(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Industrialization and variation in social structure : an empirical test of the convergence hypothesis"

LIBRARY 

OF THE 

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE 
OF TECHNOLOGY 



WORKING PAPER 
ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 



MASSACHUSETTS 

INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

50 MEMORIAL DRIVE 

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139 



^ts&. INST, rfc^j^ 
DEC 1.2 1975 J 

MASS. INST. TECH. 



DEC 



9 75 



INDUSTRIALIZATION AND VARIATION IN SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE 
CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS 

By Stephen J. Kobrin 



WP 825-75 



December, 1975 



INDUSTRIALIZATION AND VARIATION IN SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE 
CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS 

By Stephen J. Kobrin 




WP 825-75 



December, 1975 



^£) , 825- ^s■ 



DEC 10 1975 ': 



I. Introduction* 

In Industrialism and Industrial Man , Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers 
concluded that social systems become more uniform and societies in general 
become more alike as they industrialize. While the convergence hypothesis 
has generated a good deal of discussion and controversy in the intervening 
fifteen years, reports of empirical tests of the concept have been limited. 
This paper summarizes such an attempt utilizing the techniques of cross- 
national research across a group of fifty-nine developing countries. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis will first be discussed, the 
concept will then be restated in terms of testable hypotheses, the empirical 
findings will be reviewed, and, last, the conclusions will be presented. 

II, Industrialization and social change 

Reduced to its essence, industrialization entails the use of inanimate 

2 
sources of power--tools and machines--to multiply human effort in production. 

As its raison d'etre is an increase in output per unit of (human) input, 

broadscale industrialization results in an increased societal emphasis on 

efficiency which, given the nature of the machine pleads to larger scale 

productive units. There is thus a central logic to industrialization, a 

logic which leads to an increased emphasis on efficiency and scale. 

As Moore has observed, it is not reasonable to expect industrialization 
to be neutral in its social consequences. Rather, evidence from both the 
West and the developing countries indicates that industrialization tends 
to be a "universal social solvent." The logic of the machine, the pressure 
it exerts for increases in efficiency and scale, is inconsistent with the 



* The author would like to thank Charles A, Myers and Clark Kerr for their 
comments and encouragement. 

0725880 



- 2 



basic structure of traditional society. 

Widespread mechanization of production is difficult ( if not impossible) 
to achieve within the bounds of a traditional society where roles are diffused 

and ascribed, and the economic, social, and religious aspects of life 

9 
are often interwoven as a whole cloth. This conflict between mechanization 

and social structure results in what is perhaps the most important immediate 

effect of industrialization, the different iation of roles or the division of labor. 

Development of a mechanized and occupationally differentiated system 
of production, in turn, results in pressures for increases in both horizontal 
and vertical mobility and for changes in the basic patterns of social organ- 
ization, A relatively rigid and stable stratification system, with both 
status and roles ascriptively determined, directly conflicts with the 
"functional requisites of a society with expanding and progressing economic 
activities," To the extent efficiency is important, positions must be 
filled on the basis of skills and abilities rather than status; if large 
scale productive organizations are to develop, workers must be free to 
change locale. 

Similarly, industrialization has placed severe disintegrative pressure 

12 
on extended families, tribes, and clans. As Tumin has noted, industrial- 

13 
ization violates the corporate nature of the clan; its organization is 

inconsistent with the use of individuals as units of work or remuneration. 
The nuclear or conjugal family is much better suited to broadscale mechan- 
ization. It is geographically and socially mobile, allows for individual 
specialization, and importantly for individual remuneration and accumulation. 



Two points emerge from this brief summary of the relationship between 
industrialization and social change. First, industrialization results in 
pressures for change in the structure of traditional society, a process defined 
in this paper as social modernization. Second, there is a central logic to 
industrialization resulting from the emphasis on efficiency and scale which 
directs--within limits--the process of change. The social structures which 
evolve must be consistent with the requisites of industrialization. We would 
have to agree with Levy that: "(T)he emphasis associated with high levels 
of modernization on rationality, universalism, and functional specificity, 
for example, limit the possibilities of relationships in terms of which 
manufacturing can be carried out." As one author has noted, there are 
many ways of skinning a cat, but very few ways of operating a zipper, 

III. Convergence 

In their final review of Industrialism and Industrial Man . Dunlop et al 
conclude that, "...the logic of industrialization results in advanced indus- 
trial societies becoming more alike, despite cultural and political differ- 
ences, and certainly more alike than any one of them is like a less developed 
country." However, they note that given political, social and cultural 

differences, there will never be total convergence; that convergence is 

18 
towards a range of alternatives rather than a single point. 

There has been a good deal of support for the concept of convergence 
in the literature, Karsh and Cole note that the application of science and 

technology implies a level of standardization more universal than in pre- 

19 
industrial society. Haskins finds, "(F)undamentally convergent pressures 



- 4 



20 
immanent in the nature and structure of science and technology." Levy 

concludes that, "(F)or all of their important differences, all relatively 

modernized societies are in fact becoming more and more alike all the time 

21 
and the range of possible variation among them decreases all the time." 

According to Moore and Feldman, "virtually no one rejects the notion 

that industrial societies share a core set of social structures that together 

22 
provide an extended operational definition of industrialism itself." 

However, Moore had earlier (in 1965) concluded that the weight of the evidence 

was against convergence. He felt that while structural interdependence and 

functional integration exert pressures for convergence, they are more than 

offset by differences in preindustrial society and differences in the routes 

23 
and processes of change. Upon closer examination, it is not clear that 

this position differs from that contained in Industrialism and Industrial 

Man and its various postscripts. It will be recalled that Dunlop et al 

noted that cultural, social and political differences prevent complete 

uniformity. Furthermore, they saw the process as so complex and "subject to 

24 
such contrary internal pressures" that it is inherently pluralistic. 

In this research we are concerned with the direct impact of industrial- 
ization upon social structure. We are thus not interested in testing (nor 
entering the lists on) questions of convergence of political systems, ideol- 
ogies, values and attitudes, or cultural orientations. We would agree that 
both preindustrial social structures and differences in the path of industrial- 
ization impinge on the process of social modernization. However, it appears 
obvious that once a society embarks on a course of broadscale industrialization, 
with its emphasis upon efficiency and scale, and pressures for role differen- 
tiation, mobility, and changes in social organization, the range and variation 



of social structure becomes increasingly circumscribed. 

IV, Hypotheses 

In operational terras the convergence hypothesis implies differences in 
the variation of an indicator (or indicators) of social structure at differ- 
ent levels of industrialization. One would expect decreases in the variation 
of an indicator of social structure (about a central measure) at higher levels 
of industrialization. Furthermore, assuming one could isolate and quantify 
various aspects of social structure (e.g. mobility or family organization) 
one would also expect less variation among the various aspects of social 
structure at higher levels of industrialization. Thus we would hypothesize 
that: 

(1) The variation about the mean for a given indicator of social 
structure decreases as the level of industrialization increases. 

(2) There is less variation between the indicators of various aspects 
of social structure at higher levels of industrialization. 

(3) If countries are divided into relatively less and relatively more 
industrialized groups, there is less variation within than between 
groups. 

V. Methodology 

The methodology is cross-national and cross sectional with most data 

25 
collected between 1962-1965. All non-socialist bloc developing countries 

that were sovereign states as of 1965 and met population and economic size 

26 
minimums were included in the analysis. The final country list (see Table 4) 

27 
contains fifty-nine countries. 

Raw indicators of social structure that are directly affected by indus- 
trialization were obtained from published sources, such as the various yearbooks 
published by international organizations, university data banks, and collections 



- 6 



of qualitative indicators such as those compiled by Adelman and Morris or 

28 
Banks and Textor, The original list included twenty- two indicators; after 

redundant and apparently spurious indicators were deleted, seventeen were 

29 
retained for further analysis. The appendix contains a detailed description 

of the indicators and their sources. 

The seventeen raw indicators of social structure consist of a relatively 

large number of variabljes which are to a large extent interdependent and 

30 
correlated with one another. Factor analysis was thus used to reduce the 

data to a smaller number of independent, and hopefully conceptually more 

meaningful, aspects of social structure. 

Quantification of industrialization was straightforward. Its definition 

(the application of inanimate sources of power to production) suggests power 

31 
consumption per capita as a basic indicator. To provide a measure of the 

breadth of industrialization, the size of the manufacturing sector, as a 

percentage of GDP, was added. The index of industrialization thus consists 

32 
of an unweighted linear average of the two variables. 

Given both the somewhat diffuse nature of the convergence hypothesis and 

33 
the problems of accuracy and comparability of data which arise when one 

works with statistical indicators across a relatively large number of devel- 
oping countries, relatively simple and straightforward techniques are used to 
test the hypotheses. These can best be duscussed in the context of the findings, 

VI. Findings 

As noted above, factor analysis (a principal axis solution and a varimax 
rotation) was used to reduce the seventeen raw indicators to a smaller number 
of aspects of social structure. The matrix of rotated factor loadings is 



- 7 - 



shown as Table 1. The loadings are a measure of the degree to which a given 

variable is associated with a given factor; they are analogous to correlation 

2 
coefficients. The column headed by h contains communalities or the percentage 

of the common variance of a given variable accounted for by the factors in 

total. As the factors were orthogonally rotated, the loadings define the 

major clusters of interrelationships among the variables and the factors are 

independent. While interpretation is necessarily subjective, the conceptual 

content of a factor is typically inferred from those variables loading most 

highly on it. 

The variables which load most highly on the first factor represent the 
movement from diffused and traditional agricultural roles into more differ- 
entiated roles in the mining and manufacturing industries and commercial 
agriculture, and the associated general societal changes. It is thus named 
role differentiation or roles . The second factor is clearly defined; it 
captures variables which are measures or requisites of vertical and horizontal 
mobility and it is so named. 

The last factor can be interpreted as encompassing the transition from 
tribes and extended families to nuclear families, a corresponding lessening of 
the influence of non-associational groups, and increasing integration and 
homogeneity of society as cultural and linguistic differences break down. The 
third factor thus describes basic changes in the organization of society and 
is named social organization . 

The three factors represent major components of the changes in social 
structure which result from industrialization; increased differentiation of 
roles, increased mobility, and a shift to a more homogeneous society composed 



of nuclear family units. Scores for each of the factors were obtained by 

utilizing the loadings as weights and summing for the (suitably rescaled) 

35 
variables which load highest on each factor. 

The first hypothesis posits less variation in each of the indicators of 
social structure at higher levels of industrialization. This suggests a 
comparison of their dispersion at several levels of 

industrialization. While the standard deviation provides an absolute measure 
of dispersion, a relative measure is required for comparison. To this end, 
the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation expressed as 
a percentage of the arithmetic mean, was computed for each aspect at four 
levels of industrialization. The results are presented in Table 2. 

In each instance there is less dispersion (relative to the mean) in a 
given indicator at higher than at lower levels of industrialization. Consider- 
ing each indicator in turn, countries are more alike at higher than at lower 
levels of industrialization. It is interesting to note that both the absolute 
and relative measure of dispersion for social organization is larger, at each 
level of industrialization, than for either roles or mobility. This is 
consistent with what the theory would predict as: 1) there tends to be a 
greater variation in this aspect of social structure in preindustrial societies 
than for roles or mobility and 2) changes in social organization are a function 

of changes in the other two factors which are more immediately affected by 

37 
industrialization. 

The second hypothesis states that there will be less variation between 
the various aspects of social modernization as nations industrialize. If the 
process of social modernization is a coherent phenomenon, and if the three 



- 9 



factors are actual aspects of modernization, then a country which is more 
modernized than another should score higher on each of the three aspects of 

modernization than the other. The three aspects or factors would then con- 

38 
stitute what is known as a unidimensional scale. 

In actual practice we would expect deviations from a unidimensional scale. 
We would expect to find errors or a less than perfect correspondence between 
an ideal or predicted scale and the actual scale. In terms of the problem at 
hand, we would expect this correspondence to vary at different levels of 
industrialization; we would expect a better fit between ideal and actual 
scales at higher levels of industrialization. 

This correspondence, or the degree of reproducibility of the ideal scale, 

39 
may be computed by a technique known as scaleogram analysis. Guttman scales 

are utilized to determine if responses of subjects to given items form a 

40 41 

scale; if they can be ordered along an underlying dimension. In a perfect 

Guttman scale, responses of a subject to all items can be reproduced from the 

42 
knowledge of its rank order alone. The technique thus involves construction 

of an ideal scale, comparing the actual and ideal scale (counting errors), 

and then determining if the degree of reproducibility is satisfactory. 

In the case at hand, we thus want to determine if country scores on roles, 
mobility, and social organization form a scale and if the degree of reproduci- 
bility varies at different levels of industrialization. The three aspects of 

modernization were converted to ordinal scales (quartiles) by reference to 

43 
their distributions. The ideal or predicted scale was constructed by util- 

44 
izing the bar chart method and is shown as Table 3. The lowest value for a 

given aspect is zero and the highest is three; the total scale score is simply 



10 



the row sum. The ideal scale appears to be consistent with theory; where 
deviations from a homogeneous pattern (eg 3,3,3) occur, roles always has 
a value equal to or greater than the other two indicators. This is to be 
expected if role differentiation is the first order effect of industrial- 
iation. 

The actual scale is presented as table 4. The countries are grouped 
by four levels of industrialization based upon a division of the ordinal 

scale for that variable into four equal parts. The errors are simply the 

45 
deviations from the closest ideal pattern. The coefficient of reproduce- 

ability (CR) which is one less the number of errors as a percentage of 

46 
the number of responses of all subject to all items, is then used to 

judge whether the actual responses constitute a scale. Originally 

Guttman selected a CR of 0.85 as the dividing line separating scales from 

47 
non-scales, but more recently the standard has been tightened to 0.90. 

Table 5 summarizes the degree of reproduceability (CR) for the overall 

48 
scale and each of the four levels of industrialization. The overall CR 

of 0.92 is clearly acceptable; the categorized country scores on the three 
aspects of modernization constitute a unidimensional scale. The pattern 
of reproduceability over the sub-groups is consistent with the second 
hypothesis. The correspondence between the ideal and actual scales is best 
at the lowest and at the highest levels of industrialization. The fit, while 
still acceptable, is poorer at interim levels. 

While we would certainly not claim that the fifteen least industrialized 
countries represent "ideal" traditional societies, they are reasonable approx- 
imations of preindustrial states. Thus, one would expect a good deal of 
homogeneity. In fact, six of the fifteen countries in the group (all of 

which rank among the eight least industrialized of the countries studied) 

49 
have a scale score of zero. 



- 11 - 



At interim levels of development, one would expect a poorer corres- 
pondence between the predicted and the actual scale patterns; greater 
variation in the relationship between the various aspects of social 
structure. The immediate effects of the introduction of industrialization 
are disintegrative^^ and a breakup of the structures of traditional society 
results. While, in general, pressures for social change are exerted through 
the increased differentiation of roles, there is no reason to expect either 
the path of industrialization or the process of social modernization to 
follow the same course in each country. 

If the convergence hypothesis is correct, one would expect that as 
industrialization proceedes, its requisites would limit the variation be- 
tween aspects of social structure. Thus, the improvement in reproduceability 
of the predicted scale pattern in the fourth quartile is consistent with the 
hypothesis. It should also be noted that thirty-eight percent of the 
errors in the fourth quartile are attributable to South Africa, which is 
certainly a very singular case. If South Africa is dropped from the 
analysis, the CR for the fourth quartile becomes 0.96. 

The third hypothesis was tested through cluster analysis which is a 
technique used to identify groups of similar individuals within a given 
population. Cluster analysis is performed on cases (countries) rather than 

variables and essentially groups individuals based upon their profile over 

52 
a given set of variables. In this instance, the fifty-nine countries 

were clustered on the basis of their profiles over the seventeen raw 

indicators of social structure. 

While the clustering procedure is hierarchical, building from the most 

similar pair of countries, the two penultimate clusters contained all of 

the countries analyzed. Table 6 shows the cluster each country is 

contained in with the countries grouped by level of industrialization. 



-12- 

If the match was perfect, all countries in quartiles III and IV would 
be contained in cluster I and all of the countries in quartiles I and II 
in cluster II. On this basis nine or fifteen percent of the countries are 
misplaced. However, if one considers only the most and least industrial- 
ized quartiles only one country (Ceylon) is contained in the "wrong" 
cluster. 

VII Conclusions 

The findings must be considered tentative for several reasons. First, 
one must have substantial concerns about the accuracy and comparability 

of indicators of social structure collected across a large number of 

53 
developing countries. Second, attempting to investigate a longitudinal 

phenomena through a cross-sectional methodology requires assumptions about 

54 
the nature of the process which may lead to conceptual difficulties. 

Third, the tests did not involve rigorous statistical tests of significance. 

Thus, one certainly can not state the convergence hypothesis is proven. 
However, it is reasonable to conclude that it is consistent with the data 
and the findings of this research. The variance of both a given aspect of 
social structure and among the three aspects considered together was found 
to be smaller at higher levels of industrialization. Furthermore, the 
findings of all the tests were consistent lending additional confidence to 
the conclusions. 

It is important to note that convergence is narrowly defined in this 
research. Both conceptually and empirically, we are considering convergence 
in those social structures which are directly affected by industrialization. 
The findings of this research can not be generalized to draw conclusions about 
a tendency towards convergence of political systems, cultures or individual 
values. We can only conclude that this research supports the notion that 



- 13 



as societies industrialize, the nature of the process places limits on the 
pennissable variation in social structure. 

This research represents only a preliminary effort at a test of the 
convergence hypothesis. We would hope that advances in both the availability 
of data and in the methodology of cross-national research will allow 
a longitudinal investigation of the topic in the near future. If one 
could trace the process of industrialization and social modernization 
in a number of countries, a good deal more could be learned about the 
process as well as the end result. Additionally it would be interesting 
to extend this research to include the most industrialized capitalist 
countries as well as the socialist countries. 



- lA- 



TABLE I 



Factor Analysis of Social Modernization 



Variables 



Rotated Factors 



1. 


% Agriculture 


-.69 




-.48 




-.38 


2. 


% Min. and Mfg. 


.59 


.51 .32 


3. 


Agric. Org. 


.69 


.32 .24 


4. 


Middle Class 


.55 


.47 .27 


5. 


Dualism 


.78 


.47 .14 


6. 


Mod. Out, 


.85 


.15 .28 


7. 


Bureaucracy 


.55 


.29 .22 


8. 


Assoc. Groups 
Literacy 


.62 




.36 


.37 


9. 


.48 




.50 


.48 


10. 


Enrol. 1 and 2 


.41 


.63 


.22 


11. 


Enrol. 3 


.35 


.74 


.31 


12. 


Human Res. 


.33 


.84 


.31 


13. 


Urbanization 


.44 


.63 


.38 


14. 


Transportation 
Family 


.37 


.65 




.36 


15. 


.43 


.30 




.69 


16. 


Non Assoc. Groups 


-.37 -.21 


-.71 


17. 


Fractionalization 


-.09 -.40 


-.65 


Percent of Total Varianc 


-e 29 25 17 


Cumulative Percent of 


29 




54 




71 



.85 
.71 
.64 
.59 
.85 
.83 
.42 
.64 
.72 
.61 
,81 
.91 
,72 
,70 
,74 
,68 
,58 



Variance 



- 15 - 

TABLE 2 
Measures of Dispersion 



Industrialization 



Roles 



Mobility 



Social 
Organization 



I. Lowest 

a 
coeff of var. 
(N=15) 

II. Lower 

o 
coeff of var. 
(N=14) 

III. Higher 

o 
coeff of var. 
(N=15) 

IV. Highest 



coeff of var. 
(N=15) 



27.0 
.56 



20.6 
.29 



27.3 
.27 



22.5 
.16 



32.3 
.52 



20.2 
.22 



24.6 
.19 



24.9 
.16 



22.6 
.69 



33.8 
.65 



35.3 
.45 



35.8 
.33 



- 16 - 



TABLE 3 
Ideal Scale Patterns 



Social Scale 

Roles Mobility Organization Score 



3 3 3 9 

3 2 3 8 

2 2 2 6 

2 2 1 5 

111 3 

110 2 





- 17 - 

TABLE 4 
Actual Scale Scores 



Country 



Scale 
Score 



Roles 



Mobility 



Social 
Organization 



Errors 



Industrialization 



IV 



Argentina 


9 


3 


3 


Chile 


9 


3 


3 


Greece 


9 


3 


3 


Venezuela 


9 


3 


3 


Uruguay 


9 


3 


3 


Brazil 


8 


3 


2 


Jamacia 


8 


3 


2 


Panama 


8 


2 


3 


Portugal 


8 


3 


2 


Spain 


8 


3 


3 


Taiwain 


8 


3 


3 


Colombia 


7 


2 


2 


Mexico 


7 


3 


2 


Peru 


6 


2 


2 


S. Africa 


5 


3 


2 


Industriali 


zation 


III 





Costa Rica 

Lebanon 

Turkey 

Dominican R. 

El Salvador 

Ecuador 

Philippines 

S. Korea 

UAR 

Iraq 

Syria 

Bolivia 

India 



9 
8 
8 
7 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 



3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 



3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 



3 





3 





3 





3 





3 





3 





3 





3 


1 


3 





2 


1 


2 


1 


2 


1 


2 


1 


2 








3 



3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 

2 
2 
2 
1 
2 





1 


1 
1 


3 
3 

1 

1 
1 



- 18 - 



TABLE 4 (cont.) 



Tunes ia 


3 


1 


1 


Iran 


2 


1 


1 


Industrialization II 


2 




licaragua 


6 


1 


Guatemala 


5 


2 


1 


Honduras 


5 


1 


1 


Jordan 


4 


1 


2 


Ghana 


3 


2 


1 


Morocco 


3 


1 


1 


Vietnam 


3 





2 


Algeria 


2 


1 





Malaysia 


2 


1 


1 


Congo 


1 





1 


Kenya 


1 


1 





Thailand 


1 





1 


Zambia 


1 


1 





Senegal 











Industrialization I 






Ceylon 


5 


2 


2 


Burma 


2 





1 


Cambodia 


2 





1 


Lybia 


2 





1 


Pakistan 


2 


1 


1 


Indonesia 


1 


1 





Ivory Coast 


1 


1 





Malagasay R. 


1 








Nigeria 


1 


1 





Cameroon 











Ethiopia 











Nepal 











Sudan 











Tanzania 











Uganda 











* 









1 



3 
2 
3 
1 

1 
1 
1 







1 

1 
1 
1 





1 














2 

1 

2 
1 

1 

2 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 




1 
1 

1 



1 
1 
1 
1 










IV is the highest level of industrialization 



- 19 - 



TABLE 5 
Comparison of Errors 



Level of 
Industrialization 



N 



Errors 



Coeff. of 
Reproducibility 



I Lowes t 
II Lower 

III Higher 
IV Highest 

Total Sample 



15 
14 
15 
15 
59 



7 
14 
12 

8 
41 



.95 
.89 
.91 
.94 
.92 



- 20 - 

TABLE 6 
Cluster of Counries versus Level of Industrialization 



Country 



Cluster 



Country 



Cluster 



Quartile IV 

Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Greece 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
Portugal 
Spain 
S. Africa 
Taiwan 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Quartile III 
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
India 
Iran 
Iraq 
Lebanon 
Philippines 
S. Korea 
Syria 
Tunes ia 
Turkey 
UAR 





Quartile II 


I 


Algeria 


I 


Congo 


I 


Ghana 


I 


Guatemala 


I 


Honduras 


I 


Jordan 


I 


Kenya 


I 


Morocco 


I 


Malaysia 


I 


Nicaragra 


I 


Senegal 


I 


Thailand 


I 


Vietnam 


I 


Zambia 


I 


Quartile I 




Burma 


II 


Cambodia 


I 


Cameroon 


I 


Ceylon 


I 


Ethiopia 


I 


Indonesia 


II 


Ivory Coast 


II 


Libya 


II 


Malagasay Rep 


I 


Nepal 


I 


Nigeria 


I 


Pakastan 


I 


Sudan 


I 


Tanzania 


I 


Uganda 


I 





II 
II 
II 

I 
II 

I 

II 
II 

I 

I 

II 
II 
II 
II 

II 

II 

II 

I 

II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 



21 



Appendix 
Sources and Measurement of Social Variables 

1. Percentage of the economically active population in traditional 
agriculture. (Adelman and Morris, cross-checked against U.N. and I.L.O. 
data.) 

2. Percentage of the economically active population in mining and 
manufacturing. (Yearbook of Labor Statistics.) 

3. Character of agricultural organization reflecting the range from 
peasant farming to modern commercial agriculture. Countries were divided 
into groups based upon area studies and the classifications were then 
validated through interviews with experts. (Adelman and Morris.) 

4. Importance of the indigenous middle class. An estimate based upon 
(1) the percentage of the population engaged in middle class occupations 
and (2) a qualitative assessment of the importance of expatriates. 
(Adelman and Morris.) 

5. The extent of dualism. A qualitative estimate of the degree of separa- 
tion of the traditional and modern sectors. Countries are divided into 
groups (as described under three above) ranging from an overwhelmingly 
traditional economy to the relatively complete integration of traditional 
and modern sectors. (Adelman and Morris.) 

6. Modernization of outlook. A qualitative estimate (perhaps the most 
subjective used in this study) of the modernization (in terms of lifestyle) 
of educated urban groups and the degree of acceptance of programs of 
social and political modernization among both urban and rural populations. 
(Adelman and Morris . ) 

7. The efficiency and modernization of the bureaucracy. An estimate 
(countries were divided into four groups) of the efficiency and ascriptive 
versus achievement orientation of the civil service. Efficiency is judged 
in terms of functionally specific relationships and rational decision making. 
(Banks and Textor.) 

8. The extent of interest articulation by associational groups. This re- 
flects the influence of voluntary groups, such as trade unions and civic 
associations. (Banks and Textor.) 

9. Literacy. The percentage of the adult population (generally over fifteen 
years of age) that meets a given country's standard of literacy. (Taylor 
and Hudson. ) 

10. First and second level school enrollment ratio. The percentage of 
appropriate age groups enrolled in primary and secondary schools. (Taylor 
and Hudson.) 



22 



11. Third level enrollment ratio. The percentage of appropriate age 
groups enrolled in university. (U.N.E.S.C.O. Statistical Yearbook.) 

12. An index of human resource utilization. A linear combination of 
variables ten and eleven with the latter weighted by a factor of five. 
The index is suggested in Harbison, Frederick and Myers, C.A. Education , 
Manpower and Economic Development . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 

13. Urbanization. The percentage of the population living in cities of 
100,000 or more. (Taylor and Hudson, and Banks.) 

14. Transportation. An index, original to this research, intended as 
a measure of the potential for horizontal mobility and economic inde- 
pendence. The index is composed of a measure of road and rail length 
per unit of area multipled by an index of the concentration of the popu- 
lation. The latter is scored so that the more concentrated the popula- 
tion (a greater proportion living in a few large cities rather than in 
many smaller ones) the higher the index. It is assumed that, ceteris 
paribus, countries with more diffused populations will tend to have larger 
transportation networks relative to area. ( The Statesman's Yearbook . 
London: MacMillan, 1967 and 1972; Ginsburg, Norton. Atlas of Economic 
Development . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961; and Taylor 

and Hudson. ) 

15. Basic family structure. Countries were grouped into three classes: 
those in which tribal allegiances are widespread, those in which the 
extended family is the norm and those in which the nuclear family pre- 
dominates. (Adelman and Morris.) 

16. The extent of interest articulation by non-associational groups. 
This reflects the importance of ascriptive groups such as clans and 
tribes in a society. The index is qualitative; countries were divided 
into groups based upon country studies. (Banks and Textor.) 

17. Cultural and linquistic fractionalization. Countries are scored on 
a scale ranging from .00 (extremely homogeneous) to .99 (extremely 

f ractionalized) . (Atlas Narodov Mira , Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 
reported in Taylor and Hudson.) 

Sources 

Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic 
Development . (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967). 

Arthur S. Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data . (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971) 

Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey . (Cambridge: 
MIT press, 1963). 

Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators: Second Edition . (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1972). 



23 



NOTES 



Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and Charles 
A. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man , (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1960; New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 238. 

"Marion J. Levy, Jr. , Modernization and the Structure of Societies : 
A Setting for International Affairs , (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966; Princeton; Princeton Paperback, 1969), p. 11; Wilbert E. Moore, 
Social Change , (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 91; James Sidney 
Slotkin, From Field to Factory: New Industrial Employees , (Glencoe: The 
Free Press, 1960), p. 13. 

3 
Kerr et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man, p, 21, 

4 
Ibid, p. 15. 

Wilbert E. Moore, The Impact of Industry , (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 45. 

Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies , p. 744. 

A traditional society is typically structured on the basis of small, 
agarian, often ascriptive, independent and self sufficient, production- 
consumption units. This structure (which is obviously idealized, in 
Weber's sense) is not compatible with the requisites of broadscale industrial- 
ization. 

8 

In an ideal traditional society, we would envision a rural production 

unit which grew their own food, built their own house, and made their own 
clothes. Any differentiation of roles which exists would be ascribed on 
the basis of age and sex. 

9 
Again, the aspects of life as well as occupational roles are diffused. 

It is difficult to separate social and economic, or occupational and recrea- 
tional activities. The idea of a distinct economic sector is a relatively 
modern concept. 

Kahl called the occupational division of labor the "...economically 
determined skeleton on which the flesh of modern social organization develops.' 
Joseph A. Kahl, "Some Social Concomitants of Industrialization and Urbaniza- 
tion", Human Organization 18 (Summer, 1959), p. 58; Also see, Gayle D. Ness, 
ed. The Sociology of Economic Development: A Reader , (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970), p. 11. 

Bert F. Hoselitz, "Stratification and Mobility in Industrial Society", 
International Social Science Journal 16 (1964), reprinted in, William A Faunce 
and William H. Form, eds.. Comparative Perspectives on Industrial Society , 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1969), p. 173. 



24 



12 

If one idea emerges from the literature, it is that industrialization 

and the extended family or clan are not compatible. Levy suiranarized the 

issue in absolute terms; "(E)very society regardless of the basis from which 

change took place, which has changed in the direction of relatively high 

levels of modernization has been marked by a change in the ideal structures 

for family types toward multilineal conjugal family units." Modernization 

and the Structure of Societies , p. 417. 

13 

Melvin M. Tumin, "Competing Status Systems", in Labor Commitment 

and Social Change in Developing Areas , ed. Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold 

Feldman, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p. 315. 

14 

William J. Goode, "Industrialization and Family Change", in North 

American Conference on the Social Implications of Technological Change , eds. 

Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, (Paris: Mouton, 1963), p. 242. 

Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies , p. 240. 

1 6 

Bruce F. Ryan, Social and Cultural Change , (New York: Ronald Press 

Company, 1969), p. 252. 

John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, Clark Kerr, and Charles A. Myers, 
Industrialism and Industrial Man Reconsidered , (Princeton: The Inter-University 
Study of Human Resources in National Development, 1975), p. 37. 

18 

Ibid, pp. 36 and 37. 

19 

Bernard Karsh and Robert E. Cole, "Industrialization and the Convergence 

Hypothesis: Some Aspects of Contemporary Japan", Journal of Social Issues 

24 (October 1968), p. 46. 

20 

Caryl P. Haskins, "Science and Policy for a New Decade", Foreign 

Affairs 49 (January 1971), p. 239. 

21 

Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies , p. 103. 

22 

Moore and Feldman, Labor Commitment and Social Change , p. 59 and 60. 

23 

Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Labor; Social Aspects of Economic 

Development , (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), p. 13. 

24 

Kerr et al, Industrialism and Industrial Man , p. 233. 

25 

Socialist bloc nations have been excluded from many studies of 

comparative socio-economic development due to problems of comparability and 

the lack of data. See Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics 

and Economic Development , (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967), 



25 



p. 106; and Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth , (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966), p. 508. 

Nations which did not have a population of at least one million 
and a GNP of at least $500 million in 1965 were excluded from the analysis 
to insure comparability of national units. 

27 

One country which met the size minimums, Saudi Arabia, had to be 

dropped due to a lack of data. For more detailed information see; 

Stephen J. Kobrin, "Foreign Direct Investment, Industrialization and Social 

Change: Acculturation and Modernization in Developing countries," (Ph.D. 

dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1975) . 

28 

Examples of university data banks are; Charles Lewis Taylor and 

Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators : 
Second Edition , (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) and Arthur 
S. Banks, Cross-Polity Timeseries Data , (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971). 
Qualitative Indicators are found in Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics 
and Economic Development and Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor , A Cross- 
Polity Survey , (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963). 

29 

Missing data was estimated by; 1) reference to other comparable 

indicators or, 2) regression on other correlated variables. When a distri- 
bution was highly skewed the variable was transformed logarithmically. 
Variables were judged spurious — not in fact measuring what they purported 
to measure — if they loaded randomly in factor analysis. 

30 

The raw indicators were all selected as measures of the elements of 

social structure that are likely change with industrialization. Thus, they 

all are components of, and should be correlated with, some generalized notion 

of social development. 

31 

The source for this indicator is the United Nations Statistical Yearbook , 

(New York: United Nations, various years). 

32 

Power consumption per capita alone may be misleading as very resource- 
intensive countries may consume relatively large amounts of power in an 
isolated economic (or geographic) sector. The source for national accounts 
data is the United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics , (New York: 
The United Nations, various years). 

33 

Problems of accuracy and comparability are both practical and 

conceptual. Developing countries, almost by definition, face a shortage 

of administrators and technicians. It is not reasonable to expect that 

collection procedures are standardized within countries, much less between 

countries. However, the major problem may be conceptual. While international 

organizations such as the United Nations are making progress, at this point 

there is no reason to expect that each of the indicators of social structure 

is defined the same way in each of the countries studied. 



26 



34 , , 

The three factors captured seventy-one percent of the variance 
the original seventeen indicators had in common. Thus the use of factor 
analysis for purposes of data reduction was relatively efficient as there 
was a considerable gain in simplicity at a relatively low cost. 

35 

It is perhaps more common to obtain factor scores by a more complex 
technique which maintains their statistical independence. However main- 
taining the independence of factors would have resulted in problems in this 
case. As the first factor (roles) is very highly correlated with industrial- 
ization ( a simple R of .88), maintaining factor independence would have re- 
sulted in the second and third factors being orthogonal to industrialization. 
As this IS the result of a statistical artifact and would have interferred 
with further analysis, the alternative method of deriving factor scores was 
used. The simple correlation coefficients of mobility and roles with 
industrialization are .85 and .70 respectively. 

The countries were simply rank ordered on industrialization and the 
resulting scale was divided into four equal parts. 

37 

Patterns of preindustrial social organization vary considerably 
For example, while the extended family was the norm in India, nuclear 
families formed the basis of society in many preindustrial Indian communities 
m the Central American highlands. Similarly some areas which are now defined 
as nations in the political sense have been relatively homogeneous culturally 
since antiquity, while others have been highly factionalized for centuries. 

38 

Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Cons truction. (New York- 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), p. 172. 

39, . , 

A very interesting application of scaleogram analysis to a cross- 
national research problem can be found in; Lee Sigelman, "Lerner's Model 
of Modernization: A Reanalysis", The Journal of Developing Areas 8 (July 1974) 
525-536. 

Warren S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scalin g. (New York- 
John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 307. 

41 

Sigelman, "Lerner's Model of Modernization", p. 526. 

Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling , p. 318. 

43 

To avoid small classes due to the influence of extreme values the 
two outlying observations, at each end of the scale, were discounted in 
determining quartile cut-off points. They were, of course, included in all 
calculations. 

44 

Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction , p. 186. 



- 27 



45 

Thus the actual scale values for a given country are compared to the 

ideal scale pattern which will minimize the number of errors. For example 

if there are two ideal patterns , 121 and 222, an actual pattern of 111 would 

contain one error. See, Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling , p. 319. 

46 

Ibid, p. 323. However, as Sigelman notes, the CR is typically 

defined for a dichotomous response pattern. If there are more than two 

possible responses, the coefficient must be adjusted to take the greater 

number of possible observations into account. Thus, the general formula is 

CR = 1 - errors 



kr(n-l) 

where k is the number of columns, r the number of rows and n is the number 
of categories ( or possible answers) for each entry. In the case at hand 
there are three columns, fifty-nine rows and four categories for each 
entry. Sigelman, "Lerner's Model of Modernization", p. 531. 

47 

Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling , p. 323. 

48 

See note 46. 

49 

One of the major advantages of a scaleogram, as compared to a more 

sophisticated statistical methodology, is that the case by case comparison 

allows for identification and analysis of deviants. 

In the West the processes of industrialization and social change were 
intertwined; they developed in tandem over the course of several centuries. 
In the current less developed countries, however, the situation is quite 
different. The institutions of industrialization are transmitted from the 
West and are often superimposed upon an existing traditional society. In the 
context of the developing countries, industrialization can thus be regarded 
as an exogenous variable, with its immediate effects more easily isolated 
than was possible in the West. 

It is difficult to justify excluding any case on an a posteriori 
basis, especially if doing so improves the results. However, South Africa 
is a very singular case and it is not unreasonable to argue that its 
Government's policies force it out of the pale of observed relationships 
linking industrialization and social change. 

52 

The clustering strategy is hierarchical, building from a single pair 

which is the most homogeneous in terms of the selection criterion to a final 

step in which one large cluster includes all of the cases. The variables 

are converted to T scores and the selection criterion is then the average 

of absolute differences in T scores. The iterative procedure works on a 

pairwise basis, treating each cluster formed as a single individual by 

averaging T scores. The algorithm was developed by Professor M.C. Johnson 

of the School of Education of The University of Michigan. 



28 - 



53 

See note 33. 



54 

Investigating historical phenomena cross-sectionally requires an 
assumption that individual observations represent points on the longitudinal 
path. This obviously does not present a very accurate conception of reality, 
and while not destroying the usefullness of the analysis, it limits how far 
one can take the results. See, Bruce M. Russett, "The Yale Political Data 
Program: Experience and Prospects", in Comparing Nations: The Use of 
Quantitat ive Data in Cross-National Research , eds. Richard L. Merritt and 
Stein Rokkan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 104. 

55 

While there a major problems in terms of the availability of data 
in extending the research to Include the socialist countries, it would not 
be difficult to include the advanced capitalist countries. Although some 
of the indicators utilized in this study are not available for the industrial- 
ized countries (particularly those developed by Adelman and Morris) , 
sufficient data exists to permit quantification of the aspects of social 
structure and industrialization. 



Date Due 



BASEMENT 




MAR 2 4 1985 



Lib-26-67 



T-J5 143 w no.821- 75 

Lorange. Peter/A framework for strateg 

'liiiiiiiiil iiiiiiii 

3 TDflO ODD bSb 21E 



T-J5 143 w no.822- 75 

Haehlinq von L/Optimizing claims fluct 

725830 D*8KS Q.Q0.1.95&6... 



3 TOfiO DOD bm blD 



T-J5 143 w no.823- 75 

Lihen, Gary L/The ADVISOR* project 

725833 DfBKg 00019874 



illKrf 

llllliihliiu I 



TDflD DD3 DDfl Q 



72 



T-J5 143 w no.824- 75 

Schein, Edgar /Attitude change in the 



72583 



0*BK 



0002: 



3 TDflO 000 



bflT 205 



T-J5 143 w no.825- 75 

Kobrin, Stephe/lndustrialization and v 

72588P .P.S.BKS , ,. Q W 1 984.8 



80 D' 



3 TOflD DOD bMS M3T 



T-J5 143 w no.826- 75 

Schein, Edgar /Managers at mid-career 

"''liiiiiiiliiliiiiiiB 

3 TOaO DOD 747 T36 



T-J5 143 w no.827- 75 

Haehling von L/The probability distrib 

726374 D*BKS 00019567 




3 TOaO 000 bm b4M 



MIT aaHARIES 



25S-7fc _^^,g^ Y^cc^rd 



13 .0.0 OG. t.7 s!a '-",. ""vi;,::^ -^ ^---^ 






%S/fe7 



J5, 



HD28.M414 no.829- 76 

Merton, Robert/The impact on option pr 

726747 D*BKS 0QQ2PM5.. 



3 TOflO ODD bSb IDS