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IMPERIAL  DEFENCE 


AND 


CLOSER  UNION 


ICD 


CO 


HOWARD  D'EGVILLE 


Presented  to  the 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO 
LIBRARY 

by  the 

ONTARIO  LEGISLATIVE 
LIBRARY 

1980 


IMPERIAL   DEFENCE   AND 
CLOSER   UNION 


to  by  Elliott  $•  Fry. 

Tfie  Rt.   Hon.  Sir  JOHN    COLOMB,  K.C.M.G. 

. 

(M.P.  FOR  Bow  *  BROMLEY,   1886  1892, 
AMD  FOR  GREAT  YARMOUTH.  1898-190C.) 


'  -, 

. .  H-"!  \ 

IMPERIAL  DEFENCE 

/'» t 
AND 

CLOSER  UNION      /^ 

€ 

A  short  record  of  the  life-work  of  the  late        ,  x?^ 
SIR  JOHN   COLOMB, 

in  connection  with  the  movement  towards 
Imperial  Organisation 

By 
HOWARD    D'EGVILLE 

With  a  Preface  by 
COL.  THE  RIGHT  HON.  J.  E.  B.  SEELY,  D.S.O.,  M.P 

(SECRETARY  OF  STATE  FOR  WAR) 

And 

an  Introduction  by 
REAR-ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  L.  OTTLEY, 

K.C.M.G.,  C.B.,  M.V.O 
(LATELY  SECRETARY  TO  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE) 


LONDON  ***** 

P.    S.    KING   &   SON 

<"JWi&&ttf 
ORCHARD    HOUSE,  WESTMINST mV-M' 


>^p™ 


MiCROFOR 
PRESERVV- 

SERVIO-S 

HUN  i  5 

DATE.. 


UA 


"  The  next  ten  or  twenty' years  will  be  critical  in  the  history 
of  this  Empire ;  they  may  even  be  decisive  of  its  future.  God 
grant  that  whether  we  be  of  these  Mother  Islands,  or  of  the 
great  Dominions  beyond  the  seas,  we  may  so  bear  ourselves 
that  the  future  shall  not  hold  to  our  lips  the  chalice  of  vain  re- 
gret for  opportunity  neglected  and  dead" — The  Rt. Hon. R. L. 
Borden,  at  Dinner  of  Empire  Parliamentary  Association,  at 
House  of  Commons,  July  16,  1912. 


PREFACE 

BY 

COLONEL  THE  RT.  HON.  J.  E.  B.  SEELY, 
D.S.O.,  M.P. 

THIS  book  tells  the  story  of  a  man  whose 
political  activities  were  devoted  to  a  single 
end — Imperial  Unity.  Sir  John  Colomb 
convinced  himself  that  the  surest  way  to 
secure  the  union  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
Empire  was  to  begin  by  concentrating  on 
Imperial  Defence.  It  can  be  truly  said  of 
him  that  he  was  a  prescient  man.  It  is  not 
a  little  remarkable  that  long  before  Admiral 
Mahan  wrote  his  book  on  the  Influence  of 
Sea  Power,  Sir  John  Colomb  was  preaching 
the  doctrine  of  the  immense  strategical  ad- 
vantages of  one  Imperial  Fleet ;  long  before 
the  creation  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
he  was  urging  the  dangers  to  this  country 
— the  island  centre  of  so  wide  an  Empire — 
of  concentrating  our  efforts  on  passive  land 
defence.  Whatever  view  may  be  taken  as 
to  the  soundness  of  his  views,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  he  foresaw  clearly  the  lines 


vi  PREFACE 

upon  which  the  best  naval  and  military 
thought  would  proceed. 

It  would  be  claiming  too  much  to  say 
that  the  general  acceptance  of  these  principles 
was  due  to  Sir  John  Colomb's  unaided  efforts, 
but  it  must  certainly  be  said  that  he  contri- 
buted in  no  small  degree  to  that  end.  In 
the  House  of  Commons  his  vigilance  on  these 
subjects  was  unceasing.  If  he  saw  the  least 
sign  that  passive  land  defence  was  to  be 
exalted  at  the  expense  of  naval  power,  woe 
betide  the  unfortunate  Minister  who  wished 
to  get  his  business  through. 

At  the  meetings  of  the  Royal  United  Ser- 
vice Institution,  the  old  Imperial  Federation 
League  (of  which  he  was  a  founder),  and 
later  of  the  Imperial  Co-operation  League, 
he  always  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  Sea 
Power,  with  striking  power  to  reinforce  it. 
To  distinguished  guests  from  the  Dominions 
he  would  show  courteous  hospitality,  but  at 
the  same  time  inform  them,  with  the  utmost 
frankness,  that  he  conceived  they  were  not 
doing  enough  for  Imperial  Defence.  Nor  did 
his  guests  ever  take  offence  at  the  blunt 
statement  of  his  views,  for  it  was  impossible 
not  to  admire  and  respect  the  man  whose 
whole  life  was  devoted  to  a  single  end,  and 
whose  unselfish  devotion  to  the  cause  had 
done  much  to  clear  away  the  mists  of  un- 
certainty. 


PREFACE  vii 

Mr.  Howard  cTEgville  is  well  equipped 
for  writing  this  book,  not  only  from  his  close 
personal  friendship  with  Sir  John  Colomb, 
but  from  his  active  association  with  him  in 
the  work  of  the  Imperial  Co-operation 
League,  from  which  sprang  the  Empire 
Parliamentary  Association.  It  is  possible 
to  hope  that  this  record  of  Sir  John 
Colomb's  life  may  help  all  who  read  it  to  a 
closer  study  of  the  problems  of  Imperial 
Defence. 

J.  E.  B.  SEELY. 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

IN  presenting  this  small  volume  to  the 
public,  a  few  words  of  prefatory  explana- 
tion regarding  its  object  and  scope  may 
perhaps  be  advisable,  in  order  that  the 
somewhat  ambitious  title  of  the  book  may 
not  prepare  its  readers  for  a  disappointment. 
It  is  hoped,  therefore,  in  as  few  words  as 
possible  to  make  clear  the  very  definite 
limitations  which  I  set  for  myself  when 
undertaking  its  compilation. 

During  the  many  years  in  which  I  was 
associated  with  the  late  Sir  John  Colomb, 
both  as  his  Parliamentary  Private  Secretary 
and  later,  when  Sir  John  Colomb  left  the 
House  of  Commons,  as  a  co-worker  in  the 
cause  of  Imperial  Co-operation  for  Defence, 
it  was  brought  to  my  knowledge  that  there 
was  a  very  general  desire  amongst  Sir  John 
ColomVs  many  friends  and  followers  that 
he  should  undertake  to  write  a  history  of 
the  movement  in  which  he  had  played  so 
great  a  part.  It  was  thought,  too,  that  many 
of  his  earlier  writings  should  be  revised, 

ix  6 


.*''  *>* 


x  AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

brought  up  to  date  and  republished,  as  they 
would  undoubtedly  form  an  important  con- 
tribution to  such  a  history.  In  consequence 
of  suggestions  of  this  nature,  Sir  John 
Colomb,  shortly  before  he  died,  consulted 
me  as  to  the  best  method  to  adopt  in  order 
to  give  effect  to  the  desire,  and  some  pre- 
liminary investigation  and  preparation  had 
actually  been  commenced  when  this  last 
piece  of  work  of  "the  pioneer  of  Imperial 
Defence  "  was  unhappily  cut  short  by  death. 
While  it  was  obviously  impossible  for  anyone 
else  to  undertake  a  work  on  the  somewhat 
elaborate  and  detailed  scale  contemplated 
by  Sir  John  Colomb,  and  most  of  all  im- 
possible for  one  who  like  myself  can  claim 
no  independent  authority,  yet  it  was  thought 
by  many  that  his  work  should  be  placed  on 
record  as  an  essential  part  of  the  history  of 
the  evolution  of  Imperial  Defence.  In  the 
following  pages  I  have  endeavoured  to  do 
this  in  a  manner  which  will  be  clear  to  those 
who  have  not  hitherto  given  any  special 
attention  to  the  study  of  defence  matters, 
and  also,  I  am  sanguine  enough  to  hope,  in 
a  way  that  may  not  be  wholly  devoid  of 
interest  and  utility  to  the  serious  student 
of  naval  and  military  affairs. 

In  such  a  small  volume  it  has  been 
necessary  to  avoid  biographical  details  in 
the  body  of  the  book,  which  has  relation 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  xi 

rather  to  the  principles  for  which  Sir  John 
Colomb  contended  than  to  the  circumstances 
of  his  own  life.  But  in  order  that  the 
reader  may  have  some  slight  record  of  the 
main  facts  of  his  career  I  may  state  here 
that  Sir  John  Colomb  was  a  son  of  General 
George  Thomas  Colomb,  and  was  born  on 
1st  May,  1838.  He  was  educated  at  the 
Royal  Naval  College,  and  entered  the  Royal 
Marine  Artillery  in  1854,  retiring  with  the 
rank  of  Captain  in  1869  in  order  to  pursue 
an  active  campaign  in  furtherance  of  the 
objects  he  had  so  much  at  heart.  His  work 
on  behalf  of  the  larger  principles  of  defence 
will  be  referred  to  from  time  to  time  in  the 
course  of  the  following  pages,  and  the  only 
other  personal  detail  which  may  be  allowed 
here  is  the  fact  of  his  marriage  on  1st 
January,  1866,  to  Mrs.  Paget  (daughter  of 
Mr.  R.  S.  Palmer  and  widow  of  Lieutenant 
Charles  Augustus  Paget,  R.N.),  whose  active 
sympathy  and  co-operation  with1  her  hus- 
band throughout  his  public  life  was  to  him 
a  source  of  perpetual  encouragement  and 
inspiration. 

The  considerations  which  have  prevented 
further  reference  to  facts  of  personal  history 
have  likewise  made  it  necessary  to  avoid 
technicalities,  and  to  print  only  such  private 
letters  as  might  serve  to  illuminate  some 
point  dealt  with  in  the  text.  Though  it  is  be- 


xii  AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

lieved  that  quotations  are  not  given  more  fre- 
quently than  is  consistent  with  easy  reading, 
principles  have  been  enunciated,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  words  of  Sir  John  Colomb 
himself.  The  latter  task  has  been  rendered 
a  little  difficult  of  accomplishment  on  ac- 
count of  the  scattered  nature  of  his  literary 
contributions,  for  though  he  was  a  fairly 
voluminous  writer,  he  published  very  few 
books.  It  has,  therefore,  been  necessary  to 
make  use  of  many  lectures,  speeches,  pam- 
phlets and  Review  articles,  in  order  to  pre- 
sent the  reader  with  a  connected  story  of 
the  evolution  of  British  Defence,  in  relation 
to  the  life-work  of  Sir  John  Colomb.  But 
his  actual  literary  output  by  no  means 
represents  the  debt  which  the  Empire  owes 
to  his  efforts.  I  could  not  hope  to  put  this 
view  more  cogently  than  was  done  by  an 
able  writer  in  the  Morning  Post,  who,  in  a 
special  article  upon  the  work  of  Sir  John 
Colomb  which  appeared  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  wrote : — 

"  A  mere  catalogue  of  his  publications  is 
not  enough  to  do  justice  to  the  important 

Sart  which,  in  conjunction  with  his  famous 
rother,  he  bore  in  rousing  and  educating 
the  public.  As  young  men,  they  both  saw 
the  Government  turning  aside  from  the 
doctrine  of  sea-power  in  pursuit  of  a  defen- 
sive Military  policy  ;  and  they  were  im- 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  idii 

pressed,  each  in  his  different  way,  by  the 
waste  and  weakness  which  passive  defence, 
whether  by  fortifications  or  Volunteers,  im- 
plied. It  may  be  said  truly  of  both  of 
them  that  they  were  pioneers  in  preaching 
the  doctrine  which  is  nowadays  insepar- 
ably connected  with  the  name  of  Captain 
Mahan." 

It  would  not  be  fitting  to  omit  from  these 
prefatory  remarks  a  reference  to  the  eminent 
career  of  Sir  John  Colomb's  brother,  Vice- 
Admiral  P.  H.  Colomb.  In  his  standard 
work  upon  Naval  Warfare,  and  in  many 
books  and  essays,  Admiral  Colomb  empha- 
sized the  doctrines  of  which  his  brother  was 
the  original  exponent.  Indeed,  so  constantly 
were  the  two  names  before  the  public,  that 
they  were  frequently  confused,  and  Sir  John 
was  himself  referred  to  more  than  once  as 
"  Admiral/'  though,  in  fact,  he  retired,  as 
already  mentioned,  with  the  rank  of  Captain 
in  the  Royal  Marine  Artillery.  But  the  two 
brothers  were  ever  working  together  in  the 
closest  communication,  and  Admiral  Colomb 
always  acknowledged,  in  public  and  in 
private,  how  much  he  owed  to  the  pioneer 
work  of  his  younger  brother.  In  his  essay 
on  Imperial  Defence  (written  in  1889  and 
published  in  Essays  on  Naval  Defence) 
Admiral  Colomb  wrote  : — 

"  I  may  be  pardoned,  perhaps,  for  assign- 


riv  AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

ing  to  my  brother,  Sir  John  Colomb,  the 
leading  part  in  laying  down  and  continually 
differentiating  the  governing  principles  of 
Imperial  Defence.  He  took  up  the  study 
more  than  twenty  years  ago,  at  a  time  when 
it  had  not  been  touched ;  and  in  his  first 
pamphlet,  The  Protection  of  our  Commerce, 
and  Distribution  of  our  War  Forces  Considered, 
which  was  published  in  1867,  may  be  fairly 
said  to  have  given  the  key-note  to  all  subse- 
quent discussions/' 

While  I  have  sought  in  the  following 
pages  to  meet  the  need  of  those  who 
wished  to  have  the  views  of  Sir  John 
Colomb  on  general  principles  of  defence 
put  before  them  in  an  easily  accessible 
form,  the  necessity  of  bringing  the  story  of 
Imperial  Defence  up  to  date  has  not  been 
disregarded.  So  much  of  recent  develop- 
ment— more  especially  in  regard  to  Canadian 
Naval  policy — has  been  in  direct  continua- 
tion of  the  work  begun  many  years  ago  by 
Sir  John  Colomb,  that  the  record  of  events 
connected  with  it  finds  a  necessary  place  in 
this  small  volume,  as  does  also  the  progress 
made  at  various  Imperial  Conferences. 
Moreover,  as  Sir  John  Colomb  always  con- 
sidered that  the  problem  of  Imperial  Re- 
presentation lay  at  the  root  of  closer  union 
within  the  Empire  for  purposes  of  defence, 
Chapter  V  of  the  book  is  devoted  to  the 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  xv 

discussion  of  this  important  question  in  its 
latest  phases.  In  this  last  chapter,  there- 
fore, the  reader  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  taken 
away  from  the  subject  matter  of  the  previous 
chapters,  in  order  to  review  some  aspects  of 
the  constitutional  side  of  Imperial  Organi- 
zation, the  consideration  of  which  is  now 
urgently  demanded  if  any  further  progress 
is  to  be  made  towards  closer  union  for 
defence. 

But  while  the  progress  of  thought  both  at 
home  and  oversea  relating  to  co-operation 
for  defence  is  touched  upon  in  Chapters  III 
and  IV,  Chapters  I  and  II  are  devoted  to 
the  gradual  emergence  and  tardy  acceptance 
of  principles  of  defence  for  the  recognition  of 
which  Sir  John  Colomb  so  long  laboured.  At 
a  time  such  as  the  present,  when  once  again 
purely  military  ideas  of  British  Defence,  as 
expounded  by  eminent  soldiers  (who  are  not 
always  as  careful  as  their  Naval  colleagues 
in  expressing  views  upon  matters  lying 
outside  their  province)  are  in  some  danger 
of  gaining  too  great  an  ascendancy  over  the 
public  mind,  it  may  not  be  altogether  in- 
opportune to  call  attention  to  general  prin- 
ciples as  they  were  outlined  by  the  man  who 
first  gave  them  modern  expression  ;  for  as 
the  eminent  writer  upon  defence,  Mr.  Spenser 
Wilkinson,  put  it,  when  writing  to  Sir 
John  Colomb  shortly  before  his  death  : — 


xvi  AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

"  As  regards  naval  war  and  the  sea 
aspects  of  any  British  war,  those  in  this 
country  whose  language  is  the  one  I  under- 
stand look  to  you  as  the  man  who  first 
taught  them  that  language, — il  maestro  di 
color  che  sanno, — as  Dante  said  of  an  earlier 
pioneer/' 

I  cannot  bring  these  preliminary  obser- 
vations to  a  close  without  a  word  of  thanks 
to  Colonel  Seely,  who,  amidst  his  manifold 
and  important  duties  as  Secretary  of  State 
for  War,  has  found  time  to  write  so  appre- 
ciatively in  the  Preface  to  this  book  of  Sir 
John  Colomb's  work  for  the  Empire.  This 
tribute  from  the  head  of  the  British  Army 
will  serve  to  illustrate  how  much  military 
thought  has  benefited  by  the  labours  of  the 
man  who  was  at  one  time  the  most  fearless 
of  War  Office  critics  ;  while  the  observa- 
tions from  the  pen  of  Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Ottley,  which  I  also  gratefully  acknowledge, 
in  the  Introduction  which  precedes  the 
text,  will  show  how  substantial  is  the  debt 
which  the  Navy  owes  to  Sir  John  Colomb's 
efforts.  Indeed,  I  cannot  refrain  from  add- 
ing this  personal  observation  that  when 
writing  the  book  I  had  no  idea  that  its 
modest  attempt  to  elucidate  general  prin- 
ciples would  be  supported  by  so  brilliant  an 
essay  as  that  which  Sir  Charles  Ottley  has 
written.  His  Introduction,  coming  as  it 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  xvli 

does  from  the  pen  of  one  who  was  not  only 
head  of  the  Naval  Intelligence  Department, 
but  also  Secretary  to  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence,  will  lend  weight  and 
value  to  the  practical  ideals  which  it  has 
been  the  object  of  this  volume  to  set  forth. 

HOWARD  D'EGVILLE. 
February,  1913. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

PAGE 

PREFACE,  BY  COLONEL  THE  RT.  HON.  J.  E.  B.  SEELY, 

D.S.O.,  M.P v 

AUTHOR'S  NOTE ix 

INTRODUCTION,   BY  REAR-ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  L. 

OTTLEY,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B.,  M.V.O.        .         .         .     xxi 

CHAP. 
I.    PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888  ...         3 

II.     PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909  ...       35 

III.  PROTECTION     OF    COMMERCE  :      IMPERIAL     CO- 

OPERATION, 1884-1902         ....       89 

IV.  IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION  (continued),  1902-1912  .     139 

V.    IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION — PAST  PROGRESS  AND 

FUTURE  DEVELOPMENT      .         .         .         .197 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 265 

it 
INDEX  .         .  269 


xix 


INTRODUCTION 

BY 
REAR-ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  L    OTTLEY. 

THE  large  and  increasing  public  which 
throughout  the  Empire  is  to-day  occupied 
with  the  problems  of  a  closer  understanding 
between  the  Mother-Country  and  the 
Dominions  on  questions  of  defence  will,  I  feel 
sure,  welcome  Mr.  d'Egville's  little  book  as 
one  of  the  most  useful  contributions  towards 
a  solution  of  the  outstanding  difficulties  that 
has  yet  been  published.  And,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  largely  an  appreciation  of  the  services 
rendered  by  Sir  John  Colomb  to  the  cause 
of  Imperial  Defence,  it  is  but  fitting  that 
one  of  those  who,  at  the  Naval  Intelligence 
Department  and  at  the  Committee  of  Im- 
perial Defence,  officially  reaped  the  benefit 
of  his  labours  should  gratefully  acknow- 
ledge their  importance  and  value. 

It  is  perfectly  true,  if  hitherto  perhaps  not 
generally  recognized,  that  to  John  Colomb 

xxi 


xxii  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

belongs  in  a  large  measure  the  credit  of 
authorship  of  the  great  series  of  reforms  in 
our  defensive  arrangements  which  culmi- 
nated in  1904  in  the  creation,  on  its  present 
basis,  of  the  Imperial  Defence  Committee, 
with  all  its  far-reaching  consequences- 
consequences  still  to-day  hardly  beyond  their 
inception,  but  which  may  conceivably  be 
destined  in  some  distant  future  to  realize, 
by  the  agency  of  a  beneficent  Pax  Britannica, 
brought  about  by  an  ever-widening  circle  of 
union  between  the  English-speaking  peoples, 
that  dream  of  universal  and  lasting  peace 
which  in  all  ages  has  proved  so  attractive  to 
mankind. 

How  far  this  latter  splendid  vision  may 
have  appealed  to  John  Colomb's  sober  and 
serene  intelligence  we  need  not  here  pause 
to  inquire,  for  it  is  certain  that  his  logiral 
mind  cherished  no  delusions  as  to  the  near 
approach  of  the  millennium .  He  saw  clearly 
enough  that  the  golden  age  was  still  far  dis- 
tant— no  man  was  better  able  than  he  to 
draw  correct  inferences  from  the  inexorable 
facts  of  the  world  in  which  we  live.  The 
present  writer  recalls  a  last  conversation 
with  him,  held  at  the  office  of  the  Defence 
Committee  in  1909,  when,  after  explaining 
certain  proposals  which  he  had  in  minu  for 
a  closer  defensive  union  between  the  Mother- 
Country  and  the  Dominions,  he  turned  for 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY   xxiii 

a  few  moments  to  the  fundamental  question. 
Was  there  in  reality  any  ground  for  the  hope 
that  the  arbitration  movement  might  de- 
velop into  an  effective  and  satisfactory  sub- 
stitute in  international  disputes  for  the 
crude  and  cruel  arbitrament  of  war  ?  It  is 
indeed  the  master-problem  for  all  high- 
minded  men  who  adopt  the  profession  of 
arms,  and  no  excuse  therefore  can  be  needed 
for  placing  it  in  the  forefront  of  the  con- 
siderations which  must  be  held  in  mind  in 
assessing  the  value  of  the  work  done  by 
John  Colomb.  Can  arbitration  replace 
war  ?  It  is  the  riddle  of  the  Sphinx.  Men 
strive  to  answer  it  with  the  unquestioning 
affirmative  which  their  hearts,  their  hopes, 
their  interests  dictate.  The  past  fifty  years 
particularly  have  witnessed,  side  by  side 
with  the  colossal  increase  of  armaments,  this 
growing  revolt  against  the  old  barbaric  law 
of  force  as  the  last  remedy  in  the  disputes 
of  nations.  But,  simultaneously  with  the 
growth  of  that  revolt,  the  same  fifty  years 
have  witnessed  their  full  share  also  of  the 
sufferings  and  horrors  of  war.  The  abhorrent 
spectre  will  not  be  laid.  The  ruthless  irony 
of  battlefields,  still  red  to-day,  seems  to 
give  the  lie  to  the  aspirations  of  the  peace 
societies.  Hence  the  present  need  to  in- 
quire into  the  scope  and  limitations  of 
arbitration  as  a  substitute  for  war,  since, 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

should  it  appear  that  reference  to  some 
International  Tribunal  might  in  all  cases 
provide  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the 
quarrels  between  nations,  not  merely  does 
warlike  preparation  become  superfluous, 
but  any  expenditure  on  armaments,  except 
on  the  minor  scale  needed  for  police  pur- 
poses, is  manifestly  unjustifiable. 

On  the  writer's  arrival  at  The  Hague  for 
the  Peace  Conference  of  1907  he  found  the 
idea  of  arbitration  much  in  the  air,  but  it 
was  difficult  to  escape  the  impression  that  it 
had  reacted  upon  the  matter-of-fact  minds  of 
some  of  the  delegates  with  unfortunate 
consequences,  sowing  seeds  of  scepticism, 
and  even  unmerited  suspicion,  as  to  the 
good  faith  of  those  who  professed  allegiance 
to  it.  The  explanation  of  this  pessimistic 
attitude  of  mind  towards  the  idea  of  arbi- 
tration was  perhaps  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  in  no  single  case  of  the  wars  (then  recent) 
in  Cuba,  in  South  Africa,  or  in  the  Far  East, 
could  any  conceivable  Arbitral  Court  have 
satisfactorily  effected  a  peaceful  settlement 
between  the  parties.  The  attractive  and 
sincere  counsels  of  that  veteran  pacifist,  the 
late  Mr.  W.  T.  Stead  (who  was  himself  much 
in  evidence  as  an  unofficial  but  active  pro- 
pagandist at  the  Hague), to  "always  arbitrate 
before  you  fight/'  fell  at  the  Hague  upon  the 
ears  of  Russian  and  Japanese  delegates  still 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY    xxv 

deafened  by  the  roar  of  the  guns  at  Tsu 
Shima.  British  delegates  heard  them,  and 
reflected  upon  the  part  played  by  the  drawn 
sword  and  the  British  Army  in  South  Africa, 
by  the  undrawn  sword  and  the  British  Fleet 
at  sea  in  holding  off  the  intervention  of  a 
jealous  Europe  ;  the  delegates  of  Spain  and 
the  United  States,  if  they  considered  Mr. 
Stead's  advice,  could  only  do  so  while  recall- 
ing the  deplorable  struggle  in  Cuba. 

Can  it  to-day  be  maintained  that  Japan 
could  have  been  induced  except  by  force,  or 
the  threat  of  force  implied  by  armaments,  to 
submit  her  quarrel  with  Russia  to  arbitra- 
tion, and  to  abide  by  the  result  ?  Is  it 
possible  to  imagine  that  Turkey  would  have 
been  ready,  without  drawing  sword,  to 
acquiesce  in  the  mandate  of  any  tribunal 
which  dictated  the  yielding  of  Tripoli  to  her 
enemy  of  yesterday,  or  of  Adrianople  to  her 
foes  of  to-day  ?  And,  even  supposing  that 
such  a  Court  could  be  constituted  and  in- 
vested with  power  to  enforce  its  decrees,  by 
what  code  of  laws  could  the  verdict  have 
been  given  in  any  sense  except  as  a  decision 
in  favour  of  the  status  quo  ?  The  existing 
text-books  of  International  Law,  whose  doc- 
trines must  rule  in  such  a  Court,  would  have 
to  be  read  backwards  before  anything  they 
contained  could  be  twisted  into  an  approval 
of  the  handing  over  of  her  oversea  dominions 


xxvi  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

from  the  lawful  ownership  of  feeble  Spain  to 
the  strong  but  aggressive  guidance  of  the 
United  States.  By  what  conceivable  legal 
process  could  the  dismemberment  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  by  Italy  and  the  Balkan 
States,  or  the  incorporation  of  the  South 
African  Republics  in  the  British  Empire, 
have  been  upheld  ? 

The  present  writer  desires  to  express  no 
opinion  on  those  questions,  some  of  them 
still  undecided.  But  it  is  impossible  to  over- 
look the  fact  that  those  "illegal"  actions 
are  defended  in  impassioned  language  by 
many  of  the  most  respected  publicists  in 
Europe  on  the  ground  that,  on  the  whole, 
and  assessed  by  the  higher  unwritten  law 
which  has  regard  to  the  liberty,  welfare 
and  progress  of  mankind,  each  and  all  of 
these  " lawless  transactions"  is  capable  of 
justification  because  the  human  race  is  the 
better  for  them,  not  the  worse. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  value 
of  the  principle  of  arbitration  is  impugned  be- 
cause the  principle  is, as  we  have  seen,  y.l-nnly 
inapplicable  in  certain,  and  those  the  i 
dangerous,  cases.  In  scores  of  lesser  quarn  1  s 
recourse  has  been  had  to  arbitration,  and  its 
awards  have  been  accepted  without  the  loss 
of  one  jot  of  national  honour  or  prestige. 
Still  less  is  it  fair  to  belittle  the  yeoman 
service  rendered  by  successive  Hague  Con- 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY    xxvii 

ferences  to  the  cause  of  humanity  by  the  codi- 
fication of  the  laws  of  war  and  of  neutrality. 
In  all  these  matters  we  have  lately  witnessed 
real  progress  and  large  prospect  of  future 
gains.  But,  all  this  notwithstanding,  in  a  last 
analysis,  as  Bacon  long  ago  pointed  out,  the 
ability  of  a  State  to  use  force,  the  power  to 
right  wrongs  and  uphold  claims  if  necessary 
by  the  sword  is,  and,  in  the  light  of  the 
foregoing  considerations,  seems  likely  for 
the  present  to  remain,  not  less  essentially  a 
condition  for  the  greatness  of  kingdoms  and 
estates  than  are  the  purely  municipal  and 
economic  qualifications — a  numerous  and 
contented  population,  equal  laws,  a  vigorous 
commerce,  equitable  taxation  and  the  like. 

Since,  then,  war  seems  destined  for  the 
present  to  be,  as  it  has  been  from  the  imme- 
morial past,  a  condition  which  may  from 
time  to  time  overtake  the  best  of  nations, 
it  behoves  a  prudent  people  to  prepare  in 
peace  time  to  make  war  effectively,  and  in 
such  fashion  as  shall  best  conduce  to  the 
prospect  of  victory. 

Herein  lies  the  justification  for  the  de- 
votion of  a  life's  career  to  the  problems 
of  defence,  or,  in  other  words,  of  war- 
like preparation  ;  and  if  such  preparation 
can  no  longer  be  dismissed — as  Herbert 
Spencer  might  have  dismissed  it  fifty 
years  ago — as  a  mere  deplorable  diversion 


xxviii    INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

of  the  vital  energies  of  the  race  from 
purely  industrial  activities  to  the  culti- 
vation of  its  "  teeth  and  claws/'  if  it  has 
at  length  come  to  be  recognized  that 
without  a  due  regard  for  the  efficiency  of  its 
"  teeth  and  claws  "  the  whole  body  politic 
of  the  modern  State  stands  in  jeopardy  every 
hour,  this  changed  outlook  is  in  the  British 
Empire  largely  due  to  the  teaching  of  men 
such  as  John  Colomb. 

As  Mr.  d'Egville  so  clearly  indicates  in 
his  opening  chapters,  there  were  at  the  date 
when  Colomb  entered  upon  public  life 
scarcely  any  reasoned  convictions  amongst 
British  statesmen  on  defence  questions. 
It  might,  indeed,  almost  be  said  that  such 
convictions  as  did  exist  were  fundamentally 
erroneous.  Soldiers  and  sailors  alike  seemed 
in  the  early  sixties  to  have  gone  astray  on 
first  principles.  So  far  as  the  writer  is 
aware,  the  Admiralty  at  that  date  acquiesced 
without  protest  in  the  perverted  strategical 
theories  which  prompted  the  building,  at  :\ 
huge  cost,  of  the  Palmerston  Forts.  Subse- 
quent Sea  Lords  laid  down  ship  after  ship 
for  coast  defence  in  defiance  of  the  funda- 
mental purpose  for  which  the  British  Fleet 
exists  and  of  the  strategic  necessity  which 
demands  that  its  role  must  always  be  the 
offensive  and  its  battle  ground,  not  the 
British  coast,  but  the  open  sea,  if  not  the 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR)  C.  L.  OTTLEY  xxix 

coastline  of  its  enemy.  The  War  Office 
figured  to  itself  terrific  stealthy  descents  of 
legions  of  continental  soldiery  upon  the 
defenceless  shores  of  England,  and  prepared 
to  meet  that  dire  contingency  not  as  Eliza- 
bethan England  met  it,  on  the  sea,  but  by 
a  system  of  hedgerow  defence  of  the  English 
shires. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that 
John  Colomb  broke  his  first  lance  for  Im- 
perial Defence  by  his  maiden  essay  on  The 
Protectioji  of  Commerce  and  the  Distribution  of 
our  War  Forces  Considered.  In  it  he  empha- 
sized the  fundamental  principles  which, 
thanks  largely  to  the  pioneer  work  done  by 
himself  and  his  brother,  Admiral  P.  H. 
Colomb,  have  since  come  to  be  accepted  as 
governing  our  whole  Imperial  Defence  sys- 
tem, namely,  that  the  British  Empire  floats 
upon  the  British  Navy,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  that  Empire  only  exists  on  the  con- 
dition that  in  war  time  it  is  capable  of 
holding  command  of  the  sea. 

The  long  Iliad  of  his  struggles  in  defence 
of  this  irrefragable  axiom  is  well  unfolded 
in  the  book  before  us.  If  his  teaching  can 
be  summarized  in  a  single  sentence,  it  might 
be  said  that  he  stood  for  a  sane  consideration 
of  all  the  factors  in  the  problem  of  defence, 
and  an  assessment  of  each  of  them  at  their 
true  worth  and  in  their  true  relative  pro- 


xxx    INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

portion.  He  saw  the  problem  of  Imperial 
Defence  "  steadily  "  and  he  saw  it  "whole." 
He  had  ever  in  mind  the  evolution  of  a 
systematic  plan  which  should  embrace,  not 
merely  the  Mother-Country,  but  the  remotest 
islands  and  most  distant  possessions  of  the 
Empire,  and  should  co-ordinate  every  branch 
of  national  life  in  a  great  plan  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  world-wide  possessions  of  the 
British  Crown. 

His  conception  of  the  duties  of  the  British 
Navy  in  war  was,  in  consequence  of  his 
clear-cut  convictions  stated  above,  perfectly 
simple  and  explicit.  The  Fleet  of  Britain 
must  command  the  maritime  communica- 
tions of  the  Empire  throughout  the  world. 
Its  strength  must  be  proportionate  to  its 
colossal  task.  The  organization  and  num- 
bers of  the  British  Army  were,  in  Colomb's 
view  to  be  based  upon  the  postulate  that 
our  Navy  was  capable  of  fulfilling  this 
fundamental  duty.  If,  by  some  frightful 
mischance,  the  Navy  should  prove  incapable 
of  holding  the  sea  communications  of  the 
Kmpire,  the  "game  was  up/'  The  Empire 
would  automatically  cease  to  exist.  Fr 
ment  by  fragment  it  must  disintegrate,  and, 
it  \var  continued  long  enough,  starvation 
would  overtake  the  dense  population  at  its 
heart.  What  palliative,  <  olomb  demanded 
ol  his  countrymen,  would  a  standing  army 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY   xxxi 

of  a  million  men  provide  against  the  spectre 
of  ruined  industries  and  perhaps  slow  star- 
vation ?  What  would  be  the  use  of  a  con- 
script army  on  the  continental  scale  to  a 
belligerent  who  had  lost  the  means  of  putting 
its  soldiers  upon  the  continent  ?  So  long, 
then,  as  there  was  any  danger  of  the  Navy 
proving  inadequate  to  fulfil  its  vital  function 
of  keeping  open  the  sea  communications, 
the  cure  for  that  appalling  menace  was  not 
to  provide  more  soldiers  to  slowly  starve,  or 
fret  in  impotent  inactivity  on  the  soil  of 
the  Motherland,  but  to  add  more  and 
more  ships  to  the  British  Fleet,  until  such  a 
preponderance  of  naval  force  was  at  our 
disposal  as  would  ensure  that  the  vital  con- 
dition of  sea  command  should  be  fulfilled. 

Such  being  ColomVs  conception  of  the 
part  which  must  be  played  by  the  British 
Fleet  in  war,  his  ideals  regarding  the 
organization  and  strength  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  Empire  were  necessarily  co- 
ordinated upon  it.  The  entire  fabric  of 
our  military  policy  reposed,  in  his  view, 
upon  the  condition  precedent  of  a  Navy 
strong  enough  to  give  us  the  command  of 
the  sea.  It  followed  that  the  invasion 
of  the  tJnited  Kingdom  on  a  large  scale 
was  a  contingency  which,  in  his  view, 
ought  not  to  be  considered,  or,  as  he  would 
himself  probably  have  put  it,  the  implication 


xxxii    INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

was  not  so  much  that  invasion  was  abso- 
]  ut  cly  impossible,  as  that,  amongst  the 
dangers  to  which  a  political  organization  of 
the  unique  character  of  the  British  Empire 
is  in  war  time  likely  to  be  exposed,  the 
chance  of  successful  invasion  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  minimum,  since  in  any  case  the 
calamity  was  only  one  of  several  others 
which  might  or  might  not  take  place  if  we 
permanently  lost  command  of  the  sea. 
When  that  was  lost,  all  was  lost.  But,  un- 
less and  until  that  supreme  disaster  over- 
took us,  Colomb's  view  was  that  the  blow  at 
the  heart  could  not  be  delivered  ;  we  could 
not  successfully  be  invaded  in  force. 

And  here  we  may  pause  for  a  moment  to 
notice  that  the  opinion  expressed  by  John 
Colomb,  and  the  little  company  of  sturdy 
pioneers  who  thought  with  him,  has,  by  sheer 
force  of  argument,  now  not  only  reached  a 
position  of  general  acceptance  from  both 
I  ><  >1  itical  parties  in  the  State, but  from  soldiers 
and  sailors  also.  If  we  may  judge  from  the 
recent  public  pronouncements  of  successive 
Prime  Ministers,  it  is  to-day  an  axiom  of 
Imperial  Defence  policy.  Opinions  may 
indeed  still  differ  as  to  the  umximum  force, 
wind i,  embarking  on  board  swift  transports 
,  1 1 1  d  employing  tactics  of  evasion,  might  elude 
the  guard  of  the  British  Fleet  and  effect  a 
temporary  lodgment  on  the  soil  of  Great 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY  xxxiii 

Britain.  But  the  principle  that  the  per- 
manent invasion  of  the  United  Kingdom  in 
force  is  so  improbable  a  contingency  that  it 
may  safely  be  neglected,  is  now  generally 
conceded. 

What,  then,  are  the  functions  of  the 
British  Army  ?  Colomb,  with  his  clear  grip 
upon  the  essential  factors  of  the  problem, 
had  no  hesitation  on  this  point.  The  Army 
was  to  be  "  the  spear/'  the  Navy  "  the 
shield."  The  military  needs  of  the  Empire 
demanded,  firstly,  garrisons  for  the  naval 
bases  and  defended  ports  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  abroad  ;  secondly,  an  army 
for  the  defence  of  India  ;  and,  thirdly,  an 
expeditionary  force  for  service  outside  the 
United  Kingdom.  Incidentally  the  neces- 
sity for  providing  periodical  reliefs  for  our 
garrisons  abroad  and  in  India  guaranteed 
the  presence  in  the  United  Kingdom  at  any 
given  moment  of  a  considerable  force  of 
regulars. 

To  these  self-evident  necessities  on  the 
military  side  prudence  adds  also  the  provi- 
sion of  a  force  for  home  defence  large  enough 
to  give  a  good  account  of  any  raiding  ex- 
pedition, which  might  effect  a  temporary 
landing.  Herein  lies  the  justification  for  the 
Territorial  Army.  Whatever  its  merits  or  de- 
fects, it  exists  for  the  fulfilment  of  this  duty. 
Much  has  been  written  lately  in  criticism  of 


"'  ' 


xxxiv  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

its  shortcomings  in  numbers  and  in  training, 
and  Lord  Roberts  himself  has  lately  thrown 
all  the  weight  of  his  great  authority  into 
a  patriotic  endeavour  to  awaken  British 
people  to  its  weakness  in  these  respects. 
The  personal  magnetism  and  military  repu- 
tation of  our  greatest  living  soldier  are 
doing  their  work,  and  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  nation,  as  a  whole,  has  been 
deeply  stirred.  It  is  uneasy  ;  and  so  far  as 
this  uneasiness  results  in  improved  military 
training  and  organization,  all  Englishmen 
will  wish  well  to  the  movement.  But, 
against  any  attempt  to  raise  in  Great 
Britain  a  home-defence  army  on  the  conti- 
nental scale,  we  may  be  sure  that  John 
Colomb  would  have  set  his  face  as  a  flint.  For, 
even  if  our  national  resources  permitted — 
as  they  would  not — of  our  maintaining  at 
one  and  the  same  time  a  fleet  on  the  present 
standard  and  a  home-defence  army  on  the 
continental  scale,  he  regarded  an  army  on 
the  latter  scale  as  needless,  and,  therefore, 
wasteful  dissipation  of  strategic  effort.  It 
is  because  there  appears  to  be  some  danger 
that  the  criticism  of  our  military  organiza- 
tion may  rise  to  a  crescendo  of  panic  which 
may  hurl  us  towards  those  useless  and 
dangerous  strategic  theories  which  John 
Colomb  set  himself  to  combat  two  genera- 
tions ago,  that  the  publication  of  this 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY    xxxv 

volume  is  opportune.  His  outlook  was 
singularly  free  from  bias  towards  the  mili- 
tary or  the  naval  professions.  He  depre- 
cated any  kind  of  rivalry  between  the  two 
Services  ;  he  regarded  them  as  being  as 
essentially  two  parts  of  a  whole  as  the  hilt 
and  blade  of  a  sword.  No  just  conclusion, 
he  held,  could  be  reached  as  to  the  strength 
or  the  disposition  of  the  Army  without  also 
considering  the  strength  and  disposition  of 
the  Fleet.  To  discuss  the  Navy  Estimates 
and  the  Army  Estimates  in  separate  water- 
tight compartments  seemed  to  him  the 
height  of  absurdity.  But  he  went  much 
further  than  this.  Recognizing  that  arma- 
ments depend  upon  policy,  he  looked  for- 
ward to  the  institution  of  a  central  Council 
of  Defence  at  which  not  merely  the  Army 
and  the  Navy,  but  the  Cabinet,  and  more 
particularly  the  Foreign  Office,  should  be 
represented  ;  and,  some  years  before  his 
death,  he  saw,  in  the  creation  of  the  Defence 
Committee,  the  fulfilment  of  his  hope. 

His  imagination  indeed  took  a  still 
wider  sweep.  By  a  process  of  logical  de- 
duction he  predicted  the  necessity  which, 
seen  dimly  fifty  years  ago,  grips  Imperial 
statesmanship  by  the  throat  to-day.  John 
Colomb,  in  a  word,  foresaw  the  time  when, 
if  the  Empire  was  to  hold  together,  it  would 
be  essential  to  call  the  Dominions  to  the 


xxxvi  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

Imperial  council-board.  To  the  present 
writer  the  whole  future  of  Imperial  Unity 
appears  to  focus  upon  this  great  ideal,  and  the 
st»-ps  which  have  Urn  taken  towards  its  rea- 
lization must  be  now  alluded  to  very  briefly. 

As  regards  Naval  Defence,  it  will  be  re- 
membered that  at  the  Imperial  Conference 
of  1909  the  Admiralty  enunciated  the  un- 
impeachable truism  that  "the  greatest  out- 
put of  strength  for  a  given  expenditure  is 
obtained  by  the  maintenance  of  a  single 
Navy  with  concomitant  unity  of  training 
and  unity  of  command/'  and  they  added  the 
sufficiently  obvious  rider  that  "the  maximum 
power  would  be  gained  if  all  parts  of  the 
Km  pi  re  contributed  to  the  sources  of  the 
British  Navy."  In  greater  or  less  degree 
each  of  the  Oversea  Dominions  did,  as  a 
consequence  of  that  Conference,  contribute 
something  more  to  the  general  stock  of  the 
naval  resources  of  the  Empire,  and  no  one 
who  has  followed  the  trend  of  public  opinion 
in  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand  and 
South  Africa  during  the  last  two  years  can 
doubt  that,  on  the  whole,  the  sense  of  a 
solidarity  of  interests  on  defence  matters 
between  themselves  and  the  Mother-Country 
is  everywhere  growing. 

But,  unless  the  defensive  league  between 
ourselves  and  tin  Oversea  Dominions  is  to 
disappear  with  the  lapse  of  time,  and  the 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY  xxxvii 

growth  in  the  Dominions  of  the  sense  of 
nationality,  it  is  urgently  important  that  a 
way  should  be  found  as  quickly  as  possible 
for  reconciling  the  very  natural  desire  of 
these  young  communities  for  a  voice  in  the 
shaping  of  the  Foreign  Policy  of  the  Empire, 
and  for  a  control  over  their  now  rapidly 
growing  expenditure  on  defence,  with  the 
fundamental  strategic  principle  of  single 
control  in  war  on  which  every  seaman  and 
strategist  naturally  insists.  That  unity  is 
strength  is  as  true  in  strategy  as  elsewhere, 
and  (though  the  lesson  is  more  than  2,000 
years  old),  the  experience  of  Athens  and  the 
break-up  of  the  Delian  League  points  a 
moral  which  must  not  be  disregarded.  The 
difficulties  which  confront  us,  though  great, 
are  not  insurmountable.  Various  proposals 
have  been  put  forward  from  time  to  time  to 
meet  them.  The  one  which  seems  to  the 
present  writer  the  most  promising  is  the 
creation  of  a  local  Naval  Board  in  each 
Dominion  to  administer  the  local  naval 
finances,  and  in  peace  time  supervise  its  own 
naval  personnel  and  material,  thus  giving  a 
large  measure  of  local  control  ;  and  the 
admission,  side  by  side  with  the  creation  of 
these  Local  Boards,  of  representatives  of  the 
Dominions  to  the  councils  of  the  Admiralty 
in  Whitehall. 

It  is  at  least  possible  that  similar  pro- 


xxxviii  INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

posals  might  be  worked  out  for  ensur- 
ing to  each  Dominion  the  local  control,  in 
peace,  of  her  military  forces,  side  by  side 
with  a  cordial  welcome  of  her  military 
experts  at  the  headquarters  of  our  own 
Imperial  General  Staff.  The  recent  crea- 
tion of  that  Staff  is  itself  not  merely  a 
measure  of  the  greatest  strategical  impor- 
tance, but  politically  it  is  a  pledge  of 
military  co-operation  and  mutual  assistance 
in  warlike  preparation  the  significance  of 
which  can  scarcely  be  exaggerated. 

For  the  present,  and  until  wars  finally 
cease  upon  the  earth,  the  main  interest  of 
any  people  must  still  be  not  commercial 
gain  but  security  ;  the  certitude  of  safety 
against  warlike  aggression.  The  danger 
seems  to  be  that  this  aspect  of  the  Imperial 
Federation  problem  may  be  overlooked. 

The  forces  of  disintegration,  trifling  by 
comparison,  are  fully  in  evidence ;  much  is 
made  of  opposing  fiscal  and  financial  inter- 
ests, and  of  minor  questions  in  which  the 
Motherland  and  the  Dominions  do  not  see 
eye  to  eye.  Hence  the  urgent  need  of  a 
marshalling  of  the  forces,  surely  vastly 
stronger  than  any  centrifugal  tendencies, 
which  make  for  unity  and  federation.  We 
want  ,i  quickened  sense  of  the  family  Ixnxl, 
of  the  f«  <  lin:_r  that  "  no  distance  breaks  the 
ties  of  blood,  brothers  are  brothers  ever- 


INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY    xxxix 

more/'  and  that  when  we  speak  with  the 
enemy  in  the  gate  we  speak  with  a  united 
voice.  A  special  importance,  therefore,  at- 
taches to  the  policy  recently  inaugurated  as 
regards  both  Naval  and  Military  Defence, 
of  active  and  constant  interchange  of  infor- 
mation, and  of  the  personnel  of  the  Staffs, 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  Mother-Country 
and  of  the  Dominions.  The  object  in  view 
is,  of  course,  primarily,  to  ensure  that  when 
war  breaks  out  the  whole  complicated 
machinery  of  Imperial  Defence  works 
smoothly  and  with  lightning  speed.  But  a 
secondary  advantage  of  no  mean  importance 
is  also  to  be  looked  for,  since  every  officer 
and  man  interchanged  between  the  Home 
and  Dominion  Staffs  is  unconsciously  dis- 
charging the  functions  of  an  ambassador  of 
Empire,  and  preaching  by  the  mere  fact  of 
his  presence  the  essential  doctrine  of  the 
brotherhood  of  the  British  race. 

The  sense  of  racial  fraternity  between 
the  English-speaking  peoples  will  be  fostered 
in  proportion  as  such  interchange  becomes 
habitual  and  a  matter  of  course.  But  this 
invaluable  moral  factor  in  the  problem  can- 
not be  expected  to  survive  unless  side  by  side 
with  the  burdens  borne  by  the  Dominions  in 
the  personnel  and  material  of  Defence,  goes 
a  fair  share  of  Representation  in  shaping  the 
Foreign  Policy  of  the  Empire.  The  means 


xl      INTRODUCTION  BY  SIR  C.  L.  OTTLEY 

by  which  this  essential  condition  of  Imperial 
Unity  is  to  be  brought  about  demand  anxious 
and  careful  consideration.  Mr.  d'Egville  him- 
self makes  certain  proposals  on  the  subject 
which  are  important. 

To  sum  up.  We  appear  to  have  arrived 
at  a  parting  of  the  ways.  The  question 
of  Imperial  Representation  hammers  at  the 
doors.  Unless  advantage  is  taken  of  the 
opportunity  to-day,  that  opportunity  may 
be  lost  for  ever.  This  little  book  will  not 
have  been  written  in  vain  if  it  serves  to 
draw  attention  to  the  fine  contribution 
which  John  Colomb  made  towards  a  correct 
understanding  of  Imperial  problems  and 
their  rational  solution,  and  for  this  reason  it 
is  to  be  hoped  that  Mr.  d'Egville's  volume 
will  be  widely  and  sympathetically  read. 

CHARLES  L.  OTTLEY. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888 


CHAPTER    I 
PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888 

"Sir  John  Colomb,  the  father  of  modern  English  naval  strategy 
and  the  pioneer  of  Imperial  Defence.  No  more  original  and  no 
more  judicious  mind  has  been  engaged  in  the  study  of  these 
problems  during  the  last  forty  years,  and  if  sound  ideas  on  naval 
war,  and  on  its  place  in  the  defence  of  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  Empire,  are  now  more  widespread  than  they  were  fifteen 
or  twenty  years  ago,  the  change  is  due  chiefly  to  Sir  John  Colomb, 
of  whom  all  the  British  thinkers  on  maritime  war  are  directly 
or  indirectly  the  disciples." — Morning  Post.1 

Introductory. — Sir  John  Colomb  as  early  exponent  of  Prin- 
ciples of  Imperial  Defence. — Period  covered  by  present 
Work. — Connexion  between  Defence  Policy  and  Closer 
Union  of  Empire. — Defence  Principles  at  beginning  of 
century  contrasted  with  Policy  of  1859. — "  Steam  has 
bridged  the  Channel." — Royal  Commission  of  1859  and 
its  findings. — Sir  John  Colomb  on  Protection  of  Com- 
merce, the  purely  Military  Spirit,  Co-operation  with 
Colonies,  and  Striking  Army. — Invasion  Scare  of  1871. — 
Lord  Cardwell  on  Principles  of  Defence — Sir  John 
Colomb  on  Command  of  Sea  and  Imperial  Water  Roads 
and  plea  for  controlling  power  over  Navy  and  Army. — 
Carnarvon  Commission  of  1879. — The  new  revelation, 
"  Imperial  Defence." — Sir  John  Colomb  and  necessity 
for  Naval  Intelligence  Department. — Need  for  syste- 
matic study  of  Sea  Commerce  in  relation  to  Naval  Opera- 
tions.— Creation  of  new  Department  at  Admiralty. — 
»» 

1  See  article  on  death  of  Sir  John  Colomb  in  issue  of 
May  28,  1909. 


IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Imperial  Federation  and  larger  aspects  of  British  De- 
fence.— Divorce  between  Admiralty  and  War  Office,  an 
influence  against  Colonial  Co-operation. — Sir  John 
Colomb  begins  work  in  House  of  Commons. — Relations 
of  Navy  and  Army  when  considered  in  Parliament.— 
Differences  between  Admiralty  and  War  Office  regarding 
Invasion. — Necessity  of  central  control. — Hartington 
Commission,  1888. — Combined  action  between  two 
Departments  necessary. — Suggested  Naval  and  Military 
Council. 


STUDENTS  of  defence  and  of  modern  political 
and  economic  conditions  may  find  some  difficulty, 
during  the  whirl  of  present  controversy,  in  tracing 
the  principles  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  British 
Defence  and  which  must  ultimately  form  the  bed- 
rock of  closer  union  if  the  Empire  is  to  endure. 
This  difficulty  arises  from  the  fact  that  though  the 
principles  affecting  the  safety  of  states  and  the 
regulation  of  war  are  unchanging,  the  adminis- 
trators of  the  last  half  century  have,  with  one  or 
two  exceptions,  ignored  the  fundamental  truths 
of  the  British  position,  and  have  yielded  to 
popular  delusions,  and  sought  to  allay  popular 
fears,  by  the  acceptance  of  doctrines  which  logic- 
ally involved  the  assumption  that  the  Empire  and 
the  Navy  had  ceased  to  exist. 

Policies  of  the  last  fifty  years  have  provided  for 
huge  expenditure  upon  fortifications,  or  upon 
training  men  to  defend  the  hedgerows  of  England 
when  maritime  supremacy  should  have  passed 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888        5 

from  British  hands,  and  statesmen  have  contem- 
plated with  equanimity  the  abandonment  of  sea 
supremacy  in  the  defence  of  a  world- wide  Empire. 
But  during  all  this  time  the  fight  for  British  safety 
upon  the  seas  was  waged  by  a  small  band  of 
pioneers,  who,  in  the  later  phases  of  our  Empire's 
story,  have  seen  the  acceptance  of  the  principles 
for  which  they  have  striven,  and  the  recognition 
of  the  Unity  and  Defence  of  the  Empire  as  the 
basis  of  British  policy.  Some  record  of  the 
strenuous  fight,  therefore,  should  not  only  be  full 
of  instruction  for  students  of  the  present  day,  but 
should  also  prove  of  real  utility  to  those  adminis- 
trators and  politicians  who  desire  to  avoid  the 
errors  of  the  past. 

It  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  place  any  such 
record  before  the  public  apart  from  the  life-work 
of  one  man,  who,  during  the  early  days  of  the 
history  of  Empire  Defence,  left  his  career  in  the 
Service  to  lead  the  onslaught  against  the  bulwarks 
of  popular  prejudice  and  delusion,  supported  as 
they  were  by  official  apathy  and  confusion  of 
thought,  and  lived  long  enough  to  see  the  princi- 
ples for  which  he  fought  take  a  firm,  and,  it  is 
hoped,  lasting  root  in  the  minds  of  leading  states- 
men. That  man  is  the  late  Sir  John  Colomb,  and 
round  his  life-work  the  present  small  volume  is 
written  in  the  belief  that  this  treatment  will  most 


6      IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

effectively  serve  the  end  in  view ;  viz.,  a  clear 
enunciation  of  the  principles  of  British  Defence, 
and  a  plain  indication  of  the  lines  along  which  it 
is  hoped  the  statesmen  of  the  great  sister-nations 
may  proceed  in  the  endeavour  to  promote  the 
co-ordination  of  the  resources  of  the  Empire  in 
peace,  and  their  effective  combination  to  ensure 
its  safety  in  war. 

The  period  of  half  a  century  which  is  covered 
by  the  following  pages  has  been  chosen  for  many 
reasons,  the  chief  of  which  it  is  sufficient,  perhaps, 
to  state  here.  Firstly,  then,  it  has  been  chosen 
because  the  years  since  1860  have  been  the  most 
fruitful  in  affording  illustrations  of  past  failure  to 
recognize  the  British  Empire  as  a  fact  in  relation  to 
its  defence,  and  opportunities  are  consequently 
provided  of  pointing  the  lesson  of  the  future ; 
secondly,  because  the  work  of  the  pioneers,  led  by 
the  brothers  Colomb,  took  place  within  this  period, 
and  changed  the  whole  current  of  thought,  and 
in  the  end  the  policy  and  practice,  of  successive 
Admiralty  and  War  Office  administrators ;  and 
thirdly,  because  the  later  of  these  eventful  years 
have  seen  the  awakening  of  Greater  Britain  to  the 
call  of  a  maritime  Empire. 

It  would,  perhaps,  appear  to  the  superficial 
observer  of  the  defensive  history  of  the  last  fifty 
years  that  many  of  the  phases  through  which 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888       7 

we  have  passed  have  had  little  bearing  upon 
Imperial  Unity.  But  when  it  is  remembered 
that  during  the  time  referred  to  the  United 
Kingdom  has  regulated  the  defensive  policy 
of  the  whole  Empire,  and  has  been  responsible 
for  its  safety,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  ad- 
herence to  principles,  and  continuity  of  thought, 
in  dealing  with  the  problems  with  which  the 
Mother-Country  has  been  faced,  must  have  had 
the  greatest  possible  effect  both  upon  the  course 
taken  by  the  Oversea  States  in  the  past  and  upon 
the  steps  they  may  contemplate  in  the  future. 
Statesmen  of  the  United  Kingdom,  therefore,  who 
failed  to  recognize  that  the  Defence  of  the  Empire 
did  not  resolve  itself  merely  into  the  defence  of 
the  shores  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  that  the 
functions  of  the  Navy  and  the  Army  were  inter- 
related as  part  of  a  world-problem  and  not  to  be 
understood  by  putting  the  Admiralty  and  War 
Office  into  water-tight  compartments,  were  not 
only  responsible  for  huge  expenditure  on  useless 
works  at  home,  but  were  ignoring  the  existence 
of  the  Empire  as  a  single  organism,  and  the  dis- 
astrous results  which  would  attend  the  omission 
to  include  the  growing  States  oversea  in  the 
formation  of  any  scheme  of  Empire  Defence. 
That  the  shortsightedness  of  statesmen,  anxious 
to  please  an  insular  and  ignorant  people,  did  not 


8      IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

cause  the  break-up  of  the  Empire  as  a  maritime 
State,  was  due,  in  a  large  measure,  to  Sir  John 
Colomb,  who,  from  the  early  years  of  his  prolonged 
campaign  on  behalf  of  Imperial  defensive  organiza- 
tion, never  failed  to  insist  on  the  essential  Unity 
of  the  Empire,  and  the  urgent  necessity  of  looking 
upon  the  defence  of  each  portion  of  it  as  part  of 
a  scheme  for  the  defence  of  the  whole. 

The  observations  that  follow  will  deal  with  the 
struggle  for  the  recognition  of  principles  and 
their  application  to  practical  policy  ;  but  in 
order  to  appreciate  the  subject  from  the  wider 
aspect,  as  affecting  the  Empire,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  pay  some  attention  to  the  main  features  of  our 
defensive  history  during  the  eventful  half  century 
which  closed  with  the  year  1912. 

During  the  early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 
it  is  roughly  correct  to  say  that  the  object  of  our 
military  expenditure  was  to  provide  an  Army 
which  could  be  ready  for  service  beyond  the  seas 
as  a  necessary  complement  to  naval  power,  the 
local  military  defence  of  these  Islands  being  left 
to  the  Militia,  so  far  as  that  might  be  necessary 
under  the  protection  of  the  Fleet.  The  real  nature 
of  superior  sea  force  was  impressed  on  the  public 
mind  perhaps  with  the  greatest  force  by  Trafalgar, 
and  the  great  act  of  folly  committed  by  Napoleon 
when  he  ignored  the  elements  of  sea-power  during 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888       9 

his  ill-fated  expedition  to  Egypt.1  But  shortly 
before  the  year  1859  public  opinion  underwent  a 
change,  brought  about  in  a  large  measure  by  the 
concentration  of  public  attention  upon  the  military 
drama  in  the  Crimea,  followed  by  the  Indian 
Mutiny  and  the  War  in  China.  The  Fleet  not 
being  uppermost  in  the  public  mind,  it  was  easy 
to  overlook  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  com- 
bined Fleets  of  England  and  France  asserted  the 
maritime  supremacy  of  the  allies  and  rendered  the 

i  See  "  British  Defence,  1800-1900  "  read  by  Sir  John 
Colomb  before  Royal  Colonial  Institute,  April  10,  1900,  and 
published  in  British  Dangers  (London  :  Swan,  Sonnenschein 
&  Co.),  pp.  21-22. 

On  this  subject  Admiral  A.  T.  Mahan  writes  :  "  Bona- 
parte, to  quote  a  French  author,  never  attained  *  le  senti- 
ment exact  des  difficultes  maritimes.'  The  Army  had  ad- 
vanced into  the  enemy's  country ;  it  had  seized  its  first  ob- 
jective; but  the  blow  was  not  fatal  and  its  own  communi- 
cations were  in  deadly  danger.  There  was  no  relieving  force 
to  throw  in  supplies  and  reinforcements,  as  to  Gibraltar 
twenty  years  before,  because  the  hostile  Navy  controlled 
the  intervening  country — the  sea.  .  .  .  The  whole  under- 
taking from  beginning  to  end  illustrates  Lord  Kitchener's 
comment  on  present  day  conditions.  There  is  the  enforced 
absence  of  the  British  Navy  due  to  contemporary  military 
and  naval  conditions,  occasioned  by  the  events  of  the  war 
in  the  years  immediately  preceding,  and  there  is  the  disas- 
trous ultimate  result  as  soon  as  the  superior  Navy  recovered 
its  freedom  of  action."  See  Naval  Strategy,  p.  186  (London  : 
Sampson  Low,  Mars  ton  &  Co.) 


10    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

sea  safe  for  operations  in  Russia.  A  riddle  in 
Punch  aptly  described  the  popular  misconception 
of  the  position.  It  was  asked,  "  What  is  the 
difference  between  the  Fleet  in  the  Baltic  and  the 
Fleet  in  the  Black  Sea  ?  "  The  answer  being, 
'  The  Fleet  in  the  Baltic  was  expected  to  do  every- 
thing and  it  did  nothing ;  the  Fleet  in  the  Black 
Sea  was  expected  to  do  nothing  and  it  did  it." 
Though  these  Fleets  did  everything  required  of 
maritime  supremacy,  and  "  sea  command  was 
absolute,  without  effort,  by  the  alliance  of  the 
three  greatest  maritime  Powers  in  the  world,"  l 
the  public  were  not  able  to  realize  the  silent  power 
of  the  Navy,  and  statesmen  and  people  were  led 
to  doubt  the  capability  of  maritime  force  to  save 
an  island  people  from  the  bugbear  of  invasion. 
The  Prime  Minister  (Lord  Palmerston)  declared 
that  "  steam  has  bridged  the  Channel."  The 
popular  voice  re-echoed  the  statement  and  clam- 
oured for  expenditure  upon  forts  and  forces,  in 
the  fond  belief  that  the  country  would  thus  be 
saved  from  the  consequences  involved  by  a  sudden 
descent  of  a  hostile  force  upon  our  shores.  The 
result  was  the  appointment  in  1859  of  a  Royal 
Commission  to  inquire  into  the  present  state, 
condition,  and  sufficiency  of  the  fortifications 
existing  and  projected  for  the  defence  of  the 
1  Sir  John  Colomb  in  British  Dangers,  p.  23. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      11 

United  Kingdom  and  for  considering  the  most 
effectual  means  of  placing  the  Kingdom  in  a  com- 
plete state  of  defence,1  and  the  Commissioners 
proceeded  to  consider  the  defence  of  the  United 
Kingdom  against  foreign  invasion.  Basing  their 
calculations  upon  the  inability  of  the  Fleet  to 
discharge  its  functions  in  war,  and  assuming, 
without  any  evidence,  that  the  Fleet  might  be 
disabled  by  storm,  overpowered,  or  temporarily 
absent,  the  Commissioners  reported  "  since  the 
application  of  steam  to  the  propulsion  of  vessels, 
we  can  no  longer  rely  upon  being  able  to  prevent 
the  landing  of  a  hostile  force  in  the  country,"  and 
having  made  the  astounding  assertion  that  an 
invading  Army  might  be  "  thrown  on  shore  in 
two  or  three  hours  "  proceeded  to  consider  the 
means  of  defence  against  an  enemy  when  landed. 
The  Commissioners  dismissed  the  combined  forces 
of  Navy,  Standing  Army,  and  Volunteers  as  inade- 
quate to  resist  invasion,  and  found  salvation  in 
"  fortifications."  2  Huge  outlays  upon  military 

1  Royal  Commission  on  the  Defence  of  the  United  King- 
dom, 1860. 

2  Commenting  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Royal 
Commission  of  1859-60  to  spend  enormous  sums  on  the  local 
defence  of  Portsmouth,  Plymouth,  the  Thames,  and  the  Med- 
way,  on  the  plea  that  the  country  would   never  stand  the 
expense  of  maintaining  a  Channel  Fleet  sufficiently  powerful 
to  cover  these  ports  and  therefore  to  preserve  the  water  com- 


12    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

works  resulted  from  the  Report  of  this  Commis- 
sion, and  the  influence  of  it  was  paramount  for  a 
considerable  period  and  laid  the  foundation  for 
much  of  the  policy  of  wasteful  expenditure  of 
successive  Secretaries  for  War. 

The  abandonment  of  principles  which  had  made 
the  United  Kingdom  great  and  laid  the  foundations 
of  our  maritime  Empire,  received  vigorous  treat- 
ment from  Sir  John  Colomb,  who,  after  many 
years  of  study,  entered  the  public  arena  in  1867 
with  the  publication  of  Protection  of  Commerce 
in  War,1  standing  alone  at  that  time  as  the  expon- 
ent of  the  doctrine  of  sea  supremacy  in  relation 
to  the  defence  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
safety  of  its  oversea  commerce  and  possessions. 
In  this  able  essay  he  declared  "  in  all  naval  and 
military  operations,  whether  offensive  or  defensive, 
there  is  a  golden  rule,  to  neglect  which  is  certain 
ruin  ;  it  is  the  fundamental  law  which  applies  to 
all  warfare  and  is  simply  this,  that  the  success  of 


munications,  Admiral  P.  H.  Colomb  wrote  in  1889  "it  is 
now  scarcely  conceivable  that  such  an  argument  could 
have  been  put  forward  except  as  a  joke  !  "    See  Essays  on 
Naval  Defence  (London  :  W.  H.  Allen  &  Co.),  p.  6. 

1  It  was  in  respect  of  this  pamphlet  that  Admiral  P.  1 1 . 
Colomb  wrote  "  it  may  be  fairly  said  to  have  given  the  key- 
note to  all  subsequent  discussions."  See  also  Author's 

Notr. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      13 

all  operations  depends  upon  the  disposition  of  the 
forces  in  such  a  manner  as  will  best  secure  the 
base  of  operations  and  ensure  safety  and  freedom 
of  communication." 

In  a  notable  article  appearing  in  18721  Sir 
John  Colomb  reviewed  defensive  arrangements 
and  policy  from  1859.  He  said  :  "  The  first  thing 
of  striking  importance  is  the  growth  of  a  purely 
military  spirit  amongst  us,  plainly  exhibited  (1) 
by  the  spontaneous  action  of  the  nation  in  arming 
and  organizing  itself  into  a  Volunteer  Force  of 
170,000  binding  itself  to  serve  for  the  defence  of 
Great  Britain  only ;  (2)  the  resuscitation  and 
total  re-organization  by  successive  Governments 
of  the  Militia  and  Yeomanry,  a  force  of  some 
150,000  legally  bound  to  serve  only  in  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  ;  (3)  the  complete  re-organiza- 
tion of  our  regular  Army — '  horse,  foot,  and 
artillery '  ;  (4)  the  construction  of  splendid  forti- 
fications and  military  works  in  the  United  King- 
dom at  Plymouth,  Portsmouth  and  Chatham,  etc., 
which  did  not  exist  twenty  years  ago.  Now,  the 
whole  of  these  great,  extraordinary,  and  rapid 
movements  in  a  purely  military  direction  spring 

1  The  article  originally  appeared  in  the  British  Trade 
Journal  of  January  1,  1872,  and  subsequently  formed  Chapter 
ii  of  The,  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain  (London  :  Edward 
Stanford,  1880). 


14    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

originally  from  a  feeling  of  national  insecurity, 
created  by  the  fall  of  the  national  confidence  in 
the  power  of  the  *  wooden  walls  of  old  England  ' 
to  protect  these  Islands  from  invasion." x  In 
this  same  paper  Sir  John  Colomb  went  on  to  point 
out  that  the  national  stake  on  the  water  was  then 
four  times  as  great  as  in  1859,  and  warned  his 
readers  of  the  danger  of  forgetting  that  "  the 
purely  military  defence  of  our  Empire  as  a  whole 
must  ever  be  secondary  to  its  naval  security." 
He  pleaded  for  a  more  equal  distribution  of  the 
burdens  of  naval  defence  between  the  Mother- 
Country  and  the  Colonies,  starting  here  the  idea, 
in  respect  of  which  subsequent  chapters  will  show 
the  development,  that  "  we  must  not  ask  our 
Colonies  simply  for  cash,  but  we  must  enlist  their 
active  sympathy  and  practical  help  in  a  common 
effort  for  a  common  good.  If  the  foundation 
stones  of  any  real  system  of  British  Naval  Defence 
are  ever  to  be  laid,  the  Colonies  must  be  called 
into  consultation  on  the  matter."  He  ended  by 
asking  for  a  Royal  Commission  to  be  appointed 

1  Writing  much  later  (in  1899)  Admiral  P.  H.  Colomb 
said  :  "  Every  re-examination  I  make,  every  fresh  illustra- 
tion that  I  bring  before  my  mind  with  the  view  of  balancing 
it,  tends  more  and  more  to  raise  the  value  of  all  that  keeps 
up  communication  by  sea,  and  to  lower  the  value  of  all  abso- 
lutely fixed  local  Defences."  Essays  an  Naval  Defence,  p.  19. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888     15 

to  inquire  into  a  subject  of  such  vital  importance 
to  each  and  all  parts  of  the  Empire,  which  he 
thought  would  not  fail  to  lay  down  "  principles 
ensuring  ultimate  co-operation  and  practical  suc- 


cess." 


It  must  not  be  supposed  from  the  foregoing 
that  Sir  John  Colomb  was  ever  such  an  exponent 
of  the  so-called  "  blue- water  "  doctrine  as  to  ignore 
the  necessity  of  military  force  as  the  complement 
of  the  Navy.1  So  far  back  as  1870  2  while  pro- 
testing against  the  attempt  to  "  Prussianize"  our 
system,  he  showed  that  our  defence  was  not  a 
purely  naval  question,  because  "  First,  National 
Defence  does  not  mean  merely  the  defence  of  these 
small  islands ;  Second,  the  defence  of  a  country 
is  best  secured  by  being  prepared  to  carry  war  into 
that  of  an  enemy."  3  In  other  words,  Sir  John 

1  In  the  course  of  the  article  in  the  Morning  Post,  from 
which  an  extract  is  quoted  at  the  head  of  this  chapter,  the 
writer,  in  referring  to  Sir  John  Colomb  and  his  brother,  Ad- 
miral P.  H.  Colomb,  said  :    "  They  were  among  the  ablest 
exponents  of  the  '  Blue  Water  School '  properly  so-called  ; 
but  even  the  most  ignorant  and  unconscientious  faddist  would 
find  in  their  works  no  support  for  the  so-called  tenets  of  the 
imaginary  '  Blue- Water  School/  which  has  from  time  to  time 
been  set  up  to  do  duty  as  a  scarecrow." 

2  Imperial  Strategy  (London  :    Edward  Stanford,   1871). 

3  It  is  pointed  out  by  the  well-known  Naval  authority, 
Mr.    James    R.    Thursfield,  with     characteristic     clearness, 
that  "It  is  hardly  a  paradox  to  say  that  all  defence  is 


16    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Colomb  believed  that  no  war  on  the  seas  in  which 
the  Empire  was  engaged  could  ever  be  brought  to 
a  successful  conclusion  without  a  "  striking " 
Army  for  the  purpose  of  transport  oversea  to 
carry  war  into  the  enemy's  camp,  and,  therefore, 
he  deprecated  heavy  expenditure  upon  military 
forces  whose  liability  for  service  was  confined  to 
these  shores.  To  use  a  simile  frequently  employed 
by  him  in  reference  to  the  defence  of  a  maritime 
Empire,  "  The  Navy  is  the  shield  to  guard  and 
the  Army  is  the  spear  to  strike  "  ;  but  the  length 
of  time  which  elapsed  before  the  official  acceptance 
of  this  now  very  obvious  truth  will  appear  from  a 
perusal  of  subsequent  observations. 

The  public  of  England,  however,  scared  by  the 
ruin  of  the  French  Empire  in  a  few  short  weeks 
of  war,  were  ready  to  see  in  that  event  a  confirma- 

attack.  It  is  nothing  but  the  truth  to  say  that  attack 
is  by  far  the  most  effective  form  of  defence.  '  The 
more  you  hurt  the  enemy '  said  Farragut  '  the  less  likely 
he  is  to  hurt  you,'  and  all  operations  of  warfare  between 
belligerents  of  anything  like  equal  power  are  conducted  on 
this  principle.  The  belligerent  who  acts  purely  on  the  de- 
fensive is  already  more  than  half-beaten,  and  is  probably 
only  holding  out  in  the  hope  either  of  receiving  assistance 
from  without  or  of  his  assailant  becoming  exhausted.  In 
either  case,  the  offensive  is  resumed  the  moment  it  becomes 
possible/1  See  "  The  Higher  Policy  of  I><  fmrc  "  appearing 
in  Nelson  and  other  Naval  Studies,  by  J.  R.  Thursfield  (Lon- 
don :  John  Murray),  pp.  343-4. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888     17 

tion  of  the  doctrines  laid  down  by  the  military 
Royal  Commission  of  1859,  and  were  induced  to 
believe  that  "  passive  "  defence,  or  the  creation 
of  forces  to  be  locked  up  behind  forts  "  waiting 
to  be  attacked,"  was  the  beginning  and  end  of 
national  safety.  The  picture  of  War  Office  ideals 
was  painted  by  Mr.  (afterwards  Lord)  Cardwell  in 
introducing  his  scheme  of  Army  reform  in  1871. 
He  said  :  "  Out  of  all  the  curious  whirl  of  scientific 
controversy  one  thing  emerges  clear,  that  scientific 
defence  is  gaining  on  scientific  attack.  I  believe 
if  we  agree  to  arm  our  population,  as  we  propose 
to  arm  them,  and  if  we  avail  ourselves  of  our 
national  means  of  defence  by  placing  torpedoes 
in  all  our  harbours  and  rivers,  and  rifles  behind  our 
ditches  and  hedges,  the  time  has  arrived  when  we 
need  no  longer  give  way  to  panic  or  fear  of  in- 


vasion.'1 


It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  shortsighted 
folly  and  confusion  of  thought  involved  in  the 
above  statement,  ignoring  as  it  does  the  whole 
basis  of  defence  necessary  not  only  for  an  island 
but  for  an  Empire  having  territories  throughout 
the  habitable  globe.  "  Consider  for  one  moment," 
Sir  John  Colomb  asked  in  a  paper  read  before  the 
Royal  Colonial  Institute,  "  on  what  the  presump- 
tion of  possible  invasion  rests.  It  rests  on  this— 
the  loss,  temporary  or  permanent,  of  the  command 


18    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

of  the  waters  surrounding  the  British  Islands. 
But  remember  that  the  lines  of  communication 
all  radiate  from  these  waters  ;  the  loss,  therefore, 
of  our  command  here  cuts  every  one  of  the  Im- 
perial lines  ;  and  what  is  this  but  investment  ?  "  l 
Once  again,  it  was  laid  down  in  this  paper  that 
"  the  command  of  the  sea  can  only  be  maintained 
by  a  scientific  combination  of  three  things- 
strategy,  purely  military  force,  and  purely  naval 
power.  The  command  of  the  sea  is  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  the  command  of  the  Imperial  roads,1 
the  securing  of  the  first  line  of  colonial  defen< 
Rather,  then,  than  a  military  force  tied  to  the 
shores  of  England,  Sir  John  Colomb  indie, 
the  necessity  in  the  defence  of  Imperial  com- 
munications of  a  mobile  military  force,  and  asserted 

1  "  Colonial  Defence,"  a  paper  read  before  the  Royal 
Colonial  Institute,  June  28,  1873,  and  forming  Chapter  iii 
of  The  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain. 

1  Mr.  Julian  S.  Corbett  writes  :  "  Command  of  the  sea 
means  nothing  but  the  control  of  sea  communications.  .  . 
In  maritime  warfare  the  control  of  communications  takes 
exactly  the  place  which  in  the  sister  art  is  occupied  by  tin* 
conquest  of  territory ;  and  when  we  say  that  the  primary 
object  of  our  battle  fleets  must  always  be  the  destruction 
of  the  battle  fleets  of  the  enemy,  what  we  really  mean  is  that 
the  primary  function  of  our  battle  fleets  is  to  seize  and  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  seizing  the  main  lines  of  comnni. 
tion.  See  England  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  (London  :  Long- 
mans, Green  &  Co.),  Vol.  i  at  p. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      19 

that  as  military  force  is  necessary  to  the  support 
of  naval  power,  and  as  in  our  case  military  force 
is  in  its  turn  dependent  upon  naval  power,  "  the 
distribution  of  the  one  must  have  reference  to  that 
of  the  other." 

In  this  paper  above  referred  to,  and  in  a  subse- 
quent paper,1  Sir  John  Colomb  demonstrated  the 
fallacy  that  Colonial  Defence  could  be  considered 
as  an  abstract  question,  or  that  National  Defence 
could  be  limited  to  the  defence  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  He  pointed  out  that  we  could  only 
secure  the  Imperial  water-roads  by  a  firm  grasp 
of  the  points  which  command  them,  and  that 
Fleets  would  be  paralysed  if  the  points  between 
which  they  were  to  operate  were  not  held  by 
militarjr  forces  sufficient  to  render  the  protection 
of  sea-going  Fleets  unnecessary.  As  the  Imperial 
strategic  points  "  had  been  and  are  utterly  neg- 
lected "  Sir  John  Colomb  urged  the  appointment 
of  a  Royal  Commission  to  inquire  into  the  matter. 
So  important  is  the  following  passage  in  view  of 
subsequent  history  that  it  is  well  to  give  it  in  full : 
"  Some  change  appears  necessary  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  our  war  forces,  because  as  the  protection 

of  the  Imperial  roads  is  partly  naval  and  partly 

<* 

1  "Imperial  and  Colonial  Responsibilities  in  War,"  read 
before  Royal  Colonial  Institute,  May,  1877,  and  forming 
Chapter  iv  of  The  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain. 


20  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

military,  there  is  no  one  controlling  power  over 
both ;  the  Admiralty  may  scatter  fleets  in  one 
direction,  the  War  Office  tie  up  military  forces 
in  another,  but  there  is  no  power  to  combine  the 
two,  and  without  such  combination  each  branch 
of  our  war  power  of  defence  would  be  helpless."  * 
But  the  lines  of  communication  so  vital  to  the 
preservation'of  the  Empire  in  war,  as  constantly 
insisted  upon  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  did  not  receive 
detailed  consideration  till  the  year  1879,  when 
another  Royal  Commission  was  appointed  to 
inquire  into  <fc  the  Defence  of  our  Coaling  Stations 
abroad."  This  Commission,  presided  over  by 
Lord  Carnarvon,  did  not  make  public  either  the 
evidence  taken  or  its  Report2;  but  a  furt lid- 
expenditure  upon  fortifications  evidenced  the 
military  character  of  the  Report,  due,  no  doubt, 
to  similar  exaggerated  notions  of  naval  possi- 
bilities which  influenced  the  Commission  of  1859. 
The  Commission  was,  however,  in  the  words  of 
Sir  John  Colomb  writing  many  years  later,8  ''an 
epoch-making  event.  It  was  the  official  acknow- 
ledgment that  the  theory  of  insular  defence,  even 

1  The  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain,  p.  80. 

2  A  great  deal  of  it  was,  however,  subsequently  published 
in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Colonial  Conference,  1887  ;  see  p.  103. 

*  "  Army  Policy  Past    and    Present,"  National    Review, 
June  1904. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      21 

in  its  purely  military  aspect,  was  a  sham,  and 
that  to  secure  these  islands  the  Empire  as  a  whole 
must  be  defended.  Thus  came  the  new  revelation 
—Imperial  Defence  ;  and  the  War  Office  idol  was 
shaken  on  its  pedestal  in  Pall  Mall." 

Having  traced  very  roughly  some  of  the  main 
features  of  policy,  largely,  it  will  be  seen,  regulated 
by  considerations  of  a  military  character,  it  will 
be  well  to  turn  for  a  moment  to  matters  more 
closely  affecting  the  protection  of  our  commerce 
upon  the  high  seas. 

The  trend  oj  thought  at  the  period  mentioned 
can  perhaps  best  be  appreciated  by  the  following 
observations  made  by  Sir  John  Colomb  in  the 
course  of  a  Lecture  delivered  on  May  13,  1881, 
entitled  "  Naval  Intelligence  and  Protection  of 
Commerce  in  War."  1  He  wrote  :  "  Public  opin- 
ion will  not  apparently  turn  out  of  the  current  of 
ever-changing,  but  now  always  purely  military, 
theories  of  insular  defence  requirements,  to  a  calm, 
quiet  contemplation  of  the  grim  realities  of  modern 
maritime  war  to  a  people  dependent  on  the  sea 
for  daily  bread." 

The  Lecture   was   without  doubt  the   ablest 

argument  that  had  yet  appeared  in  this  country 

for  the  urgent  need  of  an  efficient  Naval  Intelli- 

1  See  Journal  of   Royal  United  Service    Institution,  Vol. 

XXV- 


22  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

gence  Department,  and,  in  fact,  directly  led  to  the 
creation  of  that  Department  at  the  Admiralty. 
The  sad  neglect  of  the  Navy  in  this  most  vital 
direction  was  shown  when  Sir  John  Colomb  de- 
clared :  "I,  for  one,  feel  confident  that  our  Ad- 
miralty struggles  hard  to  obtain  complete  foreign 
information  with  the  miserably  scanty  means  pro- 
vided by  the  country  for  collecting  it.  It  is  a 
noteworthy  fact  that,  while  we  have  a  great 
Military  'Intelligence  Department,'  and  besides 
have  a  Military  Attache  at  the  Courts  of  the  great 
Powers,  we  are  quite  content  that  one  solitary 
naval  officer  should  be  charged  with  watching 
the  naval  developments  and  preparations  of  t In- 
whole  of  Europe." 

In  proceeding  to  demonstrate  the  need  of  a 
special  and  distinct  Intelligence  Department,  so 
constituted  as  to  be  in  a  position  to  ensure  that 
the  Admiralty  should  at  all  times  have  at  its  com- 
mand the  fullest  and  most  complete  information 
respecting  the  position  of  our  commerce  on  the 
sea,  the  author  indicated  the  lines  of  the  intelli- 
gence required,  one  being  in  relation  to  blockade 
and  the  other  to  the  direct  protection  of  com- 
merce. In  the  latter  connexion  he  wished  to  see 
a  systematic  study  of  the  general  laws  governing 
the  distribution  of  British  sea  commerce  through- 
out the  world,  of  the  influences  which  particular 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888     23 

wars  would  be  likely  to  produce  on  the  direction 
and  value  of  British  commerce  passing  over  differ- 
ent sea-lines,  of  the  development  of  grain-produc- 
ing lands  and  the  food  supply  of  the  United  King- 
dom in  war,  of  the  direction  of  coal  exports  from 
England  and  the  Colonies,  of  the  constitution  and 
speed  of  every  merchant  steamer  in  the  world 
capable  of  adaptation  as  a  war  cruiser,  and  of  the 
movements  of  foreign  ships  of  war.  Sir  John 
wished  really  to  see  a  "  Commercial  Intelligence 
Council  "  presided  over  by  an  Admiral  with  a  seat 
at  the  Board  of  Admiralty,  and  having  subordinate 
departments  in  our  great  Colonies,  and  showed 
by  means  of  diagrams  and  tables  how  impossible 
it  was,  without  a  complete  system  of  intelligence, 
to  provide  for  the  three  great  naval  operations 
in  war,  viz. — 

1st.     The  blockade  of  the  enemy's  coast ; 

2nd.  The  securing  of  the  ocean  routes  of  the 
world ; 

3rd.  Coast  covering  operations  off  neutral 
seaboards  to  provide  safety  for  our  com- 
merce on  passage  between  such  seaboards 
and  the  ocean  routes. 

In  the  ^ year  following  the  delivery  of  this 
Lecture,  the  then  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
(Lord  Northbrook),  referred  to  the  paper,  and 


24  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

stated  that  the  Board  of  Admiralty  had  taken  the 
matter  into  consideration  and  hoped  to  set  on  foot 
a  system  which  would  bring  together  the  scattered 
materials  of  Naval  Intelligence.  In  the  Navy 
estimates  of  1884-5  appeared  for  the  first  time  a 
charge  of  £1,796  for  "  Foreign  Intelligence  Com- 
mittee," but  it  was  not  until  February  1,  1887, 
that  it  became  a  "  Naval  Intelligence  Depart- 
ment," when  the  charge  amounted  to  £4,648.  It 
may  be  pertinent  to  remark  here  that  it  was  very 
many  years  before  the  amount  of  the  charge  for 
the  Naval  Intelligence  Department  even  ap- 
proached the  charge  for  the  Military  Intelligence 
Department  at  the  War  Office. 

Other  aspects  of  the  Naval  situation  brought 
into  prominence  both  by  the  rapid  development 
of  the  Oversea  Colonies  and  the  growth  of  the  sea 
interests  of  the  United  Kingdom  were  made 
apparent  about  this  time,  but  for  further  details 
as  to  the  movement  towards  co-operation  in 
defence  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Oversea  States  the  reader  is  referred  to  Chapters 
III  and  IV.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  moment  to 
say  that  the  formation  of  the  Imperial  Federation 
League  (of  which  Sir  John  Colomb  was  one  of  the 
Founders  and  original  Vice-Chairmen)  in  1885,  and 
the  delivery  of  a  Lecture  by  Sir  John  Colomb, 
entitled  "  Imperial  Federation,  Naval  and  Mili- 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      25 

tary  "  *  had  a  very  distinct  influence  in  turning  the 
current  of  official  thought  towards  the  larger 
aspects  of  British  Defence. 

But  still  the  strange  divorce  between  the 
Admiralty  and  the  War  Office,  and  the  absence 
of  any  co-ordinating  power  regulating  the  func- 
tions of  the  two  Departments,  was  responsible 
not  only  for  wasteful  expenditure,  but  also  for 
the  impossibility  of  framing  any  really  adequate 
system  of  British  Defence,  or  of  bringing  the  great 
and  growing  Oversea  Dominions  into  effective 
combination  with  the  United  Kingdom.  Not 
knowing  what  we  ourselves  wanted,  it  was  not 
surprising  that  the  1887  Conference  between  the 
representatives  of  the  Oversea  Colonies  and  the 
Home  Government  was  so  barren  of  results  ;  but 
if  the  two  great  spending  Departments  had  been 
in  close  consultation,  Chapters  III  and  IV  of  this 
book  would,  probably,  have  told  a  different  tale, 
and  might  have  recorded  the  history  of  a  real  and 
adequate  Imperial  combination  for  the  safety  of 
the  Empire  in  war. 

Seeing  how  great  was  the  necessity  for  taking 
every  step  possible  to  bring  about  co-ordination 
between  the  two  Services,  Sir  John  Colomb  entered 

1  Lecture-  before  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  on 
May  31,  1886.  King  Edward  VII  (then  Prince  of  Wales)  was 
present,  and  the  late  Duke  of  Cambridge  occupied  the  Chair. 


26  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  House  of  Commons  as  Member  for  Bow  and 
Bromley  in  the  year  1886.1  He  was  not  long  in 
proceeding  to  the  attack,  for,  after  several  speeches 
on  defence  during  1887,  he  moved  a  Resolution 
on  March  5,  1888  in  these  terms :  "  That  it  is 
desirable  that  this  House,  before  having  submitted 
to  its  consideration  the  Army  Estimates,  should 
be  in  possession  of  an  explanatory  statement  from 
Her  Majesty's  Government  setting  forth  the 
general  principles  of  defence  which  have  deter- 
mined the  gross  amount  proposed  to  be  allocated 
to  naval  and  military  purposes  respectively,  and 
indicating  the  main  lines  of  the  general  plan,  or 
programme,  of  British  Defence,  to  which  the 
Admiralty  and  War  Office  administration,  ar- 
rangement and  expenditure  are  respectively  to 
conform." 

In  his  speech  in  support  of  the  Resolution  Sir 
John  Colomb  was  brought  face  to  face  with  a 
difficulty  that  perhaps  illustrated  his  argument 
better  than  he  could  have  hoped.  In  considering 
the  relation  of  the  Army  to  the  Navy,  and  pointing 
out  that  although  our  sea  interests  had  grown 
enormously  we  spent  four  millions  more  upon 

1  From  the  year  1886  to  1892,  Sir  John  Colomb  repre- 
sented Bow  and  Bromley.  From  the  year  1895  to  1900,  and 
again  from  1900  to  1905,  Sir  John  Colomb  represented  Great 
Yarmouth. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      27 

the  Army  than  upon  the  Navy,  he  was  called  to 
order  by  the  Speaker,  who  considered  the  observa- 
tion would  be  more  properly  made  upon  the  Navy 
Estimates.  However,  Sir  John  was  able  to  get  his 
points  home,  and  these  he  summed  up  as  follows  : 
"  It  was  proposed  to  have  the  Army  Estimates 
discussed  by  a  Committee,  who  would,  however, 
only  deal  with  the  military  part,  while  the  Naval 
Estimates  would  be  referred  to  another  Committee 
who  would  only  deal  with  the  naval  part."  He 
thought  they  were  working  a  system  of  National 
Defence  in  two  watertight  compartments,  without 
any  real  responsibility,  and  no  central  controlling 
authority  for  both.  "  Our  safety  in  war,"  he 
affirmed,  "  would  have  to  be  evolved  out  of  dual 
control  and  divided  responsibility." 

On  June  4  of  the  same  year  Sir  John  Colomb 
returned  to  the  attack,1  and  charged  the  War 
Office  with  assuming  Naval  conditions  without 
inquiry,  more  especially  in  relation  to  the  Invasion 
of  England.  In  reply  to  the  War  Secretary's 
assertion  that  the  Intelligence  Departments  of  the 
Navy  and  Army  were  in  communication,  Sir  John 
Colomb  asked  how  it  was  that  the  head  of  the  War 
Office  Intelligence  Department  stated  that  150,000 
men  could  be  landed  on  these  shores  in  a  week, 
while  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  stated  that 
1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol.  cccxxvi. 


28  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

it  was  impossible  for  100,000  men  to  be  conveyed 
across  the  Channel  without  absorbing  the  total 
carrying  power  of  France,  and  that  th?  operations 
would  consume  weeks.  By  such  examples  he 
drove  home  his  point  that  "  working  the  defence 
of  the  country  under  two  Departments  without 
central  control  they  never  got  at  the  truth  or  at 
a  correct  basis  as  to  how  they  should  proceed." 

Meanwhile,  the  strenuous  work  of  Sir  John 
Colomb  and  those  who  were  pressing  the  claims 
of  a  supreme  Fleet  as  the  most  urgent  necessity 
for  all  parts  of  the  British  Empire  was  beginning 
to  make  itself  felt,  and  many  representative  men, 
not  hitherto  specially  interested  in  defence,  awoke 
to  the  fact  that  all  was  not  well  with  the  Navy 
in  comparison  to  foreign  countries,  and  that  its 
functions  in  relation  to  the  Army  were  ill-defined 
and  unsatisfactory.  So  it  came  about  that  yet 
another  Royal  Commission l  was  appointed  in  1888, 
under  the  Chairmanship  of  Lord  Hartington,  to 
examine  "  the  Civil  and  Professional  Administra- 
tion of  the  Naval  and  Military  Departments,  and 
the  relation  of  those  Departments  to  each  other." 

The  Report  of  this  Commission  afforded  a  clear 
vindication  of  that  for  which  Sir  John  Colomb  had 
contended  up  till  almost  the  day  of  its  appoint- 
ment, for,  in  referring  to  the  two  great  Depart- 

1  o.  5979. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      29 

ments,  the  Report  stated  :  "  While  in  action  they 
must  be  to  a  large  extent  dependent  on  each  other, 
and  while  in  some  of  the  arrangements  necessary 
as  a  preparation  for  war  they  are  absolutely 
dependent  on  the  assistance  of  each  other,  little 
or  no  attempt  has  ever  been  made  to  establish 
settled  and  regular  inter-communication  or  rela- 
tions between  them,  or  to  secure  that  the  estab- 
lishment of  one  Service  should  be  determined  with 
any  reference  to  the  requirements  of  the  other." 
Later,  the  Commissioners  asserted  that  "  no  com- 
bined plan  of  operations  for  the  Defence  of  the 
Empire  in  any  given  contingency  has  ever  been 
worked  out  or  decided  upon  by  the  two  Depart- 
ments," and  again,  "  there  does  not  appear  to  us 
to  exist  sufficient  provision  for  the  consideration 
by  either  service  of  the  wants  of  the  other  .  .  . 
and  there  is  a  want  of  such  definite  and  estab- 
lished relations  between  the  Admiralty  and  the 
War  Office  as  would  give  the  opportunity  to  either 
Department  of  calling  the  attention  of  the  other 
to  the  condition  of  the  establishment  and  pre- 
parations in  which  it  is  vitally  interested." 

The  Commissioners  made  various  recommenda- 
tions as  to  the  internal  arrangements  of  the 
Admiralty  and  War  Office,  providing  for  greater 
personal  responsibility  and  the  separation  of  exe- 
cutive from  administrative  duties,  etc.  ;  but  the 


30  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

suggestion  of  most  interest  and  importance  in  the 
wider  sense  was,  undoubtedly,  that  which  had 
reference  to  the  formation  of  a  :c  Naval  and 
Military  Council  "  to  be  presided  over  by  the 
Prime  Minister,  and  to  consist  of  the  Parliamentary 
Heads  of  the  two  Services  and  their  principal  pro- 
fessional advisers.  The  Council  might,  it  was 
also  suggested,  include  officers  of  great  reputa- 
tion, but  not  holding  official  appointments  in  the 
Admiralty  or  War  Office  at  the  time,  and  it  should 
meet  before  the  Estimates  of  the  year  were  de- 
cided on  by  the  Cabinet  "  so  that  the  establish- 
ments proposed  for  each  Service  should  be  dis- 
cussed from  the  point  of  view  of  the  other  ;  and 
the  relative  importance  of  any  proposed  expendi- 
ture might  be  fully  considered."  The  Council 
could,  it  was  added,  meet  also  from  timo  to  time 
to  decide  unsettled  questions  between  thr  t\\<> 
Departments,  and  it  would  be  essential  that  its 
proceedings  and  decisions  should  be  recorded, 
11  instances  having  occurred  in  which  Cabinet 
decisions  have  been  differently  understood  by 
the  two  Departments,  and  have  become  practically 
a  dead  letter."  l 

The  importance  of  the  above  proposal  in  the 


1  Lord  Randolph  Chun-hill  as  a  Member  of  the 
appended  a  Memorandum  to  the  Report  in  which  he  advocated 
the  abolition  of  the  Office  of  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1859-1888      31 

history  of  Imperial  Defence  can  scarcely  be  over- 
estimated ;  but,  though  meeting  with  hearty  sup- 
port from  the  pioneers  of  defence,  it  was  consigned 
to  the  limbo  of  things  forgotten  by  the  officials, 
and  not  until  many  years  later  did  it  emerge  under 
the  title  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence.1 
Some  idea  of  the  mistakes  which  might  have 
been  avoided,  and  of  the  valuable  Imperial  work 
which  might  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
earlier  adoption  of  the  proposal  may,  perhaps,  be 
gained  from  a  perusal  of  the  following  chapter, 
where  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  trace  some 
further  stages  of  the  gradual  evolution  towards  an 
organized  system  of  British  Defence. 

of  the  Board  of  the  Admiralty,  and  the  creation  in  their  place 
of  three  new  offices  : 

(1)  A  Commander-in-Chief  for  the  Navy, 

(2)  A  Commander-in-Chief  for  the  Army,  and 

(3)  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  the  control  of  Parliament 

and  supplying  the  needed  link  between  the  Services 
a  Secretary  of  State  and  Treasurer  for  the  Sea  and 
Land  Forces  of  the  Crown." 
1  See  p.  57. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909 


CHAPTER   II 
PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909 

"  Divided  control  means  divided  responsibility ;  and  that 
in  turn  means  no  responsibility,  or  at  least  one  very  hard  to 
fix"— ADMIRAL  A.  T.  MAHAN.1 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  Council  of  Defence. — The  Invasion  of 
England  based  on  Military  theories. — Mr.  Brodrick 
and  Home  Defence. — Sir  John  Colomb  and  Striking 
Force. — Examination  into  theories  of  Invasion. — French 
Ports  and  Transport  Facilities. — Cabinet  Committee  of 
Defence. — The  Militia  as  an  Imperial  Force. — Marine 
Garrisons  for  Naval  Bases. — Danger  of  Dual  Control. — 
Military  Works  and  mobile  Forces. — Wei-hai-Wei. — 
Lessons  of  War  in  South  Africa,  Naval  and  Military. — 
Mr.  Brodrick  and  Army  Reform. — Sir  John  Colomb  on 
Military  Defence  of  United  Kingdom. — Cabinet  Com- 
mittee of  Defence  useless  in  controlling  War  Office. — 
Mr.  Balfour  establishes  real  Committee  of  Imperial  De- 
fence.— Recognition  of  Sir  John  Colomb 's  arguments. — 
Reference  to  Colonies  and  Committee. — Royal  Commis- 
sion on  War  in  South  Africa. — Esher  Committee. — Pro- 
posals for  development  of  Defence  Committee. — Mr. 
Arnold-Forster's  estimate  of  situation. — Mr.  Balfour 
on  Imperial  Defence  Committee  and  Invasion  of  England. 
— Navy  and  Army  discussed  together  in  House  of  Com- 
mons for  first  time. — Mr.  Arnold -Forster  and  Mr.  Haldane 

1  Naval  Administration  and  Warfare  (London  :  Sampson 
Low,  Marston  &  Co.),  p.  26. 


36  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

on  Functions  of  Army. — Lord  Roberts  and  Invasion  of 
England. — Government  position. — Subsequent  investiga- 
tions by  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence. — Mr.  Asquith's 
Statement  thereon. — Recognition  of  Principles  for  which 
Sir  John  Colomb  contended. 


IT  will  have  been  seen  from  the  foregoing  how 
much  of  the  theory  and  practice  of  our  defensive 
policy  up  to  the  appointment  of  the  Hartington 
Commission  had  been  based  upon  the  possibility 
of  a  military  "  invasion  of  England."  If  the 
Report  of  that  Commission  had  induced  the 
Government  of  the  day  to  realize  the  importance 
of  bringing  the  heads  of  the  two  great  Departments 
more  closely  together,  a  great  portion  of  the  sub- 
sequent campaign  of  Sir  John  Colomb  might  have 
been  rendered  unnecessary.  As  it  was,  the  recom- 
mendation in  favour  of  the  creation  of  a  Council 
of  Imperial  Defence  was  not  acted  upon.  Speak- 
ing in  the  House  of  Commons  on  July  13,  189 1,1 
Sir  John  Colomb  advocated  what  was  really  an 
extension  of  the  idea  as  outlined  by  the  Hartington 
Commission,  viz.,  a  Council  of  Defence  upon  which 
"the  Mother-Country  and  her  Dependencies  should 
be  represented."  The  adequate  treatment  of 
this  theme,  however,  in  its  earlier  and  later  stages 
can  more  appropriately  be  deferred  till  the  matter 
of  co-operation  of  the  Oversea  Dominions  in  defence 

1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debate*,  Vol.  ccclv. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909      37 

is  considered  in  greater  detail,1  and  meantime  it 
will  be  well  if  an  attempt  is  made  here  to  examine 
a  little  more  fully  than  heretofore  the  attitude  of 
the  school  of  thought  which  considered  that  a 
policy  based  on  the  theory  of  a  great  military 
descent  upon  the  British  Isles  was  a  wasteful  War 
Office  delusion,  and,  for  a  people  purporting  to 
control  the  destinies  of  a  great  Sea  Empire,  a 
hopeless  acknowledgment  of  naval  impotence. 

That  the  preparation  to  resist  the  invasion  of 
England  by  military  means  was  so  long  a  War 
Office  ideal  was  due  not  so  much  to  the  incom- 
petence of  War  Ministers  as  to  the  fact  that  their 
advisers  were  "  too  military  to  be  war-like." 
But  though  the  question  of  invasion  had  been  de- 
monstrated beyond  all  doubt  to  be  mainly  a  naval 
one  and  the  importance  of  providing  troops  for 
oversea  service  in  any  war  in  which  the  Empire 
might  be  engaged  was  clearly  apparent,  it  was 
indeed  disheartening  to  find  Mr.  St.  John  Brod- 
rick,2  as  representing  the  War  Office  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  adhering  to  the  same  old 
theory  so  late  as  1896  in  these  words  : — 

"  For  some  years  past  it  has  been  felt  that  we 
must  put  the  question  of  Home  Defence  in  the 
front  rank,  and  consider  as  subsidiary  to  it  the 

1  See  Chapters  III,  IV,  and  V. 

2  Now  Viscount  Midleton. 


38  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

question  of  the  extent  to  which  we  might  have  to 
send  forces  abroad."  * 

It  would,  no  doubt,  be  interesting  to  discuss 
here  how  great  was  the  responsibility  of  this  Minis- 
ter for  the  unpreparedness  of  our  striking  Army 
when  war  broke  out  in  South  Africa,  and  how 
Jittle  excuse  he  had  for  failure  to  grasp  the  ele- 
mentary lessons  of  past  history,  which  he  had 
heard  so  often,  indeed,  in  the  House  of  Commons 
from  such  men  as  Sir  John  Colomb,  Sir  Charles 
Dilke,  Mr.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster  and  others ;  but 
it  will  serve  a  more  useful  purpose  if  a  glance  is 
taken  at  a  few  of  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
Sir  John  Colomb  from  the  standpoint  he  repeatedly 
presented  to  the  House. 

On  March  13,  1896,  Sir  John  Colomb  brought 
forward  once  again  the  motion  set  out  on  page 
26,  and  devoted  himself  firstly  to  the  diminution 
of  the  striking  power  of  our  Army  oversea.  He 
pointed  out  that  we  had  greater  land  frontiers 
than  any  other  Power  in  the  world,  and  that  though 
the  defence  of  the  Empire  depended  upon  the 
co-operation  of  naval  power  with  military  force, 

1  Harvard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  13th  March,  1896— 4th 
Series,  Vol.  38,  page  919.  The  passage  quoted  occurred  in 
a  speech  of  Mr.  Brodrick's  made  in  reply  to  the  speech  of 
Sir  John  Colomb  in  moving  the  motion  to  which  reference 
is  subsequently  made  in  this  Chapter. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909      39 

yet  the  House  was  not  permitted  to  discuss  the 
policy  of  defence  by  the  combined  action  of  both 
Services.  In  showing  that  the  Estimates  of 
£17,000,000  provided  for  a  number  of  men  exceed- 
ing 500,000,  it  was  to  be  observed  that  not  one- 
third  of  that  force  was  available  to  take  the  field 
overseas,  and  Sir  John  asked  what  was  the  origin 
of  this  want  of  mobility.  He  traced  it  to  the 
influence  of  popular  feelings  of  past  times  ;  and  he 
asserted  that  our  military  policy  was  based  on  the 
assumption  that  our  primary  danger  was  a  great 
military  invasion  of  these  Islands,  whereas  the 
possibility  of  such  an  invasion  was  primarily  a 
naval  consideration.  However  great  the  foreign 
Army  might  be  (Sir  John  Colomb  observed),  the 
soldiers  could  not  swim  across  the  water  or  come 
in  balloons,  so  it  was  a  question  of  ports  and 
facilities  for  transport. 

He  then  took  France  for  illustration,  as  she 
was  geographically  the  nearest  Power,  and 
pointed  out  that  though  our  military  prepara- 
tions for  passive  defence  had  increased  enor- 
mously, the  steam  transport  of  France  had  not 
increased  to  anything  like  the  same  extent. 
The  ports  between  Dunkirk  and  Brest  did  not 
present  the  great  steam  transport  necessary  for 
an  invading  power,  and  the  bulk  of  shipping 
transactions  in  every  one  of  those  ports  was  car- 


40  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

ried  on  in  British  ships.  Counting  every  steamer 
she  had  above  two  tons,  France  had  only  1,200 
vessels,  and  these  were  distributed  over  innumer- 
able ports  lying  from  Dunkirk  in  the  Channel  to 
Villefranche  in  the  Mediterranean.  To  collect 
the  larger  vessels  at  any  port,  France  would  have 
to  suspend  the  whole  of  her  mercantile  operations 
for  many  months.  Sir  John  Colomb  asked  the 
House  to  think  of  the  considerations  in  the  mind 
of  a  possible  invader,  and  in  this  connexion  re- 
ferred to  the  matter  of  the  sea  transport  obtainable 
and  the  capacity  of  the  ports  suitable  for  the  issue 
of  the  invading  forces,  more  particularly  in  relation 
to  their  depth  of  water,  the  width  of  entrance, 
wharfage,  rise  and  fall  of  tides,  and  the  distance 
of  ports  from  each  other,  as  affecting  the  concen- 
tration as  a  whole.  Arrangements  for  the  unin- 
terrupted issue  of  each  separate  portion  of  the 
expedition  from  each  separate  port,  and  the  unin- 
terrupted transit  of  each  portion  to  the  rendezvous 
either  in  the  Channel  or  at  the  point  of  concen- 
tration on  our  coast,  would  also  have  to  be  con- 
sidered, and  this  in  addition  to  the  means  for 
disembarkation  required,  and  the  time  it  would 
take  to  hoist  out  the  boats  and  appliances  to  land 
units  of  the  military  force  sufficient  for  the  purpose 
of  covering  the  rest  of  the  force.1 

1  The  experiences  of  the  South  African  War  fully  confirmed 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909      41 

Sir  John  Colomb  believed  that  the  possibility 
of  invasion  was  regarded  from  a  two-fold  aspect 
—first,  that  we  had  lost  command  of  the  sea, 
and  secondly,  that  our  Fleet,  though  not  beaten, 
might  be  decoyed  away  from  the  Channel.  Even 
in  the  first-named  event,  it  was  shown  that  risk 
would  be  run  in  transporting  troops,1  and  as 

the  views  which  Sir  John  Colomb  had  put  forward  regarding 
the  many  difficulties  attending  the  transport  of  troops  oversea. 
Writing  in  1902,  Sir  John  Colomb  said  "It  is  notorious  that 
troops  were  ready  to  go  to  South  Africa  long  before  we  could 
arrange  to  embark  them.  The  difficulty  was — ships.  In  the 
month  of  October  1899,  for  example,  despite  the  strenuous 
efforts  of  the  ablest  officials,  naval,  military,  and  civil,  used 
to  the  business,  this  happened — the  greatest  maritime  power, 
commanding  all  its  shipping  resources,  and  using  five  of  its 
greatest  ports,  did  not  succeed  in  floating  and  getting  to  sea 
in  that  month  quite  32,000  troops,  with  less  than  4,000  horses." 
See  Our  Ships,  Colonies  and  Commerce  in  Time  of  War  (Lon- 
don :  P.  S.  King  &  Son),  p.  39. 

1  Sir  Charles  Dilke  and  Mr.  Spenser  Wilkinson,  in  their 
work  on  Imperial  Defence,  refer  to  the  opinion  of  Admiral 
Colomb  as  expressed  in  a  lecture  of  March  1,  1889,  supported 
by  Professor  (now  Sir  John)  Laughton  in  the  discussion  upon 
it,  that  "  any  Commander,  if  he  be  wise,  will  not  undertake  a 
territorial  attack  as  long  as  his  operations  may  be  interrupted 
by  a  Fleet  even  considerably  weaker  than  his  own."  The 
authors,  however,  prefer  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  Admiral 
Colomb's  Naval  Warfare  (p.  221)  "  that  an  expedition  of  mag- 
nitude, with  an  object  of  attack  which  requires  time  to  elapse 
for  its  reduction,  must  be  protected  by  a  naval  force,  and  also 
a  covering  force  large  enough  to  engage  on  equal  terms  any 


42  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

regards  the  second,  the  concentration  of  transport 
strength  would  be  a  difficult  work  and  would  take 
a  considerable  time  to  effect,  and  as  it  would 
certainly  be  known,  the  Fleet  would  not  be  de- 
coyed away.  Such  concentration  would,  of  course, 
be  impossible  so  long  as  we  held  command  of  the 
seas  and  regarded  the  enemy's  coast  as  our 
frontiers.1 

possible  Fleet  which  the  enemy  may  bring  to  bear.  In  such  a 
case,  and  in  such  a  case  alone,  a  territorial  attack  might  safdy 
be  attempted.  This  mode  of  operation,  would,  however,  not 
be  possible  against  Great  Britain,  except  by  a  combination 
between  the  other  maritime  Powers,  until  after  the  Briti>h 
Navy  had  suffered  a  decisive  reverse." 

As  to  the  lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War  in  this  con- 
nection see  Our  Ships,  Colonies  and  Commerce  in  Time  of  War, 
I  > y  Sir  John  Colomb.  (London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son),  p.  40  ;  and 
for  the  lessons  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  reader  should 
consult  Naval  Strategy,  by  Capt.  (now  Admiral)  A.  T.  Mahan 
(London :  Sampson  Low,  Marston  &  Co.),  Chapters  xiii  and 
xiv. 

1  Col.  Sir  George  S.  Clarke  and  Mr.  James  R.  ThurshYl.l. 
writing  in  their  book  The  Navy  end  the  Nation,  give  expression 
to  the  following :  "  The  command  of  the  sea,  is,  in  fact,  to 
England  in  time  of  war  what  the  inviolability  of  its  fr< 
is  to  a  continental  Power.  The  loss  of  it  is  to  all  intents  and 
purp  it  invasion  is  to  a  continental  Power.  The  fear 

of  actual  invasion  is  a  pure  chimera  so  long  as  our  Fleets  are 
able  to  protect  us.  N  r  who  has  ever  tried  to  conjure 

\\ith  it  has  been  able  to  make  his  reasoning  c\<  n  plausible 
without  assuming  to  begin  with  that  our  Fleets  have  < 
been  annihilated  or  wafted   into   space — *  decoyed  away'   is 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909      43 

In  this  connexion  it  is  well  to  pause  for  a 
moment  to  record  the  fact  that  a  good  deal  of 
controversy  has  taken  place  amongst  eminent 
naval  writers  as  to  the  doctrine  of  a  "  Fleet  in 
Being  "  as  applied  to  operations  in  naval  war. 
In  a  work  of  this  kind,  it  is,  obviously,  impossible 
to  enter  into  the  matter  more  than  to  say  that  a 
Commander  who  undertakes  a  military  expedition 
oversea  must  first  obtain  a  free  sea  in  order  to 
transport  his  troops,  and  this  can  only  be  done 
by  defeating,  masking,  or  keeping  at  a  distance 
"  any  hostile  force  which  is  strong  enough,  if  left 
to  itself,  to  interfere  with  his  movements." 

The  doctrine  of  a  "  Fleet  in  Being,"  so  far  as 
it  is  possible  to  make  any  general  statement  at 
all,  has  been  well  defined  by  Mr.  James  R.  Thurs- 
field  as  "  a  Fleet  strategically  at  large,  not  itself 
in  command  of  the  sea,  but  strong  enough  to  deny 
that  command  to  its  adversary  by  strategic  and 


the  favourite  expression  based  on  a  perverse  misunderstanding 
of  Nelson's  pursuit  of  Villeneuve.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
destruction  of  our  Fleets  would  certainly  render  invasion 
possible,  but  would  also  render  it  superfluous."  See  p.  54,  The 
Navy  and  the  Nation  (London  :  John  Murray).  For  a  treat- 
ment of  the  above-mentioned  operations  between  Nelson  and 
Villeneuve,  see  Chapter  xvi  of  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon 
the  French  Revolution  and  Empire,  by  Admiral  A.  T.  Mahan 
(London  :  Sampson  Low,  Marston  &  Co.). 


44  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

tactical  dispositions  adapted  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  case."  l 

To  revert  to  the  speech  of  Sir  John  Colomb  of 
March,  1896,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  he  empha- 
sized once  again  the  importance  of  the  House 
being  able  to  review  matters  of  military  and  naval 
policy  together,  and  in  making  reference  to  the 
new  Cabinet  Committee  of  Defence  pointed  out 
that  this  Committee  was  independent  of  the  House 
of  Commons,  for  the  House  could  not  review  the 
work  of  the  Committee.  Again,  referring  to  the 
want  of  mobility  in  our  Army,  he  considered  that 
the  37,000  trained  and  seasoned  soldiers,  locked 
up  in  Colonial  garrisons,  should  be  realized  for 
oversea  purposes  in  war,  and  that  we  should 
adopt  a  means  to  readily  replace  them.  This  he 
wished  to  see  done  by  making  the  Militia  an 
Imperial  force,  liable  for  service  in  Imperial 
garrison  work,  while  the  Volunteers  should  not 
only  serve  in  Great  Britain  but  in  Ireland  as  well. 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  his  desire  to  see  waste 
and  confusion  avoided  by  a  scientific  regard  for 
the  proper  functions  of  the  Navy  and  the  Army 
in  relation  to  each  other,  that  Sir  John  Colomb 
always  argued  in  favour  of  garrisoning  our  naval 

1  Nebon  and  other  Naval  Studies,  by  J.  R.  Thursfield  (Lon- 
don :  John  Murray).  The  doctrine  of  th«  I  I, « t  in  Being  " 
ft*  originated  by  Torrington  after  the  battle  of  Beachy  Head, 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909      45 

bases  with  Royal  Marine  Forces  and  putting  those 
places  under  the  control  of  the  Admiralty  instead 
of  the  War  Office.  In  a  speech  delivered  on  March 
5,  1897,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  he  complained 
that  the  defence  of  these  bases  was  treated  as  a 
purely  military  question,  whereas  the  developments 
of  modern  naval  warfare  made  such  defence  more 
and  more  aquatic.  He  argued  that  the  utility 
of  a  port  was  for  the  security  of  ships  and  that 
the  defence  of  the  naval  bases  involved  not  merely 
the  defence  of  the  mouth  of  the  port,  but  of  the 
area  round  the  port,  which  was  a  naval  question. 
He  maintained  that  dual  control  was  dangerous 
and  dual  administration  mischievous,  and  showed 

and  developed  by  Admiral  Colomb,  was  treated  by  Mr.  J.  R. 
Thursfield  as  "  worthy  of  all  acceptance."  (Cf.  Admiral 
Colomb's  essay  upon  "  The  Naval  Defence  of  the  United 
Kingdom,"  in  his  Essays  on  Naval  Defence,  London  :  W.  H. 
Allen  &  Co.).  The  views  of  Admiral  A.  T.  Mahan  on  this  head 
are  given  in  his  work  Naval  Strategy,  where  he  discusses  (p.  428) 
the  theory  of  what  he  terms  the  "  Fleet  in  Being  School " 
relating  to  the  paralyzing  effect  of  an  inferior  Fleet.  Admiral 
Mahan  writes :  "  It  is  now  more  than  fifteen  years  since  I 
read  Colomb's  Naval  Warfare.  It,  therefore,  is  not  fresh  in 
my  mind  ;  but,  in  referring  to  it  for  this  occasion,  I  found  among 
the  leaves  this  Memorandum  then  made  :  '  It  appears  to  me 
that  Colomb  advocates  too  exclusively  the  abandonment  of  a 
combined  expedition  upon  the  mere  threat  of  a  naval  force — 
not  necessarily  superior — but  even  equal  or  smaller.' '  See 
Naval  Strategy,  p.  430. 


46  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

that  the  effect  on  the  Army  of  breaking  up  batta- 
lions, in  order  to  garrison  these  bases,  was  to 
destroy  efficiency  for  work  in  the  field.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  argued  that  Marines  stationed  at 
various  naval  bases  could  spend  part  of  their 
time  on  shore  and  part  of  their  time  at  sea  (in 
the  latter  case  being  relieved  by  regular  troops, 
or,  better  still,  Militia,  home  and  Colonial)  and  in 
a  war  upon  the  seas  they  would  continue  to  meet 
the  requirements  which  history  had  shown  to  be 
so  essential,  viz.  the  provision  a  mobile  military 
force  at  the  disposal  of  the  Admirals  in  order  to 
seize  and  hold  positions  necessary  to  maritime 
operations. 

In  a  letter  *  to  the  Duke  of  Devonshire,  in  his 
capacity  of  President  of  the  Defence  Committee 
of  the  Cabinet,  Sir  John  Colomb  developed  the 
proposal  to  transfer  the  local  protection  of  ports 
abroad  (not  the  great  Naval  Arsenals  at  ports 
at  home)  to  the  Admiralty,  and  in  showing  the 
disadvantage  of  dual  control  of  the  War  Office 
and  Admiralty  at  naval  bases  he  instanced  the 
Pacific  Station  of  Esquimalt,  where  the  force  of 
Royal  Marine  Artillery  was  under  the  command 
of  the  General  commanding  at  Halifax  on  the 
Atlantic,  over  3,000  miles  away.  To  pursue  this 

1  Published  afterwards  as  Army  Organization  in  relation 
to  Naval  Necessities,  1898  (London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son). 


PEINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     47 

subject  further,  however,  would  involve  entering 
into  technicalities  which,  in  a  work  dealing  with 
general  principles,  it  is  desirable  to  avoid ;  but 
enough,  it  is  hoped,  has  been  said  to  show  that 
one  of  the  main  principles  underlying  the  pro- 
posal to  transfer  the  protection  of  naval  bases 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Admiralty  was  to  increase 
the  mobility  of  military  forces. 

In  support  of  the  same  principle,  but  for 
different  reasons,  Sir  John  Colomb  made  a  strong 
protest  in  the  House  of  Commons 1  against  War 
Office  expenditure  in  connexion  with  the  Military 
Works  Bill  of  1899.  The  Bill  was  for  £4,000,000, 
of  which  £3,000,000  was  for  barracks  and 
£1,000,000  for  what  was  called  Defence  Works. 
He  showed  that  though  in  1888  the  Inspector 
General  of  Fortifications  had  estimated  the  cost 
of  putting  the  whole  of  the  barrack  accommoda- 
tion throughout  the  Empire  on  a  proper  footing 
at  from  £4,000,000  to  £5,000,000,  the  War  Office 
had,  in  fact,  since  then  spent  £10,439,000  on  bar- 
racks and  was  now  asking  for  £3,000,000,  with 
the  prospect  of  another  £2,594,000,  to  follow 
shortly.  This  was  another  step  in  the  policy  of 
1872,  and  showed  that  the  War  Office  had  no  con- 
tinuous policy  in  the  distribution  of  troops,  while 

1  See  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates ,  July  6,  1899, 


48   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

it  illustrated  the  false  system  of  putting  gigantic 
building  works  into  the  hands  of  the  Royal  Engi- 
neers. He  criticized  the  expenditure  of  £130,000 
for  permanent  barracks  at  Wei-hai-wei,  and  in 
protesting  against  money  being  spent  on  defence 
works  at  that  place '  he  showed  that  nothing  would 
be  gained  except  the  locking  up  of  more  troops 
in  garrisons.  He  asserted  once  more  that  "  both 
on  the  land  and  at  our  ports  we  are,  except  in 
India,  endeavouring  to  fulfil  at  enormous  cost 
the  military  role  of  an  inferior  Naval  Power.  The 
two  things  are  incompatible,  and  simply  spell 

*  See   Hansard1 8   Parliamentary   Debates,    July    6,    1889. 

In  this  able  speech  Sir  John  Colomb  gave  the  history  of 
the  occupation  of  Port  Hamilton  in  the  face  of  naval  opinion 
that  it  was  not  a  desirable  place  to  hold.  As  regards  the  his- 
tory of  the  occupation  of  Wei-hai-wei,  this  place  was  first 
heard  of  in  April  1 888.  There  was  no  naval  survey  of  the  place 
until  June  1898,  though  the  Royal  Engineers  had  prej 
a  military  survey  for  the  defence  of  the  port  not  navally  sur- 
veyed. The  idea  of  embarking  on  permanent  expenditure 
at  Wei-hai-wei  could  not  withstand  the  repeated  onslaughts 
of  Sir  John  Colomb,  and,  though  the  War  Office  spent  money 
with  the  object  of  making  it  a  secondary  naval  base,  the  Ad- 
miralty refused  to  adopt  it  as  such.  It  was  some  time,  how- 
ever, before  the  War  Office  would  consent  to  abandon  their 
expenditure  of  £20,000  a  year  on  maintaining  a  regiment 
there.  In  announcing  the  Government's  eventual  decision 
to  disband  this  regiment  on  March  8, 1906,  Mr.  Haldane,  aa 
Secretary  for  War,  stated, "  Wei-hai-wei  was  originally  a  naval 
base  ;  now  I  believe  it  is  a  watering-place/1 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909     49 

military  waste  and  weakness,  and  we  are  drifting 
on  with  an  ever-increasing  military  expenditure 
on  garrisons  and  an  ever  decreasing  Army  available 
for  field  service." 

The  real  truth  of  the  principles  for  the  recog- 
nition of  which  in  practical  policy  Sir  John 
Colomb  had  been  strenuously  working  all  these 
years,  was  made  manifest  in  two  striking  direc- 
tions by  the  War  in  South  Africa — firstly,  the 
want  of  a  mobile  military  force  fully  prepared 
for  despatch  oversea,  and  secondly,  the  vital 
necessity  of  the  command  of  the  sea  to  enable 
a  military  war  to  be  carried  on  in  one  of  the 
oversea  territories  of  the  Empire. 

The  naval  lessons  of  the  War  were  shortly 
summed  up  by  Sir  John  Colomb  in  1900,1  when 
he  said  : — "  In  the  prosecution  of  that  War  we 
have  arrayed  against  us  the  declared  ill-will  of 
all  the  maritime  Powers  except  America.  But 
no  one  is  the  least  uneasy  ;  nowhere  is  it  thought 
that  the  animosity  displayed  by  the  foreign  Press 
will  go  beyond  empty  words.  .  .  .  We  may 
well  ask  why  we  are  so  calm,  so  unhaunted  by 
apprehension.  It  is  the  possession  of  a  powerful 
Fleet,  believed  by  us  and  by  foreign  Powers  to 
be  adequate  to  preventing  any  attempt  to  contest 

1  "  The  Navy  and  the  War,"  published  in  the  Naval  and 
Military  Record  and  other  papers  in  February,  1900. 


50   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

its  power.  .  .  .  The  grand  lesson  taught  by  the 
present  War  is  the  supreme  power  of  moral  effect 
exercised  by  a  Fleet  '  in  being.'  "  * 

But  as  regards  the  provision  by  the  War  Office 
of  a  mobile  military  force  for  service  oversea,  it 
was  pointed  out  by  Sir  John  Colomb  that  the 
War  in  South  Africa  "  shocked  the  Department 
into  a  lucid  interval."  2  As  a  result,  Mr.  Brod- 
rick,  taking  perhaps  to  heart  not  only  the  lessons 
of  the  War  but  the  repeated  warnings  of  Sir 
John  Colomb,  went  down  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons and  precisely  reversed  his  speech  of  1896,3 
when  he  had  asserted  that  the  War  Office  put 
Home  Defence  in  the  front  rank  and  considered 
as  subsidiary  to  it  the  question  of  sending  forces 
abroad.  In  introducing  the  Army  Estimates  of 
1901,4  Mr.  Brodrick  stated  :- 

'  I  think  the  events  of  the  last  fifteen  months 
have  proved  first  of  all  that  we  must  be  prepared 
to  send  more  than  two  Army  corps  abroad ; 
secondly,  that  these  Army  corps  must  be  better 
organized ;  and  thirdly,  that,  when  you  have  parted 

1  The  words  "  in  being  "  are  here  used  in  the  general 
sense. 

1  British  Dangers,  by  Sir  John  Colomb  (London  :  Swan 
Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  1902). 

*  See  p.  37. 

4  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  8,  1901,  p.  1057. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909     51 

with  the  force  which  it  is  necessary  to  send  out 
of  the  Kingdom,  you  must  have  a  sufficient 
organization  at  home  for  our  own  protection." 

Having  realized  the  order  of  importance  for 
military  preparation  in  any  scheme  for  the  De- 
fence of  the  Empire,  Mr.  Brodrick  proposed  that 
besides  Home  Defence  "  we  ought  to  be  ready 
at  any  moment  to  send  abroad  three  Army  corps 
with  the  proper  cavalry  divisions,  in  fact,  a  force 
of  120,000  men,"  and  his  proposal  contemplated 
holding  that  force  in  readiness  and  "  still  providing 
ourselves  with  power  to  defend  ourselves  at  home 
when  that  force  had  gone." 1 

While  welcoming  the  reversal  of  "  the  order 
of  two  great  features  of  recent  military  policy  " 
by  putting  first  the  necessity  of  having  120,000 
men  ready  at  any  moment  for  service  oversea,2 
Sir  John  Colomb  soon  discovered  that  the  policy 
was  being  whittled  away,  and  after  showing  how 

1  Though  this  speech  was  a  decided  improvement  upon 
the  same  Minister's  speech  of  1895,  so  far  as  it  evidenced  some 
acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of  a  striking  force  as  a  first  essential 
in  British  Defence,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  in  this  speech 
Mr.  Brodrick  showed  his  incapacity  to  assimilate  general 
principles  by  putting  forward  the  astounding  argument  that 
when  considering  the  Army  in  relation  to  home  defence, 
Members  should  not  "  confuse  their  minds  "  by  thinking 
about  the  Navy. 

?  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  May  14,  1901. 


52   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  War  Office  had  failed  in  South  Africa  by  put- 
ting oversea  service  in  the  background  of  policy, » 
he  protested  that  by  the  Resolution  then  before 
the  House  they  were  asked  to  vote  more  staff  and 
more  buildings  "  to  prop  up  a  military  super- 
structure on  rotten  foundations.  Because,"  he 
went  on,  "  in  South  Africa,  6,000  miles  away,  the 
Army  failed  in  mobility,  we  are  asked  by  this 
Resolution  for  more  men  to  lock  up  at  home.  Be- 
cause we  suffered,  and  suffered  terribly,  in  South 
Africa  from  insufficient  cavalry  and  field  artillery, 
we  are  coolly  asked  for  more  money  to  spend  on 
staff  and  buildings  for  the  defence  of  London." 
He  traced  the  "root  cause  of  the  mischief"  to 
the  policy  of  1871,  and  asserted  that  the  War 
Office  "  sticking  to  this  German  policy  still  keeps 
invasion  in  the  forefront  and  everything  else  in 
the  background."  Thus  we  had  the  Admiralty 
spending  £31,000,000  to  secure  the  safety  of  the 
sea,  and  a  large  part  of  the  £29,000,000  for  the 
Army  to  be  spent  by  the  War  OinY<-  h«  < mse  that 
Department  "  thinks  the  Admiralty  cannot  accom- 
plisli  that  purpose."2 

••(•  p.  37. 

vo  years  later,  Mr    H 

of   State  f«>r  \V,n.   with    the    lessons    lx-fuiv    him    which  an 
earnest  study  of  the  militai  s  of  the  past  f<  w  \«  ns  had 

taught,  was  able  to  justify,  if  indeed  any  justification 
needed,  the  attitude  of  Sir  John  Coloml>          In  I'.MH."  tin- 


PRINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     53 

Amongst  those  who  were  in  constant  com- 
munication with  Sir  John  Colomb  at  this  time  was 
Colonel  Sir  George  Sydenham  Clarke,  R.E.,1  who, 
though  himself  a  well-recognized  authority  on 
Defence,  to  the  study  of  which  he  had  devoted 
the  best  years  of  his  life,  was  ever  ready  to  acknow- 
ledge the  indebtedness  of  all  thinkers  to  the  pioneer 
teaching  of  Sir  John  Colomb.  As  secretary  to 
the  Hartington  Commission 2  and  the  Colonial 


War  Secretary  declared,  "  we  ought  to  have  known  something 
about  the  Blue  Water  principles  and  the  power  of  the  Navy 
to  defend  our  shores.  We  ought  to  have  separated  the  notion 
of  a  striking  force  for  defending  the  Empire  abroad  from  the 
notion  of  home  defence.  Yet  there  was  an  organized  plan 
which  apparently  owed  its  origin  to  German  models  and  under 
which  home  defence  and  foreign  necessities  were  mixed  up 
together,  with  the  result  that  there  was  one  huge  Army  pro- 
jected which  was  to  unite  in  itself  the  functions  of  that  home 
defence  which  even  at  that  time  were  seen  to  be  unnecessary. 
The  result  was  a  scheme,  which,  if  carried  out,  would  have 
brought  the  Army  Estimates  up  to  £40,000,000.  But,  for- 
tunately, in  this  event,  with  the  aid  of  the  new  policy  of  the 
Rt.  Hon.  gentleman  opposite  (Mr.  Arnold-Forster)  and  the 
work  of  the  Esher  Commission,  all  that  was  cut  down,  and  the 
worst  of  it  remains  in  the  Barracks  of  Tidworth  which  repre- 
sent the  outcome  of  the  policy." 

1  Now  Governor   of    Bombay.      Sir   George  Clarke   has 
just  been  Raised  to  the   Peerage  (January,  1913),  and  the 
present  writer  understands  that  he  will  henceforth  be  known 
by  the  title  of  Lord  Sydenham. 

2  See  p.  28. 


54    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Defence  Committee,  Sir  George  Clarke  had  already 
done  valuable  practical  work,  but  he  was  destined 
to  accomplish  a  great  deal  more  in  the  way  of 
defence  organization  when  he  became  later  a 
member  of  Lord  Esher's  famous  Committee  of 
three  which  was  appointed  to  "  re-constitute " 
the  War  Office.  The  view,  therefore,  of  Sir 
George  Clarke,  when  writing  to  Sir  John  Colomb 
upon  the  War  Office  schemes  of  1901,  is  of  special 
interest  as  given  in  the  following  letter : — 

"13,  GLEDHOW  GARDENS, 
SOUTH  KENSINGTON,  S.W. 

August  11,  1901. 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  JOHN, — .  .  .  I  despair  of  seeing 
a  definite  policy  adopted  here.  Ministers  do  not 
seem  to  have  time  to  "study  any  great  question, 
and  our  defence  measures  are  a  sort  of  com- 
promise which  results  only  in  great  waste  and 
general  weakness. 

"  The  Army  Scheme  and  all  it  involves  are  appal- 
ling to  my  mind.  It  falls  between  two  stools. 
It  will  not  increase  our  powers  of  offence  ;  it  will 
not  give  us  a  home  army  worthy  of  the  name  ;  it 
will  entail  Army  Estimates  up  to  £30,000,000, 
which  arc  not  needed  if  there  was  a  clear  and  defi- 
nite policy  recognizing  the  functions  of  the 
Navy.  .  .  .  Yours  sincerely, 

G.  S.  CLABKE." 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909     55 

In  entering  into  details  as  to  military  inva- 
sion in  his  speech  of  May  14,  1901,  Sir  John  showed 
the  difference  between  the  theories  of  the  War 
Office  and  the  Admiralty,  and  in  discussing  trans- 
port he  was  called  to  order  by  the  Speaker,  thus 
showing  once  again,  and  perhaps  more  clearly 
than  before,  how  impossible  it  was  by  the  Rules 
of  the  House  to  discuss  Army  Policy  in  relation 
to  the  Navy. 

Sir  John  considered  that  the  Volunteer  force 
was  more  than  sufficient  in  number,  if  adequately 
organized  and  made  reasonably  efficient,  to  perform 
all  the  military  defensive  duties  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  time  of  war  under  conditions  of  sea 
supremacy.  By  such  means  he  wished  to  see  the 
Militia  released  from  obligations  at  home  and 
able  to  discharge  Imperial  duties  abroad,  thus 
freeing  the  Regular  Army  for  general  service. 
Instead  of  this,  however,  the  War  Office  brought 
into  existence  a  new  force  of  35,000  mounted  men 
"  to  resist  invasion  at  five  shillings  a  day — the 
force  to  be  called  '  Yeoman  '  to  please  the  British 
public  at  home,  and  '  Imperial '  to  amuse  the 
British  people  abroad."  x  Sir  John  Colomb,  how- 
ever, saw  a  symptom  of  improvement  by  the  sub- 
sequent offer  of  £5  a  year  to  the  "  Imperial  Yeo- 

1  British  Dangers,  p.  7. 


56  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

man "  to  become  "  Imperial "  by  voluntarily 
agreeing  to  let  the  War  Office  off  the  contract 
which  precluded  his  liability  to  Imperial  Service. 
With  all  the  lessons  of  the  war  clearly  before 
him,  Sir  John  Colomb  was  thoroughly  impatient 
at  the  War  Office  theories  of  1901,  and  disgusted 
that  the  Defence  Committee  of  the  Cabinet  was 
showing  itself  of  little  service  in  applying  general 
principles.  Indeed,  he  went  so  far  as  to  describe 
the  Committee  as  a  "  pious  political  imposture 
without  any  control  over  the  War  Office  " l  and 
stated  his  fears  for  the  future  as  founded  upon 

1  In  this  connexion  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  opinion 
of  the  late  Mr.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster,  M.P.,  who  described 
himself  as  "  a  very  humble  pupil  "  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  ''who 
had  sat  at  his  feet,  so  to  speak,  in  the  matter  of  naval  policy 
for  a  very  long  time  "  (see  Report  of  proceedings  at  a  Meeting 
of  Junior  Constitutional  Club  on  February  16,  1899,  when  Sir 
John  Colomb  delivered  a  Lecture,  "  The  Navy  in  relation  to 
the  Empire  ").  Writing  before  he  took  office  as  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  referred  to  the  Cabinet 
Committee  of  Defence  as  follows  : — "  It  is  ill  to  speak  evil 
of  dignities,  but  it  is  not  possible  to  take  this  particular  in- 
stitution seriously.  It  is  a  joke,  and  a  very  bad  one.  .  .  . 
As  a  means  of  communication  between  the  Executive  Gov- 
ernment and  the  naval  and  military  authorities,  it  has  its 
place  in  a  constitutional  country,  but  as  a  substitute  for  the 
General  Staff,  as  a  body  really  capable  of  organizing  the 
defence  of  this  country,  it  is  a  grotesque  imposture."  See 
The  War  Office,  the  Army,  and  the  Empire,  by  H.  0.  Arnold- 
Forster,  M.P.  (London  :  Cassell  &  Co.),  pp.  75-76. 


PRINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     57 

the  modern  tendency  which  loved  "  tinkering 
with  details  and  imagining  that  they  are  princi- 
ples," and  which  failed  "  to  grasp  and  apply  the 
eternal  principles  of  war  to  the  Empire  as  one 
great  concrete  whole." 

Nearly  two  years,  however,  elapsed  before 
anything  definite  was  done  to  bring  about  some 
co-ordination  between  Navy  and  Army  adminis- 
tration upon  a  definite  constitutional  basis.  On 
March  5,  1903,  the  Prime  Minister  (Mr.  A.  J. 
Balfour),  made  perhaps  the  most  epoch-making 
statement  in  the  history  of  the  relations  of  the 
two  great  Services  when  he  outlined  the  scheme 
for  reconstituting  the  then  Defence  Committee 
of  the  Cabinet  as  a  real  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence.  Hitherto,  the  Committee  had  been 
purely  a  Committee  of  the  Cabinet,  and  as  such 
kept  no  records  and  admitted  to  its  council  no 
outsiders.  In  the  freshly  constituted  Committee 
certain  experts  would  be  upon  it  as  members,  and 
not  called  to  its  deliberations  merely  as  witnesses, 
and  further  than  that  the  conclusions  of  the 
Committee  would  be  embodied  not  only  in  resolu- 
tions but  in  reasoned  documents  for  the  informa- 
tion of  the  Cabinet,  both  at  the  time,  and  at  a 
later  period,  and  also  for  the  information  of  their 
successors  in  Office.  Mr.  Balfour  defended  this 
method  for  various  reasons,  but  not  least  because 


58    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

when  differences  of  opinion  existed  between  ex- 
perts in  either  Department  it  would  be  most 
important  that,  when  the  differences  showed  them- 
selves, the  grounds  on  which  the  former  decision 
was  arrived  at  "  should  be  there  in  a  simple,  easily 
intelligible,  easily  accessible  form." 

As  regards  the  actual  constitution  of  the 
Committee,  Mr.  Balfour  considered  that  while 
there  should  be  a  fixed  and  permanent  nucleus, 
that  nucleus  should  not  be  too  large.  He  there- 
fore proposed  it  should  be  as  follows :—  "  Cabinet 
Members  :  The  Lord  President,  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter, the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty ;  non-Cabinet  Mem- 
bers :  The  First  Sea  Lord,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  the  Head  of  the  Naval  Intelligence,  and 
the  Head  of  the  Military  Intelligence.  He  did 
not  mean  to  exclude  other  members  who  might 
for  any  particular  reason  be  required ;  and  he 
thought  that  as  decisions  arrived  at  would  be  by 
the  help  of  members  of  the  Cabinet,  they  would 
receive  a  support  which  they  never  could  receive 
if  simply  "  thrown  at  the  heads  of  the  Cabinet 
from  outside."  It  would  be  difficult  to  find,  in 
the  speech  of  any  responsible  Minister,  a  more 
complete  vindication  of  the  attitude  so  long 
adopted  by  Sir  John  Colomb  (unless,  indeed,  it 
.Mr.  lialfour's  subsequent  speech  of  May  11, 


PRINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     59 

1905),1  more  especially  when  he  said  that  he 
entirely  agreed  with  those  critics  of  our  old  system, 
that  it  was  a  very  faulty  system  "  in  which  the 
Navy  decided  its  own  affairs  without  consulting 
the  Army,  and  the  Army  decided  its  own  affairs 
without  reference  to  the  Navy." 

It  will  perhaps  never  be  possible  to  estimate 
exactly  how  far  Sir  John  Colomb  directly  and 
indirectly  influenced  the  re-constitution  of  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence.  There  is,  how- 
ever, no  doubt  that  at  this  time  he  was  in  con- 
stant private  communication  with  the  Prime 
Minister,  and  was  to  a  large  extent  responsible 
for  the  increasing  interest  which  Mr.  Balfour 
showed  in  the  study  of  the  higher  policy  of  de- 
fence. His  friend,  Sir  George  Clarke,  watching 
events  from  his  new  position  as  Governor  of 
Victoria,  wrote  regularly,  and  in  the  following 
letter  foreshadowed  something  of  the  work  he  was 
himself  to  do  upon  the  Esher  Committee : — 

"STATE  GOVERNMENT  HOUSE, 
MELBOURNE, 

May  5,  1903. 

"  MY  DEAR  COLOMB, —  ...  I  think  you  have 
gained  much  if  you  have  permanently  interested 
Mr.  Balfour  in  the  question  of  National  Defence, 

1  See  p.  65. 


60   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

with  which  we  have  been  playing  fast  and  loose  to 
a  very  dangerous  extent. 

"  To  have  a  constituted  Council  is  a  great  point 
gained  ;  but  without  a  few  permanent  officials— 
and  records — it  will  not  do  what  we  hope  and 
expect. 

"  I  would  greatly  like  to  have  the  chance  of 
bringing  order  out  of  present  chaos  and  especially 
of  tackling  the  organization  of  our  military  forces 
so  as  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  big  prin- 
ciples for  which  we  have  contended. 

"  The  cost  of  the  so-called  Army  Scheme  must 
crush  it,  even  if  it  did  not  violate  all  principles. 
Retrenchment  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  demanded, 
and  I  have  always  contended  that  £23,000,000 
should  be  an  ample  provision.  There  is  much 
waste  at  the  Admiralty,  but  at  least  we  get  an 
effective  Fleet.  We  have  not  got  an  effective 
Army,  and  we  can  never  have  on  the  lines  at  pre- 
sent followed.  .  .  . 

Believe  me, 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

G.  S.  CLARKE." 

The  speech  of  Mr.  Balfour  was  welcomed  by 
Sir  John  Colomb  in  public,  and,  in  referring  to 
unnecessary  expenditure  incurred  through  lack 
of  consultation  between  the  Services,  he  said : 


PRINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     61 

"  In  my  humble  judgment,  the  step  that  has 
been  taken  is  the  most  important  one  that  has 
yet  been  taken  in  the  interests  of  economy."  Sir 
John  went  on  to  say  that  he  hoped  to  see  the 
Committee  form  the  germ  of  a  Council  in  which  the 
contributing  countries  of  the  Empire  should  have 
a  place, — that  was,  of  course,  when  the  Colonies 
took  their  share  in  the  cost  of  Imperial  defence. 
Considerable  progress  was  subsequently  made  in 
the  direction  of  taking  the  self-governing  Do- 
minions into  closer  consultation  on  defence 
through  the  medium  of  the  Committee,  and  this 
was  foreshadowed  by  Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour  in  his 
masterly  speech  of  May  11,  1905,  when  he  said  : 
"  as  time  goes  on,  our  Colonies  will  share  our 
discussions  on  those  aspects  of  Imperial  Defence 
in  which  they  are  specially  concerned."  But 
before  considering  the  Committee  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  Closer  Union  of  the  Empire,  or  even 
before  discussing  with  any  attempt  at  adequacy 
the  1905  speech  of  Mr.  Balfour,  to  which  reference 
has  just  been  made,  a  little  attention  must  be 
given  to  events  taking  place  at  the  War  Office  as 
a  result  of  the  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission 
upon  the  ^Var  in  South  Africa  and  other  Reports. 
By  the  autumn  of  1903,  two  strong  reasons 
were  in  existence  for  an  early  and  effective  hand- 
ling of  "  Army  Reform."  These  were  the  publica- 


62   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

tion  of  the  -Report  of  the  War  Commission  and 
the  failure  of  the  system  of  three  years  enlist- 
ment.1 The  next  year  saw  two  further  Reports, 
one  on  January  11,  1904,  by  the  War  Office  Recon- 
stitution  Committee  (generally  called  the  Esher 
Committee)  and  the  other  by  the  Duke  of  Nor- 
folk's Commission  on  the  Militia  and  Volunteers. 
While  the  latter  declared  both  branches  of  the 
Auxiliary  Forces  to  be  unfit  for  war,  the  former 
dealt  with  both  the  reconstitution  of  the  War 
Office  and  the  Defence  Committee. 

Having  observed  that  the  War  Office  had  been 
administered  for  many  years  from  the  point  of 
view  of  peace,  the  Esher  Committee  recommended 
a  "  complete  breach  with  the  past,"  and  made 
several  drastic  recommendations  "  with  a  single 
eye  to  the  effective  training  and  preparation  of 
the  Military  Forces  of  the  Crown  for  war."2  Refer- 
ring to  the  War  Commission,  the  Committee  re- 
marked "  the  evidence  taken  by  the  Royal  Com- 

1  Any  attempt  at  a  detailed  examination  into  Army  Policy 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work,  but  for  further  informal  ion 
on  this  head  the  reader  is  referred  to  The  Army  in  1906,  by 
the  late  Rt.  Hon.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster,  M.P.,  ex-Secretary 
of  State  for  War  (London  :  John  Murray,  1906),  and  also  to 
Military  Needs  and  Military  Policy,  by  the  same  author 
(London  :  Smith  Elder  &  Co,  1909). 

1  Report  of  the  War  Office  Reconstitution  Committee,  Part  I, 
1904  (Cd.  1932). 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,   1888-1909     63 

mission  proves  that  the  Cabinet  had  in  1899  no 
adequate  means  of  obtaining  reasoned  opinions 
on  which  to  base  a  war  policy,"  and  believing 
that  the  re-constituted  Defence  Committee  was 
all  important  in  this  connexion,  the  Esher  Com- 
mittee advocated  further  development.  In  urging 
the  need  of  a  permanent  nucleus  of  the  Defence 
Committee,  it  was  stated  that  this  should  con- 
sist of  a  permanent  secretary  and  under  this 
official,  two  naval,  two  military,  and  two  Indian 
officers,  with,  if  possible,  one  or  more  representa- 
tives of  the  Colonies  ;  and  the  duties  should  be 
to  consider  all  questions  of  Imperial  Defence  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  Navy,  the  Military  Forces, 
India  and  the  Colonies,  and  to  obtain  and  collate 
information,  prepare  documents  required  by  the 
Committee,  furnish  advice  to  the  Committee,  and 
keep  records. 

As  already  mentioned,  a  prominent  Member 
of  Lord  Esher's  Committee  of  three  was  Sir 
George  Sydenham  Clarke,1  and  as  this  distin- 
guished soldier  had  been  secretary  of  the  Harting- 
ton  Commission,  which  recommended  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Council  of  Defence,2  an  additional 
interest  is  lent  to  the  following  passage  from  the 
Report  of  the  Reconstitution  Committee  concern- 

1  The  other  Member  was  Admiral  Sir  John  Fisher, 

2  See  p.  30, 


64     IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

ing  War  Office  Reform,  which  expresses  itself  in 
words  almost  identical  with  those  used  many 
times  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  viz. :  "  when  in  1890 
the  Hartington  Commission  urged  a  drastic  mea- 
sure of  reorganization,  nothing  was  done.  It 
has  followed  that  the  War  Office  has  been  sub- 
jected to  successive  tinkering  processes,  by  which 
improvement  in  minor  matters  may  occasionally 
have  been  accomplished,  but  which  left  great 
principles  entirely  out  of  sight." 

As  Mr.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster  was  the  Minister 
appointed  at  the  War  Office  to  carry  out  the  Re- 
forms, it  is  useful  to  note  his  estimate  of  the 
situation  at  the  time  under  consideration,  more 
especially  as  this  affords  a  recognition  of  the 
practical  success  of  the  campaign  initiated  and 
carried  on  for  so  many  years  by  Sir  John  Colomb. 
"  It  had  long  been  apparent,"  wrote  Mr.  Arnold- 
Forster,  "  to  many  students  of  our  military  pro- 
blem that  a  system  which  was  based  upon  the 
hypothesis  of  liability  to  an  invasion  in  fore 
these  islands,  and  which  practically  ignored  the 
supremacy  of  the  British  Navy,  had  ceased  to  be 
suitable  to  the  needs  of  the  British  Empire.  The 
views  which  had  long  been  entertained  by  a  few 
were  now  about  to  become  the  recognized  creed 
of  the  many.  The  so-called  '  Blue  Water  School ' 
had  fought  hard  for  recognition  ;  that  ivmirni 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,  1888-1909     65 

was  now  afforded  in  the  most  authoritative 
manner.  In  1904  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  was  reconstituted  on  a  fresh  basis  by  the 
Prime  Minister.  From  that  date  the  Committee 
sat  practically  every  week."  1 

The  actual  results  of  the  first  few  months  of 
the  Committee's  work  were  given  to  the  world  in 
a  speech  of  great  importance  delivered  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  May  llth,  1905,  by  the  Prime 
Minister  (Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour),  when  he  dealt  ex- 
haustively with  the  question  of  the  relations  of 
the  Navy  and  the  Army  in  regard  to  the  Invasion 
of  England. 

It  is  first  to  be  noted  that  the  occasion  of  this 
speech  was  in  itself  most  significant,  for  it  was 
made  upon  the  vote  (Civil  Service  Estimates)  for 
the  Treasury  and  Subordinate  Departments,  which 
involved  the  cost  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence ;  and  this  vote  provided  the  opportunity, 
so  long  urged  as  a  necessity  by  Sir  John  Colomb, 
for  the  consideration  in  the  House  of  Commons 
of  joint  matters  of  naval  and  military  concern. 
That  such  joint  consideration,  in  a  scientific  man- 
ner, could  only  result  in  one  way,  Sir  John  Colomb 
never  doubted,  and  students  of  the  larger  aspects 
of  British  Defence  noted  with  real  pleasure  that 
this  speech  of  Mr.  Balfour  was  an  official  endorse- 

1  See  The  Army  in  1906. 


66  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

ment  both  as  regards  principles  and,  to  a  large 
extent,  data,  of  the  speech  which  Sir  John  Colomb 
delivered  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  13, 
1896.' 

Having  observed  that  the  Committee  of  De- 
fence was  not  an  executive  but  a  consultative 
body,  and  that  its  functions  were  extra-depart- 
mental, as  being  concerned  with  the  great  problems 
of  defence  which  lie  beyond  the  province  of  any 
single  department  and  require  the  co-operation 
either  of  two  or  more  Offices  at  Whitehall  or  of 
the  British  and  a  Colonial  Government,  Mr.  Bal- 
four  proceeded  to  examine,  in  the  most  exhaustive 
manner  yet  attempted  publicly  by  a  Minister  of 
the  Crown,  the  conditions  governing  Home  De- 
fence and  the  Invasion  of  England.  He  pointed 
out  that  since  the  time  of  Drake  great  generals 
and  admirals  had  differed  in  opinion  as  to  the 
possibility  of  invasion  ;  and  stated  that,  in  review- 
ing the  position,  the  Committee  had  based  their 
calculations  on  suppositions  most  unfavourable 
to  this  country,  viz.,  the  assumption  that  our 
Regular  Army  was  abroad  upon  some  oversea 
expedition  and  that  the  Mediterranean,  the  At- 
lantic and  the  Channel  Fleets  were  too  far  away 
to  take  any  part  in  repelling  invasion — though, 
of  course,  constituting  a  menace  to  the  communi- 

»  See  p.  38. 


PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY,   1888-1909     67 

cations  of  any  invader  effecting  a  landing.  There 
would  still  remain,  he  showed,  under  the  new 
Admiralty  system,  ready  for  sea  within  six  hours' 
notice,  6  first-class  battleships,  and  6  first-class 
cruisers  in  reserve.  In  addition  there  would  be 
in  commission  12  cruisers,  11  torpedo  gunboats, 
24  destroyers,  and  20  torpedo  boats  stationed  in 
home  waters  ;  and  in  reserve,  with  nucleus  crews 
ready  for  rapid  action,  6  first-class  battleships, 
19  cruisers,  58  destroyers,  and  28  torpedo-boats. 
That  being  the  naval  position  with  the  Fleets 
abroad  and  the  Army  absent,  Mr.  Balfour  asked 
what  was  the  smallest  number  of  men  with  which 
invasion  could  be  attempted.  Lord  Roberts' 
opinion  was  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  make 
this  attempt  with  less  than  70,000  men. 

After  referring  to  the  fact  that  steam  and 
telegraphy  enabled  concentration  of  warships  to 
take  place  far  more  quickly  than  in  the  days  when 
Napolean  contemplated  the  invasion  of  England, 
the  Prime  Minister  discussed  the  problem  of 
transporting  the  70,000  men  to  England.  He 
took  France  as  the  potential  invader  and  asked 
if  the  transport  was  to  be  accomplished  by  long 
and  open  preparation.  If  so,  then  the  hypothesis 
of  our  absent  Fleets  would  not  be  practical,  and,  if 
not,  then  the  effort  must  be  sudden.  Taking 
the  Channel  and  Atlantic  ports  of  France,  he 


68   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

estimated  that  not  more  than  100,000  tons  of 
French  shipping  could  be  collected,  and  this  would 
be  absolutely  insufficient  to  carry  70,000  men. 
For  such  a  force,  the  Admiralty  considered  280,000 
tons  necessary  ;  but  in  any  event  the  steam  ton- 
nage of  France  in  the  ports  mentioned  was  wholly 
insufficient.  Granted,  however,  that  the  trans- 
port was  procured,  what  harbour  would  be  chosen  ? 
Cherbourg  would  be  too  exposed  for  operations 
to  be  carried  on  in  secrecy,  while  it  would  be 
impossible  to  transport  all  the  70,000  men  from 
Brest  during  the  daylight.  No  convoy  could 
escape  torpedo  attack  in  the  darkness,  and  long 
before  they  reached  our  shores  the  alarm  would 
have  spread  from  the  Faroe  Islands  to  Gibraltar, 
and  every  ship  available,  cruiser,  destroyer,  gun- 
boat, down  to  the  smallest  craft,  would  be  con- 
centrated at  the  menaced  shore.  Any  attempt 
to  embark  the  expeditionary  force  from  separate 
ports  would  scatter  the  transport  along  the  whole 
North  Coast  of  France  and  would  increase  thr 
danger  of  being  dealt  with  by  British  destroyers 
and  cruisers  "  whose  speed  would  enable  them 
to  concentrate  on  any  division  of  the  slow  moving 
convoy  which  seemed  least  efficiently  protected."  ' 
Assuming,  however,  that  the  huge  convoy  had 

1  Extract  from  the  original  Memorandum  laid  before  tbo 
Defence  Committee. 


PRINCIPLES  AND   POLICY,   1888-1909     69 

escaped  attack  on  the  voyage,  it  would  take  at 
least  forty-eight  hours  in  calm  weather  to  dis- 
embark 70,000  men  on  a  coast  such  as  that  be- 
tween Plymouth  and  Dover.  The  submarine 
and  the  destroyer  would  thus  have  opportunities 
during  two  days  and  two  nights,  though  it  would 
be  surely  impossible  for  this  "  helpless  mass  of 
transports "  to  escape  attacks  of  the  coast-de- 
fence vessels,  even  if  unsupported  by  battle-ships, 
cruisers,  and  other  craft  always  in  our  ports. 
"  No  British  Admiral,"  said  Mr.  Balfour,  "  would 
regard  the  convoying  of  vessels  carrying  70,000 
men  across  at  least  seventy-five  miles  of  sea,  and 
their  subsequent  protection  for  two  days  and  two 
nights  in  positions  not  only  fixed,  but  perfectly 
ascertained,  in  waters  swarming  with  torpedo 
craft  and  submarines,  as  other  than  the  enter- 
prise of  a  lunatic.  And  what  a  British  Admiral 
would  regard  as  insane  is  scarcely  likely  to  be 
considered  as  practicable  by  sailors  of  other 
nations." 

This  important  speech  may  be  said  to  have 
opened  a  new  era  in  defensive  policy,  and  Sir 
John  Colomb  could  look  upon  it  with  pride  as, 
in  a  sense,  -the  crowning  point  of  his  arduous 
labours  since  1867  for  the  recognition  of  sound 
principles  of  naval  and  military  policy  in  relation 
to  the  defence  of  Britain  and  her  maritime  Em- 


70   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

pire.  While  it  is  true  that  Mr.  Balfour,  in  his 
speech,  did  not  emphasize  in  the  way  that  Sir 
John  Colomb  had  done  (in  dealing  with  the  Inva- 
sion of  England)  the  essential  doctrine  of  the 
command  of  the  sea,1  yet  he  accepted  the  posi- 
tion the  great  War  Office  critic  had  so  long  taken 
up  to  such  an  extent  that  when  commenting  in 
the  House  upon  the  Premier's  speech,  Sir  John 
was  able  to  say  :  "It  was  most  interesting  to 
hear  the  Rt.  Hon.  gentleman's  speech  dealing 
with  invasion,  because  the  arguments  used  there 
were  just  those  which  he  in  opposition  to  the 
War  Office  theories  had  used  so  often  in  respect 
to  that  very  question."  Recognizing  that  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  had  done  much 
to  bring  about  the  altered  state  of  official  opinion, 
Sir  John  Colomb  remarked  :  "It  was  an  enormous 
gain  when  they  found  a  body  set  up  to  judicially 
examine  naval  and  military  opinion,  and  to  deter- 

1  For  an  extremely  clear  and  easily  understood  exposition 
of  the  nature  of  sea  power,  the  reader  cannot  do  better  than 
consult  Mr.  Spenser  Wilkinson's  little  book  entitled  The  Com- 
mand of  the  Sea  (London  :  Constable  &  Co.,  1894).  In  the 
course  of  his  treatise  this  well-known  authority  gives  ex- 
pression to  the  following  :  "  The  British  Empire  is,  for  the 
purpose  of  a  war  with  any  Power  except  Russia  or  the  United 
States,  equivalent  to  a  number  of  islands  scattered  over  the 
oceans.  All  these  islands  can  be  kept  at  perpetual  peace  by 
the  systematic  use  of  a  strong  Navy." 


PEINCIPLES   AND   POLICY,    1888-1939     71 

mine  on  principles  of  high  policy ;  a  body  on 
which  experts  were  to  be  heard  and  statesmen 
were  to  be  the  assessors  and  the  judges.  .  .  . 
He  rejoiced  to  have  lived  to  hear  an  explicit  state- 
ment from  a  Prime  Minister  upon  principles  of 
policy  giving  clear  and  distinct  reasons  why 
those  principles  should  be  followed." 

Amongst  those  in  the  House  who  listened  to 
the  Debate  were  Sir  George  Sydenham  Clarke, 
who  wrote  the  next  day  to  Sir  John  Colomb  as 
follows : — 

"  COMMITTEE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE, 
2,  WHITEHALL  GARDENS,  S.W. 

May  13,  1905. 

"MY  DEAR  COLOMB, — I  listened  to  you  with 
the  greatest  pleasure  on  Thursday,  and  I  knew 
how  delighted  you  would  be  to  find  one  of  your 
aims  accomplished. 

"For  the  first  time,  a  Prime  Minister  of  this 
country  laid  down  sound  principles  of  national 
defence,  and  none  of  his  predecessors  could  have 
discharged  this  duty  so  brilliantly  as  Mr.  Bal- 
four.  You  have  laboured  to  make  this  possible, 
and  it  has  been  achieved.  Whether  it  will  last 
we  cannot  tell.  But  when  the  General  Election 
comes,  you  will  be  able  to  sing  "  Nunc  dimittis  " 
with  the  consciousness  of  achievement. 


72    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

"  Could  you  suggest  the  speech  being  revised 
for  publication  ? l  I  think  this  should  be  done. 

"I  hope  two  things  may  be  said  to  be  now 
established : — 

"(1)  That  in  a  special  and  peculiar  sense  the 
Prime  Minister  of  this  country  is  charged  with 
the  responsibility  for  its  defence. 

"  (2)  That  to  enable  him  to  discharge  this 
grave  responsibility  he  must  have  his  own  Defence 
Bureau. 

"  Was  not  the  Esher  Committee  right  in  putting 
this  in  the  forefront  of  their  recommendations  ? 

"  With  warm  congratulations  on  the  success  of 
your  efforts, 

I  am,  ever  yours  sincerely, 

G.  S.  CLARKE." 

The  abandonment  of  false  doctrine  at  the 
War  Office  was  further  assured  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  Sir  John  Colomb's  life-long  friend  and 
loyal  helper,  Mr.  H.  0.  Arnold-Forster,  as  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  War,  in  order  to  carry  out  the 
reforms  at  the  War  Office  foreshadowed  by  the 
Report  of  the  Esher  Committee.  The  old 
theories  of  "  passive  defence  "  and  of  locking  up 

1  Sir  John  Colomb  suggested  this  subsequently  in  the 
House  of  Commons  and  the  speech  was  revised  very  carefully 
and  published  by  Longmans  Green  &  Co.  in  August  1905. 


PRINCIPLES   AND    POLICY,    1888-1909     73 

troops  in  this  country  behind  fortifications  were 
now  definitely  abandoned,  and  Mr.  Arnold-Forster 
clearly  stated  his  policy  as  based  on  the  theory 
"  that  we  do  want  a  large  Army  for  service  over- 
sea ;  that  a  large  part  of  that  Army  should  not 
be  mobilized  except  in  time  of  war ;  that  we  do 
not  want  a  large  Army  for  the  defence  of  the 
United  Kingdom  in  time  of  war."  *  Mr.  Arnold- 
Forster  recognized  as  clearly  as  Sir  John  Colomb 
had  ever  done  in  the  past  that  "it  is  because  we 
will  persist  in  discussing  the  Army  as  if  it  had 
no  connexion  with  the  Navy  that  so  many  of 
our  mistakes  have  been  made  "  ; 2  and  therefore 
it  was  with  sincere  pleasure  and  gratification 
that  Sir  John  saw  in  active  and  strenuous  work 
at  the  War  Office  his  former  colleague,  or,  to  use 
Mr.  Arnold-Forster 's  own  words,  his  "  humble 
pupil."  Indeed,  in  one  of  the  last  speeches  made 
by  him  in  the  House  of  Commons 3  he  was  able, 
for  the  first  time,  whole-heartedly  to  support  the 
War  Office  representative's  enunciation  of  general 
principles  when,  in  referring  to  Mr.  Arnold- 
Forster' s  speech,  he  said : — "  There  has  been  a 

1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  August  8,   1904,  p. 
1385. 

2  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,   February  23,    1905, 
p.  1177. 

3  See  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  29,  1905. 


74    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

total  reversal  of  the  principle  upon  which,  for  some 
fifty  years,  our  Army  Policy  has  been  founded. 
It  was  not  a  new  departure,  but  a  return  to  the 
old  policy  by  which  the  Empire  was  made — the 
doctrine  of  a  free  sea,  with  a  free  Army,  with  its 
corollary  that  the  low- water  mark  of  the  enemy's 
coast  and  not  our  own  coast  was  our  frontier." 

Though  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  was  not  destined 
to  remain  long  at  the  War  Office,  he  was  succeeded 
by  one  of  the  ablest  thinkers  amongst  the  oppos- 
ing party  on  the  accession  to  Office  of  the  Liberals 
in  1905.  Mr.  (now  Lord)  Haldane's  accept- 
ance of  the  Secretaryship  of  State  for  War 
was  welcomed  by  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  himself,1 
and  while  it  is  true  that  he  was  forced  to  criticize 
much  of  Lord  Haldane's  subsequent  policy,2  he 
always  recognized  with  Sir  John  Colomb  that 
the  new  War  Secretary  had  based  his  schemes 
on  sound  principles  so  far  as  the  relations  of  the 
Navy  and  the  Army  were  concerned. 

In  introducing  the  Army  Estimates  on  March 
8,  1906,  Mr.  Haldane  called  attention  to  the  need 
of  a  striking  force  3  as  follows  :— 

1  Memoir  of  H.  0.  Arnold-Forster,  by  his  wife  (London : 
Edward  Arnold),  p.  297. 

*  See  The  Army  in  1906,  Military  Needs  and  Military 
Policy,  and  Memoir  ofH.  O.  Arnold-Forster,  p.  365. 

1  In     view     of     the    observation    as    to    Mr.    Arnold- 


PRINCIPLES   AND   POLICY,    1888-1909     75 

"  It  must  be  remembered  that  this  country 
is  in  quite  a  different  position  from  that  of  any 
foreign  nation.  If  Germany  or  France  go  to 
war,  they  have  conscription,  and  they  are  in  this 
position — that  in  time  of  peace  they  must  keep 
up  a  vast  military  organization.  They  have  only 
one  war  to  contemplate  on  a  large  scale,  and  that 
is  with  their  neighbours  across  the  border.  .  .  . 
But  the  British  Army  is  not  like  that.  We  live 
on  an  island,  and  our  coasts  are  completely  de- 
fended by  the  Fleet.  Our  Army  is  wanted  for 
purposes  abroad  and  overseas.  .  .  .  This  island 
is  the  centre  of  an  Empire  consisting  of  nearly 
twelve  million  square  miles,  and  including  some 
four  hundred  millions  of  population,  and  we  have 
to  protect  the  distant  shores  of  that  Empire  from 
the  attack  of  the  invader.  We  want,  therefore, 
an  Army  which  is  very  mobile  and  capable  of 
rapid  transport." 

And  later  on  Mr.  Haldane  accepted  Mr.  Bal- 
four's  estimate  of  70,000  men  as  the  force  which 
the  Navy  could  be  sure  of  intercepting.1 

The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  continued 

Forster's  acceptance  of  Mr.  Haldane's  principles,  it  should 
be  stated  that  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  did  not  believe  that  the 
policy  of  the  Liberal  Minister  would  produce  the  striking 
force  required.  See  p.  212  et  seq.,  Military  Needs  and 
Military  Policy. 

1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  8,  1909. 


76  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  be  of  great  importance  to  the  new  Ministry  in 
framing  their  defensive  measures,  and  on  August 
2,  1906,  an  interesting  discussion  took  place  in 
the  House  of  Commons  which  was  initiated  by 
Colonel  Seely  (now  Secretary  of  State  for  War), 
who  argued  in  favour  of  making  the  Committee 
non-party  by  having  representatives  upon  it  of 
the  party  not  then  in  power,  as  well  as  the  Govern- 
ment representatives  and  the  experts.  As  this 
discussion,  however,  mainly  had  reference  to  the 
relations  of  the  Colonies  to  the  Committee,  the 
subject  will  be  more  appropriately  treated  in 
Chapter  V,  and,  meantime,  it  is  well  to  glance  at 
a  very  important  event  which  occurred  on  Novem- 
ber 23,  1908. 

On  the  date  mentioned,  Lord  Roberts  brought 
forward  a  motion  in  the  House  of  Lords  to  the 
effect  that  the  defence  of  these  islands  necessitated 
the  possession  of  an  Army  so  strong  in  numbers 
and  so  efficient  in  quality  that  the  most  formid- 
able foreign  nation  would  hesitate  to  attempt  a 
landing  on  these  shores,  and  the  Resolution  went 
on  to  affirm  that  it  was  desirable,  in  view  of  altered 
strategical  conditions  in  the  North  Sea,  that  the 
Government  should  make  a  statement  on  the  in- 
vasion problem,  and  state  definitely  the  conclu- 
sions arrived  at  as  the  result  of  the  recent  inquiry 
by  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defeiu 


PRINCIPLES   AND    POLICY,    1888-1909     77 

Lord  Roberts  complained  that  in  his  1905 
speech  Mr.  Balfour  had  only  considered  France  as 
a  possible  invader,  whereas  he  (Lord  Roberts)  had 
calculated  that  vessels,  suitable  for  the  accommo- 
dation of  100,000  men,  were  at  all  times  available 
in  the  northern  ports  of  Germany.  He  believed 
the  men  could  be  collected  without  fuss  or  mo- 
bilization, and  that  150,000  men  could  be  trans- 
ported in  the  same  number  of  vessels  that  Mr. 
Balfour  had  been  informed  would  be  needed  for 
half  that  number  of  French.  He  thought  that 
the  embarkation  and  disembarkation  would  be 
shorter  and  that  the  transports  might  elude  the 
Fleet.1 

In  this  speech  Lord  Roberts  gave  expression 

1  The  fact  that  Lord  Roberts  takes  the  view  he  does  upon 
the  possibilities  of  invasion  is  by  no  means  conclusive,  for 
soldiers  equally  as  eminent  as  he  have  expressed  similar 
opinions  upon  this  matter,  which  is,  as  will  have  been 
seen,  essentially  a  Naval  question. 

In  referring  to  the  controversy  concerning  the  Invasion 
of  England  in  which,  since  the  time  of  Drake,  the  soldiers  in 
the  main  had  taken  one  side  and  the  sailors  the  other,  Mr. 
Balfour  in  his  speech  of  May  11,  1905  (see  p.  65)  said  :  "  It  is 
certain,  therefore,  that  Napoleon  believed  invasion  to  be 
possible  ;  it  is  equally  certain  that  Nelson  believed  it  to  be 
impossible.  Forty  years  later  you  find  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton, in  a  very  famous  letter,  expressing,  in  terms  almost  pathe- 
tic in  their  intensity,  his  fears  of  invasion,  which  naval 
opinion  has  never  shared,  provided  our  Fleets  be  adequate." 


78   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  views  similar  to  those  which  influenced  the 
policy  of  the  old  War  Office,1  and  which  moreover 
undoubtedly  formed  the  basis  of  his  own  campaign 
in  favour  of  compulsory  military  training  for  Home 
Defence.  Though  himself  a  member  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence  in  1905,  Lord  Roberts 
did  not  agree  with  Mr.  Balfour's  speech  on  Inva- 
sion, and  since  his  retirement  from  the  position 
of  Commander-in-Chief  he  has  devoted  himself, 
with  his  usual  splendid  patriotism,  to  the  advocacy 
of  compulsory  military  training,  on  the  ground 
that  a  much  stronger  and  more  highly  trained 
force  than  the  Territorial  Army  is  necessary  for 
the  defence  of  the  shores  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  on  what  doctrine  of  naval  war- 
fare this  advocacy  (and  that  of  the  National  Ser- 
vice League)  is  based,  for  it  might  have  been 
thought  that  the  brothers  Colomb,  and  the  many 
eminent  naval  writers  who  have  followed  them, 
had  sufficiently  demonstrated  that  no  Army  con- 
fined to  these  shores,2  however  great  it  may  be,  can 
save  this  country  from  starvation,  and  the  Empire 
from  ruin,  if  the  command  of  the  sea  is  lost ; 
while  if  such  command  is  maintained,  the  Invasion 
of  England  is  not  a  matter  for  serious  considera- 
tion.8 Compulsory  military  training  for  oversea 

1  See  pp.   17,  37.         •  See  pp.  15,  15  n,  18. 

8  See  also  pp.  41,42.    Sir  John  Colomb  always  considered 


PRINCIPLES  AND    POLICY,    1888-1909     79 

service  could  undoubtedly  be  more  easily  defended 
from  a  naval  standpoint,  as  the  strength  of  the 
British  striking  Army  may  quite  conceivably 
prove  inadequate  to  bring  a  naval  war  with  a 
great  Power,  or  combination  of  Powers,  to  a  con- 
clusion. But  the  extension  of  the  idea  to  this 
logical  conclusion  apparently  finds  no  support, 
perhaps  owing  to  the  belief  that  it  would  meet 
with  but  scanty  approval  from  the  electorate.1 
That  the  Government  of  the  day  were  able  to 

that  the  advocates  of  compulsory  service  in  this  country  had 
not  sufficiently  thought  out  for  what  purpose  they  wished  to 
see  the  conscript  Army  created,  or  the  cost  of  such  an  Army, 
and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  official  estimate  of  the  annual 
cost  of  a  million  home-keeping  soldiers,  trained  for  six  months 
only,  was  stated  by  Mr.  Haldane  on  December  14,  1908,  to 
be  £20,000,000.  Sir  John  Colomb  believed  that  the  increased 
cost  involved  by  conscription  could  not  be  maintained  with- 
out reduction  in  the  naval  expenditure,  and  in  this  view  he 
was  supported  by  his  friend  Mr.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster,  who 
wrote  in  1909  :  "I  do  not  myself  believe  that  this  country 
can  or  will  bear  the  cost  of  an  adequate  Navy,  an  adequate 
Regular  Army,  and  an  efficient  Conscript  Army.  I  greatly 
fear  that  in  the  attempt  to  obtain  these  three  objects,  we  may 
find  ourselves  left  with  an  inadequate  Navy,  an  insufficient 
Regular  Army,  and  a  totally  inefficient  and  useless  Conscript 
Army  "  (see  Military  Needs  and  Military  Policy,  pp.  155-156). 
1  It  is  fair  to  say,  however,  that  Mr.  L.  S.  Amery,  M.P., 
has  proposed  that  while  service  should  be  made  compulsory 
only  those  men  who  engage  to  serve  abroad  in  time  of  war 
should  receive  pay.  J 


80  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

deal  with  the  speech  of  so  popular  a  military  hero 
as  Lord  Roberts  in  the  way  they  did  in  1908, 
showed  once  more  the  value  of  having  a  joint 
Committee  of  the  best  naval  and  military  opinion 
behind  them.  With  this  support  Lord  Crewe, 
replying  to  Lord  Roberts  for  the  Government, 
stated  again  the  sound  proposition,  so  constantly 
emphasized  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  that  "  we  do  not 
abandon  our  reliance  on  the  general  power  of  the 
Navy  to  deal  with  invasion  by  a  great  force." 
He,  however,  agreed  that  a  Home  Army  was 
necessary : — 

(1)  To  repel  raids.1 

(2)  To  prevent  a  panic  that  might  hamper  the 

Admiralty  in  dealing  with  the  Fleet. 

(3)  To  compel   the   enemy   to   come   in   great 

strength. 

On  July  29,  1909,*  the  Prime  Minister  (Mr. 
Asquith),  as  President  of  the  Committee  of  Im- 
perial Defence,  made  an  important  statement  on 
the  work  of  the  Committee,  taking  the  same 
opportunity  as  that  afforded  to  Mr.  Balfour  in 
1905,  when  the  Vote  for  the  Staff  of  the  Com- 
mittee came  up  under  the  Civil  Service  Estimates. 

1  As  to  military  preparations  for  the  resistance  of  raids 
with  special  reference  to  the  Territorial  Forces,  see  Military 
Needs  and  Military  Policy,  Chapter  xiv. 
•  See  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates. 


PRINCIPLES   AND    POLICY,    1888-1909     81 

In  recognizing  the  value  of  its  existence  for  seven 
years,  Mr.  Asquith  said  :  "I  regard  it  not  only 
as  a  valuable,  but  as  an  indispensable  part  of  our 
administrative  organization,"  and  in  alluding 
to  its  functions,  said  :  "  It  is  the  primary  business 
of  the  Defence  Committee  to  study  and  determine 
what  is  the  best  provision  that  can  be  made  for 
the  naval  and  military  requirements  of  the  Empire 
as  a  whole."  As  regards  the  members  of  the 
Committee,  besides  the  four  Secretaries  of  State 
(other  than  Home  Secretary)  the  members  were 
the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  the  First  Sea 
Lord,  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence,  the  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff,  while  they  had  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Inspector  General  of  the  Forces  (Sir 
John  French),  Lord  Esher,  and  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet  Sir  A.  Wilson.1  Mr.  Asquith  expressed  a 

1  A  detailed  account  of  the  latest  work  of  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence  was  given  to  the  House  of  Commons  by 
the  Prime  Minister  (Mr.  Asquith)  on  July  25,  1912.  On  that 
occasion  Mr.  Asquith  stated  that  the  full  Committee  did  not 
meet  more  than  six  or  seven  times  a  year,  and  that  a  large 
part  of  its  work  was  entrusted  to  sub-Committees.  Of  these 
there  were  four,  viz.  the  Home  Ports  Defence  Committee,  the 
Oversea  Defence  Committee,  the  Committee  for  the  Co- 
ordination of  Departmental  action  on  the  outbreak  of  War 
and  the  Aerial  Navigation  Committee.  Besides  the  above 
permanent  sub-Committees,  many  sub-Committees  have  sat 
from  time  to  time  to  deal  with  such  matters  as  local  and  in- 


82   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

hope  that  they  would  be  assisted  by  representa- 
tives of  the  Colonies. 

In  reference  to  Lord  Roberts'  speech,  Mr. 
Asquith  stated  that  his  predecessor  (Sir  H.  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman)  recognized  the  gravity  and  im- 
portance of  the  matter,  and  appointed  a  sub- 
Committee  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
of  which  he  (Mr.  Asquith)  was  Chairman,  to  go 
into  the  whole  matter  in  the  light  of  Lord  Roberts' 
representation  and  the  previous  statements  of  the 
late  Prime  Minister  (Mr.  Balfour).  This  sub- 
Committee,  consisting  of  almost  all  the  members 
of  the  Committee  (all  the  expert  members)  carried 
on  its  investigations  from  November,  1907,  to 
October,  1908,  and  had  from  Lord  Roberts  a  full 
presentation  of  his  case,  and  studied  all  changes 
in  the  situation. 

In  stating  the  conclusions  of  the  Committee, 
Mr.  Asquith  said :  "  We  took  against  ourselves 
the  most  unfavourable  possible  conditions  and 
in  favour  of  the  hypothetical  invader  the  most 
favourable  conditions.  The  conclusion  to  which 


ternal  transportation  arid  the  distribution  of  supplies  in  time 
of  war,  with  oversea  transports  and  reinforcements  in  time 
of  war,  with  wireless  telegraphy  throughout  the  Km  pin 
with  Press  Censorship  in  time  of  War,  etc.  For  further 
references  to  the  work  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
see  pages  57,  58,  66. 


PRINCIPLES  AND    POLICY,    1888-1909     83 

we  unanimously  arrived — all  the  naval  as  well  as 
the  military  members  of  the  Committee  being  at 
one  in  this  matter — may  be  summed  up  under  two 
heads.  In  the  first  place,  that  so  long  as  the 
naval  supremacy  of  this  country  is  adequately 
assured,  invasion  on  a  large  scale,  by  which  I  mean 
invasion  on  such  a  scale  as  was  contemplated  by 
Lord  Roberts  (that  is,  the  transport  to  these 
shores  of  120,000  to  150,000  men)  is  an  absolutely 
impracticable  operation."  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Committee  agreed  that  if  command  of  the  sea 
were  lost,  then  whatever  might  be  the  strength 
and  organization  of  our  military  forces,  even 
allowing  the  United  Kingdom  possessed  an  Army 
like  Germany,  the  subjection  of  the  country  would 
be  inevitable,  and  this  might  be  brought  about 
even  without  any  invasion  of  these  shores. 

Secondly,  as  regards  the  Home  Army,  Mr.  As- 
quith  repeated  the  view  of  the  Committee,  as 
previously  given  by  Lord  Crewe,1  that  its  numbers 
and  organization  should  be  sufficient  to  repel  raids 
(i.e.  expeditions  so  small  in  numbers  as  to  evade 
the  most  carefully  watching  fleet  and  not  intended 
permanently  to  occupy  the  country)  and  compel 
an  enemy  which  contemplates  invasion  to  come 
with  such  a  substantial  force  as  to  make  it  im- 
possible to  evade  the  Fleet.  He  stated  the  Ad- 
i  See  p.  80. 


84  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

miralty  belief  that  a  force  of  70,000  men  could 
not  possibly  evade  the  Fleet. 

In  this  way  the  long  struggle  of  Sir  John  Colomb 
for  the  recognition  of  sound  principles  was 
crowned  with  success ;  in  this  way  were  laid  to 
rest 1  the  exaggerated  theories  of  invasion  which 
ignored  the  doctrine  of  sea  supremacy,  and  which 
had  been  responsible  not  only  for  wasting  huge 

1  This  statement  is  perhaps  too  sanguine,  as  eminent  sol- 
diers, looking  at  the  question  of  the  Invasion  of  England 
through  military  glasses,  will  inevitably  from  time  to  time 
endeavour  to  rouse  public  opinion  to  the  necessity  of  estab- 
lishing a  great  Army  for  Home  Defence.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Lord  Roberts'  attitude  was  entirely  unaltered  by  the  results 
of  the  investigations  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
and  he  is  now  more  than  ever  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the 
position  outlined  in  the  motion  he  moved  in  the  House  of 
Lords  on  November  23,  1908.  The  position  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence  remains  the  same  to-day  as  when 
explained  by  Mr.  Asquith  in  July,  1909,  except  that  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  attempted  invasion  of  these  shores  has  been 
rendered  still  more  remote  by  the  large  force  of  destroyers  and 
submarines,  which,  as  pointed  out  in  the  notes  supplied  by 
the  Board  of  Admiralty  to  the  War  Office  in  November,  1910, 
will  always  form  "  a  very  effective  second  line  of  defence  in 
the  improbable  event  of  such  a  second  line  being  required." 
The  naval  line  of  defence  is,  therefore,  now  twofold,  the  first 
line  consisting  of  the  Fleet ;  the  second  of  a  separate  coast- 
defence  organization  of  submarine  and  destroyer  flotillas. 
See  Compulsory  /Service,  by  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  p.  19, 
and  Admiralty.  Notes  given  in  Appendix  to  that  volume  (Lon- 
don :  John  Murray,  1911). 


PRINCIPLES   AND    POLICY,   1888-1909     85 

sums  of  money  in  the  past,  but  for  crippling  the 
striking  Army  and  preventing  a  sound  basis  of 
future  co-operation  with  the  Oversea  States  in 
defence  of  the  common  Empire. 

It  was,  perhaps,  fitting  that  the  subject  which 
of  all  others  Sir  John  Colomb  was  never  tired  of 
investigating  and  exposing  to  the  light  of  day 
should  have  been  again  so  carefully  studied  by  the 
Defence  Committee  and  made  public  in  the  very 
year  of  his  death,  for  he  passed  away  on  May  27, 
1909.  Thus  it  may  be  said  that  the  most  important 
chapter  in  the  story  of  the  evolution  of  Imperial 
Defence  closed  with  the  death  of  "  the  Pilot  that 
weathered  the  storm." 


**** 


M  «•• 


' 


PROTECTION  OF  COMMERCE  ; 
IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902. 


CHAPTER   III 

PROTECTION  OF  COMMERCE  ; 
IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902. 

"  The  larger  'principle  of  the  relations  which  self-governing 
Colonies  should  hold  to  the  Imperial  Naval  Defence  should  first 
come  under  consideration,  because  that  is  the  major  premise  of 
which  the  form  of  any  contribution  is  after  all  only  a  minor 
matter."  —  HON.  ALFRED 


The  British  Navy  ;  its  Functions.  —  Protection  of  Territories 
—  Protection  of  Commerce.  —  Royal  Commission  on  Food 
Supply.  —  Admiralty  views  on  Protection  of  Commerce.  — 
Sir  John  Colomb  on  Protection  of  Commerce  and  Neces- 
sity of  Colonial  Co-operation.  —  Growth  of  Colonial  Sea 
Commerce  and  Naval  Responsibilities.  —  Formation  of 
Imperial  Federation  League.  —  Basis  of  League's  Policy.  — 
Professor  Seeley  and  Sir  John  Colomb  on  Federation  for 
Defence.  —  Colonial  Conference  of  1887.  —  Lord  Salisbury 
on  Union  for  Defence.  —  Policy  of  Home  Government 
at  Conference.  —  Local  aspects  of  Defence,  and  Carnarvon 
Commission.  —  Influence  of  Steam  on  Naval  War.  — 
Views  of  Sir  Henry  Holland  and  Sir  John  Colomb.  — 
Australian  Squadron.  —  Scheme  of  Admiral  Tryon.  — 
Agreement  limiting  action  of  Squadron.  —  Sir  Henry 
Holland  and  Sir  John  Colomb  thereon.  —  Defence  of  King 
George's  Sound  and  Thursday  Island.  —  Home  Govern- 
ment's absence  of  Principle.  —  Australian  Military  De- 
fence. —  Proposals  for  Co-operation.  —  Sir  A.  Campbell 

1  At  1907  Imperial  Conference. 


90  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

on  Canada's  Part  in  Defence. — Mr.  Hofmeyr's  Suggestion 
for  Defence  Fund. — Deputation  of  Imperial  Federation 
League  to  Lord  Salisbury. — Appointment  of  Committee 
of  League  to  draw  up  a  Scheme. — Report  of  Committee. — 
Recognition  that  Colonies  sharing  in  cost  must  share  in 
control. — Suggestion  of  a  Conference. — Presentation  of 
Report  to  Mr.  Gladstone. — Sir  John  Colomb  on  need 
for  Common  Consultation. — Mr.  Gladstone  on  Scheme. — 
Dissolution  of  Imperial  Federation  League  and  reasons 
for  same. — Formation  of  Imperial  Federation  (Defence) 
Committee. — Colonial  Conference  of  1897. — Mr.  Joseph 
Chamberlain  on  Co-operation  in  Naval  Defence. — Mr. 
Goschen  on  Responsibility  of  Admiralty. — Military  De- 
fence ;  Uniformity  of  Arms  and  Interchange  of  Troops. — 
Cape  Colony  and  Naval  Defence  ;  unconoUtional  offer. — 
Colonial  Interests  in  Imperial  Defence  put  before  Colonies 
as  suggested  by  Sir  John  Colomb. — Colonial  Conference, 
1902.— Sir  John  Colomb  on  the  prospects. — His  proposals 
for  an  Imperial  Army. — Military  Defence  at  the  Confer- 
ence ;  proposals  of  Mr.  Seddon  and  Mr.  Brodrick. — 
Naval  Defence ;  Mr.  Chamberlain  adopts  Sir  John 
Colomb's  arguments. — Sir  John  Forrest's  Position. — 
Results  of  Conference. 

HAVING  shortly  reviewed  in  previous  chapters 
the  progress  of  thought  in  relation  to  Imperial 
Defence,  so  far  as  it  affects  the  protection  of  terri- 
tories open  to  attack  from  the  sea,  it  will  be  well 
perhaps  to  sum  up  the  functions  of  the  British 
Navy  in  this  regard  by  the  following  quotation, 
viz. :  "  The  British  Navy  so  long  as  it  maintains 
the  superiority  at  sea,  is  a  sufficient  protection 
against  invasion  for  every  part  of  the  Empire 
except  India  and  Canada."  l 

1  See  Imperial  Defence  by  Sir  Charles  Dilke  and  Spenser 
Wilkinson,  p.  40. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902     91 

Before  proceeding  to  consider,  however,  the 
general  question  of  Colonial  Co-operation  in  De- 
fence, it  is  well  to  revert  once  again  to  another 
great  function  of  the  Fleet  in  war,  so  often  dealt 
with  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  i.e.  the  Protection  of 
Commerce  upon  the  high  seas.  Many  were  the 
essays  in  which  he  discussed  this  important  sub- 
ject, commencing  with  the  paper  "  Naval  Intelli- 
gence and  Protection  of  Commerce  in  War,"1 
which  it  has  been  seen  had  such  very  practical 
results  in  the  creation  of  the  Naval  Intelligence 
Department  at  the  Admiralty.  But  the  last  word 
on  this  subject,  so  far  as  the  United  Kingdom  is 
concerned  (and  the  .principles  established  apply 
equally  to  other  parts  of  the  Empire),  was  said  in 
the  exhaustive  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission 
on  the  supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material  in  time 
of  War,2  of  which  Sir  John  Colomb  was  a  most 
active  Member. 

The  Commissioners,  by  the  terms  of  reference, 
had  to  inquire  into  the  conditions  affecting  the 
importation  of  food  and  raw  material  into  the 
United  Kingdom  in  war  and  into  the  amount  of 
reserves,  and  to  advise  whether  it  was  desirable 
to  adopt  any  measures,  in  addition  to  the  main- 
tenance of  a  strong  Fleet,  by  which  supplies  could 

*  See  p.  21. 

•  Cd.  2643 ;  Cd.  2644.    The  Report  was  dated  1906. 


92   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

be  better  secured.  As  the  Commission  had  upon 
it  several  of  the  most  prominent  advocates  of  the 
"  free  storage  of  grain "  (including  Mr.  Henry 
Chaplin,  M.P.,  and  Sir  Henry  Seton-Karr)  it  could 
scarcely  be  expected  that  the  Report  should  be 
unanimous,  for  Sir  John  Colomb  had  always  been 
a  strong  opponent  of  all  :<  faddist "  schemes 
designed  as  substitutes  for  naval  supremacy. 
Only  those  who  know  something  of  the  lengthy 
sittings  of  the  Commission,  and  followed  the 
minute  investigations  made  into  the  operations 
of  commerce  and  shipping,  can  appreciate  how 
necessary  was  the  tenacious  adherence  to  sound 
principles  which  he  always  insisted  upon,  often, 
indeed,  when  there  was  a  danger  of  the  Com- 
missioners finding  themselves  somewhat  befogged 
in  a  mass  of  technical  detail.  The  able  summary 
of  naval  requirements  in  commerce  protection 
prepared  by  the  Admiralty  helped  in  a  considerable 
measure  to  define  the  issues,  for  in  considering 
the  events  of  the  seventeenth,  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty 
pointed  out  that  naval  history  demonstrated  the 
truth  of  these  two  general  principles  1  :— 

"  1.  That  the  command  of  the  sea  is  essential 

1  See  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Supply  of 
Food  and  Raw  Material  in  Time  of  War,  p.  28. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902     93 

for  the  successful  attack  or  defence  of 
commerce,  and  should,  therefore,  be  the 
primary  aim. 

"  2.  That  the  attack  or  defence  of  commerce 
is  best  effected  by  concentration  of  force, 
and  that  a  dispersion  of  strength  for  either 
of  those  objects  is  the  strategy  of  the  weak 
and  cannot  materially  influence  the  ulti- 
mate result  of  the  war." 
In  answering  certain  questions  submitted  by 
the  Commission,  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  gave 
it  as  their  opinion  that  in  a  war  with  any  two  of 
the  great   maritime  Powers  there  would  be  no 
material  diminution  in  the  supplies  of  wheat  and 
flour  reaching  the  United  Kingdom,  though,  of 
course,  they  could  not  guarantee  that  no  captures 
whatever  would  be  made  by  the  enemy.1 

While  the  majority  of  the  Commissioners  in 
the  course  of  their  report  stated:  "We  look 
mainly  for  security  to  the  strength  of  our  Navy ; 
but  we  rely  in  only  a  less  degree  upon  the  wide- 
spread resources  of  our  Mercantile  Fleet  and  its 
powers  to  carry  on  our  trade  and  reach  all  possible 
sources  of  supply  wherever  they  exist "  ;  2  there 

1  Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Supply  of  Food 
and  Raw  Material  in  Time  of  War,  p.  30. 

2  See  Report  of  Commission,  p.  62.    It  may  be  noted  in 
this  connexion  that  Sir  John  Colomb  always  declared  himself 


94   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

were,  of  course,  reservations  made  by  those  who 
came  to  the  Commission  as  strong  advocates  of 
particular  schemes. 

The  Report,  however,  in  its  main  features, 
exercised  a  beneficial  influence  upon  official  and 
public  opinion  in  defining  one  of  the  main  functions 
of  the  Navy  in  war,  and  rendered  powerful  aid 
to  the  many  writings  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  more 
especially  in  relationship  to  the  operations  of 
shipping. 

Indeed  the  Shipping  part  of  the  Report  was 
put  mainly  into  shape  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  who 
acted  throughout  in  close  touch  with  the  Chair- 
man— Lord  Balfour  of  Burleigh.  The  feeling  of 
the  Chairman  upon  the  matter  is  shown  by  the 
following  letter  which  was  written  shortly  before 
the  Report  was  signed  :— 

"MY  DEAR  COLOMB, — Very  many  thanks  for 
your  kind  letter.  It  is  this  sort  of  thing  that  en- 

an  opponent  of  the  subvention  of  the  Mercantile  Marine  by 
the  Admiralty.  In  a  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  on 
September  7,  1887,  and  on  many  other  occasions,  he  showed 
that  it  was  not  sound  policy  to  pay  a  heavy  annual  charge 
in  peace  for  ships  to  supplement  the  naval  forces  in  uar 
when  the  result  would  be  that  we  should  rob  our  main  lines 
of  communication  of  our  best  ships  and  force  commerce  into 
slower  vessels. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902     95 

courages   me.      Everyone  is  not   so    kind  or  so 
moderate  as  you  are.  .  .  . 

"  Some  say  that  parts  of  the  Report  spoil  the 
whole  thing,  while  others  say  of  the  same  parts 
that  they  are  not  strong  enough.  If  I  can  get 
it  through  with  only  a  few  personal  reservations, 
and  no  organized  Report  by  a  minority,  I  shall  be 
satisfied.  .  .  . 

"  I  am  very  glad  the  Shipping  part,  which  owes 
so  much  to  you,  is  turning  out  well. 
Yours  very  truly, 

BALFOUR  OF  BURLEIGH." 

Some  years  before  the  publication  of  the 
Report  of  the  Food  Supply  Commission,  Sir  John 
had  himself  made  a  careful  inquiry  into  the  speed 
and  endurance  of  the  merchant  vessels  of  the  great 
Powers,  considering  their  capacity  as  commerce 
carriers  and  commerce  marauders,1  and  laid  down 
the  following  proposition  : — 

"  The  primary  business  of  our  war  Fleet  is 
to  destroy,  capture  or  contain  in  ports  the  enemy's 
war-ships.  Until  this  work  is  done  all  thought  of 
applying  the  Navy  to  the  direct  protection  of 
commerce  must  be  abandoned.  To  what  extent 

1  Our  Ships,   Colonies  and  Commerce  in  Time  of  War 
(London  :  P.  S.  King  &  Son,  1902). 


96  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

our  shipping  and  commerce  may  suffer  in  the 
interval  between  the  outbreak  of  war  and  the 
completion  of  the  Navy's  real  business,  will  depend 
upon  previous  arrangements  made  for  and  carried 
out  by  our  Mercantile  Marine  itself." 

In  the  above,  as  in  all  his  works,  Sir  John  Colomb 
did  not  limit  the  consideration  of  commerce  pro- 
tection to  the  shipping  of  the  United  Kingdom,  but 
insisted,  as  always,  that  the  commerce  of  each 
part  of  the  Empire  must  be  defended  as  part  of  a 
single  world  problem.  For  this  reason  he  be- 
lieved l  that  it  should  no  longer  be  considered  that 
the  whole  obligation  of  providing  for  the  security 
of  British  sea  commerce  and  shipping  should  rest 
solely  on  the  shoulders  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  "  but  that  a  common  necessity 
demands  a  great  British  *  combine,'  between  all 
parts  of  the  Empire,  to  secure  in  war  the  stability 
of  the  British  economic  position,  and  the  existence 
of  the  Empire  itself." 

Years  before  the  above  words  were  written, 
Sir  John  Colomb  had  many  times  urged  the  neces- 
sity of  Colonial  co-operation  in  naval  defence. 
He  put  the  matter  very  plainly  in  a  paper  which 
first  appeared  in  1877,1  when  he  maintained  that 


1  Our  fihips,  Colonies  and  Commerce  in  Time  of  War,  p.  30. 

2  "  Imperial  and  Colonial  Responsibilities  in  War,"  read 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902     97 

there  was  no  distinction  between  Imperial  and 
Colonial  responsibilities  in  war,  and  in  tho  course 
of  his  argument  instanced  the  "  external  trade  " 
of  New  South  Wales,  asking  why  the  people  of  the 
United  Kingdom  should  pay,  find  the  force  neces- 
sary, and  be  responsible  for  such  trade,  which 
neither  came  to  nor  went  from  the  United  Kingdom. 
Sir  John  considered  this  subject  at  some  length 
in  a  speech  delivered  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  March  2,  189 1,1  when  he  moved  a  Resolution 
dealing  with  the  growth  of  Colonial  Sea  Commerce 
and  British  Naval  Responsibilities,  and  he  sought 
to  obtain  a  Return  showing  the  Annual  Revenue, 
Seaborne  Commerce,  and  Naval  Expenditure  of 
Great  Britain,  Foreign  Countries  and  the  self- 
governing  Colonies.  He  showed  the  great  increase 
in  the  trade  of  the  three  great  groups  of  self- 
governing  Colonies  in  North  America,  South 
Africa  and  Australasia.  Taking  the  independent 
sea  commerce  which  was  carried  on  by  them  with 
foreign  countries,  and  in  which  the  United  King- 
dom had  no  direct  concern,  Sir  John  Colomb 
showed  that  it  amounted  in  value  to  three-fourths 


before  the  Royal  Colonial  Institute  in  May,  1877,  and  subse- 
quently republished  as  Chapter  iv.  of  The  Defence  of  Great 
and  Greater  Britain.     See  p.  114  of  last-named  work. 
1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  2,  1891. 


98   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

more  than  the  total  trade  of  the  United  Kingdom 
at  the  commencement  of  the  reign  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria, and,  at  the  time  he  was  speaking,  that  it 
amounted  to  about  four  times  as  much  as  the  sea- 
borne trade  of  all  Russia,  was  equal  to  that  of 
Germany,  about  three-fourths  that  of  France,  two 
and  a  half  times  that  of  Italy,  and  nearly  half  that 
of  the  United  States.  Taking  the  percentage  of 
naval  expenditure  and  revenue,  he  found  that 
Russia  spent  5  per  cent,  of  the  total  revenue  on 
her  Fleet,  Germany  4  per  cent.,  France  8  per 
cent.,  Italy  4  per  cent.,  the  United  States  3  per 
cent.,  while  the  naval  expenditure  of  the  outlying 
Empire  compared  with  revenue  was  practically 
nil.  Pointing  out  that  the  Navy  was  for  the 
defence  of  sea-boards  and  the  defence  of  sea 
commerce,  Sir  John  showed  the  great  stake  the 
Oversea  Colonies  had  in  the  security  of  ocean 
trade,  and  how  the  British  Empire  differed  from 
all  other  States  of  the  world  in  that  the  internal 
communications  were  sea  communications.  He 
added,  "  Let  us  remember  that  it  is  the  interest 
of  every  part  of  the  Empire  to  assist  in  keeping 
the  waterways  free,  and  that  it  can  only  be  done 
by  a  complete  arrangement  with  all  parts  of  the 
Empire."  As  to  how  far,  up  to  that  time,  any 
attempt  had  been  made  to  come  to  such  an  ar- 
rangement between  the  different  portions  of  the 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902     99 

Empire  for  the  defence  of  the  whole,  it  may  now 
be  convenient  briefly  to  consider. 

Without  attempting  any  review  of  the  efforts 
towards  co-operation  for  defence  prior  to  the  year 
1884,  except  in  so  far  as  reference  has  already  been 
made  to  Sir  John  Colomb's  early  publications  in 
this  connexion,  it  is  well  to  take  the  reader  at  once 
to  the  year  mentioned. 

In  1884  an  event  of  first-rate  importance  oc- 
curred in  the  formation  of  the  Imperial  Federation 
League  as  the  result  of  a  discussion  held  at 
a  representative  Conference,  in  the  convening 
of  which  the  active  spirits  were  Mr.  W.  E. 
Forster,  M.P.,  Sir  John  (then  Captain)  Colomb, 
Mr.  (afterwards  Sir)  Frederick  Young,  Mr.  H.  0. 
Arnold-Forster,  and  Mr.  F.  P.  Labilliere.  The 
League  commenced  active  work  in  1885  with  the 
resolutions  passed  at  the  1884  Conference  as  the 
basis  of  its  policy.  Of  these,  the  most  important 
was  "  That  any  scheme  of  Imperial  Federation 
should  combine  on  an  equitable  basis  the  resources 
of  the  Empire  for  the  maintenance  of  common 
interests,  and  adequately  provide  for  an  organized 
defence  of  common  rights." 

In  the  first  number  of  the  Journal  of  the  Im- 
perial Federation  League  appeared  an  article  in 
which  it  was  stated,  "  Imperial  Defence  is  not 
only  a  prime  factor  in  Imperial  Federation,  it  is 


100   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  main  burden  which  Imperial  Federation  takes 
upon  itself "  ;  and  though,  of  course,  as  in  all 
societies,  individual  members  had  their  own  ideas  as 
to  the  details  of  any  scheme  of  Imperial  Federation, 
the  one  matter  upon  which  all  appeared  to  be 
agreed  was  that  common  defence  was  essential 
to  any  scheme  of  closer  union  of  the  Empire.  At 
the  famous  Conference  of  the  League  held  in  1886, 
Professor  J.  R.  Seeley  (the  eminent  author  of  the 
Expansion  of  England)  stated  in  a  paper  that  the 
first  object  of  Federation  was  "  the  defence  of  a 
trade  which  covers  all  seas,"  while  Sir  John 
Colomb,  in  the  course  of  his  paper,  also  read  at 
this  Conference,  said,  "  Federation  for  common 
defence  is,  I  believe,  essentially  necessary  for 
Imperial  safety,"  and  urged  the  calling  of  a  Con- 
ference, representative  of  the  Parliaments  of  the 
Empire,  "  to  examine  the  facts  of  our  position 
and  to  fix  the  principles  which  are  to  guide  our 
arrangements  for  defence."  l 

In  the  year  following,  the  first  official  con- 
sideration to  the  great  question  of  Co-operation 
for  Imperial  Defence  by  the  representatives  of 
the  Empire  assembled  together  was  given,  for  a 
Colonial  Conference  (so  often  urged  by  Sir  John 
Colomb)  was  called  by  Mr.  Edward  Stanhope,  then 

1  For  report  of  papers  read  at  Conference  of  Imperial 
Federation  League  see  Imperial  Federation,  August,  1886. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  101 

Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies,  and  sub- 
sequently President  of  the  Imperial  Federation 
League.1  At  the  opening  meeting  of  this  historic 
gathering  in  1 887,  representatives  of  the  self-govern- 
ing Colonies  were  brought  into  formal  consultation 
for  the  first  time  with  the  Home  Government,  and 
in  his  introductory  address  Lord  Salisbury  (then 
Prime  Minister)  referred  to  the  Conference  as 
"  the  parent  of  a  long  progeniture,"  adding  that 
"  distant  Councils  of  the  Empire  may,  in  some  far 
off  time,  look  back  to  the  meeting  in  this  room  as 
the  root  from  which  all  their  greatness  and  all  their 
beneficence  sprang." 

Defence  was  undoubtedly  the  main  motive 
for  the  Conference,  and  the  urgency  of  the  matter 
of  a  defensive  organization  appealed  to  Her 
Majesty's  Government  with  great  force  owing  to 
the  patriotic  action  of  the  Colonies  in  offering  con- 
tingents of  troops  for  service  in  the  Egyptian 
campaign.  The  Prime  Minister  (Lord  Salisbury) 
in  addressing  the  Conference  did  not  leave  any 
doubt  upon  the  matter  in  the  minds  of  his  hearers, 


1  That  the  calling  of  this  Conference  was  the  direct  result 
of  the  work  -of  the  Imperial  Federation  League,  of  which 
Lord  Rosebery  was  chairman,  and  in  which  Sir  John  Colomb 
took  a  very  prominent  part,  there  can  be  no  question.  See 
article  in  Imperial  Federation  (the  organ  of  the  League,  which 
was  ably  edited  by  Mr.  Robert  J.  Beadon)  of  January  1887. 


102   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

for  in  outlining  "  the  real  and  most  important 
business  "  upon  which  they  would  be  engaged  he 
gave  it  as  "  union  for  purposes  of  mutual  defence."  l 

This  1887  Conference,  then,  afforded  the  Minis- 
ters of  the  Home  Government  a  unique  opportu- 
nity of  emphasizing  principles  and  laying  down  a 
sound  and  lasting  basis  upon  which  could  be  built 
up  and  developed,  as  the  years  went  by,  an  effective 
Imperial  organization,  in  the  scheme  of  which  all 
parts  of  the  Empire  should  take  their  appropriate 
share  in  its  naval  and  military  defence.  Various 
reasons,  however,  combined  to  let  principles  slip 
out  of  sight,  and  while  undoubtedly  difficulties 
in  securing  unanimity  faced  Ministers  at  the  first 
Conference  through  the  necessary  lack  of  technical 
knowledge  relating  to  defence  on  the  part  of 
the  Colonial  representatives,  the  variety  of 
interests  involved,  and  the  presence  of  many 
voices  speaking  for  Australia  (Federation  not  tak- 
ing place  till  1901)  and  other  causes,  yet  the  most 
fruitful  source  of  difficulty  was  the  absence  of  any 
definite  policy  of  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the 
Home  Government,  and  their  inability  to  grasp 
and  set  clearly  before  the  Conference  the  principles 
which  should  guide  the  defence  of  a  maritime 
Empire. 

It    will    have    been    seen    that    during    the 

1  See  Report  of  Conference,  pp.  6,  7. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902    103 

period  now  under  consideration  official  thought 
was  dominated  by  military  ideas,  which  the 
Carnarvon  Commission  of  1879  had  done  a 
great  deal  to  emphasize.  It  was,  therefore,  not 
surprising  that  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for 
the  Colonies,  Sir  Henry  Holland1  (afterwards 
Lord  Knutsford),  who  was  himself  a  member  of 
the  Carnarvon  Commission,  should  devote  a  good 
deal  of  his  opening  address  at  the  Conference  to 
the  findings  of  that  Commission,  and  the  more 
particularly  "  local  aspects  "  of  Imperial  Defence. 
Though,  as  has  previously  been  stated,  the 
Report  of  this  Commission  was  not  published  in 
full,2  Sir  Henry  Holland  managed  to  tell  the  Con- 
ference something  about  its  work,  and  what  is 
still  more  important,  that  the  opinions  and  re- 
commendations of  the  Commission  relating  to 
the  defence  of  Australia  had  been  "  confidentially 
communicated  "  to  the  Government  of  the  Aus- 
tralasian Colonies  in  1883.  This  latter  fact  goes 
far  to  explain  the  "  localized  "  view  of  defence 

1  Sir  Henry  Holland  had  taken  the  place  of  Mr.  Edward 
Stanhope  at  the  Colonial  Office  before  the  Conference  actually 
met,  Mr.  Edward  Stanhope  taking  office  in  the  Administra- 
tion as  Secretary  of  State  for  War. 

2  The  Report  of  the  Commission  as  mentioned  on  page  20, 
was   confidential,  but  extracts  from  it  were  published  in 
Volume  ii.  of  the  1887  Conference  Report.    See  VII  D. 


104  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

which  took  root  from  the  first  in  the  minds  of 
Australian  representative  men,  and  the  observa- 
tions of  Sir  Henry  Holland  had  only  the  effect  of 
confirming  them  in  the  very  limited  view  of 
defensive  requirements  which  they  had  previously 
been  invited  to  take. 

Having  referred  to  the  fact  that  in  1880  the 
Merchant  Navy  of  the  British  Empire  equalled  in 
tonnage  all  the  Navies  of  the  world  put  together, 
and  that  in  1885-6  more  than  two-thirds  of  the 
sea-going  registered  tonnage  of  the  world  belonged 
to  the  British  Empire,  the  Colonial  Secretary  con- 
centrated the  attention  of  the  Conference,  not 
upon  the  means  of  defending  this  great  com- 
merce by  a  powerful  Navy,  but  upon  the  local 
defence  of  ports.  He  referred  to  the  introduction 
of  steam  power  as  enabling  rapid  and  certain 
naval  combinations  to  be  made,  so  that  the  lia- 
bility of  the  outlying  ports  of  the  Empire  to  sudden 
attack  was  vastly  increased,  and  summed  up  the 
subjects  connected  with  defence  which  the  Con- 
ference should  discuss  as — the  local  defence  of 
the  ports,  naval  defence  of  the  Australian  Colonies, 
as  discussed  by  Admiral  Tryon,  and  other  matters 
relating  to  the  defence  of  ports,  the  military  as- 
pects of  telegraph  cables,  and  the  employment 
and  training  of  local  troops  for  garrisoning  works 
of  defence,  etc. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  105 

The  theories  which  had  influenced  British 
statesmen  as  to  the  increased  vulnerability  l  of 
ports  and  land  defences  through  the  introduction 
of  steam  had  been  dealt  with  many  times  by  Sir 
John  Colomb,  and  he  had  replied  effectively  to 
the  doctrine  of  "  steam  bridging  the  Channel  "  by 
pointing  out  that  it  had  done  something  infinitely 
greater,  and  had  bridged  the  water  distances  which 
separated  the  Colonies  from  the  Mother-Country 
and  from  each  other.2 

Knowing,  however,  that  measures  for  the 
local  defence  of  Australia  would  be  more  readily 
considered  by  the  Australian  delegates  than 
matters  of  general  Imperial  Defence,  the  Im- 
perial Government,  with  the  natural  desire  to 
achieve  some  practical  results  at  the  Conference, 
pursued  the  line  of  least  resistance. 

The  discussions  in  which  the  Australian  dele- 
gates took  part  evidenced  a  strong  desire  to  co- 
operate with  the  Imperial  Government  in  order  to 
secure  both  an  increase  in  the  Australian  Squadron 

1  In  an  article  referred  to  in  Imperial  Federation  of  August 
1,   1889,  Admiral  Colomb  absolutely  rejected  the  common 
idea  that  steam  had  made  distant  ports  more  vulnerable  than 
before  ;   on  the  contrary,  he  declared  that  a  steam  Navy  had 
overwhelming  powers  of  defence  as  compared  with  a  sailing 
Navy,  and  that  the  Colonies  might  rest  in  almost  absolute 
security  under  its  aegis. 

2  See  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain,  page  14. 


<?>  ;r     v    *• 

j  « 


106  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

and  also  adequate  defences  at  King  George's 
Sound  and  Thursday  Island  (Torres  Straits). 
With  regard  to  the  former,  the  initial  impulse  for 
strengthening  the  protection  of  Australia's  expand- 
ing floating  trade  was  given  at  the  Inter-Colonial 
Conference  at  Sydney  in  1881,  but  the  suggestion 
that  the  cost  of  the  increased  naval  defence  should 
be  borne  by  the  United  Kingdom  did  not  meet 
with  the  approval  of  the  Colonial  Secretary.  After 
a  great  deal  of  correspondence  had  taken  place, 
Admiral  Tryon,  then  in  command  at  the  Austra- 
lian Station,  submitted  in  1885  a  scheme  to  the 
Australian  Governments  which  involved  the  Col- 
onies bearing  the  cost  of  the  construction  and 
maintenance  of  an  additional  Fleet  to  be  provided 
by  the  Imperial  Government.  While  New  Zealand 
and  most  of  the  Australian  Colonies  would  have 
agreed  to  a  modification  of  the  scheme,  which 
meant  paying  an  annual  sum  for  depreciation 
instead  of  bearing  the  cost  of  construction,  the 
colony  of  Victoria  was  against  contributing  to  the 
cost  of  maintenance  or  depreciation.  Admiral 
Tryon  suggested  a  compromise  whereby  the 
Colonies  should  pay  the  cost  of  maintaining  the 
new  Fleet,  and  5  per  cent,  on  the  cost  of  con- 
struction, and  the  matter  then  came  before  the 
Conference. 

At  the  Conference,  the  Colonies  were  asked  to 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,    1884-1902     107 

contribute  annually  for  ten  years  5  per  cent, 
interest  on  the  cost  of  outlay  and  the  cost  of  main- 
tenance, which  would  be  (a)  in  peace  £91,000, 
(b)  in  war  £150,000,  and  this  being  subsequently 
modified  to  involve  no  additional  cost  to  the 
Australian  Colonies  in  case  of  war,  and  interest 
not  exceeding  £35,000  per  annum,  the  scheme 
was  accepted  after  discussions  at  two  whole 
sittings,  subject  to  the  sanction  of  the  respective 
Parliaments.  The  Agreement  provided  that  the 
ships  should  be  retained  within  the  limits  of 
the  Australian  Station,  and  neither  in  peace 
nor  war  employed  beyond  those  limits  without 
the  consent  of  the  Colonial  Governments.1  Sir 
Henry  Holland  in  his  remarks  on  this  subject 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that,  while  the  scheme 
constituted  a  new  departure  for  the  Colonial 
Governments  concerned,  it  was  also  new  from  an 
Imperial  point  of  view,2  for  it  had  never  before 
been  laid  down  that  a  squadron  of  a  certain 

1  The  words  "  or  employed  beyond  those  limits  only  with 
the  consent  of  the  Colonial  Governments  "    did  not  appear 
in  the  original  draft  submitted  to  the  Conference  and  were 
added  to  meet  the  views  of  the  Australian  Delegates.   Cf .  Draft 
Agreements,  pp.  258-261  of  Vol.  ii.  (appendix)  Proceedings 
of  the  Colonial  Conference,  1887.     (C.  5091-1.) 

2  Cf.  also  the  remarks  of    Lord  George  Hamilton  (then 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty)  at  the  Conference.     See  p.  42 
of  Vol.  i.  Proceedings  of  Colonial  Conference,  1887. 


108  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

strength  should  be  kept  always  in  certain  waters, 
or  removed  only  in  case  of  extreme  urgency.1 

It  was,  however,  hardly  to  be  expected  that, 
with  no  naval  traditions  or  experience  behind 
them,  the  Australian  representatives  should  real- 
ize that  the  defence  of  the  commerce  of  Australia 
would  be  better  provided  for  on  the  high  seas, 
and  possibly  by  the  exercise  of  superior  sea-power 
in  the  Channel  or  Mediterranean,  than  around  her 
own  shores ;  and  in  referring  to  the  action  of  the 
Colonial  Governments  at  the  1887  Conference  Sir 
John  Colomb  subsequently  observed  that  "  they 
were  not  so  much  to  blame  as  the  Admiralty,  who, 
hi  laudable  anxiety  to  make  some  sort  of  a  begin- 
ning, gave  official  countenance  to  natural  local 
delusions  as  to  the  method  of  securing  Australian 
maritime  safety."  2  It  is  to  be  observed  that  at 
this  Conference  the  national  feeling3  of  Australia 
had  not  sufficiently  advanced  to  evidence  any 

1  See  p.  257,  Vol.  ii.  Proceedings  of  the  Colonial  Confer- 
ence, 1887. 

2  See  The  Colonies  and  Imperial  Defence,  by  the  present 
author,  in  which  occurred  an  interview  with  Sir  John  Colomb. 
The  series  of  interviews  under  the  above  title  first  appeared 
in  the   United  Service  Gazette,   1902.  and   were  subsequently 
published  as  a  pamphlet  by  the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence) 
Committee. 

3  See  The  Imperial  Conference,  by  Richard  Jebb  (London  : 
Longmans  Green  &  Co.,  1911),  p.  54. 


IMPEKIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1002    109 

desire  on  the  part  of  her  statesmen  for  a  separate 
Australian  Navy.  The  formation  of  the  Austra- 
lian Commonwealth  in  1901  saw  the  development 
of  thought  in  this  direction,1  but  how  far  it  found 
its  basis  in  the  scheme  for  the  Australian  Squadron 
would  be  an  interesting  speculation  for  the  philo- 
sophical historian. 

As  to  the  defences  of  King  George's  Sound 
and  Thursday  Island,  the  Imperial  Government 
seemed  to  experience  a  difficulty  in  making  up 
their  minds  (no  doubt,  resulting  from  the  dual 
control  of  Admiralty  and  War  Office  at  the  coaling 
stations)  as  to  whether  these  points  were  of  suffi- 
cient Imperial  importance  to  justify  Imperial 
expenditure.  Lord  Derby,  under  the  influence  of 
the  1885  war  scare,  had  offered  armaments  and 
submarine  mine  defence  for  these  places  to  the 
Colonies,  and,  in  order  not  to  recede  from  this 
offer,  the  Home  Government  at  the  Conference 
offered  some  obsolete  muzzle-loading  guns  and  a 
submarine  mine,  but  the  Australians  unanimously 

1  See  pp.  155,  161,  et  seq.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
Defence  of  Australia  was  the  main  incentive  to  Federation. 
On  its  accomplishment  the  Land  Forces  were  organized  as 
one  Federal  Force,  the  chief  feature  of  the  new  organiza- 
tion being  an  Australian  Field  Army  made  up  of  contribu- 
tions of  mobile  troops  from  the  States.  Cf .  Report  on  Naval 
Defence  of  Australia  for  1906,  p.  9. 


110   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

rejected  anything  but  breech-loading  armaments. 
The  position  which  Sir  Henry  Holland  attempted  to 
occupy  on  behalf  of  Her  Majesty's  Government 
was  that  they  could  not  undertake  the  cost 
of  land  defences  in  Australia,  in  view  of  the  large 
expenditure  they  incurred  at  the  coaling  stations  ; 
but  he  certainly  did  not  succeed  in  showing  how 
King  George's  Sound  and  Thursday  Island  differed 
from  other  Imperial  coaling  stations.  The  places 
had  been  recognized  as  important  by  Admiral 
Tryon,  and  the  Australian  representatives  had 
been  led  to  expect  the  Imperial  Government  to 
take  a  considerable  share  in  their  defence,  and 
this  really  because  of,  rather  than  in  spite  of,  the 
policy  they  were  adopting  in  fortifying  the  coal i ML: 
stations — in  pursuance  of  the  Report  of  the  Car- 
narvon Commission.  The  absence  of  any  definite 
working  principle  shown  by  the  attitude  of  the 
Home  Government  in  regard  to  these  positions 
was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  lack  of  a  combined 
plan  for  the  defence  of  coaling  stations  by  the 
Admiralty  and  War  Office ;  and  after  Western 
Australia  had  come  forward  with  an  offer  to  con- 
tribute nearly  half  the  cost  of  the  works  at  King 
George's  Sound,  and  a  part  of  the  annual  cost  of 
maintaining  the  garrison,  if  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment would  supply  breech-loading  armament, 
both  the  Secretary  for  War  and  the  Colonial  Secre- 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  111 

tary  were  forced  to  admit  that  they  were  personally 
favourable  to  the  newer  type  of  armament. 

With  regard  to  the  military  defence  of  Aus- 
tralia and  the  possibility  of  the  establishment  of 
a  scheme  to  enable  her  forces  to  join  with  those 
of  the  Mother-Country,  a  good  deal  of  discussion 
took  place.  The  absence  of  uniformity  in  the 
methods  of  each  Colony,  and  the  desirability  of 
an  Imperial  Officer  being  appointed  as  Inspecting 
Officer  of  the  Australian  Forces  and  Military 
Adviser  to  all  the  Governments,  were  recognized, 
and  a  Memorandum  was  circulated  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  containing  useful  suggestions  for 
the  terms  of  service  of  the  Colonial  forces.  In 
this  document  it  was  proposed  that  while  the 
forces  should  serve  at  all  times  in  defence  of 
their  Colony  they  should,  with  the  assent  of  their 
Government,  aid  Her  Majesty  in  any  wars  in 
which  she  should  be  engaged,  the  command  in  the 
last-named  case  being  vested  in  the  Commanding 
Officer  of  Her  Majesty's  troops. 

It  will  have  been  seen  that  so  far  as  defence 
matters  were  concerned  the  Conference  was 
practically  an  Australian  Conference,1  but  while 
important  measures  were  discussed  and  decided 
regarding  the  defences  at  Simons  Bay  and  Table 

1  See  Article  by  Sir  Charles  Dilke  in  Fortnightly  Review  of 
June,  1887. 


1 12   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Bay,  and  Mr.  J.  H.  Hofmeyr  made  a  striking 
proposal  regarding  provision  for  the  cost  of  general 
Imperial  Defence,1  Canada  took  practically  no 
part  in  the  Defence  discussions.  Sir  Alexander 
Campbell,  on  her  behalf,  considered  that  the 
Canadian  Pacific  and  Inter-Colonial  Railways 
should  be  regarded  as  works  auxiliary  to  Imperial 
Defence,  and  that  the  North  American  Squadron 
maintained  for  Imperial  purposes  provided  Canada 
with  sufficient  security.  Though  relying  on  the 
fact  that,  at  the  time  of  the  Canadian  Confedera- 
tion movement,  the  British  Government  had 
agreed  to  undertake  the  defence  of  the  proposed 
Dominion,  the  main  reason  for  the  "  waiting " 
policy  of  Canada  was  to  be  found  in  the  existence 
of  a  doubt,  on  the  part  of  her  representative  men, 
as  to  the  direction  in  which  the  future  of  Canada 
lay.  The  national  feeling  was  beginning  even 
then  to  be  felt,  and  whether  closer  union  with  the 
United  Kingdom,  independence,  or  combination 
with  the  United  States  was  the  national  destiny 
of  Canada  constituted  a  question  as  to  which 
opinion  was  very  largely  divided. 

But  though  Mr  Hofmeyr  held  with  regard  to 
the  Colonies  that  "  so  long  as  no  system  of  federa- 
tion or  government  in  which  they  are  represented 
has  been  hit  upon  or  developed,  so  long  they  cannot 
*  See  p.  113. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  113 

be  expected  to  be  in  duty  bound  to  defend  them- 
selves against  the  European  enemies  of  England," 
he  nevertheless  foresaw  that  if  the  Colonies  re- 
mained within  the  Empire  they  would,  in  the 
future,  have  to  take  their  share  in  its  naval 
defence,  and  in  an  important  speech  he  introduced 
an  interesting  discussion  upon  the  following 
proposal : — 

"  The  feasibility  of  promoting  a  closer  union 
between  the  various  parts  of  the  British  Empire 
by  means  of  an  Imperial  Tariff  of  Customs  to  be 
levied,  independently  of  the  duties  payable  under 
existing  tariffs,  on  goods  entering  the  Empire 
from  abroad,  the  revenue  derived  from  such  tariff 
to  be  devoted  to  the  general  Defence  of  the 
Empire."  * 

As  the  above  involved  an  alteration  of  the 
Free  Trade  policy  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Mr. 
Deakin  very  properly  pointed  out  that  the  ques- 
tion was  "  one  really  for  the  English  people,  not 
for  the  Colonies  "  ;  but  as  Mr.  Hofmeyr's  proposal 
has  been  the  subject  of  much  comment  when  con- 
sidering the  burden  of  Imperial  Defence,  and  in- 

1  See  Proceedings  of  the  Colonial  Conference,  1887,  vol. 
i.  at  p.  463.  A  discussion  on  the  subject  of  an  Imperial  sur- 
tax on  foreign  imports  was  initiated  by  Mr.  Deakin  (as  Pre- 
mier of  the  Australian  Commonwealth)  at  the  Conference  of 
1907  (p.  509). 

I 


1 14  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

deed  probably  had  a  bearing  on  the  subsequent 
development  of  a  policy  for  closer  union  of  the 
Empire  in  other  directions,  it  is  thought  well  that 
the  proposal  itself  should  receive  some  place  in 
this  work. 

After  the  meeting  of  the  first  Colonial  Con- 
ference, which  the  Imperial  Federation  League 
had  been  largely  instrumental  in  bringing  about,1 
the  League  devoted  itself  to  propaganda  work 
and  the  establishment  of  branches  in  the  Pro- 
vinces and  the  Oversea  Dominions.2  Sir  John 
Colomb  took  an  active  part  on  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  League,  and  both  there  and  in 
the  House  of  Commons  urged  the  necessity  for  a 
combination  between  the  self-governing  countries 
of  the  Empire  to  secure  its  maritime  defence,8 


1  See  Note  *  on  p.    101. 

2  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Australian  Branch  of 
the  League  is  still  in  existence  at  Melbourne,  and  with  Mr. 
Alfred  Deakin  as  President  and  Mr.  E.  Morris  Miller  as  Hon. 
Secretary  does  valuable  work  in  the  discussion  of  practical 
methods  of  Imperial  Co-operation.    The  most  successful  of 
the  Canadian  branches  of  the  League  was  that  at  Toronto, 
which,  on  the  dissolution  of  the  parent  League,  became  a 
branch  of  the  British  Empire  League  with  a  frankly  "  Pre- 
ferential Trade  "  policy.    Cf.  Denison's  Struggle  for  Imperial 
Unity  (London  :  Macmillan  &  Co.). 

8  See  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  21, 
1887  ;  March  15,  1888  ;  March  2,  1891. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  115 

and  in  the  speech  of  March  2,  1891,  to  which 
reference  has  been  made  already,  he  reviewed  the 
position  as  between  the  self-governing  Colonies 
and  the  United  Kingdom. 

On  June  17,  1891,  the  Imperial  Federation 
League  organized  a  Deputation  to  the  Prime 
Minister  (Lord  Salisbury)  for  the  purpose  of  urging 
upon  him  the  convocation  of  a  second  Conference 
of  the  self-governing  countries  of  the  Empire, 
and  in  the  course  of  his  reply  Lord  Salisbury 
stated  that  it  would  be  a  frivolity  to  call  oversea 
statesmen  from  their  momentous  avocations  with- 
out having  some  proposition  to  make  to  the  Con- 
ference. "  I  think,"  he  added,  "  we  have  almost 
come  to  the  time  when  some  schemes  should  be 
proposed,  and  without  them  we  shall  not  get  very 
far." 

Upon  this  suggestion  the  League  appointed  a 
special  Committee  to  draw  up  a  scheme,  of  which 
Committee  Sir  John  Colomb  was  a  member.1 
The  Committee  presented  a  most  valuable  Report 2 
in  the  course  of  which  they  stated  in  regard  to  the 


1  The  other  members  of  the  Committee  were  Lord  Brassey 
(Chairman) ;"  Mr.  James  Bryce,  M.P. ;  Sir  Daniel  Cooper, 
Mr.  H.  O.  Arnold-Forster,  Lord  Lamington,  Sir  Lyon  Play- 
fair,  M.P.,  Mr.  (afterwards  Sir)  James  Rankin,  M.P.,  Sir 
Rawson  Rawson,  Lord  Reay  and  Sir  Charles  Tupper. 
*  See  Imperial  Federation,  December,  1892 » 


116  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

common  interests  of  the  self-governing  countries : 
"  It  is  in  the  maintenance  of  the  sea  communi- 
cations of  the  Empire  that  the  community  of 
interests  is  most  absolute.  The  primary  require- 
ments of  combined  defence,  therefore,  are  a  sea- 
going fleet  and  naval  bases."  The  Committee 
expressed  the  view  that  if  the  necessities  of  the 
case  were  made  clear,  the  Colonies  would  be  pre- 
pared to  take  their  share  in  the  cost  of  the  general 
Defence  of  the  Empire,  provided  that  they  were 
given  a  proper  share  in  the  control  and  expenditure 
of  the  common  fund,  and  they  outlined  in  some 
detail  their  recommendations  as  to  how  a  Council 
of  the  Empire  could  be  constituted.1  In  order 
to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  Colonies  as  to  meeting 
the  responsibilities  of  Imperial  Defence,  and 
determining  the  basis  of  contribution,  the  Com- 
mittee considered  that  a  Conference  should  be 
summoned  ad  hoc,  and  that  the  invitation  to  the 
Conference  should  be  accompanied  by  a  statement 
showing  the  general  necessities  of  the  Empire  in 
defence,  the  means  by  which  it  had  been  provided 
hitherto,  and  the  proposed  means  and  cost  of  pro- 
viding for  it  by  joint  action.2 

1  For  further   details  on  this   head  of   the  Report,  see 
Chapter  V.  pp.  206-208. 

2  It  was  remarked  that  a  preliminary  inquiry  by  a  Rov.il 
Commission  might  be  necessary. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  117 

On  April  13,  1893,  a  Deputation  from  the  Im- 
perial Federation  League  waited  on  Mr.  W.  E. 
Gladstone  (who  had  succeeded  Lord  Salisbury  as 
Prime  Minister)  and  presented  the  above  Report.1 
The  Deputation  was  introduced  by  the  President 
of  the  League,  Mr.  Edward  Stanhope,  M.P.,  who 
a  few  days  before  the  meeting  had  written  to  Sir 
John  Colomb  as  follows  :— 

"111,  EATON  SQUARE,  S.W., 

April  7,  1893. 

"My  DEAR  COLOMB, — I  regard  it  as  of  the 
greatest  importance,  looking  to  the  part  that  you 
have  taken,  that  you  should  attend  and  speak  at 
the  Deputation  to  Mr.  Gladstone  on  Thursday 
next.  Please,  if  you  possibly  can,  make  your 
arrangements  for  so  doing,  as  we  absolutely  rely 
upon  you. 

Believe  me, 

Yours  very  truly, 

EDWARD  STANHOPE." 

Sir  John  Colomb  was  therefore  present,  and 
after  Mr.  Stanhope  had  introduced  the  Deputation, 
and  had  stated  that  they  desired  to  press  upon  the 
Premier  that  the  important  question  of  Imperial 
Defence  ought  to  be  brought  to  the  test  and 

1  For  Report  of  proceedings  on  this  occasion  see  Imperial 
Federation,  May,  1893,  p.  111. 


118    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

examination  of  a  Conference,  he  spoke  in  support 
of  the  President.  He  referred  again  to  the  growth 
of  Colonial  sea-trade,  pointing  out  that  the  portion 
which  was  independent  of  the  United  Kingdom 
amounted  to  83J  millions  a  year.  While  acknow- 
ledging the  contribution  of  Natal  of  £4,000  for 
military  purposes,  purely  local,  and  the  £126,000 
of  the  Australasian  Colonies  for  "  naval  purposes 
purely  local,"  Sir  John  remarked  that  the  three 
great  groups  of  self-governing  Colonies  were  con- 
tributing nothing  to  the  general  Defence  of  the 
Empire,  the  United  Kingdom  bearing  all  the 
responsibility  and  all  the  cost.  He  said  that  the 
time  had  come  for  common  consultation  with  the 
Colonies,  who  could  not  be  expected  to  take  the 
initiative,  and  while  he  did  not  suggest  a  demand 
for  direct  contributions  from  the  Colonies  he  sug- 
gested a  Conference  be  called  to  consider  the  mat- 
ter. Mr.  Gladstone,  in  reply,  acknowledged  that 
some  considerable  progress  had  been  made  towards 
the  formation  of  a  scheme,  but  he  thought  that 
nothing  could  be  called  a  scheme  which  did  not 
distinctly  lay  down  the  principles  upon  which  the 
burden  of  common  defence  was  to  be  distributed 
and  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  proposed  Im- 
perial Council  of  Defence. 

The     Imperial     Federation     League     having 
brought  the  matter  to  this  point  and  obtained 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902  119 

the  approval  of  the  present  and  late  Prime  Minis- 
ters to  their  proposal  for  a  Conference,  proceeded 
to  appoint  a  special  Committee  to  consider  its 
future  action,  and  this  Committee  took  the  view 
that  the  Report  laid  before  the  Prime  Minister 
in  April  represented  the  maximum  of  political 
principles  and  opinions  attainable  by  the  League 
as  a  homogeneous  body,  by  all  the  numerous  and 
diverse  elements  of  which  it  was  composed,  and 
recommended  that  the  operations  of  the  League 
be  brought  to  a  close.1  This  course  of  action, 
which  was  taken  at  the  close  of  the  year  1893, 
rendered  the  individual  members  free  to  advocate 


1  See  Imperial  Federation,  December,  1893,  at  p.  279. 
It  was,  of  course,  inevitable  that  statements  should  be  made 
that  the  leaders  of  the  League  had  disbanded  it  because 
they  found  Imperial  Federation  to  be  an  impracticable  dream. 
(Cf.  Statements  by  Mr.  John  S.  Ewart,  of  Ottawa,  in  the 
Kingdom  Papers  No.  3,  at  p.  83.)  For  an  entire  refutation 
of  this  the  reader  should  consult  the  leading  article  "  A  Fresh 
Start "  in  the  above  number  of  Imperial  Federation,  from 
which  it  will  be  seen  that  while  the  organization  was  essential 
for  the  first  stages  of  the  movement,  when  the  time  arrived 
to  define  the  form  Imperial  unity  should  take  a  want  of  homo- 
geneity made  itself  felt.  The  sections  striving  to  move  in 
different  directions  brought  about  a  paralysis  of  real  move- 
ment and  activity.  The  restraining  bands  of  the  common 
organization  were,  therefore,  unloosed,  thus  giving  freedom 
to  the  various  forces  to  forge  ahead  towards  the  ultimate  end 
along  their  own  several  paths. 


120   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

particular  methods  of  Federation  by  means  of 
separate  organizations,  and  this  is  what  in  fact 
occurred. 

Those  believing  that  common  defence  was  the 
essential  basis  of  any  scheme  of  Imperial  Federa- 
tion,1 formed  themselves  into  the  Imperial  Federa- 
tion (Defence)  Committee  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
late  League  (Mr.  Arthur  H.  Loring)2  as  its  first 
Honorary  Secretary.  Amongst  the  members  of 
the  late  League  on  the  first  Executive  of  this  Com- 
mittee were  Sir  John  Colomb  (Chairman),  Mr.  H.  O. 
Arnold-Forster  and  Lord  Lamington,  and  many 
other  prominent  members  of  the  old  League  (in- 
cluding Lord  Roberts)  gave  it  their  support.  The 
Committee  continued  to  urge  the  establishment 
of  a  common  system  of  maritime  defence,  pro- 
vided and  controlled  by  a  body  in  which  all  parts 
of  the  Empire  were  represented,  and  also  the 
necessity  of  joint  consultation  between  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  self-governing  Colonies.8 

1  Those  believing  in  a  scheme  for  the  Commercial  Union 
of  the  Empire  formed  themselves  into  "  The  United  Empire 
Trade  League,"  and  of  this  organization  the  late  Sir  Howard 
Vincent  was  the  guiding  spirit. 

2  It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  value  of  the  work  accom- 
plished by  Mr.  Arthur  Loring  during  his  nine  years  of  strenu- 
ous work  as  secretary  of  the  Imperial  Federation  League. 

3  The  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  as  a  small 
working  body  performed  its  operations  under  that  title  until 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902  121 

No  further  Conference,  however,  for  the  dis- 
cussion of  defence  and  other  great  issues  was  in 
fact  called  in  London  until  1897,1  in  which  year 
the  Jubilee  Celebrations  brought  together  at  the 
centre  of  the  Empire  the  Premiers  of  the  Oversea 
States.  On  this  occasion  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain 
(who  had  taken  office  as  Colonial  Secretary  in 
Lord  Salisbury's  1895  administration)  presided, 
and  it  was  decided  that  the  proceedings  should  be 
informal  and  that  the  general  results  only  should 
be  published. 

In  his  opening  address,  Mr.  Chamberlain  called 
attention  to  the  gigantic  naval  and  military 
forces  of  the  United  Kingdom,  which  were  main- 
tained at  heavy  cost  not  exclusively,  or  even 
mainly,  for  the  benefit  of  home  interests,  but  still 
more  as  a  necessity  of  Empire,  and  for  the  pro- 
tection of  Imperial  trade  interests  all  over  the 

1909,  in  which  year  the  name  was  changed  to  that  of  "  Im- 
perial Co-operation  League."  This  League  which  is,  there- 
fore, the  lineal  descendant  of  the  Imperial  Federation  League, 
continues  to  perform  useful  work  on  much  the  same  lines  as 
the  Imperial  Federation  League  of  Australia  and  the  Empire 
Club  of  Canada  (with  both  of  which  it  works  in  touch)  and 
serves  to  promote  closer  union  in  Defence  and  Policy  by  the 
consideration  in  public  and  private  of  practical  methods  of 
Imperial  Co-operation. 

1  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  a  Conference  was  held 
at  Ottawa  in  1894  where  the  United  Kingdom  and  practically 


122   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

world.1  He  showed  the  great  interests  of  Canada 
and  Australia  in  Imperial  Defence,  and,  while 
acknowledging  the  Australian  naval  contribution, 
also  referred  with  appreciation  to  the  offer  of  a 
battleship  from  Cape  Colony.  On  this  head  Mr. 
Goschen  (First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty)  subse- 
quently spoke  in  appreciation  of  Cape  Colony's 
offer,  and  hinted,  not  obscurely,  that  "  we  should 
be  very  glad  to  open  up  negotiations  with  Canada." 
He  expressed  himself  in  favour  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Australian  Agreement,  and  inci- 
dentally stated  that  in  regard  to  the  safety  of 
Australia,  New  Zealand  and  Tasmania  "  we  hold 
ourselves  responsible  in  the  same  way  as  we  hold 
ourselves  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  British 
Isles." 

In  regard  to  Military  Defence,  Mr.  Chamberlain 
urged  that  it  was  most  desirable  there  should  be 
in  Australia  and  South  Africa  a  uniformity  of  arms 

all  the  self-governing  Colonies  were  represented.  The  Con- 
ference met  mainly  to  discuss  the  Pacific  Cable  Scheme,  the 
consideration  of  which,  though  of  great  importance  to  Im- 
perial Defence,  is  somewhat  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work. 
For  a  short  account  of  the  Ottawa  Conference  see  The  Imperial 
Conference  by  Richard  Jebb  (London  :  Longmans  Green  & 
Co.),  vol.  i.  at  p.  133. 

1  See  Proceedings  of  a  Conference  betuoeen  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  the  Colonies  and  the  Premiers  of  the  self-governing 
Colonies,  June  and  July,  1897.  (C.  8596.) 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902  123 

and  equipment,  some  central  provision  for  stores, 
and  for  military  instruction.  He  also  made 
reference  to  the  necessity  of  interchangeability 
of  military  duties  between  Home  and  Colonial 
troops,  so  that,  for  example,  a  Canadian  regi- 
ment might  come  to  this  country  and  exercise 
with  the  British  Army  for  twelve  months  and  a 
similar  regiment  of  British  troops  go  to  Canada. 
Looking  to  the  future  (and  it  was  curious  how  soon 
afterwards  the  idea  was  brought  to  fruition),  Mr. 
Chamberlain  said :  "  I  see  no  reason  why  these 
Colonial  troops  should  not  from  time  to  time  fight 
side  by  side  with  their  British  colleagues."  An- 
other suggestion  had  relation  to  an  offer  of  com- 
missions in  the  British  Army  to  cadets  from  such 
Military  Colleges  as  Kingston,  and  this  proposal 
was  soon  afterwards  carried  out. 

While  the  discussion  of  political  relations  at 
this  Conference  was  of  importance  historically,1 
it  recorded  a  material  development  in  co-operation 
for  Naval  Defence  by  the  unconditional  offer  of 
Sir  Gordon  Sprigg  on  behalf  of  Cape  Colony  to 
provide  a  battleship  for  the  British  Fleet.  In  1899 
the  Speech  from  the  Throne  on  the  opening  of 
Parliament  expressed  gratification  that  the  Cape 
Parliament  had  recognized  the  principle  of  a 
common  responsibility  for  the  Naval  Defence  of 

1  See  pp.  216,  217. 


124   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  Empire  by  providing  a  permanent  annual 
contribution  towards  that  object.  The  gift  of 
£35,000  thus  made  was  the  more  important  in 
that  it  was  subject  to  no  restrictions,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Australian  contribution,  and,  in  the 
words  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  the  Cape  "  recognized 
the  absurdity  ...  of  supposing  that  these  two 
islands  could  possibly  bear  the  whole  burden  of 
the  maritime  defence  of  the  Empire."  1  It  is  to 
be  observed  that  the  Conference  of  1897  was  the 
first  occasion  on  which  a  responsible  Minister  had 
put  before  representatives  of  the  Colonies  their 
relations  towards  Imperial  Defence,  thus  ac- 
cepting the  suggestion  urged  officially  many  times 
by  the  Imperial  Federation  League,  and  advocated, 
in  season  and  out  of  season,  with  energy  and 
determination,  by  Sir  John  Colomb. 

It  remained,  however,  for  the  1902  Conference 
to  see  the  whole  position  put  clearly  before  the 
Colonial  representatives  in  the  comprehensive 
manner  that  Sir  John  Colomb  believed  to  be  essen- 
tial ;  but,  before  considering  that  Conference  from 
its  defensive  aspects,  it  is  well  to  recall  that  the 
fight  against  the  Boer  Republics  altered  in  a 

1  See  "  The  Navy  in  Relation  to  the  Empire,"  an  Ad- 
dress by  Sir  John  Colomb  before  the  Junior  Constitutional 
Club  on  February  16,  1899.  For  Lord  Milner's  views  upon 
the  Cape  contribution  see  p.  iM<  . 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  125 

practical  direction  many  cherished  military  no- 
tions, scattered  the  remaining  theories  of  "  pas- 
sive "  defence  to  the  winds,  and  evidenced  the 
solidarity  of  British  interests  throughout  the 
world  by  the  fact  that  "  c  the  soldiers  of  the 
Queen,'  furnished  by  the  Colonies  and  Mother- 
Country  alike,  crossed  the  oceans  and  shed  their 
blood  on  the  kopjes  and  in  the  drifts  of  South 
Africa."  * 

Sir  John  Colomb  was  apprehensive  of  any  sound 
scheme  of  Empire  Defence  resulting  from  another 
Imperial  Conference  while  the  War  Office  was 
still  in  doubt  as  to  the  real  functions  of  British 
military  forces.  He  called  attention  to  Mr. 
Brodrick's  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  on 
March  4,  1902,  when  the  War  Secretary  had  re- 
ferred to  the  approaching  Colonial  Conference  by 
saying,  "  We  shall  then  have  an  opportunity  of 
seeing  how  far  the  scheme  in  our  minds  commends 
itself  to  the  Colonies,"  and  he  remarked  that  there 
was  nothing  very  new  in  a  War  Office  "  scheme," 
but  the  mischief  was  that  "  it  never  comes  off 
with  success."  2 

As  to  what  Sir  John  Colomb  himself  proposed 
as  a  programme  for  securing  that  British  military 

1  "British  Defence,    1800-1900."     See  British  Dangers, 
p.  28. 

2  See  British  Dangers,  p.  6, 


126  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

power  should  be  promptly  available  for  the  general 
Defence  of  the  Empire  in  war,  he  stated  it  shortly 
in  the  following  terms  :— 

1.  The  Regular  Army,  and  its  Reserves,  to  be 

the  nucleus  of  the  Imperial  Army. 

2.  The  Imperial  Army  for  great  defensive  wars 

to  consist  of  the  Army  and  its  Reserves, 
augmented  by  such  portion  of  Home  and 
Colonial  territorial  forces  as  volunteer, 
and  prepare,  in  peace,  to  hold  themselves 
available  for  general  service  in  war. 

3.  The  acceptance  of  a  binding  obligation  be- 

tween the  Governments  of  all  parts  of  the 
Empire  to  secure  similarity  in  armament, 
warlike  stores,  and  all  things  really  essen- 
tial to  such  uniformity  as  is  necessary  to 
secure  that,  when  the  Imperial  Reserves 
furnished   by  territorial  forces  from  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the   Empire  are   brought 
together    in  the    field,  complication  and 
confusion  shall  be  avoided.1 
The  consideration  of  Military  Defence  at  the 
Conference  arose  on  a  motion   by  Mr.   Seddon, 
Prime  Minister  of  New  Zealand,  who,  in  1900,  had 
succeeded  in  passing  an  Act  in  the  New  Zealand 
Legislature  to  provide  for  an  Imperial  Reserve. 
He  wished  to  see  each  Dominion  form  such  a 

1  See  British  Dangers,  pp.  31-32. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  127 

Reserve  on  the  lines  of  the  Resolution  which  he 
moved  as  follows  :  "  That  it  is  desirable  to  have 
an  Imperial  Reserve  Force  formed  in  each  of  His 
Majesty's  Dominions  over  the  seas  for  service  in 
case  of  emergency  outside  the  Dominion  or  Colony 
in  which  such  Reserve  is  formed.  The  limits 
within  which  such  Reserve  Force  may  be  employed 
outside  the  Colony  wherein  it  is  raised  to  be  defined 
by  the  Imperial  and  Colonial  Governments  at  the 
time  such  Reserve  is  formed,  and  to  be  in  accord- 
ance with  any  law  in  force  for  the  time  being 
respecting  the  same.  The  cost  of  maintaining  and 
equipping  such  an  Imperial  Force  to  be  defrayed 
in  such  proportion  and  manner  as  may  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  Imperial  and  Colonial  Govern- 
ments." l 

1  It  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  Report  of  the  Major- 
General  commanding  the  Canadian  Militia — Major-General 
(afterwards  Sir)  Edward  T.  H.  Hutton — published  before  the 
War  in  South  Africa  in  1899,  the  organization  of  the  Canadian 
Forces  had  been  considered  for  (a)  the  Defence  of  Canadian 
soil  and  (b)  the  power  to  participate  in  the  Defence  of  the 
British  Empire.  (Ottawa  Government  Printing  Bureau.) 

That  same  able  officer  was  Commandant  of  the  Military 
Forces  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  in  1902,  and  a  copy 
of  his  Minute  to  the  Defence  Minister  was  printed  in  the 
Appendix  to  the  Papers  Relating  to  the  Conference.  (CD.  1299.) 
General  Hutton  considered  the  provision  of  troops  for 
(a)  the  Defence  of  Australian  soil  and  (6)  the  Defence  of  Aus- 
tralian interests  wherever  they  might  be  threatened,  and  for 


128   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

On  this  Mr.  Brodrick  launched  the  War  Office 
"  scheme."  He  was  unable,  as  in  all  his  past 
utterances  in  the  House  of  Commons,  to  keep  his 
favourite  theme  of  the  "  invasion  of  England  " 
even  out  of  this  speech  to  the  oversea  represent- 
atives. He  alluded  to  the  large  preparations  for 
military  defence  made  by  the  War  Office,  which 
were  not  too  large  "  in  view  of  the  possibility  of 
our  at  any  time  losing  command  of  the  sea,"  and 
said  that  circumstances  might  occur  in  which  it 
was  most  desirable  that  we  should  have  a  call  on 
further  troops.  He  referred  to  the  good  fighting 
material  in  Canada  and  Australia,  and  suggested 
that  a  portion  of  the  oversea  forces  should  be 
trained  and  held  in  readiness  for  oversea  service, 
forming  part  of  an  Army  Reserve  of  an  Imperial 
Force,  whose  services  were  absolutely  pledged  in 
the  event  of  the  Government  to  which  they  be- 
longed proffering  assistance  to  the  Imperial  forces 
in  an  emergency. 

Now  it  is  to  be  observed  that  it  would  have 
been  difficult  to  launch  a  scheme  of  this  distinctly 
Imperial  character  at  a  more  favourable  opportu- 
nity, for  Imperial  feeling  was  now  at  its  height 
owing  to  Home  and  Colonial  soldiers  having  fought 

the  latter,  as  in  the  case  (6)  of  Canada  he  referred  to  the  neces- 
sity of  a  Field  Force  capable  of  undertaking  military  opera- 
tions in  any  part  of  the  world. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902  1 

side  by  side  for  the  common  cause  in  South  Africa. 
But  the  absence  of  combined  action  between  the 
Admiralty  and  the  War  Office  led  to  an  unattrac- 
tive and  confused  picture  of    our  defensive  re- 
quirements being  put  before  the  Conference.     The 
War  Office  representative  was  asking  for  aid  in 
forming   an    Imperial    Reserve   for   fighting   the 
Empire's  battles  "  in  view  of  the  possibility  of 
our  losing  command  of  the  sea,"  while  the  Ad- 
miralty representative  (Lord  Selborne)  was  assur- 
ing the   oversea  statesmen,  in  the  course  of  an 
able  exposition  of  principles,  that  "  the  British 
Empire  owes  its  existence  to  the  sea,  and  it  can 
only  continue  to  exist  if  all  parts  of  it  regard  the 
sea   as   their   material    source   of   existence   and 
strength."     The  lack  of  consultation  between  the 
Admiralty  and  War  Office *  was  no  doubt  largely 
responsible  for  the  failure  to  inspire  the  represent- 
atives with  enthusiasm  for  the  Imperial  Reserve. 
Put  forward  in  this  piecemeal  fashion  as  a  scheme 
of  its  own,  and  not  inter-related  to  a  larger  scheme 
of  Empire  Defence  in  which  all  were  shown  to  be 
equally  interested,  Mr.  Brodrick's  advocagy.^^as 
suggestive  of  an  appealjor  support* of  the  Mother^ 
Country  in  carrying  on  military  conflicts  in  which 
she  might  become  involved  in  Europe  or  else- 
where.    Either    through    lack    of    knowledge    or 
1  See  view  of  Sir  Charles  Dilke  on  p.  131,  note  *. 

K 


IttO   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

absence  of  imagination,  or  possibly  a  combination 
of  both,  the  War  Secretary  failed  to  recognize  the 
feeling  of  growing  nationality  in  the  Oversea  States 
which  would  not  be  satisfied  with  anything  short 
of  a  joint  partnership  in  naval  and  military  mat- 
ters, and  he  was,  therefore,  not  prepared  for  Canada 
and  Australia  to  regard  his  proposals  as  an  en- 
croachment upon  their  autonomy.  The  War  Office 
Scheme,  accordingly,though  sound  for  once  in  itself, 
fell  flat,  and  the  Canadian  Ministers  put  the  matter 
in  a  nut-shell  when  they  gave  expression  to  the 
view  that  the  acceptance  of  the  proposals  for  ear- 
marking troops  for  Imperial  Service  ;c  would 
entail  an  important  departure  from  the  principles 
of  Colonial  self-government."  1 

1  It  is,  perhaps,  only  fair  to  add  that  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier, 
fearful  of  French-Canadian  antipathy  to  any  Imperial  measure, 
would  probably  have  rendered  any  scheme  of  closer  union 
for  defence  very  difficult  of  accomplishment  at  the  Confer- 
ence. Moreover,  he  was  supported  by  a  colleague,  Sir  Fred- 
erick Borden,  whose  attitude  of  mind  was  shown  most  clearly 
by  a  subsequent  speech  (delivered  at  Ottawa  on  February  23, 
1906)  when  he  argued  that  while  Canadians  could  not  tax 
themselves  to  maintain  the  British  Navy,  seeing  that  the 
money  would  be  expended  by  a  Committee  in  which  the  Cana- 
dians had  no  say,  it  was  in  fact  unnecessary  for  Canada  to 
assist  in  supporting  the  Imperial  Fleet  as  she  was  afforded 
sufficient  protection  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  behind  which 
"  were  the  guns  and  warships  of  the  United  States  and  the 
whole  power  of  eighty  million  souls." 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1884-1902  131 

However,  put  broadly,  the  main  cause  of  the 
meagre  results  of  this  Conference,  either  in  a 
military  or  naval  direction,  has  been  given  with 
tolerable  accuracy  above,  and  it  was  summed  up 
in  a  few  words  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  who,  speaking 
later,  said :  1  "  With  regard  to  the  Coronation 
Conference,  I  think  a  great  deal  of  the  breakdown 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Admiralty  came  for- 
ward with  the  clearest  possible  statement  of  what 
supremacy  at  sea  meant  in  its  influences  upon 
territorial  defence,  and  the  War  Office  walked  in 
after  them  with  an  official  contradiction."  2 

As  regards  Naval  Defence,  Mr.  Joseph  Cham- 
berlain put  the  whole  position  of  the  distribution 
of  the  Empire's  burden  before  the  representatives 
in  an  even  clearer  and  more  emphatic  manner  than 
he  had  done  at  the  previous  Conference,  and  he 

1  Speech  of  Sir  John  Colomb  as  Chairman  at  a  private 
discussion  dinner  of  the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Com- 
mittee, November  19,  1906.     See  Report  of  the  proceedings 
published  by  the  Committee,  pp.  27-28. 

2  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Sir  Charles  Dilke  took  the 
same  view  of  the  Conference  as  Sir  John  Colomb.    Speaking 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  8,  1903,  Sir  Charles  said  : 
"  The  Colonial  Conference  failed  very  largely  through  the 
difference  of  opinion  between  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  which 
the  personal  supervision  of  the  Prime  Minister,  with  the 
highest  advice  behind  him,   might  have  prevented."      See 
Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  4  Series,  vol.  118,  at  p.  1606, 


132   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

used  the  exact  arguments  which  had  been  so  fre- 
quently employed  by  Sir  John  Colomb  for  many 
years  in  favour  of  the  Oversea  Dominions  taking 
a  greater  share  in  the  cost  of  defence.  In  the 
course  of  his  vigorous  address,  he  said :  '  While 
the  Colonies  were  young  and  poor,  in  the  first 
place  they  did  not  offer  anything  like  the  same 
temptation  to  the  ambitions  of  others,  and,  in  the 
second  place,  they  were  clearly  incapable  of  pro- 
viding large  sums  for  their  own  defence,  and, 
therefore,  it  was  perfectly  right  and  natural  that 
the  Mother-Country  should  undertake  the  pro- 
tection of  her  children.  But  now  that  the  Colonies 
are  rich  and  powerful,  that  every  day  they  are 
growing  by  leaps  and  bounds,  their  material  pros- 
perity promises  to  rival  that  of  the  United  King- 
dom itself,  and  I  think  it  is  inconsistent  with  their 
position,  inconsistent  with  their  dignity  as  nations, 
that  they  should  leave  the  Mother-Country  to  bear 
the  whole,  or  almost  the  whole,  of  the  expense."  l 
The  views  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  found  adequate 
support  from  the  Prime  Minister  of  New  Zealand, 
Mr.  Seddon,  who  moved  a  resolution  to  increase 

1  The  small  response  on  the  part  of  the  Colonies  to  the 
suggestions  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  no  doubt  largely  influenced 
that  statesman  in  starting  his  scheme  of  closer  commercial 
union  as  an  alternative  method  of  bringing  about  Imperial 
unity. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  133 

the  strength  of  the  Australian  Squadron,  and  also 
from  Sir  John  Forrest,  the  Commonwealth  Minis- 
ter of  Defence,  who,  in  a  statesmanlike  and  well- 
reasoned  Minute  to  his  Prime  Minister  (which  was 
laid  before  the  Conference)  showed  the  inadvis- 
ability  of  a  separate  Navy  for  Australia.  "Our 
aim  and  objects,"  he  wrote,  "  should  be  to 
make  the  Royal  Navy  the  Empire's  Navy, 
supported  by  the  whole  of  the  self-governing  por- 
tions of  the  Empire  "  ;  but  he  observed  that  if 
the  Oversea  Dominions  agreed  to  this,  it  would 
be  necessary  for  them  to  be  "  adequately  repre- 
sented at  the  Admiralty." 

It  should  be  added  that  Mr.  Chamberlain 
always  recognized  that,  on  the  Dominions  assum- 
ing a  larger  share  of  the  burden  of  defence,  they 
should  be  represented  in  Imperial  affairs,  and  at 
the  Conference  he  took  the  opportunity  of  replying 
to  the  famous  dictum  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  "  If 
you  want  our  aid  call  us  to  your  Councils,"  by 
giving  expression  to  these  words :  "If  you  are 
prepared  at  any  time  to  take  any  share,  any  pro- 
portionate share,  in  the  burdens  of  the  Empire, 
we  are  prepared  to  meet  you  with  any  proposal  for 
giving  to  you  a  corresponding  voice  in  the  policy 
of  the  Empire."  * 

1  For  further  information  on  this  head  see  Chapter  V. 


tl\: 


134  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

As  a  result  of  the  Conference  the  Admiralty 
were  able  to  announce  the  following  offers  :— 

Cape  Colony :  £50,000  per  annum  to  the  general 
maintenance  of  the  Navy.  No  conditions. 

Commonwealth  of  Australia  :  £200,000  per  annum 
to  an  improved  Australasian  Squadron,  and 
the  establishment  of  a  branch  of  the  Royal 
Naval  Reserve,  two  of  the  vessels  of  the 
Squadron  to  be  manned  by  Australians  who 
would  receive  extra  pay.  Under  the  new 
Agreement  the  sphere  of  operations  of  the 
Force  was  extended  to  the  China  and  East 
Indies  Stations  in  addition  to  that  of  Austra- 
lia. 

Natal :  £35,000  per  annum  to  the  general  main- 
tenance of  the  Navy.  No  conditions. 

Newfoundland  :  £3,000  per  annum  (and  £1,800  as 
a  special  contribution  to  the  fitting  and  pre- 
paration of  a  drill  ship)  towards  the  main- 
tenance of  a  branch  of  the  Royal  Naval 
Reserve  of  not  less  than  600  men. 

New  Zealand  :  £40,000  per  annum  to  an  improved 
Australasian  Squadron,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  branch  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve. 

With  regard  to  Canada,  it  was  announced  that 
this  Dominion  was  unable  to  make  any  offer 
analogous  to  the  above  ;  but  the  Government  had 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1884-1902  135 

in  contemplation  the  establishment  of  a  local  naval 
force  in  Canadian  waters. 

The  consideration,  however,  of  some  aspects 
of  the  policy  relating  to  the  localization  of  Colonial 
naval  forces  may  be  conveniently  deferred  until 
the  next  chapter. 


IMPERIAL   CO-OPERATION    (Cont.), 
1902-1912 


CHAPTER    IV 

IMPERIAL^  CO-OPERATION    (Cant.), 
1902-1912 

"  Britain's  Fleet  is  the  instrument  of  power  and  the  symbol 
of  her  unity.  British  ships  of  war  are  the  safe-guard  of  Colonial 
liberty,  and  the  natural  chain  which  holds  the  scattered  com- 
munities together.  The  Fleet,  therefore,  ought  to  be  one.  Divi- 
sion is  weakness,  and  the  old  story  of  the  bundle  of  sticks  has  here 
its  proper  application"— THE  RT.  HON.  W.  B.  DALLBY. 

Localization  of  Naval  Forces. — Lord  Selborne  thereon. — Sir 
John  Colomb  on  Separate  Colonial  Navies. — Deputation 
to  Mr.  Balfour,  1904. — Responsibility  for  Localized  view. 
— Capt.  Cresswell  and  Australian  Navy. — Sir  John 
Colomb's  views. — Mr.  Harold  Cox's  Amendment  to 
Address. — Conference  of  1907. — Attitude  of  newT  Govern- 
ment.— Mr.  Haldane  and  Military  Defence  ;  Imperial 
General  Staff  ;  Colonial  views. — Lord  Tweedmouth  on 
Naval  Co-operation  ;  Colonial  Views. — Results  of  Confer- 
ence.— Sir  John  Colomb  ;  further  views  on  Australian 
Navy  and  future  of  Pacific. — Mr.  Deakin's  Intro- 
duction of  Defence  Scheme. — Naval  Scare  of  1909. — New 
Zealand's  Offer. — Australian  attitude. — Canadian  Reso- 
lutions.— Conference  on  Defence,  as  advocated  by  Sir 
John  Colomb,  called  1909. — Sir  John  Colomb's  Letter 
thereon. — Death  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  1909. — Admiralty 
Proposal  of  Fleet  Units. — Attitude  of  Dominions. — Mili- 

iw 


140   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

tary  Defence. — Principles  as  laid  down  by  Sir  John 
Colomb  accepted  at  1909  Conference. — Canadian  Naval 
Service  Bill. — Proposals  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier. — Recep- 
tion by  Mr.  R.  L.  Borden  and  others  in  Canada. — Control 
in  time  of  War. — Progress  of  Canadian  Naval  Policy. — 
Imperial  Conference  of  1911. — Conditions  of  Dominion's 
Naval  Services  agreed  upon. — Progress  in  Military 
matters. — Imperial  Control  of  Dominion  Troops  and 
Ships  a  matter  of  Imperial  Representation. — Mr.  Borden's 
Visit,  1912. — Admiralty  Memorandum. — Rise  of  German 
Fleet.— The  Canadian  Offer  of  1912.— Mr.  Borden's 
speech. — Acceptance  of  Principle  urged  by  Sir  John 
Colomb. — Recognition  that  Imperial  Representation  is 
essential  to  Imperial  Organization. — Sir  John  Colomb 's 
view  that  Representation  lies  at  the  root  of  the  Defence 
Problem. 

THOUGH  Lord  Selborne  had  pointed  out  to  the 
1902  Conference  that  "  the  Sea  is  all  one  and  that 
the  British  Navy,  therefore,  must  be  all  one,"  and 
that  any  attempt  at  the  localization  of  naval 
forces  would  only  be  inviting  disaster,1  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  Canada,  who  had  proceeded 
further  on  the  road  to  nationhood  than  any  of  the 
other  Dominions,  showed  a  growing  desire  for  a 
local  Fleet.  The  tendency  towards  the  estab- 
lishment of  local  naval  forces  then  manifested 
in  Canada,  and  beginning  in  Australia  with  the 

1  In  Lord  Selborne's  able  statement  of  policy  made  to  the 
Conference,  he  observed  :  "  The  real  problem  which  the  Empire 
has  to  face  in  the  case  of  a  naval  war  is  simply  and  absolutely 
to  find  out  where  the  ships  of  the  enemy  are,  to  concentrate 
the  greatest  possible  force  where  those  ships  are  and  to  destroy 
those  snipe." 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  141 

Report  of  the  Five  Naval  Commandants,  had, 
of  course,  a  political  rather  than  a  strategical  basis. 
Oversea  politicians  realized  that  the  public  wanted 
not  only  to  see  something  for  their  money,  but  to 
maintain  some  control  over  the  disposition  of 
ships,  there  being  an  objection  to  providing  ships 
to  be  controlled  by  a  Board  in  London  upon  which 
they  were  not  represented.  If  a  little  more  con- 
sideration had  been  given  to  this  point  of  view 
from  the  first,  a  great  deal  might  have  been  done 
to  place  matters  on  a  satisfactory  and  permanent 
footing.  Whether  this  may  not  soon  be  too  late 
will  be  considered  hereafter. 

Meantime,  it  is  well  to  make  clear  the  strate- 
gical objection  to  separate  Colonial  Navies  which 
may  be  given  shortly  in  the  words  of  Sir  John 
Colomb  as  follows  :  "  Our  territories  cannot  be 
secured  by  ships,  so  to  speak,  mounting  guard  over 
them  ;  their  safety  will  depend  upon  our  ability 
to  produce  such  force  as  is  necessary,  and  to  so 
distribute  it  as  to  deprive  the  enemy's  ships  of 
freedom  of  action.  To  restrict  the  freedom  of 
action  of  British  fleets,  squadrons  or  ships  to 
artificially  defined  areas,  is  to  paralyse  their 
power.  .  .  .  Even  though  it  be  assumed  that 
such  local  squadrons  would  be  freed  from  restric- 
tion on  the  outbreak  of  war,  it  is  very  certain  that, 
when  brought  together  with  each  other,  and  with 


142   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

those  of  the  Mother-Country,  a  homogeneous  whole 
would  not  be  formed."  1 

But  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  fragmentary 
and  insular  policies  of  defence  put  forward  by  the 
United  Kingdom  in  the  past  had  exercised  a  very 
potent  influence  on  the  Dominions,  and  caused 
their  statesmen  to  adopt  the  local  view  of  defens- 
ive requirements.  In  the  Memorandum  of  the 
great  Deputation  formed  by  the  Imperial  Federa- 
tion (Defence)  Committee,  which  waited  upon  Mr. 
Balfour  as  Prime  Minister  on  December  10,  1904,2 
to  urge  upon  him  the  necessity  of  primary  con- 
sideration being  given  to  Colonial  Co-operation 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  Navy  at  the  next 
Colonial  Conference,  the  matter  was  put  very 
plainly  in  these  words :  '  The  example  of  the 
Mother-Country  in  the  past  in  pursuing  a  policy 
for  her  own  defence,  so  obviously  founded  upon 
mistrust  of  the  efficacy  of  superior  sea  power  to 
prevent  military  descents  by  sea,  is  largely  re- 
sponsible for  apparent  misconceptions  on  the  part 

1  See  The  Colonies  and  Imperial  Defence  by  the  present 
author. 

2  This  Deputation  was  organized  by  Sir  John  Colomb, 
Mr.  Hayes  Fisher,  the  present  author  (as  Hon.  Secretary 
of  the  Committee),  and  other  Members  of  the  Executive 
Committee,  and  on  receiving  it  Mr.  Balfour  expressed  a  doubt 
"  whether  a  more  important  or  influential  Deputation  had 
ever  waited  on  a  Prime  Minister  of  this  country." 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  143 

of  the  Colonies  of  the  relation  of  the  Navy  to  their 
Military  security." 

But  the  influence  of  the  "localized  view  "  had 
taken  root  oversea,  with  the  result  that,  before 
the  next  Conference  could  be  summoned,  there  had 
been  a  considerable  development  in  the  movement 
for  an  Australian  Navy.  In  1905  Captain  Cress- 
well,1  the  Director  of  Australian  Naval  Forces, 
presented  a  Report  to  the  Commonwealth  Minister 
of  Defence  in  which  he  recommended  the  forma- 
tion of  a  coast-defence  squadron,  consisting  of 
three  destroyers,  and  fifteen  torpedo  boats  of  the 
first  and  second  class,  which,  while  distinct  from  the 
Australian  Squadron,  should  nevertheless  be  able 
to  co-operate  with  the  British  Navy.  Captain 
Cresswell  admitted  that  "  Australia  is  only  assail- 
able by  sea,  and  its  safety  depends  on  the  naval 
supremacy  of  the  Empire,"  but  he  considered 
that  the  inter-colonial  oversea  trade  of  Australia, 
which  he  valued  at  £145,000,000,  would  be  at  the 
mercy  of  the  "  volunteer  extemporized  "  or  regu- 
lar raiding  cruiser  if  the  Australian  (Imperial) 
Squadron  were  ordered  to  rendezvous  elsewhere.2 

The  views  of  Sir  John  Colomb  upon  this  Re- 

1  Now  Sir  W.  Cresswell. 

2  See  p.  12  of  the  Report  of  the  Director  of  the  Naval  Forces 
on  the  Naval  Defence  of  the  Commonwealth  for  the  year  1905, 
Melbourne.    C  847. 


144  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

port  were  given  soon  after  its  publication.1  He 
admitted  that  such  local  defence  as  might  be 
required  to  resist  minor  attacks  from  the  sea  were 
becoming  more  aquatic  under  modern  conditions, 
and,  therefore,  agreed  that  torpedo  craft  was 
necessary  to  meet  the  necessities  of  such  ports  as 
were  essential  to  the  upkeep  of  sea-going  power. 
But  he  pointed  out  that  these  ports  were  very  few 
and  far  between,  and  in  Australia  limited  to  about 
one  or  two.  "  The  policy  for  Australia,"  Sir  John 
Colomb  declared,  "  as  for  all  other  maritime 
States,  or  parts  of  States,  is  to  make  all  sacrifices 
possible  to  maintain  command  of  the  sea,  and  not 
to  waste  money  upon  attempts  at  local  naval  pro- 
tection of  home  waters.  Their  security  and  that 
of  coasts  depends  upon  sea  command,  which  is 
only  to  be  obtained  by  the  provision  and  exercise 
of  sufficient  power  to  extinguish  or  paralyse  the 
ability  of  the  enemy  to  attack."  a  Sir  John  Co- 

1  See  British  Australasian  of  April  26,  1906,  p.  5. 

*  The  attitude  taken  by  Sir  John  Colomb  was  strikingly 
supported  from  time  to  time  by  the  eminent  author  of  The 
Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  Captain  (now  Admiral) 
A.  T.  Mahan,  whose  works  (as  pointed  out  by  Admiral  Sir 
Vesey  Hamilton  and  others)  were  the  outcome  of  the  move- 
ment begun  years  before  by  Sir  John  Colomb.  Writing  in 
the  National  Review  of  July.  1002,  upon  "Considerations 
governing  the  Disposition  of  Navies  "  (subsequently  repub- 
lished  amongst  his  Essays)  Captain  Mahan  said  :  "  What 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  145 

lomb  considered  that  Captain  Cresswell  had  wholly 
underrated  the  difficulties  of  any  enemy  in  carrying 
out  an  attack  upon  Australian  commerce  by  armed 
merchant  cruisers,  and  consequently  that  he  had 
overrated  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  in  Aus- 
tralian waters  from  any  such  form  of  attack. 

Opinion  in  the  House  of  Commons  regarding 
Colonial  Co-operation  in  the  Defence  of  the  Empire 
found  expression  on  February  15,  1907,  when,  in 
anticipation  of  the  advent  of  the  Colonial  Con- 
ference, Mr.  Harold  Cox  proposed  an  Amendment 
to  the  Address,  submitting  that  in  accordance 
with  the  precedent  of  1902,  it  was  desirable  that 
the  first  question  to  be  laid  before  the  delegates 
from  the  Colonies  should  be  the  importance  of  the 
fuller  participation  by  the  Colonies  in  the  cost  of 
defending  His  Majesty's  Dominions.  In  the  De- 
bate which  followed,  Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour  (Leader 
of  the  Opposition  in  the  new  Parliament)  took  ^i 
rather  different  line  to  that  which  he  had  adopted 
in  his  speech  in  reply  to  the  Deputation  he  re- 
Australasia  needs  is  not  her  petty  fraction  of  the  Imperial 
Navy,  a  squadron  assigned  to  her  in  perpetual  presence,  but 
an  organization  of  naval  force  which  constitutes  a  firm  grasp 
of  the  universal  naval  situation.  .  .  .  The  essence  of  the 
matter  is  that  local  security  does  not  necessarily,  nor  usually, 
depend  upon  the  constant  local  presence  of  a  protector,  ship, 
or  squadron,  but  upon  general  dispositions."  Cf.  Sir  John 
Colomb's  views  in  his  earliest  essay,  pages  12,  13. 


146   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

ceived  as  Prime  Minister  on  December  10,  1904,1 
and  deprecated  pressing  the  Colonies  to  provide 
ships  and  troops  to  hand  over  to  the  United  King- 
dom in  the  event  of  Imperial  complications.  He 
did  not  think  this  could  be  done  until  there  was 
some  centralized  organization  by  which  all  parts 
of  the  Empire  were  combined  into  one  more  highly 
organized  body.  He  regarded  asking  Colonial  tax- 
payers to  vote  money  for  somebody  else  to  spend 
as  an  impossible  proposition.2 

From  this  important  Debate  it  is  well  to  take 
the  reader  at  once  to  the  Colonial  Conference  of 
1907.  It  may  first  be  observed  that  the  task  of 
calling  this  Conference  no  longer  rested  with  a 
Unionist  Administration  (as  in  the  cases  of  the 
previous  Conferences  in  1887,  1897  and  1902),  for 
the  sweeping  victories  of  the  Liberals  in  1906  con- 
firmed in  power  the  Administration  of  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman  which  had  assumed  Office 
on  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Balfour  in  1905. 

While   the   desire   to   promote   Imperial   Co- 

1  See  p.  142. 

2  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  had  always  strongly  opposed  the 
idea  of  Canada  spending  money  on  defence,  the  extent  of 
which  might,  he  thought,  be  regulated  by  European  rather 
than    Canadian  interests.     Speaking  in    March,   1907,   Sir 
Wilfrid  declared :    "I  expressed  five  years  ago  that  for  no 
consideration    whatever   would    Canada  be  induced    to  be 
drawn  into  the  vortex  of  European  militarism." 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  147 

operation  on  the  lines  of  Defence  had  been  clearly 
manifested  throughout  their  careers  by  such  lead- 
ing Liberals  as  Mr.  Asquith,  Mr.  Haldane,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  others,  who  may  be  considered 
as  belonging  to  the  Imperial  group  of  the  Liberal 
party,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  a  considerable 
section  of  the  victorious  Liberals,  of  which  the 
Prime  Minister  was  one,  looked  rather  to  a  policy 
of  friendship  with  foreign  countries,  and  a  con- 
sequent limitation  of  armaments,  as  the  policy  of 
this  country,  in  contradistinction  somewhat  to 
her  finding  salvation  in  a  policy  of  closer  union 
with  the  Oversea  States  of  the  Empire  for  the 
maintenance  of  adequate  naval  and  military 
defence.  The  alteration  in  the  driving  force 
behind  the  desire  for  closer  co-operation  possessed 
by  the  new  Ministry  as  against  the  old  one  was, 
perhaps,  revealed  to  some  extent  in  the  difference 
of  tone  between  the  last  despatch  of  the  Unionist 
Colonial  Secretary  (Mr.  Alfred  Lyttelton)  and  the 
first  one  of  his  Liberal  successor  (Lord  Elgin). 
Writing  in  regard  to  the  next  Conference  while 
he  was  still  in  office,  Mr.  Lyttelton,  in  the  course 
of  a  despatch  to  the  Oversea  Dominions,  expressed 
the  hope  of  His  Majesty's  Government  that  it 
would"  promote  the  better  union  and  the  collect- 
ive prosperity  of  the  British  Empire  "  ;  l  while, 
i  Cd.  3406,  p.  15. 


148   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

writing  of  the  same  Conference,  Lord  Elgin  stated 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  had  every  con- 
fidence that  the  Conference  would  "  help  to  in- 
crease the  good  understanding  and  cordial  feeling  " 
existing  between  the  self-governing  countries  of 
the  Empire.1  It  would  be  obviously  unfair  to 
draw  any  definite  conclusions  from  the  mere 
difference  in  wording  of  the  above  quoted  des- 
patches, yet  the  dissimilarity  in  the  mode  of 
expression  did,  in  fact,  evidence  an  alteration  in 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Home  Government. 
But  the  matter  had  to  be  viewed  from  more  than 
one  aspect,  and  though  the  Colonial  Office  was 
unfortunately  given  to  a  statesman  who  could 
be  trusted  not  to  embark  on  any  original  course 
of  action,  it  was  a  great  gain  that  Military  Defence 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  one  of  the  clearest 
thinkers  and  most  practical  statesmen  in  the 
Empire,  for  it  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  Mr. 
Haldane  was  likely  to  let  slip  any  opportunity  of 
developing  co-operation. 

Introducing  the  subject  of  Military  Defence 
at  the  1907  Imperial  Conference,  Mr.  Haldane 
explained  firstly  that  the  Army  should  be  divided 
into  two  parts,  one  for  Home  Defence,  raised  by 
the  citizens,  and  under  no  obligation  to  go  ovcf 

4  Cd.  2976,  p.  4. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  149 

sea,  and  the  other  for  the  Empire  as  a  whole, 
acting  as  an  expeditionary  force  in  conjunction 
with  a  Navy  in  command  of  the  sea.  He  empha- 
sized the  desirability  of  the  home  forces  of  the 
various  Dominions  being  organized,  if  not  on  a 
common  pattern  yet  with  a  common  end  in  view 
and  a  common  conception.  He  compared  the 
Territorial  Army  about  to  be  established  in  Eng- 
land as  corresponding  in  its  functions  with  the 
Canadian  Militia  and  with  the  forces  in  Australia, 
New  Zealand  and  South  Africa.  In  order  to  work 
with  a  common  conception  it  was  necessary  to 
have  skilled  advisers,  and  he  suggested  for  this 
purpose  that  the  General  Staff  which  had  been 
created  at  home  should  receive  an  Imperial 
character.  The  General  Staff  Officers,  being 
trained  in  a  great  common  school  but  recruited 
from  varying  parts  of  the  Empire,  would  be  at 
the  disposition  of  the  local  government  or  local 
Commander-in-Chief,  whether  he  were  Canadian, 
British,  Australian,  New  Zealander,  or  South 
African.  The  Commanding  Officer  could  accept 
or  disregard  the  advice  of  his  General  Staff  Officer, 
but  he  would  have  at  his  elbow  some  one  with 
knowledge  from  the  headquarters  of  the  General 
Staff.  He  instanced  how  valuable  it  would  be 
when  studying  matters  of  Imperial  Defence,  say 
in  Canada,  for  a  General  Staff  Officer  to  be  sent 


150   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  Canada  in  exchange  for  one  of  the  Canadian 
General  Staff,  who  would  come  over  here  and  assist 
in  working  out  the  problem.  By  such  interchange 
of  officers,  and  the  General  Staff  working  as  a 
military  mind  surveying  the  Empire  as  a  whole, 
much  would  be  done  to  bring  about  uniformity  of 
pattern  in  organization  and  weapons,  etc.,  which 
was  essential  to  effective  co-operation  hi  war. 

Mr.  Haldane  circulated  papers  calling  attention 
to  three  great  principles,  viz. :  (1)  The  obligation 
of  each  self-governing  community  to  provide  for 
its  local  security ;  (2)  the  duty  of  arranging  for 
mutual  assistance  on  some  definite  lines  in  case 
of  common  need  ;  (3)  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
sea  supremacy  which  could  alone  ensure  military 
co-operation  at  all. 

He  wanted  to  make  the  General  Staff  an  Im- 
perial school  of  military  thought  so  that  all  the 
members  would  be  imbued  with  the  same  tradi- 
tions, and  be  acquainted  with  the  principles 
generally  accepted  at  headquarters. 

Sir  Frederick  Borden  for  Canada  pointed  out 
that  under  the  Militia  Law  the  Dominion  could 
only  spend  money  for  the  defence  of  Canada  her- 
self, and  before  a  force  could  be  contributed  to 
Imperial  Defence  abroad,  Parliament  would  have 
to  be  called  together,  each  case  being  dealt  with 
as  it  should  arise.  lie  appeared  apprehensive 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  151 

that  the  General  Staff  might  have  authority  inde- 
pendent of  the  Defence  Minister  in  the  Dominions, 
but,  on  learning  of  the  purely  "  advisory  "  func- 
tions, he  welcomed  the  exchange  of  officers,  and 
agreed  also  to  the  necessity  of  uniformity  of 
weapons  and  the  desirability  of  establishing  fac- 
tories in  the  Dominions  for  the  supply  of  arms  and 
ammunition.  Mr.  Deakin  for  Australia  regretted 
that  the  remoteness  of  his  Dominion  might  make 
interchange  of  whole  units  impracticable,  but  Sir 
Joseph  Ward  for  New  Zealand  did  not  take  that 
view,  and  thought  that  New  Zealand  could  get  to- 
gether a  Volunteer  unit  at  any  time  for  training  with 
the  forces  in  Great  Britain.  Dr.  (now  Sir  Thomas) 
Smartt  spoke  in  favour  of  disbanding  some  of  the 
forces  of  the  Cape  Colony  and  re-enrolling  them  on 
terms  of  liability  to  serve  anywhere  in  the  Empire,  if 
the  Colonial  Government  wished  to  despatch  an 
expeditionary  force.  Mr.  Haldane  thought  this 
"  would  be  a  most  valuable  thing,"  but  Sir  Joseph 
Ward  opposed  the  idea  of  ear-marking  troops 
beforehand,  believing  that  the  best  method  was 
to  draw  upon  the  volunteers  for  wherever  the  fight 
might  be.  Mr.  Haldane,  however,  showed  that 
what  was  wanted  was  similar  to  his  Territorial 
organization,  the  men  of  which,  though  liable  to 
serve  only  in  the  United  Kingdom,  were  enabled, 
through  the  Commanding  Officer,  to  subject 


152   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

themselves  to  serve  in  any  place  outside  the 
United  Kingdom. 

But  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  was  very  fearful  of  any 
resolution  which  tended  to  commit  his  Govern- 
ment to  any  action,  and  while  Mr.  Haldane  de- 
scribed the  General  Staff  as  "  for  the  service  of  the 
Empire,"  Sir  Frederick  Borden  preferred  "  for 
the  service  of  the  various  Dominions." 

Regarding  the  relations  of  the  Colonies  to  the 
Imperial  Committee  of  Defence,  Mr.  Deakin 
wished  that  the  Dominions  should  have  a  right  of 
consulting  the  Committee  and  sending  Repre- 
sentatives to  express  their  views,  and  this  was 
agreed  to  by  formal  resolution.1 

With  reference  to  Naval  Defence,  the  Confer- 
ence was  addressed  in  a  somewhat  inconsequent 
fashion  by  Lord  Tweedmouth,2  then  First  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty.  Having  observed  that  the 
United  Kingdom  was  responsible  for  the  Naval 

1  It  should  be  mentioned  that  Sir  Frederick  Borden  in 
1903  had  been  invited  to  sit  with  the  Committee. 

2  The  absence  of  any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  First  Lord 
to  promote  any  measures  of  closer  union  for  naval  defence 
was   clearly   shown    before   the   Conference.    Speaking   on 
January  26,  1906,  this  kindly  gentleman,  whose  qualifications 
for  one  of  the  most  important  Cabinet  offices  will  always 
remain  a  mystery,  gave  expression  to  the  statement  that  "  for 
his  part  he  should  be  quite  prepared  to  give  the  protection 
of  the  British  Navy  to  the  Colonies  as  a  free  gift." 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  153 

Defence  of  the  Empire  at  large,  he  stated  with 
regard  to  Colonial  aid  that  "  we  gladly  take  all 
that  you  can  give  us,  but,  at  the  same  time,  if 
you  are  not  inclined  to  give  us  the  help  that  we 
hope  to  have  from  you,  we  acknowledge  our  abso- 
lute obligation  to  defend  the  King's  Dominions 
across  the  seas  to  the  best  of  our  ability." 

Having  regard  to  the  rapid  development  of 
thought  oversea  in  regard  to  the  Navy,  something 
more  than  this  weak  statement  was  required  ;  but 
the  utmost  that  the  First  Lord  would  admit  in 
suggesting  co-operation  was  that  the  Government 
were  ready  to  consider  a  modification  of  the  exist- 
ing arrangements  to  meet  the  views  of  the  various 
Colonies,  and  thus  it  would  be  of  assistance  if  the 
Colonial  Governments  would  undertake  to  pro- 
vide for  local  service  in  the  Imperial  Squadrons 
the  smaller  vessels  that  are  useful  for  defence 
against  possible  raids,  and  also  to  maintain  docks 
and  coaling  facilities  for  His  Majesty's  ships. 
The  idea  was  that  the  Australian  desire  for  a  local 
naval  service  could  be  met  by  Australia  making 
local  provision  for  the  smaller  craft. 

This  suggestion  "  to  allocate  to  local  purposes 
certain  portions  of  the  subsidies  already  given  " 
having  been  put  forward,  Lord  Tweedmouth 
asked  for  the  views  of  the  representatives.  Mr. 
Deakin,  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  Australian 


154  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Commonwealth  (who  was  present  at  the  1887  Con- 
ference), spoke,  as  regards  general  defence,  of  the 
difficulty  of  finding  the  measure  of  responsibility; 
Sir  Joseph  Ward  for  New  Zealand  favoured  an 
increase  of  cash  contributions;  Mr.  Brodeur  for 
Canada  considered  that  the  naval  contribution 
of  his  Dominion  should  not  be  officially  given  as 
Nil,  as  she  provided  the  Fisheries  Protection  ser- 
vice and  was  taking  over  the  dockyards  at  Halifax 
and  Esquimalt ;  while  Dr.  Smartt  and  Mr.  Moor 
for  Cape  Colony  and  Natal  respectively,  took  the 
view  that  the  abnormal  military  expenditure  of 
these  Colonies,  owing  to  the  native  population, 
was  the  same  in  principle  as  Canada's  expenditure 
on  policing  the  fisheries ;  but  the  people  of  Cape 
Colony  (Dr.  Smartt  declared)  would  not  "  for  one 
moment  desire  to  raise  that  as  an  argument "  to 
prevent  them  meeting  the  legitimate  obligation 
to  assist  in  naval  defence.  They  wished  to  de- 
velop the  Naval  Volunteers  and  approved  the 
policy  of  providing  submarines.  Newfoundland 
was  prepared  to  increase  her  liability  regarding 
the  Naval  Reserve  under  the  Agreement  of  1902. 
General  Botha,  speaking  for  the  Transvaal,  wanted 
to  see  the  South  African  Colonies  federated,  and 
then  "  a  system  of  defence  for  the  whole  of  South 
Africa." 

The  results  of  the  meetings  of  this  Conference 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  155 

and  interviews  between  the  Colonial  Ministers 
and  the  Admiralty  made  it  manifest,  Lord  Tweed- 
mouth  subsequently  stated,  that  Australia  wished 
to  terminate  the  Agreement  of  1902  and  start 
"  something  in  the  way  of  a  local  defence  force." 
New  Zealand  wished  either  to  continue  the  subsidy 
or  aid  in  defence  by  the  provision  of  submarines, 
while  South  Africa  wanted  either  a  submarine 
flotilla  or  help  with  regard  to  Naval  Volunteers 
at  Cape  Town,  Port  Elizabeth,  and  Natal.  In  the 
latter  connexion,  the  First  Lord  had  pointed  out, 
when  replying  on  the  discussion,  that  the  wastage 
in  war  would  be  one  of  ships  rather  than  men,  as 
was  shown  in  the  Japanese  War,  and  that  a  consider- 
able number  of  men  from  damaged  ships  would 
be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Admiralty  for  service  in 
other  ships.  The  admission,  therefore,  of  an  un- 
limited number  of  men  to  the  Naval  Service  would 
mean  that  there  would  be  nothing  for  them  to  do. 
He  called  attention  later,  however,  to  the  system 
of  naval  cadetships.  There  were  eight  allotted 
to  Australia,  two  for  New  Zealand,  two  for  the 
Cape,  one  for  Natal,  and  two  for  other  Colonies 
(including  Canada),  who  had  not  at  the  time 
expressed  a  wish  to  have  any. 

Mr.  Deakin,  in  speaking  of  the  Naval  Agree- 
ment of  1902,  stated  that  it  was  not  satisfactory 
either  to  the  Admiralty,  as  the  ships  were 


166   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

localized,  or  to  the  Parliament  of  the  Common- 
wealth, as  the  function  of  local  protection, 
which  had  been  the  reason  for  entering  into 
the  Agreement  in  1887,  had  practically  ceased 
to  exist  by  the  enlargement  of  the  area  of  opera- 
tions of  the  squadron  to  China  and  Indian  seas. 
He  realized  the  wisdom  of  associating  any  local 
force  in  the  closest  possible  manner  with  the  Navy, 
thus  assisting  to  keep  the  local  vessels  up  to  its 
high  standard  and  enable  officers  and  men  to  enjoy 
opportunities  of  advancement  which  they  would 
not  have  if  the  service  were  completely  isolated. 
'  We  look,"  he  said,  "  upon  any  vessels  for  local 
defence  not  only  as  Imperial  in  the  sense  of  pro- 
tecting Australia,  but  because  they  will  be 
capable  of  co-operating  with  any  squadron  which 
you  may  think  fit  to  send  into  our  waters  to 
meet  any  direct  attacks  in  proximity  to  our 
coasts." 

Sir  Joseph  Ward  expressed  the  willingness  of 
New  Zealand  to  fall  in  with  Australia's  wishes 
regarding  the  termination  of  the  Agreement  to 
which  he  was  not,  however,  opposed  in  principle. 
He  wished  to  get  advice  from  the  Admiralty  as 
to  the  comparative  merits  of  subsidy  and  sub- 
marines, but  the  Admiralty  refused  to  give  this 
on  the  somewhat  astonishing  juvtrxt,  put  forward 
by  Lord  Twecdmouth,  that  it  was  not  a  matter 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  157 

in  which  the  Admiralty  could  pretend  to  adjudi- 
cate. 

As  regards  South  Africa,  the  £85,000  paid  by 
Cape  Colony  and  Natal  would  go  towards  providing 
a  flotilla  of  submarines  or  destroyers  and  a  vessel 
for  training  the  Naval  Volunteers,  now  to  be 
called  "  Royal." 

For  Canada,  Mr.  Brodeur  reiterated  the  plea 
that  his  Dominion  had  been  doing  her  duty  "  in 
the  manner  most  conducive  to  Imperial  interests," 
and  he  again  laid  stress  upon  the  fisheries  protec- 
tion and  responsibilities  at  Halifax  and  Esqui- 
malt.  He  expressed  willingness  to  work  in  co- 
operation with  the  Imperial  authorities  "  so  far 
as  it  is  consistent  with  self-government." 

It  remained  for  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  however, 
to  adopt  all  the  old  arguments,  which  had  been 
made  familiar  twenty  or  thirty  years  before,  in 
favour  of  Canada  doing  nothing  for  Imperial 
Defence.  On  a  motion  of  Dr.  Smartt  that  the 
Conference,  recognizing  the  vast  importance  of 
the  Navy  to  the  Defence  of  the  Empire  and  the 
protection  of  its  trade,  considered  it  the  duty  of 
the  Dominions  to  make  such  contribution  towards 
the  upkeep  of  the  Navy  as  might  be  determined 
by  the  local  legislatures,  Sir  Wilfrid  expressed 
the  view  that  it  was  impossible  to  have  a  uniform 
policy  and  said  that  in  Canada  "  we  have  to  tax  our- 


158   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

selves  to  the  utmost  of  our  resources  in  the  develop- 
ment of  our  country,  and  we  could  not  contribute 
or  undertake  to  do  more  than  we  are  doing." 

This  "  out  of  date "  attitude,  which  the 
Canadian  people  subsequently  emphatically  repu- 
diated as  unworthy  of  the  status  of  the  great 
Dominion,1  was  no  doubt  adopted  to  please  the 
French  Canadians,  who,  while  opposed  to  a  policy 
of  annexation  to  the  United  States,  were  confirmed 
adherents  of  the  status  quo  as  regards  Canadian 
relations  with  the  rest  of  the  Empire.  The  refusal 
of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  to  lead  rather  than  be  led 
by  this  section  of  Canadian  opinion  was  shown 
later  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  blunders  of  his 
political  life.  Confining  attention,  however,  for 
the  moment  to  the  events  at  the  Conference,  the 
opposition  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  to  the  Resolution 
of  Dr.  Smartt  was  sufficient  to  cause  it  to  be 
abandoned,  although  no  other  objection  was 
raised,  it  being  considered  that  the  Resolution 
should  be  unanimous  if  passed  at  all. 

It  will  have  been  seen,  therefore,  that  the  Aus- 
tralian attitude  in  the  desire  for  a  separate  fleet 

1  The  Canadian  General  Election  of  1911  was  largely  con- 
cerned with  the  naval  question,  and  resulted  in  the  complete 
defeat  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  and  the  placing  in  power  of  the 
well-known  Imperialist,  Mr.  R.  L.  Borden.  As  to  the  attitude 
of  this  statesman  towards  the  Navy,  see  pp.  175-180,  and 
pp.  187-193. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912   159 

was  the  most  emphatic  departure  from  previous 
policy  and  practice  which  the  Conference  had  to 
record  in  the  direction  of  naval  defence.  The 
result  of  the  Conference  was  a  great  disappoint- 
ment to  Sir  John  Colomb,  who  wrote :  "  It  is 
quite  clear  that  the  broad  principle  of  co-operation 
as  accepted  by  the  first  Conference,  approved  by 
the  second,  and  not  only  confirmed,  but  in  its 
application  extended,  by  the  third,  has  now  been 
abandoned  by  the  fourth.  So  the  relations  of 
outlying  British  States  to  the  responsibilities  and 
burdens  of  maintaining  a  free  sea,  without  which 
they  cannot  survive,  may  be  described  once  more 
as  '  go  as  you  please.'  "  1 

Sir  John  Colomb  saw  at  once  the  difficulties 
that  would  be  encountered,  both  from  the  point 
of  view  of  effective  naval  defence  and  Imperial 
unity,  in  bringing  into  existence  a  separate  Navy 
for  Australia.  He  pointed  out  that  "  what- 
ever may  be  the  initial  cost  of  starting  the  pro- 
gramme of  an  Australian  Navy,  the  amount 
of  expenditure  must  be  continually  and  per- 
sistently augmented  if  the  possession  of  a  Navy, 
in  any  true  sense,  is  not  to  become  a  costly  and 
an  idle  dream."  2  He  also  referred  to  the  diffi- 

1  See  article  by  Sir  John  Colomb  entitled  "  Australia  and 
the  Navy  "  in  Melbourne  Argus  of  June  15,  1907. 

2  See  article  "  Australia  and  the  Navy,"  ibid. 


160  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

culty  of  Australian  ships  flying  the  white  en- 
sign and  acquiring  the  status  of  British  ships 
of  war  when  they  were  not  under  the  direct  autho- 
rity, and  subject  to  the  control,  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  As  regards  personnel,  he  showed  that 
the  training  necessary  to  qualify  for  rank  or  grade 
in  the  Royal  Navy  could  not  be  reduced  or  sim- 
plified, nor  tests  of  fitness  lowered,  to  facilitate 
interchange,  and,  therefore,  that  the  Australian 
force  could  not  as  a  whole  be  regarded  as  an 
organized  and  efficient  reserve  for  the  Royal 
Navy.  In  the  latter  connexion,  he  emphasized 
the  need  of  ships  in  modern  war  rather  than 
men,  and  asked  "  when  the  ships  of  Spain  had 
been  sent  to  the  bottom  at  Manilla  and  those 
of  Russia  in  the  Straits  of  Tsu  Shima,  of  what 
avail  were  the  King  of  Spain's  Naval  Reserves 
on  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  or  those  of 
the  Czar  on  the  Baltic  coast  ?  " 

As  regards  the  defence  of  the  Pacific  area, 
Sir  John  called  attention  to  the  necessity  of  the 
development  of  war  resources  in  the  Colonies 
having  Pacific  sea-boards,1  and  gave  the  following 

1  In  the  Fortnightly  Review  of  August,  1900,  Sir  John 
Colomb  had  called  attention,  in  an  article  entitled  "  Our  Naval 
Arrangements  in  the  other  Hemisphere,"  to  the  urgent  neces- 
sity of  establishing  means  of  production  and  manufacture  of 
supplies  and  ammunition  of  war  to  meet  naval  requirements 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  161 

warning :  "  The  voices  that  call  for  real  British 
unity  are  drowned  by  the  shoutings  for  con- 
stitutional rights  reverberating  throughout  the 
Empire  from  one  self-governing  State  to  another. 
Until  the  current  of  thought  turns  back  to  its 
old  British  channel  of  willing  sacrifice  in  the 
discharge  of  duties  to  the  Empire,  the  British 
future  in  the  Pacific  ocean  will  probably  be  found, 
at  no  distant  date,  to  rest  upon  the  good  nature 
of  the  United  States  or  the  tender  mercies  of 
Japan." 

On  December  13,  1907,  Mr.  Deakin  intro- 
duced his  Defence  Scheme  into  the  Common- 
wealth Parliament.  He  based  the  whole  of  his 
remarks  upon  what  he  termed  "  an  entire  change 
of  front  on  the  part  of  the  British  Parliament," 
for  recent  speeches  of  British  statesmen  in  the 
Commons  and  at  the  Conference  evidenced  that 
no  demands  of  any  kind  would  be  made  upon 
Australia  in  connexion  with  Imperial  Naval 
Defence.  He  called  attention  to  the  speech  of 
Mr.  Balfour1  in  the  House  of  Commons  when 
the  Opposition  Leader  had  deprecated  pressing 
the  Colonies  to  assist  in  defence,  and  to  that 

in  the  Oversea  States  of  Canada  and  Australia,  which  he 
regarded  as  Pacific  States. 
1  See  p.  146. 


X"  *>« 

*?•  '»,.. 

I  y 

t  .••:-.  i  *  M  u 

•    -  -  • 


1 62    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

of  Sir  H.  Campbell-Bannerman,  made  at  the 
opening  of  the  Imperial  Conference,  when  the 
Premier  had  stated  that  the  control  of  naval 
defence  and  foreign  affairs  must  go  together; 
and  from  these  utterances  Mr.  Deakin  con- 
cluded, "  seeing  that  we  have  no  voice  in  foreign 
affairs,  we  are  not  obliged  to  take  any  part 
in  naval  defence."  He  referred  to  Lord  Tweed- 
mouth's  "  splendidly  magnanimous  attitude  " 
and  showed  that  representatives  of  the  Admir- 
alty had  arrived  at  the  same  position  as  the  Aus- 
tralian Premiers  did  in  1881,  viz.,  that  the  whole 
defence  of  the  sea  and  its  control  should  be  a 
matter  for  the  British  Government  and  the  Brit- 
ish Navy,  while  the  defence  of  Australian  har- 
bours and  coasts  should  be  left  to  Australia,  except 
that  there  might  be  a  small  flotilla  of  Austra- 
lian vessels  capable  of  being  used  by  the  Navy 
as  part  of  its  Squadron. 

On  this  reading  of  Australian  requirements 
Mr.  Deakin  proposed  that,  in  place  of  the  Aus- 
tralian Naval  Agreement  lately  in  existence,  the 
Commonwealth  should  build,  man,  and  main- 
tain at  her  sole  expense  a  flotilla  of  submarines 
and  destroyers.  The  feature  which  he  had  been 
pressing  on  the  Admiralty  (and  he  quoted  the 
correspondence),1  was  that  any  flotilla  created  and 

1  Cd.  4325. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  163 

maintained  by  the  Commonwealth  must  be  under 
Commonwealth  control,  though  the  Parliament 
would  place  the  ships  under  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  whenever  that  was  deemed  necessary. 
In  order  that  the  men  of  the  flotilla  should  not 
be  removed  from  the  possibilities  of  advance- 
ment, Mr.  Deakin  wanted  them  to  be  engaged 
in  Australia  under  the  same  conditions  as  those 
of  the  Royal  Navy  and,  after  serving  on  the  local 
vessels,  to  pass  into  other  ships  of  the  Royal 
Navy  and  continue  their  training  elsewhere. 
They  would  be  inspected  by  the  Admiral  and  be 
subject  to  naval  discipline,  and  while  on  the  sta- 
tion they  would  receive  Australian  rates  of  pay. 
The  ships  would  fly  the  white  ensign  with  the 
Southern  Cross  and  be  altogether  Australian  in 
cost  and  political  control  as  to  their  movements 
and  stations.  In  everything  else  they  would  be 
part  of  the  British  Navy. 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  this  speech  of  the  Aus- 
tralian Premier  certain  points  had  been  considered, 
but  rather  more  at  that  moment  from  the  Aus- 
tralian than  the  Imperial  point  of  view;  and 
there  were  many  difficulties,  as,  for  example,  the 
movements  of  ships  of  an  Australian  separate 
Fleet,  flying  the  white  ensign,  which  might  at 
any  time  complicate  delicate  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  Kingdom  and  foreign  Powers. 


164   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

These  and  many  other  points  had  subsequently 
to  be  considered. 

The  serious  statements  as  to  the  growth  of 
foreign  Navies  (more  especially  that  of  Germany) 
made  by  the  British  Prime  Minister  and  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  on  the  introduction 
of  the  Navy  Estimates  of  1909-10  caused,  how- 
ever, a  new  turn  to  be  given  to  the  question  of 
Imperial  Co-operation  in  Defence.  As  a  result 
of  these  statements,  New  Zealand,  through  her 
patriotic  Prime  Minister  Sir  Joseph  Ward,  tele- 
graphed on  March  22,  1909,  an  offer  to  bear  the 
cost  of  the  immediate  building  and  arming  of  a 
first-class  battleship1  and,  if  subsequent  events 
showed  it  to  be  necessary,  this  Dominion  offered 
a  second  warship  of  the  same  type.  As  the 
Australian  Commonwealth  did  not  act  at  once, 
the  Governments  of  New  South  Wales  and  Vic- 
toria telegraphed  their  willingness  to  share  the 
cost  if  the  Commonwealth  subsequently  offered 
a  Dreadnought,  and,  if  no  such  offer  was  made, 
to  bear  the  whole  cost  themselves. 

On  April  15,  1909,  the  Commonwealth  Govern- 
ment cabled  a  Memorandum  setting  forth  pro- 
posals for  a  Naval  Defence  Force  on  the  lines 
proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin  in  1907,  though  it  was 

1  The  completed  battlc-crusi<  r  H  M.S.  New  Zealand  was 
inspected  by  His  Majesty  the  King  before  she  left  for  a 
world-cruise  in  February,  1913. 


IMPERIAL   CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  165 

suggested  that  in  time  of  war,  or  upon  a  declar- 
ation by  the  senior  naval  officer  representing 
the  British  Government  that  a  condition  of  emer- 
gency existed,  the  vessels  should  be  placed  by  the 
Commonwealth  under  the  orders  of  the  Admiralty. 
The  approval  of  the  Commonwealth  would, 
however,  be  necessary  for  coast-defence  vessels 
to  be  employed  in  seas  remote  from  Australia.1 

As  the  Canadian  Parliament  had  passed  a 
Resolution  on  March  29,  1909,  in  favour  of  the 
speedy  organization  of  a  Canadian  Naval  Ser- 
vice, to  act  in  co-operation  with  the  Imperial 
Navy,  Mr.  Asquith,  as  President  of  the  Imperial 
Conference,2  conveyed  an  invitation  to  all  the 
self-governing  Dominions  to  attend  a  Confer- 
ence on  Defence  3  in  July  of  that  year. 

So  the  exact  consummation  for  which  Sir 
John  Colomb  had  always  striven,  viz.,  a  Con- 
ference between  Home  and  Oversea  Governments 
called  specially  for  the  purpose  of  considering 
matters  of  Naval  and  Military  Defence  was  at 

1  See  Correspondence  and  Papers  relating  to  Naval  and 
Military  Defence,  1909.     Cd.  4948. 

2  The  1907  Conference  altered  the  title  from  "  Colonial 
Conference "    to   "  Imperial  Conference,"   and   the   British 
Prime  Minister  was  made  President. 

3  This  was  suggested  in  accordance  with  Resolution  I.  of 
the  Conference  of  1909,  which  provided  for  the  summoning  of 
subsidiary  Conferences. 


166  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

last  achieved,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  this 
important  move  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Asquith  met 
with  his  cordial  and  hearty  support. 

On  May  8,  1909,  Sir  John  Colomb,  as  Chair- 
man of  the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Com- 
mittee,1 addressed  a  letter  to  Mr.  Asquith  as 
Prime  Minister  conveying  warm  appreciation  of 
his  action  in  inviting  the  self-governing  States 
to  a  Conference  upon  Defence.  In  the  course 
of  the  letter,  Sir  John  Colomb  wrote :  "  Having 
carefully  watched  the  proceedings  of  the  various 
Imperial  and  Colonial  Conferences  which  have 
only  incidentally  dealt  with  the  Naval  Defence 
of  the  Empire,  the  Committee  has  realized  with 
regret  that  hitherto  no  broad  general  line  of 
policy  has  been  laid  down,  and  believe  that  this 
is  mainly  due  to  the  want  of  a  full  and  joint  inquiry 
beforehand  by  a  representative  Imperial  Com- 
mission."2 While  the  fear  was  expressed  that 
the  system  which  had  hitherto  prevailed  of  indi- 

1  This  was  the  last  official  act  of  the  Committee  under 
that  name,  as  it  changed  its  name  immediately  afterwards  to 
"  Imperial  Co-operation  League  "  ;  indeed,  the  decision  to 
change  the  name  was  recorded  in  the  letter  to  Mr.  Asquith. 

1  At  the  Imperial  Conference  of  1911  it  was  decided  to 
appoint  an  Imperial  Commission  to  deal  with  trade.  Sub- 
sequent events  regarding  defence  showed  how  difficult  it  was 
to  reach  a  satisfactory  agreement  without  a  thorough  inves- 
tigation beforehand 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  167 

vidual  and  independent  consultation  between 
the  Oversea  States  and  the  Admiralty,  before 
any  general  principles  were  agreed  upon  by  the 
Empire,  did  not  tend  to  effective  organization 
and  co-ordination  of  efforts,  it  was  recognized 
as  impracticable  to  hold  an  inquiry  by  the  sug- 
gested representative  Imperial  Commission  before 
the  July  Conference.  Still,  it  was  hoped  when 
the  occasion  arose  the  idea  would  be  borne  in 
mind. 1 

As  the  preparation  of  this  letter  was  prac- 
tically the  last  piece  of  public  work  performed 
by  Sir  John  Colomb  before  his  death  on  May  27, 
1909,  apathetic  interest  attaches  to  the  concluding 
paragraph,  which  read  as  follows :  "  To  those 
who  have  long  laboured  to  awaken  attention 
to  the  ever  increasing  burdens  of  British  naval 
responsibilities,  the  recent  manifestations  from 
His  Majesty's  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas  (to 
which  in  your  recent  speech  at  Glasgow  you  so 
eloquently  referred)  have  not  come  as  a  surprise, 
and  they  feel  that  this  outburst  of  recognition  of 
common  interest  in  maritime  security,  from  all 
parts  of  the  Empire,  seems  now  to  offer  a  unique 
opportunity  for  statesmanship  which,  if  lost, 
may  never  recur." 

About  the  same  time  as  this  letter  was 
1  See  also  p.  247. 


168   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

penned,  Sir  John  Colomb  was  engaged  in 
writing  a  Memorandum  which  he  intended 
for  the  consideration  of  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence.  In  view  of  subsequent  de- 
velopments which  brought  about  the  Canadian 
offer l  the  following  extract  from  the  notes  left 
by  Sir  John  Colomb,  referring  to  the  import- 
ance of  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
taking  a  share  in  providing  for  naval  contin- 
gencies in  the  Pacific  area,  shows  a  really  remark- 
able prescience :  "  The  first  step  towards  a  be- 
ginning is  the  awakening  of  these  States  to  a 
conviction  of  the  necessity  for  their  co-operation 
in  a  general  plan  for  the  maintenance  of  the  naval 
position  in  the  Pacific.  Such  a  declaration- 
confidential  or  otherwise — must  come  not  from 
the  Admiralty  but  the  Government.  The  op- 
portunity is  afforded  by  the  splendid  evidence 
of  Colonial  recognition  of  the  extra  burden  thrown 
on  the  United  Kingdom  for  defence  in  the  North 
Sea  by  the  naval  development  of  Germany."  * 

1  See  pp.  189-190. 

2  The  Memorandum  from  which  this  is  a  quotation  was 
never  completed  owing  to  Sir  John  Colomb's  death  soon  after 
it  was  started.    Writing  to  his  friend,  Lieutenant  L.  H. 
Hordern,  R.N.,  a  fortnight  before  he  died,  Sir  John  said  :  "  I 
am  ill  in  bed.  ...    I  fear  it  is  all  up  with  my  preparing  the 
Memorandum."     (Cf.  Admiralty  Memorandum  prepared  for 
Canadian  Government,  p.  187.) 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  169 

It  will  be  always  a  matter  for  profound  regret 
to  Sir  John  Colomb's  followers  and  co-workers 
in  the  cause  of  Closer  Union  for  Defence  that  he 
should  not  have  lived  to  see  the  meeting  and 
hear  the  results  of  the  first  Naval  and  Military 
Conference  of  the  Empire,  but  this  regret  is  tem- 
pered by  the  reflection  that  before  his  death  Sir 
John  knew  that  the  Conference,  which  he  had 
so  long  and  so  strenuously  advocated,  was  about 
to  assemble  at  the  centre  of  the  Empire. 

When  the  delegates  met  in  August,  1909, 
they  were  provided  with  a  Memorandum  from 
the  Admiralty  in  which  it  was  laid  down  that 
the  main  duty  of  the  Conference,  as  regards  naval 
defence,  was  to  determine  the  form  in  which 
the  various  Dominion  Governments  could  best 
participate  in  the  burden  of  Imperial  Defence, 
with  due  regard  to  varying  political  and  geo- 
graphical conditions. 

The  opinion  was  then  expressed  that  a  Domi- 
nion Government  desirous  of  creating  a  Navy 
should  aim  at  forming  a  distinct  Fleet  Unit  con- 
sisting of  at  least  the  following : 

One  Armoured  Cruiser  (new  Indomitable  class, 
which  is  of  the  Dreadnought  type). 

Three  unarmoured  Cruisers  (Bristol  class). 

Six  Destroyers. 

Three  Submarines  with  necessary  auxiliaries. 


170   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Methods  on  different  bases  of  expenditure 
were  discussed,  with  the  result  that  Canada  and 
Australia  evinced  a  desire  to  lay  the  foundations 
of  Fleets  of  their  own,  though  it  was  recognized 
that  the  personnel  should  be  trained  and  disci- 
plined under  similar  regulations  to  the  Royal 
Navy,  so  as  to  allow  of  interchange  and  union 
between  the  British  and  Dominion  Services. 

A  remodelling  of  the  squadrons  in  Far  East- 
ern waters  was  considered  on  the  basis  of  estab- 
lishing a  Pacific  Fleet  consisting  of  three  Units, 
of  the  composition  already  mentioned,  in  the 
East  Indies,  Australia  and  China  Seas,  and  it 
was  proposed  that  Australia  (with  some  tem- 
porary assistance  from  Imperial  funds)  should 
provide  the  Australian  Unit.  In  peace  time, 
and  while  on  the  Australian  Station,  the  Unit 
would  be  under  the  control  of  the  Commonwealth 
as  regards  movements  and  general  adminis- 
tration, but  when  placed  by  the  Commonwealth 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Admiralty  in  war  time 
the  vessels  would  be  under  the  naval  Comman- 
der-in-Chief.  A  Fleet  Unit  for  Canada  was  not 
considered  suitable  by  her  representatives  on 
account  of  her  double  sea-board.  So  it  was 
proposed  that  Canada  should  make  a  start  with 
cruisers  of  the  Bristol  class  and  destroyers 
of  an  improved  River  class — a  part  to  be  sta- 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  171 

tioned  on  the  Atlantic  sea-board,  and  part  on 
the  Pacific.  New  Zealand  preferred  to  adhere 
to  her  policy  of  direct  contribution,  but  this 
would  be  applied  to  the  maintenance  of  the  China 
Unit. 

The  gifts  of  battleships  offered  firstly  by 
New  Zealand,  and  subsequently  also  by  the  Com- 
monwealth, were  accepted  with  the  substitution 
of  cruisers  of  the  Indomitable  type  for  battleships, 
one  of  these  to  be  placed  on  the  China  and  one 
on  the  Australian  station. 

With  regard  to  South  Africa,  this  Colony  was 
not  able  to  take  part  in  the  Conference  pending 
the  completion  of  the  arrangements  for  the  Union 
of  South  Africa.  Meanwhile,  the  new  Union 
Government  would  take  over  the  obligation  to 
make  the  existing  contributions  to  the  Navy 
hitherto  paid  by  Cape  Colony  and  Natal. 

The  question  of  Military  Defence  was  also  dis- 
cussed at  the  Conference,  and  an  important  docu- 
ment, prepared  by  the  General  Staff,  was  circulated 
setting  out  general  principles. 

The  basis  recognized  by  the  Mother-Country 
was  stated  to  be  that  for  which  Sir  John  Colomb 
had  always  contended,  viz  :  x 

(a)  The    maintenance    of    a    Navy    which    is 
designed  to  keep  command  of   the  seas. 
1  See  pp.  15,  18,  44,  etc. 


172   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

(b)  The   provision   of   Territorial   Forces   for 

Home  Defence. 

(c)  The  creation  of  an  Expeditionary  Force 

ready  to  proceed  to  any  threatened  part 
of  the  Empire. 

It  was  observed,  however,  that  in  the  Over- 
sea Dominions  no  organization  had  yet  been 
devised  for  rendering  assistance  to  other  parts 
of  the  Empire  in  an  emergency,  and  it  was  sug- 
gested that  the  time  had  arrived  when  the  im- 
portant question  should  be  considered.  It  was 
recommended  that,  without  impairing  the  con- 
trol of  the  Government  of  each  Dominion  over 
the  military  forces  raised  within  it,  these  forces 
should  be  standardized ;  the  formation  of  units, 
the  arrangements  for  transports,  the  patterns 
of  weapons,  etc.,  being  as  far  as  possible  assimi- 
lated to  those  in  the  British  Army.  While  the 
troops  would  be  for  the  defence  of  each  Domi- 
nion, it  would  thus  be  made  practicable  to  mo- 
bilize and  use  them  for  the  defence  of  the  Empire 
in  an  emergency,  so  that  a  homogeneous  Imperial 
Army  might  be  formed. 

The  Military  Conference  entrusted  the  details 
to  a  sub-Conference  presided  over  by  the  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff1  (Sir  W.  Nichol- 

1  The  Imperial  General  Staff  was  brought  into  existence 
at  the  1907  Conference,  see  p.  149. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  173 

son),  who  acted  in  this  capacity  for  the  first  time. 
Complete  agreement  was  reached  and  the  con- 
clusions were  approved  by  the  main  Conference 
and  by  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  which 
sat  for  the  purpose  presided  over  by  the  British 
Prime  Minister. 

The  development  of  the  movement  towards 
Co-operation  in  Naval  Defence  on  the  part  of 
Canada  may  now  be  shortly  considered.  It 
will  have  been  seen  that,  notwithstanding  the 
opposition  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  to  Canada  taking 
an  active  part  in  any  scheme  to  secure  the  mari- 
time supremacy  of  the  British  Empire,  clearly 
shown  at  the  Conferences  of  1902  and  1907,  the 
patriotic  action  of  New  Zealand,  and  afterwards 
of  the  Commonwealth,  forced  the  matter  into 
the  open,  and  obliged  Sir  Wilfrid  to  take  some 
practical  step  in  the  direction  of  Canadian  par- 
ticipation in  naval  defence.  While  anxious  to 
conciliate  the  French  Canadians,  the  Dominion 
Premier  saw  clearly  that  any  further  shuffling 
with  the  naval  question  would  antagonize  many 
of  his  own  supporters,  while  at  the  same  time 
it  would  hand  over  a  powerful  weapon  to  the 
Opposition,  ably  led  by  Mr.  R.  L.  Borden — a 
statesman  as  thoroughly  imbued  as  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier  with  Canadian  national  ideals,  but  with 
a  far  wider  range  of  vision,  and  a  firm  conviction 


174   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

that  the  destiny  of  Canada  lay  in  a  full  and  com- 
plete partnership  with  the  other  sister-States 
of  the  Empire. 

On  January  12,  1910,  therefore,  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier  introduced  the  Canadian  Naval  Service 
Bill  into  the  Dominion  House  of  Commons. 
The  Bill  provided  for  the  creation  of  a  naval 
force  to  be  composed  of  a  permanent  corps,  a 
reserve  force,  and  a  volunteer  force,  on  the  same 
pattern  as  the  organization  of  the  Canadian  .Militia 
force.  It  may  be  mentioned  that  under  the 
Militia  Act  the  whole  male  population  of  Canada, 
from  the  age  of  17  to  that  of  60,  is  liable  to  mili- 
tary service,  and,  in  case  of  emergency,  the  whole 
male  population  may  be  called  upon  for  service. 
The  Naval  Bill  differed  in  the  respect  that  men 
would  only  be  enrolled  by  voluntary  engagement, 
there  being  no  compulsion  and  no  balloting. 
The  naval  force  would  be  under  the  Depart- 
ment of  Marine  and  Fisheries,  with  a  Director  of 
Naval  Service  to  supervise  and  a  Naval  Board 
to  advise.  Commissions  in  the  naval  militia 
would  issue  in  the  name  of  the  King,  and  a  Naval 
College  on  the  lines  of  the  Kingston  Military 
College  was  foreshadowed,  while  discipline  would 
be  in  accordance  with  the  King's  Regulations. 

With  regard  to  the  important  question  of 
control  in  peace  and  war,  the  force  would  be 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  175 

under  the  control  of  the  Canadian  Government, 
but,  in  case  of  emergency,  the  Governor-General- 
in-Council  might  place  the  force  on  "  active 
service "  and  at  the  disposal  of  His  Majesty 
for  general  service  with  the  Royal  Navy.  If 
such  action  were  taken  at  a  time  when  Parlia- 
ment was  not  sitting,  it  was  provided  that  Par- 
liament should  immediately  be  called  together. 

As  previously  mentioned,  the  Canadian  Gov- 
ernment at  the  1909  Conference  did  not  accept 
the  Admiralty  plan  of  a  Naval  Unit *  in  the 
Pacific,  but  afterwards  determined  to  accept  a 
proposition  to  construct  11  ships,  viz.,  4  Bristols, 
1  Boadicea,  and  6  Destroyers,  placing  part  of  the 
force  on  the  Atlantic  and  part  on  the  Pacific. 

While  the  Premier's  proposals  were  attacked 
by  Mr.  F.  D.  Monk  (a  French  Conservative  who 
supported  Mr.  Borden  in  practically  everything 
but  his  naval  policy)  and  other  French  Canadians 
as  going  too  far  in  committing  Canada  to  "  Im- 
perial "  action,  they  were  criticized  by  Mr.  Bor- 
den and  Mr.  George  E.  Foster  as  being  in  many 
respects  the  negation  of  Imperial  Unity. 

1  The  eminent  and  eloquent  Conservative  leader,  the 
Hon.  George  E.  Foster,  M.P.  (now  Minister  for  Trade  and 
Commerce  in  the  Canadian  Cabinet),  in  a  masterly  speech  in 
the  Canadian  House  of  Commons  on  February  3,  1910,  re- 
ferred to  Canada's  contribution  to  the  debates  at  the  Defence 
Conference  as  showing  her  "  pitiable  "  position, 


176  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  had  observed,  in  reply 
to  a  question,  that  "  when  Britain  is  at  war, 
Canada  is  at  war,"  but  he  subsequently  whittled 
this  away  by  declining  to  say  that  Canada  should 
take  part  in  all  the  wars  of  England.  She  would 
be  guided  by  circumstances  of  which  the  Cana- 
dian Parliament  was  the  judge.  Upon  this,  Mr. 
Borden  declared  that  the  proposition  that  the 
rest  of  the  Empire  might  be  at  war  while  Canada 
was  at  peace  was  an  impossible  one,  and  that 
if,  in  time  of  war,  the  Canadian  Government  did 
not  place  the  Canadian  Navy  under  the  control 
of  the  Imperial  authorities  "  it  would  amount 
to  a  declaration  of  independence."  He  empha- 
sized his  position  by  moving  a  resolution  that 
the  proposals  did  not  follow  the  suggestions  of 
the  Admiralty,  and,  in  so  far  as  they  empowered 
the  Government  to  withhold  the  naval  forces 
of  Canada  from  those  of  the  Empire  in  time  of 
war,  were  ill-advised  and  dangerous.  The  Reso- 
lution further  stated  that  such  proposals  could 
not  safely  be  accepted  unless  they  thoroughly 
ensured  unity  of  organization  and  of  action, 
without  which  there  could  be  no  effective  co- 
operation in  any  common  scheme  of  Empire 
Defence,  and  that,  while  the  proposals  involved 
heavy  outlay,  they  would  give  no  effective  aid  to 
the  Empire  and  no  satisfactory  results  to  Canada. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  177 

Mr.  Borden  wound  up  by  proposing  that 
Canada  in  the  present  crisis  should  offer  such  an 
amount  as  would  construct  two  battleships  or 
armoured  cruisers  of  the  latest  "  Dreadnought " 
type,  giving  to  the  Admiralty  full  discretion  to 
expend  the  sum  for  naval  defence  as,  in  their 
judgment,  might  best  serve  to  increase  the  united 
strength  of  the  Empire. 

The  above-mentioned  Resolution  was,  natu- 
rally, defeated  on  a  Division,  but  in  the  course 
of  the  many  lengthy  discussions  which  took 
place  in  the  Canadian  Parliament  on  the  naval 
proposals,  Mr.  Borden  managed  to  elicit  from  the 
Premier  the  statement  that  if  the  Governor- 
General-in-Council l  did  not  make  any  order  to 
place  the  Canadian  ships  at  the  disposal  of  His 
Majesty  in  war,  then  the  Canadian  Navy  would 
take  no  part  in  the  war.  Mr.  Borden  at  once 
seized  upon  this  position,  and  pointed  out  that 
Canadian  ships  during  a  war  in  which  the  Empire 
was  engaged  would  presumably  be  flying  the  British 
flag,  and,  if  so,  they  would  be  subject  to  attack. 
He  wanted  to  know  whether  such  a  ship,  on 
meeting  one  of  the  enemy,  would  fight.  To  this 
Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  replied  that  he  did  not  know 
that  she  would  or  should  fight,  and  added  "  she 
should  not  fight  until  the  Government  by  which 

1  In  practice,  the  Canadian  Cabinet. 


178  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

she  is  commissioned  have  determined  whether 
she  should  go  into  the  war,"  upon  which  Mr. 
Borden  commented :  "  The  position  of  the  Prime 
Minister  is  that  ships  flying  the  British  flag  should 
meet  an  enemy  on  the  high  seas  and  not  attack 
them.  That  is  a  new  position  for  the  British 
Navy." ' 

In  short,  Mr.  Borden's  position  was  that  in  a 
war  of  the  Empire  the  Canadian  naval  force 
ought  to  be  classed  exactly  in  the  same  category 
as  the  other  forces  of  the  Empire,  and  that  was 
the  only  workable  theory  on  which  a  scheme 
could  be  devised  for  maintaining  a  great  Naval 
Force  of  the  Empire,  if  the  Empire  was  to  hold 
together. 

When  the  Second  Reading  of  the  Bill  came 
before  the  Senate,  the  Hon.  J.  A.  Lougheed, 
Opposition  Leader,  declared  "  the  logical  result 
of  a  Canadian  Navy  must  be  to  produce  in  Canada 

1  The  illogical  position  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  was  recog- 
nized by  even  advanced  Canadian  Nationalists,  who  were 
strongly  opposed  to  Canada  doing  anything  in  Imperial  De- 
fence. Mr.  Olivar  Asselin,  one  of  the  most  brilliant  fighting 
lieutenants  of  Mr.  Bourassa,  issued  a  pamphlet  in  April,  1910, 
in  which  he  asked :  "  Could  anything,  for  instance,  .be  more 
illogical  than  to  acknowledge  a  military  duty  to  the  Motlu-i- 
Country  on  the  part  of  the  Colonies,  and  at  the  same  time 
reserve  the  right  for  the  latter  to  say  when  and  how  that  duty 
shall  be  performed  ?  " 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912  179 

ultimately  a  severance  from  Great  Britain," 
and  argued  that  it  would  have  been  better  to 
make  a  direct  grant  to  Britain,  and  then  discuss 
a  Federal  Defence  Committee  of  the  Em- 
pire.1 

The  Naval  Service  Bill  continued  to  be  the 
chief  subject  of  discussion,  not  only  in  Parlia- 
ment, but  throughout  the  Press  and  on  every 
public  platform  of  the  Dominion. 

Mr.  Bourassa,  the  Leader  of  the  French  Cana- 
dian Nationalists,  joined  with  Mr.  Monk  in  attack- 
ing any  policy,  such  as  that  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier, 
which  would  "  draw  them  into  distant  wars, 
foreign  to  Canada,  so  long,  at  least,  as  the  self- 
governing  Colonies  of  the  Empire  shall  not  enjoy 
with  the  Mother-Country,  and  upon  equal  footing, 
the  sovereign  power  and  authority."  The  French 
Canadian  attitude,  while  vigorously  opposing 
anything  in  the  nature  of  "  Imperialism,"  ap- 
peared, as  always,  to  be  just  as  opposed  to  a 
policy  of  annexation  to  the  States,  which,  it 
was  considered,  might  mean  forfeiting  various 
privileges  enjoyed  by  the  Province  of  Quebec 
under  the  British  North  America  Act.  So  far 
as  can  be  seen,  the  attitude  was  simply  one  of 
waiting,  and  taking  no  active  part  in  Empire 

1   For  further    information    on    this  matter,   see    pp. 
207-210,  and  also  pp.  216,  235,  260,  etc. 


180   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

affairs,  until  the  time  came  to  assert  Canadian 
National  Independence.1 

This  was  a  position  which  Mr.  Borden  and 
other  Imperialists  could  not  understand.  He 
could  understand  the  ideal  of  annexation  to  the 
United  States,  or  the  ideal  of  independence,  but 
he  denounced  as  inconsistent  with  self-respect 
to  accept  the  protection  of  the  British  flag  and 
"  have  every  dollar  of  the  cost  paid  by  the  over- 
burdened taxpayers  of  the  British  Islands."  In 
a  fine  passage  in  this  connexion,  uttered  in  a 
speech  during  the  progress  of  this  controvc  -i 
Mr.  Borden  said :  "  When  the  Battle  of  Arma- 
geddon comes,  when  the  Empire  is  fighting  for 
its  existence,  when  our  kinsmen  of  the  other 
great  Dominions  are  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle, 
shall  we  sit  silent  and  inactive  while  we  contem- 
plate with  smug  satisfaction  our  increasing  crops 
and  products,  or  shall  we,  pauper-like,  seek  fan- 
cied but  delusive  security  hi  an  appeal  to  the 
charity  of  some  indefinite  and  high-sounding 
political  doctrine  of  a  great  neighbouring  nation  . 
No,  a  thousand  times  no  !  " 

As  to  the  actual  progress  of  the  Canadian  naval 
policy    in    1910,   two    cruisers    were    purchased 

1  For  the  position  of  the  extreme  advocates  of  so-called 
Canadian  Nationalism  see  Tfa  Kingdom  Papers,  by  John  S. 
Kwart,  published  at  Ottawa. 


IMPERIAL    CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  181 

by  the  Canadian  Government  (Niobe  and  Rain- 
bow) and  Rear- Admiral  Kingsmill  was  appointed 
Director  of  Naval  Service,  with  a  Naval  Staff 
at  Ottawa,  while  it  was  announced  that  the  new 
Naval  College  at  Halifax  would  be  opened  in 
1911.  An  Imperial  Order  in  Council  transferred 
the  Naval  Station  at  Halifax  to  the  Canadian 
Government  on  October  13,  1910,  and  the  for- 
mal transfer  of  Esquimalt  was  completed  on 
November  9  of  the  same  year. 

Meantime,  much  private  negotiation  was  pro- 
ceeding between  the  Admiralty  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Australian  Government  as  to 
the  conditions  of  the  Australian  Navy.  Various 
matters  which,  naturally,  could  only  occur  to 
those  who  had  experience  both  of  naval  matters 
and  foreign  affairs,  had  not  been  thought  of  by 
the  Australian  representatives.  Practically  the 
same  remark  applies  to  the  negotiations  with 
Canada,  and  it  was  almost  surprising,  considering 
the  difficulties,  that  even  so  satisfactory  an  agree- 
ment as  that  recorded  at  the  Imperial  Conference 
of  1911  was  brought  about. 

At  the  1911  Conference  the  results  of  the 
negotiations  between  the  British  Admiralty  and 
the  representatives  of  Canada  and  Australia 1 

1  It  is  to  be  observed  that  at  the  1911  Conference  the 
Australian  Commonwealth  was  represented  by  its  Premier, 


182   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

were  given,  from  which  it  will  be  seen  that  some 
sort  of  working  arrangement  was  made  possible. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  Naval  Services  and 
forces  of  the  Dominions  should  be  under  the 
exclusive  control  of  then*  respective  Govern- 
ments, but  that  the  training  and  discipline  should 
be  generally  uniform  with  that  of  the  Fleet  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  ^officers  and  men 
should  be  interchangeable.  The  ships  should 
fly  the  white  ensign  at  the  stern  and  the  dis- 
tinctive flag  of  the  Dominion  at  the  jack-staff, 
while  the  Canadian  and  Australian  Governments 
should  have  then*  own  naval  stations. 

To  meet  the  difficulty  of  Canadian  or  Aus- 
tralian ships  proceeding  about  the  seas,  and 
possibly  into  foreign  ports,  unknown  to  the 
Admiralty,  and  to  the  danger  of  negotiations 
which  might  be  in  progress  between  the  Foreign 
Office  and  one  or  more  of  the  Great  Powers,  it 
was  provided  that  the  Dominion  Governments 
would  notify  the  Admiralty  if  they  desired  to 
send  ships  outside  their  stations,  while  with 
regard  to  entry  into  foreign  ports,  those  Govern- 
ments would  first  obtain  the  concurrence  of  the 
Imperial  Government.  The  officer  in  command 

Mr.  Andrew  Fisher,  who  took  office  as  head  of  a  Labour  Ad- 
ministration in  succession  to  Mr.  Alfred  Deakin,  the  Leader 
of  the  Liberal  Party. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  183 

of  a  Dominion  ship  at  a  foreign  port  would  re- 
port proceedings  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  on 
the  station  or  to  the  British  Admiralty,  and  he 
would  obey  any  instructions  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  Kingdom  as  to  the  conduct 
of  international  matters,  the  Dominion  Govern- 
ment being  informed.  If  a  Dominion  ship  were 
to  be  forced  by  weather  or  unforeseen  emergency 
to  enter  a  foreign  port,  the  Commander  would 
report  in  the  same  way  and  be  subject  to  the 
same  conditions  of  obedience,  etc.,  as  if  previous 
arrangement  had  been  made. 

Upon  ships  of  the  British  Admiralty  and 
the  Dominions  meeting,  the  senior  officer  would 
have  the  right  to  command  in  matters  of  cere- 
mony, but  he  would  have  no  power  to  direct  the 
movements  of  ships  unless  the  ships  were  ordered 
to  co-operate  by  mutual  arrangement. 

Other  matters  agreed  upon  had  relation  to 
the  loan  of  officers  and  men  by  the  Admiralty, 
to  the  determination  of  questions  of  seniority 
by  the  date  of  Commissions  in  British,  Cana- 
dian or  Australian  Services,  and  to  Fleet  exer- 
cises for  ships  of  the  Dominions  under  the  senior 
naval  officer.  The  Dominions  applied  to  their 
forces  the  King's  Regulations  and  Admiralty 
Instructions  and  the  Naval  Discipline  Act. 

In  time  of   war,  if    the  Naval  Service  of  a 


184  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Dominion  were  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  Im- 
perial Government,  the  ships  would  form  an  inte- 
gral portion  of  the  British  Fleet  and  would  remain 
under  the  control  of  the  Admiralty  during  the 
continuance  of  the  war.1 

A  Committee  of  the  Imperial  Conference  dis- 

1  As  regards  the  progress  of  the  Australian  Fleet  Unit  since 
the  1911  Imperial  Conference,  it  may  be  observed  that  the 
second  reading  of  the  Naval  Agreement  Bill  was  moved  in 
the  Commonwealth  House  of  Representatives  on  September 
5,  1912.  From  the  information  there  afforded  it  appeared 
that  delay  had  taken  place  in  the  construction  of  the  ships 
of  the  Australian  Fleet  Unit,  though  it  was  expected  the  Mel- 
bourne would  be  ready  by  January,  1913,  and  the  Australia 
and  the  Sydney  a  few  months  later.  The  cruiser  Brisbane 
is  being  assembled  in  Australia.  With  regard  to  the  recruiting 
of  men,  it  was  originally  thought  that  the  men  recruited  in 
Australia  for  service  in  the  ships  of  the  Imperial  Squadron 
would  be  available  to  form  the  nucleus  crews  of  the  Austra- 
lian Fleet  Unit.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  recruiting 
did  not  meet  with  the  success  anticipated,  with  the  result 
that  the  number  of  men  available  to  man  the  vessels  would 
not  be  sufficient  when  the  ships  were  ready  for  service.  So 
the  aid  of  the  Imperial  Government  was  sought  for  a  training 
ship  and  loan  of  officers  and  men.  The  Admiralty  placed 
the  Encounter  at  the  disposal  of  the  Australian  Government 
with  the  nucleus  of  a  crew  and  officers  for  the  training  of 
Australian  crews.  The  cost  of  the  Encounter  to  the  Austra- 
lian Government  will  be  £25,000,  and  as  the  subsidy  of  £200,000 
per  annum  has  still  to  be  paid  under  the  Agreement  of  1903 
till  the  Australian  Squadron  shall  be  relieved  by  the  Austra- 
lian Fleet  Unit,  the  amount  really  payable  by  Australia  will 
be  the  £200,000  less  £25,000,  viz.  £175,000. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  185 

cussed  Military  affairs  and  recorded  that  a  Cana- 
dian section  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  was 
in  process  of  formation,  while  the  constitution 
of  the  Commonwealth  section,  as  organized  in 
August,  1909,  was  given.  The  New  Zealand  sec- 
tion of  the  Staff  was  organized  in  December, 
1910,  and  it  was  stated  that  the  Government 
had  applied  for  the  services  of  four  more  General 
Officers.  In  South  Africa,  owing  to  political 
change,  it  was  not  possible  to  gauge  the  require- 
ments of  the  Union  Defence  Forces. 

The  subjects  being  dealt  with  by  the  local 
General  Staffs  were : 

1.  Local  Defence. 

2.  The  Training  of    troops  on  lines   similar 

to  those  now  followed  for  the  United 
Kingdom  by  the  Training  Directorate 
of  the  War  Office. 

It  had  been  agreed  at  the  Conferences  of  1907 
and  1909  that  the  education  of  officers  was  the 
bedrock  of  the  formation  of  Imperial  Military 
Organization,  and  the  1911  Conference  was  able 
to  record  satisfactory  progress  towards  uniform- 
ity in  the  education  of  officers  throughout  the 
Empire. 

But  it  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  that 
no  definite  step  has  yet  been  taken  towards  estab- 
lishing a  binding  obligation  upon  any  portion 


186  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

of  the  military  forces  of  the  Oversea  Dominions 
to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  serve  in  any 
part  of  the  world,  with  the  Regular  forces  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  in  a  single  Imperial  Army. 
While  the  arrangements  now  completed  would 
undoubtedly  facilitate  co-operation  in  the  field 
between  the  United  Kingdom  forces  and  those 
volunteering  from  the  Dominions,  it  is  clear 
that  the  Empire  cannot  rely  upon  any  certain 
quota  of  men  from  a  Dominion  to  act  in  any  real 
scheme  of  Imperial  Organization.  From  all  that 
has  been  recorded  in  this  and  the  last  chapter, 
it  will  have  been  made  quite  manifest  that  any 
such  binding  obligation  would  be  looked  upon 
by  the  growing  nations  as  an  encroachment  upon 
their  autonomy ;  and,  therefore,  before  anything 
can  be  done,  a  system  of  Imperial  Representa- 
tion must  be  established  in  which  the  Dominions 
may  have  an  effective  voice  in  the  control  of  the 
Imperial  forces  and  in  the  decision  of  matters 
of  peace  and  war. 

For  the  same  reason,  it  could  not  be  expected 
that  the  1911  Conference  would  record  any  ad- 
vance in  the  direction  of  agreement  to  place 
Dominion  ships  automatically  under  the  control 
of  the  Admiralty  in  time  of  war.  Without 
giving  the  Dominions  some  definite  share  in  the 
control  of  ships,  by  constituting,  possibly,  an 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  187 

Imperial  Board  of  Admiralty,  and  without  giving 
them  a  voice  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  the  Empire 
which  might  involve  them  in  war,  it  was  not  to 
be  expected  that  the  great  sister-nations  could 
agree  to  their  vessels  being  taken  away  from 
them  on  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  United 
Kingdom,  who,  after  all,  was  only  one  of  the 
partners  in  "  John  Bull  and  Company." 

In  1912,  having  assumed  office  as  Prime 
Minister  of  Canada,  in  consequence  of  the  defeat 
of  Sir  W.  Laurieratthe  1911  General  Election,  Mr. 
R.  L.  Borden  visited  England,  with  three  other 
members  of  his  Cabinet,  in  order  to  confer  with 
the  Home  Government  on  the  question  of  Naval 
Defence.  Mr.  Borden  and  his  colleagues  attended 
sittings  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
and  the  oversea  Ministers  had  the  situation  both 
as  regards  the  Navy  and  Foreign  Affairs  put 
before  them  in  detail.  As  a  result,  the  Canadian 
Premier  asked  that  a  Memorandum  should  be 
prepared  by  the  Admiralty  for  the  consideration 
of  the  Cabinet  on  his  return  to  Canada.  This 
was  done,  and  the  Memorandum,  which  was 
forwarded  in  October,  1912,  in  the  course  of 
reviewing  the  international  position,  pointed  out 
that  the  development  of  the  German  Fleet  was 
the  most  striking  feature  of  the  naval  situation. 

By  way  of  illustration  it  was   mentioned  in 


188   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  Memorandum  that  whereas  in  1898  the  Ger- 
man Fleet  consisted  of  9  battleships  (excluding 
coast-defence  vessels),  3  large  cruisers,  28  small 
cruisers,  113  torpedo-boats,  and  25,000  men, 
maintained  at  an  annual  cost  of  £6,000,000,  the 
full  fleet  of  1920  would  consist  of  41  battleships, 
20  large  cruisers,  40  small  cruisers,  144  torpedo 
boats,  72  submarines,  and  101,500  men,  estimated 
to  be  maintained  at  an  annual  cost  of  £23,000,000. 
It  was,  however,  observed  that  the  figures  gave 
no  real  idea  of  the  advance,  for  Germany  had 
systematically  replaced  old  and  small  ships  by 
the  most  powerful  and  costly  vessels,  and  con- 
sequently for  the  German  Navy,  with  such  a 
large  proportion  of  new  ships,  the  cost  of  main- 
tenance and  repair  was  much  less  than  in  longer 
established  Navies.1 

Having  proved  by  facts  and  figures  that  the 
naval  expansion  of  Germany  was  not  provoked 
by  British  naval  increases,  the  Memorandum 
went  on  to  show  that  it  had  been  necessary  with- 
in the  past  decade  to  concentrate  the  Fleet  mainly 
in  Home  waters.  For  instance,  in  1902  there 
were  160  British  vessels  in  the  oversea  stations, 

1  For  a  clear  exposition  by  a  leading  authority  of  the 
effect  of  the  rise  of  the  war  power  of  Germany  upon  Great 
Britain,  see  Britain  at  Bay,  by  Spenser  Wilkinson  (Lon- 
don :  Constable  &  Co.). 


IMPERIAL   CO-OPERATION,   1902-1912     189 

while  in  1912  there  were  only  76.  No  doubt 
that  was  a  circumstance  which  might  create 
some  disquietude  in  the  minds  of  inhabitants 
of  the  Empire  resident  oversea,  but  the  Ad- 
miralty laid  down  once  more  the  proposition  so 
constantly  insisted  upon  by  Sir  John  Colomb, 
viz.,  that  it  is  the  general  naval  supremacy 
of  Great  Britain,  enabling  her  to  drive  from 
the  seas  the  strongest  hostile  Navy  wherever 
it  may  be  found,  which  is  the  primary  safe- 
guard of  the  security  and  interests  of  the  great 
Dominions.  Having  observed  that  the  over- 
seas trade  of  Canada,  amounting  in  1909-10 
to  £72,000,000,  and  the  Canadian  vessels,  amount- 
ing in  tonnage  to  718,000  tons,  were  dependent 
upon  the  Imperial  Navy,  without  contribution 
or  cost  to  Canada,  the  Memorandum  wound  up 
with  a  reply  to  the  Canadian  Prime  Minister's 
inquiry  as  to  the  most  effective  immediate  aid 
the  Dominion  could  offer  by  stating  the  view 
that  such  aid  should  include  the  provision  of  a 
certain  number  of  the  largest  and  strongest  ships 
of  war  which  science  could  build  or  money  supply. 
As  a  consequence,  Mr.  Borden  made  his  his- 
toric statement  in  the  Canadian  House  of  Com- 
mons on  December  5,  1912,  when  he  asked  the 
Dominion  Parliament  to  vote  £7,000,000  for 
the  immediate  construction  of  three  battleships, 


190   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

which  would  be  the  most  powerful  in  the  world, 
and  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment for  the  common  Defence  of  the  Empire, 
as  part  of  the  Royal  Navy.  The  ships,  there- 
fore, would  be  maintained  and  controlled  by 
the  Admiralty,  but  if,  in  the  future,  the  Dominion 
established  a  Canadian  Unit  of  the  Fleet,  Mr. 
Borden  stated  that  the  ships  might,  with  rea- 
sonable notice,  be  called  by  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment to  form  part  of  the  Unit,  and  would  then 
be  maintained  by  the  Dominion. 

With  regard  to  the  question  of  a  Canadian 
Navy,  the  Prime  Minister  asked  whether  there 
was  really  any  need  that  "  we  should  undertake 
the  hazardous  and  costly  experiment  of  building 
up  a  naval  organization  specially  restricted  to 
Canada,  when  upon  just  and  self-respecting  terms 
we  can  take  such  part  as  we  desire  in  naval  de- 
fence through  the  existing  naval  organization 
of  the  Empire."1 

1  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  Mr.  Borden's  pro- 
posals were  opposed  in  the  Canadian  Parliament  by  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier,  who  reiterated  his  arguments  in  favour  of  a  separate 
Canadian  Navy.  It  is  a  little  difficult  to  realize  that 
some  English  newspapers,  apparently  imperfectly  acquainted 
either  with  the  previous  history  of  the  controversy  or  with 
the  views  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  sought  to  convey  the  im- 
pression that  the  ex-Premier's  proposals  for  a  Canadian  Navy 
were  more  "  Imperialistic  "  than  Mr.  Borden's.  They  of 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-1912  191 

As  to  the  terms  above  referred  to  Mr.  Borden 
foreshadowed  the  permanent  representation  of 
Canada  upon  the  Committee  of  Imperial  De- 
fence by  the  presence  in  London  of  a  Canadian 
Minister  during  the  whole  or  a  portion  of  each 
year.1 

Thus  it  happened  that  three  years  after  the 
death  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  the  great  Dominion 
of  Canada  came  into  line  with  the  other  over- 
sea nations  in  making  her  contribution  towards 
the  Naval  Defence  of  the  Empire,  and  on  a  scale 
commensurate  with  her  position  as  the  oldest 
and  greatest  of  the  self-governing  Dominions 
of  the  Crown.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said  that, 
after  standing  out  so  long,  Canada  has  now  gone 
much  further  than  any  other  Dominion,  for  she 
has  recognized  on  a  great  scale  the  principle  so 
urgently  maintained  by  Sir  John  Colomb,  in  all 
his  advocacy,  that  the  single  control  of  the  Navy 
is  essential  to  effective  defence,  and  that  the 

course  ignored  the  fact  that  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  showed  no 
desire  that  Canada  should  aid  the  Empire  in  an  emergency 
by  adding  strength  to  the  Royal  Navy  in  the  manner  most 
in  accord  with  the  dictates  of  the  threatening  naval  situation, 
but  sought  to  establish  a  few  ships  in  Canadian  waters  which 
would  only  go  to  war  at  the  command  of  the  Canadian 
Parliament. 

1  Cf.  suggestion  of  Imperial  Federation  League  special 
Committee  on  p.  207. 


192   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

only  really  effective  contributions  to  the  Empire's 
strength  in  war  must  be  to  an  Imperial  Navy 
whose  ships  can  be  moved  to  any  part  of  the 
world,  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the 
naval  situation. 

But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  fine 
contribution  of  Canada  is  in  the  nature  of  an 
emergency  contribution,  for  Mr.  Borden  always 
recognized  during  his  1912  visit,  and  in  the  course 
of  his  speech  proposing  the  vote,  that  anything 
in  the  nature  of  a  definite  and  permanent  obli- 
gation, undertaken  by  Canada  in  the  Naval  De- 
fence of  the  Empire,  should  be  accompanied 
by  adequate  representation  in  Imperial  councils. 

While  Mr.  Borden  recognized  to  the  full  the 
marked  gain  to  Canada  in  having  a  permanent 
representative  on  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  1  which  had  necessarily  to  consider  for- 
eign policy  and  foreign  relations,  he  distinctly 
referred  to  this  important  step  as  being  taken 
"  pending  a  final  solution  of  the  question  of  voice 
and  influence,"  when,  of  course,  Canada  and  the 
other  Dominions  would  be  able  to  exercise  their 
legitimate  share  of  control  of  foreign  policy  cor- 
responding to  their  assumption  of  responsibility. 

1  This  step,  as  will  be  seen  from  a  perusal  of  other 
chapters,  was  advocated  for  many  years  by  Sir  John  Colomb. 
See  pp.  14,  36,  61,  207. 


IMPERIAL  CO-OPERATION,  1902-4912  193 

It  comes  about,  therefore,  that  in  the  prob- 
lem of  permanent  defensive  co-operation  between 
the  home  and  oversea  communities,  the  words 
written  by  Sir  John  Colomb  in  the  introduction 
to  his  work  The  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Bri- 
tain in  18791  are  as  true  to-day  as  when  they  were 
penned,  viz.,  "  the  whole  problem  of  defence 
resolves  itself  in  practice  into  one  of  cost,  cost 
in  its  vturn  resolves  itself  into  one  of  taxes,  and, 
as  taxes  cannot  be  separated  from  representa- 
tion, we  are  at  once  brought  face  to  face  with 
the  naked  fact  that  Imperial  Representation 
lies  at  the  root  of  the  problem  of  Imperial  De- 
fence." 

The  next  chapter,  therefore,  will  be  devoted 
to  the  discussion  of  the  progress  and  possible 
developments  of  the  Imperial  Constitution  which 
must  inevitably  prove  so  vital  to  the  future  of 
Imperial  defensive  organization. 

1  See  p.  80  of  The  Defence  of  Great  and  Greater  Britain. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION— PAST 
PROGRESS  AND  FUTURE  DEVELOP- 
MENT 


CHAPTER  V 

IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION  -  -  PAST 
PROGRESS  AND  FUTURE  DEVELOP- 
MENT 

"  The  constitutional  aspects  so  govern  the  whole  situation 
that  no  really  adequate  or  complete  system  of  co-operative  action, 
on  a  sufficiently  wide  basis,  can  be  devised,  pending  solution  of 
the  difficulties  they  present." — SIR  JOHN  CoLOMB.1 

Imperial  Representation  the  Crux  of  the  Question. — Absence 
of  suggestions  from  Home  Statesmen. — Admiralty  and 
Cash  Contributions. — Political  Difficulty. — Control  of 
Separate  Fleets. — Imperial  Disintegration  or  Partner- 
ship.— Constitutional  Voice  in  Foreign  Policy  necessary. 
— Dominions  and  Foreign  Affairs— Sir  John  Colomb's 
views. — Offer  of  Representation  essential. — Proposals  of 
Imperial  Federation  League. — Representation  on  Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence — Views  of  Lord  Esher, 
Colonel  Seely,  and  Mr.  Borden. — Mr.  Chamberlain  and 
Federal  Council. — Development  of  Imperial  Conference 
as  a  Representative  Assembly. — Sir  Frederick  Pollock's 
proposals. — The  Lyttelton  Despatch — Reception  by 
Dominions — Mr.  Deakin  at  1907  Conference  ;  Proposals 
for  Imperial  Secretariat — Opposition  by  Lord  Elgin. — 
Mr.  Harcourt  at  1911  Conference,  proposal  for  Standing 

1  Extract  from  Memorandum  which  Sir  John  Colomb 
was  preparing  at  the  time  of  his  death  for  submission  to  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence. 

197 


198   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Committee. — Bifurcation  of  Colonial  Office. — Sir  Joseph 
Ward's  proposal  for  Imperial  Council. — Mr.  Asquith  on 
sharing  of  Authority  in  Foreign  Policy — Mr.  Borden's 
views  thereon — Mother  of  Parliaments  not  truly  Im- 
perial— Lord  Milner  on  Representation  in  House  of 
Commons — Constitutional  importance  of  Imperial  Con- 
ference.— More  frequent  Meetings  necessary. — Reasons 
for  inadequate  results  at  Conferences. — Methods  of  over- 
coming Difficulties — Imperial  Commissions — Parliamen- 
tary Committees — Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs — An 
Imperial  Board  of  Admiralty  and  National  Navy  Boards. 
— Opinion  of  Sir  John  Colomb. — No  Decentralization  of 
Control — Lord  Milner  thereon. — Sir  John  Colomb  on 
Real  Partnership  offering  the  only  Solution. — Summing 
up  of  Proposals. — The  Next  Step. 


IT  will  have  been  seen  from  such  events  as  have 
already  been  recorded  that,  when  principles  of 
defence  have  been  recognized  by  the  home 
authorities  and  put  forward  for  acceptance  at  the 
later  Conferences,  the  main  difficulty  in  arriving 
at  an  organized  system  of  Imperial  Defence  has 
been  the  absence  of  any  adequate  method  of 
Imperial  Representation. 

Suggestions  involving  the  self-governing  States 
in  permanent  expenditure  for  Imperial  objects 
have  always  been  regarded  by  them  as  encroaching 
upon  their  autonomy,  for  no  definite  scheme  by 
which  representatives  from  oversea  could  give 
expression  to  their  views  in  Imperial  councils 
has  ever  been  put  before  the  sister-nations  by  the 
home  Government,  which,  up  to  the  present, 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION          199 

has  been  exclusively  responsible  for  the  conduct 
of  Imperial  affairs. 

Opportunities  of  promise  have  occurred,  but 
the  statesmen  of  the  United  Kingdom  have  in 
most  cases  confined  their  official  utterances  to 
vague  generalities,  while  in  others  they  have 
assisted  in  throwing  cold  water  upon  suggestions 
from  oversea.  The  consideration  of  events  will 
illustrate  the  truth  of  this  assertion ;  and  it  is 
almost  inconceivable  that  if  politicians  at  home 
are  really  alive  to  the  greatness  of  the  issues  in- 
volved, they  will  continue  much  longer  to  ignore 
the  vital  problem,  beside  which  the  bickerings  of 
party  politicians  and  the  issues  of  party  strife 
sink  into  appropriate  insignificance. 

That  the  problem  of  Representation  lies  at  the 
root  of  any  organized  system  of  Imperial  Defence 
was  realized  long  ago  by  such  clear  thinkers  as 
Sir  John  Colomb,  and  though  the  constitutional 
side  of  the  closer  union  movement  did  not  occupy 
so  great  a  share  of  his  attention  as  that  of  defence, 
yet  he  never  failed  to  emphasize  the  impossibility 
of  arriving  at  any  satisfactory  solution  without 
recognizing  the  oversea  claim  to  a  real  partner- 
ship in  Imperial  concerns.  The  last  Conferences 
have  seen  a  deliberate  shirking  of  the  issues  by 
the  politicians  at  home,  and  the  Admiralty  have 
been  left  to  try  and  construct  schemes  of  strategic 


200   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

excellence  which  have  ignored  the  most  elementary 
and  fundamental  political  facts.  It  was  scarcely 
surprising  that  distinguished  naval  administra- 
tors, anxious  for  the  greatest  professional  effi- 
ciency, should  omit  to  place  political  aspirations 
in  the  forefront  of  their  schemes,  and,  not  being 
politicians,  their  imagination  did  not  take  them 
beyond  suggestions  that  the  Oversea  States  should 
provide  either  cash  contributions  to  the  support 
of  the  Imperial  Navy,  controlled  by  the  United 
Kingdom,  or  ships  which  should  be  placed  under 
the  control  of  the  Admiralty  in  time  of  war. 

While  the  oversea  self-governing  States  were 
in  reality  "  Colonies,"  and  had  not  fully  developed 
a  national  consciousness,  the  simplest  method  of 
assistance  was  undoubtedly  "  cash  contributions  " 
to  the  Navy,  for  the  amounts  contributed  were 
too  small  to  raise  the  matter  of  representation  in 
a  practical  way ;  but  with  the  growth  of  the 
Dominions  into  great  communities,  with  interests 
in  all  parts  of  the  world,  it  was  inevitable  that 
they  should  demand  a  recognition  of  equality 
of  political  status  by  the  United  Kingdom  directly 
they  were  prepared  to  assume  a  substantial  share 
of  the  Imperial  burden,  and  the  basis  of  this  is 
undoubtedly  joint  control  both  of  the  Imperial 
Forces  which  all  would  provide,  and  of  Imperial 
Policy  in  which  all  would  be  equally  interested. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         201 

The  attitude  of  the  statesmen  guiding  the 
destinies  of  Canada  and  Australia  has  been  suffi- 
ciently indicated  in  the  last  chapter,  and  it  is 
merely  necessary  to  say  here  that  the  tendency 
manifested  in  the  direction  of  not  only  establishing 
separate  Fleets  but  of  keeping  such  control  over 
them  as  possibly  to  withhold  them  from  action 
when  the  Empire  is  at  war,  may,  in  course  of  time, 
be  followed  by  other  Dominions,  and  will  inevitably 
make  for  Imperial  disintegration  unless  adequate 
measures  are  taken  to  provide  for  an  effective 
Imperial  partnership.  Though  earnest  efforts 
were  undoubtedly  made  before  the  1911  Confer- 
ence to  arrive  at  a  working  scheme,  by  means  of 
which  the  Navies  of  the  Dominions  and  the  United 
Kingdom  could  co-operate  to  the  fullest  extent, 
yet  the  fact  must  be  fairly  faced  that  there  is  no 
policy  more  calculated  to  emphasize  any  diver- 
gence of  interests  than  that  which  contemplates 
the  possibility  of  one  part  of  the  Empire  remaining 
at  peace  while  the  rest  of  the  Empire  is  at  war. 
In  short,  the  single  control  of  the  Navy  in  time 
of  war  is  the  bed-rock  of  Imperial  unity,  and  the 
life-long  struggle  of  Sir  John  Colomb  would,  in- 
deed, have  been  waged  in  vain  if  the  recognition 
of  this  great  principle  were  abandoned  now. 

But,  at  the  same  time,  it  must  also  be  recog- 
nized, and  to  an  extent  even  greater  than  during 


202   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

the  life-time  of  Sir  John  Colomb,  that  the  great 
Oversea  States,  with  their  ever- widening  spheres 
of  international  activity,  must  either  be  system- 
atically consulted  upon  matters  concerning  the 
disposition  of  the  Imperial  Forces,  and  also  upon 
the  policy  which  may  lead  to  war,  or  they  will 
be  forced,  in  their  own  interests,  to  maintain  a 
complete  control  over  such  forces  as  they  pro- 
vide, and  develop  their  individual  relationships 
with  foreign  Powers.  It  has  become  increasingly 
apparent,  even  if  the  discussions  at  each  Imperial 
Conference  are  alone  considered,  that  the  illogical 
position  in  which  the  oversea  nations  are  placed 
through  having  no  recognized  constitutional  voice 
in  regulating  the  Foreign  Policy  of  the  Empire, 
cannot  continue  indefinitely ;  and  though  many 
amateur  schemes  for  obviating  the  injustice  of  ex- 
cluding some  thirteen  millions  of  our  fellow-subjects 
from  the  Imperial  Franchise  have,  from  time  to 
time,  been  put  forward,  no  British  statesman 
of  the  front  rank  has  yet  thought  fit  to  propose 
any  matured  solution  of  this  difficult  problem, 
even  for  discussion,  at  an  Imperial  Conference. 

In  the  hope,  therefore,  that  some  consideration 
of  the  most  authoritative  schemes  hitherto  put 
forward  for  giving  the  Dominions  a  voice  in  Foreign 
Policy  may  assist  in  developing  suggestions  upon 
a  really  constructive  basis,  it  is  proposed  to 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         203 

examine  shortly  the  progress  of  thought  in  regard 
to  the  question  which  past  chapters  have  shown 
to  be  fundamental.  Before  doing  so,  however, 
it  would  be  well  to  recall  how  closely  the  Oversea 
States  have  been  associated  from  time  to  time 
with  foreign  countries  in  the  guidance  of  events 
which  have  had  an  important  bearing  upon  their 
destinies  as  nations. 

The  influence  exercised  by  the  Dominions 
upon  the  foreign  relations  of  the  Empire  was 
always  regarded  by  Sir  John  Colomb  as  a 
factor  of  great  importance  in  the  situation,  and 
the  growth  of  commercial  and  other  interests  in 
this  connexion  was  considered  by  him  as  likely 
to  prove  embarrassing  to  closer  union  unless  the 
great  States  of  the  Empire  were  associated  in  a 
constitutional  way  with  the  United  Kingdom  in 
regulating  policy  in  addition  to  sharing  responsi- 
bility. Dealing  with  this  aspect  of  the  position 
he  wrote  in  1902  :  *  "  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that 
these  great  British  commercial  communities  have 
claimed  and  obtained  a  voice  in  the  framing  of 
British  commercial  treaties  with  foreign  nations. 
For  example,  Colonial  pressure  on  the  Mother- 
Country  compelled  her  c  to  denounce  '  her  treaties 
with  the  Empire  of  Germany  and  the  Kingdom 

1  British  Dangers,  "  The  Warnings  of  Peace,"  p.  36. 


204  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

of  Belgium.  Nor  do  such  claims  now  stop  at 
commercial  treaties.  They  have  already  pushed 
home  with  effect  in  wider  fields  of  international 
affairs."  In  illustration,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
point  to  such  matters  as  the  New  Hebrides  ques- 
tion as  affecting  our  relations  with  France ;  the 
Australian  Immigration  Restriction  Bill  as  affect- 
ing Japan ;  the  Costa  Rica  Packet  case,  which 
occasioned  serious  differences  between  the  Govern- 
ments of  Holland  and  New  South  Wales ;  the 
Newfoundland  Fishery  question  as  creating  a 
difficult  situation  with  France ;  the  Behring  Sea 
and  seal  dispute,  and  the  Alaskan  Boundary 
question  which  brought  Canada  and  the  United 
States  into  contact.  All  these  and  similar  matters, 
as  Sir  John  Colomb  pointed  out,  "  tell  the  same 
tale  of  ever-advancing  Colonial  insistence  to  share 
hi  shaping  British  Foreign  Policy." 

It  would,  indeed,  be  easy  to  multiply  instances 
of  the  growing  influence  of  the  Oversea  Dominions 
in  foreign  affairs,  which  would  show  how  obviously 
possible  it  is  for  the  United  Kingdom  to  be  drawn 
into  a  war  in  which  she  is  not  directly  concerned 
in  order  to  defend  some  interest  of  an  Oversea 
State.  That  the  circumstances  were  striking, 
even  so  far  back  as  1892,  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  the  then  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord  Rosebery, 
declared  in  a  speech  in  March  of  that  year  that 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         205 

"  Our  Foreign  Policy  has  become  a  Colonial 
Policy,  and  is  in  reality  more  dictated  from  the 
extremities  of  the  Empire  than  from  London 
itself." 

While  it  is  true,  therefore,  that  the  influence 
of  the  Dominions  in  the  foreign  affairs  of  the 
Empire  is  often  most  potent,  and,  on  occa- 
sion, has,  it  must  be  admitted,  proved  incon- 
venient owing  to  the  absence  of  corresponding 
responsibility,  yet  the  omission  to  provide  a  con- 
stitutional means  for  making  the  voices  of  the 
Dominions  heard  in  the  councils  which  determine 
policy  is  a  source  of  legitimate  grievance  to  over- 
sea statesmen,  and  has  afforded  a  powerful  argu- 
ment for  those  in  the  Dominions  who  wish  to 
avoid  taking  a  share  in  a  scheme  of  Empire  De- 
fence. Ideas  on  the  subject  have,  therefore, 
circulated  in  a  kind  of  vicious  circle.  Some  have 
said  that  there  can  be  no  proper  share  in  defence 
until  control  of  foreign  affairs  is  given,  others 
that  there  can  be  no  control  of  foreign  affairs 
till  a  proportionate  share  is  taken  in  providing 
for  the  Empire's  defence,  and  this,  indeed,  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  central  authority  can  rely  upon 
certain  forces  being  in  readiness  to  enforce  the 
will  of  the  Empire  in  war.  There  can,  however, 
be  no  real  doubt  that  "  the  cost  of  naval  defence 
and  the  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  foreign 


206  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

affairs  hang  together,"  l  and  events  have  now 
reached  a  stage  in  which  an  offer  of  Representation 
is  essential,  in  order  to  ensure  that  any  further 
substantial  progress  shall  be  made  towards  an 
organized  system  of  Imperial  Co-operation  upon 
a  permanent  footing. 

It  was  in  November  of  1892  that  the  first 
serious  and  considered  effort  to  solve  the  problem 
of  Imperial  Representation  was  made  public  by  a 
special  Committee  of  the  Imperial  Federation 
League,  which  was  in  fact  an  expert  Committee 
with  exceptional  qualifications  for  dealing  with 
such  a  matter.2  The  Committee,  appointed  by 
the  League  in  1891,  sat  for  a  year  and  collected 
a  great  amount  of  valuable  material,  including  the 
written  views  of  practically  every  person  whose 
opinion  was  worth  having,  and  the  Report  marked 
a  distinct  step  forward. 

In  order  to  secure  more  complete  co-operation 
in  defending  the  common  interests  of  the  Empire, 
the  Committee  considered  that  means  should  be 
adopted  for  more  intimate  consultation  between 
the  great  outlying  British  possessions  and  the 
Imperial  Cabinet,  and  to  that  end  it  was  proposed 

1  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  at  Colonial  Conference 
of  1907,  p.  5. 

*  The  names  of  the  Members  of  this  Committee,  of  which 
Sir  John  Colomb  was  one,  are  given  on  page  115,  note  *. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         207 

that  representatives  in  London  of  the  Dominions 
of  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South 
Africa  should  be  available  for  consultation  with 
the  Cabinet  when  matters  of  Foreign  Policy  affect- 
ing the  Colonies  were  under  consideration.  The 
Committee  submitted  that  a  Council  of  Defence 
of  the  Empire  should  be  constituted,  which  should 
consist  of  representatives  of  the  United  Kingdom 
in  the  persons  of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Secre- 
taries for  Foreign  Affairs,  War,  Colonies,  and 
India  (the  two  last-named  also  representing  the 
interests  of  India  and  the  Crown  Colonies),  the 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  and  the  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer,  and  of  the  representatives  of 
the  three  groups  of  self-governing  Colonies  in 
North  America,  Australasia,  and  South  Africa. 
It  was  considered  that  the  Council  might  deal 
with  Imperial  Defence  somewhat  on  the  lines  of 
the  Naval  and  Military  Council  contemplated 
by  the  Hartington  Commission,1  and  that  it  should 
receive  such  information  relating  to  matters  of 

1  See  p.  30.  It  will  have  been  seen  that  a  Council  of  the 
above  nature  proposed  by  the  Hartington  Commission  is  now 
in  existence  as  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  and  that 
while  representatives  of  the  self-governing  States  have  already 
sat  from  time  to  time  as  members  of  the  Committee,  there 
is  now  a  strong  probability  that  not  only  Canada  but  all  the 
self-governing  Dominions  will  appoint  permanent  represent- 
atives to  sit  on  the  Committee, 


208   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Foreign  Policy  as  would  enable  it  to  deal  ade- 
quately with  questions  of  Defence.  It  was  recom- 
mended that  the  Council  should  supervise  the 
appropriation  of  any  moneys  provided  for  the 
Defence  of  the  Empire  by  the  common  contribu- 
tion of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Colonies, 
and  regarding  the  methods  of  raising  such  contri- 
butions it  was  agreed  that  this  would  probably  be 
left  at  the  outset  to  the  choice  of  the  individual 
self-governing  States.  A  suggestion  was  thrown 
out  that  future  developments  might  disclose  a 
means  of  raising  contributions  upon  a  uniform 
basis  throughout  the  Empire  by  the  allocation  of 
special  sources  of  revenue  or  otherwise.  In  any 
case,  however,  it  was  laid  down  that  the  several 
amounts  should  be  fixed  in  the  first  instance  for 
a  term  of  years  by  a  Conference,  but  subject  to 
periodical  revisions. 

It  will  have  been  seen  that  the  proposed  Coun- 
cil bore  a  considerable  resemblance  to  the  present 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,1  though  the  latter, 
with  its  expert  members,  may  be  said,  perhaps, 
to  be  more  in  the  nature  of  a  professional  body 
to  advise  and  educate  the  Executive  Government 
on  the  relative  functions  and  needs  of  the  two 
Services.  Still,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
Dominions  have  been  brought  into  intimate  rela- 
1  Aa  to  the  constitution  of  this  Committee  see  pp.  58  and  81. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         209 

tions  with  the  Committee,  and  their  representa- 
tives have  actually  sat  upon  it  as  members  with 
every  likelihood  of  doing  so  regularly  in  the  future; l 
and,  undoubtedly,  when  special  sittings  have 
been  held  to  enable  representatives  of  the  Do- 
minions to  consult  on  defence  matters  (as,  for 
example,  during  the  1911  Conference,  and  again 
when  Mr.  Borden  was  in  England  in  1912),  full 
and  confidential  information  regarding  foreign 
affairs  has  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Com- 
mittee and  the  oversea  members  sitting  upon  it. 
Nevertheless,  though  Lord  Esher  (an  active  mem- 
ber of  the  Committee)  apparently  believes 2  that 
complete  confidence  and  free  communication  be- 
tween the  British  and  Dominion  Prime  Ministers 
on  matters  of  Foreign  Policy,  combined  with  con- 
stant representation  of  the  Dominions  upon  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  would  meet  the 
immediate  needs  of  the  future,  it  would  seem 
difficult  to  accept  the  proposition  that  even  fre- 
quent meetings  of  the  Defence  Committee,  and 

1  The  formal  offer  of  more  continuous  representation  of 
the  Dominions  upon  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  was 
conveyed  to  the  Oversea  Governments  by  the  Colonial  Secre- 
tary (Mr.  Lewis  Harcourt)  in  a  despatch  dated  December  10, 
1912. 

2  The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  its  Functions  and 
Potentialities,  by  Viscount  Esher  (London :    John  Murray). 


210   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

fairly  constant  exchange  of  information  by  means 
of  despatches  between  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
Empire,  can  really  fulfil  the  needs  of  the  situation 
in  an  effective  manner  for  any  length  of  time. 
The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  itself  can, 
of  course,  scarcely  be  expected  to  exercise  more 
than  an  indirect  influence  upon  Foreign  Policy, 
and  its  functions  as  an  expert  advisory  body 
would  be  somewhat  interfered  with  if  an  attempt 
to  develop  it  as  an  institution  mainly  fulfilling 
representative  functions  were  to  succeed.  For 
this  reason,  essential  as  the  presence  of  Dominion 
representatives  has  been,  and  must  be,  upon  the 
Committee,  it  can,  in  its  present  form,  hardly  be 
said  to  fill  the  place  of  the  Constitutional  machine 
necessary  for  the  adequate  representation  of  the 
Oversea  States  in  the  councils  of  the  Empire. 
The  Committee,  no  doubt,  as  a  factor  in  the  scheme 
of  Imperial  evolution,  occupies  a  prominent,  and 
at  the  moment  even  a  foremost  place,  but  this  is 
in  the  direction  rather  of  co-ordination  of  effort 
than  of  the  gratification  of  political  aspirations. 
It  is  true,  however,  that  certain  far-sighted 
politicians  have  observed  in  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence  a  means  of  meeting  the  situation  ; 
and,  undoubtedly,  one  of  the  most  important  pro- 
posals made  with  regard  to  the  development  of 
this  Committee  was  that  put  forward  by  the  pre- 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         211 

sent  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  before  he  took 
office  in  the  present  Liberal  Administration.  On 
August  2,  1906,  Col.  (then  Major)  Seely  initiated 
a  discussion  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  in  the 
course  of  his  remarks  argued  that  it  was  impossible 
to  have  a  proper  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence 
unless  it  included  upon  it  not  only  representa- 
tives of  the  Colonies  and  India,  but  also  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  great  political  parties  in  this 
country.  Colonel  Seely  subsequently  developed 
his  ideas  on  the  subject 1  before  a  private  meeting 
of  the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee, 
when  he  expressed  the  view  that  the  Colonies 
resented  the  changes  of  opinion  which  followed  the 
change  of  party,  and  for  this  reason  he  wished 
to  see  a  non-party  President  of  the  Committee  in 
the  person  of  a  Member  of  the  Royal  Family,  and 
on  the  Committee  an  equal  proportion  of  members 
of  both  political  parties,  so  that  it  would  include 
the  present  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  and  the 
ex-First  Lord,  the  present  Secretary  for  War 
and  the  ex-Secretary,  and  so  on.  Further,  Col- 
onel Seely  wished  the  self-governing  Dominions 

1  The  Report  of  the  discussion  at  this  private  dinner 
of  the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  held  on 
November  19,  1906,  was  subsequently  printed  by  the  Com- 
mittee. On  this  occasion,  Major  Seely  opened  the  discussion, 
with  Sir  John  Colomb  in  the  Chair. 


212   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  send  representatives  to  reside  permanently 
in  this  country  in  order  to  serve  regularly  on  the 
Committee,  though  the  Committee  would  remain 
advisory  and  its  recommendations  would  not  be 
enforceable  until  approved  by  the  respective  Par- 
liaments. He  thought  in  this  way  to  overcome 
to  some  extent  the  difficulty  of  "  taxation  without 
representation." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Mr.  R.  L.  Borden, 
when  still  Leader  of  the  Opposition  in  the  Canadian 
House  of  Commons,  and  shortly  before  assuming 
Office  as  Prime  Minister,  took  a  similar  view  to 
the  above,  as  regards  the  non-party  character 
of  the  representation,  in  a  speech  delivered  on  June 
12,  1910.  Mr.  Borden  then  expressed  the  hope 
that  a  Defence  Committee,  or  an  Imperial  Confer- 
ence having  special  jurisdiction  over  defence 
matters,  composed  of  men  from  both  parties  in 
Great  Britain  itself  as  well  as  in  the  self-governing 
nations  of  the  Empire,  would  have  some  control 
over  the  organization  of  Imperial  Defence ;  and, 
as  an  outcome  of  such  a  Committee  or  Conference, 
he  would  expect  that  in  future  the  United  King- 
dom would  engage  in  no  great  war  without  know- 
ing beforehand  that  she  had  the  support  and 
sympathy  of  every  one  of  the  self-governing  na- 
tions of  the  Empire.  This  would  give  to  these 
Dominions  a  voice  in  the  control  of  war,  because 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION        213 

he  thoroughly  agreed  that  if  they  were  to  take 
part  in  the  permanent  defence  of  this  great 
Empire,  they  must  have  some  control  and  some 
voice  in  such  matters. 

A  difficulty  that  might  seem  apparent  in  re- 
gard to  Colonel  Seely's  proposal  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  representatives  of  the  Dominions  to 
permanently  reside  in  London  is  that  they  would 
soon  get  out  of  touch  with  opinion  in  the  State 
they  were  representing ;  and,  further  than  this, 
it  is  fairly  certain  that  no  Dominion  would  entrust 
a  person  with  any  real  or  plenipotentiary  powers 
unless  he  were  a  Prime  Minister,  or  at  least  a 
Cabinet  Minister  directly  responsible  to  Parlia- 
ment. This  difficulty  can,  and  probably  will, 
be  surmounted  by  each  Dominion  agreeing  to 
appoint  a  Minister  for  External  Affairs1  whose 
presence  in  London  could,  if  necessary,  alternate 
with  that  of  the  Prime  Minister  or  Minister  for 
Defence,  so  that  such  a  Minister  could  be  serving 
on  the  Committee  while  his  Parliament  was  in 
session  and  have  his  place  in  London  taken  by 
the  Defence  Minister,  or  Prime  Minister,  when 
either  could  get  away  to  relieve  him.  In  this 

1  Such  a  Minister  exists  in  Australia,  and  the  creation  of 
one  for  New  Zealand  has  been  advocated  for  his  Dominion 
by  Mr.  A.  M.  Myers,  the  ex-Minister  of  Defence  for  New 
Zealand. 


214   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

way  both  a  responsible  Minister,  and  one,  more- 
over, in  touch  with  oversea  opinion,  could  always 
be  available  for  consultation,  which,  in  the  case 
of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  is  a  more  real 
difficulty  than  in  the  less  remote  countries  of 
Canada  and  South  Africa.  Indeed,  in  the  case 
of  Canada,  it  has  already  been  seen  l  that  Mr. 
Borden,  speaking  as  Prime  Minister  on  December 
5,  1912,  agreed  to  the  presence  of  a  Canadian 
Minister  in  London  who  should  be  summoned  to 
attend  all  meetings  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  and  be  regarded  as  one  of  its  permanent 
members,  upon  the  understanding  that  no  im- 
portant step  in  Foreign  Policy  should  be  under- 
taken without  consultation  with  the  representa- 
tive of  Canada. 

While  the  policy  of  more  intimate  connexion 
between  the  Defence  Committee  and  the  Do- 
minions undoubtedly  marks  a  considerable  ad- 
vance, and  will  tend  to  promote  uniformity  both 
of  preparation  and  action  in  defence  matters, 
yet  it  can  only  be  accepted  by  oversea  statesmen 
as  "  pending  a  final  solution  "*  of  the  question  of 
full  Representation,  for  even  information  system- 
atically given  to  oversea  statesmen  at  the 
meetings  of  the  Defence  Committee  upon  the  chief 
features  of  Foreign  Policy  cannot  wholly  meet 

1  See  p.  102.  *  See  p.  102. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         215 

the  legitimate  demand  for  definite  constitutional 
Representation.  It  would  seem  that  the  national 
instinct  in  the  sister-countries,  sensitive  to  an 
encroachment  on  autonomy  or  to  a  difference  in 
political  status,  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any- 
thing short  of  a  direct  voice,  capable  of  influencing 
the  course  of  Imperial  policy,  in  any  system 
which  involved  a  binding  obligation  to  co-operate 
on  all  occasions  in  war. 

At  the  same  time  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  has  now  an  established  place  in  the  con- 
sultative machinery  of  the  Empire,  and  the  recent 
developments  are  the  outcome  of  the  resolution 
proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin  at  the  1907  Imperial 
Conference,  which  affirmed  that  the  Colonies  should 
be  authorized  to  refer  local  matters  to  the  Com- 
mittee where  expert  assistance  was  desirable,  and 
also  that  whenever  desired  a  representative  of 
the  Colony  wishing  for  advice  should  be  summoned 
to  attend  as  a  member  of  the  Committee.  More- 
over, when  the  members  of  the  1911  Imperial 
Conference  attended  a  meeting  of  the  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence,  they  agreed  upon  the  desir- 
ability of  oversea  Ministers  attending  meetings 
of  the  Committee,  and  accepted  the  principle  of 
establishing  local  Defence  Committees  in  each 
Dominion  to  work  in  touch  with  the  Committee 
in  London. 


216  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Proposals,  however,  from  home  statesmen 
for  more  intimate  connexion  with  the  Dominions 
hi  the  control  of  the  Navy  and  in  the  wider  sphere 
of  international  relations  have,  as  before  pointed 
out,  been  either  vague  or  entirely  absent.1  It  is 
true  that  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain  at  the  Confer- 
ence of  1897  said  it  had  sometimes  struck  him 
that  it  might  be  feasible  to  create  a  great  Council 
of  the  Empire  to  which  the  Colonies  would  send 
not  mere  delegates,  who  would  be  unable  to  speak 
without  reference  to  their  respective  Governments, 
but  representative  plenipotentiaries,  and  expressed 
his  belief  that  such  a  body  might  slowly  grow  to 
that  Federal  Council  "  to  which  we  must  always 
look  forward  as  our  ultimate  ideal."  Again,  at 
the  1902  Conference,  Mr.  Chamberlain  expressed 
the  willingness  of  the  Home  Government  to  give 
the  Oversea  States  a  corresponding  voice  in  the 
policy  of  the  Empire  directly  they  were  prepared 
to  take  a  proportionate  share  of  Imperial  burdens,1 
and  he  repeated  that  a  Council  of  the  Empire 

1  Perhaps  some  qualification  is  necessary  to  this  state- 
ment in  view  of  Mr.  Lyttelton's  Despatch  of  April  20,  1905. 
As  will  be  seen,  however,  on  reference  to  pages  224  and  229  the 
proposals  contained  in  the  despatch  were  dropped  at  the 
1907  Conference  through  the  opposition  of  Lord  Elgin  and 
Sir  Wilfred  Laurier. 

•  See  also  p.  133. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         217 

might  be  created  which  would  be  in  the  first  in- 
stance advisory;  but  he  added  that  the  object 
would  not  be  completely  secured  until  there  had 
been  conferred  upon  such  a  Council  executive 
functions,  and  perhaps  also  legislative  powers. 
However,  these  suggestions  were  only  tentatively 
advanced,  and  in  any  case  the  time  had  not  then 
come  for  a  representative  Council.  Though  the 
existing  political  relations  were  considered  by 
the  oversea  representatives  at  the  1897  Confer- 
ence to  be  generally  satisfactory,1  the  attitude 
of  the  majority  of  the  representatives  being  that 
a  greater  share  in  the  direction  of  Imperial  policy 
would  involve  a  proportionate  contribution  in  aid 
of  Imperial  expenditure,  for  which  at  that  time 
the  Colonies  were  not  prepared,2  the  1902  Confer- 
ence took  a  step  in  advance  by  affirming  the 
desirability  of  holding  quadrennial  Conferences. 
In  the  latter  connexion  it  may  now  be  convenient 
to  consider  the  evolution  of  the  Imperial  Confer- 
ence itself  as  a  piece  of  constitutional  machinery 
of  a  representative  character. 

It  must  first  be  observed  that  the  1887  Confer- 
ence differed  from  its  successors  in  that  it  was 
much  larger,  and  those  attending  it  were  not 

1  Mr.  Seddon  and  Sir  E.  N.  C.  Braddon  dissented  from 
this  Resolution. 

2  See  Proceedings  of  1897  Conference  (C.  8596)  at  p.  15. 


218   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

necessarily  members  of  Home  and  Oversea  Govern- 
ments. Indeed,  at  the  opening  meeting,  there 
were  some  121  representatives  present,  including 
leading  public  men  of  various  political  opinions, 
and  representatives  of  Crown  Colonies.  At  the 
meetings  where  business  was  actually  transacted, 
however,  those  taking  part  were  mostly  repre- 
sentatives of  the  self-governing  Colonies  and  of 
the  British  State  Departments.  Although  it  may 
be  said  with  a  certain  amount  of  truth  that  the 
Conference  was  one  between  Governments,  as 
all  representatives  were  nominated  by  Govern- 
ments, yet  it  was  not  so  truly  "  between  Govern- 
ments "  as  the  Conference  of  1897,1  when  those 
assembled  together  were  not  only  all  Ministers 
of  responsible  Governments,  but  were  all  Prime 
Ministers  and  members  of  the  British  Privy  Coun- 
cil. In  a  constitutional  sense,  therefore,  this 
Conference  was  strictly  a  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council.  At  the  1902  Conference  the  represent- 
ation was  again  restricted  to  Governments,  but 
the  Prime  Ministers  were  attended  by  other 
Ministers  who,  however,  were  present  at  the  table 

1  As  already  observed  a  Conference  took  place  between 
1887  and  1897,  viz.,  in  1894,  at  Ottawa.  The  representatives 
there,  however,  were  really  delegates  with  precise  instructions 
from  their  Governments  to  deal  with  a  specific  matter,  i.e.  the 
Pacific  Cable. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         219 

only  when  the  subjects  in  which  they  were  con- 
cerned were  under  discussion.  At  all  these  meet- 
ings the  Colonial  Secretary  presided,  and  while 
he  still  occupied  the  chair  at  the  1907  Conference, 
the  Prime  Minister  (Sir  Henry  Campbell-Banner- 
man)  was  present  and  addressed  the  gathering, 
which,  on  this  occasion,  consisted  of  the  oversea 
Premiers  and  three  of  their  Ministers,  together 
with  certain  members  of  the  British  Cabinet  and 
their  Under-Secretaries.  An  official  welcome  by 
the  home  Premier  had  not  taken  place  since  1887, 
and  Sir  H.  Campbell-Bannerman  took  occasion 
to  emphasize  the  fact  that,  though  the  Secretary 
for  the  Colonies  presided,  the  Conference  was  one 
between  the  Imperial  Government  and  the  Pre- 
miers and  not  merely  between  the  Colonial  Secre- 
tary and  the  Premiers.  It  was  obvious,  however, 
that  the  oversea  Premiers,  and  notably  Mr. 
Deakin,  wished  it  made  clear  that  the  repre- 
sentatives met  upon  an  equality  of  political  status, 
the  only  difference  between  them  being  as  to 
"  seniority  and  scope,"  and  a  most  important 
step  in  this  direction  was  taken  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  British  Prime  Minister  as  ex-officio 
President  of  the  Conference. 

In  the  Resolution  providing  for  the  above  and 
also  for  the  calling  of  subsidiary  Conferences,  in 
order  to  deal  with  such  matters  as  could  not  be 


220  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

conveniently  postponed1  till  the  next  Session,  it 
is  important  to  note  that  the  word  "  Colonies  " 
as  a  designation  for  the  Oversea  States  was  aban- 
doned in  favour  of  "  His  Majesty's  Dominions 
beyond  the  Seas,"  though  this  was  certainly  not 
welcomed  by  the  Colonial  Secretary 2  (Lord  Elgin), 
who  was  very  much  in  the  hands  of  the  permanent 
officials  at  the  Colonial  Office,  as  will  be  seen 
again  hereafter. 

With  regard  to  the  attendance  of  other  Ministers, 
accompanying  the  Prime  Ministers,  it  was  agreed, 
as  an  understanding,  that  such  Ministers  should 
be  present  in  order  to  assist  the  Premiers,  and  that 
not  more  than  one  should  give  this  help  at  the 
same  meeting.  The  possible  attendance  of  one 
of  the  High  Commissioners  was  considered  and 
the  idea  negatived,  so  the  Conference  was  main- 
tained as  one  strictly  between  Governments. 

This  position  was  still  further  emphasized  at 
the  Conference  of  1911,  when  all  the  Prime 
Ministers  were  present  (Mr.  Botha  representing 
the  new  Union  Government  of  South  Africa  in- 
stead of  the  Transvaal  merely,  as  in  1907)  accom- 
panied by  their  Ministerial  colleagues ;  and  the 

1  The  Defence  Conference  of  1909  was  called  in  pursuance 
of  this  Resolution  (see  p.  165). 

*  See  speech  at  the  Corona  Club,  reported  in  The  Times 
of  June  20,  1907. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         221 

British  Prime  Minister  (Mr.  Asquith)  took  the 
Chair  for  the  first  time  as  President.  Also  for 
the  first  time  the  Conference  assumed  its  name 
(as  agreed  to  at  the  1907  Session)  of  "  Imperial 
Conference,"  instead  of  "  Colonial  Conference " 
as  on  previous  occasions. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  Conference  gradu- 
ally clothed  itself  with  a  definite  Constitution, 
and,  meeting  at  regular  intervals,  was  able  to  hold 
actual  Sessions,  when  its  members  conferred  on 
such  matters  of  mutual  interest  as  Defence,  Com- 
mercial Relations,  Shipping,  Imperial  Appeal 
Court,  Uniformity  of  Laws,  Trade  and  Postal 
Communications, Naturalization,  etc.,  etc.  Though 
still  purely  consultative  and  possessing  no  execu- 
tive power,  yet,  as  the  heads  of  each  responsible 
Government  are  members  of  the  Conference,  a 
unanimous  decision  of  the  body  has  in  effect  a 
binding  force  throughout  the  countries  of  the 
Empire. 

When  considering  the  possible  developments 
of  this  Conference  as  a  Representative  Assembly, 
it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  the  steps  that  have  been 
attempted  to  provide  it  with  greater  continuity 
of  purpose  by  bringing  into  existence  a  definite 
organization  to  work  permanently  between  the 
sittings.  At  the  beginning  of  1903,  Sir  Frederick 
Pollock,  as  a  member  of  the  Executive  of  the 


222   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee,  brought 
before  the  members  of  that  body  the  desirability 
of  working  out  some  constructive  plan  of  Imperial 
organization,  and,  after  consultation  with  Sir 
John  Colomb  (then  Chairman  of  the  Executive 
of  the  Committee)  it  was  decided  that  an  informal 
Committee  of  an  independent  character,  and  with- 
out even  a  name, was  more  suitable  for  the  "  tossing 
of  thoughts  "  in  this  connexion.  Sir  Frederick 
Pollock,  therefore,  got  a  number  of  politicians, 
officials,  and  thinkers  in  various  directions  to- 
gether for  private  discussions,  amongst  whom  Sir 
John  Colomb  and  Mr.  Spenser  Wilkinson  may 
be  said  to  have  represented  defence  interests, 
and  Lord  (then  Mr.)  Haldane,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
Lord  Milner,  Professor  Westlake,  and  others  the 
more  strictly  political  and  constitutional  side. 
Sir  Frederick  Pollock  collected  what  he  considered 
to  be  the  result  of  these  discussions  and  presented 
it  in  the  form  of  a  paper  read  to  the  Royal  Colonial 
Institute  in  April,  1905.  The  main  suggestion 
in  this  paper  was  for  the  constitution  of  an  Advis- 
ory Council  of  the  Empire  in  the  shape  of  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  Privy  Council — the  nucleus  of  the 
Committee  existing  in  the  Conference  of  Premiers 
which  met  in  1902.  It  was  suggested  that  the 
President  of  the  Committee  should  be  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  United  Kingdom,  that  ex-Ministers 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         223 

in  Opposition  should  be  sometimes  summoned  to 
attend,  and  that  the  Colonies  should  be  repre- 
sented by  their  Prime  Ministers  or  special  Minis- 
ters. In  order  to  give  the  Committee  a  continuous 
existence  between  its  meetings  every  four  or  five 
years,  an  Imperial  Secretariat  and  Intelligence 
Department  was  advocated  with  a  secretary, 
attached  to  the  Prime  Minister,  collecting  in- 
formation through  an  Imperial  Commission  whose 
members  would  represent  all  branches  of  know- 
ledge and  research  and  act  mostly  through  expert 
Committees  dealing  with  special  subjects.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  say  that  this  latter  proposal 
related  to  matters  of  a  civil  character,  as  the  work 
of  defence  in  this  connexion  was  already  done 
by  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  to  which 
oversea  Ministers  were  admitted  as  members. 

It  is  not  possible  to  say  exactly  how  much  of 
the  paper  represented  collective  opinion  or  the 
individual  view  of  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  but  it 
will  be  seen  that  it  revived  the  idea  of  an  Advisory 
Council  suggested  by  Mr.  Chamberlain.  There 
is  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  views  put  forward 
had  a  direct  influence  upon  the  Colonial  Secretary, 
Mr.  Alfred  Lyttelton  (who  had  succeeded  Mr. 
Joseph  Chamberlain),  and  on  April  20,  1905,  a 
despatch  was  sent  to  all  the  Governments  of  the 
self-governing  Dominions  which  set  forth  the 


224  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

suggestion  that,  as  the  Conference  had  assumed 
a  more  definite  shape  and  acquired  a  more  con- 
tinuous status,  the  words  "  Colonial  Conference  " 
as  the  title  should  be  abandoned,  and  that  future 
meetings  should  be  spoken  of  as  meetings  of  the 
"  Imperial  Council."  The  idea  of  the  Imperial 
Commission  with  an  office  in  London  and  an  ade- 
quate secretarial  staff  was  also  put  before  the 
Dominion  Governments. 

The  response  to  this  despatch  on  the  part  of 
Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier's  Cabinet  evidenced  a  profound 
suspicion  of  any  attempt  to  interfere  with  Colonial 
self-government,  and  there  is*no  doubt  at  all  that 
the  French-Canadian  Premier  was  influenced  in 
his  attitude  by  the  fear,  which  seemed  to  be  con- 
stantly before  him,  that  his  compatriots  and 
supporters  in  French  Canada  would  be  bitterly 
opposed  to  any  measure  tending  towards  the 
establishment  of  a  Federal  Cabinet  of  the  Empire, 
ultimately,  perhaps,  possessing  executive  power. 
The  word  "  Council "  combined  with  the  word 
"  Imperial "  seemed  to  suggest  to  Canadian 
Ministers  that  an  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  alter 
the  Conference  from  an  "  unconventional  gather- 
ing for  informal  discussion  "  to  a  "  permanent 
institution  "  which,  "  endowed  with  a  continuous 
life,"  might  encroach  upon  the  autonomous  legisla- 
tive and  administrative  power  enjoyed  by  the 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         225 

self-governing  Colonies ;  and  they  also  thought 
that  the  proposed  "  Commission  "  might  interfere 
with  responsible  government. 

The  Premier  of  Newfoundland  (Sir  Robert 
Bond)  considered  that  a  voice  in  the  policy  of 
the  Empire  meant  corresponding  responsibilities, 
and  it  was  "  practically  impossible  "  for  his  colony 
to  make  any  direct  contribution  towards  Imperial 
Defence  or  to  grant  a  trade  preference,  as  revenue 
was  required  for  "  public  benefit."  The  inability 
to  regard  defence  as  a  matter  of  public  benefit 
may  perhaps  seem  a  ^little  curious,  as  a  similar 
position  if  adopted  by  the  United  Kingdom  would, 
as  Sir  John  Colomb  so  often  pointed  out,  leave 
the  Empire  with  no  defence  at  all.  But  the 
acceptance  of  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the 
United  Kingdom  for  the  Defence  of  the  Empire 
from  general  attack  no  doubt  led  many  of  the 
Oversea  States  to  take  the  provision  of  their  de- 
fence by  the  home  country  as  a  matter  of  course, 
until  they  were  aroused  to  the  realities  of  the 
position  by  some  external  danger  like  the  rise  of 
German  naval  power,  which  showed  that  one 
country  could  not  for  all  time  bear  the  burden  of 
the  defence  of  the  whole  Empire. 

The  attitude  of  the  other  Oversea  Govern- 
ments towards  the  Lyttelton  despatch  was  gener- 
ally favourable,  and,  though  the  matter  could 


A 


«*  r"  '  '-v.    * 
..& 


226  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

not  be  carried  further  by  Mr.  Lyttelton  before 
the  next  Conference,  owing,  firstly,  to  the  oppo- 
sition of  Canada,  and  secondly  to  the  resignation 
of  the  Balfour  Administration  in  1905,  Mr.  Deakin, 
on  behalf  of  Australia,  gave  notice  of  a  Resolution 
for  the  1907  Conference  which  clearly  reflected 
the  influence  of  the  Pollock  Committee  l  and  the 
proposals  of  the  Unionist  Colonial  Secretary. 
This  Resolution  affirmed  the  desirability  of  estab- 
lishing "  an  Imperial  Council,  consisting  of  repre- 
sentatives of  Great  Britain  and  the  self-governing 
Colonies,  chosen  ex-officio  from  their  existing 
administrations."  It  was  further  set  out  in  the 
Resolution  that  such  a  Council  should  establish 
a  system  by  which  its  members  should  be  kept 
informed  between  the  Conferences  as  to  matters 
which  had  been  or  might  be  subjects  for  discussion, 


1  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  went  on  with  his  efforts  to  work 
out  a  scheme  for  giving  greater  "  continuity  "  to  the  Con- 
ference, and  though  the  Advisory  Council  idea  was  practically 
dropped,  a  Memorandum  embodying  the  ideas  of  Sir  Frederick 
and  his  co-workers  was  issued  in  March  of  1907  and  signed 
by  Sir  John  Colomb,  Lord  Milner,  Sir  G.  S.  Clarke,  Mr.  W.  P. 
Beeves  and  others.  This  Memorandum  suggested  the 
permanent  representation  of  the  Colonial  Government 
London  with  a  Secretariat  and  a  permanent  secretary  and 
efficient  staff.  An  Intelligence  Department  with  a  perma- 
nent Royal  Commission  as  an  adjunct  was  also  advocated. 
See  page  223, 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         227 

and  that  a  permanent  secretarial  staff  should  be 
charged  with  the  duty  of  obtaining  information 
for  the  use  of  the  Council,  attending  to  the  execu- 
tion of  its  Resolutions  and  conducting  correspond- 
ence. The  expenses  of  the  staff  should  be  borne 
by  the  countries  represented  on  the  Council  in 
proportion  to  their  populations. 

When  the  Conference  of  1907  opened  under 
the  Chairmanship  of  Lord  Elgin  (the  new  Liberal 
Colonial  Secretary),  Mr.  Deakin  first  dealt  with 
the  proposal  to  change  the  name  of  the  Conference 
to  "  Imperial  Council,"  and  stated  that  the 
Australian  Government  was  prepared  to  mark 
its  appreciation  of  the  intention  of  Mr.  Lyttelton's 
despatch  by  adopting  the  title.  Upon  learning 
the  view  of  the  Canadian  members,  however,  Mr. 
Deakin  accepted  the  title  of  "  Imperial  Confer- 
ence," and  he  then  proceeded  to  argue  in  favour 
of  an  Imperial  Secretariat  which  should  provide 
a  means  of  consultation  for  the  various  members 
of  the  Conference  in  the  intervals  between  the 
meetings.  By  this  means  questions  likely  to  be 
dealt  with  might  be  examined  some  time  ahead, 
and  all  necessary  inquiries  made  and  views  ex- 
changed. Touching  the  use  of  such  a  Secretariat 
in  relation  to  foreign  affairs,  Mr.  Deakin  said  :  — 

;c  At  the  present  time  any  communication  on 
those  matters  is  indirect  of  necessity,  but  it  is 


228    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

also  impeded  by  other  considerations.  We  may 
appear  officious ;  we  may  appear  to  be  assuming 
without  sufficient  knowledge  that  some  com- 
munication of  ours  is  called  for.  We  desire  to 
be  in  a  position  to  be  able  to  make  such  necessary 
inquiries  in  regard  to  foreign  politics  as  may 
appear  to  us  to  be  urgent  and  important,  to  make 
them  direct,  to  obtain  a  reply,  and  if  that  reply 
appears  to  us  to  embody  any  principle,  to  com- 
municate through  such  a  Secretariat  with  the  self- 
governing  communities,  asking  that  they  be  placed 
in  possession  of  the  same  information  in  order 
that  they  may  consider  whether,  in  the  interests 
of  their  own  people,  they  too  should  not  communi- 
cate direct  with  the  Government  of  this  country 
in  whom  the  whole  control  of  foreign  affairs  and 
defence  rests." 

Mr.  Deakin  wished  to  see  the  Secretariat 
directly  under  the  control  of  the  Imperial  Confer- 
ence, and  suggested  that  it  was  desirable  that  the 
Colonial  Office  should  be,  in  the  future,  what  it 
was  at  its  commencement,  simply  the  Office  for 
the  Crown  Colonies.  The  communications  from 
the  self-governing  Colonies  would  thus  go  through 
another  channel  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  the 
United  Kingdom  direct.  This  idea  was  opposed 
by  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  who  considered  the  Colonial 
Office  was  the  proper  Department  to  deal  with 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         229 

the  self-governing  Colonies  or  the  Crown  Colonies, 
but  Dr.  Jameson  supported  and  elaborated  the 
proposal,  stating  that  his  idea  of  the  Secretariat 
was  that  each  of  the  Colonies  should  appoint  its 
representatives  upon  it,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
England  also  being  represented. 

This  attempt  to  recognize  the  equality  of 
political  status  of  the  countries  of  the  Empire, 
and  to  provide  the  Conference  with  efficient 
machinery,  received  its  quietus  from  Lord  Elgin, 
who,  having  no  doubt  been  shown  by  the  officials 
of  the  Colonial  Office  that  the  existence  of  the 
Office  was  threatened  by  the  proposal,  adopted 
the  curious  position  of  a  champion  of  the  rights 
of  Colonial  self-government.  He  argued  that  a 
body  interposing  in  any  way  between  Ministers 
and  the  Parliaments  to  which  they  were  respons- 
ible might  almost  endanger  the  liberties  which 
ought  to  be  inviolate,  and  he  obtained  the  help 
of  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  by  announcing 
the  Prime  Minister's  refusal  to  the  suggestion 
that  the  Secretariat  should  be  under  his  control 
as  President  of  the  Conference. 

So  the  effort  to  establish  a  system  which  would 
place  the  Oversea  Dominions  in  contact  with  the 
Home  Government  through  a  really  Imperial 
Office,  instead  of  through  a  Department  con- 
trolled by  the  United  Kingdom,  was  defeated, 


230   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

and  instead  the  Colonial  Office  undertook  to  form 
a  Secretariat  themselves.  In  the  terms  of  the 
Resolution  as  finally  adopted  the  permanent 
secretarial  staff  was  charged  "  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  " 
with  the  duty  of  obtaining  information  for  the 
use  of  the  Conference,  and  of  attending  to  its 
Resolutions,  etc.  No  doubt  the  Secretariat,  so 
far  as  it  has  any  really  separate  existence  at  all, 
as  part  of  the  Dominions  Department  of  the 
Colonial  Office,  has  since  performed  its  work  of 
corresponding  between  the  Governments,  and  of 
referring  matters  for  treatment  to  the  various 
Departments,  with  reasonable  efficiency;  but  it 
is  not  to  be  expected  that  a  branch  of  a  British 
State  Department,  not  representing,  or  even 
effectively  in  touch  with,  the  Oversea  States,  could 
initiate  or  guide  effort  in  the  real  sense  of  "  getting 
things  done "  between  the  Conferences.  The 
present  method  is  only  a  makeshift  to  please  the 
official  mind,  and  can  never  take  the  place  of  the 
Secretariat  proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin,  whose  offi- 
cials, appointed  and  paid  by  the  Governments 
concerned,  would  have  acted  in  practice  as  direct 
representatives  of  the  Prime  Ministers,  and  have 
been  responsible  to  the  Conference  as  a  whole 
instead  of  (under  the  adopted  scheme)  to  one 
country,  i.e.  the  United  Kingdom.  Mr.  Deakin 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION  231 

wished  both  for  equality  of  status  of  the  various 
countries,  and  for  equality  of  responsibility  in 
providing  the  Secretariat,  and  he  wanted  to  get 
rid  of  the  arrangement  which  put  the  great 
Dominions  virtually  in  a  position  of  dependence 
under  the  Colonial  Office,  whose  methods  of  ad- 
ministration in  connection  with  the  Crown  Colonies 
begot  an  attitude  of  mind  which  gave  those  in 
the  self-governing  States  "  a  general  sense  of  dis- 
cussing a  question  with  persons  who  have  already 
made  up  their  minds  upon  it  on  another  basis 
altogether."  l  However,  the  opposition  of  the 
Colonial  Office  and  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  were  suffi- 
cient to  defeat  Mr.  Deakin's  proposal,  the  adop- 
tion of  which  would  have  proved  undoubtedly  an 
important  step  in  the  evolution  towards  an 
Imperial  partnership. 

While  the  Conference  re-affirmed  the  Resolu- 
tion of  the  1902  Conference  in  favour  of  holding 
quadrennial  Conferences,  it  also  approved  the 
principle  of  holding  subsidiary  Conferences,  al- 
though Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  at  first  opposed  this 
too. 

At  the  1911  Conference,  therefore,  the  newly 
appointed  Colonial  Secretary,  Mr.  Lewis  Har- 
court,  in  order  to  meet  what  was  believed  to  be 

1  See  Mr.  Deakin's  remarks  at  the  Conference  (p.  44  of 
Minutes  of  Proceedings,  Cd.  3523). 


232   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

a  desire  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  Dominions, 
put  forward  a  suggestion  for  an  Advisory  Standing 
Committee  of  the  Conference,  the  idea  being  that 
each  Oversea  Government  should  appoint  a  repre- 
sentative upon  this  Committee  which,  between 
the  Conferences,  would  thresh  out  questions  that 
the  Conference  itself  had  not  time  to  go  into.  In 
this  manner  it  was  thought  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  next  Conference,  and  generally  to  carry 
on  the  work  between  the  Conferences.  While 
receiving  the  support  of  Sir  Joseph  Ward  for  New 
Zealand,  and  Mr.  Fisher  for  Australia,  the  sugges- 
tion was  opposed  by  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  who 
apprehended  that  the  Committee  might  interfere 
between  the  Home  and  Oversea  Governments, 
and  also  by  General  Botha,  who  thought  it  might 
lead  up  to  that  Imperial  Council  to  which  he  very 
strongly  objected.  This  suggested  Standing  Com- 
mittee would  have  been  essentially  a  Colonial 
Office  concern,  with  one  of  its  officials  acting  as 
secretary,  and  it  would  have  carried  matters  very 
little  further  ;  but  owing  to  the  lack  of  unanimity 
at  the  Conference  concerning  it,  the  proposal 
dropped,  and  so  also  did  the  Resolution  of  South 
Africa  that  the  Secretariat  and  all  matters  relating 
to  the  self-governing  Colonies  should  be  placed 
directly  under  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  United 
1\  ingdom.  The  latter  suggestion,  in  fact,  was  with- 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         233 

drawn  as  the  British  Prime  Minister  stated  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  accede  to  it. 

The  Resolution  of  New  Zealand  involving 
suggestions  for  separating  the  Department  of  the 
Dominions  from  that  of  the  Crown  Colonies,  and 
the  change  of  the  title  of  the  Colonial  Secretary  to 
that  of  "  Secretary  of  State  for  Imperial  Affairs," 
was  met  by  the  Colonial  Secretary  pointing  out 
the  difficulties  of  "  bifurcation  "  of  the  Colonial 
Office,  and  that  the  division  of  the  Departments 
of  the  Office  below  the  permanent  Under- Secretary 
was  already  complete,  there  being  two  Assistant 
Under-Secretaries,  one  for  the  Dominions  and 
one  for  the  Crown  Colonies,  with  a  full  Department 
under  each.  In  the  discussion  Mr.  Fisher  pointed 
out  that  "  these  recognized  nations  "  undoubtedly 
would  feel  themselves  more  and  more,  as  time 
passed,  desirous  of  entering  into  the  spirit  of  the 
policy  that  governs  the  Empire,  and  he  threw 
out  the  suggestion  for  more  definite  consultation 
between  the  representatives  of  the  Dominions 
and  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

A  comprehensive  scheme,  however,  in  con- 
nexion with  the  representation  of  the  Dominions 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Empire  was  put  forward  at 
the  1911  Conference  by  Sir  Joseph  Ward,  who 
moved  a  Resolution  to  the  effect  that  the  Em- 
pire had  reached  a  stage  of  Imperial  develop- 


234  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

ment  which  rendered  it  expedient  that  there 
should  be  an  Imperial  Council  of  State,  upon 
which  representatives  from  all  parts  of  the 
Empire  should  act  in  an  advisory  capacity 
to  the  Imperial  Government  on  all  questions 
affecting  their  interests.  In  his  speech  supporting 
this  suggestion  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  Sir  Joseph 
confused  the  issue  by  constantly  referring  to  an 
Imperial  Parliament  of  Defence  instead  of  to  an 
Advisory  Council,  as  in  the  Resolution.  Thi> 
rendered  it  difficult  for  the  Conference  to  vote 
upon  the  Resolution  itself,  for  it  could  not  be  dis- 
sociated from  the  arguments  advanced  by  the 
New  Zealand  Premier  in  favour  of  something 
which  appeared  quite  different  from  the  original 
proposal.  However  this  may  be,  Sir  Joseph  Ward 
based  his  arguments  on  the  proposition  that  "  the 
day  for  partnership  in  true  Imperial  affairs  has 
arrived,  and  the  question  which  now  emerges  is 
upon  what  basis  is  that  partnership  to  rest  ?  It 
certainly  cannot  rest  upon  the  present  relation- 
ship." He  pointed  out  that  the  people  of  the 
self-governing  dependencies  were  not  yet  citizens 
of  the  Empire,  and  he  emphasized  the  need  of  some 
Imperial  Council  to  co-ordinate  and  harmonize 
the  policies  of  Naval  Defence  so  as  to  avoid  the 
possibility,  under  the  existing  system,  of  the 
Empire  being  at  war,  and  Canada,  for  example,  at 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         235 

peace.  He  thought  that  by  means  of  the  Imperial 
Council  the  separate  naval  policies  of  the  two 
greatest  Dominions  could  be  made  integral  with  the 
Imperial  Navy,  and  that  there  would  be  a  uniform 
system  of  contribution. 

Sir  Joseph  Ward  outlined  the  principles  of 
his  scheme  as  follows :  The  United  Kingdom, 
Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa,  New  Zealand 
and  Newfoundland  should  elect  an  Imperial  House 
of  Representatives  for  Naval  Defence  for  the  term 
of  five  years,  one  representative  being  elected 
for  each  200,000  of  their  respective  populations, 
i.e.  (approximately)  the  United  Kingdom  220, 
Canada  37,  Australia  25,  South  Africa  7,  New 
Zealand  6,  Newfoundland  2,  making  a  total  of 
about  300  Representatives.  From  these  the  re- 
spective countries  would  elect  two  representatives 
to  be  an  Imperial  Council  of  Defence,  this  Council 
thus  mustering  twelve.  The  new  body  should 
have  control  of  peace  and  war  treaties,  foreign 
relations  generally  and  Imperial  Defence  (Naval), 
and  the  provision  of  revenues  for  that  purpose. 
On  the  first  election  of  this  Parliament,  it  should 
have  no  powers  of  taxation,  and  the  amount  pay- 
able by  each  Oversea  Dominion,  as  its  proportion 
of  the  revenue,  should  be  deemed  to  be  a  debt  and 
paid  by  that  Dominion  to  the  Exchequer  of  the 
Imperial  Parliament  of  Defence.  At  the  expira- 


236  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

tion  of  ten  years  the  amount  would  be  raised  in 
such  manner  as  the  Dominions  agreed,  the  Im- 
perial Parliament  determining  the  sum  to  be  con- 
tributed (estimated  per  capita  of  population)  for 
the  purpose  of  Imperial  Defence  and  war,  pro- 
vided that  the  contribution  of  the  Oversea  Domin- 
ions should  not  exceed  50  per  cent,  of  the  amount 
furnished  by  the  United  Kingdom.  The  proposal 
presupposed  that  there  was  local  autonomy  for 
the  divisions  of  the  United  Kingdom,  or  "  Home 
Rule  All  Round."  Sir  Joseph  Ward  argued  that 
if  the  Oversea  Dominions  were  to  share  in  the 
responsibilities,  they  were  entitled,  as  a  matter  of 
right,  to  have  some  say,  even  though  they  should 
be  in  a  minority,  upon  a  properly  constituted  body 
deciding  questions  of  peace  or  war. 

While  the  reasons  given  for  the  proposals  by 
Sir  Joseph  Ward  were  undoubtedly  sound,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  proposals  themselves 
had  scarcely  been  sufficiently  thought  out  or  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  many  similar  schemes  put 
forward  from  time  to  time.  It  was,  therefore, 
almost  inevitable  that  Sir  Joseph  should  get  no 
support  from  his  colleagues,  and  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier 
had  an  easier  task  than  usual  in  demolishing  an- 
other attempt  at  closer  union,  for  he  was  able  to 
show  that  the  proposal  was  not  an  Advisory  Coun- 
cil but  a  legislative  body,  and  one,  moreover, 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         237 

with -power  to  create  expenditure  but  no  power  to 
create  revenue.  Mr.  Fisher,  however,  suggested 
the  idea  of  an  Advisory  Council  associated  with 
the  Imperial  Government,  in  close  touch  at  all 
times,  so  that  communications  might  be  made  to 
representatives  on  the  spot  directly  responsible 
to  the  Governments  of  the  Dominions. 

Mr.  Asquith  in  his  reply  called  attention  to  the 
memorial  recently  presented  to  him,  and  signed 
by  about  300  Members  of  Parliament,  stating  the 
view  that  the  time  had  arrived  for  associating  the 
Oversea  Dominions  in  a  more  practical  manner 
with  the  conduct  of  Imperial  affairs  by  means  of 
an  established  representative  Council  of  an  advis- 
ory character. 

The  President  of  the  Conference  went  on  to 
say  that  the  effect  of  Sir  Joseph  Ward's  proposals 
would  be  to  impair,  if  not  altogether  to  destroy, 
the  authority  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
Kingdom  in  such  grave  matters  as  the  conduct  of 
foreign  policy,  the  conclusion  of  treaties,  and  the 
maintenance  of  peace  or  the  declaration  of  war. 
"  That  authority,"  declared  Mr.  Asquith,  "  cannot 
be  shared,"  and  he  added  that  the  co-existence  side 
by  side  with  the  Cabinet  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  this  proposed  body  would,  in  his  judgment, 
be  fatal  to  the  system  of  responsible  government. 

Having  been  discussed,   the  Resolution  was 


238   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

withdrawn  ;  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
declaration  of  the  British  Premier  that  authority 
in  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  could  not  be  shared 
went  much  further  than  the  necessities  of  the  case 
demanded,  and,  if  maintained  in  the  future  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  Kingdom,  such  a  posi- 
tion would  obviously  render  any  scheme  of  co- 
operation with  the  Oversea  States  impossible  of 
accomplishment.  Indeed,  this  was  made  clear 
by  Mr.  R.  L.  Borden  when  introducing  his  Bill  for 
increasing  the  Naval  Forces  of  the  Empire  on 
December  5,  1912,  for  he  specifically  referred  to 
the  matter  in  these  grave  words :  "It  has  been 
declared  in  the  past,  and  even  during  recent  years, 
that  the  responsibility  for  Foreign  Policy  could 
not  be  shared  by  Great  Britain  with  the  Dominions. 
In  my  humble  opinion  adherence  to  such  a  position 
could  have  but  one,  and  that  a  most  disastrous, 
result." 

The  Canadian  Premier  also  observed  that 
during  his  recent  visit  to  England  he  had  on  many 
public  occasions  propounded  the  principle  that 
the  great  Dominions,  sharing  in  the  Defence  of 
the  Empire  upon  the  high  seas,  must  necessarily 
be  entitled  to  share  also  in  the  responsibility  for 
and  in  the  control  of  Foreign  Policy.  "  It  is  satis- 
factory to  know  to-day,"  he  added,  "  that  not  only 
His  Majesty's  Ministers,  but  also  the  leaders  of 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         239 

the  opposite  political  party  in  Great  Britain,  have 
explicitly  accepted  this  principle,  and  have  affirmed 
their  conviction  that  the  means  by  which  it  can 
be  constitutionally  accomplished  must  be  sought, 
discovered  and  utilized  without  delay." 

The  total  inadequacy  of  the  present  so-called 
Imperial  Parliament  as  a  representative  Parlia- 
ment of  the  Empire  was  referred  to  by  Mr.  Borden 
during  his  1912  visit.  Speaking  at  a  dinner  of 
the  Empire  Parliamentary  Association  within  the 
walls  of  the  House  of  Commons  itself  the  eminent 
Canadian  statesman  said  :— 

"  At  one  time  this  Mother  of  Parliaments  was 
in  truth  and  in  fact  an  Imperial  Parliament  in  the 
highest  sense.  If  I  understand  correctly  the 
conditions  of  to-day,  that  status  has  ceased  to 
exist.  A  Parliament  elected  upon  issues  chiefly, 
if  not  altogether,  local  and  domestic,  a  Parliament 
which  expends  so  large  a  portion  of  its  time  and 
energy  in  discussing  and  determining  questions 
of  purely  domestic  concern,  can  hardly  be  regarded 
as  an  Imperial  Parliament  in  the  highest  or  truest 


sense." 


The  difficulty  of  providing  any  means  of  ade- 

quate representation  of  the  Dominions  in  a  body 

having  effective  control  of  Imperial  affairs  has 

induced  some  to  argue  in  favour  of  making  the 

i  See  The  Times  of  July  17,  1912, 


240  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

present  House  of  Commons  truly  Imperial  by 
giving  the  Dominions  representation  within  it; 
and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  foremost  states- 
man of  to-day,  and  one,  moreover,  who  in  matters 
concerning  the  Empire  possesses  probably  the 
widest  knowledge  and  clearest  insight,  Lord 
Milner,  was  at  one  time  in  favour  of  this  method. 
In  writing  to  Sir  John  Colomb,  then  Chairman  of 
the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee, 
during  his  last  voyage  to  the  Cape  before  the  out- 
break of  the  war  in  South  Africa,  and  in  reply  to 
a  suggestion  of  Sir  John's  relating  to  the  contri- 
bution of  Cape  Colony  to  the  British  Navy,  Lord 
(then  Sir  Alfred)  Milner  wrote  :— 

"ON  BOARD  THE  Briton, 

NEARING  MADEIRA, 

January  31,  1899. 

"  DEAR  SIR  JOHN  COLOMB, — My  last  ten  days 
in  London  were  so  hurried  that  I  had  no  time 
to  answer  your  interesting  letter  of  18th. 

"  With  regard  to  the  particular  suggestion  made 
in  it,  viz.,  that  the  speech  from  the  throne  at  the 
opening  of  the  Cape  Parliament  should  always 
contain  an  appeal  to  vote  money  for  Imperial 
Defence,  I  think  it  is  open  to  the  objection  that 
such  money  fortunately  will  not  require  to  be 
annually  voted.  The  £35,000  a  year  is  secured 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         241 

by  Act  and  will,  with  only  a  few  other  items,  be  an 
annual  charge  on  the  Revenues  of  the  Colony  in 
permanence  and  not  dependent  on  a  vote  of  the 
House. 

"  But,  while  I  make  this  remark  on  your  par- 
ticular suggestion,  I  am  cordially  and  enthusias- 
tically in  accord  with  the  spirit  which  prompted 
it,  and  with  the  objects  of  your  Committee.  I 
regard  the  step  taken  by  the  Cape  Parliament  as 
the  most  important  we  have  yet  seen  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Imperial  Federation.  The  sum  is  small  (I 
hope  to  live  to  see  it  increased),  but  the  example, 
especially  when  set  by  a  Colony  which  is  for  the 
moment  suffering  from  a  falling  Revenue  and 
severe  financial  depression,  is  invaluable  and  you 
cannot  make  too  much  of  it. 

"  What  I  am  particularly  anxious  to  see  is  a 
movement  at  home  to  invite  the  Colonies,  who  are 
ready  to  take  a  share  in  the  defence  of  the  Empire, 
to  send  representatives  to  the  body  which  controls 
the  spending  of  that  money.  If  the  offer  of  the 
money  comes  from  them,  the  offer  of  the  power 
should  come  from  us.  I  know  all  the  objections 
to  Colonial  representatives  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, but,  until  you  get  a  really  effective  Imperial 
Council,  which  is  still  a  long  way  off,  I  think  it  is 
far  better  to  have  Colonists  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons than  not  to  have  them  at  all.  Of  course, 


242  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

while  you  have  only  one  Colony  contributing  to 
the  general  Imperial  Fund,  and  only  contributing 
I/ 2000th  part  of  it  (I  take  Imperial  expenses, 
Army,  Navy,  etc.,  at  roughly  60  millions),  it  is 
not  possible  to  start  Colonial  representation,  even 
in  its  small  beginnings  (and  it  is  much  better  and 
avoids  many  difficulties  that  the  beginnings  should 
be  small),  but  it  is  not  too  soon  to  ventilate  the 
idea.  It  seems  to  me  that  if  there  were  only  five 
Members  of  the  House  of  Commons  freely  elected 
by  the  people  of  those  Colonies,  who  took  a  share 
in  supporting  the  defence  of  the  Empire  (say  one 
Member  for  every  £50,000  of  contribution,  which 
would  be  Liberal),  we  should  have  introduced  a 
principle  of  great  moment  which,  in  time,  would 
transform  the  present  half-local  and  half-Imperial 
British  Parliament  into  a  true  Imperial  Assembly 
supreme  as  regards  Defence  and  Foreign  Policy, 
and  gradually  delegating  its  local  duties,  either  to 
Committees  of  local  Members,  or  to  new  subordin- 
ate bodies,  a  harmless  form  of  Home  Rule. 

"  What  I  feel  is  that  it  is  no  use  us  having 
Colonists  to  come  to  any  representative  body  not 
having  real  power.  However  small  their  share  of 
power  at  first  (it  must  begin  small),  the  quality  of 
it  should  not  be  inferior,  i.e.,  they  should  have  a 
voice  in  the  making  and  unmaking  of  that  central 
government  which  has  the  destinies  of  the  Empire 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         243 

in  its  hands,  which  is  the  British  Ministry.  And 
that  Ministry  is,  in  effect,  chosen  by  the  House  of 
Commons. 

"  Please  give  this  your  consideration.  We  shall 
have  a  hard  battle  to  fight  to  get  over  the  objec- 
tions (very  superficial  as  most  of  them  are),  but 
if  we  could  win  this  trick  I  believe  the  game  would 

be  ours. 

Yours  very  truly, 

A.  MILNER." 

The  difficulty,  however,  of  Colonial  repre- 
sentation in  the  House  of  Commons  is  that  the 
Home  Legislature  deals  not  only  with  Imperial 
matters  of  Defence  and  Foreign  Policy,  etc.,  but 
also  with  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  United  King- 
dom, and  by  granting  the  Dominions  representa- 
tion in  the  House  of  Commons,  as  at  present  con- 
stituted, a  voice  would  be  given  them  in  the  local 
legislation  affecting  the  Mother-Country  which, 
of  course,  would  be  denied  to  and  not  indeed  sought 
by  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  domestic  concerns 
of  the  Oversea  States.  A  measure  of  devolution  or 
"  Home  Rule  All  Round,"  by  which  local  Parlia- 
ments would  be  established  for  England,  Scotland, 
Ireland  and  Wales,  with  a  central  Parliament  to 
deal  with  the  affairs  of  the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  Empire  as  a  whole,  would  no  doubt  go  far  to 


244   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

surmount  the  main  difficulty,  but  many  thorny 
questions  have  to  be  solved  before  this  change  can 
come  about,  or  be  even  attempted  with  any 
reasonable  prospect  of  success.  Meantime,  it  be- 
hoves all  thinkers  earnestly  to  consider  in  what  way 
the  Dominions  can  be  more  closely  associated 
with  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  conduct  of 
Imperial  affairs. 

Now  it  first  appears  necessary  to  avoid  at- 
tempts at  introducing  any  very  radical  changes, 
and  to  recognize  the  gradual  evolution  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  institutions  at  least  to  the  extent  of  utiliz- 
ing, as  far  as  possible,  such  of  the  existing  forms 
of  constitutional  machinery  as  may  admit  of  easy 
adaptation  and  growth.  Apart  from  the  very 
important  and  immediately  attainable  practice  of 
receiving  permanent  oversea  representatives  as 
members  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 
it  will  have  been  seen  from  past  observations  that 
the  Imperial  Conference  has  now  reached  a  position 
of  definite  importance  as  the  highest  deliberative 
assembly  of  the  Empire.  It  is  not  merely  the  only 
official  gathering  of  the  heads  of  the  Executive 
Governments  of  the  self-governing  nations,  but  it 
meets  in  definite  Sessions.  The  principle  of  its 
continuous  existence  has,  moreover,  been  recog- 
nized by  the  establishment  of  the  Secretariat  to 
collect  information  and  conduct  correspondence 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         245 

between  the  Conferences  to  which  attention  has 
already  been  called,  and  however  inadequate  to 
the  importance  of  the  task  the  present  Secretariat 
may  be,  its  establishment  is  a  recognition  of  the 
permanent  nature  of  the  Imperial  Conference. 

The  question,  therefore,  arises  as  to  how  far 
the  system  and  machinery  of  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference must  enter  into  any  scheme  designed  to 
give  the  Dominions  a  greater  share  in  the  control 
of  Imperial  affairs. 

From  the  references  to  past  discussions  at  the 
Conferences,  it  has  been  seen  that  the  matters 
dealt  with  have  been  of  a  varied  description  ;  but 
as  the  Sessions  have  always  been  very  limited  in 
duration,  the  treatment  of  subjects  has  necessarily 
been  of  a  somewhat  academic  and  discursive 
character.  The  main  remedy  for  this  is  that  the 
Conference  should  meet  more  often,  and  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  Premier  of  the  most  re- 
mote of  the  oversea  nations,  Mr.  Andrew  Fisher, 
laid  great  stress,  more  than  once,  at  the  1911  Con- 
ference upon  the  desirability  of  the  Conference 
meeting  more  frequently  than  once  in  four  years, 
and  he  himself  suggested  biennial  Conferences. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  with  the 
rapid  increase  of  transport  facilities,  an  annual 
Session  could  be  arranged,  and  if  sufficient  time 
were  given  to  the  deliberations,  and  some  attempt 


246   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

made  to  overcome  the  difficulties  connected  with 
its  obvious  hesitation  to  commit  itself  to  anything 
very  definite,  real  progress  in  the  evolution  of  an 
Imperial  Constitution  might  be  recorded. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  Conference  has 
been  hampered  in  its  action  by  two  facts:  (1) 
that  being  unable  to  decide  on  matters  of  import- 
ance without  unanimous  agreement,  the  different 
political  considerations  prevailing  in  each  State 
have  influenced  the  Premiers  against  taking  deci- 
sive action  for  fear  of  subsequent  political  and 
Parliamentary  criticism,  and  (2)  that  the  Con- 
ference has  met  without  the  subjects  for  considera- 
tion being  thoroughly  prepared  and  threshed  out 
beforehand  in  readiness  for  deliberation. 

The  second  difficulty  might  be  to  a  large  extent 
met  by  the  appointment  of  Imperial  Commissions 
(working  in  conjunction  with  an  efficient  Intelli- 
gence Office),  the  members  of  which  would  be 
largely  composed  of  experts  in  particular  lines, 
and  would  be  called  upon  to  present  reports  on 
various  expert  subjects  for  the  consideration  of  the 
Conference. 

This  was  a  matter  to  which  Sir  John  Colomb 
attached,  during  his  later  years,  considerable  im- 
portance. In  the  Memorandum  which  he  was 
preparing  at  the  time  of  his  death,  from  which  a 
quotation  is  made  at  the  head  of  this  chapter, 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         247 

Sir  John  wrote  :  "  It  would,  in  my  belief,  promote 
real  progress  towards  co-operation  were  an  Im- 
perial Commission  appointed,  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives nominated  by  the  several  Governments, 
to  take  evidence  in  the  Colonies  (self-governing) 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  from  responsible  autho- 
rities and  departments  concerned,  and  to  inquire 
and  report  generally  on  the  question  of  co-operat- 
ive action  both  in  its  main  constitutional  features 
as  well  as  in  its  broad  technical  aspects.  Any 
Conference  with  such  a  Report  before  it  would  have 
something  definite  to  discuss  and  consider,  each 
member  beforehand  having  had,  in  consultation 
with  his  Government,  time  to  mature  his  views. 
...  I  venture  to  make  the  suggestion  of  an  Im- 
perial Commission  because  my  observation  has 
led  me  to  think  that  individual  and  independent 
consultation  between  the  Oversea  States  and  the 
Admiralty  and  the  Colonial  Office,  and  even  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  without  any  guid- 
ing principles  of  general  application  being  laid 
down,  does  not  tend  to  effective  organization  and 
co-ordination  of  efforts." 

But  while  expert  Commissions  are  essential 
in  certain  aspects  of  the  work,  it  is  fairly  certain 
that  the  timidity  of  the  Conference  and  its  reluc- 
tance to  embark  on  any  decisive  action  would 
only  be  overcome  by  the  consideration  of  its  sub- 


248   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

jects  beforehand  by  a  body  closely  associated 
with,  if  not  actually  answerable  to,  Parliament. 
No  intelligent  observer  at  all  acquainted  with  the 
oversea  countries  and  their  public  men  can  fail 
to  grasp  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  underlying 
fear  of  oversea  statesmen  who  meet  at  the  London 
Conferences  is  that  any  action  they  take,  or  lan- 
guage they  use,  may  be  attacked  in  Parliament  on 
their  return  as  a  surrender  of  autonomous  rights. 
Some  method  of  associating  the  oversea  Parlia- 
ments with  the  Conference,  though  only  in  an 
indirect  and  informal  way,  seems  therefore  to  be 
indicated,  and  the  following  suggestion  is  put 
forward  entirely  on  the  present  writer's  individual 
responsibility. 

It  is,  of  course,  well  known  that  a  large  portion 
of  the  work  of  the  Parliaments  both  at  home  and 
oversea  is  carried  on  by  means  of  Committees, 
and  many  matters  of  public  importance  are  re- 
ferred to  Parliamentary  Committees  for  inquiry 
and  report.  The  Executive  Department  presided 
over  by  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  often  finds  these 
Committees  more  useful  than  Royal  Commissions, 
and  sometimes  acts  upon  their  Reports  without 
necessarily  any  formal  discussion  of  them  by  Par- 
liament as  a  whole  taking  place.  The  precise 
form  is  not  essential,  but  the  analogy  might  surely 
be  used  in  dealing  with  Empire  affairs,  for  certain 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         249 

subjects  that  required  consideration  and  delibera- 
tion between  the  Conferences  (e.g.,  the  unification 
of  laws  in  various  directions)  might  well  be  re- 
ferred for  report  by  the  Executive  Governments 
to  Parliamentary  Committees  in  each  Parliament 
of  the  Empire.  The  Committees  would,  of  course, 
work  in  touch  with  each  other  by  correspondence, 
but  in  the  year  of  each  Conference,  and  several 
months  before  its  actual  meeting,  a  delegation  from 
each  Parliamentary  Committee  might  meet  in 
London  for  the  joint  consideration  with  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  Lords  and  Commons  of  the  subjects 
dealt  with  by  the  various  Committees.1 

By  this  means  matters  affecting  Dominions  in 
different  ways  might  be  harmonized  and  a  useful 
Report  prepared.  Such  a  Report  in  its  final  form 
might  then  go  before  the  Executive  Governments 
for  consideration  at  the  Conference,  and  though 
in  no  sense  possessing  any  binding  force,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  a  joint  Report  by  strong  non-party 
Committees,  who  are  acquainted  with  political 
difficulties  in  the  various  countries,  and  who  might 
occasionally  be  assisted  by  a  few  co-opted  ex- 
perts if  they  thought  necessary,  would  go  far 


1  Cf.  Paper  by  Mr.  L.  S.  Amery,  M.P.,  read  before  the 
Royal  Colonial  Institute  on  June  14,  1910,  entitled  "  Some 
•Steps  towards  aii  Imperial  Constitution." 


250   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  encourage  the  Executive  Governments  to  take 
more  deliberate  action  in  the  joint  interests  of  the 
Empire  as  a  whole. 

While  the  [Parliamentary  delegates  would  have 
no  official  relationship  to  the  Imperial  Conference, 
it  might  perhaps  be  thought  advisable,  in  connex- 
ion with  certain  matters  that  came  up  for  delibera- 
tion, to  invite  the  Leader  of  the  Opposition  in  each 
Parliament  to  attend  a  sitting  of  the  Conference  so 
that  the  unanimous  consent  of  Parliament  might 
be  rendered  more  certain.  For  this  reason  it  is  sug- 
gested that  the  Leader  of  the  Opposition,  or  Deputy 
Leader,  should  always  be  amongst  those  forming 
the  Parliamentary  delegations,  and,  of  course,  the 
Leader  of  the  Opposition  in  the  home  Parliament 
should  be  correspondingly  invited  to  serve  on  the 
Committee  of  the  Lords  and  Commons.  It  might 
perhaps  be  objected  that  great  difficulties  would 
occur,  on  account  of  distance,  in  bringing  Members 
of  so  many  Parliaments  to  the  centre  of  the  Empire 
at  the  same  moment,  and  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  a  time  suitable  to  all  Parliaments.  But  it 
should  be  remembered  that  a  representation  of  all 
the  oversea  Parliaments  at  the  heart  of  the  Em- 
pire has  already  taken  place,  for  at  the  Coronation 
of  King  George  V.  in  1911,  each  of  the  Parliaments 
of  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa 
and  Newfoundland  appointed  delegates  to  repre- 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         251 

sent  them,1  and  on  that  occasion  joint  Conferences 
were  held  with  Members  of  the  home  Parliament. 
Though  the  above  proposal  might  materially 
assist  action  at  the  Imperial  Conferences,  it  would 
not  afford  representation  to  the  Oversea  States  in 
Imperial  councils,  however  Llikely  or  unlikely  it 
would  be  that  a  regular  meeting  of  Parliamentary 
representatives  would  slowly  grow  to  be  recog- 
nized as  a  deliberative  Assembly  in  itself,  and  one 
not  unworthy  of  a  place  in  the  machinery  of  Em- 
pire. But  representation,  so  far  as  Foreign  Policy 
is  concerned,  could  be,  to  a  far  greater  extent  than 
at  present  exists,  provided  by  annual  sessions  of  the 

1  The  Representatives  of  the  oversea  Parliaments  were 
the  Guests  of  "  The  Lords  and  Commons  Committee  (1911)" 
as  representing  the  home  Parliament.  The  Parliaments 
of  the  Dominions  were  invited  to  send  Delegates  to  represent 
them  in  the  following  proportions,  i.e.  Canada,  18,  Australia 
18,  South  Africa  14,  New  Zealand  8,  and  Newfoundland  2. 
It  was  at  this  historic  gathering  that  the  Empire  Parlia- 
mentary Association  was  formed  for  the  purpose  of  facili- 
tating the  exchange  of  visits  and  information  between 
the  Members  of  the  Empire's  Parliaments  by  a  system  of 
Introductions,  Hospitality,  Parliamentary  Privileges,  Travel 
Facilities,  Exchange  of  Information,  etc.,  etc.  The  Lord 
Chancellor  and  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  are 
joint-Presidents  of  the  United  Kingdom  Branch  of  the  Associa- 
tion, while  the  Speakers  of  the  Upper  and  Lower  Houses  are 
joint-Presidents  of  Branches  in  each  oversea  Parliament 
except  that  of  Canada,  where  the  Prime  Minister  and  Leader 
of  the  Opposition  are  Presidents.  (See  Parliaments  of  the 
Empire  by  the  present  author.) 


252   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Imperial  Conference,  and  a  definite  linking  up  of 
the  oversea  and  home  Governments  between  the 
meetings  of  the  Conferences  by  the  institution 
of  an  Imperial  Office  with  an  efficient  Secretariat 
and  properly  organized  Intelligence  Department. 
The  Imperial  Office  and  Secretariat,  etc.,  would  be 
directly  under  the  control  of  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference, as  suggested  by  Mr.  Deakin  in  1907,1  and 
wholly  dissociated  from  the  Colonial  Office,  which 
would  be  left  to  deal  with  the  Crown  Colonies 
and  Dependencies.  The  United  Kingdom  repre- 
sentative to  negotiate  with  the  Oversea  States 
through  the  Imperial  Office  would  be  a  new  Cabinet 
Minister,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Imperial 
Affairs,  unless  the  Prime  Minister  could  under- 
take the  duties  himself. 

Though  a  close  connexion  between  the  Foreign 
Secretary  and  the  representatives  of  the  Domin- 
ions in  the  Imperial  Office  would  no  doubt  be  main- 
tained between  the  Conferences,  no  effective  sys- 
tem could  be  ensured  without  the  constant  presence 
in  London  of  a  member  of  every  oversea  Cabinet. 
In  the  event  of  a  Minister  for  External  Affairs 
being  appointed  by  each  Dominion  to  represent 
lu's  country  on  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence 
(with  a  system  of  "  reliefs  "  for  Australian  and 
New  Zealand  Ministers  as  already  suggested),  it 

1  See  p.  228. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         253 

would,  without  doubt,  be  found  necessary  to  insti- 
tute a  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  which  the 
representatives  of  the  oversea  Cabinets  would  be 
members.  All  important  questions  of  Foreign 
Policy  would  be  discussed  by  such  a  Committee, 
and  no  step  of  a  far-reaching  character  would  be 
taken  without  its  approval ;  and  though  it  is  true 
that  while  the  main  cost  of  defence  is  provided 
by  the  United  Kingdom  the  British  Foreign 
Secretary  would  be  able  to  exercise  authoritative 
influence  in  cases  of  emergency  or  difference  of 
opinion,  there  is  110  doubt  whatever  that  it  would 
be  practically  impossible  for  the  home  Cabinet  to 
enter  on  a  war  without  the  unanimous  approval  of 
the  Committee,  while  each  member  of  it  would 
exercise  a  constant  influence  upon  the  course  of 
Foreign  Policy.  The  same  Minister  of  External 
Affairs  would  also  sit  upon  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence,  but  it  is  suggested  that  the 
two  Committees,  while  closely  associated,  should 
be  distinct  bodies  and  presided  over  by  different 
British  Ministers.1 

1  The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  at  present  often 
varies  its  Chairman,  the  Secretary  for  War  presiding  one 
day,  for  example,  the  Premier  another,  and  so  on  ;  but  the 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  would  have  as  its  permanent 
Chairman  the  British  Foreign  Secretary.  Possibly  it  appears 
at  first  sight  that  the  most  convenient  course  to  adopt  in 


254   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

With  regard  to  the  control  of  oversea  forces, 
representation  upon  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  would  go  far  to  co-ordinate  efforts,  but 
something  further  than  this  is  required  if  the 
policy  of  establishing  Fleet  Units  is  to  be  continued 
by  the  Oversea  States.  The  old  idea  that  the 
creation  of  a  common  authority  would  lead  to  a 
common  system  of  defence  has  now  to  be  amended 
by  a  recognition  that  the  separate  defence  forces 
already  created  can  only  be  combined  and  co- 
ordinated for  the  purpose  of  war  by  the  institu- 
tion of  a  common  authority  to  enable  co-operation 
to  be  effected.  The  solution  probably  lies  in 
making  the  Board  of  Admiralty  itself  more  Im- 
perial in  the  sense  of  having  members  upon  it 
nominated  by  the  Oversea  States,  and  in  establish- 
ing national  Navy  Boards  in  each  Dominion  to 
act  in  full  co-operation  with  it.  The  Admiralty 
would  in  that  case  control  the  sea-going  Fleets, 
and  their  technical  direction  in  peace  and  war, 
while  the  Navy  Boards  would  provide  men  and 

establishing  a  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  would  be  to  start 
it  as  a  sub-Committee  of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence. 
On  account,  however,  of  the  importance  of  its  functions  and 
the  necessity  of  providing  it  with  an  appropriate  status  from 
the  commencement,  it  would  be  important  for  the  Committee 
of  Foreign  Affairs  to  be  a  distinct  body  with  its  own  separate 
staff. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         255 

material,  and  be  responsible  for  victualling,  cloth- 
ing, coal,  stores,  ammunition,  dockyards,  main- 
tenance and  repairs. 

So  far  as  the  writer  is  aware,  this  idea  was  first 
developed  in  any  detail  by  Lieut.  L.  H.  Hordern, 
R.N.,  in  a  paper  upon  "  The  Naval  Defence  of  Aus- 
tralia," *  and  Sir  John  Colomb  himself  supported 
the  view  put  forward.  Writing  to  Lieut.  Hordern 
on  May  7,  1909,  shortly  before  his  fatal  illness 
overtook  him,  Sir  John  said  :  "I  have  been  read- 
ing again  and  considering  your  paper  read  at  the 
Imperial  Federation  League  meeting  in  Australia. 
I  am  still  more  impressed  by  it,  and  think  your 
proposal  is  the  best  one  extant.  By  and  by  I 
intend  privately  to  press  Asquith  and  Haldane  to 
study  and  consider  all  you  say.  It  seems  a  possi- 
ble key  to  the  solution  of  the  complex  and  difficult 
problem." 

While  decentralization  of  control  of  the  Navy 
is  obviously  impossible  in  any  effective  scheme  of 


1  Read  before  the  Imperial  Federation  League  of  Aus- 
tralia on  May  18,  1908.  The  details  of  the  scheme  were 
more  fully  worked  out  by  Lieut.  Hordern  in  an  able  essay 
entitled  "  How  can  the  Colonies  best  help  in  the  Naval  De- 
fence of  the  Empire  ?  "  Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service 
Institution,  May,  1911.  See  also  The  Framework  of  Imperial 
Partnership,  by  the  same  author  (London ;  William  Clowes 
&  Sons). 


256   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

Empire  Defence,  a  certain  amount  of  decentraliza- 
tion of  effort  in  the  provision  of  men  and  material 
will  almost  certainly  be  found  necessary  in  order 
to  satisfy  both  the  national  and  maritime  aspira- 
tions of  Oversea  States.  The  matter  cannot  be 
more  than  touched  upon  here,  but  in  order  that 
there  can  be  no  mistake  as  to  Sir  John  Colomb's 
attitude  regarding  centralized  control  it  is  useful 
to  recall  that  when  on  May  29,  1904,  Lord  Milner 
spoke  in  favour  of  larger  Colonial  contributions 
towards  the  support  of  the  Fleet,  and  remarked  that 
when  this  occurred  the  Colonies  would  "  demand  a 
voice  in  the  control  of  the  Navy,"  a  meeting  of 
the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee, 
with  Sir  John  Colomb  in  the  Chair,  passed  a  B 
lution  welcoming  Lord  Milner' s  acceptance  of  the 
principles  for  which  the  Committee  had  so  long 
contended,  viz.,  that  the  Unity  of  the  Empire 
could  best  be  secured  by  co-operation  for  the  pro- 
vision and  maintenance  of  a  Navy  of  the  Empire. 
At  this  meeting,  Sir  John  Colomb  moved  an  amend- 
ment, to  be  added  to  the  Resolution,  to  the  effect 
that  the  Committee  desired  to  repeat  its  conviction 
that  under  no  circumstances  should  the  control 
of  the  Navy  of  the  Empire  be  decentralized.  In 
acknowledging  the  Resolution  as  amended,  Lord 
Milner  wrote  privately  to  Sir  John  Colomb  as 
follows ; — 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         257 

"  JOHANNESBURG, 

TRANSVAAL, 
July  4,  1904. 

"DEAR  SIR  JOHN  COLOMB, — I  enclose  a 
formal  acknowledgment  of  the  resolution  of 
the  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee. 
In  doing  so  let  me  thank  you  for  your  kind 
private  letter.  I  need  not  say  that  I  am  in  the 
greatest  sympathy  with  the  work  of  your  Com- 
mittee. 

"  There  is  one  point,  to  which  I  do  not  wish  to 
refer  in  my  public  letter,  but  which  I  should  like 
you  at  any  rate  to  understand.  The  Resolution 
seems  to  indicate  that  my  remarks  pointed  to  a 
decentralisation  of  the  control  of  the  Navy.  Nothing 
is  further  from  my  mind.  What  I  was  attempting 
to  indicate  was  the  doctrine  of  the  Unity  of  the 
Empire,  and  the  absolute  equality  of  right  in  every 
portion  of  it  to  share  in  the  control  of  its  common 
forces.  Of  course  that  is  a  distant  ideal,  as  I  took 
care  to  point  out. 

"It  means  equality  of  contribution,  and  as, 
for  many  years  to  come,  the  U.  K.  will  have  to 
bear  the  greater  portion  of  the  burden,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  it  will  have  preponderant  control. 
And  even  if  at  any  far  future  date  the  centre  of 
power  shifted  and  the  Imperial  Council  sat  per- 
manently or  occasionally  elsewhere  than  in  London, 


258   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

a  possibility  which  I  think  remote,  perhaps  im- 
probable, and  only  contemplate  to  illustrate  the 
completeness  of  my  Imperialism,  which  could 
survive  the  United  Kingdom  in  course  of  time 
being  outgrown  by  the  Colonies,  it  would  not  mean 
splitting  up  the  Navy  or  the  control  of  the  Navy. 
I  doubt  not  that  the  danger  of  any  such  splitting 
up  would  be  permanently  obviated  if  the  idea  that 
the  Navy  was  intended  to  be  the  common  property 
of  the  whole  Empire,  as  much  an  Australian's  or 
Canadian's,  when  Australia  or  Canada  really  con- 
tribute to  it,  as  an  Englishman's,  were  once  tho- 
roughly realized.  The  realization  of  that  idea 
would  do  more  than  anything  else  to  remove  the 
danger  of  a  division  of  forces  and  of  political 
separation. 

"The  one  thing  which  even  the  most  loyal 
Colonists  shy  at,  and  rightly  shy  at,  is  the  idea  of 
a  common  Navy  being  under  the  exclusive  control 
of  a  purely  British  Parliament,  subject  to  the 
narrow  and  often  pernicious  influences  of  local 
U.  K.  politics.  A  really  common  Navy,  a  distant 
ideal,  no  doubt,  but  the  ideal  best  worth  working 
for,  inevitably  involves  the  representation  of  the 
Colonies  in  the  body  ultimately  controlling  our 
Navy  and  Foreign  Policy. 

"  Some  day  I  hope  I  may  have  a  chance  of  dis- 
cussing these  matters  with  you  more  fully,  and 


IMPERAL  REPRESENTATION         259 

perhaps  in  making  my  view  more  clear.  At  pres- 
ent my  hands  are  full,  but  in  all  I  do  here  I  always 
try  to  keep  the  ultimate  object  of  all  my  local 
efforts,  Imperial  Unity,  uppermost  in  my  mind 
and  that  of  others. 

Believe  me, 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

MILNEE." 

It  will  probably  have  been  made  sufficiently 
apparent  that  one  or  two  of  the  suggestions  in 
this  chapter  are  put  forward  upon  the  author's 
individual  responsibility,  and  not  with  any  attempt 
to  label  them  as  the  views  of  Sir  John  Colomb. 
From  intimate  knowledge,  however,  of  Sir  John's 
views,  the  writer  believes  that  if  such  views  could  be 
pronounced  in  the  light  of  recent  events  they  would 
not  be  found  to  differ  in  any  material  respects  from 
those  here  adumbrated,  and  that,  at  any  rate,  the 
great  pioneer  would  accept  the  principles  under- 
lying all  the  suggestions  made  as  based  on  his 
own  dictum  that  "  An  open  real  partnership 
between  the  Mother-Country  and  the  Colonies, 
established  upon  a  business  basis  of  reciprocal 
interests  and  duties,  offers  the  only  possible  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulties  of  British  Defence."  J 

It  may,  perhaps,  serve  some  useful  purpose 
1  See  British  Dangers,  p.  39, 


260   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

to  sum  up  in  brief  outline  the  specific  suggestions 
made  in  this  chapter  for  the  closer  association  of 
the  oversea  sister-countries  in  the  guidance  of 
Imperial  affairs.  Roughly,  then,  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  present  situation  and  allow  of  oppor- 
tunity of  expansion  and  development,  the  sug- 
gestions are  as  follows  :  - 

(a)  That  the  Minister  of  External  Affairs  of 

each  Dominion  should  be  resident  in  Lon- 
don, and  that  he  should  be  summoned  as 
a  member  to  attend  all  meetings  of  the 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  and  also 
of  a  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs.  In 
the  case  of  the  more  remote  Dominions, 
the  Minister  should  alternate  with  some 
other  member  of  the  oversea  Cabinet  in 
order  to  ensure  complete  touch  being  main- 
tained with  Colonial  opinion. 

(b)  That  more  frequent  Meetings  of  the  Im- 

perial Conference  should  be  arranged  so 
that  annual  or  at  least  biennial  Sessions 
could  be  held. 

(c)  That  a  system  should  be  established  where- 

by questions  to  be  discussed  at  the  Con- 
ference should  be  considered  and  threshed 
out  beforehand  by  bodies  in  touch  with 
political  and  Parliamentary  opinion  in 
each  self-governing  country.  For  this 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         261 

purpose,  certain  questions  requiring  careful 
consideration  between  the  meetings  of  the 
Conference  should  be  referred  for  report 
to  Imperial  Commissions  composed  of 
representatives  nominated  by  the  several 
Governments,  and  also  to  Parliamentary 
Committees  in  the  various  Parliaments, 
in  much  the  same  way  as  important  public 
matters  at  home  are  now  referred  to  similar 
Commissions  and  Committees.  A  delega- 
tion from  each  Parliamentary  Committee 
would  meet  before  the  Conference  to  agree 
upon  a  joint  Report  respecting  the  various 
matters  dealt  with.  Neither  the  Reports 
of  Committees  nor  Commissions  would  bind 
any  members  of  the  Conference,  and  they 
could  be  acted  upon  or  not  as  might  be 
thought  desirable. 

(d)  That  an  Imperial  Office  be  set  on  foot  with 
an  Intelligence  Department  and  Secretariat 
attached  which  would  work  in  connexion 
with  and  be  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
Imperial  Conference.  Such  an  Imperial 
Office  would  be  entirely  distinct  from  the 
Colonial  Office,  which  should  be  left  to 
deal  with  the  Crown  Colonies  and  Depen- 
dencies. The  Office  would  be  maintained 
at  the  joint  expense  of  the  Governments 


262   IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

taking  part  in  the  Conference,  and,  though 
it  would  have  official  representatives  of  all 
the  Dominions  working  within  it,  it  would 
be  under  the  immediate  supervision,  be- 
tween the  Conferences,  either  of  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  United  Kingdom,  or  of  a 
Secretary  for  Imperial  Affairs,  who  would 
be  a  member  of  the  British  Cabinet. 
(e)  That  the  Board  of  Admiralty  should  be 
made  more  distinctively  Imperial  by  the 
Dominions  having  power  to  nominate  cer- 
tain professional  members  upon  it,  and 
that  such  Board  would  have  entire  control 
of  the  sea-going  Fleets  and  their  technical 
direction  in  peace  and  war,  and  Navy 
Boards  in  each  self-governing  country 
would  be  made  responsible  for  the  provision 
of  men  and  material.  While  there  cannot 
be  decentralization  of  control,  there  is 
necessity  for  some  decentralization  in  other 
matters. 

Though  these  suggestions  are  not  in  any  sense  put 
forward  as  a  final  solution,  it  is  believed  that  their 
adoption  would  go  far  towards  establishing  a  sys- 
tem of  joint  partnership  in  accord  with  oversea 
national  aspirations,  and  towards  providing  a  basis 
for  the  future  development  of  the  Imperial  Con- 
stitution. 


IMPERIAL  REPRESENTATION         263 

It  does  not  require  any  special  prevision  to 
enable  a  fairly  diligent  observer  of  Empire  affairs 
to  declare  with  confidence  that  the  United  King- 
dom and  the  self-governing  Dominions  are  now 
"  at  the  parting  of  the  ways."  More  than  one 
Oversea  State  has  shown  a  marked  tendency  to 
develop  its  individual  nationality,  and  if  scope  be 
not  afforded  within  the  Empire,  on  lines  at  once 
in  consonance  with  the  political  dignity  and  the 
constitutional  status  of  the  Oversea  Nations,  it 
will  inevitably  be  sought  outside.  But  amid 
signs  from  within  the  Empire  which  occasion  some 
disquietude,  and  amid  the  clash  of  international 
rivalries  from  without,  the  statesmen  of  the  United 
Kingdom  have  received  a  message  of  hope  and 
promise  from  the  oldest  and  greatest  of  the  Do- 
minions oversea.  Canadian  statesmen  have  risen 
to  the  height  of  a  great  conception ;  it  remains 
for  the  statesmen  of  the  Home  Country  to  do  the 
same,  and  offer  to  those  Dominions  who  are  ready 
to  share  in  the  burdens  of  the  Empire  a  voice  in 
the  conduct  of  its  affairs. 

No  truer  words  could  be  written  at  this  day 
than  those  penned  by  Sir  John  Colomb  in  the 
Memorandum  he  was  engaged  in  writing  on  his 
last  bed  of  sickness.  "  In  short,  all  look  for  a  lead 
on  this  great  question,  and  to  the  Prime  Minister 
of  England  to  give  it ;  filtered  opinions  through 


264    IMPERIAL  DEFENCE  AND  CLOSER  UNION 

departmental  channels  do  not  satisfy.  The  desire 
is  to  be  addressed  as  States  by  the  head  of  the 
Government  of  the  Metropolitan  State."1 

The  next  step  therefore  rests  with  the  states- 
men at  Home,  and  now,  more  than  ever,  is  it 
necessary  that  the  question  of  Imperial  Repre- 
sentation should  be  "  faced  resolutely  and  solved 
soon."  2  If  the  present  momentous  epoch  is 
allowed  to  slip  by  without  effort  and  without 
action,  the  future  may  indeed,  in  the  words  of 
Canada's  foremost  son,  "  hold  to  our  lips  the  cha- 
lice of  vain  regret  for  opportunity  neglected  and 
dead."  3 

1  Extract  from  Memorandum  to  which  references  are 
made  on  pp.  168,  197,  246,  247. 

2  Sir  John  Colomb  in  British  Dangers,  p.  40. 

3  Mr.  R.  L.   Borden  at  Dinner  of  the  Empire  Parlia- 
mentary Association,  at  the  House  of  Commons,  July  16, 
1912. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


OF  BOOKS,  PAMPHLETS,  LECTURES,  AND  ARTICLES  RE- 
FERRED TO  IN  THIS  VOLUME,  WHICH  MAY  ADVAN- 
TAGEOUSLY BE  CONSULTED  IN  CONNEXION  WITH  IT.1 


Title. 

Author. 

Nature  of 
Publica- 
tion. 

Publisher. 

Place  of 
Publica- 
tion. 

Army    Organiza- 

Sir John  Colomb 

Pamphlet 

P.  S.   King  & 

London 

tion  in  relation 

Son 

to  Naval  Neces- 

sities 

Army  Policy,  Past 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Article 

National    Re- 

London 

and  Present 

view,   June, 

1904 

Australia  and  the 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Article 

Melbourne  Ar- 

Mel- 

Navy 

gus,  June  15, 

bourne 

1907 

Britain  at  Bay   . 

Spenser   Wilkin- 

Book 

Constable   & 

London 

son 

Co. 

British  Dangers 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Pamphlet 

Swan  Sonnen- 

London 

schein  &  Co. 

Compulsory   Ser- 

Gen.    Sir    Ian 

Book 

John  Murray 

London 

vice 

Hamilton 

Considerations 

Admiral    A.    T. 

Article 

National    Re- 

London 

Governing    the 

Mahan 

view,    July, 

Disposition    of 

1902 

Navies 

England    and    the 

Julian  S.  Corbett 

Book 

Longmans, 

London 

Seven    Years' 

Green  &  Co. 

War 

Essays  on  Naval 

Admiral    P.    H. 

Book 

W.  H.  Allen  & 

London 

Defence 

Colomb 

Co. 

How  Can  the  Colo- 

Lieut.    L.     H. 

Article 

Journal  of  ike 

London 

nies  best  Help 

Hordern 

Royal  United 

in    the    Naval 

Service    In- 

Defence of  the 

stitution, 

Empire 

May,  1911 

1  Though  by  no  means  exhaustive,  it  is  thought  that  this  list  will  be  mainly  useful 
to  students  who  may  be  in  need  of  some  general  guidance  in  the  choice  of  literature. 

265 


266 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Title. 

Author. 

Nature  of 
Publica-            Publisher, 
tion. 

Pla< 
Publica- 
tion. 

Imperial  Defence 

A.  J.  Balfour 

Pamphlet 

Longmans, 

London 

Green  &  Co. 

Imperial  Defence 

Sir  Charles  Dilke 

Book         Constable  & 

London 

and   Spenser 

Co. 

Wilkinson 

Imperial  Defence 

Sir    George    S. 

Book         Imperial  Press 

London 

Clarke 

Imperial  Federa- 

Sir John  Colomb 

Lecture 

Journal    of 

London 

tion,  Naval  and 

Royal  United 

Military 

Service    In- 

stitution, 

May,  1886 

Imperial  Strategy 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Pamphlet  Edward  Stan- 

London 

ford 

Memoir  of  H.  0. 

Mrs.   Arnold- 

Book 

Edward     Ar- 

London 

Arnold-Forster 

Forster 

nold 

Military  Needs 

H.    0.    Arnold- 

Book          Smith,  Elder  & 

London 

and   Military 

Forster 

Co. 

Policy 

Naval    Adminis- 

Admiral   A.    T. 

Book 

Sampson  Low, 

London 

tration     and 

Mahan 

Marston    & 

Warfare 

Co. 

Naval  Intelligence 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Lecture 

Journal        o\ 

London 

and  Protection 

Royal  United 

of  Commerce  in 

Service    In- 

War 

stitution,  Vol. 

XXV 

Naval  Policy 

Admiral  Sir  R. 

Book 

Black  wood, 

London 

distance 

Naval  Strategy  . 

Admiral    A.    T. 

Book 

Sampson  Low, 

London 

Mahan 

Marston     & 

Co. 

Naval  Warfare  . 

Admiral    P.     II. 

Book         W.    H.   Allen 

London 

Colomb 

&Co. 

Nelson  and  other 

J.  R.  Thursfield 

Book 

John  Murray 

don 

Naval  Studies 

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267 


Title. 

Author. 

Nature  of 
Publica- 
tion. 

Publisher. 

Place  of 
Publica- 
tion. 

Our    Naval    Ar- 

Sir John  Colomb 

Article 

Fortnightly  Re- 

London 

rangements    in 

view,    Aug., 

the  other  Hemi- 

1900 

sphere 

Our  Ships,  Colo- 

Sir John  Colomb 

Pamphlet 

P.  S.  King  & 

London 

nies  and  Com- 

Son 

merce  in  Time 

of  War 

Parliaments  of  the 

Howard  d'Egville 

Book 

Empire  Parlia- 

London 

Empire 

mentary  As- 

sociation 

Report  of  Special 

— 

Report 

Journal  of  the 

London 

Committee  of 

Imperial 

Imperial  Feder- 

Federation 

ation  League 

League,  De- 

cember, 1892 

Sea-Power     and 

Admiral    Sir 

Book 

Smith,  Elder 

London 

other  Studies 

Cyprian  Bridge 

&Co. 

Some   Steps   To- 

L. S.  Amery 

Lecture 

Journal  of 

London 

wards  an  Im- 

Royal  Colo- 

perial Constitu- 

nial Institute, 

tion 

July,  1910 

The  Army  in  1906 

H.    0.    Arnold- 

Book 

John  Murray 

London 

Forster 

The  Art  of  Naval 

Admiral     Sir 

Book 

Smith,  Elder 

London 

Warfare 

Cyprian  Bridge 

&Co, 

The  Colonies  and 

Howard  d'Egville 

Pamphlet 

Imperial    Co- 

London 

Imperial  De- 

operation 

fence 

League 

The  Command  of 

Spenser     Wilkin- 

Book 

Constable     & 

London 

the  Sea 

son 

Co. 

The  Committee  of 

Viscount  Esher 

Book 

John  Murray 

London 

Imperial     De- 

fence, its  Func- 

tions  and   Po- 

tentialities 

The    Defence    of 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Book 

Edward  Stan- 

London 

Great    and 

ford 

Greater  Britain 

268 


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London 

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Richard Jebb 

Book 

Longmans, 

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ference 

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The  Imperial  Con- 

Sir   John    G. 

Book 

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Sea  Power  upon 

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the  French  Re- 

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Empire 

The  Navy  and  the 

Sir    George    S. 

Book 

John  Murray 

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R.  Thursfield 

The  Navy  and  the 

Sir  John  Colomb 

Article 

Naval  and  Mili- 

Plym t 

War 

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Feb.,  1900 

The  Navy  in  Re- 

Sir John  Colomb 

Lecture 

McCorquodale 

London 

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&Co. 

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Pamphlet 

The  Relations  of 

Col.    Seely,    Sir 

Pamphlet 

Imperial    Co- 

London 

the  Colonies  to 

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operation 

the    Imperial 

and  others 

League 

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The  Struggle  for 

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Bool 

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INDEX 


A 

Abroad,  Forces,  PAGE 

Subsidiary  to  Home  Defence,  Mr.  Brodrick  on       .         .  37-38 

Address,  Amendment  to  the, 

proposed  by  Mr.  Harold  Cox  .         .         .         .         .          .145 

Administrators, 

policy  of  Admiralty  and  War  Office         .  •        .         .         .         6 

Admiralty, 

and  Australian  Squadron          .          .          .         .         .          .108 

and  protection  of  ports,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .46 
maintenance  and  control  of  Canadian  ships      .          .          .190 
Memorandum  at  1909  Conference     .          .          .          .          .169 

Memorandum  for  Mr.  Borden's  Government     .          .        187-189 
necessity  for  controlling  power  over  War  Office  and        .          .       20 
notes  on  naval  second  line  of  defence       ....     84% 

on  most  effective  aid  from  Canada  .          .          .          .189 

on  naval  supremacy  being  safeguard  of  Dominions         .          .189 
policy  of  administrators  of       ......         6 

proposals  for  fleet  units  .          .          .          .          .          .          .169 

refusal  of  advice  to  New  Zealand    .          .          .          .          .156 

Representation  of  Dominions  at, 

Sir  J.  Forrest  on      .......      133 

proposals  for    ......         254-255,  262 

schemes  ignored  political  facts          .....     200 

Admiralty  and  War  Office, 

absence  of  combined  action  at  1 902  Conference      .       129,  I3i,i3i« 
administration,  Resolution  on  .....       26 

at  1887  Conference  .......       25 

at  1902  Conference,  Sir  John  Colomb  on          .         .          -131 

divorce  between .          -25 

dual  control, 

at  Esquimalt   ........       46 

at  Naval  Bases          .......       46 

expenditure,  Sir  John  Colomb  on     .          .          .          .          .52 

need  of  central  control   .          .          .          .          .          .          .28 

relations  between,  reported  on  by  Hartington  Commission      .       29 
theories  of  invasion          .          .          .          .          .          .          -55 

Admiralty,  Lords  of, 

on  attack  and  defence  of  commerce         .          .          .          .  92-93 

Aerial  Navigation, 

Committee  for         ...  8i« 


270 


INDEX 


PAGE 

Alaskan  Boundary  Question  .......     204 

Amery,  Mr.  L.  S., 

on  Imperial  Constitution  ......   249*1 

proposals  regarding  compulsory  service     ....       79 

Ammunition  Factories, 

desirability  of,  in  Dominions  .          .          .          .          .          -151 

Armament,  Uniformity  of, 

Mr.  Chamberlain  at  1 897  Conference  ....       122-123 

Sir  F.  Borden  on  .          .          .          .          .          .     151 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .         .          .          .          .          .126 

Armaments,  Limitation  of, 

as  policy  of  Liberal  Party       .          .         .          .          .          -147 

Army  (see  also  under  "  Dominions,"  etc.), 

as  complement  to  Naval  Power       ..... 

Commissions  in,  offer  to  Kingston  cadets          .          .          .123 
division  into  two  parts,  Mr.  Haldane  on.          .          .       148-149 
for  field  service,  decreasing      .          .          .          .          .          »       49 

for  oversea  service,  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on  .          -73 

functions  of  in  relation  to  navy  ill-defined     ....       28 

invading,  "thrown  on  shore,"  Royal  Commission  of  1859  and       1 1 
mobility, 

and  naval  bases        .......       47 

want  of  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          -44 

necessity  of  strong,  to  prevent  invasion. 

Lord  Roberts  on       ....    76-78,  80,  82,  83,  84* 

object  of,  in  early  nineteenth  century      .... 

oversea ..........       44 

policy  of  breaking  up  battalions  for  garrisons         ...       45 
relation  of  to  Navy,  Hartington  Commission  on     .          .  28-29 

"  spear  "  and  Navy  "  shield  "  .....       16 

striking 16,  38,  49,  52,  53*1.  73,  75,  171 

Army  and  Navy  (see  also  under  "  Admiralty  and  War  Office  "), 

connexion  between,  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on  .         •       73 

discussed  together  on  Vote  for  Defence  Committee  .          .       65 
discussion  under  Rules  of  House      .....       55 

inter-relation  of       ........         7 

need  for  common  consultation,  Mr.  Balfour  on  .         -59 

Army,  Australian, 

organization  of  field         .......   109*1 

Army  Corps, 

necessity  of,  for  oversea  service,  Mr.  Brodrick  on  .          .         .50 

Army  Estimates. 

of  1901,  Sir  George  S.  Clarke  on 54 

Army  Policy, 

reversal  of  principle  by  Mr.  Arnold-Forster      ...       74 

Army  Reform, 

Lord  Card  well's  speech  on                .         .         .         .         -17 
strong  reasons  for  in  1903 61 

Army  Scheme. 

of  1903,  Sir  George  Clarke's  letter  on  .          .          .60 

of  Mr.  Haldane,  principles  on  which  based       ...       74 


INDEX  271 

Army,  Striking  (see  also  under  "  Army  ")  PAGE 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  necessity  for    .          .          .         16,  38,  49,  52 

Arnold-Forster,  Rt.  Hon.  H.  O.f 

and  Executive  of  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee    .      120 
and  lessons  of  history     .......       38 

and  special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League   .          .    iifjn 
appointment  to  War  Office      .          .          .          .          .  64,  72 

as  a  founder  of  Imperial  Federation  League     ...       99 
as  "  humble  pupil  "  of  Sir  John  Colomb        ....     56^ 

basis  of  his  policy  ........       73 

on  "  Blue  Water  "  School  and  its  recognition  ...       64 
on  cause  of  mistakes       .......       73 

on  Defence  Committee  of  the  Cabinet      ....       56 

on  invasion  of  England  and  supremacy  of  Navy  .  .  64 
support  of  policy  by  Sir  John  Colomb  «...  73 
welcome  of  Mr.  Haldane's  appointment  ....  74 

Asquith,  Rt.  Hon.  H.  H., 

as  one  of  Liberal  Imperial  group     .          .          .          .          .147 

as  President  of  Imperial  Conference          .          .          .          .165 

invitation  to  Dominions  for  Defence  Conference    .          .          .165 
on  Imperial  Defence  Committee       ....  80-83 

on  Invasion  of  England  ......  82-84 

on  sharing  authority  in  foreign  affairs      .          .          .          .237 

on  Sir  Joseph  Ward's  proposals  for  Imperial  Council  .  .  237 
Sir  J.  Colomb's  letter  to 166 

Asselin,  Mr.  Olivar, 

on  Canadian  naval  policy          ......   178^ 

Attack, 

liability  to,  stated  to  be  increased  by  steam    .          .          .104 

Australia, 

and  Canada  as  Pacific  States  ......    i6ow 

delegates  from,  at  1887  Conference  .          .          .          .102 

desire  of  delegates  at  1887  Conference     ....      105 

Federation  of  .......        102,  109 

local  defence  of ,  considered  at  1 88 7  Conference      .          .          .105 
"  localized  "  view  of  representative  men  .          .          .        103-104 
military  defence  of,  at  1887  Conference   .          .          .          .      in 

representation  by  alternating  ministers     .          .          .       213,  260 

Australia  and  Imperial  Defence, 

General  Sir  E.  Hutton  on  Field  Force  .  .  .  .  iz'jn 
Mr.  Chamberlain  on  .  .  .  .  .  .  .122 

Australia  and  the  Navy, 

Admiral  Mahan  on  .......    144^ 

Admiral  Tryon's  suggestion     .....        104,  106 

agreement  for  Squadron  at  1887  Conference  .         106,  107,  108 

at  1887  Conference  .......      106 

at  1902  Conference,  improved  squadron  .          .          .          .134 

Mr.  Deakin  on  Defence  of  harbours  and  coasts         .          .162 
Mr.  Deakin  on  no  demands  to  be  made  .          .          .          .161 

policy  for,  denned  by  Sir  John  Colomb  .          .          .          -144 
proposals  for  fleet  unit   .          .          .          .          .          .          .170 

proposals  of  Commonwealth  Government,  1909          t         .164 


272 


INDEX 


Australia  and  the  Navy,  continued —  PAGE 

Report  of  Five  Naval  Commandants         .          .          .  i.ji 

Sir  John  Forrest  on,  at  1902  Conference.          .          .          .     133 

Australia  and  the  Pacific, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  naval  position      .         .          .          .          .168 

Australia,  Western, 

and  Defence  of  King  George's  Sound         .          .          .          .no 

Australian  Branch, 

of  Imperial  Federation  League         .          .          .          .          .   114* 

Australian  Colonies, 

and  recommendations  of  Carnarvon  Commisson         .          .103 

Australian  Commerce, 

protection  of,  on  high  seas      .          .          .          .          .          .108 

Australian  Field  Army, 

organization  of        ........    109*1 

Australian  Fleet  Unit, 

progress  of     .          .  .    184*1 

recruiting  for.          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .   184*1 

Australian  Government, 

Memo  on  Naval  Defence  Force,  1909        .          .          .          ,164 

Australian  Harbours  and  Coasts, 

to  be  left  to  Australia  to  defend      .          .          .          .          .162 

Australian  Immigration  Restriction  Bill.          ....     204 

Australian  Navy, 

Capt.  Cresswell's  suggestions  in  1905        .          .          .          .143 

desire  for  at  1909  Conference  .          .          .          .          .170 

flag  and  status, 

arrangements,  1911  ......        182-184 

Sir  J.  Colomb  on      .......      160 

movement  of  ships  complicating  foreign  policy          .         .163 
Naval  Agreement  Bill  in  Parliament         ....    184*1 

negotiations  regard  ing,  and  results,  1911       .          .          .        181-184 
not  efficient  reserve  for  Royal  Navy,  Sir  J .  Colomb  on    .         .160 
proceeding  to  foreign  ports      .....       182-183 

progress  and  recruiting  of,  for  fleet  unit  .          .         .   184*1 

proposals  of  Commonwealth,  1909   .          .          .          .          .164 

Sir  John  Colomb  on         .....         159,  160,  161 

training,  discipline  and  pay     ...  .163 

training  of  personnel,  Sir  J.  Colomb  on   .          .          .          .     160 

under  Australian  control,  proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin  .      163 

Australian  Squadron, 

a  new  departure.  Sir  H.  Holland  on  .107 

Admiralty  blamed  for  .          .          .          .          .108 

Agreement  of  1002,  Mr.  Deakin  on.          .          .          .       i55-'56 

limited  action  of     .  ....       107-108 

local  functions  ceasing    .  .....     156 

scheme  at  1887  Conference  .          .          .         106,  107,  108 

1902 

.    184*1 


sphere  of  operations  extended 


to  be  relieved  by  fleet  unit 
Autonomy, 

encroachment  on  (see  under  "  Self-Government  "). 


INDEX  273 

B 

Balfour,  Rt.  Hon.  A.  J.,  PAGE 

against  pressing  the  Colonies  for  ships  and  men     .          .      146,161 
deputation  to,   from  Imperial    Federation   (Defence)   Com- 
mittee     .........     142 

increasing  interest  in  defence  .          .          .          .          .          -59 

on  centralized  organization  of  Empire      .          .          .          .146 

on  Colonial  Representation  on  Defence  Committee         .          .       61 
on  invasion  of  England  and  work  of  Defence  Committee  65-70 

on  scheme  for  reconstituting  Defence  Committee  .          .  57 

resignation  of,  1905          .......     226 

speech  of,  1905,  Lord  Roberts  on    .          .          .          .          -77 

speech  on  Mr.  Harold  Cox's  motion          .          .          .        145-146 

Balfour,  Rt.  Hon.  Lord,  of  Burleigh, 

letter  to  Sir  J.  Colomb  .......       94 

Barrack  Accommodation, 

estimated  cost  of  putting  on  proper  footing     ...       47 

Battleships, 

gifts  of,  cruisers  substituted  for        .          .          .,         .          -171 

Beadon,  Mr.  Robert  J., 

and  Imperial  Federation  League          ....  loin 

Behring  Sea  Dispute      .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .     204 

Blockade, 

of  enemy's  coast  as  operation  of  war       ....       23 

"  Blue  Water  School," 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on  recognition  of  .          .          .64 

Sir  John  Colomb  and       .          .          .          .          .          .        15,   1591 

Bond,  Hon.  Sir  Robert, 

on  revenue  for  "  public  benefit  "     .          .          .          .          .225 

Borden,  Rt.  Hon.  R.  L., 

conviction  regarding  Canadian  destiny      .          .          .          .174 

criticism  of  Sir  W.  Laurier's  Naval  Scheme  .  .          .        175-180 

on  Canadian  naval  force  and  other  forces      .          .          .          .178 

on  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence       .          .          .         191,192,212 
on  fancied  security  of  Munroe  doctrine    .          .          .          .180 

on  impossibility  of  Canada  being  at  peace  if  Empire  at  war      .      176 
on  inadequacy  of  present  Imperial  Parliament       .          .          .     239 
on  neglected  opportunity          ......     264 

on  non-party  Defence  Committee     .          .          .          .          .212 

on  permanent  representation  of  Canada  on  Defence  Com- 
mittee     .........      191 

on  representation  accompanying  permanent  obligation  .         .192 
on  sharing  in  defence  and  in  policy          ....     238 

on  sharing  responsibility  for  foreign  affairs        .          .          .238 
on  withholding  Canadian  Naval  forces  from  Empire       .          .176 
representation  on  Defence  Committee ' '  pending  final  solution' '    192 
Resolution  on  unity  of  naval  organization        .          .          .176 
statement  of  December  5,  1912        .          .          .          .        189-191 

visit  to  England,  1912    .......      187 

Borden,  Hon.  Sir  Frederick, 

on  Canada  and  Navy      .......    I3on 

on  Canadian  force  for  oversea  service      .         .         .          .150 

T 


274  INDEX 

Bordcn,  Hon.  Sir  Frederick,  continued —  PAGE 

on  exchange  of  Officers  .          .          .          .          .          .          .151 

on  General  Staff  "  for  service  of  Dominions  "  .  .  .  152 
on  Munroe  Doctrine  as  protection  for  Canada  .  .  .  I5on 

Botha,  Gen.  Rt.  Hon.  L., 

on  defence  for  whole  of  South  Africa  .  .  .  .154 
opposition  to  Standing  Committee  proposal  .  .  .  222 
representing  South  Africa  at  1911  Conference  .  .  .  220 

Bourassa,  Mr.  Henri, 

against  Canada  being  drawn  into  distant  wars       .          .  1 79 

on  Colonies  and  equal  sovereign  power         .         .         .          .      1 79 

Brassey,  Earl, 

on  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League     . 

British  Defence  (see  under  "  Imperial  Defence,"  "  Defence  of  Em- 
pire," etc.). 

British  Empire, 

"  combine  "  demanded  to  secure  existence  of  ...  96 
League,  Canadian  Branch  of  .  .  .  .  .  114*1 

British  Parliament, 

Mr.  Deakin  on  change  of  front  of  .          .          .          .          .161 

Brodeur,  Hon.  L.  P., 

on  Canadian  naval  contribution  being  given  as  nil  .  .  154 
on  Fisheries  protection,  etc.,  provided  by  Canada.  .  154,157 

Brodrick,  Rt.  Hon.  St.  John  (now  Lord  Midleton), 

and  South  African  War  .......       38 

and  unpreparedness  of  striking  Army       ....       38 

on  Army  and  Navy  in  relation  to  Home  Defence    .  5 in 

on   Home  Defence  .......         51,  51*1 

on  "  Home  Defence  in  front  rank  "          ....       37 

on  lessons  of  South  African  War     .....       50 

on  Military  preparations  in  view  of  losing  command  of  sea      .     1 28 
on  sending  two  Army  Corps  abroad          ....       50 

on  War  Office  Scheme  at  1902  Conference        .         .       128-130 

Bryce,  Rt.  Hon.  James, 

and  special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League          .    115** 

Burden  of  Empire, 

when  shared,  offer  of  representation    .         .         .          .       133,216 

Burden  of  Imperial  Defence, 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on         ......       132-133 

C 

Cabinet  Committee  of  Defence  (see  under  "Defence  Comm 

of  the  Cabinet") 
Campbell,  Sir  Alexander, 

at  1887  Conference  on  Canada  and  Imperial  Defence      .         .     112 
Campbell-Bannerman,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  H., 

on  defence  and  foreign  affairs  going  together 

refusal  to  have  Secretariat  under  his  control    .          .          .     229 

welcome  at  1907  Conference    ...... 

Canada, 

and  Alaskan  Boundary  Question      .....     204 

and  Australia  as  Pacific  States 


INDEX  276 

Canada,  continued —  PAGE 
coming  into  line  with  other  Dominions    ....     191 

offer  of  191 2  an  emergency  contribution       .          .  .      192 

permanent  representation  on  Defence  Committee      191,  192,  214 

overseas  trade  of,  1909-10       .          .          .          .          .  .189 

recognition  of  principles  maintained  by  Sir  John  Co lomb  .      191 

security  of,  Sir  A.  Campbell  on                  .          .          .  .112 

Canada  and  Imperial  Defence, 

participation  in,  Gen.  Sir  E.  Hutton  on  .         .          .  .     127 

reason  for  "waiting"  policy    .          .          .          .          .  .112 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on,  at  1897  Conference.          .          .  .      122 

Sir  A.  Campbell  on,  at  1887  Conference      .          .          .  .112 

Canada  and  the  Army, 

Sir  F.  Borden  at  1907  Conference   ....  150-151 

Canada  and  the  Imperial  Conference, 

against  alteration  of  "  informal  gathering  "  to  "  permanent 

institution "........     224 

Canada  and  the  Navy, 

a  message  of  hope  .......     263 

at  1902  Conference  unable  to  make  offer           .          .  134,  135 

contribution  given  as  m7  at  1907  Conference           .          .  .154 

decision  to  construct  force       .          .          .          .          .  .      175 

development  of  movement       .....  173-181 

fleet  unit  not  considered  suitable     .          .          .          .  .170 

proposals  at  1909  Conference  .....  170-171 

Resolution  of  Dominion  Parliament           .          .          .  .165 

Sir  John  Colo mb  on  naval  position      .          .          .          .  .168 

Sir  W.  Laurier, 

j            against  contribution           .          .          .          .          .  .158 

on  impossibility  of  uniform  policy     .          .          .  .157 

Canadian  Fleet  unit, 

ships  of  Dominion  may  be  called  for        .          .          .  .190 

Canadian  Independence, 

French-Canadian  attitude  towards    ....  179-180 

Canadian  Naval  Service, 

Admiral  Kingsmill,  Director  of         .          .          .          .  .181 

Bill  introduced  into  Dominion  House       .          .          .  .      174 

control  in  peace  and  war         .....  174-175 

Director  of  and  Advisory  Board       .          .          .          .  .      174 

force  to  be  constructed  .          .          .          .          .          .  .175 

men  to  be  enrolled  voluntarily         .          .          .          .  .174 

Resolution  of  Dominion  Parliament  on     .          .          .  .165 

Canadian  Navy  (see  also  under  "  Canadian  Naval  Service  "). 

as  to  taking  no  part  in  war   .          .          .          .          .  .177 

desire  for  at  1909  Conference .         .         .          .          .  .170 

force  to  be  constructed       .          .          .          .          .          .  .175 

Mr.  Borden  on  costly  experiment     .          .          .          .  .190 

negotiations  regarding,  and  results,  1911  .         .          .  181-184 

proceeding  to  foreign  ports      .....  182-183 

progress  of      ........  180-181 

Service  Bill  introduced    .          .          .          .          .          .  .174 

should  be  same  as  other  forces,  Mr.  Borden  on       .          .  .     178 

Sir  W.  Laurier's  alternative  policy .                   ,         .  .   igon 


276  INDEX 

Cape  Colony,  PAGE 

gift  of  £35,000 123-124 

as  step  in  Imperial  Federation  .         .          .          .241 

Lord  Milner  on         .          .          .          .          .          .          .240 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .          .          .          -      i  - 1 

offer  of  battleship,  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Goschcnon  i_»j 
offer  of  £50,000  to  Navy  at  1 902  Conference.  .  .  '  i 

Card  well,  Lord, 

on  placing  rifles  behind  ditches  .  .  .  .  .17 
on  scientific  defence  gaining  on  scientific  attack  .  .  17 

speech  on  Army  Keform          .          .          .          .          .          -17 

Carnarvon  Commission, 

recommendations  of  communicated  to  Australia        .         .     103 
Report  of        .......        20,  103,  103*1 

Sir  Henry  Holland  as  member  of    .          .         .         .         .103 

Cash  Contributions, 

Colonies  not  prepared  for  at  1897  Conference  .  .  .217 
Newfoundland  finds  not  possible  .....  225 
proposal  to  allocate  special  revenues  ....  208 
proposal  to  fix  by  Conference.  .  .  .  208 

simplest  method  while  oversea  States  "  Colonies  "  .  .  200 
Sir  John  Colomb  on  asking  Colonies  for  .  .  .  M 

Sir  Joseph  Ward  in  favour  of 
suggestions  for        ........     200 

Central  Control, 

over  Admiralty  and  War  Office  needed    .         .         .         .28 

Chamberlain,  Rt.  Hon.  Joseph, 

address  at  1897  Conference  .  .  .  .  .  121-123 
as  Chairman  of  1897  Conference  .  .  .  .  .121 
at  1902  Conference  adopts  arguments  of  Sir  John  Colomb  .  132 
offer  of  voice  in  policy  of  Empire  .  .  .  13^, 

on  Colonies  and  naval  defence  at  1902  Conference  .  131-133 
oncostof  Imperial  Defence  at  1897  Conference  .  .  121-122 
on  Council  of  Empire  .  .  .  .  .  133 

on  Federal  Council  as  "  ultimate  ideal  "       ....     216 
on  interchange  of  troops,  at  1897  Conference          .          .          .      123 
on  troops  fighting  "  side  by  side  "  . 
on  uniformity  of  armament,  at  1897  Conference    .          .       122-123 

Channel, 

and  Atlantic  ports  of  France  .....  39-40,  67 
"  steam  has  bridged  the "  .  .  .  .10,  105 

Chaplin.  Rt.  Hon.  Henry, 

as  advocate  of  free  storage  of  grain          ....       92 

Churchill,  Lord  Randolph, 

proposals  to  abolish  Secretary  for  \Yar  ami  1  '.<  i.ird  of  Admiralt 

Citizens  of  the  Empire, 

people  of  Dominions  not          .          .          .          .          .          -234 

Clarke.  Col.  Sir  George  S.  (now  Lord  Sydenham), 

and  Thursfield  on  command  of  sea  and  invasion  .  .  42*1 
as  member  of  Esher  Committee  .  .  .  .  .63 
as  Secretary  to  Colonial  Defence  Committee  .  .  -53 
as  Secretary  to  Hartington  Commission  .  .  .  •  53 


INDEX  277 

Clarke,  Col.  Sir  George  S.,  continued —  PAGE 

as  signatory  to  Pollock  memo  .....  226 
letter  on  Army  Scheme  of  1901  .  .  -54 
letter  on  Defence  Committee  and  Army  Scheme  .  .  60 
letter  on  principles  of  Defence  .  .  .  .  71 

letters  to  Sir  John  Colomb 54.59,71 

Closer  Commercial  Union, 

what  influenced  Mr.  Chamberlain  towards          .          .          .132 

Closer  Union  for  Defence, 

as  the  policy  of  this  country  .          .          .          .          .          .      147 

Coaling  Stations, 

Carnarvon  Commission  on        ......       20 

defence  of       .........       20 

Marine  Garrisons  for       ......  44~47 

Coast, 

blockade  of  enemy's        .......       23 

covering  operations  off  neutral  sea-boards    .          .         .          .23 

of  enemy  our  frontier,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .74 

Coast  Defence  Ships, 

in  case  of  invasion  ......         69,  84^ 

Colomb,  Admiral  P.  H., 

as  exponent  of  "  blue  water  school "  .          .  i$n 

on  Fleet  in  being  ........     45*1 

on  local  defence  of  ports         .          .          .          .         .          .     nn 

on  steam  making  ports  more  vulnerable  .         .         .    IO5« 

on  territorial  attack  with  weaker  Fleet  in  existence  .  .  41  n 
on  value  of  fixed  local  defences  .  .  .  .  i^n 

Colomb,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  John, 

and  "  blue-water  "  doctrine     .....         15,  i$n 

and  Executive  of  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee     120 
and  Imperial  Federation  League       ....        114-119 

and  shipping  portion  of  Food  Supply  Commission  Report    94,  95 
and  Sir  F.  Pollock's  Committee        .....     222 

as  founder  of  Imperial  Federation  League         .          .  24, 99 

as  influencing  constitution  of  Defence  Committee      .          .       59 
as  Member  of  Commission  on  Food  Supply      .          .          .91 
as  pioneer       .........         6 

as  signatory  to  Pollock  Memo          .....     226 

campaign  of  .........         8 

definition  of  command  of  sea  .          .          .          .          .18 

enters  House  of  Commons       ......       26 

examination  of  invasion  theories      .....       39 

letter  to  Mr.  Asquith  on  Defence  Conference    .          .          .166 
letter  to,  from  Lord  Balf our      ....  -94 

letter  to,  from  Mr.  Edward  Stanhope       .          .          .          .      117 

letters  to,  from  Lord  Milner    .....      240,  257 

letters  to,  from  Sir  George  S.  Clarke        .          .          -54,  59,  71 
life-work  of    .........         5 

motion  for  Return  of  naval  expenditure  .          .          .          .97 

on  Admiralty  and  War  Office  administration  .  .  .26 
on  asking  Colonies  for  cash  contributions  ...  14 
on  Australia  and  sea  command  .  .  .  .  -144 


27*  INDEX 

Colomb,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  John,  continued —  PAGE 

on  Australian  naval  defence    .         .         .         .         .          .144 

on  Australian  Navy         .....         159,  160,  161 

on  Australian  Squadron  .          .         .         .         .         .          .108 

on  Cape  gift  of  ^35,000  to  Navy     .         .         .          .          .124 

on  Captain  Cresswell's  1905  Report          .         .         .       143-145 
on  Carnarvon  Commission        ......       20 

on  carrying  war  into  enemy's  country      .          .          .          .15 

on  central  control  of  Admiralty  and  War  Office      .          .       28 
on  Commission  to  deal  with  Colonies  and  Defence   .         14,247 
on  Conference  to  deal  with  Colonies  and  Defence     100,  118,  142 
on  constitutional  rights  .          .          .          .          .          .          .161 

on  consultation  with  Colonies  .          .          .          .         .14 

on  controlling  powers  over  Admiralty  and  War  Office       .       20 
on  co-operation  of  naval  and  military  force     ...       38 
on  cost  of  barracks          .......       47 

on  decentralization  of  naval  control          ....     256 

on  Defence  Committee  of  Cabinet  .          .          .         .  44,  56 

on  Defence  of  Empire     .......       38 

as  a  whole       ........       21 

on  differences  between  Intelligence  Departments       .  27,  28 

on  distribution 

of  military  and  naval  forces      .....       19 

of  sea  commerce       ......  22, 23 

on  German  Policy  of  War  Office     .....       52 

on  Imperial  Commission  .....       166, 247 

on  Imperial  Federation,  Naval  and  Military     .         .  24 

on  influence  of  Dominions  in  foreign  affairs     .         .       203,  204 
on  Intelligence  Departments  of  Navy  and  Army       .          .       27 
on  lessons  of  Russo-Japanese  War    .....     160 

on  lessons  of  South  African  War     .          .         .         .  49,50 

on  lessons  of  Spanish- American  War          .          .          .      42*,  160 
on  locking  up  troops  in  garrisons    .....       44 

on  Marine  garrisons  for  Naval  bases         .          .         .  45~47 

on  meaning  of  National  Defence      .         .          .          .          -15 

on  men  for  oversea  service      ......       39 

on  military  service  confined  to  shores      .          .          .         .16 

on  Military  Works  Bill  of  1899 47 

on  Militia, 

as  Imperial  Force     .......       44 

for  duties  abroad      .......       55 

on  Mr.  Balfour's  speech  of  1905      ....  70-71 

on  Napoleonic  expedition  to  Egypt  9*1 

on  Naval  aspect  of  South  African  War   ...  49,  50 

on  Naval  Intelligence  and  Protection  of  Commerce  .         .21 
on  Navy  as  "  shield  "  and  Army  as  "  spear  "  .          .       16 

on  Navy  and  Army  under  Rules  of  House  of  Commons  .       55 
on  need  of  ships  rather  than  men  .          .         .         .         .160 

on  neglect  of  strategic  points  .          .  .          .       19 

on  numbers  of  troops  transported  to  South  Africa  .          .     .\in 
on  partnership  as  solution  of  defence  <li (Virilities       .  259 

on  ports  and  steam  transport  of  France  .         .  39,  40 


INDEX  279 

Colomb,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  John,  continued —  PAGE 

on  presumption  of  invasion     .....  17 


on  primary  business  of  fleet     ..... 

on  proposal  for  Navy  Boards  .... 

on  reconstituted  Defence  Committee 

on  relation  of  Navy  to  Army.          .... 

on  Representation  lying  at  root  of  Defence  problem 

on  result  of  1907  Conference  ..... 

on  reversal  of  Army  Policy     ..... 

on  securing  points  commanding  Imperial  roads 

on  "  steam  has  bridged  the  Channel  " 

on  striking  power  of  Army      .          .          .          .  16, 38 

on  three  naval  operations  in  war     . 

on  uniformity  of  armament     .... 

on  Unity  of  Empire         ..... 

on  Volunteer  service        ..... 

on  want  of  mobility  in  Army 

on  working  Defence  in  water-tight  compartments 

programme  for  military  defence  of  Empire 


95 

255 

61 

27 

193 

159 

74 

19 

105 

49,52 

23 

126 

8 

44 

44 

27 

126 


proposal  for  Imperial  Commission    ....       166,  247 

proposal  to  transfer  local  protection  of  ports  to  Admiralty      46 
protest  against  expenditure  at  Wei-hai-wei        .          .         48,  487? 
Resolution  on  Defence  of  Empire    .          .          .          .          .26 

speech  at  Deputation  to  Mr.  Gladstone    .          .          .       117,  118 
success  of  long  struggle  of       ......       84 

suggestion  for  Colonial  representation, 

on  Defence  Committee        .          .          .          .          .          .61 

on  Naval  and  Military  Council.          ....       36 

support  of  Mr.  Arnold-Forster's  policy     ....       73 

Colonial  Conference  (see  also  under  "  Imperial  Cenference  ") 

alteration  of  title  to  Imperial  Conference          .          .          .   165** 
as  "  between  governments "     .          .         .         .          .          .218 

calling  of,  urged  by  Sir  John  Colomb       .          .         100,  117-118 
Colonial  Secretary  as  President         .          .          .          .          .219 

constitution  of         .......       217-219 

suggestion  for,  to  deal  with  Naval  Defence      .          .          .142 

Colonial  Conference  of  1887, 

an  Australian  Conference          .          .          .          .          .          .in 

and  Australian  Squadron          ....         106,  107,  108 

brought  about  by  Imperial  Federation  League  .     roiw,  114 

called  by  Mr.  Stanhope  .          .         .          .         .         .          .100 

cause  of  barren  results  of        ......       25 

Defence  main  motive       .          .          .          .          .          .  101 

different  from  successors  .          .          .          .          .          .217 

inability  of  Home  Government  to  grasp  principles    .          .102 
opportunity  for  basis  of  organization        ....     102 

Colonial  Conference  of  1897, 

and  political  relations      .          .          .          .          .          .          .217 

as  between  Prime  Ministers     .          .         >.          .          .          .218 

called  by  Mr.  J.  Chamberlain  .          .          .          .          .121 

Colonies  not  prepared  for  contributions    .          .          .          .217 

defence  questions  at          ......       121-124 


280  INDEX 

Colonial  Conference  of  1902,  PAGE 

cause  of  breakdown         .          .          .          .          .         .         .131 

Defence  position  put  before  Colonies        .          .         .          .124 

military  defence  at          .          .          .          .          .          .         .126 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on  naval  defence  at  .          .          .131 

Mr.  Seddon  on  naval  defence  at  .         .         .       132-133 

Sir  John  Forrest  on  naval  defence  at  .         .         .     133 

Colonial  Conference  of  1907, 

between  Imperial  Government  and  Premiers     .         .          .219 
called  by  Liberal  Government  .          .          .          .          .146 

defence  questions  at          ......       148-159 

Mr.  Brodeur,  Mr.  Moor,  Dr.  Smartt,  Gen.  Botha  and  Sir  J.  Ward  at  154 
principle  of  co-operation  abandoned  .  .  .  .159 

results    . 154-155 

welcome  by  British  Premier    .          .         .         .         .         .219 

Colonial  Defence, 

not  an  abstract  question          .         .         .         .         .         .19 

Colonial  Forces, 

Memo  at  1887  Conference        .         .         .         .          .         .     in 

Colonial  Office, 

and  Secretariat        ........     230 

as  Office  for  Crown  Colonies  only    .          .         .        228,  252,  261 
"  bifurcation "  of    .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .     233 

division  of  departments  .......     233 

Dominions  in  position  of  dependence  under      .         .         -231 
methods  of  dealing  with  Dominions,  Mr.  Deakin  on          .231 
officials  and  Lord  Elgin  ......       220.  229 

opposition  to  Mr.  Deakin's  proposals        .         .         .       229, 231 

Colonies  (see  also  under  "  Dominions  "). 

and  cost  of  Defence,  Debate  in  Commons  .  .  .145 
stake  in  security  of  ocean  trade  .....  98 
word  abandoned  for  "  Dominions "  .  .  .  .220 

Colonies  and  Imperial  Defence, 

basis  of  contribution,  Conference  necessary  .  .  .116 
interview  with  Sir  John  Colomb  on  ....  io8n 
matter  put  before  1897  Conference  .  .  .  .124 

offers  towards  cost  at  1902  Conference  .  .  .  .134 
those  undertaking  burden  offered  voice  in  policy  .  .133 

Colonies  and  Naval  Defence  (see  also  under  "  Dominions  "), 

at  1902  Conference  ......        131-134 

Cape  gift  of  £35,000 123-124,240-241 

Mr.  Harold  Cox's  amendment  to  Address  .  .  .145 
offer  of  battleship  by  Cape  Colony  .  .  .  122,  123 

offers  towards  cost  at  1902  Conference    .  .         .     134 

primary    consideration  at   Conference   urged    by    Deputa- 
tion   ..........     142 

Command  of  the  Sea, 

and  "  Fleet  in  being  "     . 

and  invasion,  Defence  Committee  on 

as  basis  of  policy  at  1909  Conference 


as  paralysing  attack  of  enemy,  Sir  John  Colomb  on 
during  Crimean  War        ...... 


M4 
9,  10 


INDEX  281 

Cemmand  of  the  Sea,  continued —  PAGE 

essential  for  Defence  of  Commerce  93 

how  maintained,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .18 

in  relation  to  invasion  of  England  .....  70 
loss  of,  and  transport  of  troops  .  .  .  .  .41 
maintenance  of,  for  Australian  security  .  .  .  .144 
military  preparations  in  view  of  losing  .  .  .  .128 
Mr.  Julian  Corbett's  definition  of  .  .  .  .  .  i8n 
Mr.  Haldane  on,  at  1907  Conference  .  .  .  .149 
what  is,  defined  by  Sir  John  Colomb  .  .  .  .118 

Command  of  Waters, 

Sir  J.  Colomb  on  loss  of          .....  17-18 

Commerce  (see  also  under  "  Protection  "), 

carriers  and  marauders,  capacity  of  ....  95 
comparison  of  Colonial  independent  ....  97 

Commerce,  Colonial  Sea, 

growth  of        .........       97 

Commerce  of  Australia, 

Capt.  Cresswelland 143-145 

merchant  cruisers  and,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .  .  .  145 
protection  of,  provided  on  high  seas  .  .  .  .108 

Commercial  Intelligence  Council, 

Sir  J.  Colomb's  proposal          .         .          .         .  23 

Commercial  Relations, 

considered  at  Conferences         .          .          .          .          .          .221 

Commission  (see  under  "  Royal  "  and  "  Imperial  "). 

Commissioners  of  1859, 

and  invasion  of  England .          .          .          .          .          .          .11 

Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs, 

Chairman  of  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .  253*1 

necessity  for  distinct  body       .....  253**,  254*1 

suggestions  for         .......       253,  260 

Committee  of  Imperial  Defence, 

an  established  place  in  machinery  .  .  .  .  .215 
as  a  judicial  body,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .  .  .  -7° 
Canadian  Minister  as  permanent  Member  of  .  .  .214 
compared  to  Hartington  Commission  proposals  .  .  207** 
considered  as  representative  institution  ....  210 
constitution  of,  outlined  by  Mr.  Balfour  ....  58 
consultative  not  executive  body  .....  66 
Dominions  to  refer  matters  to  .  .  .  .  .215 
establishment  of  Oversea  Branches  .  .  .  .  .  215 

germ  of 31 

investigation  of  Lord  Roberts'  case  .         .          .  82-84 

Mr.  Asquith 

on  business  and  constitution  of          .         .  f        .          .81 
on  indispensability  of  .          .          .          .          .81 

Mr.  Balfour's  speech  of  May,  1905  on  .         .         .66 

Mr.  Borden  and  colleagues  attend  sittings  of   .          .          .187 
Mr.  Bordenon          ......         191,192,212 

Mr.  Deakin  on  right  of  Colonies  to  consult  .  .  .152 
oversea  Ministers  to  attend  meetings  of  .  .  .  .215 


282 


INDEX 


PAGE 

191,  192 

.       84*1 

76,  211,  212 

192,  208-215 


192 


209 
,214 

57 

152* 


8o, 


65 


Conscription  "), 


Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  continued — 

permanent  representation  of  Canada  on  , 

present  attitude  on  invasion  problem 

proposal  to  make  non-party    . 

relation  of  Dominions  to          ... 

representation  of  Dominions, 

Lord  Esher  on  .... 

"  pending  a  final  solution  " 

scheme  for,  outlined  by  Mr.  Balfour 

Sir  F.  Borden  invited  to  sit  with,  1903 

Sub-Committees  of  . 

Vote  for,  and  opportunity  for  discussion 

work  and  sub-Committees  of  . 
Commons  (see  under  "  House  of  Commons  "). 
Communication, 

freedom  of,  Sir  John  Colomb  on 

of  British  Empire,  sea  communications 
Communication,  lines  of, 

dealt  with  by  Carnarvon  Commission 

Mr.  Julian  S.  Corbett  on 
Compulsory  Military  Training  (see  also  under 

for  Oversea  service          ..... 

Lord  Roberts'  advocacy  of 

Sir  John  Colomb's  views  on    . 
Conference  (see  also  under  "  Colonial  "  and  "  Imperial  " 

necessity  of,  to  determine  basis  of  contribution 

quadrennial 

desirability  of  affirmed,  1902 
approved  at  1907  Conference    . 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  desirability  of  calling  a 

subjects  discussed  at       ....... 

subsidiary, 

policy  of  approved  . 
Resolution  providing  for  t 

Conference,  Inter-Colonial, 

at  Sydney,  1881 

Conference  on  Defence, 

between  Home  and  Canadian  Governments 

1909,  consummation  for  which  Sir  John  Colomb  had  striven 

Military i7I~I73 

Naval 165-171 

Conscription, 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster's  views  on 

Sir  John  Colomb's  views  on    . 
Constitutional  Machinery, 

existing  forms  should  be  used          ..... 
Constitutional  Rights, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .... 

Contributions, 

Colonial,  to  Defence  (see  under  "  Colonies  and  Naval  Defence." 
"  Colonies  and  Imperial  Defence,"  and  "  Cash  Con- 
tributions "). 


13 
98 

20 

i8n 

78-79 
78 

78n 

116 


.  217 
.  231 
loo,  117,  118 

.   221 

•   231 

.   219 

1 06 


187 
165 


78n 
244 

161 


INDEX  288 

Control,  PAGE 

Australian  correspondence  with  Admiralty  as  to        .        162-163 
Australian,  for  flotilla  proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin          .          .163 
decentralization  of  Naval         .....       255-257 

joint,  of  Imperial  Forces          ......     200 

of  Admiralty  in  War       .......     200 

of  Canadian  forces  in  war,  Mr.  Borden  on          .          .       176-178 
of  Canadian  Naval  Service  in  peace  and  war  .          .          .     175 
of  Canadian  ships  by  Admiralty      .         .          .         .          .190 

of  common  forces,  Lord  Milner  on  .         .          .          .       257-258 

of  Dominion  ships, 

a  matter  of  Imperial  Representation    .          .          .       186-187 
and  withholding  in  war    ....         176-178,  201 

of  Naval  Services  of  Dominions       ....       182,  183 

single, 

of  Navy,  bedrock  of  Imperial  Unity  .         .         .201 

of  Navy,  essential  to  effective  Defence       .         .          .191 

Controlling  power, 

over  Admiralty  and  War  Office  necessary         ...       20 

Convoy, 

in  case  of  invasion  attacked  by  torpedoes        ...       68 

Cooper,  Sir  Daniel, 

on  special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League         .   11572 

Corbett,  Mr.  Julian  S., 

definition  of  Command  of  Sea          .         .         .         .         .     i8n 

Costa  Rica  Packet  case          .......     204 

Council  (see  under  "  Naval  and  Military  "  and  "  Imperial  Council  "). 

Cox,  Mr.  Harold, 

on  Colonies  and  Naval  Defence        .          .         .         .         .     145 

Cresswell,  Capt.  (now  Sir  W.), 

on  dangers  to  Australian  Commerce  .  .  .  .145 
Report  on  Naval  Defence  of  Australia,  1905  .  .  .143 
suggestion  for  coast-defence  squadron  .  .  .  .143 

Crewe,  Rt.  Hon.  Marquis  of, 

on  Invasion  problem  and  functions  of  Home  Army  .       80 

Crimea, 

maritime  supremacy  of  England  and  France  .  .  •  9 
military  drama  in,  public  and  .  .  ...  9 


Deakin,  the  Hon.  Alfred, 

introduction  of  Defence  Scheme,  1907      .          .  .     161 

on  interchange  of  troops 


on  "  measure  of  responsibility  " 

on  Mr.  Hofmeyr's  proposal  at  1887  Conference 

on  Naval  Agreement  of  1902  . 

on  right  of  Colonies  to  consult  Defence  Committee 

on  Secretariat  proposal    .... 

on  voice  in  foreign  affairs,  and  part  in  defence 

Resolution  at  1907  Conference 


•  154 

•  "3 
155-156 

.  152 
227-228 

.  162 
226-228 


284  INDEX 

Decentralization,  PAGE 

of  control  impossible  for  Navy   .....       255-257 
of  effort  in  provision  of  men  and  material       .          .          .     256 

Defence  (see  also  under  "  Home,"  "  Imperial,"    "  Defence  of  the 

Empire,"  etc.), 

against  enemy  when  landed,  Commission  of  1859  and     .       n 
principles  of  British         .......         6 

provision  of,  taken  by  Dominions  as  matter  of  course     .          .     225 
regarded  by  Newfoundland  as  not  of "  public  benefit  "  .          .     225 

Defence  Committee  of  the  Cabinet, 

an  imposture.          .......          56  $6n 

independent  of  House  of  Commons   .....       44 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on     .          .          .          .          .          .          .     $6n 

reconstitution  of  by  Mr.  Balfour      .          .         .          .          -57 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        .......       56 

Defence,  Military  (see  under  "  Military  Defence  "). 

Defence,  National, 

not  limited  to  United  Kingdom       .         .         .         .  19 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  meaning  of  .         .         .         .15 

Defence,  Naval  (see  under  "  Naval  Defence  ") 

Defence  of  Great  Britain, 

by  Volunteer  force.          .          .          .          .          .         .  13 

Defence  of  the  Empire  (see  also  under  "  Naval  Defence  "and 

"  Military  Defence  "), 
as  a  whole     ........  20,  57 

as  basis  of  Imperial  Federation        ....  120 


basis  of  policy 

bearing  on  Imperial  unity        ..... 

campaign  of  Sir  John  Colomb  .... 

Canadian  ships  for.          ...... 

considered  during  Mr.  Borden's  visit,  1912  . 

dependent  upon  co-operation  of  Naval  and  Mili tary  forces 

Dominions  sharing  must  share  in  policy 

each  portion  defended  as  part  of  whole  . 

House  of  Commons  reviewing.          .... 

military  programme  of  Sir  John  Colomb . 
military,  "  secondary  to  Naval  security  " 
Mr.  Haldane  on  three  great  principles 
mobilization  of  troops  for,  made  practicable,  1909 
"  no  combined  plan  of  operations,"  Hartington  Commission 
on  ......  • 

not  merely  defence  of  United  Kingdom  . 

primary  requirements  of. 

regulation  of  policy  by  United  Kingdom. 

Sir  E.  Hutton  on  organization  in  Canada  and  Australia 

supervision  of  moneys  provided  for. 


5 

8 

190 

187 

38 

238 

8 

44 
126 

M 

150 
172 

29 

116 

7 


208 


Defence  of  United  Kingdom  (see  also  under  "  Invasion  of  Eng 

land  "), 
large  army  not  required.         .         .         .         .         .         •       1  \ 

Militia  and 

Royal  Commission  on  (1859)  .....         .  10-11 


INDEX  285 

Defences,  PAGE 

fixed  local,  Admiral  Colomb  on  value  of.  .     i+n 

Departments, 

relations  between  ,  Hartington  Commission  on     .          .     28,  29,  30 

Derby,  Rt.  Hon.  Earl  of, 

on  King  George's  Sound  and  Thursday  Island  .          .      109 

Despatch  of  Mr.  Alfred  Lyttelton, 

attitude  of  Dominions  towards         ....       224-228 
on  Imperial  Council,  Secretariat,  etc.        .          .          .       223-227 

Destroyers, 

opportunities  during  disembarkation          ....       69 
provision  of ,  by  South  Africa      .          .          .          .          .          .157 

Destroyers  and  Submarines, 

flotilla  of,  proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin.          .          .          .          .162 

Devonshire,  Duke  of, 

as  President  of  Defence  Committee.          ....       46 
letter  to,  from  Sir  John  Colomb      .          .          .          .          .46 

Dilke,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Charles, 

and  lessons  of  history     .         .          .         .          .          .          .38 

and  Mr.  Spenser  Wilkinson, 

views  on  Invasion     .......       90 

views  on  territorial  attack         .          .          .          .          .     4i« 

on  1902  Conference          .         .          .          .          .          .          .   131** 

Disembarkation,  g&| 

means  for,  in  relation  to  invasion    .....       40 
of  invading  force,  Lord  Roberts  on  ....       77 

of  70,000  men  in  case  of  invasion   .....       69 

Disposition  of  forces, 

Admiral  Mahan  on  .  .          .          .          .          .          .    145^ 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        .......       13 

systematic  consultation  necessary     .....     202 

Distribution, 

of  military  force  in  reference  to  naval  power  .          .          .19 

Distribution  of  Commerce, 

need  for  study  of,  .         .         .  .         .          .  22-23 

Divided  Responsibility, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        .......        27 

Dominion  Ministers, 

other  than  Premiers  at  Conferences  .          .         .         .220 

Dominion  Parliaments, 

proposal  for  Committees  in  .         .          .         248-251,  261 

representation  in  London,   1911         ....     250,  25 in 

Dominions  (see  also  under  "  Colonies  "), 

omission  to  include  in  scheme  of  Defence          ...         7 
word  substituted  for  "  Colonies "  .          .          .          .     220 

Dominions  and  Defence  Committee  (see  also  wider  "  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence"), 

representation  "  pending  a  final  solution  "  .          .          .          .214 
right  to  consult      .          .         .         .          .         .          .          .152 

Dominions  and  Foreign  Affairs, 

examples  of  interest  in      .......     204 

Lord  Esher  on  confidence  between  Premiers     .          ,          .     209 


286  INDEX 

Dominions  and  Foreign  Affairs,  continued —  PAGE 

Mr.  Fisher  on  more  definite  consultation.          .          .          .     233 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        ......       203-204 

systematic  consultation  necessary     .....     202 

Dominions  and  Naval  Defence  (see  also  under  "  Colonies  and 

Naval  Defence  "). 

Admiralty  proposals  for  Fleet  units          .          .         .       169-170 
arrangements  for  ships  entering  foreign  ports        .          .       182-183 
at  1907  Conference  .....       152-159 

at  1909  Conference          ......       165-171 

at  1911  Conference,  arrangements  for  Naval  services  .       181-184 
duty  to  contribute,  Dr.  Smartt  on  . 

placing  ships  under  Admiralty  in  war          .          .         176-177,  186 
withholding  ships  in  war          ....         176-178,  201 

Dominions  and  the  Army, 

discussion  at  1911  Conference .          .          .          .          .          .185 

desirability  of  common  conception  .          .         .          .          .149 

no  obligation  to  serve  in  an  Imperial  Army  ....      186 

sections  of  Imperial  General  Staff  oversea         .          .          .185 

Dominions  and  United  Kingdom, 

demand  of  equality  of  political  status      ....     200 
now  at  "  parting  of  ways  "...  .     263 

Dominions  Department  of  Colonial  Office, 

and  secretariat        .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .230 


E 

Education  of  Officers, 

bedrock  of  Imperial  Military  organization         .          .         .185 

Egypt,  Napoleonic  expedition  to    .          .          .          .          .          .9 

Admiral  Mahan  on.         .          .          .          .          .          .  gn 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        .......       gn 

Egyptian  Campaign, 

Colonial  offer  of  troops  for  .          .          .          .          .     101 

Elgin,  Rt.  Hon.  Earl  of, 

Despatch  relating  to  next  Conference       ....     147 
influence  of  permanent  officials  on  .         .          .          .       220 
opposition  to  Secretariat  proposal    .          .         .          .          .229 
prefers  word  "  Colonies  "  to  "  Dominions  "       .         .          .220 

Empire, 

as  single  organism  ........         7 

Defence  of  (s«  under  "  Defence  "). 

Great  Britain  and  maritime    ......         6 

part  at  peace  while  rest  at  war       .         .          .          .       176,  201 

unity  of,  Sir  John  Colomb  and        ..... 

Empire  Club  of  Canada I*S4 

Empire  Parliamentary  Association, 

formation  of  ........  251* 

Mr.  R.  L.  Borden's  declaration  at  .         .         .  .239 

Esher,  Viscount, 

on  Dominions  and  foreign  affairs     .....     209 


INDEX  287 

Esher  (Lord),  Committee,  PAGE 

and  permanent  nucleus  for  Defence  Committee         .          .       63 
and  Royal  Commission  on  War  in  South  Africa     .  .       63 

constitution  of         ......  -63 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster  and  .......       72 

Mr.  Haldane  on  work  of          ......     53% 

Report  of        ........  62-63 

Sir  George  Clarke  on       .......       72 

Esquimalt, 

force  at,  under  General  at  Halifax  .....       46 

Ewart,  Mr.  John  S., 

as  advocate  of  Canadian  Nationalism       ....   i8on 
on  impracticabiltiy  of  Imperial  Federation       .          .          .    ngn 

Expeditionary  Force, 

for  oversea,  policy  at  1909  Conference     .          .          .          .172 
Mr.  Haldane  on      ........      149 

Expenditure, 

military,  Sir  John  Colomb  on.          .          .          .          .          .49 

on  fortifications       ........         4 

on  useless  works     ........       77 

wasteful,  and  Royal  Commission  of  1859  .          .          .12 

wasteful,  due  to  divorce  between  Admiralty  and  War  Office   .       25 

External  Affairs  (see  under  "  Minister  for  ")." 

F 

Federal  Council, 

Mr.  J.  Chamberlain  on  .          .          .          .          .          .          .     216 

Federation  (see  under  "  Australian  Federation,"  "  Imperial  Feder- 
ation   (Defence)    Committee,"    "  Imperial    Federation 
League  "), 

Federation  of  Australia .          ......       102,109 

Field  Army, 

Australian       ........  109^,  127** 

Canadian         .........   128^ 

efficiency  destroyed  by  garrison  work       ....       45 

"  ever  decreasing,"  Sir  John  Colomb  on        ....       49 

Fisher,  Rt.  Hon.  Andrew, 

on  biennial  Conferences  .......     245 

on  consultation  in  Foreign  Affairs   .....     233 

on  Imperial  Advisory  Council.          .....     237 

on  Standing  Committee  proposal      .          .          .          .          .232 

Five  Naval  Commandants, 

Report  of,  on  Australian  Defence    .          .          .          .          .141 

Fixed  Defence, 

Admiral  Colomb  on  value  of  .         .          .          .          .  i^n 

Flag, 

of  Dominion  Naval  Services    .         .  163,  178.  182 

Fleet, 

and  maritime  supremacy  during  Crimean  War  .         .       10 

concentration  of  in  Home  Waters    .          .          .          .          .188 

"  decoyed  away  " 41,  42« 

defence  of  coasts  by,  Mr.  Haldane  on      .         ,         .         .75 


288  INDEX 

Fleet,  continued —  PAGE 

disabled  by  storm,  Royal  Commission  of  1859  and          .          .       1 1 
evasion  of  by  invading  force  ......       83 

in  Baltic  and  Black  Seas         .          .          .          .          .          .10 

moral  effect  of,  in  South  African  War     .          .          .  <$o 

overpowered,  Royal  Commission  of  1859  and   .          .          .11 
paralysis,  if  insufficient  military  forces     .          .          .          .19 

primary  business  of.  Sir  John  Colomb  on          .          .          -95 
restriction  of  action,  Sir  John  Colomb  on 

sea-going  and  naval  bases,  primary  requirements  .          .          .116 
strong,    whether   additional   measures   necessary   for   food 

supply      .........       91 

"  temporarily  absent,"  Royal  Commission  of  1 859  and  .         .       n 

"  Fleet  in  Being," 

Admiral  Colomb  and       .......     45*1 

Admiral  Mahan  and          .         .         .          .          .          .          .     45 n 

as  originated  by  Torrington     .         .          .          .          .  44*1 

definition  by  Mr.  J.  R.  Thursfield 63 

doctrine  of     .........       43 

Fleet  Units, 

Admiralty  proposals  at  1909  Conference  .          .          .       169-170 
for  Australia,  proposals  for      .          .         .         .          .          .170 

for  Canada,  not  considered  suitable  .          .          .          .170 

Food  Supply  (see  also  under  "  Royal  Commission  "), 

of  United  Kingdom  part  of  Naval  Intelligence       ...       23 

Forces  (see  also  under  "  Distribution  "  and  "  Military  "), 

Colonial,  Memo  on  service  of  .          .          .          .          .     1 1 1 

Foreign  Affairs, 

and  Imperial  Conference.  .          .          .          .          .251 

authority  "  cannot  be  shared,"  Mr.  Asquith  on      .          .          .     237 
Committee  of,  proposal  for      .....       253,  260 

control  of  and  Defence  go  together.         .          .         162,  205,  206 
influence  of  Defence  Committee  on  .         .          .          .          .210 

influence  of  Dominions  on        .....       203-205 

information  as  to,  Mr.  Deakin  on    .         .          .          .          .     228 

information  as  to  and  demand  for  Representation          .       2 1 4-2 1 5 
Lord  Rosebery  on  Colonies  and  .          .         .          .          .205 

Mr.  Borden  on  sharing  responsibility  for  . 

Mr.  Chamberlain's  offer  of  voice  in.          .          .          .          .216 

Mr.  Fisher  on  more  definite  consultation. 

no  constitutional  voice  in,  cannot  continue  ....     202 

no  important  step  without  consultation    .  .214 

put  before  Dominion  Representatives  at  Defence  Committee  .  187 
Secretariat  in  relation  to,  Mr.  Deakin  on  .  .  227-228 
Sir  H.  Campbell-Bannerman  on  Defence  and  .  162,  205,  206 
to  be  considered  by  Imperial  Council  .  .  .  207, 208 

Foreign  Intelligence  Committee      .         .         .         .         .         -24 

Foreign  Navies, 

growth  of,  statement  by  Premier     ...  .164 

Foreign  Policy  (see  under  "  Foreign  Affairs  "). 

Forrest,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  John, 

Memo  against  Australian  separate  Fleet  .          .  .      i  •  •; 

on  Representation  of  Dominions  at  Admiralty       .         .  i  •;  •; 


INDEX  289 

Forster,  Rt.  Hon.  W.  E.t  PAGB 

and  Imperial  Federation  League      .         .         .         .         •       99 

Forster,  Rt.  Hon.  H.  O.  Arnold-  (see  ~  under  "  Arnold-Forster  "). 

Fortifications, 

and  Defence  of  United  Kingdom     .         .         .         .  10,  li 

at  Plymouth,  Portsmouth,  etc.. 

Admiral  Colomb  on nn 

Sir  John  Colomb  on          ......       13 

expenditure  on  .....         4 

Inspector  General  of,  and  cost  of  barracks       ...       47 
Royal  Commission  of  1859  and        ....     IO-H,  13 

Forts, 

expenditure  on  in  relation  to  Invasion          .         .         .         .10 
Lord  Palmerston  and      ......  10-11 

Foster,  Hon.  George  E., 

criticism  of  Laurier  Naval  Scheme  .          .         .         .         .175 
on  Canada's  part  in  Defence  Conference       ....   17511 

France, 

and  Invasion  of  England, 

Mr.  Balfour  on .          .          .          .          .          .          .  67-68 

Sir  John  Colomb  on          ......       39 

and  Newfoundland  Fishery  Question         ....     204 

as  possible  invader,  Lord  Roberts  on       .         .          .         .       77 

as  potential  invader,  Mr.  Balfour  on  .         .67 

carrying  power  to  transport  100,000  men          ...       28 
Channel  and  Atlantic  ports  of          .....       67 

ports  and  transport         .          .          .         .         .          .          -39 

vessels  available  for  transport          .....       40 

Franco-German  War, 

and  "  passive "  Defence  .         .          .          .          .          .         .17 

influence  on  English  opinon    .          .          .          .          .         .17 

Free  Storage  of  Grain    ........       92 

French-Canadians, 

adherents  of  status  quo   .  .          .          .          .          .          .158 

attitude  towards 

closer  union  and  annexation          .          .         .         .         .179 

Independence    .  .         .         .         .         .         .180 

influence  on  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier        .         .         .         .158, 224 

Functions  of  Navy  and  Army, 

ill-defined 28 

relation  of  44 


Garrisons, 

increasing  Military  expenditure  on  .  .  .  .  .49 
Garrisons,  Colonial, 

locking  up  troops  in  .          .          .          .          .          .44 

General  Staff, 

to  receive  an  Imperial  character      .         .         .         .         .149 


290  INDEX 

German  Fleet, 

expansion  not  provoked  by  British  increases  .  .  .188 
most  striking  feature  of  Naval  situation  .  .  .  .187 
rise  of,  and  effect  on  Great  Britain  ....  i88n 

German  Naval  Development, 

Sir  John  Colomb  and  extra  burden  in  North  Sea     .         .168 

German  Naval  Power, 

rise  of,  showing  burden  of  defence  .....     225 

German  policy, 

influence  on  War  Office, 

Mr.  Haldane  on        .-».....     5311 
Sir  John  Colomb  on          ......       52 

Germany, 

as  possible  invader,  Lord  Roberts  on  .          .          -77 

Gladstone.  Rt.  Hon.  W.  E., 

Deputation  of  Imperial  Federation  League  to  .  .  117-118 
on  nature  and  powers  of  Imperial  Council  .  .  .118 

Goschen,  Rt.  Hon.  G.  J.  (afterwards  Lord), 

on  Canada  and  Navy  at  1897  Conference  .  .  .122 
on  responsibility  for  Defence  of  Australia  .  .  .122 

Grey,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Edward, 

and  Sir  F.  Pollock's  Committee  .....  222 
as  one  of  Liberal  Imperial  group  .  .  .  .  .  147 

H 

Haldane,  Rt.  Hon.  R.  B.  (now  Lord), 

and  Sir  F.  Pollock's  Committee       .....     222 

as  one  of  Liberal  Imperial  group     .          .          .          .          .147 

as  War  Secretary,  welcomed  by  Mr.  Arnold-Forster .          .       74 
on  abandonment  of  Wei-hai-wei       .....       48 

on  Blue-Water  principles          ......     5311 

on  Colonial  Troops  for  Oversea  Service    .          .          .          .151 

on  force  which  Navy  should  intercept      ....       75 

on  Home  Defence   .          .         .          .          .          .         .         53»,  75 

on  Imperial  General  Staff        .....       149-151 

on  striking  force  oversea.         ....          53*1,  75,  172 

on  Territorial  organization       .         .         .         .         .       149,  151 

on  three  great  principles  of  Defence         .          .          .          .150 

schemes  based  on  sound  principles  .          .         .          -74 

Halifax, 

General  at,  in  control  of  force  at  Esquimalt  ...  46 
Naval  College  at 181 

Harcourt,  Rt.  Hon.  Lewis, 

on  Standing  Committee  of  Conference      ....     232 

Hartington  (Lord)  Commission, 

and  Naval  and  Military  Council      .          .  30,  31,  207,  20711 

Report  of       ........  28-31 

Hedgerows, 

Defence  of      .........         4 

High  Commissioners, 

attendance  at  Conferences  considered       ....     220 


INDEX  291 

History,  »AGE 

Defensive,  necessity  for  .paying  attention  to 
Hofmeyr,  Mr.  J.  H., 

proposals  for  cost  of  Defence  at  1887  Conference      .       112-113 
Mr.  Deakin  on         ..          .          .          .          .         •         •     "3 

Holland,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Henry  (now  Lord  Knutsford), 

and  Australian  Squadron          .....  107 


as  Colonial  Secretary 

as  Member  of  Carnarvon  Commission 

on  findings  of  Carnarvon  Commission 

on  "  local  aspects  "  of  Imperial  Defence 

on  Thursday  Island  and  King  George's  Sound. 


103** 

103 
103 
103 
a a       no 

Home  Army, 

functions  of ..          .         .         .  80,  83 

Home  Defence, 

citizen  army  for     .          .          .          .         »•'••*          .          .      148 
in  front  rank,  Mr.  Brodrick  on  .         .          .  37 

Mr.  Balfour  on  66,  67,  68,  69,  70 

Mr.  Brodrick.  on      .         .          .          .          .          .          .         51. 5™ 

Mr.  Haldane.on     ........  ....     53« 

Home  Government, 

at  1887  Conference,  inability  to  grasp  principles       .         .102 

Home  Ports  Defence  Committee "    .          .          .         ,          .  8in 

Home  Rule, 

Lord  Milner  on  harmless  form  of     .          .          .          .         .     242 

Home  Rule  All  Round, 

Lord  Milner  on       ........     242 

measure  of  .        ..        ..         ..          .         -          .         .     243 

Sir  Joseph  Ward  on  .          ...          .         .          .     236 

Hordern,  Lieut.  L.  H., 

letters  to,  from  Sir  John  Colomb     .         .         .  i68«,  255 

proposal  for  Navy  Boards        ......     255 

House  of  Commons, 

representation  of  Dominions  in,  Lord  Milner  on  .  240-242 
representation  of  Dominions  in,  objections  to  .  .  .  243 
review  of  Military  and  Naval  Policy  together  ...  44 
Rules  of,  when  discussing  Army  and  Navy  .  .  26,  27,  55 
Vote  for  Defence  Committee  providing  opportunity  for  dis- 
cussion .  ...  .  .  .  -65 

Hutton,  Lieut.  Gen.  Sir  Edward,1 

on  Australian  Military  Defence         .         .         .         .          .   iifn 
Report  on  Canadian  Forces     .         .         .        *         .         .  127*1 


Imperial  and  Colonial  Responsibilities  in  War, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on        ....         .          .          «       97 

Imperial  Appeal  Court, 

considered  at  Conferences        .         .         .         .         .         .221 

Imperial  Army, 

no  obligation  on  Dominions  to  serve  in  .         .         .          .186 

proposals  for,  at  1909  Conference 172 

Sir  John  Colomb's*  proposals  for      ....         .     126 


292 


INDEX 


Imperial  Assembly, 

Lord  Milner  on  Parliament  as 
Imperial  Board  of  Admiralty, 

suggestions  for 

to  give  share  in  control  of  ships 
Imperial  Commission, 

attached  to  Conference   . 

Canadian  suspicion  about 

enquiry  by,  on  Naval  Defence 

idea  of  . 

on  Trade,  appointed  1911 

Sir  John  Colomb  on 
Imperial  Conference  (see  also  under  ' 

annual  meetings  of 

appointment  of  British  Premier  as  President,  1907  . 

as  deliberative  Assembly  of  Empire 

as  representative  institution  considered    . 

biennial  meetings  of,  suggested 

continuous  existence  of  . 

evolution  of   . 

fear  of  decisive  action     ..... 

how  hampered  in  action  .... 

Mr.  Asquith  as  President  of    . 

more  frequent  meetings  necessary    . 

organization  to  provide  continuity  considered  . 

proposal  to  assist  by  Parliamentary  Committees 

proposal  to  change  name  to  Council 

sessions  and  constitution  of     . 

Standing  Committee  of,  proposal     . 

subjects  not  prepared  beforehand     . 

unanimous  decision  a  binding  force 

with  control  over  Defence,  Mr.  Borden  on 
Imperial  Conference  of  1911, 

Constitution  of 

Military  Defence  at 

Naval  Defence  at   . 

proposals  at  . 
Imperial  Constitution, 

evolution  of  . 

Mr.  Amery  on 

Imperial   Co-operation  League  (see  also  "  Imperial  Federation 
[Defence]  Committee), 

work  of.          ...... 

Imperial  Council, 

as  proposed  by  Imperial  Federation  League 

compared  with  Defence  Committee 

despatch  of  Mr.  Alfred  Lyttelton  concerning 

General  Botha  opposed  to       ... 

Lord  Milner  on       ..... 

Memorial  by  300  M.P.'s  on  . 
Mr.  Chamberlain  on  powers  of 
Mr.  Dcakin  on,  at  1907  Conference 


PAGE 
.     242 

254,  255.  262 
186-187 

246,  261 

225 

166 

.    166,  223,  224,  246.  247,  261 

166 

166,  247 
Colonial  Conference  "), 

245,  251,  260 
.     219 
.     244 
217-229 
.       245, 260 
.     244 
.     246 
.     246 
.  246 

165,  219 
245,  251,  260 
221-233 
248-251,  261 
.       224,  227 

.  221 

.  232 

.  246 

.  221 

.  212 


220-221 
.   I85 

181-184,  186 
.   231-238 

.   246 


I20H, I2I» 

.  207 
.  208 
223-227 

241.  257 

216,  217 
226-228 


INDEX  293 

Imperial  Council,  continued —  PAGE 
Mr.  Fisher  on,  at  1911  Conference  .....     237 

Mr.  Gladstone  on  nature  and  powers  of  .          .          .  .118 

Sir  F.  Pollock's  proposals        .....  222,  223 

Imperial  Council  of  Defence, 

objections  to  Sir  J.  Ward's  proposals       .          .          .  236, 237 

Sir  J.  Ward  on  constitution  and  powers  of      .         .  234,  235 

Imperial  Customs  Tariff, 

Mr.  Hofmeyr's  proposal  at  1887  Conference      .          .  .113 

Imperial  Defence  (see  also  under  "  Committee  of  Imperial  De- 
fence," "  Defence  of  the  Empire,"  etc.). 

as  new  revelation   .          .         .          .         .         .         .  .21 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on         .         .          .         .         .         .  121,  132 

burden  of,  Mr.  Gladstone  on  .          .          .          .          .  .118 

burden  of,  Mr.  Hofmeyr's  proposals,  1887         .          .  112,  113 

Canada's  part,  Sir  A.  Campbell  on,  1887           .          .  .112 

cost  of,  Mr.  Chamberlain  at  1902  Conference     .          .  .132 

cost  of,  not  mainly  for  Home  interests    .          .          .  .121 

Imperial  Federation  League  and  Mr.  Gladstone         .  117-118 

Representation  at  root  of  problem  ....  193,  199 

Sir  Henry  Holland  on  "  local  aspects  "of        .          .  .103 

Imperial  Defence  Organization, 

absence  of  Representation  main  difficulty          .          .  .     198 

Imperial  Federation, 

Defence  as  basis  of  any  Scheme      .          .          .          .  .120 

Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee, 

and  decentralization  of  naval  control        ....     256 

change  of  name  to  Imperial  Co-operation  League     .  .    12 iw 

Col.  Seely  and  Sir  John  Colomb  at  meeting  of         .  211,  2iin 

Deputation  to  Mr.  Balfour      .         .          .          .          .  .142 

Lord  Milner  and     .         .          .         .          .          .          .  .     257 

enthusiastically  in  accord  with     .          .  .241 

Sir  John  Colomb  as  Chairman  of     .          .          .          .  .166 

work  of.          .          .          .          .         ...          .  .      120 

Imperial  Federation  League, 

agreed  that  common  defence  essential       .          .          .  .100 

Australian  Branch  of       .         .          .         .          .         .  114*7,  12 iw 

Deputation  to 

Lord  Salisbury          .         .         .          .          .          .  .115 

Mr.  Gladstone            ......  117-118 

dissolution  of,  and  reasons  for          .          .          .          .  119,  11992 

formation  of  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .  24,  99,  120 

Journal  of       ........  99,  loin 

Lord  Rosebery  and          .......   191  n 

Mr.  E.  Stanhope  and      ......  101,  117 

Report  of  Special  Committee  .          .          .  115,  116,  206,207 

Resolution  at  formation  of  .          .          .          ...       99 

Sir  John  Colomb 

as  founder  of,.         .         .         .         .         .         .  .99 

on  Special  Committee  of           .          .          .          .  .115 

suggestions  acted  upon,  at  1897  Conference      ,          ,  ,     $24 


294  INDEX 

Imperial  Forces,  PACK 

joint  control  of     -  .       •  .          .          .          .          .          .          .     200 

Imperial  Franchise, 

injustice  of  excluding  Dominions  from      ....     202 

Imperial  General  Staff, 

as  school  of  Military  thought  .          .          .          .          .150 

Australian  section  of  .          .          .          .          .          .185 

Canadian  section  of         .          .          .          .          .          .          .185 

Chief  of,  Chairman  of  sub-Conference.   IC»OQ      .          .          .172 
discussed  at  1907  Conference  ....         149.  150,  151 

New  Zealand  section  of  .         .         .         .         .         .         .185 

subjects  dealt  with  locally       .          .          .          .          .          .185 

Imperial  Government, 

at  1887  Conference,  pursued  line  of  least  resistance  .     105 

Imperial  Navy, 

movement  of  ships  .         .          .          .          .          .          .192 

Imperial  Office, 

proposal  for   .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .       229, 261 

to  link  up  Governments  between  Conferences  .          .          .     252 
under  British  Prime  Minister  ......     262 

Imperial  Organization, 

Mr.  Balfour  on       ........     146 

Sir  F.  Pollock's  proposals        ....       222-223.  226*1 

Imperial  Parliament, 

inadequacy  of,  Mr.  Borden  on          .          .          .          .          .239 

Imperial  Parliament  of  Defence. 

Sir  Joseph  Ward's  proposals   .....       234-237 

Imperial  Partnership, 

as  solution  of  Defence   difficulties.  Sir  J.  Colomb   on  259 

day  for,  arrived,  Sir  J.  Ward  on  .          .          .          .     234 

Imperial  Representation, 
at  Admiralty, 

proposals  for    ......         254.  255,  262 

Sir  John  Forrest  on          .         .         .         .         .         .133 

at  root  of  Defence  problem,  Sir  John  Colomb  on     .       193,  199 
Col.  Seely's  proposals      ......       211,212 

Dominion  Representatives  getting  "  out  of  touch  "  .          .     213 
Dominions  and  responsibility  to  Parliament      .         .          .213 
"  faced  resolutely  and  solved  soon  "         .          .          .          .264 

in  House  of  Commons,  Lord  Milner  on    .          .          .        240-242 
main  difficulty  in  Defence  organization    . 

Mr.  J.  Chamberlain  on,  at  1897  Conference        .  .216 

Mr.  J.  Chamberlain  on,  at  1902  Conference       .        133,  216,  217 
must  accompany  permanent  obligation,  Mr.  Bordrn  i-n     .     192 
no  definite  scheme  by  Home  Government         .  i  , 

offer  of,  now  essential     .....  .     206 

on  a  Naval  and  Military  Council     .....       36 

proposals  by  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  .  .       221-226 

shirked  by  politicians  at  Home        .          .          .          .          >     >99 

suggestion  that  OVWIM   Ministers  should  alternate     213.  260 
what  is  meant  by  *          .          .          .          .          •          •          .186 

Imperial  Reserve  Force, 

Canadian  Ministers  on,  at  1902  Conference       .  130 


INDEX  295 

Imperial  Reserve  Force,  continued —  PAGE 

furnished  by  Empire,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .  .  .126 
Mr.  Brodrick's  proposals,  1902  ....  128-130 
Mr.  Seddon's  Resolution,  1902  ....  126,  127 
New  Zealand  Act  to  provide  .  .  .  .  .  .126 

Imperial  Secretariat, 

and  foreign  affairs  .......       227-228 

Dr.  Jameson  and    ........     229 

expenses  of    .........     227 

Lord  Elgin  and       ........     229 

Mr.  Deakin  on        .......       226-228 

officials  of,  as  representatives  of  Prime  Ministers      .          .     230 
proposal  for  .........     223 

responsibility  to  Conferences    .          .         .          .         .         .230 

Sir  H.  Campbell-Bannerman  and      .....     229 

Sir  W.  Laurier  and 228 

under  control  of  Conference     .  228,  252 

Imperial  Unity, 

bed-rock,  single  control  of  Navy      .....     201 

Imperial  Water  Roads, 

security  of      .........       19 

Imperial  Yeomanry, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .         .          .          .          •          •       55 

Independent  Sea  Commerce, 

of  Colonies  compared  to  foreign  countries         ...       97 

Indian  Mutiny       .........         9 

Inspector  General  of  Fortifications  (see  under  "  Fortifications  "). 

Insular  Defence, 

a  sham  ..........       20 

Insular  Policy  of  Defence, 

an  influence  on  Dominions       .          .          .          .          .          .142 

Intelligence  (see  under  "  Naval,"  "  Commercial  "  and  "  Foreign  "). 

Intelligence  Department, 

suggested  formation  of    .          .          .          .          .         223,  252,  261 

Intelligence  Office, 

attached  to  Conference   .          .          .         .         .          .       246,  261 

Inter-Colonial  Conference, 

at  Sydney  in  1881  .......      106 

Interchange  of  Troops, 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on         .         .  .          .          .          .123 

Mr.  Deakin  on         ........      151 

Sir  F.  Borden  on    .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .      151 

Sir  J.  Ward  on       ........     151 

Invasion  of  England, 

a  chimera,  while  Fleets  protect        .....     42^ 

a  Naval  question    .......     37,  39,  77 

a  question  of  ports  and  transport    .....       39 

Admiralty  Notes  on         .......     84n 

at  time  of  Crimean  War          .         .         .         .         .         .10 

beliefs  of  Napoleon  and  Nelson        .....       77 

by  France      .          .          .          .          ...         .          •     39, 67-68 

by  Germany,  Lord  Roberts  on  .          .         .          -77 

Commission  of  1859  and          .         .         .         .         .          10,  n 


296  INDEX 

Invasion  of  England,  continued —  PAGE 

communication  between  Intelligence  Departments     .         .       27 
considerations  in  mind  of  invader    .....       40 

different  theories  of  Admiralty  and  War  Office          .         .       55 
impracticability  of,  Mr.  Asquith  on  ....       83 

investigated  by  Defence  Committee  ....       82 

Lord  Roberts, 

on  strong  army  to  prevent        .         .    76-78,  80,  82,  83,  84*1 
on  smallest  number  to  attempt          ....       67 

military  policy  based  on  assumption  of   .         .          .          -39 
Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on,  and  supremacy  of  Navy        .          .       64 
Mr.  Balfour's  1905  speech        .....  65-71 

opinions  of  Generals  and  Admirals  .....       66 

reason  for  military  ideas  on    .          .          .         .          .          -37 

Sir  John  Colomb, 

on  France  and          ......  39-40 

on  presumption  of    .         .         .         .         .          .          -17 

on  two-fold  aspect  of        ......       41 

smallest  number  of  men  to  attempt         ....       67 

suggestion  that  Army  and  Volunteers  inadequate      .          .       n 

War  Office  ideas  of 37 

Invasion  of  Empire, 

how  far  Navy  a  protection      ......       90 

Investment, 
of  United  Kingdom,  Sir  John  Colomb  on   .          .          .          .18 

J 

Jameson,  Dr.  L.  S.  (now  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Starr), 

support  of  Secretariat  proposal  .  .  .  .  .229 
Japan, 

and  Australian  Immigration  Bill  .....  204 
Japanese  War  (see  under  "  Russo-Japanese  "). 

K 

King  George's  Sound, 

Admiral  Tryon  on  .          .          .          .         .          .          .          .no 

armament  of.  Lord  Derby  on.          .          .          .          .         .109 

defences  of,  considered  at  1 887  Conference  .          .         106,109.110 
offer  of  W.  Australia  to  contribute  to  cost  of          .          .  110 

Sir  Henry  Holland  on     .          .          .          .          .          .          .no 

King's  Regulations, 

applied  to  Dominion  Naval  Forces  .          .          .          .          .183 

Kingsmill,  Rear-Admiral, 

as  Director  of  Canadian  Naval  Service    .          .          .          .181 

Kingston  Military  College, 

Cadets  from,  offered  commissions     .         .         .          .          -123 

Kitchener,  Field-Marshal  Viscount. 

comment  on  present  day  conditions.  Admiral  Mahan  on          .       911 

Knutsford.  Rt.  Hon.  Viscount  (see  under  "  Sir  Henry  Holland  "). 

L 

Labilliere,  Mr.  F.  P 99 

Lamington.  Lord, 

and  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  .          .          .120 
and  special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League  .  1 1 5*1 


INDEX  297 

Land  Frontiers  of  Empire,  PAGE 

relation  to  Navy  and  invasion  ...       90 


Sir  John  Colomb  on 
Landing  of  Hostile  Force, 

Mr.  Balfour  on        ... 

Royal  Commission  of  1 859  and  . 

Sir  John  Colomb  on 

War  Office  Intelligence  Department  on 


•  38 

66-68 
ii 

38-42 

•  27 


Laughton,  Prof.  Sir  John, 

on  territorial  attack         .          .         .         .          .          .          .     41** 

Laurier,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Wilfrid, 

against  committing  his  Government,   1907         .          .          .152 
and  closer  union  for  defence,  at  1 902  Conference   .          .          .  130*1 
and  French-Canadians      .         .         .         .          .         .158,  224 

attitude  repudiated  by  Canadian  people       .          .          .          .158 

Cabinet  of,  attitude  toward  Lyttelton  Despatch    .          .          .     224 
"  call  us  to  your  Councils,"  Mr.  Chamberlain's  reply       .          .133 
defeat  of,  at  General  Election          .....    138*1 

forced  to  take  step  in  Naval  Defence       .          .          .          .173 

in  favour  of  Canada  doing  nothing  for  Imperial  Defence  .      157 

on  Canada  being  drawn  into  "  European  Militarism  "    .          .    146** 
on  Canada  not  taking  part  in  wars  of  England        .          .176 
on  Canadian  ships  not  fighting  if  attacked    .          .          .        177,178 
on  impossibility  of  uniform  Naval  policy      .         .         .         .157 

opposition  of 

to  Canada  taking  part  in  securing  Naval  supremacy      .      173 
to  Dr.  Smartt's  Resolution         .          .          .          .          .158 

to  Secretariat  proposal      .         .          .          .          .       228,  231 

to  Sir  Joseph  Ward's  proposals,  1911         .         .          .     236 
to  Standing  Committee  proposal        ....     232 

to  Subsidiary  Conferences.          .....     231 

"  when  Britain  is  at  War  Canada  is  at  War,"         .          .          .176 

Leader  of  Opposition, 

proposal  for  attendance  at  Conferences     ....     250 

Liberal  Party, 

Imperial  group  of  .          .          .          .          .          .147 

Liberal  Policy, 

friendship  with  foreign  countries      .....      147 

Limitation  of  Armaments, 

as  policy  of  Liberal  party        ......      147 

Local  Defences, 

of  ports,  Admiral  Colomb  on  .          .          .          .          .          .      nw 

Local  Fixed  Defences, 

Admiral  Colomb  on  value  of  .          .          .          .          .          .      i4« 

Local  Function, 

of  Australian  Squadron  ceased,  Mr.  Deakin  on       .          .          .156 

Local  Navy, 

and  local  security,  Admiral  Mahan  on .          .  M5M 

contemplated  for  Canada  in  1902     .          .          .          .          .135 

for  Australia,  Sir  John  Colomb's  objections  to       .          .        159,  160 
political  rather  than  strategical  basis  of        ....      141 

strategical  objections  to.          .          .          .          .          .        141, 142 

training  and  discipline  of         .          .          .          .          .          .170 

wisdom  of  associating  with  Royal  Navy,  Mr.  Deakin  on .         .     156 


298  INDEX 

Local  Protection  of  Ports,  PAGE 

proposal  to  transfer  to  Admiralty    .....       46 

Local  security, 

not  dependent  on  local  ships.  Admiral  Mahan  on  .         .          .    145*1 

Local  Service, 

provision  of  smaller  vessels  for  Imperial  Squadron          .         .     153 

Local  Troops, 

for  garrisoning  works,  considered  at  1 887  Conference      .          .     104 

Localization  of  Naval  Forces, 

as  inviting  disaster.  Lord  Selborne  on  .          .          .140 

contemplated  by  Canada,  1902         .          .          .          .          .135 
Lord  Tweedmouth  on  .          .          .          .          .          .153 

Localized  Defence, 

explanation  of  Australian  view  at  1 887  Conference         .          .     103 

Locking  up  troops, 

in  Colonial  garrisons        .......       44 

London,  Defence  of, 

staff  and  buildings  for    .......       52 

Lords  and  Commons  Committee  (1911), 

Oversea  Parliaments  at  Coronation  ....     250,  25 1»: 

Loring,  Mr.  Arthur  H., 

as  Hon.  Sec.,  of  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee      .      120 
work  as  Secretary  of  Imperial  Federation  League.          .          .   i2on 

Lougheed,  Sen.  Hon.  J.  .A., 

on  Canadian  Navy  producing  severance  from  Gt.  Britain      178,  179 
on  direct  grant  and  Federal  Defence  Committee    .          .          .179 

Lyttelton,  Rt.  Hon.  Alfred, 

Despatch  relating  to  next  Conference  ....      147 

Despatch  relating  to  Council  and  Secretariat      .          .      223-227 

II 

Mahan,  Admiral  A.  T., 

on  Colomb  and  "  Fleet  in  Being  School  "         .          .          .     45* 
on  Napoleonic  Expedition  to  Egypt  .       9* 

on  Naval  needs  of  Australia    ....  .    144*1 

on  Nelson  and  Villeneuve        .... 

Marine  Forces, 

as  garrisons  for  Naval  bases   .          .  45~47 

Maritime  Defence, 

common  system  of.          .          .          .          .          .          .          .      120 

Maritime  Empire  (see  under  "  Empire  "). 

Maritime  War, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  realities  of  .          .          .          .21 

Memorandum, 

at  1887  Conference  on  service  of  Colonial  Forces      .  in 

of  Admiralty  for  Mr.  Borden's  Government      .          .       187-189 
of  Admiralty  on  most  effective  aid  from  Canada  .         .189 

of  Sir  John  Colomb        ....       i86»z,  1971;,  246,  263 

Mercantile  Fleet, 

resources  of,  relied  on  by  Food  Supply  Commission 

Merchant  Cruisers, 

and  Australian  Commerce,  Sir  John  Colomb  on     .  .     145 

hant  Navy  of  Empire. 

in  1880  equalled  tonnage  of  all  Navies    .  .104 


INDEX  299 


Merchant  Steamers,  PAGE 

adaptation  as  war  cruisers  .  .  .  .  «  .23 
of  great  powers,  speed  and  endurance  ....  95 

Midleton,  Rt.JHon.  Viscount  (seeunder  "  Brodrick,  Rt.  Hon.  St.  J.") 

Military  Defence, 

at  1907  Conference  ......        148-152 

at  1909  Conference  ......       171-172 

at  IQXI  Conference  .......     185 

Militia  and     ......... 

of  Empire, 

division  of  Army  into  two  parts    ....        148,149 

Mr.  Haldane  on  three  great  principles        .          .          .      150 
secondary  to  Naval  security      .          .          .          .          .14 

uniformity  in,  Mr.  Chamberlain  on    .          .          .        122-123 

Military  Defence  of  Australia, 

at  1887  Conference  .          .          .          .          .  .      in 

Sir  E.  Hutton  on  .          .          .          .          .          .          .          .    127** 

Military  Expedition, 

necessity  of  free  sea  for.          .          .          .          .          .          .43 

Military  Expenditure, 

object  during  early  nineteenth  century  ....  8 
on  garrisons  as  against  Field  Army  ....  49 

Military  Force, 

as  complement  to  Navy,  Sir  John  Colomb  on.  .  .  15 
at  strategic  points,  must  be  sufficient  .  ....  19 
liability  for  service  confined  to  shores,  Sir  J .  Colomb  on  .16 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  necessity  of  mobile  .  .  .  .18 
War  Office  doubt  as  to  functions  of  .  .  .  .125 

Military  Policy, 

and  Invasion  of  England          ......       39 

Military  Spirit, 

growth  of.  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .         .         .         .13 

Military  Works, 

Bill  of  1899 47 

resulting  from  Report  of  Royal  Commission  of  1859  .  .  12 
Sir  John  Colomb  on  .......  47 

Militia, 

and  growth  of  Military  spirit,  Sir  John  Colomb  on .          .          .        13 
as  Imperial  Force  .  ......       44 

for  Defence  of  British  Islands.          .....         8 

for  Imperial  duties  abroad       ......       33 

Home  and  Colonial  at  naval  bases  .....       45 

Militia  and  Volunteers, 

Royal  Commission  on  .          .          .          .          .          .62 

Militia,  Canadian, 

law  of  Dominion  as  to  defence  of  Canada  herself  .  .  .150 
under  Act,  male  population  liable  for  service  .  .  .174 

Milner,  Rt.  Hon.  Viscount, 

as  signatory  to  Pollock  Memorandum       ....     226 

letters  to  Sir  John  Colomb      .          .          .  240-243,  257-259 

on  Cape  Contribution      ......       240,  241 

on  control  of  Navy          .......     258 

90  decentralization  of  control.  T          ,       257-258 


300  INDEX 

Milner,  Rt .  Hon.  Viscount,  continued —  PAGE 

on  Imperial  Federation  .         .         .         .         .         .          .241 

on  Imperial  Representation      .....       240-243 

on  offer  of  power  to  Dominions       .         .         .          .          .241 

sympathy  with  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  241,  257 

Milner,  Sir  Alfred  (see  under  "Milner,  Rt.  Hon.  Viscount"). 

Minister  for  External  Affairs, 

proposal  for,  to  serve  in  London  .  .  .  213,214,260 
to  sit  on  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  ...  253 
to  sit  on  Defence  Committee  .  .  .  .  .  .253 

Mobile  Military  Force, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  necessity  of  .          .          .          .18 

Mobility  of  Army, 

increased  if  Naval  bases  under  Admiralty  ...  47 
want  of  ........  39,  44 

Monk,  Hon.  F.  D., 

on  proposals  for  Canadian  Navy      .         .         .         .  175 

Moor,  Rt.  Hon.  F.  R., 

on  Naval  Volunteers       .         .         .         .         .         .         -154 

"  Morning  Post," 

on  Sir  John  Colomb  as  pioneer  .....  3 
on  Sir  John  Colomb  and  "  Blue  Water  School  "  .  .  .  15*1 

Munro  Doctrine, 

Mr.  R.  L.  Borden  on  fancied  security  of  .          .          .180 

Sir  F.  Borden  on  protection  to  Canada          .          .          .          .   1 30*1 

Mutiny,  Indian      .........         9 

Myers,  Mr.  A.  M., 

proposal  for  Minister  of  External  Affairs          .          .          -213 

N 

Napoleon, 

belief  in  possibility  of  Invasion        .          .  -     77n 

contemplation  of  invasion        ......       67 

expedition  to  Egypt  9,  gn 

ignoring  elements  of  sea-power         .....         8 

Natal, 

and  Naval  Volunteers     .          .          .  .          .       154, 155 

offer  towards  cost  of  Navy  at  1902  Conference         .          .134 

National  Defence, 

meaning  of,  Sir  John  Colomb  on     .  •       *3 

not  limited  to  United  Kingdom       .  i«> 

worked  in  water- tight  compartments         .  -27 

National  instinct, 

of  oversea  countries         .         .          .          .          .  -215 

Naturalization, 

considered  at  Conferences        .         .         .         .  .221 

Naval  Agreement, 

of  1902  with  Australia,  Mr.  Deakin  on .  1 55-156 

Naval  and  Military  Conference,  1909.          ....        165-173 
Sir  John  Colomb's  consummation        .....     165 

Naval  and  Military  Council, 

Colonial  Representation  suggested  by  Sir  J.  Colomb  .       36 

Hartington  Commission  on  .         .         .30,  207, 20711 


INDEX  301 

Naval  and  Military  Forces,  PAGE 

not  mainly  for  Home  interests,  Mr.  Chamberlain  on     .  .     121 

Naval  Bases, 

and  sea-going  Fleet,  primary  requirements  .          .         .  .116 

dual  control  at                           .          .          .          .         .  .46 

garrisoning  of,  with  Marine  Forces  ....  45~47 

Naval  Board, 

under  Canadian  Naval  Service  Bill  .         .         .          .  .     174 

Naval  Cadetships, 

numbers  allotted  to  Dominions         .          .          .          .  .     155 

Naval  Defence  (see  also  under  "  Colonies  "  and  "  Dominions,"  etc.), 

and  foreign  affairs  going  together         .          .          .         .  .162 

at  1902  Conference,  .         .         . .        .          .          .         .  131-135 

at  1907  Conference           .                   ....  152-159 

at  1909  Conference           ......  169-171 

at  1911  Conference           ......  181-184 

burden  of,  Sir  J.  Colomb  on  .          .          .          .         .  .14 

Canadian  contribution  towards          .          .          .          .  .191 

Colonial  co-operation  in,  suggested  Conference      .        100,  118,  142 

Colonies  and,  need  for  consultation      .          .          .          .  .14 

Dr.  Smartt  on  obligation  of  Dominions   .          .          .  .154 

foundation  stones,  Sir  John  Colomb  on   .          .          .  .14 

of  Empire, 

enquiry  by  Imperial  Commission .         .         .         .  .166 

Mr.  Borden's  policy  to  provide  for          .         .         .  189-191 

policy  not  laid  down         .         .          .          .          .  .166 

responsibility  accepted  by  Lord  Tweedmouth          .  152-153 

Naval  Discipline  Act, 

applied  to  Dominion  Forces    .         .         .         .         .  .183 

Naval  Intelligence, 

Department  communicating  with  Military         .          .  -27 

Department,  creation  of  .        .         .          .         .         .  .24 

scanty  means  for  collecting      .          .          .          .          .  .22 

Sir  J.  Colomb's  lecture  on       .....  21-23 

Naval  Militia  of  Canada, 

Commissions  in                 .          .          .          .          .          .  .174 

Naval  Stations, 

of  Canada  and  Australia          .          .         .          .          .  .182 

Naval  Volunteers, 

Natal,  Mr.  Moor  on         .......     154 

South  Africa  and    ...         .         .         .          .  .     155 

Navies, 

growth  of  foreign,  statement  by  the  Premier  .          .  .164 

Navy  (see  also  under  "  Colonies  "  and  "  Dominions  "), 

and  exclusive  control  of  British  Parliament      .          .  .     258 

as  common  property  of  Empire,  Lord  Milner  on    .         .  .     258 
as  protection  against  Invasion         .                   ...       90 


British,  Australian  Navy  part  of     . 
British,  Mr.  Deakin  on  functions  of 
Cape  gift  of  ^35,000  towards  cost  of     . 
Cape  offer  of  battleship  to 
Colonial  co-operation  in  maintenance  of 
control  of,  Lord  Milner  on       . 


.  163 
.  162 
.  124 

122,  123,  124 
.  I42 
.  258 


302  INDEX 


Navy  (see  also  under  "Colonies  "  and  Dominions),  "  conid.  — 

intercepting  invading  force  of  70,000  .  .          .          -75 

local,  contemplated  by  Canada  in  1902    .          .          .  135 

local  provision  for  smaller  craft       .          .          .          .  153 

local,  strategical  objections  to  .  .          .          .          .     141 

power  of,  during  Crimean  War  .  .  .  .  .10 
relation  of  to  Army,  Hartington  Commission  on  .  28-29 

ships  rather  than  men  wanted  for  .  .  .  .  .  155 
single  control  of,  bedrock  of  Imperial  unity  .  .  .  .  201 
splitting  up  of.  Lord  Milner  on  .....  258 
strength  of,  looked  to  by  Food  Supply  Commiiision.  .  93 
supremacy  of,  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on  .  .  .64 

the  "  shield  "  and  Army  the  "  spear  "     .          .         .          .16 

Navy  and  Army, 

connexion  between,  Mr.  Arnold-Forster  on  .  73 

discussed  together  on  Vote  for  Defence  Committee         .          .       <>s 
discussion  under  Rules  of  House      .....       55 

functions  ill-defined          .......       28 

inter-relation     of     ........         7 

need  for  consultation,  Mr.  Balfour  on  .          .          -59 

relations,  Colonial  misconception  of.          .          .          .          .142 

relations  of,  Hartington  Commission  on      ...  28-29 

Navy  Boards, 

for  Oversea  Dominions   .....          254-256,  262 

Navy  of  the  Empire, 

Lord  Milner  and     ...          .....     258 

Sir  John  Colomb  and      .  .256 

Sir  John  Forrest  on  .          .          .          .          .          .133 

Nelson, 

belief  in  impossibility  of  Invasion    .  -77 

pursuit  of  Villeneuve       .......     43*1 

Newfoundland, 

and  Naval  Reserve  .          .          .          .          .  154 

offer  towards  cost  of  R.N.R.  at  1902  Conference  .  .134 
revenue  required  for  "  public  benefit  "  .  .  .  225 

Newfoundland  Fishery  Question     ......     204 

New  Hebrides  Question          .......     204 

New  South  Wales, 

and  Costa  Rica  Packet  Case   ......     204 

and  Victoria,  offer  of  "  Dreadnought  "     .          .          .         .164 

external  trade  of    .          .         ...         .          .          .          -97 

New  Zealand, 

contribution  applied  to  China  Unit.          .  -171 

offer  at  1902  Conference.         ....  .     134 

offer  of  "  Dreadnought  "          ......     164 

Representation  by  alternating  Ministers  .          .          .       213,  260 

New  Zealand  and  Pacific,     . 

Sir  J.  Colomb  on  naval  position      .  .  .168 

Next  step, 

rests  with  statesmen  at  home.         .....     264 

Nicholson,  General  Sir  W., 

as  Chief  of  Imperial  General  Staff  .....     172 

Norfolk,  Duke  of, 

Commission  on  Militia  and  Volunteers     ....       62 


INDEX  303 

North  Sea,  PAGE 

extra  Defence  through  German  Naval  Development  .          .      168 

Northbrook,  Rt.  Hon.  Lord, 

on  creation  of  Naval  Intelligence  Department       .  .           23-24 

O 

Ocean  Routes, 

securing  of,  as  operation  of  War      .....       23 

Organization  (see  also  under  "  Imperial  Organization  "), 

for  Imperial  .Defence        .......         8 

of  Australian  Field  Army         ......    logn 

Oversea  Army, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .  .  16,  44,  50,  51,  126 

Oversea  Defence  Committee   .  .     8 in 

Oversea  Dominions  (see  under  "  Dominions  "  and  "Colonies"). 

Oversea  Service, 

Army  for,  Mr.  Haldane  on  need  of  ....       75 

Colonial  troops  for,  Memo,  at  1887  Conference          .          .in 
Colonial  troops  for,  Mr.  Brodrick's  proposals      .          .        128-130 

Dr.  Smartt  and  Sir  J.  Ward  on 151 

in  background  of  policy  ......       52 

men  available  in  Estimates  of  1896          ....       39 

Sir  Frederick  Borden  on  Canadian  Force  for    .          .          .150 
Sir  John  Colomb  and      .          .  .16,  44,  50,  51,  126 

Oversea  States  (see  under  "Dominions"  and  "Colonies"). 

Oversea  Stations, 

ships  in  1902  and  1912  ......       188,  189 


Pacific  area, 

defence  of,  Sir  J.  Colomb  on  ...         160,  161,  168 

naval  contingencies  in,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .  .  .168 
Pacific  Fleet, 

of  three  units,  proposals  at  1909  Conference  .  .  .170 
Pacific  sea-boards, 

Colonies  with,  necessity  of  developing  war  resources  .  160 
Palmerston,  Lord, 

and  creation  of  forts       .         .          .          .          .          .  10,  n 

"  steam  has  bridged  the  Channel "  .  .  .  .10 

Parliamentary  Committees, 

proposal  for  Reports  by  ....  248-251,  261 

Parliamentary  Delegations, 

proposal  for .  250,  251 

Parting  of  the  Ways, 

United  Kingdom  and  Dominions  now  at.  .  .  .  263 
Passive  Defence, 

influence  of  Franco-German  War  on  ideas  of   .          .          .        17 

theories  shattered  by  South  African  War  .  .  .125 
Pioneer  of  Imperial  Defence, 

Sir  John  Colomb  as 3,  6 

Pioneers, 

acceptance  of  principles 5 

led  by  brothers  Colomb  .....  6 


304  INDEX 

Playfair,  Sir  Lyon,  PAGE 

on  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League        .  115*1 

Policy  of  Defence, 

basis  of  .........         5 

of  United  Kingdom  an  influence  on  Dominions  .  .142 
regulated  by  United  Kingdom  .....  7 

Policy  of  the  Empire, 

voice  in,  offered  to  Colonies    .         .          .         .         .          .133 

Political  Relations, 

considered  satisfactory  at  1897  Conference        .         .          .217 

Political  Status, 

demand  for  equality  of  .          .         .         .         .          .          .     200 

equality  of 229,  231 

equality  of,  Mr.  Deakin  on       ......     219 

Pollock,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Frederick, 

and  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  .          .     222 

and  informal  Committee  for  discussion     .          .          .          .222 

proposals  for  Imperial  Organization  considered          .       221-226 
on  Advisory  Council        ......     222,  226n 

on  Imperial  Commission  ......     223 

on  Imperial  Secretariat  and  Intelligence  Department         .     223 

Port  Hamilton, 

Sir  John  Colomb  and 48 

Ports, 

capacity  of,  for  invading  Forces       .....       40 

Channel  and  Atlantic  (French)          .....       67 

enemy's  ships  to  be  contained  in     .          .          .          .  95 

foreign,  Dominion  ships  at  .         .  182,  183 

French,  and  steam  transport  .  .  39. 40 

German,  Lord  Roberts  on  capacity  of  -77 

local  Defence  of. 

Admiral  Colomb  on.          .          .          .          .          .          .     nn 

considered  at  1887  Conference  .  .104 

proposal  to  transfer  to  Admiralty      .  .       46 

vulnerability  of,  whether  increased  by  steam   .          .     105,  IO5» 

Powers, 

Maritime  and  Crimean  War     .         .         .         .         •         .10 

Prime  Minister,  British, 

and  Imperial  Office          .... 

as  President  of  Imperial  Conference  .  •     219 

charged  with  responsibility  for  Defence,  Sir  G.  Clarke  on       72 

looked  to,  for  a  lead 

proposal  that  Dominions  should  come  under  .  .  228,  232 
refusal  to  have  Secretariat  under  .  .  .  •  229,  233 
suggested  as  President  of  Advisory  Committee 

Prime  Ministers, 

of  Dominions  to  alternate  with  other  Ministers 

Principles, 

opportunity  for  establishing,  at  1887  Conference     . 

Protection  of  Commerce, 

Admiralty  principles  laid  down        .         .         •          •  9*.  93 

as  function  of  Fleet 9*-99 


INDEX  305 

Protection  of  Commerce,  continued —  PAGE 

Australia,  provided  on  high  seas      .          .          .          .          .108 

in  War,  Sir  J.  Colomb  on        ......       12 

Naval  Intelligence  and,  Sir  J.  Colomb's  lecture         .          .       21 
Navy  and,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .          -95 

Q 

Quadrennial  Conferences, 

affirmed,  1902          ........     217 

approved,  1907        .         .         .          .          .  .          .231 

R 
Rankin,  Sir  James, 

on  special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League         .   115^ 
Raw  Material, 

supply  of  in  time  of  war  (see  Royal  Commission  on). 
Rawson,  Sir  Rawson, 

on  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League        .   11511 
Reay,  Lord, 

on  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League        .   u$n 
Reeves,  Hon.  W.  P., 

as  signatory  to  Pollock  Memo.         .....     226 

Regular  Army  (see  also  under  "  Army  "), 

reorganization  of,  and  Military  spirit        .          .          .          .13 
Relation  of  Navy  to  Army  (see  also  under"  Navy  and  Army,"  etc.), 

Hartington  Commission  on  .         .          .          .          .28 

Report  (see  also  under  "  War  Office  Reconstitution,"   r<  Royal 
Commission  "), 

of  Carnarvon  Commission         .          .          .          .          .     103,  10312 

of  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League  .       115,  116 
Representation  (see  under  "  Imperial  "). 
Reserve  (see  under  "  Imperial  Reserve  Force  "). 
Resolution, 

of  Sir  John  Colomb,  on  principles  of  Defence  ...       26 
Responsibilities,  Imperial  and  Colonial, 

no  distinction  between    ......          .       97 

Responsibilities  Naval, 

growth  of  British    ........       97 

Responsibility, 

for  defence,  recognized  by  Cape  Colony   .          .          .          .123 

for  foreign  affairs, 

Mr.  Asquith  on         ......  -237 


Mr.  Borden  on 
for  naval  defence  accepted  by  Lord  Tweedmouth 
for  safety  of  Dominions,  accepted  by  Mr.  Goschen 
measure  of,  Mr.  Deakin  on 
of  maintaining  free  sea,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  . 


•  238 
152,  153 

.   122 

•  154 

•  159 


Responsibility  to  Parliament, 

of  Dominion  representatives  in  London    .         .         .         .213 

Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Earl, 

and  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee  120 

motion  in  House  of  Lords,  1908      .          .  76,  77,  80,  82,  84,  8^n 


306  INDEX 

Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Earl,  continued —  PAGE 

on  Invasion,  Mr.  Asquitli  and  .          .          .          .  82, 83 

on  Mr.  Balfour's  1905  Speech.          .          .          .          .  77,  78 

on  70,000  men  as  smallest  number  to  attempt  invasion    .       67 
on  transports  eluding  Fleet     .          .         .          .          .  77 

present  attitude  on  Invasion  problem       ....     84*1 

Rosebery,  Rt.  Hon.  Earl  of, 

as  Chairman  of  Imperial  Federation  League    .          .          .    loin 
on  Foreign  and  Colonial  Policy.       .         .          .          .          .205 

Routes  (see  under  "  Ocean  "). 

Royal  Commission, 

need  for,  to  deal  with  Colonies  and  Defence    .          .          •        M 
need  for,  to  inquire  into  defence  of  strategic  points          .        i<> 
on  civil  and  professional  administration  of  Navy  and  Army  28 
on  Defence  of  Coaling  Stations  (Carnarvon)      .        20,  103,  10311 
on  Defence  of  United  Kingdom,  1859      .          .          .     IO,  II,  12 
on  Militia  and  Volunteers        ......       62 

on  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Material  in  War          .          .91-95 
on  War  in  South  Africa.          .....  61,62 

Royal  Marine  Forces, 

as  providing  mobile  force         .         .          .          .         .         .45 

for  garrisoning  Naval  Bases     .....     45,  46,  47 

Royal  Naval  Volunteers  (see  under  "  Naval  Volunteers  "). 

Russo-Japanese  War, 

wastage  of,  ships  rather  than  men  .... 

lessons  of. 

Admiral  Mahan  on   .         .          .          .          .          .          ,     42*1 

Sir  John  Colomb  on          ......     160 


Salisbury,  Rt.  Hon.  Marquis  of, 

at  1887  Conference  .          .          .      101 

Deputation  of  Imperial  Federation  League  to  .          .          .115 
on  Defence,  as  real  business  of  1887  Conference       .          .      102 

Scheme, 

of  War  Office  at  1902  Conference    .  .          .          .     125 

Sea,  Command  of  (see  under  "  Command  of  the  Sea  "). 

Sea  Commerce, 

Colonial,  growth  of          .......       97 

Foreign  compared  with  Colonial       .... 

Sea  Communications  of  Empire, 

common  interests  in        .          .          .          .         .          .          .116 

Sea  Supremacy  (see  also  under  "  Command    of    the  Sea  "), 

abandonment  of      ........         5 

during  Crimean  War      .......         9 

Secretariat  (see  also  under  "  Imperial  "). 

as  recognition  of  permanence  of  Conference      .          .       244-245 

formed  by  Colonial  Office 230 

present  method  a  makeshift     ......     230 

proposal  to  place  under  Prime  Minister    .          .          .       228,  232 

Secretary  of  State  for  Imperial  At: 

Resolution  of  New  Zealand  regarding       ....     233 


INDEX  307 

Secretary  of  State  for  Imperial  Affairs,  continued —  PACK 

suggested  new  Cabinet  Minister        ....       252,  262 

Seddon.  Rt.  Hon.  R., 

proposal  to  increase  Australian  Squadron  .          .  133 

Resolution  on  Imperial  Reserve  Force  .  .  .  126-127 
support  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  at  1902  Conference  .  132-133 

Seeley,  Professor  Sir  James  R., 

on  Defence  being  first  object  of  Federation      .          .          .     100 

Seely,  Col.  The  Rt.  Hon.  J.  E.  B., 

and  Imperial  Federation  (Defence)  Committee.  .  211,  inn 
on  Dominions  and  Defence  Committee  .  .  76,211,212 

proposal  to  make  Defence  Committee  non-party         76,  211-212 

Selborne,  Rt.  Hon.  Earl  of, 

on  localization  of  Naval  force  .  .140 

on  "  Sea  all  one  and  Navy  all  one  "        .          .          .          .140 

Self-government,  Colonial, 

co-operation  so  far  as  consistent  with,  Mr.  Brodeur  on     .      157 
departure  from,  and  Mr.  Brodrick's  proposals  .          .         .130 
encroachment  on 

by  expenditure  on  Imperial  objects   .         .          .          .198 

if  Imperial  Army  without  representation   .          .        130,  186 
fear  of  surrendering  rights  at  Conference  .          .          .248 

Lord  Elgin  as  champion  of      ......     229 

sister-countries  sensitive  as  to  .          .          .          .          .215 

suspicions  of  Laurier  Cabinet  at  interference  with     .          .     224 

Service  of  Colonial  Forces, 

Memo  at  1887  Conference  on  .          .          .          .          .  in 

Seton-Karr,  Sir  Henry, 

as  advocate  of  free  storage  of  grain          ....       92 

Ships. 

on  Oversea  Stations,   1902  and  1912          .          .          .       188,  189 
provided  by  Dominions  to  be  controlled  by  them     .          .      141 
provision  of,  by  Canada,  suggested  by  Admiralty,   1912    .      189 
rather  than  men, 

Lord  Tweedmouth  on         .          .          .          .          .          .155 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .          .          .          .160 

readiness  of  in  South  African  War  .          .          .          .     41^ 

under  Admiralty  in  War          .          .          .176-178,   186-187,  20° 

Shipping, 

Admiralty  views  on         ......  92-93 

British  in  French  Ports  ......          39,  40 

considered  at  Conferences     .          .  .          .          .          .221 

dealt  with  by  Commission  on  Food  Supply  ...  94 
extent  it  may  suffer  on  outbreak  of  War  ...  96 
in  Channel  and  Atlantic  Ports  of  France  ...  68 

Sir  J.  Colomb  on     .          .          .          .          .          .          .          94-96 

Simons  Bay  and  Table  Bay, 

defence  of,  at  1887  Conference         .          .          .          .          .in 

Smartt,  Dr.  (now  Sir  Thomas), 

on  Colonial  troops  for  oversea  service  .  .  .  .151 
on  duty  of  Dominions  to  contribute  to  Navy  .  .  .  157 
on  Military  expenditure  of  Cape  and  Canada  .  .  .154 
on  obligation  of  Dominions  towards  Naval  Defence  .  154 


308  INDEX 

South  Africa,  PAGE 

proposal  to  place  Secretariat  under  Prime  Minister  .          .     232 

South  Africa  and  the  Navy  (see  also  under  "  Cape  Colony  "), 
contributions   of   Cape   and   Natal   taken   over   by   Union 

Government      .          .          .          .         .          .          .          -171 

sum  of  ^85,000  for  submarines  or  destroyers    .         .          .     157 

South  African  War, 

and  Command  of  the  sea         ......       49 

Cabinet  and  War  Policy,  Esher  Committee  on  63 

lessons  of, 

Mr.  Brodrick  on        .......       50 

Sir  J.  Colomb  on      ......  49-50 

Royal  Commission  on  .          .          .          .          .  61, 62 

shattered  theories  of  passive  defence         .          .          .          .125 

want  of  mobile  military  force.          .....       49 

why  War  Office  failed,  Sir  J.  Colomb  on          ...       52 

Spanish-American  War, 

lessons  of.  Sir  J.  Colomb  on   .          .          .          .          .       421*.  160 

Sprigg,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Gordon, 

offer  of  Cape  Battleship  .          .  .          .          .123 

Standing  Committee  of  Conference, 

Mr.  Harcourt's  proposal  .          .          .          .          .          .232 

Stanhope,  Rt.  Hon.  Edward, 

letter  to  Sir  John  Colomb        .          .          .          .          .          .117 

as  President  of  Imperial  Federation  League  .  .  .  101 
as  Secretary  of  State  for  War  ....  io3n 

States,  Oversea  (see  under  "  Colonies  "  and  "  Dominions  "). 

Statesmen, 

British,  and  solution  of  Representation  problem  .  .  202 
Home,  proposals  for  Representation  vague  .  .  199, 216 
of  Canada  and  great  conception  .....  263 
shortsightedness  of  .......  7 

Steam, 

application  to  vessels,  Royal  Commission  of  1859  and  .  n 
introduction  of,  as  affecting  naval  combinations  .  .  104 
whether  vulnerability  of  ports  increased  by  .  .  105, 105*1 

"  Steam  has  bridged  the  Channel," 

Lord  Palmerston  on  .10 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  .105 

Storage  of  grain    .  .       92 

Strategic  points, 

neglect  of       .....  .          .       19 

Striking  Army, 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster  and  .  -73 

Mr.  Brodrick  and   ........     5'w 

Mr.  Haldane  on  need  of  .          .          .         •    53".  74.  75 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  necessity  for  .  .  .  16,  38,  49,  52 
strength  may  be  inadequate  .....  79 

Submarines, 

New  Zealand  and,  at  1907  Conference      .          .  155 

opportunities  during  disembarkation  of  invading  force  .  69 
provision  of,  by  South  Africa  .  .  .  .  157 


INDEX  309 

Submarines  and  Destroyers,  PAGB 

flotilla  of,  proposed  by  Mr.  Deakin.          .          .          .          .162 

Subsidy  or  Submarines, 

Lord  Tweedmouth's  refusal  of  advice  to  New  Zealand      .      156 

Supply  of  Food  (see  tinder  "  Food  Supply  "). 

Supply  of  Wheat  and  Flour, 

no  material  diminution  in  War        .          .         .          .  93 


Table  Bay  and  Simon's  Bay, 

defence  of  at  1887  Conference  .          .          .  .      in 

Taxation  without  Representation    .  .212 

Territorial  Army, 

and  Service  outside  United  Kingdom  .  .  .  .151 
for  Home  Defence,  policy  at  1909  Conference  .  1 72 

functions  of,  compared  with  oversea  forces    .  .149 

Lord  Roberts'  views  on  .....  78 

Territorial  Attack, 

with  weaker  Fleet  in  existence         ...  .417? 

Territories, 

not  secured  by  ships  mounting  guard       .  .          .141 

safety  of,  what  depending  on.  .          .      141 

Three  years'  enlistment, 

failure  of  system         ...  ...       62 

Thursday  Island, 

Admiral  Tryon  on.          ....  .no 

armament  of,  Lord  Derby  on.          .  .          .          .109 

Defences  of,  considered  at  1887  Conference  .  .  106,  109,  no 
Sir  Henry  Holland  on  .  .  .  .  .  .  .no 

Thursfield,  Mr.  James  R., 

and  Clarke,  on  command  of  Sea  .  .  .  .  .42 
and  Clarke,  on  invasion  of  England  ....  42^ 
on  attack  most  effective  form  of  Defence  .  .  .  15*1 

on  "  Fleet  in  Being  ".......       43 

Torpedo  Attack, 

on  convoy  in  case  of  Invasion         .....       68 

Trade, 

Australian,  at  mercy  of  raiding  cruiser     .          .          .          .      143 

Canadian  overseas  .....  .189 

Foreign  and  Colonial        .......       98 

Imperial  Commission  on,  appointed  1911      ....      166 

increase  of  Colonial          .......       9? 

Trade  and  Postal  Communications, 

considered  at  Conferences          .          .          .          .          .          .221 

Trade,  Seaborne  (see  under  "Trade"). 

Trafalgar, 

and  nature  of  superior  sea-force       .....         8 

Training  (see  under  "  Compulsory  Military  "). 

Training  and  Discipline, 

of  Dominion  Naval  Services    .  .  .182 

Training  of  Officers  (see  under  "  Education  "). 


310  INDEX 

Training  of  Troops,  PAGE 

oversea,  on  lines  similar  to  United  Kingdom    .          .          .185 

Transport  of  Troops, 

difficulties  of,  in  South  African  War     .....     40*1 

from  France  as  invader  .......       68 

from  Germany  without  mobilization,  Lord  Roberts  on   .          -77 
in  relation  to  Invasion    .          .          .          .          .          .  39-42 

necessity  of  free  sea  for   .          .          .          .         .          .          .43 

numbers  sent  to  South  Africa  .          .          .          .          .41*1 

risk  even  with  command  of  sea        .          .          .          .          -41 

Transports, 

eluding  Fleet  in  case  of  invasion      .          .          .          .          -77 
French,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .          .          .  39,  40 

Treaties,  Commercial, 

Dominions  and        .......       203-204 

Treaties  with  Germany  and  Belgium, 

denouncing  of          ........     203 

Troops  (see  also  under  "  Transport  "  and  "  Interchange  "). 

fighting  side  by  side,  Mr.  Chamberlain  on      ....     123 

Troops,  Colonial, 

for    oversea  service,  Dr.  Smartt,  Mr.  Haldane,  and  Sir  J. 

Ward  on.         ........      151 

Troops,  Local, 

for  garrisoning  works,  considered  at  1887  Conference      .          .104 

Tryon,  Admiral, 

and  Naval  Defence  of  Australia       ....        104.  106 

Tupper,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Charles, 

on  Special  Committee  of  Imperial  Federation  League    .          .    1 1 5» 

Tweedmouth,  Rt.  Hon.  Lord, 

magnanimous  attitude,  Mr.  Deakin  on  .          .          .162 

on  Naval  Defence  at  1907  Conference      .  152.  153,  155 

on  responsibility  for  Defence  .  .       152-153 

refusal  of  advice  to  New  Zealand    .          .          .          .          .156 


U 

Uniformity  of  Armament, 

at  1909  Conference  .          .          .          .          .          .          -172 

Mr.  Chamberlain  on,  at  1897  Conference.          .          .       122 

Uniformity  of  Laws, 

considered  at  Conferences        .          .          .  .          .221 

United  Kingdom, 

Defence  of,  Royal  Commission  of  1859    .          .         .  10.  n 

Defence  of  shores  of        ......  7 

drawn  into  war  by  oversea  interests         ....     204 

regulation  of  Defensive  policy.         ...  7 

responsibility  for  safety  of  Empire  .          .          .    7.  122,  152 

United  Kingdom  and  Dominions  (see  also  under  "  Colonies  "  .md 

Dominions  "), 
now  at  parting  of  ways  .......     263 

United  States, 

and  Alaskan  Boundary   ....  .     204 


INDEX 


air 


V  PAGE 

Victoria, 

and  New  South  Wales,  offer  of "  Dreadnought  "  .  .164 

Villeneuve, 

pursuit  of,  by  Nelson  ....  •  43M 

Volunteer  Force, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on,  and  growth  of  military  spirit.  .  13 

Volunteers, 

service  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  suggested       .  .        44 

sufficient,  if  organized  for  Home  Defence  55 

Volunteers  and  Militia, 

Royal  Commission  on       .......       62 

W 

War, 

Declaration  of,  Mr.  Asquith  on  sharing  authority  .  .     237 

Empire  at,  and  Canada  at  peace 

Sir  J.  Ward  on  .  .          .       234,235 

Sir  W.  Laurier  on     .  .        174-176 

in  China          ...  ...         9 

in  Crimea        ...  ...         9 

in  India          ...  ...         9 

in  South  Africa  (see  under  "  South  African  War  "). 
influence  of  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  on          .          .          .     253 
into  country  of  enemy,  best  form  of  Defence         .          .          15,  I5« 
Russo-Japanese,  lessons  of        ...  .     42n 

Spanish-American,  lessons  of    ...  .     42« 

voice  as  to,  Mr.  Borden  on     .          .          .          .          .       212,  213 

wastage  in,  ships  rather  than  men  .          .          .          .  155 

War,  Maritime, 

Sir  John  Colomb  on  realities  of       ....          .       21 

War  Office, 

and  German  policy          .          .          .          .         .          .          .       52 

and  Wei-hai-wei      .......         48,  48** 

"  breach  with  past,"  recommended  by  Esher  Committee         .       62 
contradiction  of  Admiralty  at  1902  Conference      .          .          .      131 
doubt  as  to  functions  of  Military  forces         .          .          .          .125 

expenditure  on  barracks.          .          .         .         .          .          .47 

ideas  on  Invasion  .......  37,  52 

Intelligence  Department  not  working  with  Naval      .          .       27 
necessity  for  control  over  Admiralty  and       ....       20 

policy  of  administrators  of      ......         6 

preparations  in  view  of  losing  command  of  sea  .          .          .128 

War  Office  and  Admiralty, 

absenceof  combined  action  at  1902  Conference  129,  131,  i$in 

Administration,  Resolution  on  ....       26 

at  1887  Conference          .  ....       25 

at  1902  Conference,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  .          .          .131 

divorce  between      .  .  ....       25 

dual  control  at  Esquimalt       .  ....       46 

dual  control  at  naval  bases     .  ....       46 

expenditure,  Sir  John  Colomb  on  ....       52 

need  of  central  control    .  ....       28 


312  INDEX 

War  Office  and  Admirality,  continued —  PAGE 

relations  between,  Hartington  Commission  on  .          -29 

theories  of  invasion          .......       55 

War  Office  Reconstitution  Committee    (see  also   under  "  Esher 

Committee  "), 
Report  of       .........       62 

War  Office  Reform,  (see  also  under  "  Esher  Committee  "), 

Mr.  Arnold-Forster  appointed  to  carry  out  ....       72 
principles  left  out  of  sight,  Esher  Committee  on     .         .          .64 

War.  Time  of, 

Australian  ships  and  Admiralty  orders     .          .          .        164,  165 
Canadian  Ships  and  Admiralty  control         .  176-178,181-184 

Dominion  ships  and  Admiralty  control        .          .          .          .184 
Food  Supply  in  (see  under  "  Royal  Commission  "). 
single  control  of  Navy    .          .    *     .          .          .          .       200,  201 

Ward,  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Joseph, 

in  favour  of  increased  cash  contributions          .          .          .154 
offer  of  "  Dreadnought "          .          .          .          .          .          .164 

on  Australian  Squadron  Agreement.          .          .          .          .156 

on  ear-marking  troops  for  oversea  service          .          .          .151 
on  Empire  at  War  and  Canada  at  peace          .          .       233,  235 
on  interchange  of  troops          .          .         .          .          .          .151 

on  standing  Committee  proposal      .....     232 

proposal  for  Imperial  Parliament  of  Defence    .          .       233-237 

Watertight  compartments. 

Defence  worked  in  .         .         .          .          .          .          .  27 

Wei-hai-wei, 

as  "  secondary  Naval  base  "   .          .          .          .          .          .     4&n 

barracks  at       .........       48 

defence  works  at,  Sir  J.Colomb's  pro  test      .          .  48,  48*1 

Mr.  Haldane  on       ........       48 

Wellington,  Field-Marshal  the  Duke  of, 

views  on  Invasion  of  England          .          .          .          .          -77 

Westlake,  Professor, 

and  Sir  F.  Pollock's  Committee 222 

Wheat  and  Flour  Supply, 

no  material  diminution  in  war  .       93 

Wilkinson,  Mr.  Spencer, 

and  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  views  on  Navy  and  Invasion 
and  Sir  F.  Pollock's  Committee       ...  .222 

on  rise  of  German  War  power         .  .  .   i88» 

views  on  Territorial  attack      .          .  .     4 in 

Works  (see  also  under  "  Military  "), 

Expenditure  on       ........         7 


Yeomanry  (see  under  "  Imperial  "). 

Young,  Sir  Frederick     .....  -99 


P.  S.  KINO  &  SON,  Printers,  Westminster,  London,  S.W.