. who agreed to grant 
to Jalal most of Bihar that remained after reserving 
land worth one crore of double dams or five lakhs of 
rupees 3 revenue as khalsa, and after granting a jagir of fifty 
lakhs of double dams or two lakhs and a half of rupees 
revenue to Mahmud Khan Nuhani, who obtained it as a 
reward for his services under Askari, at the battle of the 
Gogra or Ghagra, 4 fought a few days earlier, on May 4. 

The difficulties of Sultan Jalal lay in the fact that his 
small State was hemmed in by two powerful kingdoms, 

1 The latest being the assassination of Shaikh Hasan Qarmali at 
Chanderl; see C. H. /., p. 249. 

2#. N., pp. 664, 676. 

8 For an idea of the coins of the time, see Erskine : B$bur, 
Appendix . 

4 Babur gives to the river more than one name, e.g,, Sarii on p. 667, 
Gagar p. 602 and Kakar p. 465. 



C 39 1 

i.e., Delhi and Bengal, and that he had befriended the 
rulers of both. Although he had no share in the battle of 
the Gogra, fought between Babur and the other Afghans, 
aided by the Bengal army, yet Babur* writes of Nasrat 
Shah's influence on the young Sultan, in words such as 
these : ' Jalal Khan whom the Bengali Nasrat Shah must 
have held as if eye-bewitched.' 1 When Babur patched up 
peace with the ruler of Bengal on May 19, 1529 A. D. and 
retired to Agra in the following month, the cloud that had 
hung over the Afghan State cleared away for the time being. 

Dudu died a few months later. 3 With the death of 
this wise and peace-loving lady, there arose a bitter quarrel 
between the Nuhanis, including king Jalal, and Sher Khan. 
The Nuhanis were so jealous of the minister's ascendancy 
in the State, that they preferred to surrender themselves 
to any neighbouring king .rather than submit to him. 
But to which of the two kings, Babur or Nasrat, were they 
to offer their submission ? They selected Nasrat for reasons 
that may be summed up as follows : 

(a) The Mughal king was looked upon as a usurper of 
the Afghan sovereign rights and privileges and 
hence no alliance with, or submission to him 
could be thought of. If Sher Khan had been 
to the Mughal court in the past, so much the 
worse for him. 

(&) BIban and Bayazid, two of the Afghan npbles, 
had led opposition against the Mughals and 
hence they were popular. A submission to 
Babur would mean fight with such Afghans, a 
course not welcome to the Nuhanis. 

(c) So far Nasrat Shah had behaved like a friend and 
taken part in the battle of the Ghagra, on behalf 
of the Afghans. But there was no certainty 
that he would continue to be friendly. The 
mutual recriminations between the Nuhanis and 



B. N., p. 664. 
Circa, 1529 A. D. 



[ 40 J 

Sher Khan had weakened the Bihar State; and 
Nasrat Shah being nearer than the Mughals 
might take advantage of this fact and threaten 
to invade Bihar, hence he was to be feared more. 

(d) Already the relations between Nasrat Shah and 
Sher Khan had become strained. The causes 
of this were the latter's ability, and his close 
friendship with Makhdum-i-Alam, governor of 
Hajipur, i.e., North Bihar, on behalf of the 
ruler of Bengal. The Nuhanis turned against 
Sher Khan's friend, i.e., Makhdum, and went 
over to his enemy, the king of Bengal. 

For these reasons, Sultan Jalal and the other Nuhanis 
surrendered themselves to Nasrat Shah, whom they 
regarded as their benefactor and friend. 

Now let us return to Sultan Mahmud Lodi. In 1528 
A. D., after Rana Sanga's death, he left Chitor, came to 
Bihar, and launched an ambitious campaign against the 
Delhi kingdom (February 1529 A. D:). 

His army consisted of three divisions : the first under 
Biban and Bayazid to move in the north against Gorakh- 
pur; the second under Sher Khan to capture Benares from 
Jalaluddin Sharql, 1 a protege of Babur, and then to pass 
on to Jaunpur, where stayed Sultan Junaid Barlas, the 
govei^ior; and the third under Mahmud himself, his object- 
ive being to take the famous fort of Chunargarh. It seems 
that some success had been achieved ; for Jalal had retreat- 
ed to Kora 2 where he met Babur. If the Dorn be believ- 
ed 3 even Jaunpur fell into Mahmud's hands, Junaid, the 
Mughal governor, retreating westward, and the whole 
territory up to Lucknow was occupied by the Afghans. 
But then Babur came immediately after, in March 1529 



1 The descendant of the Sharql kings, being the son of the last king, 
Sultan Husain Shah. Mrs. Beveridge wrongly calls him an Afghan. 

2 About 86 miles west of Jaunpur. 

3 p. 102. 



A. D. and the enemy raised the siege of Chunar and fled 
pell-mell. 1 Mahmud, for the time being, retired eastward. 2 

The Afghan leader appeared on the scene again. After 
Jalal Nuham's desertion of the Afghan cause, when Sher 
Khan, single-handed, was trying his utmost to save the 
small State from the threatening dangers, the chief nobles 
again invited Mahmud. The glamour of Mahmud's 
pedigree counted for much with even the democratic 
Afghans and though they acknowledged Sher Khan's ability 
as administrator 3 , they looked for some one else who could 
boast of belonging to a more illustrious family. The invita- 
tion to Mahmud went from a number of distinguished 
nobles, whose names Abbas gives in his work. 4 

With the appearance of Mahmud Lodi in 1530 A. D., 
Sher Khan retired to his old jdglr/' but this the other nobles 
would not allow; for they knew his worth. Noticing that 
Mahmud was surrounded by the older chiefs, turbulent but 
without experience of orderly administration, Sher Khan 
knew how futile it was to hope for good results under such 
conditions. So when the far man reached him asking him 
to join his new master, he did not stir. But Mahmud him- 
self went to Sher Khan and brought him along with him 
for the new venture he had decided upon. 

Before proceeding any further, let us sum up the 
Afghan situation at the opening of Humayun's reign. The 
Nuhanis had retreated eastward. Mahmud Lodi, the new 
leader, had launched a campaign only a year ago which had 
failed dismally. The only able administrator was Sher 
Khan, who had enriched the State treasury, recruited 
soldiers devoted to himself, protected the ryots, and worked 

1 B. N. f pp. 653-54. 

2 According to Qanungo, the author of the Sher Shah, to Bengal. See 
pp. 81-82. 

3 The latest proof of which was Sher Khan's quiet possession of 
Chunar in 1529 A. D, How cleverly he accomplished it may be seen in 
Abbas Sarwam's work, the Tarfkh-i-Sher Shdhi. 

4 See Elliot and Dowson, Vol. V, p. 347. 

5 It speaks of Sher Khan's unselfishness that his personal jdgir con- 
sisted of nothing more than what he had inherited from his father, plus 
Chunar. 



C 42 3 

day and night for the good of his countrymen. He had 
also acquired for himself vast riches, so that among^the 
Afghans he was by far the richest person. But he was 
a mere Sur 1 and his grandfather a horse-dealer, and hence 
he was denied leadership. 

At this stage Mahmud organized a new campaign. He 
made great preparations. Every Afghan, willingly or un- 
willingly, joined him. A year later (1532 A. D.), when the 
Afghan army seemed ready, a rapid march was undertaken 
to the west. So quick were the Afghan movements that, 
almost unchecked, they proceeded more than 250 miles. 
Junaid retreated, and the Afghans advanced as far as the 
present Nawabganj tahsil of the Bara-Banki district. It 
was this advance that caused Humayun to agree hurriedly 
to the Raja of Kalinjar's terms and hasten to meet the 
Afghans. 

The actual battle took place at Dadrah in August 1532 
A. D. 2 which proved an easy affair. The Mughals were 
victorious, and in the general rout, the Afghans lost 
two of their chief generals, Bayazid Qarmali and Ibrahim 
Khan Yusuf-Khail.* 



1 Even Humayiin, according to the Tarlkh-i-Daudl, once sneered that 
Sher Shah was low-born *iy ^^ gf uf^ $?-)?* '( thou gn a king), 
he yet smells of a common soldier/ u$&* or more correctly 

is a Turki word signifying a soldier or policeman. 

2 The Tdrifyh-i-Aljl (Or. 465 fol. 5550), mentions the year 939 A. H. 
(1542-43 A. D.), also H. R. T. B., No. 40 of Buhar section of Imperial 
Library, Calcutta. Hence we are unable to accept Qunungo's date, July, 
1531 A. D. We put the battle at the beginning of the Muslim year 
because the Tarikh-i-Alfi mentions it first among the year's events. 

The battlefield has been differently named, Dadrah by Illahdad Faizi 
Sirhindi, Lucknow by Abbas, on the bank of the Sani or the Gumtl by 
Tauhar. Dadrah was a mahal in Lucknow Sirkar. See A. A. (Tr.), Vol. 
II, p. 178. It is now a village in Nawabganj tahsil of the Bara-Banki 
district. Qunungo mentions the place as Dauroh. 

s Abbas, Dorn, H. R. T. B. by Illahdad Faizi and Jauhar add the 
name of Blban to the list of the killed. Jauhar calls him a Lodi. But 
Abbas later on makes him live and join Sher Ihan. 

Who was Biban ? There seem to be three of them : one, the sister-in- 
law of Bayazid Qarmali; the second, Biban Khan Jalwani, one of the 
chief commanders of Mahmud; and the third Biban Kh&n Lodi. Prob- 
ably the last was killed at Dadrah. 



E 43 1 

What was Sher Khan's part in this battle ? It seems 
strange that where Sher Khan, the victor against the large 
Bengal army on several occasions, was present, there 
should be such a stampede. 

Sher Khan cannot be made responsible for the 
Afgan movements on the battlefield. The supreme com- 
mander was Sultan Mahmud, who was incapable of 
fighting a battle. His chief advisers were Biban Khan 
Jalwani and Bayazld Qarmali, both brave soldiers 
but not prudent commanders. 1 Sher Khan was thus 
under a cloud and resented his neglect. He felt that 
he was not wanted. He was not even placed among the 
chief commanders and Bihar, which had prospered under 
his administration, was partitioned among the Afghan 
nobles without any reference to him. He was only consol- 
ed with the assurance that when the Jaunpur province 
would be conquered, the jdgtrs of the nobles would be 
transferred there and he would be assigned the whole of 
Bihar. In fact, a farman to that effect was granted to him 
in advance. There were two other distinguished Afghans, 
Masnad-i-All Azam Humayun, Sultan Mahmud's father-in- 
law, and Masnad-i-AU Isa Khan, both wise and experienced 
officers ; but like Sher Khan disappointed at being neglect- 
ed. 2 Hence the Afghan camp lacked cohesion and unity 
of action. 

Sher Khan had thus sufficient cause for annoyance. 
His services were not fully recognised; he was thrown 
into the background and his whole work undone. There 
was plenty of bustle and enthusiasm in Mahmud's camp 
but there was no prudent strategist or tactician. 



1 Abbas' s words, with reference to B5yaild, are 
;y*l )>* 3U1 j &\ j>yiA ^ U| jjlij^ 1^ jyL ^J*\*f 

8 According to Abbas, they had joined the army 



[' 44 ] 

Having foreseen the consequences of the coming battle 
with the well-trained Mughals, Sher Khan now strove 
to save himself and his countrymen. He wrote to Hindu 
Beg, Humayun's general, 1 that he was a loyal servant of 
the Mughals; that his presence in the Afghan camp was 
under compulsion; and that on the battlefield he would not 
engage in the fight and thus he would be the primary cause 
of the Afghan defeat. 2 

Qanungo, the author of the Sher Shah, disbelieves the 
statement, though it is supported by most of the contem- 
porary historians. 3 He gives several reasons for his opinion 
which may be summed up as follows : 

(a) The alleged desertion is inconsistent with Sher 
Khan's noble character. 

(6) The writers have all copied from the garrulous 
author of the Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi and hence 
they are not independent authorities. 

(c) Many of the writers make mention of the 

treachery in the description of Sher Shah's 
career, but fail to mention it in the description 
of Humayun's reign. This omission is suspici- 
ous and discredits their statement of the deser- 
tion. 

(d) The accusation of treachery is always ready at hand 

to explain any national defeat. It is too cheap 
a statement to be always credited. 

(e) Even a modern historian like Elphinstone has re- 

jected the imputation of treachery to Sher Khan. 

We might have added some more arguments, e.g., 
(i) that there is no mention of Sher Khan's treachery in 
the Akbar-nama; (2) that the first mention of the treachery 
is made by a writer sojne 48 years after the battle; (3) that 



* * ttindQ Beg seems to be the chief of Humayfcn's military staff, while 
Jnnaid Barlas continues to act as governor of Jaunpur. 

* Abbas. J F 

* PP- 73-7*. 



C 45 ] 

there is some resemblance of language in Abbas 's, Nizam- 
uddin's and Farishta's writings, and since Abbas is the 
earliest among the writers, the others may be supposed to 
have copied his statement. 

To us, however, the above reasons are not fully con- 
vincing. It would be bad logic, (i) to dismiss every charge 
of treachery made by the contemporary historian as an 
explanation of a national disaster, 1 (2) to interpret the 
omission of a fact from records as its non-existence, (3) to 
assert that the narration of the same fact by the succeeding 
writers only implies slavish copy of the statement made by 
the earliest of them. Let us now state the positive reasons 
that lead us to reject Qanungo's conclusions that Sher 
Khan was not present on the battlefield: 

(a) It was a mighty venture in which all the Afghans, 
willynilly, took part. Isa Khan and Azam 
Humayun 2 could not absent themselves, nor 
could Sher Khan. 

(6) Sher Khan was met in his ja&r by Sultan 
Mahmud and a farmdn, conferring the province 
of Bihar on him after the Sultan's capture of 
Jaunpur, was handed over to him. No doubt 
it was a tardy recognition of his merits but Sher 
Khan could hardly refuse support, specially 
when the Sultan himself had gone to him. 

(c) His actions while technically termed treacherous to 
his race, actually benefited it in the long run. 
The Mughals counted upon the friendship of 
some Afghans, Sher Khan being the chief 
among them, and patronized and favoured them 
in every respect. One of the reasons of Sher 
Khan's continued success, for the next five years 
was the absence of interference from the 



1 Would anyone assert that Sirajuddaula was not betrayed by Mir 
Jafar at Plassey or Sadashiva Rao Bhao at Panipat? 

2 Sultan Mahmud's father-in-law. 



[ 46 ] 

Mughals, who interpreted his success as that of 
a Mughal nobleman. 

(d) Sher Khan looked upon himself and rightly too 

as the future saviour of his countrymen and 
had nothing but contempt for the worthless 
Sultan and his ill-advised commanders. Why 
should he not prove the facts by abstaining from 
the battle where he had no immediate touch 
with the Sultan? The latter 's discredit would 
mean the restoration of his legitimate dignity 
and influence in the State. Sher Khan was 
highly popular and hence he had no difficulty 
in regaining his former eminence. So the 
Afghan writer, Abbas, while stating the truth 
of the so-called treason, does not curse or 
denounce him. 

(e) Even supposing that all other writers copy Abbas, 

it will not be wise to reject his statement. He 
has usually great admiration for his hero, de- 
fends his measures for the capture of Rohtas, 1 
and absolves him of Puran Mai's murder. 2 
Being a Mughal courtier, his statement of 
Sher Khan's criticisms of Babur's system of 
government 3 was highly unpalatable to his 
master, the Emperor Akbar, but he does all, 
this, probably because he thought that he was 
putting forth the whole truth, viz., the correct 
interpretation of Sher Khan's actions. Similar- 
ly, though he adored his hero, he admits that 
on the present occasion he could not speak entire- 
ly in his favour. 

After the battle of Dadrah, Sultan Mahmud resigned 
lead; for his poverty and love of pleasure made Mm 

1 See Elliot and Dowson, Vol. IV, p. 362. 

2 Ibid., p. 402. 

3 Ibid., p. 330. 



C 47 1 

unfit for such a responsible task. Hence he retired into 
private life, settled down at Patna and passed the next ten 
or twelve years in dissipation, 1 entirely unmindful of the 
stirring events that were shaping the destiny of his country- 
men. He died in 949 A. H. (1542-43 A. D.). 

From Dadrah Humayun next proceeded to Chunar. 

The rocky fort of Chunar, lying 16 miles south-west of 
Benares and 18 miles east of Mirzapur, commands a strate- 
gic position on the Ganges. Situated on the 
Chunar: its southern bank, the rock juts out into the 
geographical r i ver anc j deflects its course to the north. The 
atid'pasl fort, perched on the rock 100 to 150 feet high, 
history. j s 750 yards in length and 300 in breadth. The 
river is navigable at the foot of the rock, and 
according to Thornton, 2 even for crafts of 50 or 60 tons. 
Although the rock was not of much height, its steepness 
would make its storming hazardous. 

The place is traditionally connected with the brother of 
Vikramaditya of Ujjain, Bhartrmath, who had chosen the 
solitary wooded rock as the site of his hermitage. In 
the Muslim period, it was captured, lost and recap- 
tured several times; one mutilated inscription recording its 
capture by the Hindus, is still extant. The noted 
mediaeval buildings and works are the antique Hindu 
palace at the highest point of the rocky eminence, a well 
sunk to a great depth in the solid rock and the mausoleum 
of the local Muslim saint, Shah Qasim Sulaiman. 

Chunar came into prominence in the beginning of 
the sixteenth century when Sultan Ibrahim Lodi located 
there the central treasury of the kingdom and Taj Khan 



1 Abbas 1 s words are 

*j> ,/ J^* **J ; 

2 The Gazetteer. 



C 48 ] 

Sarangkham 1 was placed in charge of its fort and its 
treasures. Babur also attached some importance to it. 
He visited it in May, 1529 A. D., and though Taj Khan was 
perfectly submissive to him, 2 he appointed Sultan Junaid 
as its governor, Muhammad Zaman M. taking his place 
as governor of Jaunpur. 3 Taj Khan's rights appear to 
have been ignored, except that he continued in the 
fort as a subordinate official. 4 After his return to Agra 
in June, 1529 A. D., Babur never again visited his eastern 
dominions; Muhammad Zaman M., too, had moved off to 
the capital, and Sultan Junaid was again left by himself to 
solve the problems of the east as best he could. He must 
have gone to Jaunpur, leaving the loyal Taj Khan in 
possession of Chunar as before. Junaid was pleased with 
Sher Khan also and had helped him in reclaiming his jagir 
from Muhammad Khan Sur, in his first year of appoint- 
ment, i.e., 1527 A. D. 

Taj Khan was accidentally killed by his eldest son, 
Ahmad, in 1529 A. D., and then Ahmad and his two 
brothers had a long quarrel with their step-mother, Taj 
Khan's wife, Lad Malika, in which she had the upperhand; 
for her wise administration and lavish distribution of reward 
to her followers generally retained their loyalty to her. 
Thus worsted, the sons thought of a novel plan to de- 
prive the Malika of her independence. They proposed 
her marriage with Sher Khan, and agreed to surrender the 
fort of Chunar to him. To Sher Khan, the Malika' s wealth 
was as welcome as herself and the Malika also appears not 
to have been unwilling to accept him as her husband. 5 So 
all parties agreed and the nuptials were celebrated and each 



1 A. N. and the Mirat-ul-Alam (M. A.) call him Jamal Khan Khassa- 
lj:hail Sarangkhani. 

2 B. B. t 'pp. 654, 657. 

3 Junaid was governor of Jaunpur from 1527 A. D. till his death in 
1537 A. D. with this short interval. He was present at the battle of the 
Gogra. 

* See Erskine, Vol. II, p. 131. 

* As a young wife, she was probably not very happy in her relations 
with the old Taj 



[ 49 ] 

one got what he or she wanted: 1 Sher Khan wealth, Lad 
a husband, and the sons the satisfaction of seeing Lad in 
subservience to her husband. 

The possession of the Chunar fort, is a landmark in 
Sher Khan's career. Abbas expresses 



(sic.) 

(Tr.) 'His affairs were more firmly established; for 
he now owned a fort, possessed treasure, and his followers, 
both horsemen and footmen, considerably increased in 
number.' 

All this had happened in Babur's reign, in the year 
1529 A. D. Now Humayun, after the victory of Dadrah 
in August, 1532 A. D. came forward to claim Chunar for 
himself. He sent Hindu Beg 2 with a contingent; for he 
did not expect any opposition from Sher Khan. But the 
latter would not willingly yield and so he himself moved 
forward and laid a siege to the place. Sher Khan placed 
his second son Jalal Khan 3 in charge of the defence and 
himself withdrew to Baharkunda, in the interior of Bihar. 4 

The siege lasted for four months, September to 
December, 1532 A. D." and then Humayun, realising the 
likelihood of a prolonged stay on the eastern frontier, grew 
restless. Both the parties had come to know of Bahadur's 
war preparations and hostile intentions against Delhi. 
The king had left his capital sometime past and it would 
not be prudent to prolong his absence. Sher Khan, 
always supplied with every information by his spies, 
was aware of the growing complexities and of the 
king's anxiety to return. So he resolved to turn to his 



1 Abbas estimates it at 150 mans of gold (8 lakhs and 40 thousand 
rupees) besides 150 costly jewels and 7 mans of pearl. 

2 To give his full name, Mr. Hindu Beg Quchin. He was with Babur 
since 1519 A. D. 

3 The later Islam Shah, the ruler of Delhi, and successor to Sher Shah. 

4 Qanungo, 142 n. 

5 Jauhar's Tazkirat-ul-waqidt (T. W.) translated by Stewart, p. i. 



[ 50 ] 

advantage these developments in the situation and secure 
advantageous terms for himself. Without any further 
delay, therefore, he himself came forward to propose terms. 
He was willing to hold the fort under the Mughal suzerainty 
and place 500 Afghan retainers under his third son, Qutb 
Khan 1 at the disposal of the king for service. Humayun 
was agreeable but suggested that the commander of the 
contingent should be the valorous Jalal Khan. To this 
Sher Khan would not agree. He pointed out that he him- 
self needed Jalal Khan's aid in facing so many of his 
enemies. The king did not probably attach much import- 
ance to the volour displayed by an Afghan, who was 
looked down upon by the Mughals; so he accepted 
all the terms of Sher Khan and returned to Agra in 
January, 1533 A. D. 2 

The chronology of the several incidents mentioned 
above may be stated here : 

A. D. A. H. 

(1) Humayun's accession to the throne Dec. 30, 1530 937 

(2) Humayun's stay at Delhi, January-June, 1531 937 

(3) Humayun at Kalinjar, July- August, 1531 938 

(4) The battle of Dadrah August, 1532 939 

(5) Humayun at Chunar September-December, 1532 939 

(6) The treaty of Chunar December, 1532 939 

(7) Humayun's return to Agra January, 1533 -939 



* A. N. has at p. 123, Abdur-Rashld instead of Qutb Ifhan but, later 
on, at p. 151 puts down the name of Qutb Khan also. The first may be 
the real name, the latter signifying only a title. See the Erskine, Vol. II, 
p. 12. 

9 G. H, N. t p* 112, n. 2. 



CHAPTER V 

HUMAYCN'S EARLY RELATIONS WITH 
KAMRAN (151433 A.D.) 

As stated before, when Humayun, at Babur's death 
(December, 1530 A. D.), became the ruler of Delhi, Kamran 
continued to be the governor of Kabul and Qandahar, 
They were born of different mothers. While Humayun 's 
mother was Maham Begam, a descendant of Shaikh 
Ahmad of Turbat-i-Jam and relation of Sultan Husain 
Baiqara, whom Babur had married at Herat in 1506 A.D., 
Kamran was born of Gulrukh Begchik, whose parentage, 
contrary to his usual method, Babur has not given. 1 He 
married her two years after Humayun 's birth on May 
6, 1508 A.D. Kamran was born six years later, i.e., in 
1514 A. D. and his younger brother Askari in 1516 A. D. 

As to his eldest son, Humayun, so also to his younger 
sons, Kamran and Askari, Babur gave a thorough educa- 
tion. Besides studying languages they underwent military 
and administrative training. Thus Kamran was appointed 
governor of Kabul at the age of 15, Hindal of Badakhshan 
at ii or 12, Askari commanded a division at the battle of 
the Ghagra at the age of 13, and Humayun at the battles 
of Panipat and Khanwah at the ages of 18 and 19 
respectively. Other details show the policy which 
Babur uniformly followed in the matter of education of his 
children. In 1522 A. D., when Kamran was merely a 
child of 8, Babur specially wrote a verse on Muslim Law 

1 Babur 's 3 other wives were : 

(a) Masfima Sultan Begam, whose daughter of the same pame was 
married to Muhammad Zaman JVlirza. 

(b) Dildar Aghacha, mother of Hindal. 

(c) Blbl Mubaraka, a Ydsufzal lady. 



[ 52 ] 

entitled Dar Fiqha-i-Mubaiyan for his instruction. 1 When 
after the capture of Milwat, 2 in January 1526 A. D. he 
inspected the fort, the first thing that he did was to visit 
Ghkzi Khan's 3 library and to choose some books for 
Humayun and Kamran. Again, in January 1529 A. D., 
he sent his Indian verses to Humayun and Kamran and 
the alphabet of the Baburi script to Hindal, then a child of 
10 or ii. 4 

The above non-preferential treatment of the children 
tended to foster a spirit of cordiality among the brothers, 
a spirit which was reinforced by Babur's dying instructions 
to Humayun to preserve and promote the cohesion among 
the members of the family. 5 

It thus happened, therefore, that at Babur's death, 
Humayun had his domestic policy practically pre-deter- 
mined by his father. He would not dislodge Kamran 
from the government of Kabul and Qandahar, where he 
had been virtually ruling for the last five years. His 
removal might have been useful to him; for the direct 
allegiance of the Kabulis and the Qandaharis to himself 
would have been of great help to him, as it had been to 
Babur in facing the rebellious Afghans of India. Humayun 
was practically a stranger to the Kabul! Afghans and, of 
course, in India, he was hated by the Afghans who thought 
he was the son of a usurper who had deprived them of 
their privileges of rulership. Kamran had thus an 
advantage over his brother; for he directly ruled over the 
warlike Afghans of Kabul. 

Humayun might have realised the disadvantage of not 
removing Kamran but under the influence of his father's 

1 B. N. f p, 438. 

2 See Malot in the Imperial Gazetteer of India. Situated in 3i5o' N. 
76 E. in Hushiarpur' district. There is another fort of the same name in 
the Jhelam district, which Mrs. Beveridge wrongly identifies with this fort 
of Daulat Ihan. See B. N. f p. 461. 

3 Ghazi han was the eldest son of Daulat IJhan Lodi, the governor 
of the Punjabr 

4 B. N.. p. 642. 

5 See G. H. N., fol. igb. 



C 53 1 

sentiments he did not effect any change. Matters, however, 
did not end here. Babur had, in the fullness of his 
generosity, divided the inheritance between Humayun and 
Kamran as 6 to 5. Certainly, he had a precedent in his 
own uncle's case. The eldest, Sultan Ahmad Mirza as the 
ruler of Samarqand had the largest share; the second, 
Sultan Mahmud Mirza had slightly less; while the third, 
Umar Shaikh Mirza and the fourth, Ulugh Mirza had 
considerably smaller shares. 

So, when Humayun came to the throne, it was expect- 
ed that he would increase Kamran's jdgirs considerably 
beyond their existing limits. 1 Unfortunately, he was busy 
with more important affairs and let this matter remain in 
abeyance for nearly two years. 

Kamran, on the other hand, like all ambitious youths, 
grew impatient of any delay. When he found the king 
engaged elsewhere, he took matters into his own hands and 
proceeded to act independently. He collected an army 
and marched to Lahore, where Mir Yunas All, the 
governor, stubbornly opposed him till he was captured. 
Qaracha Beg, one of Kamran ; s chief nobles, went to Yunas 
AH pretending to be displeased with his master and then 
on a suitable opportunity captured him. The surrender 
of the place automatically followed. Kamran was willing 
to continue Yunas in the office, but the latter declined 
and was then allowed to go to Humayun. Erskine* has 
very strongly criticised Kamran's actions in these words: 
"No sooner did Kamran, who was at Kabul, hear of his 
father's death than disdaining the ample dominions he had 
enjoyed under his father and in the possession of which 

his brother had consented to confirm him 

collected an army and in the true spirit of brotherhood 
among Asiatic princes marched for Hindustan, under pre- 

1 See B. N., p. 625. 

2 Kamran's possessions in 1530 A. D. were less than half the present 
size of Afghanistan. He did not possess the province of Herat, neither 
any territory to the north of the Hindukush nor any to the south of 
Qandahar. 

3 The History of India, Vol. II (Humayfin), p. 6. 



C 54 ] 

tence of congratulating Humayun on his accession, but in 
reality to try the strength of his sword and to see whether 
his own good fortune might not raise him to the throne of 
Delhi itself." To us, it appears that there are two glaring 
inaccuracies in the statement : 

(i) Erskine's theory of the rupture between the two 
brothers cannot be maintained at least for the first eight 
years of Humayiin 's reign. Kamran desired neither to 
contest the throne of Delhi nor to act as an independent 
prince. Humayiin, on his return to Delhi, added not only 
Lahore, Multan, and other eastern districts up to the Sutlaj 
to his dominion, but also Hisar Firuza, which was regard- 
ed as the heir-apparent's jdgir in the Mughal period. 1 
The coins, too, of the period bearing the names of both the 
brothers and the mintage town and year also support our 
statement. Of the eight coins preserved in the British 
Museum, six are dated, the latest being issued in 946 A.H* 
= 1539 40 A.D. One of the inscriptions reads: 

urv 

and 



If ^ 

Tr. 

' The justice of Muhammad Kamran Badshah-i-Ghazi ' 
and 'Muhammad Humayiin Ghazi, Sultan the Great and 
Illustrious, may God bless his territory and Sultanate/ 

These coins are stamped by Kamran in Lahore or 
in some other town in his jdgir . Kamran calls himself 
Bddshdh after the example of his father who then owned 
only the single province of Kabul. Humayun bore the 
morfe common title of Sultan. 2 

The true relation between the two brothers is clear 
from the phrase, 'as Sultdn-al-dzam' added to Humayun's 
name. It signifies that Humayun was the greater of the 
two, 

1 See B'eni Prasad's Jehangir. If the statement is cotfect, since no 
son was born to Humayfln, Kamran was indicated as his successor. 

2 We have seen in the Kilinjar inscription that as a prince, he called 
himself B&dsh&h-i~Ghazl< 



[ 55 ] 

The titles, Shah, Sultan, etc., were so indiscriminately 
bestowed on princes and even on nobles that among 
Babur's and Humayun's grandees there must have been 
at least two dozen with these titles. 

As we have pointed out, in compliance with Babur's 
wishes, viz., to recognize Kamran's importance, Humayun 
bestowed on him the provinces of Kabul, Qandahar, 
Multan, Hisar Firuza and others and the right of coinage. 
He also gave him permission to use the title of Badshah. 
Such grants were a common feature in Mughal India. Even 
so late as the middle of the i8th century, the East India 
Company and the Nawabs of the provinces issued coins, 
though they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Emperor 
of Delhi. 1 

(2) The second inaccuracy occurs where Erskine terms 
Kamran's territories of Kabul and Qandahar 'ample 
dominions/ The two provinces together would be less 
than half the size of the present insignificant Afghanistan. 
Kamran's jagirs were so small that an addition was 
expected. 



1 The last six rulers of Oudh were called Shahs or Badshahs, but 
they were wholly subordinate to the East India Company. A few 
mediaeval examples may also be given. The Mtrat-t-Stkandari refers to the 
grant of the title of Shah by Bahadur Shah of Gujrat to Nizam-ul-mulk 
of Ahmadnagar who had submitted to him. Similarly Shah Jahan had 
granted to Muhammad Adil of Bijapur the title of Shah. Perhaps the 
most striking parallel is afforded .by the coins of Ghiyasuddm Ghuri. 
There are many gold and silver coins in which the names of Ghiyasuddin 
and his brother Muizuddin Muhammad Ghuri jointly occur. Let us take 
one of these coins. In a gold coin (see Thomas's Chronicles of the Pathdn 
Kings of Delhi, p. 12), dated 592 A. H. = 1195 A - D., on the obverse side 
can be read 



^ Ji ; UJtete pJi*)H ^I 
and on the reverse pL- ^ *+&* j*&)fy\ ^jJjj UijJlj** jJiuJJ 



Now we know that the actual ruler was Ghiyasuddin Muhammad bin 
Sam while his younger brother Muizuddin Muhammad bin Sam was his 
commander-in-chief and governor of a province. (See C. H. /., Vol. Ill, 
p. 38). It was the magnanimity of elder brother that allowed regal titles 
to the younger brother, but all the same the head of the family was the 
elder brother, commanding allegiance of all other members of the family 
including Muizuddin. GhiySts's headship was so recognised a fact that 
tiie bestowal of titles on Muiz never clouded the issue. 



C 56 ] 

We may further point out that the opposition of 
Humayun's governor Mir Yunas AH to Kamran was due 
to the latter's impatience. What a little patience on his 
part might have obtained from the king without any blood- 
shed, he sought to obtain by a display of brute force. This 
was resented by Yunas who, as a loyal servant of the Delhi 
throne, considered it his duty to oppose such a high-handed 
procedure. He was probably unaware of the late king's 
desires and Humayun's acquiescence. 

Abul Fazl fully bears out our views. 1 He says, 'His 
Majesty Jehdnbdni (i.e., Humayun) partly because the sea 
of his liberality had been set in motion and partly from a 
desire to observe the precepts of his Majesty Geti-sitdni 
(Babur) made over the province to him.' 

Thus, the affair ended in peace and goodwill. A 
farmdn was issued confirming the grant of Kabul, 
Qandahar and the Punjab. In grateful acknowledgment 
of it, Kamran wrote the following lines : 



Translation : 

May thy beauty grow each moment, 
And thy destiny be happy and glorious. 
The dust that rises on thy path, 
Illumines the eyes of this afflicted. 
The dust that rises on Laila's path, 
Its rightful place is Majnun's eyes 
He who did not turn round thee like 
(the outer leg of a pair of) compasses 

1 See A. N.. p. 125. 



[ 57 1 

Is outside this circle. 1 

Kamran, so long as this world lasts, 

Let the monarch of the Age be Humayun. 2 

Humayun was so much pleased with the verses that he 
made a further gift of Hisar Firuza, a territory which had 
been granted to himself as a reward for his first victory on 
the Afghans under Hamid Khan in February, 1525 A.D. 3 
The grant to Kamran must have been made in 939 A. H.= 
January, 1533 A.D., soon after Humayun's return to Agra. 

To recapitulate our conclusions : 

(1) Up till 1538 A.D. Kamran was loyal to his elder 
brother. This is attested by the coins of the period. 

(2) Some addition to Kamran 's jdgirs of Kabul and 
Qandahar was desired by Babur and agreed to by 
Humayun. 

(3) In his impatience to increase his jdgirs, Kamran 
exerted force against the governor of Lahore and captured 
him. 

(4) Humayun, on his return to Agra, made amends 
for the delay, confirmed Kamran 's possession of Lahore 
and added Multan to it. 

(5) Cordial relations subsisted between the brothers as 
evidenced by Kamran's verses of panegyric in honour 
of Humayun and by the latter's grant of Hisar Firuza to 
the former. 



1 I.e., he who does not belong to Humay tin's court, has nohting to 
do with the Mughal empire. 

2 My English rendering differs in one or two lines from that of 
Beveridgcs 1 

3 B. M,:p. 466. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE FOUNDATION OF DIN-PANAH JULY, 1533 
APRIL, 1534 A.D. THE STATE FESTIVITIES. 

Humayun returned to Agra in January, 1533 A.D., 
after achieving a threefold success, as he conceived it, 
namely, (i) obtaining the title of Ghazi by defeating the 
Raja of Kalinjar, (2) defeating the Afghans at Dadrah, 
and (3) making a treaty with Sher Khan and allowing him 
to call himself a Mughal nobleman. 

One bf the reasons of Humayun's early return to the 
capital was the report that Sultan Bahadur Shah of 
Gujrat had hostile intentions against Delhi. Bahadur's 
rapid successes were alarming in themselves. He had taken 
Mandu in March 1531 A. D.; uprooted Silhadi of Raisen, 1 
a prominent nobleman ot Malwa in April 1532 A. D.; 2 
occupied Ranthambhor ; 3 and granted Chanderi, Bhilsa 
and Raisen to an Afghan nobleman, Alam Khan of Kalpi, 4 
who had taken shelter with him. 

With a view to impressing Bahadur and other neigh- 
bouring kings with his glory, on his return, Humayun , 
at the instance of his mother, Maham Begam, held a series 
of festivities to celebrate his signal success in the east. 
Public durbars, illuminations, State banquets and street 
decorations were the main features of the celebrations. 
Under Maham's orders the meanest citizen of Agra had to 



1 Another famous mediaeval fort, now in a state of neglect. Its situa- 
tion is in 23*20' N. and 7747' E. The origin of the name is Rajavasinl or 
the ' royal palace/ It is now the headquarters of the eastern districts of 
the Bhopal State in central India. B. N., p. 598, spells it as Raising. 

*Ramz&fl, 938 A. H. 

3 At present, in the Jaipur State, about 220 miles, South of Delhi. 
* He is different from Alam Khan, Ibrahim's uncle, who had taken 
shelter with Babur and desired to be ruler of Delhi in place of his nephew. 



[ 59 ] 



decorate his quarters. In fact, street decorations on a 
large scale, 1 according to one writer, were initiated by 
this lady. 2 The festivities continued for several days and 
ended with the bestowal of khilats and horses on a number 
of nobles. If Nizamuddin Ahmad, the author of the 
Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, be believed, 12000 of the khilats 3 with 
gold buttons were distributed, (January, 1533 A, D.). 

In order to make further impression on Bahadur, 
Humayun moved southwards and went to Gwalior 4 with 
his seraglio and stayed there for two months, (February 
and March, 1533 A. D.). Humayun indulged in another 
series of festivities and organized durbars as if to announce 
to Bahadur that though he was ever ready to face the 
Sultan and had actually come out to meet him, he was not 
averse to peace. The nobles entertained the king and 
he was weighed in scales against coin. He was found to 
weigh 15000 misqdU tankas equivalent to one maund thirty- 
eight seers and two chhataks of our time. Public proces- 
sions were held, consisting of a large number of elephants, 
camels, and horses. Free food was supplied to the public. 

These demonstrations made some impression on 
Bahadur; for he gave up his projects and made a treaty 
with Rana Vikramajit Singh of Chitor who was made to 
purchase a respite by a surrender of territories, a large sum 
of money, and the precious jewels 5 obtained by the late 
Rana Sanga from the late king of Malwa. The treaty with 
Rana Vikramajit was concluded on March 24, 1533 A. D. 
, To Humayun the capture of Ranthambhor 6 and the humi- 
liation of the Rana were distasteful, but at the moment he 



i Called 

* G. H. N. t fol. 22b. 

3 G. H. N. puts the number at 7000. The Tabaqdt-Akbati (T. A.) 
calls the khilat ^A^Db the outer garment. 

4 72 miles, s. e. of Agra. 

6 A crown, a jewelled belt and a necklace. 

6 8 miles, n. e. of Sewai Madbopur railway junction in the Jaipur 
State. The fort is situated on an isolated rock 1578 feet above the sea- 
level, surrounded by a massive wall strengthened by towers and bastions. 



[ 60 ] 

was not quite ready to launch a new campaign, and so he 
remained quiet. 

The cause of Humayun's hesitation seems to be the 
illness of his mother, Maham Begam. She had been suffer- 
ing for some time past from some abdomen trouble. It 
grew so serious that Humayun had to cut short his stay at 
Gwalior and repair to Agra where he arranged for a better 
treatment for his mother. All efforts, however, proved 
futile and she died on May 8, 1533 A. D. 1 

Maham was a remarkable lady and wielded a great 
deal of power during her husband's and son's reigns. 
Born a Shia, and related to the cultured Sultan Husain 
Baiqara, she was a fit spouse for the illustrious Babur. Her 
importance may be judged from the following facts: 
(i) her accompaniment with her husband to Samarqand 
when Babur conquered it in 1511 A. D. or when later on 
he was driven out of it, (2) the fact of her being the only 
queen who was allowed to sit by the side of the king 
on the throne of Delhi; 2 (3) Babur's decision that 
she was to be the guardian of the child expected to be born 
to Dildar Aghacha. 3 He paid no regard to the fact that 
Maham already possessed a son in Humayun, while Dildar 
had none. The newly born child was named Hindal and 
placed under Maham 's care; (4) the part played by her in 
her son's reign. It was she who organized many of the 
social functions of the palace and of the kingdom, and 
partly controlled the administration. 

After Babur's death Maham hardly ever left Agra. 4 
Muhammad Ali Asas, probably her brother, 5 was made the 
superintendent of Babur's tomb and sixty reciters of the 
Quran were appointed. As a pious widow she interested 



i J i3th Shawwdl 939 A. H. As Mrs. Beveridge points out Gulbadan 
Begam wrongly assigns 940 A. H. to her death. 

2 A. N., p. 114. Beveridge has wrongly translated cxio into 'table/ 

a B. N., p. 374- 

4 During the late trip to Gwalior, many ladies had accompanied 
tyun but probably Maham had stayed behind, 

5 G> H. N. f p. no n, 3. 



herself in the maintenance of her husband's tomb. Gul- 
badan Begam mentions that she especially looked after the 
food prepared twice daily for the attendants and the 
visitors. She further adds that the quantity of meat need- 
ed daily an ox, two sheep, and five goats in the morning, 
and five goats in the afternoon was provided by the 
widow. 

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Providence 
denied her the fulfilment of her only desire during her 
widowhood, viz., the birth of a male child to Humayun and 
the consequent stability of the Mughal throne. In her 
anxiety to have a grandson, she was ever negotiating new 
marriages for her son, though most of her proposals fell 
through because of Humayun's disapproval. 1 

At the end of the usual period of mourning, viz., forty 
days or more after his mother's death, Humayun went to 
Delhi in July 1533 A. D. Even now he did not think of 
waging a war against Sultan Bahadur but occupied him- 
selt with a peaceful measure, viz., the foundation of a new 
city. The site he selected was the historic plain of 
Indraprastha, 2 associated with the Panda vas of the 
Mahabharata. It commanded a better situation than the 
old Lodi town in the south-west. 3 His new capital would 
be close to the river Jamna. The old ruins of Firuzabad, 
Sin, Kilugarhi, 4 and even the abandoned houses in the LodI 
Delhi, would supply him with sufficient building materials. 
The spurs of the Aravalli hills afforded him protection in 
the west while the space enclosed between them and the 
river, some six miles in width, was enough for the city to 
develop in. None of the previous Delhis, e.g. Qila-i-Rai 
Pithaura, Siri, Jahanpanah, Firuzabad, had these two ad- 

1 See G, H. N., fol. 2ib. 

2 Popularly called Indarpat. It was one of the five villages granted 
to the Pandavas, the other four being Panipat, Sdnpat, Baghpat and 
Tilpat. See Fenshawe: Delhi Past and Present (F. D. P. P.) 

3 Now indicated by the three Lodi tombs. 

4 Kilfigarhi has been differently spelt. The proper form is Kilugarhi, 
meaning a fort, or garni by the side of water. It was founded by 
Kaiqubad in 1287 A. D. by the bank of the Jamna , south of the present 
Purana Qila. 



C 62 ] 

vantages nor the later Shahjahanabad. 1 The capital had 
the further advantage of being close to the saint Nizamud- 
din Aulia's tomb. The area around it is considered sacred 
by the devout, and Humayun's city might share the 
sanctity on account of its situation. The site, thus, was 
an ideal one. 

The foundations of the new city were laid in Muharram 
940 A. H. (July 1533 A. D.). It was named Dm-panah, 
"the Asylum of the Faith* and was completed in nine 
months, i.e., by Shawwal 940 A. H. (April, 1534 A. D.). 
The chronogram, Shahr-i-padshah-i-Din-pandh gives 940 
A. H. as the year of its completion. 

Khwandamir 2 has given a description of the founda- 
tion of the city. While Humayun was staying in Gwalior, 
it had occurred to him that he should found a new city in 
Delhi which would contain a citadel with lofty walls and 
palaces of several storeys situated amidst delightful gardens 
and orchards. So on his return and at an auspicious hour 3 
chosen by himself, he laid the first stone-rbrick on the earth 
and after him, the Mashaikh, Sayyids, learned maulavis, 
and the elders of the city, placed more stone-bricks in the 
foundation. One and all of them enthusiastically support- 
ed the king's scheme, and the throng was so great that there 
was hardly any room for more. Thus the architects, 
masons, and labourers, could hardly cope with the demand 
of brick-stones and mortar. 

It was no foolish vanity that had stirred Humayun to 
build a new capital. He had found that the Delhi of the 
Lodis breathed too much of class distinction or sectaria- 
nism. In Buhlul LodTs time, every Afghan looked upon 
himself as a ruler and regarded all others as inferior. 



1 A, glance at the map of Delhi attached to F. D. p. p. would make 
my point clear. 

* Author of the Hwndy&n~ndma. See Elliot, Vol. V, pp. 124-26. 
> * Humayun was an expert astronomer and could calculate the move- 
ments of the planets, Later on he had himself selected the time of his 
marriage with Hamfda Begam. See G. H. N., fol. 430. 



[ 63 ] 

Sikandar LodTs bigotry was revolting to a liberal Muslim. 1 
His new city was to be the haven for the wise and intelli- 
gent from all countries and the name, ' the Asylum of the 
Faith/ was to attract the pious of all denominations. Din- 
panah, like Muhammad Tughluq's Daulatabad, was to 
announce the new Imperial policy of toleration and fair 
dealing to all. But Humayun did not make a fetish of 
his ideal; and unlike Muhammad Tughluq who gave 
preference to the foreigners over his own subjects, 2 he 
accorded a welcome to the learned poets, sufis, historians, 
philosophers, etc., who arrived from all parts of the 
Muslim world. He was so successful in his patronage that 
a very large number of the intellectuals gathered in his 
court, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that in 
his time the centre of Muslim culture was Delhi and not 
any town of Persia, Turkey, or Central Asia, and that every 
aspirant to literary or philosophic fame sought the patron- 
age of the Mughal court. 3 It was the liberal outlook of 
the cultured king that improved the tone of society in this 
remarkable way. 

It may further be pointed out that the foundation of 
Din-panah was meant indirectly to express Humayun's 
strong disapproval of the Safawi or Ottoman policy of 
tyranny and religious persecution. 4 Hence Humayun's 
court was thronged by the refugees from both the countries. 

The ruins of Din-panah or Purana Qila as it is called 
to-day, have been preserved by the Archaeological Depaft- 
ment of the Government of India. The old city has 



1 For Buhlul's reign see the Tarikh-i-Daudi in Elliot IV, pp. 436-37 
for Sikandar's, Elliot IV, p. 439 and the Tabaqdt-i-Akbari (Newal Kishore 
edition), pp. 163 last line, 16, 170-71. Also C. H. I., Vol. Ill, pp. 240, 
246. 

2 See the Ibn Batuta translated by Gibb, p. 184. Muhammad Tughluq 
Called every foreigner Aziz or ' the Honourable/ 

8 This question of Mughal patronage of Muslim learning has been dis- 
cussed at length by M. Gharu in his book, ' a history of the Persian 
language and literature at the Mughal Court/ Part II, pp, 166-83, 

4 For a brief description of the , cruelties Brown : Literary History 
of Persia (B. L. H. P.) Vol. IV, pp, 55-56, 71-73, 96-97 may be consulted. 



[ 64 ] 

Almost disappeared. The citadel may yet be located; for 
Din-panah or the outer walls are almost entire. It is three 
Pur&na Qiia. furlongs long and a furlong and a half 
wide. At one time, water from the Jamna surrounded it 
on all sides, as is clear from the causeway at the western 
entrance. The walls are lofty being about 40 feet in height 
and the entrance gate and the distant Lai Darwdza 1 are 
imposing structures and eloquent of the builder's design 
and ambition. How efficient Humayun 's Public Works 
department was may be judged from the fact that the 
walls were completed in nine months, July, 1533 to April, 
1534 A. D. 

After Humayun's expulsion from India, in Sher 
Shah's time were added the two existing buildings, Masjid- 
i-Qila-i-kohna and Sher Mandal, the former being the Jdmi 
Masjid of the citadel and the latter being used for secular 
purposes. Humayun after his return made good use of 
both of them. He continued the first as a Jdmi Masjid 
and utilised the second as a library. It was in Sher Mandal 
that Humayun stumbled, on the stairs, and died of the 
accident on January 24, 1556 A. D. 

Two months after the completion of the citadel, in 
June 1534 A. D. a third series of feasts and durbars was 
held," in which khilats, titles, and other honours, were again 
bestowed on the princes and nobles. A long list is given 
by Khwandamlr, Hindal and Yadgar Nasir Mirza 2 each 
gqt a crown, a costly khilat, and an Arab horse with gold 
trappings. Others who received khilats were Abdullah 
Sultan-, Sultan Ali Mirza, Amir Mubarizuddin Faqir Ali, 
and Mirza Qasim Arghun. Qasim Arghun also got the 
togh* or the pennant of horse's hair and Yusuf Beg, son of 
Amir TaghM a costly shaggy carpet. 4 Ustdd Ali Quli, the 

1 Which can be seen from the Purana Qila. It is believed that 
Humayun had left it incomplete and that it was his successors, Sher Shah 
and Salim Shah who completed it. The incomplete portions must have 
been the buildings within the citadel. 

2 Son of Babuf's third brother, Nasir Mirza. 

3 See picture of Tumantogh or Chatrtogh in A. A. t Vol. I, Plate IX,. 
At the on4. 

in Persian. 



C 65 ] 

master-gunner, got a crown, a gold-embroidered khilat, 
a golden dagger with belt, and an Arab horse. 

Sultan Bahadur regarded the foundation of Din- 
panah and the citadel as a reply to his many campaigns 
which are to be dealt with later. So he set about to soothe 
the alarmed king and sent an envoy with a message of 
friendship and good will/ Humayun must have been 
greatly relieved; for he immediately responded by sending 
an equally cordial reply. The mutual assurance continued 
for some time after. 2 

After the completion of Din-panah, Humayun return- 
ed to Agra in July 1534 A. D. At the request of the ladies 
of the palace, specially of his aunt, Khan-Zada Begam, two 
more feasts were arranged. One has been called by Mrs. 
Beveridge the ' mystic ' feast. 3 The other was HindaTs 
marriage feast. Both were confined to the women of the 
palace or to those related to the nobles. Initially the idea 
of the celebrations had occurred to Maham Begam but she 
was now dead and her place was taken by Khan-Zada 
Begam. The full description of the feasts may be read in 
Gulbadan's work. At the first, there was, on the ground 
floor in the middle of a large octagonal hall, a tank with a 
platform where young men, pretty girls, musicians, and 
sweet-voiced reciters, were seated. The king and his sister, 
Khan-Zada, were assigned the jewelled throne presented 
by Maham Begam, who, if she had been alive, would 
herself have taken Khan-Zada 's place. The palace, of more 
than one storey, was throughout highly decorated, dn 
the first floor, there were three rooms termed, the Houses 
of (i) Dominion, (2) Good Fortune, (3) Pleasure. Large 
sums of money were distributed to the members of the 

1 Khwandamlr, a protege of Humayun, misinterprets it as a message 
of submission. According to him, the envoy. 



Notice that the word w&li, governor, has been used for Bahadur 
instead of Sultan or Shah f -" 

* A. H, G. f p. 227. & 

* According to Mrs. Beveridge, it commemorated rjumayftn's acces- 
sion to the throne. We do not know the reasons of her statement. 



C 66 ] 

palace, and other people who included all classes, e.g,, 
the Mirzas, chiefs, nobles, theologians, dervishes, grey- 
beards, soldiers, devotees, the poor, and the needy. It 
ended with a banquet and distribution of khilats to the 
selected persons of the assembly, 

The second feast was of greater importance; for it 
united Mahdi Khwdja's family with Humayun's own. 
The actual marriage of Hindal with Mahdi's sister, 
Sultanam Begam had already been celebrated in the life- 
time of Maham Begam but the festivities had to be post- 
poned owing to her illness. Now, Khan-Zada proposed 
that these should take place. She was greatly interested 
in the bride, not only because she was her husband's 
sister, but also because she had acted as her guardian and 
brought her up from the time she was a child of two. The 
marriage affords an example of Humayun's magnanimity 
towards his rivals and opponents. Here we see that he 
was not prejudiced by Mahdi Khwdja's intrigues against 
his accession, and bore no malice or ill-will towards him. 
Gulbadan describes, in detail, the various gifts to the bride- 
groom and the bride, which included jewellery, costly 
dresses, furniture, articles from the royal workshops, 1 
horses, elephants, and slaves from various countries 
Turkey, Circassia, Russia, and Abyssinia. 

After these festivities were over, Humayun conti- 
nued at Agra for sometime longer. He would occa- 
sionally go with his ladies to the other side of the 
Jamna where a large number of pavilions had been set up 
for their use. The king would stay in one of them and the 
hostess and all other ladies would gather round him 
and pass the evening in merriment. On these occasions, 
amidst the crowd of women, the wives of the king would 
find themselves rather ignored. Once, one of them, 
Bega Begam 2 protested against the neglect saying, '...How 



1 Indicated by the word ^JU^K . It cannot mean workshops, because 
they could not be presented. 

2 According to G. H. N. she was Humayun's chief queen, at this 
time. Later on, after the battle *>i Chausa, she fell into Sher Shah's hand 
but was restored to the king. 



[ 67 ] 

long will you think it right to show all these disfavours to 
us helpless ones ? We, too, have hearts. Three times ypu 
have honoured other places with visits, and you have run 
day and night into one in amusement and conversation/ 1 
The king felt annoyed and kept quiet for the moment; but 
after a few days he got all the wives and sisters together 
and pleaded that as he was an opium-eater they should 
not be very exacting with him; that these assemblies were 
meant to please the elder women, aunts and grand-aunts, 
i.e., those who had once enjoyed happy days but were 
now, as widows, ignored by the world. He then proceed- 
ed to obtain a signed declaration from Bega Begam and the 
other ladies, in which they were made to say that they were 
content with their lot whether he attended to them or not. 
The ladies felt helpless and signed, Bega Begam only 
murmured a few words of disapproval but dared not 
refuse her signature. His desire to ameliorate the hard 
lot of his ' wali-nimaian* speaks well of Humayun, the 
man. He would sacrifice his own pleasures and those of 
his queens for the sake of his elder widowed relations. It 
was really a continuance of his father's policy, the only 
difference being that whereas Babur used to visit them on 
Friday afternoons, 2 Humayun preferred the Sunday and 
Tuesday evenings. 

The chronology of the events related in this chapter 
may be given here: 









A. D. 


A. H. 


I. 


Humayun in Agra 


January 


1533 


939 


2. 


Humayun in Gwalior February & March 


1533 


939 


3- 


Humayun on Agra 


April 


1533 


939 


4- 


Death of Maham Begam at Agra 


May 


1533 


939 


5- 


Humayun' s stay in Agra May 


& June 


1533 


939 


6. 


Humayun went to Delhi, beginning of 


July 


1533 


939 


7- 


Foundation of Dln-panah, end of 


July 


1533 


940 


8. 


Completion of Dm-panah 


April 


1534 


940 


9- 


Festivities at Dm-panah 


June 


1534 


940 


10. 


Message from Bahadur 


June 


1534 


940 


ii. 


Humayun' s return to Agra 


July 


1534 


940 


12. 


Mystic feast, end of 


July 


1534 


941 


*3- 


Hindal's marriage festivities, beginning of 


August 


1534 


941 



G. H. N. fol. 3oa. 
G. H. N. fol. lib. 



CHAPTER VII 

MUHAMMAD ZAMAN MIRZA'S REBELLION- 
SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
AFGHANS, 1534 A. D. 

The foundation of Din-panah (April* 1534 A. D.) and 
the exchange of messages with Bahadur Shah of Gujrat 
(June, 1534 A. D.) made Humayun's position more secure 
and impressive among the rulers of India. And his 
festivities and recent munificence went a, long way 
towards weaning his nobles and subjects from his 
disgruntled relatives, among whom may be specially 
mentioned Muhammad Zaman Mirza and Muhammad 
Sultan Mirza and the latter's sons, tJlugh Mirza and Shah 
Mirza. They were ever ready to create a disturbance. 
Humayun's kindly nature and his father's dying injunc- 
tions, however, prevented him from taking any extreme 
disciplinary step against them, and so when at his acces- 
sion, some four years back, they had risen in rebellion, he 
had defeated them, ignored their crimes, and gone ahead 
with his conciliatory policy and confirmed their jagirs. 
Thus Muhammad Zaman Mirza got back his jdgtrs in Bihar 
and Muhammad Sultan those in Qanauj. 1 To Zaman, 
Humayun was especially kind; for he was the king's 
brother-in-law, being married to his half-sister, Masuma 
Sultan Begam, and was a young Timurid of distinguished 
lineage and considerable abilities. Humayun made him 
the governor of Bihar and did a special honour to Masuma 
by giving her the most costly tent during his campings out 
of Agra. Humayun hoped that such a generous gesture to 
the Mirza and Masuma Sultan 2 would be appreciated and 
would tend to foster peace and harmony in the family and 
thereby in the Mughal kingdom. 

* See Er&kine, Vol. II, p. 13 and G. H. N. f fol. 22b. 

* She was Bibur's eldest daughter and older than Htun&yfla by a few 
months. See G, H. N. f 29b. 



[ 69 ] 

In July 1534 A.D. when the political sky was clear 
and the king, was expecting a long term of peace, the Jwo 
Mirzas raised their heads and allied themselves with another 
less distinguished prince, Wali Khub Mirza. 1 Humayun 's 
prestige helped him to crush the enemy completely. A 
Mughal army proceeded to Bihar and took Muhammad 
Zaman M. prisoner. At the same time Muhammad Sultan 
M. and his two sons Ulugh M. and Shah M. were captured. 
The king who had once mercifully condoned their treasons, 
determined not to show them favour any further. He 
ordered the three principal Mirzas, Zaman, Sultan and Wali 
Khub to be blinded with fire-pencil, 2 and so long as the 
operation be not performed, they were to be kept in prison 
along with the two other Mirzas, Ulugh and Shah. The 
prisoners were entrusted to Mirza Yadgar Beg Taghai, 
maternal uncle, as well as father-in-law of Humayun. 3 
Wali Khub M. and Muhammad Sultan M. were blinded but 
Muhammad Zaman M., by reason of his youth, prevailed 
upon his jailor to show mercy to him and spare him the 
misery of being blinded. The taghai agreed and thus he 
became the cause of incalculable suffering to Humayun and 
the Mughal kingdom; for Muhammad Zaman M. escaped 
and fled to Bahadur Shah of Gujrat whom he incited to 
attack the Mughal dominions. 

Having crushed the Timurid rebels of Bihar, 
Humayun desired to reduce Afghans of the province also 
to submission. 

On his last contact with the Mughals Sher Khan had 
made terms with Humayun and had been permitted to retain 
Chunar. From that date December, 1532 
The Afghans. ^ D. Sher han's affairs had brightened. 
Since the Nuhanis and Sultan Mahmud Lodi had 
retired, he made himself the leader of his countrymen. 



1 Farishta calls him Nu^hwat Mirza. 

3 The process of blinding has been described by Erskine, See E. 
. fi H. /., Volume II, 14 n. 

8 Mirza Y&dgar Beg's daughter Bega or Hajl Begam was married to 
Humayun. 



t 70 3 

Nasrat Shah 1 of Bengal was succeeded by his son, 
Alauddin FIruz, in 1532 A. D.; but Mahmud, Nasrat's 
The rulers of brother and FIruz's uncle, who had been 
Bengal. generously treated by the late king whom, 

however, he had ill-repaid by his rebellious conduct, 3 
developed the ambition of seizing the throne and so after 
four months, when an opportunity occurred, he killed 
FIruz, and usurped the throne in May, 1533 A. D. under 
the title of Sultan Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah. 

The usurpation of the throne by Mahmud Shah was 
not liked by some of his nobles, chief among whom was 
his brother-in-law, 3 Makdum-i-Alam, the governor of 
Mahmud skdh Hajipur, in Bihar. So when Mahmud as- 
and Makhdum-i- cended the throne, a conflict with Makhdum 
Alam ' became inevitable. The latter in order to 

strengthen his position cordially reciprocated the advances 
of Sher Khan and thus between the two, the closest attach- 
ment grew up. Having thus secured an ally, Makhdum 
adopted a more defiant attitude towards Mahmud and set 
about making preparations for a war in order to punish 
him for the murder of his late master's son. Mahmud, in 
his turn, ordered Qutb Khan, the governor of Mungir, 
to crush Makhdum but in the actual battle he did not 
fare well and was defeated by his opponent, aided by 
Sher Khan. Qutb was sent again with better equipment and 
as Sher Khan was not by Makhdum's side Qutb obtained 
a decisive victory, and Makhdum was killed on the battle- 
field. But Bengal could not profit by his vast wealth; 
for under a presentiment of his approaching end, Makhdum 
had transferred the whole of it to Sher Khan. 

In the meantime, Sher Khan's strife with his master, 
Jalaluddin and other Nuhanis had reached a climax, and 
Jalal and his clansmen continually found themselves 
worsted. Hence they thought of surrendering their 

1 Called also Naslb Shah. The Ridz-us-Salatin (R. S.), p. 139 points 
out the correctness of the name Nasrat and not of Naslb. 

2 As early as 933 A. H. 1526-27 A. D. he had rebelled against 
Nasrat Shah and issued coins in. his own name. 

* Yazna, sister's husband according to R. S. 



t 71 ] 

heritage to the king of Bengal, in the hope that Mahmud 
Sher Khan as Shah after disposing of Sher Khan would 
governor m Bihar, allow Bihar to be governed by the Nuhanis 
under the suzerainty of the king of Bengal. 

Sher Khan gained considerably from the defection of 
the Nuhanis. For it left him master of the situation 
and made him highly popular with his non-Nuham 
countrymen who realized his solicitude for the welfare of 
his people as contrasted with the mean desertion of the 
Nuhanis. 1 

To proceed with the task of ameliorating the condition 
of his subjects, Sher Khan invited every Afghan, even from 
distant Afghanistan with the idea that every Afghan would 
Sher Khan as the ^^ shelter and protection in his territory. 
benefactor of his Sher Khan planned a definite scheme of 
countrymen. public welfare and utilized the public 
wealth as well as his private treasure for the purpose. The 
chief features of the scheme were : 

(a) The provision of employment for every indigent 
Afghan. 

(b) Every Afghan was to do hard work in his own 
interest as well as in that of the State. The individual 
would thereby become more efficient and respected and the 
State would benefit by his exertions. 

(c) Vagrancy was to be put down with a strong hand. 
An idler or shirker of work was to be severely punished, if 
necessary, capitally. 

(d) In order to maintain a unity of purpose and avoid 
wastage or duplication, the whole organization was to 
work under his supervision, which would remove the 
great defect of an Afghan democracy, namely; a weak 
foreign policy. He would vigilantly protect "the interests 
of his countrymen and* if necessary, defend their rights 
against aggressors. 

1 According to Qanungo, Jalal Nuhanl went over to Mahmfid Shah 
in 1533 A. T>,; according to Erskine, 4 years earlier. No other writer 
records the date of the flight. " ' J '* .. , r 



r 72 ] 

Maiunud Shah did not stop with the death of 
Makhdum but turned his attention to Sher Khan. More 
than one war followed. In the first Qutb Khan, the 
general on behalf of Mahmud, mentioned 
sh$r gk&n's wars already, was killed and in the second, his 
with Bengal. ^^ IbliLhim> was signally defeated at the 
battle of Surajgarh, n miles west of Mungir, on the river 
Ganges, in March, 1534 A. D. On both the occasions, 
Sher Khan extended his territories first from Barh 1 to the 
river Kiul and then fifty miles further east up to almost 
Mungir itself. 

Let us now turn to Humayun. He was staying at 
Agra till the beginning of September, 1534 A. D. He must 
have been fretfully watching Sher Khan's movements and 
getting uneasy at his attempt at uniting his people ; though 
at times he lulled himself into the belief that Sher Khan 
was a nobleman of the Mughal kingdom and his conquests 
indicated the extension of the kingdom itself. Humayun 
did not therefore move agaist Sher Khan. 

But there was another reason why Humayun could 
not proceed immediately against Sher Ihan. Bahadur 
Shah after exchanging cordial messages with Humayun, 
had turned hostile and between Sher Khan and Bahadur 
Shah there had developed the political understanding 
that when Humayun would attack the one, the other would 
be more active. It will be remembered that it was 
Bahadur Shah's activities in the north that had forced 
Humayun to the treaty of Chunar with Sher Khan and 
now when Sher Khan won victories, the same fear of 
Bahadur prevented him from moving against the Afghans 
of Bihar. 

With the death of Qutb and defeat of his son, 
however, Hmnayun realized that no further delay was 
advisable. He thought the completion of Din-panah 
would keep Bahadur quiet and he would be able to 
finish his Afghan expedition in a brief campaign. So in 

1 Situated 34 miles east of Patna. 



C 73 ] 

September, 1534 A. D. he collected an army and went as 
far as Kanar 1 in the Kalpi district. There he heard a great 
deal of the renewed activities of Bahadur; how he had 
laid the second siege to Chitor; extended a ready welcome 
to Alam Khan Alauddm 2 and his son Tatar Khan, and later 
on to Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who had escaped from 
prison and fled to Bahadur 3 followed by Yadgar Taghdi; 
and finally, how Bahadur was organizing a mighty cam- 
paign against Delhi. Reluctantly therefore and rather 
injudiciously, Humayun hastened back to Agra determined 
to face once for all this persistent menace and in one well- 
directed campaign to end it for good. 

The following dates may be noted : 

(1) Rebellion of Mahammad Zaman M. and 

Muhammad Sultan M July, 1534 A. D. 

(2) The defeat and capture of the Mirzas . August, 1534 A. D. 

(3) Humayun's march to the east . . . September, 1534 A - > 

(4) Humayun's return to Agra .... November, 1534 A. D. 



, * See A. A., Vol. II, p. 184. 

* IbrdMm L5df s uncle, who had been, for some time B&bur's candi- 
date for the throne of Delhi. 

* November, 1534 A. D. 



CHAPTER VIII 

BAHADUR SHAH OF GUJRAT (1526-37 A. D.) 

Gujrat comprises to-day the Gujrat speaking regions , 
viz. the peninsula of Kathiawad and Cutch, the districts 
and states of the Bombay Presidency from Palanpur to 
. Daman, i.e., the country lying between 2Og r 

*"*' and 2443'N. and 6825' and 72 22' E. The 

total area is more than 40,000 sq. miles of which nearly 
half consists of the Kathiawad peninsula. In mediaeval 
times, Gujrat had a wider political connotation and includ- 
ed the subordinate provinces of Sindh and Khandesh and 
after 1531 A. D., of Malwa also. The principal town, 
Ahmadabad, situated on the river Sabarmati, occupies the 
neck of the peninsula. The mainland is intersected by 
several other rivers, of which the principal are the Mahi, 
the Banas, the Narbada, and the Tapti. 

The province has hardly any high mountains, the 
Narbada and the Tapti flowing through hillocks of low 

elevation. The western extremities of the 
'Gur*f ls f Vindhya and the Satpura ranges, Dungarpur 

Girnar and the Palitana hills and Mount 
Abu, these constitute the elevated and hilly regions. 

The province is rich in its products and its ports, Diu, 
Gogo, Cambay, Broach, Surat, Navsari, Bulsar, and 

Daman, were world-famous in the Muslim 

days. The customs duties paid by the 
Persian merchants alone at these ports reached the figure 
of 60,000 rupees. 1 

Iron ore is found in the peninsula and at the mouth 
of the Tapti und cornelian of good quality in abundance 
in Rajpipla* Several agricultural crops are produced, 
namely rice, wheat, barley, millets, and gram. But the 



See M . S. (B. M .) fol. 



t 75 ] 

most valuable crop is cotton, of which a large quantity is 
raised. The date-palm and the palmyra flourish through- 
out the country. Of fruits many varieties prevail, of which 
jack, mango, musk-melon, and water-melon, are well- 
known. The figs and the huge adansonia useful to the 
coastal fishermen as floats for their nets may also be 
mentioned. In Abul Fazl's words, 'From the numerous 
groves of mango and other trees, it (Gujrat) may be said 
to represent a garden/ 1 

Gujrat was a thriving centre of industries and art 
crafts. The mother-of-pearl inlay work, painting, seal- 
engraving, have been mentioned by the Atn-i-Akbari. 
Similarly, various kinds of skilled work in gold 
Industries embroidery on cotton or silk, such as Chirah, 
Fotah, etc., and velvets and brocades, were 
manufactured and various imitations of those imported 
from Turkey, Europe, or Persia, were made. Excellent 
swords and daggers, bows and arrows were made in the 
province and there was a brisk business in jewellery. 
Silver was imported from Turkey and Mesopotamia. 

The history of Gujrat goes into the distant past. Sri 
Krishna is said to have retreated to Dwarka, at the 
extreme end of the Kathiwad peninsula, and died there. 
Coming to a more recent period, we know 
*^ at tf 16 P en i nsu l a under the name of 
Surashtra and also the mainland were in- 
cluded in Asoka's empire. The Saka chiefs of Surashtra 
were again made tributary in the time of Samudra Gupta 
and Chandra Gupta II in the 4th century A. D. 

With the fall of the Guptas, Western India came under 
the control of the Maitraka tribe, who fixed their capital 
at Vallabhi. 3 In Harsha's time (606-47 A.D.), Vallabhi 
acknowledged his suzerainty. 



1 A. A., Vol. II, p. 239. Lane-Poole in his Mediaeval India, Ch. VII, 
expresses the same sentiment. 

2 See Forbes: R&s Mala, Vol. I, p. 20, n. i. The town was situated 
20 miles west of Bhavanagar and 25 miles south of Satrunjaya hills. 



[ 76 ] 

After the death of Harsha, when India broke up into 
small independent principalities, Gujrat also set itself up as 
a separate kingdom. The Chalukya or Solanki dynasty, 
founded by one Mulraj, continued till 1242 A. D., when its 
last ruler Bhima Deva II died. Bhima is remembered for 
a victory that he obtained on Muhammad Ghuri in 1179 
A<D., though fifteen years later, Muhammad's general 
Qutbuddin Aibak took revenge by winning a victory and 
plundering the rich country. 

After Bhima Deva's disappearance, the Baghela 
ministers of the Solanki chiefs came into prominence. 
Visala Deva became an independent ruler in 1243 A. D., 
and it was his great grandson, Kama Deva 1 who was 
defeated by Alauddin's generals, tJlugh Khan and Nusrat 
Khan in 1287 A. D. 

Henceforward Gujrat formed part of the Delhi kingdom. 
Its last governor was Zafar Khan appointed in 1391 A. D. 
By 1396 A. D., he secured his position and when he 
found that the rival puppet kings of Delhi, Mahmud Shah 
and Nasrat Shah, both of the Tughluq dynasty, were 
constantly fighting against each other, he assumed inde- 
dendence (1396 A. D.), though the actual title of Sultan 
Muzaffar Shah was adopted eight years later in 1404 A. D. 2 

Bahadur Shah belonged to this dynasty. He was the 
grandson of the equally famous Sultan Mahmud Begarha 
(1458-1511 A. D.). As a prince, Bahadur was noted for 
his ability and energy. Annoyed because his 
father > Muzaffar Shah II, (1511-26 A.D.), 
refused to treat him on equal terms with his 
elder brother, Sikandar Khan, the heir-apparent, he left 

1 Rds Mdld, Vol. I, p. 372, gives the following genealogy about him: 
Visala DSva 

J 
Arjtina Deva 

Sprang Deva 

Kama Deva 
C. H. L. Vol. III. the chapter on Gujrat. 




[ 77 

the kingdom, and passing throi 
Mewat 1 reached Delhi, in the be 
Everything was in a state 
there ; for Babur had crossed the IndifeifliwWI and last 
time, imprisoned Daulat Khan, occupied the whole pro- 
vince of the Punjab, and was fast approaching Panipat. 

Bahadur moved to Sultan Ibrahim's camp, situated 

several miles to the south-east of the battlefield. The prince 

was welcomed by the Sultan and he took up the Lodi 

cause. 2 This made him popular with the 

Bahadur Khan Afghan army and so the Sultan grew jealous 

m Sultan 5 u irri- -r i - i T -I ,1 

Ibrahim's camp, and cold. When Bahadur discovered this, 
he refrained from further activity and in the 
actual battle fought on April 18, 1526 A. D., he remained 
merely a spectator. He was impressed by Babur's skill 
and his followers' valour on the> battlefield. 3 Several 
years afterwards, he was unwilling to come into direct 
conflict with the Mughals, observing that the Indians as 
compared with the Mughals were like glass against stone 
and in any impact between the two, it would be the Indians 
who would suffer. 4 

Immediately after the defeat of the Afghans, Bahadur 
was offered the throne of Jaunpur. At the end of Sultan 

1 See A. H. G., p. 128, where the writer says: 
jjj fea.1! I/* ^iUJI &jJej y/ 4J fep 
This contradicts the same writer's statement on page 121. 



The former seems to be the more correct statement. According to 
M. S., Bahadur's Murshid, Hazrat Shah Shaikh Jiu died immediately after 
and Sikandar made the derisive remark I^A \Jy^ t^* I/* J& ' ^ e master 
died and the disciple became a wanderer.' 

2 A. H. G., p. 128 has -jfc^y Jfylj Ax^Uo^jl^ ^ 

*j (the Mughals) 



8 See -4. T. FF. H. G., p. 3. He is incorrect in his statement that 
Bahadur reached Ibrahim's camp on the day of the battle. I have 
followed A. H. G., pp. 120-21, see alsq p, 229. 

*A. H. G., p. 229. 



C 78 ] 

Ibrahim's reign there was plenty of unrest, and the eastern 
Afghans under the leadership of Bahadur Khan Nuhani, 
rebelled against him. Those who had gathered at Pani- 
pat saw nothing but defeat and death of their master 
because of the superior skill of the foe. Impressed by this 
superiority of the foreigner they were in search of an abler 
leader than the Nuhanis could supply. Hence their request 
to Bahadur to ascend the throne of Jaunpur. 

But in Gujrat also, Bahadur was needed, his father, 
Muzaffar Shah, having died on April 7, 1526 AD., n days 
before the battle of Panipat. The nobles were not 
unanimous in their selection ; some favoured Sikandar, the 
heir-apparent, some the second son Bahadur, and a few 
the third son Latif Khan. Being on the spot, Sikandar 
Khan succeeded but his supporters, Imad-ul-Mulk Khush- 
qadam, and Khudawand Khan al-Iji, and those who were 
not in his favour, all got alarmed at his insensate idiocy. 1 
He was assassinated by Imad-ul-Mulk on April 12, 1526 
A. D., after a reign of 5 days. 

As mentioned above, there were several parties favour- 
ing the remaining princes. A large number of nobles 
headed by Taj Khan Narpali 2 favoured Bahadur; a few, 
headed by Qaisar Khan, 3 Latif Khan; but the two most 
important of the ministers, Khudawand Khan al-Iji and 
Imad-ul-Mulk Khushqadam, 4 who had raised Sikandar to 
the throne and then murdered him, were in favour of 
Muzaffar Shah's youngest son, Nasir Khan. 5 They tried 

1 A. H. G., p. 133. He would strike at his shoes or sugar-cane sticks, 
bound together, with his sword and name some nobleman, whom he 
thought he was beheading. The author's words are ^5!****^ Uu~ ^ 

S^awBV^JBjw,. 



a A. H. G. calls 
3 Also called 

* A. H. G., p. 133, 11. 3-4. 

* A. H. G* f p. 133, 11. 20-25. M. S. points out that Imad was the 
first murderer of a Gujrat king, also that henceforth no king would die 
in his bed. The latter statement is not true. 



C 79 ] 

to win over the other nobles by a lavish grant of titles but 
as it was not accompanied by any jdgir, it did not reconcile 
them. Next Imad-ul-mulk wrote to the neighbouring 
chiefs, Imad-ul-mulk of Berar 1 and Rana Sanga and also 
to Babur, 2 to support his government. 3 Since it might 
mean loss of independence for Gujrat, some patriots 
headed by Taj Khan Narpali 4 combined to frustrate his 
plans, They sent Payanda Khan to Bahadur with an offer 
of the throne of Gujrat. He met Bahadur at Bagh Pat, 5 
and delivered his message. Bahadur preferred the throne 
of his native kingdom to that of the distant Jaunpur, 
explained the situation to the accompanying Jaunpuri 
nobles, offered excuses and obtained permission to part 
with them. After a rapid march, he reached Ahmadabad 
and ascended the throne on July II, 1526 A. D. 

One of his first actions was to secure and execute 

Imad-ul-mulk Khushqadam 6 and the other assassins of 

Sikandar; Latif also disappeared about this time, the infant 

ruler, Nasir Khan, entitled Mahmud Shah 

Bahadur as j^ was murdered, and another adult 

e ' brother, Chand Khan left for Mandu. So 

Bahadur was left without any rival in his kingdom. 

Sultan Bahadur Shah ruled for nearly n years (July 
1526 February, 1537 A. D.) and is remembered as one of 
the most distinguished rulers of Gujrat and deserves, along 
with his grandfather, Sultan Mahmud Begarha, a place 
among the renowned kings of India. At the time of his 
accession, he was reputed for ability, energy, and piety, 

1 Alauddin Imad Shah who ruled 1504-29 A. D. 

2 Babur was offered a cror of tankas in cash. See M. S. fol. 1300. 

3 In which, M. S. includes the author of the Tdrikh-i-Bahddur Shdhi,' 
This precious history seems to have completely disappeared. 

4 Taj Khan is remembered as the builder of the marble tomb of Shah 
Alam, the son of Qutb-ul-Alam, the great saint of Ahmadabad. See its 
photograph in C. H. I., Vol. Ill, plate 27. 

5 Situated in 2856' N. and 77i7' E. The name is incorrectly 
written in M. 5. as Bagh-i-Panipat. The Mirat-i-Ahmadi makes Bahadur 
reach the Jaunpur kingdom before his return to Gujrat, which is unlikely. 

A. T. W. H. G. says, he was flayed aliw. - 



I &> ] 

and known to be deeply devoted to Hazrat Shah Shaikh 
Jin 1 and his successor. 

With Bahadur's accession, Gujrat entered on one of 
its most brilliant periods. Bahadur was merely a youth of 
twenty and almost immediately after his accession started 
on a career of campaigns and conquests. After restoring 
tranquillity to his kingdom, he launched upon a protracted 
warfare against his neighbours. It will suffice to record 
here his successes with a brief description of some of 
them : 

(1) In 1527-29 A. D., in response to an appeal from 
Alauddm Imad-ul-mulk of Berar and Muhammad II of 
Khandesh,* Bahadur forced Burhan Nizam Shah (1509-53 
A. D.) to retreat and acknowledge him as his suzerain and 
read khutbah in his name. 

(2) In 1530-31 A. D., he faced the Portuguese who had 
already captured Daman. In the naval conflict near Diu, 
the Portuguese were repulsed. , 

(3) In 1531 A. D., in alliance with Rana Ratan Singh, 
he put an end to the independence of Malwa. In the past, 
i.e. in Muzaffar's time, Mahmud II of Malwa (1511-31 
A. D.) was treated with the most generous consideration. 
In Mahmud's interest, so far back as 1518 A. D., 19,000 of 
the Rajputs, who kept him in bondage, were massacred at 
Mandu, and Gujrat contingents were placed in the different 
parts of Malwa. 

But with the accession of Bahadur, the friendliness 
had changed at first into indifference and then into hostility 
and for both these changes, Mahmud had to thank him- 
self* He gave shelter to Chand Khan, one of Bahadur's 

1 It was at Shaikh Jiu's death and Bahadur's departure that 
Sikandar's sneering remark L* 1**. 4jy 'y*j-S was mac ^ e - The Shaikh's 
full name was Sayyid Jaaluddin Shah Shaikh Jiu. He was the grandson 
of Qutb-ul-Alam Sayyid BurhSn-ud-din. 

See ihe Mirdt'i-Ahmadi (GaekwSuJ's Oriental Series) Supplement, p. 24 
for a description of the Shaikh's life. Bom 853 A. H. = 1449-50 A* D.; 
died $n 931 A. H.**i$4 A. D.; and lies buried at Batwah, 

* Muhammad was Bahadur's nephew, bang the son of his sister. 



[ 8i ] 

brothers, 1 and pretender to the throne of Gujrat and this 
in spite of repeated protests from Bahadjir. 2 To add to 
his crime, he attacked some of the districts of the Rana. 
So the two combined and proposed an invasion of 
Mahmud's kingdom. Bahadur still hoped that the Malwa 
ruler would come to his senses and concede the surrender 
of Chand Khan. There were repeated promises but the 
actual surrender was never made. At last Bahadur, seeing 
that no compromise was forthcoming, took Mahmud 
prisoner and annexed his kingdom in March, 1531 A. D. 3 

(4) In the same year, he granted to Burhan Nizam of 
Ahmadnagar and also to his nephew, Muhammad of 
Khandesh permission to affix the title of Shah to their 
names. People would style him, as pointed out by Burhan, 
Shah-in-Shdh or the Shah of the Shahs. Amir Barid-ul- 
Mumalik of Bldar 4 also, according to the Mirat-i-Sikandari, 
seems to have submitted to Bahadur by reading khutbah 
in his name. 



1 Muzaffar Shah's family is shown: 

Muzaffar Shah (1511-26 A. D.) 

I 

III II 

Sikandar Kh. Bahadur Kh. Latif Kh. Chand Kh. Nasir Kh. Daughter^ 

Adil Khan of Khandesh. 

I 
Muhammad II. 

C. H. /., Vol. Ill, p. 711 makes Nasir Khan and Muhammad two 
different personages; also Chand Ihan as younger to Nasir Khan. The 
histories do not support these assumptions. 

2 See A. H. G. f pp. 195-96 for the full description. Even on the last 
day of his kingship, just before his surrender, to Bahadur, Mahmud 
requested Rai Rai Singh to escort Chand Khan to a safe refuge. Mahmud's 
reason for this solicitude was that Muzaffar Shah had entrusted Chand 
Khan to him and he would not be false to his benefactor whatever might 
happen to him. See also Af. 5. fol. 142. 

3 4" H. G. gives the date of Mahmud's imprisonment as the loth 
shabdn and Bahadur's annexation of Malwa as Friday, the I2th Shabdn 
937 A. H. = 3ist March, 1531 A. D. The Tabaqdt-i-Akbari's date is I2th 
Ramzdn 938 A. H. 

* M, 5. fol. i32a calls him Barfd Shah. According to C. H. l. t it 
was Amir's successor, All (1542-71 A. D.), that first assumed the title. For 
Burhaa Nizam's request for the title of Shah, see M. 5. fol. I42b.; for 
Muhammad of KhS-ndesh, fol. 1450.. 



[ 82 ] 

(5) The capture of Raisen, May, 1532 A. D. Next 
Bahadur turned against the semi-independent Rajput 
chiefs of Malwa. In the last twenty years or more they 
had brought the whole kingdom under their control 
and divided the eastern districts amongst themselves. 1 The 
chief of them was Silhadi, the Lord of Raisen. 2 Bahadur 
who was bitterly opposed to the non-Muslims outside his 
kingdom, 3 turned against Silhadi, who had given him 
umbrage by keeping in his harem a large number of 
Muslim women. Silhadi interested the Gujrat nobleman, 
Nassan Khan in his favour and when Bahadur paid no 
heed to his pleadings, took the extreme step of turning a 
Muslim, called himself Salahuddm, and obtained initiation 
into the Muslim faith from Nuruddin Burhan-ul-mulk 
Banbani. 4 But Bahadur did not spare him even then. So 
he retracted his profession, returned to his brother, Laksh- 
man Singh, who had been left in charge of the fort and 
both of them died fighting along with most of their Rajput 



1 Hence called the Purabiya Rajputs. 

2 Ojha, the author of the Udaipur Rajya ka Itihas (U. R. I.), says 
that Raisen was in his brother, Lakshman Singh's possession. Probably, 
the latter was Silhadi' s deputy. 

8 Bahadur's policy towards the Hindus was not without some redeem- 
ing features: 

(a) He had promised to redress Silhadi' s wrongs against Mahmud 

Khaljl of Malwa. 
(6) Hindu heirs were granted stipends of their parents see A. H. G., 

p. 247, i, 17. 

(c) Hindus were freely appointed to trusted commands; even the 

aboriginal tribes were treated with consideration. These 
explain why Bahadur's subjects in rural districts paid him 
revenue of their own accord and also why the Kolis and the 
Bhlls of Cambay, acting in his favour, attached Humayun's 
camp. 

(d) He gave a Sanskrit name, Sangdr (Sringar) Mandap to his 

Durbar Hall and thus pleased his Hindu subjects. See 
Bailey's History of Gujrat, p. 329. 

(e) Bahadur had allowed Ratan Singh's minister, Karma Singh to 

repair a temple at Satrunjaya in Kathlawad. See Ojha 
U. R. L t Vol. I. pp. 391-92. 

* M. S. fol. i47b, A, H. G. t p. 224. The latter says that Silhadi 
accepted Islam in Bahadur Shah's presence. But Babur's memoirs names 
him SaUhuddin in the description of the battle of Khanwah. Silhadi's 
defect appears to be his inclination to Islam as well as to his clansmen. 



[ 83 ] 

followers. The women had performed the jauhar 
ceremony before the death of their male relations. The 
fall of Raisen, mostly due to the artillery fire of Rumi 
Khan, 1 his master-gunner, took place at the end of 
Ramzan, 938 A.H. (=May, 1532 A. D.) 

Bahadur had hardly any territorial ambition in crush- 
ing Silhadi; for he gave most of the Rajput ' jagirs includ- 
ing the districts of Chanderi, Bhilsa, and Raisen to Alam 
Khan Lodi, the late governor of Kalpi under Ibrahim. 
Alam Khan had been turned away by Humayun and 
had taken shelter with Bahadur. In return for the grant 
of jagirs to Alam Khan, Bahadur wanted him to crush the 
influence of the Purabiya Rajputs and establish that of 
his master instead. It seems that Kalpi also had been con- 
ferred on Alam but probably his hold on this district was 
merely nominal. 

(6) The first siege of Chitor f 1533 A. D. Before des- 
cribing Bahadur's first siege of Chitor, it seems advisable to 
give a brief history of the recent events in the State. Rana 
Sanga died on January 19, 1528 A. D.* and was succeeded 
_, . by Ratan Singh, whom Tod represents 3 as 

The previous J . . G *,_, r i i ,r t 

history of a vainglorious youth for his boastful corti- 

Chitor. mand that the gates of Chitor should never 

be closed, for 'its portals were Delhi and Mandu.' But 
probably there is too much colour in his picture of the Rana. 



1 A person of outstanding personality. Commissariat in his article 
on ' a brief History of the Gujrdt Sultanate/ (H. G. S.) in the Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society. Bombay Branch (J. R. A. S. B. B.) 1918-19 
furnishes many interesting details but is wrong in taking Rumi Khan 
to be a European. A. H. G. also gives details on pp. 218-20; thus we 
know that his name was Amir Mustafa bin Behram of Constantinople; on 
his arrival at Diu, he was welcomed by the governor and later on by 
Bahadur; he was given jdglrs in Ranir and Surat and later on Diu was 
added to it. A. N. also pays him a great compliment 



dj* fa}) && fUjjl (jl*~ fJ) ' was the paragon of age in conquering strong 

forts and sky-high castles/ The Tazkirat-ul-Umard supports A. H. G. in 
the details of Rumi Khan's father. Erskine is mistaken in calling him 
Khudawand Khan ROml. 

2 See U. R. I., p. 383. 

3 See Tod's Rajasthan, Vol. I, p. 247. 



C 8 4 ] 

Be that as it may; he had a short reign, dying in I53I 1 A.D. 
of a wound received in a family brawl started by himself. 2 

As he left no son, he was succeeded by his younger 
brother Vikramaditya, (Bikramajit) who was, as prince, 
lord of Ranthambhpr 3 and was prepared to surrender the 
place to Babur, so far back as October 1528 A. D., in return 
either for Biana or for the throne of Chitor. Vikramaditya 
was wholly unworthy of his illustrious father or even his 
reckless brother. Tod represents him as insolent, passionate 
and vindictive and accuses him of favouring his personal 
followers and seven thousand wrestlers whom he had 
engaged in his service. The Rajput sardars whom he ridi- 
culed, retired in sullen disgust to their jdgws determined to 
have nothing to do with their new Rana. Left to himself 
and his favourites, Vikramaditya neglected the administra- 
tion of his State to such an extent that by the people of the 
kingdom his reign was nick-named ' Pappa Bai ka raj.'* 

Bahadur Shah had long had a covetous eye on Chitor. 
He had so long refrained from an expedition ; for both the 
Ranas, Sanga and Ratan Singh, had been courteous to 
him, one congratulating him on his accession and the other 
obtaining his permission to repair a temple at Satrun- 
jaya. 5 But the new Rana seemed to ignore him and 
the rest of the world. Only once did he stir to render aid 
to Silhadi against the Sultan of Gujrat. But Vikramaditya 
was so lazy that beyond some half-hearted movements, he 
made no serious efforts to save Silhadi. But his move- 
ments angered Bahadur, who now, when the Rana's nobles 
had deserted him, found an excellent opportunity of attack- 
ing him. 

* I/. R. /., P . 393. 

* Tod, VoL L, p. 247. Erskine wrongly assigns to him a reign of five 
years. 

B. N. t pp. 616-17. V. R. L. Vol. I, p. 394. 

* * Lady-father's rule/ The Rana is addressed in his State as Father 
but Vikramaditya was a Bai, ' lady/ because he remained confined to the 
palace. See Tod, p. 24$. Also C, H. L, Vol., Ill, p. 530. 

* U. R, L, p 7 391. 



C 85 ] 

Bahadur's campaign started with the capture of -Ran- 
thambhor 1 by Rumi Khan. His other generals like Muham- 
mad of Khandesh, Khudawand Khan, and Alaf Khan, 
captured the other minor forts, Gagraum, JCanor, Tilhati, 
and Pergusa. He himself followed at a greater leisure in 
November 16, 1532 A. D. 2 Before he reached Chitor, the 
Rana's ambassadors had come with an offer of tribute and 
surrender of the districts, recently acquired by the subju- 
gation of Malwa. But the Sultan, correctly informed of 
the state of the Rana's army by his own cousin, Narsingh 
Deva, 5 paid no heed to his vakils' representations; he urged 
Tatar Khan Lodi, Alauddin Alam Khan's son, to hasten 
with a further contingent of Gujrati troops instead. This 
he did so promptly that he reached Chitorgarh on the 30th 
January, 1533 A. D. 4 days in advance of the other 
generals. 4 The Sultan followed. According to the Tarikh- 
i-Bahddur Shdhi, Bahadur had assembled such a vast 
army *that a complete siege of the fort, never attempted 
before, was now possible. 

Bahadur placed the siege operations in charge of 
Rumi Khan, a gunner of outstanding ability and renown. 
On his first arrival at the Gujrat coast in 1531 A. D., he 
was taken into service with all his followers. Henceforth 
his promotion was rapid and a short while after his enlist- 
ment, he succeeded Malik Tughan, 5 the son of the more 
renowned Malik Ayaz, 6 as the governor of Diu. But 
Mustafa Rumi Khan was a man of insatiable ambition 
and hankered after further rewards, e.g., the gift of a fort 
like Ranthambhor or Chitor. The former had been 
promised by the Sultan before its capture, but afterwards 
he changed his mind, as it was represented to him that 

1 A. H. G. discusses the question whether RanthambhSr was taken 
earlier than Chitor and comes to the conclusion that it was. See p. 228. 

* U. X. /., p. 395- 

3 Ibid. I reject the other name, MedinI Rao, who had died in 
1528 A. D. 

* C. H. /., Vol. Ill, makes them arrive on February 14, which is un^ 
likely. 

5 A. H. G., p. 220, speaks of his extraordinary physique and strength. 
The victor of the battle of Chaul. See C. H. /., Vol. Ill; p. 312. 



[ 86 ] 

the bestowal of an impregnable fort like that of Rantham- 
bhor on a stranger was inadvisable ; it was then given to 
another noble, Nassan Khan. 1 Rumi Khan seems never 
to have forgiven Bahadur for the nonfulfilment of his 
promise. 

The fort of Chitor or Chitrakut situated in 2453'N 
and 7439'E is about 500' high and at the top, forms a 
plateau 3^ miles in length and half a mile broad; near by 
flows the river Gambhir. Tradition assigns 
the foundation of the fort to Bhima, the second 
of the Panda va brothers. Originally, it 
belonged to the Mori Rajputs from whom Bappa Rawal 
had captured it in 734 A. D. For the next eight centuries 
or more, till 1567 A. D., Chitor had remained the capital 
of the Mewar State. In that year the seat of the govern- 
ment was removed to Udaipur. 2 

Chitor was thrice captured and sacked by the Muslims ; 
once by Alauddin in 1303 A. D., the second time by 
Bahadur Shah in 1535 A. D., and lastly by Akbar in 1567 
A. D. It is to the credit of Mewar that it survived such 
tremendous shocks and continued to wage almost con- 
tinuous war for another half a century or so. 

To-day the fort is nothing but a collection of ruins, 
unfolding to an archaeologist a wonderful tale of chivalry, 
devotion, piety, and sacrifice, commencing from the days 
of the Mori Rajputs. Its ruins are too many and we 
would be content merely to mention the two stambhas 
Kirti and Jaya, the three gates Rama Pol, Lakhota Bari, 
and Suraj Pol, and the temples dedicated to Krishna and 
Kalika. The huge ramparts, the various tals, and the in- 
numerable cenotaphs, add to the picturesqueness of the 
place. 

In the neighbourhood of Chitor on the west, is situated 
the bridge built by Alauddin in the name of his son, Khizr 



* A. H. G., p. 229- 

2 Even at the present day, ' Chitrakut ' i.e., ChitSr is inscribed on the 
R&oa's coins. 



Khan; and 7 miles to the north lies the village of Nagari, 
which served Akbar for his camp, a fact attested, to this 
day, by a pyramidal column called by the vulgar people, 
Akbar's dia or lamp. 

Rumi Khan opened his siege by capturing a hillock 
commanding the fort and taking his guns there. By 
continuous firing, he unnerved the besieged. He also 
ran mines and made covered pathways for the approach 
of his soldiers. Rani Karnavati, the Rana's 
The siege mother 1 had appealed to Humayun for help 
operations of b u t since no response came except the king's 

Ruml Khan. , j. ^ -v j j. 11 r * 

advance to Gwalior and stay there for two 
months, 2 she was forced to purchase peace on humiliating 
terms, viz. the surrender of the conquered districts of 
Malwa, the jewelled crown and belt taken from Mahmud 
II, 10 elephants, 100 horses, and five crores of tankas. 
Bahadur for the present retired. 3 The treaty was signed 
on March 24, 1533 A. D. 4 

(7) The capture of Ajmer and Nagore, 1533 A. D., 
Bahadur turned next to a more northern part of Rajputana, 
where he captured Ajmer and Nagore. 5 Certainly the 
capture of Ranthambhor, Ajmer, and Nagore, drove 
a wedge into Rajputana, dividing it into two halves, to 
either of which, Bahadur could turn at his leisure. 

1 Tod is mistaken in calling her Udai Singh's mother. B. N. calls her 
Padmavatf. U. R. I., p. 396 calls her Karnavati. 

2 February and March, 1533 A. D. Fanshta, p. 213, 1. 24 has 

lj cwUj ^ alfc j jly JU^y j,6&> J^fcj ijjLJijb jl i&yxsJ! - jj 



It is probable that Bahadur was led to sign a treaty with Rajputs on 
account of Humuyan's advance to Gwalior. 

3 V. R. I., p. 396 n. has put in a curious anecdote that on retirement, 
Bahadur had carried with him, the infant Udai Singh in order to make 
him his successor but the Rajput followers of Udai, getting wind of the 
matter, spirited him away. For the details of the treaty see M. S. 

4 27th Shaban 939 A. H. 

5 At present, in the Jodhpur State. In mediaeval times, it lay on one 
of the few main routes from Delhi to Gujrat. In 'sayer' or commercial 
duties alone, it paid nearly a lac of rupees to the Jodhpur government. 
Situated in 27 id' N. and 7353' E. and distant 250 miles from Delhi. 



[ 88 ] 

(8) The second siege of Chitor, November, 1534 
March, 1535 A.D., followed by its capture, Since the 
Rana had not profited by the respite granted during the last 
20 months and continued to be as careless as before and 
the sardarsr still as indifferent, Bahadur again turned 
towards him and fought a battle at Loicha. 1 There 
the Rana's vassals deserted him and he was signally defeat- 
ed. Then the Sultan brought again a large army to Chitor 
and settled round the fort. Even with the approach of 
the enemy, the Rana made no effort to rally his men. The 
task was left to be done by his mother, Karnavati, who 
appealed to the disgruntled sardars, to bestir themselves 
for the defence of their homes, if not of their chief. The 
appeal had its effect and the Sisodias gathered from all 
parts of Mewar. The unpopular Vikramaditya and the 
infant Udai Singh both were removed to Boondi and the 
direction of the defence was entrusted to Rawat Bagh Singh 
of Devlia-Pratapgarh. The Rawat, realizing the insigni- 
ficance of the Rajput garrison, abandoned all idea of an 
offensive and concentrated his whole attention on defence. 
The different gates were entrusted to the different chiefs. 
He himself took his post at the Bhairava gate and placed 
Solanki Bhairava Das at Hanuman Pol and Jhala Raj- 
rand Sajja of Dailwara at Ganesh Pol. 

As on the previous occasion, Bahadur entrusted the 
attack to Rumi Khan. Instead of trying to take the place by 
assault or starving the garrison, Rumi Khan occupied the 
neighbouring* hillock at the south-western extremity of the 
fort and carried his guns to the top. From there he started 
a withering fire which blew away some twenty-two yards 
of the defences in the direction of Bika-khoh early in March, 
1535 A. D. While the Hada leader, Arjun, was defend- 
ing himself to death, the besiegers rushed in other direc- 
tions, i.e., towards Bhairava Pol, Suraj Pol and Lakhota 
Bari. At the first gate Bagh Singh was the commandant, 
who was killed with his nephew Rawat Narbad. The other 

i In the Btxmdi State. Situated in *$n' N. and 7534' E. 



sarddrs were also killed, at the other gates. The Udaipur, 
Rajya ka Itihas mentions the death of the following chiefs : 

1. Bagh Singh of Devlia-Pratapgarh, 

2. Solanki Bhairava Das of Daisuri, 

3. Rdjrdnd Sajja of Dailwara, 

4. Rawats Duda, Satta and Kamma, the Chanda* 
wats, 

5. Mala of Songarh, 

6. Rdwat Devi Das, 

7. Rdwat Bagh, 

8. Rdwat Nanda, 

9. Dodia Bhdnd. 

According to the Khidts, the Rajput chronicles, the 
Rajputs lost 32,000 men and their women performed the 
jauhar ceremony and burnt themselves to death. After 
the capture of the fort, on 3rd Ramzdn 941 A.H. ( = 8th 
March, 1535, A. D.), Bahadur granted it, not to Rumi 
Khan whom he had promised it when the siege had begun, 
but to Burhan-ul-mulk Banbani. Thus Rumi Khan was 
disappointed for the second time and this intensified the 
offence he had taken. 

We shall see in the next chapter how Rumi Khan took 
his revenge by playing Bahadur false and ruining his 
cause. 



CHAPTER IX 

SULTAN BAHADUR SHAH OF GUJRAT AND 

THE PRINCELY REFUGEES FROM 

THE MUGHAL KINGDOM 

(1534 A.D.) 

Bahadur Shah came to the throne in 1526 A. D. 
His reputation for munificence and other princely virtues 
had been so great that needy persons from all parts of India 
flocked to his realm. The recent revolution threw 
most of the Afghans out of employment, who till then had 
formed the ruling class. Both the common Afghans and 
the nobility gathered in Bahadur's court, the former as 
ordinary soldiers 1 and the latter in a more dignified capa- 
city. Of these Afghan nobles, two have been specially 
mentioned. One was Alam Khan Jighat, the late governor 
of Kalpi. He supported Babur in 1529 A. D. against the 
Afghans of Bihar. For some unrecorded reason, he was 
dissatisfied with Humayun and fled to Bahadur, who 
granted him, after the fall of Raisen 2 in May 1532 A. D., 
the territory round it in addition to Bhilsa 3 and Chanderi. 4 
It was hoped that under him, the jdgir would form a distant 
part of the Gujrat kingdom. It will be noticed that after 
the annexation of Nagore, Ajmer, Ranthambhor, and 
Malwa, the Gujrat kingdom had a common boundary with 
the Mughal kingdom for some distance. Alam Khan 
Jighat remained faithful to his new master, and fought 
against Humayun till he was captured and disabled by 
him. 

The second Afghan noble mentioned in the history of 



1 After Bahadur's death, they went away to serve under Sher Khan. 
a In lat. 244i' long 78 12'. 
3 In lat. 2350 / long 74*6'. 
* In lat. 2322' long 7756'. 



Gujrat was Sultan Alam Khan Alauddin Lodl. He had 
a son named Tatar Khan. Alauddin was Sultan Buhlul 
Lodi's son and during Ibrahim's last days, was a candidate 
for the Delhi throne. Babur supported him at first but 
when he discovered his incompetence he put him aside, and 
fought for his own hand against Sultan Ibrahim of Delhi. 
Thus after the battle of Panipat, we find Alauddin not as 
the king of Delhi but as a prisoner in the distant Qila-i- 
Zafar in Badakhshan. 1 From there he managed to escape 
to Gujrat where he was accorded a cordial reception by 
Sultan Bahadur. 

Alam Khan Alauddin had not entirely forgotten about 
his royal pretensions; only now in Bahadur's court, they 
were pressed by his son. Tatar Khan was an active youth 
of considerable merit and at every suitable opportunity he 
harped on his father's claims to the Delhi throne. Baha- 
dur favoured Tatar for his military qualities 2 but did not 
pay much heed to his pleadings. Tatar's ambition was to 
obtain the throne of Delhi for his father, and he was 
sanguine that Bahadur, after the precedent of his father, 
Muzaffar, who had returned Malwa to Mahmud II, would 
restore Alam Khan to his heritage. There were several 
reasons why Bahadur was not keen on Tatar's project: 

(a) Alam Khan had never actually sat on the throne 
of Delhi and so could not claim the sympathy 
which Mahmud II of Malwa had secured from 
Muzaffar. 

(6) Babur had put him down as incompetent. Baha- 
dur, who might easily have supported Tatar 
himself, hesitated to support his father, a worth- 
less prince. 



1 Erskine: History of India, Vol. II, Humayun (E, H.), p. 41, 
considers him dangerous because of his birth and pretensions. 

2 An example had occurred when starting several days after Muham- 
mad of Khandesh and Khudawand Khan, he reached Chitor earlier. He 
showed military skill in capturing two* places Tilhati and Perkfcsah and 
also two of the gates of Chitorgarh. 



[ 92 ] 

(c) Before his flight to Bahadur, Alauddin had lived 

for several years in prison. In 1534 A. D, he 
was not known to have any local influence in 
Mughal India. 

(d) In asserting Alauddm's claims, Bahadur would 

have to fight the renowned Mughal troops. He 
hesitated to do so ; for he himself had seen them 
fight on the battle-field of Panipat and noticed 
their superiority. He was convinced that no 
purely Indian troops, including the Afghans, 
would be able to cope with the Mughals. 1 Tatar 
Khan protested against this opinion by repre- 
senting that Babur's veterans had now degener- 
ated into luxury-loving dandies, and hence they 
would not be able to contend with Bahadur's 
invincible troops. 2 But, for the present Baha- 
dur would not stir. 

Next there arrived in November, 1534 A.D. a still more 
distinguished personage in Muhammad Zaman Mirza, the 
eldest $on-in-law of Babur. He was older than Humayun 
by several years and had earned distinction in Babur's 
Bihar campaign. He had twice rebelled, once imme- 
diately after Humayun's accession and then in July, 1534 
A. D, To Bahadur, his supreme qualification was that he 
was a Mughal and a close relation of the ruler of Delhi. 
Bahadur welcomed him, attended to his personal needs, 3 



1 See A. H. G., p. 229. 

a A. T. W. H. G. t p. 5 has 



* See Badauni (Newul) Kishore Edition), p. 92 for the cartloads of 
candied conserve of roses ( ojtf ) sent to Muhammad Zaman M. for the 
treatment of his heart-ache. 



[ 93 3 

and placed him at the head of all the Mughals that had 
gathered in his court. 1 

Thus Bahadur Shah had two sets of men, each with 
the ambition of recovering Delhi; one, the Afghans of whom 
Tatar Khan (on behalf of his father) might be considered 
the leader, and the other, the Mughals with Muhammad 
Zaman M. at their head. By supporting any of the parties, 
the utmost gain that Bahadur would achieve would be the 
right of suzerainty over the kingdom of Delhi. In follow- 
ing his father's example of restoring a neighbouring king- 
dom to its prince, he was in the present case running a 
much greater risk than his father, and it is also possible 
that if Tatar Khan should realize his dream of making his 
father an independent ruler, even the formality of acknow- 
ledging Bahadur's suzerainty would cease to be observed. 2 

The rivalry between the two parties hastened matters. 
Muhammad Zaman M., who had recently arrived, was not 
yet ready for a move and so Tatar Khan could forestall 
him by proposing an expedition into the Mughal territory. 
Bahadur was pleased with his rapid march and subsequent 
capture of the outposts and gates of Chitorgarh and was 
prepared to supply him with resources from his kingdom. 
He permitted him to proceed to Ranthambhor which was 
to serve him for a base and allowed him a cror of Gujrati 
tonkas to spend on gathering recruits from all parts 
and, when he was ready, to march out and threaten 
Agra. In order to distract the Mughals from the main 
objective, two subsidiary campaigns were also projected, 

1 A. H. G. t p. 230, 1, 4 has 

JJlftjLJl^lc ^! 

A. T. W. G. H., p. 5 has 

J^tf Oja. Jtja> 

2 M. S. fol. i59a, 1.5 has 

c/ ** *j &$ (Tatar han);J w! 



[ 94 ] 

one under Alam Khan Alauddm himself, and the other 
under Burhan-ul-mulk Narpali. The former was to aim 
at the capture of Kalinjar not yet fully subjugated by 
Humayun, 1 and the latter was expected to create disturb- 
ance in the Delhi district or further west in the Punjab. 2 

A rumour of some such expedition had reached 
Humayun, which compelled him to return hurriedly from 
Kanar 3 and postpone, for the present, his campaigns 
against the Afghans. When he reached Agra, he found 
that he had returned none too soon; for the enemy had 
already come forward to confront the Mughals. 

Humayun 's quick return frustrated to some extent 
Bahadur's design; for during his absence in Bihar, 
the three divisions of Tatar, Alam, and Burhan-ul- 
mulk, would have scored success, and the goal, namely, 
the capture of Agra, might have been achieved. It seems 
that Bahadur Shah had expected that the divisions would 
succeed and that he would be able to complete the dis- 
comfiture of the Mughals by a campaign against them in 
person. He had instructed Tatar Khan to remain on the 
defensive and wait for his arrival. The actual conclusion, 
viz., the complete annihilation of Tatar, had never entered 

his calculation. 

* 

What happened may be briefly told here. Tatar Khan 
boldly went forward, unmindful of the enemy's strength, 
captured Biana, 4 a notable achievement and sent 
ravaging columns even to the gates of Agra. There was 
panic in the city till Askari and Hindal arrived from Delhi 



1 We have seen that Humayun was satisfied with the perfunctory 
submission of the Raja on payment of an indemnity of 12 ' mans ' of 
gold. 

2 See A. N., p. 128. ^ 3 In the Kalpi District. 

4 Situated in 2657' arid 772o' E., 53 miles S. W. of Agra, it forms 
a railway junction. In mediaeval India it contained a particularly strong 
fort as is clear from the remains even to-day. The rocks stretching north 
and south make the place easy to defend, and therein lies its strategic 
importance. For the first 3 centuries of Muslim rule it remained the 
headquarters of a province. When Sultan Sikteiar LodI founded Agra 
as his capital, the importance, of Biana declined. 



[ 95 ] 

with some 18,000 soldiers under the distinguished Mughal 
commanders like Qasim Husain Sultan, Zahid Beg, 1 and 
Dost Beg. They recovered Biana, 2 Tatar Khan retreating to 
Mandrael. 3 There he waited confidently; for he possessed 
an army of 40,000 men. 4 Probably he yet dreamed of 
establishing another Lodi dynasty at Agra and later on at 
Delhi with his father as its first king. But he was soon dis- 
illusioned. Within a few days his select troops, as stated 
by the author of the Mirdt-i-Sikandan, melted away, at the 
prospect of a battle. There was nothing to wonder at it. 
The soldiers had been hastily collected by a lavish distri- 
bution of Gujrat wealth and hence they lacked discipline. 
They had forced their commander to retire from Biana, 
and now when Tatar was eager for a contest they deserted 
him altogether. 

Thus, at Mandrael, Tatar Khan saw the end of his 
dream of securing the throne of Delhi. He 
was left with 3,000 horse only. 5 Hindal 
November , advanced from Biana with 5,000 Mughal 
1534 ' ' troops and a fierce battle took place from 
which Tatar could not fly lest he should have to face 
Bahadur's wrath for disobeying his orders for a defensive 
campaign. So Tatar fell with some 300 of his followers 
(November, 1934 A. D.). 

With the death of Tatar Khan the main project of 
an attack on Agra fell through; the two subsidiary con- 
tingents working against Kalinjar and Delhi also failed in 
their purpose. The commanders realized that they were 
widely separated from each other so that no co-ordination 
was possible between their movements; and singly each 
failed to make any impression on the Mughals. 

1 Humayun's brother-in-law, having been married to the queen, Bega 
Begam's sister. In G. H. N. f p. 134 n.4. 

2 From Khurasan Khan, one of Gujrat noblemen. 

3 Situated in 26 18' N. and 77i8' E. A. H., Vol. II, p. 190, calls 
it Mandteer. 

4 M. S. makes it a select army of 30,000 men. 

* A. N. and the Parish ta has 10,000, T. A. has 300. 



C 96 ] 

The direct result of the battle so far as the relations 
_ f between the two kings, Bahadur and 

The conse- TT , , . 

quence of Humauun were concerned, was practically 

the battle. n [\ t Humayun did not complain of Baha- 

dur's aiding Tatar Khan nor did Sultan Bahadur follow 
the defeat up by other expeditions. Humayun kept quiet 
on the subject, guessing probably that it was purely the 
outcome of the mad-cap Tatar's enthusiasm. Humayun 
ignored the other two expeditions also. For the present, 
he remained perfectly satisfied with the complete discom- 
fiture of the enemy in all the three quarters. 

But for Bahadur, it was not so easy to get out of the 
war; for he had complicated matters by receiving 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who had been put into prison 
for the serious crime of treason against Humayun. Let us 
here recall a few facts. In June 1534 A.D. after the founda- 
tion of Dm-panah, Sultan Bahadur had sent a message of 
congratulations to Humayun and the latter had responded 
by generously permitting him to retain all his late conquests 
viz., Malwa, Raisen, Ranthambhor, Ajmer, and Nagore 
and professing amity and good will. 1 The reception of 
Muhammad Zaman M. by Bahadur a few months later 
nullified all the steps taken to maintain cordiality between 
the two kingdoms. 

Muhammad Zaman M., we have seen, had rebelled in 
Muhammad J 53i A.D. as well as in 1534 A.D. Humayun 
Zaman Mima's had ignored the first rebellion and had 
affairs. allowed him to continue as governor in 

Bihar- He had hoped' that his generosity would have a 
salutary effect on his brother-in-law. But the ever-restless 
Muhammad Zaman M. was not won over and three years 
later, he combined with Muhammad Sultan M. and made 
a more serious effort to overthrow the government of 
Humayun. Humayun by his prompt measures nipped the 
rebellion in the bud, defeated the combined enemy in the 
battle at -Bhojpiir, and captured both the leaders. He 

i A. H. G,,P. 327, 



r 97 1 

did hot repeat his previous generosity, threw them into 
prison, and in order to put an end to all their political 
aspirations, gave orders to the jailor, his own uncle Mirza 
Yadgar Beg Taghai, 1 to blind them along with another 
prince, Wali Khub Mirza. 2 Muhammad Sultan M. and 
Wali Khub M. were blinded. But Muhammad Zaman M, 
escaped the penalty by the partiality of the Taghal or his 
men 3 and a few days later he escaped 4 to Bahadur Shah. 
The Taghal also, for fear of encountering the king's wrath 
at .the neglect of his orders, followed Muhammad Zaman 
M. and reached Bahadur's court at Chitor in November, 
1534 A. D. 

* To such a prince, who had twice sinned against the 
king of Delhi, Bahadur Shah offered a ready welcome, 
only a few months after his last message of goodwill to 
Humayun. This was naturally taken by Humayun as a 
change of heart and initiation of a new policy, not friendly 
to himself. Humayun felt disappointed but hesitated to 
undertake hostilities against his erstwhile friendly neigh- 
bour. He therefore contented himself with only making 
a demonstration by moving out to Gwalior and staying 
there for a couple of months. 5 

The historian of to-day recognizes that Humayun 
should have replied to Bahadur by going to the aid of the 

1 He was Humayun' s maternal uncle as well as father-in-law and it 
was his daughter, Bega Begam, who was captured by Sher Shah in 1539 
A. D. 

2 T. A., p. 194, 1. 23, records Humayun's orders for the blinding of 
Muhammad Sultan M. 

a T. A. 

* A. N., p. 124 says he escaped by showing a forged letter. 

5 A. N. gives the date of moving out to be November 8th, 1534 A. D. 
(beginning of Jumddal-awwal 941 A. H.). The Rauzat-ut-Tdhirin (R. T.) t 
the British Museum or 168, fol. 6i4b, 1. 3 makes Humayun proceed 
straightway from Gwalior to Malwa. Its words are 



G. H. N., fol. 23b refers to the length of stay as two months. It 
appears that Humayun had stayed in Gwalior at least twice, the period 
of stay being, on each occasion, two months. Parish ta's reference on 
p. 213 (last line) is to the first occasion. The second occasion is the one 
we are now considering. *rOn either occasion Humayun's object was to 
a demonstration as a warning to Bahadur. See Humayun' 3 letter 

T m * * - * * 



[ 98 ] 

besieged Rajputs of Chitor, but he could not rise above 
the political convention of his day which forbade his 
rendering aid to an infidel engaged in a war with a faithful. 
Hence, another of Humayun's half -measures, viz., a move 
out to and a long stay at Gwalior. He had hoped that 
just as on a previous occasion, a demonstration on his part 
had served to put Bahadur on his guard and had made 
him sign a treaty and retire from Chitor so the present 
one would also have its effect. But Bahadur did not 
abandon the siege this time and Humayun in his turn had 
to pass on to Sarangpur with a more grim determination. 



CHAPTER X 

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HUMAYtJN 
BADsHAH AND SULTAN BAHADUR SHAH 
OF GUJRAT, 1534-35 A. D. 

We have already noticed that two months after the 
completion of Din-panah, in April, 1534 A.D., 
Bahadur Shah sent a message of congratula- 
tions to Humayun. He reciprocated Baha- 
dur's friendly gesture by sending him his own envoy, who 
submitted presents and spoke to him on 'diverse matters. 
He referred particularly to the welcome Bahadur Shah had 
accorded to Tatar Jthan, Alam Khan Alauddln's son. He 
emphasised sincerity as the sine qua non of friendship and 
assured Bahadur fyat his master, the Badshah, would not 
harbour any run-aways from Gujrat; for by harbouring 
them he would be putting an end to the friendly relations 
subsisting betweefi the two kingdoms. He would therefore 
expect that Bahadur, too, would not shelter fugitives from 
Delhi. In the end the envoy remarked that the welfare 
of the two kingdoms depended on mutual considerations; 
and that man's existence in this world is brief. The world, 
therefore, should be regarded as a place of worship to God. 1 

Bahadur treated the envoy very courteously, put him 
up near his palace, provided him with every 
comfort and luxury, and fixed for him a liberal 
allowance both in cash and in kind. The 
envoy was so much pleased that at one time he thought 
of permanently staying with Bahadur rather than return 
to his master. However, the time for his return came and 
Bahadur sent with him magnificent presents 2 for Humayun, 

1 A. H. G. t p. 228. 

2 Ibtd.* one sentence may be quoted 



and wrote a reply of which only one short sentence has 
come down to us through Abdullah, the author of the 
Arabic History of Gujrat f namely, to hear^ is to obey, 
( ictUf, **iJ|) meaning, that as now he hid known of 
Humayun's wishes, he would certainly carry them out. 

The effect of this early correspondence was salutary; 
for Humayun, in return for this submissive reply, as it 
were, approved of Bahadur's retaining all that he had 
conquered in Malwa. 

All this happened in the year 940 A.H. The following 
year, 941 A.H., when Humayun went to Kalpi in Septem- 
ber, 1534 A. D., its governor, Alam Khan, instead of 
submitting to the Mughals, fled to Gujrat. Bahadur knew 
of the hostile relations between Humayun and Alam 
Khan 1 and yet he received him. Not only that, he added to 
his jdgir by the grant of Raisen, Bhilsa, and Chanderi. 
Again, he added various dignities to Muhammad Zaman 
Mirza's rank when he reached Chitor during its siege by 
Bahadur. It is thus clear that a change had occurred in 
Bahadur Shah's mind, viz., that though he was not 
prepared actually to declare a war against the Mughals, he 
was making preparations for it and* biding his time 
for a suitable opportunity. He cherished also the hope of 
forestalling and playing the aggressor against the Mughal 
intruders into India, if he could but complete his prepara- 
tions. 

Humayun wrote his second letter from Kalpi in a 
firmer tone and referred solely to Muhammad 
Zar n Mirz ' s reception. He began by 
remarking that the reception amounted to the 
negation of Bahadur's pledge of sincerity and that it would 
lead to serious consequences for which Bahadur would 



1 Ibid, p. 230. &5j ^UA ,^ (Alam) **# 



<*} suggests ' slight acquaintance. 1 This view can hardly be main- 
tained; for B. N. has references to Alam Kh.n of Kalpi as early as 1526 
A.D. See p. 523. 



t 

have to be responsible. He ended by quoting the Prophet's 
saying that a pledge was a part of one's faith. 1 

Humayun received Bahadur's reply at Agra in Nov- 
ember 1534 A.D. It was unusually conciliatory in tone 
and to some extent incompatible with his future plans such 
as had been foreshadowed by his welcome to the Mughal 
refugees. The only explanation that can be given is that 
he was not yet fully prepared for a breach, because he was 
preoccupied either with the Rajput war or in recruiting 
soldiers for a future Mughal war. 

Bahadur began his reply with an Arabic verse, 



Tr. 

God forbid, your promises be neglected; 
For I cannot afford to be forgotten by you. 

and then went on to say about Muhammad 
*econd'lpi y . Zaman M. that he had been welcomed 
under the impression that he was like a son 
to the king. 2 Bahadur promised that henceforward he 
would try to please the Mughal king by carrying out his 
wishes. 3 

Actually, however, he proceeded with his military 
preparations and did not part with any of the refugees, to 
the retention of whom Humayun had objection; and he 
therefore sent a reminder from Agra on the subject. 

Humayun's next letter is in the form of an allegory in 
which two philosophers are questioned: who 
is the most helpless person in the world? 
One of them answers, 'He who has no friend/ 

/o). The other, however, corrects him, "No! 



1 A. H. G., p. 330 has 

2 The Mirzd was older than Humayfiri. Of course being a king, 
Humayun might be looked upon as a father to every one of his. subjects 
including the Mirz&s, 

* A. H.*G., p. 230 has (f$*$^*t#fy which may literally be rendered, 
* soon that will happen which will please you/ 



[ 102 ] 

the most helpless man is he who had a friend but has 
managed to lose him." Humayun himself then pointed 
at the moral of the story by saying that a thousand friends 
were too few and one enemy was too many, meaning that 
Bahadur should not be so foolish as to lose his friendship. 
Humayun ended with the oft-quoted verse, 

*>l*j J* ** 



Plant the tree of amity, that it may bear fruit, namely, 

(the fulfilment of) the heart's desire, 

Uproot the sapling of hostility that yields countless ills. 1 

Bahadur's reply as seen in the Arabic History of 

Gujrdt, has been characterised as rude by Abdullah. The 

Bahadur's Sultan began by mentioning the five reasons 

third reply. ^ g enerally lead to war 

(a) the desire of creating a kingdom where none 

existed before 
(6) the desire of protecting and safeguarding the 

territory that one possessed, 

(c) the zeal which prompted one to attack the unjust 

possessor of a kingdom with the sword of 
justice, 

(d) the desire of adding to the wealth that one already 

possessed, 

(e) the most mischievous of all, viz., an attempt to 

fill the earth with strife out of a love of con- 
quest and plunder, and out of arrogance to- 
wards the submissive. 

He added that none of the above reasons had actuated 
him 2 and that his pleasure lay in distributing wealth in order 
to beat up recruits for a Holy war. He then quoted a verse 

>j ^o{ b 

^b * 



1 Beveridge's rendering of the first hemistich is, ' Plant .... amity 
that the heart's desire may bear fruit.' 

2 Not a very sincere statement. 



Tr. 

In neither of the two worlds 1 have I any ill-will against 
others ; 

If some one else'has any against me, let God's mercy 
be in abundance on him. 

He finished with another verse 



Tr. 

While a guest of the tavern, be decorous to the other 

wine-bibbers, 

Otherwise when drunkenness leads to crop-sickness, 
thou wilt be in trouble. 

The text of Humayun's fourth letter is given in Abu 
Humayun's Turab Wali's History of Gujrat, the Mirat- 

fourtk letter. i-Sikandari and Abul Fazl's Akbar-ndma. 
The substance may be given thus : 

After salutation etc., let it be known that Qazi Abdul 
Qadir and Muhmamad Muqim reached here and informed 
us about your pledges and engagements. We, who believe 
in unity and concord, could not imagine that you would 
transgress the Quranic verse, ' ye, that believeth, abide 
by your agreements ' or that you could ignore the verse, 
' verily, the best of the pacts are a part of the Faith/ 

We sent Salah-ul-mulk Maulana Qasim Ali and 
Ghiyasuddm Qurchi, to represent on our behalf that if you 
meant to be firm in the path of friendship and unity, it 
were well that you should either send to us those rebellious 
men who had taken refuge with you or drive them away 
at least from your dominion, so that the other subjects in 
our kingdom be not led astray (by this example of disaffec- 
tion) from the path of devotion and loyalty. 

I awaited the receipt of a proper reply so that the dust 
of suspicion and hostility be washed away by the pure water 



1 This or the next. 



I 104 I 

of concord and the tree of sincerity might bear fruit in the. 
garden of mutual aid. When my envoys returned in the 
company of Nur Muhammad Khalil (Bahadur's agent), 
they did not bring any proper explanation of your pledges 
and we felt surprised. 

Regarding Muhammad Zaman M., you have quoted 
precedents in justification of your action, e.g., how in spite 
of the amity and alliance that existed between Sultan 
Sikandar Lodi of Delhi and Sultan Muzaffar, your father, 
Alauddin and other princes and nobles had left Agra for 
Gujrat and had been received with an attention befitting 
their rank, without causing any breach in the relation 
between the two kings. Similarly, you argue, ' what harm 
if Muhammad Zaman M. stays with me?' No similarity 
exists between the two cases and it is strange that you 
mention one as analogous to the other. You will best prove 
your steadfastness to treaties and obligations by* accepting 
my advice. Therefore, either return those contemptible 
fellows or drive them away from your kingdom. If you 
act up to my suggestion, it will be as apparent as the 
mid-day sun that your heart is in accord with your pro- 
fession; otherwise what reliance could be placed on your 
letters of agreement. Verse, 



Tr. 

O thou, that boasteth of a loving heart, 
Greetings to thee, if thy heart and tongue accord. 

Perhaps the Sultan knows that Sahib-Qiran Timur long 
desisted from invading Turkey in spite of the provocations 
he had received from Ilderim Bayazid, because the latter 
was engaged in fighting the Christians of Europe. 1 But 
when the Qaisar (Bayazid) gave shelter to Qara Yusuf 

1 The Emperor of Bizantium and his allies. 



[ 105 ] 

Turkman and Sultan Ahmad Jalair, 1 Timur made several, 
though fruitless, attempts to prevent him from showing 
them any favour and to persuade him to drive them away 
from his kingdom. The Qaisar paid no heed to Timur's 
words, with what consequence, is known to all. Verse 
(repeated) , 

jTLvJ Jj * 



o^) 1 ^ 4- >; * 
Tr. 

Plant the tree of amity that it may bear fruit, namely, 
(the fulfilment of) the heart's desire; 

Uproot the sapling of hostility that yields countless ills. 2 
Verse, 



To^pne who resides in the mansion of felicity 

Is enough one single word from Sadi's discourses. 
Verse, 



Tr. 

This will suffice (as advice), if only you listen to it, 
By sowing thorn, no jasmine can be reaped. 

Since your letter, sent by Muhammad Muqim, contain- 
ed alarming news and references to tortuous measures, we 
had made the determination of going to Gwalior. When 
Nur Muhammad Khalfl brought me your agreement, I 
myself went through it and after I had granted the conge 
to him, I sent Shaikh Ibrahim, one of my confidants, with 
my answer to your letter. I hope, as soon as he fulfils his 



1 See A. N, (Tr.), p. 296 for Beveridge's note on these two persons. 
Qara Yflsuf was the ruler of Azarbaijan and Sultan Ahmad Khan Jalair of 
Baghdad. 

* Beveridge draws attention to the fact that the couplet was first 
written by Shah Ismafl to ShaibanI Ifhan of Turkistan. 

8 l*he word &** ' sufficient ' has wrongly been' put down in A. T. 
W* H. G. us ji*| See p, 8. 



t 106 ] 

mission, he will be given leave to depart. 1 Peace be on 
him who follows the Guidance. 3 

Humayun, even at this stage, was not wholly alienated 
from Sultan Bahadur. When Nur Muhammad Khalil 
reached Humayun's court .with 'his master's reply to his 
letter and various gifts including a manuscript copy of the 
Quran beautifully written and artistically illuminated, the 
king took the Quran in hand and praised its calligraphy. 
But almost immediately, he turned to the subject of agree- 
ment and asserted his own sincerity in the matter by an 
oath on the Holy Book. When Nur Muhammad Khalil on 
his return to Gujrat made mention of Humayun's sincerity 
in Sultan Bahadur's court, the courtiers disbelieved him. 

After going through Humayun's letter, Bahadur, who 
himself was illiterate, ordered his scribe, Mulla Muhammad 
Lari, to draft a suitable reply touching every point men- 
tioned in the letter. The Mulla, it is said, had served 
Humayun in the past and had an especial grudge against 
him. 4 Hence he wrote an impertinent reply, read it artfully 
when the Sultan and his young companions were in their 
cups. Most of the young courtiers approved of the reply as 
Gujrat's challenge to Delhi. The king, from the little that 
he understood, 5 could foresee the trouble that would arise 
but out of timidity kept quiet. The scribe sent it post-haste. 
The next morning when the ministers came to know of the 
contents of the letter already despatched, they realized the 
danger the tetter portended, and prevailed on the Sultan to 
send some noblemen to overtake the courier. The nobles 



1 The relations between two eastern kings were determined by the 
length of stay of the envoy of one at the other's court. 

3 Muhammad, the prophet, used to end his letters thus. 
3 The Mirat-i-Sikandari (M. S.). 
* Ibid. 

5 As Bahadur had no education, he cannot be supposed to have fully 
understood the meaning of the ornate sentences of the munshi. As 
M. S. puts it ' 



r 107 ] 

sent were Malik Nassau and Wajih-ul-mulk but the pursuit 
proved fruitless and they returned from the pass of Narwar. 1 

Bahadur's fourth reply may be briefly given as 
follows : 

After praise to God and salutation to the Prophet, 
etc., take notice that your messenger arrived 
Bahadur's h ere j n CO mpany of Nur Muhammad Khalil, 
the confidant of the Exalted Majesty (Baha- 
dur), and was received in audience. He presented the 
strangely-worded letter and we became aware of its vain 
contents. Therein you write that Qasim Ali and Ghiyas- 
uddm were sent to suggest the expulsion of those who have 
taken shelter here so that our sincerity and friendship be 
proved. Now all this is a lie. Your representatives never 
breathed a word on the subject except that they spoke 
approvingly of my steadfastness to the pledge of friend- . 
ship. If we had the slightest idea that you had had 
such a motive for sending the message, matters would not 
have been allowed to come to such a pass as to permit you 
to proceed boldly to Gwalior. What mad ambition or im- 
possible notion is this ? All are aware of your brotherly 
behaviour 2 towards Muhammad Zaman M., the best of the 
great Sultans and the gifted of the famous Khaqans. As 
soon as you got an opportunity, you turned your face 
from (the path of) sincerity and harmony and broke your 
plighted faith. With the rest of the world, Muhammad 
Zaman M. had come to know how when Sultan Mahmud 
Khaljl of Malwa fled from the Rajputs and sought shelter 
with my revered father, Sultan Muzaffar, extreme genero- 
sity and patronage were shown to him. So the Mirza also 
under a similar expectation tendered his homage to this 
court and complained against the oath-breakers. 3 

1 Narwar,, situated in 2539' N. and 7758' E. was an important halt 
on one of the routes between the north and the south India. At one 
time, the town was 14 or 15 miles in circumference, but from Sikandar 
L5df s time, when a massive wall surrounded it, it reduced to a mile and 
a half in circumference. 

a Written ironically. 

8 Bahadur includes Humayun among them* 



[ 108 ] 

As we are upholders of the Faith and dispensers of 
justice, we, in accordance with the Prophet's words, ' help 
your brother, be he a tyrant or an oppressed, 1 accorded 
our patronage to him. Our sincere faith in God's aid 
makes us hope for the realization of Muhammad Zaman 
Mirza's desires and ambitions. In the presence of Qazi 
Abdul Qadir and Mutaman-uz-zaman, Khurasan Khan, 1 
without any previous reference from us on the subject, you, 
of your own accord, asserted the sincerity of your pledge, 
by swearing on the Holy Book. When we heard of it, 
we believed you and put trust in your pledges with the 
result that the consideration of affairs on your side was 
postponed and we turned to cross over to the island of 
Diu in order to uproot the Europeans. 2 You, working 
under a false notion and a fancied provocation, 3 thought it 
to be, a suitable opportunity (of carrying out your hostile 
intentions) and forgetting to act in accordance with the 
Quranic verse, 'thou shalt not break thy oath after its con- 
firmation,' boldly rode forth to Gwalior. When we became 
aware of your movements, we turned back with our troops. 
Then you also realized on a little reflection that an advance 
towards us was not possible and beyond your power and 
so you returned, the only result of the broken pledge being 
that some of the provinces were added to our dominions. 4 
Treacherously, you represented our return as due to 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza's arrival. I had made no men- 
tion whatever of it, but you thought I had, and then wrote 
of having accepted my unwritten apology a proceeding, 
not heard of before. Of course your protestations (about 
pledges and sincerity) would be appropriate in a way; for 
from your correspondence and movements, your courage 

1 He has been referred to in Humayfin's letter as Muhammad Muqlm. 
A. H. G., p. 240 11. 6-7 and A. N. t p. 131 gives the name as well as the 
title. 

a Really, the Portuguese. Farishta, Vol. II, p. 222, 1. 9, notes that 
Bahadur had captured their big gun, the largest that had been seen in 
India, His words are, ^ JL*p**j4 ^ v y J{ ^ A* tf 

3 Lit. ^1^ means ecstasy. 

* An incorrect statement. 



[ 109 ] 

can well be gauged. For example, whereas some descrip- 
tion of your own achievements would have been more 
proper, you bring in your seventh ancestor. But then, so 
far, you have achieved nothing worth mentioning. Well, if 
your object (in referring* to your ancestor) was to relate 
historical romances or narratives, then in accordance with 
the proverb, that, 'all novelties are delicious/ you should 
have referred to some of my deeds ; for there is no parallel 
in history of so many deeds being achieved in such a brief 
space of time. 1 Verses : 




If thy sword hast no tongue (to speak of your valour) , 

Do not trouble the sword of thy tongue by mere boast. 

If thy sword hast no lustre, my son I 

Do not brag of thy father's noble descent. 

If thou art short-statured, do not tie wooden legs 2 to 

thy feet, 
To look tall in children's eyes. 

By the grace of God, so long as I am ruler of this 
country, no king dare challenge my army. Why do you, 
who have so far only faced a few Afghans, give yourself 
trouble ? 

It is advisable, that acting on the proverb, 'Let not 
Satan mislead you,' you drive away vanity from your head. 

Verse, 



Tr. 

Pride throws away the crown from the head, 
Let none boast of his strength. 

1 Though uttered in a boastful vein, *there is some truth in the state- 
ment. * Stilts. 



[ no ] 

Events in the immediate future will tell what the 
Almighty desires. Verse. 



u> 

Tr. 

The ascetic asked for the nectar 1 of the Paradise and 

Hafiz for the cup (of wine) ; 
Which of the two God prefers, is yet to be seen. 

The letter concludes here. It will be noticed that of 
the eight letters mentioned above, the first six are frag- 
mentary in character. There are one or two stray passages 
mentioned by other writers, which we have not been able 
to incorporate accurately in any of the above letters. Still, 
as they partly reveal the minds of the respective kings we 
ins*ert them here. 

Farishta 2 attributes the following verses to Humayun 



^s -j 
Tr. 

O thou that art Chitor's foe 

How art thou occupied in seizing the infidels ? 

A king has arrived 3 at thy head, 

And thou seated in hope of seizing Chitor. 

Farishta also notes Bahadur's answer, put in rhyme, 



Tr. 

I that am foe to the city of Chitor 
Am seizing the infidels by force 
He who succours Chitor 
Thou shalt see, how I seize him too. 



Lit. ' wine.' 

(Newal Kishora Press edition), Part I, p. 214, 1. 8. 
Lit. 'readied,' 



[ III ] 

The Mirdt-i-Sikandari 1 has given another stray verse, 
quoted also by the Tazkirah-i-Bukharai. 2 According to the 
latter, these were written by Humayun. The verse is 



Tr. 

From grief every fold of my heart has turned into blood 
(To think) that in spite of our oneness, duality is attri- 
buted to us. 

I never recollect you without weeping bitterly, 
(Nay), I seldom recollect you (for fear) that I may 
have to weep much. 3 

Here ends the correspondence. Before attempting the 
description of the war it led up to, we shall dilate on the 
twin question of mediaeval Muslim Diplomacy and Religio- 
political attitude of the Muslim victor towards the Hindu 
vanquished. The following observations may be made in 
this connexion: 

(a) The States were not usually represented by ambas- 
sadors or consuls permanently stationed in each other's 
capital. Envoys were specially sent when occasion arose 
and their stay might be prolonged either at the pleasure of 
the king who desired to shower continued favours on them 
or by the envoys themselves in order to send political 
information to their masters. In the latter case, in order 
to check the spying, the king had to dismiss them. 4 The 



1 Fol. 

2 See the MS. with the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. 

8 These lines must have been written at an earlier stage when cordial 
relations subsisted between the two kings. 

4 The most noted example of it occurred in Shah Jahan's time, when 
the envoys to Persia were instructed to supply news to him. Shah 
Abbas II had to dismiss the Mughal envoys in order to make his 
preparations in secret for the recovery of (Jandahar. See B. P. Saxena: 
Shah Jahan, p. 223. The official relations between the two kingdoms 



[ 112 ] 

normal business of an envoy was to carry the various gifts 
and a congratulatory epistle, in which was included the 
description of the various events in his master's State. On 
his dismissal and return, he would be accompanied by 
another envoy from the land visited for his own master. 
Very often an envoy took a year or more to return. 

(6) Muslim rulers in India usually made some distinc- 
tion between a Muslim and a Hindu State. The latter, if 
the Hiddya or the work on the Muslim Jurisprudence 1 is to 
be literally interpreted, was outside the Muslim code of 
International Equity and a Muslim king 2 was not permitted 
to maintain permanent peace with an ' infidel ' State. 

In spite of their overwhelming number 3 the Hindus, 
caste-ridden as they were, could play no aggressive part in 
the contemporary politics : nor could they defend themselves 
from Muslim attacks. They therefore had to acquiesce in 
arbitrary dictations which were a common feature of the 
political practice adopted by the Muslim State in India 
towards its weak Hindu neighbours. We may cite here 
two cases by way of example: 

(t) After the treaty of 1533 A. D. with the Rana of 
Chitor, when he surrendered some territory besides paying 
a large indemnity, Bahadur Shah for no reason whatever 
except an ambition to conquer an ' infidel ' kingdom, 
destroyed Chitor two years later. 

(if) Bahadur's grandfather, Sultan Mahmud Begarha 
cruelly forced his tributary and obedient chief, Mandalak 
of Girnar, to embrace Islam. 4 



1 See the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain, 1835 
A. D., p. 61-135, Kennedy's article on the Hiddya. 

2 To quote Kennedy in this connexion, ' the making war on infidels 
being a duty incumbent on all true believers, a Muhammadan prince was 
not at liberty to conclude a permanent peace with the infidels because 
such a peace would be an infringement of the positive command of God 
which enjoins war to be carried on against the infidels.' 

a It should be remembered that in the United Provinces, where the 
Muslims had the headquarters of their empire, the Hindus number even 
y something like $5 per cent, of the total population. 
For full details see C, H. / Vol* III, p. 305. 



[ "3 ] 

Such instances of wanton bigotry, however, were few 
and far between. No doubt early Muslim annals of India 
were stained by religious vandalism. But, if once a Hindu 
State accepted Muslim suzerainty, its subjects were left 
alone and the victors generally respected their institutions 
and practices and earned their gratitude. 

The picture of Muslim religious bigotry has generally 
been overdrawn. It should be remembered that if the 
Muslims had really carried out extensively the policy of 
destruction of temples, as ascribed to them by some writers, 
there should not have existed, after several centuries of 
Muslim rule, any temple in the heart of the Muslim empire 
for Aurangzib to destroy. Four explanations for the occa- 
sional outbursts of Muslim iconoclastic zeal suggest them- 
selves to us. 

In the first place, their monotheism and intense hatred 
for idol worship. Inspired by instinctive disdain for 
idolatry, the victorious Muslim army could not repress its 
extreme disapproval of the religion of the vanquished. 
This alone furnishes the explanation for three-fourths of 
the temple destruction that took place during the Muslim 
rule in India. 

In the second place, even the most liberal-minded of 
Muslim rulers had to sanction or approve of the demolition 
of a temple on political considerations, namely, to 
enlist the co-operation of the clerical party which guided 
the religious thought of Muslim India. Under this explana- 
tion we may instance the demolition of the temple of Rama 
at Janamsthan in Ajudhya in Babur's time. 1 The mullahs 
were the chroniclers, and they being actuated by religious 
bigotry magnified this policy of their royal patrons. 

In the third place, in his zeal to win the applause of 
the Muslim world, a Muslim ruler adopted the policy of 
religious persecution against the non-Muslims. It is said 4 

1 The subject of the demolition of Rama's temple in Ajudhya has 
been fully discussed in the author's article on ' Bdbur and the Hindus ' 
published in the U. P. Historical Society Journal, 1936, A. D. 



C "4 3 

that Aurangzib's religious policy was guided by some such 
consideration. But whether the Muslim world appreciated 
his persecutions is a different question. 1 

In the fourth place, the desire of possessing the sacred 
places of the enemy and erecting their own mosques 
instead, e.g., the thakurdwdrd of Prithvi Raj at Delhi was 
converted by Qutbuddin into the Quwwat-ul-Isldm Masjid. 2 
Very often in the course of a war a temple was deliberately 
or otherwise desecrated, and the Hindus abandoned it on 
that account. The Muslims either occupied it or utilized 
its materials for their own use. 3 Sometimes even an old 
deserted Muslim building was similarly utilized, e.g., Sher 
Shah's Purana Qila was largely built out of the materials 
provided by the remains of Alauddin's Siri. 4 Such a con- 
version of thfe enemy's houses of. worship was not the 
feature of conquest in India alone. In Spain, Saracenic 
mosques were converted into churches, theimost famous 
being the great mosque of Cordova which has been used as 
a Christian church since 1238 A.D. 5 

In the light of the above explanations, the picture of 
Muslim fanaticism generally drawn deep by the clerical 
party responsible for mediaeval Muslim history may be 
brought to its proper perspective. The commonplace 
historical errors of Muslim bigotry should be rectified, the 
hitherto unquestioned contemporary verdict on men and 
their affairs be modified, and a great deal of communal 
misunderstandings clouding our national life be clarified* 

When a Hindu State was attacked by a Muslim ruler, 
the other Hindu chiefs very often refrained from going to 



1 The anti-theocratic policy of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq is said to 
have been popular with the rest of the Muslim world. 

* See Sayyid Ahmad: Asdr-us-San&did, pp. 11-13. 

8 Consult Fergnsson: Indian Saracenic Architecture, Vol. II, p. 201, 

4 See Fenshawe : Delhi, Past and Present, p. 253. For the situa- 
tion of Siri consult ' map of country round Delhi ' in the pocket of the 
bo4k, ' \ ' * , ' ' ' ' ' ' 



* Consult Fletcher: History of Architecture, the last chapter on 
Moslem Architecture written by Richmond. ' i ' 



Its aid for fear of drastic penalties. 1 Nor could a neigh- 
bouring Muslim State help it; for the Muslim public opinion 
strongly protested against such an attitude of a sister 
Muslim State towards f its Hindu neighbour. For the sake 
of illustration it may be mentioned that there is a tradition 
in Mewar that an appeal was made for help by Rana 
Vikramaditya's mother to Humayun Badshah 2 against 
Bahadur Shah. Possibly it was made. Bahadur was in a 
fix but his maulavis assured him that Humayun would not 
help Mewar for the simple reason that no Muslim could up- 
hold an ' infidel ' cause against another Muslim. 

Thus we discover a uniformity of political policy pur- 
sued by the Muslims towards the non-believers. We also 
read into it religious bigotry. For the war against the 
Hindus was styled jihad, the leader, at the end of the war, 
a ghdzi, and those who were killed shuhadd or martyrs. 
Political considerations, in the main, dictated this policy. 
The appeal to religion alone could weld the small number 
of the Muslims who otherwise could not have subjugated 
a vast country like India. 

On the subject of the political refugees no uniform 
written law was in force. If the fugitive was a Muslim with 
no political pretensions, he was allowed shelter in a neigh- 
bouring Muslim State. He remained un- 
noticed so long as he did not meddle with 
the politics of the State, he had come from 
or gone to. In Babur's and Humayun's reign, thousands 
of the Afghans took shelter with the king of Bengal but 
neither of the Mughal kings made it a cause of war. Simi- 
larly when the refugees took shelter with Bahadur Shah, 
no serious notice was taken of the fact. 3 



1 To illustrate, the reason given fof*the first siege of Chit8r by 
Bahadur Shah, is Rana Vikramaditya's futile attempt to succour Silhadi 
during the siege of Raisen. 

*ee Todd: R&j#$than (Routledge popular edition), Vol. I, p. 250. 

3 A. H. G. f p. 237, says that with Tatar Khan were 40,000 Afghans 
The actual number might have been smaller. ' 



C "6 ] 

But when the fugitive was a personage of exalted rank 
and with high political pretensions, prone to intrigue and 
nursing a hostile feeling against the ruler of his own State, 
he was treated differently. The safety of the ruler needed 
some check on the activities of the refugee and hence a 
demand was generally made for his extradition from the 
State which had given him shelter. Such a demand was 
treated by the protector of the refugee according to the 
measure of his strength. If strong, he resisted the demand, 1 
if weak, he surrendered the refugee. Bahadur Shah des- 
troyed Malwa, because his brother Chand Khan had taken 
shelter there and the ruler, Sultan Mahmud, would not sur- 
render him. 

Humayun also had ignored the flight of Alam Khan of 
KalpI, and mildly protested against Tatar Khan's reception 
at Bahadur's court but determined to make Muhammad 
Zaman Mirza's flight and shelter with Bahadur the cause 
of a campaign. Similarly, if Bahadur had felt himself 
strong enough to face the Mughals, he would have waged 
a war against Humayun if the latter had granted protection 
to any of the discontented nobles of Gujrat. 2 

It is one of the redeeming traits of the escutcheon of 
the mediaeval Muslim kings that while they often waged 
war against one another for mere trifles, they sometimes 
The occa- showed extreme charity towards their weaker 
sionai generous neighbours. Sultan Mahmud Be gar ha of 
b fowa}&T Gujrat, whose fierce bigotry we had an occa- 
a brother sion to mention of, behaved with a generosity, 
Muslim king. rare i y known, to two of his neighbours. One 
of them was the infant king, Nizam Shah Bahmani (1461 
1463 A. D.). When he was attacked by Mahmud Khaljl of 



1 Timur's demand of Bayazid for the surrender of Qaril Yusuf and 
Sultan Ahmad Jalair was not attended to. Neither did Sultan Bahadur 
pay any heed to Humayun's demand for the surrender of Muhammad 
Zaman M., nor Sultan Mahmud of Malwa to 'Bahadur's demand for the 
surrender of Chand KhiLn. 

2 But Bahadur had no courage to oppose when Razl-ul-mulk, a 
Malwa nobleman, intrigued with Humayun in favour of Chand fhan. 
See A. H. G., p. 195. 



[ H7 1 

Malwa (1436 1469 A. D.), Mahmud Begarha came to his 
rescue and forced the Khalji ruler to retire. More than 
once Mahmud Begarha acted as 'a protector and got nothing 
more than the grateful thanks of the Bahmani government 
for all the trouble he had taken. Again he indirectly helped 
Sultan Ghiyasuddin of Malwa, who had just succeeded his 
father, the unscrupulous Mahmud Khalji, by disapproving 
of the proposal of invading Malwa broached by his Gujrat 
nobles, remarking that with him it was a matter of principle 
not to invade a State which had just lost its ruler. 1 In 
the preceding century, Firuz Shah Tughluq had similarly 
refrained from molesting the Bahmani kingdom on Alauddm 
Bahman Shah's death in 1358 A.D. 

But the best examples of generosity are furnished by 
the sixteenth century. Muzaffar Shah II of Gujrat (1511-26) 
captured Mandu by massacring 19,000 of the Rajputs and 
then, instead of annexing the State, restored it to its ruler, 
Mahmud II in 1518 A.D. 2 Bahadur Shah also was agree- 
able to the separate entity of the Malwa kingdom, he only 
insisted on the surrender of his fugitive brother, Chand 
Khan, and a personal interview with the Malwa ruler. To 
this the latter never agreed 3 and thus brought about the 
extinction of his kingdom. Again, Humayun, marched 
against Sher Khan in Bengal in order to restore it to its 
dispossessed and wounded king, Ghiyasuddin Mahmud. In 
pursuance of this praiseworthy object, he had to shut his 
eyes to the more advantageous offers of Sher Khan. 4 Last, 
but not least, the loan of a large army by Shah Tahmasp 
of Persia to Humayun for the reconquest of his territories 
is another instance in point. 

1 See C. H. 1., Vol. Ill, pp. 304-5. 

2 Ibid., p. 319. 

3 The reason being that he could not agree to Chand Khan's surrender. 

A. H. G., p. 1. 4 has d **(*j> al fk# dJ jj~! < even in his last 

moments Mahmud tried to save Chand Khftn. See also p. 196, 1. 5. 

4 Vide infra, Chapter XVII. 



CHAPTER XI 

HUMAYtJN'S MARCH TO UJJAIN THE CAPTURE 

OF CHITOR BY BAHADUR SHAH, MARCH, 

1935 A. D. THE BATTLE OF MANDA- 

SOR, APRIL, 1535 A.D. 

By the time the correspondence between Humayun 
and Bahadur Shah ended, Humayun reached Sarang- 
piir (January, 1535 A. D.), where he stayed for more than 
a month. Humayun's march through the eastern Malwa 
alarmed Bahadur so much that he thought of raising the 
siege of Chitor, of returning to his capital or Mandu, and 
of making a serious preparation to face Humayun. But 
his minister, Sadr Khan, 1 relying on the Muslim tradition 
mentioned in the last chapter, dissuaded him from the 
course, and assured him that Humayun would not attack 
him while the latter was engaged in a war with a non- 
Muslim. 2 The expected happened. 3 

It must not, however, be supposed that Humayun was 
here meekly carrying out the wishes of the Guj rails; for, 
though technically he did not violate the Muslim conven- 
tion of refraining from an attack on a brother-in-faith 
engaged in a war with the unbelievers, actually he gained 
an advantage over his enemy. Being certain of Bahadur's 

1 Farishta in Part I, p. 215, 1. 4 calls him Sadr Jahan Khan and 
again in Part II, p. 222 last line calls him Haidar Khan. M. S. calls him 
son of Malik Rajl (^1;) A. H. G., p. 238 qualifies him as 



2 The Farishta, Part II, 223, 1. 2, the Tarikh-i-Alfi (Or. 465) fol. 
526b., 1. 4, the Muntakhab-ut-Tawdri%h by Yusuf, fol. i6oa, 1. 3, the 
Zabdat-ut-T awarihh , fol. 92, 1. i, agree in saying that when Humayun 
heard of Bahadur's deliberations with his nobles, he decided not to molest 
him. 

According to Bakhtawar Chan's Mirdt-ul-Alam (B. M. A.) it was 
Bahadur who requested Humayun to refrain from an attack during the 
siege of ChitSr, and Humayun agreed. 

3 Humayun, probably, never realized the advantages that he threw 
^way by not proceeding immediately to the aid of the Rajpftts; for he 
might have, If be had chosen, earned their permanent gratitude by a 

aid. 



occupation at Chitor, he safely proceeded to Ujjain 1 in 
February, 1535 A.D., and stayed there till the end of the 
siege of Chitor on March 8, 1535 A. D. The advantages 
that he thus secured may here be stated : 

(a) He occupied a part of the enemy's territories and 
obtained a hold on its resources. Alam Khan Jighat who 
had gone to aid Bahadur at Chitor, must have lost his 
jagtr. 2 

(6) Humayun by his stay at Sarangpur and at Ujjain 
was able to win over the Malwa people, including the Pur a- 
biya Rajputs whom Bahadur had offended. That he was 
for the present rather anxious to reconcile the people to 
himself than fight Bahadur is clear from his march in a 
south-westerly direction to the important Hindu town of 
Ujjain. If Bahadur's camp had been his objective, he 
would have proceeded due west or north-west, shortening 
his distance from the enemy as well as from the Gujrat 
capital, Ahmedabad. 

1 = Chitor. 

2 = Ahmadabad. 
1\ 

3 = Ujjain. 

4 = Sarangpur. 

O Bahadur's encampment. 




Mandugtrh 

* Ujjain, situated in 23!!' N. and 7547* E. on the Sipra, is one of 
the seven sacred cities of the Hindus. It served as the capital to the 
semi-mythical Vikramaditya. Its chief temple is that of Mahakall, on the 
site of the famous structure destroyed by Iltutmish in 1235 A, D. Nearby 
at Kaliadaha, lies an old pleasure-resort of Jahanglr, now repaired and 
used by the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior. 

* Which consisted , of a stretch of land* from Chandfirl, Bhpilsa and 
Raisen. 



E I*) ] 

(c) He placed himself between Mandugarh and the 
Gtijirat army and thus made it impossible for his adversary 
to reach the Malwa capital without passing through his 
camp. The diagram given on the previous page will 
illustrate this statement. 

(d) Even after the capture of Chitor if Bahadur were to 
attempt to reach Ahmadabad along with his heavy guns, 
it would be easy for the lightly-equipped Humayun to out- 
distance him. 

(e) In a war between Bahadur and the Mughals, it 
was possible for Humayun to receive some indirect support 
from the Rajputs who surrounded the Sultan in the north 
and in the west. They must have sent provisions to him; 
for there was never any difficulty about the supply of pro- 
visions to the Mughal camp, and they were friendly to him. 

Chitor fell on March 8, 1535 A.D. 1 after a siege of 
more than three months. 2 The city was abandoned to 
plunder for three days and then a proclamation for the 
The fail of protection of life and property was made. 

Chitor, March 8 The fortifications, which had suffered from 
1535 A. D. Rumi Khan's bombardment, were repaired 

and strengthened/ guns mounted, and a year's provisions 
stored. 3 Its governorship was again denied to Rumi Khan, 
and was to be bestowed, perhaps temporarily, on Malik 
Nassan Khan. 4 

1 =3rd Ramzdn, 941 A. H. Most of the writers mention the date, 
the only exceptions being (a) U. R. I. which omits it and (b) A. T. W. 
H. G. which puts it down as happening in 942 A. H. 

2 A. H. 6. in the same breath makes two contradictory statements 
(i) that the garrison was put to the sword ^jjuJl \j***) and (2) Bahadur 
proclaimed peace to all. See p. 239, 1. i. 

* Ibid, If the statement is correct, in the war between Bahadur and 
Humayun, when Chit5r was recovered by the Rajputs, the provisions must 
have been placed at Humayun' s disposal. Bahadur never profited by them 
and actually lost the battle of Mandasor because of starvation in his camp. 

4 M. S. fol. i59b, 1. 12. ...It seems that Malik Nassan was the per- 
manent incumbent of Ranthambhor and was temporarily placed at Chitor 
in charge of the repairs; After their completion he would revert to his 
old post. The Rauzat-ut-Tahirin (Or. 168) fol. 6i4b, 1. 15, is wrong in 
saying that Chitor, after its capture, was handed over to Rumi Khan. 

U. R. /. refers to some coins of Rana Vikramaditya on which could 
be traced the word Sultan and it presumes the word refers to Bahadur 
But it makes no suggestion as to their relation with each other. 



Rumi Khan was a person of outstanding merit. He 
was in charge of the naval ports and the artillery of Gujrat, 
and took a prominent part in the conduct of the campaigns 
or sieges. 1 It was feared that if he were 
. an. placed also in charge of impregnable forts 
like Chitor he would grow so powerful as to endanger the 
very existence of the Gujrat kingdom. It was a natural 
fear of the people of the country, themselves weak in the 
manipulation of heavy guns and marvelling at the wonder- 
ful skill of some of the foreign gunners. 2 These foreigners, 
if loyal, would make their master great; but, they, if dis- 
loyal, would ruin him. 

Free from the work of the siege, Bahadur found him- 
self in an alarming situation. His army reduced in number 
and removed far from the capital was suffering from the 
after-effects of a protracted campaign. The Rajputs 
looked sullen, though exhausted. They might rise against 
Bahadur. 3 What was more, Humayun at Ujjain had cut 
him off from the capital of Malwa and threatened his 
hold on Gujrat; and lastly, Rumi Khan, ambitious, un- 
scrupulous, discontented, was ready to sell his master. 4 

Certainly, the proper course for Bahadur to adopt in 
such a crisis would have been to get rid of the undesirable 
Rumi Khan, either by undertaking the conduct of the cam- 
paign himself, or by entrusting it to some other loyal com- 
manders. If Rumi Khan resented the supersession, he 



1 E.g., at Chitor; according to A. H. G., p. 230 
Similarly at Ranthambhor, A. H. G., p. 227 

A. N. on p. 151, 1. 2 has 



2 Another gunner, named Scott has been referred to by A. H. G. t 
p. 234, 11. 21-23. He had become a Muslim at Bahadur's instance. It 
describes how he had proposed to aim at one of Humayun' s guns and 
succeeded in dismantling it. He was rewarded with 7 mans of gold by 
Raja Narsingha Deo, 

9 Actually the fear was never realized; for Rana Vikramaditya conti- 
nued to neglect the administration and died in 1536 A. D. at the early 
age of 16. See U. R. /., p. 401. 

* A. H. G,, p. 239, U. 6-7. 



{ 122 ] 

could have been dismissed, imprisoned, or even put to 
death. 1 

If Bahadur had been left to himself he might have risen 
to the occasion. But since his declaration of war with the 
Mughals, he had been shirking a bold policy. At the battle 
of Panipat, he had seen the Mughals win with the aid 
of their guns and so he attached too much importance to 
guns and gunners. He did not see the logical conclusion 
of his ideas in this respect. If artillery were to be the 
chief weapon of winning victories, the foreigners, control- 
ling the ordinance department, were bound, sooner or later, 
to control their masters, and ultimately to become the very 
rulers of the land. 2 

Maybe, he was not blind to the risk of employing 
foreigners but he felt alarmed at the advance of the 
Mughals, and thought that without the foreign gunners, he 
could not stand for a day against them, but with their help, 
he might be able to check their advance for a while. The 
alternative course, namely, submission to Humayun, his 
superior in military organization, the patriot in him for- 
bade him to adopt. Hence the vicious circle : he must fight 
the Mughals; to fight the Mughals he must engage the 
foreign gunners; and the foreign gunners would, sooner 
than later, imperil his kingdom. 

Next, granting that he must fight the Mughals, obvi- 
ously, the best course was to engage forthwith and break 
through their lines. It is possible that he might have 
effected his escape. 3 For his army not yet weakened 
nay flushed with the success at Chitor might have faced 
the Mughals with great courage and confidence. This 
was the course suggested to him by Taj Khan Narpali and 
Sadr Khan, two of his prominent nobles; but Bahadur 

1 As actually done by Humayun, later on. 

a ,For the next two centuries nothing untoward happened. The 
strong central government kept foreign adventurers under control. It was 
only wken the central administration broke down, that the skilled foreign 
organizations pf the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and lastly the 
English took advantage of the situation.. 

flmr under, -tjie command of Sadr Jh&n.did after the defeat 
1 " ' " ' 



did not consider it wise* to ignore the advice of Rumi 
Khan, who, now as a traitor 1 and in league with Humayun, 
counselled him against it. 

Humayun now moved on to Mandasor 2 and thus 
secured the additional advantage of getting closer to 
Ahmadabad, the capital of Gujrat, 3 as would be clear from 
the diagram below, 

= Chitor. 
= Ahmadabad. 
= Ujjain. 
= Mandasor 




1 Bahadur Shah might have or might not have known the full extent 
of Rumi Khan's treachery but he felt helpless in either case. 

3 Situated in 24 4' N. and 75 5' E. on the bank of a tributary of the 
Sipra, and a railway station on the B. B. & C. I. Railway. There is a 
large tank outside the city, by the side of which, the two armies 
encamped. Its fort was founded by Alauddm Khalji. Holkar, after his 
defeat at Mahldpur, made his treaty with the English here in 1818 A. D. 

3 Jauhar Ajtabchi is very unreliable here. He says (see B. M, 1611) 
that 

(a) (fol. 4b, 1.8) Humayun stayed at Tilwar while Bahadur besieged 

Chitor. 

(b) (1. 9) Bahadur returned to Gujrat. This is impossible from the 

relative positions of Bahadur and Humayun. 

(c) (1 n) The battle took place at Mori in Burhanpur district. 

This would have no meaning and take away both Bahadur 
and Humayun from their objectives, 

(d) (fol. 25a) It was Humayfin who proposed to besiege Bahadur. 

His interest lay in fighting an immediate battle as JR. J. 
(B. M. Or. 168) fol. 614^ 1. 4 puts it 



from which it is clear that his purpose was to meet Bahadur 
in an immediate battle. ,, 



I 124 ] 

Though, Bahadur realized that he had been out- 
manoeuvred, he had no other choice than to march for- 
ward and meet him. Thus both the armies encamped at 
Mandasor by the side of a large tank. 1 Small skirmishes 
took place in which Bahadur suffered reverses, which so 
much damped the spirit of his soldiers that he gladly accept- 
ed Rumi Khan's suggestion of encamping in an open field 
and entrenching in the Turkish fashion, viz., surrounding 
the camp with carts, waggons, and artillery, 2 and then again 
with a ditch round them. Bahadur's object in listening to 
Rumi Khan's advice, as has been observed above, was 
to prevent his desertion. The Sultan also hoped that his 
alliance with Sher Khan and with the king of Bengal might 
bring in some unexpected relief for him. 3 

Thus Bahadur willingly suffered a long siege. He was 
so strongly entrenched and fortified that Humayun's first 
assaults made in the hope of putting an immediate end to 
the war were repulsed with heavy casualties. He then 
grew wiser, refrained from a direct attack on the enemy's 
fortifications, and turned his attention to cutting off supplies 
to the garrison. 4 As every information regarding the Guj- 
rati camp was furnished to him by the treacherous Rumi 
Khan, the task was easily performed. 

1 The Mirat-ul-Alam (B. M. 23530) fol. 279!), 1. u and A. H. G., 
p. 239, 1. 10. This meeting according to the Huqtqatlidi-Hindustdn took 
place on the 6th Shawwdl 941 A. H. = loth April, 1535 A. D. 

3 Since the entrenchment was constructed with the help of the gun- 
carriages and country carts, the encampment was called <fcl;l See 
A. T. W. H. G., p. 14 and A. H. G., pp. 249 and 263. The gun-carriages 
have been called by Parish ta b jl$ ty] In Arabic, a cart-driver is 
called 



3 For Sher Khan see A. H. G., p. 237, beginning with the sentence 
A. N. t p. 148 says 



For the king of Bengal see Khondamir: Humayun-Nama (Or. 1762) 
fol. i5oa, 1. u or the Riyaz-us-Satetin, pp. 137-38. 

A $<?e Jfef. S. fol. i5Qb for an illustration. Mehtar Banjdra, who was 
carrying provisions for the besieged garrison under an escort of 5000 
$ol4iers, was captured by the Mughals, 4. H. G., p. 240, 11. 9-10 also 
mentions the capture. 



C 125 ] 

The siege lasted for 16 days from the loth to the 25th 
April, .1535 A.D. 1 Bahadur was so ill-served by his com- 
missariat department, if he had any, that at the close of 
this short period his horses were dying in large numbers 2 
and men starving. When Bahadur's garrison was reduced 
to these straits, he deliberated with his chief advisers, and 
with their consent 3 at last determined on a flight. 

Bahadur's flight took place on April 25, 1535 A. D. 4 
Before his departure he took care to destroy his jewellery, 
guns, and animals. The Sultan shed bitter tears when his 
favourite elephants, Sharzah and Pat-sin gar, or his chief 
cannon, Laila and Majnun, were destroyed. 5 While this 
destruction was taking place in Bahadur's camp, Ruml 
Khan slunk away to Humayun, and set his alarm at rest 
by explaining to him the cause of the uproar and confusion 
that prevailed in the Gujrat camp. Even then, during 
the remaining portion of the night and some portion of 
the following morning, Humayun remained on horseback 



1 If the actual meeting of the two armies took place on the 6th 
Shawwdl 941 A. H., as mentioned by the Haqiqathdi-Hindustdn and if 
Bahadur fled from Mandasor on the 2ist Shawwdl, the total period of the 
siege comes to ]6 days only. Thus I am forced to reject Jauhar who 
prolongs the siege to 3 or 4 months. T. A., p. 196, 1. 7, the Farishta, 
Part II, p. 223, 1. n, Yusuf: Muntakhab (B. M. 25786) fol. i6ob, 1. 2, 
all put it to 2 months. They probably include the total period from 3rd 
Ramzdn to 2ist Shawwdl 941 A. H.; even then it comes to i month and 
1 8 days. 

U. R. I. gives the date of Bahadur's capture of Chitor as 3rd Ramzdn 
and his flight from Mandasor as 2oth Ramzdn. At the same time he 
mentions the period of the siege as lasting for 2 months. Thus one fact 
is inconsistent with the other. 

2 M . S. makes two statements in this connexion : 

(a) The flesh of 4 horses would feed only two soldiers. 

(b) The horses had nothing else to chew than one another's tails. 

3 An exception should be made of IJhudawand Khan al-ljl, Bahadur's 
minister as well as of tutor (ojjaJ) . He estimated Gujrat kingdom to be 
half of the whole country (JJA) and could not agree to his master's 
flight. See A. T. W. H. G., p. 15, 11.1-3. 

4 2ist Shawwdl 941 A. H. The chronogram ^ol^Ji indicates one 
year too many. Such slight discrepancies are excusable. 

5 M, S. fol. i6ob. and A. H. G. t p. 232. We have attached no 
importance to the anecdote described by either of them that a box fell 
into Bahadur's hand in which were found some salt and coal and a few 
tattered clothes, blue in colour. As soon a* Bahadur saw this, he got 
terrified and fled away. 



[ 126 ] 

. 30,000 men 1 to guard against any surprise attack of 
Ifae enemy. That he made no attack on the distressed and 
terror-stricken enemy may be owing to one or more of the 
following reasons: 

(a) He was too chivalrous to take advantage of his 
adversary's weak position. Humayun could not forget 
the Sultan's past glory and achievements, and hence this 
consideration for him. 

(b) He had great respect for Bahadur's military quali- 
ties, and did not desire to risk an unnecessary attack, 
when the slow but steady process of starvation was helping 
his cause. If this consideration weighed with Humayun it 
shows that he was not correctly apprised of the affairs of 
the Gujrat camp and that he possessed no efficient system 
of scouting in his army. Humayun did not stir even 
when Rumi Khan supplied him with necessary informa- 
tion. 

(c) He desired to keep his army under control during 
the night and lead it to the enemy's camp in the morning. 
He actually did so, but could not follow his father's prin- 
ciple of iron discipline; for he gave a free permission to 
plunder and secure captives. The only condition that he 
made was that no captive was to be killed. 2 

Bahadur Shah escaped with five followers 8 among 
whom, it is mentioned, were the faithful Muhammad of 
Khandesh and Mallu Khan entitled Qadir Shah Manduall. 
His path lay through risk and danger, and Humayun's 
army stood between him and his two capitals, Mandu and 
Ahmadabad. So he had recourse to stratagem to ensure his 
safety. Instead of proceeding direct to the south, he pro- 
ceeded northward, i.e., towards Agra and then after pro- 
ceeding a few stages, turned round to take the road to 



1 A. N., p. 132, A. H. G., p. 241. 
* A. H. G., p. 241. fcj) fyj 

*ff}1 (Ar&bah) here means the camp. 

/, 3 The remaining three according to A. !T. W. H. G., p. 15, were 
Alph lhan Dutaai and two horse-guards. According to A. H. G., p. 240, 
L 22, the number wast ' less than ten/ 



Mandu. 1 Thus he eluded pursuit and safely reached 
Mandu. 2 . - * 

The rest of the Gujrat army gathered under Sadr 
Khan and Imad-ul-Mulk, and proceeded by a more direct 
route to the same destination. It speaks of the courage 
and military skill of the two generals that they proceeded 
southwards not as vanquished fugitives but as commanders 
of 15 to 20,000 soldiers, with banners unfurled, and drums 
beating. So firmly did they march that Humayun, who 
followed them with several thousand followers, 3 desist- 
ed from attacking them. It is rather strange that though 
Humayun thought Bahadur to be present in Sadr Khan's 
army, he refrained from an attack, and was content only to 
follow it at some distance. What was Humayun's hesita- 
tion due to ? Was it that Humayun took pity on Bahadur 
and did not desire to add to his distress ; or was it that he 
wished to have a small casualty list and gain his end by a 
discreet pursuit from a distance? Whatever the reason, 
one 'is confident that Humayun's faint-heartedness had 
nothing to do with it. 

On the morning following Bahadur's flight, Humayun 
obtained possession of his camp, when it was found 
that the destruction ordered by him before his 
departure had not been completed. Practically, the 
camp had been left entire. 4 Its splendour surprised the 
Mughals. Abu Turab Wali describes the royal enclosure 
as having a circumference of a mile. 5 The tent-cloth con- 

1 See A. H. G. Also A N., p. 132. Compare Bahadur's flight with 
that of Shivaji when the latter escaped from Agra in 1665-66 A. D., 
Shiva ji also followed a round-about route. 

2 Bahadur reached there on i4th Zulqada^igih May, 1535 A. D. 
See A. N. Tr. by Beveridge, p. 304. 

3 The number of soldiers in Humayun's army has been variously put 
<Jown as 2 or 3000 to 30000 men. Jauhar Aft&bchi's figure is 3 or 4000. 

* One would like to Itoquire as to what prevented the plunder of the 
Gujrat camp. Are we to conclude that Sadr Khan's departure in the 
morning}' was immediately followed by Humayun's entry? 

, A. T. W. G. H., p. * has ^ tf ^f A. A. describes Akbar's 

encampment; the royal seraglio, the audience hall, and the naqqdr kh&nah 
together occupying a length of 1530 Ildhi gaz. One, such gaz equalled 
33 inches. 



[ 128 ] 

sisted of velvet, silk, and brocade, the ropes of silken cords, 
and the pegs of gold and silver. At the sight, Humayun 
is said to have exclaimed, 'Why should it not be so, he is 
the lord of both Land and Sea/ The author of the Mirat-i- 
Sikandari puts it in a slightly different form, 'Delhi relies 
on its wheat and millets for revenue while Gujrat counts 
upon its corals and pearls/ 

Of the numerous Gujrati captives, secured by the 
Mughals, two distinguished personages have been speci- 
ally mentioned, Khudawand Khan al-Iji, 1 one of Bahadur's 
foremost ministers, and Jam Firuz, the ex-ruler of Thatha 
and Bahadur's father-in-law. 

Khudawand Khan 2 had served four kings, attained 
eighty years of age, and owing to debility was unable to 
ride a horse. But he possessed indomitable courage, super- 
vised his army from a palankeen, and in the conference in 
which Bahadur's flight was discussed he voted against the 
proposition. After the break-up of the Gujrat army, infirm 
and old as he was, he was captured by the Mughals and 
carried to Humayun. His age, length of service, learning, 
and valour, moved Humayun 's heart and in a short while, 
Khudawand Khan became one of his principal courtiers 
and advisers in the Gujrat campaign. Humayun was 
especially pleased with his learning, and profited by his 
discourses on hadis or Muhammad's sayings. 

Jam Firuz had lost his State to Shah Beg Arghun 3 in 
1521 A. D. and since then had been staying with Bahadur. 
Humayun carried him about for a time but subsequently 



1 Briggs, the translator of the Parish ta. has made a confusion by mix- 
ing up three persons into one (i) Mustafa Rumi Khan, (2) Rumi Khan 
Safar, the builder of Surat castle in 1542-43 A. D., as a protection against 
the Portuguese who molested the Muslim pilgrims, (3) Khudawand Khan 
Al-Iji. Similarly Erskine (pp. 49, 76, 82) confuses Rumi Khan and 
Khudawand Khan. Many interesting details about the last personage may 
be obtained from Mr Commissariat's article on ' A Brief history of the 
Gujr#t Sultanate ' in J. R. A. S. B^ B., 1918-19 A. D. 

The four kings would be (i) Mahmiid Begarha, (2) Muzaffar II, 
(3) Sikandar, ( 4 ) Bahadur. 

3 C. H. /., Vol. Ill, p. 501. 



put him to death during an alarm when a general rising of 
the inhabitants took place at Cambay. 1 

Two other results that followed the victory of Mandasor 
may also be indicated. The one was the flight of Muham- 
mad Zaman M. Finding that Bahadur, in his distress, 
could be of no further help to him, he deserted the Gujrat 
camp for ' fresh woods ' and found a place in Lahore during 
the temporary absence of Kamran from there. He remained 
there causing disturbances till the return of the prince. 

The other result was the recovery of Chitor by the 
Rajputs. Rana Vikramaditya 2 was sent for from Boondi 
and again placed on the throne of Chitor in 1535 A. D. For 
a year more he ruled, and was then murdered at the age 
of i6 3 by his cousin, Kuhwar Banbir Singh. 4 

The three prominent dates of this chapter are given 
below : 

(1) The fall of Chitor 

3rd Ramzdn 941 A. H.=8th March, 1535 A. D. 

(2) The meeting of the t\vo kings at Mandasor, 

6th Shawwdl 941 A. H. = ioth April, 1535 A. D. 

(3) Bahadur's defeat and flight from Mandasor, 

2ist Shawwdl 941 A. H. = 25th April, 1535 A. D. 



1 We have omitted from the text the story of Bahadur's parrot , 
which, when brought to Humayun's court, repeatedly cried out ' Rumi 
Khan hardm khor/ i.e., Rumi Khan, the traitor. See M. S. fol. i6ia 
and A. H. G. f p. 235. We need not conclude from M. 5/5 next sentence 
j>j$ pjl** <Ll*a^3 y ojlkc ^| ^^c* ^^ -^^ c!y**a. that Humayun did not 

understand the Urdu language. He had been now, for more than ten 
years in the country and hence we may conclude that he knew the 
language. 

2 R. T. makes the mistake of calling him, Rana Sanga. 
a U. R. I., p. 401. 

4 The relation of Vikramaditya with Banbir is thus indicated : 

Rana Rai Singh 

Rana Sanga Kr. Prithvi Raj 

Rana Vikramaditya Kr. Banbir 



CHAPTER XII 

THE FLIGHT OF BAHADUR SHAH FALL OF 
MANDtf, CAMBAY AND CHAMP ANIR, 1535 A. D. 

We have noticed in the last chapter that the two 
Gujrat generals, Sadr Khan and Imad-ul-Mulk, reached 
Mandugarh by May, 1535 A. D., followed by Humayun. 
Bahadur slipped in unnoticed a fortnight later, that is, by 
the igth of May. 1 A subsequent contingent of the Mughals 
under the command of Yadgar Nasir Mirza, Hindu Beg, 
and Qasim Husain Sultan, also joined the camp of 
Humayun by that time. Humayun, a lover of natural 
scenery, preferred to encamp at Nalcha, 2 6 miles north of 
Mandu. Nalcha had a plentiful supply of water from wells, 
tanks, and a small stream that fell into the Narbada; and as 
its elevation was more than two thousand feet from the 
sea-level, its climate also was bracing. 

With the arrival of the other Mughal generals, 
Humayun set to work out the plans of a siege. The task 
was a huge one; for Mandugarh 3 is a hill 
fortress of about 23 miles in circumference, 
2079 feet high from the sea-level, and everywhere pro- 
tected by battlements. 

1 See A. N., p. 304 and n. 4. 

2 Situated in 2225' N. and 7527' E. It contains noble ruins of 
many splendid edifices raised principally by Mahmud Khalji I who ruled 
from 1436-69 A. D. 

3 It had been the capital of Malwa from Hushang Shah's time (1405- 
*435 A. D.) to its extinction in 1531 A. D. Its principal buildings are 
(a) Hindola Mahal with its steeply sloping buttresses, (b) Jahaz Mahal 
probably so called because it overhangs a lake, (c) The magnificent Jami 
Masjid built by Hushang Shah and his mausoleum by its side, (d) The 
picturesque palaces of Baz Bahadur and Rupmati. Beneath her bower is 
a drop of several hundred feet. The river Narbada flows in its neigh- 
bourhood. 

Sir Thomas Roe, during a visit to Jah&ngir, resided in a mosque near 
the Jahaz Mahal. See the Arch&ological Report of the Year 1912-13 A. D., 
pp. 148-51. 



C 

Both Himrayun and Bahadur realized the difficulties 
of their situation. Humayun 's difficulty was that a regular 
siege of the usual type would not enable him to take a 
fortress of such gigantic dimensions, and defended by 
a large garrison. Bahadur found that he had been com- 
pletely cut off from Gujrat, and what he could at the most 
hope for, was a prolonged resistance but that, too, would 
eventually end in a surrender. It is true that Bahadur still 
had a large army 1 and a few faithful commanders, 2 but he 
feared that they also might desert him. 

So both the parties were inclined to some compromise. 
Humayun broached the subject first. He sent Sayyid 
Amir with Bairam Khan to Bahadur 3 to say that since the 
The settlement rainy reason had started, it was not proper 
between the for Bahadur to keep the Mughals under the 

two kings. canvas. What he proposed was that Guj- 

rat, being the hereditary dominion of the Sultan, might 
remain with him, but that the rest of his territories includ- 
ing Malwa be surrendered to himself. Humayun, however, 
frankly admitted that the immediate reason for his proposal 
was the inconvenience of an open encampment. 

As might be expected, the proposals were received 
well by Bahadur with the result that further negotiations 
were entrusted to the accredited agents of the two kings; 
Maulana Muhammad Farghali acting on behalf of Huma- 
yun and Sadr Khan on behalf of Bahadur. It was settled 
that the two representatives would meet at the Blue Road, 4 
midway between Nalcha and Mandu. The Mughals made 
one more concession, namely, allowed two of the respect- 

1 The number of his soldiers was now reduced from 20,000 to 15,000. 
See A. T. W. H. G., p. 16. 

2 Besides Sadr Khan and Imad-ul-Mulk, there were Qadir Shah and 
Alam Ihan LodI of Kalpl. According to A. H. G. t p. 241, Qadir Shah 
was the commandant of the place. 

8 A. T. W. H. G., p. 17. The Tdrikh-i-Humayfin Shah by Allahdad 
Faizi correctly indicates Sayyid Amir as Humayun's agent but wrongly 
(a) specifies the place of negotiation to be MandasSr instead of Mandu, 
(h) indicates that Bahadur was to pay tribute. 

4 J**~J* See A. T. W. H. G., p. 16. 



[ 132 I 

able Gujrati maulavis to join in the proceedings in support 
of .Sadr IjChan. They were Shah Qutbuddin Sukrullah and 
Shah Kamaluddin Fathullah, father and uncle, respectively, 
of Abu Turab Wali, the author of the History of Gujrdt. 

Surprising as it may appear, Sadr Khan would not 
agree to Humayun's terms, and so Humayun made a 
personal appeal to the two maulavis to intervene and 
counsel Bahadur Shah or his agent, Sadr Khan, to yield 
to him. They proved better negotiators and impressed 
Humayun with their piety and earnestness, so that a slight 
modification of the terms was agreed upon, namely, the 
addition of Chitor to Bahadur's dominion. Three reasons 
may be assigned for Humayun's ready agreement: (a) It 
cost him nothing, (b) He had no ambition of possessing 
Chitor. His relations with the Rajputs were cordial, and 
he had no desire to bring them under subjection, (c) He 
knew that Bahadur in the present state of his political 
weakness would not be able to retain Chitor. Thus we see 
here that Humayun acted diplomatically by feeding 
Bahadur's vanity in allowing him to retain Chitor. Later 
on, Humayun saw with approval and satisfaction the Raj- 
puts' recovering the place. 

Humayun ended the negotiations by confirming, in a 
personal letter, the grant of Gujrat and Chitor to the Sultan 
and settling that Bahadur should leave Mandu by the 
Lowani gate in the west and Humayun would enter later by 
the Delhi gate in the north. 1 

Bahadur made the technical blunder by accepting 
Humayun's terms, and by proclaiming to his soldiers that 
the war would end on the following day and thus allowed 
the Mughals an opportunity of capturing the place, if they 
chose, that very night. Actually in the small hours, 2 the 
Mughals got on to the top of the fortress with the help of 



1 See Art: Dhdr and Mandu by Ernest Barnes in /. JR. A. S. 
(Bombay Branch), 1903, Vol. XXI and the map at the end. 
*A.T. W. H. G. has 



[ 133 1 

700 ladders. Qadir Shah ran from his tower 1 to inform his 
master. The attendants 2 would not allow him to enter but 
the Sultan recognizing him by his voice, called him in. 
When the Sultan realized the situation he mounted a horse 
and came out. Qadir Shah and two or three police officers 
followed him on foot. Silhadi's son, Bhupat Rai, also 
joined him. Rumi Khan had incited the Rajput to desert 
Bahadur by reminding him of his father's cruel fate and 
assuring him that Humayun would restore to him all that 
his father had lost and, possibly, grant something in addi- 
tion. Bhupat refused, however, and joined Bahadur. 3 He 
was loyal to the Sultan and was prepared to sacrifice his 
all in his cause. 

Since a stiff opposition from the garrison still con- 
tinued in the 'three-gate bazaar/* Bahadur commanded 
Bhupat to attack the enemy and joined him himself on 
a piebald horse striking its rider with a dagger 5 snatched 
from an armour-bearer. He had a mind to return 
and continue the combat. But Qadir Shah pointed out its 
futility, the Mughals being there in large numbers under 
the direct command of Humayun. He persuaded the 
Sultan to repair to the citadel, Songhar, 6 still retained by 
the Gujratis. When Bahadur arrived there, he realized 
that that portion of the fort also must fall into the hands 
of the enemy, and so he let himself down from the citadel 
and fled with five or six followers, (June i, 1535 A. D.). 7 



Ordinarily means an outpost, but here the secondary mean- 
ing of ' a tower ' is to be preferred. 

2 ^jjlj j^ in Persian. 

3 I prefer A. T. W. H. G.'s version to M. S.'s or A. H. G.'s suggestion 
of treachery on the part of Bhupat, the reason being that Turab's father 
and uncle were present on the occasion and Turab, later on, became an 
honoured official of the Mughals. Bhupat had now stayed with Bahadur 
for three years or more, after his father's murder. 



8 Songhar is a semi-detached hillock in the west, which served as a 
citadel. See Barnes's article and the map at the end. 

7 The date is conjectural. Presumably the rains had started early 
that year. 



C 

During his flight Bahadur narrowly escaped capture; 
for he was recognized by an Uzbeg soldier, Nuri, 1 belong* 
ing to Qasiin Husain Sultan's division who spoke to his 
commander about his suspicion. But Qasim Husain feign- 
ed disbelief and remarked, ' how could a Sultan have only 
three or four men as followers?' So he let Bahadur 
escape. 2 

Sadr Khan continued the struggle at the Delhi gate 
and then retreated to the citadel where Alam Khan also 
joined him. Humayun acted with a stern ferocity towards 
the inhabitants of the city of Mandu, now in his possession, 
and gave up the city to plunder. 3 This continued so long 
as Humayun wore a red robe and was relaxed only when 
Ustdd Manjhu the famous musician of Gujrat, humoured 
him with melodious songs ; then he changed his diss from 
red to green indicating security for the inhabitants. The 
hideous butchery 4 stopped at once, and peace and orddt 
reigned once more in the city. 

This cruelty had the effect of terrorizing the garrison, 
and bore fruit immediately. Sadr Khan and Alam Khan 
after their retreat to Songhar had continued the struggle 
and paid no heed to Humayun 's assurance that if they 
surrendered, their lives would be spared. Now, when the 
gruesome tale of Humayun's severity reached them, they 
submitted. No harm was done to Sadr Khan, except that 
he was placed under surveillance. The captive gave word 
that he would not leave the Mughal camp, and he observed 



1 There are several variants of the name. 

3 The usual reason^ given for this generosity on the part of Qasim 
Husain is that he had served Bahadur in the past and did his duty with 
him now by turning against his present master. 

3 A. N. says, the plunder lasted for three days but possibly Af. S. 
and A. H. G., p. 233, are more correct in restricting it to one day only. 

4 Af S. and A. H. G. both have given some account of Manjhu. 
Later on he fled to Bahadur, who remarked on his arrival that even in his 
present landless condition he was so pleased with his jeturn 'that he felt 
he had got back his Whole kingdom. 

,, Regarding the massacre M. S. describes how 



C 135 3 

the condition so faithfully that when later on, at Cambay, 
efforts were made to rescue him he refused to leave. Un- 
fortunately, his honesty did not save him from death. 
The Mughal jailors, fearing lest other attempts should be 
made in his favour, killed him as well as Jam Firiiz, the 
ex-ruler of Thatha. Humayun when he heard of this, 
lamented the death of the" high-souled and god-fearing 
nobleman and inflicted capital punishment on the mur- 
derers. Alam Khan Lodi did not receive the same consi- 
deration as Sadr Khan; for though his life was spared, he 
was hamstringed and disabled for life. 

We may pause here to reflect on Humayun's cruelty 
after the capture of Mandu and its effect on the people. 

(a) The cruelty is strikingly incompatible with Huma- 
yun 's general character. Usually he was kind and affable. 
(Jn two occasions only and both taking place during the 
Gujrat campaign, we find him somewhat different: now, 
and once again during his stay at Cambay he gave orders 
for plunder and slaughter. 

(6) Humayun did not inherit this ferocity from his 
father, Babur, who generally spared the inoffensive in- 
habitants and even punished his own soldiers if they molest- 
ed the people. 1 

(c) The reputation of the Mughals depended on the 
superior culture as well as on greater humanity which they 
usually displayed. The entire policy of the Mughals after 
the battle of Panipat aimed at conciliating the Afghans and 
other people of the country. The senseless cruelty at 
Mandu and later on at Cambay was a direct negation of 
this liberal policy. 

(d) This cruelty might have been -largely responsible 
for the alienation of the people of Malwa and of Gujrat 
from the Mughals. It might also explain why the two 
provinces were lost soon after their occupation. 



1 See B. N. t pp. 380 and 383. 



[ 136 ] 

(e) In both Malwa and Gujrat, the local rulers treated 
-their Hindu and Muslim subjects impartially. The Hindus 
in fact predominated in Malwa; and in Gujrat, too, there 
were Hindu nobles who were more loyal and devoted than 
the Muslims. The example of Bhupat Rai is in point. 
He was more faithful to his master than the Turkish 
gunner, Mustafa Rumi Khan. Raja Nar Singh Deo's 
loyalty is another example. When the Sultan heard of his 
death, he exclaimed that the fort Champanir would now 
fall; for the Raja was the real commandant of the fort 2 and 
not the bookish, impractical Ikhtiyar Khan. 

(/) This cruelty would also explain the rise of the 
whole population, rural as well as urban, in Bahadur's 
favour and speedy recovery by him of his lost territory. 
The people got frightened at Humayun 's cruelty apd rallied 
round their old master. 

(g) If Humayun had stayed a little longer in Gujrat, 
he might gradually have brought about a change in the 
people's attitude towards the Mughals. As it was, the 
Mughals got no chance, and were driven out of Gujrat 
before they could settle down and organize an administra- 
tion. 

From Mandu Bahadur fled to Champanir, and so 
Humayun followed him there. 

Champanir, named after the Champak tree, 3 lies 
mostly in ruins, but it once served as a capital. 4 Its situa- 
tion is in 222Q' N. and 7332 / E. about 25 miles north of 
Ctomtamr Baroda. Its most prominent features are: 

mpamr. ^ Pavagarh or Pavangarh, a fortified hill 

of great strength on the north-east, (b) the citadel Bhadar, 
(c) a large lake (now called Bard Taldo but probably 
named in the i6th century after Imad-ul-Mulk) fed by a 

1 A. H. G,, p, 235. M. S. calls him Bir Singh Deo. 

3 A. H. G. has &&!J*; 

a See the Imperial Gazetteer of India. 

4 See Commissariat's article on ' A Brief History of the Gujrat 
Sultanate ' in /. R. A. S. (Bombay Branch) 1918-19 A. D. He mentions 
th interesting fact that the last coins issued from Champanir mint were 
those issued by Humayun in 1535 A. D. 



[ 137 ] 

canal from the eastern hills and (d) its Jdmi Masjid, a 
magnificent specimen of the massive Muslim architecture of 
the western India. 

Champanir was called by Mahmud Begarha, Muham- 
madabad in contradistinction to Girnar called after its 
conquest, Mustafabad. 1 In his time, it was noted for its 
silk-weaving industry and manufacture of sword-blades but 
its glory lasted for 50 years only. From the beginning of 
the I7th century it gradually decayed and to-day it is 
covered with wild growth. Its unhealthy climate has 
baffled all attempts at colonization. 

To revert to our narration, Bahadur took shelter in 
the fort while Humayun halted in the open, near the large 
tank, 2 called Imad-ul-Mulk's, nth Zulhijj^i^th June, 
1535 A.D. and after a few days entered the town 3 but not 
the fortress. Bahadur found it impossible to stay here also. 
But before leaving it, he entrusted Masnad-i-Ali Abdul 
Aziz Asaf Khan with his women, treasure, and other valu- 
able property, and asked him to take them to Diu. He 
next set fire to the town and then left for Cambay. Huma- 
yun, who was now in possession of the town, readily put 
his soldiers on to extinguishing the flames, and earned the 
gratitude of its inhabitants. 

Bahadur had practically lost everything. What was 
his object now ? It appears that he had lost faith in the 
Mughals since their attack on Mandu during negotiations, 
and so, now, instead of resigning to the inevitable, namely, 
submission to Humayun, he was following an illusory 
course. 

A part of this scheme we have already noted, namely, 
sending his women, and treasure with Asaf Khan to Diu. 
The rest we shall describe here. He hoped to send 
Asaf Khan as an embassy to Sulaiman I, the ruler of 

1 Mahmfid was called begarha or * two forts ' because of his conquest 
of these two forts Girnar and Champanir. 

2 At the Pipli gate. 

3 A. H. G, f p. 243, 11. 24-25. The fort remained in the possession of 
the Gujratls for another couple of months' or so. 



C 138 3 

Turkey, Turkey had . been friendly to {jujrat, and in 
Mahmud Begarha's reign, the Sultan of Turkey had 
rendered great help to the local fleet in fighting the Portu- 
guese. Bahadur hoped that Turkey would continue its 
generous policy towards him. 

So Asaf Khan left the Indian shores with ten large 
ships each containing 250- men besides the crew, 1 and 
skirting the Persian coast, reached the Kuria Muria islands 
and thence went to Jedda. From there Bahadur's letter 
of appeal for aid and the accompanying gifts were sent to 
Sultan Sulaiman. The Sultan listened to his request and 
decided to comply with it. But on account of the powerful 
resistance by the Portuguese who swarmed the Indian 
Ocean, he could not afford to be hasty. Actually a Turkish 
fleet was sent under Sulaiman Pasha al-Khadim but it 
arrived at the Gujrat coast after Bahadur's death. The 
expedition failed partly because of Sulaiman Pasha's 
cruelties to his own co-religionists and partly because of 
the incompetence of Sultan Mahmud III, (1537-54 A. D.). a 

Bahadur had another difficulty to face, and it was in 
part his own creation. He had inherited a dislike to 
the Portuguese from his predecessors and the Portuguese 
by strengthening the fortifications at Diu 

had & ven him offence - He built a lar g e 
fleet which stood him in good stead when 

the Portuguese attacked him in 1531 A. D. 3 He repulsed 
them and then tried to guard against future attacks by 
forming a combination with some of the Muslim States of 



1 The largest among the boats was called 

, 2 For fuller details see C. H. /., Vol. Ill, pp. 336-37 and Danvers: 
The Portuguese in India. Vol. I, pp. 425-35. The latter seems to have 
made no distinction between the two Sulaimans, one the Sultan of 
Turkey, and the other the Pasha and commander of the fleet. Probably 
Bahadur had not meant that the Turks should fight against the Portuguese 
first. But 5a the time of Mahmud III, they had no other work to do. 

3 iSee the article: Garcia d'Orta of Bombay in /. R. A. S. (B. B.) f 
4-5- It was Malik Tfcghan, Rum* Chan's predecessor, who defended 
against the Portuguese governor, Nuno da Cunha. 



E 139 1 

the south. 1 The Sultan's plan was discovered by the' 
Portuguese and their relations with him grew more strained; 
Now, the Sultan was anxious to take Diu from them or 
reduce their military strength by demolishing the fortifica- 
tions of the island. 

Diu is an island situated in 20 43'N. and 7i2'E. and 

separated from the southern extremity of the peninsula of 

Kathiawad by a narrow channel. 2 East to 

west it is seven miles, and north to south, 

about two, the total area of the island being 20 sq. miles. 

The population in the sixteenth century must have been 

more than 50,000 but now it has dwindled to less than half. 

The fortress, situated at the eastern extremity of the 
island, was an imposing structure, specially after the im- 
provements introduced by Dom Joao de Castro at the 
close of a war with Gujrat in 1545 A. D. 

Owing to the advantages which its position afforded, 
the Portuguese had been fired early with the ambition of 
establishing their mastery over the island. This the Gujrat 
rulers were not prepared to allow. Hence the rupture 
with them. 

It should have been apparent to Bahadur that a 
simultaneous fight on land and at sea on an extensive scale 
could not be carried on against superior enemies. Of his 
enemies, the Mughals were stronger than him on land, and 
the Portuguese at sea, being masters of the Arabian sea. 
So if he had really hoped to receive aid from Sultan 
Sulaiman I of Turkey, it was necessary for him to have 
made peace with the Portuguese by making it clear to 
them that his objective was Delhi and not Diu. Then 
and then alone the Turkish fleet could have reached the 



M. S. foL i6ga, 1. 6, says, 



IJ U 

* Danvers has given in Vol. I a picture of the island opposite p, 400* 



[ 140 ] 

'Indian shore and rendered aid to Bahadur in his wars 
against the Mughals. 1 

Possibly Bahadur had realized his difficulties and so, 
though the Portuguese had transgressed the laws of the 
land by strengthening the fortress walls with stone in place 
of the former wooden palisades, 2 under the treaty of 
December 23, 1534 A. D. 3 at Bassein, 4 between Malik 
Tughan and Nuno da Cunha, 5 he continued to be on 
friendly terms with them. 

From Champanir Bahadur fled to Cambay, 6 a town 
of considerable importance in the sixteenth century, 7 being 
famous for its manufacture of agate, cornelian, and onyx 
ornaments. Sometime back in the port, Bahadur had 
gathered a fleet of 100 warships 8 in order to fight the 
Portuguese but he was now afraid that at his departure 
these might fall into the hands of the Mughals. So he 
burnt them and then passed on to Diu, where four months 
later, a fresh treaty was signed between Bahadur and 
Nuno in October 25, 1535 A. D., by which the surrender 
of Bassein to the Portuguese was confirmed, the Portuguese 
agreeing, in return, to help him on land or at sea 9 against 
the Mughals or Rumi Khan. 10 Before anything more could 



1 We have already pointed out above that when the fleet arrived, 
Mahmud turned it against the Portuguese; for by 1538 A. D. all quarrels 
between the Mughals and the Gujratis had come to an end. 

2 See A. H. G., p. 251, 1. 20 and p. 252, 11. 4-5. Also M. S. 

3 /. A. R. S. B. B. Garcia, p. 205. 

4 Possibly Bahadur's engagement at Chitor gave the Portuguese this 
opportunity* 

5 Malik Tughan had reverted to his old post after Rum! Khan's 
departure. Nuno was Viceroy of Goa from 1529-39 A. D. See the 
Danvers, Vol. I, Ch. XV. 

* According to T. A. and G. H. N. Bahadur went to Cambay via 
Ahmadabad and so did his pursuers. 

Cambay is situated in 22 18' N. and 72 40' E. at the head of the Gulf 
of Cambay/ on the north of the estuary of the river Mahl, 52 miles south 
of Ahamadabad. 

r TJhough in the next, Surat took its place in importance. See 
the Imperial Gazetteer of India under Cambay and Surat. 

See A. H: G., p. 243, 11. 12-13. 
, The Danvers, Vol. I, p. 407. 

* A. H. ., p. 351, L 16 and p. 258, I. i. Banvers thinks that the 
fv<entte of the port of Dia remained with Bahadur. 



C 141 J 



happen, Bahadur's fortune, as we shall presently see, took 
a favourable turn. 

Humayun also reached Cambay in the evening, a 
few hours after Bahadur's departure. 1 At first he an- 
nounced protection to all, and Sayyid Sharif Gilani, 2 the 
governor of the town, showed him consideration befitting 
his royal position. But the good intentions of the king* 
were frustrated by a late night attack organized by 
Malik Ahriiad Lad, a Gujrafi nobleman in alliance with 
the Bhils and Kolis. 3 The attack was so sudden that 
though forewarned by an old woman whose son was a 
captive with the Mughals, they were taken by surprise. 
The poor aboriginal cave-men, who chose to plunder rather 
than make use of opportunity and crush the enemy, helped 
themselves to the loot in the Mughal camp. Abul Fazl 
makes mention of th'e loss of Hatifi's poem entitled the 
Tlmur-nama, transcribed by Sultan All and illustrated by 
Bihzad. 4 It has later on recovered. 

After the first surprise was over, it was easy for the 
disciplined Mughal troops to disperse and kill the raiders. 
Humayiin then grew fierce and took a savage revenge on 
the innocent inhabitants of the place 5 and for three days, 
he allowed the town to be sacked by his followers without 
any restriction. It was at this time that the two distinguish- 
ed captives, Sadr Khan and Jam Firuz, the ex-ruler of 
thatha, were done away with. 

At Cambay, Humayiin halted. His conquest now 
extended up to the very land's end and he seems to have 
reflected on the following lines: 

(a) Except for the solitary fort of Champanir, the 
whole of the central Gujrat had come into his possession. 

1 A. T. W. H. G., p. 19. . 

2 A. T. W. H. G., p. 20. Sharif prevented his slave from carrying 
out his project of killing the few Mughal darbaris in Humayun's court by 
gathering trie excited mob of the city. 

3 A. H. G., p. 244, calls them rough people, who lived in caves, 
wore no shoes and hardly any clothes, but went well-armed. 

4 See Beveridge's comments in A. N. (tr.), p. 309 n. 2. 

* See A. T. W. H. G., p. 21 and Commissariat's article. 



C 

(b) Sultan Bahadur Shah was now a beggar and had 
placed himself at the mercy of the Portuguese, and as no 
amity was possible between the two, the Sultan and the 
Portuguese, he should pay no more attention to Bahadur. 

(c) What was next needed was the consolidation of his 
conquests and completion of the occupation of the central 

'Gujrat by capturing Champanir and organizing its civil 
administration. These measures would mollify the people. 
He must rear his political edifice on the goodwill of the 
people. 

(d) He had been told of the enormous treasures of 
Champanir, and it would be prudent on his part to stop 
all other work and concentrate his whole attention on the 
capture of the place and its riches. 

(e) Having driven a wedge between the north and 
south Gujrat, he would be able to subjugate either part at 
his leisure. 

So Humayun left Bahadur to his fate, and turned to 
complete his conquest by the capture of Champanir 1 about 
the beginning of July 1535 A. D. All this time, a Mughal 
contingent lay encamped there, maintaining a nominal 
siege. When Humayun reached there, steps were taken 
to complete the cordon of investing troops and prevent 
the garrison from getting any supplies. The thorough 
siege did not produce appreciable effect for some time; 
for the besieged garrison led by their two leaders, Ikhtiyar 
Klhan and Nar Singh Deo, offered a vigorous resistance. 
They possessed powerful guns also, 2 worked by celebrated 
gunners. 3 The siege dragged on for more than two 

1 G. H, N. says that from Cambay Humayfcn went to Baroda and 
next to Champanir. But she gives no reason tot his journey to Baroda. 

a A. T. W. H. G., p. 22, says that iron balls of x, 2 or 3 mans were 
tided. If man would indicate the weight of Shah Jahan's time, then 
Dora's guns used at Qandah&r in 1653 A. D. were less powerful than 
these Gujratt guns at Champanir. 

* E .* the achievements of Scott, See A. H. G., p. 234, 1. 21 and 
M. S. fof. ifya, 1. 4. Erskine calls him San Jago. Notice also how Hum! 
Jjpian repaired one of Bah&dur's guns, shortened the barrel and fired to 
A longer distance. See A. H. G., p. 234 and M. $. 1635, 1. 13. 



[ 143 ] 

months. 1 At last Nar Singh Deo, the actual organizer 
of the defence died % 2 Ikhtiyar IJhan was left alone and 
though he was more of a scholar 3 than of a soldier, he 
doggedly continued the defence. Suddenly, fortune favour- 
ed Humayun. He discovered how through a jungly and 
unfrequented path near Halol in the west, the wild men 
of the neighbourhood supplied food to the garrison. He 
realized that it would not be possible for the Mughal soldiers 
to imitate these wild denizens of the fort by clambering 
up the inaccesible path to a height of 60 or 70 yards. So 
Humayun got 70 or 80 large nails driven into the wall at 
midnight to the right and left of the ascent at distances of 
a yard or so. Since the place was far away from the 
main quarters of the garrison, situated in the east, and 
moreover as it was considered inaccessible, no sentries 
had been placed there to guard against a surprise attack 
from that direction. The Mughals used the nails as rungs 
of a ladder, and about 300 of the escaladers including 
Humayun who was the 4ist, got to the top of the fort. At 
the same time a fierce artillery fire was opened to distract 
the enemy. The Mughal attack succeeded and Ikhtiyar 
Khan retreated to the citadel, Pavagarh, in the east. 
Humayun who had some respect for the commandant's 
learning, granted him easy terms, and allowed him either 
to stay with him or to return to Bahadur. Ikhtiyar sur- 
rendered and stayed with Humayun. The date of the fall 
of Champanir is given in a chronogram both by Abul 
Fazl and by Badauni. The former has JM &* *Iia Jjf ' the 
first week of the month of safar' which according to Abjad 



1 A. N. t p. 137, says the siege lasted for four months which might 
be correct; for it started in Zulqada and ended in Safar of the next year, 
942 A. D. We do not think that the siege dragged on for more than a 
year as Beveridge suggests. The author of A. T. W. H. G., whose father 
and uncle were eye-witnesses and who himself was a high official in Gujrat 
in Akbar's time, says that the siege lasted for ' 3 or 4 months/ 

* See A. H. G., p. 235, 11. 5-7, for Bahadur's praise for him. He 
calls Nar Singh ' the man of the fort.' 

, a#. S. has ty/tA> v^**} f&i&Jy* *&**)* See also 4. T. 
W.'H. G., p. 21. A. ft. G., p. 245, 11. 17-19. 



gives the year 942 A. H. 1 The latter gives 
(the date of capture) was gth Safar/ -The year works out 
to be 942 A. H. Of these two chronograms, giving slightly 
different dates, we think Abul Fazl's to be more correct. 
The day of capture has been given by a third writer, Abu 
Turab Wali, to be a Friday. 2 He is a reliable writer; for 
his father and his uncle were present, as we have seen, in 
the Gujrat campaign, and Turab also was an honoured 
official in Akbar's time. Hence 6th Safar 942 A. H., 3 
being a Friday, would be a more correct date than gth 
Safar of Badaum's. 

Ikhtiyar Khan later on explained to Humayun that 
the resistance of the Gujrati garrison might have been 
further prolonged if only his conscience had approved of it. 
His hesitation was due to the fact that he could not discover 
any canonical decree which would give a clear verdict in 
favour of either the continuation of war or the abandon- 
ment of hostilities, when the surrounding districts were 
already in the possession of a Muslim king. 4 Humayun 
must have appreciated the subtleties of the problem, him- 
self being a man of erudition. 5 

Thus Humayun concluded his conquest of central 
Gujrat. 

The several events narrated in this chapter may be 
chronologically stated here : 

(a) Bahadur's flight from Mandasor 

2ist Shawwdl, 941 A. H. = 25th April, 1535 A. D. 
(6) Sadr Khan's arrival at Mandu 

27th Shawwdl, 941 A. H. ^ ist May, 1535 A. D. 

1 We see no reason why ** should be read ^* as suggested 
by Beveridge. The capture of Champanir took place after a siege of 2 
or 3 months in 942 A. H. and not 943 A. H. Both A. N. and A. T. W. 
H. G. support our statement. 



* P. 24 * 

3 =6th August, 1535 A. D. 

* J.1U #Uob refers to Humayun, 

5 ^f. S, fol. i6ia says that the author's father was in charge of the 
royal library. From him he had learnt that the king never rested from 
the study of books, neither had his father any rest. The words are 



C 145 ] 

(c) Humayun's arrival at Nalcha 

2nd Zulqada, 941 A. H. =5th May, 1535 A. D. 

(d) Bahadur's arrival at Mandu 

i6th Zulqada, 941 A. H. = igth May, 1535 A. D. 

(e?) Bahadur's flight from Mandu 

28th Zulqada, 941 A. H. = ist June, 1535 A. D. 

(/) Bahadur's arrival at Champanlr 

7th Zulhtjj, 941 A. H. =9th June, 1535 A. D. 

(g) Humayun's arrival at Champamr 

nth Zulhijj, 941 A. H. = i3th June, 1535 A. D. 

(h) Bahadur's flight from Champamr, followed by Humayun 

i3th Zulhij], 941 A. H. = i5th June, 1535 A. D. 



(i) Humayun's return to Champamr 

29th ZuUntf, 941 A. H. = ist July, 1535 A. D. 



(;) The fall of Champamr 

6th Safar, 942 A. H. =6th August, 1535 A. D. 



10 



CHAPTER XIII 

HUMAYCN AT CHAMPANIR FALL OF AHMADA- 

BAD THE MUGHAL ADMINISTRATION 

OFGUJRAT, 1535 A. D. 

After the fall of Champanir, Humayun stayed his 
career of conquest for a while. Two reasons can be 
assigned for this pause : 

(a) As a result of his campaigns during the last ten 
months practically the whole of Malwa and central Gujrat 
had come into his possession. He now thought that it 
would be wiser for him to suspend all military activities 
and to mollify and concilate the people by giving them a 
sound system of civil administration. A successful ad- 
ministration, he thought, would automatically reduce the 
rest of the Gujrat kingdom to submission and loyalty; for 
the province was in a state of flux, its ruler a forlorn fugi- 
tive at Diu and its jagtrdars biding their time; and 
in such circumstances the good will of the people was the 
only thing needed to make the whole of Gujrat his own. 

(b) At Champamr, Humayun got possession of a huge 
mass of wealth belonging to Sultan Bahadur. He had now 
to distribute a portion of it among his followers, and 
preserve carefully the rest for future State needs. The 
wealth made him forget about the campaigns. 

Some of Humayun's followers, however, flushed with 
a series of military successes, did not want to stop short of 
their victorious career. They decided that if their king 
would not lead them, they would do without him. They 
counted about 400 in number, formed a plan for the con- 
quest of the Deccan and at the end of a state banquet in the 
gardens of Halol, 1 departed to carry out their ill-conceived 
scheme. 

1 A suburb of ChSmpanlr, at its western extremity. 



[ 147 1 

When he was told of their scheme Humayun grew 
indignant, and his indignation was not without reason. 

Firstly, no permission had been obtained from him 
for the expedition, and he was unaware of its definite 
objective. As king, he was responsible ior the safety of 
his followers, and he resented being overridden in this way. 
Any unnecessary sacrifice of human lives would make him 
unpopular in his kingdom and make it difficult for him to 
enlist recruits in future. 1 

Secondly, indisciplinary conduct such as this would 
demoralize the Mughals, encamped, as they were, far from 
their homes in a country which yet remained unsubdued. 

Thirdly, the conduct of the four hundred nobles would 
very likely lower the prestige of the Mughals because 
their wild scheme, started in ignorance and without 
sufficient support, might fail * and endanger their safety. 
In passing, we may briefly describe here what the 
scheme was. The Akbar-nama mentions the conquest 
of the Deccan as the objective of the nobles who prob- 
ably wanted to conquer one of the Muslim States into 
which the Bahmani kingdom had split up. If they meant 
to conquer any of the four States of Ahmadnagar, Gol- 
conda, Bidar, and Berar, it would appear that such a 
scheme was too audacious and difficult of realization; for 
each of them was governed by an efficient and capable 
ruler. 2 A defeat at the hands of any of them would prove 
disastrous to the Mughal cause in the Deccan. Bijapur, 
perhaps, was the State they had determined on, because it 
had been in a state of chaos since 1534 A. D. Ismail Adil 



1 Cf . Ikhtlyar-ud-dln Muhammad bin Bayitiyar was extremely un- 
popular after his failure in Assam. See the Tabaqat-i-N&siri. (Buhar 
library copy No. 3587), p. 156. Firuz Tughluq and the people of Delhi 
grieved the death of thousands of followers in Bengal and Sindh. 

a Ahmadnagar was ruled by Burhan Nizam Shah i59-53 A. D. 

Golconda was ruled by Qutb Shah 1502-43 A. D. 

Bidar was ruled by Amir AH Barid 1504-42 A. D. 

r Berar was ruled by Darya Imad Shah 1529-62 A. D. 

Thus every one of them had ruled prosperously, for more than thirty 
years. ^ , 



I 148 ] 

Shah had died in that year and had been succeeded by 
Mallu, tiis eldest son. But as he was a shameless 
debauchee, he was deposed by the chief minister, Asad 
Khan, in favour of the next brother, Ibrahim, in March 
1535 A. D. 1 But it was not possible for the Mughals to 
reach Bijapur by land without passing through some of 
the other prosperous States. 2 Moreover, none of the five 
Muslim States had given any provocation to the Mughals, 
and it would therefore be against all canon of Mughal 
diplomacy and public morality to attack a Muslim kingdom 
simply in an aggressive spirit. 3 

Humayun had to prevent the expedition to the south 
which was about to be undertaken with little knowledge of 
the geography of the country. He determined to punish 
the nobles for their defection in much the same spirit in 
which his father would have done in similar circumstances. 
Accordingly, as soon as Humayun heard of the dis- 
appearance of the four hundred nobles from among his 
followers, he sent ten thousand troops to discover them, 
and force them to return. The troops carried out the 
instructions and brought back the desperadoes a motley 
group of ' book-bearers, armour bearers, ink-horn bearers, 
and the like/ Humayun who was never a statesman, 
inflicted sanguinary punishments on these pseudo-adven- 
turers. Some were beheaded or trampled under elephant's 
feet, while others suffered the loss of their noses, ears, or 
limbs. When one considers together the crime committed 
and the insignificant position of the criminals, one is 
inclined to agree with Erskine 4 who condemns Humayun 
for his barbarous punishments. But at the same time one 



1 See Haig's articles in the Indian Antiquary of 1920 A. D. on the 
Nizam Shdhl kings of Ahmadnagar. 

2 See C. H. /., Vol. Ill, map facing p. 432, showing the distribution 
of the five kingdoms. 

3 The Mughals freely attacked the Hindu States, e.g., Babur attacked, 
Medini Rao of Chanderl, Humayun the Raja of Kalinjar, Akbar Rani 
Durgavati of Chauragarh; but they did not attack a Muslim State with- - 
out some tangible cause. 

* See Erskine: th* History of India, Volume II (Humayfln), p. 69. 



C 149 ] 

would not accuse Humayun of such a revolting levity as 
Abul Fazl has treated the whole matter with. 1 

It was sunset by the time the miscreants had been 
punished. During the maghrib or sunset prayers, the 
Imam, righteously indignant, read, at the end of the first 
genuflexion, the chapter of the Quran, entitled the Elephant 
( cU*Jl ). 2 The Imam, probably desired to impress upon 
the hearers the sanctity of the Kaba as much as the tyranny 
inflicted by the rich delinquents. But his selection of the 
chapter was unfortunate ; for the expression ' the possessors 
of the elephant ' was taken by Humayun to be a reference to 
himself and in a temper as he was, he immediately after 
the prayers were over, ordered that the Imam be trampled 
to death by an elephant. Mauldna Muhammad Farghali 
interceded for the Imam but in vain. 3 Later, after the 
Imam was dead, Humayun, in his cooler moments 
realized that he had been hasty in his judgment and had 
punished an innocent though foolish man. 4 

Thus Humayun did not start his work of restoring 
order to Gujrat under happy auspices. The Imam's death 
and the sufferings of four hundred men must have cast a 
gloom on his followers. In order to buoy them up he 



1 We may be excused for quoting a few of Abul Fazl's lines given on 
140 



i * t3ix& 1$ O^JOJ ( OJOo IJV O J *JU JUru d&.U& (} \\ 



tlai. J 



2 It is one of the shortest chapters and may be quoted here in full : 

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful 

(1) Have you not considered how your Lord dealt with the 

possessors of the elephant? 

(2) Did he not cause their war to end in confusion? 

(3) And send down (to prey) upon them birds in flocks, 

(4) Casting them against hard stones, 

(5) So He rendered them like straw eaten up. 

3 Not because, as Erskine suggests, that the king 'was probably still 
labouring under the effects of his previous excesses.' 

4 If there was any allusion to the recent executions it was to the just 
retributions that visited these ' possessors of the elephant/ meaning the 
desperadoes. But HumSytln misunderstood the reference by attributing it 
to himself. 



[ 150 ] 

distributed some portion of the large store of wealth of 
Gujrat at Champamr. In order to save time, the distribu- 
tion was conducted with the help of a pair of scales or 
a shield. 

Humayun was not much of a loser by this extra- 
vagance; for he obtained other stores of treasures from 
sources disclosed by Alam Khan 1 of Dhandhuka. 2 A large 
cistern, when drained of its water, was found to be full of 
gold, and a well when similarly treated, yielded gold and 
silver bars. Humayun, recklessly generous like his father, 
divided the wealth of the cistern among his followers. 
He might have justified his liberality on the grounds that 
he was emulating the example of his august father; 3 
that he hoped his followers would be encouraged thereby; 
and that there were other hoards of treasures available for 
the State use. 

Some critics, however, have charged Humayun with 
a feckless extravagance and condemned his action on the 
followirig grounds : 

(a) Although he might have regarded the rewards as 
an atonement for his injudicious punishments, 
actually no wrong can be righted by the com- 
mission of another wrong or indiscretion. 
(6) Any unearned reward debases the recipient. An 
indiscriminate distribution in shieldful would 
put the zealous and the lazy on the same footing 
with the consequence that the efficiency of the 
army would suffer. 

() A large acquisition of wealth during the progress 
of a campaign adversely affects the morale of 
an army and leads to debauchery and other 
vices. In a modern army the possession by 
soldiers in active service, of large amounts of 
wealth is discouraged. 

1 This Alain Khan is a different personage from the two Alam Khans 
mentioned above. 

2 In Kathrawad. Situated in 22*23' N. and 71*59' E. 

9 Who had squandered the wealth of Agra on the Muslims of the 
western world. See S. N*, pp. 522-23. 



(d) The people of the province must have resented 
this reckless waste of Gujrat wealth. 

So far as the people of the province were concerned, 
Humayun's specific act of kindness to them consisted in 
forgoing the' land-revenue to enable the farmers to repair 
their fortunes. But his motive went unappreciated. The 
Gujrafi villagers sent in deputation their elders to suggest 
to Sultan Bahadur to send some one to collect the revenue 
that was due to the government. This is a significant fact 
in several ways: 

Firstly, it is a remarkable illustration of the honesty 
of the people. They did not want to deprive the govern- 
ment of its legitimate income. 

Secondly, though Humayun considered Bahadur's 
cause a lost one and abandoned his pursuit, the Gujrat 
people had not lost faith in their ruler and sent him, of their 
own accord, resources to enable him to mend his fortune. 

Thirdly, the people of Gujrat could not tolerate the 
idea of their rich country's merging in the larger kingdom 
of Delhi; for then the importance of the larger towns of 
Gujrat 1 would diminish. 

Fourthly, the people did not want that the resources 
of Gujrat should be utilized elsewhere in the Mughal king- 
dom. If the province maintained its separate entity, its 
wealth would benefit the Gujratis alone. 

Lastly, as most of the elders were Hindus, this deputa- 
tion bears a remarkable testimony to the loyalty 
of the Hf&du subjects to their Sultan. One would not 
expect so much devotion from them to the Sultan who 
had destroyed the Hindus of Raisen and of Chitor. But, 
probably they preferred a Gujrati Sultan to the foreign 
Mughals. The loyalty of the Hindus may be explained, 
on the one hand, by the solicitude of the Sultan for the wel- 
fare of his subjects, and on the other, by the fact that the 
Gujrat Hindus formed a separate body, having no concern 

1 The antiquarian researches of the archaeological department amply 
prove this importance from the rich remains of the various towns of 
Gujrat. 



L 152 ] 

with the Hindus of the other parts of the country. Hence 
their unflinching loyalty to Bahadur Shah. Sultan Bahadur, 
who even now was in Diu, could not for some time accept 
the offer of the deputation for want of a suitable nobleman 
who would undertake the task of the collection of land- 
revenue. But at last, Imad-ul-Mulk came forward to do 
the work on condition that no-one would question him 
how he spent the revenue realized or distributed jdgirs 
among his followers* The condition was accepted and Imad- 
ul-Mulk met with an immediate success. He had started 
with seventy followers but by the time he reached Ahmada- 
bad, the band increased to 10,000 and a little later it swelled 
to 30,000 men. What large sums of money he had to 
spend on the collection of any army may be understood from 
the remark in the Akbar-nama, that each pair of horses cost 
him a lakh of Gujrafi tankas. Help came also from other 
quarters, e.g., Mujahid Khan of Junagarh 1 came with 
10,000 soldiers. Humayun could not but notice this omin- 
ous move on the part of Imad-ul-Mulk, so he also moved 
forward. Imad, a brave commander as he was, did not 
wish to remain cooped up in Ahmadabad, and suffer as his 
master, Bahadur, had suffered at Mandasor. The battle was 
fought at Mahmudabad. 2 Imad opened the attack and 
drove away Askari who was in charge of the van-guard; 
but later on, other commanders, e.g., Yadgar Nasir Mirza, 
Hindu Beg, and Qasim Husain Khan, arrived with large 
contingents, and Imad was utterly defeated. When Huma- 
yun arrived to inspect the field, he found some 4^00 Gujrat 
soldiers lying stretched on the field, and also that his own 
casualty list was a long one. Such a fiercely-contested 



1 Jftnagarh, situated in 2i2i' N. and 7o36' E, near Girnar hills is 
one of the ancient and picturesque towns of India. The present town 
known as Mustafabad was founded <by Mahmud Begarha. 

2 The name of the battlefield is given by Farishta and the battle has 
been described by T. A. on p. 198. Nizamuddin's father was actually 
present on the battlefield. See also Commissariat's article. 

The town, commonly spelt MehmadSbad, is situated 17 miles south- 
east of Ahmadabad and contains the tomb of Mahmud Begarha 's minister, 
Mubarak Sayyid. Fergusson has extravagantly praised the tomb. See 
Burgess: The AwhiUrtural Antiquities of Western India, p. 69. 



[ 153 1 

battle could not be repeated. So Humayun was anxious 
to know whether the last battle had been fought or others 
were going to follow. He was considerably relieved when 
he was assured by Khudawand Khan, the aged minister, 
that since Imad had commanded in person at the battle 
of Mahmudabad, it might be presumed no other battles 
would be fought at least under Imad's leadership. 

Since the Gujrat army had been shattered, the capital, 
Ahmadabad, 1 lay at the feet of the Mughals. But Humayun 
avoided an immediate entry; for he feared, as pointed out 
by Askari, that it might lead to a wholesale plunder of the 
town. The Mughal army halted on the first day at Kan- 
kariya tdl, about a mile to the south-east, and the next 
day moved on to Sarkhej, 2 and on the third halted at 
Batwa. 3 Askari had, however, been ordered to enter the 
capital and protect the inhabitants. At Batwa, Humayun 
was shown, at Hazrat Qutb-ul-Alam's tomb, 4 the relic of the 
saint's miracle known among the populace as j+*j jt) *jJ 
i.e., 'iron, wood and stone* all in one. That Humayun 
was not anxious to enter the Gujrat capital at once is clear 
from his march for these three days. Instead of pushing 
on north-west for another mile from Kankariya idl t he went 
to Sarkhej and then turned south-east. The following 
sketch will make our point clear. 

With the fall of Ahmadabad, the second stage of the 
conquest of Gujrat was completed, the first having ended 
with the fall of Champanir. The peninsula of Kathiawad 



1 The glories of Ahmadabad have been described in ' The Muham- 
madan Architecture of Ahmadabad ' 2 volumes by Burgess. Situated in 
23 2' N. and 7235' E., it is said to have contained 900,000 souls in the 
days of its prosperity. It was founded by Ahmad Shah (1411-43 A. D.) 
on the site of the older city of Asawal. According to Parish ta, it con- 
tained 360 wards. 

2 Situated about 5 miles south-west of Ahmadabad, It contains the 
tombs of Mahmud Begarha and Shaikh Ahmad Khattri. 

3 Situated 6 miles south of Ahmadabad. 

4 Qutb-ul-Alam died in 1543 A. D, He was a Bukhara Sayyid. The 
genealogy of the Bukhara Sayyids has been given in ' Ahmadabad Archi- 
tecture/ Part II by Burgess on p. 15. * 



[ 154 3" 

other districts on the south-east yet remained to be 
Conquered; but Humayun did not consider the comple- 



Ahmadlbid 



ScAto out milt 



Sarkhaj 




Batwft 



tion of the conquest to be as necessary as the partition of 
the conquered province among his nobles. 

He began with Askari whose prudence in not entering 
the town on the first day after the victory at Mahmudabad 
had pleased him. He therefore made him his viceroy, 
with headquarters at Ahmadabad 1 and Hindu Beg as his 
adviser. Other postings were : 

Names of persons. Name of the place or 

places where posted. 

i) Yadgar Nasir M. ... Patan. 3 

'2) Qasim Husain Khan Broach, 3 Surat and Navasari. 4 

(3) Dost Beg Ishaq Aqa Baroda and Cambay. 

(4) Mir Bachka Bahadur Mahmudabad. 

(5) Tardi Beg ... Champanlr. 

1 Why at Ahmadabad is explained by Farishta in these words 



But Jahanglr, a widely-travelled king, gives quite a contrary opinion 
itt his memoirs. See the Memoirs of Jahdnglr by Rogers and Beveridge, 
VoL II, p. 13. 

f Known at first as Anhilwara and later on as Nehrwara or Nahrwala 
situated i^i 235*' N. and 72 10' E. 

3 For interesting details of Broach, Cambay, and Champimr, among 
other books, may be consulted Burgess: Muhammadan Architecture of 
Bharoach, Cambay, Dholka, Champanir, and Mahmfiddabad in Gujrat. 
' f Navsari situate4 la 20*57' K. and 75*56' E. is an and*+ *nwti AS\A 
;waa the headquarterB of the Pareees in. mediaeval India. 



C 155 ] 

We may briefly indicate the special features of the 
arrangement : 

(a) Humayun did not set apart any land as khdlsa or 

crown-land. 

(b) He put Mirza Askari in charge of the administra- 

tion with almost plenary powers. 

This was what Kamran also had possessed. Such an 
autonomous system of Mughal administration in Gujrat, he 



Pitan 




hoped, would be in keeping with the parochial instinct of 
the Gujratis and would also ensure the Mughal hold on the 
province. He further hoped that the arrangement would 
provide against the efforts that might be madfe in future 
for the resuscitation of, Bahadur's s6vereignty . 



[ 156 ] 

(c) In the allotment of territories Humayun had 
neglected Kathiawad and the eastern districts of the pro- 
vince. The desire for controlling the coast arose from the 
large sea-borne trade that flowed through the Gujrat ports. 
If time had allowed, he would have extended the Mughal 
influence over Kathiawad coast-land also. For the present 
he desired to avoid a contact with the eastern neighbours, 
and so let the eastern districts alone. 

Humayiin now turned to Malwa; for there, too, he had 
to introduce some system of administration. We have 
seen how his measures at Mandu had alienated the people 
from him. He hoped that now he would be able to make 
amends for his past blunders. 

When he reached there, he found the province seeth- 
ing with discontent and disaffection. Three prominent 
chiefs of Malwa, Mallu Khan of Mandu 1 one of Bahadur's 
henchmen, Sikandar of Satwas 2 , and Mihtar Zambur of 
Handia, 3 had combined to attack the Mughal garrison under 
Darwesh All Kitabddr posted at Ujjain. The commandant 
persisted in the defence till he was killed in one of the 
skirmishes. Then the survivors retreated towards the 
approaching king's army. 

The first thing Humayun had now to do was to re- 
cover his lost territories in Malwa. Judiciously he selected 
Mandu as his headquarters depriving Mallu Khan of the 
local influence and threatening the other two rebellious 
chiefs by its nearness to their headquarters. 

But could not a still better arrangement than the king's 
stay in Malwa be thought of? Let us briefly review the 
conditions prevailing in north India. We notice two signi- 
ficant facts: 

One was the rebellion of the Mirzas, that is Muham- 
mad Sultan Mirza, his sons, and grandsons, in the Agra 
district. It had spread, sometime, as far east as Oudh. 

1 Situated in 2232' l^fand 7 6 *43' E - Under the Mughals it formed 
a mahal in the Sarkdr nrilyyrth in the subah of Malwa. 

2 On the southern ^H^^ *h e Narbada about 15 miles e. s. e. of 

3 Handia would be lel|||han 100 miles from Mandfi and Satwas much 
nearer. 




[ 157 ] 

The other was the rapid rise 
vantage of Humayun's pre-oc 
Sher Khan had turned to 
Surajgarh (1534 A. D.), and 
Mungir. 

In such circumstances, wa^M^docious onthOji^ of 
Humayun to confine his atterAjT fl^M^^a^^e and 
neglect the more important part o^(Xld^g(|^<?/ -tie had 
two very good alternatives to act upon?** dtftr he should 
have restored Bahadur to Gujrat as his deputy and an- 
nexed Malwa to the Delhi kingdom, Chitor, no doubt 
regaining its independence ; l or he should have apportioned 
Malwa too among the Mughal and the Malwa nobles and 
made his fourth brother, Hindal, its Viceroy, just as he had 
appointed Askari, Viceroy of Gujrat. Then, freed from the 
worries of the settlement of the newly conquered provinces, 
Humayun would have had leisure to return to Agra and aim 
at the restoration of political equilibrium in north India. If 
this course had been adopted, there would have been no 
cause for the dissatisfaction shown by Hindal later on, 
nor could Sher Khan have had any opportunity of growing 
so powerful as to portend danger first to Bengal and then 
to the Mughal kingdom itself. 

Humayun's return to Malwa had one salutary effect: 
it immediately quieted the situation. 2 He sent for his 
seraglio and proposed an indefinite stay there. It is very 
likely that if he had had the opportunity of a longer stay 
there, he would have inspired loyalty among the people 
by his benignant administration and amiable disposition. 
But his hopes were not realized; and a few months 
later he had to depart for Agra. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, Malwa and Gujrat went out of hand 
soon after his departure. 



1 Jauhar approves of this policy. The Tazkirat-ul-Waqiat (B. M. 
Add. 16711) has 



As A. N. on p. 142, puts 



CHAPTER XIV 

RECOVERY OF GUJRAT BY SULTAN BAHADUR 

SHAH, AND RETREAT OF HUMAYtJN FROM 

MALWA, 1535-36 A. D. 

For three months after Humayun's departure from 
Gujrat, there was peace in the province. 1 There was an 
opportunity for the Mughals of displaying their constructive 
ability by giving the people an intelligent and systematic 
government. But Askari and his merry companions, 
however, indulged in a series of riotous banquets and 
other festivities which became the fashion among the 
lesser nobles and officials. This frivolity among the 
Mughals demoralized the tone of the civil administration. 
No one took his duties seriously. Dissatisfied with the 
Mughals, the Gujrafe seriously thought of making an 
effort for the restoration of their king, Bahadur Shah. If 
the Mughals had endeavoured to bring about such reforms 
as would have proved conducive to the well-being of their 
subjects, they not only would not have lost some of their 
territories but would have acquired some more, and estab- 
lished their hold on the affections of the people. 2 But 
they denied themselves this opportunity, and the disaffec- 
tion against them grew apace. 

The disaffection started at Navsari where Abdullah 
Khan governed as Qasim Husain Sultan's agent. The 
Gujrafi rebels led by Nuruddln Khan Jahan of Shiraz and 
Rum! Khan Safar, the builder of the fort of Surat, occupied 
Navsari as well as Surat, so that Abdullah Khan had to 
retreat to Broach. Qasim Husain, alarmed at the strength 



i See A. N.> p. 142. 

3 It is thus that the earlvf 'Muslim empire had spread to the remotest 
corners of north India atilne beginning of the thirteenth century as 
would be dear from a pettBt of tfce Tabaq 



[ 15,9 1 

of the enemy's force, retreated immediately to Champanir, 
sixty-five miles further north, and thence to Ahmadabad; 
for those who had started from Navsari, the total distance 
covered during the retreat was more than a hundred and 
fifty miles. How the Mughals had deteriorated may be 
inferred from this continuous retreat. Qasim Husain Sultan, 
the chief commander, was a relation of Humayun, having 
descended from -the illustrious Sultan Husain Baiqara, 1 
and had rendered distinguished service at the battle 
of Khanwah as commander of the right wing, and had 
been granted the coveted governorship of Badaun. A man 
with such a record beat a hasty retreat ! It was an indi- 
cation of the general panic that had overtaken the Mughals. 

The other retreats were those of Dost Beg from Cambay 
and Yadgar Nasir Mirza from Patan.* Both of them 
joined Askari, so that except Champanir where the 
indomitable Tardi Beg 2 held on, the Mughal^ had eva- 
cuated all other places which were immediately occupied 
by Sultan Bahadur's men. How hasty some of the eva- 
cuations were is apparent from the fact related by most 
of the writers, that two of Bahadur's loyal nobles Darya 
Khan and Muhafiz Khan whilst passing by Patan on their 
way back from their posts at Raisen, found the place empty 
of the Mughals, stayed there, and informed Bahadur that 
Patan had been recovered. It is a surprise that Humayun, 
who was much nearer the place than these officials of 
Raisen, made no efforts to save Patan or any other town 
lately under the Mughal occupation. 

The Mughals in Gujrat and in Malwa now stayed in the 
three headquarters, Ahmedabad, Champanir, and Mandu, 
lying at distances of 70 and 120 miles from each other. 
Considering that Babur's outposts were sometimes fixed at 



1 See B. N., pp. 550 and 556. Qasim Husain's genealogy may be 
indicated thus: 

Sultan Husain Baiqara 

Ayisha Sultan BSgamQSsim Sultan Shaibanl 
I 
Husain Sultan 



[ x6o ] 

much greater distances from his base, Kabul, e.g., Bhira in 
1519 A. D. and Sialkot and Lahore in 1525 A. D., it should 
not have been impossible for Humayun to station the 
Mughal forces at the three places, and re-occupy gradually 
the recently lost territories. But the demoralization 
amongst the Mughals made it impossible for them to hit 
upon any constructive and fruitful scheme of reoccupation. 

What was wrong with the Mughals ? 

(1) As mentioned above, the Mughal headquarters at 
Ahmadabad could not control and co-ordinate the activities 
of the different officials in the different districts, which 
alone could have borne down the less belligerent but more 
united Gujratls. 

(2) The riotous life led by Askari and his merry friends 
had a disintegrating effect. It led, on the one hand, to 
mutual strife and bickerings; on the other, to disrespect 
for the Viceroy from the only district commander now left, 
namely, Tardi Beg. 

To illustrate how deeply these private squabbles had 
affected the situation, we shall refer to the following 
incident. 1 One evening, in a banquet, while wine was in 
free circulation, Askari, completely drunk, stated that he 
was the Shadow of God ( Jb\J>& ) meaning a king. Gazan- 
far, who was his foster-brother and companion for years 
together, jokingly whispered to the next 'you are, only 
just now you are drunk,' ( ^Ji~* (j!>if*>j* (J^*)- All 
those sitting near-by, burst into laughter. Askari being at 
some distance, could not follow the joke, and when it was 
explained to him, got furious and threw Gazanfar into 
prison. When the latter saw that the prince's rage was 
persisting, he escaped to Bahadur, told him that the 
Mughals were thinking of retreating from Gujrat, and sug- 
gested that that was the most suitable opportunity for an 
attack on them. 

i See r. A. (N. K. Te^jC p. 19$. 

3 The RaUMt-ut-TtJ&l&luu a slightly different form. 



Still worse was the attitude of Hindu Beg. It was on 
account of his long service under the Mughal kings, 1 and 
his varied experience that Humayun had chosen him as 
Askari's adviser. But Hindu Beg acted very unwisely; 
for he advised Askari, sometime before the incident, to 
assume sovereignty by reading khutbah and issuing coins 
in his name. Hindu Beg might have had some political 
reasons for his suggestion, namely, the desire of satisfying 
the Gujratis who desired to have a king of their own, who 
would maintain the integrity of the Gujrat kingdom. But 
was he not aware that Askari would never make a good 
ruler? Could Askari have really maintained himself in- 
dependently of Delhi? 2 It must be remembered that 
Central Asia or Afghanistan usually supplied recruits to 
Kamran, Humayun, Sher Khan, or Mahmud Shah of 
Bengal. Gujrat usually recruited from the other Muslim 
countries, e.g., Egypt, Arabia, and Eastern Africa. These 
recruits were no match for the more robust and skilled 
fighters of the north. If Bahadur with all his ability and 
devoted loyalty of his subjects could not make a stand 
against Humayun, could the frivolous Askari, far removed 
as he was from the real seats of Mughal power and counting 
mostly on doubtful local support, withstand the onslaughts 
of Delhi ? Tardi Beg was prudent enough to foresee the 
futility of the suggestion, and decided to oppose it. He 
wanted Humayun alone to be the sovereign of the Mughals 
and all others to be subordinate to him. 

The only result of Hindu Beg's suggestion was to con- 
fuse Mirza Askari, who no doubt rejected Hindu Beg's 



1 Dating as far back as 1500 A. D., see B. N. t p. 122. He had been 
in Humayun' s service since 1526 A. D. 

2 Is it possible that Hindu Beg did not want Askari to sever all 
connexions with Delhi or to act in hostility to Humayun' s interests? High- 
sounding titles were sometimes adopted by chiefs who were by no means 
wholly independent. The rulers of Khandesh and Ahmadnagar, though 
entitled Shah, were subordinate to Sultan Bahadur. Kamran, as we have 
mentioned above, used the titles of Bddshdh and Ghdzi but was really 
subordinate to the ruler of Delhi. If this is what Hindu Beg desired 
Askari to do, would the measure have satisfied the Gujratis; also why was 
Tardi Beg hostile to Askari? 



advice but still continued to ruminate on it. It never 
assumed a practical shape and the majority of the Mughals 
heard nothing more than a vague rumour. 

To sum up our conclusions : Hindu Beg suggested to 
Askari to become independent of Delhi in order to rally 
the Gujratis round the prince, but the incapable Askari 
was unfit for the task, and so he rejected the suggestion, but 
continued to dream of it till on a festive occasion he gave 
expression to his dreams, which led to the unreasonable im- 
prisonment of Gazanfar, his flight, and transfer of allegiance 
to Bahadur; and which raised in Tardi Beg's mind a 
suspicion that Askari had accepted Hindu Beg's sugges- 
tion. Naturally Tardi Beg decided to oppose Askari. * 

Let us now turn to Gazanfar. This hot-headed person, 
life-long companion of the prince, now forgot all Askari's 
past kindnesses, resented his recent imprisonment, and 
divulged all the facts about the weakness of the Mughals 
.to his new master, e.g., the incapacity of the prince, 
divisions that prevailed in the Mughal camp, and the readi- 
ness of his followers to evacuate Ahmadabad on some 
excuse. He emphasized his statements by suggesting that 
he might be placed under duress till the Sultan was satis- 
fied about the correctness of his information, and that if it 
be found false he might be put to death. 

Gazanfar's flight boded ill for the Mughals; for he 
carried with him 300 of his followers. Many others 
followed his example of desertion and fled to Bahadur. 
Askari had evidently fallen on evil days. Left only with 
the lukewarm Mughal loyalists at Ahmadabad, he had to 
face the rising tide in favour of Bahadur. Tardi Beg 
would not render any aid after his (the Mirza's) indis- 
cretion: he was ashamed to write to Humayun after 
Gazanfar's desertion. 

For some time the Mirza stayed at Ahmadabad hoping 
that the dark cloud which had hung over him would dis- 
appear: fortune might dbile on him: succour might ojme 
from some unexpected quarter. But how unfortunate he 



was in some respects we have already 'seen. Although he 
had rejected the idea of kingship, Tardi Beg would not 
render any support. From Raisen Darya Khan and 
Muhafiz Khan could come to occupy Patan; but Humayun, 
who was staying much nearer, did not care to come to his 
aid; his own foster-brother incited Bahadur to act against 
him. 

Assured of success by Gazanfar, Bahadur landed at 
Diu, advanced towards Ahmadabad, and encamped at 
Sarkhej. Askari, too, went there and fought a battle in 
which the very first cannon ball fired by the Mughals 
brought down Bahadur's standard. Although the battle 
remained indecisive during the day, at nightfall the prince 
retreated across the Sabarmati. 1 The enemy pursued and 
at Mahmudabad was fought a skirmish between Bahadur's 
vanguard and Askari 's rear commanded by Yadgar Nasir 
M. After the skirmish, Askari hurriedly crossed the river 
Mahi but in crossing, he lost many of his followers. Baha- 
dur went back from the other side of the river. The prince 
safely reached the foot of the fort of Champanlr and 
entered the city. He represented to TardJ Beg that money 
was so urgently needed for a further campaign that he could 
not wait for Humayun 's reply to his appeal. Tardi Beg 
refused to part with any money and reported to the king 
about Askari's misdeeds, adding that he had evil intentions 
in Gujrat and probably an eye on Agra also, to which 
place he was now proceeding. What were Askari's inten- 
tions ? And was the information that Tardi Beg had sent 
to Humayun correct? 

(a) The Tabaqdt-i-Akbari decidedly puts the blame of 
the whole affair on Tardi Beg and says that Askari had no 
evil intentions. 2 

(b) The Tarikh-i-Farishta which generally copies the 
Tabaqdt differs here. It says that Askari's intentions 

1 We have followed T 9 . A.; A. N. and A. H. G. maintain that no 
battle was fought. If they are correct, the Mughals ran away without 
striking a blow. 

2 P. 199, U. 14-17. 



E 164 ] 

were to niake himself king, and he needed money to accom- 
plish his design. 1 

(c) The Akbar-nama says that Askari asked for a 
grant of money, and when it was refused, he determined to 
capture Tardi Beg, get possession of the wealth, establish 
the sovereignty in his own name, 2 and then try once more 
to fight Bahadur, who was encamped on the bank of the 
Mahi about 15 cos from Champamr. If he were successful 
so far so good. If not, since Humayun preferred to stay 
in Malwa, he would go with his companions to Agra, lying 
unoccupied by any prince. 3 

(d) Badauni's Muntakhab says that Askari wished 
with the help of Hindu Beg to read khutbah in his own 
name, and without much fighting he left for Champanlr, 
and that Tardi Beg wrote to Humayun about Askari's 
hostility. 

(e) Abu Turab Wali's Tdrikh-i-Gujrat says that when 
the prince and his party reached Champamr, Tardi Beg 
at first treated them generously, gave each one a horse, 
and arranged banquets in their honour. But he expressed 
his inability of supplying any portion of the royal treasure 
without the king's permission. Since the Mirza intended to 
do him harm, he turned hostile and forced them to leave 
the vicinity, by firing guns at their camp. 

(f) Abdullah's Arabic History of Gujrat also makes a 
similar statement, viz., that Tardi Beg met the Mirzas and 
when he was told that they were anxious to fight Bahadur, 
he returned to procure some money for them. But then he 
discovered some deep-laid scheme of confining him in order 
to secure the wealth of Champamr for Askari, and then of 
proceeding to Agra to carry out measures against Humayun. 

In the light of the opinions expressed above on the 
subject, it is possible to arrive at some definite conclusions. 



1 On p. 216 it has 
4& wJUu] &+f+ * 
3 P. 144, L 3 has oy^j** <gjt~* r U* 



(1) On the question of fight against Bahadur: it is 
clear that Askari was anxious to meet Bahadur again and 
retrieve his military reputation. In order to beat up 
recruits and pay his old soldiers he needed money. Since 
he himself had none, he implored Tardi Beg to spare him 
some. This Tardi Beg refused to do. Hence a natural 
bitterness grew up between Askari and his friends and 
Tardi Beg. In their desperate plight they felt indignant 
and plotted for his capture; for then alone could they 
secure the wealth. 

Tardi Beg, on the other hand, knowing full well that 
the prince was good-for-nothing, rightly refused to part 
with what Humayun had entrusted to him. Askari, as 
Viceroy, had plenty of opportunities of consolidating his 
government but wasted his time in banquets and drinks. 
That such a fool could not be able to improve his fortunes 
by the mere acquisition of wealth was certain; rather he 
would waste it in further dissipation. 

(2) On the question of sovereignty: Tardi Beg 
having no confidence in Askari gave him no credit for 
loyalty to Humayun. Hindu Beg, perhaps, for wider 
political considerations desired to obtain for his immediate 
master a royal title. Askari, fearing lest Hindu Beg's 
suggestion should be misconstrued, did not accept it. We 
must give credit to the prince for having acted with pru- 
dence here. Later on, when Askari found that the nearest 
commander, Tardi Beg, had been indifferent to his cause 
and that Humayun, too, remained unconcerned, his in- 
dignation got the better of prudence, and he determined, in 
a childish spirit, as it were, to punish both Tardi Beg and 
his brother by immediately proceeding to Agra and creating 
mischief there. He thought that if Humayun, even then, 
tarried in Mandu, he would interpret it to the people at Agra 
as his intention to remain there permanently on account 
of the salubrity of the climate of the place, and thus 
-would gradually incite the people against him. It is true 
that Askari would not be a direct gainer from such a course 

.nf aHiAn fnr 'firc+Hr 



[ 166 ] 

planted by any of his younger brothers and, secondly, even 
if he were, it would be his next brother, Kamran, that 
would step in and not Askari. 

For fear of disaffection in Agra, Humayun had to take 
notice of Askari's movements, and he felt that he had no 
other alternative than to follow and overtake his misguided 
brother. That Askari's movements were only the half- 
hearted efforts of a disappointed and excited prince is 
evident from the fact that, though he had several days' start 
of Humayun, he did not press on to Agra, and allowed 
Humayun to overtake him at Chitor. Reconciliation took 
place between the two brothers, in which the part played 
by the royal harem must have been great; and the whole 
party moved on to Agra. 

The defects in Humayun as administrator during his 
stay at Mandu 1 must have become obvious to the reader by 
now, and before closing the chapter we may sum them up : 

In the first place, Humayun made no arrangements to 
remove the large wealth deposited at Champanir. This 
would not have been a difficult task, and if he had desired, 
the whole of it could have been stored at Agra or at Delhi 
against future contingencies. The more sagacious Sher 
Khan, a couple of years later, was able to remove the 
wealth of Gaur to Rohtasgarh. Why could not Humayun 
do it? The result of his negligence was that it fell, 
after Tardi Beg's retreat, back into Bahadur's hand. 2 

In the second place, he made no arrangements to 
ensure the continuity of the Mughal system of government 
in Malwa. The province was completely evacuated and 
no governor or garrison was left behind. 

In the third place, before his departure for the north, 
he did not revise his opinion of Bahadur, excuse his past 



1 It seems that HumayOn became addicted to opium about this time. 
See G. H. N. t fol. job. and the Farishta, p. 216, 1. 17. 

a See R. T. (B. M, Or. 168) fol. 6i4b, 



[ 167 ] 

actions, and arrive at some workable proposition. If only 
he had tackled Bahadur cleverly, he could have secured 
several advantages, e.g., the recognition, of the Mughal 
suzerainty in Gujrat; a break-up of the alliance between 
Bahadur and Sher Khan; and an alliance between Delhi 
and Gujrat against the Portuguese. 

In the fourth place he maintained no efficient Intelli- 
gence Department with the result that he was not correctly 
informed either of Askari's measures, actions or motives, 
or of Bahadur's rapid recovery of his lost territories. 

In short, Humayun was a poor reader of the future. 
He betrayed lack of statesmanship and allowed his enemies 
an opportunity of queering the pitch for his cause in Gujrat. 
He could have averted his doom by a proper and skilful 
co-ordination of his moves. Not only thereby could he 
have broken up the secret alliance between Bahadur and 
Sher Khan, but he could have also befriended Bahadur, 
and hoist Sher Khan with his own petard by exploiting 
against him Bahadur's friendship so far coveted by Sher 
Khan. But he let the grass grow under his feet, and his 
misfortunes were not long in coming. 

An accidental result of Humayun 's Gujrat campaign 
may, in passing, be noted here, namely, the recovery of 
Chitor by the Rajputs of Me war, whether with Humayun 's 
help as stated by Tod or without his help. Both the 
Rauzat-ul-Tahirin and the Udaipur Rdjya ka Itihds men- 
tion that the recovery was made immediately after Baha- 
dur's defeat at Mandasor, i.e., in Rana Vikramaditya's 
time who died in 1536 A. D. Thus it may be presumed 
the Muslim possession of Chitor lasted for a few months 
only. 

Whether Humayun helped the Rajputs in the recovery 
of their fortress-capital or not, one fact is clear, gamely, 
he showed no signs of resentment at it and ever afterwards 
his relations with them were cordial, as shown by their 
sheltering him during his flight in Sher Shah's reign. 



** [ 168 ] 

The chronology of the later events of the Gujrat 
campaign is: 

The fall of Champanir, 6th Safar 942 A. H.=6th August, 1535 A. D. 

Humayun's stay at Champanir for a month and a half, till the end 

of Rablul-awwal 942 A. H. = till 29th September, 1535 A. D. 

The capture of Ahmadabad .... Rablul-dkhir - October, 1535 A. D. 
The distribution of jdgir and the nobles taking up their posts, took 

a month and a half up to the beginning of Jumddal-dkhtr up to 

27th November, 1535 A. D. 

Humayun arrived at Mandu end of Shabdn = 22nd February, 

1536 A. D. 

The breaking out of the Gujrat rebellion . . . beginning of Ramzdn = 
23rd to 29th February, 1536 A. D. 

The Mughals retired to Ahmadabad end of Ramzan 

23rd March, 1536 A. D. 

Their arrival at Champanir beginning of Shawwdl 

ist April, 1536 A. D. 

Askari started for Agra 1 . . . end of Shawwdl 2ist April, 1536 A. D. 

Askari's stay at Chitor Zulhtjj-Zulqada = M.a,y and half 

of June, 1536 A. D. 

Tardi Beg surrendered Champanir 2 9 . beginning of Zulqoda 

22nd April, 1536 A. D. 

Tardi Beg reached Mandu, middle of Zulqada=8th May, 1536 A. D. 

Humayun started for Chitor 3rd week of Zulqada = 

middle of May, 1536 A. D. 

Humayun reached Chitor . . middle of Zulhijj-Stl\ June, 1536 A. D. 

Humayun reached Agra i8th Safar 943 A. H. = 9th August, 

1536 A. D. 



1 Erskine does not seem to be correct when he makes Askari start for 
Agra in 943 A. H. The correct date may be calculated on the basis of 
the following considerations: 

8 C. H. I., Vol. Ill, p. 333 gives 25th May, 1536 as the date of 
surrender and Bahadur's entry to the fort. 

G. H. N. fol. 39, 1. 17 says that the king rested at Agra for a year 
and the Farishta, p. 216, 1. 20 that Humayun started for JaunpOr on the 
1 8th Safar 944 A. H., so that Humayun must have reached Agra by 943 
A. H. Then Askari MirzS, must ha v$, started at he end of 949 A. H., 



CHAPTER XV 

THE DISAFFECTION OF THE MIRZAS, 
153640 A. D. 

Both Muhammad Zaman M. and Muhammad Sultan 
M. were the grandsons of Sultan Husain Balqara, the 
renowned ruler of Herat, and were steady supporters of the 
Mughal throne in Babur's time. But towards Humayun, 
their attitude was one of unmitigated hostility. 1 Humayun 
had twice pardoned them; but making light of his mag- 
nanimous treatment they pursued an obstructive course 
until they ruined themselves, the king, and the kingdom. 

Let us turn to Muhammad Zaman M. first. We saw 
him last in Bahadur's camp. At Mandasor he fought on 
behalf of the Sultan. On the eve of the Sultan's flight, Md. 
Zaman M. separated in order to carry out Bahadur's 
instructions to create disturbances elsewhere to distract 
Humayun 's attention. 

Md. Zaman M. first went to Sindh but found its able 
ruler, Shah Husain Arghun, (1523-54 A. D.), so firmly 
established on his throne and so keen on his duties that he 
took his advice and turned towards Lahore, where Kamran, 
its governor, was absent, conducting a campaign in 
Qandahar. Kamran possessed Multan, Kabul, and Qanda- 
har also. Unable to govern all the four provinces per- 
sonally, he had placed the last two under Khwdja Anur 
Kalan. 8 Now, Shah Tahmasp, the able successor of Shah 
Ismail, was like his father, an ambitious monarch, keen on 
expanding his kingdom and on possessing Qandahar. He 
sent a large army under his brother, Sam Mirza, aided by 

1 See Supra, Ch, II and VIII. 

a He was a life-long friend of Babur, who recommended him tq 
Humayun also. The former partook of banquets at his place and over- 
looked his impudence in writing uncomplimentary couplets about India, 
See B. N., pp. 37*-72> 375. 5*5-26, 627. 



[ 170 ] 

two other high officers, Aghziwar Khan, the Mirza's tutor, 
and Sultan Murad Afshar. For eight months, Khwdja 
Kalan suffered a siege and then Kamran arrived with 
20,000 men. The enemy retreated one stage to the west, 
and so the two Mughal sections had an opportunity of 
combining. Then they moved westward, and utterly 
defeated the Persians, Aghziwar Khan having been cap- 
tured and put to death, (January 25, 1536 A. D.) 1 

It was while Kamran was engaged on Qandahar, that 
the mischief-seeker, Muhammad Zaman M., reached 
Lahore. At first he resorted to negotiation for its surrender. 
When it failed, he laid siege to it. The siege was not pro- 
gressing well, when he heard of Kamran's return. He had 
to fly precipitately to Delhi, where he lingered for several 
months even after Humayun's arrival at Agra, (August, 
1536 A. D.). But when he saw no prospects of success, he 
thought of the province of Gujrat, which had treated him 
generously in the past. 

In the meantime Bahadur had died childless, (February 
T 3> I 537 A. D.). Md. Zaman M., whom the late Sultan had 
treated as his brother, 2 hastened to Ahmadabad, thinking 
that his death would make an opening for him. First of 
all, he obtained possession of some of the unspent State 
treasure, carried it in 700 golden chests, and collected 
12000 Mughal 3 and other soldiers from the north. He then 
approached the ladies of Bahadur's harem, bemoaned the 
Sultan's death, tore his garments, and would not be con- 
soled by any words of the ladies. Bahadur's mother 
honoured him by the grant of 300 saropas. But when he 
asked them to support his cause, they correctly pointed out 
that in Gujrat at least no royal inmate of the harem had 
taken interest in the question of succession, and it was best 



1 ist Shabdn 942 A. H. The Shah made a second attempt a few 
months later under his direct command. Kh. Kalan surrendered, but 
Kamran reappeared and captured the fort from the Persian governor, 
Budagh Khan Qajar. 

* A. N. t p. 146 says, ' He also called himself the son of Sultan 
Bahadur's mother/ 

3 The despicable Gazanfar now joined Md. Zaman M. 



for them to keep themselves aloof, and accept what the 
nobles would ultimately decide. 

Next, in order to win them over, he talked of avenging 
the late Sultan's murder by waging a war against the 
Portuguese: later, he adroitly changed his attitude, went 
to Diu, and by heavy bribery coaxed the people to read 
khutbah in his name in the chief mosque 1 of the island. 

But Md. Zaman M. in the eyes of the Gujratis possessed 
two defects which debarred him from the throne. Firstly, 
his personal character : he had grown ease-loving, prone to 
wine, opium, and bhang.' 2 Being a distinguished person- 
age, he was continually entertained, and in return he 
squandered the treasure that was in his possession. Such 
a man could not have been expected to prove a worthy 
successor to the ever-active Bahadur. Secondly, he was a 
foreigner. He represented the very Mughals whom 
Bahadur had opposed with all his might, almost to the 
last breath of his life. The Gujratis took pride in the 
wealth and culture of their province. 3 To them, Md. 
Zaman M. was as good a foreigner as Humayun, though 
the former's services in Bahadur's wars against Chitor and 
against the Mughals deserved recognition in other ways. 

Besides, the late Sultan had already nominated his 
own successors. His immediate successor was to be the 
ever-faithful Miran Muhammad Shah of Khandesh, son of 
Bahadur's sister. The late Sultan had also recognized 
Mahmud, the son of his brother, Latif Khan, by nominat- 
ing him as Miran Muhammad Shah's successor. The 
nobles had such a regard for their late Sultan that they 
accepted his double nomination without a demur, however 
unusual it might have appeared. Md. Zaman M. for some 

1 Called Sa^d mosque by A. N. See tr., p. 325 n. 2. Most of the 
description is from A. T. W. H. G. 

2 Hemp of which an intoxicating potion is made. 

a For the excellence of Gujrat architecture consult the Archaeological 
reports of the western circle published by the department. For some of 
the other details, see A. A. t Vol. I (tr.), pp. 75, 88, 92, 143 and Vol. II, 
pp. 



C 172 ] 

time faced the opposition of the nobles, and it is very likely 
that if he had boldly proceeded immediately to Ahmadabad, 
he might have been able to seize it. But he delayed too 
long. In the meantime, Imad-ul-Mulk, a nobleman who 
had risen from a slave, boldly came forward, and swore 
that he would, if properly supported, take Md. Zaman M. 
prisoner or drive him out of the province. By his earnest 
eloquence, he moved the two most influential nobles, 
Ikhtiyar Khan 1 and Afzal Khan, who obtained for him 
the deputyship of the rightful heir, 2 and the authority of 
distributing ja$r among his recruits, according to their 
importance or service. He then proclaimed a jdgir of a 
lakh of tankah for a horseman who would join his army 
with three horses. 8 The result was that though at the start 
of his campaign, he had only nine troopers to lead, in a 
month's time the number reached forty thousand. 

Encouragement also came from the prospective ruler. 
Miran Muhammad, who had been away to Mandu, on a 
career of conquest, reminded his supporters of his legitimate 
claims to the throne. Ikhtiyar Khan and Afzal Khan were 
in his favour, but Imad-ul-Mulk was not; for he feared 
that with Miran Muhammad's appearance amidst the 
Gujrafis the importance of Khandesh would grow at the 
expense of Gujrat, and Ahmadabad would be reduced to a 
mufassal town. The two ministers satisfied him by point- 
ing out that the succession of a Gujrati was assured by 
Bahadur's second nomination of Mahmud as Muhammad's 
successor. In order to satisfy Imad-ul-Mulk further, thev 



E 173 } 

ancestors to the very founder of the Gujrat dynasty would 
be mentioned. Imad-ul-Mulk was now completely satis- 
fied. 

Having solved the question of succession, he went 
forward to meet Md. Zaman M. and stopped when he 
came within a few miles of the Mughal camp, in the 
hope that the foe would open the attack. But Md. 
Zamari M. showed no such sign. Instead he made all the 
preparations of undergoing a siege, dug trenches around, 
and made Hisamuddin Mirak, Mir Khatifa's son, 1 his 
deputy. and commander-in-chief. Hisamuddin carried on 
the defence, fought several skirmishes, and let his master 
escape one day, by distracting the enemy with repeated 
attacks. When all was finished, he joined Md. Zaman M. 
himself. They were driven out of the country, and thus 
Imad-ul-Mulk redeemed his promise. 

Md. Zaman M. was again a wanderer, and turned to 
Sindh once more. He could do no mischief there. As he 
was a dissolute person, the life of a vagrant would not suit 
him; and so being altogether disappointed, he at last 
determined to fall back upon the generosity of his relation* 
the king of Delhi. Thus he returned to Agra, which he 
had left for Bahadur's camp some three years before. 

Unfortunately, he could not immediately meet Huma- 
yun who had moved eastward (August, 1537 A. D.). But 
bfeing in a mood of self-condemnation Md. Zaman M. had 
lost all patience, and hence persuaded his wife, Masflma 
Sultan Begam, who was present at Agra, to plead his cause; 
To her request of pardon for her husband, Humayun gave 
a gracious reply, promising a complete reomdlktibn* 
Md. Zaman M., thus assured went forward to meet him in 
his camp, 

He was received with great honour. The full 



i It was Mir Khatifd who had raised objections to HumSyfto' 
sion alter Bftbur's <ieatn. Now we find hi* son supporting' interests otn 

* 



[ 172 ] 

time faced the opposition of the nobles, and it is very likely 
that if he had boldly proceeded immediately to Ahmadabad, 
he might have been able to seize it. But he delayed too 
long. In the meantime, Imad-ul-Mulk, a nobleman who 
had risen from a slave, boldly came forward, and swore 
that he would, if properly supported, take Md. Zaman M. 
prisoner or drive him out of the province. By his earnest 
eloquence, he moved the two most influential nobles, 
Ikhtiyar Khan 1 and Afzal Khan, who obtained for him 
the deputyship of the rightful heir, 2 and the authority of 
distributing jagir among his recruits, according to their 
importance or service. He then proclaimed a jdgir of a 
lakh of tankah for a horseman who would join his army 
with three horses. 3 The result was that though at the start 
of his campaign, he had only nine troopers to lead, in a 
month's time the number reached forty thousand. 

Encouragement also came from the prospective ruler. 
Miran Muhammad, who had been away to Mandu, on a 
career of conquest, reminded his supporters of his legitimate 
claims to the throne. Ikhtiyar Khan and Afzal Khan were 
in his favour, but Imad-ul-Mulk was not; for he feared 
that with Miran Muhammad's appearance amidst the 
Gujratis the importance of Khandesh would grow at the 
expense of Gujrat, and Ahmadabad would be reduced to a 
mufassal town. The two ministers satisfied him by point- 
ing out that the succession of a Gujrati was assured by 
Bahadur's second nomination of Mahmud as Muhammad's 
successor. In order to satisfy Imad-ul-Mulk further, they 
proposed that the khutbah would be read in Miran Muham- 
mad's name in the following form: 



i.e., instead of mentioning Miran Muhammad's paternal 
ancestors after his name, the name of Bahadur and his 



1 Possibly, the late defender of Champanlr. 

a Miran Mohammad Shah of Kh&ndesh. 

* There may be some exaggeration in this statement. 



E 173 J 

ancestors to the very founder of the Gujrat dynasty would 
be mentioned. Imad-ul-Mulk was now completely satis- 
fied. 

Having solved the question of succession, he went 
forward to meet Md. Zaman M. and stopped when he 
came within a few miles of the Mughal camp, in the 
hope that the foe would open the attack. But Md. 
Zamari M. showed no such sign. Instead he made all the 
preparations of undergoing a siege, dug trenches around, 
and made Hisamuddin Mirak, Mir KhaMfd's son, 1 his 
deputy. and commander-in-chief. Hisamuddin carried on 
the defence, fought several skirmishes, and let his master 
escape one day, by distracting the enemy with repeated 
attacks. When all was finished, he joined Md. Zaman M. 
himself. They were driven out of the country, and thus 
Imad-ul-Mulk redeemed his promise. 

Md. Zaman M. was again a wanderer, and turned to 
Sindh once more. He could do no mischief there. As he 
was a dissolute person, the life of a vagrant would not suit 
him; and so being altogether disappointed, he at last 
determined to fall back upon the generosity of his relation, 
the king of Delhi. Thus he returned to Agra, which he 
had left for Bahadur's camp some three years before. 

Unfortunately, he could not immediately meet Huma- 
yun who had moved eastward (August, 1537 A. D.). But 
bteing in a mood of self-condemnation Md. Zaman M. had 
lost all patience, and hence persuaded his wife, Masuma 
Sultan Begam, who was present at Agra, to plead his cause. 
To her request of pardon for her husband, Humayun gave 
a gracious reply, promising a complete reconciliation* 
Md. Zaman M., thus assured went forward to meet him in 
his camp. 

He was received with great honour. The full descrip- 



i It was Mir Khalifa who had raised objections to Huraaytin's acces* 
sk>n after Babur's death. Now we find hi$ son supporting' interests other 



L 174 ) 

tioh of his reception has been given by Abul Fazl. 1 At 
first the high officials of the kingdom went forward to wel- 
come him on behalf of the king and then at a day's march 
from the royal camp, Askari and Hindal met him, both 
according him a formal welcome by a alute Askari by 
raising his hand up to his breast and Hindal by putting his 
hand on his head. Then they escorted him during the rest 
of the journey, and saw him to his assigned tent. The next 
day, he met the king, who did him the rare honour of con- 
ferring on him twice in the same meeting a special khilat, 
decking him with a belt and a sword, and presenting him 
with a horse. 

Undoubtedly, Humayun showed a great deal of self- 
control and forbearance in dealing with one who had never 
given one kind word or thought to him. Abul Fazl also 
commends Humayun 's behaviour in glowing sentences of 
which we shall quote one only. 'In short, his Majesty 
Jahanbam Jannat Ashyam in spite of rebellion so great 
that (even) to pardon it were improper, became an ex- 
pounder of the Divine ethics and returned good for evil." 2 

We do not fully agree with Abul Fazl. One may extol 
Humayun for his forgiving nature and generosity; but all 
that is generous is not always prudent. We may briefly 
analyse our view. Md. Zaman M. should not have been 
leniently dealt with; firstly, in view of his having been 
pardoned twice before and having caused a protracted war 
between Delhi and Gujrat; and secondly, because he could 
not have been relied upon ; for he had always been neglect- 
ful of his duties. Humayun had to thank the Mirza for 
the disaster he met at Chausa two years later, because 
Md. Zaman M. let the enemy overpower the king's camp 
from the start of the battle. Humayun should have fore- 
seen the difficulties .which Md. Zaman M. would create for 
.the State by his pretensions to high lineage and his irres- 
ponsible conduct. In fact, Humayun betrayed a softness 
which has always been incompatible with the stern duties 

* A. N. t p* 150. 

* Ibid. 



[ 175 ] 

of a ruler. Perhaps he excused himself on the score of his 
father's dying advice to be kind to his relations, and also 
of his regard for his elder half-sister, Masuma Begam. But 
he had better obeyed the laws of duty 'that stern 
daughter of the voice of God/ 

Let us now turn to the other Mirza, Md. Sultan M* 
His genealogy may be given here. 

Timur 

i 
Umar Shaikh M. 

I 
Balqara M. 

I 
Mansur M. 

Baiqara M. Sultan Husairi M. 

I I 

Sultan Wais M. = Sultanam Begam. 

Md. Sultan M. 



I ~i - - | - -j - , , 

Olugh M. Shah M. Md. Husain M. Ibrahim M. Masud Husain M. Aqil M. 

I ___ _ ___ I 

| | Muzaffar Husain M. 

Md. Sultan M. Sikandar Sultan M. 

Md. Sultan M. had joined Babur sometime before the 
battle of Panipat and had taken part in that battle as well 
as in the following one at Khanwah. After Babur' s victory 
against the Rajputs, he got a jdgir in Qanauj worth thirty 
lakhs of dam and the honorific title 



'the Honourable, Upright and Fortunate brother, and 
Chosen of the Creator. 1 

In Humayun's reign, he generally acted in concert 
with Md. Zaman M., and like him twice rebelled against 
Humayun. On the second occasion he was captured and 
blinded. 2 Both he and Md. Zaman M. were placed in the 

i See H. R. T. B. (No. 43 of Buhar section of the Imperial Library, 
Calcutta). 

9 Some historians maintain that the operation was imperfectly per- 
formed and he retained partial vision, 



[ 176 ] 

same prison. So when the latter escaped together with the 
jailor, Md. Sultan M. also secured his freedom. He escaped 
to his jagir. 

Almost immediately after, Humayun got absorbed in 
the Gujrat affairs and completely overlooked Md. Sultan 
Mirza's escape. As may be seen from the genealogy above, 
Md. Sultan M. had a large progeny, and so though he him- 
self was disabled by the total or partial loss of vision, his 
sons carried on his policy of opposing Humayun. They first 
attacked Bilgram, 1 situated on the other side of the Ganges, 2 
and forced the local officials, Khusru 3 Kokultdsh's sons to 
retire. Md. Sultan M. then made Bilgram his head- 
quarters 4 and sent two of his sons to operate further 
eastward. The eldest son, Ulugh M. pushed on due east 
and occupied district after district of the Mughal territory 
till he reached Jaunpur. Shah M., the second son, crossed 
the Ganges, worked in the south-east, and extended his 
control as far as Kara-Manikpur. The territory thus 
acquired was some two hundred miles in length and less 
than a hundred in breadth. 5 It was decided to control this 
large stretch of newly conquered territory by setting up 
headquarters at Bilgram, Jaunpur, and Kara-Manikpur. 

It was a serious matter for the Delhi kingdom : for, at 
the least, it meant the loss of two provinces. Hindal, 
apprehending that any further delay would lead to their 
permanent alienation for which he would not be forgiven 
by the king, made efforts to recover the lost provinces and 
suppress or drive away the Mirzas. He was able to accom- 
plish his task without much difficulty; for Sultan M., with 
a view to strengthening his government in all parts of his 



1 In the Hardoi district of the United Provinces. 

2 Jauhar has given a good description of Md. Sultan M. and his 
children's mischievous activities in his Tazkivat-ul-Waqidt. 

9 Khusru was in Babur's service and took a share in the battles of 
Panipat and Khanwah. 

4 The Tdnkh-i-Humdyun Shdhl by Allahdad Faizi Sirhindl gives some 
useful minor details. 

5 In Akbar's time it comprised two of his svbahs. 



[ 177 1 

conquered territories had split up his army, one section to 
work at a distance with Ulugh M. at Jaunpur, and the other, 
somewhat nearer, with Shah M. Hindal did not miss this 
opportunity, made a rapid march, crossed over to Bilgram, 
mainly by the exertions of Toqlan Beg, and met Shah M. 
in a battle, before his elder brother could come up with the 
other section of the army. Hindal won a complete victory. 1 
Then he pushed on to meet tJlugh M. Two months later 
they met at Ajudhya, and Hindal again won a victory. 2 
The Mirzas now took to flight in sheer despair. Hindal's 
pursuit forced them to leave the Mughal dominions and 
seek refuge with the Afghans in Biharkunda. 3 

Hindal, in his pursuit, halted at Jaunpur. Without 
instructions from Humayun, he did not think it advisable to 
plunge into Bihar and annoy the rising Afghans. Fortun- 
ately for him, Humayun reached Agra soon after; and so 
putting off the question of the administration of Jaunpur, 
Hindal hurried back to the capital, to meet Humayun and 
give an account of his stewardship. 

Md. Sultan M. remained with the Afghans for the next 
two years, during which period Sher Khan first conquered 
Bengal, and then defeated Humayun at Chausa, (June 26, 
1539 A.D.). Then the Mirza realized that his protector 
had grown so powerful as to eclipse every individual 
Mughal chief. He therefore gave up all hopes of supplant- 
ing Humayun by himself or by any of his sons, and thus 
having grown wiser he hastened to join Humayun and the 
other Mirzas who had gathered at Agra. But he could not 
continue to be loyal. The very next year when the 
Mughals met Sher Shah again at Bilgram (May 17, 1540 
A. D.), he and his sons played traitors and fled away from 
the battlefield. 



1 According to Jauhar, a westerly storm helped the Mughals by blow- 
ing dust into the eyes of the enemy. 

3 With Hindal was Shaikh Buhlul who wanted to disperse the enemy 
with his incantations. See t. W. 

8 The word BihSricunda seems to be a corruption of the Hindi word 
BihSr-khanda meaning Bihar region. 

12 



[ 178 ] 

To conclude : the Mirzas were an unworthy set, proud 
of their lineage, prone to plague their neighbours, and 
always a menace to the Mughal king. Humayun owed 
many of his political troubles to them. Having colluded 1 
with the enemies of the Mughals, they caused incalculable 
loss to the kingdom. The ruinous Gujrat campaign is in 
point. Not only did it mean a disaster to the Mughals in 
one particular province, it encouraged Humayun 's worst 
enemy, namely, Sher Khan, who literally hounded 
Humayun out of Hindustan. - 

While closing this chapter we may remark that it was 
Humayun's misplaced generosity 2 towards the Mirzas that 
was responsible for their rebellions and misdemeanours. 
' Kingship knows no kinship ' should have been the guiding 
maxim of the king in his relations with the Mirzas. 



* E.g., Md. Zaman M. took refuge with Bahadur Shah; Md. Sult&n M. 
with the Afghans. Each tried to bring disaster to the kingdom in collu- 
sion with its enemies Bahadur and Sher Khan. 

2 We have already indicated how generously Humayftn had treated 
Md, Zaman M. and how the MirzS. had brought disaster to the king at 
Chausa. Similar was his treatment of Md, Sultan M. 



CHAPTER XVI 
SHER SHAH'S EARLY CAREER [14721536 A.D.] 

As there is an excellent monograph on Sher Shah, 1 
we shall content ourselves with describing his achievements 
before he came into conflict with Humayun in 1537 A. D. 

Farid the future Sher Shah was born [circ. 1472 
A. D.] in an Afghan family. His father Mian Hasan, a 
mansabddr, had four wives and eight children. 2 Infatuated 
by the charms of his youngest wife, he neglected his 
Afghan wife and her eldest son Farid. 3 Farid could not 
brook his father's neglect, and left for Jaunpur, in 1494 
A. D., for study. 4 

In the fifteenth century Jaunpur had come into promi- 
nence under the patronage of the enlightened Sharqi kings. 5 
It had developed into a splendid and magnificent seat 
of culture and learning catering for the intellectual needs 
of the northern India. There had sprung 
Jaunpur and up some twenty schools of thought, each 
its eminence. having on its rolls several hundred scholars. 

In fact, Jaunpur had begun to challenge 

1 By Dr K. R. Qanungo. Some of his dates and events have been 
corrected by Dr P. Saran in the Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal 
of March, 1934 A. D. 

2 The genealogy as given by Abbas SarwanI in his Tarikh-i-Sher Shdhi 
is given here. 

Mian Ibrahim 

I 

Mian Hasan 
by ist wife. by and wife. j by jrd wife. by 4th wife. 

Farid Nizam. All Yusuf. Khurram ShadI Khan, Sulaiman Ahmad. 

Dorn: History of the Afghdns slightly differs. 

Mian Hasan was a mansabddr of five hundred and had been granted 
ihe parganas of Sahasram and Khawaspur Tanda in jaglr. Hasan's father, 
Ibrahim, also had been a mansabdar of five hundred with jdgir in Narnol. 
See the Dorn, p. 81. 

8 Dr Saran corrects Qanungo by pointing out that Farid' s mother 
was neglected after Mian Hasan's settling down in Bihar. 

4 According to Saran, Farid had already learnt reading and writing. 

5 Both Sultan Ibrahim Shah Sfaarql an Husaia Shah Sharqi were 
noted authors. 



the cultural eminence of Delhi and was popularly known 
as the Shiraz of India. 1 Its claim to the intellectual leader- 
ship of the contemporary India is borne out by the fact 
that it produced a number of scholars who led men and 
movements, Muhammad Jaunpuri was the founder of 
the Indian Mahdavi movement laterly known as the AIM 
movement of the sixteenth century. He suffered for his 
preachings, left his home, and died in distant Farrah in 
Afghanistan. But his tenets survived him and continued 
to influence some of the acute minds of India. At one 
time, Shaikh Mubarak, father of Abul Fazl, the historian, 
was among his chief adherents. Again, Jaunpur possessed 
in Sher Shah the finest specimen of its culture which 
added to the bead-roll of our national heroes a personage, 
who by his lofty ideals and principles sustained India's 
claims to political eminence in mediaeval times. Muham- 
mad Yazd was another brilliant product of Jaunpur. He 
worked up a spirited opposition against Akbar and gave a 
fatwd canonical decree for his deposition, [1581 A. D.], 
strongly condemning his religious vagaries. Even after 
the loss of its political glory on the transference of the 
administrative headquarters to Chunar, Jaunpur continued 
to maintain and enrich its intellectual traditions. 

In the realm of architecture also Jaunpur made a 
striking contribution by boldly cutting itself adrift from the 
matter-of-fact and conventional building traditions. In 
the entire range of Muslim architecture the three extant 
mosques of Jaunpur (i) Atala Devi. 
( 2 ) Lsl Darwdza t (3) Jdmi masjid stand 
out as unique monuments, representing the 
distinguishing features of the Sharqi style of architecture 2 
the high sloping entrance gates of the mosques, sloping 
buttress-like propylons in the central facade projecting far 
above the roof of the UwSn, the massive west wall, the 



See C. H. /., Vol. Ill, p. 259. 
2 For a detailed study consult Fuhrer's Sharqi Architecture of 



storeyed cloisters several deep aisles arranged round 
extensive courtyards. The Jaunpur school of architecture 
began and ended with the Sharqi dynasty, and amongst the 
later rulers it was only Akbar who reproduced, though 
feebly, some of the Sharqi features in his Jami Masjid at 
Fatehpur Sikri. 

To such an intellectual centre, Farid went; for though 
the Sharqi patronage was no more available, Jaunpur was 
humming with scholars and students ; and the discarded and 
distracted Farid found solace in such a vigorously intellec- 
tual atmosphere. So earnestly did he address himself to 
his studies that in three years' time, (1494-97 A. D.), by 
virtue of his scholarship he secured for himself the position 
of a maulavi a rare distinction among the Afghan man- 
sabdars. 1 We get a glimpse of the studies of that day in 
the contemporary writings. The standard Persian works, 
the Gulistdn and the Bustdn of Shaikh Sadl, the Sikandar- 
ndma of Nizami, and the Arabic work Kdfia with commen- 
taries, formed the basis of a student's studies, though they 
were supplemented by biographical and historical works 
like the Shdh-ndma of Firdausi. 

At the end of the period, fortune smiled on Farid. 
His well-wishers persuaded his father, who had come to 
his patron, Jamal Khan, at Jaunpur, to resign his tenure 
of jagir to Farid and content himself with the personal 
service of Jamal Khan. 

Thus began Farid 's administrative career. For the 
next twenty-one years, (1497 1518 A. D.), he remained in 
the jagir, and in its management he seems to have been 
inspired by such broad principles of government as 
characterize the work of a true administrator. We shall 
refer here to only a few of them : 

wt^k-Jb iff Jxc Vj Jo^Jb | vJCU V 



1 Abbas' s words are 



[ x8a ] 

Tr. (There could be) no state without justice and no 
justice without punishment. 

Later on he added another maxim : 

(J t>ijfjb ojUfi Jto Jf^l **^ & && \) 

ooU-c 



Tr. It is incumbent on kings that they should illumine 
the pages of their careers with (the spirit of) devotion or 
service, in order that their servants and subjects may 
develop a love for service. 1 

(2) Consideration for the ryots' welfare and hence 
fixation of their land-revenue at a moderate figure but 
realization in full, i.e. without any arrears. 

(3) Officials to be kept in proper control. Recognition 
of small perquisites for them, e.g. the settlement officers 
and revenue officers to be allowed fees for measurement 
and tax collection and food for the day. 2 

(4) The zamindars to be kept well in hand (i) If they 
were "mere individuals," any disobedience or highway 
robbery on their part was to be sternly punished and the 
culprits to be exterminated. For example, he rejected 
the insincere offers of submission from such wretches and 
destroyed them, killing the men, enslaving their families, 
and bringing settlers from elsewhere to the ruined villages. 3 
(ii) If they formed a group of individuals, knit together 
by bonds of caste or brotherhood, a more lenient treatment 
was to be accorded. He would bear down their opposi- 
tion, and if the rebels repented, restored their property, 
and treated them with consideration. 



1 For several of such ideals see the latter part of Abbas' s work. 

2 Abbas puts down the perquisites as AJltosv J Jyi ) *JUU* ^ *&>)*> 

* See Moreland : The Agrarian System of Moslem India (M. A. S. 
M. L), page 70. 

Abbis 's words are: 



We may briefly indicate the three main features of his 
administration : 

(a) He evolved a scientific system of land-assessment 
by gradually abandoning the four sharing system that had 
prevailed so long, viz., (i) khet-batdi, (2) kankut, (3) batdi 
or bhdoti, (4) lank batai. 1 As every one of them depended 
on an estimate of the produce and not on an actual measure- 
ment, he thought it led to fraud or deception. 

Instead, he introduced a careful measurement and 
then on its basis, fixed the assessment. 2 He was not, how- 
ever, an aggressive reformer, and if some ryots preferred 
sharing, he allowed it to operate in their case. 

(b) He maintained some two hundred horsemen in his 
service for keeping peace and order. These were in addi- 
tion to those that served the king of Delhi at Jaunpur or at 
the capital. 

(c) He was accessible to the humblest of his subjects 
and encouraged them to represent their grievances to him. 
If on inquiry an official was found guilty, he was severely 
dealt with. 

Thus in the administration of his jdgir Sher Shah's 

statesmanship was on its trial. He gave evidence of quali- 

- ,. , ties that at once mark him out as an adminis- 

An estimate ! i tr / i 

of his work trator. His solicitude for the welfare of his 
mhisjagir. ryots, his masterful control of the zamindars, 
his strict supervision over his officials, and, above all, his 
vigorous and intelligent system of land assessment, are 
some of the features of his administration that indicate that 
Farid had at this early stage of his career developed and 
demonstrated an unmistakably national outlook, and seem- 
ed cut out for the rulership of India which he eminently 
justified. 

His land assessment, inter alia, sustains his daim to 
statesmanship. No government should ever hope to suc- 

1 See A. A. (T*.) Vol. II, page 44 for the explanation of the terms. 
* See Jlf. A. & M. /., pp. 69 and 71.* 



I x4 ] 

ceed in India an agricultural country par excellence 
which fails to place rural economy in the forefront of its 
political programme. Not only does the stability of the 
rural life in India conduce to the material well-being of the 
people; not only does it justify the existence of the State 
institutions; it also constitutes the mainstay of the State 
resources. And it is to the lasting glory of Sher Shah that 
he set afoot what are termed in modern phraseology the 
rural development schemes. He ran to meet and solved 
to a great extent some of the agrarian problems awaiting 
their solutions at the hands of the present government. 

Again, in his policy towards the zantinddrs we dis- 
cover the germs that later on quickened into an Afghan 
Democracy under his inspiring leadership. He took the 
earliest opportunity of bearing down the refractory and 
individual zannnd&rs, but respected and recognized, as a 
rule, the group-opinion. Much to his credit, he anticipated 
some of the fundamental and sound principles of a modern 
Democracy, namely, the majority opinion should be 
respected, and the individual vagaries militating against the 
healthy growth of democratic institutions ruthlessly checked. 

Although he always respected the legitimate aspira- 
tions of his subjects and allowed them opportunities of 
influencing his State policy, as a trustee for his people he 
redeemed his moral obligation of looking to their best 
interests. He thought he alone was responsible for their 
well-being. In fact, he comes very much nearer Plato's 
Philosopher-king, who being the sole representative of his 
people, expresses the general will and carries it out. Like 
the good Shepherd he reared and protected his sheep. 

These remarks may appear as mere obiter dicta here, 
but a careful analysis of his character, personality, and 
political achievements which does not form a part of 
our present study will lend support to them. 

In short, his management of his father's ja$r gives 
us an earnest of his future administration which was a 



C i5 3 

natural and systematic evolution of the principles he had 
brought to bear upon his work in Sahasram and Khawas- 
pur-Tanda. 

But as luck would have it, in 1518 A. D. his fame cost 
him his stewardship. His step-mother, now the favourite 
of Mian Hasan, who had two sons of her own, growing 
jealous of Farid's success, got her weak-willed husband to 
dismiss his able son from the jdgir . This was against the 
pact agreed upon at Jaunpur, but Mian Hasan, worried by 
a cantankerous domestic atmosphere, decided to break his 
word, and take back the management of the jdgir into his 
own hand. Farid regarded the resumption as a breach of 
faith, and reprehended his father's conduct. With faith in 
his own ability, he went straight to Agra to wait upon 
Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. He represented to him his griev- 
ances, and tried to persuade him to transfer the jagir from 
the Mian to himself. He was unsuccessful and stayed there 
patiently to bide his time. 

The opportunity came sooner than he might have 
expected; for his father died a few months later, (1525 
A. D.), and now Sultan Ibrahim gladly recognized his 
ability by granting him his father's rank and jagir. On his 
return to his parganas, however, he found that it was no 
easy task to get the full possession of the estate; for 
Muhammad Khan Sur, the powerful mansabddr of the 
neighbouring jdgir of Chaund, was with Sulaiman, Farid's 
step-brother and rival. Muhammad. Khan's object was to 
bring the brothers into conflict, weaken and destroy them 
individually, and finally occupy the jagir, himself, Partly 
because he saw through the move and partly because he 
was not equal to meeting Muhammad, Farid sprang upon 
his rival a surprise by going over to Sultan Muhammad 
Nuhani of Bihar. 1 The disaster of Panipat had changed 
the entire situation (1526 A. D.). The Afghan hegemony 

1 The original name of Sultan Muhammad has been variously written, 
e.g., Pahar ifhan, Par Iflhan (Born), Sana* ipian (Abbas), Behar JChan 
(Erskine), Bihar Ifhan (Mrs. Beveridge), Bahadur ?han {C. K. /., 
Vol. Ill), 



[ 186 ] 

under the Lddis at Delhi had been supplanted by the 
Mughal dynasty with Babur as its first ruler. In this state 
of confusion, the Afghans had for the time acknowledged 
Sultan Muhammad as their leader. By taking shelter with 
this leader of the Afghans, Farid overreached Muhammad 
Khan Sur an4 retained his jdgir for himself. 

Farid served his new master with his characteristic 
zeal and devotion. He once risked his life to save his 
master from the attacks of a ferocious tiger. His loyalty 
was adequately rewarded: the Sultan took him into his 
confidence, appointed him tutor to the prince, Jalaluddin 
Nuhanl, and conferred upon him the title of Sher Khan. 
He was held up as an example of courage and sagacity. 

Sher Khan, however, was not satisfied with his present 
lot, and it may well be that he was thinking more about his 
j&gir. He found that let alone any question of a further 
grant of land to him as a reward for his faithful services, 
even the existing territory was not guaranteed against the 
future machinations of Muhammad Khan Sur, and that the 
Sultan, in the state of confusion prevailing at the time was 
not prepared to displease one of his chief nobles for his 
sake. So after two years' waiting, Sher Khan returned to 
Sahasram to think out some other way of rescuing his 
small estate. 

After Sher Khan's departure, Muhammad Khan had 
the opportunity of poisoning the Sultan's mind against 
him. He made capital out of Sher Khan's continued 
absence 1 arid suggested to the Sultan that as a punishment, 
his estate should be taken away and transferred to some- 
one else. Sultan Muhammad in view of Sher Khan's ser- 
vices to himself declined to interfere but allowed Muham- 
mad Khan to act as an intermediary and to bring the issue 
to a satisfactory conclusion. Thus authorized, Muham- 
*'inad lhan wait to Sher Chan's j&gir with the object of 



l Either ShSr $h$n had gone away without permission or exceeded 
hit leave of absence. Abb&s's words are ^ ^ Jt^M 1; ; ! i.e., he grew 
indolent. It suggests some sort of negligence. 



[ 187 I 

dividing it amongst the brothers. He invited Sher Khan to 
give his consent to his project. Sher Khan ably pointed 
out the administrative fallacy in the proposal by saying that 
the division of an estate as prevalent amongst the Afghans 
of Roh 1 could not be applied to a jdgir; for the latter 
belonged to the State and was in exchange for military 
services rendered. Since the service was indivisible, the 
estate must also remain indivisible; and that it was only the 
king's farmdn that legalized the right to the jdgir and 
nothing less than a farmdn could take it away; finally as 
Sultan Ibrahim LodTs farmdn had granted the entire estate 
to him, no one else had any right to take it away or alter 
it. 2 The pleading was essentially sound but Muhammad, 
bent on carrying out his own design, refused to give a 
patient hearing. The result was a fight between them, in 
which Sher Khan was worsted. But though vanquished, 
he continued 'to argue/ obtained help from an entirely 
alien quarter, e.g., Sultan Junaid BarlSs, the Mughal 
governor of Jaunpur, defeated Muhammad Khan, regained 
his own territories, and even overran his foe's (1527 A.D.). 
Sher Khan, however, did not adopt any retaliatory attitude 
on the occasion or betray any greed for adding to his 
estate at the expense of his neighbour. On the other 
hand, he set a bound to his success. He had noticed that 
the presence of the Mughal soldiers had dimmed his 
popularity. No sooner did he recover his estate than he 
hastened to thank his benefactors, the Mughals. He re- 
warded them and. persuaded them to withdraw to their 
territory. Having accomplished this much, he turned to 
the remaining portion of his task, viz., to win. over his 
foe. He wrote a genuinely kind letter to Muhammad 
]han and followed it up by making an offer of restoring 
to him the whole of his territory. Muhammad was over-, 



1 The whole of the' hilly region of north-eastern Afghanistan was 
called R5h and according to one writer, i* was only another term lor 
iy (hill), 



[ 188 ] 

whelmed by Sher Khan's magnanimity and returned to his 
jagir. He determined never again to raise the question of 
Sher Khan's estate, but to remain a friend of his generous 
benefactor. 

Sher Khan's appeal for help to the Mughals had been 
regarded as such a heinous crime by the Afghans that even 
his magnanimity for Muhammad Khan, his foe, and his 
causing the Mughals to withdraw from his territory could 
not enable him to retrieve the esteem in which he had been 
held as Sultan Muhammad's minister by the Afghans. So 
Sher Khan set to work in another direction. He broad- 
casted his opinions on the deplorable political situation of 
the Afghans in general and suggested remedies. He dilated 
on the selfishness of every individual Afghan, condemning 
how each was actuated by the sole ambition of unjustly 
possessing another Afghan's property with the result that 
one and all of them had lost esteem in his eyes as well as in 
the alien's. The remedy for such an unhealthy state of 
affairs, he continued, was obvious. The rich must be 
taught to be more patriotic, induced to help the poorer 
Afghans by employing as many of them as possible in their 
service, and told to work with each other in unison. The 
speeches enabled Sher Khan to recover his popularity and 
reputation. 

Having thus secured and stabilized his position in his 
jdgir, Sher Khan set to familiarize himself with the Mughal 
system of administration. He had profited by the aid 
rendered by the Mughal governor and hence was eager to 
study their system of government. Accordingly, he went 
to Agra in 1527 A. D. Actually, he was disappointed to 
see the Mughal administrative practice. He thought the 
Mughals to be corrupt and oppressive on the poor, i.e., the 
cultivate^ and the soldier, and traced the evil to the ruler's 
lack of personal interest and to too great a dependence on 
his officials. Whether these observations of Sher Khan's, 
ignorant as he yet was of the Mughal affairs, be* sound or 
not he freely gave expression to them and in the city his 
views were known to all. It is said that Babur disliked 



his free expression of opinion and independent spirit 1 and 
at one time thought of throwing him into prison; but the 
officials, Junaid and the KhaRfa possibly because -they 
were bribed, felt interested in him, and allowed him to leave 
Agra without getting into any difficulty. 

Sher Khan's journey to Agra had not been fruitful. 
He failed to reconcile himself to the Mughal system, 
and after his return from Agra concluded that his con- 
nexions with the Mughals had ended for good. So he 
turned again to his Afghan master, Sultan Muhammad, 
who probably had waited all this time for his return. He 
warmly welcomed Sher Khan and excused his long delay. 
He not only had been kind to Sher Khan in the past out 
of a feeling of gratitude for his services to himself and the 
State, but had done him a favour by refusing to listen to 
his rival, Muhammad Khan's suggestion of punishment 
made during his absence. Now when Sher Khan came 
back to him, he reinstated him in his post and appointed 
him tutor to the minor prince, Jalaluddin (1528 A. D.). 

A few months later, Sultan Muhammad died (1528 
A. D.), but his death did not mean any material change to 
Sher Khan; for Jalaluddin 's mother, Dudu Bibi, who had 
become the regent after her husband's death, had perfect 
confidence in him. So Sher Khan's ministry, which might 
now be termed deputy-rulership, continued. Shortly 
afterwards, Dudu Bibi also died. Sher Khan's ability and 
influence with the boy-king increased his power; and as a 
conscientious minister he was busily engaged in the various 
political struggles and reforms of the State. Some of them 
may be briefly described below : 

(a) He had to save the small Afghan kingdom of 
South Bihar from the more powerful ruler, Nasiruddin 



1 B. N. does not .record any such unfavourable opinion of the kin; 
Qanungo disbelieves most of Sher Khan's speeches as well as h 
behaviour at.Babur's dinner table. See B. & O. R. S. Journal of the 
year 1921 A. D. 



C 190 ] 

Kasrat Shah, (15181533 A. D.). Sher han first of all 
Appealed to the Shah's magnanimity and asked him to take 
pity on Jalal, a mere boy, and leave him alone. But 
this bore no fruit, and he had to devise other ways. The 
nearest governor on behalf of the Bengal ruler was 
Makhdum-i-Alam, 1 connected with the king, and reported 
to be enormously rich and also eminently just* Sher 
Khan cultivated friendship with him, which grew to be so 
intimate that it alarmed Nasrat Shah, who turned from the 
Afghans of Bihar, fell upon his brother-in-law, and killed 
him. Sher Khan thus lost in him one of his well-wishers 
but also gained a little; for the large wealth hoarded by 
MakKdum-i-Alam, a wise and careful administrator, came 
into his possession. 

Then a long struggle took place between Nasrat Shah 
and Sher Khan, which ended in the latter's victory, 
,(1529 A. D.). The Bengal ruler retired for the time, leav- 
ing Sher Khan alone. 

(&) In the midst of his wars, another source of 
trouble, so long dormant, became noticeable. With all his 
ability, Sher Khan was considered to be a commoner, i.e. 
devoid of aristocratic blood, 2 and since he was nothing less 
than a dictator, the 'numerous nobles, who had inherited 
rank from Sultan Buhlul's time, i.e. those belonging to 
Lodi, Nuhani, and 42armall tribes, resented his dominance 
in the State. They planned to kill him. The scheme 
failed owing to the vigilance of Sher Khan and his spies, 
of whom he had maintained a large number. But it 
'indicated to him the intensity of the prejudice which these 
high-born nobles bore against him. So he next attempted 
to reconcile them by sharing power with them. He 
proposed a division of work and offered them either of the 
two tasks, the other to be left to him (i) the protection of 

* Nasrat's brother-in-law, his sister being married to Ma^hdum. 

3 Mian Ibrahim, Sher Khan's grand-father, before being a Mansabdtr 
b*d been a, dealer in horses and as such was thought to be low-born. 
Later, when Sher Kb** became king, it was claimed that he was a lineal 
ctescendant of the ShansabanI kings of <Ghflr. 



3 

Bihar against the attacks from Bengal, and (2) the internal 
administration of the country. The Nuhanis refused to 
perform either; instead, they straightway went over along 
with their leader, Jalaluddin to Nasrat Shah, surrendering, 
at the same time, their territories to him. This was the 
worst course for them to choose; for now they appeared as 
traitors to their ciountrymen whom Sher Khan had been 
striving hard to save from the clutches of their powerful 
eastern neighbour. So at the conclusion of his long contest 
with the Nuhanis, he came out successful and his rivals 
withdrew in shame and ignominy. The Nuhanis did not 
end their treachery here, but incited the Bengal ruler to 
make further attacks. 

(c) SherJKhan, for some time now, was the sole admini- 
strator of the country but he knew that the age-long 
prejudices of the Afghans against low birth, would not 
permit him to assume any regal title, and so he contented 
himself with the lesser title of the Hazrat-i-Ald. But, he 
patiently carried on his work of administration by (i) im- 
proving the lot of his ryots, (2) rallying the Afghans round 
him by providing everyone with some sort of service, and 
(3) improving the finances of his small State, by cutting 
down the expenses and developing its resources. He was 
so earnest in his work that he placed all his personal wealth 
at the disposal of the State. His pwn resources were 
considerable; for he had recently obtained Chunar with its 
treasures and also other large sums of money. 1 

(d) His schemes suffered suspension, for some time at 
least, with the arrival of Sultan Mahmud Lodi (1529 A. D.) 
at the invitation of the prominent Bihar nobles. His 
advent was an eye-opener to him; for, instead of relying 
on him who had saved them from the Bengal invasions, 
who had placed his all unreservedly at their disposal, and 
who had considerably improved the lot of all classes of 
people, they preferred to choose a rather obscure and un- 



1 We have already mentioned how he had obtained 
..wealth. Hfe marriage with the rich heiree? Gohar Gosain and gift from 
}' Blbi Fath Mafcka may be mentioned in this connexion. ....... 



known perspn merely on the ground of his birth and 
lineage. This gave a rude shock to all his aspirations, and 
he chose to retire to his humble jdgir rather than join the 
newly chosen leader. But the other nobles did not foresee 
that Sher Khan would take such a step; they would not 
allow him to retire; for they knew full well that without him 
they could achieve nothing. So the new Sultan Mahmud 
as their mouthpiece tried to win him over (i) by giving him 
a written assurance of granting him the whole of south 
Bihar as soon as some other territory was obtained for him- 
self and the other Afghans; and (2) by going to his jdgir 
and making him join in the coming Afghan expeditions 
against the Mughal territory. Sher Ihan joined un- 
willingly, and the expedition brought forth no result. Three 
years later, Mahmud relapsed into obscurity (1532 A. D.). 

With Mahmud's disappearance, Sher Khan's prospects 
again looked up; He was recalled to the charge of the 
State. With his advent, the invasions from the east 
ceased and resources of the State improved. There was 
only one possible danger, an invasion from the Mughals. 
He had hoped that after his decidedly friendly attitude to 
them at the recent battle of Dadrah (August 1532 A. D.), 
the Mughals would welcome his lead in Bihar. His hopes , 
were not wholly realized; for Humayun, after the battle of 
Dadrah besieged him at Chunar (February to June, 1533 
A. D.) and Sher Khan got off on easy terms at the end of 
the siege. 

Humayun was next occupied elsewhere, and Sher 
Khan got respite to organize the administration of the 
country and retaliate on the hostile Bengal. While observ- 
ing about his administration, Abbas especially commends 
his achievement in turning the unruly Afghans into tried 
soldiers. His industry and sagacity reconciled all classes 
including the nobles who had till 1529 A. D, refused to 
recognize him as their leader and had invited Mahmud. 
Although he now became the idol of the Afghans, he re- 
frained irom assuming any regal title; for, having obtained 
all the power he cared for, he did not wish to alarm his , 



[ 193 ] 

Mughal or Bengali neighbours or annoy some of his old- 
fashioned subjects by the assumption of a high-sounding 
title, to which, according to them, he had no claim. 

(e) Next Sher Khan thought of invading Bengal. 
Already as a result of his previous victories his territories 
had extended up to as far east as Surajgarh. 1 In 1534 
A.D. he fought a battle near it as a result of which he 
added further territories as far as Mungir. Two years 
later he added more territories in the same direction as far 
as Sikrigalli 2 (February, 1536 A. D.). Thus, in the four 
years that he was allowed to work without obstruction, he 
not only organized the administration but more than 
doubled the size of the Afghan dominion. 

How this growth of the Afghan power alarmed 
Humayun and precipitated his invasion of Bihar and 
Bengal will be related in the following chapter. 

The chronology of Sher Khan's early career 3 is: 

Farid was born in ... ... ... ... 1472 A. D. 

,, studied at Jaunpur ... ... 1494-97 A. D. 

,, in Mian Hasan's jdglr ... ... 1497-1518 A. D. 

in Agra * ... ... ... 1518-25 A. D. 

Mian Hasan's death ... ... ... ... 1525 A. D. 

Farid in his jdglr ... ... ... 1525-26 A. D. 

with Sultan Muhammad Nuhanl ... 1526-27 A. D. 

Sher IChan returned to his jdgir ... ... ... 1527 A. D. 

,, ,, lost and recovered his jdgir; Muhammad 

Khan Sur was befriended 1527 A. D. 

,, ,, in Agra with Babur ... ... 1527 A. D. 

in his jdglr ... ... 1528 A. D. 

with Sultan Muhammad ... 1528 A. D. 

The death of Sultan Muhammad and Dfidu Bibl 1528 A. D, 

The death of Malfhdum-i-Alam ... ... 1529 A. D. 

Sher Khan's fight with Nasrat Shah ... 1529 A. D. 

Jalaluddln Nuhanl' s retreat to Bengal ... 1529 A. D. 

The arrival of Sultan Mahmud LodI hi Bihar "... 1529 A. D. 

1 Situated on the southern bank of the Ganges and on the old Grand 
Trunk Road, about 20 miles W S W., of Mungir. 

a Situated 35io' N. 87*43' E. on the south bank of the Ganges 
about 268 miles by river from Calcutta. According to Dorn, p. 99, his 
army obtained so much of plunder on this occasion that not one of .them 
was in need of a horse or a camel. 

9 The authorities oi Sher Shah's reign are very sparing in their dates 
.and much of the chronology put in above has been arrived at from 
internal evidences. 

13 



[ 194 ] 

The battle of Dadrah ... ... ... August, 1532 A. D, 

Mahmud retired and Sher Khan again succeeded 

to the leadership ... ... 1532 A. D. 

Humayun besieged Chunar ... February-June, 1533 A. D. 

The death of JSasrat Shah ... ... ... 1533 A. D. 

Battle of Surajgarh ... ... ... ... 1534 A. D. 

Further victories of Sher Khan against Bengal ... 1536 A. D. 



CHAPTER XVII 

HUMAYCN'S INVASION AND CONQUEST OF 

BENGAL (JULY, issy-AUGUST, 
1538 A. D.) 

We have seen in the previous chapters 1 that 
Humayun returned to Agra in August, 1536 A. D., and that 
Muhammad Zaman M. and Muhammad Sultan M. conti- 
nued to plague the Mughals with their insurrections in and 
outside the kingdom for a considerable period. The 
disturbances, however, eventually came to an end. Md. 
Zaman M. retreated to Gujrat hoping to succeed Bahadur 
who had died in February, 1537 A. D., and Md. Sultan M. 
went away to the Afghans in Biharkunda. 

After his return from Mandu, Humayun stayed in 
Agra for a year, 2 from August, 1536 July, 1537 A. D. 
There were several reasons for this : 

(a) Bahadur had recovered Gujrat during March 
April, '1536 A. D. Humayun waited at the capital to 
watch carefully his future movements. If he resumed 
his schemes against the Delhi kingdom, the capital might 
be in danger and it would not be advisable for Humayun 
to move elsewhere. 3 After Bahadur Shah's death in 
February, 1537 A. D., when Md. Zaman M. went to 
Gujrat and attempted to usurp its throne, it was again 
not safe for Humayun to leave the capital lest Md. Zaman 
M. with his seven years' hostility against him should also 
launch an attack against Agra. 

(b) An element of indolence in his own character might 
have held him up so long in Agra. It has been pointed 

i Chapters XIV and XV. 

3 See G. H. N., Badauni, Mirdt-ul-Alam t Zabdat-ut-Tawdrtkh. 

* On a previous occasion Agra was threatened by Tatar Khan, Alam 
Khan's son, and Humayfin had to repel him by sending Askari M. and 
Hindil M. See Supra, Chapter IX; 



[ 196 ] 

out that at Mandu Humayun had increased his daily dose 
of opium and had become a confirmed opium-eater, 1 and 
that his stay at Agra was due to nothing but indolence. 
This may be partly but not wholly true. Humayun 
seemed to work by spurts. After his first campaign against 
the Afghans, 2 he lingered in Delhi to found his capital, 
Din-panah. 3 After a strenuous campaign in Gujrat, he 
let time drift at Mandu during February May, 1536 A. D., 
and now after a hurried retreat to Agra, he did not move 
for a year. We thus observe a period of inertia between 
two periods of intense activity. 

In this connexion it may be remarked that Humayun 
was not a man of dissolute habit, who revelled in wine 
and dissipation. The complaint of his queen, Bega 
Begam, was rather otherwise, viz. that he neglected his 
wives in entertaining his sisters, widowed aunts, and grand- 
aunts. Nor did his addiction to opium interfere with his 
later campaigns in Kabul and, in India. He recovered 
Kabul from his brother, Kamran, and won splendid 
victories over the Afghans in the Punjab. His occasional 
sloth might not, therefore, have proved to be a very grave 
defect in him after all. Whatever might have b$en the 
reasons for his prolonged stay in the capital, Humayun 
had now to bestir himself once more to check Sher Khan's 
activities in Bengal. 

Hindu Beg has been accused of falsely reporting that 
everything was quiet on the eastern front, which delayed 
Humayun's attack on the Afghans by a year or so/ 
The news, however, that Sher Khan's Bengal war had 
ended and that he had undertaken the more peaceful task 
of consolidating his administration 5 might have justified 
Hindu Beg's report to his master. Similarly, it would 
be a mistake to think that Hindu Beg had deceived 

1 G. H. N. Humayttn's words, as quoted by his sister, are, 1 am an 
Opium-eater/ 

* See Chapter IV. 

* For its description see Chapter VI. 

* Abbas: T*ri%h-i~Sh3r Sh&hi. 

5 See chronology at the end of the last chapter. 



: [ 197 ] 

his master by mentioning that Sher Khan was a Mughal 
nobleman and that his achievements only served to 
enhance the credit of the Delhi kingdom. Sher Khan's 
measures would belie any such statement; for it was known 
to everybody that Sher Khan had been consolidating the 
Afghans and conducting campaigns against the ruler of 
Bengal. It was also known that Sher Khan had paid no 
tribute to the Delhi kingdom either for the old territory in 
Bihar or for the new additions. His treaty after the first siege 
of Chunar, December, 1532 A. D., when he had promised 
to provide the Mughal king with a contingent under 
one of his sons, remained a dead letter for the last 3 years 
or more, and now he was again rapidly extending his 
territories towards the east. Thus Humayun could have 
no misconception of Sher Khan and his political ambi- 
tions. If, therefore, he delayed an attack on him, it was 
not because he trusted Sher Khan as an ally but 
because he himself was pre-occupied elsewhere. Besides, 
when Humayun finished his Gujrat campaign, Sher Khan 
had also finished his in Bengal, and Humayun could not 
attack him during a peace. Sher Khan had given him no 
provocation, and had specifically professed, however false- 
ly, to be a well-wisher of the Mughals. Humayun waited 
for some overt act on Sher Khan's part which could give 
him an excuse and an opportunity of challenging him. 
This opportunity came his way the very next year 
(1537 A.D.). 

In order to understand how the opportunity came 
we should review the history of Bengal during the 
preceding four years. Nasrat Shah, the ruler of Bengal, 
was murdered in 1533 A, D. and succeeded by his minor 
son, Alauddin Firflz. The latter ruled for three months 
only, and was then murdered by Nasrat's brother, Ghiyas- 
uddin Mahmud. Though he had made his way to the 
throne through bloodshed he was expected to be an able 
ruler; for during his brother's reign he had wielded almost 
royal power in the greater part of the kingdom. Actually, 
he proved a sad failure. Unlike his father, Husain Shah, 



[ 198 ] 

he was a dissolute and inefficient king. Campos 1 states on 
Faria y Souza's authority 2 that his concubines alone 
numbered 10,000. In Nasrat Shah's time Sher Khan had 
already won several campaigns. Now with the ineffi- 
cient Mahmud on the throne, he reopened his war and with 
a much better prospect. Mahmud was repeatedly beaten in 
war. Seeing no other way, he sought the help of the Portu- 
guese of Chinsura. They came in 1536 A. D. , and defended 
the passes of Teliagarhi and of Sikrigalli; but Sher Khan 
worked round the enemy's flank and threatened Gaur, the 
capital of Bengal. So Mahmud was obliged to desist and 
make a hasty treaty, surrendering 13 lakhs of rupees worth 
of gold. Sher Khan was not content with his success ; for he 
desired to put the ruler of Bengal absolutely out of his way 
before the Portuguese should have time to come to his aid. 
They had been for some time engaged in a conflict with 
Bahadur Shah of Gujrat, and after his death, feared an 
attack from Sultan Sulaiman of Turkey in alliance with 
Bahadur's successor. 3 Hence at that moment they could 
render no aid to Mahmud but promised to do so in the 
year following. 4 Sher Khan, who had seen the Portuguese 
display their valour at Teliagarhi and at Sikrigalli, was 
naturally anxkjus to forestall them, and so he determined 
to carry out an immediate attack on him on the pretext that 
the promised annual tribute had not been duly paid. 5 

Humayun who had been patiently watching the 
developments in the east realized that his opportunity had 
arrived, and immediately made preparations to start for the 
east. He entrusted Delhi to Mir Fakhr All, the stubborn 



1 Campos: History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 31. 

2 His work is named Asia Portuguesa and was publisher in the seven- 
teenth century. Danvers: The Portuguese in India gives a meagre des- 
cription on pp. 42-43. 

3 This invasion actually took place in 1538 A. D. See Danvers, 
.. 426. 

4 Sher Khan's information bureau had correctly informed him that 
Mahm&d's request for help had been answered by the Portuguese, and they 
bad promised to come the next year, i.e., 1538 A. D. 

* See Campos, p. 40. 



[ 199 ] 

antagonist of Prince Kamran at Lahore, 1 whose staunch 
loyalty deserved this signal recognition. Mir Muhammad 
Bakshi was placed at Agra. In order to maintain his 
communications with the two capitals, he posted his cousin, 
Yadgar Nasir M., to Kalpi, Nuruddin Muhammad M. to 
Qanauj, and Hindu Beg to Jaunpur. Having made these 
arrangements he started on the i8th Safar, 944 A. H., (ayth 
July, 1537 A. D.) 2 accompanied by a number of nobles, 
of whom the chief were Askari M., Hindal M., Tardi Beg, 
Bairam Khan, Qasirn Husain Khan, and Jahangir Quli 
Beg. 3 Rumi Khan accompanied as the chief gunner. 
Md. Zaman M. joined him at Chunar. 4 Humayun's 
seraglio also, as was the mediaeval custom, went with him. 

Chunar was one of the important headquarters 
containing a large amount of wealth and was considered by 
Sher Khan the gate to Bihar and Bengal. As the Afghan 
leader had moved towards the east, planning a campaign 
on an extensive scale, Humayun decided to attack it. 
When he reached Chunar in November, 1537 A. D. he 
found, as he had expected, that it was not commanded 
by Sher Khan in person but by his second son, Jalal Khan, 
and brother, Ghazi Khan Sur/' 

When Humayun reached the foot of the fort he heard 
of Sher Khan's movements in the east, and it was appre- 
hended by some of his followers that the Afghan chief 
might finish his campaign with the capture of the capital, 
Gaur. Hence it was debated whether he should press on 



1 See Supra, Ch. V. 

2 There is a discrepancy about the date. Some give 942 A. D. others 
943 or 945 A. H. A. N. is silent on the point. The correct date is given 
by Fanshta and Rtydz-us-Saldtln. For Farishta see R. A. S. B. MS. 
No. 135 fol. i62b, ! 15; for Rtydz see R, A. S. B. edition, p. 141, 1. 4. 

3 For the full list consult any of the following histories: Akbar- 
ndma, Zabdat-ut-Tawdrikh, Rauzat-ut-Tdhirin. 

4 Tyrikh-i-Alft makes him join on the return march. This cannot 
be true; for he died at the battle of Chausa before the Mughal army 
reached Chunar. 

5 Riydz omits the name of Jalal and A. N. calls him Qutb Khan. 
They forget that much of Jalal' s reputation depended upon his valiant 
defence at Chunar, and that he was selected as Sher Shah's successor for 
his ability and courage. 



[ 200 ] 

eastward and relieve his fellow-king of Bengal, or should 
stay where he had arrived, capture the place, and then 
move forward. There was a sharp difference of opinion 
among his officers; the Turki and other foreign command- 
ers, mostly young in age, recommending the latter course; 
while the senior and more experienced officers led by 
Dilawar Khan supported the former. Humayun sided 
with his countrymen, and for this decision he has been 
severely criticized. It is said that he stands condemned 
on his own statement, that he preferred to side with the 
Turki youths rather than follow the sagacious advice of his 
Afghan well-wishers. 1 It may be observed that it is always 
possible to be wise after the event. In favour of Huma- 
yun's decision, however, the following observations may 
be made: 

(a) He had the bitter experience of Gujrat. There he 
had reached Cambay without subjugating 
Champanir or most of the other districts. The 
campaign, which had begun with a spectacular 
series of conquests, ended in a speedy loss of the 
whole province. 

(6) Sher Khan attached great strategic importance to 
Chunar, and had been opposed to its surrender 
to the Mughals, five years back. 2 Now that 
Humayun had at last determined to break with 
him, it was best for him to commence hostilities 
by attacking a place, the enemy attached so 
much value to. Its fall would signal the end of 
the Afghan kingdom of south Bihar. Incident- 
ally, if the treasure had not yet been removed 
from Chunar, it might come into his possession. 

(c) He could never have foreseen that Sultan Mahmud, 
son of the illustrious Alauddm Husain Shah, and 
himself an experienced ruler of the -extensive 



* See Abbds. 

* See Chapter IV. 



C 201 ] 

kingdom of Bengal, would speedily succumb to 
Sher Khan. On the other hand, he would 
expect that Mahmud would prove fitter than 
Nasrat Shah, who had been murdered for his 
tyranny. 1 Mahmud had wielded royal powers 
during his brother's reign, and though he had 
waded his way to the throne through blood, his 
previous experience was expected to stand him 
in good stead; and he had already occupied 
the throne for five years. For this reason 
Humayun would think that Sher Khan's war 
against Bengal would continue for some time. 

(d) It should also be remembered that in November, 

1537 A. D., Humayun was engaged in his own 
affairs against the Afghans, and as such was not 
directly concerned with the question, whether 
Mahmud would be able to resist Sher Khan. 
Humayun 's interest in Mahmud dated from his 
meeting with him after the fall of Gaur into the 
hands of the Afghans. 

(e) Humayun had failed to judge of Sher Khan's 

abilities as leader. He was aware that he was 
an able administrator and skilful commander; 
but he could never realize that the very 
Afghans, whose vast number had been defeated 
only a few years back by a handful of Turks, 2 
would now dare face the very same Mughals 
with confidence, in spite of their having no king 
to lead them. In short, Humayun had not 
been able to observe the vast changes brought 
about by Sher Khan in the Afghan character. 

(/) There may be some truth in the Makhzan-i-Afdghi- 
nah's statement 8 that the suggestion made by 

i See C. H. /., Vol. Ill, p. 273. 

* The battle of Panipat was fought twelve years back and that of the * 
Ghagra only nine years back. 

* See Dora: History of the Afgh&ns, p. 107. 



[ 202 ] 

the Afghans for a rapid march to Gaur was 
prompted more by the greed for plunder than 
by any sound reason. If so, Humayun might 
have hoped to satisfy them after the fall of 
Chunar with its treasure and the subsequent 
conquest of Bengal. 

(g) Supposing Humayun had passed by Chunar, 
where would he have stopped ? He would have 
to go across the whole of Bengal, before he 
could meet Mahmud and render him aid. 
Would he have been justified in dragging on 
the war to the eastern extremity of northern 
India? 1 

It will thus be seen that Humayun 's misreading of 
the situation was mainly due to an under-estimate or mis- 
conception of Sher Khan's abilities. There having been 
no pressing appeal from the king of Bengal, he elected to 
proceed in a leisurely but thorough manner. 

In the meantime, Sher Khan after conquering the 
rest of the territory between Mungir and Gaur, 2 (July 
October, 1537 A. D.), arrived at and besieged Gaur. It 
will thus be seen that from November, 1537 A. D. both 
Sher Khan and Humayun were engaged in sieges at Gaur 
and at Chunar respectively. Although Humayun had 
hoped that, manned as he was by superior gunners, he 
would easily capture the fortress, its siege actually lasted 
for six months, (October, 1537 March, 1538 A. D.), in 
which Jalal Khan showed the greatest heroism. It might 
have been indefinitely prolonged but for the ruse of RumI 
Khan, who severely flogged a slave, and sent him to the 

1 Md. GhiU1's rapid extension of Muslim territory does not afford an 
exact parallel. His task was easy as the opposers were divided into small 
principalities. In the present case the Afghans formed a united body, 
whom it was difficult to ignore and through whose territory it was difficult 
to pass. 

2 According to Trt$h-i-D&&di, his march lay north of the Ganges 
through Tirhoot. In one of the survey maps entitled Gorakhpur and 
AT. Bihdr frontier issued by the Survey of India Department, Muzaffarpur 
Is pat as an alternative name for Tirhoot. 



[ 203 ] 

fortress, where he caused the garrison to believe by the 
bleeding scars caused by the cuts, that he was a deserter. 
As he was also a gunner, he noticed the weak points of 
the defence, and on his return reported to Rumi Khan. 
Thus informed, Rumi Khan changed his tactics, attacked 
from the river side, mounted guns on a raised platform 
formed by tying several boats together, and by a heavy 
bombardment forced the besieged to surrender. It was 
the gunner's last notable achievement; for immediately 
after this he disappears from the scene. Partly because of 
the jealousy of the other commanders at his being given 
the supreme conduct of the siege, 1 and partly because of 
the excessive cruelty which he had perpetrated on the three 
hundred of the captured Afghan gunners, he was poisoned 
in June, 1538 A. D. 2 Humayun, essentially kind by 
nature, must have been horrified to see the wanton amputa- 
tion of the right arms of the captured prisoners, and must 
have ordered the gunner's death. According to the 
Tazkiral-ul-Umara, the death of Rumi Khan took place in 
the year 945 A. H. which commenced on the 3Oth May, 
1538 A. D. so that Rumi Khan lived for two or three 
months, (March June, 1538 A. D.), after his last success. 

The capture of Chunar was only a prelude to what 
might prove an arduous campaign. What was coming 
next? Sher Khan found that his guidance was necessary 
in so many directions, that after making every arrange- 
ment for the conduct of the siege, he placed Khawas Khan 
in charge of the operations, and himself went westward. 
So that he was not very far from the Mughal camp when 
the news of the fall of Chunar reached him, Humayun 
next captured Benares. From there he sent back Hindu 



1 T. A., page 200 says da.L- ^UJljfUa* ^ y c^e^ ' the king had made 
him the sole commander or organizer of (the siege)/ 

2 Jauhar, p. 14 gives both the reasons. I reject A. N.'s statement 
when it blames Muwaiid Beg Duldal for the amputation. Similarly I 
reject T. A. and Tarikh-i-Atfi when they make Humayun responsible 
for the amputation. The former says that 

4*1? 



[ 204 ] 

Beg, the governor of Jaunpur, since Junaid Barlas's 
death in 943 A. H., (June 20, 1536 June 10, 1537 A. D.). 
The governor was honoured with the title of Amw-ul-umard 
and the grant of a golden chair. 1 

Humayun stayed for sometime at Benares and Sher 
Khan at the town of Bihar. 2 Both were agreeable to come 
to some amicable settlement; Humayun, because he found 
that his plan of subjugating the Afghans would not fructify 
immediately; for it had already taken six months to capture 
one fort; Sher Khan, because, as an ever-cautious general, 
he was always willing to adopt peaceful methods even if 
they brought forth less striking results. In order to press 
his terms to a better advantage, Humayun went nearer the 
Afghan territory and stopped at Maner on the river Son. 
The terms 3 Humayun offered to Sher Khan were that the 
latter should surrender all the Afghan territories in Bihar or 
in Bengal and accept a small jagir in Rohtasgarh, in 
Chunar or in Jaunpur. Sher Khan, the victor of so many 
battles, the organizer of all that was good and noble in the 
Afghan government, the idol of the Afghan people and of 
his Hindu subjects, rightly considered the terms to be 
inadequate. Humayun probably realized it and later on 
made a more reasonable suggestion, viz., the surrender by 
Sher Khan of the Afghan territories in Bihar and the reten- 
tion by him of his conquests in Bengal on payment of an 
annual tribute of ten lakhs of rupees. Sher Khan not being 
prepared to risk his all, was willing to accept them for the 
present. He knew that Bihar as an Afghan province was 
too close to the Mughals to be allowed peace and security 



* BaddHni, R. A. S. B. text, 34$ 11. 20-21. 

3 There is much confusion about the name of the place where Sher 
KhAn stayed about this time. It has been called Biharkunda, Jharkand 
(jauhar) or Charkand (G. H. N.). Possibly Biharkunda is only another 
form of Biharkhand and means the land of Bihar. The writer of the 
article: Routes Old and New Bengal: Past and Present, July- 
September number, 1924, draws attention to the fact that the word Bihar- 
konda is used in Todar Mall's rent-roll. The old city of Bihar is nowadays 
named Bihar Sharif. 

* See Darn, p, nx* 



[ 205 ] 

and too small to satisfy the aspirations of the teeming 
Afghans. So, if he had to surrender any portion, he desir- 
ed it to be the western portion of his territory. Bengal, 
large and fertile, though as yet not wholly conquered, 
would be sufficient for the Afghan requirements, and 
lay further away from the Mughal dominion. So both ap- 
peared satisfied; Humayun by an accession of territory 
and Sher Khan's agreement to pay tribute, and Sher Khan 
by a prudent exchange of the large for the small. The 
negotiations had been so amicable that Humayun sent a 
khilat and a horse for the Afghan leader. 

But with all the good-will on both the sides the nego- 
tiations did not mature. The ratification of a treaty in 
mediaeval India involved much delay. Before this parti- 
cular treaty could be ratified, there came the news of the fall 
of Gaur 1 to Khawas Khan. It changed the entire political 
situation. Sher Khan was elated, while Humayun was 
approached for help by the vanquished Mahmud, first 
through a messenger and then by himself shortly after in 
the Mughal camp at Maner. We are not given the details 
of the meeting between Humayun and Mahmud. We only 
know that the ex-king, wounded as he was, appealed to 
Humayun 's generous instincts, and besought him to conduct 
a campaign for his benefit. He gave him assurance of its 
success, since the districts as opposed to the capital, Gaur, 
were yet loyal to him. The statement might have some 
truth in it; for, with a long administrative experience 
as prince and as king, he might have had some hold on 
the country. 

Humayun gave the ex-king an honourable reception 
in his camp, listened patiently to his appeal, and gave up 
the settlement awaiting a ratification. All this he did, not 
for any earthly gain Mahmud did not promise him any- 
thing, either in land or in money , but simply because he 



1 Gaur fell on Monday, the 6th Zulqada, 944 A. H,=6th April, 
1558 A. D. 



[ 206 ] 

felt it to be a moral obligation to succour his fellow-king, 1 
even though it might mean the loss of Bihar and ten lakhs 
of rupees a year. 

There was also a second reason for this change in 
Humayun's attitude towards the Afghans. So far Sher 
Khan had surrendered no territory. When Humayun's 
men went to obtain possession of Rohtasgarh where lay 
the recently-transf erred treasure of Bengal, it was refused, 
and they returned without securing the surrender of the 
fort. 

Sher Khan, too, seemed indifferent to the breaking off 
of the negotiations. Even before the settlement of the 
terms, he had secured Rohtasgarh from a local Raja, and 
after the fall of Gaur, had transferred all its wealth to it. 
He prized its possession and was unwilling to relinquish 
it to the Mughals, and when they went there, they had to 
return disappointed. 

After the failure of negotiations, he made much of his 
surrenders and supplications to Humayun. He made a 
lengthy speech to his Afghan followers, pointing out how 
he had presented to the Mughals the very home of the 
Afghans in India, surrendered the insignia of sovereignty, 
and agreed to pay tribute for his possessions in Bengal. 
His sole object in making such sacrifices was to appease 
them and thereby obtain a haven of safety for the Afghans. 
He further stated that Humayun had considered it to be a 
fair settlement and agreed to the terms, but that then, all 
of a sudden and for no cause whatever he had changed 
his mind. The only conclusion that he could draw was 
that Humayun was bent on the total destruction of the 
Afghans. If such were his intentions, he had no other 



1 In the 1 5th and i6th centuries, we get several examples of such a 
succour, e.g. : 

(a) Mahmud Begarha rendered aid to Nizam Shah Bahmam. 

(b) Muzafiar Shah of Gujrat rendered aid to Mahmud II of Malwa. 

(c) Shah Tahmasp of Persia rendered aid to Humayun to recover 

Qandahar. Is the last a recognition of Humayun 'a gesture 
towards Mahmud of Bengal? 



[ 207 ] 

choice than to fight to a finish for the very existence of the 
Afghans. 

We need not discuss at length whether Humayun 
wanted to destroy the Afghans or conquer Bengal for the 
Mughals. We know that even if the first object had 
initially moved him, he abandoned it later on and was pre- 
pared to make terms with the Afghans. Next, when a still 
weaker person, viz. Mahmud, had appealed 'to him, he 
had thrown away all the advantages obtained from the 
Afghans, and gallantly gone to help one who had offered 
him nothing so far. If the wounded and heirless Mahmud's 
death 1 rendered Humayun 's generous gesture ineffectual 
and compelled him to include Bengal in his kingdom, 
Humayun surely could not be blamed for it. 

Humayun proceeded eastward. He himself possessed 
a large army, and the fugitive Sultan Mahmud had also 
some followers. As it was impossible to make commissariat 
arrangement for the whole army if it remained together, the 
king made two divisions of it. One group, formed of some 
thirty thousand troops, was placed under Muwaiid Beg, 
Sultan Muhammad Duldai, Jahangir Quli Beg, Mir Buzka, 
Tardi Beg, Biri Barlas, Mubarak Qarmali, etc. ; the other 
under his direct command was to remain about seven 
cos in the rear. The Mughals suffered from one serious 
blemish, namely, they had no efficient Intelligence depart- 
ment. Actually while Humayun was staying at Patna 
during his march and the other division under Muwaiid Beg 
was camping seven cos eastward, the latter came across 
Sher Khan's men. Muwaiid Beg was an incompetent 
commander, possessing no initiative. Instead of attacking 
the enemy immediately, he hesitated. Cowed probably by 
Sher Khan's reputation, he consulted Humayun, who was 
staying behind, and thus let slip his opportunity. 

So far, i.e., up to Patna, Humayun followed the route 
his father had taken, though it was not the old Grand Trunk 

1 Mahmtid's children had been murdered by the Afghans. 



[ 208 ] 

Road which ^proceeded from Benares to Sahasram 
(Sasaram), and then struck north-east through Ghatauli 
and Daudnagar to Patna. It had the advantage of being 
the shortest route to Bengal. It also enabled the Mughals 
to keep close to the Ganges. The river communication 
facilitated heavy transport, including the carriage of the 
large number of the non-combatants, and women and 
children. 

From Patna eastward, the road followed the course of 
the Ganges by Barh, Nawab-ganj, Surajgarh, Mungir, 
Bhagalpur, and Kahalgaon (Colgaon). At the place men- 
tioned last, Sultan Mahmud died, it is said, of a broken- 
heart but more probably of the wound received during the 
flight from Gaur. His corpse was taken to Gaur and 
buried in Sadullahpur, one of its suburbs. 1 

Sher Khan in the meantime was busy transferring 
the Bengal wealth from Gaur to Rohtasgarh, and in order 
to accomplish this work, he had ordered his son, Jalal 
Khan, to make a stand at Teliagarhi and defend the place 
as long as it was possible without any risk to his army. At 
Mungir, Humayun knew of Jalal's resolve to resist him. 

Teliagarhi is a fort and a- pass combined, and the river 
Ganges skirts it on the north. At present it lies close to 
the East India Railway line about seven miles east of 
Sahibganj. In the sixteenth century it was a place of 
strategic importance and was known as ' the key of Bengal.' 
From Tieffenthaler's sketch of the place, it is clear that the 
narrow space between the Ganges and lower slopes of the 
Rajmahal hills, was occupied by the fort and battlemented 
walls on the two flanks, leading to the hills on one side, 
and .to the river on the other. On the hill side the walls 
ended on a rapid rivulet. 2 



1 See Malda Gazetteer, p. 20. 

3 Raymond, the translator of Siyar-ul-tnutakhkhirin has a poor 
opinion of its strength. See Bengal District Gazetteer: Santal Par- 
ganas, p. 284. 

The name comes from the Hindi word telia which means black, as the 
place is full of black stones. 



[ 209 ] 

Here it was that Jalal Khan made a stand against the 
whole Mughal army. He had been forbidden to take the 
offensive or make any attack on the Mughals ; for a defeat 
might frustrate Sher Khan's plans. But Jalal, who was 
an impetuous youth, lost all patience, and disdaining the 
cautious advice of his amirs who had reminded him of his 
father's instructions, came into the open, fought with a 
section of the Mughals, and killed Mubarak Qarmali and 
Abul Fath Lanka and a considerable number of soldiers. 
He was satisfied with this achievement, and then confined 
himself to the defence. The enemy's heroism, the strength 
of the pass, and the occasional setting in of the rains, delay- 
ed Humayun for a month (June, 1538 A. D.). Sher Khan 
utilized the period in transferring his wealth. When it was 
accomplished, he recalled Jalal Khan. The Afghans 
retired so quietly that the Mughals were unaware of their 
movements another proof of the inefficiency of their scout- 
ing system and when next they moved forward, they 
found no trace of their enemy and occupied the empty fort. 

Henceforward, to Humayun's good fortune, he had 
an easier journey and met with no opposition. Along the 
whole distance from Teliagarhi to Udhuanala, about thirty- 
five miles, the hills are so close to the river Ganges, that it 
was always possible for a determined enemy to obstruct 
the Mughal invaders at every step. But Sher Khan was 
just then occupied in crossing or skirting the Jharkhand 1 
a term used for the unexplored wooded territory stretching 
for about eighty miles south of the Ganges and was in 
no mood to fight with Humayun. This explains why the 
Mughals were able to pass easily from Teliagarhi to 
Sikrigalli. Sikrigalli, like the other place, consists of a 
narrow, winding road of nine to twelve feet in width, cut 
through a rock arid hemmed in on both sides by impene- 
trable jungle. There were fortifications also so that 



1 Jharkhand is a general term for a large wooded territory. Sher 
Khan, according to Qanungo, went to Sherpflr and thence struck west- 
ward. His object was to reach Sarath, follow the Grand Trunk Road, 

reach Sahasram and Rohtasgarh. 



Sikrigalli formed another formidable barrier to the passage 
into Bengal. As against the garki or the fortifications of 
the former place, the long lane of Sikri suggests the gullet, 
hence it has been called galli. 

Humayun reached Gaur, probably without crossing 
the river which then flowed east of Gaur, 1 in about a month 
and a half, (middle of August, 1538 A. D.=945 A. H.). 

A list of the important dates of this chapter is given 
here: 

(1) Hurnayun started from Agra i8th Safar 944 A. H.= 

27th July, 1537 A. D, 

(2) Humayun reached Chunar, Jumadal-awwal 944 A. H. = 

October, 1537 A. D. 

(3) The siege of Chunar by Humayun, Jumadal-awwal- 

Shawwal 944 A. H. = October, 1537 A. D. 
March, 1538 A. D. 

(4) Humayun at Patna Zuihtjj 944 A. H. = May, 1538 A. D. 

(5) The death of Ruml Khan, Muharram 945 A. H. = 

June, 1538 A. D. 

(6) Sher Khan's conquest from Mungir to Gaur 

Safar to Jumadal-awwal = July-October, 1537 A. D. 

(7) Sher Khan besieged Gaur, Jumddal-ukhrd-Zulqada 

944 A. H. = November, 1537 A. D. 

(8) The fall of Gaur 6th Zulqada 944 A. H. = 6th April, 1538 A. D. 

(9) Sher reached Gaur Zulqada 944 A. H. = April, 1538 A. D. 

(10) Sher removed treasures from Gaur to Rohtasgarh 

Muharram-Safar 945 A. H. = June-July, 1538 A. D. 

(n) Humayun reached Teliagarhi 

ist Muharram 945 A. H. =end of May, 1538 A. D. 

(12) Humayun stayed at Teliagarhi 

Muharram 945 A. H. =June, 1538 A. D. 

(13) Humayun reached Gaur 

2oth Rabiul-awwal 945 A. H. = I5th August, 1538 A. D. 



See Malda Gazetteer, p. 85. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

HUMAYCN AT GAUR AND HIS RETREAT 
, TO CHAUSA (AUGUST, 1538 TO 
APRIL, 1539 A. D.) 

Humayun reached Gaur in the middle of August, 
1538 A. D. Since Sultan Mahmud was dead and his 
children had been murdered by Jalal Khan, he himself 
had to take over the charge of the government. In order 
to show respect to the late ruler, he had his corpse brought 
from Kahalgaon (Colgaon) to Sadullahpur, and buried it 
there. 1 

Gaur to-day is marked by a number of mounds and 
though at one time it stretched over an area of fifteen to 
twenty square miles, no single village in the locality bears 
the name to-day. Both the names, Pandua and Gaur, 
seem to have been completely forgotten. 

But in the mediaeval days Gaur 3 or as it was called 
alternately, Lakhnauti or Lakshmanavati, played an 
, important part in the history of Bengal. Founded by one 
of the Pal kings, it stood at the confluence 
of ^e Mahananda and the Ganges, so that 
the latter flowed to the east of the town, 
instead of west, as it does to-day. After the Pals came the 
Sena kings, of whom the last, Lakshman Sena, is said to 
have given the name Lakhnauti to the place. 

After Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar's 
occupation of Bengal, 3 he retired to Gaur and made it his 
capital. It remained so till Shamsuddui Iliyas Shah's 
reign, 1343-57 A. D. When Firuz Shah Tughluq of Delhi 
invaded Bengal in 1353-54 A.D., Iliyas prudently retired to 

2 Situated 2O52' N. and 80 10' E., some ten miles S. W. of English 
Bazar town. 
^ In H97-9 A. D. C. H. /. Vol. Ill, p. 46 puts it in 1202 A. D. 



[ 212 ] 

Pandua on the other side of the river and later on to Ikdala, 
on the Brahmaputra, and allowed Firuz Shah to bestow 
in his vanity the name of Firiizabad on the unconquered 
Pandua. After Firuz Shah's retreat, Iliyas settled down 
at Pandua which continued to be the capital of Bengal till 
Jalaluddm Muhammad Shah's (Jadu's) reign, 1414-31 A.D. 
He returned to Gaur which remained the capital till 
Humayun's time. 

To-day, Gaur lies in ruins as a site of antiquarian 
interest. The Adina Masjid, the two Sona Masjids, the 
Firuz Minor, the Ddkhil Darwaza, the Qadam Rasul, 
tombs of Akhi Sirajuddin and Shah Nimatullah Wali, and 
the three tanks of Sdgardihi, Piydsbdri, 1 and Kumhirpir, 2 
are of considerable interest to the archaeologist. Several of 
these monuments, e.g., the Minar, the Darwaza , the sacred 
foot-print, and the Akhi's tomb, are ascribed to Sultan 
Alauddm Husain Shah (1493-1518 A. D.) and to his son, 
Nasiruddin Nasrat Shah, (1518-1533 A. D.). In Sadullah- 
pur, the suburb to the north-west, lies the tomb, as already 
stated, of Sultan Mahmud, whom Humayun went to 
succour. 

Humayun changed the name of Gaur. The word 
Gaur sounded like the Persian word ^ which signifies a 
grave, 3 and so he changed the name to Jannatdbdd, the 
abode of heaven.. Sher Khan's long siege of it accom- 
panied by a thorough plunder 4 and now its occupation by 
the Mughals, had drained it of its wealth. The inhabitants 
had been reduced to such an abject state of poverty that 
they had not money enough to clear the city of the debris 
or of the putrid corpses that befouled the atmosphere. So 
Humayun, on its occupation, gave directions for cleaning 
the city and repairing the public buildings. 

1 Its water was reputed to be so poisonous that criminals condemned 
to death were, made to drink it. See A. A. Vol., II, p. 123. 

2 So named because its crocodiles were believed to represent a saint 
and disciples. See Mdlda Gazetteer. 

3 For the pun on the word see T. A. (N. K. Text), p. 331, 1. 2. 

4 See Dorn, p. 106 where 4he author says, * All Bengal fell a prey 
to the Afghans, whp unrestrained, were occupied in seizing the wearied 
and unarmed.' J - - . 



t 213 1 

He then wanted to make a settlement of the conquered 
provinces. But Sher Khan, with whom it was to be made, 
had gone far to the west; and so in his absence, he made 
a makeshift arrangement by distributing the districts of 
the province among his nobles, hoping that the assurances 
of Sultan Mahmud, that the country was loyal to him and 
not to Sher Khan, would prove true. All this took one 
month from his arrival in the middle of August, 1538 A. D. 1 

This is all that can be mentioned about Humayun's 
Bengal administration, omitting, of course, his determina- 
tion of the order of precedence of the different Muslim 
monarchs by assigning them places in his court in relative 
proximity to his throne. 2 In fact, almost all the Muslim 
historians are out to accuse him of gross negligence in 
administration. In their own characteristic fashion, they 
tell us that after a month, Humayun gave up stirring out of 
his palace, and all except those who could meet him in the 
palace, ' waited to get a glimpse of him as of a new moon 
and even then their desire was not fulfilled/ 3 The 
Khulasat-ut-Tawdrikh* tells us that in the palace he held 
many festive assemblies ( C; ^^) but was careless of State 
matters. The Tdrikh-i-Ddudi wishes us to believe that a 
woman was the cause of all this, one said to be the most 
beautiful lady of her day, who was presented to Humayun 
by Sher Khan with the object of keeping the Mughal king's 
attention away from the concerns of the State. Nimat- 
ullah, the author of the Makhzan-i-Afdghina, says that Sher 
Khan decorated the palace in Gaur in diverse ways to 
engage the king's interests. Again, some writers make 
two almost contradictory statements in the same breath, 
namely (i) Humayun stayed in Bengal because he liked the 



1 = 2oth Rablul-awwal 945 A. H. 

2 R. T. says that he had assigned to the Sultan of Turkey the seat 
next to him on the right and to the Shah of Persia on the left and to the 
king of Twr&n a seat near the throne. The reforms mentioned by 
Khwandamlr are of an earlier date. See Elliot and Dowson, Vol. V, 
pp. 119-24. 

3 See Jauhar. * 

i ' * Jauhar agrees with him. See Stewart's translation, p. 18. 



I 214 ] 

tountry, and (2) diseases took heavy toll of his men; 
the country was thus unsuitable. They deepen the picture 
jby saying that the king was unaware of all this, and in bliss- 
mi ignorance continued to enjoy his time in Jannatdbdd. 

It is difficult to believe the picture these writers have 
painted with relish of Humayun's doings during his eight- 
month sojourn in Bengal. Humayun's moral character 
had always been above reproach, and the decorations 
Nimatullah speaks of could not have kept him engaged all 
day and* night for full eight months. Nor does it stand to 
reason that Humayun was so much engrossed in frivolities 
that he would betray stoical indifference to the sufferings 
said to have been caused by diseases to his camp and 
soldiery. In fact, the entire picture of Humayun's moral 
turpitude, as it were, drawn by these writers is so incon- 
gruous with his general character that we feel disposed to 
reject it prima facie. And we are further strengthened 
in our opinion by the fact that the account of his Bengal 
campaign, coming as it does, in the main, from the Afghan 
sources, must necessarily have been vitiated by personal 
prejudices and political passions. A devil's advocate 
always deepens a crime : he cannot but damn. 

No doubt, Humayun had no constructive scheme up 
his sleeve : nor did he attempt to evolve any. Yet, it is 
hard to imagine, that he possessed no political acumen or 
administrative sense. At any rate, we should be prepared 
to credit him with the foresight an average Mughal trooper 
showed, namely, the foresight of realizing that Bengal was 
absolutely unsuitable for the Mughals on account of its 
t>ad climate. We may be permitted to put forward some 
suggestions and surmises on the point in the absence of 
very specific and strong arguments. In the first place, 
Humayun was a man of generous instinct. He cared for 
his brothers, one of whom Askari was with him. With 
Babur's words constantly ringing in his ears 1 it is difficult 

See G. H. N. t foi. igb, A. #., p. 119. 



C 

to believe that he would willingly endanger the health or 
life of AskarL Nor would he be a callous witness to the 
death of so many followers. In the second place, as we 
have seen, he had hoped that the links in the chain of 
communication between Delhi and Gaur would stand* 
This might to-day be regarded as an abortive hope but as 
long as he was not informed of the desertion of his two 
governors, Hindal and Nuruddin at Tirhoot and Qanauj 
respectively, he was justified in relying on the arrange- 
ments he had made. Their departure was not immediate- 
ly communicated to him and for this, the defective inform- 
ation bureau of the Mughals was responsible. 

In the third place, even now he could not realize how 
formidable or how determined his enemy was. He 
regarded Sher Khan as a great civil administrator and 
benefactor of the Afghans. But he was not aware that 
he was also invincible in war; and he probably argued 
that the successes, achieved by Sher Khan so far, were 
after all against the weaker ruler of Bengal and not against 
the Mughals. 

In the fourth place, we may fancy that the earlier part 
of his stay at Gaur was a period of ill health. It would 
furnish an explanation for the limitations and shortcomings 
of his work in Bengal, namely, the neglect of the adminis- 
tration, the lack of touch with his soldiery, and his 
continued stay in Gaur even when his men and animals 
were dying in large numbers. Thus he would find on his 
recovery, say after four or five months, that the military 
situation had changed for the worse. By evacuating 
Tirhoot, Hindal had allowed Sher Khan an opportunity of 
extending and consolidating his territories, in the regions 
to the west of Bengal. 

Humayun must have shuddered to think of the 
disaster Hindal's indiscretion foreboded for the kingdom. 
He therefore sent Shaikh Buhlul to dissuade the prince 
from his seditious intentions and persuade him to come to 
the king's aid. The negotiatio^ was absolutely necessary ; 
for, supposing Sher Khan had been defeated or had 



[ 216 J 

allowed the Mughals to pass through unimpeded to Delhi, 
would it have been possible for Humayun to resume 
the reins of government at Delhi without opposition from 
the many miscreants, Zahid Beg, Khusru Beg Kokultdsh, 
Hafi Muhammad, son of Baba Qushqa, Nuruddm 
Muhammad, with Hindal at their head ? 

Humayun's conquest of Bengal, judged from the 
results it led up to, was a failure. He failed to realize the 
two objects that had initially moved him the restoration 
of Bengal to its rightful ruler, Sultan Mahmud, and the 
annihilation of the Afghans. Now he appeared selfish 
in annexing Bengal and possibly North Bihar. By his 
continued inactivity he allowed his foe to come in between 
himself and Delhi. Lastly he stultified his attitude towards 
the Afghans by his cancellation of the late negotiations 
with Sher Khan, to whom he thus allowed an opportunity 
of working up the Afghan sentiment to a desperate degree 
against himself. Above all, his long absence from the 
capital had encouraged many an ambitious spirit under 
the vain Hindal to rise up in arms against him. In short, 
his Bengal campaign was one of the presages of the doom 
which was soon to overtake the Delhi kingdom. 

Shaikh BuhluTs embassy to Hindal failed to produce 
any satisfactory result. Instead of going to the aid of his 
eldest brother, the king, Hindal at Zahid Beg's suggestion, 1 
chose to place himself on the throne and when the Shaikh 
protested, he killed him. 2 Sher Khan too, noticing how 
matters were taking a turn in his favour, went forward, 
captured Benares, killed Mir Fazli, the governor, and 
thus broke the third link in the chain of the Mughal 

1 Zahid Beg was Humay tin's brother-in-law, and had been offered the 
governorship of Bengal. He insolently refused and Humayun threatened 
to kill him. So Zahid fled and set Hindal against the king. 

3 The year of the Shaikh's death is given by the chronogram 



' verity the martyr died ' = 945 A. H. Probably the death occurred 
in the beginning of January, 1539 A. D. How partial Gulbadan Begam 
is to her full brother, Hindal, may be seen from her assertion that the 
Shaikh was killed for his treachery to the Mughals. It is not likely 
that the Shdikh who was the spiritual guide to Humayun would turn 
against his royal disciple. 



communications, the first two having already been broken 
in the loss of Tirhoot and in the desertion of his post by 
the governor of Qanauj. Besides, about this time Hindu 
Beg, the governor of Jaunpur, died, and further disloca- 
tion took place in the work of administering the eastern 
provinces. The acting governor, Baba Khan Jalair, 
either did not possess the requisite authority of a 
permanent incumbent or was too weak to exercise his 
power. But this defect disappeared after the accidental 
arrival of a brave nobleman in Yusuf Beg, son of 
Ibrahim Beg Chabuq. Sher Khan had ordered Jalal 
Khan to move forward and capture the place. The two 
Mughal chiefs together now put up a brave fight in which 
Yusuf was killed, but before his death he had done the 
good service of putting heart into Baba Khan, so that even 
after Yusuf 's death, the other continued to defend himself, 
and sent an appeal for aid both to Humayun and to his 
governors, at Delhi and at Agra. The king's situation did 
not allow him to move out of Gaur. Mr Fakhr Ali 1 and 
Mir Muhammad Munshi, the governors of Delhi and 
Agra respectively, stepped in to render aid. Mir Muham- 
mad Munshi requested Hindal to go forward, and he 
himself proceeded to JCalpi to stir up Yadgar Nasir M.. 
'. Yadgar Nasir M. willingly promised to supply money and 
food for the relieving force, and also proceeded to meet 
Hindal M. on the border of the Agra district to discuss 
plans to be adopted to relieve Baba Beg and fight the 
Afghans. 

In the meantime Zahid Beg who had met Nuruddin 
at Qanauj, persuaded him to go along with him, and 
the two together reached Hindal M.. Hindal had been 
cogitating in his mind whether he should yield to Mir 
Fakhr Ali's and Yadgar Nasir Mirza's persuasions, when 
the two rebels (Zahid Beg and Nuruddin)) reached him.* 
He acted up to their evil counsel and slackened his 

1 According to Erskine, The History of India, Vol. II, p. 160, Mir 
Ali was acting under the guidance of Yadgar Nasir M., the governor of 
Kalpl. 

2 For some interesting details, see C. H. I., Vol. IV, pp. 31-32. 



t 218 ] 

preparations for a campaign. It was now that Shaikh 
Btihlul 1 arrived only to suffer death for attempting to stop 
Hindal from rebellion. 

Even now, Humayun's cause was not lost; for 
though Hindal M. assumed the title of a king, 3 the ladies 
of the palace as well as the two deputies continued to 
exercise their influence. Amongst the ladies, HindaTs 
mother, Dildar Begam's efforts have been specially men- 
tioned. On the day of Hindal's accession, she put on 
a blue robe as a sign of mourning and when the Mirzd 
asked her the reason, she answered, ' Why do you care for 
me? I am wearing mourning for you; you are young 
and on account of the instigation of unreflecting sedition- 
mongers, you have lost the true way; you have girded 
your loins for your own destruction/ 3 Hindal, who had 
been primarily responsible for Buhlul's destruction and 
gone very far towards rebellion, paid no heed to his 
mother's protests. 

Mir Muhammad Munshi* also protested, but he could 
not be expected to succeed where Hindal's mother had 
failed. Still, it is said, becoming desperate, he addressed 
Hindal thus, ' You have killed Buhlul, why do you delay 
about me ?' 5 Mir Fakhr Ali had gone to Yadgar Nasir M. 
at Kalpi after Hindal's rebellion and finding him in a more 
reasonable mood the two together decided not to let Delhi, 
at least, pass into the hands of Hindal. So avoiding 
Agra where Hindal had proclaimed himself king, they 
reached Delhi. Now realizing that he had missed the 

1 Shaikh Buhlul was the elder brother of Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus of 
Gwilior, He has been extolled by all the contemporary writers, e.g., 
Abul Fazl and Badaunl. Only the author of the Tdrikh-i-Rashidi speaks 
of him as a sorcerer. 

2 There are no coins extant in his name. This was probably due to 
the state of confusion in the kingdom; also to the feet that he had reigned 
for a very brief period. 

* s See A. N., p. 339. 

* Called also Badalfhshi and Bafchshi. Probably he came from 
Badaljchshan and as the king's deputy was specially interested in the office 
Of the Bdkhshi. ' 

Both the Ska#h and the Mir were acting together in collecting 
supplies and mofcey for ifce campaign. 



opportunity of securing Delhi, Hindal moved towards it, 
but anticipated as he was, failed in his object. Hindal 
now determined on a siege and the defenders on a stubborn 
resistance. They were fully aware that, left to themselves, 
they would be no match for the more numerous besiegers, 
and so they wrote to JKamran informing him of Hindal's 
doings and their present condition, and implored him to 
come to their aid. Kamran was in two minds: he had 
not been able to decide whether he should act on behalf 
of Humayun or himself. He at last decided that he 
should punish Hindal for his pretensions, and forthwith 
proceeded towards Delhi with a large and well-trained 
army. When he reached Sonpat, about twenty-seven miles 
to the north-west of Delhi, Hindal lost heart, abandoned 
the siege, and took shelter in Alwar. Kamran pushed 
on and reached Delhi. But the cautious Fakhr Ali, little 
realizing the object Kamran had in view, refused him 
entrance into the fort and tactfully persuaded him to deal 
with Hindal first. Hence Kamran marched towards Agra 
and reached there in a few days. Hindal now saw the 
frustration of all his plans and, in a mood of contrition, 
let his mother, Dildar Begam, bring him into Kamran 's 
presence with the hangman's rope round his neck. The 
submission secured for him and his followers a pardon. 

After the suppression of Hindars sedition, it seemed 
very likely that Humayun would now be getting some 
reinforcement. At Agra more than one prince had 
been present Kamran, Hindal, and Yadgar Nasir, the 
last-named having arrived from Delhi. Of these, Kamran 
was ruling over a hardy race, and possessed a fairly 
extensive territory, stretching from the Hindukush to the 
Punjab. If he alone had made up his mind to go to 
Humayun 's aid, he would have been able to rescue him 
from his miserable plight. 

The princes met and deliberated, made some slight 
demonstration by moving their camp to the eastern bank 
of the Jamna, as if a campaign were about to start in right 
earnest. But it all ended in smoke* Possibly they 



[ 220 ] 

Abandoned the campaign because they could not decide 
on the prince who would conduct it, none being willing to 
obey another. Thus, Humayun, left in the cold, had to 
shift as best he could for himself. 

Let us for a moment take stock of Sher Khan's 
activities. He had already taken possession of Benares, 
later planned an extensive campaign and captured Kara, 1 
Bahraich, Qanauj, and Sambhal, one after another. 
Even Jaunpur, so stoutly defended by Baba Beg Jalair, 
now fell. So that by the middle of January, 1539 A. D. 
(Shaban, 945 A. H.), the whole of North India between the 
Kosi and the Ganges, a stretch of territory more than five 
hundred miles in length came into his possession. Three 
facts may be noticed in this connexion, (i) the territories 
south of the Jamna and immediately north of it remained 
in the possession of the Mughals, (2) in Bihar, all territory 
from the Himalayas to the wild Gondwana was occupied 
by the Afghans, and hence if Humayun wished to retrace 
his steps to Delhi, he must pass through the enemy's 
territories; (3) wherever possible Sher Khan introduced 
civil administration and fiscal regulations immediately 
after the conquest of a district, and thus secured the good 
will of the population, which stood him in good stead in 
his future campaigns. 

Realizing that he was left alone with his hopes shatter- 
ed, and a reduced and suffering army, Humayun made 
just one feeble effort to get out of his predicament. He 
divided his army into three divisions, sent one with 
Dilawar Khan Lodi, the Khan-Khanan, in advance, to 
Mungir; retained the second with himself to follow the 
Khan-Khanan at greater leisure; and the third, about 
five thousand in number and consisting of picked soldiers 2 
was to be left behind at Gaur under Jahangir Quli Beg. 
We cannot approve the measures as sound. His army of 

1 Variously spelt as Kurrah, Karra, etc. It is situated on the 
Qanges, 40 miles N, W. of Allahabad. 

2 T. A. (N. K. Text), p. 204, 1. 3 and Bad&Zni (N. K Text), p. 93* 
I 29, have 



emaciated and fever*stricken soldiers could have had some 
chance of winning a victory against the Afghans, if only it 
had been kept together. By dividing it into three groups, 
he weakened it still further. The result of these ill-con- 
ceived measures may easily be imagined. The Khan- 
Khanan, when he arrived at Mungir, had to fight against 
Khawas Khan; he (Khan-Khanan) was defeated and cap- 
tured practically with his whole army. Similarly, Jahangir 
Quli Beg stayed in peace at Gaur till Sher Khan's arrival. 
The Afghans then captured the place, and the whole 
garrison surrendered to the enemy. The Mughal contin- 
gent was at Sher Khan's orders exterminated. 

When Humayun realized the failure of his first 
measure, he appealed to Askari, who had accompanied 
him, to save him from the perilous situation, and agreed 
to grant him any four requests that he would make. 
Askari's first instincts were to ask for a plenty of dancing 
girls, eunuchs, and articles of pomp and sensual indulgence, 
but later he changed his mind and asked for soldiers, 
noted noblemen, and monetary resources to maintain the 
army during the march. All this Humayun gladly and 
let us fancy with a feeling of gratitude granted, and added 
to Askari's list of officers, the names of Qasim Qaracha 
Khan, Toglan Beg Koka, and Baba Beg Kurbeg. Thus 
equipped, Askari marched as an advance-guard, a few 
miles ahead of the main army, along the northern bank 
of the Ganges, reached opposite Kahalgaon (Colgaon), and 
a few days later opposite Mungir, 1 where the king joined 
him soon after. 

Up to that point the Mughal army had been marching 
along the left bank of the river. As the Ganges in the 
sixteenth century flowed east of Gaur and the Bhagirathi 
on the west, he must have crossed the former somwhere, 
possibly near the capital, and so far had met with no 
trouble. 



1 G. H. N. fol. 32b. 



[ 222 ] 

By this time (March, 1539 A. D.), further losses were 
reported to him, namely, of Ajudhya and Chunar, and 
the Mughal governor of Jaunpur accompanied by Mirak 
Beg and Mughal Beg fell back eastward to joint the main 
Mughal army proceeding westward. The arrival of the 
large contingents of troops gave rise to the food problem. 
Although Humayun was well-supplied with money, the 
provision ran short, and price of grain rose several-fold. 1 

At Mungir, a new adviser appeared. Instead of rely- 
ing on Askari, whom he had himself entrusted with the 
conduct of the army, Humayun now listened to Muwaiid 
Beg. We do not know his qualifications in military 
matters. All the same, he came forward to make the 
astounding suggestion that the king should not change his 
route but adopt the one that he had followed on the onward 
journey. Although Humayun knew of the dangers of 
passing through a hostile territory, he did not very much 
care about the route, chose to please his favourite, and 
accepted his suggestion. 2 So the whole army crossed the 
.Ganges and proceeded along the right or southern bank, 
by the main highway, viz., the Grand Trunk Road of 
mediaeval times. 

Such imprudence on his part cost him much; for, 
though he got the benefit of a better road, and hence of 
a rapid retreat, it also gave his enemies an advantage. 
It was thoroughly under Sher Khan's control, and hence- 
forth all the movements of the Mughal army and ot 
Humayun himself were communicated to Sher Khan 
by his vigilant scouts. Also, in contrast with the more 
northern route which would have meant the crossing of 
narrower rivers and so far as the Ganges was concerned, 
no crossing until within a hundred miles of Agra or 



1 Ibid. T. A., p. 201. Baddunl, p. 94. One principal reason for 
the shortage was . that most of the Mughal amirs had lost their jdgirs in 
Bengal and Bihar. 

* It was opposed by most of the other nobles. See Erskine, Vol. II, 
p. 156- 



C 2*3 I 

Delhi, Humayun chose the southern route. Should he" 
have desired to recross the Ganges, it would have been 
difficult to do so; for the enemy controlled the locality and 
possibly the bridges on the river. A vigilant and active 
enemy would entirely cut off the Mughal army at such a 
juncture. It was in fact Humay tin's choice of the southern 
route that made Sher Khan decide to engage himself in a 
battle with the Mughals. 

Thus aimlessly and in blissful ignorance, Humayun 
made his way to Bihiya, 1 a subdivision of Bhojpur, and 
thence to Chausa, where he again crossed the river. We 
consider Huinayun's performance fairly creditable in view 
of the fact that the Afghans were in the neighbourhood, 
and confusion prevailed in the Mughal carnp. 2 

Now, Sher Khan realized that his opportunity had 
arrived. He gave up the Fabian policy of caution and 
boldly prepared for a series of contests with the Mughals. 
If we are to believe the Mughal writers, in most of the 
skirmishes Sher Khan was worsted. But the Afghan 
reverses did not improve matters for Humayun. The 
enemy maintained the pursuit, hovered round the Mughals 
in camp or on the march, and kept them constantly 
engaged on land or water, carrying away, if possible, their 
guns or provisions. 3 The skirmishes continued till Huma- 
yun reached Chausa and crossed over to the other side. 

Sher Khan, who had stayed behind for some un- 
explained reason, arrived before the whole Mughal army 
had crossed over. Humayun noticed his arrival, and as 
he was greatly disgusted with the persistent guerilla tactics 
of the enemy, he thought of putting an end to further 
annoyance, by meeting him in an immediate battle. So 
he recrossed the Ganges and cams over to the eastern 
bank. Sher Khan, whose heart must have rejoiced at 

1 Bihiya to-day is not situated on the Grand Trunk RosCd as it now 
follows a more southern course. It is situated 20 miks east of BhSjpur. 

2 It was now the beginning of April, 133^ A. D,*Z*]qrda, 945 A, H. 

3 The largest cannon of the Jjfcagfeftls named Koh-skikan was thus 
taken away by the enemy. 



[ 224 1 

this foolhardiness of the king, receded some distance in 
order to make the landing of the Mughals easy. It speaks 
of his chivalry that he did not try to attack Humayun 
while the latter was crossing the river. Probably, Sher 
Khan hoped for a complete victory and hence he refrained 
for the present from inflicting any injury. 

Humayun committed another blunder in putting off 
the battle. He could have hoped to succeed by making 
an immediate attack only. After the crossing was over, 
he realized the demoralized condition of his army, grew 
wiser, and delayed the battle. It is clear that in these 
circumstances he had better continued his march absolutely 
ignoring Sher Khan's irregular warfare. Now, he played 
again into the hands of his enemy. 

For the present, Sher Khan also would not take the 
offensive, and so the two armies lay facing each other for 
three months, from April to 26th June, 1539 A. D. 
(Zulqada to gth Safar, 946 A. H.). 1 

Humayun made one more attempt to resettle his 
quarrel with Sher Khan but it was too late. We have 
seen that when he was strong and Sher Khan had 
accepted 'his terms, he himself broke them. Now when 
he was weak and his army in hopeless disorder, how could 
he hope for the same considerations from his enemy? 
Still, the cautious and shrewd Afghan leader did not 
reject the king's offer immediately, even when Humayun 
added that for the sake of his prestige, the Afghans 
were to pretend to retreat with the Mughal troops in 
pursuit. 2 He let Humayun open the negotiations. The 
terms offered, if Farishta and Nizamuddm are to be 
believed, were somewhat better than on the previous 
occasion; for instead of Bengal alone, Sher Khan was now 
to be allowed to retain both Bengal and Bihar and was 

1 Farishta. p. 217. 1. 8. T. A., p. 201, Bada&ni. p. 350, 1. 17, R. T. 
fol, 616, l f 6> Riydz-us-Satetin (R. S.), p. 145, 1. 2, Mirat-ul-Alam (M. A.), 
all put the period as one of 3 months. 

2 See Dorn t p. 119. 



[ 225 ] 

not to pay any tribute, an acknowledgment of the 
Mughal suzerainty by reading the khutbah and striking 
coin in the king's name being considered sufficient. All 
other territories were to be surrendered. Sher Khan con- 
sidered the king's proposal and suggested a minor modi- 
fication only, namely, the addition of Chunar to his 
territory, as it already belonged to him. But the im- 
prudent king, forgetting his miserable plight and throwing 
all foresight and prudence to the wind, refused the request 
on the sentimental ground that the capture of the fort 
represented the firstfruits of his Bengal campaign, and 
hence it could not be surrendered. The result was that 
the negotiations fell through. 

Once again just before the actual battle, Humayun 
made the last attempt of concluding a treaty by sending 
Mutta Mir Muhammad Parghari, 1 a follower of the 
murdered Shaikh Buhlul and favourite of the king. Sher 
Khan, too, sent Shaikh Khalil, a descendant of Farid 
Shakarganj. 2 The king was so struck by his piety that 
he too nominated him as his ambassador and charged him 
to negotiate on his behalf also. Thus entrusted with work 
by both the parties, he fell a prey to Sher Khan's shrewd- 
ness; for in an interview he was put the straight question, 
whether the Afghans should make peace with the Mughals 
or not, and he forgetting his charge on behalf of Humayun 
straightway gave his opinion that they should not. 
Naturally, Sher Khan then closed the negotiations. 

Humayun 's wanton disregard of the events around 
him may be judged when it is remembered that Sher 
Khaft's men 3 had been rapidly spreading over North 
India. Lucknow was now added to the Afghan kingdom, 
and arrangements were being completed to collect revenue 
in the territories east of Qanauj. 



1 T. R. speaks well of him. See pp. 398-469. 

2 One of the ChishtL saints. He had preceded Nizamuddln Aulia as 
the spiritual guide of his followers. 

3 Dorn mentions the nobles, Haibat Khan NiazI and Jalal Khan Talft, 
to be in charge of the operations. 



C 226 ] 

After the break-off of the negotiations, Sher Khan 
grew bold and pointed out to his nobles the state of con- 
fusion that prevailed in the king's army. But even now he 
did not propose to go beyond the bounds of prudence and 
caution. So far, he had been digging trenches round his 
camp, and now when he determined to attack the Mughals, 
he proposed to do so by stealth. The announcement of 
the attack was received with great acclamations, testifying 
to the popularity of the leader and to the very much 
changed character of the Afghans. 

Fortune also smiled on Sher Khan. After a stay of 
three months, the rains had set in, and the Mughals held up 
between the two rivers, the Ganges and the Karamnasa, 
found themselves flooded in the low ground that they had 
chosen for their encampment. There seemed no help for 
it; for Sher Khan commanded the situation and was sure 
to take the fullest advantage of any attempt made by the 
Mughals to shift their camp. 

Having secured this strategic superiority Sher Khan 
next tried to puj the Mughals off their guard; for they 
were strongly protected by two rivers, and it needed great 
skill to cross over and attack them. 

He thought out a novel plan, viz., to attack Maharatha 
Chero. The Cheros are an aboriginal people who, along 
The Cheros. with the Bhars and Savars, had been a 

dominant race, before the advent of the Aryans, in the 
Shahabad district of Bihar. Even when the Aryans con- 
quered and ousted them from the fertile parts, they conti- 
nued to occupy the hilly and jungly tracts. 2 Some of the 
Chero chiefs existed even in Muslim times and one of 
them, probably the most powerful that lived about this 
time, i.e., in 1539 A. D., has been called by the Tarikh-i- 
Sher Shdhi, Maharatha. The Shahabad District Gazetteer 
says of him, ' the power of this chief appears to have been 
considerable; it is said in the Makhzan-i-Afdghina that he 

1 Abbas, fol. 43, 1. 9 has *>y^v* o-tj J^ $ pU *JS 

2 See Shdhabdd District Gazetteer, p. 19. 



[ 227 3 

used to descend from his hills and jungles and harass the 
tenants round about and that he closed the door to Gaur 
and Bengal.' The depredations of the Chero chief were 
intolerable to an administrator like Sher Khan 1 and so 
while he lay idle opposite Humayun 's camp, he planned 
out a campaign against Maharatha. Of course, he could 
not carry it out so long as he had not dealt with the 
Mughals. But he tried to fulfil his desire by throwing the 
enemy off its guard. 

On the 25th June, 1539 A. D. (8th Safar, 946 A. H.), he 
collected his men and gave out that he was proceeding to 
fight the Chero chief. 2 This news spread in the Mughal 
camp and the king, as in his Gujrat campaign, when 
Bahadur was besieging Chitor, proposed to be neutral. 
After midnight, he came back with his army and surprised 
the Mughals in their sleep, and thus gave a rude shock to 
their sense of security. 

The next chapter gives the description of the battle. 

The chronology of the events described in this 
Chapter is: 

(1) Humayun reaches Gaur 

2oth Rabiul-awwal, 945 A. H. = Middle of August, 1538 A. D. 

(2) Humayun' s stay in Gaur, Rabiul-awwal to 

Shawwdl 945 A. H. = August to end of March, 1539 A. D. 

(3) The death of Shaikh Buhlul 

Rajab, 945 A. H. = Beginning of January, 1539 A. D. 

(4) Jaunpur captured by the Afghans 

Shabdn, 945 A. H.== Middle of January, 1539 A. D. 

(5) Ajudhya and Chunar captured by the Afghans 

Ramzdn, 945 A. H.= Beginning of March, 1539 A. D. 

(6) Baba Beg etc. joined the Bengal Mughals 

Shawwdl, 945 A. H. = Middle of March, 1539 A. D. 

(7) Humayun reached Chausa 

Zulqada, 945 A. H.= Beginning of April, 1539 A. D. 

(8) The encampment at Chausa 

Zulqada, 945 A. H. to 9th Safar, 946 A. H. 

= April to 26th June, 1539 A. D. 

(9) Sher JJhan marched against Maharatha 

8th Safar, 946 A. H. = 25th June, 1539, A. D. 

1 Shdhabdd District Gazetteer, p. 20, quotes Tdrfyh-i-Mushtdqi to 
point out that of the three great works that Sher Shah had set for him- 
self, one was the destruction of Maharatha. We know of the work, 
Wdqidt-i-Mushtdqi, but not of any under the above name. 

2 Dorn, p. 120 says the ruse had been repeated for the last five or 
six days in succession. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE BATTLES OF CHAUSA, JUNE 26, 1539 A. D., 
AND OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D, 

Let us now study the details of the surprise attack 
referred to in the last chapter. On the evening of June 25, 
1539 A.D., i.e. 9 the 8th of Safar, 946 A.H., it was 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza's turn to act as the head of the 
night watch. In spite of the warning that Khawas Khan 
had moved out of his camp with a large army, 1 he 
neglected his duly and was sleeping elsewhere, and the 
men under him followed his example, so that the whole 
camp lay unguarded and at the mercy of the enemy. 

N 



t 




FIG. 



In Fig. I, we have indicated the respective camps of 
the Mughals and the Afghans. It will be seen that the two 
armies had encamped on the same side of the river Ganges 
and on opposite sides of its tributary, the Karamnasa, and 

1 See Jauhar, p. 24. 



[ 229 ] 



they were guarded on the flanks by the two rivers, the 
Afghans being more secure than their enemies. The 
Chero land lay to the south of the Karamnasa. 1 

Sher Khan's movements were so well-timed that 
almost simultaneously, the three divisions, commanded by 
Sher Khan himself, by Jalal Khan, his son, and by Khawas 
Khan, the captor of Gaur, attacked the Mughal camp (see 
2). Jalal Khan attacked the Mughals nearest the 



N 



I I 

/// 

Can* 




FIG. 2 



1 See the two district Gazetteers. In Ghazlpflr, Blrpttr, opposite BSm 
on the Ganges was once their headquarters, and in Shahabad, Rohtasgarh 
was in their possession. The southern part of the Shahabad district is 
hilly and infertile, and formed the refuge of the CherSs. 



C 230 ] 

town of Chausa, Sher- Khan the centre of the enemy, and 
Khawas Khan went round the Mughal camp and the 
stable, 1 to the bank of the Ganges, and demolished one of 
the bridges. 2 By these skilful tactics, Sher Khan com- 
pletely surrounded the enemy before they were aware 
of the fact. This attack caused panic and uproar in the 
Mughal camp. The Mughals found themselves completely 
hemmed in, and the bridges either broken or in the posses- 
sion of Khawas Khan's men. As the rainy season had set 
in, the rivers had widened, obliterating the traces of the 
ford that lay near the Mughal camp. Even the Karam- 
nasa tributary was unfordable. 

While the enemy's attack had been on, most of the 
Mughal commanders were not yet ready to take the field. 
Muhammad Zaman Mirza, whose culpable negligence was 
the cause of the Mughal ill-luck, disappeared early, 
being drowned in trying to cross the river and escape 
from the battle. A few others, Baba Beg Jalair, Tardi 
Beg, and Koch Beg, hastily got up to inform Humayun of 
the critical situation. The king had already got informa- 
tion of the commotion, but took some time in dressing and 
making ablution. He was mounting his horse when Tardi 
Beg etc., reached him. 

By this time the panic had spread, and the Mughals 
had been scattered in all directions. The king had to 
restore order, and the only way by which he could prevent 
the flight of his men was to destroy the remaining bridges, 
which they had made use of for crossing over. However 
urgent Humayun's decision might appear, the actual 
result was that none of the bridges was available for a 
Mughal retreat. The ford also, as mentioned above, was 
submerged and could not be used at this time of the year. 

Humayun next rode forward, beating his war-drum, 
hoping, now that all means of escape had been stopped, 



3 It was a perilous venture and Sher Khan, instead of giving orders 
to some one of the nobles to undertake the task, asked for volunteers. 
Khawas Khan alone responded. 



[ 231 1 

his followers, consisting of brave people from all parts of 
the Muslim world including Turkey, Asia Minor, Iraq, etc., 
would rally and face the Afghan attack. Only about 300 
brave followers responded to his call. The number was 
too small to encounter the army of Sher Khan, 70,006 
strong. The king, undeterred, determined to make a 
stand and offer resistance. He continued the unequal con- 
test, wounded an elephant, though in striking it he lost his 
lance, and received a wound from some one seated on 
another elephant. Behind his back, even those 300 
followers were melting away. Since the king would not 
realize the danger that now surrounded him, some Mughal 
follower caught hold of the reins of his horse, and led him 
out of the thick of the fight. But with the bridges broken 
or in the possession of the enemy, it was difficult for him to 
escape from the slaughter around him. He reached the 
bank and attempted to cross the river on the back of an 
elephant, but the current was so strong that he was dis- 
lodged from his seat. Providentially, a water-carrier 
named Nizam noticed him and with the aid of his leather 
water-bag helped him to the opposite bank. 1 Askari also 
reached there, though the details of his escape are not 
available. 

These two were amongst the few who had been lucky 
enough to escape; for a much larger number lost their 
lives on the battle-field or in trying to cross the river. The 
Afghans had gained the day and the demoralized panic- 
stricken Mughals were cut down in hundreds in their 
attempt to fly from the dreaded pursuers. The number of 
deaths was so large that no attempt has been made to 
compute the figure. 

We may give here the particulars of a few casualties 
among the distinguished personages who figured in the 
campaign. We have noticed the death of the ever-turbu- 
lent Muhammad Zaman Mirza. Amongst the other 

1 While taken across the river, he learnt the name of the water-carrier 
and out of gratitude compared him with NizSmuddm Aulia, the patron 
saint of Delhi. 



[ 232 ] 

generals who perished were three maulavis, Muhammad 
Parghari, Jalaluddin of Tattah and Qasim All Sadr. 1 
Similarly when Humayun was informed of the troubles of 
Bega or Haji Begam, his chief queen, 2 he sent four nobles, 
Tardi Beg, Baba Beg, Koch Beg, and MrBachka Bahadur. 
They attempted to fight their way through the Afghan 
crowd and in doing so all except Tardi Beg were cut down. 
He alone returned to Humayun. The Tazkirat-ul-umard 
mentions the death of one Mir Pehlwan Badakshi. 

As regards the women casualties, Gulbadan Begam 
has mentioned the names of a few who were either drowned 
or could not be traced. They included two wives of the 
king, (i) Chand Bibi and (2) Shad Bibi; one daughter, 
Aqiqa by his chief queen Bega Begam; and a relation, 
Ayisha Begam, daughter of Sultan Husain Baiqara. 

Amongst the women captives of Sher Khan, was Bega 
Begam, the king's principal queen. In the midst of the 
confusion and slaughter that prevailed everywhere, the 
Afghan leader made all arrangements for her protection 
and safety. He also issued a general order forbidding the 
killing or enslavement of any Mughal women or children. 3 
They all were to be sent to Bega Begam's pavilion, and 
guards were posted to protect them from injury. When 
Sher Khan became king he sent these refugees home. 
Bega Begam, too, was restored to Humayun together with 
a statement that no violence had been committed on her or, 
for the matter of that, on any other Mughal woman. 
Humayun took the Afghan leader at his word and received 
the queen back. Bega Begam or as she was later called, 

1 Under the Mughal kings, the maulavis also had a military rank and 
used to be present on a battlefield. For a description of Akbar's 
mansabddn system, see V. Smith: Akbar, the great Mogul, pp. 362-4. 
Abul Fazl was a mansabddr of 4000. 

3 As she had gone on haj several times, she has been called Hdji 
Begam. In her later life, she was in charge of her husband's tomb. 
Arab sarai, situated near the tomb was built by her? It could accom- 
modate 300 Arabs. 

3 How far in advance of his times was Sher Khan? Enslavement of 
a captured or dead soldier's family was a recognized custom in the east. 
When Akbar made a similar law in 1562 A. D., he was following his 
predecessor's lead. For Akbar's decree see A. N., Vol. II, part I, p. 159. 



[ 233 ] 

Haji Begam was dearly loved by Akbar, to whom she was 
like a second mother. 

When Sher Khan had completed his victory, he offered 
prayers to the Almighty and uttered the following lines :. 



Tr. 

O, Lord, Thou hast power and pelf 

And supporteth the poor darwesh. 
Thou hast chosen. to bestow sovereignty on Farid, 

Hasan's son, 
And throw Humayun's men to be devoured 

by the fishes (alligator, crocodile, or tortoise). 

Sher Shah slightly altered the words of the famous 
lines of Sadi's Bustdn to suit the occasion. 1 The poet's 
words are: 



Tr. 

Lord, Thou art omnipotent and supremely rich, 

And supporteth the poor darwesh. 
Thou exalteth one and bestoweth kingship on him, 

Another, thou throweth from kingship to the 

fishes of the sea. 

Be it said as a tribute to his magnanimity that Sher 
Khan refrained from pursuing and slaughtering the 
Mughals. Instead, he departed eastward to Gaur, and 
captured the Mughal contingent of 5000, left behind under 
Jahangir Quli Khan. 

The question of kingship then came up. Masnad-i- 
All Isa Khan Kakbur suggested the issue of a Fath-nama 
to which Shei^Shah objected on the ground that it could 
not be issued in the absence of a crowned leader. Isa 

1 Dorn, p. 123, credits Sher Khan with a much longer speech. 



[ 334 ] 

Khan, who had desired the Fath-ndma to be in the name 
of the community and had never meant it to be issued in 
an individual's name, read the reference to the crowned 
headship to mean Sher Shah's desire to be promoted to 
kingship; and himself came forward to satisfy him by 
proposing the higher honour for him. Isa Khan was 
promptly supported by Azam Humayun Sarwani and 
Mian Biban Lodi. The other Afghans carried the pro- 
posal with acclamation. 

Thus Sher Shah's long-cherished dream of sovereignty 
was at last realized. His full title as king was Sultan Sher 
Shah as-Sultdn-i-Adil Abul-Muzaffar Farid-ud-duniyd 



Then he committed two acts of cruelty justified, prob- 
ably, on state exigencies. One was the death of Jahangir 
Quli Khan and his five thousand followers for some time 
captives at Gaur. The other was the death of Dilawar 
Khan, Khan-Khanan. It may be remembered that the 
latter had been captured at Mungir, more than a year ago, 2 
and thrown into a dungeon. The Afghans hated him for 
his loyalty to the Mughals and desired his death. In order 
to accomplish it in a natural manner, they had given him 
half a seer of coarse and uncooked barley as his daily food. 
But the unwholesome food did not kill him. So he was 
now put to death. His followers, many of them being 
Afghans, were either released or taken into service. Sher 
Shah remained in Bengal for the next few weeks in order 
to improve the Afghan system of administration. 

Let us now turn to Humayun. After reaching the 
other side of the Ganges, somewhere near Birpur, he 
rapidly rode to Chunar. Wounded and mentally depress- 
ed as he was, he could not stay there for long. Instead, 
he hastened to Arail. 3 Even now he had some faithful 

1 No coin supports Abbas when he asserts that Shfer Shah took the 
title Shdh-i-Alam or quotes the rhyme said to have been stamped on some 

of his coins : - j& jjy cr"*> cr* |IA f l ** " fi* ** b 3 ^ *M ** 
3 See the last chapter; probably in March, 1538 A. D. 
* Close to NainI station on the E. I. Railway. 



[ 235 ] 

followers. Raja Birbhan, a zamindar from the neighbour- 
hood, came with 5,000 or 6,000 followers, fought in Huma- 
yun's rear against Mir Farid Gaur, and gave his master 
an opportunity of escaping. He also gave them food by 
opening a market for their benefit. So under his protec- 
tion, the Mughals rested for a few days, replenished their 
stores, and purchased new horses. Then they reached 
Kara 1 where again they stayed for a few days, and obtained 
provisions for themselves and provender for their horses. 
Next finding that the banks of the Ganges at Qanauj were 
strongly occupied by the Afghans, he abandoned his inten- 
tion of proceeding along the Ganges, chose now the 
Jamna instead, and for further safety crossed over to its 
south bank at Kalpi. Fortunately for him, the Afghans 
who met him on the way under Shah Muhammad Qarmali 
did not molest him. 

All this time Humayun 's number of followers was 
dwindling by desertion, and even amongst those who stayed 
with him some appeared to be apathetic. For example, 
Qasim Qaracha's son had arranged for a number of gifts to 
be presented to Humayun on his arrival, but Qasim coun- 
selled him against wasting so much wealth on a fleeing fugi- 
tive, and so the son reduced the number of gifts. Huma- 
yun, either because he had come to know what had passed 
between the father and the son, or because the gifts had 
been grudgingly offered, declined to accept them except an 
embroidered saddle, which he kept and eventually presented 
to JKamran. It is a striking example how Humayun bore 
up in adversity. Instead of getting angry with Kamran 
who had betrayed him, he was anxious to enlist his sup- 
port for his future schemes by offering him a present. 

At Kalpi Humayun heard that Sher Shah had again 
come forward as far as Chausa, (Safar, 946 A.H. 2 =middle 
of July, 1539 A. D.). Fearing lest he should fall into the 

1 Situated 40 miles N W. from Allahabad, on the Grand Trunk Road 
and the Ganges. It was here that Alauddm Khaljl killed his uncle, 
Jalaluddin Firuz. 

a Tdrikh-i'Rashidi (T. R.). The month of Safar extends from i8th 
June to i yth July. 



3 

hands of the enemy, Humayun hastened his retreat to 
Agra. 

At Agra he met his brother, Kamran. Hindal was 
lurking at Alwar in shame at his past misbehaviour. 
Kamran brought him to the king's presence and obtained 
forgiveness for him. Humayun took no notice either of 
his desertion of his post at Tirhoot or of his subsequent 
assumption of sovereignty at Delhi. It speaks well of 
Humayun that he continued to treat the prince as affec- 
tionately as before. With Humayun, Askari, too, had 
arrived, so that all the four brothers now gathered 
together. Muhammad Sultan M. also now came and 
joined the king. 1 Muhammad Sultan M. had done all he 
could to injure Humayun, and had even gone over to the 
Afghans in Bihar. When he found that he had outstayed 
his welcome in Bihar, and that the Afghans had nothing but 
scorn for him, he returned to Humayun at Agra, a sadder 
but wiser man. He is not known to, have rebelled again 
in Humayun's reign. 

Many ladies and practically all the leading Mughal 
nobles and royal relations also arrived at Agra. Gulbadan 
Begam tells us how affectionate her meeting was with 
Humayun, her brother, and how glad he was that he had 
not taken her to Bengal; for then, like many others, he 
might have lost her. She also describes the king's meet- 
ing with Dildar Begam, her mother and Hindal's, and tells 
us that, though Kamran presented her full brother to the 
king, it was mainly through Dildar's intercession that he 
was pardoned. 

We have seen that in the battle of Chausa Humayun 
had received a wound. It had continued to fester so he 
remained confined to the palace for 40 days. 2 Kamran, too, 
fell ill. Even after Humayun came round, Kamran did 
not come to his normal self . This augured ill for Humayun. 
His own troops had been wiped out either by disease in 
Bengal or on the battle-field of Chausa. He had fondly 

i See TW*h4-Alfi, fol. 5675, 1. xi. 
* G. //. N., fed. 33b. 



[ 237 I 

hoped that Kamran, like a dutiful brother, would place 
his 20,000 veteran soldiers, all in excellent health, at his 
disposal, and thus give him an opportunity of crossing his 
sword for the second time with the Afghan foe. 

But Kamran would not agree to Humayun's propo- 
sal; he considered him to be incompetent for the task, 
because of his loose tactics and defeat at Chausa, 
and his childish sentimentalism in permitting Nizam > 
the water-carrier and saviour of his life, to sit for a few 
hours 1 on the throne and help himself to the State treasures. 
Kamran therefore proposed that if another campaign was 
to be undertaken, it should be under his own command 
and not that of Humayun. Even when Humayun pressed 
for his leadership on grounds of prestige, Kamran remained 
obdurate. 

Kamran did not recover from his illness, though he 
was placed under the treatment of the most celebrated 
hakim of the time, viz., Mir Abul Baqa. When four 
months had passed and his malady grew worse depriving 
him of the use of his limbs and the power of speech, he grew 
anxious to return to Lahore. Humayun tried to argue but 
it only produced a contrary effect on him, namely, suspicion 
of poisoning 2 and eagerness to hasten back to the Punjab. 

To Humayun's appeal that during the period of his 
illness, he might be allowed the use of his army, Kamran 
made a very feeble and grudging response. He allowed 
3000 men only under Mirzd Abdullah Mughal to stay with 
Humayun, and the rest, under the command of Khwdja 
Kalan, he took with him to Lahore. It is said that 
Kamran's perversity was partly due to the evil counsel of 
the Khwdja, who disapproved of any extended campaign 
in the Gangetic region, 3 just as he had done in Babur's 
time. 4 

Kamran's refusal to lend his army to his brother was 
also partly actuated by considerations of his own safety. 

1 G. H. N. makes it ' two days.' 2 Ibid fol. 36b. 

3 See T. R. But the question may be put, whether Lahore was less 
warm than Agra or other towns situated in the Gangetic valley. 

4 See B. N., pp. 525-6. 



C 238 ] 

He had been twice attacked by the Persians, once under 
the direct command of the Shah, in 1535 A.D. and again in 
1537 A.D. 1 He did not wish to place his whole army at the 
disposal of his elder brother; for then the Persians might 
be emboldened to launch another campaign against him. 
The barren discussions and arguments between the two 
brothers occupied seven months from the middle of July, 
1539, to the 15th of March, 1540 A. D. (Rabml-awwal to 
the 7th Zulqada, 946 A. H.). 

At this desperate juncture Muhammad Haidar Mirza, 
Humayun's cousin, arrived. 2 He had gone to Babur 
as early as 1509 A. D. 3 and for the last four years had 
been staying with Kamran, 4 where he had also enjoyed the 
company of Shaikh Nura. 5 He had identified himself for 
the last thirty years or more with the Timurids; and now 
when their head, Humayun, was imploring Kamran to 
stay by his side he was pained to see the Mirza act in a 
churlish manner. So when Humayun turned to him and 
made a similar appeal for his stay, he consented. He 
also concurred in his argument that the fall of Agra 
would entail the evacuation of the rest of the Mughal 
provinces, including Kamran's territory of Lahore. In 
choosing to stay with Humayun, Haidar incurred 
Kamran's displeasure and lost the deputyship that he had 
enjoyed at Lahore, i.e., the conduct of all Kamran's affairs. 

Kamran's departure was looked upon as a public 
calamity by the Mughals and so, as many as could, sent 

1 See Erskine: The History of India, Vol. II, pp. 101 and 104. 

2 His relationship with Humayun may be indicated. 

Yflnas Khan 



Qutluq Nigar Khanam m. Umar Shaikh Mirza j 

] hub Nigar Khanam 

I m. Md. Husain M. Dughlat 

Babur I 

| Muhammad Haidar Mirza 

Humayun 



3 See B. N., p. 350. 

4 1536-40 A. D. The ._, . 

5 T. R. devotes a number of pages to describe the Shaikh's great- 



4 1536-40 A. D. The earlier date is given by 7\ R. , p. 16. 

5 T. R. devotes a number of pages to d 
ness, e.g., See pp, 389, 395-7, 397-8, 399-4 00 - 



[ 239 ] 

their women and children to Lahore, considering it to be a 
safer refuge than Agra. Gulbadan Begam mentions how 
Kamran requested her to accompany him, which she 
angrily refused at first, but later on, under the king's 
command, agreed to. 

While the two brothers discussed and argued for full 
seven months, the vigilant Sher Shah had gone back to 
Bengal, effected further improvements in administration, 
and now again came to the front. He advanced slowly, 
adding the districts he marched through, to his well- 
organized kingdom. His soldiers occupied Lucknow and 
Qanauj, and he arrived at the latter place, immediately 
after (February, 1540 A. D.). 

With the news of Sher Shah's advance, a feverish 
activity siezed the Mughals and on paper at least, Humayun 
could count 90,000 followers, all provided with horses. 
How many of these men had actually seen a battle or been 
under fire was a different matter. Most of them being raw 
recruits, were easily collected on liberal promises, but any 
serious work in the war, if it came about, could hardly be 
expected of them. 

With this large number of men in his train, Humayun 
reached Bhojpur on the west side of the river. The faith- 
ful Birbhan of Arail had accompanied him to Agra and 
now to Qanauj. He noticed the inadequacy of his master's 
preparations and suggested that if Humayun felt diffident 
of his success in the approaching contest, he might retire to 
the mountainous Panna State, 1 more than two hundred 
miles to the south of the main high-way, take shelter in its 
forests, train his men for war, wait for his opportunity, and 
when it came, pounce upon the Afghans. Humayun 
rejected the advice; for though it might provide him with 
a safe shelter, the waiting game would not suit either his 
recruits or his purse. If he desired to wipe off the disgrace 
of the late defeat at Chausa, he must fight an open battle 
and that too, at the earliest date possible. 

* See Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. XJX. 



[ 240 ] 

At this stage, Humayun 's hopes for a turn of his 
fortune received a fleeting encouragement. His generals, 
Yadgar Nasir Mirza and Qasim Husain Sultan, the ;'5gir- 
ddrs of KalpP and Etawah respectively, defeated and 
killed Sher Shah's son, Qutb Khan, when he was advanc- 
ing to Agra. As against Birbhan, they convinced Huma- 
yun that an opportune moment had arrived to defeat the 
enemy. Acting on their advice, he moved on towards 
Qanauj. 

Humayun reached Bhojpur, 2 in Qanauj Sirkar, halted 
and pitched his camp there. Sher Shah lay encamped on 
the other side of the Ganges opposite Qanauj. The distance 
between Bhojpur and Qanauj about 23 miles prevented 
either of the parties from making any attempt at a night 
attack. Thus, a month passed, April, 1540 A. D.=Zulhijj, 
946 A. H. Muharram, 947 A. H.). During his march, 
Humayun had been able to raise the number of his 
followers to 200,000. 3 

We are not told the exact date of Humayun's march 
forward to Qanauj. It must have been early in May, 
1540 A. D. (end of Muharram, 947 A. H.) and when he 
reached there he found Sher Shah encamped on the other 
side. Sher Shah, eager for an engagement, proposed 
through a vakil that since both the parties desired for an 
honourable contest, they must arrange to come to an early 
conflict and hence one of the two opposing forces should 
be allowed to cross over to the enemy's side. He further 
added that he was prepared to cross the river if Humayun 
would make room for him, or if the king so desired, he 
would retire a few miles in order to make way for him. 
Humayun never wanting in physical courage and eager to 
show his pluck possibly to retrieve his reputation, at once 
agreed to cross over to the Bilgram side of the river. 

1 A portion of KalpI had lately been bestowed on Kamran in order 
to interest him in the future Mughal campaigns. The expectations were 
not realized. 

2 Situated on the Ganges, about 23 miles N W. of Qanauj. 

8 T. R. But possibly Haidar M. had included the non-combatants 
in the number. 



[ 241 ] 

While the Mughals were engaged in crossing the river, 
some among Sher Shah's followers pointed out to him that 
it was an excellent opportunity for attacking the enemy. 
Those who have read the description of the march of a 
Mughal army in a state of confusion would appreciate the 
soundness of the Afghan suggestion. 1 But the cool, 
chivalrous, and self-reliant Sher Shah rejected the sugges- 
tion, and told them to prepare for an open battle; for in 
the next battle that he would fight, he would neither apply 
any artifice nor make any surprise attack by night. 

It is useless to blame Humayun for this decision. 
His dependance on raw recruits and Kamran's refusal to 
support his cause made his defeat inevitable. If he had 
crossed over in bravado, he is to be condemned, but 
possibly he took his men across the river, in order to 
prevent their deserting him later on. If so, he might be 
excused for his decision. It may be observed that except 
the guilty Muhammad Sultan Mirza and his adherents, no 
Mughal soldier, not even a raw recruit, went over to the 
enemy even when pressed hard by them in battle. If they 
gave way, it was only to fly to their homes or other places 
of safety. 

Although Humayun had gone over to the other side, 
the expected battle did not take place immediately. Both 
the parties marked time; Humayun because he dared not 
attack the Afghan veterans, and Sher Shah because, like 
the cautious general that he was, he awaited the return of 
Khawas Khan, who was at the moment completing his 
success against the distant Cheros. There was a secondary 
reason for the postponement of the issue. Like an expe- 
rienced commander, Sher Shah knew that in another 
month or so, the monsoon would break and the Mughal 
camp, situated near the bank, would be deluged. The 
Mughal soldiers would die of disease and their cattle be 



1 Notice how Mahabat Khan captured Jahangir while the latter was 
crossing the river Jhelam. 

16 



C 242 j 

unfit to draw the heavy cannon. 1 A victory for the 
Afghans would inevitably follow. 

Thus the battle remained in abeyance till the first 
heavy shower, which occurred on the isth May or the day 
following. It completely swamped the Mughal camp 
with rain-water. As more showers might follow, a change 
of the site became necessary. Haidar Mirza, on whose 
judgment Humayun mainly depended and who for this 
reason, had been made generalissimo, chose some higher 
ground in the neighbourhood. His plan was that a 
demonstration was to be made in order to induce the 
enemy to attack the Mughal army. If the Afghans failed 
to stir out, the next day the demonstration would be 
repeated while simultaneously the camp was to be shifted 
to the neighbouring high ground. 

The first demonstration was fixed for the following 
day, (the I7th May, 1540 A. D. = ioth Muharram, 947 
A. H.). Sher Shah was cleverer than Humayun or Haidar 
Mirza and was well-informed of the enemy's plans. Of 
course, he forthwith decided to avail himself of the oppor- 
tunity of starting the battle, and as soon as he saw the 
Mughals coming out of their camp, led his soldiers into 
the field. By his quick decision, he deprived the Mughals 
of the use of their heavy guns, one of their main weapons 
of winning a victory. 

The Mughals were not at first so anxious for a battle 
as to change the site of their encampment. Only a portion 
of the army met the Afghans on the field but the prospects 
of a clash of arms drev? the others in. 

Haider M. has minutely described the battle which 
ensued and is usually accepted as the chief authority. We 
however have not been able to accept all his statements. 
For example, his estimate of the respective strength of the 
armies, namely Mughal 40,000, and Afghan 15,000, can 



1 Some of the larger cannon used balls from 500 to 5000 misq&l in 
weight TL misqdl is equal to 1-3/7 dram. According to Babur, i misqal 
*>* md$hds=$/i2 tola. 



[ 243 ] 

be accepted only with a great deal of reservation. Firstly, 
as the demonstration was arranged with a motive other 
than war, the whole Mughal army was not placed in the 
field in the early stages of the battle. The Afghan number, 
too, appears to be inconceivably small. We have been 
told that Sher Shah had recruited every able-bodied 
Afghan. 1 We had better reverse Haidar Mirza's estimate 
of the two respective armies. 2 

Similarly, when Haidar M. records, 'Not a cannon 
was fired not a gun. The artillery was totally useless, 1 
he has not clearly stated why it was so. The reason for not 
filing the guns was that they had not been brought out to 
the battlefield. The Mughals' object was to move to some 
higher ground and hence in the demonstration the heavier 
guns had been left out. When the battle commenced, the 
Mughals were taken by surprise and failed to utilize them. 
There were, of course, the lighter pieces from the start of 
the contest. ' 

The battle took place on the I7th May, 1540 A. D. 
The Mughal army hastily got together and continually re- 
inforced from the base had three main divisions ; the central 
where Humayun and Haidar Mirza, the 
The description generalissimo, commanded, the left nearest 

12^^17. the river under HM1 > and the ri S ht ' 
1540 A'. D. ' covering the high ground, under Yadgar 

Nasir M. The vanguard was placed under 
Askari. There were five thousand matchlock men placed 
under Muhammad Khan Rumi, Ustad Ahmad Rumi, 
Hasan Khalifa, and the sons of the late Ustad AH QulL 
There seems to be np Mughal flying bodies to undertake a 
flank movement nor any large reserve. 

The Afghans were divided into seven divisions. Sher 
Khan himself took his stand at the centre with a trench 
running in front of him. On his right were the two Jalals, 
namely Jalal Khan, Sher Shah's son, and Jalal Khan Jalu, 

1 Dow, p. 104. 

8 C. H. I. t Vol. IV, has accepted Haidar Mirza's description and figures. 



C 244 ] 

with the brave Niaris under them. Similarly, on the left 
stood Adil Khan, Sher Shah's eldest son, with the Kiram 
Afghans. The fourth and the fifth divisions, placed at the 
extreme ends, were to imitate the tulghamd movements of 
the Mughals and while the battle progressed, to attempt at 
surrounding the enemy from the flanks and the rear. The 
vanguard was commanded by Khawas Khan and Barmazid 
Gaur, while a division was kept in reserve. 

THE BATTLE OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D. 
POSITION i. 



Reserve 
XXXX 

f 4th Division Jalal Khan Sher Shah Add Khan 5 th Division 

xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx 

trench 
0*00-000-0- 

Khawas Khan 
xxxxxxxx 



Askan 



trench 



Matchlockmen 
IHIIIt 




Yadgar Nasir and 
Qabim Husain Sulti 



A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river. 
B indicates the highgrouhd to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted. 

The battle opened, not on the whole front, but by an 
Afghan attack on the Mughal left only, 1 the Afghan object 



* A, 



$> i. c. 



[ 245 ] 

probably being to cut the Mughals off from the river and 
their base. A sanguinary contest took place here between 
Hindal M. and Jalal Khan Sur, in which the latter was 
wounded and fell from his horse and his army was routed. 
Sher Shah, noticing the state of confusion in Jalal Khan's 
division, for a moment thought of leaving the central 
command and proceeding to his son's aid. But he was 
persuaded by Qutb Khan Shahukhail Lodi not to commit 
the mistake, lest the king's absence at the centre should be 
misunderstood by his men as defeat and they might lose 
heart. Sher SMh, therefore, sent other commanders. 
Hindal having won the initial success, could not push it 
home. For with the arrival of other Afghan contingents, 
the Niazis reformed their ranks and renewed the contest. 

THE BATTLE OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D. 
POSITION a. 

N 

4th Division Jalal han 



Sh5r Shah 

f X M 




A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river. 
B indicates the highground to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted. 

The two vanguards also came into clash and Askari, 
unable to bear the brunt of the enemy's attack, fell back 



246 



upon the main army, to some extent covering the Mughal 
musketeers and stopping their firing. 

THE BATTLE OF QANAUJ, MAY 17, 1540 A. D. 
POSITION 3. 





A indicates the Mughal encampment immediately after crossing the river. 
B indicates the highground to which the Mughal camp was to be shifted. 

But the heaviest reverses for the Mughals occurred on 
their right. Yadgar Nasir and Qasim Husain were driven 
back by Adil Khan and Sarmast Khan. Yadgar had to 
fall back upon the centre and the Afghans taking advantage 
of the situation, turned round the enemy's wing, and sent 
a division to its rear. 

The Afghans were getting an upper hand in their 
right also. Hindal who had opened the battle so brilliantly, 



[ 247 ] 

had, for some unaccountable reason, been unable to press 
forward. Jalal, strengthened by the arrival of fresh re- 
inforcements, reformed his line and advanced. Hindal 
was gradually pushed back. The fourth division on a 
suitable opportunity, turned round the enemy and went to 
its rear. 

The pressure from the Afghans drove the non- 
combatants who stayed at the Mughal base, on to the main 
army. The discipline of the hastily got-up army of the 
Mughals was not up to the mark and now the panic- 
stricken fugitives made it worse. Neither could the soldiers 
play their part, nor the matchlockmen theirs. And 
Haidar M. at his wit's end, allowed the whole non- 
combatant crowd to mingle with the soldiers and also to 
press forward by unloosening the leathern chains which 
had secured the gun-carts in front but now were of no use. 1 
The reason for Haidar 's decision has not been stated. It is 
very likely that he considered himself helpless at the on- 
rush of the crowd from behind, and that as the day was 
practically lost, it did not matter how the non-combatants 
were killed, whether in the rear, or in the ranks or later 
on during the flight. 

Be that as it may; the result of this indiscipline was 
that the loose crowd came in between the two opposing 
armies and hastened to end the contest. So far as the 
Mughals were concerned, the soldiers could not fight in such 
a state of confusion, and the musketeers or the artillerymen 
could not fire. The Afghans, on the other hand, continued 
their work, only it now changed from warfare to slaughter. 
Haidar M. describes the magnitude of the Mughal loss by 
saying that out of one contingent of one thousand retainers, 
only eight arrived safe on the other bank. 

It would be evident from the above description that the 
Mughals were defeated by the Afghans adopting against 



1 Jauhar, Elias and Ross, p. 476 reject Aft&bchi's statement for 
insufficient reasons. 



[ 248 ] 

them their own tulghanta tactics, evolved fourteen years 
ago at the battle of Panipat. This brilliant result was 
caused partly by the supreme military skill of the Afghans 
and partly by Humayun's unwise decision of crossing over 
to the eastern bank putting the river behind him. 

The causes of Humayun's defeat at this battle may be 
indicated here: 

(a) Humayun himself must be held primarily respons- 
ible for the disaster. On the battlefield he had surrendered 
the supreme command of his army to his cousin, Haidar M. 
That at Qanauj he was suffering from some mental disorder 
is evident from the hallucinations to which he was subject 
at this time. He is reported to have observed to Mir 
Rajiuddin Safavi that 



/.tJ j 

Tr. 

During the course of attack, a host of darweshes were 
striking at the mouths of the horses of our soldiers. 

As far as we are aware no such ascetics were utilized 
by Sher Shah in the battle and their presence must be 
ascribed to Humayun's imagination. Bearing in mind the 
king's incompetence, it is to be regretted that he did not 
agree to Kamran's proposal of permitting him to take his 
place as commander in this battle. 

(6) Another factor that contributed to Humayan's 
failure was the inexperience of the hastily collected army. 
The veteran soldiers that had won the previous victories 
for the Mughals either had become superannuated, or had 
died in Bengal, or at the battle of Chausa, or had accom- 
panied Kamran to Lahore. The raw recruits gathered at 
Qanauj could not achieve a victory. In this connexion it 
may be noted that the Mughal generals, Hindal, Qasim 
Husain, etc., were not wholly incompetent, and we attach 
no value to Haidar Mirza's statement that Humayun's 
officers were cowards, and did not unfurl their standards 
for fear of an attack from the enemy. Similarly his state- 



[ 249 I 

ment that 'not a man, friend, or foe had been wounded* 
when the Mughals were routed, is also to be rejected. 

(c) Another reason for the Mughal loss was Humayun's 
foolhardiness in crossing the river. If he had chosen to 
remain on the western bank, the loss of life at the close of 
the conflict might have been considerably smaller. Similar- 
ly the choice of the low sandy ground by the river for his 
camp was an unhappy choice. 

(d) Above all, the absence of discipline in the Mughal 
camp accounts for their defeat. The end of the battle came 
much too soon because of the irregular camp-followers, 
viz., the ghuldms. There is much truth in Haidar's words, 
' many amirs of illustrious name perished, and all from 
want of concert and control. Every one went or came at 
his own will/ 

Under such disadvantages it would have been nothing 
short of a marvel if a victory had been secured against the 
alert and self-reliant Sher Shah. The heaven's judgment 
was eminently just on this occasion. 



CHAPTER XX 

THE KING'S FLIGHT TO AGRA AND THE 

PUNJAB, REASONS FOR HIS DEPOSITION 

FROM KINGSHIP 

When the battle was over, and the Afghans were 
pursuing the retreating Mughals, Humayun accompanied 
by his attendant, Jauhar, managed to reach the bank of 
the Ganges. The river was broad and unfordable, but 
Humayun noticed an old elephant on the bank with a 
royal official seated in the howdah. He was a eunuch who 
had acted as the superintendent (or keeper) of the king's 
elephants and bore the name of Khwdja Kafur. Both 
Humayun and his attendant were taken on to the howdah, 
but the driver, out of cowardice or treachery, refused to 
stir, and so at Kafur 's suggestion, he was beheaded by 
Humayun on the spot. The eunuch now took his place and 
led the animal across the river. It was not easy to reach 
the high and steep western bank. As no suitable landing 
place was available, the other Mughal fugitives tied their 
turbans, and thereby helped Humayun to get down to 
the bank. Amongst the helpers, Shamsuddin Atkah Khan 
-has been specially mentioned. Later on he was suitably 
rewarded, and he became one of the trusted nobles of the 
kingdom. 

Askari M., Hindal M., and Yadgar Nasir M., soon 
joined Humaj'un, and all of them together set out for 
Agra. Up to Bhongaon 1 they followed the Grand Trunk 
Road. Here the party met with a considerable amount of 
opposition; for the inhabitants of the village were 'in the 
habit of plundering a defeated army.' In the m616e that 
ensued Yadgar Nasir was wounded by an arrow, and on 
his request to Askari to go forward and punish the villagers, 

1 In the Mainpuri district. Situated 27 15' N. and 79 14' E. 



[ 251 ] 

the latter got offended. A quarrel ensued between the two 
Mirzas in which each horse-whipped the other. However, 
the villagers were punished, and the party proceeded on its 
journey. 

It now left the highway and went probably by the 
present road that leads to Agra via Mainpuri and Firuza- 
bad. The party at last reached Agra. Humayun did 
not immediately go to his palace, situated opposite the 
present site of the Taj and later on destroyed by Shah 
Jahan to make room for his projected Mahtab Bagh, but 
proceeded to the residence of the renowned saint, Sayyid 
Rafiuddin Safavi, 1 and was content with the simple fare 
provided by the saint. Ashamed of his failure, Humayun 
avoided a visit to his palace, and instead, sent for his 
people to visit him at the saint's residence. 

The brothers, except Kamran, and several other 
Mirzas had gathered at Agra. But their deliberations had 
to be cut short; for the Afghans were still pursuing them, 
and it was dangerous for them to delay at Agra. Hence, 
reluctantly they left for Sikri, 2 on their way to the north- 
west. At Sikri, something very suspicious happened; an 
unknown hand shot an arrow which nearly found Huma- 
yun, and when he sent two of his attendants to search for 
the assailant, both returned wounded. The occurrence 
convinced Humayun of the unfriendly feelings of the 
neighbouring villagers, and so he hurried on to Bajauna/ 
on the river Kanbir. 8 Although Humayun had lost his 
sovereignty, he had not shorn himself of royal pride and 
hauteur, and carried himself as king so far as his followers 
were concerned. An incident that happened here will 
illustrate this. In the course of his flight the faithful Mw 

1 Abul Fazl's mother belonged to the family, Rafiuddin was one of 
the learned divines who later on gave the fatwah for Puran Mai's death 
in Sher Shah's reign. As he was a Safavi and ' Hasan and Husaini ' 
Sayyid, he had probably Shia tendencies. 

* See Sarkar : India of Aurangzib, p. xcvii. Sikri lay on the main 
road from Agra to Delhi. 

3 Nether Bajauna nor Kanblr can be located. There is one Bajna, 
south-west ,of Khair in Aligarh district, but we are not sure whether 
Humiyun traversed the district. 



Fakhr AH once inadvertantly, passed in front of Humayun. 
This aroused him, and he ordered his death. Of course the 
poor Mir, loyal as he was, corrected himself, and, deeply 
humiliated, fell back to the rear. 

At Bajauna, the rumour of the pursuit of Mir Farld 
Gaur, the Afghan general, reached Humayun, and at 
Askari's suggestion, the party moved again. It was a 
painful journey when the men were exposed to rain 
and suffered from exhaustion, starvation, and disease. 
Humayun, in his own interest, made some kind of arrange- 
ment, and ordered that he was to be guarded by a detach- 
ment on both the wings, and that several noblemen should 
cover the rear. But even now he would not allow anyone 
to go ahead of him, and threatened to destroy the house of 
anyone who did so. It speaks well of the loyalty of his 
followers that they bore with the vanity of Humayun. 

No doubt, every follower in Humayun 's train did not 
behave decently on all occasions. There were occasion- 
ally serious lapses of discipline. For example, Chobta 
Bahadur, a nobleman, forcibly obtained possession of a 
common trooper's horse which, even at the king's com- 
mand, he refused to surrender. So Humayun ordered his 
death, and the order was carried out. For the next few 
days, the severed head of Chobta Bahadur was carried on 
the point of a spear as a warning to the recalcitrant. The 
execution had a salutary effect, and for the rest of the 
journey he had no trouble from his own followers. 

If Jauhar is to be believed, Humayun's route lay 
through Alwar. He might have reached Delhi, but his stay 
must have been of a short duration. The Afghans had 
continued to press on him, and so they kept him moving 
on. Sher Shih had occupied Agra. These facts destroyed 
the chance of Humayun's stay at Delhi, and he was forced 
to fly westward, halting next at Sirhind. 

Since by this time Sher Shah had occupied Delhi as 
well, we may conclude that Humayun had relinquished 
the throne of Delhi to Sher Shah. 



[ 253 ] 

Before concluding the present study of Humayun, it 
seems advisable to sum up the reasons that led to his 
removal from the throne. 

(a) Humayun had been neglecting his duties for some 
time past. We have noticed that at the end of the Gujrat 
campaign he had chosen to retire to Malwa rather than stay 
in Gujrat or withdraw to Delhi. Next, during his stay at 
Gaur or Jannatabad, sloth and lassitude due to whatever 
causes had grown on him. Instead of immediately return- 
ing from Bengal, he continued to linger, shut* himself up 
in his palace at Gaur, and let the provinces of the kingdom 
slip one after another from his grasp. . His defeat at 
Chausa is the direct result of his prolonged stay in malarious 
Bengal and indifference to administration. 

(b) As the head of the Timurids and Padshah of the 
Delhi kingdom allegiance from his brothers and from the 
Mirzas was his due. But his brothers were disloyal, and 
several of the Mirzas also had at one time or the other 
played him false. Some of them may be mentioned here. 

(1) The first was Muhammad Zaman M. who from the 
day of Humayun 's accession till his (the Mirza's) death at 
Chausa in 1540 A. D. had been the cause of woe to Huma- 
yun. He was the direct cause of the Mughal campaign 
against Sultan Bahadur of Gujrat, and neither he nor 
Humayun profited by it. Under Babur, his age, ex- 
perience, high lineage, royal antecedents, long service, and 
the respect due to his wife as the eldest daughter of the 
king, had cast a glamour around him that he scarcely 
deserved. His ignominious death at Chausa was a fitting 
end to his discreditable record throughout the reign of 
Humayun. 

(2) The second malefactor was Muhammad Sultan M., 
who always associated himself with Muhammad Zaman M., 
and vied with him in doing harm to Humayun. We have 
described a part of his evil record in the previous chapter. 
The rest is told when it is mentioned that on the eve of the 
battle of Qanauj he deserted and kept aloof till Kamran 
returned to Kabul where he joined him. 



[ 254 ] 

(3) All the three brothers, Kamran, Askari, and 
Hindal, are to > blame for their hostility or indifference to 
their brother. Kamran was the worst offender; for his 
indifference towards Humayun affected Mughal interests 
most. In the earlier years he had been faithful, but during 
Humayun's stay in Bengal, he was vacillating between his 
duties towards the kingdom and his own selfish interests. 
Humayun's defeat at Chausa inclined him towards 
Kamran whose guiding principle henceforth was to care 
for himself only and to oppose the elder brother. This 
attitude continued till he was incapacitated by the loss of 
eye-sight in 1553 A.D. His cardinal mistake was to ignore 
the position of his elder brother, and the. natural conse- 
quence of it was the passing away of the kingdom into the 
hands of the Afghans, who were the sworn enemy of the 
Mughals. 

Askari and Hindal were only the understudies of 
Kamran. Their resources were small and their abilities 
of an inferior order. Askari did harm to himself and to 
Humayun in Gujrat by neglecting the administration of 
the province, which had been entrusted to him as Viceroy. 
Later on, he made amends by remaining loyal to Humayun 
in Bengal and also during his retreat to Agra. In both the 
losing battles he was present and played a considerable 
part. It was only when he lost hope of Humayun's 
return to fortune during the latter's wanderings in Sindh 
that he turned to his full brother, Kamran. He had thus 
a better sense of duty towards Humayun as the head of 
the family than Kamran. 

Hindal, the full brother of Gulbadan Begam, was 
usually a staunch, supporter of Humayun's interests. 
During Humayun's Gujrat campaign, he was left behind at 
Delhi as the deputy of the ruler. As such, his record was 
creditable. He fought more than one battle against 
Muhammad Sultan Mirza and his sons, and also fought in 
alliance with Askari against Tatar Khan at Mandrael in 
1534 A. D. But he also had proved disloyal. His dis- 
affection had commenced with his desertion from Tirhoot, 



[ 255 ] 

when he went to Delhi and assumed the sovereign titles. 
To his other crimes, he added that of the murder of 
Shaikh Buhlul, Humayun's spiritual preceptor. HindaTs 
disaffection seriously affected Humayun's interests. For 
while Hindal's pretensions continued, Kamran could not 
proceed to Humayun's aid, and without their help, it was 
not possible for Humayun to extricate himself from his 
difficulties in Bengal. After Humayun's defeat at Chausa, 
Hindal's good sense returned, and ever afterwards he 
remained faithful to him. It was while fighting for 
Humayun against Kamran that he was speared to death in 
November, 1551 A. D. 

While discussing the three brothers' behaviour, we 
may also consider Humayun's attitude towards them and 
its consequences. He was magnanimous to them and to 
the other Mirzas to an unusual degree. Babur's dying 
words were, 'the cream of our testamentary directions is 
this, "Do naught against your brothers even though they 
may deserve it" M and Humayun acted in obedience to the 
wishes of his father. We have had several illustrations 
of Humayun's behaviour towards the Mirzas in the preced- 
ing pages. A modern historian with an acute political bias 
will condemn Humayun and pronounce his generosity to 
be entirely misplaced. This is not the place to discuss 
fully the character of Humayun. Suffice it to say that 
he was a scholar by inclination and habit, and hence 
matters of martial interest were not to his taste. He is a 
specimen of the Baburid culture and not of Central Asian 
ferocity. His defects are glaring, but we shall see that 
some of his merits are also equally worthy of notice. 

(c) The true reason of Humayun's expulsion will be 
clear from the following considerations. The Mughals 
under Babur had been welcomed in Samarqand, Kabul, 
and Delhi in recognition of the higher standard of Mughal 
culture. It was Babur's lofty moral principles that set 
a stamp of superiority on his administration. His strict 

i A. N. t p. 117. 



C 256 ] 

sense of justice, 1 his love of fair play, 2 his intense desire to 
protect the people, 3 and his democratic ideas, 4 had made a 
deep impression on his subjects. His was a more social, 
more tolerant, more intellectual, and more martial regime, 
and Babur's subjects were proud of him. With Humayun 's 
accession, the principles underlying the administration did 
not alter except in one respect, namely, the military. 
Kamran gradually appropriated the different fighting 
elements of the Muslim world with the result that Humayun 
was left with the aged veterans or the country recruits. 

Humayun, even then, might have prospered but for 
the rise of a new power, namely, the Afghans, under the 
inspiring leadership of Sher Shah. The Afghan leader 
assimilated all the good features of the Mughal adminis- 
tration, e.g., he maintained a personal touch with the 
people, protected them against official malfeasance, main- 
tained the Mughal Dm-panah as capital, and effected several 
other improvements, namely, personal supervision of the 
administration, 5 systematic revenue settlement, erection of 
forts, named after the ruler Shergarhs, throughout the 
kingdom for the protection of the ryots, garrisoning them 
with small detachments termed jauj, and opening up of 
roads, which in turn, led to improvement in trade. 

After Sher Shah's death, his system continued under 
his son and successor, Salim Shah. But after his son's 
death the Afghan system broke down, and Humayun had 
a chance again to bid for the throne. Luck favoured him, 
and once more he sat on the throne of Delhi. This recovery 
was achieved as much by the prowess of Bairam Khan as 
by Humayun's innate goodness; for the people were 
hoping for a more enlightened regime through his acces- 
sion. The full story will be related in the following volume. 

1 For illustration see B. N., pp. 67, 87 and 383. 

2 The author's article, ' Bdbur and the Hindus ' may be read in the 
U. P. Historical Journal of 1936 in this connexion. 

3 B. N., p. 300. 

4 Notice his relations with his nobles, e.g., Rhwaja Kalan, on the 
different occasions, especially at the festive gatherings. 

5 He had noticed Babur's carelessness in this respect. See Elliot and 
Dowson, History of India, Vol. IV, p. 330. 



TABLE OF HJJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

APPENDIX I 

APPENDIX II 

INDEX 



TABLE OF HIJRA AND CHRISTIAN YEARS 

A. H. A. D. First, Muharram, corresponds to 

937 1530 August 25 

938 1531 - August 15 

939 1532 August 3 

940 1533 July 23 

941 1534 July J 3 

942 1535 July 2 

943 1536 June 20 

944 1537 ' June 10 

945 1538 May 30 

946 1539 May 19 
9^7 1540 May 8 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Historians have generally put Humayun down as a failure, and their 
verdict appears to be justified in view of the sad end to his life. Lane- 
Poole picturesquely closes his appreciation of Humayun with the follow- 
ing words: ' he tumbled through life, and he tumbled out of it.' Vincent 
Smith is of opinion that, ' Humayun, although a cultivated gentleman, 
not lacking in ability, was deficient in the energetic promptitude of his 
versatile father/ No doubt these observations contain some truth, but 
they have resulted in a gross misreading of his character and objects. 
Humayun has been held up as a pleasure-loving sovereign lacking kingly 
virtues and steeped in dissipation. Some regard him as a perpetrator of 
' ferocious massacres and cruel punishments.' 

But a scientific evaluation of the contemporary sources redeem the 
entire picture. Humayun emerges as a scholar and lover of the Arts, 
intensely humane and morally unimpeachable, possessed of soldierly 
qualities and of a general's strategy. And yet he fails: he fails on 
account of the defects of his qualities. The present work frankly con- 
fesses that if it has stressed Humayun' s virtues, it has also exposed his 
defects. A balance has been struck. 

The foundation of Dm-panah objectifies the generous and enlightened 
character of the king. His humane instincts are in full evidence through- 
out his career. He treated the Khalifa and his nominee, Mahdi Khwaja, 
generously; he released his captives in Gujrat as a token of his apprecia- 
tion of Manjhu's Gujrati songs. His attitude towards his brothers 
and towards the Mirzas was extraordinarily lenient. He granted very 
liberal terms to Sher Khan in his first eastern campaign. It was in the 
unselfish and laudable instinct of helping a brother king, the forlorn 
fugitive Mahmud, that he proceeded to Bengal against Sher Khan. 

And these frequent demonstrations of his generosity wove a political 
web that Humayun found it difficult to unravel. In fact, in all his 
doings, a painful struggle between his head and heart is obvious in which 
the latter almost always triumphed. The present work has analysed this 
struggle into four stages, (i) Humayun as prince and the first four years 
of his reign when his mother was alive. In this period, he sought to 
consolidate his position on the throne. He undertook expeditions against 
Kalinjar (1530-31 A. D.), and against the Afghans (1532-33 A. D.), 
conciliated Kamran (1533 A. D.), and suppressed rebellions headed by 
the Mirzas (1534 A. D.). (2) His Gujrat campaign and relations with 
Sultan Bahadur Shah (1534-36 A. D.). Although his campaign ultimately 
failed, it revealed him as a general and strategist. His march to Sarang- 
pur, to Ujjain, and to Mandasor, outwitted the Sultan, and his siege 
operations ajt Mandasor were conducted on approved lines. (3) His 



[ 260 ] 

Bengal campaign and his dealings with the Afghans in general, and with 
Sher Khan in particular (1537-38 A. D.). He started from Agra with the 
determination of subduing the Afghans, but denied himself the first-fruits 
of his campaign by going back upon the terms of the treaty agreed upon 
between himself and Sher Khan under the generous impulse of helping 
the wounded Mahmud of Bengal against Sher Khan. (4) The battles of 
Chausa (June 26, 1539 A. D.), and of Qanauj (May 17, 1540 A. D.), 
and his expulsion from his kingdom. These battles are a denouement of 
the tale that had woven itself in the preceding years. His recent neglect 
of army and of administration, by no means due to any dissipation on his 
part, hastened the issue. 

In short, the main strength of this work lies in its clear analysis of 
the political dilemma in which Humayun found himself on account of the 
development of a close league between Bahadur and Sher Khan : one 
would renew his activities if the other was attacked by Humayun. And 
there was no getting over it. 

Among the contemporary authorities, Abul Fazl's Akbar-ndma, 
Jauhar's Tazkirat-ul-Waqidt, Gulbadan Begam's Humdyun-ndma and 
The authorities Nizamuddln Ahmad* s Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, have been 

bearing^on all these utilized with profit throughout all the four stages. 
four stages. All of them are contemporary works, and the first 

three were commenced at Akbar's suggestion in 1587 A. D. 

Of these Abul Fazl's work is by far the best and most reliable. 

Abul Fazl wrote under State patronage, and hence had all the facilities 

the State could place at his disposal. He obtained material from the 

record of&ce and ' from the old members of the 

The Akbar-ndma. iu ustr i ous family and the servants of the State.' 
Abul Fazl himself says, ' I examined both prudent, truth-speak- 
ing old men and active-minded, right-actioned young ones and 
reduced their statements to writing. The royal commands were issued 
to the provinces that those who from old service remembered with 
certainty or with adminicle of doubt, the events of the past, should 
copy out their notes and memoranda and submit them to Court.' 
Amongst the mediaeval historians, Abul Fazl was the most gifted. He 
possessed a sound historical imagination which he brought into play while 
writing the Akbar-ndma and thus throws considerable light on Mughal 
culture and military strength. 

Gulbadan Begam's history, though a small incomplete book of 
82 folios, each page of which consists of 15 lines, is a precious work. 
Gulbadan is Humayun' s sister and is the only woman writer of the 
Gulbadan Begam's period. Her descriptions of (i) Babur's affection 
Humdyun-nama. for Maham Begam and for Humayun, and his 
sacrifice of life for the latter, (2) Maham Begam's interest in Humayun' s 
reign, (3) the ' mystic ' feasts and Hindal's marriage feasts (4) Humayfin's 
return journey from Gaur (5) the record of losses among Humayun' s 



women after the battle of Chausa, are extremely vivid. Her quotation 
of Humayun's words about Hindal, after the Mirza's rebellion at Agra, 
may be given as a sample of Humayun's softness ot heart. Humayun 
is made to say, ' Hindal is my strength and my spear, the desirable 
light of my eyes, the might of my arm, the desired, the beloved . . . 
what shall I say to Mirza Muhammad Hindal about the affair of my 
Shaikh Buhlul? What was to be has been! Now there is no anger in 
my heart against Hindal/ But she is not devoid of faults, (i) Her 
spelling of words is not always in the orthodox style ; (2) her dates 
are not always correct: this is because she wrote the memoirs more 
than forty years after the occurrence of the events ; (3) her love for 
her full brother, Hindal, made her blind to his defects. When even the 
Mirza's own mother regretted Hindal' s rebellion against Humayun, the 
Begam justified his murder of Shaikh Buhlul, and gives the false plea 
of the Shaikh's intrigue with Sher Khan. Her work has not been so 
far utilized by any biographer of Humayun. 

Jauhar too is a contemporary historian. As he served Humayun 
only in a menial capacity and accompanied him for more than twenty- 
five years, he developed an exaggerated notion of his master's abilities 
Jauhar' s Tazkirat- anc * P u t d w n the most trivial incidents connected 
ul-Wdqidt. with him. As he himself says, ' Let no one 

reprove me for degrading the importance of history because I write 
such things. In another case I would not have written them ; but 
since they were done by an Emperor, and I myself saw and heard 
them I thought it right to conceal nothing, and to transmit these 
matters for the information of posterity ; as if they had been of the 
utmost consequence.' Though sometimes he loves to deal with petty 
details, occasionally he rises to the level of a true historian, (i) He 
regrets that at the end of the Gujrat compaign, it did not occur to 
Humayun that Bahadur might be utilized as his Deputy in Gujrat and 
Malwa. If this suggestion of his had been adopted, much of 
Humayun's later troubles would never have occurred. (2) He correctly 
gives both the reasons for Rumi Khan's removal by poison, (a) the 
jealousy of the other nobles, and (b) the disgust that the Mughals felt 
at Rumi Khan's cruelty to the captive Afghan gunners. (3) He points 
out Mirza Haidar's blunder in allowing the non-combatants to come in 
between the two contending armies. It silenced Humayun's guns and 
made it impossible for the Mughals to continue the fight. But Jauhar 
suffers from a failing memory, and at times he makes silly mistakes. 
One such has been indicated on p. 123, n. 3. He must have had a very 
poor topographical knowledge of the Deccan, otherwise his location of the 
encounter between Humayun and Bahadur in the Burhanpur district is 
inconceivable. Similarly, the prolonging of the siege at Mandasor to 
three or four months does not seem to be correct. 

Nizamuddln Ahmad' s Tabaqdt-Akbari also has a high place among 
the mediaeval histories of India. As pointed out by Dowson, ' It is 



[ 262 ] 

one of the most celebrated histories of India and is the first that was 
The Tabaqdt-i- composed upon a new model in which India alone 

Akbari. forms the subject matter of the work, to the 

exclusion of the histories of other Asiatic countries/ Both Parish ta and 
Shah Nawaz Khan, the author of the Madsir-ul-Umard, have highly 
praised Nizamuddln's work. According to Parish ta, ' of all the histories 
that he consulted, it is the only one he found complete.' Shah Nawaz 
says, ' This work cost the author much care and reflection in ascertaining 
facts and collecting materials, and as Mir Masum Bhakkari and other 
persons of note afforded their assistance in the compilation, it is entitled 
to much credit.' He is a straightforward writer, and is esteemed even 
by the irascible Abdul Qadir Badauni. We have accepted Nizamuddln's 
version of the Khalifa's move to set aside Humayun and his brothers 
from the throne, and place Mahdi Khwaja as Babur's successor ; we 
have not been able to see eye to eye with Mrs Bevendge in her suggestion 
that Nizamuddm deliberately suppressed Muhammad Zaman Mirza's 
name and inserted instead that of Mahdi Khwaja' s. Nizamuddm gives 
interesting details of (i) Muhammad Sultan M. and Muhammad Zaman 
Mirza's activities. (2) Humayun's return journey and negotiations with 
Sher Khan just before the battle of Chausa and makes a pun on the 
word y J . But even such a careful writer is not free from blemishes ; 
(i) he is usually too plain in his descriptions and lacks in human touch; 
and (2) one or two of his facts are disputable, e.g., when he makes 
Humayun responsible for the amputation of the Afghan captives. 

Though written later than the Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, the Tdrikh-i- 
Fartshta enjoys the reputation of being a reliable history. Muhammad 
Qasim Hindu Shah wrote his history at the suggestion of Ibrahim Adil 
The Tdrikh-i- Shah, and so in his work we find a great deal of 

Parish ta. space allotted to the description of the rulers of 

the South Indian States. In a historian's language, ' He is free from 
prejudice and partiality; he does not even flatter the prince in whose 
reign he lived; and though not entirely without sectarian bitterness 
when noticing Sayyids and though not exempt from Muhammadan 
bigotry, when speaking of the wholesale massacre of the defenceless 
Hindus, he is more divested of that feeling than any other author of his 
own religious creed who recounts similar atrocities.' To Parish ta we are 
indebted for several facts, (i) Babur's illness during the last ten months 
of his reign; (2) the stray verses exchanged between Humayun and 
Bahadur; (3) Bahadur's prowess in capturing the biggest gun of the 
time possessed by the Portuguese; (4) his intentions to render some sort 
of aid to the Maharana of Chitor against Bahadur; (5) the battle of 
Mahmud&bad fought between Askari and Imad-ul-Mulk; (6) the exact 
date (i8th Safar, 944 A. H.), when Humayun started for his last Bengal 
campaign. 

While it is true that the Bdbur-ndma cannot serve as a primary 
source 'for Humayun's reign, it gives us a good picture of him as prince. 



C 263 ] 

In fact, for the first five chapters, it has been one of our main authorities. 
_ In the remaining chapters, we have had occasions 

2 he Bdbur-ndma. the footnotes indicate to consult it. It is the 



Bible of the Mughal history of India, and any fact quoted from or 
supported by it is placed beyond all doubt. ' In this history I have held 
firmly to it that truth should be reached in every matter, and that every 
act should be recorded precisely as it occurred. From this it follows of 
necessity that I have set down of good and bad whatever is known 
concerning father and elder brother, kinsman and stranger ......... ' In 

a study of Humayun's imitation of his father, the Bdbur-ndma has 
proved very useful. The memoirs truly embody Babur's career, ' for it 
has the rare distinction of being contemporary with the events it 
describes, is boyish in his boyhood, grows with his growth, matures as 
he matured.' Such a biography would naturally have a hold on 
Humayun and considerably mould his character. 

Khwandamir (Khondamir) like his grandfather, Mirkhond is a well- 
known figure among the Muslim historians. His full name was Ghiyas- 
uddin Khwandamir bin Humamuddm. He has written several wroks 
including the Humayun-ndma, the most famous 

ghwdndamir's bdng the jfablb-us-Styar. He was born in Herat 

Humaytn-nama. i 



His history, the Huwdyun-ndma, though it deals only with the first 
three years of Humayun's reign, was written at the king's desire. 
Humayun's words as quoted by the writer are, ' It seems proper and 
desirable that the inventions of my auspicious mind, and the improvement 
of my enlightened understanding, should be arranged in a series and 
written down ............... ' The details regarding the foundation of Din- 

panah are mainly taken from Khwandamir's work. 

Among the secondary authorities we have laid under contribution 
the following works, viz., (i) Abdul Qadir Badaunl's Muntakhab-ut- 
Tawdrikh, (2) Mulla Muhammad Ahmad and Jafar Beg Asaf Khan, etc.'s 
Tdrikh-i-A1}i f (3) Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari, (4) Tahir Muhammad's 
Rauzat-ut-Tdhtrin, (5) Allahdad Faizi Sirhindi's Tdrikk-i-Humdyun 
Slidhi, (6) Nur-ul-Haqq's Zabadat-ut-Tawdrikh, (7) Bakhtawar Khan's 
Mirdt-ul-Alam, (8) Muhammad Yusuf's *Muntakhab-ut-Tawdrikh, (g) Sujan 
Rai's Khuldsat-ut-%awdrikh, (10) the Haft Risdla-i-Taqwlm-i-Bulddn, 
(n) the Haqiqathdi'Hindust&n. All these are useful works giving details 
and confirming the other historians. Occasionally a useful date and 
some additional dates are given. BadaunI clearly indicates that the 
Khalifa was Babur's Deputy and Prime Minister of the realm; also that 
Humayun left behind under Jahangir Quli Khan 5000 of his select 
soldiers. The Tdrlkh-t-Alfl has enabled us to fix the date of the battle of 
Dadrah. But usually it disappoints the reader. The arrangement of the 
narration from year to year is unsound, and some of the details are mis- 
Ipading or incorrect. Thus Muhammad Zaman M., who, we know, was 
drowned at the end of the battle of Chausa, is made to live longer and 



[ 264 ] 

join HumSyun at Chunar after the defeat. Similarly, Humayun is made 
responsible for the amputation of the captive Afghan gunners. Even 
the statement that the Kalinjar campaign took two years to complete 
is not supported by any other historian. Altogether its fame belies its 
merit. Abul Fazl's Ain-i-Akbari supplies details about places, e.g., the 
correct spelling of Dadrah, the situation of Kanar, the description of 
Gaur and Gujrat, the land-revenue system before Sher Shah's time, etc. 
Of the others, the Rauzat-ut-Tdhirin supports ghtvdndamir in the 
description of Humayun' s estimation of the relative value of the Muslim 
kings of the world. It also clearly states that Humayun's object in 
marching to Gwalior and to Malwa was to conduct a campaign against 
Bahadur. The Tdrfyh-i-Humdyun Shdhl gives interesting details about 
the Mirzis. The Mirdt-ul-Alam wrongly thinks Bahadur to have 
appealed to Humayun not to attack him while he was engaged against 
the Rajputs at Chitor. The Zabdat-ut-Tawdrikh states that after the 
Gujrat campaign he stayed in Agra for a year. Then when he started 
on the Bengal campaign, it gives the list of the nobles that accompanied 
Humayun. The Khuldsat-ut-Tawdrikh gives a copious description of the 
rewards granted on HumSyun's accession, also of the feasts held by 
Humayun in his palaces at Gaur. The Haft Risdla-i-Taqwim-i-Bulddn 
gives the titles granted by Babur after the battle of Khanwah, and we 
know from it those that were granted to the Khalifa, Mahdi Khwaja, 
Muhammad Sultan M., Ustdd All Quli Khan, and Mustafa Ruml IChan. 
The Haqlqathdi-Hindustdn confirms the date of the battle of Mandasor. 

For the Gujrat campaign we have excellent materials in Arabic, 
Persian, Hindi and Portuguese. The Arabic History of Gujrat by 
Abdullah Muhammad bin Omar edited by Sir . Denison Ross and the 
The authorities Tdrikh-i-Sihandari by Sikandar bin Ahmad, born 

for the Gujrdt 1553 A. D., are valued works and have been freely 

campaign. consulted. Both the authors mention histories that 

they had consulted but which" are supposed not to exist to-day, e.g., 
the Tdnkh-4-Bahddur Shdhl. The small printed work called the Tdrikh- 
i-Gujrdt written by Abu Turab Wall is also a contemporary work. 
Aba Turab's father and uncle, Shah Qutbuddln Shukrullah and Shah 
Kamaluddln Fathullah respectively, were noted divines, and took part 
in the negotiations between the two kings as Bahadur's representatives. 
Tod's Annals and Antiquities of Rdjasthdn and Ojka's Vdaipur Rajya 
ka Itihds, though modern works, have given us many details from the 
Rajput point of view. Similarly Danvers's History of the Portuguese in 
India gives details of Bahadur's clash with Nuno da Cunha, the Viceroy 
of Goa (1529-39 A. D.). The Mirat-i-Ahmadi, text and translation 
by E. C, Bayley and of the Gaekwad's Oriental series, several articles in 
the historical journals, e.g., ' Dhdra and Mandu/ ' A brief History of 
the Gujrdt Sultdnate ' and ' Garcia d'Orta of Bombay * have provided 
us with a few historical and geographical details. 

In dealing with Humayun's Bengal campaign, we had the advantage 
of consulting Dr Qanungo's Sher Shdh and the Cambridge History of 



India, Vol. IV, Chap III. The main authorities are (i) Abbas IChan 
Sarwani's Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi, also called Tuhfa-i- 

The authorities Akbar Shdhl, (2) Nimatullah's Mahhzan-i-Afaghma 

for the Bengal or its translation by Dorn, (3) Ghulam Husain 

campaign. Sallm's Riydz-us-Salatin, (4) Campos's History of 

the Portuguese in Bengal, (5) Father Tieffenthaler's 

Description de Vlnde. Most of Sher Shah's chronology is obtained from 
internal evidences. Some corrections have been made by Dr P, Saran in 
his article on ' The date and place of Sher Shah's birth ' in the Bihar 
and Orissa Research Society Journal. We have incorporated them. 
Similarly, the survey maps of the Government of India, old as well as 
new, have enabled us to determine Humayun's route on the outward and 
return journeys. Here, some help has also been obtained from an 
excellent sketch of the old routes in Bengal, Past and Present Journal 
ot July-September, 1924 A. D. Several district Gazetteers of Bengal 
proved useful, e.g., the Mdlda Gazetteer in suggesting that Humayun 
did not cross the Ganges in reaching Gaur; the Santal Parganas Gazetteer 
in giving a topographical description of the river Ganges from Teliagarhi 
to Sikrigalli; the Shdhabdd Gazetteer for a description of the C herds, the 
Patna Gazetteer for the details of Bihar Sharif and the rise of Patna 
town. 

For details of the battle of Chausa we have to depend on some of 
the authorities mentioned above, e.g., the Jauhar, the Akbar-ndma, etc., 
The battles of an< * * or ^ e Da ^ e ^ Qanauj, mostly on Haidar 

Chausa and Qanauj Mirza's Tdrikh-i-Rashidi. Though we accept his 
and after. narrative of the battle, we have differed from some 

of his comments. It seems to us that he has shoved some of his blunders 
on the shoulders of the Indian officers and men. 

Among the modern works on Humayun, we may mention (i) Erskine's 

History of India, 2 volumes (Babur and Humayun), (2) Rushbrook 

Williams's An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century, (3) Law's 

Promotion of Learning in India, Vol. I, (4) Browne's 

The modern works. Ltterary HlstoYy of Persiaf 4 vo i s ., ( 5) Moreland's 

Agrarian System of Moslem India, ^ (6) Numismatic Catalogues of the 
Mughal Coins in the British Museum, (7) Sarkar's India of Aurangzib, 
(8) The Imperial Gazetteer, several volumes, (9) Elliot and Dowson's 
History of India by its Own Historians, Vols. IV, V and VI, (10) Ghani's 
History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court, 3 vols., 
(n) The Cambridge History of India, Vols. Ill and IV. All of them are 
useful books and give a good picture of the times. 



APPENDIX I 

A LIST OF THE OTHER WORKS CONSULTED 
IN THE PREPARATION OF THE BOOK 

1. ABDULLAH The Tarikh-i-Daudi, MS. Copy Or. 197 of the Br. Mus. 

2. AHMAD YADGAR- The Tarikh-i-Salatm-i-Afaghina, MS. Copy Or. 1939 

of the Br. Mus. or its translation in Elliot and Dowson's 
History of India, Vol. V, pp. 1-66. 

3. Archaeological Reports published by the Government of India. 

4. BAYLEY, E. C. History of Gujrat, Allen & Co., London, 1886. 

5. BENI PRASAD History of Jahangir, Indian Press, Second Edition, 

1930. 

6. BURGESS, J. The Ahmadabad Architecture, Part I, W. Griggs, 

London, 1900. 

7. BURGESS, J. The Muhammadan Architecture of Bharaoch, Cambay, 

Dholka, Champamr and Mahmudabad in Gujrat, W. Griggs, 
London, 1896. 

8. FENSHAWE, H. C. Delhi, Past and Present, J. Murray, London, 

1902. 

9. FERGUSSON, J. History of India and Eastern Architecture, 2 vols., 

J. Murray, London, Second Edition, 1910. 

10. FLETCHER, B. F. A History of Architecture on the Comparative 

Method, B. T. Batsford Ltd., London, Sixth Edition, 1921. 

11. FORBES, A. K. Ras Mala, edited by H. G. Rawlinson, Oxford 

University Press, London, 1924. 

12. FUHRER, A. The Sharqi Architecture of Jaunpur. The Government 

Printing Press, Calcutta, 1889. 

13. GHULAM HUSAIN KHAN Siyar-ul-Mutakhkhirin. Printed text by 

Newal Kishore Press. Translation published by Cambray & 
Co., Calcutta, Reprint, 1902. 

14. GIBB, H. A. R. The Travels of Ibn Battuta, G. Routledge, 

London, 1929. 

15. HAIG, W. The Historic Landmarks of the Deccan, Pioneer Press, 

Allahabad, reprint, 1919. 

16. HERKLOTS, G. A. Islam in India, edited by W. Crooke, Oxford 

University Press, London, new edition, 1921. 

17. IBN HASAN The Central Structure of the Mogul Empire, Oxford 

University Press, Bombay, 1936. 

18. IRVINE, W. The Army of the Indian Moghuls, Luzac, London, 

1903. 



C 267 ] 

19. KHOSLA, R. P. The Mughal Kingship and Nobility, Indian Press, 

Allahabad, 1934. 

20. MACLAGAN, E. The Jesuits and the Great 

Washbourne, London, 1932. 

21. MINHAJ-I-SIRAJ The Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, 

1864. 

' 2i(). RAVERTY, H. G. Translation of 
Series, London, 1881. 

22. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN Mirat-i- Ahmad 

AH (Gaekwad's Oriental Series^ 

3927. TL 

23. MORELAND, W. H. India at the Defttnypr\Akbar , 

London, 1920. ^^^ CV*;?"* 

24. MORELAND, W. H. & CHATTERJEE, A. C. A^^ja History of India, 

Longmans, Green, London, 1936. 

25. MULLA ABDUL BAQI NAHAVANDI Maasir-i-Rahimi, Bib. Ind. Series, 

Calcutta, 1924. 

26. MULLA SALIH KAMBO Amal-i-Salih or Shahjahan-nama, Bib. Ind. 

Series, Calcutta, 1923. 

27. SARDA, H. B. Maharana Sanga, Scottish Mission Press, Ajmir, 1918. 

28. SAYYID AHMAD KHAN Asar-us-Sanadid (in Urdu), Nami Press, 

Cawnpore, third edition, 1904. 

29. TARA CHAND Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, Indian Press, 

Allahabad, 1936. 

30. THOMAS, E. The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi, Trubner 

& Co., London, 1871. 

31. THORNTON, E. A Gazetteer of the Territories under the Government 

of the East India Company. Allen & Co., London, 1857. 

32. TRIPATHI, R. P. Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Indian 

Press, Allahabad, 1936. 

33. SMITH, V. Oxford History of India, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923. 



APPENDIX II 
ARTICLES OF THE JOURNALS CONSULTED 

1. BANERJI, S. K. Babur and the Hindus, Journal, The U. P. 

Historical Society, 1936. 

2. BARNES, E. Dhara and Mandu, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 

Bombay Branch, 1903. 

3. BEVERIDGE, H. Mahdi Khwaja, Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica, 

1915-16. 

4. COMMISSARIAT, M. S. A Brief History of the Gujrat Sultanate. 

Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, 1918-19. 

5. KENNEDY Hidaya, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 1835. 

6. HAIG, SIR W. The Nizam Shahi Kings of Ahmadnagar, Indian 

Antiquary, 1920. 

7. RICHMOND Moslem Architecture, the Last Chapter in Fletcher's 

History of Architecture. 

8. SARAN, P. The Date and Place of Sher Shah's Birth, Journal, Bihar 

and Orissa Research Society, 1934. 

9 . Garcia d'Orta of Bombay, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 

Bombay, Branch, 1922-23. 

10. Ross, SIR E. D. The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 
and 1517, Journal, Royal Asiatic Society, 1921. 

n. Routes, Old and New Bengal, Past and Present, July- 
September, 1924. 



INDEX 



Abbas, 43 n. 1-2 author of the 
Tdrikh-i-Sher Shdhi, 44 garrul- 
ous, 44 acceptance of his state- 
ments, 46 absolves Sher Shah of 
Puran Mai's murder, 46. 

Abbas II Shah, see Shah Abbas. 

Abdul Aziz, Asaf Khan, Masnad-i- 
Ali, see Asaf Khan, Masnad-i- 
A1I, Abdul Aziz.' 

Abdullah Khan, Qasim Husain Sul- 
tan's agent, retreated from 
Navsari, 158. 

Abdullah Muhammad bin Umar, the 
author of the Arabic History of 
Gujrat, loo, 102, 164. 

Abdul Qadir Badauni, see Badauni, 
Abdul Qadir. 

Abdul Qadir, Qazi, Sultan Bahadur's 
agent, 103, 108. 

Abul Baqa, Mir, the most celebrated 
hakim, 237. 

Abul Fazl, author of the Akbar-ndma 
and the Ain-i-Akbari, men- 
tioned, 9, 103, 141, 143, 144, 
164, 174 mentions the Khalifa 
to be by Babur's bed-side, 14 
corroborates Nizamuddm's story 
about the Khalifa's conspiracy 
against Humayun, 21 n. his love 
of truth, 22-^his date of the 
Raja of Kalin jar's submission, 
36 -bears out the author's views 
about Kamran's relations with 
Humayun, 56. 

Abu TurUb Wall, the author of the 
History of Gujrat, mentioned, 
103, 132, 144, 164. 

Adil Khan, Sher Shah's eldest son, 
commanded an Afghan division 
at the battle of Qanauj, 244. 

Afzal Khan, a Gujrat nobleman, won 
over by Imad-ul-Mulk, 172. 



Aghziwai Khan, a Persian com- 
mander, defeated and killed, 170. 

Ahmad, Shaikh of Turbat-i-Jam, 51. 

Ahmad Mirza, Sultan, 53. 

Ahmadabad, its comparative distance 
from Chitor and Ujjain, 119 and 
from Chitor and Mandasor, 123 
protected by Askari, 153 
description, 153 n. i. 

Ahmad Lad, Malik, a Gujratl noble- 
man, organized a night attack at 
Cambay, 141. 

Ahmad Yadgar, the author of the 
Tdrikh-i-Saldtin-i-Afdghina, his 
statement about Babur's health, 
10 mentioned, 12. 

The Ain-i-Akbarl, 75. 

Ajmer, captured by Bahadur Shah, 
87. 

Ajudhya, Babur's mosque at, 6 the 
battle of, 177 captured by Sher 
Khan, 222, 

Alai movement, 180. 

Alauddin Firuz, Nasrat Shah's son, 
70 reigned for four months, 
deposed by Mahmud, 70. 

Alam Khan of Dhandhuka, disclosed 
treasures to Humayun, 150. 

Alam Khan Alauddin Lodi, Babur's 
candidate for the throne of 
Delhi, 31, 91 parentage, 91 
kept as prisoner in Bada^hshan, 
91 led a campaign against 
Kalinjar, 94. 

Alauddin Imad-ul-Mulk of Berar, 
implored help of Bahadur, 80. 

Alam Khan Jighat (Lodi) of Kalpi, 
son of Jalal Khan Jighat, 7 - 
expelled from the Delhi king- 
dom, 83 granted jdgir by Baha- 
dur, 83 lost his jdgir, 119 



[ 270 ] 



captured and hamstringed at 

Mandu, 135. 
Alwar, granted to Hindal, 28 

Humayun in, 252. 
Atal Devi Mosque, mentioned, 180. 
Aqlqa, Humay tin's daughter, lost at 

Chausa, 232. 
Arail, a town, 234. 
Araish Khan, an Indian nobleman, 

22. 
Asaf Khan, Masnad-i-All Abdul Aziz, 

entrusted with Bahadur's women 

and treasures, 137 went to 

Jedda, 138. 

Askari, younger than Humayun by 
eight years, 19 was granted 
Sambhal at Humayun' s acces- 
sion, 28 governor of Multan, 
29 a commander at the battle 
of the Ghagra, 38, 51 given a 
thorough education by Babur, 51 
appointed viceroy of Gujrat, 
154 his failure, 158 causes of 
his failure, 160 rejected Hindu 
Beg's suggestion to make him- 
self sovereign, 162 fought a 
battle at Ahmadabad, retreated, 
163 no money available for a 
second battle, 165 proceeded to 
Agra, 165 welcomed Md. Zaman 
M., 174 accompanied Humayun 
to Bengal, 199 placed in the 
advance-guard, 221 at the battle 
of Qanauj, 243-45 quarrel with 
Yadgar Nasir M., 251. 

Ayisha Begam, lost at Chausa, 232. 

Baba Khan (Beg) Jalair, the acting 
governor of Jaunpur and its 
defender against Sher Khan, 220 
at Chausa, 230. 

Baba B6g Kurbeg, one of Askari' s 
officers, 221 at Chausa, 232. 

Babur, Zahiruddin Muhammad, early 
career, 1-2 assumption of the 
title of Padshah, 2 fought the 
battle of Panipat, 4 bestowed 



the Koh-i-nur diamond on Huma- 
yun, 5 grant of ^agir to 
Ibrahim's mother, 5 rewards to 
the Mughal soldiers and the 
select people of the Muslim 
world, 5-6 the battle of Khan- 
wah, 7 his darwesh-like tempe- 
rament, 6, ii an inscription on 
Babur' s mosque in Ajudhya 
refers to him as qalandar, 6 
appointed Sulaiman M. governor 
of Badakhshan, 11-12 sacrificed 
his life for Humayun, 13 death, * 
14 the malady considered to be 
the effect of poison, 15 buried 
at first in Agra and later on in 
Kabul, 15-16 Multan occupied 
by, 29 his policy of appointing 
the eldest sons to the north- 
west regions, 29 his system of 
provincial administration, 30 
supported by some Indian nobles, 
31 efforts to conciliate the 
Afghans, 31-32 visited by Jalal 
Nuhani and his mother, Dudu, 
38 wrote a verse on Muslim 
Law for Kamran's benefit, 51 
division of the inheritance bet- 
ween Humayun and Kamran, 53 
his love for Maham Begam, 60 
tomb at Agra, 15, 60-6 1 his I 
corpse removed to Kabul, 15-16 
demolition of Rama's temple 

i in Ajudhya, 113 and n. i dis- 

j tance of some of his outposts 
from Kabul, 160. 

JBachka Bahadur, Mir, posted at 

! Mahmudabad, 154 at Chausa, 

1 232. 

iBadauni, Abdul Qadir, gives the 
chronogram of the date of the 
capture of Champamr, 143-44 
mentioned, 164. 

Bagh Singh, Rawat of Devlia-Pratap- 
garh, defender of Chitor, 88, 89. 

Bahadur Khan Nuhani, see Sultan 
Muhammad Shah Nuhani. v 



I 271 3 



Sultan Bahadur Shah, king of Gujrat 
a potentate on the Mughal 
border, 32 report about his 
hostile intentions, 58 his rapid 
successes, 58, 80-89 treaty with 
Rana Vikramaditya, 59 his acti- 
vities forced Humayun to sign 
the treaty of Chunar with Sher 
Khan, 72 and to return to Agra, 
73 career as prince, 76-79 in 
Sultan Ibrahim's camp, 77 a 
spectator at the battle of Pani- 
pat, 77 was offered the throne 
of Jaunpur or Gujrat, 77-78 
went to Gujrat, 79 career as 
king, 79-89 policy towards the 
Hindus, 82, n. 3 captured 
Ranthambhor, 85 the first siege 
of Chi tor, 85, 87 granted terms 
to Ram Karnavati, 87 captured 
Ajmer and Nagore, 87 gave 
shelter to the Delhi nobles, 90-92 
reluctant to accept Tatar 
Khan's proposals, 91 reasons, 
91-92 at last granted permission 
to conduct a campaign, 93-94 
correspondence with Hum.ly un , 
99-1 1 1 alarmed by Humayun' s 
march to the eastern Malwa, 118 
fall of Chitor, 89, 120 did not 
grant Chitor to Rumi Khan, 
reasons, 121 his alarming situa- 
tion, 121 the proper course for 
him, 121-23 undergoes a siege 
at Mandasor, 124 his flight to 
Mandu, 125-27 the splendour 
of his camp, 127-28 besieged at 
Mandu, 130 the proposed settle- 
ment between him and Humayun, 
131 attacked by the Mughals, 
132 his flight to Champanir, 136 
sent his women and treasures 
. with Asaf Khan with instructions 
to proceed to Turkey, 137-38 
left for Cambay, 137 His rela- 
tions with the Portuguese, 138- 
40 loyalty of the people of 



Gujrat for him, 151-52 recover- 
ed some districts, 158-59, also 
Ahmadabad, 163. 

Bairam Khan, accompanied Huma- 
yun to Bengal, 199 mentioned, 
256. 

Bajauna, a town, 251-2. 

Banbir Singh, Kunwar, his genealogy, 
129, n. 4 murdered Vikram- 
aditya, 129. 

Bassein, treaty of, between Bahadur 
and Nuno da Cunha, 140. 

Batwa, its situation, the tomb of 
Hazral Qutb-ul-Alam, 153. 

Bayazid, an Afghan nobleman, 39 
acted in alliance with Biban, 40 
deserted the Mughals, 7. 

Bayazid, Ildenm, 104. 

Bayazld Qarmali, 42 and n. 3. 

Bega Begam, Humayun's chief queen, 
232 captured by the Afghans at 
Chausa, and later on restored, 
232. 

Beveridge, Mrs A. S., points out 
Maham's affectionate relations 
with Babur, 3 her reasons for 
the Khalifa's dissatisfaction with 
Humayun, 8 accuses Humayun 
of deserting his post in Badakh- 
shan, 8 mentions Ahmad 
Yadgar, 12 disbelieves some 
portions of Nizamuddm Ahmad 's 
story, and suggests Md. Zaman's 
name for Mahdi Khwaja, 22-4. 

Bhojpur, (i) in Bihar, 223, (2) in 
Qanauj Sarkar, 239-40. 

Bhongaon, 250. 

Bhua, Mian, Sultan Ibrahim's 
minister, 37. 

Bhupat Rai, Silhadi's son in Baha- 
dur's army, resisted Rumi 
Khan's incitement to desert to 
the Mughals, 133. 

Biana, description of, 94 n. 4 battle 
of, 94 mentioned, 7. 

Biban, an Afghan "nobleman, 39 
acts in alliance with Bayazid, 40 



[ 272 ] 



the three Bibans of the period, regained by the Rajputs, 129, 

42, n. 3 deserted the Mughals, 7 167. 

Bihiya, a subdivision of Bhojpur, 223 Chobta Bahadur, forcibly took posses- 

in Humayun's time situated on sion of a trooper's horse, killed 

the Grand Trunk Road, 223 by Humayiin, 252. 

n. 1-2. Chunar, description and past history, 

Bihzad, illustrated Hatifi's poem, 141. 47 commandant Taj Khan, and 

Blrbhan, Raja, protected the Mughal after him, Lad Maltha, 47-8 

rear, 235 accompanied Huma- Sher Khan came into possession, 

yun to Qanauj, 239 -his proposal 48-9 besieged by Humayun, 49 

of retreating to Panna, 239. treaty of between Humayun 

Birpur, 234. and Sher Khan, 50 the later 

Bikramajit, the Raja of Gwalior, died Mughal headquarters, 180 

in battle, 4 his family sur- defended by Jalal Khan, 199 

rendered the Koh-i-nur diamond, besieged by Humayun, 200 

c reasons, 200-2 its capture, 203 

Bikramajit, Maharana, see Vikram- -recovered by the Afghans, 222. 

aditya, Maharana. 225- 

Bridal. Shaikh, sent by HnmaySn to Dadrah battle at, and defeat of the 

Hindal, 215 killed, 216, 255 a ^ Afghans, 42. 

chronogram giving the year of Darwe ffl sh A1! f'^/f''. a Mu / hal 

death, 216 n. 2-particulars. officer posted at Uj jam 156. 

2I g n j Darya Khan a Gujratl nobleman, 

_ . ' ' _, _ , , , occupied Patan, 159. 

Burhan Nizam Shah, forced by t _ _ T t, . XT-I_- - / 

J i Darya Khan Nuhani, governor of 

Bahadur to retreat, 8o-acknow- Bihar> raised head againgt 

ledfeed Bahadur as suzerain, 80 Ibrahim, 38 died, 38. 

allowed to call himself the Shah, Dau]at jj han j^ imprisoned by 

81 Babur, 77. 



Champanir, description, 136 Baha- 



Dilawar Khan, Khan-Khanan, Daulat 



dur fled to, pursued by Huma- Khan's sonhis advice to pro- 

.yun, i36-~caUed Muhammadabad ceed direct t o Bengal, 200 in 

by Mahmud Begarha, 137- command of a Mughal division, 

Chand Bib!, Humayun's wife, lost at 220 captured by Sher Khan and 

Chausa, 232. put to death> 22I| 2 ^[ 

Chand Khan, given shelter by Di i dar B egam (Aghacha), Babur's 

Mahmud II of Malwa, 80- 1 w if e , Maham to be the guardian 

cause of end to the independence O f her child, 19 n. 4, 60 in 

of the Malwa kingdom, 116. mourning on the day of Hindal's 

Chausa, Humayun reached, 223 the accession, her speech, 218 

battle of, 228-33. secured pardon from Kamran, 

Cheros, aboriginal people of the 219. 

Shahabad district of Bihar, 226-7. DIn-panh, Humayun's capital, 

Chitor (or Chitrakut), description, 86 foundations laid, July, 1533, the 

its present condition, 86-7 the walls of the citadel completed, 

first siege of, 85-7 the second April, 1534, 62 reasons for its 

siege of, 88-9 its fall, 89, 120 foundation, 62-3 its present 



[ 273 ] 



ruins, 63-4 Bahadur's views, 65 
mentioned, 196. 

Dm, description, 139 mentioned, 85, 
137, 140, 163. 

Dorn, his statement on the capture 
of Jaunpur by Mahmud L5di, 40 
see also other foot-notes. 

Dost Beg Ishaq Aqa, posted at 
Baroda and Cambay, 154 
retreated to Askan, 159. 

Dudu Bibl, Sultan Muhammad Shah 
Nuhani's wife, acted as regent in 
Jalaluddm's reign, 38, 189 met 
Babur, 38 died, 38, 189. 

Erskine, the author of the History of 
India, 2 Vols. (Babur and Huma- 
yun), accuses Humayun of deser- 
tion from Badakhshan, 8 
criticizes Kamran's actions, 53 
the author's criticism, 54-6. 

Fakhr All, Mir, Hindal's tutor, 9 
in Badakhshan, 9 Humayun' s 
deputy in Delhi, 198, 217-8 
rebuked by Humayun, 252. 

Farghali, Maulana Muhammad, 
Humayun' s agent, 131 his fruit- 
less intercession for the con- 
demned Imam, 149. 

Farid Gaur, Mir, an Afghan general, 
attacked Humayun 's rear, 235 
mentioned, 252. 

Farid Khan, see Sher Shah. 

Farishta, Muhammad Qasim Hindu 
Shah Astarabadi- his state- 
ment about Humayun getting 3^ 
lakhs of rupees in reward, 5 his 
language resembles Abbas' s, 45 
his Tdrlkh mentioned, 13, 163. 

Fazli Mir, the governor of Benares 
killed by Sher Khan, 216. 

Firdausi, 181. 

Gaur, description, 211-2 present 
state, 212 historical buildings, 
212 its name changed to Janna- 
tabad, 212, 214 the Ganges 
flowed east of it, 211, 221. 

D 



Gazanfar, Askari's foster-brother, 
annoyed Askari by his remarks; 
was imprisoned, 160 flight to 
Bahadur, 160 divulged Mughal 
weakness, 162. 

The Ghagra (Gogra), battle of, 38, 51. 

Ghiyasuddin, Sultan of Malwa, 117. 

Ghiyasuddm Qurchi, Humayun' s 
agent, 103, 107. 

The Grand Trunk Road, of Huma- 
yun' s time, 207-8, 222. 

Gulbadan Begam, the authoress of 
the Humayun-nama f 2 her 
reasons for Humayun' s return 
from Badakhshan, 10 descrip- 
tion of Babur 's sacrifice of life 
for his son's, 13- calls Mahdi 
Khwaja Yazna, 24 describes 
Mahdi Khwaja' s presents on the 
occasion of Hindal's marriage, 27 
describes Maham Begam' s 
interest in the maintenance of 
Babur' s tomb at Agra, 60-1 
describes the ' mystic ' feast and 
Hindal's marriage feast, 65-6 
justifies Hindal's murder of 
Shaikh Buhlul, 216 n. 2 enu- 
merates the women casualties at 
Chausa, 232. 

Gulrukh Begchik, Kamran's mother, 
her parentage not known, 51. 

Haidar Mirza Dughlat, Muhammad, 
Babur 's cousin, 9 gives reason 
for Humayun' s departure from 
Badakhshan, 10 the author of 
the Tdrikh-i-Rashidl, 12 stayed 
with Humayun to make prepara- 
tions for a second battle with 
Sher Shah, 238 appointed gene- 
ralissimo by Humayun, 242 
description of the battle oi 
Qanauj criticized, 242-3 his 
demonstration developed into 
battle, 242. 

Hasan, Mian, Sher Shah's father, a 
mansabddr, 179 dismissed Farid 
from his j&gir, 185. 



[ 274 J 



Hatifi, his poem entitled the Tlmur- 
ndma, 141. 

Hazrat Shah Shaikh J\u. see Jiu, 
Hazrat Shah Shaikh. 

Hajl Begam, see Bega Begam. 

Hidaya, 112 and n. i. 

Hindal Mirza, Abul-Nasir Muham- 
mad, younger than Humayun by 
ten years, 19 governor of 
Bada^hshan, 9 married to 
Mahdi Khwaja's sister, 27 
granted Alwar in jdgir, 28 the 
alphabet of the Baburl script sent 
to him, 52 placed under Maham 
Begam' s care, 60 obtained a 
crown in reward, 64 defeated 
and killed Tatar Khan, 95 
welcomed Md. Zaman M., 174 
defeated Md. Sultan M. and his 
sons, 176-7 accompanied Huma- 
yun, 199 appointed governor of 
Tirhoot, 215, deserted his post, 
215, 254-5 did not agree to help 
Humayun, 2-17-8 Agra taken 
from him by Kamran; his mis- 
conduct excused, 219 at the 
battle of Qanauj, 243-5. 

Hindu Beg, present at the battle of 
Panipat, 4 on Humayun 1 s 
military staff, 44 and n. i 
joined Humayun, 130 at the 
battle of Mahmudabad, 152 
appointed Askari's adviser, 154 
advised Askari to assume sove- 
reignty, 161 his reasons, 161 
and n. 2 his report about Sher 
^Chan, 196-7 succeeded Junaid 
Barlas as governor of Jaun- 
pur, 199, 203-4 made Amlr-ul- 
Umard, 204 death, 217. 

Humayun Badshah-i-Ghazi, Nasir- 
uddln Muhammad, date of birth, 
i his mother, 2 education, 3-4 
a commander at the battle of 
Panipat* 4 obtained the Koh-i- 
n&r diamond from Gwalior, 5 
grant of Hisar Firuza and 



Sambhal hi jdgir, 5 conducted 
an eastern campaign against the 
Afghans, 6-7 commanded a divi- 
sion at the battle of IJhanwah, 7 
appointed governor of Badikh- 
shan, 7 opened treasure-houses 
at Delhi, 8 returned from 
Badakhshan, 8 in his jdgir at 
Sambhal, 12 fell ill and brought 
to Agra; recovered expedition 
to Kalinjar, 13 in Agra when 
Babur died, 17 the Khalifas 
conspiracy against him, reasons, 
1 8-9 its failure, 22 accession 
to the throne, 22, 28, his later 
treatment of the Khalifa and 
Mahdi Khwaja, 26-7 festivities 
at his accession, 28 the cam- 
paign against Kalinjar, 34-6 
assumption of the title of the 
Ghdzi, 36 the battle of Dadrah, 
42 besieged Chunar, 49 the 
settlement between Humayun 
and Sher Khan, 50 early rela- 
tions with Kamran, 54 exchange 
of verses with him, 56-7 grant 
of Hisar Firuza to him, 57 
return to Agra, 58 reasons, 58 
held festivities, 58-9 stay in 
Gwalior, weight, 59 started for 
the east, 72-3 return to Agra, 
reasons, 73 stay in Gwalior, 97. 
and n. 5 correspondence with 
Bahadur, 99-111 appealed to by 
Rana Vikramaditya's mother, 
115 march to Ujjain ana 
Mandasor via Sarangpur, 118-9, 
123 the advantages secured, 
119-20, 123-4 his mistake in 
not helping the Rajputs, 118 
n. 3 besieged Bahadur at 
Mandasor, 124 in communica- 
tion with RumI Khan, 124 
Bahadur's flight, 126 Humayun 
did not attack him, reasons, 126 
besieged Bahadur at Mandu, 
1 30 proposed settlement, 131-2 



[ 275 



the Mughal night assault on 
Mandu, its capture, 132-4 the 
city plundered, 134 its effect, 
135-6 pursued Bahadur to 
Champanir and Cambay, 136, 
137, 141 return and capture of 
Champanir, 142-3 punished his 
followers for indisciplinary con- 
duct, 146-7 its justification, 
147-8 -executed an Imam, 149 
distribution of wealth obtained at 
Champanir, its criticism, 150-1 
the battle of Mahmudabad, 152 
the fall of Ahmadabad, 153 
postings of the Mughal officers, 
154 return to Malwa, 156 stay 
at Mandu, 156 criticism of his 
arrangements, an alternative 
suggestion, 156-7 rendered no 
aid to Askari, 163 on Askari's 
leaving Gujrat, he also aban- 
doned Malwa, met Askari in 
Chitor, 1 66 his defects as 
administrator, 166-7 stay in 
Agra, reasons, 195-6 besieged 
Chunar, 200 reasons for not 
directly proceeding to Bengal, 
200-3 the capture of Benares, 
203 proposals of settlement with 
Stier Khan, 204 dropped on 
Sultan Mahmud's arrival, 205 
reasons for Humayun's change of 
mind, 205-6 his route to Bengal, 
207-8 Jalal Stir's opposition at 
Teliagarhi, 209 reached Gaur, 
210 the first administrative mea- 
sures, 212-3 later neglect and its 
causes, 213-4 fruitless conquest 
of Bengal, 216 deserted by 
Kamran, Hindal and Yadgar 
Nasir M,, 218-21 the three 
divisions of his army, 220 
Askari acted as leader of the 
advance-guard, 221 reached 

Chausa, 223 the negotiations 
with Sher Khan, 224-5 the 
battle of Chausa, 228-33 



retreat to Agra, 234-6 pardoned 
Hindal, 236 proposal of a 
second battle with Sher Shah, 
237 Kamran could not be per- 
suaded to stay with him 237 
but Haidar M. was, 238 march 
to BhSjpur, 239-40 and to 
Qanauj, 240 his acceptance of 
Sher Shah's suggestion of crossing 
over to the Bilgram side of the 
Ganges, 240 his hallucination, 
248 the causes of the Mughal 
defeat, 248-0 retreat to AgpS f 
Delhi and Sirhind, 250-2 the 
causes of his dethronement, 
253-6. 

Ibrahim Lodi, Sultan, defeated and 
killed at the battle of Panipat, 
37 his mother was granted a 
pargana, 5 short-sighted policy, 
and rebellion of his nobles, 37-8 
his treasure located in Chunar; 
47 at first welcomed Bahadur 
but later on, grew jealous of 
him, 77 Farid in his court, 185 
his far man, 187. 

Ibrahim, Shaikh, Humayun's agent, 
105. 

Ikdala, for sometime capital of 
Bengal, situated on the Brahma- 
putra, 212. 

I^htiyar Khan, the commandant at 
Champanir, 142 the fort sur- 
rendered, 143 reasons for sur- 
render, 144 won over Imad-ul- 
Mulk, 172-3. 

Imad-ul-Mulk, conducted Bahadur's 
army to Mandu, 127 raised an 
army for him, 152 was defeated 
at the battle of Mahmfidabad, 
152 opposed Md. Zaman M., 
172-3 favoured Miran Muham- 
mad, 172-3. 

Imad-ul-Mulk Khushqadam, a Gujrat 
nobleman, supported Sikandar 
Khan and then killed him, 78 



[ 276 3 



favoured Nasir IJhan was exe- 
cuted, 79. 

Indraprastha, see Din-panah. 

Jahangir Qull Beg, accompanied 
Humayun to Bengal, 199 was 
left behind in Gaur, 221 cap- 
tured and killed by Sher Khan, 
221, 233, 234. 

Jajmau, situated near Cawnpore, 6 
Afghans gathered there to oppose 
Humayun but later on fled 
away, 6. 

Jalal Khan Jalu, at the battle of 
Qanauj, 243. 

Jalal Khan Sur, Sher Shah's son, 
defended Chunar, 199 his heroic 
stand, 202 defended Teliagarhi, 
209 murdered Sultan Mahmud 's 
children, 211 in command of an 
Afghan division at Chausa, 229 
and at Qanauj, 243-7. 

Jalaluddm Nuhani, Sultan, a poten- 
tate on the Mughal border, 32 
ancestry, 38 met Babur, 38 
difficulties, 38-9 submission to 
the ruler of Bengal, 39, 71 
reasons, 39-40 ascended the 
throne of South Bihar, 189-90. 

Jam Firuz, the ex-ruler of Thatha, 
captured by Humayun, 128 put 
to death, 128-9, 141- 

Jamal Khan, 181. 

Jami Masjid of Jaunpiir, 180. 

Jannatabad, the name given to Gaur, 
212, 214. 

Jaunpur, description, 179-80 archi- 
tecture, 180-1 its capture by 
Sher Khan, 220. 

Jiu, Sayyid Jalaluddm Hazrat Shah 
Shaikh, Bahadur's preceptor, 80 
and n. i. 

Junaid Barlas, Sultan, married to 
Babur's half-sister, 18, 28 n. 3 
governor of Jaunpur, 26, 28, 44 
n. i-^-retreated when attacked 
by Mahmud LodI, 42 helped 
Shr Ihan with soldiers, 187 



possibly bribed by him, 189 
death in 943 A. H. 

Kahalgaon (Colgaon), situated on the 
Ganges, 208 Mahmud died 
there, 208, 211. 

Kalinjar, Humayun' s first expedition, 
13 an inscription on one of its 
rocks, 13 Humayun 's second 
expedition, 34-6 geography and 
past history, 34-5 the Raja's 
submission, 36. 

Kamaluddm Fathullah, Shah, Baha- 
dur's agent, 132. 

Kamran, his rejection as nominee by 
the Khalifa, 19 governor of 
Kabul and Qandahar, 28 
nominal submission to Huma- 
yun, 33 Babur's writing a verse 
for his benefit, 51-2 Babur's * 
division of the inheritance bet- 
ween Humayun and Kamran, 53 
-occupied Lahore, 53 no desire 
to rule over Delhi, 54 his coins, 
54-5 his verses, 56 was granted 
the Punjab and Hisar Firuza, 
56-7 rendered aid to Khwaja 
Kalan and defeated the Persians, 
170 went to Fakhr All's aid 
and then passed on to Agra, 219 
pardoned Hindal, 219 did not 
agree to Humayun' s lead in , 
another battle against Sher Shah, 
reasons, 237 fell ill and returned 
to Lahore, other reasons, 237-8. 

Kanbir, an unidentified river, 251. 

Kara, 235. 

Karamnasa, a tributary of the 
Ganges, 226 the Mughals and 
the Afghans encamped on oppo- 
site sides of, 228. 

KarnavatT, Rani, Rana Vikram- 
aditya's mother, made peace 
terms with Bahadur, 87 appeal 
to Humayun, 115. 

Kennedy, article on Hiddya, 112, 
n. i & 2. 

Khalid Beg, the Khalifa's son, 26. 



[ 277 3 



The Khalifa, , see Nizamuddin All 
Khalifa, Sayyid, 

Khalll, Shaikh, a descendant of Farid 
Shakarganj Sher Khan's agent 
as well as Humayun's, 225 
frank answer to Sher Khan, 225. 

Khan-zada Begam, Babur's elder 
sister, married to Mahdi Khwaja, 
20 organized the 'mystic' feast 
and Hmdal's marriage feast, 
65-6. 

Kharid, in Ballia district, 7. 

Khawas Khan, the captor of Gaur, 
205 at Chausa, 229-30 fought 
against the Cheros, 241. 

Khudawand Khan al-Iji, a Gujrat 
nobleman, at first supported 
Sikandar Khan and then mur- 
dered him; supported Naslr 
Khan, 78 captured by Huma- 
yun, 128 details of him, 128 
mentioned, 153. 

The Khuldsat-ut-Tawarikh, 213. 

Khurasan Khan, Mutaman-uz-Zaman, 
see Muhammad Muqim. 

Khwaja Kafur, a eunuch who acted 
as superintendent of the king's 
elephants, 250. 

Khwaja Kalan, Amir, present at the 
battle of Panipat, 4 acted as 
Kamran's deputy in Kabul and 
Qandahar, 169 attacked by 
Shah Tahmasp, suffered siege for 
eight months, 169-70 returned 
to Lahore with Kamran's army, 
237. 

Khwaja Mahdi, see Mahdi Khwaja. 

Khwandamir, a Mughal courtier and 
poet author of the Humayun- 
ndma, 62 and n. 2 mentioned, 
213 n. 2. 

Lakhnauti, another name given to 
Gaur, 211. 

Lai Darwaza masjid, in Jaunpflr, 
180. 

Lari, Mulla Muhammad, Bahadur's 
scribe, 1 06 had been in Huma- 



yun's service and bore a grudge 
against him, 106 wrote an 
impudent letter on behalf of 
Bahadur, 106. 

Latif Khan, Bahadur's younger 
brother and claimant for the 
throne of Gujrat, 78. 

Lucknow, occupied by Sher Khan's 
soldiers, 239. 

Maham Begam, Humayun's mother, 
2 her parentage, 2 influence in 
the palace, 20 and in the State, 
60 a Shia, 19 influence on 
Babur, 19 and n. 4 held a series 
of feasts, 58 street decoration 
first introduced by her, 59 
illness and death, 60 her interest 
in the maintenance of Babur's 
tomb, 60- 1. 

Maharatha, a CJiero chief, 226, 227. 

Mahdi Khwaja, the Khalifa's nominee 
for the throne of Delhi after 
Babur's death, 20 Khan-zada 
Begam' s husband, 20 ancestry, 
services to Babur, 21 ultimately 
rejected by the Khalifa, 22 
later history, 26-7. 

Mahmudabad, description, 152 n. 2 
the battle of, 152. 

Mahmud II of Malwa, Sultan, helped 
by Muzaffar II of Gujrat, 80 
gave shelter to Chand Khan, 
Bahadur's brother, 116 attacked 
Rana Ratan Singh's districts, 81 
captured and his kingdom 
annexed by Bahadur, 81 men- 
tioned, 107. 

Mahmud Begarha, Sultan, a noted 
king of Gujrat, 79 his bigotry, 
112 generosity towards the 
neighbouring kings, 116-7. 

Mahmud Shah Ghiyasuddim Sultan, 
king of Bengal, succeeded 
Alauddm Firuz, 70 war against 
Makhdum-i-Alam, 70 campaigns 
against Sher Khan was defeat- 
ed, 72, 198 expected by Huma- 



I 278 3 



yfin to fight well, 200-1 met 
Humayun at Maner, 205 the 
cause of change in Humayun 's 
attitude towards Sher Khan, 
205-6 died at Kahalgaon, 208 
was buried in Sadullahpur, 208, 
211 his children murdered by 
Jalal Khan Sur, 211. 

Mahmud Khalji, Sultan, of Malwa, 
116, 117. 

Mahmud Khan, Latif Khan's son, 
was declared Miran Muhammad 
Shah's successor, 171. 

Mahmud Khan Nuham, 38. 

Mahmud Lodi, Sultan, Sultan Ibra- 
him's brother, combined with 
Rana Sanga and fought against 
the Mughals at Khanwah, 37 
invited by the Afghans of S. 
Bihar, 40 led more than one 
unsuccessful campaign against 
the Mughals, 40-2 the battle of 
Dadrah, 42 retired into private 
life, 47 death, 47. 

Mahmud Mirza, Sultan, 53. 

Mahtab Bagh, 251. 

Makhdum-i-Alam, his friendship with 
Sher Khan, 40 relationship with 
Mahmud Shah of Bengal, 70 
disliked Mahmud 's usurpation, 
70 friendship with Sher Khan, 
70 was killed in battle, 70 his 
wealth bequeathed to Sher Khan, 
70, 190 mentioned, 190 n. i. 

The Makhzan-i-Afdghina, 201, 213, 
226. 

Malik Ayaz, the governor of Diu and 
victor of the battle of Chaul, 85 
and n. 6. 

Malik Dad Kirani, opposed Huma- 
yun in Agra, 4 pardoned by 
Babur, 5. 

Malik Tughan, see Tughan Malik. 

Mallu Khan, see Qadir Shah 
ManduSlI. 

Mandalak, the chief of Girnar, forced 
to embrace Islam, 112. 



Mandasor, description, 123, n. 

siege of, 125. 
Mandrael, the battle of, 95, o 

quences, 96. 

Mandu, description, 130 and n 
non-ratified treaty of fret 
HumayQn and Bahadur, 13 
Manjhu, Ustdd, a noted music! 
Gujrat, appeased Humayun 
his music, 134. 

Masuma Sultan Begam, Ba 
eldest daughter, married 
Muhammad Zaman M., 23 
n. 2 specially honoured 
Humayun, 68. 

\Midn Hasan, see Hasan Mian. 
\ Mihtar Zambur, of Handia, 15^ 
| The Mirdt-i-Sikandari, a hist 
i work by Sikandar bin Mi 

mad, mentioned, 81, 103, 
Mir Fazli, see Fazli Mir. 
Mir Muhammad Bakhshi, see Mi 
i mad Bakhshi, Mir. 
Mubarak, Shaikh, a Mahdavi, 
Muhafiz Khan, a Gujrat nobl 
I occupied Pa tan, 159. 
i Muhammad Bakhshi, Mir M 
Humayun's deputy at Agra, IQC 
Muhammad Jaunpuri, the foun 
I the Indian Mahdavi mov< 

; ISO. 

j Muhammad Khan Sur, a Bihar 
I man and mansabddr of Cl 

185 at first opposed to 

185 later on became his 

187-8. 
Muhammad Lari, Mulld, see 

Mulld Muhammad. 
Muhammad Muqim, Khurasan 

Mutaman-uz-Zaman, Bal 

agent, 103, 105, 108 and i 
Muhammad Muqim Heravi, 

uddin Ahmad 's father, 2 

n. 2. 
Muhammad Parghari, Mulld & 

Parghari, Mulld Mir Muha 



[ 279 1 



Muhammad Shah, Miran, of Khan- 
desh, Bahadur's nephew, 80 and 
n. 2 allowed by Bahadur to 
call himself Shah, 81 acted as 
* Bahadur's commander at Ran- 
thambhor, 85 in Bahadur's 
company fled from Mandasor, 
126 declared heir by Bahadur, 
171. 

Muhammad Yazd, see Yazd Muham- 
mad. 

Muhammad Sultan Mirza, a Timurid 
by descent, 25 restless, 33 his 
rebellion against Humayun, 69, 
175 captured, imprisoned and 
blinded, 69 genealogy, 175 
title granted by Babur, 175 
had a large progeny, 176 was 
defeated by Hmdal, 177 fled to 
the Afghans in Biharkunda, 177 
deserted Humayun on the 
battlefield of Bilgram, 177, 241 
joined Humayun at Agra, 236 

Muhammad Zaman Mirza, relation- 
ship with Babur, qualifications, 
23 the Khalifa's nominee, ac- 
cording to Mrs Beveridge, 23 
the author's criticisms, 24-5 one 
of Humayun's enemies, 33 first 
rebellion, 34 pardoned and 
made governor of Bihar, 68 
second rebellion, and capture, 
69, 73, 96 flight to Bahadur, 
73, 97 made leader of the 
Mughal party in Bahadur's court, 
92 subject of correspondence 
between Humayun and Bahadur, 
99-1 1 1 flight to Sindh, 169 and 
to Lahore, 129, 169-70 re- 
appeared in Gujrat, took posses- 
sion of its treasure-houses and 
claimed kingship, 170-1 the 
Portuguese read khutbah in his 
name, 171 his disqualifications, 
171 opposed by Imad-ul-Mulk, 
172 left Gujrat, 173 joined 
at Chiinar, 173-4, J 99 



his reception described, 174 
the cause of the disaster at 
Chausa, 174 in charge of the 
night watch at Chausa, 228 
was drowned in crossing the 
Ganges, 230. 

Muhibb All Khan, the Khalifa's son, 
26. 

Mustafa ,Rumi Khan, see RumI 
Khan, Mustafa. 

Muwaiid Beg, in command of one of 
Humayun's retreating divisions, 
207 incompetent, allowed Sher 
Khan to escape, 207 his sugges- 
tion that the route of the on- 
ward journey should be followed, 
222. 

Muzaifar Shah II, Bahadur's father, 
76, 78 his death, 78 his treat- 
ment of Mahmud II of Malwa, 
80, 117 mentioned, 104, 107. 

Nagore, a town, 87 and n. 5. 

Nar Singh Deo, the organizer of 
defence at Champamr, death, 
143 and n. 2. 

Narwar, 107 and n. i. 

Nasir Khan, Bahadur Khan's 
youngest brother, 78 a Gujrat! 
party in his support, 78 was 
murdered, 79. 

Nasrat Shah, Nasiruddm, his in- 
fluence on Jalaluddm Nuhani, 39 
the submission of the Niihanls 
to him, 39 reasons, 39-40 
succeeded first by Alauddin 
Firuz and then by Mahmud, 70, 

197- 

Nassan Khan Malik, a GujratI noble- 
man, Silhadi sought his help, 82 
was granted Ranthambhor, 86 
mentioned, 107. 

Nizami, his work, the Sikandar- 
nama, 181. 

Nizamuddm Ahmad, the author of 
the Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, 21 his 
father, Md. Muqim Heravl, 21 
and n. 2 his description of the 



[ 280 3 

Khalifa's conspiracy, 21-2 Mrs assault on Mandu, 133 local 

Beveridge's criticisms, 22-3 the influence in Mandu, 156. 

author's acceptance of his state- Qanauj, Nuruddin, the governor of, 

ment and reasons, 25-6 his 215 captured by Sher Shah, 220 

description of the battle of Sher Shah's arrival at, 239-'- 

Dadrah resembles that of Abbas, the battle of, 243-7 causes o, 

45 mentions the distribution of Humayun's defeat at, 248-9. 

khilats f 59 his history men- Qanungo, K. R., disbelieves Shei 

tioned, 163 and in several foot- Khan's desertion at Dadrah, 44 

notes. his reasons, 44-5 the author' 

Nizamuddm All Muhammad, Khalifa, criticisms, 45-6 his book on 

other titles, Sayyid, Sultan, Sher Shah, 179 and n. i. 

Hakim, Khwdja, 17 importance, Qaracha Beg, one of Kamran's nobles, 

1 8 refused governorship of 53. 

Badafchshan, u at the dying Qara Yusuf Turkman, 104-5 and 

Babur's bedside, 14 rejection of n. i. 

Huma*yun and choice of Mahdl Qasim AH Salah-ul-Mulk, Mauldna, 

Khwaja for the throne of Delhi, Humayun's agent, 103, 107. 

reasons, 20-1 abandonment of Qasim Husain Khan, Sultan, arrive 1 

the scheme, 22 later history, 26 in Humayun's camp, 130 

mentioned, 189. allowed Bahadur to escape from 

Nura, Shaikh, 238 and n. 5. Mandu, 134 and n. 2 a Mughal 

Nur Muhammad Khalil, Bahadur's commander at the battle of 

agent, 104, 105, 106, 107. Mahmudabad, 152 posted at 

Nuruddin Khan Jahan of Shiraz, led Broach, Surat and Navsari, 154 

the Gujrat! rebels against the retreated to Ahmadabad, 159 

Mughals, 158. ancestry, 359 and genealogy, 

Nuruddin Muhammad M., the gover- n - I ~ accompanied Humayun to 

nor of Qanauj, 199 went to Bengal, i 9 9--defeated and killed 

Hindal in Agra, 215-6, 217. Q utb ^n, Sher Shah's son, 240 

Pandua, situated in the neighbour- ~ at the battle of Q anau J' 2 ^' 

hood of Gaur, 211-2. Q asim Q aracha ' 2 *>- 

Parghari, Mulld Mir Muhammad, a Qut " * . h ^ **"!" f Mungh ' 

.. , _, .. , __ killed Makhdum-i-Alam, 70 was 

follower of Shaikh Buhlul, . . , . ,,,., . , c *. T -u- 

. . , A ' . ' killed in a battle with Sher Khan, 
Humayun s agent, 225 perished 

at Chausa, 232. ^ h _ n ^ ^^ han , g son 

Payanda ^Chan, a Gujrat nobleman, __ tQ be in -Humayun's service, 

met Bahadur at Bagh Pat and 50 __ killed 24O . 

welcomed him to Gujrat, 79. Qut b u dd!n, converted Prithvi Raj's 

Prithvi Raj, his thdkurdwdrd, 114. thakurdwdrd into a mosque, 114 

Purana Qila, 63, 114. See also Din- an d n . 2 . 

P an ^- Qutbuddm Shukrullah, Shah, Baha- 

Qadir Shah Manduall (Mallu Khan), dur's agent, 132. 

accompanied Bahadur in his Qutb-ul-Alam, Hazrat, description 

flight from Mandasor, 126 and tomb, 153 and n. 4 a relic 

warned Bahadur of Mughal of the saint's miracle] 153. 



[ 281 ] 



Rafiuddin Safavi, Sayyid, a renowned 
personage of Agra, stay of 
Humayun with him, 251. 

Rajiuddin Safavi, Mir, 248. 

Sana Sanga, approached the Mughal 
frontiers, 7 combined with Mah- 
mud Lodi, 37 death, 37, 83 
his successor, Ratan Singh, 32, 

83- 

Ranthambhor, capture of by 

Sultan Bahadur, 85. 

Ratan Singh, Maharana, succeeded 
Sanga, 32, 83 in alliance with 
Bahadur crushed Malwa, 80 
character, 83 death, 84. 

The Rauzat-ut-Tdhirm, 167. 

Rohtasgarh, taken by Sher Khan 
from a local chief, 206 not 
surrendered to the Mughals, 206 
the wealth of Gaur transferred 
to, 208. 

RumI Khan Mustafa, parentage, 83 
n. i career in Gujrat, 85 
captor of Raisen, 83, and 
RanthambhSr, 85 conducted the 
two sieges of Chi tor, 87-8 Chitor 
not granted to him, 121 his 
merits, 121 turns a traitor, 123 
his suggestion to undergo a 
siege at Maridasor, 124 supplied 
information to Humayun, 124 
incited Bhupat Rai to desert 
Bahadur and join Humayun, 
133 accompanied Humayun to 
Bengal, 199 captured Chunar, 
203 poisoned, 203 reasons, 203. 

RumI Khan Safar, the builder of 
Surat fort, led the Gujrati rebels 
against the Mughals, 158. 

SadI Shaikh, the noted Persian poet, 
his works, Gulistdn and Bus tan, 
181. 

Sadr Khan, Bahadur's minister, 118 
his assurance that Humayun 
would riot attack him, while 
engaged against the Rajputs, 118 
suggested immediate attack on 



the Mughals, 122 conducted 
retreat to Mandu, 127 Baha- 
dur's agent, 131 continued the 
struggle at Mandu, 134 submis- 
sion to Humayun, 134 placed 
' under surveillance, 134 killed at 
Cambay, 135, 141. 

Said Khan of Kashgarh, relationship 
with Babur, 9 desired to annex 
Badakhshan, unsuccessful siege 
of its capital, 9 Babur rebuked 
him, 12. 

Sajja, Rdjrdnd of Dailwara, defended 
Ganesh Pol, 88. 

Salahuddm, see Silhadi. 

Salah-ul-mulk, see Qiisim All. 

Saran, P , corrects some of Qanungo's 
dates and events, 179 n. i. 

Sarkhej, its geographical situation, 

*53> 154- 

Shad Bibi, Humayun' s wife, lost at 
Chausa, 232. 

Shah Abbas II, in n. 4. 

Shah Jahan, in n. 4. 

Shah Mirza, son of Muhammad 
Sultan Mirza, occupied Mughal 
territory as far as Kara-Manik- 
pur, 176. 

Shah Tahmasp, see Tahmasp, Shah. 

Shaikh Buhlul, see Buhlul, Shaikh. 

Shamsuddin Atkah Khan, helped 
Humayun in escaping after the 
battle of Qanauj, suitably re- 
warded, 250. 

Sharif Gilani, Say y id, the governor 
of Cambay, welcomed Humayun, 
141. 

Sharql dynasty of Jaunpur, 179-81. 

Sher Shah, name Farid Khan, genea- 
logy, 179 n. 2 early career, 
179-81 management of his 
father's jdgir, his administrative 
principles, 181-5 in Sultan 
Ibrahim's court, 185 succeeded 
to his father's jdgir, 185 Md. 
Khan Sur's hostility, 185-6 
took shelter with Sultan Md., 



C 282 ] 

186 saved his life from a tiger waited for Khawas Khan' 

and hence entitled Sher Khan, return, 241 the battle o 

appointed tutor to Jalaluddin; Qanauj, 243-7 occupied Delhi, 

return to his j&gir, 186 Md. 252 administration, 256. 

Khan authorized to partition it, Sikandar bin Muhammad (Manjhft 

Sher Ihan refused to agree, Akbar), the author of the Mimt- 

obtained Mughal help and i-Sikandari, 95, 128. 

defeated Md. Khan and then Sikandar of Satwas, 156. 

befriended him, * 187-8 visited Sikandar Khan, Bahadur's elder 

Babur's court, studied the brother succeeded Muzaffar 

Mughal administrative system, Shah and reigned for five days, 

1 88 and then fled away, 189 78. 

repaired to Sultan Md.; ministry Sikandar Lodi, Sultan, 104. 

in Jalaluddin' s reign, 189 came Sikri, 251. 

into possession of Chunar by Sikrigalli, a pass, 198 description, 

marrying Lad Mahka, 48-9 took 209-10. 

part in the battle of Dadrah, 42 Silhadi (Salahuddin), the lord of 

primary cause of the Afghan Raisen, 82 turned Muslim and 

defeat, 44 Qanungo's refuta- died fighting against Bahadur, 

tion, 44-4 and the author's 82-3 and n. 4. 

criticisms, 45-6 the treaty of Slri, Alauddin Khalji's capital, 114. 

Chunar, 50 difficulties, 189-92 Sulaiman Mirza, ancestry, 12 

after Mahmud Lodfs retirement Badalfhshan granted by Babur, 

acknowledged as leader, 192 12 married to Haram Begam, 9, 

the two wars with Sultan n. i' continued to govern 

Mahmud of Bengal ended with Badafchshan, 28. 

the battle of Surajgarh, 193 Sultan Ahmad Jalair, 105 and n. i. 

extension of territory, 193 Sultan All, transcribed Matin's poem, 

besieged Gaur, 202 negotiations 141. 

with Humayun, 204 Sher Khan Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, see Ibrahim 

failed to observe terms, 206 Lodi, Sultan. 

speech to his followers, 206 Sultan Muhammad Shah Nuhanl, 

transferred wealth to Rohtasgarh, Darya Khan Nuham's son, 38 

208 captured Benares, 216 originally called Bahadur Khan, 

introduced civil administration in 38 rebellion against Ibrahim 

the conquered provinces, 220 Lodi, 78 after Ibrahim's death, 

captured Ajudhya and Chunar, assumed royal titles, 38 acknow- 

222, Lucknow, 225 collected ledged by the Afghans as leader, 

revenue east of Qanauj, 225 186 died, 38, 189. 

fought battle at Chausa, 228-33, Surajgarh, geographical situation, 193 

defeated the Mughals, 231, n. i the battle of, 72, 193. 

generous treatment of Bega Tahmasp, Shah, his generous help to 

Begam and the other Mughal Humayun, 117. 

ladies, 232 became king, 234 Taj Khan, commandant of the 

his full royal title, 234-5 killed Chun?,r fort, 48 killed by his 

Jahanglr Qull Khan and Dilawar son, Ahmad, 48 his widow Lad 

Ifhan, 234 reached Qanauj, 240 Malika married Sher Ihan, 48-9. 



283 



'Taj Khan Narpall, a Gujrati noble- 
man, favoured Bahadur, 78 
suggested immediate battle with 
the Mughals, 122. 

fcnur, Sdhib-Qirdn, 104. 

Tardi Beg, posted at Champanlr, 154 
opposed Askari's assumption of 
sovereignty, 161 reported to 
Humayun about Askari's doings, 
163 accompanied Humayun to 
Bengal, 199 at Chausa, 230 
sent to succour Bega Begam, 
232. 

The Tdnk)i-i-Bahddur Shdhi, 85. 

The Tdrikh-i-Ddudi, Nimatullah, 
author ot, 214. 

Tatar Khan, son of Alam Khan 
Alauddin, sought shelter with 
Bahadur, 91 took part in the 
first siege of Chit5r, 85 urged 
his father's claims on Delhi, 91 
led a campaign against Agra, 
captured Biana, 94 fought the 
battle of Mandrael and was 
killed, 95. 

The Tazktrah-t-Bukhardi, in. 

The Tazktrat-ul-Umard, a Persian 
work, 203. 

Teliagarhi, a pass, 198 description, 
208 Humayun was opposed here 
by Jalal Khan Sur, 209. 

Tieffenthaler, Rev., his sketch of 
Teliagarhi, 208. 

Tirhoot, Hindal governor of, 215 
possibly another name for Muzaf- 
farpur, 202, n. 2. 

Tod, his description of Ratan Singh's 
character, 83 and Vikram- 
aditya's, 84. 

Toglan Beg Koka, one of Askari's 
officers, 22 1 , 

Tughan, Malik, son of Malik Ayaz, 
appointed governor of Diu, 85. 

The Udaipur Rdjya kd Itihds, 89, 
167. 

Cjjain, Humayun's march to, 119 
description, 119, n. i. 



Clugh Mirza, (i) Babur's uncle, 53, 
(2) son of Md. Sultan Mirza, 
occupied territory up to JaunpOr, 
176. 

Umar Shaikh Mirza, 53. 

Vikramaditya (Bikramajit or Vikram- 
ajlt), his treaty with Bahadur, 
59 as prince, held Rantham- 
bhor in jdgir t 84 negotiation 
with Babur about exchange of 
ydgir, 84 character, made an 
ineffectual effort to help SilhadI, 

8 4 . 

Wais Khan Mirza, governor of 
Badakhshan, 7 death, 7 
ancestry, 12. 

Wais Kulabl, Sultan, a local chief in 
Badakhshan, 8 his daughter, 
Haram Begam married to 
Sulaiman, 9, n* i. 

Wali Khub Mirza, rebelled against 
Humayun, 69 imprisoned and 
blinded, 69, 97. 

Yadgar Beg Taghdi Mirza, maternal 
uncle and father-in-law of 
Humayun, 69 acted as jailor, 
69 allowed Muhammad Zaman 
to escape to Bahadur, 69, 97 
and himself followed him, 97. 

Yadgar Nasir Mirza, joined Huma- 
yun at Mandu, 130 at the battle 
of Mahmudabad, 152 posted at 
Patan, 154 retreated to Askari, 
159 the governor of Kalpi, 199 
willing to help Humayun, 217 
defeated and killed Qutb Khan, 
Sher Shah's son, 240 -at the 
battle of Qanauj, 243, 246 
wounded at Bhongaon, 250 
quarrel with Askari, 251. 

Yazd, Muhammad, 180. 

Yunas All, Mir, the governor -of 
Lahore, 53 captured by Kam- 
ran, allowed to go to Humayun, 
53 reason of his opposition to 
Karnran, 56. 

Zahid Beg, Humayun' s brother-in- 



law, was displeased with him, Zaman Mirza, Md., see Muhammad 

joined Hindal, 216 and n. i Zaman Mirza. 

suggested Buhlul's death, 216. Zambur, Mihtar, see Mihtar Zambur.