Hungary and Roumania

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;AST EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

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HUNGARY

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ROUMANIA

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By
B.^JANCS6

• * » »

LONDON 1921 NEWYORK

,0W, W. DAWSON A SONS STEIGER <& COM P.

BUDAPEST
FERDINAND PFEIFER (ZEIDLER BROTHERS)

Hungary and Roumania.

When considering the conditions of Hungary with
regard to the nationalities, we must not take as
guide the conditions of other states with regard to
the same, not even those of the late Monarchy.
In Austria the development of the whole historical
life of the nationalities, and consequently also their
constitutional and political position, was quite dif-
ferent. The Czechs, before they had been defeated
at the White Mountain, possessed a totally inde-
pendent and autonomous state existence, the effect
of which could be felt in the autonomy of the
Czech state even in the days of their greatest de-
nationalisation. The position of the Poles was a
similar one. Andthe Italians, Dalmatians and Slovenes,
in consequence of their autonomy developed on a
historical basis, lived under quite different political
conditions from the nationalities of Hungary.

The constant attitude of the Hungarian nation
and government towards the nationalities of Hun-
gary since 1867 can only be rightly judged if we
examine its whole previous historical development.

This examination makes it clear that in Hun-
gary the nationalities — the Roumanians, Servians,
Ruthenians, etc. — have, till the second half of the
19^^ century, lived a quite simple life without any
pronounced political tendencies, having in fact no
policy but that of the Hungarians. It proves
further also that the nationalistic movements
and political tendencies, developed since the second
decade of the 19^^ century, however violent and

22-24. 1

Ts r. ^ ■ ■ *..•.;.

2 B. Jancsd

ckfnorcus tiey may have been, have never shown any
irredentist features — until quite recently; not
even during revolutionary periods when, especially
in 1849, the Habsburg's power was much shaken.

Lastly we may refer also to the fact that the
Hungarian nation and Grovernment have never
declined to satisfy the political demands of the
nationalities so far as they could be made to har-
monise with the integrity of the Hungarian State
and its independence to Austria.

That an agreement between the Hungarian go-
vernment and the nationalities, and a mutual
understanding could not be effected to such an
extent as it would have been desirable for both
parties, was caused in each instance by external
influences, or was the result of that influence which
the peculiar internal political condition of the
Habsburg Monarchy had, at certain periods, on the
attitude of the nationalities of Hungary.

The standpoint taken by the Hungarian nation
in face of the political demands of the natio-
nalities of Hungary on occasion of their first
being formulated as a political program, was
first of all elucidated by Louis Kossuth in his speech
delivered held On Aug. 26*^ 1848, with the aim of
considering the demands of the nationalities.

Kossuth was inclined to grant everything readily
that secures the free nationalistic, linguistic, and
cultural development of the single nationalities
equally in the sphere of their ecclesiastical and
educational as well as in that of their communal and
municipal life, not admitting however that the nation-
alities should organize themselves and form poli-
tical units in the Monarchy according to territories,
because this would lead to the dismemberment of
the Hungarian State.

This was the spirit in which article XXI
of the bill "on the guarantees of the rights

Hungary and Roumania

of the Roumanian nation on the basis of civil
equality", was prepared. This bill however on
account of subsequent stormy events could not
be made law. But the majority of the political
leaders of Roumania at that time adhered to the
demand that Transylvania should in the future
remain a separate autonomous province on the
basis of an equality of rights enjoyed by the Rou-
manian nation together with the Hungarian, Szekely
and Saxon nations.

Later, when the conflict between the Hungarian
nation and the dynasty entered on its final stage,
they again tried to enforce their own separate
demands not, this time, witkin the frame of the
Hungarian State, but in that of the whole Monarchy.

Some of the Roumanian nationalist leaders
did not approve the above mentioned standpoint
of the politicians directed by Siaguna, but intended
to attain the satisfaction of the Roumanian natio-
nalist demands within the frame of the Hun-
garian State, and therefore in the interest of the
agreement, they continued the negotiations with
Louis Kossuth even during the War of Indepen-
dence in the years of 1848/49.

Thus the Roumanian nationalist party broke
into two parts as early as 1848/49, and in the re-
lation of the Hungarian government and the Rou-
manian nationalist parties to each other, this
dualism of the Roumanian nationalist party de-
serves a more careful consideration for the reason
that the possibility or impossibility of an understand-
ing and a peaceful agreement between the Hun-
garians and Roumanians was pending on the ques-
tion which of the two directions should become the
leading one ?

After the downfall of Austrian absolutism (1861),
inaugurated when the Hungarian War of Indepen-
dence had tragically failed, the Hungarian Parliament
of 1861 sent out a Commission of 27 members, to
prepare a law for "distinctly regulating the na-

1*

4 B. Janc86

tional rights of the non-Magyar population of the
country with regard to their language, their natio-
nal development, and their public administration.*

The proposition was prepared and together with
a proposal of the national minority, having a decidedly
radical tendency, it was placed before the House on
the 1^* of August in the same year. The opinion
of the national minority was.the same as in 1848,
namely, that the nationalities should have separate
autonomy on the territory of their language and
thus the country should be transformed into a national
confederation.

After this the Emperor dissolved Parliament
and from this fact the nationalities formulated the
conclusion that they need not make friends with
the Magyars, since they would get more from
Vienna than the Magyars could give.
. The dissolution of Parliament was the first step
towards the realisation of the plans of Schmer-
ling, Austrian State-minister, who desired to reor-
ganise the Austrian Empire on a federal basis,
excluding all idea of the historical unity of the
countries subject to the Hungarian Crown, dismem-
bering these countries in order to break the resist-
ance of the Hungarian nation — refusing to re-
nounce their political independence — against all
efforts of centralisation carried on by Vienna and
having for final aim the germanisation of Hungary.

This attempt was, as regards Hungary proper,
nothing but a theoretical one, but in Transylvania
it came within a certain distance of realisation. The
Emperor convoked to Nagyszeben the Provincial
Diet for the 1^* of July 1863. The Magyars adopt-
ing an attitude of passive resistance, did not take
part in this Diet whose convocation was anti-
constitutional, but the Saxon and Roumanian de-
puties began their work. The first law contained
the regulation of the equality of the Roumanian
nation with the other (Magyar and German) nations,
the second regulated the use of the official Ian-

Hungary and Roumania

guages (Hungarian, German and Roumanian). The
Diet began also to prepare the reorganisation
of the juridical and municipal administration of
the provinces on the basis of the equality of the
nations. Political equalit}' was not the real aim,
however; the object for which they strove was to
secure illegal advantages for the Roumanians and
Saxons. Briefly, the autonomical and federative or-
ganisation of the Transylvanian nations became
almost an accomplished fact.

However, this federislic organisation of Schmer-
ling failed and consequently the Emperor dissolved
the Nagyszeben Diet, but the question of nationa-
lities remained an equally important one in the
Transylvanian Diet of 1865 as in the common Par-
liament of 1865 — 68 in Pest. The latter accepted
the standpoint of 1861 and was ready to give the
nationalities everything required by their own
interest and by the common interest of the country,
in consequence of which the Nationality Act of
1868 (LXIV) was passed.

The proposition of the Radical-Nationalist mino-
rity, true to their traditions, made a stand for
territorial autonomy. They wished to organise the
Hungarian State on a system, of nationalist
cantons, copied from Switzerland. The difference
between the law of 1868 (LXIV) and the propo-
sition of the national minorities was that this
law secured for each individual citizen the right
to make use of his mother tongue, wliilst the
proposition of the minorities, relied on the natural
rights of the individual belonging to a political
nation living on an independent and separately
administered territory.

A year after this law was made on the 8^ of
May 1869, the Roumanians of Transylvania held a
meeting at Szerdahely and declared their intention
of remaining passive, and not taking part in the
work of the Hungarian Parliament. This decision
of the Roumanians had two motives. The first

6 ^ \ B. Jancsd

was of a political character and originated from
Roumania.

Bismarck was already laying his plans for
a war against France, and as it might be expected
that the Monarchy had not yet given up a ''re-
vanche pour Sadowa", turned towards the young
Hohenzollern, who was on the throne of Rouma-
nia, in order to keep the Monarchy engaged, and
gave the Roumanian statesmen the council to look
to St. Petersburg for political information.

The Bucarest politicians came to the conclusion
that Bismarck had in view a veritable alliance
with Russia against the Monarchy, and began a
most furious agitation in the newspapers, as well
as in public meetings, against the Monarchy and
especially against Dualism. It was this agitation
that gave the impulse to the Transylvanians for
the Szerdahely declaration.

The second motive of the Roumanians was based
on the political movements then going on in Austria.

The Emperor entrusted Count Hohenwarth on
4th of Feb. to form a ministry with the object
of satisfying the nationalities by reorganising the
Austrian State on a federal basis, expecting a si-
milar transformation to take place in Hungary.
Inasmuch as this federation in the Transleithan
part of the Monarchy would have been followed
by the downfall of the dualistic system, Count
Andrassy and Beust defeated Hohenwarth's policy.
But by showing that even in the highest circles
Dualism between the two states was not considered
to be permanent, and consequently the transfor-
mation of the Monarchy on a federative system was
not quite excluded, the attempt at federation gave
a new impulse to the Hungarian nationalities.

The occupation of Bosnia after the 1876 — 78
Russo-Serb-Ronmanian and Turkish war created a
new situation in foreign politics, and had a great
effect on the behaviour of the Nationalities of Hun-
gai-y towards the Hungarian State.

Hungari/ and Boumania

The court and military circles of Vienna found
it desirable to possess the two provinces for con-
stituting, within the limits of the Monarchy, a united
Catholic and Southslav State of a Croatian charac-
ter, so as to have a starting point on the road down-
wards to Salonika. The Hungarians opposed this prog-
ram of establishing a Southslav State, which streng-
thened all federalistic tendencies within the monarchy
and had an eftect upon the nationalist movement
in Hungary itself. What Hohenwarth did not succeed
in establishing in the year 1871 on a Czech basis
they now hoped to attain on a Southslav basis.

Roumania having taken part in the Russo-
Turkish war in 1877 — 78 received its independence
as reward, by decision of the Berlin congress,
and the idea of independence filled the Roumanian
politicians with daring thoughts and far-reaching
aspiratons. This effect became noticeable among
the Roumanians of Hungary, too. On the 12*^
of May 1881 a meeting was held at Nagyszeben
and the leaders of this meeting formulated a pro-
gram for the "Roumanian National Party.* In the
first point they demanded the autonomy of Tran-
sylvania in accordance with the Act of Nagyszeben
1863, signed by His Majesty. Concerning Dualism
they announced that the question, not being on the
order of the day, would be treated on some other
occasion when the federal transformation of the
Monarchy became an acute question.

It is evident that in the history of the national
aspirations of the Roumanian nationality a con-
siderable part was played by Roumania entering
the Triple Alliance. The Liberal leader at that
time, Demeter Sturdza, tried to use this circum-
stance as a legal basis for interfering in Vienna as
intermediary on behalf of the Roumanians of Hun-
gary, demanding the fulfilment of some of their
wishes. To be enabled to make use of the Transyl-

8 B. Jancsd

vanian question as conveniently as possible for
their own interest, the Roumanian Liberal Party
established the Liga Culturala, and by doing so
safeguarded themselves against being -compromised
in foreign affairs. By noisy and tactless behaviour
and by constant endeavours to interfere, the
Liga Culturala prevented the Roumanians and Hun-,
garians coming to an understanding, for which
several efforts were being made by the leading
Hungarian politicians.

The most important step in the Roumanian natio-
nal struggles and in the history of the development
of internal politics was undoubtedly taken in 1884
by establishing the daily paper, the Tribuna. This
newspaper represented the idea that among the Rou-
manians and Hungarians direct understanding was
impossible, and that the Roumanians, being an in-
dependent element of the united Habsburg empire,
had to ask the fulfilment of their wishes not from
the Hungarian Grovernment but from the Austrian
emperor. It was due to the agitation of the Tri-
buna that the Roumanian National Party iii 1887
held a meeting and passed by vote the resolution
of summing up their demands and grievances in a
memorandum and sending it, unknown to the Hun-
garian Government, to the Emperor of Austria. From
that moment onwards the Memorandum affair was
for ten years the centre of the Roumanian nationa-
list struggles.

There was a large party, however, composed
chiefly of Roumanians living in Hungary proper,
who, under the leadership of Alexander Mocson)^i,
declared that the Roumanians could not expect
the fulfilment of their just demands either from
the intervention of Roumania, or by means of an
energetic step on the part of the dynasty, but only
by means of a settlement with tlie Hungarian
nation. This he declared to be ouly possible if
the Roumanians acknowledged Dualism and the
independence of the Hungarian State. According

Hungary and Roumania

to the ideas of this party the Hungarians would be
ready to fulfil Roumanian demands as soon as it
was proved that the Roumanians truly acknowledge
the independence of Hungary from Austria.

The fight between these two Roumanian parties
concerning the Memorandum lasted ten years and
finished with the fall of Mocsonyi and his party.
Nevertheless, even later on, frequent attempts were
made to arrive at the understanding so much desired.

Since the hostile attitude of the Roumanian
nationalistic party continued even after the nation-
ality law was enacted and loyally executed, serious
misgivings arose in Hungarian public opinion and
gradually more energetic means of defence were
called for and severer measures, not intended
however as retaliation, except in serious cases
bordering on sedition.

The general opinion was that it would be pos-
sible to stop, or at least neutralise, the destructive
forces at work by developing the political, admi-
nistrative, economic and cultural institutions of
the country, but it was only in the eighties of
last centur}' that this action began to be carried
out in a systematic manner owing to a change in
the attitude of the nationalities caused by the in-
terior aid exterior political situation of the Mon-
archy after the war of 1876/78 between Russia,
Servia, Roumania and Turkey.

The Roumanian nationalistic politicians and
especially tlie Roumanian nationalist press alw^ays
accused these purely defensive measures of being
attempts to magyarize all nationalities, especially
the Roumanians, and to crush the existence of these
nationalities and their language. Tt was especially
their habit to accompany with commentaries all
laws and ordinances concerning public instruction
and to emphasize the allegation that these were
most cruel and brut'al attempts at magyarization.

10 B. Jancso

In reality these laws and regulations never con-
tained less, and frequently more, than what is con-
ceded to the nationalities in the fifth Section of
the Austrian Treaty of Peace (Protection des Mino-
rites) in article 68 where we find the words
„Cette stipulation n'emp^chera pas le gouvernement
autrichien de rendre obligatoire. I'enseignement de
la langue allemande dans les dites ecoles".

According to the Hungarian laws the teaching
of the Hungarian language was only required besides
others, and measures were taken that this should
be accomplished as far as possible.

That the Hungarian school-laws, against which
so many accusations were brought forward and
such a noise was made in the international press,
did not deprive the Roumanian school- children of
the possibility of learning in their own language (con-
formable to the Austrian Treaty of Peace § 1.)
is clearly shown by the statistical figures for
1912, according to which there existed then in
Hungary 2301 elementary schools in which Rou-
manian was the language of instruction.

Comparing this number with that of the
elementary schools in Roumania, we find that the
seven million Roumanians of the kingdom pos-
sessed at that time but 4453 elementary schools,
whereas, to keep up the ratio existing between ele-
mentary schools and the total Roumanian popu-
lation of Transylvania, there ought then to have
existed in Roumania 5369 schools. This single fact
shows that the Roumanians of Transylvania were
better provided with elementary schools than the
Roumanians living in the Kingdom.

Besides this the paragraph quoted from the
Austrian Treaty of Peace assures the teaching of
the minorities' languages only in the elementary
schools, while the Hungarian school laws, in accor-
dance with the Nationality Act of 1868, declare
that not only the churches, l)ut even private per-
sons have the right to maintain schools and that

Hungary and Roumania ; 11

those who maintain them have the right to decide
what shall be the general language of instruction
in that school. Apart from all this, the Hungarian
Government helped the churches and the schools
of the different nationalities with subsidies amount-
ing annually to several millions, without being
obliged to do so by any international agreement.
An American, Professor Dorsey, wrote in December
1910, in a letter to the Chicago Tribune treating
of the Slovak nationalist movements, that in the
eyes of Slovak political leaders nothing the Hun-
garians did was right. They liked to represent
the progress of the Slovak people as due solely
to their own efforts, carried on in the face of Hun-
garian persecution and oppression. "They are afraid
of losing this feeling of being persecuted, knowing
they would then have no cause to continue their
nationalist policy".

The Hungarian election laws were exposed to
still more vehement attacks on the part of the
nationalities than the school laws. According to these
accusations it was impossible to remedy the causes
of the Roumanian complaints within the limits
drawn by the constitution, for the Nationality Act
was just made to protect the political supremacy
of the feeble Hungarian majority, and conventional
methods used at elections prevented the diffeient
nationalities from coming into the House of Com-
mons in such force as would have answered to
their number, their economic strength and their
national and political importance.

If, however, we analyse this law and consider
at the same time the political economic and cul-
tural importance of the nationalities, we find that it
was not the nature of the law but their own poli-
tical weaknes that prevented the nationalities from
exercising such political influence as their leaders
wished.

Among the million of electors 577o w^re Ma-
gyars, only 37o more than their relative num-

12 B. Jancso

ber (547o) ^^ tlie total population. This small
percentage was surely never capable of assuring
for the Magyars the supremacy over the natio-
nalities. The nationalist leaders say this result
was obtained by an artificial grouping of the con-
stituencies, but the truth is that only in 229 of
the 413 constituencies, that is to say in 557oi
were the Magyars in majority. So the percentage
of Magyar constituencies is 207o smaller than the
proportion of electors.

It was also a grievance and the source of many
accusations on the part of the nationalities, that
the electoral laws were partly based on the taxes
paid. Here the truth is that this was in most cases
a decided disadvantage for the Magyars, for the
absolute size of the property that served as basis
for these calculations was not everywhere iden-
tical.

Some examples will illustrate this. In the Slovak
territory, in the counties Arva and Lipto, anyone
could be elector who payed K 0'68 income tax,
while in the purely Hungarian county of Csanad
the right of sufirage depended on the payment of
more than K 0"68. In the mountainous districts of
county Bihar, inhabited by Koumanians, suffrage
depended on an income tax of K P'92, whereas
on the flat and mostly Magyar parts of this terri-
tory the minimum of. tax required was K 30.

The dualistic form of government establi^ied in
1867 did not satisfy the majority of the Magyar
element, as for instance the smaller landowners
of the middle class, the peasantry and the poorer
town citizens, who thus formed a Hungarian demo-
cratic element, that adhered to the program of
Louis Kossuth. They found Dualism to be a
very meagre counterweight for renouncing personal
union between the two states, that seeming more
apt to ensure their national freedom and the inde-
pendence of their country.

Hungary and Roumania 13

If, on whatever map showing the outcome of a
parliamentary election, we cover those parts where
deputies belonging to the Hungarian Independent
Party were elected with the same colour we use
for marking the Hungarians on an ethnographic
map, we shall find that the two maps are as like as
two peas. On the other hand, the members of the
Government party = adherents of Dualism — were
elected, with few exceptions, in the nationality dis-
tricts. So these maps are a good illustration of the
fact that the Hungarian element from 1867 till
our days was, within the limits made possible by
the constitution, artificially kept down to the profit
of Austria and the ruling family, by help of the
constituenciens inhabited by non-Magyar nationa-
lities. The Government was forced to recur to such
measures, for, if the majority in Parliament had
demanded the personal union of Austria and Hun-
gary it would have met with a decided refusal
on the part of Austria and the ruling family
and it would have been impossible to settle this
conflict in a constitutional manner. Such a situation
did actually come about in 1904. It was in con-
sequence of this awkward situation ^ that the reali-
sation of the political desires of the Magyar part
of the population had to be prevented as far as
possible and this circumstance, and not the desire
of magyarization was the reason why powerful
influences were sometimes brought to bear on the
elections. Sometimes the Government had even
to resort to illegal means to assure a strong
governmental party that would make a stand for
the dual monarchy and thus avoid further compli-
cations.

On account of these reasons abuses on a much

* We have said «awkwar(l situation ». It is proved such by
the fact that it excluded certain political tendencies, sup-
ported by the majority of Hungarians, being realised in a
conslituiioyml manner.

14 B. Jancsd

greater scale occurred during elections on the Magyar
than on the non-Magyar territory, for it was on
the former that the tendencies which might lead
to a personal union made themselves strongly felt.
In face of the veto of Austria and the dynasty
the electional abuses were a sort of safety valve,
for without these the nation would again have been
brought to the verge of revolution. We must estab-
lish the fact that the electoral abuses in question
were not committed unilaterally against the natio-
nalist party.

Parallel with the development of the Roumanian
nationalistic movement as sketched above, afforts
were continued on the part of the Roumanians to
effect a reconciliation with the Magyars.

A condition of this reconciliation from the point
of view of the Magyars was, that the Roumanian
national party should give up its passive attitude
and participate in political life, for this only would
lead to an eff'ective reconciliation. After a proposal
made io this eff'ect by M. Aurelius Vldd, one of
the political leaders of the Roumanians, at a sitting
of the Roumanian National committee, when, how-
ever, the measure was not carried, in 1905 the Rou-
manian National party declared that it would try
to attain its political aims by constitutional means
and that it would again take up activity. National-
ist candidates were nominated in the different
constituencies but at the following elections only
eight gained a seat in the House of Commons.

Previous to the elections in May 1906 some Rou-
manian nationalist leaders had a confidential pour-
parler with the head of the cabinet, M. Wekerle about,
the Roumanian and Magyar reconciliation, and on
this occasion the Roumanians expressed the wish
that, anterior to the election. Government should
agree with them and formulate a contract concern-
ing those constituencies which it was ready to
pass over to them without electoral contest.

Hungary and Roumania . 15

Govemmentjil circles considered the Roumanians
ought to conclude this contract not with the cen%
tral governmental authorities but with those of the
counties. The latter were, however, not willing to
give up the field without a struggle and in the
ensuing electoral campaign the Roumanians gained
but 14 seats.

This result is a good illustration of the fact that
the electors of Roumanian nationality were in ge-
neral not disposed to accept the program of the
Roumanian National party.

After Wekerle and the Coalition Cabinet retired
in 1910 and Count Khuen-Hedervary had been
nominated Prime Minister, the Roumanian leaders
again took up the connection. This time there was
talk not only of an understanding regarding the
elections but of the Roumanians and Hungarians
finally coming to terms.

The Roumanians again demanded the handing
over of a certain number of electoral districts
where their candidates should be elected without
opposition and they went as far as to name the
districts, but since it happened that not one of
them was of such a nature that the election of
an Opposition candidate had to be feared, but on
the contrary all were constituencies where the
election of ^ Governmental candidate seemed pretty
certain, Khuen-Hedervdry, who was in this election
preparing for a strong fight for the upholding of
Dualism, refused the request.

Negotiations of this sort continued after the
elections, first through the mediation of Basil
Mangra, the late Greek Catholic metropolitan, with
Count Tisza, the leader of the National Labour
party then in office, but these also were unsuccess-
ful, for differences arose between the older, mode-
rate, and younger, more radical, faction of the
Roumanian Nationalist party. The radical friction,
which, at the past elections, had not gained a single
seat in the House, accused the moderate one of

16 B, Janesd

not working for national but for party purposes,
> and these, again, accused the former that the negotia-
tions passing through Mangra's hands were not
likely to safeguard Koumanian political interest,
but those of Tisza's nationalist policy.

In reality the agreement was frustrated by the
intrigues of the Liberals of Roumania who feared
that if an agreement were formed, the "Transyl-
vanian question" would cease to exist, and so one
of the means of coming into power would be lost.
The dissolution of the Eoumanian national party
would not have suited them for other reasons either,
therefore M. Constantine Stere was despatched to
Nagyszeben in the quality of intermediary and
succeeded in restoring peace between the two
factions.

Roumania' s participation in the Balkan war and
her diplomatic success at the Peace of Bucarest
raised her self-confidence to a great degree and
made general the conviction that the time was
near when the Austro-Hungarian problem would
have to be solved.

It was under such circumstances that in 1913
Count Tisza began again to gather up the threads
of negotiation with the Roumanian . politicians,
dropped since 1910. At the beginning the Roumanian
committee was in favour of making JDcace on the
grounds of his propositions but later, in consequence
of the agitation of OctavianGoga, it turned against
his project. In this, however, the Crown Prince
Francis Ferdinand and the Christian Socialist Party
of Austria — supporters of the Crown Prince's
policy — had a part, for a compromise was con-
sidered dangerous to federalism.

Another reason for the rejection of a peaceful
settlement was the influence of Bucarest which,
after the Balkan War, gained an g,scendency over
the minds of the Roumanian nationalists who were
more and more inclined to take directions from

Hungary an d Roumania 17

Rouinania. These iustructions were, in the essen-
tial. L^ follows :

1. The Roumanian party in Hungary keeps its
eyes on thr interests of tlie whole Koumanian race
conjointly with those of Roumania.

2. It results from this that every endeavour to
come to a political understanding with the Hun-
garians is perfectly useless.

3. It may be presupposed with certainty that
if in the imminent European war Roumania takes
part on the Russian side against the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy she will be victorious and be
enabled to attain the fulfilment of her national
desires namely : Greater Roumania.

01 the members of the committee, Octavian Goga,
who prevented the understanding with the Hunga-
rians, had excellent connections in Bucarest, and
so was quite well informed that a European war
was on the point of breaking out and of the pro-
bable part that would to be taken by Roumania.

All this shows that in reality there never existed
insuperable differences between the main ideas of
Hungarian national and constitutional policy and'
the points of the Roumanian nationahst pro-
gram, it further shows that from time to time
efiorts were made to come to an understanding
and that even ample good-will was evinced on
both sides, but at the same time it becomes evi-
dent that every reconciliation was frustrated first
by Vienna, later — just before the war — by Bucarest
influence. It is not true that, without these influences,
a reconciliation would have been impossible.

The relations between the Hungarian Government
and the nationalities, especially the Roumanians,
can only be judged with justice if we consider
that in the Habsburg monarchy the Hungarians
could not dispose of absolute political freedom.
They were constantly prevented from acting in a
manner that would have best suited their desires
or their political interests.

22-24. 2

18 B. Jancso

In the strife which Hungary has been involved
in since the middle of the last century for main-
taining her independence, or for being at least an
equal factor in the Dual Monarchy, the Roumanians
were always on the Austrian side. This alone was
enough for the government and public opinion to
distrust their claims. If that minority of Roumanians
had come to power, which did not want to attain
the fulfilment of Roumanian desires by the crea-
tion of a federal Monarchy but in accordance with
tlie Hungarian element, the distrust on part of the
Hungarians would have ceased. However, on the
contrary, the Roumanian leaders always empha-
sized the fact that they did not reckon with the
realisation of their desires by the King of Hun-
gar}^ but by the Austrian Emperor.

Besides this, in the last thirty years, the Bucarest
influence led the Hungarians to distrust the Rou-
manians all the more. This influence a rose in con-
sequence of a literary and sentimental tendency
declaring the homogeneous civilisation of all Rou-
manians between the Dnjester and the Tisza and
the creation of a Greater Roumania to be the poli-
tical ideal and desire of every educated Rouma-
nian. Books were written, new daily papers were
started and societies were founded in support of
this ideal, so that the movement was not with-
out efi*ect on the official circles of Roumania. The
uncertainty of the position greatly increased from
the day when Roumania entered the Triple Alliance
and when every party, on going into opposition,
demanded that the Roumanian Government should
appeal to the friendly bonds existing and to inter-
cede in Vienna and Berlin in favour of the Rou-
manians, so that a pressure might be brought to
bear on the Hungarians regarding the political
wishes of the Roumanians.

These repeated, continuous and more and more
energetic steps of the Roumanian government of
course confirmed the suspicions of the Hungarians

Hungary and Rotimania 19

that behind the so called national desires irrident-
ism lay hidden and that the fulfilment ot every
nationalist desire would be but a step on the
way to a complete separation from Hungary.

Everybody who wants to have a clear idea of
the process going on between the Hungarians and
Roumanians since 1867 must consider the impor-
tant facts here enumerated.

We must, on the other hand, for truth's sake
point out that irridentism was in Roumania only
a literar)' movement, a sentiment of the educated
classes and never a real political program, till the
declaration of war in 1910.

By all responsible statesmen and politicans, on
every occasion and all the time, irridentism was
disapproved in the most decided manner and so
it will prehaps always remain an unsolved prob-
lem how it happened that Roumanians declaration
of war in the year 1916 was based on irredent-
ism and the desire of new conquest.

Glances at declarations of loyality made by
the Roumanians of Hungary.

All memoranda, political programs, manifestos,
proclamations and so on which from time to
time fixed the position of the Roumanian national
party in Hungary, or contained some explanation
of their point of view, always emphasized the
loyality of the Roumanians towards the dynasty
and to the State in which they were living. They
even went so far as to declare that they desired
the accomplishment of their political wishes just
to be able to work with all the greater enthusiasm
for the prosperity of this country.

These declarations give ample proof that the
nationalist leaders of the Roumanians in Hungary
never thought of seceding from this State. They
were the less inclined to do so as they were quite

2*

20 B. Jancsd

capable of seeing the advantage of having their
nationality recognised within the Hungarian State
which provided its Roumanian subjects with insti-
tutions more democratic, an economic existence
better and surer, and culture much higher than
those of Roumania, inferior in all these respects to
Hungary. The nationaKst leaders never aspired to
more than a certain autonomy within the state. We
are justified in declaring that in spite of Rouma-
nia's military intervention, in spite of the Hunga-
rian revolution, Bolshevism and the resolutions
ot the Peace Conference so advantageous to Rou-
mania, it is a national autonomy and not annexation
by Roumania that is desired by the masses of Rou-
manians of Hungary and even by the majority of
the better classes, and they will never be able to
tolerate the interference of Roumania in their
affairs.

We will prove this by declarations made by
themselves in regard to Roumania during the last
half century and even during the war.

The Memorandum of the Roumanian Nationalists
already mentioned, presented to the Sovereign in May
1892, emphasizes that: ''The interest of the Mo-
narchy, the interest of our country and the well-
fare of the Hungarians demands that more cor-
dial relations should be initiated between the
different nationalities, so that they, trusting one
another, might unite in common endeavour at the
foot of the throne so as to strengthen the com-
mon fatherland and make it flourish."

"As the complaints of the Roumanians are not
directed against the Hungarian state" says the
pamphlet "Replica" published in 1892 by the
Roumanian university students, "so the Memoran-
dum itself was not directed against the state either.
The Roumanian population of Transylvania and
Hungary is well known for its loyalty and might
be held up as a model for a law-abiding people.
History contains not a single event in which the

Hungary and Roumania 21

Roumanians show lack of tidelity towards the throne
or the state, whose supporters the Roumanians flat-
ter themselves always to have been, just as the
state has always granted them rights.

At a congress held in August 1895 by
different nationalities in Budapest the first point
of the resolution passed was, that the allied
Roumanians, Serbs, Slovaks etc. desire to mantain
in every respect the territorial integrity of Hun-
gary. When debating about the adress to be deli-
vered as answer to the address from the King at
the opening of Parliament in 1906 the Roumanian
nationalistic deputies, headed by Theodore Mihali,
formulated their wishes in a, special address and
here, too, they emphasized, in accordance with
their declaration of 1895, their adherence to the
principle of territorial integrity and their desire
to obtain the accomplishment of their national de-
mands within the limits granted by the law and
in accordance to the constitution of the couutr)^

The Roumanians of Hungary still adhered to this
point of view when in 1914 the war broke out.
On the day of mobilisation their youths thronged
under the banner with the same enthusiasm as
the Hungarians. In the different classes of society
Roumanians were, from the beginning to the end
of the war, just as ready for any sacrifice and
bore the heavy trials with- the same endurance as
the Magyar population. Their leaders roused the
enthusiasm of their compatriots in exactly the
same manner as those of the Magyar.^. The admoni-
tions delivered by> the heads of the clergy of both
Roumanian denominations were filled with the
same fighting spirit as those of the Magyar bish-
ops. In consequence of this the Roumanians
of Hungary as, in general, all other nationalities

22 B. Janc86

living in. Hungary must, with few exceptions, bear
the responsibilities concerning this war to the same
extent as the Magyars.

The following quotations will provide an inter-
esting illustration of the above.

Mgr. Demetrius Radu, Greek Catholic bishop of
Nagyvarad issued, at the outbreak of tfie war, an
episcopal charge in which the following sentences
are to be met with.

"Our apostolic King relies upon his people
and we can answer this mark of confidence
in no other manner than by being ready to obey
his commands and to shed our blood at his
bidding. This is the tradition we inherited from
our forefathers ^and with God's help we will hand
it down unsullied to our children. This is the
supreme command of the throne of our dear country
and of the radiant crown of Saint Stephen. The
sense of duty inspires our men who, when hearing
the command, rush to arms and die fighting for
their country. No danger wliatever will be able
\o prevent us from defending this land where our
ibre fathers rest. The example of our ancestors and
the glorious past of many a century will induce
the Roumanians to fight with their well known valour
in response to the summons of their sovereign."

The Orthodox Greek bishop, Mgr. John Pap, requests
his priests on August 7. 1914 "to read the procla-
mation of the King addressed to his people at the
outbreak of the war in all the churches, to explain
its contents and to show their flock that the war
was inevitable and was undertaken for a rightful
cause." The bishop is happy to remark that his
whole flock obeyed the summons with promptitude
and enthusiasm, and considers it the duty of
the clergy to explain to the population that tliey
must prove with deeds and not with words only

Hungary and Boumania

that the Roumanians of Hungary hawe always been
loyal to the throne, so that their Lord and King
Francis Joseph should be satisfied with them.

Mgr. Miron Christea, Orthodox Greek bishop of
Kar^nsebes (since metropolitan of Nagy-Szeben),
in his charge of August 8. 1914, declares the war
against Serbia to be rightful and just and exhorts
his flock to remain steady in their loyalty towards
their country and their king. "We know — he
continues — that the frontier of Serbia extends
from Orsova to Pancsova along the Danube and
that it therefore touches the bishopric of Karansebes,
and although the enemy does not even dream of
putting his foot into our territory nevertheless we
must be watchful. Our soldiery passing through
the bishopric must be received with the utmost
enthusiasm, for it is everybody's duty to help those
in w^hose hands lies at present the fate of the
country".

The Greek Catholic bishop of Szamosiijvdr, Mgr.
Basil Hosszu, not only emitted an episcopal charge
of similar contents but when, on August 14. 1914,
the hussar regiment stationed in his residential town
marched out to war he delivered a speech in which
ho said : "It is with a benediction I speed you on
your way, a benediction which will, I hope, follow
you on the road beset with danger, but filled also
with glory. The w^ar requires sacrifices for the country.
Death for our country must be received with joy.
With love we embrace you in this solemn mo-
ment, but remember that although we love you
and wish you to return yet we are more ready
to support the pain of eternal separation than to
see you returning beaten and with shame. Go forward
and ascend the steep path which leads to glory."

Not only Mgr. Hosszu but all the other Roumanian
high priests seized every available occasion in
those fateful days to raise the warlike spirit of their
people and to induce them to give proofs of their
patriotism and loyalty.

24 B. Jancs6

On Aug. 18, the birthday of the king, Bishop
Miron Cristea gave a banquet, during wiiich the
Eoumanian M. P. t^onstance Burdia (Government
party) pointed out, in a toast, the necessity of the
Roumanians and Magyars holding fast to each other.
Upon this the Bishop replied that in this critical
moment the Roumanian was standig by the Magyar
like a brother and that this behaviour was not only
in accordance with the sentiments, but also with the
interests of the Roumanians. The downfall of the
Monarchy would not only mean the downfall of the
Roumanians of Hungary but of the whole Roumanian
nation. Bishop Cristea asks his priests and the leading
government officials to do their best to propagate
and to augment patriotism and to encourage the
friendship with the Hungarians and the loyalty
towards the state, so that a better future might arise
out of the present situation even as regards the
nationalist question and the mutual sympathy
between the different races inhabiting the country.

Besides the chief Roumanian clergy the leaders
of the Roumanian Nationalist Party also made
similar declarations, and by so doing they proved
that the}^ also were ready to partake in the sacrifices
and the responsibility of the war, which followed
their solidarity with the Magyars.

On August 2, 1914, Theodore Mihali, the president
of the Roumanian nationalist party issued, on be-
half of his party, the following declaration.

"The youth of our country are called to the
field of glory. As in the past, sO surely also in the
present, the Roumanian soldier will fulfil his duty
to the glory of his race and in a manner worthy
his fame. His Majesty, our aged Sovereign, and
our fatherland will again receive proofs of the
ancient loyalty of the Roumanians that live under
the Habsburg rule and of their readiness for sacrifices.
It is with enthusiasm that the Roumanian youth

Hungary and Roumania 25

have joined the colours to shed their blood on the
battlefield. Those who have stayed at home are
prepared for any endurance. It is with keenest
interest and with the longing for a glorious and
victorious result that we await the end of those
historical events that are developing before our
eyes and those which are yet to come".

" {^Exceptional measures having been taken by Go-
vernment and all public meetings having thus become
impossible, the Roumanian nationalist party was
prevented from holding a great meeting as was
planned, and thus lacking the opportunity to deliver
several speeches containing loyal declarations, the
party addresses all Roumanians living on Hungarian
territory by means- of the newspaper press, and
requests them to be even more ready in these
dark days to fulfil their duty and perform any
sacrifice, and exhorts them to be calm and put
their trust in Grod.

"The Roumanian population — so runs this semi-
official proclamation — has always shown its good
commonsense, it is orderly, loyal, and steadfast.
These are the traits of character that we inherited
from our forefathers and these we must now show.
We hope that our splendid and patriotic conduct;
worthy of our nation and our Roumanian name,
and the courage of our sons on the field of battle,
will both enhance the value put upon the services
hitherto rendered, so that the Roumanian nation
will finally be enabled to come into possession of
all those rights for which it struggled till now,
and for which it will continue to struggle in a
lawful manner and with all measures available
within the constitutioli*.

Another leading member of the Roumanian natio-
nalist party, M. Alexander Vajda, M. P. made at the
same time the following declaration before a corre-
spondent of the Bucarest paper, the Adverul.

"The Roumanians living in Hungary havejoiuedthe
colours with the greatest enthusiasm, giving a proof of

26 B. Jancs&

their loyality towards the ruling family and of their
patriotism. In these fateful moments the population
adheres to its old traditions. It is true that this
is partly due to the behaviour of the nationalist party»
The strife that was going on between Roumanians
and Hungarians must be put aside till the common
foe is vanquished and till the better future is assured.
All nationalities must unite in love in face of the
exterior foe for the sake of their country and their
throne. The Roumanian people and their leaders
are well aware of the danger that threatens, not
only the dual Monarchy and the whole Roumanian
nation, but even the whole civilisation of Europe,
in case Russia were to win. In face of this danger
the difference of political opinion between Rouma-
nians and Hungarians dwindles to a harmless do-
mestic quarrel. It would be tragic if, on account
of the attitude of the Roumanian Kingdom, the
Roumanians living under the Habsbnrg rule and
those of the Kingdom should be forced in this
decisive moment to face each other as enemies.
Since we, Roumanians who are fighting for the dual
Monarchy, represent half of the Roumanian nation, it
becomes inadmissible that at this moment the Rou-
manian Kingdom should remain neutral or —
worse than that — should attack the Monarchy and
help Russia. If Roumania would act in confor-
mity with the interest of all Roumanians, it will
first of all help the Roumanians living in Bess-
arabia. The Roumanians inhabiting the Monarchy
are strong enough to help themselves and to up-
hold their nationality. It is to be hoped that Rou-
mania will consider the well known ingratitude
of Russia and understand what are the measures
required by the political interests of all Rouma-
nians".

At the same time M. Alexander Vajda published
in the "Budapester Tageblatt" the following lines:

"The line of conduct of the Roumanians of Hun-
gary has proved that towards this most lo^al

Hungary atid Roumania 27

people a policy of confidence is the best. Our sol-
diers are joining the ranks with the greatest fer-
vour and the brave Roumanians y as the Crown
Prince, of sacred memory, once called them, will
again fulfil their duty honourably and loyally.

The Roumanians are proving once agam that
they are a perennial source of energy for the
dual Monarchy, upon which the Monarchy can
always count. There never was a traitor among
them and never will be".

M. Basil Goldis, formerly M. P. and a leader of
the nationalist party,at present headof religiousaft.iirs
and education in the ConsiliulDirigent atNagyszeben,
made the following declaration on Nov. 14, 1 »14
in the daily paper Romanul appearing at And:

"We must declare that, even when fighting in
lawful manner and with lawful weapons for the
safeguarding of our nationality and tor the possi-
bility of unimpeded political and economic deve-
lopment, we nevertheless always keep in mind that
there exist common interests between the Magyar
and Roumanian people and we are fully aware of
the great irtiportance of the Roumanian people in the
dual Monarchy. This is why the Roum.anian natio-
nalist party is convinced that it will not be diffi-
cult to lay open to the leading factors of the Mo-
narchy the rightful and patriotic tendency of its
nationalist program and so to settle the conflict
existing ever since 1867, the commencement of the
Constitutional Era, between the point of view of the
Hungarian Government and the necessities of life
of the Roumanians".

These patriotic proclamations of the leaders of
the Roumanians are backed by the whole educated
class. Every opportunity is seized for solemn decla-
rations of loyality, of patriotic feeling and (A' ro.-idi-
ness to help.

28 B. Jancsd

Headed by the lawyer, Justinian Pop, the Rou-
manians of Deva appeared before the deputy-prefect
of the county August 2, 1914, and on the part of the
Roumanians of county Hunyad presented a declara-
tion of io3^alty, begging him to forward it to Govern-
ment. This declaration contains a statement of eter-
nal loyalty and patriotism. Stress is laid on the fact
that now, in this most critical moment, all disputes
arising from the constitutional struggle are put aside.
All causes of disagreament are declared to have dis-
solved in the flame of patriotic enthusiasm. They all
declare solemnly their readinness for the utmost sacri-
fices so as to promote by all means a victorious
result, and to prove once more the fidelity of
the Roumanian people towards the crown and the
country. It is further on declared that the Rouma-
nians of HuQgary simply fulfil their duty when
rising to defend Hungary's King and their common
country. They desire to prove that they love their
country just as much as the Hungarians. If anyone
attempts to violate the territory of the country
they will find themselves face to face with the
Roumanians, ready to shed the last drop of their
blood in her defence.

Basil Osvada, the director of a bank at Vajda-
hunyad, declared at the same time in a public
speech that "the Roumanians conduct themselves
with the greatest possible patriotism and loyalty
in this war and are ready to shed their verj'^ last
drop of blood for the common country".

The lawyer Victor Popu delivered a declaration
bearing 42 signatures of the Roumanians living in that
district to the chief magistrate of the hundred of Puj
on the second of August, and the chief magistrate of
the hundred was requested to "inform his superiors
that the Roumanian educated classes in the district
are absolntly decided to help the Roumanian po-
pulation in fulfilling their duty towards their mother
country and their King. Joyfully the Roumanians put
their lives and their fortunes at the disposal of

Hungary and Roumania 29

their country, for at this moment but one wish fills
the heart of every Roumanian, this being that the
crown of St. Stephen should triumph over its foes*.

In the county of Zilah, on the very same day,
a deputation led by Alexander Sotie, Greek Catho-
lic vicar, waited upon the Piefect of the county
and brought to his knowledge that "in these days
of supreme need the Roumanians of the county
consider it their duty to declare their sympathy
with the Hungarians and ask that the Government
be solemnly informed of the fidelity of the Rouma-
nians towards their ruler and of their readiness to
sacrifice everything on the altai of their country.
This is already proved by the readiness to take
up arms."

At the meeting of the General Assembly of county
Temes of Oct. 14, 1914, the Prefect moved the
proposition that the council should inform the So-
vereign that its members not only adhere loy-
ally to the Throne but are, without difference
of nationality or denomination, ready to make
the utmost moral and material sacrifices so as to
insure a victorous ending of the war. After this
proposal Aurelius Comsa, a leading member in the
county ot the Roumanian nationalist party, rose to
speak and declared that when the common country
was in danger, the unity existing between the
different nationalities always increased. The enthu-
siasm with which the Roumanian youths in the
hour of danger answered the summon to arms,
rivalling in this with the other nationnlities of the
country, shows best their patriotism and readiness
for all sacrifice. This occasion has again proved
the Roumanians to be the very truest sons of the
country and most loyal subjects of the dynasty.

On August 5, 1914 a deputation of Orthodox Greek
priests and teachers led by Dean Daian (Greek
Catholic) appeared before the royal commissioner
at Kolozsvar and asked him to notify to the Govern-
ment their declaration of loyalty. The speaker of the

30 B. Jancsd

deputation declared that the leaders of the Rouma-
niau people of the county are not only doing
their utmost to uphold the loyalty and the patriot-
ism of their fellow countrymen but are all ready to
sacrifice their lives for their country and their King.

At Gryulafehervdr also a deputation appeared be-
fore the prefect of the county and the leader Tecu-
lescu, a Grreek Oriental dean of Roumanian natio-
nality, asked that the prefect should inform the
Government of their loyal feelings.

But not only the larger towns and the centres
of counties or hundreds were scenes of patriotic
demonstrations; such occurred in many out-of-the-
way places where the Roumanians rivalled even
the Hungarians in love of their country.

The Magyar, Roumanian and Saxon inhabitants
of the village Teke (county Kolozs) arranged on
July 31 a demonstration, in which the priests of
all denominations represented read the Manifesto of
the King to his people on the occasion of the war
breaking out and, rousing by speeches the enthu-
siasm of the hearers, they declared it to be the
duty of every one, without difference of nationa-
lity, to unite and to defend the throne and their
common county. The same scene repeated itself a
few days after at the meeting of the Roumanian
Cultural League in the village M6cs.

Thus patriotism showed itself in an imposing man-
ner all over the country where the Roumanians
lived, thus proving that at the outbreak of the war
enthusiasm seized the Roumanians just in the
same manner as it did all the other nationalities
living in Hungary.

The patriotic Roumanian press, especially the
official gazette of the Roumanian national party,
the Bomanul, wrote in a similarly enthusiastic
manner.

The Roumanian papers busied themselves with
particular pleasure with recording the heroism of
the troops of Roumanian nationality, aiming not

Hungary and Roumania 31

\

only to make it clear before the Roumanian people,
that their sons fought with a heroism deserving
every recognition, but also that their attitude was
by far superior to that of the Hungarian soldiers
fighting together with them and therefore, if the
Monarchy's Army should come victoriously out of
the war, the Roumanian soldier would have a
much greater merit in it than the Hungarian soldier.

"Look — writes the Romanul in an article on
the 28-th July 1914, entitled "Soldatul roman" —
how they rushed to their garrisons on the very
day, when at dawn the drums brought the marching
order of the Emperor. With what strong determina-
tion did they tear themselves from their wives,
who clasped their arms aroviiid their necks. How
gaily did they, by singing and dancing, shorten
the road leading from their native villages, the
road which led them into a foreign country
poisoned by hate, where only cartridges awaited
them. Who fears death? Nobody in the Rouma-
nian villages knows of a single deserter".

The same paper on August 7*^, in an article
entitled "Ostasul Roman" gives a vivid account
of the enthusiasm of Roumanian youths joining
their colours. The article was inspired by a speech
of Mgr. Radu, Greek Catholic bishof of Nagyvarad,
delivered to the soldiers starting for the field of
battle from that town.

In an article: "Vitejia romanesca" ihe Romanul
mentions with pride the great appreciation of the
Austrian-German and Hungarian papers show for
the heroism of the troops of Roumanian nationality
on the Galician front. In its number of the 2(3''^
of September it refers to the declaration of Roda
Roda, the war correspondent of the "Neue Freie
Presse", about the bravery of the Roumanian
soldiers in the actions at Grodek and about the
brotherly feelings existing between them and their
Hungarian comrades. On the 8*'' October in an
article entitled "Ostesul roman*, it reproduces an

32 B. J a ncs 6

article of the "Pester Lloyd" which mentions the
bravery of the soldiers of Roumanian nationality
during the fight in Galicia.

The same Romanul repeats on the 14^^^ Sep-
tember 1914 the following utterance of the regi-
mental surgeon Ozako (a Hungarian) who served
in the Bruderman Army, about the behaviour of
the soldiers of Roumanian nationality: "I saw the
wonderful attacks of our Hussars and the rush
of the Hungarian infantry, but what the Honved
regiment of Deva, composed purely of men of Rouma-
nian nationality, accomplished surpasses all efibrts of
imagination. I cannot describe it, for nobody would
believe it. The officers could not keep them back.
The mocz (mountaineers) rushed like tigers upon
the enemy and destroyed them with their bayonets,
with the butt end of their rifles or even with their
bare hands. I could never have imagined men
fighting with such enthusiasm and such valour."

In its issue of the 14*^ December, 1914 the
Romcmul publishes a letter from Major Georg^e
Flesarm of the Austro-Hungarian Army, himself
of Roumanian nationality, saying the following
about the heroism of the Roumanians : ;,The well-
known heroism of the Roumanians is insur-
pas sable, I too am proud of it." In its issue
of December 22 Major Barbini writes with great
acknowledgement of the courage of the 33.
Inf.-Rgmt. of Arad, composed of men of Rou-
manian nationality. In its number of the 31*^ De-
cember it publishes a declaration of the Archduke
Frederick, Commander in Chief of the Austro-Hun-
garian Army, about the behaviour of the Inf.-
Rgmt of Nagyszebeu, whose men were nearly all
Roumanians, at the battle of Prizdborg. "It was
wonderful what the men of the 31. Rgmt. ac-
complished. According to the reports presented to
me a single batallion of this Regiment, under the
leadership of a lieutenant, took Prizdborg by
storm." '

Hungary and Roumania 33

In its issue of January 5, 1915, the Romanul
reproduces a letter from a lawyer and officer
of the reserve, published in the Naqyvdrad^
who writes, that the commanding general, an old
Austrian soldier, had tears of joy in his eyes, when
he saw the men of Roumanian nationality of the
Militia-Rgmt: of Lugos attacking in Servia. An
Austrian Lieutenant-Colonel said the following:
"These militiamen are ideal soldiers. They have
now been three days in service without grumbUng,
and make astounding marches."

Basil Goldis, at present head of the office for
religious and educational afifairs of the Conziliul
Dirigent at Nagyszeben writes in the Romanul in
its issue of January 7. 1915, under the heading
of "Priu moarte la viata" (Through death to life) the
following: "The hour of sufiering has returned
Roumanian youth, at the call of the Emperor, fling
itself into the murderous fire. The blood, lost by
traditional heroism, will save the Throne and the
Country. The sacrifice graciously received by Heaven
will save our Roumanian race also."

But not only on the front did the Roumanians
of Hungary take a great share in supporting their
country; at home they did their best and, according
to their pecuniary abilities, made every sacrifice in
economic matters. The Roumanian press urged them
to this financial sacrifice just as well as it urged
them to fulfil their duty in the line of fire. At the
time of the issue of the first War loan the
Romanul in its issue of November 7. 1914
under the heading "Bancile si imprumutul de
rAsboi" (The Banks and the War-loan) says :
The result of the subscription ought to be the
thermometer of the public enthusiasm. We do
not doubt, that they will soon perceive abroad
the solidarity which unites every subject of this
country in these hard times . . . We Roumanians

22—24. 3

34 B. Janes 6

shall, according to our economic forces, fulfil our
duty to such an extent as will astonish our
compatriots".

The same paper writes from Kardnsebes that
the readiness to suscribe the War-loan is great. The
former "Bansdgi vagyonkozosseg* (Co-proprietors of
the Banat),the bench of bishops of the Orthodox Greek
Church, and private people suscribed fair amounts.
The gymnasium at Karansebes — mostly Roumanian
youths, all children of poor labourers, collected
2000 crowns for the war-loan, those of the VIII
class bought a share of the 100 Crowns Bonds,
which they offered as a patriotic donation to their
school. The Directors of the school bought war-
loans for 8000 crowns out of the school-funds.
The teachers subscribed separately.

The Roumanians therefore behaved in everything
just as the Hungarians or, with few exceptions,
like every true son of his country. True, there
were some exceptions who, contrary to the totality
of the Roumanians, took a different view of the
war. There were some amongst the leading men
of the Roumanian national party, who fled to
Roumania to take part in tha agitations against
the Monarchy. Ladislas Lucaciu and Octavian
Ooga belonged to these. But what the Roumanians
themselves thought about these exceptions may be
illustrated by the following quotation.

The Liga CuUurala of Bukarest held an as-
sembly on Dec. 29. 1914, where it was decided to
change its name and the purposes it followed till
that date. Up till now it fought only for the culttiral
union of the Roumanian race, henceforth it will
fight for its political union. By this the Liga Cul-
turala took its stand on the basis of irre-
dentism, until then, repudiated, and subsequently
it ranged itself among those social organisations
which, since the outbreak of the World-war,

Huyigary and Roumania '_ 35

endeavoured to *^ain the public of Roumania for
tlie idea of war against Austria-Hungary, and thus
induce the Government of Roumania to declare war,
and all this is in the interest of Greater Roumania,
whose boundaries should extend to the river Tisza.
To show that the Roumanians of Hungary were
in accordance with them, they elected Ladislas
l.ucaciu and Octavian Goga as members of the
Directing Committee on Jan 3. 1915. The official
paper of the Roumanian national party, the '^Ro-
manul'" informed the Liga Culturala as well as
Lucaciu and Goga, of its view of the case, writing
as follows:

"It was always the principle of the Roumanians
of Hungary never to interfere in the affairs of Rou-
mania, but they also expected that Roumania should
not interfere with those of the Roumanians of Hun-
gary. Whenever they tried to do this, they always
brought trouble upon the aspirations of Hungary's
Roumanians, Roumania may follow the foreign policy
that suits her, she will be responsible for it, but it
is our duty to inform our brothers of Roumania
of our thoughts and feelings regarding the Euro-
pean conflagration, so that they may not be mis-
taken in their calculations about this matter. Regard-
ing events in the Liga culturala we consider
it our duty most earnestly to affirm that the Rou-
manians of Hungary will under all circumstances
be faithful to their country and to the glorious
dynasty of the Habsburgs".

"Faithful to the throne and country, hundreds
of thousands of Roumanian soldiers have shed
their blood with acknowledged heroism. This
heroism and patriotic attitude is the only lode-star
of the Roumanians of Hungary that can guide
them and their leaders in their actions and prin-
ciples. These bloody sacrifices show that it is their
firm conviction, born of the national instinct of
self-preservation, that the only real danger mena-
cing their national existence is Slavism. If our

3*

36 B. Jancsd

brothers of Roumania think otherwise, it is their
affair. But it is not Lucaciu's or Goga's busi-
ness to make politics for the Roumanians of Hun-,
gary. If they are desirous to take part in political
actions and propaganda in Roumania they ought
first to expatriate themselves and to declare that
they will no more take official part in the politics
of the Roumanians of Hungary. These must make
their own politics, by themselves and at home,
and if anyone wishes to direct them in whatever
way, he must stand at the head of this people and
be responsible for it and before them. The Com-
mittee of the Roumanian national party cannot
represent any other policy than the totality of the
Roumanians of Hungary are making, having pro-
fusely shed their blood for the throne and country.
We are convinced that Messrs. Lucaciu and Goga
have already found time to send in their, resignations
to the President of the Committee*.

This stand-point was held by the Roumanians
even when Roumania, to, accomplish her national
ideal. Greater Roumania, on the 28^^^ of August 1916
declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy^
who had been her ally for 35 years.

On the 21^* of September 1916 the Roumanian
Orthodox Greek bishops, by name : John Pap of
Arad, Michael Christea of Kardnsebes and Basil
Mangra, vicar of the bishopric of Nagyvarad, sent
the following pastoral epistle to their respective
congregations :

*To our great sorrow Roumania has not kept
her promise of loyalty, has treacherously broken the
seals of the Alliance and has seized arms against
her brothers who have been fighting for two
years with incredible heroism a fight for life and
death against the enemies of the Monarchy. Those
who cross our frontiers with cunning words on their
lips and with the intention to rob in their hearts,

Hungary and Roumnnia I 37

are not our brothers, but our most insidious ene-
mies, who, to satisfy their savage greed, kill their
children and pjirents. Yes, our brothers of yester-
day are, because of their godless greed, to-day
our greatest and most abominable enemies. The
voice ot blood and nature's law constrain us to
mercilessly oppose them".

Diimetrius Badiiy Greek Catholic Bishop of Nagy-
varad. having received his invitation to the sitting
of tlfe Upper House too late to attend, sent on
the 3'"'* of September 1916 the following telegram
to the President of that assembly:

"l very much regret that having been absent
from my residence it was only to-night I received
the invitaiion to the session of the Upper House
to-morrow, and the shortness of time makes my
])resence there impossible and prevents me from
expressing, in the face of recent events causing us
such deep sorrow, in my own name, in the name
of my priests and the whole of my diocese in
accordance to our patriotic feelings, our unalter-
able faith and devoti%n to the high Throne, the
glorious Dynasty and the Holy Crown of Hun-
'-;ary^

Two days later, on September 5. one of the
leading men of the Roumanian national party in
Hungary, Stephen C. Pop — at present Minister
for Transylvania in the Government of Bucarest —
made, in the name of the above mentioned party,
and empowered by it, the following declaration of
loyalty :

"It is with profound surprise we have heard that
our neighbour Roumania has joined the ranks of
our enemies. We are astonished, for we should ne-
ver have thought it possible that Roumania sh(mld
turn against the Monarchy, in which several mil-
lions of Roumanians live as loyal subject? enjoying
the greatest prosperity under the rule of the glo-
rious Habsburg Dynasty. We conceived it impossible
that Roumania should ally herself with that Russian

38 [ B. Jancs6

Empire, which menaces mostly the existence of
the Roumanian race, for just Roiimania's history
gives proof of Russia's ingratitude and perfidy for
a thousand years.

"The Roumanian population of Hungary has for
a thousand years worked in a brotherly manner
together with the Magyars, to defend the country
against evjery external enemy, and as everybody ack-
nowledges in the present war also, the Roumanian
soldiers by their bravery have given proof, of their
fidelity to the country and the throne.

"Those who stayed at home united with the Ma-
gyars in making every necessary sacrifice, so as
to ensure the victory of the army. The loyalty of
Hungary's Roumanian-speaking population and the
love of its country never can be vanquished. Even
the unexpected declaration of war on the part of
the Roumanian Kingdom cannot alter this. Hun-
gary's Roumanians will continue to defend their
country and the apostolic throne against every
attack, wherever it may come from.

"This I considered it my duty to declare, not as
if it were possible for anyone within the Monarchy
to doubt the fidelity of the Roumanians, but because
I consider it necessary to make this fact clear to
the minds of those in authority in foreign countries
who seem to have supposed that in this new phase
of the Great War, the loyalty of Hungary's Rou-
manians might waver for a moment. I beg the
Honourable House to take due notice of this decla-
ration".

In a Note presented to the President of the
United States at the beginning of 1917, the Entente
Powers declared the liberation of various nationa-
lities living under a foreign yoke to be the aim
of the war. This, however, the Roumanians
living in Hungary interpreted as an interference
in their own affairs and, far from agreeing,
they presented to the Prime Minister a solemn

Hungary and Roumania 39

declaration, which they desired should be submit-
ted to the Sovereign.

This declaration bears the signature of all the
Roumanian bishops of both Greek denominations,
dignitaries of the Greek Churches, archdeacons,
canons and deans, professors, the most esteemed
leaders of the Roumanian educated classes, etc. and
besides these there figures also the name of Theo-
dore Mihali, vice-president of the Roumanian nation-
alist party. Altogether a hundred and eighty of the
most notable Roumanians signed this declaration.

''Since the Note addressed by the Allied States
to the President of the United States — so runs
this protest — mentions among the objects of the
war the deliverance of some nationalities, the Rouma-
nians among others, from a foreign rule, the Entente
is ^vorking against the integrity of our country.

*We, the leaders and representatives of all Rou-
manians living in Hungary, in the name of our
people, raise a solemn protest against being consi-
dered by anyone as living under a foreign' yoke.
We Roumanians are free citizens of Hungary and
citizens endowed with perfectly equal rights. There
exists in Hungary not a single law that recognises
any difference between the rights and the duties of
the Magyar and non-Magyar populations.

"For centuries the Roumanian population has
clung with love and fidelity to this country, hallowed
by the blood of their ancestors. The loyalty towards
the anointed monarch and the fidelity towards the
royal family are old Roumanian virtues. Imbued
with such feelings, we have fought for a thousand
years together with the Magyars for the defence of
the Holy Crown, and the fact that our youth is doing
the same and that its blood is shed in torrents today,
proves that we remain unchanged and our enthu-
siasm makes us ready for every sacrifice. The em-
pire of the Crown of Saint Stepen is not a foreign
yoke to us. We do not need to be delivered, we

40 B. Jancsd

adhere to the integrity of our Hungarian Father-
land.

** This decided point of view of ours is not the
outcome of a time-serving policy, but is a deeply
rooted conviction, based on the experiences of
many centuries and historical traditions. We well
know that in fature the splendour and influence of
Saint Stephen's Crown will assure the cultural,
economic and political development of Hungary's
Roumanians.

"We Roumanians of Hungary hold fast to our
desire to remain as heretofore under the rule of the
Holy Hungarian Crown, and it is for this that
thousands of our hopeful youth are bleeding. The
Roumanian people will fight to ensure the fulfil-
ment of this end with all the moral and material
weapons at their disposal."

Even all these declarations however fail to exhaust
the data proving that the Roumanians of Hungary
took part in the Great War with the same enthusiasm
and unselfishness as the Magyars and Hungary's
other nationalities, and this was not even changed
by Roumania's entering on the scene in 1916. Just
to complete the picture, we annex further state-
ments made by Roumanian nationalist M. P.-s in
Parliament.

Mgr. Miron Christea in a sitting of the Upper
House July 22 1917 gave a detailed account
of the courage shown by the soldiers of Roumanian
nationality on the different theatres of war and
quoted this courage as a proof that the Roumanians
had always and under all circumstances been
faithful to Hungary.

M. Nicolas Serban pointed out in the House of
Commons on July 22. 1917, that the common in-
terest of Hungarians and Roumanians compel them
at present and in the future to rely one upon the
other. The war was welcomed by the Rouma-
nians as an eff'ective means of dispersing by

Hungary aud Rnumania 41

their conduct therein all mistrust, with which up
till that time all the political and cultural efiorts of
the Roumanians were regarded by the Magyars.
The declaration of war on the part of the Rou-
manian Kingdom in no way afiected the behaviour
of the Roumanians of Hungary, for even during
the occupation of some parts of the country by
Roumanian troops very few traitors were to
be found. Even those cannot be found absolutely
disloyal who left the country t-ogether with the
beaten troops of Roumania, for they did not leave
of their own will, but were dragge(f away- by
force.

Stephen C. Pop at a meeting of the House of
Commons on July 27^^ testified to the fact that
he and his party had always lived on good and
friendly terms with the Magyars, and that they
desired to live so in future too. Their complaints were
never against the Magyar nation, but only against the
Government. He and his {)arty, when the Roumanian
troops broke in, made a voluntary declaration of loy-
alty. Gount Tisza accused him of not having signed
the protest against the Note of the Entente, addressed
to the U. S. A., wherein the deliverance of different
nationalities from a foreign yoke is put down as
being one of the aims of the war, but this accusation is
utterly without foundation, for such a signature
seemed perfectly unnecessary after his declaration
made in September 1916 in the House of Commons.

Until November 1918 not a single party of the
Roumanians in Hungary, none, at least of any
importance, viewed the war or Hungary's integrity
in any other manner than shown in the declarations
and statements quoted. All of them adhered to the
program that had been drawn up at a meeting of
the Roumanians of Hungary in 1881 as follows :

1. Transylvania's autonomy is demanded in ac-
cordance to the regulations accepted by the Pro-

42 B. Jancs6

vincial Diet of Nagyszeben in 1868 and sanctioned
by the Sovereign.

2. Roumanian shall be the official language in
the courts of law and in the administration on all
territories inhabited by Roumanians.

3. In the public offices of the counties and auto-
nomous towns inhabited by Roumanians, should be
employed, Roumanian officials or only such Magyars
as speak Roumanian perfectly.

4. The Nationality Act shall be be revised and
brought into line with Roumanian aspirations.

5. All laws preventing the Roumanians' national
development must be abolished.

6. The autonomy of schools and churches is to
be maintained.

7. Roumanian schools and cultural societies shall
be subsidised by the State, and the amount of
this help must be in proportion to the taxes-
paid by the Roumanians.

8. Elections must be regulated according to a
new law permitting everyone to participate in the
elections or extending this right at least to all
those who pay some sort of direct tax.

This program differed from the Nationality Act
only in so far as it derived all these rights not
from the personal rights of any citizen, but from
the natural rights of a nation living on an auto-^
nomous territory, the demand of this latter being
the program of the Roumanian politicians from the
beginning.

In opposition to the Roumanian Kingdom, the Rou-
manian population of Hungary adheres even to-day
to Transylvanian autonomy, but the latter as the
result of the historical and political development
of some few centuries can only be effected within
the boundaries of Hungary. The unity with Rou-
mania excludes the autonomy of Trans3dvania and,
without such, not only the development of the
non-Roumanian nationalities will be imperilled, but
even the Roumanians living in Hungary will lose

Hungary and Roumania [ 43

those moral, cultural and economical qualities of
the race that are due to its separate development,
going on for centuries, which have thus become
characteristic traits and to which a whole world
of tradition and sentiment rs attached.

It was only after the military collapse of the
Central Powers and the occupation of Transylvania
by the Royal Roumanian troops in the autumn of
1918 that the leaders of the Roumanians of Hun-
gary altered their views, and came to a point of
view diametrically opposed as well to their histo-
rical past as to their political evolution. Either
they are lorony now^ or they were ivrony then.
The latter we cannot believe^ for we consider it a
moral impossibility that a nation should exist that
bases its national and political program merely
upon lies and that was capable of sustaini^ig such
lies for centuries toith a perfect ivant of faith, relia-
bility and appearance of truth.

Orecid Isopescu, Roumanian member of the Aus-
trian parliament, made the following declaration in
the name of all the Roumanians of the Monarchy;

"The four million Roumanians of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy claim the right to form a seperate
state within the Monarchy. This they may the better
demand, since the newly formed state will attract
the Roumanian Kingdom and may influence her to
join the Monarchy. This mode of working will be
in harmony with our former attitude, for we never
endeavoured to separate from the Monarchy, but
to adhere to the Monarchy, though maintaining our
state independence."

It is characteristic of the political attitude of the
Roumanian leaders that Theodor Mihali, presi-
dent of the Roumanian National Party, conjointly
with John Hock, president ot the revolutionary
Hungarian National Council and William Mclczcr,
member of the parliamentary Saxon National Party,

44 B. Jancsd

published a common appeal to all the Transylva-
nian Hungarians, Saxons and Roumanians on No 7.
1. 1918, requesting them to renew intercourse
with one another, and to try with mutual trust and
understanding to maintain order and the security
of property and person.

The Karolyi Government communicated this ap-
peal to all the political and other authorities as
a proof of the mutual unterstanding between the
different nationalities, on the basis of which the
Wilsonian principles could be realised in the most
satisfactory way.

It is a conspicuous phenomenon, that in several
county councils — in Mdramaros and Ugocsa — '■
the Roumanian members of the council protested (in
the second half of November) against any attempt
to separate Transylvania from the Hungarian State.

The same tendency is observable in an open
letter published on November 24. 1916, by a
well known Roumanian advocate of Nagyvdrad,
John Felle, addressed to the president of the
Nagyvarad National Council, ' Aurelius Ldzdr, de-
claring that "he would join the council and re-
main true to them as long as they fought for
the Roumanians of Hungary and not for those
beyond the mountains". Mr. Pelle says that it may
be a fine idea to join Roumania but it is not cor-
rect since it is not founded on the well considered
decision of serious minds, but only on the wish of
dreamers. He is not afraid to say that if the union
were to be carried out "the Roumanians would be
ruined and it would be a very poor consolation
that it would inflict an incurable wound on the
Hungarians also".

A very significant part, we may say the majo-
rity of the RoLimanian working men, were against
the union with Roumania. Trajan Novae, a leading
member of the Roumanian National Party, two
weeks after the Gyulafehervar resolution for joining
Roumania, published an open protest at KolozsvAr.

Hungary and Roumania 45

— "It is not true — lie says — that they made
their decisiou with the cousent of the whole prole-
tariat. Those who spoke there in the name of the
proletarians had no mandate from them to declare
for separation from Hungary in their name. The
simple fact is that union was not carried by vote, it
was simply declared from the chair. The Rouma-
nian proletariat will not hear of a union with the
Roumanian Kingdom until there exists a ^v.^ni()cracy
similar at least to that declared in Hungary by the
Revolution of 31. October".

The feelings of the Roumanian-speaking villagers
of Transylvania can be best illustrated by the follow-
ing two cases :

Theodor Mijiali, being a landowner in Nagyilonda,
called the people of that place together (on Nov. 14.
1918) in order to inform them of the altered situation.
When he began to speak about the necessity of
joining Roumania the people stopped him, began
to throw stones at him, and even threatened him
in his house where he took refuge. He was ob-
liged to appeal to the Roumanian military guard
for help, and in consequence of their intervention
several of the offenders were wounded. The same
thing happened also to Alexander Vajda, another
important member of the Roumanian national party.

The Roumanian national political endeavours had
their strongest and almost only supporters among
the priests of the Orthodox Greek and Greek
Catholic Churches. But the idea of union caused
grave anxiety even in the souls of the majority
of the priesthood. The Greek Catholic priests who
were better informed of church-life in Roumania,
knew that there the Orthodox Religion is a State
Religion, therefore they felt anxious lest the Catholic
character of their Church should be lost. The
priests of the Orthodox confession — on the other
hand — were afraid of losing the autonomy of their
Church, for they were aware that the Roumanian
Greek Church, although boasting of being a State

46 B. Jancsd

Church, has no autonomy whatever, consequently
they knew that they too would have to give up the
autonomy they enjoyed hitherto and become the
tool of political power, similarly to the Orthodox
Church of Roumania in which, according to canon
law, they would simply be absorbed.

The natural motives for a union with Roumania if
not wholly absent from the minds of the Roumanian
politicians at the time of the collapse of the Central
European military forces were still so faint that
they could not have brought about a decision of
so much importance. Outside influences must have
been brought to bear upon them to give force to this
idea, and these outside influences came from two
quarters.

One. was the declaration of King Charles IV.
issued on 16*^ October 1918, in which he consented
to the transformation of Austria into a feder-
ation of different independent states created on
tbeir respective territories by each people, who
should take part in the organisation of the state
by means of their representative national coun-
cils.

The other was a contract, drawn up in 1916
by Roumania and the Allied Powers, which
was secretly sent to the Hungarian leaders of the
Roumanian National Party by Jonel Bratianu, prime
minister of the Government. It was noticed that Lan-
sing, state-secretary of the United States, consented
to it in President Wilson's name.

Two days after the publication of King Charles's
declaration, Alexander Vajda read a resolution of
the Roumanian National Party in the Hungarian
parliament, which declared that Hungary's Rou-
manian people wish, when deciding upon their
position in the State, to exercise their right inde-
pendently of any foreign influence. In this declaration,
while mention was made of a Roumanian National
Assembly which should have the sole right of
deciding upon the manner in which the new state

Hungary and Roumania 47

formation should be effected, there was not the
faintest alhision to a separation from the Hungarian
State or to a union with Roumania.

On the 31. October 1918 the rabble of the streets
overthrew the government with the assistance of
the so-called Hungarian National Council formed
a few days previously, and started Hungary on the
road to a ruin such as was never witnessed be-
fore in the whole history of the Hungarian Nation,
leading, after a short period of four and a half
months, to Bolshevism.

Soon after this several National Councils were
formed, to the detriment of the central power of
executive and lawful administration. During this
evolution the parliamentary Roumanian National Party
transformed itself into a Roumanian National Coun-
cil at Arad under the presidency of Stephen C.
Pop. On the fourth of November a Central Roumanian
National Council was formed for the territory of
the ancient (political) Transylvania. In connection
with these national councils militarv councils were
formed throughout Transylvania.

Hungarian public opinion evinced no mistrust
towards these new formations because, although
the Roumanians gave expression to their posi-
tion to act independently in the matter of sacred
right they were to hold in the State, not a word
>vas heard respecting a union with Roumania, or
separation from Hungary.

The Roumanian national councils openly mani-
fested their intention to cooperate on brotherly
terms with the Hungarian and Saxon councils for
the maintenance of public order. No objection there-
fore was raised when the Roumanian national
councils formed armed bodies, called Roumanian
National Guards, under Roumanian flags and officers
who took the oath before the Roumanian national
councils.

The Roumanian National Council at Kolozsvnr,
conjointly with the Kolozsvnr Hungarian Natio-

48 B. Jancs6

nal Council, had undertaken, in the beginning
of Isfovember, to keep order in the whole of
Transylvania. They agreed that the auxiliary
forces should be under the command of General
Siegler, who was appointed by the Hungarian Mili-
tary Command. The men of the Roumanian national
army were supplied with equipment and pay just
as the Hungarians by the Hungarian military autho-
rities.

It happened that in some places an oath was
required from our soldiers ot Roumanian birth in the
name of the Hungarian National Council by theHunga
rian military authorities. The Budapest Roumanian
National Council lodged a protest against this with the
Hungarian Minister of Foreis^n Affairs, who accepted
the protest with the greatest courtesy and gave
orders that the Roumanian soldiers should take the
oath of fidelity to the Roumanian National Councils.
At the same time the minister ordered that the
Roumanian soldiers should get the same pay as
those Hungarians who swore fidelity to the Hunga-
rian National Council.

During the first ten days of the Hungarian revo~
lution, it was the universally accepted opinion of the
whole country, and of the Government in particular,
that the Hungarian national question should be
solved according to the Wilsonian principles and
Hungary should be built up as a sort of confede-
ration similar to Switzerland, but without any serious
change regarding territorial extension. The attitude
of the nationalities, that of the Roumanians especially,
seemed to support this belief. External influences
were again responsible for the failure of the plan.

On November 7. 1918 Wilson's message to the
Roumanian representative at Washington was made
public at Jassv, according to which "the President
sympathises with the idea of the union of the Rou-
manians wherever they live, and according to
which the government of the United States will
not miss the opportunity of exercising its influence

Hungary and Roumnnia 49

for the Roumanian people to attain their national and
territorial rights, and to be saved from all foreign
interference".

This message was followed at Jassy and in other
towns by many noisy political demonstrations. On
such an occasion General Avarescu, Generalissimo
in the campaign of 1916 — 17, declared that the
realisation of the Roumanian national ideal for
which so much blood has been recently spilt, was
approaching its fruition.

It was public talk in Roumania that the King would
soon issue an order to the army to occupy Transyl-
vania and the eastern part of Hungary up to the
line determined in the treaty with the Allied Powers
in 1916 as the boundary line of Greater Roumania.

The armistice concluded between Count Karolyi
and Franchet D'Esperey in Belgrade set down as a
demarcation line the left bank ot the river Maros
and declared in the 1^* paragraph that even on the
territory to be occupied by the Entente troops
civil administration should remain in the hands of
the Hungarian authorities and that they should have
the right to maintain public order by means of the
gendarmerie and police force.

These provisions of the armistice made the
impression, both on the Hungarian and the Rouma-
nian public, that the Entente powers would not
deprive Hungary of those parts of the country which
are marked in the treaty of 1916. This conviction
led the Bucarest statesmen as well as the Rou-
manians of Hungary to the most daring irreden-
tism, carefully avoided previously.

The Roumanian National Council in an address
to the Hungarian Government (Nov. 9.) demanded
that on the basis of the popular right of self-de-
termination the imperium should be given over to
the Roumanian National Council in those 26 counties
in which the majority of the population are Rouma-
nians, right up to the line marked in the treaty of
1916 as the boundary of Greater Roumania, because

22—24. 4

50 B. Jancso

on this territory, they only could maintain order,
safety of persons and property. Should the Hunga-
rian Government not comply with this desire, they
would be obliged to declare before the world that
the rights laid down in Wilson's 14 points were
for them unattainable and, consequent^, if public
order could not be maintained on that territory,
all responsibility therefor would fall upon the Hun-
garian Government.

This declaration, which might reasonably be
taken for a threat, seems to refer to the 17**^ § of
the Belgrade treaty, in which it is stated that, in case
of disturbances occuring, the Entente troops may
occupy territories beyond the lines of demarcation.
It was to be read between the lines that the Rou-
manian National Council was sure that such dis-
turbances and even bloodshed would take place at
a moment's notice and thus the Roumanian royal
troops as an ally of the Entente Powers would
have a good pretext to occupy those territories.

Nothing can serve for a better proof of the utter
lack of irredentism or dreams" of a Greater Rou-
manian Kingdom among the Roumanian people,
than the fact that when almost every Roumanian
had arms in his hands and the Huugarian State
was in utter confusion, no disturbance, nor any
bloody revolution actually took place, in spite of the
newspaper rumours spread by irredentist agitators
in foreign lands. These disturbances did not occur
because the people simply never felt any of that
oppression with which the different English, French
and German pamphlets — written by Roumanians —
made the world resound.

The Kdrolyi Government, instead of refusing the
demand of the Roumanian National Council of
Arad already alluded to, was ready to take it into
consideration. It accepted the offer, and consequently
Oscar Jdszi, Minister of the Nationalities in the K^-
rolyi cabinet, went to Arad, where he. declared that the
Roumanian National Council might exercise dominion

Hungarif and Roumania 51

in all those districts and towns in which the Rouma-
nians were in the majority. J^szi consented further,
that in those phices where the Roumanians were in
minority their defence should be secured jyovision-
ally according to the rules laid down in Act
XLIV. ot 1868 (Nationality Act). He declared also
that this decision should be available only until the
Peace treaty be made, and that the situation cre-
ated by this agreement should not influence the
})osition to be taken by either of the parties at
the Peace Conference.

The Roumanians refused the offer, and tried to
explain their decision in a proclamation addressed
to the peoples of the World.

They said that since the Hungarian Government
was not inclined to permit the Roumanian nation
to exercise dominion on the territories where the
Magyars live in majority, it was impossible for
the Roumanians to exercise the natural right of dis-
posal on the territories inhabited by them. Thus
the Hungarian Government recurred to might against
right.

They argued that the ethnical situation on the
territories claimed by them, w^as not the- original
or the natural one for the class of oppressors, of
course Hungarians, had during the long run of cen-
turies purposely wedged in masses of Hungarian
population to divide the body of Roumanians. It
was the acknowledged aim of the Hungarian Go-
vernment since 1867 — they said — to destroy
the existence of the Roumanian nation. They created
settlements without having any right to do so in
order to magyarise the Roumanians, they sent hun-
dreds of thousands of Hungarian officials to Rouma-
nian territories, they prevented the Roumanians from
having their own industry, and compelled the popu-
lation of the towns to become Hungarian and thus
created a polyglot population for Roumanian terri-
tories, in order to annihilate the Roumanian people.

4*

52 B. Janes 6

Considering that since 1867 only one insignificant
settlement of 41,000 souls was established in Tran-
sylvania, which was not sufficient to alter the
character of a territory with six and a half million
inhabitants, farther that, as all historic data proves,
Roumanians had never lived in the towns said to have
been violently magyarised, the Hungarians considered
these declarations only as such falsifications as
they were accustomed to and as were used by the
Roumanians from time to time to mislead foreign
public opinion.

The fact, however, that the Roumanians by means
of armed force succeeded — without any right —
in extending their power over the parts inhab-
ited by Hungarians, and Roumanian adminis-
tration began the expulsion of Hungarian func-
tionaries and Hungarian citizens, and that under
any shallow pretext, settling Roumanians in their
place, shows that the open declaration of the
Roumanian National Council was nothing but an
introduction meant to be a justification of the acts
of violence and injustice to follow, made specially
inhuman by the manner in which they were carried
out. Their treatment of officials and their families
is unequalled and unknown in the history of civilised
peoples.

It is, however, worth noticing that in the
Roumanian proclamation no mention is made of
the intention of the Hungarian Roumanians to
separate from Hungary and join Roumania, they
simply emphasize their intention of creating an inde-
pendent and free state on the territory in which they
live. The only allusion to Roumania is that the
Roumanian nation of Hungary hopes and expects
help in this struggle for freedom from the whole
Roumanian race, with which it hopes to be one
in soul for ever.

In spite of this proclamation filled with such
a determined fighting spirit the Roumanian Natio-
nal Council was not above asking the tyrannical

Hungary and Roumania 53

Hungiirian Government, (not even acknowledged by
them) to provide for the use of iha Roumanian Natio-
nal Guard 160,000 rifles, 5,000 machine guns and
10.000,000 crowns in cash.

On the day oi the i<5sue of the Roumanian procla-
mation Ferdinand I. King of Roumania, ordered
tlie whole army to be mobilised and issued a
command to his Army saying: "I call you to arms,
in order to realise our old dream, the unification
of all the Roumanians, for which you shed so
much blood in 1916/17, and fought so bravely.
Your Bukovinian and Transjdvanian brethren are
calling you to the last fight to gain their freedom
and with your valour to throw off the foreign
yoke".

Three days after this royal proclamation was is-
sued the Roumanian troops, under the leadership of
General Presan crossed the eastern and southern fron-
tiers of Hungary. "We have crossed the Carpathians
according to the command of King Ferdinand I.
and at the request of the Roumanian National
Committee" — says General Presan in his order of
the day.

We are not in a position to fix with certainty
whether it was the National Committee that called
in the Roumanian Army — as is said in the
above — but that it was not a surprise to the
Roumanian National Council may be gathered from
the fact that ten days previously small detachments
of soldiers had already crossed the Uzok and
Ojtoz passes and three days later the Hungarian
Minister of War announced officially that the
Roumanians were advancing in the county of Csik
in a westerly direction.

The Hungarian troops stationed on the frontiers
attempted no resistance, since the Government
was convinced that in accordance with the measures
of the Belgrade Armistice Treaty the Roumanian
troops were advancing only as far as the Maros —
the line of demarcation.

54 - B. Jancso

The Karolyi government and the public, even
after King Ferdinand's and General Presan's procla-
mation had become known to them, believed the
Roumanian troops to be coming in accordance v^ith
the armistice to keep order, and not to occupy the
country. This is conspicuously demonstrated by
the fact that the Hungarian Government fulfilled
all the wishes brought forward by the Roumanian
National Council regarding the Roumanian National
Guard and , the Roumanian national • gathering at
Gyulafehervar as well. A separate railway train
was placed at the disposal of the Roumanian repre-
sentatives going to Gyulafehervar on December 1.

This Roumanian national gathering was an exact
counterpart of others held previously, and was any-
thing but a legal representation of all the Rouma-
nians of Hungary. This gathering accepted certain
resolutions with general acclamation. The following
are the most important:

*The National Assembly declares the union of all
the territories of Hungary inhabited by Roumanians
with Roumania, and guarantees autonomy to all
of them till matters shall be definitely settled by
a constitutional meeting.

It declares further

a) that all the national minorities shall enjoy
full national freedom, that they may use their
own language for instruction, and be represented
in all legal bodies ;

h) all peoples of the Roumanian State shall
enjoy religious freedom;

c) all shall have an entirely democratic govern-
ment on the basis of a universal suffrage, by ballot.
Every man and woman of 21 years of age shall
have right to vote;

d) they shall have perfect freedom concerning
societies, meetings and the newspaper press;

e) an agrarian reform shall be carried through
according to which the large estates shall be distri-

Hungary and JRoumania 55

biited so that every agricultural labourer shall
have as much land as he is able to cultivate ;

f) the iudustrial labourers shall enjoy the same
rights as those of any western state."

These resolutions being carried, a Roumanian
National Council of 120 members was elected
to exercise State power until the Constitutional
Meeting of Greater Roumania be formed. Next a
Governing Council, with a provisional seat in
Nagyszeben. was nominated. This Council was to
manage the government of those territories which
had, in theory, been separated from Hungary.

On the same day the Roumanian Royal Army
reached the demarcation line as fixed in* the
Belgrade Armistice Treaty and entered Marosv^sar-
hely under the command of General Mosiu, who
issued a proclamation to the Roumanians delivered
by them from what he chose to call their thousand
years serfdom. He referred to Woywode MihMy,
who had first attempted centuries ago to liberate
Transylvania, and then declared with pride that now
indeed the Roumanians' chains were broken and
all Roumanians had become one and indivisible.

Thus, parallel with the onward move of the Rou-
manian army and with the military downfall of
the central powers, the Roumanian irredentist
movement gained in force.

But at the same time, amidst the joy of the
Roumanian political leaders and of the majority
of the educated classes, the voices of doubt and
anxiety might also be heard.

Very soon after the Gyulafehervdr Meeting the
question arose whether it had been prudent to declare,
in that moment of enthusiasm, an unconditional union
with Roumania? What would become of the rights
and privileges enjoyed thus far in church and
school ?

What would guarantee the autonomy of local
administration enjoyed under the Hungarian reign
but unknown in the public law of the Roumanian

56 B. Jancsd

Kingdom? Would it not have been more expedient
to make union subject to conditions, thus securing
a broad autonomy for the territories in question?

Those who had moved the proposition of union
gave some explanations to quiet the anxiety of the Hun-
garians and the doubts of the Roumanians. Aurelius
Lazar, president of the Nagyvarad Council, declared
that the Resolution of Gyulafehervar was misunder-
stood by many. He declared that the imperium
would be applied only to territories wholly inhabited
by Roumanians. They had no desire to - seize
power by force, meaning to acquire it in harmony
with the Hungarians. They desired to prove that
they wished to introduce a really democratic admi-
nistration which would be a blessing and happiness
not only to the Roumanians but to the Hungarian
minority too. The Roumanians were aware that great
difficulties would have to be overcome until the
Hungarian administration were replaced by the Rou-
manian, but they counted upon the assistance of
the Hungarian* officials. At the beginning Hunga-
rian should be retained as the language of ad-
ministration, because this cannot be altered from
one day to the other.

These semi-official announcements did not much
interest the Hungarian public, they were more
anxious to see whether the Roumanian army would
cross the demarcation line fixed by the Belgrade
Armistice, namely, the River Maros.

The Hungarians considered the occupation up to
the Maros river as a task imposed on the Royal
Roumanian Army by the decision of the Entente
powers, therefore, not the break the Belgrade
Treaty, they offered no resistance. They would
consider it a similarly grave transgression of the
Belgrade Treaty were the Roumanians to cross
the Maros. In such a case they wished to obtain
a resolution for armed resistance from the govern-
ment who had crossed from the left of the Maros.
At the same time the Sz6kely soldiers, who saw

Hun'iarti nivl Roumnnia 57

how their country, this pure Huu^arian district,
was being occupied by the Roumanians, could
hardly be kept from attiicking the advancing Rou-
manian Army.

The Hungarian Government, desirous of prevent-
ing any conflict, withdrew the Szekely troops to
KolozsvAr, where their number was augmented by
soldiers returning from the western front, so that
soon they would have been strong enough to drive
the proportionately small and deticiently equipped
Royal Roumanian Army out of Transylvania.

The Roumanian army did not hesitate, but crossing
the' line of demarcation it followed the Szekely.
soldiers retiring towards Kolozsvdr. Not being sure
whether the Roumanian action was a private enter-
prise or was ordered by the Entente powers, the
Hungarian Governcient tried to get an explanation
from the representatives of the Entente staying
then at Budapest. The answer came late, and even
then it was evasive.

Now we know that the Roumanian Government
had not been satisfied with the demarcation line
fixed in the Belgrade Treaty, the same not agreeing
with the western boundary assigned to Greater Rou-
mania in the Agreement of 19l6, and had asked
the permission of the Entente powers to occupy
the whole territory. This permission was not yet
in the hands of -the Roumanian Government when
the army crossed the Maros line.

At this period of desperate uncertainty, the desire
for resistance grew apace among the Szekely
troops. When the Hungarian Government was in-
formed by Lieutenant- Colonel Vix, representative
of the Entente at Budapest, that the Roumanian
army had been authorised to cross the Maros, the
Szekely troops, having now attained the strength
of a whole division, decided to resist and to hold
Kolozsvar. The Roumanians were only some 8000
men, poorly armed and miserably equipped, so

58 B. Jancso

that the Szekelys were convinced of their ability
to drive them out of the country.

The plans of the Szekely Army were most
warmly favoured by the people, but the Hungarian
Government tried, by means of the Kolozsvar
Governing Committee, to avoid their execution at all
costs. The Government sent out a special delegate
to the troops to persuade them to rescind their
decision and to refrain from resistance. After long
and weighty discussions the troops left Kolozsvar
and about 5000 men of the Roumanian Royal
Army under General Gherescu's command, entered
Kolozsvar on the 24*^ December 1918.

Ihe Szekely troups then settled on the western
boundary of historic Transylvania, the line of Mara-
marossziget, Zilah, Csucsa, Zam, to defend it
against the Roumanians. In consequence of this
retreat of the Szekelys the whole of Transylvania
fell into the hands of the Roumanians.

It was under such circumstances that the Nagy-
szeben Governing Council seized the imperium in
ancient Transylvania under the most effective pro-
tection of the Roumanian Royal Army.

The Roumanian Royal Army considered Transyl-
vania as a country occupied by right of conquest.
It laid hands upon the post and railway, placing
them under military supervision. They compelled
the Hungarian staff of both services to continue
their work under penalty. They disarmed the
Hungarian gendarmerie and entrusted their mili-
tary gendarmerie with the maintenance of order.
They introduced the most severe press- and corres-
pondence censureship, forbade every kind of public
gathering, closed all the clubs, and no one was
allowed to move without a passport, not even to
the nearest village. They seized every kind
of military equipment and the food supply found
in the state depots, and began a most cruel requisi-
tioning of foodstuff in privi^te houses. The slightest
resistance or default was severely punished. Flog-

Hungary and Roumania - 59

ging, — a punishment unknown to citizens of the
Hungarian State — was an everyday occurrence.
So on the whole territory of Roumanian occupation
personal freedom and safety as well as security of
property became simply illusory.

Simultaneously the Nagj'szeben Council began
the transformation — called nationalisation — of
civil administration. This began in the territories
purely Roumanian or Roumanian in majority. They
simply dismissed the Hungarian officials and put
Roumanians into their places, paying no heed to
qualification.

Since the Roumanian troops were small in number
and no reinforcements were to be expected from the
Roumanian kingdom, recruiting was ordered on
the whole territory occupied. But it hardly seemed
wise to arm the disarmed Hungarian inhabitants,
even within the corps of the Roumanian army and
these therefore were omitted. At the same time
the national guards, equipped by the help of the
Hungarian Government, were incorporated into the
Royal Roumanian Army, the latter thus gaining
considerable increase of force.

The transformation of civil administration on the
Hungarian territories of Transylvania was commen-
ced a month after Kolozsvar had been occupied. It
was carried out in the following manner :

Roumanian prefects were put at the head of the
counties. These called upon the officials of the
administration to take the oath of allegiance to
Ferdinand I, King of Greater Roumania if they wished
to retain their offices, for the Entente Powders had
announced that Transylvania should be given to
Roumania, and the Roumanian nation had declared
the union with Roumania at the meeting of Gyula-
fehervar. Since the Peace Conference had not yet
decided in the matter of these territories occupied
by Roumania the Hungarian officials considered
themselves Hungarian citizens and refused the oath,
to take which they considered equal to high treason.

60 B. Jancsd

The prefects made the chief officials responsible
for the refusal of the oath; they put them into prison,
flogged them most criielly and threatened them with
death. They stopped the salaries of these officials,
requisitioned their food supply and forbade the banks
to lend them money. In many places they even
prevented their earning their living by heavy labour
in industrial, farming or commercial work.

As the occupation of the territories lying west
and northwest of the Maros had taken place by
order of the Entente, the Hungarian Government
argued that the treaty of Belgrade must be observed
by the Roumanian Royal Army and also the Grovern-
ing Council of Nagyszeben, and repeatedly protested
against the treatment received. It emphasized that
the administration must remain in the hands of
the Hungarians, but the protest oft repeated was
of no avail. With the assistance of the Roumanian
army the Roumanian Governing Council of Nagy-
szeben carried out the installation of the Rouma-
nian im]oerium in the most heedless manner with-
out regard for the outraged feelings of the Hunga-
rians.

Day by day the Hungarians of Transylvania saw
more distinctly that the declarations of the Gyula-
feh6rvar Meeting regarding the autonomy, the free
use of language, and the political and national
rights were nothing but promises and they were
soon convinced that under the Roumanian rule
civil, national or cultural life would be perfectly
impossible for the Hungarians.

This was the course of events from the seizure
of power by the Roumanians on the territory
occupied by Roumanian troops up to the day when
on March 20. 1919 Lieutenant-Colonel Vix handed
over to the Kdrolyi Cabinet the note referring
to the new line of demarcation and the neutral
zone as fixed by the Entente powers which
were to separate the Roumanian and Hungarian
troops.

Hungary and Roumania 61

On the next day K«^rolyi, under pressure of the
wretched condition of affairs brought about by
the bad policy of his Government in the interior of
the country, resigned power in favour of the Prole-
tariat and this most lamentable event was followed
by the relations between Hungarians and Roumanians
becoming more strained day by day. Hungarian
troops, whose discipline had already shickened,
turned into Bolshevist bands. It was only the Sze-
kely soldiers, facing the Roumanians, who kept up
military order and a patriotic spirit, but their
situation soon became critical.

To avoid a catastrophe the Szekely officers and
men sent a deputation to the Nagyszeben Rouma-
nian Council, and another to Arad to the French
General Gondrecourt, with the following message:
The Szekely Division is not Bolshevist, and is not
inclined to serve the Budapest Bolshevist "Govern-
ment. On the contrary it is ready to march
against Budapest to abolish the Dictatorship of
the Proletariat in case the Entente powers are
disposed to assure them that the Roumanian troops
will not cross the neutral zone nor attack the
Szekely troops in the rear during their operations
against Budapest.

On the 12**^ of March the deputation brought
answer from .Nagyszeben that the Roumanian
troops would undertake no offensive without
the authorisation of the Entente powers. General
Gondrecourt received an authorisation from the
chief Command of the Eastern Entente Army
(dated Apr. 7) to fulfil the desire of the Szekely
division. The messenger of the Hungarian captain
on the staff, who had been sent to Arad, left that
town on the 16'^ April with a written document
from General Gondrecourt, which categorically stated
that if the Szekely Division would march against
Budapest to overthrow Bolshevism, the Rouma-
nians would not pass the neutral zone fixed in

62 '_ ^ ^ B. Jancsd

Lieutenant-Colonel Vix's Note and would not
attack the Szekely Division.

Coutrar}^ to this double assurance, the Rou-
manian troops attacked the Szekely Division, which
had considered itself as secure from all attack,
quite unexpectedly early in the morning of April 16.
We must, however, suppose that by doing so they
did not act upon any authorisation of the Entente, but
undertook this just in ~order to make the plan of
the Szekely Division impossible, for they hoped by
an easy victory over Bolshevism in Hungary to
gain a better title to the territories assigned to
Koumania in the Agreement of 1916.

Since the commanders of the Red Army were
also informed of the intention of the Szekelys' to
march against Budapest these ordered their gangs
likewise to attack the Szekelys when retreating.

So the Szekely division was between two enemies
and thus it was forced to surrender.. After
the surrender of the Sz6kelys the Roumanian army
came in touch with the Red Army which had
resolved itself into undisciplined bands of soldiers,
who however very soon fled towards the capital.

Three months later the Red Army starting new
operations provoked an offensive of the Roumanian
army in which the Red Army was perfectly routed
and the Royal Roumanian Army marched into
Budapest.

Dpring the time of this occupation the work
of roumanising all institutions east of the river
Tisza was continued systematically, more quickly and
rigorously than before. This work was conducted
with the greatest disregard of all international laws
and accompanied by excesses, of which we sent
several reports to the Supreme Council by means
of the Budapest Entente Missions.

Taking into consideration all the events occurring
since the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
in the Hungarian portion of that empire it becomes
in truth apparent that the joining of the territories

Hungary and Routnanin 63

under discussion to Ron mania did not form part
of the aspirations of Roumanian national policy
which indeed knew no further goal than that of
the Roumanian people of Hungary forming a confe-
deration within the boundaries of Hungary, or of
the Habsburg monarchy, with the Hungarian Na-
tion on the basis of perfect equality of rights.

It is equally certain that the great change in
the political aspirations of the Roumanians of Hun-
gary, resulting in the union with Roumania, was
not a spontaneous expression of the state of mind
of the people, but simply an outcome of the im-
perialistic tendencies of Roumania, and consequently
it seems but an ephemeral impulse which cannot
be looked upon as a constant force strong enough
not only to insure the permanence of the new
state-formation but also to counteract the many
differences of history, culture and sentiment
so noticeable as between the Roumanians of Hun-
gary and of the Roumanian Kingdom, and resulting
from the twofold development going on through
centuries in a direction often diametrically opposed
one to the other. We venture to predict
that if the Roumanian and non-Roumanian in-
habitants of the territory, on the basis of the
experience regarding Roumanian methods of go-
vernment and administration gained during the
one year of Roumanian occupation, were allowed
to vote, free from Roumanian oppression, under
a full international control, they would vote as
follows :

"We do not wish to be incorporated into Greater
Roumania and live under Roumanian rule, but
to remain on the territory in which we have lived
through many centuries of good and evil times
Magyars, Roumanians and Saxons together as na-
tions enjoying equal rights on the grounds of the Wil-
sonian principles as truly interpreted, keeping the
peoples' right of self-determination in full respect,
in close alliance with the mother-country, but as

64

B. Jancsd : Hungary and Roumanid

an autonomous Transylvania. We have had enough of
the Roumanian impernim, of Macedonian and Al-
banian style, in the course of one single year. We-
are not accustomed to continual extortion by
unqualified administrators. We are not accustomed
to 1^5 to 50 lashes being given, or being flogged till
half dead. We have never before been bound and
gagged and thrown into foul prisons. We have
never before been kicked by the rough high bo*)ts
of uncouth pickpockets miscalled political agents.
We wish to remain and live as before in cultural
and economic communion with the people of the
West and under the protection of right and justice.
This is claimed by us by right of our past, our
civilisation and our geographical situation. All our
rivers, slopes and roads lead towards Hungary,
and a rampart of high mountains separates us from
Ronmania and from it^ Balkanic ideas and morals.
What God has joined together cannot be per-
manently put asunder by human power, however
great, or by man's mind, however wise it be.*

If you want to keep abreast of events in

East Europe
read the following publications:

East European Problems

No. 1. The Peace Treaty Proposed to Hun-
gary. By Count Albert Apponyi

No. 2. Establishment of Three States in
the Place of One. By A. Kovdcs.

No. 3. The Solution of the Fiume Question.

By D. Ddrday.

No. 4. The Geographical Impossibility of
the Czech State. By Dr. Francis Fodor.

No. 5. Can Roumanian Rule in East Hun-
gary Last? By A. Kovdcs.

No. 6. West Hungary. By Gustav Thirring.

No. 7. The Martyrdom of Croatia.

By C. Battorich.

No. 8. The Hungarians of Moldavia. By

John Tatrosi.

No. 9. The Hungarian Polish Frontier
Question.

No. 10. The Historical Right of the Hungarian
Nation to its Territorial Integrity.

By John Kardcsonyi.

No. 11. Hungarian Foreign Policy. By Count
Albert Apponyi.

No. 12. Hungary and the World Wan A secret
document.

No. 13. The development of the population
of Hungary since the cessation of
the Turkish rule. By A. Kovdcs.

No. 14. The Responsibility of the Hungarian
Nation in the War. By Count Stephen
Csdky.

No. 15 — 18. The Transylvanian Question. By

J, Ajtay, B. fancso and A. Kovdcs.

No. 19—20. In Transylvania. By Transylvanus
Viator.

No. 21. Peoples of Hungary. By A. Kovdcs.

No. 22—24. Hungary and Roumania. By B.

Jancso.

Each number 6 d. or 10 cent.
For specimen copy please apply to

Low, W. Dawson & Sons, London E. C.
St. Dunstan's House, Fleet Street.

Steiger & Comp. New- York E. 49 Murray Street.

Ferd. Pfeifer (Zeidler Brothers), Budapest IV.
7 Kossuth Lajos Street.

hornyAnbzky viktosi BUDAPear.

Manufaciurets

Syracuse, N. Y.
Stockton, Calif.

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