Plaintiff -Appellant ,
LJUBOMIR RANKICH and DJOLE LIPOVICH,
a/k/a GEORGE LIPOVICH, a/k/a GEORGE A.
LIPOVICH, a/k/a GEORGE LIPOVIC,
APPEAL FROM THE
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF COOK COUNTY,
MR. JUSTICE LYONS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
This is an appeal taken from an order dated July 7, 1964,
vacating a default order and judgment entered on January 3, 1964, in
an action brought to recover damages under the Dram Shop Act.
On October 29, 1963, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by him when plaintiff was slugged and
beaten by a person. An Alias Summons was issued December 4, 1963,
returnable December 18, 1963, as to defendant Lipovich. On December 12,
1963, the Alias Summons was filed in the Municipal Court Clerk's Office
showing service on Mrs. George Lipovich on behalf of George Lipovich,
and bearing the follov^ing return of the bailiff:
Served this writ on the within named defendant, George
Lipovich at his usual place of abode by delivering a
copy thereof with a Praecipe and Statement of Claim and
Affidavit attached thereto, stamped by the Clerk, "A
' Triie Copy,'* to Mrs. G. Lipovich (wife), a person of his
family of the age of ten years or upwards and informing
her of the concents thereof, in the City of Chicago, this
10th day of December, 1963.
Matthew W. Bieszczat, bailiff, by George Hagopian,
Deputy, and also by sending through the United States
Post Office on the 11th day of Dec. 1963, a copy of the
within writ in a sealed envelope, with postage fully
prepaid, addressed to the said defendant at such usual
place of abode.
Defendant Lipovich failed to file his appearance or otherwise plead.
On January 3, 1964, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in the
amount of $7,500.00 and costs. The order recited that the court heard
the evidence and found both defendants guilty in the manner and form as
charged in plaintiff's statement of claim, and assessed the damages in
the amount of $7,500. 00. Subsequently , an execution and levy issued.
On June 24, 1964, defendant Lipovich filed a motion with a
supporting affidavit, apparently under 111. Rev. Stat, (1963) Chapter
110, Sec, 72, to vacate the judgment as to him and to stay the levy and
sale set for 10:00 A.M. that day. The judge stayed all proceedings,
entered the motion and set the hearing for July 7,1964. The affidavit
of defendant Lipovich (hereinafter called defendant) claimed he had a
minimal ability to read and write English; that the first knowledge he
had of this proceeding was on May 18, 1964; that he was informed that
his present wife, Mrs. George Lipovich, was served with a summons
directed to him, but at the time summons was served he was divorced and ;|
On July 1, 1964, defendant filed an amended motion to open the
judgment, with leave to defend, together with his supporting affidavit
and the supporting affidavit of his wife, Anna Lipovich. He apparently 1^
abandoned his first motion to vacate and set aside the judgment. He
stated in his amended affidavit that he first learned of this case June
18, 1964 (he said May 18, 1964, in his first affidavit), and then hired
an attorney; that he was the owner and lessor of the property; and that
he was informed that the present Mrs, George Lipovich was served with
summons on his behalf, but that he was not married at the time. He
stated further that he had a valid defense, since the incident complained
of did not result from the sale of liquor on his property.
The supporting affidavit of the present Mrs, George Lipovich,
stated that she has lived with defendant for the past ten years at 2244
South Blue Island Avenue; was married to him on June 25, 1964, (which was
the day after the first motion to vacate on June 24, 1964), in Chicago;
and that she used the name Anna Markov and not Mrs, George Lipovich
until June 25, 1964. The affidavit uses the name Anna Markov, but is
signed "Anna Lipovich." There is a denial that she was served with
At the hearing on June 24, 1964, the court directed the attorney
for defendant to have defendant and his wife in court at the next hearing,
saying, "Subpoena her if you have to because you have to prove by clear
and convincing proof that the defendant was not properly served. The
record shows on its face that the bailiff served his wife who ordinarily
woiild be a member of the household." Plaintiff was ordered to produce
the bailiff at the next hearing.
At the next hearing on July 7, 1964, plaintiff produced the
bailiff, George E. Hagopian, who was examined by the court. He stated
that he had been a bailiff since 1958 and had an independent recollection
of serving a woman with the name of Mrs. George Lipovich, that a bartender
told him the woman was Mrs. Lipovich and that the woman asked him to
stay for lunch.
Defendant was in the court room, but refused to testify, and
therefore was not cross-examined by plaintiff. Mrs. George Lipovich
failed to appear to testify at the hearing.
The trial court stated that "there was nothing to indicate \\
defendant ever found out about the service on the woman he allegedly ^^
lived with who was not his wife." The court then entered the following
order vacating the judgment of January 3rd, 1964: ^
Now comes the defendant GEORGE LIPOVICH only and moves
the court to vacate judgment of JANUARY 3rd, 1964, and
the court being fully advised in the premises, sustained
said motion and thereupon it is ordered that judgment of
JANUARY 3rd, 1964, be and the same is hereby vacated,
set aside and for naught esteemed as to GEORGE LIPOVICH
It is further ordered by the court that leave be and the
same is hereby given defendant to file answer within
TWENTY (20) DAYS and that this cause be and the same is
hereby set for trial in Room 910 on OCTOBER 6th, 1964.
Minimum Appeal Bond set at TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00).
At the outset, an examination of the record reveals that service
was made in another area of the same building occupied by defendant and
that the area where service took place was not the usual place of abode
'(' of defendant. There was no finding by the trial court that the service
did not take place at the usual place of abode of defendant. The trial
1| court did find, however, that service was not on the wife of defendant, -^y^
but in its order vacating the judgment of January 3, 1964, ordered that
\ defendant file an answer within twenty days. Therefore, the court must
'^ have found both that service on the present Mrs. George Lipovich was not
valid and that defendant waived any jurisdictional defense by asking for
leave to defend. Therefore, we must determine, one, whether defendant
exercised diligence in bringing his motion to vacate the judgment of
January 3, 1964, and two, whether there was an abuse of discretion by the
trial court in granting defendant leave to defend plaintiff's alleged
cause of action. Dann v. Gumbiner . 29 111. App.2d 374, 381, 173 N.E.2d
The affidavit of defendant reveals that he first gained knowledge
of the proceedings on June 18, 1964, when he was served with an execution
summons and notice that a levy had been made on certain of his real
estate. He immediately filed his petition. Therefore, we find that
there was diligence on the part of defendant.
We further find the action of the trial court in setting aside
the order was not an abuse of its discretion. A meritorious defense was |'
set out by defendant in his affidavit. For the above reasons the order
BURKE, P.J., and BRYANT, J., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintif f -Appellee ,
JOHN L. DISMUKE,
Defendant -Appel lant ,
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Or» an indictment charging armed robbery the defendant was
iov:nd g :tlty and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less
than or^e year nor f.aore than five years. He appeals from the judgment.
Corrine Moore is the wife of Joseph Moore who owns a tavern
arid liquor store at 701 East 75th Street, Chicago. On Sunday, July 12,
196-^5 at, about 1:00 P.M. she went to the tavern to bring change for the
cash register. At the time the only other person there was the bartender,
Charles Thorrias. Shortly after she arrived a man walked in and asked the
price of a bottle of vodka. Two other men walked in behind him. One of
the;?e t.ien was the defendant. The first man then went to the door, closed
it, r?rid announced a holdup. There is a dispute in the testimony as to
' who closed the door. The second man pulled a gun and the third man, the
defendant, stooci behind him. The man with the gun ushered the bartender
j and Mrs., Moore into the washroom. After a period of five or ten minutes,
the captives came out of the washroom, made a search and found that $1^00
I had been stolen.
Defendant and his two companions fled the scene and by auto-
mobile "Aerit to the 57th Street Beach, where, according to the evidence
lntr©di:ced by the People, defendant received part of the proceeds. From
an examination of photographs produced by the police, the bartender
identified a photograph of defendant. About two weeks after the robbery
the defendant was arrested in Peoria. He was brought to Chicago where he
was Identified by the bartender and Mrs. Moore. The defendant had been
in the tavern pre^'iousLy. Prior to the robbery the defendant lived a
block from the tavern for two weeks. The arresting officer testified
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that on the way back to Chicago the defendant said that he received $17
of the stolen money and that this was the first robbery that he "had gone
on" with the other men.
The first point presented by the defendant is that the People
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He concedes that
he was present when the robbery occurred. He says that the record shows
that he did not actively and voluntarily participate In the robbery. The
People answer that the evidence shows beyond all reasonable doubt that
the defendant was guilty of the crime of armed robbery. The State says
that the circumstances in the case at bar show a connon design to do an
unlawful act. The defendant entered the tavern in the company of two
other men. Nothing was purchased and immediately upon entering^ one of
the men announced a holdup and another drew a gun. The defendant placed
himself behind the man with the gxin named "Pops" and closed the door when
the man with the gun told him to do so. The defendant was well ac-
quainted with one of the robbers; they were schoolmates in high school.
In answer to the question "Did you do anything actively in that robbery?"
the defendant answered "I closed the door," To the question "And at the
time you closed the door, did you know there was about to occur a
robbery?" the defendant answered "I heard him say it," The defendant was
referring to the robber with the gun. The defendant denied participating
in the robbery. He denied that he told the officer or anyone that he
got any money from the proceeds of the robbery.
The defendant left the tavern with the other men and took part
of the proceeds. One of the participants drove the defendant to the
beach at 61st Street and Lake Michigan in Chicago, where defendant's car
was parked. Defendant did not notify the police. That day the defendant
drove to his home in Peoria.
The evidence shows that the defendant entered the tavern with
his two acquaintances, remained there with them while the robbery was
committed and then left with them when the robbery was con^leted. He
then shared :;..i the proceeds of the robbery. No one heard him protest or
saw hirn evince st:rprise. There was also an oral admission by the
defendant to the police officer who made the arrest that this was the
only robbery he had gone on with Bunny Wilson and the other defendant.
The fact that the >^^efendant had been in the tavern on prior occasions
as a patron, does not in the light of the other circumstances support
his argument that it is improbable that he participated in the robbery.
The defendant was from out of town. His assertion that he told the
bartender that he wi.3 from Peoria was contradicted by the bartender. We
find that tne evidence shows a common design to do an unlawful act and
supports the finding and Judgment that he is guilty as a principal beyond
a reasonable dovibt .
The second point urged by the defendant is that the State
failed to pro" e ownership or possession of the property allegedly taken.
The indictment charges the defendant with taking $400 from the person and
presence of Corrine Moore. Defendant insists that the record shows that
Corrlne Moore did not own or have possession of the money taken nor was
any money taken from her person during the robbery and that this failure
of proof entitles him to a reversal. 111. Rev. Stat. 1965, Chap. 38.
§ 18-1 (a) reads;
"A person commits robbery when he takes property from
the person or presence of another by the use of force or by
threatening the iminent use of force."
Defendant say^ that the record shows that the ownership of the $400 was
in Joe's Three Corner Tavern and that the control was in Charles Thomas.
The money was the property of the owner of the tavern, Joseph Moore.
Charles Thomas 5 the bartender, was employed by Joseph Moore.
We think that the evidence shows that Corrine Moore was the
agent of her husband in the operation of the tavern; that it was within
her authority to supervise the employees and that she was in charge at
I the time of the robbery. We are satisfied that at the time of the robbery
Mrs, Moore was in custody and control of the money.
The judgraent is affirmed.
BRYANT, J., .'-nd LYONS, J., concur.
STATE OF ILLINOIS
AT AN APPELLATE COURT, for the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Illinois, sitting at Springfield:
HONORABLE HAROLD F. TRAPP, Presiding Judge
HONORABLE SAMUEL 0. SMITH. Judge
HONORABLE JAMES C. CRAVEN. Judge
Attest: ROBERT L. CONN, Clerk.
BE IT REMEMBERED, that to-wit: On the 29th day
of December A. D. 19_65., there was filed in the office of
the said Clerk of said Court an opinion of said Court, in words and
•bWlpr-hqS lr> igjiiHis ,e.ion
Gere-al N:.. ICcll
Agenda N-' . 1
i ' ^ n r *' — ? f^ j», »■ . »^
A'"-/' • i" '; ' ■>■
;irve Heiileberg. a--'-: a
> — • ^ ■ri
In a 'oenzh zrLi
v;as a:'a'uitted on the ch^:
He v/as found sulltv or. ?.
~o corrjnit rape
ury having been waived, defendant;
f burglary as alleged in Count I.
II. III. IV and V, charging atternpt
aggravated battery and aggravated
S^r.". enced tc serve one to two years in
the Illinois Penitentiary", .-.e appeals from that conviction and
Qefendar.- clai".; 'a) that the trial court erred in
permitting the indie tTr.er." "- be amended on its face to shov; ■
the occurrence date was '"'irch l8. 1964. instead of March 20,
(b) that Oount I and II :r:_.Tnate the place of the occurrence
as "a b-_;ild.ing of Virgin y.;=.r" Hamilton" in Sangamon County and
Counts III, IV, and V, cnl"" refer to Sangamon Count^,^ and each
is contrarv to the time s"-^. rlace requirements of the Criminal
Coie and (c) that the intr--i.uction into evidence of statements
made or the defendant in T:r absence of counsel violated the
due process clause of the Jrurteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. ' ' ' ' "'
111. Rev. Stat. I'-:?, chapt. jS , Sec. 111-3, in force
at the time of the offense, reads in part as follows:
",'a) A charge s'.'.all be in writing and allege
the commission :f =n offense b;" :
• • • ' "
(4) Statiy.r The time and place of
the offense as definitely as can be
done ; ..."
Defendant was re^oresentei t- the Public Defender. On motion
of the prosecution made 'ssz prior to the start of the bench
trial, the court allowed an amendment to the indictment to
reflect >Tarch 18 rather, than. March 20 as the occurrence date.
Defendant objected to i;he ajrendment for the reason that it was
not a formal defect within rhe precise language of the Code
authorizing amendments for formal defects in certain instances.
111. Rev. Stat. 1963, chart. 38, Sec. 111-5.
In People v. Hall, 55 111, App. 2d 255, 204 N.E. 2d
473» we had occasion to cc::ment on this statute and to state
that the word "including" as used in the statute enumerating
the specific grounds for amendment should be read as "including
but not limited to". There we held that an incorrect citation
of uhe statute allegedly violated was amendable and that no con-
stitutional, statutory, or fundamental hurrian right of the defend-
ant vas violated by so doing. It did not appear there nor does
it appear here that there was a total failure to comply with one
or Tiore of the requirements of "^ 111-3 of the Code. There, as
here, the defect was not of total omission, but of inept and
inaccurate attem.pted compliance. We thin'-: it clear tnat there
is a vast difference between total want of compliance and an
attempted ccm.pliance inexpertly, inaccurately or inadequately
done. Hte former may v.'-ell be \nalnerable to a proper motion
tim.ely made; the latter may well be form.al and amendable. Ttiere
is no showing in this record that the defendant was mislead,
prejudicea, surprised or aeprived of any available defense by
the amendment. In permitting the amendment, the court corrected,
perfected and made accurate an allegation required by the stat-
ute. It did not supply a wholly absent allegation. Each count
fully and correctly stated the nature and the elements of the
offense charge. Only the date of its occurrence was inaccurately
stated. This, in our judgment, was a formal rather than a sub-
stantive defect and within the ambit and the purpose of H 111-5
permitting the correction of formal defects by amendm.ent. To
return these indictments to the grand Jury for correction is
to impose a straight jacket long since discarded and to bow in
submission to formal rather thaji substantive defects.
vie now turn tc the complaint that the place of the
occurrence is insufficiently stated and thus voids the indict-
Tient. 7nis contention was recently and effectively interred
"cy our 3uprerr;e Court in People v. Blanchett_. 33 III. 2d 52? .
212 N.E. 2d 97 , wherein it departed from the doctrine -oro-
nour.cec in People v. Williams. 30 111. 2d 125, lo6 N.E. 2d 483,
and reversed a decision oi' this court entertaining the viev/s
here advocated by tne defendant. 55 111. App . 2d l4l, 20h N.E.
2d 173. • ■-■.■'■
Defendant's last contention that the introduction
in evidence of statements made by the defendant on arraigrLment
ana in the absence of and without benefit o:' counsel violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. During the arraignment the defendant was tendered
counsel, refused it and stated he wanted to plead guilty. The
plea was accepted. Defendant then stated that he had a de-
tective call over for him. and he was told that if he pleaded
guilty to aggravated assault, the remaining charges would be
dropped and that was why he pleaded guilty. The trial judge
promptly and properly recsLnted, entered a "not guilty" plea
over defendant's protest, appointed the Public Defender to
represent him euid continued the case for trial. The bench trial
which we review was subsequently conducted by a different judge.
Cross-examination of the defendant elicited this testimony
from, the defendant concerning the arraignment events:
"l remember telling the court I wanted t,o plead
guilty and my answer,. "Here is the thing. I
realize that I asri guilty. I v.'as drunk. I don't
remember too much about it myself because I was
drunk." I recall my answer to the court, "l
didn't realize until a couple of days ago that
I v/ent by this woman's house. I didn't mean to
rape her . "
"The reason I xvas so anxious to plead guilty to
these charges on the 26th was that I v/as told by
a person over at the County Jail by the name of
Mr. Charlie Kaun that if I would go over there and
plead guilty and then bring it up about hov; my
name was misspelled that they v.'ould throw it out."
We would observe that the statements made on p^rraign-
ment were made after tender and refusal of legal counsel and
effectively precluded the arraignment judge from accepting a
guilty plea. It did net deter the trial judge from a not
guilty finding on the burglary charge. We see no violation
of due process or prejudicial error in this record. Absent
this cross-examination, the evidence in the record establishes
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude
that the defendant had a fair trial with proper regards for
his rights and the judgment must be affirmed. This is, accord-
Trapp, P.J. and Craven, J. concur.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
) Appeal from Circuit
) Court of Cook County,
) Criminal Division,
WILLIE J. MINGO and FREDERICK L. SAWYER, )
MR, JUSTICE SCHWARTZ DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
In a trial by the court without a jury, the defendants were
convicted of burglary of a cleaning establishment. They were
apprehended at the premises under circumstances that admit of no
reasonable doubt as to their guilt. They do not question the
sufficiency of the evidence but contend that a statement to the
court made by their counsel during the hearing in mitigation and
aggravation shows that they were denied effective, good faith
assistance of counsel in the conduct of the trial. They ask for
a new trial ox in the alternative for a new hearing in mitigation
The statement complained of is as follows;
"Well, Your Honor, all I can say is that I had hopes that
these defendants will sometime see their faults and come
to the realization that this is serious business and I
hope that Your Honor will take into consideration that
they— =well, they are old enough to know better. There
is something lacking that they don't face up to it or
want to acknowledge it and they ask for mercy in this
These words standing alone do not give a correct picture of defense
counsel's conduct of the case. Defendants point to no omission or
error made by counsel and an examination of the record shows that
he was alert, that he made proper objections with respect to
evidentiary matters which were frequently sustained, and that
he vigorously and capably conducted cross-examination.
Defendant Mingo who had a substantial record of prior
convictions was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 to 7 years and
defendant Sawyer who had one prior conviction was sentenced
to imprisonment for 2 to 5 years. There is no showing of any
matter in mitigation that might have been raised in the trial
court. The defendants were properly defended and the sentences
imposed are reasonable.
What we have said should not be construed as any
reflection on the counsel for the defendants in this court
who with due zeal and ability have performed their duty in this
and other cases that have come before us.
Dempseys P.J., and Sullivan, J., concur.
50622 -^ (^6_2M^^73
MARGARET KAPUT, a/k/a MARGE KAYE, ) APPEAL FROM
Di n^^iff A ^n<=>o ^ CIRCUIT COURT OF
Plaintiff -Appellee, )
) COOK COUNTY.
V. ) (Consolidated appeals)
WALTER KAPUT, a/k/a WALTER KAYE, ) i'f^^bll
MR. JUSTICE LYONS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
These are consolidated appeals from two orders entered by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff.
On January 6, 1949, plaintiff and defendant separated. One
child was born as a result of the marriage between the parties; namely,
John Kaput, a/k/a John Kaye, who was two years of age at the time of the
separation. Custody, plus a $10.00 a week order for support, was granted
to plaintiff pursuant to a decree of divorce entered October 19, 1949.
Plaintiff, however, left the child with defendant. The child lived with
his father and paternal grandparents continuously until on or about ,
October 1, 1960. x
Defendant raised and educated the child, paying the paternal
grandparents $10.00 per week for food and lodging. He also paid for the
child's clothing and other living expenses, from the date of the decree,
to October 1, 1960, a period of 10 years 11 months and 12 days. The child
sometimes stayed with plaintiff on week ends. There was conflicting
testimony as to whether or not plaintiff contributed to the child's support
during this period. Subsequently, the child lived with his Aunt Sally
Matt, until March 31, 1961, plaintiff and defendant contributing equally
toward his support. On March 31, 1961, plaintiff took actual custody
of the child.
On July 9, 1962, defendant was served with notice that plaintiff
was going to appear before the court on July 12, 1962, and preis^^ent a
petition asking the court to find defendant in contempt for an arrearage
in child support in the sum of $2,680,00 and praying that said sum be
reduced to judgment. At no other time had plaintiff sought to recover
child support until she filed this petition.
Plaintiff's petition stated ttiat defendant paid child support
from time to time; that he had made no payments since September 1, 1958;
that prior to said date he was in arrears in the sum of $720,00; and
that since said date he had accumulated a further arrearage of $1,960.00
V or a total of $25680.00, Nowhere in said petition did plaintiff allege
that at times during that period for which she was claiming an arrearage,
the child was living with his father and paternal grandparents.
Defendant contacted plaintiff by telephone and inquired as to
the reason for her petition. He expressed great concern about said
petition. He visited plaintiff at her home and asked her to give him a
signed statement that she would not appear in court. She refused to
give him a signed statement. ' ■• -
On July 12, 1962 plaintiff presented said petition. Defendant
failed to appear and judgment was entered against him for $2,680,00.
Defendants pursuant to Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act,
filed a petition to vacate the judgment. Defendant alleged, one, that
he was diligent in that he was not advised of said judgment until served
with notice August 12, 1963 that plaintiff was appearing before the court
August 15, 1963 to ask for a ruling, and two, that he had a good and
meritorious defense^ Defendant's petition was denied. Subsequently,
notice of appeal from said order was filed by defendant in the trial
court and is heard in this consolidated appeal as #50250.
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff filed her petition in the trial court
for attorney's fees to contest defendant's appeal, pursuant to the
Divorce Act,; Illinois Revised Statute (1963) Chapter 40, Section 15,
Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground
that the order appealed from was not a suit for divorce and therefore,
the trial court could not derive its jurisdiction from the Divorce Act,
Counsel for plaintiff showed the Appellate Record to the court, advised
the court of the extent of the master's hearings and requested an award
of Fifteen Hundred Dollars in attorney's fees for the prospective
defense of the appeal. The court interrogated plaintiff as to her
financial status. Plaintiff testified that she had no monies with which
to employ counsel to defend the appeal. Counsel for defendant was
allowed to cross-examine plaintiff.
Thereafter counsel for defendant stated to the court that his
client had no monies to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees. Plaintiff then
advised the court that defendant had inherited an interest in a piece of
real estate and that he was not impoverished. The court allowed counsel
for plaintiff and counsel for defendant to sum up their clients' positions.
The court verbally ruled that it had jurisdiction and awarded plaintiff's
$1,000.00 in attorney's fees for the defense of said appeal. Immediately
after the court's ruling and pronouncement, counsel for defendant
informed the court that defendant was without funds to pay the said One
Thousand Dollars. Counsel asked that the court allow him to file a
written answer to plaintiff's petition, and have the matter set for
further hearing. The court denied the request of defendant's counsel.
In #50622 defendant has appealed from the order allowing plaintiff
Defendant's theory in #50250 is that he was diligent in bringing
his petition to vacate the judgment; that a meritorious defense of fraud
was raised by him; and that the lower court's findings that the judgment
of July 12, 1962 was not fraudulently obtained , was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff's theory is that the judgment entered on July 12, 1962
was in all instances legally sufficient; that defendant has not sustained
his burden of proving the facts essential to entitle him to relief under
Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act; and that the findings of fact by 1
the master upon conflicting evidence and conflicting testimony of
witnesses will not be reversed, on appeal, unless the error is clear and
We agree with plaintiff , Specific findings of fact were made
by the master and his report containing said findings of fact was
approved in its entirety by the trial judge. There is a presumption^
on reviewj that the evidence sustains the findings, Gromer v, M olby, 385
111, 283^ 286, 52 N.Eo2d ^'^1 (1944). A master^s report on controverted
questions of fact 5 contairitag findings based on the evidence presented 3
when approved and made more specific by the trial judge, will not be
reversed unless the error is clear and palpable. Allendo rf v. Daily, 6
111. 2d 577, 586, 129 N„E.2d 673 (1955). There was conflicting evidence
i) and testimony by the parties concerning; onej whether plaintiff made
false representations to induce defendant to forego making his
appearance in courts and two 5 whether plaintiff made certain allegations
in her petition that were untrue. We agree with plaintiff that the
\ evidence presented by plaintiff was sufficient to support the findings
made by the master and approved by the trial judge 5 and that these findings
are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
1 Furtherm.ore, to entitle a party to relief against a judgment
or decree;, the burden of proof is upon the moving party, first, to prove
the invalidity of the judgment or decree, and two, to show that diligence
r^ was exercised. The master found that defendant did not meet his burden.
An examination of the record reveals that defendant's petition was
In #50622 defendant contends that the action involved in #50250
was net a divorce or separate maintenance suit and that the trial court
could not grant fees for defense of an appeal of said action. Defendant
bases this contention on the theory that by filing an appeal, appellate
jurisdiction attached, and Lhe trial court could not grant: fees for a
defense of the appeal. We disagree with defendant. In the case of an
appeal 5 the court in which the decree or order is rendered may grant,
and enforce, the payment of money, for the defense of an appeal, during
the pendency of the appeal. Saxon v. S&xon , 20 111. App.2d 478, 156
N,E.2d 229 (1959).
Defendant also contends that it was improper for the trial
court to grant fees without hearing evidence as to the work done and
the value of the services rendered. An examination of the record shows
there was evidence submitted as to how much work would be involved in
defending the appeals The trial court evaluated this evidence and
found in favor of plaintiff. We will not disturb the lower court's
The decision of the lower court is affirmed as to both appeals,
BRYANT, P.J,, and BURKE, J„, concur.
. COOK COUNTY,
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
Plaintiff's libel action was dismissed for vant of prosecu-
tion on February 3s 1965 » On February 19 j 1965, and again on
March 18 p 1965 ^ the court denied plaintiff's petitions to vacate
the order of dismissal and to reinstate the cause. Plaintiff
appeals. Defendant has filed no brief.
The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County
on May 16^ 1958. An answer was filed on July 3, 1958, and the case
was at issue. The order of February 3, 1965, which dismissed the
cause for want of prosecution shows that it came "on to be heard
upon the regular call of cases for trial."
We have examined the pleadings and both of the petitions
filed by plaintiff to vacate the order of dismissal. In our
opinion they show a meritorious claim and due diligence and require
At the time of dismissal, the case had been afwaiting trial
for seven years. The first petition to vacate the order of dis-
missal was presented within sixteen days after the order was entered.
Courts in this state are liberal in setting aside defaults or
orders of dismissal during the term time in which they are entered,
when it appears that justice will be done. ( Dann v. Gumbiner .
29 111. App.2d 374s 379^ 173 N.E.2d 525 (1961).) Under paragraph 24a
of the Limitations Act (111. Rev, Stat. 1963, Ch, 83), a plaintiff
who has suffered an involuntary dismissal is given a year to file
a new action, "if the time limited for bringing such action shall
have expired during the pendency of such suit," ( Wright v. Chicago
Transit Authority . 43 111. App.2d 408, 193 N.E.2d 597 (1963).)
We believe the petitions sufficiently presented to the trial court
a situation which required the use of the power to set aside a
dismissal order and permit the plaintiff to have his day in court,
and to prevent an injustice.
The orders denying the motion to vacate are reversed and
the cause is remanded with directions to allow the motions and
to restore the cause to the trial calendar.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS,
KLUCZYNSKI, P.J., and BURMAN, J., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintif f -Appellee,
EUNICE L. EASLEY,
Def endant=Appellant .
MR, JUSTICE BURKE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT;
In a trial without a jury Eunice L. Easley was found guilty
of the crime of aggravated battery as charged in the indictment and
sentenced to a term of 3 to 8 years in the penitentiary. In appealing
he requests that the judgment be reversed on the ground that the People
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The complainants Ethel Brown, testified that at about 4; 00
P.M. on May 30 j 19645 she was shot in the back by the defendant while
in her sister's kitchen at 1535 South Lawndale Avenue, Chicago. The
defendant had come to complainant's apartment at the invitation of her
niece. Mrsc Brown testified that until one week prior to the shooting
she was on the most intimate terms with the defendant; that the
defendant walked into her apartment and questioned her as to the reason
she had "quit him" ^ that as she turned around he shot her in the left
side and that she then began to scuffle with him. Janie Nellem, sister
of Mrs. Brown, testified that she was awakened by the commotion. She
ran into the kitchen and saw complainant holding onto defendant.
Defendant was trying to break loose and Miss Nellem "grabbed" him.
Defendant exclaimed; "I am going to jump out the window and make them
think you all throwed me out." She saw the gun in defendant ''s right
hand. He placed the gun to witness^ stomach, pushed his head against the
screen and said "I am going to jump." Witness further testified that she
said "jump" and turned him loose. The witness came into the room after
the shot was fired. She was holding defendant around the waist. He was
trying to get loose„ The gun was in defendant's right hand. She knew
him about 2 yearso She said defendant was "friendly and nice to me."
The Nellem apartment where the shooting took place was on the first or
ground floor, Sam Cotton and Frank Walker testified that they saw the
defendant lying on the ground in a pool of blood. Defendant was resting
on his back with the gun in his right hand across his chest, Walke^
picked up the gun and after wrapping it in a handkerchief ^ took it to
the home of William Jenkins, Policeman James Davis testified Walker
accompanied him to the Jenkins' residence where the gun was recovered.
The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, said that he was
making love to Ruth Rhodes when the complainant walked in on the scene;
that complainant left and soon returned with a gun and in a jealous out-
burst threatened to shoot the defendant. He testified that as he grabbed
her hands, he was hit on the head with a bottle and was thrown out the
window. He claimed not to be aware that a shot was fired. After the
finding of guilty in response to the inquiry by the court as to whether
there was anything to be presented in aggravation or mitigation^ the
People brought out that on February 19;, 1958, the defendant was convicted
on "a murder charge, reduced to manslaughter" and sentenced to a term of
from 5 to 12 years in the penitentiary and that at the time of his arrest
was on parole. In mitigation the defendant's attorney pointed out that
the defendant has a minimal education.
The finding and judgment will not be disturbed unless it is
based on clearly unsatisfactory and improbable evidence. We will not
reverse merely because there is a conflict in the evidence. We are
satisfied that the record supports the finding of the court that the
defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore the
judgment is affirmed,
BRYANT, P.J. 5 and LYONS, J., concur.
50485 ^^ ;; ^
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, '
APPEAL FROM THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF
Defendant in Error,
ROBERT QUINLAN, (Impleaded)
Plaintiff in Error „
MR, PRESIDING JUSTICE BRYANT DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
This appeal comes from a finding of guilty of armed robbery-
entered March 27, 1963 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ciiminal
Division. This appeal is taken on the grounds that the indictment was
not specific enough to enable the appellant to adequately prepare his
defense and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The appellant claims the indictment was insufficient in that
it did not specifically state either the place where or the time at
which the alleged offense occurred. In support of this proposition
is cited the case of People v. Williams , 30 111. 2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483
(1964). We need not discuss that case for it has been specifically
overruled in the case of P eople v. Reed. 111. 2d , N .E. 2d
_____ (Docket No. 39251, September, 1965). The indictment in the case
at bar sets forth the date and the county in which the offense was
alleged to have occurred. The Reed opinion, supra, holds that this is
sufficient. At trial no objection was made to the indictment not
being specific enough and after reading the record we cannot say that
the appellant was prejudiced by the indictment's not being more specific.
After ha.lng revievjed the transcript of the proceedings below,
we conclude that the appellant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The appellant, Robert Quinlan, was indicted with another man,
Donald Whitlock, and was charged with the armed robbery September 23,
1962 of a drug store located at 5845 W. Madison Street. The owner of
the drug store, Harry Dombrowski, testified that he came to work that
morning ac about I1°00 o'clock. He testified that at about 11:30 a
man came into ihe store who demanded his supply of narcotics at gun
= 2 =
point „ Donbrowski said he gave this man some narcotics and some money
from the rear of i:he store. He was then told to lay down on the floor
in the rear of the store and not to get up for two or three minutes.
He was told by the man that his partner would be near the door to see
that he stayed there „ Dombrowski never saw another man and cannot say
whether the man actually had a partner or not. He testified that when
he closed the store that afternoon, he noticed that there was money
missing from a cash register located near the front of the store. He
said there was nine or ten dollars in that cash register, Dombrowski
identified the man who robbed him as appellant's co-defendant, Donald
Kenneth Derma , a high school student and part-time employee
at the drug store, testified that he arrived for work that morning at
ll;30o As he approached the store, he encountered a man at the front
entrance. This aa.a held the door shut and said, "Get out of here, kid,"
Derma then waited outside the store a few moments and watched through
a plate glas? window while the man went inside, walked behind a cigar
counter near the front of the store and dusted off the cash register.
Derma then ran to a nearby tavern and called the police. Derma testified
that Lb.e man was wearing gray work clothes with a small brimmed hat and
carrying a mop. Derma identified the appellant from a police line-up
a few cays later.
Hazel Reilly, a woman who lives near the drug store, testified
that bhe looked out of her apartment window around 11:00 that morning
ana sa- a r^an walking outside carrying a bucket and mop. She said she
saw him. again at about 11:40 when she was on her way back from mass.
She testified that he was not wearing a hat.
The appellant took the stand in his own defense and testified
that he was at home at the time the robbery occurred. He said his
mother and nephew could substantiate his claim. Neither person
appeared at trial.
We feel the evidence supports the Court below in finding the
appellant guilty of the crime of armed robbery. The evidence supports
the People's theory that the appellant and his co-defendant at the
trial acted in consort in robbing the drug store. The man who held
the g-'..n on Dombrowski said he had a partner outside the store. At
the time the robbery was going on, Kenneth Derma was stopped by the
appellant who told him to get away. Derma then saw the appellant enter
the store and wipe off the cash register in front. The appellant
claims that at most this shows that he committed a robbery, but that
this cannot oe held armed robbery because no connection was shown
between him and the man who had the gun and who was robbing Dombrowski
in the back of the store. The Court does not have to believe that by
chance ihis drug store was being robbed by two different people at the
same time. There is a reasonable inference that the men were acting
in consort. We feel the appellant was sufficiently identified even
though LHere was some small discrepancy between the testimony given by
Derma and Mrs. Reilly, The finding of the Court below is supportable
by the lact s adduced at the trial. The judgment is, therefore,
LYONS, J., and BURKE, J., concur.