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50006 (f^TA^ 


Plaintiff -Appellant , 




Defendants-Appellees . 

This is an appeal taken from an order dated July 7, 1964, 
vacating a default order and judgment entered on January 3, 1964, in 
an action brought to recover damages under the Dram Shop Act. 

On October 29, 1963, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages 

for personal injuries sustained by him when plaintiff was slugged and 

beaten by a person. An Alias Summons was issued December 4, 1963, 

returnable December 18, 1963, as to defendant Lipovich. On December 12, 

1963, the Alias Summons was filed in the Municipal Court Clerk's Office 

showing service on Mrs. George Lipovich on behalf of George Lipovich, 

and bearing the follov^ing return of the bailiff: 

Served this writ on the within named defendant, George 
Lipovich at his usual place of abode by delivering a 
copy thereof with a Praecipe and Statement of Claim and 
Affidavit attached thereto, stamped by the Clerk, "A 
' Triie Copy,'* to Mrs. G. Lipovich (wife), a person of his 
family of the age of ten years or upwards and informing 
her of the concents thereof, in the City of Chicago, this 
10th day of December, 1963. 


Matthew W. Bieszczat, bailiff, by George Hagopian, 
Deputy, and also by sending through the United States 
Post Office on the 11th day of Dec. 1963, a copy of the 
within writ in a sealed envelope, with postage fully 
prepaid, addressed to the said defendant at such usual 
place of abode. 

Defendant Lipovich failed to file his appearance or otherwise plead. 

On January 3, 1964, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in the 

amount of $7,500.00 and costs. The order recited that the court heard 

the evidence and found both defendants guilty in the manner and form as 

charged in plaintiff's statement of claim, and assessed the damages in 

the amount of $7,500. 00. Subsequently , an execution and levy issued. 




On June 24, 1964, defendant Lipovich filed a motion with a 
supporting affidavit, apparently under 111. Rev. Stat, (1963) Chapter 
110, Sec, 72, to vacate the judgment as to him and to stay the levy and 
sale set for 10:00 A.M. that day. The judge stayed all proceedings, 
entered the motion and set the hearing for July 7,1964. The affidavit 
of defendant Lipovich (hereinafter called defendant) claimed he had a 
minimal ability to read and write English; that the first knowledge he 
had of this proceeding was on May 18, 1964; that he was informed that 
his present wife, Mrs. George Lipovich, was served with a summons 
directed to him, but at the time summons was served he was divorced and ;| 
not remarried. 

On July 1, 1964, defendant filed an amended motion to open the 
judgment, with leave to defend, together with his supporting affidavit 
and the supporting affidavit of his wife, Anna Lipovich. He apparently 1^ 
abandoned his first motion to vacate and set aside the judgment. He 
stated in his amended affidavit that he first learned of this case June 
18, 1964 (he said May 18, 1964, in his first affidavit), and then hired 
an attorney; that he was the owner and lessor of the property; and that 
he was informed that the present Mrs, George Lipovich was served with 
summons on his behalf, but that he was not married at the time. He 
stated further that he had a valid defense, since the incident complained 
of did not result from the sale of liquor on his property. 

The supporting affidavit of the present Mrs, George Lipovich, 
stated that she has lived with defendant for the past ten years at 2244 
South Blue Island Avenue; was married to him on June 25, 1964, (which was 
the day after the first motion to vacate on June 24, 1964), in Chicago; 
and that she used the name Anna Markov and not Mrs, George Lipovich 
until June 25, 1964. The affidavit uses the name Anna Markov, but is 
signed "Anna Lipovich." There is a denial that she was served with 
summons . 


At the hearing on June 24, 1964, the court directed the attorney 
for defendant to have defendant and his wife in court at the next hearing, 
saying, "Subpoena her if you have to because you have to prove by clear 
and convincing proof that the defendant was not properly served. The 
record shows on its face that the bailiff served his wife who ordinarily 
woiild be a member of the household." Plaintiff was ordered to produce 
the bailiff at the next hearing. 

At the next hearing on July 7, 1964, plaintiff produced the 
bailiff, George E. Hagopian, who was examined by the court. He stated 
that he had been a bailiff since 1958 and had an independent recollection 
of serving a woman with the name of Mrs. George Lipovich, that a bartender 
told him the woman was Mrs. Lipovich and that the woman asked him to 
stay for lunch. 

Defendant was in the court room, but refused to testify, and 
therefore was not cross-examined by plaintiff. Mrs. George Lipovich 
failed to appear to testify at the hearing. 

The trial court stated that "there was nothing to indicate \\ 

defendant ever found out about the service on the woman he allegedly ^^ 

lived with who was not his wife." The court then entered the following 

order vacating the judgment of January 3rd, 1964: ^ 

Now comes the defendant GEORGE LIPOVICH only and moves 
the court to vacate judgment of JANUARY 3rd, 1964, and 
the court being fully advised in the premises, sustained 
said motion and thereupon it is ordered that judgment of 
JANUARY 3rd, 1964, be and the same is hereby vacated, 
set aside and for naught esteemed as to GEORGE LIPOVICH 
only and 

It is further ordered by the court that leave be and the 
same is hereby given defendant to file answer within 
TWENTY (20) DAYS and that this cause be and the same is 
hereby set for trial in Room 910 on OCTOBER 6th, 1964. 

Minimum Appeal Bond set at TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00). 

At the outset, an examination of the record reveals that service 
was made in another area of the same building occupied by defendant and 
that the area where service took place was not the usual place of abode 



'(' of defendant. There was no finding by the trial court that the service 

did not take place at the usual place of abode of defendant. The trial 
1| court did find, however, that service was not on the wife of defendant, -^y^ 

but in its order vacating the judgment of January 3, 1964, ordered that 
\ defendant file an answer within twenty days. Therefore, the court must 
'^ have found both that service on the present Mrs. George Lipovich was not 

valid and that defendant waived any jurisdictional defense by asking for 

leave to defend. Therefore, we must determine, one, whether defendant 

exercised diligence in bringing his motion to vacate the judgment of 
January 3, 1964, and two, whether there was an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in granting defendant leave to defend plaintiff's alleged 
cause of action. Dann v. Gumbiner . 29 111. App.2d 374, 381, 173 N.E.2d 
525 (1961), 

The affidavit of defendant reveals that he first gained knowledge 
of the proceedings on June 18, 1964, when he was served with an execution 
summons and notice that a levy had been made on certain of his real 
estate. He immediately filed his petition. Therefore, we find that 
there was diligence on the part of defendant. 

We further find the action of the trial court in setting aside 
the order was not an abuse of its discretion. A meritorious defense was |' 
set out by defendant in his affidavit. For the above reasons the order 
is affirmed. 


BURKE, P.J., and BRYANT, J., concur. 







Plaintif f -Appellee , 



Defendant -Appel lant , 

Or» an indictment charging armed robbery the defendant was 
iov:nd g :tlty and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less 
than or^e year nor f.aore than five years. He appeals from the judgment. 
Corrine Moore is the wife of Joseph Moore who owns a tavern 
arid liquor store at 701 East 75th Street, Chicago. On Sunday, July 12, 
196-^5 at, about 1:00 P.M. she went to the tavern to bring change for the 
cash register. At the time the only other person there was the bartender, 
Charles Thorrias. Shortly after she arrived a man walked in and asked the 
price of a bottle of vodka. Two other men walked in behind him. One of 
the;?e t.ien was the defendant. The first man then went to the door, closed 
it, r?rid announced a holdup. There is a dispute in the testimony as to 

' who closed the door. The second man pulled a gun and the third man, the 
defendant, stooci behind him. The man with the gun ushered the bartender 

j and Mrs., Moore into the washroom. After a period of five or ten minutes, 
the captives came out of the washroom, made a search and found that $1^00 

I had been stolen. 

Defendant and his two companions fled the scene and by auto- 
mobile "Aerit to the 57th Street Beach, where, according to the evidence 
lntr©di:ced by the People, defendant received part of the proceeds. From 
an examination of photographs produced by the police, the bartender 
identified a photograph of defendant. About two weeks after the robbery 
the defendant was arrested in Peoria. He was brought to Chicago where he 
was Identified by the bartender and Mrs. Moore. The defendant had been 
in the tavern pre^'iousLy. Prior to the robbery the defendant lived a 
block from the tavern for two weeks. The arresting officer testified 

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that on the way back to Chicago the defendant said that he received $17 
of the stolen money and that this was the first robbery that he "had gone 
on" with the other men. 

The first point presented by the defendant is that the People 
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He concedes that 
he was present when the robbery occurred. He says that the record shows 
that he did not actively and voluntarily participate In the robbery. The 
People answer that the evidence shows beyond all reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was guilty of the crime of armed robbery. The State says 
that the circumstances in the case at bar show a connon design to do an 
unlawful act. The defendant entered the tavern in the company of two 
other men. Nothing was purchased and immediately upon entering^ one of 
the men announced a holdup and another drew a gun. The defendant placed 
himself behind the man with the gxin named "Pops" and closed the door when 
the man with the gun told him to do so. The defendant was well ac- 
quainted with one of the robbers; they were schoolmates in high school. 
In answer to the question "Did you do anything actively in that robbery?" 
the defendant answered "I closed the door," To the question "And at the 
time you closed the door, did you know there was about to occur a 
robbery?" the defendant answered "I heard him say it," The defendant was 
referring to the robber with the gun. The defendant denied participating 
in the robbery. He denied that he told the officer or anyone that he 
got any money from the proceeds of the robbery. 

The defendant left the tavern with the other men and took part 
of the proceeds. One of the participants drove the defendant to the 
beach at 61st Street and Lake Michigan in Chicago, where defendant's car 
was parked. Defendant did not notify the police. That day the defendant 
drove to his home in Peoria. 

The evidence shows that the defendant entered the tavern with 
his two acquaintances, remained there with them while the robbery was 
committed and then left with them when the robbery was con^leted. He 
then shared :;..i the proceeds of the robbery. No one heard him protest or 

. ..I 

„3 = 

saw hirn evince st:rprise. There was also an oral admission by the 

defendant to the police officer who made the arrest that this was the 

only robbery he had gone on with Bunny Wilson and the other defendant. 

The fact that the >^^efendant had been in the tavern on prior occasions 

as a patron, does not in the light of the other circumstances support 

his argument that it is improbable that he participated in the robbery. 

The defendant was from out of town. His assertion that he told the 

bartender that he wi.3 from Peoria was contradicted by the bartender. We 

find that tne evidence shows a common design to do an unlawful act and 

supports the finding and Judgment that he is guilty as a principal beyond 

a reasonable dovibt . 

The second point urged by the defendant is that the State 

failed to pro" e ownership or possession of the property allegedly taken. 

The indictment charges the defendant with taking $400 from the person and 

presence of Corrine Moore. Defendant insists that the record shows that 

Corrlne Moore did not own or have possession of the money taken nor was 

any money taken from her person during the robbery and that this failure 

of proof entitles him to a reversal. 111. Rev. Stat. 1965, Chap. 38. 

§ 18-1 (a) reads; 

"A person commits robbery when he takes property from 
the person or presence of another by the use of force or by 
threatening the iminent use of force." 

Defendant say^ that the record shows that the ownership of the $400 was 

in Joe's Three Corner Tavern and that the control was in Charles Thomas. 

The money was the property of the owner of the tavern, Joseph Moore. 

Charles Thomas 5 the bartender, was employed by Joseph Moore. 

We think that the evidence shows that Corrine Moore was the 

agent of her husband in the operation of the tavern; that it was within 

her authority to supervise the employees and that she was in charge at 

I the time of the robbery. We are satisfied that at the time of the robbery 

Mrs, Moore was in custody and control of the money. 

The judgraent is affirmed. 

BRYANT, J., .'-nd LYONS, J., concur. 

(32825—9-66) 14 



AT AN APPELLATE COURT, for the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Illinois, sitting at Springfield: 





Attest: ROBERT L. CONN, Clerk. 

BE IT REMEMBERED, that to-wit: On the 29th day 

of December A. D. 19_65., there was filed in the office of 

the said Clerk of said Court an opinion of said Court, in words and 
figures following: 

*■>. ..':>"M 


en; 10 

SJtft ic 

•bWlpr-hqS lr> igjiiHis ,e.ion 


<^M^ *k 


Gere-al N:.. ICcll 

6 6X.ft.^'6^ 

Agenda N-' . 1 


Or' IlLINC-lS 

'J-^ ^.-vJ.. 



i ' ^ n r *' — ? f^ j», »■ . »^ 

A'"-/' • i" '; ' ■>■ 

ADDeal ;ro: 

;irve Heiileberg. a--'-: a 
;ieze Heidelterc. 


> — • ^ ■ri 

In a 'oenzh zrLi 
v;as a:'a'uitted on the ch^: 
He v/as found sulltv or. ?. 

Sangar:on Cc^'onty 

~o corrjnit rape 


ury having been waived, defendant; 
f burglary as alleged in Count I. 
II. III. IV and V, charging atternpt 
aggravated battery and aggravated 

S^r.". enced tc serve one to two years in 
the Illinois Penitentiary", .-.e appeals from that conviction and 
tne sentence. 

Qefendar.- clai".; 'a) that the trial court erred in 
permitting the indie" "- be amended on its face to shov; ■ 
the occurrence date was '"'irch l8. 1964. instead of March 20, 
(b) that Oount I and II :r:_.Tnate the place of the occurrence 

as "a b-_; of Virgin y.;=.r" Hamilton" in Sangamon County and 

Counts III, IV, and V, cnl"" refer to Sangamon Count^,^ and each 

is contrarv to the time s"-^. rlace requirements of the Criminal 

Coie and (c) that the intr--i.uction into evidence of statements 

made or the defendant in T:r absence of counsel violated the 

due process clause of the Jrurteenth Amendment to the Federal 

Constitution. ' ' ' ' "' 

111. Rev. Stat. I'-:?, chapt. jS , Sec. 111-3, in force 

at the time of the offense, reads in part as follows: 

",'a) A charge s'.'.all be in writing and allege 
the commission :f =n offense b;" : 

• • • ' " 

(4) Statiy.r The time and place of 
the offense as definitely as can be 
done ; ..." 

Defendant was re^oresentei t- the Public Defender. On motion 

of the prosecution made 'ssz prior to the start of the bench 

trial, the court allowed an amendment to the indictment to 

reflect >Tarch 18 rather, than. March 20 as the occurrence date. 

Defendant objected to i;he ajrendment for the reason that it was 

not a formal defect within rhe precise language of the Code 

authorizing amendments for formal defects in certain instances. 

111. Rev. Stat. 1963, chart. 38, Sec. 111-5. 

In People v. Hall, 55 111, App. 2d 255, 204 N.E. 2d 

473» we had occasion to cc::ment on this statute and to state 

that the word "including" as used in the statute enumerating 

the specific grounds for amendment should be read as "including 

but not limited to". There we held that an incorrect citation 


of uhe statute allegedly violated was amendable and that no con- 
stitutional, statutory, or fundamental hurrian right of the defend- 
ant vas violated by so doing. It did not appear there nor does 
it appear here that there was a total failure to comply with one 
or Tiore of the requirements of "^ 111-3 of the Code. There, as 
here, the defect was not of total omission, but of inept and 
inaccurate attem.pted compliance. We thin'-: it clear tnat there 
is a vast difference between total want of compliance and an 
attempted ccm.pliance inexpertly, inaccurately or inadequately 
done. Hte former may v.'-ell be \nalnerable to a proper motion 
tim.ely made; the latter may well be and amendable. Ttiere 
is no showing in this record that the defendant was mislead, 
prejudicea, surprised or aeprived of any available defense by 
the amendment. In permitting the amendment, the court corrected, 
perfected and made accurate an allegation required by the stat- 
ute. It did not supply a wholly absent allegation. Each count 
fully and correctly stated the nature and the elements of the 
offense charge. Only the date of its occurrence was inaccurately 
stated. This, in our judgment, was a formal rather than a sub- 
stantive defect and within the ambit and the purpose of H 111-5 
permitting the correction of formal defects by amendm.ent. To 
return these indictments to the grand Jury for correction is 
to impose a straight jacket long since discarded and to bow in 
submission to formal rather thaji substantive defects. 


vie now turn tc the complaint that the place of the 
occurrence is insufficiently stated and thus voids the indict- 
Tient. 7nis contention was recently and effectively interred 
"cy our 3uprerr;e Court in People v. Blanchett_. 33 III. 2d 52? . 
212 N.E. 2d 97 , wherein it departed from the doctrine -oro- 

nour.cec in People v. Williams. 30 111. 2d 125, lo6 N.E. 2d 483, 
and reversed a decision oi' this court entertaining the viev/s 
here advocated by tne defendant. 55 111. App . 2d l4l, 20h N.E. 
2d 173. • ■-■.■'■ 

Defendant's last contention that the introduction 
in evidence of statements made by the defendant on arraigrLment 
ana in the absence of and without benefit o:' counsel violated 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. During the arraignment the defendant was tendered 
counsel, refused it and stated he wanted to plead guilty. The 
plea was accepted. Defendant then stated that he had a de- 
tective call over for him. and he was told that if he pleaded 
guilty to aggravated assault, the remaining charges would be 
dropped and that was why he pleaded guilty. The trial judge 
promptly and properly recsLnted, entered a "not guilty" plea 
over defendant's protest, appointed the Public Defender to 
represent him euid continued the case for trial. The bench trial 
which we review was subsequently conducted by a different judge. 
Cross-examination of the defendant elicited this testimony 
from, the defendant concerning the arraignment events: 


"l remember telling the court I wanted t,o plead 
guilty and my answer,. "Here is the thing. I 
realize that I asri guilty. I v.'as drunk. I don't 
remember too much about it myself because I was 
drunk." I recall my answer to the court, "l 
didn't realize until a couple of days ago that 
I v/ent by this woman's house. I didn't mean to 
rape her . " 

"The reason I xvas so anxious to plead guilty to 
these charges on the 26th was that I v/as told by 
a person over at the County Jail by the name of 
Mr. Charlie Kaun that if I would go over there and 
plead guilty and then bring it up about hov; my 
name was misspelled that they v.'ould throw it out." 

We would observe that the statements made on p^rraign- 
ment were made after tender and refusal of legal counsel and 
effectively precluded the arraignment judge from accepting a 
guilty plea. It did net deter the trial judge from a not 
guilty finding on the burglary charge. We see no violation 
of due process or prejudicial error in this record. Absent 
this cross-examination, the evidence in the record establishes 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude 
that the defendant had a fair trial with proper regards for 
his rights and the judgment must be affirmed. This is, accord- 
ingly, done. 

Judgment affirmed. 

Trapp, P.J. and Craven, J. concur. 





) Appeal from Circuit 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) Court of Cook County, 
V. \ 

) Criminal Division, 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 


In a trial by the court without a jury, the defendants were 

convicted of burglary of a cleaning establishment. They were 

apprehended at the premises under circumstances that admit of no 

reasonable doubt as to their guilt. They do not question the 

sufficiency of the evidence but contend that a statement to the 

court made by their counsel during the hearing in mitigation and 

aggravation shows that they were denied effective, good faith 

assistance of counsel in the conduct of the trial. They ask for 

a new trial ox in the alternative for a new hearing in mitigation 

and aggravation. 

The statement complained of is as follows; 

"Well, Your Honor, all I can say is that I had hopes that 
these defendants will sometime see their faults and come 
to the realization that this is serious business and I 
hope that Your Honor will take into consideration that 
they— =well, they are old enough to know better. There 
is something lacking that they don't face up to it or 
want to acknowledge it and they ask for mercy in this 

These words standing alone do not give a correct picture of defense 
counsel's conduct of the case. Defendants point to no omission or 
error made by counsel and an examination of the record shows that 
he was alert, that he made proper objections with respect to 
evidentiary matters which were frequently sustained, and that 
he vigorously and capably conducted cross-examination. 


Defendant Mingo who had a substantial record of prior 
convictions was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 to 7 years and 
defendant Sawyer who had one prior conviction was sentenced 
to imprisonment for 2 to 5 years. There is no showing of any 
matter in mitigation that might have been raised in the trial 
court. The defendants were properly defended and the sentences 
imposed are reasonable. 

What we have said should not be construed as any 
reflection on the counsel for the defendants in this court 
who with due zeal and ability have performed their duty in this 
and other cases that have come before us. 

Judgment affirmed. 

Dempseys P.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. 
Abstract only. 


50250 — 

50622 -^ (^6_2M^^73 


Di n^^iff A ^n<=>o ^ CIRCUIT COURT OF 
Plaintiff -Appellee, ) 


V. ) (Consolidated appeals) 

) #50250 

WALTER KAPUT, a/k/a WALTER KAYE, ) i'f^^bll 




These are consolidated appeals from two orders entered by the 
lower court in favor of plaintiff. 

On January 6, 1949, plaintiff and defendant separated. One 
child was born as a result of the marriage between the parties; namely, 
John Kaput, a/k/a John Kaye, who was two years of age at the time of the 
separation. Custody, plus a $10.00 a week order for support, was granted 
to plaintiff pursuant to a decree of divorce entered October 19, 1949. 
Plaintiff, however, left the child with defendant. The child lived with 
his father and paternal grandparents continuously until on or about , 
October 1, 1960. x 

Defendant raised and educated the child, paying the paternal 
grandparents $10.00 per week for food and lodging. He also paid for the 
child's clothing and other living expenses, from the date of the decree, 
to October 1, 1960, a period of 10 years 11 months and 12 days. The child 
sometimes stayed with plaintiff on week ends. There was conflicting 
testimony as to whether or not plaintiff contributed to the child's support 
during this period. Subsequently, the child lived with his Aunt Sally 
Matt, until March 31, 1961, plaintiff and defendant contributing equally 
toward his support. On March 31, 1961, plaintiff took actual custody 
of the child. 

On July 9, 1962, defendant was served with notice that plaintiff 
was going to appear before the court on July 12, 1962, and preis^^ent a 
petition asking the court to find defendant in contempt for an arrearage 
in child support in the sum of $2,680,00 and praying that said sum be 
reduced to judgment. At no other time had plaintiff sought to recover 




child support until she filed this petition. 

Plaintiff's petition stated ttiat defendant paid child support 
from time to time; that he had made no payments since September 1, 1958; 
that prior to said date he was in arrears in the sum of $720,00; and 
that since said date he had accumulated a further arrearage of $1,960.00 
V or a total of $25680.00, Nowhere in said petition did plaintiff allege 
that at times during that period for which she was claiming an arrearage, 
the child was living with his father and paternal grandparents. 

Defendant contacted plaintiff by telephone and inquired as to 
the reason for her petition. He expressed great concern about said 
petition. He visited plaintiff at her home and asked her to give him a 
signed statement that she would not appear in court. She refused to 
give him a signed statement. ' ■• - 

On July 12, 1962 plaintiff presented said petition. Defendant 
failed to appear and judgment was entered against him for $2,680,00. 

Defendants pursuant to Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, 
filed a petition to vacate the judgment. Defendant alleged, one, that 
he was diligent in that he was not advised of said judgment until served 
with notice August 12, 1963 that plaintiff was appearing before the court 
August 15, 1963 to ask for a ruling, and two, that he had a good and 
meritorious defense^ Defendant's petition was denied. Subsequently, 
notice of appeal from said order was filed by defendant in the trial 
court and is heard in this consolidated appeal as #50250. 

On April 2, 1965 plaintiff filed her petition in the trial court 
for attorney's fees to contest defendant's appeal, pursuant to the 
Divorce Act,; Illinois Revised Statute (1963) Chapter 40, Section 15, 
Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground 
that the order appealed from was not a suit for divorce and therefore, 
the trial court could not derive its jurisdiction from the Divorce Act, 
Counsel for plaintiff showed the Appellate Record to the court, advised 
the court of the extent of the master's hearings and requested an award 


-3 = 

of Fifteen Hundred Dollars in attorney's fees for the prospective 
defense of the appeal. The court interrogated plaintiff as to her 
financial status. Plaintiff testified that she had no monies with which 
to employ counsel to defend the appeal. Counsel for defendant was 
allowed to cross-examine plaintiff. 

Thereafter counsel for defendant stated to the court that his 
client had no monies to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees. Plaintiff then 
advised the court that defendant had inherited an interest in a piece of 
real estate and that he was not impoverished. The court allowed counsel 
for plaintiff and counsel for defendant to sum up their clients' positions. 
The court verbally ruled that it had jurisdiction and awarded plaintiff's 
$1,000.00 in attorney's fees for the defense of said appeal. Immediately 
after the court's ruling and pronouncement, counsel for defendant 
informed the court that defendant was without funds to pay the said One 
Thousand Dollars. Counsel asked that the court allow him to file a 
written answer to plaintiff's petition, and have the matter set for 
further hearing. The court denied the request of defendant's counsel. 
In #50622 defendant has appealed from the order allowing plaintiff 
attorney's fees. 

Defendant's theory in #50250 is that he was diligent in bringing 
his petition to vacate the judgment; that a meritorious defense of fraud 
was raised by him; and that the lower court's findings that the judgment 
of July 12, 1962 was not fraudulently obtained , was against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. 

Plaintiff's theory is that the judgment entered on July 12, 1962 
was in all instances legally sufficient; that defendant has not sustained 
his burden of proving the facts essential to entitle him to relief under 
Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act; and that the findings of fact by 1 
the master upon conflicting evidence and conflicting testimony of 
witnesses will not be reversed, on appeal, unless the error is clear and 



We agree with plaintiff , Specific findings of fact were made 
by the master and his report containing said findings of fact was 
approved in its entirety by the trial judge. There is a presumption^ 
on reviewj that the evidence sustains the findings, Gromer v, M olby, 385 
111, 283^ 286, 52 N.Eo2d ^'^1 (1944). A master^s report on controverted 
questions of fact 5 contairitag findings based on the evidence presented 3 
when approved and made more specific by the trial judge, will not be 
reversed unless the error is clear and palpable. Allendo rf v. Daily, 6 
111. 2d 577, 586, 129 N„E.2d 673 (1955). There was conflicting evidence 

i) and testimony by the parties concerning; onej whether plaintiff made 
false representations to induce defendant to forego making his 
appearance in courts and two 5 whether plaintiff made certain allegations 
in her petition that were untrue. We agree with plaintiff that the 
\ evidence presented by plaintiff was sufficient to support the findings 

made by the master and approved by the trial judge 5 and that these findings 
are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 

1 Furtherm.ore, to entitle a party to relief against a judgment 

or decree;, the burden of proof is upon the moving party, first, to prove 
the invalidity of the judgment or decree, and two, to show that diligence 
r^ was exercised. The master found that defendant did not meet his burden. 
An examination of the record reveals that defendant's petition was 
properly refused. 

In #50622 defendant contends that the action involved in #50250 
was net a divorce or separate maintenance suit and that the trial court 
could not grant fees for defense of an appeal of said action. Defendant 
bases this contention on the theory that by filing an appeal, appellate 
jurisdiction attached, and Lhe trial court could not grant: fees for a 
defense of the appeal. We disagree with defendant. In the case of an 
appeal 5 the court in which the decree or order is rendered may grant, 
and enforce, the payment of money, for the defense of an appeal, during 
the pendency of the appeal. Saxon v. S&xon , 20 111. App.2d 478, 156 
N,E.2d 229 (1959). 





Defendant also contends that it was improper for the trial 
court to grant fees without hearing evidence as to the work done and 
the value of the services rendered. An examination of the record shows 
there was evidence submitted as to how much work would be involved in 
defending the appeals The trial court evaluated this evidence and 
found in favor of plaintiff. We will not disturb the lower court's 

The decision of the lower court is affirmed as to both appeals, 


BRYANT, P.J,, and BURKE, J„, concur. 




Plaintiff-Appellant 5 


Defendant -Appellee. 

kYYY.k\. FROM 



Plaintiff's libel action was dismissed for vant of prosecu- 
tion on February 3s 1965 » On February 19 j 1965, and again on 
March 18 p 1965 ^ the court denied plaintiff's petitions to vacate 
the order of dismissal and to reinstate the cause. Plaintiff 
appeals. Defendant has filed no brief. 

The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County 
on May 16^ 1958. An answer was filed on July 3, 1958, and the case 
was at issue. The order of February 3, 1965, which dismissed the 
cause for want of prosecution shows that it came "on to be heard 
upon the regular call of cases for trial." 

We have examined the pleadings and both of the petitions 
filed by plaintiff to vacate the order of dismissal. In our 
opinion they show a meritorious claim and due diligence and require 
no discussion. 

At the time of dismissal, the case had been afwaiting trial 
for seven years. The first petition to vacate the order of dis- 
missal was presented within sixteen days after the order was entered. 
Courts in this state are liberal in setting aside defaults or 
orders of dismissal during the term time in which they are entered, 
when it appears that justice will be done. ( Dann v. Gumbiner . 
29 111. App.2d 374s 379^ 173 N.E.2d 525 (1961).) Under paragraph 24a 
of the Limitations Act (111. Rev, Stat. 1963, Ch, 83), a plaintiff 


who has suffered an involuntary dismissal is given a year to file 
a new action, "if the time limited for bringing such action shall 
have expired during the pendency of such suit," ( Wright v. Chicago 
Transit Authority . 43 111. App.2d 408, 193 N.E.2d 597 (1963).) 
We believe the petitions sufficiently presented to the trial court 
a situation which required the use of the power to set aside a 
dismissal order and permit the plaintiff to have his day in court, 
and to prevent an injustice. 

The orders denying the motion to vacate are reversed and 
the cause is remanded with directions to allow the motions and 
to restore the cause to the trial calendar. 


KLUCZYNSKI, P.J., and BURMAN, J., concur. 
Abstract only. 





Plaintif f -Appellee, 



Def endant=Appellant . 

In a trial without a jury Eunice L. Easley was found guilty 
of the crime of aggravated battery as charged in the indictment and 
sentenced to a term of 3 to 8 years in the penitentiary. In appealing 
he requests that the judgment be reversed on the ground that the People 
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The complainants Ethel Brown, testified that at about 4; 00 
P.M. on May 30 j 19645 she was shot in the back by the defendant while 
in her sister's kitchen at 1535 South Lawndale Avenue, Chicago. The 
defendant had come to complainant's apartment at the invitation of her 
niece. Mrsc Brown testified that until one week prior to the shooting 
she was on the most intimate terms with the defendant; that the 
defendant walked into her apartment and questioned her as to the reason 
she had "quit him" ^ that as she turned around he shot her in the left 
side and that she then began to scuffle with him. Janie Nellem, sister 
of Mrs. Brown, testified that she was awakened by the commotion. She 
ran into the kitchen and saw complainant holding onto defendant. 
Defendant was trying to break loose and Miss Nellem "grabbed" him. 
Defendant exclaimed; "I am going to jump out the window and make them 
think you all throwed me out." She saw the gun in defendant ''s right 
hand. He placed the gun to witness^ stomach, pushed his head against the 
screen and said "I am going to jump." Witness further testified that she 
said "jump" and turned him loose. The witness came into the room after 
the shot was fired. She was holding defendant around the waist. He was 
trying to get loose„ The gun was in defendant's right hand. She knew 
him about 2 yearso She said defendant was "friendly and nice to me." 


The Nellem apartment where the shooting took place was on the first or 
ground floor, Sam Cotton and Frank Walker testified that they saw the 
defendant lying on the ground in a pool of blood. Defendant was resting 
on his back with the gun in his right hand across his chest, Walke^ 
picked up the gun and after wrapping it in a handkerchief ^ took it to 
the home of William Jenkins, Policeman James Davis testified Walker 
accompanied him to the Jenkins' residence where the gun was recovered. 

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, said that he was 
making love to Ruth Rhodes when the complainant walked in on the scene; 
that complainant left and soon returned with a gun and in a jealous out- 
burst threatened to shoot the defendant. He testified that as he grabbed 
her hands, he was hit on the head with a bottle and was thrown out the 
window. He claimed not to be aware that a shot was fired. After the 
finding of guilty in response to the inquiry by the court as to whether 
there was anything to be presented in aggravation or mitigation^ the 
People brought out that on February 19;, 1958, the defendant was convicted 
on "a murder charge, reduced to manslaughter" and sentenced to a term of 
from 5 to 12 years in the penitentiary and that at the time of his arrest 
was on parole. In mitigation the defendant's attorney pointed out that 
the defendant has a minimal education. 

The finding and judgment will not be disturbed unless it is 
based on clearly unsatisfactory and improbable evidence. We will not 
reverse merely because there is a conflict in the evidence. We are 
satisfied that the record supports the finding of the court that the 
defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore the 
judgment is affirmed, 

BRYANT, P.J. 5 and LYONS, J., concur. 

_ ftf 

■ 'y 

50485 ^^ ;; ^ 




Defendant in Error, 


ROBERT QUINLAN, (Impleaded) 

Plaintiff in Error „ 

This appeal comes from a finding of guilty of armed robbery- 
entered March 27, 1963 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ciiminal 
Division. This appeal is taken on the grounds that the indictment was 
not specific enough to enable the appellant to adequately prepare his 
defense and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The appellant claims the indictment was insufficient in that 
it did not specifically state either the place where or the time at 
which the alleged offense occurred. In support of this proposition 
is cited the case of People v. Williams , 30 111. 2d 125, 196 N.E.2d 483 
(1964). We need not discuss that case for it has been specifically 

overruled in the case of P eople v. Reed. 111. 2d , N .E. 2d 

_____ (Docket No. 39251, September, 1965). The indictment in the case 
at bar sets forth the date and the county in which the offense was 
alleged to have occurred. The Reed opinion, supra, holds that this is 
sufficient. At trial no objection was made to the indictment not 
being specific enough and after reading the record we cannot say that 
the appellant was prejudiced by the indictment's not being more specific. 

After ha.lng revievjed the transcript of the proceedings below, 
we conclude that the appellant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The appellant, Robert Quinlan, was indicted with another man, 
Donald Whitlock, and was charged with the armed robbery September 23, 
1962 of a drug store located at 5845 W. Madison Street. The owner of 
the drug store, Harry Dombrowski, testified that he came to work that 
morning ac about I1°00 o'clock. He testified that at about 11:30 a 
man came into ihe store who demanded his supply of narcotics at gun 

= 2 = 

point „ Donbrowski said he gave this man some narcotics and some money 
from the rear of i:he store. He was then told to lay down on the floor 
in the rear of the store and not to get up for two or three minutes. 
He was told by the man that his partner would be near the door to see 
that he stayed there „ Dombrowski never saw another man and cannot say 
whether the man actually had a partner or not. He testified that when 
he closed the store that afternoon, he noticed that there was money 
missing from a cash register located near the front of the store. He 
said there was nine or ten dollars in that cash register, Dombrowski 
identified the man who robbed him as appellant's co-defendant, Donald 

Kenneth Derma , a high school student and part-time employee 
at the drug store, testified that he arrived for work that morning at 
ll;30o As he approached the store, he encountered a man at the front 
entrance. This aa.a held the door shut and said, "Get out of here, kid," 
Derma then waited outside the store a few moments and watched through 
a plate glas? window while the man went inside, walked behind a cigar 
counter near the front of the store and dusted off the cash register. 
Derma then ran to a nearby tavern and called the police. Derma testified 
that Lb.e man was wearing gray work clothes with a small brimmed hat and 
carrying a mop. Derma identified the appellant from a police line-up 
a few cays later. 

Hazel Reilly, a woman who lives near the drug store, testified 
that bhe looked out of her apartment window around 11:00 that morning 
ana sa- a r^an walking outside carrying a bucket and mop. She said she 
saw him. again at about 11:40 when she was on her way back from mass. 
She testified that he was not wearing a hat. 

The appellant took the stand in his own defense and testified 
that he was at home at the time the robbery occurred. He said his 
mother and nephew could substantiate his claim. Neither person 
appeared at trial. 

=3 = 

We feel the evidence supports the Court below in finding the 
appellant guilty of the crime of armed robbery. The evidence supports 
the People's theory that the appellant and his co-defendant at the 
trial acted in consort in robbing the drug store. The man who held 
the g-'..n on Dombrowski said he had a partner outside the store. At 
the time the robbery was going on, Kenneth Derma was stopped by the 
appellant who told him to get away. Derma then saw the appellant enter 
the store and wipe off the cash register in front. The appellant 
claims that at most this shows that he committed a robbery, but that 
this cannot oe held armed robbery because no connection was shown 
between him and the man who had the gun and who was robbing Dombrowski 
in the back of the store. The Court does not have to believe that by 
chance ihis drug store was being robbed by two different people at the 
same time. There is a reasonable inference that the men were acting 
in consort. We feel the appellant was sufficiently identified even 
though LHere was some small discrepancy between the testimony given by 
Derma and Mrs. Reilly, The finding of the Court below is supportable 
by the lact s adduced at the trial. The judgment is, therefore, 


LYONS, J., and BURKE, J., concur.