THE INDEPENDENCE OF
THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS
Other Books by the Same Author :
THE LAST AMERICAN FRONTIER (1910)
THE CIVIL WAR (1911)
THE NEW NATION (1915)
GUIDE TO THE MATERIALS IN LONDON
ARCHIVES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 (1914,
with C. O. Paullin)
The Independence of
The South American Republics
A STUDY IN
RECOGNITION AND FOREIGN POLICY
Second Edition
BY
FREDERIC L. PAXSON
Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin and sometime
Harrison Fellow in the University of Pennsylvania
FERRIS & LEACH
29 South Seventh Street
1916
Copyright, 1903, by
FREDERIC L PAXSON
PKEFACE TO SECOND EDITION
In the twelve years that have elapsed since this
book appeared, it has been in demand so contin-
uously that a revision and reprinting are necessary.
New materials on recognition have appeared, while
guides prepared under the direction of the Carnegie
Institution have opened up the archives of London,
Madrid, Mexico and Washington as never before.
I have not re-written the text, but I have revised
and re-arranged the notes for this edition, and I
have added to the notes references to the more im-
portant new materials. Both recognition and neu-
trality, its parent, have acquired new precedents
since 1903; and in the cases of the Panama Repub-
lic and the War of 1914 it has again been made
clear that international law advances most rapidly in
the hands of disinterested nations.
FBEDERIC L. PAXSON.
Madison, Wis., February, 1916.
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
The great subject of South American history has
been so little exploited that it must be approached
with modesty and care, for it is not to be expected
that initial studies will, either in breadth or in in-
tensity, reach its confines. Its bibliography has not
been worked out. Facts of biography are difficult to
6 South American Independence
obtain, and materials relating to it have not yet been
systematically collected or sifted.
Yet, if the character of the South American re-
publics is to be understood, and if they are to be
dealt with by the other nations of the world in a
rational and honest manner, it is necessary that their
history be narrated and considered. With their
antecedents before us, certain conditions now
prevalent in the Latin republics are, if not justified,
at least explained. From a careful examination of
these antecedents it may not be impossible to arrive
at the causes of the evil conditions, which will be
the first step towards correcting them.
This little book is a study in a single period and a
single phase. For the greater part it is based upon
unpublished original manuscript; while none of its
material, printed or not, has hitherto been used to
any considerable extent. Some care has been taken
to make the sources here used more available for
future students.
I have the honor to acknowledge my great indebt-
edness to my masters, Albert Bushnell Hart and
John Bach McMaster, and to Hubert Hall, Pendle-
ton King and Charles Francis Adams, who gave me
their time and care that I might reach the archives
in their charge. FEEDEEIC L. PAXSOH.
Philadelphia, June, 1903.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTBODUCTION
Doctrine of recognition 17
Neutrality in seventeenth century 18
Theory of classical writers 19
Neutrality in American revolution 20
Silas Deane and France 20
Instructions of Deane 21
American theory of recognition 22
Policy of France 23
Motive of Louis XVI, in recognition 24
The French treaties 25
French intervention, not recognition 26
The Dutch recognition 27
Mission of William Lee 28
Holland declares war on England 29
Value of French and Dutch precedents 30
The Swedish recognition 32
Recognition by Spain 33
Recognition by Prussia 34
The French revolution 35
Conduct of Gouverneur Morris 36
Attitude of British minister in Paris 36
Morris remains in Paris 38
New French government and Morris 39
Disinterested situation of United States 40
8 South American Independence
Washington recognizes the French government 41
War between England and France 41
The proclamation of neutrality, April 22nd, 1793 42
Influence of American precedents 43
CHAPTER I
The South American Wars of Liberation
Spanish colonial system 44
Colonial population 45
San Martin, Bolivar and Miranda 46
Miranda's filibustering expedition 47
Popham's attack on Buenos Ayres 48
Whitelocke expedition fails 49
Spanish-American revolts, Buenos Ayres 50
Chile, New Granada and Venezuela 51
Growth of English trade 52
Effect of foreign commerce on South America 53
Situation of Buenos Ayres 54
Turbulence in Buenos Ayres 55
Declaration of independence 57
San Martin at Mendoza 58
Chile and the brothers Carrera 59
Growth of San Martin's army 60
He moves across at Uspallata 61
Chacabuca and Talca 62
Maypu and the independence of Chile 63
Preparations to invade Peru 63
Arrival of Lord Cochrane 64
Capture of Valdavia k 66
Liberating squadron leaves Chile 67
Table of Contents 9
Pledges of San Martin 68
The Work of Arenales 68
La Serna replaces Pezuela as viceroy 69
Spanish forces evacuate Lima 70
Independence of Peru declared 71
San Martin assumes Protectorship 71
His disputes with Cochrane 72
Reinforcement and evacuation of Callao 74
San Martin goes to Guayaquil 75
Torre Tagle and Monteagudo 75
Meeting of Bolivar and San Martin 76
San Martin abdicates and retires 77
Beginning of career of Bolivar 78
Surrender of Miranda to Spain 79
Geography of Venezuela and New Granada 79
Bolivar in New Granada 80
The " War to the Death " 80
Bolivar becomes Dictator 81
Spain sends out Morillo in 1815 82
He re-takes New Granada 83
Bolivar erects capital at Angostura 84
The Foreign Legions 85
Campaign of 1819 85
Tunja and Boyaca 86
Union of Venezuela and New Granada 87
Armistice of 1820 88
Bolivar ends armistice of Truxillo 89
Constituent congress at Cucuta 89
Battle of Carabobo, June 24th, 1821 90
Capital moved to Santa F6 de Bogota 91
Meeting of liberating armies in Ecuador 92
Sucre wins at Bompono and Pichincha 92
10 South American Independence
The meeting at Guayaquil 93
Ecuador annexed to Colombia 94
Spanish victory at lea 95
Revolt at Lima 96
Bolivar summoned to Peru 97
Rive-Aguero deposed 97
Bolivar enters Lima, September 1st, 1823 97
Spanish strength in Upper Peru 98
Quarrels between Olaneta and Canterac 99
Bolivar becomes Dictator of Peru 99
He marches inland 100
Spanish forces defeated at Junin 101
And at Ayacucho 102
Miller finishes work at Potosi 103
Independence of Bolivia 103
Bolivar returns to Colombia . . 104
CHAPTER II
South American Policy of the United States
Traditional attitude of the United States 105
Sympathy with filibusters 106
Petition of the Miranda men 107
Randolph's theory of recognition 108
The Poinsett mission 109
Instructions of Poinsett 110
Other agents in South America 113
Status of the agents in South America 114
Nature of their reports 115
Mendez and Thompson in United States 116
Protests of deOnis . . 117
Table of Contents 11
Flaws in United States neutrality laws 118
South American privateers 119
Public opinion in 1816 120
Foray th introduces new neutrality act 121
Further news from South America 122
Poinsett offered a second mission 123
The three commissioners sail 124
Their instructions 124
Beginning of factious opposition 127
Newspaper rumors in summer of 1817 128
Letters of "Lautaro" 128
Reply of " Phocion " 129
Attitude of Monroe and Adams 129
Nature of the opposition 130
Monroe transmits correspondence 131
Clay's great speech 132
Debate on his motion 134
Reply of Forsyth 134
Reports of South American commissioners 135
Superficial and discordant character 136
Their evidence as to political instability 136
Clay's attitude in session of 1818-1819 137
Delicate relations with Spain 138
Message of May 9th, 1820 139
day brings up his motion 141
It passes in the House 141
Session of 1820-1821 142
Triumph of Clay 144
Its barren nature 146
Position of Adams in the cabinet 146
His letter to Alex. H. Everett 146
Jealousy of Spain 149
12 South American Independence
Adams and the European powers 150
Adams' theory of neutrality 151
He foresees the British policy 152
Embarrassments caused by agents 153
Aguirre and the privateers 154
Devereux, Worthington and Halsey 155
Yielding policy of Monroe 156
Courts of Europe sounded 156
Action at Aix-la-Chapelle 157
American policy of inaction !58
Question of the exequaturs 159
Instructions of January 1st, 1819 160
Influence of the Florida negotiations 161
Recognition postponed for two years 162
Difficulties of Adams's position 162
Forbes's mission to Buenos Ayres 164
His instructions 164
Buenos Ayres in 1820 165
His treatment and attitude 166
Rivadavia, Garcia and reform 168
Victories of San Martin and Bolivar 169
Successes of 1821 169
De facto independence achieved 170
Adams prepares for recognition 171
Message of March 8th, 1822 172
Its calm reception 174
Attitude of the newspapers 174
Comment of the Journal des Dtoats 176
Recognition 178
Table of Contents 13
CHAPTER III
British Relations with South America
Two phases of British attitude 180
Policy after 1811 181
Liverpool ministry and commercial demands 182
Popular sympathy in Great Britain 184
Agitation for recognition begins 184
Weapons of the opposition 185
Services of British officers in South America 186
Proclamations by the Prince Regent 187
Inadequacy of neutrality laws 188
New foreign enlistment act 188
Tierney and Mackintosh oppose 190
Attitude of ministry 190
Petitions from merchants 191
Effect of the new act 192
Spain seeks intervention 193
Interests of the allied powers 193
Aix-la-Chapelle 194
The Spanish expedition of 1818-1819 195
Revolution of 1820 196
Invasion of Spain by France 196
British policy at Congress of Verona 197
Lushington and the commercial demands 198
Reports of the American commissioners 199
England and the American recognition 200
Growing importance of question with Canning 201
Zea circular 202
Renewed demands by merchants 203
And by Commons 203
Canning opposes French intervention in Spain 204
14 South American Independence
He determines to keep France out of America 205
Mission of Mackie to Mexico 206
Fall of Cadiz and action by Canning 207
Polignac-Canning conference, October 9th, 1823 208
Instructions to new consuls and commissioners 209
Special instructions for Mexico 213
Motive of Canning in sending consuls 216
Allies fail to act on South America 217
Canning's move wins 217
Speech from the Throne, February 3d, 1824 218
Sources of information on South America 219
Difficulties with Mackie in Mexico 220
Difficulties with Hervey, O'Gorman and Ward 221
The treaty of Morier and Ward 222
Hamilton and the Colombian Commission 223
Ordered to re-peruse his instructions 224
Campbell's reports 225
Parish and Buenos Ayres 225
Debate in Parliament, February, 1824 226
Polignac memorandum revealed 226
Lansdowne moves for recognition 227
Great Speech of Sir James Mackintosh, June 15th, 1824. . 228
His analysis of theory of recognition 229
Reception of Parish at Buenos Ayres 232
His work satisfies Canning 233
His report of June 25th, 1824 234
Canning's instructions to Parish, August 23d, 1824 235
Parish acts slowly upon them 237
Address of the Government of Buenos Ayres to the Con-
gress 239
New Fundamental Law for Buenos Ayres 241
Parish signs a treaty, February 2nd, 1825 241
Table of Contents 15
Canning determines to recognize the republics 242
Spain once more refuses mediation 243
Canning announces recognition to Spain 244
Reply of Spain 245
Reception of British recognition by Europe 247
Protest of Esterhazy, for Vienna 248
Protest of Lieven, for St. Petersburg 249
Protest of Maltzahn, for Berlin 250
Summary of British policy 251
Opening of diplomatic relations 252
INTRODUCTION
Among the doctrines of international law which
can hardly be said to have existed previous to the
war of the American revolution, is that of recogni-
tion.1 It is true that in some few cases before 1776
a new State had come into existence. Thus the
United Netherlands had won their independence of
Spain in the sixteenth century, to have it recognized
by the powers of Europe in the seventeenth; thus
Switzerland had broken off from the dominions of
the Hapsburgs and maintained her separate exist-
ence; thus Portugal had established itself as an inde-
pendent monarchy at the expense of Spain. It is
true also that in some cases a successful revolution
1 Neither recognition nor the recognition of the South American
Bepublics had been discussed in detail prior to the appearance of the
first edition of this work in 1903, although a few paragraphs on both
subjects were to be found in the standard works on international law.
There had been considerable contentious writing upon the recognition
of the belligerency of the Confederate States and upon the power and
expediency of acknowledging the independence of Cuba. But no one
seems to have connected the theory of recognition with the doctrine of
neutrality, or to have dissociated it from the idea of intervention, as is
done here. Recently these ideas have been made the basis of a general
treatise upon the subject, drawn exclusively from printed sources and
covering comprehensively the experiences of the United States. Julius
Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States (Columbia.
University Studies, Vol. LXVI. 1915).
18 South American Independence
had erected a new and illegitimate government. In
the most notable of these Cromwell had established
the principle that internal changes do not affect the
identity of a State, and had compelled his royal neigh-
bors to extend to him every courtesy that the ex-
pelled Stuarts could have demanded. But in none
of these cases was there a discussion of a theory of
recognition by which a community of people, upon
attaining a defined territory, together with an inde-
pendent government, permanently organized, has a
right to demand treatment as a State by the pre-
istent nations of the world.
The absence of any well-developed theory of neu-
trality until the United States came into existence
to create one, prevented the establishment of a
theory of recognition, for this latter is strictly de-
pendent upon the former. The wars of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries were generally Euro-
pean in their scope. No nation strong enough to
make its impartiality respected had been able to re-
main neutral; while the petty States, if only for the
sake of protection, were forced to seek alliance with
one side or another. So it happened that when new
States came into existence their recognition de-
pended solely on the physical strength of their
friends. Recognition by general European treaty
at the end of a general European war could have no
Introduction 19
authority as a precedent in developing an abstract
theory upon the subject.
Before a doctrine of recognition could be evolved
there must be created a background of neutrality.
The right of a State to participate in or abstain
from a war must be freely admitted. Upon this
condition alone could a newly-born State receive the
theoretical treatment that would help to establish
the conditions upon which such an organism has a
right to be acknowledged, and would have a tendency
to remove recognition from the opportunist realm of
international politics to set it up as a permanent
doctrine of international law.
Previous to the American revolution there were
no neutrals, although there existed the foundations
for a superstructure of neutrality. The classical
writers on international law, from Grotius, with his
idea that neutrality consists in not denying to one
belligerent a right conceded to the other, to Vattel,
who would not allow the neutral State to render aid
to either party, all fail to understand the doctrine
as it is understood to-day. The series of sixteenth
and seventeenth century treaties, specifying that the
contracting States shall not aid the enemy of each
other in time of war, shows how far neutrality was
from being looked upon as a regular and probable
condition. Usage of nations as revealed by the wars
20 South American Independence
of the eighteenth century shows a general disregard
of what are the commonplaces of neutral obligation
to-day.
As there had been no neutrals before 1776, so in
the wars of the American revolution no neutrals
were created. France and Spain, during the period
of their professed neutrality, were systematically ren-
dering aid to one of the contestants. The far-famed
Armed Neutrality of 1780 was nothing more than
an alliance that introduced another party into the
general war. The recognition of the independence
of the United States by France was only the step
that marked the advance of Louis XVI. from a state
of overt hostility to one of open war.
The great aim of American diplomacy during the
early years of the revolution was to secure sufficient
aid from Europe to bring the war to a successful ter-
mination. France, as the hereditary enemy of Eng-
land, was the first resort. Thither in the spring of
1776 Silas Deane was sent, ostensibly as an India
merchant to gratify his curiosity, actually to beg
Vergennes to supply arms to his country and to
pledge her commerce in return. Already France was
hinting that no aid could be expected of her while
the colonies remained colonies, and assuring the
Americans that they had "the same protection and
liberty as all other English to resort to France to ex-
Introduction 21
port thence merchandise, arms and munitions of
war." 2 " That as to independency," wrote Deane to
the Committee of Secret Correspondence, describing
an interview with the French Minister and the words
of the latter, " it was an event in the womb of time,
and it would be highly improper from him to say
anything on that subject until it had actually taken
place." 3 Great Britain feared, as the United States
hoped for, a French intervention in the war, and as-
sisted Lord Stormont in his protests against the un-
friendly acts of the French Government.
In the mind of the Americans, recognition was far
from being an act of neutrality. Between it and par-
ticipation on the side of England was a condition to
which their commissioners were instructed to lead the
powers of Europe if the latter could not be prevailed
upon to take up the American cause. " You shall en-
deavor ... to obtain from them a recognition of
our independency and sovereignty, and to conclude
treaties of peace, amity and commerce. ... If that
cannot be effected, you shall to the utmost of your
power prevent their taking part with Great Britain
in the war which his Britannic majesty prosecutes
'Dumas to Com. of Secret Correspondence. Francis Wharton,
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States
(6 vols., Washington, 1889), II: 91.
» Deane to Committee, August 18, 1776. Wharton, II: 112.
22 South American Independence
" against us, or entering into offensive alliances with
that king." *
The value of an instance of recognition as a pre-
cedent depends upon its non-partisan character. It
" is a matter, which, from its nature precludes any
equivalent whatsoever; — either there is a reason for
it, and it ought to be demanded as a right, or it can-
not be asked for, and to grant extraordinary conces-
sions as the price of obtaining it, is to give them
merely in return for the name, and to change the
substance for the shadow." 5 But this view of the
subject had not been taken in 1776. The United
States had no hesitation in offering a price for what
they truly considered an effective service, though it
was concealed under the name of recognition.
" As the other princes of Europe, " ran the note
of the three commissioners making their seductive
offer to Vergennes, " are lending or hiring their
troops to Britain against America, it is apprehended
that France may, if she thinks fit, afford our inde-
pendent States the same kind of aid, without giving
England any first cause of complaint. . . .
" North America now offers to France and Spain
her amity and commerce. She is also ready to guar-
4 Committee to Franklin, Deane, and Lee, October 16, 1776
Wharton,!!: 172.
8 Forbes to Garcia, Decembers, 1824 ; enclosed in Parish to Planta,
February 18, 1825. Foreign Office MM.
Introduction 23
" anty in the firmest manner to those nations all her
present possessions in the West Indies, as well as
those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war
that may be consequential of such assistance as she
requests. The interests of the three nations are the
same. The opportunity of cementing them and of
securing all the advantages of that commerce, which
in time will be immense, now presents itself. If
neglected, it may never again return; and we can-
not help suggesting that a considerable delay may be
attended with fatal consequences." 6
The interest of the French government in the
prosperity of the American cause was slight. There
was in France a popular feeling that wished the in-
surgents well, but the motive inspiring the ministry
to action was that of hostility to England rather
than anxiety for a republican member of the family
of nations. Accordingly the French court resisted
the popularity of Franklin and confined itself to ren-
dering a surreptitious assistance to the rebels until
the progress of the war forced upon it a change of
policy. The surrender of Burgoyne was the deter-
mining event in this change.
Both Vergennes and Franklin realized the prob-
ability of British overtures for peace when the news
of the surrender reached Paris on 4th December,
• January 5, 1777. Wharton, II : 245.
24 South American Independence
1777. The commissioners at once addressed a new
demand for recognition to the French court and
were accorded a meeting on 12th December. " On
signifying to the ministry," they described the con-
ference, " the importance it might be of at this junc-
ture— when probably Britain would be making some
propositions of accommodation — that the Congress
should be informed explicitly what might be ex-
pected from France and Spain, M. Gerard, one of
the secretaries, came yesterday to inform us, by order
of the king, that after long and full consideration of
our affairs and propositions in council it was decided,
and his majesty was determined, to acknowledge our
independence, and make a treaty with us of amity
and commerce." 7 Louis XVI. himself recorded
the motive that inspired this step. He wrote to
Charles III. of Spain on the 8th of January, 1778,8
of the policy he had followed during the three pre-
ceding years : " The destruction of the army of Bur-
goyne and the straitened condition of Howe have
totally changed the face of things. America is tri-
umphant, and England cast down, but the latter has
still a great unbroken maritime force, and the hope
of forming a beneficial alliance with her Colonies,
( the impossibility., of their being subdued by arms
7 December 18, 1777. Wharton, II : 452.
fiWharton, II: 467.
Introduction 25
" bemg_now jemonstrated^ All the English parties
ligree on this point. Lord North has himself an-
nounced, in full Parliament, a plan of pacification
for the first session, and all sides are assiduously
employed upon it." Even King Louis did not yet
know the extent of the " political somersault " which
Lord North would turn when he introduced his meas-
ure in February. " Thus," his letter continued, " it
is the same to us whether this minister, or any other,
be in power. From different motives they join
against us, and do not forget our bad offices. They
will fall upon us in as great strength as if the war
had not existed. This being understood, and our
grievances against England notorious, I have thought,
after taking the advice of my council . . . and having
consulted upon the propositions which the insurgents
make, that it was just and necessary to begin to treat
with them to prevent their reunion with the mother
country."
According to the resolution of the king " to pre-
vent their reunion with the mother country," treaties
of alliance and commerce were signed at Paris on
6th February, 1778. In these is found the first
recognition of the United States as independent. In
the words of the French ambassador, as he announced
these treaties to the Court of St. James, there is any * '
insolence so colossal as to be almost admirable. " In
26 South American Independence
" making this communication to the Court of London,
the King is firmly persuaded, that it will find in it
fresh Proofs of His Majesty's constant and sincere
Dispositions for Peace; and that His Britannic Ma-
jesty, animated by the same Sentiments, will equally
avoid every Thing that may interrupt their Har-
mony; and that He will take, in particular, effectual
Measures to hinder the Commerce of His Majesty's
Subjects with the United States of North America
from being disturbed, and to cause to be observed in
this Respect, the Usages received between trading
Nations, and the Rules that may be deemed subsist-
ing between the Crowns of France and Great Brit-
ain." 9 But nothing was clearer in the minds of all
concerned than that this recognition was an act of
war, that the colonies, in spite of their declaration,
were not in fact independent, and that it was the
interest of France rather than regard for any rights
of the insurgents that inspired the act. " I knew
very well," wrote a French ambassador from Madrid,
a few years later, " that one could not count on the
gratitude of the United States, but that, however,
repeated and recent favors formed ties which it
would be at least difficult to break suddenly, and
especially at the very period of their enjoyment." 10
• Common*' Journals, XXXVI : 832.
10 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1782. He was writing of
later efforts to prevent a peace. Wharton, V : 287.
Introduction 27
The second formal recognition of the United
States came from Holland, and is to be viewed less
as an intervention like that of France than as an
effort to get in ahead of England and secure a share
of American commerce. News of the successful ter-
mination of the Yorktown campaign and of the
imminence of peace negotiations had reached Hol-
land before she could induce herself to act.
From the beginning of the war the Dutch had
watched with envious eyes the breakup of the Brit-
ish Empire. Neutrality was their policy, enjoined
upon them by many treaties with England, but an
opportunity for the extension of commerce was not
to be lightly disregarded. "I find they have the
greatest inclination to serve us," wrote William Car-
michael from Amsterdam, " and at the same time
themselves, for no people see their interests
clearer." But the events of the early years of the
war were not such as to tempt a peace-loving nation
to take up the cause of the Americans. Guided by
" their fears that we shall be subdued," the Dutch
avoided giving Great Britain cause for offense.11
Among the peripatetic agents appointed by Con-
gress to the courts of Europe was William Lee, who
was commissioned in the summer of 1777 to Vienna
« Carmichael to Committee, November 2, 1776. Wharton, II : 185.
28 South American Independence
and Berlin.12 Proceeding to the latter post, in spite
of the protests of the Prussian minister in the fall of
1778, he was stopped by the outbreak of war be-
tween Prussia and Austria. He retired to Frank-
fort to await its outcome, and there amused himself
by negotiating a treaty, unauthorized on his side and
unconstitutional on theirs, with the pensionary and
burgomasters of Amsterdam.18 It was an unfortu-
nate transaction. His fellow commissioners at Paris
snubbed him well for the assumption of authority;14
and the draft of the treaty captured at a later time
among the papers of Henry Laurens 15 was made a
casus belli by the English, notwithstanding every
effort by the Dutch to disavow16 it. Holland, in
spite of herself, was driven into the war.
" You say the Dutch are disturbed," commented
John Adams upon the blustering tactics of Sir Jo-
seph Yorke, the British Minister at Amsterdam.
" Do you wonder at it ? They have been kicked by
the English as no reasonable man would kick a dog.
They have been whipped by them as no sober postilion
would whip a hackney-coach horse." 1T
" President of Congress to William Lee, July 1, 1777. Wharton,
II: 359.
» W. Lee to Com. For. Off., September 12, 1778. Wharton, II : 715.
"Commissioners to W. Lee, September 26, 1778. Wharton, II: 744.
16 Dana to Jonathan Jackson, November 11,1780. Wharton, IV : 151.
"Manifestoof States General, November 27,1780. Wharton, IV: 310.
"Adams to W. Lee, March 21, 1780. Wharton, III: 564.
Introduction 29
On 12th March, 1781, the Dutch declared war on
England, but even yet they refused to receive a let-
ter from John Adams in his new official character of
Minister Plenipotentiary.18 It was not until the end
of the year, when the news of the surrender of Corn-
wallis had reached them, that the provinces began to
instruct their delegates in favor of a recognition.
Then, in one day, five million guilders were sub-
scribed to be lent to France for the use of the United
States,19 and the cumbrous diplomatic machinery of
the States General was put in motion. " If it was
in any other country," wrote Adams, on 14th Janu-
ary, 1782, " I should conclude from all appearances
that an alliance with America and France at least
would be finished in a few weeks; but I have been
here long enough to know the nation better. The
constitution of government is so complicated and so
whimsical a thing, and the temper and character of
the nation so peculiar, that this is considered every-
where as the most difficult embassy in Europe. But
at present it is more so than ever; the nation is more
divided than usual, and they are afraid of every-
body."20 And so he might well be content to be
accorded his formal reception by the Prince of
18 Adams to Pres. Cong., May 7, 1781. Wharton, IV : 401.
19 Dumas to Pres. Cong., January 7/1782. Wharton, V : 86.
80 Adams to Pres. Cong., January 14, 1782. Wharton, V : 100.
30 South American Independence
Orange on 22d April. 21 On the twenty-third the
French minister at Amsterdam gave a banquet to the
diplomatic corps in honor of their new member. The
treaty was concluded on October 8th. But the
ministry of North had fallen, and British agents
were at Paris discussing with Franklin the terms of
peace before Holland had ventured upon her recog-
nition.
The value of a precedent in recognition, it has
been said, depends on its non-partisan character. It
also depends to a considerable degree upon the atti-
tude of the mother country. For it is only before
the mother country has brought herself to acknowl-
edge the independence of her former territory that
there can be any question as to the propriety of the
recognition. Between the time of the declaration of
independence, which in the case of the United States
was 4th July, 1776, and the recognition of the same
by the parent State, which in the same case occurred
at the signature of the preliminary articles on 30th
November, 1782, the third power in granting recog-
nition must consider two things; the fact of inde-
pendence and the nature of its relations with the
belligerents. If the former of these does not mani-
festly exist, and in the case under discussion it did
not, none can question the right, in a moral way, of
" Adams to Livingston, April 22, 1782. Wharton, V.: 320.
Introduction 31
the mother country to consider the recognition as
premature and an act of war. Thus thf» recognition
by France and in a less degree that by Holland, for
she refrained from acting until Britain had shown
her own hand, were interventions dictated by self-
interest of one form or another. If the interests of
the third power are of such a nature as not to be
affected by the struggle, she is not likely to be led
into a premature recognition, or into any recogni-
tion, until the mother country by her own action has
renounced her pretension to sovereignty over the
new State by acknowledging its independence.
Cases of recognition will have great value in estab-
lishing the international law upon the subject only
when the mother country delays this renunciation
beyond a reasonable time, so that third powers feel
that they must recognize the fact of independence in
justice to themselves and to the new State.
No valuable precedent in recognition occurred dur-
ing the American revolution, or could have occurred,
for Great Britain acted promptly herself and
acknowledged the independence of her former
colonies at a time when the fact of their independ-
ence was not a matter beyond dispute, and when her
own hopes were in no means destroyed, in spite of
her loss of a considerable army. ~No recognition
before 30th November, 1782, could have been other
32 South American Independence
than an intervention; none after that time can be
considered as of importance save as an indication of
European policy and commercial necessity. Before
the administration of Washington began, only three
other European States had seen fit to open formal
and regular relations with the United States, and
only two of them concluded treaties.
Sweden made a treaty of amity and commerce with
the United States on the 3d of April, 1783. It was
the first time, so the King took credit to himself,
that an European power had solicited the friendship
of the United States. There is reason to believe that
the enormous prestige of Dr. Franklin was an in-
spiration that accentuated his majesty's desire for
commercial relations. Upon his general instructions
Franklin entered readily upon the negotiations pro-
posed by the Swedish ambassador, and before he had
concluded them his special instructions for this
treaty had arrived. He signed the final draft in
almost the very words of the project, and at the end
of the proceedings was complimented by a request
for " young Mr. Franklin " as ambassador.22
The Spanish negotiations, long and tedious in their
course, failed to terminate in a treaty within the
period under consideration, although the opening of
diplomatic relations was not deferred long after the
»Wharton,V: 512, VI: 133,163,276,483.
Introduction 33
recognition by England. Arthur Lee, Franklin and
Jay were at various times during the war commis-
sioned to the court of Spain, but they could accom-
plish no open result. Spain advanced more or less
material assistance to the colonies, but two reasons
seem to have kept her from a formal recognition.
The principle of independence was none too popular
in a country with enormous colonial possessions of
her own, while the demano} of the United States for
free navigation of the Mississippi to its mouth was
not to be admitted by a king who needed the whole
Gulf of Mexico for himself. Even the offer made
near the end of the war, to relinquish the demand
for the free navigation, failed to induce Spain to
treat. It was not until after the peace preliminaries
with England had been signed that the Spanish minis-
ter in Paris told Jay that Spain was ready to receive
the latter in form. Even then a treaty was not to be
had for more than a decade.
Frederick the Great, ruling in Prussia during the
revolution, showed some solicitude for American
commerce at an early period in the war, and amused
himself with the American envoys throughout its
length. But there was too little to be gained for him
to compromise his country by a recognition, so he
fought off the persistent attacks of the Lees until
the war was over. Then, on the model of the Swe-
34 South American Independence
dish treaty, he allowed John Adams to negotiate a
treaty with Prussia. Many of its articles revealed
a " platonic philosophy " 23 that would scarcely have
been admitted between two countries having any
considerable intercourse.
Thus, by the end of 1785, the United States had
formal diplomatic relations with six States of Eu-
rope, France, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain
and Prussia. In one case the recognition had marked
a renunciation of sovereignty. In three more, subse-
quent to this renunciation, it had indicated only a
general friendly feeling now free to act. And, in two
cases, it had come as an intervention, with differing
degrees of flagrancy. In no case had there been any
consideration of the question already asked, —
whether there is a time in a revolution when the
revolting people have a right to demand, or a neutral
a right to accord, a recognition in spite of the hostile
attitude of the mother country. As has been seen,
the nature of the American revolution was such that
that question could not have arisen. Some light was
destined to be thrown upon the question, however,
by the policy of the new republic whose own recog-
nition has now been considered.
The most serious diplomatic problem that had yet
88 Adams to Thulemeier, February 13, 1785. John Adams, Works
(10 vols., Boston, 1853), VIII: 225.
Introduction 35
presented itself to the administration of George
Washington arose when the French revolution passed
from the municipal stage into the international. The
events of 1792, bringing down upon France the
wrath of Europe, aroused in the United States a
feeling of sympathy that might well have influenced
a government to make more of its treaty obligations
to the distressed country than the Washington
government showed itself disposed to do. But
Washington was profoundly impressed with the need
of the United States for a long period of uneventful
development. As the wars broke out he saw clearly
how little they had to offer the United States and
how greatly they would check her growth if she
allowed herself to become involved in them.
Realizing these dangers, he had little difficulty in
convincing himself that the obligations of the treaty
of 1778, with France, did not apply to the conditions
of 1792, and that the duties of the United States
coincided with her interests in prescribing a policy
of strict neutrality.
While the French republic was coming into exist-
ence, in the autumn of 1792, diplomats were decid-
ing, as their interests prompted them, how it should
be greeted. Upon Gouverneur Morris, minister pleni-
potentiary from the United States, more than his
share of the responsibility fell, for his distance from
36 South American Independence
Philadelphia and his lack of specific instructions
applicable to the events of the tenth of August forced
him to frame his policy for himself. " You will
observe, sir/' he commented upon those events,
" that matters are now brought to a simple question
between an absolute monarchy and a republic: for
all middle terms are done away.7' 2*
As representing a republican government, Morris
could not well take offense at the adoption of a simi-
lar government by France; nor could be proclaim a
neutrality similar to that of Britain. The minister
of the latter power demanded his passports on 20th
August, presenting at the same time a threatening
note to the effect " that Britain has determined on a
strict neutrality, that she means to preserve it, and
therefore as his letters of credence are to the king,
now dethroned, he had best come away. To this is
subjoined a hope that nothing will happen to the
King or his family, because that would excite the
indignation of all Europe. This despatch turned
into plain English, is, shortly, that the British court
resent what is already done, and will make war
immediately, if the treatment of the King be such
as to call for, or to justify, measures of extremity." 25
** Morris to Jefferson, August 16, 1792. American State Papers,
Foreign Relations, 1 : 333. The folio State Papers are hereafter to
be cited as A. S. P. F. R.
* Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792. A. S. P. F. R., 1 : 336.
Introduction 37
The other courts of Europe, fearful with England of
the effect of French pronunciamentos in the name of
liberty, also withdrew their ministers from Paris,
leaving Morris to constitute the whole diplomatic
corps. On the last day of the year Lord Grenville
formally refused to accredit the minister of the
French republic. " You are not ignorant," he wrote
to Chauvelin, " that since the unhappy events of the
10th of August, the king has thought proper to sus-
pend all official communication with France. You
are yourself no otherwise accredited to the king,
than in the name of his most Christian majesty. The
proposition of receiving a minister accredited by any
other authority or power in France, would be a new
question, which, whenever it should occur, the king
would have the right to decide according to the inter-
ests of his subjects, his own dignity, and the regard
which he owes to his allies, and the general system
of Europe. I am therefore to inform you, sir, that
I acknowledge you in no other public character than
that of minister from his most Christian majesty, and
that consequently you cannot be admitted to treat
with the king's ministers in the quality, and under
the form stated in your note." 28
The attitude which Morris determined to take was
26 Grenville to Chauvelin, December 31, 1792. Annual Register t
1793, 116.
38 South American Independence
the opposite of this of England. He remained in
Paris, and continued his relations with the ministry
of Foreign Affairs with as little interruption as the
course of events would allow. He remained, as he
wrote home, " because, in the admitted case that my
letters of credence are to the monarchy, and not to
the republic of France, it becomes a matter of indif-
ference whether I remain in this country, or go to
England, during the time which may be needful to
obtain your orders, or to produce a settlement of
affairs here. Going hence, however, would look like
taking part against the late revolution, and I am not
only unauthorized in this respect, but I am bound to
suppose that, if the great majority of the nation
adhere to the new form, the United States will
approve thereof, because, in the first place, we have
no right to prescribe to this country the government
they shall adopt, and next, because the basis of our
own constitution is the indefeasible right of the peo-
ple to establish it." 27
The new French Government itself almost drove
Morris to leave Paris. Without specific instructions
he declined to pay the instalments on the American
debt to the republic as they came due, and a letter of
Le Brun, insisting strongly on the identity of France,
whatever her domestic form, induced him to demand
« Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792. A. 8. P. F. R., 1 : 336.
Introduction 39
his passports. This action evoked an explanatory
note from the French minister, so that the demand
was withdrawn. "As to my personal opinions,"
wrote Morris, consenting to remain, " they are unim-
portant in an affair so serious, but you may be per-
suaded that I have never doubted the right which
every people have of forming, to themselves, such
government as they please." 28 He was much re-
lieved when Jefferson, on learning of the suspension
of the French constitution, wrote him instructions
that approved his actions. " During the time of this
suspension, and while no legitimate government
exists, we apprehend that we cannot continue the
payments of our debt to France, because there is no
one authorized to receive it and to give us an unob-
jectionable acquittal." Until further orders Morris
was directed to suspend payments, with the under-
standing that "this suspension [shall not] be con-
tinued one moment after we can see our way clear
out of the difficulty into which their situation has
thrown us." 29
The situation and interests of the United States
were such that in this crisis she was enabled to fulfil
in their strictness both the letter and the spirit of
38 Morris to LeBrun, September 17, 1792. A.S.P.F.JK., 1 : 340.
» Jefferson to Morris, October 15, 1792. P. L. Ford, Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, VI: 120.
40 South American Independence
the law. And where the indistinct law of neutrality
was silent, she guided her actions by logical reason-
ing, based upon the broad principles of honest impar-
tiality and the consent of the governed. The conduct
of Morris received the support of the administration.
His new instructions, when they came, authorized
him to continue the course he had started upon. " It
accords with our principles," wrote Jefferson, stating
the law of recognition of governments as it has come
to be accepted to-day, " to acknowledge any Govern-
ment to be rightful which is formed by the will of
the nation, substantially declared. The late Govern-
ment was of this kind, and was accordingly acknowl-
edged by all the branches of ours; so any alteration
of it which shall be made by the will of the nation,
substantially declared, will doubtless be acknowl-
eclged in like manner. With such a Government,
every Icind of business may be done." 30 The situa-
tion was such as has been insisted upon as essential
for the development of a precedent in recognition;
there was a change of government, the effect of it
was being contested, a neutral party with no interest
in a termination in either direction acted as seemed
to it reasonable and right. It is well for the develop-
ment of international law when the interest of States
guides them into logical paths rather than selfish
30 Jefferson to Morris, November 7, 1792. Ford, Writings, VI: 131.
Introduction 41
ones. " The President receives, with great satisfac-
tion," wrote Jefferson to the French minister in
Philadelphia, acknowledging his notification of the
change of government, " this attention of the Execu-
tive Council and the desire they have manifested of
making known to us the resolution entered into by
the National Convention, even before a definite
regulation of their new establishment could take
place. Be assured, Sir, that the Government and the
citizens of the United States view with the most sin-
cere pleasure every advance of your nation towards
its happiness, an object essentially connected with its
liberty, and they consider the union of principles and
pursuits between our two countries as a link which
binds still closer their interests and affections." 31
The actual outbreak of war between France and
England, in 1793, brought to this attitude of neu-
trality the supreme test. France was at once the
traditional friend of the United States, and the ex-
ponent of a governmental system that could not fail
to command the warmest admiration in America.
She had rendered to the struggling States, fifteen
years before, an assistance that at a later date in the
war had become decisive; and it was by no means
clear that the bond whereby she pledged her assist-
ance did not entitle her to the aid of the United
«* Jefferson to Ternant, February 23, 1793. Ford, Writing*, VI : 189.
42 South American Independence
States in her own crisis. To resist a popular distrust
of England, a sympathy with France and the obliga-
tion of the treaty of 1778 was no easy task. By
rather close reasoning on the changed situations in
Europe, and the obligations of treaties, reinforced by
a profound realization of the need of peace to the
United States, Washington was led to take for his
country an epoch-making attitude.
Summoning his cabinet to meet him,82 the Presi-
dent hurried from Mt. Vernon to Philadelphia when
news of the outbreak of the war reached him. To
his advisers he propounded a series of thirteen per-
tinent questions on neutrality and the French
treaties,33 and with their approval, on 22d April,
1793, issued a proclamation that "has had greater
influence in moulding international law than any sin-
gle document of the last hundred years." 8* With
the brief neutrality proclamation as a text, Jefferson,
in his later correspondence with Genet, formulated
" against France," and against his own inclination, it
might be added, " broad principles of neutrality, to
which time has added nothing." 85 A year later
these principles of international law, now for the first
82 Circular to Cabinet, April 12, 1793. J. Sparks, Writing* of Wash-
ington, X : 336.
88 Sparks, Writings of Washington, X : 533.
84 J. W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy (Boston, 1900),
154.
86 W. F. Reddoway, The Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, 1898), 15.
Introduction 43
time laid down with authority, were enacted with
fitting pains and penalties into a statute by the Con-
gress of the United States.
This prompt recognition of the French republic,
accompanied by a more thorough-going neutrality^
than had yet been seen, marks the entrance into
European diplomacy of a new power, in whose guid-
ance principles distinctly different from those of
Europe would predominate. It may be conjectured
that the development of international law since 1793
has been influenced more by this power than by any
other, just because of the isolation of interests that
forced it into a neutral attitude, from which it could
act freely, as a logical international theory might
dictate. From the action of the United States re-
garding the French governments, for the Director-
ate, the Consulate and the Empire were severally
acknowledged as the Republic had been, and the
French wars, it might be guessed with considerable
accuracy what would be its action when the next
great case for recognition should arise — when the
American colonies of His Catholic Majesty should be
driven by a Castilian stupidity, even greater than an
eighteenth-century English stupidity, into a war for
independence.
CHAPTEK I
THE SOUTH AMERICAN WAKS OF LIBERATION
The enterprise of the inhabitants of Spam's four
American viceroyalties displayed itself in systematic
and consistent smuggling rather than in any form of
opposition to Spanish rule as such. Exploitation and
repression were the essential features of the Spanish
colonial system. If Buenos Ayres proved to be a
competitor to the Spanish merchants, her olive trees
must come down and her vines must come up by the
roots, for it was clearly understood that Spain was to
be protected, and that colonies existed only for the
benefit of the mother country. It is hard to see how
such a system could have been carried out honestly,
or, if this were possible, how it could have been en-
dured. But the administrators of Spain made the
colonial system a means for recuperating distressed
fortunes, while the colonists utilized the cupidity of
their rulers to develop an extensive, illicit and profit-
able foreign commerce.1
No community 'of interest could well exist in the
1E. G. Bourne, Spain in America (New York, 1906), gives a de-
tailed account of the Spanish colonial system. He had already edited
a chapter from Boscher, Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung,
under the title The Spanish Colonial System (New York, 1904), His
analysis is more sympathetic than the one here given.
Wars of Liberation 45
population of the Spanish American colonies. Ex-
cepting their American residence, and common
dependence on a mother country, there are few
generalizations that can be made regarding the peo-
ple living in the southern Americas. Some families
were Castilian, were insolently proud of their birth
in the peninsula, and looked to a speedy return to
civilization and Spain. At the other end of the social
scale were negroes and Indians of unmixed blood.
Between these was an immense population made up
of Creoles on the one hand, and on the other of vari-
ous degrees of mestizos and mulattos, for the Spanish
settlers in America had amalgamated with the native
and lower races as only peoples of Latin blood have
done. Caste and class flourished in Latin America,
and gave a clear promise of permanence to Spanish
dominion which was the one unifying principle on
the continent. Without the assistance of Spain no
other common fact could come to exist, and no
dangerous spirit of revolution could prevail without
some other common facts.
South America, strange as it may seem, in spite of
centuries of misgovernment and blindness on the
part of the mother country, was patriotic during
those early years of the last century, when patriotism
was almost the only asset of the Spanish peoples.
The colonial system had been atrocious, but, keeping
46 South American Independence
those at the bottom of the social scale in dense ignor-
ance, and allowing those at the top to enrich them-
selves by illicit means, it had been successful. The
history of 1806 and 1807 proves this with reasonable
conclusiveness.
Three great names stand forth in the history of
South American Liberation.2 To Jose de San Martin
and Simon Bolivar belongs the credit of accomplish-
ing the emancipation; to Francisco de Miranda that
of inaugurating the movement.3 The first liberator,
Miranda, was a man of good family, a native of
Caracas, in Venezuela, and a wanderer of much
experience.4 Born in 1754, he had fought in the
American revolution with the French allies, and had
* The history of the wars of liberation is yet to be written. They
are the subject of a bulky Latin American literature, much of which
is lowered in value by its partisan character and its lack of critical
spirit. Little use has been made of this in the above chapter, although
references to it are included in the foot-notes. The principal sources
of the chapter are the memoirs and travels of foreigners in South
America during the revolutionary period, the British and American
foreign correspondence, and the original documents accompanying the
files of the latter. Bulletins of the armies, pamphlet laws and con-
stitutions, and the like, are preserved in great number in the archives.
8 W. S. Robertson, " Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing
of Spanish America," in Amer. Hist. Asso. Ann. Report, 1907, 1 : 189-
539, gives the best account of the inception of the movement for liber-
ation, and describes in substantiated detail the caree'r here alluded to.
4 Documents on the revolutionary career of Miranda are in Alph.
Comte O'Kelly de Galway, Francisco de Miranda: General de
Division des Armees de la Rtpubliquc (1791-1794); Heros de V Indb-
pendance Americaine ( 1756-1816) . (Paris, 1913. )
Wars of Liberation 47
there formed the resolution to repeat the process in
his own land. Years of travel over all of Europe,
broken into by service at the head of a French
republican brigade, and by visits to London and con-
ferences with British and American statesmen, had
confirmed the resolution, and it was only a change
in the conditions of Europe that kept Pitt from back-
ing a filibustering expedition under his leadership
in 1798. Another change of conditions brought the
object of his ambitions within his reach, and in
February, 1806, the Leander sailed from New
York, under one Martin,5 who at sea turned into
Miranda, the leader of a revolutionary expedition
against Venezuela.6 After touching at a port of San
Domingo, the Leander proceeded to the north
coast of Venezuela, where a Spanish force drove it
back. But Lord Cochrane, from the West Indian
station, was induced to convoy the expedition to an
easy landing in the neighborhood of Coro, whence
he convoyed it once more to Trinidad and safety a
few days later. The days at Coro had been spent in
vigorous revolutionary propagandism, to no effect.
5 Annals of Congress, llth Cong., 1st Sess., 257.
•The diary and letters of Henry Ingersoll, who accompanied the
Leander expedition as a printer, are given in Amer. Hist. Rev., Ill :
674.
48 South American Independence
The one thing essential to a revolution was lacking —
the people of Venezuela would not revolt.7
The experience of Miranda with an apathetic and
timorous population was duplicated in the same year
by the experience of another filibustering expedition,
this time directed against the viceroyalty of Buenos
Ayres. While the British ministry was considering
the plans of Miranda, in 1804, Sir Home Eiggs Pop-
ham had been designated as commander of a possible
British contingent, and had been placed in communi-
cation with the South American adventurer.8 Thus
Popham had come to consider the possibilities of
South American independence. And when the
capture of Cape Colony, in January, 1806, left him
free to act with his fleet, he listened to the tales of
7 The History of Don Francisco de Miranda's Attempt to effect a
Revolution in South America, in a Series of Letters, by a Gentleman
who was an Officer under that General, to his Friend in the United
States. To which are annexed Sketches of the Life of Miranda, and
Geographical Notices of Caracas (Boston, 1808), 110; Annual
Register, 1806, 239 ; A . S. P. F. R. , III : 256 ; Amer. Hist. Rev. , VI :
508; Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 257-315; J. H. Latane",
The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America
(Baltimore, 1900), 21-29 ; Colombia, Being a geographical, statistical,
agricultural, commercial, and political Account of that Country, adap-
ted for the general Reader, the Merchant and the Colonist. (2 vols.,
London, 1822) II: 302, — perhaps by Zea, the Colombian agent since
it is a tract in favor of Colombian loans and contains the documents on
recognition by the United States.
8 C. W. Vane, ed., Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of
Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry (12 vols., Lon-
don, 1851- ), VII: 288.
Wars of Liberation 49
the captain of an American merchantman, borrowed
Lord Beresford and twelve hundred men, and sailed
west to free Montevideo and Buenos Ayres from the
Spanish tyranny under which they groaned, and to
open to British merchants their valuable commerce.9
The Spanish viceroy was so hopelessly incompetent
that Buenos Ayres fell before Beresford's handful
of troops, in July. But the groaning and oppressed
people united under the lead of a French officer in
the Spanish service, Liniers, and shortly made Beres-
ford and his soldiers prisoners of war.10 So success-
ful was their resistance that when General White-
locke arrived with nine thousand reinforcements,
and a commission as civil governor of the province,
he was forced to give up hostilities and return to
England to be court-martialed and cashiered.11
Thus the attempts to revolutionize South America
under British auspices proved to be premature. With
»C. W. Vane, Castlereagh Corresp. VII: 302; W. M. Sloane, in
Amer. Hist. Rev., IV : 449-453; see text of proclamations in S. H.
Wilcocke, History of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres; containing
the most accurate Details relative to the Topography, History, Com-
merce, Population, Government, etc., etc., of that valuable Colony (Lon-
don, 1807), 356.
10 Joseph Andrews, Journey from Buenos Ayres, through the Prov-
inces of Cordova, Tecuman, and Salta, to Potosi, thence by the Deserts
Carauja to Arica, and subsequently, to Santiago de Chili and Coquimbo
. . .in the years 1825-26 (2 vols., London, 1827), 1 : 34.
11 C. W. Vane, Castlereagh Corresp., VII: 314; LatanS, Dipl.
ReL, 29-31 ; and Dictionary of National Biography.
50 South American Independence
all their grievances the colonists were not yet pre-
pared for independence. And when at last the first
step was taken that led to the ultimate separation,
the motive was not love of freedom, but a patriotic
desire to maintain Spanish authority in Spanish
colonies.
When Napoleon established his brother on the
throne of Spain he gave the signal for the erection
of patriotic juntas throughout the peninsula. The
inhabitants of Spanish- America were no less deter-
mined than those of Ferdinand's European posses-
sions not to submit to French rule. With some
friction 12 caused by the desire of the regency of
Cadiz to rule the colonies as well as Spain, they took
matters into their own hands and set up independent
local governments in the name of Ferdinand. At
Buenos Ayres the viceroy Cisneros met with opposi-
tion from the minute of his arrival, in May, 1809.13
A year later he was deposed by a movement inspired
by a writer of pamphlets, Moreno, who became the
soul of the new " junta gubernative " that succeeded
him.14 Valparaiso followed the example of Buenos
w Colombia. . .Account, II: 320.
1$ J. R. Rengger, The Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspard Roderick
de Francia in Paraguay ; being an Account of a Six Years' Residence
in that Republic, from July, 1819, to May, 1825 (London, 1827),
In trod. xiv.
i* John Miller, Memoirs of General Miller, in the Service of the
Republic of Peru (2 vol., London, 1828), I: 59. These memoirs of
Wars of Liberation 51
Ayres, in July, 1810, deposed the president Carrasco,
and turned the municipal cabildo into a patriotic
junta.15 Santiago did the same in September, and
with a remarkable unanimity Chile determined no
longer to form a captain-generalcy under the viceroy
of Peru, and met in her first free congress in the
spring of 181 1.18 In the northern viceroy alty of
New Granada, Quito had set up the first junta in
August, 1809.17 Caracas joined in the movement
six months later, and abolished slavery, in addition
to proclaiming Ferdinand and forming a federative
government for Venezuela.18 Bogota acted in simi-
lar manner in July, following this in December,
1810, with a congress and a " Eepublic of Cundina-
marca " to be ruled by a president and vice-president
in the name of the old King of Spain.19 And on 5th
the most successful foreign officer in the service of the liberating army
form the most valuable single source on the history of the war. The
military operations are particularly well treated.
15 W. B. Stevenson, A historical and descriptive Narrative of a
Twenty Year*' Residence in South America (3 vol., London, 1825),
III: 176.
" Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 105.
17 The Republic of Colombia : an Account of its Boundaries, Extent
. . . and History. Printed from the Article in the Seventh Edition
of the Encyclopedia Britannica (New York, 1836), 45-49.
"Simon de Schryver, Esquisse de la Vie Bolivar (Brussels, 1899),
13 ; Jonathan Elliott, The American Diplomatic Code (2 vols., Wash-
ington, 1834) 1 : 14.
19 Bernard Moses, " Political Constitution of Colombia," in Ann.
Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science. Ill : 57.
52 South American Independence
July, 1811, the first motion of independence of
Spain was adopted by the Congress of Venezuela.20
The widespread popular feeling which showed
itself in the movements here described was founded
on loyalty to Spain.21 Many of the leaders of the
day were individually in favor of a complete inde-
pendence, but there was as yet no public opinion to
support them. Even so much as had been attained
was soon lost, as throughout the greater part of
South America the popular governments were sup-
pressed, with varying degrees of difficulty. But the
fact of independence was established. Although in
name Spain continued to rule the Americas for
several years to come, her rule had now ceased to be
effectual, and the principle of commercial restriction
upon which her colonial policy was founded ceased to
be operative. The great English trade which came
at once into existence made the restoration of the
old system more impossible every day, and gave
strength to the real movements for political inde-
pendence which at once began. The overthrow of
Ferdinand in Spain had established the economic
independence of the colonies.
80 Republic of Colombia, 51; The Present State of Colombia; by
an Officer, late in the Colombian Service (London, 1827), 29.
21 William Walton, An Expose of the Dissensions of Spanish Amer-
ica . . . intended as a means to induce the mediatory Interference
of Great Britain (London, 1814), 100.
Wars of Liberation 53
The overthrow of Spanish rule in America is the
result of two simultaneous movements which origi-
nated in local disturbances in Venezuela and Buenos
Ayres, which spread gradually northward and south-
ward along the western coast of the continent de-
veloping leaders as they advanced, and which finally
united within the limits of the present republic of
Ecuador, to continue the advance together into the
heights of upper Peru, until the attainment of a com-
plete and perfect independence.22 The name of
Simon Bolivar, who was the spirit of the northern
movement, is better known than that of San Martin,
who accomplished a greater work in the southern
half of the continent.
When economic independence was forced upon the
Spanish provinces, about the year 1810, and their
ports were opened more widely than ever before to
foreign commerce, there began an invasion of capital
and commercial adventurers that had a permanent
influence on the history of the colonies.23 There had
M A great calendar of documents bearing upon the liberation was
published in 1912 by Pedro Torres Lanzas, Director of the General
Archive of the Indies at Seville, under the title Independencia de
America: Fuentes para, su Estudio. Catdlago de Documentos con-
servados en el Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla. (6 vols., Madrid
1912). These volumes will be indispensable to the definitive historian
of the movement.
88 A Five Years1 Residence in Buenos Ayres during the Years 1820
to 1825, containing Remarks on the Country and Inhabitants, and a
Visit to Colonia del Sacramento. By an Englishman (2 ed., London,
1827), 33; Wilcocke, Viceroyalty, preface.
54 South American Independence
always been much foreign commerce in spite of Span-
ish colonial system, but it had paid a heavy unofficial
tax, and the goods were distributed through Spanish
hands. Now began the establishment of commercial
houses in the large cities and the permanent invest-
ment of foreign capital, which was mostly English.
It was not long before those houses and this capital
were forced into politics, and, owing their life to the
existence of an illegal condition, they necessarily
fought to maintain that condition and enlisted heart-
ily in the cause of independence. The materials are
not yet collected to show how far Spanish American
independence was due to the Liverpool and Man-
chester merchants, but such as are available seem to
show that commercial pressure was the great influ-
ence in keeping the patriots patriotic. Particularly
was this true in the chief port of entry for the
southern provinces, Buenos Ayres.
The junta gubernative, which was set up in Buenos
Ayres on the 25th of May, 1810,24 was the beginning
of an independent regime that has endured in that
territory, in one form or another, from that day to
this. It was a doubtful period of political instability
that followed the erection of this government for ten
84 T. C. Dawson, The South American Republics (2 vols., 1903, 1904,
in " The Story of the Nations " ) , 1 : 90. Dawson gives an intelligent
popular survey of South American affairs.
Wars of Liberation 55
years or more. War was almost constant on three
parts of the frontier: Artigas dominated in the city
of Montevideo, and declined to submit to the
authority of Buenos Ayres; Dr. Francia shut him-
self up in the city of Paraguay and maintained a
permanent embargo on the inhabitants of the
province under his control; and on the northern
frontier of the viceroyalty the Spanish forces from
upper Peru were constant in their depredations.
Meanwhile, within the frontiers thus harassed,
partisan politics was doing its worst, and between the
rivalries of revolutionary chieftains and the jeal-
ousies existing between the rural districts and the city
of Buenos Ayres the province had little domestic
stability.25 Moreno, who led the attack on the vice-
roy Cisneros, in 1810, dominating the junta that suc-
ceeded him, seems to have been an honest man and
too severe for his time.26 He died while on a forced
mission to England. Saavedra, who drove him out,
was himself forced to leave abruptly before the end
KAn account, historical, political and statistical, of the United
Provinces of JRio de la Plata ; with an Appendix concerning the Usur-
pation of Monte Video by the Portuguese and Brazilian Governments.
Translated from the Spanish (London, 1825) 9, et seq., — this is a semi-
official account, prepared at the request of the British agent, and con-
tains an excellent map and numerous documents.
26 Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 60, et seq.; Don Vicente Pazos, Letters on the
United Provinces of South America, addressed to the Hon. Henry Clay
(New York and London, 1819), 49.
56 South American Independence
of 1811. And after an interregnum of several
months Juan Martin Pueyrredon arrived from the
army and took command at Buenos Ayres.27 In the
last month of 1813 the position of Supreme Director
was established, to be filled for the first time by
Gervasio Antonio de Posadas. He was followed by
General Alvear,28 later the victim of another revolu-
tion, succeeded by Alvarez, pro temporej and by
Pueyrredon, who was chosen Supreme Director in
March, 1816, by the Congress of Tucuman.29
Throughout this period of strife Buenos Ayres was
in an anomalous condition. She had revolted in the
name of Ferdinand VII. She did not issue any
declaration of independence until 1816. Spain was
maintaining that her own sway was still unbroken:
" the Laws of the Indias (which are still in force)
do not permit any Foreign Vessel to approach or
carry on commerce with " the port of Buenos Ayres.
Yet when the British Foreign Office sent a consul to
that city the junta declined to grant hini an exequa-
tur, because in his commission the independence of
Buenos Ayres was not acknowledged. The congress
that met at Tucuman in 1816 ended this uncertainty.
By this time negotiations entered into for the estab-
» Bland, in Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 2146.
88 Halsey to Secretary of State, May 5, 1815. State Dept. MM.
» Bland, in Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 2149.
Wars of Liberation 57
lishment of a Spanish prince on the throne of Buenos
Ayres had failed because of the unalterable deter-
mination of Spain, after the restoration, to reconquer
the colonies.30 So the representatives of the United
Provinces of Rio de la Plata declared their inde-
pendence at Tucuman on July 9th, 1816, and issued
a manifesto of causes on the 25th of the following
month.31
The series of military successes that was destined
to lead to South American independence began at
Tucuman in the fall of 1812, and at Salta on Febru-
ary 20th, 1813.32 In these battles the Spanish forces
from upper Peru were driven back as they crossed
the frontier of Buenos Ayres, and at the latter the
royalist general Tristan was decisively defeated by
the patriot Belgrano. But on the 1st of October, of
the same year, the royalists, violating their parole
given after Salta, destroyed Belgrano's army at
Vilcapujio. This was a distinct service to the
patriots, for it placed in command of the remnants of
Belgrano's force Jose de San Martin, just returned
80 Sir Woodbine Parish, Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio
de la Plata : from their Discovery and Conquest by the Spaniards to
the Establishment of their political Independence (2d ed. London, 1852),
75, 386.
81 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 1877, 2045; Annual
Register, 1816 [159] ; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 30.
»2 North American Review, CLX V : 556 ; Miller, Memoirs 1 : 76.
58 South American Independence
from twenty years of honorable service in the
Spanish armies to aid his countrymen in their fight.
San Martin recognized at once the futility of
attacking Spain in the mountains of upper Peru,
with more than four hundred leagues of impassable
roads33 between his army and his base of supplies.34
He conceived the idea of forcing Spain to defend her
own base at Lima and Callao, and to this purpose
elaborated a plan for an invasion of Chile, a capture
of Valparaiso, and a combined military and naval
attack on the capital of Peru. To this end he will-
ingly gave up the command of his northern army
to General Alvear, taking for himself, in September,
1814, the governorship of the backwoods province
of Cuyo, Mendoza the capital, at the eastern end of
the Uspallata pass over the Andes.35
33 In 1908 and 1909 Hiram Bingham, of Yale University, in connec-
tion with his visit to the First Pan-American Scientific Congress
at Santiago, made the overland trip along the old road from Buenos
Ayres to Bolivia and Peru. He describes and illustrates the supreme
difficulties that would have impeded San Martin in an overland con-
quest of Peru in Across South America, An Account of a Journey from
Buenos Aires to Lima by Way of Potosi (Boston, 1911), 50, ff.
34 Peter Schmidtmeyer, Travels into Chile, over the Andes, in the
Years 1820 and 1821 (London, 1824), 132, gives the distance from
Buenos Ayres to Tucuman as 328 leagues, and to Salta 415 leagues.
35 J. H. Latane", DipL Eel., 37 ; Alexander Cadcleugh, Travels in
South America during the Years 1819-20-21, containing An Account of
the present State of Brazil, Buenos Ayres and Chile (2 vols., London,
1825), 1 : 293-297.
Wars of Liberation 59
A popular revolt had occurred in Chile a short
time after the overthrow of the viceroy at Buenos
Ayres, the cabildo of Valparaiso advancing the pre-
text that the captain-general could not save the prov-
ince for Ferdinand. Following a common line of
development this revolt ripened into a popular con-
gress in June, 1811, only to fall in December of the
same year before " the unprincipled ambition " of
three gifted brothers Carrera. Encouraged by the
factions so soon developed in Chile, the viceroy of
Peru seized the opportunity to send down an army in
the early months of 1813. The Chilenos at once
put aside their strife, met the invaders, and under
the leadership, first of Jos6 Miguel Carrera, and
then of Bernardo O'Higgins, extorted a truce at Talca
on the 5th of May, 1814. By this truce the existing
order in Chile was acknowledged. The truce was the
signal for the renewal of partisan strife between
O'Higgins and the Carreras, who had been forced
to surrender to him the command of the patriot
army. But once more they came to a forced recon-
ciliation, when the news arrived that the viceroy
repudiated the truce of Talca, and that General
Osorio was on his way south with another royalist
army. The patriots were hopelessly weakened by
their domestic strife, however, so that a decisive
victory at Kancagua, on 1st October, 1814, marked
60 South American Independence
a complete restoration of Spanish authority in
Chile.36 O'Higgins and a few of his officers escaped
from the wreck of their army, crossed the Andes,
and placed themselves under the command of San
Martin, the new governor at Mendoza.37
San Martin settled down at Mendoza with a hand-
ful of recruits — the number is stated at 160 — and a
great plan. In a few weeks he was joined by another
handful of Chilenos, who escaped destruction at
Rancagua. Then he began the long task of building
up a weak province, collecting and organizing an
army, and educating the authorities of Buenos Ayres
in the strategic necessities of the war. From the
city he had chosen for his capital it was only a short
journey to the coast cities of Chile. But the passage
of the Andes was considered impossible for an army,
and few stratagems were needed to close the eyes of
the Spanish forces to the possibility of danger from
this side.
His long experience in the Spanish army had given
San Martin a thorough knowledge of the art of war.
86 Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 105-118 ; Stevenson, Narrative of Residence,
III : 176-181 ; Maria Graham, Journal of a Residence in Chile during
the Year 1822 ; and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 182S (London,
1824), 16. The history of this period is based on memoirs, the public
records having been destroyed to keep them from the Spaniards.
Graham, Introd., 3.
*T Samuel Haigh, Sketches of Ifuenos Ayres and Chile (London,
1829), 160.
Wars of Liberation 61
To this were added a character that inspired confi-
dence, and a greater amount of industry than was
common to Latin Americans. Eecruiting proceeded
at Mendoza with considerable rapidity; constant
drilling turned the raw recruits into first-rate sol-
diers; from the foreign merchants at Buenos Ayres,
whose confidence had early been gained, came a sup-
ply of material 38 things that made the equipment of
an army possible.
After two years of quiet organization the new
army was ready to move, and notice to this effect was
served in an indirect way on the Spanish authorities
in Chile. Relying confidently on the insincerity of
the native Indians, San Martin summoned them to a
great conference and celebration in the fall of 1816.
Here, under pledge of profound secrecy, he told the
chiefs of his purpose, and marked out for them a line
of march across the Andes that he had no intention of
following.39 Having thus successfully misled his
enemy, San Martin moved from Mendoza on the 17th
of January, 1817, with a force of about 4,000 men.
After a terrible journey over the Uspallata pass,
four thousand feet higher than another more famous
one, of St. Bernard, he descended the western slope
88 Miller, Memoirs, I: 88.
» Miller , Memoirs, I : 89-102; Graham, Journal, 29.
62 South American Independence
of the Andes and fell upon the Spanish outpost at
La Guardia, on 7th February.40
The liberation of Chile, the second step in San
Martin's plan, of which the creation of an army at
Mendoza was the first, was the work of fifteen
months. Osorio, who had become captain-general of
Chile after his victory at Rancagua, in 1814,41 had
been suspecting danger as he watched the proceedings
across the mountains, and soon had an army ready to
be sacrificed before the invader at Chacabuca, on
February 12th.42 Two days later the liberating
army entered Santiago. During the succeeding
months the patriot government in Chile was erected
again. A congress met to offer the Supreme
Directorship to San Martin, and then to O'Higgins,
when the former refused it; while on the first day
of the ensuing year the independence of Chile was
proclaimed.43 Meanwhile the Spanish army, in its
refuge at Talcuhuana, in the south of Chile, was
gathering reinforcements from Peru. Then Osorio
*° C. R. Markham, A History of Peru ( Chicago, 1892) , 239 ; Miller,
Memoirs, I: 120.
« Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 120.
» ** Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, 182 ; Journal of a Residence
in Chile. By a Young American, detained in that Country during the
revolutionary Scenes of 1817-18-19 (Boston, 1823), 1-17 ; Schmidtmeyer,
Travels, 351.
43 Annual Register, 1818, 44.
Wars of Liberation 63
marched ** against the patriots with 8,000 men, and
defeated them completely at Talca, 19th March,
18 18.45 But this was only the dark before dawn,
for the patriots, who rallied under San Martin and
O'Higgins, melted down their plate and sold their
jewels, and in three weeks placed a new army in the
field. On the 5th of April, 1818, the virtual inde-
pendence of Chile was achieved on the plain of
Maypu.46 Spain never again had any considerable
force in the province.
With Chile cleared of Spanish troops, and with
Valparaiso at his service for a base of supplies, San
Martin was ready to enter upon the next stage of his
work, the liberation of Peru. From this point in his
career he is no longer to be considered as a general
of Buenos Ayres. He is become the Liberator, with
larger plans than the home faction that appointed
him can comprehend. We are not at this place con-
cerned with the internecine strife that continued in
Buenos Ayres regardless of his successes, or with his
summons by, disobedience to, and final rupture with
the Buenos Ayrean authorities. San Martin realized
« Graham, Journal, 33 ; Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 179 ; Basil Hall,
Extracts from a Journal written on the coasts of Chili, Peru and^
Mexico in the years 1820, 1821, 1822 (2 vol., Edinburgh, 1824), 1 : 58,'
a valuable account by an outsider skilled in travel and observation.
45 Journal by a Young American, 40-71.
** Haigh, Sketches, 190-239 ; Cadcleugh, Travels, II : 31.
64 South American Independence
that extinction of Spanish power was more important
than local politics, and continued on the course he
had mapped out in spite of the orders and pleadings
that he come home and restore peace.*7
Another period of two years elapsed between the
decisive victory at Maypu and the definitive invasion
of Peru. It was a period, like that at Mendoza, filled
with recruiting, organizing, drilling and educating.
A series of proclamations prepared the Peruvians for
their emancipation; the friendship and protection of
the Liberator were promised them; while a treaty of
alliance between Buenos Ayres and Chile guaranteed
the independence of a new State to be erected by
their joint army in Peru.48
At this time arrived in Valparaiso a most consid-
erable addition to the patriot force in the person of
Thomas, Lord Cochrane, later tenth Earl of Dun-
donald. Cochrane, who was an energetic and able
naval officer, had been thrown out of the British
navy on a rather doubtful charge, and had been
engaged, in 1817, by Alvarez, the Chilian agent in
London,49 to go out and organize a naval force for
^'February, 1820. Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 258.
48 Graham, Journal, 481 ; British and Foreign State Papers, XII :
811.
*» Thomas Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, Narrative of
Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish
and Portuguese Domination (2 vols., London, 1859), I. This is one of
Wars of Liberation 65
Chile. His arrival in November, 1818, introduced
at once an element of efficiency in the branch of the
service on which San Martin was most dependent for
success in Peru.50 But it also introduced feelings of
jealousy among the native officers thus superseded
that well nigh wrecked the whole enterprise.
An active naval warfare was at once begun against
the Spanish forces, and before long reports began to
come to Europe and the United States of the pirati-
cal proceedings of insurgent cruisers in the Pacific,
of seizures of neutrals, and of paper blockades.51 The
first expedition of Cochrane anchored off Callao on
28th February, 1819, after a twelve days' voyage
from Valparaiso.52 The following day a blockade of
the Peruvian coast was instituted.53 But this attack
accomplished nothing of consequence. With a fleet
of eight vessels Cochrane sailed for a second time in
the best accounts of the war, but is violently prejudiced against San
Martin. Cochrane also published The Autobiography of a Seaman
(2 vols., London, 1860) ; which was completed in The Life of Thomas,
Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald (2 vol., London 1869), by
the Eleventh Earl of Dundonald and H. R. Fox Bourne. On his
earlier career, see J. B. Atlay, The Trial of Lord Cochrane before Lord
Ellenborough (London, 1897), and The Guilt of Lord Cochrane, A
Criticism (London, 1914), by Lord Ellenborough, grandson of the
Lord Chief Justice.
50 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 147.
61 Nile* Register, XVII : 191.
52 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 139 ; Cochrane, Narra-
tive, 1:5. s3 Annual Register, 1819, II : 154.
66 South American Independence
September of this same year, only to find, when he
met the enemy, that his rockets were filled with sand
instead of powder. The Chilian authorities had
frugally employed Spanish prisoners in the manu-
facture of ammunition.54 In spite of this disap-
pointment, however, Valdavia was captured by the
fleet, and at once Spain was deprived of her best
harbor in the Pacific, and San Martin was enabled
to devote his whole attention to Peru.55 By this
time the latter was ready to move his new army, and
in August, 1820, a combined military and naval
expedition departed from Valparaiso.
Peru, the stronghold of Spanish power in America,
had undergone less violent revolutionary movements
than any other part of the continent; and in August,
1820, was fully under the control of General Don
Joaquin de la Pezuela, forty-fourth viceroy after
Pizarro. But it was three years now since Pezuela
had written home that he stood over a volcano liable
to burst into action at any time.58 To understand
San Martin's campaign against the viceroy, and his
illegitimate successor, La Serna, we must remember
that San Martin realized this condition and labored
to produce an eruption of the volcano, to induce the
Peruvians to free themselves,
M Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 220. M Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 246.
5«Markham, Peru, 237.
Wars of Liberation 67
On August 21st, 1820, the liberating squadron
sailed from Valparaiso with San Martin, Cochrane
arid some 4,500 troops on board. On 12th Septem-
ber these were landed at the bay of Pisco, and two
weeks later the viceroy concluded a truce at Mira-
flores.57 This was the beginning of what seemed to
Lord Cochrane to be a series of dilatory movements
inspired by irresolution and incapacity, if not by
actual cowardice. Cochrane was a strenuous leader,
and could not understand a war conducted without
fighting. All his life he had been engaged in con-
flicts with his superiors in the navy, magistrates and
committees. ISTow began the misunderstanding that
led to an open rupture between the leaders, and
finally induced the admiral to abandon a service
where he considered himself ill-treated, to enter
what he hoped would be a more congenial service in
Brazil. The truce of Miraflores came to nothing, for
Pezuela had no power to treat on the only basis San
Martin would consider — that of independence. So
hostilities were soon resumed. The campaign was
one of education. " I come to fulfil the expecta-
tions," proclaimed the Liberator, " of all those who
wish to belong to the country that gave them birth,
and who desire to be governed by their own laws.
On that day when Peru shall freely pronounce as
M Hall, Extracts from Jowrnal, 1 : 70 ; Graham, Journal 67-69.
68 South American Independence
to the form of her institutions, be they whatever
they may, my functions shall cease, and I shall have
the glory of announcing to the government of Chile,
of which I am a subject, that their heroic efforts
have at last received the consolation of having given
liberty to Peru, and security to the neighboring
States." 58 To a British officer on duty in South
American waters, San Martin declared that he de-
sired to convert thinking men, but had no ambition
to figure as a conqueror.59
After a few weeks at Pisco the army was again
placed on its transports and moved off Callao, where
it remained long enough for Cochrane to cut out a
Spanish frigate, the Esmeralda, which lay in the har-
bor. Then it was moved to a bay some twenty-nine
leagues north of Callao and disembarked at Huacho
on 9th November. Here, " having shown sufficiently
what his army and fleet were capable of," 60 San
Martin settled for a period of six months, and con-
tinued the dissemination of revolutionary principles.61
Colonel Arenales was perhaps the most efficient
educator employed by the patriots. While the army
lay at Pisco, he set out with 1,000 troops, crossed
the Andes, marched north through the heart of the
68 October 13, 1820. Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III: 286.
59 Hall, Extracts from Journal, 1 : 210.
60 Hall, Extracts from Journal, 1 : 83.
61 Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 270 ; Cochrane, Narrative, 1 : 82.
Wars of Liberation 69
Spanish territory, and rejoined the main body of the
army at Huacho. As he marched around Lima,
Arenales spread a feeling of independence among
the inhabitants. Troops sent against him from Lima
were defeated. A long line of revolutionized towns
was left in his wake; while Spanish soldiers by the
hundred deserted and marched over to the patriot
army.62
Meanwhile the effects of war were being felt by
the royalists in Lima. Cochrane was maintaining a
rigorous blockade of Callao, and San Martin and
Arenales were investing the city from the land.
Faction and dissatisfaction prevailed, so that when
General La Serna came down from Upper Peru, on
his way to Spain, he went no further than the capital.
Here he was promoted by the viceroy Pezuela to the
command of the royalist armies; and by the favor of
the army he deposed Pezuela and inaugurated him-
self as viceroy in his place.63 This was on the 29th
of January, 1821. No general actions occurred dur-
ing the ensuing months. Miller, the only English
officer who fought through the whole war, was en-
gaged in an expedition similar to that of Arenales,
when news came to him of the conclusion of another
armistice on the 23d of May.64 La Serna, in the
" Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 303.
68 Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 281. «* Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 284.
70 South American Independence
negotiations which now occurred, was more pliable
than Pezuela had been during the truce of Mira-
flores. He was thoroughly convinced of the hope-
lessness of his fight, and was ready to recognize the
independence of Peru, and permit the establishment
of a provisional government until a Bourbon prince
could come out to take the throne. But his officers
forced him to abandon those terms and end the truce.
Spain made no terms with rebels; but her position
in Lima had become untenable, and at daybreak on
the 6th of July, 1821, she marched her army out of
the city.65
With deliberation, San Martin moved his army
into the capital thus evacuated. He had long since
proclaimed that he did not come as a conqueror, and
now he delayed his entry until the fiery Cochrane
was almost blind with anger, and the cabildo sent a
deputation of magnates to invite him to take pos-
session.66 Even then he did not move his troops
until he had thoroughly policed the town.
Although Lima was in his hands, the political edu-
cation of the Peruvians was by no means completed,
and harmony had ceased to exist in the ranks of the
patriots. At the suggestion of the Liberator an as-
sembly of eminent citizens, the cabildo, the arch-
66 Hall, Extracts from Journal, 1 : 217 ; Markham, Pert*, 249.
w Markham, Peru, 250.
Wars of Liberation 71
bishop, the prelates and the nobles, met on the
15th of July and declared the independence of
Peru, which was publicly proclaimed a little later:
" Peru is from this moment free and independent,
by the general vote of the people, and by the justice
of her cause, which God defend! " 67 This act ac-
complished, the erection of a government was the
next problem to be solved. It " was necessary that
an authority should be created capable of restoring
the movement of this grand machine, by preparing
it to receive new forms and modifications. Im-
perious circumstances pointed out the person on
whom the supreme power was to fall." Accord-
ingly, on 3d August San Martin issued a proclama-
tion assuming the supreme power, giving himself the
title of Protector, and promising to surrender the
government to the people as soon as Peru should be
free.69 It was a curious paper, wrote Basil Hall,
"it has little of the wonted bombast of such docu-
ments, and though not sparing of self-praise, is manly
67 British and Foreign State Papers, IX : 393 ; Stevenson, Narra-
tive of Residence, III : 341.
68 Bernardo Monteagudo, Peruvian Pamphlet : Being an Exposition
of the administrative Labours of the Peruvian Government, from the
Time of Its Formation, till the 15th of July, 1822; Presented to the
Council by the Minister of State and Foreign Relations, . . .in Con-
formity with a protectorial Decree of the 18th of January (London.
1823), 12. Monteagudo's work is partisan in character, but as a confi-
dential agent of San Martin he was in a position to know his facts.
* British and Foreign State Papers, VIII : 1271.
72 South American Independence
" and decided; and, as I believe, from a number of
collateral circumstances, perfectly sincere." 70 But
by this time the controversy between the Protector
and the Admiral had become so bitter that there was
no longer hope of reconciliation, and the former had
to order the latter, with his fleet, to leave the coast
of Peru. " It now became evident to me," is Coch-
rane's story, " that the army had been kept inert for
the purpose of preserving it entire to further the am-
bitious views of the general, and that with the whole
force now at Lima the inhabitants were completely at
the mercy of their pretended liberator, but really
their conqueror." 71 " It is almost unnecessary to
say," complained one of his partisans, " how ill this
self-constituted authority agrees with the promises
made by the Supreme Director of Chile in his procla-
mation to the Peruvians; and in that of General San
Martin, issued after his arrival in Peru." 72 San
Martin was not unmindful of the difficulties of his
position when he reported to his superior, O'Higgins,
that he would retain his authority " until the meet-
70 Hall, Extracts from Journal, I: 266.
71Cochrane, Narrative I'. 125.
72 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III: 352; John Miers, Travels
in Chile and La Plata, including Accounts respecting the Geography
Geology, Statistics, Government, Finances, Agriculture, Manners and
Customs, and the mining Operations in Chile (2 vol., London, 1826),
64; Gilbert F. Mathison, Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru,
and the Sandwich Islands, during the Years 1821 and 1822 (London,
1825), 243.
Wars of Liberation 73
" ing of the sovereign congress, composed of repre-
sentatives from all the districts, into which august
body I will resign my command, and to which I will
be answerable for what I may have done." 73
The wisdom of this assumption of power at this
critical period of Peruvian history is hardly to be
contested. These were the decisive campaigns of
the war of liberation. The future of Buenos Ayres
and Chile, of New Granada and Venezuela, of all
the Spanish provinces, depended on the battles that
were now to be fought in the mountains of Peru.
For this was the royalist heart of South America.
San Martin was not destined to fight these final bat-
tles, but he has the honor of conceiving the plan of
action, of executing it almost to the end, and of
showing a moderation and modesty unparalleled
among Latin American politicians.
The great popularity of the Liberator seems to
have begun to wane shortly after this time. It is
said on excellent authority that he always retained
the affections of the common people, but jealousy
and distrust had split his co-workers into hostile fac-
tions. There was little plunder to be shared by the
followers of San Martin; there was little military
glory to be achieved, for his policy was never one of
fighting. The greatest blow he sustained was per-
73 Monteagudo, Peruvian Pamphlet, App., 88, et seq.
74 South American Independence
haps one that came a month after his accession of
power. Spain, in evacuating Lima, had retained the
port of Callao, and on 10th September, 1821, she
marched reinforcements into the fort. San Martin,
with what his apologist well calls the " prudence of
real courage," declined to fight, and permitted the
Spanish force to pass unmolested within sight of his
army. The fact that in eleven days Callao was
quietly evacuated, without loss of life, and with con-
sequent discredit to the royalists, was as nothing in
the minds of the general's detractors. As they told
the story, habitual cowardice alone kept him out of
action.'*
For a year San Martin remained in Peru. It was
a year of great activity on his part, but of no per-
manent result. His effective contribution had been
made. The organization of a government was his
first work; 75 a provisional constitution was promul-
7* Miller, Memoirs 1 : 336 ; Hall, Extracts from Journal, II : 69 ;
Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 374 ; D. Ger6nimo Espejo,
Recuerdos histdricos : San Martin y Bolivar. Entrevista de Guaya-
quil (18S2), . . . illustrada con dos retrados (Buenos Ayres, 1873), 12,
contains an attack on Cochrane. Espejo was at Guayaquil during the
interview; Monteagudo, Peruvian Pamphlet, 16, 30; Markham,
Peru, 253.
75 " I never mentioned a wish to San Martin, or to Monteagudo, that
was not granted, and granted immediately, in the most obliging man-
ner. After their going away, I scarcely mentioned anything I wished
done that was not refused." James Thomson, Letters on the moral and
religious State of South America, written during a Residence of nearly
seven Years in Buenos Ayres, Chile, Peru, and Colombia (London, 1827),
Wars of Liberation 75
gated; a committee was started on a general code;
and a representative congress was summoned. In
the meantime the northern movement, under the
direction of Simon Bolivar, was approaching Peru,
arriving at Guayaquil in the spring of 1822. The
meeting of the two Liberators marks the end of San
Martin's career. Appointing as Supremo Delegado
the Marquis of Torre Tagle, a member of the old
nobility, who had turned patriot, and leaving the
actual administration of affairs in the hands of
Bernardo Monteagudo, San Martin set sail for Guay-
aquil in February, 1822.78 A change in Bolivar's
plans making a meeting impossible at this time, he
returned to Lima in a few weeks, but did not resume
the government. This was unfortunate. Montea-
gudo, whose ability was undoubted, was "a most
zealous patriot," but, " besides being very unpopular
in his manners, was a bitter enemy to the whole race
of Spaniards." 7T His enemy tells us he was " of the
lowest rank in society, of spurious offspring, and
African genealogy." 78 Ultimately a mob at Lima re-
warded his actions by taking his life in the streets.
Under Monteagudo a series of proscriptions of
70. Thomson was an English missionary and teacher of the Lancas-
trian school system. In his latter capacity he was employed by the
revolutionary government.
76 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 432.
"Hall, Extracts from Journal, II: 85.
78 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 281.
7.6 South American Independence
Spaniards took place that brought the administration
into great disfavor.78 An incompetent general lost
a whole division of the liberating army.80 And
when San Martin, for the second time, went to
Guayaquil, in July, the city rose in revolt.
Various accounts, and none of them authentic,
have recorded the meeting of the two leaders at
Guayaquil, on the 26th of July, 1822. According to
Lord Cochrane, Bolivar " bitterly taunted San Mar-
tin with the folly and cruelty of his conduct towards
the Limenos; to such an extent, indeed, that the lat-
ter, fearing designs upon his person, precipitately left
Guayaquil and returned to Callao." 81 Such taunts
would not have come well from the lips of Bolivar.
More reasonable and more in harmony with prece-
dent and subsequent facts is the conclusion of Sir
Clements E. Markham: " General Bolivar came to
the port of Guayaquil flushed with victory, and full
of ambition to add to the lustre of his name by the
liberation of Peru. General San Martin was a pure
patriot,82 with little personal ambition. He saw
clearly that there could be no room for himself and
Bolivar in the same sphere of action, and it was
necessary for the welfare of the common cause that
n Hall, Extracts from Journal, II: 86; Mathison, Narrative of
Visit, 234.
80 Monteagudo, Peruvian Pamphlet, 33 ; Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 350.
81 Cochrane, Narrative 1 : 235. 8a Thomson, Letters, 52.
Wars of Liberation 77
one of them should retire. He did not hesitate to
make the sacrifice." 83 And so, after a conference of
a single day, San Martin returned to the revolted city
of Lima. Here he remained for a short time restor-
ing order and preparing for an expedition into upper
Peru;8* then upon the meeting of the first Peruvian
Congress, he " resigned the supreme authority he
had assumed a year before,"85 accepted the honorary
title of Generalissimo and a pension,86 issued a proc-
lamation of farewell, and returned to Chile. A few
months later he passes out of history, causing a mild
flutter at the Foreign Office as he came from Buenos
Ayres to London, bringing his little daughter to be
educated.87
It is now necessary to take up the other chain of
events of the war of liberation, to bring it down to
the point reached by San Martin, and to carry it on
to the successful termination of the struggle.
We have already seen how the premature attempt
of Miranda to revolutionize South America met with
failure in 1806, and how in 1810 the patriotic wave
established at Caracas and Bogota juntas ruling in
the name of Ferdinand VII.88 Simon Bolivar, who,
88 Markham, Peru, 254. M Monteagudo, Peruvian Pamphlet, App. 63.
83 Hall, Extracts from Journal,!!: 88. *« Cochra,ne,Narrativet I: 226.
87 Parish to Canning, April 25, 1824. F. O. Mss.
MJos6 Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitutional de Venezuela (2vol.,
Berlin, 1907, 1909), is described by H. Bingham as " a most interesting
78 South American Independence
like Miranda and San Martin, came of an honorable
American family, at once placed his services at the
disposition of the Venezuelan junta.89 Miranda ar-
rived a few months later; and in March, 1811, the
first congress met. This body, after four months of
deliberation, abandoned the policy with which the
revolution had started and proclaimed the independ-
ence of Venezuela.90
The movement which had thus fallen into the
hands of the extremists advanced rapidly. The con-*
gress framed a liberal constitution and presented it
to the people of Venezuela for approval.91 But the
patriot cause was literally shattered by an unfortu-
nate earthquake that occurred on Holy Thursday of
1812, and gave the clergy of the province a chance to
preach the wickedness of insurrection and the terrors
of divine vengeance.92 This moral blow was closely
followed by a series of military successes on the part
of Spain. Dissensions arose among the leaders.
Bolivar deserted Porto Cabello, Miranda and the in-
and satisfactory account" by "a really notable historian." Amer.
Hist. Rev., XV : 907. 89 De Schryver, Bolivar, 13.
^Present State of Colombia, 29. ^Republic of Colombia Account, 53.
92 For an account of the destruction which left Caracas in ruins and
reduced Cucuta from 12,000 to 3,000, see Letters written from Colombia
during a Journey from Caracas to Bogota, and thence to Santa Martha
in 182S (London, 1824), 76 ; B. Bache, Notes on Colombia, taken in the
Years 1822-S. With an Itinerary of the Route from Caracas to Bogota ;
and an Appendix. By an Officer in the United States Army (Philadel-
phia, 1827), 38.
Wars of Liberation 79
surgent army leaving them to the mercy of the
Spaniards, who promptly took the city. Miranda
himself was captured as he attempted to escape, and
his partisans maintain that the deliberate desertion of
Bolivar was the cause of his being surrendered to the
Spanish general Monteverde. While that general,
beginning a policy that became common among roy-
alist officers, coolly violated the pledge of safety he
had given to his prisoner, and sent him to Spain,
where he speedily died in prison.93
The valley of the Orinoco, extending east and west
across three-fourths of the continent, is the backbone
of Venezuela. It is separated by the high mountain
wall of the Andes from the north and south valley of
the Magdalena, which similarly is the backbone of
New Granada. The wall is so solid that the two
provinces were practically isolated, the one land
route of importance being a road running from
Caracas to the southwest, crossing the Andes between
Barinas and Merida, and continuing its course up the
valley of the Magdalena from San Rosario de
Cucuta, through the city of Tunja, to Santa Fe de
Bogota, in the district of Cundinamarca.94 But the
93 Republic of Colombia Account, 58 ; Markham, Peru, 267.
M Partly for the purpose of studying the difficulties overcome by
Bolivar, Hiram Bingham has made the journey which he has recorded
in The Journal of an Expedition Across Venezuela and Colombia,
1906-07 (New Haven, 1909).
80 South American Independence
road was long and the journey one of many weeks,
so that land communication between the capitals was
considered out of question for large bodies of troops.
The situation was similar to that of Buenos Ayres
and Chile, which were thought to have no military
communication by land until San Martin did the im-
possible and crossed at Uspallata.
The elimination of Miranda gave Simon Bolivar
full sway in the military and political councils of the
northern provinces. His vigor and activity were
equal to the opportunity. When the disastrous re-
sults 95 of the spring of 1812 destroyed the insurgents
in Venezuela, and gave their cities into the hands of
the royalists, he crossed into New Granada for the
time. There he found no powerful Spanish force in
the upper country; but, instead, the patriots them-
selves were quarreling over the principle of federa-
tion, the City of Bogota standing out in determined
resistance against the Congress of New Granada.98
In the fall of the year, under authority of this Con-
gress, Bolivar was able to open the mouth of the
Magdalena to the patriots. A little later, with six
hundred men, he struck the Spanish at Cucuta,
passed through Merida and over the Andes to
Barinas, proclaiming " War to the Death." On the
4th of August, 1813, he entered Caracas once
w Colombia Account, II : 334. » Colombia Account, II : 337.
Wars of Liberation 81
more.97 Here the Dictatorial career of the Liberator
began. Disregarding his orders from the Congress
of New Granada, to reassemble the Congress of
Venezuela, Bolivar called an assembly of notables in
Caracas, told them what he had done, confided to
them his plans, and resigned into their hands his au-
thority. As was to be expected, his notables at once
reinvested him with Dictatorial power, to last until a
union between Venezuela and New Granada should
come.98 With a promising beginning, 1814 came to
a disastrous end. Royalist successes drove the Lib-
erator out of Venezuela. Returning to New Granada,
the Congress, then sitting at Tunja sent him
against the stubborn city of Bogota, which he re-
duced to membership in the federation." As a re-
ward, the Congress made him Captain-General of its
armies, arousing thereby a feeling of discontent
among its officers that defeated all his plans. Even
darker days were to follow.
The restoration of Ferdinand VII. to the throne of
Spain was the beginning of an absolutist reaction in
the peninsula, and of a determined attempt at recon-
quest in the colonies. By this time the movements
97 Colombia Account, II : 345. Republic of Colombia Account, 61.
w January 2, 1814. Present State of Colombia, 35; Colombia
Account, II : 351 ; Republic of Colombia Account, 64.
WG. Mollien, Travels in the Republic of Colombia, in the Years
1822 and 1823. Translated from the French (London, 1824), 136.
82 South American Independence
that had started in favor of the monarchy had devel-
oped into struggles for political independence. Spain
showed no disposition to conciliate the provinces,
failed to recognize the changes that a decade of
economic independence had wrought, and by her own
fatuous policy made her rehabilitation as an Ameri-
can power impossible. For a time, however, she had
the appearance of success in all her provinces but
Buenos Ayres.
In the spring of 1815 it was announced that an
extensive armament was preparing for the subjuga-
tion of South America. In July General Morillo, as
skillful and experienced a soldier as Spain possessed,
arrived off Carthagena with two ships of the line, six
frigates, seventy transports and twelve thousand
veteran troops.100 For a time the patriot forces re-
pulsed Morillo from this city, but the latter settled
down before it with so rigorous an investment that
after six months' siege an evacuation took place, and
the insurgent troops departed for Aux Cayes.101 At
the end of the year the Spanish general made the pre-
mature but significant boast that he had not " left
alive, in the kingdom of New Granada, a single indi-
vidual of sufficient influence or talents to conduct
100 Annual Register, 1815, [127] ; Mollien, Travels, 141.
101 December 6, 1815. Annual Register, 1816, [157].
Wars of Liberation 83
" the revolution." 102 After another period of six
months the boast might have been well founded, for
in June, 1816, the invading army completed its
march up the Magdalena and entered the capital city
of Bogota in triumph.103
With the arrival of Morillo in the Yermillion Sea,
Bolivar abandoned the continent, went to Jamaica,
and thence to the island of St. Domingo. Then at
Aux Cayes he was joined by the garrison at Cartha-
gena, and in May, 1816, he started an expedition to
Venezuela. No permanent success rewarded this
attempt. In a few weeks the Liberator was back
in Aux Cayes preparing a second expedition, which
was able to possess itself of the island of Margarita
in December.104 Co-operating with Sir Gregor
M'Gregor who had taken Caracas for the patriots in
October, Bolivar advanced from Margarita to the
mainland and set up his government at Barcelona,
some two hundred miles east of Caracas. But
Morillo had moved his army to Margarita, after the
capture of Bogota in June, 1816, and now opposed
himself to the Liberator in Venezuela.105 In April,
3817, the royalists took Barcelona. Bolivar moved
102 Present State of Colombia, 40, quoting Cadiz Journal of January
6, 1816. m Annual Register, 1816, [158].
** Annual Register, 1816, [158] ; Colombia Account, II : 367.
1(» Annual Register, 1818, 18.
84 South American Independence
his capital to the lower valley of the Orinoco, where
he placed it in the city of St. Thomas de Angostura.
The campaign of 1818 was undecisive. Morillo
held the valley of the Magdalena and the cities of
New Granada with almost uncontested authority,
while he was well established, also, on the northern
coast of Venezuela, in the vicinity of Caracas.
Bolivar was at Angostura organizing his government
and worrying the enemy. In February he shut up
the Spaniard within the walls of Calaboza, and later
forced him to withdraw hurriedly to the north. In
the fall he established a Council for Foreign Rela-
tions at Angostura, and issued writs for an assembly
to meet in 1819.106 The second Congress of Vene-
zuela convened at Angostura on 15th February,
1819, pursuant to the call of the Liberator. Before
this body Bolivar made a long and eloquent speech,
and again resigned his Dictatorial authority, only to
be elected to the same position once more.107 Mean-
while, in July and August of the previous year, most
important reinforcements to the patriot cause had
arrived at Margarita, in the shape of various Irish
108 Republic of Colombia Account, 81.
107 Colombia Account, II : 376 ; Republic of Colombia Account, 88 ;
Simon Bolivar, South American Independence ! The Speech of His
Excellency \ Gen. Bolivar, on the Act of Installation of the Second
National Congress of Venezuela, on the 15th day of February, 1819.
. . . With an accurate Account of the Proceedings on that interesting
Occasion (London, 1819).
Wars of Liberation 85
and Albion brigades, forming a Foreign Legion, and
recruited in Great Britain from the discharged
veterans of the Napoleonic wars.108 With the aid
of these disciplined adventurers Bolivar was pre-
pared to make significant advances in 1819.
In the spring of 1819 Morillo advanced from
Caracas inland towards the Orinoco with ten thou-
sand men. Bolivar, from Angostura, sent Santan-
dar west to head off Spanish reinforcements coming
down the New Granada road, sent Marino north to
head off Morillo's left wing at Barcelona, established
his foreign auxiliaries on Margarita to move as di-
rected, and, with Paez, marched himself against the
main column of Morillo.109 The strategy of the
campaign was completely successful. Barcelona fell
before the combined attack of Marino and the Eng-
108 Recollections of a Service of three Years during the War-of-
Extermination in the Republics of Venezuela and Colombia. By an
Officer of the Colombian Navy (2 vol., London, 1828), I: 6-19;
James Hackett, First Lieutenant of the late Venezuelan Artillery
Brigade, Narrative of the Expedition which sailed from England
in 1817 to join the South American Patriots, comprising every
Particular concerned with its Formation, History and Fate; with
Observations and authentic Information elucidating the real Character
of the Contest, Mode of Warfare, State of the Armies, etc., (London,
1818) ; George Laval Chesterton, late Captain and Judge Advocate of
the British Legion, raised for the Service of the Republic of Venezuela,
A Narrative of Proceedings in Venezuela in South America, in the
Years 1819 and 1820 ; with general Observations on the Country and
People; the Character of the Republican Government, and its leading
Members (London, 1820). ™ Annual Register, 1819, [241].
86 South American Independence
lish.11( Santandar checked his opponent in the
west. And the Liberator left Paez to drive Morillo
into a corner at the mouth of Lake Maracaibo, while
he himself joined Santandar's wing,111 made an unex-
pected crossing of the Andes, struck the Spaniards
at Tunja 112 on the 25th of July, and won the decis-
ive battle of Boyaca 113 on the 7th August. The
following day the liberating army marched into
Santa Fe de Bogota.114
The battle of Boyaca was decisive in the affairs of
New Granada. The Spanish army was wrecked, its
general was a prisoner, and the viceroy was a fugi-
tive. From this time Spain never had an effective
force in the upper valley of the Magdalena, and her
forts at the mouth of the river were soon lost. The
Liberator lingered in New Granada for some weeks;
then he made a quick trip back across the Andes and
down into Angostura, where he reported his successes
to the Venezuelan Congress.115 It speaks well for
this influence over that body, that on the day after
his arrival it promulgated a Fundamental Law for
110 Chesterton, Proceedings in Venezuela, 29.
111 Colombia, Account, II : 418 ; Charles Stewart Cochrane, Journal
of Residence and Travels in Colombia during the Years 182S and 18%4
(2 vols., London, 1825), 1 : 477.
112 Republic of Colombia Account, 90 ; Recollections of a Service,
I: 21.
113 Present State of Colombia, 45 ; Letters from Colombia, 137.
114 Niles Register, XVII : 328 ; Annual Register, 1819, 245.
W Recollections of a Service, II : 28.
Wars of Liberation 87
the union of New Granada and Venezuela as the
Republic of Colombia,116 and but little later sum-
moned a general Congress of two houses, represent-
ing both provinces, to meet at the city of Rosario de
Cucuta, on the eastern frontier of 'New Granada.
The law was issued December 17, 1819; the Con-
gress met in May, 1821. Meanwhile the last steps
in the liberation of Colombia had been taken.
During the year 1820 there was no fighting of
consequence in Venezuela. It was a period rather
of negotiation, tentative on the part of the Spanish
officials, definite on the part of Bolivar. Morillo
opened the correspondence, addressing the Congress
of Angostura in June, calling the patriots brothers,
summoning them to peace on a constitutional basis,
and announcing the beginning of negotiations for
an armistice preliminary to a reconciliation.117 This
was an act under orders, for Ferdinand VII. had ex-
perienced a change of heart in the spring of 1820.
He had accepted a revolution, and with it a constitu-
tion for the Spanish monarchy. On this basis he
sought a peace. " Vanquished, expelled, or rather
effaced from the American soil," wrote the Abbe de
Pradt, "impotent to re-establish herself, and tor-
116 British and Foreign State Papers, IX : 407 ; Colombia Account,
II : 439 ; Moses, Const. Colombia, 13.
117 Niles Register, XVII : 463 ; Cochrane, Residence in Colombia
I: 506.
88 8outh American Independence
" merited by the two-fold feeling of this impotency
and the greatness of a loss, the sorrowful weight of
which was exaggerated in her eyes by the want of re-
flection, Spain has, since the period of the last revolu-
tion, adopted various expedients in order to neutral-
ize the consequences of a position, which a secret in-
stinct informed her she could not escape." 118 This
expedient, however, was wasted, for the Congress of
Angostura, meeting in a special session, promptly re-
plied to General Morillo that they would hear with
pleasure any proposals based on an " absolute ac-
knowledgment of the entire sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the Eepublic of Colombia," 119 and no
others whatsoever. Later in the year pacific over-
tures were more successful, and Bolivar signed an
armistice with the royalist leaders at Truxillo on the
25th of November.120
The truce had not been on for many weeks before
Bolivar realized that it was a mistake on his part.
He had met the royalist leaders at Truxillo, had em-
braced and eaten and drunk with them, and had
joined in fervent protestations of undying frater-
118 Abb6 de Pradt, Europe and America in 1821 ; with an Examin-
ation of the Plan laid before the Cortes of Spain for the Recognition of
the Independence of South America. Translated from the French . . .
by J. G.Williams (2 vols., London, 1822) II: app.t 11.
119 Niles Register, XVII : 463.
120 British and Foreign State Papers, VIII : 1225.
Wars of Liberation 89
nity. But no results came.121 Instead, as the
months went on, and the time passed when a reply
from Spain could have been expected, his troops
dwindled and suffered. It was almost impossible to
hold a patriotic army together except by the imme-
diate prospect of fighting. And so, in March, 1821,
he took advantage of a clause providing for renewal
of hostilities on forty days' notice, and declared the
truce at end.122 La Torre was now in command of
the Spanish armies, for Morillo had seized the oppor-
tunity afforded by the truce to return to Spain, where
he played a great part in the domestic revolution.
The final campaign in the Colombian war now fol-
lowed. As it went on, there was sitting in the
sacristy of the parish church at Rosario de Cucuta
the first general congress of Colombia.123 Here the
Act of Union of Angostura and the principle of cen-
tralization were debated for three months. Here, on
12th July, it was declared that " We, the Representa-
tives of the People of New Granada and Venezuela,
in General Congress assembled " do decree that
these same provinces " shall remain united, in one
single National Body," forever to be independent
131 Recollections of a Service, II : 109.
128 Annual Register, 1821 [261] ; British and Foreign State Papers,
VIII: 1233.
128 Moses, Const. Colombia, 16 ; Letters from Colombia, 106 ; British
and Foreign State Papers, IX: 410.
90 South American Independence
and a republic.124 And here, on the 30th of August,
was promulgated a constitution in which the princi-
ple of centralization prevailed over that of federa-
tion.125
The last important battle had been fought before
the constitution was proclaimed. The truce expired
on 28th April, with the Spanish under La Torre and
Morales concentrated around Valencia. Caracas
changed hands several times in the early weeks.
Bermudez took this city for the patriots in May, only
to be driven out in twelve days.126 In another
month he re-entered, to be driven out again just be-
fore the decisive battle. These were skirmishes.
The armies met on June 24th at Carabobo, where
Paez, Sedeno, and Mackintosh with his English
brigade, led the patriots to a complete victory that
virtually ended the war in the north.127 Bolivar
marched into Caracas at once.128 La Guayra and
m British and Foreign State Papers, IX : 696.
125 British and Foreign State Papers, IX: 698; Republic of
Colombia Account, 105.
186 Annual Register, 1821, 262 ; Republic of Colombia Account, 103.
™Niles Register, XXI: 15; Annual Register, 1821, [262];
Recollections of a Service, II : 196 ; Bache, Notes on Colombia, 144 ;
H. L. V. Decoudray-Holstein, Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, President
Liberator of the Republic of Colombia ; and of his principal Generals;
secret History of the Revolution, and of the Events which preceded it,
from 1807 to the present Time (Boston, 1829) 281, gives an adverse view,
by Bolivar's former chief of staff.
128 Decoudray-Holstein, Bolivar, 286.
Wars of Liberation 91
Carthagena yielded to the insurgents, and at the end
of the year Spain held only Porto Cabello and
Panama. On the 3d of October, 1821, the Libera-
tor once more, and for the third time, was induced,
under pressure, to take the oath of office as President
of the Republic.129 With plans of larger conquest
in mind he soon moved the capital from Cucuta up
the valley of the Magdalena to Santa Fe de Bogota.
San Martin had just entered the city of Lima.
It has already been seen how Jose de San Martin
fathered a series of patriotic successes, extending
from the city of Mendoza, in the viceroyalty of
Buenos Ayres, to the city of Lima, in the viceroyalty
of Peru. In the summer of 1821 the two liberating
armies were drawing close together, with only the
territory known to-day as Ecuador lying between
them. To gain this territory, and complete the de-
liverance of South America from the hands of her
master, was the patriotic aim of both the Liberator
of Colombia and the Protector of Peru. The for-
mer, however, had the easier task and the better
chance to reach the goal, for the Spanish armies still
existing in South America were massed, not in the
territory intervening between the patriot forces, but
in the mountains around and to the southward of
Lima. Bolivar had less to fear from royalist move-
129 Annual Register, 1821, [264] ; British and Foreign State Papers,
IX: 414.
92 South American Independence
ments than San Martin, who was in danger of ex-
tinction by an army of upper Peru at any time.
The city of Guayaquil, the chief port of Ecuador,
lying at the head of the Gulf whose name it bears,
erected a junta and declared its independence in the
fall of 1820.130 This act, it is said, convinced Gen-
eral Morillo of the utter hopelessness of all efforts at
reconquest, and caused him to return to Spain to in-
sist upon a peace.131 The patriots helped the new
junta when they could. Cochrane, with his fleet,
called at Guayaquil from time to time, while San
Martin sent a division of his army as soon as he was
established at Lima.132 It was left for Bolivar to
take the really effective action. After his victory at
Carabobo the Liberator left Paez to hold Morales in
check along the seacoast, and returned himself to the
capital of Colombia, which he soon moved up the
river to Bogota. From this city, in the spring of
1822, he marched on up the valley towards the city of
Quito. At Bompono, on 7th March, he destroyed a
considerable Spanish force; 133 while his right hand,
Sucre, who had been sent on ahead won a more de-
cisive battle at Pichincha, on 24th May. The narra-
tives of the battle tell us that a dash of Colombian
cavalry decided the day after its burden and heat had
180 Espejo, Recuerdas, 26. m Republic of Colombia Account, 100.
182 Espejo Recuerdas, 87 : Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III :
414. 13S De Schryver Bolivar, 260.
Wars of Liberation 93
been borne by the Peruvian division and the English
battalion.134 Quito, a league from Pichincha, fell
at once, and four days later an assembly of its promi-
nent men agreed upon an act of union with Vene-
zuela and New Granada.135 The idea of the
Liberator of a grand federation of American
republics, under his guidance, was one step nearer
attainment.
From Quito, over the mountains to Guayaquil,
was the next move. San Martin's enemies say that
now the Limenos were secretly begging the Liberator
to advance even to Peru and free them at once
" from the Protector and the Spaniards," 136 and that
Sucre was now hurried on to the coast to make sure
that Guayaquil might not fall into Peruvian hands.
Certain it is that Bolivar, following up the victories
of his lieutenant, made his triumphal entry into
Quito on the 16th of June; on the very day, could
he but have known it, that Don Manuel Torres was
informed by John Quincy Adams that the President
of the United States was ready to receive him as
Charge d' Affaires from the Eepublic of Colom-
bia.137 The occupation of Guayaquil was peaceful.
134 Espejo, Eecuerdas, 55 ; Republic of Colombia Account, 109 ;
Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 353.
135 De Schryver, Bolivar, 261.
186 Cochrane, Narrative, 1 : 219 ; Miers, Travels in Chile, II : 80.
»7 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI : 23.
94 South American Independence
The Peruvian division, needed at home, and no
longer of use in Ecuador, was embarked on its trans-
ports in July, while the Liberator offered to lend
San Martin some regiments of Colombian troops for
service in Peru.138 At the same time treaties of
union, league and confederation, were signed at
Lima for the preservation of South American inde-
pendence and the gathering of a pan- American Con-
gress at Panama.139 A week later a proclamation
of the Liberator annexed Guayaquil to Colombia.140
On the 26th of July, 1822, San Martin disem-
barked at Guayaquil; on the 28th he left that port
for Callao.141 What occurred at the meeting of the
generals, as has been seen, is not really known, but
the result is clear. Up to this day there are two
dominant forces to be considered in the war; after
this day Bolivar becomes the one center of activity,
and under his leadership, along the lines mapped out
by San Martin, the final blows are struck and the
final peace is attained. We have no occasion here to
enter into the controversy waged over the merits of
1M Espejo, Recuerdas, 57.
iwjuly 6, 1822. British and Foreign State Papers, XI: 105;
Annual Register, 1823, 204,* [247].
140 Espejo, Recuerdas, 75 ; Miller, Memoirs, 1 : 304.
141 Espejo, Recuerdas, 94.
Wars of Liberation 95
these men.143 The steps in the achievement of
actual independence alone concern us.
Had the Protector been sincere, cried his oppo-
nents, who had cried loudly at his assumption of
supreme authority the year before, he would not
have abandoned Peru at this critical period.143 In
April, Canterac, one of the ablest and boldest of
Spain's generals in America, had surprised and
routed completely a whole division of the patriot
army at lea. During the last two months of his
protectorship, San Martin worked to repair this loss,
with the result that at his departure he left an army
of eight thousand, under Alverado and Arenales, for
the protection of the country. But the new govern-
ment failed to make effective use of this force. The
provisional junta kept half the army idle, and sent
the other half down to Arica, and thence up into the
country, where, at Moquegua, at the beginning of
the next year Canterac again destroyed a republican
army.144 The Congress meanwhile busied itself with
142 J. P. Hamilton, Travels through the interior Provinces of Colom-
bia (2 vols., London, 1827), 1 : 229. Hamilton, who was British com-
missioner in Colombia, gives a friendly view of Bolivar.
1<3 Stevenson, Narrative of Residence, III : 458.
144 Annual Register, 1823, [248] ; Robert Proctor, Narrative of a
Journey across the Cordillera of the Andes, and of a Residence in
Lima and other Parts of Peru, in the Years 18SS and 1824 (London,
1825), 126.
96 South American Independence
treaties of alliance and bases for constitutions.145 As
the fragments of the dismembered army drifted into
Lima, the Congress, with its three-headed junta, be-
came unpopular, was declared unfit to govern, the
army mutinied, " and the people of Lima rose and
deposed them, & placed a popular leader of the name
of Riva-Aguero at the head of affairs." 146
With Don Jos6 de la Rive-Aguero as president,
the Peruvian revolution was for the first time, and
last, in the hands of native Peruvians. Santa Cruz
was put in command of the troops, and his activity
was at once reflected in their higher discipline. The
foreign1 merchants were won over to the side of the
government, while Bolivar was summoned to take up
the work San Martin had dropped. Sucre had
already appeared in Lima as his agent.147 In May
Santa Cruz was sent to Arica with another army, to
regain the ground lost by the defeat at Moquegua.
Almost as he left, the army of Canterac approached
Callao and occupied the capital148 on 16th June,
1823. The Congress at once lost its head and pre-
pared for instant flight. Before it left, " after much
146 British and Foreign State Papers, IX: 919, X:
XII: 813.
146 Robertson to Parish, May 7, 1823. F. 0. Mss.
UT Miller, Memoirs, II : 57 ; Proctor, across the Cordillera, 129.
148 Proctor, A cross the Cordillera, 148 ; Hall, Extracts from Journal,
II: 93; MiUer, Memoirs, II : 63, says June 18.
Wars of Liberation 97
" boisterous discussion, Sucre was named supreme
military chief, with powers little short of a dictator-
ship, a step imperiously demanded by the critical
situation of the patriots." 149 With the elevation of
Sucre came the practical end of the career of Rive-
Aguero. He was probably the victim of Colombian
intrigues that induced Congress to put Sucre in his
place until the arrival of Bolivar. He was allowed,
however, to accompany the Congress in its flight to
Truxillo, where he ran an isolated course * until
Bolivar suppressed him in November.150 On the
first day of September the Liberator entered the city
of Lima, and received from the welcoming people the
new title of Deliverer.
Early in June Santa Cruz sailed for Arica, whither
Miller followed him with reinforcements in July.151
The march of the patriots into upper Peru was suc-
cessfully accomplished. They passed by the bridge
of the Inca, over the Desaguadero, on 25th July, and
two weeks later entered the city of La Paz.152 On
25th August they marched out from that city to
defeat Valdez, who had come up against them by a
long and rapid march. But soon Valdez was joined
by La Serna, the viceroy, and Olaneta brought
further aid to the royalists, while the patriots began
149 Miller, Memoirs, II : 63. 15° Proctor, Across the Cordillera, 135.
151 Proctor, Across the Cordillera, 160. 132 Miller, Memoirs, II : 67.
98 South American Independence
an inevitable retreat to the coast. With the royal-
ists following, the retreat turned into a precipitate
and shameless flight. A third army had been sacri-
ficed. Sucre had marched to support Santa Cruz
after the evacuation of Lima by the royalists [July
17th, 1823]. Now he returned to the capital.153
The task of Bolivar, to drive the Spanish forces
from their almost impregnable situation in the
mountains of Upper Peru, seemed great at the end
of 1823. The defeat of the army of Santa Cruz, in
September, had left them with as strong a hold as
ever on Potosi, La Paz and the Desaguadero; while
his own time had been frittered away in suppressing
the ci-devant president, Rive-Aguero, and erecting
a new Congress to continue the work of constitution
making. But the Spaniards themselves came royally
and unexpectedly to his assistance. Ferdinand VII.,
whose heart had become constitutional in 1820,
experienced another change in 1823, when the Holy
Allies lent him troops. The domestic troubles were
reflected in the colonies. " We have pretty late
accounts from the Interior of Peru," wrote one of
the British merchants, " and they are at last, & in
the least expected way truly favorable for the cause
of the patriots. The Royalists have gone to Logger-
heads among themselves ! Olaneta, the Commander-
«8 Miller, Memoirs, II: 76.
Wars of Liberation 99
" in-chief at Potosi, has declared for the absolute
Ferdinand, and the Catholic religion, as 'twas an
hundred years ago. La Serna & Canterac cry, Long
live the Constitution, & down with the serviles ! and
there seems little chance of a composition between
these doughty Chiefs. Blood has already been shed
in the quarrel; and the advocate of absolute power
& blind obedience, & breathes nothing but vengeance
& death to the Traitors & Innovators who would
betray their Country. The Patriots could have hit
upon no better plan than their own Enemies have
done, to get rid of the whole of the latter." 154
The campaign of 1824 opened with a mutiny of
patriot troops in the fortress of Callao that gave that
place into the hands of the royalists and threatened
serious injury to the Peruvian cause.151 The Con-
gress, startled by the sudden danger, ceased its con-
stitutional debates, " named General Bolivar dictator,
and dissolved itself. Thus, at least, closing their
political existence with an act of unquestionable wis-
dom."156 With his accustomed professions of re-
luctance the Liberator accepted the dictatorial
154 John Parish Robertson & Co., to Mr. Parish of Bath, March 10,
1824. F. 0. Mss.
155 Proctor, Across the Cordillera, 339 ; Miller, Memoirs, II: 98;
Parish to Canning, No. 11, April 25, 1824. F. 0. Mss.
186 Miller, Memoirs, II: 102; British and Foreign State Papers,
XI: 866.
100 South American Independence
power and proceeded to justify his possession of it.
He suppressed the mutiny. " By his firmness,
activity, and seasonable severities, he checked
further defections, and obtained the respect and
entire confidence of every faithful patriot. There
was a charm in the name of Bolivar, and he was
looked up to as the only man capable of saving the
republic." 15T Then, with the mutiny quelled, he
abandoned Lima to the royalists, who had already
obtained Callao, and marched against Canterac.
From Huaraz, on the coast, and sixty leagues
north of Lima, the armies of Bolivar marched up
into the country. A new discipline appeared in the
regiments as the result of his activity. A new spirit
of contentment prevailed, for he saw to it that the
wages of the soldiers were paid to the soldiers.158
In June he crossed the Andes in three divisions,159
making long marches through the mountains that
would have been impossible, perhaps, to any Euro-
pean armies. In July he drew near to Pasco, where
Arenales had won a noted victory as he marched
around Lima at San Martin's command in 1820. In
August he came up to Canterac, who marched con-
fidently to meet him. Emboldened by their recent
successes, the royalists had been content to leave
«T Miller, Memoirs, II: 106. 158 Miller, Memoirs, II : 113.
!5» Parish to Canning, No. 44, September 26, 1824. F. O. Mss.
Wars of Liberation 101
Valdez to struggle with Olaneta, the absolutist, in
the mountains around Potosi. With some nine thou-
sand men Canterac met the rebels on the plain of
Junin, at the southern end of Lake Chinchaycocha,
on the 6th of August, 1824, only to have his victory
turned into an utter defeat by a despairing charge
of the Peruvian lancers.160 Satisfied witE the work
of the campaign, Bolivar left his army to go into
cantonments for the rainy season, and returned to
direct in person the operations around Lima.
The river valleys run from the plain of Junin up
into the southeast for a hundred leagues to the
ancient city of Cuzco; thence in the same direction a
second hundred leagues extend beyond Lake Titicaca
to the city of La Paz, at its southeast corner; a third
hundred, bearing somewhat more to the south, covers
the distance from La Paz to Potosi and Chuquisaca.
At the southern end of this long chain of valleys
Olaneta and Valdez were giving a death-blow to
their own cause. La Paz and Cuzco were strong-
holds of the royalist army. At Junin Sucre was in
command of the patriots, at last victorious in Peru.
Sucre failed to put his troops into cantonments as
Bolivar had expected, but spent two months manoeu-
vering in the valleys, and watching the armies of La
Serna and Canterac. On 3d December the viceroy
160 Miller, Memoirs, II : 127, gives map ; De Schry ver, Bolivar, 263.
102 Souih American Independence
met the patriots and defeated them.161 On 9th
December he came up with them again half way
between Cuzco and Junin. The royalists were flushed
with confidence, for they already had one victory
to their credit in that week. The patriots were
hungry, hard-pressed and discouraged. But when
the eighty minutes of battle on the plain of Ayacu-
cho were over, La Serna, the viceroy, was dead, and
Canterac, a prisoner, signed a capitulation for his
whole army.162 The war as such was ended. Ga-
marra, with an advance guard of the patriots,
entered Cuzco on Christmas day, with the rest of
the army close behind him.163
Olaneta still held out for his master in Upper
Peru. Although possessed of great mining estates,
he resisted, even to the end, all overtures of the
patriots to exchange his lost cause for his property.
He kept up the warfare in this final stronghold of
Spanish authority against the armies of Buenos
Ayres, under the veteran Arenales, and against the
armies of Peru, under the English veteran Miller.
For fifteen years an active state of war had existed
in the country between Salta and Potosi, the country
which San Martin had wisely despaired of conquer-
in Annual Register, 1825, [209].
™*F. O. Mss. Buenos Ayres, Vol. VIII ; Nile* Register, XXVIII :
156; Annual Register, 1825, 148 .* 16S Miller, Memoirs II : 183.
Wars of Liberation 103
ing ten years before.164 On Christmas day, 1824, the
patriots reached Cuzco; in March, 1825, they came
to La Paz, whence Miller was sent on to end the
struggle. At the close of March Olaneta was beaten,
and his own troops slew him. Miller entered Potosi,
April 25th.166
Bolivar had meanwhile reassembled the Peruvian
Congress on 10th February, and had gone through
the ceremony of resigning and accepting for another
year his dictatorial authority.166 Then he had de-
parted for a triumphal progress through the country.
At Arequipa he confirmed a Congress for Upper
Peru that Sucre had called; its proceedings were to
be subject to the action of the Peruvian Congress of
1826, while Sucre himself should be the government
for the intervening year.167 This Congress, meeting
at Chuquisaca, later rebaptized Sucre, declared for
the independence of Upper Peru, on August 6th,
1825, and five days later adopted the name of the
Liberator for the new republic.168 Peru and Buenos
Ayres joined in confirming the independence of
164 Andrews, Journey from Buenos Ayres, II: 252.
165 Miller, Memoirs, II: 200; Andrews, Journey from Buenos
Ayres, 1 : 296 ; Parish to Canning, No. 10, February 10, 1825.
F. 0. Mss.
1W British and Foreign State Papers, XII: 885; De Schryver,
Bolivar, 267; Annual Register, 1825, [211].
167 Parish to Canning, No. 55, August 6, 1825. F. O. Mss.
168 British and Foreign State Papers, XII : 859.
104 South American Independence
Bolivia in the following spring. The Spanish sur-
rendered the port of Callao on 19th January, 1826.
From this port, nine months later, the Liberator
sailed for Guayaquil, never to return. From Guay-
aquil he journeyed down to Bogota and reassumed
his functions as President of Colombia.
CHAPTER II
SOUTH AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Liberty and independence have always been names
to conjure with in the United States. Popular sym-
pathy has always gone out to a party or a people
struggling with these as their watchwords. Yet it is
rarely that the government has allowed them to
blind its eyes to its international duties or interests.
The wave of feeling engendered by the French revo-
lution threatened for a time to drive the country
into an active foreign alliance, but its ultimate re-
sult was only to bring about the enunciation of a
system of neutral obligations that has endured to
this day. The sufferings of the Greek patriots called
forth the eloquence of Henry Clay and Daniel Web-
ster and Edward Everett; called forth money by
thousands from the pockets of liberty-loving citizens ;
but failed to move for an instant the administration
from its proper course. At a later time the misery of
Cuba aroused the national emotion, but an entirely
different cause precipitated a war. So it was in the
South American struggle for independence.
Before the contest had really begun it had become
evident that the events in South America would be
106 South American Independence
watched with a more eager interest than our semi-
hostile relations with Spain could explain. When it
came to the issue Jefferson was unwilling to impli-
cate the country in movements hostile to Ferdinand,
but the ease with which Miranda had secured audi-
ence of the president and his secretaries, and had
won over to his enterprise prominent federal officials
of New York, indicated that few were unfriendly to
a South American cause as such. And when some
two years after the failure of his expedition the
petition of thirty-six American citizens incarcerated
in the fortress of Carthagena came before Congress
a lively interest in their behalf was at once called
forth.1 The story told by these young filibusters,
with variations, had become a familiar tale: their
expedition was the prototype of innumerable later
expeditions, extending through the times of William
Walker to the days of John D. Hart, the Three
Friends and the Laurada; their career was the
familiar one of great expectations veiled in alluring
mystery, doubtful expedients, suspicion, and utter,
hopeless failure; and now they came to Congress
to find friends who should urge an intervention in
their behalf.
For two weeks, in the beginning of June, 1809,
weeks in which the South Americans were over-
*A.S.P.F.B.,III: 257.
Policy of the United States 107
throwing their viceroys and erecting juntas in
the name of Ferdinand, the petition of the Miranda
men was under consideration in the House of Repre-
sentatives. It was accompanied by a favorable re-
port from a special committee, and a resolution
recommending that the President, if convinced that
they were involuntarily drawn into the unlawful
enterprise, should use every effort to obtain their
release.2 The debate ran on for several days, re-
viewing laws of neutrality and relations with France
and Spain, until at last the Committee of the Whole,
from sympathy and the underlying conviction that
Spain had no rights in her colonies which a friend
of liberty was bound to respect, passed the resolu-
tion.3 Before the House, the opposition, with John
Randolph at its head, became more insistent. Here
the latter continued his heavy fire of sarcasm and
vituperation that had already brought Pearson, of
North Carolina, to offer him his blood, until the
sentimental inclinations of the House were in a
measure overcome. He alluded particularly to the
rupture of relations with Spain, which had occurred
upon the elevation of Joseph, raising for the first
time the question of the recognition of the South
American provinces. To accomplish the release of
9 A. S. P. F. R., Ill : 258 ; Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 257.
3 June 13, 1809. Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 283.
108 South American Independence
the prisoners an agent must be sent to Caracas. But
we cannot send this agent, declared Randolph,
" without acknowledging the independence of the
colonies of South America, and then involving our-
selves in a war with France, or addressing ourselves,
in the first instance, to the Government of France." 4
The truly American doctrine that a premature
recognition is a cause for war, was thus declared.
Later in the same day, by the vote of the Speaker,
the resolution was defeated.5
Two years later this tendency of the House was
revealed in connection with the President's message.
In November, 1811, Madison alluded to the interest-
ing scenes " developing themselves among the great
communities which occupy the southern portion of
our own hemisphere." 6 The special committee to
which this portion of the message was referred read
the declaration of independence of Venezuela and
reported a resolution expressing a friendly solicitude
in the welfare of these communities and a readiness,
when they should have become nations " by a just
exercise of their rights," to unite with the executive
in establishing with them such relations as might
* Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 1 Sees., 306.
5 June 14, 1809. Annals of Congress, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 315.
• J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents I: 494.
Policy of the United States 109
become necessary.7 This was an indication of the
sentiment of Congress. Evidently the sentiment
might become more pronounced if events in South
America should become more active.
President Madison realized the significance of the
movements that took place throughout South
America in 1809 and 1810. He saw clearly that
they might in time call upon the United States for
political action, and that already there were com-
mercial interests to be protected and developed. As
early as 1807 the State Department had been in-
formed of the embarrassments under which Ameri-
can commerce struggled at Buenos Ay res.8 The
commerce was admittedly illegal, but it was toler-
ated, and the need of an agent to protect it was
avowed. The Jefferson administration took no action
in this direction, but on 28th June, 1810, Secretary
Smith instructed an agent to visit South America.
Joel Roberts Poinsett,9 of South Carolina, had
1A.S.P.F.R., Ill : 538 : Annals of Congress, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 427.
8 David C. De Forest to James Madison, Oct. 4, 1807. State Dept.
Mss.
*In the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are the
papers of Joel Roberts Poinsett, in some fourteen folio volumes. They
contain not only duplicates of his correspondence with the State Depart-
ment, but even many of the originals, for which search may be made
in vain in Washington. A short " Life and Public Services of Joel R.
Poinsett," by C. J. Stille" ia in Pa. Mag. of Hist, and Biog., XII:
129, 257.
110 South American Independence
already seen much of the world when Madison
appointed him to this new mission. Possessed of
independent fortune, he had traveled over Europe,
visited Siberia and the interior of Russia, and de-
clined to enter the service of the Czar. Later he
became a center of contention in Mexico and played
a part in the emancipation of Greece. Now, as
American agent, he journeyed into Buenos Ayres
and Chile, and in the latter country led a brigade
of the patriot army against the Spaniards.10 In
spite of this lapse from duty — which went unblamed
— he seems to have been one of the ablest and best
representatives of the United States in South
America. He seems not to have engaged in priva-
teering or commerce. Some years later it is de-
clared that there was not a single American in
Buenos Ayres who was not interested in privateer-
ing. The list is quite long of improper persons,
English and American, who were sent to South
America.
" As a crisis is approaching," " went Poinsett's
instructions, " which must produce great changes in
the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve
altogether its colonial relations to Europe, and as the
geographical position of the United States and other
10 Graham, Journal, 23.
11 R. Smith to J. R. Poinsett, June 28, 1810. S. D. Mss.
Policy of the United States 111
" obvious considerations give them an intimate inter-
est in whatever may affect the destiny of that part of
tho American Continent, it is our duty to turn our
attention to this important subject, and to take such
steps not incompatible with the neutral character and
honest policy of the United States, as the occasion
renders proper. With this view you have been
selected to proceed without delay to Buenos Ayres,
and thence, if convenient, to Lima in Peru or
Santiago in Chile or both. You will make it your
object whenever it may be proper, to diffuse the im-
pression that the United States cherish the sincerest
good will towards the people of South America as
neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the
globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating
friendly intercourse; that this disposition will exist
whatever may be their internal system or European
relations, with respect to which no interference of
any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a
political separation from the parent country and of
the establishment of an independent system of Na-
tional Government, it will coincide with the senti-
ments and policy of the United States to promote
the most friendly relations and the most liberal
intercourse between the inhabitants of this Hemis-
phere, as having, all a common interest, and as lying
under a common obligation to maintain that system
112 South American Independence
of peace, justice and good will, which is the only
source of happiness for nations.
" Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and
dispositions of the United States, it will be no less
proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only
towards the United States, but in reference to the
great nations of Europe, as also to that of Brazil,
and the Spanish branches of the Government there;
and to the Commercial and other connections with
them respectively, and generally to inquire into the
State, the characteristics, intelligence and wealth of
the several parties, the amount of the population,
the extent and organization of the military force and
the pecuniary resources of the country.
" The real as well as ostensible object of your mis-
sion is to explain the mutual advantages of a com-
merce with the United States, to promote liberal and
stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable infor-
mation on the subject." 12
12 Until about 1835 the State Department kept two series of letter-
books, one containing copies of instructions to American ministers
abroad, and the other all notes sent to the legations in Washington.
In addition, two files were kept for each country, comprising, respec-
tively, the despatches from the American minister and the notes re-
ceived from the legations. After this date the consolidated letter-books
were abandoned, and manuscripts in the State Department are most
easily traced through C. H. Van Tyne and W. G. Leland, Guide to the
Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington (Car-
negie Institution, 1907).
Policy of the United States 113
With these objects in view, Poinsett was given the
title of Agent for Seamen and Commerce in the Port
of Buenos Ayres. Ten months later Louis Godde-
froy was appointed " Consul for Buenos Ayres and
the ports below it on the River Plate/' 13 and Poin-
sett was raised to Consul General. " The instructions
already given you," wrote Monroe,14 " are so full
that there seems to be little cause to add to them at
this time. Much solicitude is felt to hear from you
on all the topics to which they relate — the dis-
position shown by most of the Spanish provinces to
separate from Europe and to erect themselves into
independent States, excites great interest here. As
Inhabitants of the same Hemisphere, as Neighbors,
the United States cannot be unfeeling Spectators of
so important a moment [movement?]. The destiny
of these provinces must depend on themselves.
Should such a revolution however take place, it can-
not be doubted that our relation with them will be
more intimate, and our friendship stronger than it
can be while they are colonies of any European
power."
For a period of six years the United States main-
tained consuls or agents in South America. William
R. Lowry was sent to Caracas as Poinsett was sent
M Monroe to Goddefroy, April 30, 1811. S. D. Mss.
u Monroe to Poinsett, April 30, 1811. 8. D. Mss.
114 South American Independence
to Buenos Ayres.15 But the representation in Vene-
zuela was not kept up as steadily as that in the south
of the continent, for the patriotic movements in that
region were but spasmodic in the beginning and
finally succumbed to the pressure of Morillo's armies.
In the south representation, like the independent
government, was maintained steadily after 1810.
The status of the American agents, however, is not
entirely clear. There existed no intent to recognize
the governments at this time, and the administration
was not sure that the juntas would give public recog-
nition to United States consuls who could not give
reciprocal recognition to them.16 So Poinsett went
out as an unofficial but accredited agent for seamen
and commerce with letters similar to those held by
various agents in the West Indies. Yet in 1811 he
was commissioned as consul-general and a consul was
appointed under him while the State Department
constantly addressed him and his successors by these
titles. No trace has been found of an exequatur
issued to any of these agents, but they speak in their
despatches of being formally received.17 In March,
1812, the junta of Buenos Ayres definitely refused
» Smith to Lowry, November 6, 1810. 8. D. Mss.
16 Smith to Poinsett, August 7, 1810. S. £>. Mas.
« Poinsett JfM./.Vol. I.
Policy of the United States 115
an exequatur to Robert Staples, British Consul, be-
cause he could not acknowledge its independence.18
Through these agents the State Department kept
itself informed on events in Spanish America. In
their despatches can be found accounts of the fre-
quent revolutions that made government in Buenos
Ayres a hazardous and fascinating pastime. The
military events on the frontiers are told with con-
siderable exactness, and original bulletins of the
junta and the liberating army are frequently en-
closed. At times the agents themselves played a
part in the local events. Poinsett went from Buenos
Ayres into Chile, there to make friends with the
Carreras and fight in their armies. He returned to
Buenos Ayres just in time to escape the disasters of
Rancagua that sent O'Higgins and his handful of
survivors to swell the forces of San Martin at Men-
doza.19 Thence, dodging the British cruisers, he
returned to the United States to be congratulated
by Monroe in the name of the President on the
ability, zeal and success with which he had conducted
his delicate mission.20 At a later day his successor,
Devereux, guaranteed a loan, that snatched the
existing government from the hands of its enemies.
18 Memorandum dated June 26, 1823. F. O. Mss.
19 Halsey to Sec. State, Feb. 11, 1815. 8. D. Mss.
20 Monroe to Poinsett, July 16, 1815. Poinsett Mss.
116 South American Independence
Less successful than Poinsett, this agent was dis-
avowed and dismissed.21
The South Americans were as eager to give infor-
mation as the United States to receive it. Their
Directors and Dictators constantly addressed the
northern President with news of victory and requests
for arms, accompanied by expressions of profound
friendship. At the same time their agents appeared
at Washington as well as at London. Venezuela
sent Don Luis Lopez Mendez to the latter city in
18 II,22 having already sent Don T. Orea to the
United States in 1810.23 In 1816 the first repre-
sentative from Buenos Ayres appeared at Washing-
ton with an apology for the delay and an assurance
that a declaration of independence would soon be
passed. " In the meantime," his credentials went
on,24 " our deputy near your Excellency will not be
invested with a public character, nor will he be dis-
posed to exceed the object of his mission, without
an understanding with your Excellency and your
Ministers. That these views may be exactly fulfilled,
I have selected a gentleman who, from his personal
qualities, will not excite suspicion that he is sent by
the Government invested with so serious and im-
21 Rush to Halsey, April 21, 1817. S. D. Mss.
22 Present State of Colombia, 86. 2S Aurora, October 29, 1817.
2* Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1876.
Policy of the United States 117
"portant a commission. He is Colonel Martin Thomp-
son. ... I hope your Excellency will give him full
credit, and secure for him all the consideration
which, in a like case, we would give and secure to
the Ministers whom your Excellency may think
proper to send to these provinces."
The Spanish minister in the United States, Don
Luis de Onis, failed to view the development of these
friendly, though unofficial, relations with equanim-
ity. For six years in his informal capacity he had
watched the growth of a sentiment in favor of South
America. Arriving with credentials from the
Regency of Cadiz, in the early days of Madison's
first administration, he had been refused a reception
on the ground of the uncertain character of that
government. Madison never recognized the revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic governments in Spain, so it
was not until the restoration of Ferdinand VH. in
1815 that the Spanish minister was received in his
official capacity. Thereupon the latter took up in a
formal way the protests he had long been making
informally.
The South American situation was at this time
bound up with the aggressions of the United States
in the Floridas and the piratical establishments in the
Gulf of Mexico. In their broadest extent the de-
mands of de Onis comprehended the complete exclu-
118 South American Independence
sion of the various South American flags from the
ports of the United States. To these pretentious the
Secretary of State replied with proper dignity that
the United States could pay no attention to the flags
of vessels seeking admission to its harbors and obey-
ing its laws.25
But Spain had reasonable grievances enough with-
out resorting to preposterous demands.
The neutrality laws of the United States, although
adequate in spirit, failed in their details to meet the
situation created by the revolt of Spain's American
provinces. Based upon the great proclamation of
the first President, and enacted in 1794, the law con-
templated wars between independent States. So far
it was correct in spirit and formulated for the first
time the principles of international law upon the sub-
ject. But the law was difficult of execution, for no
authority was given in it for the seizure of vessels
suspected of intention to violate neutrality, and its
provisions did not sufficiently cover acts done by
aliens within the limits of the United States. At a
later day the courts discovered that services in
behalf of unrecognized governments were not un-
neutral in the eye of the law, for this contemplated
only offenses in behalf of sovereign States.26
15 Monroe to de Onis, January 19, 1815. National Intelligencer,
November 12, 1817. *Gelston vs. Hoyt. Wheaton, III: 246.
Policy of the United States 119
Through these inadequacies in the law, the sym-
pathies and commercial interests of the Americans
had come to the support of the southern patriots.
Blank commissions for privateers issued from the
South American capitals in shoals, and from Balti-
more the vessels thus equipped put out to prey upon
Spanish commerce;27 too often upon any commerce
that was not armed to protect itself. At times with
scrupulous regard for the dictates of neutrality, the
privateer would go to a port in South America be-
fore commencing its cruise; too often, it was enough
to have cleared from Baltimore or New Orleans for
such a port. And when the cruise was ended, no
privateer or ship of war hesitated to put into a
United States port to refit and recruit, to restore or
augment its armament. The issuing of commissions
within the United States, the equipment of vessels
to destroy the commerce of Spain, and the augmen-
tation of their strength, were all manifest violations
of neutrality. Against them the Spanish minister
protested with propriety. When the prizes of South
American privateers came within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, these examined into
the antecedents of the captors, and did not hesitate
8T Adams to Halsey , January 22, 1818 ; Halsey to Adams, August 21,
1818. S. D. MSB. Halsey was dismissed for dealing in such com-
missions. He defended himself by alluding to the notorious equipment
of privateers in the United States.
120 South American Independence
to restore the prize to the proper owners. But this
possibility of redress had little effect upon the crime.
And so, through the imperfections of the law, and
the prevalence of a popular sympathy that made jury
convictions well-nigh impossible, the Latin-Ameri-
cans made the United States a base for their naval
operations with impunity.
When the fourteenth Congress met, in the fall of
1816, for its last session, the question of the recogni-
tion of the South American provinces did not exist.
There was widespread sympathy for those provinces
in their struggle, and a general, genuine interest in
the events transpiring in their continent. Few
would have disclaimed a hope in their ultimate inde-
pendence and recognition, or a feeling that there is a
real American community of interest; in spite of the
scornful epigram of Mr. Adams, " As to an Ameri-
can system, we have it; we constitute the whole of
it." 28 But no person of consequence had so much as
intimated that the time was ripe for an acknowledg-
88 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-1877), V : 176.
The archives of the Adams family, now deposited in the building of
the Massachusetts Historical Society, are rich in materials on foreign
affairs. Here are to be found duplicates of most of the correspondence
of John Quincy Adams, while Secretary of State, as well as the manu-
script of his journal and the papers of his father and his son. From
this collection W. C. Ford has drawn materials for his various writings
on the Monroe doctrine as well as for his edition of The Writings of
John Quincy Adams (1913- ).
Policy of the United States 121
ment of the independence of these States. Indeed,
all the States but Buenos Ayres had been extin-
guished within the past year by the triumphant
armies of the restored Ferdinand. Before the end of
the session the South American question had been
again reviewed and the customary expressions of
friendship had been once more evoked.
On 14th January, 1817, Forsyth, from the House
Committee on Foreign Kelations, reported a bill20
which came to be " called, and properly called, a
bill for making peace between His Catholic Majesty
and the town of Baltimore." 30 It was a revision of
the neutrality act, that had been suggested by the
President in a special message of 26th December.31
The debate on this new neutrality act extended over
the rest of the session and did not end until the third
of March. Much opposition was shown to strength-
ening the legislation in the interests of Spain; an
act which was felt to be hostile to the rebellious
colonies. Some were almost ready for a positive
intervention on the side of these. Henry Clay
thought the existing acts went far enough, agreed
that a professed neutrality must be maintained, but
29 Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 2 Sess., 477.
80 By John Randolph, January 24,1817. Annals of Congress, 14
Cong., 2 Seas., 732.
sl Richardson, Messages, 1 : 682 , Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 2
122 South American Independence
admitted a strong hope for the independence of the
colonies. Even he was not insistent upon an imme-
diate recognition. When the next Congress met,
recognition had been made a question.
During the winter and spring of 1817 the news
from South America indicated that affairs had taken
a more hopeful appearance for the patriots. A new
order seemed to have been born to Buenos Ayres,
where a Congress of the provinces had come together
at Tucuman, and issued, on 9th July, 1816, a decla-
ration of independence in the name of the United
Provinces of Rio de la Plata.32 Its manifesto re-
minded the nations of the world that Buenos Ayres
had maintained an uncontested independence for six
years. The patriot armies too had begun to retrieve
their losses. San Martin, in his province of Men-
doza, had nearly completed the period of recruit-
ing, and before the spring was far advanced the
news reached Washington that he had broken camp,
made a marvelous march across the Andes and de-
feated the Spanish army at Chacabuco. With more
results to feed upon, popular and governmental
interests in South America took a new life. The
President determined to learn the truth about the
revolution, to be ready for any event. In the House
** Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., ISess., 1877; Annual Register,
1816 [159].
Policy of the United States 123
of Commons, Henry Brougham interrogated the
ministry on the subject.33
In his efforts to find a suitable agent for this mis-
sion, President Monroe turned once more to Joel R.
Poinsett. On April 25th, 1817, he wrote him a
personal note, asking him to make the trip to Buenos
Ayres in a public ship, and offering him " liberal
compensation." " The progress of the revolution
in the Spanish Provinces," he wrote, " which has
always been interesting to the U. States, is made
much more so, by many causes, and particularly by
a well-founded hope, that it will succeed." 34 But
Poinsett had entered the Legislature of South Caro-
lina and declined the appointment.35 Forced to give
up this plan, the President settled upon a Commis-
sion, invited Caesar A. Rodney, of Delaware, and
John Graham to serve upon it, and departed from
the capital for his tour through New England and
the West,38 leaving Richard Rush as Secretary of
State to carry out his designs. Through the months
of July and August Rush labored zealously to carry
out the wish of his superior, but without avail. One
commissioner resigned. Rodney was detained at
home by the illness of a son. And the secretary
"March 19, 1817. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, XXXV: 1194.
* Monroe to Poinsett, April 25, 1817. 8. D. M&s. The original is in
the Poinsett Mas. 85 PoinseU Mas.
* J. B. McMaster, Hi*t. of the People of the United States, IV: 377.
124 8outh American Independence
did not dare to send a single commissioner. As the
President was out of communication with Washing-
ton for several weeks the matter had to drop until
his return in September. Then the business was re-
sumed, with the result that on 4th December the
frigate Congress sailed from Hampton Roads,37
carrying CaBsar A. Rodney, John Graham and
Theodorick Bland as commissioners, and H. M.
Brackenridge as secretary.38 At the same time John
B. Prevost was sent to Chile and Peru on a similar
mission, with the additional charge to take posses-
sion of the Oregon country.39 There is considerable
justice in the statement that " several " of the men
chosen were known to be fanatics in the " cause of
emancipation;" 40 Brackenridge, in particular, was a
"mere enthusiast;" Judge Bland started out as
one.41
In the instructions to the commissioners, Richard
Rush stated the policy of the United States : " The
contest beween Spain and the Spanish colonies in
the southern parts of this continent has been, from
37 Eland's Report in Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 2106.
88 H. M. Brackenridge, Voyage to South America. Performed by
Order of the American Government, in the years 1817 and 1818, in the
Frigate Congress (2 vols., Baltimore, 1819). Brackenridge became a
strong partisan of the South Americans.
39 Bush to Prevost, July 18, 1817 ; J. Q. Adams to Prevost, Septem-
ber 29, 1817. 8. D. Mss. 40 W. F. Reddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 25.
« J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV: 156-388.
Policy of the United States 125
" its commencement, highly interesting, under many
views, to the United States. As inhabitants of the
same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel
a solicitude for the welfare of the colonists. It was
nevertheless our duty to maintain the neutral char-
acter with impartiality and allow of no privileges of
any kind to one party which were not extended to
the other. The government of Spain viewing the
colonies as in a state of rebellion, had endeavored to
impose upon foreign powers in their intercourse with
them, the conditions applicable to such a state. This
pretension has not been acceded to by this govern-
ment, which has considered the contest in the light
of a civil war, in which the parties were equal. An
entire conviction exists that the view taken on this
point has been correct, and that the United States
have fully satisfied every just claim of Spain.
" In other respects we have been made to feel the
progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized
and condemned, our citizens made captives and our
lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre
of the war, been interrupted. Acting with im-
partiality towards the parties, we have endeavored
to secure from each a just return. In whatever
quarter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an
independent government erected, it was essential to
the security of our rights that we should enjoy its
126 South American Independence
" friendship. Spain could not impose conditions upon
other powers incident to complete sovereignty in
places where she did not maintain it. On this prin-
ciple the United States have sent agents into the
Spanish colonies; addressed to the existing authority,
whether of Spain or of the colony, with instructions
to cultivate its friendship and secure as far as
practicable the faithful observance of our rights.
" The contest by the extension of the revolution-
ary movement, and the greater stability which it
appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more im-
portance to the United States. It is by success that
the colonies acquire new claims on other powers
which it may comport neither with their interest nor
duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having
declared their independence and enjoyed it for some
years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in
others, it seems probable that, if the parties be left
to themselves, the most permanent political changes
will be effected. It therefore seems incumbent on
the United States to watch the movement in its sub-
sequent steps with particular attention, with a view
to pursue such course as a just regard for all those
considerations which they are bound to respect may
dictate.
" Under these impressions, the President deems
it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehen-
Policy of the United States 127
" sive than has heretofore been done, correct infor-
mation of the actual state of affairs in those
colonies. . . ." 42
By the time the commissioners bearing these in-
structions sailed, in December, 1817, the whole
question of recognition had assumed a new shape. It
had become the subject of a factious opposition
waged by Henry Clay. When Monroe became Presi-
dent, the Speaker had set his heart on the position of
Secretary of State, which had come to be that of
heir-apparent. " In the government of the United
States," said Simon Bolivar, in one of his addresses,
" it has latterly been the practice to nominate the
prime minister as successor to the president. Noth-
ing can be more suitable to a republic than this
method." 43 With his eye fixed upon the presidency,
Clay was prepared to be disgusted ancl thrown into
the opposition when Monroe looked over his head
and recalled Adams from the Court of St. James to
take the post.44 He declined the portfolio of war, as
he had declined it in the previous year, when Madi-
son had offered it. The British mission was, in his
42 Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817. S. D. Mss. The
commissioners' sailed in December with these instructions. Adams
was then Secretary of State.
« Address to the Congress of Bolivia, May 25, 1826. British and
Foreign State Papers, XII : 865-893 ; Miller, Memoirs, II : 409.
44 C. Schurz, Henry Clay, 1 : 126, 141 ; McMaster, Hist. People, IV:
376 ; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 63.
128 South American Independence
mind, no adequate substitute, and he returned to
Congress eager for a subject upon which to fight.
The question of the recognition of the Latin-
American States that were waging such a stubborn
war of liberation was an admirable theme for a
romantic orator. As the friend of liberty he might
force the hand of the administration, or perhaps
overturn the succession at the end of Monroe's term.
At any rate, he might force his enemies to appear
the friends of Spain and the upholders of a heartless
tyranny.45 The mutterings of the coming storm
were heard during the recess of Congress.
During the summer of 18 IT news from South
America occupied a prominent place in the news-
papers. The progress of San Martin, in Chile, and
the doings of Bolivar and his Congress of Angostura,
were described in detail that grew more elaborate as
the weeks advanced. In September the topic of im-
mediate recognition was broached in the Richmond
Enquirer. In a series of seven letters, which were
immediately reprinted in the National Intelligencer,
" Lautaro " addressed the Hon. Henry Clay.46 He
"Schurz, 1 : 146 et seq., thinks Clay's advocacy was due to sym-
pathy and was not inspired by a desire to oppose the administration.
He shows that Clay had expressed sympathy as early as 1816. There
is a distinction, however, between active sympathy and a demand for
immediate recognition. There is no doubt that in the former Clay was
sincere. « National Intelligencer, September 30 to October 18, 1817.
Policy of the United States 129
traversed the whole subject and policy of the war of
independence, concluding with a recommendation of
recognition of Chile and Peru, as the most difficult
of access to Spain of all her former provinces. Other
writers elaborated and controverted various points of
his argument. It is suspected that Mr. Adams him-
self, over the name of " Phocion," entered the con-
troversy in behalf of conservatism. Six weeks before
the opening of Congress the editor of the Intelli-
gencer announced that if the President should neglect
to treat the matter adequately in his message, he was
warranted in saying that it would be broached in the
House of Representatives, where it would form a
good theme for the display of oratorical abilities.47
Monroe saw the storm coming and questioned his
cabinet on the subject. An immediate recognition
would remove this fertile topic from the reach of
Clay. But Mr. Adams, though realizing the essen-
tial rivalry between himself and the Speaker, did not
hesitate to avow " my opinion that it is not now ex-
pedient for the President to acknowledge the
Government of Buenos Ayres." 48 He continued the
preparations begun by Mr. Eush for sending the
commissioners to South America, determined not to
act without real knowledge of the subject.
4T National Intelligencer, October 21, 1817.
48 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 15.
130 South American Independence
On 3d December, 1817, the day before the "Con-
gress " sailed, Henry Clay rose in the House and
offered an amendment instructing the Committee on
the Message to inquire what was necessary to secure
to the South Americans their rights as belligerents.49
The motion was accepted without opposition. The
period of factious advocacy had begun.
The Secretary of State was by no means blind to
the nature of the opposition. Before the first week
of the session ended he wrote that Mr. Clay " had
already mounted his South American great horse
. . . [in his effort] to control or overthrow the
Executive by swaying the House of Representa-
tives," 50 and as the subsequent weeks passed he
began to fear that his opponent might succeed.81
Clay did not force the fighting rapidly. One of his
allies called for the papers relating to the independ-
ence and condition of South America on December
5th.52 Three days later he himself directed the de-
bate on Amelia Island and Galveston to a discussion
of the hostility of the administration towards the
revolting provinces.53 A little later he opposed in
« Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 401.
MJ. Q.Adams, Memoirs, IV: 28.
61 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 61.
52 Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 406.
53 Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 409, 1890, 1897 ; A. 8. P. F.
R., IV: 173-183.
Policy of the United 8taies 131
vain an amendment to the neutrality act. At the
same time, stirred up by the attitude of the opposi-
tion, if not directly inspired by its members, the
South American agents in Washington began their
importunities for immediate recognition. None of
them had presented credentials justifying demands
of a diplomatic nature, but now one at least offered
to conclude a treaty, without instructions. On 25th
March, 1818, the President sent to Congress a mass
of correspondence on South America, together with
a critical report by Adams on the demands of the
agents. The day before, Clay had come out with
the beginning of his great speech. With the general
appropriation bill under consideration, he had moved
an item of eighteen thousand dollars to provide for
a minister to the Provinces of Rio de la Plata.5*
Candid members of Congress, as their recorded
votes show, realized that there was no pressing need
for haste in recognizing countries that had not even
sent ministers to demand it.55 Mr. Clay's devoted
biographer finds in this " daring philanthropy " of
his subject, better described as rancorous benevo-
lence by Mr. Adams, " a law of instructions and
authority for the president to act upon. It was a
step — a large step in advance, not only of the coun-
**J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV: 67; Annals of Congress, 15 Cong.,
1 Sess., 1469. w pg^ Jacksonian Epoch, 76.
132 South American Independence
" try and of the government, but of the whole civil-
ized world." 56 Clay himself later discovered that it
was a " course exclusively American," opposed to the
course desired by the President, who contemplated
a simultaneous recognition with European powers.57
The speech was able, and seems to have been appre-
ciated by the countries in whose behalf it was made.
" We have learned from a gentleman who has
traveled in South America, that the noble speeches,
pronounced by Mr. Clay in support of his motion for
the recognition of Colombian Independence, were
printed and suspended in the Legislative Halls and
Council Chambers of that country, and that his name
was mentioned only to be blessed by the people
whose cause he had so ably and so eloquently
espoused." 58
For several hours on 25th March, 1818, Clay
urged upon the House the claims of South America.59
He was as consistent as his position at the head of a
factious opposition would permit. He disclaimed a
desire for war with Spain, or for a departure from
the customary course of neutrality, maintaining that
a mere recogntion was no cause for hostilities. Yet
<* Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of Henry Clay (2 ed., 2 vols.,
New York, 1846), I: 216.
"Colton, Clay, I: 225. Speech of Clay at Lexington, June 7, 1820.
"Littell, The Clay Minstrel, or National Songster, 43.
» Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess ., 1474-1500.
Policy of the United States 133
in the same breath he urged that Spain be pressed
vigorously for redress for the wrongs she had done
to the United States, and that pressure be brought
not by the seizure of the Floridas, but by a recogni-
tion of her provinces.
With the manifesto of the Congress of Tucuman
in his hand, he drew an eloquent picture of an
oppressed people, revolting not against " a mere
theory of tyranny/' as the NorthAmerican colonies
did, but against an actual tyranny of centuries, horri-
ble, bloody and destructive. Playing on the sym-
pathies of the House with one hand, with the other
he played upon its greed, as he showed the extent of
South American commerce, the value of its exports,
and the deep and abiding interest of the United
States therein. At the same time he calmed the
fears of the timorous by showing that Spain was in
no condition to enter into a war — for which he had
already said she would have no just cause; that the
allies had lost their principle of cohesion since
Waterloo; that England, the only dangerous power
of Europe, had a commercial interest in independ-
ence even greater than our own.
As to recognition, he showed that the United
States had already established a policy of acknowl-
edging the de facto government without regard to its
legitimacy. The recognition of the revolutionary
134 South American Independence
governments of France, one after another, proved
this conclusively. The refusal to recognize either
government in Spain from 1808 to 1815 confirmed
his contention. And so, he maintained, our duty to
ourselves bound us to recognize the independence of
la Plata, which possessed an organized government
and an unmolested independence of eight years'
duration.
In conclusion he urged the co-ordinate right of
Congress in recognition, holding it proper for either
Congress or President to take the initial step.
The debate on Clay's amendment continued for
four days, revealing a general sympathy for the
patriots that brought members from sick bed to
speak in their behalf. The heart of the House was
generous, but its head leaned strongly to expediency
and propriety in spite of Clay's admonition that the
former was the better guide. Even Forsyth, chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Kelations, and de-
fender of the administration, expressed a strong,
hopeful interest in the colonies, opposing the amend-
ment on the grounds of its impropriety, — for he
denied the fact of independence — its influence on
other foreign relations, and the insincerity of its
origin. " Notice had been given from this city, and
was now ringing through the western country, that
questions were to be brought in view, by whose de-
Policy of the United States 135
" cision the people, would be able to discriminate be-
tween those who were just and unjust to the
patriotic cause — between the friends and the enemies
of freedom." On the 28th of March the motion was
lost by the decisive vote of 115 to 45.60
The first session of the fifteenth Congress closed
with the issue of South American recognition well
before the public, and with Henry Clay pledged as
its advocate. When the Congress met for its second
session, the commissioners, sent in December, 1817,
had returned, and their reports were transmitted by
the President. Unfortunately, no two of the com-
missioners could agree in interpreting what they saw.
Bland soon had lost confidence in the patriots; then
Rodney, under the influence of their secretary,
Brackenridge, perhaps, wrote an enthusiastic report,
which Graham was unwilling to sign.61 Accordingly
three reports by the commissioners were sent to
Congress by the President in November and De-
cember, 1818, together with a fourth by Joel R.
Poinsett.62
No new facts of importance were given out in the
60 Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1500-1522, 1646.
61 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV: 156, 158.
63 Message of November 17, 1818, and reports of Rodney and Graham.
A.S.P.F.R., IV: 217-348. Message of December 15, 1818, and reports
of Bland and Poinsett. Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sees.,
2104-2316.
136 South American Independence
reports of the commissioners. Traveling in a public
ship and in an official capacity, the agents had caused
some little flutter in South America. At Rio de
Janeiro the Spanish minister had hastened to an-
nounce that his master had petitioned the European
allies to mediate between him and his rebellious sub-
jects, and that Great Britain had responded favor-
ably.63 At Buenos Ayres and Montevideo they had
been received with every courtesy and honor that
they would accept. On this their reports agree. But
the very character of their mission made it difficult
to go below the surface in the politics of South
America. They were forced to accept such facts as
were brought officially to their notice. Their
generalizations upon these facts varied with their
prejudices.
The reports told the same story that had run in
the journals for eight years. It was the story of
political instability. Buenos Ayres, since the erection
of her junta, in 1809, had enjoyed independence
of Spain, but nothing more. At no time had she
possessed a central government whose authority was
recognized throughout all the provinces of the old
vice-royalty. Several times she had experienced
revolutions. All the time she had been in danger, on
her northern frontier, of attacks by the Spanish
•» Adams to Gallatin May 19, 1818. S. D. Mss.
Policy of the United States 137
forces in upper Peru. On the east, Paraguay re-
fused resolutely to deal with Buenos Ayres; while
the Banda Oriental stood in continued revolt against
her authority, under the lead of the partisan general,
Artigas, and encouraged by Brazil, who claimed the
province.
With this condition before him, Monroe was non-
committal in his message.64 He could see no pros-
pect of a " speedy termination " of the war. He de-
scribed briefly the condition of the rebellious govern-
ments. He expressed with satisfaction the conviction
that the allies at Aix-la-Chapelle would confine
themselves " to the expression of their sentiments,
abstaining from the application of force." In-
ferentially, the message declared to Congress and
the world " the determination of the United States
to stand neutral in the great contest between Spain
and her colonies till success shall decide it." 65
Henry Clay failed to return to the attack in this
session, although it would have been well for his
future had he done so. Recognition and liberation
were essentially popular topics. In a way they were
a manifestation of the feeling towards Spain that
showed itself in popular approval of General Jack-
son's career in Florida. Instead of choosing a sub-
«* Richardson, Messages, II: 43,44; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV:
166. « Annual Register, 1819, 233.
138 South American Independence
ject for opposition in which, the people could be with
him, Clay felt bound to attack the conduct of the
" military hero." For several weeks of the session,
which was the short one, he kept up the fight, to the
exclusion of the safer question of recognition. To-
wards the end of the session Monroe sent to Con-
gress another collection of documents, bearing this
time on his refusal to grant exequaturs to consuls
from South America.66 Thereupon Clay arose and
apologized for not speaking at length in favor of a
recognition, pleaded illness and pressure of business
as an excuse, declared that his conviction as to its
propriety was unshaken, and promised to return to
the subject when Congress should meet again.67
The administration was more than content not to
have recognition pressed at this time. Relations with
Spain were in a delicate condition; a treaty was in
process of negotiation. Determined to support the
acts of Jackson and to acquire Florida, it was well
not to aggravate Spain needlessly on the score of her
colonies. The treaty was signed 22d February, 1819.
A revival of the recognition question in the follow-
ing session well-nigh prevented its ratification by the
King of Spain, and certainly postponed it.
The sixteenth Congress met to receive a message
<* A. S. P. F. K., IV : 412 ; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 223.
« February 10, 1819. Armals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1148.
Policy of the United States 139
that marked an advance towards recognition. Mon-
roe was moving as rapidly as events would allow and
Adams would countenance. The latter had little
confidence in the South Americans, was unwilling to
allow a sentimental sympathy to compromise the
government, and argued out of the message an invita-
tion to France and Great Britain to act with the
United States in a joint recognition.68 France and
Russia were both exerting pressure to prevent the
act. Accordingly the message confined itself to a
strong expression of sympathy.
Clay remembered his promise of the last winter
and renewed his attempt to hasten the steps of the
administration.
During the winter of 1819-1820 the relations with
Spain, already confused, became more complicated
by the revolution in the peninsula and the acceptance
of a new constitution by Ferdinand. The treaty had
not yet been ratified. The Spanish minister had been
instructed to get a pledge from Monroe that he would
not recognize the colonies as a preliminary to ratifi-
cation. On 9th May, 1820, the President stated the
situation to Congress in a temperate message.69 He
transmitted at this time correspondence with the
envoy of his Catholic Majesty over the treaty of
M Richardson, Messages, II: 58; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV: 461.
69 Richardson, Messages, II: 70.
140 South American Independence
22d February, 1819. He commented upon the com-
plaints of the latter respecting the hostility of the
citizens and the unfriendly policy of the government
of the United States towards the subjects and do-
minions of Spain, maintaining that both were
" utterly destitute of foundation. ... In regard to
the stipulation proposed as the condition of the
ratification of the treaty, that the United States
shall abandon the right to recognize the revolution-
ary colonies in South America, or to form other
relations with them when in their judgment it may
be just and expedient so to do, it is manifestly so
repugnant to the honor and even to the independ-
ence of the United States, that it has been impossi-
ble to discuss it." But, considering the domestic
troubles of Spain, he asked Congress, "Is this the
time to make the pressure? If the United States
were governed by views of ambition and aggrandize-
ment, many strong reasons might be given in its
favor; but they have no objects of that kind to
accomplish, none which are not founded in justice
and which can be injured by forbearance." In con-
clusion, he urged Congress not to decide the ques-
tion until the next session.
On the 4th of April, Clay had moved that it was
expedient to provide outfit and salary for such min-
isters to South America as the President might deem
Policy of the United States
it expedient to send.70 On the 10th of May, the day
after the reception of the message, he brought up his
motion in the House. Clay disliked the Spanish
treaty. He was unwilling to compensate Spain for
the Floridas, which we must at any rate ultimately
obtain. He was strongly opposed to a southwestern
boundary that left Texas outside the United States.
Now he seized the opportunity at once to frighten
Spain into a definite refusal to ratify the obnoxious
treaty, and to attack the policy of the administra-
tion. The speech contained little that was new. It
was a defiance of Spain. Forgetting his maxim that
recognition was no violation of neutrality, Clay re-
gretted that the United States had not recognized
the provinces two years before, when they really
needed assistance. He urged the creation of an
American system, with the United States as its
center, in defiance of the despotisms of the Old
World. And he deprecated the deference of the
administration to the wishes of a Castlereagh and a
Nesselrode. To his surprise, perhaps, and certainly
to the surprise of the President, his motion passed
the House. The next day Mr. Adams had the satis-
faction of telling the French minister, de Neuville,
that if Spain was vexed she had only herself to
*° Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 1 Sess., 1781.
142 South American Independence
thank; that the administration contemplated no
change of policy.71
At the next session, second and last of the six-
teenth Congress, Clay brought this motion up once
more. The message of Monroe, as it referred to
South America, had been short, friendly and, as
usual, non-committal.72 This was Clay's last oppor-
tunity, for he had declined a re-election that he
might resume the practice of law and restore his
private affairs to some sort of order. On 3d Febru-
ary, 1821, he moved once more the resolution that
had passed in the preceding May, and asked that it
be referred to the Committee of the Whole.73 Here,
three days later, he called it up to speak in its de-
fence, a speech that has not been preserved. His
colleague, Robertson, replied.
Eobertson discountenanced this method of forcing
the hand of the President. He objected to the use
of an abstract resolution of the House as an expres-
sion of an overwhelming popular sentiment. Foreign
affairs were the business of the executive, and in
his conduct of these he should not be embarrassed.
" I voted with my colleague last Winter, . . ." he de-
clared,74 "because I was aiding him in that which
71 The vote was 80 to 75. Annals of Congress, 16 Cong. , 1 Sess. , 2223-
2229 ; Adams, Memoirs,^ : 108, 111. « Richardson, Messages, II : 77.
w Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1029.
w Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1042-1053.
Policy of the United States 143
" was to him a splendid triumph, and one which was
achieved without sacrifice of principle. I knew that
he would soon leave us (which I regret), and I was
anxious that he should retire with honor and
applause; and, in regard to that retirement (which I
hope will be only temporary), I thought it but due
to his distinguished services that his country should
say to him, as Jove did to Hector: —
" 'Yet live, I give thee one illustrious day,
One blaze of glory, ere thou fad'st away.'
" Sir, the vote of last Winter, by giving success to
his exertions for the Patriots, did crown him with
laurels. I would not wither them, or pluck one leaf
from the bright wreath. I wish they may flourish
and be forever green. But I cannot water them with
the vote I am about to give. I hoped that the sub-
ject was buried last Winter, and that it should not
be resuscitated. To carry the motion can confer no
additional honor on the mover; to lose it, may dimin-
ish the glory of the triumph he has won. If he
would be content with an abstract expression of our
feelings towards the Patriots, although it is unneces-
sary and superfluous (having done this before), I
would vote for it, because it will speak only what I
feel in common with my constituents, and will not
be liable to the principal objections which I have
144 South American Independence
" to the proposition which he has made. And why
would not such a resolution satisfy all his wishes?
Why annoy the Executive, session after session, with
our opinion and advice, when we know that he does
not desire them, and will not conform to them?
And why do this, too, when every legitimate and
desirable object has been already achieved, and can
be again effected if desired, as far as the Patriots are
to be benefited, in the manner which I have just
suggested ? "
This motion failed in the Committee of the Whole ;
it was lost again when brought up in the House on
February 9th. But Clay saw that its rejection was
due to form rather than substance, and on the 10th
offered a new resolution to the effect that the House
joined with the people of the United States in their
sympathy with the South Americans; that it was
ready to support the President whenever he should
think it expedient to recognize their governments.
The question was divided on the insistence of one of
the members, and the first part was carried by the
overwhelming majority of 134 to 12. The second
followed with 86 to 68. In the words of his eulogist,
Mr. Clay " had fought and won, before the country,
before the world — a pity to say, against his own
government — one of the most brilliant battles for
humanity, and for the rights of man, which history
Policy of the United States 145
" records." 75 It was a fitting end to his period of
factious opposition when " the triumph of Mr. Clay
was signalized in the house of representatives by
adopting the unusual course of appointing a special
committee to wait on the president with a copy of
the resolution, as a mode of advising him [sic] a
result of their action in the case. The usual mode
was to transmit a certified copy of the journals by
the hand of an officer of the house. But on this
occasion, in consideration of the importance of the
transaction in the cause of freedom, of the notoriety
which the debates on the subject had attained, of
the growing interest of the public mind, which had
been raised to an excitement, and, inasmuch as the
whole transaction was avowedly designed for moral
effect — it could have been no other — Mr. Clay
thought proper to move for this Committee, which
was promptly granted, and himself, as a mover, was
of course placed at the head of it." For years he
had been in a sort of " quasi opposition," which
" the president did not think best openly to oppose."
Mr. Monroe and his friends saw in the committee
a studied insult, " but, of course, Mr. Clay per-
formed his part with the greatest delicacy and
courtesy toward the executive, though, after all
w Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1055, 1071, 1081 ; Colton
Clay, I: 239.
146 South American Independence
" that had passed, it could hardly have been very de-
sirable to that functionary." ™
With this session Clay retired into private life.
His triumph had been a barren one. Save for em-
phasizing his position and crowning his opposition,
it stood for nothing. The executive, unmoved by the
resolution, continued calmly on the course it had
marked out for itself. Eecognition did not come a
day earlier because of the advocacy of Henry Clay.
The departure of the South American commission-
ers in December, 1817, marked the commencement
at once of Clay's factious opposition and of a more
active policy on the part of the administration. The
inclination of Monroe to yield before the threats of
the opposition was checked by John Quincy Adams.
It was changed into a determination to learn the
actual condition of the republics and to ascertain the
attitude which the European powers would take
towards recognition when it should come. For the
administration, no less than Clay, sympathized with
the struggle and contemplated recognition in the
near future.
The sympathy of Mr. Adams was tempered with
misgivings. " The mention of Buenos Ayres," he
wrote in one of his political letters,77 " brings to my
wColton, Clay, I: 242, 243.
77 J. Q. Adams to Alexander H. Everett, December 29, 1817. Letter-
book of J. Q. Adams, Private, No. 2. Adams Mas.
Policy of the United States 147
" mind an Article that I have lately seen in the Bos-
ton Patriot, and which I concluded was from your
pen. Its tendency was to show the inexpediency and
injustice there would be in our taking side with the
South Americans in their present struggle against
Spain ! It was an excellent article, and I should be
glad to see the same train of thought further pur-
sued. As for example by a discussion, ... by what
right we could take side? and who in this state of
civil war has constituted us the judges, which of the
parties has the righteous cause ? then by an enquiry
what the cause of the South Americans is, and
whether it really be as their partisans here allege
the same as our own cause in the War of our Revo-
lution? Whether for instance if Buenos Ayres has
formally offered to accept the Infant Don Carlos as
the absolute Monarch upon condition of being politi-
cally Independent of Spain, their cause is the same
as ours was ? Whether if Bolivar, being at the head
of the Eepublic of Venezuela, has solemnly pro-
claimed the absolute and total emancipation of the
Slaves, the cause of Venezuela is precisely the same
as ours was? Whether in short there is any other
feature of identity between their cause and ours,
than that they are as we were Colonies fighting for
Independence. In our Revolution there were two
distinct Stages. In the first of which we contended
148 South American Independence
" for our Civil Rights and in the second for our
Political Independence. The second, as we solemnly
declared to the World was imposed upon us as a means
of necessity after every practicable effort had been
made in vain to secure the first.
" In South America, Civil Eights if not entirely
out of the question appear to have been equally dis-
regarded and trampled upon by all parties. Buenos
Ayres has no constitution; and its present ruling
powers are establishing only by the entire banish-
ment of their predecessors. Venezuela though it
has emancipated all its slaves has been constantly
alternating between an absolute Military Govern-
ment, a Capitulation to Spanish Authority, and
Guerillas, Black and White, of which every petty
chief has acted for purposes of War and Rapine as
an Independent Sovereign. There is finally in South
America neither unity of cause nor unity of effort
as there was in our Revolution.
" Neither was our revolution disgraced by that
buccaneering and piratical Spirit which has lately
appeared among the South Americans not of their
own growth, but I am sorry to say chiefly from the
contamination of their intercourse with us. Their
Privateers have been for the most part fitted out and
officered in our Ports and manned from the Sweep-
ings of our Streets. . . . [yet] such is the propensity
Policy of the United States 149
" of our people to sympathize with the South Ameri-
cans, that no feeble exertion is now making to rouse
a party in this Country against the Government of
the Union, and against the President for having
issued orders to put down this host of free-booters
at our doors."
The attitude of the Powers toward South America
seemed likely to undergo a change during 1818. Mr.
Adams watched it with a jealous interest. The
earliest despatches of the commissioners told how at
Rio de Janeiro " the Spanish Minister, Count Casa-
Flores, appears to have been so much alarmed by the
suspicion that the object of the mission was the
formal acknowledgment of the government of la
Plata, that he thought it his duty to make to Mr.
Sumter an official communication that he had re-
ceived an official despatch from the Duke of San
Carlos, the Spanish Ambassador at London, dated
the 7th of November last, informing him, that the
British Government had acceeded to the proposition
made by the Spanish Government of a general media-
tion of the powers to obtain the pacification of South
America, the negotiation of which, it was on the
point of being decided, whether it should be at London
or Madrid." 78
On the receipt of this news, the Secretary of State
w Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818. 8. D. Mss.
150 South American Independence
wrote to the American minister in Paris, Albert Gal-
latin, complaining of the reserve with which the
European powers treated the United States. He
regretted at length that they had seen fit to conceal
this proposed mediation. If its object " be any other
than to promote the total independence political and
commercial of South America, we are neither desir-
ous of being invited to take a part in it, nor dis-
posed to accept the invitation if given. Our policy
in the contest between Spain and her colonies has
been impartial neutrality. Is the proposed general
mediation to be a departure from that line of neu-
trality? If it is, which side of the contest are the
allies to take? the side of Spain? on what principle
and by what right ? As contesting parties in a civil
war, the South Americans have rights, which the
other powers are bound to respect as much as the
rights of Spain; and after having by an avowed neu-
trality, admitted the existence of those rights, upon
what principle of justice can the allies consider them
as forfeited, or themselves as justifiable in taking
sides with Spain against them ?
" There is no discernible motive of justice or of
interest which can induce the allied sovereigns to
interpose for the restoration of the Spanish colonial
dominion in South America. There is none even of
policy; for if all the organized power of Europe is
Policy of the United States 151
" combined to maintain the authority of each Sover-
eign over his own people, it is hardly supposed that
the sober senses of the allied cabinets will permit
them to extend the application of this principle of
union to the maintenance of colonial dominion be-
yond the Atlantic and the Equator.
" By the usual principles of international law, the
state of neutrality, recognizes the cause of both par-
ties to the contest, as just — that is, it avoids all con-
sideration of the merits of the contest. But when
abandoning that neutrality, a nation takes one side,
in a war of other parties, the first question to be
settled is the justice of the cause to be assumed. If
the European allies are to take side with Spain, to
reduce the South American colonies to submission,
we trust they will make some previous enquiry into
the justice of the cause they are to undertake. As
neutrals we are not required to decide the question
of justice. We are sure we should not find it on the
side of Spain."
These general principles Mr. Gallatin was in-
structed to communicate informally to the French
minister. He was to assure him " That it is our
earnest desire to pursue a line of policy, at once just
to both parties in that contest, and harmonious with
that of the European allies. That we must know
their system, in order to shape our own measures
152 South American Independence
accordingly; but that we do not want to join them in
any plan of interference to restore any part of the
Spanish supremacy, in any of the South American
Provinces." 79
In the same frame of mind, and in some of the
same paragraphs, Adams wrote to Eichard Eush in
London the following day.80 He conjectured wisely,
in conclusion, that the British Cabinet "will soon
discover the great interest of Great Britain in the
total Independence of South America, and will pro-
mote that event just as far as their obligations
towards Spain will permit. The time is probably not
far remote, when the acknowledgment of the South
American Independence will be an act of friendship
towards Spain herself — when it will be kindness to
her to put an end to that self-delusion under which
she is wasting all the remnant of her resources, in a
war, infamous by the atrocities with which it is car-
ried on, and utterly hopeless of success. It may be
an interesting object of your attention to watch the
moment when this idea will become prevalent in the
British Councils, and to encourage any disposition
which may consequently be manifested to a more
perfect concert of measures between the United
States and Great Britain towards that end; the total
79 Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818. 8. D. Mss.
«° Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818. S. I>. Ms*.
Policy of the United States 153
" Independence of the Spanish South American
Provinces." . . .
Thus in the spring of 1818 the policy of the United
States was outlined in the instructions to Rush and
Gallatin, and later to George W. Campbell at St.
Petersburg.81 It was unmistakably the policy of
John Quincy Adams. It was a policy distinctly
friendly to South America, Mr. Clay to the contrary,
notwithstanding. It watched with considerable
apprehension the gathering of the sovereigns at Aix-
la-Chapelle; but had a well-founded suspicion that
the interests of these same sovereigns would confine
their activities to their own side of the Atlantic. It
took such shape that the Eussian minister in the
autumn could express satisfaction " to see a navy
growing up on the other side of the Atlantic, that
might one day act as a ballance, as he expressed him-
self to that on this side." 82 From broad principles
of policy Mr. Adams now had to turn his attention
to the doings of agents, North and South American.
The embarrassments caused to the administration
by Henry Clay hardly exceeded those for which the
agents of the patriots in the United States, or of the
United States in the southern republics, were respon-
81 June 28,1818. S. D. Mss.
81 Q. W. Campbell to Adams, from St. Petersburg, October 7, 1818.
S. D. MM.
154 South American Independence
sible. These of the agents were not confined to ses-
sions of Congress, like the former, but were peren-
nial. Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre had
arrived from Buenos Ayres in 1817, bearing a com-
mission from the Supreme Director, Pueyrredon,
accrediting him as " Agent of this Government near
that of the United States of North America," and
asking for him " all the protection and consideration
required by his diplomatic rank and the actual state
of our relations." 8S Once in the United States, he
engaged in the patriotic work of equipping priva-
teers. In odd moments he addressed the Secretary
of State,84 to demand recognition and countenance,
to complain of the injustice done his country by the
neutrality acts, to explain the workings and describe
the situation of his government, to emphasize the
moderation of his demands, and to threaten the
United States with severance of commercial rela-
tions. Mr. Adams was not a timid man to be fright-
ened into recognition nor was he a weak man to be
driven into hostility to the patriots by their lack of
consideration. He continued unmoved, though with
some irritation, his friendly, conservative course. In
the summer of 1818 he was forced to refuse com-
» Annals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1879, 1880.
w December 16, 24, 26 and 29, 1817 ; January 6 and 16, 1818. An-
nals of Congress, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1877-1897.
Policy of the United States 155
pliance with the demands of one de Forrest to be
granted an exequatur as Consul General for Buenos
Ayres in the United States. Here he laid down the
doctrine that the granting of an exequatur is a recog-
nition. His own agents caused him the greatest
trouble. In one of the revolts in Buenos Ayres,
Devereux guaranteed a loan that saved the life of
the existing government. For this he was dismissed
in 1817 by the predecessor of Mr. Adams. His
successors, Worthington and Halsey, did little better.
The former, " swelling upon his agency " until he
broke out " into a self-accredited Plenipotentiary,"
negotiated a commercial treaty on his own responsi-
bility. The latter entered into privateering schemes
and sent blank commissions to the United States.
He was summarily removed. On the whole, the
position of the Secretary of State was not a happy
one. He was the great restraining influence; poli-
ticians were shouting for recognition; agents of all
sorts were embarrassing the government, and his
own colleagues in the cabinet were discussing the
expediency of sending a naval force into southern
waters to encourage the insurgent states.85
President Monroe was ready to move more rapidly
in the direction of recognition than was Mr. Adams.
» J. Q. Adams, Menwirs, IV : 70, 88, 91, 158. Rush to Halsey, April
». 1817: Adams to Halsey, January 22, 1818. 8. D. Ms*.
156 South American Independence
In July, 1818, he wanted to propose to England a
co-operation in behalf of the South Americans. If
the journal of Mr. Adams, which is the only authority
on the point, can be accepted, the President was in-
fluenced by the eager demands of the Richmond En-
quirer, and only the arguments of the Secretary of
State restrained his benevolence.86 Evidently these
arguments were effective, for the proposal was not
made. In its place a circular was directed to the
American ministers at London, Paris and St. Peters-
burg in August, asking what part these governments
"will take in the dispute between Spain and her
colonies, and in what light they will view an
acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies
by the United States? Whether they will view it
as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain
should declare war against us, in consequence,
whether . . . [they] will take part with her in it ? " 8T
When the responses to this circular began to come
in, it was clear that Mr. Adams had not misjudged
the attitude of the Powers. From London, Kush
wrote in October that a recognition would certainly
meet with popular approval in England, while the
ministry, although " high-toned in its aristocracy,"
* J. Q. Adams, Memoirs IV : 118.
»' Adams to Rush, August 15, 1818; to Gallatin and Campbell,
August 20, 1818. S.D.Mss.
Policy of the United States 157
would not be likely " to take Spain by the hand in a
war against us." France, wrote Gallatin, would
view a recognition with disfavor because of the
peculiar nature of her family ties with Spain; but she
would not fight over this cause. Russia would not
fight alone, was Campbell's estimate of the situation
at his court.88 She might uphold the rights of Spain
in concert with the allies, but without them she
would not move. A little later Rush intimated that
the vigorous determination of the President to have
nothing to do with any scheme for coercing the col-
onies had helped to decide the Court of St. James in
the matter.
The Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle adjourned with-
out taking action acceptable to Spain. It recom-
mended a mediation through the Duke of Welling-
ton,89 which England accepted on the condition that
in event of his failure to reconcile the combatants
there should be no resort to coercion.
But before these responses reached Washington
Congress had convened, and the President once more
had been forced to decide upon a policy. By this
time the discordant reports of the three South
88 Rush to Adams, October 12 and November 20, 1818 ; Gallatin to
Adams, November 5, 1818 ; Campbell to Adams, December 22, 18181
S.D. Mss.
89 Campbell to Adams, February 18, 1819. 8. D. MM.
158 South American Independence
American Commissioners were at hand. With the
picture of political disorder revealed by these re-
ports before his eyes, and with his mind uncertain
as to the policy of the allies, Adams could have no
hesitation in counselling delay.90 A year before
Monroe had thought seriously of an immediate
recognition; now he seems to have agreed with his
Secretary. " From the view taken of this subject,"
he announced, " founded on all the information that
we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to
be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by
the United States in regard to this contest, and to
conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially
in the present state of affairs." 91
The session which began in November, 1818, the
second of the fifteenth Congress, is the one in which
Clay built up his opposition on Florida rather than
on South America. Attacking the conduct of Jack-
son with all his strength, he gave the administration
opportunity to pursue its own policy unhampered.
Mr. Adams was obliged, however, to develop the
domestic portion of his policy to meet the demands
of the South American agents. David C. De Forest
from Buenos Ayres, and Don Lino de Clemente,
from Venezuela, were at this time demanding recog-
WJ.Q. Adams, Jfewwrirs, IV: 166. 91 Richardson, Messages, II: 44.
Policy of the United States 159
nition as consuls from their respective republics. The
latter was not given even a hearing, for the commis-
sion of a privateer, with his signature annexed, had
come to the hand of the State Department. The
former was heard in full, but his solicitations met
with no success, for Adams felt, as already stated,
that granting an exequatur is tantamount to a recog-
nition. De Forest did not rest easily upon his re-
fusal, but protested bitterly. The House called for
papers upon the applications, and received from the
Secretary a careful report that described the sins of
Clemente, the unauthorized treaty of Worthington
and De Forest's petition based upon it, and the weak-
ness of the latter's argument that granting an
exequatur is not a recognition.92
Although not yet ready for a recognition at the
end of 1818, Monroe felt that the time for it was
rapidly approaching. As December passed away the
prospect of European intervention in behalf of Spain
grew less and less. At the beginning of January,
1819, the Secretary of State was ordered to draft a
new instruction to the minister in London. The
document bears date the 1st of January. It was
92 Adams to Clemente, December 16, 1818; De Forest to Adams,
January 8, 1819. & D. Mas. ; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 223 ; Annalt
of Congress, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., 544, 1606, 1612.
160 South American Independence
not despatched until the month was several days
advanced.83
The policy of the United States towards the rebel-
lious provinces of Spain, wrote Adams, in substance,
has been one of rigid neutrality. We have not recog-
nized them as independent, nor received their con-
suls, which were an equivalent act. But we have
considered it an obligation of our neutrality to give
the parties as equal rights as possible; so we have
always listened to the representations of their agents.
Thus far our neutrality operates against Spain, as
an inevitable consequence of the nature of the
struggle. With the preponderating success of one
of the parties to the civil war, this condition will
cease, as it has done in Mexico and seems likely soon
to do in Buenos Ayres. Spain has solicited the
mediation of the allies to prevent this separation, but
such mediation, as Great Britain clearly saw, would
be a departure on their part from the line of neu-
trality. We are opposed to a third-party interven-
tion of any sort. We believe " that the contest can-
not and ought not to terminate otherwise than by
the total Independence of South America," but we
desire to do our duty by Spain and maintain the
w Adams to Rush, January 1, 1819. S. D. Mss. The copy in the
Adams Mss. is endorsed as being sent January 4 by Mr. Bagot's mes-
senger.
Policy of the United States 161
good-will of the Powers, and so have taken no de-
cisive step as yet. Now that we are convinced that
the power of Spain cannot he restored, we desire
Europe to consider how important it is that the new
States should be recognized and held in their re-
sponsibilities as independent bodies. We have it in
contemplation ourselves to acknowledge the govern-
ment of Buenos Ayres at no remote period unless
something should occur to justify a further postpone-
ment of the act. It would be gratifying should
England see fit to adopt similar measures at the same
time and in concert with the United States. " When
adopted it will be a mere acknowledgment of the fact
of Independence, and without deciding upon the ex-
tent of their Territory, or upon their claims to sov-
ereignty, in any part of the Provinces of La Plata,
where it is not established and uncontested."
The unforeseen seems to have happened on the
3d of January, 1819, when it was learned that the
success of the Florida negotiations would be endan-
gered by a recognition. For more than two years,
until the treaty was signed and safely ratified, recog-
nition was postponed. Agitation did not cease during
these two years; factious opposition did its worst;
Don Manuel Torres, a new agent from Colombia,
created a long series of entries in Mr. Adams's
journal. There is no absolute evidence that fear of
162 South American Independence
Spain was the inspiring motive of the administra-
tion's conservatism. But Adams ceased to worry
over the attitude of Europe during these years. He
announced a policy of forbearance for the time to
the Russian minister. There is abundant proof in
the correspondence with Spain that recognition was
a determining cause in the delay of the latter to
ratify the treaty. And it is certain that recognition
did not come until the winter of 1822.
The message of 1819, expurgated by the Secre-
tary of State, until it was harmless, made some slight
advance toward recognition. Mr. Adams felt that
the less said about South America at this time the
better it would be.94 Three months later he opposed
in the Cabinet a tendency to grant arms to the
Colombians, denouncing the scheme as dishonorable,
unneutral, unconstitutional, and an act of war. At
the same time, outside the Cabinet, he resisted the
efforts of an " ambidexter personage," agent of
Venezuela in Washington, to get himself appointed
as agent of the United States to Venezuela.95 The
whole burden of foreign policy seems to have been
laid upon the broad shoulders of John Quincy
Adams. To conciliate Spain and induce her to ratify
a treaty forced upon him by the administration, he
94 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV : 209, 379, 461.
* J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V : 45-51.
Policy of ike United States 163
had to fight at once the opposition of the Speaker
of the House, the pretensions of the South Ameri-
cans and the unneutral disposition of his own
cabinet. When the President transmitted his mes-
sage of 9th May, 1820, with its hard words for the
demands of Spain, the first storm broke, and Clay,
as has been seen, gained his first triumph.
The summer of 1820 saw more agents sent to
South America, charged to protest against the acts
of insurgent privateers and to acquire news. Charles
S. Todd went as Agent for Seamen and Commerce
to Colombia. " With regard to the formal recogni-
tion by the Government of the U. S. of the
Republic of Colombia," were his instructions,
" should anything be said to you, the obvious reply
will be that you have not been authorized to discuss
the subject. As a reason for this reserve it may be
alleged that besides the actual War still waged by
Spain, during which the Independence of the other
party could not be acknowledged without a depart-
ure from our avowed and long-established system of
neutrality, the changes still occurring will require
some lapse of time to give to the Republic that char-
acter of permanency which would justify the formal
acknowledgment of it by foreign powers." 96
J. B. Prevost, agent at Lima, had been trans-
* Adams to Todd, June 5, 1820. S. D. Mss.
164 South American Independence
f erred to Buenos Ayres in 1819 on the dismissal of
Halsey and Worthington ; but his sphere of activity
covered also Chile and Peru. Uncertain as to his
location, Adams commissioned John M. Forbes to
Chile or Buenos Ayres, as there should be a vacancy,
in June, 1820. The instructions of Forbes are
dated 5th July, 1820. Further and more significant
instructions were issued to him after the arrival of a
despatch from Prevost a week later.97 In these the
Secretary reviewed recent upheavals in Buenos
Ayres, warning Forbes, as Todd had been warned,
not to discuss a recognition. Now that the old cen-
tral government had been swept away, if we were
" to recognize the single province of Buenos Ayres,
the recognition upon reaching that city might prob-
ably find it no longer independent.
" You will take occasion to remark whenever it
may be proper that the Government of the United
States have never intended to secure to themselves
any advantage, commercial or otherwise, as an equiv-
alent for acknowledging the Independence of any
part of South America. They do not think it a
proper subject for equivalent; and they have entire
confidence that no exclusive privilege will be granted
91 Adams to Prevost, May 3, 1819 ; Adams to Forbes, July 12, 1820.
S. D. Mas. Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 2059; British and
Foreign State Papers, IX : 370.
Policy of the United States 165
" to any other nation to the prejudice of the U. S.
They think themselves entitled to this, and con-
sider it as essential to the Independence itself to
be acknowledged — aware that no such privileges can
be granted but by a sacrifice of the interests of the
nation which grants them, they have never intended
to ask them to the detriment of others, as they rely
that they will not be conceded to others in detriment
to them."
The early despatches of Forbes show a most dis-
tracted condition prevailing in Buenos Ayres in
1821. The news from Prevost, dated 30th April,
1820, was of a successful revolt against the Congress
and the Supreme Director Pueyrredon. The latter,
with his faction, had been engaged in secret negotia-
tions with France and Spain, having in view the
establishment of a Bourbon dynasty in South
America. A revolt overthrew him and started a
prosecution of the leaders of his party for high
treason, thus continuing a decade of turmoil. " Up
to 1820 . . . the History of these Provinces com-
prises little but a Series of Military Operations.
. . . The Successes of their Armies have been splen-
did and extraordinary, but a Review of their inter-
nal Government for the first ten years presents
166 South American Independence
"nothing but a Picture of Anarchy and Confu-
sion." 98 This was the time when General San Mar-
tin, engaged in Chile in his large projects against
Peru, disobeyed the orders of his government to re-
turn home and restore peace."
Pueyrredon went into exile in the early part of
1820. He was succeeded in quick succession of dic-
tatorship by Aguirre, known in North America;
Sarratea and Balcarce, until the affairs of the prov-
inces became hopeless. As Forbes reached Rio de
Janeiro on the way to his post, in September, 1820,
he learned that " a kind of political Auction is to
take place at which the rights of a distracted Coun-
try are to be struck off to the highest bidder. — Eng-
land will offer maritime protection and Commercial
abundance and, notwithstanding that the most im-
penetrable mystery covers everything here, it is
inferred from the gaiety and good humor of the
Spanish mission that the nature of the proposals they
are about to make is not without charms and hope."
Preceded by rumors that he bore a formal recog-
nition, Forbes was received by the local government
at Buenos Ayres with distinguished honors. State
coach and aide-de-camp were forced upon him; a
98Keport of Woodbine Parish, June 25, 1824. F. O. Mss. An
Account . . . of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata (London,
1825), 9, 20-24.
99 Sketch of Occurrences in Buenos Ayres, 1820. S. D. Mss.
Policy of the United States 167
public mansion was offered for his residence; while
on the other hand, he was embarrassed by the evil
rumors that he attributed to disgruntled South
American agents who had returned from Washing-
ton to justify their failure by attacking the United
States. But Forbes could not be lured into partisan
politics. He sat outside, watching the game of fac-
tions, sometimes hazarding " the opinion that a per-
manent and good government is very important."
The government at Buenos Ayres, by the end of
the year, had become a " mere military police," liv-
ing a precarious existence from day to day, and
awaiting the action of a Congress of the provinces
assembling at Cordova. It was a war between re-
publicanism in the provinces and monarchical ten-
dency at Buenos Ayres. The Congress gathered
with true Castilian deliberation, to perform an enor-
mous task. It " requires little short of Omnipo-
tence," wrote Forbes, " to create order out of such
utter Chaos as now exists." By the 1st of April,
1821, he was reduced to wish for a popular general
and a victorious republican army, for the country
seemed " in the most utter darkness of despair and
without one ray of hope." On 20th April, Good
Friday, Pueyrredon landed, having returned from
exile at the call of the government. In two weeks
more the clouds of anarchy had broken.
168 South American Independence
About 1st May, 1821, there appeared in Buenos
Ayres a new journal, edited by two patriots, Ber-
nardo Rivadavia and Manuel Jose Garcia, of whom
the former had once been at the head of the govern-
ment, while both had just returned from an extended
diplomatic mission in Europe. Before the end of the
month it appeared to the American agent that the
party of Pueyrredon was falling into disrepute. In
July the administration fell, Rivadavia came in as
Minister of State, while Garcia took the Treasury.
This was the beginning of an orderly government in
Buenos Ayres. Garcia at once inaugurated a policy
" without example in the history of the Revolution,"
by paying the debts of the government, and paying
them in gold. Rivadavia, after some correspondence
with Forbes, issued a decree recalling all privateers
sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres and revoking
their commissions. At the same time glad tidings
came from across the mountains. " At the moment
I am writing," wrote Forbes on 2d September, " a
salvo of Artillery and the most extravagant demon-
strations of joy through the streets, announce the
capture of Lima by San Martin's besieging army. If
this news be true, it puts the Seal to the Independ-
ence of South America. The Spanish Royalty,
driven from its last hope in these Provinces, and
enlightened by a Representative Government, will, I
Policy of the United States 169
" think, within six months, acknowledge their Inde-
pendence."
The news was true. Progress during the past
months had not been confined to the limits of Buenos
Ayres or to the leadership of Kivadavia and Garcia.
We have already traced the steps of the armies of
liberation. San Martin, in July, 1821, had really
marched into the city of Lima, after a year's cam-
paign of education in its vicinity. Bolivar had ended
the truce with Morillo to defeat the royalists at
Carabobo on 24th June. On 12th July his Congress
at Cucuta had proclaimed the permanent union of
Venezuela and New Granada; while on 30th August
it had proclaimed a federative constitution for the
new republic.
The year 1821 was marked by successes of the re-
publican armies and by the erection of orderly gov-
ernments in the most important of the South Ameri-
can States, while on the other side of the Atlantic
it seemed probable that Spain had come to her
senses. The successful revolution of 1820, establish-
ing Ferdinand VII. as constitutional monarch, was
followed by an attempt to reconcile the colonies and
the mother country. It could not be foreseen that
an armed intervention would overthrow the con-
stitution, while the Cortez would recall its pacific
overtures.
170 South American Independence
In Mexico, on 24th August, 1821, the Spanish
General O'Donoju concluded a treaty of peace on
the basis of independence. Later this was dis-
avowed; " yet his private instructions found among
his papers," it is said,100 " clearly proved beyond a
possibility of doubt, that he was fully authorized to
act as he did, and in the event of their Independence
being declared, to make the most eligible terms he
possibly could in favor of Old Spain. . . ." Morillo,
too, had made a truce with his opponent, though
Bolivar had terminated it before a treaty had been
arranged. From Spain the news came that Mexican
and Colombian commissioners were on hand, that
they were demanding complete independence, that
the Cortez was listening to their demands and
petitioning the ministry to come to some conclu-
sion.101
In other words, the South American provinces in
1821 had achieved their independence, and a recog-
nition had become fully justifiable. The United
States, relieved by the final ratification of the Span-
ish treaty in February, 1821, of the necessity for
JMHis authority is doubtful. Mackie's Report, March 17, 1823.
F. 0. Mss.
lo1 Thomas L. L. Brent to Adams, April 10, 1821. 8. D. Mss.
British and Foreign State Papers, IX : 394.
Policy of the United States 171
silence, came to this conclusion as the fall and winter
advanced.
The seventeenth Congress met in December,
1821, Clay being out of it.102 With him had disap-
peared the ardent desire for recognition. " It has
long been manifest/' declared Monroe in his mess-
age, " that it would be impossible for Spain to re-
duce these colonies by force, and equally so that no
conditions short of their independence would be
satisfactory to them. It may therefore be pre-
sumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the Govern-
ment of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal
councils, will find it to comport to its interests and
due to its magnanimity to terminate this exhausting
controversy on that basis. To promote this result
by friendly counsel with the Government of Spain
will be the object of the Government of the United
States." 103
As the weeks ran on, the despatches of Forbes
convinced the administration that the time had
come. In January Adams replied to one of the
102 W. S. Robertson, "The United States and Spain in 1822," in
Amer. Hist. Eev., XX: 781, adds much new information to our
knowledge of the effect of recognition upon the relations of the United
States and Spain, and upon those of Spain and the European allies :
a phase of recognition not considered above. He has made extensive
use of the archives at Washington and Madrid.
i<» Richardson, Messages, II: 105.
172 South American Independence
frequent demands of the Colombian agent that the
President had the matter of recognition under con-
sideration. Ten days later he wrote to Todd, who
had returned from Colombia, " It is probable that
the formal recognition of the Republic of Colombia
will ensue at no distant day." 10* Before the next
month was over the chief clerk of the Department
of State announced to Forbes the preparation of a
report and documents in response to a call of the
House. " I know not how the cat jumps in relation
to this great question/' he wrote, " but am apt to
believe that a discretionary power will be given to
the President, to acknowledge, or not, according to
his views of circumstances, the sovereignty and Inde-
pendence of any or all of these Governments. That
of Buenos Ayres has given a good moral Lesson to
older and long-established States, in the formal sup-
pression of Privateering under its flag."
On the 8th of March, 1822, responding to a call
for documents of 30th January, President Monroe
recommended that the independence of the South
American republics be acknowledged.106 The Presi-
dent sketched briefly the long struggle of the col-
104 Adams to Torres, January 18, 1822 ; Adams to Todd, January
28, 1822. 8. D. MSB. ; Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess.,
«* D. Brent to Forbes, February 19, 1822. 8. D. Mss.
H» Richardson, Messages, II: 116.
Policy of the United States 173
onies, the sympathy of the people of the United
States and the policy of neutrality that had checked
that sympathy. Now he was compelled to conclude,
from a review of the situation in South America,
" that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces
which have declared their independence and are in
the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized." He
presumed that Spain would soon become reconciled
to the separation, though he admitted that he had
received no recent information on the subject from
Spain or from the other Powers. Some time since,
it had been understood that these latter were not
yet prepared for recognition. " The immense space
between those powers, even those which border on
the Atlantic, and these Provinces makes the move-
ment an affair of less interest and excitement to
them than to us. ...
" In proposing this measure it is not contemplated
to change thereby in the slightest manner our
friendly relations with either of the parties, but to
observe, in all respects, as heretofore, should the
war be continued, the most perfect neutrality be-
tween them. Of this friendly disposition an assur-
ance will be given to the Government of Spain, to
whom it is presumed it will be, as it ought to be,
satisfactory. The measure is proposed under a
thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with
174 South American Independence
" the law of nations, that it is just and right as to
the parties, and that the United States owe it to their
station and character in the world, as well as to their
essential interests, to adopt it. Should Congress con-
cur in the view herein presented, they will doubt-
less see the propriety of making the necessary appro-
priations for carrying it into effect."
With the departure of Henry Clay from the
House of Representatives the .question of recogni-
tion had fallen back to its proper place, the Depart-
ment of State. In his absence there was no one
whose interests impelled him to make use of a gener-
ous popular sentiment to drag the foreign policy of
the government into Congress. The sentiment con-
tinued to exist, strong as ever, fed by the frequent
columns of South American news in the papers.
But the emotion was humanitarian rather than poli-
tical. It was felt by Adams and Monroe as keenly
as by Congress and the people. The purely factious
nature of Clay's advocacy of recognition is shown by
the fact that the seventeenth Congress felt no neces-
sity to take the matter from the hands of the Presi-
dent. Even after the call for documents in January,
1822, the papers paid no attention to the subject.
The message of 8th March was received with calm-
ness, though with general satisfaction. It does small
credit to Clay's political wisdom that he spent four
Policy of the United States 175
years in advocacy of an assured cause, and that for
all his efforts he could not hasten by a day the ad-
vance of the government in the direction whither he
was urging it.
The rest of the story can be quickly told : how the
message was received at home; how it was received
abroad; the actual steps in formal recognition.
During the weeks following the 8th of March,
1822, the message, with its accompanying docu-
ments, was reprinted generally throughout the
country. The information transmitted at this time
was not new, and was received without general
enthusiasm. The Aurora and the Enquirer, long
the advocates of recognition, did their best by it,
now it had come. The former expressed its satis-
faction that the President had at last done justice
to the South Americans and hailed him as a bene-
factor of the republics.107 The Baltimore Patriot
worked itself up to declare the message the most
intrinsically important state paper it had seen. But
South America had already gained its independence,
so that recognition was an acknowledgment of a
fact rather than a prop to a wavering cause. It
came too late to be considered as an emotional
appeal.
The Spanish minister in Washington, Don Joaquin
107 Aurora, March 11, March 12, March 15, 1822.
176 South American Independence
de Anduaga, fired his " diplomatic blunderbuss " at
the Secretary of State as soon as the message of
Monroe reached him.108 His note was of the char-
acter that was to be expected. Where is " the right
of The United States," he demanded, "to sanction
and declare legitimate a rebellion, without cause,
and the event of which is not even decided ? " He
denied the fact of independence, and in the lan-
guage of injured, surprised innocence, registered a
formal protest against the act of recognition, re-
serving to Spain all her rights in the provinces de-
spite the act. In his reply of a month later, Adams
justified the action of the executive, admitted the
reservation of Spain's rights, for recognition has no
effect upon existing rights, and closed the contro-
versy. !N~o other European power expressed formal
disapprobation of the policy of the United States.
News of the message reached Paris at a time when
Europe was excited over a threat of commercial dis-
crimination by Colombia. " The United States, as
we write," said the Journal des Debats™* " have
probably recognized the independence of the Span-
ish American governments. This resolution is not
surprising from a government which has established
^Anduaga to Adams, March 9, 1822; Adams to Anduaga, April
9, 1822. British and Foreign State Papers, IX : 752, 754.
109 Journal des Debats, April 17, 1822.
Policy of the United States 177
" as a maxim of public law ' thst when a province
maintains itself victoriously in independence against
the mother country it has a right to demand recog-
nition as a sovereign state.' The president of the
United States would have been wise not to talk of
principle, EIGHT and LAW OF NATIONS: for suppose
Boston with the five New England States should
one day separate from the American Union. . . .
Then England with his message in her hand could
say amicably to Congress, c We do not wish to
change any of our relations with the Union, but the
five states east of the Hudson demand our recogni-
tion, they have beaten your armies and you are abso-
lutely incapable of subduing them; so according to
the law of nations established by yourselves, they
have a right to be recognized. So we shall recog-
nize them without injuring you. Our ambassador
at Washington is instructed to assure you of our
sympathy and that we act from no motive of
interest/ . . .
" The preliminary measures regarding the new
governments have been skilfully conducted by the
president of the United States. He sent agents or
commissioners who after coasting slowly along
South America submitted somewhat contradictory
official reports. Thus the United States showed their
regard for the new governments without injuring
178 South American Independence
" Spain, and after three years of negotiation and pre-
liminary measures came to a point where the Euro-
pean situation is such that they can safely establish
with their neighbors what relations they please. . . .
" Is it possible that the old governments of
Europe cannot keep up with the march of the pru-
dent young republic? We hope our statesmen will
find means to conciliate the interests affected by
this important question."
The formal steps in recognition occupied three
months in the spring of 1822. The message of the
President was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, which on 19th March reported resolutions
vigorously sustaining the policy of the administra-
tion and instructing the Committee on Ways and
Means to report a bill for the salaries of ministers to
South America. Nine days later, after slight de-
bate, the resolutions were adopted with but one dis-
senting vote. On 10th April the debate on the bill
for the missions was commenced;110 it was signed by
the President some three weeks later, in spite of
the unpleasant news that the Cortez had disavowed
the concessions to the provinces and declared that
the recognition of their independence by other
powers would be considered as a violation of their
treaties with Spain. On the 19th of June, 1822,
"o Annals of Congress, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 1314, 1382, 1518.
Policy of the United States 179
John Quincy Adams " presented Mr. Manuel Torres
as Charge d' Affaires from the republic of Colombia
to the President. This incident was chiefly interest-
ing as being the first formal act of recognition of an
independent South American Government." The
next day the Secretary proposed to the President to
offer the Colombian mission to Henry Clay.111
111 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V : 489, VI : 23, 26.
CHAPTEK III
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA
There seems to have been no connection between
the interests that inspired Pitt to keep in touch with
Francisco de Miranda in the last years of the eigh-
teenth century and the early ones of the nineteenth,
that impelled Sir Home Kiggs Popham to attack the
Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres on the broad grounds
of commercial advantage and injury to Spain, and
those later interests that developed a mercantile
opposition in England to embarrass the ministry as
Henry Clay's political opposition embarrassed the
American administration of John Quincy Adams and
his president, James Monroe. In England there is a
distinct break between these periods. From an atti-
tude of hostility to Spain in the earlier years, Great
Britain passed through a stage of friendly protection
that drove the French out of the peninsula, into an-
other period of semi-hostility to the restored Ferdi-
nand. During this last period, beginning roughly in
1815, the interests of Great Britain were divided.
On the one hand an enormous trade with Latin
America was threatened with destruction, should
Spain's colonial policy come back with Spain's king.
England and South America 181
On the other, were the political interests of England
in Europe, the body of treaties concluded during the
wars against Napoleon, the newly-developed policy
of joint action by the Powers. With the United
States recognition was a question of American
policy; with England it was merely one of the rami-
fications of European politics. At no time was the
British ministry in a position to treat it on its merits ;
instead it struggled for a decade to avert action,
to cherish at once the commerce with the colonies
and the friendly relations with Spain. It was not
until the clamorings of the merchants drowned the
protests of the Bourbons that England recognized
the South American republics.
Once an ally of Spain, the disposition of Eng-
land to respect the rights of the former in her
provinces became pronounced. In 1811 one Robert
Staples was commissioned as consul to Buenos
Ayres, but when the Eegency of Cadiz replied to
Sir Henry Wellesley's request for an exequatur*
that the " Laws of the Indias " were still in force,
Perceval dropped the matter and the ministries
thereafter disavowed the actions of Staples in South
America.2 In 1814 a treaty was entered into with
1 Memorandum of June 26, 1823. F. 0. Mss.
* The archives of the British Foreign Office contain materials upon
the South American wars of liberation, and on recognition, surpassing
in interest those of the State Department. They are, so far as the
182 South American Independence
Spain binding England to prevent her subjects from
furnishing " arms, ammunition, or any other warlike
article to the revolted in South America." For his
Britannic Majesty was " anxious that the troubles
and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the
Dominions of His Catholic Majesty in America
should entirely cease, and the Subjects of those
Provinces should return to their obedience to their
lawful sovereign." 8
The attitude of the Liverpool ministry was by no
means favorable to colonies struggling for independ-
ence. The regent was narrow and aristocratic to the
last degree; later, as George IV., he followed the
course that could have been expected of him. He
remembered with bitterness the day that marked the
separation of her American colonies from Great
period here in question is concerned, preserved in the Public Records
Office ; and are described in detail in C. O. Paullin and F. L. Paxson,
Guide to the Materials in London Archives for the History of the
United States since 1783 ( Carnegie Institution , 1914) . In the preparation
of this Guide all of the Foreign Office volumes relating to the United
States and many others relating to South America were handled. The
search brought to light many new documents relating to recognition
in addition to those referred to in the pages of the above chapter.
8 Hansard. Part. Debates, XXXV : 1200 ; British and Foreign
State Papers, I : pt. 1, 292; Treaty of Madrid, July 5, 1814, and addi-
tional articles, August 28, 1814. In return for this pledge, England
was to receive a full share of the colonial trade if Spain should throw
it open to any power. C. K. Webster, " Castlereagh and the Spanish
Colonies, 1816-1818," in English Hist. Rev., XXVII: 78.
England and 8outh America 183
Britain, and with such antecedents could with diffi-
culty bring himself to countenance the separation of
her own from Spain. The force that drove him to
the final recognition was commercial, with George
Canning as its prophet. That the latter " called a
New World into existence to redress the balance of
the old " 4 may well be doubted, for before he moved,
another and a not uncertain voice had sounded from
America. He guided his influence by the side of
John Quincy Adams to maintain the new republics,
less for their effect on old world politics or for the
sake of the republics themselves, than that the com-
merce of the British merchants might be protected
and increased.5
Recognition became a subject of agitation in
Great Britain as early as in the United States, but
4 This assertion was made near the end of the debate upon France,
Spain and Portugal, in the House of Commons, December 12, 1826.
Parl. Debates, New Series, XVI : 396.
5H. W. V. Temperley, "The Later American Policy of George
Canning," in Amer. Hist. Rev., XI : 779, attempts " to show that the
later American policy of George Canning was intended to defeat certain
claims and pretensions of the Monroe doctrine." He presents various
documents, some of them not used in the above chapter, to defend the
substantial truth of Canning's rhetorical boast, but seems to give too
little weight to the obvious fact that the new world was already clearly
in existence before he acted. Ibid, 781. Doubtless a fear of United
States hegemony in America was among his motives, but so far as this
was the case it was the balance in the new world that he was attempting
to redress. Compare with this E. M. Lloyd, " Canning and Spanish
America," in Transactions of theRoyal Hist. Soc.t new Series, XVIII :
93.
184: South American Independence
there is in the former country no trace of a purely
factious opposition using a widespread popular emo-
tion to embarrass an administration. The United
States had little commerce with South American
ports; its sympathies were almost entirely senti-
mental. Great Britain also had a feeling for what
it considered a struggle for liberty, but the feeling
was buttressed up by considerations of a commerce
that fed and clothed the southern patriots. Feel-
ing the depredations of Spanish and insurgent
privateers, Mackintosh and Brougham could with
better grace than Henry Clay demand governmental
intervention in their behalf.
Eleven years after their conclusion the treaties of
1814 rose to plague the Foreign Secretary, but in
1817 they constituted the foundation of his strength.
Sir Henry Brougham, professionally a member of
the opposition, and in all things liberal, interrogated
the members of the ministerial bench on their South
American program almost a year before the spec-
tacular oratory of Henry Clay began, " The con-
duct which this country followed with respect to
these disputes," replied Lord Castlereagh, " was,
that of adhering to a strict neutrality, and not that
which the hon. and learned gentleman seemed
to recommend — to assist the colonies against the
native country, which would be in direct contraven-
England and South America 185
" tion to the treaties between Great Britain and
Spain. . . . [The] events in the river Plate. . . .
must be considered not as a mere South American
question, but as an European question." 6
The war thus opened was continued with increas-
ing energy as the English South American com-
merce increased in volume. The ministry fought off
recognition until of possible evils it was the least;
until nothing was to be gained by further concilia-
tion of Spain; until it was convinced that the prov-
inces were independent and possessed of responsible
governments. As it was hostile to the new republics,
this conviction came with deliberate steps. At last
the ministry yielded to the commercial influence,
intensified by popular sympathy, and by its recogni-
tion incurred the disapprobation of all of Europe.
The weapons of the opposition in England were
much the same as in the United States. Speeches in
House of Commons, demands of South American
agents, equipment of South American armaments
were all brought into use. Brougham, who had
stirred up the ministry in March, 1817, returned to
the attack in July in his speech on the State of the
Nation. On the very day when Secretary Rush was
pushing the preparations for the South American
• In House of CommonB,-March 19, 1817. Parl. Debates, XXXV:
1196.
186 South American Independence
Commission, Brougham complained to the House of
Commons that Great Britain had no system respect-
ing that portion of the globe.7 In later months Don
Bernardino Rivadavia, who was at a future time to
play such a significant part in the development of
Buenos Ayres, was passing through Europe, from
capital to capital, making his representations and
upholding the interests of his country. When Spain
asked the mediation of the powers, he assured Lord
Castlereagh that Buenos Ayres respected the other
nations of the world and wanted peace, but that no
peace would be admissible save on the basis, of abso-
lute separation from the mother country. Six
months later he announced that the mediation of
Great Britain would be welcome if founded on no
other motive than humanity. It was too late for
Spain to seek to preserve her supremacy.8
The part played by British officers and men in the
war of South American liberation has already been
described. Lord Cochrane and General Miller are
only the most notable names among those who
fought with the armies of the south. Whole regi-
ments are found with the armies of the north. The
end of the Napoleonic wars, coinciding as it did with
* July 11, 1817. Part. Debates, XXXVI : 1384.
sBivadavia to Castlereagh, October 29, 1817, April 10, 1818, en-
closed in Gallatin's NOF. 70 and 73, S. D. Mss.
England and South America 187
the beginning of the second period of the South
American war, made it possible for the patriots to
secure the services of many trained soldiers for
their cause. Whole battalions are said to have
listened to the glowing promises of Don Luis Lopez
Mendez the agent of Bolivar in England, and been
mustered out of the British army only to enlist
immediately for South American service. Others
flocked to the support of adventurers armed with
stacks of blank commissions, and sailed for Mar-
garita on the assurance that there they would re-
ceive rank, expenses and increased remuneration.
Only too often their hopes went the way of the
funds of investors in high-rated South American
stocks.
It was not without reason that the Prince Regent
issued his proclamation in the fall of 1817 warning
his subjects against participation in the war and
holding before their eyes the penalties of felony pre-
scribed by the old statutes of George II. Six ex-
peditions are said to have been sent from London by
Mendez before the year came to an end. Further
proclamations in the summer of 1818 were equally
necessary and unavailing. An instruction was issued
by the Admiralty for the seizure of South American
armed vessels guilty of aggressions on British com-
merce,— pirates they were designated; and customs
188 South American Independence
officials were ordered to check illegal preparations
for South. American service in their ports.9 But all
these efforts could not prevent an Irish and English
brigade of two thousand, under one Colonel English,
from sailing in June to reach the insurgent ports
before the end of August.10 And other expeditions
sailed for South America at will.
As in the United States, these expeditions re-
vealed the inadequacy of the laws of neutrality.
Strictly speaking, Great Britain had no law express-
ing her duties as a neutral upon her statute books.
The provisions of international law upon the subject
were admittedly a part of her common law, but she
had let the United States remain the first and only
nation to embody these duties in a statute and pro-
vide means and measures for their enforcement.
When the latter, in 1818 and 1819, went further,
and modified her laws to meet the situation created
by the South American revolt, the British ministry
was shamed into doing its duty by Spain and offered
in the House of Commons a Foreign Enlistment Act.
Thus they established a principle, later to vex them
greatly, that neutrality demands more than an
9 November 27, 1817; June 8 and July 9, 1818. British and
Foreign State Papers, IV : 488, V : 963, 1224 ; Present State of
Colombia, 87.
M Recollections of a Service, I: 6-19; Chesterton, Proceedings in
Venezuela.
England and South America 189
observance of existing laws; it demands that ade-
quate laws shall exist.
The law which the Attorney-General asked leave
to introduce on* 13th May, 18 19,11 was avowedly
based on the recent neutrality act of the United
States, but went beyond the requirements of inter-
national law. It made it an offence not only to en-
list in England for foreign service, but to enter the
foreign service at all. As was to be expected, the
opposition seized upon the measure as of political
intent, and charged that it was an unneutral service
in behalf of Spain itself. Sir James Mackintosh at
once, amid loud cheers from his followers, attacked
the bill, " which he considered in no other light than
as an enactment to repress the rising liberty of the
South Americans, and to enable Spain to reimpose
that yoke of tyranny which they were unable to
bear, which they had nobly shaken off, and from
which, he trusted God they would finally be enabled
to free themselves, whatever attempts were made by
the ministers of this or any other country, to
countenance or assist their oppressors." 12
The debate on the act ranged over the whole of
foreign and commercial policy. " Independent of
the sympathy which Great Britain, as a free country,
must feel in every contest for liberty," complained
11 Parl. Debates, XL : 362. la Par/. Debate*, XL : 367, 368.
190 South American Independence
George Tierney, member from Knaresborough and
acknowledged leader of the opposition, " independ-
ent of the ardor with which she would be inclined
to aid the oppressed, it would not have been extra-
ordinary if ministers, merely upon mercantile con-
siderations, had looked towards South America as a
vent for our trade. Yet they had not only done noth-
ing, but they had done worse than nothing. They had
done their utmost to prevent the success of those by
whose triumph we might be benefited; for a bill
was now depending, calculated to exasperate the
whole mass of South Americans, and to destroy
every hope of commercial advantage." 1S In answer
to this complaint Canning sustained the policy of
the ministry, characterizing an open interference on
behalf of South America as mad as well as criminal.
" No," he continued, " the British government had
but one wise, as but one honest course to pursue in
this contest. They have not interfered to assist
either party; but have repeatedly offered their good
offices with a view to reconcilement through an im-
partial mediation. . . . Amicable intercourse has
been kept up with every part of South America, to
which our flag has access. . . .
" In one respect, his majesty's ministers are cer-
tainly guilty of the charges brought against them.
"Par/. Debates, XL: 482.
England and South America 191
" In their transactions with South America, they
have abstained from endeavoring, by a commercial
treaty, to turn the troubles and distresses of a strug-
gling people to the advantage of this country. The
assistance which they did not think -it right to grant,
they would not be tempted to sell." 14
It was a more difficult task to put the Foreign En-
listment Act through Parliament than it had been to
put its prototype through Congress, for it had in
the former body to meet an opposition of longer
standing, of more close amalgamation, and based
upon a more sincere cause. The petitions from Brit-
ish merchants that were offered in opposition of the
act show how seriously it threatened to affect their
commerce. One of them bore the signatures of
seventeen hundred tradesmen from London alone.
" We could not forget," cried one of the opposition,
taking another line of attack, " that we first invited
them to throw off the yoke which our government
was now trying to reimpose, and that the birth of
their independence took place under the protection
of England." It is vain, declared another, to say
that the act is only now introduced because the pro-
posed mediation has failed and the struggle will
proceed indefinitely. The conclusion of the Ameri-
can negotiations with Spain by the cession of the
"Parl. Debates, XL: 534.
192 South American Independence
Floridas is the true cause. And, " Although a sop
has," added still another, " for the present, been
given to Cerberus, by the cession of the Floridas
to the United States, the policy of the government
will not long be able to restrain the wishes of the
people, but be compelled to join this popular and
patriotic cause; an event which will at once con-
summate the independence of South America." 15
The passage of the Foreign Enlistment Act seems
to have had little effect upon the promotion of ex-
peditions, for within a month General d' Evereux,
after an elaborate public banquet in Dublin, took
another expedition to South America.16
It was indeed too late for Tory ministers to check
the progress of the revolt, or to restore the suprem-
acy of Ferdinand in his colonial dominions. Even
if it had been desired or possible to enforce the new
law of neutrality in all its strictness, the nickering
light of Spain would have continued only to nicker
vainly until its ultimate extinction. The events of
the past year in Europe had shown that Spain must
stand alone in her struggle against the insurgent
powers; in the peninsula they had shown that even
her own power could not be relied upon to any great
extent. At the time of the passage of the law there
was impending an explosion that was within the next
w Part. Debates, XL : 373, 858, 888, 894. 16 Niles Register, XVII : 53.
England and South America 193
five years to make Spain herself, rather than Ultra-
mar, a subject for the armed intervention of the
allied powers of Europe.
In the spring of 1818, while Henry Clay was
bringing up his motion for the recognition of her
provinces, Spain, terrified at the possibility of Amer-
ican intervention, was entreating the powers to take
action in her behalf. Her petition was not received
with enthusiasm, although nearly every court in Eu-
rope was at heart in sympathy with his Catholic
Majesty. France and, to a greater degree, Eussia
might have been induced to enter an armed suppres-
sion, euphoniously named mediation, of insurgents
boasting of democratic principles. For they were
in a position to take a theoretical attitude respecting
Spain's American colonies. Neither possessed any
South American commerce, while the rotten ships
that the founder of the Holy Allies sold to Ferdi-
nand gave the only profit that came to either from
the revolution. But their philanthropic readiness to
check the career of Ferdinand's subjects was itself
held back, not by the real tendency of the British
ministry, but by a feeling " out of doors " that
warned Castlereagh to be careful of his commerce.
The avowed disposition of the United States to dis-
countenance armed intervention may also have had
some weight in the mind of the British minister. It
194 South American Independence
is my opinion, wrote Richard Rush, " that the cause
of the South Americans gains upon the esteem of
this country, and that should our government see fit
to acknowledge their independence the measure
would receive support in the approbation and popu-
larity of extensive and powerful classes." 1T
No definite conclusion upon the application of
Spain was reached for some months and when
reached it was distasteful to the applicant. The
gathering of the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, in
the fall of 1818, had been watched with anxiety
from both sides of the Atlantic. But at the confer-
ence there was shown, as Rush had anticipated, " no
serious intention on the part of any of the great
sovereigns to take the cause of Ferdinand effectively
in hand." Vague generalizations in behalf of peace,
and a suggestion of a Wellington mediation that
should have no ultimate resort to force failed to
meet the situation.18 It was clear that Spain could
at this time hope for little support from without.19
Early in the next year the decay of the Spanish
empire began with the cession, practically forced
upon her, of the Floridas to the United States. This
" Rush to Adams, October 12, 1818. 8. D. Ms*.
18 Rush to Adams, November 20, 1818 ; Campbell to Adams, Febru-
ary 18, 1819. S.D.Mas.
»C. K.Webster, " Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1815-1818,"
in English. Hist. Rev., XXVII : 89.
England and South America 195
" sop to Cerberus/' as a jealous statesman called it,
seems to have deferred recognition by the United
States for more than two years. Direct testimony is
wanting, but inference ifi powerful that Adams and
Monroe feared to acknowledge the new republics lest
Spain should decline to ratify her treaty. Certain
it is that Spain herself, and France and Kussia in her
behalf, tried to persuade the United States to pur-
chase Florida by a renunciation of the right of
recognition.
Throwing over the cargo failed to save the sinking
ship of Spain's colonial system, for a mutiny of the
crew made it impossible to navigate the vessel on its
charted course. A great expedition had been sent to
New Granada upon the restoration of Ferdinand, in
1815. In large measure it had been dissipated, and
another extensive armament was preparing to take
its place as Spain sought the aid of the allies in 1818.
By the following year this was ready to sail. But
the months that were required to make the Holy
Ally's fleet of death-traps less unseaworthy weak-
ened the discipline of the army until mutiny broke
forth. Three thousand troops that were started for
America promptly went over to the service of the
insurgents at Buenos Ayres, Yellow fever de-
196 South American Independence
stroyed the remainder at Cadiz. This was the last
serious attempt of Spain to quell the insurrection.20
After the mutiny of the troops at Cadiz came the
Spanish revolution, with its liberal constitution and
its reconstructed Ferdinand. On top of this the
doctrine of intervention received new elaboration as
the congress of the powers met in session after ses-
sion to deal with these manifestations of popular
activities. The culmination of the concert is
reached when a French army marches into Spain
and restores for a second time Ferdinand and his
absolute regime.
The attitude of the British ministry has already,
been described. At heart it distrusted and feared the
popular movements in South America, but it was
constrained by a generous popular sympathy and a
vivid popular realization of the necessities of South
American trade, to refuse its sanction to any scheme
for restoring the old order of affairs by force. It
permitted a free trade with the colonies and allowed
their flags to enter British ports, but it went no
further. In Parliament it preached the duty of
neutrality in much the same language as Forsyth
preached it in the American Congress.
*>Niles Register, XVII: 143; Annual Register, 1819, 178; Spencer
Walpole, A History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War
in 1815, II : 299.
England and South America 197
The triumphant advance of the French army into
Spain made a further step in development of
British policy essential. It was well enough to let
the contest between Ferdinand and his trans-
Atlantic subjects run its course, for it had become
evident that the former could never restore his
authority. But, with the power of France behind
his throne, and with the combined forces of the Holy
Allies at the back of France, it was time once more
to look to the interests of English commerce.
There is a distinct difference between the policy
of the British ministry at the congresses of Trappau
and Laybach, and that which was manifested to the
mystification of Prince Metternich at the congress
of Verona in 1822. At the former meetings the
attitude of the British envoy was one of non-partici-
pation, it is true, but the private assurances of the
Duke of Wellington were that his ministry was not
averse to the suppression of the revolt in Italy by
the troops of Austria. Before Wellington set out
for Vienna for the last of the meetings, for the
Verona meeting commenced its sessions in Vienna,
a change had taken place in the British cabinet that
affected the whole European situation. Lord Castle-
reagh, who had intended to take Wellington's place
at the congress, had become insane, and killed him-
self. In his stead, in September, 1822, George Can-
198 South American Independence
ning had been made Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
One of the last acts of Castlereagh had been to
instruct himself to fight to the end any movement
for a combined intervention in the affairs of Spain.
George Canning had no great love for the insur-
gent republics of South America, but he failed to
share the fear of their principles that animated the
king and a portion of the cabinet. For years he had
been opposing the South American agitators in the
House of Commons. While denouncing recognition
as an unneutral and impolitic act, he had come to
see that the restoration of Spain's colonial system
must be prevented and to believe that the surest way
to accomplish this was to leave Spain and her sub-
jects to themselves. So long as Spain remained
without assistance nothing was to be feared from
her.21
The commercial opposition that had made the en-
actment of the law on foreign enlistments so difficult
in 1819 was a constant quantity, though never vio-
lent or unreasonable. In the summer of 1820 Dr.
Lushington brought up the question once more by
jailing upon the ministry for documents respecting
21 There is a good general account of Canning's influence upon the
Liverpool Ministry in H. W. V. Temperley, Life of Canning (London,
1905), 127-191. With this should be compared the more recent George
Canning and His Friends, containing hitherto unpublished Letters,
Jetcx jy Esprit, etc. (London, 1909), edited by Captain Josceline Bagot.
England and South America 199
the proposition to seat the Prince of Lucca on the
throne of Buenos Ayres — the proposition which had
already driven Pueyrredon into a temporary exile.
He asked the opinion of the ministers " as to the
obligations of other governments to recognize the
independence of those South American provinces
which had emancipated themselves from the yoke
of the mother country. His own opinion on the sub-
ject was, that when colonies had once acquired
independence for themselves, it was at the option of
other governments either to acknowledge their inde-
pendence or not, according to the views of policy
which they might entertain. It was indeed a matter
of pure necessity to make such an acknowledgment,
on account of the great inconvenience and injustice
that would otherwise attend the existence of an un-
settled and unrecognized state." 22 One cause for
the presenting of this motion at this time was the
attitude of the United States. The reports of the
South American Commissioners had been reprinted
and edited as soon as they reached London in 1819.28
"Par/. Debates, N. S., II : 393 ; Annual Register, 1820, 113.
2S Rush to Adams, March 16, 1819. S. D. Mss. Messrs. Baldwin,
Cradock, and Joy, who printed much other South American literature,
brought out those discordant reports as The Reports on the present
State of the United Provinces of South America ; drawn up by Messrs.
Rodney and Graham, Commissioners sent to Buenos Ayres by the Gov-
ernment of North America, and laid before the Congress of the United
States; with their accompanying Documents; occasional Notes by the
200 South American Independence
They had been eagerly received by the commercial
classes. The news that came in the spring of 1820
that Clay's resolution had at last passed the House
inspired the opposition to keep pace with their
American rivals. The moderate nature of the oppo-
sition is shown by the withdrawal of this motion
when Castlereagh stated that it would embarrass the
ministry.
The year 1822 was a busy period in matters per-
taining to South America. In Spain the constitu-
tional government was considering the basis of inde-
pendence. Monroe recommended recognition by the
United States in March and consummated the act in
June. The Colombian agent, in April, issued a
threatening manifesto to such nations as should not
acknowledge his country. British merchants took
alarm and filled the mail of the foreign office with
their petitions. Castlereagh died; there was an in-
terregnum for a month, then Canning took his
place.
" Great Britain of course likes it," wrote Gallatin
from Paris, when he heard of the message of 8th
March, " and will be glad of a pretence to do the
same thing substantially, though probably not in
Editor; and an introductory Discourse, intended to present, with the
Reports and Documents, a View of the present State of the Country, and
of the Progress of the Independents. With a map.
England and South America 201
" the same fair and decisive way. The other lesser
maritime powers have the same feelings. Russia
has now other objects to engross her attention. The
continental powers are indifferent about it." 2* In-
deed the continental powers were too much occupied
to take American action seriously to heart. Affairs
in the peninsula and the Balkans were nearer home
and engrossed their attention. " It seems that the
cannibals of Europe," wrote one American ex-presi-
dent to another, " are going to eating one another
again. A war between Russia and Turkey is like
the battle of the kite and the snake; whichever de-
stroys the other, leaves a destroyer the less for the
world." 26
But in the British foreign office the importance
of the South American question could not be hidden
or suppressed. " Every day convinces me more and
more," declared Canning, " that in the present state
of the world, in the present state of the Peninsula,
and in the present state of this country, the Ameri-
can questions are out of all proportion more im-
portant to us than the European, and that if we do
not seize and turn them to our advantage in time,
we shall rue the loss of an opportunity never to be
"Gallatin to Adams, April 26, 1822. S. D. MM.
25 Jefferson to John Adams. Niks Register, XXIII : 247.
202 South American Independence
" recovered." 26 The conditions upon which the
Foreign Secretary based this opinion are patent. On
8th April, 1822, the Colombian agent in Paris, Zea
by name, Minister Plenipotentiary by title, had
issued a circular to the powers of Europe and asked
for it a quick response.27 Stating the general and
well-known incidents of the revolution, Zea declared
that Colombia was an independent State, with a
right as such to be recognized; that she desired to
establish reciprocal relations of trade with all the
world; that she was prepared to treat with any
government regardless of the legitimacy of its
origin; but, and here was the threat that disquieted
the British merchants, that these other governments,
as the condition of the establishment of commerce,
must recognize the independence of Colombia. The
news that the United States had determined to grant
this recognition, coming close upon the publication
of the Zea circular, increased the agitation and
swelled the number of petitions. Later, the news
that the Colombian government had disavowed a
loan negotiated by Zea on 13th March, 1822, gave
a new impetus to the movement, which the news that
* Canning to Wellington, November 8, 1822. Walpole, Hist. Eng-
land, II: 856.
3T British and Foreign State Papers, IX: 851; Nile* Register,
XXII : 247.
England and South America 203
his threatening circular also had been disavowed
could not entirely check.28
As early as 23d April, 1822, meetings were held
by London merchants with a view to maintaining
commercial intercourse with the colonies " formerly
under the dominion of Spain, a mode of expression
which . . . has sprung into use since the President's
message on the recognition, and seems already to
have become as universal, as it was before un-
known." 29 Similar meetings were held in the other
commercial centers of Great Britain, and their reso-
lutions fill the files of the foreign office. On the 9th
of May the Liverpool Ship Owners' Association pre-
sented its memorial; in June the Liverpool mer-
chants followed suit in a petition to the Privy Coun-
cil; in July sixty-one firms of Glasgow petitioned
Canning for the recognition of the republics; and in
the same month the merchants and shipowners of
Liverpool begged the House of Commons for action
in their behalf. Commons could not fail to notice
the pressure thus brought, and Lord Liverpool had
to defend the ministry on more than one occasion.
J8 Memorandum on loan of March 13, 1822, dated January 9, 1823,
with a copy of contract and an original bond. F. 0. MSB. Colombia,
vol. III. Gazette of July 7, 1822, with decree of June 1, 1822, by
Santandar, Vice-President of Colombia ; report of Pedro Gual, Sec-
retary for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, April 17, 1823, saying that he
had disavowed the circular. F. O. Mss. ; British and Foreign State
Papers, X : 740. ^Rush to Adams, May 6, 1822. S. D. MBS.
204 South American Independence
" Every right of real value, as regarded their ships
and their commerce especially, had been conceded to
them," he declared on 23d July, when opposing a
motion for the Zea correspondence.30 The question
of recognition, he maintained, was purely a British
question, unfettered by any treaties made at Aix-la-
Chapelle, resting only on the law of nations and the
generosity and prudence of Great Britain. His
ministerial majority rejected the call for papers by
an overwhelming vote. But the public din was in-
creasing. " This voice will grow louder and louder,
nor can it, I believe, be ultimately resisted by the
government." The ministry could not permanently
ward off the effect of the American precedent by
pleading that it " stood upon a ground by itself, the
United States having no European connections to
look to when determining upon such a policy." S1
With these facts in mind, George Canning turned
in the fall of 1822 to American affairs as more
interesting than those of Europe, instructed Lord
Wellington, as his predecessor had done, at Verona
to oppose a general intervention in the affairs of
Spain, and in Parliament himself expressed disap-
proval of the invasion of the peninsula by the army
of the Due d'Angouleme in the spring of 1823. At
so Parl. Debates, N. S., VII : 1731-1736.
81 Rush to Adams, July 24, 1822. S. D. MM.
England and South America 205
the same time, while protecting Spain at Verona,
he took another step in the development of com-
merce. Up to this time the colonial system of Spain
was still theoretically in force, and from the few
remaining ports held by Ferdinand in the Americas
issued fleets of Spanish privateers to prey upon the
commerce with the insurgent states. The constant
seizures of British vessels by these cruisers had been
borne with by the ministry for years, but in 1822
they became too great. In June of this year Parlia-
ment passed a new navigation act to regulate the
trade with South America, while in October Can-
ning despatched Sir Thomas Hardy with a fleet to
southern waters and announced to Spain that these
seizures must stop.32 An indemnity, with a decree
permitting commerce with South American ports
resulted from this protest. With this Canning was
temporarily content. He took no further action
until the result of the war between France and
Spain had been reached.
When the triumphant march of d'Angouleme to
Cadiz revealed that France was to dominate in the
affairs of Spain, Canning determined that that
domination should not extend to Spanish America.
He seems in vain to have tried to get a self-denying
"Walpole, Hist. England, II: 356.
206 South American Independence
pledge from France.33 He sounded the American
minister on the question of a joint defiance, and be-
gan to collect in more systematic form than hereto-
fore information on the conditions prevailing in the
republics. Great Britain had not, like the United
States, filled South America with consuls from the
very beginning of the revolt. In December Canning
had accepted the offer of one Patrick Mackie to go
out to Mexico, on the public service, at his own ex*
pense; had addressed the Lords Commissioners for
Trade as to proper locations for consuls in South
America, and the Lords of the Treasury for funds to
pay them; and had asked the Colombian agent to
prepare a report upon the condition of his country.84
The conditions that were decisive in determining
the policy of both the United States and Great Brit-
ain were those prevailing in Buenos Ayres and
Colombia. Mexico seems to have had no weight in
bringing either cabinet to a decision.85 But the
instructions prepared for Dr. Mackie are significant,
»» W. C. Ford in Amer. Hist. -Rev., VII : 679.
84 Mackie to Canning, November 28, 1822 ; Planta to Lack, Secret,
December 7, 1822 ; Lack to Planta, Secret, December 13, 1822 ; Can-
ning to Mackie, December 21, 1822 ; Planta to Geo. Harrison, Secret,
December 21, 1822 ; Revenga to Canning, January 22, 1823. F. 0. Mst.
K H. E. Bolton, in Amer. Hist. Rev., XVII : 640, has called atten-
tion to the valuable and recent Documentos Histbricos Mexicanos:
Obra Commemorativa del Primer Centenario de la Independcncia de
Mexico (6 vols., Mexico, 1912), edited by Genaro Garcia.
England and South America 207
in spite of his destination, as showing the attitude
of the foreign office at the end of 1822. They were
simply instructions to acquire information : as to the
probable stability of the government; as to the dis-
position of the ruling class towards British com-
merce; as to their disposition towards Spain and a
return to a condition of dependence, and towards a
mediation by Great Britain; as to the treatment they
would accord commercial agents in their ports. You
" will state on all occasions," concluded the instruc-
tions, " with the utmost confidence your persuasion
of the friendly disposition of this Govt.; of its
determination to maintain, so long as Spain and her
late colonies are at variance, a perfect & scrupu-
lous neutrality, between the contending Parties, and
of its desire to see the Contest brought to a Con-
clusion on terms consistent with the Interests and
Happiness of Both."36
On 3d October, 1823, French intervention in
Spain was crowned by the capitulation of Cadiz; on
the same day Canning instructed Sir William a
Court, the British minister to Spain, to enter into
no discussions on the subject of Spanish America
whatever.87 He had decided that the time was come
to act. The petitions that indicated the disposition
* December 21, 1822, F. O. Mss.
ST Canning to & Court, October 3, 1822, F. O. Mss.
208 South American Independence
of the merchants in 1822 had continued to be pre-
sented in 1823 to confirm the Foreign Secretary in
his opinion that their interests must be paramount
in his policy. Sir William Adams had presented a
memorial to the foreign office on the 29th of
June; 88 three weeks later " sundry British mer-
chants " petitioned Mr. Canning; the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce acted in August, as did a
body of British merchants trading with Mexico;
other petitions were presented in great numbers.
Among the commercial class there seemed to be
but one opinion upon the subject of recognition.
On the 9th of October, 1823, Mr. Canning had a
conference with the French minister, Polignac, that
has become famous among the historians of the Mon-
roe Doctrine. In a way the memorandum that was
prepared on this day is a British Monroe Doctrine,
for the Foreign Secretary declared in explicit terms
that Great Britain wanted none of the colonies of
Spain, nor any special preference in their commerce ;
that she would, however, make no special stipulation
on the subject of recognition, for she could not agree
to postpone it indefinitely; and that foreign inter-
ference in the affairs of the colonies would be the
w This, and other memorials, are in F. O. Mss., Mexico, vol. 2,
and Spanish America, vol. 283.
England and South America 209
signal for an immediate acknowledgment.39 With
this declaration before their eyes, fortified by a
veiled threat of war from the President of the
United States, eight weeks later, the allies were con-
tent to take no effective action upon the appeal of
the newly-liberated Ferdinand that they carry their
intervention across the Atlantic to the territories
of the revolted in America. The day after the con-
ference with Polignac, Canning instructed consuls
for service in the ports of South America and com-
missions of investigation to Colombia and Mexico.
The instructions to the Colombian Commissioners,
drawn up before the conference with Polignac and
the disclaimer of American ambitions which that
minister had then made, are extremely significant.
"The growing importance of the States of Spanish
America," wrote Canning to Colonel Hamilton, the
head of the mission,40 " and the unsatisfactory
nature of the accounts, which are to be derived from
accidental sources of intelligence, with respect to
events that are passing on in that part of the world,
have determined His Majesty's Government to send
89 British and Foreign State Papers, XI : 49.
40 October 10, 1823. F. 0. Mss. The Commission consisted of Col.
Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. Campbell and a Mr. Henderson who was to be
Consul-General. The same instructions, mutatis mutandis, were given
to the Mexican Commissioners and to Parish at Buenos Ayres.
210 South American Independence
" out a Special Commission, for the purpose of ascer-
taining the actual state of affairs in Colombia.
" The apparent hopelessness of the recovery by
Spain of her dominion over her late South American
Provinces: the purpose of France (notorious to all
the world) to support with arms every attempt of
the Spanish Crown, to recover that dominion; and
on the other hand, the public Acts of the Legislature
of the United States of North America, empowering
their President to recognize the independence of
whatever Government the Spanish Colonies respec-
tively may have erected, or may erect, for them-
selves, present additional motives for sending out
such a Commission. . . .
" Notice 41 has long ago been given to Spain of
the intention of His Majesty to recognize whenever
His Majesty shall think fit, the independence of such
of the late Spanish Colonies as shall have formed to
themselves a de facto Government, with a reasonable
prospect of stability; — and the appointment of Con-
sular Agents has been announced to Spain as a
measure actually resolved upon, and one of which
the execution could not long be delayed.
" If upon your arrival at [blank] you shall find
that Events have induced the Government to direct
41 From this point the extract from the instructions given to Parish
has been followed.
England and South America 211
"their thoughts towards a Union with Spain, you
will bear in. mind that there is no desire on the part
of Great Britain to interpose obstacles to the restora-
tion of a lona fide understanding between the
Colonies and the Mother Country: — But it must be
with the Mother Country really independent; not
in any shape subjected or subservient to [France,
struck out in the original draft] any Foreign Power,
nor employing the intervention of [French, struck
out] Foreign arms to re-establish its supremacy in
the Colonies. So far from interposing Obstacles to
a beneficial arrangement between [blank] and old
Spain on the principle of reconciliation and mutual
advantage, you are authorized to receive and to
transmit for the consideration of your Government
any proposal to that effect which the ruling party in
[blank] may be desirous of having communicated
to Spain.
" Should their Government be established as inde-
pendent, whether as a single State or as a federal
System of States, but purely national and neither
connected with Spain by subordination nor with any
other Country by incorporation or federal union, —
the decision of your Government as to the mode of
dealing with such State or States would depend
mainly on the following considerations; with respect
212 South American Independence
" to which you will therefore employ your best en-
deavors to collect the most accurate information. —
" 1st. Has the Government so constituted, already
notified, by a publick act, its determination to re-
main independent of Spain, and to admit no terms of
accommodation with the Mother Country?
" 2dly. Is it in military possession of the Country;
and also in a respectable condition of military de-
fence against any probable attack from Europe ?
" 3rdly. Does it appear to have acquired a reason-
able degree of consistency, and to enjoy the confi-
dence and good will of the several orders of the
people ?
" 4thly. Has it abjured and abolished the Slave
Trade?
" Should these enquiries all be answered in the
afiirmative; and should it appear to your satisfac-
tion, that there is a fair probability of things going
on in the train in which you find them, You are to
address yourself to the person exercising the Office
of Secretary to the Government, and are to suggest
the expediency of sending to England some individ-
ual in the confidence of the [blank] Government,
upon communication with whom as well as upon re-
ceipt of your Reports, We may be enabled to de-
termine whether the time is ripe for the Establish-
England and South America
" ment of an ostensible political relation with
[blank] by the interchange of diplomatic Missions. . . .
" It may perhaps be unnecessary to state to you,
but it is very material, that it should be understood
by the persons with whom you communicate in
[blank] that so far is Great Britain from looking to
any more intimate connection with any of the late
Spanish Provinces, than that of friendly political
and commercial Intercourse, that His Majesty could
not be induced, by any consideration to enter any
engagement which might be considered as bringing
them under His Dominion.
" Neither, on the other hand, would his Majesty
consent to see them (in the event of their final
separation from Spain) brought under the Dominion
of any other Power."
So far the instructions to the two sets of Commis-
sioners were the same even in wording. Beyond this
point the peculiar monarchical tendencies which had
been developed in Mexico demanded special treat-
ment.42 " Among the possible Arrangements of the
affairs of Mexico, which are contemplated in the
Instructions already given to you for your guidance,
41 Further instructions to Mexican commissioners, October 10, 1818.
F. 0. Mas. This commission consisted of Messrs. Hervey, O'Germaa
and Ward ; the first to be minister upon a recognition, the second
charge*, and the last consul-general. Dr. Mackie's commission was
revoked.
214 South American Independence
" one is not specified, of which, nevertheless there
has been much question at former periods, and of
which recent events may not improbably revive the
consideration.
"I mean the settlement of that great Country
under a monarchical form of Government, practi-
cally independent of Spain, but with a Spanish
Infante upon the Throne.
" This case was not included among those specified
in your Instructions, because the condition of Spain
at the time when those Instructions were drawn,
while the duration and issue of the War were still
uncertain, afforded no immediate probability that a
Spanish Prince would be available for such destina-
tion, otherwise than through the contrivance, and
with the aid, and under the superintendence of
France.
" The conclusion of the war brings back the possi-
bility of such an arrangement with Spain, if there
shall exist a disposition to it in Mexico.
"The constitution of Mexican society favors the
notion of the existence of such a disposition. The
great number of large Proprietors, the wealth and
influence of the Clergy, and the long experience of
a Vice-Kegal Establishment, invested with all
Monarchical forms, afford many probabilities of a
predilection for that mode of Government.
England and South America 215
"The experience of Iturbide's Keign will (as
stated in your former Instructions) have shewn to
the Mexican People the instability of an elective
Monarchy, and will have taught any new General,
who may find himself in possession of the confidence
of the Army, that he would better entitle himself
to the gratitude of his Country, by exerting his in-
fluence for the purposes of a solid pacification, than
for that of his own temporary and precarious
aggrandizement.
" In this state of things, and in the present ex-
haustion of the Mother Country, which, while it
diminishes on one side the apprehension of forcible
conquest, may perhaps create, on the other, a willing-
ness for amicable compromise, it does not seem
unlikely, that the views of the Mexicans should be
turned, with pretty general concurrence, to the
restoration of a Monarchy, in the person of one of
the Princes of the Spanish race, but on the basis of
Mexican Independence.
" To any proposal for your co-operation to bring
about such a settlement, you will not hesitate to
avow yourself ready to accede, with the certainty of
obtaining the cordial approbation of your Govern-
ment.
" I need not add, that, while you are to accept
such a proposal, if submitted to you, you are not
216 South American Independence
" to attempt to prescribe to the Mexican Authorities
this, or any particular course of action. Nor need I
repeat, that, to your acceptance of the proposal, it is
an essential and indispensable condition, that the
Negotiation is to be carried on with Spain alone, and
that no foreign force should be employed to conduct
the Spanish Prince to Mexico."
The policy of George Canning, as indicated in
these instructions to his Commissioners in the fall
of 1823, is political only so far as his determination
to maintain the commerce that had been developed
with Latin-America during the years of turmoil
forced him to use political means. The facts do not
justify his famous boast. If it be true that he really
did " call the new world into existence," which may
well be controverted, it is still manifest that his
motive, as has been said before, was not to " redress
the balance of the old." Nor had regard for the
rights of the belligerent communities any consider-
able share in determining the steps of his policy.
He took at this time the irrevocable step of sending
consuls to South American ports to emphasize before
the world the fact that Great Britain would be no
party to a forcible rehabilitation of Spain's colonial
system. In taking the step it was the interests of
the Liverpool and Belfast and London merchants
that he had at heart.
England and South America 217
The declaration to Polignac, coupled with the
sending of consuls, which was made public on 17th
October, had the desired effect of driving the Holy
Allies into cover. Legitimist sympathies must have
been powerful indeed to have moved in opposition
to the wishes of Great Britain in a matter of mari-
time significance. " With respect to the question of
Spanish America," Canning was able to write to Sir
William & Court at the end of the year,43 "I am
happy to inform you that there appears now to be
little prospect of any practical divergence between
this Country and the Powers of the Continent. Of
the opinions of Russia, indeed, I am not yet enabled
to speak positively : There has not yet been time to
hear from Petersburgh since the communication of
the Memorandum of my conversation with The
Prince de Polignac. You will probably have col-
lected from General Pozzo di Borgo, all that could
be known of those opinions up to the period at which
that communication was made; but Russia can
hardly act alone for the re-establishment of Spanish
Supremacy in the Colonies. France has repeatedly
and distinctly disclaimed any intention of engag-
ing in such an enterprize:
" Austria and Prussia have severally declared
their opinion that a Congress upon South American
*» December 29, 1843. F. O. Ms*.
218 South American Independence
"Affairs would, in any case, have been a matter of
very doubtful policy; and that is one which it would
be idle to think of, when Great Britain declines being
a party to it.
" It is not immaterial to add, that the Govern-
ment of the United States has declared Its Senti-
ments upon this subject in a manner wholly con-
sonant with the declarations previously made by this
Country; going indeed beyond us, in as much as, It
has actually acknowledged the Independence of the
Spanish American Provinces.
" A frank communication was made to the Ameri-
can Minister some months ago of the course which
Great Britain intended to pursue, which was no
doubt reported by that Minister to his Govt. before
the opening of the Session of Congress."
The sending of consuls to South American ports
was in contemplation of a recognition at no distant
date. The various Commissioners were instructed to
gather information upon which to justify the same;
for Great Britain was now definitely committed to
the policy which Canning had anticipated in 1822,
when he saw in America matters of more interest to
his country than in Europe.
" As to any further Measures," announced the
Speech from the Throne at the next session of Par-
liament, "His Majesty has reserved to Himself an
England and South America 219
" unfettered Discretion, to be exercised as the Cir-
cumstances of those Countries, and the Interests of
His own People may appear to His majesty to re-
quire." "
The collection of information upon South Ameri-
can conditions was attended with embarrassing com-
plications in Great Britain, as it had been six years
before in the United States. In the case of the lat-
ter, the files of consular despatches were rich mines
of information: the official reports of the special
Commissioners adding no new facts of consequence.
But the Foreign Office had not this regular source
of knowledge. Previous to the consular despatches
that began to arrive in the end of 1823, the Foreign
Secretary seems to have derived his information
through a number of channels, none of which were
official. The correspondence in the newspapers gave
him all that was printed in America. Despatches of
naval officers on duty in South American waters
were turned over to him by the Admiralty in con-
siderable numbers. South American agents in Lon-
don wrote to him profusely. British commercial
houses possessing branches in the republics fre-
quently sent copies of letters from their agents for
his edification. In all, little of importance that oc-
curred in those regions could have failed to reach
** February 3, 1824. From an original pamphlet edition in F. O.
Mss.
220 South American Independence
the Foreign Office; but in the establishment of con-
suls in October, 1823, is found the beginning of
official channels of information.
The difficulties of South American diplomacy have
been seen in a previous chapter. With an agent
leading a division of the insurgent army, with
another guaranteeing an insurgent loan, with a third
engaging in the tempting game of privateers, the
neutral course of Mr. Adams had been embarrassed.
Canning did not fail to encounter similar distrac-
tions.
The agents in Mexico were particularly hard to
handle. Dr. Mackie, who had gone out on an in-
formal mission, in 1822, had exceeded his instruc-
tions from the first. On arriving at Vera Cruz he
learned that the Mexicans were at the point of con-
cluding a commercial treaty with Spain, giving
marked advantages to the latter. "It therefore
required/' he reported to Canning with compla-
cency,45 " no little Address and Management to do
away the proceedings which had taken place; but
upon my assuring him [General Vittoria, the suc-
cessor of Iturbide] of the friendly disposition of
Great Britain I had the satisfaction, before I left
him to annull a Treaty so inimical to the Policy &
Commerce of the British Empire." The successors
« Mackie to Canning, July 14, 1823. F. O. MSB.
England and South America 221
of Mackie, — Hervey, O'Gorman and Ward, — were
of course instructed to disavow this interposition of
their predecessor and apologize to the government.
But they themselves were no more willing than he
to obey their orders. Arriving at the city of Mex-
ico on the last day of the year, they were able, in
eighteen days, to prepare an enthusiastic report upon
the condition of the country, and were willing to send
it home in the care of Mr. Ward just as a dangerous
insurrection, known by the name of Lobato, was in
progress. To this superficiality of investigation was
added a more positive offence when the head of the
Commission, Mr. Lionel Hervey, repeated Dev-
ereux's action, and guaranteed a loan to sustain the
existing government in a crisis. The reproaches of
the Foreign Secretary, that the report was based on
a "fortnight's, or three week's, experience," and
despatched, not only " before you had allowed your-
selves time to form a mature judgment," but at " a
moment of publick disturbance," were followed, as
news of the loan reached London, by the imperative
recall of Hervey: the vessel bringing out his suc-
cessor would wait to take him back.46 James
Morier, the new Commissioner, went out ordered
" That you are sent to ascertain the Fact of Mexican
46 Hervey to Canning, January 1, February 18 and 20, 1824; Can-
ning to Hervey, April 23, July 20, 1824. F. O. Mas.
222 South American Independence
" Independence, not actively to promote it ; , and to
form and report an Opinion of the Stability of the
Government, not to prescribe its form or attempt
to influence its Councils." But even Morier and
Ward, the latter as a subordinate having retained the
confidence of the Ministry, were not impervious to
Mexican influence. At the beginning of the next
year they were instructed to conclude a treaty of
commerce with Mexico : in the negotiations they al-
lowed themselves to admit into the treaty clauses
radically at variance with their instructions. It is
not to be expected, wrote Canning with exasperation
as he rejected the whole treaty and ordered the nego-
tiation of a new one, that we will abandon " for
the sake of this new connexion, principles which we
never have conceded, in our intercourse with other
States, whether of the Old World or the New, either
to considerations of friendship, or to menaces of hos-
tility." 4T
This investigation of the character of South
American agents has carried the account somewhat
beyond the limits of recognition. It reveals a ten-
dency that prevailed in most of the negotiations. As
in the case of Adams's envoys, many of Canning's
« Canning to Morier, July 30, 1824 ; to Ward and Morier, January
3, 1825 ; to Ward, September 9, 1825 ; Ward and Morier to Canning,
No. I, April 10, 1825. F. 0. Mss.
England and South America 223
were little more than mere enthusiasts; if they
were not often " fanatics in the cause of emancipa-
tion," 48 they were almost always devotees of a more
selfish interest— that of British commerce. The
Colombian experiences of Canning hardly rival those
of his Mexican negotiations.
The British Commissioners to Colombia reached
Jamaica, on their way out, before the end of 1823,
and on the 8th of the following March they were
graciously received by the Vice-President, Sant-
andar, at Bogota. Their reception, however, was in
an unofficial capacity as Don Pedro Gual, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, found himself unable to grant
exequaturs to consuls who were commissioned to
" provinces and dependencies " rather than to inde-
pendent States. Four months after their arrival,
Colonel Hamilton, the head of the mission, wrote a
report in answer to the questions of his instructions,
and announced that it expressed the unanimous
opinion of the Commissioners.49 That he had never
shown his instructions to his colleagues, and that he
had not hesitated publicly to pledge the support of
Great Britain in case of a forcible intervention in
South America, seemed to him no deviation from
^Reddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 26.
« Hamilton to Canning, December 19, 1823, March 19, 1824, July
5, 1824; Gual to Hamilton, April 14, 1824. F. O.Mss. Annual Regis-
ter, 1824
224 South American Independence
the line of duty. He was typical of his class of
agents. Here, as in the Mexican business, Canning
was angry and made little attempt to conceal his ir-
ritation. He had already received a report on
Colombian conditions from Hurtado, the London
agent. Now he was forced to take other reports
from Campbell, who had brought home that of Ham-
ilton, and whose " unanimous opinion " had been
pledged by his chief without his knowledge.50 Al-
ready the Foreign Secretary had had Joseph Planta,
his chief subordinate, write to Hamilton, that51 " Mr.
Canning desires that you will take the trouble to
reperuse your Instructions; and to compare them
with the letters which you have written since your
arrival at your place of destination; and with the
language which you are represented by the Colom-
bian Newspapers to have held at your presentation
and other Publick Meetings.
" The unsatisfactory meagreness of your written
communications to this office, falls as far below what
was prescribed to you on the one hand, as the vague
and unmeasured terms in which you have publickly
pledged the opinions and intentions of your Govt. go
beyond it on the other.
M Hurtado to Canning, July 16, 1824; Campbell to Canning,
November 6 and December 10, 1824. F. 0. Mss.
si Planta to Hamilton, August 19, 1824. F. 0. Mss.
England and South America 225
" Both have exposed your Govt. to the greatest
possible inconvenience.'7
Upon the arrival of Campbell, with his verbal
accounts of the Chief Commissioner's policy, the lat-
ter was censured for a second time, and by Canning
himself. In words that were no less emphatic be-
cause they were veiled in diplomatic phrases, he was
ordered during the rest of his stay in Colombia to
carry out the objects of his mission.52 From this
point, so far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the
Colombian negotiations progressed smoothly. It did
not become necessary there, as in Mexico, actually to
disavow any of the agents.
In Buenos Ayres alone, the most important of the
three storm-centres of Spanish America, did the
agents of Great Britain carry out the wishes of the
Ministry in thoroughly satisfactory manner. Here
the revolution had advanced to the furthest point,
here the interests of English merchants were the
greatest, and so upon the course of events here
British policy depended. As the most important
post in the republics, it received the ablest of the
agents in the person of Woodbine Parish, later in
life to become vice-president of the Royal Geograph-
ical Society, and a knight, who went out as Consul-
General at the beginning of 1824.
52 Canning to Hamilton, November 8, 1824. F. O. MSB.
226 South American Independence
Before Woodbine Parish had had time to send
home many despatches upon the condition of Buenos
Ayres, there occurred in Parliament the last and
most exhaustive debate that the subject of recogni-
tion had yet received. To this day the speech of Sir
James Mackintosh is the best statement of the theory
and nature of recognition that has been made.
The announcement made in the speech from the
Throne, on 3d February, 1824, that Great Britain
would follow her own interests regarding South
America, did not satisfy the representatives of the
commercial classes, who had been preparing petitions
for two years, and were now more anxious than ever
for a formal recognition. Debate on the speech, be-
ginning the night it was presented, was continued in
Commons for two days, bringing Canning to his feet
more than once to defend the Ministry against the
attacks of Brougham, and to announce again the
policy guiding it; that Spain might recover her colo-
nies if she could, but that she must do it unaided.53
In both Houses notice was given within the next two
weeks of general motions on South America in case
the Ministry should so long hesitate to act. On 4th
March, Canning proved his statements as to policy
by laying before Parliament the Polignac memoran-
dum of 9th October, 1823, and a correspondence
**Parl. Debates, N. S., X: 90.
England and South America 227
with Sir William a Court, British Minister to Spain,
on the subject of the South American conference,
invited by Ferdinand on his second restoration in the
faU of that year."
In the House of Lords, Lansdowne, who had, a
week before, shown interest in the action of Spain
on Canning's last proposal of mediation, made an
elaborate speech in behalf of a motion for an ad-
dress to the King on the expediency of a recogni-
tion.55 He thanked the Ministry for the papers of
4th March, begging at the same time for further
steps and speedy ones. He proved to his complete
satisfaction that the States of South America were
de facto independent; that they could maintain their
independence, so that Spain had no prospect of re-
covering them; that their commerce with Britain
was of exceeding great importance. In the year
1821, he declared, they bought from British mer-
chants goods to the value of £3,227,560; in 1822
they increased their purchases; and now they con-
sumed half as much as their neighboring republic in
North America. By comparison with the United
States, he showed that once independent their pur-
chasing capacity would be much enhanced. To him
"Part. Debates, K. S., X: 105, 157, 708; British and Foreign
State Papers, XI : 49.
*Parl. Debates, N. S., X : 777, 970-992.
228 South American Independence
replied the Earl of Liverpool, in words that brought
out a ministerial majority of 95 to 34 to veto the
motion, saying "that what had been done was all
that could have been done, embracing every practical
advantage consistent with honor and good faith. A
formal acknowledgment of independence could prop-
erly be made only by the power who claimed do-
minion over another; and, in a strict sense of the
word, we had no right either to acknowledge or dis-
pute their independence." 56
The Earl of Liverpool touched lightly upon a
theory of recognition in his reply to Lansdowne : the
subject received an exhaustive examination at the
hands of Sir James Mackintosh, in the House of
Commons, on 15th June, 1824. With a petition
from 117 commercial houses of London in his hand
as a text, he cleared away much of the confusion
existing in the minds of both parties as to the mean-
ing of recognition.
" I must go back for a moment," he explained,57
" to those elementary principles which are so grossly
misunderstood. And first with respect to the term
' Kecognition/ the introduction of which into these
6« Annual Register, 1824 [23] ; Parl. Debates, N. S., X. : 992-1010.
67 Substance of a Speech of Sir James Mackintosh in the House of
Commons, June 15, 1824, on presenting a Petition from the Merchants
of London for the Recognition of the Independent States established in
the Countries of America formerly subject to Spain (London, 1824), 5.
England and South America 229
" discussions has proved the principal occasion of
darkness and error. It is a term which is used in two
senses so different from each other as to have nothing
very important in common. The first, which is the
true and legitimate sense of the word ' Recognition/
as a technical term of international law, is that in
which it denotes the explicit acknowledgment of the
independence of a country by a State which formerly
exercised sovereignty over it. Spain has been
doomed to exhibit more examples of this species of
recognition than any other European State, of which
the most memorable cases are the acknowledgment
of the independence of Portugal and Holland. This
country also paid the penalty of evil councils in that
hour of folly and infatuation which led to a hostile
separation between the American colonies and their
mother country. Such recognitions are renuncia-
tions of sovereignty. They are a surrender of the
power or of the claim to govern. They are of the
utmost importance, as quieting possession and ex-
tinguishing a foreign pretension to authority; they
free a nation from the evils of a disputed sov-
ereignty; they remove the only competitor who can
with any colour of right contend against the actual
Government, and they secure to a country the ad-
vantage of an undisputed independence.
" But we, who are as foreign to the Spanish States
230 8outh American Independence
" in America as we are to Spain herself, who never
had any more authority over them than over her,
have in this case no claims to renounce, no power
to abdicate, no sovereignty to resign, no legal rights
to confer. They are as independent without our
acknowledgment of their independence as with it.
No act of ours can ever remove an obstacle which
stands in the way of their independence, or with-
draw any force which disturbs its exercise. What
we have to do, is therefore not recognition in its first
and most strictly proper sense. It is not by formal
stipulations or solemn declarations that we are to
recognize the American States; but by measures of
practical policy, which imply that we acknowledge
their independence. Our recognition is virtual. We
are called upon to treat them as independent; to
establish with them the same relations and the same
intercourse which we are accustomed to maintain
with other Governments; to deal with them in every
respect as commonwealths entitled to admission into
the great society of civilized States."
Here, for the first time, Mackintosh defined recog-
nition in clear and precise terms. He went on to
show, as John Quincy Adams had shown six years
before, that it was no violation of neutrality. " It
implies no guarantee/' he declared, " no alliance, no
aid, no approbation of the successful revolt; no in-
England and South America 231
" timation of an opinion concerning the justice or in-
justice of the means by which it has been accom-
plished. . . . As a State, we can neither condemn
nor justify revolutions which do not affect our safety
and are not amenable to our laws. . . . The prin-
ciple which requires such an intercourse is the same,
whether the governments be old or new. Antiquity
affords a presumption of stability, which, like all
other presumptions, may and does fail in particular
instances. But in itself it is nothing; and when it
ceases to indicate stability, it ought to be regarded
by a foreign country as of no account. .
[When] Great Britain (I hope very soon) recog-
nizes the States of Spanish America, it will not be
as a concession to them, for they need no such recog-
nition; but it will be for her own sake, to promote
her own interest; to protect the trade and naviga-
tion of her subjects; to acquire the best means of
cultivating friendly relations with important coun-
tries, and of composing by immediate negotiation
those differences which might otherwise terminate
in war."
From this legal analysis of the doctrine of recog-
nition, Mackintosh returned to the customary trend
of South American speeches. Once more he told the
history of the revolt, and described the needs of his
232 South American Independence
commercial constituents. On subsequent days he
presented more petitions to the House.
At the last sitting of the House of Lords, for Par-
liament was prorogued on the 25th of June, 1824,
the Earl of Liverpool replied to an interrogation
from the Marquis of Lansdowne that every attempt
to bring Spain to a recognition on her own account
had failed; that the government held itself ready to
recognize when it should become expedient.58 Dur-
ing the ensuing recess the Ministry had time to
meditate upon the attitude of Parliament and the
reports of its South American Commissioners.
Woodbine Parish, Consul-General for Buenos
Ayres, embarked on the ship Cambridge on 3d
January, 1824. With him were the consuls for the
region under his supervision, and in his despatch bag
were the instructions of 10th October, 1823, that
have already been examined, a copy of the Polignac
memorandum, and three gold snuff boxes, bearing
the portrait of his Majesty, George IV. The spirit
of friendly conciliation that is implied by the pres-
ence of the snuff boxes has been borne out by the
examination of the more formal impedimenta of his
mission. After a voyage of nearly three months,
Parish landed in the city of Buenos Ayres. A month
later, on 17th April, arrived The Countess of Chi-
**Parl. Debates, N. S., XI: 1479.
England and South America 233
Chester, the first of the line of British packets that
the Admiralty had established at this time.59
The reception of the new agent was cordial, as was
to be expected. Rivadavia, on the verge of retire-
ment from the all-important post he had held for
three years, was ready to enter into the negotiations
proposed, with freedom. On the terms of a " pre-
vious Recognition of the Independence of this State
(which he said was a sine qua non) " wrote Parish,
a few days after his arrival,60 " and, of Spain being
placed with respect to her Commerce, upon the same
footing with the Natives of the Country, they were
sincerely disposed to enter into any arrangement
with His Catholic Majesty's Government upon such
terms as Great Britain would say were fair and rea-
sonable."
In the performance of his duty, in the collection
of information, Parish was in strong contrast to the
agents in Colombia and Mexico. At his request a
native of the country wrote an elaborate monograph
on its conditions and resources;61 his despatches are
full of details upon the subjects of British interest
and local politics; and not a few South American
gazettes, bulletins and pamphlets were enclosed in
«» Forbes to Adams, March 31, 1824. S. D. Mss.
"April 15, 1824. F. O. Mss.
61 Ygnacio Nunez, An account, historical, political and statistical,
of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata (London, 1825).
234 South American Independence
his mail to the Foreign Office. So assiduous was he
in the work of conciliation that in two months he
wrote to Planta for more snuff boxes, and intimated
that a few framed portraits of the king would be
highly useful.62
The report that was sent to England on 25th June,
1824, was highly favorable to the government exist-
ing at Buenos Ayres. The value of the labors of
Bivadavia and Garcia was as apparent to Parish now
as it had been to Forbes, the American, three years
before. There was no reason to believe that the new
government of Las Heras, just come into existence,
would prove less stable than its predecessor. The
general congress, whose time of meeting was in sight,
would probably complete the union of the provinces,
for as yet Buenos Ayres conducted the foreign rela-
tions only by tacit consent. There was no funda-
mental law of union. " It is of importance to ob-
serve," wrote General Alvear, their minister to the
United States, then in London en route to his post,
" that all the Provinces about to meet in Congress,
have enjoyed for the last fourteen years, and up-
wards, without interruption, their full Independence,
that is to say, ever since the 25th of May, 1810." 6S
Before the exhaustive report of Parish reached
«' Parish to Planta, June 4, 1824. F. 0. Mas.
« Alvear to Canning. July 24, 1824. F. O. Mss.
England and South America 235
London, Canning was ready for the final step towards
recognition, and had convinced his reluctant Min-
istry of its necessity. The debates of June had
brought out as never before the importance of South
American trade; and reports of the London agents,
of Alvear, and of Parish himself, showed in good
light the character of the new republic. On 23d
August, he instructed Parish once more.
" Before His Majesty's Government," read the
instruction, after commending Parish for his satis-
factory despatches, " can take any decisive step for
drawing closer to their relations with any of the new
States of America, it is obviously necessary to ascer-
tain,
" 1st. That any such State has renounced finally
and irrevocably all political connection with Spain.
2ndly, That it has the power as well as the will to
maintain the independence which it has established;
and 3rdly, That the frame of its Government is
such as to afford a reasonable security for the con-
tinuance of its internal Peace, and for the good faith
with which it would be enabled to maintain what-
ever relations it might contract with other Powers.
" It is neither the right nor the intention of Great
Britain to do anything to promote the separation of
any one of the Spanish Colonies from Spain: But
the fact of that Separation is an indispensable pre-
236 South American Independence
" liminary to any further proceedings or inquiries;
and it is not till after that fact has been decisively
ascertained, that a question can arise as to the ex-
pediency of entering into .arrangements founded
upon a recognition of it.
" The fact of Separation seems to be clearly estab-
lished with respect to Buenos Ayres, by the length of
time which has elapsed since its original Declaration
of independence, and since a Spanish force has
existed in its territory; and by the absence of any-
thing like a Spanish party in the State.
"The competency of that State to enter into
arrangements with other Countries does not appear
liable to question. But there is one point upon which
Your Eeport is not so clear as might be desired — I
mean as to the power of the Government of Buenos
Ayres to bind by its Stipulations with a Foreign
State, all the Members of the Confederacy constitut-
ing the United States of Rio de la Plata, . . .
" As however the General Congress was about to
assemble when Your last Despatches came away, it
is to be presumed that if the requisite Authority
was not already formally acknowledged it will have
been clearly and definitely established long before
these Instructions, and the Full Power, which ac-
companies them, can reach you.
England and South America 237
" The Full Power is drawn in that presumption :
and would be inapplicable to any other case.
" Supposing then that case to exist, and supposing
the general situation of affairs at Buenos Ayres to
continue as favorable, as your last Despatches de-
scribe it, You will, upon receipt of this Despatch,
declare to the Minister with whom you are in the
habit of communicating, that His Majesty has been
graciously pleased to direct to be prepared, and trans-
mitted to you, an Instrument of Full Power, author-
izing you to treat with such Persons, as may be
duly appointed on behalf of the United States of La
Plata, for the negotiation of a Treaty which shall
place on a regular and permanent footing the com-
mercial intercourse that has so long subsisted be-
tween His Majesty's Subjects and these States."
Upon the receipt of these instructions, Parish
acted with self-restraint unparalleled in South
American agents. Although in close sympathy with
the patriots, and confident that their government was
permanent, he obeyed his orders in the fullness of
their spirit.
"From my preceding despatches," he replied to
Canning, on 24th October, " you will have learnt
that the General Congress of the Provinces of La
Plata has not yet met, and that however united these
Provinces are nominally, and to all appearances
238 South American Independence
" upon all General Points, they are as yet uncon-
nected by any -precisely denned National Govern-
ment.
"The Administration of Buenos Ayres has in-
deed taken the lead upon all those National Points
which under other Circumstances would have de-
volved upon a General Government; a Course in
which the rest of the Provinces have unanimously
acquiesced, more especially in matters connected
with their Foreign Relations; — but, the Authority
so assumed, and so acquiesced in, does not appear
to me to be sufficiently formal to justify me, under
your Instructions, in entering with the Government
of Buenos Ayres upon the very important matter en-
trusted to me. Under such Circumstances I have
considered that I should more properly fulfil the
Spirit of those Instructions, by withholding any
formal Communication of my being authorized to
enter into a Negotiation with the United Provinces
of La Plata, till such time as those Provinces shall
have re-installed their National Government.
" I have had the less hesitation in coming to this
determination, as the Meeting of the Congress,
though frequently delayed, is now upon the point of
taking place; and on the very morning I had the
honor to receive your despatches, the first prelimi-
nary meeting of the Deputies was held at the Resi-
dence of the Governor of Buenos Ayres, when it was
England and South America 239
generally determined that they should commence
their Public Proceedings on the 1st of January next
at latest, or sooner, if possible.
" Under such circumstances I trust that I shall not
have erred in the Course I have adopted."
Although not presenting his new credentials in an
open manner, a course which Canning thoroughly
approved,64 Parish informed Garcia that he pos-
sessed them, and that the erection of a national gov-
ernment was the one thing necessary to secure a
recognition. With this condition in mind, the gov-
ernment of Buenos Ayres presented its report on
foreign relations to the General Congress in the
middle of the month of December.65 While not re-
miss in expressing its acknowledgments to the
United States, who had " constituted Itself Guar-
dian of the Field of Battle, in order to prevent
any foreign assistance from being introduced in the
aid of our Rival," the Government dwelt most at
length upon the conditions of Europe. " The vac-
illation of some of the great Powers of the Conti-
nent of Europe, and the malevolence which they
shew towards the new Republics of this part of the
World proceed from the forced Position to which
they are reduced by a Policy inconsistent with the
84 Canning to Parish, December 28, 1824. F. O. 3fss.
« Enclosed in Parish's N. 70, December 22, 1824. F. 0. Mss.
240 South American Independence
" true state of things. Kings can have no force or
Power but by those means which perfect social order
affords. They are well aware of the extent and ad-
vantage of those means; but alarmed by the move-
ments they perceive around their thrones, they are
endeavouring to recover their former passive state
and to preserve the fruitful activity of human rea-
son. They would wish that truth and error could
be united in order to strengthen their Authority.
From hence has arisen that inexplicable Dogma of
Legitimacy which now disturbs the Nations of
ancient Europe, and for the propagation of which
the Holy Alliance has created itself. It is indeed a
matter of difficulty for this Alliance to acknowledge
as legitimate, Governments whose Origin is not ob-
scure and whose authority is not supported by
miracles, but merely by the simple and natural
Rights of Nations. Nevertheless it can never be
feared that the Soldiers of the Holy Alliance will
come over to re-establish on this side of the Ocean
the Odious Legitimacy of the Catholic King. Great
Britain unfettered by the engagements of the Allies
has adopted with respect to the States of America
a Conduct noble and truly worthy of a Nation the
most civilized, the most independent, and certainly
the most powerful of Europe. The Solemn Recog-
nition of the Independence of the new Republics
England and South America 241
"must be the Result of those Principles .which she
has proclaimed; and you may believe Gentlemen,
that this important Event with respect to the Prov-
inces of Rio de la Plata principally depends on their
appearing as a National Body, and capable of main-
taining the excellent Institutions they already pos-
sess."
The inspired hint contained in the last sentence of
the message was soon acted upon by the General
Congress. From day to day, in expectation of what
should occur, Parish held the January packet at
Buenos Ayres. Then on the 24th of January, 1825,
he let her sail, bearing with her to England a copy
of a fundamental law of the Congress, placing in a
formal manner in the hands of Buenos Ayres those
powers which she had already exercised for so many
years. Nine days later he concluded, in the terms
of his instructions, a treaty of amity, commerce and
navigation with the United Provinces of Rio de la
Plata.66
Before the Buenos Ayrean treaty was concluded,
Canning had announced the final step in recognition
from the Foreign Office. Fearful of a domination
of France in Spanish policy, and determined to main-
tain British trade, even at the cost of European hos-
M Parish to Canning, No. 6, January 24, 1825. F. O. Mas. British
and Foreign State Papers, XII : 29.
242 South American Independence
tility, Canning had persuaded his reluctant govern-
ment to send consuls to South American ports in
October, 1823. Thus pledged to the ultimate recog-
nition of the provinces, the final act had become
only a matter of time and means. But even Can-
ning shared with his colleagues a reluctance to enter
upon the establishment of formal diplomatic rela-
tions. Once more, as the proposed conference on
South America was under consideration, he gave
Spain the opportunity to come to his rescue by recog-
nizing her rebellious provinces herself. And once
again he offered British mediation for the further-
ance of that end. " The British government," he
instructed Sir William a Court, at Madrid,67 " have
no desire to anticipate Spain in that recognition.
On the contrary, it is on every account their wish,
that his Catholic majesty should have the grace and
advantage of leading the way, in that recognition,
among the Powers of Europe. But the Court of
Madrid must be aware, that the discretion of his
majesty in this respect cannot be indefinitely bound
up in that of his Catholic majesty; and that even
before many months elapse, the desire now sincerely
felt by the British government, to leave this prece-
dency to Spain, may be overborne by considerations
of a more comprehensive nature, — considerations
•'January 30, 1824. Parl. Debates, N. S., X : 717.
England and South America
" regarding not only the essential interests of his
majesty's subjects, but the relations of the old
world with the new."
It has been seen that the cry for recognition was
loud in Parliament in the spring of 1824, and that
the Ministry was induced to justify its inaction in
March by making public the Polignac memorandum
and the a Court correspondence as showing a deter-
mination to admit no European interference in the
Spanish question. As the months advanced the op-
position became more insistent in its demands for
a formal recognition. Spain, at the same time, was
content to acknowledge the receipt of Canning's
offer of another mediation: but she took no action.
The reports of Parish meanwhile, and of the other
Commissioners, were beginning to come in with
their accounts of a reasonable stability in some of
the South American governments. There were two
things which, in Canning's mind, were indispensable
preliminaries to a recognition. The former was a
promise of permanent independence. The latter was
a less reasonable condition, and one which interna-
tional law withdraws from the cognizance of out-
side powers, but which could be insisted upon in this
case with impunity. He was not content that a gov-
ernment should exist capable of maintaining its in-
ternational duties, but insisted that it should have
244 South American Independence
the rare Latin-American quality of permanence.
The reports of Parish led the Foreign Secretary to
believe by August that these had been attained in
Buenos Ayres.
And so, convinced that it was hopeless to await
the co-operation of Spain, Canning conquered the
prejudices of his colleagues and his king, risking
thereby the resignation of the Duke of Wellington
from the cabinet, and authorized Parish to conclude
a commercial treaty in August.68
We do not expect Spain to be reconciled to this
step, wrote Canning to George Bosanquet, at Mad-
rid, on the last day of the year, but she must long
have expected it, for our declarations have left no
doubt that we should ultimately be called upon to
take it. We have consistently informed her, and so
late as 30th January last, that we should be guided
by the reports of our agents and the interests of our
subjects. Since then the consolidation and capacity
of the republics have been advancing, commerce has
increased in proportion, and Spain has once more
refused to listen to our offers of mediation. We are
convinced that her struggle is hopeless. Such ex-
tensive portions of the world should not continue
longer without a recognized existence, so we have
, Hist. England, II: 367; Report of Gen. Alvear, June
29, 1824, enclosed in Parish to Canning, November 6, 1824. F. O. Mss.
England and South America 245
sent instructions for a treaty to Buenos Ayres, and
are preparing them for Colombia and Mexico. The
effect of the treaties when ratified " will be a Diplo-
matick Eecognition of the De facto Governments of
those three countries."
On 3d January, 1825, the instructions for the
Colombian and Mexican treaties were signed, and
the determination of Great Britain was announced
to the diplomatic corps in London.69
The reply of Francisco de Zea Bermudez, the
Spanish Minister, to George Bosanquet, was filled
with bitter complaint that Great Britain should take
such action at a moment when — with Castilian hope-
fulness— everything was favorable for a reconquest
of the " rebellious subjects, who, after having per-
fidiously seized upon the Government in various
parts of his [Catholic majesty's] American Do-
minions, now affect to consider themselves the arbi-
ters of the destinies & to defend the political In-
terests of those very people whom they oppress and
destroy." In language of surprise and grief he cited
the old treaties between England and Spain, alluded
to their joint resistance to " the Usurper of the
Throne of France," and the opposition of Great
Britain to "the recognition of the momentary
69 F O. MM. ; the report of the Mezican Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions for 1826 is in British and Foreign State Papers, XIV : 1106.
246 South American Independence
" triumph of violence over justice." Was this the
time for her to cast aside her treaties and contradict
these principles to " sanction the existence of some
Governments de facto the offspring of Rebellion. —
Infants in strength, but old in crime, supported by
Ambition, and defended by blood and Anarchy?"
The Minister made the most of the turbulence of
South American republicanism, and of the factious
services of the very British Commissioners on whose
evidence recognition was to be accorded. He would
not attempt, he said, to enumerate the times British
subjects had provided the insurgents with arms in
defiance of treaty stipulations. He complained that
Britain's professed desire for mediation had always
been based upon the inadmissible condition of in-
dependence— a charge which some one at the For-
eign Office saw fit to deny on the margin of the
despatch : " this is not true of any offer from 1812
to 1818." He cited brilliant, but imaginary, vic-
tories of the Royalist armies in Upper Peru, main-
tained the unswerving loyalty of the majority of the
South Americans, and insisted, in conclusion, that
Spain would never abandon in those provinces her
legitimate rights.70
To this tirade replied Canning toward the end of
March, in a note to M. de los Rios, his Catholic maj-
*°Zea to Bosanquet, January 21, 1825. F. 0. Mss.
England and South America 247
esty's minister in London. He declined to enter
into any controversy upon the facts in the case,
Spain's weakest point, for de Zea Bermudez had sys-
tematically and blindly denied every essential fact
upon which British opinion was based. Upon the
theory of recognition he replied at some length in
the language that Mackintosh had thrust upon him
for eight years. He saw in the determination of
Spain never to recognize the independence a com-
plete justification for British action. " We admit,"
he stated in conclusion, " that no question of right
is decided by our recognition of the new states of
America." Four days later he enclosed a copy of
his note to Bosanquet, and hoped sincerely that
Spain would let the discussion drop.71
In 1822, nearly two years before the enunciation
of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States saw fit to
recognize the independent existence of the South
American republics. Although the action was in
direct opposition to the avowed policy of Europe, no
Power took occasion in a formal manner to reproach
the United States for this deviation from their
course. Instead, the European statesmen admitted
at this early date the principle of isolation as applied
to American policy, while European journals ex-
71 Canning to de los Rios, March 25, 1825 ; to Bosanquet, March 29,
1825. F. 0. Mas. Annual Register, 1825, 51*.
248 South American Independence
pressed jealous regrets that their governments could
not act in similar manner. In striking contrast to
this treatment of recognition by the United States is
the procession of diplomats to the Foreign Office in
the early days of March, 1825, in protest against
recognition by Great Britain.
Canning had entered deliberately into the course
which led him to recognition. The fight he had
fought in his own cabinet against an aristocratic hos-
tility to the provinces must have prepared him for
the treatment which his policy received when pub-
licly announced. Evidently by concert, the min-
isters of Austria, Russia and Prussia called upon
him, on the second and fourth of March, to protest
in a formal manner against his action.
Prince Esterhazy72 announced to the Foreign Sec-
retary :
" 1. That the Court of Vienna views with regret
and disapprobation the Course adopted towards the
Countries of Spanish America, as being a deviation
from the Principles of Legitimacy, which guide the
Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe.
" 2nd. That the Court of Vienna does not pre-
tend to erect itself into a Judge of the Interests of
Great Britain, nor to decide how far those Interests
71 Substance of a communication from Prince Esterhazy, March 2,
1825. F. O. Mss.
England and South America 249
" might, or might not be sufficiently urgent to neces-
sitate a step which, It could not but consider precipi-
tate, even in that point of view.
" 3d. But that it could not admit the validity of
such a Plea, because, affecting as it does, in this in-
stance, the rights of Spain, it might, if once admit-
ted affect equally in some instances the right of
some other Power.
"4th. That the court of Vienna faithful to its
principles would not acknowledge any of the Coun-
tries of Spanish America, until the Mother Country
shall have set the example."
In place of the fourth article of the memorandum,
Prince Esterhazy desired to substitute, " 4th. That
the Court of Vienna, faithful to its principles, would
not deviate from those which guided the Politicks of
the Great Powers of Europe for these last ten
years."
The communications from the ministers of Rus-
sia and Prussia were identical in substance with that
of Austria. Count Lieven added 73 that " History
will not forget to record that, if in Spain and in
France the Cause of legitimate authority obtained
an advantageous Triumph, if Monarchs long unfor-
tunate, recovered their Crowns and the Dominions
73 Substance of a communication from Count Lieven, March 2, 1825.
F. 0. Mss.
250 8outli American Independence
" of Their Ancestors, it was more especially to the
British Govt that was to be attributed this mem-
orable Reparation of the Evils caused by Revolu-
tionary Violence.
" That, applying the Maxims of a Policy so gen-
erous, to the Situation of the Peninsula and of her
insurgent Colonies reciprocally, Russia could not
forbear to follow the Example which had been given
by England, in those past transactions."
By the time that Baron Maltzahn T* bore to him
a third message of this character, the serenity of the
Foreign Secretary seems to have been disturbed.
" Upon Mr. Canning's taking the liberty of asking,"
runs the memorandum, " how it was possible to
reconcile with the strictness of those principles
which Baron Maltzahn described as constituting the
rule of the conduct of the great Powers of Europe,
the willingness which had been manifested by some
of those Great Powers, after the successes of 1814,
not only to make peace with Buonaparte to the ex-
clusion of the Bourbons, but, even after Buonaparte
was out of the question, to place some other than
the Bourbons on the Throne of France, and with the
unqualified acknowledgment of the present King of
Sweden, while the legitimate King of Sweden, who
u Substance of a communication from Baron Maltzahn (undated,
but corrected on March 5, 1825). F. 0. Mss.
England and South America 251
has certainly not abdicated his rights, was wandering
an exile over Europe.
"Baron Maltzahn declared that he was not in-
structed to enter into discussion upon these points;
but simply to express the dissatisfaction of His
Court at the steps taken by His Majesty towards the
States of Spanish America."
The South American policy of the British Minis-
try has now been traced to its conclusion, the recog-
nition of the independence of the South American
republics. It has been seen how the Ministry was in
the beginning legitimist in its actions, and the cen-
ter of the opposition to revolutionary tendencies in
Europe; how it was legitimist in its real sympathies
to the end.75 The progress of European wars, throw-
ing the South Americans upon their own resources,
enabled them to establish a freedom of commerce,
meaning English commerce, that had been unknown.
The restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, unenlight-
ened by gleams of intelligence in the policy of Fer-
dinand, forced the issue of liberation upon them.
And in this issue the interests of an enormous British
trade, amounting to more than three millions in
w H. W. V. Temperley, in Amer. Hist. Rev.t XI : 783n., seems to
have misunderstood this last clause, and to have interpreted it as
applying to England's policy, rather than to the sympathies of the
Liverpool Ministry. Cf. a/nte, and Temperley, Life of Canning (1905),
149, 159, 179, 186.
252 South American Independence
1821, were involved. Reinforced by a popular sym-
pathy, as in the United States, the commercial inter-
ests made themselves felt in the Parliamentary oppo-
sition to the Ministry, convincing Canning at length
that they, rather than legitimist principles in Eu-
rope, should be the object of his solicitude. To pro-
tect them, he was forced by the threatening action
of France in Spain to take steps towards recog-
nition, which the logic of events forced him as soon
as might be, to follow to the end. He " called " his
new world into existence because he must.
Upon the details in connection with the opening
of diplomatic relations with the new States, but little
time need be spent. The first treaty was concluded,
with Buenos Ay res, on 2d February. In approba-
tion of his conduct, Parish was commissioned as the
first Charge to the Provinces, and was accorded his
formal recognition in that capacity on the 26th of
July, 1825. The Commissioners to Colombia, forc-
ing their project upon that government as the price
of any treaty, signed their treaty on the 18th of
April,76 and ten days later Patrick Campbell was
received as Charge. The Mexican treaty, later to
76 British and Foreign State Papers, XII : 661 ; Canning to Parish,
May 24, 1825. F. 0. MSB.
England and South. America 253
be rejected by Canning, was signed on 6th April by
Morier and Ward, the latter being given his audi-
ence as Charge on the 21st of May.77
77 Campbell to Canning, April 28, 1825 ; Ward to Canning, No. 1,
May 21, 1825. F. O. Mss.; J. H. Smith, " The Mexican Recognition
of Texas," inAmer. Hist. ltev.t XVI : 36, is interesting as a basis
for comparing the attitude of Spain and Mexico in similar situations.
.
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