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Full text of "India And Tibet"

INDIA AND TIBET 



INDIA AND TIBET 

A HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS WHICH HAVE 
SUBSISTED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
FROM THE TIME OF WARREN HASTINGS TO 
1910 ; WITH A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE 
MISSION TO LHASA OF 1904 



BY SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND 

K C.LE. *** 



WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 



LONDON 

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 

1910 



TO 

MY WIFE, 

ON WHOM FELL THE ANXIETY 

AND SUSPENSE OF 
DISTANTLY AWAITING THE EESDLTS OF HIGH ADVENTURE, 

I DEDICATE THIS BOOK, 

IN THE HOPE THAT 

FROM II MAY COME SOME RECOMPENSE FOR 
THE SUFFERING SHE ENDURED 



PREFACE 

AN apology is needed for the length of this book When 
it was passing thiough the pi ess, a Parliamentary Blue- 
book appeared containing much important mfoi motion as to 
lecent developments, and what 1 had intended as only the 
account of oui iclationswith Tibet up to the ictuin of the 
Mission of 1901 1 thought with advantage might be extended 
Lo include oui iclations to the piesent time The whole 
foims one connected nariative of the attempt, piotracted 
ovei 137 yeais, to accomplish a single purpose the estab- 
lishment of ordinary neighbouily intercourse with Tibet 
The diamatic ending disclosed is that, when that puipose 
had at last been achieved, we forthwith abandoned the 
result 

Theieasons foi this abandonment have been firstly, 
the jealousy boine by two great Poweis for one anothei , 
and,' secondly, the love of isolation engrained in us islanders 
1 have suggested that oui aim should be to replace jealousy 
by co-operation, and, instead of coiling up in fugid isolation, 
we should expand oui selves to make and keep fnendships 

The means I have recommended are living personalities 
lather than dry tieaties, and what Waiien Hastings and 
Lord Curzon wanted an agent at Lhasa is to me also 
the one tiue means of achieving oui puipose 

I am fully conscious of having made mistakes in that 
part of the conduct of thes affans which fell to me to 
discharge. The exactly tiue adjustment of diplomatic 
with military requirements, and of the wishes of men in 
England with the necessities of the situation in Tibet, 
could only be made by a human being arrived at perfec- 
tion, Not yet having ainved there, I doubtless made 
many errors. I can only assume that, if 1 had never 
made a mistake, I should never have made a success. 



Vll 



vm PREFACE 

Likewise, in my recommendations for the future, I may 
often be in enor in detail, but in the mam conclusion of 
substituting intimacy for isolation and effecting the change 
by personality, I would fain believe I shall piove right. 

What I say has no official inspiration or sanction, 
for I have left the employment of Government, and 
am seeking to serve my country in fields of greatei 
freedom though not less responsibility , but, in compiling 
the narrative of our iclations with the Tibetans, I have 
made the fullest use of the foui Blue-books which have 
been presented to Parliament These contain information 
of the highest value, though in the veiy undigested foim 
chaiacteiistic of Parliamentary Papers. Beyond pcrsonnl 
impressions I have added nothing to them, but merely 
sought to deduce from them a connected account of events 
and of the motives which impelled them. To Sir Clement 
Markham's account of Bogle's Mission and Manning's 
journey to Lhasa, to Captain Turner's account of his 
Mission to Tibet, and to Perceval London's, Edmund 
Candler's, and Colonel Waddell's accounts of the Mission 
of 1904, I am also indebted, as well as to Mr. White, 
Captain Bailey and Messrs. Johnston and Hoffman lor 
photographs 

I lastly desire to acknowledge the trouble which 
Mi John Mmray has so kindly taken in correcting the 
proofs 

FKANCIS YOUNGHUSDAND 
September 7, 1910 



P.S Too late to make use of it, I have received the 
just published reprint fi om the T'sung Pao of Mr. Koek- 
hiU's " The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations to 
the Manchu Emperors of Cfeina " The conclusion of this 
famous authority on Tibet, that the Tibetans have no desire 
for total independence of China, but that their complaints 
have always been directed against the manner in which 
the local Chinese officials have performed their duties, is 
particularly noteworthy 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

WAKllEN HASHNGS' POLICY BOGLE^S MISSION 1774 

Bhutanese aggiessiou on Bengal m 1772, p 4 Warieu Hastings repels 
degression, p 4 Tosh i Lama intercedes on behalf of Bhutauese, p 5 Wairen 
JUshngs lephes, piopofeing treaty of amity and commerce, p 7 His policy, p 7 
iroholocts Bogle foi Miwion, p 8 His instructions to Bogle, p 9 Value of 
(liftcietiouaiv powois to agents, p 10 Bogle's leceptiou by Tashi Lama, p 13 
The Lama acltnowledgem unjustifiabihty of Bhutauese action, p 14 Conversation 
icgarfling trade, p In Hogle receives two Lhasa delegates, p 17 Tibetan fear 
of the Chinese, p 10 Bogle suggests alliance with Tibetans against Gurkhas, 
p 10 Ohstrui tivcuoss of Lhasa delegates, p 20 The Nepalese instigate the 
Tibetans agamsL Hogle, p, 21 Conveisations with Kashmiri and Tibetan 
merchants, p 22 HcHulta of the Mission, p 24 

CIIAFrER II 

wviiiiKN HASTINGS' POLICY (continue^)- TURNER'S MISSION 1782 

Warien Hastings' further efforts, p 26 Captain Turner sent to Shigatse, 
p 27. Power of the Chinese, p, 28 Admission to traders granted, p 29 
Nepaleso invasion in 1792, p 30, Closing of intercourse with Tibet, p 31 

CHAPTER IH 

MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA isn 

Maimuig'fl previous career, p. 33 He makes fneuds with the Chinese, p 34 
< Mitams permiNHion from them to visit Lhasa, p. 37 He visits the Grand Lama, 
p. 37. HIH etoy in Lhasa, p. 38. Results of hie journey, p. 30, Subsequent 
exploration, p 40 

CHAPTER'IV 

J'HK DJfiNUAL GOVliUlNMEN r r''s KFFOttTS 1873-1886 

Bengal Government urge improvement of intercourbo with the Tibetans, 
Ittfttj p. 42, Prus% for adaiWHiou of tea to Tibet, p 44 Delay caused by refer- 
unco of local questions to central Governments, p 45 Colman Macaulay's 
efforta in 18B/5, p 4G. The Tibetans cross our frontier in force, 1886, p 47 
Neither Chinese nor Tibetan Government can or will withdraw them, p 48 
General Graham expels them, 1888, p 40. 

ix 



x CONTENTS 

CHAPTER V 

THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 1890 

The Chinese ask that a tieaty should be made, p 50 Convention 
March, 1890, p 51 Trade Regulations signed December, 1893, p 62 Tibetans 
fail to observe Regulations, p 54 Bengal Government wish to protest, p 65 
Government of India piefer to be patient, p 55 Tibetans occupy land msiflo 
Treaty boundary, p 66 Efforts to demarcate bouudaiy, p 57 Tibetans 
remove boundary pillais, p 59 Su Cliarles Elliott proposes occupation of 
Chumbi, p 61 Government of India adhere to policy of foibeaiance, p 02 
Reasons for Tibetans' seclusive policy, p 63 Chinese fail to anange nutters 
p 64 Report ou result of five years' working of the Tieaty, p fo5 

CHAPTER VI 

SMITHING THE ntEAfY HlOirih 1899-1901 

Attempts by Loid Curzoii to open dnect communication with Diihu Lnnm, 
p 66 Dalai Lama's Mission to Russia, p 67 Ruesuu Government diKclmm its 
having political nature, p 68 Tibetans expelled by us from Gwgoiitf nihide 
Treaty boundary, p 71 Rumouis ot Russo-Tibetau agieement, i> 72. Reasons 
why Russian activity m Tibet should cause Indian Government anxiety, p 7ft. 
Indian Government piopose sending Mission to Lhasa, p 76 

CHAPTER VII 

NEGOTIATIONS WITH EU&SIA 1903 

Russian piotests, p 79 Lord Lausdowne'q icjomdcr, p 81. Russian 
aBsmances of no intention to mteifere in Tibet, p 82 Such assurances did noL 
preclude possibility of Tibetans lelynig on Russian bupport, p 8.J 

CHAPTER VIII 

A MISSION SANC1IONLD 1903 

Views of His Majesty's Government on geneial question, p Hi, Cone- 
spondence with Viceioy ai to scope of Mission, p 86 Viceroy's proposal to 
have agent at Gyantse, p 87 Decision to despatch a Mission to Khamba Jimtf, 
p 87 Correspondence with the Chinese, p 88 InstiuctioiiH to the British 
Commissioner, p 91 Justification for despatch of MibSion, p 92 

CHAPTER IX 



SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONti 1903 

I am summoned to Simla, May, 1003, p 05 Receive Loid Curaon'h uifltruc 
tions, p. 96 Mr White's ai rival, p 97 Magnificent sceneiy on way to Dar- 
jdmg, p 100 Views of Kmchinjuuga, p, 101 Assistance tfiven by Bengal 
Government, p 103, Tropical foiests, p 104. Character of Lepchas, p 107. 
Hard work of 32nd Pioneers, p 108 Reach Upper Sikkim, p 109. Tibetan* 
protest against our passing Giagong, p 110 Lhasa delegates amve on frontier, 
p 111 Mr White, with escort, reach Khamba Jong, p 112 



CONTENTS xi 

CH \PTER X 

KHAMBA JONG 1903 

I ]oui Mr White at Khamba Jong, p 110 Intel view with Mr Ho, p 117 
Speech to 'Iibetan delegates, p 118 'I hey refuse to lepoit to Lhasa, p 121 
Kecic.itions at Kh unb,i Jong, p 122 Deputation from lashi Lama, p 123 
An iv il of Ah Wilton, p 121 Viceioy suggests to Resident he himself should 
meet me, p 12 J 'I MO Sikkimese sei/ed hy hbetans, p 12> Shigatse Abbot 
ui iv us, p 12/5 Sitmtion grows thieitemng, p 128 Depaitmc of Mr Ho, 
p 1 51 My su^o tions to (Joveinment tor moetmg the situation,, p 132 Aid 
gi\en by NepileH, p IV, Buhsh rtpiesenUtion to Chinese Goveinmeut, 
p Lib 1 Recommendations ot Indian Government, p 140 feeoietaiy of State 
sani turns idvuueto Gyantst, p 110 Viceroy notifies Chinese Resident, p 142 
Chinese Go, eminent pi otesl, p in Russi in (ioveinment also piotest, p 144 
Justification ioi .idv.uu e, ]> j 1(> 

CHAPTER XI 

I) \JUILINC, 10 rill'MDI 1'XH 

Question ol advuunig in winter 01 waiting till sptmg, p 11 ( ) Risks in 
< lossinu HnnaUjas in winter, p ISO TuuisporL piep nations, p ]/>] Depaitmc 
iiom Dujiling, p l')2 Ciossmg the Jel ip U (piss), p 1/5,3 Piotestf fiom 
1'ibclans, p 15,") Anne \titung, p 1/5(> Ma< don ild oc cupies Phaii, p 117 
Olwtnution of Lhasa inonkK, p Ifi') Kxtieme cold, p IdO C'lossing the 
'lang l,i, p !(!() 

CHAPTER XII 

TUN \ 1<W 

Lli is i olhnals < nine h> Tun i, p 102 I visit Tibetan camp, p 10,'? 
^tuition, ]> H!b Coin liNions as to Tibptiin disposition, p 1(7 Lhasi 
visits me, p K!H iSeveic cold, p 1<J ( > Bhutanese Envoy <u rives, p l(j<) His 
attempts to le'isrm with TibetiaiH, p 170 Our losses fiom cold, p 172 Mac 
don ild ,u lives, March 2B, p 17-i AVt* athaiue to Guru, p 174 Ti oops advance 
without iinng, p 17(> Tibetans reluso to allow passage, p 177 buddeu com- 
meiKi'meut of rut ion, )> 17^ Chinese Resident mges delay, p, 17'J Our arrival 
at <tymtse, p III!) 

CHAPTER XIII 

<.V \NlMv 1901 

Fiicndty attitude of peo[)le, p, 1H2 But no signs ot negotiator, p 1HJJ I 
H(lvo< ,ite piep.u.itions to mlvtiiu c to Lhasa, p liH Tibetan ti oops a^ un assemble, 
p, 1H"), Mission atUu ked, p, IH7 liiander attacks TibetuiiH on Karo la (pass), 
p 1!J') IJe tt'LuniH to <iy<tntse, p J!)l, Advuiu e to Lhas i sauetioned by Home 
Uoveinment, ]. J')l, Mission escort romfoned, p l!)2 ( aptaiiiH Sheppiirdaud 
Otlh-y, p, li)ii Ihander attat ks Pall a village, p 104 I am leuillod to Chumbi, 
p. 3i)fl Attat ked at Kaiignm, ], lf)(! 1 advocate preparing to stop at Lhasa for 
p 11)7 Uoveinmeiit discourage the idea, p IDO Renewed pledges to 
p 20 1 How theMO fettered the Indian Government, p. 20 J. Meeting 
with TongMft Punlojj of Hhutau, p. 21),}, Moiu aid fiom Nepal, p 201! 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 1904 

Macdonald, with reinforcements, leaves Chumbi, p 208 Good feeling of 
country people, p. 208 Reinforcements reach Gyantse, p 209 Ta Lama 
ainves to negotiate, p 211 He is informed jong must be evacuated, p 215 
Operations against jong commence, p 217 Gordon killed, p 218 Grant leads 
assault, p 210 Jong captured, p 220 Negotiators not to be found, p 221 
Preparations for advance completed, p 221 Tongaa Penlop informs Ta Lama 
of my readiness to negotiate en route to Lhasa, and Dalai Lama of our tcrmH, 
p 222 

CHAPTER XV 

THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 1904 

Dalai Lama asks Tongsa Penlop to effect a settlement, p 223 Action at 
Karo-la, p 224 At Nagartse find deputation from Lhasa, p 225 They ank us 
to return to Gyant&e, p 226 They fear their religion will be spoilt, p, iWO. 
And that Russians might want to go to Lhasa, p 231 Importance I attached to 
good peisonal relations, p 232 The beautiful Yam-dok Tso (lake), p 239. 
Arrival at Brahmaputra, p 234 Letter from National Assembly, p 28/5 
Question whether to negotiate here 01 go on to Lhasa, p 236 Majoi Biethtsiton 
diowned, p 237 Dalai Lama's Chambeilain brings letter fiom his mastiM, 
p 238 I reply that we must advance to Lhasa, p 239 We discuss goneiul 
question of inteicourse with India, p 240 Further discussion with Ta Luna, 
p. 243 We advance across Brahmaputra, p 247 Final deputation attempts to 
dissuade us from going to Lhasa, p 249 Arrival at Lhasa, p. 260 

CHAPTER XVI 

THE TERMS 1904 

Disadvantage of being pressed for time, p 251 Views of Indian Govern- 
ment regarding terms, p 252 Their desire to have Agent at Lhasa, p 252 
And to occupy the Chumbi Valley, p 256 The question of an indemnity, p, JJ57 
Of an Agent at Gyantse, p 258 Of exclusive political influence in Tibet, p. 2fi), 
Of facilities foi trade, p 269 His Majesty's Govoniment consider proposal 
excessive, and decide against Agent at Lhasa, p. 200 And against GyantHe Agent 
proceeding to Lhasa, p 2C2 Amount of indemnity to be such as can bo paid in 
three years, p 262 

CHAPTER XVII 

THE NEGOTIATIONS 

Chinese Resident visits me day of our urnval at Lhasa, p. 203 Question of 
entering Lhasa city, p 264 Impressions of city, p 205 Reception by Chmo&e 
Resident, p 266 Nepalese representative and Tougsa Peulop of Bhutan visit 
me, p 267 Flight of Dalai Lama, p 269 Chinese Resident sayn ordinary 
people anxious for intercourse, p. 270. The Ti Rimpoche (Regent) ronunuuew 
negotiations, p 273 Disagrees with obstructive policy of National AfiHombly, 
p 274 Two Sikkimese prisoners released, p 270 Dffficultiea in roganl tn 
indemnity, p. 279 Tongua Penlop suggests that Nepal, Bhutan, aud Hbol 



CONTENTS xm 

should look to England,, p 280 Chinese Resident denounces the Dalai Lama, 
p, 282 Tibetans incline to agiee to some of terms, p 282 But continue to 
piotest against indemnity; p 284 



CHAPTER XVIII 

im< imAii roNciimi'D 1904 



Piessmc foi time, p 281) Militaiy considerations demand very early with- 
drawal, p 2')0 Necessity foi decisnc action,, p 290 Tibetans piesented with 
hnil teims p 291 They piopose extension of time foi payment of indemnity,, 
p 294 Reisons foi accepting pioposal, p 294 Question of Chumbi Valley,' 
p 29,"5 Pei mission foi Gymtse Agent to pioceed to Lhasa, p 299 I insist on 
signing lYeatv m Potala, p 300 The oeiemony of signatme, p 303 

CHAPTER XIX 

IMrill'SSIONS AT TTIAbA - 1904 

Release of pnsoners, p 307 Visits to monasteries, p 309 Chaiacter or 
Lam.iR, p 310 The effects of Lamaism on Tibetans and Mongols, p 314 Visit 
to Jo Klung Temple, p 31 d The mner spnit of the people, p 317 Socia 
side ot Tibetans, p 318 Tibetan view of English, p 319 Chinese attitude to 
Tibetans, p 321 

CHAPTER XX 

niV EE1UBN 1904 

Famvell visits, p 32*5 .Sensations of good-will, p 326 Good behavioui of 
Indian tioopn, p 327 Exploring paities, p 328 Successful woik of Rawlmg 
and Rydoi, p, 330 Return to Simla, p 332 Meeting with Lord Curzon, p. 333 
Audience of His late Majesty, p 333 Mission flag placed in Windsor Castle, 
p 334 

CHAPTER XXI 

111- SIT US OF THE MISSION 

Good-will of Tibetans, p 335 Friendship of Bhutan, p 330 Scientific 
icsults, p 337 Indemnity i educed by His Majesty's Government, p 338 
Period of occupation of Chumbi i educed, p 338 Permission for Gyantse Agent 
to proceed to Lhasa abandoned, p 330 Reasons of His Majesty's Government 
for above, p 339 

CHAPTER XXII 

NFtJOJFAHONS WITH CHJJtfA - 1905-1910 

Convention xvith China coufuming Lhasa Convention, p 342 Unfriendly 
attitude of Chinese in Tibet, p 343 Thou attempts to prevent direct relations 
with Tibetans, p 344. Sir Edward Grey's remonstrances, p 345 Indian Govern- 
ment complains of breaches of Lhasa Convention, p 347 Chinese device to 
prevent direct relations between us and the Tihetans in regard to payment of 
indemnity, p 348 Question of evacuating Chumbi Valley, p 354, Chumbi 
evacuated, p. 360, Trade Regulations agreed to, p 350 Chinese forward move- 
ment commences, p 302 Bhutan taken undei our protection, p 365 



xiv CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XXIII 

AITI1UDE OF IHk 1IBMANS SINCE 1904 1904-1910 



I<a\omable Tibetan attitude following signatme of Tieaty, p 3d" Dis- 
tuibances in Eastern Tibet, 1005, p 3GB Bating annexed by Chinese, p 37 J 
Dalai Lama's movements in Mongolia, p 377 Anglo-Russian agiranent in 
regard to Tibet, p 378 Dalai Lama ai lives in Peking, p 382 Loaves Peking, 
p 385 Ariives near Lhasa, Novembei, 1909, and complains of Chinese en< icu< fo- 
ments, p 386 Ariives m Lliasa, p 387 Chinese intention to tike aw iy his 
temporal powei, p 389 Chinese troops aune in Lhasa, p 389 Dalai Lattia 
flees, p 391 Ariives in Daiplmg, p 392 Visits Viceroy in Calcutta, p 'Wi 
Tibetan Ministers ask foi Bntish officei with troops to be despatched to Lhasa, 
and for alliance, p 395 Dahi Lama's request foi aid lefused, p 8% Hut 
British Government makes pi otest to Chinese Goveinment, p 3% Chinese st tti- 
they merely wish to exercise effective control, p 398 Dalai Lama deposed, 
p 399 Chinese view of situation, p 400 Indian Goveinment's views, p 109 
Lord Moi ley's views, p 404 

CHAPTER XXIV 

SOME CONCJUSJONS 

Tendency to centialization of contiol, p 407 Reasons why Bntish udmims 
tialois in India lack confidence 111 centiali/ation in London, p 108 Rcim-du^ 
for evil, p 411 Moie intimate pei&onal lelahonship, p i!2 Mou> trtihl in 
the man on the spot," p 41 5 Summary ot situation in Tibet, p H fl Moi ality 
of intervention in Tibet, p 410 Co opeiabou with Ruftsm, p 121 ( laws' 
pneially good neighbour, p 421 Necessity f m sc< nnng u-moval ot nnnmal 
local Chinese officials, p 423 And foi pieseivinj- intimate touch with 1'ibHans 
p iZ4- A foi ward poluy lecommeuded, p 42G 

CHAPTER XXV 

A FINAL IfFJLITJION 

"A stiange force 01 the designs of buieauuatf,," p 430 No dchbcruto 

SbaZt r qntt l l ^" } P ^ ImpellC<1 t0 UI ^ ' '^ o P S 
Probatolity of some foice impelling us on, p 4,34 Kcahtv of an ,,,* 
impulse, p 435 Its direction 



APPENDIX 

ion, 1904, Anglo-Chinese Conve,^,,, 
vention, 1907 

INDEX i (p 447) 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

TO PACE PAGE 

I'HF DA FAT TAMA - Frontispiece 

(Reproduced by pei mission of the "Sphere ") 

MH BOGLE ---.... 8 

SIKlflM SCENERY - - - - - - 105 

MISSION CAMP, KHAMBA JONG - - - - - 116 

THE SHIGATSE ABBOT ...... 128 

THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL - - - -134 

COLUMN CROSSING THE TANG-LA, JANUARY, 1904 - - - 160 
CHUMAUIAUI - - - - - - -162 

MOUNTED INJ< VN'IRY - - - - - - 169 

'HIE HjL'AIir I ROM TUNA FOR GURTT - 173 
SfcPOYS " SHOULDERING " TIBETANS 1'ROM POSITION GURU, MARCH, 

1904 176 

TID'' TONGRA I'KNLOP (NOW MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN) - - 204) 
GYANTSE JONG - - - - - - - 

CAMP NhAR KARO-LA ...... 

UhRTHON BOATS ON BllAIIMAPUlllA - ... 

1'A LAMA AND HIS SECRETARY ----- 

THE GATE OF LHASA ... - - - 250 

THE DALAI LAMA ------ 256 

(Itrprodiu.ed by permission offfte Ftoprwtma oftfa "Daily ffraphic ") 

THE POTATO, LHASA _.---- 265 

MISSION (iUARi'ElU>, LHASA .... - 267 

THE COUNCIL - 268 

THE TI RIMPOCHB ...... 273 

XV 



xvi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



THE CHUMBI VALLEY - - - - ' " 

and. 

SIGNING THE TREATY ------ ^" u 

SEALS AFFIXED TO TREATY - ^"" 

'ilfl 

THE SERA MONASTERY ------ tJAV 



MAPS 

1 THE CHINESE EMPIRE, SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITION OT< ' 
TIBET TO CHINA PROPER, INDIA, AND RUSSIA 

end 

PAUT OF TIBET, SHOWING THE HOUTE FOLLOWFD BY Til* 
MISSION TO LHASA ----- 



INDIA AND TIBET 



INTRODUCTION 

Tins book is an account of our relations with Tibet, but 
many still wonder why we need have any such relations at 
all. The country lies on the far side of the Himalayas, the 
greatest range of snowy mountains in the world Why, 
then, should we trouble ourselves about what goes on there ? 
Why do we want to interfere with the Tibetans ? Why not 
leave them alone ? These are very reasonable and pertinent 
questions, and such as naturally spring to the mind of even 
the least intelligent of Englishmen Obviously, therefore, 
they must have sprung to the minds of responsible British 
statesmen before they ever sanctioned intervention. The 
sedate gentlemen who compose the Government of India 
are not renowned for being carried away by bursts of 
excitement or enthusiasm, nor are they remarkable for 
impulsive, thoughtless action. They have spent their lives 
in the dull routine of official grind, and by the time they 
attain a seat in the Viceregal Council they are, if anything, 
too free from emotional impulses. Certainly, the initiation 
of anything forward and interfering was as little to be 
expected from them as from the most rigorous anti- 
Imperialist. The head of the Government of India at the 
time of the Tibet Mission was,*it is true, a man of less 
mature official experience, but he happened to be a man 
who had studied Asiatic policy in nearly every part of Asia, 
Besides having been Under-Seeretary for Foreign Affairs ; 
and even supposing he had been the most impulsive and 
irresponsible of Viceroys, he could take no action without 
gaining the assent of the majority of his colleagues in India, 



2 INTRODUCTION 

and without convincing the Secretary of State in England. 
India is not governed by the Viceroy alone, but by the 
Viceioy in Council On such a question as the despatch ot 
a mission to Tibet, the Viceroy would not be able to act 
without the concurrence of three out of his six councillors, 
and without the appioval of the Secretaiy of State, who, 
111 his turn, as expenditure is incurred, would have to gam 
the support of his Council of tried and experienced Indian 
admimstiators and soldiers, besides the appioval of the 
whole Cabinet 

It is, then, a veiy fau piesumption at the outset that if 
all these various authorities had satisfied themselves that 
action in Tibet was necessary, there probably was some 
icasonable giound for interference What was it that 
influenced these sedate authorities, alike m India and 
in England, to depart from the natural course of leaving 
the Tibetans alone, to behave or misbehave themselves 
as they liked ? What was it that peisuaded these gentle- 
men that action, and not inaction, intervention, and 
not laisse^-jaire, were required, and that we could no 
longer leave this remote State on the far side of the mighty 
Himalayas severely alone ? There must have been some 
strong reason, for it was not merely a matter of permitting 
an adventurous exploier to try and reach the "forbidden 
city " After thirty years of correspondence what was 
eventually sanctioned was the despatch of a mission with 
an escort strong enough to break down all opposition 
What was the reason 2 

The answer to this I will eventually give But to make 
that answer clear we must view the matter from a long 
perspective, and trace its gradual evolution from the 
original beginnings And, at the start, I shall have 
to emphasize the point that there has always been 
intercourse of some kinS between Tibet and India, for 
Tibet is not an island in mid-ocean It is in the heart 
of a continent surrounded by other countries. That it is 
a mysterious, secluded country in the remote hinterland of 
the Himalayas most people are vaguely aware. But that 
it is contiguous for nearly a thousand miles with the 
British Empire, from Kashmir to Burma, few have 



INTERCOURSE WITH TIBET 8 

properly realized. Still less have they appreciated that 
this contact between the countries means intercourse of 
some kind between the peoples inhabiting them, even 
though it has to be over a snowy range The Tibetans 
drew their lehgion from India From time immemorial 
they have been accustomed to visit the sacred shrines of 
India Tibetan traders have come down to Bengal, 
Kashmni and Indian tiaders have gone to Tibet Tibetan 
shepherds have brought their flocks to the pastures on the 
Indian side of the range m some parts In other parts 
the shepherds nom the Indian side have taken their sheep 
and goats to the plateaux of Tibet Sometimes the 
Tibetans or their vassals have raided to valleys and plains 
of India, sometimes Indian feudatories have raided into 
Tibet At other times, again, the intercourse has been of 
a more pacific kind, and intermarriages between the 
bordering peoples and interchanges of presents have taken 
place In a multitude of ways there has evei been inter- 
course between Tibet and India Tibet has never been 
really isolated And, as I shall in due course show, the 
Mission to Lhasa of 1904, was merely the culmination of a 
long series of efforts to regulanze and humanize that inter- 
course, and put the relationship which must necessarily 
subsist between India and Tibet upon a business -like and 
permanently satisfactory footing 



CHAPTER I 

BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

IT is an interesting icflection for those to make who 
think that we must necessarily have been the aggressive 
party, that the far-distant primary cause of all our attempts 
at intercourse with the Tibetans was an act of aggression, 
not on our part, not on the part of an ambitious Pro- 
consul, or some headstrong frontier officer, but of the Bhu- 
tanese, neighbours, and then vassals, of the Tibetans, who 
nearly a century and a half ago committed the first act 
an act of aggression which brought us into relationship 
with the Tibetans In the year 1772 they descended into 
the plains of Bengal and overran Kuch Behar, coined oil' 
the Raja as a prisoner, seized his country, and offered such 
a menace to the British province of Bengal, now only 
separated from them by a small stream, that when the 
people of Kuch Behar asked the British Governor for help, 
he granted their request, and resolved to dnve the moun- 
taineers back into their fastnesses. Success attended his 
efforts, though, as usual, at much sacrifice. We learn 
that our troops were decimated with disease, and that the 
malaria proved fatal to Captain Jones, the commander, 
and many other officers " One can hardly breathe," says 

Bogle, who passed through the country two years later 

" frogs, watery insects, and dank air " And those who 
have been over that same country since, and seen, if only 
from a railway train, those deadly swamps, who have 
felt that suffocating, poisonous atmosphere arising from 
them, and who have experienced that ghastly, depressing 
enervation which saps all manhood and all life out of one, 
can well imagine what those early pioneers must have 
suffered 



BHUTANESE AGGRESSION 5 

Fortunately there was at the head of affairs the greatest, 
though the most maligned, of all the Governors- General 
of India, who was able to turn to profit the advantages 
accruing from the sacrifices which had been made. 
Fortunately, too, in those days a Go vernoi- General still 
had some power and initiative left, and was able, without 
interminable delays, debates, correspondence, and inter- 
national considenngs, to act decisively and strongly before 
the psychological moment had passed. 

Warren Hastings resisted the aggression of the Bhu- 
tanese, and drove them back from the plains of Bengal into 
then: own mountains , but when the Tashi Lama of Tibet 
interceded on their behalf, he at once not only acceded, 
but went further, and made a deliberate effort to come into 
permanent relationship with both the Bhutanese and 
Tibetans Nor did he think he would gain lasting results 
by any fitful effort He knew well that to achieve any- 
thing effort must be long, must be continuous, and must 
be persistent, and that the results would be small at first, 
but, accumulating in the long process of years, would 
eventually amount to what was of value. 

The Bhutanese, I have said, when they found them- 
selves being sorely punished for their aggression, appealed 
to the Tashi Lama of Tibet to intercede for them with 
the Governor of Bengal , and the Tashi Lama, who was 
then acting as Regent of Tibet during the infancy of the 
Dalai Lama, wrote to Warren Hastings a very remark- 
able letter, which is quoted both by Turner and Markham, 
and which is especially noteworthy as marking that the 
intercourse between us and the Tibetans was started by 
the Tibetans. The Tibetans have stated on many a 
subsequent occasion to the Government of India, and on 
innumerable occasions to mysejf, that they aie not per- 
mitted to have intercourse with us But originally, and 
when they wanted a favour from us, the intercourse was 
started by themselves, and in a very reasonable s dignified, 
and neighbourly manner 

The Tashi Lama wrote to Warren' Hastings, after 
various compliments : " Neither to molest nor to perse- 
cute is my aim. . . But in justice and humanity I 



6 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

am informed you far smpass . I have been lepcatedly 
informed that you have been engaged in hostilities 
against the Deb Judhur, to which, it is said, the Deb's 
own criminal conduct in committing ravages and other 
outrages on your fiontier has given nse As he is of a 
rude and ignorant race (past times are not destitute of 
instances of the hke misconduct which his own avarice 
tempted him to commit), it is not unlikely that he has 
now renewed those instances, and the ravages and plundci 
which he committed on the skirts of the Bengal and 
Behar provinces have given you provocation to send your 
avenging army against him However, his paity has been 
defeated, many of his people have been killed, three foils 
have been taken fiom him, he has met with the punish- 
ment he deseived, and it is evident as the sun that your 
aimy has been victorious, and that, if you had been 
desirous of it, you might in the space of two days have 
entirely extiipated him, for he had no powei to resist your 
efforts But I now take upon me to be his mediator, and 
to icpresent to you that, as the said Deb Raja is dependent 
upon the Dalai Lama should you peisist in offering 

further molestation to the Deb Raja's country, it will 
irritate both the Lama and all his subjects against you. 
Therefore, from a regard to our religion and customs, I 
request you will cease all hostilities against him, and in 
doing this you will confer the greatest favom and friend- 
ship upon me. I have reprimanded the Deb foi his past 
conduct, and I have admonished him to desist from his 
evil practices in future, and to be submissive to you in all 
matters I am persuaded that he will conform to the 
, advice which I have given him, and it will be necessary 
that you treat him with compassion and clemency. As 
for my part, I am but a Fakn, and it is the custom of my 
Sect, with the rosary in oui hands, to pray foi the welfare 
of mankind and for the peace and happiness of the inhabi- 
tants of this country ; and I do now, with my hcml 
uncovered, entreat that you may cease all hostilities amunst 
the Deb in future." B 

On receipt of this letter, Warren Hastings laid it before 
the Board at Calcutta, and informed them that, in reply, he 



WARREN HASTINGS' POLICY 7 

had written to the Tashi Lama, proposing a geneial treaty 
of amity and commeice between Bengal and Tibet The 
lettci o the Lama, he said, had invited us to friendship, 
and the final arrangement of the disputes on the f'rontiei 
had lendered the country accessible, without dangei either 
to the persons or effects of tiavelleis He had, theiefore, 
wntten for and obtained a passport foi a European to 
piocecd to Tibet for the negotiation of the tieaty, and he 
now puiposcd sending Mi Bogle, a seivant of the Com- 
pany, well known foi Ins intelligence, assiduity, and exact- 
ness in affans, as well as foi the ' coolness and moderation 
of tempei which he seems to possess in an eminent degree " 
Wfincn Hustings, with gicat wisdom and knowledge of 
Asiatic affairs, adds that he * is fai horn being sanguine 
m his hopes of success, but the present occasion appears 
too favourable for the attempt to be neglected " 

This latter is precisely the point which we who have 
dealt with Asiatics can appicciatc so well taking the 
opportunity, stnkmg while the non is hot, not letting the 
chance go by, knowing om mind, knowing what we want, 
and acting decisively when the exact occasion anses. It 
is hard to do nowadays, with the Piovmcml Govern- 
ment so subordinate to the Government of India, with the 
Government of India so governed by the Secretaiy of 
State, with Cabinet Ministers telling us that the House of 
Commons are then masters, and membeis of the House 
of Commons saying they are the mouthpieces of their con- 
stituents Nevertheless, the advantages of such a method 
of conducting attairs must not be forgotten. Decision and 
rapidity of action arc often important factois in the 
conduct of Asiatic affairs, and may save more trouble 
than is saved by caution and long deliberation. 

Warren Hastings' policy was, then, not to sit still 
within his holders, supremely indifferent to what occurred 
on the other side, and intent upon respecting not merely 
the independence but also the isolation of his neighbours 
It was u forward policy, and combined in a noteworthy 
manner alertness and deliberation, rapidity and persist- 
ency, Hssertivcncss and receptivity. He sought to secure 
his bordeis by at once striking when danger threatened, 



8 s BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

but also by taking infinite pains over long periods 
of time to promote ordinary neighbourly intercourse 
with those on the other side. Both qualities aie 
necessary Spasmodic action unaccompanied by steady, 
continuous efforts at conciliation produces no less bad 
results than does plodding conciliation never accompanied 
by action It was because Warren Hastings possessed 
this capacity for instantly seizing an opportunity, because 
he could and would without hesitation or fear use seventy 
where severity alone would secure enduring harmony, 
but would yet persistently and with infinite tact, sagacity, 
and leal good-heartedness work foi humane and neigh- 
bourly relationship with adjoining peoples, that he must 
be consideied the greatest of all the gieat Governors- 
General of India 



But to be successful a policy must be embodied in. a 
fitting peisonahty And to appreciate Warren Hastings 1 
Tibetan policy we must know something of the agent he 
chose to cany it into effect What was the character of 
the man who was to lead the first Mission ever sent to 
Tibet ? We learn from Maikham that he was born m 
1746, and had at first been bi ought up in a business office, 
but on proceeding to India had been given a post in the 
Revenue Department His letters to his fathei and sisters 
show him to have been a man of the strongest home feel- 
ings, and his conversations with the Tibetans indicate that 
he was a man of high honour and strict rectitude. Warren 
Hastings himself not only had a high opinion of his abilities 
and official aptitude, but also entertained for him a warm 
personal friendship 

The youth of Warren Hastings' agent is the first point 
to note: he was only twenty-eight. Nowadays we use 
men who are much too old It is when men are young, 
when they are still crammed full of energy, when their 
faculties are alert, that they are most useful and effective, 
I often doubt whether the experience of maturer age 
possesses all the advantages which are commonly attri- 
buted to it, and whether young men act more rashly 



WARREN HASTINGS' INSTRUCTIONS 9 

or mesponsibly than old men The former have their 
whole careeis betbie them, and their imputations to make. 
They are no more likely, therefore, to act rashly than "old 
men in a huny" Warren Hastings was therefore wise, 
in my opinion, to choose a young man, and he was 
equally wise to choose an agent of good breeding 
and with great natural kindliness of disposition Asiatics 
do not mind quickness or hotncss of temper, 01 seventy 
of nunner, as long as they can feel that at bottom 
the man they have to do with has a good, warm, generous 
heait He need not wcai it on his sleeve, but they will 
know nght enough whethci he possesses one or not And 
that Warren Hastings' agent had such a heart his home 
correspondence, his fueiidship with Hastings himself, and 
his eventual dealings with the Tibetans amply testify. 



Having determined his policy and selected his agent, 
Warren Hastings gave him the following instructions,* 
dated May KJ, 1774: "I desire you will proceed to 
Lhasa, . . . The design of your mission is to open a 
mutual and equal communication of trade between the 
inhabitants of Bhutan [Tibet] and Bengal, and you will be 
guided by your own judgment in using such means of 
negotiation as may be most likely to effect this purpose. 
You will take with you samples, for a trial of such articles 
of commerce as may be scut from this country, . . . And 
you will diligently inform yourself of the manufactures, 
productions, goods, introduced by the intercourse with 
other countries, which arc to be procured in Bhutan, . . . 
The following will be also proper objects of your inquiry : 
the nature of the roads between the borders of Bengal and 
Lhasa, and of the country lying between, the communica- 
tions between Lhasa and the neighbouring countries, their 
government, revenue, and manners. . , . The period of 
your stay must be left to your discretion. I wish you to 
remain a suflicient time to fulfil the purposes of your 
deputation, and obtain a complete knowledge of the 
country and the points referred to your inquiry. If you 

* Markham, "Mission of Bogle," p, & 



10 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

shall judge that a residence may be usefully established at 
Lhasa without putting the Company to any expense, but 
such as may be repaid by the advantages which may be 
hereafter derived from it, you will take the earliest oppor- 
tunity to advise me of it , and if you should find it neces- 
sary to come away before you icceive my orders upon it, 
you may leave such persons as you shall think fit to remain 
as your agents till a proper resident can be appointed 
You will draw on me for youi charges, and your drafts 
shall be regularly answered To these I can fix no limita- 
tion, but empowei you to act according to your discretion, 
knowing that I need not recommend to you a strict 
frugality and economy where the good of the service on 
which you are commissioned shall not require a deviation 
from these rules " 

Did ever an agent despatched on an important mission 
receive more satisfactory instructions * The object clearly 
defined, and the fullest discretion left to him as to the 
manner of carrying it out Hastings, having selected the 
fittest agent to carry out his purpose, leaves everything to 
his judgment Whatevei would most effectively cany 
out the mam purpose, that the agent was at perfect liberty 
to do, and time and money were freely at his disposal ** I 
want the thing done," says Warren Hastings in effect, 
"and all you require to get it done you shall have." 

The only equally good instructions I havepeisonally seen 
issued to an agent were given by Cecil Rhbdes in Rhodesia. 
I travelled up to Fort Sahsbury with Major Forbes, whom 
Rhodes had summoned from a place two months' journey 
distant to receive instructions, for he did not believe in 
letters, but only in personal communication After dinner 
Rhodes questioned Forbes most minutely as to his require- 
ments, as to the condition of things, as to the difficulties 
which were likely to be encountered, and as to Ins ideas on 
how those difficulties should be overcome. He said he 
wanted to know now what Forbes required in order to 
accomplish the object in view, because he did not wish to 
see him coming back later on, saying he could have earned 
it out if only he had had this, that, or the other. Let him 
therefore say now whatever he required to insure success 



DISCRETION LEFT TO AGENT 11 

All that he asked, and more than he asked, Rhodes gave 
him, and then despatched him, saying, " Now, I don't want 
to heai of you again till I get a telegram saying your job 
is done " 

These are, of couise, ideal methods of conveying 
instructions to an agent, which it is not always possible for 
a high official to give Lord Curzon would, I know, have 
liked to give similai insti notions to me, and, as far as pro- 
viding money, staff 1 , military support, etc , he did But, 
with the closei interconnection of public affairs, public 
business is now so complicated that it is not, I suppose, 
possible to leave to an agent the same amount of discretion 
that Will i en Hastings did to Bogle Still, great results 
in many fields, and, what is moie, great men, have been 
produced by the use oi' Wairen Hastings' method of 
selecting the fittest agent, and then leaving everything m 
Ins hands. I do not sec that any better icsults have 
been obtained by utilizing human agents as mere 
telephones It 1 the conduct of affairs has become com- 
plicated, that docs not appeal to be any icason in itself 
{'or abandoning the method It appeals only a reason for 
principals and agents rising to the higher occasion while 
still pursuing the old successful method. Ease of com- 
munication has brought nations more closely together and 
complicated affairs, but it has also made possible readier 
personal communication between principal and agent 
And therefore there is need not so much for curtailing 
the discretion of the agent while he is at work as for 
utili/ing the greater facility for personal intercourse now 
possible. In conversation the agent will be able to 
impress his principals with whatevei local and personal 
clifliculties he has to contend with, and the means 
required for carrying out their object, and they will be 
able to impress him with the limits outside which it is 
impossible to allow him to act It is a clear certainty that 
the present tendency to concentrate, not merely control, 
but also direction, in London, cannot go on for ever. An 
Empire like ours, immense m size and immensely com- 
plicated, cannot be managed in detail from headquarters. 
The time must come when the House of Commons and 



12 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

the constituencies, overburdened with the great aifans 
with which they have to deal, will, by the sheer force and 
weight of circumstances, see the advantages of leaving 
more to the men on the spot They will probably insist 
on agents being more carefully selected. They willrequne 
them to keep in much closer personal contact with head- 
quarters They will expect, too, that politicians who 
control should already be personally acquainted, or make 
themselves personally acquainted, with the countries they 
control But with these conditions fulfilled they will, it 
may be hoped, be able to leave more to the men on the 
spot, removing them relentlessly if they act wrongly, but 
while they are acting, leaving them to act in their own way. 
Bogle, with these free instmctions and this ample sup- 
port, set out from Calcutta in the middle of May, 1774, 
that is, less than two months from the date of the despatch 
of the Tashi Lama's lettei from Shigatse, so that Wairen 
Hastings, if he had left ample leisuie to his agent to carry 
out Ins purpose, had himself acted with the utmost 
promptitude, even in so important a matter as sending a 
mission to Lhasa with the possibility of establishing there 
a permanent resident Rapidity of communication has 
not resulted in the rapidity of the transaction of public 
affairs, and the consideration of despatching a mission 
to Lhasa nowadays takes as many years as weeks were 
occupied m the days of Warren Hastings. 

During his passage through Bhutan, Bogle found 

many obstacles placed in his way ; but he eventually left 

the capital in the middle of October, and on the 2rd 

ol that month reached Phan, at the head of the Chumbi 

Valley up which we marched to Lhasa 130 years later, 

Here he was received by two Lhasa officers, and farther 

on, at Gyantse, where the Mission of 1904 was attacked 

and besieged for nearly two months, he was entertained 

by a priest, an elderly man of polite and pleasant 

manners, who sat with mm most of the afternoon, and 

drank "above twenty cups of tea" Crowds of p^le 

appear to have assembled to look at him, but beyond 



TASHI LAMA RECEIVES BOGLE 13 

the irksomeness of these attentions he suffeied no incon- 
venience or opposition 

On Novembei 8, 1774, he ai rived at the place near 
Shigatse wheie the Tashi Lama was at the time in 
residence The day following he had an interview with 
the Lama, and delivered to him a letter and a necklace of 
pearls from Warren Hastings. This was the first official 
inteiview which had ever taken place between a British 
officer and a Tibetan, and as such is particularly worthy 
of note 

The Tashi Lama received Bogle y "with a very 
courteous and smiling countenance," seated him near him 
on a high stool covered with a carpet, and spoke to him 
in Hindustani, of which he had " a moderate knowledge " 
Aftei inquiring about AVairen Hastings' health, and 
Bogle's journey through Bhutan, he mtioduced the 
subject of the war in Behar that is, the Bhutanese invasion 
of the plains of Bengal. "I always," said the Lama, 
" disappioved of Deb Judhur (the Bhutanese Chief) seizing 
the Bchcir Haja (the Haja of Kuch Behar) and going 
to war with the Fringies (the English), but the Deb 
considered himself as powerful in arms, and would not 
listen to my advice After he was defeated, T wrote to 
the Governor, who, m ceasing hostilities against the 
Bhutanese, in consequence of my application, and restoring 
to them their country, has made me very happy, and has 
done a very pious action, My servants who went to 
Calcutta were only little men, and the kind reception they 
had from the Governor I consider as another mark of 
friendship," 

Bogle explained that Kuch Behar was separated 
from tne British province of Bengal only by a rivulet ; 
that the Bhutanese from time immemorial had confined 
themselves to their mountains,* and when they visited 
the low countries it was in an amicable manner, and 
in order to tiadc ; that when many thousand armed men 
issued at once from their forests, carried off the Raja 
of Kuch Behar as prisoner, and seized his country, the 
Company very justly became alarmed, and concluded 

* Markham, p. 135 



14 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

that the Bhutanese, encouraged by their successes in 
Kuch Behar to-day, and undeterred by so slight a 
boundary as a small stream, might invade the Biitish 
provinces to-morrow Bogle continued that Warren 
Hastings, on the people of Kuch Behar applying to him 
for assistance, immediately despatched a battalion of sepoys 
to repel the invaders, but was extremely glad, on icceipt 
of the Tashi Lama's letter, to suspend hostilities and 
subsequently to conclude a peace with the Bhutanese and 
restore them then country In conclusion, he said th.it 
Warren Hastings, being happy to cultivate the friendship 
of a man whose fame was so well known, and whose 
character was held in veneration by so many nations, had 
sent him to the Lama's presence with the lettei and tokens 
of friendship which he had laid before him 

The Lama said that the Deb Judhui did not manage 
his country properly, and had been turned out. Bogle 
replied that the English had no concern with his expulsion ; 
it was brought about by his own people: the Company 
only wished the Bhutanese to continue in their own 
country, and not to encroach upon Bengal, or raise 
distuibances upon its frontier " The Governor," said the 
Lama, " had reason for going to war, but, as I am averse 
from bloodshed, and the Bhutanese are my vassals, I am 
glad it is brought to a conclusion." 

The point, then, that it was an act of aggression on the 
part of a vassal of the Tibetans which was the initial 
cause of our relationship with the Tibetans , that that act 
was considered unjustifiable by the then ruler of Tibet, and 
that our own action was approved of and appreciated 
by him, is established by this conversation. Except for 
the unjustifiable aggression of the Bhutanese upon our 
neighbours, we would never have been brought into 
conflict with these vassals of Tibet, and but for the 
intervention of the Tibetan Regent on their behalf, we 
should not then have thought of any relationship with the 
Tibetans. The initiation of our intercourse did* not rest 
with us. We were not the inteiferers. It was the 



THE TASHI LAMA 15 

Tibetans themselves who made the fiist move This 
much is cleai from the Tashi Lama's conversation. 



We may well pause for a moment to consider the man 
who had thus first communicated with us It so happens 
that he was the most remarkable man Tibet has produced 
in the last centuiy and a half, and one cannot help thinking 
that if he had lived longer, and Warren Hastings had 
remained longer in India, these two able and eminently 
sensible and conciliatory men would have come to some 
amicable and neighbouily agreement by which the inter- 
iclations of their respective countries might have been 
peacefully conducted from that time till now. 

Bogle says of him that he was about forty years of age, 
that his disposition was open, candid, and generous, and 
that the expression of his countenance was smiling and 
good-humoured. He was extremely merry and entertain- 
ing in conversation, and told a pleasant story with a great 
deal of humour and action. " I endeavoured," says Bogle, 
"to find out, in his character, those defects which are 
inseparable from humanity, but he is so universally 
beloved that I had no success, and not a man could 
find it in his heart to speak ill of him." 

The Lama treated Bogle in the most intimate manner. 
He would walk the room with the strange Englishman, 
explain to him the pictures, and make remarks upon the 
colour of his eyes. " For, although," says Bogle, '* vene- 
rated as God's vicegerent through all the eastern countries 
of Asia, endowed with a portion of omniscience, and with 
many other Divine attributes, he throws aside, m con- 
versation, all the awful part of his character, accommodates 
himself to the weakness of mortals, endeavours to make 
himself loved rather than feared, and behaves with the 
greatest affability to everybody, particularly to strangers," 

Continuing his conversation on the subject of Behar, 
the Lama, m subsequent interviews, said that many people 
had advised him against receiving an Englishman. " I 



16 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

had heard also,"* he said, "much of the power of the 
Fnngies : that the Company was like a great King, and 
fond of war and conquest, and as my business and 
that of my people is to pray to God, I was afraid to admit 
any Fnngies into the country. But I have since learned 
that the Frmgies aie a fan and a just people." To this 
Bogle icplied that the Governor was, above all things, 
desirous of obtaining his friendship and favour, as the 
character of the English and their good or bad name 
depended greatly upon his judgment In return the 
Lama assured Bogle that his heart was open and well 
disposed towards the English, and that he wished to have 
a place on the banks of the Ganges to which he might 
send his people to pray, and that he intended to write 
to Wairen Hastings about it This he did, after Bogle's 
return, and a piece of land was given him on the banks of 
the Hooghly branch of the Ganges, opposite Calcutta, and 
a house and temple were constructed on it by Bogle 
for the Lama. 

The conversation now turned to the question of tiade. 
The Tashi Lama said that, owing to the lecent wais in 
Nepal and Bhutan, trade between Bengal and Tibet was 
not flourishing, but that, as for himself, he gave encourage- 
ment to merchants, and in Tibet they were free and secure. 
He enumerated the different articles which went from 
Tibet to Bengal " gold, musk, cow-tails (yak-tails), and 
coarse woollen clothes " but he said the Tibetans were 
afraid to go to Bengal on account of the heat In the 
previous year he had sent four people to worship at 
Benaies, but three had died In former times great 
numbers used to resort to Hindustan The Lamas had 
temples in Benares, Gaya, and several other places ; their 
priests used to travel thither to study the sacred books and 
the religion of the Hindus, and after remaining there ten, 
twenty, or thirty years, return to Tibet and communicate 
their knowledge to then* countrymen , but since the Mo- 
hammedan conquest of India the inhabitants of Tibet 
had had httle connection with Bengal or the southern 
countnes 

* Markham, p 137 



OBSTRUCTION FROM LHASA 17 

Bogle assured him that times were now altered, that 
under the Company in Bengal and it must be remembered 
that when he was speaking our rule did not extend beyond 
Bengal on that side of India every person's property was 
secure, and everyone was at liberty to follow his own 
religion. 

The Lama said he was informed that under the 
Fringies the country was very quiet, and that he would 
be ashamed if Bogle were to icturn with a fruitless errand. 
He would therefore consult his officers and some men 
from Lhasa, as well as some of the chief merchants, and 
after informing them of the Governor's desire to encourage 
trade, and of the encouragement and protection which the 
Company afforded to traders in Bengal, " discuss the most 
proper method of carrying it on and extending it." 

The following day the Lama told Bogle that he " had 
written to Lhasa on the subject of opening a free com- 
mercial communication between his country and Bengal." 
" But," says Bogle, c * although he spoke with all the zeal 
in the world, I confess I did not much like the thoughts 
of referring my business to Lhasa, where I was not present, 
where I was unacquainted, and where I had reason to 
think the Ministers had entertained no favourable idea of 
me and my commission," 



Later on, at the request of the Tashi Lama, two 
deputies from Lhasa came to visit Bogle They said the 
English had shown great favour to the Lama and to them 
by making peace with the Bhutanese and restoring their 
country* Bogle replied that the English were far from 
being of that quarrelsome nature which some evil-minded 
persons represented them to be, and wished not for extent 
of territories. They were entrusted with the management 
of Bengal, and only wished it should remain in tran- 
quillity. The war with the Bhutanese was of their own 
seeking. The deputies might judge whether the Company 
had not cause for alarm when eight or ten thousand Bhu- 
tanese, who had formerly confined themselves to their 
mountains, poured into the low country, seized the Raja 

2 



18 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

of Kuch Behar, took possession of his territories, and 
earned then* arms to the borders of Bengal The deputies 
could judge for themselves whether the Company weie 
not in the right in opposing them In the course of the 
war some of the Bhutan territory was taken fiom them, 
but was immediately restored at the request of the Tashi 
Lama, and so far from desiring conquest, the boundaries 
of Bengal lemamed the same as formerly 

The Lhasa deputies said the Lama had written to 
Lhasa about trading, but that the Tibetans were afraid of 
the heat, and proceeded, therefore, only as far as Phan, 
where the Bhutanese brought the commodities of Bengal 
and exchanged them for those of Tibet This was the 
ancient custom, and would certainly be observed 

Bogle stated that besides this there was formerly a 
very extensive tiade carried on between Tibet and Bengal , 
Warren Hastings was desirous of removing existing 
obstacles, and had sent him to Tibet to repiesent the 
matter to the Tashi Lama, and he tiusted that the Lhasa 
authorities would agree to so icasonable a proposal They 
answered that Gesub Rimpoche (the Regent at Lhasa) 
would do everything in his power, but that he and all the 
country were subject to the Emperoi of China. 



" This," says Bogle, " is a stumbling-block which crosses 
me in all my paths " And in the paths of how many 
negotiators since has it not stood as a stumbling-block 1 
The Tibetans are ready to do anything, but they can do 
nothing without the permission of the Chinese The 
Chinese would freely open the whole of Tibet, but the 
Tibetans themselves are so terribly seclusive. So the 
same old story goes on ^ear after year, till centuries are 
beginning to roll by, and the story is still unfinished When 
in the Audience Hall of the Dalai Lama's Palace at Lhasa 
itself I had obtained the seals of the Dalai Lama, of the 
Council, of the National Assembly, and of the three great 
monasteries, to an agi cement, and had done all this in the 
presence of the Chinese Resident, I thought we had at 
last laid that fiction low for evei But it seems to be 



FEAR OF THE CHINESE 19 

springing up again in all its old exuberance, and showing 
still perennial vitality 

Bogle, at the request of the Tashi Lama, related to him 
the substance of his conversation with the Lhasa deputies 
The Lama assured him again of the reasonableness of his 
proposals in legard to trade, but said that, in reply to the 
letter he had written on the subject, he had icceived a 
letter from the Lhasa Regent mentioning his apprehension 
of giving umbrage to the Chinese Theie were, too, 
disturbances in Nepal and Sikkim which rendered this an 
improper time to settle anything, but in a year or two he 
hoped to bring it about As to the English, the Lhasa 
Regent had received such accounts as made him suspicious, 
" and," added the Tashi Lama, " his heait is confined, and 
he does not see things in the same view as I do." 

Bogle then hinted at the advisability of the Tibetans 
coming into some fonn of alliance with the English so that 
the influence of the latter might be used to restrain the 
Guikhas of Nepal nom attacking Tibet and its feudatories 
This argument evidently much struck the Lama, who 
asked if he might wnte it to the Lhasa Regent. Bogle 
told him he might, and that he had no doubt that Warren 
Hastings would be ready to employ his mediation to make 
the Gurkha Raja desist from his attempts on the temtones. 
subject to Lhasa, and that he had reason to thmk that 
from the Gurkha Raja's dread of the English it would be 
effectual. The Lama said that the Regent's apprehensions 
of the English arose not only from himself, but also from 
his fear of giving offence to the Chinese, to whom Tibet 
was subject. The Regent wished, therefore, to receive an 
answer from the Court at Peking 

Bogle contended that Warren Hastings, in his proposals 
to facilitate trade, was promoting the advantage of Tibet 
as well as of Bengal , that in former times merchants 
used to come freely into Tibet , that the Gurkha Raja's 
wars and oppressions had prevented their coming for some 
years past, and he only prayed the Lama to remove the 
obstacles which these had occasioned. To this the Lama 



20 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

replied that he had no doubt of cairjnng the point, but 
that it might require a year or two to do it effectually 

So we see the well-intentioned Tashi Lama held back 
by the obstructive Lhasa authorities , and this was still 
more evident at Bogle's next interview, which was with 
the Lhasa deputies. They came to pay him a farewell 
visit, and in the innocence of his heart he made the very 
simple request that they would convey a letter from him 
to the Lhasa Regent Nothing could be more natural 
than such a request, but, till iccently, one might just 
as well have asked a Tibetan to touch a red-hot poker as 
to carry a letter from an Englishman. The deputies said 
that if it contained anything to do with business they 
could not carry it. " I confess," says Bogle, " I was much 
struck with this answer " Poor man, he might well be 1 
And I was equally stiuck, 130 years latei, when I was 
formally deputed on a mission to Tibet, with the full 
consent of the Chinese suzerain, when Tibetans still i e fused 
to take a letter from an Englishman. It was only when 
we were in full march to Lhasa, and but a few miles distant, 
that they at last consented to so simple a proceeding as 
receiving a lettei, though now they have changed so 
completely round, that this year the Dalai Lama himself, 
at Calcutta, appealed to the Viceroy of India " to secure the 
observance of the i ight which the Tibetans had of dealing 
direct with the British." 

Bogle told the Lhasa deputies that he wished to know 
the giounds of the Regent's suspicions, but they replied 
" that much conversation was not the custom of their 
country," and wished him a good journey back to Bengal. 
Bogle endeavoured to get them to listen to him, as he 
wished to introduce the subject of trade, but it was to no 
purpose. 



" This conversation gave me more concern," he re 
" than any I had in Tibet." He immediately asked to see 



he records, 

j jsked to see 

the Tashi Lama, and told him with some warmth," as he 



NEPALESE INTRUSION 21 

was " a good deal affected," that he could not help being 
concerned that the Regent should suspect him of coming 
into his country to raise disturbances , that God was his 
witness that he wished the Regent well, and wished the 
Lama well, and the country well, and that a suspicion of 
treachery and falsehood he could not hear The Tashi 
Lami tried to calm him, and eventually dictated a letter 
in Tibetan in Bogle's name to the Lhasa Regent This 
lettei contained only one sentence of pme business It 
simply said : " I request, in the name of the Governor, my 
master, that you will allow merchants to trade between 
this country and Bengal " Not a very aggressive request 
to make or a very great favour to ask, especially as the 
Tibetans had begun their intercourse by asking a favour 
from us. But it was not for a century and a quarter, and 
not till we had can led our arms to Lhasa itself, that that 
simple request was answered, although all the 'time the 
people and traders of Tibet were only too willing to 
trade with us. 

Why Bogle did not himself go to Lhasa, as he was 
empowered to do by his instructions, seems strange The 
Tashi Lama said that he himself would have been quite 
willing, but that the Lhasa Regent was very averse, and 
he dissuaded Bogle, saying that the Regent's heart was 
small and suspicious, and he could not promise that he 
would be able to procure the Regent's consent. 



And now the feeling of suspicion was to be increased 
by an unfortunate occurrence The Gurkha Raja of 
Nepal wrote to both the Tashi Lama and the Lhasa 
Regent, announcing that he had subdued certain districts 
He said he did not wish to quanfel with Tibet, but if they 
had a mind for war he let them know he was well prepared, 
and he would desue them to remember he was a Rajput, 
Fie wished to establish factories at places upon the 
Tibetan border, where the merchants of Tibet might pur- 
chase the commodities of his country and of Bengal, and 
he desired the concurrence of the Tibetans, He also 
further desned the Tibetans "to have no connection with 



22 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

Frmgies or Moghuls, and not to allow them into the 
country, but to follow the ancient custom, which he was 
resolved likewise to do " A Fimgy had come to him 
upon some business, and was now in his country, but he 
intended to send him back as soon as possible, and desired 
the Tibetans to do the same with Bogle 

Thus were Bogle's difficulties still further mci eased 
A.nd in one respect, at least, we have advanced since his 
day ; for the Mission to Lhasa in 1904, instead of being 
hampered, was warmly supported by the Nepalese. The 
Dewan of Nepal wrote strongly to the Lhasa authorities, 
urging them to reason, and his agent at Lhasa was of the 
greatest assistance to me in my negotiations with the 
Tibetans. 



Besides China and Nepal thus entering into this 
Tibetan question, there was also some mention of Russia 
even so far back as that The Tashi Lama had already 
questioned Bogle about the Empress of Russia He now 
told Bogle that there was a quarrel between the Russians 
and the Chinese over some Tartar tribe. The Russians 
had not yet begun hostilities, but he imagined they would 
soon go to war about it. Bogle told him that as the 
Russians were engaged in a very heavy war with the Turks 
how far back that other stoiy reaches I he supposed 
they would hardly think of entering into another with 
the Chinese He said the Russians were a very hardy 
and warlike people, capable of great efforts, and he 
doubted whether the Chinese would be able to cope with 
then: troops. 

r 

Bogle then had conversations with the Kashmiri 
traders, who had been sent to him by the Tashi Lama, 
and who wanted to be allowed to trade with Bengal 
through Bhutan. They stated the difficulties which the 
Bhutanese placed in their way, and said that the Chief of 
Bhutan would soon remove these if the Company would 
threaten him with war, as after the last war he was in 



TIBETAN MERCHANTS 23 

great dread of the English It is a point which should 
be specially noted by those who believe that Warren 
Hastings' policy was aggiessive, that Bogle, in leply to this 
hint, told the mei chants * that he had no powei to use 
such language to the Bhutanese, and that whatever he did 
with the Raja witst be by peaceable and friendly mean's 
The Company had enteied into a tieaty of peace with 
them, "which, accoidmg to the maxim of the English 
Government, would lemam foi evei inviolate " 

Tibetan mei chants also came, at the Tashi Lama's 
request, to see Bogle They dealt chiefly in tea, some of 
them to the extent of two 01 three lakhs of lupees a year 
of the then value of 20,000 to 30,000 They said the 
Lama had advised them to send agents to Bengal, but they 
weie afiaid to go into the heat of the plains They had a 
tradition that about eight hundied yeais ago people of 
Tibet used to go to Bengal, but that eight out of ten 
died befoie then letuin Bogle told them that if they 
weie afiaid of sending then seivants thithei, the Ka&hmiii 
would supply them with what they wanted They said 
that formeily wool, broadcloth, etc , used to come through 
Nepal, but since the wars in Nepal the trade had diminished 
They added that people imagined nom gold being produced 
in Tibet that it was extremely rich, but that this was not 
the case, and if extraoidmaiy quantities of gold weie sent 
to Bengal, the Empeioi of China, who was Soveieign oi 
the country, would be displeased 

At his faiewell interview Bogle said that Wan en 
Hastings would send letteis to the Lama by his own 
servants, upon which the Lama said '* I wish the Goveinoi 
will not at present send an Englishman You know what 
difficulties I had about youi coming into the country, and 
how I had to struggle with the jealousy of the Gesub 
Rimpoche (the Regent) and the people at Lhasa Even 
now they are uneasy at my having kept you so long I 
could wish, therefore, that the Governor would rather send 
a Hindu 1 am in hopes my letter to the Regent will 
have a good effect in lemovmg his jealousy, and I expect 
in a yeai or two that the government of this country will 

* Maikham, p 162 



24 BOGLE'S MISSION, 1774 

be in the Dalai Lama's hands, when I will inform the 
Governor, and he may then send an Englishman to me and 
to the Dalai Lama." 

The Tashi Lama repeated his concern at Bogle's 
departure and the satisfaction he had received in being 
informed of the customs of Europe He spoke all this, 
m and with a look very different from the studied compli- 
ments of Hindustan " I never could reconcile myself," 
continues Bogle, " to taking a last leave of anybody ; and 
what from the Lama's pleasant and amiable character, what 
from the many favours and civilities he had shown me, I 
could not help being particularly affected He observed 
it, and m order to cheer me mentioned his hopes of seeing 
me again " 

Of Bogle's own warm-heaited and affectionate feelings 
to the people of Tibet there can be no question On the 
eve of his departure he wrote in a letter to his sister 
" Farewell, ye honest and simple people ! May ye long 
enjoy the happiness which is denied to more polished 
nations ; and while they are engaged in the endless 
pursuits of avarice and ambition, defended by your barren 
mountains, may ye continue to live in peace and content- 
ment, and know no wants but those of nature," 



At the close of Bogle's Mission we may review its 
results. He was sent by Warren Hastings to establish 
relationship and intercourse of trade with the Tibetans. 
How far did he succeed in carrying out that object * 

It is sufficiently clear that, as regards personal relation- 
ship, he was eminently successful, and that was about as 
much as he could have expected to establish at the start, 
As we have already seen, Warren Hastings never expected 
any very striking result from the first communication; He 
wished to lay the foundation for neighbourly intercourse 
and in this much he succeeded He had had experience 
enough of Asiatics in other quarters to be aware that they 
are very naturally suspicious of a European Power, then by 
some apparently irresistible process gradually expanding 
over smaller Asiatic peoples As the instance of the Gurkha 



RESULTS OF MISSION 25 

Raja's letter showed, there are few Asiatic rulers who, if 
they have the power to subdue a weakei neighbour, will not 
as a perfectly natural course proceed to bring that neighbour 
undei subjection This is looked upon by most Asiatics 
as a quite normal and inevitable proceeding Naturally, 
therefore, the Tibetans would assume that it would only 
be a matter of time before the English Governor of Bengal 
would attack Tibet He had the power to subdue the 
country; he would therefore subdue it In the first 
instance he would, of course, send up an agent to spy out 
the land, to see what it was worth, and to find out the best 
way into it ; and such an agent doubtless Bogle was, in their 
opinion. It was inevitable, therefore, that Bogle should 
be viewed with suspicion, and that the Tibetans should not, 
at the first jump off, throw their country freely open to 
trade. How much wiser, in their opinion, would be the 
views of some shrewd old counsellor who said : " Keep the 
English at a distance; don't let one into our country, stay 
behind our mountain barrier and have nothing whatever 
to do with anyone beyond it This is the ' ancient custom. ' 
Do not let us depart from it. Let us be civil to this Bogle 
now he is here, lest we offend his powerful master, but 
for God's sake let us get rid of him as soon as we can, and 
put every polite difficulty we know of in the way of any 
other Englishman coming amongst us." 

We can imagine how sound such an opinion would 
seem to the generality of the old greybeard s hearers, and 
how difficult it would be for anyone even the Tashi 
Larna to contend against it And with such a feeling in 
existence Bogle could not do more than produce a 
favourable personal impression, and put in an argument or 
two, whenever he had the opportunity, to show that there 
were also some advantages in "having relationship with 
the English, in the hopes that these arguments might 
gradually sink into the Tibetan mind, and when the 
opportunity should arise, bring forth fruit. And this much 
he did most effectively in carrying out the Governor's 
policy. 



CHAPTER II 

TURNER'S MISSION, 1782 

WARREN HASTINGS was not content with a single effort 
to reopen the commercial and friendly intercourse which 
in formei times had subsisted between Tibet and India 
As he had expected little from the first move, so he had 
always intended to work continuously with the same end 
in view, hoping to eventually gam that end by repeated 
efforts over long periods 

Bogle returned to Calcutta in June, 1775, and in 
November of the same year Hastings deputed Dr. Hamil- 
ton, who had accompanied him to Tibet, on a second 
mission to Bhutan. Hamilton spent some months in 
Bhutan, inquiring into and settling certain causes of dis- 
pute , and in July, 1777, he was sent on a third mission 
to Bhutan to congratulate a new Deb Raja on his succes- 
sion. Thus, as Markham points out, Warren Hastings, 
by keeping up a regular intercourse with the Bhutan 
rulers, by maintaining a correspondence with the Tashi 
Lama, and by means of an annual fair at Rangpur, 
prevented the opening made by Bogle from again being 
closed 

Warren Hastings also intended to send another mis- 
sion to Tibet itself, and in 1779 Bogle was appointed 
Envoy for a second time. But in the meanwhile the 
Tashi Lama had decided to undertake a journey to 
Peking to visit the Chinese Emperor. Bogle, therefore, 
was to have been sent to Peking to meet the Lama there, 
but, most disastrously for all friendly intercourse between 
Tibet and India, the Lama died in Peking m November 
1780, and Bogle himself died at Calcutta in April, 17BL 

The success of Asiatic affairs depends so much on the 

26 



PERSISTENCE OF WARREN HASTINGS 27 

influence of personalities that the death of these two men, 
who had conceived such a real respect and affection 
foi one another, was an almost fatal blow to Warren 
Hastings' plans foi the improvement of the lelationship 
between Tibet and India Nevertheless, he kept steadily 
on with his dehbeiate policy, and watched for some other 
opportunity of cariymg it to fruition Peisistency of aim 
and watchfulness foi opportunities, making the most of 
the occasion offered, and decisiveness of action these were 
always Hastings' guiding pnnciples So when, in Feb- 
luary, 1782, news leached Calcutta that the Tashi Lama, 
in accordance with the Tibetan ideas of reincarnation, 
had leappeared in the peison of an infant, he resolved 
to send another mission to Tibet to congratulate the 
Regent 

Foi this duty he selected Captain Samuel Turner, an 
officer who had distinguished himself at the Siege of 
Sermgapatam and on a mission to Tippoo Sultan, and 
who was then thirty-thiee years of age 



Turner himself was very favouiably icceived at 
Shigatse, and at his first interview informed the Regent 
that Warien Hastings had an earnest solicitude to 
pieserve and cultivate the amicable intercourse that had 
so happily commenced between them ; that this corie- 
spondence, in its eaihest stages, had been dictated by the 
purest motives of humanity, and had hitherto pointed with 
unexampled sincerity and steadiness towaids one great 
object, which constituted the grand business of the Tashi 
Lama's life peace and universal good , that the Governor- 
General, whose attention was always directed towards the 
same pursuits, was overwhelmed with anxiety lest the 
friendship which had been established between himself 
and the Regent might undergo a change, and he had 
therefore sent a trusted agent to convey his congiatulations 
on the joyful reappearance in the woild of the late Tashi 
Lama, and to express the hope that everything that was 
expected would at length be effectually accomplished 

To this the Regent replied that the present and the 



28 TURNER'S MISSION, 1782 

late Tashi Lama were one and the same, and that there 
was no manner of difference between them, only that, as 
he was yet merely an infant, and his spirit had but just 
returned into the world, he was at present incapable of 
action The Regent assured Turner of the firm, un- 
shaken attachment which the Tashi Lama had entertained 
foi Mr Hastings to his latest breath, and he was also loud 
in liis encomiums on the occasion that gave birth' to their 
present friendship, which originated entirely in his granting 
peace to the Bhutanese in compliance with the intercession 
of the Tashi Lama 

In other interviews the Regent assured Turner that 
during the interview of the late Tashi Lama with the 
Emperor of China, the Lama had taken several opportuni- 
ties to represent in the strongest terms the particular 
amity which subsisted between the Governor-General and 
himself. The Regent said that the Lama's conveisation 
, had even influenced the Emperor to resolve upon com- 
mencing a correspondence with his fnend Turner was 
also assured that the Tashi Lama particularly sought from 
the Emperor liberty to grant admission to Tibet to what- 
ever person he chose, without control. And to this the 
Emperor is said to have consented , but, owing to the 
death of the Tashi Lama and the jealousy of the Chinese 
officials, nothing resulted. 



The power and influence of these Chinese officials 
in Tibet was evidently very great, for in his intercourse 
with the Tibetan officials Turner could plainly trace, 
though they were averse to own any immediate de- 
pendence upon the Chinese, the greatest awe of the 
Emperor of China, andof his officers stationed at the 
Court of Lhasa, who had usurped even from the hands of 
the Dalai Lama the greatest portion of his temporal power. 
When Turner offered to attend a certain ceremony, the 
Regent excused himself from accepting the offer of his 
company on account of the Chinese, whose jealousy 
of strangers was well known, and to whom he was par- 
ticularly anxious to give no occasion for offence. On a 



TRADERS ADMITTED 29 

subsequent occasion the Regent told Turner that many 
letters had passed between himself and the Dalai Lama, 
who was always favourably inclined towards the English , 
but he attributed the discouragement and obstruction 
Turner had received to the Chinese officials at Lhasa 
"The influence of the Chinese," adds Turner, "oveiawes 
the Tibetans in all their proceedings, and produces a 
timidity and caution in then conduct more suited to the 
chaiactei of subjects than allies " At the same time, they 
weie very jealous of interference by the Chinese, and 
uneasy of their yoke, though it sat so lightly upon them 
And while they respected the Chinese Emperoi, and had 
this f'eai of Chinese officials, they "looked upon the 
Chinese as a gross and impure lace of men " 



And now again, as m Bogle's time, we see tiaces of 
Russian influence The Regent and the Ministers told 
Tiunci that they were no strangeis to the reputation of 
the leigmng Czaiina, Catherine, her extent of dominion, 
and the commerce earned on with China. Many ovei- 
tures, they told him, had been made on the part of 
Russia to extend hei commerce to the internal part of 
Tibet, but the disinclination of the Tibetans to enter into 
any new foreign connection, and the watchful jealousy of 
the Chinese, had hitherto defeated every attempt of 
that nature 

Tinner spent nearly a year in Tibet, and though he was 
unable to visit Lhasa owing to the antipathy of the 
Lamas, he was able to obtain some substantial concessions 
from the Regent of the Tashi Lama at Shigatse He 
obtained* " his promise of encouragement to all merchants, 
natives of India, that may be sent to traffic in Tibet, on 
behalf of the Government of Bengal," and he reports to 
Warren Hastings that his authority alone is requisite 
to secure these merchants the protection of the Regent, 
who had promised to grant free admission into Tibet 

* Turnei, p 374- 



SO TURNER'S MISSION, 1782 

to all such merchants, natives of India, as shall come 
recommended by the Governor of Bengal , to yield them 
every assistance requisite for the transport of their goods , 
and to assign them a place of residence for vending their 
commodities, either within the monastery at Shigatse, 01, 
should it be considered as more eligible, in the town itself 
He did not consider it consistent with the spint of 
Warren Hastings' instructions, he reports, to be impor- 
tunate for greater privileges than those to native traders 
Such as he had obtained he hoped would suffice to open 
the much-wished-foi communication. When merchants 
had learnt the way, tasted the profit and established 
intercourse, the traffic might bear a tax, which, if laid 
upon it in its infancy, might suppress its growth 

Turnei rejoined Wairen Hastings at Patna in March, 
1784, and I remember seeing, among some original letters 
of Warren Hastings in the Indian Foreign Office, an 
enthusiastic appreciation of Turner's work, and an ex- 
pression of the great pleasure the meeting affoided him , 
for Hastings was as waimly appreciative with some men 
as he was coldly reseived with others 

As long as Hastings remained in India our intercourse 
with Tibet prospered But soon after his departuie a 
contretemps occurred, and all his woik was undone. In 
1792 the Nepalese invaded Tibet, sacked Shigaise, and 
carried off all the plundei of the monasteries The Lumas 
had to flee across the Brahmaputia and apply for piotection 
to the Chinese. A Chinese army was despatched to their 
assistance The Nepalese were defeated and driven back 
across their own frontier, and peace was only concluded 
upon the conditions of an annual tnbute to the Empcior 
and the full restitution of all the spoils which they 
carried off. 

By an unfortunate ciicuinstance, through the first 
British Envoy having arrived in Nepal just about the time 
of this^ invasion, the Chinese commander formed the 
impression that we had instigated, or at least encouraged, 
the Nepalese in their attack on Tibet; and the representa- 



TRADE AGAIN STOPPED 31 

tions which he made to his Goveinment, coupled, says 
Turner, with our declining to afford effectual assistance to 
the Lamas' cause, had considerable weight As a conse- 
quence, all communication between Tibet and India was 
stopped, and " the approach of strangers, even of Bengal 
and Hindustan, was utterly prohibited " The Hindu holy 
men weie charged with treachery in acting as spies and 
guides for the Nepalese, and were forbidden to remain 
any longer in Shigatse , and " from this period," con- 
tinues Turner, "unhappily is to be dated the interrup- 
tion which has taken place in the icgular intercourse 
between the Company 's possessions and the territory of 
the Lama " 



It was a sad ending to what had begun so promisingly, 
and one is tempted to reflect what Wan en Hastings 
would have done if he had still held the reins of govern- 
ment m Bengal, and whether he would have been able to 
restrain the Gurkhas, to assist the Lamas, and to icassure 
the Chinese Certainly it is a most unfortunate circum- 
stance that we so often arc unable to help our friends just 
when they most need our help, and press our friendship 
upon them just when they least want it. 

Thus the results of Warren Hastings' forethought and 
careful, steady endeavour were all lost Yet it must be 
conceded by the sturdiest advocate of non-interference 
that those endeavours were not merely statesman-hke, but 
humane, Theie was never any attempt to aggress No 
threats were ever used , no impatience was shown 
Warren Hastings, as the representative of a trading com- 
pany, looked, firstly, to improve trade relations , but as 
the ruler of many millions of human beings, he knew 
that trade or any other relationship must be based on 
mutual good feeling, and he knew that good feeling with 
a suspicious people can only be established by a very, 
very slow process. He therefore took each step deliber- 
ately, and he strove to secure permanently the advantages 
of each small step taken , and, having done this, he had 
some right to expect ,that when he himself had shown 



32 TURNER'S MISSION, 1782 

so much restraint and moderation, those who followed 
after would continue the same deliberate policy 

Unfortunately, as we have seen, the policy of drift and 
inaction in regard to Tihet set in on Warren Hastings' 
departure. The promotion of intercourse had pioved a 
difficult business , and with so much on hand elsewheie 
in the building up of the Indian Empire, it was perhaps 
natural that the ordinary Goveinor-General should let the 
matter drop. 



CHAPTER III 

MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA 

Now when statesmen were most lukewarm about Tibet 
the inevitable English adventurer came to the front And 
it is a cunous circumstance that it was just when our 
relations with the Tibetans were at their coldest that 
the only Englishman who ever reached Lhasa before the 
Mission of 1904 achieved this success He was not an 
accredited agent of Government sent to bring into effect 
a deliberate policy such as that conceived by Warien 
Hastings. He was a private adventurer, and he went up 
in spite of, and against the wishes of, the Government of 
the time 

His name was Manning At Cambridge he was the 
friend of Charles Lamb, and was of such ability that he 
was expected to be at least Second Wrangler, but he was 
of an eccentric nature, and "had a strong repugnance to 
oaths," and left the University without a degree. He 
conceived, however, a passionate desire to see the Chinese 
Empire. He studied the Chinese language in France and 
England, aftei wards made his way to Canton, remained there 
three years and in 1810 procured a letter of introduction 
from the Select Committee of Canton to Lord Minto, then 
Governor-General of India, asking him to give him every 
practicable assistance in the prosecution of his plans But 
he received little or no aid from the Government, and was 
left to his own resources, without official recognition of 
any description 

Manning, attended by a Chinese servant, proceeded to 
Tibet through Bhutan, and on October 21, 1811, arrived 
at Phan, at the head of the Chumbi Valley. His descrip- 
tion of the Jong then precisely corresponds with our own 

33 ft 



34 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA 

experiences in Tibet on many an occasion since: "Dirt, 
dirt, grease, smoke. Miseiy, but good mutton " 

A Chinese Mandaim arrived there about the same time, 
and Manning gave him two bottles of cherry-brandy and 
a wineglass This, and probably Manning's very original 
manners, evidently unfioze hib heart, for he asked him to 
dinner, and promised to write immediately to the Lhasa 
Mandarin for permission for him to proceed Manning 
also leceived applications to cure soldieis, and his medicines 
" did wonderfully well, and the patients were very grateful." 
They even petitioned foi him to go with the Mandarin 
towards Gyantse, and the Mandarin granted their 
lequest 

Altogether Manning made a very favourable impression 
on the Chinese who, he remarked, lorded it in Tibet like the 
English in India, and made the Tibetans stand before 
them And he considered then that there were advantages 
in having the Chinese in this superior position " Things 
aie much pleasanter now the Chinese are here," he says ; 
" the magistrate hints about overtures respecting opening 
a commercial intercourse between the Chmese and the 
English thiough Bhutan I cannot help exclaiming in my 
mind (as I often do) what fools the Company aie to give 
me no commission, no authoiity, no instructions What 
use are their Embassies when their Ambassadors cannot 
speak to a soul, and can only make ordinary phrases pass 
through a stupid interpreter 2 No finesse, no toumuie, 
no compliments Fools, fools, fools, to neglect an oppor- 
tunity they may never have again 1 " 



Poor Manning experienced very severe cold, and 
travelled to Gyantse in great discomfort, and felt these 
discomforts acutely, so that the greater part of his diary 
is filled with quaint denunciation of his Chinese clerk ; 
of a vicious horse which kicked and bit him; of the 
" common horse-furniture," which was ' detestable " ; of 
the saddle which was so high behind and before that he sat 



INTERCOURSE WITH CHINESE 35 

in pain unless he twisted himself unequally , of another 
pony "which sprang forward in a full runaway gallop, with 
the most fuiious and awkward motion he ever experienced" , 
of yet another that was " so weak, so tottering, and so 
stumbling, and which trembled so whenever he set his foot 
on a stone, winch was about every other step," that he 
could " hardly keep up with the company " , of his being 
" so eaten up by little insects " that he had to sit down in 
the sunshine and get nd of as many as he could, foi he 
" suffered a good deal from these little insects, whose 
society he was not used to " , of his at last finding " a 
very pleasant-going hoise with a handsome countenance," 
which he was tempted to buy, " but was checked by the 
prudent consideration that he might encumber me at 
Lhasa," and too much disencumber his lean purse, Stiange 
that the first Englishman ever to visit Lhasa should have 
been incommoded for want of a five-pound note with 
which to buy a rough hill pony 

At Gyantse the Chinese Mandarin and Geneial, iii 
whose train Manning had come, appointed him a little 
lodge in the courtyard of the principal house, and what- 
ever he required was soon supplied by the Chinese soldiers 
and others who wished medical treatment from him. 
" One brought rice, one brought meat, another brought a 
table, another brought a little paste and paper and mended 
a hole in the window, another brought a present of a pen 
and candles." Every Chinaman in the town came to see 
him. The General was "vastly civil and polite," and 
invited him to dinner. But though he was " very much 
of a gentleman," Manning concluded that he was " really 
no better than an old woman." The dinner was tolerably 
good, and the wine excellent, but the cooking was 
indifferent. 

On the other hand, the Mandarin was impressed by 
Manning's beard. He had known men with better 
moustaches than Manning's, for he had, *' for convenience 
of eating, song, and drink," cut his short in India, and it 
had not yet grown again. But the beard never failed to 
excite the General's admiration, and he declared he had, 
never seen one nearly so handsome The General, like- 



36 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA 

wise, approved of his " countenance and manner." He 
pretended to skill in physiognomy and fortune-telling, 
and foretold very great things of Manning 

Manning also visited the Tibet Mandarin, who lived 
" in a sort of castle on the top of a hill," the Jong, which 
General Macdonald attacked and captured in 1904, and 
they discussed Calcutta and Tibet together for half an 
hour, but what they said Manning does not record The 
Tibetan intimated that he would return the visit the 
next day, and he sent " some rice and a useful piece of 
cloth, but did not come himself " 

With his medical practice Manning had a greater 
success. To one Chinaman and his wife, who were 
suffering from " an inteimittent fever," he gave " opium, 
Fowler's solution of arsenic, and afterwards left them a 
few pages of bark The mother-in-law, also, who had the 
complaint of old age, he cheered up with a little comfort- 
ing physic " 

The General often came to see him, " for, like many 
other Generals, he had nothing to do, and was glad of a 
morning lounge" He managed, howevei, to foist a 
Chinese servant on to Manning as cook This man's 
cooking was bad, but " in drying and folding up linen he 
saved him infinite trouble," for, says Manning, " I never 
could to this day fold up a shirt or other vestment A 
handkerchief or a sheet I can manage, but nothing 
further " 

Manning, hearing that the General was fond of music, 
and "no bad performer," took the opportunity " one day, 
while he was smoking his pipe in my courtyard, of intro- 
ducing the subject, and paying my court to him by 
requesting the favour of hearing music. This brought me 
an invitation to take an -evening repast and wine with him, 
which was just what I liked. He gave us a very pretty 
concert The Chinese music, though rather meagre 

to a European, has its beauties. . . The General 
insisted upon my giving him a specimen of European 
(Calcutta) music on the Chinese flute I was not ac- 
quainted with the fingering of that instrument, but I 
managed to produce something, which he politely praised," 



VISITS THE GRAND LAMA 37 

The answer from the Lhasa magistrate to his request 
to be permitted to proceed to Lhasa arrived a few days 
after his ai rival at Gyantse A passport was given him, 
tiansport and supplies furnished, and as he neared Lhasa 
he was met by a " respectable person on horseback, who 
dismounted and saluted," and who had been sent out by 
the Tibetan authorities to welcome him and conduct him 
to Lhasa 

The view of the Potala, " of the lofty, towering palace, 
which forms a majestic mountain of a building," excited 
his admiration, but if the palace had exceeded his expec- 
tations, he says, the town as fai fell shoit of them There 
was "nothing striking, nothing pleasing, in its appeal ance 
The habitations were bcginncd with smut and dirt . . 
In short, everything seemed mean and gloomy, and 
excited the idea of something unreal " 

His first care was to provide himself with a proper 
hut, and, having found one, he proceeded to pay his 
respects to the Chinese Mandarin, Coming into his 
presence, he for the first time in his life performed the 
ceremony oiketcsc, or kneeling. The Mandarin received 
him politely, and said he had provided him with quarters* 
On the following day he visited two of the chief Tibetan 
officials. 



On December 17, 1811, he went to the Potala to salute 
the Grand Ltima He took with him as an offering some 
broadcloth, two pair of china ewers, and a pair of good 
brass candlesticks, which he had " clean and furbished 
up," and into which he put " two wax candles to make a 
show " He also took " thirty new bright dollars, and as 
many pieces of zinc," and, besides this, " some genuine 
Smith's lavender-water , . , and a good store of Nankin 
tea, which is a rarity and delicacy at Lhasa, and not to be 
bought there " 

Arrived in the great hall he made due obeisance, 
touching the ground three times with his head to the 
Grand Lama, and once to the Ti-rm-fu. While he was 
bowing, " the awkward servants contrived to let fall and 



38 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA 

break the bottle of lavender-water " Having dehveied 
his present to the Grand Lama, he took off his hat, and 
"humbly gave his clean-shaved head to lay Ins hands 
upon " 

This ceremony over, he sat on a cushion, not far from 
the Lama's throne, and had such brought them But "the 
Lama's beautiful and interesting face and manner engrossed 
almost all his attention" His face was, he thought, 
poetically and affectmgly beautiful, He was at that time 
about seven years old, and had the sunple and unaffected 
manneis of a well-educated, pimcely child Sometimes, 
particulaily when he looked at Maiming, his smile almost 
approached to a gentle laugh " No doubt," naively re- 
marks Manning, "my gum beard and spectacles somewhat 
excited his risibility," 

The little Grand Lama addressed a few remaiks to 
Manning, speaking in Tibetan to the Chinese interpreter, 
the interpieter in Chinese to Manning's Chinese Muushi, 
and the Munshi in Latin to Manning " I was extremely 
affected by this interview with the Lama," says Manning. 
" I could have wept through strangeness of sensation " 



Heie m Lhasa, as at Gyantse, Manning had many 
applications made to him for medicine, and he treated 
both Chinese and Tibetans But spies also came, and 
" certainly," says Manning, " my bile used to rise when 
the hounds looked into my room " The Tartar General 
detested Europeans They were the cause, he said, of all 
his misfortunes Sometimes he said Manning was ti 
missionary, and at other times a spy " These Europeans 
are very formidable ; now one man has come to spy the 
country he will inform others, Numbers will come, and 
at last they will be for taking the country from us." So 
argued the Mandarins, and, indeed, there were rumours 
that the Chinese meant to execute Manning. He had 
always fully expected this possibility, and writes: "I never 
could, even in idea, make up my mind to submit to an 
execution with firmness and manliness." 

Yet, on the whole, he was not badly treated. He 



RETURN TO INDIA 39 

remained on at Lhasa for several months, paying many 
visits to the Giaud Lama, and eventually orders came 
from Peking for him to return the way he came He 
left Lhasa on April 19, and leached Kuch Behar on 
June 10, 1812 



Manning's own object was " A moral view of China, its 
manners, the degree of happiness the people enjoy, their 
sentiments and opinions so far as they influence life, their 
hteiatine, their history, the causes of then stability and 
vast population, then minor arts and contiivances , what 
there might be m China to serve as a model for imitation, 
and what to scive as a beacon to avoid." Having been 
foiled in this his mam object, he does not appear to 
have regarded the subsidiary circumstance that he had 
readied Lhasa as of particular interest. And lie seems 
to have been so disgusted with the Government's icfusal 
to support him, that when he returned to Calcutta he 
would give no one any particulars of his journey The 
account which Markham published sixty years later was 
only discovered long after his death 

It is a meagre record of so important a journey, yet 
it exemplifies one or two points which are worthy of 
note It showed that an individual Englishman, with 
delicacy of touch and with a real sympathetic feebng 
towards those among whom he was travelling, could find 
his way even into the very presence of the Dalai Lama in 
the Potala itself It showed, too, that he could get on 
perfectly well with the Chinese personally. But it showed 
likewise that at the back of the minds of both the 
Tibetans and Chinese was a stiong dread of the Batish 
power, which made them tear to allow a single ttnglish- 
mau to leiiuim m Tibet 01 even pass through the country. 

Yet Maiming confirmed what Bogle and Turner had 
also noticed - that, while the Tibetans dreaded the 
Chinese* they disliked them intensely He says that the 
Chinese were very disrespectful to the Tibetans. Only 
bad-charactei ed Chinamen were sent to Tibet, and he 
could not help thinking that the Tibetans * would view 



40 MANNING'S VISIT TO LHASA 

the Chinese influence in Tibet overthrown without many 
emotions of regret, especially if the rulers under the new 
influence were to treat the Grand Lama with respect , foi 
this is a point in which those haughty Mandarins are some- 
what deficient, to the no small dissatisfaction of the good 
people of Lhasa." These words would be very fairly 
applicable to the situation at the present day. 

After Manning, no Englishman, in either a private or 
official capacity, visited Lhasa till the Mission of 1 904. 
This seems to show want of entei prise on the part of 
Englishmen in India ; but some did make the attempt, 
and many more would have if they could have obtained the 
necessary leave fiom all the authorities concerned. British 
officeis in India are keen enough to go on such adven- 
tures, but leave can very rarely be obtained. I had myself 
planned out such a journey in 1889. I had interviewed 
the Foreign Secretary, now Sn Mortimer Durand, and 
not only obtained permission, but even some pecuniary 
assistance, when, at the last moment, I was refused per- 
mission by the Colonel of my regiment. Such restric- 
tions must, I know, have prevented many another besides 
myself. Still, efforts were made by individual officers, 
unsupported by Government, to explore Tibet, and, if 
possible, teach Lhasa Moorcroft explored Western 
Tibet, and, according to some reports, actually reached 
Lhasa and died there , Richaid and Henry Strachey visited 
the sources of the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej ; Carey, 
Littledale, Bower, Wellby, Deasy, and Rawling explored 
1411 Northern Tibet ; and native surveyors mapped even 
Lhasa itself, to which point Sarat Chandra Das also pene- 
trated at great risk and brought back most valuable 
information. 

These and other efforts to explore the country by the 
Russian travellers Prjevalsky, Pievtsoff and Kozoloff; by 
the Frenchmen Hue and Gabet, Bonvalot, Prince Henri 
d'Orle'ans, Dutreuil de Rhins and Grcnard ; and by that 
indefatigable and courageous Swedish traveller, Sven 
Hedm, have all been brought together by Sir Thomas 



SUBSEQUENT EXPLORATION 41 

Holdich in his recent work on exploration m Tibet It 
is not necessary here to do more than refer to the fact 
that efforts to gam a knowledge of the country were 
almost continuously being made through the second half 
of last century ; my object is rather to describe the effort, 
not so much to explore the country, as to regularize and 
fostei the intercourse which already existed with its 
people. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS, 1873-1886 

IT was not till a century had elapsed smce Warren 
Hastings had begun his attempts to form a friendship 
with the Tibetans that the Government in India again 
made any real effort to come into proper relationship with 
their neighbours Foi a century they were content to let 
things take their course, m spite of then mfoiinahty, and 
in spite of the fact that Indian subjects were having all 
the worst of the intercoms, for while Tibetans were 
allowed to come to India when and where and how they 
liked, to trade theie without duty and without hindrance, 
to travel and to reside wherever they wished, on the 
othei side, obstructions of every kind were placed in the 
way of Indians, and still moie of British, trading, travel- 
ling, or residing in Tibet But in the year 1873 the Indian 
Government began to stir, and take stock of the position, 
and to reflect whether this one-sided condition of affans 
might not be changed to the advantage of Indians and 
Europeans without huitmg the Tibetans. 

In that year the Bengal Government addiessed the 
Government of India a letter, a copy of which was sent to 
the Hoyal Geographical Society, in which they urged that 
the Chinese should be piessed "for an ordei of admittance 
to Tibet," and that "the authorities at Peking should 
allow a renewal of the friendly intercourse between India 
and Tibet which existed in the days of Bogie and 
Turner " The Bengal Government said that the Govern- 
ment of India and the Secretary of State had repeatedly 
expressed the great interest which they took in this 
subject, and the wish that no favourable opportunity 
should be neglected of promoting the development of 

4,2 



NEED OF INTERCOURSE 43 

commercial intercourse between British India and those 
trans-Himalayan countries which were then practically 
closed to us If only the Chinese and Tibetans would 
remove the embargo at present imposed upon the entry of 
our trade, theie were, by routes under our own control, 
no senous difficulties or dangers of any kind to overcome, 
and none of the risks of collision which existed else- 
whei e. 

Tibet, the Bengal Government said, was a well- 
legulated country with which our Hillmen weie in constant 
communication. When Europeans went to the frontier 
and tried to cioss it, there was no display of violence or 
distui bancc They weie civilly turned back, with an 
intimation that there were orders not to admit them All 
the 1 inquiries of the Lieutenant-Govcnior led to the 
belief that the Tibetans themselves had no objections to 
intercourse with us. The experiences of the gieat botanist, 
Sir Joseph Hooker, who in 1840 had travelled to the 
Tibetan border, and Blanford among the recent travellers, 
and of Bogle and Turner in the past, were singularly at one 
upon this point* The Commandant of Khamba Jong, who 
had met Mr Blanford on the frontier m 1870, assured him 
that the Tibetans had no ill-will to foreigners, and would, if 
allowed, gladly receive Europeans. The fact appeared to 
be, the Lieutenant-Governor said, tbat " the prohibition to 
intercourse with Tibet is part of the Chinese policy of 
exclusion imposed on the Tibebans by Chinese officials and 
enforced by Chinese troops stationed in Tibet " He fully 
sympathised with the Chinese desire to keep out foreigners 
in China, " But," be said, " in Tibet theie is not wealth 
enough to attract many adventurers , there is room only 
for a moderate and legitimate commerce , " and among a 
people so good and well regulated as the Tibetans there 
would be no such difficulties as existed in China. If the 
road weie opened, it would be used only by lair tiaders and 
by responsible Government servants or travellers under 
tiie control of Government. 

In seeking to press the Chinese for admittance to 
Tibet, lie said, the moat emphatic declaration might be 
made that, having our natural and best boundary in the 



44 THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS 

Himalayas, we could not, and would not in any circum- 
stances, encroach on Tibet, and we might offer to arrange 
that none save Hillmen 01 classes domiciled in Tibet 
should be allowed to go in without a pass, which would be 
given under such restrictions that Government would be 
responsible for the conduct of the holders 

The Lieutenant-Governor adduced as a further reason 
for entering into formal relationship with the Tibetans that, 
if we had an understanding between us, we should together 
be able to keep in order the wild tribes inhabiting the 
hilly country between Butish territory and Tibet. And 
he instanced the case of the Mezhow Mishmes, who for 
murdering two French missionaries in 1854 were punished 
both by us and by the Tibetans, and who, in consequence, 
evei after had " a most salutary dread of using violence." 



The Bengal Government also contended then m 1873, 
as they are still contending now, for the admission of our 
tea Indian tea is giown in large quantities on the hills in 
Bntish temtory bordering Tibet But, said the Lieu- 
tenant- Governor, nearly forty years ago : " The Tibetans, 
or rather their Chinese Governois, will not, on piotectionibt 
principles, admit our tea across the passes An absolute 
embargo is laid on anythmg m the shape of tea,'* The 
removal of this, he thought, might well be made a sub- 
ject of special negotiation. And besides tea, the Bengal 
Government thought that Manchester and Birmingham 
goods and Indian indigo would find a market in Tibet, 
and that we should receive m return much wool, sheep, 
cattle, walnuts, Tibetan cloths, and other commodities. 

Thus, thirty years before the Tibet Mission started the 
local Government had made a real effort to have the 
Chinese pressed to abandon their policy of exclusion so 
far as Tibet was concerned. The lineal official descendant 
of Warren Hastings m the Governorship of Bengal neither 
attempted nor advocated any high-handed local measures, 
He stated his case calmly and reasonably, and advocated 
the most conect course the attempt to settle the matter 
direct with the Chinese. 



DELAYS OF CENTRALIZATION 45 

Local officers are often told that they are too im- 
patient, and that they too frequently want to settle a 
matter by local ac-tion, when it might be so much better 
disposed of by coirespondcnce from headquarteis ; by 
negotiations, for instance, between London and Peking, or 
London and St. Peteisburg. They are urged to take a 
wider view, and to display a calmei spirit, and greater con- 
fidence in the wisdom and sagacity of their London lulers 
liul when thirty years after this veiy moderate and perfectly 
reasonable icquest was made by the local authority, the 
matter was still no ncarci settlement than it was when 
the request was made , and when the House of Commons, 
which controls the destinies of the Empiie, was still asking 
why we did not apply to the Chinese, the local officer's 
faith in the superior efficacy of headquarters treatment 
is somewhat shaken. And he often questions whether 
matters which, after forming the subject of voluminous 
correspondence between the provincial Government and 
the Government of India, between the latter and the 
India Office, between the India Office and the Foreign 
Office, between the Foreign Office and the Ambassador 
abroad, between him and the Foreign Government, which 
are discussed in the Cabinet, and form a subject for debate 
in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, 
and for platform speeches and newspaper articles in- 
numerable, do not m this lengthy process assume a 
magnitude which they never originally possessed , whether, 
having assumed such magnitude, they ever really do get 
settled or only compromised ; and whether, after all, they 
might not have been settled expeditiously and decisively on 
the spot before they had been allowed to grow to these 
alarming proportions 

There arc, one knows, many cases which can only 
be settled by the Central Government, and which are so 
settled very satisfactorily, but I am doubtful if Tibet 
is one of these, and whether we have been wise in the 
instance of Tibet, and in many others connected with 
China, to make so much of* and expect so much from, the 
Chinese Central Government, which has so little real 
control over the local Governments. Perhaps if the 



48 THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS 

This is a very essential fact to bear in mind m the 
consideration of the Tibetan question that aftei both 
Tibetan and Chinese susceptibilities had been given way 
to on every occasion, it was the Tibetans who invaded us 
It was a Bhutanese invasion of the plains of Bengal, 
followed by a letter from the Tashi Lama, that had 
initiated our relations with Tibet in the time of Warren 
Hastings And it was this invasion of Sikkim that forced 
upon us the regularization of our relations with the 
Tibetans 



When the Tibetans thus invaded the teintory of our 
feudatory, we should have been well within our right in 
forthwith expelling them by foice, but, in accordance 
with the policy of forbearance we had so consistently 
pursued, we leferred the matter to the Chinese, and 
icquested them to procure thewithdiawal of the Tibetans, 
We also allowed the Chinese ample time, a year, within 
which to bring then: influence to beai Then, at the end 
of 1887, we wrote to the Tibetan commander that unless 
he evacuted his position before March 15, 1888, he would 
be expelled by force This letter was returned unopened. 
In February we wrote to the Dalai Lama himself to the 
same effect, but again we received no reply. It was only 
on March 20, 1888, that a British force assumed the 
offensive, and advanced upon the Tibetans in the position 
they had occupied within our frontier at Lengtu, 

The Tibetans, for the time being, offered no resistance, 
and retired to Chumbi, on their own side of the frontier, 
and our troops occupied a position at Gnatong, on our 
side. Two months later, however, the Tibetans again 
showed truculence, and with 8,000 men attacked our 
camp at Gnatong. They were repulsed, and once more 
withdrew. But in September they, for the third time, 
advanced across our border, and m a single night, with 
that skill m building for which they are so remarkable* 
threw uj> a wall three miles long and from 3 to 4 feet high 
in a position just above Gnatong, and some miles within 
our bordef 



TIBETANS EXPELLED 49 

This position General Graham attacked on the follow- 
ing day, and drove the Tibetans from it over the Jelap-la 
Pass, and in the ensuing days pursued them into the 
Chuinbi Valley But here again, in accordance with our 
principle of respecting Chinese susceptibilities, our troops 
did not remain in Chumbi a single day, but xeturned at 
once to Gnatong. For two years now the Tibetans had 
been encroaching on our side of the frontier, but not for 
one day would we permit our troops to remain on the 
Tibetan side Forbearance could scarcely go further than 
this, but yet it was to be still more strained on many a 
subsequent occasion. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

THE Chinese Amban. or Resident, at Lhasa now appeared 
upon the scene to effect a settlement, and during 1889 we 
endeavomed to have the frontier line pioperly fixed and 
our exclusive supremacy m Sikkim, which was recorded in 
well-known treaties, definitely iccognized We also wished, 
if possible, to have trade regulated Considering that we 
had abandoned the pioposed mission to Lhasa out of 
deference to Chinese and Tibetan susceptibilities, that the 
Tibetans had assumed the offensive, and that the Chinese 
had shown themselves utterly unable to control them, this 
was not an unreasonable expectation to hold We made 
no demand for indemnity 01 for any accession of territory. 
We meiely asked that the boundary and tiade should be 
regulated Yet a year of negotiation passed and no result 
was obtained, and the Government of India told the 
Chinese negotiators that they had decided "to close the 
Sikkim incident, so far as China is concerned, without 
insisting upon a specific agreement " 

But now that the Indian Government, knowing that they 
could perfectly well hold their own up to their frontier, and 
finding that the Chinese were of little use in controlling 
events beyond it, were quite prepared to diop negotia- 
tions, the Chinese themselves came forward and pressed 
for their conclusion. This is an important point. It was 
now the Chinese who were pressing for an agreement. 
Further, and this is still more important, they stated that 
" China will be quite able to enforce in Tibet the terms of 
the treaty," and they asked the Government of India to 
depute officers to meet the Chinese Resident at Gnatong. 
For the agreement which was subsequently reached the 

so 



CHINESE DESIRE A TREATY 51 

Chinese are therefore in the fullest sense responsible 
They had themselves sought it, and they had themselves 
undertaken to control the aftaus of the Tibetans. 

Agreement was eventually i cached in 1890, and a Con- 
vention was signed by Lord Lansdowne and the Chinese 
Resident in Calcutta on Mai eh 17 It laid down that " the 
boundaiy of Sikhun and Tibet shall be the crest of the 
mountain range separating the waters flowing into the 
Sikkiin Teesta, and the affluents from the waters flowing 
into the Tibetan Mochu, and noith wards into othei riveis 
of Tibet." It admitted the Butish piotectoiate ovei the 
Sikkim State. By it both the Chinese and Bntish 
Governments engaged "reciprocally to icspect the 
boundaiy as defined in Article 1., and to pi event acts of 
aggicssion fiom their icspectivc sides of the frontier" 
The three questions of piovicling met eased facilities for 
trade, o\ pas tin ago, and of the method in which official 
communications between, the British authonties in India 
iiitl the authorities in Tibet should be conducted were 
reserved For discussion by joint Commissioners from either 
side, who should meet within six months of the ratifica- 
tion ot'lhe Convention. 

This Convention proved in practice to be of not the 
slightest use, for the Tibetans ne\er recognized it, and the 
Chinese were totally unable to impress them. But it was 
nt least a start towards effecting our ultimate object of 
icgulammg our intercourse with Tibet, and for another 
three years we solemnly occupied ourselves in discussing 
the three reserved points; the Chinese Resident, Sheng, 
being himself the joint Commissioner on the side of the 
Chinese, and Mr. A. W. Paul representing the British 
Government, 

Our principal aim was to get some mart recognized, to 
which our mei chants could result and there meet Tibetan 
merchants. We did not attempt to gam permission for 
our traders to travel all over Tibet, as Tibetan traders can 
travel all over India. We merely sought to have one 
single place recognizer! where Indian and Tibetan traders 
could meet to do business with each other. And the 
place we sought to get so recognized was not in the centre 



52 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

of Tibet, or even in Tibet proper at all It did not lie on 
the far side of the Himalayan wateished It was Phari, 
at the head of the Chumbi Valley, on the southern side of 
the mam Himalayan range. Yet to even this the Chinese 
and Tibetans would not agiee, and eventually Yatung, at 
the extreme southern end of the Chumbi Valley and 
immediately on our border, was agreed upon. 

Having made this concession, and having refrained 
fiom pressing foi permission to allow British subjects to 
tiavel beyond this or to buy land and build houses there, 
we had hoped that the Chinese would meet our wishes in 
regard to the admission of tea. Speakers in Parliament 
scoffed at the idea of pressing tea upon the Chinese, but 
for the Bengal Government it is an important point. All 
along the low hills bordeiing Tibet theie are numerous 
tea-plantations, affoidmg both an outlet for British and 
Indian capital and employment for many thousands of 
Indian labourers To a responsible local Government it 
is of importance to encouiage and foster this industry 
Now, just across the fiontier are three millions of lea 
drinkers Tea is just the kind of light, portable com- 
modity most suited for transit acioss mountains, and it 
was perfectly natural, icasonable, and right that tilt- 
Bengal Government should press for its admission to 
Tibet, that the Tibetans might at least have the chance of 
buying it or not, as they pleased But the Chinese, in 
spite of concessions in othei matters by the Government 
of India, remained obstinate, and still remain obstinate, 
in regard to the admission of tea, and eventually only 
agreed to admit Indian tea into Tibet "at a rate of duly 
not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into 
England/* which, as the latter rate of duty is 6d per pound 
and the tea drunk in Tibet is very inferior, was m reality 
the imposition of an ad valorem duty of from 150 to 200 
per cent , and was therefore a concession of not the 
slightest value. 

On December 5, 1893, the Trade Regulations were 
signed at Darjihng. The tiade-mart at Yatung was to 



TRADE REGULATIONS SIGNED 53 

"be open for all Butish subjects for purposes of trade 
from the fiist day of May, 1894," and the Government were 
to be " free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch 
the conditions of British trade" Butish subjects were 
not at liberty to buy land and build houses for themselves, 
but were to be fiee " to rent houses and godowns (stores) 
for then own accommodation and foi the storage of their 
goods," and "to sell their goods to whomsoevei they 
please, to purchase native commodities in kind 01 in 
money, to hue transport of any kind, and, in general, to 
conduct their business without any vexatious restrictions " 
Goods othei than arms, liquors, and others specified, were 
to be " exempt from duty for a period of five years " , but 
af tei that, if found desirable, a tariff might be " mutually 
agreed upon and enforced " The Political Officer in 
Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer in conference 
were to settle any trade disputes arising 

No arrangements for communication between Butish 
and Tibetan officials were made, but it was laid down that 
despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese 
Resident should be handed over by the Political Officer in 
Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer 

And as to grazing, it was agreed that at the end of 
one year such Tibetans as continued to graze their cattle 
in Sikkim should be subject to such regulations as the 
British Government might lay down. 

May 1, 1894, had been fixed as the date upon which 
the trade-mart at Yatung was to be opened, and at the 
appointed time Mr. Claude White, the Political Officer 
in Sikkim, was sent to visit Yatung, to attend the opening 
of the mart, and to report on the general situation as 
regards tiade. He was instiucted not to raise the 
question of demai eating the frontier, but to undertake, 
if the subject was mooted by the Chinese officials, that 
their views and suggestions should be laid before the 
Government of India, 

Mr. White, writing on June 9 from Yatung, reported 
that, in the first place, the site of the mart had been 



54 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

exceedingly badly chosen " It will be remembered that it 
was chosen by the Tibetans, and simply accepted by us 
out of deference to their feelings It was at the bortom 
of a narrow valley, shut in by steep hills, with no room 
for expansion. He further reported that the godowns 
(stores), 01 shops, built for the tiade would answer the 
purpose of native shops, but were quite inadequate for the 
storage of goods or for the use of European merchants, 
and that the rent proposed was exorbitant, being Rs 23 a 
month, when a fair rent would be fiom Rs. 4 to Rs. 5 He 
found the Tibetans most discourteous and obstructive, 
and he believed that the Lhasa authorities had issued 
orders that the free-trade clauses of the treaty were not 
to be carried out The local official at Phari, at the head 
of the Chumbi Valley, charged 10 per cent on all goods 
passing through Phari, both imports and exports; and 
this action, in Mr. White's opinion, certainly did away 
with any freedom of trade, as piovided for in the treaty, 
for it was obviously useless to have provided by treaty 
that Indian goods should be allowed to entei Tibet free 
of duty if a few miles inside the fiontier, and on the only 
road into Tibet, a heavy duty was to be imposed upon 
them. 

Mr White also reported that the Chinese, though 
friendly to him, and apparently willing to help, had " no 
authority whatever " They admitted that the treaty was 
not being earned out in a proper spirit, and Mr. White 
gathered that the Tibetans actually repudiated it, and 
asserted that it was signed by the British Government and 
the Chinese, and therefore they had nothing to do with it. 
In any case, they maintained that they had a right to 
impose what taxes they chose at Phari so long as goods 
were allowed to pass Yatung free. The Chinese con- 
fessed that they were not able to manage the Tibetans. 
The Tibetans would not obey them, and the Chinese 
were afraid to give any orders China was suzerain over 
Tibet only m name, was Mr. White's conclusion, Nego- 
tiation was, therefore, he said, most difficult, for though the 
Chinese agreed to any proposal, they were quite unable to 
answer for the Tibetans, and the Tibetans, when spoken to, 



TIBETANS BREAK THE CONVENTION 55 

either sheltered themselves behind the Chinese or said that 
they had no ciders to give any answer for Lhasa, and 
could only repoit. 



Mi White's immediate supenor, the Commissioner 
of the Rajshahi Division, agieed with him that the 
levying of a duty of 10 per cent ad valorem at Phaii 
was a clear breach of the mam article of the Trade 
Convention He contended that by Article IV of the 
Regulations it is provided that goods entering Tibet for 
British India across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, 
shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years, and 
that this meant a general exemption from all duties, 
wherevei imposed, the place of realization being altogether 
irrelevant He recommended, therefoie, that this breach 
of the main article of the tieaty, to which all the other 
provisions were ancillary, should be made the subject of a 
representation to the Chinese Government 

The Government of Bengal took the same view They 
thought the levy of the duty at Phari undoubtedly 
seemed to be inconsistent with the terms of the treaty, 
"which piovided for free trade for a period of five 
years. And the Lieutenant- Governor felt that no time 
should be lost in making this matter the subject of a 
representation to the Government of China. 

And in this view our Minister at Peking, Mr. 
(afterwards Sir Nicholas) O'Conor, Ambassador at St 
Petersburg and Constantinople, thoroughly concurred, and 
suggested to the Viceroy that the imposition of a 10 pei 
cent, ad valorem duty at Phari should be very strongly 
protested against as contrary to treaty stipulations. 

The Government of India, however, " recognizing the 
necessity for extreme patience in dealing with the Tibetans, 
decided that it would be premature to make any formal 
complaint of their obstructiveness,"* They wrote to the 
Government of Bengal that " The information in regard to 
the levy of duty at Phari and to the obstructiveness of the 
Tibetans was certainly unsatisfactory, but the Regulations 

* Blue-book, p. 24 



56 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

only laid down that goods entering Tibet from British 
India across the Sikkim- Tibet frontier, 01 vice vei sa, shall 
be exempt, etc Phan is a considerable distance from the 
frontier, and unless it could be shown that the duty to 
which Mr White leferred was a special one newly imposed 
it appealed doubtful whether the Government of India 
could entei a valid objection " " It has always been 
recognized," continues the despatch, "that the utmost 
patience is necessary m dealing with the Tibetans, and 
having regard to the short time which has elapsed since the 
date fixed for the opening of the Yatung mart, the 
Governor-General in Council would prefer to make nothing 
in the nature of a complaint to the Chinese Government 
at the present stage " % 

The Viceroy, accordingly, merely wiote to the Amban 
that he had been soiry to learn from Mr White's reports 
that he was disappointed at the existing conditions of 
trade between Tibet and Sikkim, that it would seem 
that Mr White was of opinion that tiadc wtus unduly 
hampered by the action of the Tibetan officials at Phan', 
that His Excellency (the Amban) would be interested to 
hear the views which Mr White had formed ; and that 
he, the Viceroy, was confident that traders will, under the 
Amban's directions, be allowed all the freedom and privi- 
leges permissible under the Regulations, and he hoped that 
before long they might be able to congratulate each other 
on successful trade development at Yatung Certainly 
nothing could have been milder, more patient, and more 
forbearing and also, as it proved, less effectual. 

It was not only m trade matters that the Tibetans 
had shown a disregard of the treaty In the matter of 
the frontier also they proved troublesome, and during his 
stay at Yatung Mr White was informed that certain 
ES m i j j 101111 - 6 ^ of Sikkim, and within the 
boundary laid down in the Convention of 1800 had 

wrnTJY ^ ccl ? led b y Tibetan soldiers. The Viceroy 
wrote to the Amban in August, 1899, pointing out that 

* Blue-book, p 31. 



TIBETANS CROSS TREATY-BOUNDARY 57 

such incidents were not unlikely to occur as long as the 
frontier officials had no practical acquaintance with the 
actual border-line, and suggesting that it would piobably 
be convenient to arrange that Frontier Officers should 
meet before long on the border and travel together along 
the boundaiy fixed by the Convention. 

To this the Amban replied, m October, that the 
Tibetan Council raised objections to our officers " travel- 
ling along " the frontier, and weie unable to agree that 
British officers should travel on the Tibetan side of the 
frontier, but that they considered the proposal to send 
officeib to define the frontier was one with which it was 
proper to comply. The Amban had, accordingly, deputed 
a Chinese Major commanding the frontier troops, and the 
Tibetan Council had deputed a General and a Chief 
Steward, to proceed to the frontiei to meet the officer 
appointed by the Viceroy, " there to inspect the border 
between Sikkim and Tibet as defined by the Convention, 
and to make a careful examination in order that boundary 
pillars might be elected, which shall be for ever respected 
by either side " In conclusion, the Amban asked to be 
informed what officei had been deputed by the Viceroy 
for this duty, and the date on which he would arrive on 
the frontier, in order that he might instmct the Chinese 
and Tibetan deputies " to proceed at the appointed time 
for the work of demarcation." 

This seemed clear and business-like enough Mr. White 
pointed out to Government that, with winter coming on, 
it would be impossible to commence demarcation before 
May the 1st in the following year, so there was plenty of 
time in which to make all preliminary arrangements. He 
also said that the Chinese deputy was an official whom he 
had met at Yatung, and who had been most courteous to 
him. And the Commissioner and Bengal Government 
agreed that the Tibetan objection to British officers travel- 
ling within the Tibetan borders might be respected, and 
that it would be sufficient to erect pillars at the passes, 
which could be approached from, the Sikkim side. So the 
Viceroy replied* in December, that he thought a start 
should be made any time between May 1 and July 1 , that 



58 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

Mr White had been deputed for the purpose, and would 
meet the other deputies at whatever point on the frontier 
might be convenient, and would be strictly enjoined 
not to travel on the Tibetan side of the boundary, as it 
would be sufficient if boundary pillars were erected ul 
the passes which can be approached from the bikkim 

side . . , t j 

The Amban replied on January 13, 1895, that he had 
sent orders to the deputies " to hold themselves m readi- 
ness to commence work at the time suggested bv the 
Viceroy," and he suggested that the respective officer, 
should " come together at Yatung, where they can decide 
upon the best place for beginning operations, and where 
the three parties (Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan) can 
agree upon a date for starting together on the work ot 
demai cation." 

Everything was then carefully and deliberately 
arranged, and there seemed good prospect of a settle- 
ment of the frontier ; but when, in the following May, 
Mr White approached the frontier to meet the Chinese 
deputy, in accordance with an arrangement they had made 
between them, he was met by a letter, written by 
direction of the deputy, and stating that the Lamas were 
obstinate in their refusal to supply transport, and that he 
was much disturbed at his failure to keep his appointment, 
but had laid his difficulties before the Amban, On 
May 19 Mr. White and the Chinese Major met tt 
different one from the deputy ongrnally appointed, for the 
latter had since died. He asked for more delay, but 
Mr White refused, as he had already been kept waiting 
with his escort at inclement altitudes, and Mr* White 
and he fixed the site of the pillar on the Jelap-la (pass), 
which is a spot where the site of the watershed forming 
the boundary, according to treaty, is quite unmistakable, 
as it runs along a very sharply-defined ridge, Mr, White 
erected a pillar here, and arranged with the Chinese 
deputy to meet him at another pass, the Dokala, cm 
June 1, while Mi. White should in the interval erect & 



TIBETANS REMOVE BOUNDARY PILLARS 59 

pillar at the Donehukla, to be afterwards inspected by the 
Chinese 

At this time Mr White also leceived a letter from the 
Amban, saying that a day tor the beginning of the woik 
hnung betn decided upon, it was, of comse, proper that a 
commencement should be made on that day, mid he had 
already icceivcd the consent of the Tibetan State Council 
to that end But the Lamas of the thiee great monas- 
teries, the Amban proceeded to explain, were still full of 
suspicion, and were pressing certain matteis upon him, 
which made it neccssaiy for him to enlighten them further 

He therefore requested Mi. White kindly to postpone 
commencing woik Cor a time, in older to avoid trouble on 
this point. But Mr. White replied that his letter had 
amvccl too late, as the work of demarcation had already 
commenced before its receipt, and he urged Government 
to grant no further delay, for the Chinese had had five years 
since the treaty was signed within which to settle with 
tlie Tibetans 

The Government of India, however, thought that no 
serious inconvenience had apparently arisen through the 
frontier being undemarcated, and that if the Chinese 
delegate failed to meet him at the Dokala on or about 
June 1, he should write to the Chinese Resident, explain- 
ing that he had proceeded so far under arrangements with 
the Chinese deputies at the Jelap-la ; but as they had not 
joined him, he would return to Gantok, He was further 
to ask the Resident whether work could be jointly pro- 
ceeded with that season, and givipg latest dates for 
recommencement. 

A few days later came the news that the pillar which 
Mr. White had erected on the Jclap-la had been de- 
molished by the Tibetans, and the stoneware slab on 
which the number of the pillar had been inscribed had 
been removed by them And on June 11 Mr. White 
telegraphed that the pillar he had erected on the 
])onchuk-la had been wilfully damaged, and as this was 
an unfrequented pass he considered the outrage must be 



60 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

deliberate He subsequently stated that the numbered 
slab here also had been taken away, and that the destruc- 
tion of the pillar was most probably the woik of thiec 
Lamas sent from Lhasa to watch the proceedings of the 
Tibetan Commissioners at Yatung 

This was brought to the notice of the Chinese Resident 
by the Viceroy, and a icply was received that the Council 
of State had sent no ordeis for the destruction of the 
pillar, and that he had given oiders that a strict examina- 
tion should be made into the affair, and the people 
who stole the slab from the pillar be severely punished 
At the same time, the Amban suggested that the work of 
delimiting the frontier should be postponed "until after 
the expiry of the nee period when the treaty was to be 
revised." 

When informed of this proposal, our Minister at Peking 
stated his opinion that it would be best to be firm in the 
refusal of a postponement, and he solicited the Viceroy's 
authority to repeat to the Chinese Government what he 
had previously informed them, that, if obliged, the British 
Commissioner would proceed alone. 

The Bengal Government also urged that Mr White 
" should be authorized to proceed with his own men alone 
to lay down the boundary and set up pillars on the passes 
along the eastern frontier where no dispute was known to 
exist " But the Lieutenant- Governor was informed that 
the Government of India were not prepared to insist upon 
the early demarcation of the frontier, and directed that 
Mr. White should return to Gantok forthwith, or, at any, 
rate withdraw at once from the immediate neighbourhood 
of the border 

The Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Charles Elliott, acknow- 
ledged that it was difficult for Mr White to remain 
indefinitely in his camp on the frontier, but declaied that 
it was impossible to disguise the fact that a return to 
Gantok practically meant the abandonment of the demar- 
cation He believed that the authorities in Peking were 
anxious that the delimitation should continue wthout 



SUGGESTED OCCUPATION OF CHUMBI 61 

delay, but it was plain that the Amban at Lhasa was 
unable to give effect to the wishes of his Government in 
consequence of the opposition manifested by the Lamas, 
who exeicised the leal authonty in Tibet The contem- 
plated withdrawal of Mr White to Gantok would un- 
doubtedly, he thought and events pioved him to be 
absolutely light cause a loss of piestige, would be looked 
upon by the Tibetans as a lebuff to British authonty, and 
would encouiage them in high-handed acts and demands, 
and possibly outrages He had no doubt that if the 
British Government had only to deal with Tibet, the 
wisest policy would be to give them warning that unless 
they at once made airangements to co-operate in the woik 
of delimitation it would be done without them, and that 
unless they appointed a mlei on then side who could 
piotect the pillars set up, the Biitish Government would 
march in and hold the Chumbi \ r alley m pawn, eithei 
temporal ily 01 permanently Such a bi usque and high- 
handed line of conduct, added the Lieutenant- Governor, 
was the only one that fiontiei tubes who have reached the 
stage of civilization of the Tibetans could undei stand But 
the affair, he allowed, was complicated by the lelations of 
Government with China, and oui desire to uphold the 
weak and tottering authonty of the Chinese in Lhasa, the 
result of which was that the people who weie m leal 
powei weie not those we dealt with, and that the people 
we dealt with had no power to cairy out their engage- 
ments with us In the circumstances, Sir Chailes Elliott 
advocated such negotiations with the Chinese Govern- 
ment as would leave the British Government free to 
march in and hold the Chumbi Valley, with their consent, 
and without any detriment to the Chinese suzerainty, 
but with the object of assisting them to establish their 
authonty more fhmly at Lhasa At any late, we ought, 
he considered, to intimate in a firm and friendly way to 
the Peking Government that either they must get their 
orders carried out 01 we must He reminded the 
Government of India that nothing had been exacted as 
the result of the British victories at Lengtu and on the 
Jelap-la not even compensation for the cost of the cam- 



62 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

paign and he urged that we should now insist that we 
would protect our own interests if China could not carry 
out hei engagements.* 

These, in the light of future events, appeal reasonable 
and sensible proposals , but the Government of India, in 
puisuance of their policy of foibeaiance and modeiation, 
would not accept them They ordered Mr White 
definitely to return to Gantok They noticed that^ the 
leturns of trade between Bntish terntoiy and libet 
showed a marked increase, and they hoped that the 
continued exercise of modeiation and patience would 
gradually remove Tibetan suspicions as to our aims and 
policy 

A few months aftei this was written, in November of 
1895, Mr Nolan, the Comtmssionei of Darjilmg, an officer 
who had for many years been conveisant with the 
Tibetan question, and who held civil charge of that 
division of Bengal which adjoins Sikkim and Bhutan, and 
who supervised oui relations with those two States as we'll 
as our trade with Tibet, visited Yatung, and had conver- 
sations with Chinese and Tibetan local officials. His 
report of the state of affairs theie is one of the most inter- 
esting published f He found that the imposition of the 
10 per cent duty at Phan was no new exaction, but had 
existed for a long tune He found, also, that the reason 
the Tibetans did not meet Mr AVhite m the previous 
summer to delimit the boundary was that they wished 
the general line of the frontier should be agreed upon, in 
the first instance, with reference to maps, and the ground 
visited only after this was done. But he found, too, 
that the Tibetans lepudiated the treaty The " Chief 
Steward," the sole Commissioner on the pait of the 
Tibetan Government for reporting on the frontier matt or, 
"made the important statement that the Tibetans did 
not consider themselves bound by the Convention with 
China, as they were not a party to it." He reported furthci , 
that the Tibetans had prevented the formation of a mart 

* Blue-book, p 44 t Nnd , p, 54. 



FEEBLE CHINESE INFLUENCE 63 

by building a wall across the valley on the farther side of 
Yatung, by efficiently guarding this and by prohibiting 
their traders from passing through. Mr. Korb, a wool 
merchant from Bengal, had come to Yatung to purchase 
wool from some of his correspondents on the Tibetan side, 
who had invited him thither , but the Tibetans prevented 
his correspondents from coming to do business with him 
Tibetan merchants were similarly prevented from seeing 
Mr Nolan. 

Mr. Nolan's conclusion was that, even though the duty 
which was collected at Phari was neither special nor newly 
imposed, yet exaction was inconsistent with the tieaty 
provision that trade with India should be exempt from 
taxation, and also that the first clause in the Trade 
Regulations, providing that " a trade-mart shall be 
established at Yatung," which "shall be open to all 
British subjects for the purposes of trade," had not been 
carried into effect 

The failure to carry out the treaty he attnbuted 
entirely to the Tibetans He was quite satisfied that the 
Chinese officials in Tibet, whatever might have been their 
prepossessions in favour of the policy of seclusion, then 
sincerely desired to see the Convention can led out, being 
afraid that they would be disgraced by their own Govern- 
ment if it were not The Tibetans were the real as well 
as the ostensible opponents And Mr Nolan believed 
their true motives in opposing the tieaty were correctly 
expressed by a monk, who said that if the English entered 
Tibet, his bowl would be broken, meaning that the 
influence of his Ordei would be destroyed, and its wealth, 
typified by the collection of food made from door to door 
in bowls, would be lost. And this opposition on the jpart 
of the Lamas the Chinese had not the means of overcoming 
They certainly had an acknowledged social superiority, and 
they were feared to a certain extent on account of then- 
power to send an army thiough the Himalayas, as they 
had done on several occasions with surprising success On 
the other hand, their present forces in Tibet were ridicu- 
lously small, and from Yatung to Gyantse they only had 
140 soldiers, and at Lhasa only a few hundreds, while 



64 THE CONVENTION WITH CHINA 

the monks at Lhasa numbered 19,100, of whom 16,500 
were concentrated in three gieat monasteries, and they 
were vigorous and formidable in a not, having attacked 

the Chinese in 1810 and 1844 and the Nepalese in 1888 

i 

Mr Nolan, with his long experience on this frontier, 
had, as events have shown, most accurately gauged the 
situation The Lieutenant-Goveinoi, Sn Charles Elliott, 
considered that his report showed that the improvement 
hoped for from conciliation and foibearance had not taken 
place in the two seasons during which the mart had 
nominally been opened, and by the systematic obstruction 
of the Tibetans the object of the treaty with China had 
been frustrated. He therefoi e renewed his i ecommendation 
that a diplomatic reference should be made to China, 
pointing out how completely the Tibetans had violated the 
spirit of the treaty and Trade Regulations, and had 
refused to be bound by their terms. 

But the Government of India again replied that they 
wished to pursue a policy of conciliation, and did not 
wish to make any serious repiesentations to the Chinese 
Goveinment. They icpeated that trade had increased, 
and as regards demarcation of the frontier, they understood 
from a further report of Mr Nolan's that the Tibetans 
claimed a strip of territory near Giagong, in the north of 
Sikkim, and these claims the Goveinment of India con- 
sidered it would not only be impolitic but inequitable to 
ignore The Viceroy therefore wrote to the Chinese 
Resident, suggesting that Chinese and Tibetan delegates 
should be sent to Gantok, the capital of Sikkim, to meet 
Mr. White there, and proceed with him to Giagong to 
make a local inquiry, but that no actual demarcation 
should take place until the reports of the results of the 
inquiry had taken place 

And so the game rolled on, and notning whatever 
resulted. The Chinese Resident was superseded, and the 
Chinese asked that action should be deferred till the new 
one arrived. The new Resident came, and wrote that 
the Tibetans are " naturally doltish, and prone to doubts 



RESULT OF FIVE YEARS' EXPERIENCE 65 

and misgivings," and it would be best therefore that they 
should " personally inspect the line of demarcation men- 
tioned in the tieaty," though a Tibetan repiesentative had 
been with the Chinese Amban when the Convention was 
made, and had ample opportunity during the years that 
agreement took in negotiating to inspect and to give the 
views of his Government upon it And so it resulted 
that when, at the conclusion of five yeais fiom the signing 
oi the Tiade Regulations, the Secretary of State asked the 
Goveinment of India foi " a full lepoit, both on the 
progress made since the date of that agi cement towards 
the'settlement of the frontier, and on the extent to which 
the tiade stipulations of the treaty and Convention had 
been opeiative," the Bengal Goveinment had to reply* 
that the boundaiy between Sikkim and Tibet, as laid 
down in AT tide 1 of the Convention, had not yet been 
demaicated, owing to the refusal of the Tibetans to abide 
by the terms of the Convention, and to their claiming a 
tiact of land to the north of Donkya-la, Giagong, and the 
Lonakh Valley , and that the tiade stipulations contained 
in the Regulations, had been inoperative The Tibetans 
had prevented Yatung becoming a leal tiade-mait ; abso- 
lutely no business was transacted theie, and it was merely 
a registenng post for goods passing between Tibet and 
India, and the proclamation of the place as a mait had in 
no way influenced the trade between the two countries, 
foi what small uiciease there was appealed to be mainly 
due to, and might have been expected from, the restora- 
tion of peace between the British Government and Tibet 

This was the net result of the policy of conciliation 
and forbearance towaids the Tibetans and of icliance on 
the Chinese Cential Government, which had been pursued 
from 1878 

* Blue book, p 92 



CHAPTER VI 

SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

Now that five years had elapsed since the Trade Regula- 
tions were concluded, and they were, according to their 
provisions, subject to revision, the Government of India 
began to consider any practical measuies for securing 
fuller facilities for trade. The Convention of 1890 arid 
the Trade Regulations of 1893 were intended to provide 
these facilities, but so far none had been obtained , and 
the Indian Government thought that, as the Tibetans 
attached great importance to retaining the Giagong piece 
of territory in Northern Sikkim, and as we had no real 
desire to hold it, there might be advantage in conceding 
that point if the Tibetans would, on their side, make some 
equivalent concession. They might, it was, thought, con- 
cede to us the point for which we had contended when 
negotiating the Trade Regulations, and recognise Phari as 
the trade-mart in place of the quite useless Yatung Lord 
Salisbury* agreed that some action was necessary, but it 
seemed to him that, as during recent years Chinese 
advisory authority in Tibet had been little more than 
nominal, and the correspondence of the Government of 
India even seemed to show that it was practically non- 
existent, it would be preferable to open direct communica- 
tion between the Government of India and the Tibetan 
authorities. 

Lord Curzon therefore commenced, in the autumn of 
1899, a series of attempts to open up direct communica- 
tion with them. Ugyen K&d, the Bhutanese Agent in 
Darjiling, who was accustomed to visit Tibet for trade 

* Blue-book, p 101. 
66 



VICEROY'S LETTERS DECLINED 67 

purposes, was first employed to write a letter on his own 
behalf to the Dalai Lama, suggesting, in general teims, 
that a high Tibetan official should be sent to discuss the 
frontier and trade questions. This letter met with an 
unfa voui able response Captain Kenmon, the Assistant 
to the Resident in Kashmir, who annually visits Leh and 
the Western Tibet frontier, was then charged with a letter 
from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, which he was to 
give to the Tibetan officials in Gartok, but six months 
aftei this was leturned to Captain Kenmon, with the 
intimation that the officials had not dared, in the face of 
the legulations against the intrusion of foreigners into 
Tibet, to send it to Lhasa. These two methods having 
failed, Ugyen Kazi was entrusted with another letter from 
the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, which he was himself to 
present at Lhasa. In August, 1901, he returned from 
Lhasa, reporting that the Dalai Lama declined to reply 
to it, stating as his reason that the matter was not one for 
him to settle, but must be discussed fully in Council with 
the Amban, the Ministers, and the Lamas, and the letter 
was brought back with the seal intact. 



A factor of determining importance now suddenly thrust 
itself into the situation. At the very time when the Vice- 
roy was making these fruitless efforts to enter into direct 
communication with the Dalai Lama came the information 
that this exclusive personage had been sending an Envoy 
to the Czar. Our Ambassador at St. Petersburg forwarded 
to the Foicign Office an announcement in the official 
column of the Journal tie jtfaint Pctersbourg of October 2 
(15), 1900, announcing the reception by His Majesty the 
Emperor of a certain Doriieff, who was described as first 
Tsanit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. And, some 
months later, our Consul-General at Odessa forwarded 
to the Foreign Office an extract from the Odessa Novosti 
of June 12 (25), 1901, stating that Odessa would welcome 
that day an Extraordinary Mission from the Dalai Lama 
of Tibet, which was proceeding to St. Petersburg with 
diplomatic instructions of importance, At the head of 



68 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

the mission was the Lama, Dorzhievy (Dorjieff), and its 
chief object was a rapprochement and the strengthening 
of good relations with Russia It was said to have been 
equipped by the Dalai Lama, and despatched with auto- 
graph letters and presents fiom him to His Impel ml 
Majesty And, among other things, it was to raise the 
question of the establishment in St Peteisburg of a pei- 
manent Tibetan Mission foi the maintenance ol good 
relations with Russia 

This Dorjieff, it appeared from an article in the Novae 
Vremya of June 18 (July 1), 1901, was a Russian subject, 
who had grown up and received his education on Russian 
soil He was by birth a Bunat of Chovmskaia (in the 
piovince of Verchnyudmsk, in Trans-Baikaha, Eastern 
Siberia), and was brought up in the province of Azocho/Jki. 
He had settled in Tibet twenty years before his present 
visit to Russia. " This reappearance of the Tibet Mission 
m Russia proved," said the Novoe Vremya "that the 
favourable impressions earned back by Dorjieff to his 
home from his previous mission have confiimed the Dalai 
Lama in his intention of contracting the friendliest rela- 
tions with Russia . A rapprochement with Russia 
must seem to him [the Dalai Lama] the most natural 
step, as Russia is the only Power able to frustrate the 
intrigues of Great Britain." 

Count Lamsdorff, however, in conversation with the 
British Ambassador* on July 3, 1901, characterized " as 
ridiculous and utteily unfounded the conclusion drawn in 
certain organs of the Russian pi ess, that these Tibetan 
visitors were charged with any diplomatic mission," He 
said Dorjieff was a Mongolian Bunat of Russian origin, 
who came occasionally to Russia with the object, he 
believed, of making money collections for his Order from 
the numerous Buddhists m the Russian Empire. Count 
Lamsdorff added that on the occasion of Dorjieff s visit in 
the previous autumn to Yalta, the Emperor had received 
him, and he himself had had an opportunity of learning 
some interesting details from him of life in Tibet; the 
Russian Geographical Society also took an interest in lug 

* Blue-book, p 166. 



DALAI LAMA'S MISSION TO RUSSIA 69 

visit, which had, however, no official character whatever, 
although he was accompanied on this visit by other 
Tibetans 

But, in spite of this declaimer, Dorjieff was still styled 
an Envoy Extraordmaiy, and the Messager Officiel of 
June 25 (July 8, 1901) had the announcement that his 
Majesty the Emperor had received on June 28, in the 
Grand Palace at Peterhof, the Envoy Extraoidinary from 
the Dalai Lama of Tibet And as the Russian press 
announced that the Envoys had paid visits to Count 
LamsdorfF and M Witte, Sir Charles Scott, the British 
Ambassador, took an oppoitunity at an interview with 
Count LamsdorfF of ascei taming some further particulars.* 
The lattei said that, although the Tibetan visitors had 
been described as Envoys Extraoidinary of the Dalai 
Lama, their mission could not be icgarded as having any 
political or diplomatic character The mission was of the 
same character as those sent by the Pope to the faithful 
in foieign lands Dorjieff had some post of confidence in 
the Dalai Lama's service, but Count Lamsdorff beheved 
that he still maintained his original Russian nationality 
He had brought the Count an autograph letter from the 
Dalai Lama, but tlus letter merely expressed a hope that 
Count Lamsdorff was in the enjoyment of good health 
and was prosperous, and informed him that the Dalai 
was able to say that he himself enjoyed excellent health. 

These proceedings naturally enough attracted the 
attention of the Secretary of State for India, who on 
July 25 pointed out to the Foreign Officet that the Dalai 
Lama had recently refused to receive the communications 
addressed to him by the Viceroy, and that while the 
Viceroy was thus treated with discourtesy a mission was 
publicly sent to Russia, and the publicity given to the 
Tibetan Mission which had recently arrived in St Peters- 
burg could not fail to engender some disquietude m the 
minds of the Indian Government as to the object and 
result of any negotiations which might ensue The 
Secretary of State for India suggested, therefore, that 
our Ambassador should be instructed to inform Count 

* Blue-book, p. 117. t H>td., P- 123. 



70 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

Lamsdorff we had received his assurance with satisfaction, 
as any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or 
disturb the existing status of Tibet, would be a movement 
m which His Majesty's Government could not acquiesce 
This suggestion was adopted, and on September 2, 1001, 
our Ambassador informed Count Lamsdorff that His 
Majesty's Government would naturally not regard with 
indifference any pioceedmgs that might have a tendency 
to alter or disturb the existing status in Tibet ^ The 
Russian Minister repeated his assertion that "the mission 
was chiefly concerned with matters of religion, and had 
no political or diplomatic object or charactei " 

For the time being the Government of India itsell 
took no action in regard to this new factor, though in 
concluding a despatch to the Secretary of State on 
Febmary 18 of the following year (1902) they declared 
that it was desirable that the unsatisfactory situation 
m Tibet should be bi ought to an end with as little ^delny 
and commotion as possible, since there were factors in the 
case which, at a latei date, might invest the breakdown 
of the unnatural barriers of Tibetan isolation with a wider 
and more serious significance. 

They continued to plod steadily along at the settle- 
ment of the frontiei, and corresponded with the Secretary 
of State and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce about the 
introduction of tea to Tibet now that the five years, during 
which it was to be excluded had expired But they 
acted with much more decision than previously, and 
instead of waiting year after year for the arrival of 
Chinese or Tibetan deputies to meet our representatives, 
they sent Mr White, in the summer of 1902, to Giagong, 
to reassert British rights to the tract of countiy which the 
Tibetans had been occupying in contravention of the 
treaty of 1890, and, if necessary, to expel them from the 
British side of the frontier Mr. White had suggested 
that an effective and simple way would be to occupy the 
Chumbi Valley, but the Government of India, though 
they considered grounds for strong action were far from 



TIBETANS EXPELLED ACROSS BORDER 71 

lacking, were not for the time in favour of such a proposal. 
And another alternative of stopping all Tibetan trade they 
thought would be hard on our own traders, and might 
drive trade permanently away to Nepal and Bhutan They 
accordingly adopted the above-mentioned course 

Mr White went to Giagong on June 26, 1902, with 
200 men, and camped half a mile fiom the Tibetan wall, 
where the Khamba Jongpen and 40 men were stationed 
He gave them twenty-foui hours' notice in which to move 
to the other side of the boundary On the following 
morning, after some piotests, the Tibetans icmoved across 
the boundary On July 4 a number of Tibetan officials 
visited him, and said they had come under instructions 
from the Tashi Lama to show him the Giagong boundary 
Mi White told them that his orders were to lay down 
the boundary as shown in the Convention of 1890, which 
had been signed by the Chinese Amban on behalf of 
the Tibetans To which they replied that they had 
heard of the treaty, but that it was invalid, as it had not 
been signed by any Tibetan. The Tibetans, however, 
asked for a copy of the treaty and for the names of the 
passes, and Mr White told them they could see for 
themselves if the water ran into the Sikkim Valley or into 
Tibet, and where the water parted into Sikkim and Tibet 
was the boundary He found on the tract 6,270 sheep, 
737 yaks, out of which only 1,148 sheep and 80 yaks 
belonged to the Sikkimese, and the remainder were 
Tibetan Near the top of the Naku La he found a 
Tibetan wall running across the valley, with a blockhouse 
on the east 

The immediate consequence of this action was, that at 
the end of July the Viceroy received a letter from the 
Chinese Resident at Lhasa, asking for an explanation 
of the object and reasons of Mr White's proceedings, and 
saying that he had appointed Mr Ho Kuang-Hsi to 
proceed to Giagong, and had further arranged with the 
Dalai Lama for the despatch of a Tibetan official to act 
conjointly with Mr. Ho in any discussion with Mr. White 
which should arise. 

The Viceroy, in reply, wrote to say that the object 



72 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

of the journey from which Mr White had recently 
returned was to inspect the boundary as laid down in the 
Convention of 1890, and to compel the withdrawal fiom 
Sikkim territory of any troops which the Tibetans might 
have established in violation of that Convention He 
reminded the Chinese Resident that he had offered to 
make concessions with respect to these frontier lands, on 
the understanding that matters as to trade would be put 
on a propei footing But Lord Curzon pointed out that 
the negotiations foi the improvement of trade iclations 
between India and Tibet had made no real progress 
during the past twelve yeais In these circumstances, he 
had no alternative but to compel the observance of the 
boundary as prescribed by the Convention, and until 
matters as to trade had been placed on a satisfactory 
footing, he must continue to insist on the boundary being 
observed, though any proposals which the Chinese 
Resident would make foi the nnpiovement of trade 
relations would leceive careful consideration, and Mi 
White had been instmcted to discuss with the Com- 
missioners appointed by the Amban any suggestions which 
they might put forward 

As a fact, the Commissioner never did meet Mr 
White. Mr Ho was prevented by " ill-health " fiom pro- 
ceeding to Gantok. Then he was recalled to Lhasa. 
Then the Chinese Resident himself was to be replaced, 
and the new one would not reach Lhasa till the following 
summer And so on, with the usual and unfailing 
excellent reasons for doing nothing. 

But, m the meanwhile, the new factor in the situation 
was assuming significant proportions and causing the 
Government of India anxiety I have alieady related 
now the Dalai Lama was sending missions to the C/ar 
with autograph letteis to the Russian Chancellor, at the 
very moment when he was declining all communications 
from the Viceroy of India And now, from a totally 
different quarter, came rumours that China was makine a 
secret agreement with Russia in regard to Tibet 



RUMOURED RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 73 

Our Minister at Peking, on August 2, 1902, tele- 
graphed * to Loid Lansdowne that theie had been going 
the rounds of the press an agreement in regard to Tibet, 
alleged to have been secretly made between Russia and 
China In return for a promise to uphold the integrity of 
China, the entire interest of China in Tibet was to be 
lelmquished to Russia This rumom, said our Minister, 
seemed to have originated in a Chinese paper published in 
Satow. Fuller mfoimation was sent by letter. According 
to this, among othei things, Russia would establish 
Government officers in Tibet to control Tibetan affairs 

On Sn Ernest Satow making, in accordance with 
Lord Lansdowne's instructions, a representation to the 
Chinese Foreign Board about this, the Piesident of the 
Board strongly denied that there was any such agree- 
ment, and declared that no such airangement had ever 
formed a subject of discussion between the Chinese and 
Russian Governments But the rumour seems to have 
had a wide picvalence and to have been regarded 
seriously, for our Ambassador at St Petersburg leported 
in Octobei that the Chinese Minister there had told him 
that several of his colleagues had been making inquiries 
from him respecting this pretended agreement, which had 
appeared in several Continental as well as Russian news- 
papeis, and which he, the Chinese Minister, had fiist seen 
m the Chinese newspapers. The Government of India, 
also, reported to the Secretary of State that circum- 
stantial evidence, derived from a variety of quarters, all 
pointed in the same direction, and tended to show the 
existence of an arrangement of some sort between Russia 
and Tibet. 



It may be askedand, indeed, it was asked why the 
Government of India should have been so nervous about 
Russian action in Tibet. The Russian Government had 
said that the mission which the Dalai Lama had sent to 
St. Petersburg was of a "religious" nature, and the 
Chinese Foreign Board had said there was no agreement 

* Blue-book, p. 140 



74 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

with Russia about Tibet Why not, then, have disre- 
garded these idle rumours ? Such lofty disregaid is easy 
for irresponsible persons at a comfortable distance in 
England to display But the responsible Government 
in India cannot dismiss such rumours with so light a 
heart Russia might not have had any agreement 
about Tibet, and the Tibetan Mission might have been 
purely religious , but that she was extremely interested 
m Tibet was unquestionable She had for years been 
sending semi-official, semi-scientific expeditions into the 
country. These had always reported on the nchness 
of Tibet in regard to gold, and the desirability of getting 
concessions there There was at the very moment one 
of these expeditions with an armed escort in Tibet 
Apart from this, the interest of Russiam Tibet was 
thoroughly natural The Dalai Lama was regaided with 
superstitious reverence by many thousands of Russian 
Asiatic subjects. Moreover, at that time it was generally 
looked upon as inevitable that Russia would shortly 
absorb Mongolia, and all Mongols look upon the 
Dalai Lama as a god. It was, indeed, because of his 
immense influence over the Mongols that the Chinese had 
for centuries, and at great cost to themselves, secured and 
maintained a dominant influence in Lhasa. It is easy to 
understand, therefore, that the Russians would be glad 
enough of any opportunity of gaming an influence with 
the Dalai Lama The mission of the lattei to the Czar 
might, as the Russian Chancellor said, be mainly religious, 
and similar to missions which the Pope sends out. But 
even m Europe it is often difficult to distinguish between 
religion and politics, and in Asia the two are almost indis- 
tinguishable A religious understanding between the 
Dalai Lama and the Czar might by the former be 
regarded as a political agreement And whatever might 
have been the intentions of the Russian Government at 
the time, they might on some subsequent occasion have 
sent a mission to Lhasa, as they had sent a mission to 
Kabul in 1879 and caused an Afghan War. 

Even so, why should we trouble? What possible 
harm could a few Russians do in Lhasa ? Russia might 



RUSSIAN DANGER TO INDIA 75 

invade India through Afghanistan, but she could never 
invade India across Tibet and over the Himalayas. Why, 
then, should we be so touchy about her action there ? 
Why not let her send as many missions and officers as she 
liked ? This also seems a broad-minded attitude, such as 
a platfoim oratoi in the heart of England might safely 
take up But, again, it was not so easy for those away on 
the fiontier of the Empire, with immediate responsibilities 
on their shoulders, to feel so complacent If Russia had 
been the iiiend she is now, arid if our influence in Lhasa 
had been unmistakable, it would have been easier to take 
such a view, and it is, indeed, in my opinion, the right 
view now to take But in 1902 she was still on the crest 
of a gieat advancing wave of expansion She had not yet 
been checked by Japan She had spread over Manchuria 
with startling rapidity Where, at the time of my journey 
Lhere with Sir Evan James, no Russian had ever been 
seen, there were now Russian railways and Russian can- 
tonments. She had expanded in Western Turkestan and 
annexed the Pamirs, and it was generally looked upon 
only as a matter of time before she would absorb Chinese 
Turkestan and Mongolia If, then, we complacently, and 
without a protest, allowed her to establish herself in Tibet, 
we could hardly expect those States dependent on us and 
bordering Tibet to think otheiwise than that this was the 
ictil Power m Asia, and this, therefore, the Power to look 
up to 

A lull-dress Russian invasion of India, through Tibet, 
no responsible person ever dreamed possible But, without 
a real invasion, Russia established in Lhasa, while we were 
unrepresented there, could cause Government a great deal 
of anxiety. In practical detail it would mean the increase 
of our army on the North-East frontier by several 
thousand men. 

It was obviously prudent, therefore, to prevent her 
acquiring a more predominant influence than our own in 
Tibet. While it was quite natural that she should be glad 
to have an influence at Lhasa, it was still more natural 
that we should be jealous of her having more influence 
than we had. For, while our border was contiguous with 



76 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

Tibet for 1,000 miles, from Kashmir nearly to Burma, the 
Russian border nowhere touched or even approached 
Tibet The whole breadth of Chinese Turkestan lay 
in between the Russian frontier and the neaiest frontier oi 
Tibet, and Lhasa itself was 1,000 miles distant from the 
nearest point on the Russian frontier To appreciate the 
position, let the reader diaw out the map at the end of this 
volume 

The Government of India, accordingly, recommended 
piompt action The attempts to negotiate an under- 
standing with the Tibetans thiough the Chinese had 
proved a failure It had been found impossible to open 
up direct communications with the Tibetans. The iesult 
of the exclusion of the Tibetans from the pasture lands at 
Giagong, though it had materially improved our position 
on the border, was not in effect more than a timely 
assertion of Bntish authority upon the spot. These 
diffeient lumoms from such varied souices tending, in the 
opinion of the Government of India, to indicate the 
existence of some kind of an airangement between Russia 
and Tibet, necessitated dealing with the situation Car more 
drastically and decisively than it had ever been dealt with 
before Continuously since 1873 the Government of 
India had been trying by every correct and leasonublo 
method to regularize their intercourse with Tibet, Their 
patience was now exhausted, and, instead of trifling about 
on the frontiei with petty Chinese or Tibetan officials, 
they proposed, in the very important despatch of January 8, 
1908,* to send a mission, with an armed escort, to Lhasa 
itself, there to settle oui future relations with Tibet, and 
to permanently establish a British representative. 

This proposal, when it reached England, seems to have 
caused considerable surprise But Warren Hastings, a 
century before, had meant to do this very thing; and 
the Russians had a Consular representative in Chinese 
Turkestan alongside their frontier, so there seemed no 
particular reason why we should not have had a similar 
representative m Tibet alongside our frontier. The 
rislc had to be considered, it is tiue, but why the case of 

* Blue-book, p 152 



PROPOSED MISSION TO LHASA 77 

Cavagnau's murder at Kabul should be eveilastmgly 
bi ought up as an aigument against sending an officer 
outside our frontier it is difficult to understand It is 
ignoble to the last degree to be scaied for all time by 
what happened then. Cavagnan was murdeied What 
then ? I agree with my old chief and first master in 
Cential Asian politics, Sn Charles Macgregor, that if 
oui agent A was muideied we should ha\e sent up B, 
and if B was murdered we should have sent up C 
Our whole Afghan policy for thirty years past has been 
frightfully ignominious, and the day will come when we 
shall bittcily regiet not having had an agent at the capital 
of a country for whose foreign policy we aie responsible. 
At any late, the fact of barbarian Afghans murdering oui 
representative at Kabul in 1879 was no adequate reason 
for not sending a repicsentative to Lhasa m 1903, 

These, however, are merely my own views The 
contention of the Government of India was that, in 
suggesting a mission to Lhasa, they weie meiely reviving 
a proposal which had been supported as far back as 1874 
by Sir T Wade, then British Minister at Peking, and 
which was almost taking definite shape m 1885-86, when 
the importance of a Burmese settlement appears to have 
so impressed itself upon ah 1 parties that the Lhasa Mission 
was sacrificed m order that the signature of the Chinese 
Government to the Burmese Convention might be 
obtained. The Government of India considered it a grave 
misfortune that they should have been diverted from a 
project of unquestionable importance by the exigencies of 
political considerations that had not the remotest con- 
nection with Tibet. They recommended, therefore, the 
revival of this precedent, and the firm pursuance of the 
policy which was then abandoned 

The Government of India regarded the so-called 
suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction. 
China was always ready to break down the barriers of 
ignorance and obstruction and to open Tibet to the 
civilizing influence of trade, but her pious wishes were 
defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In 
the same way Tibet was only too anxious to meet our 



78 SECURING THE TREATY RIGHTS 

f advanpes, but she was prevented from doing so by the 
despotic veto of the suzerain The Government of India 
wished to put an end to this " solemn farce," and would 
have preferred to deal with Tibet alone. But they 
recognized that China could not be entirely disregarded, 
and only asked that, if the Home Government trusted to 
the interposition of China, this might be accompanied 
by a resolute refusal to be defeated by the time-honomcd 
procedure, and that if and when a new treaty was 
concluded, it should not be signed by the British and 
Chinese alone, but by a direct representative of the 
Tibetan Government also. 

At the same time, said the Government of India, the 
most emphatic assurances might be given to the Chinese 
and Tibetan Governments that the mission was of an 
exclusively commercial character, that we repudiated all 
designs of a political nature upon Tibet, that we had 
no desire either to declare a protectorate or permanently 
to occupy any portion of the country, but that our 
intentions were confined to removing the embaigo that 
then rested upon all trade between Tibet and India, and 
to establishing those amicable relations and means of 
communication that ought to subsist between adjacent and 
friendly Powers. 

These proposals the Government of India commended 
to the favourable consideration of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, in the firm conviction that if some such step were 
not taken, "a senous danger would grow up in Tibet 
which might one day, and perhaps at no very distant date! 
attain to menacing dimensions." They regarded the 
situation as it seriously affected the frontiers which they 

UP n t0 defend th Indlan 



iwTo t > 

W,r S ^ ^ n Was entitled to Cf ^y weight with 
His Majesty's Government, and they enterttmed 
sincere alarm ttat, if nothing was done Ld maS were 
allowed to slide, they might before long have ucriw 
gravely to regret that action was not taken whilst was 
still relatively free from difficulty. S 



CHAPTER VH 

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 

I woui D again recall the fact that when the Government 
of India wrote the above-quoted despatch, Russia was not 
yet at wai with Japan, and was very much in the 
ascendant and active in Asia She had recently occupied 
Port Arthur, and run a railway through Manchuria ; and 
she was in a dominant, almost domineering, position at 
Peking. And as showing the interest she took in Tibet, 
there came, just after the leceipt by the India Office of 
Lord Curzon's despatch, a representation from the Russian 
Charge* d'Affaires m London, founded apparently upon 
our very humble efforts of the previous summer within 
our own frontier In this representation, which was made 
in the form of a memorandum* communicated to the 
Foreign Office, it was stated that, according to the infor- 
mation which the Russian Government had received from 
an authoritative source, a British military expedition had 
reached Komba-Ovaleko, on its way north by the Chumbi 
Valley, and that the Russian Government would consider 
such an expedition to Tibet as likely to produce a situation 
of considerable gravity, which might oblige them to take 
measures to protect their interests in those regions. 

It was impossible to tiace what place was intended 
by Komba-Ovaleko. Mr. White and his little escort of 
150 men had never gone outside the limits of Sikkim, 
and had long since returned to their headquarters. There 
was no difficulty, then, in giving the Russian Ambassador 
the assurance that this '* authoritative " information was 
without the smallest foundation. And Lord Lansdowne 
went further than merely refuting the false information. 

* Blue-book, p. 178. 
79 



80 NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 

He told the Ambassadoi* that the language of the com- 
munication had seemed to him unusual, and, indeed, almost 
minatory in tone He refeired especially to the state- 
ment that the Imperial Government might, in consequence 
of our action in a countiy which immediately adjoined 
the fiontiers of India, find it necessary Lo take measuies 
to protect Russian interests in those legions Loid Lans- 
downe said he could not conceive why it was neccssaiy 
for Russia to evince hei mteiest in this mannei 

Count Benckendoiff expressed Ins opinion that these 
exaggerated rumours had been spread designedly in order 
to fostei ill-feehng between Great Bntam and Russia, and 
thought we should spare no pains in order to dissipate 
them There was, he said, no reason whatever why the 
two Governments should have trouble over Tibet. Russia 
had no political designs upon the countiy, and he presumed 
we had not. 

Lord Lansdowne icplied that if he was invited to say 
that we had no desire to annex Tibetan territory, he 
would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative, but he 
was bound to be careful how he gave general assurances, 
the import of which might hereafter be called in question, 
as to our future lelations with Tibet. It was natural that 
the Indian Government should desire to promote Indian 
trade in that country, and they would no doubt take 
whatever measures seemed to them necessary for that 
purpose The Ambassador admitted that this was only 
natural 

A few days later, on February 18, Lord Lansdownc, 
in a further conversation with the Russian Ambassador, 
recurred to the same subject f He said that the Indian 
Government had been seriously perturbed by the com- 
munication made to the Foreign Office. The interest of 
India m Tibet was, Lord Lansdowne said, of a very 
special character. With a map of Central Asia before 
him, he pointed out to the Ambassador that Lhasa was 
within a comparatively short distance of the Indian 
frontier, while, on the other hand, it was considerably over 
1,000 miles from the Asiatic possessions of Russia, and 

* Blue-book, p 180 f Ibid, p. 181. 



RUSSIAN PROTESTS 81 

any sudden display of Russian interest or activity in the 
regions immediately adjoining the possessions of Great 
Britain could scarcely fail to have a distuibmg effect upon 
the population, or to create the impression that British 
influence was receding, and that of Russia making lapid 
advances into regions which had hitherto been regarded as 
altogethei outside her sphere of influence. 

Loid Lansdowne added that he had received nom 
apparently trustworthy sources reports to the effect that 
Russia had lately concluded agreements for the establish- 
ment of a Russian protectorate ovei Tibet, and also that, 
if she had not already done so, she intended to establish 
Russian agents or Consulai officers at Lhasa, and he 
thought it of the utmost impoitance that as the Ambas- 
sador had disclaimed on the pait of Russia political designs 
upon Tibet, he should be in a position to state whether 
these rurnouis were or were not without foundation 

Count Benckendorff replied that he did not believe 
that there was any foundation in them, but he expressed 
his readiness to inake special inquiries of the Russian 
Government as to the truth of the statements referred to 

Lord Lansdowne then went on to say that as we were 
much more closely interested than Russia in Tibet, it 
followed that, should there be any display of Russian 
ficLivity 111 that country, we should be obliged to reply by 
a display of activity, not only equivalent to, but exceeding 
that made by Russia If they sent a mission or an 
expedition, we should have to do the same, but in greater 
strength. As to our dealings with Tibet at the moment, 
Lord Laasdowne stated that we were endeavouring to 
obtain from the Tibetan authorities the fulfilment of 
pledges which had been given to us in 1890 m regard to 
the location of the frontier, and in regard to trade facilities 
on the borders of Sikkim We had found that it was of 
no use to deal with Tibet through China, owing to the 
dilatory methods of the Chinese Government and the 
filenderness of their influence over Tibet. It was abso- 
lutely necessary that these local questions should be 
disposed of to our satisfaction, and we should continue to 
take the necessary steps for that purpose. 

6 



82 NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 

Some delay occmred in getting a reply from the 
Russian Government, but on April 8, 1903, the Russian 
Ambassador informed Loid Lansdowne* that he could 
" assuie him officially that theie was no convention about 
Tibet, eithei with Tibet itself, 01 with China, 01 with any- 
one else , nor had the Russian Government any agents in 
that country, 01 any intention of sending any agents 01 
missions theie But, although the Russian Government 
had no designs whatever about Tibet, they could not 
remain indifferent to any senous disturbance of the status 
quo in that country. Such a disturbance might rendei it 
necessary foi them to safeguard their mteiests in Asia ; 
not that even in that case they would desne to interfere 
in the affairs of Tibet, as their policy 'nc viseiait le 
Tibet en aucun cas,' but they might be obliged to take 
measuies elsewhere They icgaided Tibet as ionmng 
part of the Chinese Empne, m the integrity of which they 
took an interest " 

Count BenckendoifF went on to say that he hoped thai 
theie was no question of any action on om pait in regard 
to Tibet which might have the effect of raising questions 
of this kind, and Loid Lansdowne told him thai we had 
no idea of annexing the country, but he was well await" 
that it immediately adjoined oui frontier , that we had 
treaties with the Tibetans, and a light to tiade facilities. 
If these weie denied us, and if the Tibetans did not lullil 
their treaty obligations, it would be absolutely necessary 
that we should insist upon our rights In cases of this 
kind, where an uncivilized country adjoined the posses- 
bions of a civilized Power, it was inevitable that the 
latter should exercise a certain amount of: local pre- 
dominance Such a predominance belonged to us in 
Tibet But it did riot follow from this that we hud any 
designs upon the independence of the country 

With these veiy definite assurances from Russia, it 
might well be asked why we should still have desired to 
take pronounced measures in Tibet Anxiety in regard 
to Russian action m Tibet was the mam reason why the 
Government of India sought to take action in Tibet 

* Blue-book, p 187 



TIBETAN RELIANCE ON RUSSIA 83 

Now that we were leasonably assured that Russia had no 
intention of mterfeimg in Tibet, why should we still have 
thought it necessary to send a mission into the country ? 
The answer is that we had not yet settled those questions 
of trade and mteicouise which had existed years before 
the Russian factoi intiuded itself into the situation , 
besides which we had always the consideration that, 
although it might be true enough that the Russians had 
no mind to have any dealings with the Tibetans, yet the 
Tibetans might sbll think they could icly on the Russians 
in flouting us The Germans had officially no intention 
of mterfeinig with the Boeis, yet it was because Kruger 
thought he could iely upon Geiman support that he 
went to war with England He was much too astute an 
old gentleman bo have fought us if he had thought he 
would have had to fight us by himself So it was with 
the Tibetans The Russian Government might not have 
the remotest intention of helping them in any possible 
way, yet the Tibetans might, and did, think they could 
count upon Russian support The Dalai Lama's Envoy 
Kxtraoidnuiry had been vciy well received by the Czar 
find by the Russian Chancellor and others Doubtless, 
he had collected some very handsome subscriptions and 
received valuable presents. A httle Oriental imagination 
would soon expand these ordinal y amenities into a promise 
of thick-and-thin support against the English We had 
still this erroneous impression to reckon with, 



CHAPTER VIII 

A MISSION SANCTIONED 

WHILE the negotiations with Russia were proceeding the 
Home Government would come to no final decision as to 
the action to be taken The question at issue, they m- 
foimed the Indian Government'* m February, was no 
longer one of details as to tiade and boundaries though 
on these it was necessaiy that an agi cement should be 
arrived at but the whole question of the future political 
iclations of India and Tibet They agreed with the Indian 
Government that, having regard to the geographical posi- 
tion of Tibet on the frontiers of India, and its relations 
with Nepal, it was " indispensable that British influence 
should be recognized at Lhasa in such a mannei as to 
lender it impossible for any other Powei to exeicise a 
pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with 
the interests of British India " They admitted, also, the 
force of the contention that the interest shown by the 
Russian Government in the action of the Government of 
India on the Tibetan frontier demonstrated the urgency 
of placing our relations with Tibet on a secure basis. 
They recognized that Nepal might be rightly sensitive as 
to any alteration m the political position of Tibet which 
would be likely to disturb the relations at present existing 
between the two countries, and that the establishment of 
a powerful foreign influence m Tibet would disturb those 
relations, and might even, by exposing Nepal to a pressure 
which it would be difficult to resist, affect those which 
then existed on so coidial a basis between India and 
Nepal They regretted the necessity for abandoning the 
passive attitude that had hitherto sufficed in the regulation 

* Blue-book, p 184. 
84 



VIEWS ON H.M'S GOVERNMENT 85 

of affairs on the frontier, and weie compelled to recognize 
that circumstances had lecently occurred which threw on 
them the obligation of placing our relations with the 
Government oi Lhasa upon a more satisfactory footing 
And they acknowledged that the proposal to send an 
aimed mission to enter Lhasa, by f'oice if necessaiy, and 
establish theic a Resident, might, if the issue were simply 
one between India and Tibet, be justified as a legitimate 
icply to the action of the Tibetan Government in returning 
the letters which on three occasions the Viceroy had 
addressed to them, and in disregarding the Convention 
with China of J 800 Rut they stated that they could riot 
regard the question as one concerning India and Tibet 
alone. The position of China in its relations to the 
Powers of Europe had been so modified in recent years 
that it was necessary to take into account those altered 
conditions in deciding on action affecting what still had 
to be regarded as a province of China. It was true that 
we had no desire either to declare a piolectoiate or 
permanently to occupy any portion of the country. But 
measures of that kind might become inevitable if we were 
once to find oui selves committed to armed intervention. 

For the above reasons, the Home Government thought 
it necessaiy, before sanctioning a course which might be 
regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese 
Empire, to be sure that such action could be justified by 
the* previous action of Tibet, and they had, accordingly, 
come to the conclusion that it would be premature to 
adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the 
affairs of Tibet as those proposed by the Government of 
India, They would await, therefore, the result of their 
reference to the* Russian Government, and after those 
explanations' had been jeceived they would be in a better 
p()sition to decide on the scope to be given to the negotia- 
tions with China, and on the steps to be taken to protect 
India against any danger from the establishment of foreign 
influence in Tibet. 

When the Russian assurances were at length received, 
the purport of the convei Nation Lord Lansdowne had held 
with the Russian Ambassador was at once communicated 



86 A MISSION SANCTIONED 

by telegram to the Viceroy, and on April 14 the Secretary 
of State, piesummg that it would be necessary to include 
in the scope of the negotiations with China and Tibet the 
entire question of our future relations with Tibet, com- 
meicial and otherwise, asked the Viceroy for his views as 
to the foim which these negotiations should now takes 
with special reference to the means to be adopted to 
insure that the conditions that might be arrived at would 
be observed by Tibet 

The Viceroy on April 16 icphed that he had recently 
received from the delegate deputed by the Chinese Resi- 
dent an intimation that if Yatung was not considered a 
suitable locality, they were willing to negotiate at any 
place acceptable to us And he proposed, accoidmgly, to 
invite the Chinese Resident to depute delegates to meet 
oui representative at Khamba Jong, which was the 
nearest inhabited place on the Tibetan side to the frontier 
in dispute near Giagong The Viceroy proposed that our 
representative, with an escort of 200 men, should proceed 
to that place, while reinforcements were held in icserve in 
Sikkim, and that, should the Chinese and Tibetan icpie- 
sentatives fail to appear, or should the formei come with- 
out the latter, our representative should move forward to 
Shigatse or Gyantse, in order that the arrival of the 
deputations from Lhasa might be accelerated 

The Secretary of State telegraphed on April 29 that 
there was no objection to the Chinese, Tibetan, and 
Indian representatives meeting at Khamba Jong or to the 
military anangements recommended ; but His Majesty's 
Government considered that without previous reference to 
them the Mission should not advance beyond that place, 
as in existing conditions, even in the event of the failure 
of the Chinese and Tibetan parties, any sudden advance to 
Lhasa was not, in their opinion, justified 

In regard to the subject-matter of the forthcoming 
negotiations, the Viceroy telegraphed on May 7 that, 
having regard to the stultification of existing treaty 
provisions, and to the unsuitability of either Yatung, 
Phan, or any other place in the Chumbi Valley, for a 
trade-mart, in which business could be transacted directly 



OBJECTS OF THE MISSION 87 

between British and Tibetan merchants, without incurring 
the monopoly of local traders, it was necessary to insist 
upon opening a new trade-mait and upon having a British 
agent at Gyantse The Viceroy thought that having 
a British repiesentative at Lhasa, which would be the best 
possible security foi the future observance of the con- 
ditions, would be far preferable , but assuming the un- 
willingness of His Majesty's Government to press this 
claim, the proposal for an agent at Gyantse was a suitable 
alternative In any case, the fullest facilities should be 
given to the British lepresentative for direct communica- 
tion with the Tibetan Government, and if he met with 
obstruction, it would be necessary to resort to the 
alternative of moving him forward to Lhasa Further- 
more, it would be necessary to secure for British Indian 
subjects the same freedom for trade and travel in Tibet as 
was enjoyed by Kashmiris and Nepalese, and to insist thai 
all British subjects duly authoiized by the Government of 
India should be allowed to proceed by recognized routes to 
Gyantse, beyond which a pass from the Tibetan Govern- 
ment would be leqmred 

As Commissioner, the Viceroy proposed to appoint 
Major Younghusband, Resident at Indore. He could 
confidently rely on his judgment and discretion, and he 
had great Asiatic experience. With him he would 
associate as Joint Commissioner Mr White, Political 
Officer in Sikkim 

The Secretary of State hesitated to accept at once 
the proposal icgaiding Gyantse, and, wished before coming 
to any decision to be mfoimed whether the Viceroy could 
propose any altei native in place of the extreme course 
of advancing by force into Tibet ; and the Viceroy said the 
only alternatives were (a) the costly and ineffectual 
measure of blocking all trade-routes and excluding 
Tibetans from British India, and (b) an occupation of the 
Chumbi Valley 

The final decision of the Home Government on the 
whole matter was telegraphed to the Viceroy on May 28. 
They approved a procedure by which both the Chinese 
and Tibetan Governments would be bound by the action 



88 A MISSION SANCTIONED 

of their representatives, but they wished that the negotia- 
tions should be confined to questions concerning trade 
relations, the iron tier, and grazing rights, and that no 
proposal should be made for the establishment of a 
Political Agent at Gyantse or Lhasa, as such a political 
outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incom- 
mensurate with any benefits which would be gained by it. 
They had recently received assurances that Russia had 
no intention of developing political interests in Tibet, 
and they were unwilling to be committed by threats to 
any definite course of compulsion to be undertaken in 
futuie 



While the Home Government and the Indian Govern- 
ment were thus deliberating as to the final action which 
should be taken> communications with the Chinese were 
being exchanged The Chinese Government had, in 
Decembei, informed our Mmistei at Peking that "the 
Throne, attaching deep importance to international re- 
lations, and icgarding the Tibetan question of great 
importance, had specially appointed Yu Tai to be Imperial 
Resident in Tibet, with oiders to proceed with all speed, 
and negotiate with Mr White in an amicable spirit." 
This newly-appointed Resident called on the British 
Minister on January 5, and informed him that he had 
hoped to be able to travel to his new post by way of 
India, but that, in ordei to avoid aiousing the suspicion 
of the Tibetans, it had been decided that he should travel 
by the Yangtse River and Szechuan, and would not be 
able to reach Lhasa much before July. He did not, in fact, 
reach it till six months later still, till thirteen critical 
months had elapsed since the Chinese Government had 
told us that he was to proceed to Lhasa with all possible 
speed. 

Mr. Townley, the British Charge* d' Affaires at Peking, 
on May 12, informed the Chinese Government that 
the Government of India would invite the Resident 
at Lhasa to send Chinese delegates to meet the repre- 
sentatives of the British Government at Khiunba Jong, 



CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE CHINESE 89 

foi the settlement of pending questions, and would inform 
the Resident that the Chinese delegates should be accom- 
panied by a duly acci edited Tibetan representative The 
Chinese Government weie told that we attached gieat 
impoitance to this lattei point, for the Tibetans had more 
than once intimated to the British authorities that they 
did not considei themselves bound to obseive the pro- 
visions of the tieaties previously made between the British 
and Chinese representatives, because no icpiesentative 
of the Dalai Lama had taken part m the negotiations. 

The Chinese Government, on receipt of this, tele- 
graphed to the Resident at Lhasa, asking him again to 
admonish the Dalai Lama, and to persuade him not to fail to 
send, with speed, a Tibetan official to be associated with the 
deputy Ho m his discussion with Mr White In icply, 
the Chinese Government icceived, on July 18, a telegram 
from the Resident, saying that he had at once com- 
municated these instructions to the Dalai Lama, 
"directing him to send a Tibetan [lit., barbarian] official of 
fairly high standing and despatch him to the frontier, 
provided with credentials as a negotiator, m order to 
concert with the Prefect Ho and his colleagues, to await 
British officials, and effect a harmonious and sincere 
settlement." 

The Resident at Lhasa had also at this time submitted 
to the Throne a memorial, which furnishes exceedingly 
instructive reading He said he had summoned the 
Tibetan Councillors to his office, and admonished them in 
person to the ell'ect that the English intended to bring 
troops to Tibet, and that it was difficult to fathom then 
objects. All this, lie said, was the result of their obstructing 
last year a deputy with his letinue, so that a favourable 
opportunity was lost. If the English did make this long 
march, it would, of course, be the duty of him, the 
Imperial Resident, to proceed m person to the frontier and 
find some way of persuading them to stop But the 
Tibetans, on their side, must not show their previous 
obstinacy, and if the English did not stop, and insisted on 
entering Tibet, they must on no account repel them with 
arms, but must discuss matters with them on the basis of 



90 A MISSION SANCTIONED 

reason Thus he hoped a ruptuie might be avoided, and 
things brought back to a satisfactory conclusion But if, 
as before, the Councillors allowed themselves to be guided 
by the three gieat monasteries, and hostilities once began, 
then the horrors of war would be more than he could hear- 
to think of, and even the mediation of him, the Impenal 
Resident, would be of no avail 

Such, said the Resident, were the admonitions which he 
addressed to the Tibetan Councillor, and as he did so he 
watched then: demeanour. It was submissive certainly, but 
obstinacy was engrained in the chaiacter of the Tibetan 
barbarians, and whether, when matters should become 
pressing, they would consent to obey and discuss questions 
m a friendly spint, it was difficult for him to tell in advance. 

The laconic observation by the Emperor on this curious 
document, which coriectly described the Tibetans, and 
which incidentally depicted both the contempt of the 
Chinese for these "barbarians' 1 and the ineffectiveness of 
their control over them, was " Seen " 

But the Resident had also written to the Viceroy, on 
April 6, saying that he had deputed Mr Ho and Captain 
Parr for the discussion of affairs, and they were waiting at 
Yatung The deputy appointed by the Viceroy might, 
he said, eithei come to Yatung, or the Chinese deputies 
would proceed to Sikkim, or such other place as might be 
decided on by the Viceroy. 

To this the Viceroy replied, on June 3, 1 903, that as 
the Resident had already clearly recognized, it would be 
useless to negotiate upon matters affecting Tibet without 
insuring the full and adequate representation of the 
Dalai Lama's Government throughout the proceedings. 
He was nominating as his Commissioner Colonel Young- 
husband, who, accompanied by Mr. White, Political 
Officer m Sikkim, as Joint Commissioner, would proceed 
to meet the Commissioneis appointed by the Resident, 
who should, of course, be of equivalent rank, and must be 
attended by a Tibetan officer of the highest rank, whose 
authority to bind the Tibetan Government was absolute 
and unquestioned On this understanding, that the Lhasa 
authorities would be duly and fully represented, the 



INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER 91 

Viceioy was piepaicd to accept the Resident's invitation 
that the Commissioners should meet at a very eaily date, 
and discuss, not only the exact position of the frontier 
undei the Convention of 1890 and the mutual lights of 
grazing to he allowed on cither side of that frontiei to the 
people of Tihet and Butish teintoiy, hut also the method 
m which our Liade i elation s could be improved and 
placed upon a basis moie consonant with the usage of 
civilized nations and our direct and predominating interests 
in Tibet And as the Resident was prepared to let his 
deputies meet the British representative at any place 
which the Viceioy might select, and as Khamba Jong, 
being the nearest inhabited place to the frontier in 
question, seemed to be the most suitable place for the 
meeting, he had directed Colonel Younghusband to 
proceed thither as soon as he conveniently could, and he 
trusted that the Resident would secure the attendance of 
the Chinese and Tibetan lepresentatives at Kharnba Jong 
on, or as soon as possible aftei, July 7 

On the same date as this letter was written I also 
received my own formal instiuctions.* I was informed 
that a strict insistence on the boundary-line as laid down 
in the Convention of 1890 was, perhaps, not essential either 
to the Government of India or to the Sikkim Durbar, and 
I was directed to give my opinion on this point after 
inspecting the tract in question The matter of grazing 
rights was not one of great importance, and aftei discus- 
sion with the Chinese and Tibetan delegates 1 was to 
submit my proposals as to the agreement which might be 
come to in this mattei. The revision of the Trade Regu- 
lations and the recognition of Gyantse as a trade-mart in 
place of Yatung were to form the subject of discussion 
with the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, and the provision 
of guarantees for the observance of such agi cements as 
might be concluded were to be considered a matter of the 
first importance. It was further considered very desirable 
that arrangements for free communication between the 
Government of India and the authorities at Lhasa should 
be made, and possibly also annual meetings between 

* Blue-book, p. 198. 



92 A MISSION SANCTIONED 

British and Tibetan officials for the due settlement of the 
trade and frontier difficulties which might occur 

In conclusion, I was warned to be veiy careful to 
abstain from using any language 01 taking any action 
which would bind the Government to any definite course 
hereafter without first obtaining the sanction of the 
Government of India 

All was now prepared for the start of a mission In 
this extiaordmanly complex and intricate matter the many 
different lines had at last been made to converge on one 
point The manifold communications which had taken' 
place for thirty years between the Bengal Government and 
the Government of India, between local Indian officers and 
local Chinese and Tibetans , the" coirespondence between 
Simla or Calcutta and London, between the India Office 
and the Foreign Office, between the Foieign Office and 
the Russian and Chinese Governments, and between the 
Viceroy and our Mimstei at Peking and the Chinese 
"Resident at Lhasa, had all been boiled down into the 
definite act of the despatch of a mission to a place a bare 
dozen miles inside Tibet to discuss trade-relations, frontier 
and grazing rights. 

This was not, after all, any remarkably bold or out- 
rageously aggressive act Such as it was, was it justified '* 
The narrative of the causes which led to the move lias 
been long, but, even so, it has been hard to put their true 
significance so that it may be appreciated by people un- 
acquainted with Orientals Still, there are some faiily 
plain facts and considerations which emerge from the 
long narrative, and which all who are accustomed to the 
conduct of affairs may be expected to undei stand 

The first fact is this that it was aggression on the 
pail of the Tibetans or their vassals which led to action 
on our part, and that before ever a single soldier of the 
British Government had crossed the frontier into Tibet 
Tibetan troops had ciossed it to the Indian side, It was 
the irruption of the Bhutanese into the plains of Ifeuim] 
which caused Warren Hastings to send Bogle Lo Tibet in 



JUSTIFICATION OF THE MISSION 98 

1774 It was the invasion of Sikkim by the Tihetans 
which made the necessity for the treaty of 1890. And it 
was because the Tibetans repudiated that treaty, and 
occupied terntoiy inside the boundary therein laid down, 
that we had to take measuies to see it observed 

But even supposing they were aggressive, it may be 
said that we ought to have treated the Tibetans with 
leniency, gentleness, and consideiation, because of their 
ignorance. So we ought, and so we did Warren 
Hastings conceded the request of the Tashi Lama And 
though the Tibetans for a century have been free to come 
down to India, with no restuctions on their trade 01 on 
their tiavel, we for years nevci pressed foi any ordinary 
lights of trade and travel for our own subjects, whethei 
British 01 Indian We allowed the Tibetans to come 
down where, and when, and how they liked. Foi a 
century we let the principle of heads they win, tails we 
lose, continue Even when we at last stiried, and thought 
of sending Macaulay to Lhasa to make some less one- 
sided aiiangcment, we gave up the idea when we saw that 
the Tibetans raised objection And even, again, when 
the Chinese asked us to make a definite treaty with them 
OIL behalf of the Tibetans, and guaranteed its obseivance 
by them, and when the Tibetans broke it, and repudiated 
it, and refused to meet our officers, we continued for ten 
years showing them forbeaiance and patience. It was 
only at last when the Tibetans, having broken the treaty, 
having declined to have any communication with us, yet 
sent Envoys to the Russians, that we took high action, 
and despatched a mission with an escort into Tibet. If 
we had shown no inclination to hold the Tibetans and 
Chinese to their engagements, others might well think 
that they also would not be held to theiis, and our 
authority and influence would slacken in proportion as 
this impression got abroad. No Government can conduct 
the affairs of contiguous States if it allows a treaty to be 
broken with impunity 

My personal view is that the local question would have 
been better settled, and much subsequent international 
complications would have been saved if, at an earlier stage 



94 A MISSION SANCTIONED 

in the proceedings, when it first became amply cleai that 
our treaty was valueless , that the Tibetans repudiated and 
ignored it, and that the Chinese were unable to have it 
observed, we had at once resumed the pioceedmgs wheic 
we had left them when we diove the Tibetans across 
our border, and had again advanced into the Chumbi 
Valley, and stopped there till we had effected a properly 
recognized and lasting settlement This was the course 
recommended by Sir Charles Elliott, the then Lieutenant- 
Governoi of Bengal, and whether that would have been n 
wise couise or not, I do not see how anyone who has care- 
fully considered the whole course of tiansactions which at 
last led up to the despatch of a mission to the first 
inhabited place across the bolder can deny that such a 
eouise was justified 

Whether the mission was conducted with due con- 
sideration 01 with unnecessary haishness, and whether 
any good came of it, eithei to oui selves or to the 
Tibetans or to anyone else, aie matteis foi scpa.ia.te 
icview, and to that purpose I will now addiess myself in 
the following narrative of the couise of the mission 



CHAPTER IX 

SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

THE previous chapters have been necessarily, though 
perhaps somewhat tediously, filled up with a narrative of 
the many intricate consideiations which went towaids 
the final determination to send a mission to Tibet 
Hut of all that had been going on of the voluminous 
correspondence in the great offices, of the meetings 
and attempts at meetings on the frontier I wa& wholly 
ignorant. Anglo-Indian papeis seldom contain informa- 
tion on such happenings And for some years past, 
in accordance with the well-intentioned, but, as it has 
since tinned out, thoroughly unsound, advice of a pievious 
Viceroy, that it would be to my advantage in the Political 
Department not to remain for evei on the frontier, but 
Lo acquire experience of internal affairs as well, I had 
been serving in the interior in political agencies in 
Hajputana and Central India, and had heard nothing of 
any intention to send a mission to Tibet Nor had I ever 
had any connection with Tibet, though as long ago as 
1888 the then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal had, I dis- 
covered many years after, asked the Government of India 
for my services, as I had then just returned from a journey 
around Manchuria and across Central Asia, from Peking to 
Kashmir, and it was thought that, knowing Chinese 
customs, 1 might be of use, in addition to the Chinese 
interpreter. This request was twice made, it appears ; 
but 1 was then a young subaltern, still in military employ, 
and in the throes of examination, and the Government of 
India replied that 1 was not available, as I was about to 
go up for examination, and, if sent away then, would fail 
to qualify for promotion. So 1 went up for one of those 

95 



96 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

examinations of which such a fetish is made, and never 
till now had been near the Tibet nontiei. I made, indeed, 
an abortive effort in 1889 to go to Lhasa, disguised as a 
Turki from Central Asia ; but this, too, was nipped in the 
bud by the icfusal of my Colonel to give me leave from 
the regiment What spirit of adventure I possessed 
never received much encouragement from Government, 
and, as I have said, I had left the frontier foi some years, 
and was superintending the affairs of a native State in 
the very heart of India, when, on a sweltering day in 
May, I suddenly received a summons to proceed at once 
to Simla to leceive instructions regarding a mission I was 
to lead to Tibet 

Here, indeed, I felt was the chance of my life 1 was 
once more alive. The thrill of adventuie again ran through 
my veins. And I wasted little time in rounding up my 
business, packing my things, and starting off for Simla, 

There I was handed ovei all the papers in the 
Foreign Office to digest while the final instructions of the 
Secietary of State were still awaited And one afternoon 
I was asked to lunch with Loid Curzon and Lord 
Kitchener, at a gymkhana down at Annandale, wheic, 
after lunch, sitting under the shade of the glorious pine- 
trees, Lord Curzon explained to me all his intentions, 
ideas, and difficulties Men and ladies performed every 
feat of equestrian skill and equestrian nonsense, and the 
place was crowded with all the beauty and gaiety of Simla 
in the height of the season But the Viceroy and I sat 
apart, and talked over the various difficulties I should meet 
with in Tibet, and the best means by which they could be 
overcome. 

One thing he made perfectly clear to me from the 
start that he meant to see the thing through ; that he 
intended the mission to be a success, and would provide 
me with every means within his power to make it so. 
Fortunately, we knew each other well ever since his first 
appointment as Under-Secretary of State for India. We 
had travelled together nine years pieviously lound Chitral 
and Gilgit , we had corresponded for years ; and when he 
came to India he, with a kindness of heart for which he is 



COMPOSITION OF STAFF 97 

oidinanly given veiy httle ciedit, had asked me to legaid 
him, not as Viceioy, but as an old hi end and fellow- 
tiavellei No bettei initiatoi and suppoiter of such an 
eriteipnse as a mission to Tibet could be imagined He 
had his whole heait and soul in the undei taking, and I do 
not think it took long for me to put my whole heait into 
it, too 

I had in pievious yeais been despatched fiom Simla 
on two political missions ~m 188<) to cxploie the un- 
known passes on the northern fiontiei of Kashmir, and 
to put down the laids iiom Hunza, and m 1890 to the 
Pamirs and Chinese Tuikestan so I had some geneial 
idea of what to expect on the piescnt occasion, and as I 
had also spent Llnee months in the Legation at Peking, 
besides tiavelhng fiom one end to the othei oJt the Chinese 
Empire, I knew enough about the Chinese to know that 
\ should nevei be able to deal successfully with them 
without the assistance of someone who had had a life- 
training in the woik I therefore, in the iiist place, asked 
for an officer of the China Consular Seivice to act as 
adviser and interpietei. Next, as regards dealing with 
the Tibetans, it was most necessary to have an officer who 
could speak the Tibetan language, and it was fortunate 
for the success of the mission that Government were able 
to send with it, first as Intelligence Officer and afterwards 
as Secretary, ('apt am O'Connor, an artillery officer, who, 
when stationed with his mountain battery at Darkling, 
had learned the Tibetan language and studied the history 
and customs of the Tibetans, and who, Infteiwaids found, 
was never so happy as when he was .surrounded by 
begrimed Tibetans, with whom he would spend hour after 
hour in apparently futile conversation. 

The services of some of the Gurkhas and of the 
Pathan, Shah'/acl Mir, who bad been with me on my 
mission in 1881), I also tiled to secure , but the Gurkhas 
had all left their regiment, and Shahzad Mir, who had 
been employed on many a mission and reconnaissance 
since, was then absent in Abyssinia 

Mr. White reached Simla a day or two after my 
arrival, and we at once set to work to discuss arrange- 

7 



98 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

ments He had had expeiience on that fioutioi for 
fouiteen yeais, and was naturally well up m all the luenl 
aspects of the question, and knew what I did not 
what dealing with Tibetans really meant. His accounts 
of then obstinacy and obstructiveness appeared to me 
exaggeiated, and, with the optimism of inexperience, I 
thought that we should, together with Captain O'Connor s 
assistance, be able to soon break thiough it. But Ah, 
White turned out in the end to be right, and I think 
from the first he knew that we should not be able to do 
anything elsewhere than in Lhasa 

Mr White's long local experience on that frontier 
made his recommendation in legard to arrangements 
specially valuable We were Lo have an escort of 200 
men from the 32nd Pioneeis, who had been for some 
months in Sikkim improving the road towards the frontier, 
and we wished arrangements made for them to precede 
us to the vicinity of the frontici, so that we, towelling 
lightly, might reach Khamba Jong as quickly us possible, 
for we were now getting well on into the summer, and 
had not much time to spare for negotiation before the 
winter came on 

Indian troops and officers have, fortunately, plenty of 
expeiience in rough work of this and every other descrip- 
tion The 32nd Pioneers I had known m the Kehef of 

CM I n 1895 ' and they had come almosl fctruitflil I" 
frikkun from another frontier expedition, so they could be 
relied on to be thoroughly up to the duty now expected 
ot them. All I asked Government for, on Mr. White's 
recommendation, was that, as they would be muvinir HP 

TTnn * ,\ Steamy ^ leys of Lower Sikkim ton plateau 
15,000 feet above searlevel, they should be provided with 
clothing on the winter scale, with poshtms (sheepskin 
3 r fl f ntries > jd that special rations shoufd be 
issued to the men. And foi ceremonial effect, which is 

AS TVS b Ji hgh u tly P assed over ir '^W* *H i 

Asiate I aaked that they should take with them their 

full-dress uniforms, and that twenty-five of them should 

be mounted on pomes, which could be procure 

The Government of India always equips n^d 



DEPARTURE FROM SIMLA 99 

its expeditions well, and such little arrangements were 
soon and readily made And by a piece of foresight on 
its part, there was on the spot in Sikkim the best practical 
rough-and-ready supply and transport officer in their 
service, Major Bretherton, D S O , a very old friend of 
mine in Chitial days, a man of unbounded energy, of 
infinite icsource, and of quite unconquerable optimism, 
who was drowned in the Brahmaputra within a few days' 
march of Lhasa, when we were just about to reap the 
leward which he, more than any other single man, had put 
within our leach 



All headquarter arrangements having been made, and 
my formal instructions icceived, Mr White and I left 
Simla early in June to pioceed by Darjilmg to the 
Sikkim fi on tier. In India such enterprises as we weie 
now embarking on are always started off very quietly, and 
few outside a limited official circle, and possibly the 
Russian Government, knew anything at all about oui 
mission The Government of India is over-sensitive to 
questions and criticisms in Parliament, and, dependent as 
it is upon the support of public opinion in England, 
would be bettei advised, in my opinion, to take the public 
ITI England more into its confidence But this sensitive- 
ness is intelligible It must by the necessity of the case be 
especially difficult to govern India from England, but that 
task is rendered vastly more difficult by careless questions 
and criticisms of Members of Parliament. My mission 
suf fiered much through the want of support by the British 
public, and they could hardly have been expected to give 
it suppoit when it was eventually sprung so suddenly on 
them, and when they had not had the opportunity of 
watching affairs giadually growing to a crisis On the 
other hand, the Indian Government cannot be expected 
to expose delicate affairs to the risk of rough, crude 
handling from men who, though they ultimately control 
these affairs, are so very little veised in their conduct. 

I departed, then, from Simla in the most matter-of-fact 
manner possible, telling my friends, what was perfectly 



100 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

true, that I was going to see Darjilmg I had therefore 
no " enthusiastic send-off." But I had what was better, 
the heartfelt good wishes of the Viceroy, who has known 
the conditions under which frontier officers work, and has 
been moie interested in the problems which confront them 
than any other Viceroy for many a year past I was also 
greatly cheered, and subsequently most warmly and con- 
tinuously supported, by Sir Louis Dane, the Foreign 
Secretary, whose hospitality I had enjoyed during my itay 
in Simla 



The journey from Simla to Darjilmg by Calcutta was 
a cunous beginning for an expedition to the cold of the 
Himalayas. The monsoon had not yet broken. The hunt 
of the railway journey was frightful At Calcutta tht' 
tempeiatuie was almost the highest on recoid. And w 
hurried on, for I was impatient, not only to be out of 
the heat, but to be getting to work 

At the very outset I looked forwaid to one experu-wr 
of, to me, peculiar inteiest My life through, mountains 
have excited in me a special fascination. I was hunt 
in the Himalayas, within sight of the Kashmir Moun- 
tains, and some inexplicable attraction has drawn nit* 
back to them time after time. Now that I was eullrd 
upon to pierce thiough the Himalayas to the far countn 
on the hither side, I was to make my start from that 
spot, from which of all others the most perfect view is 
to be obtained Darjilmg is now known throughout Un* 
world foi the magnificence of its mountain .scenery, and 
fortunate it is that such a spot should be now ,so easilv 



As in the earliest dawn I looked out of the twin 
window, to catch the first glimpse of thole ny 
mountains I had to penetrate, I saw far up in the sky It 

level plain The air was stifling with the^hoilt of'* 
tropical midsummer But I knew that pinky Jmss 
the sky could be nothing else tJian the ]iT nf Z" 
Himalayas, tinted by the yet unrtei sun gtt e me 



FIRST VIEW OF HIMALAYAS 101 

the first thrill of my new advcntme, and I forthwith 
drank 111 gjeedily cvciy new impression 

All ai omul in the plains there was tank, dank, 
depicssing \egctation I Jnwholesomeness exuded Irom 
the soil Puticfymj* pools of watei lay about oil c^cry 
side The whole an was tlnek with fevei. But those 
hih hcL\enly mountains waned ho]>e As the tiain 
progressed, tlie lower " hills"- themselves 7,000 or 8,000 
I'eet in height cnie into si^ht F^cntually we reached 
Liu 11 base, and left tho oidmary tiain ibi the little mountain 
railway which ascends to Daijihng. And now, indeed, 
weie charms on every hand The little railway winds 
its way upward tlnough a tropical forest of supeib 
magnificence The orchids could almost he plucked iiom 
UK* miniature carnages The* luxmiant vegetation nearly 
nu'l over the tram Immense tree-terns and wild bananas 
shot u|) beneath the oveihanging arches of the dripping 
loiest trees. Wieaths and festoons of \ine, convol- 
vulus, and begonia stretched from bough to bou^h 
Climbing baulnmas and robimas entwined the trunks and 
hung like great cables from tiee to tree. Bamboos shot 
up in dense tufts to a height of 100 feet Refreshing 
streams dashed foaming down the mountain-side, Glorious 
waterfalls here and there thundered over steep cliffs. 
And through all the diminutive train panted its way 
upward- by xigxags, by spirals, thiough tunnels, across 
diray bridges, along the sides of cliffs- -but only too slowly, 
fou glorious as was the tropical forest, I thirsted for the 
sight of Kinchinjtmga, which we should get when we at 
last topped the ridge and reached Darjiling. 

Alas ! when we at last reached the summit, all was hid 
in cloud. Fresh from the steamy plains, we shivered in the 
damp mists, and whoa we reached Darjilmg itself rain was 
descending in cataracts It was depressing, but it had the 
advantage that it enabled me to recuperate u little from 
tlit* hot, trying railway journey through the plains of 
India, and be all the more fit therefore to thoroughly 
enjoy and appreciate the great view when at last it should 
be revealed. 

Many times afterwards I saw it, and each time with a 



102 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

new and more wonderful impression. Sometimes in the 
eddying cloudy billows a break would come, giving a 
glimpse into heaven itself, and through the little inlet \\ (mid 
be seen a piece of sky of the mtensest blue, and against it 
a peak of purest white, so lofty and so much a paituci of 
the sky and clouds it seemed impossible it could ever bo ol 
earth This was Kinchmjunga m one of its aspects At 
another time, when all was clear of cloud, I would look 
steeply down from the tropical foiests of Dmjihng fin 1 
6,000 feet to the bottom of the narrow valley beneath, 
and then up and up through tier aftei tier of evci -heighten- 
ing ndges, till, far up in the skies, suffused in the blue 
and dreamy haze, my eyes would rest on the culminating 
range of all, spotless and ethereal, and reaching its climax 
in one noble peak nearly 28,000 feet above the valley 
depths from which it rose. And at yet another time, when 
the houses were all lit in the bazaai, and the lamps 
lighted along the roads, and night had almost settled 
down upon Darjihng, high up in the skies would be 
seen a rosy flush: Kinchmjunga was still icceivmg tlu k 
rays of the sun, long since set to us below. In these 
and many other aspects Kinchmjunga had never-ending 
charms 

Darjihng itself, with such scenery and vegetation, w;is, 
it need hardly be said, an exquisitely beautiful place. 
And it had about it none of the busy air of Simla. It 
was at this season nearly always shrouded in mist, mid 
seemed wrapped m cotton-wool No one was in a hurry, 
and the whole tone of the place was placid and serene 

Sir James Bourdillon, the acting Lieutenant-Governor; 
Mr Macpherson, the Chief Secretary; Mr. Mariiulin, the 
Commissioner , Mr Walsh, the Deputy-Commissioner, 
were aU most helpful to me, and I appreciated their assist 
ance all the more because I could not help feeling somewhat 
of an interloper and poacher upon other people's preserves. 
Since 1873 the Bengal Government had been working for 
the settlement of then- frontier affairs with Tibet, and now 
at the crucial moment a stranger dropped down from the 
Olympian heights of Simla to cariy out the culminating 
act 1 could naturally expect oidinary official civility 



OVER-CENTRALIZATION 103 

fiom them But they, eveiy one of them, went out of 
then way to put then whole infoimation and experience 
at my disposal More than that, both they and their 
wives weie moie thoughtful and kind to my wife than 
I could possibly iccoid duimg all that time of anxiety 
and depiession when we subsequently advanced to Lhasa, 
and we have evei felt most deeply giateful to them 

The Bengal Government, I have often thought, has 
expenenced a haid fate ovei Tibet affans It was a 
Goveinoi of Bengal Wairen Hastings who initiated 
the idea of sending a mission to Tibet It was anothei 
Lieutenant- Go vei 1101 who revived the idea of mteicouise 
in 1873 It was a Bengal officei, Colman Macaulay, who 
ongmated and pushed thiough the idea of a mission to 
Lhasa in 1885 It was a Bengal officer, Mr Paul, who 
negotiated the Tiade Regulations of 1893 , and it was a 
Lieutenant-Go vei 1101, Su Charles Elliott, who, in 1805, 
made what seems to me to have been the most suitable 
lecommendatioii foi the settlement of the question, an 
occupation of the Chumbi Valley 

But giadually, in the course of yeais, the conduct of 
fiontiei matteis has been taken out of their hands by the 
Government of India and out of the hands of the latter 
by the Impenal Government Theie has been a gieatei 
and gi eater centralization of the conduct of frontier lela- 
tions, which may be necessaiy fiom some points of view, 
but one of the effects of which is appaient locally The 
local Government loses its sense of responsibility foi 
fiontiei matteis Local officei s feel little inducement to 
fit themselves for the conduct of such affairs And, con- 
sequently, when good tiontier officei s really aie wanted 
in future, they will not be found, and the next mission 
to Lhasa will in all probability be led by a cleik fiom 
the Foreign Office in London 

I left Daijihng on June 19, in drenching ram To 
leahze it the English leader must picture to himself the 
heaviest thimdeistoim he has evei seen, and imagine that 
pouimg down continuously night and day, I was, of 
course, piovided with a heavy waterproof cloak, with a 
riding apion and an umbrella, but the moisture seemed to 



104 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

soak through everything, for there was not only the ram 
beating down nom ahove, hut the penetrating mists 
creeping in all round But I could not be depressed by 
mere ram, howevei much The road passed through a 
forest of unsurpassable beauty Chestnuts, walnuts, oaks, 
laurels, rhododendrons and magnolias grew in great mag- 
nificence, and' among them Himalayan kinds of birch, 
aldei, maple, holly, apple, and cheriy Orchids of the 
most brilliant varieties I could have gathered in basketfuls 
The perpetual moisture and the still atmosphere nourished 
the most delicate ferns, while the mosses weie almost as 
beautiful, and hung from the trees in giaceful pendants, 
blending with the festoons of the climbing plants 

After ndmg for some miles along the ridge, we de- 
scended towards the Teesta River, and again met with the 
magnificent tree-ferns, palms, bamboos, and wild bananas 
We passed by seveial flourishing tea plantations, each 
with its cosy, but lonely, bungalow, sunounded by a 
beautiful garden. By the roadway caladiums of every 
variegated colour brightened the piospeet But as we* 
descended the atmosphere grew more oppressive and 
stifling, till when we reached the Teesta itself, which here 
lies at an altitude of only 700 feet above sea-level, the 
atmosphere was precisely that of a hothouse The 
thermometer did not rise above 95, but the heat was weJl- 
nigh unbearable. Perspiration poured from every pore. 
Energy oozed away with every drop, and the thought of n 
winter amid the snows of Tibet became positively cheering. 
It was a curious beginning for such an expedition as was 
to follow, but the Indian officer has to be prepared to 
undergo at a moment's notice every degree of heat or 
cold, of storm and sunshine, of drought or deluge, and 
take everything he meets cheerily as in the day's work. 

We were now in Sikkim proper, the thin wedge of <i 
valley which runs from the plains to the watershed of 
the Himalayas, and separates Nepal from Bhutan. For 
luxuriance and for variety of vegetation, and of animal, 
bird,' and insect life, it must, I should say, be unequalled 
by any other country in the world, for it lies in the 
tropics, and rises from an elevaLion of only a few hundred 




SIKKIM SCENERY 



7*11 



TROPICAL SCENERY 105 

feet above sea-level to a snowy range, culminating in a 
peak 28,178 feet m height 

The valley bottom was naiiow, and the Teesta 
River, 100 yaids 01 so bioad, dashed down over great 
boulders and beside piccipitous cliffs with immense 
velocity Both the main and the side valleys were very 
deep, the slopes steep, and the whole packed with a dense 
tbiest of rich and graceful and variegated foliage Tropical 
oaks of gigantic size, a tree with a buttressed trunk grow- 
ing to a height of 200 feet, " sal," sago-palms, bamboos, 
bananas, baulnmas, " took," screw-pine, and on the ridges 
Pnim dccelms An immense chmbei, with pendulous 
blossoms, and which beais a fruit like a melon, was very 
picvaJcnt, and anstolochias, with then- pitchei-like ttoweis, 
oichids, and ferns Tropical profusion of vegetable 
growth was nowhere bcttei exemplified But almost 
moie lemarkable weje the number and the variety of the 
HutteiHies 1 counted seventeen different species in a 
couple of bundled yards, some of the most exquisitely 
beautiful colommg, flashing out every brilliant and 
metallic hue , others mimicking the foliage, dnd when at 
rest shutting their wmgs together, and exactly resembling 
the leaves of a tree Less beautiful, but equally abundant, 
was the wealth of insect life And here with a vengeance 
was the thorn which every lose possesses Midges, 
mosquitoes, gnats, cvciy conceivable hoiror and annoy- 
ance in tins particular line, was picsent here; also beetles 
in myriads , some spiders, too, of enormous si/e , cock- 
chafers and cockroaches, winged ants, and, in addition to 
nil these insect pests, the countless leeches on every leaf 
and every blade of grass It is indeed a paradise for a 
naturalist, but only for such a naturalist as has his flesh 
under due subjection to the spirit And such a naturalist 
was the great Sir Joseph Hooker, the fuend of Dai win, 
who first explored this country m 1848 and 1849, and who 
is even now living amongst us 

The stillness of these parts I have already referred^to. 
There is seldom a breath of air stirring, and one feels in a 
gigantic hothouse. But it is not noiseless, for, apart from 
the roar of the main river as it dashes impetuously 



106 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

thiough the languid forest, and, apart from the thundering 
of the voluminous waterfalls, which, fringed with rich 
masses of maidenhair and many other delicate and grace- 
ful ferns, form yet another striking featme in the laud- 
scape, one hears also in the forest depths the incessant 
choius of the insects Bud-life thcie is scarcely any, and 
therefore veiy little song of the birds; hut thcie is an 
incessant rhythmic rise and fall of insect whirring, biokcn 
at intervals by the deafening, dissonant screeching s of 
invisible crickets 

All this was very beautiful and veiy interesting as tin 
experience, but I felt no temptation to linger in the 
stifling valley, and was glad when the road began to rise 
to Gantok and the temperatuie to lower Then the 
more distinctly tropical vegetation began to disappear, 
and at between 4,000 and 5,000 feet a kind of birch, 
willows, alders, rhododendrons, and walnuts grew side 
by side with the plantains, palms, and bamboos Among 
the plants grew balsam, climbing vines, brambles, speed- 
wells, forget-me-nots, strawberries, geraniums, orchids, 
tree-ferns, and lycopodiums 

Embedded amidst all the luxuriance of forest and 
plant hfe, and facing the snowy range with a view of 
Kmchmjunga itself, is the Gantok Residency, a charmmij 
J&ngnsh house, clustered over with roses, and surrounded 
by a garden in which rhododendrons, magnolias, cnimu 
of every rich variety tree-ferns, lilies, and orchids-, and 
all that could excite the envy of the horticulturist, grow 
alm iSd ^thout the trouble of putting them into the 

Here T enjoyed the hospitality of Mr. White, who Imd 

E d6 ^ T to , ma , ke P* e P aratl < He and M m W i ' 
had lived there for fourteen years. They were devoted to 
their garden, m which they found a never-ending interes 
with all us, daftbdnf pa 

tr P ical P^s 



, ey oun a never-ending 

with all the English flowers-narcissus, daftbdnf 



recent book, "Sikkim and Bhutan,"*- 



CHARACTER OF LEPCHAS 107 

people, amongst whom it is a pleasuie to live " And 
he says they make excellent and fciustwoithy seivants 
Ceitamly these people wcie devoted to Mr White, who, 
in a kindly patnaichal way, did many a kindness foi them 
as he touted thiough then \alley And T was paiticulaily 
mteiested in obseivmg them, and hearing Mi White's 
opinion ol them, because they have been the subject of so 
man> encomiums on the pait of Heibert Spencei On 
account of then tiuthfulness and gentleness they had been 
held up by him as an example to civilized people, and 
I was anxious to sec whether at close quaiteis they were 
as estimable as they had appealed at a distance to the 
philosophci 

They aie ol the Mongolian type of featuie, yet they 
have veiy distinctive featuies of then own, and would 
ncvei be mistaken foi eilhei the Tibetans, the Nepalese, 
01 the Bhulanese, who touch them on eithei side, and they 
seem to have come along the foothills fiom Assam and 
Bui nm Then chief chaiactenstic is undoubtedly then 
gentleness Timidity is the woid which might bettei 
descnbe it. They live 111 a still, soft, humid climate, and 
then chaiactei is soft like the climate , but then disposition 
is also attractive, like their countiy They aie gieat loveis 
of Natuie, and unequalled as collectois In their own 
country and unspoiled they aie fiank and open, good- 
natured and smiling, and when they are at their ease, 
amiable, obliging, and polite They are indolent and 
improvident, but they seldom have pirvate 01 political 
feuds. They never aggi ess upon their neighboms And 
by nature they aie scuipulously honest Then women 
are chaste, and neilhei men noi women dimk in excess 

These 0,000 Lepchas certainly have every estimable 
quality, and many foi which we Euiopeans are not 
strikingly rcmaikable Yet rncie gentleness, without 
strength and passion at the back, can hardly count much 
in the woild, and it is not possible seriously to regard the 
Lepchas as an ensample ibi our living Even the naughty 
little Gmkhas, who would, except foi oui protection of the 
Lepchas, have long since swallowed them up, we really 
prefei . 



108 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

We remained only a few days in Gantok, and then 
pushed on toward the Tibetan frontier, for we were well 
on in the summer now, and we wanted, if possible, to get 
the mattei settled before wintei The ram never ceased : 
bucketfuls and bucketfuls came drenching down Hie 
ordinal y waterproofing in which we wrapped oui luggage 
was soaked through as if it had been paper In the valley 
bottom we passed the camp of the 32nd Pioneers engaged 
in improving the load, and anything more depressing and 
miserable I have nevei seen Tents, clothes, furniture 
everything was soaking The heat was stifling, the insect 
pests unbearable Fever sapped the life out of the men, 
and one shuddered at the misery of life under such condi- 
tions : day after day, week after week, month aftei month, 
digging and blasting away at a road which as soon as it 
was made was washed into the liver again , wet through 
with lain and with peispiration while at work, and finding 
everything equally moist on returning to camp, toimented 
with insect pests at work and in camp by night and by 
day Yet it was only by mastering such conditions as 
these that the eventual settlement with Tibet was ever 
rendered possible 

Fortunately for them, some 200 were now to leave 
these dismal suiroundings and accompany me to the 
Tibetan frontier as escort We marched on up the valley 
by a road earned in many places along the side of preci- 
pices overhanging the roaring river, and with neither wall 
nor railing intervening between one and destruction. 
Only m Hunza, beyond Kashmir, have I seen a more pre- 
carious roadway The same luxuriant vegetation extended 
everywhere But what impressed me most in this middle 
region of Sikkim were the glorious waterfalls. Never 
anywhere have I seen then* equal We were m the midst 
of the rains. The toirents were full to the limit, and they 
would come, boiling, foaming, thundenng down the mouii- 
tain-sides in long series of cascades, gleaming white through 
the ever-green forest, and festooned over and framed with 
every graceful form of palm and fern and foliage, 

And now, as we reached the higher regions, the louth- 
some leeches, the mosquitoes, gnats, and midges, were left 



UPPER SIKKIM 109 

behind, and we came into a legion of Alpine vegetation 
spmce-fiis, ash, birch, maple, crab-apple, and nut, with 
jasmine, ivy, spiraea, wood-sorrel, and here and there, rising 
lightly through the shade of the forest, a gigantic white 
lily, most exquisitely lovely. 

On June 26 we i cached Tangu, at a height of 12,000 
feet above the sea, and here in a comfortable wooden rest- 
house, in a cool and refreshing climate, we were able to 
ibiget all the depressions of the steamy valleys The 
spnaja, maple, cheny, and laich, which we had met 
lower down, had now disappeaied, and in then- place 
were willow, junipei, stunted birch, silver fii, white 
lose, beibeny, curiant, and many rhododendrons The 
mountain-sides were covered with glass and carpeted with 
ilowcis, and especially wiLli many beautiful vaiieties of 
pnmuLis, as we]] as with gentians, potentillas, geianmms, 
campcinuliis, giound oichids, delphiniums, and many other 
plants, while neai by we found a fine dark blue poppy , 
and, most icinarkable plant of all, growing here and 
there on the mountain -side m isolated giandeur, a gigantic 
iliubarb (Rheum nobik], dcscnbed by Hooker as the hand- 
somest herbaceous plant in Sikkim, with great leaves 
spread out on the giound at the base, while the mam 
plant rose erect to a height of 3 feet in the form of a 
pyramid, but with the clusters of flowers protected from 
the wind and rain, by reflcxed bracts 

Here, at Tangu, only a march below the district 
round Giagong, which the Tibetans claimed, the leal 
business of the mission commenced. By July 1 the 
whole of both the escort and the support the former 
200 men and the latter 300 were assembled, under the 
command of Colonel Biander. Both the men and the 
transport animals had suffered greatly m marching through 
the drenching ruin and the steamy, fever-laden lower 
valleys , but now, in the cooler air of Tangu, they re- 
covered their strength, and all were eager for the advance 
into Tibet, 1 was myself equally keen, but as I could 
hear no news of either Chinese or Tibetan officials of rank 



110 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

01 authority having arrived at Khamba Jong to meet me, 
I decided to let Mi White, with Captain O'Connoi rind 
the whole escoit, go on in advance to arrange pic- 
limmanes 

On July 4 they left Tangu, and encamped some nine 
miles distant, on the near side of the wall at Giagong, 
winch the Tibetans claimed as their boundaiy, and from 
which they had been removed by Mr White in the pic- 
vious year Before reaching camp that is to say, well 
on the Sikkim side of even the wall Mi White was met 
by the Jongpen, or Commandant, of Khamba Jong 
"Jong" being the Tibetan foi fort. He mfbimed 
Mr White that theie were encamped at Giagong, on the 
other side of what the Tibetans claimed as then frontier, 
two officials a General and a Chief Secietaiy of the 
Dalai Lama who had been deputed to discuss Iron tier 
matters, and who were anxious to confei with Mr, White 
on the following day 

Mr White informed the Jongpen that he would be 
prepared to gieet the officials on the load, and to icccive 
them in a friendly mannei in his camp on the next evening, 
but that he was not piepared to halt or hold any discussion 
at Giagong. 

On the following day Captain O'Connoi rode forward, 
and was met by the Jongpen of Khamba Jong at tlie w:ill 
at Giagong, which the Tibetans clanned as their frontier, 
but which was on a nver flowing into the Teesta Kivor, 
and therefore clearly on our side of the frontier laid down 
by the Convention of 1890, concluded by the Chinese 
Resident, who had with him a Tibetan representative. 
The Jongpen importuned Captain O'Connor to dismount 
and to persuade Mr. White to do the same. But Captain 
O'Connor said that no discussion was possible, and on 
Mr. White's arrival with the escort they all passed 
through the wall, and just beyond saw the two Lhasa 
officers arrayed in yellow silks, and accompanied by u 
crowd of unarmed retainers nding towaids them from 
their camp Captain O'Connor advanced to meet them, 
and they dismounted and spoke to him very civilly. They 
asked him to persuade Mr. White to dismount, to proceed 



TIBETAN REMONSTRANCES 111 

to then tent close by, to paitake of some refreshments, 
and to " discuss matters " Captain O'Connoi replied 
that Mi White was not piepared to bieak his journey 01 
to discuss matteis at Giagong, but would be glad to see 
them in his camp that evening, though any discussion 
must be defeired until aftei the ai rival of myself and the 
Chinese Commissionei at Khamba Jong 

They piessed forward on loot, and, catching hold of 
Mi White's bridle, impoituned him to dismount and 
lepair to then tents At the same time their servants 
piessed round the hoises of the Butish officers, and, 
seizing then icins, endeavouied to lead them away 
Attei speaking veiy civilly to the two Lhasa officials, 
Mi White was obliged to call two 01 thiec sepoys to cleai 
the way, and the Butish officers then lode on, while the 
two LI visa officers mounted and lode back to camp The 
Jongpen aitctvvaids followed the Butish officeis, and made 
repeated efforts to induce them to halt foi a day al the 
next camp in oicloi to confei with the two Lhasa officials. 
lie was in <i vciy excited state, and hinted moie than once 
at possible hostilities, and said " You may flick a dog 
once 01 twice without his biting, but if you tiead on his 
tail, even if he has no teeth, he will tuin and try and 
bite you " 

1 suppose it is always difficult foi one party to see the 
other paity's point of view, but, of couise, Ins contention 
legarclmg us precisely applied to what we thought of 
the Tibetans It was simply because the Tibetans had 
encroached on us, and weie even now dddiessmg us inside 
the frontier fixed by treaty, that we were at last turning 
and insisting on oui treaty lights 

That evening Mr. Ho, the Chinese delegate, sent word 
that he had arrived at Gin, just on the other side of the 
frontier, and asking that Mr White would remain at 
Giagong 

The next day Mr. White and his escort lode quietly 
across the fioritier, without meeting anyone except the 
Chinese Commandant of the small post of Gin, who 
passed by without speaking Mr White encamped neai 
Gin, and received a visit from Mr Ho, who communicated 



112 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

to him the contents of the Resident's reply to the Viceroy, 
and made a lequebt, which was politely declined, that the 
Butish Commissionei should remain at Gm in prefeiencc 
to proceeding to Khamba Jong In this despatch the 
Chinese Resident informed the Viceroy that he had again 
deputed Mr Ho, in conjunction with Captain Parr, the 
Customs Commissioner at Yatung, who, he said, weie 
truly of equal lank to the Commissioner deputed by the 
Viceroy, to discuss all matters in a friendly manner, He 
further said that the Dalai Lama had deputed his Chief 
Secietary and a Depon (General) of Lhasa to negotiate 
in conjunction with the Chinese Commissioners. But the 
Resident understood, he said, that Khamba Jong was in 
Tibetan temtory, and therefore the meeting could only 
be at the boundary neai the grazmg-grounds fixed by the 
Convention of 1890 The Resident contended, that is to 
say, that though the Tibetans had for thirteen years with 
armed men occupied terntory on our side of the frontier 
laid down by the Convention, we were not even to meet 
temporarily for discussion on the Tibetan side of the same 
frontier 

On July 7 Mr White, with his escort, marched 1o 
Khamba Jong, and encamped on a small stream not far 
from the Jong, 01 fort, which was an imposing building 
on the summit of a lofty crag some hundreds of feet above 
the plain Mr Ho wrote to Mr. White saying that he 
had instructed the Khamba Jongpen to provide linn with 
supplies, and that he himself, accompanied by the two 
Lhasa officials, would arrive theie on the following day 
A letter of thanks was sent, and on the strength of 
Mr Ho's letter Mr White wrote to the Tibetan Jongpen 
asking him to supply some grass , but the letter was 
icturned unopened, with a somewhat unceremonious 
verbal message 

Major Bretherton, the energetic supply and transport 
officer, who had come up from Sikkim to arrange supply 
matters, on the following day found a rich and fertile 
valley some three or four miles fiom Khamba Jong, where 
grazing was abundant, and where barley crops were raised 
and sheep and cattle reared 



THE LHASA DELEGATES 113 

In the evening the Khamba Jongpen, with two 
jumoi officei s bearing presents from the Lhasa delegates, 
arnved in camp JMi White leccived them, and sent 
polite messages in letuin, and Captain O'Connoi after- 
wards IT itei viewed the messenger m his own tent, and 
conversed very amicably for some tune, the messenger 
being evidently veiy pleased with his reception, and alto- 
gether u j f using to accept money, which was all Mr White 
had at the moment, in return ioi their presents The 
Jongpon also behaved with gieat civility, and repeatedly 
apologized in icgard to Ins refusal to accept the lettei, 
and piomised to supply grass on the following day. 

The two Lhasa officials, who were those refened to in 
the Chinese Resident's lettei to the Viceioy, visited Mr. 
White on July 1 1 They were well-mannei cd, but made 
piotcsts icgaidmg what they called our transgiession of 
the frontier After the interview with Mr. White they 
visited the Sikkun hcir-appai ent, who had arrived in 
Mi. White's camp on the previous day , and here 
Captain O'Connoi , in a less formal way, had a long con- 
versation with them, endeavouring to find out under what 
amount of authority they had come. But they evaded 
all queues, and meiely reiterated that if they had not had 
proper orders they would not, of course, be there. On 
the same day Mr. White visited Mr* Ho. 

Captain O'Connor had a two-hours conversation with 
the Lhasa delegates on the 12th. He elicited that the 
Chief Secretary had been to 1'eking arid back by Calcutta 
and Shanghai The position they took up was that the 
place appointed by their Government for the discussion of 
affairs was the Gwgong frontiei, and on arrival there they 
would produce their credentials As regaids official coire- 
spondcncc, they stud that by the terms of some treaty 
between the Chinese and the Tibetans all official corre- 
spondence between the Tibetans and foreigners had to be 
conducted through the Ainbons, and, under these circum- 
stances, they could neither receive nor reply to our letters. 
But they affirmed, nevertheless, that they were fully 
empowered to treat with our Commissioners at the proper 
plttoe- the Giagong frontier. 



114 SIMLA TO KHAMBA JONG 

Their dislike of the Chinese they plainly expiesscd 
They said the Chinese despised the Tibetans, and weie 
often instrumental in letting foieigners into the countiy 
the poor Chinese who are accused hy us of keeping 
foieigneis out f The iclations of Tibetans and Chinese- 
were indeed extiaordmanly anomalous Whilst I lie 
Tibetans deferred to Mr Ho in almost every mattei, 
going so far as to foiward to him official letteis lecenut 
from our camp for fear that they might get into trouble it' 
they retained them, Mr Ho himself admitted that in 
many matters he was poweiless The Tibetan officials 
appeared to be childishly impotent and terrified of their 
own Government, whilst at the same time they were 
dehbeiately obstructive m eveiy matter, great or .small, in 
which the Bntish were concerned, and were quite ready 
to use the Chinese as a very convenient scapegoat when- 
ever it suited them 

Mi White made a foimal visit to them on July Itf, 
and at the close of the interview gave them presents, 
including two packets of tea each They tried U> raise 
some objections to receiving the tea, but no attention 
was paid, and the piesents weie accepted. 

While all these proceedings were taking place 1 , I 
confess that I at Tangu was in some anxiety To 
march across the frontier in face of all protest* as 
Mr. White did, appears, when set down like this, us 
a very high-handed action But it was also very risky, 
I had purposely, though not very wisely, but at any 
rate to avoid a duect collision at the very start, decided 
not to attack, and remove the Tibetans from Giugong, 
as they had been removed on the previous year. Mr. 
White was simply to march through to the place appointed 
by om Government in communication with the Chinese 
Government for the place of negotiation. But in so doing 
we left Tibetan troops in a good position on our Jmu of 
communications, and as the Tibetans were evidently in an 
irritable state, this was no mean risk to take, and Colonel 
Biander and I at Tangu used to look out with con- 
siderable anxiety for the arrival of the daily dak from 
Mr White. y 



FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS 115 

On the face of it there seems some force in the 

Tibetan argument that discussion should take place at 

Giagong , and when officials from Lhasa had at last arrived, 

and with a Chinese deputy as well, and even provided with 

ciedentials, and were leady to negotiate, it would seem moie 

icasonable on our pait to have met there and negotiated 

But such negotiations would not in fact have led to 

anyiesult The poweis they had would simply have been 

not to let us mside the wall They would have had none 

to negotiate in the real sense of the word, and they would 

have been afraid to make any kind of concession for fear 

their property or even their lives would be forfeited Even 

when we arrived close to Lhasa, and men of much higher 

lank came to meet us, they had absolutely no power. 

Even the Regent had none, nor the whole Council. The 

Tibetans had no machinery for the conduct of foreign 

relations They were under some arrangement to let the 

Chinese conduct their foreign relations, and yet, as we 

had experienced, they refused to abide by what the 

Chinese did for them. 



CHAPTER X 

KHAMBA JONG 

Now that Chinese and Tibetan representatives of sonic 
kind had appeared, even though they were not of much 
rank or accredited with much power, I thought it well to 
proceed to Khamba Jong to get into touch with them, 
and form my own impression of how matters stood 1 
therefore rode straight through from Tangii to Khnmki 
Jong on the 18th, accompanied by Mr Dover, the 
Sikkim engineer, who had made such excellent rough 
roads and bridges, and escoited by a few mounted men 

After Tangu the mountain-sides became more ami 
more barren , trees were replaced by low shrubs awl 
dwarf rhododendrons, and highei up they, too, disappeared, 
till, when we crossed the Kangra-la (pass), there was 
nothing but lough coarse scrub The pass itscli' was easy 
enough, though it was just over 17,000 feet in height* 
As we descended from it we were at length really in 
Tibet, and the change was most marked. In place of 
narrow valleys were great wide plains, intersected indeed 
by distant ranges of mountains, and absolutely devoid of 
trees, but open and traversable in every diiection. The 
sky, too, was clear The great monsoon clouds were led 
behind, and the sun shone with a power which brought 
the temperature up to 82 m the shade, and made ll 
quite uncomfortably hot at midday, though at night there- 
were 4 of frost ft 

As we rode on into Tibet and got out into the open, 
and well away from the Himalayan range, we obtained 
a glonous view of that stupendous range from Chumal- 
han, 24,000 feet, on the extreme east, to Kiuclniyuugn, 



OBJECTIONS TO KHAMBA JONG 117 

28,275 feet, in the centre, and Everest itself, 29,002 feet, 
and ninety miles distant in the far west. 

On July 20 I made a formal call upon Mr Ho and 
the Tibetan delegates Mr Ho was not a very polished 
official, and did not favourably impress me. The Tibetan 
Chief Secretary, however, did, and I reported at the time 
that he had an " exceedingly genial, land, accomplished 
style of face " But appeal ance belied him, and right up 
to the conclusion of the tieaty, nearly fourteen months 
later, he was the most inimical to us of all the Tibetans 

As this was a first interview, I did not proceed with 
any business discussion, but I told the delegates that, 
though I must await the orders of the Viceroy on the 
leLtci which the Resident had addiessed him, and could not, 
therefoie, yet commence foimal negotiations, yet I would 
at our next meeting state plainly in detail the view which 
Lhc Viceroy took of the situation, so that they might 
know oui views, and be ready when the formal negotiations 
commenced to make proposals for their settlement 

Two days later they all came to return my visit, and 
after the usual polite conversation I said I would now 
ledeem my promise, and 1 told the mteipreter to com- 
mence reading a speech which I had prepared beforehand, 
and which Captain O'Connor had carefully translated into 
Tibetan But befoie he could commence the Tibetans 
raised objections to holding negotiations at Khamba 
Jong at all. The pioper place, they said, was Giagong 
1 told them that the place of meeting wab a matter 
to be decided upon, not by the negotiators, but by 
the Viceroy and Amban The Viceroy had selected 
Khamba Jong because of its proximity to the portion of 
frontier in dispute, and he had chosen a place on the 
Tibetan lather than the Indian side of the frontier because 
the last negotiations were conducted in India ; and when, 
after much trouble a treaty had been concluded between 
the Chinese and British Governments, the Tibetans had 
repudiated it, saying they knew nothing about it. On the 
present occasion, therefore, the Viceroy decided that 
negotiations should take place in Tibet, and had asked 
that a Tibetan official of the highest rank should take 



118 KHAMBA JONG 

part in them, in order that, when the new settlement was 
completed, the Tibetans should not be able to say they 
knew nothing of it. 

The Tibetans then raised objections to the size of my 
escort. I explained that it was merely the escort which 
was becoming to my rank, and was even smaller than the 
escort which the Chinese Resident took to Darjiling and 
Calcutta at the former negotiations. They said they had 
understood that the negotiations were to be friendly, and so 
they themselves had brought no armed escort. I replied 
that the negotiations certainly were to be friendly, ami 
that if I had had any hostile intentions I shoxild have 
brought many more than 200 men, a number which was 
only just sufficient to guard me against such attacks of 
bad characters as had very recently been made upon the 
British Ambassador at the capital of the Chinese Empire. 
My speech was then read by the interpreter. It 
recounted how, seventeen years before, the Viceroy 
proposed a peaceful mission to Lhasa to arrange the 
conditions of trade with Tibet. British subjects luid UK- 
right to trade in other parts and provinces of the Chinese 
J^mpire, just as all subjects of the Chinese Emperor were 
allowed to trade in every part of the British Empire. Hut 
m this one single dependency of the Chinese Empire, in 
libet, obstacles were always raised in the way of trade. 
It was to discuss this matter with the Tibetan authorities 
at Lhasa and to see if these obstacles could not be removed, 
that the then Viceroy of India proposed, with the consent 
?n ! sL ST G , oven ? mer *' io send a mission to Lhasa 
rJ ^ But when the mi ssion was about to start, the 

vSf 6 t ?7!f nm p e ? at the kst moment informed the 
^ iceroy that the Tibetans were so opposed to the idea of 
admitting a British mission to their country that they (the 
Chinese Government) begged that the mission rnigh e 
postponed; and out of good feeling to the cl nee 
Government and on the distinct understanding thut the 

SSfS W v rt the Tibetans to P romote "Sd dcveC 
trade, the Viceroy counterordered the mission. ' 

Seventeen years had now passed away since the 
Chinese made the promise, and the British GovenLent 



SPEECH TO LHASA DELEGATES 119 

had just cause to complain that in all these years, owing 
to the persistent obstruction of the Tibetans, the Chinese 
had been unable to perform their pledge. 

And the forbearance which the Viceroy had shown in 
countermanding the mission had met with a bad return on 
the part of the Tibetans, for they had proceeded, without 
any cause or justification, to invade a State under British 
protection. Even this the Viceroy bore with patience for 
nearly two years, trusting they would be obedient to the 
authority of the Chinese Government and withdraw. But 
when they still remained in Sikkim, and even attacked 
the British troops there, he was compelled to punish them 
and drive them back from Sikkim and pursue them into 
Chumbi. And in Chumbi the British troops would have 
remained as a punishment for the unprovoked attack 
upon them if it had not been for the friendship which 
existed between the Emperor of China and the Queen of 
England. 

Out of regard, however, for that friendship, the Viceroy 
agreed to enter into negotiation with the Chinese Resident 
acting, on behalf of the Tibetans, and after some years an 
agreement was made, by which the boundary between 
Tibet and Sikkim was laid down, and arrangements were 
made for traders to come to Yatung to sell the goods to 
whomsoever they pleased, to purchase native commodities, 
to hire transport, and to conduct their business without 
any vexatious restrictions. It was also agreed that if, 
after five years, either side should wish to make any 
alterations, both parties should meet again and make a 
new agreement. 

At the end of five years the Queen's Secretary of State 
wrote to the Viceroy and inquired how the treaty was 
being observed, and the reply went back that the Tibetans 
had destroyed the boundary pillars which British and 
Chinese officials had erected on the frontier laid down by 
the treaty ; that they had occupied land at Giagong inside 
that boundary ; that they had built a wall on the other 
side of Yatung, and allowed no one to pass through to 
trade with the traders who came there from India ; and, 
lastly, that they had repudiated the treaty which had been 



120 KHAMBA JONG 

signed by the Resident and the Viceroy on the ground 
that it had not been signed by one of themselves. 

When the Queen's Great Secretary heard of the way 
they had set at naught the treaty which the Amban and 
the Viceroy had signed, he was exceedingly angry, and 
ordered Mr. White to go to Giagong to remove the 
Tibetans who had presumed to cross the frontier which 
the Amban and Viceroy had fixed. Mr. White had gone 
there and removed the Tibetans, and thrown down their 
guard-house, and reported to the Viceroy what he had 
done. 

Now the Amban, when he heard what Mr. White had 
done, wrote to the Viceroy that, if there was any matter 
which needed discussion, he would send a Chinese officer 
and a representative of the Dalai Lama to settle it with a 
British officer. And the Viceroy had written in reply 
that he had sent a high officer with Mr. White to 
Khamba Jong to settle everything about the frontier and 
about trade ; but as the Tibetans had broken the old treaty 
because they said they had known nothing about it, His 
Excellency had written to the Amban that there must be 
at the negotiations a Tibetan official of the highest rank, 
whose authority to bind his Government must be un- 
questioned. Mr. White and I had accordingly come, and 
as soon as I heard from the Viceroy that he was satisfied 
on this last point I was ready to commence negotiations. 

The Viceroy, I could assure them, had no intention 
whatever of annexing their country, and it was possible, 
indeed, that he might make concessions in regard to the 
lands near Giagong, if in the coming negotiations they 
showed themselves reasonable in regard to trade. But I 
warned them that, after the way in which they had broken 
and repudiated the old treaty, concluded in their interests 
by the Amban at the close of a war in which they were 
defeated, they must expect that he would demand from 
them some assurance that they would faithfully observe 
any new settlement which might be made. 

" You come and travel and trade in India just as you 
please," I said. " You go where you like, and stay there 
as long as you like. But if any one from India wishes to 



TIBETANS REFUSE TO REPORT SPEECH 121 

trade in Tibet he is stopped on the frontier, and no one is 
allowed to go near him. He can trade in Russia, in 
Germany, in France, and in all other great countries, and 
in all other dependencies of the Chinese Empire, in 
Manchuria, in Mongolia, and in Turkestan ; but in Tibet 
alone of all countries he cannot trade. This is a one-sided 
arrangement, unworthy of so fair-minded and cultured a 
people as you are ; and though His Excellency has no 
intention of annexing your country, and may, indeed, if 
you prove reasonable in regard to the admission of trade, 
make concessions to you in respect to the frontier lands 
near Giagong, yet lie will insist that the obstacles which 
you have lor so many years put in the way of trade 
between India and Tibet shall be once and for ever 
removed/ 5 

This speech was, of course, made for the benefit of the 
Lhasa Government. The Tibetan officials would receive 
no written communications, but 1 thought it barely 
possible that they might pass on a verbal communication, 
especially when it was made before a responsible Chinese 
official, and after I had given due notice of my intention. 

The Tibetan delegates listened attentively while it was 
being delivered, but at its conclusion said that they could 
not enter into any discussion upon it. I replied that 
neither could I discuss it with them, for I had not yet 
heard from the Viceroy that he was satisfied that they 
were of sufficiently high rank to carry on negotiations, I 
had, however, as a matter of courtesy, taken the trouble 
to acquaint them informally with the Viceroy's views, 
which I trusted they would report to their Government. 
They replied that they could not even do that much, that 
they could make no report at all unless we went back to 
Giagong, 

Mr. Ilo here interposed, and said that the Tibetans 
were very ignorant and difficult to deal with, and he asked 
me if I could not meet them by agreeing to go to the 
frontier* I said I would with pleasure, and when repre- 
sentatives whom the Viceroy would permit me to 
negotiate with were present I would gladly ride with them 
to the frontier and discuss the question on the spot; but 



122 KHAMBA JONG 

the frontier was not at Giagong, as the Tibetans supposed, 
but at the Kangra-la (pass), only ten miles from where 
we where. Mr. Ho said the actual position of the frontier 
was not known yet, but that it was where the waters 
flowed down to India. I said five minutes' investigation 
would make clear where that was, and Mr. Ho said that 
then the matter could be very easily settled. 

Mr. Ho's Chinese secretary then suggested that I 
should give the Tibetans the copy of my speech which the 
interpreter had read from. I assented with readiness, and, 
with Mr. Ho's approval, presented it to them. But they 
could not have got rid of a viper with greater haste thaii 
they got rid of that paper. They said that they could on 
no account receive it, and handed it on to Mr. Ho's secre- 
tary, to whom, as he spoke English, I had also given an 
English version. 

These so-called delegates never came near us again at 
Khamba Jong, but shut themselves up in the fort and 
sulked. And in reporting the result of this interview to 
Government, I said that both Mr. White and I were of 
opinion that Government must be prepared for very pro- 
tracted negotiations, and also for the possibility of coercion. 
The attitude of the Tibetans was fully as obstructive, I 
said, as Mr. White and every other person acquainted 
with them had predicted it would be, and I saw at present 
little prospect of coming to a settlement without coercion, 
though I would use every possible means of argument and 
persuasion. 

And if the delegates did not choose to give me any 
work, I was quite content to do none, for I was thoroughly 
happy camp there at Khamba Jong. All my staff were 
deligttfiil companions, and we were very happy together. 
Mr. White was the best possible hand at making a camp 
comfortable and feeding arrangements good; and we 
had neither the stifling heat of the Indian plains nor the 
discomforts of the rainy season in the hifis. We were 
beyond the reach of the monsoon. We had occasional 
refreshing showers but for July, August, and September, 
the rainfall was only 4-9 inches, and, for the most part, 
the weather was bright and fine and clear. We could see 



DEPUTATION FROM TASHI LAMA 123 

immense distances over the rolling plains. We would watch 
the mighty monsoon clouds sweeping along the Himalayas ; 
we would catch glimpses of some noble peak rising superbly 
above them, and Kinchin) unga close by and Everest in 
the farthest distance were a perpetual joy. 

Some of us went out shooting antelopes and Ovis 
cunmon; while others went botanizing or geologizing; and 
when, later on, our scientific staff was complete, I could 
accompany Mr. Hayden to hunt for fossils, Captain 
Walton to collect birds, and Colonel Prain, now Director 
of the Botanical Gardens at Kew, to collect plants, and 
thus hear from each of these specialists in turn all the 
interests of their sciences, so I did not care a pin how 
long these obstinate Tibetans kept us up there. 

But while the Lhasa delegates would have no more to 
say to us, a deputation came to see me on behalf of the 
Tashi Lama, who is of equal spiritual importance with the 
Dalai Lama, though of less political authority. They 
said that they had been sent to represent to us that the 
Tashi Lama was put to great trouble with the Lhasa 
authorities by our presence at Khamba Jong ; that the 
Lhasa authorities held him responsible for permitting us 
to cross the frontier, and he begged me to be so kind as 
to save him from the trouble by withdrawing across the 
frontier or to Yatmig, which was the place fixed for meet- 
ings of this kiwi 1 repeated to them all the arguments I 
hud used with the Lhasa delegates. They were much 
more courteous, and talked over the matter in a perfectly 
friendly, and even cheery, way. They said, though, that 
they knew nothing about the treaty, as it was concluded 
by the Amban, and not by themselves, and they could not 
be responsible for observing it. 1 said that that was pre- 
cisely the reason why we had now come to Tibet We 
wished now to make a new treaty there, where Tibetans 
could take part in the negotiations, so that they would 
not in future be able to say they knew nothing about it. 
They laughed, and said this was a very reasonable argu- 
ment, but that it was the Lhasa people, and not them- 
selves, who had broken the treaty, and we ought to go to 
Yatung and make the new treaty there. 



124 KHAMBA JONG 



I told them that, in the first place, they also had 
broken the treaty by crossing the boundary fixed in it and 
occupying Giagong ; and, in the second place, we must 
regard Tibetans as all one people, and hold all responsible 
for the actions of each. 

The impression left upon me by this interview, 1 
reported at the time, was that the Tibetans, though exces- 
sively childish, were very pleasant, cheery people, and, 
individually, probably quite well disposed towards us, 

Mr. Wilton, of the China Consular Service, joined us 
on August 7. He had been acting as Consul at Chcngtu, 
in Szechuan, and I had not spoken to him for more than 
five minutes before I realized what a help he would be to 
us. He at once said that neither the Chinese nor the 
Tibetan delegates were of at all sufficient rank or authority 
to conduct negotiations with us, and no one else than one 
of the Ambans and one of the Tibetan Councillors would 
be of any use. The new Chinese Resident, who had been 
deputed in the previous December specially for the pur- 
pose of conducting these negotiations lie had himself seen 
at Chengtu, and it is significant of the dilatoriness of the 
Chinese that, while Mr. Wilton reached me early in 
August, the Resident did not reach Lhasa till the next 
February, thirteen months after he had set out from 
Peking. 

Having received Mr. Wilton's advice regarding the 
status of the delegates, the Viceroy, on August 25, wrote 
to the Chinese Resident, suggesting that either he himself 
or his Associate Resident should meet me, and that, as the 
present Tibetan delegates had shown themselves entirely 
unsuited for diplomatic intercourse, and would not even 
accept the copy of the speech explanatory of the relations 
between India and Tibet which I had made, he proposed 
that the Tibetan Government should be invited to depute 
a Councillor of the Dalai Lama, accompanied by a high 
member of the National Assembly. 

As regards the objection which the Resident had made 
to the selection of Khamba Jong as the meeting-place, 
Lord Curzon said that it was the nearest point in Tibet 
to the disputed boundary ; and it was necessary that the 



FEAR OF TIBETAN ATTACK 125 

present negotiations should be conducted in Tibet, as the 
former Convention which the Tibetans had repudiated was 
concluded in India, and His Majesty's Government were 
not prepared to allow a similar repudiation of any new 
agreement. But, as winter was approaching, if the 
negotiations were not completed, I might have to select 
some other place in Tibet for passing the winter. In con- 
clusion, the Viceroy emphasized the importance of my 
position and duties, and stated that I was entitled to 
expect that he should reply to my communications, and 
look to him for co-operation. 

At Khamba Jong itself no progress was being made. 
There was, indeed, fear at one time that we should be 
attacked, and I have not much doubt that we should have 
been if we had shown any slackness or unguardedness. 
But Captain Betlmne was an officer of much experience, 
and his men were all accustomed to frontier warfare, and 
every precaution was taken. Our camp was well fortified 
and the country round regularly patrolled. 

Two Sikkim men who had gone to Shigatse, as was 
customary, were seized, however, and, we heard, had either 
been tortured or killed. In spite of our representations, 
the Tibetans refused to give them up, and, in retaliation, 
we had to seisse Tibetan herds and to remove all the 
Tibetans I had so far, though at considerable risk, allowed 
to remain at Uiagong. 

Some slight chance of a settlement appeared when, on 
August 21, the head Abbot of the Tashi Lumpo monas- 
tery, near Shigutse, came to make another representation 
on behalf of the Tashi Lama, tie was a courteous, kindly 
man, and wits accompanied by two monks and a lay 
representative, besides the former deputy from the Tashi 
Lama* The Abbot said that a Council had been held by 
the Tashi Lama, and it had been decided to make another 
representation to me. This representation did not, how- 
ever, differ from the first, and I repeated the same argu- 
ments in reply. He was especially insistent about 
Giagong, and I asked him when one man had a certain 
thing which another man wished to get from him, which 
was the wiser course to pursue to make friends with him. 



126 KHAMBA JONG 

or to do everything to make him annoyed. The Tibetans 
all burst out laughing at this argument, and I then went 
on to say that the Lhasa authorities, instead of doing 
everything they could to dispose us favourably towards 
them, and incline us to make concessions in regard to 
Giagong, had adopted a steadily unfriendly attitude; they 
had sent only small officials to meet Mr. White and 
myself, and these small officials did nothing but say tlii'y 
would negotiate nowhere else but at Giagong, This was 
not the way to predispose us in their favour. 

The Abbot said the delegates were not small officials, 
but were next in rank to the Councillors, I said I had 
concluded they were men of little power, because when I 
had made a speech to them on my first arrival, and had 
asked them to report the substance of it to the Lhasa 
Government, they had refused. If they could not even 
report a speech, I supposed they would not be fit to 
negotiate an important treaty. 

I asked the Abbot to give this advice to His Holiness 
that if he wished us to withdraw from Khamba Jong, he 
should use his influence with the Lhasa authorities to 
induce them to send proper delegates, and instruct such 
delegates to discuss matters with us in a reasonable arid 
friendly spirit. Then matters would be very soon settled, 
and we would return to India. 

I then made some personal observations to the Abbot, 
and he told me that from a boy he had been brought up 
in a monastery in a religious way, and was not accus- 
tomed to deal with political matters, I told him I envied 
him his life of devotion. It was my business to wrangle 
about these small political matters, but I always admired 
those who spent their lives in the worship of God. He 
asked me if he might come and see me again, and I said 
he might come and see me every day and all day long ; 
and Captain O'Connor, who could speak Tibetan, would 
9 often pay him visits. 

On August 24 the Abbot again came to see me* and 
said that after his previous visit he had gone to the Lhasa 
delegates and urged them to negotiate at Khamba Jong, 
instead of at Giagong. But they had replied that* just && 



INTERVIEW WITH SHIGATSE ABBOT 127 

my orders were to negotiate at the former place, so their 
orders were to negotiate at the latter, and they could not 
agree to anything different. The Abbot, therefore, now 
came to say that there were several hundred Tibetan 
troops near by, but he would get those withdrawn if I 
would send away my escort. He thought that then the 
Lhasa Government would probably consent to negotiations 
at Khamba Jong. I told him that I had not the slightest 
objection to the presence of the Tibetan troops, but it 
surprised me that, when they had so many hundreds near, 
they should have any objection to the small number 
which I myself had. 

The innocent-minded Abbot then asked if I would send 
away half, and he woyj^l himself remain with us as a 
hostage. He explained that the Tibetans thought we had 
come with no friendly intent, as we had forced our way 
into the country, and a reduction of our escort would 
appease them- I told the Abbot I could not acknowledge 
that we had forced our way into Tibet, as I had up to 
now ignored the presence of Tibetan soldiers inside the 
treaty frontier, who had no business to be where they 
were ; and I repeated my old arguments in regard to the 
strength of my escort. 

The Abbot very politely apologized for all the trouble 
he was giving me by making so many requests. I told 
him he might make requests to me all day long, and he 
would always find me ready to listen to him^and give him 
what I, at any rate, considered reasonable answers. I 
much regretted the inconvenience which was being caused 
to the Tashi Lama, and I felt sure that if the conduct of 
these negotiations rested with His Holiness and the 
polite and reasonable advisers of his whom he had sent to 
me, we should very soon come to a settlement. 

I advised the Abbot to get the Tashi Lama to repre- 
sent matters directly to Lhasa. He replied they were not 
allowed to make representations against the orders of the 
Lhasa Government Nevertheless, he would again, that 
very day, go to the Lhasa delegates, tell them how he had 
once more tried to induce me to go back to Giagong, and 
would ask them to make a request to Lhasa to open 



128 KHAMBA JONG 

negotiations at Khamba Jong, and he said he would even 
go so far as to undertake to receive in their stead any 
punishment which the Lhasa Government might order 
upon the delegates for daring to make this request. 

He then asked me what we wanted in the coming 
negotiations. I told him that I had set our requirements 
forth fully in a speech I had made on my first arrival, a copy 
of which I would very gladly give him. But he was well 
acquainted with it, and asked me what was meant exactly 
by opening a trade-mart. I explained that we wanted a 
proper trade-mart, which would not be closed with a wall 
behind it, as Yatung had been a mart where Indian 
traders could come and meet Tibetan traders ; a mart such 
as we had hi other parts of the Chinese Empire, and had 
formerly had in Shigatse itself. 

The Abbot himself was a charming old gentleman. 
Whatever intellectual capacity he may have had was not 
very apparent to the casual observer, and he corrected me 
when I inadvertently let slip some observation implying 
that the earth was round, and assured me that when I had 
lived longer in Tibet, and had time to study, I should find 
that it was not round, but flat, and not circular, but 
triangular, like the bone of a shoulder of mutton. On 
the other hand, he was very sociable and genial He 
would come and have lunch and tea with us, and would 
spend hours with Captain O'Connor and Mr. Bailey, 
playing with gramophones, typewriters, pictures, photo- 
graphs, and all the various novelties of our camp. 

But the situation now began to grow worse. On 
August 31 I was informed by a trustworthy person, who 
had exceptional sources of information, that he was 
convinced that the Tibetans would do nothing till they 
were made to and a situation had arisen. They were 
said' to be quite sure in their own minds that they were 
fully equal to us, and, far from our getting anything out 
of them, they thought they would be able to force some- 
thing out of us. Some 2,600 Tibetan soldiers were occu- 
pying the heights and passes on a line between Phari and 
Shigatse. My informant did not think, however, that they 
would attack us for the present, though they might in the 




I 

SL 



TIBETANS ASSEMBLE TROOPS 129 

winter, when our communications would be cut off. Their 
immediate policy was one of passive obstruction. They* 
had made up their minds to have no negotiations with us' 
inside Tibet, and they would simply leave us at Khambu . 
Jong, while if we tried to advance farther, they* woulft 
oppose us by force. They were afraid that if they gave 
us an inch we would take an elf, and if they allowed lis at 
Khamba" Jong one year we should go to Shigatse the next, 
and Lhasa the year after- So they were determined to 
stop us at the start. 

The Shigatse Abbot had, I beard, done his best to 
make the Lhasa officials take a more reasonable view, but 
without success* The Lhasa officiate were entirely ruled 
by the National Assembly at Lhasa* and this Assembly 
was composed chiefly of Lhasa monks. 

It was difficult to understand why there was all this 
trouble about negotiating at Khamba Jong, for the 
Chinese Government had informed our Minister at 
Peking on July 19 that "the Imperial Resident had 
now arranged with the Dalai Lama to appoint two 
Tibetan officials of fairly high standing to proceed with 
the Prefect Ho to Khamba to meet Major Younghusband 
and Mr. White, and discuss with them what steps are to 
be taken/* The Chinese Government added that they 
trusted it would be possible to effect a speedy and 
friendly settlement of this long-starring dispute, and 
requested Mr. Townley to acquaint his Government by 
telegraph with the contents of this communication, so 
that Major Yourighusband and Br, White might be 
instructed to open negotiations in a friendly spirit with 
the Tibetan and other delegates appointed, and it was 
hoped that the pending questions would* then be speedily 
and finally settled. 

The Chinese Government did, indeed, ask the British 
Government to withdraw the troops we had with us at 
Khamba Jongf, but this was on the strength of fc report 
they had received that when I was to follow Mr- White 
to Khamba Jong, I was to bring with me the 80(* men who 
formed the support left at Tangu. ^ 

That the Dalai Lama himself had agreed to SJhamba 

r * 



130 KHAMBA JONG 

Jong being the meeting-place seems evident from the 
copy of the telegram from the Chinese Resident at 
Lhasa, which the Chinese Government forwarded to 
Mr. Townley with the above-mentioned communication. 
The Resident's words were : " The Dalai Lama's answer 
is to the effect that, since the British Government has 
appointed Major Younghusband as Boundary Commis- 
sioner and Mr. White as his fellow-Commissioner, and 
fixed the 7th instant for the meeting of the delegates at 
the frontier station of Khamba, and as the Prefect Ho 
Kuang Hsieh is to proceed there in a few days from 
Chingshi, it is his duty, the matter being a very important 
one, also to appoint interpreter officials above the usual 
rank to proceed to Kliamba, and, in company with the 
Prefect Shou [? Ho], to meet the British delegates and 
discuss the frontier question with them." 

Nothing would seem clearer than this. Both the 
Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama accepted 
Khamba that is, Khamba Jong as the place of meeting, 
and directed their delegates to proceed to meet Mr, White 
and myself there. Yet, when we met at the appointed 
place, they refused to have anything to do with us ! 

I think a solution of this extraordinary proceeding 
may be found in the last paragraph of the telegram of the 
Resident to his Government. In this very same telegram 
in which he announces that the Dalai Lama is sending 
delegates with Mr. Ho to meet me at Khamba Jong, 
the Resident asks that we should " be careful not to cross 
the frontier, and thus again excite the suspicion and alarm 
of the Tibetans." 

My impression is that neither the Chinese Govern* 
ment, the Resident, nor the Dalai Lama knew that 
Khamba Jong was on the Tibetan side of the frontier. 
And this appalling ignorance of the frontier by men who, 
nevertheless, kept the control of frontier affairs absolutely 
in their hands was one of the main difficulties with which 
we had to deal, and was what made it an absolute 
necessity to negotiate with them face to face at Lhaa 
itself. 

In any case, whether they really were ignorant or not 



REPRESENTATION TO CHINESE 131 

of the position of Khamba Jong, they had all formally 
agreed to send delegates to meet Mr. White and myself 
there, and the continued refusal of these delegates even to 
receive communications was utterly indefensible. 

On September 1 Mr. Ho came to me to say he had 
been recalled to Lhasa owing to ill-health. I took the 
opportunity to recount the difficulties the Chinese Govern- 
ment had placed us in by undertaking responsibilities in 
regard to the Tibetans, and then not being able to fulfil 
them. The British Government had time after time 
shown consideration to the Chinese Government, but the 
net result was that the Tibetans had broken the old 
treaty, and now placed every obstacle in the way of 
negotiating a new one. I trusted he would represent to 
the Resident the seriousness of the position, and impress 
upon him the importance of using his influence with the 
Tibetan Government to induce them to change their 
present intolerable attitude. The Tibetans did not seem 
to understand that for years they had been offending the 
British Government, and that it ill became them, therefore, 
to object to the mere place where negotiations were to be 
held. We had given them the opportunity for negotiat- 
ing, and if the Lhasa Government still persisted in 
refusing to hold negotiations at Khamba Jong, and the 
Chinese still showed their incapacity to make them 
negotiate there, then the Resident must understand that 
the position would become very grave indeed, and the 
Chinese and Tibetans would only have themselves to 
thank if, under these circumstances, the British Govern- 
ment took matters into their own hands and adopted their 
own measures for effecting a settlement 

Mr. Ho said he would explain all this to the Amban, 
and he also then and there explained it to the Tibetans 
4$te Shigatse Abbot and others, though not including the 
tehasa delegates who were present, and these seemed 
impressed, though they said we were acting in a very 
0|>pe$$ive manner. 

t>n September 2 the Government of India asked me to 
submit proposals for dealing with the situation if the 
Tibetans continued to be so impracticable. I replied on 



132 KHAMBA JONG 

the 9th, that I thought that the Viceroy's reply to the 
Resident might have some effect upon the Chinese at least 
Both Chinese and Tibetans had so far been under the 
impression that the present mission was only one more of 
the futile little missions which had come and gone on the 
Sikkim frontier for years past. They thought that if they 
could be obstructive enough during the summer ami 
autumn, we should no doubt return before the winter. On 
this point the Viceroy's letter would leave them in no 
doubt. It was clear from that that we intended to stay 
for the winter. Besides this I had, I said, in conversation 
with Mr. Ho and the Shigatse people, tried to bring both 
the Chinese and the Tashi Lama round to putting 
pressure on the obstinate Lhasa monks. But there was 
little hope, I thought, that mere verbal persuasion would 
be sufficient. Direct action would be required. The 
despatch of a second Pioneer regiment to put the road 
to the Jelap-la (pass) in order, had, I understood, been 
ordered. I recommended, therefore, that about the same* 
time my escort should be strengthened by 100 men from 
the support. 

What I thought, however, would have a greater effect 
than anything else upon the Tibetans would be the 
demonstrating to them that the Nepalese were on our 
side, and not theirs. The Nepalese Minister had offered 
8,000 yaks. I would have 500 of these march across to us 
by the Tinki Jong route, and would recommend that 
a suitable representative of the Nepalese Durbar should 
accompany them for the purpose of formally handing 
them over to us. This would be a sign which the Tibetans 
could not mistake that the Nepalese were on our side. 

The strengthening of my escort and the appearance of 
the Nepalese yaks might be made to coincide with the 
concentration of the 23rd Pioneers in the neighbourhood 
of the Jelap-la (pass) in about a month's time* Tins I 
thought was all that dould be done to bring the Tibetans 
to a more suitable frame of mind. If these measures 
failed, an advance into the Chumbi Valley was the most 
obvious course to take, for the Jelap-la could be crossed at 
any time during the winter, and along the Chumbi Valley 



PLANS FOR COERCION 133 

lay the best trade-route and military road to Lhasa. 
When the Chumbi Valley had been occupied, the mission 
might, transported by Nepalese yaks, march across to 
Gyantse. The 32nd Pioneers and all transport would 
then be transferred to the Chumbi Valley line, and that 
line be made our chief line of communication. 

These were my recommendations to Government 
when two months' experience had shown me the difficulty 
of even entering into communication with the Tibetans. 
Neither Mr. White nor I, nor any of us, had any real hope 
of effecting a final settlement anywhere short of Lhasa 
itself; for it was quite evident to us on the spot that 
to carry the negotiations through we should have to come 
to close grips with the priestly autocrats who kept all 
power in their own hands, and to whom the officials 
on the frontier were frightened to represent the real 
state of affairs. But at that time it was high treason 
for me to whisper the word Lhasa to my nearest friend, 
such agitation did the sound of it cause in England. So I 
racked my brains and everyone else's brains to think of 
alternative measures to an advance to Lhasa, which might 
be exhausted before this alarming proposal could be made. 
And I subsequently strove honestly to get the utmost out 
of each of those measures before I suggested the next, for 
I quite realized the difficulty which any Government at 
home has in securing support from the House of Commons 
in a matter of this kind. Such methods are very costty , 
very risky, and very ineffective ; but as long as what an 
officer in the heart of Asia may do is contingent on the 
" will " of " men in the street " of grimy manufacturing 
towns in the heart of England, so long must our action be 
$low, clumsy, and hesitating, when it ought to be sharp 
a&d decisive. 



1 have referred to the offer of the Nepalese Govern- 
ment to help us with yaks, a species of buffalo peculiar to 
Tibet, which are of value as transport animals at high 
altitudes. This offer was not only of great practical use, 
but of still greater political significance. And it is time 



134 KHAMBA JONG 

now to consider this yet other important factor in the 
situation the attitude of the Nepalese Government ; for 
Nepal was in rather a peculiar position in this matter. 
On the one hand, it sends a mission to Peking every three 
years, and also has a treaty with the Tibetans, under 
which it is bound to come to their assistance if they are 
attacked; on the other hand, it has political relations 
with ourselves. The attitude which the Nepalese Govern- 
ment would take under the circumstances was a matter of 
considerable importance to us, and no doubt of much 
questioning among themselves. 

Recognizing this, the Government of India at the 
start laid down in their despatch to the Secretary of State 
of January 8, 1903, that they contemplated acting in com- 
plete unison witk the Nepalese Durbar throughout their 
proceedings, and?would invite them, if thought advisable, 
to take part in our mission. The Indian Government 
believed that the policy of frank discussion and co- 
operation with the Nepalese Durbar would find the latter 
prepared most cordially to assist our plans. An interview 
at Delhi at the time of the Durbar between Lord Curzon 
and the Prime Minister of Nepal, Maharaja Chandra 
Shamsher Jang the same who came to England in 1908 
confirmed the impression. The Nepalese Government 
regarded this rumour of intrigue in Tibet with the most 
lively apprehension, and considered the future of the 
Nepalese State to be directly involved. Further, the 
Maharaja (the Prime Minister) was prepared to eo- 
ogerate with the Government of India in whatever way 
might be thought most desirable, either within or beyond 
the frontier, for the frustration of designs which he 
deemed to be utterly inconsistent with the interests of his 
own country. 

This intention the Maharaja afterwards most ann>ly 
fulfilled right up to the close of the mission. The 
welcome offer of 500 yaks, now accompanied as it was by 
a further offer of 8,000 yaks within a month, was the first 
practical sign of the intention. A second was to follow. 
And early in September I received from Colonel Raven- 
shaw, our Resident in Nepal, who had so much con- 




THE PH1MB MINISTER OF NEPAL. 



AID FROM NEPAL 135 

tributed to this good understanding between us and the 
Nepal Prime Minister, the translation of a letter which the 
latter had just addressed to the Council of Lhasa. 

In this letter the Nepal Minister said that he had 
heard from his frontier officers and from newspaper 
reports that, in the absence of fully-empowered Com- 
missioners from Tibet to deal with the British Commis- 
sioners at Khamba Jong, no settlement could be arrived 
at, and the latter were being unnecessarily detained. 
This omission to depute Commissioners vested with full 
authority, and the neglect or failure of the Tibetan 
Council to bring about a reasonable settlement for so 
long, compelled him to say that "such unjustifiable 
conduct" might lead to grave consequences. It was laid 
clown, the Minister said, in the treaty between Nepal and 
Tibet that Nepal would assist Tibet in the case of the 
invasion of its territory by any foreign Rajas. Conse- 
quently, when a difference of opinion arose between the 
Tibetans and anyone else, it was incumbent on him to 
help them to the best of his power with his advice and 
guidance, in order to prevent any trouble befalling them 
from such difference of opinion. And the manner in 
which the Tibetans had managed the present business not 
appearing commendable, the assistance he would give at 
this crisis 4 * of their own creation " would consist in giving 
such advice as would conduce to the welfare of their 
country. Should they fail to follow his advice and trouble 
befall them, there would be no other way open to him of 
assisting them in the troublous solution brought about by 
following a wayward course of their own. This should be 
understood well, for the British Government did not 
appear to him to have acted in an improper or ^high- 
handed way in this matter, but was simply striving to 
have the conditions of the treaty fulfilled, and it was 
against the treaty and against all morality or policy to 
allow matters to drift, and to regard as enemies the 
officers of such a powerful Government who had come to 
enforce such rights, Besides, when the Emperor of 
China had, for their good, posted Ambans of high rank, it 
was a serious mistake on their part to disregard even their 



136 KHAMBA JONG 

advice and neglect to carry on business with the British 
Commissioners. 

The advice the Nepal Minister gave to the Tibetan 
Council was this : If the report was correct that they had 
refused to be bound by the treaty of 1890, on the ground 
that it was concluded by the Chinese and not by them- 
selves, then they had acted very improperly. The 
Tibetans and the Nepalese had for a long time held the 
Emperor of China in high respect. It was improper, 
then, to declare that the treaty, having been made by the 
Chinese, was not binding upon the Tibetans, since what- 
ever was done was done on their behalf. The Minister 
pointed out that, since the conclusion of the treaty 
between the British and Nepal Governments representa- 
tives of each of the Governments had resideu in the 
other's country, and the due observance of the terms of 
the treaty had been continually advantageous to the 
Government of Nepal, and their religion had not suffered 
in any way. The advantages derived from such an 
arrangement were too many to enumerate. Since the 
treaty was made, the British Government had on different 
occasions restored to them territories lost by Nepal in 
war, and producing a revenue of many lakhs of rupees. 
The Tibetans must bear in mind that the Government that 
they had to deal with was not a despotic, but a constitu- 
tional, one, and this would be corroborated by the fact 
that the British had helped the Nepalese to maintain the 
autonomy of their country for so long a time, whereas 
they might easily have deprived them of it if they had had 
a mind to behave in a despotic and unjust manner. The 
most notable feature in the relations of the Nepalese with 
the British, continued the Minister, was that they 
sacredly observed Nepalese religious and social prejudices. 
Hence if the Tibetans would even now take time by the 
forelock, settle the pending questions, and behave witn the 
British as true friends, he was sure Tibet would derive 
the same benefit from such an alliance as Nepal had 
hitherto done. That the British Government had any 
evil designs upon Tibet did not appear from any source. 
It was well known that the sun never sets upon the 



ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE 137 

British dominions, and that the Sovereign of such a vast 
Empire should entertain designs of unjustly and im- 
properly taking the Tibetan mountainous country should 
never cross their minds. So wrote the Nepalese Minister 
to the Lhasa Council 



Another month passed, and there was still no improve- 
ment in the situation. On the contrary, continued 
rumours arrived that the Tibetans were massing troops, 
and that at Lhasa they were quite prepared to go to war. 
The old Shigatse Abbot was very friendly, but quite 
ineffectual in bringing about negotiations. One day he 
lunched with us, and assured us that he had made a 
divination that Yatung was the place where negotiations 
would be carried on quickest. I said that what we 
wanted to find was a place where the negotiations could 
be carried on, not quickest, but best ; and I asked him to 
consult his beads again, and see if Shigatse would not be 
suitable in that respect. He laughed, and replied that the 
divination had to be made in front of an altar, to the 
accompaniment of music. Captain O'Connor had suc- 
ceeded in making the Abbot and his people so friendly 
that Mr. Wilton heard from Chinese sources that the 
Chinese believed that we had either bought over the 
Abbot or promised him some considerable concession 
neither of which was, of course, the case. Still, all this 
friendliness of the Shigatse men amounted to very little 
practical use as long as the Lhasa people were still 
obstinate. So on October 7 I telegraphed to Government 
that J was strengthening my escort by 300 men from the 
support, and on the following day telegraphed them a 
rcSsumd of the whole situation. 

I said that the Viceroy's despatch had reached the 
Resident one month previously, ana no reply had yet been 
received* though letters from Lhasa could reach Khamba 
Jong in four days, The Mission had been there for three 
months without being able to even commence negotiations. 
The Chinese showed indifference and incompetence, and 
the Tibetans pure obstruction* The present Resident was 



138 KHAMBA JONG 

acknowledged by even the Chinese to be weak and incom- 
petent, and his Associate Resident had been allowed Lo 
resign some months back. The new Amban, though 
appointed in December, was only just leaving Chengtu, 
and could not reach the frontier till January, The new 
Associate Resident had been given sick-leave before even 
joining his post. Mr, Ho, though 1 had given him the 
above-mentioned very serious warning, made no haste to 
proceed to Lhasa, but had loitered at Phari. Even if the 
Chinese showed less indifference, they could do little with 
the Tibetans. Mr, Ho was refused transport, and Colonel 
Chao (his successor) had informed me that the new Resi- 
dent could not bring large numbers of troops into Tibet, 
as Tibetans would refuse to furnish transport and sup- 
plies. As regards the attitude of the Tibetans, the people 
in the vicinity and the Shigatse deputies were perfectly 
friendly, but the Lhasa authorities were as obstructive us 
ever. The delegates, since the first formal visits, had 
refused all communication, social or official, with me. 
The two Sikkim men made prisoners remained in custody, 
and Tibetan troops lined all the heights between our camp 
and Gyantse or Shigatse ; and there was much probability 
that Siberian Buriat Lamas were present in Lhasa. The 
result of all our moderation in the present and previous 
years was nil, and I could, I said, no longer hold out any 
nope to Government of a peaceful solution of the question. 

On October 11 I left Khamba Jong to proceed to 
Simla to confer with the Government of India on future 
action, and thus ended this futile effort to settle the ques- 
tion on the frontier. 

The unsatisfactory nature of the situation had in the 
meanwhile been taken notice of by the Government in 
England, and, under their instructions, Sir Ernest Satow, 
our Minister at Peking, on September 25 presented n note 
to the Chinese Government, stating that, in spite of the 
Dalai Lama having agreed that negotiations .should take 
place at Khamba Jong, the Tibetan representatives had 
refused to negotiate there ; they had imprisoned two British 
subjects at Shigatse, and refused to release them ; and 
they were collecting troops, and making hostile prepara* 



SUMMONED TO SIMLA 139 

tions. Sir Ernest Satow further verbally informed the 
Foreign Board, in accordance with his instructions, that 
His Majesty's Government expected them to bring imme- 
diate pressure to bear upon the Dalai Lama, with a view 
to the release of the two British subjects who had been 
imprisoned, and to the commencement without delay of 
negotiations between the Tibetan delegates and the British 
Commissioners. Should the Dalai Lama not give imme- 
diate satisfaction to these demands, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would feel themselves compelled to take such 
measures as they might consider necessary for the safety 
of their Mission and for the release of the two British 
subjects. 

Prince Ching promised Sir Ernest Satow to despatch 
u telegram at once to Lhasa by Batang, and said he hoped 
an improvement would manifest itself as soon as the new 
Resident arrived ; but he described the Tibetans as 
intensely ignorant mid obstinate, and very difficult to 
influence. 

At first the Imperial Government was not prepared 
to sanction anything further than the occupation of the 
Chuinbi Valley ; but on October 1 Lord George Hamilton 
telegraphed lo the Government of India that Govern- 
ment had again considered the position, and were now 
prepared, if complete rupture of negotiations proved 
inevitable, to authorise, not only the occupation of the 
Chuinbi Valley, but also the advance of the Mission to 
Gyantse, if it could be made with safety ; and he asked 
the Viceroy to inform him of his plans, and particularly 
how he proposed to secure the safety of the Mission at 
Gyantse* 

It was upon this that 1 was summoned to Simla to 
advise the Government of India, and after consultation 
with me at a meeting of the Council, which I was invited 
to attend, they telegraphed, on October 26, to Mr, Brodrick, 
who had now succeeded as Secretary of State, that, for 
the following reasons, an advance into Tibet seemed indis- 
pensable : (1) Though the Dalai Lama had agreed to the 
Commissioners meeting at Khamba Jong, the Tibetan 
delegates had refused to hold any communication with the 



140 KHAMBA JONG 

British Commissioner ; (2) no Chinese delegates of suitable 
rank had as yet been sent ; (3) the procrastination of the 
Chinese Government ; (4) the warlike preparations of the 
Tibetans ; (5) the arrest and imprisonment of two British 
subjects ; (6) the complete failure of the policy pursued 
for twenty-five years, the only result of which was that 
the Tibetans mistook our patience for weakness, and 
despised our strength. They recommended, therefore, the 
advance should extend to Gyantse, and should not be con- 
fined to the Chumbi Valley, for these reasons: (1) That 
the Chumbi Valley is on the Indian side of the watershed, 
and is not regarded as part of Tibet, and a move from 
Khamba Jong only to there would be regarded as a retro- 
grade movement by the Tibetans ; (2) that if we moved 
only into the Chumbi Valley, we should find the existing 
situation at Khamba Jong repeated at Phari; (3) that 
Colonel Younghusband considered it extremely important 
that we should come into contact with the Tibetan people, 
for they were quite prepared to enter into relations with 
us, and were friendly, it being only the hierarchy of 
Lhasa Lamas who were opposed ; (4) that, as we wore 
pressing to have a mart at Gyantse, that object could be 
secured in no better way than by advancing thither at 
once. On arrival at Gyantse the force would not attack 
the place, but, as had been done at Khamba Jong, would 
establish a fortified port, and invite Tibetans and Chinese 
to resume negotiations. 

It was estimated, in a subsequent telegram, that the 
total force to be employed would be one battalion of 
Gurkhas, two companies of Sappers and Miners, two 
battalions of Pioneers, two guns, British Mountain Battery, 
two Maxims, and two seven-pounder guns. The com- 
mand of the whole was to be entrusted to Brigadier- 
General Macdonald. 

The Secretary of State,* in a telegram dated Novem- 
ber 6, at last gave his sanction to an advance. In view of 
the recent conduct of the Tibetans, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment felt that it would be impossible not to take action, 
and they accordingly sanctioned the advance of the 

* Blue-book, I., p. 



MOVE TO GYANTSE SANCTIONED 141 

Mission to Gyantse. They were, however, clearly of 
opinion that "this step should not be allowed to lead to 
occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs 
in any form. The advance should be made for the sole 
purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and as soon as reparation 
was obtained a withdrawal should be effected. While 
His Majesty's Government considered the proposed action 
to be necessary, they were not prepared to establish a 
permanent Mission iri Tibet, and the question of enforcing 
trade facilities in that country should be considered in the 
light of this telegram." 

It was a curious telegram, which I never quite under- 
stood. It said that the advance was to be made for the 
sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction. But it was always 
understood, and it was most emphatically laid down, that 
this was not a punitive expedition to obtain satisfaction 
and get reparation. It was a Mission despatched to put 
our relations with the Tibetans on a regular footing, to 
establish ordinary neighbourly intercourse with them. 
Lord Lansdowne himself said in the House of Lords* : 
" We desire that a new Convention should be entered 
into between the Government of India, on the one hand, 
and the Tibetans and Chinese, as the suzerain Power, on 
the other. That is the object of the Mission/* It is 
remarkable that a document which was so often quoted to 
the Russian Government, to the Indian Government, to 
the Chinese Government, and which the Indian Govern- 
ment on one occasion quoted to me in terms of admoni- 
tion, should have described with so little precision the real 
purpose of the advance and this at the culminating point 
of thirty years' effort on the part of the Government of 
India, It was not till after the Mission had been attacked 
at Gyantse, and on account of that attack, that we 
demanded satisfaction in the shape of an indemnity. 
The obvious purpose of the advance was to do what 
Warren Hastings had attempted, what the Government of 
Bengal since 1878 had been advocating to put our inter- 
Bourse with the Tibetans on proper terms* We had 
fmind it impossible to effect this object on the frontier or 

* February 26, 1904, 



142 KHAMBA JONG 

by negotiation with the Chinese Government. We were 
going to advance into Tibet, to Gyantse, to see if we 
could not effect it there, to get the frontier defined and 
recognized, to have the conditions under which trade 
could be carried on determined, and to have the method 
of communication between our officials and Tibetan 
officials clearly laid down. This, and not the obtaining of 
satisfaction, which is the business of a military commander 
in charge of a punitive expedition, was obviously the 
purpose of our advance into Tibet, and it is odd that this 
was not recognized in what was so often afterwards quoted 
as the fundamental statement of our policy. 

The telegram was not very purposeful or instructive, 
but such as it was we were glad enough to get it* It at 
least allowed us to go to Gyantse, and though at the time 
when my advice was asked I said I did not think we 
should get the business really settled till we reached Lhasa, 
we certainly stood a better chance at Gyantse than at 
Khamba Jong. In all civilized countries envoys who 
have to negotiate a treaty go straight to the capital, and 
how it could ever have been expected that in Tibiet, where 
all power was concentrated in a supposed god, who relied 
upon the support of Russia in any difficulties, we should 
have been able to negotiate a treaty at anywhere short of 
Lhasa, it is hard now to realize. 

However, as I told Lord Curzon at his camp in 
Patiala, where I took leave of him on my return to Tibet 
I meant to do my very best to get the thing through, 
He once more gave me the same warm encouragement 
he always extended to those in India whom he believed 
to be working well, and I left again for Darjiling. 

While we were making preparations at Darjiling for 
the next move, correspondence was also taking place 
from headquarters. The Viceroy, in reply to a letter of 
the Lhasa Resident's of October 17, stating that he had 
nominated a Colonel Chao in place of Mr. Ho, that he 
had asked the Dalai Lama to send a Councillor of State 
to accompany him (the Resident) to Khamba Jong, but 



CHINESE PROTESTS 143 

that all this required time to settle, and asserting that the 
Tibetan passes were guarded by soldiers, and requesting 
the Viceroy, therefore, to instruct the British Commissioner 
not to move from the present camp, told the Resident 
that he understood that Colonel Chao was of lower, not 
higher, rank than Mr. Ho, and that, as the Resident's 
departure was contingent on the Dalai Lama's nomination 
of a Councillor, and as the Dalai Lama had for four 
months past failed to send, as desired, an officer of the 
highest rank, he saw no prospect of the Resident arriving 
at Khamba Jong within any reasonable time. The 
Viceroy then recapitulated our various grounds of com- 
plaint, and concluded by saying that, in these circumstances, 
he had no alternative but to transfer the place of negotia- 
tions to some more suitable spot, where he hoped they 
might be resumed. And as the Resident had stated that 
the Tibetan passes were guarded by soldiers, he had been 
compelled to take measures to insure the safety of the 
Commissioners in moving from Khamba Jong, and to 
prevent any possible interruption of communication with 
them. 

The Chinese Government made on November 16 a 
protest to Lord Lansdowne against an advance, and 
hoped that I would be instructed to await the arrival of 
the new Resident, who, it will be remembered, had been 
instructed nearly a year previously to proceed as rapidly 
as possible to Lhasa; but Lord Lansdowne informed 
them that His Majesty's Government had learnt by 
experience that the Tibetans systematically disregarded 
the injunctions of the Emperor and the Chinese Govern- 
ment, who had no real influence in restraining them from 
acts such as those we complained of. We had treated 
the Tibetans with the utmost forbearance, but these 
recent proceedings compelled us to exact satisfaction, and 
we could not remain inactive until the arrival of the new 
Resident, who had unnecessarily protracted his journey. 

The Chinese Minister said that his Government 
recognized the forbearance shown by the British authori- 
ties towards the Tibetans, and also the friendly spirit 
brought by the British Commissioners to the discussion of 



144 KHAMBA JONG 

frontier questions, and they hoped that we would recog- 
nize the difficult position in which China had been placed 
by her obstinate and ignorant vassal, and enjoin our Com- 
missioners to exercise patience and forbearance, and thus 
assist the Resident, who had been instructed to proceed 
in person to the frontier to bring the Tibetans to a 
juster sense of their duties and responsibilities as good 
neighbours. 

To this Lord Lansdowne replied that the Chinese 
had hitherto signally failed in such attempts, and the 
attitude of the Tibetan authorities had of late been of 
increased hostility. It was impossible, therefore, for us to 
desist from the measures already sanctioned. 

In the event, it turned out that the Resident never 
did meet me on the frontier, and that even his successor, 
when at last he arrived at Lhasa, did not care to meet 
me even at Gyantse, for the Tibetans, so he informed me, 
would not provide him with transport. Lord Lans- 
downe's refusal to desist from action and pursue still 
further the policy of patience and forbearance was, there- 
fore, amply justified by events. 



But it was not only the Chinese Government who 
were now beginning to protest against our action* The 
Russian Government also began to move in the matter. 
Lord Lansdowne had on November 7 5 the day on 
which the forward move was sanctioned by Government, 
informed the Russian Ambassador* that, owing to the 
outrageous conduct of the Tibetans, it had been decided to 
send our Mission, with a suitable escort, farther into the 
Tibetan territory, but that this step should not be taken 
"as indicating any intention of annexing, or even of 
permanently occupying, Tibetan territory/' And on 
November 17 Count Benckendorff called on Lord 
Lansdowne,f and spoke in the most earnest tones of the 
effect which had been created in Russia by the announce- 
ment that we were about to advance into Tibet He was 
instructed to remind Lord Lansdowne of the former 

* Blue-book, I., p, 294- t Ibid., p, 298, 



RUSSIAN PROTESTS 145 

statement he (Count Benckendorft) had made to him as 
to the manner in which the Russian Government regarded 
the Tibetan question. They could not help feeling that 
the invasion of Tibetan territory by a British force was 
calculated to involve a grave disturbance of the Central 
Asian situation, and it was most unfortunate that at that 
moment, when the Russian Government were disposed 
to enter into an amicable discussion of our relations at 
the various points where British and Russian interests were 
in contact an allusion to the preliminary negotiations 
for the Anglo-Russian Agreement and entente cordiale 
an event of this kind, so calculated to create mistrust on 
the part of Russia, should have occurred. 

Lord Lansdowne expressed his great surprise at the 
excitement which the announcement of the advance 
seemed to have enacted. He had, he said, already pointed 
out to the Ambassador that Tibet was, on the one hand, 
in close geographical connection with India, and, on the 
other, far remote from any of Russia's Asiatic possessions. 
Our interest in Tibetan affairs was therefore wholly 
different from any which Russia could have in them. 
He reminded Count Benckendorff that he had already 
explained to shim that we had received the greatest 
provocation at the hands of the Tibetans, who had not 
only failed to fulfil their treaty obligations, but had virtually 
refused to negotiate with us. We had alwajrs been 
reluctant to entangle ourselves in quarrels with the 
Tibetans, but our forbearance had led them to believe 
that we could be ill-treated with impunity. Lord 
Lansdowne said he was firmly convinced that the Russian 
Government would not have shown as much patience as 
we* had, and that they would have been at Lhasa by that 
time. He felt bound to add that it seemed to him beyond 
measure strange that these protests should be made by 
the Government of a Power which had, all over the world, 
never hesitated to encroach ugon its neighbours when the 
circumstances seemed to require it. If the Russians had 
a right to complain of us for taking steps to obtain 
reparation from the Tibetans by advancing into Tibetan 
territory, what kind of language should we not be entitled 

10 



146 KHAMBA JONG 

to use in regard to Russian encroachments in Manchuria, 
Turkestan, and Persia. 

Count Benckendorff asked him whether he had any 
objection to his saying that Government had approved of 
the advance into Tibetan territory with reluctance, and 
only because circumstances had made it inevitable, and 
that our sole object was to obtain satisfaction for the 
affronts we had received from the Tibetans; and Lord 
Lansdowne said that he had no objection to his making 
such a statement. 

Despite Russian and Chinese protests, the advance to 
Gyantse was now irrevocably decided on, and once again we 
have now to ask, Was the Mission justified in advancing 
into Tibet ? I have given all the reasons for thinking that 
the despatch of the Mission to Khamba Jong was justified. 
Was this further advance into the Chumbi Valley and to 
Gyantse equally necessary? Perhaps, if we had shown 
yet more patience and yet more forbearance, we might 
have effected our object without advancing by force into 
the country. Was this so ? 

What eventually occurred showed that there were no 

g^ssible grounds for such a belief. Even when the 
hinese Central Government were aroused, and had 
ordered the Resident to proceed to the frontier to settle 
matters, he was unable to get there. The Tibetans refused 
him transport, and when we reached Lhasa, in August 
of the following year, we found him to be practically 
a prisoner, and almost without enough to eat, as the 
Tibetans had prevented supplies of money from reaching 
him, and he had actually to borrow money from us- But 
it was with the Tibetans that we really wished to 
negotiate. Perhaps they would have come to terms with 
us if we had been a little less impatient and remained on 
the frontier ? Perhaps they would have sent a Councillor, 
as we had asked, and negotiated a treaty ?, On this point, 
too, our later experience showed that we could not have 
relied. When we at length reached Lhasa I had to 
negotiate, not with one Councillor only, but with the whole 



REPLY TO RUSSIAN PROTESTS 147 

Council; and not with the Council, but the Regent himself, 
to whom the Dalai Lama had entrusted his own seal and 
whom he had appointed in his place ; and not with the 
Council and the Regent only, but with the National As- 
sembly and three great monasteries in addition ; and with 
all in the presence of the Chinese Resident himself. No 
one man would ever have been entrusted by them with 
power, and no one man would take responsibility. It was 
only with the whole together that it was possible to nego- 
tiate ; and we could negotiate with the whole together no 
where but in Lhasa itself. 

Granted all this, some may say, but even then was it 
worth incurring Russian resentment in order to settle a 
trumpery affair of boundary pillars and petty trade 
interests in a remote corner of our Empire? Now, I most 
fully sympathize with the Russian view. Our advancing 
into Tibet would and, in fact, did u involve a grave 
disturbance of the Central Asian situation/* The news 
of our signing a treaty in the Potala at Lhasa, and of 
the Dalai Lama having to flee, did produce a profound 
impression. But if the subject-matter of our dispute was 
small, there was small reason why the Russians should 
trouble us about it. The matter grew in dimension 
because the Tibetans, whom the Chinese suzerains them- 
selves had characterized as obstinate and difficult to 
influence, had grown still more obstinate and still more 
difficult to influence, through their having led themselves 
to believe that they could count on Russian support* In 
view of Russian disclaimers, we can assume that the 
Russian Government gave them no intentional grounds 
for that belief, Nevertheless, they had it, and for practical 
purposes that was all that concerned us then* The 
reception of the Dalai Lama's religious missions by 
the Czar, the Czarina, the Chancellor and Minister, 
and the subscriptions they had collected, together with 
the extraordinary belief they had that Russia was nearer 
to Lhasa than India was, had led the ignorant Dalai 
Lama to believe that he could count on Russian support 
against the British* One can cmite realize that the 
Russians, with their thousands of Buddhist Asiatic sub- 



148 KHAMBA JONG 

jects, and with the prospect that then seemed near of 
their absorbing Mongolia, and so possessing still more 
Buddhist subjects, would be sensitive of our acquiring a 
predominant influence with the Dalai Lama. But that is 
scarcely a reason why we should not take measures to 
counteract an influence which was already, and in hard 
fact proving, detrimental to our own interests by en- 
couraging the Tibetans in the belief that they could with 
impunity ignore their treaty obligations. The Russian 
Government had no intention of sending an agent to 
Lhasa. Nevertheless, there was in Lhasa all the time a 
Russian subject who had more influence over the Dalai 
Lama ^ than the Chinese Resident When such was the 
condition of affairs, we could hardly defer to Russia in a 
matter concerning a country adjoining our frontier, but 
nowhere adjoining hers. 

Just as the move to Khamba Jong a dozen miles 
inside the Tibetan frontier was most amply justified, so 
also was the move to Gyantse, halfway to the capital. 



CHAPTER XI 

DARJILING TO CHUMBI 

DURING our stay at Khamba Jong Mr. White, Captain 
O'Connor, and I had often talked over the question of 
advancing into Tibet in winter. It had always so far 
been assumed that with the approach of winter all opera- 
tions on this frontier must cease, missions must withdraw, 
and troops go into winter-quarters. But on the Gilgit 
frontier we had taken troops across snow-passes in winter, 
and Colonel Kelly took troops and guns across the 
Shandur Pass to the relief of Chitral in April, which, from 
the softness of the snow, is the very worst time. I asked 
Mr, White, who knew the Sikkim frontier so well, 
whether there was really any insuperable obstacle to our 
crossing these passes in winter, and as he said there was 
not, and as he was heartily in favour of such a move, I 
urged Government not to delay till the spring, but to let 
us advance even in winter. We do not hesitate when 
there is real necessity to send troops and missions into 
unhealthy and hot places in the hottest season of the year. 
Why, then, should we be put off by cold ? Against cold 
we could take plenty of precautions by clothing troops 
and followers with furs and sheepskins, and we should 
doubtless lose some, but not more than we lose from 
malaria and heat-strokes in hot places. And as for passes 
being closed, I had had as much experience as most people 
of Himalayan passes, and I knew that passes which are 
closed for single men or small parties, are not necessarily 
closed for large parties, which can organize regular shelters 
&jid trample down paths in the snow. It was a risk to 
take, and Lord Curzon and the Government of India 
were courageous in taking it. But, like many other risks 

149 



150 DARJILING TO CHUMBT 

we took on this enterprise, it was justified by the result 
By April the casualties from sickness and frost-bite were 
only thirty-five deaths among combatants and forty-five 
among followers, which, considering the circumstances, 
was wonderfully low, and we had proved for all time to 
the Tibetans, to ourselves, and to the world, that Indian 
troops could march across the Himalayas in the very 
depth of winter, 

As we settled down to our preparations at Darjiling, 
it did indeed seem a bold task that we were under- 
taking. The weather now, in November, was clear and 
bright. Day after day from our headquarters at the 
Rockville Hotel we could look out on that stupendous 
range of snowy mountains, to view which hundreds of 
people come at this season from all over the world. And 
to think that we had to pierce through that mighty 
barrier at the coldest season of the year in face of the 
certain opposition of the Tibetans, and to establish our- 
selves far beyond in a spob to which for half a century 
no European had approached, did indeed at times appal 
one. But the very risk and romance and novelty of the 
task soon again inspired one with enthusiasm. It was no 
ignoble little raid, as ignoble Little Englanders were 
saying, that we were embarking on, It was an under- 
taking with every moral justification behind it. And it 
was a feat which, if successfully performed, would add 
one more to the triumphs of man over Nature, and 
bring added glory to the Indian army by whom it was 
accomplished. 

It had been originally intended that I should return to 
Khamba Jong to the Mission which I had left there, and 
with them march across to Kalatso, on the Gyantse line, 
while General Macdonald marched up through Chumbi. 
But on talking the matter over with him at Darjiling, he 
thought that such a move would involve unnecessary risk* 
apd would be difficult to arrange for with the transport 
and supplies, as the Tibetans had forcibly dispersed the 
yaks which the Nepalese had sent across the frontier, 
It was arranged, therefore, that the Mission, now under 
the charge of Mr, Wilton, should be withdrawn from 



PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADVANCE 151 

Khamba Jong ; but both Mr. White and I were anxious 
that no retirement should take place from one direction 
till we were actually advancing in another, for any 
symptom of withdrawal before such people as the Tibetans 
is apt to be misconstrued into fear, and to encourage 
them into hostile action. So it was arranged that until 
we advanced into Chumbi the Mission would remain at 
Khamba Jong, and then retire into Sikkim and join 
General Macdonald and myself in Chumbi. 

General Macdonald, his Chief Staff Officer, Major 
Iggulden, who was well acquainted with the frontier, 
having served in the little Sikkim campaign of 1888, 
Major Bretherton, and Captain O'Connor now had their 
hands full with the arrangements for the advance, and, as 
always happens, every additional unnecessary difficulty 
arose. For advance into Tibet in mid-winter, animals like 
yaks, which hate being below 12,000 feet, and are stifled 
with the heat if the thermometer rises above the freezing- 
point, were, of all others, the most suitable, and the 
Nepalese Government, with great trouble had collected 
several thousand and despatched them to Sikkim. But 
just as they arrived some kind of disease broke out among 
them, and all, except a very few, which had to be secluded, 
died. It was a terrible blow, but Major Bretherton, with his 
unfailing cheery resourcefulness, set about getting the 
transport he knew and had worked so well on the 
Kashmir frontier Kashmir ponies, Balti and Poonch 
coolies. Sir Edmond Elles, the Military Member of 
Council, was near by in Calcutta at the time, and with 
his unrivalled experience in organizing such expeditions, 
was able to direct the whole scheme of arrangement to its 
greatest possible advantage. He would not, indeed, at 
this stage spare those magnificently organized mule corps 
which he treasured up in the event of greater need else- 
where, and which he only eventually sent when operations 
in Tibet assumed a greater importance* But in every 
other way he gave General Macdonald support it these 
most difficult transport and supply arrangements, and 
with great rapidity bullocks, ponies, and coolies, arrived in 
the Teesta valley. And sheepskins, blankets, woollen 



152 DARJILING TO CHUMBI 

comforters, thick jerseys, and warm socks, were provided 
for both fighting men and followers. If the Government 
of India does a thing at all, it does it well, and nothing 
was spared except the mules to make the movement a 
success. 

The local authorities were also extremely helpful. 
Mr. Walsh, the Deputy Commissioner of Darjiling, on 
account of his knowledge of the frontier, and because he 
spoke Tibetan, was to accompany me as an Assistant 
Commissioner ; and Mr. Garrett, who took his place^ at 
Darjiling, put his whole energies to collecting coolies, 
ponies, and supplies. The local engineers got the road 
along the Teesta Valley which with unfailing regularity 
falls into the river in the rainy season into proper work- 
ing order again. Mr. White, in Sikkim, set to work to 
raise a coolie corps for work on the passes. And in a 
month from the date of receiving the sanction of the 
Secretary of State, General Macdonald was able, in spite 
of the blow which had befallen him in the loss of the 
yaks, to make the start towards Tibet. 

It was a sad day when I said good-bye to my wife and 
little girl to plunge into the unknown beyond the mighty 
snowy range which lay before us. To me there was 
nothing but the stir and thrill of an enterprise which 
would ever live in history ; before her there lay only long 
and dreary months of sickening anxiety and suspense, for 
which my eventual success might or might not be a 
sufficient recompense. A little knot of visitors assembled 
at the Rockville Hotel on the morning of December 5 to 
bid us good-bye and good luck, and Mrs. Wakefield, the 
manageress, patriotically waved a Union Jack. Then we 
were off as it turned out, to the mysterious Lhasa itself. 

The first night I passed with Mr. James, a nephew of 
my old travelling companion in Manchuria, at a most 
charming little bungalow in a tea-plantation, and on the 
way met other tea-planters, all very anxious that my 
Mission would have the result of opening up Tibet for 
their produce, I once more rode through all that glorious 
tropical vegetation in the Teesta Valley. I passed the 
camp of the 23rd Pioneers, and first made the acquaintance 



CROSSING THE FIRST PASS 153 

of Colonel Hogge and his officers, with whom I was to 
be so closely associated in future, and in whom I always 
found such firm supporters. And by December 10 
General Macdonald and his staff, the bulk of the troops 
for the advance, Mr. White, Mr. Walsh, Captain O'Connor, 
and myself had all rendezvoused at Gnatong, ready to move 
into Tibet. 

The force then assembled consisted of two guns, No. 7 
Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery ; a Maxim gun de- 
tachment of the Norfolk Regiment ; two guns, 7-pounders, 
8th Gurkhas ; half-company 2nd Sappers ; eight companies 
23rd Sikh Pioneers; six companies 8th Gurkhas; with 
field hospitals, engineer field park, ammunition column, 
telegraph, postal, and survey department detachments. 
In spite of foot-and-mouth disease among the pack- 
bullocks, of sickness and desertion amongst the Nepalese 
Coolie Corps, and of rinderpest, Major Bretherton had 
succeeded in accumulating a month's supply for the troops 
and ten days' fodder for the animals, and General Mac- 
donald was able to make a short march on the llth to 
the foot of the Jelap-la (pass) with the first column, 
consisting of 1,150 fighting men, four guns, and four 
Maxims. 

On December 12 we crossed the pass itself. It is 
14,390 feet in height, and leads, not across the main 
watershed of the Himalayas, but across the range dividing 
Sikkim from Chumbi, a sharp, bare, rocky ridge. The 
ascent to it was very steep, and, as the ridge formed the 
boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, it was possible we 
might be opposed at the summit. 

But on the question of opposition I had had some 
communication with the Tibetans. News of the assembly 
of troops and of the preparations we were making had 
naturally reached the Tibetans, and on November 28 
Captain Parr, who was in Chinese employ, associated with 
the Chinese delegate, informed me that the Tibetans were 
expecting that, before any advance was made into their 
country, the British Government would make a formal 
declaration of their intention ; that if they intended to 
make war they would make a formal declaration of war. 



154 DARJILING TO CHUMBI 

I replied that no more formal declaration would be made 
than that conveyed in the letter from the Viceroy to the 
Chinese Resident. If the progress of the Mission were 
obstructed, General Macdonald would use force to clear a 
way for the passage of the Mission. If no opposition were 
offered, he would not attack the Tibetans. We were pre- 
pared to fight if fighting were forced upon us ; we were 
equally ready to negotiate if the Chinese and Tibetans 
would send proper delegates to negotiate with us. 

All accounts seemed to show at that time that the 
Tibetans intended to fight, and from several independent 
sources came information that they were relying on 
Russian support. And these latter reports were con- 
firmed later by Colonel Chao, the Chinese delegate, 
who said that Dorjieff was then in Lhasa, and that the 
arrogance of the Tibetans was due to their reliance on the 
support of the Russians, since many discussions had been 
held in Russia between Dorjieff and Russian officials, with 
the result that of late the Tibetans had been taunting the 
Chinese openly, and saying that they had now a stronger 
and greater Power than China upon which to rely for 
assistance. 

Still, I meant to do my best to secure our passage to 
Gyantse without fighting, and to the General commanding 
the Tibetan troops at Yatung I gave the pledge that we 
were conducting the Mission, under adequate protection, 
to a place better fitted for negotiation, but that we were 
not at war with Tibet, and unless we were ourselves 
attacked, we should not attack the Tibetans. I repeated 
these assurances to some Tibetan messengers at Gnatong, 
and told them to tell the Tibetan Generals that if they did 
not attack us we would not attack them. 

On reaching the summit of the Jelap-la, on a bright, 
clear sunny day, with glorious views all round, we found 
no one to oppose us. We looked down into the Chumbi 
Valley into a sort of labyrinth of deep forest-clad valleys, 
and beyond these to the high main range, which still 
separated us from Tibet proper, for Chumbi is not 
geographically part of Tibet, nor are its inhabitants true 
Tibetans. 



ARRIVAL AT YATUNG 155 

The march was very trying for the troops and trans- 
port, for the " road " was simply a mountain-path of the 
roughest description. One coolie corps struck work, and 
a number of the local drivers of a pony corps and many 
Nepalese coolies had deserted, for a curious feeling was 
prevalent on the frontier that we were advancing to our 
doom. But the troops and the bulk of the transport got 
over all right, though very exhausted, and we encamped 
in three bodies near Langram, well below the pass, in a 
deep, narrow, forest-clad gorge. 

Here I was met by the ubiquitous Captain Parr, who 
in many ways was extremely helpful at this time, by the 
local Chinese official, and by the Tibetan General. They 
asked me to go back to Gnatong, where the Chinese 
Resident and Tibetan Councillors would come and discuss 
matters with me. On my declining, they asked me to 
remain where I was for two or three months. I told them 
I had waited for months without result at Khamba Jong ; 
now I had to go on into Tibet, If my passage were 
opposed, General Macdonald would break down opposi- 
tion ; if they did not oppose us, we would not attack 
them. They asked me what we should do if on the 
morrow we found the gate in the Yatung wall closed. I 
said we would blow it open. 

What would happen on the morrow was now the 
interesting question. We would reach Yatung, which 
for the last ten years we had been trying to make into a 
trade-mart, according to the treaty, and we would approach 
that wall which the Tibetans had thrown up to prevent 
anyone coming to trade. The dramatic moment had 
arrived ; and as General Macdonald and I on the following 
morning rode down the wooded gorge with all military 
precautions, it was impossible to say what our reception 
would be. 

Suddenly, as we turned a sharp corner, we saw a solid 
wall, stretching right across the valley from the river up 
the mountain-side. General Macdonald sent a flanking 
party up the hills, and a skirmishing party to advance 
straight at the wall As we approached we were met by 
the same officials who had visited us on the previous night 



156 DARJILING TO CHUMBI 

They asked us not to advance, but we noticed that they 
had left the gate open, so the advance-guard passed through. 
Then General Macdonald and I followed, and exactly as I 
passed under the gateway the local official seized my bridle 
and made one last ineffectual protest. 

On the other side I called together all the officials, and 
sitting on a stone, with a large crowd gathered round, I 
explained to them the reason for our advance. I let them 
repeat their protests, for it evidently appeased the Tibetan 
General to say it in public ; but it did not strike me that 
he personally particularly minded our coming, and the 
meeting broke up in great good -humour. Then we 
adjourned to Captain Parr's house, where we had to eat 
not only his lunch, but lunches sent us by the Chinese and 
Tibetan officials as well, these latter themselves joining in 
the meal. 

This was an excellent beginning, which filled me with 
great hopes of effecting a settlement peacefully ; and as 
we advanced up the valley in the next few days we found 
the villagers ready to bring in supplies for purchase, and 
to hire out their mules and ponies, while the women and 
children who had run away to the hills returned to the 
villages in perfect confidence. 

After we had struck off from the subsidiary Yatung 
Valley into the main Chumbi Valley, through which runs 
the Amo-chu (river), the valley opened to a width of 
two or three huudred yards, the road was good, there was 
a considerable amount of cultivation, and grass was 
plentiful; the houses were better built, and the villages 
had a more prosperous look than is generally seen in 
Himalayan valleys; and with a road right down the 
Amo-chu to the plains of Bengal, which would save 
crossing the Jelap-la, this seemed the obvious route by 
which to approach Tibet. 

General Macdonald had to halt for some days, com- 
pleting his arrangements for supplies and transport, and 
while we were halted we were joined by Mr. Wilton,, 
Captain Ryder, RE., the Survey Officer, and Mr. Hayden, 
the geologist, who had all come in from Khamba Jong. 
They had had a very cold and very trying time after I 



MACDONALD OCCUPIES PHARI 157 

left, and their retirement was an extremely delicate opera- 
tion. The Tibetan troops hovered about, and with a 
17,000 feet pass to cross in December, Captain Bethune 
had about as difficult a manoeuvre to perform as often falls 
to the lot of a soldier. The Tibetans occupied our camp 
in triumph, but never actually attacked, and the retire- 
ment was safely effected. 

Both Captain Ryder and Mr. Hayden had done excel- 
lent work. The former had surveyed all the neighbour- 
hood, fixing many new peaks far into Tibet; and Mr. 
Hayden, roaming over the hills, had made interesting 
discoveries of fossil-bearing beds, which enabled him to 
determine the age of the strata in those parts. 

General Macdonald, with a flying column of 795 fight- 
ing men, started on the 18th for Phari, through a piece 
of country which had never before been traversed by a 
European. It was reported that there was a Tibetan 
force there ready to oppose us. The first march beyond 
the permanent camp at the meeting of the Amo-chu and 
the Rilo-chu was easy ; but the second march was over a 
very bad road, ascending steeply through a narrow wooded 
gorge, where a few determined men could have greatly 
delayed the advance of the column. The hardships of the 
march were increased by the almost total absence of fuel 
at Kamparab camping-ground, which was two miles beyond 
the wood limit. A certain amount of fuel had been taken 
on spare mules, and this, with yak-dung in small quantities, 
had to suffice. On the 20th General Macdonald reached 
Phari, marching over open country, where the only obstacle 
to rapid marching was the great altitude and numerous 
frozen streams. The Jong (fort) he found unoccupied. 
It was a strong, lofty, masonry-castellated structure, at 
lite junction of the road to the Tang-la (pass), with a road 
to Bhutan, up which Bogle, Turner, and Manning had 
proceeded to Tibet so many years before. 

In this Jong General Macdonald stationed two 

>anies of the 8th Gurkhas and one 7-jtounder gun, 

5 the remainder of the column camped on the plain 
Side. To the Tibetan and Chinese officials General 

Idnald explained that he was only safeguarding the 




158 DARJILING TO CHUMBI 

road for the advance of the Mission, and guarding against 
the regrettable display of force with which the Tibetans 
had endeavoured to intimidate the Mission at Khamha 
Jong. He stayed there a couple of nights, during which 
the cold was intense, the thermometer registering about 
40 of frost at night The ground was frozen so 
hard that a working party of twelve men only succeeded, 
after two hours' hard work, in excavating some 33 cubic 
feet of earth, and as neither turf nor stones were avail- 
able, it was impossible to construct any entrench- 
ments. 

Leaving Major Row in command of the two companies 
in the Jong, General Macdonald returned with the 
remainder of the force to Chumbi, which he reached on 
the 23rd* And on Christmas Day we received a mostly 
kindly and encouraging telegram from Lord Curzon. The 
inhabitants of the Chumbi Valley were now selling us grass, 
buck-wheat, turnips and potatoes, and Major Bretherton 
had arranged for 400 mules to ply on a contract system 
between here and the Teesta Valley, This, though very 
helpful, did not amount to very much, and we were 
dependent for most of our supplies and transport from 
the rear. In addition to this, the loss of the yaks was 
now severely felt. So our progress was necessarily slow. 
But I was very anxious, as soon as we could, to be 
over the main range, in Tibet proper, in some position 
equivalent to Khamba Jong. Just over the Tang-la (pass) 
we knew there was a small place called Tuna, and there 1 
wished the Mission established with a good escort and 
plenty of ammunition and supplies, while all arrangements 
were being completed for the further advance to Gytintse. 
There was a certain amount of risk in this ; but to be 
among the Tibetans proper, and to compensate for the with- 
drawal from Khamba Jong, I thought it was necessary to 
run it. Our prestige at this time on the Sikkim frontier 
was quite astonishingly low, I had never seen it so 
low elsewhere. , In other places there was always that 
indefinable something behind which gave one something 
to work; with, but on this frontier the people stood to 
much greater awe of the Lhasa Lamas than ttiejr did of 



OBSTRUCTION OF LHASA MONKS 159 

us, and we had to do everything we could, short of 
fighting, to establish some prestige. 

On January 4 the Mission and a flying column, under 
General Macdonald's personal command, left Chumbi, and 
on the 6th reached Phari. The cold was now terrible. 
Piercing winds swept down the valley, and discomfort was 
extreme. Near our camp was a big waterfall frozen solid. 
At Phari we found that representatives of the three 
great monasteries at Lhasa and a General from Lhasa 
had arrived, and Major Row reported many cases in 
which the inhabitants had expressed their willingness to 
deal with us, but feared to do so on account of the threats 
of these Lhasa functionaries. Captain O'Connor saw 
these monks, whom he found to be exceedingly surly, 
saying they would discuss nothing whatever until we went 
back to Yatung. 

A Major Li, who had been deputed by the Resident to 
take Colonel Chao's place, visited me, and told me it was 
impossible to get the Tibetans to do anything. He said 
,they were a most obstinate people, and at present would 
pay no respect to the Chinese, as they were so fully 
relying on Russian support. 

Captain O'Connor reported that the whole demeanour 
Q& these Lhasa monks, who were the men who really 
g^led the destinies of Tibet, was impracticable in the 
extreme. They made no advance in civility, though I 
insteaeted Captain O'Connor to be studiously polite in his 
r, and they adopted the high tone of demanding 
withdrawal. All I asked them was an assurance that 
would not prevent willing people from selling 
ies to us, and even this little they refused both the 
*ese and myself. 

the worst feature of the situation, as I reported at 
e, was that the local people, and even the Chinese, 
llteaglit that in advancing into Tibet we were advancing to 
truction. They were not impressed by our troops ; 
how few there were ; they knew of thousands 
troops on the far side of the pass ; and they 
lat the new Lhasa-made rifles $nd the new 
prevent the loss the^ had incurred in their 





160 DARJ1LING TO CHUA1BI 

last campaign against us. Many of our camp-followers 
deserted, and local men in our employ brought, in stones 
of the numbers and prowess of the Tibetans, and how 
they would attack us in the night and swamp us. 

These were the circumstances in which we set out, 
now in the extreme depth of winter, to cross over the 
main range of the Himalayas into Tibet. 

On January 7 we encamped nl the foot of the pass, 
the thermometer that night falling to 18 below/ero. As 
I looked out of my tent at the first streak of dawn the 
next morning there was a elear cutting feel in the atmo- 
sphere, such as is only experienced at great altitudes. 
The stars were darting out their rays with almost super* 
natural brilliance. The sky was of a steely clearness, into 
which one could look unfathomable depths. Behind the* 
great sentinel peak of Chumalhari, which guards the 
entrance to Tibet, the first streaks of dawn were just 
appearing. Not a breath of air stirred, but all was gripped 
tight in the frost which turned buckets of water left out 
overnight into solid ice, and made the remains of last 
night's stew as hard as a rock, (under such conditions 
we prepared for our advance over the pass, and as the 
troops were formed on parade, preparatory to starling, it 
was found that many of the rifles and one of the Maxims 
would not work, on account of the oil having frown* 

The rise to the pass was very gradual, and the puss 
itself, 1 5,200 feet above sea-level, was so wide and level that 
we could have advanced across it in line. But soon now 
the wind got up, and swept along the pass with terrific 1 
force. At this altittide, and clad in such heavy elothmg, 
we could advance but slowly, and the march seemed in- 
terminable. The clearness of the atmosphere made the 
little hamlet of Tuna appear quite near ; hut hour after 
hour we plodded wearily over the plateau, and it was late 
in the aftem<x>n before we reached it, and even then* for 
the sake of water, we had to go a mile or more beyond* 
and encamp i&the open, 

A Tibetan force was near at hand, and a,s they were 
credited with a habit of attacking at night, General Mac- 
donald took .special precautions against such m even- 




S 



EH 



O 
ffi 



3 

o 



CROSSING THE TANG-LA 161 

, tuality ; but as darkness set in and the cold increased in 
intensity, we felt we should be pretty helpless in an open 
camp, and 1 there were some thoughts of retiring again across 
the pass, for the military risks were very great. But, on 
the whole, we thought it would be better to face it now 
we were there ; and as, next morning, we examined the 
hamlet of Tuna, and found it could Jbe turned into a good 
defensible post, and had a well within the walls, we 
decided that the Mission should remain there, with an 
escort of four companies of the 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant 
Hadow's Maxim-gun detachment, and a 7-pounder 
the whole under Colonel Hogge ; while General JVlac- 
donald, with the flying column, returned to Chumbi to 
complete his arrangements, 

The immediate surroundings in which we now found 
ourselves were miserable in the extreme. Tuna was nearly 
15,000 feel above the sea, and was the filthiest place I 
have ever seen. We tried to live in the houses, but after 
a few days preferred our tents, in spite of the cold, which 
was intense, and against which we could not have the 
comfort and cheer of a fire, for only sufficient fuel for 
cooking could be obtained, most of it being yak-dung, and 
much having to be brought from Chumbi. The saving 
feature was the grand natural scenery, which was a joy 
of which I nevtr tired. Immediately before us was an 
almost level and perfectly smooth gravel plain ten or 
twelve miles in width, and on the far side of this rose 
the great snowy range, which forms the rnain axis of 
the Himalayas, and here separates Tibet from Bhutan. 
Snow seldom fell; The sky was generally clear, and 
the sunshine brillianVand well wrapped up, away from 
the dirty hamlet and sheltered from the terrific wind, 
there was pleasure to be had out of everfTTuna. And *the 
sight of the serene and mighty Qhumaihari, rising proudly 
above all the storms below and spotless in its purity, was 
a never-ending solace in our sordid winter post. 



11 



CHAPTER XII 

TUNA 



THE first event of importance after our arrival at Tuna 
was the receipt, on January 12, of a message from the 
Lhasa officials, saying that they wished for an interview. 
At noon, the time I had appointed, several hundreds 
of men appeared on the plain below the village. They 
halted there, and asked that I should come out and meet 
them halfway. Perhaps unnecessarily, J refused this 
request. It was bitingly cold in the open plain, and I 
thought the Tibetan leaders might have come into my 
camp, where I had said I would receive them, and where 
a guard of honour was ready. However, I sent out the 
indispensable and ever-ready Captain O'Connor to hear 
what they had to say, and on his return he replied that 
they once more urged us to return to Yatung, but after- 
wards stated that they were prepared to discuss mutters 
there, at Tuna. 

This constituted a distinct improvement on the 
attitude adopted by them at Phari, and their general 
demeanour was much more cordial, according to Cantain' 
O Connor. But they told him that if we advanceJand 
they were defeated, they would fell buck upon another 
Power, and that things would then be bad for us. In 
conversation with the Munahi they suid thai they would 
prevent us from advancing beyond our present position, 
and they repudiated our treaty with the Chinese', sayinif 
they were tired of the Chinese, and could concimi J 
treaty by themselves. 

. Encouraged by the fact that they showed some litflr 
signs of a desire to discuss matters, I determined now f o 
make a bold move to get to close quarter* with them. 

162 



VISIT TO TIBETAN CAMP i 63 

I was heartily tired of this fencing about at a dis- 
tance ; 1 wanted to get in under their reserve. And I 
thought that if we could meet and could tell them in an 
uncontentious arid unceremonious manner what all the 
pother was about, we might at any rate get a start get 
what the Americans call a "move on." It was worth 
while, it seemed to me, to make a supreme effort to get 
this intrinsically small matter settled by peaceful means, 
even if a very considerable risk was incurred in the 
process ; and 1 wished particularly to see them, and to 
judge of them, in their own natural surroundings. I was 
constantly being called upon by Government to give my 
opinion upon the probable action of the Tibetans, but so 
far I had only seen them in our own camps, and they had 
steadily refused to admit me into theirs. 1 therefore 
determined on the following morning, without any for- 
mality, without any previous announcement, and without 
uny escort, to ride over to their camp, about ten miles 
distant, at ^Guru, and talk over the general situation 
not as British Commissioner, with a list of grievances for 
which he had to demand redress, but as one who wished 
to understand them, and by friendly means to effect 
a settlement I was only too well aware that such an 
attempt was likely to be taken by the Tibetans as a sign 
of weakness ; still, when I saw these people so steeped in 
ignorance of what opposing the might of the British 
Empire really meant, I felt it my J duty to reason wijth 
them up to the latest moment, to save them from ti& 
results of their ignorance. 

Captain O'Connor and Captain Sawyer, of the 23rd 
Pioneers, who was learning Tibetan, accompanied me, but 
we did not 'take with us even a single sepoy as escort. 
On our way we were met by messengers, who had come 
to say that the Tibetan chiefs would not come to see me 
at Tuna, and I was all the more pleased that I had left 
Tuna before the message arrived. 

' On reaching Guru, a small village under a hill, we 
found numbers of Tibetan soldiers out collecting yak* > 
dung in the sttrroundijag pl^in ; but there was no military 
precaution whatever^jsken, and we rode straight into the 



164 TUNA 

village. About 600 soldiers were huddled up in the 
cattle-yards of the houses. They were only armed with 
spears and matchlocks, and had no breech-loaders. As 
we rode through the village they all crowded out to look 
at us, and not with any scowls, but laughing to each other, 
as if we were an excellent entertainment. They were not 
very different in appearance from the ordinary Khuiia 
dandy-bearers of Darjiling or the yak-drivers we had with 
us in camp. 

We asked for the General, and on reaching the 
principal house I was received at the head of the stairs by 
a polite, well-dressed, and well-mannered man, who was 
the Tibetan leader, and who was most cordial in his greet- 
ing. Other Generals stood behind him, and smiled and 
shook hands also. I was then conducted into a room in 
which the three Lhasa monks were seated, and here the 
difference was at once observable. They made no attempt 
to rise, and only made a barely civil salutation from their 
cushions. One object of my visit had already been 
attained : I could from this in itself see how the land lay, 
and where the real obstruction came from. 

The Lhasa General and the Shigatse Generals - -we 
had become accustomed to calling them Generals, though 
the English reader must not imagine they at all resembled 
Napoleon took their seats on cushions at the head of the 
room and opposite to the monks. We were given three 
cushions on the right, and two Shigatse Generals and 
another Shigatse representative had seats on the left, 
Tea was served, and the Lhasa General, as the spokes- 
man of the assembly, asked after my health* 

After I had made the usual polite replies and inquiries 
after their own welfare, I said I had not come to them 
now on a formal visit as British Commissioner, or with 
any idea of officially discussing the various points of differ- 
ence between us ; but I was anxious to see them and 
know them, and to have an opportunity of freely discuss* 
ing the general situation in a friendly, informal manner. 
So I had ridden over, without ceremony and without 
escort, to talk matters over, and see if there > was no means 
of arriving at a settlement by peaceful means. 1 said that 



DISCUSSION WITH TIBETAN LEADERS 165 

I had been appointed British Commissioner on account of 
my general experience in many different countries, that I 
had no preconceived ideas upon this question and no 
animus against them ; from what I had seen of them, I 
was convinced there was no people with whom we were 
more likely to get on, and I hoped now we had really met 
each other face to face we should find a means of settling 
our differences and forming a lasting friendship. 

The Lhasa General replied that all the people ot 
Tibet had a covenant that no Europeans were ever to be 
allowed to enter their country, and the reason was that 
they wished to preserve their religion. The monks here 
chimed in, saying that their religion must be preserved, and 
that no European, on any account, must be admitted. The 
General then went on to say that, if I really wanted to 
make a friendly settlement, 1 should go back to Yatung. 

1 told him that for a century and a half we had re- 
mained quietly in India, and made no attempt to force 
ourselves upon them. Even though we had a treaty right 
to station tin officer nt Yatung, we had not exercised that 
right But of recent years we had heard from many 
different sources that they were entering into friendly 
relations with the Russians, while they were still keeping 
us at arm's length. One Dorjieff, for instance, had been 
the bearer of autograph letters from the Dalai Lama to 
the Cmr and Russian officials at the very time when the 
Lama was refusing letters from the Viceroy of India, We 
could understand their being friendly with both the 
Russians and ourselves, or their wishing to have nothing 
to do with either ; but when they were friendly with the 
Russians and unfriendly with us, they must not be sur- 
prised at our now paying closer attention to our treaty 
rights. 

The General assured me that it was untrue that they 
had any dealings with the Russians, and the monks 
brusquely intimated that they disliked the Russians just as 
much as they disliked us ; they protested that they had 
nothing to do with the Russians, that there was no 
Russian near Lhasa at that time, and that Dorjieff was a 
Mongolian, and the custom of Mongolians was to make 



166 TUNA 

large presents to the monasteries. They asked me, there- 
fore, not to be so suspicious. 

I said it was difficult not to be suspicious when they 
persistently kept us at such a distance* I then addressed 
them in regard to religion, and asked them if they had ever 
heard that we interfered with the religions of the people 
of India. They admitted that we did not interfere, but 
they maintained, nevertheless, that it was to preserve their 
religion that they adhered to their determination to keep 
us out. 

As the Buddhist religion nowhere preaches this 
seclusion, it was evident that what the monks wished 
to preserve was not their religion, but their priestly 
influence. This was the crux of the whole situation. 
And it entirely bore out what Mr. Nolan, the Com- 
missioner of Darjiling, had observed many years before* 
that it was " the breaking of the beggars' bowl " that was 
in question, the loss of these presents from Mongolians and 
others. 

So far the conversation, in spite of occasional bursts 
from the monks, had been maintained with perfect good- 
humour ; but when I made a sign of moving, and said that 
I must be returning to Tuna, the monks, looking as black 
as devils, shouted out : " No, you won't ; you'll stop here.*' 
One of the Generals said, quite politely, that we had 
broken the rule of the road in coming into their country, 
and we were nothing but thieves and brigands in occupy- 
ing Phari Fort. The monks, using forms of speech which 
Captain O'Connor told me were only used in addressing 
inferiors, loudly clamoured for us to name a date when we 
would retire from Tuna before they would let me leave 
the room. The atmosphere became electric. The faces 
of all were set. One of the Generals left the room; 
trumpets outside were sounded, and attendants closed 
round behind us. 

A real crisis was on us, when any false step might 
be fatal. I told Captain O'Connor, though there was really 
no necessity to give such a warning to anyone so im- 
perturbable, to keep his voice studiously calm, and to 

* See p. 68. 



CRITICAL SITUATION 167 

smile as much as he possibly could, and I then said that I 
had to obey the orders of my Government, just as much as 
they had to obey the orders of theirs ; that I would ask 
them to report to their Government what I had said, and 
I would report to my Government what they had told 
me. That was all that could be done at present ; but if 
the Viceroy, in reply to my reports, ordered me back tc 
India I should personally be only too thankful, as theirs 
was a cold, barren, and inhospitable country, and I had a 
wife and child at Darjiling, whom I was anxious to see 
again as soon as I could. 

This eased matters a little. But the monks continued 
to clamour for me to name a date for withdrawal, and the 
situation was only relieved when a General suggested that 
a messenger should return with me to Tuna to receive 
there the answer from the Viceroy. The other Generals 
eagerly accepted the suggestion, and the tension was at 
once removed. Their faces became smiling again, and they 
conducted me to the outer door with the same geniality 
and politeness with which they had received us, though 
the monks remained seated and as surly and evil-looking 
as men well could look, 

We preserved our equanimity of demeanour and the 
smiles on our faces till we had mounted our ponies and 
were well outside the camp, and then we galloped off as 
hard as we could, lest the monks should get the upper 
hand again and send men after us. It had been a close 
shave, but it was worth it. 

I had sized up the situation, and felt now I knew how 
I stood. I knew from that moment that nowhere else 
than in Lhasa, and not until the monkish power had been 
broken, should we ever make a settlement. But it was 
still treason to mention the word " Lhasa " in any com- 
munication to Government, and I had to keep these con- 
clusions to myself for many months yet, for fear I might 
frighten people in England who had not yet got accus- 
tomed to the idea of our going even as far as Gyantse. 

While I perceived that the monks were implacably 
hostile, that they had the preponderating influence in the 
State, and were entirely convinced of their power to 



168 TUNA 

dictate to us, I perceived also that the lay officials were 
much less unfriendly, less ignorant of our strength, and 
more amenable to reason, and that the ordinary people 
and soldiers, though perhaps liable to be worked on by the 
monks, had no innate bad feeling against us. Hereon I 
based my hopes for the security of the eventual settlement. 

A few days later the Lhasa General, known as the 
Lhi-ding Depon, in company with a high Shigatse official 
and the General who had met me at Yatung, paid me a 
visit at Tuna. The Lhasa General announced that, like 
me, he was most anxious to come to a friendly settlement, 
and therefore he would ask me to withdraw to Yatung, 
where discussions could then take place in the most 
amicable manner. I told him I did not wish to say any- 
thing disagreeable to himself personally, as he had always 
been polite to me, but I would ask him to let his Govern- 
ment know that the time was past for talk of this kind, 
and to warn them that they must take a more serious 
view of the situation ; they must realize that the British 
Government were exceedingly angry at the treatment 
that I, their representative, had received, and were in no 
mood to be trifled with. Far from going back, or even 
staying here, we were going to advance still farther into 
Tibet, and I expected to be met both by the Amban and 
by a Tibetan official of the highest rank, who would have 
sufficient authority to negotiate a proper treaty with me 
in the place of the one concluded by the Amban, which 
the Tibetans repudiated. I had waited for six months for 
a proper representative to be sent to meet me, but even 
now none had arrived, 

I heard from him later that he had communicated to 
the Lhasa monks the substance of this interview, but they 
had stated they could make no report of my views to the 
Lhasa Government until we had retired to Yatung. 

Two Captains were sent to me on February 7 with a 
message that I must retire to Yatung, and I sent the 
usual reply verbally by them and in writing by the hands 
of my Tibetan Munshi. This latter communication was 
returned, with the customary intimation that letters were 
not received- 




o 

I 

I 



PH 
&H 



p 

O 



TRIALS FROM COLD 169 

Two more messengers arrived on the 10th, asking me 
to fix a date for withdrawal, and threatening trouble if I 
remained. These threats and rumours of attacks, and 
reports of the monks having set apart five days to curse 
us solemnly, continued for the following weeks, and caused 
us to keep well on the lookout: double sentries were 
posted at night, and, on account of the cold, relieved every 
hour. It was wearisome and anxious work, but we felt 
quite confident of ourselves, and in the end no attack was 
made. 

General Macdonald and the main body were also 
having a perhaps equally trying time. Communications 
had to be kept up across two high passes right through 
the winter ; a flying column had to be ready to proceed at 
any moment to our assistance at Tuna ; and supplies and 
transport had to be collected for our advance as soon as 
possible to Gyantse. On the Tang-la there was never any 
great depth of snow, and what snow fell soon cleared away ; 
but there were terrible winds, and the convoys sometimes 
crossed in blinding, icy blizzards. In February General 
Macdonald himself came over with one of these convoys 
for a short inspection. On the passes into Sikkim there 
was much more snow, and they were occasionally closed 
after an unusually heavy storm. Still, fairly continuously 
the transport corps plied across them, and supplies accumu- 
lated in Chumbi. 

All this time we had been in considerable anxiety in 
regard to Bhutan. During our advance through Chumbi 
we had Bhutan on our right flank. The Bhutanese were 
of the same religion as the Tibetans, and closely connected 
with them. It was possible, therefore, that they might 
take the Tibetan side, and it was of the highest importance 
that we should secure at least their neutrality. Mr, 
Marindin, the Commissioner of Darjiling, had written to 
ask them to send someone to discuss matters with him ; 
but the answer, which was received as we were passing 
through Chumbi, was not wholly satisfactory, so I sent 
another message, with the result that an official of some 
standing, the Trimpuk Jongpen, arrived at Pliari, and was 
brought on by Mr. Walsh to see me at Tuna. 

t, 



170 TUNA 

He was a rough, jovial person, and when I said that I 
merely wished to know on which side the Bhutunese 
intended to place themselves, that, as they were of the 
same religion and race as the Tibetans, we could quite 
understand their siding with them, but only wished to 
know plainly, so that we could make our arrangements 
accordingly, he replied most emphatically that the Bhu- 
tanese would be on our side. I said that these were mere 
words, and he said that he would put them on paper and 
seal it, which he did. I said that that was, after all only 
a piece of paper. Would he show his friendship by 
deeds? Would he help us with supplies? And he 
readily promised, and gave us permission, on payment, to 
make a road up the Amo-chu. Like the Nepalese on our 
left flank, these Bhutanese on our right were most whole- 
souled in their support, and it greatly strengthened ^my 
position subsequently to be able to advance into Tibet 
arm-in-arm with Nepal and Bhutan. 

This Trimpuk Jongpen at once became a useful ally. 
I explained to him the whole of our case with the Tibetans, 
pretty much as I had explained it to the Tibetans in my 
speech at Khamba Jong. He asked me whether he might 
see the Lhasa delegates, explain our views to them, and 
try and induce them to come to a settlement, for he said 
his Government were most anxious that a peaceful settle- 
ment should be arrived at I had no hope that he would 
be able to effect anything, but I thought that the fact of 
his attempting to mediate might be the means of bringing 
the Bhutanese Government into closer relation with us. 
I therefore consented to his seeing the Lhasa delegates, 
and asked when he proposed to go to Guru. His answer 
surprised me. He said he found there was no one there 
of sufficient rank for him to visit them, so he would send 
over and invite them to come and see him. The Lhasa 
General, another General, and one of the Lama repre- 
sentatives did come and see him, and this incident 
furnished sufficient proof of what we had all along con- 
tendedthat the men whom the Lhasa Government had 
sent to negotiate with me were of an altogether too insig- 
nificant position for me to meet in serious negotiation. 



INTERVIEW WITH BHUTANESE ENVOY 171 

After the first interview the Bhutan Envoy came to 
me to report the result. He said he had repeated to them 
what I told him, and the Lhasa delegates had replied that 
Yatung was the place appointed for discussions, and we 
ought to have discussed matters there ; but, instead of 
that, we came with an armed force to Khamba Jong, and 
then had come into Chumbi, so they did not believe that 
we honestty intended to make a peaceful settlement, but 
they asked what were the terms of the settlement we 
wished to make. 

I told the Envoy that I would willingly go back to 
Yatung if I thought that by doing so there was the 
slightest prospect of making a durable settlement with 
the Tibetans. But, as a matter of fact, we had tried for 
years to make a settlement at Yatung. Our political 
officers, Mr, White and Captain Le Mesurier, had met 
Tibetan officials, and also the Amban, there, but without 
result* As to what terms we would ask in the settlement, 
that was, of course, a matter which I should have to discuss 
with the high official possessed of full powers to negotiate, 
as soon as one was appointed ; but I might say, in general 
terms, that there were three main points we should want 
to settle with the Tibetans : Firstly, the boundary with 
Sikkim ; secondly, the regulation of trade and the selec- 
tion of a more suitable trade-mart than Yatung; and 
thirdly, the means of communication between ourselves 
and the Tibetans. The Envoy then returned to the 
Lhasa delegates, who had been awaiting my reply. On 
the following day they had a full meeting at Guru to 
consider it, and the Lhasa General paid another visit to 
the Bhutan Envoy. The Tibetans said that, as we were 
in the wrong, having advanced into Tibet, we should 
retire to Yatung, and then negotiations could take place ; 
but as regards our wish to regulate communications with 
them, they coiild 6nly say that no communications would 
ever be allowed, as it was against the rule of the country. 
These negotiations had led to nothing ; but one more 
stone had been turned in our attempt to effect a settle- 
ment peacefully, and incidentally the attempt had been 
instrument^ in putting us on good terms with the Bhu- 



172 TUNA 

tanese. I wrote at the time that I was hopeful that 
from this beginning we might establish more intimate 
relations with Bhutan, for the Envoy was the first sensible 
man I had met on that frontier, and there might be 
advantage in closer intimacy between us. Everything 
turned out well afterwards. Mr. White twice visited the 
country and established the best possible relations with 
the people, and Bhutan is now definitely under our 
protection. 

This was the last attempt to negotiate before we 
advanced. The old Resident at Lhasa spoke much of 
coming to meet me, but never came. The new Resident, 
who had been appointed specially for this work in De- 
cember, 3902, did not reach Lhasa till February the llth, 
1904^ and neither he nor any proper Tibetan negotiator 
appeared. And we remained patiently at Tuna through 
all February and March. 

The military officers had a poor time, for they had to 
be so rigorously on the watch, and Colonel Hogge had 
such a bout of sleeplessness from the effect of the high 
altitudes that he had to go for a fortnight's change to 
Chumbi, which is only 9,000 feet above sea-level, to give 
himself the chance of sleeping again, after which he was 
all right. We had, too, twelve cases of pneumonia among 
the sepoys, eleven of which, from the altitude, proved 
fatal. And one poor young fellow in the postal depart- 
ment, Mr. Lewis, had to have both his feet amputated 
for frost-bite, and eventually died of the effects. 

But we had much to employ us, too. Captain Ryder 
would go off surveying; Mr. Hayden would make 
geologizing expeditions; Captain Walton would collect 
every living animal of any size and description he could 
detect; Captain O'Connor would always be surrounded 
with Tibetans, of every degree of dirt; and I would 
spend my days on the mountain-sides, sheltered as much 
as I could be from the wind, getting as much as I could 
of the bright warm sunshine of these southern latitudes, 
and on the whole thoroughly enjoying myself, for the 
natural scenery was an unfailing pleasure. 

Generally the days were clear and bright, but almost 



Fife; 




TERRIFIC BLIZZARDS 173 

invariably at ten or eleven a terrific wind would arise, and 
blow with fury for the rest of the day. And sometimes 
mighty masses of cloud would come sweeping up from 
the direction of India. Snow would fall, and then for two 
or three days together we would be the sport of a terrific 
blizzard. The mountains would be hidden, and nothing 
would be visible but dull masses of fiercely-driven snow, 
as fine and dry as dust, and penetrating everywhere. For 
days together the thermometer would not rise above 15 
even in the middle of the day. Our camp would be the 
very picture of desolation. It seemed impossible that the 
poor sentries at night would ever be able to stand against 
the howling storm and the penetrating snow* or that our 
soldiers would ever be able to resist an attack from the 
Tibetans in such terrific circumstances. 

By the middle of March General Marrionald's 
arrangements were Hearing completion, and 1 wrote to the 
new Resident, who had recently announced his arrival, 
saying that I was about to move to (iyuntse to commence 
negotiations, that I hoped to meet him there, and trusted 
he would secure the attendance of fully-empowered 
Tibetan representatives of suitable rank* I asked him to 
warn the Tibetans that the consequences of resistance to 
the passage of my Mission would be very serious, 

On March 24 General Macdonald left Chumbi, and 
arrived at Tuna on the 28th, with two 10-pounder guns, one 
7 -pounder, four companies ?Wnd Pioneers, three and a half 
companies 8th Gurkhas, iield-hospitai, and engineer park* 

Colonel Hodge's patrols had been watching the 
Tibetans carefully lately* Reinforcement?} had arrived 
since i visited Guru, and the Tibetans had built a wall 
across the road about six miles from Tuna. There was 
also a considerable force on the other side of the Bam-tso 
(lake). 

On March 81* after we hud given fair warning to the 
Tibetans, the advance was made. Light snow lay on the 
ground* The cold was even now intense* News that the 
Tibetans were still in position had reached us, and the 
crucial moment which was to decide upon peace or war 
was now approaching. 



174 TUNA 

We moved along as rapidly as is possible at those high 
altitudes and encumbered with heavy clothing. A short 
way out we were met by a messenger from the Tibetan 
General, urging us to go back to India. I told the 
messenger to gallop back at once and tell the Lhasa 
General that we were on our way to Gyantse, and were 
going as far as Guru, ten miles distant, that day, I said 
that we did not want to fight, and would not unless we 
were opposed, but that the road must be left clear for us, 
and the Tibetans must withdraw from their positions 
across it. Farther on, as we advanced across an almost 
level gravelly plain, we came in sight of the Tibetan 
position in a series of sangars on a ridge. At 1,000 yards' 
distance we halted, and awaited the arrival of the Tibetans 
for our last palaver. They rode up briskly with a little 
cavalcade, and we all dismounted, set out rugs and coats 
on the ground, and sat down for the final discussion. I 
reiterated the same old statement that we had no wish or 
intention of fighting if we were not opposed, but that we 
must advance to Gyantse. If they did not obstruct our 
progress or did not attack us, we would not attack them. 
But advance we must, for we had found it impossible to 
negotiate anywhere else. They replied with the request 
or, indeed, almost order that we must go back to Yatung, 
and they would negotiate there. They said these were 
their instructions from Lhasa. They also did not wish to 
fight, but they had orders to send us back to Yatung. 

There was no possible reasoning with such people. 
They had such overweening confidence in their Lama's 
powers. How could anyone dare to resist the orders of 
the Great Lama ? Surely lightning would descend from 
heaven or the earth open up and destroy anyone who had 
such temerity! I pointed to our troops, now ready 
deployed for action. I said that we had tried for fourteen 
years inside our frontier to settle matters. I urged that 
for eight months now I had patiently tried to negotiate, 
but no one with authority came to see me, my letters 
were returned, and even messages were refused. I had 
therefore received the commands of the Emperor to 
advance to Gyantse, in the hope that perhaps there re- 



ADVANCE TO GURU 175 

sponsible negotiators would meet us. Anyhow, the time 
for further parleying here was gone. The moment for 
advance had arrived. I would give them a quarter of an 
hour after their return to their lines within which to make 
up their minds. After that interval General Macdonald 
would advance, and if the Tibetans had not already left 
their positions blocking our line of advance, he would 
expel them by force. 

All this was interpreted to them by Captain O'Connor 
with his inimitable suavity and composure. But we might 
just as well have spoken to a stone wall. Not the very 
slightest effect was produced. After all, our numbers were 
not very overwhelming. The Tibetans had charms against 
our bullets, and the supernatural powers of the Great 
Lama in the background. Whether they had any lurking 
suspicions that perhaps, after all, these might not be 
efficacious I know not. But, anyhow, all had to obey the 
orders from Lhasa. Those orders were not to let us 
proceed farther, so stop us they must, and that was all 
they were concerned with. They had formed no plan of 
what they should do if we did advance contrary to the 
Great Lama's orders. But for that there was no need ; 
the Lama would provide. Such were their ideas. It was, 
of course, an impossible situation. 

The Generals and their following returned to their 
camp. The quarter of an hour of grace elapsed. And 
now the great moment had arrived. But I wished still 
to give them just one last chance, in the hope that at 
the eleventh hour, and at the fifty-ninth minute of 
the eleventh hour, they might change their minds. I 
therefore asked General Macdonald to order his men not 
to fire upon the Tibetans until the Tibetans first fired on 
them. In making this request I well knew the responsi- 
bility I was incurring. We were but a handful of men 
about 100 Englishmen and 1,200 Indians in the face of 
superior numbers of Tibetans, in the heart of their country, 
15,000 feet above the sea, and separated from India by 
two high passes ; and the advantage our troops possessed 
from arms of precision and long-range fire I took from 
them. 



176 TUNA 

It was the last and final effort to carry out our object 
without the shedding of blood. The troops responded 
with admirable discipline to the call They steadily ad- 
vanced across the plain and up the hillside to the Tibetan 
lines, expecting at any moment that from behind the 
sangars a destructive volley might be opened upon them 
before they could fire a shot. Some of them afterwards, 
and very naturally, told me that they hoped they would 
never again be put in so awkward a position. But I trust 
their discipline will at any rate show to those in England 
who so decried this day's action, and spoke about our 
** massacring unarmed Tibetans " that men on the re- 
motest confines of the Empire can and do exercise 
moderation and restraint in the discharge of their duty* 
and do not always act with that wantonness and reckless 
cruelty with which they are so often credited at home. 

If General Macdonald had had a perfectly free hand, 
and had been allowed to think only of military considera- 
tions, he would have attacked the Tibetans by surprise in 
their camp, without giving them any warning at all ; and 
even after I had given the Tibetans warning, if he had still 
been free to act on only military lines, he would have 
shelled their position with his guns, and with long-range rifle- 
fire have broken down the defence before advancing to the 
attack. As it was, in order to give them a chance up 
to the very last moment, he abdicated both the advantage 
of surprise and of long-range fire, and his troops advanced 
up the mountain-side on less than even terms to the 
fortified position of the Tibetans. 

The Tibetans on their side showed great indecision* 
They also had apparently received orders not to fire first ; 
and the whole affair seemed likely to end in comedy rather 
than in the tragedy which actually followed. The Tibetans 
first ran into their sangars and then ran out again. 
Gradually our troops erept up and round the flanks. They 
arrived eventually face to face with the Tibetans, as will 
be seen in the accompanying photograph by Lieutenant 
Bailey, and things were almost at aa impasse till the 
Tibetans slowly yielded to the 'admonitions of our troops, 
and allowed themselves to be shouldered out of their 




1 
-I 



o 

H 



IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION 

position and be "moved on/* as Londo%policemen would 
disperse a crowd from Trafalgar Square. 

At this point the two Lhasa Majors who had met me 
previously m the day rode out again, and told me that 
the Tibetans had been ordered not to fire, and* begged 
me to stop the troops from advancing. I replied that 
we must continue the advance, and could not allow 
any troops to remain on the road. There was a post 
actually on the road, with a wall newly and deliberately 
built across it, and it was obvious that if we were ever 
to get to Gyantse the Tibetans behind that wall must be 
^ n Tn. d ; Yet l thou g ht *e affair was practically over. 
I he libetans were streaming away from their position 
along the ridge, and had even begun to leave their post on 
the road. Then a change came. The Lhasa General, or 
possibly the monks, recalled the men to their post, and 
an officer reported to General Macdonald that, though 
surrounded by our troops, they refused to retreat : they 
were not fighting, but they would not leave the wall they 
Jiad built acr6ss the road. 

General Macdonald and I had a consultation together, 
p ^nd agreed that in these circumstances the only thing to 
q* was to disarm them and let them go. We rode, 
together to the spot, and found the Tibetans huddidf 
* $her like a flock of sheep behind the wall. Our 
ttry were in position on the hillside only 20 yards 
ve .them on the one side ; on the other our Maxims 
K guns were trained upon them at not 200 yards' dis- 
\e. Our mounted infantry were in readiness in the 
.^ sgjn only a quarter of a mile away. Our sepoys were 
ftfually standing up to the wall, with their rifles pointing 
|>ver at the Tibetans within a few feet of them. And the 
|sa General himself with J^js staff was on our side of 
wall, in amoi^g our sepoys. 

" ; had, of course, completely lost his head. Though 
tmaridw some thousands of armed men, and though 
given him Dimple warning of our intention' to 
^ance, he^-wsas totally unprepared fer action wheft our 
'ance was ma,del He had brought his men back iiito aft 
a|$urd positid^- his action when he had got them back * 




178 TUNA 



was simply childish. J sent Captain O'Connor to announce 
to him that General Macdonald and I had decided thai, 
his men must be disarmed, but he remained sullen ami 
did nothing ; and when, 'after a pause, the disarmament 
was actually commenced, he threw himself upon a sepoy, 
drew a revolver, and shot the sepoy in the jaw. 

Not, as I think, with any deliberate intention, but from 
sheer inanity, the signal had now been given. Other 
Tibetan shots immediately followed. Simultaneously 
volleys from our own troops rang out; the guns aa'd 
Maxims commenced to fire. Tibetan swordsmen made it 
rush upon any within reach, and the plucky and enter- 
prising Edmund Candler, the very able correspondent of 
the Daily Mail, received more than a dozen wounds, while 
Major Wallace Dunlop, one of the best officers in the 
force, was severely handled. For just one single instant 
the Tibetans, by a concerted and concentrated rush, might 
have broken our thin line, and have carried the Mission 
and the military staff. But that instant passed in a /lash. 
Before a few seconds were over, rifles and guns were dettliiur 
the deadliest destruction on them in their huddled musses! 
Ihe Lhasa General himself was killed at the start, and 
m a few minutes the whole affair was over. The plain 
was strewn with dead Tibetans, and our troops instiru-- 
tively and without direct orders ceased firing-thoud., in 
fact, they had only fired thirteen rounds per man. 

It was a terrible and ghastly business ; but it was not 
fair for an English statesman to call it a massacre of 
unarmed men, for photographs testify that the Tibetans 
were aU armed r and, looking back now! I do not see how 
it could possibly have been avoided. The Tibetans after- 
ward* i at Lhasa told me in all seriousness thrt I iSt 
have known their General did not mean to fight, foi ifhe 
did he would not have been in the front as he was This 
no doubt, was true, and, left to himself, he would we 
may be sure have arranged matters with me in a J? 



THE GURU DISASTER 179 

awing him, a fanatical Lama from Lhasa. Ignorant and 
arrogant, this priest herded the superstitious peasantry to 
destruction. It is only fair to assume that, somewhere in 
the depths of his nature, he felt that the people's religion 
was in danger, and that he was called upon to preserve it, 
But blind fear of the danger which he believed threatened 
was so combined with overweening confidence, and there 
was such a lack of effort to avert the supposed danger by 
reasonable means, as might so easily have been done, that 
lie simply brought disaster on his country, and, poor man, 
paid the penalty of his unreasonableness with his life. 
What to me is so sad is that now, when the Lamas have 
discovered their errors and are imploring our aid, we can 
do so little to befriend them. 

After the action. General Macdonald ordered the whole 
of the medical staff to attend the wounded Tibetans, 
Everything that with our limited means we could do 
for them was done. Captains Davies, Walton, Baird, 
Franklin and Kelly, devoted themselves to their care, A 
rough hospital was made at Tuna. And the Tibetans 
showed great gratitude for what we did, though they failed 
to understand why we should try to take their lives one day 
and try to save them the next. We had been in some 
anxiety regarding a second body of Tibetans, 2,000 strong, 
on the opposite side of the lake, but these, on hearing of 
the disaster near Guru, retreated ; and on April 5 we 
resumed our march in the direction of Gyantse, the ther- 
mometer, even thus in April, showing 23 degrees of frost 
on the morning we started. 

I now received a letter, dated March the 27th, from 
the Resident, who said he was most anxious to hasten to 
meet me, and had seen the Dalai Lama, but " difficulties 
arose over transport, which he was unwilling to grant/* 
After considering all this, he had come to the conclusion 
that Tibetan politics were those of drift; that Chinese 
officials were too engrossed in self-seeking, and hence the 
Tibetans shirked action. But a quarrel on his part with 
the Dalai Lama would only mar matters, so he would 
" go on " and perform his share of the duties allotted to 
him, and he had decided to write " a succinct report to 



180 TUNA 

Peking," and then again ask for transport. He hoped I 
would recognize his perplexities. I had excellent reason 
for an advance to Gyantse with my escort, he said. But, 
" notwithstanding the craft and deceit of the Tibetans and 
their violation of principle," he had compelled them 
" somewhat to understand the meaning of principle," and 
if I suddenly penetrated into their country he feared they 
would lapse into their former temper, and thus imperil 
the conclusion of trade relations. The Dalai Lama had 
told him that if I would retire to Yatung he would select 
Tibetan delegates and request him (the Resident) to 
proceed there and discuss matters. The Resident added 
that " this frontier matter had been hanging fire for over 
ten years because it had been perfunctorily drawn up in 
the beginning, and because subsequently it was shirked by 
the different delegates, who did not strive honestly to 
adjust the difficulties." He was ashamed to mention the 
question of my retirement to Yatung, but, still, he thought 
it would be better for me to retire there and ''insure the 
smooth working of a settlement." 

This is all we got after waiting for him for fifteen 
months. I replied, informing him of the circumstances of 
the Guru fight, and telling him that I was advancing on 
Gyantse, winch I expected to reach in about a week, and 
I hoped that I should then have the pleasure of meeting 
him and a high Tibetan official with the power to make a 
settlement which would prevent any further useless blood- 
shed. 

On the way to Gyantse, at the Tsamdang Gorge, the 
Tibetans again opposed our progress by building a wall 
across the narrow passage. But General Macdonald dis- 
lodged them and inflicted heavy loss, and on April 11 we 
arrived at Gyantse. 

We found the valley covered with well-built hamlets 
and numerous trees and plenty of cultivation. Most of 
the inhabitants had fled, but the jong, or fort, which 
stands on an eminence in the middle of the valley, was 
still partially occupied. The Commandant was informed 
that General Macdonald proposed to occupy the jong on 
the following morning, and \vould expect to find it vacated 



ARRIVAL AT GYANTSE 181 

by 9 a.m. On the morning of the 12th we found that 
the troops had been withdrawn, and the Jong was occupied 
without opposition. 

So ended another phase of the enterprise, and on 
April 14 the Viceroy telegraphed, offering to myself, 
General Macdonald, and to all the officers and men of the 
Mission escort, both civil and military, his warmest con- 
gratulations upon the success of the first part of our 
undertaking, and his grateful recognition of the cheerful- 
ness, self-restraint, and endurance exhibited by all ranks 
in circumstances unexampled in warfare, and calling for 
no ordinary patience and fortitude. 



CHAPTER XIII 

GYANTSE 



GYANTSE, which had been our goal for so many months, 
and with which we were to be but too well acquainted 
before we had finished, has two principal features the 
Jong and the monastery, called Palkhor Choide. The 
Jong is a really imposing structure built of strong, solid 
masonry, and rising in tiers of walls up a rocky eminence 
springing abruptly out of the plain to a height of 400 or 
500 feet. It has a most commanding and dominant look. 
And the monastery immediately adjoining it at a purl ol' 
the base of the hill is also impressive from the height and 
solidity of the walls with which it is surrounded, mid by 
the massiveness of the buildings within the walls.* 

The town itself was not of much importance, nor so 
promising as a trading-mart as I had hoped. It lay at 
the foot of the jong, and the bazaar did not possess shops 
of any size. The real population, indeed, seemed to be 
scattered in the numerous hamlets dotted all over the 
valley, through which ran a considerable river. 

The demeanour of the inhabitants was respectful. 
Iney brought in supplies for sale, and in a few days a 
regular bazaar was established by the Tibetans immediately 
outside our camp, the bartering being carried on, as usual. 
mostly by women The people said they had not the 
slightest wish to fight us, and only desired to escape 
being commandeered by the Lhasa authorities. The 
valley proved to be very fertile, with cultivation all down 
it, and supplies were plentiful. 



e found 
182 



QUIET AT GYANTSE 183 

Gyantse was indeed a delightful change from Tuna. 
It was, in the first place, nearly 2,000 feet lower, so 
naturally warmer. In addition, spring was coming on. 
Leaf-buds were beginning to sprout on the willows. The 
little irises in plenty were appearing. And birds of several 
rare varieties came to rejoice Captain Walton's heart and 
fill his collection. 

Captain O'Connor, Captain Ryder, and Mr. Hayden 
rode down the Shigatse road to Dongtse and visited its 
monastery, besides other houses and estates of note in 
the valley. They found the people everywhere friendly 
and very different from what they would have been on 
the north-west frontier, for instance, under similar circum- 
stances. The peasants were ploughing and sowing their 
fields, and the whole country appeared perfectly contented 
and quiet. 

From the rear, too, came encouraging tidings. I 
received a letter from the Dhann Raja, of Bhutan, saying 
that when he heard that his friends had won a victory he 
was greatly rejoiced, for nowadays England and Blmtan 
had established a firm friendship, and he hoped that there 
would always be firm faith and friendship between the 
English and Bhutanese. 

Yet, with all this ease and quiet, there was not the 
slightest real sign of the business of negotiation being 
commenced. I had naturally expected that, when the 
Resident had been specially deputed by the Chinese 
Government for these negotiations sixteen months pre- 
viously, I should have found him at Gyantse, or at any 
rate on his way there, and that, after the Chinese Govern- 
ment had been urging the Tibetans since the previous 
summer to send a properly empowered delegate, the 
Resident would have been accompanied by a Tibetan 
Commissioner capable of negotiating with tone. But on 
April 22 I received a despatch from the Resident, stating, 
indeed, his intention of arriving at Gyantse before May 12, 
but giving no news that a proper Tibetan Commissioner had 
been appointed. He stated that the Lhasa General had 
been the aggressor in the fight at Guru, that the fault was 
on the side of the Tibetans, who had disregarded his 



184 GYANTSE 

advice, and he recognized our compassion in having mag- 
nanimously released the foolish and ignorant prisoners, 
cared for the wounded, and shown humane motives of 
sternness and mercy. He added that the Dalai Lama 
was now aroused to a sense of our power. But still there 
was no mention that the transport which the Resident 
was "insisting on" had been provided, and the appoint- 
ment of a proper Tibetan Commissioner was still not 
made. In fact, the Councillors had all been imprisoned 
by the Dalai Lama, and there were fct but few capable 
Tibetan officials to settle the frontier and oilier important 
questions," ^ which could not, added the Resident, "be 
disposed of in a peremptory manner/' A few days' delay 
would not, therefore, he considered, be out of place. 

Three days later he wrote that in this matter of 
proceeding to meet me he had exhausted himself in talking 
with the Tibetans, and trusted I would perceive something 
of the difficult nature of the circumstances. And on 
April 20 lie wrote that he had received a reply from the 
Dalai Lamn about some representations I had made 
against monks taking part in the fighting, but in this reply 
not a word was mentioned about his transport or any other 
matters. 

In these circumstances I telegraphed to Government 
on April 22 that the best way to meet these dilatory 
tactics was, at the earliest moment by which military pre- 
parations could be completed, to move the Mission straight 
to Lhasa, and carry on the negotiations at the capital, 
instead of halfway. This, I said, would be the most 
effective and only permanent way of clinching matters, 
besides being the cheapest and quickest Our prestige, I 
urged, was then at its height, Nepal and Bhutan were 
with us, the people were not against us, the Tibetan 
soldiers did not care to %ht, the Lumas were stunned. 
By a decisive move then a permanent settlement could 
be procured, I added that, in recommending this pro- 
posal at so early & stage for the consideration of Govern- 
ment, my object was that the favourable season might be 
utilized to the full, and that we might not allow the 
psychological moment to pass without taking advantage 



TIBETANS AGAIN ASSEMBLE 185 

of it. Meanwhile, I said, I would receive the Amban, 
and would ascertain what power to effect a settlement he 
and the Tibetan representative really possessed. 

In making this recommendation I was counting on a 
collapse of the Lhasa authorities, which seemed to be 
indicated by the Resident's statement, by the statement 
of a Chinese official from Lhasa that Tibetan officers were 
begging the Resident to intercede, by the fact that the 
common people even, it was said, at Lhasa did not resent 
our presence, that there were few troops between Gyantse 
and Lhasa, and that the Lhasa authorities had been able 
to produce only 5,000 men to oppose our advance as far as 
Gyantse. 

Whether this collapse would have taken place if we 
had then set about advancing to Lhasa it is impossible to 
say. Certainly it did not take place. But this may have 
been due to the retirement of General Macdonald with 
the greater part of the force which now took place, in 
accordance with the plan prearranged between us of 
leaving the Mission with a good strong escort to conduct 
negotiations while the bulk of the force remained in sup- 
port in Chumbi, where supplies were more readily avail- 
able. This, from a supply point of view, was desirable, 
and it was in accordance with the policy of Government, 
but it may have had the effect of re-arousing the Tibetans. 

Anyhow, rumours soon began to reach me that 
Tibetan forces were collecting again. On the 24th came 
news that they were building walls across the road at the 
Karo-la (pass) on the way to Lhasa, that camps holding 
700 or 800 Tibetans had been established there, that the 
Dalai Lama was endeavouring to gain time to enlist 
Tibetans from far and wide to resist a British advance to 
Lhasa, and that the local soldiers round Gyantse were, 
under his orders, quietly leaving and proceeding towards 
Lhasa. 

To ascertain the truth of these rumours. Colonel 
Brander, who was now in command of the Mission escort 
of 500 men, two guns and two Maxims, and some mounted 
infantry, on April 28 sent out a reconnaissance party of 
one company of mounted infantry to the Karo-la ; and on 



186 GYANTSE 

May 1 we received news from Captain Hodgson, com- 
manding the party, that he had advanced with his mounted 
infantry across the pass, and three miles beyond had found 
the Tibetans in occupation of a wall, some 600 yards long, 
built across the valley. The Tibetans, estimated at from 
1,000 to 1,500 in number, opened a heavy fire on the 
mounted infantry at about 300 yards' distance. Our men 
then retired steadily, firing only a few shots and returned 
towards Gyantse. 

Besides the definite information thus acquired, reports 
also reached me that other troops were assembling in the 
Rong Valley, ready to support those on the Lhasa road, 
and that there was a large gathering, estimated at 4,000, 
assembled at Shigatse itself, a portion of which was to 
move up to Dongtse, twelve miles from Gyantse. 

Colonel Brander now came to me and asked for leave 
to go out and attack the Tibetans before these gatherings 
could come to a head. He had much frontier experience, 
and I also had some, and we both of us knew that when 
such gatherings take place it is a pretty sound general 
principle to take the initiative, and hit hard at them 
before they have time to accumulate overwhelming 
strength. It was a bold move, he contemplated, for the 
Karo-la (pass) was forty-five miles distant, and was over 
16,000 feet high ; and while he was away with two-thirds 
of the escort, the Mission, with only one-third of its full 
escort, might be itself attacked. I said that if he, on his 
side, did not mind taking this risk, I, on my side, did not 
mind it, and, as far as my military opinion was worth 
anything, was quite in favour of the operation* 

But it was on political grounds that I had to give the 
decision, and on those grounds I had no objection. I had 
come to negotiate, but there was no symptom of nego- 
tiators appearing. On the other hand, the Tibetans were 
still further massing their troops ; their position at the 
Karo-la and between there and Kangma was threatening 
our line of communication; and they had fired on our 
reconnoitring party. For these reasons I informed 
Government by telegram on May 2 that I had raised no 
objection on political grounds to Colonel Brander's pro- 



ATTACK ON THE MISSION 187 

posal to go out and attack the Tibetans on the pass before 
they could attack our line of communication. I had stated, 
verbally and in writing, to the Chinese and to the Tibetans 
that we came to Gyantse to negotiate. Since our arrival 
we had evacuated the Jong, and General Macdonald, with 
the greater part of the force, had returned to Chumbi. 
There could be no question, then, that we meant to 
negotiate and not to fight. Yet they still neither sent a 
negotiator, nor said they had any intention to negotiate ; 
instead they massed troops to attack us ; and I felt at 
perfect liberty to let the commander of the Mission escort 
take whatever means he liked to secure its safety. 

On the same day, in view of the rumours of the hostile 
attitude of the Tibetans towards Shigatse and of their 
reinforcement by local levies, I placed the Gyantse Jong- 
pen in custody in the British camp. 

Colonel Brander set out on May 3, with three com- 
patiies of the 32nd Pioneers, one company 8th Gurkhas, 
two 7-pounder guns and two Maxims, accompanied by 
Mr. Wilton and Captain O'Connor, to assist him in case 
Chinese or Tibetan officials were met with. 

On May 4 Captain Walton's patients waxned him that 
some kind of attack on us at Gyantse was likely, and 
Major Murray, 8th Gurkhas, who was in command during 
Colonel Brander's absence, sent out a mounted patrol some 
miles down the Shigatse road ; but they returned, report- 
ing everything quiet. 

At dawn the next morning the storm burst, I was 
suddenly awaked by shots and loud booing close by my 
tent. I dashed out, and there were Tibetans firing through 
our own loopholes only a few yards ofR From the Shigatse 
direction a force of 800 men had marched all night, and 
many, under cover of the darkness, had crept up under 
the walls of our post. Then at dawn these suddenly 
jumped up, and, supported by the remainder, made an 
attempt to rush our post, a substantial house with a 
garden at one side, the wall of which we had loopholed. 
In the first critical moment they almost succeeded. They 
as nearly as possible forced an entrance, but were stoutly 
held at bay by two gallant little Gurkha sentries till our 



188 GYANTSE 

men turned out. Then, as at Guru, once the single 
favourable moment had flashed by, nothing but disaster 
lay before them. The attack began at about 4.30, and 
did not cease till nearly 6.30, but in that time they had 
left about 250 dead and wounded round our post. 

Personally, 1 did not deserve to get through the 
attack unscathed, for directly I was out of my tent I 
made straight for the Mission rendezvous. I was in my 
pyjamas, and only half awake, and the first thought that 
struck me was to go to the rendezvous, agreed upon before- 
hand, in what we called the citadel. But I ought, as I 
did on other occasions and as I think always should be 
done in cases of any sudden attack to have made straight 
for the wall with whatever weapon came to hand, and 
joined in repelling the attack during the few crucial 
moments. 

Major Murray, as soon as he had repelled the attack, 
pursued the enemy for about two miles down the Shigatse 
road. But it now became evident that this attacking 
party was not the only force of Tibetans in the neighbour- 
hood, and that another of similar strength had occupied 
the Jong, for these latter began firing into our post, and 
we gradually came to realize that we were now besieged. 

It turned out from information received from prisoners 
that these troops had been collected by a General recently 
appointed by the Lhasa Government, and that it was 
accompanied by a representative of the great Gaden 
monastery at Lhasa, by two clerks of the Dalai Lama, 
and by other Lhasa officials. It was, therefore, no mere 
local rising, but an attack deliberately planned by the 
Central Tibetan Government. 

For a few days, till Colonel Brander returned, we were 
in a critical position, and we were also anxious about 
Colonel Brander himself. The worst that, in making our 
calculations at Darjiling in November, we 'had deemed 
likely to happen had happened, and we were now at the 
straining-point. Major Murray, assisted especially by 
Captain Ryder with his engineering experience, strength- 
ened the post as far as possible during the day, and at 
night we looked out watchfully for a further attack. For 



BRANDER'S FIGHT AT KARO-LA 189 

it was at night, when our long-range rifles lost their 
special advantage, that the Tibetans would have their 
best chance. We only had 170 men, and the vastly 
superior numbers which the Tibetans were now collect- 
ing ought to have had a fair chance of overwhelming us 
if they had pressed home a well-planned night attack. 
They fired a good deal during this and the following 
nights, but we kept a good watch, and we heard after- 
wards that the Lamas tried to organize a second attack 
on us, but the men refused to turn out. 

It was an intense relief to me to hear on the 7th that 
Colonel Braiiderhad been successful in clearing the gather- 
ing at the Karo-la, which consisted of 2,500 men, armed 
with numerous Lhasa-made and foreign rifles, and headed 
by many influential Lamas and officials from Lhasa. In 
a short note to me he told me of the anxious moments he 
had passed when, on the early morning before he made his 
attack, he received a letter from me saying that the 
Mission had been attacked at Gyantse. The Tibetans 
were in a very strong position behind a loopholed wall of 
great solidity, and 800 yards long, which they had built 
right across the pass ; and to attack such a position at a 
height of over 16,000 feet above sea-level, surrounded with 
glaciers, with only a sixth of the numbers opposed to him, 
and with his communications not over safe behind, Colonel 
Brander had in truth to set his teeth and steel his 
nerves. His frontal attack failed. Poor Bethune, a 
typically steady, reliable and lion-hearted officer was killed. 
The guns proved absolutely ineffective. Ammunition was 
none too plentiful. And Colonel Brander said in his letter 
to me that he was on the point of despairing when, just 
at the critical moment, the turning movement of the 
Gurkhas, under Major Row, who had slowly scrambled 
up to a height of 18,000 feet, proved successful. Panic 
took the Tibetans. They first began dribbling away from 
the wall, then poured away in torrents. Colonel Brander 
hurled his mounted infantry at them, and Captain Ottley 
pursued them halfway to Lhasa. 

It was a plucky and daring little action, and unique of 
its kind in the annals of any nation ; for never before had 



190 GYANTSE 

fighting taken place at altitudes well over the summit of 
Mont Blaric. I was indeed relieved to hear of its brilliant 
success, and late at night on the 7th that is, the very day 
after the fight to welcome back Captain O'Connor, Mr. 
Perceval Landon, and the indefatigable Captain Ottley, 
with his dashing mounted infantry, already the terror of 
the Tibetans. They had made a bold dash back ahead of 
Colonel Brander, and on the very next morning Captain 
Ottley was to show the Tibetans who were investing us 
the difference which his presence made. 

A party of Tibetan horsemen were seen from our post 
sauntering unsuspectingly along the valley, out of reach 
of our rifles, but not out of reach of our mounted infantry, 
twenty of whom, under Captain Ottley, now dashed out 
of our post in pursuit. The Tibetans galloped up a side 
valley ; Captain Ottley galloped after them ; and now we 
saw a great body of Tibetan horsemen issue from the Jong 
to cut him off. I held my breath in suspense, fearing he 
would not see the party behind in his eager pursuit of 
the party in front But Captain Ottley was not to be 
so easily caught. He suddenly wheeled on to some rising 
ground, dismounted his men as quick as lightning, and 
was blazing away at both parties before they could realize 
what had happened. In a moment several Tibetans 
dropped, and the remainder scuttled away as fast as they 
could. 

All this put fresh spirit into our men, for we had had 
three days and nights of considerable strain; and on the 
day following Colonel Brander himself with his column 
returned safely to camp, and arrangements were at once 
made to harry the garrison of the jong with rifle and 
Maxim fire. 

We now heard full details of the Karo-la fight. It 
appears that the Tibetans engaged were mostly drawn 
from the districts of South-Eastern Tibet They were 
commanded by a layman and a monk official, and had 
been organized by a monk State Councillor and another 
high ecclesiastical official who had been stationed for some 
time at Nagartse. Representatives of the three great 
Lhasa monasteries were at the fight. m& each monk had 



DEATH OF BETHUNE 191 

been provided by the Lhasa Government with a matchlock 
and a knife before starting to join the army. 

On the morning of the 10th we buried the remains of 
poor Bethune, and it was my melancholy duty to read the 
Burial Service over one whom I had known since the 
Relief of Chitral, whose genial,, manly nature attached him 
to every one of us, and for whose soldierly qualities all had 
the highest admiration. He was a grand type of British 
officer, strict and thorough in his duties, yet beloved by 
his men, and his loss was severely felt in the days that 
were upon us. 

Colonel Brander now reconnoitred the Jong to see if 
it was possible to capture it. He came to the conclusion 
that an attack was too much to undertake. Our two 
7-pounder guns were useless, though they had been 
brought up specially for this purpose, and our force was 
too small to carry the place by assault. It will naturally 
be asked why, when the Jong was evacuated on our first 
arrival, we were not now occupying it instead of a house 
in the plain. General Macdonald had several excellent 
reasons for not establishing the Mission with escort in the 
jong. It was too far from a water-supply ; and it was too 
big to hold. The post he chose was compact and on the 
river. Here he placed us, with ample supplies to last us 
till relief could arrive if we were attacked. As I have 
said, the worst that could happen did happen, and we held 
out till reinforcements came. 

But Colonel Brander, though he could not attack the 
jong, did not allow himself to be simply invested in his 
post. He constantly sallied out to clear villages, and 
demolish any within the vicinity of our post ; he main- 
tained a mounted dak service to the rear, and in every 
way endeavoured to keep as much in the ascendant as 
was possible in the circumstances. 

An important stage had now been reached. The 
Government of India on May 14 telegraphed to me that 
His Majesty's Government agreed with them that recent 
events made it inevitable that the Mission should advance 
to Lhasa, unless the Tibetans consented to^ open negotia- 
tions at Gyantse, I was, therefore, to give notice to the 



192 GYANTSE 

Amban that we should insist on negotiating at Lhasa 
itself if no competent negotiator appeared in conjunction 
with him at Gyantse within a month. 

This was satisfactory to a certain degree, but I was 
disappointed to have to be still further talking about 
negotiations when we had been wantonly attacked, when 
we were now actually invested, and when the Lamas 
were gathering yet more forces around us. Any mention 
of negotiating in such circumstances would only lead them 
to believe we feared them, and it was with much re- 
luctance that 1 eventually gave this message. But the 
Government had to contend with many difficulties. They 
were in the face of a strong opposition in the House of 
Commons. There was no enthusiasm for the enterprise in 
the country. We had only recently emerged from the 
South African War. The Russo-Japanese War was 
causing anxiety. And we had not yet concluded the 
agreement and formed the Entente Cordiale with France. 
General Macdonald was meanwhile making every 
preparation in Chumbi for supporting the Mission escort 
and eventually advancing to Lhasa ; and he had many 
difficulties of his own to contend with, through an out- 
break of cholera, and through the heavy rains causing 
many breaches in the road in Sikkim. Supplies, munitions 
and transport, had to be laboriously collected, and progress 
was necessarily slow. But on May 24 strong reinforce- 
ments reached Gyantse, and were a most welcome addition 
to our strength, enabling Colonel Brander to assume n 
more active attitude. They consisted of two 10-pounder 
guns of the British mountain battery, under Lieutenant 

sa ^ ers and min -> ^h, 

.-f^ ttle i a son was strengthened, too, by the 

-5 



SHEPPARD AND OTTLEY 193 

paigns for his bravery. Here he added daily to his 
reputation, and he and Captain Ottley were the two 
whom I, as an onlooker seeing a good deal, if not always 
most, of the game singled out to myself as having in them 
the surest signs of military genius. In a military career 
so much depends on chance that these two may very 
possibly sink down to the usual humdrum respectable 
commander or staff officer. But I will stake my reputa- 
tion as a prophet that, if the chance ever does come to 
either of them before routine and examinations have 
quenched their burning vitality, they will make a mark 
like Lord Roberts or like the daring Hodson of Hodson's 
Horse. 

Here I must in a brief parenthesis criticize some re- 
marks I heard Mr. Roosevelt, for whom otherwise I have 
the greatest admiration, make to the Cambridge University 
Union Society, He said that in public life and in the 
army geniuses were not wanted, but that what was required 
were average men with the ordinary qualities developed 
by the men themselves to an extraordinary degree. In 
this I most profoundly disagree. It is not the ordinary 
average man, however much he may develop his mediocrity, 
that is most wanted. It is the exceptional man. It is the 
man with just that touch which we cannot possibly define, 
but which we all instinctively recognize as genius. There 
is a superabundance of ordinary men, and it must be 
admitted that they do ordinary work very much better 
than geniuses. But it is the genius alone who, when the 
occasion arises, will flash a ray through these masses of 
ordinary men, and make them do what they would never 
do with any amount of development of their ordinary 
plodding qualities. And it is of the highest importance to 
find out these exceptional men. But the way to do this 
is not by examinations unless those who are least capable 
of passing them are chosen. It is by letting the best 
select the best, by letting the proved best select whom 
they think promise best. 

All this, however, is byway of interlude, and is merely 
one of the many reflections I made while I was myself 
under enforced inactivity, and had nothing much else to 

13 



194 GYANTSE 

do but watch the adtion of those others upon whom the 
responsibility for the time being rested. 

With his reinforcements Colonel Brander now UK >k the 
offensive in earnest, and on May 26 attacked the strongly- 
built village of Palla, which was only 1,100 yardn from our 
post, and which the Tibetans were holding in strength, 
and connecting with the jong by a wall* In the dead of 
night, in utter darkness, the attacking party assembled. 
All of us who were to remain behind went up to the roof 
to watch the result. The column moved noiselessly out 
from our post. A long silence followed. Then a few 
sharp rifle cracks rang out, and soon from the jong and 
from the Palla village there was a continuous crackle, with 
sharp spurts of flame lighting the darkness. Soon after a 
great explosion was heard, followed by a deadly silence, 
What had happened we heard afterwards* Captain 
Sheppard, accompanied by Captain O'Connor, had dashed 
up to the wall of one of the principal houses in the village 1 , 
and after shooting two Tibetans with his revolver, placed 
a charge of gun-cotton, lighted a fuse, and dashed back 
again to cover. The explosion was the result, and a big 
breach had been made. Captain O'Connor had tlujn, with 
his cake of gun-cotton, rushed into another hou.se and 
successfully fired it. Lieutenant Garstin and Lieutenant 
Walker in another place tried to make a similar breach, 
but the fuse did not act, and in making a second attempt 
the former was killed, while Captain O'Connor also was 
severely wounded. 

This blowing up of houses crammed full of armed wen 
is indeed a desperate undertaking, but except by this 
method of deliberately rushing up and placing a charge 
under manned walls, and firing the charge, there was no 
means of getting in and Sheppard, Garstin, Walker, and 
O Connor deserve all the honour that is due to the bravest 
of military actions. 

Breaches had been made, but the village had yet to be 
stormed, and Major Peterson, with his Sikh Pioneer* a* 
soon as it was light, gallantly stormed house after home 
while Colonel Brander supported him with tteg^on 
the hillside a few hundred yards off; The Tibetam 



FIGHT AT PALLA 195 

fought stubbornly, as they always did in these villages, but 
Major Peterson pressed steadily on, and by 1.30 the 
village was in Colonel Brander's hands. 

Our losses were, besides Lieutenant Garstin, Royal 
Engineers killed, Captain O'Connor, Lieutenant Mitchell, 
32nd Pioneers, Lieutenant Walker, Royal Engineers, and 
nine men wounded. It was a heavy casualty list for our 
little garrison to sustain, but the capture of the village 
was a great shock to the Tibetans, who till then, accord- 
ing to a Chinaman whom Mr. Wilton met when accom- 
panying one of our sorties, had become very truculent, 
and talked of first attacking us and cutting all our 
throats, and then murdering all Chinese. 

The Palla village was occupied by our troops, and at 
1.30 on the morning of May 30 the Tibetans, who had for 
long been trying to screw themselves up for an attack 
upon us, attacked both this and a Gurkha outpost we had 
established. It was a beautiful sight to watch, with the 
jong keeping up a heavy fire on us, and the houses at the 
foot of the jong firing away hard on the village. But the 
Tibetans were easily repulsed, for Colonel Brander had 
been careful to fortify the place well, and the Tibetans 
after this never ventured to take the offensive against 
us, and the tide now definitely began to turn. 

I therefore now with less reluctance wrote letters to the 
Resident and Dalai Lama, saying that we were ready to 
negotiate at Gyantse up to June 25, but that unless by 
that date the Resident and competent negotiators had 
arrived, we would insist upon negotiations being carried 
on at Lhasa. The letters, together with a covering letter 
to the Tibetan commander in the jong, were sent by the 
hands of prisoners. Before undertaking their delivery, 
however, the bearers stipulated that they should be 
allowed to return to us as prisoners, which was a signifi- 
cant commentary on the method of enlistment of the 
Tibetan forces opposing us. The next morning the letters 
were returned by the Tibetan General, who said that it 
was not their custom to receive communications from the 
English. 

On the afternoon of June 5 I received instructions 



196 GYANTSE 

from the Government of India to proceed to Chumbi, 
to confer with General Macdonald as to future plans, 
We had to a certain degree kept open our communications. 
Still, there were Tibetans all about, and it was a some- 
what unusual, and certainly risky, proceeding for the chief 
of the Mission to have to ride 150 miles down the lines 
to consult the military commander. However, I was 
glad enough of the change from the monotony of our 
investment at Gyantse, and at four the next morning, 
while it was still dark, I rode out with an escort of forty 
mounted infantry, under Major Murray, and accompanied 
by that gallant doctor of the 8th Gurkhas, Dr. Franklin. 
We gave a wide berth to the Niani monastery, and arrived 
safely at Kangma, our first fortified post, forty miles 
distant, where Captain Pearson, of the 23rd Pioneers, was 
in command with about, 100 men. 

All was quiet here, and the post had never so far 
been attacked, owing probably to the effect of Colonel 
Brander's action on the Karo-la, from which a route led 
direct to this place, I had risen at 4.30 the next morning 
to make an early start, and was just dressed when I heard 
that peculiar jackal-like yell which the Tibetans had used 
when they made their attacks at Gyantse, I instantly 
dashed on to the roof, and there, sure enough, was a mob 
of about 300 of them weighing down upon the post, and 



n "-^*-***^ V*VTT** V*/VJU diV IMsnbf Hi lit 

before our men were out they were right up to the walls, 
hurling stones and firing at me up on the roof, which was 
flat, and from which I could not for the moment find a 
way down. We all, dressed or undressed, dashed up to 
the walls, seizing the first rifles we could find, and firinir 
away as hard as we could. And here again the Tibetans 
just lost their opportunity. As before, in a moment it was 
gone, and they suffered terribly for their want of military 
acumen. Sixty or seventy were killed, and the rest drew 
ott up the mountains. 

Whfi?*?" 8 WES n0t f^ e on , ly bod y of Tibetans about. 
White these were making the direct attack, two other 

met^thf bet "^ ^ - a PP eajred ' dl of them KhaS 
valley and the other down, to cut ^oifAJr^on&th^t 



TIBETANS ATTACK KANGMA 197 

hand. This was a great strategical effort on the part 
of the Tibetan commander, but it failed, because as soon 
as the attack on our post was repulsed Major Murray 
sallied forth, and in turn attacked the other Tibetan 
parties, climbing the hillside and sending them helter- 
skelter over the mountains. 

Then we had some breakfast, and I proceeded on my 
way to Chumbi. It was twenty-eight miles to the next 
stage, at Kala Tso, and there was considerable risk of 
encountering Tibetans on the way; but I argued that 
there was less risk immediately after a repulse than there 
might be a day or two later. So I set out with twenty 
mounted infantry, Major Murray and his men having 
to return to Gyantse. At Kala Tso I was welcomed by 
my old friends the 23rd Pioneers, under Colonel Hogge, 
who had been our escort at Tuna during all that terrible 
winter. 

I now replied to a telegram I had received in the 
morning from Government, asking me to communicate 
my views on the general situation by telegram, as they 
wished to have them as soon as possible. I said, with 
reference to the contention which had been made by 
the military authorities that it would be impossible to 
keep troops at Lhasa after the autumn, that in my 
opinion * an effort should be made to quarter troops at 
Lhasa for the winter, for if we retired to Chumbi in 
November, we risked the loss of all the results of our 
present efforts, and the Tibetans would be still more 
obstructive." 1 computed that the Lhasa and Gyantse 
valleys would support 1,000 men each. I hoped that 
while the ample forces now being sent would break 
down opposition during the summer months, it would 
be possible to keep in Lhasa a garrison, like that then 
at Gyantse, capable of holding its own for a whole winter. 
I added that if it was the case, as the military said, that 
troops could not be maintained in Lhasa during the 
winter, I had better not go to Lhasa at all, for there was 
little use in my commencing negotiations with two such 
obstructive people as the Tibetans and Chinese in any 
place where I could not stay a full year, if necessary, I 



198 GYANTSE 

had been eleven months trying even to begin negotiations. 
I should be quite unable to complete them in two or three 
months, especially if the Chinese and Tibetans knew 
we intended to leave before the winter. 

The substance of this telegram I still think was per- 
fectly sound, but its tone I do not now in cold blood 
seek to defend. I must confess that during all this 
Gyantse period I was not so steady and imperturbable as 
an agent should be. Perhaps the prolonged stay at very 
high altitudes was 'beginning to tell, for even Gyantse was 
over 13,000 feet. Perhaps it was the greater realization 
that nothing ever would be effected short of Lhasa, and 
,that this playing about at Khamba Jong, at Tuna, and at 
Gyantse was merely for the benefit of the distant British 
elector. Or it may have been the difficulty of reconciling 
military with political considerations. Or possibly it was 
reading in the newspapers now arriving from England 
the accusations of cruelty, injustice, and oppression which 
were being publicly brought against the Mission, and the 
prophecies of disaster, such as befell Cavagnari, which 
were to come on us also. Whatever it was, I certainly 
became very restive, and now earned a rebuff from the 
Government of India, which only made me worse, awl 
determined me to give up the whole business, ft seemed 
so easy to carry through if we only went straight at it, so 
utterly impossible when in England they were only hnlf- 
hearted. I see now that I ought to have gone stolidly 
and cheerily on, for Governments, too, have innumerable 
difficulties of their own. Still, this was not easy at the 
time. 

It was tolerably certain a fortnight after my arrival at 
Gyantse that the Tibetans did not seriously mean to 
negotiate, and if we had to go to Lhasa, it was urgently 
necessary to make early preparations for an advance*, 
so that another whole summer might not pass away 
without result. Yet I was undoubtedly premature in 
breathing the word Lhasa so early as the end of April 
It was clear to me that if we wished to make a well- 
taought-out, complete, and lasting settlement with the 
Tibetans and the Chinese combined, and if we wished 



NEED FOR REMAINING AT LHASA 199 

what I always regarded as much more important than 
any paper settlement, and as our real object in going to 
Tibet the establishment of a good feeling between our- 
selves and the Tibetans, we must not only go to Lhasa, 
but be able to stay there for an ample period. Yet when 
1 stated this opinion to Government, I should, I acknow- 
ledge, have given it in a less brusque way than I did in 
the telegram I have quoted. 

I had this much in excuse. I had, as I have related, 
at dawn on the day I sent that telegram, and before having 
had my breakfast, been attacked by the Tibetans, and had 
myself to fight with a rifle in my hand. I had had, after 
breakfast, to ride nearly thirty miles with the constant risk 
of further attack on the way. I had had to do all this 
after being cooped up for a month in a house without 
being able to stir outside it, I had therefore to compose 
and cipher my telegram when 1 was physically exhausted 
and depressed in spirit. I knew that military considera- 
tions, and Imperial considerations, and international con- 
siderations, and every other consideration which hampers 
action, were dead against my proposal, and I was not in 
the mood to be respectful towards them. Still, I was ill- 
advised to let my telegram have the slightest tinge of 
brusqueness in it If I wanted to get the thing done, I 
should have preserved that marvellous imperturbability 
and cheery good sense which, from the Strangers' Gallery, 
I have so frequently admired in British Ministers in the 
House of Commons. All this I note for the benefit of 
future leaders of unpopular Missions. For the effect of 
my telegram was not to further the object I had in view 
the making of all preparations for keeping the Mission 
at Lhasa for the winter, if need be. It fherely earned for 
me a reprimand from Government, who telegraphed back 
on June 14 that they found it necessary to remind me 
that any definite proposals I made for their consideration 
should be, as far as possible, in conformity with the orders 
and present policy of His Majesty's Government ; and I 
was to remember that the policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment was based on considerations of international relations 
wider than the mere relations between India and Tibet, 



200 GYANTSE 

which were not only beyond my purview, but also beyond 
the purview of the Government of India. They expected 
me, therefore, to do my utmost to carry out the present 
plans until there was unquestionable proof that they were 
impracticable. It was impossible, I was told, to argue 
the political necessity for remaining at Lhasa during the 
winter until I had arrived there and gauged the situation ; 
and the military objections were great and obvious. 

My reply to this is not published, so I will not quote 
it, I will only say that I pretty well despaired of getting 
this business through. Lord Curzon was away in England, 
and evidently now military, and not political, considerations 
were having the upper hand. I knew about the u inter- 
national relations " and the " wider view," for copies of all 
the important despatches to our Ambassadors were sent 
to me. But there were dozens and scores of men to repre- 
sent those " wider " views, which need not, as is so often 
imagined, be wiser simply because they are wider, whereas 
there was only one person, and that was myself, to repre- 
sent the narrower view, but which, because it was local, 
need not be inferior or less important. 

^ The narrow local point of view was, then, that for 
thirty years continuously we in India had been trying 
to settle a trumpery affair of trade and boundary with 
a semi-barbarous people on our frontier, and time a Her 
time we had been put off by these "considerations of 
international relations wider than the mere relations 
between India and Tibet/' But now we had the chance 
of a century of settling this business once and for till 
We had, after years of negotiations and correspondence, 
made our effort. We had taken immense trouble and 
gone to great expense. And all I wished to do was to 
represent from my restricted point of view that I ought 
to have plenty of time to make the most of this oppor- 
tunity. I should have represented my views in less 
provocative language, I admit ; but the main contention 
was, I am sure, sound, and it would have been better now 
if it had been acted on. If I had not been rushed at 
Lhasa, but had had plenty of time to gauge and report 
the situation there, and to receive the orders of Govern- 



RENEWED PLEDGES TO RUSSIA 201 

ment on any modifications which might be suggested by 
the circumstances, I should have been able to conclude 
with both the Chinese and Tibetans a treaty which my 
own Government as well as they would have accepted. 



The Russian Government now began again to refer 
to Tibetan affairs. On April 18 Lord Lansdowne had 
assured the Russian Ambassador* that "nothing had 
happened to modify the objects with which we had 
originally determined to send Colonel Younghusband's 
Mission into Tibetan territory." And on June 2,f the 
Ambassador having on several occasions expressed a hope 
that our policy towards Tibet would not be altered by 
recent events, Lord Lansdowne informed him in writing 
that, in sanctioning the advance of the Mission to Gyantse, 
they announced to the Government of India that " they 
were clearly of opinion that this step should not be 
allowed to lead up to the occupation of Tibet, or to 
permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs. They stated 
that the advance was to be made for the sole purpose of 
obtaining satisfaction, and that as soon as reparation had 
been obtained, withdrawal would be effected. They added 
that they were not prepared to establish a permanent 
mission in Tibet, and that the question of enforcing trade 
facilities in that country was to be considered in the light 
of this decision." " I am now able to tell you," continued 
Lord Lansdowne, " that His Majesty's Government still 
adhere to the policy thus described, though it is obviou r s 
that their action must to some extent depend upon the 
conduct of the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's 
Government cannot undertake that they will not depart 
in any eventuality from the policy which now commends 
itself to them. They desire, however, to state in the most 
emphatic terms that, so long as no other Power endeavours 
to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, they would not attempt 
either to annex it, to establish a protectorate over it, or 
in any way to control its internal administration." 

This, in the sequel, was to be a clinching fetter on the 

* Blue-book, IIL, p. L t HM., p. 15. 



202 GYANTSE 

action of the Indian Government. They still wanted a 
representative at Lhasa ; and in view of the determined 
hostility of the Tibetans, they wanted discretion to occupy 
the Chumbi Valley as a guarantee for the fulfilment of 
the treaty; and when the Russians had permanently 
stationed thousands of troops in Manchuria, had con- 
structed railways, built forts, and established posts, where 
seventeen years before I had not seen a single Russian, 
and when they had Consular representatives all along 
their border in Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia, it was 
hard to see on what grounds they could have objected to 
the very mild measures which the Government of India 
desired to adopt. In any case, when the Tibetans had 
shown, not merely passive obstinacy, but downright hos- 
tility, and when, even though it might be the case that, in 
the words of Count Lamsdorff to Sir Charles Hardinge,* 
" the relations between Russia and Tibet were of a purely 
religious nature, due solely to the large number of Russian 
Buriats who regarded the Dalai Lama as their Pope," it 
was clear that the Tibetans relied on those merely religious 
relations as a support against us, the Government of India 
might have hoped that their hands would be freed to 
enable them to definitely settle up this intrinsically not, 
very important Tibetan affair. But "wider international 
considerations " were, as so often happens in Indian aflairs, 
to^tell hardly against the Government of India, Since tho 
Mission had started into Tibet war between Russia and 
Japan had broken out. Our relations with Russia were, 
consequently, at a very delicate stage. War was in the 
air, and statesmen had to be careful For the sake of 
this insignificant business with Tibet, it would be hardly 
worth while endangering our relations with Russia, 
especially when her adhesion to our arrangement with 
France in regard to Egypt was required. Yet when we 
look at the map at the end of this book, and see how far 
the Russian frontier is from Tibet and to what a length 
our own actually touches it, and when we remember, too, 
that there was actually in Lhasa at this time a Russian 
subject who had been accustomed to go backwards and 
* Blue-book, III., p, 20. 



FETTERING RESULT OF PLEDGES 203 

forwards between Lhasa and St. Petersburg, and served 
therefore all the purposes required of those religious rela- 
tions which it was very natural should subsist between the 
Dalai Lama and Russian Buddhists, it does seem hard 
that the Government of India, now at the climax of all 
their efforts, should have been tied down through defer- 
ence to the distant Power. 

It is a remarkable coincidence, in this connection, that 
while the Russians were making protests and representa- 
tions upon a move of ours which was not within a thousand 
miles of their frontier, the Chinese Vice-Minister, when 
Sir Ernest Satow informed him* that we intended to 
advance to Lhasa, received the news with perfect equa- 
nimity, raised no objection, and remarked that the Dalai 
Lama was ignorant and pigheaded. 

I reached Chumbi on June 10, and spent the next few 
days in discussing details of the advance with General 
Macdonald. The change from the monotony of the 
investment at Gyantse and from the barrenness and high 
altitude of Tibet was refreshing in the extreme. I met 
old friends again : Colonel J. M. Stewart, who had years 
before relieved me when I had been arrested by the 
Russians on the Pamirs ; Major Beynon, who had been 
Colonel Kelly's Staff Officer in the Relief of Chitral ; and 
my brother-in-law, Vernon Magniac, who was to accompany 
me now as private secretary, and whose companionship 
was the greatest relief in the midst of a host of the usual 
official worries. The drop from 13,000 feet at Gyantse to 
9,000 feet in Chumbi, and the change from constant risk 
to absolute security, all eased the tension on me ; and the 
joy of being once more amidst luxuriant vegetation, with 
gorgeous rhododendrons, dense pine forests, roses, primulas, 
and all the wealth of Alpine flowery beauty, was a soften- 
ing and welcome relaxation. 

At Phari, on my way to Chumbi, I had met the 
Tongsa Penlop, now the Maharaja of Bhutan, who had 
recently come, to interview General Macdonald and myself. 

* Blue-book, III., p. 19. 



204 GYANTSE 

Mr. Walsh, who had been in political charge of Chumbi, 
had interviewed him on June 3, and to him the Tongsa 
Penlop had admitted the unreasonableness and folly of 
the Tibetans, but argued that it was due to the bad advice 
of the Councillors, who had, in consequence, all been put 
in prison. He said, though, that nothing could be gained 
by our going to Lhasa, as the Dalai Lama and the Govern- 
ment would all leave before our arrival, and we should find 
no one there with whom to negotiate. He had written to 
the Dalai Lama, informing him of what I had told the 
Trimpuk Jongpen at Tuna we wanted, and the Dalai 
Lama had replied that the Sikkim boundary must be 
as it was, that no trade-mart could be established, and 
that no communication from the Indian Government 
could be received by the Tibetan Government The 
Tongsa Penlop added that the rumour in Bhutan 
was that Mr. Walsh had been kiUed at Guru, that 
I had been killed at Gyantse, and that Russians hud 
landed at Calcutta, defeated the English, and set up five 
banners. 

This was a somewhat gloomy outlook ; still, I was a 
good deal encouraged by my interview with the Tongsa 
Penlop. Mr. Walsh had been able to dispel many 
illusions, and at subsequent interviews the Tongsa, Penlop 
had been a good deal impressed by General Macdoimld 
and Mr. White, the latter of whom founded a friendship 
which has had most beneficial subsequent results. 

The Tongsa Penlop I found to be a straight, honest- 
looking, dignified man of about forty-seven years of aw. 
He bore himself well, dressed well, gave me costly presents, 
ancl altogether showed himself a man of importance and 
authority. He said he was most anxious to effect a .settle- 
ment between us and the Tibetans. The latter had been 
very obstinate and wrong-headed, but the Dalai Lama 
was a young man, who needed good counsellors, and un- 
fortunately there were bad men in Lhasa, who acted in hi* 
name to the detriment of the country. General Mae- 
dosald had told him that we were prepared to rece ve 
negdtiators up to June 25, and he (the Tongsa Penlop} 
had, accordingly, written urgently to the Tibetans to send 




THK TONOMA I'KNLOI' (NOW MAIf,\UA.IA <>!' H1HITAN). 



INTERVIEW WITH TONGSA PENLQP 205 

a negotiator before that date. Would not I, therefore, 
show patience up to then ? 

I asked him whether he himself would be inclined to 
be patient if he had been attacked four times at night 
after waiting eleven months for negotiators to come. He 
admitted that he would not, and would feel more inclined 
to go about killing people ; but he said I was the repre- 
sentative of a great Government, and ought to be more 
patient than he would be. I said I had named June 25 
as the date up to which I would receive negotiators, but 
since then I had been again attacked at Kangma, and I 
could not answer for it that the Viceroy would still allow 
me to receive negotiators, 

I said no Englishman liked killing villagers who were 
forced from their homes to fight us. We knew they did 
not want to fight, and we had no quarrel with them. But, 
unfortunately, it seemed impossible to get at the real 
instigators of the opposition to us except by fighting, in 
which the innocent peasant-soldiers, and not the authors 
of the trouble, suffered most. If these latter would only 
lead their men I would be better pleased, for then they 
would appreciate what opposition to the British Govern- 
ment really meant The Tongsa Penlop was much 
amused at the suggestion, but said the leaders always 
remained a march behind when any fighting was likely to 
take place* 

Continuing, I said that, though I had little hope that 
any settlement would be arrived at without fighting, yet, 
fighting or no fighting, I had to make a settlement some 
time, and one that would last another hundred years. If 
the Tibetan#$iad only been as sensible as the Bhutanese, 
and come and talked matters over with me, we could 
easily have arrived at* a settlement long ago. All we 
desired was to be on friendly and neighbourly terms with 
States like Bhutan'and Tibet lying on our frontier. War, 
though it could have but one result, gave us much trouble, 
which we had &o wish unnecessarily to incur. We, there- 
fore, much preferred peace, I sent my respects to the 
Dharm Raja, and asked the Tongsa Penlop to write to 
me often and give me advice regarding the settlement 



206 GYANTSE 

with Tibet, and he fervently assured me of the good-will 
of the Bhutanese, and said that they would never depart 
from their friendship with the British Government. 

In this interview I purposely appeared indifferent 
about receiving negotiators, for the less anxious I seemed 
for them to come the more likely was their arrival. As a 
fact, when, a fortnight later, there really were signs of their 
appearance, I asked Government to agree, which they 
readily did, to grant a few days' grace beyond the 25th to 
allow them to come in. 

Besides this friendly support from Bhutan on our right, 
we had also further evidence at this time of equally 
friendly, and much more valuable, support from Nepal on 
our left. The Nepalese Minister informed Colonel Raven - 
shaw that he had received a letter and some presents from 
the Dalai Lama, but that he made no allusion to our 
Mission, which omission led the Minister to think that 
the Dalai Lama was kept in ignorance of what was going 
on. And this surmise was, I think, perfectly correct, and 
represented one of the great difficulties with which %ve 
had to contend. No one dared inform this little god that 
things were not going as he would like them, and yd 
they had to get orders from him, for they would do nothing 
without his orders. 

The Nepalese Minister, to remove this difficulty, wrote 
early in June to the Dalai Lama, expressing his anxiety 
at < e the breach of relations [between India and Tibet] 
which had been brought about by the failure of* the 
Tibetan Government to have the matters in dispute settled 
by friendly negotiation." He referred to the letter which 
he had written to the four Councillors in the previous 
autumn, and he went on : Wise and far-seeing as you 
are, the vast resources of the British Government must be 
well known to you. To rush to extremes with .such a big 
Power, and wantonly to bring calamities upon your poor 
subjects without having strong and valid grounds of your 
own to insist upon, cannot readily be accepted as a 
virtuous course or wise policy. Hence it may fairly be 



MORE AID FROM NEPAL 207 

inferred that the detailed circumstances of the pending 
questions have not been properly and correctly represented 
to you." The Minister then urged the Dalai Lama at 
once to send a duly authorized Councillor to meet the 
British officers, to desist from fighting with the British 
Government, and to try his best to bring about a peaceful 
settlement ; otherwise he saw clearly that great calamities 
were in store for Tibet. He concluded by saying that 
His Holiness was' too sacred to be troubled with mundane 
affairs,, but the present critical condition in Tibet demanded 
his utmost foresight, and on him depended the salvation of 
his country. 

It is melancholy to think that the Dalai Lama paid 
no heed to this well-intentioned advice, and then, when 
calamities had fallen upon his country and we were just 
outside Lhasa, fled on the pretext of retiring into religious 
seclusion, and left his country to take care of itself. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

STRONG reinforcements had now come up from India : 
the remainder of the mountain battery, under Major 
Fuller, a wing of the Royal Fusiliers, the 40th Pathans, 
and the 29th Punjabis ; and on June 13 I set out to return 
to Gyantse with General Macdonald to relieve the Mission 
escort at Gyantse and, if need be, to advance to Lhasa, 
while Colonel Reid remained in charge of the communi- 
cations. 

At each post we stopped at the officers in charge 
invariably reported that the people were well content with 
us on account of our liberal treatment. The villagers 
themselves were thoroughly friendly. They were making 
money by selling their produce at rates very favourable 
to themselves. They were only afraid of the officials arid 
Lamas. Captain Rawling, who had explored in Western 
Tibet in the previous year, and was well acquainted with 
the Tibetans, and who was now stationed at Phari in 
charge of a transport corps, specially remarked this. 
What the people were now afraid of was not our stopping, 
but our withdrawing, and leaving them to the vengeance 
of the Lamas* 

This is a dilemma in which we are constantly being 
placed on the Indian frontier. The people of a country 
into which we advance are often ready to be friendly with 
us if they could be certain we would stay and be able to 
support them afterwards. But if they know we are going 
to withdraw they naturally fight shy, for those who show 
us friendship would get into trouble when we left This 
is one of the many reasons which make me favour our 
keeping up a strong continuous influence when once we 

208 



MACDONALD ARRIVES AT GYANTSE 209 

have been compelled to advance into a semi-civilized or 
barbarous country. It is often highly inconvenient to have 
to do this, but it is the most humane course, and I am 
not sure that it would be so inconvenient if it were 
followed consistently. It need not mean annexation or 
petty interference, but it must mean sufficient influence 
to prevent relapses to barbarism. 

We reached Kangma without incident on June 22, 
and halted a day while Colonel Hogge was sent to disperse 
a body of 1,000 Tibetans who were holding a sangared 
position on the road which runs down here from the 
Karo-la. While halted I received a telegram from the 
Tongsa Penlop at Phari to say that a big Lama and one 
of the Councillors were coming to Gyantse, and that a 
parcel of silk had arrived for me. The Penlop also said 
he wished to come himself to see me at Gyantse. 
Thinking this might indicate anxiety of the Tibetans to 
come to terms at last at literally the eleventh hour, for 
there were only two days left up to the expiry of the time 
beyond which I had signified that I would no longer be 
able to negotiate at Gyantse I telegraphed to Govern- 
ment, recommending that a period of five days' grace, 
up to June 30, should be given to them. Government 
replied, on June 24, that the advance to Lhasa might 
certainly be deferred for that purpose, and I so informed 
the Tongsa Penlop. 

On June 26 we reached Gyantse, after encountering 
considerable opposition at the village and monastery of 
Niani, which was held by 800 Tibetans. The fight lasted 
from 10 a.m. till 2 p.m., Colonel Brander from Gyantse 
assisting by occupying the hills above the village. Major 
Lye, 23rd Pioneers, was here severely wounded in the 
hand and slightly in the head. On its arrival our force 
was ineffectually bombarded from the Jong. 

General Macdonald had now to break up the Tibetan 
force investing Gyantse. On the 28th he attacked a 
strong position on a ridge on which were the Tse-chen 
monastery and several fortified towers and sangars. The 
process of clearing the villages in the plain below lasted 
most of the day. At 5,80 the position itself was stormed 

14 



210 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

by the 8th Gurkhas and the 40th Pathans, supported 
by the mountain battery. The fight was severe, for the 
hillside was very steep. Captain Craster, 46th Pathans, 
was killed whilst gallantly leading his company, and 
Captains Bliss and Humphreys slightly wounded. The 
capture of this position much disheartened the Tibetans ; 
communications between Gyantse Jong and Shigatsc were 
cut off, and the jong was now surrounded on three sides. 

Hearing that the big Lama from Lhasa, known as the 
Ta Lama, was at Shigatse, and that the Councillor was at 
Nagartse, on the road to Lhasa, I made a Lama in our 
employ write to these two on June 28, saying that the 
Tongsa Penlop had told me that they wished to come 
here to settle matters, but were afraid. I promised them, 
if they had proper credentials to effect a settlement to 
guarantee their safety and treat them with respect ; but 
I said they must come at once, for we were about to start 
for Lhasa. These letters I sent by the hands of prisoners. 
One of these messengers was seized by the Tibetans 
and Jbrought to the jong, where a council was held to 
consider its contents, as a result of which, on the following 
morning, a messenger with a flag of truce of enormous 
dimensions was sent to the Mission post The whole 
garrison crowded to the walls to see his arrival, for this 
was the first indication of peace. He said the Tibetan 
leaders desired an armistice till the Ta Lama, who was at 
Penam, halfway to Shigatse, and who could be at Gyantse 
on the following day, could arrive to negotiate with me. 
The messenger said that he and the Councillor coming 
from Nagartse had powers from the Dalai Lama to treat 

After consultation with General Macdonald, I replied 
to the Tibetans that I would grant the armistice they 
asked for till sunset of June 30, to enable tfce Ta Lama to 
reach Gyantse; but that as I was attacked on May 5 with- 
out warning, though I had informed the Tibetan Govern- 
ment that I was ready to negotiate there, and as Tibetan 
armed forces had occupied the jong and fired into my 
camp ever since General Macdonald, who was responsible 
for the safety of the Mission, demanded that they should 
evacuate the jong and withdraw all armed force beyond 



ARRIVAL OF TA LAMA 211 

Karo-la, Yang-la, and Dongtse., A reasonable time for 
this would be given. 

By June 30 neither of the Tibetan delegates had 
arrived, but both the Tongsa Penlop and the Ta Lama 
were to arrive the next day, and we allowed the armistice 
to extend informally till they arrived. The Tongsa Penlop 
arrived first, though he had had twice the distance to 
travel, and at once came to see me, and showed me a 
letter he had received from the Dalai Lama, saying he 
had heard we had appointed a date up to which we would 
negotiate, and after which we would fight ; but as fighting 
was bad for men and animals, he asked the Tongsa Penlop 
to assist in making a peaceful settlement, and he was 
appointing the Ta Lama, who was a Councillor, the Grand 
Secretary, and representative of the three great monas- 
teries, to negotiate. The Tongsa Penlop also produced 
a packet of silks, which he said the Dalai Lama had 
sent me. 

About three in the afternoon the Ta Lama arrived in 
Gyantse, and as he was already a day later than the date 
of the armistice, and six days over the date of the original 
ultimatum, I sent a message to say I should be glad to see 
him that afternoon. He replied that he proposed to visit 
the Tongsa Penlop on the following day, and would come 
and see me some time after that. 1 returned a message 
to the effect that unless he visited me by nine on the 
following morning military operations would be resumed. 

Undisturbed by this threat, he shortly after nine on 
the following morning proceeded to visit the Tongsa 
Penlop ; but as he had to pass my camp, I sent out Captain 
O'Connor to say that 1 insisted on his coming to pay his 
respects to me, unless he wished me to consider he was 
not anxious to /negotiate. He was at perfect liberty to 
discuss matters with the Tongsa Penlop, but he must no 
longer delay paying his respects to me, and giving me 
evidence that the Tibetan Government were sincere in 
their wish to negotiate. 

At eleven I received the Ta Lama and .the Tongsa 
Penlop in Durbar* There were also present the Tung-yig- 
Chembo (the Grand Secretary, who was one of the dele- 



212 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

gates at Khamba Jong last year), and six representatives 
of the three great Lhasa monasteries. As all except the 
Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before, 
and were probably ignorant of our view of the situation, I 
recounted it at length, showing how we had lived on very 
good terms with Tibet for nearly a century and a half, 
and it was only after the Tibetans had wantonly invaded 
Sikkim territory in 1886 . that misunderstanding had 
arisen ; that Mr. White had for years tried at Yatung to 
make them observe the treaty made on their behalf by the 
Chinese ; and that when I came to Khamba Jong, a place 
of meeting which the Viceroy had been informed was 
approved of both by the Emperor of China and the Dalai 
Lama, they still repudiated the old treaty, refused to 
negotiate a new one, or have any intercourse at all with 
us ; while after my arrival at Gyantse, when I told them I 
was ready to negotiate, instead of sending me negotiators, 
they sent soldiers and treacherously attacked me at night 
I concluded by saying that the Viceroy, on hearing this, 
had directed me to write letters to the Dalai Lama and 
the Amban, announcing that if proper negotiators did not 
arrive here by June 25 we would advance to Lhasa to 
compel negotiations there; but these letters had been 
returned by the commander in the jong, no negotiators 
had arrived by the 25th, and it was only because on the 
24th the Tongsa Penlop had informed me that negotiators 
really were on the way that the British Government, in 
their anxiety for a peaceful settlement, had been pleased 
to grant them a few days' grace. We were ready to go on 
to Lhasa the next day. If they were really in earnest and 
had power to make a settlement, I was prepared to nego- 
tiate with them. If they were not empowered to make a 
settlement, we would advance to Lhasa forthwith. Had 
they proper credentials ? 

The Grand Secretary replied, on behalf of the Ta 
Lama, that we had come by force into the country, and 
occupied Chumbi and Phari, and though the Tibetan 
soldiers at Guru had strict orders not to fire on us, we 
had fired on them and had killed all the high officials, 
He said they did not know I was here when thin camp 



TA LAMA AND TONGSA PENLOP 213 

was attacked on May 5 ; but they now had orders to 
negotiate with me. They had no special credentials, but 
the Dalai Lama, in his letter to the Tongsa Penlop, had 
mentioned that they were coming to negotiate, and the 
fact of a man in the Ta Lama's high position being here 
was evidence of their intentions. 

I replied that I did not wish to discuss the past except 
to make clear one point. They were not at the Guru 
fight, but I was, and I saw the first shot fired by the 
Tibetans after General Macdonald had purposely restrained 
his men from firing. But what concerned me was the 
future. If they made a settlement with me now, would it 
be observed, or would it be repudiated like the last one ? 
They at first replied that this would depend upon what 
was in the settlement, but subsequently explained that, 
though they might have to refer to Lhasa for orders, yet, 
when once the Dalai Lama had placed his seal on a treaty, 
it would be scrupulously observed. They said they wished 
to talk matters over with the Tongsa Penlop, who would 
act as mediator and arrange matters with me. I informed 
them that I would be very glad if they could discuss the 
situation witli him, and I was quite willing that he should 
accompany them when they came to see me, but they 
themselves must come to me if they desired that negotia- 
tions should take place. They said they would have a 
talk with him the next day, and come and see me the day 
after. I told them, however, that they must have their 
talk before noon on the following day, and come and see 
me again at that hour, as I was not yet satisfied of the 
earnestness of their intentions* 

The same afternoon they had a prolonged interview 
with the Tongsa Penlop, who asked them what they had 
gained by their silly attitude of obstruction, and advised 
them to give up fighting and make terms with us. The 
Tongsa Penlop informed me he thought the delegates, or 
certainly the Dalai Lama, were really anxious to make a 
settlement. 

On July 3 the Tongsa Penlop arrived half an hour 
before the time fixed for the reception of the delegates. 
At noon I took my seat in the Durbar, which was attended 



2H THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

by General Macdonald and many military officers, while a 
strong guard of honour lined the approach. I waited for 
half an hour, but as at the end of that time the Tibetan 
delegates had not arrived, I rose and dismissed the 
Durbar. 

At 1.30 the Tibetans appeared ; but as the dilatoriness 
they had shown in coming to Gyantse and after their 
arrival in coming to see me was a pretty clear indication 
that they had not even yet realized how serious the situa- 
tion was, I saw that I should have to do something yet to 
impress them with its gravity. The Tongsa Penlop was 
able to come from much farther and reach Gyantse before 
them. He had come to see me at once on arrival, while 
they had delayed till the next day ; he had come half an 
hour before the time fixed for the Durbar, while they had 
come an hour and a half late. All this indicated that, 
while they were still so casual and indifferent, no negotia- 
tion that I could enter into with them would produce the 
smallest result. They had yet to be shown that we were 
not to be trifled with any longer. So on their arrival I 
had them shown into a spare tent, and informed that I 
had waited for them in Durbar for half an hour ; that as 
they had not arrived by then, I had dismissed the Durbar, 
and would not now be at leisure to receive them for 
another two or three hours. 

By four o'clock the Durbar was again assembled, with 
General Macdonald and his officers, all my staff, and a 
guard of honour. Captain O'Connor then led in the 
Tibetan delegates, and showed them to their places on 
my right ; but I made no signs of receiving them, and 
remained perfectly silent, awaiting an apology. They 
moved about uncomfortably during this deadening silence, 
and at last the Ta Lama, who was really a very kindly, 
though perfectly incapable, old gentleman, and absolutely 
in the hands of the more capable but evil-minded Chief 
Secretary, murmured out a full apology. I informed 
them that the inference I drew from the disrespect they 
had shown me in arriving an hour and a half late was that 
they were not in earnest in desiring a settlement The 
Ta Lama assured me that they were really in earnest, but 



INTERVIEW WITH TA LAMA 215 

that the Grand Secretary was ill. I then informed them 
that, as I had been attacked at Gyantse without any warn- 
ing, and after I had written repeatedly to the Amban 
saying I was waiting there to negotiate, and as I had been 
fired on from the jong continually for two months since 
the attack, I must press for its evacuation. General Mac- 
donald was prepared to give them till noon of the 5th 
that is, nearly two days in which to effect the evacua- 
tion ; but if after that time the Jong was occupied, he 
would commence military operations against it. Irrespec- 
tive of these operations, I would, however, be ready to 
receive them if they wished to make a settlement, and 
prevent the necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa. 

The Grand Secretary then said that if the Tibetan 
troops withdrew from the Jong, they would expect that we 
also would withdraw our troops ; otherwise the Tibetans 
would be suspicious. I replied that the Tibetans did not 
at all seem to realize that they would have to pay a 
penalty for the attack they had made on the Mission, and 
that 1 could not discuss the matter further. They must 
either leave the Jong peaceably before noon on the 5th, or 
expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving, the 
Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his 
regrets for having kept me waiting, and begged that I 
would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary went 
away without a word of apology. He was the evil genius 
of the Tibetans throughout this affair. 

The following morning the delegates had a long inter- 
view with the Tongsa Penlop, and asked whether time 
could not be given them to refer to Lhasa for orders. I 
sent back a message saying that it was already nearly a 
week since I had let the Ta Lama know that the evacua- 
tion of the jong would be demanded, that they ought to 
be grateful for the opportunity that had been giv,en them 
of withdrawing unmolested, and that no further grace 
could be allowed. 

The Tongsa Penlop also informed me that they were 
very suspicious, and wanted an assurance that we really 
wished a settlement. I told him he might inform them 
that the best evidence that we desired a settlement was 



216 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

the fact that the control of affairs was in my hands. If 
we had intended war the control would have been in the 
hands of a General. 

The delegates and the commanders in the Jong were 
still undecided. No one would take the responsibility of 
evacuating the Jong. On the morning of the 5th the 
Tongsa Penlop with some Lhasa Lamas came to see me, 
and I sent one of the latter over to the delegates, saying 
that at twelve a signal gun would be fired to warn them 
that half an hour afterwards firing would commence. I 
told them that if they came over either before or after 
with a flag of truce they would be given an asylum in the 
Tongsa Penlop's camp. I begged that the women and 
children should be taken out of the town ; and I sent a 
special warning to General Ma, the local Chinese official. 
No notice was taken of any of these warnings. At twelve 
I had a signal gun fired, and at 12.30 I heliographed to 
General Macdonald that he was free to commence firing. 

The Tongsa Penlop had stayed with me on the 
ramparts of our post up till noon, and I asked him to 
remain and see the fight. But he said he would prefer to 
see it from a little farther off, and I dare say he did not 
yet feel quite certain that we should win. For it was a 
tough task that lay before General Macdonald. We 
were right in the heart of Tibet, with all the strength that 
the Lamas, with a full year of effort, could put forth. 
The fortress to be attacked from our little post in the 
plain looked impregnable. It was built of solid masonry 
on a precipitous rock rising sheer out of the plain. It was 
held by at least double, and possibly treble, our own force, 
and they were armed, many hundreds of them, with Lhasa- 
made rifles, which carried over a thousand yards. In 
addition, there were several guns mounted. No wonder 
the Tongsa Penlop thought it best to be a little distance 
off, and not too decidedly identified with either side* 

General Macdonald probably never would have been 
able to take the jong if his guns had not just been supplied, 
on the recommendation of General Parsons, the Inspector- 
General of Artillery, with " common " shell as well as the 
shrapnel, which was all that up till now they had carried 



NIGHT ATTACK ON GYANTSE TOWN 217 

with them. Shrapnel is of use only against troops. 
Common shell is more solid, and can be used against 
masonry, and against the Jong it proved tremendously 
effective when fired by the accurate and hard-hitting little 
10-pounders. 

At 1.45 p.m. on July 5 General Macdonald began his 
operations by renewing the rifle fire on the Jong. Then, 
at 3.30 p.m., two guns, six companies of infantry, and one 
company of mounted infantry, were sent to make a feint 
on the monastery side of the Jong. This succeeded in 
inducing the Tibetans to reinforce largely that side of 
their defences. But after dark this column was with- 
drawn, and shortly after midnight a force of twelve guns, 
twelve companies of infantry* one company of mounted 
in tun try 4 and half a company of sappers moved out in two 
columns to take up a position south-east of Gyantse. 

We in the Mission post naturally spent the night on 
the ramparts awaiting events. It was 3.30 a.m. by the 
time the columns had taken up their position. Dawn had 
not yet appeared. All was still and quiet. The stars 
shone out in nil the brilliance of these high altitudes!, and 
nothing could be more serene and peaceful than this clear 
summer night Suddenly a few sharp rifle cracks spat 
out, telling us that the enemy had seen our assaulting 
columns. Then the dull, heavy thud of an explosion 
showed that some doorway had been blown open. And 
niter that came the full blaze of the fight, the whole Jong 
lighting up with the flashes of rifle and jingai fire, and 
down below our own fire getting hotter and hotter, ^ 

As day dawned we could see that we had gained a 
footing in the tovm which was the immediate object of 
General Maedonald's attack previous to the assault on the 
jong itself. What had happened was this : The Tibetans 
had opened an unexpectedly heavy fire before the assault- 
ing columns could get close up under the walls of the 
outlying parts of the town, and our three columns were 
reorganised into two that on the right under Colonel 
Campbell, of the 40th Pathans, a tried and experienced 
frontier officer, and that on the left under Major Murray, 
8th Gurkhas. With Colonel Campbell was Captain 



218 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

Sheppard, R.E., who, with that dash and effectiveness 
which always characterized him, succeeded in laying and 
firing a charge under the walls of the most strongly held 
house, and blowing in it a breach, which, with the damage 
done by the fire of the 7-pounder gun, gave an opening 
for the assaulting column. On the left Lieutenants 
Gurdon and Burney also succeeded in blowing breaches in 
the walls of the houses ; but, to the grief of all, Gurdon 
was killed it is believed by the falling debris of the veiy 
wall which he had blown up. He had been with the 
Mission escort from the very first, and in many of these 
very dangerous assaults on villages had displayed most 
daring courage. He was a brother of the Captain (now 
Lieutenant-Colonel) Gurdon who had so distinguished 
himself in the Siege of Chitral, and who was one of my 
closest friends. When the news came in to me from the 
front, I felt how sad indeed it was that one so young and 
so full of promise, with a great and useful career most 
certainly before him, should have been thus in an instant 
cut off. But he did not fall in vain, for what he had done 
at the cost of his life enabled the assaulting columns 
to enter the town, which by 7 a,m. was in our possession. 

The troops began to make good their position in the 
area thus won, but the real business had yet to be 
accomplished. The Jong, with 5,000 or 6,000 Tibetans 
inside it, still had to be assaulted. During the morning 
there was a general lull in the proceedings while the 
troops rested. But about two o'clock Colonel Campbell, 
who was in command of all the advanced troops in the 
town, sent back word to General Macdonald, who was in 
the Palla village, recommending that an assault should be 
made on the extreme east of the Jong. To him in his 
advanced position, immediately under the walls of the 
jong, it appeared that if our guns could make a breach in 
the wall itself an assault could be made, though the storm- 
ing party would have a stiff, hazardous climb over the 
steepest part of the rock. General Macdonald adopted 
the proposal, and as the Tibetans now appeared somewhat 
exhausted, ordered the assault to be made at once. 

At three o'clock General Macdonald ordered forward 



THE ASSAULT ON JONG 219 

four companies of the reserve, and directed the 10-poundqr 
guns to concentrate their fire on the portion of the wall to 
be breached for the assault. As the reinforcements crossed 
the open to the town the Tibetans redoubled their fire, 
but our fire from all parts of the field also increased. The 
10-pounder battery under Major Fuller did magnificent 
work. Stationed only 1,000 yards from the point to be 
breached, it placed one shell after another in exactly the 
same spot. Bit by bit the wall came tumbling down, A 
larger and larger gap appeared, and by four a breach suffi- 
ciently large for an assault had been made. 

Then the heliograph flashed from post to post that the 
jong was now to be assaulted. Major Fuller immediately 
gave the order for " Rapid firing " on the upper buildings. 
Maxims from three different directions began rattling 
away with peremptory emphasis. Every man poured in 
his rifle fire with increasing energy. Then a little cluster 
of black figures, ever augmenting in numbers, was seen, 
like a swarm of ants, slowly making its way up the nearly 
precipitous rock towards the breach. A cheer was raised, 
which was taken up from post to post all round our 
encircling force and back to the reserves in the rear. The 
Tibetans could still be seen firing away in the breach and 
hurling down stones, but we only redoubled our fire upon 
them. 

Very, very gradually or so it seemed to us in our 
suspense below the Gurkhas, under Lieutenant Grant, 
made their upward way. First a few arrived just under 
the breach, then more and more. Then came the crisis, 
and Grant was seen leading his men straight for the 
opening. Instantly our bugles all over the field rang out 
the " Cease fire," so as not to endanger our storming 
party* The Tibetans, too, now stopped firing; and 
where a moment before there had been a deafening din 
there was now an aching silence. We held our breath, 
and in tense excitement awaited the result of the assault. 
We saw the little Gurkhas and the Royal Fusiliers, 
who formed the storming party, stream through the 
breach. Then we watched them working up from 
building to building. Tier after tier of the fortifications 



220 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

was crowned, and at last our men were seen placing the 
Union Jack on the highest pinnacle of the jong. The 
Tibetans had fled precipitately, and Gyantse was ours. 

The Tongsa Penlop next morning came over to con- 
gratulate General Macdonald and myself; and we went 
over the jong together. Till I had got up there and 
looked down through the Tibetan loopholes on our insig- 
nificant Mission post below, I had not realized how certain 
the Tibetans must have felt that they could overwhelm 
us, and how impossible it must have seemed that we could 
ever turn the tables upon them. If one stood in the Round 
Tower of Windsor Castle and looked down from there 
upon a house and garden in the fields about Eton, held by 
some strangers who said they had come to make a, treaty, 
one would get the best idea of what must have been in 
the Tibetans' minds. They were in a lofty and seemingly 
impregnable fortress in the heart of their own country. 
We were a little dot in the plain below. The idea of 
making a treaty with us, if they did not want to, must 
have appeared ridiculous. And as I stood there in their 
position and looked down upon what had till just then 
been my own, I soon understood how it was' that the 
Ta Lama and other delegates had been so casual in their 
behaviour. 

Yet, in spite of our success, and to a certain extent by 
reason of it, I was still ready to negotiate with Tibetan 
delegates. I had disliked, with an intensity which only 
those can know who have been in a similar position, the 
idea of making any mention of negotiation during all that 
critical time in May, while they were firing proudly at us 
from the jong, and were surrounding me in my little post 
below. Now that, through General Macdonald s skilful 
dispositions and the bravery of his troops, I was in the top 
place, I readily tried to negotiate. And 1 thought that 
His Majesty's Government were anxious that further 
efforts to negotiate here should be made; for on June 20 
they had telegraphed that if there was reasonable expecta- 
tion of the early arrival of the Resident, accompanied by 
competent Tibetan negotiators, the advance to Lhasa might 
be postponed. They thought that the advance should 



CAPTURE OF JONG 221 

not be undertaken unless there was adequate ground for 
doubting the competency of the Tibetan delegates or the 
earnestness of the Tibetan Government. Moreover, some 
few days' delay was necessary for General Macdonald to 
complete his arrangements for the advance, to collect 
sufficient supplies, and to establish Gyantse as his 
secondary base. 

I therefore, immediately the jong was captured, asked 
the Tongsa Penlop to send messengers to tell the Ta Lama 
and the Councillor at Nagartse that I was still ready to 
negotiate, as previously announced, but that they must 
come in at once, as otherwise we would proceed to Lhasa. 
But the messenger found the monastery in which they 
had been staying deserted and the delegates fled. 

On July 9 the Government of India telegraphed 
to me that they considered the advance to Lhasa in- 
evitable, but that if the delegates could be induced to 
come in and negotiate en route I might invite them to 
accompany me, explaining the terms of His Majesty's 
Government, and warning them that any further resist- 
ance would involve a settlement less favourable to Tibet. 

By July 13 General Macdonald's preparations were all 
complete. He had reconnoitred the country both up and 
down the valley, and found the Tibetans had fled in every 
direction. He had amassed plentiful supplies. He had set 
about repairing the Jong, in which he was, to my infinite 
regret, to leave Colonel Hogge, and the 23rd Pioneers, and 
he was ready to leave for Lhasa the next day. It was sad 
that the old Pioneers, who had borne the burden and the 
cold of the day at Tuna all through that dreary and 
anxious winter should be left behind, while other regiments 
who had but just arrived from India should have the glory 
of going to Lhasa, and I would willingly have had it 
other 'Wise 

All were now eager and ready for the advance, and I 
wrote to the Chinese Resident, that as neither he nor any 
competent Tibetan negotiator had come to Gyantse I was 
proceeding to Lhasa. I stated that my purpose was still 
to negotiate, but that I must ask him to prevent the 
Tibetans from further opposing my Mission, and I inti- 



222 THE STORMING OF GYANTSE JONG 

mated that the terms 1 was demanding would be still 
more severe if we encountered opposition. 

The Tongsa Penlop also, at my request, wrote to the 
Ta Lama, saying that I was prepared to carry on negotia- 
tions en roiite> in order that the settlement might be ready 
for signature at an early date at Lhasa. And I asked the 
Tongsa Penlop, further, to write to the Dalai Lama him- 
self, giving an outline of the terms we should demand. 

Lastly, I issued a proclamation, drafted by the Govern- 
ment of India, stating that we had no desire to fight with 
the people of Tibet or to interfere with their liberties or 
religion, but that it was necessary to impress unmistakably 
upon the Government of Tibet that they could not with 
impunity offer insults to the British Government, and that 
they must realize the obligations they had entered into 
and act up to them in all respects. The people were 
warned that any opposition to our advance would only 
result in making the terms demanded more exacting* 



CHAPTER XV 

THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

JUST a year had now elapsed since we had arrived at 
Khamba Jong, and now at length all were united in the 
single purpose of advancing to Lhasa the Imperial 
Government, the Indian Government, and the military 
authorities. A year had been wasted in futile forbearance 
for the benefit of the British public, but at length what 
the responsible Government of India had advocated since 
January of the previous year was to be carried into effect, 
and on July 14 we left our dreary little post at Gyantse 
and set out, full of enthusiasm, for Lhasa. 

Though we were so high above sea-level, it was quite 
hot now in the middle of the day, for the sun in these low 
latitudes and in this clear atmosphere struck down with 
considerable force. But we also had some very heavy 
rain in the next few days. 

As we approached the Karo~la (pass), the scene of 
Colonel Brander's gallant little action, I received a letter 
from the Tongsa Penlop at Gyantse, enclosing a letter he 
had received from the Dalai Lama. It said : 

" We have written to the Yutok Sha-p, inquiring from 
him whether it will be easy to effect a settlement or not 
Will jmu also request the English privately not to nibble up 
otir country ? Please use your influence well both with 
the English and the Tibetans, I cannot at present speak 
with exactness with regard to the frontier, but I have 
said something on the matter to the Pukong Tulku, so it 
will be well if the negotiations are begun quickly. Once 
they have begun, we shall hear gradually who is in the 
right" 

On the next day, July 17, we marched to a camp 



224 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

immediately below the Karo-la, and there we found the 
Bhutanese messenger who had earned a letter from the 
Tongsa Penlop to the Yutok Sha-pe's camp had returned, 
saying that some Tibetan officials would come over pre- 
sently to see us. The Tibetans, however, fired at our 
mounted infantry from the wall on the far side of the 
pass, and no officials appeared. 

This looked as if we were to have another fight. 
Before we left Gyantse we had heard that the pass was 
occupied by 2,000 Tibetans, and that there were 2,000 
more in support, and the mounted infantry now reported 
the pass to be strongly held and fresh walls and surigars 
, to have been built. All the villages en route* too, had 
been deserted, so we fully expected a fight. 

Our camp under the pass was right in among it lolly 
knot of mountains, one of which rose to a height of over 
24,000 feet above sea-level. A magnificent glacier de- 
scended a side valley to within 500 yards of the camp* 
The whole scene was desolate in the highest degree. And 
though we were on the highroad to Lhasa, the road was 
nothing but the roughest little mountain pathway rubbed 
out by the traffic of mules and men across it. 

The afternoon and evening of the 17th were occupied 
in reconnoitring the position of the Tibetans, They were 
very strongly posted at a narrow gorge three miles from 
our camp on the north side of the pass, and their position 
was flanked by impassable snow mountains. The old 
wall of Colonel Brander's time had been extended on 
either hand till it touched precipices immediately under 
the snow-line. Behind this lay a second barrier of 
sangars. Like all the walls which the Tibetans so skil- 
fully erected at such places, this was built up of heavy 
stones. The position was manned, according to our latest 
information, by about 1,500 Tibetans. 

At 7 a,m. on the morning of the 18th, when now, 
even in the height of summer, there was still a nip of 
frost in the air, the advance troops marched off. The 
Royal Fusiliers, under Colonel Cooper, were to attack 
the centre, and, on either side parties of the 8th Gurkhts 
were to turn the flanks. 




3 



ACTION AT KARO-LA 225 

While the Gurkhas were slowly plodding up the 
mountain-sides, I seated myself beside Major Fuller's 
mountain battery, and watched the effects of gun-fire at 
these altitudes. It was most interesting. The pass 
itself was 16,600 feet, and the battery was a few hundred 
feet above it, and was for some time firing at groups 
5,000 yards away, and some of them on the glacier at 
about 18,000 feet above the sea. In such a rare atmosphere 
ordinary sighting and ordinary fuses were quite useless. 
The shells would cleave through the thin air at very con- 
siderably greater velocity than they would pass through 
the thicker air at sea-level. All the sighting and the 
timing of the fuses had, therefore, to be completely read- 
justed by trial and guesswork. Despite this, however, 
wonderfully accurate shooting was effected by these 
splendid little guns, and it would have made all the differ- 
ence to Colonel Brander if he had had them instead of the 
useless 7-pounders, 

The Gurkhas and Pathans, after a long and difficult 
climb to 18,000 feet, turned the position, but the Tibetans 
in the centre had not waited. They knew that the 
dreaded mounted infantry would be after them, so each 
determined that he, at any rate, would not be the last to 
leave Ithe position, and all had cleared off before our troops 
arrived. Most, indeed, had retreated in the night, and in 
reality only about 700 Kham men were left to hold the 
position. Many of these escaped high up over the snows, 
pursued only by our shrapnel shells. Our mounted 
infantry reconnoitred up to within two miles of Nagartse 
Jong, which was found to be occupied, while reports 
came in that 1,800 more men from Kham were expected, 

Nagartse was reached bn the 19th, and close to it I was 
met by a deputation from Lhasa. Here were signs of 
negotiations at last I said I would have a full interview 
at three that afternoon, but must warn them at once that 
it would be necessary for me to occupy the Jong, and to 
advance to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the 
way* The deputation, "which consisted of the Yutok Sha-p^, 
the Ta Lama, the Chief Secretary, and some monies, 
arrived in my camp shortly before the time appointed. 

15 



226 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

The Yutok Sha-p took the chief place. He was a genial 
gentlemanly official of good family and pleasant manners. 
But it soon became apparent that both he and the la 
Lama were in the hands of the Chief Secretary, the monk 
official who, from our first meeting at Khamba Jong, had 
ever been an obstacle in our way. This latter official, 
acting as spokesman, said they had heard from the Tongsa 
Penlop that we wished to negotiate at Gyantse, and they 
had set out to meet us when they heard that we were 
advancing. They were quite willing to negotiate if we 
returned to Gyantse, and in that case they would ac- 
company us and make a proper settlement with us there. 

I repeated for the fiftieth time that I had waited for 
more than a year to negotiate ; that even at Gyantse I had 
given them many opportunities; that when I had first 
arrived there I had announced my desire to negotiate ; 
that after the attack upon me I had still declared my 
willingness to negotiate up to June 25 ; that on the inter- 
cession of the Tongsa Penlop the Viceroy had extended 
that term for some days ; that even after the capture of 
the jong I had sent messengers over the country to find 
them, and waited for another week at Gyantse ; but that 
eventually the patience of the Viceroy had become com- 
pletely exhausted, and His Excellency had ordered me to 
advance to Lhasa forthwith, as he had reluctantly become 
convinced that only there could a settlement be made. 
We were now advancing to Lhasa. I would be quite 
ready to negotiate with them on the way, and if the 
Tibetan troops did not oppose us we would not fight 
against them ; but as our troops had on the previous day 
been fired at from the Jong, we must send our troops in to 
occupy it. We would, however, allow the delegates to 
remain unmolested, and would see that their property was 
not disturbed, and that they themselves were accorded 
proper marks of respect. 

The delegates replied that if we went on to Lhasa there 
was no chance of a settlement being arrived at ; that they 
had come here with the sincere intention of making 
friendship with us and securing peace, but if we sent 
troops into the jong they did not see how they could be 



LHASA DELEGATES ARRIVE 227 

friends with us ; they were the two biggest men in Tibet 
next to the Dalai Lama, and it was both against their 
religion and disgusting to them to have soldiers in the 
same place where they were staying. I said they must, 
after all, allow that this could not be half so disgusting to 
them as having their soldiers firing into my camp at 
Gyantse, while I was asleep, was to me. They continued 
one after another wrangling and protesting against our 
occupying the Jong. After listening for an hour to their 
protests, I asked them if they would now care to hear the 
terms we intended to ask of them. They replied that 
they could not discuss any terms till we returned to 
Gyantse. I said I had no wish now to discuss the terms, 
but merely desired to know if they wanted to be acquainted 
with them. They continued to protest that they would 
discuss nothing here, and it was only after considerable 
fencing that I got them to admit that they had heard the 
terms from the Tongsa Penlop. 

I then said that I wished them to understand that if 
we were further opposed on the way to Lhasa, or at 
Lhasa itself, these terms would be made stricter. I said the 
British Government had no wish to be on any other than 
friendly terms with Tibet, that we had no intention of 
remaining in Lhasa any longer than was required to make 
a settlement, and as soon as a settlement was made we 
would leave. But I had the Viceroy's orders to go to Lhasa, 
and go there I must I desired, however, to give them 
most earnest advice and warning. They were the leading 
men of Tibet, and upon them lay a great responsibility. I 
was quite prepared on arrival at Lhasa to live on as 
friendly and peaceable terms with the people as I had at 
Khamba Jong, and as I had when I first arrived at 
Gyantse; to pay for everything, and to respect their 
religious buildings. It rested with them now to decide 
whether our stay at Lhasa should be of this peaceable 
nature and of short duration, and whether the settlement 
should be of the mild nature we at present contemplated, 
or whether we should have to resort to force, as we had 
been compelled to do at Gyantse, to impose severer terms, 
and to prolong our stay. 



228 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

The delegates listened attentively while I made this 
exhortation to them, but, after consulting together, replied 
that even if we did make a settlement at Lhasa, it would 
be of no use, for in Tibet everything depended on religion, 
and by the mere fact of our going to Lhasa we should 
spoil their religion, as no men of other religions were 
allowed in Lhasa. I asked them if there were no Moham- 
medans living in Lhasa, and they replied that there were 
a few, but they were not allowed to practise their religious 
rites a sad admission in view of the toleration which the 
Buddhist religion in reality enjoins. I added that we 
would not have gone to Lhasa unless we had been abso- 
lutely compelled to by their incivility in not meeting us 
elsewhere ; that personally I had already suffered great 
inconvenience, and would much prefer not to have the 
further inconvenience of going to Lhasa; but no other 
resource was now left to us, and my orders from the 
Viceroy were final. 

The Yutok Sha-p throughout was calm and polite, 
and at his departure was cordial in his manner. The 
Ta Lama, though more excited, was not ill-mannered. 
The Chief Secretary was very much excited throughout, 
and argumentative and querulous. The whole tone of the 
delegates showed that they or, at any rate, the Dalai 
Lama had not even yet realized the seriousness of the 
position. The tone they adopted entirely ignored their 
serious breaches of international courtesy, and was that of 
people with a grievance against us and quite ignorant of 
the fact that we had grievances against them ; they were, 
too, excessively unbusinesslike and impracticable, and I 
anticipated an infinity of trouble in carrying through a 
settlement with such men. On the other hand, the dis- 
position and manners of the Yutok Sha-p gave one more 
confirmation of the impression I had long formed that the 
laymen of Tibet were by no means inimical, and that but 
for the opposition of the monks we might be on extremely 
friendly terms with them. 

Under General Macdonald's well-thought-out arrange- 
ments the occupation of the jong was effected without 
any mishap or loss of life. Captain O'Connor aecom- 



ATTEMPTS TO STOP OUR ADVANCE 229 

panied the delegates back towards the Jong, which, how- 
ever, they did not again enter, but took up their quarters 
in the village, while their followers and baggage were sent 
down to them there. I expressed my regret to the Yutok 
Sha-p that at our first meeting I should have had to put 
him to such inconvenience. But the occupation of the 
jong was a military necessity. It was a matter of con- 
gratulation that it should have been effected without the 
loss of life on either side. 

The following day the Tibetan delegates held another 
prolonged interview with me, lasting three and a half 
hours. They made no further mention of the occupation 
of the Jong, but were very insistent that we should not 
advance to Lhasa. The Yutok Sha-pe was the chief 
spokesman at first, but during the course of the interview 
each one repeated separately much the same arguments. 
They said that in Lhasa there were a great number of 
monks and many unruly characters, and disturbances might 
easily arise ; to which I replied that I should much regret 
any such disturbances, and hoped the delegates would do 
their best to prevent them, for the result could only be 
the same as the result of the disturbances at Gyantse. 

Another argument the delegates used was that, if we 
went to Lhasa, we should probably find no one there. To 
this I replied that this would necessitate our waiting until 
people returned. I reminded them that they lived apart 
from the rest of the world, and did not understand the 
customs of international intercourse. To us the fact of 
their having kept the representative of a great Power 
waiting for a year to negotiate was a deep insult, which 
most Powers would resent by making war without giving 
any further ehance for negotiation. But the British 
Government disliked making war if they could possibly 
help it They had therefore commanded me to give the 
Tibetans one more chance of negotiating, though that 
chance could only be given at Lhasa itself. Let them 
make the most of this opportunity. 

The delegates replied that they had intended no insult 
by keeping me waiting a year ; it was merely the custom 
of their country to keep out strangers. " But, anyhow," 



230 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

they said, " let us forget the past ; let us be practical, and 
look only at the present. Here we are, the leading men 
in Tibet, ready to negotiate at Gyantse, and make a settle- 
ment which will last for a century." 

I replied to the Yutpk Sha-p that I had no doubt that 
if a sensible man like himself had been sent to me sooner, 
we might have made up a satisfactory settlement long 
ago, and there would have been no necessity for us to go 
through all this inconvenience of advancing through an 
inhospitable country to Lhasa ; but after the many chances 
which had been given them of negotiating at Gyantse, 
they could hardly consider it reasonable that we should 
give them any more. Moreover, the Viceroy had formed 
the opinion, from the fact of the Ta Lama having told me 
at Gyantse that he had no authority to evacuate the Jong 
without referring to Lhasa, and from the fact of his run- 
ning away, that he had not sufficient power to make a 
settlement. For all these reasons we were compelled to 
go to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the way, 
and we would return directly a settlement was made. 

They then made further reference to their religion 
being spoilt if we went to Lhasa, and I asked them to 
make more clear to me in what way precisely their re- 
ligion would be spoilt. I said we were not intolerant of 
other religions, as they themselves were. They had yester- 
day told me that, though there were some Mohammedans 
in Lhasa, yet they were not allowed to practise their 
religious rites. We had no such feelings towards other 
religions. On the contrary, we allowed the followers of 
each to practise their religious observances as they liked. 

The delegates said that they were not so intolerant to 
the Mohammedans: they merely forbade building mosques, 
and prevented any new Mohammedans coming into their 
country. I said that at any rate some were there, and 
apparently they had not spoilt the religion of the 
Tibetans. They replied that the ancestors of these had 
come many, many years ago, and the Tibetans had become 
accustomed to them ; to which my rejoinder was that if 
Mohammedans had lived among them practising their 
religious rites for all these years apparently for centuries 



DELEGATES REFUSE DISCUSS TERMS 281 

without spoiling the religion of Tibet, I could not 
believe that the fact of our going to Lhasa for a few 
weeks only could have any permanent ill-effect on the 
religion of Tibet. 

They then remarked that if we now went to Lhasa all 
the other nations would want to go there, and see the 
sights, and establish agents there. I told them I had not 
the smallest wish to see the sights of Lhasa. I had 
already travelled in many different lands, and seen finer 
sights than they could show me at Lhasa; and as to 
stationing an agent there, we had no such intention. 
Could they tell me if any other nation wished to ? They 
replied that the Russians would be wanting to send an 
agent to Lhasa. I told them they need not be in any fear 
on that score, for the Russian Government had assured 
our Government that they had no intention of sending an 
agent to Tibet. I added that, though we had no intention 
of establishing a political agent at Lhasa, we desired to 
open a trade-mart at Gyantse on the same conditions as 
the tnide-mart at Yatung had been opened that is, with 
the right to send a British officer there to superintend the 
trade. 

The delegates would not, however, be led into a dis- 
cussion of the terms. They said they could only discuss 
the terms at Gyantse, and the conversation drifted back 
into the old lines of withdrawing to Gyantse. Each of the 
four members of the delegation repeated in turn the same 
arguments for withdrawing to Gyantse, and I gave to 
each in turn my reasons for advancing to Lhasa. I said I 
feared they must think me extremely obstinate, and I felt 
sure that, if they had been deputed by their Government 
earlier in the day, I should have been able to agree to 
their wishes, and we could have soon come to an' agree- 
ment As matters stood at present, I could do nothing 
but obey the orders of the Viceroy. They asked if I 
could not stop here, represent to His Excellency what 
they had said, and await further instructions* I replied 
that the Viceroy only issued his orders after very careful 
deliberation, but once they were issued, he never revoked 
them. 



232 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

I endeavoured throughout the interview to avoid being 
drawn into petty wrangling. Even more important than 
the securing of a paper convention, which might or might 
not, be of value, was, I stated to Government at the time, 
the placing of our personal relations with the officials of 
Tibet upon a good footing from the start. I had to be 
severe with them at Gyantse, because they would not pay 
proper respect to me ; but at each interview since they had 
come well before the appointed time, they were thoroughly 
respectful throughout, and I was able to treat them with 
the politeness I preferred to show them when they made 
this possible. I trusted that, after I had suffered two 
interviews, one of three and a quarter hours and another 
of three and a half hours, they would feel that I was at any 
rate accessible, and that they would have no compunction 
in coming to see me whenever they felt inclined. Until, 
however, they received further orders from Lhasa, there 
was nothing more to be said on either side. 

We had halted a day at Nagartse to collect supplies, 
of which we were short, and some question arose whether, 
as we had the negotiators here, it would not be better to 
stop and negotiate. By being too uncompromising we 
might be simply stiffening them up to renewed fighting, 
and in the desolate country in which we found ourselves, 
with practically no supplies and with a lofty pass behind 
us, we might find ourselves in a very awkward predica- 
ment. All this had certainly to be taken into considera- 
tion. Still, we should be sure to find supplies in the Lhasa 
Valley, unless the Tibetans resorted to the extreme course 
of destroying or carrying off all their foodstuffs ; and as the 
Tibetans were now evidently on the run, I never had any 
real doubt that we should keep them on the run, and 
follow them clean through, right up to Lhasa. 

On the 21st we found that the delegates had decamped 
in the night. Perhaps, after all, I had made a mistake, 
and allowed these very coy birds to escape just as tlxey 
had come into my hand. On the whole I thought not. 
I believed others would soon come in. So I marched very 
contentedly along the shores of one of the most beautiful 
lakes I have ever seen the Yamdok Tso. It was 14,850 



A LOVELY LAKE 233 

feet above sea-level. In shape it was like a rough ring, sur- 
rounding what is practically an island ; and in colour it 
varied to every shade of violet and turquoise blue and 
green. At times it would be the blue of heaven, reflect- 
ing the intense Tibetan sky. Then, as some cloud passed 
over it, or as, marching along, we beheld it at some 
different angle, it would flash back rays of the deep greeny- 
blue of a turquoise. Anon it would show out in various 
shades of richest violet. Often, when overhead all was 
black with heavy rain-clouds, we would see a streak of 
brilliant light and colour flashing from the far horizon of 
the lake ; while beyond it and beyond the bordering moun- 
tains, each receding range of which was of one more 
beautiful shade of purple than the last, rose once more 
the mighty axial range of the Himalayas, at that great 
distance not harsh in their whity coldness, but softly 
tinted with a delicate blue, and shading away into the 
exquisite azure of the sky- What caused the marvellous 
colouring of this lake, which even the Tibetans call the 
Turquoise Luke, \vc could none of us say. Perhaps it was 
its depth, perhaps it was its saline character, or some 
chemical component of its water. But whatever the 
luain cause, one cause at least must have been the in- 
tense blue of the Tibetan sky at these great altitudes, so 
deep and so translucent that even the sky of Greece and 
Italy would pale beside it. 

This latter theory is what Lord llayleigh would adopt 
In n lecture which he delivered this year at the Royal 
Institution on the causes of the coloration of water, he 
gave his conclusion, from careful observations and tests, 
that the cause of the blueness of, say, the Mediterranean 
Sea was the Mediterranean sky, which was exactly the 
tiieory we had thought must apply to this Tibetan lake. 

Marching along uy this lake we had much rain, turning 
into snow at night. Pete Jong, a picturesque little fort 
close to the shore, was reached on the 22nd, where, as at 
Nagartsc, a company of infantry and a few mounted 
infantry were left to keep up the line of communications. 
From here the mounted mfaixtry, reconnoitring ahead, 
reported the remnants of the Kham force to be retreating 



23* THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

in a disorganized condition, and looting the country en 
route. 

Another of the Tibetan stone walls, running from the 
waters of the lake far up the mountain-side, was found 
deserted on the next day, and that same day we crossed 
the last pass on the way to Lhasa, the Kamba-la, 15,400 
feet The ascent was steep, but we all eagerly clambered 
up in the faint hope of getting some distant glimpse of 
Lhasa, or at any rate of the mighty Brahmaputra River, 
which still lay in between us and the sacred city. The 
enthusiastic Perceval Landon was quite certain that 
through some chink he saw the glitter of a gilded cupola, 
and refused to be convinced by the prosaic survey officers 
that whatever it might be it at any rate was not the roof 
of the Potala. 

But if we were not yet to catch a sight of our goal we 
had many other exciting incidents on that day. We 
descended rapidly from the pass by a very steep path to 

a n amp U the banks of the ^ eat Brahmaputra itself, 
called here the Sanpo, .and presumed to be identical - 
though this is a great geographical problem yet to be 
solved with the Brahmaputra of India. It was here 
11,550 above sea-level, and spread out in many channels, 
but farther down, where it was narrowed into a single 
channel, it was 140 yards wide and flowing with a strong, 
swift current. The valley was wide and well cultivated 
with wheat and barley, and several cultivated valleys ran 
into it. In these valleys were plenty of trees, poplars 
and willows, but the hillsides were not wooded, as we 
had hoped. 

General Macdouald sent on his mounted infantry to 
seize the Chaksam Ferry, and they succeeded in capturing 
the two krgS ferry-boats, and occupied Chaksam for the 

?% *K V 11 * WaS a "*?* stroke ' as if the Tibetans had 
kept the boats on the other side of the river our difficulties 
in surmounting this most serious obstacle would have 
been immensely increased. 

Another great event on this day was the receipt of 

RriSh ^ i t e / Wt ^ rit ? en comm ication which 
any British official had received from a Tibetan official 




I 

5 



H 
-"J 

O 



O 

B 



LETTER FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 235 

since the time of Warren Hastings, It was addressed to 
u The all- wise Sahib sent by the English Government to 
settle affairs, from the Tibetan National Assembly." It 
ran as follows : 

** Recently the Tongsa Penloj} sent a letter to the 
Dalai Lama, and also communicated with the two 
delegates, but hitherto a treaty has not been effected. 
The Sahibs say that they intend to come to Lhasa and to 
see the Dalai Lama and to negotiate there, and that they 
will there establish friendship. The letter which contains 
the nine terms of the Convention has arrived here* This 
is a matter of great importance, and therefore the 
Chigyab Kenpo (Lord Chamberlain) has been sent to 
Chisul. Now, our Tibetan religion is very precious, so 
our Regent, officials, monks, and laymen have consulted 
together. Formerly we made a National Convention 
I hut none was to enter the country. So now, even if the 
Sahibs should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama, 
this will not advantage the cause of friendship. Should a 
fresh cause of dispute arise, we greatly fear that a dis- 
turbance, contrary to the interests of friendship, may 
follow. So we beg of the Sahibs both now and in the 
future to give the matter their earnest consideration, and 
if they will negotiate with the delegates who are now here 
all will be well Please consider well all that has been 
said, and do not press forward hastily to Lhasa. 

" Dated the Wood Dragon year/' 

This letter was brought by a messenger, who said that 
the new delegates were then at Chisul, on the opposite 
bank of the river. And now again arose the question 
whether we should make use of this new chance of 
negotiating or should still press on to Lhasa. We had 
in front of us the serious obstacle formed by the Brahma- 
putra Iliver, which, if we crossed it, would be a nasty 
impediment to have in our rear. On the other hand, we 
had negotiators here with more ample credentials than 
any had had before, and we had the National Assembly 



236 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

itself in communication with us. The fear of our going 
to Lhasa might have more effect than our actual presence 
in the place. The mere dread of our advance might make 
them agree to our terms, while if we actually advanced to 
their sacred city we might find that the most determined 
defence had been reserved for the capital; and that we 
had put our heads into a hornets' nest, and irritated 20,000 
monks into buzzing about our ears. This was an eventu- 
ality on which I had to count, and of which I had been 
warned by speeches by responsible men in England which 
did ^little to encourage me in my task. An ex-Prime 
Minister, Lord Rosebery, had said in February in the 
House of Lords that this Mission bore "in its circum- 
stances so melancholy a resemblance to that first war in 
Afghanistan, which we conducted under the lute Lord 
Lytton, that it must give all those whose minds and 
memories recurred to the past serious grounds of mis- 
givings when they saw once more His Majesty's Govern- 
ment proceeding in the same direction Lo an end which 
they could not see themselves." A future Prime Minister, 
Sir Henry Campbell-Baimerman, in pressing for the recall 
of the Mission, had said in the House of Commons in 
April that " we had had experience before, and the associa- 
tions connected with the name of Cavagnari did not seem 
to invite us to undertake a similar policy again/' 

If we pressed on to Lhasa, into this swarm of fanati- 
cally hostile monks, we might all share the fate of 
Cavagnari, while if we simply held up the threat of 
advancing we might, get the treaty through* It was an 
alternative which I had to consider ; but I felt fairly sure by 
now that I had rightly taken the measure of the Tibetans, 
so I sent a verbal intimation by the messenger that 1 
would be glad to receive the delegates, but that I could 
not consent to defer my advance to Lhasa, And, in reply 
to the letter of the National Assembly, 1 wrote to the 
Dalai Lama that more than a year ago I had arrived at 
Ivhamba Jong, which he had approved as a meetiiiir-pkcc 
lor the negotiations, but that the appointed delegates 
refused to negotiate. I had advanced to Gyantse, but 
still no negotiators had arrived, and instead, 1 was 



MAJOR BRETHERTON DROWNED 237 

treacherously attacked at night. Now the Viceroy had 
ordered me to advance to Lhasa to negotiate there. 
Those orders I had to obey, but I had no desire to create 
disturbances in Lhasa or interfere with the religion of the 
country, and as soon as I had obtained his seal to the 
Convention I had been instructed to negotiate, I would 
retire from Lhasa. No religious places which were not 
occupied by Tibetan soldiers would be occupied by British 
soldiers ; our soldiers would not fire if no opposition was 
offered to them ; and all supplies taken from the peasants 
would be paid for. But if opposition were offered, our 
troops would be compelled to commence military opera- 
tions, as they did at Gyantse, and the terms of the settlement 
would be increased in severity. 

This letter I despatched on the 25th, and the same 
day we marched six miles down the banks of the Brahma- 
putra River, to Chaksam Ferry. For the purpose of 
crossing this river we had brought with us from India 
four collapsible Berthon boats, and with these and the 
local ferry-boats seven companies of infantry and one 
company of mounted infantry were crossed over by 
nightfall. 

But a sad accident occurred : one of the boats capsized 
in the rushing, eddying current, and Major Bretherton, 
the Chief Supply and Transport Officer, and two Gurkhas 
were drowned. There was no more capable and energetic 
officer in the Force. Our success depended much less on 
fighting than on supply and transport arrangements, and 
these had been wellnigh perfect. Major Bretherton, in the 
Kashmir, Gilgit, Chitral, and North- West frontiers, had 
almost unrivalled experience of rough transport work, and 
his driving power, his readiness, quickness, far-sightedness, 
and inexhaustible buoyancy and cheerfulness were of 
inestimable value in carrying through such an enterprise 
as that which we had now so nearly completed. It was 
hard that young Gurdpn should lose his life just at the 
beginning of so promising a career; it seemed almost 
more cruel that a man who had achieved so much, and 
who was just within sight of the goal for which he had 
worked longer and harder than any one of us, should have 



238 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

been swept away in an instant and have never seen his 
reward. It is in reflecting on cases such as these that one 
begins to wonder whether our touching trustfulness in the 
mercy of Providence is altogether justified. 

We had to halt some days now, while the troops and 
baggage were being transported across the river, and on 
the 27th I had a three hours' interview with this new 
deputation from Lhasa, which consisted of the Dalai 
Lama's Chamberlain, a man of some capacity, with an air 
of great consequence, who was evidently regarded with 
much respect; the Ta Lama, the somewhat effete, but 
genial, old gentleman who had met me at Gyantse ; and 
a Secretary of the Council, a brisk, cheery gentleman, with 
an ever-ready smile, and very different from the other 
Secretary who had met us at Khamba Jong, Gyantse, and 
Nagartse. 

They brought with them a letter from the Dalai 
Lama, and repeated the old request that we should not 
go to Lhasa. The only new argument they used was 
that our going to Lhasa would so spoil their religion that 
the Dalai Lama might die. I told them that I should 
much regret that our arrival in Lhasa should have any 
such melancholy result, but I had studied their religion, 
and could hardly believe it was so weak that it would not 
stand our presence in Lhasa for a few weeks. The dele- 
gates repeatedly urged me to realize the personal incon- 
venience our presence in Lhasa would be to the Dalai 
Lama. The Ta Lama explained that the Chamberlain 
was in constant personal attendance on the Dalai Lama, 
and enjoyed his fullest confidence, and for that reason had 
been specially deputed by the Dalai Lama. I was given 
to understand that this was a very unusual favour, and I 
was earnestly begged to accede to the Dalai Lama's per- 
sonal wishes ; the delegates further told me that if I did 
not accede to them they would themselves be severely 
punished by the Dalai Lama. y 

In reply I expressed my inability to accede to the 
JUaiai llamas wishes, but trusted they would ask His 
Holiness to excuse my insistence. They had spoken of 
the inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would cause the 



ENVOY FROM DALIA LAMA 239 

Dalai Lama, but His Holiness would, I felt sure, realize 
the inconvenience we had already suffered through the 
delay in the arrival of negotiators. I could assure them 
that the Viceroy had every desire to consult the feelings 
of the Dalai Lama, and it was because we knew that His 
Holiness was averse to the presence of strangers in Lhasa 
that His Excellency had not sent me there in the first 
instance, though the capital of a country was the natural 
and usual place in which to conduct negotiations. It was 
only after we had found it impossible to effect a settle- 
ment anywhere else that I had been ordered to proceed to 
Lhasa. 

I added that after an Envoy had been kept waiting for 
a year, and had been attacked and shot at for two mouths, 
most rulers would have refused to allow their representa- 
tive to negotiate till the capital had been captured. We 
were not, however, advancing with that object. They 
could see that here we were paying for all supplies we 
took, and the monastery immediately outside the camp 
was left unmolested. I was prepared to sho^ like con- 
sideration on our arrival at Lhasa if we were unopposed, 
and I trusted His Holiness would appreciate this con- 
cession. 

The delegates assured me again that the Dalai Lama 
was really anxious to make a settlement, that they had 
come in a peaceful manner, and had let the army they had 
with them a few days ago disperse to their homes. I 
had little difficulty in believing these assertions, for we had 
received accounts that the Tibetan army had scattered in 
a panic, the Kham levies looting in all directions. A 
peaceful settlement was undoubtedly, therefore, the sincere 
desire of the Dalai Lama, though turbulent monks might 
yet create a disturbance in Lhasa. As to the delegates 
being punished if we advanced to Lhasa, I said that I 
myself would be punished if we did not. 

A discussion afterwards followed on the question of 
other foreigners coming to Tibet if we were allowed there. 
I told them it was the usual custom for neighbouring 
countries to have representatives at each other's capital, 
and we would probably have avoided all the niisunder- 



240 THE ADVANCE TO LHASA 

standings which led to the present troubles if we had had 
a representative at Lhasa and they had had one in 
Calcutta. We knew, however, their aversion to keeping a 
British agent at Lhasa ; we were not, therefore, pressing 
the point, and were only insisting upon having trade 
agents at Gyantse and other marts. There would, how- 
ever, in any case, have been no reason for other foreigners 
establishing an agent at Lhasa. Russia had declared that 
she had no intention of sending an agent to Tibet. The 
delegates replied that our establishing an agent even at 
Gyantse would be against their custom, and spoil their 
religion. I said that I understood, then, that they were not 
prepared even now to agree to our terms, and they 
informed me that they were only authorized to discuss 
them, and they would have to be considered in the 
National Assembly. " You expect me, then," I said, " to 
remain out here in a half-desert place discussing terms. I 
have already remained for months together in desert 
places in Tibet, and can now negotiate in no other place 
than Lhasa." I begged the Chamberlain as a practical 
man to accept this as inevitable, and to turn his mind now 
to insuring that there should be no more useless blood- 
shed on the way, and that we should be enabled by the 
speedy conclusion of the settlement to leave Lhasa at an 
early date. 

Before closing the interview, I had Some conversation 
with the delegates on the general question of intercourse 
between Tibet and India. I said that we should be very 
glad if they would more frequently accept the hospitality 
we were always ready to offer them in India. They would 
find that in India they could travel wherever they liked, 
and would everywhere be protected and welcomed. They 
would see, too, that though we were Christians we not 
only tolerated but protected Buddhists, Hindus, and 
Mohammedans. We even spent large sums of money in 
preserving ancient buildings of other religions. In this 
camp was an officer, Colonel Waddell, who had spent his 
life in studying the Buddhist religion, and while reading 
the ancient books had discovered instructions indicating 
exactly