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A HISTORY 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 




May He, who links the minds of all people, 
through the apertures of time, with new threads 
of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased 
to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered, 
though it be small, with the greatest devotion. 



A HISTORY 

OF 

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

BY 
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D., 



VOLUME I 



CAMBRIDGE 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1957 



PUBLISHED BY 
THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

London Office: Bentley House, N.W.I 



First Printed 1922 

Reprinted 1932 

1951 

1957 




MAY 2 3 f95S 



Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cartridge 

Reprinted by offset-litho 
by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd. 



DEDICATION 

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly 
dedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages 
of India, who, for the first time in history, formulated 
the true principles of freedom and devoted themselves 
to the holy quest of truth and the final assessment 
and discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of 
man through their concrete lives, critical thought, 
dominant will and self-denial. 



NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF 

TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT 

AND PALI WORDS 

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way 
as in Italian, except that the sound of a approaches 
that of o in bond or u in but, and a that of a as in army. 
The consonants are as in English, except c, ch in church ; 
/, d, n are cerebrals, to which English t, d, n almost 
correspond; t, d, n are pure dentals; kk, gh, ch, jh, 
tk, dh, th, dh, ph, bh are the simple sounds plus an 
aspiration ; n is the French gn ; r is usually pronounced 
as n, and s, f as sk. 



PREFACE 

T~" N HE old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many- 
J. sided developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, 
morals, and science so far as it was understood in those days. 
But the most important achievement of Indian thought was 
philosophy. It was regarded as the goal of all the highest 
practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated the point of 
unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex 
growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples 
produced. It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the 
rise of independent kingdoms at different times, in the empires 
of this or that great monarch that the unity of India is to be 
sought. It is essentially one of spiritual aspirations and obedience 
to the law of the spirit, which were regarded as superior to every 
thing else, and it has outlived all the political changes through 
which India passed. 

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the 
Moguls who occupied the land and controlled the political 
machinery never ruled the minds of the people, for these political 
events were like hurricanes or the changes of season, mere 
phenomena of a natural or physical order which never affected 
the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after a passivity of 
some centuries India is again going to become creative it is 
mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and 
civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other 
countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those 
who wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of 
Indian culture that they should properly understand the history 
of Indian philosophical thought which is the nucleus round 
which all that is best and highest in India has grown. Much harm 
has already been done by the circulation of opinions that the 
culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is 
therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples 
should become more and more acquainted with the true charac 
teristics of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct 
estimate of its special features. 

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of 



viii Preface 

India that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record 
of the past thoughts of India. For most of the problems that 
are still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in 
more or less divergent forms to the philosophers of India. Their 
discussions, difficulties and solutions when properly grasped in 
connection with the problems of our own times may throw light 
on the course of the process of the future reconstruction of modern 
thought. The discovery of the important features of Indian 
philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full signi 
ficance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy 
as the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of 
modern philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task 
of re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not 
yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists 
also with very few exceptions have neglected this important 
field of study, for most of these scholars have been interested 
more in mythology, philology, and history than in philosophy. 
Much work however has already been done in the way of the 
publication of a large number of important texts, and translations 
of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the 
presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philo 
sophical literature, the translations in most cases are hardly in 
telligible to those who are not familiar with the texts themselves. 
A work containing some general account of the mutual rela 
tions of the chief systems is necessary for those who intend to 
pursue the study of a particular school. This is also necessary 
for lay readers interested in philosophy and students of Western 
philosophy who have no inclination or time to specialise in any 
Indian system, but who are at the same time interested to know 
what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books The 
Study of Patanjali and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian 
Systems of Thought I have attempted to interpret the Samkhya 
and Yoga systems both from their inner point of view and from 
the point of view of their relation to other Indian systems. The 
present attempt deals with the important features of these as also 
of all the other systems and seeks to show some of their inner 
philosophical relations especially in regard to the history of their 
development. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts 
as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pali technical 
terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide 



Preface ix 

for further study. To understand something of these terms is 
indeed essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is 
following the actual course of the thoughts. 

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of 
treating the different topics are altogether different from what 
we find in any modern work of philosophy. Materials had there 
fore to be collected from a large number of works on each system 
and these have been knit together and given a shape which 
is likely to be more intelligible to people unacquainted with 
Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I considered 
it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts in 
order to make them appear as European. This will explain 
much of what might appear quaint to a European reader. But 
while keeping all the thoughts and expressions of the Indian 
thinkers I have tried to arrange them in a systematic whole in a 
manner which appeared to me strictly faithful to their clear 
indications and suggestions. It is only in very few places that I 
have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of English 
philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those 
were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of 
the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which 
have not been made dangerous by the acquirement of technical 
senses. This however is difficult, for the words which are used in 
philosophy always acquire some sort of technical sense. I would 
therefore request my readers to take those words in an unsophisti 
cated sense and associate them with such meanings as are 
justified by the passages and contexts in which they are used. 
Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I hope be 
removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for unfamiliarity 
sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But I 
may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in 
many places where condensation was inevitable and the systems 
themselves have also sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no 
system of philosophy is without its dark and uncomfortable 
corners. 

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brah- 
manic stage, my treatment of this period has been very slight. 
The beginnings of the evolution of philosophical thought, though 
they can be traced in the later Vedic hymns, are neither connected 
nor systematic. 



x Preface 

More is found in the Brahmanas, but I do not think it worth 
while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. 
I could have dealt with the Upanisad period more fully, but 
many works on the subject have already been published in 
Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go 
to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant current 
flowing through the earlier Upanisads. Notices of other currents 
of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other 
systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately 
connected. It will be noticed that my treatment of early Bud 
dhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is 
largely due to the inconclusive character of the texts which were 
put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and 
where the precision and directness required in philosophy were 
not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of theories 
about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early 
Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always 
easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of 
being dogmatic ; and the scope of my work was also too limited 
to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual 
difficulties. But still I also have in many places formed theories 
of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars 
to judge. I had no space for entering into any polemic, but it 
will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different 
in some cases from those offered by some European scholars who 
have worked on them and I leave it to those who are acquainted 
with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be 
in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of 
Logic (Navya-Nyaya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most 
of the contributions of this school consist in the invention of 
technical expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of 
strict exactitude and absolute preciseness of logical definitions 
and discussions and these are almost untranslatable in intelligible 
English. I have however incorporated what important differences 
of philosophical points of view I could find in it. Discussions of 
a purely technical character could not be very fruitful in a work 
like this. The bibliography given of the different Indian systems 
in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but consists mostly of 
books which have been actually studied or consulted in the 
writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the 



Preface xi 

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where 
a difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt 
that a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or 
where the opinions of modern writers have been incorporated. 

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest 
gratefulness to the Hon ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra 
Nundy, K.C.I. E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised 
to bear the entire expense of the publication of both volumes 
of the present work. 

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in 
Bengal for the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational 
and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about 
.300,000, of which those devoted to education come to about 
200,000. But the man himself is far above the gifts he has 
made. His sterling character, universal sympathy and friendship, 
his kindness and amiability make him a veritable Bodhisattva 
one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many 
other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the 
encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies 
and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness 
for him are too deep for utterance. 

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E. J. Thomas 
of the Cambridge University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie 
for their kindly revising the proofs of this work, in the course 
of which they improved my English in many places. To the 
former I am also indebted for his attention to the translitera 
tion of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the 
whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he 
assisted me with his advice on many points of detail, in par 
ticular the exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of 
rebirth owes something of its treatment to repeated discussions 
with him. 

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr 
N. K. Siddhanta, M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and 
Mademoiselle Paule Povie for the kind assistance they have 
rendered in preparing the index. My obligations are also due to 
the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the honour 
they have done me in publishing this work. 

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour 
of reading my book and who may be impressed with its inevit- 



xii Preface 

able shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of 
Hemacandra: 

Pramdnasiddhantaviruddham atra 
Yatkincidnktam matimdndyadosdt 
Mdtsaryyam ntsdryya taddryyacittdh 
Prasddam ddhdya visodhayantu^. 

S.D. 

TRINITV COLLEGE, 
CAMBRIDGE. 

February, 1922. 



1 May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct 
whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the 
way of wrong interpretations and misstat ements. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY z 

CHAPTER II 
THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY 

1 The Vedas and their antiquity 10 

2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind 10 

3 Classification of the Vedic literature 1 1 

4 The Samhitas 12 

5 The Brahmanas 13 

6 The Aranyakas .14 

7 The Rg-Veda, its civilization 14 

8 The Vedic gods 16 

9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism 17 

10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency ; Prajapati, Visvakarma . . 19 

11 Brahma 20 

12 Sacrifice ; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma . . .21 

13 Cosmogony Mythological and_ Philosophical 23 

14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Atman 25 

15 Conclusion .26 

CHAPTER III ~ 

THE EARLIER UPANISADS (700 B.C. 600 B.C.) 

1 The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature .... 28 

2 The names of the Upanisads; Non-Brahmanic influence . . 30 

3 Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads 31 

4 The meaning of the word Upanisad 38 

5 The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads .... 38 

6 Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times 39 

7 The Upanisads and their interpretations 41 

8 The quest after Brahman : the struggle and the failures . .42 

9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method ... 44 

10 The Atman doctrine 45 

1 1 Place of Brahman in the Upanisads 48 

12 The World 51 

13 The World-Soul 52 

14 The Theory of Causation 52 

15 Doctrine of Transmigration 53 

16 Emancipation 58 

CHAPTER IV 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS 

OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

i In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible? 62 



2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature 

3 The Indian systems of Philosophy . 

4 Some fundamental points of agreement 

1 The Karma theory 

2 The Doctrine of Mukti 

3 The Doctrine of Soul . 



65 
67 



74 
75 



5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic 
Faith in the end 75 

6 Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical 
endeavours) 77 



xiv Contents 

CHAPTER V 

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 

PAGE 

1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha .... 78 

2 Buddha: his Life .......... 81 

3 Early Buddhist Literature . . . ... . . .82 

4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism ... 84 

5 The Khandhas 93 

6 Avijja and Asava .......... 99 

7 Slla and Samadhi 100 

8 Kamma 106 

9 Upanisads and Buddhism 109 

10 The Schools of Theravada Buddhism .112 

11 Mahayanism 125 

12 The Tathata Philosophy of Asvaghosa (80 A.D.) . . . .129 

13 The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school Nihilism . . .138 

14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnanavada Buddhism 145 

1 5 Sautrantika theory of Perception 151 

16 Sautrantika theory of Inference 155 

17 The Doctrine of Momentariness 158 

1 8 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal 
Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva) . . . . . . . .163 

19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems 
diverged 164 

20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought . . .166 



CHAPTER VI 
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 



1 The Origin of Jainism . . . 

2 Two Sects of Jainism 

3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains 

4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains 

5 Life of Mahavira 

6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology 

7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekantavada) 

8 The Doctrine of Nayas 

9 The Doctrine of Syadvada 

to Knowledge, its value for us 

1 1 Theory of Perception 

12 Non-Perceptual knowledge 

13 Knowledge as Revelation 



. 169 

. 170 

i?i 
. 172 

i?3 

173 

175 
. 176 

179 
. 181 

3 

. 185 

. 186 

14 The Jivas 188 

15 Karma Theory 190 

16 Karma, Asrava and Nirjara .192 

17 Pudgala 195 

1 8 Dharma, Adharma, Akasa 197 

19 Kala and Samaya 198 

20 Jaina Cosmography 199 

21 Jaina Yoga 199 

22 Jaina Atheism 203 

23 Moksa (emancipation) 207 



Contents xv 
CHAPTER VII 

THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAMKHYA (YOGA) 

PAGE 

1 A Review 208 

2 The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanisads 211 

3 Samkhya and Yoga Literature 212 

4 An Early School of Samkhya . 213 

5 Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Misra and Vijnana 
Bhiksu 222 

6 Yoga and Patanjali 226 

7 The Samkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa . . . 238 

8 Thought and Matter 241 

9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 242 

10 The Gunas 243 

11 Prakrti and its evolution 245 

1 2 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium . . . 247 

13 Mahat and Ahamkara . . . 248 

14 The Tanmatras and the Paramanus . . . . , .251 

15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy . . . 254 

16 Change as the formation of new collocations 255 

17 Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially 
exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause) . . 257 

1 8 Samkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism 258 

19 Buddhi and Purusa 259 

20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta . .261 

21 Sorrow and its Dissolution 264 

22 Citta 268 

23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma) 270 

24 The Yoga Meditation 271 

CHAPTER VIII 
THE NYAYA- VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the Nyaya standpoint . 274 

2 Nyaya and Vaisesika sutras 276 

3 Does Vaisesika represent an old school of Mimamsa ? . . . 280 

4 Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras . . . * . . . . 285 

5 Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 294 

6 Philosophy of Nyaya sutras and Vaisesika sutras . . . .301 

7 The Vaisesika and Nyaya Literature 305 

8 The main doctrine of the Nyaya- Vaisesika Philosophy . . . 310 

9 The six Padarthas : Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, ViSesa, Sama- 313 
vaya 313 

10 The Theory of Causation 319 

1 1 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srsti) 323 

12 Proof of the Existence of Is* vara 325 

13 The Nyaya- Vaisesika Physics 326 

14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana) 330 

1 5 The four Pramanas of Nyaya 332 

1 6 Perception (Pratyaksa) 333 

17 Inference 343 

1 8 Upamana and Sabda 354 

19 Negation in Nyaya-Vai5eika 355 

20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker 

of Salvation ........... 360 

2 1 The Doctrine of Soul 362 

22 Is" vara and Salvation 363 



xvi Contents 

CHAPTER IX 

MlMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 

PAGE 

1 A Comparative Review 367 

2 The Mlmamsa Literature . . 369 

3 The Paratah-pramanya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svatah-pramanya 
doctrine of Mlmamsa 372 

4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception 375 

5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception 378 

6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Per 
ception 379 

7 The Nature of Knowledge 382 

8 The Psychology of Illusion 384 

9 Inference 387 

10 Upamana, Arthapatti 391 

11 Sabda-pramana 394 

12 The Pramana of Non-perception (anupalabdhi) .... 397 

13 Self, Salvation, and God 399 

14 Mimamsa as Philosophy and Mlmamsa. as Ritualism . . . 403 



CHAPTER X 
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA 

1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than the 
Dialectic of Controversy 406 

2 The philosophical situation : a Review 408 

3 Vedanta Literature 418 

4 Vedanta in Ga.udapa.da 420 

5 Vedanta and Sankara (788 820 A.D.) 429 

6 The main idea of the Vedanta philosophy .... 439 

7 In what sense is the world-appearance false? .... 443 

8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena . . . 445 

9 The Definition of Ajnana (nescience) ..... 452 

10 Ajnana established by Perception and Inference . . . 454 

11 Locus and Object of Ajnana, Ahamkara and Antahkarana . 457 

12 Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta dialectic . 461 

13 The Theory of Causation 465 

14 Vedanta theory of Perception and Inference .... 470 

15 Atman, Jlva, Isvara, Ekajlvavada and Drstisrstivada . . 474 

16 Vedanta theory of Illusion . 485 

17 Vedanta Ethics and Vedanta Emancipation .... 489 

1 8 Vedanta and other Indian systems 492 

INDEX 495 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy 
are but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is 
unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There 
is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired 
life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they 
do not .know English and are not used to modern ways of thinking, 
and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in 
order to popularize the subject does not appeal to them. Through 
the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both 
in Europe and in India large numbers of philosophical works in 
Sanskrit and Pali have been published, as well as translations of 
a few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt 
on the part of scholars to study them and judge their value. There 
are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian 
thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been trans 
lated. Indian modes "of expression, entailing difficult technical 
philosophical terms are so different from those of European 
thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It 
is therefore very difficult for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit 
to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing 
from translations. Pali is a much easier language than Sanskrit, 
but a knowledge of Pali is helpful in understanding only the 
earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical 
stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But 
no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary 
Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and 
abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who 
can easily understand the Vedas, the Upanisads, the Puranas, the 
Law Books and the literary works, and is also well acquainted with 
European philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible 
to understand even small portions of a work of advanced Indian 
logic, or the dialectical Vedanta. This is due to two reasons, the 
use of technical terms and of great condensation in expression, 
and the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The 

D. I 



2 Introductory [CH. 

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and un 
ambiguous manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought.but 
from the ninth century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, 
and precise expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, 
and as a result of that a large number of technical terms began to be 
invented. These terms are seldom properly explained, and it is 
presupposed that the reader who wants to read the works should 
have a knowledge of them. Any one in olden times who took to the 
study of any system of philosophy, had to do so with a teacher, who 
explained those terms to him. The teacher himself had got it from 
his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to popularize 
philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the chosen 
few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become 
fit students (adhikdrt) of philosophy, under the direction of a 
teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength 
to devote their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy 
and the rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of 
philosophy were allowed to study it. 

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that 
sometimes the same technical terms are used in extremely 
different senses in different systems. The student must know the 
meaning of each technical term with reference to the system in 
which it occurs, and no dictionary will enlighten him much about 
the matter 1 . He will have to pick them up as he advances and 
finds them used. Allusions to the doctrines of other systems and 
their refutations during the discussions of similar doctrines in any 
particular system of thought are often very puzzling even to a 
well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to know all the 
doctrines of other systems without going through them, and so 
it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and 
refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discus 
sions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving 
a summary of some of the principal systems of Indian thought, 
viz. the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, and the Saddarsanasamuccaya of 
Haribhadra with the commentary of Gunaratna; but the former is 
very sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding 
of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the 
systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I 

1 Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called 
Nyayakoda has been prepared by M. M. Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press. 



i] Introductory 3 

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. 
Gunaratna s commentary isexcellentso faras Jainism is concerned, 
and it sometimes gives interesting information about other 
systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical 
notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or 
ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the 
right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian 
thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in 
brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological 
positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good 
Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, 
even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical 
philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties 
of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get him 
self used to the technical terms and the general positions of the 
different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can 
master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are 
a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in 
helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the 
writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or 
misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think 
well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered 
philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpre 
tation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every 
philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical ex 
pressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself 
understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the 
Pali literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some 
technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repeti 
tion in different places in more or less different senses heighten 
the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be 
conveyed. 

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should 
be written? There are some people who think that the Indians 
never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they 
cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. 
Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in 
his History of Philosophy 1 ^ 1 h. universal history of philosophy would 
include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however 

1 New York, 1914, p. 3. 

I 2 



4 Introductory [CH. 

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of 
only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise 
beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental 
peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of 
mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing 
systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith. 
We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western 
countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, 
on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are 
doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and 
untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. 
It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, 
for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If 
they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and 
elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid 
they will have to go to the originals referred to in the biblio 
graphical notices of the chapters. 

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for 
an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two 
different reasons are given from two different points of view. It 
is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a 
vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible 
for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original 
sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists 
working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth 
in this objection, but although in some of the important systems 
the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them 
are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious 
selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the 
systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct 
exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have 
always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always 
tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they 
appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have 
chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most 
important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult 
problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems 
to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be 
excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at com 
pleteness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and 



i] Introductory 5 

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler 
than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the 
imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those 
whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No 
attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imper 
fections. 

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper 
and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore 
impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection 
is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much 
as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the 
earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in 
a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and 
posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems 
developed side by side through many centuries their mutual 
relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The 
special nature of this development has been touched on in the 
fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings 
and a continuous course of development through the succeeding 
centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy 
of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with 
the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not 
supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent 
form of it, which was generally true to the original system but 
was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western 
countries often brought forth the development of more coherent 
types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types 
remained the same, their development through history made them 
more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts 
were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an 
undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the 
different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the 
systems of thought became more and more differentiated, deter 
minate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been 
almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have 
been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite 
could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation 
could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do 
it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical 
interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no 



6 Introductory [CH. 

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be 
a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little 
chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in form 
ing a general notion about the growth and development of the 
different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the con 
dition of the development of philosophy in India had been the 
same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be 
considered much more indispensable. For, when one system 
supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should 
know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems 
are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in 
their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the 
conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather 
a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best 
I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier 
stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of 
these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, 
yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the 
whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the 
correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not 
treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without 
unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for 
they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the 
same type of thought in more and more determinate forms. 

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist 
mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. 
Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work 
(probably about 1000 B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them 
in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely 
interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological 
character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the 
later Vedic works called the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas written 
mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two 
tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of 
ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative 
thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was 
indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that 
the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of 
philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to 
express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency 



i] Introductory 7 

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written 
in prose and verse called the Upanisads, which contain various 
sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic 
but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not 
reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived 
or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great 
force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable 
that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as 
500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha 
from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that 
Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or 
other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or 
eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian 
systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age 
of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina philosophy was probably 
prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came 
in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to 
me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other 
systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vaisnava 
thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by 
the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like 
Haribhadra and Gunaratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist 
systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal 
may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other 
reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting 
to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst 
the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not 
split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one 
another as Buddhist thought did. 

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina 
philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six sys 
tems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Samkhya, the Yoga, the 
Nyaya, the Vaisesika, the Mlmamsa (generally known as Purva 
Mlmamsa), and the Vedanta (known also as Uttara Mlmamsa). 
Of these what is differently known as Samkhya and Yoga are but 
different schools of one system. The Vaisesika and the Nyaya in 
later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the 
similarity of the former with Mlmamsa was greater than that with 
Nyaya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the 
same systems. Nyaya and Vaisesika have therefore been treated 



8 Introductory [CH. 

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began 
to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably 
had their early beginnings at the time of the Upanisads. But at 
that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems 
of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were 
associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works 
treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of 
their most important early works is the Bhagavadgltd. This book 
is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu 
thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, 
and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of 
system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin 
to the poetry of the Upanisads than to the dialectical and syste 
matic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts 
were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were 
floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by 
metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic, 
and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools 
of Vaisnava philosophy. Most of the Vaisnava thinkers wished 
to show that their systems were taught in the Upanisads, and thus 
wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and 
also wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra, the classical ex 
position of the philosophy of the Upanisads. In addition to the 
works of these Vaisnava thinkers there sprang up another class 
of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These 
also had their beginnings in periods as old as the Upanisads. 
They are known as the Saiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt 
with in the second volume of this work. 

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of 
Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 
IOO or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about 
the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty. 
Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with 
regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it 
will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest 
manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable. 
As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side 
by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they 
were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an 
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system 
of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now 



i] Introductory 9 

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the 
growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went 
on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to 
answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in 
which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be 
strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the 
earliest speculations of some form of Samkhya, Yoga, and 
Mlmamsa were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated 
after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these 
systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my 
opinion the Vaisesika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, 
but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association 
with Nyaya, and partly on account of the fact that all its com 
mentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain 
that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been 
lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the 
stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual 
relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied 
with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn 
my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the 
literature of each system which I have put in before beginning 
the study of any particular system of thought. 

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original 
sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old 
and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me 
to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought 
for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this 
striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines 
and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the 
human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational 
thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian 
thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present 
attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, 
I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European 
philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian 
philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the 
point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a 
variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard 
to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be ex 
pressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the 
present work. 



CHAPTER II 

THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY 

The Vedas and their antiquity. 

THE sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed 
to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It 
is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these com 
positions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been 
offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. 
Max Miiller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. 
and Bal Garigadhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom 
kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political 
achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to 
mouth from a period of unknown antiquity ; and the Hindus 
generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was 
therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God 
to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages 
who were the "seers" (mantradrasta) of the hymns. Thus we find 
that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the 
Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, 
but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in 
time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some 
unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation. 

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind. 

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no 
system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous 
zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by 
heart by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been trans 
mitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last 3000 
years or more with little or no interpolations at all. The religious 
history of India had suffered considerable changes in the latter 
periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such was 
the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as 
the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at 
all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus 
at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old 



CH. n] Classification of the Vedic literature 1 1 

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times 
a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as 
prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight 
into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show 
that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted 
upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered 
according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin 
can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his 
daily Vedtc prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at 
this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money 
for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. 
Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas 
base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as 
authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their alle 
giance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would 
often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying 
to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the 
Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which 
regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and 
rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but 
mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are 
held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British 
administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in 
such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this 
claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into 
details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far 
from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still 
looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures 
except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may 
say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, 
the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an 
adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed 
its light all through the past. 

Classification of the Vedic literature. 

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study 
of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused 
when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and 
subjects having the same generic name " Veda " or " Sruti " (from 
sru to hear) ; for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any 



1 2 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch ex 
tending over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As 
this literature represents the total achievements of the Indian 
people in different directions for such a long period, it must of 
necessity be of a diversified character. If we roughly classify 
this huge literature from the points of view of age, language, and 
subject matter, we can point out four different types, namely the 
Samhita or collection of verses (sam together, hita put), Brah 
manas, Aranyakas (" forest treatises ") and the Upanisads. All 
these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so 
holy that in early times it was thought almost a sacrilege to write 
them; they were therefore learnt by heart by the Brahmins from 
the mouth of their preceptors and were hence called sruti (liter 
ally anything heard) 1 . 

The Samhitas. 

There are four collections or Samhitas, namely Rg-Veda, 
Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the Rg- 
Veda is probably the earliest. The Sama-Veda has practically 
no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting 
only 75) entirely from the Rg-Veda, which were meant to be 
sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book 
of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the 
verses taken from the Rg-Veda many original prose formulas. 
The arrangement of the verses of the Sama-Veda is solely with 
reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the con 
tents of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the 
verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. 
It is therefore called the Veda of Yajus sacrificial prayers. These 
may be contrasted with the arrangement in the Rg-Veda in this, 
that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with 
the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get 
all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those 
to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva- 
Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than 
the Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says, 
" it is not only entirely different from the Rigveda but represents a 
much more primitive stage of thought. While the Rigveda deals 
almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a com- 

1 Panini, in. iii. 94. 



u] The Brahmanas 1 3 

paratively advanced and refined sacerdotal c\a.ss,theAtAarva-Veda 
is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the 
demon world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current 
among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an 
immemorial antiquity. These two, thus complementary to each 
other in contents are obviously the most important of the four 
VedasV 

The Brahmanas 2 . 

After the Samhitas there grew up the theological treatises 
called the Brahmanas, which were of a distinctly different literary 
type. They are written in prose, and explain the sacred signi 
ficance of the different rituals to those who are not already 
familiar with them. " They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, 
" the spirit of an age in which all intellectual activity is concen 
trated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its 
value, speculating on its origin and significance." These works 
are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and specu 
lations of an unbounded imagination in the field of sacrificial 
details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably never so 
elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. 
But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from 
generation to generation the ceremonials became more and more 
complicated. Thus there came about the necessity of the dis 
tribution of the different sacrificial functions amongseveral distinct 
classes of priests. We may assume that this was a period when 
the caste system was becoming established, and when the only 
thing which could engage wise and religious minds was sacrifice 
and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking was thus 
subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result was 
the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic 

1 A. A. Macdonell s History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 31. 

a Weber (Hist. Ind. Lit., p. u, note) says that the word Brahmana signifies "that 
which relates to prayer brahman." Max Miiller (S.B. E. I. p. Ixvi) says that Brah 
mana meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of 
priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S. B E. XII. Introd. 
p. xxii) says that the Brahmanas were so called "probably either because they were 
intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because 
they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly 
versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintend 
ing priests. " But in view of the fact that the Brahmanas were also supposed to be as 
much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber s view is the correct 
one. 



14 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is 
now generally believed that the close of the Brahmana period 
was not later than 500 B.C. 

The Aranyakas. 

As a further development of the Brahmanas however we get 
the Aranyakas or forest treatises. These works were probably 
composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were 
thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude 
of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests. 
In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of 
great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices 
as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst 
a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began 
to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of 
truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an 
illustration from the beginning of the Brhadaranyaka we find 
that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice 
(asvamedha) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn 
( Usas) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, 
the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advance 
ment of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual 
performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The 
growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing 
the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic 
ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic 
meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus 
we find that the Aranyaka age was a period during which free 
thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism 
which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the 
Aranyakas could pave the way for the Upanisads, revive the 
germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them 
in a manner which made the Upanisads the source of all philo 
sophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought. 

The Rg-Veda, its civilization. 

The hymns of the Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a 
single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They 
were composed probably at different periods by different sages, 
and it is not improbable that some of them were composed 



n] The g- Veda, its civilization 1 5 

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were 
handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through 
the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding 
generations. It was when the collection had increased to a very 
considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present 
form, or in some other previous forms to which the present 
arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization 
of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity before and 
after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long 
vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is 
genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive 
society which produced it the oldest book of the Aryan race. 
The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the 
cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, 
and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. 
"The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread, 
of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many 
sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, 
is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and 
family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more im 
portant part than eating 1 ." The wood -worker built war-chariots 
and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. 
Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The 
women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing ; 
they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men 
and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a 
tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families 
forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of 
the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases 
electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the 
will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and 
law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, " the hymns 
strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people 
were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the 
world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the 
realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, 
was punished and the sin expiated 8 ." Thus it is only right and 
proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13 * Ibid. p. 18. 



1 6 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans 
more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and 
dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular 
ones. Thus Kaegi says, " The whole significance of the Rigveda 
in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly 
been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents 
to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest 
beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its 
relation to man 1 ." 

The Vedic Gods. 

The hymns of the Rg-Veda were almost all composed in 
praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary 
importance, as these references had only to be mentioned inci 
dentally in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. 
The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse 
powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have 
therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the 
Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the 
Puranas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the 
thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods 
associated with them are also similar in character. The same 
epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few 
specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later 
mythological compositions of the Puranas the gods lost their 
character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual 
personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow 
like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted 
with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the 
characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers 
of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as 
Kaegi has it, as one that " lies concealed in the softer wood, as 
in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early 
morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. 
The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests 
pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing 
like a horse he whom men love to see increasing like their own 
prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 26. 



n] Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism 1 7 

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he 
presents to all sides his front. 

All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light, 
His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance, 
The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream, 
So Agni s rays gleam over bright and never cease *." 

R. V. I. 143. 3. 

They would describe the wind (Vata) and adore him and say 

" In what place was he born, and from whence comes he ? 
The vital breath of gods, the world s great offspring, 
The God where er he will moves at his pleasure : 
His rushing sound we hear what his appearance, no one 2 ." 

R, V. x. 168. 3, 4- 

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth 
here, the atmosphere around and above U9, or in the Heaven 
beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and 
imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a 
few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some 
dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the terres 
trial, atmospheric, and celestial. 

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism. 

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer 
to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an in 
telligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism 
but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may 
be said to owe their origin. The gods here do not preserve their 
proper places as in a polytheistic faith, but each one of them 
shrinks into insignificance or shines as supreme according as it is 
the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children 
of nature. Every natural phenomenon excited their wonder, 
admiration or veneration. The poet is struck with wonder that 
" the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance or 
the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic 
sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims: 

" Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it 
That downward turned he falls not downward ? 
The guide of his ascending path, who saw it 1 ?" R. V. IV. 13. 5. 

The sages wonder how " the sparkling waters of all rivers flow 
into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic 

1 The Rigwda, by Kaegi, p. 35. * Ibid. p. 38. 

D. 2 



1 8 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and 
fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to 
accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude 
of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They 
hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed 
them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or 
aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the de 
votion or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the 
time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Miiller has called 
HenotheismorKathehotheism: "a belief in singlegods.each in turn 
standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of 
as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special 
concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they 
ascribe the most power in the matter, to whose department if I 
may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind 
of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated every 
thing that can be said of a divine being; he is the highest, the only 
god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, 
no offence or depreciation of any other god 1 ." " Against this theory 
it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his Vedic Myth 
ology*, "that Vedic deities are not represented as independent of 
all the rest, since no religion brings its gods into more frequent 
and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even the 
mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus 
Varuna and Surya are subordinate to Indra (i. 101), Varuna and 
the Asvins submit to the power of Visnu (i. 156).... Even when a 
god is spoken of as unique or chief (eka), as is natural enough in 
laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic 
force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the con 
text or even by the same verse 3 ." " Henotheism is therefore an 
appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance 
produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropo 
morphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position 
of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural 
tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to 
exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 27. 

1 See Ibid. p. 33. See also Arrowsmith s note on it for other references to Heno 
theism. 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, pp. 16, 17. 



n] Growth of a Monotheistic tendency 19 

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35) 
each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine 1 ." But 
whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggera 
tion of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this 
stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, 
but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it 
was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. 
The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a 
monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different 
deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side 
was a tendency towards polytheism. 

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajapati, Visvakarma. 

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and 
highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme 
Lord of all beings (Prajapati), not by a process of conscious 
generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, 
able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and 
physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be per 
ceived. Thus the epithet Prajapati or the Lord of beings, which 
was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized 
as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said 
in R. V. x. I2i 8 : 

In the beginning rose Hiranyagarbha, 

Born as the only lord of all existence. 

This earth he settled firm and heaven established : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding 

All creatures must obey, the bright gods even ; 

Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who by his might alone became the monarch 

Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers, 

Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains, 

The ocean and the distant stream exhibit ; 

Whose arms extended are these spreading regions : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring, 

Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens ; 

Who measured out the air s extended spaces: 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

1 MacdonelFs Vedic Mythology, p. 17. a The Rigveda, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89. 

22 



2O The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vivakarma 
(All-creator) 1 . He is said to be father and procreator of all beings, 
though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters. 
It is to him that the sage says, 

Who is our father, our creator, maker, 

Who every place doth know and every creature, 

By whom alone to gods their names were given, 

To him all other creatures go to ask him 2 . R. V. x. 82. 3. 

Brahma. 

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory 
for the Vedanta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in 
the Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The 
meanings that Sayana the celebrated commentator of the Vedas 
gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering, 
(b) the chant of the sama-singer, (c) magical formula or text, 
(d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift 
together, (f) the recitatioa of the hotr priest, (g) great. Roth 
says that it also means " the devotion which manifests itself as 
longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the 
gods." But it is only in the ^atapatha Brahmana that the con 
ception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the 
supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. 
Thus the atapatha says, " Verily in the beginning this (universe) 
was the Brahman (neut). It created the gods; and, having 
created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this 
(terrestrial) world, Vayu the air, and Surya the sky.... Then the 
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up 
to the sphere beyond, it considered, How can I descend again 
into these worlds ? It then descended again by means of these 
two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name ; and 
that again which has no name and which one knows by its form, 
this is (of a certain) form, that is form : as far as there are Form 
and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed 
are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows 
these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force*. 
In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the 
Universe and is identified with Prajapati, Purusa and Prana 

1 See The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. pp. 5-11. 

8 Kaegi s translation. 

8 See Eggeling s translation of Satapatha Brabmana S. B. E. vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28. 



n] Sacrifice: the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma 2 1 

(the vital air 1 ). In another place Brahman is described as being 
the Svayambhu (self-born) performing austerities, who offered 
his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, 
and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over 
all creatures 2 . The conception of the supreme man (Purusa) in 
the Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the 
world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining 
three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the 
present, past and future 8 . 

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma. 

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic 
tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. 
On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually 
growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth 
contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unim 
portant position, and to raise the dignity of the magical charac 
teristics of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the 
desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not 
dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian 
or Vaisnava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is con 
ceived as Haug notes " to be a kind of machinery in which every 
piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the 
performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring 
of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils 
employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw 
contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole 
sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. 
Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results 
might follow. Thus when Tvastr performed a sacrifice for the 
production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy 
Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object 
was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if 
the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest 
detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition 
of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not 
by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. 
The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain 
mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired 

1 See S. B. E. XLIH. pp. 59, 60, 400 and XLIV. p. 409. 

2 See Ibid. XLIV. p. 418. R. V. x. 90, Purusa Sukta. 



22 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of 
a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed 
to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of 
the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice per 
formed by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says " as an 
invisible thing at all times and is like the latent power of elec 
tricity in an electrifying machine, requiring only the operation 
of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is 
not offered to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain 
from him welfare on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are 
directly produced by the sacrifice itself through the correct per 
formance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which 
constitute the sacrifice. Though in each sacrifice certain gods 
were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves 
were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice or in com 
pleting the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice 
is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even to 
the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank 
by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only 
kind of duty, and it was also called karma or kriya (action) and 
the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good 
or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of 
sacrifices which were performed for injuring one s enemies or 
gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) 
were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that 
the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature 
under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the 
use of the word Rta (literally the course of things). This word 
was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the " order 
in the moral world as truth and right and in the religious 
world as sacrifice or rite 1 " and its unalterable law of producing 
effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here 
that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises 
such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present 
day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic 
hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex 
system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course 
towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate 
reality of the universe. 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. n. 



n] Cosmogony Mythological and philosophical 23 

Cosmogony Mythological and philosophical. 

The cosmogony of the Rg-Veda may be looked at from two 
aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological 
aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, 
" The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical pro 
duction, the work of carpenter s and joiner s skill; the other 
represents it as the result of natural generation 1 ." Thus in the 
Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, " what was 
the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven 
and earth 3 ?" The answer given to this question in Taittiriya- 
Brahmana is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from 
which the heaven and earth were made 8 ." Heaven and Earth are 
sometimes described as having been supported with posts*. They 
are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and parentage 
is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Daksa. 

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man- 
hymn 8 attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already 
noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever 
has been and shall be ; he is the lord of immortality who has become 
diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and 
all beings came out of him ; from his navel came the atmosphere; 
from his head arose the sky ; from his feet came the earth ; from 
his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which 
the Sun is called the soul (atmari) of all that is movable and 
all that is immovable . There are also statements to the effect 
that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the 
sages 7 . The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme 
Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hiranyagarbha 8 ). In 
some passages it is said " Brahmanaspati blew forth these births 
like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent 
sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the 
existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions 
sprang, thereafter, from Uttanapada 9 ." The most remarkable and 
sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. n. 

2 R. V. x. 8 1. 4. 8 Taitt. Br. 11. 8. 9. 6. 

4 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. u ; also R. V. n. 15 and iv. 56. 

8 R.V. x. 90. 6 R.V. i. 115. 

R. V. i. 164. 46. 8 R. V. x. in. 

Muir s translation of R. V. x. 73 ; Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. v. p. 48. 



24 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world 
are found is the 1 29th hymn of R. V. X. 

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being. 
The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it. 
What covered all ? and where ? by what protected ? 
Was there the fathomless abyss of waters ? 

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed; 

Of day and night there was yet no distinction. 
Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported, 
Other than It was none, nor aught above It. 

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden; 
The universe was undistinguished water. 
That which in void and emptiness lay hidden 
Alone by power of fervor was developed. 

4. Then for the first time there arose desire, 
Which was the primal germ of mind, within it. 
And sages, searching in their heart, discovered 
In Nothing the connecting bond of Being. 

6. Who is it knows ? Who here can tell us surely 
From what and how this universe has risen? 
And whether not till after it the gods lived ? 
Who then can know from what it has arisen? 

7. The source from which this universe has risen, 
And whether it was made, or uncreated, 

He only knows, who from the highest heaven 
Rules, the all-seeing lord or does not He know 1 ? 

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the 
atapatha Brahmana (X. 5. 3. i) which says that " in the beginning 
this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; 
in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did 
not exist : there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been 
declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda X. 129. i ), There was then neither 
the non-existent nor the existent for Mind was, as it were, neither 
existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to 
become manifest, more defined, more substantial : it sought after 
a self (a body) ; it practised austerity : it acquired consistency 2 ." 
In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of the 
universe were comprehended within the god Skambha 3 . 

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang 
forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 90. R. V. x. 119. 

2 See Eggeling s translation of S. B., S. B. E. vol. XLIII. pp. 374, 375. 

3 A. V. x. 7. ro. 



n] Eschatologyi the Doctrine of Atman 25 

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which 
could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the 
mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being ; 
and which could think that it was the primal One which by its 
inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first 
manifestation of the germ of mind.from which the universe sprang 
forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the 
Brahmanas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally 
requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the 
starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution. is com 
bined with the theory of creation, so that Prajapati is sometimes 
spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said 
to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg. 

Eschatology ; the Doctrine of Atman. 

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could 
be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could 
exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the 
doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the Satapatha 
Brahmana it is said that those who do not perform rites with 
correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death 
again. In a hymn of the Rg-Veda (x. 58) the soul (manas) of a man 
apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the 
trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there 
is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the 
highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance 
of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath 
where the evil-doers are punished. In the atapatha Brahmana 
we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the evil 
doers, but let the good go by 1 ; it is also said there that everyone 
is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives 
reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. 
It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to 
the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he 
performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of 
the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys 
or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world 
according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the 
moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were 

1 See 5. B. i. 9. 3, and also Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, pp. 166, 167. 



26 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good 
works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection 
of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad 
works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or 
order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with 
the conception of rta, and the unalterable law which produces 
the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the 
doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the 
Rg-Veda are manas, dtman and asu. The word dtman however 
which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used 
to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought 
and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as 
dwelling in the heart 1 . It is however difficult to understand how 
atman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man going out of 
the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence or 
reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one 
passage in the Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and 
deeper passes from the vital breath (asu) to the blood, and thence 
to atman as the inmost self of the world ; " Who has seen how 
the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was 
born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital 
breath, the blood, the Self (dtman) of the world ? Who went to 
ask him that knows it a ?" In Taittiriya Aranyaka i. 23, however, 
it is said that Prajapati after having created his self (as the world) 
with his own self entered into it. In Taittiriya Brahmana the 
atman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows 
him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the 
pre-Upanisad Vedic literature atman probably was first used to 
denote " vital breath " in man, then the self of the world, and then 
the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces 
of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omni 
present supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which 
makes a man sinless and pure. 

Conclusion. 

Looking at the advancement of thought in the Rg-Veda we 
find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which 
not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a 

* Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. 166 and R. V. vm 89. 

9 R. V. i. 164. 4 and Deussen s article on Atman in Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics. 



n] Conclusion 27 

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having 
emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as 
one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as 
being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother 
of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express 
doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation "Who 
knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly, 
the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable 
nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their 
effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities 
as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the 
tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple 
character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some 
quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable 
from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another 
world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the 
soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be re 
born on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may 
be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of 
transmigration. The self (atman) is spoken of in one place as the 
essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brahmanas 
and the Aranyakas we see that atman has begun to mean the 
supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus 
approached the great Atman doctrine of the Upanisads. 



CHAPTER III 

THE EARLIER UPANISADS 1 . (700 B.C. 600 B.C.) 

The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature. 

THOUGH it is generally held that the Upanisads are usually 
attached as appendices to the Aranyakas which are again attached 
to the Brahmanas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as 
separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases 
that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brahmana 
are introduced into the Aranyakas and the Aranyaka materials 
are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upanisad teaching. 
This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one 

1 There are about 112 Upanisads which have been published by the "Nirnaya- 
Sagara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are i isa, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 Prasna, 5 Mun- 
daka, 6 Mandukya, 7 Taittiriya, 8 Aitareya, 9 Chandogya, 10 Brhadafanyaka, 
ii vetasVatara, 12 Kausltaki, 13 Maitreyi, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jabala, 16 Brahma- 
bindu, 17 Harnsa, 18 Arunika, 19 Garbha, 20 Narayana, 21 Narayana, 22 Para- 
mahamsa, 23 Brahma, 24 Amrtanada, 25 Atharva&ras, 26 Atharva^ikha, 27 Mai- 
trayam, 28 Brhajjabala, 29 Nrsimhapurvatapini, 30 Nrsimhottaratapini, 31 Kalag- 
nirudra, 31 Subala, 33 Ksurika, 34 Yantrika, 35 Sarvasara, 36 Niralamba, 37 u- 
karahasya, 38 Vajrasucika, 39Tejobindu, 40 Nadabindu, 41 Dhyanabindu, 42 Brah- 
mavidya, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Naradaparivrajaka, 46 Trisikhibrahmana, 
47 Sita, 48 Yogacudamani, 49 Nirvana, 50 Mandalabrahmana, 51 Daksinamfirtti, 
52 Sarabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripadvibhutimahanarayana, 55 Advayataraka, 56 Rarna- 
rahasya, 57 Ramapurvatapini, 58 Ramottaratapim, 59 Vasudeva, 60 Mudgala, 
6 1 Sandilya, 62 Paingala, 63 Bhiksuka, 64 Maha, 65 6ariraka, 66 Yogasikha, 
67 TuriyatTta, 68 Sarnnyasa, 69 Paramahamsaparivrajaka, 70 Aksamala, 7iAvyakta, 
72 Ekaksara, 73 Annapiirna, 74 Surya, 75 Aksi, 76 Adhyatma, 77 Kundika, 78 Sa- 
vitrl, 79Atman, 80 Pas\ipatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhuta, 83 Tripuratapini, 
84 Devi, 85 Tripura, 86 Katharodra, 87 Bhavana, 88 Rudrahrdaya, 89 Yogakundall, 
90 Bhasmajabala, 91 Rudraksajabala, 92 Ganapati, 93 Jabaladariana, 94 Tarasara, 
95 Mahavakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Pranagnihotra, 98 Gopalapurvatapini, 99 Gopa- 
lottaratapini, 100 Krsna, 101 Yajfiavalkya, 102 Varaha, 103 ^athyayanlya, 104 Ha- 
yagriva, 105 Dattatreya, 106 Garuda, 107 Kalisantarana, 108 Jabali, 109 Sau- 
bhagyalaksml, no Sarasvatirahasya, in Bahvrca, 112 Muktika. 

The collection of Upanisads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb s brother, contained 
50 Upanisads. The Muktika Upanisad gives a list of 108 Upanisads. With the exception 
of the first 13 Upanisads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upanisads 
dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some 
which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the 6aiva, akta, 
the Yoga and the Vaisnava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the 
consideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upanisads which only repeat the 
purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of 
the later Upanisads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century- 



CH. in] The place of the Upanisads in Vedic Literature 29 

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts 
of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. 
Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be 
found in this, that the Brahmanas were intended for the house 
holders, the Aranyakas for those who in their old age withdrew 
into the solitude of the forests and the Upanisads for those who 
renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. 
Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the 
ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upanisads as being 
of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature 
as dictating the path of knowledge (Jftana-mdrga) as opposed 
to the path of works (karma-mdrgd) which forms the content 
of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the 
orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the 
Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain 
actions (vidht) or prohibitions against committing certain others 
(ntsedha). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted 
that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to 
praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the 
commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue 
why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no 
reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails 
to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that 
the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions 
to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs 
therefore to that of the Karma-marga or the performance of Vedic 
duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upanisads however do not require 
the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth 
and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. 
Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong 
controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedanta 
( Upanisads) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy 
to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle 
that the Upanisads should not be regarded as an exception, but 
that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be 
held out as commending the performance of duties ; but the 
former dissociate the Upanisads from the rest of the Vedic litera 
ture and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to 
any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which 
reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving. 



30 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

^ahkara the most eminent exponent of the Upanisads holds that 
they are meant for such superior men who are already above 
worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties 
have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be 
such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an 
ascetic, for him the Upanisads have been revealed for his ultimate 
emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the 
Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer 
care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final 
emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the 
Upanisads 1 . 

The names of the Upanisads ; Non-Brahmanic influence. 

The Upanisads are also known by another name Vedanta, as 
they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (veda-anta, 
end) ; it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upanisads, 
the Vedanta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student 
knows that in language the Upanisads approach the classical 
Sanskrit ; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmina 
tion of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they 
thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their 
Vedic names which they took from the name of the different 
schools or branches (sdkhd) among which the Vedas were studied 2 . 
Thus the Upanisads attached to the Brahmanas of the Aitareya 
and Kausltaki schools are called respectively Aitareya and 
Kausltaki Upanisads. Those of the Tandins and Talavakaras of 
the Sama-veda are called the Chandogya and Talavakara (or 
Kena) Upanisads. Those of the Taittirlya school of the Yajurveda 

1 This is what is called the difference of fitness (adhikdribhedd). Those who perform 
the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upanisads and those who are fit to hear the Upa 
nisads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties. 

2 When the Samhita texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed 
to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil 
along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter 
formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brahmanas. These however were 
gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies 
and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there 
occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brahmanas even of the 
same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name 
of particular Sakhas (e.g. Aitareya, Kausltaki) with which the Brahmanas were asso 
ciated or named. According to the divergence of the Brahmanas of the different 
Sakhas there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upanisads 
associated with them. 



in] Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads 3 1 

form the Taittiriya and Mahanarayana, of the Katha school 
the Kathaka, of the Maitrayam school the Maitrayanl. The 
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad forms part of the &atapatha Brahmana 
of the Vajasaneyi schools. The Isa Upanisad also belongs to the 
latter school. But the school to which the vetasvatara belongs 
cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presump 
tion with regard to these Upanisads is that they represent the 
enlightened views of the particular schools among which they 
flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number 
of Upanisads of a comparatively later age were attached to the 
Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the 
Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which 
they dealt 1 . 

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the 
frequent episodes in the Upanisads in which the Brahmins are 
described as having gone to the Ksattriyas for the highest know 
ledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the 
Upanisad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the 
Brahmanas and from the allusions to the existence of philo 
sophical speculations amongst the people in Pali works, it may be 
inferred that among the Ksattriyas in general there existed earnest 
philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted 
an important influence in the formation of the Upanisad doctrines. 
There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the 
Upanisads are found directly incorporated with the Brahmanas 
it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas 
alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either 
set the Upanisad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assist 
ance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved 
their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins. 

Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads. 

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brahmanic to the 
Upanisad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the 
history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic 
hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were 
developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of 
the Upanisads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 

1 Garbha Upanisad, Atman Upanisad, Pra^na Upanisad, etc. There were however 
some exceptions such as the Mandukya, Jabala, Paingala, 6aunaka, etc. 



32 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of VisVakarman or 
Hiranyagarbha into the atman and the Brahman of the Upani 
sads seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing 
to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the atman 
doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout 
the earlier Upanisads no mention is to be found of Visvakarman, 
Hiranyagarbha or Brahmanaspati and no reference of such a 
nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upanisad 
ideas with those conceptions 1 . The word purusa no doubt occurs 
frequently in the Upanisads, but the sense and the association 
that come along with it are widely different from that of the 
purusa of the Purusasukta of the Rg-Veda. 

When the Rg-Veda describes Visvakarman it describes him 
as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom 
they pray for worldly benefits. " What was the position, which 
and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Visvakar 
man produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might ? The 
one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every 
side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, 
shapes them with his arms and with his wings Do thou, Visva 
karman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, 
and the lowest, and the middle... may a generous son remain here 
to us 2 "; again in R.V.X.82 we find "Visvakarman is wise, energetic, 

the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition He 

who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and 
creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the 
other creatures resort for instruction 8 ." Again about Hiranyagarbha 
we find in R.V. I. 121, " Hiranyagarbha arose in the beginning ; 
born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the 
earth and this sky ; to what god shall we offer our oblation ? . . . 
May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who 
ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced 
the great and brilliant waters ! to what god, etc. ? Prajapati, no 
other than thou is lord over all these created things : may we 
obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we 
become masters of riches 4 ." Speaking of the purusa the Rg-Veda 

1 The name VisVakarma appears in 6 vet. IV. 17. Hiranyagarbha appears in 6vet. 
in. 4 and iv. la, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvahammani Hiran 
yagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later Nrsimh. 9. The word Brah 
manaspati does not occur at all in the Upanisads. 

a Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. pp. 6, 7. 3 Ibid. p. 7. * Ibid. pp. 16, 17. 



in] How did the Upanisads originate ? 33 

says " Purusha has a thousand heads. . .a thousand eyes, and a thou 
sand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it] 
by a space of ten fingers. ...He formed those aerial creatures, and 
the animals, both wild and tame 1 ," etc. Even that famous hymn 
(R.V. X. 129) which begins with "There was then neither being 
nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above " ends with saying 
" From whence this creation came into being, whether it was 
created or not he whp is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably 
knows or does not know." 

In the Upanisads however, the position is entirely changed, 
and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside 
but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic posi 
tion of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed 
theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality 
and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation 
here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are 
offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true 
self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of 
philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. 
This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does 
not carry with it in the Upanisads any elaborate philosophical 
discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter 
of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has 
been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the 
apparently meaningless speculations of the Brahmanas this doc 
trine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too im 
probable to be believed. 

On the strength of the stories of Balaki Gargya and Ajataatru 
(Brh. II. i), Ibvetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali (Cha. V. 3 and Brh. 
VI. 2) and Aruni and ASvapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. 1 1) Garbe thinks 
"that it can be proven that the Brahman s profoundest wisdom, the 
doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence 
on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin 
in the circle of Brahmans at all a " and that "it took its rise in 
the ranks of the warrior caste 8 ." This if true would of course 
lead the development of the Upanisads away from the influence 
of the Veda, Brahmanas and the Aranyakas. But do the facts 
prove this ? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe him- 

1 Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. V. pp. 368, 371. 

2 Garbe s article, "Hindu Monism," p. 68. 3 Ibid. p. 78. 

D. 3 



34 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

self has produced. In the story of Balaki Gargya and Ajataatru 
(Brh. II. i) referred to by him, Balaki Gargya is a boastful man 
who wants to teach the Ksattriya Ajataatru the true Brahman, 
but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this 
Ajataatru replies (following Garbe s own translation) " it is 
contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction 
from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to 
him 1 ." Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a 
Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the 
Ksattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a 
Ksattriya aboutthe trueknowledge of Brahman? At the beginning 
of the conversation, Ajatasatru had promised to pay Balaki one 
thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people 
used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman 8 . The second 
story of vetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali seems to be fairly con 
clusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, 
the way of the gods (devaydnd) and the way of -the fathers 
(pitrydna) had originated among the Ksattriyas, but it is without 
any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge 
of Brahman as the true self. 

The third story of Aruni and AsVapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. n) 
is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to 
know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddalaka 
Aruni ; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied 
them to the Ksattriya king Asvapati Kaikeya who was studying 
the subject. But AsVapati ends the conversation by giving them 
certain instructions about the fire doctrine (vaisvdnara agni) and 
the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the 
true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are 
only the few exceptional cases where Ksattriya kings were in 
structing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were 
discussing and instructing the atman knowledge. I am thus led 
to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the 
Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been 
too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have 
been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references 
given by him to the Upanisad passages are also the same as we 

1 Garbe s article, "Hindu Monism," p. 74. 

2 Brh. n., compare also Brh. iv. 3, how Yajftavalkya speaks to Janaka about the 
brahmavidya. 



in] Aranyakas and the Upanisads 35 

just examined 1 . The truth seems to me to be this, that the 
Ksattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio- 
philosophical quest manifested in the Upanisads. The enquirers 
were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman 
or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and 
birth*; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking 
that the Upanisad philosophy originated among the Ksattriyas 
or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the 
Brahmanas and the Aranyakas which were the productions of 
the Brahmins. 

The change of the BrShmana into the Aranyaka thought is 
signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to 
their symbolic representations and meditations which were re 
garded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we 
find in the Brhadaranyaka (l. i) that instead of a horse sacrifice 
the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated 
upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the 
eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so 
on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good 
can its sacrifice lead ? This moving universe is the horse which is 
most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is 
the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere 
animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place 
of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material 
substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals 
lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side 
by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the 
Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and sym 
bolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and 
action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only 
chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from 
the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but 
even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that 
the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was pro 
ductive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing 
value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances 
and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth 8 . 

1 Winternitz s Geschichte der indischen Litteratur^ I. pp. 197 ff. 
J The story of Maitreyl and Yajflavalkya (Brh. n. 4) and that of Satyakama son of 
Jabala and his teacher (Cha. iv. 4). 8 Cha. v. n. 

32 



36 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The Uktha (verse) of Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya 
Aranyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prana 1 , the 
Udgltha of the Samaveda was identified with Om, Prana, sun and 
eye ; in Chandogya II. the Saman was identified with Om, rain, 
water, seasons, Prana, etc., in Chandogya III. 16-17 man was 
identified with sacrifice ; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initia 
tion ; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras ; 
and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with 
sacrificial fees (daksina). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic 
Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision 
of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the 
Aranyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things 
which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instru 
mentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure 
identity. Thus in Ait. Aran. II. I. 3 we find "Then comes the origin 
of food. The seed of Prajapati are the gods. The seed of the gods 
is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The 
seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of 
creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed 
of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done 
is this man the abode of Brahman 8 ." 

The word Brahman according to Sayana meant mantras 
(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hotr priest, the great. 
Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, 
"as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from 
the fathers." It originates from the seat of the Rta, springs forth 
at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma 
juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, 
endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its 
guardian (R.V. vin. 37. i, vin. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, i. 47. 2, vn. 22. 9, 
VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the 
conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can 
be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as 
the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of 
the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts 8 . I am disposed to 
think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as 
we find it in many passages in the Aranyakas and the Upanisads. 
The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between 

1 Ait. Aran. II. 1-3. * Keith s Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka. 

* Hillebrandt s article on Brahman, E. R. E. 



in] Aranyakas and the Upanisads 37 

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is 
rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by 
meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still 
remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages 
of the Upanisads people are thinking of meditating upon this 
great force " Brahman " as being identified with diverse symbols, 
natural objects, parts and functions of the body. 

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its 
actual performance in the external world to certain forms of 
meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories 
of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions 
was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing 
could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations 
of the Paficagnividya are so much referred to in the Upanisads 
as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that 
the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. 
When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is 
really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they 
thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the 
gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a 
man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for 
the gods that men should know this great truth 1 . 

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of 
the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vayu (wind) to 
blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman 
that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The 
whole process of Upanisad thought shows that the magic power 
of sacrifices as associated with Rta (unalterable law) was being 
abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. 
There are many stories in the Upanisads of the search after the 
nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only 
imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power 
of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with 
bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical re 
presentations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea 
that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found 
inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of 
the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman 
originated. 

1 Brh. I. 4. 10. 



38 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The meaning of the word Upanisad. 

The word Upanisad is derived from the root sad with the prefix 
ni (to sit), and Max Miiller says that the word originally meant the 
act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to 
him. In his introduction to the Upanisads he says, "The history 
and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that 
Upanisad meant originallysession,particularlya session consisting 
of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher 1 ." 
Deussen points out that the word means "secret "or "secret instruc 
tion," and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upani 
sads themselves. Max Miiller also agrees that the word was used 
in this sense in the Upanisads 8 . There we find that great injunc 
tions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the 
doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student 
or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires 
proves himself deserving to hear them. Sankara however, the 
great Indian exponent of the Upanisads, derives the word from 
the root sad to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it 
destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the 
right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the 
word Upanisad occurs in the Upanisads themselves it seems that 
Deussen s meaning is fully justified 8 . 

The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads. 

The oldest Upanisads are written in prose. Next to these we 
have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in 
classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upanisad the 
more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upanisads have 
an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to 
Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. 
We can read and read them over again without getting tired. 
The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm 
apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word 
Upanisad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret 
doctrine or instruction" ; the Upanisad teachings were also in 
tended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of 
high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving 

1 Max MUller s Translation of the Upanishads, S. B.E, vol. I. p. Ixxxi. 

a S. B. E. vol. I. p. Ixxxiii. 

8 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 10-15. 



in] Revival of Upanisad studies 39 

emancipation. It was thus that the Upanisad style of expression, 
when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and 
attraction for earnest religious people ; and as a result of that we 
find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been 
adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upanisad form of com 
position had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upanisads 
were compiled by 500 B.C., they continued to be written even so 
late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The 
earliest and most important are probably those that have been 
commented upon by^ankara namely Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, 
Aitareya, Taittirlya, fsa, Kena, Katha, PraSna, Mundaka and 
Mandukya 1 . It is important to note in this connection that the 
separate Upanisads differ much from one another with regard to 
their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of 
them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of 
the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon 
the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of Siva, of Visnu and 
the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be 
respectively called the Yoga, aiva, Visnu and J->arira Upanisads. 
These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight. 

Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times. 

How the Upanisads came to be introduced into Europe is an 
interesting story. Dara Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor 
Shah Jahan heard of the Upanisads during his stay in Kashmir 
in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who 
undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 
Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend-Avesta, received 
a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the 
French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shuja-uddaulah. 
Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801- 
1 802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by 
Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer 
himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he 

1 Deussen supposes that Kausitaki is also one of the earliest. Max Miiller and 
Schroeder think that Maitrayani also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen 
counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upanisads into 
four periods. In the first period he includes Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, 
Aitareya, Kausitaki and Kena. In the second he includes Kathaka, Ia, SvetasVatara, 
Mundaka, Mahanarayana, and in the third period he includes Pras na, Maitrayani and 
Mandukya. The rest of the Upanisads he includes in the fourth period. 



4O The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

writes in the preface to his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung^, 
"And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit 
conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through 
the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this 
still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe 
that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less 
deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth 
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and 
assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best 
of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him. ...I might ex 
press the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected 
aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as 
a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though 
the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads 
is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display 
its firm,definite,and throughout harmonious meaning! From every 
sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole 
is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit... In the whole 
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial 
and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace 
of my life, it will be the solace of my death! 1 " Through Schopen 
hauer the study of the Upanisads attracted much attention in 
Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study 
of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as 
well. 

The study of the Upanisads has however gained a great 
impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who 
not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and 
published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma 
Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were 
derived directly from the Upanisads. 

1 Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii. 

1 Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishads (S. B. E. I. p. Ixii ; see 
also pp. Ix, bii) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as pro 
ducts of the highest wisdom "...that he should have placed the pantheism there taught 
high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as 
brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate 
reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their 
favour." 



in] The Upanisads and their interpretations 41 

The Upanisads and their interpretations. 

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upanisads it may 
be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse 
and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the 
Upanisads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past 
times. The Upanisads, as we have seen, formed the concluding 
portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the 
Vedanta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that 
the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the 
Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a compara 
tively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its 
judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the 
apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest know 
ledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having 
been once for all declared in the Upanisads. Reason had only to 
unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers 
of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it 
presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths 
are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in 
those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue 
and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no 
finality can ever be achieved ; we are to be content only with as 
much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience 
at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious 
that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be 
should have any right to say anything regarding the highest 
truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons 
that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was neces 
sary for him to show from the texts of the Upanisads that they 
supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus 
it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their 
principal duties to interpret the Upanisads in order to show that 
they alone represented the true Vedanta doctrines. Any one 
who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any 
particular school might say that in following that school he was 
following the Vedanta. 

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is 
absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of 
diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upanisads 



42 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each 
interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own 
doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried 
to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the 
various systems of Upanisad interpretation we find that the in 
terpretation offered by arikara very largely represents the view 
of the general body of the earlier Upanisad doctrines, though 
there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other 
systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedanta 
is generally associated with the interpretation of ^arikara and 
arikara s system of thought is called the Vedanta system, though 
there are many other systems which put forth their claim as repre 
senting the true Vedanta doctrines. 

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern in 
terpreter of the Upanisads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute 
claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upanisads not as 
a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of 
thought the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were 
still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of ^arikara, 
or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of 
by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a 
modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients 
that all the Upanisads represent a connected system, but take the 
texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, 
though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they 
appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of 
the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upanisads, and thus 
find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts. 



The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures. 

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upanisads 
is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an un 
changeable reality which is identical with that which underlies 
the essence in man 1 . If we look at Greek philosophy in Par- 
menides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the 
same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the 
reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upanisads are 

1 Brh. iv. 4. 5, 11. 



m] The Quest after Brahman 43 

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations 
or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. 
There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there 
is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual 
reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm 
of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness 
in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature 
of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature? 

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Samhita 
there were people who had risen to the conception of a single 
creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajapati, 
VisVakarman, Purusa, Brahmanaspati and Brahman. But this 
divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the 
nature of this deity began in the Upanisads. Many visible objects 
of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various 
psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render 
satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages 
in the Upanisads had already started with the idea that there was 
a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the 
universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with 
any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity 
at all? The Upanisads present to us the history of this quest and 
the results that were achieved. 

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not 
yet gone out of the Aranyaka ideas and of symbolic (pratika) 
forms of worship. Prana (vital breath) was regarded as the most 
essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are 
related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the 
eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This 
recognition of the superiority of prana brings us to the meditations 
on prana as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. 
So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting 
characters of omnipresence and eternality dkd&a (space) is 
meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Aditya (sun) 
are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the 
visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vayu, 
or the sun and the immaterial representation as akasa, manas or 
prana, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes 
for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest 
after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought 



44 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic 
associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice 
yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of 
Brahman. 

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the 
history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to 
identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, 
lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of 
these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is 
indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are 
tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original 
as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how 
toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations 
could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to 
undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of 
Brahman. 

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method. 

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the 
discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic 
worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. 
The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship 
deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the 
idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. 
They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many 
symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They 
did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a 
dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls 
which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this 
was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be 
satisfied with anything short of the highest. 

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a 
positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, 
they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not 
point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance 
to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not 
like aught that we find in experience. Yajfiavalkya said "He 
the atman is not this, nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, 
for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, 
untouched, for nothing touches him ; he cannot suffer by a stroke 



in] The Negative Method and the Atman doctrine 45 

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury 1 ." He is asaf, non-being, 
for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such 
being as is known to us by experience ; yet he is being, for he alone 
is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves 
are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can 
experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the 
unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, 
invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, 
without beginning or^nd, greater than the great (makat\\he fixed. 
He who knows it is released from the jaws of death 3 ." Space, time 
and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their 
essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, ye.t 
the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no 
characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial 
to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He 
is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which 
rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical 
universe. When Bahva was questioned by Vaskali, he expounded 
the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence "Teach 
me," said Vaskali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman." 
Bahva however remained silent. But when the question was put 
forth a second or third time he answered, " I teach you indeed but 
you do not understand; the Atman is silence 8 ." The way to in 
dicate it is thus by neti neti, it is not this, it is not this. We 
cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited 
by conceptual thought. 

The Atman doctrine. 

The sum and substance of the Upanisad teaching is involved 
in the equation Atman = Brahman. We have already seen that the 
word Atman was used in the Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand 
the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital 
breath in man. Later on in the Upanisads we see that the word 
Brahman is generall> used in the former sense, while the word 
Atman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the 

1 Brh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Miiller and Roer have all misinterpreted this 
passage; asito has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence 
has ever been adduced ; it is evidently the ablative of asi, a sword. 

a Katha III. 15. 

3 Ssankara on BraJimasiitra, III. t. 17, and also Deussen, Philosophy of the Upani- 
skads, p. 156, 



46 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

Upanisads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one 
and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self 
of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. 
Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical 
parts of man) he is called annamaya. But behind the sheath of 
this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath 
which is called the self as vital breath (prdnamaya dtman), 
Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called 
the manomaya dtman. This again contains within it the self 
"consisting of consciousness" called the vijndnamaya dtman. But 
behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the 
dnandamaya dtman). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture; 
for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could 
live, who could breathe if this space (dkdsa) was not bliss? For 
it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self- 
surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he 
really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, 
between himself and this Atman there is fear for him 1 ." 

Again in another place we find that Prajapati said: "The self 
(dtman) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and 
grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogita 
tions are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired ; 
he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self 3 ." The 
gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana 
respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from 
Prajapati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look 
into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could 
find. They answered : " We see, this our whole self, even to the 
hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that 
is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went 
away pleased, but Prajapati thought, "There they go away, 
without having discovered, without having realized the self." 
Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the 
self ; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and 
pestered with doubts and came back to Prajapati and said, "just 
as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well- 
dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the 
body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when 
the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in 
one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes 
1 Taitt. n. 7. 2 Cha. vin. 7. i. 



in] Atman as changeless 47 

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory." 
Prajapati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and 
said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this 
is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed 
but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came 
back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind 
when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is 
so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by 
its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered 
and as if it wept in this I see no good." Prajapati gave a still 
higher instruction : "When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, 
does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, 
the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again 
filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the 
self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does 
he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. 
I see no good in this." And now Prajapati after having given a 
course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as 
the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and 
having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this 
was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, 
ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the 
full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the 
deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected 
by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body can 
not get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not 
touch the bodiless self 1 ." 

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and un 
changeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. 
This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject- 
object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the 
seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all 
knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows 
but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump 
of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through 
entirely of savour; as in truth this Atman has no inner or outer, 
but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is 
not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman 
is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who 
has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than 

1 Cha. vm. 7-i. 



48 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it 
and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par 
excellence, our inmost Atman. All limitation is fraught with pain ; 
it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man 
receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss ; for who could breathe, 
who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (akdsd)1 It is he 
who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless 
support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable 
one, then has he attained peace. 

Place of Brahman in the Upanisads. 

There is the atman not in man alone but in all objects of the 
universe, the sun, the moon, the world ; and Brahman is this atman. 
There is nothing outside the atman, and therefore there is no 
plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay 
is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of 
black iron is known, so when this atman the Brahman is known 
everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence 
of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman. 

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature 
of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But 
we must also remember that the Upanisads do not represent so 
much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers 
who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not 
notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and 
nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity 
attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all 
Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it 
return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered 
into it as its inner controller (antarydmin). Here is thus a glaring 
dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, 
though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that 
these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known 
everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made 
for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as 
^aiikara the great professor of Vedanta does by explaining away 
the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the 
real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that 
the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in 
the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The 



in] Brahman in the Upanisads 49 

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, 
wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and un 
affected 1 ". He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south 
and in the north, he is all this 2 . "These rivers in the east and 
in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and 
become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they 
are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being 
do not know that they have come from the Being.... That which 
is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self 
thou art O Svetaketu 3 ." "Brahman," as Deussen points out, 
"was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe 
as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the 
universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was 
represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman." 
Thus it is said in Mund. I. i. 7: 

As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads), 

As the plants shoot forth on the earth, 

As the hairs on the head and body of the living man, 

So from the imperishable all that is here. 

As the sparks from the well-kindled fire, 

In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands, 

So, my dear sir, from the imperishable 

Living beings of many kinds go forth, 

And again return into him 4 . 

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest 
teaching of the Upanisads is "That art thou." 

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner 
controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as 
the atman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the 
result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a 
theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing 
aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it 
is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and 
earth stand held together 5 . God and soul are distinguished again 
in the famous verse of Svetasvatara 6 : 

Two bright-feathered bosom friends 

Flit around one and the same tree ; 

One of them tastes the sweet berries, 

The other without eating merely gazes down. 

1 Cha. Hi. 14. 4. 2 Ibid. vn. 25. i; also Mundaka II. i. n. s Cha. VI. 10. 
4 Deussen s translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 164. 5 Brh. m. 8. i. 
6 Svetasvatara iv. 6, and Mundaka ill. i. i, also Deussen s translation in Philosophy 
of the Upanishads, p. 177. 

D. A 



50 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occa 
sional use of the word Isa or hdna, there seems to be no doubt 
that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknow 
ledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted 
position of the atman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in 
Kausltaki Upanisad 3. 9, " He is not great by good deeds nor low 
by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he 
wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants 
to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the 
master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (atman)." 
Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are 
again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once 
immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that 
eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose 
branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it 
and no one can transcend it. This is that, " . . .from its fear the fire 
burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vayu and Death 
the fifth (with the other two) run on 1 ." 

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the 
conception of Brahman in the Upanisads and look to the main 
currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has 
found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the 
Atman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this 
everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is 
to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that 
identifies the universe with the Atman or Brahman. The third 
current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord 
controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the 
melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked 
out, that the later exponents of Vedanta, ^ankara, Ramanuja, 
and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to 
develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it 
is that the doctrine of Maya which is slightly hinted at once in 
Brhadaranyaka and thrice in ^veta^vatara, becomes the founda 
tion of ankara s philosophy of the Vedanta in which Brahman 
alone is real and all else beside him is unreal 2 . 

1 Katha n. 6. i and 3. a Brh. II. 5. 19, vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10. 



m] The World 51 

The World. 

We have already seen that the universe has come out of 
Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back 
to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as 
represented to experience could not be denied. Sankara held 
that the Upanisads referred to the external world and accorded 
a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely 
relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon 
as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however 
remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not 
probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to 
the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the 
highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior 
world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this 
reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only 
reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding 
that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it 
is maintained in him and it will return back to him. 

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the i 
organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, ) 
animals or men, have souls 1 . Brahman desiring to be many created 
fire (tejas\ water (ap) and earth (ksiti). Then the self-existent 
Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination 
that all other bodies are formed 2 . So all other things are produced 
as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three 
together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive 
elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially 
in the Samkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (tanmdtrd) 
and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is 
composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Prana 
IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler 
natures, e.g. earth (prthivt), and the subtler state of earth 
(prthivtmdtra). In the Taittirlya, II. i, however, ether (dkdsa) 
is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other 
elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each pro 
ceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it. 

1 Cha. vi. 1 1. * ibid. vi. 2, 3, 4. 

42 



52 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The World-Soul. 

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the 
soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V. X. 121. I, 
where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation 
from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred 
to in the vetavatara, in III. 4 and IV. 1 2. It is indeed very strange 
that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upanisads. 
In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical 
character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier 
products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance 
from the point of view of the development of the theory of 
Brahman or Atman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the 
Purusa, nor the ViSvakarma, nor the Hiranyagarbha played an 
important part in the earlier development of the Upanisads 
leads me to think that the Upanisad doctrines were not directly 
developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Rg-Veda 
speculations. The passages in &vetas" vatara clearly show how from 
the supreme eminence that he had in R.V. X. 121, Hiranyagarbha 
had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen 
in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine of the Upanisads says that the "entire objective universe is 
possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This 
subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in 
all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For 
the individual objects pass away but the objective universe con 
tinues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal 
knowing subject also (hiranyagarbhd) by whom it is sustained. 
Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accord 
ingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore 
from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it 
has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality 1 ." This however 
seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance 
in the Upanisads. 

The Theory of Causation. 

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the 
Upanisads. Sankara, the later exponent of Vedanta philosophy, 
always tried to show that the Upanisads looked upon the cause 

1 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upaniskads, p. 201. 



in] Transmigration 53 

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in 
reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did 
on the strength of a series of examples in the Chandogya 
Upanisad (vi. i) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is 
spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, 
the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many 
diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the 
pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of 
name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which 
in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, 
plate, or jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable 
Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer 
change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only 
an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, 
the real par excellence. 

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded 
as having been expounded in the Upanisads in an imperfect 
manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks 
upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the 
cause itself through the action and combination of the elements 
of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have 
been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination 
of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real 
change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we 
shall see hereafter) the Parinama theory of causation advocated 
by the Samkhya school 1 . 

Doctrine of Transmigration. 

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body 
they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath 
to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts 
of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in 
the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our 
own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the 
human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration 
had but little developed at the time. 

In the Upanisads however we find a clear development in 
the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one 
the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with 

1 Cha. vi. 4-4. 



54 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine 
of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the 
idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that 
those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the 
digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers 
(J>itryana\ in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, 
then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches 
the moon ; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his 
good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, 
mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimi 
lation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is 
born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense 
in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world 1 . 

The other way is the way of gods (devaydna), meant for those 
who cultivate faith and asceticism (tafias). These souls at death 
enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright 
half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into 
Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of 
the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions 
of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright 
and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the light of 
lights " {jyotisam jyotiK)*- 

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine 
of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of 
his deeds (karma) by passing through the other worlds and with 
out reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, 
the Yanas. Thus Yajnavalkya says, "when the soul becomes 
weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with 
which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses 
go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and 
centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye 
turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become 
one(with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses) 
become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become 
one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with 
him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he 
does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not 
think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the 
senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The 

1 Cha. V. 10. 2 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upaniskads, p. 335. 



in] Transmigration 55 

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. 
When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any 
other part of the body, the vital function (prdnd) follows and all 
the senses follow the vital function (prdna) in coming out. He 
is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes 
out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (prajfta) 
accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade 
of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so 
this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a 
separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a 
small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul 
after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a 
newer and fairer form as of the Pitrs, the Gandharvas, the gods, 
of Prajapati or Brahma or of any other being.... As he acts and 
behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, 
virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full 
of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as 
the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being 
attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he 
was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the 
end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this 
world for doing karma 1 . So it is the case with those who have 
desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has 
freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in 
himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains 
Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are 
in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and 
attains Brahma here" (Brh. IV. iv. 1-7). 

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the 
self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer 
frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present 
life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all 
senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, 
work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the 
body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer 
body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which 
thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse cate 
gories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding, 

1 It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that 
thi fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds. 



56 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of 
the essence of the five elements (which would make up the 
physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of de 
sires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of 
the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, 
of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this 
(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (Brh. IV. iv. 5). 
The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral 
and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which 
compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes 
follows from this nature of his ; for whatever he desires, he wills 
and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts 
the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and 
its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral 
and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of 
the physical world on the other. 

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse 
psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements 
holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The 
root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition 
of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and 
act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing 
acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for perform 
ing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the 
fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But 
there is no emphasis in the Upanisads on this point. The Pitryana 
theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part 
in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in 
this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the 
self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no 
rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of 
this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth 
and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between 
desires and rebirth for it is said that whatever a man desires he 
wills, and whatever he wills he acts. 

Thus it is said in another place " he who knowingly desires is 
born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose 
desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his 
desires vanish here" (Mund III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires 
is effected by the right knowledge of the self. " He who knows 



in] Transmigration 57 

his self as I am the person for what wish and for what desire 
will he trouble the body,... even being here if we know it, well if 
we do not, what a great destruction" (Brh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). " In 
former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what 
shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe " (Brh. IV. 
iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which 
we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought 
can be found in the Upanisads. The whole scheme is worked 
out on the principle of desire (kfimd) and karma only serves as 
the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by 
the person. 

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently 
with the idea that desires (k&ma) led to rebirth, we find that 
in some Upanisads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a 
woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of 
man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth 
elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is 
said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is 
but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of 
his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put 
in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes 
part of the woman s self like any part of her body ; it therefore 
does not hurt her ; she protects and develops the embryo within 
herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be 
protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) 
but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he 
is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that 
the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This 
is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative 
for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after 
realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going 
away he is born again that is his third birth " (Aitareya, II. 1-4)*. 
No special emphasis is given in the Upanisads to the sex-desire 
or the desire for a son ; for, being called kama, whatever was the 
desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the 
desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (Brh. 
iv. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any 
other desire. 

1 See also Kausitaki, II. 15. 



58 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

Emancipation. 

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connec 
tion is that of emancipation (mukti). Already we know that the 
doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and per 
formed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through 
successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. 
This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (pitrydnd) 
where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and 
then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faith 
ful and perform sraddhd had a distinctly different type of goal from 
those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general 
altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development 
in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means 
in the Upanisads the state of infiniteness that a man attains 
when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The 
ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are 
ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all 
passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes 
Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him. 

He who beholds that loftiest and deepest, 
For him the fetters of the heart break asunder, 
For him all doubts are solved, 
And his works become nothingness 1 . 

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions 
and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is 
ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is 
false. We " do not know " but are " pure knowledge " ourselves. 
We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do 
not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not 
a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but 
it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always 
emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and 
seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because 
we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the 
true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is 
emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only 
so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural 
and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature 
and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that 

1 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 353. 



in] Emancipation 59 

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in 
our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing 
necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is there 
fore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, 
all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Katha 
Upanisad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, 
the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. 
Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with 
him, said, " O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget 
his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the 
second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be 
made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, 
" There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death 
of man ; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know 
instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, " It was 
inquired of old, even by the gods ; for it is not easy to under 
stand it Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not- 
compel me to this." Naciketas said, " Even by the gods was it 
inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy 
to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like 
thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, " Choose sons 
and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of 
cattle ; choose elephants and gold and horses ; choose the wide 
expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest 
Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth 
and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make 
thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult 
to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure ; 
those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instru 
ments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give 
them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." 
Naciketas replied, " All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and 
they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the 
dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could 
obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as 
long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." 
Yama said, " One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is 
he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses 
the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, 
hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is 



6o The Earlier Upani$ads [CH. 

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), 
are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. 
Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless 
youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast 
asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly hap 
piness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what 
is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him 
whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee 
O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to 
Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains 
whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; 
he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is 
not slain, though the body is slain ; subtler than what is subtle, 
greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes every 
where. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among 
fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot 
be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It 
can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals 
its own nature 1 ." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, 
he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the 
present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the 
highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and prin 
ciple of the universe, the immortal and the infinite,he ceases to have 
desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth 
of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome 
of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents 
of the gross body (annamaya kosa\ the vital functions (prZlna- 
maya kosa) of life, the will and desire (ntanomayd) and the 
thoughts and ideas (vijndnamaya\ and so long as he keeps him 
self in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences 
in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences 
are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers 
pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from 
these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he 
is one with his experience and there is no change and no move 
ment. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of 
concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is 
not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge ; it is not 

1 Katha n. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract 
which may be differently interpreted. 



in] Emancipation 6 1 

whatever one knows as this and this (neti neti). In this infinite 
and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and 
tuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence 
will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put 
in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately 
but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, 
Maitreyi, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting 
only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal 
existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal know 
ledge" (Brh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the 
processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it 
retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a 
state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and 
pure blessedness. 



CHAPTER IV 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS 
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible ? 

IT is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy 
in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have 
been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came 
one after another and offered their .independent speculations 
on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in 
chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon 
the influence of one school upon another or upon the general 
change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. 
Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had 
their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and 
it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, 
or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many 
divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these 
were formulated just after the earliest Upanisads had been com 
posed or arranged. 

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant 
half-sentences (sutras) which did not elaborate the subject in 
detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads 
of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already 
thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half- 
sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had 
direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject It is indeed 
difficult to guess from the sutras the extent of their significance, 
or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were 
originally intended by them. The sutras of the Vedanta system, 
known as the ^arlraka-sutras or Brahma-sutras of Badarayana 
for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise 
to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one 
of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high 
esteem and respect in which these writers of the sutras were held 
by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to 



CH. iv] Schools of Philosophy 63 

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of 
the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of 
the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of 
these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since 
the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or 
other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought 
up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the in 
dependence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the 
faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of 
producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own 
systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth 
schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular 
systems from generation to generation, who explained and ex 
pounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other 
rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish 
the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an 
example, the Nyaya system of philosophy consisting of a number 
of half-sentences or sutras is attributed to Gautama, also called 
Aksapada. The earliest commentary on these sutras, called the 
Vdtsydyana bhdsya, was written by Vatsyayana. This work was 
sharply criticized by the Buddhist Dinnaga, and to answer these 
criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary 
called the Bhdsyavdttika 1 . As time went on the original force 
of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of 
the school. At this Vacaspati MiSra wrote a commentary called 
Vdrttika-tdtparyatlkd on this second commentary, where he tried 
to refute all objections against the Nyaya system made by other 
rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, 
called Nydya-tdtparyattkd, had another commentary called Nydya- 
tdtparyatlkd-parisuddhi written by the great Udayana. This 
commentary had another commentary called Nydya-nibandha- 
prakdsa written by Varddhamana the son of the illustrious 
Gangesa. This again had another commentary called Varddha- 
mdnendu upon it by Padmanabha Misra, and this again had 
another named Nydya-tdtparyamandana by &afikara Misra. The 
names of Vatsyayana, Vacaspati, and Udayana are indeed very 
great, but ever they contented themselves by writing com 
mentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any 

1 I have preferred to spell Dinnaga after Vacaspati s Tdtparyattka (p. i) and net 
Dignaga as it is generally spelt. 



64 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

original system. Even ankara, probably the greatest man of 
India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the 
Brahma-sutras, the Upanisads, and the Bhagavadgltd. 

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents 
and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least pre 
pared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and 
subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the 
defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was 
originally formulated in the sutras had probably but few problems 
to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of 
other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems 
in which the original views were more or less involved but to 
which no attention had been given before. 

The contributions of the successive commentators served to 
make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and 
stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully 
against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system 
in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if 
we take it along with its developments down to the beginning 
of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man 
strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible 
to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is 
necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in 
all the growth it has/ acquired through the successive ages of 
history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole 1 . 
In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems 
which had their importance only so long as they lived and were 
then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each 
system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents 
through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this 
growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system 
is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth 
it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose 
selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history. 

1 In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier 
phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supple 
mentary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as 
harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them. 



iv] Growth of the Philosophic Literature 65 

Growth of the Philosophic Literature. 

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, 
and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a 
spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the 
earliest Upanisads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final 
essence or truth was the atman, that a search after it was our 
highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we 
can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything 
else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we 
want (neti neti}. Philosophical enquires were however continuing 
in circles other than those of the Upanisads. Thus the Buddha 
who closely followed the early Upanisad period, spoke of and enu 
merated sixty-two kinds of heresies 1 , and these can hardly be 
traced in the Upanisads. The Jaina activities were also probably 
going on contemporaneously but in the Upanisads no reference 
to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there 
were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than 
those of the Upanisad sages, of which we have but scanty records. 
It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated 
among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upanisad 
circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antago 
nistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these 
sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were prob 
ably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time 
when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama 
or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various 
topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified 
and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and 
recorded it in sutras. These sutras were intended probably for 
people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus 
could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases con 
tained in the aphorisms. The sutras thus contain sometimes 
allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in 
which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed 
of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and 
conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken 
chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however 
free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own 

1 Brahmajala-sutla, Digha, I. p. 12 ff. 
D 5 



66 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary 
views with which they did not agree or which they found it diffi 
cult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools 
often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems 
unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent 
of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with 
the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to 
offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize 
them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications 
generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any 
serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, 
for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explana 
tions of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They 
would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things 
only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. 
It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system 
by treating the contributions of the individual commentators sepa 
rately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except 
when there is a specially new development, the system is to be 
interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators 
treating their contributions as forming one whole. 

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival 
systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark 
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always 
written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to 
be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever 
he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections 
put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects 
of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It 
is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objec 
tions and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his 
destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are 
referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the 
views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit 
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different 
from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, 
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, 
that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid 
of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not 
widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced 



iv] Different Types of Literature 67 

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that par 
ticular system are expressed in such close interconnection with 
the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood 
without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in 
particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth 
of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian 
philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual 
opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at 
which they ceased to grow and came to a stop a purpose for 
which a work like the present one may only be regarded as 
forming a preliminary introduction. 

Besides the sutras and their commentaries there are also in 
dependent treatises on the systems in verse called kdrikds % which 
try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct 
manner; the Sdmkhya kdrikd may be mentioned as a work of this 
kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, 
commentaries, or general observations on any system written in 
verses called the varttikas; the Slokavdrttika, of Kumarilaor the 
Vdrttika of SuresVara may be mentioned as examples. All these 
of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition 
to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose 
in which the writers either nominally followed some selected 
sutras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class 
the Nydyamanjarl of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example 
and of the latter the Prasastapdda bhdsya, the Advaitasiddhi of 
Madhusudana Sarasvati or the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmara- 
jadhvarindra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a 
masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they 
adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of 
their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their 
commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the 
growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 
500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in 
the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some 
minor publications are seen to come out. 

The Indian Systems of Philosophy. 

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, 
namely, the nastika and the dstika. The nastika (na asti "it is 
not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible 

52 



68 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are 
principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. 
The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, 
Yoga, Vedanta, Mlmamsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika, generally known 
as the six systems (saddarsana 1 }. 

The Samkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the 
earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga 
system is attributed to Patafljali and the original sutras are called 
the Pdtanjala Yoga sutras. The general metaphysical position 
of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and 
the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this 
that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (Isvara) as distinct 
from Atman and lays much importance on certain mystical 
practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achieve 
ment of liberation, whereas the Samkhya denies the existence of 
Isvara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture 
are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and 
thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system 
of Samkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system 
associated with Pataftjali are but two divergent modifications of 
an original Samkhya school, of which we now get only references 
here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted 
as two should more properly be looked upon as two different 
schools of the same Samkhya system one may be called the 
Kapila Samkhya and the other Pataftjala Samkhya. 

The Purva Mlmamsa (from the root man to think rational 
conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philo 
sophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with 
which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices. 

1 The word "darfana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest 
use in the Vatiesika sutras of Kanada (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre- Buddhistic. 
The Buddhist pitakas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit drsti 
from the same root drs from which darana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) 
uses the word Dars"ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadarsancrvacyt? 
rthah Saddarsanasamuccaya I.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the 
word also in the same sense (" Yadi nama darfane darfane nanaprakaram sattvalak- 
sanam uktamasti." Ksanabhangasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts, p. 20). Madhava 
(1331 A.D. ) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadarsanasamgraha. 
The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other 
systems. But there is no word to denote philosophers in the technical sense. The 
Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views " tairthika." The words "siddha," 
"jndnin" etc. do not denote philosophers in the modern sense, they are used rather in 
the sense of " seers" or "perfects." 



iv] Purva Mlmamsa 69 

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, 
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a 
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the 
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view 
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may 
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact 
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex 
Vedic context. The Mlmamsa formulated some principles accord 
ing to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions 
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it 
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, 
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in 
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite 
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and 
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and 
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is 
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a 
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical 
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary 
discussions in the Mlmamsa that it may be called a system of 
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of 
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this 
day. The sutras of Mlmamsa are attributed to Jaimini, and abara 
wrote a bhasya upon it. The two great names in the history of 
Mlmamsa literature after Jaimini and abara are Kumarila Bhatta 
and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master 
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, 
and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views 
of Kumarila Bhatta pass as bhatta-matd 1 . It may not be out of 
place to mention here that Hindu Law (smrtt) accepts without 
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated 
by the Mlmamsa. 

1 There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit 
sentence " Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaruktam" (hence spoken twice). 
Tunoktam phonetically admits of two combinations, tu noktam (but not said) and tuna 
uktam (said by the particle tu) and tatrapi noktam as tatra api na uktam (not said also 
there) and tatra apina uktam (said there by the particle apt). Under the first inter 
pretation the sentence would mean, " Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken 
twice." This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed 
out to him that the meaning was here it is indicated by tu and there by api, and so it is 
indicated twice." Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) 
at this. 



7o Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

The Veddnta sutras, also called Uttara Mlmamsa, written by 
Badarayana, otherwise known as the Brahma-sutras, form the 
original authoritative work of Vedanta. The word Vedanta means 
"end of the Veda," i.e. the Upanisads, and the Veddnta sutras are 
so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general 
views of the Upanisads. This work is divided into four books or 
adhyayas and each adhyaya is divided into four padas or chapters. 
The first four sutras of the work commonly known as Catuhsutri 
are (i) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth 
and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, 
(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upanisads. 
The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to 
justifying the position of the Vedanta against the attacks of the 
rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in 
dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are 
devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of in 
dividual Upanisad texts. The really philosophical portion of the 
work is thus limited to the first four sutras and the first arid second 
chapters of the second book. The other portions are like com 
mentaries to the Upanisads, which however contain many theo 
logical views of the system. The first commentary of the Brahma- 
siitra was probably written by Baudhayana, which however is not 
available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that 
of the great Sankara. His interpretations of the Brahma-sutras 
together with all the commentaries and other works that follow 
his views are popularly known as Vedanta philosophy, though 
this philosophy ought more properly to be called Visuddhadvaita- 
vada school of Vedanta philosophy (i.e. the Vedanta philosophy 
of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic 
philosophy as represented by the Vaisnavas, aivas, Ramayatas, 
etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma 
sutras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as 
Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva, rlkantha, Baladeva, etc., have 
written independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra to show 
that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of 
the Upanisads and as summarized in the Brahma-sutras. These 
differed largely and often vehemently attacked Sarikara s inter 
pretations of the same sutras. These systems as expounded by 
them also pass by the name of Vedanta as these are also claimed 
to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedanta (Upanisads) 



iv] Some Points of Agreement 7 i 

and the Veddnta sutras. Of these the system of Ramanuja has 
great philosophical importance. 

The Ny ay a sutras attributed to Gautama, called also Aksapada, 
and the VaiSesika sutras attributed to Kanada, called also Uluka, 
represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are 
in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor 
importance. So far as the sutras are concerned the Nydya sutras 
lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while 
the Vaisesika sutras deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. 
In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philoso 
phies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon 
largely as modifications of the Samkhya and Vedanta systems, 
though their own contributions are also noteworthy. 

Some fundamental Points of Agreement, 
i. The Karma Theory. 

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the 
Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some funda 
mental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India 
were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the 
human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in 
abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of 
the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the ] 
postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found / 
to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be 
their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general 
postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the summum 
bonum of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in 
thorough agreement It may be worth while to note some of them 
at this stage. 

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems 
agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual 
leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to 
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good 
or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot 
be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual 
has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to 
suffer them. 

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent 
at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic 




72 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest 
error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical 
virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately 
or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the 
Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain 
mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects 
without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible 
agents of ordinary cause and effect When the sacrifice is per 
formed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called 
the adrsta (the unseen) or the apurva (new), that by it the desired 
object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus 
operandi of the apurva is unknown. There is also the notion 
prevalent in the Samhitas, as we have already noticed, that he 
who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he 
who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. 
These were probably associated with the conception of rta, the 
inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements 
which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well 
established but not emphasized in the Upanisads, where it is said 
that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad 
births. 

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma 
doctrine as established in the astika systems we find that it was 
believed that the unseen {adrsta) potency of the action generally 
required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the 
merited punishment or enjoyment These would often accumulate 
and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in 
his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely 
wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The 
nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of 
pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for 
him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences deter 
mined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be 
realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a 
goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world 
process, so there is no time at which any person first began his 
actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past 
lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of 
life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus when 
ever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man, 



iv] Theory of Karma 73 

the special instincts of that life (technically called vdsana) come 
forth. In accordance with these vasanas the person passes through 
the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by 
his action. The length of life is also determined by the number 
and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying 
actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for 
giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those 
actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the 
person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But 
even such an emancipated (muktd} person has to pass through 
the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the 
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds 
of actions, white or virtuous (sukla), black or wicked (krsna), 
white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (fukla-krsna) as 
most of our actions are, neither black nor white (asuklakrsqa), 
i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not 
associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person 
can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action 
that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. 
He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which 
have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true 
knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, 
and as his acts are only of the aSuklakrsna type no fresh karma 
for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all 
karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone. 

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech 
and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is pro 
duced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that 
attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and 
sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul 
during the infinite number of past lives is technically called kdr- 
masartra,v/hich encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. 
This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and ex 
hausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment 
of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being 
expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by 
his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of 
suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated 
in the soul produces a kind of coloration called lesyd, such as 
white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The 



74 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

idea of the ukla and krsna karmas of the Yoga system was pro 
bably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from 
passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, 
his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is 
then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously 
earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect 
and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict 
adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and 
when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the 
person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of 
contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities 
having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top 
of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever. 

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma 
theory which however being intimately connected with their 
metaphysics will be treated later on. 

2. The Doctrine of Mukti. 

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the 
inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case 
of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births 
and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the 
basis of the mysterious connection of one s actions with the 
happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that 
this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and re 
births, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere 
its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or 
in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma 
leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of 
all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should 
find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, 
neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied 
by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and 
believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they 
generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could 
be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all 
action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the 
connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, 
artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched 
by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance 



iv] Pessimism and Optimism 75 

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginning- 
less time that we connect it with these. The realization of this 
transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless 
cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did 
not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final 
realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate 
dissolution called Nirvana, the nature of which we shall discuss 
latei on. 

3. The Doctrine of Soul. 

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence 
of a permanent entity variously called atman, purusa or jlva. 
As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed diver 
gences of view. Thus while the Nyaya calls it absolutely 
qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, 
Samkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure conscious 
ness, the Vedanta says that it is that fundamental point of unity 
implied in pure consciousness (cit\ pure bliss (dnanda), and pure 
being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied 
in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not 
form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained 
when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self 
is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other ex 
traneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated. 

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the 
Optimistic Faith in the end. 

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been 
equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be 
considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest 
utterance in Samkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable 
chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as 
nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the 
meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures 
are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is 
painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are 
anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much asso 
ciated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped 
when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All 
our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow- 
begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the 



76 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable 
appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as 
painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness 
to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin 
is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of dis 
turbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot 
be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, 
for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot 
also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually 
being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to 
another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of 1 
it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge 
which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self 1 
is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, 
that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoy 
ment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through 
the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion 
towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech 
from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self 
shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. 
When this is once done the self can never again be associated 
with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately 
dissociated from citta which contains within it the root of all 
emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever 
conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this 
connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion 
to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed 
person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti 
as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic 
creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity 
peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency 
to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through 
right performance and right understanding. It is only when a 
man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for 
aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which 
all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only 
shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as 
sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from 
all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. 
In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some 



iv] Unity in Sadhana 77 

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the funda 
mental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the 
complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically 
deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember 
that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The 
pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic 
confidence in one s own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of 
emancipation. 

Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious 
and ethical endeavours). 

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon 
the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed 
for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be con 
trolled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all 
desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are 
almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very 
high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare 
his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment 
of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with 
regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are 
indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the 
means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essen 
tially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only 
in later times that devotion (bhaktf) is seen to occupy a more 
prominent place specially in Vaisnava schools of thought. Thus 
it was that though there were many differences among the various 
systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and 
the means for the attainment of the goal (sadhana) being funda 
mentally the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sadhana 
of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been 
universal in India and this uniformity of sadhana has therefore 
secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings. 



CHAPTER V 

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 

MANY scholars are of opinion that the Samkhya and the Yoga 
represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also 
suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. 
It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the 
systematic Samkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had 
decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known 
to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the 
Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of 
the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is 
therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different 
systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It 
seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism 
first 

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha. 

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different 
philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before 
Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upanisads are well known, and 
these have already been briefly described. But these were not the 
only ones. Even in the Upanisads we find references to diverse 
atheistical creeds 1 . We find there that the origin of the world 
and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought 
that " time " was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these 
had sprung forth by their own nature (svabhdVa\ others that 
everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable 
destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or 
through matter combinations in general. References to diverse 
kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no 
detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upanisad 
type of materialists the two schools of Carvakas (Dhurtta and 
SuSiksita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in 
which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered 2 . But it seems 

1 i->vetas"vatara, I. 2, kalah svabhabo niycUiryadrcchd bhutaniyonih purusa iti cintyam. 

2 Lokayata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have 
been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gunaratna 
on the Lokayatas. 



CH. v] C&rvakas 79 

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained 
in the Upanisads refers to these or to similar schools. The 
Carvakas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any 
other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life 
and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, 
just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with 
yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses 
(madasakti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as 
there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So 
long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as every 
thing will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt 
to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in 
the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can 
be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the 
distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon 
some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy 
the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case 
any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and 
there is no certitude about it They were called Carvaka because 
they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or 
moral responsibility. The word comes from caru to eat. The 
Dhurtta Carvakas held that there was nothing but the four 
elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the 
result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no 
virtue or vice. The Susiksita Carvakas held that there was 
a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with 
the destruction of the body. The original work of the Carvakas 
was written in sutras probably by Brhaspati. Jayanta and Gunar- 
atna quote two sutras from it. Short accounts of this school may be 
found in Jayanta s Nydyamanjari, Madhava s Sarvadarsanasam- 
graha and Gunaratna s Tarkarahasyadipikd. Mahdbhdrata gives 
an account of a man called Carvaka meeting Yudhisthira. 

Side by side with the doctrine of the Carvaka materialists we 
are reminded of the Ajlvakas of which Makkhali Gosala, probably 
a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahavira and a contemporary 
of Buddha and Mahavira, was the leader. This was a thorough 
going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral 
responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of 
Makkhali s system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate 
or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They 



8o Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one s 
own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends 
on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, 
or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due 
to fate, to their environment and their own nature 1 ." 

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught 
that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds ; there is no 
other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any 
former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that 
we can do prevents any of us alike from being, wholly brought to 
an end at death 2 . 

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the 
sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any 
person could attain anything he desired ; secondly the Upanisad 
teaching that the Brahman^ the self, is the ultimate reality and 
being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do 
not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the 
real and true, and this is self. .Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions 
that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes 
into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some 
unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably 
come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in 
the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of 
traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue 
of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they 
gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational 
basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These 
were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the 
nebulous Samkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain 
sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting 
a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which 
thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity 
to come. If the Being of the Upanisads, the superlatively motion 
less, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new 
speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of 
interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous con 
course of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the 
direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical 

1 Samannaphaia-sutta, Digha, li. 20 Hoemle s article on the Ajivakas, E. R. E. 

2 Sdmannaphala-sutta, II. 23. 



v] Buddha s Life 81 

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that 
was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into 
account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, 
we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic 
contribution to philosophy. 

Buddha : his Life. 

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. 
in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in 
the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, 
a prince of the Sakya clan, and his mother Queen Mahamaya. 
According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would 
enter upon the ascetic life when he should see " A decrepit old 
man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried 
his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and 
surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, 
issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four 
things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and 
realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to 
forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to 
immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his " Great 
Renunciation " when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled 
on foot to Rajagrha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvela, where in 
company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of 
extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length 
that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down sense 
less and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great 
struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by 
the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course 
of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment There 
after the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in 
travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to 
all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha 
realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered 
into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained 
nirvana 1 . The vast developments which the system of this great 
teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in 
other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will 
probably take yet many years more before even the materials for 

1 Mahdparinibbanasutfanta, Dtgha, XVI. 6, 8, 9. 
D. 6 



82 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess 
it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and 
subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to over 
estimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization 
of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding 
centuries. 

Early Buddhist Literature. 

The BuddhistPali Scriptures containthree different collections : 
the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the 
discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally 
to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a 
scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious 
history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates 
for the collection or composition of the different parts of the 
aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were 
however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very 
probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were 
completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during 
the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine 
(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals 
only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. 
The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that 
of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. 
Buddhaghosa in his introduction to Atthasdlinl^ the commentary 
on the Dhammasangani, says that the Abhidhamma is so called 
(abhi and dhamma) because it describes the same Dhammas as are 
related in the suttas in a more intensified (dhammatirekd) and 
specialized (dhammavisesatthend) manner. The Abhidhammas 
do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but 
they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found 
in the suttas. Buddhaghosa in distinguishing the special features 
of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement 
of the former leads one to attain meditation (samadhi) whereas 
the latter leads one to attain wisdom (panndsampadam). The force 
of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the 
suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is 
not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in 
enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a 
technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned 



v] Early Buddhist Literature 83 

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving 
for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. 
The Abhidhamma known as the Kathavatthu differs from the 
other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views 
of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed 
in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the 
opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory 
assumptions. 

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikayas. 
These are (i) Dlgha Nikdya, called so on account of the length 
of the suttas contained in it; (2) Majjhima Nikaya (middling 
Nikaya), called so on account of the middling extent of the 
suttas contained in it ; (3) Samyutta Nikdya (Nikayas relating 
to special meetings), called samyutta on account of their being 
delivered owing to the meetings (samyogd) of special persons which 
were the occasions for them ; (4) Anguttara Nikdya, so called be 
cause in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion 
increase by one 1 ; (5) Khuddaka Nikdya containing Khuddaka 
patha, Dhammapada, Uddna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipdta, Vimdna- 
vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathd, Therlgdthd, Jdtaka, Niddesa, 
Patisambhiddmagga, Apaddna, Buddhavamsa, Carydpitaka. 

The Abhidhammas are Patthdna, Dhammasangani, Dhdtu- 
kathd, Puggalapannatti, Vibhanga, Yamaka and Kathavatthu. 
There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts 
of the above works known as atthakatha. The work known as 
Milinda Panha (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is 
of considerable philosophical value. 

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature 
is generally now known as Sthaviravada or Theravada. On the 
origin of the name Theravada (the doctrine of the elders) Dlpa- 
vamsa says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) 
and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vada*. It 
does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pali litera 
ture developed much since the time of Buddhaghosa (400 A.D.), the 
writer of "Visuddhimagga (a compendium of theravada doctrines) 
and the commentator of Dlghanikdya, Dhammasangani^ etc. 

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced 
by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but 
it does not appear that Pali Buddhism had any share in it. I 

1 See Buddhaghosa s Atthasdlini, p. 25. z Oldenberg s Dipavamsa, p. 31. 

62 



84 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could 
be considered as being acquainted with Pali. 

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism 1 . 

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally 
in four senses: (i) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (guna), (3) cause 
(hetu) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (nissatta nijjlva?). Of 
these it is the last meaning which is particularly important from 
the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist 
philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all 
reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial pheno 
mena and these were called jjharnmas. The question arises that 
if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the 
phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing 
away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find 
out " What being what else is," " What happening what else 
happens" and " What not being what else is not." The pheno 
mena are happening in a series and we see that there being 
certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening 
of some events others also are produced. This is called (paticca- 
samuppddd) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand 
what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as 
Samyutta Nikdya (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started 
before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition 
are the people ! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away 
and are born again ; and they do not know the path of escape 

i from this decay, death and misery. 

How to know the way to escape from this misery of decay 
and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay 
and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought 
deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay 
and death can only occur when there is birth (jdti), so they depend 

1 There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine 
of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Samyutta Nikdya as the earliest 
Buddhist view, as Samyutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as 
this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine 
and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjec 
tural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact. 

a Atthasdtini, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as 
dhamma desand where it means religious teaching. The Lankavat&rn described Dharmma 
as gunadravyapurvaka dharmma, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attrii 
butes and substances. 



v] Doctrine of Causal Connection 85 

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth 
depend ? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if 
there were previous existence (bhava) 1 . But on what does this 
existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it 
occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there 
were holding fast (updddnd)*. But on what did upadana depend? 
It occurred to him that it was desire (tanha) on which upadana 
depended. There can be upadana if there is desire (tanha)*. But 
what being there, can there be desire ? To this question it 
occurred to him that there must be feeling (yedana) in order that 
there may be desire. But on what does vedana depend, or rather 
what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedanaft To this 
it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (phassa) 
in order that there may be feeling 4 . If there should be no sense- 
contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense- 
contact depend ? It occurred to him that as there are six sense- 
contacts, there are the six fields of contact (dyatana)*. But on 
what do the six ayatanas depend ? It occurred to him that 
there must be the mind and body (ndmariipa) in order that there 
may be the six fields of contact 6 ; but on what does namarupa 
depend ? It occurred to him that without consciousness (vinndnd) 
there could be no namarupa 6 . But what being there would there 

1 This word bhava is interpreted by Candraklrtti in his Madhyamika vrtti, p. 565 
(La Vallee Poussin s edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhava- 

janakam karma samutthdpayati k.yena vdcd manasd ca). 

2 Atthasalini, p. 385,upadanantidalhagahanarn. Candraklrtti in explaining upadana 
says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for 
attaining it (yatra vastuni satrsnastasya vastuno rjandya vidhapandya updddnamupd- 
datte tatra tatra prdrthayate). Madhyamika vrtti, p. 565. 

3 Candraklrtti describes trsna as dsvddandbhinandanddhyavasdnasthdndddtmapri- 
yarupairviyogo md bhut, nityamapantydgo bhavediti, yeyam prdrthand the desire 
that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to 
us. Ibid. 565. 

4 We read also of phassayatana and phassakaya. M. N. II. 261, III. 280, etc. Can- 
drakirtti says that sadbhirdyatanadvdraih krtyaprakriydh pravarttante prajAdyante. 
tanndmarupapratyayam saddyatanamucyate. sadbhyafcdyatanebhyah satsparSakdydh 
pravarttante. M. V. 565. 

5 Ayatana means the six senses together with their objects. Ayatana literally is 
" Field of operation." Salayatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candra 
klrtti has dyatanadvdraih. 

8 I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering namarupa as mind and body, 
Compendium, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called 
nama in each birth. These together with rupa (matter) give us namarupa (mind 
and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates 
possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf.M. V. 564. Govindananda, the commentator 



86 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

be viftftana. Here it occurred to him that in order that there 
might be viftftana there must be the conformations (sankhdra) 1 . 
But what being there are there the sarikharas ? Here it occurred 
to him that the sarikharas can only be if there is ignorance 
(avijja). If avijja could be stopped then the sankharas will be 
stopped, and if the sarikharas could be stopped viftflana could be 
stopped and so on*. 

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha 
actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence 
sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and 
death (jardmarand) could not have happened if there was no 
birth*. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty 
begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was 

on Sankara s bhasya on the Brahma-sutras (n. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of 
Namarupa which may probably refer to the Vijnanavada view though we have no means 
at hand to verify it. He says To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; 
from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation ; from 
there the first vijftana or thought of the foetus is produced ; from that alayavijfiana, and 
the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, 
and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rupa. 
Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama 
signifies the semen and the ovum while rupa means the visible physical body built out 
of them. Vijflana entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced 
through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalpataru, pp. 274, 275. On 
the doctrine of the entrance of vijfiana into the womb compare D. N. n. 63. 

1 It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was 
one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseo 
logy with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in 
more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore 
rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definitemeaningwhichwe find 
in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S. N. III. p. 87, " Sankhatam abhisahkharonti" 
sankhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is trans 
lated as will, action. Mr Aung thinks that it means the same as karma ; it is here used 
in a different sense from what we find in the word sankhara khandha (viz. mentat 
states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sankhara khandha in Dhamma 
Sangani, p. 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. 
In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasamskara, it also counts thirteen cittavi- 
prayuktasainskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and 
infatuation, p. 563. Govindananda, the commentator on Sankara s Brahma-sutra (ll. ii. 
19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as 
attachment, antipathy and infatuation. 

a Samyutta Nikdya, II. 7-8. 

3 Jara and marana bring in oka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), duhkha (suffer 
ing), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of 
extreme destitution) at the prospect of one s death or the death of other dear ones. 
All these make up suffering and are the results of jati (birth). M. V. (B. T. S. p. ao8). 
Sankara in his bhasya counted all the terms from jara, separately. The whole series 
is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha. 



v] Theory of Rebirth 87 

enunciated in the Upanisads. The Brhadaranyaka says that just 
as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort 
collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of 
this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes 
another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been 
before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove 
the doctrine of rebirth 1 . All schools of philosophy except the 
Carvakas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Car- 
vaka sutras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this 
doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not 
criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an 
infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of 
a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them 
in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the 
Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth 
might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (bhava). 
If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candraklrtti takes 
it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only 
take place on account of the works of a previous existence which 
determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upanisad note I 
N / < as a man does so will he be born " ( Yat karma kurute tadabhi- 
sampadyate, Brh. IV. iv. 5). Candraklrtti s interpretation of "bhava" 
as Karma (Jrunarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit 
better than " existence." The word was probably used rather 
loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the 
earlier Upanisads and was used in the Pali scriptures for the 
first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this 
bhava depend ? There could not have been a previous existence 
if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they 
desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accord 
ance with desire is called upadana. In the Upanisads we read, 
" whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" ( Yatkratur- 
bhavati tatkarmma kurute, Brh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to 
the thing depends upon desire (trsnd), it is said that in order 
that there may be upadana there must be tanha. In the Upani 
sads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake 
himself to" (sa yathdkamo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither 
the word upadana nor trsna (the Sanskrit word corresponding 

1 The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works 
such as the Nyaya, etc., are slight and inadequate. 



88 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to tanha) is found in the earlier Upanisads, but the ideas contained 
in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kdma." Desire 
(tanha) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. 
Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation 1 . 
These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the 
whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) 
called namarupa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani 
sads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and 
names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable 
reality 2 . Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga says that by 
" Name " are meant the three groups beginning with sensation 
(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" 
the four elements and form derivative from the four elements 1 . 
He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, 
such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form 
also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like 
the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and 
effectuate the changes 4 .( But there exists no heap or collection 
of material for the production of Name and Form ; " but just as 
when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound ; 
and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from 
any such store ; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the 
cardinal or intermediate points of the compass ;...in exactly the 
same way all the elements of being both those with form and 
those without, come into existence after having previously been 
non-existent and having come into existence pass away 5 ." Nama 
rupa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and 
body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found 
to operate in the six doors of sense (saldyatand). If we take 
namarupa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend 
upon the vinflana (consciousness). Consciousness has been com 
pared in the Milinda Panha with a watchman at the middle of 

1 The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upanisads in the sense 
of "field or place," Cha. I. 5, Brh. in. 9. 10, but sadayatana does not occur. 

2 Candraklrtti interprets nama as Vedanddayo rtipinas catvarah skandhdstatra tatra 
bha-vt namayantiti nama. saha rupaskandhena ca ndma rupam ctti namarupamucyate. 
The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rupa make 
namarupa. M. V. 564. 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 184. 

* Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvn. 

* Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvn. 



v] Theory of Consciousness 89 

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction 1 . Bud- 
dhaghosa in the Atthasdlini also says that consciousness means 
that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics 
we must say that it knows (vijdnana), goes in advance (pubbah- 
gama\ connects (sandhdna), and stands on namarupa (ndmarupa- 
padatthdnam). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place 
the objects of sense are discerned (drammana-vibhdvanatthdne) 
and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen 
by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the 
dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only 
by the consciousness 2 . Buddhaghosa also refers here to the passage 
in the Milinda Pahha we have just referred to. He further goes 
on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, 
they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and 
consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the 
aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost ; but there are the four 
aggregates as namarupa, it stands on nama and therefore it is 
said that it stands on namarupa. He further asks, Is this con 
sciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different 
from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows 
itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those 
in truth ; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected 
heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that 
the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness 
takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So 
though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different 
from them*. 

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jati 
(birth) is the cause of decay and death, jardmarana, etc. Jati is 
the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas 4 . 
Coming to bhava which determines jati, I cannot think of any 
better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 182. Milinda Panha (62 s ). 

8 Atthasdlini, p. in. 

1 Ibid. p. 113, Yathd hi rupddtni upaddya pannattd suriyddayo na atthato rupd- 
dihi anne honti ten 1 eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samayc fossa tejd-san- 
khdtam rupam piti evam vuccamdne pi na rupddihi anno suriyo ndma atthi. Tatha 
cittam phassddayo dhammc upaddya pafinapiyati. Atthato pan ettha tehi annam eva. 
Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppannam hoti ekamsen eva tasmin samaye phassadihi 
atthato annad eva hoti ti. 

4 "Jdtirdehajanma pancaskandhasamuddyah" Govindananda s Ratnaprabhd on 
Sankara s bhasya, II. ii. 19. 



9O Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth 1 . 
Upadana is an advanced trsna leading to positive clinging 2 . It 
is produced by trsna (desire) which again is the result of vedana 
(pleasure and pain). But this vedana is of course vedana with 
ignorance (avtdyd), for an Arhat may have also vedana but as 
he has no avidya, the vedana cannot produce trsna in turn. On 
its development it immediately passes into upadana. Vedana 
means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one 
side it leads to trsna (desire) and on the other it is produced by 
sense-contact (sparsa). Prof. De la Valise Poussin says that 
Irmlabha distinguishes three processes in the production of 
vedana. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and 
the object ; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then 
there is the vedana. Depending on Majjhima Nikdya, iii. 242, 
Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two 
sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also 
vedana takes place simultaneously with sparsa for they are 
" produits par un meme complexe de causes (sdmagri)*" 

Sparsa is produced by sadayatana, sadayatana by riamarupa, 
and namarupa by vijfiana, and is said to descend in the womb 
of the mother and produce the five skandhas as namarupa, out 
of which the six senses are specialized. 

Vijflana in this connection probably means the principle or 
germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the 
five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the 
past karmas (sahkhdrd) of the dying man and of his past 
consciousness too. 

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last 
thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next 

1 Govindananda in his Ratnaprabha on ankara s bhasya, II. ii. 19, explains " bhava " 
as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dkarmddi). See also 
Vibhanga, p. 137 and Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in 
Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kamraabhavo (the active side of 
an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that 
bhava is a contraction of " kammabhava " or Karma becoming i.e. karmic activity. 

2 Prof. De la Vallee Poussin in his Thtorie des Douse Causes, p. 26, says that 
Salistambhasutra explains the word "upadana" as "trsnavaipulya" or hyper-trsna 
and Candrakirtti also gives the same meaning, M. V. (B. T. S. p. 210). Govindananda 
explains "upadana" as pravrtti (movement) generated by trsna (desire), i.e. the active 
tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upadana means "support" it would denote all 
the five skandhas. Thus Madhyamaka vrtti says upaddnam pancaskandhalaksanam . . . 
pancopadanaskandhakhyam up&ddnam. M. V. xxvn. 6. 

3 Poussin s Thorie des Douzt Causes, p. 23. 



v] Consciousness and Rebirth 91 

birth 1 . The manner in which the vijftana produced in the womb 
is determined by the past vijnana of the previous existence is 
according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, 
like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, 
like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress 
of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, 
so death also is but a similar change ; there is no great break, 
but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. 
New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale 
pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp 
is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the 
vijftana resulting from his previous karmas and vijftanas enters 
into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which 
the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijftana thus forms 
the principle of the new life. It is in this vijftana that name 
(ndma) and form (rupd) become associated. 

The vijftana is indeed a direct product of the samskaras and 
the sort of birth in which vijftana should bring down (ndmayati) 
the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the samskaras 8 , for 
in reality the happening of death (maranabhavd) and the instil 
lation of the vijftana as the beginning of the new life (upapatti- 
bkava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at 
the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that 
they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijftana had not entered 
the womb then no namarupa could have appeared*. 

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus 
avidya and samskara of the past life produce the vijftana, nama- 

1 The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the 
master of the house, Citta, ill said " make your resolution, May I be a cakravartti 
king in a next existence, " Samyutta, iv. 303. 

* "ja cedanandavijnanam matuhkuksim ndvakrameta, na tat kalalam kalalatvaya 
sannivartteta" M. V, 552. Compare Caraka, $drtra, ill. 5-8, where he speaks of a 
"upapaduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which 
the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a 
pure condition one can remember even the previous births ; character, purity, antipathy, 
memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is 
made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus. 

8 Madhyamaka vrtti (B.T. S. 102-203). Poussin quotes from Dtgka t n. 63, "si le 
vijnana ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s y constituerait-il ? " 
Govindananda on Sankara s commentary on the Brahma-sutras (n. ii. 19) says that the 
first consciousness (vijfiana) of the foetus is produced by the samskaras of the previous 
birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white 
and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbudavastha) is 
produced. 



92 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

rupa, sadayatana, sparSa, vedana, trsna, upadana and the bhava 
(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava 
produces the jati and jaramarana of the next life 1 . 

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain 
extending in three sections over three lives are all but the 
manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they natur 
ally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammatthasangaha 
says " each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite 
term sorrow, etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences 
of birth. Again when ignorance and the actions of the 
mind have been taken into account, craving (trmd\ grasping 
(updddnd) and (karma) becoming (bhava} are implicitly ac 
counted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping 
and (karma ) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance 
and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also ; 
and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even 
the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are 
accounted for. And thus : 

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold fruit. 

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold fruit make up 
the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (i. sahkhara and 
viftnana, 2. vedana and tanha, 3. bhava and jati) and the four 
groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the 
Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant 
group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) 2 ." 

These twelve interdependent links (dvddasahgd) represent 
the paticcasamuppada {pratityasamutpdda) doctrines (dependent 
origination) 3 which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles 
of sorrow. The term paticcasamuppada or pratltyasamutpada 
has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature 4 . 

1 This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts ; but Buddha- 
ghosa mentions it in Sumangalavilasini on Mahanidana suttanta. We find it also in 
Abhidhammatthasangaha, vin. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to 
the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the 
present. It is styled as trikandaka (having three branches) in Abhidharmakoia, in. 
20-14. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa 
pratityasamutpado dvadajangastrikandakah purvaparantayordve dve madhyestau." 

2 Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids translation of Abhidhammatthasangaha, pp. 189-190. 

3 The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues 
of the Buddha, n. 23 f., avijja and sankhara have been omitted and the start has been 
made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name 
and form ; it goes not beyond." 

4 M. V. p. 5 f. 



v] Avijja in Paticcasamuppada 93 

Samutpada means appearance or arising (prddurbhdva) and pra- 
titya means after getting (prati+i+ya)\ combining the two we 
find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending 
on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and 
paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in 
the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also 
used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijja is the 
paccaya of sarikhara it is meant that avijja is the ground (thiti) 
of the origin of the sarikharas, is the ground of their movement, 
of the instrument through which they stand (nimittatthiti\ of 
their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their 
intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause 
and of their function as the ground with reference to those which 
are determined by them. Avijja in all these nine ways is 
the ground of sarikhara both in the past and also in the future, 
thoug a avijja itself is determined in its turn by other grounds 1 . 
When we take the hetu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot 
think of anything else but succession, but when we take the 
paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the 
cause as ground. Thus when avijja is said to be the ground 
of the sarikharas in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems 
reasonable to think that the sarikharas were in some sense 
regarded as special manifestations of avijja 8 . But as this point 
was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would 
be unwise to proceed further with it. 

The Khandhas.^ 

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree 
and is generally used to mean group or aggregate*. We have 
seen that Buddha said that there was no atman (soul). He said 
that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, 
they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of 
them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical 
states which are immediate with us and are divided into five 

1 See Patisambhiddmagga, vol. I. p. 50 ; see also Majjhima Nikaya, I. 67, san- 

khara...avijjanidana avijjasamudaya avijjajatikd avijjapabhava. 

2 In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (antipathy) 
and abhinivesa (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the 
five special stages of the growth of avidya (pancaparva avidya}. 

3 The word skandha is used in Chandogya, n. 23 (trayo dharmaskandhdh yajnah 
adhyayanam ddnam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitri, 



94 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

classes: (i) rupa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense 
data, etc., (2) vedana (feeling pleasurable, painful and in 
different), (3) saflna (conceptual knowledge), (4) saiikhara (syn 
thetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound 
sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), 
(5) vinnana (consciousness) 1 . 

All these states rise depending one upon the other (paticca- 
samuppannd) and when a man says that he perceives the self he 
only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. 
The word rupa in rupakhandha stands for matter and material 
qualities, the senses, and the sense data 2 . But " rupa " is also 
used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind 
as we find in the Khandha Yamaka, I. p. 16, and also in Sam- 
yutta Nikdya, III. 86. Rupaskandha according to Dharma- 
samgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, 
and the implicatory communications associated in sense per 
ceptions (vijnapti). 

The elaborate discussion of Dhammasangani begins by defin 
ing rupa as " cattdro ca mahdbhiitd catunnanca mahdbhutdnam 
updddya rupam" (the four mahabhutas or elements and that 
proceeding from the grasping of that is called rupa) 3 . Buddha- 
ghosa explains it by saying that rupa means the four maha 
bhutas and those which arise depending (nissdyd) on them as 
a modification of them. In the rupa the six senses including 
their affections are also included. In explaining why the four 
elements are called mahabhutas, Buddhaghosa says : "Just as a 
magician (mdydkdrd) makes the water which is not hard appear 
as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold ; 
just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself 
appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not them 
selves blue make themselves appear as blue (nllam upddd rupam), 
not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red 
or white (pddtam updddrilpani), so on account of their similarity 
to the appearances created by the magician they are called 
mahabhuta 4 ." 

In the Samyutta Nikdya we find that the Buddha says, "O 
Bhikkhus it is called rupam because it manifests (rupyati}\ how 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, ill. 86, etc. 

2 Abhidhammatthasangaha, J. P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff. 

3 Dhammasangani, pp. 124-179. 4 Atthasalini, p. 299. 



v] Theory of Matter 95 

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and 
as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the 
sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rupa 1 ." 

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above 
for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand 
what is meant by rupa, I think we find that that which mani 
fested itself to the senses and organs was called rupa No dis 
tinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as 
colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their 
appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different 
and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the 
sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations 
were " rupa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were fol 
lowed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with 
the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. 
And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposi 
tion and duality were found neither in the Upanisads nor in the 
Samkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. 
The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and 
were therefore called rupa ; the forms of affection that appeared 
were also called rupa ; many other mental states or features 
which appeared with them were also called rupa 2 . The ayatanas 
or the senses were also called rupa*. The mahabhutas or four 
elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they 
together with all that appeared in association with them were 
called rupa and formed the rupa khandha (the classes of sense- 
materials, sense-data, senses and sensations). 

In Samyutta Nikdya (ill. 101) it is said that "the four 
mahabhutas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communica 
tion of the rupakkhandha (rupakkhandhassa panndpandya). Con 
tact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of 
feelings (vedana) ; sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya 
for the communication of the sanftakkhandha ; sense-contact is 
also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sahkhara- 
kkhandha. But namarOpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the 
communication of the viftnanakkhandha." Thus not only feelings 
arise on account of the sense-contact but saftfia and sarikhara 
also arise therefrom. Sanna is that where specific knowing or 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 86. 2 Khandhayamaka. 

3 Dhammasangani, p. 124 ff. 



g6 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific dis 
tinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place. 

Mrs Rhys Davids writing on saftfta says: "In editing the 
second book of the Abhidhamma pitaka I found a classification 
distinguishing between sanfta as cognitive assimilation on occasion 
of sense, and sanfta as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of 
naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposi 
tion (patigha-safina). This, writes Buddhaghosa, is perception on 
occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the 
impact of impressions ; of external things as different, we might 
say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or 
name (adhivackdnd-sannd) and is exercised by the sensus com- 
munis (mano), when e.g. one is seated... and asks another who 
is thoughtful : "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through 
his speech. Thus there are two stages of saftfia-consciousness, 
i. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they 
are by naming 1 ." 

About saiikhara we read in Samyutta Nikdya (ill. 87) that it 
is called sankhara because it synthesises (abhisankharonti), it is 
that which conglomerated rupa as rupa, conglomerated sanfta 
as saftna, sankhara as sankhara and consciousness (vinndnd) 
as consciousness. It is called sankhara because it synthesises 
the conglomerated (sankhatam abhisankharonti). It is thus a 
synthetic function which synthesises the passive rupa, saftna, 
sankhara and viftftana elements. The fact that we hear of 52 
sankhara states and also that the saiikhara exercises its syn 
thetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show 
that probably the word sankhara is used in two senses, as mental 
states and as synthetic activity. 

Viftftana or consciousness meant according to Buddhaghosa, 
as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage 
at which the intellectual process started and also the final 
resulting consciousness. 

Buddhaghosa in explainingthe process of Buddhist psychology 
says that "consciousness (citta) first comes into touch (phassa) with 
its object (arammana) and thereafter feeling, conception (sanna) 
and volition (cetana) come in. This contact is like the pillars of 
a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it 
(dabbasambhdrasadisd). But it should not be thought that contact 

1 Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50. 



v] Theory of Sense-contact 97 

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole 
consciousness (ekacittasmim) it cannot be said that this comes 
first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association 
with feeling (vedand), conceiving (sanna) or volition (cetana); 
it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends 
objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side 
of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes 
consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and 
visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is Its function; or 
it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, 
owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. 
For it is said in the Commentary: "contact in the four planes of 
existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the 
object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. 
For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name having the 
characteristic of touch as well as having the function of impact. 
But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic 
of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is 
quoted As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent 
the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. 
And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or 
two hands were to clap against each other, one hand would 
represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision 
contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the 
function of impact 1 . Contact is the manifestation of the union 
of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its 
effect is feeling (vedana)\ though it is generated by the objects 
it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing 
(anubhavd) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the 
taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only 
partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, 
of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere 
coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling 
alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste 
of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states 
are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of 
diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, 
breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup 
and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out 

1 Atthasalini, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144. 
D. 7 



98 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of 
various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, 
expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting 
of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object 
by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the 
food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and 
as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according 
to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys 
the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or 
experience is its function 1 ." 

The special feature of sanna is said to be the recognizing 
(paccabhinna) by means of a sign (abhinndnend). According to 
another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion 
of the totality (of aspects) sabbasahgahikavasena. The work of 
volition (cetand} is said to be coordination or binding together 
(abhisandahand), "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes 
a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 
Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking 
fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was 
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous ; he doubled his 
strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out 
the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, 
etc., and took an equal share of the work. The simile should be 
thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral 
states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five 
strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort 
by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of 
volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts 8 ." It 
seems that probably the active side operating in sarikhara was 
separately designated as cetana (volition). 

"When one says I, what he does is that he refers either to 
all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes him 
self that that was I. Just as one could not say that the 
fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the 
pollen, so one could not say that the rupa was I or that the 
vedana was I or any of the other khandhas was I. There is 
nowhere to be found in the khandhas I am 3 ." 

1 Atthasalinl, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146. 

2 Ibid. p. in ; translation, pp. 147-148. 

3 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 130. 



v] Ignorance 99 

Avijja and Asava. 

As to the question how the avijja (ignorance) first started 
there can be no answer, for we could never say that either 
ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning 1 . Its 
fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes 
in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we 
can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements 
which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by 
certain others. This mutual determination can only take place 
in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for 
there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority 
in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into 
being of the asavas or depravities that the avijja came into 
being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (asava) 
the avijja was- destroyed 2 . These asavas are classified in the 
Dhammasangani as kamasava, bhavasava, ditthasava and avij- 
jasava. Kamasava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst 
after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavasava means 
desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; ditthasava 
means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal 
or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not 
come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are 
different; avijjasava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its 
extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasangani adds 
four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of 
anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior 
and posterior together, and their mutual dependence 8 . Kamasava 
and bhavasava can as Buddhaghosa says be counted as one, for 
they are both but depravities due to attachment 4 . 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap, xvn.), p. 175. 

2 M. N. i. p. 54. Childers translates "asava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys 
Davids as " intoxicants." The word "asava" in Skr. means " old wine." It is derived 
from "su" to produce by Buddhaghosa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira 
parivasikatthena" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They 
work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. 
As those wines which are kept long are called "asavas" so these are also called 
asavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhaghosa gives is 
that they are called asava on account of their producing samsaradukkha (sorrows of 
the world), Atthasalini, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina asrava (flowing in of karma 
matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhaghosa, I have 
translated it as "depravities," after Childers. 

3 See Dhammasangani, p. 195. 4 Buddhaghosa s Atthasdltni, p. 371. 

72 



ioo Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The ditthasavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical 
views stand in the way of one s adopting the true Buddhistic doc 
trines. The kamasavas stand in the way of one s entering into 
the way of Nirvana (andgdmimagga} and the bhavasavas and 
avijjasavas stand in the way of one s attaining arhattva or final 
emancipation. When the Majjhima Nikdya says that from the 
rise of the asavas avijja rises, it evidently counts avijja there as 
in some sense separate from the other asavas, such as those of 
attachment and desire of existence which veil the true know 
ledge about sorrow. 

The afflictions (kilesas} do not differ much from the asavas 
for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar 
to us, such as covetousness (lob/ia), anger or hatred (dosa), 
infatuation (moha), arrogance, pride or vanity (mdna), heresy 
(ditthi), doubt or uncertainty (vicikicchd), idleness (thina), boast- 
fulness (udhacca\ shamelessness (ahirikd) and hardness of heart 
(anottapd); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the asavas. 
In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, 
dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are 
associated with the vedanakkhandha, safifiakkhandha, sarikharak- 
khandha and viftnanakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds 
of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind 1 . 

Sila and Samadhi. 

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the 
tangles of desire (tanhd jatd), and the only way by which these 
may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (slid), con 
centration (samddhi) and wisdom (panna). Sila briefly means 
the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (sabbapdpassa 
akaranam). With slla therefore the first start has to be made, 
for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires 
and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. 
This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper per 
formance of the slla would lead one to the first two successive 
stages of sainthood, viz. the sotapannabhava (the stage in which 
one is put in the right current) and the sakadagamibhava (the 
stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samadhi 
is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old 
kilesas are destroyed and the tanha or desire is removed and 

1 Dhammasahgani) p. 180. 



v] Right Conduct 101 

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It 
directly brings in panna (true wisdom) and by paftfia the saint 
achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an 
arhat 1 . Wisdom {panna) is right knowledge about the four 
ariya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause 
of destruction. 

Slla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. 
by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions 
maintains himself on the right path. Slla thus means i. right 
volition (cetana), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika\ 
3. mental control (samvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression 
(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind 
by the preceding three silas called avitikkama. Samvara is 
spoken of as being of five kinds. I. Patimokkhasamvara (the 
control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisamvara (the 
control of mindfulness), 3. Nanasamvara (the control of know 
ledge), 4. Khantisamvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriya- 
samvara (the control of active self-restraint). Patimokkha 
samvara means all self-control in general. Satisamvara means 
the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good 
associations when using one s cognitive senses. Even when 
looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindful- 
ness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to 
think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it 
as may lead in the right direction. Khantisamvara is that by 
which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the 
proper adherence to slla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities 
(kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samddhd- 
nam, upadhdranam, patittha)*. 

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a 
number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, 
dining, etc., which are called the dhutahgas or pure disciplinary 
parts 8 . The practice of slla and the dhutaiigas help the sage to 
adopt the course of samadhi. Samadhi as we have seen means 
the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusala- 
cittekaggatd samddhih) together with its states upon one parti 
cular object (ekdrammana) so that they may completely cease to 
shift and change (sammd ca avikkhipamdndy. 

1 Visuddhimagga Niddnddikathd. 8 Visuddhimagga-silaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8. 

3 Visuddhimajga, n. * Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85. 



IO2 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The man who has practised slla must train his mind first 
in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire 
the chief concentration of meditation called jhana (fixed and 
steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind 
for the acquirement of jhanasamadhi eventually lead to it 
and are called upacara samadhi (preliminary samadhi) as dis 
tinguished from the jhanasamadhi called the appanasamadhi 
(achieved samadhi) 1 , Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he 
has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appe 
titive desires for eating and drinking (ahare pa(ikkulasafina) by 
emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated 
in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome trans 
formations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man 
continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting 
associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attach 
ment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, 
only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows 
will come 8 . Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea 
that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, 
ksiti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase 
of a cow at the butcher s shop. This is technically called catu- 
dhatuvavatthanabhavana (the meditation of the body as being 
made up of the four elements) 3 . Thirdly he has to habituate his 
mind to think again and again (anussati} about the virtues or 
greatness of the Buddha, the sarigha (the monks following the 
Buddha), the gods and the law (dhammd) of the Buddha, about 
the good effects of slla, and the making of gifts (cdgdnussati), 
about the nature of death (marandnussati) and about the deep 
nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena 
(upasamanussati} 4 . 

1 As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to 
be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhana (Skr. dhvana] vith 
its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga, pp. 85 f.). 

2 Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, " 1 mart, ca 
pana ahare patikulasaftflam anuyitttassa bhikkhuno rasatanhaya cittam patiliyati, 
patikuttati, pativattati ; so, kantdranittharanatthiko viya piittamamsam vigatamado 
aharam ahareti yavadeva dukkhassa nittharanatthdya" p. 347. The mind of him who 
inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for 
palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of 
getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat 
the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest. 

* Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370. * Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-794. 



v] Meditation \ 03 

Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or pre 
parations called the upacara samadhi we come to those other 
sources of concentration and meditation called the appanasamadhi 
which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samadhi. 
The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind 
continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts 
which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbana. In the first part 
of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and 
notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and 
think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, 
and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies 
and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the 
dead carcases are as loathsome as they 1 . This is called asubhakam- 
matthana or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. 
He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the 
body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter 
into the first jhana by leading his mind away from his body. 
This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness 
about the nature of the body 2 . As an aid to concentration the 
sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling 
(passdsa) and the exhaling (dssdsa) of his breath, so that instead 
of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be 
aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to 
mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his 
mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole 
process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. 
This is called the anapanasati or the mindfulness of inhalation 
and exhalation 3 . 

Next to this we come to Brahmavihara, the fourfold medi 
tation of metta (universal friendship), karuna (universal pity), 
mudita (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and 
upekkha (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his 
friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to 
the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with think 
ing how he should himself like to root out all misery and become 
happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheer 
fully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also 
have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think 
that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is -ot 

1 Vmiddhimagga, VI. 2 Ibid. pp. 239-266. 3 Ibid. pp. 266-192. 



IO4 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself 
to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any 
difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. 
He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any 
time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on 
him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling 
his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He 
should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by 
anger, he would spoil all his sila which he was so carefully prac 
tising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, 
should he himself also do the same by being angry at it ? If he 
were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself 
indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas 
are momentary (khanikatta) ; that there no longer existed the 
khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the inflic 
tion of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was 
injured was himself an indispensable element in the production 
of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and 
there could not thus be any special reason for making him re 
sponsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking 
in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by 
indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through 
his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man 
by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not 
to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to 
free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish him 
self in an attitude of universal friendship 1 . This is called the 
metta-bhavana. In the meditation of universal pity (karuna) 
also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and 
foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for 
those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither 
acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to 
Nibbana, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow 2 . 

We next come to the jhanas with the help of material things 
as objects of concentration called the Kasinam. These objects of 
concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, 
yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space 
(paricchinndkdsa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth 
and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes 

1 Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314. 2 Ibid. pp. 314-315. 



v] Meditation 105 

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds 
that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his 
mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to 
concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind. 

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhdnani) 
the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding 
it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse 
relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive 
meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in 
which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms 
but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without 
any quivering. This state is called vicara (steadily moving). The 
first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhaghosa s Visud- 
dhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas 
the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the 
least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with 
a buoyant exaltation (/z7z)and a steady inward bliss called sukha 1 
instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhana roots out 
five ties of avijja, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyapado 
(hatred), thlnamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam 
(pride and restlessness), and vicikiccha (doubt). The five elements 
of which this jhana is constituted are vitakka, vicara, plti, sukham 
and ekaggata (one pointedness). 

When the sage masters the first jhana he finds it defective 
and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhdnam), 
where there is neither any vitakka nor vicara of the first jhana, 
but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhavam). It is a 
much steadier state and does not possess the movement which 
characterized the vitakka and the vicara stages of the first jhana 
and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicdrakkhobha- 
virahena ativiya acalatd suppasannata ca). It is however associ 
ated with plti, sukha and ekaggata as the first jhana was. 

When the second jhana is mastered the sage becomes disin 
clined towards the enjoyment of the plti of that stage and becomes 
indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the 
objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all 
the asavas of the sage become loosened (khtndsavd). Th 
enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and th 

1 Where there is plti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not 
necessarily be piti. Visuddhimagga, p. 145. 



106 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes 
to turn back to the enjoyment of piti again. The two character 
istics of this jhana are sukha and ekaggata. It should however 
be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, 
the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it 
(atimadhurasukhe sukhapdramippatte pi tatiyajjhdne upekkhako, 
na tattha sukhdbhisangena dkaddhiyatiy . The earth ball (pathavi] 
is however still the object of the jhana. 

In the fourth or the last jhana both the sukha (happiness) and 
the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment 
and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by 
supreme and absolute indifference (upekkhd) which was slowly 
growing in all the various stages of the jhanas. The characteris 
tics of this jhana are therefore upekkha and ekaggata. With the 
mastery of this jhana comes final perfection and total extinction 
of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an 
arhat 2 . There is no further production of the khandhas,-no rebirth, 
and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings 
Nibbana. 

Kamma. 

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fpol who is blinded 
with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he 
thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he 
comes again and again within my grasp." In the Dlgha Nikaya 
also we read how Payasi was trying to give his reasons in support 
of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there 
beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or 
result of deeds well done or ill done 3 ." Some of his arguments 
were that neither th vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us 
that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that 
if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed 
in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at 
the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precau 
tions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that 
his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of 
the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his argu 
ments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of 

1 Visuddhimagga, p. 163. 

2 Majjhima Nikaya, I. p. 296, and Visuddhimagja, pp. 167-168. 

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349; D.N. II. pp. 317 ff. 



v] Deeds and Desires 107 

Payasi s type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine 
of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the 
Upanisads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In 
the Milinda Panha, we find Nagasena saying " it is through a 
difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some 
long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some 
handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some 
rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low 
degree, some wise and some foolish 1 ." We have seen in the 
third chapter that the same sort of views was enunciated by the 
Upanisad sages. 

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any 
other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and in 
fatuation. But " when a man s deeds are performed without 
covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned with 
out covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these 
deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a 
palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring 
up again in the future 2 ." Karma by itself without craving (tanha) 
is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the 
Mahdsatipatthana sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, 
that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satis 
faction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of 
sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving 
for not becoming (for no new rebirth) 8 ." " Craving for things 
visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may 
be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These 
are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. 
There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell 4 ." Pre-occu- 
pation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to 
craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first 
arya satya (noble truth). 

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter 
cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving 
it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it 8 ." 

When the desire or craving (tanhd) has once ceased the 
sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after 
that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 215. 2 Ibid. pp. 216-217. 

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340. 4 Ibid. p. 341. 8 Ibid. p. 341. 



io8 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma 
finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all 
ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there 
is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the 
effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as 
Moggallana did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma 
an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of 
his desire 1 . 

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and 
mind (kdyika, vacika and mdnasika). The root of this kamma 
is however volition (cetana) and the states associated with it 2 . If 
a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of 
them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, 
his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually 
commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for com 
mitting a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out 
with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vacika) and not 
by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether 
carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mdna- 
sika)*. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of 
all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case 
of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him. 

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into 
four classes, viz. (i) those which are bad and produce impurity, 
(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those 
which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of 
both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor 
bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which 
contribute to the destruction of kammas 4 . 

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbdnd) takes place as the natural 
result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have 
tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and 
various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Valle"e 
Poussin has pointed out that in the Pali texts Nibbana has 
sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihila 
tion, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state 5 . 

1 See Kathavatlhu and Warren s Buddhism in Translations, pp. 111 ff. 

2 Atthasdlini) p. 88. * See Atthasalini, p. 90. 4 See Atthasalini, p. 89. 
6 Prof. De la Vallee Poussin s article in the E. K. E. on Nirvana. See also 

Cullavagga, ix. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids s Psalms of the early Buddhists, I. and n., 
Introduction, p. xxxvii; Digha, II. 15; Udana, vm. ; Samyutta, in. 109. 



v] Nibbana 1 09 

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbana in Pali Text Society Journal, 
1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become 
identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space 
(akasa) or consciousness (yiiindna) attained to a state in which 
they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having 
really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of 
Nibbana seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit 
of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task 
to explain Nibbana in terms of worldly experience, and there 
is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that 
it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly 
experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive 
or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not 
exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to 
think of a Tathagata as existing eternally (sdsvatd) or not- 
existing (asdsvata) or whether he is existing as well as not 
existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any 
one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbana is either a positive 
and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, 
takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. 
It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for 
we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to 
give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as 
illegitimate. 

Later Buddhistic writers like Nagarjuna and Candraklrtti 
took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and inter 
preted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. 
Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the exist 
ence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There 
is no difference between the wordly stage (samsdra) and Nibbana, 
for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during 
the samsara so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbana. 

Upanisads and Buddhism. 

The Upanisads had discovered that the true self was ananda 
(bliss) 1 . We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly pre 
supposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was 
the self (atta) it must be bliss. The Upanisads had asserted that 
the st\f(dtman) was indestructible and eternal*. If we are allowed 
1 Tail. n. 5. 2 Brh. iv. 5. 14. Katha. v. 13. 



no Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could 
conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, 
because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed 
been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upanisads, but he 
who carefully reads the Upanisads cannot but think that the 
reason why the Upanisads speak of the self as bliss is that it is 
eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal 
was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the 
Upanisads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that 
which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self 1 . 
The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upanisads lies 
in the experiences of the self. The Upanisads doubtless con 
sidered that there were many experiences which we often iden 
tify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is 
found in the Upanisads that there was associated with these a 
permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence 
which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They con 
sidered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined 
as this, but could only be indicated as .not this, not this (neti 
netiy. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere 
find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our 
changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and 
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self 
was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me 
as my self 8 . 

The true self was with the Upanisads a matter of tran 
scendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not 
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out 
as " there," behind all the changing mental categories. The 
Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But 
how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken 
of as demonstrated in experience ? To this the reply of the 
Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said 
that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences 
either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did 
not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise 
men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (rupa) 
or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He 

1 Samyutta Nikdya, in. pp. 44-45 if. 

- See Brh. IV. iv. Chandogya, vin. 7-12. 3 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 45. 



v] Upanisads and Buddhism 1 1 1 

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or ex 
perienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought 
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experi 
ences that he considered as the perception of the self 1 . 

The Upanisads did not try to establish any school of discipline 
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an 
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only 
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this 
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. 
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. 
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, 
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorf- 
ance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent 
the fourfold ignorance (avijj d) 2 . The avidya, which is equivalent 
to the Pali word avijja, occurs in the Upanisads also, but there! 
it means ignorance about the atman doctrine, and it is sometimes 
contrasted with vidya or true knowledge about the self (atmari)*. 
With the Upanisads the highest truth was the permanent self, 
the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and 
all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow 4 . 
This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance con 
cerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold 
ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of 
the fourfold cardinal truths (ariya saccd) sorrow, cause of the 
origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto. 

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no 
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we 
may ordinarily be led to suppose. 

Thus it is said in the Visuddhimagga " inasmuch however 
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming 
into existence and a disappearing from existence... and is empty 
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence, 
...or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and 
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest therefore is it 
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with 
a twelvefold emptiness 8 ." 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 46. 2 Majjhima Nikdya, I. p. 54. 

3 Cha. i. i. 10. Brh. iv. 3. 20. i here are some passages where vidya and avidya 
have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, Is^i 9-1 r. 

4 Ang. Nikdya, in. 85. 

5 Warren s Budakism in Translations {Visuddhimagga, chap. xvn. ), p. 175. 



1 1 2 Buddhist Philosophy [CH, 

The Schools of Theravada Buddhism. 

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the 
Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. 
Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst 
the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about 
his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined 
upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesali 
decided against the Vrjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, 
they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahasarigha) and 
came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus 
came to be called as the Mahasarighikas 1 . According to Vasu- 
mitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahasarighikas seceded in 
400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise 
first to the three schools Ekavyavaharikas, Lokottaravadins, and 
Kukkulikas and after that the Bahusrutlyas. In the course of the 
next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the 
Prajfiaptivadins, Caittikas, Aparasailas and Uttarasailas. The 
Theravada or the Sthaviravada school which had convened the 
council of Vesali developed during the second and first century B.C. 
into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, 
Mahlsasakas, Kasyaplyas, Sarikrantikas (more well known as 
Sautrantikas)andtheVatsiputtrIyas which latter was again split up 
into the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayaniyas, Sammitlyas and Chan- 
nagarikas. The main branch of the Theravada school was from 
the second century downwards known as the Hetuvadins or 
Sarvastivadins 2 . The Mahdbodhivamsa identifies the Theravada 
school with the Vibhajjavadins. The commentator of the Kathd- 
vatthu who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids some 
time in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of 
Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. 
Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of 

1 The Mahavamsa. differs from Dipa-vamsa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did 
not develop into the Mahasanghikas, but it was the Mahasarighikas who first seceded 
while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahdbodhivamsa, which 
according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D. IOOOA.D., follows the Maha 
vamsa in holding the Mahasanghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have 
seceded independently. 

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pataliputra. See 
introduction to translation of Kathavatthu by Mrs Rhys Davids. 

2 For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids s translation 
of Kathavatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv. 



v] Schools of Buddhism 113 

certain schools, of the Mahasarighikas, Lokottaravadins, Ekavya- 
vaharikas, Kukkulikas, Prajfiaptivadins and Sarvastivadins, but 
these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philo 
sophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (i) that the 
Mahasarighikas were said to believe that the body was filled with 
mind (cittd) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajfiap 
tivadins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no 
untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, 
(3) that the Sarvastivadins believed that everything existed. From 
the discussions found in the Kathdvatthu also we may know the 
views of some of the schools on some points which are not always 
devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found 
by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It 
is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism 
were not so many different systems but only differed from one 
another on some points of dogma or practice which were con 
sidered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now 
appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their 
literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. 
These schools are however not very important for a history of later 
Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any 
of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism 
with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct 
contact, are the Sarvastivadins including the Sautrantikas and 
the Vaibhasikas, the Yogacara or the Vijfianavadins and the 
Madhyamikas or the unyavadins. We do not know which of the 
diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, 
the Sautrantika, Vaibhasika, Yogacara and the Madhyamika 
schools. But as these schools were most important in relation 
to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, 
it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can 
about these systems of Buddhistic thought. 

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in 
general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling 
them the Vijflanavadins or the Yogacaras and the ^unyavadins, 
they often refer to the Sarvastivadins by which they mean 
both the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, ignoring the differ 
ence that exists between these two schools. It is well to 
mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the 
Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravada doctrines 

D. 8 



H4 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

as expressed in the Pali works. The Vaibhasikas and the Sau 
trantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus 
the Abhidharmakosasdstra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhasika 
was commented upon by Yasomitra who was a Sautrantika. The 
difference between the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas that 
attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former 
believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas 
the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could 
only be inferred from our diversified knowledge 1 . Gunaratna 
(fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadipikd 
QftSaddarsanasamuccaya says that the Vaibhasika was but another 
name of the Aryasammitlya school. According to Gunaratna the 
Vaibhasikas held that things existed for four moments, the 
moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of 
decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out 
in Vasubandhu s Abhidharmakosa that the Vaibhasikas believed 
these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination 
with the permanent essence of an entity produced its imperma 
nent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky s translation 
of Yasomitra on Abhidharmakosa kdrikd, V. 25). The self called 
pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was 
formless and was produced along with its object by the very 
same conditions (arthasahabhdsi ekasamdgryadhtnak). The Sau 
trantikas according to Gunaratna held that there was no soul but 
only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, 
the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, akasa and pudgala 
are but names (samjndmdtram}, mere assertions (flrattjndmdtram), 
mere limitations (samvrtamdtram) and mere phenomena (vya- 
vaharamdtram). By pudgala they meant that which other people 
called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never 
directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining 
the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all 
compounded things are momentary (ksanikdh sarvasamskdrd/i}. 

1 Madhavacarya s Sarvadarfanasamgraha, chapter n. Sastradipika, the discussions 
on Pratyaksa, Amalananda s commentary (on Bhamati} Vedantakalpataru, p. 286, 
vaibhasikasya bahyo rthah pratyaksah, sautrantikasya jftanagatakarcmaicitryen 
anumeyah." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantikas is shown thus by Amala- 
nanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kddacitkdh te tadatiriktapeksah" (those 
(i.e. cognitions) which in spite ol certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted 
diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) 
Veddntakalpataru, p. 289. 



v] Schools of Buddhism 115 

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are 
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always 
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is 
intended to be signified by that word (anydpohah sabdarthah). 
Salvation (mok$a) comes as the result of the destruction of the 
process of knowledge through continual meditation that there 
is no soul 1 . 

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavadins, Sau- 
trantikas and the Vaibhasikas or the Sarvastivadins appears to 
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest 
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus Abhidharmakosa (v. 24...) 
describes the Sarvastivadins as those who maintain the universal 
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajja 
vadins are those " who maintain that the present elements and 
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, 
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and 
of those among the past that have already produced fruition." 
There were four branches of this school represented by Dhar- 
matrata, Ghosa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrata main 
tained that when an element enters different times, its existence 
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd 
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes 
though the essence remains the same. Ghosa held that " when 
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its 
past aspects without being severed from its future and present 
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without 
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in 
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love 
other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasu 
mitra held that an entity is called present, past and future accord 
ing as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having 
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddha 
deva maintained the view that just as the same woman may 
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be 
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the 
preceding or the succeeding moment. 

All these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they 
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhasika finds them all 
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrata s 

1 Gunaratna s TarkarahasyadJpika, pp. 46-47. 

82 



u6 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

view is only a veiled Samkhya doctrine; that of Ghosa is a 
confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the co 
existence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and 
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would 
suppose that all the three times were found together and included 
in one of them. The Vaibhasika finds himself in agreement 
with Vasumitra s view and holds that the difference in time 
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity ; at the 
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is 
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having 
produced it, it stops, it becomes past ; there is a real existence 
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks 
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could 
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in 
past times could not have produced its effects in the present 
time. The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibhasika s 
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, 
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time- 
difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, 
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, 
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared 
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to 
exist. He objected to the Vaibhasika view that the past is to 
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing 
about the present on the ground that in that case there should 
be no difference between the past and the present, since both 
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present 
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we 
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We 
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent 
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply 
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is 
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why 
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another 
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no dif 
ference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that 
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the 
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing 
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the 
same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are 



v] Vasubandhu and the Vatsiputtriyas 117 

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhasika suggests, but 
past passions leave residues which become the causes of new 
passions of the present moment 1 . 

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of 
the Vatsiputtriyas and the Sarvastivadins as represented by 
Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of 
the existence of soul in Abhidharmakosa, The argument of 
Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though 
it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a deter 
mining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which 
may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. 
If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and 
must be something different from the elements or entities of a 
personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and un 
changing being would be without any practical efficiency (artha- 
kriydkdritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The 
soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a 
mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are 
only the elements of a personal life. But the Vatslputtrlya 
school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the 
same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is 
separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has 
a separate existence, though we could not say that it was 
altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the 
same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements 
of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence 
cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must 
be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise 
an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. 
To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a 
person) does not represent an unity. " It is only an unbroken 
continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which 
simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the 
name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is con 
ditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, 
but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving 
from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as 

1 I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan 
of a small portion of Abhidharmakota by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky 
of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it. 



1 1 8 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new produc 
tions in different places, just as the expressions fire moves, 
sound spreads have the meaning of continuities (of new pro 
ductions in new places). They likewise use the words Devadatta 
cognises in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place 
in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, 
these former moments coming in close succession being called 
Devadatta)." 

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, 
for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces 
its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of 
the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, 
etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or 
violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of 
memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind 
and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying 
that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only 
meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the 
same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say 
" this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this 
object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two 
moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is 
the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be 
known by descriptions such as " this venerable man, having this 
name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating 
such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such 
an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away 
having reached an age." Only so much description can be 
understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the 
individual ; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of 
sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the 
former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The in 
dividual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere 
thing of description and not of acquaintance ; it cannot be 
grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. 
This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other 
fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we 
sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but 
what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., 
fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are 



v] Sabbatthivadins 119 

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some 
colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designa 
tion individual but a common name for the different elements 
of which it is composed." 

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question 
whether the " living being is identical with the body or not " is 
just because there did not exist any living being as " individual," 
as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living 
being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would 
have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was 
also denied. In truth the " living being " is only a conventional 
name for a set of constantly changing elements 1 . 

The only book of the Sammitlyas known to us and that by 
name only is the Sammitlyasdstra translated into Chinese between 
350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however 
probably lost 2 . 

The Vaibhasikas are identified with the Sarvastivadins who 
according to Dipavamsa V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, 
branched off from the Mahiasakas, who in their turn had 
separated from the Theravada school. 

From the Kathdvatthu we know (i) that the Sabbatthivadins 
believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attain 
ment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual 
process, (3) that consciousness or even samadhi was nothing but 

1 This account is based on the translation of Aftamakofasthananibaddhah pudgala- 
viniscayah, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakosa^ by Prof. Th. 
Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de FAcadtmie des Sciences defiusste, 1919. 

* Professor De la Vall6e Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine 
in an article on the Sammitiyas in the . R. E. He there says that in the Abhidhar- 
makoiavyakhya the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that 
many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhasikas of a later age. Some of their views 
are as follows: (i) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (i) there is an 
intermediate state between death and rebirth called antarabhava ; (3) merit accrues not 
only by gift (tyaganvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped 
by the man to whom the th*ng was given (paribhog&nvaya puny a) ; (4) not only 
abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit 
by itself alone ; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from 
which it can be said to be either different or non-different. " The pudgala cannot be 
said to be transitory (anitya) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down 
the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden ; it cannot be said to be permanent, 
since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas 
as sketched by Professor De la Valle e Poussin is not in full agreement with the 
pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Gunaratna which we have noticed 
above. 



1 20 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away 1 . The Sab- 
batthivadins or Sarvastivadins have a vast Abhidharma literature 
still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the 
Abhidharma of the Theravada school which we have already 
mentioned". These are I . Jndnaprasthdna Sdstra of Katyayanl- 
puttra which passed by the name of Mahd Vibhdsd from which 
the Sabbatthivadins who followed it are called Vaibhasikas 3 . This 
work is said to have been given a literary form by Asvaghosa. 
2. Dharmaskandlia by Sariputtra. 3. Dhdtukdya by Purna. 
4. Prajnaptisdstra by Maudgalyayana. 5. Vijndnakdya by De- 
vaksema. 6. Sangltiparyydya by Sariputtra and Prakaranapdda 
by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D. 500 A.D.) wrote a work on 
the Vaibhasika 4 system in verses (kdrikd) known as the Abhidhar- 
makosa, to which he appended a commentary of his own which 
passes by the name Abhidharma Kosabhdsya in which he pointed 
out some of the defects of the Vaibhasika school from the Sau 
trantika point of view 5 . This work was commented upon by 
Vasumitra and Gunamati and later on by Ya^omitra who was 
himself a Sautrantika and called his work Abhidharmakosa 
vydkhyd ; Sanghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote 
Samayapradipa and Nydydnusdra (Chinese translations of which 
are available) on strict Vaibhasika lines. We hear also of other 
Vaibhasika writers such as Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, Vasumitra 
and Bhadanta, the writer of Samyuktdbhidharmasdstra and Ma- 
hdvibhdsd. Dirinaga (480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhasika 
or a Sautrantika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote 
his famous work Pramdnasamuccaya in which he established 
Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vatsyayana 
the celebrated commentator of the Nydya sutras; but we regret 

1 See Mrs Rhys Davids s translation Kath&vatthu, p. xix, and Sections I. 6, 7 ; 
ii. 9 and xi. 6. 

z Mahavyutpatti gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz. Mulasarvastivada and Ary- 
yasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasar 
vastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, 
E. India. Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasu 
bandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, 
who studied it there. 

8 Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra s work was probably 
a compilation from other Vibhasas which existed before the Chinese translations and 
Vibhisa texts dated 383 A.D. 

4 See Takak usu s article J.R. A.S. 1905. 

5 The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhasikas as authentic 
and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapitaka. 



v] Sabbatthivadins 1 2 1 

to say tnat none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, 
nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into 
any of the modern European or Indian languages. 

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at 
Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivadins 
from the Chinese versions of the Abhidharmakosa, Mahdvibhd- 
sdsdstra, etc., rather elaborately 1 . The following is a short sketch, 
which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen. 

The Sabbatthivadins admitted the five skandhas, twelve 
ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, the three asamskrta dharmas of 
pratisamkhyanirodha apratisamkhyanirodha and akasa, and the 
samskrta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rupa 
(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non- 
mental) 11 . All effects are produced by the coming together 
(samskrta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the 
rupa, citta, etc., are thus called samskrta dharmas (composite 
things or collocations sambhuyakdri). The rupa dharmas are 
eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 
cittaviprayukta samskara dharmas (non-mental composite things); 
adding to these the three asamskrta dharmas we have the seventy- 
five dharmas. Rupa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the 
sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or 
collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, 
taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum 
is known as paramanu, which is the minutest form of rupa. It 
cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is 
indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and in 
tangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary 
flash into being. The simple atoms are called dravyaparamdyu 
and the compound ones samghataparamaqu. In the words of 
Prof. Stcherbatsky " the universal elements of matter are mani 
fested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more 
energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded 
as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramanus com 
bine together to form an anu, and it is in this combined form 
only that they become perceptible. The combination takes 
place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and 

1 Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the Calcutta University. 
8 Sankara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his bhasya 
on the Brahma-sutras n. ? notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen. 



122 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

others around it. The point which must be remembered in con 
nection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities 
of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the paramanus. The special 
characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), 
viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging 
to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to 
form each of the elements ; the difference between the different 
elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special 
characteristics were predominant and active, and other charac 
teristics though present remained only in a potential form. The 
mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of 
earth or the solidness inherent in them ; the mutual attraction of 
things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. 
The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, 
(i) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as 
activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dhrti or attrac 
tion, samgraha or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyuliana 
or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally 
by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction 
between the Vaibhasika Sarvastivadins and other forms of Bud 
dhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are re 
garded as permanent and eternal ; they are said to be momentary 
only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, 
owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not 
regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of 
pratltyasamutpada ; nor is it ignorance of any particular in 
dividual, but is rather identical with " moha " or delusion and 
represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidya, 
which through samskara, etc., produces namarupa in the case of 
a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence 
but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present 
life. 

" The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when 
it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, 
clay becomes jar, having changed its state ; and in this case the 
name clay is lost and the name jar arises 1 . The Sarvastivadins 
allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the 
case of composite things (samprayukta hettt} and in the case of 

1 Sogen s quotation from Kumarajlva s Chinese version of Aryyadeva s commentary 
on the Aladhyamika Jastra (chapter XX. Karika 9). 



v] Sabbatthivadins 123 

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum 
of "vijftana" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and 
the aggregate of the five senses (indriyas) is called the perceiver. 
It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a 
permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a 
substratum formed of them. 

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, 
red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of 
appearance (samsthdna) of long, short, round, square, high, low, 
straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kdyendriya) has for 
its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, 
roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These 
qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by 
the objects of touch> hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted 
under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch 
which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of 
wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other 
energies ; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which 
excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire 
becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The 
indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse 
thought (vijndna) ; each of the five senses is an agent without 
which none of the five vijftanas would become capable of per 
ceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely 
material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal 
sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal 
senses consists of a combination of paramanus, which are ex 
tremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is 
the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from 
one another with respect to the manner and form of their respec 
tive atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is 
performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed 
on our person which is designated as avijftapti rupa. It is called 
rupa because it is a result or effect of rupa-contact ; it is called 
avijftapti because it is latent and unconscious ; this latent energy 
is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is 
the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma 
done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered 
as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as 
activity (caitasika karma}. This last, again, is of two kinds, viz. 



1 24 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

that due to body-motion (kdyika karma) and speech (vdcika 
karma). Both these may again be latent (avijnapti) and patent 
(yijnapti), giving us the kayika-vijftapti karma, kayikavijftapti 
karma, vacika-vijfiapti karma and vacikavijftapti karma. Avijflapti 
rupa and avijflapti karma are what we should call in modern 
phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corre 
sponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity 
there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself 
in future thoughts and actions ; as these are not directly known but 
are similar to those which are known, they are called avijflapti. 

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it 
wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijftana 
because it discriminates (nirdisati). The discrimination may be 
of three kinds: (i) svabhava nirdesa (natural perceptual discrimi 
nation), (2) prayoga nirdeSa (actual discrimination as present, 
past and future), and (3) anusmrti nirdesa (reminiscent discrimi 
nation referring only to the past). The senses only possess the 
svabhava nzrdesa,the other two belong exclusively to manovijftana. 
Each of the vijflanas as associated with its specific sense dis 
criminates its particular object and perceives its general charac 
teristics; the six vijflanas combine to form what is known as the 
Vijftanaskandha, which is presided over by mind (mano). There 
are forty-six caitta samskrta dharmas. Of the three asamskrta 
dharmas akasa (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, 
establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance 
(nirupdkhya, non-rupa). The second asamskrta dharma, aprati- 
samkhya nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused 
by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my 
attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because 
they are non-existent but because the conditions which would 
have made them visible were absent. The third asamskrta 
dharma, pratisamkhya nirodha, is the final deliverance from 
bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These 
are called asamskrta because being of the nature of negation 
they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dis 
solution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state 
consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right con 
duct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture 1 . 

1 Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hlnayana thinker (about 
750 A. D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which 



v] Mahay anism 125 

Mahay anism. 

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahayanism took 
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahasanghikas 
separated themselves from the Theravadins probably some time in 
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those 
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be 
labelled as Mahayana were gradually on the way to taking their 
first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works 
which are regarded as various Mahayana sutras, some of which 
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others 
as late as 300 or 400 A.D. 1 . These Mahayanasutras, also called 
the Vaipulyasutras, are generally all in the form of instructions 
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or 
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and 
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravada 
school. 

The word Hlnayana refers to the schools of Theravada, and 
as such it is contrasted with Mahayana. The words are generally 
translated as small vehicle (hma= small, ydna= vehicle) and great 
vehicle (mahd great, ydna vehicle). But this translation by 
no means expresses what is meant by Mahayana and Hlna 
yana 3 . Asahga (480 A.D.) in his Mahay anasutrdlamkdra gives 

propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his 
works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name 
by Sanskrit writers. 

1 Quotations and references to many of these sutras are found in Candraklrtti s com 
mentary on the Mddkyamtka karikas of Nagarjuna ; some of these are the following : 
Astasdhasrikdprajndpdramitd (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-i67 A.D.), Satasahas- 
rikdprajndpdramitd, Gaganaganja, Samddhisutra, Tathdgataguhyasutra y Drdhddhyd- 
Sayasancodandsutra, Dhydyitamusttsutra, Pitdputrasamdgamasutra, Mahay anasutra, 
Mtlradamanasutra, Ratnakutasutra, Ratnacutldpariprcchasutra, Ratnameghasutra, 
RatnardSisutra, Ratndkarasutra, Rdstrapdlapariprcchdsutra, Lankdvatdrasutra, 
Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikasutra, VimalakirttinirdeSasutra, Salistambhasutra, 
Samddhirajasutra, Sukhavativyuha, SuvarnaprabkasasiUra, Saddharmapundarika 
(translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitdyurdkydnasutra, Haslikdkhyasutra, etc. 

3 The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous 
contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or 
way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajn&paramitd^ pp. 24, 319; 
Samddkirdjasutra, p. i ; Karundpundarika, p. 67; Lankavatarasutra, pp. 68, 108, 132). 
The word Yana is as old as the Upanisads where we read of Devayana and Pitryana. 
There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in 
Lankdvatdra of Sravakayana (career of the 6ravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists), 
Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha 
yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods), 



126 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

us the reason why one school was called Hinayana whereas the 
other, which he professed, was called Mahayana. He says that, 
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, 
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hlnayana 
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Maha 
(great) Yana, and hence it is branded as Hlna (small, or low). 
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction 
between Hlnayana and Mahayana. The ultimate good of an 
adherent of the Hlnayana is to attain his own nirvana or salva 
tion, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Maha 
yana creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the 
salvation of all beings. So the Hlnayana goal was lower, and in 
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, 
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were 
narrower than that of the Mahayana adherents. A Hlnayana man 
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this 
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahayana adherent was 
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain 
salvation. So the Hlnayana adherents required only a short period 
of work and may from that point of view also be called hma, or 
lower. 

This point, though important from the point of view of the 
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point 
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Maha- 
yanists which distinguishes them from the Hmayanists from the 
philosophical point of view. The Mahayanists believed that all 
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and 
void at bottom, whereas the Hmayanists only believed in the 
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than 
that. 

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nagarjuna first 
preached the doctrine of 6unyavada (essencelessness or voidness 
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahayana sutras 
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we 
take some of those sutras which were in all probability earlier than 
Nagarjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nagarjuna expounded 

Brahmayana (career of becoming a Brahma), Tathagatayana (career of a Tathagata). 
In one place Lankavatara says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three 
careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant 
(Lankavatara, p. 68). 



v] Mahay ana Philosophy 127 

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted 
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhuti saying to 
the Buddha that vedana (feeling), samjfta (concepts) and the 
samskaras (conformations) are all maya (illusion) 1 . All the 
skandhas, dhatus (elements) and ayatanas are void and absolute 
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void 
is not different from the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas, and this 
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest know 
ledge (prajndpdramita)*. Everything being void there is in reality 
no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (sdsvata) 
nor non-eternal (asdsvata) but pure void. It should be the object 
of a saint s endeavour to put himself in the " thatncss" (tat/tatd) and 
consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisatlvd) has to estab 
lish himself in all the virtues (pdramita}, benevolence (dana- 
pdramitd\ the virtue of character (silapdramitd\ the virtue of 
forbearance (ksdntipdramitd), the virtue of tenacity and strength 
(ylryyapdramitd) and the virtue of meditation (dhydnapdra- 
mitd). The saint (bodhisattvd) is firmly determined that he will 
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvana. In reality, 
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salva 
tion ; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid 
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for 
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. 
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his 
work on the strength of his paramitas, though in reality there 
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who 
is to help him to attain it*. The true prajnaparamita is the 
absolute cessation of all appearance (yah anupalambhah sarva- 
dharmdndm sa prajndpdramitd ityucyate) . 

The Mahayana doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that 
of unyavada or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijftanavada. 
The difference between ^unyavada and Vijftanavada (the theory 
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) 
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them 
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything 
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But 
while the unyavadins were more busy in showing this indefin- 
ableness of all phenomena, the Vijftanavadins, tacitly accepting 

1 Astasahasrikaprajnaparamita, p. 16. a Ibid. p. 177. 

8 Ibid. p. 21. 4 Ibid. p. 177. 



128 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

the truth preached by the Sunyavadins, interested themselves in 
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of 
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (vasana). 

Asvaghosa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher 
of a new type of idealism (vijhdnavddd) known as the Tathata 
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki s identification of a quotation in 
Asvaghosa s Sraddhotpddasdstra as being made from Lankdva- 
tdrasiitra, we should think of the Lankdvatdrasutra as being one 
of the early works of the Vijnanavadins 1 . The greatest later writer 
of the Vijfianavada school was Asariga (400 A.D.), to whom are 
attributed the Saptadasabhumi sutra, Mahdydna sutra, Upadesa, 
Mahay dnasamparigraha sdstra, Yogdcdrabhumi sdstra and 
Mahay dnasutrdlamkdra. None of these works excepting the 
last one is available to readers who have no access to the 
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are 
in all probability lost. The Vijfianavada school is known to 
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogacara, and it does 
not seem an improbable supposition that Asanga s Yogdcdra 
bhumi Sdstra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, 
a younger brother of Asanga, was, as Paramartha (499-569) tells 
us, at first a liberal Sarvastivadin, but was converted to Vijfia 
navada, late in his life, by Asanga. Thus Vasubandhu, who 
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvasti- 
vadins, Abhidharmakosa, devoted himself in his later life to Vijfia 
navada 2 . He is said to have commented upon a number of 
Mahayana sutras, such zsAvatamsaka, Nirvana, Saddharmapun- 
darlka, Prajndpdramitd, Vimalaklrtti and Srtmdldsimhandda, and 
compiled some Mahayana sutras, such as Vijndnamdtrasiddhi, 
Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijfianavada continued for at 
least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in 
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him. 

We have already noticed that the Sunyavada formed the fun 
damental principle of all schools of Mahayana. The most powerful 
exponent of this doctrine was Nagarjuna (100 A.D.), a brief account 
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nagarjuna s 
karikas (verses) were commented upon by Aryyadeva, a disciple 
of his, Kumarajlva (383 A.D.), Buddhapalita and Candraklrtti 
(55OA.D.). Aryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at 

1 Dr S. C. Vidyabhushana thinks that Lankavatara belongs to about 300 A.D. 

2 Takakusu s "A study of the Paramartha s life of Vasubandhu, " J. R.A. S. 1905. 



vj Aryyadevas Philosophy 129 

least three other books, viz. Catuhsataka, Hastabdlaprakarana- 
vrtti and Cittavisuddhiprakarana^. In the small work called 
Hastabdlaprakaranavrtti Aryyadeva says that whatever depends 
for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory ; 
all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions 
and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded 
as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is depen 
dent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man 
should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phe 
nomenal appearances. In his Cittavisuddhiprakaratia he says 
that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflec 
tion of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself 
colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of ima 
gination (vikalpa). In reality the mind (citta) without a touch 
of imagination (kalpand) in it is the pure reality. 

It does not seem however that the unyavadins could produce 
any great writers after Candraklrtti. References to unyavada 
show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers 
until the time of the great Mlmamsa authority Kumarila who 
flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the Sunyavadins 
were no longer occupying the position of strong and active dis 
putants. 

The Tathata Philosophy of ASvaghosa (SoA.D.) 2 . 

Asvaghosa was the son of a Brahmin named Saimhaguhya 
who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of 
India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was pro 
bably converted to Buddhism by Parva who was an important 
person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to 
some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other 
authorities by Punyayaas 8 . 

1 Aryyadeva s Hastabalaprakaranavrtti has been reclaimed by Dr F. W. Thomas. 
Fragmentary portions of his CittavUuddhiprakarana were published by Mahamahopad- 
hyaya Haraprasada s astri in the Bengal Asiatic Society s journal, 1898. 

2 The above section is based on) the Awakening of Faith, an English trans 
lation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of Sraddhotpadaiastra by Asvaghosa, the 
Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a 
mass of evidence to show that Asvaghosa was a contemporary of Kaniska. 

* Taranatha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nagarjuna, 
Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki s 
Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. Asvaghosa wrote the Buddkacaritakavya, of great 
poetical excellence, and the Mahtilatnkilrahlstra. He was also a musician and had 



130 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished 
the aspect as thatness (bhutatathata) and the aspect as the cycle 
of birth and death (samsdra). The soul as bhutatathata means 
the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhdtu). Its essen 
tial nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account 
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious 
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smrti) 
appear under the forms of individuation 1 . If we could overcome 
this smrti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there 
would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their 
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They can 
not be adequately expressed in any form of language. They 
possess absolute sameness (samatd}. They are subject neither to 
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul " 
thatness (bhutatathata). This "thatness" has no attribute and 
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." 
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is 
spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor 
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor 
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This 
bhutatathata is neither that which is existence, nor that which is 
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non- 
existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-exist 
ence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is 
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity 
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is 
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept 
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be compre 
hended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is 
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of 
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that 
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the 
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call 
it negation, "sunyata," in this sense. The truth is that which 

invented a musical instrument called Rastavara that he might by that means convert the 
people of the city. " Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the 
audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35. 
1 I have ventured to translate "smrti" in the sense of vasana in preference to 
Suzuki s "confused subjectivity" because smrti in the sense of vasana is not unlamiliar 
to the readers of such Buddhist works as Lankavatara* The word "subjectivity" 
seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense. 



v] Asvagkosds Absolutism 131 

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (sunyata) is 
also void (sunya) in its nature, that neither that which is negated 
nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure 
soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and 
completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be 
called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, 
because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory 
(smrti) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the 
truth the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations. 

"The soul as birth and death (samsdra) comes forth from 
the Tathagata womb (tathdgatagarbha\ the ultimate reality. 
But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. 
Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus 
when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self- 
affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (dlayavijndnd). 
It embraces two principles, (i) enlightenment, (2) non -enlighten 
ment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is 
free from thje corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient 
memory (smrti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dharma- 
dhdtu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakaya of all 
Tathagatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence. 

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this funda 
mental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any 
real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence a mere ima 
ginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the 
delusive smrti. The multitude of people (bahujand) are said to be 
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidya) prevails, 
there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of 
smrti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which 
they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested 
of this smrti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, 
viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have 
any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation 
with the one soul, for they are not self-existent. 

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our cor 
rupted phenomenal experience as prajfta (wisdom) and karma 
(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we under 
stand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, 
disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma) and 
accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the dlayavijndnd) 

92 



132 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down 
and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and 
the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakaya will manifest 
itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are 
mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is 
identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore 
ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense 
it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the 
water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here 
the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical 
with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the 
water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of 
the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise 
when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and 
clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves 
of mentality (vijndna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. 
the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, 
and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is 
annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the 
essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the 
enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of rela 
tivity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in 
the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they 
neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear 
nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both 
affectional (klesdvarand) and intellectual (jneydvarana), as well 
as from the mind (i.e. dlayavijnana) which implicates itself with 
birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, 
calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms 
and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form 
of a tathagata or in some other forms, in order that all beings 
may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity. 

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its 
relation with enlightenment a priori? But enlightenment a priori 
is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non- 
enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses 
its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual rela 
tion as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations 
of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (i) as a disturb 
ance of the mind (dlayavijnana), by the avidyakarma (ignorant 



v] Theory of world-construction 133 

action), producing misery (duhkhd); (2) by the appearance of an 
ego or of a perceiver ; and (3) by the creation of an external world 
which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Con 
ditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena 
arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensa 
tion); being affected by the external world the mind becomes 
conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagree 
able. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon 
intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well 
as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. 
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and 
succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there 
arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attach 
ment to names or ideas (samjnd\ etc. By clinging the mind 
hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. 
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (karma). On 
account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations 
of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon 
is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering 
arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of 
its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through 
avidya. 

The relation between this truth and avidya is in one sense 
a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds 
of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay 1 . 
Likewise the undefiled (andsrava} and ignorance (avidya} and 
their various transient forms all come from one and the same 
entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all 
eternity abiding in Nirvana. 

It is by the touch of ignorance (avidya} that this truth assumes 
all the phenomenal forms of existence. 

In the all-conserving mind (alayavijndnd) ignorance manifests 
itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that 
which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and 
that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas). 
Five different names are given to the ego (according to its dif 
ferent modes of operation). The first name is activity-conscious 
ness (karmavijndnd) in the sense that through the agency of 
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or 

1 Compare Chandogya, vi. i. 4. 



1 34 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (pravrtti- 
vijndnd) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there 
evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is 
representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (manas) 
represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror 
reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the repre 
sentation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with 
the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously 
and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, 
in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled 
as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the 
sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness 
of attention (manaskdrd) it (manas) retains all experiences and 
never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well 
as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, 
painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present 
or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously 
recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things 
to come. Therefore the three domains (kdmaloka, domain of 
feeling rupaloka, domain of bodily existence arupaloka, domain 
of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the 
mind (i.e. dlayavijndna which is practically identical with bhuta- 
tathata). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence 
to the mind (dlayavijndna), are produced by smrti, all the modes 
of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The 
mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes 
is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that 
all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized 
and established only through ignorance (avidya) and memory 
(smrti), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They 
arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When 
the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but 
when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. 
By ego-consciousness (manovijndnd) we mean the ignorant mind 
which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of 
I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of 
sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-conscious 
ness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the 
prejudices (dsrava\ intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believ 
ing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes 



v] Theory of Good and Evil 135 

oblivious of the principle of sameness (samata) that underlies all 
things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no 
sign of becoming. 

Non-enlightenment is the raison d etre of samsara. When 
this is annihilated the conditions the external world are also 
annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also 
annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation 
of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an un 
ruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing 
the waves have been annihilated. 

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidya (ignor 
ance), karmavijftana (activity-consciousness the subjective mind), 
visaya (external world represented by the senses) and the tathata 
(suchness), Asvaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of 
these elements. Thus AsVaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean 
that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no 
odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet 
acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the sub 
stance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (tathata) is likewise 
a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming 
power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to 
do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the 
work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. 
Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d etre of 
all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness 
and produces smrti. This smrti in its turn perfumes ignorance. 
On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunder 
stood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world 
of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming 
power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. 
And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer 
as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "such- 
ness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming 
the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of 
birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvana. This 
longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn 
perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we 
are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves 
of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and 
we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing 



1 36 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

but the illusory manifestations of the mind (alayavijndna) and 
have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand 
the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform 
those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We 
should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By 
virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innu 
merable asarikhyeyakalpas 1 we get ignorance annihilated. As 
ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (dlayavijndna) is no longer 
disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no 
longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world 
is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition 
of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all 
annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvana and that various 
spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvana 
of the tathata philosophy is not nothingness, but tathata (suchness 
or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance 
which produces all the diversity of experience. 

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession 
of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it 
that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, 
AsVaghosa s reply is that though all beings are uniformly in 
possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the prin 
ciple of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such 
manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and 
hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle 
in one s own being which, embraced and protected by the love 
(maitrt) and compassion (karuna) of all Buddhas and Bodhisatt- 
vas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe 
in nirvana, to cultivate the root of merit (kusalamula), to habit 
uate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence 
of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, re 
ceiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced 
to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and 
enter into Nirvana. This implies that all beings have such perfum 
ing power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes 
of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path 
of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas 
and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) 
benefits (hitatd}" and "entering into the samadhi of purity, they 

1 Technical name for a very vast period of time. 



v] Theory of Good and Evil 137 

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all- 
penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of 
the absolute oneness (samata) of the universe (sarvalokd) and to 
see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas." 

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in 
unison with suchness, as in the case of sravakas (theravadin 
monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only 
continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state 
of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. 
But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with 
suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow 
themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. 
The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from 
all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one 
at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma 
(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interrup 
tion. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great 
wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhatu (universe), 
the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its 
own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the 
pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called 
the tathagatagarbha or the dharmakaya. It may be objected that 
since thatness or suchness has been described as being without 
characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing 
all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, 
it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all 
objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being 
of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of par- 
ticularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their 
(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are 
free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment 
there originates a subjective mind (alayavijndnd) that becomes 
conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or 
avidya. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly 
pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign 
to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is 
called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to 
illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, 
though the stage of the perfuming of avidya comes to an end with 
the Buddhas when they attain to nirvana. All Buddhas while at 



138 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (mahdkaruna) for all 
beings, practise all virtues (pdramitds) and many other meritorious 
deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a 
universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless 
numbers of kalpas, recognize truthfully and adequately the 
principle of equality (samatd) among people; and do not cling 
to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is 
meant by the activity of tathata. The main idea of this tathata 
philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is 
at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidya veils 
it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the 
pure thatness also perfumes the avidya there is a striving for the 
good as well. As the stage of avidya is passed its luminous 
character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only 
illusorily appeared as the many of the world. 

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view 
of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than 
that of the nihilistic idealism of Lankdvatdra. Considering the 
fact that Asvaghosa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early 
life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upanisad influence in 
this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably 
with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sarikara. The Lankdvatdra 
admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas 
(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self 
(dtman). But Asvaghosa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality 
as the ultimate truth. Nagarjuna s Madhyamika doctrines which 
eclipsed the profound philosophy of AsVaghosa seem to be more 
faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijftanavada 
creed of Buddhism as explained in the Lankdvatdra 1 . 

The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school. Nihilism. 

Candrakirtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna s verses known as 
"Madhyamika kdrikd" in explaining the doctrine of dependent 
origination (pratltyasamutpdda) as described by Nagarjuna starts 
with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word 
pratltyasamutpada means the origination (utpdda) of the non 
existent (abhdvd) depending on (pratttya) reasons and causes 

1 As I have no access to the Chinese translation of A^vaghosa s Sraddhotpdda 
Sastra, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki s expressions as they appear in his trans 
lation. 



v] Pratltyasamutpada 1 39 

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratltya 
means each and every destructible individual and pratltyasamut 
pada means the origination of each and every destructible in 
dividual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The 
second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali 
Scriptures generally speak of pratltyasamutpada (e.g. caksuh 
pratltya rupdni ca utpadyante caksurvijndnam) for it does not 
mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, 
but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. per 
ception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) 
depending upon certain specific conditions. 

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example 
if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual per 
cept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual 
knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be 
intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we 
interpret the maxim of pratltyasamutpada as this happening that 
happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All 
origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor 
by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. 
For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. 
To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean 
that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again 
without any further qualification it is said that depending on 
one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any 
other thing could come into being from light we could have dark 
ness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, 
it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them 
together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, 
for then all things could come into being at all times. It is there 
fore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this 
so-called dependent origination {pratltyasamutpada} it was re 
ferred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and 
senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is 
not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance 
(avidyd}. The only thing which is not lost (amosadharma) is 
nirvana; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena 
(samskdras) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarva- 
samskdrdsca mrsdmosadhanndnaK). 

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appear- 



140 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

ances are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no 
good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the 
case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion 
should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the 
nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced con 
fidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really 
wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly 
they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with 
the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus 
there are neither works nor cycles of births (samsdra) and also he 
does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of 
any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakutasutra that 
howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover conscious 
ness (citta)\ what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, 
and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and 
as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all ; and that which 
has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. 
He who through his false knowledge (viparyydsa) does not com 
prehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be 
real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (samsdra}. Like all 
illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm 
of rebirth and sorrow. 

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true 
according to the nihilists (sunyavddins), then their statement that 
there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candraklrtti 
in replying to this says that with sunyavadins the truth is absolute 
silence. When the Sunyavadin sages argue, they only accept for 
the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with 
them in their own manner to help them to come to a right 
comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite 
of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, 
that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that 
we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these 
phenomena have no true essence. 

When the doctrine of pratltyasamutpada is described as "this 
being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be 
indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have 
no essence or true nature. Nihilism (sunyavdda) also means just 
this. The true meaning of pratltyasamutpada or sunyavada is 
this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that 



v] Essencelessness \ 4 1 

appear 1 . As the phenomena have no essence they are neither 
produced nor destroyed ; they really neither come nor go. They 
are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (sunya) 
does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of 
position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any 
intrinsic nature of their own (nihsvabhdvatvam). 

The Madhyamaka or unya system does not hold that any 
thing has any essence or nature (svabhdvd) of its own; even 
heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat 
and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, 
and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the 
nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the 
true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on 
anything else, and sipce no such essence or nature can be pointed 
out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it 
exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we can 
not affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhdvd). If we 
cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot conse 
quently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first 
believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are 
not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhdva), 
but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we can 
not speak of anything negative either*. 

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process 
going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of 
change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we 
can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; 
for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment 
after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to 
justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes 
from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as de 
stroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, 
and so a process (samsdra) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot 
be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had 
suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the 
second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact 
there being no relation between the two, the temporal determina 
tion as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a 
self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), p. 50. 2 Ibid. pp. 93-100. 



142 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if 
the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, 
for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character 
and takes up another at the same identical moment which is 
inconceivable 1 . 

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, 
and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what 
is then the nirvana which is described as the final extinction of 
all afflictions (klesa)t To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does 
not agree to such a definition of nirvana. Nirvana on the Madhya 
maka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that 
which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased 
or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anutpannam). In 
nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease 
to exist in nirvana, but like the illusory snake in the rope they 
never existed*. Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort 
of state of being (bhdva), for all positive states or things are joint 
products of combined causes (samskrta) and are liable to decay 
and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since 
we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a 
negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are 
communicated as being in a state of change and process coming 
one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth 
can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be 
produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be 
determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvana is merely the 
cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapancapravrttf). It 
cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for 
these conceptions belong to phenomena (na cdpravrttimdtram 
bhdvdbhdveti parikalpitum pdryyate evam na bhdvabhdvanir- 
vanam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, 
and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to 
appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, 
a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings . 

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any 
bondage or emancipation ; all phenomena are like shadows, like 
the mirage, the dream, the maya, and the magic without any real 
nature (nihsvabhdvd). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-101. 3 Ibid. p. 194. 

3 Ibid. pp. 162 and 201. 



v] Causal conditions 143 

one is trying to win a real nirvana 1 . It is this false egoism that 
is to be considered as avidya. When considered deeply it is found 
that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. 
Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance- (avidya), there 
would have been no conformations (samskaras}, and if there were 
no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so 
on ; but it cannot be said of the ignorance " I am generating the 
samskaras," and it can be said of the samskaras "we are being 
produced by the avidya." But there being avidya, there come the 
samskaras and so on with other categories too. This character of 
the pratltyasamutpada is known as the coming of the consequent 
depending on an antecedent reason (hetupanibandha). 

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of depend 
ence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandhd). 
It is by the combination (samavdyd) of the four elements, space 
(dkdsa) and consciousness (yijndnd) that a man is made. It is 
due to earth (prthivi) that the body becomes solid, it is due to 
water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is 
digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due 
to akaa that there is porosity, and it is due to vijfiana that 
there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination 
that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think 
that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be 
allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or 
souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and 
attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come 
the samskaras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thought 
lessness (rdga, dvesa, moha) ; from these proceed the vijfiana and 
the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name 
and form (ndmarupd), from these proceed the senses (sadayatana), 
from the coming together of those three comes contact (sparsd) ; 
from that feelings, from that comes desire (trsnd) and so on. 
These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence 
or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all 8 . The 
phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or 
non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism 
(sasvatavdda) or nihilism (ucchedavddd), and it is for this reason 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108. 

* Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Salistambhasutra. Vacaspatimis ra also quotes 
this passage in his Bhamati on Sankara s Brahmaputra. 



144 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (madhyamakci) 1 . 
Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (sam- 
vrtisatya) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true 
reality (paramdrthasatya) in them or anything else. Morality 
plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any 
other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nagar- 
juna s Suhrllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from 
the Tibetan translation. 

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asard) give according to 
the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is 
no better friend than giving. 

7. Exhibit morality (Silo) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, 
for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the 
moving and immovable. 

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, 
patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having 
reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina 
prince. 

9. View as enemies, avarice (matsaryya], deceit (Jsathya), duplicity (mdya\ 
lust, indolence (kausidya), pride (mana), greed (raga), hatred \dvesa) and 
pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power. 

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door 
for anger ; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall 
attain the degree of an anagamin (a saint who never suffers rebirth). 

21. Do not look after another s wife; but if you see her, regard her, 
according to age, like your mother, daughter or sinter. 

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the 
six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the 
wise praise the first as the greater hero. 

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly 
conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame 
and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts. 

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, 
careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) 
honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family. 

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, 
joy and indifference ; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) 
will obtain the happiness of Brahman s world (brahmavihara). 

41. By the four dhyanas completely abandoning desire (kama\ reflection 
(vicara), joy (flrttt), and happiness and pain (sukha, duhkhd) you will obtain 
as fruit the lot of a Brahman. 

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am 
not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me ; 
and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggre 
gates." 

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), p. 160. 



v] Vijnanavada 145 

nature (J>rakrti), not from themselves (svabkdvat), nor from the Lord (isvara), 
nor yet are they without cause ; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyd) 
and desire (trsnti). 

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (Silabrataparamarsd), 
wrong views (mithyadrstf) and doubt (vicikitsa) are the three fetters. 

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, 
the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one 
rules (of the Pra timoksci) are combined perfectly in these three. 

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without 
substance (andtma) without help (asarana) without protector (an&tha) and 
without abode (asthana) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with 
this worthless (asara) kadali-tree of the orb. 

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish 
and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other 
higher necessity than this. 

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dig 
nity of the quieting and the subduing nirvana not subject to age, death or 
decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon. 

107. Where there is no wisdom (prajna) there is also no contemplation 
(dhyana\ where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom ; but know 
that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove. 



Uncompromising Idealism or the School 
of Vijnanavada Buddhism. 

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijftanavada 
or Yogacara has often been referred to by such prominent teachers 
of Hindu thought as Kumarila and Sarikara. It agrees to a great 
extent with the ^unyavadins whom we have already described. 
All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary 
constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the 
so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We 
construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists 
\yy\\.s&\f(nirmmitapratimohiy. There are two functions involved 
in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khydti 
vijndna), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions 
(vastuprativikalpavijndnd). The two functions however mutually 
determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished 
(abhinnalaksane anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work 
on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent 
in them in relation to the world of appearance (anddikdla-pra- 
panca-vdsandhetukancd) 2 . 

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse 

1 Lankavatdrasutra, pp. 21-22. 3 Ibid. p. 44. 

D. 10 



1 46 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (abkuta- 
parikalpa-vasand-vaicitra-nirodhdy. All our phenomenal know 
ledge is without any essence or truth (nihsvabkdva) and is but a 
creation of maya, a mirage or a dream. There is-nothing which 
may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the 
mind (svacittd), which has been accustomed to create imaginary 
appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose move 
ment these creations take place as subject and object has no 
appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence 
and extinction (utpddasthitibhahgavarjjam) and is called the alaya- 
vijflana. The reason why this alayavijftana itself is said to be 
without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, 
that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all 
the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no exist 
ence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not 
affirm any special essence of it. 

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing 
external but of our own mind (svacitta), and there is also the begin 
ningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world 
of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which 
takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also 
the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account 
of these four reasons there are produced in the alayavijftana (mind) 
the ripples of our sense experiences (pravrttivijndna) as in a lake, 
and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skan- 
dhas called pancavijhdnakdya thus appear in a proper synthetic 
form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either 
identical or different from the alayavijftana just as the waves can 
not be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As 
the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the alayavijftana 
is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (vrtti). As 
citta it collects all movements (karma) within it, as manas it 
synthesizes (vidhiyate) and as vijftana it constructs the fivefold 
perceptions (yijUanen vijdndti drsyam kalpate pancabhih)" 1 . 

It is only due to maya (illusion) that the phenomena appear 
in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always 
be regarded as an appearance (sarnvrtisatyatd) whereas in the real 
aspect we could never say whether they existed (bhdva) or did not 
exist 8 . 

1 Lankavatdrasiitra, p. 44. 8 Ibid. pp. 50-55. 

8 Asanga s MahayHnasutralamk&ra, pp. 58-59. 



v] Vijnanavada and Vedanta 147 

All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (sada- 
santah mdyopamdk). When we look deeply into them we find that 
there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even 
all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the 
ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which 
the positive and negative are one and the same (bhdvdbhdvasa- 
mdnatd} 1 . Such a state which is complete in itself and has no 
name and no substance had been described in the Larikavatara- 
sutra as thatness (tathata)" . This state is also described in another 
place in the Lankdvatdra as voidness (sunyatd) which is one and 
has no origination and no essence 3 . In another place it is also 
designated as tathagatagarbha 4 . 

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified 
ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic atman or Brahman 
like the tathata doctrine of Asvaghosa; and we find in Larika- 
vatara that Havana asks the Buddha " How can you say that 
your doctrine of tathagatagarbha was not the same as the atman 
doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics 
also consider the atman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all-per 
vading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply 
thus "Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those 
heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction 
of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or sub 
stance in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that 
I say that all things are in reality the tathagatagarbha. This 
should not be regarded as atman. Just as a lump of clay is made 
into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all 
phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics (sarvavikal- 
palaksanavinivrttam) that is variously described as the garbha 
or the nairatmya (essencelessness). This explanation of tathaga 
tagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to 
attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined 
to believe in the atman doctrine 6 ." 

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned 
the idealistic Buddhists (yijndnavddins) agreed to the doctrine of 
pratltyasamutpada with certain modifications. There was with 
them an external pratltyasamutpada just as it appeared in the 

1 Asanga s Mahdydnasutr&lamkdra, p. 65. 

2 Lankavatarasutra, p. 70. 8 Ibid. p. 78. 

4 Ibid. p. 80. 8 Ibid. pp. 80-81. 



102 



148 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

objective aspect and an internal pratityasamutpada. The external 
pratityasamutpada (dependent origination) is represented in the 
way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the 
co-operation of diverse elements the lump of clay, the potter, 
the wheel, etc. The internal (adhydtmikd) pratityasamutpada 
was represented by avidya, trsna, karma, the skandhas, and the 
ayatanas produced out of them 1 . 

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the 
pravicayabuddhi and the vikalpalaksanagrahdbhinivesapratisthd- 
pikabuddhi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to 
take things in either of the following four ways, that they are 
either this or the other (ekatvdnyatvd}\ either both or not both 
(ubhaydnubhayd), either are or are not (astindsti\ either eternal 
or non-eternal (nitydnityd). But in reality none of these can be 
affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that 
habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and 
arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity 
parikalpa} in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and 
predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature 
of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external 
world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the; 
mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of 
smoothness (snehd) that constructs the water as an external sub 
stance; it is the sense construction df activity or energy that 
constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construc 
tion of movement that constructs the external substance of air. 
In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the 
real (mithydsatydbhinivesa) five skandhas appear. If these were 
to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal 
relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be 
no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them 
together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or 
destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up 
things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as per- 
ceivers. It is simply a convention (yyavahdra) to speak of things 
as known 2 . Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech- 
construction (ydgvikalpa} and unreal. In speech one could not 
speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal 

1 Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 85. 

a Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 87, compare the term " vyavaharika " as used of the pheno 
menal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by Sahkara. 



v] Voidness of all phenomena 149 

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; 
the real truth (paramdrtha) can never be referred to by such 
speech-construction. 

The nothingness (siinyata) of things may be viewed from 
seven aspects (i) that they are alwaysjnterdependent, and hence 
have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot 
be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms 
of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference 
to an " other " is also undetermined, and hence they are all in 
definable (laksanasunyata) ; (2) that they haygjno positive jssence 
(bhdvasvabhdvasunyata), since they spring up from a natural non- 
existence (svabhdvdbhdvotpatti); (3) that they are_oLaO--unkr4Own 
type of noji-exjstence (apracaritasiinyata), since all the skandhas 
vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as^con- 
nected though non-existent (pracaritasunyatd), for their skandhas 
have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but 
yet they appear to be somehow causally connected ; (5) that none 
of the things can be described as having any definite nature, 
they are all undemonstrable by language (nirabhilapyasunyata) ; 
(6) that there cannot be any knowledge^aliQiiLlherrL except that 
which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires 
which pollute all our vision ; (7) that things are also non-existent 
in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and 
time in which they are not (itaretarasunyatd). 

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal 
nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a maya ; the 
two kinds of negation (nirodhd) are akasa (space) and nirvana ; 
things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only 
imagined to be existent by fools. 

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of 
this school, that the reality is called the tathagatagarbha (the 
womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal 
appearances of the clusters (skandhas}, elements (dhdtus), and 
fields of sense operation (dyatanas) only serve to veil it with 
impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a 
universal soul as the reality. But the Lankdvatdra attempts to 
explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to 
the tathagatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to 
attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairatmya (non- 
soul) doctrine 1 . 

1 Lank&vatarasutra, p. 80. 



1 50 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold 
knowledge of (i) svacittadrsyabhdvand, (2) utpddasthitibhanga- 
vivarjjanata, (3) bdhyabhavabhavopalaksanata and (4) svapra- 
tydryyajndnddhigamdbhinnalaksanatd. The first means that all 
things are but creations of the imagination of one s mind. The 
second means that as things have no essence there is no origina 
tion, existence or destruction. The third means that one should 
know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said 
either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely 
like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire 
(vdsana) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us 
to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the 
nature of all things. 

The four dhyanas spoken of in the Lankdvatdra seem to be 
different from those which have been described in connection with 
the Theravada Buddhism. These dhyanas are called (i) bdlo- 
pacdrika, (2) arthapravicaya, (3) tathatalambana and (4) tathd- 
gata. The first one is said to be that practised by the ravakas 
and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the 
doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairdtmyd), and that every 
thing is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all 
things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on 
till all conceptual knowing ceases (dsamjndnirodhdt); we have 
what is called the valopacarika dhyana (the meditation for be 
ginners). 

The second is the advanced state where not only there is 
full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the com 
prehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics 
may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that 
appears. This is called the arthapravicayadkydna, for the sage 
concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pra- 
vicayd) the nature of all things (arthd). 

The third dhyana, that in which the mind realizes that the 
thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, 
is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness 
(tathata). This dhyana is called tathatalambana^ because it has for 
its object tathata or thatness. 

The last or the fourth dhyana is that in which the lapse of 
the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness 
and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized; 



v] Ultimate goal 1 5 1 

and nirvana is that in which all root desires (vdsana) manifesting 
themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with know 
ledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This 
cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it can 
not be called destruction, for only compounded things (samskrtd) 
suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or 
destruction. This nirvana is different from that of the s"ravakas 
and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state 
nirvana, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics 
of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to 
things and cease to make erroneous judgments 1 . 

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) 
of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is 
said that the world is maya or illusion, what is meant to be 
emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The pheno 
mena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere 
constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathata or thatness 
is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or 
nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations 
of beginningless root desires (vasana)*. The tathata has no 
separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the 
course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore 
also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind 
(cittavimukta\ for here there is no construction of imagination 
(sarvakalpandvirahitam)*. 

Sautrantika Theory of Perception. 

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakirtti s 4 
(about 635 A.D.) Nydyabindu, a Sautrantika logical and episte- 
mological work, describes right knowledge (samyagjnana) as an 
invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man 

1 Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 100. 2 Ibid. p. 109. 

8 This account of the Vijftanavada school is collected mainly from Lankavatara- 
sutra, as no other authentic work of the Vijfianavada school is available. Hindu 
accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Rumania s Sloka 
vdrttika or Sahkara s bhasya, II. ii, etc. Asanga s Mahayanasutralamkara deals more 
with the duties concerning the career of a saint (Bodhisattva) than with the metaphysics 
of the system. 

4 Dharmaklrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his Santdndntara- 
siddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nyayabitidu seems rightly to have been considered 
by the author of Nyayabindutikdtippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika 
point of view. 



152 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

desires to have (samyagjitdnapurvikd sarvapurusdrthasiddhiy. 
When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of % any 
knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right 
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one 
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthddhi- 
gati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the per 
ceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing 
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it 
(arthddhigamdt samdptah pramdnavydpdrati). Thus there are 
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge : 
(i) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, 
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with 
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference 
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical 
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connec 
tions and helping us to realize them. In perception this presen 
tation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly 
through the liriga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the 
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is dis 
cussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought 
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to 
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called 
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the 
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, 
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization 
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt 
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was per 
ceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that 
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents 
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself 
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series 
(nllddau ya eva santdnah paricchinno nllajndnena sa eva tena 
prdpitah tena nllajndnam pramdnam}*. 

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable ante 
cedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding 
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant 

1 Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyayabindu, 
Vinltadeva and 6antabha.dra (seventh century), are found in Nyayabindutikatippani, 
a commentary of Nyayabindutika of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available 
to us. 

2 Nyayabindutikatippani, p. n. 



v] Theory of Perception 153 

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it ; for, with the rise 
of any right perception there is a memory of past experiences, 
desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with 
it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the 
object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right 
knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. 
Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the 
object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it 
is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in 
connection with our achieving the object presented by perception. 
Perception (pratyaksd) has been defined by Dharmaklrtti as 
a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unasso- 
ciated by any names or relations (kalpand} and which is not 
erroneous (kalpandpodhamabhrdntamy. This definition does not 
indeed represent the actual nature (svarufa) of perception, but only 
shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything 
may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a per 
ception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that 
if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, 
he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him 
by his perception (tasmddgrdhye qrthe vasturiipe yadaviparyastam 
tadabhrdntamiha veditavyam). It is said that a right perception 
could not be associated with names (kalpand or abhildpd). This 
qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not 
directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing 
only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being 
the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded 
as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present 
the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also 
must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are 
when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work 
of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced 
by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of 
previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented 

1 The definition first given in the Pramanasamuccaya (not available in Sanskrit) of 
Dinnaga (500 A.D.) was " Kalpanapodham." According to Dharmakirtti it is the in 
determinate knowledge (nirvikalpa j fldna) consisting only of the copy of the object 
presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. 
The determinate knowledge (savikalpajftdna), as formed by the conceptual activity of 
the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be 
regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses. 



1 54 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to the sense (purvadrstdparadrstancdrthamekikurvadvijndnam- 
asannihitavisayam purvadrstasydsannihitatvdf). In all illusory 
perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous 
or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not per 
verted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception 
thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an 
object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features 
which are its and its alone (svalaksanam). The validity of know 
ledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented 
by it (arthena saha yatsdrupyam sddrsyamasya jndnasya tatpra- 
mdnamiha). But the objection here is that if our percept is only 
similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which 
is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes 
invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which 
appears as being similar to the object It is by virtue of their 
sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sdrupyam 
tasya vasdt) and our perception of the object becomes possible. 
It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of 
having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between 
the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and 
the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of 
causation but of a determinant and a determinate (yyavasthdpya- 
vyavasthdpakabhdvena). Thus it is the same cognition which in 
one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of 
perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the 
percept (tata ekasya vastunah kincidrupam pramdnam kincitpra- 
mdnaphalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity 
with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the 
definite awareness (yyavasthdpanaheturhi sdrupyam), so that by 
the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the 
similarity of the sense-datum with the object (pramdna) we come 
to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" 
(pramdnaphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its 
object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from 
the awareness (sdrupyamanubhutam vyavasthdpanahetuft). The 
object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this 
correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object 
so presented by right knowledge 1 . 

1 See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nydyabindu, 
Nydyabindutikd, Nydyabindutikatippani (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing 
with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nydyabindu is probably 



v] Inference 155 



Sautrantika theory of Inference 1 . 

According to the Sautrantika doctrine of Buddhism as de 
scribed by Dharmaklrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the 
only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to 
us in Sanskrit, inference (anumdna) is divided into two classes, 
called svarthanumana (inferential knowledge attained by a person 
arguing in his own mind or judgments), and pararthanumana (in 
ference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing 
others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the 
validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of 
the external world. Inference copied external realities as much 
as perception did ; just as the validity of the immediate perception 
of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing 
perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, 
so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the 
external fact thus inferred (sdrupyavasaddhi tannllapratitirupam 
sidhyati}. 

The reason by which an inference is made should be such 
that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to 
be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not 
exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint 
conditions that an unfailing connection ( prattbandha) between 
the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is 
not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where 
the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not 
exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the 
above case. This law (niyamd) is essential for establishing 
the unfailing condition necessary for inference 2 . This unfailing 
natural connection (svabhdvapratibandhd) is found in two types 

one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva (practical 
fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded 
as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakirtti s works and the profuse references by Hindu 
writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriyd is found in Candra- 
klrtti s commentary on Nagarjunaand also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed 
out to me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word 
has no philosophical significance there. 

1 As the Pramanasamuccaya of Dihnaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly 
know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyaya- 
bindutika of Dharmmottara. 

2 tasmat niyamauatorevdnvayavyatirekayoh prayogah karttavyah yena pratibandko 
gamy eta sadhanyasa sddhyena. Nyayabindutika, p. 44. 



156 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is con 
tained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where 
the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred 
is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines 
may come to think that pines are called trees because they are 
tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small 
pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness 
forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being 
a species is contained in the latter as a genus ; the nature of the 
species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could 
infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called 
the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tdddtmyd). 
The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect 
which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke 
the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of 
these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected 
with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no 
inference is warrantable. 

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhdvapratibandha), 
be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the 
genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is 
the ground of all inference 1 . The svabhavapratibandha deter 
mines the inseparability of connection (avinabhavaniyama) and 
the inference is made not through a series of premisses but 
directly by the liriga (reason) which has the inseparable con 
nection 8 . 

The second type of inference known as pararthanumana 
agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the 
main difference between the two is this, that in the case of 
pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in 
premisses. 

Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth cen 
tury A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyaptisamarthana in which 

1 na hi yo yalra svabhavena na pratibaddhah sa tarn apratibaddhavisayamavaiya- 
meva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyamah. Nyayabindutika, p. 29. 

2 The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the 
linga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (i) paksasattva (existence of the 
linga in the paksa the thing about which something is inferred) ; (2) sapaksasattva 
(existence of the linga in those cases where the sadhya or probandum existed), and 
(3) vipaksasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist). 
The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because 
it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake. 



v] Inference 157 

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those 
cases which possess the liriga or reason with the cases which 
possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the 
characteristics of the liriga with that which has the characteristics 
of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance 
is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, 
etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the 
characteristic of the liriga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the 
characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature 
of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyapti), 
whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing 
possessing liriga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer 
concomitance (bahirvyapti} and generally accepted by the Nyaya 
school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is 
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine. 

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of 
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early 
as the Kathdvatthu (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of 
the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic a t the time of Asoka 
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process 
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses 
such as the udaharana ( Yo yo aggimd so so dhumava whatever is 
fiery is -smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhumava this 
hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmddayam aggimd therefore 
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the 
method of the arguments which are found in the Kathdvatthu as 
follows: 

"Adherent. Is A J3? (thdpana). 
Opponent. Yes. 
Adherent. Is CD} (pdpand). 
Opponent. No. 
Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) C is D. 

That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false. 

Hence your first answer is refuted.") 

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed 
thapana, because the opponent s position, A is , is conditionally 
established for the purpose of refutation. 

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed 
papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the con- 



158 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

elusion is termed ropana because the regulation is placed on the 
opponent. Next: 

"If D be derived of C. 
Then B should have been derived of A. 
But you affirmed B of A. 

(therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is 
wrong." 

This is the patiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted 
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the 
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major 
in the latter method we get 

If A is B CisD. 
But A is B. 
Therefore C is D. 

By this indirect method the opponent s second answer is re 
established 1 ." 

The Doctrine of Momentariness. 

Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of 
all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the 
method of agreement in presence (anvayavydpti), and then by the 
method of difference by proving that the production of effects 
could not be justified on the assumption of things being per 
manent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness 
as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of 
producing anything (arthakriydkaritva). The form of the first 
type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: "What 
ever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example 
the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are dis 
cussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot 
be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an 
existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain 
effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these 
are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing 
no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, 
for those which are done now could not be done again in the 
future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to 

1 See introduction to the translation of Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy) by 
Mrs Rhys Davids. 



v] Momentariness 159 

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in thai case one 
might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at 
the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing 
anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does pro 
duce at one moment and does not produce at another, this 
contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were 
different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature 
of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at 
those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have 
in it two contradictory capacities. 

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the 
work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do 
so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the 
future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the 
capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two 
moments (saktdsaktasvabhdvatayd pratiksanam bhedati). The 
capacity of producing effects (arthakriydsakti), which is but the 
other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momen- 
tariness (ksanikatvavydpta). 

The Nyaya school of philosophy objects to this view and says 
that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect 
produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded 
as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect 
cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and 
that another ad infinitum. Since there can be no being that has 
not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can 
demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible 
to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects 
as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were 
momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe 
the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be 
any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this 
Ratnaklrtti replies that capacity (sdmarthyd) cannot be denied, 
for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation 
of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in 
absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under 
certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the 
concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions 
there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This 
knowledge of concomitance atthe succeeding momentholds within 



160 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, 
and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer. 

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (sattva) is 
indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that 
in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of 
being; seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and 
even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce 
effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that 
the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing 
the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite 1 . Though things are 
momentary, yet we could have concomitance between things only 
so long as their apparent forms are not different (atadriipa- 
pardvrttayoreva sddhyasddhanayoh pratyaksena vydptigrahandf). 
The vyapti or concomitance of any two things (e.g. the fire and 
the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not on identity. 

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness 
is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other 
collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect 
(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratna- 
klrtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the 
effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special 
effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both 
the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. 
How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special 
effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which 
preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnaklrtti wishes to 
draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals 
a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number 
of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has 
being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy. 

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of 
Ratnaklrtti s arguments in which he tries to show that the pro 
duction of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose 

1 The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians 
at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which 
differentiates the two clearly (Nydyamanjari, p. 22) : 

" mulaksatikarimahuranavastham hi dusanam. 

mulasiddhau tvarucydpi ndnavasthd nivdryate." 

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root 
matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the 
root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it. 



v] Momentariness 1 6 1 

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute 
the doctrines of Nyaya than an elaboration of the Buddhist 
principles. 

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary 
of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all 
dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all 
strictly momentary (ksanika i.e. existing only for one moment) 
was not emphasized in early Pali literature. Asvaghosa in his 
Sraddhotpadasastra speaks of all skandhas as ksanika (Suzuki s 
translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation 
of the khandhas as khanika in his Visuddhimagga. But from the 
seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together 
with the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva received great attention at 
the hands of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas. All the 
Nyaya and Vedanta literature of this period is full of refutations 
and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account 
available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of 
Ratnaklrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in 
favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it 
may be found in any of the important Nyaya works of this period 
such as NyQyamaftjari, Tdtparyyatlkd of Vacaspati Misra, etc. 

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be per 
manent. With the development of this doctrine they gave great 
emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and 
the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is 
momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived 
from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied 
the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as 
self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies 
manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these 
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones 
appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. 
Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot 
discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of 
these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of 
self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant pro 
duct as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any 
particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every 
moment there is no such thing as a permanent self. 

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for 

D. II 



1 62 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been 
existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I 
perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that 
"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in 
memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident 
that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the 
past, whereas "this book " refers to the book which is before 
my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove per 
manence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory 
referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived 
at the present moment by the senses 1 . This is true not only of 
all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but 
also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of 
self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions 
arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But 
since memory points to an object of past perception, and the per 
ception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot 
be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects 
of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet 
things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. 
Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we 
have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old 
hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave 
the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that 
though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to 
these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment 
and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce 
the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been 
persisting through all the passing moments 2 . Just as the flame 
of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as 
if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so 
all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects 
around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are 
being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the 
objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the 
preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained 
the same and no destruction has taken place. 

1 See pratyabhijnanirasa of the Buddhists, Nyayamanjari, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc. 

2 See Tarkarahasyadipikd of Gunaratna, p. 30, and also Nyayamanjari, V.S. 
edition, p. 450. 



v] Causal Efficiency 1 63 

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine 
of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva). 

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from 
the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse 
characteristics 1 . What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of 
diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or 
influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as 
inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the 
elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the 
conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of 
these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, 
the conglomeration is to be called a new one 2 . Existence or 
being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or 
the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in 
Sanskrit is called arthakriydkdritva which literally translated 
means the power of performing actions and purposes of some 
kind 3 . The criterion of existence or being is the performance of 
certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain 
effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That 
which has produced such an effect is then called existent or sat. 
Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding 
change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect 

1 Compare Milindapanha, n. i. i The Chariot Simile. 

2 Compare Tarkarahasyadipika of Gunaratna, A. S. s edition, pp. 34, 28 and 
Nyayamanjarf, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on Ksanabhanga- 
siddhi by Ratnaklrtti in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts. 

3 This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of 
the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find 
the development of this meaning both in Ratnaklrtti as well as in Nyaya writers who 
referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A. D.) the word " arthakriya- 
siddhi" meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (artha- 
Sabdena prayojanamucyate purusasya prayojanam darupakadi tasya siddhih nispattih 
the word artha means need ; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc. ; siddhi of 
that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and 
a half later arlhasiddhi means action (anusthiti) with reference to undesirable and 
desirable objects (heyopadeyarthavisaya). But with Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.) the word 
arthakriyakaritva has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of 
producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition 
of existence (sattva). Thus he says in his Ksanabhangasiddhi, pp. 20, 21, that though 
in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will 
open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as arthakriya 
karitva (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after 
Ratnakirtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of arthakriyakaritva they usually refer to this 
doctrine in Ratnakirtti s sense. 

II 2 



164 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot 
be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once 
produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in 
us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but 
cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect 
and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming 
into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things 
were permanent there would be no reason why they should be 
performing different effects at different points of time. Any 
difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself 
or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting 
that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. 
The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it 
has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power 
then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no 
notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression 
produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power 
exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should 
hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the pro 
duction of impressions or effects there should be some other 
permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed 
even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power 
of producing effects and define each unit of such power as 
amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be 
different units of power at different moments, there should also 
be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as 
momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. 
This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of 
momentariness shown by Ratnaklrtti. 

Some Ontological Problems on which the 
Different Indian Systems Diverged. 

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy 
without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems 
which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philo 
sophical circles of India. These are in brief: (i) the relation of 
cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (avayavi} and the 
part (avayava\ (3) the relation of generality (s&mdnya) to the 
specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and 
the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the 



v] Ontological Problems 165 

relation of power (sakti) to the power-possessor (saktimdri). Thus 
on the relation of cause and effect, &arikara held that cause alone 
was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent 
illusions due to ignorance, Samkhya held that there was no 
difference between cause and effect, except that the former was 
only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain 
changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is 
the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. 
Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor 
effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary 
existence has been determined by the destruction of its momen 
tary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality 
which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by 
another and this determination is nothing more than "that 
happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, 
Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According 
to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the 
individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and 
thus there is no such thing as " whole 1 ." The Buddhists hold again 
that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which 
come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there 
is no such thing as fingerness (angulitva) as the abstract universal 
of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we 
know that the Sautrantika Buddhists did not believe in the exist 
ence of any substance apart from its attributes ; what we call a 
substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. 
In the external world there are as many individual simple units 
(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each 
unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective 
world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the 
assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there 
are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of 
sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next 
moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such rela 
tion as that of inherence (samavayd) in which relation the attri 
butes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no 
separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation 
of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not 

1 See Avayavinirdkarana, Six Buddhist Nydya tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 
1910. 



1 66 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the 
power. 

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought. 

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid 
to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What 
was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation 
of sorrow and what could lead to it ? The doctrine of paticcasa- 
muppdda was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and 
not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The 
discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether 
the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata 
existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early 
Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on slla, samadhi and pafifia 
and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas 
hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in 
the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with 
enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahaynna 
scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non- 
essentialness and voidness of all dhammas began to be preached. 
This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, 
Aryyadeva, Kumarajlva and Candraklrtti, is more or less a co 
rollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not 
say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a 
Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was 
no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only 
legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to 
think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These 
appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from 
their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. 
The Tathata doctrine which was preached by Asvaghosa oscillated 
between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all 
dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the 
background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called 
tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such per 
manent entity could exist. The Vijflanavada doctrine which also 
took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the 
Sunyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully 
examined it seems to be nothing but Sunyavada, with an attempt 
at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was 



v] Buddhist Schools 167 

non-essential howdid it originate? Vijftanavada proposes to give an 
answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind 
generated by the beginningless vasana (desire) of the mind. The 
difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathata doctrine that 
there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas 
appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijflanavada 
doctrine. The Vijftanavadins could not admit the existence of such 
a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not 
properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was 
some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of 
heresy, but they s aid that this was a compromise to make the 
doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality 
assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijflanavada 
literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we 
are not in a position to judge what answers Vijflanavada could give 
on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the 
same time and the difficulty of conceiving Sunya (void), tathata, 
(thatness) and the alayavijftana of Vijflanavada is more or less 
the same. 

The Tathata doctrine of ASvaghosa practically ceased with 
him. But the unyavada and the Vijflanavada doctrines which 
originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably 
till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with Sunyavada 
doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu 
philosophy, after Kumarila and Sankara. From the third or 
ihe fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of 
systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu 
logicians. Dirinaga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably 
started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines 
of the great Hindu logician Vatsyayana, in his Pramana- 
samuccaya. In association with this logical activity we find the 
activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvastivadins 
(known also as Vaibhasikas) and the Sautrantikas. Both the 
Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas accepted the existence of the 
external world, and they were generally in conflict with the 
Hindu schools of thought Nyaya-Vaisesika and Samkhya which 
also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu 
(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. 
We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist 
thinkers such as Yasomitra (commentator of Vasubandhu s work), 



1 68 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. v 

Dharmmaklrtti (writer of Nyayabindu 635 A.D.), Vinltadeva and 
Santabhadra (commentators of Nyayabindu), Dharmmottara 
(commentator of Nyayabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.), 
Pandita Asoka, and Ratnakara Santi, some of whose contributious 
have been published in the Six Buddhist Nydya Tracts, published 
in Calcutta in the Bibliotheca Indica series. These Buddhist 
writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature 
of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and 
the doctrine of causal efficiency (arthakriydkaritva) as demon 
strating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were 
interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyaya and 
Samkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, 
relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These 
problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrantika and 
non-Vaibhasika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of 
course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence 
of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their 
doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between 
Hindu thought up to Sarikara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought 
till the time of Sarikara consisted mainly in the denial by the 
Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. 
For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the 
Vedanta of Sarikara admitted the existence of the permanent 
external world in some sense. With Sankara the forms of the 
external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a per 
manent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality 
behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrantikas 
admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel 
with Nyaya and Samkhya was with regard to their doctrine 
of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the 
different ontological problems were in accordance with their 
doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not 
hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this 
time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of 
Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyaya, the Vedanta of the school of 
Sarikara and the Theistic Vedanta of Ramanuja, Madhva, etc. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 

The Origin of Jainism. 

NOTWITHSTANDING the radical differences in their philosophical 
notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders 
of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some re 
semblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars 
who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples 
of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an off 
shoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina 
literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it 
has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong 
and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism, The oldest Buddhist 
works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their 
old name Jjjgantha and their leader Nataputta Varddhamana 
Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of 
the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings 
as reigned during Buddha s career. 

Thus Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike 
Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder 
of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed 
afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tlrtharikara) of 
Jainism 1 . His predecessor ParSva, the last Tlrtharikara but one, 
is said to have died 250 years before Mahavira, while Parsva s 
predecessor Aristanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before 
Mahavlra s Nirvana. The story in Uttarddkyayan&sutra that a 
disciple of ParSva met a disciple of Mahavira and brought about 
the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahavira 
seems to suggest that this ParsVa was probably a historical person. 

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion 
is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one 
of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable 
Tlrtharikaras. In the present period the first Tlrtharikara was 
Rsabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardham5na Mahavira. All 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . 



170 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

Tlrtharikaras have reached moksa at their death, and they 
neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet 
they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped 1 

Two Sects of Jainism 2 . 

There are two main sects of Jains, Svetambaras (wearers of 
white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally 
agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets 
peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as 
the Tlrtharikaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of 
Mahavira was not removed from the womb of Devananda to that 
of Trisala as the Svetambaras contend, thirdly that a monk 
who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Moksa, 
fourthly that no woman can reach Moksa 3 . The Digambaras 
deny the canonical works of the Svetambaras and assert that 
these had been lost immediately after Mahavira. The origin of 
the Digambaras is attributed to Sivabhuti (A.D. 83) by the 
Svetambaras as due to a schism in the old Svetambara church, 
of which there had already been previous to that seven other 
schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that 
they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and 
that under Bhadrabahu, the eighth sage after Mahavira, the last 
Tlrtharikara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphalakas with laxer 
principles, from which developed the present sect of Svetambaras 
(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times 
from the Svetambaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of 
their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, 
though there is practically no difference about the main creed. 
It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit 
works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than 
those of the Svetambaras, if we except the canonical books of 
the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed 
in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from 
one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called 
gacchas, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, 
which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have 

1 See " Digumbara Jain Iconography (\. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and 
Biihler s "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura," in Epigraphica Indica, II. 
pp. 31 1 etc. See also Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. E. 

2 See Jacohi s article on Jainism, E. R. E, 

3 See Gunaratna s commentary on Jainism in Saddartanasamuccaya. 



vi] Jama Literature 171 

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahavlra 
(sthavirdvali, pattdvali, gurvdvali) and also many legends about 
them such as those in the Kalpasiitra, the Paris ista-parvan of 
Hemacandra, etc. 

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains. 

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of 
sacred books, the fourteen Purvas and the eleven Arigas. The 
Purvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were 
gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Arigas are now 
the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these 
are Acdra, Sutrakrta, Sthdna, Samavdya Bhagavati, Jndtadhar^ 
makathds, Updsakadasds, Antakrtadasds Anuttaraupapdtikadasds, 
Prasnavydkarana, Vipdka. In addition to these there are the twelve 
Updngas 1 , the ten Prakirnas*, six Chedasutras 3 , Ndndl and Anu- 
yogadvdra and four Mulasutras (Uttarddhyayana, Avasyaka^ 
Dasavaikdlika, and Pindaniryukti], The Digambaras however 
assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the 
present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The 
original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhama- 
gadhl, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best 
to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prakrit and that 
of the later works Jaina Maharastn. A large literature of glosses 
and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And 
besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain 
systematic expositions of their faith in Prakrit and Sanskrit. 
Many commentaries have also been written upon these indepen 
dent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umasvati s 
Tattvarthadhigamasutra (1-85 A.D. ). Some of the most important 
later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are Visesdva- 
syakabhdsya, Jaina Tarkavdrttika, with the commentary of 
antyacaryya, Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), 
Syddvddamanjari of Mallisena (1292 A.D.), Nydydvatdra of 
Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.), Partksdmukhasutralaghuvrtti of 
Anantavlryya (1039 A.D.), Prameyakamalamdrtanda of Prabha- 

1 Aupafidttka, Rajapratnlya, Jivdbhigama, Prajn&pana, [ambudvipaprajnapti, 
Candraprajnapti, Suryaprajnapti, Niraydvali, fCalpdvatamsikd, Puspikd, Puspaculikd, 
Vrsnidcdas. 

3 CatuhSarana, Samstdra, Aturapratydkhydna, Bhaktdparijnd, Tandulavaiydlf, 
Canddvija, Devendraslava, Ganivija, Mahapratydkhydna, Virastava. 

3 NiJitAa, Mahdniiitha, Vyavahdra, Datairutaskandha, Brhatkalpa, Pancakalpa, 



172 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

candra(825 A.D.), Yogasastrasi Hemacandra(io88-i i72A.D.),and 
Pramdnanayatattvdlokdlamkdra of Deva Suri (1086-1 169 A.D.). 
I am indebted for these dates to Vidyabhusana s Indian Logic. 

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular 
literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and 
Prakrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. Samardicca-kahd, 
Upamitabhavaprapanca-kathd in Prakrit, and the Yasastilaka of 
Somadevaand Dhanapala s Tilakamanjarl}; Jaina Sanskrit poems 
both in the Purana and Kavya style and hymns in Prakrit and 
Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina 
dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, 
original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific litera 
ture of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, 
poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic 
deserve special notice 1 . 

Some General Characteristics of the Jains. 

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less 
than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in 
Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western pro 
vinces, Eastern Rajputana and the Punjab. The head-quarters of 
the Svetambaras are in Gujarat and Western Rajputana, but they 
are to be found also all over Northern and Central India. 

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to 
bare necessaries, and these he must beg clothes, a blanket, an alms- 
bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover 
his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it 2 . The outfit of 
nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The 
Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms 
of peacock s feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (cdmara) 3 . The 
monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out The 
latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is 
regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks 
are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend 
the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, 
studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of 
their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The lay 
men should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . a See Jacobi, loc. cit. 

3 See Saddartanasamuccaya, chapter IV. 



vi] Mahavtra 173 

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are 
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in 
the upasrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist 
viharas). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any 
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very 
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a 
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, 
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it care 
fully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living 
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, 
etc., and has thrust them into commerce 1 . 

Life of Mahavira. 

Mahavlra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Ksattriya of 
the Jftata clan and a native of Vaisali (modern Besarh, 27 miles 
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhartha and Trisala. 
The ^vetambaras maintain that the embryo of the Tlrthahkara 
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devananda 
was then transferred to the womb of Trisala. This story the 
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents 
were the worshippers of Parsva and gave him the name Varddha- 
mana (Vlra or Mahavlra). He married Yasoda and had a daughter 
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the per 
mission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After 
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained 
omniscience (kevala, cf. bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to 
preach for forty-two years more, and attained moksa (emanci 
pation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. 8 . 

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology. 

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and 
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or 
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chandogya Upanisad held 
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, 
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state 
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . 

* See Hoernle s translation of Uvasagadasao, Jacobi, loc. ctt., and Hoernle s article 
on the Ajlvakas, E. R. E. The S-ivetambaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C., 
and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later. 



174 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. 
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere 
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (ndma-rupay. What 
we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real 
existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phan 
toms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason. 

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be per 
ceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. 
What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we 
perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities 
we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upan- 
isads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent 
and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, 
as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities 
do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, 
for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither 
be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the 
momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of 
quality as a new existence. 

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and 
possibly of some of the Upanisads too, and they had also a solu 
tion to offer. They held that it was not true that substance 
alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory ap 
pearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that 
there was no permanent substance but merely the change of 
passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views 
and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain 
some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in 
experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are 
three elements: (i) that some collocations of qualities appear 
to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated ; 
(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities 
of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not 
changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump 
has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is 
permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have 
been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in 
it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, 
has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still 

1 See Chandogya, vi. i. 



vi] Relative Pluralism 175 

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a 
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus 
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific 
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" 
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, 
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some 
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to 
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the 
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in 
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (sat) then is 
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing 
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is 
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, 
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and 
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent 
(dhruva) accession of some new qualities (utpadd) and loss of 
some old qualities (vyaydy. The solution of Jainism is thus a re 
conciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on 
grounds of common-sense experience. 

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekantavada). 

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and 
change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekantavada or 
what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme abso 
lutism of the Upanisads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. 
The Jains regarded all things as anekdnta (na-ekdnta\ or in 
other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, 
as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and 
limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its exist 
ence as a substance (dravyd) is of the nature of a collocation 
of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (akdsa), 
i.e. a gold jug is a dravya only in one sense of the term and 
not in every sense; so it is a dravya in the sense that it is a 
collocation of atoms and not a dravya in the sense of space or 
time (kdla). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one 
and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a 
composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is 

1 See Tattvdrthadkigamasutra, and Gunaratna s treatment of Jainism in Saddar- 
ianasamuccaya. 



176 The jaina Philosophy [CH. 

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth- 
atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of 
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. 
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense 
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It 
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and un 
sullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again 
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered 
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajnadatta. 
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only 
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug 
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner 
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a 
certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite 
number of qualities (anantadharmdtmakam vastu}, each of which 
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing 
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of 
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number 6f qualities 
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted 
senses and not absolutely 1 . Thus in the positive relation riches 
cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such 
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no 
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in 
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be 
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very 
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints 
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) 
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as ap 
pearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya*. 

The Doctrine of Nayas. 

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open 
to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and character 
istics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when 
we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic 
qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or 
characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from 

1 See Gunaratna on Jainaniata in SaddarSanasamuccaya, pp. 211, etc., and also 
Tattvarthadhigamasiitra. 

2 See Tattvarthadhigamasutra, and Vitesavatyaka bhdsya, pp. 895-923. 



vi] Standpoints of Judgment 177 

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and 
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist 
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book 
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone percep 
tible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two 
points of view are respectively called dravyanaya&fr&paryayanaya>. 
The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryaya- 
naya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for 
our purposes, the other three being important rather from the 
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted 
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, 
samgraha-naya and vyavahara-naya. 

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point 
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may 
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are 
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, 
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer 
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of 
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its 
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of 
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was 
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling 
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, 
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose 
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, 
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their 
most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special 
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is techni 
cally called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably 
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most 
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may 
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other 
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the 
Jains the Nyaya and Vaiesika schools interpret experience. 

Samgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the 
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual 
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." 
This according to the Jains is the Vedanta way of looking at 
things. 

1 Syadvddamanjart, pp. 171-173. 
D. 12 



178 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

The vyavahSra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence 
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual prac 
tical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general 
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past 
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes 
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand 
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared 
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are 
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but 
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will 
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, 
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday ex 
perience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being 
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the 
Samkhya way of looking at things. 

The first view of paryaya-naya called rjusutra is the Buddhist 
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the 
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomera 
tion of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at 
any given moment. At each new moment there are new colloca 
tions of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as 
the true essence of our notion of things 1 . 

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or 
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. 
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The 
Jains hold that the Nyaya-Vais"esika, the Vedanta, the Samkhya, 
and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize 
experience from one of the above four points of view, and each re 
gards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely 
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error 
(naydbhdsa\ for each standpoint represents only one of the many 
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirma 
tions from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and 
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may 
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or 
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore 
be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame 

1 The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and lin 
guistic points of view, are fabda-naya, samabhirudha-naya, and cvambhuta-naya. See 
Viies&vaiyaka bhdsya, pp. 895-923. 



vi] Syadvada 179 

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The 
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and incon 
ceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness 
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase sydt 
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, 
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reser 
vations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment 
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely 
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. 
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syadvada 1 . 

The Doctrine of Syadvada. 

The doctrine of Syadvada holds that since the most contrary 
characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, 
affirmation made from whatever standpoint (nayd) cannot be re 
garded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some syddasti or 
"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; 
all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense 
(syddavaktavya) ; all affirmations are true as well as false in some 
sense (syddasti sydnndsti) ; all affirmations are true as well as in 
definite (syddasti cdvaktavyascd) ; all affirmations are false as well 
as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in 
some sense (syddasti sydnndsti syddavaktavyasca). Thus we may 
say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to 
say explicitly that "may be (sydt) that the jug is," otherwise if 
"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, 
it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a 
cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined 
by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute 
existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the 
form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of 
existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence 
in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence 
"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the 
cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the 
negation of all other things in the world ; each quality or charac 
teristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined 
by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, 
golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all 

1 See VifesavaSyaka bhdsya, pp. 895, etc., and Syadvadamanjari, pp. 170, etc. 

12 2 



180 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those 
constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. 
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the 
rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view 
the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked 
at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being 
(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may 
say, may be it is an affirmation of being (syddasti), may be it is a 
negation of being (sydnndsti}; or I may proceed in quite another 
way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which 
naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judg 
ment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not 
there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug 
is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us 
in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may 
be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two 
aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," 
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood 
here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics 
constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis 
on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the 
affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is 
put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try 
to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments 
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the ex 
istence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable 
avaktavya, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of 
the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot 
but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both 
true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and 
indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, 
(i) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet 
unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or 
finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains 
hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each 
is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any 
of the above seven alternatives (technically called saptabhangl} 
holds good 1 . The Jains say that other Indian systems each from 
its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only 

1 See Syadvadamanjari, with Hemacandra s commentary, pp. 166, etc. 



vi] Relativity of Judgments 181 

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality 
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, 
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or 
senses (upddhi). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation 
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or 
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of 
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly 
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing 
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively perma 
nent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also 
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, 
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense 
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of 
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, 
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of 
the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that 
for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as 
many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of 
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne 
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, 
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made ab 
solutely according to any particular naya without any reference to 
other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are 
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such 
judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas 
(naydbhdsa) \ 

Knowledge, its value for us. 

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on Nydyabindu 
says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in 
which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them 
to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found 
to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the 
task of examining the nature of true knowledge (samyagjiidna or 
pramdna). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us 
to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement 
with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists 2 . They also 

1 The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and saptabhahgi probably occurs 
in Bhadrabahu s (433-357 B.C.) commentary Sutrakrtanganiryukti. 

2 See Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkdra (Benares), p. 16 , also Partksa-mukha- 
sutra-vrtti (Asiatic Society), ch. I. 



1 82 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The 
validity (prdmdnyd) of anything consists in this, that it directly 
helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad 
for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can 
adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what 
is good for us and avoid what is bad 1 . The conditions that 
lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence 
of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an 
object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this con 
nection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is 
produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. 
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain 
conditions assume such a special fitness (yogyatd} that we can 
have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they 
generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under 
certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other con 
ditions we do not know it 2 . The enquiry as to the nature of the 
special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them pos 
sible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such 
a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but 
little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the 
acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by 
knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects. 

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well 
as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to 
suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of 
external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, 
and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other 
characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual 
experience, but are derived only by imagination (utpreksd), and 
that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity 
of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (nirvikalpa 
jfidna). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand 
reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives 
a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of 
their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our 
immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes. 

1 Pramdna-naya-tattvdlokdlamkara, p. 26. 

2 See Pariksa-mukha-sutra, II. 9, and its vrtti, and also the concluding vrtti of 
ch. II. 



vi] Knowledge 183 

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to 
us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us 
the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the 
attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if 
knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been 
impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that 
it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for 
serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontra- 
dicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that 
which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. 
When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of 
a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. 
perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and 
ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that 1 . The error thus con 
sists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. 
The perception of a snake under relations and environments in 
which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. 
What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted 
and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the mis 
representation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge 
therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful repre 
sentation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contra 
dicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association 
with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and 
distinct, and is called perceptional (pralyaksa); when attained 
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then 
called non-perceptional (parok$a*). 

Theory of Perception. 

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the 
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the 
Jains think that perception (pratyak^a) reveals to us the external 
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of 
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul 

1 Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations 
to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves 
actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake 
actually exists though its relationing with the " this " as " this is a snake " does not 
exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called satkhyati or misrelationing 
of existents (sat). 

a See Jaina-tarka-varttika of Siddhasena, ch. I., and vrtti by Santyacarya, 
Pramananayatattvalokalamkara, ch. I., Pariksd-mukha-sutra-vrtti, ch. I. 



184 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it 
before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vi- 
jflanavadin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge 
of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. 
The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished 
from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which 
alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive 
senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are 
only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the 
five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of 
itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with 
those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account 
of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself 
before. The process of external perception does not thus involve 
the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise 
of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with 
the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch 
with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge 
which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is 
associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, 
I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the know 
ledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and 
hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the 
rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into 
myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my know 
ledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this 
happens in association with the eye ; I say that I see through 
the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have 
only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As 
experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable 
to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Pro 
ceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence 
of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in ex 
perience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as 
self alone can serve its purpose 1 . Perception of an object means 

1 Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim lu atma ca indriyam.. .anupahatataksuradidesesu 
eva atmanah karmaksayopcdamastenasthagitagavaksattilyani caksuradini upakaranani. 
faina-Vattika-Vrtfi, n. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as 
eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according 
>o the number of senses they possess. (See Pramanamimamsa. See also Tatlfartha- 
Jhii^at? asutra, ch. n. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial 



vi] Non-perceptual Knowledge 185 

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has 
been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the 
karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the pre 
sence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense 
organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists 
and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence 
of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savi- 
kalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct 
revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense- 
materials were necessary for the development of determinate 
perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who 
regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of in 
determinate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. 
The determinate stage with them is the result of the application 
of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence 
does not truly represent the presentative part 1 . 

Non-Perceptual Knowledge. 

Non-perceptual knowledge (parokfa) differs from pratyaksa 
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the 
latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any func 
tion in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction 
they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge 
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us 
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. 
Paroksa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, 
etc. ; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception. 

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to 
have five propositions, such as: (i) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because 
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the 
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called 
respectively pralijnd, hetu, drstdnla, upanaya and nigamana, ex 
cept for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two 
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process 
(Prameyakamalamdrtanda, pp. 108, 109). When we make an 

of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having 
a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like 
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge 
which rises in the soul hy inward determination ; for it is already existent in it ; the 
perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed. 
1 Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 8-n. 



1 86 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as 
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected 
with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhdva) or as in 
variable antecedence (kramabhdva) will from the mere statement 
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the 
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of 
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child 
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an 
inference 1 . 

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the 
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give 
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who 
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and 
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all 
ignorance 2 . 

Knowledge as Revelation. 

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of 
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. 
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that 

1 As regards concomitance (vydpti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists 
prefer antarvyapti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke 
with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svartha- 
numdna for one s own self and pardrthdnumdna for convincing others. It may rot 
be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his 
Das"avaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference ; 
(i) Pratijnd (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijftavibhakti (non-in 
jury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those 
who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), 
(4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest 
places of virtue), (5) Vipaksa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by 
reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipaksa 
pratisedha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should 
be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drstdnta (the Arhats take food from 
householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) As- 
arika (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), 
(9) Asankdpratisedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, 
so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana 
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhusana s Indian Logic). These are 
persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a 
formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his Nyaya- 
sutrabkdsya, I. i. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as 
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had 
this Jaina view in his mind. 

2 See Jainatarkavdrttika, and Pariksaniukhasutravrtti, and Saddarfanasamuccaya 
with Gunaratna on Jainism. 



vi] Theory of Being 187 

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was 
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically 
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect, 
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of 
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of 
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. 
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect 
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert 
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corre 
sponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we 
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, 
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect 
produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, 
and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for ex 
perience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing 
every moment ; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is 
found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as ear 
rings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face 
of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes 
every moment and that new things are being renewed at each 
succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and 
unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the 
conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence 
associated with change parydya (acquirement of new qualities 
and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other 
systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one 
particular standpoint (nayd) whereas they alone carefully weigh 
experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths 
indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and 
limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of 
arthakriydkdritva the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting 
on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they 
became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable 
abstract speculations which went directly against experience. 
Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor 
the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which 
reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies 
at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself 
as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my 
own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge 



1 88 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the 
rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. 
The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective 
collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness 
that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. 
Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred 
in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us 
as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character 
of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent 
of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious 
and an unconscious element in knowledge as Samkhya does. Nor 
should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it 
reveals, as the Sautrantikas think, for then by copying the materi 
ality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. 
Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the 
self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mlmamsa view that the 
validity (pramanyd) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge it- 
self (svatahprdmdnya) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically 
the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence 
(sanivdda} with facts. But in those cases where by previous 
knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced 
there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without 
reference to objective facts (prdmdnyamutpattau parata eva 
jnaptau svakdrye ca svatah paratasca abhydsdnabhydsdpeksayaj 1 . 
The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But 
that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypo 
thesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This 
brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics. 

The JIvas. 

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be 
divided into the living (jtva) and the non-living (ajlva\ The 
principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most 
erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property 
of the body 2 . It is on account of this life-principle that the body 
appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is 
directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things 
are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or 

1 Prameyakamalamdrtanifa, pp. 38-43. 

2 See Jaina Vdrttika, p. 60. 



vi] Souls 189 

a description. This is directly against the view of the great 
Mlmamsa authority Prabhakara 1 . The soul in its pure state is 
possessed of infinite perception (ananta-darsand), infinite know 
ledge (ananta-jftdna\ infinite bliss (ananta-sukhd) and infinite 
power (ananta-vlrya)*. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with 
the exception of a few released pure souls (mukta-jwd), all the 
other jlvas (samsdriri) have all their purity and power covered with 
a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them 
from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They 
are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumer 
able space-points in our mundane world (lokdkdsa}, have a limited 
size (madhyama-parimdna) and are neither all-pervasive (yibhii) 
nor atomic (anu); it is on account of this that jwa is called 
Jivdstikdya. The word astikdya means anything that occupies 
space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and 
contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body 
which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and 
smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to 
the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it 
lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, 
wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel 
it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often ex 
plained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines 
the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The 
Jains divide the jlvas according to the number of sense-organs 
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess 
only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that 
of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. 
Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. 
The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in 
addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all 
the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely 
men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these 
an inner sense-organ namely manas by virtue of which they are 

1 See Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 33. 

2 The Jains distinguish between dariana a.ndjftana. Dars"ana is the knowledge of 
things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jnana means the knowledge of details, 
e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, 
where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars"ana and then jflana. 
The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite 
knowledge of all things in all their details. 



190 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

called rational (samjniri) while the lower animals have no reason 
and are called asamjnin. 

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains 
regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being ani 
mated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of 
souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; 
they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. 
These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case 
they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. 
Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other 
plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all 
the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. 
Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross ; they 
exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants 
of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and 
invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. 
The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they 
are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, 
having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing ex 
treme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with 
them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply 
of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an 
infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to 
replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the 
souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to 
the present. Thus it is evident the samsara will never be empty 
of living beings. Those of the nigodas who long for development 
come out and contiune their course of progress through successive 
stages 1 . 

Karma Theory. 

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jlvas are 
born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already 
noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul 
is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of 
the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. 
Those which obscure right knowledge of details (jndna) are 
called jndnavaraniya, those which obscure right perception 
(darsana) as in sleep are called darsandvaraniya, those which 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. ., and Lokaprakdfa, vi. pp. 31 ff. 



vi] Effects of Karma 191 

obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and 
pain are vedaniya, and those which obscure the right attitude of the 
soul towards faith and right conduct mohaniya 1 . In addition to 
these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which 
determine (i) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body 
with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nation 
ality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the 
soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good 
action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called 
(l) dynska karma, (2) ndma karma, (3) gotra karma, (4) antardya 
karma. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are con 
tinually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first 
instance is called bhdva karma, which transforms itself into dravya 
karma and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming 
into contact with the passions (kasdya} of the soul. These act like 
viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This 
matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided 
into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the 
cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma 
matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as 
golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are 
called the lesyds. The feelings generated by the accumulation of 
the karma-matter are called bhdva-lesya and the actual coloration 
of the soul by it is called dravya-lesyd. According as any karma 
matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it 
gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the know 
ledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., 
is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which 
the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind 
of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge 
of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our 
knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that 
kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All 
knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from 
within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be 
generating them all being but mere coexistent external con 
ditions. 

1 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge : (r) matijfUna (ordinary cog 
nition), (?) fruti (testimony), (3) avadhi (supernatural cognition), (4) manahparydya 
(thought-reading), (5) kevala-jAHna (omniscience). 



192 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

After the effect of a particular karma matter (karma-vargana) 
is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. 
This process of purging off the karmas is called nirjard. If no 
new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging 
off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as 
it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma 
matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and 
binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to 
continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and re 
birth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with 
its karmic body (kdrmanasarira), goes in a few moments to the 
place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding 
or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter. 

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its 
proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the 
audayika state. By proper efforts karma may however be pre 
vented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and 
this is said to be the aupasamika state of the soul. When karma 
is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul 
is said to be in the ksayika state, and it is from this state that 
Moksa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary 
good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, 
and some active (ksdyopasamika) 1 . 

Karma, Asrava and Nirjara. 

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all 
the experiences of this world process, including births and re 
births in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. 
The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter 
(karma-vargana). The influx of these karma particles into the 
soul is called asrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by 
body, mind, and speech. The asravas represent the channels or 
modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the 
channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains 
distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually 

1 The stages through which a developing soul passes are technically called guna- 
sthdnas which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of 
faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, 
in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the 
thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he still practises yoga and at the 
fourteenth stage he attains liberation (see Dravyasarngrahavrtti, I3th verse). 



vi] Influx of Karma 193 

enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds 
of asravas, bhavasrava and karmasrava. Bhavasrava means the 
thought activities of the soul through which or on account of 
which the karma particles enter the soul 1 . Thus Nemicandra 
says that bhavasrava is that kind of change in the soul (which 
is the contrary to what can destroy the karmasrava), by which 
the karmas enter the soul 8 . Karmasrava, however, means the 
actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These 
bhavasravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion 
(mithydtva\ want of control (avirati), inadvertence (pramdda), 
the activities of body, mind and speech (yoga) and the pas 
sions (kasdyas). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely ekdnta 
(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), 
viparlta (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), vinaya 
(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit \ 
sarpsaya (doubt as to right or wrong) and ajndna (want of any 
belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). 
Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (himsd), falsehood (anrta), 
stealing (cauryya), incontinence (abrahma), and desire to have 
things which one does not already possess (parigrahdkdnk$a). 
Pramada or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad con 
versation (vikathd), passions (ka$dya\ bad use of the five senses 
(indriya), sleep (nidrd\ attachment (rdgd)*. 

Coming to dravyasrava we find that it means that actual in 
flux of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners 
in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight 
different kinds, namely jftanavaraniya, dars"anavaranlya, veda- 
nlya, mohanlya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya. These actual 
influxes take place only as a result of the bhavasrava, or the re 
prehensible thought activities, or changes (parindma) of the soul. 
The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas 
is called bhavabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the 
actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called 
dravyabandha. It is on account of bhavabandha that the actual 
connection between the karmas and the soul can take place 4 . The 
actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking 

o 

1 Dravyasamgraha, SI. 29. 

2 Nemicandra s commentary on DravyasamgrahcL, Jsl. 39, edited by S. C. Gboshal, 
Arrah, 1917. 

3 See Nemicandra s commentary on SI. 30. 

4 Nemicandra on 31, and Vardhamanapur&na xvi. 44, quoted by GhoshaL 
D. 13 



194 The Jaina Philosophy [CH 

of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with 
oil. Thus Gunaratna says: "The influx of karma means the 
contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the 
particular kind of karma, with the soul, just like the sticking of 
dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of 
the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes 
so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked 
at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a 
material body during its samsara stage 1 ." From one point of 
view the bondage of karma is only of punya and pdpa (good 
and bad karmas) 2 . From another this bondage is of four kinds, 
according to the nature of karma (prakrti), duration of bondage 
(sthiti), intensity (anubhdgd) and extension (pradesa). The 
nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already 
mentioned, namely the jfianavaranlya karma which obscures the 
infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, darSana- 
varanlya karma which obscures the infinite general .knowledge 
of the soul, vedanlya karma which produces the feelings of 
pleasure and pain in the soul, mohanlya karma, which so in 
fatuates souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from 
what is wrong, ayu karma, which determines the tenure of any 
particular life, nama karma which gives them personalities, gotra 
karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding 
for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the per 
formance of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay 
of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be 
intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle 
of division, anubhaga. Pradesa refers to the different parts of 
the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The 
duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due 
to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the 
different classification of karmas as jfianavaranlya, etc., are due to 
the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter 3 . 

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhava- 
srava and dravyasrava) are two kinds of control opposing this 
inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and 
by the actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and 
these are respectively called bhavasamvara and dravyasamvara 4 . 

1 See Gunaratna, p. 181. 2 Ibid. 8 Nemicandra, 33. 

4 Varddhamanapurana, XVI. 67-68, and Dravyasamgrahavrtti, Si. 35. 



vi] Self-control 195 

The bhavasamvaras are (i) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, 
abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects 
of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order 
to avoid injury to insects (irya), gentle and holy talk (bhdsd\ re 
ceiving proper alms (esand), etc., (3) guptis or restraints of body, 
speech and mind, (4) dharmas consisting of habits of forgive 
ness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, 
penance, abandonment, indifference to any kind of gain or loss, 
and supreme sex-control 1 , (5) anupreksd consisting of meditation 
about the transient character of the world, about our helplessness 
without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our 
own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the 
difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the unclean- 
liness of our body and all that is associated with it, about the in 
flux of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those 
karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter 
and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining 
true knowledge, faith, and conduct, and about the essential prin 
ciples of the world 2 , (6) the parlsahajaya consisting of the con 
quering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc., and 
of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) cdritra or right 
conduct. 

Next to this we come to nirjara or the purging off of the 
karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjara also is of two 
kinds, bhavanirjara and dravyanirjara. Bhavanirjara means that 
change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are 
destroyed. Dravyanirjara means the actual destruction of these 
karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by 
penances before their time of fruition, called savipaka and avipaka 
nirjaras respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed moksa 
or liberation is effected. 

Pudgala. 

The ajlva (non-living) is divided into pudgaldstikdya, dharma 
stikdya, adharmdstikdya, dkdsdstikdya, kdla, punya, pdpa. The 
word pudgala means matter 3 , and it is called astikdya in the 
sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms 

1 Tattvarthadhigamasutra. 2 Ibid. 

3 This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists pudgala 
means an individual or a person. 

132 



196 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two 
states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such 
as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things 
are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The 
smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (anu). 
The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, 
and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the 
different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combi 
nation of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrange 
ment and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic 
space (ghanapratarabhedena). Some combinations take place by 
simple mutual contact at two points (yugmapradesa) whereas 
in others the atoms are only held together by the points of at 
tractive force (ojahpradesa) (Prajndpanopdngasiitra, pp. 10-12). 
Two atoms form a compound (skandka), when the one is viscous 
and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or 
dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that 
there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded 
the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These 
compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce 
the gross things of the world. They are, however, liable to 
constant change (parindma) by which they lose some of their 
old qualities (gunas) and acquire new ones. There are four 
elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these 
are alike in character. The perception of grossness however 
is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the 
atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the 
perception of atoms scattered spatially length wise and breadthwise 
(as the Samkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of 
a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the com 
bined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given 
in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing 
appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have 
all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the 
darsanavaraniya and jfianavaranlya veil, there arises in the soul 
the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness 
(samdna-rupata) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of 
atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) 
is technically called tiryaksdmdnya. This samanya or generality 
is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity 



vi] Dharma 197 

(as maintained by the Naiyayikas) but represents only the ac 
cession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities 
of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of 
qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and 
to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing 
to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the 
developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the 
relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to 
the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of 
some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as 
a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This 
sameness of qualities in time is technically called urdhvasdmdnya 1 . 
If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change 
and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to 
destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of 
substance (dravyd) they are eternal. 

Dharma, Adharma, Akasa. 

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is 
absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of 
Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, 
sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe 
(lokdkasd) and pervades every part of it. The term astikdya 
is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the ac 
companying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, 
like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition 
or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent 
or passive (uddslnd) and not an active or solicitous (preraka) 
cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move ; but if 
the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its 
motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move ; but 
if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of 
dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (lokd) 
in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the 
liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there 
because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma 2 . 
Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which 

1 See Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 136-143 ; Jainatarkavarttika, p. 106. 

2 Dravyasamgrahavrtti, 17-20. 



198 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

helps jlvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance 
could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if 
there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two 
categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on 
account of their notion that the inner activity of the jlva or the 
atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other 
extraneous entity, without which this could not have been trans 
formed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jlvas 
were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be 
found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which 
was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required 
for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent 
in the region of the liberated souls. 

The category of akasa is that subtle entity which pervades 
the mundane universe (loka) and the transcendent region of 
liberated souls (aloka) which allows the subsistence of all other 
substances such as dharma, adharma, jlva, pudgala. It. is not a 
mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere empti 
ness, but a positive entity which helps other things to inter 
penetrate it. On account of its pervasive character it is called 
akdsastikaya *. 

Kala and Samaya. 

Time (kala) in reality consists of those innumerable particles 
which never mix with one another, but which help the happening 
of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change 
of qualities of the atoms. Kala does not bring about the changes 
of qualities, in things, but just as akasa helps interpenetration 
and dharma motion, so also kala helps the action of the transfor 
mation of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, 
hours, days, etc., is called samaya. This is the appearance of the 
unchangeable kala in so many forms. Kala thus not only aids 
the modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifi 
cations as moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), 
and the moments, hours, etc., are its paryayas. The unit of samaya 
is the time required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a 
slow movement. 

1 Dravyasamgrahavrtti, 19. 



vi] Rules of Conduct 1 99 

Jaina Cosmography. 

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning 
or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are expe 
rienced as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, 
urdhva (where the gods reside), madhya (this world of ours), and 
adho (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe 
(lokakasa) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement 
possible. Beyond the lokakasa there is no dharma and therefore 
no movement, but only space (dkdsa). Surrounding this lokakasa 
are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over 
the urdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakasa and (there being 
no dharma) remains motionless there. 

Jaina Yoga. 

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation). 
This yoga consists of jflana (knowledge of reality as it is), sraddha 
(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from 
doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of ahimsd (not 
taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), sunrta 
(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), asteya 
(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya 
(abandoning lust for all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and 
body), and aparigraka (abandoning attachment for all things) 1 . 
These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent 
on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary 
householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, 
that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should 
follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from 
a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so 
forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and 

1 Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are : Iryya (to 
go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun s rays, so that 
proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on 
insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), bkdfd (to speak well and pleasantly 
to all beings), isana (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), danasamiti (to 
inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything), 
utsargasamiti (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to 
injure any being), manogupti (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within 
oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), vaggupti (absolute silence), and 
kayagupti (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of caritra are 
counted in Dravyasamgrahavrtti 35. 



2oo The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon 
the virtues of ahimsa, sunrta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the 
root of all these is ahimsa. The virtues of sunrta, asteya and 
brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrol- 
laries of ahimsa. Ahimsa may thus be generalized as the funda 
mental ethical virtue of Jainism ; judgment on all actions may be 
passed in accordance with the standard of ahimsa ; sunrta, asteya 
and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression 
leads to himsa (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice 
of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this 
is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling 
for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues 
according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called 
mahabrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a 
householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere 
cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahabrata it would 
be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex- 
acts. Ahimsa according to a householder, according to anubrata, 
would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according 
to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to 
prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to 
any living being in any way. 

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all 
of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahimsa. These 
are (i) digvirati (to carry out activities within a restricted area 
and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), 
(2) bhogopabhogamdna (to desist from drinking liquors, taking 
flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and 
vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding 
time and place of taking meals), (3) anarthadanda consisting of 
(a) apadhydna (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, 
killing of one s enemies, etc.), (fr) pdpopadesa (desisting from 
advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing 
of so many insects), (c) himsopakdriddna (desisting from giving 
implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury 
of insects), (d) pramdddcarana (to desist from attending musical 
parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature, gambling, etc.), ($)siksd- 
padabrata consisting of (a) sdmayikabrata (to try to treat all 
beings equally), (b) desdvakdsikabrata (gradually to practise the 
digviratibrata more and more extensively), (c} posadhabrata 



vi] Rules of Conduct 201 

(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) atithisamvibhdgabrata (to 
make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called 
aticdra, should be carefully avoided. 

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to 
know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the 
soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can 
be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is 
pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on 
account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are 
burnt (dhydndgnidagdhakarmd) the self becomes purified. The 
soul is itself the samsara (the cycle of rebirths) when it is over 
powered by the four kasayas (passions) and the senses. The four 
kasayas are krodha (anger), mdna (vanity and pride), mdyd 
(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and lobha (greed). 
These kasayas cannot be removed except by a control of the 
senses ; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind 
(manahsuddhi). Without the control of the mind no one can 
proceed in "the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when 
the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should 
make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism 
(tapas) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attach 
ment and antipathy (rdgadvesd) can be removed only by the 
purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that 
man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin 
(sage) that he should be free from them and become independent 
in the real sense of the term. When a man learns to look upon 
all beings with equality (samalvd) he can effect such a conquest 
over raga and dvesa as one could never do even by the strictest 
asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this 
samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of 
meditation (bhdvana) : 

We should think of the transitoriness (anityata) of all things, 
that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, 
what it was at mid-day it is not at night ; for all things are 
transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, 
wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles 
in a whirlwind. 

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will 
by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of 
misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in 



2O2 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we 
find that it fails us. This is called aaranabhavana (the meditation 
of helplessness). 

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits 
of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one 
anothei by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and 
by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate 
on these aspects is called ekatvabhavana and anyatvabhavana. 

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, 
blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called asucibhavana 
(meditation of the impurity of the body). 

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of uni 
versal friendship and compassion and the passions are removed, 
then only will good (subha) accrue to me, but if on the contrary 
I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil 
will befall me, is called asravabhavarra (meditation of the be 
falling of evil). By the control of the asrava (inrush of karma) 
comes the samvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the 
destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nirjara 
(decay and destruction of karma matter). 

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas 
(virtues) of self control (samyama\ truthfulness (sunrta), purity 
(sauca), chastity (brahma), absolute want of greed (akiftcanatd\ 
asceticism (tapas), forbearance, patience (ksdnti), mildness 
(mdrdava), sincerity (rjutd\ and freedom or emancipation from 
all sins (mukti) can alone help us in the achievement of the 
highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can 
look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called 
dharmasvakhyatatabhavana. 

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also 
of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the 
diverse conditions of men. These two are called lokabhdvand 
and bodhibhdvand. 

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man 
becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, 
and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a 
mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should 
take to the performance of dhyana or meditation by deep concen 
tration. The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyana 
are interdependent, so that without dhyana there is no samatva 



vi] Anti-theistic Arguments 203 

and without samatva there is no dhyana. In order to make the 
mind steady by dhyana one should think of maitrt (universal 
friendship), pramoda (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of 
men), karund (universal compassion) and mddhyastha (indifference 
to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any 
note of sinners). The Jaina dhyana consists in concentrating 
the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The 
dhyana however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to 
making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed 
towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the 
final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a com 
plete course of moral discipline which leads to the purification 
of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu 
yoga of Patafijali or even of the Buddhists 1 . 

Jaina Atheism 2 . 

The Naiyayikas assert that as the world is of the nature of 
an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and 
this agent is Isvara (God). To this the Jain replies, " What does 
the Naiyayika mean when he says that the world is of the nature 
of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (i) that which is made 
up of parts (sdvayava), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a 
non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as 
having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (vtkdrit- 
vam). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If it 
means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (sdmdnya) 
existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence 
destructible, but these the Naiyayikas regard as being partless and 
eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space" 
(dkdsd) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyayika regards 
it as eternal. 

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a 
thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one 
could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the 
elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal. 

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as 

1 Yogatastra, by Heniacandra, edited by Windisch, in Zeitschrift der Deutschen 
Morg. Gesellschaft, Leipsig, 1874, and Dravyasamgraha, edited by Ghoshal, 1917. 

2 See Gunaratna s Tarkarahasyadipika. 



204 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when 
a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in 
the hollow which he dug. 

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could 
suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require 
another creator to create him and he another, and so on ad 
infinitum. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to 
change with reference to his creative activity. 

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some 
time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects." 
But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things 
contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then 
that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and 
thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these 
are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue 
of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo 
changes of colour by heat. 

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a 
whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the 
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the 
cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is 
argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human 
causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human 
beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly 
an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings 
but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because 
water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in 
inferring fire from water- vapour, as he would do from smoke. 
If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the 
inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to pro 
duce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing 
old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were pro 
duced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which 
we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, 
and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is 
said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been 
made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer 
the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having 
been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have 
a vicious circle (anyonydsrayd}. 



vi] Anti-theistic Arguments 205 

Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by 
an agent, then such an agent should have a body, for we have 
never seen any intelligent creator without a body. Jf it is held 
that we should consider the general condition of agency only, 
namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that 
this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind 
of body. If you take the instances of other kinds of effects such 
as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that 
these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it 
is said that these are also made by God, then you have an 
argument in a circle (cakrakd), for this was the very matter which 
you sought to prove. 

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. 
Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in 
that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the 
world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does 
he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is im 
possible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a 
body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any 
other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there 
cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that 
he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that 
he can be all-creator. 

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless 
God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take 
to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would 
be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it 
in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then 
he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it 
through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose 
there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing 
else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they 
suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious 
actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such 
a blind destiny (adrsta) might take the place of God. If He took 
to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things 
without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain 
people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism 
on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took 
place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of 



206 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

admitting him at all ? You may rather say that the world came 
into being out of its own nature. 

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help 
of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create 
this world. This is against all experience. 

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, 
you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to 
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has 
no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. 
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the pro 
duction of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied 
a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then 
there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and de 
struction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one 
unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character 
of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which 
knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not 
aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is 
omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any 
knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any 
perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot 
have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposi 
tion of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this 
also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if 
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other supposi 
tions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain 
all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of 
karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods 
too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be 
quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of 
a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and 
wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can 
co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if 
there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate 
that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think 
his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in which 
ever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it 
is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense 
with the supposition altogether 1 . 

1 See Saddarfanasamuccaya, Gunaratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124. 



vi] Emancipation 207 

Moksa (emancipation). 

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (moksa} is 
the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the 
state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is 
also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (anantajndna) and infi 
nite perception (anantadarsana). In the samsara state on account 
of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn 
out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and 
that time as ordinary knowledge (matt}, testimony (srutd), super 
natural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (avadhi), and direct 
knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (manah- 
parydya). In the state of release however there is omniscience 
{kevala-jftdna) and all things are simultaneously known to the 
perfect (kevaliri) as they are. In the samsara stage the soul always 
acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though 
remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage 
the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus 
it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance 
as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change 
meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities. 

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the 
karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways 
yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action 
(anantavirya), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and 
infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time 
by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this 
power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. 
If man had not this anantavlrya in him he might have been eter 
nally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured 
his bondage (bandhd). But since man is the repository of this 
indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and 
produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his 
highest good. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAMKHYA (YOGA) 1 . 

A Review. 

THE examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of 
Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince 
us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in 
circles other than those of the Upanisad sages. That certain 
practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the 
wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some 
of the Upanisads but were accepted by the two nastika schools 
of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the 
point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nastika schools 
appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial 
disciplines of the Brahmanas. Both these systems originated with 
the Ksattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the 
taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals 
at the sacrifices. 

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable com 
bination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical 
power of producing the desired effect a shower of rain, the 
birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices 
were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as 
for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas 
were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate 
a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a 
certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses 
in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired 
by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define 
truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic 
culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with 
which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth 
of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our 

1 This chapter is based on my Study of Patanjali, published by the Calcutta 
University, and my Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought, 
awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in 
those two works. 



CH. vn] Buddhism and Jainism 209 

objects. Truth cannot be determined a priori but depends upon 
the test of experience 1 . 

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though 
probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial 
creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental 
principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at 
least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see 
that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being 
due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that 
which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme 
did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in 
formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness 2 . Turning 
to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of know 
ledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is 
good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an 
account of things that on proceeding according to its directions 
we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct 
estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good 
and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes 
were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not 
carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in 
the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so 
far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent 
soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute 
view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening 
of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true 
only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, 
which we acknowledge as superior to mere a priori abstrac 
tions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the 
assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new 
qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this 
common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary 
experience, could not satisfy our inner a priori demands for 
finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but 
absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism 

1 The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mimamsa of Kumarila and 
Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined a priori 
while error is determined by experience. 

2 Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of 
arthakriyakaritva. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was 
the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriy&karitva. 

D. 14 



2io The Kapila and the PataHjala Samkhya [CH. 

would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but 
untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such 
a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer 
cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pro 
nouncement, an absolute judgment. 

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism 
from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formu 
late a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient 
beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was 
busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles 
or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual perform 
ances of sacrifices. Again action with the newsystems did not mean 
sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions 
were here considered bad or good according as they brought 
about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial 
creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal 
degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth 
should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The 
sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the 
other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned 
their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and 
unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever 
dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, 
was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for 
the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial 
creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed 
only if it was so dictated in the Vedas. Karma and the fruit of 
karma (karmaphald) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its 
fruits temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit 
of sacrifices ; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of 
sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems how 
ever, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were 
taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or 
absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no 
narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happi 
ness or destruction of sorrow ; karma was still the way, but not 
sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions 
performed by us ; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth 
or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice. 

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upa- 



vi i] Samkhya in the Upanisads 211 

nisads which had anticipated the new systems in all these 
directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew 
their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the 
Upanisads, and built their systems independently by their own 
rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upanisads were 
thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, 
it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp 
such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to 
harmonize the suggestions of the Upanisads and of the sacrificial 
creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a con 
sistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are 
indeed fulfilled in the Samkhya philosophy, germs of which may 
be discovered in the Upanisads. 

The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanisads. 
It is indeed true that in the Upanisads there is a large number 
of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahrnan, the 
infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing 
forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the 
earliest Vedic literature, mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and 
also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired re 
sult 1 . In many passages of the Upanisads this Brahman appears 
as the universal and supreme principle from which all others de 
rived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages 
for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of 
development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level 
in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, 
and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the 
only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the 
monistic Vedanta as explained by aiikara. But there was 
another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, 
which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made 
up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in veta- 
svatara and particularly in MaitrayanI from which it appears 
that the Samkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and 
many of its technical terms were already in use 8 . But the date 
of MaitrayanI has not yet been definitely settled, and the details 

1 See Hillebrandt s article, " Brahman" (E. R. .). 

1 Katha in. 10, v. 7. 6veta. v. 7, 8, 11, iv. 5, i. 3. This has been dealt with in 
detail in my Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought, in the first 
chapter. 

142 



212 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion 
of the Samkhya thought as it developed in the Upanisads. It is 
not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave 
some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Samkhya-Yoga 
philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all 
the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it 
unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanisads with the 
doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of 
relativism of the Jains. 

Samkhya and Yoga Literature. 

The main exposition of the system of Samkhya and Yoga in 
this section has been based on the Samkhya kdrikd, the Sam 
khya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patafljali with their commen 
taries and sub-commentaries. The Samkhya kdrikd (about 
200 A.D.) was written by Is"varakrsna. The account of Samkhya 
given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and 
this has been treated separately. Vacaspati MiSra (ninth century 
A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as Tattvakaumudi. But 
before him Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the 
Samkhya kdrikd*. Narayanatlrtha wrote his Candrikd on Gauda- 
pada s commentary. The Samkhya sutras which have been com 
mented on by Vijftana Bhiksu (called Pravacanabhasya) of the 
sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author 
after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the 
fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the 
Samkhya sutras. Vijftana Bhiksu wrote also another elementary 
work on Samkhya known as Sdmkhyasdra. Another short work 
of late origin is Tattvasamdsa (probably fourteenth century). Two 
other works on Samkhya, viz. Slmananda s Sdmkhyatattvavivecana 
and Bhavaganesa s Sdmkhyatattvayathdrthyadlpana (both later 
than Vijftanabhiksu) of real philosophical value have also been 
freely consulted. Pataftjali s Yoga sutra (not earlier than 147 B.C.) 
was commented on by Vyasa (400 A.D.) and Vyasa s bhasya 
commented on by Vacaspati Misra is called Tattvavaisdradl, 
by Vijftana Bhiksu Yogavdrttika, by Bhoja in the tenth century 
Bhojavrtti, and by Nagesa (seventeenth century) Chdydvyakhyd. 

1 I suppose that Raja s commentary on the KarikS, was the same as Rajavarttika 
quoted by Vacaspati. Raja s commentary on the Karika has been referred to by 
Jayanta in his Nydyamattjari, p. 109. This book is probably now lost. 



vn] Samkhya in Caraka 213 

Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may 
mention the two treatises Mechanical, physical and chemical theories 
of the A ncient Hindus and \he Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus 
by Dr B. N. Seal and my two works on Yoga Study ofPatanjali pub 
lished by the Calcutta University, and Yoga Philosophy in relation 
to other Indian Systems of Thought which is shortly to be published, 
and my Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus, awaiting publi 
cation with the Calcutta University. 

Gunaratna mentions two other authoritative Samkhya works, 
viz. Mdtharabhasya and Atreyatantra. Of these the second is 
probably the same as Caraka s treatment of Samkhya,.for we know 
that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka s work and for that it 
was called Atreyasamhitd or Atreyatantra, Nothing is known 
of the Mdtharabhasya^. 

An Early School of Samkhya. 

It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that 
Caraka s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been 
dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should 
be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. 
According to Caraka there are six elements (dhdtus\ viz. the 
five elements such as akaSa, vayu etc. and cetana, called also 
purusa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to 
be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five 
conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold 
prakrti (prakrti, mahat, ahamkara and the five elements) 2 . The 
manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence 
is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses 
there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with 
them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate 
sensing (uhd) and conceiving (vicdra) before definite understanding 
(buddhi) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the 
combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with 
a preponderance of akaSa, the sense of touch with a preponderance 

1 Readers unacquainted with Samkhya- Yoga may omit the following three sections 
at the time of first reading. 

2 Purusa is here excluded from the list. Cakrapani, the commentator, says that 
the prakrti and purusa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted 
as one. Prakrtivyatiriktancodasinam purusamavyaktatvasddharmyat avyaktdyam 
prakrtaveva praksipya avyaktaSabdenaiva grhndti, Harinatha Vi&Lrada s edition of 

Caraka, Sdrira, p. 4. 



214 The Kapila and the Patanjala S&mkhya [CH. 

of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with 
a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponder 
ance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmatras at all 1 . The 
conglomeration of the sense-objects (indriyarthd) or gross matter, 
the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhutas and prakrti, mahat 
and ahamkara taking place through rajas make up what we call 
man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. 
All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, 
life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also 
the purusa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, 
bondage, or salvation. If the atman were not regarded as cause, 
all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a 
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one 
others would be responsible. This purusa, called a\so#aramdtman, 
is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in 
itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it 
through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By 
ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of purusa 
and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, 
cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects 
are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but 
all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which 
is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the 
avyakta part of prakrti with purusa as forming one category. 
The vikara or evolutionary products of prakrti are called ksetra, 
whereas the avyakta part of prakrti is regarded as the ksetrajfia 
(avyaktamasya ksetrasya ksetrajnamrsayo viduk). This avyakta 
and cetan are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested 
prakrti or cetana is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is 
derived the ego (ahamkara) and from the ahamkara the five 
elements and the senses are produced, and when this production 
is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time 
of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return 
back to prakrti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the 
time of a new creation from the purusa the unmanifest (avyakta)^ 
all the manifested forms the evolutes of buddhi, ahamkara, etc. 

1 But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as 
forming part of prakrti which is regarded as having eight elements in it (prakrtifca- 
ftadh&tuki), viz. avyakta, mahat , ahamkara, and five other elements. In addition to these 
elements forming part of the prakrti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects 
which have evolved out of the prakrti. 



vn] Samkhya in Caraka 215 

appear 1 . This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and 
new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and 
so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this 
revolution in a cycle. The jnanas can only become active in asso 
ciation with the self, which is the real agent This self of itself takes 
rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undeter 
mined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will 
and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, 
yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are 
associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains 
are felt by the conglomeration (rdsi), and not by the atman pre 
siding over it From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and 
pain comes desire (trsna) consisting of wish and antipathy, and 
from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Moksa means complete 
cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association 
of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the 
manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when 
there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns 
that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of them 
selves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do 
not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last 
renunciation when all affections and knowledge become "finally 
extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence 
of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived*. 
It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this 
state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any 
characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Samkhyas as their 
goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are 
rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be 
enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth, 

1 This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakra- 
pani as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prakrti the 
purusa and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapani on 
sarira, I. 46. 

8 Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman 
of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This 
indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence 
(alaksanam), resembling Nagarjuna s Nirvana. Thus Caraka writes : tasmimScarama- 
sannyase samuldhsarvcevedanah asamjft&jftanavijflanti nivrttim y&ntyaHtsatah. atah- 
param brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate nihsrtah saruabhdvtbhyah cihnam yasya 
tia vidyate, gatirbrahmaviddm brahma tatcdkfaramalakfanam. Caraka, Sarira 1. 
98-100. 



216 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

the state of moksa comes about. Various kinds of moral en 
deavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning 
of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed 
attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) 
thus discovered should be recalled again and again 1 and this will 
ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the 
self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or 
character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation 
(mokse nivrttirnihsesd). 

The main features of the Samkhya doctrine as given by Caraka 
are thus: I. Purusa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera- 
of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed 
which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are 
not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of 
the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of 
emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless abso 
lute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state ; there is 
no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the con 
glomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, ahamkara etc. 
6. The senses are formed of matter (bhautika). 

This account of Samkhya agrees with the system of Samkhya 
propounded by Paftcasikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of 
Asuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the 
Mahabharata XII. 219. Pancasikha of course does not describe 
the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what 
little he says it may be supposed that the system of Samkhya 
he sketches is the same as that of Caraka 2 . Paflcasikha speaks 
of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all 
Samkhya literature to prakrti) in the state of purusa (purusd- 
vasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination 
of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases 
with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a 
discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as 
the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. 
The same discussion occurs in Paflcasikha also, and the proofs 

1 Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (r) Thinking of the 
cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (i) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, 
and (4) by acute attempt to remember. 

2 Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pan- 
cas"ikha s doctrine as a genuine Samkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the 
fact that the Samkhya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice. 



vn] Samkhya of Pancafikha and Caraka 217 

for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again 
Paficasikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions 
of the conglomeration of our physical body mind, and the 
element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such 
independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the 
phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our 
suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Moksa 
is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these 
phenomena. The gunas described by Paftcaikha are the different 
kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. 
The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the ksetra, as 
Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the 
last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose 
themselves in the ocean and it is called alinga (without any 
characteristic) a term reserved for prakrti in later Samkhya. 
This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renuncia 
tion which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction 
(samyagbadha). 

Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of Sad- 
darsanasamuccaya, mentions two schools of Samkhya, the 
Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) 1 . Of these the 
doctrine of the Maulikya Samkhya is said to be that which 
believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman 
(maulikyasdmkhyd hydtmdnamdtmdnam prati prthak pradhdnam 
vadanti). This seems to be a reference to the Samkhya doctrine 
I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this 
represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Samkhya. 

In Mahdbhdrata XII. 318 three schools of Samkhya are 
mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the 
school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty- 
five (the well-known orthodox Samkhya system) and those who 
admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a 
supreme being in addition to purusa and this was the twenty-sixth 
principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the 
form of Samkhya advocated in the Makubkzrata. The schools of 
Samkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here 
denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of 
Samkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the 

1 Gunaratna s Tarkarahasyadtpikd, p. 99. 



2 1 8 The Kapila and tke Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

other chapters of the Makdbhdrata (xil. 203, 204). The self 
apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon 
day; it is said that as Rahu (the shadow on the sun during an 
eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be 
seen apart from the body. The selfs (saririnaK) are spoken of as 
manifesting from prakrti. 

We do not know anything about Asuri the direct disciple 
of Kapila 1 . But it seems probable that the system of SSmkhya 
we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same 
form in the Mahdbhdrata and has been attributed there to Paft- 
caikha is probably the earliest form of Samkhya available to us 
in a systematic form. Not only does Gunaratna s reference to the 
school of Maulikya Samkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka 
(78 A.D.) does not refer to the Samkhya as described by Isvarak- 
rsna and referred to in other parts of Mahdbhdrata is a definite 
proof that Ivarakrsna s Samkhya is a later modification, which 
was either non-existent in Caraka s time or was not regarded as 
an authoritative old Samkhya view. 

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavasin al 
tered the Samkhya according to his own views 8 . Takakusu thinks 
that Vindhyavasin was a title of IsVarakrsna 8 and Garbe holds that 
the date of ISvarakrsna was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very 
plausible view that IsVarakrsna was indebted for his karikas to 
another work, which was probably written in a style different 
from what he employs. The seventh verse of his Kdrikd seems to 
be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the 

1 A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gunaratna (Tarkarakasyadipika, p. 104). 
The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, 
it (purusa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water. 

3 Vassilief s Buddhismus, p. 240. 

8 Takakusu s "A study of Paramartha s life of Vasubandhu," J. R.A.S., 1905. 
This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for 
Gunaratna mentions Kvarakrsna and Vindhyavasin as two different authorities ( 7 arka- 
rahasyadipikd, pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in 
anustubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Is"varakrsna. It appears that Kvara- 
krsna wrote two books; one is the Samkhya k&rika and another an independent work 
on Samkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gunaratna, stands as follows : 

" Pratiniyatadhyavasayah Srotradisamuttha adhyaksam" (p. 108). 

If Vacaspati s interpretation of the classification of anumana in his Tattvakaumwfi 
be considered to be a correct explanation of Samkhya karika then IsVarakrsna must be 
a different person from Vindhyavasin whose views on anumana as referred to in 
Slokavarttika, p. 393, are altogether different. But Vacaspati s own statement in the 
Tatparyyatika (pp. 109 and 131) shows that bis treatment there was not faithful. 



vi i] Ihvarak^sna s Samkhya 219 

Mahdbhdsya of Patafljali the grammarian (147 B.C.) 1 . The subject 
of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate 
visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with 
the strictly technical part of SSmkhya, and it is just possible 
that the book from which Pataftjali quoted the passage, and which 
was probably paraphrased in the Arya metre by Isvarakrsna 
was not a Samkhya book at all. But though the subject of the 
verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Samkhya, yet 
since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of 
Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safe 
guard against certain objections against the Samkhya doctrine of 
prakrti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the 
verse of a Samkhya book which was paraphrased by Isvarakrsna. 

The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with 
Isvarakrsna s Samkhya (but with an addition of Isvara) are to be 
found in Patafljali s Yoga sutras and in the Mahdbhdrata ; but we 
are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched 
here was known to Pataftjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is 
made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. 

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Samkhya 
of Caraka and Paflcasikha is very important ; for it shows a 
transitional stage of thought between the Upanisad ideas and 
the orthodox Samkhya doctrine as represented by Isvarakrsna. 
On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and 
that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that 
the purusa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyaya, 
and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer 
than the orthodox Samkhya. 

We hear of a Sastitantrasastra as being one of the oldest Sam 
khya works. This is described in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita as 
containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters*. 
A quotation from Rajavdrttika (a work about which there is no 
definite information) in Vacaspati Misra s commentary on the 
Samkhya kdrika(j2) says that it was called the Sastitantra because 
it dealt with the existence of prakrti, its oneness, its difference 
from purusas, its purposefulness for purusas, the multiplicity of 
purusas, connection and separation from purusas, the evolution of 

1 Patafijali s Mahabhasya, IV. i. 3. Atisannikarsadativiprakarsat murttyantara- 
vyavadhdnat tanuuavrtatvat indriyadaurvalyddatipram&dttt, etc. (Benares edition. ) 

J Ahirbudhnya. Samhita, pp. 108, no. 



220 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

the categories, the inactivity of the purusas and the hveviparyyayas, 
nine tustis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the 
eight siddhis 1 . 

But the content of the Sastitantra as given in Ahirbudhnya 
Samhitdis different from it, and it appears from it that the Samkhya 
of the Sastitantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Samhitd was of 
a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Paflcaratra 
Vaisnavas and the Ahirbudhnya Samhitd says that Kapila s 
theory of Samkhya was a Vaisnava one. Vijflana Bhiksu, the 
greatest expounder of Samkhya, says in many places of his work 
VijndndmrtaBhasya that Samkhya was originally theistic, and that 
the atheistic Samkhya is only a praudhivdda (an exaggerated 
attempt to show that no supposition of Isvara is necessary to 
explain the world process) though the Mahdbhdrata points out 
that the difference between Samkhya and Yoga is this, that the 
former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy 
between the two accounts of Sastitantra suggests that the original 
Sastitantra as referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Samhitd was sub 
sequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is 
corroborated by the fact that Gunaratna does not mention among 
the important Samkhya works Sastitantra but Sastitantroddhdra 

1 The doctrine of the viparyyaya, tusti, defects of organs, and the siddhi are men 
tioned in the Karika of Kvarakrsna, but I have omitted them in my account of 
Samkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false know 
ledge) are five, viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (anti 
pathy), abhinives"a (self-love), which are also called tamo, moha, mahdmoha, tamisrd, 
and andhatamisra. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion 
is necessary, since prakrti will herself bring our salvation (ambhas), that it is not 
necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder s life (salila), 
that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (megha), that salvation will be 
worked out by fate (bhdgya), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding 
from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (para), the troubles of protecting 
the earned money (supara), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (para- 
para), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (anuttamambhas), all gain 
leads to the injury of others (uttamdmbhas). This renunciation proceeds from external 
considerations with those who consider prakrti and its evolutes as the self. The 
siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (i) reading of scriptures (tdra), 
(i) enquiry into their meaning (sutdra), (3) proper reasoning (tdratdra), (4) corrobo 
rating one s own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same 
field (ramyaka), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (saddmudita). 
The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamana lead directly to the 
separation of the prakrti from the purusa. The twenty-eight sense defects are the 
eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding 
corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, 
tustis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of 
the Samkhya goal. 



vi i] Changes in the Samkhya doctrine 221 

(revised edition of Sastitantra)^. Probably the earlier Sastitantra 
was lost even before Vacaspati s time. 

If we believe the Sastitantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya 
Samhitd to be in all essential parts the same work which was 
composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it 
has to be assumed that Kapila s Samkhya was theistic 2 . It seems 
probable that his disciple Asuri tried to popularise it. But it seems 
that a great change occurred when Paflcasikha the disciple of 
Asuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine 
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It 
is said in Samkhya kdrika (70) that the literature was divided by 
him into many parts (tena bahudhdkrtam tantram). The exact 
meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that 
the original Sastitantra was rewritten by him in various treatises. 
It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vaisnavas 
accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essen 
tial parts as the Samkhya cosmology. This justifies the assump 
tion that Kapila s doctrine was probably theistic. But there are 
a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the 
Patafljala Samkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may 
be ventured is that Paflcasikha probably modified Kapila s 
work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila s work. If this 
supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of 
Samkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but 
which is kept in a modified form by the Patafljala school of Sam 
khya, second an atheistic one as represented by PaftcaSikha, and 
a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Samkhya system. 
An important change in the Samkhya doctrine seems to have 
been introduced by Vijflana Bhiksu (sixteenth century A.D.) by his 
treatment of gunas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this 
interpretation of Samkhya as the most rational and philosophical 
one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system 
of the accepted Kapila and the Patafljala school of Samkhya. But 
it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gunas was 
applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then 
they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase 
and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the 

1 Tarkarahasyadtpika, p. 109. 

1 evam sadvimfakam prahuh iariramih mdnavdh idmkhyam samkhy&tmakatv&cca 
kapiladibhirucyate . Matsyapurana, IV. 28. 



222 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explana- 
nation of the gunas was attempted in two, different lines by 
Vijftana Bhiksu and the Vaisnava writer Venkata 1 . As the Yoga 
philosophy compiled by Patafljali and commented on by Vyasa, 
Vacaspati and Vijflana Bhiksu, agree with the Samkhya doctrine 
as explained by Vacaspati and Vijflana Bhiksu in most points I 
have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Patanjala schools 
of Samkhya and have treated them together a principle which 
was followed by Haribhadra in his Saddarsanasamuccaya. 

The other important Samkhya teachers mentioned by Gauda- 
p5da are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanatana and Vodhu. Nothing is 
Known about their historicity or doctrines. 

Sarnkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Misra and 
Vijftana Bhiksu. 

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my inter 
pretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya kdrikd is 
the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by 
later writers. The Samkhya sutra was not referred to by any 
writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth 
centrry A.D.). Even Gunaratna of the fourteenth century A.D. who 
made allusions to a number of Sarnkhya works, did not make any 
reference to the Samkhya sutra, and no other writer who is known 
to have flourished before Gunaratna seems to have made any 
reference to the Samkhya sutra. The natural conclusion therefore 
is that these sutras were probably written some time after 
the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to 
prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is 
said at the end of the Samkhya kdrikd of Isvarakrsna that the 
karikas give an exposition of the Sarnkhya doctrine excluding 
the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the 
parables attached to the original Samkhya works the Sastitan- 
trasdstra. The Samkhya sutras contain refutations of other doc 
trines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that 
these were collected from some earlier Sarnkhya work which is 
now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition 
of the Sastitantrasdstra (Sastitantroddhdra as mentioned by 

1 Verikata s philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present 
work. 



vn] Interpretations of Samkhya 223 

Gunaratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to 
suppose that the Samkhya doctrine found in the sutras differs in 
any important way from the Samkhya doctrine as found in the 
Samkhya kdrikd. The only point of importance is this, that the 
Samkhya sutras hold that when the Upanisads spoke of one ab 
solute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved 
in the class of intelligent purusas as distinct from the class of 
the gunas. As all purusas were of the nature of pure intelligence, 
they were spoken of in the Upanisads as one, for they all form 
the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some 
sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in 
the Sdmkkya kdrikd. This is, however, a case of omission and not 
of difference. Vijftana Bhiksu, the commentator of the Sam 
khya sutra, was more inclined to theistic Samkhya or Yoga than 
to atheistic Samkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in 
his Sdmkhyapravacanabhdsya^ Yogavdrttika, and Vijnandmrta- 
bhdsya (an independent commentary on the Brahmasutras of 
Badarayana on theistic Samkhya lines). Vijflana Bhiksu s own 
view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he 
agreed more with the views of the Samkhya doctrine of the 
Puranas, where both the diverse purusas and the prakrti are said 
to be merged in the end in IsVara, by whose will the creative 
process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. 
He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the 
Samkhya sutras, but he remarked that these were used only with 
a view to showing that the Samkhya system gave such a rational 
explanation that even without the intervention of an Ivara it could 
explain all facts. Vijflana Bhiksu in his interpretation of Samkhya 
differed on many points from those of Vacaspati, and it is difficult 
to say who is right Vijflana Bhiksu has this advantage that 
he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points 
on which Vacaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the 
nature of the conception of the gunas, which I believe is the most 
important thing in Samkhya. Vijflana Bhiksu described the 
gunas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vacaspati and 
GaudapSda (the other commentator of the Samkhya kdrikd) 
remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their 
interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of 
Vijflana Bhiksu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite 
explanations regarding the nature of the gunas, Bhiksu definitely 



224 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation 
of their nature. 

Since no definite explanation of the gunas is found in any 
other work before Bhiksu, it is quite probable that this matter 
may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka 
nor the Mahdbhdrata explains the nature of the gunas. But 
Bhiksu s interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known 
of the manifestations and the workings of the gunas in all early 
documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhiksu 
in giving my account of the nature of the gunas. The Kdrikd 
speaks of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and 
dullness (sattva, rajas and tamas). It also describes sattva as 
being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and 
causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati 
merely paraphrases this statement of \hzKdrikd but does not enter 
into any further explanations. Bhiksu s interpretation fits in well 
with all that is known of the gunas, though it is quite possible 
that this view might not have been known before, and when the 
original Samkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vague 
ness as to the conception of the gunas. 

There are some other points in which Bhiksu s interpretation 
differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may 
be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of 
the buddhi states with the purusa. Vacaspati holds that there is 
no contact (samyogd) of any buddhi state with the purusa but that 
a reflection of the purusa is caught in the state of buddhi by 
virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and trans 
formed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection 
that it does not explain how the purusa can be said to be the 
experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection 
in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an ex 
perience (bhogd) on the basis of that image alone without any 
actual connection of the purusa with the buddhi. The answer of 
Vacaspati Misra is that there is no contact of the two in space 
and time, but that their proximity (sannidhf) means only a specific 
kind of fitness (yogyatd) by virtue of which the purusa, though it 
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, 
and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed 
to a person. Vijflana Bhiksu differs from Vacaspati and says that 
if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no 



vnj Interpretations of Bhiksu and Vacaspati 225 

reason why purusa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time 
of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, 
for the fitness being in the purusa, he could not be divested of it, 
and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in 
the buddhi for ever. Vijflana Bhiksu thus holds that there is a 
real contact of the purusa with the buddhi state in any cognitive 
state. Such a contact of the purusa and the buddhi does not 
necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on 
account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change 
means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers 
changes, and when these changes are reflected in the purusa, there 
is the notion of a person or experiencer in the purusa, and when 
the purusa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears 
as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between 
Vacaspati and Bhiksu as regards the nature of the perceptual 
process. Bhiksu thinks that the senses can directly perceive the 
determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, 
whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the 
sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate 
sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is 
the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at 
the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association 
by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified 
by the activity of manas called samkalpa which coordinates the 
indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and 
conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. 
Bhiksu who supposes that the determinate character of things is 
directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a sub 
ordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, 
doubt, and imagination. 

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are 
one or two passages in Vacaspati s commentary on the Sdmkhya 
k&fikd which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (aham- 
kdra) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the 
objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, 
but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not 
necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view 
with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat; 
for contrary to the view of Vydsabhdsya and Vijflana Bhiksu etc. 
Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was ahamkara and 

D. 15 



226 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

from ahamkara the tanmatras 1 . Vijflana Bhiksu however holds that 
both the separation of ahamkara and the evolution of the tanmatras 
take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more 
reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some 
other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between 
Vacaspati and Bhiksu which are not of much philosophical 
importance. 

Yoga and Patahjali. 

The word yoga occurs in the Rg-Veda in various senses such 
as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, 
and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the 
other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was 
used in this sense in Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as 
the Satapatha Brahmana and the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 3 . The 
word has another derivative " yugya" in later Sanskrit literature 8 . 

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the 
Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very 
much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow 
of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues 
and considered as being productive of the highest power 4 . 

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force 
of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of 
a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally 
applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control 
of the senses 8 . 

In Panini s time the word yoga had attained its technical 
meaning, and he distinguished this root "yuj samddhau " (yuj 
in the sense of concentration) from " yujir yoge " (root yujir in 
the sense of connecting). Yuj in the first sense is seldom used as 
a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological 
derivation of the word yoga 8 . 

1 See my Study of Patanjali, p. 60 ff. 

2 Compare R.V. i. 34. 9/vn. 67. 8/m. 27. n/x. 30. n/x. 114. 9/iv. 24. 4/1. 5. 
3/1. 30. 7; Datapaths Brahmana 14. 7. i. 11. 

3 It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. 
geoc, Latin jugum. 

4 See Chandogya in. 17. 4; Brh. I. 2. 6; Brh. in. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. i/m. i. i/ni. 
3. i ; Taitt. Bran. n. 2. 3. 3 ; R.V. x. 129; Satap. Brah. xi. 5. 8. i. 

6 Katha III. 4, indriyani hayanahuh visay&ttsugocaran. The senses are the horses 
and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. Karmendriyanyasya hayah 
the conative senses are its horses. 

6 Yugyah is used from the root of yujir yoge and not from yuja samddhau. A con 
sideration of Panini s rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam," V. i. 94 shows that not only 



vn] Antiquity of Yoga 227 

In the Bhagavadgltd, we find that the word yoga has been 
used not only in conformity with the root " yuj-samddhau " but 
also with " yujir yoge" This has been the source of some confu 
sion to the readers of the Bhagavadgltd. "Yogin" in the sense 
of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded 
with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of 
this word lies in this that the Bhagavadgitd tried to mark out a 
middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstrac 
tion on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action 
of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently 
from yujir yoge} on the other, who should combine in himself the 
best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet 
abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires. 

Kautilya in his A rthasdstra when enumerating the philosophic 
sciences of study names Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata. The 
oddest Buddhist sutras ^e.g. the Satipatthdna sutta) are fully 
familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus 
infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a tech 
nical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha. 

As regards the connection of Yoga with Samkhya, as we find 
it in the Yoga sutras of Patafljali, it is indeed difficult to come to 
any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted 
notice in many of the earlier Upanisads, though there had not 
probably developed any systematic form of pranayama (a system 
of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we 
come to MaitrayanI that we find that the Yoga method had at 
tained a systematic development. The other two Upanisads in 
which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the vetasvatara and 
the Katha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three 
Upanisads of Krsna Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga 
methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to 
the Samkhya tenets, though the Samkhya and Yoga ideas do not 
appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of 
the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the 
MaitrayanI in the conversation between akyayana and Brhad 
ratha where we find that the Samkhya metaphysics was offered 

different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya 
were prevalent in the country at the time (Panini as Goldstiicker has proved is pre- 
buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental 
discipline which passed by the name of Yoga. 

152 



228 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, 
and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the 
Samkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the 
work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently 
systematized by Pataftjali. Thus akyayana says : " Here some 
say it is the guna which through the differences of nature goes 
into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when 
the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the 
mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, un 
belief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but 
mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in 
his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacil 
lating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and 
he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a 
man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, 
but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man 
stand free from will, imagination and belief this is the sign of 
liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening 
of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of dark 
ness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a 
verse: When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together 
with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called 
the highest state 1 . " 

An examination of such Yoga Upanisads as andilya, Yoga- 
tattva, Dhyanabindu, Hamsa, Amrtanada, Varaha, Mandala 
Brahmana, Nadabindu, and Yogakundall, shows that the Yoga 
practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but 
none of these show any predilection for the Samkhya. Thus the 
Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the 

1 Vatsyayana, however, in his bhasya on Nyaya sutra, I. i. 19, distinguishes 
Samkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Samkhya holds that nothing can 
come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence 
(niratisayah cetandh). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the 
manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the purusa. 
Dosas (passions) and the pravrtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences 
or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non-being can come into being and 
what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from 
the Yoga of Vyasabkdsya. It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana s 
statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose 
in creation was borrowed by Samkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara s remarks on the same 
sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Samkhya and Yoga on the 
doctrine of the indriyas being " abkautika. " Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a 
passage from Vyasabhasya, in. 13, in his bhasya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-con 
tradictory (viruddha). 



vn] Patanjali, a Compiler 229 

Saivas and aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantra- 
yoga; they grew in another direction as the Hathayoga which 
was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through 
constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also 
associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The 
Yogatattva Upanisad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the 
Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Hathayogaand Rajayoga 1 . Insomecases 
we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedantism 
with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in 
the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also 
very great, but we have to leave out these from our present 
consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as 
they are not connected with our present endeavour. 

Of the Pataftjala school of Samkhya, which forms the subject of 
the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patafijali was probably 
the most notable person for he not only collected the different 
forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which 
were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all 
on the Samkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which 
they have been handed down to us. Vacaspati and Vijflana 
Bhiksu, the two great commentators on the Vydsabhdsya, agree 
with us in holding that Patafljali was not the founder of the Yoga, 
but an editor. Analytic study of the sutras also brings the con 
viction that the sutras do not show any original attempt, but a 
masterly and systematic compilation which was also supple 
mented by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also 
in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition 
and classification shows that the materials were already in 
existence and that Patafljali only systematized them. There was 
no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of 
other systems, except as far as they might come in, by way of 
explaining the system. Patafljali is not even anxious to establish 
the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts 
as he had them. Most of the criticisms against the Buddhists 
occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are 
described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated 
from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhists are 

1 The Yoga writer Jaigisavya wrote " DhdranaJastra" which dealt with Yoga more 
in the fashion of Tantra than that given by Patafijali. He mentions different places 
in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) 
which are centres of memory where concentration is to i made. See Vacaspati s 
Tatparyatlkd or Vatsyayana s bhasya on Nyaya sutra, III. ii. 43. 



230 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

criticized; the putting of an "iti" (the word to denote the conclu 
sion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to 
denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course 
another " iti " at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the 
conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis 
seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a 
hand other than that of Patafijali who was anxious to supply 
some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for 
the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of 
view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the 
supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a 
marked change (due either to its supplementary character or 
to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last 
chapter as compared with the style of the other three. 

The sutras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what 
has already been said in the second chapter and some of the 
topics introduced are such that they could well have been 
dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar 
discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter 
is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sutras, 
whereas the average number of sutras in other chapters is between 
51 toss. 

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date 
of this famous Yoga author Patafijali. Weber had tried to con 
nect him with Kapya Patamchala of atapatha Brahmana 1 ; in 
Katyayana s Vdrttika we get the name Patafijali which is ex 
plained by later commentators as patantah anjalayah yasmai (for 
whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed 
difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of 
names. There is however another theory which identifies the 
writer of the great commentary on Panini called the Mahd- 
bhdsya with the Patafijali of the Yoga sutra. This theory has been 
accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of 
some Indian commentators who identified the two Patafijalis. 
Of these one is the writer of the Patanjalicarita (Ramabhadra 
Dlksita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth 
century. The other is that cited in Sivarama s commentary on 
Vdsavadatta which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. 
The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and Cakrapanidatta, 

1 Weber s History of Indian Literature, p. 223 n. 



vn] Identity of Pataftjali 231 

the commentator of Caraka, who belonged to the eleventh 
century A.D. Thus Cakrapani says that he adores the Ahipati 
(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech 
and body by his Pdtahjala mahdbhdsya and the revision of 
Caraka. Bhoja says : " Victory be to the luminous words of 
that illustrious sovereign Ranarangamalla who by composing his 
grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patafijala and by 
producing a treatise on medicine called Rdjamrganka has like the 
lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, 
mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyasa (which is con 
sidered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also 
based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that 
the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion 
between the three Patafljalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, 
and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as 
Pdtahjalatantra, and whq has been quoted by ivadasa in his 
commentary on Cakradatta in connection with the heating of 
metals. 

Professor J. H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore 
in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the gram 
marian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these 
commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great 
commentators of the grammar school such as Bhartrhari, Kaiy- 
yata, Vamana, Jayaditya, Nagea, etc. are silent on this point. 
This is indeed a point against the identification of the two 
Patafijalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later 
age. And if other proofs are available which go against such 
an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the 
Yoga writer to be the same person. 

Let us now see if Patafljali s grammatical work contains any 
thing which may lead us to think that he was not the same 
person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the 
philosophic concept of substance (dravya) of the two Patafljalis 
differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that 
dravya is described in Vydsabhdsya in one place as being the 
unity of species and qualities (sdmdnyavisesdtmaka), whereas 
the Mahdbhdsya holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also 
specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on 
either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antago 
nistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by 



232 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

Vyadi and Vajapyayana (Vyadi holding that words denoted 
qualities or dravya and Vajapyayana holding that words denoted 
species 1 ). Even Panini had these two different ideas in "jdtydkhyd- 
ydmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasydm" and " sar updnameka- 
sesamekavibhaktau" and Patafljali the writer of the Mahdbhdsya 
only combined these two views. This does not show that he 
opposes the view of Vydsabhdsya, though we must remember 
that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard 
to the writer of the sutras. Moreover, when we read that dravya 
is spoken of in the Mahdbhdsya as that object which is the 
specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is 
of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc. " yat sdsndldngulakakudakhura- 
visdnyartharupam" we are reminded of its similarity with 
" ayutasiddhdvayavabheddnugatah samuhah dravyam " (a con 
glomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the Vydsa- 
bhdsya. So far as I have examined the Mahdbhdsya I have 
not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us 
in holding that the two Pataftjalis cannot be identified. There 
are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even 
in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians 
that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very un 
warrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views 
of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the 
writer of the Mahdbkdsya knew most of the important points of 
the Samkhya- Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer 
to the guna theory (I. 2. 64, 4. I. 3), the Samkhya dictum of ex 
nihilo nihil fit (i. I. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the 
idea of the return of similars into similars (i. I. 50), the idea of 
change vikdra as production of new qualities gundntarddhdna 
(5. 1.2, 5. i. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 1 33). 
We may add to it that the Mahdbhdsya agrees with the Yoga 
view as regards the Sphotavada, which is not held in common 
by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this 
external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin 
their works in a similar manner (atha yogdnusdsa nam and atha 
sdbddnusdsanam) " now begins the compilation of the instruc 
tions on Yoga" (Yoga sutrd) and "now begins the compilation 
of the instructions of words" (Mahdbhdsya). 

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments 

1 Patafijali s Mahdbhdsya, I. 2. 64. 



vi i] Kitab Patanjal 233 

which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the 
Yoga sutra between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, 
as they stand on a weak basis ; for firstly if the two Patafljalis 
cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the 
Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed 
Buddhist 1 reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I 
have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they 
were written by Pataftjali it cannot be inferred that because 
Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijftana- 
vadi type, we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or 
even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras 
had been developing long before the time of Nagarjuna. 

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators 
may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two 
Patafljalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative 
critical study of the Yoga sutras and the text of the Mahd- 
bhdsya, which can lead us to say that the writer of the Yoga 
sutras flourished at a later date than the other Pataftjali. 

Postponing our views about the time of Pataftjali the Yoga 
editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing 
the other work Kitab Patanjal, of which Alberuni speaks, for 
our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous 
one and he translates it along with another book called Sdnka 
(Samkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the 
form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that 
this book was not the present Yoga sutra of Pataftjali, though it 
had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation 
and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. 
The book was called by Alberuni Kitab Patanjal, which is to 
be translated as the book of Patafljala, because in another place, 
speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when 
translated stands as "the author of the book of Patanjal." It 
had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes 
many extracts, though he does not tell us the author s name. It 
treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in 
the Yoga sutra, but the manner in which these are described (so 

1 It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference nacaika- 
cittatantram vastu tadapram&nakam tada kim syat (iv. 16) was probably a line of the 
Vyasabhasya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the 
preface, does not count it as a sutra. 



234 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by 
Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change 
from what we find in the Yoga sutra. Following the idea of God 
in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless 
emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and 
shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they 
could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name 
of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of 
which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives 
him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is iden 
tical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it 
uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption 
with him and beatitude is obtained 1 . 

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the Yoga sutra. 
The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the 
eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation 
on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of medi 
tation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the Yoga 
sutrc He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, 
of which the first is the abhydsa (habit) of Patafijali, and the 
object of this abhyasa is unity with God 2 . The second stands 
for vairagya ; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek 
his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. Yoga sutra, I. 23 and 
I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasa- 
yana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the 
same as in the Yoga sutra, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated 
state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being 
one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an urddhvamula 
avdksdkha asvattha (a tree with roots upwards and branches 
below), after the Upanisad fashion, the upper root is pure 
Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different 
doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of inter 
pretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces ; the 

1 Cf. Yoga sutra i. 23-29 and II. i, 45. The Yoga sutras speak of Is"vara (God) 
as an eternally emancipated purusa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. 
By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the 
way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects 
of concentration. The commentator Vyasa notes that he is the best object, for being 
drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration He so wills that he can easily attain 
concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the Yoga sutras of 
the existence of God. 

2 Cf. Yoga ii. i. 



vn] Patanjali of Kitab Patanjal 235 

object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the 
roots. 

The difference of this system from that of the Yoga sutra is : 
(i) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance 
that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption 
in him is the goal ; (2) the importance of the yama 1 and the 
niyama has been reduced to the minimum ; (3) the value of the 
Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any 
connection with God as we find in the Yoga sutra has been lost 
sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in 
God ; (5) the introduction of Brahman ; (6) the very significance 
of Yoga as control of mental states (cittavrttinirodhd) is lost 
sight of, and (7) rasayana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the 
means of salvation. 

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modi 
fication of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Pataftjali s Yoga 
sutra in the direction of Vedanta and Tantra, and as such it 
probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga 
doctrine of the sutras entered into a new channel in such a way 
that it could be easily assimilated from there by later develop 
ments of Vedanta, Tantra and aiva doctrines 2 . As the author 
mentions rasayana as a means of salvation, it is very probable 
that he flourished after Nagarjuna and was probably the same 
person who wrote Pdtanjala tantra, who has been quoted by 
bivadasa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of 
by Nagesa as "Carake Patafijalih." We can also assume with some 
degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that 
Cakrapani and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with 
the writer of the Mahdbhdsya, It is also very probable that Cakra 
pani by his line " patanjalamahdbhdsyacarakapratisamskrtaih" 
refers to this work which was called " Pataftjala." The commen 
tator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvlpas and 
the sagaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the 
Vydsabhdsya, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was pro 
bably written at a time when the VydsabJtdsya was not written 
or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni 

1 Alberuni, in his account of the book of Samkhya, gives a list of commandments 
which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them 
one cannot attain salvation. 

2 Cf. the account of Paiupatadariana in Saruadarianasamgraha. 



236 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

also described the book as being very famous at the time, and 
Bhoja and Cakrapani also probably confused him with Patafljali 
the grammarian ; from this we can fairly assume that this book 
of Patafijali was probably written by some other Patafljali within 
the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not 
be improbable that when Vydsabhdsya quotes in III. 44 as " iti 
Patafijalih," he refers to this Patafljali. 

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrayana 
Upanisad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely prana- 
yama, pratyhara, dhyana, dharana, tarka and samadhi 1 . Com 
paring this list with that of the list in the Yoga sutras we find 
that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been 
replaced by asana. Now from the account of the sixty-two 
heresies given in the Brahmajdla sutta we know that there were 
people who either from meditation of three degrees or through 
logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external 
world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the 
association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samadhi 
or Dhyana school as belonging to one class of thinkers called 
Sasvatavada, and from the inclusion of tarka as an anga in 
samadhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the arigas given in 
MaitrayanI Upanisad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doc 
trine, when the Samkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being 
grafted on each other, and when the Samkhya method of dis 
cussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The 
substitution of asana for tarka in the list of Patafljali shows that 
the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Samkhya. 
The introduction of ahimsa (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), 
asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha 
(want of greed) as yama and sauca (purity), santosa (content 
ment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is 
deemed impossible (for the first time in the sutras), probably 
marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the 
Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrl, 
karuna, mudita, upeksa is also equally significant, as we do not 
find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other 
literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipa 
tion. Beginning from the Acdrdhgasutra, Uttarddhyayanasutra, 

1 prdndydmah pratydhdrah dhydnam dhdrand tarkah sam&dhih sadahga ityucyate 
yogah (Maitr. 6. 8). 



vn] Yoga and Buddhism 237 

the Sutrakrtdngasutra, etc., and passing through Umasvati s Tat- 
tvdrthddhigamasutra to Hemacandra s Yogasdstra we find that 
the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the 
basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the 
opinion expressed in Alberuni s Pdtanjal that these cannot give 
salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from 
the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its 
thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connec 
tion with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the 
same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely 
suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering; and of the 
path to the removal of suffering 1 . Again, the metaphysics of the 
samsara (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, 
decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of 
similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. 
Avidya is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidya should 
not be confused with the Vedanta avidya of &ankara, as it is an 
avidya of the Buddhist type ; it is not a cosmic power of illusion 
nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the 
range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidya is the ignorance 
of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sutra " anitydsuciduh- 
khdndtmasu nityasuciduhkhdtmakhydtiravidyd" (II. 5). 

The ground of our existing is our will to live (abhiniveSd). 
"This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be 
ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds 
of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts 
off being for us at least 2 ." This is true as much of Buddhism as 
of the Yoga abhiniveSa, which is a term coined and used in the 
Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has 
never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu 
literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things 
in this section is to show that the Yoga sutras proper (first three 
chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of 
Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between 
the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such 

1 Yoga sutra, II. 15, 16, 17. Yathdcikitsdfdstram caturuyukam rogo rogahttuh 
Arogyam bhaifajyamiti evamidamapi Sastram caturvyuhameva ; tody at ha samsdrah, 
samsarahetuh moksah moksopayah; duhkhabahulah samsaro heyah,pradhanapurusayok 
satpyogo heyaketuh, saipyogasy&tyantiki nivrttirhanam hanop&yah samyagdarfanam, 

Vydsabhdsya, n. 15 

2 Oldenberg s Buddhism 1 . 



238 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. 
As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed 
to think that the date of the first three chapters of the Yoga 
sutras must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there 
is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the 
grammarian Pataftjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may 
take them as being identical 1 . 

The Samkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusa. 

The Samkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two prin 
ciples, souls and prakrti, the root principle of matter. Souls are 
many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. 
They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a 
smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are 
not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But 
the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it 
and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the 
mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are 
many, and had it not been so (the Samkhya argues) with the 
birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one 
all would have died 2 . 

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of compre 
hension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly 
grasp in order to understand the Samkhya philosophy. Unlike 
the Jaina soul possessing anantajndna, anantadarsana, ananta- 
sukka, and anantavlryya, the Samkhya soul is described as being 
devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is abso 
lute pure consciousness ( /). The Samkhya view differs from 
the Vedanta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to 
be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (anandd)*. Bliss 
with Samkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it 
belongs to prakrti and does not constitute the nature of soul ; 
secondly, according to Vedanta the individual souls (jiva) are 

1 See S. N. Das Gupta, Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of 
thought, ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be 
that both the Patafijalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of 
sphota which was denied even by Samkhya. On the doctrine of Sphota see my Study 
of Patanjali, Appendix I. 

2 Karika, 18. 

3 See Citsukha s Tattvapradipika, IV. 



vn] Analysis of Knowledge 239 

but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the 
Brahman, but according to Samkhya they are all real and many. 
The most interesting feature of Samkhya as of Vedanta is 
the analysis of knowledge. Samkhya holds that our knowledge 
of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things 
are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, 
the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in 
some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature 
like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, 
they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, 
and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, 
but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. 
These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, 
if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connec 
tion with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted 
as the experience of a person 1 . We know that the Upanisads 
consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite consciousness, 
distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. 
In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that 
beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle 
which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which 
illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. 
The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self" 
but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other 
things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The 
Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and 
every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the 
veil. Samkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image 
of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent 
principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle 
matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms 
or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind- 
substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed 
in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, 
the pictures appear one by one before the light and are illu 
minated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic 
of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would 
be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and 

1 Tattakaumudi,^; Yogavdrttika, IV. 11; Vijndndmrtabhdsya,^. 74; Yogavdrttika 
and Tattvavaifdradi, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; Vydsabhdsya, I. 6, 7. 



240 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the 
same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens 
these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become con 
scious. This principle of consciousness (cit) cannot indeed be 
separately perceived per se, but the presence of this principle in 
all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. 
This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, 
no impurity 1 . The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place 
in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, 
and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes 
of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item 
of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is 
but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the 
principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge 
carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, 
it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Know 
ledge-revelation is not the unveiling or revelation of a particular 
part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation of 
the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure en 
livening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge 
or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is 
the blind knowledge-stuff. 

The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse con 
stituent parts, and had held that the coming together of these 
brought about the conscious states. This coming together was 
to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity 
or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary 
collocation. With Samkhya however the self, the pure cit, is 
neither illusory nor an abstraction ; it is concrete but transcen 
dent. Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements 
of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise 
have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into 
connection with this principle of intelligence that they are inter 
preted as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and 
may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the ex 
pression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of 

1 It is important to note that Samkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects 
involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (cit), and the 
content (buddhi) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and 
the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter. 



vn] The Stuff of Thought and Matter 241 

knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a 
system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called 
purusa. There is a separate purusa in Samkhya for each indi 
vidual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedanta 
atman however is different from the Samkhya purusa in this that 
it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being, 
and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory maya it 
appears as many. 

Thought and Matter. 

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are 
made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter 
are, why then should the purusa illuminate it and not external 
material objects. The answer that Samkhya gives is that the 
knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external ob 
jects in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance 
of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (sattva), which 
resembles the light of purusa, and is thus fit for reflecting and 
absorbing the light of the purusa. The two principal character 
istics of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it 
has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photo 
graphed by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has 
again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able 
to catch the reflection of the cit the super-translucent transcen 
dent principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic 
of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to 
both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is 
at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity 
of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the 
intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the 
gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that 
thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of 
thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, 
and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its 
object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter 
did not possess some of the essential substances of which the 
copy was made up. But this plastic entity (sattva) which is 
so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination 
in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some 
such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in 

D. 16 



242 Tke Kapila and the Pdtanjala Samkhya [CH. 

thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have 
movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images 
do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The trans 
lucent and plastic element of thought (sattva) in association with 
movement (rajas] would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation 
of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction 
(tamas) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and dis 
closes things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff) 
holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter dark 
ness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as though 
by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the 
light of the purusa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its 
stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture 
or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates 
that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests 
itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both 
thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a 
plasticity of intelligence-stuff (sattva), energy-stuff (rajas), and 
mass-stuff (tamas), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last 
two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought. 

Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 1 . 

Another question that arises in this connection is the position 
of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Samkhya 
holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have 
analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most 
interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that 
we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If \ve 
should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped 
sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its 
appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and 
we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image. 
Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of 
knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down 
the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of 
matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling 
which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale 
of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there 
comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling 

1 Karika, 12, with Gaudpada and Narayanatirtha. 



vn] The Gu%as 243 

reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark 
the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the 
point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in 
ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain 
stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at 
a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with 
matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-them- 
selves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross 
matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in 
taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross 
matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed 
to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember 
the Samkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and 
matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle sub 
stances which are in essence but three types of feeling entities. 
The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we 
have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations 
of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings 
that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that 
we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither 
sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression 
(visdda) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of 
manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as 
shining (prakdsa), energy (pravrtti), obstruction (niyama), there 
are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as 
the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross 
matter and thought by their varying modifications. 

The Gun as 1 . 

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically 
called guna in Samkhya philosophy. Guna in Sanskrit has three 
meanings, namely (i) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These 
entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it 
may be mentioned in this connection that in Samkhya philosophy 
there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each 
and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What 
we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance 
of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality 

1 Yogav&rttika, II. 18; Bhavaga^e^a s Ta.ttvaydtharthyadipa.Tw, pp. 1-3; Vtjnd- 
ndmrtabhdfya, p. 100; Tattvakaumudi, 13; also Gaudapada and Narayagatlrtha, 13. 

1 6 2 



244 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts ; any 
object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Samkhya 
holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality, 
however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding 
subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a 
quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects 
but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities 
were thus called gunas probably to suggest that they are the 
entities which by their various modifications manifest them 
selves as gunas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be 
called gunas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes 
by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and 
matter. These may also be called gunas as things of secondary 
importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they 
continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual 
groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalter 
ably constant like the souls (purusd). Moreover the object of the 
world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the purusas, 
the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of 
primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined 
to justify the name guna as applied to these subtle entities, it 
should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or 
subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gunas are 
infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main char 
acteristics as described above they have been arranged in three 
classes or types called sattva (intelligence-stuff"), rajas (energy- 
stuff) and tamos (mass-stuff"). An infinite number of subtle sub 
stances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or 
plasticity are called the sattva-gunas and those which behave as 
units of activity are called the rajo-gunas and those which behave 
as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called tamo-gunas. 
These subtle guna substances are united in different proportions 
(e.g. a larger number of sattva substances with a lesser number of 
rajas or tamas, or a larger number of tamas substances with a 
smaller number of rajas and sattva substances and so on in 
varying proportions), and as a result of this, different substances 
with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one 
another when united in different proportions, they mutually act 
and react upon one another, and thus by their combined resultant 
produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is how- 



vn] Prakrti as Equilibrium of Gunas 245 

ever one and only one stage in which the gunas are not com 
pounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the guna 
substances is opposed by each of the other guna substances, and 
thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in 
which none of the characters of the gunas manifest themselves. 
This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics 
that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It 
is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which 
is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium 
of the gunas is called prakrti 1 . This is a state which cannot be 
said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but 
it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the 
earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications 
take place. 

Prakrti and its Evolution. 

Samkhya believes that before this world came into being there 
was such a state of dissolution a state in which the guna com 
pounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their 
mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakrti. Then 
later on disturbance arose in the prakrti, and as a result of that a 
process of unequal aggregation of the gunas in varying proportions 
took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold. 
Prakrti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the 
gunas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more deter 
minate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gunas are 
always uniting, separating, and uniting again 2 . Varying qualities 
of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one another 
and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve 
from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or 
qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce 
the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies 
never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy 
there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter, 
resistance, stability, is due to tamas,and all conscious manifestation 
to sattva. The particular guna which happens to be predominant 
in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and 
others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their 

1 Yogavarttika, II. 19, and Pravacanabkdsya, I. 61. 

* Kaumudi, 13-16; TattvavaiS&radi, II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also Yogavarttika, IV. 13, 14. 



246 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy 
latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a 
moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is 
partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of 
the gunas in different proportions presuppose the state of prakrti 
as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to 
conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are 
exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass, 
and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest When this equi 
librium is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural 
affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other 
reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there 
arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at differ 
ent moments. When one guna is preponderant in any particular 
collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series 
beginning from the first disturbance of the prakrti to the final 
transformation as the world- order, is subject to "a definite law 
which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B. N. Seal 1 /" the pro 
cess of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated 
(yaisamya) within the undifferentiated (sdmydvasthd) of the deter 
minate (visesa) within the indeterminate (avisesa) of the coherent 
(yutastddha) within the incoherent (ayutasiddha). The order of 
succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the 
parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less deter 
minate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, 
more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such 
an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in 
the shape of the evolving collocations of guna reals take place 
within the body of the prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the in 
finite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not 
mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or 
that the totality of the gunas in the prakrti has been unhinged 
from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast 
number of gunas constituting the worlds of thought and matter 
has been upset. These gunas once thrown out of balance begin to 
group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then 
in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of 
aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way 
that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones, 
so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist. 

1 Dr B. N. Seal s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindtis, 19x5, p. 7. 



vn] Prakrti and its Evolution 247 

For the truth is that one stage is produced after another ; this 
second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the 
reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first 
stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the 
second stage is made good by a refilling from the prakrti. So also, 
as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals 
of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage 
is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the 
first stage from the prakrti. Thus by a succession of refillings the 
process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where 
there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical 
and physical changes of qualities in things which had already 
evolved. Evolution (tattvdntaraparindmd) in Samkhya means the 
development of categories of existence and not mere changes of 
qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). 
Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent 
category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differ 
entiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus 
it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differen 
tiation of new stages as integrated in previous stages (samsrsta- 
vivekd). 

Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium. 

But how or rather why prakrti should be disturbed is the most 
knotty point in Samkhya. It is postulated that the prakrti or the 
sum-total of the gunas is so connected with the purusas, and there 
is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakrti, 
that all its evolution and transformations take place for the sake 
of the diverse purusas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and 
sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them 
to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world 
into the quiescent state (pralaya) of prakrti takes place when the 
karmas of all purusas collectively require that there should be 
such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment 
the guna compounds are gradually broken.and there is a backward 
movement (pratisancara) till everything is reduced to the gunas in 
their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition 
brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a 
mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense 
activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of 
new things and qualities (visadrsa-parinamd); this course of new 



248 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same 
state (sadrsa-parindmd) of equilibrium, so that there is no change 
or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension 
of the teleology or purpose of the gunas, or an absolute break of 
the course of guna evolution ; for the state of pralaya, since it 
has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated 
karmas of purusas, and since there is still the activity of the 
gunas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, 
is also a stage of the samsara cycle. The state of mukti (libera 
tion) is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement 
of the gunas ceases for ever with reference to the liberated soul. 
But still the question remains, what breaksthe state of equilibrium ? 
The Samkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental (non- 
mechanical) influence of the purusa 1 . This influence of the purusa 
again, if it means anything, means that there is inherent in the 
gunas a teleology that all their movements or modifications should 
take place in such a way that these may serve the purposes of the 
purusas. Thus when the karmas of the purusas had demanded 
that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period 
there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent pur 
pose of the prakrti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable 
world for the experiences of the purusas by which its quiescent 
state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the 
inherent teleology of the prakrti, which demands that a state of 
pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should 
begin. Since there is a purpose in the gunas which brought 
them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also pre 
supposes that it also may be broken up again when the purpose 
so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prakrti brought 
about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative 
work again, and it is this natural change in the prakrti that may 
be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental 
influence of the purusas. 

Mahat and Ahamkara. 

The first evolute of the prakrti is generated by a preponderance 
of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state 
from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth ; and it is a 
state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds 

1 The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the disturbance of the 
equilibrium of the prakrti for new creation takes place by the will of IsVara (God). 



vii] Evolution of Mahat 249 

within it the minds (buddhi) of all purusas which were lost in the 
prakrti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution 
of prakrti to serve the purusas is thus manifested by the separating 
out of the old buddhis or minds (of the purusas) which hold within 
themselves the old specific ignorance (avidya) inherent in them 
with reference to each purusa with which any particular buddhi 
is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This 
state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi) 
of all the purusas is therefore called buddhitattva. It is a state 
which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all indi 
viduals. The individual buddhis of individual purusas are on one 
hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated 
with their specific purusas. When some buddhis once begin to 
be separated from the prakrti, other buddhi evolutions take 
place. In other words, we are to understand that once the trans 
formation of buddhis is effected for the service of the purusas, 
all the other direct transformations that take place from the 
prakrti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being 
once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other trans 
formations of prakrti that follow them have also the sattva pre 
ponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the 
first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prakrti becomes 
buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be re 
garded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it 
all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of 
which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of 
view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising 
all creation, and is thus called mahat (fas. great one). It is called 
linga (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the 
ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distin 
guished from the prakrti which is called alinga, i.e. of which no 
linga or characteristic may be affirmed. 

This mahat-tattva being once produced, further modifications 
begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of 
undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas pre 
ponderance and tamas preponderance. This state when the mahat 
is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of 
tamas, rajas and sattva is called ahamkdra, and the above three 
tendencies are respectively called tdmasika ahamkdra or bhutddi, 
rdjasika or taijasa ahamkdra, and vaikdrika ahamkdra. The raja- 
sika ahamkara cannot mark a new preponderance by itself; it only 



250 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

helps (sahakdri) the transformations of the sattva preponderance 
and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former 
preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more 
and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember 
that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva 
preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on 
the line of sattva development could only take place when the 
buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first 
development of the buddhi on this line is called sdttvika or vai- 
kdrika ahamkara. This ahamkara represents the development 
in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine," 
and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi, the 
function of which is a mere understanding and general datum as 
thisness. 

The ego or ahamkara (abhimdna-dravyd) is the specific expres 
sion of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. 
The function of the ego is therefore called abhimdna (self-asser 
tion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, 
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five conative senses of speech, 
handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative 
sense; the prdnas (bio-motor force) which help both conation and 
cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The indi 
vidual ahamkaras and senses are related to the individual buddhis 
by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come 
into being. Each buddhi with its own group of ahamkara (ego) 
and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar 
other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as 
knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different 
for each individual, but so far as a general mind (kdrana buddhi) 
apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of 
all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi 
is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated 
ignorance (avidyd). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aham 
kara and the senses are so related that though they are different 
from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the 
buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We 
must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, 
for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to ahamkara, the de 
ficiency of buddhi is made good by prakrti ; again as ahamkara 
partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the defi- 



vn] Evolution of Infra-atoms 251 

ciency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the 
change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good 
and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state 
and finally from prakrti. 

The Tanmatras and the Paramanus 1 . 

The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped 
by the liberated rajas of ahamkara, in order to make itself pre 
ponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in over 
coming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, 
is called bhutadi. From this bhutadi with the help of rajas are 
generated the tanmdtras, the immediately preceding causes of the 
gross elements. The bhutadi thus represents only the intermediate 
stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas 
reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmatras. 
There has been some controversy between Samkhya and Yoga 
as to whether the tanmatras are generated from the mahat or from 
ahamkara. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that 
evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but in 
creasing differentiation in integration within the evolving whole. 
Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation 
which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as 
bhutadi. Bhutadi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid 
of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass. 
The second stadium tanmatra represents subtle matter, vibratory, 
impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "poten 
tials" arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units 
in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribu 
tion of the original energy (rajas). The tanmatras possess some 
thing more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess 
physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of 
impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of 
viscous and cohesive attraction*. 

In intimate relation with those physical characters they also 
possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch, 
colour, taste, and smell ; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid 

1 I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit 
terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating 
exposition of this subject as given in Ray s Hindu Chemistry. The credit of explaining 
Samkhya physics in the light of the text belongs entirely to him. 

8 Dr Seal s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. 



252 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles 
of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other 
words, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar 
transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can 
act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest 
particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (atln- 
driya but not anudbhutcty. 

Of the tanmatras the sabda or dkdsa tanmdtra (the sound- 
potential) is first generated directly from the bhutadi. Next 
comes the sparsa or the vdyu tanmdtra (touch-potential) which is 
generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhutadi with the 
akasa tanmatra. The rupa tanmdtra (colour-potential) is generated 
similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhutadi ; the 
rasa tanmdtra (taste-potential) or the ap tanmdtra is also similarly 
formed. This ap tanmatra again by its union with a unit of tamas 
from bhutadi produces the gandha tanmdtra (smell-potential) or 
the ksiti tanmdtra 2 . The difference of tanmatras or infra-atomic 
units and atoms (paramdnu} is this, that the tanmatras have only 
the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be grouped 
and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence 
as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses. 
It is important in this connection to point out that the classifica 
tion of all gross objects as ksiti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is 
not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view 
of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be 
brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a 
particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are 
said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be 
grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of 
these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or 
tanmatras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five 
gross forms. 

The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmatras as 
follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter 
from bhutadi generates the akasa-atom. The touch-potentials com 
bine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the 

1 Dr Seal s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. 

2 There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmatras and atoms were ex 
plained in literatures other than Samkhya ; for some account of it see Dr Seal s Positive 
Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. 



vn] Evolution of Atoms 253 

vayu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch- 
potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The 
taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch- 
potentials and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the 
smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate 
the earth-atom. The akasa-atom possesses penetrability, the vayu- 
atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat 
and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom 
cohesive attraction. The akaa we have seen forms the transition 
link from the bhutadi to the tanmatra and from the tanmatra to 
the atomic production ; it therefore deserves a special notice at 
this stage. Samkhya distinguishes between a karana-akasa and 
karyakasa. The karana-akaa (non-atomic and all-pervasive) 
is the formless tamas the mass in prakrti or bhutadi; it is 
indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere un- 
occupiedness (avarandbhdva) or vacuum 1 . When energy is first 
associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound- 
potential ; the atomic akasa is the result of the integration of the 
original mass-units from bhutadi with this sound-potential (sabda 
tanmatra). Such an akasa-atom is called the karyakasa; it is 
formed everywhere and held up in the original karana akasa as 
the medium for the development of vayu atoms. Being atomic 
it occupies limited space. 

The ahamkara and the five tanmatras are technically called 
avisesa or indeterminate, for further determinations or differentia 
tions of them for the formation of newer categories of existence 
are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called 
visesa, i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined 
as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course 
of evolution which started in the prakrti reaches its furthest limit 
in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms 
on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having 
atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due 
to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the intro 
duction of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are 
not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by 
them which was substantially different from the combined atoms. 

1 Dr B. N. Seal in describing this akas a says " Akas a corresponds in some respects 
to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." 
Ray s History of Hindu Chemistry, p. 88. 



254 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things 
certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it 
will be better to enquire about the principle of causation accord 
ing to which the Samkhya -Yoga evolution should be compre 
hended or interpreted. 



Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy 1 . 

The question is raised, how can the prakrti supply the de- 
ficiences made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes 
from them ? When from mahat some tanmatras have evolved, or 
when from the tanmatras some atoms have evolved, how can the 
deficiency in mahat and the tanmatras be made good by the 
prakrti ? 

Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations 
that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, 
changes into curd, and so on? Samkhya says that "as the total 
energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, 
cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same 
ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes 
in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes, 
and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the 
gunas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the 
(material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the pro 
duction or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the 
unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (udbhuta- 
vrtti) in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary 
to call forth the so-called material cause into activity 2 ." The 
appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure 
of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the 
sculptor s art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality 
and the concomitant conditions (sahakdri-sakti} or efficient cause 
(nimitta-kdrana, such as the sculptor s art) is a sort of mechanical 
help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition 3 . The 
refilling from prakrti thus means nothing more than this, that 
by the inherent teleology of the prakrti, the reals there are so 
collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat 
have been collocated to form the bhutadi or the tanmatras. 

1 Vyasabhasya and Yogavarttika, IV. 3 ; Tattvavaifaradi, IV. 3. 

2 Ray, History of Hindu Chemistry, p. 72. 3 Ibid. p. 73. 



vn] Conservation of Energy and Change 255 

Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of 
transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of 
material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the 
sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the 
sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens 
is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs 
the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of 
energy together with a fresh collocation (gunasannivesavisesd). 
As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one 
field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove 
the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself 
to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes 
(such as the sculptor s art) remove the barrier inherent in any 
collocation against its transformation into any other collocation, 
the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding 
manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the 
energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a 
state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this 
barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a 
corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for 
the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed 
from the prakrti, guided by the constant will of Isvara, the reals 
in equilibrium in the state of prakrti leave their state of arrest 
and evolve themselves into mahat, etc. 

Change as the formation of new collocations. 

It is easy to see from what we have already said that any 
collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, 
unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the 
present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous 
instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the colloca 
tion of the five atoms of ksiti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The 
difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its 
collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms 
is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation 
has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that 
collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that 
these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other 
infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier 
is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the 



256 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers 
could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing. 
And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by 
which they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out of 
any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the 
line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be over 
stepped" (parindmakramaniya-ma) or in other words there are 
some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the 
evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those 
lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows 
in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of 
countries (deSdpabandhd) ; certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy 
season only, this is limitation of season or time (kaldpabandhd); 
deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (dkdrdpabandha) ; 
curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes (nimit- 
tdpabandhd). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that 
path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural 
obstructions 1 . 

Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least 
to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and 
changing places in any and every object. At each moment the 
whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms 
at any moment is different from what it was at the previous 
moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived 
as dharmaparindma or changes of dharma or quality; but per 
ceived or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This 
change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by 
virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new, 
and these are respectively called the laksanaparindma a^idavasthd- 
parindma. At every moment every object of the world is under 
going evolution or change, change as past, present and future, 
as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state 
we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub- 
latent again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential, 
manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future, 
present and past 2 . 

1 Vyasabhasya, Tattvavaifaradi and Yogavdrttika, in. 14. 

2 It is well to note in this connection that Samkhya-yoga does not admit the exist 
ence of time as an independent entity like the Nyaya-VaiSesika. Time represents the 
order of moments in which the mind grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a 
construction of the mind (buddhi-nirmana). The time required by an atom to move 



vn] Theory of Causation 257 

Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect poten 
tially exists before it is generated by the movement of 
the cause). 

The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of 
the Samkhya view of causation as satkdryavdda. Samkhya holds 
that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent; 
causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due 
to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already 
held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means 
an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and 
this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of 
the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of 
such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new col 
location the effect. This doctrine is called satkdryavdda, i.e. 
that the karya or effect is sat or existent even before the causal 
operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in 
the sesamum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk. The 
causal operation (karakavydpdra) only renders that manifest 
(dvirbhuta) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition 
(tirohitdf. 

The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Samkhya 
did, but with them there was no background to the change; 
every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was 
past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There 
were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and 
qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or sub 
stance. Samkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas, 
but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions 
of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals 
change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable. 
The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came 
into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory 
of causation and also on account of their doctrine of unya, they 
were called vaindsikas (nihilists) by the Vedantins. This doctrine 
is therefore contrasted to Samkhya doctrine as asatkdryavdda. 

its own measure of space is called a moment (kfana) or one unit of time. Vijfiana 
Bhiksu regards one unit movement of the gunas or reals as a moment. When by 
true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and 
space vanish. Vyasabhasya, Tattvavaifdradi, and Yogavdrttika, in. 51 and III. 13. 
1 Tattvakaumudi, 9. 
D. I 7 



258 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

The Jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and 
that from one point of view satkaryavada is true and from another 
asatkaryavada. The Samkhya view that the cause is continually 
transforming itself into its effects is technically called parindma- 
vdda as against the Vedanta view called the vivarttavdda: that 
cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but 
illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form 
mere Maya 1 . 

SSmkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism. 

Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite 
number of reals produce all the world and its transformations ; 
whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of 
cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which 
prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the 
first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakrti? Samkhya 
denies the existence of IsVara(God) or any other exterior influence, 
and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which 
guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands 
that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that 
they may render some service to the souls either in the direction 
of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a 
tendency that prakrti is disturbed, and the gunas develop on two 
lines on the mental plane, citta or mind comprising the sense 
faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects ; and it is 
in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one 
hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the 
buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of ob 
jective things. It is this tendency to be of service to the purusas 
(purusdrthatd) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains 
all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and 
finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain 
liberation from the association of prakrti and its gratuitous service, 
which causes us all this trouble of samsara. 

Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent 

1 Both the Vedanta and the Samkhya theories of causation are sometimes loosely 
called satkaryyavada. But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have 
pointed out, the Vedanta theory of causation should be called satkaranavada for ac 
cording to it the karana (cause) alone exists (sat) and all karyyas (effects) are illusory 
appearances of the karana ; but according to Samkhya the karyya exists in a potential 
state in the karana and is hence always existing and real. 



vi i] Yoga Theism 259 

prakrti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, 
how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best 
service to the purusas, how can it remove its own barriers and 
lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prakrti 
equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the 
evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to 
their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? 
There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course 
of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony 
may be attained. This Being is Isvara. IsVara is a purusa who 
had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His 
body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by 
ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a per 
manent wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of 
the reals by which the evolution of the gunas may best serve the 
double interest of the purusa s experience (bhoga) and liberation 
(apavarga) should be removed. It is according to this perma 
nent will of IsVara that the proper barriers are removed and the 
gunas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the 
service of the best interests of the purusas. IsVara has not created 
the prakrti ; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prakrti in its 
quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order 
by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order 
of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of IsVara 
in Yoga and its denial by Samkhya marks the main theoretic 
difference between the two according to which the Yoga and 
Samkhya are distinguished as SesVara Samkhya (Samkhya with 
IsVara) and NirlsVara Samkhya (Atheistic Samkhya) 1 . 

Buddhi and Purusa. 

The question again arises that though purusa is pure intel 
ligence, the gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how 
can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover, 
the purusa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of 
impurity and what service or need can such a purusa have of 
the gunas? This difficulty is anticipated by Samkhya, which has 
already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of 
the gunas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and 
the intelligence of the purusa to a very high degree, so much so 

1 Tattvavaifdradi, IV. 3; Yogavarttika, \. 14; and Pravacanabhdsya, v. 1-12. 

17 2 



260 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

that it can reflect the intelligence of the purusa, and thus render 
its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were in 
telligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional 
operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the 
buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue 
of the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi, these appear as if 
they are intelligent. The self (purusa) according to Samkhya- 
Yoga is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its 
existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and 
grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly 
noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through 
beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing 
states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes 
are further so associated with the reflection of the purusa in the 
buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the purusa. 
This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the purusa 
in the buddhi has such a special fitness (yogyatd) that it is inter 
preted as the experience of the purusa. This explanation of 
Vacaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijfiana Bhiksu. 
Vijftana Bhiksu says that the association of the buddhi with the 
image of the purusa cannot give us the notion of a real person 
who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore 
that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the purusa, 
it is then superimposed upon the purusa, and we have the notion 
of an abiding person who experiences 1 . Whatever may be the 
explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the purusa 
is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of cit on 
buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the purusa cannot 
realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. 
Buddhi resembles purusa in transparency, and the purusa fails to 
differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as 
a result of this non-distinction the purusa becomes bound down 
to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the 
buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non- 
distinction of purusa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi 
is what is meant by avidyd (non-knowledge) in Samkhya, and is 
the root of all experience and all misery 2 . 

1 Tattvavaisaradi and Yogavarttika, I. 4. 

2 This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Samkhya. It is the 
non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that 



vn] Ignorance and Illusion 261 

Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the 
purusa not only fails to distinguish the difference between it 
self and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of 
buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference 
but positively false knowledge, that we take the purusa to be 
that which it is not (anyathdkhydti). It takes the changing, 
impure, sorrowful, and objective prakrti or buddhi to be the 
changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks 
buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and 
capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidya of Yoga. 
A buddhi associated with a purusa is dominated by such an 
avidya, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated 
with the same purusa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidya. 
If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged 
in the prakrti, and the avidya also sleeps with it. When at the 
beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated 
with the purusas emerge, the old avidyas also become manifest 
by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the 
purusas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus 
proceeds the course of samsara. When the avidya of a person 
is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to 
attach itself to the purusa and is forever dissociated from it, and 
this is the state of mukti. 

The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta. 

It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have 
evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusa. 
What is the process of this experience? Samkhya (as explained 
by Vacaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes 
into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this 
touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the parti 
culars of the thing cannot be noticed. This is called nirmkalpa 
pratyaksa (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by 
the function of the samkalpa (synthesis) and vikalpa (abstraction 
or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in 
all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, 
and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and 

is the cause of illusion ; it is therefore called the akhyati (non-apprehension) theory of 
illusion which must be distinguished from the anyathdkhydti (misapprehension) theory 
of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending one (e.g. the rope) 
for the other (e.g. snake). Yogavdrttika, I. 8. 



262 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized 
by the purusa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the 
experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkara, 
and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other 
times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijfiana Bhiksu 
differs from this view of Vacaspati, and denies the synthetic 
activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi 
directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. 
At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate, 
but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate 1 . 
It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced 
to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of de 
sire, doubt and imagination. 

Buddhi, including ahamkara and the senses, often called citta 
in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame 
of a lamp; it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure 
sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one con 
tent to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi 
and purusa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being 
interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the 
purusa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of con 
sciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour. 
The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its 
functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Samkhya 
does not admit any separate prana vayu (vital breath) to keep the 
body living. What are called vdyus (bio-motor force) in Vedanta 
are but the different modes of operation of this category of 
buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse move 
ments performs the life-functions and sense-functions of the body. 

1 As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the 
senses, the sense-data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. 
The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the 
time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds 
that the external objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they are reflected, 
like trees in a lake : 

" tasmtmfca darpane sphare samasta vastudrstayah 
imastah pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumah" Yogavarttika, I. 4. 

The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by the senses, 
or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the external objects and assumes 
their forms : indriyanyeva pranalikd cittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola- 
kadvdrd bahyavastusuparaktasya cittasyendriyasdhityenaivarthdkdrah parindmo 
bhavati." Yogav&rttika, I. vi. 7. Contrast Tattvakaumudi, 27 and 30. 



vn] Instinct and Desire 263 

Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or 
rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root im 
pressions (samskaras) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies 
of all past lives (vdsand) 1 . These sarnskaras are revived under suit 
able associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births in 
their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the 
same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected 
within itself the instincts and tendencies -of all those different 
animal lives. It is knotted with these vasanas like a net. If a man 
passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vasanas of a dog life, which 
the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of 
births, are revived, and the man s tendencies become like those of 
a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes 
attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival 
of the vasana suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be 
any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and 
tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was 
born as man. 

The samskaras represent the root impressions by which any 
habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in 
which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were 

1 The word samskara is used by Panini who probably preceded Buddha in three 
different senses : (i) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality 
(Sata utkarsadhanam samskdrah, Kas ika on Panini, vi. ii. 16), (i) conglomeration 
or aggregation, and (3) adornment (Panini, vi. i. 137, 138). In the Pitakas the word 
sankhara is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embel 
lishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact 
sankhara stands for almost anything of which impermanence could be predicated. 
But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning 
of aggregation (samavaya of Panini) is prominent. The word satnskaroti is used in 
Kausltaki, n. 6, Chandogya, IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and Brhadaranyaka, VI. iii. i, 
in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second 
meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of samskara in Hindu philosophy is altogether 
different. It means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the 
objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative 
exist in sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be* reproduced as 
memory (smrti). The word vasana ( Yoga sutra, iv. 24) seems to be a later word. The 
earlier Upanisads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Palj 
puakas. Abhidhanappadtpika of Moggallana mentions it, and it occurs in the Muktika 
Upanisad. It comes from the root "vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense 
of samskara, and in Vydsabhdsya they are identified in iv. 9. But vasana generally 
refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those 
appear which can find scope in this life. But samskaras are the sub-conscious states 
which are being constantly generated by experience. Vasanas are innate samskaras not 
acquired in this life. See Vydsabhasya, TattvavaiSaradi and Yogavarttika, II. 13. 



264 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might 
not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced 
before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the 
citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without 
any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of 
any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its 
roots as already left in the citta in the form of samskaras should 
be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a con 
trary tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own 
samskara naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable 
samskaras. 

Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (cesta) 
by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their 
objects. There is also the reserved potent power (sakti) of citta, 
by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue 
to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved 
in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga 
method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state 
of mind to the exclusion of others. 

Merit or demerit (punya, pdpd) also is imbedded in the citta 
as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and 
giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it. 

Sorrow and its Dissolution 1 . 

Samkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all 
experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain 
substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all com 
binations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree 
of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure, 
we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited 
it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the 
fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much 
greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the 
keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his 
capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full 
of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that 
all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by 
ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences 
through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to 

1 Tattuavaifaradi and Yogavarttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaurmtdi, i. 



vn] Sorrow and its Dissolution 265 

eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or 
the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures 
lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing 
sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately ; 
he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the 
pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according 
to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve 
the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also 
some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded 
as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures 
that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow. 
Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes, 
what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is 
uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to 
philosophy to find out the means of doing it. 

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical 
enquiry of the Samkhya philosophy 1 . All experiences are sorrow. 
Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experi 
ences may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after 
death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and purusa 
are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue. 
Citta must be dissociated from purusa. Citta or buddhi, Sam 
khya says, is associated with purusa because of the non-dis 
tinction of itself from buddhi 2 . It is necessary therefore that in 
buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the 
nature of purusa ; when this true conception of purusa arises in 
the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from and 
quite unrelated to purusa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As 
a result of that, buddhi turns its back on purusa and can no 
longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably con 
nected with sorrow, and thus the purusa remains in its true 
form. This according to Samkhya philosophy is alone adequate 
to bring about the liberation of the purusa. Prakrti which was 
leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils 
its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating 

1 Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the cessation of the rebirth- 
process which is so much associated with sorrow (duhkhabahulah samsarah heya/i). 

2 The word citta is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is the repository of all 
sub-conscious states. Samkhya generally uses the word buddhi. Both the words mean 
the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi 
means intellection. 



266 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

purusa from prakrti. This final purpose being attained the 
prakrti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom 
this right knowledge was generated ; for other purusas however 
the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experi 
ences from one birth to another in an endless cycle. 

Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient. 
In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true 
knowledge differentiating purusa and buddhi should arise, but it 
is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all 
its samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived 
again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest 
state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the purusa. This is 
the kevala (oneness) state of existence after which (all samskaras, 
all avidya being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any 
longer to hold on to the purusa, and like a stone hurled from a 
mountain top, gravitates back into the prakrti 1 . To destroy the 
old samskaras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a graduated 
course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should 
be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher 
and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler 
states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin 
advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and 
try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the 
state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity. 
At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the purusa, and 
final liberation takes place. 

Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes : ( I ) sukla or 
white (punya, those that produce happiness), (2) krsna or black 
(pdpa, those that produce sorrow), (3) sukla-krsna (punya-pdpa, 
most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious 
as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many 
insects), (4) asuklakrma (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and 
meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains). 
All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work 
in the world and avoid taking the Ijves of insects 2 . All karmas 

1 Both Samkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state as Kaivalya (alone-ness) , 
the former because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again 
and the latter because at this state purusa remains for ever alone without any associa 
tion with buddhi, see Samkhya karika, 68 and Yoga sfttras, IV. 34. 

3 Vyasabhasya and Tattvavaisaradi, IV. 7. 



vn] Modes of Ignorance 267 

proceed from the five-fold afflictions (klesas\ namely avidyd, 
asmitd, rdga, dvesa and abhinivesa. 

We have already noticed what was meant by avidya. It con 
sists generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it 
as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge 
while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other 
four forms of asmita, etc. Asmita means the thinking of worldly 
objects and our experiences as really belonging to us the 
sense of " mine " or " I " to things that really are the qualities or 
transformations of the gunas. Raga means the consequent attach 
ment to pleasures and things. Dvesa means aversion or antipathy 
to unpleasant things. Abhinivesa is the desire for life or love of 
life the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our 
experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family 
to be our own, our possessions to be our own ; because we are 
attached to these ; because we feel great antipathy against any 
mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our 
life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all 
proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidya, which consists 
in the false identification of buddhi with purusa. These five, 
avidya, asmita, raga, dvesa and abhinivesa, permeate our buddhi, 
and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together 
with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as 
a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth 
to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them 1 . The karma in the 
aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of 
it is called karmdsaya (the bed of karma for the purusa to lie in). 
We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (klesd) of 
the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or 
modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the 
teleology of the prakrti and the removal of obstacles in the course 
of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of 
Isvara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous 
one pleasure, 

The karmas performed in the present life will generally ac 
cumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such 
a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for 
him according to the evolution of prakrti as shall make it possible 
for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the 

1 Vyasabkasya and Tattvawaifaradi, n. 3-9. 



268 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth 
(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (ayus) and the 
painful or pleasurable experiences (bhogd) destined for that life. 
Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often pro 
duce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has 
done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which 
he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which 
he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain 
in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first 
and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good 
actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, 
all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot 
again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those 
karmas which have already ripened. This is tic& jivanmukti stage, 
when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering 
mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already 
ripened (tisthati samskdravasdt cakrabhramivaddhrtasariraJt). 

Citta. 

The word Yoga which wa. c formerly used in Vedic literature 
in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in 
his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or 
steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may 
be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against 
a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. 
The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called 
ksipta (wild) and of the latter type pramudha (ignorant). There 
is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which 
concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining 
steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to 
another thing and so on. This is called the viksipta (unsteady) 
stage of mind (cittabhumi}. As distinguished from these there is 
an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on 
an object for a long time. This is the ekdgra (one- pointed) stage. 
There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes 
are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti, 
and is called the nirodha (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of 
Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta. 

The cittas have five processes (vrtti\ (i) pramdna 1 (valid 

1 Samkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon 
the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects 
(svatah prdmanyam svatah apramanya>>i). The contribution of Samkhya to the doc- 



vn] Tendencies of Good and Evil 269 

cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference 
and scriptural testimony), (2) viparyaya (false knowledge, illusion, 
etc.), (3) vikalpa (abstraction, construction and different kinds of 
imagination), (4) nidrd (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which 
tamas tends to predominate), (5) smrti (memory). 

These states of mind (vrtti) comprise our inner experience. 
When they lead us towards samsara into the course of passions 
and their satisfactions, they are said to be klista (afflicted or 
leading to affliction) ; when they lead us towards liberation, they 
are called aklista (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards 
samsara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of 
mind ; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, 
and whichever state should tend towards our final good (libera 
tion) must be regarded as good. 

This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta, 
that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and some 
times towards bad (samsara). It is like a river, as the Vydsa- 
bhdsya says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the 
good. The teleology of prakrti requires that it should produce 
in man the samsara as well as the liberation tendency. 

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts 
and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, 
and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad 
thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore 
never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is 
as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather 
remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that 
our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction 
for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency 
of the mind to follow the path of liberation 1 . Removal of pains 

trine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vacaspati says on the subject has 
been borrowed from Vatsyayana such as the putvavat, Sesavat and samanyatodrsta types 
of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyaya or in the Tatpar- 
yatika of Vacaspati. Samkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on 
the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of in 
ference "matranimittasamyogivirodhisahacaribhik. Svasvamibadhyaghatadyaih sam- 
khya nam saptadhanuma " (Tdtparyattkd, p. 09). Samkhya definition of inference as 
given by Udyotakara (I. I. v) is " sambandhadekasmat pratyaksacchesas iddhiranuma- 
nam." 

1 Samkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds 
of sorrows, ddhyatmika (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatis 
fied passions of the mind), adhibhautika (generated externally by the injuries inflicted 
by other men, beasts, etc.) and adhidaivika (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons 
and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (purusartha). 



270 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but 
still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible 
tendency of the mind. Man has power (saktt) stored up in his 
citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may 
gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the 
other. He must succeed in this, since prakrti wants liberation for 
her final realization 1 . 

Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma). 

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on 
the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, 
so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more 
weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind 
can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should 
be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin 
should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (ahimsa), 
absolute and strict truthfulness (satyd), non-stealing (asteya\ 
absolute sexual restraint (brahmacarya) and the acceptance of 
nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (aparigraha). 
These are collectively called yama. Again side by side with these 
abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablu 
tions and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the 
habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the 
body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (tapas), the study 
of philosophy (svddhydya) and meditation on I3vara (Isvara- 
pranidhdna). These are collectively called niyamas. To these are 
also to be added certain other moral disciplines such &s> pratipaksa- 
bhdvand, maitrl, karund, muditd and upeksd. Pratipaksa-bhavana 
means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish motive) may 
come one should practise the opposite good thought (self- 
sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. 
Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations 
with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere 
abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should 
habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with 
our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrl means to think of 
all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to 
think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one 
should practise karuna or kindly feeling for sufferers, mudita 
1 See my "Yoga Psychology," Quest, October, 1921. 



vi i] Yogd Meditation 271 

or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upeksa 
or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. 
The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note 
of the vices of vicious men. 

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures 
(yairdgyd) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the per 
formances of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross 
and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may 
attain liberation by a constant practice (abhydsd) attended with 
faith, confidence (sraddha), strength of purpose and execution 
(virya) and wisdom (prajnd) attained at each advance. 

The Yoga Meditation. 

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being 
ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such 
a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (asand) and fixes his mind 
on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should 
fix it on Isvara, for in that case Isvara being pleased removes 
many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for 
him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, 
and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration 
(samadhi) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying 
concentration namely vitarka, vicdra, dnanda and asmitd. Of 
these vitarka and vicara have each two varieties, savitarka, ntrvi- 
tarka,savicdra,nirvicdra^. When the mind concentrates on objects, 
remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka 
stage ; when on the five tanmatras with a remembrance of their 
qualities it is called savicara, and when it is one with the tan 
matras without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicara. 
Higher than these are the ananda and the asmita states. In the 
ananda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its func 
tions of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmita stage buddhi 
concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifica 
tions. In all these stages there are objects on which the mind 
consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the samprajhdta 
(with knowledge of objects) types of samadhi. Next to this comes 
the last stage of samadhi called the asamprajndta or nirodha 
samadhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining 

1 Vacaspati, however, thinks that ananda and asmita have also two other varieties, 
which is denied by Bhiksu. 



272 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [CH. 

long in this stage the old potencies (samskaras) or impressions 
due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards 
the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner 
thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the 
nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the 
buddhi becomes as pure as the purusa, and after that the citta not 
being able to bind the purusa any longer returns back to prakrti. 
In order to practise this concentration one has to see that 
there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a 
quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles 
is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This 
has to be stopped by the practice of prdndydma. Pranayama 
consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then 
giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for 
hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need 
of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained 
steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed. 

The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting 
in a steady posture, holding the breath by pranayama, excluding 
all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (dhdrand}. 
At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same 
thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called 
dhydna. After sufficient practice in dhyana the mind attains the 
power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one 
with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is 
no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind 
becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called 
samadhi 1 . We have already described the six stages of samadhi. 
As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samadhi, he passes 
on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards 
he attains miraculous powers (yibhuti} and his faith and hope 
in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them 
many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even 
though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. 
His wisdom (prajfid) also increases at each step. Prajfla know 
ledge is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to 

1 It should be noted that the word samadhi cannot properly be translated either 
by " concentration" or by " meditation." It meajis that peculiar kind of concentra 
tion in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no 
movement of the mind into its passing states. 



vn] Wisdom and Emancipation 273 

certain gross things and certain gross qualities 1 prajfia has no 
such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the tan- 
matras, the gunas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their 
subtle conditions and qualities 1 . As the potencies (samskdrd) of the 
prajfia wisdom grow in strength the potencies of ordinary know 
ledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain always 
in his prajfla wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajfia that it 
leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to samsara. 
The final prajfias which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, 
namely, ( i ) I have known the world, the object of suffering and 
misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and 
roots of samsara have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more 
of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of 
direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge 
in the shape of a discrimination of purusa from prakrti has been 
understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather 
metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are 
as follows : (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and 
emancipation (bhoga and apavarga) has been realized. (6) The 
strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gunas drives 
them into prakrti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. 
(7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gunas 
become merged in the prakrti and remain there for ever. The 
purusa having passed beyond the bondage of the gunas shines 
forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in 
this Samkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prakrti. It 
is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Samkhya tries to 
achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected 
discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental 
states. 

1 The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the Karika as follows : 
Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium 
inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme 
smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by 
walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed 
up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake). 

8 Though all things are but the modifications of gunas yet the real nature of the 
gunas is never revealed by the sense-knowledge. What appears to the senses are but 
illusory characteristics like those of magic (maya) : 

" Gundndm pa.ra.mam rupam na drftipathamrechati 
Yattu drstipatham praptam tanmdyeva sutucchakam." 

VySsabhdsya, IV. r3. 
The real nature of the gunas is thus revealed only by prajfia. 

D. 18 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the 
Nyaya standpoint. 

THE Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of 
substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of 
things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; 
each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to 
another group and that to another and so on. But if a col 
location representing milk generates the collocation of curd 
it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming 
the cause-collocation and the modus operandi is unintelligible; 
the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately 
generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on 
such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine 
of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of in 
fluence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination 
and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. 
The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the 
result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is 
against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific 
elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are 
the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the 
whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, 
blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump 
state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in 
the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. 
Moreover there would be no difference between material (updddna, 
e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (nimitta 
and sahakdri, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in 
forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and 
there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instru 
mental causes, as such. 

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is 
brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its 



CH. vm] Criticism of Samkhya 275 

effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the 
cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence 
to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the 
moment after it is born produce any effect ? The truth is that 
causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated 
the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we 
perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is 
perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as 
future and things are perceived as existing from a past time on 
wards. 

The Samkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized 
states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds 
within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is 
already existent even before the causal movement for the pro 
duction of the effect, is also baseless. Samkhya says that the 
oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and 
that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the 
stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists 
only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in 
a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of 
clay is called the cause and the jug the effect ; of what good is it 
to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never 
carry water ? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. 
What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was 
in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest 
or actual ? What does potential state mean ? The potential state 
of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state 
of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is 
meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of 
which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does 
not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump 
of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it 
can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the 
potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the 
effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said 
that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Samkhya 
that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also 
against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and 
attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again 
Samkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different 

18 2 



276 The Nyaya-Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non- 
intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that 
the qualities of buddhi are reflected on purusa and then again on 
buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul 
(dtman) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why 
Samkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that know 
ledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in 
order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double 
reflection. Again Samkhya prakrti is non-intelligent, and where 
is the guarantee that she (prakrti) will not bind the wise again 
and will emancipate him once for all ? Why did the purusa be 
come bound down ? Prakrti is being utilized for enjoyment by 
the infinite number of purusas, and she is no delicate girl (as 
Samkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the purusa 
ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure 
(snkha), sorrow (duhkhd) and a blinding feeling through ignorance 
(moha) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what 
impudence could Samkhya think of these as material substances? 
Again their cosmology of a mahat, ahamkara, the tanmatras, 
is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor 
by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. 
The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful recon 
struction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot 
be found in other systems. (See Nydyamatijari, pp. 452-466 
and 490-496.) 

Nyaya and Vaisesika sutras. 

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are 
to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars 
trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use 
in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place be 
tween the adherents of different schools of thought trying to 
defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in 
the days of the Upanisads, and the art of disputation was regarded 
even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by 
the name vi vdkovdkya. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Apastamba 
who according to Buhler lived before the third century B.C. used the 
word Nyaya in the sense of Mimamsa 1 . The word Nyaya derived 

1 Apastamba^ trans, by Buhler, Introduction, p. xxvil., and Bodas s article on the 
Historical Survey of Indian Logic in the Bombay Branch of J.R. A.S., vol. xix. 



vi 1 1] The Science of Nyaya 277 

from the root nl is sometimes explained as that by which sentences 
and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning 
and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of 
words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing 
out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered 
into combination) were called Nyaya 1 . Prof. Jacobi on the strength 
of Kautilya s enumeration of the vidyd (sciences) as Anvlksikl 
(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge 
by further scrutiny), trayi (the three Vedas), vdrttd (the sciences 
of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and dandantti (polity), and the 
enumeration of the philosophies as Samkhya, Yoga, Lokayata 
and Anvlksikl, supposes that the Nyaya sutra was not in existence 
in Kautilya s time 300 B.C.) 2 . Kautilya s reference to Nyaya as 
Anvlksikl only suggests that the word Nyaya was not a familiar 
name for Anvlksikl in Kautilya s time. He seems to misunderstand 
Vatsyayana in thinking that Vatsyayana distinguishes Nyaya 
from the Anvlksikl in holding that while the latter only means 
the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. 
What appears from Vatsyayana s statement in Nyaya sutra I. i. I 
is this that he points out that the science which was known in his 
time as Nyaya was the same as was referred to as Anvlksikl by 
Kautilya. He distinctly identifies Nyayavidya with Anvlksikl, 
but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories 
such as samsaya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained 
within the first two terms pratndna (means of cognition) and 
prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its 
special and separate branches (prthakprastkdna) were treated, 
Nyayavidya would simply become metaphysics (adhydtmavidya) 
like the Upanisads. The old meaning of Nyaya as the means of de 
termining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon 
by Vatsyayana and is sanctioned by Vacaspati in his Nydyavdrt- 
tikatdtparyatlkd I. i. i). He compares the meaning of the word 
Nyaya (pramdnairarthapariksanam to scrutinize an object by 
means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word 
an vlksikl (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by percep 
tion and scriptures). Vatsyayana of course points out that so far as 
this logical side of Nyaya is concerned it has the widest scope for 

1 Kalidasa s FCumdrasambhava Udghdto pranavo ydsdm nydyaistriohirudfranam," 
also Mallinatha s gloss on it. 

3 Prof. Jacobi s "The early history of Indian Philosophy " Indian Antiquary, 1918. 



2 78 The Nyaya - Vai&sika Philosophy [CH. 

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences 1 . 
He quotes Kautilya to show that in this capacity Nyaya is like 
light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its 
capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the 
way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi s main point that 
the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this 
seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vatsyayana him 
self designates the logical portion as a prthakprasthana (separate 
branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vatsyayana or 
Kautilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made 
after Kautilya. Vatsyayana has no doubt put more stress on the 
importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that 
seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or 
adhydtmavidyd was acknowledged by all. But the importance of 
the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of 
the dharmaSastras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend 
any support to It, and Vatsyayana had to seek the support of 
Kautilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau 
tilya was not satisfied by counting Anvlksikl as one of the four 
vidyas but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side 
with Samkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably 
even in Kautilya s time Nyaya was composed of two branches, 
one as adhyatmavidya and another as a science of logic or rather 
of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, 
and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added 
to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might 
not attract sufficient attention. Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada 
astri in an article in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society 
1905 says that as Vacaspati made two attempts to collect the 
Nyaya sutras, one as Nydyasuci and the other as Nydyasutroddhdra, 
it seems that even in Vacaspati s time he was not certain as to 
the authenticity of many of the Nyaya sutras. He further points 
out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sutras 
were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China 
and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyaya and Yoga. He also 

1 Yena prayuktah pravarttate tat prayojanam (that by which one is led to act is 
called prayojanam) ; yamartham abhipsan jihasan va karma drabhate tenanena sarve 
praninah sarvdni karmani sarvd/ca vidydh vyaptah tadafrayafca nyayah pravarttatt 
(all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all 
beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these 
depend on Nyaya). Vatsyayana bhdsya, I. i. i. 



vm] Date of the Nyaya sutras 279 

thinks that the sutras underwent two additions, one at the hands 
of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who 
put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These 
suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but 
we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such 
additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs 
of the interpolation of many of the sutras makes the fixing of 
the date of the original part of the Nyaya sutras still more diffi 
cult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and 
Prof. Jacobi s attempt to fix the date of the Nydya sutras. on the 
basis of references to Sunyavada naturally loses its value, except 
on the supposition that all references to Sunyavada must be later 
than Nagarjuna, which is not correct, since the Mahdydna sutras 
written before Nagarjuna also held the Sunyavada doctrine. 

The late Dr S. C. Vidyabhusana in J.R.A.S. 1918 thinks 
that the earlier part of Nyaya was written by Gautama about 
550 B.C. whereas the Nydya sutras of Aksapada were written 
about 1 50 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyaya in the 
sense of logic in Mahdbhdrata I. I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be 
regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any 
reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment 
of the subject that the fixing of the date of Aksapada was made 
to fit in somehow with his idea that Aksapada wrote his Nydya 
sutras under the influence of Aristotle a supposition which does 
not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyabhusana 
has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced 
a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part 
of the Nyaya. Goldstiicker says that both Patafljali (140 B.C.) 
and Katyayana (fourth century B.C.) knew the Nydya sutras*. We 
know that Kautilya knew the Nyaya in some form as Anvlksikl 
in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say 
that the Nyaya existed in some form as early as the fourth 
century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think 
that at least some of the present sutras were written some time 
in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Badarayana s 
sutras make allusions to the VaiSesika doctrines and not to Nyaya. 
On this ground he thinks that Vaisesika sutras were written be 
fore Badarayana s Brahma-sutras, whereas the Nydya sutras were 
written later. Candrakanta Tarkalamkara also contends in his 
1 Goldstticker s Pdnini, p. 157. 



280 The Nyaya, -Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

edition of Vateesika that the Vaisesika sutras were earlier than the 
Nyaya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vaisesika 
sutras were written before Caraka (80 A.D.) ; for he not only quotes 
one of the Vaisesika sutras, but the whole foundation of his medical 
physics is based on the Vaisesika physics 1 . The Lankdvatara 
sutra (which as it was quoted by Asvaghosa is earlier than 
80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are 
other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing 
that the Vaisesika sutras are probably pre-Buddhistic 2 . 

It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyaya 
sutras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by 
thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. i. 32 in which 
the sutra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (avayava) 
Vatsyayana says that this sutra was written to refute the views 
of those who held that there should be ten premisses 8 . The 
Vaisesika sutras also give us some of the earliest types of inference, 
which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyaya 
doctrine of inference 4 . 

Does Vaisesika represent an Old School of Mimamsa ? 

The Vaisesika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition 
that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed 
to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented 
in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisesika 
sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable 
way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes 
a Vaisesika sutra. An examination of Caraka s Sutrasthdna (I. 
35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some 
compendium of Vaisesika such as that of the Bhdsdpariccheda 
before him. Caraka sutra or kdrikd (i. i. 36) says that the gunas 
are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., 
cognition, and those which begin with the guna "para" (univer 
sality) and end with "prayatna" (effort) together with the sense- 
qualities (sdrthd). It seems that this is a reference to some well- 
known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found 
in the Vaisesika sutra (I. i. 6) which leaves out the six gunas, 

1 Caraka, Sdrira, 39. 
* See the next section. 

8 Vatsyayana s Bhasya on the Nyaya sutras, i. i. 32. This is undoubtedly a reference 
to the Jaina view as found in Dafavaikalikaniryukti as noted before. 

4 Nyaya sutra I. i. 5, and Vaisesika sutras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and in. i. 8-17. 



vm] Antiquity of Vaifesika 281 

heaviness (gurutva), liquid ity(dravafva),oi\ mess(sneha), elasticity 
(samskdra), merit (dharmd) and demerit (adharmd) ; in one part 
of the sutra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) 
and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within 
the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, 
whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is 
separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka s 
sutra was written at a time when the six gunas left out in the 
Vaisesika enumeration had come to be counted as gunas, and 
compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. 
Bhdsdpariccheda (a later Vaisesika compendium), is a compilation 
from some very old karikas which are referred to by ViSvanatha 
as being collected from " atisamksiptacirantanoktibhih" (from 
very ancient aphorisms 1 ); Caraka s definition of samanya and 
viesa shows that they had not then been counted as separate 
categories as in later Nyaya- Vaisesika doctrines; but though 
slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition 
one finds in the Vaisesika sutra that samanya (generality) and 
vis"esa are relative to each other 2 . Caraka s sutras were therefore 
probably written at a time when the Vaisesika doctrines were 
undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were begin 
ning to be written on them. 

The Vaisesika sutras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist 
doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is 
no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the 
argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an 
object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There 
is also no other reference to any other systems except to some 
Mlmamsa doctrines and occasionally to Samkhya. There is no 
reason to suppose that the Mlmamsa doctrines referred to allude 
to the Mimdmsd sutras of Jaimini. The manner in which the 
nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyaya 
phraseology of "purvavat" and "sesavat" was not known. Vaise 
sika sutras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate 
cause 3 . We know that the SvetasVatara Upanisad refers to those 
who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the 

1 Professor Vanamali Vedantatlrtha s article in_/. A,S.B., 1908. 

3 Caraka (i. i. 33) says that samanya is that which produces unity and vis"esa is 
that which separates. V. S. n. ii. 7. Samanya and viesa depend upon our mode of 
thinking (as united or as separate). 

3 VaiSesika sutra (n. ii. 9 and V. ii. iff). 



282 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient 
view 1 . These considerations as well as the general style of the 
work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these 
sutras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability 
are pre- Buddhistic. 

The Vaisesika sutra begins with the statement that its object 
is to explain virtue, "dharma." This is we know the manifest duty 
of Mlmamsa and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini 
begins his Mlmdmsd sutras by defining "dharma." This at first 
seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaisesika, viz., the de 
scription of the nature of padartha 2 . He then defines dharma as 
that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasd) and 
says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate 
this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions 
(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives 
bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us 
through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must 
be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts*. The fact 
that the Vaisesika begins with a promise to describe dharma and 
after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions 
and also the adrsta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit 
accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many 
of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book 
by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce 
any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows 
that Kanada s method of explaining dharma has been by showing 
that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and 
actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a 
good number cannot be explained at all except on the as 
sumption of adrsta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The 

1 SvetasVatara I. i. i. 

2 I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalapa Vyakarana, in 
which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kanada in his Vaisesika 
sutras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to 
proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himalaya). 
" Dharmam vyakhyatukamasya satpaddrthopavarnanatii Himavadgantukamasya saga- 
ragamanopam am . " 

3 The sutra " Tadvacanad dmndyasya prdmdnyam (l. i. 3 and x. ii. 9) has been 
explained by Upaskara as meaning " The Veda being the word of I^vara (God) must 
be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of " Kvara " anywhere in the text 
this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaisesika. Sutra x. ii. 8 is only 
a repetition of vi. ii. i. 



vmj Antiquity of Vaifesika 283 

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but 
is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these 
cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on 
the supposition of adrsta proceeding out of the performance 
of Vedic deeds. In v. i. 15 the movement of needles towards 
magnets, in V. ii. 7 the Circulation of water in plant bodies, 
v. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion 
of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all com 
binations have taken place), and the original movement of the 
mind are said to be due to adrsta. In v. ii. 17 the movement 
of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the 
assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the 
movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in 
Upaskdra} are said to be due to adrsta. Salvation (moksa) is 
said to be produced by the annihilation of adrsta leading to the 
annihilation of all contacts and non-production of rebirths. 
Vaisesika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) 
and the adrsta. All the categories that he describes are founded 
on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experi 
ence are due to adrsta. These are the acts on which depend all 
life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or 
the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, 
death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena 
by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), 
in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. 
Kanada s philosophy gives onlysome facts of experience regarding 
substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of 
metaphysics to adrsta. But what leads to adrsta? In answer to 
this, Kanada does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or 
sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (sndna), 
fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house 
of the teacher (gurukulavdsa\ retired forest life (vdnaprastha}, 
sacrifice (yajha\ gifts (ddna), certain kinds of sacrificial sprink 
ling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the 
prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) 
(VI. ii. 2). 

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure 
food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the con 
trary being impure; and he says that the taking of pure food 
leads to prosperity through adrsta. He also described how 



284 The Nyaya - Vaisesika Philosophy [CH. 

feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adrsta. 
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kanada is busy in showing 
the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A refer 
ence to our chapter on Mlmamsa will show that the later Mlmamsa 
writers agreed with the Nyaya- Vaisesika doctrines in most of their 
views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points 
in which Mlmamsa differs from Nyaya-VaiSesika are (i) self- 
validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief 
in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (sabda), (5) (accord 
ing to Kumarila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. 
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject 
of discussion in the Vaisesika. But as no Isvara is mentioned, 
and as all adrsta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we 
may assume that Vaisesika had no dispute with Mlmamsa. The 
fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due 
to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the 
Vaisesika sutras. It is probable that Kanada believed that the 
Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with 
Mlmamsa suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never 
written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in 
the days of the Vaisesika sutras, the view was probably what is 
represented in the Vaisesika sutras. As there is no reference to 
Isvara and as adrsta proceeding out of the performance of actions 
in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all 
atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaisesika was 
as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mlmarnsa philosophers. 
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one 
of the main points of quarrel between the Nyaya- Vaisesika and 
the Mlmamsa, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kanada gives reasons 
in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 
till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the 
eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mlmamsa view as we 
know from the later Mlmamsa writers 1 . Next comes the question 
of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyaya view is 

1 The last two concluding sutras n. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly inter 
preted by 6ankara MisVa in his Upaskara (n. ii. 36 by adding an "aft" to the sutra 
and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination 
" samkhyabhava " as samkhya and bhava instead of samkhya and abhava, which in 
my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as 
we find in the later Nyaya-Vais"esika view. 



vm] Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras 285 

that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the 
seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally 
this is regarded as the Vaisesika view as well. But in Vaisesika 
III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its 
activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this 
inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the 
activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no 
certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in in. ii. 8 it is 
suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted 
on the authority of the scriptures (agamd). To this the final 
Vaisesika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self 
in our feeling as "I" (aham), and we have therefore not to depend 
on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus 
the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional 
proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (aham) (in. ii. 
10-18, also IX. i. n). 

These considerations lead me to think that the Vaisesika 
represented a school of Mlmamsa thought which supplemented 
a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas. 

Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras. 

The Vaisesika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of ex 
plaining virtue (dharma) (I. i. i) and dharma according to it is 
that by which prosperity (abhyudayd) and salvation (nihsreyasd) 
are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the 
Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and 
salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that 
salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by 
special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of 
the categories of substance (dravyd), quality (guna), class con 
cept (sdmdnyd}, particularity (visesd), and inherence (samavdydy. 
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, 
and mind. The gunas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, 
measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to 
high genus or to species 2 . Action (karma) means upward move- 

1 Upaskara notes that vis"esa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and 
not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible 
atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference. 

2 Here the well known qualities of heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oili- 
ness (sneha), elasticity (samskdra), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) have been 
altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vais esika commentaries and com- 



286 The Nyaya-Vai&sika Philosophy [CH. 

ment, down ward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal 
movement. The three common qualities of dravya, guna and karma 
are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, 
and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other 
dravyas and the gunas other gunas. But karma is not necessarily 
produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or 
its effect, but the gunas are destroyed both by the cause and by 
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses 
karma and guna and is regarded as the material (samavdyi) cause. 
Gunas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gunas, and are 
not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is 
devoid of guna, cannot remain at one time in more than one 
object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of 
contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) 
of (derivative) dravyas, guna, and karma; guna is also the non- 
material cause (flsamdvdyi) of dravya, guna and karma. Karma 
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion 
(vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be 
produced even without karma 1 . Dravya is the general effect of 
dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guna in this that it does not pro 
duce karma. The numbers two, three, etc., separateness, contact 
and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma 
not being connected with more than one thing is not produced 
by more than one thing 8 . A dravya is the result of many con 
tacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many 
colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and 
contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In 
denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the 
cause of dravya and karma*. 

In the second chapter of the first book Kanada first says that 
if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause 
even though there may not be the effect. He next says that 
genus (sdmanyd) and species (visesa) are relative to the under- 

pendiums. It must be noted tha* "guna" in Vai^esika means qualities and not subtle 
reals or substances as in Samkhya-Yoga. Guna in Vai^esika would be akin to what 
Yoga would call dharma. 

1 It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See Upaskara I. i. 12. 

2 If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we 
should have felt that two or more things were moving. 

3 It must be noted that "karma" in this sense is quite different from the more 
extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth. 



vin] Philosophy in the Vaifesika sutras 287 

standing; being (bhdvd) indicates continuity only and is hence 
only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action 
may be both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ulti 
mate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient). 
In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being 
(satta) in virtue of which things appear as existent; all other 
genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or 
species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it 
is different from dravya, guna and karma, and yet exists in them, 
and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that some 
thing is and must be regarded as a category existing as one 
identical entity in all dravya, guna, and karma, for in its uni 
versal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the 
different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of 
thingness (dravyatva\ qualitiness (guftatva) or actionness (kar- 
matvd) are also categories which are separate from universal being 
(bhdva or satta) for they also have no separate genus or species 
and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhava or 
being was the same in all. 

In the first chapter of the second book Kanada deals with 
substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch ; water, 
colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (snigdha)\ fire, 
colour and touch; air, touch; but none of these qualities can be 
found in ether (dkdsd). Liquidity is a special quality of water 
because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids 
only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself 1 . 
Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by 
touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred 
from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing in 
ferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not 
itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya) 
and is eternal 2 . The inference of air is of the type of inference 
of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics 
called sdmdnyato drsta. The name of air "vayu" is derived 
from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us 
has (asmadvisistdndm) to be admitted for accounting for the 

1 It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury 
was known at a time later than Caraka. 

2 Substance is that which possesses quality and action. It should be noted that 
the word " adravyatvena" in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as " adravyavattvtna" 



288 The Nyaya-Vatiesika Philosophy [CH. 

giving of names to things (samjndkarma). Because we find 
that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented 
by us) 1 . On account of the fact that movements rest only in 
one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any un 
occupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of akasa 
(ether). Akasa has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance 
in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a 
quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, 
there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this 
substance is akasa. It is a substance and eternal like air. As 
being is one so akasa is one 2 . 

In the second chapter of the second book Kanada tries to 
prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, 
and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the 
notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is 
one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, be 
cause the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space 
supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much 
nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have 
diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the 
sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound 
is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises 
when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features 
coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remem 
bered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some 
other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way 
but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely 
grasped, whether rightly seen or not He then discusses the ques 
tion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons 
to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with 
a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal. 

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the 
inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must 
be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact 
of the senses and their object inheres. 

The knowledge of sense-objects (indriydrtha) is the reason by 

1 I have differed from Upaskara in interpreting " samjftakarma " in II. i. 18, 19 as 
a genitive compound while Upaskara makes it a dvandva compound. Upaskara s 
interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the 
existence of God. 

2 This interpretation is according to Sankara Misra s Upaskara. 



vm] Philosophy in the Vaifesika sutras 289 

which we can infer the existence of something different from the 
senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The 
types of inferences referred to are ( I ) inference of non-existence of 
some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence 
of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the 
existence of some things from the existence of others. In all 
these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to 
be connected with each other (prasiddkipurvakatv&t apadesasyd) 1 . 
When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have 
anapadesa (fallacious middle) and sandigdha (doubtful middle); 
thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it 
has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of 
soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses 
and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of 
the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way 
in which the existence of one s own soul is inferred 2 , i.e. by virtue 
of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the 
second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only 
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects 
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance 
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simul 
taneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it 
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person). 

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling 
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections 
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance 
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vayu. An objector 
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his 
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of sdmdnyatodrsta 
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cog 
nition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but 
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of 
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But 
the Vaisesika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to 
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of 
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But 

1 In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in 
which Gautama s terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but 
specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis. 

3 The forms of inference used show that Kanada was probably not aware of 
Gautama s terminology. 

D. 19 



290 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such ex 
periences as "I am Yajfiadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the 
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference 
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the con 
viction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajfiadatta goes, 
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajfiadatta the 
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think 
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. 
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, 
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many 
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on 
the strength of the scriptures 1 . 

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that 
which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered 
eternal (nityd). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can 
only take place because of the cause. When we speak of any 
thing as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that 
also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal 
is ignorance (avid/yd)*. Colour is visible in a thing which is great 
(mahat) and compounded. Air (jvdyu) is not perceived to have 
colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not 
the actuality of colour (rufiasamskara i.e. in air there is only 
colour in its unmanifested form) in it Colour is thus visible only 
when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions 8 . In 
this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. 
Number,measure,separateness, contact, and disjoining, the quality 
of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they 
abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The 
number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the 
eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva) 

1 I have differed here from the meaning given in Upaskara. I think the three 
sutras " Sukhaduhkhajnanani spotty avifesadekatmy am" "vyavasthdto ndnd," and "JYW- 
tras&marthyat ca " originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many 
limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the 
scriptures, they are regarded as many. 

* I have differed here also in my meaning from the Upaskara, which regards this 
sutra " avidyd" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non- 
eternality of the atoms. 

3 This is what is meant in the later distinctions of udbhUtarupavattva and anud- 
bhutartipavattva. The word samskaru in Vais"esika has many senses. It means inertia, 
elasticity, collection (samavdya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome (anab- 
hibhava). For the last three senses see Upaskara IV. i. 7. 



vi n] Philosophy in the Vaifesika sutras 291 

are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, 
and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, 
etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile 
sense) 1 . 

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the 
earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There 
cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the 
three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one 
of them acts as the central radicle (upastambhakd). Bodies are of 
two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are other 
wise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance 
with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due 
to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to 
be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been 
given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and 
also on account of the authority of the Vedas. 

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (karma) is dis 
cussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said 
that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the 
soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due 
to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of 
the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is 
not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the 
hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the 
soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of 
heaviness (gurutva) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. 
Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed 
motions (nodanavisesa) which are generated by special kinds of 
efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. 
The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown 
cause (adrstakaranaka\ The arrow first acquires motion by 
specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia 
(vegasamskara) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls 
down through heaviness. 

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explana- 

1 This portion has been taken from the Upnskdra of Sankara Misra on the Vaiie- 
sika sutras of Kanada. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to 
Vaisesika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (apeksdbuddJiijanya). But this mental 
relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched ; and it 
is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual 
sense. 

192 



292 The Nyaya-Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

tions of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical 
importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained 
as being due to unknown cause (adr$takdritam) and no ex 
planation is given as to the nature of this unknown (adrsta). 
It is however said that with the absence of adrsta there is no con 
tact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore 
moksa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the 
self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind 
is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes 
steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, akaa are 
regarded as inactive. 

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts 
are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account 
of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain 
Vedic performances, which brings in adrsta, purification and im 
purities of things, how passions are often generated by adrsta, 
how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how moksa 
takes place as a result of the work of the soul. 

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal 
things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The 
change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning 
in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size 
is visible. Visibility is due to a thing s being made up of many 
causes 1 , but the atom is therefore different from those that have 
great size. The same thing may be called great and small rela 
tively at the same time. In accordance with anutva (atomic) and 
mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The 
eternal size of parimandala (round) belongs to the atoms. Akasa 
and atman are called mahan or paramamahan (the supremely 
great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure 
it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being 
of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat). Atomic size 
(parimandala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and 
the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether 
(akasa) are regarded as eternal. 

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity 
and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from 
other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality; 
the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are 

1 I have differed from the Upaskara in the interpretation of this sutra. 



vi 1 1] Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras 293 

neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekaprthaktvd). 
The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. 
Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the 
effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither 
contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist 
independently (yutasiddhyabhdvdt). In the eighth book it is said 
that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the ap 
prehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity 
perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the 
cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the 
cause of taste, colour and touch 1 . In the ninth book negation is 
described ; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which 
neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things 
may become non-existent and that which is existent in one 
way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind 
of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of 
existence and non-existence 2 . All negation can be directly per 
ceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the 
mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also 
made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the 
yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices). 
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the 
middle term is described. It is said that anything connected 
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as con 
trary or as inseparably connected, will serve as liriga (reason). 
The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or 
"these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may 
also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllo 
gism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal 
cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyd) is 
due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal- 
observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite 
of this is true knowledge (vidya). In the tenth it is said that 
pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to 
doubt and certainty. 

1 Upaskara here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those 
specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sutras. 

2 In the previous three kinds of non-existence, pragabhava (negation before pro 
duction), dhvamsabhava (negation after destruction), and anyonyabhava (mutual 
negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is sdnidn- 
yabhava (general negation). 



294 The Nyaya- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for 
because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. 
Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Con 
tact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which 
inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production 
of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of 
fire is also a cause. 

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they 
have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the 
Vedas direct them, they have validity. 

Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 1 . 

The Nydya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen 
subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramdna), object of right 
knowledge (prameya), doubt (samsayd), purpose (prayojana), il 
lustrative instances (drstdnta), accepted conclusions (siddhdnta), 
premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarkd), ascertainment (nir- 
naya), debates \vddd), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms 
{vitanda), fallacy (hetvdbhdsd), quibble (chala), refutations (j dft), 
points of opponent s defeat (nigrahasthdna), and hold that by a 
thorough knowledge of these the highest good (m /zsreyasa), is 
attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavargd) 
is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge 
(mithydjndnd), defects (dosd), endeavours (pravrtti), birth (jan- 
ma\ and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said 
to be of four kinds, perception (pratyaksd), inference (anumdna), 
analogy (upamdnd), and testimony (sabda). Perception is defined 
asuncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names 
proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three 
kinds, from cause to effect (purvavai), effect to cause (sesavat), 
and inference from common characteristics (sdmdnyato drsta}. 
Upamana is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well- 
known thing. 

Sabda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (apta) 2 . 

1 This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in Nyaya sutras, supplemented 
here and there with the views of Vatsyayana, the commentator. This follows the 
order of the sutras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those 
of later day Nyaya as possible. The general treatment of Nyaya- Vais esika expounds 
the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators. 

2 It is curious to notice that Vatsyayana says that an arya, a rsi or a mleccha 
(foreigner), may be an apta (reliable authority). 



viu] Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 295 

Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be ex 
perienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of know 
ledge are said to be self (atman\ body, senses, sense-objects, 
understanding (buddht), mind (manas), endeavour (pravrtti), re 
births, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and 
salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and 
knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which 
upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain 
as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects 1 ; the five 
senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivl, ap, 
tejas, vayu and akasa ; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are 
the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the 
objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot 
occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas}. 
Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and 
body. Dosas (attachment, antipathy, etc.) are those which lead 
men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering 2 . 
Ultimate cessation from pain is called apavarga*. Doubt arises 
when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions 
etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for 
attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work 
is called prayojana. 

Illustrative example (drstdntd) is that on which both the 
common man and the expert (parzksaka) hold the same opinion. 
Established texts or conclusions (siddhdnta) are of four kinds, 
viz. ( I ) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called 
the sarvatantrasiddhanta\ (2) those which are held by one school 
or similar schools but opposed by others called the pratitantra- 
siddhdnta; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will 
also naturally follow called adhikaranasiddhdnta\ (4) those of the 
opponent s views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who 
proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby 
show his own special skill and bring the opponent s intellect to 
disrepute (abhyupagamasiddhantay. The premisses are five: 

1 Here I have followed Vatsyayana s meaning. 

2 Vatsyayana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he 
wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached 
and thus is emancipated. 

3 Vatsyayana wants to emphasize that there is no bliss in salvation, but only 
cessation from pain. 

* I have followed Vatsyayana s interpretation here. 



296 The Ny ay a- Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

(1) pratijha (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved); 

(2) hetu (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the 
strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known exam 
ples or negative instances); (3) uddharaqa (positive or negative 
illustrative instances) ; (4) upanaya (corroboration by the instance) ; 
(5) nigamana (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). 
Then come the definitions of tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, 
the fallacies (hetvabhasa), chala, jati, and nigrahasthana, which 
have been enumerated in the first sutra. 

The second book deals with the refutations of objections 
against the means of right knowledge (pramana). In refutation 
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening 
of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there 
was always a difference between the two things regarding which 
doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special dif 
ferentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. 
Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object 
to the validity of the pramana in general and particularly of 
perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before 
the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, 
and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they 
could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two 
happened together then there would be no notion of succession 
in our cognitions. To this the Nyaya reply is that if there were 
no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of 
knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all 
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any 
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no 
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds 
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the pre 
vious existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, 
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous exist 
ence of those objects of knowledge 1 . 

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as 
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cog 
nition of other things may themselves be the objects of right 

1 Yathapafcatsiddhena labdena purvasiddham atodyamanunnyate sddhyam ca ato- 
dyam sadhanam ca Sabdah antarhite hy&todye svanatah anumanam bhcrvattti, vino, 
vadyate venuk puryyate iti svanavifescna atodyaviiesam pratipadyate tatha purvasiJ- 
dham upalabdhivisayam pafc&tsiddhena upalabdhihetuna pratipadyate. Vatsyayana 
bhatya, II. i. 15. 



vmj Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 297 

knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which 
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere 
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right know 
ledge. The means of right knowledge (pramana) do not require 
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of 
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal them 
selves as well. 

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition 
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact 
of the soul with the mind 1 . Then it is said that though we per 
ceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the per 
ception of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we 
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not 
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could 
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms 2 . Some 
objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is 
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this 
the Nyaya answer is that there is always such a difference in the 
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each par 
ticular effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own par 
ticular cause 8 . In refuting those who object to the existence of 
time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time 
did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. 
The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have 
perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be 
done in the future. The validity of analogy (upamdnct) as a 
means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. 
The four pramanas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture 

1 Here the sutras, II. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, 
not against the Nyaya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition 
of perception as given in the Ny&ya sutra, n. i. 4. 

3 This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence 
of wholes (avayavl). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita As"oka 
(9th century A.D.), Avayavinirakarana in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts t may be re 
ferred to. 

8 Purvodakavis istam khalu varsodakan Sighrataram srotasa bahutaraphenaphala- 
parnakasthadivahanaflcopalabhamdnah piirnatvena, nadya upari vrsto deva ityanu- 
minoti nodakabrddhimatretia. Vatsyayana bkdsya, II. i. 38. The inference that there 
has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from 
the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current 
large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated 
with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be 
due to the happening of rain up the river. 



298 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthapatti (impli 
cation), aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood 
in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is 
also understood if we know that there is a bushel of corn any 
where we understand that the same contains eight gallons of 
corn as well) and abhava (non-existence) as separate pramanas 
for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthapatti, 
sambhava and abhava are included within inference. 

The validity of these as pramanas is recognized, but they are 
said to be included in the four pramanas mentioned before. The 
theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non- 
eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to 
refer to class-notions (jdti), individuals (vyaktt), and the specific 
position of the limbs (dkrti), by which the class notion is mani 
fested. Class (Jdtt) is defined as that which produces the notion 
of sameness (samdnaprasavdtmikd jdtik). 

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of 
the self or atman. It is said that each of the senses is associated 
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity 
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and 
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from 
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there 
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men; again if there 
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize 
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by 
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united 
together as one visual perception of the things 1 ; moreover if 
there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour 
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If conscious 
ness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recogni 
tion, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. 
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected 
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose 
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this 
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it 
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is 
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the 
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the 

1 According to Vatsyayana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyo- 
takara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes. 



vm] Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 299 

senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained. 
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants 
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy 
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in 
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, 
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments 
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is 
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in 
previous existences. 

The body is made up of the ksiti element. The visual sense 
is material and so also are all other senses 1 . Incidentally the 
view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation 
is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, 
fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, 
and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of 
earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements 
of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made 
by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the dis 
tinctive quality of earth, viz. smell. 

Against the Samkhya distinction of buddhi (cognition) and 
cit (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between 
the buddhi and cit. We do not find in our consciousness two 
elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, 
but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Samkhya 
epistemology that the antahkarana assumes diverse forms in 
cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the sup 
position of contacts of manas with the senses, atman and external 
objects. The Buddhist objection against the Samkhya explana 
tion that the antahkaranas catch reflection from the external 
world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may 
lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of 
crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at 
different times is refuted by Nyaya; for it says that it cannot be 
said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to 
in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. 
In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no 
coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but 

1 It is well to remember that Samkhya did not believe that the senses were con 
stituted of the gross elements. But the Samkhya- Yoga view represented in Atreya- 
samhita (Carakd) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements. 



3oo The Nyaya- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The 
contact of manas with soul (atman) takes place within the body 
and not in that part of atman which is outside the body ; know 
ledge belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for 
even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cogni 
tions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simul 
taneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of 
these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). 
Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again 
if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be 
borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of 
another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given 
as follows: (i) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, 
(5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor 
and the possessed or master and servant, or things which 
are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of 
husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, 
(11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover 
and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that 
which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such 
as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, 
(19) merit and demerit 1 . It is said that knowledge does not belong 
to body, and then the question of the production of the body as 
due to adrsta is described. Salvation (apavarga) is effected by 
the manas being permanenly separated from the soul (atman) 
through the destruction of karma. 

In the fourth book in course of the examination of dosa 
(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all 
other defects such as raga (attachment) and dvesa (antipathy). 
As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by 
destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the 
process of origination. Isvara is regarded as the cause of the 
production of effects of deeds performed by men s efforts, for 
man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. 
A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all 
things have come into being by no-cause (animitta), for then 
no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible. 

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted 
on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed. 

1 Nydya sutra ill. ii. 44. 



vm] Caraka, Nyaya and Vaitesika 301 

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (sunyavadin Bauddhas) 
that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to 
other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are 
merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are 
then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like 
the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. 
Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means 
sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tor 
mented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for 
pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dream 
less sleep, so there is no affliction (klesa) in the man who attains 
apavarga (salvation) 1 . When once this state is attained all efforts 
(pravrttt) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless 
with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then 
there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism 
(ahamkdra) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of de 
fects (dosd) ; about the nature of whole and parts and about the 
nature of atoms (anus) which cannot further be divided. A dis 
cussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijflana- 
vadins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when 
separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as 
leading to right knowledge. 

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition 
is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations 
(nigrahasthdnd) and futilities (jatt). 

Caraka, Nyaya sutras and Vai^esika sutras. 

When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisesika 
sutras we find that in the former two or three different streams 
of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homo 
geneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates 
treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead 
one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from 
some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and 
Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in 
debates with their opponents 2 . This assumption is justified when 

1 Vatsyayana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, iv. i. 63. 

* A reference to the Suvarnaprabhasa sutra shows that the Buddhist missionaries 
used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue 
with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvati (goddess of learning), who they 
supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information 
and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates. 



3O2 The Nyaya- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

we compare the futilities (jati) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to 
disputations as found in the Nyaya sutra with those that are 
found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There 
are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the 
Nyaya sutra and" Caraka-samhita which have treated of these 
matters. Caraka s description of some of the categories (e.g. 
drstanta, prayojana, pratijfia and vitanda) follows very closely 
the definitions given of those in the Nyaya sutras*. There are 
others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthana, etc., 
where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are 
some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. pra- 
tisthdpand, jijndsd, vyavasdya, vdkyadosa, vdkyaprasanisd, upa- 
lambha, parihdra, abhyanujnd, etc.) which are not found in the 
Nyaya sutra 1 . Again,the various types of futilities (jati) and points 
of opponent s refutation (nigrahasthana) mentioned in the Nyaya 
sutra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are 
found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in 
Caraka, upamdna in Nyaya sutra, arthdpatti in Nyaya sutra and 
arthaprdpti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything 
about the Nyaya work on this subject, and it is plain that the 
treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much 
simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyaya sutras. 
If we leave out the varieties of jati and nigrahasthana of the 
fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the 
treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyaya sutras. It seems there 
fore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyaya 
sutras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of dispu 
tation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka s compilation 
was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyaya sutras repre 
sents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had 
necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied 
in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. 
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have 
been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing 
through the Nyaya sutras is that of a polemic against the doctrines 
which could be attributed to the Sauti.mtika Buddhists, the 
Vijftanavada Buddhists, the nihilists, the Samkhya, the Carvaka, 
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no 

1 Like Vais esika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anu- 
mdna) as purvavat, iesavat and samanyatodrsta. 



vin] Nyaya sutras and Vaisesika sutras 303 

further allusion elsewhere. The Vaisesika sutras as we have already 
seen had argued only against the Mlmamsa, and ultimately agreed 
with them on most points. The dispute with Mlmamsa in the 
Nyaya sutras is the same as in the Vai&esika over the question 
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the 
self- validity of knowledge (svatahprdmd nydvdda) and the akhyati 
doctrine of illusion of the Mlmamsists, which form the two chief 
points of discussion between later Mlmamsa and later Nyaya, 
are never alluded to in the Nyaya sutras. The advocacy of Yoga 
methods (Nyaya sutras, iv. ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to be 
an alien element; these are not found in Vaisesika and are not in 
keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya sutras, and the 
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamaho- 
padhyaya Haraprasada ^astrl has pointed out 1 is not improbable. 
The Vaisesika sutras, III. i. 18 and III. ii. i, describe per 
ceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the^ 
self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they 
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived 
under special conditions of samskdra (conglomeration etc.). 
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non- 
simultaneity (ayaugapadyd) of knowledge and efforts is almost 
the same with Vaisesika as with Nyaya. The Nyaya sutras 
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring 
in the questions of samskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vai- 
Sesika does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three 
classifications as purvavat, Sesavat and samanyatodrsta, but no 
definition. The Vaisesika sutras do not know of these classifica 
tions, and give only particular types or instances of inference 
(V. S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made 
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation 
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing ; one kind 
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and 
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of infer 
ence without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti 
(concomitance oihetu (reason) and sddhya(probsindum)) which be 
came so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formu 
lated either in the Nyaya sutras or in the Vaisesika. Vaisesika 
sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance 
between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipurvakatvdt apadesasya), 

i J.A.S.B. 1905. 



304 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of 
the term prasiddhipuruakatva of Vaisesika seems to be more 
loose than the term vydpti as we know it in the later Nyaya. The 
Vaisesika sutras do not count scriptures (sabda) as a separate 
pramana, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. 
With Nyaya sutras sabda as a pramana applies not only to the 
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and 
Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three 
kinds rsi, drya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamana which is 
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even 
referred to in the Vaisesika sutras. The Nyaya sutras know of 
other pramanas, such as arthdpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but 
include them within the pramanas admitted by them, but the 
Vaisesika sutras do not seem to know them at all 1 . The Vaise 
sika sutras believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through 
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 
i-io,. The Nyaya sutras (II. ii. I, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as 
non-existence or negation can be perceived ; when one asks another 
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks 
are absent in some clothes and brings them ; so it is argued that 
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived 2 . Though 
there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika 
sutras about the acceptance of abhav? as being due to perception, 
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyaya 
sutras say nothing about the categories of dravya, guna, karma, 
visesa and samavdya which form the main subjects of Vateeska 
discussions . The Nyaya sutras take much pains to prove the 
materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have 
been important with Vaisesika. The slight reference to this 
question in vin. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. 
The Vaisesika sutras do not mention the name of" Isvara," whereas 
the Nyaya sutras try to prove his existence on eschatological 
grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self 
in the Nyaya sutras are mainly on the ground of the unity of 
sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the 

1 The only old authority which knows these pramanas is Caraka. But he also gives 
an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls arthapatti 
arthaprapti {Caraka in. viii.). 

2 The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayana s commentary. 

3 The Nyaya stitra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as "samdnapra- 
saijatmika jatih " (I I. ii. 71). 



vin] Nyaya sutras and Vaisesika sutras 305 

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact 
of knowledge. Both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika sutras admit 
the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of 
atomic structure in later Nyaya- Vaisesika are absent there. The 
VaiSesika calls salvation nihsreyasa or moksa and the Nyaya 
apavarga. Moksa with Vaisesika is the permanent cessation of 
connection with body ; the apavarga with Nyaya is cessation of 
pain 1 . In later times the main points of difference between the 
Vaisesika and Nyaya are said to lie with regard to theory of the 
notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. 
Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which 
cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment 
there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of one 
ness, then from a sense of relativeness apeksabuddhi notion 
of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two 
things) ; again, the doctrine of pilupaka (changes of qualities by 
heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyaya held) 
was held by Vaisesika, which the Naiyayikas did not admit 2 . But 
as the Nyaya sutras are silent on these points, it is not possible to 
say that such were really the differences between early Nyaya and 
early Vaisesika. These differences may be said to hold between 
the later interpreters of Vaisesika and the later interpreters of 
Nyaya. The Vaisesika as we find it in the commentary of 
PraSastapada (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyaya from 
the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost 
the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore 
preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of tbye 
Nyaya- VaiSesika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found 
from the sixth century onwards. 

The Vai&esika and Nyaya Literature. 
It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaisesika 
sulras by Kanada, also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though 
there is every reason to suppose it to be pre- Buddhistic. It 

1 Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha quotes a passage from Samk$epa$ankarajaya t 
XVI. 68-69 m f A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyaya writer Bhasarvajfla, 
pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyayikas considered that there 
was an element of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais"e- 
sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the 
Vaisesika sutras ; unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the 
presence of some sort of bliss or happiness. 

2 See Madhava s Sarvadarianasamgraha-Aulukyadarfana. 

D. 20 



306 The Nyaya-VaiSesika Philosophy [CH. 

appears from the Vdyu purdna that he was born in Prabhasa near 
Dvaraka, and was the disciple of SomaSarma. The time of 
PraSastapada who wrote a bhasya (commentary) of the Vaise 
sika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The pecu 
liarity of PraSastapada s bhasya is this that unlike other bhasyas 
(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sutras and 
then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explain 
ing the first brief comments), it does not follow the sutras but 
is an independent dissertation based on their main contents 1 . 
There were two other bhasyas on the Vaisesika sutras, namely 
Rdvana-bhdsya and Bharddvdja-vrtti, but these are now probably 
lost. References to the former are found in Kirandvallbhdskara 
of Padmanabha MiSra and also in Ratnaprabhd 2. 2. n. Four 
commentaries were written on this bhasya, namely Vyomavati by 
Vyomaekharacarya, Nydyakandali by rldhara, Kirandvali by 
Udayana (984 A.D.) and Lildvati by rivatsacarya. In addition to 
these JagadlSaBhattacarya of Navadvlpa andSarikara MiSra wrote 
two other commentaries on the Prasastapdda-bhasya, namely 
Bhdsyasukti and Kandda-rahasya. Sankara MiSra (1425 A.D.) 
also wrote a commentary on the Vaisesika sutras called the 
Upaskdra. Of these Nydya-kandall of ridhara on account of its 
simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably 
the best for a modern student of Vaisesika. Its author was a 
native of the village of Bhurisrsti in Bengal (Radha). His father s 
name was Baladeva and mother s name was Acchoka and he 
wrote his work in 913 Saka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes 
at the end of his work. 

The Nydya sutra was written by Aksapada or Gautama, and 
the earliest commentary on it written by Vatsyayana is known 
as the Vdtsydyana-blidsya. The date of Vatsyayana has not 

1 The bhasya of Prasastapada can hardly be called a bhasya (elaborate commen 
tary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the 
properties of the categories (Paddrthadharmasamgraha). He takes the categories of 
dravya, guna, karma, sdmdnya, vifesa and samavdya in order and without raising any 
discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines 
which are important in later Nyaya-Vais"esika discussions, such as the doctrine of 
creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms 
contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupaka in con 
nection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first 
time as the Vaihsika sutras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his 
date definitely ; he is the earliest writer on Vaisesika available to us after Kanada 
and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D. 



viu] Nyaya Literature 307 

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived 
some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi 
places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a 
Vdrttika on Vatsyayana s bhasya to establish the Nyaya views 
and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Dirinaga 
(about 500 A.D.) in his Pramdnasamuccaya, VacaspatimiSra 
(840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nydyavdrttika of 
Udyotakara called Nydyavdrttikatdtparyatlkd in order to make 
clear the right meanings of Udyotakara s Vdrttika which was sink 
ing in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings 
(dustarakunibandhapankamagndndm), Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote 
a sub-commentary on the Tdtparyatlkd called Tdtparyatlkd- 
parisuddhi. Varddhamana (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary 
on that called the Nydyanibandhaprakdsa. Padmanabha wrote 
a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamdnendu and arikara 
MiSra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the 
Nydyatdtparyamandana. In the seventeenth century ViSvanatha 
wrote an independent short commentary known as Visvandtha- 
vrtti, on the Nyaya sutra, and Radhamohana wrote a separate 
commentary on the Nyaya sutras known as Nydyasutravivarana. 
In addition to these works on the Nyaya sutras many other 
independent works of great phflosophical value have been written 
on the Nyaya system. The most important of these in medieval 
times is the Nydyamanjari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished 
shortly after VacaspatimiSra. Jayanta chooses some of the Nyaya 
sutras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyaya views quite 
independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian 
thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vacaspati s 
Tdtparyatlkd, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another 
important work is Uday ana s Kusumdnjali in which he tries to 
prove the existence of IsVara (God). This work ought to be read 
with its commentary Prakdsa by Varddhamana (1225 A.D.) and its 
sub-commentary Makaranda by Rucidatta ( 1 275 A.D.). Udayana s 
Atmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in 
which he tries to establish the Nyaya doctrine of soul. In addition 
to these we have a number of useful works on Nyaya in later 
times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connec 
tion with the present work. Bhdsdpariccheda by VisVanatha with 
its commentaries Muktdvali, Dinakarl and Rdmarudri, Tarka- 
samgraha with Nydyanirnaya, Tarkabhdsd of Kesava Misra with 

20 2 



308 The Nyaya-VaiSesika Philosophy [CH. 

the commentary Nyayapradipa, Saptapaddrthl of ivaditya, 
Tarkikaraksd, of Varadaraja with the commentary Niskantaka of 
Mallinatha, Nydyasdra of Madhava Deva of the city of Dhara 
and Nydyasiddhdntamanjari of Janaklnatha Bhattacarya with 
the Nyayamanjarisara by Yadavacarya, and Nyayasiddhantadipa 
of Sasadhara with Prabha by Sesanantacarya. 

The new school of Nyaya philosophy known as Navya-Nyaya 
began with Garigesa Upadhyaya of Mithila, about 1200 A.D. 
Garigesa wrote only on the four pramanas admitted by the Nyaya, 
viz. pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, and sabda.and not on any of the 
topics of Nyaya metaphysics. But it so happened that his dis- 
cussionsonanumana(inference)attracted unusually great attention 
in Navadvlpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and 
commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumana 
portion of his work Tattvacintamani, and many independent 
treatises on sabda and anumana were also written by the scholars 
of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home 
of Nyaya studies. The commentaries of Raghunatha iromani 
(1500 A.D.), Mathura Bhattacarya (1580 A.D.), Gadadhara Bhatta 
carya (1650 A.D.) and Jagadlsa Bhattacarya (1590 A.D.), commen 
taries on Siromani s commentary on Tattvacintamani, had been 
very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyaya became the 
most important study in Navadvlpa and there appeared a series 
of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject 1 . 
The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, 
ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system 
of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any 
concept or its relation with other concepts 2 . 

Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the 
nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke 
and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature 
of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that .here 
should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic 
thinking and the development of a system of highly technical 

1 From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth 
century the new school of Nyaya was started in Mithila (Behar) ; but from the fifteenth 
to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyaya studies. 
See Mr Cakravartti s paper,/. A. S. B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the 
dates mentioned in this section. 

1 Sfvaranumdna of Raghunatha as well as his Padarthatattvanirupana are, how 
ever, notable exceptions. 



vm] Nyaya Literature 309 

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical 
expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted 
even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate 
and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit 
ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the 
importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it 
can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by 
attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers. 

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that 
so far as the logical portion of the Nyaya system is concerned, 
though Aksapada was the first to write a comprehensive account 
of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had indepen 
dently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyaya ac 
count of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic 
Dasavaikdlikaniryukti of Bhadrabahu (357 B.C.), Umasvati s 
Tattvdrthddhigama sutra, Nydydvatdra of Siddhasena Divakara 
(533 A.D.) Manikya Nandl s (800 A.D.) Parlksdmukha sutra, and 
Pramdnanayatattvdlokdlamkdra of Deva Suri (1159 A.D.) and 
Prameyakamalamdrtanda of Prabhacandra deserve special notice. 
Pramdnasamuccaya and Nydyapravesa of Dirinaga (5OOA.D.), 
Pramanavarttika karikn and Nyayabindu of Dharmaklrtti 
(650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most 
interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic 1 . The 
diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and 
Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on 
Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the 
present volume. 

It is interesting to notice that between the Vdtsydyana 
bhasya and the Udyotakara s V&rttika no Hindu work on logic 
of importance seems to have been written : it appears that the 
science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and 
the Buddhists ; and it was Dirinaga s criticism of Hindu Nyaya 
that roused Udyotakara to write the Varttika. The Buddhist and 
the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics 
as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we 
come to GangeSa, and there is probably only one Hindu work of 
importance on Nyaya in the Buddhist style namely Nyayasara 
of Bhasarvajfla. Other older Hindu works generally treated of 

1 See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S. C. Vidyabhusana, for a biblio 
graphy of Jain and Buddhist Logic. 



3io The Nyaya -Vaisesika Philosophy [CH. 

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyaya 
interest 1 . 

The main doctrine of the Nyaya- Vaisesika Philosophy*. 

The Nyaya- Vaisesika having dismissed the doctrine of mo- 
mentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that 
things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange 
themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug con 
tinues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by 
the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce 
an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or 
through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because exist 
ence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver 
did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. 
Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding 
environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general 
characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things 
are testified by experience to be existing. 

As the Nyaya- Vaisesikas depended solely on experience and 
on valid reasons, they dismissed the Samkhya cosmology, but 
accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhutas\ earth 
(ksiti\ water (ap\ fire (tejas\ and air (marut). These atoms are 
eternal ; the fifth substance (akdsd) is all pervasive and eternal. 
It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all- 
pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it mani 
fests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows 
itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man de 
serves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf 
man though he has the akasa as his sense of hearing, cannot hear 
on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense 
organ*. In addition to these they admitted the existence of time 
(kdla) as extending from the past through the present to the 

1 Almost all the books on Nyaya and Vaisesika referred to have been consulted in 
the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography 
of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called " The History of Navya 
Nyaya in Bengal," by Mr Cakravartti \nJ.A.S.B. 1915. 

8 I have treated Nyaya and Vais esika as the same system. Whatever may have been 
their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete 
agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supple 
mented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already 
been treated. 

3 See Nydyakandati, pp. 59-64. 



viu] Metaphysical Categories 311 

endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could 
have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account 
for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Samkhya 
did not admit the existence of any real time ; to them the unit 
of kala is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its 
own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms 
and their movements. The appearance of kala as a separate entity 
is a creation of our buddhi (buddhinirmdna) as it represents the 
order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But 
kala in Nyaya-Vaisesika is regarded as a substance existing by 
itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself 
as past, present, and future. Samkhya regarded it as past, present, 
and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things 
in its different manifesting stages of evolution (adhvan). The 
astronomers regarded it as being due to the motion of the planets. 
These must all be contrasted with the Nyaya-Vaisesika con 
ception of kala which is regarded as an all -pervading, partless 
substance which appears as many in association with the changes 
related to it 1 . 

The seventh substance is relative space (dik). It is that sub 
stance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the 
right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards ; kala like dik is 
also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight 
directions and in the upper and lower 2 . The eighth substance is 
the soul (atman) which is all-pervading. There are separate atmans 
for each person ; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure 
and pain, desire, etc. belong to dtman. Manas (mind) is the ninth 
substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory ; all affec 
tions of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated 
tvy the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. 
It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, 
and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or 
willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have 
a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience 
is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simul 
taneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition 

1 See NydyakanJali, pp. 64-66, and Nyayamaftjari, pp. 136-139. The VaUesika 
sutras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things 
which are eternal. 

8 See Nyayakandali, pp. 66-69, and Nydyamattjari, p. 140. 



312 The Ny ay a-Vai^esika Philosophy [CH. 

of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas 
the other things such as quality (guna}, action (karma), sameness 
or generality (sdmdnyd), speciality or specific individuality (visesa) 
and the relation of inherence (samavdya) cannot show themselves 
without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place 
of rest (asrayd) on which all the others depend (dsrtd). Dravya, 
guna, karma, samanya, visesa, and samavaya are the six original 
entities of which all things in the world are made up 1 . When a 
man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and 
a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way 
of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics 
and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any 
passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and 
attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated 2 . The 
Nyaya-Vaisesika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to 
reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor 
dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the de 
mands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The 
entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The under 
lying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there 
must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the 
percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types 
or categories (paddrtha), and held that the notion of each type 
was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in 
number dravya, guna, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red 
book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which 
rests the concept of "redness " and "oneness," and we thus call the 
book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which 
has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatvd). So also guna and 
karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the 
same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with 
Samkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say 

1 Abhava (negation) as dependent on bhava (position) is mentioned in the Vaiiesika 
sutras. Later Nyaya writers such as Udayana include abhava as a separate category, 
but Sridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted 
by Pras astapada as it was dependent on bhava ^abhdvasya prthaganupadefah 
bhdvapdratantrydt na tvabhdvdt." Nydyakandali, p. 6, and Laksan&vali, p. i. 

" Tattvato jndtesu bdhyddhydtmikesu visayesu dosadarSandt viraktasya samiAd- 
nivrttau dtmajnasya tadarthani karmdnyakurvatah tatparilydgasddhandni frutismr- 
tyuditdni asankalpitaphaldni upddaddnasya dtmajndnamabhyasyatah prakrstanivart- 
takadharmopacayt sati paripakvdtmajnanasydtyantikaSariraviyogasya bhdvdt." Ibid. 
p. 7. 



vm] Category of Quality 313 

whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but 
Nyaya-VaiSesika would collect "all whiteness" under the name 
of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed 1 . They 
only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate 
mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions 
could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or 
not ; but whenever they found that there were some experiences 
which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate 
entities or categories. 

The six Padarthas : Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, 
Visesa, Samavaya. 

Of the six classes of entities or categories (paddrthd) we have 
already given some account of dravya*. Let us now turn to 
the others. Of the qualities (guna} the first one called rupa 
{colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone 
and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, 
yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citrd). Colours are 
found only in ksiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are 
permanent (nitya\ but the colour of ksiti changes when heat 
is applied, and this, Sridhara holds, is due to the fact that 
heat changes the atomic structure of ksiti (earth) and thus the 
old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour 
is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general 
name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus ru- 
patva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which 
rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be appre 
hended by the eye. 

The second is rasa (taste), that quality of things which can be 
apprehended only by the tongue ; these are sweet, sour, pungent 
(katu), astringent (kasdya) and bitter (tikta\ Only ksiti and ap 
have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like 
rupa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must 
be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are 
apprehended by the tongue. 

The third is gandha (odour), that quality which can be ap 
prehended by the nose alone. It belongs to ksiti alone. Water 

1 The reference is to Sautrantika Buddhism, " yo yo viruddhadhy&savan nasave- 
kah." See Panditas oka s Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts. 

2 The word "paddrtha" literally means denotations of words. 



314 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence 
of earth materials. 

The fourth is sparsa (touch), that quality which can be ap 
prehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, 
hot, neither hot nor cold. Sparsa belongs to ksiti; ap, tejas, and 
vayu. The fifth sabda (sound) is an attribute of akasa. Had there 
been no akasa there would have been no sound. 

The sixth is samkhya (number), that entity of quality belonging 
to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, 
etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative 
oscillatory state of the mind (apeksdbuddhi) ; thus when there are 
two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion This is one jug and 
that is another jug. This is called apeksabuddhi ; then in the 
two jugs there arises the quality of twoness (dvitvd) and then an 
indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa-dvitva-gund) of dvitva in us 
and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. 
The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a 
similar manner 1 . 

The seventh is parimiti (measure), that entity of quality in 
things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and 
speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is 
called parimandala parimana ; it is eternal, and it cannot gene 
rate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own abso 
lutely; when two atoms generate a dyad (dvyanuka) it is not 
the measure of the atom that generates the arm (atomic) and 
the hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule (dvyanuka), 
for then the size (parimana) of it would have been still smaller 
than the measure of the atom (parimandala), whereas the 
measure of the dyanuka is of a different kind, namely the 
small (hrasva)*. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but 
then the number (samkhya) of the atom should be regarded as 
bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (hrasva) 
measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dyanuka) 
compose a tryanuka the number and not the measure " small " 

1 This is distinctively a Vaiesika view introduced by Praiastapada. Nyaya seems 
to be silent on this matter. See Sahkara Mis"ra s Upaskdra, vn. ii. 8. 

2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eterqal as in 
"paramanus" and non-eternal as in the dvyanuka. The parimandala parimana is thus 
a variety of anuparimana. The anuparimana and the hrasvaparimana represent the 
two dimensions of the measure of dvyanukas as mahat and dirgha are with reference 
to tryanukas. See Nyayakandali, p. 133. 



vm] The Quality of Measure 3 1 5 

(hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure " great " (mahat) 
of the tryanuka. But when we come to the region of these gross 
tryanukas we find that the " great " measure of the tryanukas is 
the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by 
them. For as many tryanukas constitute a gross body, so much 
bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya 
nukas of mahat parimana makes things of still more mahat pari 
mana. The measure of tryanukas is not only regarded as mahat 
but also as dlrgha (long) and this dirgha parimana has to be ad 
mitted as coexisting with mahat parimana but not identical, for 
things not only appear as great but also as long (dtrgha). Here 
we find that the accumulation of tryanukas means the accumula 
tion of "great" (mahat) and "long" (dtrgha) parimana, and hence 
the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater 
and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. 
Now the hrasva parimana of the dyads is not regarded as having 
a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct 
type of measure which is called small (hrasva). As accumulation 
of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, 
grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the 
hrasva (small) parimana ought to generate still more hrasva 
parimana, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of 
the dyads was the cause of the measure of the tryanukas, the 
tryanukas should be even smaller than the dyanukas. So also if 
the atomic and circular (parimandala) size of the atoms is re 
garded as generating by their measure the measure of the dya 
nukas, then the measure of the dyanukas ought to be more atomic 
than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should 
not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures pro 
duced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be 
regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign 
to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the 
cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness 
and the parimandala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to 
generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. 
But since the dyads and the tryanuka molecules are seen to 
be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are 
not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued 
that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the 
measure of their effects, but it is their number which is the cause 



316 The Nyaya-Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

of the measure of the latter. This explains anuparimana, hrasva 
parimana, mahat parimana, and dlrgha parimana. The parimana 
of akasa, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, 
is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimanas 
of the atoms, akasa, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded 
as eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimanas as belonging to 
non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal. 

The eighth is prthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of 
things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things 
appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is 
perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation 
such as this jug is not this pot. 

The ninth is samyoga (connection), that entity of guna by 
virtue of which things appear to us as connected. 

The tenth is vibhdga (separation), that entity of guna which 
destroys the connection or contact of things. 

The eleventh and twelfth gunas, paratva and aparatva, give 
rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote 
and near. 

The other gunas such as buddhi (knowledge), sukha (happiness), 
duhkha (sorrow), icchd (will), dvesa (antipathy or hatred) and 
yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul. 

The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of 
which things fall to the ground. The guna of sneha (oiliness) 
belongs to water. The guna of samskdra is of three kinds, (i) vega 
(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, 
(2) sthiti-sthdpaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing 
tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhd- 
vand is that quality of atman by which things are constantly 
practised or by which things experienced are remembered and 
recognized 1 . Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables 
the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation*. Adharma is 

1 Pra^astapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to 
intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remem 
bered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of 
South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the sarnskara 
becomes particularly strong. See Nyayakandali, p. 267. Kanada however is silent 
on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul 
and also by the sarnskara, memory (smrti) is produced (ix. i, 6). 

2 Prasastapada speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon 
&ridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (na 
karmasamarthyam). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary 



viu] Category of Universality 3 1 7 

the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a 
man to suffer. Adrsta or destiny is that unknown quality of 
things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and 
arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with 
their merits or demerits. 

Karma means movement ; it is the third thing which must 
be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or guna. There 
are five kinds of movement, (i) upward, (2) downward, (3) con 
traction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of 
karmas rest on substances just as the gunas do, and cause the 
things to which they belong to move. 

Sdmdnya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect 
of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite 
of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of 
them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. 
In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all 
perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a same 
ness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, guna, 
and karma. This sameness is called samdnya or jdti, and it is 
regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, guna, or 
karma. This highest genus sattd (being) is called parajdti (highest 
universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajdti (lower 
universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of guna, or 
still more intermediate jatis such as gotvajdti (the genus cow), 
nllatvajdti (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera 
sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as 
pasutva (animal jati) and gotva (the cow jati); here however 
gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati. 
The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which 
from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species. 

they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the 
action is destroyed its power (samarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted 
as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happi 
ness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith 
(traddha), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex -control, 
sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, 
fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned 
to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pras"astapada as producing dharma. 
The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf. 
Pataftjali s Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a 
dharma which brings liberation (moksa). Srldhara refers to the Samkhya-Yoga 
account of the method of attaining salvation (Nyayakandalt, pp. 272-280). See also 
Vallabha s Nyayaltlavatt, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.) 



318 The Nyaya- Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

This jati or sdmdnya thus must be regarded as having a separate 
independent reality though it is existent in dravya, guna and 
karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any indepen 
dent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow 
was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The per 
ception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this 
is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who 
should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent 
reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns 
on his own head 1 . The Nyaya- Vaisesika said that negation 
of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness per 
ceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained 
by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Samanya has 
thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as 
sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that 
object 1 . This jati is eternal or non-destructible; for even with 
the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the 
latter is not destroyed*. 

Through visesa things are perceived as diverse. No single 
sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees 
with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the 
existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms them 
selves. The specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated 
souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it 

1 The Buddhist Panditas oka says that there is no single thing running through 
different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established. 
For if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without 
any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is 
formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish 
jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the 
cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to 
hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have 
a regressus ad infinitum Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent 
(yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyatc taltadasat}. Samanya is such, 
therefore samanya is non-existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an 
entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence 
and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external 
objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally per 
ceptible Samdnyadusanadikprasarita in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts. The Vedanta 
also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a 
separate substance. So it discards jati. See Vedantaparibhasa, Sikhdmani and Mani- 
prabhd, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa s Khandanakhandakhadya, pp. 1079-1086. 

2 Similarity (fddrsya) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is denned as 
identity in difference (tadbhinnatve sali tadgalabhuyodharmavattvam). 



vin] Category of Inherence 319 

is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the 
yogins who can perceive them. 

Samavdya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation 
by virtue of which two different things such as substance and 
attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana 
(cause) and karya (effect), atoms and vis"esa, appear so unified 
that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. 
This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why 
substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in sub 
stance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they 
are one and the same thing. Samyoga or contact may take place 
between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected 
and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put 
my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances 
and were disconnected; the samyoga relation is the guna by 
virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya 
however makes absolutely different things such as dravya and 
guna and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as 
one inseparable whole (ayutasiddhd). This relation is thus a 
separate and independent category. This is not regarded as 
many like samyogas (contact) but as one and eternal because 
it has no cause. This or that object (e.g. jug) may be destroyed 
but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being 
by anybody always remains 1 . 

These six things are called the six padarthas or independent 
realities experienced in perception and expressed in language. 

The Theory of Causation. 

The Nyaya-Vais esika in most of its speculations took that 
view of things which finds expression in our language, and which 
we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus 

1 The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as sub 
sisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus &ankara 
says (Brahma- sutrabhdsy a n. ii. 13) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to 
connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect 
it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, 
and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthd). Nyaya, however, would not re 
gard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknow 
ledge two kinds of anavastha prdmdniki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of 
the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another apr&tnaniki 
anavasthd (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything involves an infinite chain 
before it can be completed. 



320 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya. Vi^esa they 
had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did 
not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, 
and that everything could be produced out of everything by a 
change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. 
In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the 
effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that 
the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the 
accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the 
wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two de 
stroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent 
before but was newly produced. This is what is called the 
doctrine of asatkdryavdda. This is just the opposite of the 
Samkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed (nd- 
bhdvo vidyate satah) and that the non-existent could never be 
produced (ndsato vidyate bhdvafi}. The objection to this view is 
that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such im 
possible things as the hare s horn could also be produced. The 
Nyaya-Vaiesika answer is that the view is not that anything 
that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced 
was non-existent 1 . 

It is held by Mlmamsa that an unseen power resides in the 
cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this 
is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for 
there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental 
operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily ex 
plained by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing 
except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) 
between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of 
an antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of what 
succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anya- 
tfatsiddhisunyasya niyatdpurvavarttita). Unconditionality and in 
variability are indispensable for kdryakdrana-bhdva or cause and 
effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious 
accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invari 
able antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral 
or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional 
upon something else (na svdtantryend). The potter s stick is an 
unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour 

1 Nyayamanjari, p. 494. 



vin] Doctrine of Causation 32 1 

of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment 
or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is 
not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be 
regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invari 
able antecedents or what enters into the production of their 
co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they 
are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those 
of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the 
sound produced by the stick or by the potter s wheel invariably 
precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and akasa (ether) as the 
substrate and vayu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into 
the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional 
antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumera 
tion of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the 
conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent 
of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), 
the potter s father, does not stand in a causal relation to the 
potter s handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be 
unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally 
all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with 
or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded 
as causal conditions. Thus Dr Seal in describing it rightly 
remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to 
complete the sum -of causes from what is dependent, collateral, 
secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the 
irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of 
energy. This test the Nyaya would accept only in the sense of 
an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (paris- 
panda eva bhautiko vydpdrah karotyarthah atindriyastu vyd- 
paro ndsti* Jayanta s Maftjarl Ahnika I), but would emphatically 
reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious 
causal power or efficiency (sakti) 1 ." With Nyaya all energy is 
necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyaya its insisting 
that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations 
of the different causal conditions that these operations are of 
the nature of motion of kinetic, in other words it firmly holds 
to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, 
i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely 
repudiates the Samkhya conception of power or productive 

1 Dr P. C. Ray s Hindu Chemistry, .1909, pp. 749-150. 
D. 21 



322 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (atlndriya) and finds 
nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable com 
plements of operative conditions (kdrana-sdmagrt\ and nothing 
in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results 
from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions 1 . Certain 
general conditions such as relative space (dik}, time (kdla), the will 
of Isvara, destiny (adrsta) are regarded as the common cause of all 
effects (kdryatva-prayojaka). Those are called sddhdrana-kdrana 
(common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which 
determine the specific effects which are called asddhdrana kdrana. 
It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyaya while 
repudiating transcendental power (sakti) in the mechanism of 
nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of 
metaphysical conditions like merit (dharma), which constitutes 
a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the 
mechanical systems and order of nature. 

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, 
is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained 
only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in 
presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from 
a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of 
essence 3 . 

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the 
samavdyi-kdrana of the jug. Samav&ya means as we have seen 
an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A karana is called 
samavZyi when its materials are found inseparably connected 
with the materials of the effect. Asamavayi-karana is that which 
produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of 
the samavayi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of 
the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the 
colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay 
in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This 
colour of the clay is thus called the asamavayi cause of the jug. 
Any quality (gund) or movement which existing in thesamavaya 
cause in the samavaya relation determines the characteristics of 
the effect is called the asamavayi-karana. The instrumental 

1 Dr P. C. Ray s Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250. 

* See for this portion Dr B. N. Seal s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 
pp. 263-266. SarvadarJanasamgraha on Buddhism. Nyayamanjari, Bhasd-pariccheda, 
with Muktdvali and Dinakari, and Tarkasamgraha. The doctrine of Anyathasiddhi 
was systematically developed from the time of Ganges a. 



vni J Dissolution and Creation 323 

nimitta and accessory (sahakdri) causes are those which help the 
material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel 
and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakari 
causes of the effect. 

We know that the Nyaya-Vaiesika regards the effect as non 
existent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it 
holds that the gunas in the cause are the causes of the gunas in 
the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the 
black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an 
extraneous cause to generate other qualities ; thus when a clay 
jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the 
colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another im 
portant exception is to be found in the case of the production of 
the parimanas of dvyanukas and trasarenus which are not pro 
duced by the parimanas of an arm or a dyanuka, but by their 
number as we have already seen. 

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srs{i). 

The docrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems 
except the Mlmamsa 1 . According to the Nyaya-Vais"esika view 
ISvara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings 
desires to bring about dissolution (samhdreccho bhavati). Simul 
taneously with it the adrsta force residing in all the souls and 
forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act 
(sakti-pratibandha\ As a result of this no further bodies, senses, 
or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about 
of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of IsVara) 
the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations 
as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to 
the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then 
all vayu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated 
with dharma, adharma and past impressions (samskdra) remain 
suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that 
souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, 
non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected 
with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of 
manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the adrsta of souls the 

1 The doctrine of pralaya and srsti is found only in later Nyaya-Vais esika works, 
but the sutras of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter. 

21 2 



324 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the 
part of Isvara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to 
give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings. 

At the time of creation, Isvara wishes to create and this desire 
of Isvara works in all the souls as adrsta. This one eternal 
desire of Isvara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya) 
as accessory causes (sahakdri) helps the disintegration of atoms 
and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process 
of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. 
When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called 
adrsta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this 
adrsta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. 
At the time of creation action first begins in the vayu atoms by 
the kinetic function of this adrsta, by the contact of the souls 
with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact 
with one another and the dvyanukas are formed and then in a 
similar way the tryanukas are formed, and thus vayu originates. 
After vayu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water 
atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth 
atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the 
gross form, the god Brahma and all the worlds are created by 
Isvara and Brahma is directed by Isvara to do the rest of the 
work. Brahma thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of 
the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. IsVara brings 
about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good 
of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they 
may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for 
the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Isvara 
arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of 
pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in 
our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes 
or punishments according to good or bad deeds 1 . Many Nyaya 
books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahma as de 
puty for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma 
according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and 
creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of 
men, or that it may be due to a mere play (Ilia) of Isvara. 
IsVara is one, for if there were many Isvaras they might quarrel. 
The will of Isvara not only brings about dissolution and creation, 

1 See Ny&yakandali, pp. 48-54. 



vm] Proof of the Existence of God 325 

but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it 
our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of 
pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the 
exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. 
The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men s actions. 
Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications 
take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire 
(iccha) of Isvara may thus be compared with the icchd of Isvara 
as we find it in the Yoga system. 

Proof of the Existence of Isvara. 

Samkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakrti is suffi 
cient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The 
Mimamsakas, the Carvakas, the Buddhists and the Jains all 
deny the existence of Isvara (God). Nyaya believes that IsVara 
has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing 
atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If 
this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement 
must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is 
Isvara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose, 
but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a 
collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other in 
dividual objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world 
being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any 
other effect. The objection made against this view is that such 
effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents 
as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers, 
oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects 
that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have 
a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The 
answer that Nyaya gives is that the concomitance between two 
things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific 
peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had 
seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had 
thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is 
fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small 
fires, could I say that only small quantities <?f smoke could lead 
us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large 
volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be 
sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest? 



326 The Nyaya- Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects 
are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably 
and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore 
being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is 
Isvara. This cause we cannot see, because Isvara has no visible 
body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that 
we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are 
not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyaya 
answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also 
effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not 
because there is no maker of them, but because the creator can 
not be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was 
no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point 
to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done 
it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legiti 
mate for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots 
as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. 
This cause is ISvara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful. 
At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our 
father who is always engaged in doing us good 1 . 

The Nyaya- Vaisesika Physics. 

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. 
These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), vis 
cosity (or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, 
taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of 
heat. Akaa (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being 
only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel 
wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combina 
tion is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot 
exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmo 
spheric air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state. 

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (dvyanuka). Two, 
three, four, or five dvyanukas form themselves into grosser mole 
cules of tryanuka, caturanuka, etc. 8 Though this was the generally 
current view, there was also another view as has been pointed out 
by Dr B. N. Seal in his Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindu j.that 
the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that 

1 See Jayanta s Ny&yamanjnri, pp. 190-704, and Udayana s Kusumanjali with 
Prakaia and Ihiaranumdna of Raghunatha. 

2 ffaddfit tnbhirarabhyatt id tryanukamityucyatt, kaddcit cnturbhirarabhyate 
kaddcit pancabhiriti yathestam kalpan&. AyayaAandali, p. 31. 



vin] Molecular Changes 327 

they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into 
groups of threes, fours, etc. directly, or by the successive addition 
of one atom to each preceding aggregate 1 ." Of course the atoms 
are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It 
must however be noted in this connection that behind this 
physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the adrsta, the 
will of Ivara, which gives the direction of all such unions in har 
mony with the principle of a "moral government of the universe," 
so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the 
due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance 
thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer 
qualitative changes under the influence of heat (pdkajotpattt)" 
The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvyanuka into the 
atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining 
them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to im 
pinge reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other 
molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for 
the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vaisesika 
holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then 
change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination, 
under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine 
of pilupdka (heating of atoms). Nyaya on the other hand thinks 
that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of quali 
ties, but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the 
influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyaya directly affects 
the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities with 
out effecting a change in the atoms. Nyaya holds that the 
heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and 
thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is 
not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for 
such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is 
called the doctrine of pitharapdka (heating of molecules). This 
is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyaya 
and Vaisesika systems 2 . 

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the 

1 Utpala s commentary on Brhatsamhita \. 7. 

2 See Dr B. N. Seal in P. C. Ray s Hindu Chemistry, pp. igo-igi,JVyayamafl/ari, 
p. 438, and Udyotakara s Varttika. There is very little indication in the Nyaya and 
Vaisesika sutras that they had any of those differences indicated here. Though there 

are slight indications of these matters in the Vaisesika sutras (vn. i), the Nyaya 
sutras are almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory 
of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after Vatsyayana. 



328 The Ny ay a-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

atoms of the same bhuta or of many bhutas. According to the 
Nyaya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same 
bhuta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the 
compound of the same bhuta are due only to diverse collocations 
of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (ill. i. 4) that there is no 
difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed, 
since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact 
of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and 
heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes 
etc. in the original bhuta atoms. The change of these physical 
characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances 
in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the 
species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks 
bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms 
separate bodies with them. 

PraSastapada (the commentator of Vaisesika) holds that in 
the higher compounds of the same bhuta the transformation takes 
place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the com 
pound molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound 
and not in the original atoms of the bhuta entering into the com 
position of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd, 
the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined 
as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the 
milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the 
original bhuta of which the milk is a modification. The change 
as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule 
has not to be disintegrated into ksiti or ap atoms. So again in 
the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in 
the Vaisesika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accom 
paniments of other bhutas) are broken up into homogeneous earth 
atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal 
heat and biomotor force vayu to form the germ (kalala). But 
when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the 
blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of 
the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically 
determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm. 
These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of 
the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues 1 . This 
atomic contact is called arambhaka-samyoga. 

1 See Dr B. N. Seal s Positive Sciences, pp. 104-108, and Nydyakandalt, pp. 33-34, 
Sarir&rambhe paramdnava eva karanam na iukra-ionitasannipatah kriyavibhaga- 



vii i] Molecular Changes and Heat 329 

In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is 
another kind of contact called upasfambka. Thus in the case of 
such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms 
cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by 
the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the 
infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar 
qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds 
are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vayu atoms form the 
inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g. 
gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the sur 
rounding upastambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap) 
are regarded as physical mixtures. 

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the 
stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are 
differences in the modes of the action of heat ; and the kind of 
contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical 
action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what 
transforms flavour or taste. 

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely 
small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions recti- 
lineally with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through 
the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as 
when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency 
light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with pari- 
spanda of the nature of deflection or refraction (tiryag-gamand). 
In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound 
back which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the 
atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform 
the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recom- 
bine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable 
velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical 
combination 1 . Govardhana a later Nyaya writer says that paka 
means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that 



diny&ytna tayorvindSe satiutpannapakajaihparam&nubhirarambhat, na ca (ukroJonita- 
paramanundm kafddvifesah pdrthivatvavifesat....Pituh fakram mdtuh fonitam tayos 
sannipdtanantaram jathardnalasambandh&t fukra-fonitarambhakefu paramdnusu 
purvarup&divindSc samanagunantarotpattau dvyanukddikramena kalalafarirotpattih 
tatrdntahkaranaprave{o...tatra mdturdhdraraso matrayd samkrdmate, adrstavafdttatra 
punarjathardnalasambandhdt kalaldrambhakaparamdnuru kriydvibhdgddinydyena 
kalalafarire naste samutpannapdkajaih kalaldrambhakaparamdnubhiradrstavafdd 
upajdtakriyairdh&raparamdnubhih saha sambhuya farirdntaramdrabhyate." 
1 See Dr Seal s Positive Sciences of the Hindus. 



330 The Nyaya - Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates 
or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the 
same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When 
grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of 
heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into 
such forms as those that belong to milk 1 . 

In the Nyaya- Vaisesika system all action of matter on matter 
is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (prayatna) is 
distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Samkhya 
doctrine which considered everything other than purusa (in 
telligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore 
to be subject to vibratory motion. 

The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana). 

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the 
most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We 
have already seen that Samkhya- Yoga explained it by supposing 
that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the 
object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was 
then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusa. 
The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to 
a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all- 
intelligence of the self. 

Nyaya-Vaisesika regarded all effects as being due to the as 
semblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, 
and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (s&magri) 
which produced knowlege involved certain non-intelligent as well 
as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action un- 
contradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this 
collocation is thus called pramana or the determining cause of the 
origin of knowledge 2 . None of the separate elements composing 

1 Govardhana s Nyayabodhini on Tarkasamgraha, pp. 9, 10. 

2 " Avyabhicarinimasandigdharthopalabdhim vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava sama- 
gri pram&nam." Nyayamanjari, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "pramana" 
as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta s view 
which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the 
senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge 
is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: " siddhamindriyadi, asiddhafica tatsannikarsadi 
vyaparayannutpddayan karana eva caritarthah karnam tvindriyddi tatsannikarsadi va. 
nanyatra caritarthamiti saksddupalabdhaveva phale vyapriyate." Tatparyatlka, p. 15. 
Thus it is the action of the senses as pramana which is the direct cause of the pro 
duction of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the 



vm] Nature of Pramana 331 

the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only 
their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for 
sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal 
collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of 
course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated 
from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the 
preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. 
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate 
cognition as qualification (visesana) in determinate perceptions, 
the knowledge of liriga in inference, the seeing of similar things in 
upamana, the hearing of sound in sabda) but also the assemblage 
of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, 
capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for 
the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements 
all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce 
further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the colloca 
tions that is called pramana. 

Nyaya argues that in the Samkhya view knowledge origi 
nates by the transcendent influence of purusa on a particular 
state of buddhi ; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does 
not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains 
within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept 
(knowledge). The purusa to whom the knowledge belongs, how 
ever, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as 
it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the trans 
cendental contact of the purusa with buddhi is but a mere sem 
blance or appearance or illusion, then the Samkhya has to admit 
that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge 
is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Samkhyists have 
precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge. 

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine 
that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the 
knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the 
rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither 
is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the 
knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is 
evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should 

subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. " Pramatr- 
prameyayoh pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmiit tadeva pha- 
lahetuh. Pramatrprameyc tu phalodde&na pravrtte iti taddhetu kathancit. " Ibid. p. 16. 



332 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are 
both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes 
this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the 
object. The doetrine of the Vijflana vadins, that it is knowledge 
alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also 
irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and ob 
ject in such a manner that knowledge as object should require 
the knowledge as subject to illuminate it ? If this be the case we 
might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also 
require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so 
on adinfinitum. Again if pramana be defined %.$prdpana (capacity 
of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being 
momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot 
be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called 
pramana. These views moreover do not explain the origin of 
knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like 
any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same 
way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes 
intellectual and physical 1 . There is no transcendent element 
involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production 
on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena 
are produced 2 . 

The four Pramanas of Nyaya. 

We know that the Carvakas admitted perception (pratyaksd) 
alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the 
Vaisesika admitted two sources, pratyaksa and inference (anu- 
mdna) 3 . Samkhya added sabda (testimony) as the third source; 

1 See Nyayamanjari, pp. 12-26. 

2 Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ganges^, a later naiyayika 
of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence 
of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That 
which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure 
that if I work in accordance with th perception of an object I shall be successful, 1 
call it valid knowledge. Tattvacintdmani, K. TarkavagisVs edition, Pramanyavada. 

3 The Vattesika sutras tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramana. The view that 
Vaisesika only admitted two pramanas, perception and inference, is traditionally ac 
cepted, " pratyaksamckamcarvakah kanadasugatau punah anumananca taccapi, etc." 
Pra^astapada divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidya (right knowledge) and avidya 
(ignorance). Under avidya he counts samJaya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya 
(illusion or error), anadhyavas&ya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who 
had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna 
(dream). Right knowledge (vidya) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and 
the supernatural knowledge of the sages (arsa). Interpreting the Vaifesika sutras I. i. 3, 



v 1 1 1 ] Perception 333 

Nyaya adds a fourth, upamana (analogy). The principle on which 
the four-fold division of pramanas depends is that the causal 
collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature 
or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is 
different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of 
our perception, may become the object of inference or sabda 
(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of know 
ledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions 
producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be 
admitted that inference and sabda are different pramanas, though 
they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya 
thus objects to the incorporation of sabda (testimony) or upamana 
within inference, on the ground that since the mode of produc 
tion of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different 
pramanas 1 . 

Perception (Pratyaksa). 

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which 
they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. 
These senses could each come in contact with the special charac 
teristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the 
ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of 
akasa, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The 
eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. 
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects 
by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. 
The conative senses (vdk,pdm,pdda,p&yu, and w/tfj^z) recognized 
in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such 
for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the 
general motor functions of the body. 

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the 
contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error 
not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such 

VI. i. i, and vi. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trust 
worthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. 
Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. 
Arthdpatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference 
and upamana (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith 
in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference. 

1 Sdmagribheddt phalabheddcca pramdnabhedah 

Anye eva hi sdmagrtphale pratyaksalingayok 
Anye eva ca sdmagriphale fabdopamdnayoh. Nyayamanjari, p. 33. 



334 The Ny ay a- Vai^esika Philosophy [CH. 

as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just 
at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and de 
terminate 1 . If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the 
knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be 
counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (Sabda-pramdna). 
That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact 
of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the 
perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate 
(nirvikalpa) and (savikalpd) determinate. Indeterminate percep 
tion is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of 
perception in which it appears without any association with name. 
Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage 
is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all charac 
teristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete 
experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their 
characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no 
association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the 
names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate 
perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyaksa. If at the time 
of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known 
to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should 
be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that 
product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results 
from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with 
the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is 
held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it 
directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first 
stage without which the determinate consciousness could not 
arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage 
in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the 
other conditions of perception in producing the determinate per 
ception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded 
as being of six kinds: (i) contact with the dravya (thing) called 
samyoga, (2) contact with the gunas (qualities) through the thing 
(samyukta-samavdya) in which they inhere in samavaya (insepar 
able) relation, (3) contact with the gunas (such as colour etc.) in 
the generic character as universals of those qualities.e.g. colourness 
(rupatva), which inhere in the gunas in the samavaya relation. 

1 Ganges^, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate 
awareness (pratyaksasya saksatkaritvani laksanam ). 



vm] Sense-contact and Perception 335 

This species of contact is called samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, 
for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour 
is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the 
colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya 
relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya 
by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory 
sense is akasa and the sound exists in akasa in the samavaya 
relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a pe 
culiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) Thegeneric 
character of sound as the universal of sound (sabdatva) is perceived 
by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is 
another kind of contact by which negation (abhava) is perceived, 
namely samyukta visesana (as qualifying contact). This is so 
called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is 
qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. 
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in 
this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug 
is only a kind of quality 6f the ground which is perceived along 
with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen 
that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all 
kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly 
apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented). 
The most important thing about the Nyaya- Vaisesika theory 
of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the 
contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear per 
ception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its 
usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of percep 
tion and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and 
the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact 
between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All know 
ledge is indeed arthaprakdsa, revelation of objects, and it is called 
perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its 
production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with 
which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with 
the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not 
only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with 
the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. 
The senses according to Nyaya- Vaisesika are material and we have 
seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of trans 
cendental (atindriya) power (sakti) than that of actual vibratory 



336 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition 1 . 
The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occur 
rence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by 
the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When 
I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch 
not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the 
universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also 
with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The 
result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called dlocana- 
jndna (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the 
memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character 
(sukhasddhanatvasmrti} and as a result of that I perceive the 
orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character 2 . 
It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable 
object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception 
through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant 
cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and under 
stand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon 
understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though 
this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, 
yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, 
it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and 
hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the succes 
sive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense- 
contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is 
in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual pro 
cess. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indis 
pensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses 
be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals 
associated with them but also with negation. A perception is 
erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does 
not possess (atasmimstaditi) and right knowledge (pramd} is that 
which presents an object with a character which it really has 

Na khalvatindriya Saktirasmabhirupagamyate 
yayd saha no. kdryyasya sambandhajftanasambhavah, 

Nyayamanjari, p. 69. 

Sukhadi manasa buddhvd kapitthadi ca caksusd 
tasya karanatd tatra manasaivdvagamyate . . . 
. . . Sambandhagrahanakale yattatkapitthadivisayamaksajam 
jfianam tadupadeyadijnanaphalamiti bhdsyakrtatcetasi sthitam 
sukhasadhanatvajndnamupadeyajndnani. 

Ny&yamanjart, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71. 



vm] Nature of Illusion 337 

(tadvati tatprakdrakdnubhava)*. In all cases of perceptual illu 
sion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is 
only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that 
it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as 
a different object. Thus when the sun s rays are perceived in a 
desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate 
stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus 
far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is 
concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the 
similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream 
that it is misapprehended as a stream 2 . Jayanta observes that on 
account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing 
of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense 
is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the 
characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by 
illusion 8 . In the case of mental delusions however there is no 
sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant 
memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions 4 . This doctrine 
of illusion is known as viparitakhydti or anyathdkhydti. What 
existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (hrdaye 
parisphuratd rthasya bahiravabhdsanam)*. Later Vaisesika as 
interpreted by Prasastapada and Sridhara is in full agreement 
with Nyaya in this doctrine of illusion (bhrama or as Vaisesika 
calls it viparyaya) that the object of illusion is always the right 
thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion 
consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics 6 . 

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into 
two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (deter 
minate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati 
says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a 
particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nir- 
vikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the 
universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal 

1 See Udyotakara s Nydyavdrttika, p. 37, and Ganger s Tattvacintdmani, p. 401, 
Bibliotheca Indica. 

2 " Indriyenalocya maricin iuca.vacamuccal.ato nirvikaipena grhitva pafcattatro 
paghatadosat viparyycti, savikalpakd sya pratyayo bhranto jayate tasmddvijttanasya 
vvabhicaro narthasya, Vacaspati s Tatparyatfkd," p. 87. 

3 Nydyamanjari, p. 88. * Jbid. pp. 89 and, 184. & Ibid. p. 184. 

6 Nyayakandalt, pp. 177-181, " Suktisamyuktenettdriyena dosasahakdrina rajata- 
samskdrasacivena sddrSyatnanurundhatd fuktikavisayo rajatadhyavasayah krtak" 

D. 22 



338 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." 
The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with 
the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, 
the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not 
as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and 
attribute (jdtyddisvarupdvagdhi na tu jdtyddlndm mitho visesana- 
visesyabhdvdvagdhiti y&vaty. He thinks that such a stage, when 
the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject- 
predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in 
the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names 
of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the 
association of the names and relations could be distinguished 
as occurring at a succeeding stage*. Sridhara, in explaining the 
VaiSesika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above 
view of Vacaspati. Thus Sridhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage 
not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. 
But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no 
manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result 
by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they 
are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously 
ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this," which can 
only take place at the savikalpa stage 8 . Vacaspati did not 
bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only 
spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject- 
predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyaya 
writers however, following Gahgesa, hold an altogether dif 
ferent opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge 
means the knowledge of mere predication without any associa 
tion with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. 
But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nir 
vikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of per 
ceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would 

1 Tdtparyattkd, p. 82, also ibid. p. 91, " prathamamalocitd rthah samanyavifesa- 
vdn." 

2 Ibid. p. 84, " tasmddvyutpannasydpi ndmadheyasmarandya purvamesitavyo vi- 
naiva ndmadheyamarthapratyayah" 

3 Nyayakandah , p. 189 ff., " atah savikalpakamicchatd nirvfkalpakamapyesitavyam, 
tacca na sdmdnyamdtram grhndti bhedasydpi pratibhdsandt ndpi svalaksanamdtram 
sdmdnydkdrasydpi samvedandt vyaktyantaradarfane pratisandhdndcca, kintu sdmdn- 
yam vifesancobhayamapi grhndti yadi paramidam sdmdnyamayam vi/esaA ityevam 
vivicya na pratyeti vastvantardnusandhdnavirahdt, pinddntardnuvrttigrahandddhi 
sdmdnyam vivicyate, vydvrttigrahanddvifesoyamiti vivekah." 



vm] Indeterminate Perception 339 

not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible 
to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a 
quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate 
(visistavaisistyajndnam prati hi visesanatdvacchedakaprakdram 
jndnam kdranam) 1 . So, before any determinate knowledge such 
as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must 
be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the 
indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, un 
connected with universality or any other relations (jdtyddiyo- 
jandrahitam vaisistydnavagdhi nisprakdrakam nirvikalpakam)*- 
But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atlndriya) 
and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic 
conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a pre 
dicate with a subject. Thus VisVanatha says in his Siddhanta- 
muktavall, "the cognition which does not involve relationing 
cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form I know 
the jug ; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, 
the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of 
jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the 
predicative quality (visesanatdvacchedakd) of the predicate jug 
which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the 
knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the pre 
dicative quality, the content 3 ." But in order that the knowledge 
of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at 
which the universal or the pure predication should be known 
and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though 
not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably 
necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an 
universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be 
related to the particular with which it is associated. 

But both the old and the new schools of Nyaya and Vai- 
Sesika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which 
the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary 
particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or uni- 
versals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the 
perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced 
by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa per 
ception consists in the attribution ofjati(universal),guna (quality), 

1 Tattvacintamani, p. 8n. 2 Ibid. p. 809. 

3 Siddhantamuktavali on Bhasapariccheda kdrika, 58. 

22 2 



340 The Nyaya - Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things 1 . 
The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are 
not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predi 
cation of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the 
false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the 
quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a 
thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The 
same remark applies to action, for motion is not something dif 
ferent from that which moves. But name is completely different 
from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, 
and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it 
was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are 
altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now 
as regards the first three objections it is a question of the dif 
ference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Bud 
dhists, for we know that Nyaya and Vaiesika believe jati, guna 
and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the pre 
dicating of them of substance as different categories related to it 
at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as 
erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the 
memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make 
the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot 
in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not asso 
ciated until the second stage through the joint action of memory 
is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in 
order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in 
mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only asso 
ciated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there 
cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the 
Buddhists further object that there is no reascn why one should 
identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which 
was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual 
perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of 
memory or past impressions (samskdrd) this can be considered 
as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be 
the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is 

1 Nyayamanjarz, pp. 93-100, "Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, gunakal- 
pana, kriydkalpand, n&makalpana dravyakalpana ceti, taSca kvacidabhede pi bhedakal- 
panat kvacicca bhede pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucy ante." See Dharmakirtti s theory of 
Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book. 



vin] Transcendental Contact 341 

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an 
effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an 
object of past experience refers to a past time and place and 
is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with 
an object which is experienced at the present moment. It 
has to be admitted that Vacaspati s answer is not very satis 
factory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct percep 
tion which was challenged by the Buddhists 1 . It is easy to see 
that early Nyaya- Vaisesika could not dismiss the savikalpa per 
ception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and 
differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with 
the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual 
development of perception as the progressive effects of causal 
operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the 
self and the object under the influence of various intellectual 
(e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, 
it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only 
give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The varia 
tion as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon 
the variety of causal collocations. 

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense 
and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy 
and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds 
of contact of a transcendental nature called sdmdnyalaksana, 
jndnalaksana and yogaja (miraculous). The contact samanyalak- 
sana is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a 
particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all 
the particulars (in a general way) of which the correspond 
ing universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and 
through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated 
with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all 
smoke in general. Jftanalaksana contact is that by virtue of which 
we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving 
by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of 
sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, 
but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact 
of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental 
contact (alaukika sannikarsa) by virtue of which this is rendered 

1 Tatparyatika, pp. 88-95. 



34 2 The Nyaya -Vaisesika Philosophy [CH. 

possible is called jfianalaksana. But the knowledge acquired by 
these two contacts is not counted as perception 1 . 

Pleasures and pains (sukha and duhkha) are held by Nyaya 
to be different from knowledge (jflana). For knowledge interprets, 
conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to 
appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel 
that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot 
be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then 
that experience which generates sukha in one should have gene 
rated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should 
have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not 
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might 
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument s 
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, 
it is evident that there must be some differences between the 
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, 
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case 
was associated with sukha and in another case with duhkha. 
This shows that sukha and duhkha are not themselves knowledge. 
Such is the course of things that sukha and duhkha are generated 
by the collocation of certain conditions,and are manifested through 
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or 
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in 
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be 
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes 
in their production. 

The yogins are believed to have the pratyaksa of the most 
distant things beyond our senses ; they can acquire this power 
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and per 
ceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their 
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions 
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may 
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come," 

1 Siddhdntamuktavali on Kdrika 63 and 64. We must remember that Ganges"a 
discarded the definition of perception as given in the Nyaya sutra which we have dis 
cussed above, and held that perception should be denned as that cognition which has 
the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition 
of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle 
(Tattvacint&mani, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of 
perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds 
of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above. 



vm] Inference 343 

and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhana- 
jftana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyaksa directly 
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form 
of perception called manasa-pratyaksa, by which memories of 
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept 
visualized at the present moment ; thus we see a rose and per 
ceive that it is fragrant ; the fragrance is not perceived by the 
eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual 
percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception 
is only a case of inference. The pratibha-pratyaksa however is 
that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. 
When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective 
cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to 
the self by the mind as " I know this pot." This is effected by 
the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cogni 
tion which had already been generated in the soul. This second 
reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can 
proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya 1 . 

Inference. 

Inference (anumdnd) is the second means of proof (pramana) 
and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has 
been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a 
thing on the strength of the mark or liriga which is associated 
with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember 
that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire 
in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically 
called liriga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been 
made (the hill in this example) is called paksa, and the term 
"fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is 
necessary that the hetu or liriga must be present in the paksa, 

1 This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is 
produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the triputipratyaksa doctrine of 
Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simul 
taneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Ganges^, 
gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this 
object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called 
anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), "idamaham janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate tad- 
bodhakendriyasannikarsabhavat kintvidamvisayakajnanatvaviiistasya jnanasya vai- 
hstyamatmani bhasate; na ca svaprakase vyavasaye t&Jrsam svasya vaihstyam bha- 
silumarhati,purvam visesanasya tasyajnanat, tasmadidamahamjananiiiinavyavasayah 
kintu anuvyavasayah." Tattvacintamant , p. 795. 



344 The Nyaya- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

and in all other known objects similar to the paksa in having the 
sadhya in it (sapaksa-satta), i.e., which are known to possess the 
sadhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liriga must 
not be present in any such object as does not possess the 
sadhya (vipaksa-vydvrtti absent from vipaksa or that which does 
not possess the sadhya). The inferred assertion should not be 
such that it is invalidated by direct perception (pratyaksa) or 
the testimony of the sastra (abddhita-visayatvd). The lihga 
should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way 
could also be possible (asat-pratipaksa). The violation of any 
one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu 
as determining the inference, and thus would only make the 
hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or 
seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. 
Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible 
is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the 
paksa) does not possess 1 . This hetvabhasa is technically 
called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, 
technically called viruddha-hetu, may be exemplified in the case 
that sound is eternal, since it is created ; the hetu " being 
created " is present in the opposite of sadhya (vipaksa), namely 
non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality 
which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, 
technically called anaikdntika-hetu> is found in the case that 
sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now " being 
an object of knowledge " (prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is 
present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well 
as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the 
sadhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the 
sadhya is not absolute (anaikdntika). A fallacy of the fourth 
type, technically called kdldtyaydpadi$ta, may be found in the 
example fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. 
Here pratyaksa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is 
fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakaranasama, is to be 
found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same 
time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non- 

1 It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the 
eternality of sound, which the Mimamsa did. Eternality of sound meant with Mimamsa 
the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only 
manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a 
particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles. 



vin] Nyaya and Buddhism on Causation 345 

eternal, since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like 
akas"a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it. 

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against 
inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are 
valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uni 
formity of nature in two relations, viz. tdddtmya (essential 
identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and 
effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not 
of causation ; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer 
that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related 
to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of 
the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a 
pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity 
(tdddtmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of 
succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire. 

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable 
association (niyamd) of the liriga or hetu (the concomitance of 
which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions 
noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific 
relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the 
inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the 
essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument 
that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; 
for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both 
ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a 
pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with 
those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essen 
tial identity, but to the invariable association of the liriga (mark) 
with the lihgin (the possessor of liriga), otherwise called niyama. 
The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) 
is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the 
case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of 
other types of inference, where the association as cause and 
effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is 
inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the 
liriga with the lirigin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted 
above, is" what leads us to make a valid inference 1 . 

We perceived in many cases that a liriga (e.g. smoke) was 
associated with a lirigin (fire), and had thence formed the notion 

1 See Nyayamanjarl on anumana. 



346 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we 
perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered 
the concomitance (yyapti} of smoke and fire which we had 
observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, 
which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we 
concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the 
liriga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its 
concomitance with fire (trtlya-lihga-pardmarsd) is thus the cause 
(anumitikarana or anumdnd) of the inference (anumiti). The con 
comitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyaptt. When 
this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with 
those having fire, it is called bahirvydpti\ and when it refers to the 
conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any 
relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was 
observed, it is called antarvydpti. The Buddhists since they did 
not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti 
view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference 1 . 

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference 
will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign 
(hetu} with the signate (sddkya), how are we to assure ourselves in 
each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vydp- 
tigraha) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance 
had been valid. The Mlmamsa school held, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case 
in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases 
I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there 
was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. 
But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where 
there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in 
all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any 
smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should 
be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire 
should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically 
called anvayavydpti and the latter vyatirekavydptt. But even this 
is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a 
hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have 
been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but 
it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomi- 

1 See Antarvyaptisamarthana, by Ratnakaraanti in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, 
Bibliothtca Indica, 1910. 



vin] Invariable Unconditional Concomitance 347 

tance, or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It 
may be that one might never have observed smoke without an 
antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even 
that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in 
a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass 
produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents re 
mained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately 
followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmin sati bttavanam 
yato vind na bhavanam iti bhuyodarsanam> Nydyamanjari, 
p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of 
concomitance (yydptt) between the ass and the smoke 1 . But of 
course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the 
above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, 
and there might be some other condition (upddhi) associated 
with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire 
in green wood (ardrendhand) produced smoke, but one might 
doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that pro 
duced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. 
But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged 
in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would 
have to be dispensed with (vydghdtd). Thus such doubts as 
lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or 
unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at which we 
had arrived by careful observation and consideration 2 . The 
Buddhists and the naiyayikas generally agreed as to the method 
of forming the notion of concomitance or vyapti (vydptigrahd), 
but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a con 
comitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect 
or of identity of essence, whereas Nyaya held that neither the 
relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of 
genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was 
quite a number of other types of inference which could not be 
brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the 
tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things hap 
pening other things would happen could certainly exist, even 
without the supposition of an identity of essence. 

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often 
have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to 

1 See Tatparyatika on anumana and vyaptigraha. 

z Tatparyatika on vyaptigraha, and Tattvacintamani of Gaiigea on vyaptigraha. 



348 The Ny ay a- Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyaya holds how 
ever that though different causes are often found to produce 
the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one 
effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its 
other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found 
that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other 
effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy 
downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water 
of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of 
the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits 
that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the 
rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street 
of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circum 
stances, the special manner in which the water flows by small 
rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was 
due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we 
see that Nyaya relied on empirical induction based on uniform 
and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists 
assumed a priori principles of causality or identity of essence. 
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya 
works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves 
assured that there was no such upadhi (condition) associated with 
the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but 
that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sadhya in 
a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not pro 
duce smoke ; fire must be associated with green wood in order to 
produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition 
(upddht) without which no smoke could be produced. It is on 
account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and 
so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in 
the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so 
in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the 
validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be assured that 
there should be nothing associated with the hetu which con 
ditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide 
experience (bhuyodarsand). 

Prasastapada in defining inference as the " knowledge of that 
(e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of 
the reason" described a valid reason (lingo) as that which is con 
nected with the object of inference (anumeya) and which exists 
wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases 



vm] Pra^astapada s Interpretation of Inference 349 

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyaya 
qualifications of paksasattva, sapaksasattva and vipaksdsattva of 
a valid reason (hetu). Praastapada further quotes a verse to say 
that this is the same as what Kasyapa (believed to be the family 
name of Kanada) said. Kanada says that we can infer a cause 
from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one 
thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in op 
position or in a relation of inherence (ix. ii. i and III. i. 9). We 
can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (prasiddhipur- 
vakatvd) with the object of inference. What this association was 
according to Kanada can also be understood for he tells us (ill. 
i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) 
is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no 
concomitance with it (aprasiddhd) or it has a doubtful existence 
(sandigdha). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has 
horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. 
Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for 
there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though 
a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The 
first fallacy is a combination of paksasattva and sapaksasattva, 
for not only the present paksa (the ass) had no horns, but no 
horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipaksasattva, 
for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, 
it seems that when PraSastapada says that he is giving us the view 
of Kanada he is faithful to it. Praastapada says that wherever 
there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. 
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the 
smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that 
there is fire. But with regard to Kanada s enumeration of types of 
inference such as " a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect 
from the cause," etc., PraSastapada holds that these are not the 
only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing 
the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connec 
tion such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides 
inference into two classes, drsta (from the experienced charac 
teristics of one member of a class to z nother member of the same 
class), and samanyato drsta. Drsta (perceived resemblance) is 
that where the previously known case and the inferred case is 
exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point 
out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of 
flesh on its neck (sasna), I can whenever I see the same hanging 



350 The Nyaya - Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But 
when on the strength of a common quality the inference is ex 
tended to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato drsta. 
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded 
with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, 
namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with 
the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of 
heaven). When the conclusion to which one has arrived (svani- 
scitdrthd) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others 
who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then 
the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinc 
tion of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana 
(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. 
Prasastapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes 
of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be 
conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is 
called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an 
entirely new innovation of Prasastapada, for in IX. 2, Kanada 
himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyedam kdryyakdra- 
nasambandhascdvayavddbhavati). The five premisses which are 
called in Nyaya pratijnd, hetu drstdnta, upanaya, and nigamana 
are called in Vaisesika/ratfz/wtf, apadesa, nidarsana, anusandhdna, 
and pratydmndya. Kanada however does not mention the name 
of any of these premisses excepting the second " apadesa." 
Pratijfia is of course the same as we have in Nyaya, and the term 
nidarsana is very similar to Nyaya drstanta, but the last two are 
entirely different. Nidarsana may be of two kinds, (i) agreement 
in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen 
in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not 
a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal 
being 1 ). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example 

1 Dr Vidyabhusana says that "An example before the time of Dignaga served as 
a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The 
hill is fiery ; because it has smoke ; like a kitchen (example). Asahga made the ex 
ample more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal 
proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection 
between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery ; because it has 
smoke ; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen " {Indian Logic, pp. 95, 96). It is of 
course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as " like a kitchen " (fabdah 
utpattidharmakatvadanityah sthdlyddivat, I. i. 36), but Pras"astapada has it in the 
proper form. Whether Prasastapada borrowed it from Dirinaga or Dinnaga from 
Prasastapada cannot be easily settled. 



vm] Doctrine of Concomitance 351 

(nidarsandbhdsd). Prasastapada s contribution thus seems to con 
sist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of 
the nidarsana, but the names of the last two premisses are so 
different from what are current in other systems that it is reason 
able to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional 
Vaisesika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely 
indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being 
pursued in Vaisesika circles independently of Nyaya. There is 
no reason however to suppose that Prasastapada borrowed any 
thing from Dirinaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, 
for, as I have shown above, most of Prasastapada s apparent in 
novations are all definitely alluded to by Kanada himself, and 
Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the 
question of the fallacies of nidarsana, unless it is definitely proved 
that Dirinaga preceded Prasastapada, there is no reason whatever 
to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former 1 . 

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most 
important part of inference. Vatsyayana says that an inference 
can be made by the sight of the liriga (reason or middle) through 
the memory of the connection between the middle and the major 
previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it 
is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the 
connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded 
as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to 
inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is linga- 
pardmarsa, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor 
associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for 
inference does not immediately follow the memory of the con 
nection, but the present perception of the middle associated with 
the memory of the connection (smrtyanugrhito lingapardmarso). 
But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. 
Udyotakara s criticisms of Dirinaga as shown by Vacaspati have 
no reference to this point. The doctrine of tdddtmya and tadut- 
patti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to 
Buddhist logic by Dharmaklrtti. Dharmaklrtti s contention was 
that the root principle of the connection between the middle and 
the major was that the former was either identical in essence 
with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a 
mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us 

1 Prasastapada s bhasya with Nyayakandali, pp. 200-255. 



352 The Ny ay a- Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

the desired connection 1 . Vacaspati in his refutation of this view 
says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a 
separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate ante 
cedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being 
no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with 
perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the 
smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless 
it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element as 
sociated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately 
preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of 
argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is 
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke 
can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time 
and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many 
cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause 
and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this 
morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of 
identity of essence (tdddtmya as in the case of the pine and the 
tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be 
inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any 
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be de 
scribed in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are 
naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when 
such is the case, though we may not know any further about the 
nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former 
and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under 
certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there 
may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate 
the validity of inference. To this Vacaspati s answer is that if 
even after observing a large number of cases and careful search 
such conditions (upddhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take 
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural 
connection between the middle and the major. The later 
Buddhists introduced the method of Pancakdranl in order to 
determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions 
determining the causal relation are (i) neither the cause nor the 
effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate 
succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in 

1 Karyyakaranabhavadva svabhavadva niyamakat avinabhavaniyamo darsandnna 
na darfanat. Tatparyatlka^. 105. 



vm] Classification of Inference 353 

immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method 
cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause 
and effect relation ; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect 
relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better 
to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect 
relation 1 . 

In early Nyaya books three kinds of inference are described, 
namely purvavat, sesavat, and samanyato-drsta. Purvavat is the 
inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from 
heavy dark clouds ; Sesavat is the inference of causes from effects, 
e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river ; samanyato- 
drsta refers to the inference in all cases other than those of 
cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the 
tamarind from its form and colour. Nydyamanjari mentions 
another form of anumana, namely pariesamana (reductio ad 
absurdum), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. conscious 
ness) of any other thing (e.g. atman), because it was already 
definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any 
other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to 
anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of 
these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely 
that of the inference of the probandum (sddhya) by virtue of the 
unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called 
the vyapti-niyama. In the new school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya) 
a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an 
important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalanvayi, and 
kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the 
vyapti has been observed by a combination of a large number of 
instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, 
as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever 
there is smoke there is fire (anvayd)^ and where there is no fire, 
there is no smoke (vyatirekd)}. An inference could be for one s 
own self (svdrthdnumdnd) or for the sake of convincing others 
(pardrthdnumdna). In the latter case, when it was necessary that 
an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, 
five propositions (avayavas) were regarded as necessary, namely 
pratijfta (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), uda- 
harana (where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), 
upanaya (this hill has smoke), nigamana (therefore it has got 

1 Vatsyaya^ia s bhasya, Udyotakara s Varttika and Tatparyyatikd, I. i. 5. 
D. 23 



354 The Ny ay a- Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

fire). Kevalanvayi is that type of inference, the vyapti of which 
could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case 
" this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge 
{idattt, vdcyani prameyatvdt)" Now no such case is known which 
is not an object of knowledge ; we cannot therefore know of any 
case where there was no object of knowledge (prameyatva) and 
no name (yficyatva) ; the vyapti here has therefore to be based 
necessarily on cases of agreement wherever there is prame- 
yatva or an object of knowledge, there is vacyatva or name. 
The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive in 
stances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the 
inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing 
the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from 
other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident 
that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the 
concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There 
is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our 
inference earth differs from other elements, since it has the 
special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in 
those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such 
special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone. 

Upamana and Sabda. 

The third pramana, which is admitted by Nyaya and not by 
VaiSesika, is upamana, and consists in associating a thing un 
known before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some 
other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never 
seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester 
"what is gavaya?" and the forester replies "oh, you do not 
know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the 
forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to 
be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. 
This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its 
similarity to a known thing is called upamana. If some forester 
had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him 
that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have 
known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would 
have been due to testimony (sabda-pramdna). The knowledge is 
said to be generated by the upamana process when the associa 
tion of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer 



vm] Upamana and Sabda 355 

on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the un 
known animal to a known one. The naiyayikas are thorough 
realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of 
similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. 
Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the 
association of the name in accordance with the perception of 
similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is 
called upamdncf. 

abda-pramana or testimony is the right knowledge which 
we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful 
persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the 
Vedas were uttered by ISvara himself. The Vedas give us 
right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the 
utterances of the infallible IsVara. The VaiSesikas did not admit 
abda as a separate pramana, but they sought to establish the 
validity of testimony (sabdd) on the strength of inference (anu- 
miti) on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible 
person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly 
corroborated by the Vaisesika sutras, which tacitly admit the 
validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this 
was how Vaisesika was interpreted in later times. 

Negation in Nyaya- Vaisesika. 

The problem of negation or non-existence (abhdva) is of great 
interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its 
nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumarila 1 

1 See Nyayamanjari on upamana. The oldest Nyaya view was that the instruction 
given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name " wild ox" to the 
strange animal was possible was itself "upamana." When PraSastapada held that upa 
mana should be treated as a case of testimony (dptavacana), he had probably this inter 
pretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vacaspati hold that it was not by the instruction 
alone of the forester that the association of the name " wild ox " was made, but there 
was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too. 
So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead 
us to this association called upamana. What Vatsyayana meant is not very clear, but 
Dinnaga supposes that according to him the result of upamana was the knowledge of 
similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vacaspati of course holds that 
he has correctly interpreted Vatsyayana s intention. It is however definite that upamana 
means the associating of a name to a new object (sam&khyasambandhapratipattirupama- 
ndrthah, Vatsyayana). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which 
directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester 
cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under 
testimony (Sabda). See Pra^astapada and NydyakandaK, pp. 110-21, Vatsyayana, 
Udyotakara, Vacaspati and Jayanta on Upamana. 

2 See Rumania s treatment of abhava in the Slokavdrttika, pp. 473-493. 

23 2 



356 The Nyaya-Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. 

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the 
next chapter, hold that negation (abhdvd) appears as an intuition 
(mdnam) with reference to the object negated where there are no 
means of ordinary cognition (pramdna) leading to prove the exist 
ence (satparicchedakam) of that thing. They held that the notion 
"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no 
contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when 
we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non- 
existence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and 
the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see 
neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged 
that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say 
the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even 
then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense- 
contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say 
that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and 
remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises 
the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual 
perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were 
no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence 
at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he 
is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where 
he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware 
of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even 
without perceiving the place and without any operation of the 
memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of 
there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, 
for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, 
and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could 
be regarded as a reason (lingo), for the non- perception of the jug 
is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no 
concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and 
its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of 
non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same diffi 
culty about the notion of non-existence (abhdvd) which was sought 
to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be 
admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process 
of knowledge. Nyaya however says that the perception of 
non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception 
of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g. 



vm] Mimamsa view of Negation 357 

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the 
ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug 
arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and 
there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground 
should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of 
the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due 
to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug 
is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle 
that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact 
with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or 
non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even 
without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive sub 
stance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense- 
contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required 
in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation 
or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. 
To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary 
that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a 
thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only 
be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as 
well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the appre 
hension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to 
be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non- 
existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived 
before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence 
(e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abkava) can thus, ac 
cording to Nyaya, generate its cognition just as any positive 
existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere 
vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," 
as position (bhdva) is what generates the cognition "it is." 

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold 
that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with 
specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); 
but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think 
that negation could thus be associated with them in any 
relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its 
pratiyogi (thing negated e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for 
when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there 
is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the 
relation of opposition (yirodhd), for we could have admitted it, if 



358 The Nyaya - Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, 
for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without 
effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether nega 
tion is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the 
nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it 
will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it 
will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or 
that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non- 
perception, e.g. (i) svabhavanupalabdhi (natural non-perception 
there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) karananupalabdhi 
(non-perception of cause there is no smoke here, since there is 
no fire); (3) vyapakanupalabdhi (non-perception of the species 
there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) karyanupalabdhi 
(non-perception of effects there are not the causes of smoke here, 
since there is no smoke); (5) svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi (percep- 
ti6n of contradictory natures there is no cold touch here because 
of fire) ; (6) viruddhakaryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory 
effects there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virud- 
dhavyaptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance past is not of neces 
sity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) karyyavi- 
ruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects there is not here the causes 
which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopa- 
labdhi (opposite concomitants there is no touch of snow here, 
because of fire); (10) karanaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes 
there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire) ; 
(11) karanaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes 
this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it 
is full of smoke 1 ). 

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of nega 
tion, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the 
cognition of negation (heturnabhdvasamvidak). All that we can 
say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use 
(yogyata) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyata 
is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage 
as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. 
Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of 
negation, but only shows that there are certain positive percep 
tions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive 
perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that 

1 See Nydyabindu, p. u, and Nyayamanjari, pp. 53-7. 



vui] Nyaya view of Negation 359 

leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug 
(anupalambhah abhdvam vyavahdrayati)*. 

The Nyaya reply against this is that the perception of positive 
existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we 
have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said 
that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the percep 
tion of the ground without the jug. But is this being without 
the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then 
it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even 
when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over 
the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a 
distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground 
with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, 
without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter 
mu.ch, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Nega 
tion is apprehended by perception as much as any positive 
existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are dif 
ferent; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects 
there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of 
negation with space and time with which it appears associated is 
the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality 
(visesya visesand). The relation between the negation and its 
pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is 
the other is not. The Vaisesika sutra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhava 
in a similar way as Kumarila the Mlmamsist does, though the 
commentators have tried to explain it away 2 . In Vaisesika the 
four kinds of negation are enumerated as (i) prdgabhdva (the 
negation preceding the production of an object e.g. of the jug 
before it is made by the potter); (2) dhvamsdbhdva (the negation 
following the destruction of an object as of the jug after it is 
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyonydbhava (mutual 
negation e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and 

1 See Nydyabindu(fkd, pp. 34 ff., and also Nydyamanjari, pp. 48-63. 

2 Pras"astapada says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence 
of the cause, so the non -production of it is the sign of its non-existence. Sridhara in 
commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (lingo) 
of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that 
non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhavavad abhavcfpindriyagra- 
hanayogyah) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the 
collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (abhavendriyasannikarso 1 pi abhd- 
vagrahanasdmagri), ffydyakandalt, pp. 225-30. 



360 The Nyaya - Vaites ika Philosophy [CH. 

in the horse that of th& cow) ; (4) atyantabhava (a negation which 
always exists e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in 
other places is not destroyed) 1 . 

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices 
for the seeker of Salvation. 

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmo 
sphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence 
of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do 
not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are 
tarka^ nirnaya, vdda, jalpa, vitandd, hetvdbhdsa, chala, jdti and 
n igrahasthdna. 

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern 
its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of 
some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions ; it is not 
inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right 
conclusion. When there is doubt (samsayd) about the specific 
nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nirnaya means the 
conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two 
opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the 
doctrines that there is or is not an atman, in which each of them 
tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is 
called a vdda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants 
give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective op 
ponents. A jalpa is called a vitandd when it is only a destructive 
criticism which seeks to refute the opponent s doctrine without 
seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvabhasas 
are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyaya 
sutras enumerate five fallacies (hetvdbhdsas) of the middle (hetu): 
savyabhicdra (erratic), virudd/ia (contradictory), prakaranasama 
(tautology), sddhyasama (unproved reason) and kdldtita (inop 
portune). Savyabhicara is that where the same reason may prove 
opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it j s intangible 
like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because 
it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal) ; viruddha 
is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a 
jug is eternal, because it is produced) ; prakaranasama is that 

1 The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical 
problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small 
section like this. 



vi n] Fallacies 361 

where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form 
(e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of 
eternality) ; sadhyasama is that where the reason itself requires 
to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, 
but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not) ; 
kalatlta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not 
tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that 
sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the 
drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and 
the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour 
is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was 
already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the 
case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the 
stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. 
The later Nyaya works divide savyabhicara into three classes, 
(i) sadharana or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is 
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire 
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asadharana or too restricted 
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound ; this 
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the 
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasamharin or unsubsuming 
(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of 
knowledge ; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be 
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite con 
clusion may also be drawn). The fallacy satpratipaksa is that in 
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite 
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is 
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy asiddha (unreal) 
is of three kinds (i) dsraydsiddha (the lotus of the sky is fragrant 
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in 
the sky), (2) svarupdsiddha (sound is a quality because it is 
visible ; but sound has no visibility), (3) vydpyatvdsiddha is that 
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence 
is not invariable and inevitable ; there is smoke in the hill because 
there is fire ; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red 
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated 
with smoke. The fallacy bddhita is that which pretends to prove 
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot 
because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the 
fallacies counted by Vaisesika. Contrary to Nyaya practice 



362 The Nyaya - Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

Prasastapada counts the fallacies of the example. Dirinaga also 
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is 
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms ; 
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmaklrtti counted also the 
fallacies of the paksa (minor) ; but Nyaya rightly considers that 
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard 
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the 
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent s arguments for the 
purpose of defeating him. Jati consists in the drawing of contra 
dictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with 
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthana 
means the exposure of the opponent s argument as involving 
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is 
conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious 
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating 
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical 
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to 
emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari that these 
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant 
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. 
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the 
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, 
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding 
onward for the attainment of moksa should acquire these devices 
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A know 
ledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyaya sutra as 
being necessary for the attainment of salvation 1 . 

The doctrine of Soul. 

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded 
consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were 
other Carvakas called Suiksita Carvakas who admitted the 
existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. 
The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. 
The naiyayikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics 
mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. 
They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, 
etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be 

1 See Nyayamanjari, pp. 586-659, and Tarkikaraksa of Varadaraja and Nis- 
kantaka of Mallinatha, pp. 185 ff. 



vm] Doctrine of Soul 363 

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self 
is not proved according to Nyaya merely by the notion of our 
self-consciousness, as in the case of Mlmamsa, for Nyaya holds 
that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may 
be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or 
I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot 
be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we 
cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the 
inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to 
which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are pro 
duced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of 
atman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any 
destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not 
located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at 
the same time in all places (vibhu), and does not travel with 
the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though 
atman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are 
seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation 
of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested 
or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires conscious 
ness as a result of suitable collocations 1 . 

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different 
facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than 
the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and 
pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures 
and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be 
due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men per 
formed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world 
must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as 
the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance. 

Isvara and Salvation. 

Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Isvara on the 
basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and 
the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Isvara and 
offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute 
these and prove the existence of Isvara by an inference of the 
samanyato-drsta type. 

1 JMnasamavayanibandhanamevatmanaScetayitrtvam, &c. See Nydyamaftjart, 
pp. 432 ff. 



364 The Nyaya - Vaitesika Philosophy [CH. 

The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the 
world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never 
produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to 
this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an 
effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and land 
slips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in 
nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a 
result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the 
atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of 
the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a 
difference between the order and arrangement of human produc 
tions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; 
and therefore from the order and a.rra.ng&ment(sannivesa-viststatd) 
of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was 
produced by a creator ; for, it is from the sort of order and 
arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator 
or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyaya answers that the 
concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement" 
in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with 
specific cases of " order and arrangement," for each specific case 
may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar 
other specific cases ; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same 
kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard 
the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and con 
sider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. 
So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and 
arrangement " in general with " the existence of a creator," and 
thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be 
different from the order and arrangement of things produced by 
man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would 
not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many 
effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground 
without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, 
for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created 
by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has 
a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in 
its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order 
and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an 
effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. 
Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes, 



vin] God and Salvation 365 

so IsVara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus 
omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not 
require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without 
any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is 
always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the 
karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or 
protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the 
results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless 
can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in 
the external world, so IsVara also can by his will create the 
universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any 
association of body with lvara is indispensable for our con 
ception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, 
so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of 
our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements 
are produced in the atoms 1 . 

The naiyayikas in common with most other systems of Indian 
philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that 
the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of 
sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (sarvam 
duhkham vivekinaK) ; the wise therefore is never attached to the 
so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows. 

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (mithyd- 
jndna) which consists in thinking as my own self that which 
is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and know 
ledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padarthas and 
as Nyaya says, of the proofs (pramdna), the objects of knowledge 
(prameya), and of the other logical categories of inference is 
attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can 
be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (pratipaksa- 
bhdvana), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any 
pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but 
pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it 
will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction 
of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and 
ignorance about them (collectively called dosa, cf. the klesa of 
Pataftjali) are also destroyed. 

With the destruction of attachment actions (pravrtti) for the 

1 See Nydyamanjart, pp. 190-204, hvaranumdna of Raghunatha 6iromani and 
Udayana s Kusumanjalt. 



366 The Nyaya - Vaifesika Philosophy [CH. vm 

fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with 
it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, 
actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the 
production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of 
sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all 
its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains 
in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyaya- 
Vaisesika is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a 
state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in 
its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness 
in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute 
happiness (ananda\ though really speaking the state of mukti 
can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in 
its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, 
knowledge, willing, etc. 1 . 

1 Nyayamanjari, pp. 499-533. 



CHAPTER IX 

MlMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 1 

A Comparative Review. 

THE Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy looked at experience from 
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any 
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our 
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of 
an original universal (e.g. prakrti of the Samkhya). Space, time, 
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are sub 
stantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material 
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many 
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which 
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also 
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even 
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in 
substances. Knowledge (jnand) which illuminates all things is 
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are 
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely 
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is 
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other 
physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical 
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the 
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and 
the objects of sense, knowledge (Jndna) is produced. Soul with 
Nyaya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc. 
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, 
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as 
without it the different entities being without any principle of 
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction. 
Samkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an 
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their 
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, 
qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist 
between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived 
1 On the meaning of the word Mimamsa see Chapter :v. 



368 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three 
types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within 
them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, 
willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly 
and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collo 
cations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a 
phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another 
form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them 
merely a form of subtle illuminating matter-stuff. Samkhya holds 
however that there is a transcendent entity as pure conscious 
ness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact 
this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought- 
matter into conscious thought or experience of a person. 

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and 
separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly 
be demonstrated in our common sense experience ; and this has 
been pointed out by the Nyaya school in a very strong and 
emphatic manner. Even Samkhya did not try to prove that the 
existence of its transcendent purusa could be demonstrated in 
experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the 
existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of 
a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states 
of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle 
towards virtue and emancipation. Samkhya had first supposed 
knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and 
then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as 
purusa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here 
in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by 
the inadequate analysis of consciousness (buddht) as being non- 
intelligent and incessantly changing. 

Nyaya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self 
on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, 
and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis 
is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances 
and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature 
of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was 
a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance 
in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon 
the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their 
conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self- 



ix] Nyaya and Mtmamsa 369 

conscious thought. Of course it is true that Samkhya had ap 
proached nearer to this view than Nyaya, but it had separated 
the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it 
threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite 
unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem 
to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification 
of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this 
could not be done except by what may be regarded as a make 
shift a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless 
time. These difficulties occurred because Samkhya soared to a 
region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common 
sense experience. The Nyaya position is of course much worse 
as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve any 
thing, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could 
not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on 
a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common 
sense experience that substances are different from qualities and 
actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the 
whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, 
to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary 
that the importance of the self- revealing thought must be brought 
to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and 
an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. 
No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores 
the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is 
a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction 
is ushered in by the Mlmamsa system. The Mimamsd sutras 
were written by Jaimini and the commentary (bhdsya) on it was 
written by abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made 
by Kumarila, who preceded the great Sarikaracarya, and a disciple 
of Kumarila, Prabhakara. 

The Mlmamsa Literature. 

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew 
in India in the Brahmanas. This system once set up gradually 
began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details 
of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some 
generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of 
India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old 
rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition 

D. 24 



37o Mlmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smrti literature. Dis 
cussions and doubts became more common about the many 
intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries 
into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and 
priests. These represent the beginnings of Mlmamsa (lit. at 
tempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were 
different schools of this thought. That Jaimini s Mtmdmsd sutras 
(which are with us the foundations of Mlmamsa) are only a compre 
hensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from 
the references he gives to the views in different matters of other 
preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not 
available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has 
written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it 
may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so 
masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other 
attempts that were made before him. Jaimini s Mtmdmsd siifras 
were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work 
of the Mlmamsa system. Commentaries were written on it by 
various persons such as Bhartrmitra (alluded to in Nydyaratndkara 
verse 10 of Slokavdrttikd), Bhavadasa (Pratijhasutra 63), Hari and 
Upavarsa (mentioned in Sdstradlpikd). It is probable that at least 
some of these preceded abara, the writer of the famous com 
mentary known as the Sabara-bhasya. It is difficult to say any 
thing about the time in which he flourished. Dr Gariganatha 
Jha would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current 
verse which speaks of King Vikramaditya as being the son 
of ^abarasvamin by a Ksattriya wife. This bhasya of Sabara 
is the basis of the later Mlmamsa works. It was commented 
upon by an unknown person alluded to as Varttikakara by 
Prabhakara and merely referred to as " yathahuh " (as they say) 
by Kumarila. Dr Gahganatha Jha says that Prabhakara s com 
mentary Brhati on the Sabara- bhasya was based upon the work 
of this Varttikakara. This Brhati of Prabhakara had another 
commentary on it Rjuvimdld by alikanatha Misra, who also 
wrote a compendium on the Prabhakara interpretation of Ml 
mamsa called Prakaranapancikd. Tradition says that Prab 
hakara (often referred to as Nibandhakara), whose views are 
often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumarila. Ku 
marila Bhatta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior con 
temporary of Sarikara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent 



ix] Mlmamsa Literature 371 

exposition of Sahara s bhasya in three parts known as Sloka- 
vdrttika (dealing only with the philosophical portion of Sahara s 
work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as 
Tarkapada), Tantravdrttika (dealing with the remaining three 
chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and 
Tuptlkd (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books) 1 . 
Kumarila is referred to by his later followers as Bhatta, Bhatta- 
pada, and Varttikakara. The next great Mlmamsa scholar and 
follower of Kumarila was Mandana Misra, the author of Vidhi- 
viveka, Mlmdmsdnukramant and the commentator of Tantra- 
vdrttika,vi\\Q became later on converted by Sankara to Vedantism. 
Parthasarathi MisYa (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his Sdstradi- 
pikd, Tantraratna, and Nydyaratnamdld following the footprints 
of Kumarila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumarila, 
fhe names of Sucarita Mira the author of Kdsikd and SomesVara 
the author of Nydyasudhd deserve special notice. Ramakrsna 
Bhatta wrote an excellent commentary on the Tarkapdda of Sds- 
tradlpikd called the Yuktisnehapurani-siddhdnta-candrikd and 
Somanatha wrote his Mayukhamdlikd on the remaining chapters 
of Sdstradtpikd. Other important current MimamsS works which 
deserve notice are such as Nydyamdldvi stara of Madhava, Subo- 
dhim, Mimdmsdbdlaprakdsa of Sarikara Bhatta, Nydyakanikd of 
Vacaspati MiSra, Mimdmsdparibhdsa by Krsnayajvan, Mimdmsd- 
nydyaprakdsa by Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta s Bhattacintdmani, 
etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the 
writing of this chapter. The importance of the Mlmmsa litera 
ture for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties 
to be performed according to its maxims, but even the smrti 
literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals 
of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained 
by them. The legal side of the smrtis consisting of inheritance, 
proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even 
under the British administration is explained according to the 
Mlmamsa maxims. Its relations to the Vedanta philosophy will 
be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with Nyaya- 
VaiSesika have also been pointed out in various places of this 
chapter. The views of the two schools of Mlmamsa as propounded 
by Prabhakara and Kumarila on all the important topics have 

1 Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada &astri says, in his introduction to Six Buddhist 
Nyaya Tracts, that " Kumarila preceded Sankara by two generations." 

242 



372 Mtmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

also been pointed out. Prabhakara s views however could not 
win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that 
he was regarded by Kumarila as a very strong rival 1 . Hardly 
any new contribution has been made to the Mimamsa philosophy 
after Kumarila and Prabhakara. The Mimdmsd sutras deal mostly 
with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in 
connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be 
gleaned out of them. Sahara s contributions are also slight and 
vague. Varttikakara s views also can only be gathered from the 
references to them by Kumarila and Prabhakara. What we know 
of Mimamsa philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. 
It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the 
subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do 
not know of any work on Mimamsa written in English except 
the excellent one by Dr Gariganatha Jha on the Prabhakara 
Mimamsa to which I have frequently referred. 

The Paratah-pramanya doctrine of Nyaya and the 
Svatah-pramanya doctrine of Mimamsa. 

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah- 
prdntdnyd) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure 
of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certi 
tude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all know 
ledge excepting the action of remembering (smrtt) or memory is 
valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither 
depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other 
knowledge for its validity. But Nyaya holds that this self- 
validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. 
It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge 
is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this 
knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive 
anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this 
visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is 
true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge 

1 There is a story that Kumarila, not being able to convert Prabhakara, his own 
pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples 
then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to 
Rumania s views or Prabhakara s. Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous, 
but these were held by him only to rouse up Rumania s pointed attacks, whereas 
Rumania s views were the right ones. Rumarila then rose up and said that Prabhakara 
was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But 
this has of course no historic value. 



ix] Objections against the Self-validity of Knowledge 373 

it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and 
how can it certify the objective truth of its representation ? In 
other words, how can my perception " a blue thing " guarantee 
that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively 
as well ? After my perception of anything as blue we do not 
have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue 
is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot 
be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be cer 
tain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but 
there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object 
from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively 
valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify 
its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory know 
ledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should 
never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our per 
ceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the 
directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, 
which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the per 
ception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, 
every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal colloca 
tions, and as such depends upon them for its production, and 
hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. 
It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for 
validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and 
attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People 
only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically 
in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of 
a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with 
our perception we do not find anything that can serve the pur 
poses of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of 
knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the 
object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (arthakriyd- 
jiidna or phalajndna) just as perception or knowledge repre 
sented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of 
knowledge (svatah-prdmdnya), but validity is ascertained by 
samvdda or agreement with the objective facts of experience 1 . 

It is easy to see that this Nyaya objection is based on the 
supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective 
collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can 

1 See Nydyamanjari, pp. 160-173. 



374 M imams a Philosophy [CH. 

only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this 
theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis ; for it can never be 
experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations ; 
we have a perception and immediately we become aware of cer 
tain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the 
objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that 
the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis 
which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme 
prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a 
phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we 
say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external 
collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is un 
warranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the 
objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that 
knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is 
only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation 
to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is 
not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and 
interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in 
things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What 
we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the 
agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for ob 
jective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken 
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty 
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise in 
deed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but 
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this 
is never experienced ; we are never aware of any objective fact 
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes 
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for 
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and 
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by 
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts 
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is 
what is said to be the self-validity (svatah-prdmdnyci) of know 
ledge in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is pro 
duced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link 
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on 
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing 
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent 



ix] Self -validity of Knowledge 375 

of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well 
{svakdryakarane svatah pramdnyam jndnasya). Whenever there 
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is 
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work 
(pravrttt) according to its direction. There is no indecision in 
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correct 
ness of knowledge ; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with 
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases 
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which 
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not 
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear 
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we 
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed 
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which 
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man 
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction 
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper 
of mind. This is what Mlmamsa means when it says that the 
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though 
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other 
data (jndnasya pramdnyam svatah aprdmdnyam paratati). Know 
ledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory 
experience (bddhakajndna) comes in or when our organs etc. are 
known to be faulty and defective (karanadosajndnd). It is from 
these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when 
we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them 
not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of 
knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not 
be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find 
any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All 
knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently 
by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory 
is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon 
a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and 
cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself. 

The place of sense organs in perception. 

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it 
could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, 
the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in 



376 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the 
ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not 
afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore 
accepted the Nyaya view of sense-contact as a condition of know 
ledge with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of 
svatah-pramanya. It does not appear to have been conscious of 
a conflict between these two different principles of the production 
of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked 
at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts 
of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by 
virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a 
matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge 
are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but 
when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses 
must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to 
be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one 
knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or know 
ledge as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence 
of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the 
physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be 
operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only in 
ferred later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic 
of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge 
which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later 
on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it. 
Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects 
may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the 
rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us 
as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand. 

Prabhakara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of 
the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are 
phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always 
in the same manner.for these vary differently at different moments ; 
the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus 
be regarded as the material cause (samavdyikdrand) ; but there 
must be some such movements or other specific associations 
(asamavayikdrana) which render the production of this or 
that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist 
either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the 
colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which 



ix] Sense-contact and Perception 377 

is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which 
form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause it 
self (e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a 
substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial 
cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put 
in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is 
eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that 
the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must 
inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again 
accepting the Nyaya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities 
in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some 
other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul 
acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. 
Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in 
other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are 
three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and 
space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. 
Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise 
of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind 
of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. 
This atom may be called manas (mind). This manas alone by 
itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, 
effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid 
of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot 
lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities ; hence 
it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized 
by these qualities ; for the cognition of colour, the mind will 
need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic 
quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous 
characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know 
that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must 
be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light, 
and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye for the cogni 
tion of colour ; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly 
organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the 
akasic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of 
touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these 
organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have 
to be admitted, (i) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the 
sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas 



378 Mlmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The 
objects of perception are of three kinds,(i) substances, (2) qualities, 
(3) jati or class. The material substances are tangible objects of 
earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic 
states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste, 
smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, dis 
junction, priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and 
effort 1 . 

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that 
Kumarila Bhatta was rather undecided as to the nature of the 
senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that 
the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or 
activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things 
without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might 
be entities which actually come in contact with their objects 8 , and 
he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory. 

Indeterminate and determinate perception. 

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first 
stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa 
(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its per 
ception at the first moment of the association of the senses and 
their objects. Thus Kumarila says that the cognition that appears 
first is a mere dlocana or simple perception, called non-determinate 
pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling 
the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around 
himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is 
presented to consciousness ; all that is present there is the 
individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate 
perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist 
view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality 
(svalaksana) and regards it as being the only valid element in 
perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary 

1 See Prakaranapaftcikd, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ganganatha Jha s Prabhakarami- 
mdmsd, pp. 35 etc. 

y Slokavarttika, see Pratyaksasutra, 40 etc., and Nyayaratnakara on it. It may be 
noted in this connection that Samkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyaya that the senses 
actually went out to meet the objects (prdpyakdritva) but held that there was a special 
kind of functioning (vt ttt) by virtue of which the senses could grasp even such distant 
objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the 
objects. The nature of this vrtti is not further clearly explained and Parthasarathi objects 
to it as being almost a different category (tattvantara). 



ix J Indeterminate and Determinate Perception 379 

impositions. But both Kumarila and Prabhakara think that both 
the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate 
stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because 
we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in 
contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or 
differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in 
comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well- 
defined characters ; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a 
class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features 
in common with some other things ; so we see that as other things 
are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept 
at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an 
individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the 
characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are per 
ceived at the indeterminate stage 1 . So long as other things are not 
remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and 
hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first 
stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past im 
pressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones 
and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It 
is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate 
and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case 
memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory 
in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of 
memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the 
determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet 
since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not 
enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as 
a valid cognition. Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in 
holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception 
valid 8 . 

Some Ontological Problems connected with the 
Doctrine of Perception. 

The perception of the class (jdli) of a percept in relation to 
other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference 
between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The pro 
blems of jati and avayavavayavl (part and whole notion) were 

1 Compare this with the Vai^esika view as interpreted by Sridhara. 

2 See PrakaranapaftcikA and Sditradipikfi. 



380 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before enter 
ing into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the 
problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). He argues as 
an exponent of svatah-pramanyavada that the proof of the true 
existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own con 
sciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness 
must be admitted to have its existence established. Following 
this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist, 
since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material 
cause and their connection (samyoga) is the immaterial cause 
(asamavayik&rana), and it is the latter which renders the whole 
altogether different from the parts of which it is composed ; and 
it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the 
whole is perceived. Kumarila holds that it is due to the point of 
view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate 
whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are iden 
tical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing 
appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it 
from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing 
appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see Slokavdrttika^ 
Vanavddd) 1 . 

Jati, though incorporating the idea of having many units within 
one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides 
in its entirety in each individual constituting that jati (vydsajya- 

1 According to Samkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and 
the particular (samanyavifesasamuddyo dravyam, Vyasabhasya^ 111.44); for there is no 
other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere 
as Nyaya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts 
exist at a distance from one another (e. g. a forest), and those in which they exist close to 
gether (nirantara hi tadavayavah}^ and it is this latter combination (ayutasiddhavayava) 
which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts ; 
it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between 
them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Panditas"oka has shown did 
not believe in any whole (avayavi) ; it is the atoms which in connection with one 
another appeared as a whole occupying space {paramanava eva hi pararupadefapari- 
harenotpannah parasparasahita avabhasamana desavitdnavanto bhavanti). The whole 
is thus a mere appearance and notareality (stz Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya 
Tracts}. Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless (niravayava) and hence it 
would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence 
of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and 
there is no valid reason against it : 

adustakaranodbh Uta manavirbh utabddhakam 
asandigdanca vijiianam katham mithyeti kathyate." 

Nyayamanjari, pp. 550 ff. 



ix] Jati and Samavaya 381 

vrtli\ but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the 
argument that jati should be denied, because it involves the concep 
tion of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The 
class character or jati exists because it is distinctly perceived by 
us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal 
in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even 
when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new in 
dividual of that class (e.g. cow class) comes into being, a new 
relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is 
brought into relation with the class-character existing in other 
individuals; for inherence (samavdyd) according to Prabhakara 
is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced 
and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is 
non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyaya 
holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of 
things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the 
class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that in 
dividual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of 
class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With 
the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new 
relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the class- 
character or jati has no separate existence apart from the indivi 
duals as Nyaya supposes. Apprehension of jati is essentially 
the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to 
other similar things of that class by the perception of the common 
characteristics. But Prabhakara would not admit the existence of 
a highest genus satta (being) as acknowledged by Nyaya. He 
argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended be 
cause we find that the individuals of a class possess some common 
characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate 
things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate 
jati as satta, as demanded by the naiyayikas. That all things are 
said to be sat (existing) is more or less a word or a name without 
the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our ex 
perience always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we 
can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or 
being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When 
we speak of a thing as sat, we do not mean that it is possessed 
of any such class-characters as satta (being) ; what we mean 
is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarii- 



382 Mtmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

pasattd. Thus the Nyaya view of perception as taking only the 
thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc. (sanmdtra-visayam 
pratyaksam) is made untenable by Prabhakara, as according to 
him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According 
to Rumania however jati is not something different from the 
individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived. 
Kumarila S view of jati is thus similar to that held by Samkhya, 
namely that when we look at an individual from one point of 
view (jati as identical with the individual), it is the individual that 
lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jati be 
comes latent, but when we look at it from another point of view 
(the individual as identical with jati) it is the jati which presents 
itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent. 
The apprehension as jati or as individual is thus only a matter 
of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look 
at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jati, Kumarila 
holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is dis 
tinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, 
but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves 
(Slokavdrttika, Pratyaksasutra^ 149, 150, abheddt samavdydstu 
svarupam dharmadharminoti), Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara 
that jati is perceived by the senses (tatraikabuddhinirgrdhyd 
jdtirindriyagoca.ro). 

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of 
Prabhakara we find that the category of visesa admitted by the 
Kanada school is not accepted as a separate category by the 
Mimamsa on the ground that the differentiation of eternal 
things from one another, for which the category of viSesa is 
admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary 
qualities of these things. The quality of prthaktva or specific 
differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they 
constitute, can very well serve the purposes of visesa. 

The nature of knowledge. 

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the 
knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether 
perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal 
the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self 
is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be re 
garded as perception from the point of view of self. The division 



ix] Self-revealing Character of Knowledge 383 

of the pramanas as pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference), 
etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with 
reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within 
the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining 
or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have 
knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the 
remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (samvid) that reveals 
by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects. 
It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of 
knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they 
are said to reveal ; and if they have the same form we may rather 
say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mlmamsa 
answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the 
cognized were not different from one another, they could not 
have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is 
by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The 
cognition (samvedana) of a person simply means that such a 
special kind of quality (dharma) has been manifested in the 
self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to 
a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cog 
nition is that with reference to which the active operation of the 
self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely form 
less, for they have the cognitional character by which things are 
illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than 
this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are 
believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal 
to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to 
objects that were perceived previously, and of which the im 
pressions were left in the mind and were aroused by the 
unseen agency (adrsta). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of 
remembrance of that which was previously experienced. Only 
such of the impressions of cognized objects are roused in dreams 
as can beget just that amount of pleasurable or painful experience, 
in accordance with the operation of adrsta, as the person deserves 
to have in accordance with his previous merit or demerit. 

The Prabhakara Mlmamsa, in refuting the arguments of those 
who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized 
by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we 
do not experience any such double cognition and also because it 
would lead us to a regressus ad infinitum, for if a second cognition 



384 Mtmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third 
and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, 
then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course un 
known to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and 
reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the 
illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this self- 
cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred 
and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the 
presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be 
apprehended by perception (pratyaksa). Prabhakara draws a 
subtle distinction between perceptuality (samvedyatva) and being 
object of knowledge (prameyatva). A thing can only be appre 
hended (samvedyate) by perception, whereas inference can only 
indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the 
object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other 
cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence 
of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself 1 . 

Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding that per 
ception is never the object of another perception and that it ends 
in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he 
says that every perception involves a relationship between the 
perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as 
the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cog 
nition. This is indeed different from the Prabhakara view, that 
in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and 
the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine oi 
triputlpratyaksd) 2 . 

The Psychology of Illusion, 

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are 
valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot 
be regarded as valid ? The problem of illusory perception and 
its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian 
philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called 
satkhydti which we have described before, and of the Vedantists, 
which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three 
different theories of illusion, viz. (i) atmakhydti, (2) viparitakhydti 
or anyathdkhyati, and (3) akhydti of the Mlmamsa school. The 

1 See Prabhdkaramimamsa, by Dr Gariganatha Jha. 

2 loc. cit. pp. 26-28. 



ix] Buddhist and Nyaya Doctrine of Illusion 385 

viparltakhyati or anyathakhyati theory of illusion is accepted by 
the Nyaya, Vaiesika and the Yoga, the akhyati theory by 
Mlmamsa and Samkhya and the atmakhyati by the Buddhists. 

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is 
the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece 
of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced 
by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard 
to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny 
the existence of the external world and think that there are only 
the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of 
past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so 
also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge 
which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account 
of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates 
sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong 
perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so- 
called external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did 
exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right 
perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge 
creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This 
is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory per 
ception. Nyaya objects to the above view, and says that if 
knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon 
itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception 
ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver." 
Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false 
hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming 
from outside and that the external as such does not exist. 

The viparltakhyati or the anyathakhyati theory supposes that 
the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we 
do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished 
from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the 
conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere 
is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In 
illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is 
not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it 
is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it 
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before 
that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as 
silver. This school agrees with the akhyati school that the fact 

D. 25 



386 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of 
illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough 
to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite 
positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of 
silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us. 

The akhyati theory of Mimamsa holds that since the special 
peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous 
to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as 
the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cog 
nized at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the 
features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the per- 
ceiver fails to apprehend the difference between these two things, 
and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain 
weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the 
common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended, 
and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past 
time that has appeared before him is not perceived ; and it is as 
a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the 
silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion 
takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a 
dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is 
different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a 
matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the 
difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of 
the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception 
appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real 
valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on 
the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver 
would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case 
of a real perception. Kumarila agrees with this view as expounded 
by Prabhakara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as 
valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any 
real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that 
does not matter, for it is admitted in Mimamsa that when later 
experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate 
the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its 
production 1 . It is easy to see that the Mimamsa had to adopt 
this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition 
at the moment of its production is valid. The akhyati theory 

1 See Prakaranapancikd, Sastradipika, and Slokavdrttika, sutra i. 



ix] Inference 387 

tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any 
positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non- 
apprehension due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that 
though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cog 
nition, is made up of two elements, the present perception and 
memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually 
present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of 
any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cogni 
tion is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also, 
as in the case " Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived 
is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this 
perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of 
the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of ap 
prehension involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded 
as self-valid as any other cognition. 

Inference. 

Sabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation 
has been known to exist between two things, we can have the 
idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind 
of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this 
tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice 
that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) 
subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some inde 
pendent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend 
upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also neces 
sary that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third 
thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of 
one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the 
other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire), 
though including all the cases of the existence of the other 
(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter 
(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether 
it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of 
the constellation of Krttika with RohinI, where, by the rise of the 
former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of 
identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or 
a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and 
a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of 
cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming 

252 



388 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the 
one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the 
existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all 
such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending 
beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called 
gamya or vydpaka and the other (e.g. smoke) vydpya or gamaka 
and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill, 
the paksa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be 
inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the 
gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is 
fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case 
of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent 
relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a 
third thing (e.g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only 
in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place 
where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory 
that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka 
thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that 
the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also. 
Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception 
and not from any universal general proposition. Kumarila holds 
that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major 
and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of 
fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was 
known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the pos 
sessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated 
and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new 
knowledge (desakdlddhikyddyuktamagrhitagrdhitvam anumdna- 
sya, Nyayaratnakara, p. 363 )\ It should also be noted that in 
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things, 
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered 
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough 
that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was 
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomit 
ance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances 
in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an 

1 It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila was indebted to 
Dinnaga for this ; for Dinnaga s main contention is that " it is not fire, nor the con 
nection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred " for otherwise 
inference would give us no new knowledge (see Vidyabhiisana s Indian Logic, p. 87 
and Tatparyatika, p. 120. 



ix] Inference 389 

absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a 
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for 
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation 1 . The ex 
perience of a large number of particular cases in which any two 
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some 
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure 
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the 
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist 
in exactly the same relation 2 . In those cases where the circle of 
the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the exist 
ence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. 
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases 
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of 
coexistence as well. 

The question arises that if no inference is possible without 
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity 
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not re 
garded as self-valid. To this Rumania s answer is that memory 
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramana, as it does 
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the 
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coex 
istence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, 
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya 
in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the 
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not 
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the 
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all. 

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the ex 
plicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others 
(pdrdrthdnumdna) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three 
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three 
premisses pratijfta, hetu and drstanta may quite serve the purpose 
of an anumana. 

There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila 
viz. pratyaksatodrstasambandha and samanyatodrstasambandha. 
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent 

1 Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyaptt) is ascer 
tained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones. 

2 " tasmadanavagatipisarvatranvaye saruataSca vyatireke bahuSah sahityavagama- 
matradeva vyabhicaradarfanasanathadanumanotpattirangikartavyah. " NyayaratnA- 
kara, p. 288. 



390 Mimamsa Philosophy [CH. 

relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and 
fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where 
the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete 
things but between two general notions, as in the case of move 
ment and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is 
change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the 
change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held 
that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals 1 . 
Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the 
permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact 
that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) 
is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both 
subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation be 
tween two things is the main point, whereas in all other associa 
tions of time and place the things in which these two subsist 
together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things 
(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that 
though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the 
concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and abso 
lute 2 . When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that 
the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the 
presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any 
smoke is seen. Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the 
minor (paksdbhdsa), of the enunciation (pratijnabhasa) and of 
the example (drstdntdbhdsa) along with the fallacies of the middle 
and this seems to indicate that the Mimamsa logic was not alto 
gether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke 
includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there 
would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential 
cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhakara, 
for he does not admit that a pramana should necessarily bring 
us any new knowledge, for pramana is simply defined as "appre 
hension." So though the inferential cognition always pertains to 
things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramana, 
since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension. 

1 See Slokavdrttika, Nyayaratnakara, Saslradipika, Yiiktisnehapurani, Sid.dha.n- 
tacandrikii on anumana. 

2 On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (upadhi) 
which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that 
where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot be 
discovered we must say that it does not exist (prayatnenanvisyamane aupadhikatva- 
navagamat, see Prakaranapancika, p. 71). 



ix] Upamana and Arthapatti 391 

Upamana, Arthapatti. 

Analogy (upamana} is accepted by Mlmamsa in a sense which 
is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who 
has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox 
(gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with 
the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is riot 
within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. The 
cognition of this similarity of the gavaya in the go, as it follows 
directly from the perception of the similarity of the go in the 
gavaya, is called upamana (analogy). It is regarded as a sepa 
rate pramana, because by it we can apprehend the similarity 
existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is 
not mere remembrance, for at the time the go was seen the 
gavaya was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, 
and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference 
of Prabhakara and Kumarila on this point is that while the 
latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting, in the fact 
of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the 
former regards it as a distinct category. 

Arthapatti (implication) is a new pramana which is admitted 
by the Mlmamsa. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta 
is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot re 
concile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being 
in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside 
the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Deva 
datta outside the house is called arthdpatti (presumption or 
implication). 

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this artha- 
patti cognition is a matter on which Prabhakara and Kumarila 
disagree. Prabhakara holds that when a man knows that Deva 
datta habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him 
there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired 
previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and 
the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his 
house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause 
of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Deva 
datta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain 
somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, 
without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed. 
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for 



392 Mlmamsa Philosophy [CH. 

making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he 
might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and 
also that he was not at home ; this perception of his absence from 
home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is 
living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there cre