Indications of the creator. Extracts, bearing upon theology, from the History and the Philosophy of the inductive sciences

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Indications

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INDICATIONS OF THE CREATOR

EXTEACTS,
BEARING UPON THEOLOGY,

FROM

THE HISTORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.

By WILLIAM VVHEWELL, D.D..

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE,

AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHV IN THE

l^NIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
JOHN W. PARKER, AVEST STRAND.

M.DCCC.XLVI.

DEDICATION.

TO

WILLIAM SMYTH, Esquire,

PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF CAMBRIDGE.

My dear Professor Smyth,

I KNOW that you have always felt a peculiar
interest in the contemplation of Indications of the
Creator, drawn from the Creation in which we live,
and from the Philosophy which we are led to frame
concerning it : and I think that you will be pleased
to see a contribution to this train of thought offered
at the present moment. It will be a gratification
to me, if, in publishing it, I am allowed to inscribe
it to you.

One who, like myself, has for many years
enjoyed your friendship, and witnessed your influ-
ence in this University, may well rejoice at having
an opportunity of offering an open tribute of admi-
ration and regard to the virtues and kindly affections

a2

4 DEDICATION.

by which we have so long profited ; and of express-
ing his gratitude for the pleasure and instruction
you have so long diffused among us. And I am
happy to be able to add that, now, the wider
public also has, in your published Lectures, the
means of judging of our obligations to you. All
may there see that you have, throughout your
labours, been zealous and consistent in inculcating
those principles of justice and mutual forbearance, of
moral purpose in political designs, and moderation
in political action, which, so far as they prevail, make
the world of human history a more visible represen-
tation of the will of its Divine Ruler.

That you may long enjoy the recollection of
these your past benefits to us, and of our gratitude
to you, is the cordial wish and prayer of,

My dear Professor Smyth,

Your affectionate Friend,

W. WHEWELL.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
Feb. 14, 1845.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Preface to the Second Edition 7

First Edition 31

ASTRONOMY.

The Copernican System 45

The Nebular Hypothesis 52

PHYSIOLOGY.

Recognition of Final Causes in Physiology 64

The Plans of Animal Forms 60

Use of Final Causes in Physiology 73

Question of the Transmutation of Species 97

Hypothesis of Progressive Tendencies 101

GEOLOGY.
The Question of Creation as related to Science 106

6 CONTENTS.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY.

The Idea of Final Causes 116

PAGK

PAL^TTOLOGY.

Nature of Palaetiology 140

Doctrine of Catastrophes and of Uniformity 147

Relation of Tradition to Palaetiology 167

Of the Conception of a First Cause 194

Of the Supreme Cause 206

PREFACE

THE SECOND EDITION,

In the Preface to the First Edition of these Ex-
tracts, I have stated that they were published in
the hope of interesting many persons who would
be unlikely to read the History and the PJiilosophy
of Science, from which they are taken. At the
present day, when the opinions and conjectures of
men of science are so widely circulated among gene-
ral readers, it is highly desirable that such readers
should also receive the lessons which are taught
by a survey of the whole field of science. And
though it is difficult to convey effectually, in any
summary way, lessons which are the result of a
long study of history and philosophy, I trusted that
on some important points warnings might be given
which might not be without their use.

It appeared especially important, at the present
time, to teach this lesson : — that, according to the
best scientific views hitherto obtained, the Origin
of Man, and the Origin of Life upon the earth,
were events of a different order from the common

8 PREFACE TO THE

course of nature. The Origin of Man is the Origin
of Language, of Law, of Social Relations, of In-
tellectual and Social and Moral Progress ; and
though in all these characteristics of humanity we
can trace a constant series of changes and move-
ments, we can discern in them no evidence of a
beginning homogeneous with the present order of
changes. If Science does not positively teach that
man was placed upon the earth by a special act
of his Creator, she at least shews no difficulty in
the way of such a belief. She leaves us free to
hold that the placing of man upon the earth was
not an ordinary step in the natural course of the
world ; but an extraordinary step, the beginning
of a providential and moral course of the world.
She negatives the doctrine that men grew out of
apes, that language is the necessary developement
of the jabbering of such creatures, and reason the
product of their conflicting appetites.

This appeared to me to be the result of the
sciences which trace backwards the history of nature
and of man. In order to speak of such sciences
collectively, I applied to them a single term, and
called them Palcetiological sciences. I explained as
distinctly as I could, (p. 140 of this volume) that
I used this term merely to describe a class of exist-

SECOND EDITION. 9

ing sciences ; and that I so termed them, because
they seek to ascend to an ancient condition of things
by the study of present causes. Yet a modern
writer* has so strangely misunderstood me as to
say, that I call them so because in all these sciences
we have to seek for an ancient and different class
of causes from any which are now operating. When
an ingenious person, specially concerned in the im-
port of the passage, could make such a mistake, T
fear some of my other readers may also have fallen
into a like confusion of thought. Yet the differ-
ence of the two statements seems to require but
a small effort of attention to catch it. I say, that,
as I read the lessons of science, the existing causes
that lead us backward, do not lead us to the
beginning ; this writer makes me say, that, because
it is the beginning, we are not to try to reach it
by existing causes, but are to seek a different class.
I say that if we try we fail. He makes me say we
ought not to try. I say that an impassable abyss
separates us from the origin of things ; but he
makes me give this as a gratuitous assumption^
whereas I really state it as the general residt of
scientific investigations. I have, in the works re-

* Erphmatinns : A Sequel to Vestiges of the Natural History of
Creation, p. 127.

a5

10

PREFACE TO THE

ferred to, given an account of many of the trains
of investigation on which I found this opinion. I
could have given more, if the plan of my work
had allowed me to refer to the History of Nations.
The writer does not reply to my facts taken from
the history of science. He does not answer my
arguments respecting uniformitarian doctrines in
general*. He throws himself, for support in his
opinions, upon the successive movements by which
geological theories have, as he thinks, tended to-
wards the uniformitarian view ; and he refers to
these movements, and to their bearing upon my
views, in a way which shews that he has not taken
the trouble to understand what I have said. " Had
Dr. Whewell been writing fifty years ago,'' he says,
" he would of course have included among his
palsetiological sciences the formation of strata and
the intrusions of the granitic and trappean among
the aqueous rocks, which ingenuity has since ex-
plained." Since geology is one of the palaetiological
sciences, whenever I had written, I should have
spoken of the researches here described, as palae-
tiological ; and I call them so now, as any reader
of those parts of my works where the term is used
may see.

* p. 147 of this.

SECOND EDITION. 11

But the passage just quoted involves, in its
purport, the main argument by which this writer
supports his doctrine of uniformity in the course
of nature through all ages ; namely, this — that be-
cause phenomena, which at one time seemed to be
exceptions to the uniform course of nature, are
sometimes, at a subsequent time, explained by the
ingenuity of men of science, so as to fall in with
the action of known causes, therefore we may assume
known causes as absolutely and without exception
containing in themselves an explanation of the phe-
nomena of the universe.

This doctrine does, in fact, erect the collection
of natural processes, which are assumed by the writer
as known, into a complete Theory of the Universe ;
excluding all supernatural intervention of Creative
Power, and even all those parts of the ordinary
course of Providence which are at present unknown
to man. Arbitrary and dangerous as this doctrine
is, it is presented in phrases extremely likely to
recommend it to the general reader. It is termed
a " System of Universal Order ;" and is represented
as identical with the belief that God, the Author
of the Universe, acts by fixed and general laws.

Yet a moment's attention will shew us that the
System to which I refer is very improperly described

12 PREFACE TO THE

by merely calling it a System of Order : for it does
not merely assert Order in general, but a specified
and determinate Order, collected by the Author from
the combination of the results, real or supposed,
of various sciences. For the purpose of making in-
telligible the discussions respecting it, the System
ought to be described as a System of Order in
which life grows out of dead matter^ the higher out
of the loioer animals^ and man out of brutes.

When an acceptance of this System is represented
as identical with a belief that the Creator of the
Universe acts by general laws ; we are to recollect
that those who reject this System do not at all
the less on that account believe that the Creator
acts by general laws ; but they do not believe that
the writer in question is able to tell them what
those laws are, as he professes to be.

To take, for instance, one of the laws asserted
by the author of the '^ Vestiges ;'" — the develope-
ment of animal life through successive stages, and
the generation of the higher forms of such life from
the lower ; — those who disbelieve that doctrine are
not, on that account, to be supposed to be blind to
the wonderful order and harmony, the gradations
and connexions, which run througli the forms of
animal life, and enable the anatomist and physiolo-

SECOND EDITION. 13

gist to pass in thought, calong an unbroken hue,
from the rudest and simplest organic germs to the
most completely developed animal structure. Nor
do they doubt that this spectacle of analogies and
resemblances impUes the existence of laws in the*
mind of the Creator, according to which he has
proceeded in the work of Creation. But they can-
not go onwards, with the writer of the ^'Vestiges,"
from resemblance to sequence, and from sequence
to causation. They cannot venture to say that
animals followed one another upon the earth in the
order of their anatomical resemblances ; and that
their anatomical differences grew out of each other
naturally by general laws. They see plainly that
each animal, so far as its structure is fully displayed
to us, is constructed with a view to its mode of life.
They see that there is a purpose in the organization
of animals. They dwell upon the manifestations of
this purpose, rather than upon those views of gradual
and necessary causation which seem to exclude the
notion of purpose ; which have been urged as ex-
cluding that notion*; and which to the greatest
physiologists and zoologists have appeared in the
highest degree doubtful and obscure ; while the
conception of a purpose in organization has ap-

* See p. 79 of this volume.

14 PREFACE TO THE

peared to the same class of scientific men in the
highest degree evident and clear. They see abun-
dant Vestiges of causation and connexion in the
universe ; but they also see indisputable evidence
of design, combined with connexions which we cannot
comprehend, and a causation beyond visible causa-
tion. They think that science does not destroy this
evidence, but, on the contrary, confirms it, and thus
offers to us, everywhere, Indications of the Creator.

In order further to explain the difference of
opinion which I wish to point out, let us suppose
some great sovereign to found a city upon a noble
scale, laying it out in streets and markets and
squares and gardens, designing and building halls
of justice and temples, palaces and manufactories,
shops and private dwellings. Let it be supposed,
too, that the founder has in his mind some special
style of architecture, so deeply imprinted that all
the edifices which he designs, great and small, public
and private, bear traces of this style, and have
resemblances in their elements, construction and de-
coration. We know that this may be so ; — that
the spirit of connexion and consistency in some
architectural styles is so deep and pervasive that
it breaks out in every part. Thus, in a city so
built, it is probable that every part would be recog-

SECOND EDITION. 15

nizable by an architectural eye ; and after any in-
terval of ages, the skilful antiquary would be able
to point out the marks of the all-pervading style,
and to shew common features in the workshop
and the palace, a connexion in masonry between
the cottage and the court. But if we suppose a
spectator thus able to discover resemblance and con-
nexion in the parts of the city, what should we
think of his wisdom, if, on the strength of such
resemblances, he were to maintain that all the dif-
ferent kinds of buildings had, in the history of the
city, grown out of some original form of mansion
by gradual steps ; — if he were to hold that the
site was first occupied by a few cottages, and that
these multiplied, extended, coalesced, retaining in
their masonry and structure the traces of their
origin, and thus become the great and well-built
city? Still more, what should we think of him,
if he were to teach that it was rejecting a " System
of Order" in archaeology, to believe that the tri-
bunals, and markets, and public walks, and religious
edifices, had been originally constructed with a view
to their special uses? It appears to me that such
a doctrine in archaeology would correspond to that
" System of Order" in physiology, which makes the
higher forms of animal life grow out of the lower.

16 PREFACE TO THE

We who reject that system are not blind to the
traces of connexion in the various parts of his work
which the great Architect has left ; but we cannot,
on that account, give up the behef that the founda-
tion of this our city was a special act. We can
the less abandon this belief, inasmuch as we connect
with it the behef that the Founder of the city has
also given us laws for our conduct; and has not
left us to guide ourselves by considering how the
city grew up of itself ;_if indeed there be any
means of guidance supphed by such consideration.

As I have said, the main argument offered in
support of the "system of order" propounded in the
Vestiges is, that many difficulties which seemed to
lie in the way of this System have already been
removed by the progress of science. And therefore
the author, identifying those who reject his system
with those who reject the idea of universal order
altogether, speaks of his opponents as taking refuge
in nooks into which light has not fully penetrated*,
with other hke phrases. Perhaps the most curious
example of this identification of the very essence
of law with his special hypothesis, is his findino-
one of the main supports of his system in the well-

E,r plana lions, p. 27.

SECOND EDITION. l7

known facts that, in large masses of population
under given conditions, the proportion of births and
deaths, the rate of the growth of the human frame,
the number of criminals, the effect of education, and
the like, are fixed quantities, and may be determined
numerically. That the average amount of each of
such quantities, in the long run and upon a large
scale, is very steady, has long been a familiar fact ;
and every thinking man has collected, from this
steadiness, that there is a definite relation between
such effects and their causes. But what has this
undoubted truth to do with such fanciful and pre-
carious hypotheses as those of the Vestiges 9 Yet
the author treats this truth as if it were a new and
extraordinary confirmation of his views. '' It is to
M. Quetelet, of Brussels," he says*, "that we are
indebted for the first satisfactory exphcation of this
o-reat truth.'' The work of M. Quetelet, to which

o

he refers, is one of great interest and value ; but
1 think it could never have been pressed into such
a service as this, except by a person desirous to
bring together, as the materials of his system, all
scientific novelties ; and sharing in the vulgar de-
lusion that numbers and curves, applied to the

Explanations, p. 24.

18 PREFACE TO THE

expression of probable truths, make them approach
to mathematical certainty.

Nor can I discover any sense, except this same
identification of all stable laws with his own hypo-
thesis, in the author's concluding remarks : when
he says*, " The entire conduct of a large portion
of society, and more or less that of nearly all the
rest, is regulated, or rather cast loose from all regu-
lation, by the want of definite ideas regarding that
fixed plan of the divine working, on the study and
observance of which it is evident that our secular
happiness nearly altogether depends." He pursues
this subject at some length ; but the only meaning
connected with his special views which I can assign
to his language is, that men err in the conduct of
life from an ignorance of the laws of nature ; and
that a knowledge of the laws of nature is an assent
to his hypothesis. Yet I am quite unable to per-
ceive what light is thrown by his system on the
rules of human conduct with regard to the points
to which he refers, — disease, contagion, poverty,
" unlimited acquisitiveness," with consequent discon-
tent and crime, national degradation and misery
arising from war, and the like. Men know, and

* E'i'phinations, p, 182.

SECOND EDITION. 19

have long known, that in all such matters, their
well-being depends in a great measure upon their
own conduct ; and physical science has told them
some of the truths which should guide them in their
determinations on such matters ; though to the stock
of their guiding truths, physical science has con-
tributed but a small proportion. But I do not
see that the system before us, even if it were true,
would contribute any thing to man^s guidance. Cer-
tainly men have not waited for the appearance of
a theory which makes them the descendants of a
baboon or a chimpanzee, to learn that their secular
happiness depends mainly on their own conduct, and
that they are the subjects of a Universal Sovereign,
who governs by stedfast laws. They know that
they live in a System of Order, in the highest and
most solemn sense ; and it sounds to them most
strange, to hear men talking as if the essence of
this Order consisted in life growing out of dead
matter, the higher animals out of the lower, and
man out of brutes.

Hence we cannot but look upon it as an in-
stance of curious audacity, when this writer adopts
and uses the expressions which imply such a System
of Order as thoughtful men have hitherto commonly
believed. In the new system, these expressions

20 PREFACE TO THE

must strike every reader as strangely incongruous
and unintelligible. The belief in a Moral Order,
regulated by Moral Laws, under a Moral Gover-
nor ; — in a Providential, as something beyond a
mere Natural Order; — this belief does indeed lead
us to speak of " *the disgrace of trouble and of
trespass,*' — of "fsorrov^s and of glories number-
less,"*' — and may give us rest in the faith that
" J we are part of an assured system of benevolence
and justice, and that having faith in this we are
safe.'" But what connexion is there between such
convictions, and the belief in a System of Order which
makes men grow out of brutes by natural causes,
and recognizes no Providential History of the world ?
What are ^' trespass'"* and '' faith,'' what is '' jus-
tice," what '' glories" are held before us, on this
system ? And when this writer has told us that
his system points to a state of things in which all
human agency and human virtue shall have sunk
into the past, where does he leave his disciples
ground for what he at the same time tells them ;
that "^the faith may not be shaken, that that
which has been endowed with the power of godlike
thought, and allowed to come into communion with
its Eternal Author, cannot truly be lost f

Ex'ptanations,-p.\n7. fPlBH. ± Ibid. § P. 188.

SECOND EDITION. 21

Doubtless we rejoice that any one clings to
these convictions, even when they are most incon-
sistent with his " happy hypotheses ; " and we see,
in this tenacity, an evidence that such convictions
have a truth in human nature which cannot easily
be shaken by any rash and wanton wandering of
thought. But in the abrupt and incoherent man-
ner in which these expressions of natural piety are
appended to a collection of wild and fantastical
doctrines, repudiated by all those who are best
able to judge of them, we see how utterly false is
the pretension of this system, not only to add
anything to the abundant grounds of belief on such
subjects which we already possess, but even to bring
itself into harmony with such a belief, by any con-
tinuation of those views of connexion which are its
boast and its only recommendation to the minds
of the most credulous.

It may be said, if the hypothesis of creation
put forwards in the Vestiges be not the true one,
what then is ? To this question, men of real science
do not venture to return an answer. And in this
their reserve, the author of the hypothesis has his
great advantage. But then, it is to be recollected
that this is an advantage which he has in common
with all the authors of positive cosmogonies and

22 PREFACE TO THE

complete systems of the universe who have ever
existed. It is an advantage v^^hich he has in com-
mon with the Cartesian assertors of the system of
vortices ; with Lucretius and the other assertors
of the Epicurean system of atoms ; and even with
the boldest of the alchemists and astrologers. All
these persons, in their turn, have put forward large
and comprehensive schemes, full of striking turns
of ingenuity, and proffering explanations of many
things in the universe which the more cautious
philosophy of the teachers of genuine science could
not explain. All these might have asked, and in-
deed often did ask, If ours be not the true cosmo-
gony, ours the true Order of the Universe, what is?
If you accept not our views, you reject the only
system which even pretends to exhibit a Universal
Order. The question lies, they might have said,
still with the author of the Vestiges^, not between
two philosophical theories, but between one philo-
sophical theory, and a broken and obscure view of
nature. And these large and bold theorists, the

* Explanatio7is, p. 181. The author says, " between one philo-
sophical theory, and a view of nature which does not even profess to
look to nature for a basis." But as I cannot see the meaning of this
language as applied to doctrines different from his own, even on his
own views, I have altered it so as to shew what I suppose to be
meant,

SECOND EDITION. 28

Cartesian or the Epicurean or the Astrologer or
the Alchemist, might, without the smallest difficulty,
have dealt with the men of science of their time
as the author of the Vestiges deals with the greatest
men of ours, — Cuvier, Agassiz, Owen, and others.
They might have replied, Each of these men is fal-
lible; and might perhaps have pointed out mistakes
of each ; and on this ground they might have refused
to acknowledge the authority of such men when
it was adverse. They might have appealed, as this
author does, from men of science to the world at
large, as free from the partial views, and prejudices,
and timidity of men who have made science their
business*.

Since, as I have endeavoured to show in the
following pages, the chain of existing causes does
not, in any case, conduct us back to its origin ; —
not in the history of the mass of the earth, nor of its
strata, nor of animal life, nor of man ; — I must
necessarily confess that we cannot obtain from science
a complete view of the history of the universe. That
human reason should be thus unable to fathom and
comprehend the acts of the Creator and Governor
of the world, is no surprize nor humiliation to me ;

* E applanations, pp. 175, 176.

24 PREFACE TO THE

and I think that those do well who learn, from the
study of the sciences, this lesson of humility. But
the writer of the Vestiges is impatient of this les-
son ; and in this feeling, I have no doubt he finds
many ready to sympathize with him. He thinks
it a great merit of his scheme that it promises to
rescue us from this humiliation. And no doubt it
is in any scheme a great charm for the common
reader*, that it does this; — that it offers a con-
nected view of the progress of things, from the
first rudiments of a stellar system to the highest
developement of man, and perhaps so on to the ex-
tinction of the human race. The author rehes upon
this merit, and in virtue of it, he claims indulgence
for many defects. With such a promise, he will
not allow that special objections are of much weight.
" It may prove a true system,"" he says, " though
one half of the illustrations presented by its first
appearance should be wrong." And upon the strength
of this possibility that it mai/ be true, he treats with
great levity objections which he cannot answer.
Thus he saysj-, "It is represented, for instance,
that the matter of the solar system could not in
any conceiveable gaseous form fill the space com-

* Explanations, p. 187. + P. 18,

SECOND EDITION 25

prehended by the orbit of Uranus. If this be the
case, let it be allowed as a difficulty ; *" and so of
other objections ; — they are allowed as difficulties,
but do not shake his belief, though, as he says,
they cannot now be answered. Sometimes he offers
as a solution of a difficulty some very fanciful sug-
gestion : thus he ascribes the inclinations of the
planetary axes to undulations in the nebular mass
out of which the planets were, as he holds, formed ;
and attributes the inversion of the motion of Uranus's
satellites to ''a curve in the outermost portion,
amounting to a fold, — like the curl of a high
wave."

This selfcomplacent levity in the multiplication
of rash hypotheses appears to be supported by a
persuasion that hypotheses are in themselves lauda-
ble things, inasmuch as discoveries often begin with
hypotheses. This latter assertion no doubt is true,
and has been repeatedly taught by modern writers.
But the hypotheses which have thus been advan-
tageous to science have been tentative hypotheses
admitted into the mind for trial, and rejected if the
facts were found to contradict them; not dogmatic
hypotheses published to the worlds and defended by
an appeal from men of science to "another tribunal.''
I have already pointed out the office of such tenia-

B

26 PREFACE TO THE

tive hypotheses^. " The truth of tentative hypotheses
must be tested by their application to facts. The
discoverer must be ready carefully to try his hypo-
theses in this manner, and to reject them if they
will not bear this test, in spite of indolence and
vanity." With this condition the value of such hy-
potheses is allowed. "The process of scientific dis-
covery is cautious and rigorous, not by abstaining
from hypotheses, but by rigorously comparing hy-
potheses with facts, and by resolutely rejecting all
which the comparison does not confirm."''' The
aphorism on which the author of the Vestiges pro-
ceeds, appears to be very different from these, and
is apparently this, that Dogmatic Hypotheses may
be steadily asserted, though half the facts be against
them ; and it may be supposed that the discrepance
between the Hypotheses and the Facts arises from
our not understanding the adverse Facts, the Hy-
potheses remaining unshaken.

With regard to the part of the system to which
I have just referred, the author's very bold mode of
dealing with the objections seems to arise from a
notion, a very extravagant one as appears to me, that

* Aphorisms concerning Science, ix.and x. in the Phil. Ind. Sc.
Vol. I. p. xxxviii.

SECOND EDITION 27

the Nebular Hypothesis may be "* placed near to
ascertained truths." The various discussions which
have taken place respecting the Nebular Hypothesis
have tended, as I conceive, to make it looked upon
as far more probable than it really is. As thrown
out by Laplace, it was a mere conjecture. It is
a mere conjecture still. The confirmation which
will make it more than this, time alone can give.
Hitherto, so far as I can judge, it has lost ground
in the progress of astronomical researches. Perhaps
in fifty years, perhaps in five hundred, the obser-
vations of Nebulae by astronomers, will shew whether
there really do take place in these phenomena such
changes and arrangements as the hypothesis sup-
poses. Hitherto not a single fact having that ten-
dency has been discovered. Facts of an opposite
tendency have been observed. Nothing but time
can give us more evidence. No other evidence is
of any value. Men in general are impatient of this
suspense, — of knowledge so long deferred : but the
scientific student knows that thus it has ever been,
especially in astronomy, and that thus it must be,
when solid knowledge is to be acquired.

Explanations^ p. 7-

b2

28 PREFACE TO THE

The general reader or spectator, strongly af-
fected by the impressions of sense, is naturally much
struck by the beautiful illustrations of the Nebular
Hypothesis which M. Plateau has devised ; for in
these we see spheroids, and rings, and satellites
formed by the rotation of fluid masses. But how-
ever beautifully these experiments illustrate the
doctrine, they add nothing whatever to its proba-
bility: they only exhibit to the senses results which
no mathematician had any difficulty or doubt about.
Ijaplace had shown that such results would arise
under proper conditions; and his mathematical read-
ers saw the truth of the assertion, though it required
M. Plateau's ingenuity to realize the conditions.
These experiments are not needed to confirm the
mechanical consistency of the Laplacian hypothesis,
any more than the common experiment of whirling a
flexible hoop round an axis, which illustrates New-
ton's explanation of the spheroidal form of the earth,
is needed to show the mechanical consistency of
that explanation. Such experiments make common
spectators see with their eyes what mathematical
reasoners see with their minds : but the proof or
disproof of the hypothesis as an explanation of cos-
mical phenomena must come from otlier sources.

SECOND EDITION. 29

I am aware that when I thus represent the
results of the History of Science as being in a great
measure negative with regard to such questions as
I have spoken of, I am not thereby hkely to make
them acceptable to the general reader. Doubt and
delay, caution and conscious ignorance, are dispo-
sitions which men do not look upon with satisfaction,
and lessons which find for the most part unwilling
scholars. I can only say that in my judgement,
doubt and delay are better than headlong haste
and baseless confidence, on questions so large and
so deep ; and that as we shall never entirely get
rid of our ignorance, there seems to be some ad-
vantage in not throwing off the consciousness of it.
And we shall be able to bear our ignorance the
more patiently, if we have not looked to science for
that which science cannot give : — if we are not in
the unhappy condition described by the author of
whom we have spoken*, "When the awakened and
craving mind asks what science can do for us in
explaining the great ends of the Author of Nature,
and our relations to him, to good and evil, to life
and to eternity?" and revolts at the emptiness of

* E applanations, p. 178.

30 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

the answer, because it only tells of classes of ani-
mals, of electric and chemical agencies, and the like.
Strange caprice of the human mind f that one who
feels all such answers to be worthless, should think
that he has remedied all their deficiencies, and sup-
plied all that the soul can desire, when he has told
us that life grows out of dead matter, the higher ani-
mals out of the lower, and man out of brutes !

Trixity College, Cambridge,
Dec. 22, 1845.

PREFACE

THE FIRST EDITION,

The following Extracts are now published from
a persuasion that they may be interesting to many
persons who would be unlikely to read the larger
works from which they are taken. The Philosophy
of the Sciences is necessarily a series of somewhat
abstruse dissertations, and is likely to be acceptable
only to thoughtful students. The History of Science
is a subject of a more popular character, yet when
the history is carried through all the epochs of all
the material sciences, probably but few will accom-
pany the historian through a plan so extensive.
But lessons of Natural Theology always find a large
class of willing readers, when there is anything of
novelty in their form. The reflections which the fol-
lowing pages contain, being those which result from a
review of the whole progress of science, and of the
principles and processes which have been concerned
in that progress, necessarily differ in many respects
from those of other writers on Natural Theology.

32 PREFACE TO THE

Perhaps, also, there may be some recommenda-
tion of these Indications of the Creator in their
being the result of researches and reasonings under-
taken with no purpose of bringing such indications
into view, but with objects of quite another kind.
For when an author writes with a theological con-
clusion set before him from the first, as that to
which he must conduct his argument, there may
arise a suspicion of a defect of candour and com-
prehensiveness in what he writes. It may be sup-
posed that he will strain or evade anything that points
away from his predetermined end. But a narrative
of the whole History of Science, and an analysis of
the processes by which sciences have been formed,
are undertakings too large, and their course too
rigidly determined by their plan, to allow them to be
drawn aside by partial and irrelevant considerations.
The passages now extracted as having a Theological
bearing will be seen, on reference, to flow naturally
from the trains of thought with which they are
combined in the original works.

The main points to which these extracts refer
are the Indications of Design in the Creator, and
of a Supernatural Origin of the World ; and, as con-
nected with this latter point, the consistency of the
Inductive with the Revealed History of the World.

FIRST EDITION. 33

I have not attempted to combine the Extracts into
a system, but have given them in the order in
which they occur in the original works. I have
added a short extract from another work, on the
subject of the Nebular Hypothesis, bearing on the
same questions.

The questions which belong to Natural Theology
are, in substance, the same from age to age ; but
they change their aspect with every advance or
supposed advance in the Inductive Sciences. I have
(p. 138) endeavoured to shew the assertion to be
quite baseless, that, as science advances, final causes
recede before it, and disappear one after the other.
I have also, I trust, made it appear, by a survey of
the whole history of one great science, Physiology,
that in that science the Doctrine of Final Causes
has been not only consistent with the successive
steps of discovery, but has been the great instrument
of every step of discovery from Galen to Cuvier.

I have further attempted to explain that the
modern doctrine of Unity of Plan in different kinds
of animals does not at all necessarily contradict the
Doctrine of Final Causes : that Morphology is not
necessarily inconsistent with Teleology. But I have
also had to shew that, in modern times, the two
doctrines have been put in opposition to each other.

b5

S4 PREFACE TO THE

The Morphologists have declared, on the ground of
their pecuHar views, that they could not allow them-
selves to ascribe to the Creator any intention (p.
79.) And probably an impression as if the evi-
dence of Design in the Creator were obscured and
weakened, is generally produced by the first aspect of
morphological doctrines, in minds eager for new views,
and yet led, by their own want of the discoverer's
power, to borrow their new views from others.

I have already ventured to express an opinion*
that Inductive Minds, those which have been able to
discover Laws of Nature, have also commonly been
ready to believe in an Intelligent Author of Nature ;
while Deductive Minds, those which have employed
themselves in tracing the consequences of Laws
discovered by others, have been willing to rest in
Laws, without looking beyond to an Author of
Laws. I have taken the liberty also (p. 89) to
apply this remark to the case of the opposition
between Teleology and Morphology ; and have re-
marked that Cuvier, the great Zoological Discoverer
of our time, was a firm believer in Creative De-
sign, notwithstanding the arguments of the Mor-
phologists who controverted such doctrines. I have,

* Bridge water Treatise, Book iii. Ch. v. and

FIRST EDITION. 35

in the following pages, so fully discussed this sub-
ject, that it would be superfluous to add anything
here, if it were not that, as I have already said,
morphological views have a peculiar tendency to
appear unfavourable to the belief of final causes, in
minds to which they are new.

But as morphological views, when they are first
presented, appear to some persons to dim the bright-
ness of those proofs of Creative Design with which
we are familiar ; so, on the other hand, when a
newly-discovered instance of Creative Design is first
made known to us by the zoological discoverer, it
is impossible for most persons not to see in it a
clear and strong indication of an Intelhgent Crea-
tor ; how^ever much this conviction may afterwards
be obscured and confused by morphological generali-
ties of expression. I have given an example of such
a new evidence of design, in Mr. Owen's discoveries
with regard to the process of suckling of the kan-
garoo (p. 128). I do not think any one, becoming
acquainted for the first time with the provisions
for this purpose, as described by Mr, Owen, can
help receiving the conviction which Mr. Owen ex-
presses, that this is an "irrefragable evidence of
creative forethought.""

36 PREFACE TO THE

Mr. Owen, in this, as in many other parts of
his writings, is an instance, in addition to those
which I have previously^ adduced, of the teleological
turn of the Inductive Mind. It would be going too
far to say, conversely, that those whose minds are
not inductive have a bias towards morphology. But
yet this would not be too much to say, if morpho-
logy were very loosely understood. We should not
be surprised at the morphologist coming to conclu-
sions very different from those of the teleological
discoverer, if that unity of plan which the morpho-
logists assert, be made to consist in resemblances
of the most heterogeneous and fantastical kind ; if,
for instance, plants were supposed to be analogous
to the branching forms of crystallization ; or trees
growing out of the ground to the electrical brush :
if some animals were supposed to fall in with the
supposed unity of plan because they have abundant
tail, and ornaments for the head in the form of
tufts, crests, or horns, while others occupy an analo-
gous position to these because they are of a soft
and sluggish character and abundantly edible : if,
again, we have a part of a classification in which
some animals are placed because they have been
denounced as impure, with other animals because

FIRST EDITION. 37

they are wild and striped, and others because they
have spines and prickles : if, finally, notions of
moral judgements and of symbolism are introduced
into natural history, and we are told of classes
of animals which are symbolically types of evil ;
Morphology, pursued with such habits of mind, can-
not, we should suppose from all the analogy which
the history of science lends us, lead to any solid
truth, either in natural history or in philosophy.

There is one morphological doctrine of modern
times which has attracted much notice, in conse-
quence of its being imagined to offer a solution of the
great difficulty of the uniformitarian theory in geology,
namely, the appearance of new species and classes of
animals as we proceed from the earlier to the later
formations. The morphological doctrine of which I
speak is, that the kinds of animals may be arranged
in a series ascending from lower to higher : and
that each animal of a higher kind, in the progress
of its embryo state, passes through states which are
the final condition of the lower kind. The applica-
tion of this morphological doctrine to geological dif-
ficulty is this : that the higher kinds of animals,
came later, and were developed from the lower kinds,
which came earlier in the series, by new peculiar

38 PREFACE TO THE

conditions, operating upon the embryo, and carrying-
it to a higher stage. Now in the apparent sim-
plicity of this doctrine, thus enunciated in general
terms, we have that which recommends it to those
who accept such doctrines in their general shape.
But the zoologist and the geologist, who can test
its general assertions by the special facts with which
their researches have made them acquainted, know
that the facts do not agree with this doctrine. With-
out going into detail on this subject, I venture to
offer the following remarks.

It is not at all agreed among eminent physiolo-
gists*, that animals can be arranged in a series
ascending from lower to higher, such that each animal
of a higher kind in its embryo state passes through
the successive stages of the lower kinds ; the cha-
racters of these stages being (in the asserted doctrine)
taken from the brain and the heart, and man being
the highest point of the series. For such physio-
logists assert, that the brain of the human embryo
does not resemble, at any period, however early, the
brain of any Mollusk or of any Articulate, which
are two of the lower stages. It never passes through

* I make these remarks on the authority of a physiological friend.

FIRST EDITION. §9

a stage comparable or analagous to a permanent con-
dition of the same organ in an Invertebrate Animal.
And in like manner the spinal chord in the human
vertebrae at no period agrees with the corresponding
part of the lower kinds of animals. The moment
it becomes visible in the human embryo, it is entirely
dorsal in position ; while in Mollusks and Articu-
lates a great part, or nearly the whole, is ventral.
The same is true of the heart, or center of the
vascular system, which has always a different rela
tive position to the great nervous center in the
Human Embryo from what it has in any Articulate
Animal, and in most Mollusks.

Again ; the order of lower and higher stages of
developement of the human embryo, does not agree
with the successive stages of animal life at successive
periods of the earth's history as disclosed by geology.
For even if we were to admit, what has not been
proved, that the lowest kind of animal developement,
which has been termed polpgastric monads^ exist in
the earliest fossiliferous rocks, these rocks also
manifest the higher types of Echinodermal, Articu-
late, and Molluscous Animals ; while the human
germ, commencing with a form and vital properties
analogous to those of the monad, passes from the

40 PREFACE TO THE

monad stage at once to the Vertebrate, and never
enters or typifies the Radiate, the Articulate, or the
Molluscous series of organic forms : whereas these
forms of Invertebrates have preceded the Vertebrate
forms on the earth''s surface, according to the best
evidence disclosed by geology.

Moreover in the Vertebrate, as well as in the
Invertebrate part of the animal series, the asserted
order fails. It has been pointed out by others*, that
in order to produce the asserted accordance between
the order of zoological developement and geological
succession, geological facts are misrepresented in the
most flagrant manner. For Vertebrate animals do
exist in the Silurian rocks, from which the asserted
law excludes them. Again ; if we are to have a geo-
logical period eminently characterized by Saurians, it
must be that of the lias and oolites, and not that of
the new red sandstone, as asserted in the hypothetical
scheme ; while one of the Saurians which most ap-
proaches the mammalian character, has recently been
found in a formation below those in which the more
ordinary Saurian forms occur. Again ; birds, which
the new law places in the oolitic group, have left their

* Parker'' s Magazine^ Feb. 1845, p. 102.

FIRST EDITION. 41

traces on the earlier formation of the new red sand-
stone. The new law finds geological epochs corre-
sponding to some of the orders of quadrupeds, namely
the rodents, ruminants, digitigrades, and quadrumans ;
but it gives no place to the other orders, which
might claim one with equal reason, pachyderms,
marsupials, plantigrades and edentates. Finally, the
law requires the monkey to be placed in the newer
tertiaries ; whereas their remains have been found in
the older tertiaries of France, India, and England.

Further, the doctrine of the developement of the
kinds of animals from one kind to another by the
influence of external conditions, is contrary to the
conclusions of the most esteemed physiologists, as
is stated in the following pages. This doctrine is
coupled with the assertion of the origin of living
beings without an egg or other living parent. This
assertion is at variance with the latest and most
careful, as well as with all preceding experiments, of
eminent physiologists*. And the tenet that any
animal can be advanced to a higher stage by a period
of gestation prolonged beyond the usual time, is
contrary to all fact. The advancement of the vital

Owen's Lectures, 1843, p. 3S.

42 PREFACE TO THE

organs to more perfect stages of developement
requires the stimulus of respiration and muscular
action, for which birth is essential. Under these
conditions, the organs of animals have been de-
veloped beyond their usual state ; but, as is stated
in the following pages, never to a stage beyond that
which characterizes the species.

I have hitherto spoken in general terms of the
stages of animal organization, meaning by that, such
stages as fish, lizard, bird, beast. And I have spoken
as if there were, in the question before us, no
difficulty, except that of advancing from one of these
stages to another. But in fact there have been and
are existing on the earth many kinds of fish, many
kinds of saurians, many of birds, many of beasts.
These have the most various forms and habits, with
an internal organization of each, which, though
wonderful, is in a great measure intelligible, when
considered as designed for the animal's support and
preservation according to its habits. But to arrange
all these kinds of animals, that is, the whole animal
creation, in a series, as successive stages of one line
of developements, or of any ramified line; and to
make the form and the habits of each the result of
the stage of developement at which the animal has

FIRST EDITION. 43

arrived ; is a mode of speculating which is the opposite
of that which all successful zoological speculation has
followed, and may be expected to lead to opposite
results.

The same imperfection in the evidence would be
found, if we were to examine, in other subjects as
well as in zoology, the asserted law of the identity
of the stages of natural developement of the faculties,
ascending from beast to man, with the probable his-
tory of mankind. For instance, the view of the
speech of man as of the same nature with the signs
by which animals express their feelings and purposes,
is a view which leaves out of sight the essential
character of language. For the essential nature of
language consists, not in its expressing particular
feelings and purposes, but in its expressing thoughts
and things in a general manner. Words express
abstract thoughts, each of which may be applied to
innumerable particular objects ; and Human Reason
can deal with thoughts so abstracted, and by means
of them, can express Truth, which it is her peculiar
privilege to contemplate. There are, in animals, no
germs of this power of abstraction, this apprehension
of abstract and general Truth. The Instinct of ani-
mals cannot become the Reason of man, by any pro-

44 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

cess of developement. We cannot unfold the mind
of a spider or a bee into the mind of a geometer.

On the other subjects to which the Extracts refer,
it does not appear necessary to add anything to what
is there said. The opinions there expressed have
been for some time before the world ; and are such
as, I trust, can give just offence to no one.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
Feb. 14, 1845.

EXTRACTS,

ASTRONOMY.

THE COPERNICAN SYSTEM.

[About a.d. 1500, Copernicus had satisfied himself
of the truth of the Heliocentric Theory, according
to which the planets, and the earth as one of them,
revolve round the sun as the center of their motions.
His book De Bevolutionibus Orbium Celestium was
pubhshed in 1543, the year of his death. In 1610
Galileo, having invented a telescope, discovered Jupi-
ter's satellites and the moon-like phases of Venus ;
and these discoveries supplied additional arguments
for the truth of the Copernican system. This system
Galileo afterwards defended in his writings, which
were on that account condemned as heretical by the
Inquisition.]

* The doctrines promulgated by Copernicus ex-
cited no visible alarm among the theologians of his
own time ; we may assign as a reason for this,

History of the Inductive Sciences. Book v. Chap, iii. Sect. 4.

46 ASTRONOMY.

that those who were disposed to assert the sway of
authority in all matters of belief, had not yet been
roused and ruffled by the aggressions of innovators
in philosophy and religion, as they soon afterwards
were. Probably, also, we ought to take into account
the different temper and circumstances of the ultra-
montane and Italian learned men. The latter, living
under the immediate shadow of the papal chair,
were necessarily less bold in their speculations, and
less open in their promulgation of any opinions which
might have a taint of heresy. This influence ope-
rated less strongly in Poland and Germany ; and we
find no evidence which leads us to deny to these
countries the glory of having received the Coper-
nican system of the world, from the first, with satis-
faction, and without bigoted opposition. The great
religious reform which had its rise in Germany about
the time of the promulgation of the Copernican
system, showed sufficiently that that was the land
where opinions would assert their freedom; and
where authority could not, with prudence, urge
superfluous claims.

But in Italy the church entertained the persua-
sion that her authority could not be upheld at all,
without maintaining it to be supreme on all points.
The spirit of dogmatism of the middle ages had
descended upon the ecclesiastical institutions of the
seventeenth century; and in consistency with that

THE COPERNICAN SYSTEM. 47

spirit, it was criminal to disturb received doctrines,
or to separate philosophy from religion. The tenet
of the earth being at rest in the center of the
universe, was not only a part of the established
school-philosophy, but was also, it was conceived,
sanctioned by Scripture. The Copernican system,
therefore, so far as it came into view, was looked
at with suspicion and aversion. But though this
system is afterwards, in the official condemnation of
it, spoken of as "entertained by many,'' it never came
under the notice of the spiritual judges in any con-
spicuous manner, till it had been illustrated by Gali-
leo's discoveries, and recommended by his writings.

The story of the condemnation of Galileo by
the Inquisition, for asserting the motion of the
earth, and of his formal renunciation of this doc-
trine in the presence of his judges, has been so
often told, that I need not here repeat the details.
It rather belongs to our purpose to consider what
lessons may be gathered from it with regard to
the progress of science.

One reflection which occurs is, that both Galileo's
behaviour and that of his judges, appear to disclose
some Italian traits of character. The assumption
of supreme authority in all matters of opinion, an
assumption unsuited to the powers and condition
of man, had led, it would seem, to a kind of arti-
ficial state of compromise, in which men's published

48 ASTRONOMY.

opinions were treated as a point of decorum only,
the truth being left out of consideration. Thus
Galileo seems to have expected that the flimsiest
veil of professed submission in his behef would
enable his arguments in favour of the Copernican
doctrine to pass unvisited ; and the inquisitors were
satisfied with a renunciation which they could not
believe to be sincere. This artificial state, again,
was probably one occasion of the furtive mode of
insinuating his doctrines, so much employed by Gali-
leo, which some of his historians admire as subtle
irony, and others blame as insincerity. Nor do we
see anything to lead us to believe that Gahleo was
not at all times ready to make such submissions as
the spiritual tribunals required ; although undoubt-
edly he was also very desirous of promoting the
cause of what he conceived to be philosophical truth.
The same absence of earnestness appears on the
other side, in the courtesy and indulgence with which,
as is now almost universally allowed, Galileo was
treated throughout the course of the proceedings
against him. For his being confined in the dun-
geons of the Inquisition, as his lot has sometimes
been described, appears to have consisted principally
in his being placed under some slight restrictions,
first, in the house of Nicolini, the ambassador of his
own sovereign, the Duke of Tuscany, and afterwards
in the country-seat of Archbishop Piccolomini, one

THE COPERNICAN SYSTEM. 49

of his own warmest friends. It appears to be not
going too far to suppose that the extravagant as-
sumptions of the church of Rome, which it was
impossible sincerely to allow, and necessary to evade
by artifice, generated in the philosophers of Italy
an acuteness and subtlety, but also a suppleness and
servility very different from the vigorous independent
habits of thought of Germany and England.

But there remains something more to be attended
to in the case of Galileo ; for though the See of
Rome might exaggerate the claims of religious autho-
rity, there is a question of no small real difficulty,
which the progress of science often brings into notice,
as it did then. The revelation on which our religion
is founded, seems to declare, or to take for granted,
opinions on points on which science also gives her
decision ; and we then come to this dilemma, — that
doctrines, established by a scientific use of reason,
may seem to contradict the declarations of reve-
lation according to our view of its meaning ; — and
yet, that w^e cannot, in consistency with our reli-
gious views, make reason a judge of the truth of
revealed doctrines. In the case of astronomy, on
which Galileo was called in question, the general
sense of cultivated and sober-minded men has long
a<ro drawn the distinction between relioious and
physical tenets, which is necessary to resolve this
dilemma. On this point, it is reasonably held,

C

50 ASTRONOMY.

that the phrases which are employed in Scripture
respecting astronomical facts, are not to be made
use of to guide our scientific opinions ; they may
be supposed to answer their end, if they fall in
with common notions, and are thus effectually sub-
servient to the moral and religious import of reve-
lation. But the establishment of this distinction
was not accomplished without long and distressing
controversies. Nor, if we wish to include all cases
in which the same dilemma may again come into
play, is it easy to lay down an adequate canon
for the purpose. For we can hardly foresee, be-
forehand, what part of the past history of the
universe may eventually be found to come within
the domain of science ; or what bearing the tenets
which science establishes, may have upon our view
of the providential and revealed government of the
world. But without attempting here to generahse
on this subject, there are two reflections which may
be worth our notice : they are supported by what
took place in reference to astronomy on the oc-
casion of which we are speaking ; and may, at other
periods, be applicable to other sciences.

In the first place, the meaning which any gene-
ration puts upon the phrases of Scripture, depends,
more than is at first sight supposed, upon the re-
ceived philosophy of the time. Hence, while men
imagine that they are contending for revelation,

THE COPERNICAN SYSTEM. 51

they are, in fact, contending for their own inter-
pretation of revelation, unconsciously adapted to
what they believe to be rationally probable. And
the new interpretation, which the new philosophy
requires, and which appears to the older school to
be a fatal violence done to the authority of religion,
is accepted by their successors without the danger-
ous results which were apprehended. When the
language of Scripture, invested with its new mean-
ing, has become familiar to men, it is found that
the ideas which it calls up, are quite as reconcile-
able as the former ones were, with the soundest
religious view^s. And the world then looks back
with surprise at the error of those who thought
that the essence of revelation was involved in their
own arbitrary version of some collateral circum-
stance. At the present day we can hardly con-
ceive how reasonable men should have imagined
that religious reflections on the stability of the
earth, and the beauty and use of the luminaries
which revolve round it, would be interfered with
by its being acknowledged that this rest and mo-
tion are apparent only.

In the next place, we may observe that those
who thus adhere tenaciously to the traditionary or
arbitrary mode of understanding Scriptural expres-
sions of physical events, are always strongly con-
demned by succeeding generations. They are looked

52 ASTRONOMY.

upon with contempt by the world at large, who
cannot enter into the obsolete difficulties with which
they encumbered themselves ; and with pity by the
more considerate and serious, who know how much
sagacity and right-mindedness are requisite for the
conduct of philosophers and religious men on such
occasions ; but who know also how weak and vain
is the attempt to get rid of the difficulty by merely
denouncing the new tenets as inconsistent with re-
ligious belief, and by visiting the promulgators of
them with severity such as the state of opinions
and institutions may allow. The prosecutors of
Gahleo are still held up to the scorn and aversion
of mankind ; although, as we have seen, they did
not act till it seemed that their position compelled
them to do so, and then proceeded with all the
gentleness and moderation which were compatible
with judicial forms.

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS.

[* Laplace has proved that the state of the solar
system is stable : that is, the ellipses which the
planets describe will always remain nearly circular,
and the axis of revolution of the earth will never
deviate much from its present position. He has

Bridgewater Treatise. Book ii. Chap. iii.

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS. 53

shown also that this stabihty depends on the fact
that the planets all move in the same direction, in
orbits of small excentricity, and slightly inclined to
each other. He has moreover given a mathematical
proof that this fact is not accidental. Hence we
may regard this arrangement as the result of de-
sign, and as intended to secure the stability of the
system.]

* We have referred to Laplace, as a profound ma-
thematician, who has strongly expressed the opinion,
that the arrangement by which the stability of the
solar system is secured is not the result of chance ;
that " a 2)r%mitive cause has directed the planetary
motions." This author, however, having arrived,
as we have done, at this conviction, does not draw
from it the conclusion which has appeared to us so
irresistible, that " the admirable arrangement of the
solar system cannot but be the work of an intelli-
gent and most powerful being.'' He quotes these
expressions, which are those of Newton, and points
at them as instances where that great philosopher
had deviated from the method of true philosophy.
He himself proposes an hypothesis concerning the
nature of the primitive cause of which he conceives
the existence to be thus probable : and this hypo-

Bndgeicatcr Treatise. Book ii. Chap. vii.

54 ASTR0N03IY.

thesis, on account of the facts which it attempts
to combine, the view of the universe which it pre-
sents, and the eminence of the person by whom it
is propounded, deserves our notice.

1. Laplace conjectures that in the original con-
dition of the solar system, the sun revolved upon
his axis, surrounded by an atmosphere wdiich, in
virtue of an excessive heat, extended far beyond
the orbits of all the planets, the planets as yet
having no existence. The heat gradually diminished,
and as the solar atmosphere contracted by cooling,
the rapidity of its rotation increased by the laws of
rotatory motion, and an exterior zone of vapour
was detached from the rest, the central attraction
being no longer able to overcome the increased cen-
trifugal force. This zone of vapour might in some
cases retain its form, as we see it in Saturn's ring ;
but more usually the ring of vapour would break
into several masses, and these w^ould generally coa-
lesce into one mass, which would revolve about the
sun. Such portions of the solar atmosphere, aban-
doned successively at different distances, would form
" planets in the state of vapour." These masses
of vapour, it appears from mechanical considera-
tions, would have each its rotatory motion, and as
the cooling of the vapour still went on, would each
produce a planet, which might have satellites and
rings, formed from the planet in the same manner

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS. 55

as the planets were formed from the atmosphere of
the sun.

It may easily be conceived that all the primary
motions of a system so produced would be nearly
circular, nearly in the plane of the original equator
of the solar rotation, and in the direction of that
rotation. Reasons are offered also to show that
the motions of the satellites thus produced and the
motions of rotation of the planets must be in the
same direction. And thus it is held that the hypo-
thesis accounts for the most remarkable circum-
stances in the structure of the solar system : namely,
the motions of the planets in the same direction,
and almost in the same plane ; the motions of the
satellites in the same direction as those of the
planets; the motions of rotation of these different
bodies still in the same direction as the other mo-
tions, and in planes not much different ; the small
excentricity of the orbits of the planets, upon which
condition, along with some of the preceding ones,
the stability of the system depends ; and the posi-
tion of the source of light and heat in the center
of the system.

It is not necessary for the purpose, nor suitable
to the plan of the present treatise, to examine, on
physical grounds, the probability of the above hypo-
thesis. It is proposed by its author, with great
diflfidence, as a conjecture only. We might, there-

56 ASTRONOMY.

fore, very reasonably put off all discussion of the
bearings of this opinion upon our views of the go-
vernment of the world, till the opinion itself should
have assumed a less indistinct and precarious form.
It can be no charge against our doctrines, that
there is a difficulty in reconciling with them arbi-
trary guesses and half-formed theories. We shall,
however, make a few observations upon this nebular
hypothesu^ as it may be termed.

2. If w^e grant, for a moment, the hypothesis,
it by no means proves that the solar system was
formed without the intervention of inteUigence and
design. It only transfers our view of the skill
exercised, and the means employed, to another part
of the work. For, how came the sun and its atmo-
sphere to have such materials, such motions, such
a constitution, that these consequences followed from
their primordial condition ? How came the parent
vapour thus to be capable of coherence, separation,
contraction, solidification? How came the laws of
its motion, attraction, repulsion, condensation, to be
so fixed, as to lead to a beautiful and harmonious
system in the end? How came it to be neither
too fluid nor too tenacious, to contract neither too
quickly nor too slowly, for the successive formation
of the several planetary bodies ? How came that
substance, which at one time was a luminous vapour,
to be at a subsequent period, solids and fluids of

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS. 57

many various kinds ? What but design and intel-
ligence prepared and tempered this previously exist-
ing element, so that it should by its natural changes
produce such an orderly system ?

And if in this way we suppose a planet to be
produced, what sort of a body would it be I — some-
thing, it may be presumed, resembling a large me-
teoric stone. How comes this mass to be covered
with motion and organization, with life and happi-
ness ? What primitive cause stocked it with plants
and animals, and produced all the wonderful and
subtle contrivances which we find in their structure,
all the wide and profound mutual dependences which
we trace in their economy? Was man, with his
thought and feeling, his powers and hopes, his
will and conscience, also produced as an ultimate
result of the condensation of the solar atmosphere !
Except we allow a prior purpose and intelligence
presiding over this material '' primitive cause,'' how
irreconcileable is it with the evidence which crowds
in upon us on every side !

3. In the next place, we may observe concern-
ing this hypothesis, that it carries us back to the
beginning of the present system of things ; but that
it is impossible for our reason to stop at the point
thus presented to it. The sun, the earth, the
planets, the moons, were brouglit into their present
order out of a previous state, and, as is supposed in

c 5

58 ASTRONOMV. .

the theory, by the natural operation of laws. But
how came that previous state to exist ? We are
compelled to suppose that it, in like manner, was
educed from a still prior state of things ; and this,
again, must have been the result of a condition prior
still. Nor is it possible for us to find, in the tenets
of the nebular hypothesis, any restingplace or satis-
faction for the mind. The same reasoning faculty,
which seeks for the origin of the present system of
things, and is capable of assenting to, or dissenting
from the hypothesis propounded by Laplace as an
answer to this inquiry, is necessarily led to seek, in
the same manner, for the origin of any previous
system of things, out of which the present may ap-
pear to have grown : and must pursue this train of
enquiries unremittingly, so long as the answer which
it receives describes a mere assemblage of matter
and motion ; since it would be to contradict the
laws of matter and the nature of motion, to sup-
pose such an assemblage to be the Jirst condition.

The reflection just stated, may be illustrated
by the further consideration of the Nebular Hypo-
tliesis. This opinion refers us, for the origin of the
solar system, to a sun surrounded with an atmo-
sphere of enormously elevated temperature, revolv-
ing and cooling. But as we ascend to a still earher
period, what state of things are we to suppose? —
a still higher temperature, a still more diffused

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS. 59

atmosphere. Laplace conceives that, in its prniu-
tive state, the sun consisted in a diffused himinosity
so as to resemble those nebulae among the fixed
stars, which are seen by the aid of the telescope,
and which exhibit a nucleus, more or less briUiant,
surrounded by a cloudy brightness. " This anterior
state was itself preceded by other states, in which
the nebulous matter was more and more diffuse, the
nucleus being less and less luminous. We arrive,"
Laplace says, " in this manner, at a nebulosity so
diffuse, that its existence could scarcely be sus-
pected."

" Such is " he adds, " in fact, the first state of
the nebulae which Herschel carefully observed by
means of his powerful telescopes. He traced the
progress of condensation, not indeed on one nebula,
for this progress can only become perceptible to us
in the course of centuries ; but in the assemblage of
nebula ; much in the same manner as in a large
forest we may trace the growth of trees among the
examples of different ages which stand side by side.
He saw in the first place the nebulous matter dis-
persed in patches, in the different parts of the sky.
He saw in some of these patches this matter feebly
condensed round one or more faint nuclei. In other
nebulae, these nuclei were brighter in proportion to
the surrounding nebulosity ; when by a further con-
densation the atmosphere of each nucleus becomes

60 ASTRONOMY.

separate from the others, the result is multiple ne-
bulous stars, formed by brilliant nuclei very near
each other, and each surrounded by an atmosphere :
sometimes the nebulous matter condensing in a uni-
form manner has produced nebulous systems which
are called 'planetary. Finally, a still greater degree
of condensation transforms all these nebulous sys-
tems into stars. The nebulae, classed according to
this philosophical view, indicate with extreme pro-
bability their future transformation into stars, and
the anterior nebulous condition of the stars which
now exist/'

It appears then that the highest point to which
this series of conjectures can conduct us, is "an
extremely diffused nebulosity, attended, we may
suppose, by a far higher degree of heat, than that
which, at a later period of the hypothetical process,
keeps all the materials of our earth and planets in
a state of vapour. Now is it not impossible to avoid
asking, whence was this light, this heat, this dif-
fusion? How came the laws which such a state
implies, to be already in existence \ Whether light
and heat produce their effects by means of fluid
vehicles or otherwise, they have complex and varied
laws which indicate the existence of some subtle
machinery for their action. When and how was this
machinery constructed? Whence too that enor-
mous expansive power which the nebulous matter

THE NEBULAR HVPOTPIESIS. 61

Is supposed to possess' And if, as would seem to
be supposed in this doctrine, all the material ingre-
dients of the earth existed in this diffuse nebulosity,
either in the state of vapour, or in some state of
still greater expansion, whence were they and their
properties? how came there to be of each simple
substance which now enters into the composition of
the universe, just so much and no more ? Do we
not, far more than ever, require an origin of this
origin ? an explanation of this explanation ? What-
ever may be the merits of the opinion as a physical
hypothesis, with which we do not here meddle, can
it for a moment prevent our looking beyond the
hypothesis, to a First Cause, an Intelligent Author,
an origin proceeding from free volition, not from
material necessity?

But again : let us ascend to the highest point
of the hypothetical progression : let us suppose the
nebulosity diffused throughout all space, so that its
course of running into patches is not yet begun.
How are we to suppose it distributed I Is it equably
diffused in every part ? clearly not ; for if it were,
what should cause it to gather into masses, so
various in size, form and arrangement? The sepa-
ration of the nebulous matter into distinct nebulae
implies necessarily some original inequality of dis-
tribution ; some determining circumstances in its
primitive condition. Whence were these circum-

62 ASTRONOMY.

stances ? this inequality I we are still compelled to
seek some ulterior agency and power.

Why must the primeval condition be one of
change at all ? Why should not the nebulous mat-
ter be equably diffused throughout space, and con-
tinue for ever in its state of equable diffusion, as it
must do, from the absence of all cause to determine
the time and manner of its separation ? why should
this nebulous matter grow cooler and cooler? why
should it not retain for ever the same degree of
heat, whatever heat be? If heat be a fluid, if to
cool be to part with its fluid, as many philosophers
suppose, what becomes of the fluid heat of the nebu-
lous matter, as the matter cools down ? Into what
unoccupied region does it find its way ?

Innumerable questions of the same kind might
be asked, and the conclusion to be drawn is, that
every new physical theory which we include in our
view of the universe, involves us in new difficulties
and perplexities, if we try to erect it into an ulti-
mate and final account of the existence and arrange-
ment of tlie world in which we live. With the
evidence of such theories, considered as scientific
generalizations of ascertained facts, with their claims
to a place in our natural philosophy, we have here
nothing to do. But if they are put forwards as a
disclosure of the ultimate cause of that which occurs,
and as superseding the necessity of looking further

THE NEBULAR HYP(>THEaIS. 63

or higher; if they chiiin a place in our Natural
Theology, as well as our Natural Philosophy ; we
conceive that their pretensions will not bear a mo-
ment's examination.

Leaving then to other persons and to future ages
to decide upon the scientific merits of the nebular
hypothesis, we conceive that the final fate of this
opinion can not, in sound reason, affect at all the
view which we have been endeavouring to illustrate ;
— the view of the universe as the work of a wise
and good Creator. Let it be supposed that the
point to which this hypothesis leads us, is the ulti-
mate point of phj^sical science ; that the farthest
glimpse w^e can obtain of the material universe by
our natural faculties, shows it to us occupied by a
boundless abyss of luminous matter ; still we ask,
how space came to be thus occupied, how matter
came to be thus luminous ? If we establish by phy-
sical proofs, that the first fact which can be traced
in the history of the world, is that " there was
light ; " we shall still be led, even by our natural rea-
son, to suppose that before this could occur, "God
said, Let there be light."

64

PHYSIOLOGY.

RECOGNITION OF FINAL CAUSES IN PHYSIOLOGY.

* There is one idea which the researches of the phy-
siologist and the anatomist so constantly force upon
him, that he cannot help assuming it as one of
the guides of his speculations ; I mean, the idea of
a purpose^ or, as it is called in Aristotelian phrase,
a final cause, in the arrangements of the animal
frame. It is impossible to doubt that the motive
nerves run along the limbs, i7i order that they may
convey to the muscles the impulses of the will ; and
that the muscles are attached to the bones, in order
that they may move and support them. This con-
viction prevails so steadily among anatomists, that
even when the use of any part is altogether un-
known, it is still taken for granted that it has
some use. The developement of this conviction, —
of a purpose in the parts of animals, — of a func-
tion to which each portion of the organization is
subservient, — contributed greatly to the progress
of physiology ; for it constantly urged men for-
wards in their researches respecting each organ,
till some definite view of its purpose was obtained.

History of the Inductive Sciences. Book xvii. C'ha]). i. Sect. 2.

RECOGNITION OF FINAL CAUSES. 65

The assumption of hypothetical final causes in phy-
sics may have been, as Bacon asserts it to have
been, prejudicial to science; but the assumption
of unknown final causes in physiology, has given
rise to the science. The two branches of specula-
tion, Physics and Physiology, were equally led, by
every new phenomenon, to ask their question,
"Why?" But, in the former case, "why'' meant
"through what cause?" in the latter, "for what
end?" And though it may be possible to intro-
duce into physiology the doctrine of efficient causes,
such a step can never obliterate the obligations
which the science owes to the pervading concep-
tion of a purpose contained in all organization.

This conception makes its appearance very early.
Indeed, without any special study of our struc-
ture, the thought, that we are fearfully and won-
derfully made, forces itself upon men, with a mys-
terious impressiveness, as a suggestion of our ^laker.
In this bearing, the thouglit is developed to a con-
siderable extent in the well-known passage in Xeno-
nophon's Conversations of Socrates. Nor did it
ever lose its hold on sober-minded and instructed
men. The Epicureans, indeed, held that the eye
was not made for seeing, nor the ear for hearing;
and Asclepiades, whom we have already mentioned
as an impudent pretender, adopted this wild dogma.
Such assertions required no labour. "It is easy,"

66 PHVJSIOLOGV.

says Galen, '' for people like Asclepiades, when
they come to any difficulty, to say that nature
has worked to no purpose." The great anato-
mist himself pursues his subject in a very different
temper. In a well-known passage, he breaks out
into an enthusiastic scorn of the folly of the atheis-
tical notions. " Try," he sa^'s, " if you can ima-
gine a shoe made with half the skill which appears
in the skin of the foot." Some one had spoken of
a structure of the human body which he would have
preferred to that which it now has. " See," Galen
exclaims, after pointing out the absurdity of the
imaginary scheme, " see what brutishness there is
in this wish. But if I were to spend more words
on such cattle, reasonable men might blame me
for desecrating my work, which I regard as a reli-
gious hymn in honour of the Creator."

THE PLANS OF ANLMAL FORMS.

* Animals were divided by Lamarck into vertebrate
and invertebrate; and the general analogies of all
vertebrate animals are easily made manifest. But
with regard to other animals, the point is far from
clear. Cuvier was the first to give a really philo-
sophical view of the animal world in reference to
the plan on which each animal is constructed.

History of the Inductive Sciences. Book x vi i. Chap. vii. Sect. 2, 3.

PLANS OF AMMAL FORMS. 67

There are*, he Scays, four such plans; — four forms
on which animals appear to have been modelled;
and of which the ulterior divisions, with whatever
titles naturalists have decorated them, are only very
slight modifications, founded on the developement
or addition of some parts which do not produce
any essential change in the plan.

The four great branches of the animal world
are the mrtebrata, mollusca, articulata, radiata ; and
the differences of these are so important that a
slight explanation of them may be permitted.

The vertehrata are those animals which (as man
and other sucklers, birds, fishes, lizards, frogs, ser-
pents,) have a back-bone and a skull, with lateral
appendages, within which the viscera are included,
and to which the muscles are attached.

The mollusca, or soft animals, have no bony
skeleton; the muscles are attached to the skin,
which often includes stony plates called shells ; such
molluscs are shell-fish, others are cuttle-fish, and
many pulpy sea-animals.

The articulata consist of Crustacea, (lobsters, &c.,)
insects, spiders, and annulose worms, which, like the
other classes of this branch, consist of a head and
a number of successive portions of the body jointed
together, whence the name.

Reyne Animal, p 57.

68 PHYSIOLOGY.

Finally, the radiata include the animals known
under the name of zoophytes. In the preceding
three branches, the organs of motion and of sense
were distributed symmetrically on the two sides
of an axis, so that the animal has a right and a
left side. In the radiata the similar members ra-
diate from the axis in a circular manner, like the
petals of a regular flower.

The whole value of such a classification cannot
be understood without explaining its use in enabling
us to give general descriptions, and general laws
of the animal functions, of the classes which it in-
cludes ; but in the present part of our work our
business is to exhibit it as an exemplification of
the reduction of animals to laws of symmetry. The
bipartite symmetry of the form of vertebrate and
articulate animals is obvious; and the reduction of
the various forms of such animals to a common
type has been effected, by attention to their ana-
tomy, in a manner which has satisfied those who
have best studied the subject. The mollusks, es-
pecially those in which the head disappears, as
oysters, or those which are rolled into a spiral,
as snails, have a less obvious symmetry, but here
also we can apply certain general types. And the
symmetry of the radiated zoophytes is of a na-
ture quite different from all the rest, and approach-
ing, as we have suggested, to the kind of sym-

PLANS OF ANIMAL FORMS. 69

nietry found in plants. Some naturalists have
doubted whether* these zoophytes are not referrible
to two types {acrita or polypes, and true radiata)^
rather than to one.

Supposing this great step in Zoology, of which
we have given an account, — the reduction of all
animals to four types or plans, — to be quite secure,
we are then led to ask whether any further advance
is possible ; — whether several of these types can be
referred to one common form by any wider effort
of generalization. On this question there has been
a considerable difference of opinion. Geoffroy Saint-
Hilairet, who had previously endeavoured to show
that all vertebrate animals were constructed so ex-
actly upon the same plan as to preserve the strictest
analogy of parts in respect to their osteology, thought
to extend this unity of plan by demonstrating, that
the hard parts of crustaces and insects are still only
modifications of the skeleton of higher animals, and
that therefore the type of vertebrata must be made
to include them also : — the segments of the articu-
lata are held to be strictly analogous to the vertebrae
of the higher animals, and thus the former live
within their vertebral column in the same manner
as the latter live zvithotit it. Attempts have even
been made to reduce molluscous and vertebrate

* Brit. Assoc. Rep. iv. 227. t Mr. Jenyns, Ibid. iv. l.'>0.

^Q PHYSIOLOGY.

animals to a community of type, as we shall see

shortly.

Another application of the principle, according
to which creatures the most different are develope-
ments of the same original type, may be discerned*
in the doctrine, that the embryo of the higher forms
of animal life passes by gradations through those
forms which are permanent in inferior animals.
Thus, according to this view, the human foetus
assumes successively, the plan of the zoophyte, the
worm, the fish, the turtle, the bird, the beast. But
it has been well observed, that " in these analogies
we look in vain for the precision which can alone
support the inference that has been deduced f ;" and
that at each step, the higher embryo and the lower
animal which it is supposed to resemble, differ in
having each different organs suited to their respective
destinations.

Cuvier:|: never assented to this view, nor to the
attempts to refer the different divisions of his system
to a common type. " He could not admit,'' says his
biographer, "that the lungs or gills of the verte-
brates are in the same connexion as the branchiae of
moUusks and crustaces, which in the one are situated
at the base of the feet, or fixed on the feet them-

* Dr. Clark, liriL Assoc. Report, iv. 113. t Dr. Clark, p. 114.

:t Laurillard, Elog. de Cuvier, p. (JG.

PLANS OF ANIMAL F0R3IS. 71

selves, and in the other often on the back or about
tlie arms. He did not admit the analogy between
the skeleton of the vertebrates and the skin of the
articulates ; he could not believe that the tenia and
the sepia were constructed on the same plan ; that
there was a similarity of composition between the
bird and the echinus, the whale and the snail ; in
spite of the skill with which some persons sought
gradually to efface their discrepancies."

^Vliether it may be possible to establish, among
the four great divisions of the " Animal Kingdom,''
some analogies of a higher order than those which
prevail within each division, I do not pretend to
conjecture. If this can be done, it is clear that it
must be by comparing the types of these divisions
under their most general forms ; and thus, Cuvier's
arrangement, so far as it is itself rightly founded
on the unity of composition of each branch, is the
vsurest step to the discovery of a unity pervading
and uniting these branches. But though those who
generalize surely, and those who generalize rapidly,
may travel in the same direction, they soon separate
so widely, that they appear to move from each other.
The partisans of a universal " unity of composition"
of animals, accused Cuvier of being too inert in fol-
lowing the progress of physiological and zoological
science. Borrowing their illustration from the poli-
tical parties of the times, they asserted that he

72 PHYSIOLOGY.

belonged to the science of the resistance, not to the
science of the movement. Such a charge is highly
honourable to him ; for no one acquainted with the
history of zoology can doubt that he had a great
share in the impulse by which the " movement'' was
occasioned ; or that he himself made a large advance
with it ; and it was because he was so poised by the
vast mass of his knowledge, so temperate in his love
of doubtful generahzations, that he was not swept
on in the wilder part of the stream. To such a
charge, moderate reformers, who appreciate the value
of the good which exists, though they try to make it
better, and who know the knowledge, thoughtful-
ness, and caution, which are needful in such a task,
are naturally exposed. For us, who can only decide
on such a subject by the general analogies of the his-
tory of science, it may suffice to say, that it appears
doubtful whether the fundamental conceptions of
affinity, analogy, transition, and developement, have
yet been fixed in the minds of physiologists with
sufficient firmness and clearness, or unfolded with
sufficient consistency and generality, to make it
likely that any great additional step of this kind
can for some time be made.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 73

USE OF FINAL CAUSES IN PHYSIOLOGY.
Doctrine of Unity of Plan. — We have repeatedly
seen, in the course of our historical view of physio-
logy, that those who have studied the structure of
animals and plants, have had a conviction forced
upon them, that the organs are constructed and
combined in subservience to the life and functions
of the whole. The parts have a purpose, as well as

a, law ; we can trace final causes, as well as laws

of causation. This principle is peculiar to physio-
logy ; and it might naturally be expected that, in
the progress of the science, it would come under
special consideration. This accordingly has happen-
ed; and the principle has been drawn into a pro-
minent position by the struggle of two antagonist
schools of physiologists. On the one hand, it has
been maintained that this doctrine of final causes
is altogether unphilosophical, and requires to be
replaced by a more comprehensive and profound
principle : on the other hand, it is asserted that the
doctrine is not only true, but that, in our own time,
it has been fixed and developed so as to become
the instrument of some of the most important dis-
coveries which have been made. Of the views of
these two schools we must endeavour to give some
account.

The disciples of the former of the two schools
express their tenets by the phrases unity of plan,

D

74 PHYSIOLOGY.

unity of composition ; and the more detailed deve-
lopement of these doctrines has been termed the
Theory of Analogues^ by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, who
claims this theory as his own creation. According
to this theory, the structure and functions of animals
are to be studied by the guide of their analogy only;
our attention is to be turned, not to the fitness of
the organization for any end of life or action, but to
its resemblance to other organizations by which it is
gradually derived from the original type.

According to the rival view of this subject, we
must not assume, and cannot establish, that the plan
of all animals is the same, or their composition
similar. The existence of a single and universal
system of analogies in the construction of all ani-
mals is entirely unproved, and therefore cannot be
made our guide in the study of their properties.
On the other hand, the plan of the animal, the
purpose of its organization in the support of its
life, the necessity of the functions to its existence,
are truths which are irresistibly apparent, and which
may therefore be safely taken as the bases of our
reasonings. This view has been put forwards as
the doctrine of the conditions of existence: it may
also be described as the principle of a purpose in
organization ; the structure being considered as
having the function for its end. We must say a
few words on each of these views.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 7o

It had been pointed out by Cuvier, as we have
seen in the last chapter, that the animal kingdom
may be divided into four great branches ; in each of
which the plan of the animal is different, namely,
vertebrata^ articulata^ mollusca^ radiata. Now the
question naturally occurs, is there really no resem-
blance of construction in these different classes \ It
was maintained by some, that there is such a
resemblance. In 1820*, M. Audouin, a young na-
turalist of Paris, endeavoured to fill up the chasm
which separates insects from other* animals ; and by
examining carefully the portions which compose the
solid frame-work of insects, and following them
through their various transformations in different
classes, he conceived that he found relations of posi-
tion and function, and often of number and form,
which might be compared with the relations of the
parts of the skeleton in vertebrate animals. He
thought that the first segment of an insect, the head f,
represents one of the three vertebrae which, accord-
ing to Spix and others, compose the vertebrate
head : the second segment of the insects, (the pro-
thorax of Audouin,) is, according to M. Geoffroy,
the second vertebra of the head of the vertebrata,
and so on. Upon this speculation Cuvier J does
not give any decided opinion ; observing only, that

Cuv. Hist. Sc. Nat. J? I. 422. t Ibid. 437. :|: Ibid. 4il.

I ) ^2

76 PHYSIOLOGY.

even if false, it leads to active thought and useful
research .

But when an attempt was further made to iden-
tify the plan of another branch of the animal world,
the mollusca, with that of the vertebrata, the radical
op])osition between such views and those of Cuvier,
broke out into an animated controversy.

Two French anatomists, INIM. Laurencet and
Meyranx, presented to the Academy of Sciences,
in 1 880, a Memoir containing their views on the
organization of molluscous animals ; and on the sepia
or cuttle-fish in particular, as one of the most com-
plete examples of such animals. These creatures,
indeed, though thus placed in the same division with
shell-fish of the most defective organization and
obscure structure, are far from being scantily orga-
nized. They have a brain*, often eyes, and these,
in the animals of this class, {ceplialopodd) are more
complicated than in any vertebrates ■[- ; they have
sometimes ears, salivary glands, multiple stomachs,
a considerable liver, a bile, a complete double cir-
culation provided with auricles and ventricles ; in
short, their vital activity is vigorous, and their senses
are distinct.

But still, though this organization, in the abun-

" (xeoftroy Saint-Hilare denies this. Priitcipes de Phil. Zoolo-
gique discutis en 1830, p. 68.
t Ibid. p. 55.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 77

dance and diversity of its parts, approaches that of
vertebrate animals, it had not been considered as
composed in the same manner, or arranged in the
same order. Cuvier had always maintained that the
plan of mollusks is not a continuation of the plan
of vertebrates.

MM. Laurencet and Meyranx, on the contrary,
conceived that the sepia might be reduced to the
type of a vertebrate creature, by considering the
back-bone of the latter bent double backwards, so
as to bring the root of the tail to the nape of the
neck; the parts thus brought into contact being
supposed to coalesce. By this mode of conception,
these anatomists held that the viscera were placed
in the same connexion as in the vertebrate type, and
the functions exercised in an analogous manner.

To decide on the reality of the analogy thus
asserted, clearly belonged to the jurisdiction of the
most eminent anatomists and physiologists. The
Memoir was committed to Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire
and Latreille, two eminent zoologists, in order to be
reported on. Their report was extremely favour-
able ; and went almost to the length of adopting
the views of the authors.

Cuvier expressed some dissatisfaction with this
report on its being read * ; and a short time after-

• Phil. Zool. p. 36.

78 PHYSIOLOGY. .

wards*, represented Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire as having
jisserted that the new views of Laurencet and Mey-
ranx refuted completely tlie notion of the great
interval which exists between molluscous and verte-
brate animals. Geofiroy protested against such an
interpretation of his expressions ; but it soon ap-
peared, by the controversial character which the dis-
cussions on this and several other subjects assumed,
that a real opposition of opinions was in action.

Without attempting to explain the exact views
of Geoffrey, (we may, perhaps, venture to say that
they are hardly yet generally understood with suf-
ficient distinctness to justify the mere historian of
science in attempting such an explanation,) their
general tendency may be sufficiently collected from
what has been said ; and from the phrases in which
his views are conveyed -j*. The prmciple of connexions^
the elective affinities of organic elements^ the equilibriza-
tion of organs ; — such are the designations of the
leading doctrines which are unfolded in the prelimi-
nary discourse of his Anatomical Philosophy/. Elec-
tive affinities of organic elements are the forces by
which the vital structures and varied forms of living
things are produced ; and the principles of connexion
and equilibrium of these forces in the various parts
of the organization, prescribe limits and conditions
to the variety and developement of such forms.

* Phil. Zool. p. 50. t Ibid. p. lo.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 79

The character and tendency of this philosophy
will be, I think, much more clear, if we consider
what it excludes and denies. It rejects altogether
all conception of a plan and purpose in the organs
of animals, as a principle which has determined their
forms, or can be of use in directing our reasonings.
"I take care," says GeoflProy*, "not to ascribe to
God any intention." And when Cuvier speaks of
the combination of organs in such order that they
may be in consistence with the part which the animal
has to play in nature; his rival rejoins f, "I know
nothing of animals which have to play a part m
nature." Such a notion is, he holds, unphilosophical
and dangerous. It is an abuse of final causes, which
makes the cause to be engendered by the effect.
And to illustrate still further his own view, he says,
" I have read concerning fishes, that because they
live in a medium which resists more than air, their
motive forces are calculated so as to give them the
power of progression under those circumstances.
By this mode of reasoning, you would say of a man
who makes use of crutches, that he was originally
destined to the misfortune of having a leg paralyzed
or amputated."

• "Je me garde de preter a Dieu aucune intention." Phil.

Zool. p. 10. -Ill

t " Je ne connais point d'animal qui doive jouer un role dans la

nature." p. C5.

80 PHYSIOLOGY.

How far this doctrine of unity in the plan in
animals is admissible or probable in physiology when
kept within proper limits, that is, when not put in
opposition to the doctrine of a purpose involved in
the plan of animals, I do not pretend even to con-
jecture. The question is one which appears to be
at present deeply occupying the minds of the most
learned and profound physiologists; and such persons
alone, adding to their knowledge and zeal, judicial
sagacity and impartiality, can tell us what is the
general tendency of the best researches on this
subject*. But when the anatomist expresses such
opinions, and defends them by such illustrations as
those which T have just quoted f, we perceive that
he quits the entrenchments of his superior science,
in which he might have remained unassailable so
long as the question was a professional one ; and
the discussion is open to those who possess no pecu-
liar knowledge of anatomy. We shall, therefore,
venture to say a few words upon it.

So far as this doctrine is generally accepted among tlie best
physiologists, we cannot doubt the propriety of Aleckel's remarks,
{Comparative Anatomy, 1821, Pref. p. xi.) that it cannot be truly
asserted either to be new, or to be peculiarly due to GeofFroy Saint-
Hilaire.

t It is hardly worth while answering such illustrations, but 1 may
remark, that the one quoted above, irrelevant and unbecoming as it is,
tells altogether against its author. The fact that the wooden leg is of
the same length as the other, proves, and would satisfy the most in-
credulous man, that it was intended for walking.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 81

Estimate of this doctrine. — It has been so often
repeated, and so generally allowed in modern times,
that final causes ought not to be made our guides
in natural philosophy, that a prejudice has been
established against the introduction of any views to
which this designation can be applied, into physical
speculations. Yet, in fact, the assumption of an end
or purpose in the structure of organized beings,
appears to be an intellectual habit which no efforts
can cast off. It has prevailed from the earliest to
the latest ages of zoological research ; appears to
be fastened upon us alike by our ignorance and our
knowledge ; and has been formally accepted by so
many great anatomists, that we cannot feel any
scruple in believing the rejection of it to be a su-
perstition of a false philosophy, and a result of the
exaggeration of other principles which are supposed
capable of superseding its use. And the doctrine of
unity of plan of all animals, and the other principles
associated with this doctrine, so far as they exclude
the conviction of an intelligible scheme and a dis-
coverable end in the organization of animals, appear
to be utterly erroneous. I will offer a few reasons
for an opinion which may appear presumptuous in
a writer who has only a general knowledge of the
subject.

1. In the first place, it appears to me that the
argumentation on the case in question, the sepia,

d5

82 PHYSIOLOGY.

does by no means turn out to the advantage of the
new hypothesis. The arguments in support of the
hypothetical view of the structure of this mollusk
were, that by this view the relative position of the
parts was explained, and conformations which had
appeared altogether anomalous, were reduced to
rule ; for example, the beak, which had been sup-
posed to be in a position the reverse of all other
beaks, was shown, by the assumed posture, to have
its upper mandible longer than the lower, and thus
to be regularly placed. " But," says Cuvier*, " sup-
posing the posture, in order that the side on which
the funnel of the sepia is folded should be the back
of the animal, considered as similar to a vertebrate,
the brain with regard to the beak, and the oesopha-
gus with regard to the liver, should have positions
corresponding to those in vertebrates ; but the
positions of these organs are exactly contrary to
the hypothesis. How, then, can you say,^' he asks,
" that the cephalopods and vertebrates have identity/
of composition, unity of composition^ without using
words in a sense entirely different from their com-
mon meaning? "

This argument appears to be exactly of the kind
on which the value of the hypothesis must depend f.

* G.S. H. Phil, y.ool. p. 70.

t I do not dwell on other arguments which were employed. It
.'as given as a circumstance suggesting the supposed posture of the

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 83

It is, therefore, interesting to see the reply made to
it by the theorist. It is this : " I admit the facts
here stated, but I deny that they lead to the notion
of a different sort of animal composition. Molluscous
animals had been placed too high in the zoological
scale ; but if they are only the embryos of its
lower stages, if they are only beings in which far
fewer organs come into play, it does not follow that
the organs are destitute of the relations which the
power of successive generations may demand. The
organ A will be in an unusual relation with the
organ C, if B has not been produced ; — if a stop-
page of the developement has fallen upon this latter
organ, and has thus prevented its production. And
thus," he says, "we see how we may have different
arrangements, and diverse constructions as they ap-
pear to the eye/'

It seems to me that such a concession as this
entirely destroys the theory which it attempts to
defend ; for what arrangement does the principle of
unity of composition exclude^ if it admits unusual,
that is, various arrangements of some organs, ac-

type, that in this way the back was coloured, and the belly was white.
On this Cuvier observes, {Phil Zoot. p. 39, 68.) •' 1 must say, that I
do not know any naturalist so ignorant as to suppose that the back is
determined by its dark colour, or even by its position when the animal
is in m.otion ; they all know that the badger has a black belly and a
white back ; that an infinity of other animals, especially among in-
sects, are in the same case ; and that many fishes swim on their side,
or with their belly upwards."

34 PHYSIOLOGY.

companied by the total absence pf others ! Or how
does this differ from Cuvier's mode of stating the
conclusion, except in the introduction of certain
arbitrary hypotheses of developement and stoppage.
" I reduce the facts," Cuvier says, " to their true
expression, by saying that cephalopoda have several
organs which are common to them and vertebrates,
and which discharge the same offices ; but that these
organs are in them differently distributed, and often
constructed in a different manner ; and they are ac-
companied by several other organs which vertebrates
liave not; while these on the other hand have several
which are wanting in cephalopods."

We shall see afterwards the general principles
which Cuvier himself considered as the best guides
in these reasonings. But I will first add a few
words on the disposition of the school now under
consideration, to reject all assumption of an end.

2. That the parts of the bodies of animals are
made in order to discharge their respective offices, is
a conviction which we cannot believe to be other-
wise than an irremovable principle of the philosophy
of organization, when we see the manner in which
it has constantly forced itself upon the minds of
zoologists and anatomists in all ages; not only as
an inference, but as a guide whose indications they
could not help following. I have already noticed
expressions of this conviction in some of the prin-

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 85

cipal persons who occur in the history of physiology,
as Galen and Harvey. I might add many more, but
I will content myself with adducing a contemporary
of Geoffroy's, whose testimony is the more remark-
able, because he obviously shares with his country-
man in the common prejudice against the use of
final causes. "I consider,'' he says, in speaking
of the provisions for the reproduction of animals*,
•* with the great Bacon, the philosophy of final
causes as sterile ; but I have elsewhere acknowledged
that it was very difficult for the most cautious man
never to have recourse to them in his explanations."
After the survey which we have had to take of the
history of physiology, we cannot but see that the
assumption of final causes in this branch of science
is so far from being sterile, that it has had a large
share in every discovery which is included in the
existing mass of real knowledge. The use of every
organ has been discovered by starting from the
assumption that it must have soine use. The doc-
trine of the circulation of the blood was, as we have
seen, clearly and professedly due to the persuasion
of a purpose in the circulatory apparatus. The
study of comparative anatomy is the study of the
adaptation of animal structures to their purposes.
And we shall soon have to shew that this conception

* Cabanis, Rapports du Physique et du Morale de r Homme,
1. 299.

86 PHYSIOLOGY.

of final causes has, in out* own times, been so far
from barren, that it has, in the hands of Cuvier and
others, enabled us to become intimately acquainted
with vast departments of zoology to which we have
no other mode of access. It has placed before us
in a complete state, animals, of which, for thousands
of years, only a few fragments have existed, and
which differ widely from all existing animals ; and it
has given birth, or at least has given the greatest
part of its importance and interest, to a science
which forms one of the brightest parts of the modern
progress of knowledge. It is, therefore, very far
from being a vague and empty assertion, when we
say that final causes are a real and indestructible
element in zoological philosophy ; and that the ex-
clusion of them, as attempted by the school of which
we speak, is a fundamental and most mischievous
error.

3. Thus, though the physiologist may persuade
himself that he ought not to refer to final causes,
we find that, practically, he cannot help it; and
that the event shows that his practical habit is right
and well-founded. But he may still cling to the
speculative difficulties and doubts in which such sub-
jects may be involved by a priori considerations.
He may say, as Saint-Hilaire does say*, " I ascribe

• Phil. Zool. p. 10.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 87

no intention to God, for I mistrust the feeble powers
of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go no
further. I only pretend to the character of the his-
torian of icJiat is." "I cannot make nature an in-
telligent being who does nothing in vain, who acts
by the shortest mode, who does all for the best.""

I am not going to enter at any length into this
subject, which, thus considered, is metaphysical and
theological, rather than physiological. If any one
maintain, as some have maintained, that no mani-
festation of means apparently used for ends in nature,
can prove the existence of design in the Author of
nature, this is not the place to refute such an
opinion in its general form. But I think it may
be worth while to show, that even those who in-
cline to such an opinion, still cannot resist the
necessity which compels men to assume, in organized
beings, the existence of an end.

Among the philosophers who have referred our
conviction of the being of God to our moral nature,
and have denied the possibility of demonstration on
mere physical grounds, Kant is perhaps the most
eminent. Yet he has asserted the reality of such a
principle of physiology as we are now maintaining
in the most emphatic manner. Indeed, this assump-
tion of an end makes his very definition of an orga-
nized being. "An organized product of nature is
that in which all the parts are mutually ends and

88 PHYSIOLOGY.

means*." And this, he says, is a universal and neces-
sary maxim. Ho adds, " It is well known that the
anatomizers of plants and animals, in order to inves-
tigate their structure, and to obtain an insight into
the grounds why and to what end such parts, why'
such a situation and connexion of the parts, and
exactly such an internal form, come before them,
assume, as indispensably necessary, this maxim, that
in such a creature nothing is in vain, and proceed
upon it in the same way in which in general natural
philosophy we proceed upon the principle that nothing
happens hy chance. In fact, they can as little free
themselves from this teleological principle as from
the general physical one ; for as, on omitting the
latter, no experience would be possible, so on omit-
ting the former principle, no clue could exist for the
observation of a kind of natural objects which can
be considered teleologically under the conception of
natural ends.''

Even if the reader should not follow the reason-
ing of this celebrated philosopher, he will still have
no difficulty in seeing that he asserts, in the most
distinct manner, that which is denied by the author
whom we have before quoted, the propriety and
necessity of assuming the existence of an end as our
guide in the study of animal organization.

• Urtheilskraft, p. 296.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 89

4. It appears to me, therefore, that whether we
judge from the arguments, the results, the practice
of physiologists, their speculative opinions, or those
of the philosophers of a wider field, we are led to
the same conviction, that in the organized world we
may and must adopt the belief, that organization
exists for its purpose, and that the apprehension of
the purpose may guide us in seeing the meaning of
the organization. And 1 now proceed to shew how
this principle has been brought into additional clear-
ness and use by Cuvier.

In doing this, I may, perhaps, be allowed to
make a reflection of a kind somewhat different from
the preceding remarks, though suggested by them.
In another work*, I endeavoured to shew that those
who have been discoverers in science have generally
had minds, the disposition of which was to believe
in an intelligent Maker of the universe ; and that
the scientific speculations wliich produced an oppo-
site tendency, were generally those which, though
they might deal famiHarly with known physical truths,
and conjecture boldly with regard to the unknown,
did not add to the number of solid generalizations.
In order to judge whether this remark is distinctively
applicable in the case now considered, I should have

* Brid(feivater Treatise, Book iii. Chap. vii. and viii. On Induc-
tive Habits of Thought, and On Deductive Habits of Thought.

90 PHYSIOLOGY.

to estimate Cuvier in comparison with other physi-
ologists of his time, which I do not presume to do.
But I may observe, that he is allowed by all to have
established, on an indestructible basis, many of the
most important generalizations which zoology now
contains; and the principal defect which his critics
have pointed out, has been, that he did not generalize
still more widely and boldly. It appears, therefore,
that he cannot but be placed among the great dis-
coverers in the studies which he pursued ; and this
being the case, those who look with pleasure on the
tendency of the thoughts of the greatest men to
an Intelligence far higher than their own, must be
gratified to find that he was an example of this
tendency; and that the acknowledgement of a crea-
tive purpose, as well as a creative power, not only
entered into his belief, but made an indispensable
and prominent part of his philosophy.

Doctrine of Final Causes. — We have now to
describe more in detail the doctrine which Cuvier
maintained in opposition to such opinions as we have
been speaking of; and whicli, in his way of apply-
ing it, we look upon as a material advance in phy-
siological knowledge, and therefore give to it a
distinct place in our history. " Zoology has," he
says*, in the outset of his Regno Animal, "a prin-

* Regnc An. p. C.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 91

ciple of reasoning which is pecuhar to it, and which
it employs with advantage on many occasions : this
is the principle of the conditions of existence^ vulgarly
called the principle of final causes. As nothing can
exist if it do not combine all the conditions which
render its existence possible, the different parts of
each being must be co-ordinated in such a manner
as to render the total being possible, not only in
itself, but in its relations to those which surround
it ; and the analysis of these conditions often leads
to general laws, as clearly demonstrated as those
which result from calculation or from experience.'"

This is the enunciation of his leading principle
in general terras. To our ascribing it to him, some
may object, on the ground of its being self-evident in
its nature*, and having been very anciently applied.
But to this we reply, that the principle must be
considered as a real discovery, in the hands of him
who first shows how to make it an instrument of
other discoveries. It is true in other cases as well as
in this, that some vague apprehension of true general
principles, such as a priori considerations can supply,
has long preceded the knowledge of them as real
and verified laws. In such a way it was seen,
before Newton, that the motions of the planets
must result from attraction ; and before Dufay and

* Swainson, Study of Nat. Hist. p. 85.

92 PHYSIOLOGY.

Franklin, it was held that electrical actions must
result from a fluid. Cuvier's merit consisted, not
in seeing that an animal cannot exist without com-
bining all the conditions of its existence ; but in
perceiving that this truth may be taken as a guide
in our researches concerning animals ; — that the
mode of their existence may be collected from one
part of their structure, and then applied to inter-
pret or detect another part. He went on the sup-
position, not only that animal forms have some plan,
some purpose, but that they have an intelligible plan,
a discoverable purpose. He proceeded in his inves-
tigations hke the decipherer of a manuscript, who
makes out his alphabet from one part of the context,
and then applies it to read the rest. The proof
that his principle was something very different from
an identical proposition, is to be found in the fact,
that it enabled him to understand and arrange the
structures of animals with unprecedented clearness
and completeness of order ; and to restore the forms
of the extinct animals which are found in the rocks
of the earth, in a manner which has been universally
assented to as irresistibly convincing. These results
cannot flow from a trifling or barren principle ; and
they shew us that if we are disposed to form such
a judgment of Cuvier's doctrine, it must be because
we do not fully apprehend its import.

To illustrate this, we need only (juote the state-

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 93

luent which he makes, and the uses to which he
apphes it. Thus in the Introduction to his great
work on " Fossil Remains," he says, " Every orga-
nized being forms an entire system of its own, all
the parts of which mutually correspond, and con-
cur to produce a certain definite purpose by reci-
procal reaction, or by combining to the same end.
Hence none of these separate parts can change their
forms, without a corresponding change in the other
parts of the same animal ; and consequently each
of these parts, taken separately, indicates all the
other' parts to which it has belonged. Thus, if the
viscera of an animal are so organized as only to be
fitted for the digestion of recent flesh, it is also
requisite that the jaws should be so constructed as
to fit them for devouring prey; the claws must be
constructed for seizing and tearing it in pieces ; the
teeth for cutting and dividing its flesh ; the entire
system of the limbs or organs of motion for pursuing
and overtaking it ; and the organs of sense for dis-
covering it at a distance. Nature must also have
endowed the brain of the animal with instincts suf-
ficient for concealing itself, and for laying plans to
catch its necessary victims*.'' By such considera-
tions he has been able to reconstruct the whole of

Theory of the Earthy p. 90.

94

PHYSIOLOGY.

many animals of which parts only were given; —
a positive result, which shows both the reahty and
the value of the truth on which he wrought.

Another great example, equally showing the
immense importance of this principle in Cuvier's
hands, is the reform which, by means of it, he intro-
duced into the classification of animals. Here again
we may quote the view he himself has given* of the
character of his own improvements. In studying
the physiology of the natural classes of vertebrate
animals, he found, he says, " in the respective quan-
tity of their respiration, the reason of the quantity
of their motion, and consequently of the kind of
locomotion. This, again, furnishes the reason for
the forms of their skeletons and muscles; and the
energy of their senses, and the force of their diges-
tion, are in a necessary proportion to the same quan-
tity. Thus a division which had till then been
established, like that of vegetables, only upon obser-
vation, was found to rest upon causes appreciable,
and ai)phcable to other cases.'' Accordingly, he
appHed this view to invertebrates; — examined the
modifications which take place in their organs of
circulation, respiration, and sensation ; and having
calculated the necessary results of these modifica-

Hist. Sc. Nat. i., 293.

USE OF FINAL CAUSES. 95

tions, he deduced from it a new division of those
{inimals, in which they are arranged according to
their true relations.

Sucli have been some of the results of the prin-
ciple of the conditions of existence, as applied by its
great assertor.

It is clear, indeed, that such a principle could
acquire its practical value only in the hands of a
person intimately acquainted with anatomical details,
with the functions of the organs, and with their
variety in different animals. It is only by means
of such nutriment that the embryo truth could be
developed into a vast tree of science. But it is
not the less clear, that Cuvier's immense knowledge
and great powers of thought led to their results,
only by being employed under the guidance of this
master-principle : and, therefore, we may justly
consider it as the distinctive feature of his specu-
lations, and follow it with a gratified eye, as the
thread of gold which runs through, connects, and
enriches his zoological researches : — gives them a
deeper interest and a higher value than can belong
to any view of the organical sciences, in which the
very essence of organization is kept out of view.

The real philosopher, who knows that all the
kinds of truth are intimately connected, and that
all the best hopes and encouragements which are
o-ranted to our nature must be consistent with truth,

96 PHYSIOLOGY.

will be satisfied and confirmed, rather than surprised
and disturbed, thus to find the natural sciences
leading him to the borders of a higher region. To
him it will appear natural and reasonable, that,
after journeying so long among the beautiful and
orderly laws by which the universe is governed, we
find ourselves at last approaching to a source of
order and law, and intellectual beauty : — that, after
venturing into the region of life and feeling and
will, we are led to believe the fountain of life and
will, not to be itself unintelligent and dead, but
to be a living mind, a power which aims as well as
acts. To us this doctrine appears like the natural
cadence of the tones to which we have so long been
listening ; and without such a final strain our ears
would have been left craving and unsatisfied. We
have been lingering long amid the harmonies of
law and symmetry, constancy and developement ;
and these notes, though their music was sweet and
deep, must too often have sounded to the ear of
our moral nature, as vague and unmeaning melodies,
floating in the air around us, but conveying no
definite thought, moulded into no intelligible an-
nouncement. But one passage which we have again
and again caught by snatches, though sometimes
interrupted and lost, at last swells in our ears full,
clear, and decided ; and the religious " Hymn in
honour of the Creator," to which Galen so gladly

TRANSMUTATION OF SPECIES. 97

lent his voice, and in which the best physiologists
of succeeding times have ever joined, is filled into
a richer and deeper harmony by the greatest philo-
sophers of these later days, and will roll on here-
after, the " perpetual song" of the temple of science.

QUESTION OF THE TRANSMUTATION OF SPECIES.

* Besides the fortunes of individual plants and
animals, of which the geologist has traces brought
under his notice, there is another class of questions,
of great interest, but of great difficulty; — the for-
tunes of each species. In what manner do species
which were not, begin to be ? as geology teaches us
that they many times have done; and, as even our
own reasonings convince us they must have done, at
least in the case of the species among which we
live.

We here obviously place before us, as a subject
of research, the creation of living things ; — a sub-
ject shrouded in mystery, and not to be approached
without reverence. But though we may conceive,
that, on this subject, we are not to seek our be-
lief from science alone, we shall find, it is asserted,
within the limits of allowable and unavoidable specu-
lation, many curious and important problems which

Hist. Ind. Sc. Book xviii. Chap. vi. Sect. 2, 3, 4.

E

gg PHYSIOLOGY.

may well employ our physiological skill. For exam-
ple, we may ask :— how we are to recognize the spe-
cies which were originally created distinct^— whether
the population of the earth at one geological epoch
could pass to the form which it has at a succeed-
ing period, by the agency of natural causes alone ?—
and if not, what other account we can give of the
succession which we find to have taken place?

The most remarkable point in the attempts to
answer these and the like questions, is the contro-
versy between the advocates and the opponents of
the doctrine of the transmutation of species. This
question is, even from its mere physiological im-
port, one of great interest; and the interest is
much enhanced by our geological researches, which
again bring the question before us in a striking
form, and on a gigantic scale. We shall, therefore,
briefly state the point at issue.

We see that animals and plants may, by the
influence of breeding, and of external agents operat-
ing upon their constitution, be greatly modified, so
as to give rise to varieties and races different from
what before existed. How different, for instance,
is one kind and breed of dog from another ! The
question, then, is, whether organized beings can,
by the mere working of natural causes, pass from
the type of one species to that of another ? whether
the wolf may, by domestication, become the dog \

TRANSMUTATION OF SPECIES. 99

whether the ourang-outang may, by the power of
external circumstances, be brought within the circle
of the human species? And the dilemma in which
we are placed is this ; — that if species are not
thus interchangeable, we must suppose the fluc-
tuations of which each species is capable, and which
are apparently indefinite, to be bounded by rigor-
ous limits ; whereas, if we allow such a transmuta-
tion of species^ we abandon that belief in the adap-
tation of the structure of every creature to its
destined mode of being, which not only most per-
sons would give up with repugnance, but which,
as we have seen, has constantly and irresistibly
impressed itself on the minds of the best naturalists,
as the true view of the order of the world.

The question, of the limited or unlimited ex-
tent of the modifications of animals and plants, has
received full and careful consideration from emi-
nent physiologists : and in their opinions we find,
I think, an indisputable preponderance to that deci-
sion which rejects the transmutation of species, and
which accepts the former side of the dilemma ;
namely, that the changes of which each species is
susceptible, though difficult to define in words, are
limited in fact. It is extremely interesting and
satisfactory thus to receive an answer in which
we can confide, to inquiries seemingly so wide and
bold as those which this subject involves. I refer

e2

100 PHYSIOLOGY.

to Mr. Lyell, Dr. Prichard, Mr. Lawrence, and
others, for the history of the discussion, and for
the grounds of the decision; and I shall quote
very briefly the main points and conclusions to which
the inquiry has led*.

It may be considered, then, as determined by
the over-balance of physiological authority, that
there is a capacity in all species to accommodate
themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of ex-
ternal circumstances; this extent varying greatly
according to the species. There may thus arise
changes of appearance or structure, and some of
these changes are transmissible to the offspring:
but the mutations thus superinduced are governed
by constant laws, and confined within certain limits.
Indefinite divergence from the original type is not
possible ; and the extreme Hmit of possible variation
may usually be reached in a short period of time :
in short, species ha'ce a real existence in nature^ and a
transmutation from one to another does not exist.

Thus, for example, Cuvier remarks f, that not-
withstanding all the differences of size, appearance,
and habits, which we find in the dogs of various
races and countries, and though we have (in the
Egyptian mummies) skeletons of this animal as it
existed three thousand years ago, the relation of

Lyell, B. ii. c. iv. t Ossem. Foss. Diss. Prel. p. 61.

PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. 101

the bones to each other remains essentially the
same ; and, with all the varieties of their shape
and size, there are characters which resist all the
influences both of external nature, of human inter-
course, and of time.

HYPOTHESIS OF PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES.

Within certain limits, however, as we have said,
external circumstances produce changes in the forms
of organized beings. The causes of change, and
the laws and limits of their eff*ects, as they obtain
in the existing state of the organic creation, are
in the highest degree interesting. And, as has
been already intimated, the knowledge thus obtain-
ed, has been applied with a view to explain the
origin of the existing population of the world,
and the succession of its past conditions. But
those who have attempted such an explanation,
have found it necessary to assume certain addi-
tional laws, in order to enable themselves to de-
duce, from the tenet of the transmutability of the
species of organized beings, such a state of things
as we see about us, and such a succession of states
as is evidenced by geological researches. And here,
again, we are brought to questions of which we must
seek the answers from the most profound physiolo-
gists. Now referring, as before, to those which

102 PHYSIOLOGY.

appear to be the best authorities, it is found that
these additional positive laws are still more inad-
missible than the primary assumption of indefinite
capacity of change. For example, in order to ac-
count, on this hypothesis, for the seeming adapta-
tion of the endowments of animals to their wants,
it is held that the endowments are the result
of the wants ; — that the swiftness of the antelope,
the claws and teeth of the lion, the trunk of the
elephant, the long neck of the giraffe, have been
produced by a certain plastic character in the con-
stitution of animals, operated upon, for a long course
of ages, by the attempts which these animals made
to attain objects which their previous organization
did not place within their reach. In this way, it
is maintained that the most striking attributes of
animals, those which apparently imply most clearly
the providing skill of their Creator, have been
brought forth by the long-repeated efforts of the
creatures to attain the object of their desires ; thus
animals with the highest endowments have been
gradually developed from ancestral forms of the most
limited organization : thus fish, birds, and beasts,
have grown from small gelatinous bodies^ " petits
corps gelatineux," possessing some obscure principle
of life, and the capacity of developement ; and thus
man himself, with all his intellectual and moral,
as well as physical privileges, has been derived from

PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. 103

some creature of the ape or baboon tribe, urged
by a constant tendency to Improve, or at least to
alter his condition.

As we have said, in order to arrive, even hypo-
thetically, at this result, it is necessary to assume,
besides a mere capacity for change, other positive
and active principles, some of which we may notice.
Thus, we must have, as the direct productions of
nature on this hypothesis, certain monads or rough
draughts, the primary rudiments of plants and ani-
mals. We must have, in these, a constant tendency
to progressive improtement^ to the attainment of
higher powers and faculties than they possess; which
tendency is again perpetually modified and controlled
by the force of external circumstances. And in order
to account for the simultaneous existence of animals
in every stage of this imaginary progress, we must
suppose that nature is compelled to be constantly
producing those elementary beings, from which all
animals are successively developed.

I need not stay to point out how extremely arbi-
trary every part of this scheme is; and how com-
plex its machinery would be, even if it did account
for the facts. It may be sufficient to observe, as
others have done*, that the capacity of change, and
of being influenced by external circumstances, such

* Lyell, Book in. (hap. i. p. 413.

104 PHYSIOLOGV,

as we really find it in nature, and therefore such as
in science we must represent it, is a tendency, not
to improve, but to deteriorate. When species are
modified by external causes, they usually degenerate,
and do not advance. And there is no instance of a
species acquiring an entirely new sense, faculty, or
organ, in addition to, or in the place of, what it
had before.

Not only, then, is the doctrine of the transmuta-
tion of species in itself disproved by the best phy-
siological reasonings, but the additional assumptions
which are requisite, to enable its advocates to apply
it to the explanation of the geological and other
phenomena of the earth, are altogether gratuitous
and fantastical.

Such is the judgment to which we are led by the
examination of the discussions which have taken
place on this subject. Yet in certain speculations,
occasioned by the discovery of the Sivatherium, a
new fossil animal from the Sub-Himalaya mountains
of India, M. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire speaks of the
behef in the immutabihty of species as a conviction
which is fading away from men's minds. He speaks
too of the termination of the age of Cuvier, " la
cloture du siecle de Cuvier," and of the commence-
ment of a better zoological philosophy*. But though

• Compte Rendu de VAcad. des Sc. 1837, No. 3. p. 81,

PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES. 105

he expresses himself with great animation, I do not
perceive that he adduces, in support of his pecuhar
opinions, any arguments in addition to those which
he urged during the Hfetime of Cuvier. And the
reader* may recollect that the consideration of that
controversy led us to very different anticipations
from his, respecting the probable future progress of
physiology. The discovery of the Sivatherium sup-
plies no particle of proof to the hypothesis, that the
existing species of animals are descended from ex-
tinct creatures which are specifically distinct : and
we cannot act more wisely than in listening to the
advice of that eminent naturaHst, M. de Blainvillef.
" Against this hypothesis, which, up to the pre-
sent time, I regard as purely gratuitous, and likely
to turn geologists out of the sound and excellent
road in which they now are, I willingly raise my
voice, with the most absolute conviction of being
in the right."

See p. 83. t Compte Rendu, 1837, No. 5, p. 1«8.

e5

106

GEOLOGY.

THE QUESTION OF CREATION AS RELATED TO
SCIENCE.

*The study of geology opens to us the spectacle of
many groups of species which have, in the course
of the earth's history, succeeded each other at vast
intervals of time ; one set of animals and plants dis-
appearing, as it would seem, from the face of our
planet, and others, which did not before exist, be-
coming the only occupants of the globe. And the
dilemma then presents itself to us anew : — either we
must accept the doctrine of the transmutation of
species, and must suppose that the organized species
of one geological epoch were transmuted into those
of another by some long-continued agency of natural
causes ; or else, we must believe in many successive
acts of creation and extinction of species, out of the
common course of nature ; acts which, therefore, we
may properly call miraculous.

But since we reject the production of new species
by means of external influence, do we then, it may
be asked, accept the other side of the dilemma
which we have stated ; and admit a series of crea-

* Hist. Ind. Sc. Book xviii. Chap. vi. Sect. 5.

CREATION AS RELATED TO SCIENCE. 107

tions of species, by some power beyond that which
we trace in tlie ordinary course of nature ?

To this question, the history and analogy of
science, I conceive, teach us to reply as follows : —
All palsetiological sciences, all speculations which at-
tempt to ascend from the present to the remote past,
by the chain of causation, do also, by an inevitable
consequence, urge us to look for the beginning of the
state of things which we thus contemplate ; but in
none of these cases have men been able, by the aid
of science, to arrive at a beginning which is homo-
geneous with the known course of events. The first
origin of language, of civilization, of law and govern-
ment, cannot be clearly made out by reasoning and
research ; and just as little, we may expect, will a
knowledge of the origin of the existing and extinct
species of plants and animals, be the result of phy-
siological and geological investigation.

But, though philosophers have never yet demon-
strated, and perhaps never will be able to demon-
strate, what was that primitive state of things in the
social and material worlds, from which the progres-
sive state took its first departure ; they can still, in
all the lines of research to which we have referred,
go very far back ; — determine many of the remote cir-
cumstances of the past sequence of events; — ascend
to a point which, from our position at least, seems
to be near the origin ; — and exclude many supposi-

108 GEOLOGY.

tions respecting the origin itself. Whether, by the
light of reason alone, men will ever be able to do
more than this, it is difficult to say. It is, I think,
no irrational opinion, even on grounds of philoso-
phical analogy alone, that in all those sciences which
look back and seek a beginning of things, we may
be unable to arrive at a consistent and definite belief,
without having recourse to other grounds of truth,
as well as to historical research and scientific rea-
soning. When our thoughts would apprehend stea-
dily the creation of things, we find that we are
obliged to summon up other ideas than those which
regulate the pursuit of scientific truths ; — to call in
other powers than those to which we refer natural
events : it cannot, then, be considered as very sur-
prising, if, in this part of our inquiry, we are com-
pelled to look for other than the ordinary evidence
of science.

Geology, forming one of the pala^tiological class
of sciences, which trace back the history of the earth
and its inhabitants on philosophical grounds, is thus
associated with a number of other kinds of research,
which are concerned about language, law, art, and
consequently about the internal faculties of man, his
thoughts, his social habits, his conception of right,
his love of beauty. Geology being thus brought
into the atmosphere of moral and mental specula-
tions, it may be expected that her investigations of

CREATION AS RELATED TO SCIENCE. J 09

the probable past will share an influence common to
them ; and that she will not be allowed to point to
an origin of her own, a merely physical beginning of
things ; but that, as she approaches towards such a
goal, she will be led to see that it is the origin of
many trains of events, the point of convergence of
many lines. It may be, that instead of being allowed
to travel up to this focus of being, we are only able
to estimate its place and nature, and to form of it
such a judgment as this; — that it is not only
the source of mere vegetable and animal life, but
also of rational and social life, language and arts,
law and order ; in short, of all the progressive ten-
dencies by which the highest principles of the intel-
lectual and moral world have been and are developed,
as well as of the succession of organic forms, which
we find scattered, dead or living, over the earth.

This reflection concerning the natural scientific
view of creation, it will be observed, has not been
sought for, from a wish to arrive at such conclusions ;
but it has flowed spontaneously from the manner in
which we have had to introduce geology into our
classification of the sciences : and this classification
was framed from an unbiassed consideration of the
general analogies and guiding ideas of the various
portions of our knowledge. Such remarks as we
have made may on this account be considered more
worthy of attention.

1 1 0 GEOLOGV.

But such a train of thought must be pursued
with caution. Although it may not be possible to
arrive at a right conviction respecting the origin of
the world, without having recourse to other than
physical considerations, and to other than geological
evidence ; yet extraneous considerations, and extrane-
ous evidence, respecting the nature of the beginning
of things, must never be allowed to influence our
physics or our geology. Our geological dynamics,
like our astronomical dynamics, may be inadequate
to carry us back to an origin of that state of things,
of which it explains the progress : but this deficiency
must be supplied, not by adding supernatural to
natural geological dynamics, but by accepting, in
their proper place, the views supplied by a portion
of knowledge of a different character and order. If
we include in theology the speculations to which we
have recourse for this purpose, we must exclude
them from geology. The two sciences may con-
spire, not by having any part in common, but
because, though widely diverse in their lines, both
point to a mysterious and invisible origin of the
world.

All that which claims our assent on those higlier
grounds of which theology takes cognizance, must
claim such assent as is consistent with those grounds ;
that is, it nmst require belief in respect of all that
bears upon the highest relations of our being, those

CREATION AS RELATED TO SCIENCE. HI

on which depend our duties and our hopes. Doc-
trines of this kind may and must be conveyed and
maintained, by means of information concerning the
past history of man, and his social and material, as
well as moral and spiritual fortunes. He who be-
lieves that a Providence has ruled the affairs of
mankind, will also believe that a Providence has
governed the material world. But any language in
which the narrative of this government of the ma-
terial world can be conveyed, must necessarily be
very imperfect and inappropriate ; being expressed
in terms of those ideas which have been selected by
men, in order to describe the appearances and rela-
tions of created things as they affect one another.
In all cases, therefore, where we have to attempt to
interpret such a narrative, we must feel that we are
extremely liable to err ; and most of all, when our
interpretation refers to those material objects and
operations which are most foreign to the main pur-
pose of a history of providence. If we have to
consider a communication containing a view of such
M government of the world, imparted to us, as we
may suppose, in order to point out the right direc-
tion for our feelings of trust, and reverence, and
hope, towards the Governor of the world; we may
expect that we shall be in no danger of collecting
from our authority erroneous notions with regard
to the power, and wisdom, and goodness of His

112 GEOLOGY.

government ; or with respect to our own place, duties,
and prospects, and the history of our race, so far as
our duties and prospects are concerned. But that
we should rightly understand the detail of all events
in the history of man, or of the skies, or of the
earth, which are narrated for the purpose of thus
giving a right direction to our minds, is by no
means equally certain ; and I do not think it would
be too much to say, that an immunity from per-
plexity and error, in such matters, is, on general
grounds, very improbable. It cannot then surprize
us to find, that parts of such narrations which
seem to refer to occurrences like those of which
astronomers and geologists have attempted to deter-
mine the laws, have given rise to many interpreta-
tions, all inconsistent with one another, and most of
them at variance with the best estabhshed principles
of astronomy and geology.

It may be urged, that all truths must be consistent
with all other truths, and that therefore the results
of true geology or astronomy cannot be irreconcile-
able with the statements of true theology. And
this universal consistency of truth with itself must
be assented to ; but it by no means follows that we
must be able to obtain a full insight into the nature
and manner of such a consistency. Such an insight
would only be possible if we could obtain a clear
view of that central body of truth, the source

CREATION AS RELATED TO SCIENCE. 113

of the principles which appear in the separate
lines of speculation. To expect that we should see
clearly how the providential government of the
world is consistent with the unvarying laws by
which its motions and developements are regulated,
is to expect to understand thoroughly the laws of
motion, of developement, and of providence ; it is to
expect that we may ascend from geology and astro-
nomy to the creative and legislative center, from
which proceeded earth and stars ; and then descend
again into the moral and spiritual world, because its
source and center are the same as those of the
material creation. It is to say that reason, whether
finite or infinite, must be consistent with itself;
and that, therefore, the finite must be able to com-
prehend the infinite, to travel from any one pro-
vince of the moral and material universe to any
other, to trace their bearing, and to connect their
boundaries.

One of the advantages of that study of the history
and nature of science in which we are now engaged
is, that it warns us of the hopeless and presumptuous
character of such attempts to understand the govern-
ment of the world by the aid of science, without
throwing any discredit upon the reality of our know-
ledge ; — that while it shows how solid and certain
each science is, so long as it refers its own facts to
its own ideas, it confines each science within its own

114 GEOLOGY.

limits, and condemns it as empty and helpless, when
it pronounces upon those subjects which are extra-
neous to it. The error of persons who should seek a
geological narrative in theological records, would be
rather in the search itself than in their interpretation
of what they might find ; and in like manner the error
of those who would conclude against a supernatural
beginning, or a providential direction of the world,
upon geological or physiological reasonings, would
be, that they had expected those sciences alone to
place the origin or the government of the world in
its proper light.

Though these observations apply generally to all
the palaetiological sciences, they may be permitted
here, because they have an especial bearing upon
some of the difficulties which have embarrassed the
progress of geological speculation ; and though such
difficulties are, I trust, nearly gone by, it is impor-
tant for us to see them in their true bearing.

From what has been said, it follows that geology
and astronomy are, of themselves, incapable of
giving us any distinct and satisfactory account of
the origin of the universe, or of its parts. We
need not wonder, then, at any particular instance of
this incapacity ; as for example, that of which we
have been speaking, the impossibility of accounting
by any natural means for the production of all the
successive tribes of plants and animals which have

CREATION AS RELATED TO SCIENCE. Ho

peopled the world in the various stages of its pro-
gress, as geology teaches us. That they were, like
our own animal and vegetable contemporaries, pro-
foundly adapted to the condition in which they were
placed, we have ample reason to believe ; but when
we inquire whence they came into this our world,
geology is silent. The mystery of creation is not
within the range of her legitimate territory ; she
says nothing, but she points upwards.

116

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY.

THE IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES.

* 1 . By an examination of those notions which
enter into all our reasonings and judgments on
living things, it appears that we conceive animal
life as a vortex or cycle of moving matter in which
the form of the vortex determines the motions, and
these motions again support the form of the vortex :
the stationary parts circulate the fluids, and the
fluids nourish the permanent parts. Each portion
ministers to the others, each depends upon the
other. The parts make up the whole, but the
existence of the whole is essential to the preser-
vation of the parts. But parts existing under such
conditions are organs^ and the whole is organized.
This is the fundamental conception of organization.
"Organized beings," says the physiologist -j-, "are com-
posed of a number of essential and mutually depen-
dent parts." " An organized product of nature,'"
says the great metaphysician J, " is that in which all
the parts are mutually ends and means."

2. It will be observed that we do not content
ourselves with saying that in such a whole, all the

* Phil. Ind. Sc. Book ix. Chap. vi.

t Muller, Elem. p. 18. $ Kant, UrtheilskrafL p. 296.

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 1 17

parts are mutually dependent. This might be true
even of a mechanical structure ; it would be easy to
imagine a framework in which each part should be
necessary to the support of each of the others ; for
example, an arch of several stones. But in such
a structure the parts have no properties which they
derive from the whole. They are beams or stones
when separate ; they are no more when joined.
But the same is not the case in an organized
whole. The limb of an animal separated from the
body, loses the properties of a limb and soon ceases
to retain even its form.

3. Nor do we content ourselves with saying that
the parts are mutually causes and effects. This is the
case in machinery. In a clock, the pendulum by
means of the escapement causes the descent of the
weight, the weight by the same escapement keeps
up the motion of the pendulum. But things of this
kind may happen by accident. Stones slide from
a rock down the side of a hill and cause it to be
smooth ; the smoothness of the slope causes stones
still to slide. Yet no one would call such a slide
an organized system. The system is organized, when
the effects which take place among the parts are
essential to our conception of tJie whole; when the
whole would not he a whole, nor the parts, parts,
except these effects were produced ; when the effects
not only happen in fact, but are included in the

1X3 BIOLOGY.

idea of the object ; when they are not only seen,
but foreseen; not only expected, but intended: in
short when, instead of being causes and effects, they
are ends and meam, as they are termed in the above

definition.

Thus we necessarily include, in our Idea of
Organization, the notion of an end, a purpose, a
design ; or, to use another phrase which has been
peculiarly appropriated in this case, a Final Cause.
This idea of a Final Cause is an essential condition
in order to the pursuing our researches respecting
organized bodies.

4. This Idea of Final Cause is not deduced
from the phenomena by reasoning, but is assumed
as the only condition under which we can reason on
such subjects at all. We do not deduce the Idea
of Space, or Time, or efficient Cause, from the phe-
nomena about us, but necessarily look at phenomena
as subordinate to these Ideas from the beginning of
our reasoning. It is true, our ideas of relations of
Space, and Time, and Force, may become much
more clear by our famiharizing ourselves with par-
ticular phenomena: but still, the Fundamental Ideas
are not generated, but unfolded ; not extracted from
the external world, but evolved from the world
within. In like manner, in the contemplation of
organic structures, we consider each part as sub-
servient to some use, and we cannot study the

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 119

structure as organic without such a conception.
This notion of adaptation, — this Idea of an End, —
may become much more clear and impressive by
seeing it exempHfied in particular cases. But still,
though suggested and evoked by special cases, it is
not furnished by them. If it be not supplied by
the mind itself, it can never be logically deduced
from the phenomena. It is not a portion of the
facts which wo study, but it is a principle which
connects, includes, and renders them intelligible ;
as our other Fundamental Ideas do the classes of
facts to which they respectively apply.

5. This has already been confirmed by reference
to fact ; in the History of Physiology, I have shown
that those who studied the structure of animals were
irresistibly led to the conviction that the parts of
this structure have each its end or purpose ; — that
each member and organ not merely produces a
certain effect or answers a certain use, but is so
framed as to impress us with the persuasion that
it was constructed for that use : — that it was in-
tended to produce the effect. It was there seen
that this persuasion was repeatedly expressed in the
most emphatic manner by Galen ; — that it directed
the researches and led to the discoveries of Harvey ;
— that it has always been dwelt upon as a favourite
contemplation, and followed as a certain guide, by
the best anatomists ; — and that it is inculcated by

120 BIOLOGY.

the physiologists of the profoundest views and most
extensive knowledge of our own time. All these
persons have deemed it a most certain and impor-
tant principle of physiology, that in every organized
structure, plant or animal, each intelligible part has
its allotted office: — each organ is designed for its
appropriate function: — that nature, in these cases,
produces nothing in vain : that, in short, each por-
tion of the whole arrangement has its final cause ;
an end to which it is adapted, and in this end, the
reason that it is where and what it is.

6. This notion of Design in organized bodies
must, I say, be supplied by the student of organi-
zation out of his own mind : a truth which will
become clearer if we attend to the most conspicuous
and acknowledged instances of design. The struc-
ture of the eye, in which the parts are curiously
adjusted so as to produce a distinct image on the
retina, as in an optical instrument ; — the trochlear
muscle of the eye, in which the tendon passes round
a support and turns back, like a rope round a
pulley; — the prospective contrivances for the pre-
servation of animals, provided long before they are
wanted, as the milk of the mother, the teeth of the
child, the eyes and the lungs of the foetus : — these
arrangements, and innumerable others, call up m
us a persuasion that Design has entered into the
plan of animal form and progress. And if we

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 121

bring in our minds this conception of Design,
nothing can more fully square with and fit it, than
such instances as these. But if we did not already
possess the Idea of Design ; — if we had not had
our notion of mechanical contrivance awakened by
inspection of optical instruments, or pulleys, or in
some other way ; — if we had never been conscious
ourselves of providing for the future; — if this were
the case, we could not recognize contrivance and
prospectiveness in such instances as we have referred
to. The facts are, indeed, admirably in accordance
with these conceptions, when the two are brought
together : but the facts and the conceptions come
together from different quarters — from without and
from within.

7. We may further illustrate this point by re-
ferring to the relations of travellers who tell us that
when consummate examples of human mechanical
contrivance have been set before savages, they have
appeared incapable of apprehending them as proofs
of design. This shews that in such cases the Idea
of Design had not been developed in the minds of
the people who were thus unintelligent : but it no
more proves that such an idea does not naturally
and necessarily arise, in the progress of men's minds,
than the confused manner in which the same savages
apprehend the relations of space, or number, or
cause, proves that these ideas do not naturally be-

F

^ 22 BIOLOGY.

long to their intellects. All men have these ideas ;
and it is because they cannot help referring their
sensations to such ideas, that they apprehend the
world as existing in time and space, and as a series
of causes and effects. It would be very erroneous
to say that the belief of such truths is obtained
by logical reasoning from facts. And in like man-
ner we cannot logically deduce design from the con-
templation of organic structures; although it is
impossible for ns, when the facts are clearly before
us, not to find a reference to design operating in
our minds.

8. Again ; the evidence of the doctrine of Final
Causes as a fundamental principle of Biology may be
obscured and weakened in some minds by the con-
stant habit of viewing this doctrine with suspicion
as unphilosophical and at variance with morphology.
By cherishing such views it is probable that many
persons, physiologists and others, have gradually
brought themselves to suppose that many or most
of the arrangements which are familiarly adduced
as instances of design may be accounted for, or
explained away ; — that there is a certain degree of
prejudice and narrowness of comprehension in that
lively admiration of the adaptation of means to
ends which common minds derive from the spectacle
of organic arrangements. And yet, even in persons
accustomed to these views, the strong and natural

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 123

influence of the Idcca of a Final Cause, the spon-
taneous recognition of the relation of means to an
end as the assumption which makes organic arrange-
ments intelligible, breaks forth when we bring be-
fore them a new case, with regard to which their
genuine convictions have not yet been modified by
their intellectual habits. I will offer, as an example
which may serve to illustrate this, the discoveries
recently made with regard to the process of suck-
ling of the kangaroo. In the case of this, as of
other pouched animals, the young animal is removed,
while very small and imperfectly formed, from the
womb to the pouch, in which the teats are, and is
there placed with its lips against one of the nipples.
But the young animal taken altogether is not so
large as the nipple, and is therefore incapable of
sucking after the manner of common mammals.
Here is a difficulty : how is it overcome I — By an
appropriate contrivance: the nipple, which in com-
mon mammals is not furnished with any muscle, is
in the kangaroo provided with a powerful extrusory
nmscle by which the mother can inject the milk into
the mouth of her offspring. And again; in order
to give attachment to this muscle there is a bone
which is not found in animals of other kinds. But
this mode of solving the problem of suckling so
small a creature introduces another difficulty. If
the milk is injected into the mouth of the young

f2

] .>4. BIOLOGY

one, without any action of its own muscles, what
is to prevent the fluid entering the windpipe and
producing suffocation? How is this danger avoided ?

By another appropriate contrivance: there is a

funnel in the back of the throat by which the air-
passage is completely separated from the passage
for nutriment, and the injected milk passes in a
divided stream on each side of the larynx to the
oesophagus*. And as if to show that this apparatus
is really formed with a view to the wants of the
young one, the structure alters in the course of
the animaFs growth; and the funnel, no longer
needed, is modified and disappears.

With regard to this and similar examples, the
remark which I would urge is this :— that no one,
however prejudiced or unphilosophical he may in
general deem the reference to Final Causes, can,
at the first impression, help regarding this curious
system of arrangement as the means to an end.
So contemplated, it becomes significant, intelligible,
admirable: without such a principle, it is an un-
meaning complexity, a collection of contradictions,
producing an almost impossible result by a por-
tentous conflict of chances. The parts of this ap-
paratus cannot have produced one another; one
part is in the mother; another part in the young

• Mr. Owen, in Phil. Trans., 1834, p. 348.

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 125

one : without their harmony they could not be
effective ; but nothing except design can operate to
make them harmonious. They are intended to work
together ; and we cannot resist the conviction of this
intention when the facts first come before us. Per-
haps there may hereafter be physiologists who,
tracing the gradual developement of the parts of
which we have spoken, and the analogies which
connect them with the structures of other animals,
may think that this developement, these analogies,
account for the conformation we have described ;
and may hence think lightly of the explanation
derived from the reference to Final Causes. Yet
surely it is clear, on a calm consideration of the
subject, that the latter explanation is not disturbed
by the former; and that the observer's first im-
pression, that this is " an irrefragable evidence of
creative foresight*," can never be obliterated; how-
ever much it may be obscured in the minds of
those who confuse this view by mixing it with
others which are utterly heterogeneous to it, and
therefore cannot be contradictory.

9. I have elsewhere -f remarked how physiologists,
who thus look with suspicion and dislike upon the
introduction of Final Causes into physiology, have
still been unable to exclude from their speculations

» Mr. Owen, in Phil, Trans., 1834, p. 349.
t Bridgewater Treatise , p. 352.

1 26 BIOLOGY.

causes of this kind. Thus Cabanis says*, " I regard
with the great Bacon, the philosophy of Final
Causes as sterile ; but I have elsewhere acknow-
ledged that it was very difficult for the most cautious
man never to have recourse to them in his expla-
nations." Accordingly, he says, " The partisans of
Final Causes nowhere find arguments so strong in
favour of their way of looking at nature as in the
laws which preside and the circumstances of all
kinds which concur in the reproduction of living
races. In no case do the means employed appear
so clearly relative to the end." And it would be
easy to find similar acknowledgments, express or
virtual, in other writers of the same kind. Thus
Bichat, after noting the difference between the or-
ganic sensibility by which the organs are made to
perform their offices, and the animal sensibihty of
which the nervous center is the seat, says|, " No
doubt it will be asked, ichyT — that is, as we shall
see, for wdiat end — " the organs of internal life have
received from nature an inferior degree of sensibility
only, and why they do not transmit to the brain the
impressions which they receive, while all the acts of
the animal life imply this transmission ? The reason
is simply this, that all the phenomena which establish
our connexions with surrounding objects ought to he,

* Rapports de Physique et du Moral, i. 21j9.
f Life and Death, (trans. > p. 32.

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 127

and are in fact, under the influence of the will; while
all those which serve for the purpose of assimilation
only, escape, and ought indeed to escape, such in-
fluence." The reason here assigned is the Final
Cause ; which, as Bichat justly says, we cannot help
asking for.

10. Again; I may quote from the writer last
mentioned another remark, which shews that in the
organical sciences, and in them alone, the Idea of
forces as Means acting to an End, is inevitably
assumed and acknowledged as of supreme authority.
In Biology alone, observes Bichat*, have we to con-
template the state of disease. " Physiology is to
the movements of living bodies, what astronomy,
dynamics, hydraulics, &c., are to those of inert
matter : but these latter sciences have no branches
which correspond to them as pathology corresponds
to physiology. For the same reason all notion of
a medicament is repugnant to the physical sciences.
A medicament has for its object to bring the pro-
perties of the system back to their natural type ;
but the physical properties never depart from this
type, and have no need to be brought back to it :
and thus there is nothing in the physical sciences
which holds the place of therapeutick in physiology."

Anatomie Gene rale, i. lii

128 BIOLOGY.

Or, as we might express it otherwise, of inert forces
we have no conception of what they ought to do^ ex-
cept what they do. The forces of gravity, elasticity,
affinity, never act in a diseased manner ; we never
conceive them as faihng in their purpose ; for we
do not conceive them as having any purpose which
is answered by one mode of their action rather
than another. But with organical forces the case
is different ; they are necessarily conceived as acting
for the preservation and developement of the system
in which they reside. If they do not do this, they
fail, they are deranged, diseased. They have for
their object to conform the living being to a cer-
tain type ; and if they cause or allow it to deviate
from this type, their action is distorted, morbid,
contrary to the ends of nature. And thus this
conception of organized beings as susceptible of
disease, implies the recognition of a state of health,
and of the organs and the vital forces as means for
preserving this normal condition. The state of health
and of perpetual developement is necessarily con-
templated as the Final Cause of the processes and
powers with which the different parts of plants and
animals are endowed.

1 1 . This idea of a Final Cause is applicable as a
fundamental and regulative idea to our speculations
concerning organized creatures only. That there is

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 129

a purpose in many other parts of the creation, we
find abundant reason to beheve from the arrrange-
ments and laws which prevail around us. But
this persuasion is not to be allowed to regulate
and direct our reasonings with regard to inorganic
matter, of which conception the relation of means
and end forms no essential part. In mere Physics,
Final Causes, as Bacon has observed, are not to
be admitted as a principle of reasoning But in
the organical sciences, the assumption of design and
purpose in every part of every whole, that is, the
pervading idea of Final Cause, is the basis of sound
reasoning and the source of true doctrine.

12. The Idea of Final Cause, of end, purpose,
design, intention, is altogether different from the
Idea of Cause, as efficient cause, which we formerly
had to consider ; and on this account the use of
the word Cause in this phrase has been objected to.
If the idea be clearly entertained and steadily
applied, the word is a question of subordinate
importance. The term Final Cause has been long
familiarly used, and appears not likely to lead to
confusion.

13. The consideration of Final Causes, both in
physiology and in other subjects, has at all times
attracted much attention, in consequence of its
bearing upon the belief of an Intelligent Author
of the Universe. I do not intend, in this place, to

f5

130 BIOLOGY.

pursue the subject far in this view : but there is one
antithesis of opinion, already noticed in speaking of
Physiology, on which I will again make a few re-
marks*.

It has appeared to some persons that the mere
aspect of order and symmetry in the works of nature
—the contemplation of comprehensive and consistent
law— is sufficient to lead us to the conception of a
design and intelligence producing the order and
carrying into effect the law. Without here at-
tempting to decide whether this is true, we may
discern, after what has been said, that the concep-
tion of design, arrived at in this manner, is alto-
gether different from that idea of design which is
suggested to us by organized bodies, and which we
describe as the doctrine of Final Causes. The
regular form of a crystal, whatever beautiful sym-
metry it may exhibit, whatever general laws it may
exemphfy, does not prove design in the same man-
ner in which design is proved by the provisions for
the preservation and growth of the seeds of plants,
and of the young of animals. The law of universal
gravitation, however wide and simple, does not im-
press us with the belief of a purpose, as does that
propensity by which the two sexes of each animal
are brought together. If it could be shewn that

* See p. 73.

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 131

the symmetrical structure of a flower results from
laws of the same kind as those which determine the
regular forms of crystals, or the motions of the
planets, the discovery might be very striking and
important, but it would not at all come under our
idea of Final Cause.

14. Accordingly, there have been, in modern
times, two different schools of physiologists, the
one proceeding upon the idea of Final Causes, the
other school seeking in the realm of organized bodies
wide laws and analogies from which that idea is ex-
cluded. All the great biologists of preceding times,
and some of the greatest of modern times, have
belonged to the former school; and especially Cuvier,
who may be considered as the head of it. It was
solely by the assiduous application of this principle
of Final Cause, as he himself constantly declared,
that he was enabled to make the discoveries which
have rendered his name so illustrious, and which
contain a far larger portion of important anatomical
and biological truth than it ever before fell to the
lot of one man to contribute to the science.

15. The opinions which have been put in op-
position to the principle of Final Causes have, for
the most part, been stated vaguely and ambiguously.
Among the most definite of such principles, is that
which, in the History of the subject, I have termed
the Principle of metamorphosed and developed Sym-

^32 BIOLOGY.

metry, upon which has been founded the science of
Morphology.

The reality and importance of this principle are
not to be denied by us : we have shown how they
are proved by its apphcation in various sciences,
and especially in botany. But those advocates of
this principle who have placed it in antithesis to
the doctrine of Final Causes, have by this means
done far more injustice to their own favourite doc-
trine than damage to the one which they opposed.
The adaptation of the bones of the skeleton to the
muscles, the provision of fulcrums, projecting pro-
cesses, channels, so that the motions and forces
shall be such as the needs of life require, cannot
possibly become less striking and convincing, from
any discovery of general analogies of one animal
frame with another, or of laws connecting the de-
velopement of different parts. AMienever such laws
are discovered, we can only consider them as the
means of producing that adaptation which we so
much admire. Our conviction that the Artist works
intelligently, is not destroyed, though it may be
modified and transferred, when we obtain a sight
of his tools. Our discovery of laws cannot con-
tradict our persuasion of ends ; our Morphology
cannot prejudice our Teleology.

16. The irresistible and constant apprehension
of a purpose in the forms and functions of animals

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 133

has introduced into the writings of speculators on
these subjects various forms of expression, more or
less precise, more or less figurative; as, that animals
are framed with a view to the part which they
have to play ; — that nature does nothing in vain ;
that she employs the best means for her ends ; and
the like. However metaphorical or inexact any
of these phrases may be in particular, yet taken
altogether, they convey, clearly and definitely enough
to preclude any serious error, a principle of the
most profound reality and of the highest impor-
tance in the organical sciences. But some adherents
of the morphological school of which I have spoken
reject, and even ridicule, all such modes of ex-
pression. " T know nothing,'' says M. Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire, "of animals which have to play a part in
nature. I cannot make of nature an intelligent
being who does nothing in vain ; who acts by the
shortest mode ; who does all for the best.'' The
philosophers of this school, therefore, do not, it
would seem, feel any of the admiration which is
irresistibly excited in all the rest of mankind at
the contemplation of the various and wonderful
adaptations for the preservation, the enjoyment, the
continuation of the creatures which people the
giobe ; — at the survey of the mechanical contri-
vances, the chemical agencies, the prospective ar-
rangements, the compensations, the minute adap-

134 BIOLOGY.

tations, the comprehensive interdependencies, which
zoology and physiology have brought into view,
more and more, the further their researches have
been carried. Yet the clear and deep-seated con-
viction of the reality of these provisions, which the
study of anatomy produces in its most profound
and accurate cultivators, cannot be shaken by any
objections to the metaphors or terms in which this
conviction is clothed. In regard to the Idea of a
Purpose in organization, as in regard to any other
idea, we cannot fully express our meaning by phrases
borrowed from any extraneous source ; but that
impossibihty arises precisely from the circumstance
of its being a Fundamental Idea which is inevitably
assumed in our representation of each special fact.
The same objection has been made to the idea of
mechanical force, on account of its being often ex-
pressed in metaphorical language ; for writers have
spoken of an energy^ effort, or solicitation to motion ;
and bodies have been said to be animated by a force.
Such language, it has been urged, implies vohtion,
and the act of animated beings. But the idea of
force as distinct from mere motion, — as the cause
of motion, or of tendency to motion, — is not on
that account less real. We endeavour in vain to
conduct our mechanical reasonings without the aid
of this idea, and must express it as we can. Just
as little can we reason concerning organized beings

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 135

without assuming that each part has its function,
each function its purpose ; and so far as our phrases
imply this, they will not mislead us, however inexact,
or however figurative they be.

17. The doctrine of a purpose in organization
has been sometimes called the doctrine of the Con-
ditions of Existence ; and has been stated as teach-
ing that each animal must be so framed as to
contain in its structure the conditions which its
existence requires. When expressed in this man-
ner, it has given rise to the objection, that it
merely offers an identical proposition; since no
animal can exist without such conditions. But in
reality, such expressions as those just quoted give
an inadequate statement of the Principle of a Final
Cause. For we discover in innumerable cases, ar-
rangements in an animal, of which we see, indeed,
that they are subservient to its well being; but
the nature of which we never should have been able
at all to conjecture, from considering what was
necessary to its existence, and which strike us, no
less by their unexpectedness than by their adapta-
tion: so far are they from being presented by any
perceptible necessity. Who would venture to say
that the trochlear muscle, or the power of articu-
late speech, must occur in man, because they are
the necessary conditions of his existence i When,
indeed, the general scheme and mode of being of

^og BIOLOGV.

an animal are known, the expert and profound
anatomist can reason concerning the proportions
and form of its various parts and organs, and prove
in some measure what their relations must be. We
can assert, with Cuvier, that certain forms of the
viscera require certain forms of the teeth, certain
forms of the limbs, certain powers of the senses.
But in all this, the functions of self-nutrition and
digestion are supposed already existing as ends : and
it "being taken for granted, as the only conceivable
basis of reasoning, that the organs are means to
these ends, we may discover what modifications of
these organs are necessarily related to and con-
nected with each other. Instead of terming this
rule of speculation merely " the principle of the con-
ditions of existence,'^ we might term it "the prin-
ciple of the conditions of organs as means adapted to
animal existence as their end:' And how far this
principle is from being a mere barren truism, the
extraordinary discoveries made by the great assertor
of the principle, and universally assented to by
naturalists, abundantly prove. The vast extinct
creation which is recalled to life in Cuvier's great
work, the Ossemens Fossiles, cannot be the conse-
(|uence of a mere identical proposition.

18. It has been objected, also, that the doctrine
of Final Causes supposes us to be acquainted with
the intentions of the Creator; which, it is insinuated,

IDEA OF FINAL CAUSES. 137

is a most presumptuous and irrational basis for our
reasonings. But there can be nothing presumptuous
or irrational in reasoning on that basis, which if we
reject, we cannot reason at all. If men really can
discern, and cannot help discerning, a design in cer-
tain portions of the works of creation, this per-
ception is the soundest and most satisfactory ground
for the convictions to which it leads. The Ideas
which we necessarily employ in the contemplation of
the world around us, afford us the only natural
means of forming any conception of the Creator and
Governor of the Universe ; and if we are by such
means enabled to elevate our thoughts, however
inadequately, towards Him, where is the presumption
of doing so ? or rather, where is the wisdom of re-
fusing to open our minds to contemplations so ani-
mating and elevating, and yet so entirely convincing i
We possess the ideas of time and space, under
which all the objects of the universe present them-
selves to us ; and in virtue of these ideas thus pos-
sessed, we believe the Creator to be eternal and
omnipotent. When we find that we, in like man-
ner, possess the idea of a Design in Creation, and
that with regard to ourselves, and creatures more
or less resembling ourselves, we cannot but contem-
plate their constitution under this idea, we cannot
abstain from ascribing to the Creator the intinite

188

BIOLOGY.

profundity and extent of design to which all these
special instances belong as parts of a whole.

19. I have here considered Design as manifest
in organization only : for in that field of speculation
it is forced upon us as contained in all the pheno-
mena, and as the only mode of our understanding
them. The existence of Final Causes has often
been pointed out in other portions of the creation ; —
in the apparent adaptations of the various parts of
the earth and of the solar system to each other
and to organized beings. In these provinces of
speculation, however, the principle of Final Causes
is no longer the basis and guide, but the sequel and
result of our physical reasonings. If in looking at
the universe, we follow the widest analogies of which
we obtain a view, we see, however dimly, reason to
beheve that all its laws are adapted to each other,
and intended to work together for the benefit of
its organic population, and for the general welfare
of its rational tenants. On this subject, however,
not immediately included in the principle of Final
Causes as here stated, I shall not dwell. I will
only make this remark ; that the assertion appears
to be quite unfounded, that as science advances from
point to point, Final Causes recede before it, and
disappear one after the other. The principle of
design changes its mode of application indeed, but

IDEA OF FLNAL CAUSES. 139

it loses none of its force. We no longer consider
particular facts as produced by special interpositions,
but we consider design as exhibited in the esta-
blishment and adjustment of the laws by which
particular facts are produced. We do not look
upon each particular cloud as brought near us that
it may drop fatness on our fields, but the general
adaptation of the laws of heat, and air, and mois-
ture, to the promotion of vegetation, does not be-
come doubtful. We do not consider the sun as less
intended to warm and vivify the tribes of plants and
animals, because we find that, instead of revolving
round the earth as an attendant, the earth along
with other planets revolves round him. We are
rather, by the discovery of the general laws of
nature, led into a scene of wider design, of deeper
contrivance, of more comprehensive adjustments.
Final causes, if they appear driven further from us
by such an extension of our views, embrace us only
with a vaster and more majestic circuit : instead of
a few threads connecting some detached objects,
they become a stupendous net-work, which is wound
round and round the universal frame of things.

140

PALiETIOLOGY.

NATURE OF PAL.ETIOLOGY.

*1. The class of Sciences which I designate as
Palcetiological are those in which the object is
to ascend from the present state of things to a
more ancient condition, from which the present
is derived by intelligible causes. As conspicuous
examples of this class we may take Geology, Glos-
sology or Comparative Philology, and Comparative
Archseology. These provinces of knowledge might
perhaps be intelligibly described as Histories ; the
History of the Earth, — the History of Languages, —
the History of Arts. But these phrases would
not fully describe the sciences we have in view ;
for the object to which we now suppose their in-
vestigations to be directed is not merely to ascer-
tain what the series of events has been, as in the
common forms of History, but also how it has
been brought about. These sciences are to treat
of causes as well as of effects. Such researches
might be termed philosophical history ; or, in order
to mark more distinctly that the causes of events
are the leading object of attention, wtiological his-

" Phil Ind. Sc. Book x. Ch. i.

NATURE OF PAL^TIOLOGV. 141

tory. But since it will be more convenient to de-
scribe this class of sciences by a single appellation,
I have taken the liberty of proposing to call them
PalGetiological'^ Sciences.

AVhile PalcGontology describes the beings which
have lived in former ages without investigating
their causes, and Etiology treats of causes with-
out distinguishing historical from mechanical causa-
tion ; Palwtiology is a combination of the two
sciences; exploring by means of the second the
phenomena presented by the first. The portions
of knowledge which I include in this term are
palseontological setiological sciences.

2. All these sciences are connected by this
bond ; — that they all endeavour to ascend to a past
state, by considering what is the present state of
things, and what are the causes of change. Geology
examines the existing appearances of the materials
which form the earth, infers from them previous
conditions, and speculates concerning the forces by
which one condition has been made to succeed
another. Another science, cultivated with great

* A philological writer, in ;i very interest^ni^ work, (iMr. Donaldson,
in his New Cratylus, p. 12,) expresses his dislike of this word, and
suggests that I must mean palce-cetiologicaL I think the word is more
likely to obtain currency in the '.nore compact and euphonious form in
which I have used it. It has been adopted by Mr. Winning, in his
iMuuual of Cumpaialice Fiiiloloiiy.

142 PALiETIOLOGY.

zeal and success in modern times, compares the
languages of different countries and nations, and
by an examination of their materials and structure,
endeavours to determine their descent from one
another : this science has been termed Comparative
Philology or Ethnography ; and by the French, Lin-
guistique^ a word which we might imitate in order
to have a single name for the science, but the
Greek derivative Glossology appears to be more con-
venient in its form. The progress of the Arts
(Architecture and the like) ; how one stage of
their culture produced another ; and how far we
can trace their maturest and most complete con-
dition to their earliest form in various nations ; —
are problems of great interest belonging to another
subject, which we may for the present term Com-
parative Archseology. I have already noticed, in
the History'^, how the researches into the origin
of natural objects, and those relating to works of
art, pass by slight gradations into each other ; how
the examination of the changes which have affected
an ancient temple or fortress, harbour or river,
may concern alike the geologist and the antiquary.
Cuvier'^s assertion that the geologist is an antiquary
of a new order, is perfectly correct, for both are
palsetiologists.

* Hint. lud. So. III., 4iJ2.

NATURE OF PAL.^TIOLOGV. 143

o. We are very far from having exhausted,
by this enumeration, the class of sciences which
are thus connected. We may easily point out
many other subjects of speculation of the same kind.
As we may look back towards the first condition
of our planet, we may in like manner turn our
thoughts towards the first condition of the solar
system, and try whether we can discern any traces
of an order of things antecedent to that which is
now established ; and if we find, as some great
mathematicians have conceived, indications of an ear-
lier state in wliich the planets were not yet gathered
into their present forms, we have, in the pursuit
of this train of research, a palsetiological portion
of Astronomy. Again, as we may inquire how lan-
guages, and how man, have been diffused over the
earth's surface from place to place, we may make
the like inquiry with regard to the races of plants
and animals, founding our inferences upon the ex-
isting geographical distribution of the animal and
vegetable kingdoms : and thus the Geography of
Plants and of Animals also becomes a portion of
Palaetiology. Again, as we can in some measure
trace the progress of Arts from nation to nation
and from age to age, we can also pursue a similar
investigation with respect to the progress of Mytho-
logy, of Poetry, of Government, of Law. Thus the
philosophical history of the human race, viewed

144 PALiETIOLOGY.

with reference to these subjects, if it can give rise
to knowledge so exact as to be properly called
Science, will supply sciences belonging to the class
I am now to consider.

4. It is not an arbitrary and useless proceeding
to construct such a class of sciences. For wide
and various as their subjects are, it will be found
that they have all certain principles, maxims, and
rules of procedure in common ; and thus may re-
flect light upon each other by being treated of toge-
ther. Indeed it will, I trust, appear, that we
may by such a juxtaposition of different specula-
tions, obtain most salutary lessons. And questions,
which, when viewed as they first present themselves
under the aspect of a special science, disturb and
alarm men's minds, may perhaps be contemplated
more calmly, as well as more clearly, when they
are considered as general problems of palsetiology.

5. It will at once occur to the reader that,
if we include in the circuit of our classification such
subjects as have been mentioned, — politics and law,
mythology and poetry, — we are travelling very far
beyond the material sciences within whose limits
we at the outset proposed to confine our discus-
sion of principles. But we shall remain faithful to
our original plan ; and for that purpose shall con-
fine ourselves in this work to those palsetiological
sciences which deal with material things. It is

NATURE OF PAL.«TIOLOGY. 145

true, that the general principles and maxims which
regulate these sciences apply also to investigations
of a parallel kind respecting the products which
result from man*'s imaginative and social endow-
ments. But although there may be a similarity
in the general form of such portions of knowledge,
their materials are so different from those with
which we have been hitherto dealing, that we can-
not hope to take them into our present account
with any profit. Language, Government, Law,
Poetry, Art, embrace a number of peculiar Fun-
damental Ideas, hitherto not touched upon in the
disquisitions in which we have been engaged ; and
most of them involved in far greater perplexity and
ambiguity, the subject of controversies far more
vehement, than the Ideas we have hitherto been
examining. We must therefore avoid resting any
part of our philosophy upon sciences, or supposed
sciences, which treat of such subjects. To attend
to this caution, is the only way in which we can
secure the advantage we proposed to ourselves at
the outset, of taking, as the basis of our specula-
tions, none but systems of undisputed truths, clearly
understood and expressed*. We have already said
that we must, knowingly and voluntarily, resign
that livelier and warmer interest which doctrines

• Phil.Ind. Sc. Vol.1, p. 8.

G

146 PAL.ETIOLOGY.

on subjects of Polity or Art possess, and content
ourselves with the cold truths of the material sciences,
in order that we may avoid having the very foun-
dations of our philosophy involved in controversy,
doubt, and obscurity.

6. We may remark, however, that the neces-
sity of rejecting from our survey a large portion
of the researches which the general notion of Palse-
tiology mcludes, suggests one consideration which
adds to the interest of our task. We began our
inquiry with the trust that any sound views which
we should be able to obtain respecting the nature
of truth in the physical sciences, and the mode of
discovering it, must also tend to throw light upon
the nature and prospects of knowledge of all other
kinds; — must be useful to us in moral, political,
and philological researches. We stated this as a
confident anticipation; and the evidence of the
justice of our belief already begins to appear. We
have seen that biology leads us to psychology, if
we choose to follow the path ; and thus the passage
from the material to the immaterial has already
unfolded itself at one point ; and we now perceive
that there are several large provinces of speculation
which concern subjects belonging to man's imma-
terial nature, and which are governed by the same
laws as sciences altogether physical. It is not our
business here to dwell on the prospects which our

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. I47

philosphy thus opens to our contemplation ; but we
may allow ourselves, in this last stage of our pil-
grimage among the foundations of the physical
sciences, to be cheered and animated by the ray that
thus beams upon us, however dimly, from a higher
and brighter region.

But in our reasonings and examples we shall
mainly confine ourselves to the physical sciences ;
and for the most part to Geology, which in the
History I have put forwards as the best represen-
tative of the Palsetiological Sciences.

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES AND OF UNIFORMITY.

1. Doctrine of Catastrophes. — The attempts to
frame a theory of the earth have brought into view
two complete opposite opinions : — one, which re-
presents the course of nature as uniform through all
ages, the causes which produce change having had
the same intensity in former times which they have
at the present day; — the other opinion, which sees
in the present condition of things evidences of cata-
strophes ; changes of a more sweeping kind, and pro-
duced by more powerful agencies than those which
occur in recent times. Geologists who held the
latter opinion, maintained that the forces which have
elevated the Alps or the Andes to their present

g2

]48 PAL^TIOLOGY.

height could not have been any forces which are
now in action : they pointed to vast masses of strata
hundreds of miles long, thousands of feet thick,
thrown into highly-inclined positions, fractured, dis-
located, crushed : they remarked that upon the shat-
tered edges of such strata they found enormous
accumulations of fragments and rubbish, rounded by
the action of water, so as to denote ages of violent
aqueous action: they conceived that they saw in-
stances in which whole mountains of rock in a state
of igneous fusion, must have burst the earth's crust
from below: they found that in the course of the
revolutions by which one stratum of rock was placed
upon another, the whole collection of animal species
which tenanted the earth and the seas had been
removed, and a new set of living things introduced
in its place : finally, they found above all the strata
vast masses of sand and gravel containing bones of
animals, and apparently the work of a mighty deluge.
With all these proofs before their eyes they thought
it impossible not to judge that the agents of change
by which the world was urged from one condition
to another till it reached its present state, must
have been more violent, more powerful, than any
which we see at work around us. They conceived
that the evidence of "catastrophes" was irre-
sistible.

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 149

2. Doctrine of Uniformity. — I need not here
repeat the narrative (given in the History*) of the
process by which this formidable array of proofs was,
in the minds of some eminent geologists, weakened,
and at last overcome. This was done by showing
that the sudden breaks in the succession of strata
were apparent only, the discontinuity of the series
which occurred in one country being removed by
terms interposed in another locality : by urging that
the total effect produced by existing causes, taking
into account the accumulated result of long periods,
is far greater than a casual speculator would think
possible : by making it appear that there are in
many parts of the world evidences of a slow and
imperceptible rising of the land since it was the
habitation of now existing species : by proving that
it is not universally true that the strata separated in
time by supposed catastophes contain distinct species
of animals : by pointing out the limited fields of the
supposed diluvial action : and finally, by remarking
that though the creation of species is a mystery, the
extinction of them is going on in our own day.
Hypotheses were suggested, too, by which it was
conceived that the change of climate might be ex-
plained, which, as the consideration of the fossil
remains seemed to show, must have taken place

Hist. IntL Sc, iii. 612.

150 PAL^TIOLOGY.

between the ancient and the modern times. In this
manner the whole evidence of catastrophes was ex-
plained away: the notion of a series of paroxysms
of violence in the causes of change was represented
as a delusion arising from our contemplating short
periods only in the action of present causes : length
of time was called in to take the place of intensity
of force : and it was declared that geology need not
despair of accounting for the revolutions of the earth,
as astronomy accounts for the revolutions of the
heavens, by the universal action of causes which are
close at hand to us, operating through time and
space without variation or decay.

An antagonism of opinions, somewhat of the
same kind as this, will be found to manifest itself
in the other Palsetiological Sciences as well as in
Geology ; and it will be instructive to endeavour to
balance these opposite doctrines. I will mention
some of the considerations which bear upon the
subject.

8. Is Uniformity probaUe a priori f — The doc-
trine of Uniformity in the course of nature has
sometimes been represented by its adherents as
possessing a great degree of a priori probability.
It is highly unphilosophical, it has been urged, to
assume that the causes of the geological events of
former times were of a different kind from causes
now in action, if causes of this latter kind can in

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 151

any way be made to explain the facts. The analogy
of all other sciences compels us, it was said, to ex-
plain phenomena by known, not by unknown, causes.
And on these grounds the geological teacher recom-
mended* "an earnest and patient endeavour to
reconcile the indications of former change with the
evidence of gradual mutations now in progress."

But on this we may remark, that if by known
causes we mean causes acting with the same intensity
which they have had during historical times, the
restriction is altogether arbitrary and groundless.
Let it be granted, for instance, that many parts
of the earth's surface are now undergoing an imper-
ceptible rise. It is not pretended that the rate of
this elevation is rigorously uniform ; what, then, are
the limits of its velocity ? Why may it not increase
so as to assume that character of violence which
we may term a catastrophe with reference to all
changes hitherto recorded ? Why may not the rate
of elevation be such that we may conceive the strata
to assume suddenly a position nearly vertical ? and is
it, in fact, easy to conceive a position of strata nearly
vertical, a position which occurs so frequently, to bo
gradually assumed? In cases where the strata arr
nearly vertical, as in the Isle of Wight, and hun-
dreds of other places, or where they are actually

* Lyell, B. IV. c. i. p. 328.

J52 PAL^TIOLOGV.

inverted, as sometimes occurs, are not the causes
which have produced the effect as truly knowii
causes, as those which have raised the coasts where
we trace the former beach in an elevated terrace?
If the latter case proves slow elevation, does not
the former case prove rapid elevation? In neither
case have we any measure of the time employed
in the change; but does not the very nature of
the results enable us to discern, that if one was
gradual, the other was comparatively sudden?

The causes which are now elevating a portion
of Scandinavia can be called known causes, only
because we know the effect. Are not the causes
which have elevated the Alps and the Andes known
causes in the same sense? We know nothing in
either case which confines the intensity of the force
within any limit, or prescribes to it any law of uni-
formity. Why, then, should we make a merit of
cramping our speculations by such assumptions?
Whether the causes of change do act uniformly ; —
whether they oscillate only within narrow limits; —
whether their intensity in former times was nearly
the same as it now is ; — these are precisely the
questions which we wish Nature to answer to us
impartially and truly : where is then the wisdom of
"an earnest and patient endeavour" to secure an
affirmative reply?

Thus I conceive that the assertion of an a priori

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 153

claim to probability and philosophical spirit in favour
of the doctrine of uniformity, is quite untenable.
We must learn from an examination of all the facts,
and not from any assumption of our own, whether
the course of nature be uniform. The limit of inten-
sity being really unknown., catastrophes are just as
probable as uniformity. If a volcano may repose
for a thousand years, and then break out and destroy
a city ; why may not another volcano repose for ten
thousand years, and then destroy a continent ; or if
a continent, why not the whole habitable surface of
the earth ?

4. Cycle of Uniformity indefinite. — But this argu-
ment may be put in another form. When it is said
that the course of nature is uniform, the assertion
is not intended to exclude certain smaller variations
of violence and rest, such as we have just spoken
of ; — alternations of activity and repose in volcanos ;
or earthquakes, deluges, and storms, interposed in a
more tranquil state of things. With regard to such
occurrences, terrible as they appear at the time, they
may not much affect the average rate of change;
there may be a cycle, though an irregular one, of
rapid and slow change ; and if such cycles go on suc-
ceeding each other, we may still call the order of
nature uniform, notwithstanding the periods of vio-
lence which it involves. The maximum and minimum
intensities of the forces of mutation alternate with

g5

154 paltETIOLOgy.

one another ; and we may estimate the average course
of nature as that which corresponds to something
between the two extremes.

But if we thus attempt to maintain the uni-
formity of nature by representing it as a series of
cycles^ we find that we cannot discover, in this con-
ception, any soHd ground for excluding catastrophes.
What is the length of that cycle the repetition of
which constitutes uniformity? What interval from
the maximum to the minimum does it admit of?
We may take for our cycle a hundred or a thousand
years, but evidently such a proceeding is altogether
arbitrary. We may mark our cycles by the greatest
known paroxysms of volcanic and terremotive agency,
but this procedure is no less indefinite and incon-
clusive than the other.

But further; since the cycle in which violence
and repose alternate is thus indefinite in its length
and in its range of activity, what ground have we for
assuming more than one such cycle, extending from
the origin of things to the present time ? Why may
we not suppose the maximum force of the causes of
change to have taken place at the earliest period,
and the tendency towards the minimum to have gone
on ever since ? Or instead of only one cycle, there
may have been several, but of such length that our
historical period forms a portion only of the last ; —
the feeblest portion of the latest cycle. And thus

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 155

violence and repose may alternate upon a scale of
time and intensity so large, that man's experience
supplies no evidence enabling him to estimate the
amount. The course of things is uniform^ to an
Intelligence which can embrace the succession of
several cycles, but it is catastrophic to the contem-
plation of a man, whose survey can grasp a part only
of one cycle. And thus the hypothesis of uniformity,
since it cannot exclude degrees of change, nor limit
the range of these degrees, nor define the interval of
their recurrence, cannot possess any essential simpli-
city which, previous to inquiry, gives it a claim upon
our assent superior to that of the opposite cata-
strophic hypothesis.

5. Uniformitarian Arguments are Negative only. —
There is an opposite tendency in the mode of main-
taining the catastrophist and the uniformitarian opi-
nions, which depends upon their fundamental prin-
ciples, and shows itself in all the controversies
between them. The Catastrophist is affirmative, the
Uniformitarian is negative in his assertions : the
former is constantly attempting to construct a theory;
the latter delights in demolishing all theories. The
one is constantly bringing fresh evidence of some
great past event, or series of events, of a striking
and definite kind ; his antagonist is at every step
explaining away the evidence, and showing that it
proves nothing. One geologist adduces his proofs

156 PALyETIOLOGY.

of a vast universal deluge ; but another endeavours
to show that the proofs do not establish either the
universality or the vastness of such an event. The
inclined broken edges of a certain formation covered
with their own fragments beneath superjacent hori-
zontal deposits are at one time supposed to prove a
catastrophic breaking up of the earlier strata ; but
this opinion is controverted by showing that the same
formations, when pursued into other countries, ex-
hibit a uniform gradation from the lower to the
upper, with no trace of violence. Extensive and
lofty elevations of the coast, continents of igneous
rock, at first appear to indicate operations far more
gigantic than those which now occur; but attempts
are soon made to show that time only is wanting
to enable the present age to rival the past in the
production of such changes. Each new fact adduced
by the catastrophist is at first striking and apparently
convincing ; but as it becomes familiar, it strikes the
imagination less powerfully ; and the uniformitarian,
constantly labouring to produce some imitation of
it by the machinery which he has so well studied,
at last in every case seems to himself to succeed,
so far as to destroy the effect of his opponent's
evidence.

This is so with regard to more remote, as well
as with regard to immediate evidences of change.
When it is ascertained that in every part of the

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 157

earth's crust the temperature increases as we de-
scend below the surface, at first this fact seems to
indicate a central heat : and a central heat naturally
suggests an earlier state of the mass, in which it was
incandescent, and from which it is now cooling. But
this original incandescence of the globe of the earth
is manifestly an entire violation of the present course
of things ; it belongs to the catastrophist view, and
the advocates of uniformity have to explain it away.
Accordingly, one of them holds that this increase of
heat in descending below the surface may very pos-
sibly not go on all the way to the center. The heat
which increases at first as we descend, may, he con-
ceives, afterwards decrease ; and he suggests causes
which may have produced such a succession of hotter
and colder shells within the mass of the earth. I
have mentioned this suggestion in the History of
Geology ; and have given my reasons for believing it
altogether untenable * . Other persons also, desirous
of reconciling this subterraneous heat with the tenet
of uniformity, have offered another suggestion: — that
the warmth or incandescence of the interior parts of
the earth does not arise out of an originally hot
condition from which it is gradually cooling, but
results from chemical action constantly going on
amono" the materials of the earth's substance. And

Hisi. Ind. Sci.^ iii. 5f»2, and note.

158 PAL^TIOLOGY.

thus new attempts are perpetually making, to escape
from the cogency of the reasonings which send us
towards an original state of things different from
the present. Those who theorize concerning an
origin go on building up the fabric of their specu-
lations, while those who think such theories unphilo-
sophical, ever and anon dig away the foundation of
this structure. As we have already said, the uni-
formitarian's doctrines are a collection of negatives.

This is so entirely the case, that the uniformita-
rian would for the most part shrink from maintaining
as positive tenets the explanations which he so wil-
lingly uses as instruments of controversy. He puts
forward his suggestions as difficulties, but he will not
stand by them as doctrines. And this is in accord-
ance with his general tendency ; for any of his hypo-
theses, if insisted upon as positive theories, would be
found inconsistent with the assertion of uniformity.
For example, the nebular hypothesis appears to give
to the history of the heavens an aspect which ob-
literates all special acts of creation, for, according
to that hypothesis, new planetary systems are con-
stantly forming ; but when asserted as the origin of
our own solar system, it brings with it an original
incandescence, and an origin of the organic world.
And if, instead of using the chemical theory of sub-
terraneous heat to neutralize the evidence of original
incandescence, we assert it as a positive tenet, we

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 159

can no longer maintain the infinite past duration
of the earth ; for chemical forces, as well as mecha-
nical, tend to equilibrium ; and that condition once
attained, their efficacy ceases. Chemical affinities
tend to form new compounds ; and though, when
many and various elements are mingled together,
the play of synthesis and analysis may go on for a
long time, it must at last end. If, for instance, a
large portion of the earth''s mass were originally pure
potassium, we can imagine violent igneous action to
go on so long as any part remained unoxidized ; but
when the oxidation of the whole has once taken
place, this action must be at an end ; for there is
in the hypothesis no agency which can reproduce
the deoxidized metal. Thus a perpetual motion is
impossible in chemistry, as it is in mechanics ; and
a theory of constant change continued through in-
finite time, is untenable when asserted upon chemical,
no less than upon mechanical principles. And thus
the scepticism of the uniformitarian is of force only
so long as it is employed against the dogmatism
of the catastrophist. When the doubts are erected
into dogmas, they are no longer consistent with the
tenet of uniformity. When the negations become
affirmations, the negation of an origin vanishes also.

6. Uniformity in the Organic World. — In speak-
ing of the violent and sudden changes which con-
stitute catastrophes, our thoughts naturally turn at

160 PAL^TIOLOGY.

first to great mechanical and physical effects; — rup-
tures and displacements of strata ; extensive submer-
sions and emersions of land ; rapid changes of
temperature. But the catastrophes which we have
to consider in geology affect the organic as well as
the inorganic world. The sudden extinction of one
collection of species, and the introduction of another
in their place, is a catastrophe, even if unaccom-
panied by mechanical violence. Accordingly, the
antagonism of the catastrophist and uniformitarian
school has shown itself in this department of the
subject, as well as in the other. When geologists
had first discovered that the successive strata are
each distinguished by appropriate organic fossils, they
assumed at once that each of these collections of
living things belonged to a separate creation. But
this conclusion, as I have already said, Mr. Lyell
has attempted to invalidate, by proving that in the
existing order of things, some species become extinct ;
and by suggesting it as possible, that in the same
order it may be true that new species are from time
to time produced, even in the present course of
nature. And in this, as in the other part of the
subject, he calls in the aid of vast periods of time,
in order that the violence of the changes may be
softened down : and he appears disposed to believe
that the actual extinction and creation of species
may be so slow as to excite no more notice than

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 1(^1

it has hitherto obtained ; and yet may be rapid
enough, considering the immensity of geological
periods, to produce such a succession of different
collections of species as we find in the strata of the
earth's surface.

7. Origin of the present Organic World. — The
last great event in the history of the vegetable and
animal kingdoms was that by which their various
tribes were placed in their present seats. And we
may form various hypotheses with regard to the
sudden or gradual manner in which we may suppose
this distribution to have taken place. We may
assume that at the beginning of the present order
of things, a stock of each species was placed in the
vegetable or animal promnce to which it belongs,
by some cause out of the common order of nature ;
or we may take a uniformitarian view of the sub-
ject, and suppose that the provinces of the organic
world derived their population from some anterior
state of things by the operation of natural causes.

Nothing has been pointed out in the existing
order of things which has any analogy or resem-
blance, of any valid kind, to that creative energy
which must be exerted in the production of a new
species. And to assume the introduction of new
species as a part of the order of nature, without
pointing out any natural fact with which such an
event can be classed, would be to reject creation

162 PAL^TIOLOGY.

by an arbitrary act. Hence, even on natural grounds,
the most intelligible view of the history of the animal
and vegetable kingdoms seems to be, that each
period which is marked by a distinct collection of
species forms a cycle ; and that at the beginning
of each such cycle a creative power was exerted, of
a kind to which there was nothing at all analogous
in the succeeding part of the same cycle. If it be
urged that in some cases the same species, or the
same genus, runs through two geological formations,
which must, on other grounds, be referred to dif-
ferent cycles of creative energy, we may reply that
the creation of many new species does not imply the
extinction of all the old ones.

Thus we are led by our reasonings to this view,
that the present order of things was commenced by
an act of creative power entirely different to any
agency which has been exerted since. None of the
influences which have modified the present races of
animals and plants since they were placed in their
habitations on the earth's surface can have had any
efficacy in producing them at first. We are neces-
sarily driven to assume, as the beginning of the
present cycle of organic nature, an event not included
in the course of nature. And we may remark that
this necessity is the more cogent, precisely because
other cycles have preceded the present.

8. Nebular Origin of the Solar System. — If we

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 163

attempt to apply the same antithesis of opinion (the
doctrines of catastrophe and uniformity,) to the
other subjects of palaetiological science, we shall be
led to similar conclusions. Thus if we turn our
attention to astronomical palaetiology, we perceive
that the nebular hypothesis has a uniformitarian
tendency. According to this hypothesis the forma-
tion of this our system of sun, planets, and satellites,
was a process of the same kind as those which are
still going on in the heavens. One after another,
nebulae condense into separate masses, which begin
to revolve about each other by mechanical necessity,
and form systems of which our solar system is a
finished example. But we may remark, that the
uniformitarian doctrine on this subject rests on most
unstable foundations. We have as yet only very
vague and imperfect reasonings to shew that by
such condensation a material system such as ours
could result ; and the introduction of organized
beings into such a material system is utterly out of
the reach of our philosophy. Here again, therefore,
we are led to regard the present order of the world
as pointing towards an origin altogether of a different
kind from anything which our material science can
grasp.

9. Origin of La^iguages. — We msiy ventuve to
say that we should be led to the same conclusion
once more, if we were to take into our consideration

164 PAL^TIOLOGY.

those palsetiological sciences which are beyond the
domain of matter; for instance, the history of
languages. We may explain many of the differences
and changes which we become acquainted with, by
referring to the action of causes of change which
still operate. But what glossologist will venture to
declare that the efficacy of such causes has been
uniform ; that the influences which mould a lan-
guage, or make one language differ from others of
the same stock, operated formerly with no more
efficacy than they exercise now. " Where," as has
elsewhere been asked, " do we now find a language
in the process of formation, unfolding itself in in-
flexions, terminations, changes of vowels by gram-
matical relations, such as characterize the oldest
known languages?" Again, as another proof how
little the history of languages suggests to the philo-
sophical glossologist the persuasion of a uniform
action of the causes of change, I may refer to the
conjecture of Dr. Prichard, that the varieties of
language produced by the separation of one stock
into several, have been greater and greater as we
go backwards in history: — that* the formation of
sister dialects from a common language, (as the
Scandinavian, German, and Saxon dialects from the
Teutonic, or the Gaelic, Erse and Welsh from the

Researches^ ii., 224,

DOCTRINE OF CATASTROPHES, ETC. 1 6"5

Celtic,) belongs to the first millennium before the
Christian era ; while the formation of cognate lan-
guages of the same family, as the Sanskrit, Latin,
Greek and Gothic, must be placed at least two
thousand years before that era; and at a still
earlier period took place the separation of the great
families themselves, the Indo-European, Semitic, and
others, in which it is now difficult to trace the
features of a common origin. No hypothesis except
one of this kind will explain the existence of the
families, groups, and dialects of languages, which we
find in existence. Yet this is an entirely different
view from that which the hypothesis of the uniform
progress of change would give. And thus in the
earliest stages of man's career, the revolutions of
language must have been, even by the evidence of
the theoretical history of language itself, of an order
altogether different from any which have taken place
within the recent history of man. And we may
add, that as the early stages of the progress of
language must have been widely different from those
later ones of which we can in some measure trace
the natural causes, we cannot place the origin of
language in any point of view in which it comes under
the jurisdiction of natural causation at all.

10. No Natural Origin discoverable. — We are
thus led by a survey of several of the palaetiological
sciences to a confirmation of the principle formerly

](36- PAL.ETIOLOGY.

asserted*, That in no pal^tiological science has
man been able to arrive at a beginning which is
homogeneous with the known course of events. We
can in such sciences often go very far back; —
determine many of the remote circumstances of the
past series of events; — ascend to a point which
seems to be near the origin ; — and hmit the hypo-
theses respecting the origin itself: — but philosophers
never have demonstrated, and, so far as we can
judge, probably never will be able to demonstrate,
what was that primitive state of things from which
the progressive course of the world took its first
departure. In all these paths of research, when
we travel far backwards, the aspect of the earlier
portions becomes very different from that of the
advanced part on which we now stand ; but in all
cases the path is lost in obscurity as it is traced
backwards towards its starting point : — it becomes
not only invisible, but unimaginable ; it is not only
an interruption, but an abyss, which interposes it-
self between us and any intelligible beginning of
things.

* Hht. Jnd. Sci., in., 581.

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 167
RELATION OF TRADITION TO PAL^TIOLOGY.

1 . Importance of Tradition, — Since the Palsetio-
logical Sciences have it for their business to study
the train of past events produced by natural causes
down to the present time, the knowledge concerning
such events which is suppHed by the remembrance
and records of man, in whatever form, must have an
important bearing upon these sciences. All changes
in the condition and extent of land and sea, which
have taken place within man's observation, all effects
of deluges, sea-waves, rivers, springs, volcanos, earth-
quakes, and the like, which come within the reach of
human history, have a strong interest for the palse-
tiologist. Nor is he less concerned in all recorded
instances of the modification of the forms and habits
of plants and animals, by the operations of man, or
by transfer from one land to another. And when we
come to the Palsetiology of Language, of Art, of
Civilization, we find our subject still more closely
connected with history ; for in truth these are
historical, no less than paloetiological investigations.
But, confining ourselves at present to the material
sciences, we may observe that though the impor-
tance of the information which tradition gives us,
in the sciences now under our consideration, as, for
instance geology, has long been tacitly recognized;
yet it is only recently that geologists have em-

168 PAL^TIOLOGV.

ployed themselves in collecting their historical facts
upon such a scale and with such comprehensive views
as are required by the interest and use of collections
of this kind. The Essay of Von Hoff*, On the
Natural Alterations in the Surface of the Earth which
are proved ly Tradition^ was the work which first
opened the eyes of geologists to the extent and im-
portance of this kind of investigation. Since that
time the same path of research has been pursued
with great perseverance by others, especially by Mr.
Lyell ; and is now justly considered as an essential
portion of geology.

2 Connexion of Tradition and Science, — Events
which we might naturally expect to have some
bearing on geology, are recorded in the historical
writings which, even on mere human grounds, have
the strongest claim to our respect as records of the
early history of the world, and are confirmed by
the traditions of various nations all over the globe,
namely, the formation of the earth and its popula-
tion, and a subsequent deluge. It has been made a
matter of controversy how the narrative of these
events is to be understood, so as to make it agree
with the facts which an examination of the earth's
surface and of its vegetable and animal population
discloses to us. Such controversies, when they are

Vol. I., 1822; Vol. II., 1824.

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 169

considered as merely archaeological, may occur in
any of the palsetiological sciences. We may have
to compare and to reconcile the evidence of existing
phenomena with that of historical tradition. But
under some circumstances this process of conciliation
may assume an interest of another kind, on which
we will make a few remarks.

S. Natural and Promdential History of the
World. — We may contemplate the existence of
man upon the earth, his origin and his progress,
in the same manner as we contemplate the ex-
istence of any other race of animals ; namely, in
a purely palsetiological view. We may consider
how far our knowledge of laws of causation enables
us to explain his diffusion and migration, his dif-
ferences and resemblances, his actions and works.
And this is the view of man as a member of the
natural course of things.

But man, at the same time the contemplator
and the subject of his own contemplation, endowed
with faculties and powers, which make him a being
of a different nature from other animals, cannot
help regarding his own actions and enjoyments,
his recollections and his hopes, under an aspect
quite different from any that we have yet had pre-
sented to us. We have been endeavouring to place
in a clear light the Fundamental Ideas, such as
that of Cause, on which depends our knowledge

H

] 70 PAL^TIOLOGY.

of the natural course of things. But there are
other Ideas to which man necessarily refers his
actions ; he is led by his nature, not only to con-
sider his own actions, and those of his fellow-men,
as springing out of this or that cause, leading to
this or that material result; but also as good or
bad, as what they ought or ought not to be. He
has Ideas of morcd relations as well as those Ideas
of material relations with which we have hitherto
been occupied. He is a moral as well as a natural

agent.

Contemplating himself and the world around
him by the light of his Moral Ideas, man is led
to the conviction that his moral faculties were be-
stowed upon him by design and for a purpose;
that he is the subject of a moral government ; that
the course of the world is directed by the Power
which governs it, to the unfolding and perfecting
of man's moral nature ; that this guidance may be
traced in the career of individuals and of the world ;
that there is a promdential as well as a natural
course of things.

Yet this view is beset by no small difficulties.
The full developement of man's moral faculties; —
the perfection of his nature up to the measure of
his own ideas ; — the adaptation of his moral being
to an ultimate destination, by its transit through
a world full of moral evil, in which each has his

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. I71

share ; — are effects for which the economy of the
world appears to contain no adequate provision.
Man, though aware of his moral nature, and ready
to believe in an ultimate destination of purity and
blessedness, is too feeble to resist the temptation
of evil, and to restore his purity when once lost.
He cannot but look for some confirmation of that
providential order which he has begun to believe ;
some provision for those deficiencies in his moral
condition which he has begun to feel.

He looks at the history of the world, and he
finds that at a certain period it offers to him the
promise of what he seeks. When the natural
powers of man had been developed to their full
extent, and were beginning to exhibit symptoms of
decay ; when the intellectual progress of the world
appeared to have reached its limit, without sup-
plying man s moral needs ; we find the great Epoch
in the Providential history of the world. We find
the announcement of a Dispensation by which man's
deficiencies shall be supplied and his aspirations ful-
filled : we find a provision for the purification, the
support, and the ultimate beatification of those who
use the provided means. And thus the providential
course of the world becomes consistent and intel-
ligible.

4. The Sacred Narrative. — But with the new
Dispensation, we receive, not only an account of

172 PALyETIOLOGY.

its own scheme and history, but also a written
narrative of the providential course of the world
from the earliest times, and even from its first
creation. This narrative is recognized and autho-
rized by the new dispensation, and accredited by
some of the same evidences as the dispensation
itself. That the existence of such a sacred nar-
rative should be a part of the providential order
of things, cannot but appear natural ; but naturally
also, the study of it leads to some difficulties.

The Sacred Narrative in some of its earliest
portions speaks of natural objects and occurrences
respecting them. In the very beginning of the
course of the world, we may readily believe (in-
deed, as we have seen in the last chapter, our
scientific researches lead us to believe) that such
occurrences were very different from anything which
now takes place ; — different to an extent and in
a manner which we cannot estimate. Now the
narrative must speak of objects and occurrences in
the words and phrases which have derived their
meaning from their application to the existing
natural state of things. When applied to an initial
supernatural state therefore, these words and phrases
cannot help being to us obscure and mysterious,
perhaps ambiguous and seemingly contradictory.

5. Difficulties in interpreting the Sacred Nar-
rative The moral and providential relations of

RELATION OF TRADITIOxX THERETO. 173

man's condition are so much more important to
him than mere natural relations, that at first we
may well suppose he will accept the Sacred Nar-
rative, as not only unquestionable in its true im-
port, but also as a guide in his views even of mere
natural relations. He will try to modify the con-
ceptions which he entertains of objects and their
properties, so that the Sacred Narrative of the
supernatural condition shall retain the first meaning
which he had put upon it in virtue of his own
habits in the usage of language.

But man is so constituted that he cannot per-
sist in this procedure. The powers and tendencies
of his intellect are such that he cannot help try-
ing to attain true conceptions of objects and their
properties by the study of things themselves. For
instance, when he at first read of a firmament
dividing the waters above from the waters below,
he perhaps conceived a transparent floor in the
skies, on which the superior waters rested which
descend in rain ; but as his observations and his
reasonings satisfied him that such a floor could not
exist, he became willing to allow (as St. Augustin
allowed) that the waters above the firmament are
in a state of vapour. And in like manner in other
subjects, men, as tlieir views of nature became more
distinct and precise, modified, so far as it was neces-

174

PAL^TIOLOGY.

sary for consistency's sake, their first rude interpre-
tations of the Sacred Narrative ; so that, without in
any degree losing its import as a view of the provi-
dential course of the world, it should be so conceived
as not to contradict what they knew of the natural
order of things.

But this accommodation was not always made
without painful struggles and angry controversies.
When men had conceived the occurrences of the
Sacred Narrative in a particular manner, they could
not readily and willingly adopt a new mode of
conception ; and they resisted all attempts to recom-
mend it to them, as attacks upon the sacredness
of the Narrative. They had clothed their belief
of the workings of Providence in certain images ;
and they clung to those images with the persuasion
that without them their belief could not subsist.
Thus they imagined to themselves that the earth
was a flat floor, solidly and broadly laid for the
convenience of man, and they felt as if the kind-
ness of Providence was disparaged, when it was
maintained that the earth was a globe held toge-
ther only by the mutual attraction of its parts.

The most memorable instance of a struggle of
this kind is to be found in the circumstances which
attended the introduction of the Heliocentric Theory
of Copernicus to general acceptance. On this eon-

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 175

troversy I have already made some remarks in tlie
History of Science*, and have attempted to draw
from it some lessons which may be useful to us
when any similar conflict of opinions may occur.
I will here add a few reflections with a similar

view.

6. Such difficulties inevitable.— In the first place,
I remark that such modifications of the current in-
terpretation of the words of Scripture appear to be
an inevitable consequence of the progressive charac-
ter of Natural Science. Science is constantly teach-
ing us to describe known facts in new language, but
the language of Scripture is always the same. And
not only so, but the language of Scripture is neces-
sarily adapted to the common state of man's m-
tellectual developement, in which he is supposed
not to be possessed of science. Hence the phrases
used by Scripture are precisely those which science
soon teaches man to consider as inaccurate. Yet
they are not on that account the less fitted for their
proper purpose: for if any terms had been used,
adapted to a more advanced state of knowledge,
they must have been unintelligible among those to
whom the Scripture was first addressed. If the
Jews had been told that water existed in the
clouds in small drops, they would have marvelled

« HisL Jnd. Scu, i., 401. p. 49 of this.

176 PAL^TIOLOGY.

that it did not constantly descend ; and to have
explained the reason of this, would have been to
teach Atmology in the sacred writings. If they
had read in their Scripture that the earth was a
sphere, when it appeared to be a plain, they would
onlv have been disturbed in their thouofhts, or
driven to some wild and baseless imaginations by
a declaration to them so strange. If the Divinr
Speaker, instead of saying that he would set his
bow in the clouds, had been made to declare that
he would give to water the property of refracting:
different colours at different angles, how utterh
unmeaning to the hearers would the words have
been ! And in these cases, the expressions, being
unintelligible, startling, and bewildering, would have
been such as tended to unfit the Sacred Narrative
for its place in the providential dispensation of
the world.

Accordingly, in the great controversy which took
pace in Galileo's time between the defenders of the
then customary interpretations of Scripture, and the
assertors of the Copernican system of the universe,
when the innovators were upbraided with main-
taining opinions contrary to Scripture, tliey replied
that Scripture was not intended to teach men as-
tronomy, and that it expressed the acts of divine
power in images which were suited to the ideas of
unscientific men. To speak of the rising and set-

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. ] 77

ting and trtavelling of the sun, of the fixity and
of the foundations of the earth, was to use the
only language which would have made the Sacred
Narrative intelligible. To extract from these and
the like expressions doctrines of science, was, they
declared, in the highest degree unjustifiable ; and
such a course could lead, they held, to no result
but a weakening of the authority of Scripture in
proportion as its credit was identified with that of
these modes of applying it. And this judgment
has since been generally assented to by those who
most reverence and value the study of the designs
of Providence as well as that of the works of nature.
7. Science tells us nothing concertiing Creation.
— Other apparent difficulties arise from the accounts
given in the Scripture of the first origin of the
world in which we live : for example, light is repre-
sented as created before the sun. With regard to
difficulties of this kind, it appears that we may
derive some instruction from the result to which
we were led in the last chapter ; — namely, that
in the sciences which trace the progress of natural
occurrences, we can in no case go back to an origin,
but in every instance appear to find ourselves sepa-
rated from it by a state of things, and an order
of events, of a kind altogether different from those
which come under our experience. The thread of
induction respecting the natural course of the world

h5

178 PAL ETIOLOGY.

snaps in our fingers, when we try to ascertain where
its beginning is. Since, then, science can teach us
nothing positive respecting the beginning of things,
she can neither contradict nor confirm what is
taught by Scripture on that subject ; and thus, as
it is unworthy timidity to fear contradiction, so is
it ungrounded presumption to look for confirmation
in such cases. The providential history of the world
has its own beginning, and its own evidence ; and
we can only render the system insecure, by making
it lean on our material sciences. If any one w^ere
to suggest that the nebular hypothesis countenances
the Scripture history of the formation of this system,
by showing how the luminous matter of the sun
might exist previous to the sun itself, we should
act wisely in rejecting such an attempt to weave
together these two heterogeneous threads ; — the
one a part of a providential scheme, the other a
fragment of physical speculation.

We shall best learn those lessons of the true
philosophy of science which it is our object to col-
lect, by attending to portions of science which have
gone through such crises as we are now consider-
ing; nor is it requisite, for this purpose, to bring
forwards any subjects which are still under discus-
sion. It may, however, be mentioned that such
maxims as we are now endeavouring to establish,
and the one before us in particular, bear with a

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 1 75)

peculiar force upon those Palaetiological Sciences
of which we have been treating in the present
Book.

S. Scientific views, when familiar, do not disturb
the authority of Scripture. — There is another reflec-
tion which may serve to console and encourage us
in the painful struggles which thus take place, be-
tween those who maintain interpretations of Scrip-
ture already prevalent and those who contend for
such new ones as the new discoveries of science
require. It is this;— that though the new opinion
is resisted by one party as something destructive
of the credit of Scripture and the reverence which
is its due, yet, in fact, when the new interpreta-
tion has been generally established and incorporated
with men's current thoughts, it ceases to disturb
their views of the authority of the Scripture or
of the truth of its teaching. When the language
of Scripture, invested with its new meaning, has
become familiar to men, it is found that the ideas
which it calls up are quite as reconcileable as the
former ones were with the most entire acceptance
of the providential dispensation. And when this
has been found to be the case, all cultivated per-
sons look back with surprise at the mistake of those
who thought that the essence of the revelation was
involved in their own arbitrary version of some col-
lateral circumstance in the revealed narrative. At

180 PAL^TIOLOGV.

the present day, we can hardly conceive how rea-
sonable men could ever have imagined that religious
reflections on the stability of the earth, and the
beauty and use of the luminaries which revolve
round it, would be interfered with by an acknow-
ledgement that this rest and motion are apparent
only*. And thus the authority of revelation is not
shaken by any changes introduced by the progress
of science in the mode of interpreting expressions
which describe physical objects and occurrences ;
provided the new interpretation is admitted at a
proper season, and in a proper spirit; so as to
soften, as much as possible, both the public con-
troversies and the private scruples which almost
inevitably accompany such an alteration.

9. When should old Interpretations be given up f
— But the question then occurs. What is the pro-
per season for a religious and enlightened com-
mentator to make such a change in the current
interpretation of sacred Scripture \ At what period
ought the established exposition of a passage to be
given up, and a new mode of understanding the
passage, such as is, or seems to be, required by new
discoveries respecting the laws of nature, accepted
in its place I It is plain, that to introduce such an
alteration lightly and hastily would be a procedure

1 have here borrowed a sentence or two from my own History.

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 181

fraught with inconvenience ; for if the change were
made in such a manner, it might be afterwards dis-
covered that it had been adopted without sufficient
reason, and that it was necessary to reinstate the
old exposition. And the minds of the readers of
Scripture, always to a certain extent and for a time
disturbed by the subversion of their long- established
notions, would be distressed without any need, and
might be seriously unsettled. While, on the other
hand, a too protracted and obstinate resistance to
the innovation, on the part of the scriptural exposi-
tors, would tend to identify, at least in the minds
of many, the authority of the Scripture with the
truth of the exposition ; and therefore would bring
discredit upon the revealed word, when the esta-
bhshed interpretation was finally proved to be un-
tenable.

A rule on this subject, propounded by some
of the most enlightened dignitaries of the Roman
Catholic church, on the occasion of the great Co-
pernican controversy begun by Galileo, seems well
worthy of our attention. The following was the
opinion given by Cardinal Bellarmine at the time :
— " When a demonstration shall be found to establish
the earth's motion, it will be proper to interpret
the sacred Scriptures otherwise than they have
hitherto been interpreted in those passages where
mention is made of the stability of the earth and

182 PA hJE TIOLOG Y.

movement of the heavens.'' This appears to be a
judicious and reasonable maxim for such cases in
general. So long as the supposed scientific dis-
covery is doubtful, the exposition of the meaning
of Scripture given by commentators of established
credit is not wantonly to be disturbed : but when
a scientific theory, irreconcileable with this ancient
interpretation, is clearly proved, we must give up
the interpretation, and seek some new mode of
understanding the passage in question, by means
of which it may be consistent with what we know ;
for if it be not, our conception of the things so
described is no longer consistent with itself.

It may be said that this rule is indefinite, for
who shall decide when a new theory is completelv
demonstrated, and the old interpretation become
untenable ? But to this we may reply, that if the
rule be assented to, its application will not be very
difficult. For when men have admitted as a general
rule, that the current interpretations of scriptural
expressions respecting natural objects and events
may possibly require, and in some cases certainly
will require, to be abandoned, and new ones ad-
mitted, they will hardly allow themselves to contend
for such interpretations as if they were essential
parts of revelation; and will look upon the change
of exposition, whether it come sooner or later, with-
out alarm or anger. And when men lend them-

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. l88

selves to the progress of truth in this spirit, it is
not of any material importance at what period a
new and satisfactory interpretation of the scriptural
difficulty is found ; since a scientific exactness in
our apprehension of the meaning of such passages
as are now referred to is very far from being
essential to our full acceptance of revelation.

10. In li'liat Spirit should the Change he accepted?

Still these revolutions in scriptural interpretation

nmst always have in them something which distresses
and disturbs religious communities. And such un-
easy feelings will take a different shape, according as
the community acknowledges or rejects a paramount
interpretative authority in its religious leaders. In
the case in which the interpretation of the Church
is binding upon all its members, the more placid
minds rest in peace upon the ancient exposition,
till the spiritual authorities announce that the time
for the adoption of a new view has arrived ; but
in these circumstances, the more stirring and in-
(piisitive minds, which cannot refrain from the pur-
suit of new truths and exact conceptions, are led
to opinions which, being contrary to those of the
Church, are held to be sinful. On the other hand,
if the religious constitution of the community allow
and encourage each man to study and interpret for
himself the Sacred Writings, we are met by evils
of another kind. In this case, although, by the

J 84 PAL^TIOLOGV.

unforced influence of admired commentators, there
may prevail a general agreement in the usual in-
terpretation of difficult passages, yet as each reader
of the Scripture looks upon the sense which he has
adopted as being his own interpretation, he main-
tains it, not with the tranquil acquiescence of one
who has deposited his judgment in the hands of
his Church, but with the keenness and strenuous-
ness of self-love. In such a state of things, though
no judicial severities can be employed against the
innovators, there may arise more angry controversies
than in the other case.

It is impossible to overlook the lesson which
here offers itself, that it is in the highest degree
unwise in the friends of religion, whether individuals
or communities, unnecessarily to embark their credit
in expositions of Scripture on matters which apper-
tain to natural science. By delivering physical
doctrines as the teaching of revelation, religion may
lose much, but cannot gain anything. This maxim
of practical wisdom has often been urged by Christian
writers. Thus St. Augustin says *: " In obscure
matters and things far removed from our senses,
if we read anything, even in the divine Scripture,
which may produce diverse opinions without damag-
ing the faith which we cherish, let us not rush

* Lib. I. de Genesis ca-^.-s.v\\\.

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 185

headlong by positive assertion to either the one
opinion or the other; lest, when a more thorough
discussion has shown the opinion which we had
adopted to be false, our faith may fall with it : and
we should be found contending, not for the doc-
trine of the sacred Scriptures, but for our own ;
endeavouring to make our doctrine to be that of
the Scriptures, instead of taking the doctrine of
the Scriptures to be ours." And in nearly the
same spirit, at the time of the Copernican contro-
versy, it was thought proper to append to the work
of Copernicus a postil, to say that the work was
written to account for the phenomena, and that
people must not run on blindly and condemn either
of the opposite opinions. Even when the Inquisition,
in 1616, thought itself compelled to pronounce a
decision upon this subject, the verdict was delivered
in very moderate language ; — that " the doctrine
of the earth's motion appeared to be contrary to
Scripture:'' and yet, moderate as this expression
is, it has been blamed by judicious members of
the Roman church as deciding a point such as
religious authorities ought not to pretend to decide ;
and has brought upon that church no ordinary
weight of general condemnation. Kepler pointed
out, in his lively manner, the imprudence of em-
ploying the force of religious authorities on such
subjects : Acies dolahrw in ferrum illisa, postea nee

}8(; PAL.ETIOLOGY.

in lignum valet amplius. Capiat hoc cujus interest.
•' If you will try to chop iron, the axe becomes
unable to cut even wood."

11. In ichat Spirit should the Change be urged? —
But while we thus endeavour to show in what man-
ner the interpreters of Scripture may most safely
and most properly accept the discoveries of science,
we must not forget that there may be errors com-
mitted on the other side also ; and that men of
science, in bringing forward views which may for a
time disturb the minds of lovers of Scripture, should
consider themselves as bound by strict rules of
candour, moderation, and prudence. Intentionally
to make their supposed discoveries a means of
discrediting, contradicting, or slighting the sacred
Scriptures, or the authority of religion, is in them
unpardonable. As men who make the science of
Truth the business of their lives, and are persuaded
of her genuine superiority, and certain of her ulti-
mate triumph, they are peculiarly bound to urge
her claims in a calm and temperate spirit; not for-
ffettino: that there are other kinds of truth besides
that which they peculiarly study. They may pro-
perly reject authority in matters of science ; but
they are to leave it its proper office in matters of
religion. I may here again quote Kepler's expres-
sions : " In Theology we balance authorities, in Philo-
sophy we weigh reasons. A holy man was Lactantius

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 187

who denied that the earth was round; a holy man
was Aiigustin, who granted the rotundity, but denied
the antipodes ; a holy thing to me is the Inquisition,
which allows the smallness of the earth, but denies
its motion ; but more holy to me is Truth ; and
hence I prove, from philosophy, that the earth is
round, and inhabited on every side, of small size,
and in motion among the stars, — and this I do with
no disrespect to the Doctors." I the more wiUingly
quote such a passage from Kepler, because the entire
ingenuousness and sincere piety of his character does
not allow us to suspect in him anything of hypocrisy
or latent irony. That similar professions of respect
may be made ironically, we have a noted example
in the celebrated Introduction to Galileo's Bialor/ue
on the Copernican System ; probably the part which
was most offensive to the authorities. " Some years
ago," he begins, "a wholesome edict was promul-
gated at Rome, which, in order to check the perilous
scandals of the present age, imposed silence upon
the Pythagorean opinion of the mobility of the earth.
There were not wanting,'' he proceeds, " persons who
rashly asserted that this decree was the result, not
of a judicious inquiry, but of passion ill-informed ;
and complaints were heard that counsellors, utterly
unacquainted with astronomical observation, ought
not to be allowed, with their sudden prohibitions,
to clip the wings of speculative intellects. At the

1 88 PAL.^TIOLOGY.

hearing of rash lamentations like these^ my zeal could
not keep silence^'' And he then goes on to say, that
he wishes, in his Dialogue^ to show that the subject
had been fully examined at Rome. Here the irony
is quite transparent, and the sarcasm glaringly ob-
vious. I think we may venture to say that this is
not the temper in which scientific questions should
be treated ; although by some, perhaps, the pro-
hibition of public discussion may be considered as
justifying any evasion which is likely to pass un-
punished.

] 2. Duty of Mutual Forbearance. — We may add,
as a further reason for mutual forbearance in such
cases, that the true interests of both parties are the
same. The man of science is concerned, no less
than any other person, in the truth and import of
the divine dispensation ; the religious man, no less
than the man of science, is, by the nature of his
intellect, incapable of believing two contradictory
declarations. Hence they have both alike a need
for understanding the Scripture in some way in
which it shall be consistent with their understanding
of nature. It is for their common advantage to con-
ciliate, as Kepler says, the finger and the tongue
of God, his works and his word. And they may
find abundant reason to bear with each other, even
if they should adopt for this purpose different inter-
pretations, each finding one satisfactory to himself ;

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. ] 81)

or if any one should decline employing his thoughts
on such subjects at all. I have elsewhere* quoted
a passage from Kepler -(- which appears to me writ-
ten in a most suitable spirit : " I beseech my reader
that, not unmindful of the Divine goodness bestowed
upon man, he do with me praise and celebrate the
wisdom of the Creator, which I open to him from a
more inward explication of the form of the world,
from a searching of causes, from a detection of the
errors of vision ; and that thus, not only in the firm-
ness and stability of the earth may we perceive with
gratitude the preservation of all living things in
nature as the gift of God : but also that in its
motion, so recondite, so admirable, we may acknow-
ledge the wisdom of the Creator. But whoever is
too dull to receive this science, or too weak to believe
the Copernican system without harm to his piety,
him, I say, I advise that, leaving the school of astro-
nomy, and condemning, if so he please, any doctrines
of the philosophers, he follow his own path, and
desist from this wandering through the universe ;
and that, lifting up his natural eyes, with which
alone he can see, he pour himself out from his own
heart in worship of God the Creator, being certain
that he gives no less worship to God than the
astronomer, to whom God has given to see more

* Bridgewater Tr. p. 314. t Com. Stell. Mart. Inlrod.

Xyo PAL^TIOLOGY.

clearly with his inward eyes, and who, from what
he has himself discovered, both can and will glorify
God;^

IS. Case of Galileo. — I may perhaps venture
here to make a remark or two upon this subject
with reference to a charge brought against a cer-
tain portion of the History/ of the Inductwe Sciences.
(p. 26 of this). Complaint has been made* that the
character of the Roman church, as shown in its
behaviour towards Galileo, is misrepresented in the
account given of it in the History of Astronomy. It
is asserted that Galileo provoked the condemnation
he incurred; first, by pertinaciously demanding the
lussent of the ecclesiastical authorities to his opinion
of the consistency of the Copernican doctrine with
Scripture ; and afterwards by contumaciously, and, as
we have seen, contumeliously violating the silence
which the Church had enjoined upon him. It is further
declared that the statement which represents it as
the habit of the Romxan church to dogmatize on
points of natural science is unfounded ; as well as the
opinion that in consequence of this habit, new scien-
tific truths were promulgated less boldly in Italy
than in other countries. I shall reply very briefly
on these subjects ; for the decision of them is by no
means requisite in order to establish the doctrines

* Dublin Review^ No. jx. July, 1838, p, 72.

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. |()i

to which I have been led in the present chapter, nor,
I hope, to satisfy my reader that my views have been
collected from an impartial consideration of scientific
history.

With regard to Galileo, I do not think it can
be denied that he obtruded his opinions upon the
ecclesiastical authorities in an unnecessary and im-
prudent manner. He was of an ardent character,
strongly convinced himself, and urged on still more
by the conviction which he produced among his
disciples, and thus he became impatient for the
triumph of truth. This judgment of him has recently
been delivered by various independent authorities,
and has undoubtedly considerable foundation*. As
to the question whether authority in matters of
natural science were habitually claimed by the
authorities of the Church of Rome, I have to allow
that I cannot produce instances which establish such
a habit. We who have been accustomed to have
daily before our eyes the Monition which the Romish
editors of Newton thought it necessary to prefix —
Cwterum latis a summo Pontifice contra telluris motum

* Besides the Dublin Review, I may quote the Edinburc/h Review,
which I suppose will not be thought likely to have a bias in favour ot
the exercise of ecclesiastical authority in matters of science : " Galileo
contrived to surround the truth with every variety of obstruction. The
tide of knowledge, which had hitherto advanced in peace, he crested
with angry breakers, and he involved in its surf both his friends and
his foes."— £rf. Rev. No. cxxiii. p. 126.

]f)2 PAL.ETIOLOGY.

Decretis 7ios obsequi profitemur — were not likely to
conjecture that this was a solitary instance of the
interposition of the Papal anthority on such sub-
jects. But although it would be easy to find
declarations of heresy delivered by Romish Univer-
sities, and writers of great authority, against tenets
belonging to the natural sciences, I am not aware
that any other case can be adduced in which the
Church or the Pope can be shown to have pro-
nounced such a sentence. I am well contented to
acknowledge this ; for I should be far more grati-
fied by finding myself compelled to hold up the
seventeenth century as a model for the nineteenth in
this respect, than by having to sow enmity between
the admirers of the past and the present through
any disparaging contrast*.

With respect to the attempt made in my
History to characterize the intellectual habits of
Italy as produced by her religious condition, —
certainly it would ill become any student of the
history of science to speak slightingly of that coun-
try, always the mother of sciences, always ready to

* I may add that the most candid of the adherents of the Church
of Rome condemn the assmiiption of authority in matters of science,
made, in this one instance at least, by the ecclesiastical tribunals. The
author of the Ages of Faith (Book viii. p. 248), says, "A Congrega-
tion, it is to be lamented, declared the new system to be opposed to
Scripture, and therefore heretical."

RELATION OF TRADITION THERETO. 193

catch the dawn and hail the rising of any new hght
of knowledge. But I think our admiration of this
activity and acuteness of mind is by no means in-
consistent with the opinion, that new truths were
promulgated more boldly beyond the Alps, and that
the subtilty of the Italian intellect loved to insinuate
what the rough German bluntly asserted. Of the
decent duplicity with which forbidden opinions were
handled, the reviewer himself gives us instances,
when he boasts of the liberality with which Coper-
nican professors were placed in important stations by
the ecclesiastical authorities, soon after the doctrine
of the motion of the earth had been declared by the
same authorities contrary to Scripture, And in the
same spirit is the process of demanding from Galileo
a public and official recantation of opinions which
he had repeatedly been told by his ecclesiastical
superiors he might hold as much as he pleased. I
think it is easy to believe that among persons so
little careful to reconcile public profession with pri-
vate conviction, official decorum was all that was
demanded. When Galileo had made his renunciation
of the earth's motion on his knees, he rose and said,
as we are told, E pur si muove — " and yet it doei<
move.'" This is sometimes represented as the heroic
soliloquy of a mind cherishing its conviction of the
truth, in spite of persecution ; I think we may more
naturally conceive it uttered as a playful epigram

I

ig^ PAL^TIOLOGV.

in the ear of a cardinars secretary, with a full know-
ledge that it would be immediately repeated to his

master.

Besides the Ideas involved in the material
sciences, of which we have already examined the
principal ones, there is one Idea or Conception
which om- Sciences do not indeed include, but to
which they not obscurely point ; and the importance
of this Idea will make it proper to speak of it,
though this must be done very briefly.

OF THE CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE.

1. At the end of the last chapter (p. l66), we
were led to this result, — that we cannot, in any
of the Palsetiological Sciences, ascend to a begin-
ning which is of the same nature as the existing
course of events, and which depends upon causes
that are still in operation. Philosophers never
have demonstrated, and probably never will be able
to demonstrate, what was the original condition of
the solar system, of the earth, of the vegetable
and animal worlds, of languages, of arts. On all
these subjects the course of investigation, followed
backwards as far as our materials allow us to
pursue it, ends at last in an impenetrable gloom.
We strain our eyes in vain when we try, by our
natural faculties, to discern an Origin.

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE. 195

2. Yet speculative men have been constantly
employed in attempts to arrive at that which thus
seems to be placed out of their reach. The Origin
of Languages, the Origin of the present Distri-
bution of Plants and Animals, the Origin of the
Earth, have been common subjects of diligent and
persevering inquiry. Indeed inquiries respecting
such subjects have been, at least till lately, the
usual form which Palsetiological researches have as-
sumed. Cosmogony^ the origin of the world, of
which, in such speculations, the earth was consi-
dered as a principal part, has been a favourite study
both of ancient and of modern times : and most
of the attempts at Geology previous to the pre-
sent period have been Cosmogonies or Geogonies
rather than that . more genuine science which we
have endeavoured to delineate. Glossology, though
now an extensive body of solid knowledge, was
mainly brought into being by inquiries concerning
the original language spoken by men ; and the
nature of the first separation and diffusion of lan-
guages, the first peopling of the earth by man
and by animals, were long sought after with ardent
curiosity, although of course with reference to the
authority of the Scriptures, as well as the evidence
of natural phenomena. Indeed the interest of sueli
inquiries even yet is far from being extinguished.
The disposition to explore the past in the hope

196 PALiETIOLOGV.

of finding, by the light of natural reasoning as
well as by the aid of revelation, the origin of the
present course of things, appears to be unconquer-
able. What was the beginning ? is a question which
the human race cannot desist from perpetually
asking. And no failure in obtaining a satisfactory
answer can prevent inquisitive spirits from again
and again repeating the inquiry, although the blank
abyss into which it is uttered does not even return
an echo.

3. What, then is the reason of an attempt
so pertinacious yet so fruitless? By what motive
are we impelled thus constantly to seek what we
can never find ? Why are the errour of our con-
jectures, the futility of our reasonings, the preca-
riousness of our interpretations, over and over again
proved to us in vain? Why is it impossible for
us to acquiesce in our ignorance and to relinquish
the inquiry? Why cannot we content ourselves
with examining those links of the chain of causes
which are nearest to us; — those in which the con-
nexion is intelligible and clear ; instead of fixing
our attention upon those remote portions where
we can no longer estimate its coherence ? In short,
why did not men from the first take for the
subject of their speculations the Course of Nature
rather than the Origin of Things ?

To this we reply, that in doing what they

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE. 197

have thus done, in seeking what they have sought,
men are impelled by an intellectual necessity. They
cannot conceive a series of connected occurrences
without a commencement; they cannot help sup-
posing a cause for the whole, as well as a cause
for each part; they cannot be satisfied with a suc-
cession of causes without assuming a First Cause.
Such an assumption is necessarily impressed upon
our minds by our contemplation of a series of
causes and effects ; that there must he a First Cause,
is accepted by all intelligent reasoners as an Axiom :
and like other Axioms, its truth is necessarily im-
plied in the Idea which it involves.

4. The evidence of this axiom may be illus-
trated in several ways. In the first place, the
axiom is assumed in the argument usually offered
to prove the existence of the Deity. Since, it is
said, the world now exists, and since nothing can-
not produce something, something must have ex-
isted from eternity. This Something is the First
Cause : it is God.

Now what I have to remark here is this: the
conclusiveness of this argument, as a proof of tin-
existence of one independent, immutable Deity, de-
pends entirely upon the assumption of the axiom
above stated. The world, a series of causes and
effects, exists: therefore there must be, not only
this series of causes and effects, but also a First

198 PAL^TIOLOGV.

Cause. It will be easily seen, that without the
axiom, that in every series of causes and effects
there must be a First Cause, the reasoning is alto-
gether inconclusive.

5. Or to put the matter otherwise : The argu-
ment for the existence of the Deity was stated
thus : Something exists, therefore something must
have existed from eternity. Granted, the opponent
might say ; but this something which has existed
from eternity, why may it not be this very series
of causes and effects which is now going on, and
which appears to contain in itself no indication of
beginning or end ? And thus, without the assump-
tion of the necessity of a First Cause, the force
of the argument may be resisted.

6. But, it may be asked, how do those who
have written to prove the existence of the Deity
reply to such an objection as the one just stated?
It is natural to suppose that, on a subject so inter-
esting and so long discussed, all the obvious argu-
ments, with their replies, have been fully brought
into view. What is the result in this case ?

The principal modes of replying to the above
objection, that the series of causes and effects which
now exists, may have existed from eternity, appear
to be these.

In the first place, our minds cannot be satis-
fied with a series of successive, dependent, causes

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE. 199

and effects, without something first and indepen-
dent. We pass from effect to cause, and from
that to a higher cause, in search of something on
which the mind can rest ; but if we can do nothing
but repeat this process, there is no use in it. We
move our limbs, but make no advance. Our ques-
tion is not answered, but evaded. The mind can-
not acquiesce in the destiny thus presented to it,
of being referred from event to event, from object
to object, along an interminable vista of causation
and time. Now this mode of stating the reply,—
to say that the mind cannot thus be satisfied, ap-
pears to be equivalent to saying that the mind
is conscious of a principle in virtue of which such
a view as this must be rejected ;— the mind takes
refuge in the assumption of a First Cause, from
an employment inconsistent with its own nature.

7. Or again, we may avoid the objection, by
putting the argument for the existence of a Deity
in this form : The series of causes and effects which
we call the icorld, or the course of nature, may
be considered as a iMe, and this whole must have
a cause of its existence. The whole collection ot
objects and events may be comprehended as a
single effect, and of this effect there must be a
cause. This Cause of the Universe must be supe-
rior to, and independent of the special events, which,

200 PAL^TIOLOGY.

happening in time, make up the universe of which
He is the cause. He must exist and exercise
causation, before these events can begin : He must
be the First Cause.

Although the argument is here somewhat modi-
fied in form, the substance is the same as before.
For the assumption that we may consider the whole
series of causes and effects as a single effect, is
equivalent to the assumption that besides partial
causes, we must have a First Cause. And thus
the Idea of a First Cause, and the axiom which
asserts its necessity, are recognized in the usual
ai'gumentation on this subject.

8. This Idea of a First Cause, and the prin-
ciple involved in the Idea, have been the subject
of discussion in another manner. As we have
already said, we assume as an axiom that a First
Cause must exist; and we assert that God, the
First Cause, exists eternal and immutable, by the
necessity which the axiom implies. Hence God is
said to exist necessarily; — to be a necessarily ex-
isting being. And when this necesmry existence
of God had been spoken of, it soon began to be
contemplated as a sufficient reason, and as an abso-
lute demonstration of His existence; without any
need of referring to the world as an effect, in
order to arrive at God as the cause. And thus

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUsE. 201

men conceived that they had obtained a proof of
the existence of the Deity, d 2^^iori, from ideas,
as well as a posteriori, from effects.

9. Thus, Thomas Aquinas employs this reason-
ing to prove the eternity of God*. " Oportet ponere
aliquod primum necessarium quod est per se ipsum
necessarium ; et hoc est Deus, cum sit prima causa
ut dictum est : igitur Deus aeternus est, cum omne
necessarium per se sit aeternum.'' It is true that
the schoolmen never professed to be able to prove
the existence of the Deity d priori : but they made
use of this conception of necessary existence in a
manner which approached very near to such an
attempt. Thus Suarezf discusses the question,
" Utrum ahquo modo possit d priori demonstrari
Deuni esse.'" And resolves thj question in this
manner : " Ad hunc ergo modum dicendum est :
Demonstrato d posteriori Deum esse ens necessarium
et a se, ex hoc attributo posse d priori demon-
strari praeter illud non posse esse aliud ens neces-
sarium et a se, et consequenter demonstrari Deum
esse."

But in modern times attempts were made by
Descartes and Samuel Clarke, to prove the Divine
existence at once d priori, from the conception of

* Aquin. Contr, Geniil. Lib. i. Ch?p. xiv. p. 21.
t Meiaphys. Tom. ii. Disp. xxix. Sect. 3. p. 28.

I o

202 paLtETIOLOGy.

necessary existence; which, it was argued, coiiW
not subsist without actual existence. This argu-
mentation was acutely and severely criticized by
Dr. Waterland.

10. Without dwelling upon a subject, the dis-
cussion of which does not enter into the design of
the present work, I may remark that the question
whether an a priori proof of the existence of a
First Cause be possible, is a question concerning
the nature of our Ideas, and the evidence of the
axioms which they involve, of the same kind as
many questions which we have already had to dis-
cuss. Is our Conception or Idea of a First Cause
gathered from the effects we see around us? It
is plain that we must answer, here as in other
cases, that the Idea is not extracted from the
phenomena, but assumed in order that the phe-
nomena may become intelligible to the mind ; —
that the Idea is a necessary one, inasmuch as it
does not depend upon observation for its evidence ;
but that it depends upon observation for its de-
velopement, since without some observation, we can-
not conceive the mind to be cognizant of the rela-
tion of causation at all. In this respect, how-
ever, the Idea of a First Cause is no less necessary
than the ideas of Space, or Time, or Cause in
general. And whether we call the reasoning de-
rived from such a necessity an argument a priori

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE. 90S

or a posteriori, in either case it possesses the genuine
character of demonstration, being founded upon
axioms wliich command universal assent.

11. I have, however, spoken of our Conception
rather than of our Idea of a First Cause ; for the
notion of a First Cause appears to be rather a
modification of the Fundamental Idea of Cause,
which was formerly discussed, than a separate and
peculiar Idea. And the Axiom, that there must be
a First Cause, is recognized by most persons as
an application of the general Axiom of Causation,
that emry effect must ha'ce a cause ; this latter Axiom
being applied to the world, considered in its totality,
as a single effect. This distinction, however, be-
tween an Idea and a Conception, is of no material
consequence to our argument ; provided we allow
the maxim, that there must be a First Cause, to
be necessarily and evidently true ; whether it be
thought better to speak of it as an independent
Axiom, or to consider it as derived from the general
Axiom of Causation.

12. Thus we necessarily infer a First Cause,
although the Palaetiological Sciences only point to-
loards it, and do not lead to it. But I must observe
further; that in each of the series of events which
form the subject of Palaetiological research, the
First Cause is the same. Without here resting
upon reasoning founded upon our Conception of

204 PAL.ETIOLOGY.

a First Cau?e, I may remark that this identity is
proved by the close connexion of all the branches
of natural science, and the way in which the causes
and the events of each are interwoven with those
which belong to the others. We must needs be-
lieve that the First Cause which produced the earth
and its atmosphere is also the Cause of the plants
which clothe its surface ; that the First Cause of
the vegetable and of the animal world are the
same; that the First Cause which produced light
produced also eyes ; that the First Cause which
produced air and organs of articulation produced
also language and the faculties by which language is
rendered possible : and if those faculties, then also all
man's other faculties ; — the powers by which, as we
have said, he discerns right and wrong, and recog-
nizes a providential as well as a natural course of
things. Nor can we think otherwise than that the
Being who gave these faculties, bestowed them for
some purpose ; — bestowed them for that purpose
which alone is compatible with their nature : — the
purpose, namely, of guiding and elevating man in his
present career, and of preparing him for another state
of being to which they irresistibly direct his hopes.
And thus, although, as we have said, no one of the
Palsetiological Sciences can be traced continuously
to an origin, yet they not only each point to an
or'ffin. but all to the same orioin. Their linos are

CONCEPTION OF A FIRST CAUSE. :^0o

broken indeed, as they run backwards into the early
periods of the world, but yet they all appear
to converge to the same invisible point. And this
point, thus indicated by the natural course of things,
can be no other than that which is disclosed to
us as the starting point of the providential course
of the world ; for we are persuaded by such rea-
sons as have just been hinted, that the Creator
of the natural world can be no other than the
Author and Governor and Judge of the moral and
spiritual world.

13. Thus we are led, by our material sciences,
and especially by the Palsetiological class of them,
to the borders of a higher region, and to a point
of view from which we have a prospect of other
provinces of knowledge, in which other faculties of
man are concerned besides his intellectual, other
interests involved besides those of speculation. On
these it does not belong to our present plan to dwell :
but even such a brief glance as we have taken of
the connexion of material with moral speculations
may not be useless, since it may serve to show
that the principles of truth which we are now labo-
riously collecting among the results of the physical
sciences, may possibly find some application in tliose
parts of knowledge towards which men most natu-
rally look with deeper interest and more serious
reverence.

206 PALiETIOLOGV

OF THE SUPREME CAUSE.

The first Induction of a Cause does not close
the business of scientific inquiry. Behind proximate
causes, there are ulterior causes, perhaps a succes-
sion of such. Gravity is the cause of the motions
of the planets ; but what is the cause of gravity f
This is a question which has occupied men's minds
from the time of Newton to the present day. Earth-
quakes and volcanos are the causes of many geolo-
gical phenomena ; but what is the cause of those
subterraneous operations ? This inquiry after ulterior
causes is an inevitable result from the intellectual
constitution of man. He discovers mechanical
causes, but he cannot rest in them. He must needs
ask, whence it is that matter has its universal power
of attracting matter. He discovers polar forces : but
even if these be universal, he still desires a fur-
ther insight into the cause of this polarity. He
sees, in organic structures, convincing marks of
adaptation to an end : whence, he asks, is this adap-
tation i He traces in the history of the earth a
chain of causes and effects operating through time :
but what, he inquires, is the power which holds
the end of this chain ?

Thus we are referred back from step to step,
in the order of causation, in the same manner as,

OF THE SUPREME CAUSE. 207

in the palaetiologlcal sciences, we were referred back
in the order of time. We make discovery after
discovery in the various regions of science ; each,
it may be, satisfactory, and in itself complete, but
none final. Something always remains undone.
The last question answered, the answer suggests
still another question. The strain of music from
the lyre of Science flows on, rich and sweet, full
and harmonious, but never reaches a close : no
cadence is heard with which the intellectual ear
can feel satisfied.

In the utterance of Science, no cadence is
heard with which the human mind can feel satisfied.
Yet we cannot but go on listening for and expect-
ing a satisfactory close. The notion of a cadence
appears to be essential to our relish of the nuisic.
The idea of some closing strain seems to lurk
among our own thoughts, waiting to be articulated
in the notes which flow from the knowledge of
external nature. The idea of something ultimate
in our philosophical researches, something in
which the mind can acquiesce, and which will leave
us no further questions to ask, of ichence^ and
why^ and by what power^ seems as if it belonged
to us ; — as if we could not have it withheld from
us by any imperfection or incompleteness in the-
actual performances of science. What is the mean-

208 PALiETIOLOGY.

ing of this conviction? What is the reahty thus
anticipated ? Whither does the developement of this
Idea conduct us?

We have aheady seen that a difficulty of the
same kind, which arises in the contemplation of
causes and effects considered as forming an histo-
rical series, drives us to the assumption of a First
Cause, as an Axiom to which our Idea of Causation
in time necessarily leads. And as we were thus
guided to a First Cause in order of Succession,
tlie same kind of necessity directs us to a Supreme
Cause in order of Causation.

On this most weighty subject it is difficult to
speak fitly ; and the present is not the proper occa-
sion, even for most of that which may be said. But
there are one or two remarks which flow from the
general train of the contemplations we have been
engaged in, and with which this Work must con-
clude.

We have seen how different are the kinds of
cause to which we are led by scientific researches.
Mechanical Forces are insufficient without Chemical
Affinities ; Chemical agencies fail us, and we are
compelled to have recourse to Vital Powers ; Vital
Powers cannot be merely physical, and we nmst
believe in something hyperphysical, something of the
nature of a Soul, Not only do biological inquiries

OF THE SUPREME CAUSE. 209

lead us to assume an animal soul, but they drive
us much further ; they bring before us Perception^
and Will evoked by Perception. Still more, these
inquiries disclose to us Ideas as the necessary forms
of Perception, in the actions of which we ourselves
^re conscious. We are aware, we cannot help being
aware, of our Ideas and our Vohtions as belonging
to us^ and thus we pass from tJmigs to persons ; we
have the idea of Personality awakened. And the
idea of Design and Purpose, of which we are con-
scious in our own minds, we find reflected back to
us, with a distinctness which we cannot overlook,
in all the arrangements which constitute the frame
of organized beings.

We cannot but reflect how widely diverse are
the kinds of principles thus set before us ; — by
what vast strides we mount from the lower to the
higher, as we proceed through that series of causes
which the range of the sciences thus brings under
our notice. Yet we know how narrow is the range
of these sciences when compared with the whole
extent of human knowledge. We cannot doubt
that on many other subjects, besides those included
in physical speculation, man has made out solid
and satisfactory trains of connexion ; — has discovered
clear and indisputable evidence of causation. It is
manifest, therefore, that, if we are to attempt to
ascend to the Supreme Cause — if we are to try

210 PAL^TIOLOGY.

to frame an idea of the Cause of all these sub-
ordinate causes; — we must conceive it as more dif-
ferent from any of them, than the most diverse are
from each other; — more elevated above the highest,
than the highest is above the lowest.

But further ; — though the Supreme Cause must
thus be inconceivably different from all subordinate
causes, and immeasurably elevated above them all,
it must still include in itself all that is essential
to each of them, by virtue of that very circum-
stance, that it is the Cause of their Causality. Time
and space, — Infinite Time and Infinite Space, —
must be among its attributes ; for we cannot but
conceive Infinite Time and Space as attributes of
the Infinite Cause of the Universe. Force and
Matter must depend upon it for their efficacy; for
we cannot conceive the activity of Force, or the
resistance of Matter, to be independent powers.
But these are its lower attributes. The Vital
Powers, the Animal Soul, which are the Causes of
the actions of living things, are only the Efffects of
the Supreme Cause of Life. And this Cause, even
in the lowest forms of organized bodies, and still
more in those which stand higher in the scale, in-
volves a reference to Ends and Purposes, in short,
to manifest Final Causes. Since this is so, and
since, even when we contemplate ourselves in a
view studiously narrowed, we still find that we have

OF THE SUPREME CAUSE. 211

Ideas, and Will, and Personality, it would render
our philosophy utterly incoherent and inconsistent
with itself, to suppose that Personality, and Ideas,
and Will, and Purpose, do not belong to the Su-
preme Cause from which we derive all that we have
and all that we are.

But we may go a step further; — though, in
our present field of speculation, we confine our-
selves to knowledge founded on the facts which
the external world presents to us, we cannot for-
get, in speaking of such a theme as that to which
we have thus been led, that these are but a small,
and the least significant portion of the facts which
bear upon it. We cannot fail to recollect that
there are facts belonging to the world within us,
which more readily and strongly direct our thoughts
to the Supreme Cause of all things. W^e can
plainly discern that we have Ideas elevated above
the region of mechanical causation, of animal ex-
istence, even of mere choice and will, which still
have a clear and definite significance, a permanent
and indestructible vahdity. We perceive as a fact,
that we have a Conscience, judging of Right and
Wrong; that we have Ideas of Moral Good and
Evil ; that we are compelled to conceive the orga-
nization of the moral world, as well as of the vital
frame, to be directed to an end and governed by
a purpose. And since the Supreme Cause is the

212 PAL^TIOLOGY,

cause of these facts, the Origin of these Ideas, we
cannot refuse to recognize Him as not only the
Maker, but the Governor of the World ; as not
only a Creative, but a Providential Power ; as not
only a Universal Father, but an Ultimate Judge.

We have already passed beyond the boundary of
those speculations which we proposed to ourselves as
the basis of our conclusions. Yet we may be allowed
to add one other reflection. If we find in ourselves
Ideas of Good and Evil, manifestly bestowed upon
us to be the guides of our conduct, which guides
we yet find it impossible consistently to obey; — if
we find ourselves directed, even by our natural light,
to aim at a perfection of our moral nature from
which we are constantly deviating through weakness
and perverseness ; — if, when we thus lapse and err,
we can find, in the region of Human Philosophy,
no power which can efface our aberrations, or re-
concile our actual with our ideal being, or give
us any steady hope and trust with regard to our
actions, after we have thus discovered their incon-
gruity with their genuine standard; — if we discern
that this is our condition, how can we fail to see
that it is in the highest degree consistent with all
the indications supplied by such a philosophy as
that of which we have been attempting to lay the
foundations, that the Supreme Cause, through whom
man exists as a moral being of vast capacities

OF TIIK SUPRE3IE CAUSE. 213

and infinite hopes, should have Himself provided a
Teaching for our ignorance, a Propitiation for our
sin, a Support for our weakness, a Purification and
Sanctification of our nature ?

And thus, in concluding our long survey of the
grounds and structure of Science, and of the les-
sons which the study of it teaches us, we find our-
selves brought to a point of view in which we can
cordially sympathize, and more than sympathize,
with all the loftiest expressions of admiration and
reverence and hope and trust, which have been ut-
tered by those who in former times have spoken
of the elevated thoughts to which the contempla-
tion of the nature and progress of human know-
ledge gives rise. We can not only hold with Galen,
and Harvey, and all the great physiologists, that
the organs of animals give evidence of a purpose ;
— not only assert with Cuvier that this conviction
of a purpose can alone enable us to understand
every part of every living thing ; — not only say
with Newton that " every true step made in philo-
sophy brings us nearer to the First Cause, and is
on that account highly to be valued ;" — and that
"the business of natural philosophy is to deduce
causes from effects, till we come to the very First
Cause, which certainly is not mechanical :'' — but
we can go much further, and declare, still with

214 PALtETIOLOGY.

Newton, that " this beautiful system could have
its origin no other way than by the purpose and
command of an intelligent and powerful Being,
who governs all things, not as the soul of the
world, but as the Lord of the Universe ; who is
not only God, but Lord and Governor."*'

When we have advanced so far, there yet re-
mains one step. We may recollect the prayer of
one, the Master in this School of the Philosophy of
Science : " This also we humbly and earnestly beg :
— that human things may not prejudice such as
are divine; — neither that from the unlocking of
the gates of sense, and the kindling of a greater
natural light, anything may arise of incredulity or
intellectual night towards divine mysteries ; but
rather that by our minds, thoroughly purged and
cleansed from fancy and vanity, and yet subject
and perfectly given up to the divine oracles, there
may be given unto Faith the things that are Faith's.''
When we are thus prepared for a higher teaching,
we may be ready to Hsten to a greater than Bacon,
when he says to those who have sought their God
in the material universe, " Whom ye ignorantly
worship. Him declare I unto you." And when we
recollect how utterly inadequate all human language
has been shown to be, to express the nature of
that Supreme Cause of the Natural, and Rational,

OF THE SUPREME CAUSE. 215

and Moral, and Spiritual world, to which our
Philosophy points with trembling finger and shaded
eyes, we may receive, wdth the less wonder but
with the more reverence, the declaration which has
been vouchsafed to us :

In the Beginning was the Word, and the
Word was with God. and the Word w\\s God,

THE E N D.

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