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LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS. 


u — x~z'^ — 

Chap. Copyright  No.. 

Shell.Jrt.Si.'^. 


UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 


INTERNATIONAL  SERIES 

LIEUT.-COIv.  ARTHUR   I..  WAGNER, 

AMiitant  Adjutant-Oeneral.  U.  S.  Army;  late  Instructor  in  Art  of  War  at  the 
U.S    Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  Fort  Leavenworth.  Kansas. 


Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 


DEVELOPED  FROM 


MODERN  MILITARY   HISTORY. 


PRITZ  HOENIO. 

H 

'THE  WOBDIS  FREE.  THE  DEED  MUTE,  OBEDIENCE  BLIND. 


TrauKlatefl  from  the  Foiirtli  German  Edition 

uy 

CARLREICHMANN, 

FirHt  Lieuteuaut  NLuth  Infantry, 


No.  6. 


KANSAS  CITY,   MO  : 
HUD.SONKIMBHRLY  PUBLISHING  CO. 
1014-1010  Wyandotte  Street. 

LONDON: 

W.  H.  ALLEN  &  CO.  (Limited), 

13  Waterloo  Placb,  S.  W. 

PUBUISHRRS  TO   THE    INDIA   OFFICE, 


2f\€i  COPY, 
1896. 


^^-'^^^  I 


^ 


«  '  ;>•> 


^y 


TA]^.i.\\  OK  contp:nts. 


Editor')!  I'Ttfuct ♦  "  >"""""""'" 

I'ri-.l'Mif.  lo  Bftconfl  Krl itioti ,,..»»."  , .  - . »   ' • 

Vrf.ffu:f  Ut  I'dtirDi  I'Ailion  .  ,,,,,.,  i  >•>••  ■ 

2» 


Intro'luctiou ,      , , 

I'AkT  I, 
MiliUry-Hi»U>ncal  Btttdie», 
I.     ThT  Attark  of  the  '^th  Infantry  I'.rt'/H'U:  on  tht  I'arm»,t^a'l 
of  Hor  anrl  on  th«:  A'ljoininK,  Hntrcncht'J,  Woo'l  of  Hriz 
in  th«-  Hattic  of  K>',nimiriiiz  on  July  3.  1866  ...         ^'' 

a.  'flu:  March ^ 

b.  The  lJ»Tploymcnt ..,,,/,,,...  70 

C.    Th«:  I'.atll.-fieM , '^^ 

d,     Th«:  Atla'k "^"^ 

11.     Th*:  Attack  of  Ui»-  )',<th  Half  Oiviuion  'JJSth  infaniry  lirr/,ii'lt) 

on  the  H'Mj<h1>  of  J'.ruvill*:  on  th»:  IfJth  of  Auyuf.^,  I^JO       lOl 

a.  The  March  to  the  Battle  fiel'l  '^^J 
h.     Tlic  Ixrploynicnt '  ^^ 

c.  The  Kattle-ficM ^'* 

d.  r.«j/inninj<  of  the  Attack  ,.,, ^^ 

e.  I'«:rhon;il  <^>h»»crvationft   -,..,. /,.,,,..,....  .128 

f.  Hvcnt»  on  the  i»i'le  of  th»;  French 1^ 

f(.     Course  of  the  Atta<k *^ 

III.  Retro»pect»    1^ 

IV.  Ta/:tic«  at  I'roblu»-Bor  on  July  3,  1866 1*1 

V.     Tacticnat  Marn-la-Tour  on  August  le.  IS70  J'5''^ 

a      I'Hy';holoj<ical  Matter* '^'-^ 

b.  I<<;n»arkH  on  th«T  Battle-field  and  on  the  Enemy'i 

I'orce*     ., '''^ 

c.  The  I><r|>loyment ,...* '^'^ 

d.  Th«r  Attack '7'' 

e.  Tb'- Kctreat J78 

f.  I/OhS«rH        1^7 

K      Note*  to  the  Official  Atxount  Re;<ardinK  the  Ter- 
rain   '''*' 


8  rahlf  of  Contents. 

Page. 

VI.     Objectives  of  the  German  and  French  Commanders  192 

VII.     How  should  the  Attack  of  the  38th  Brigade  have  been  Ar- 
ranged ? 194 

VIII.     Tactical  Comments 197 

a.  The  Tactical  Forms  Employed 201 

b.  Duration  of  the  Attack 202 

c.  Expenditure  of  Ammunition  and  the  Fire  Effect.. 203 
IX.     Why  was  the  Charge  of  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  Successful  ?208 

PART  II. 

Psychology.-  and  Tactics. 

I.     General   214 

II.     Maxims 222 

III.  Inijuiries  into  the  Maxims  ....    227 

IV.  Of  the  Moral  Training  of  Troops 253 

PART  III. 
Tactical  Deductions. 

I.     Remarks  on  Tactical  Tendencies 262 

II.     Results  of  Surgical  and  Ballistic  Experiments 272 

III.  Smokeless  Powder 280 

IV.  Tactical  Deductions  Regarding  the  Attack  from  the  Experi- 

ments of  Bruns,  from  the  Ballistic  Properties  of  the  Small- 
Caliber  Rifles  and  from  the  Properties  of  the  Smokeless 

Powder 290 

V.     Of  the  Extent  of  Ground  in  Battle,  of  Control,  and  of  the 

"Treffen" 305 

VI.     Of  the  Defense 327 

VII.     Of  Reconnaissance  and  of  Preparations  by  Artillery 339 

VIII.     Of  Turning  Movements 354 

IX.     Of  the  Frontal  Action 375 

X.     Of  Village  and  Wood  Fighting 382 

XI.     Of  Night  Battles 392 

XII.     Conclusions 401 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 


•  The  book  horewitli  presented  for  (Ih?  lirst  time  in  Eng- 
lish is  a  development  of  the  work  entitled  "Two  Brigades," 
and  in  its  present  form  is,  as  the  author  says,  what  he  orig- 
inally luid  in  mind.  In  describing  the  pi-o<<*sH  of  evolution 
by  which  the  book  has  reached  its  present  form,  the  author 
remarks  that  though  the  original  work  was  well  received  in 
South  Germany,  France,  Austria,  and  other  European  coun- 
tries, it  met  with  a  cold  reception  in  North  (Jermany;  prob- 
ably because  nobody  likes  to  have  his  own  mistakes  pointed 
out.  He  intimates  that  although  the  Official  Account  of  the 
Franco-German  War  is  based  on  all  publications  and  docu- 
ments that  appeared  in  jjrint  previous  to  its  publication, 
and  although  it  is  undoubtedly  the  best  technical  account 
of  military  operations  ever  published,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  SOUK*  tilings  have  either  been  glossed  over  or  that  the 
compilers  were,  in  some  instances,  misled  by  the  defective 
accounts  and  reports  of  eye-witnesses.  In  fact,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  German  General  Staff, 
in  compiling  the  Official  Account,  was  careful  to  let  no  oppor- 
tunity slip  to  increase  the  prestige  of  the  German  arms,  and 
especially  to  avoid  impairing  that  prestige  when  unpleasant 
facts  could  be  passed  over  with  a  few  words.  He  also 
I)oints  out  errors  contained  in  regimental  histories,  and  has 
taken  great  pains  to  write  as  nearly  as  possible  the  exact 


1 0  E^iitors  Ptrfacf, 

tnuU  in  ivi^ani  u>  events  that  have  often  btvn  dtvsioribtHl 
Avith  uioro  patriotism  than  aecmaiv. 

The  it^ader  v>t*  any  work  mi  the  Franoo-Prussuan  War  is 
likely  to  be  so  stivngly  impresstnl  with  the  visibU*  niilitarv 
^H^wer  of  Prussia,  and  s<>  dazzUnl  by  the  series  of  events 
whioh  in  a  eaniimign  of  a  few  niontlis  bnnijiht  to  its  knet^ 
the  tirst  military  nation  of  Europe,  that  it  is  dittioult  for 
him  to  n»alize  that  on  the  side  of  the  (.unmans  military  mat 
ters  wert^  not  altogether  pertWt.  It  is  new  and  interesting* 
to  tiud  that  there  was  tactical  deticiency  on  the  part  of  some 
of  the  higher  German  Uwders,  and  that  the  lack  of  orgmuKa- 
tion  of  the  system  of  iviH>rts  and  nu^siiges  on  the  battle- 
field left  Von  Moltke  for  some  hours  at  i^ravelotte  without 
definite  and  re^liable  information  of  what  was  going  on. 
AVe  have  heartl  si>  much  of  the  magniticent  energy  of  the 
iierman  U^iiders  in  marching  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon 
and  promptly  joining  battle  wherever  they  could,  that  it  is 
wholesome  for  us  to  read  that  this  wild  euerg\-  of  the  sub- 
ordinate h^\der«  was  not  always  pn>ductive  of  the  best  re- 
sults, and  that  the  triH^ps  often  got  completely  beyond  the 
civutrol  of  their  generals.  The  lack  of  tactical  reiH^nuais- 
samv  was  more  marktHl  than  we  have  Invn  leti  to  believe: 
and.  with  all  due  rt^iHHt  to  the  sujn^rior  org^inizatiou  and 
the  sui^rior  training  of  the  German  Army,  we  art^  remindtni 
of  the  old  saying,  that  "Nothing  succeeds  like  suihvss." 

Honig  unites  the  qualities  so  dt^rable  in  a  tactical 
writer;  namely,  a  dtvp  knowUnlge  of  his  subjtvt  and  of 
human  nature,  a  facility  of  exv>ressicm.  fearlessness  in  set- 
ting forth  his  views,  and  a  spirit  of  phih>sophical  justice-, 
which  is  shown  in  giving  crtniit  to  his  enemies  as  well  as 
bestowing  pniise  upon  his  friends.  Even  when  we  cannot 
alti^'ther  agrtv  with  his  views,  we  are  foreeil  to  respect 
them,  and  his  book  will  be  welcomed  bv  those  who  are  most 


Editor's  Preface.  11 

interested  in  military  literature  and  tactical  training.  In 
view  of  the  many  devices  for  sheltering  troops  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, which  has  been  somewhere  happily  designated 
as  "the  cult  of  fear,"  it  is  refreshing  to  read  the  announce- 
ment that  great  loss  must  be  boldly  faced  and  not  shunned, 
and  that  officers  and  troops  must  be  instructed  that  these 
losses  are  inevitable  and  have  to  be  unflinchingly  met.  In 
the  same  spirit  is  made  the  assertion  that  only  those  men 
talk  of  night  battles  who  are  afraid  of  facing  an  enemy  in 
daytime.  It  excites  our  admiration  to  find  a  gifted  German 
soldier  saying  that  the  French  infantr}-  at  Worth  and 
Gravelotte  was  one  of  the  best  that  ever  fought;  and  in 
view  of  the  manifest  defects  of  short  service,  which  is  now 
the  rule  everywhere  in  Europe,  we  can  easily  share  his  doubt 
whether  any  French  infantry  will  ever  again  fight  with  the 
same  determination. 

It  is,  too,  rather  unusual  to  find  a  European  author  who 
refers  to  the  War  of  Secession  as  an  evidence  of  a  sound 
military  fact,  and  we  cannot  help  remarking  how  far  in 
advance  of  most  of  the  European  critics  he  is  when  we  read 
the  following  passage:  "The  armor  shields  and  armored 
clothing  prepared  by  the  Danes  and  others  do  not  seem  suit- 
able for  field  service  as  protection  against  projectiles,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  construction  of  rifled  trenches,  etc., 
by  means  of  the  spade,  will  play  a  great  role  in  future  bat- 
tles; occasions  for  their  use  will  arise  for  the  attacker  as 
well  as  for  the  defender,  since  it  is  very  probable  that  there 
will  be  battles  of  several  days'  duration — which,  however, 
are  nothing  new.  In  this  connection  it  is  sufficient  to  recall 
the  North  American  Civil  War." 

When  a  German  critic  can  do  full  justice  to  a  French 
enemy,  and  acknowledge  virtually  that  military  lessons  can 
be  drawn  from  Spottsylvania  as  well  as  from  Gravelotte, 


12  Editor's  Preface. 

the  American  reader  must  necessarily  be  predisposed  in  his 
favor,  and  it  is  confidently  believed  that  this  favorable  pre- 
disposition will  not  be  in  any  way  impaired  by  the  perusal 
of  Honig's  remarkable  book. 

Washington,  D.  C,  November  16,  1897. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


"Books  have  their  fortunes,"  says  the  proverb,  and  this 
one  has  been  no  exception.  Perhaps  it  w^ill  interest  the 
reader  to  have  me  tell  something  about  it;  anyway,  that  is 
what  prompts  me  to  do  so. 

The  book  appeared  in  1881  under  the  title  of  "Two 
Brigades,"  chiefly  upon  the  urgent  request  of  an  officer,  of 
literary  fame,  who  has  since  died,  although  I  should  have 
preferred  to  postpone  the  publication  for  some  years;  in 
addition  to  the  above  motive,  it  was  the  then  controversy 
whether  it  was  to  be  long-range  fire  or  short-range  fire,  open 
order  or  a  combination  of  close  and  open  order,  day  or  night 
battles,  etc.,  that  prompted  me  to  publish  the  book,  believ- 
ing that  I  would  be  able  to  contribute  something  toward  the 
settlement  of  the  questions  in  dispute. 

Any  historical-tactical  experiences  I  might  want  to 
draw  upon  would,  of  course,  have  to  be  beyond  the  pale  of 
doubt;  in  that  case  it  was  to  be  premised  that  in  some  places 
the  book  would  not  be  received  with  favor,  for  no  one  likes 
to  have  his  errors  pointed  out.  Of  two  cases,  but  one  was 
possible:  either  the  Official  Account  was  correct,  or  mine,  as 
their  discrepancies  are  such  that  they  cannot  be  reconciled. 
But  if  anyone  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  History 
of  the  57th  Regiment  published  after  the  "Two  Brigades" 
and  the  Official  Account,  he  will  at  once  admit  that,  aside 


14  Preface  to  Second  Edition. 

from  some  small  details,  the  aiitlior  of  the  "Two  Brigades" 
is  right. 

The  Official  Account  of  the  attack  of  the  :i8th  Brigade 
on  August  1(1,  1870,  may  therefore  justly  be  considered  as 
superseded,  and  that  of  the  attack  of  the  28th  Brigade  on 
July  3,  18GG,  as  rectified  in  many  essential  points.  I  do  not 
know  how  the  Official  Account  of  the  latter  was  prepared;  as 
regards  the  former,  a  well-known  general  officer,  capable  of 
rendering  judgment,  wrote  to  me  on  October  10,  1883,  that, 
so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  the  description  of  the  episode 
in  question  of  August  10th,  as  given  in  that  work,  left  much 
to  be  desired,  because  (out  of  consideration  for  some  of  the 
survivors)  it  silently  passed  over  one  of  the  most  important 
points:  the  retreat  of  the  10  intact  battalions  of  the  20th  Di- 
vision at  the  very  moment  when  Wedell's  brigade  advanced 
— through  some  misunderstanding!  In  the  History  of  the 
57th  Kegiment  by  Baron  von  Schimmelmann  I.  reference, 
so  far  as  that  nuiy  be  ex])ected  from  a  work  of  that  char- 
acter, to  the  incorrect  statements  of  the  Official  Account,  is 
made  by  special  note. 

The  edition  before  me  ditfers  essentially  from  the  first 
one — in  fact,  it  is  an  entirely  new  book,  such  as  I  may  have 
had  in  mind  from  the  first.  Many  communications  from 
officers  of  high  and  low  rank  have  enabled  me  to  interweave 
events  of  imj)ortane'e,  to  elucidate  others;  and  in  that  respect 
my  thanks  are  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  Major-General  von 
Hiller,  who  commanded  the  28th  Bi'igade  at  Koniggriitz; 
to  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Leszczynski,  of  the  auxiliary  es- 
tablishment of  the  great  General  b^tatl",  who  in  18()(j  was 
with  the  1st  Battalion  of  the  17th  Infantry  Regiment;  and 
to  others,  though  I  do  not  nanu^  them. 

The  Introduction  and  the  Second  Pari  had  to  be  completely 
rewritten.     Though  the  sentence  placed  at  the  head  of  the 


Preface  to  Second  Edition.  15 

book  remains  correct  from  the  general  tactical  point  of 
view,  still  no  intelligent  man  may  gainsay  the  great  in- 
fluence exercised  upon  tactics  by  the  small-caliber  rifl^e, 
smokeless  powder,  and  the  increased  effect  of  artillery  fire. 
In  making  investigations  in  this  field  the  new  edition  has 
taken  up  various  questions  of  general  interest  regarding 
the  future,  which  made  the  addition  of  a  Third  Part  indis- 
pensable. The  historical  part,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
merely  been  amplified. 

A  few  more  remarks  on  the  fortunes  of  the  First  Edi- 
tion :  According  to  my  observations,  the  same  did  not  become 
much  known  in  Northern  Germany,  owing  perhaps  to  some 
inconvenient  statements  contained  therein.  I  merely  men- 
tion the  fact,  and  am  not  deeply  concerned  about  the  reasons 
therefor;  the  reader  may  draw  his  own  conclusions.  The 
"reserve"  shown,  however,  failed  of  its  object  in  this  case. 
The  book  was  most  favorably  received  in  all  countries,  par- 
ticularly in  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Switzerland,  Sweden, 
Russia,  and  the  Netherlands. 

One  day  in  1883,  when  I  was  at  the  Hague,  I  called  on 
the  Dutch  Minister  of  War,  Den  Beer  Portugal;  the  object 
of  my  visit  is  immaterial.  He  received  me  with  great  civil- 
ity and  invited  me  to  dine  with  him  next  day.  There  I  met, 
among  other  guests,  several  general  staff  officers  from  the 
Hague,  the  minister  having  returned  my  call  in  due  form. 
The  repast  was  a  splendid  one,  and  the  tone  at  the  table  such 
as  may  only  be  found  among  well-bred  and  well-educated 
men.  You  could  feel  that  these  men  had  seen — and  had 
learned  something;  when  the  roast  was  on  the  table,  the 
Minister  of  War  rose  and  most  cordially  toasted,  in  fluent 
German,  the  German  comrade  and  above  all  the  author. 
I  responded  in  Dutch,  and,  after  the  lady  of  the  house  had 
withdrawn,  a  genial  mood  began  to  reign.     The  gentlemen 


16  Preface  to  Second  Edition. 

proved  thoroughly  familiar  with  my  writings,  particularly 
with  the  ''Two  Brigades."  Some  of  them  recited  entire 
sentences,  much  to  my  surprise,  and  the  War  Minister  him- 
self  proved  no  exception.  One  of  the  gentlemen  cold  me 
that  the  book,  which  costs  two  florins  in  Holland,  had 
brought  ten  florins  in  some  town  (Flushing?)  at  the  annual 
auction  of  the  regimental  library.  That,  he  said,  showed 
conclusively  how  much  the  book  was  held  in  esteem.  If  this 
edition  should  meet  the  eyes  of  these  gentlemen,  I  again  con- 
vey them  herewith  my  thanks  for  the  pleasant  hours  passed 
in  their  society. 

From  Austria  I  have  received  quite  enthusiastic 
comments. 

French  officers,  too,  took  much  interest  in  the  "Two 
Brigades."  One  of  them  wrote  me  that,  book  in  hand  on 
the  battle-field,  he  endeavored  to  place  himself  in  the  situa- 
tion of  the  38th  Brigade  near  Mars-la-Tour,  and  that  he 
vividly  realized  the  awful  drama  there  enacted;  that  in 
Algiers  the  book  was  his  constant  companion;  that  the 
German  author  was  his  master  and  favorite  writer,  etc. 

Nor  have  tokens  of  approval  failed  to  come  from  the 
Fatherland.  In  the  fall  of  1882  I  received  by  mail  a  pretty 
drinking-horn.  It  bore  the  inscription:  "To  the  Author  ot 
the  'Two  Brigades.'  "  I  herewith  convey  my  thanks  to  the 
kind  givers.  The  drinking-horn  is  my  pride,  for  the  book 
has  evidently  pleased  the  senders. 

In  the  spring  of  1884  I  called  on  General  of  Cavalry 
von  Willisen,  upon  the  request  of  a  distinguished  friend. 
The  general  received  me  with  the  words:  "I  knew  that  you 
were  the  author  of  the  best  book  on  modern  infantry  action, 
but  I  can  hardlv  believe  that  vou  are  also  the  author  of  the 


Preface  to  Second  Edition.  17 

anonymous  writings  on  cavalry,*"  although  I  am  assured 
by  two  corps  commanders  that  you  are.  Ever  since  I 
have  been  wanting  to  see  you,  and  if  you  had  not  come  to 
me,  I  should  have  gone  to  see  you,  if  for  uo  other  reason  than 
from  a  feeling  of  indebtedness,  because  heretofore  no  one 
has  written  so  clearly  and  convincingly  on  the  employ- 
ment of  cavalry.  Is  it  true  that  you  are  the  author  of  these 
writings?"  I  answered  in  the  affirmative,  and  the  general 
shook  me  heartily  by  the  hand  and,  as  he  said,  gratefully! 
He  said  that  he  had  learned  much  from  my  writings.  1 
have  been  in  constant  and  cordial  communication  with  liim 
ever  since.  One  day  he  led  me  to  his  desk,  and,  taking  from 
it  a  rather  ragged  book,  he  said:  "Look  at  it;  you  will  be 
gratified."  It  was  the  "Two  Brigades."  On  a  blank  leaf 
was  a  list  of  gentlemen  to  whom  he  had  loaned  the  book; 
there  were  about  fifty  of  them,  among  them  a  number  of 
general  officers.  "Kot  one,"  he  said,  "has  read  it  without 
enthusiasm.  It  has  traveled  a  good  deal,  and  its  outward 
appearance  is  not  very  fine,  but  it  remains  one  of  my 
favorite  books." 

One  corps  commander  says  that  the  description  of  the 
historical-tactical  events  equals  a  photograph  in  precision. 
Lieutenant-General  von  Legat,  formerly  commander  of  the 
30th  Division  and  who  was  my  company  commander  in  1865, 
wrote  me  from  Metz,  that  lie  had  visited  the  battle-field  of 
Mars-la-Tour  with  the  "Two  Brigades"  in  his  hand,  that  he 
had  found  my  statements  and  opinions  correct,  and  that  the 
events  passed  his  understanding.  General  von  Hiller  has 
repeatedly  thanked  me  for  the  precise  and  correct  account 
of  events  of  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  and  quite  a  number 

*1.  "On  the  Armament,  Training,  Organization,  and  Employ- 
ment of  Cavalry."  2.  "The  Cavalry  Division  as  a  Battle  Unit." 
3.  "Tactical  Directives  for  the  Formation  and  Leading  of  the  Cavalry 
Division."     All  three  published  by  R.  Felix,  Berlin. 


18  Preface  to  Second  Edition. 

of  communications,  many  of  them  from  Metz  and  from  vari- 
ous regiments,  testify  to  the  correctness  of  my  description. 
In  that  respect  the  book  has  therefore  fully  accomplished 
its  object,  and  I  hope  that  in  its  new  form  it  may  be  instru- 
mental to  some  extent  in  clearing  up  the  various  questions 
now  agitating  the  minds  of  militai'y  men. 

Fritz  Honig. 
Friedenau,  February  12,  1890. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FOURTH  EDITION. 


•  Since  the  appearance  of  the  Third  Edition,  now  com- 
pletely exhausted,  no  warlike  event  of  great  importance  has 
taken  place;  still  the  events  in  Chili  constitute  to  a  certain 
extent  a  valuable  confirmation  of  the  principles  and  opin- 
ions which  were  developed  in  the  book  before  those  events, 
and  based  entirely  on  experience  and  on  due  consideration 
of  the  progress  in  technique. 

Yet  practical  peace  experiments  and  theoretical  study 
also  have  clarified  tactical  theory  in  many  respects,  as 
evidenced  in  Germany  by  the  many  modifications  of  the 
various  regulations  and  firing  instructions,  instructions  for 
field  fortifications,  etc.,  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  other 
countries. 

In  tactics  there  can  be  no  standstill!  The  modifica- 
tions made  since  1890  had  therefore  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  for  the  most  part 
they  still  have  to  stand  practical  test.  Discussion,  held  in 
keeping  with  war  realities,  of  the  principal  questions,  par- 
ticularly of  the  infantry  attack,  will  therefore  continue  to 
form  part  of  our  daily  bread.  I  have  not  limited  myself 
to  them,  however,  but  have  endeavored  to  bring  all  tactical 
phenomena  of  the  battle-field  within  the  scope  of  my  in- 
quiry. The  elimination  of  old  and  the  addition  of  new 
matter  was  found  necessary  in  order  to  again  bring  the  con- 
tents and  form  of  the  book  up  to  date. 


20  Prefaec  to  Fourth  J-Jdition. 

Chapter  I.  of  the  First  I'art  is  the  oiilv  one  that  has  not 
been  modified;  "Events  on  the  Side  of  the  French"  has  been 
substituted  for  '^f;'  Chapter  II.,  of  the  First  Part.  A  new 
chapter,  "Losses,"  has  been  added  as  section  '7'"  of  Chapter 
V.  of  the  First  Part.  The  Third  Part  has  been  supple- 
mented by  the  chapters  on  "Extent  of  Ground  in  Battle," 
"Defense,"  and  "Street  and  Wood  Fighting."  The  chapter 
"Suggestions  Kegarding  the  Reprint  of  1880"  has  been 
eliminated. 

The  title  "^Inquiries,  etc.,^'  I  have  retained,  because  I 
wish  to  leave  it  to  the  intelligent  reader  what  position  to 
take  with  regard  to  my  opinions;  the  inquiries  are  based 
throughout  on  the  results  obtained  in  the  various  armies  by 
experience  and  experiments. 

The  example  of  the  28th  Infantry  Brigade  at  Konig- 
gratz  is  antiquated,  to  be  sure;  still  I  did  not  feel  at  liberty 
to  eliminate  it  from  this  book,  because  many  wishes  ex- 
pressed to  me  in  the  course  of  time  made  me  aware  that  its 
retention  was  desired,  particularly  in  the  Austrian  Army. 
As  regards  the  infantry  attack  en  masse,  no  more  instructive 
instance  is  to  be  found  to-day  than  that  of  the  38th  Infantry 
Brigade  at  Ma.rs-la-Tour.  notwithstanding  its  failure;  but 
such  lessons  alone  should  be  drawn  from  it  as  are  warranted 
by  the  facts. 

Both  illustrations  are  the  result  of  thorough  study  on 
the  spot  of  all  the  historical  material  available;  in  the 
case  of  the  38th  Infantry  Brigade  I  was  able  to  make  some 
valuable  rectifications.  Much  of  it  is  due  to  the  contro- 
versy carried  on  in  the  ^[ilitiir  Wochenblaft,  Xos.  71-78,  of 
1891.  Since  an  approximately  correct  historical  and  tac- 
tical account  of  the  events  was  thereby  rendered  possible,  I 
was  able  to  strike  out  all  ])oints  which  u]>  to  that  time  had 
been  in  controversv. 


Preface  to  Fourth  Edition.  21 

Tactics,  however,  cannot  be  exhausted  by  one  example; 
on  the  contrary,  as  many  of  them  as  possible;  should  be 
adduced.  That  has  been  done  in  the  Third  Part,  where  the 
relation  of  the  defense  to  the  attack  has  been  specially  dealt 
with.  I  thought  it  necessary  to  give  special  care  to  tactical 
reconnaissance  and  to  the  many  questions  closely  connected 
therewith  and  of  luoic  or  less  imjiortjince,  including  \\nt 
task  of  leading  an  army,  and  to  the  discussion  of  the  ad- 
v^ced  positions,  the  season  for  which,  if  they  ever  are  to 
be  of  any  use,  has  probably  been  ushered  in  by  smokeless 
powder.  The  conclusions  drawn  will  be  worthy  of  note, 
which  does  not  mean,  however,  that  they  are  claimed  to  be 
correct  in  every  particular. 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  infantry  tactics  in  battle  any 
more  than  tactics  of  any  other  arm;  and  a  discussion  of  the 
employment  of  all  arms  was  therefore  unavoidable.  The 
tactical  considerations  kept  in  mind  throughout  are  those 
which  probably  approximate  the  requirements  of  the  battle- 
field. All  the  incpjii-ies  have,  in  the  main,  reference  to  the 
fighting  in  a  pitched  battle. 

Shortly  after  the  adoption  of  the  Drill  Regulations  of 
1888  an  article  appeared  in  the  Milildr  Woclienhlatt,  express- 
ing the  wish  that  discussions  of  the  Regulations  should  for 
the  present  be  refrained  from.  The  Regulations  were  to 
be  subsequently  revised,  on  the  basis  of  the  official  reports 
of  the  corps  commanders.  The  published  wi-itings  did  in 
fact  show  much  reserve  in  that  respect;  the  reports  of  the 
corps  commanders  have  of  course  never  been  made  public. 
But  from  the  failure  of  the  promised  revision  to  materialize 
it  should  not  be  inferred  that  the  same  is  not  necessary; 
various  recent  phenomena  point  to  the  contrary.  Mean- 
while  there  has  been  ample  time  to  test  the   fitness  of 


22  Preface  to  Fourth  Edition. 

the  Kegulations,  and  further  observance  of  silence  would 
be  wrong. 

Fritz  Honig. 
Frledenau,  November  30,  1893. 


The  improved  fire-arms  have  not  only  modified  troop- 
leading  in  battle,  but  have  circumscribed  the  same  and 
rendered  it  more  difficult. 

Tactics  must  become  more  psychological,  if  an  army 
would  not  forego  victory. 

Fritz  Hbniq. 

Cleve,  October  1,  1881. 


INTRODUCTION. 


•    Motto:     "Whenever  art  has  decayed,   the  fault  lay  with  the 
artists.''— Schiller. 

Fire-arms  have  undergone  great  improvements  in  a 
comparatively  short  time,  yet  it  would  be  rash  to  say  that 
greater  rapidity  of  fire,  greater  accuracy,  flatter  and  longer 
trajectory,  and  greater  penetrative  force  could  not  be  ex- 
pected. Although  the  aims  of  General  Wille,  as  expressed 
in  "The  Field  Gun  of  the  Future"  and  in  "The  Smallest 
Caliber"  (R.  Eisenschmidt,  Berlin),  may  encounter  financial 
and  certain  technical  obstacles,  still  the  time  will  come 
when  tactics  will  demand  the  realization  of  the  principles 
advocated  by  him.  That  future  state  of  technique  and  its 
influence  on  tactics  must  even  now  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Infantry  is  affected  more  than  any  other  arm  by 
improved  fire-arms  and  bj'  the  increased  importance  of  fire. 
Yet  fire-arms  will  never  extinguish  the  characteristics  of 
the  various  arms  of  the  service.  Infantry  will,  as  heretofore, 
carry  to  the  end  and  decide  the  conflict,  and  will  be  unable 
to  fulfill  that  duty  by  fire-action  at  long  range  and  by  the 
fire  of  masses  delivered  at  those  distances.  It  must  take 
upon  itself  the  fighting  at  short  range,  close  upon  the  enemy, 
and  drive  him  away  by  fire  and  shock,  in  order  to  occupy  his 
position.  To  preclude  any  misunderstanding  of  the  word 
short,  is  should  be  mentioned  that  according  to  the  Firing 
Instructions  of  September  9,  1893,  ranges  up  to  600  meters 


24  Introduction. 

are  short  ranges,  theuce  to  1000  meters  medium  ranges,  and 
beyond  1000  meters  Joinj  ranges.  It  is  to  be  understood, 
therefore,  that  infantry  will  suffer  heavy  losses  in  battle. 
These  the  infantry  should  ncit  shun,  nor  should  it  be 
kept  in  ignorance  that  they  are  impending,  and  it  should 
be  trained  in  that  sense — /.  e..  to  recognize  the  dangers  of 
the  battle-field,  because  there  is  no  better  means  to  keep 
infantry  in  hand  than  a  correct  idea  of  the  losses,  and  the 
will  (reason  and  energy)  to  brave  the  dangers.  The  action  of 
infantry  will,  as  a  rule,  be  limited  to  fire-action  of  masses  of 
skirmishers — any  other  form  would  be  quickly  and  pre- 
maturely shattered;  whether  that  fire-action  of  masses  of 
skirmishers  be  styled  "regulation"  or  "organized"  is  im- 
material to  me.  In  this  method  of  fighting,  infantry  should 
be  thoroughly  efficient,  because  leading  and  control  can 
make  themselves  felt  only  within  certain  limits,  and  fre- 
quently become  wholly  impossible  after  the  dispositions  for 
the  attack,  since  most  of  the  subordinate  leaders  will  soon 
be  hors-de-comhat.  These  agencies  will  not  prevent  disorder. 
One  of  the  principal  tasks  to  be  mastered  by  infantry  that 
is  to  be  capable  of  carrying  an  attack  en  masse  through  to 
the  end — for  the  entire  question  of  ••infantry  tactics"  hinges 
on  that  point — is  that  of  fighting  in  disorder  and  of  learn- 
ing it  in  time  of  peace.  As  any  movement  is  best  assured  by 
some  system,  no  matter  how-  simple  and  how  flexible,  when- 
ever there  is  danger  of  failure  from  disorder,  so  infantry  in 
order  not  to  be  rendered  impotent  from  the  start  w  hen  set  in 
motion  against  a  common,  extensive  objective,  needs  for  the 
skirmish  fighting  en  masse  certain  fixed  laws,  principles, 
regulations,  which  will  stand  actual  test;  i.  e.,  there  should 
be  some  organization  to  this  skirmish  fighting  en  masse. 
Decisive  results  cannot  be  gained  without  the  employment 
of  masses,  and  in  that  particular  former  and  modt-rn  tactics 


Introduction.  25 

do  not  differ.  The  difference  is  to  be  found  exclusively  in 
the  tactical  form  by  means  of  which  life,  energy  and  aim  are 
to  be  imparted  to  some  principle;  still  the  difference  is  con- 
siderable, owing  to  the  difficulties  of  that  question.  The 
German  infantry  also  fights  in  masses  of  skirmishers; 
whether  sufficiently  so,  and  whether  always  on  correct  prin- 
ciples, remain  to  be  seen;  and  we  may  note  right  here  that 
no  army  has  yet  organized  the  skirmish  fighting  en  masse  in 
a  manner  which  promises  to  prove  practical. 

In  comparing  past  events  with  the  modern  task  system 
(Auftragsverfaliren)  as  laid  down  in  the  Regulations,  we 
might  say  that  the  tactical  events  in  front  of  Worth,  at  the 
Mance  ravine,  and  against  La  Folie  on  August  18,  1870 — 
i.  e.,  ideas  which  failed  of  success,  have  been  adopted  into 
our  Regulations.  The  task  system  at  these  points  of  the 
battle-fields  was  no  doubt  different  from  what  that  of  to-day 
is  meant  to  be.  The  system  was  improvised,  and  not  regle- 
mentary;  it  had  not  been  practiced;  still  in  their  essen- 
tial points  the  two  are  as  much  alike  as  two  peas:  em- 
ployment of  the  troops  by  driblets,  either  w^ithout  pre- 
vious deployment  and  disposition  for  attack  (Worth),  fol- 
lowed by  belated,  and  again  by  premature,  advance  of 
the  rear  echelons  (Worth,  Mance  ravine);  or  with  pre- 
mature dispositions  without  previous  deployment  entail- 
ing lack  of  proper  arrangement  as  to  depth  and  width,  and 
belated  appearance  of  the  supports  (La  Folie).  In  obtaining 
what  results  were  ultimate^  gained  with  much  difficulty,  the 
system  of  tasks  had  to  be  perpetually  "corrected''  without 
thereby  imparting  unity  and  combination  to  the  work — the 
carrying  through  of  the  action ;  here  under  the  task  system 
all  the  forces  were  absorbed  by  the  advanced  positions  (La 
Folie),  there  opposite  the  main  position  (Point  du  Jour), 
they  were  not  even  able  to  deploy,  and  yet  there  was  an 


26  Introduction. 

abundance  of  depressions  and  woods,  which  it  is  said  are  un- 
favorable to  the  uuitj  of  action  and  favorable  to  the  system 
of  tasks.  The  modern  task  system  will  certainly  lead  to 
better  results,  because  constantly  appealing  to  the  tactical 
judgment  of  subordinate  leaders;  but  as  surely  as  no  lieu- 
tenant from  his  sphere  is  able  to  direct  a  battle,  so  surely 
will  the  cumulation  of  results  gained  by  any  number  of 
detachments  charged  with  tasks  fail  to  decide  the  battle. 
Yet  healthy  tactics  require  this.  We  do  not  mean  to  con- 
demn the  task  system  on  general  principles,  but  one  should 
not  expect  a  pyramid  to  stand  on  its  vertex.  It  is  not  a 
question  of  task  or  order  system,  but  of  task  and  order  sys- 
tem— i.  e.,  we  want  both  and  both  are  compatible  when 
placed  in  proper  relation  to  each  other. 

Task  implies  something  general,  order  something  specific. 
The  former  naturally  is  characteristic  of  the  high  command 
in  order  that,  and  because,  it  may  utilize  many  means;  the 
latter  falls  to  the  subordinate  command,  which  is  restricted 
to  limits  that  admit  of  the  execution  of  an  order  only,  by 
cramping  considerations  of  space,  by  its  limited  sphere  of 
action,  and  by  the  narrow  front  of  its  objective.  That,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  order  of  things  in  the  Regulations;  they 
extend  the  task  system  too  far  downward. 

The  experiences  of  the  G  uard  Corps — particularly  of  the 
1st  Brigade  of  the  Guard  at  St.  Privat — speak  so  decidedly 
against  the  system  then  in  vogue  that  it  is  superfluous  to 
waste  words  over  it.  The  Guard  had  learned  mass-fighting 
only,  and  that  hobby  was  instrumental  at  any  rate  in  bring- 
ing about  some — though  insufficient — development  of  front ; 
our  attempt  at  that  time  at  the  task  system  did  not  even 
yield  that  much.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Saxons  at  Roncourt 
—St.  Privat.  the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour.  and  Kott- 
witz's  brigade  at  Loigny  knew  how  to  preserve  combination 


Introduction.  27 

when  fighting  en  masse,  and  they  produced  considerable  efifect 
in  each  instance.  To  be  sure  the  attack  of  the  five  and  one- 
half  battalions  of  the  3Sth  Brigade  failed,  but,  notwith- 
standing its  many  defects,  due  to  circumstances,  it  is  and  re- 
mains, among  all  the  attacks  made  en  masse,  the  finest  exam- 
ple of  a  tactical  offensive  against  the  strategic  flank.  There 
was  therefore  hardlj^  any  good  reason  for  declining  to  in- 
vestigate whether  more  could  not  have  been  gained  by 
means  of  timely  improvements  and  by  due  regard  for  com- 
bined action,  than  by  completely  ignoring  what  good  there 
still  remained  and  by  entrusting  the  consummation  of 
the  combat  exclusively  to  the  hands  of  the  subordinate 
leaders. 

Intimately  connected  with  these  questions  is  the  form 
and  method  of  giving  out  orders  and  tasks.  The  Field  Serv- 
ice Regulations  leave  no  doubt  that  the  written  form  should 
be  the  rule,  since  they  prescribe  expressly:  "Orders  and 
reports  are  to  be  transmitted  in  writing  whenever  time  and 
circumstances  do  not  forbid."  And  further:  "The  orders 
of  higher  troop  commanders  to  their  troops  will  usually  be 
in  writing.  Even  where  orders  could  be  communicated 
orally,  as  when  the  troops  are  assembled,  orders  of  any 
length  will  be  dictated  and  taken  down  in  writing.  In  the 
case  of  some  simple  arrangement  or  of  a  single  task,  the 
order  is  given  orally,  and  eventually  reduces  itself  to  a  mere 
word  of  command."  According  to  the  Regulations,  the  task 
system  for  infantry  tactics  begins  with  the  brigade.  The 
latter  receives  orders  and  gives  out  tasks  and  uses  the  oral 
form  alone  in  transmission  to  the  regiments,  as  do  these  to 
the  battalions  and  the  latter  to  the  companies,  as  indicated 
in  Nos.  95,  103,  112,  and  113,  Part  II.  of  the  Regulations  of 
1889.  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  the  company  and 
battalion  leaders  have  to  issue  specific  and  clear  orders  in  the 


S8  iHtnuliivtion. 

prosonoo.  if  possible,  of  all  platoon  or  coiupauv  oomniaiulors 
without  iiifiiu.uitis;  on  thoir  fivodom  of  oxiviitioii.  whilo  tvjri- 
m»M»tal  ami  In  igado  i-onimaiuloi-s  adilrt^ss  tlio  imlividual 
tasks  to  tho  rojiiiuouts  ami  battalions.  \\  itliin  tho  task 
svstom  thoiv  is  thoivforo  a  lino  o(  ilontarUation  botwoon 
ordorand  task:  tho  formor  omis  with  tho  loinpanv.  tho  lattor 
bt\i;ins  with  tlu»  battalion. 

It  is  dt^sirablo  and  nsi'fnl  on  many  aooonnts  that  battlo 
otxiors  bo  pi'oparod  in  writing  if  pi>ssiblo.  and  it  would  not 
bt»  iuootupaiibU>  «Mtlun-  with  tht>  task  systoni  or  with  tho  lino 
of  domarkation  botwtvn  oihKm*  and  task,  to  issm>  tln^  ordors 
in  ivjiard  to  tho  fortmM-  orally,  thoso  in  ropird  [o  tho  lattor  in 
writinii.  Po  bosuro.  durinu  thooontlii't  it  will  in  many  oasos 
bo  mi>«5t  dittlonlt  ti»  jiot  an  ordor  thronuh  to  a  battalion,  and 
still  moro  so  to  a  oompany.  Oi\  tho  othor  haml.  whon  rooon- 
na.issani'o  has  violdtHl  snt^ioitnu  information  ami  whon  tho 
tljjhtinir  of  \\w  ailvatu'o  uiiard  or  tirsi  lino  has  iltMrotl  np  tho 
sitnatit>n.troi»p  loadors  will  in  most  oasos  havo  snt^ioiont  timo 
to  uso  tht*  written  form.  Ium-o  mado  applieabU>  both  to  tho  or- 
dor and  to  tho  task.  A  habit  is  thus  formotl  of  ordtu-inu,  only 
what  is  ntvossary.  to  onior  it  at  tht>  risrht  moniont  and  in  tho 
cltMirt^st  and  bi^t  oonsidorini  form,  and  tho  roooivor  of  the 
written  order  has  timo  to  ivtleot  on  it  ai\d  impress  it  thor- 
oujrhlv  on  his  mind.  Moreover,  the  written  order  seems  par- 
ticularly indispensable  for  the  hiiiher  leaders  fivm  the  meri^ 
standpoint  of  ivsponsiblity.  The  written  form  of  orders 
should  thort^fort^  bo  laid  down  as  a  rule  for  the  battlo  also. 
Any  one  who  has  had  practical  oxporieuco  and  has  atten- 
tively followed  the  course  of  an  action  will  concotlo  that  in 
war  few  suportluons  orders  aiv  given,  in  peace  very  many. 
SubstHpiont  critioism  would  bo  instrumental  in  correctinjr 
tbo  suportluons  onlers  of  iHWCt^timo  and  in  rtnuleriuir  tho 
preparation  for  the  battU^tield  mort^  rtwl.     l^attlo  tactics 


Introducti/m.  29 

rc'fjuiro  nriintr'rrupf.od  mutual  rf.'laf ions  fx-twfr-n  ord^rrH  from 
above,  comjiiijfji«;af  iojiH  to  thff  flank,  and  loportH  from  below. 
'J'lir;  maintenance  of  tliese  mutrjjjj  relations  ban  been  ren- 
<Jerr;(J  mueb  more  difTieult  by  tbe  improvements  in  fire-arms, 
in  tbat  a  larj^e  number  of  leaders  is  early  placed  hors-rh- 
combat,  and  tbat  tbe  deptb  of  space  involved  is  very  mucb 
increased.  All  orders,  communications,  fjnd  reports  re<juire 
tbffrefr»rr-  more  tiirje,  and,  on  tbe  otber  band,  tbe  superior 
leader  from  bis  sljition  can,  even  witb  a  good  glass,  follow 
but  imperfectly  tbe  course  of  the  action  from  its  beginning. 
Tlie  di/Iiculties  presented  by  tb(;He  relatively  new  phenom- 
ena are  not  sufficiently  illustrated  in  peace  practice,  and  yet 
practice  should  master  them  as  mucb  as  possible. 

It  m.'iy  be  stated  as  the  rule  that  no  reports  from  the 
firing  line  can  reach  the  station  of  the  leader  (who  will  prob- 
ably be  with  tbe  rr-servej;  yet  tbat  will  be  most  necessary 
when  the  ac-tion  approaches  sufieriorify  of  fire.  Orders 
from  above  to  those  below  will,  ax  a  rule,  have  to  be  trans- 
mitted through  regular  channels,  and  refjorfs  going  in  the 
opposite  direction  will  have  to  do  the  .same;  in  either  case, 
with  the  greatest  possible  rapidity.  From  this  follows  the 
importance  of  superior  direction  for  combined  action  as  a 
natural  sefjuence.  This  indispensable  system  of  orders, 
reports,  and  communications  should  be  adapted  to  the  cir- 
cumstances and  regulated  ho  far  as  possible  in  each  case. 
It  is  not  true  tbat  any  measure  not  based  on  personal  obser- 
vation is  ordered  too  late.  It  may,  and  in  many  cases  it 
will,  be  too  late  to  give  orders;  for  that  very  good  reason,  the 
Regulations  make  the  decision  f.f  important  steps  one  of  the 
powers  of  the  sutiordinate  leaders  who  are  nearest  to  the 
enemy,  and  not  one  jf)t  should  be  taken  away  from  that 
power.  On  the  other  hand,  the  range  of  the  superior  leader's 
view  should  be  supy^lemented  and  [perfected  by  every  pos- 
sible means  on  the  part  of  the  fighting  troops,  which  alone 


iU>  hitrothivtion. 

will  iMi;ibh>  hiin  \o  form  a  oiH'ViH't  i>i>iiuon.  It  is  plain  that 
soiuo  (aotii'al  boinuiarv  is  imlisponsablo  for  the  purpose; 
that  houmlarv  lios  within  tho  hrijiado.  Tho  laitor  forms  a 
olarifviuii'  statitnu  so  to  spoaU.  and  should  thoroforo  bo  pnv 
vidod  with  sutVuiont  nionntoil  organs  fi>r  v'oniniunioation 
with  tho  tlanks  and  with  tho  superiors.  This  niothod  niiiilit 
liouorally  ho  found  praotioablo.  and  it  points  out  tho  jrroat 
iniportanoo  of  tho  briuado  ooniniandor's  position. 

All  roports  sont  by  disniountod  nion  will  arrivo  too  lato; 
so  says  thoory.  Kut  tho  aotual  battlo  t\old  pormits  niuoh. 
just  as  it  forbids  niuoh.  that  oaii  hardly  bo  sottlod  in  tin\o  of 
poaoo.  In  many  oasos  a  kintl  of  "foot  rolays"  miiiht  bo 
ostablishod  botwtvn  battalion  and  briijado  loadors.  but  only 
whon  tho  situation  oalls  for  it.  It  w  ill  bo  found  moro  or  loss 
praotioablo  whorovor  dolayinu-  aotion  is  roquirtnl.  How 
many  roports  mieht  not  havo  btHMi  sont  from  tht^  ri^ht  and 
loft  winjrs  and  from  tht'  oontor  duriuj;  \\u'  U>nii-  dolays  on  tho 
ISth  of  AusiustI  How  many  woro  rondorod?  Woro  not  all 
tho  superior  leaders  near  tho  Mani'o  ravine  kept  in  unbroken 
iiiiioranee  of  the  aotual  state  of  the  battle,  though  their  sta- 
tion permitted  a  good  view?  And  would  not  many  things 
have  gone  better  had  thert^  been  no  suoh  laok  of  informa- 
tion? In  every  oommand.  tht>roforo.  tho  transmission  of 
orders  and  roports.  t>von  during  battlo.  should  bo  most  oart'^ 
fully  systonuitizod.  This  requires  the  employment  of  well- 
mounted  oftloers  and  general  statT  otlioers  for  purposes  of 
observation,  with  speoitie  onlers  to  send  reports  as  soon  as 
possibU*:  they  would  oluH>se  their  stations  aooording  to  the 
state  of  the  aotion.  and  report  everything  of  importance  by 
means  of  mounted  orderlies  Avhile  continuing  their  observa- 
tions. Comparatively  safe  pi>sts  of  observation  are  not 
lacking  on  the  modern  battle-tield.  as  demonstrattni  by  the 
events  in  the  center  and  on  the  right  at  dravelotte.  even 


Iittrodiiclioii.  31 

;»(  S(,  I'lival — MohJoih;  I  lie  IIjiiikK  of  (lie  ciicrny'H  [lOHition 
Hlioiild,  li(»w(?v<T,  fiiHl  be  iiHc«*rfjiiii«'(I.  Apfirofniulc  organi 
/;i(i(iji  oT  Ihc  h.\hIciii  of  ordcrH  ;uHJ  rcixtrlH  in  f)ul.l,le  JH  there- 
fore more  n('C('KK;ii".y  llinii  ever,  :ui(l  slioiild  lie  (r;ir«'fiilly 
(aii};lil  in  [M'acc.  Protracted  and  fluctualinj;  finj-flghtH  will 
l)r()bal>ly  not  beabwtnt  in  the  future,  since  the  iniprovernentft 
in  fir(?-arniH  have  rather  added  (o  than  diminJHhwl  the  HJub- 
T)ornneHH  of  (lie  (ire-fi^hl.  That,  it  in  f)r('Hnin('d,  will  liohl 
^ood  wilh  oni-  jM-enent  rilleH,  when  in  I  he  liaiidH  of  good 
in  fa  Miry,  of  courHe. 

It  iH  a  fact  that  Hinc(;  Ihe  warH  of  1870-71  and  1877-78, 
all  conlinental  arniieH  of  Europe  hav(*  cha,ng(Mj  and  diniin- 
JHlicd  the  terniH  of  Hervice,  i)articiilar].y  in  the  infantry, 
while,  on  (lie  other  hand,  the  number  of  foot  troopH  ha8  been 
greatly  iiM  reaHed.  F(  may  Ite  Hafely  naid  that  a  longer  term 
of  Her  vice  mak<'H  a,  heKer  infandy  Holdier  than  a  Hhorter 
one,  liencr'  cejlain  conHe()uences  flowing  from  the  reduction 
of  the  term  of  Hervic(;  will  have  to  b(;  reckoned  with  in  the 
tacticH  of  the  battle-field.  The  infantry  of  the  Imperial 
Fr<'nc]i  Army  wan  certainly  on<,*  of  1h(?  bewt  that  haH  (;ver 
exiHted,  bn(  it  failed  in  I  lie  selection  of  ils  tactics  and  lacked 
many  incentives  ix-ciiliar  to  Ihe  ^ilerman  infantry.  Yet  it 
remains  a  matter  of  doubt  whether  any  Fi-ench  infantry  will 
ever  ecpial  that  which  fought  at  Worth  and  Gravelotte.  1 
do  not  believe  that  it  will.  To  a  certain  degree,  the  same 
may  br*  Haid  of  any  other  infantry  of  to-day,  yet  the  demands 
made  on  it  have  certainly  not  be(;n  diminished.  There  is 
bound  to  be  more  disorder  and  skulking  than  heretofore, 
and  there  is  perhaps  but  one  effective  remedy  for  the 
evil — i.  e.,  more  and  efficient  leaders  in  all  subaltern  grades 
and  some  sjiecial  organization  in  rear  of  the  line;  of  bat- 
tle for  dealing  with  skulkers.  Can  it  be  done?  The  lat- 
ter jierhaps,   the   foiiner — well,   we'll    wait   and   see.     IIii- 


B2  Introduction. 

man  nature  will  not  be  denied,  and  the  evil  will  affect  both 
sides;  one  reason  more  why  everything  should  be  done  to 
have  a  good  system  of  supervision. 

The  mass-battle  will  require  an  enormous  net  of  organs 
for  the  transmission  of  orders,  communications,  and  reports, 
well  organized,  well  trained,  covering  the  battle-field,  extend- 
ing beyond  the  flanks,  and  operating  laterally  and  trans- 
versely on  the  principles  of  the  relay  service.  On  that  basis 
the  strength  of  the  staffs  should  be  calculated  and  that  of 
the  intermediate  links  and  posts  fixed,  dependent  on  the 
distances  and  on  the  presumable  importance  of  each  point 
on  the  entire  line.  This  is  still  more  important  in  the  case 
of  battles  of  several  days'  duration,  nor  can  the  force  of  this 
consideration  be  impaired  or  broken  by  the  idea  that  here- 
after battles  can  be  arranged  from  the  strategic  point  of 
view  alone,  and  that  the  tactical  execution  should  be  left  to 
the  judgment  of  the  army.  It  is  not  permissible  that  the 
central  direction  should  be  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  progress 
of  the  battle  for  hours,  and  that  the  armies  should  be  with- 
out communication  with  the  central  direction  for  an  equal 
space  of  time,  as  was  the  case  at  Gravelotte. 

At  any  rate,  in  view  of  the  modern  armament  and  condi- 
tion of  infantry  and  in  view  of  the  uncertainties  inseparable 
therefrom,  more  consideration  is  to  be  given  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  infantry  reserves,  if  the  command  of  the  army  is 
to  retain  a  firm  footing.  So  far-reaching  is  the  effect  of 
improved  armament  in  combination  with  shortened  terms 
of  service. 

The  defender  occupying  prepared  positions — and  more, 
perhaps,  when  the  position  is  yet  to  be  prepared — is  going  to 
weigh  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  advanced  positions, 
and  it  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  they  may  play  a  much 
greater  role  in  the  future  than  they  have  in  the  past.     This 


Introduction.  33 

is  solely  due  to  modern  iufantry  and  artillery  fire  in  com- 
bination with  the  diminished  tactical  value  of  cavalry.  The 
attacker  on  his  part  must  at  this  stage  seek  the  best  method 
of  reconnaissance  and  attack.  It  is  of  no  use  to  appeal 
to  experience  and  principle;  the  question  cannot  be  solved 
in  that  way;  it  may  at  best  be  cleared  up  to  a  certain  extent 
by  peace  maneuvers  planned  with  that  object  in  view.  That 
should  be  done.  It  will  then  be  found  that  movements  of 
large  bodies  must  be  made  at  night,  that  much  shifting  and 
even  changes  of  front  become  necessary;  all  arms  must 
therefore  be  well  trained  in  this  particular. 

Many  new  or  modified  questions  will  therefore  confront 
the  tactician  which  his  experience  will  be  insufficient  to 
solve.  They  should  therefore  be  amplified  and  supple- 
mented by  reflection  without  losing  sight  of  reality — i.  e.,  we 
must  have  a  healthy  theory  of  fighting,  and  that  in  peace 
time. 

The  infantry  was  compelled  to  change  its  tactical  forms 
and  to  put  up  with  many  additional  evils  inseparable  from 
these  modifications,  though  it  did  not  have  to  change  any  of 
its  principles;  whereas  the  artillery  had  yet  to  establish 
some  of  its  principles,  before  the  two  could  become  coordi- 
nate sister  arms.  In  their  common  action  infantry  has  the 
more  difiicult  task  to  perform ;  that  of  the  artillery,  in  fight- 
ing, being  facilitated  by  the  technique  and  better  chances 
to  carry  out  its  principles.  Infantry  is  unable  to  escape 
complete  dissolution,  and  is,  in  the  end,  restricted  to  skir- 
mish fire,  but  it  remains  a  tactical  arm,  notwithstanding  its 
state  of  dissolution.  The  artillery  is  called  the  solid  frame- 
work of  the  battle,  but  the  frame  must  be  subdivided  into 
small  sections,  whereby  alone  it  is  enabled  to  preserve  the 
requisite  order  and  solidity,  and  to  become  pliable,  dirigible, 
and  highlv  effective.     Formerlv  in  infantry  firing  it  was  not 


34  Introduction. 

the  mau  who  tired,  but  the  officer  who  permitted  him  to  tire. 
To-day  infantry  lire  can  be  controlled  only  by  careful 
training  of  the  skirmisher  by  fire  discipline,  and  artillery 
tire  only  by  careful  training  of  the  battery.  Individualizing 
the  skirmishers  and  training  the  battery  as  a  tactical  funda- 
mental tiring  machine  constitute  the  best  means  for  the 
action  of  each  arm  and  for  their  combined  action.  Artillery 
had  to  follow  in  the  train  of  tactics  in  so  far  as  small  units 
with  considerable  freedom  and  entrusted  to  many  but  suffi- 
ciently trained  hands  were  substituted  for  large  units  in 
large  combinations.  In  the  pursuit  of  new  principles,  the 
artillery  aimed  for  a  long  time  at  the  direction  and  control 
of  concentrated  masses,  but  practice  has  shown  their  impos- 
sibility; in  the  artillery,  too,  there  remains  to-day  only  mass- 
elfect  by  means  of  individual  effect,  direction  of  masses  by 
means  of  individual  direction. 

During  all  the  phases  of  the  conflict  up  to  the  decision 
it  is  no  longer  correct  to  speak  of  infantry  as  the  principal 
arm,  as  compared  with  artillery.  In  every  action  of  any 
extent  the  two  arms  are  interdependent,  both  must  stead- 
fastly aim  at  the  one  object — to  gain  a  superiority  of  fire 
over  the  enemy,  because  that  is  the  prerequisite  for  all 
further  action.  During  this,  probably  the  most  sanguin- 
ary and  protracted  period,  the  artillery  nmy  here,  the  in- 
fantry there,  temporarily  prove  more  effective  than  the  sis- 
ter arm,  but  the  accomplishment  of  the  common  object  calls 
for  the  earliest  possible  employment  of  the  full  force  of  fire 
of  both.  I  am  aware  that  I  shall  raise  opposition  by  no 
longer  making  any  tactical  distinction  between  infantry  and 
ai'tillery  as  the  principal  and  auxiliary  arms,  as  first  and 
second  arms  of  the  battle-field,  and  this  breaking  with  tra- 
dition may  provoke  a  new  controversy,  which,  far  from  fear- 
ing. I  earnestly  desire. 


Introduction.  35 

In  the  case  of  either  arm  superiority  of  fire  presupposes 
direction  of  fire,  and  the  measure  of  effect  produced  depends 
on  the  quality  of  the  rifle  and  gun,  on  the  number  of  both, 
and  on  the  proficiency  in  firing.  I  deem  it  an  indisputable 
truth  that  artillery  fire  is  more  easily  directed  than  infantry 
fire,  because,  in  the  first  place,  the  former  is  effective  at 
greater  distances  than  infantry  fire,  and  because  artillery 
fire  admits  of  more  deliberation  and  better  observation. 
Under  certain  conditions  the  fire  of  the  artillery  is  moreover 
more  effective  than  that  of  infantry;  either  arm  should 
therefore  supplement  the  other  tactically  in  view  of  their 
object:  they  always  belong  together. 

To  be  sure,  my  ideas  presuppose  many  things,  particu- 
larly as  regards  artillery  and  the  training  of  the  leaders, 
which  still  have  to  materialize  or  are  to  be  improved. 
Every  artillery  man  should  be  able  to  Mt;  during  the  fire  the 
piece  must  as  much  as  possible  be  kept  ready  to  fire,  and 
when  that  is  accomplished,  the  question  of  rapid-firing  guns 
receives  its  best  solution,  depending  as  it  does  not  on  the 
construction  of  the  barrel,  but  on  that  of  the  carriage 
(brake-apparatus).  The  proper  foundation  for  the  direction 
of  fire  is  obtained  only  when,  in  addition,  the  organization  of 
the  artillery  and  the  construction  of  the  piece  guarantee  the 
tactically  highest  possible  eflflciency  (masses  of  hits).  That 
would  require  the  artillery  to  be  assigned  by  regiments  to 
the  divisions,  the  corps  artillery  to  be  abolished,  and  the 
number  of  batteries  in  the  regiment  and  the  number  of  guns 
in  the  battery  to  be  diminished.  How  far  the  reduction 
should  be  carried  is  not  to  be  inquired  into  here;  it  suffices 
to  state  that  the  present  units  are  too  large.  Artillery  acts 
by  batteries,  and  the  smaller  the  units  the  better  will  be  the 
direction  of  fire,  provided  the  artillery  has  learned  how  to 
hit.     Divisional  artillery  should  be  so  incorporated   with 


36  tutnHiHclHm, 

(ho  vlixision  ihat  iufamn  ami  artiUovv  l>o<omo  ooinplotoly 
bloudoil  (aiii^aUN  ;  ihai  llu^  last  jiim  is  in  position  l\\  tho 
timo  tUo  iufaimv  ot"  tho  viivision  is  it^aiK  tor  l>atiK\  that 
the  iufautrv  is  famiUar  with  tht^  t  tVoot  of  aitiUorv  tlvo.  ami 
the  rtrtiUorv  with  tho  otlVot  of  iufawtry  tliv:  a»ul,  abovo  all. 
that  ovtM'Y  iivnoral.ii-rosjHvtivo  <>f  his  ai*m  (oavalvv  inohuUni^, 
IS  thotvnijhlv  at  houto  in  tho  t'nmlaniontal  tluhiiuii"  prinoi- 
pK\s  of  iht^  two  tiro  hranrhos  of  tho  soi'vioo.  NN  h\  should 
it  Ih^  mo»v  dittlonlt  for  au  infatitrv  jiotioral  to  obstn m^  am\ 
jntl^v  artillorv  thv  than  ittfautn  tliv.  whon  tho  aitilloiy 
has  btvomo  invtloiont  in  thing  In  ImttoritMii  and  bv  brijjavio 
divisiious  iAU\tihtHgfH)f  Thoro  is  no  ivason  whatovor:  it 
will  bo  utvossivrv,  tv^  bo  sniv.  to  train  ot\lotM-s  from  tho  bo- 
jjiuuing'  to  familiariBO  ihomsohos  with  tho  oharaotoristios 
ami  with  tho  spirit  of  all  arnts,  ami  to  loam  how  to  jmlji-e 
thorn.  A  iivnoral  of  i«frtutrj\  oavalry,  or  artillorv  is  sht^r 
nonstnist\  wo  utHHl  but  ouo  ijvnoral.  who.  to  bo  snro,  should 
bo  ablo  ktvp  his  soat  in  all  saddlos. 

Tho  oontrovorsY  as  to  tho  prinoii^U  arm  is  thoi>^foro  an 
idlo  ono:  in  many  of  tho  phastvis  at  Wi^rth,  Vionvillo.  and 
ilravolotto  wo  saw  artillory  play  tho  ri^lo  of  tho  princi^hU 
atMh  and  ju>  dtvis^iow  will  ovor  Iv  jriviJUHl  w  ithoui  tho  fulhvst 
omployiuont  of  artillory  fire.  Jiuljiing  from  tho  poat"^ 
manouvors,  it  would  appoar  that  tho  su^nnior  oomuuindors 
do  not  by  auy  mt\u\s  invariably  display  tho  rtH|uisito  know  b 
ed|so  of  tho  oai^aoity  of  artillery  tir^;  otherwise  rnawy  tbin^ 
would  not  hapiHM\.  Artillery  will  have  to  oxeroiso  siHvial 
oar\*  in  onlor  not  to  K*  ouirnlfetl  in  oatastn^pho  at  tho  hands 
of  the  enemy's  artillory  and  infantry.  \Vith  artillery,  thort^ 
fo*v»  everything::  doi^nids  on  ooiuing  into  |H»sition  as  t\niekly. 
as  skillfnlly.  and  in  as  iin\at  strtMijjth  as  tn^ssiblo.  and  on 
antioiiKUing  tho  enemy's  artillery  in  (tifUi»(}  the  nuh;e.  If  it 
aooomplisho^  that,  artillery  with  its  prt»sent  prv^jtvtiles  will 


Introduf:twn.  37 

in  ujany  ca»e«  alKO  play  a  decisive  r61e  against  infantry, 
Th^re  can  be  no  doubt  aw  to  thi«.  If  artiJleiy  doeB  not 
attain  this,  infantry  fire  alone  may  lay  it  low  by  ranks,  and 
we  may  in  the  future  read  not  of  ''a  batter-y  of  the  dead,"  but 
of  entire  brigade  divinions.  This  power  and  weakness  of 
artillery  should  be  familiar  to  the  leaders  of  all  arms;  artil- 
lery should  not  deceive  itself  on  that  point,  and  should 
learn  three  things  in  peace:  first,  circumspection  and  judg- 
ment; second,  hitting;  and  third,  how  to  develop  its  full 
power  of  fire — in  other  words,  how  to  get  the  range  more 
quickly  than  the  opposing  artillery.  It  appeared  necessary 
to  me  at  this  point  to  emphasize  this  vital  question  of  mod- 
ern artillery;  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  thoughtless  action  may  reduce  the  tactical  life  of  the 
best  infantry  to  a  minimum. 

It  is  not  merely  the  improved  gun  and  the  improved  pro- 
jectile that  have  been  instrumental  in  the  great  ascendency 
of  the  artillery;  the  same  is  due  rather  to  the  transmutation 
incident  to  the  course  of  instruction  in  their  uses — i.  «.,  the 
tactical  training  of  the  personnel  The  progress  of  other 
armU^  has  been  similar  to  that  of  Germany,  and  every  offi- 
cer should  be  cognizant  of  the  fact,  in  order  that  he  may 
place  an  approximately  correct  estimate  on  the  opponent 
and  enter  on  the  battle-field  with  a  certain  amount  of  prep- 
aration. The  changes  in  the  tactical  training  of  artillery — 
in  Germany,  at  least — have  been  more  important  and  far- 
reaching  than  in  any  other  arm.  Up  to  a  comparatively 
recent  time  we  could  speak  of  the  German  artillery  as  a 
"technical"  arm,  and  it  is  in  keeping  with  the  truth  to  state 
that  it  entered  the  War  of  1870-71  trained  in  this  limited 
sense.  Considering  that  the  effect  of  that  "technical"  artil- 
lery was  frequently  very  great,  how  will  it  be  in  the  future, 
when  superior  construction  is  combined  with  progress  in 


38  Introduction. 

tactics  such  as  but  few  prophets  of  the  future  would  have 
dreamed  of  in  1870-71?  But  they  were  there!  It  took 
them  some  time  to  reach  pkices  of  iuflueuce.  The  separate 
training  of  the  artillery,  the  course  in  firing  at  the  firing 
school  instead  of  on  the  benches  of  the  artillery  and  engineer 
school,  the  detail  of  officers  of  the  furloughed  class  to  the 
firing  school,  the  entire  system  of  training  (which  we  will 
not  explain  here)  for  imparting  technical  proficiency  in  the 
art  of  shooting,  the  tactical  exercises  and  tactical  firing 
exercises  on  the  terrain,  the  organized  combination  of 
infantry  and  artillery,  the  principles  of  reconnaissance  and 
of  coming  into  position,  and  the  observation  and  direction 
of  fire  as  developed  in  the  course  of  practice,  these  and  other 
matters  which  I  do  not  care  to  make  public,  prove  that, 
based  on  healthy  and  tried  principles,  artillery  has  at  last — 
it  took  a  long  time — worked  itself  up  into  a  tactical  arm 
as  to  which  all  former  tactical  conceptions  are  antiquated. 
And  if  ever,  it  is  in  the  future  that  ignorance  on  the  battle- 
field will  be  paid  for  with  rivers  of  blood. 

Infantry  and  artillery  are  the  decisive  arms  on  the  field 
of  battle,  and  intelligent  cooperation  is  required  on  the  part 
of  both.  This  applies  equally  to  the  foot  artillery,  because 
the  greater  efficiency  of  the  gun  is  going  to  compel  the  de- 
fender to  construct  considerable  artificial  cover,  which  field 
artillery  will  not  always  be  able  to  destroy,  especially  where 
there  has  been  plenty  of  time  to  prepare  the  position.  For 
this  reason  armies  will  carry  guns  of  heavier  calibers  with 
them  in  the  field,  whose  effect  should  be  fully  known  by  the 
higher  leaders  at  least.  Here  we  encounter  a  new  factor  in 
tactics,  which  extends  to  the  preparation  (defense)  and  at- 
tack of  artificial  positions.  The  side  which  recognizes  its 
inferiority  in  strength  will  endeavor  to  strengthen  its  power 
of  resistance  by  artificial  cover.     Any  body  of  troops  and 


Introduction.  39 

any  army  may  find  itself  placed  in  the  role  of  the  inferior 
(defender);  hence  the  sujjerior  leaders  should  be  familiar 
with  the  principles  of  the  construction  of  entrenchments  and 
the  troops  with  those  of  their  execution.  That  is  the  reason 
why  in  the  future  the  use  of  the  spade  may  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances be  of  eminent  importance,  and  the  recognition 
of  this  fact  has  in  all  armies  brought  forth  special  instruc- 
tions under  which  leaders  and  troops  are  trained  in  time  of 
peace  for  these  additional  tasks  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Every  officer  should  be  as  familiar  with  the  instructions  for 
field  fortifications  of  April  6,  1893,  as  with  the  Field  Service 
Regulations,  the  Drill  Regulations,  and  the  Firing  Instruc- 
tions. Together  they  constitute  the  tactical  gospel:  every 
one  should  know  how  to  read  and  apply  them  as  he  would 
the  gospel.  These  Regulations  constitute  parts  of  a  whole, 
they  show  how  intimately  artillery  and  infantry  have  to 
cooperate,  and  that  they  are  the  real  arms  of  the  battle-field 
requiring  for  the  tactical  act  enlarged  services  from  the 
pioneers,  as  compared  with  former  times.  That  the  pioneers 
have  thereby  gained  in  importance  need  not  be  specifically 
stated.  From  all  this  it  would  appear  that  large,  artificially 
strengthened  positions  that  must  be  attacked  are  to  be  reck- 
oned with  in  the  future. 

Though  in  the  future  the  principal  arm  of  the  cavalry 
will  be  the  horse,  as  it  has  been  in  the  past,  I  remain  op- 
posed  to  the  arming  of  all  the  cavalry  with  the  lance. 
The  more  active  national  spirit  in  combination  with  uni- 
versal liability  to  service  are  bound  to  give  any  future  war 
the  character  of  a  national  war  to  a  greater  extent  than  was 
the  case,  for  instance,  on  the  Loire  in  1870-71.  It  is  true 
that  under  the  recruiting  laws  every  able-bodied  man  is 
employed  in  organized  bodies  up  to  his  fortieth  year.  But 
in  a  national  war  even  the  cripple  is  a  soldier  fit  ad  hoc,  and 


40  Introduction. 

the  enthusiasm,  miseries  of  the  war,  aud  governmental 
measures  will  no  doubt  compel  those  men  who  have  eoni- 
pleted  their  legal  term  of  service  to  take  up  arms  also.  The 
employment  of  the  cavalry  in  front  of  the  army,  in  the  tac- 
tical sense — one  should  call  to  mind  the  conditions  on  the 
Loire  during  the  last  third  of  November.  1870 — will  be  beset 
by  extraordinary  ditticulties;  the  lance  may  become  an  in- 
convenient burd(Mi.  whose  bearer  feels  inclined  to  discard  it. 
I  have  seen  such  things  myself  in  1870-71.  Raving  to  pay 
more  attention  to  the  lance  than  to  the  enemy,  the  horseman 
when  on  patrol  is  the  more  apt  to  tind  himself  at  a  disadvan- 
tage, as  with  the  cavalry  everything  passes  otf  quickly;  in 
short.  I  deem  the  lance  su])erfluous  and  even  harmful  for 
cavalry  on  reconnaissance.  Nor  does  war  experience  award 
to  the  lance  the  superiority  in  the  charge.  The  Prussian  1st 
Guard  Dragoons  brilliantly  defeated  the  Austrian  Alex- 
ander Vhlans  at  Koniggriitz.  Still  I  would  approve  of  the 
retention  of  the  lance  for  a  certain  number  of  regiments — 
for  instance,  for  the  medium  and  heavy  cavalry;  but  for 
light  cavalry  saber  and  carbine  are  sutticient.  All  regi- 
ments should  retain  the  carbine,  while  1  would  not  hesitate 
to  discard  the  saber  of  the  lancers.  If  in  addition  to  the 
horse,  cavalry  needs  one  common  arm.  it  certainly  is  the  car- 
bine. The  correctness  of  this  would  become  at  once  appar- 
ent in  the  operative  employment  of  cavalry,  which,  however. 
I  do  not  desire  to  discuss  here.  Even  in  tactical  reconnais- 
sance it  will  be  found  good  to  supplement  cavalry  with  artil- 
lery and  infantry  as  soon  as  it  enters  highly  cultivated  coun- 
try. That  bold  galloping  about  of  patrols,  so  misleading  in 
peace,  will  then  cease,  and  many  things  observed  and  re- 
ported by  patrols  in  peace  will  not  be  observed  and  re- 
ported in  war.  During  the  national  war  in  1870-71.  the  cav- 
alry, despite  its  best  efforts,  proved  unequal  to  its  task  in. 


Introduction.  41 

reconuaissarioo  on  a  largo  scale;  what  little  Informatlou  was 
gathered,  waH  elicited  by  a  few  gun-8hotK  or  by  deployment 
of  Kome  infantry.  As  j>henomena,  such  as  observed  on  the 
Loire,  will  hereafter  be  the  rule,  they  should  be  constantly 
keiit  in  mind  in  order  to  give  the  cavalry  an  appropriate 
armament;  nor  should  great  expectations  be  entertained 
even  then.  This  point  seems  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  in 
peace  to  an  alarming  degree,  yet  it  is  certain  that  nowhere 
"will  we  suffer  more  disappointments  than  in  the  field  of 
strategical  and  tactical  reconnaissance  by  cavalry.  The 
higher  leaders  will  be  more  frequently  placed  in  a  state  of 
relative  perplexity  than  formerly,  and  in  order  to  learn  any- 
thing at  all,  they  will  be  compelled  to  engage  with  all  three 
arras.  It  is  not  to  be  thought  for  a  moment  that  such 
demands  will  be  made  during  the  operations  only;  no,  mod- 
ern tactical  reconnaissance,  particularly  before  the  decisive 
battle,  calls  for  them  imperiously,  nor  can  theory  foretell 
what  measures  are  most  likely  to  lead  to  success.  It  is  ray 
conviction  that  here  there  is  ground  for  serious  reflections, 
inquiries,  and  experiments  far  from  simple  in  character,  and 
that  to  comply  with  the  enlarged  principles  the  means  now 
at  hand  must  be  largely  supplemented. 

Great  differences  of  arraaraent,  training,  organization, 
and  eraployraent  of  the  various  arms  and  battle  units  (divi- 
sions) do  not  now  exist  among  the  large  armies,  and  the 
same  raay  be  said  of  their  tactics;  in  nurabers  they  are  like- 
wise about  equal,  and  there  are  two  points  only  on  which 
superiority — which  cannot  be  accurately  calculated  in  ad- 
vance— raay  be  gained,  and  those  are  tactical  training  and 
raoral  education.  Both  should  be  brought  to  the  highest 
perfection. 

The  third  role  on  the  battle  field  falls  to  the  cavalry. 
As  tactics  stand  to  day,  cavalry  on  the  battle-field,  as  coqi- 

4 


42  Introduction. 

pai't'tl  with  ihe  oiIum-  twt)arms,  is  an  aiixiliaiv  aim,  and  I'an- 
not  be  the  principal  arm  except  after  the  decision  or  before 
the  battU'.  This  is  dne  to  the  eompk'te  revolntiou  of  the 
conditions,  especially  to  the  chanjied  numerical  proportion 
between  cavalry  and  infantry,  in  connection  with  the  large 
total  increase  of  the  armies.  To  be  sure,  at  Monyille — 
^lars-la  Tour,  on  the  Kith  of  Aujiust,  1870.  cayalrv  played  a 
l>rominent  role  on  the  battle  ticld.  but  the  case  has  remained 
the  exception.  Neither  in  the  >yar  apiinst  France  nor  in  the 
Turco-Kussian  War  has  there  been  a  repetition.  ^loreoyer 
the  enemy's  action  at  N'ion^ille  was  of  no  small  assistance 
to  our  cavalry;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  French  cavalry, 
for  instance,  despite  its  sacrifices,  never  exercised  a  notable 
intluence  on  the  course  of  a  battle,  either  at  \Vorth  or 
Sedan.  Xor  did  the  cavalry  bring  about  a  decision  at  Vion- 
rille,  and  it  will  not  be  able  to  do  so  in  the  future;  still  it 
is  the  duty  of  cavalry,  as  it  was  in  the  past,  to  attack  where 
there  is  prospect  of  ailequate  success.  As  tire-arms  command 
wider  zones  than  formerly,  as  rapidity  of  tire  has  been  large- 
ly increased,  both  of  Avh.ich  can  neyer  be  counterbalanced  by 
greater  speed  on  the  part  of  the  cayalry.  and  as  smoke  has 
been  suppressed,  the  tactical  employment  of  cayalry  has  be- 
come more  restricted  and  its  leading  more  difticult.  There 
will  nevertheless  be  cases  on  the  battle-tield  and  up  to  the 
yery  decision  of  the  battle  where  an  enterprising  and  effi- 
cient cayalry  will  find  tempting  objectiyes  for  attack;  these 
objeetiyes  should  then  be  charged  under  all  circumstances. 
This  will  particularly  ai)])ly  to  silenced  artillery  and  re- 
pulsed infantry.  Here  the  increased  power  of  the  tire-arms 
fails  to  nullify  the  law  of  velocity,  especially  after  the  deci- 
sion. The  battle  of  the  future  is  bound  to  mature  scenes  of 
which  eyen  the  liyeliest  inmgination  cannot  gain  a  suffi- 
cient conception:  infantry  morally  spent  to  the  degree  of 


Introduction.  43 

mcntiil  irreKp(>iiKil)iliiy,  juhI  without  aiiiriiunitiori;  "batteries 
of  the  dead"'  iiicapahle  of  irioveinenl ;  flags  and  eolorK,  if 
taken  along,  in  profusion.  The  point  therefore  jh  to  inereane 
the  enteri)riKe  of  the  lead<'rK,  and  to  sharpen  their  tactical 
judgment.  The  cavalry  leader  must  track  his  quarry  with 
the  patience  of  Ihe  eagle  and  seize  and  carry  it  off  with  the 
sani(?  resoluteness.  In  this  manner  ca\'alry  may  render  the 
decision  more  deeisi\e  on  and  immediately  in  rear  of  the 
ISattle-field,  render  the  opponent  impotent,  and  enhance  his 
discomfiture  to  an  unsuspected  degrcHi.  Human  nature 
never  changes  I  Its  moral  failings  and  defects  can  be  turned 
to  account  only  by  the  speed  of  the  cavalry. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  in  addition  cavalry  should 
possess  a  certain  degree  of  skill  in  dismounted  fighting  and 
should  be  able  to  attack  in  any  strength  and  in  any  forma- 
tion. Whatever  any  aim  is  expected  to  know  in  war,  it 
should  diligently  practice  in  peace.  For  this  reason  I  deem 
the  practice  of  the  mass-attacks  as  important  for  cavalry  as 
the  jiractice  of  fighting  in  masses  of  skirmishers  on  the  part 
of  infantry,  and  field  firing  for  artillery  in  teiTain  that  is  as 
little  known  as  possible. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  write  an  outline  of  tacties;  with 
due  consideration  for  the  effect  of  modern  arms,  I  shall  cite 
various  events  from  military  history  in  order  to  deduce 
therefrom  tactical  principles  and  forms,  such  as  will  prom- 
ise success  under  fire. 

For  no  theory  will  ever  lead  to  correct  conclusions 
unless  based  or.  [)ractice  and  military  history. 

The  Drill  Regulations  for  the  infantry  of  September  1, 
18K8  (Reprint  of  1880j,  for  the  artillery  of  June  27,  1892,  for 
the  foot  artillery  of  ^farch  H,  1889,  and  for  the  cavalry  (\)yo- 
visional)  of  1803  are  the  tactical  sediments  of  war  experi- 
ence, but  the  consequences  which  will  ffillow  from  smoke- 


44  Introduction. 

less  powder,  from  the  small-caliber  rifle,  and  from  the  great- 
ly increased  fire-effect  of  the  artillery,  for  the  training  and 
leading  of  troops,  for  theoretical  and  applied  tactics,  are  b}'  no 
means  fully  and  accurately  determined.  Detailed  discus- 
sions would  therefore  be  of  some  benefit,  even  if  nothing 
more  than  a  greater  incentive  to  reflection  were  gained. 

In  order  to  overcome  the  probabl}^  very  great  losses  to 
be  expected  in  the  future,  much  has  been  written  for  nearly 
twenty  yeai^s  about  the  importance  of  night  battles,  and 
there  are  '^tacticians"  who  seek  to  gain  by  the  aid  of  dark- 
ness what  they  do  not  dai'e  to  undertake  in  daylight.  Un- 
der certain  circumstances  comparatively  great  results,  with- 
in certain  limits,  may  be  gained  by  night  actions,  but  night 
battles  are  out  of  the  question,  and  it  is  battles  alone  that 
decide  wars.  Why  then  this  tarrying  over  irrelevant 
matters? 

For  the  same  reason  the  so-called  "ravine  theory,"  a 
parasitic  outgrowth  of  the  "task  system,"  has  of  late  found 
many  advocates.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  the  requisite 
ravines  are  not  likely  to  be  at  hand,  their  use  would  in  most 
cases  bring  about  a  deployment  near  the  limits  of  short- 
range  fire,  exactly  the  thing  we  want  to  avoid — viz.,  great 
losses  without  opportunity  to  combat  the  enemy  up  to  that 
moment  and  without  prospect  of  gaining  the  superiority 
thereafter. 

Others  propose  to  throw  the  open  lines  in  single  rank 
upon  the  enemy  without  stop,  closely  followed  by  all  the 
rear  echelons,  straight  across  country  in  the  previously 
determined  direction  of  attack,  and  to  within  the  limits  of 
short  range,  either  in  double  time  or  at  a  run,  and  to  advance 
thence  by  rushes;  others  propose  to  creep  up,  with  pauses, 
after  the  medium  range  has  been  reached;  again,  others 


Introduction.  45 

suggest  traversing  the  middle  and  short  ranges  by  means 
of  rushes  not  exceeding  30  paces,  etc. 

These  suggestions  should  neither  be  found  fault  with 
nor  characterized  as  wrong  and  useless.  Tactical  disad- 
vantages would  not  accrue  from  them  unless  one  of  these 
"methods  of  fighting"  were  incorporated  in  the  Regulations. 
Cases  might  easily  enough  occur  where,  dependent  on  the 
.terrain,  the  fire,  and  the  task,  this  tactical  '^sample  case" 
might  have  to  be  drawn  upon  by  some  organization.  Free- 
dom must  be  preserved  to  the  subordinate  leaders,  if  for  no 
other  reason  than  that  any  other  mode  would  be  incom- 
patible with  the  nature  of  the  combat  of  masses  of  skir- 
mishers. At  some  time,  however,  the  moment  must  arrive 
when  variety  will  be  entirely  or  almost  entirely  supplanted 
by  uniformity — namely,  under  short-range  fire.  Yet  even  in 
spaces  of  600  meters,  some  cover  will  frequently  be  availa- 
ble. However  that  may  be,  good  infantry  to-day  must  be 
able  to  push  forward,  creeping,  running,  rushing,  etc.,  and 
it  must  be  instructed  accordingly.  That  relative  simultane- 
ity is  thereby  destroyed  is  of  no  consequence;  it  is  not 
needed  until  the  final  rush,  but  then  we  must  have  it. 

The  armor  shields  and  armored  clothing  prepared  by 
the  Danes  and  others  do  not  seem  suitable  for  field  service 
as  protection  against  projectiles;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
construction  of  rifle-trenches,  etc.,  by  means  of  the  spade 
will  play  a  great  role  in  future  battles;  occasions  for  their 
use  will  arise  for  the  attacker  as  well  as  for  the  defender, 
since  it  is  very  probable  that  there  will  be  battles  of  several 
days'  duration — which  are  nothing  new,  however.  In  this 
connection  it  is  sufficient  to  recall  the  North  American 
Civil  War. 

In  tactics  we  find  certain  forms  and  principles  restrict- 
ed to  longer  or  shorter  periods.     In  the  history  of  the  tactics 


46  Introduction. 

of  antiquity  aud  of  the  middle  ages  these  periods  comprise 
centuries;  since  the  invention  of  gunpowder  they  have  be- 
come shorter;  and  since  the  appearance  of  the  breech-loader 
in  1SG4,  tactical  forms  and  regulations  have  been  and  are 
subject  to  constant  change. 

Tactical  changes  are  chiefly  brought  about  by  the  arma- 
ment; what  never  changes  is  man. 

It  is  well  known  that  it  is  a  law^  of  Nature  that  when 
two  or  more  persons  are  contending  for  victory,  they  study 
each  other's  means  of  fighting,  and  that  as  soon  as  either 
party  recognizes  the  superiority  of  the  other's  methods,  it 
will  adopt  them  in  order  to  overcome  the  enemy  by  his 
own  methods. 

Thus  the  Prussian  company  column,  for  instance,  may 
to-day  be  found  in  all  armies;  thus  the  swarm  of  skirmishers 
has  everywhere  become  the  principal  fighting  form  of  in- 
fantry and  skirmish  fire  the  principal  kind  of  fire,  and  in  all 
these  important  questions  the  German  infantry  has  led  the 
other  armies.  To  be  sure,  the  War  of  1870-71  did  not  find 
the  German  infantry  at  the  height  of  the  tactical  application 
of  these  principles,  so  that — and  also  because  it  had  to  con- 
front unprepared  a  very  much  superior  rifle — it  had  not  yet 
deduced  the  correct  conclusions  for  the  attack;  still,  after 
the  battles  in  August,  the  German  infantry  discovered  more 
suitable  forms  and  applied  them  without  difiiculty. 

The  tactical  combination  of  movement  and  fire-effect,  to 
whose  highest  possible  development  the  Great  Frederick 
had  devoted  a  lifetime,  has  been  occup,^-ing  the  tacticians 
ever  since  the  reign  of  the  breech-loader  was  inaugurated. 

But  the  times  have  changed  and  more  perfect  are  the 
weapons.  While  the  Great  King  could  lead  forward  his 
closed  lines  in  the  cadenced  step,  while  he  was  not  com- 
pelled  to  halt  them,  make  them  lie  down,  rise  and  resume 


Introduction.  47 

the  advance,  etc.,  before  he  pomed  an  enormous  fire  on  the 
enemy  and  broke  into  his  physically  and  morally  shattered 
ranks,  without  himself  suffering  great  losses  at  long  range 
— to-day  hundreds  fall  under  the  bullets  of  an  enemy  that 
can  barely  be  discerned  and  who  can  be  fought  only  with 
difficulty;  in  these  times  the  act  of  battle,  moreover,  lasts 
much  longer. 

Destructive  infantry  fire  sweeps  the  ground  for  1500 
meters,  and  the  question  culminates  in  how  to  traverse  it 
with  the  greatest  safetj,  and  how  to  reach  a  distance  from 
the  enemy  whence  he  may  be  subjected  to,  and  shaken  by,  a 
sustained  and  effective  fire  without  having  one's  own  fight- 
ing strength  reduced  below  the  required  degree.  Looked  at 
from  the  theoretical  standpoint,  the  excellent  fire-arms  of 
to-day  favor  more  especially  the  defender  during  the  con- 
flict; still  a  close  examination,  which  we  shall  make  below, 
will  point  out  many  advantages  for  the  attacker.  In  a 
purely  frontal  affair  the  attack  and  defense  can  array  an 
equal  number  of  men  side  b}'  side,  but  on  the  part  of  the 
defender  more  men  are  able  to  fire  at  the  same  time  because 
he  is  deployed  for  firing,  perhaps  in  several  lines,  while  the 
attacker  is  again  and  again  prevented  by  losses  from  gain- 
ing the  same  development  of  fire  for  which  he  is  striving. 
The  occurrences  at  Point  du  Jour  show  that  mere  numerical 
superiority  of  the  attacker  will  not  necessarily  give  him 
either  frontal  equality  of  fire  or  frontal  sujieriority  of  fire. 
The  attacker  must  approach  to  within  a  certain  distance  and 
expose  himself,  cover  not  being  always  available ;  this  is  not 
required  of  the  defender,  but  if  he  does  expose  himself,  it 
will  be  at  moments  when  the  attacker  is  shaken  and  is  less 
to  be  feared.  From  the  sweeping  fire  at  long  distances  and 
from  the  enormous  force  of  penetration  of  small-caliber  pro- 
jectiles arises  the  necessity  to  preserve  one's  own  forces  as 


48  Introduction. 

much  as  possible  in  order  to  enable  them  to  act  at  all.     Tac- 
tics are  expected  to  furnish  the  means  thereto. 

It  is  plain  that  in  clear  Aveather  the  use  of  the  ground 
will  play  a  more  important  part  than  heretofore,  even  before 
the  deployment.  It  will  receive  increased  attention  during 
the  march  to  the  place  of  deployment  and  the  advance  guard 
will  find  frequent  use  for  good  field-glasses.  Both  require- 
ments involve  danger.  The  use  of  the  ground  must  not  be 
allowed  to  degenerate  into  a  game  of  hide-and-seek,  which, 
aside  from  other  disadvantages,  will  dull  the  sharp  edge  of 
the  attack  which  undeniably  signalized  the  German  in- 
fantry, whatever  may  have  been  its  shortcomings.  We  do 
not  mean  here  a  reckless  rushing  in,  but  the  deliberate  ex- 
pression of  the  will,  particularly  on  the  part  o-f  the  subordi- 
nate leaders,  always,  of  course,  preserving  unity  of  action. 
Any  infantry  is  therefore  apt  to  find  itself  in  position  where 
it  must  expose  itself,  if  only  while  rushing  from  cover  to 
cover.  The  entire  execution  of  the  combat  must  be  char- 
acterized by  vigor.  In  comparing  the  fighting  methods  of 
former  and  present  times,  it  will  be  found  that  much  of  the 
vigor  has  been  lost  and  that  diffident  groping  is  noticeable, 
which  is  not  justified  by  the  new  arms.  The  necessity  under 
which  the  attacker  will  frequently  find  himself,  of  opening 
fire  at  the  medium  ranges,  impresses  on  modern  fighting 
methods  the  stamp  of  slowness.  If  that  necessity  should 
be  still  greater  in  practice,  it  is  all  the  more  reason  for  doing 
everything  to  sustain  the  tactical  offensive  spirit  by  all 
available  means.  Therefore,  there  must  be  correct  and 
quick  use  of  the  ground ;  the  forward  impulse  must  be  the 
inherent,  elementary  force  of  the  troops;  but  the  task  system 
pure  and  simple,  as  frequently  practiced,  does  not  invaria- 
bly support  that  tactical  principle,  and  herein  I  find  one  of 


Introduction.  49 

its  chief  disadvantages — viz.,  the  stunting  of  the  vigor  of  the 
infantry  combat. 

The  use  of  field-glasses  shuts  out  a  general  view  and 
favors  the  perception  of  details.  This  is  not  an  inherent 
property  of  the  instrument;  its  use  should  be  learned  likp 
that  of  a  weapon,  and  one  should  be  expert  in  scrutinizing 
cover,  from  the  mere  furrow  to  the  declivity  and  to  the  edge 
of  the  woods;  but  such  general  survey  with  the  bare  eye  as 
his  station  and  command  may  call  for  should  not  be  neg- 
lected by  the  commander.  It  seems  proper  to  point  this  out 
on  account  of  some  events  that  have  occurred. 

It  is  the  duty  of  strategy  to  see  to  it  that  when  fighting 
is  to  take  place,  it  be  done  in  the  most  effective  direction, 
and  with  the  greatest  possible  superiority  of  force.  Strat- 
egy therefore  demands  an  unfailing  eye  to  every  phase  of 
the  situation  as  regards  the  calculation  of  all  factors  of 
time,  space,  materiel,  and  politics,  and  the  utilization  of  all 
means  of  communication.  All  strategists  have  been  indus- 
trious workers,  good  calculators,  and  have  possessed  a  good 
knowledge  of  the  theaters  of  war  and  of  military  history  and 
an  understanding  for  whatever  may  be  of  any  advantage  in 
obtaining  numerical  superiority  within  a  certain  space  and 
time.  For  that  reason  strategists  have  at  the  same  time 
been  men  of  science  and,  so  to  speak,  men  of  a  system  or 
method — i.  e.,  of  that  peculiar  to  their  own  genius.  Who- 
ever desires  to  direct  a  large  army  must  himself  have  calcu- 
lated and  proved  everything  that  has  any  bearing  on  the 
leading  of  masses.  In  that  task  assistants  (general  staff 
officers)  are  indispensable  to  the  strategist;  and  they  may 
do  the  preparatory  work,  but  its  examination  and  the  final 
arrangements  are  the  duty  of  the  chief  of  the  general  staff. 

The  large  modern  armies  require  even  in  peace  a  great 
deal  of  preliminary  work,  arrangements,  and  provisions  of 


60  Introdtirthn. 

all  Uiiuls.  Sti-;U»\uv  is  orii;mi/.r«i  lor  si>  niauv  srt  rasrs  \vitl» 
tluMi"  sptH'ial  rtHiuirtMHiMils.  ilu>  loUs  air  assij»iuHl,  and  moro 
than  ovtM'  has  stratojiv  btu-oiiu'  a  scinicr,  aiul  iiu»ie  lliau  ov(M* 
is  it  t^xposod  to  tlir  daiiiior  of  inatufinji'  a  bnroaiu'ratic  inon- 
sitM-  of  luaiiv  iiUorailiui;  \n  hotels  ami  of  0(hu"Uin>i'  aiut  train- 
iuj;  hiiirau  cfiicfs  iiish'iul  of  (Hiitnil  staff  ()//;V«/>'.  In  that  i>nor- 
nious  uiachino  (>ach  individual  occupies  a  ('oriain  place,  and 
fi>r  i\\i-\\  one  (hero  is  a  restive  o\'  threi'  or  four  otVicers.  for 
the  same  plac(\  the  same  tluiv.  ilu>  same  traiK.  If  one  of 
tluMii  is  transferred  to  anoiluM'  place.  thini;s  dt>  not  lio  >vell 
at  lirst,  betause  lu>  cannot  kni>\v  evervthiui;;  the  "Kussian" 
is  not  familiar  widi  the  duties  oi  the  "•Frenchman."  while 
either  ma\  l>t>  more  faiuiliar  >vith  thest^  foreijiu  armit^s  than 
with  his  t>wn.  'V\\o  uudisturbtnl  action  of  such  a  stupendiuis 
whet^hvork  retiuires  a  (iilitjenf  and  iittjenious  mimt  a  man  who, 
so  to  speak,  has  imprt^ssed  o\\  his  mind  \\\v  oniline  (>f  any 
possible  t'ontiuii'ency  in  war. 

That  characteristic  is  to  day  inori'  ov  less  ptnuliar  to  all 
litMieral  statYs;  to  deny  it  would  be  ft>i>lish.  If  tlu^  (jenerals 
are  there  to  h^id  the  armies,  etc..  then  a  bureau  chief  may 
suttU'e  for  a  statY  officer.  NapohH>u  1.  himself  had  at  tirst 
but  a  sinipuMon!  Hut  if  lite  mMu>rals  are  m>t  tluMc.  which 
in  view  of  human  mediocrity  in  every  tield  may  ptM-hai>s  be 
the  normal  condition,  the  failure  to  cultivate  uiilitary  his- 
tory to  the  rt^iuisite  decree  would  exact  heavy  ]HM\alties. 
Properly  cultivateih  it  may  be  instruunMital  in  lime  of  peace 
in  prtMeutii;,ii  \\\o  individual  frt>m  beconiinu;.  as  he  would 
under  existing;  conditions,  a  petlantic  bureau  t'hief.  instead 
of  a  frt^sh  and  active  i^eneral  statY  officer  schoided  in  militarT 
history,  and  it  would  be  nu>st  salutary  if  ni>  t>tVutM'  were 
admit ttnl  to  the  jivneral  statY  of  the  army  unless  he  had  been 
on  duty  in  the  section  for  military  history.  No  one  who  is 
t\>nd  of  military  history,  who  is  jjifted  with  imajiinatiou.  and 


fntroditctwn.  5 1 

who  ji,|)|»i-«'cijil<'H  vvliJil  iiiJij  Im*  Icjinu'd  \>y  riK'suis  f)f  both,  will 
vycv  l»c<()iiM'  ;i  iHii^'iiiKTiit  ;  li<-  iiiiiy  /lot  Ix-  llx-  \)<:h\.  chief  of 
hiircjiii,  bill  Ji,  more  <'nifi<'i!(  jiihI  iiHcful  j^cnorjil  HlalT  ofTicf-r; 
hJH  fon<liH'HH  for-  mili(;ir'y  hiHtory  Ih  not  (liininiHhr-d,  for  il 
growH  after  ii  I;ihI<'  for  il    han  once  been   ac<jiiii-<'(J.       The 

MlilHHCH  of  llie  fill  NIC,  to  1)0  HUfC,  WllI  llOf  admit  of  HUch   IMJIH- 

lerly  [XTforinaiKeH  aH  IhoHO  of  Najmlcon  in  February,  1814, 
Th(?y  will  re(|uii'e  tin;  Hinii»leHt  of  ijlyriK  fo  keep  one  army 
from  crow(Jinj^  jnxi  cruHliin^  the  olher,  und  il  is  only  in  ^;aHe 
unpleaHanl  incidc'iilM  Khonid  llii<jw  llw  ;^ianl  polypuH  of  a 
modern  army  from  ilH  familiar  track,  that  the  dark  HidcH  of 
tin?  ^'enerjil  Klaff  bureaucracy  aH  now  reij^ning  in  all  coun- 
IrieH  would  conie  to  light. 

TliiH  bureaucrncy  Iijih  been  ftivoi-ed,  HJid  to  Hay,  in  other 
r(.'Hp(M;tH  alHo.  ]<\)rnjerly  the  g(Miernl  hIjiH'  ofTicer  was  re- 
quired  to  command  a  comj»any  for  al)onl  three  yearH  and  a 
battalion  for  I  wo  yearn,  and  remained  Kuniciently  in  touch 
with  the  nee<lH  of  the  lrooj)H,  wilh  all  jihaKeH  of  practical 
Hervice,  with  Ihe  life  in  Ihe  lin<*,  and — wilh  laclicHl  Recent- 
ly the  iibove  ()eriodH  hiive  in  jnoHt  caK<'H  been  reduced  to  one 
year,  and  what  interoHt  can  an  officer  take  in  hiH  troops 
under  hucIi  circuniHtanceH,  when  he  knowH  'Mn  a  year  f  nhall 
be  rid  of  IhiH  duly  and  be  back  in  my  bureau"?  lie  haB 
purely  pernoiial  iiilcrenlH,  and.  an  a  rule,  those  of  Ihe  trooi)K 
will  Hullei".  A  company  that  liaH  IxMtn  commanded  by  Kuch 
ofTicerK  for  two  or  three  yearn  Ih  bound  to  lack  the  rerjuinite 
HoIi<Jity  of  interior  Htriicture.  Moreover,  in  Heveral  in- 
BtanccH  ofTlcerH  of  I  bene  giJidcK  were  not  rclui'iied  to  prac- 
tical Hervice  at  all,  ami,  what  Ih  worne,  Home  Heem  to  con- 
Hider  il  unn(M;(!HHary!  Since  the  war  academy  haw  been 
pla*  <'<l  under  the  general  staff,  the  graduates  of  tin?  institu- 
tion conHid(?r  themselven  at  once  candi<lateH  for  the  general 
staff,  and  they  conliniic  to  lead  a  biireaiicrati*'  life  from  a 


62  I  nt  rod  net  Ion. 

comparatnilv  vomig  a^(\  wliik'  none  should  be  allowod  to 
become  a  major  in  the  general  staff  unless  he  has  taken  one 
oontiniivnt  of  men  through  their  entire  term  of  service.  In 
this  uuuuier  an  ollieer  learns  the  needs  of  the  troops,  and 
that  is  exaetly  Avhat  everv  general  staff  officer  must  know. 
But,  good  heavens  I  he  has  hardly  joined  the  troops,  when 
he  is  "missed"  in  the  machine  of  the  general  staJi'  because 
with  ueAv  hands  things  do  not  run  smoothly;  and  he  is 
recalled  prematurt>ly  through  concern  for  that  "machine 
constantly  kept  under  steam."  Hence  the  growing  pre- 
ponderaiu'c  of  the  hurcifucrafic  part  of  this  occupation  (which 
unfortunately,  can  no  longer  be  avoided),  over  the  act- 
ire  part. 

The  service  of  the  general  staffs  attached  to  the  troops 
has  likewise  become  more  bureaucratic,  the  documents  to  be 
prepared  grow  with  every  year,  and  the  general  statY  officer 
is  preeminently  a  bureau  chief.  The  work  in  preparation 
for  ajul  during  the  nmneuvers,  general  staff  journeys,  and 
other  exercises  are  not  a  sutticient  diversion,  and  aiv  almost 
wholly  mechajiical  in  character:  though  new  in  the  first 
3'ear,  the  conditions  are  the  same  in  subsequent  years,  with 
the  exception  of  a  chajige  of  locality,  and  it  cannot  be  gain- 
said that  in  the  discharge  of  such  duties  little  jiuhjment  is 
required,  ajid  that  with  a  modest  measure  of  mechaiiicaJ 
skill  a  satisfactory  result  can  be  accomplished.  Like  any 
one  else,  the  general  staff  officer  can  sharpen  his  tactical 
judgment  only  by  means  of  practical  service,  experience,  and 
exercises,  and  he  needs  tactical  judgment  to-day  more  than 
ever  before.  A  knowledge  of  the  o]>]>onent's  army  and  of  its 
institutions,  of  the  theaters  of  war,  and  the  sifting  of  mes- 
sages and  reports  and  their  preparation  are  not  sufficient: 
the  last  kind  of  Mork  appeals  more  particularly  to  the  tac- 
tical judgment.     To  be  sure,  the  fact  that  the  gentlemen 


Introductifjn.  53 

of  tli<;  railway  Hootiori  aio  bound  to  beoome  bureaucrats 
HpringH  from  the  very  nature  of  "strategy  organized  in 
peace";  and  there  are  many  considerations  and  require- 
ments that  stand  in  the  way  of  any  extensive  changes. 

The  \\'ar  of  1870-71  demonstratef*  the  enormous  supe- 
riority of  strategy  over  tactics.  The  superiority  of  strateg}' 
was  so  great  that  surprising  results  were  gained  in  spite  of 
racHliocre  tactics,  so  that,  properly  speaking,  the  Germane 
'won  through  strategy.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  however, 
that  the  moral  qualities,  the  inipondr-rables,  were  present  on 
the  German  side  to  a  high  degree,  and  remaine<l  so.  In 
future  there  will  be  little  difference  in  the  material  value  of 
armies,  yet  tactics  will  continue  to  level  the  path  of  strat- 
(;gy,  and  strategy  will  continue  to  receive  its  success  at  the 
hands  of  tactics.  The  tactical  training  of  officers,  those  of 
the  general  staff  included,  should  therefore  be  carried  to  the 
highest  degree,  since  victory  will  require  greater  efforts  than 
at  Worth  and  Gravelotte,  better  judgment,  more  skill  in 
the  moving  of  great  concentrated  masses,  better  coopera- 
tion of  the  masses,  and  uninterrupted  communication.  The 
masses  placed  in  readiness  by  strategy  will  remain  con- 
centrated longer,  their  maintenance,  fc^iding,  and  draining 
channels  must  be  highly  organized,  and  so-called  "grand  tac- 
tics"— viz.,  the  moving  of  army  corps  and  armies  bj'  bri- 
gades and  divisions  beyond  the  confines  of  the  battle-field — 
are  bound  to  become  indispensable.  These  things  must  be 
mastered  in  time  of  peace,  for  the  reconnaissance,  especially 
of  extensive  positions,  as  at  Gravelotte  and  on  the  Lisaine, 
will  probably  require  more  time  and  effort  than  formerly; 
to  locate  the  enem>-^s  flanks  (before  the  completion  of  which 
task  no  battle  order  should  ever  be  issued)  will  itself  require 
a  day,  nor  is  this  estimate  considered  too  high  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  17th  and  18th  of  August.     Even  then 


54  Inti'iMhwtion. 

imuh  it'UKiius  u>  (.oiupK^U'  a  avoU  cousidorod  plan  of  baitlo. 
linuitinjj  this  as  probable,  wo  shall  invariably  tind  onr- 
solvos  ronipollod  to  have  rooonrso  to  the  Napoloonir  priii- 
liplo  of  loniontration  boforo  tho  battle,  Nvhonover  an  oxton- 
sive  pit'parod  poj^itimi  is  to  bo  attaoktHl.  a.nd  tht^  oonrontra- 
tion  will  bo  one  of  niassos  oxoooding  those  at  tlravelotte; 
and  >Ye  shall  moreover  have  to  learn  llo^Y  to  move  these 
masses  from  the  plaee  of  preliminary  \o  that  of  detinite 
deployment. 

Whether  the  measnres  for  oonoentratii>t\.  the  system  of 
orders.  reiH>rts.  messiiges,  and  reoonnaissanee  dnring  oon- 
oentration.  the  modifications  in  the  deployment  ivudered 
neoessary  by  the  results  of  the  forejioinji.  the  onier  for  the 
battle  and  the  ooiiduet  of  the  latter,  be  olassititHl  as  strate 
irioal  or  taetieal.  they  all  must  reeeive  impulse  and  aim  from 
supreme  headquarters;  the  direotion  must  be  in  one  hand 
and  be  so  organizetl  that  one  hand  is  equal  to  the  task. 
The  station  for  the  central  direction  should  therefore  be 
sehvttHi  in  accordance  with  the  object  of  the  battle,  and  the 
givatest  care  should  be  exercised  to  maintain  uninterrupted 
communication  with  the  cavalry  divisions,  army  command 
ers.  and  army  corps.  The  cavalry  divisions  may  be  so  situ- 
attnl  as  to  save  time  by  making  direct  reports,  and  by  send- 
ing meivly  a  duplicate  ivport  to  the  army  connnanders. 
These  reports  will  mostly  contain  the  ivsults  of  reconnais- 
s;xnces.  and  it  may  therefoi*e  happen  that,  dependent  on  the 
impivssion  ivceived  from  the  sum  total  of  all  reports,  a 
change  of  station  niay  be  dtvmed  necessary  for  the  central 
direction.  >sor  should  the  thread  of  communication  Ivtwivu 
all  higher  commandtMs  ever  be  alloweil  to  bivak  during  the 
deployment  for  battle  or  during  the  battle  itself.  The  per- 
ftvtion  with  whith  this  system  works  alone  guarantees 
direction. 

It  cannot  now  be  prognosticateil  as  to  how  far  the  cap- 


/  atroiluct  urn .  Ij  5 

tjv<'  \ni\\()()it  will  in*-'-!  i)i<-  ''Xjx*  talioiJH  j>la<;*?«]  upon  it,  J 
Klill  <onMid*T'  if  a  caprioiorjM  riU'auH  of  nt<:unnn\¥>¥>iuu'j'  an<l 
r<'I»orl,  inforjor  to  tli<'  w<'ll  inou/itw],  boM  <>n\((-r.  Moif; 
HVHf<ni  in,  liov\'<fV<'r,  r<?<|iJir<'rJ,  arul  wlu'ii  that  in  ha<J,  it  fjiay 
hf  tak'-n  for  \!;ri\u\i't\  that  r<i>orfM  and  ord^TH  will  arrivt'  in 
j^ood  tini''.  nior«-  j»;irti<ijlarly  ko  with  th*-  aid  of  th<f  U-lc- 
t^raph.  1  do  not  h<-Hitat(f  to  Kay  that  th<;  profXT  orj^aniza 
tirni  of  tli<'  HVHtr'Ffi  r>f  rf^poHH  and  ord^TH  \h  th<;  moHt  ini[>ort- 
,Trit  (i-uUn<-  of  a  "^land  \utin\i\\\iiV\t'A-¥,r*  No  on<;  whow;  work 
ih  «')H<,'wh<fo  nfjould  h^'  toh'ralod  tluT*'.  It  njay  \n'  aKMUWUid 
thiit  th<'  j<iin<ip;j|  hattl«'«  will  tak<'  jila*''  on  a  f/ont  of  18 — 2<) 
kilonK't^TK.  Jf  \\\i'.  h^fadqiiartwH  aro  on  ono  of  \\ut  fiankK, 
<'ith<'i'  during  th^'  df'[>lov'ni<-*nt  or  during  iUi:  battl<',  orders 
and  roportH  will  mnivc  too  latr^;  if  it  ix  in  thr^  cjtntMr,  the 
time  will  in  cvcfy  inKtance  be  rwlueed  by  one-half.  It 
Mhould  he  noted,  however,  that  the  armament  of  eavalry 
and  itK  r-rrifWoynK'nt  in  <ornbination  with  artillery,  perhajjH 
in  advanerfd  poHitionK,  may  prompt  the  eentral  direction 
to  effect  the  preliminary  deployment  at  leaxt  12  kilometer-H 
from  the  enemyV  KuppoH^d  pf>«ition.  The  diKtance«  Ixi- 
tween  the  variouK  h^adquJirterK  are  thuH  incr^-aKed,  and  the 
central  direction  iH  \\('yc  confronted  with  an  arithmetical 
factor,  wliow  reduction  to  u  formula  in  not  pernilKKible,  but 
which  may  be  determined  with  fair  Htrategic  accuracy  from 
experience  and  frotn  the  ntudy  of  Home  battle«.  Modem 
organization  of  all  higher  headquarteiH.  modern  f^pjipment 
of  all.  from  the  arrny  corpH  upwardH,  with  Hufficient  organs 
for  the  trfiiiKmiKKion  of  orderK  and  reports,  and  habituating 
the  varioijK  headquartern,  by  meann  of  a  well  connidered 
Hcheme,  to  the  xno«t  rapid  and  accurate  p^mHJble  rendering  of 
rejjortK  to  their  HnfK?rior«,  to  their  inferior-H,  and  to  the 
flankn — thew?  are  re<juirementH  of  the  command   which  in 

^German  t>?rTn  for  th^-  h'ra^lquarU-rK  of  thf:  commandf^r  of  8*:vera' 
arraleg, — Tr 


56  Introduction. 

1870-71,  for  instance,  were  not  sufficiently  met.  How  such 
a  scheme  should  be  arranged  and  kept  in  operation  will  not 
be  discussed  here;  reference  to  the  conditions  at  Gravelotte 
and  elsewhere  will  enable  any  one  to  answer  the  main  ques- 
tion. So  much  is  certain,  however,  that  an  army  which  is 
abreast  of  the  re(iuirements  in  this  respect  possesses  a  great 
advantage  and  the  faculty  to  solve  more  difficult  problems 
than  those  encountered  by  the  Germans  on  the  17th  and 
18th  of  August.  Whoever  believes  in  a  central  direction 
should  study  this  example,  as  it  unquestionably  contains  all 
answers  for  the  preparation  and  direction  of  the  battle  of 
masses  in  the  future. 

That  battle  will  probably  require  more  than  one  deploy- 
ment was  shown  on  the  German  side  at  Gravelotte,  where 
the  Germans  made  three  difl'erent  deployments:  first  along 
the  road  R6zouville — Mai*s-la-Tour  on  the  17th;  on  the  18th 
along  the  road  Gravelotte — Caulre  Ferme — Doncourt — 
Jarny;  and  lastly,  along  the  road  Gravelotte — Verneville 
— Ste.  Marie-aux-Chdnes — Aubout^.  To  be  sure,  the  reasons 
for  these  deployments  must  be  sought  in  very  different 
directions.  The  first  deployment  (at  noon  on  the  17th) 
had  for  its  object  the  continuation  of  the  battle  on  that  day, 
but,  for  reasons  not  to  be  discussed  here,  the  battle  was 
subsequently  postponed  to  the  18tli.  The  first  deployment 
on  the  18th  was  the  result  of  the  embarassiug  uncertainty 
as  to  the  enemy's  whereabouts;  the  second  deployment, 
including  the  direction  of  march  given  to  the  II.  Corps,  was 
the  result  of  definite  information  as  to  the  enemy's  position. 
Though  the  reconnaissance  on  the  17th  and  18th  may  be 
called  anything  but  perfect,  yet  in  future  the  task  of  locat- 
ing the  enemy's  flanks  will  by  no  nieaus  be  an  easy  one, 
even  with  better  arrangements  for  this  object.  It  will 
hardly  be  possible  to  avoid  several  deployments,  increasing 


Introduction.  5T 

in  degree  of  completeness,  and,  indeed,  here  we  have  the 
sign-posts  for  the  battle  direction  of  the  future,  which  is 
out  of  the  question  without  a  suitable  deployment  in  keep- 
ing with  the  strategic  intent.  There  are  many  reasons  why 
in  the  future  the  development  of  the  final  deployment  for 
battle  from  several  preliminary  deployments  will  be  more 
difficult,  accompanied,  probably  by  constant  fighting,  per- 
haps by  cavalry  battles,  while,  moreover,  the  time  required 
will  be  much  greater.  In  each  one  of  the  preliminary 
deployments  the  armies  will  therefore  have  to  observe 
suitable  distances  and  intervals  to  make  them  capable  of 
sudden  and  immediate  changes  of  position  or  front.  I 
believe  that  here  there  is  much  that  is  new  in  the  way  of 
grand  tactics,  or  whatever  you  may  call  it,  since  the  advan- 
tages accruing  to  the  defender  in  the  selection  of  his  posi- 
tion, from  the  adoption  of  smokeless  powder,  are  so  great 
that  he  will  use  every  available  means  to  deceive  the 
attacker  and  lead  him  astray,  since  heretofore  the  means 
to  that  end  were  not  at  his  disposal,  and  since,  dependent 
on  his  successful  employment  of  ruses  before  the  battle, 
the  defender  will  gain  advantages  for  maneuvering  and 
moving  his  masses  which  may  give  him  the  superiority 
and  even  the  battle.  It  is  only  now  that  the  active  opera- 
tive-tactical defense  has  become  fully  practicable,  and  why 
should  not  a  leader  arise  who  knows  how  to  draw  from 
the  sum  of  these  changes  all  their  inherent  advantages? 

It  follows  that  in  such  situations  the  headquarters  will 
in  future  have  to  remain  within  the  zone  of  each  deploy- 
ment, and  that  smokeless  powder  affects  in  a  high  degree 
even  the  formulation  of  decisions  on  the  part  of  the  central 
direction,  since  all  spaces  are  enlarged,  all  times  extended, 
and  all  problems  before  the  battle  rendered  more  difficult. 


58  Intnnhtvtion. 

It  also  t'ollo^^s  tluu  the  irt'uoral  statY  oHii-or  in  ])artuMilar 
should  possess  a  oonvot  taotical  ovo.  whith  i-an  bo  aoquirod 
by  praotioo  only.  In  most  oasos  it  may  bo  possible  to  infer 
the  jionenU  direction  of  the  enemy's  position  from  stratejrie 
considerations,  aims,  and  principles;  still,  the  examples  of 
Konijjjiratz,  Ornvelotte,  the  Lisaiue,  and  OrU%ns  show  how- 
easy  it  was  in  the  past  to  be  deceived  as  to  the  details  of 
the  direction  and  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy's  main 
body.  Misapprehension  on  the  part  of  the  hiuher  leaders 
and  tlie  resultinj;  Joiihf  are  greatly  favored  by  the  new  arms. 

It  is.  110  doubt,  to  be  ascribed  to  tln^  German  system 
that  the  tactical  cajmbilities  were  not  eipial  to  the  strate- 
gical: under  that  system  general  staff  ofticers  weri>  almost 
the  only  ones  to  reach  high  command,  and  the  tattical 
school,  on  the  other  hand,  only  produced  men  skilled  in 
detachnuMit  tactics.  The  necessary  connecting  link  in  the 
chain  of  command,  brigade  and  division  commanders  firm  in 
every  saddle,  was  wanting:  hence  in  the  battles  of  1870-71 
we  have  detachment  tactics,  instead  of  battle  tactics  proper. 
Though  detachment  tactics  may  have  sutticed.  thanks  to  a 
very  superior  strategy,  we  cannot  count  on  the  return  of 
such  favorable  conditions,  and  the  more  imperiously  do  tac- 
tics iH>nunaud  that  we  learn  how  to  tight  in  large  bodies, 
that  we  discover  the  tactics  of  the  battleinasses. 

Though  strategic  discussion  has  no  place  in  this  biHd<. 
I  cannot  omit  touching  upon  one  general  matter  connected 
with  the  assembly  before  battle.  Moltke's  dictum.  "March 
divided,  fight  unittnl."  has.  thivugh  ^loltke's  genius,  and  in 
the  period  of  hi.<  strategy,  maturtnl  the  highest  triumphs 
since  war  has  been  wagtnl.  To  dispute  this  would  be  to 
deny  facts,  liut  if  Moltke  were  still  alive.  I  am  convinced 
that  the  cluuiges  whioh  have  since  occurreil,  and  which  can- 
not be  iguoivd  by  strategy,  would  have  prompted  him  to 


Introduction.  69 

modify,  Jirid  jxrluipK  to  clian^c  his  (li<tiiiii  into  "March 
united  Jiiid  fij^lil  iiiiKcd."  TliiK  in  [ilainly  foreHhadowod 
by  the  opcralioiiH  around  Mdz.  W'Iumi  Htsindinj^  by  ifself, 
how<'\'<'i-,  Iho  fir-Ht  (|Uol('d  Bontoncc  is  fio(jU(;ntly  miHuuder- 
stood  ;iiid  orronc'onHJy  intorproted.  TroopH  will  hereafter 
also  he  divi<]cd  on  (lie  ni!ii<li.  })ijt  not  8o  long  ah  heretofore; 
the  ((tncenlnition  will  Ijik*-  j)l}j<e  earlier  and  part  of  the 
operative  tJisU  will  he  solved  with  the  troopH  eoncentrated 
— nnil<'<l.  AI)ov<'  mII,  1  would  caution  af^ainst  the  idea  of  a 
return  of  the  nia}4:nifieent  Ktrategy  which  Moltke'H  Hkill  has 
aeeuHtomed  uk  to  connect  with  warfare.  The  {general  laws 
for  i>lanninj^  and  condticting  operations  will  remain,  but 
the  operations  will  b<-  slowej-,  their  s<'vernl  jjeriods  will 
re(juire  crmsiderMhle  time,  and  the  results  will  probably  be 
less  decisivf.',  whoever  may  be  the  victor.  It  is  due  to  the 
masses  that  have  to  be  set  in  motion  and  to  the  resistance 
offered  by  the  enemy's  masses  in  connection  with  defens- 
ively prepared  districts,  with  fortresses,  and  with  railroads. 
To  be  sure,  tli(^  masses  harbor  within  themselves  their  great- 
est enemy,  and  we  must  learn  how  to  overcome  him;  there 
are  many  indications  that  the  matter  is  being  given  due  con- 
sideration in  (iermany.  Take  the  ecjuipment  with  tents,  for 
instance.  Whether  it  will  succfH'd  remains  to  be  seen. 
I'.oth  opponents,  however,  will  sufTer  from  the  same  disad- 
vantages, and  it  will  sim[)ly  be  a  (juestion  which  of  the  two 
can  better  and  longer  preserve  his  armies,  nrid  thus  gain 
numerical  superiority.  Subjugation  will  not  be  effected  by 
battles  alone;  hunger  will  he  a  more  efficient  ally  than  it 
was  in  1870-71 . 

It  is  radically  wrong  to  believe  that  strategy  extends 
only  to  the  edge  of  the  battle-field  and  that  the  latter  is 
dominated  by  t;ictics  ,'ilone.  The  two  blend  in  the  battle. 
Leaving  aside  a  few  fundamental  principles,  strategy  is  sub- 
ject to  modifications  engendered  by  the  progress  of  science 


60  Introduction. 

and  civilization.  It  lies  in  the  nature  of  strategy  to  utilize 
every  improvement,  and  for  that  reason  every  general  staff 
officer  is,  as  regards  science  and  that  which  may  convey 
superiority,  invariably  a  promoter  of  a  healthy  progress. 

While  strategy  is  subject  to  considerable  modifications, 
constant  change  may  be  said  to  be  the  rule  in  tactics.  Wise 
regulations  should  therefore  leave  a  certain  amount  of  free- 
dom to  the  intellect;  where  such  is  not  the  case,  every  army 
ought  to  be  provided  with  a  printing  establishment  to  fur- 
nish new  regulations  that  would  be  abreast  of  the  times. 
That  is  about  the  point  we  have  reached,  and  it  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  we  delayed  our  reforms  far  too  long.  Indeed,  the 
omissions  of  two  decades  had  to  be  made  good  in  two  years. 
With  tactics  it  is  frequently  as  it  is  with  fortresses.  In- 
stead of  working  ahead  and  discovering  the  laws  for,  and 
the  construction  of,  cover,  the  engineer  as  a  rule  provides 
for  present  requirements,  indulges  in  all  kinds  of  fancies, 
and  loses  himself  in  forms;  and  just  as  the  fall  of  many  a 
fortress  may  be  extenuated  by  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of  its 
completion  it  was  already  out  of  date  and  incapable  of  suc- 
cessful defense,  because  a  destructive  gun  is  more  rapidly 
constructed  than  a  fortress,  so  have  armies  been  defeated 
which  had  neither  the  insight  nor  the  strength  to  promptly 
relinquish  their  superannuated  '^tactics,"  or  which  went 
astray  in  seeking  suitable  tactics.  And  thus  it  will  ever  be. 
Yet  there  are  also  armies  which  have  been  badly  beaten 
notwithstanding  their  timely  regulations,  but  that  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  strategy  was  neglected  for  the  benefit  of 
tactics,  that  the  strategic  intellect  was  not  sufficiently  cul- 
tivated. This  cultivation  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  that 
of  tactical  judgment. 

Strategy  and  tactics  are  both  based  on  military  history 
and  military  science,  and  both  may  be  acquired  to  a  high 


Introduction.  61 

degree.  The  method  of  application  of  what  has  been 
learned  shows  the  gift  of  leading,  talent,  genius,  master- 
mind of  the  individual.  A  correct  school  will  therefore  al- 
ways consider  strategy  and  tactics  as  inseparably  connected 
domains  and  conform  thereto  in  its  work.  In  that  sense 
all  great  leaders  have  acted,  and  they  are  the  ones  who  from 
their  early  age  have  done  an  immense  amount  of  intel- 
lectual work.  If  strategy  is  neglected,  the  individual  will 
never  rise  to  the  level  of  the  ar-t;  he  will  rather  be  moving  in 
lower  spheres,  he  will  not  learn  to  reflect  on  the  nature, 
causes,  and  connection  of  the  operations,  and  in  the  most 
favorable  case  he  will  not  rise  above  the  skilled  mechanic. 
This  has  always  exacted  its  penalties,  and  the  disciples  of 
Mars  should  therefore  be  encouraged  to  take  up  the  study  of 
strategy.  His  Majesty  is  not  served  with  one  strategist;  he 
can  not  have  enough  of  them.  This  should  be  preached 
from  the  house-tops;  yet  but  a  short  while  ago  the  very 
opposite  was  affirmed  and — approved!  Why  are  so  many 
skilled  tacticians  useless  as  strategists?  Why  do  such  men 
not  feel  themselves  at  home  in  strategy?  There  are  so  many 
reasons  for  it  that  we  do  not  care  to  enumerate  them,  and, 
unfortunately,  we  cannot  say  that  they  are  being  systemat- 
ically counteracted.  If.  on  the  other  hand,  tactics  is  neg- 
lected, or  if  it  goes  astray,  strategy  will  not  have  freedom 
of  operation.  It  is  the  whole  army  that  must  be  able  to 
fight  according  to  modern  conditions ;  strategy  relies  on  this 
being  the  case. 

In  tactics  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  factors 
entering  into  the  calculation  are  men,  and  that  the  psycho- 
logical motives — some,  at  least,  if  not  all  of  them — of  the 
general,  supposing  them  to  be  ideal,  should  find  expression 
to  the  same  extent  in  tactics — i.  e.,  in  the  individual  man  on 
the  battle-field.     Improved  modern  fire-arms  also  teach  us 


(VJ  I  ntroihtctioii. 

to  C'ilinuifi'  more  hialih/  the  value  of  psiichohuji/  in  taelic.<  than  iras 
fornierlji  neeessari/,  aiul  for  tlml  reason  the  irill-poirer  of  the 
indiridnal  ^ohtier  should  bo  i)orsistontly  ami  intolliiiontly  oul- 
tivatod  in  ordor  to  niatuio  in  liinu  by  moans  of  tlio  hijjh- 
ost  attainable  cultivation  of  the  ^^•ill-po^\■ol^  the  dotorniina- 
tion  to  1)0  victorious  undi'r  all  ciri'unistanoos.  This  very 
point  is  but  too  froquiMitly  noiilootod.  and  the  oxporiniontinij 
in  fai'titious  forms  soon  dojionoratos  into  a  veritable  virtiu)- 
soshi[>.  It  is  in  the  terrain  alone  that  tactics  acquires  life 
and  health.  \Vhat  formerly  swayed  the  jivneral  alone  or  a 
limited  circle  around  him — passion  and  andntion,  thirst  for 
honor  and  i»lory,  enthusiasm  for  the  object  of  the  war — 
must  to-day  permeate  the  army  in  its  entiri'ty — sufficiently, 
at  least,  to  rouse  the  individual's  own  impulses  to  a  certain 
degree;  and  this  store  of  moral  force  must  be  suitably 
guided  and  utili/ed  l\v  nu-ans  of  a  riuorous  discipline,  Jis 
was  that  of  the  old  Komans  and  that  of  the  a.rmies  of  Fred- 
erick the  (ireat;  otherwise  the  llnest  principles  and  forms 
renuvin  devoid  of  vitality.  Intelliirence  and  habit,  fear 
of  punishnuMit,  and  hope  of  reward  no  lonuer  suffice  to 
ovi>rcome  the  difficult  situations  in  which  the  infaiitrynmn 
to  day  is  apt  to  tind  himst>lf  in  any  action  where  he  means  t(» 
be  victorious.  More  is  re(|uired:  the  soldier  must  make  the 
lienerars  cause  his  own,  must  carry  within  him  the  same 
tire,  must  be  sensible  of  the  same  ardor,  or  he  will  uot  rise 
from  behind  the  eovering  fold  of  ground  to  advance  again 
in  the  face  of  tlu'  storm  of  bullets. 

^Vherever  we  may  look,  we  see  good  ideas  degemn-ate 
into  drill  ground  faui'ies.  For  the  same  reason  the  quon- 
dam echelons  of  the  threat  Frederick  became  the  fa.vorite 
tactical  features  in  the  hands  of  unwise  men  who  failed  to 
notice  that  a  ditVerent  era  had  long  set  in.  And  so  it  is  in 
our  days;  we  have  gone  from  one  exti*eme  to  the  other,  we 


Introduction.  63 

have  lost  the  hjgical  connection :  ^'La  recherche  de  la  palernite 
est  interdiie"  and  a  system  is  advocated  which  accords  no 
place  to  the  action  of  the  higher  leaders. 

Hordes  we  must  have,  bnt  we  must  also  have  definite 
principles  for  their  fighting. 

Besides  certain  precepts,  the  system  of  hordes  of  skir- 
misliei-s  also  assumes  that  the  soldier  has  been  trained  to 
self-activity  from  the  start,  to  the  development  of  all  his 
moral  and  intellectual  faculties  and  attributes,  in  order 
that  the  sense  of  honor  and  of  duty  may  actuate  him  when- 
ever he  is  no  longer  under  the  constraint  of  form  or  under 
the  eye  of  the  leader.  It  should  never  be  forgotten,  how- 
ever, that  human  nature  is  frail,  and  that  the  soldier  should 
be  acted  upon  directly  and  immediately  by  personal  exam- 
I>le  wherever  it  can  reasonably  be  done. 

In  the  past  few  wars  the  tactics  of  the  oj>ponents  dif- 
fered widely  on  account  of  the  inequality  of  armament  and 
on  account  of  the  difference  and  lack  of  understanding  of 
the  jirinciples  and  organization  of  the  opponent;  in  no  case 
were  the  tactics  in  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  the  armament. 

Certain  it  is:  First,  the  armament  of  the  infantry  of 
the  attacker  (Germans  and  Russians)  was,  on  the  average, 
inferior.  Both  sulfered  some  extraordinary  losses  against 
the  better  armed  defender. 

Second,  the  losses  began  to  be  felt  at  a  distance,  where 
the  opponent  was  unable  [i.  e.,  where  his  weapon  did  not 
permit)  to  answer  the  fire  effectively. 

In  the  Prusso-Oerman  campaign  there  were  several 
instances  which  invite  reflection,  and  which,  if  properly 
judged  by  the  facts,  ought  to  lead  to  proper  deductions. 

In  that  work  such  officers  alone  could  take  a  useful  part 
as  were  present  at  the  events,  observed  themselves,  others, 
and  the  opi)onents,  and  were  in  a  position  affording  an  ex- 


64  Introduction. 

tensive  survey;  they  slionld.  however,  closely  folknv  all  im- 
provements of  arnunnent.  so  as  not  to  teaoh  things  that  are 
ont  of  date. 

This  book  is  intended  to  be  military-historical,  psycho- 
logical, and  tactical. 

For  whoever  has  watched  actual  battle  and  the  recent 
technical  improvements,  and  who  has  also  considered  the 
growth  of  the  national  sentiment  and  of  the  military  spirit 
in  France  and  Russia,  is  bound  to  examine  the  tactics  of  the 
future  under  these  three  headings. 


PART  I. 

MILITARY-HISTORICAL  STUDIES. 

7.  The  Attach  of  the  28th  Infantry  Brigade  on  the  Farmstead  of 
Bar  and  on  the  Adjoining  Entrenched  Wood  of  Briz  in  the 
Battle  of  Koniggrdtz  on  July  3,  18GG. 

(a)  The  March.— ()n  the  3(1  of  July,  1866,  the  28th  Bri- 
gade had  completed  its  deployment  to  the  northwest  of  the 
ridge  of  I'opowitz  by  2  p.  m.  From  our  previous  position 
near  Alt-Xechanitz  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Bistritz  we  had 
been  able  to  observe  the  course  of  the  battle  as  far  as  Lipa; 
here  we  were  as  though  shut  off  from  theworld.  We  saw 
nothing  and  could  not  be  seen.  The  short  march  from 
Nechanitz  had  taken  the  brigade  over  an  hour,  because,  while 
the  infantry  was  crossing  the  Bistritz  by  the  rex>aired  nar- 
row bridge,  General  von  Hiller,  who  was  on  the  further 
bank,  received  orders  to  halt  and  to  let  the  reserve  artillery 
pass.*  As  the  bridge  was  too  narrow  for  two  columns 
abreast,  the  28th  Brigade  halted  where  it  was.  To  send  the 
artillery  to  the  front  to  prepare  the  attack  was  perfectly 
correct. 

After  Alt-Xechanitz  had  been  talcen,  F. — 28tht  followed 
the  Saxons  by  order  of  General  von  Scholer,  marching 
straight  for  the  bridge.  The  latter  was  in  flames  and  we 
were  in  a  dilemma.       F. — 27th,  with  commendable  devo- 

*Statement  of  General  von  Hiller,  February  10,  1890. 
tMeans  Fusilier  Battalion  of  the  28th  Regiment.     See  author's 
footnote,   page   67. — Tr. 


66  Inquiries  into  tliv  Tactivs  of  the  Ftitinr. 

tion.  crossed  the  Bistrit/.  farthoi'  to  tho  left  with  the  water 
up  to  their  shoiikieis,  but  the  main  (luestioii  was  to  save 
the  bridge  for  the  passage  of  the  main  body.  To  accom- 
plish that  was  the  chief  problem,  and  to  show  how  in  need 
small  means,  when  well  organized,  may  accomplish  great 
things,  I  will  brietly  state  what  happened.  F. — 2Sth 
unstra[>ped  their  mess-tins,  and,  after  the  manner  in  which 
formerly  tires  usini  to  be  fought  in  the  country  district 
where  the  regiment  is  recruited,  formed  two  lines,  which 
the  other  men  kept  supplied  with  mess-tins  tilled  w  ith  water 
from  the  Bistritz.*  In  this  way  the  small  means  at  hand 
permitted  great  masses  of  water  to  be  poured  on  the  burn- 
ing bridge.  The  men  who  were  tighting  the  tire  directly 
stood  in  the  midst  of  the  tlames,  not  without  great  danger  to 
the  devotion  of  F. — llSth,  the  tire  was  gotten  under  control, 
the  bridge  was  saved,  and  the  open  spaces  were  covered 
with  planks  and  boards  procured  by  this  battalion.  Thus 
the  smart  Khinelanders  of  F. — 2Sth  had  done  a  piece  of 
work  that  would  have  done  honor  to  trained  pioneers;  the 
latter  were — not  there  I  The  value  of  the  presence  of  mind 
ajid  of  the  organized  work  is  evident,  for,  as  matters  stood,  if 
F. — ilSth  had  not  acted  so  promptly,  no  great  bodies  of  the 
Elbe  Army  could  have  taken  an  active  part  in  the  battle, 
since  no  other  passages  were  construefed,  as  is  well  known.  The 
soldier  should  be  familiar  with  such  instances,  that  he  may 
know  how  to  help  himself  in  similar  situations. 

During  this  passage  I  stood  in  the  middle  of  the  en.er- 
gency  bridge,  and,  as  it  had  no  railing,  my  ]>osition  was  not  a 
pleasant  one,  because  the  bridge,  of  which  a  number  of  parts 
were  missing,  was  tottering  under  the  weight  of  the  guns 

♦Statement  of  Colonel  Kneusels,  the  chief  of  11th— 28th  (11th 
Company  of  the  2Sth  Regiment).     See  author's  note,  page  67. — Tr. 


Military  Historical  Studies.  67 

and  carrriages  (according  to  my  notes,  6  batteries  each  of 
the  7th  and  8th  Army  Corpsj.  During  the  long  time  it  took 
the  artillery  to  cross,  I  was  thinking  more  of  what  would  be 
the  result  if  a  few  shells  should  burst  here;  and  not  without 
reason,  for  as  yet  I  had  not  noted  any  jjrouounced  progress 
of  the  battle;  it  rather  seemed  to  be  at  a  standstill,  and  from 
Alt-Nechanitz  I  had  been  able  to  observe  with  the  naked  eye 
the  advance  and  retreat  of  several  columns.  Some  appre- 
hension seemed  even  to  have  seized  the  cool  and  heroic  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Schoning,  commanding  I. — r)7th,*  whom 
the  circumstances  had  completely  deprived  of  all  control 
over  his  battalion  during  the  passage.  Sullenly  and  impa- 
tiently he  looked  on  from  the  other  bank,  he  himself  with 
the  1st  Company  being  separated  from  the  remainder  of  his 
command.  Under  such  circumstances  time  passes  slowly, 
every  one  feels  the  inconvenience  of  the  situation,  and  the 
oftener  I  consulted  my  watch,  the  more  impatient  I  became. 
Still  I  will  state  that  the  long  column  of  artillery  moved 
with  great  steadiness,  and  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  few- 
puffs  and  cuffs,  no  accidents  occurred.  I  breathed  more 
freely,  however,  when  the  ar-tillery  was  across,  for  nothing 
is  more  uncomfortable  than  to  be  deprived  of  all  freedom 
under  such  circumstances.  The  main  thing  was  that  the 
bridge,  which  had  been  repaired  by  our  infantry  with  com- 
mendable care,  proved  eijual  to  the  demands. 

At  Alt-Nechanitz  I  had  observed  few  traces  of  the  bat- 
tle, and  our  long  delay  there  from  10:80  a.  m.  until  1  p.  m.  in 
no  way  differed  from  an  ordinary  assembly  of  troops  in 
peace.  The  ofTicers  of  the  various  regiments  visited  each 
other,  conversed,  and  shared  what  little  edibles  they  had, 

♦The  Roman  numerals  before  the  dash  denote  battalions,  the 
Arabic  figures  companies;  after  the  dash  the  Arabic  figures  denote 
regiments. 


08  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

and  none  seemed  to  have  any  premonition  that  the  3d  of 
July  was  to  be  a  historic  day  in  German  history.  To  be 
sure,  the  attention  of  the  conversing  groups  was  frequently 
attracted  by  the  battle-field,  which  extended  in  incompara- 
ble grandeur  to  our  extreme  left,  with  its  gigantic  masses  of 
fire  and  dark,  hovering,  heavy  clouds  of  smoke;  but  the  con- 
versation, as  in  the  midst  of  peace,  turned  on  the  most  harm- 
less topics,  nor  did  various  adjutants,  etc.,  inquiring  for  Gen- 
eral von  Herwarth,  arouse  unusual  curiosity.  The  general 
impression  was  that  great  masses  were  engaged  on  either 
side,  and  even  the  men  seemed  to  feel  it;  their  quiet  and  dec- 
orous behavior  during  that  hour  deserves  special  mention. 

On  the  farther  side  of  the  bridge  the  picture  changed; 
the  bodies  of  some  Saxon  soldiers  and  of  a  poorly  clad 
woman  were  the  first  dead  I  saw.  Some  of  the  houses  along 
the  Bistritz  had  been  badly  damaged;  the  broad  village 
street,  however,  presented  quite  a  peaceful  appearance;  its 
solitude  and  various  hospital  flags  alone  reminded  one  of 
war.  Beyond  the  village  we  met  a  fusilier  of  the  17tli  Regi- 
ment; as  he  approached  I  recognized  him  as  the  servant  of 
Lieutenant  von  Czernicki  (F. — 17th\  a  friend  of  mine  from 
boyhood.  I  just  had  time  to  inquire  for  his  master  without 
noticing  that  he  was  carrying  an  officer's  cloak  and  saber; 
as  he  pointed  to  them,  I  understood  what  the  good  man  was 
unable  to  utter.  His  master  had  been  killed,  and  what  the 
fusilier  was  carrying  were  the  dead  man's  belongings.  The 
meadows  of  Nechanitz  spread  in  such  luxuriant  green  that 
signs  of  the  not  inconsiderable  action  which  had  taken  place 
there  could  hardly  be  discerned;  here  and  there  a  body  cov- 
ered with  a  cloak  was  all:  the  field  had  been  thoroughly 
policed.  In  Lubno  we  first  met  some  of  our  own  troops.  It 
was  the  7th  Rifle  Battalion  which  had  taken  position  behind 
the  edge  of  the  village  to  hold  this  point  in  case  of  a  re- 


Military-Historical  Studies.  69 

verse.  A  few  greetings,  and  on  we  went.  It  is  one  of  the 
cases  in  which  such  use  of  the  rifles  has  been  criticised.  I 
am  unable  to  do  so;  the  rifles  could  be  spared  because  the 
battle  was  constantly  progressing,  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  was  most  important  to  hold  the  bridge,  and  the 
rifles  were  the  very  men  to  develop  their  full  fire  power  in 
Lubno  and  in  the  surroundings  of  the  village.  Measures 
should  not  be  judged  by  their  results;  it  should  rather  be 
inquired  what  their  object  was,  and  whether  that  object  was 
of  sufficient  importance  to  keep  back  a  whole  battalion.  In 
this  case  the  answer  should  be  in  the  affirmative. 

Although  on  the  whole  the  (preparatory,  tactical)  meas- 
ures of  Generals  von  Herwarth  and  von  Scholer  and  the 
dispositions  for  the  attack  on  Problus — Prim  surpass  many 
greater  and  smaller  attack  movements  of  the  wars  of  1866 
and  1870-71,  still  the  most  important  matter  was  neglected 
— i.  e.,  timely  provisions  for  crossing  the  Bistritz  more  rap- 
idly. A  single  narrow  bridge  was  not  enough;  two  or  three 
should  have  been  constructed  here  or  near  by,  all  the  more 
because  the  case  of  a  reverse  should  have  been  reckoned 
with.  Had  that  been  done,  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  would 
have  engaged  earlier  and  in  greater  force,  which  was  par- 
ticularly desirable  from  the  strategic  point  of  view,  because 
the  direction  of  Koniggratz,  which  might  be  assumed  to  be 
the  enemy's  principal  line  of  retreat,  was  more  sensibly 
menaced  from  the  south  than  from  any  other  point.  If  Bor 
had  been  reached  at  2  p.  m.,  for  instance,  which  would  not 
have  been  at  all  impossible,  a  retreat  on  Koniggratz  would 
have  become  impossible  and  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy 
would  have  fallen  in  the  hands  of  the  II.  Army  on  the  field 
of  battle.  Thus  the  most  trifling  omissions  of  a  tactical 
character  exact  their  penalties  when   considered   from   a 


TO  I iKjiiirii'ft  into  the  Toi'tics  of  tJic  Future. 

higlior  point,  ;md  tlu're  nv;is  oertainly  no  IjU'k  of  time  or 
material  for  tlio  t'oustriiction  of  (ho  rtHiuisilo  l)ridj!:es. 

In  such  oast^s  spocially  solootod  ollii'ors  should  bo  sta- 
tioned at  the  crossinjjs  to  assijiii  the  troops  to  bridges,  and 
it  is  advisable  to  assipi  artillery  and  cavalry  to  one,  and 
infantry  to  another  bridge.  Under  eireumstances  like  those 
before  ns  the  infantry  bridge  might  perha])s  not  be  very 
strong,  and  had  that  been  the  ease,  the  oonstrnetion  of  a 
seeond  bridge  for  infantry  ».'onld  have  presented  no  diftionl- 
ties  even  in  the  absence  of  resources  other  than  those  found 
in  Nechanitz.  l>ut  Avhen  iIumv  is  but  one  bridge,  a  bridge 
guard  becomes  all  the  nmre  indispensable.  There  was  none, 
and  I  remember  vividly  the  bewildered  faces  of  the  infantry 
as  the  artillery  trotted  through  its  ranks  without  ceremony, 
and  only  came  to  a  walk  on  the  bridge.  It  was  the  "right 
of  the  stronger." 

By  not  making  timely  provision  for  the  necessary  cross- 
ings the  lu>adquarters  of  the  army  made  a  mistake  that  could 
not  be  rectitied.  The  Prussian  Otlicial  Account  does  not 
mention  the  incident,  though  it  is  one  of  the  most  instruct- 
ive of  recent  wars;  nor  does  the  Austrian  Account,  which,  as 
regards  our  side,  frequently  draws  on  the  Prussian  source. 
The  former  simply  states,  on  page  308.  "(hat  (ho  2Sth  Bri- 
gade followed  the  27th  at  8(X)  paces."  That  nu\y  have  been 
the  distance  at  the  start,  but  the  imident  which  I  have 
related  incrt^istnl  it  to  an  hour's  manh.  The  consequence 
was  that  the  2Tth  Brigade  attacked  before  the  2Sth.  al- 
though it  had  farther  to  march  than  the  latter.  AVas  that 
intentional?  In  the  subsequent  course  of  the  action  the 
two  brigades  never  wore  abreast  of  eaih  other,  although 
the  2Sth  accelerated  its  march. 

(h)  Tlw  ]'>t'ploiinicuf. — The  unpleasant  imideiu  had 
placed  General  von  llillor  in  a  vory  painful  sidiation;  since 


Military-Historical  Studies.  7 1 

the  27th  lirigado  liad  entirely  disappeared  fioiii  liiw  view, 
and  as  there  was  no  one  at  the  moment  to  tell  him  where  to 
march,  nothing  remained  for  him  but  to  act  on  his  own 
responsibility.  Marching  on  to  Popowitz,  he  inquired  of 
Major  von  Sell,  commanding  the  7th  Kifle  Battalion  left  at 
Lubno,  who  pointed  out  lo  him  the  direction  taken  by  the 
27th  Brigade.  CJeneral  von  Ililler  now  gave  orders  for  the 
2Sth  Brigade  to  follow  the  27th.  During  Ihe  march  on 
T^opowitz,  Captain  von  Schadow,  of  General  von  Herwarth's 
staff,  brought  an  order  to  General  von  Hiller  to  halt  the 
head  of  his  column,  and  form  line  to  the  right.  General 
von  Ililler  rode  forward  to  inform  himself  of  the  situation, 
and  in  doing  so  met  General  von  Herwarth  himself,  who 
pointed  out  to  him  on  the  left  a  barely  visible  s[)ire  as  the 
objective  of  his  attack,  saying,  "That  is  Problus;  advance  in 
that  direction."*  That,  according"  to  my  notions,  is  the 
"task  sj^stem"  (Auftraf/sverfahren). 

On  returning  to  his  brigade.  General  von  Hiller  found  it 
still  in  the  act  of  forujing  uj),  and  had  time  to  communicate 
the  order  of  General  von  Herwarth  to  the  regimental  and 
battalion  commanders.  They  then  rode  to  the  front  with 
General  von  Hilh^r  beyond  the  ridge  of  Popowitz,  so  that 
they  also  could  inform  themselves  of  the  situation  and  qui- 
etly talk  the  matter  over.  Meanwhile,  the  battalions  had 
formed  in  double  column  on  the  center  in  two  lines,  but  the 
"finer  work"  of  dress  and  dircn-tion  was  still  lacking.  That 
was  now  done  in  regulation  style,  so  that  the  brigade  was 
facing  due  east,  the  battalions  dressed  accurately  as  with  a 
string.  Since  Golonel  von  der  Osten  (57th  Regiment,  in 
first  line)  was  an  expert  in  these  things,  it  was  quickly  done; 
at  any  rate,  the  time  spent  on  this  calm  and  deliberate  prep- 


*From  a  letter  of  General  von  Hiller. 


72  Inquiries  into  the  Tmtics  of  the  Future. 

aration  amply  paid  for  itself  in  the  subsequent  action 
(Sketch  I.). 

In  the  first  line  were  2  battalions  of  the  57th  Regiment,* 
I. — 57th  on  the  left,  F. — 57th  on  the  right ;  in  second  line.  2 
battalions  of  the  17th  Regiment,!  II. — 17th  on  the  right. 
I. — 17th  on  the  left.  Luxuriant  fields  of  rye  as  tall  as  a 
man  covered  the  height  and  the  entire  space  to  the  Problus 
— Prim  plateau,  except  the  meadow  bottom  in  front  of  Pro- 
blus— Prim.  All  commanders  were  in  front,  and  there  was 
a  silence  and  attention  among  the  regiments  that  could  not 
have  been  greater  on  the  drill-ground.  After  convincing 
himself  that  the  brigade  faced  exactly  in  the  desired  direc- 
tion. General  von  Hiller  again  repaired  to  Colonel  von  der 
Osten,J  of  the  57th  Regiment,  pointed  toward  the  southern 
point  of  the  wood  of  Popowitz,  and  said:  "That  is  the  direc- 
tion for  the  present;  afterward  the  church  spire  on  the  left.§ 
"Have  the  colors  displayed!"  That  done,  Colonel  von  der 
Osten  turned  toward  his  regiment,  called  for  three  cheers 
for  the  King,  which  were  given  with  a  will,  and  added  with 
his  fine,  rich  voice:  "And  now  with  God."  His  calmness 
and  assurance  made  a  deep  impression  on  those  assembled. 
The  commanders  then  resumed  front  toward  the  enemy. 
My  own  attention  (I  was  on  the  right  of  the  skirmish  platoon 
of  the  2d — 57th)  was  deeply  engrossed;  I  had  hardly  imag- 
ined going  into  a  battle  in  this  manner;  what  I  saw  far  sur- 
passed my  imagination. 

Our  men,  who  had  not  heard  a  gun  shot  except  at  Miinch- 
engratz,  and  Mho  to-day  had  for  several  hours  watched  the 
advancing  and  retreating  columns  in  the  center,  were  in  ex- 
cellent spirits.     They  had  marched  23  kilometers  on  soaked 

*The  II.  formed  the  escort  of  the  reserve  artillery. 
tF. — 17th  was  with  the  advance  guard  of  General  von  Schuler. 
$Died    in   Berlin  as  lieutenant-general. 
§The  church  spire  of  Problus. 


rtr»;- 


Sketch  of  the  yitUtck  oft/ifl4*l>I)iviswn  alKdnit/^rati  Theza'^in/'nngjutihtfomheAiiatk. 


t  Austriana  tnJJaxons. 
XX  AbaUis. 


•*f_2-_U» 


Sketch  I. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  73 

roads  and  across  fields,  and  had  been  under  arms  for  ten 
hours  without  anything  to  eat.  Having  received  its  orders 
early,  the  brigade  had  started  early.  At  9 :30  a.  m.  it  stood 
in  rear  of  the  right  of  the  I.  Army,  whence  it  moved  off  to- 
ward the  south  and  reached  Alt-Nechanitz  about  10 :30  a.  m. 
The  lack  of  bridges  enforced  a  long  delay,  and  the  early  start 
of  the  brigade  and  its  early  arrival  on  the  field  remained 
without  effect  on  the  course  of  events.  But,  the  long  delay 
ended,  and  the  brigade  once  on  the  field,  it  was  the  fine  exam- 
ple of  all,  particularly  of  the  higher  ofiicers,  and  the  imper- 
turbability and  assurance  they  exhibited,  that  inspired  the 
men  with  faith  and  confidence.  Early  in  the  morning  a  fine 
rain  had  fallen,  which  changed  to  a  dense  fog  about  7  a.  m. 
It  settled  slowly  about  noon;  the  columns  of  smoke  and 
flames  of  the  burning  villages  and  woods  drifted  in  long 
lines  slowly  to  the  southwest,  borne  by  a  light  northeast 
wind.  Toward  2  p.  m.  it  cleared  up,  but  the  events  on  the 
height  of  Problus  could  be  seen  but  indistinctly,  and  it  was 
only  after  the  heights  had  been  taken  that  the  weather 
cleared  up  entirely.  In  consequence  of  the  rain  and  fog, 
the  tall  rye-fields  were  saturated  with  water,  so  that  the 
troops  arrived  at  the  heights  of  Problus  as  wet  as  though 
they  had  been  in  water  up  to  their  necks.  That  was  more 
specially  the  case  with  the  leading  platoons,  but  all  suffered 
equally  from  the  soaked  ground,  which  impeded  movement 
very  much. 

At  the  command  of  General  von  Hiller,  ''Brigade 
march,"  the  brigade  moved  off.  At  first  all  battalions  were 
in  double  column  on  the  center.  As  soon  as  the  ridge  of 
Popowitz  had  been  crossed,  the  brigade  assumed  a  different 
formation;  General  von  Hiller,  who  was  riding  on  the 
right  of  2d — 57th  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Schoning 
(I. — 57th),  ordering  T. — 57th*  to  deploy.       The  other  bat- 

*4th — 57th  was  detached  as  escort  to  Schmelzer's  battery. 

G 


74  Itiquirk's  into  the  Toi'tks  of  the  Future. 

talions  meanwhile  took  the  short  step,  which  was  done  to 
perfection  despite  the  artillery  fire,  and  3d  and  1st — 57th 
deployed  their  skirmish  platoons  in  donble  time,  their  rear 
platoons  followin}::  at  the  regulation  distance.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  von  Sehoning  now  joined  the  skirmish  line  of  3d 
and  1st — 57th,  where  he  remained  during  the  remainder  of 
the  action.  As  General  von  Hiller  and  Colonel  von  der 
Osten  were  riding  (; — ]0  paces  to  my  right  until  2d — 57th 
was  deployed,  I  was  in  a  fortunate  position  to  hear  every 
word  they  spoke.  After  descending  into  the  bottom  be- 
tween the  ridges  of  Problus  and  Popowitz,  the  brigade  had 
about  the  following  formation:  Firing  line,  3d  and  1st — • 
57th  (at  first  one  platoon  deployed,  afterward  prolonged  and 
reinforced  by  another  platoon) ;  exactly  in  rear  of  the  center 
of  these  two  companies  (3d  on  the  left,  1st  on  the  right)  was 
2d — 57th ;  closed  in  company  column  200  paces  to  the  right 
and  abreast  of  2d — 57th  was  F. — 57th.  In  second  line  there 
remained  for  the  present  TI. — 17th  and  I. — 17th.  The  bri- 
gade had  loaded  before  starting. 

Having  established  the  first  few  movements,  I  must 
relate  a  curious  incident.  "When  the  brigade  moved  otT.  the 
bands  of  both  regiments  struck  up;  that  of  the  57th  Regi- 
ment was  at  first  with  I. — 57th,  and  when  that  battalion  was 
ordered  into  the  firing  line,  it  remained  with  2d — 57th. 
Notwithstanding  the  wet  rye-fields,  the  soaked  condition  of 
the  ground,  and  a  very  severe  artillery  fire,  the  bands  of  both 
regiments  continued  to  play  with  perfect  precision  and  with 
the  customary  intermissions  until  the  first  line  was  within 
250  meters  of  the  abattis  of  the  woods  of  Briz,  and  ceased 
playing  only  when  2d — 57th  was  deployed.  The  last  march 
played  by  the  band  of  the  57th  was  the  men's  favorite  march, 
in  which,  according  to  custon\,  the  pauses  recurring  between 
the  bars  were  filled  up  by  the  men  joining  in  with:     "O 


Military-HiHtorical  Stud/ks.  7  5 

Johnny,  what  a  hat  I"  In  this  instance  the  men  did  not  join 
in,  but  the  enemy  did  with  a  sudden  and  heavy  hail  of  lead;  I 
still  rememl>er  how  (-omical  the  situation  was.  The  staff 
'  oboist  had  failed  to  notice  or  hear  the  repeated  orders  of  Col- 
onel von  der  Osten  to  stop;  the  commander  of  2d — 57th  did 
not  seem  inclined  to  interfere  on  account  of  the  proximity  of 
the  su7)eriorK,  and  was,  moreover,  about  50  paces  in  front  on 
horseback;  the  mounted  officers  could  meanwhile  see  how 
closely  we  had  approached  the  enemy,  but  the  troops  them- 
selves could  not  3'et  overlook  the  plateau,  when  the  music 
suddenly  ceased.  It  was  not  the  staff  oboist,  however,  who 
had  given  the  signal  to  stop — it  was  the  enemy;  the  former 
looked  angrily  around,  and  Colonel  von  der  Osten's  order, 
"Northe,  stop,"  was  heard  jiist  as  the  music  had  ceased. 

I  have  related  llie  foregoing  because  it  is  a  typical  ex- 
ample of  how  firmly  peace  habits  are  rooted,  and  because  it 
shows  a  nne  piece  of  discipline,  notwithstanding  the  comical 
incidents  connected  with  it.  If  peace  habits  are  rooted 
so  firmly,  then  this  harmless  example  conveys  a  serious 
warning  to  teach  the  men  in  peace  only  reasonable  things,  in 
order  that  their  lives  may  not  be  fruitlessly  sacrificed  to 
wrong  habits.  Moreover,  can  anj'  other  large  body  of  troops 
show  a  similar  example? 

After  crossing  the  ridge  of  Popowitz,  the  view  changed 
completely,  as  though  the  curtain  had  been  raised  in  the 
theater,  and  a  stage  suddenly  laid  before  our  eyes.  And 
what  a  stage!  The  entire  hostile  front  was  wrapped  in 
smoke  and  flame  in  the  fiillest  sense  of  the  word,  from  Prim 
to  Problus,  Stresetilz,  Lij>a,  and  Chluni.  Between  Prim 
and  Problus  we  saw  one  long  line  of  artillery,  and  on  our 
side,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  advancing  skirmishers 
and  columns,  waving  colors,  playing  bands.  The  effect  of 
the  sudden  transformation  was  noticeable  also  among  the 


70  I iKiiiirits  into  the  'iact'wx  of  the  I'litnir. 

MUMi.  I'lvtM'v  om>  I  raiu'ii  lii^  ium'U  h)  s(M\  and  I  can  say  hon- 
I'slly  dial  I  imajiinrd  myself  most  anywhi'io  oxt'opt  in  a 
{^roat  dtvisivo  Itattlo.  And  tlio  t'lVoct  must  havo  been  sim- 
ilar on  many,  for  ovon  tho  admiiinji  "Ah!"  was  not  lacking. 
AVlu'thor  anything  grandor  ovor  oi'i'uncd  in  history  bofore 
1  do  not  know,  bnt  1  may  say  (hat  I  ha\(^  novor  stHMi  any- 
thing (>vtMi  appiHiximaloly  alTocting  (ho  imagination  as  this 
battlo  slago:  and  wIumi,  nndiM-  sui-h  rirfnms(anoos.  a  snnirt 
advance  is  k(>i»(  u\\  (lie  soldior  contincrs  wiihont  knowing; 
(ho  advance  was  as  (hough  "well  givased."  A  lively  and 
well-directed  artillery  fire  grcvtod  us,  but  we  advanctHl 
without  hahing  to  within  i!."iO  meters  of  the  abattis  of  the 
wood  i>f  Briz. 

(c)  The  Batllc-Field.—Tho  battle-field  of  the  brigade 
was  a  wide  depression  extending  12000  meters  north  and 
south  between  the  ritlges  of  I'opowit/.  and  Troblus.  Its 
deepest  point  lies  about  midway  botwtvn  (he  two.  With 
the  exception  of  the  cross-road  Avhich  h»ads  from  Popowitz 
to  the  T.nbno— XiediM'  Prim  highroad  and  is  lined  with 
trees,  the  baltle-tield  was  tMitirely  bart>  and  JrvoiJ  of  cover, 
while  all  tln^  riMuaining  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe 
wail  able  to  appro.ach  nnd(M'  I'over  to  within  .'>00  and  TOO 
meters  of  the  main  poin(s  of  (he  enemy's  ])osi(ion.*  The 
villagi>s  of  Vroblus  and  Prim,  which  at  th«^  (ime  of  the  a((ack 
of  the  28th  Brigade  were  still  in  the  enemy's  ]>oss(^ssion, 
were,  on  the  side  toward  us.  pre]>ared  for  defense;  that  fact 
was  nnUni>wn  to  the  higher  conmmndei's,  and  nn(il  after 
the  orders  fov  i\w  attack  had  been  given,  the  murky  weather 
prevent(Hl  details  from  btnng  nuide  out  even  with  a  good 
glass.     Tn   the  subsequent   loui-se  of   (he  attack   we  were 

♦On  page  369  of  the  Prussian  OfBclal  Account  It  is  stated  that 
from  the  wood  to  tho  villas^  the  27th  Brigade  had  to  traverse  1600 
paces  of  open  ground.     The  actuaj  distance  is  70l> — SOO  meters. 


Milit(i/ry]liHtoric(il  HtwUas.  77 

very  niiicli  Hiii[)iiH<(I  to  Huddenly  oncountor  abattin,  wliich 
wore  15  feel  liif^h  ii)  Hoiur*  places  and  cncircl*'*!  iJif  entire 
north  and  \v(?HtC'rn  edffc  of  tlio  woods  of  J>or  and  liri/..  A 
rid^f?  steeply  sloping  toward  the  west  extends  from  Problus 
to  Nieder  Prim,  but  it  had  not  been  prepared  for  defense. 
The  dislanee  from  the  edge  of  the  ridj^e  1o  the  wckkI  of  Briz 
was  then  about  '{HO  meters,  and  aKhouj^h  that  may  seem  a 
short  distance  now,  it  should  be  rememb(?red  that  the  ground 
was  almost  as  flat  and  bare*  as  a  table.  Though  about  800 
meters  from  Problus  low  meadow  grounds  streteh  to  the 
Bouth,  where  they  closely  approach  Nieder  Prim,  they  were 
of  little  effect  as  cover,  because  no  attention  seemed  to  be 
paid  to  them;  at  any  rate,  we  mardu'd  across  them  with- 
out half.  The  field  of  action  of  the  2.S<h  P.rigade  must  there- 
fore be  counted  among  those  entirely  devoid  of  cover  and 
shelter.  What  could  hit  Aow.  there  in  1800,  however,  will 
no  longer  be  practicable  in  the  future, 

Th(?  distances  had  not  been  systematically  marked  by 
the  enemy;  at  any  rate,  I  observed  no  marks  except  on 
felled  trees  along  the  Lubno — Nieder  Prim  road;  others  7 
neither  noticed,  nor  <li(l  I  hear  of  any. 

(d)  The  Attack. — Maintaining  the  direction  indicated  by 
General  von  Ililler,  the  brigade  marched  bravely  onward; 
some  of  the  officers  exhibited  some  exuberance  of  spirit,  and 
I  believe  that  there  are  few  examjiles  in  military  history  of 
a  large  unit  marching  to  battle  with  such  a  light  heart.  The 
difficulty  of  maintaining  a  certain  direction  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that,  notwitliHtanding  the  careful  pi-<'vious  arrange- 
ments, the  brigade  advanced  its  left  shoulder  more  and  more 
toward  Nieder  Prim.  When  General  von  Uiller  noticed 
that,  and  also  that  the  large  felled  trees  on  the  Lubno — 
Nieder  Prim  road  were  range  marks  prepared  by  the  enemy, 
he  moved  the  entire  brigade  more  to  the  left;  still  the  skir- 


78  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

mishers  of  1st — 57tli  found  an  opportunity  to  subject  the 
enem^-  to  a  lively  fire  as  he  withdrew  from  Nieder  Prim. 
1st — 5Tth  passed  through  Nieder  Prim  followed  by  F. — 
57th.*  General  von  Hiller  showed  an  icy  coolness,  but  his 
chestnut  horse  was  all  excitement  and  bathed  in  perspira- 
tion. All  his  talking  and  petting  could  not  quiet  the  ani- 
mal. The  horse  was  of  noble  blood,  and  there  was  a  peculiar 
charm  for  me  in  watching  its  movements  and  efforts;  I  do 
not  repent  having  made  full  use  of  the  opportunity,  for  never 
afterward  have  I  seen  a  noble  horse  struggle  so  long  with 
excitement,  or  observed  the  beautiful  attitudes  peculiar  to  a 
horse  under  such  conditions.  It  is  not  less  instructive  or 
enjoyable  than  the  observation  of  a  man  under  similar 
circumstances. 

Although  the  horse  gave  his  rider  a  good  deal  of  trouble, 
the  general  never  changed  a  muscle  of  his  face.  His  peace- 
ful, kind  expression  remained  the  same  and  he  was  as  laconic 
as  was  his  habit  in  peace.  "The  church  spire  to  the  loft, 
gentlemen,  I  pray!''  These  and  similar  words  he  repeated 
several  times.  B}^  the  side  of  the  small  figure  of  the  general. 
Colonel  von  der  Osten  on  his  big  horse  looked  like  a  knight. 
He  too  was  cool  and  attentive  to  his  regiment  and  observant 
of  the  enemy.  While  the  brigade  in  this  shape  was  crossing 
the  meadow  west  of  Problus — Prim,  we  heard  protracted 
hurrahing  from  the  left  front.  It  came  from  the  troops  who 
took  Problus!  Shortly  afterward  a  cuirassier  brigade 
passed  to  the  left  of  2d — 57th,  after  attempting  a  charge  on 
the  Saxon  artillen-  position  at  Problus — Prim.  The  charge 
of  this  cavalry  is  very  instructive,  but,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
the  most  instructive  incidents  are  very  adroitly  buried  if 
any  blunder  has  been  made.     General  von  Kotze  had  ap- 

*The  positions  of  troops  on  the  maps  of  the  Austrian  Official 
Account  are  wrong.  A  better  sketch  of  the  attack  will  be  found  on 
Plate  I.  of  the  History  of  the  16th  Regiment,  and  on  Plate  I.  of  the 
History  of  the  57th  Regiment. 


Military-Historical  IStudit'S.  79 

preached  under  cover  by  the  broad  road  which  leads  from 
Popowitz  through  the  wood  to  Problus,  his  squadrons  march- 
ing in  rear  of  each  other  with  half-platoon  front.  The 
capture  of  Problus  was  calculated  to  suggest  a  charge  on 
the  retreating  enemy,  whom  the  two  cuirassier  regiments 
had  approached  under  cover  to  within  700  meters;  in  that 
case  it  was  necessary  for  the  cavalry  leader  to  choose  the  right 
moment  by  personal  observation  and  judgment.  To  be  sure. 
General  von  Kotze  did  observe,  but  not  with  a  tactical  eye. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  in  front  and  on  the  right  there  were 
several  batteries,  but  700  meters  distant,  which  during  the 
preceding  conflict  had  had  time  to  get  the  exact  range  and 
which  could  not  be  attacked  under  cover,  it  certainly  was  a 
mistake  to  come  out  of  the  wood  700  meters  from  that  artillery, 
to  deploy  and  to  charge  that  mass  of  artillery  uphill*  Owing  to 
the  short  distance,  the  first  squadron  of  the  Pomeranian 
heavy  cavalry,  which  marched  at  the  head,  received  such  a 
fire  that  after  some  400  paces  it  turned  off  to  the  right;  the 
squadrons  following  in  rear  attempted  the  same  feat,  but  in 
vain.  As  it  usually  goes  with  cavalry  in  such  cases,  the 
fastest  horse  leads  and  all  others  follow.  The  cavalry  could 
not  save  itself  by  returning  into  the  wood,  and  galloped 
along  its  southern  edge  in  the  direction  of  the  ridge  of  Popo> 
witz,  during  which  long  and  exposed  ride  it  made  a  good 
mark  for  the  enemy.  The  two  regiments  hurried  to  the 
rear  intermingled  in  one  big  mass;  this  big  ''pulk"  rode 
down  the  right  wing  of  11th — 28th,  and  the  left  wing  of 
the  skirmishers  of  .'^>d — 57th  and  I. — 17th  came  near  sharing 
the  same  fate.  The  disorder  was  indescribable;  the  length- 
ened commands  "Ditch"  informed  us  that  the  mass  of  horse- 
men had  also  encountered  obstacles,  and  for  a  moment  we 

*The  same  thing  was  attempted  under  similar  circumstances, 
but  with  larger  bodies,  at  the  Mance  ravine  on  August  18,  1870. 


80  Inquiries  into  the  Taeties  of  the  Future. 

saw  as  many  legs  of  Lorses  and  men  in  the  air  as  swords. 
The  horsemen  in  rear  crowded  those  in  front  in  panicky 
flight,  until  the  crowd  was  out  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  even 
then  they  continued  their  flight.  The  fallen  horsemen  grad- 
ually disentangled  themselves  ajid  hastened  after  the  others 
by  ones,  twos,  and  threes.  The  retreating  mass  did  not  make 
an  inspiring  impression,  and  the  greater  was  the  merriment 
proA^oked  by  a  cuirassier  of  the  8th  Regiment,  who,  in  trot- 
ting past  2d — 57th,  called  out:  ''At  them,  boys;  they  are 
retreating."  This  fine  cavalry,  which  lost  1  officer,  32  men, 
and  58  horses,  was  useless  for  the  rest  of  the  battle,  and  how 
welcome  would  not  that  cavalry  have  been  a  few  moments 
later  in  the  same  direction !  If  General  von  Kotze  or  any  of 
his  advisers  had  manifested  any  tactical  judgment  what- 
ever, it  would  have  been  easy  after  the  capture  of  Problus 
to  reach  that  village  under  cover,  and  Bor  in  the  same  way 
after  it  had  been  taken.  The  moment  for  attack  would  tlien 
have  arrived  and  the  results  would  presumably  have  been 
great.  Thus  the  lack  of  tactical  judgment  exacts  its  penal- 
ties. It  is  bad  enough  for  the  other  arms,  but  cavalry  can 
never  make  good  such  blunders;  it  simply  disappears  from 
the  field  for  good.  At  the  moment  when  the  retreating  mass 
passed  the  first  line  of. the  28th  Brigade,  one-sixth  of  the 
horsemen  covered  the  ground  and  the  remainder  were  no 
longer  masters  of  their  horses.* 

Soon  after  the  general  staff  officer  of  the  14th  Division, 
Major  von  Thile.  reached  General  von  Hiller.  ''Problus," 
he  said,  pointing  to  the  left,  "has  just  been  taken;  the  bri- 
gade is  no  longer  needed  there;  advance  straight  between 
the  villages"  (Problus  and  Nieder  Prim).      The  general  lis- 

*The  Prussian  Official  Account  does  not  mention  the  incident. 
The  Austrian  Account  does  mention  it  (page  339,  III.),  but  at  the 
wrong  place  and  at  a  wrong  (later)  period. 


MiUtary-Hiatorical  SttiMes.  8 1 

tened  and  a  loud  "Very  well"  was  all  he  answered.  Major 
Yon  Thile's  face  was  beaming  with  joy;  he  turned  his  horse 
and  rode  away  to  the  left,  giving  a  few  cheering  words  to  the 
•troops.  As  the  brigade  approximately  had  the  indicated 
direction,  it  was  not  ditlicult  to  carry  out  the  task.  The  gen- 
eral ordered  the  left  (2d-^57th)  to  hold  back  a  little,  and  the 
thing  was  done.  The  height  between  Problus  and  Prim, 
from  which  the  Saxon  artillery  had  iviihdrawn  by  this  time, 
was  now  being  occupied  by  the  12th  Saxon  Infantry  and 
4th  Rifle  Battalions  coming  from  Nieder  Prim;  we  also  ob- 
served 2  or  8  columns  which  were  rapidly  retreating  from 
Problus  and  taking  the  direction  of  Bor.  The  2  battalions 
just  named  greeted  8d  and  1st — 57th  with  several  volleys, 
which,  however,  did  not  do  much  damage.*  The  12-pounder 
smooth-bore  battery  (Schmelzer's)  had  followed  the  move- 
ment of  the  28th  Brigade,  and  when  Captain  Schmelzer  saw 
the  situation,  the  battery  with  gunners  mounted  on  the  car- 
riages galloped  forward  through  the  midst  of  the  skir- 
mishers of  the  3d  Company  of  the  Fifty-seventh,  and  coming 
into  lattery  in  front  of  them,  opened  on  the  enemy  with  can- 
ister at  400  jiaces.  Never  since  have  I  witnessed  equally 
resolute  action,  so  much  tactical  judgment,  and  more  deci- 
sive effect  of  a  battery.  That  was  initiative,  an  initiative 
by  which  not  only  the  two  hostile  battalions  were  mown 
down  by  ranks,  but  by  which  the  confidence  of  the  attack- 
ing infantry  was  raised  to  exuberance.  This  example  dem- 
onstrates how  great  the  moral  effect  of  the  proper  use  of 
a  battery  may  be  on  the  other  arms.  The  battery  command- 
er's ringing  command,  "400  paces,  to  the  front,  canister," 
was  carried  beyond  the  skirmish  lines  of  the  3d  and  1st 

*The  statemert  (see  page  42,  History  of  the  57th-  Regiment) 
that  the  3d  and  1st  Companies  halted  and  "took  cover"  against  these 
battalions  is  incorrect,  as  our  skirmishers  did  not  interrupt  their 
advance. 


82  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Companies  of  the  Fiftj^-seventli  to  the  second  line  of  the 
brigade,  and  attiacted  the  attention  of  the  entire  brigade. 
After  a  few  ronnds  liad  driven  the  opi)osing  infantry  away, 
Schmelzer's  battery  galloped  to  the  top  of  the  ridge,  whence 
it  oi)ened  with  equal  etlect  on  the  two  badly  shaken  bat- 
talions, and  on  Bor,  and  on  the  abattis  of  the  wood  of  Briz. 
The  OflBcial  Account  states  that  the  battery  executed  that 
maneuver  against  the  village  of  Problus;  at  any  rate,  that 
is  the  inference.  It  is  possiUe  that  the  battei-y  had  pre- 
viously fired  a  few  rounds  on  the  above  mentioned  Saxon 
detachments  withdrawing  from  IM'oblus;  it  is  not  possible 
that  it  fired  on  Problus,  as  the  village  was  then  occupied  by 
the  27th  Brigade;  moreover,  the  battery  had  accompanied 
the  28th,  not  the  27th  Brigade,*  and  had  galloped,  not 
through  the  skirmishers  of  the  27tli  Brigade,  but  through 
those  of  the  3d  Company  of  the  Fifty-seventh. 

Up  to  this  time  our  infantry  (."Ul  and  1st  Companies  of 
the  Fifty-seventh)  had  each  two  platoons  deployed;  F. — 57th, 
which,  like  the  remainder  of  the  brigade,  with  the  exception 
of  I. — 57th,  had  moved  in  double  column  on  the  center,  had 
one  platoon  each  of  the  9th  and  12th  Companies  deployed; 
all  the  rest  ^^'as  in  close  order.  From  tlu^  psychological  point, 
the  "literary"  version  of  the  Official  Account,  bottom  of  page 
309,  is  not  very  intelligible;  it  is  stated  there  that  the  en- 
emy's lire  was  unable  *'to  accelerate  the  movement  of  our 
men."  We  may  also  discard  the  statement  on  page  371, 
"that  the  28th  Brigade  suffered  less  at  the  hands  of  the  hos- 
tile artillery,  because  it  got  into  a  dead  angle."  During  the 
entire  action  there  w-as  a  rare  degrei*  of  attention  from  the 
division  down  to  the  last  musketeer,  and,  although  the  deter- 
mined behavior  of  the  higher  leaders  gave  to  the  movement 

♦The  Official  Account  states,  on  page  368,  that  the  battery  was 
with  the  28th  Brigade  in  the  second  line  of  the  division. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  83 

the  appearance  of  a  resolute  and  determined  advance,  yet 
the  fire  of  llie  Saxon  art  illery  managed  to  considerably  accel- 
erate our  movement,  and  what  the  artillery  fire  did  not 
•do,  the  division  commander  did.  Before  the  brigade  had 
reached  the  crest  of  the  ridge  south  of  Problus,  Major  von 
Thile  had  ridden  along  the  front  urging  greater  rapidity  of 
movement.  About  .'{  p.  m.,  moreover,  tin?  Army  of  the  Elbe 
knew  what  was  at  stake.  At  that  hour  Problus  had  just 
been  taken.  The  results  of  the  day  could  be  fully  reai)ed 
only  by  the  most  rapid  possible  advance  of  fr(?sh  forces,  and  for 
that  purpose  the  28th  Brigade  was  nearest  at  hand,  as  Pro- 
blus formed  the  strategic  point  of  the  enemy's  left.  I  will 
also  state  that  between  the  ridges  of  Problus  and  Popowitz 
a  dead  angle  does  not  exist  and  could  not  exist.  The  de- 
pression is  generally  flat,  and  becomes  steep  only  in  its  last 
third.  When  we  reached  that  point,  the  entire  Saxon  artil- 
lery had  prudently  withdrawn  from  its  position.  From  that  mo- 
ment until  the  wood  of  Brix  was  taken,  we  received  no  more 
artillery  fire. 

The  smaller  losses  of  the  281h  Brigade.as  compared  with 
those  of  the  27th,  must  be  exphiined  by  other  circumstances. 

There  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  difference  of  time.  Ever 
since  the  blocking  of  the  bridge  nt  Nechanitz  the  two  bri- 
gades had  been  completely  separated.*  The  27tli  liiigade 
had  marched  off  at  once  without  waiting  for  the  28th. f 
Thus  it  came  that  the  27th  Biigadc,  which  derived  much 
more  cover  from  the  wood  of  Popowitz  than  the  28th  Bri- 
gade found  on  its  own  ground,  found  Problus  and  the  height 
south  of  it  strongly  occupied,  and  had  to  withstand  single- 
handed  the  fire  of  that  numerous  artillery  and  infantry. 

♦Compare  page  36. 

fin  all  these  descriptions  the  maps  of  the  Austrian  and  PruS- 
sian  Official  Accounts  of  the  battle  of  Koniggriltz  have  been  used. 


84  rnquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

SubseqiuMitly.  avIumi  llie  28th  Brigade  had  crossed  the  ridge 
of  Popowitz,  the  change  of  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  27th  to 
the  28tli  lirigade  could  be  plainly  observed.  lint  the  former 
h.id  already  sntTered  severely.  As  Problns  had  fallen  ear- 
lier than  (he  height  to  the  south  of  it,  and  as  the  Saxons  had 
abandoned  their  artillery  position  on  the  latter  before  the 
28th  Brigade  came  up,  the  28th  Brigade  was  less  exposed  to 
lire  and  sutTered  less.  Moreover,  most  of  the  shells  failed  to 
burst — they  were  Prussian  percussion  shells — and  acted 
only  as  solid  shot,  and  the  28th  Brigade  accelerated  its 
march  as  much  as  possible  in  order  to  traverse  the  zone  of  the 
annoying  artillery  fire  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Schmelzer's  battery,  whit'h  meanwhile  was  engaged  on 
the  height  south  of  Problns,  had  been  closely  followed  by 
our  skirmishers  exactly  in  the  formation  previously  stated, 
the  second  company  of  the  Fifty-seventh  being  in  close  order 
and  in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  skirmish  line. 

A  curious  incident  may  be  stated  here:  While  JM  .and 
1st  of  the  Fifty-seventh,  in  conjunction  with  Schmelzer's 
battery,  were  maintaining  such  an  etTective  fire  on  the  two 
Saxon  battalions,  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Schoning,  turn- 
ing ai'ouud,  noticed  that  the  colors  of  I. — 57th  were  with  the 
second  company.  He  sent  his  adjutant.  First  Lieutenant 
Boker,  to  that  company  with  orders  to  have  the  colors  at 
once  taken  to  F. — 57th,  which  was  still  in  close  order.  Hence 
we  saw,  at  that  critical  moment,  the  color  section  of  L — 57th 
struggling  all  alone  to  n^ach  F. — 57th  with  the  colors.  Ow- 
ing to  the  considerable  distajice  ajid  the  soaked  condition  of 
the  ground,  the  color  section  did  not  ivach  F. — 57th  until  the 
firing  line  came  to  a  halt.  btMug  thus  without  any  ])rotection 
for  about  20  minutes,  ^^■hen  the  adjutant  had  rejoined  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Schoning,  the  latter  remarked,  "This  is  a 
hellish  fire."     Lieutenant  Boker  replied,  "It  is  a  good  thing 


Military-Historical  Studies.  85 

that  not  every  bullel  liils,"  aiul  he  had  barely  uttered  the 
last  word,  when  he  fell  dead  from  his  horse.  (Statement  of 
Colonel  von  Schoninj?,  subsefiuchtly  wonnded  at  Vionville, 
'and  deceased.)  Soon  afterward  Lien  tenant-Colonel  von 
Schoning,  whose  horse  had  been  hit  several  times,  received 
a  glancing  shot  on  the  left  side  of  the  neck,  but,  hero  that  he 
was,  he  remained  in  the  saddle.  The  blood  ran  down  over 
his  tunic;  Von  Schoning  pulled  out  his  handkerchief,  tied  it 
over  the  wound,  and  led  his  battalion  to  the  end  of  the 
battle. 

The  crest  of  the  ridge,  which  had  been  taken  under  fire 
by  Schmelzer's  battery  and  by  our  skirmishers,  was  covered 
with  an  unusually  large;  number  of  dead  and  wounded.  The 
cries  of  many  of  the  latter  were  heartrending,  but,  being  in 
column,  we  could  not  always  step  over  them  as  carefully  as 
we  should  have  liked  to,  particularly  because  we  were  just 
then  wheeling  to  the  left  in  order  to  gain  the  direction  of  Bor 
and  of  the  wood  of  Briz.*  We  all  were  surprised  to  see  only 
wounded  and  dead  Saxons,  and  Colonel  von  der  Osten  said: 
"Why,  they  are  Saxons!  (Jood-niorning!"  Soon  after- 
ward a  wounded  Saxon  officer  raised  himself  up  from  these 
tangled  heaps  and  said  to  General  von  lliller,  as  he  ap- 
proached: "Back:  you  won't  be  able  to  get  through  here!" 
The  leading  of  Ihe  brigade  as  well  as  of  the  regiments  at  this 
time  deserves  the  highest  praise.  Distances  and  intervals 
between  the  lines  had  been  strictly  observed,  and  after 
marching  1.50(1  melei's  through  high  rye-fields  and  suffering 
severe  losses,  the  brigade  reached  the  height  of  IM-oblus  in 
such  fine  shape  that  the  wheel  to  the  left  conld  be  made  with- 
out first  coining  to  a  halt,  despite  the  uninteiTU[)ted'fire  of  the 
enemy.     The  oblique  movement  to  the  right  and  the  wheel 

*The  History  of  the  57th  Regiment  here  speaks  of  a  third  Saxon 
battalion,  stated  to  have  come  from  Nieder  Prim.     I  did  not  notice  it. 


86  Iiiqiiirtcs  into  the  Taetk\s  of  the  Future. 

to  the  left  had  uncovered  the  I'lont  of  I. — 17th;  to  cover  the 
new  front  General  von  Hiller  ordered  two  companies  of  this 
battalion  forward  to  ])rolong;  the  line  to  the  north  of  3d — 
571h.  (roncral  von  Hiller,  a  man  of  great  modesty,  pre- 
served a.  heroic  coolness.  The  wheel  having  made  an  exten- 
sion of  the  skirmish  line  to  the  southeast  necessary,  two  pla- 
toons of  the  2d  Company  of  the  Fifty-seventh  were  deployed 
for  the  purpose.*  They  advanced  in  double  time  until 
abreast  of  3d  and  1st,  and  soon  after  the  entire  first  line 
halted.f  Now  we  became  aware  that  we  were  in  front  of  a 
strongly  entrenched  position,  from  which  an  uninterrupted 
skirmish  tire  was  maintained.  Notwithstanding  the  short 
distance,  the  strength  of  the  defenders  could  not  be  made 
out,  and  nothing  remained  but  to  open  fire  on  the  high 
abattis  just  for  luck. 

General  von  Hiller  saw  at  once  that  on  this  ground, 
which  was  perfectly  fiat  and  devoid  of  cover  of  any  kind, 
every  minute's  delay  was  dangerous,  and  decided  to  take  the 
wood  as  quickly  as  possible.  He  ordered  the  second  and 
third  line  to  close  on  the  first.  Just  as  the  second  line  had 
almost  reached  the  first  and  we  were  on  the  point  of  making 
the  assault  with  united  forces,  the  signal  "Cavalry"  resound- 
ed on  all  sides.  The  situation  was  critical.  We  were  on 
open  ground  and  about  200  meters  from  a  strongly  occupied 
abattis  (1  brigade  of  5  battalions  and  tlie  1st  Rifle  Bat- 
talion at  Kor).  Th(>  skirmishers  rallied,  the  battalions 
formed  sc^uare;  we  waited  in  suspense  half  a  minutes  a  min- 
ute— the  cavalry  did  not  come!  A  Saxon  squadron,  which 
had  lost  its  way  in  the  wood  of  Briz,  had  suddenly  appeared 
at  the  edge  of  the  wood,  and  on  seeing  its  mistake  and  com- 

*About  300  meters  in  front  of  the  abattis. 

tThe  music  had  just  ceased  playing.    See  page  75. 


Military-Historical  ^Studies.  87 

ing  iiiid<'i-  11)0  fire  of  the  1st — 57th,  it  turned  about  and  trot- 
ted back.     That  was  all. 

This  little  incident  had  checked  the  advance.  It  goes 
to  show  what  harm  signals  may  do,  particularly  when  given 
before  the  facts  are  ascertained.  Had  that  particular 
trumpeter  not  sounded  the  signal,  which,  in  accordance  with 
the  Kcgulations,  was  repeated  right  and  left,  the  abattis 
would  have  been  taken  without  much  loss  and  many  pris- 
oners captured.  On  Uut  battle-field  all  trumpet  signals 
except  "All  advance"  should  be  carefully  guarded  against. 
They  are  prohibited,  but  they  are  not  thereby  prevented.* 

While  forming  groups  the  rifle  platoon  of  2d — 57th  re- 
ceived a  severe  fire  from  front  and  flank,  and  the  leader. 
Lieutenant  von  Stojentin,  was  mortally  wounded.  He 
turned  the  command  over  to  me,  saying:  "I  am  done  for; 
hurry  to  get  up  there,  or  all  are  going  to  be  killed  here! 
Adieu  I"  I  did  not  see  the  gentleman  again.  He  was  a 
brave  officer. 

A  description  of  the  line  of  battle  becomes  the  more  nec- 
essary at  this  ])oint,  as  no  satisfactory'  idea  of  the  situation 
can  be  gained  from  the  Prussian  and  Austrian  Official 
Accounts,  or  from  the  Histories  of  the  17th  and  57th  Regi- 
ments, either  from  the  texts  or  from  the  troops  marked  on 
the  maps;  the  troops  shown  on  the  maps  of  the  Histories  of 
those  two  regiments  rather  obscure  the  text.  AVhen  all 
three  lines  had  ascended  the  plateau  between  Problus  and 
Nieder  Prim,  it  was  not  possible  to  change  the  direction  of 
the  long  skirmish  line  of  'Ad  and  Ist — 57th.  They  continued 
the  march  straight  to  the  front  and  brought  up  against  that 
part  of  the  edge  of  the  wood  which  lies  exactly  in  the  mid- 

♦Simllar  mischief  had  just  before  been  done  by  the  signal 
"Assembly"  after  the  capture  of  Problus.  Details  will  be  found 
on  page  230  of  the  History  of  the  Sixteenth. 


88  I iKjitiiiiis  into  the  Taclics  of  the  Fiitinr. 

(lie  bowU'on  tln'lwo  piualli'l  roads  leudinj;  Iroin  IM-obhis  aiui 
NuhUm-  Trim  [o  iho  woiul  of  \\\\/.\  both  (•ouipjiiiios  lijiHod 
about  L'OO  iiiotiMs  from  llu>  abatlis.  iM  -oTlli  was  uoav 
thrown  forward  to  (ho  rij;ht  (I'astwarcl).  whooliiij;  at  tho 
sauio  timo  to  tlio  loft;  l'\ — fiTth  roinniiuHl  on  tlio  oxtroiao 
iii;ht.  st>  that  tho  skinuishors  of  its  !)th  (\>uipauv  toiu'lunl 
tho  road  from  NitMliM*  rriiu  to  tho  \\i>od  of  l»fi/.  and  halted 
abroast  o(  tho  tirst  lino.  1.  ITth  had  k(>pt  strais;ht  to  the 
front  likt>  ;U1  and  1st — oTth.  As  this  ba.ttalit)n  had  a  oon- 
sidiM-ablv  shortiM-  distamu'  to  tho  wood,  it  onconntorod.  to- 
j^othor  with  tho  two  just  nuMitionod  conipa-nios  of  tho  l"''ifty- 
sovonth,  V(M'v  obsiinato  rosista.noo  botwtuMi  tho  northorn 
think  of  tho  :>d — oTth  a.iid  tho  n>ad  from  Vroblus  to  the 
\\«md  of  llriz,  wliioh  canstnl  it  to  roinfori'O  its  skirniisliers. 
The  skirmish  lino  now  was  facing;  tho  abattis  at  a  dis- 
tanee  of  1*00  nuMors  in  tho  following  order  from  riiiht  to 
left:  11..  skirmish  platoon;  1..  skirmish  platoon;  lib.  i»la- 
toon;.")ih,  platoon;  H'.  ami  1 1 1.. skirmish  platoons.  The  II. — 
17tb.  following  in  rt>ar  of  2d — 57111,  fornnnl  S(inare  during 
the  incident  1  havt*  rt^atiHl.  about  50  paees  to  the  left 
rear  of  lM— 5Tth.  As  1.— 57th.  I.— 17th.  and  F.— 57th 
had  (U^ploved  strong  skirmish  lint>s  (1st — 57th  all  IhrtM^  ]>la- 
toons,  ;>d — 57th  and  l2d-  57th  twt>  idatoons  (>a(h.  II. — 17th 
two  and  V. — 57th  four  i>la toons),  the  skirmish  line  of  tlu» 
brigade  exttMuhnl  from  the  road  Troblus — liriz  wiuul  to  the 
roiid  NiiHler  Trim — -Hri/.  win>tl,  eompassing  tlu»  wo«nl  in  a. 
seniieirele.     i^Sot^  S^keteh  1.) 

.\fter  the  tM-ror  eanstnl  bv  the  signal  hatl  betM\  eleared 
up.  and  when  Ilu>  skirmishers  had  not  vtM  (»r  had  barely 
rt>aehed  ihtMr  former  places,  (General  von  lliller,  fei^ling  tho 
gravity  of  the  crisis  a.nd  turair  of  ///<'  ilifficiillit  of  ijcltiiuj  a 
h/ing-iloun  finiuj  line  fonranl,  roile  hack  lo  11. —  17th.  niul  (jnve 
or(h'i\'i  to  ^fdjor  ron   7^i"(7'c/>7ci'»  "/(>  adraiur  in  JonhJc  fiinc  and 


paHH  the  sIcirmiHh  line  in  ordc/r  to  (jive  a  nevj  irnpvhe  lo  the  whole 
movcrnenL"  (Jciicml  von  Hillcr  joined  the  l(?ff;  of  i\nt  bat- 
lalion,  and,  on  rcarhin^  the  HkiriniHij  lino,  ^aiJopod  forward, 
raising?  IiIh  Hwor<l  Jiiid  <;illin;<,  "Willi  me,  HkirrniHhorH!" 
"'riio  etiMic  lino,"  llic  ^cncr-iil  conliniioH,  "roHo  and  riiHhod 
rcHoluloly  forwjird  willi  druniH  boalin^,  Tlio  cjiooririfi  wjih 
continuouH  and  llio  cnoniy'H  line?  waH  broken  iil  :ill  |)oinlH 
al  alinoHJ  llie  Hanie  lime."  TjoHe  on  my  lefl  II. — 1711)  clam- 
bered over  I  In?  nbatliH,  bill,  b<'in^  in  yloHr'  order,  llie  bat<al- 
ion  naturally  IohI  Wh  formal  ion  and  wan  Homewliat  dJH- 
huieed  by  llie  moic  nimble  skirmiKlierH  fai'llier  norlli. 

II  iH  (pjeer  llial  allliouj^li  many  aceonnlH  of  lliin  ev(?nt 
liave  been  wrilten,  jl  di<J  nol  ocenr  lo  any  of  llie  liiHlorianH 
lo  aHcerlain  who  gave  llie  inipnlHo  to  tho  aHKaiill.  Had  llir- 
re^imenlH,  an  I  have*  done,  addroHHed  the  man  lo  whom  they 
owe  HO  mncli  in  eonneclion  willi  lliiH  foal  of  arnm,  we  would 
read  in  llieir  re«;inienlal  liiHlorien  whal  I  have  wrillen  here, 
inHlead  of  I  hone  lavoiile  bul  iiiaiH-  jdiiaHeH.  InHtead  of 
j^lorioijH  fealH,  Hie  re{^'iiiM'nlH  would  lunc  on<'  t/loriovs  feat, 
worlli  more  llian  Hie  dozeriH  vvliicli  eannol  be  HubHianlialed. 
My  liea.H  impelH  me  lo  ei'e<'l  HiIh  niei-ilcd  mojiiimenl  lo  lh<i 
liei-o  of  lior  and  lo  make  up  f(jr  Hie  neglect  of  the  troops 
whom  lu;  led  to  Hueh  j^loriouH  victory.  From  the  tactical 
point  of  view,  it  waH  my  duly  lo  i^ci  lo  Ihe  bottom  of  this 
oxam[de,  which,  nmhiHs  jiriilrnifJis,  \h  ajjplicabh?  to-day  in 
ma,ny  i)haHeH  of  bailie,  in  oi'der  (ujoin  and  at/ain  to  preach  the 
truth  ill  v'liirh  f  liclii'ic,  that  trodfis  mill  conquer  only  when  led,  and 
I  feel  (lee|)ly  iiidcbled  lo  Hw  i-evorod  general  for  actpiaint- 
ing  me,  1  hough  relucianlly,  with  the  details  of  the  affair. 

The  most  obslinale  rcHiHtance  was  encountered  by  I. — 
I7Hi  and  1.-57111,  Hie  least  by  F.— .57111.  I.— 57lh  encoun- 
tered cloH(»d  bodicK  wliicli  liad  lo  b<'  overpowered  by  ha.nd-to 
hand  fighting,  and  Ii'm-c  Caplaiii  a(»ii   Ledebiir,  comnianding 


90  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  4th  Company,  was  killed  at  a  range  of  10  yards.  The 
deployed  platoons  of  I. — 17th  and  I. — 57th  followed  the 
enemy  in  the  general  direction  of  Bor,  which  farmstead  was 
subseqnently  taken  by  2d — 17th.  At  the  further  edge  of 
the  northern  one  of  the  two  copses  situated  here,  3d  and 
4th — 17th  encountered  one  battalion  of  the  Sigismund  regi- 
ment, which  was  totally  dispersed  by  rapid  fire  delivered 
at  50  paces,  and  left  several  officers  and  about  150  prisoners 
in  our  hands.  Subset|uently  II. — 17th  and  I. — 17th  met 
in  Bor,  after  the  fighting  there  had  ceased.  Both  battalions 
were  halted  there  by  General  von  Hiller.  Some  platoon» 
had  an  opi)ortunity  to  fire  on  Coudenhove's  cavalry  division 
at  a  range  of  GOO — 700  paces.  About  5:.'^0  p.  m.,  the  King 
came  riding  along  from  the  north  and  was  surrounded  by 
the  jubilant  men  of  the  3d,  6th,  and  7th  Companies  of  the  Sev- 
enteenth. The  war  lord  stopped  his  horse  a  moment  and 
addressed  some  gracious  words  to  the  troops.  All  three 
companies  of  I. — 57th  likewise  followed  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  retreating  enemy.  At  the  point  where  I  was, 
the  enemy  did  not  leave  the  abattis  until  we  closed  on 
them;  on  the  further  side  a  man  from  the  1st  Battal- 
ion of  the  1st  Saxon  Infantry  Brigade  fell  into  my 
hands  and  entreated:  'Tlease  do  not  harm  me;  I  am  only 
a  carpenter."  Si>ecially  remarkable  is  the  fact  that  the 
men,  though  carrying  their  packs,  made  the  long  rush  of 
200  meters  ivithont  stop.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
additional  effort  in  climbing  over  the  abattis  so  exhausted 
the  men  that  immediate  pursuit  became  impracticable,  and 
it  would,  moreover,  have  been  very  difficult  in  many  places, 
owing  to  the  dense  underwood.  As  these  various  causes 
had  loosened  the  formation,  some  of  the  commanders  as- 
sembled their  men  on  the  road  leading  from  Bor  southward 
through  the  wood ;  thus  II. — 17th  and  2d — .^>7th.     In  forming 


Military -Historical  Studies.  9 1 

the  company  my  servant,  a  small  Westphalian,  came  up  to 
me;  he  had  been  shot  through  the  cheeks  before  the  assault 
on  the  abattis.  As  he  happened  to  be  quite  near  to  me  at 
4he  time,  I  told  him  to  go  to  the  rear.  But  the  brave  little 
fellow  thought  otherwise;  he  said  he  wanted  to  be  in  the 
attack  on  the  abattis,  and  he  kept  his  word !  Now  he  went  in 
quest  of  a  dressing  station.  His  name  was  Werthmann,  and, 
on  my  recommendation,  he  got  the  medal  of  honor,  but  the 
regimental  histories  fail  to  say  anything  about  the  afifair. 
The  delay  mentioned  explains  why  II. — 17th  and  2d — 57th 
were  late  in  reaching  the  further  edge  of  the  wood.  In  cross- 
ing the  wood,  where  the  Fifty-seventh  took  about  140  pris- 
oners, we  saw  the  effect  of  our  own  guns,  with  which  the  Sax- 
ons were  also  armed.  After  the  infantry  had  withdrawn 
from  the  wood,  the  Saxon  artillery  opened  a  severe  shell  fire, 
and  I  confess  that  the  din,  the  echo,  the  flying  splinters  of 
wood  and  iron  have  deeply  impressed  themselves  on  my 
memory ;  and  those  who  had  to  stand  that  artillery  fire  will 
understand  why  in  1870-71  the  French  showed  some  nerv- 
ousness under  it.  Up  to  that  time  there  was  nothing  more 
terrible  than  a  bursting  percussion  shell,  and  the  Saxon 
artillery  shot  well.  As  soon  as  the  men  had  been  assembled, 
therefore,  the  advance  was  resumed,  but  2d — 57th  lost  tem- 
porarily all  connection  with  the  other  units  of  the  rf»c:i 
ment.  Emerging  from  the  nothern  edge  of  the  wood,  2d — 
57th  met  General  von  Killer,  Colonel  von  der  Osten,  Col- 
onel von  Kottwitz  (17th  Eegiment),  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
von  Schoning,  the  latter  with  a  bloodstained  handkerchief 
about  his  neck;  they  had  ridden  around  the  wood  on  ac- 
count of  the  abattis.  2d — 57th  advanced  thence  in  a  north- 
erly direction,  resting  its  right  on  the  northern  edge  of  the 
northern  copse  of  Bor,  the  greater  part  of  the  company  ex- 
tending westward  over  the  open  field  and  facing  north.     At 


92  Itiquirh\'<  into  the  Tacticfi  of  the  Fiitiiir. 

that  mouuMit  the  si}j:iuil  "Cavalry"  again  rang  out  along  the 
>YhoU'  lino.  The  ofVu'ors  just  naiuod  sought  tho  sholtor  of 
the  wood  and  so  did  2d — 57th;  but,  as  no  cava.lrv  could 
bo  soon  from  thoro.  iM — HTth  rosuniod  its  fornior  position, 
■\vhonoo  it  ^^•itnossod  tho  grand  attack  of  Coiidonhovo's  cav- 
alry division  and  tho  charg(>  of  tho  1st  (luard  Dragoons.  I 
do  not  boliovo  that  a  single  shot  >vas  fired,  and  indeed  the 
view  of  those  splendid  lines  of  horsemen  wa«  so  overwhelm- 
ing that  the  men  from  sheer  surprise  and  suspense  forgot 
their  rilles  altt^gether,  althongh  the  distance  of  about  700 
paces  admitted  of  elTective  tire;  and  1,  though  their  com- 
mandtM".  did  no  bettor!  Soon  many  ridt'rless  horses  ran 
panting  here  and  there;  several  came  through  our  skirmish 
lines,  where  some  of  tluMU  were  caught,  so  that  the  offieera, 
nmuy  of  whom  had  had  their  horses  killed,  could  provide 
themselves  Avith  mounts.  Thus,  Captain  von  Stwolinski 
(1st — 57th),  First  Lieutenant  von  liernewitz  (lid — 57th).  etc. 
(Their  hoi'st^s  had  betMi  strm-k  by  several  bullets.)  CeneraJ 
von  Ililler  now  ordertnl  2d — 57th  to  return  to  the  northern 
edge  of  the  wood  of  Kriz  and  to  occupy  the  same  for  the 
present.  Meanwhile,  we  heard  prolonged  clu^rs  from  Bor; 
it  was  the  greeting  which  the  Seventeenth,  posted  there, 
were  giving  to  their  war  lord  (page  00).  In  that  way  I 
unfoiiunately  was  deprived  of  the  enjoyment  of  this  scene, 
of  which  1  (uily  learntnl  in  the  evening,  when  the  brigade 
was  assembled.* 

I  must  mer.lion  here  a  special  incident.  Shortly  be- 
fore proctHHling  to  the  assault  on  the  abattis,  we  observed 
tlothes  waving  along  the  entire  front  of  the  abattis  befoi"e 
us,  which  gave  us  the  impression  that  the  enemy  meant  to 
surrender;   that   was  not   the   case,   however,  the   Saxons 


♦These  axe  the  facts!  What  is  stated  on  page  45  of  the  History 
of  the  57th  Regiment  is  incorrect.  Queer  that  nothing  is  srad  there 
about  the   King,  whom  3d — 57th  should   have  seen. 


Military-Historical  studies.  98 

maintaining  a  severe  skirmish  fire  against  us  to  the  la«t. 
The  waving  of  the  clotlies  was  observed  by  many,  but, 
notwi(hK(iUMling  my  elToHH,  I  have  been  unable  to  ascer- 
tain  the  cause. 

It  seems  that  tlie  Saxons  made  good  us(;  of  the  time  we 
lost  in  forming  KciuaicH,  for  the  withdrawal  of  their  main 
]»()(ly;  oIliciwiKe  iiioi-c  prisoners  would,  under  the  circum- 
stances, have  fallen  in  our  hands.  As  regards  our  own  fire, 
the  dead  and  wounded  lying  in  rear  of  the  abattis  showed 
it  to  have  been  more  effective  than  we  imagined,  particular- 
ly op[)Osite  2d — HTth,  which  may  be  explained  by  the  fact 
that  Ihe  enemy  here  was  enfiladed  by  1st — 57th,  On  mak- 
ing a  closer  examination  next  morning,  I  found  that  most 
shols  had  gone  high,  jis  flu?  branches  of  the  abattis  and  of 
the  trees  on  the  edg(?  of  the  wood  bore  many  marks  of  in- 
fantry bullets  15  to  20  feet  above  the  ground.  In  the  wood 
of  lUi'A  neither  infantry  fired  much,  though  single  shots 
could  Ix'  heard  there  until  next  morning  (the  pieces  which 
were  picked  up  loaded  were  being  discharged). 

The  fight  at  the  abattis  was  very  obstinate,  but  I  did 
not  see  any  hand-to-hand  fighting  with  the  btiyonet  any- 
where; several  Saxons  were  still  firing  as  I  was  crawling 
through  the  abattis,  and  my  (;ompany  commander.  First 
Lieutenant  von  Bernewitz,  who  had  the  hardihood  to  remain 
mounted  until  he  reached  the  abattis  with  the  .'id  platoon 
of  2d — 57tli  (which  was  in  (;loHe  order),  became  the  target  for 
a  heavy  &re,  and  his  horse  received  several  shots  at  close 
range.  TFc  now  dismounted,  ''only,"  he  said,  "because  he 
could  not  ride  the  beast  over  the  abattis."  The  scene  was 
not  devoid  of  comic  features,  when  at  his  call  "Ilorseholder" 
quite  a  number  of  men  promptly  volunteered  for  that  duty. 
The  list  of  casualties  shows  a  first  lieutenant  of  the  Land- 
wehr,  lMiilii)pi,  2d — 571  h  (tth  platoon),  as  wounded  in  the 


94  Inquiries  into  tltc  Tiwtics  of  the  Future. 

foot  by  a  bayouet  lliriist.  riiilippi  was  uot  picked  up  near 
the  abattis,  but  was  found  deep  in  the  wood  by  Ensign 
Schroiber,  who  assisted  him  to  mount  a  captured  horse  and 
in  that  way  transported  the  not  very  military  figure  to  the 
dressing  station  after  the  fight  was  over.  It  was  a  queer 
sight:  the  small  ensign  with  a  big  sword  by  his  side,  in  top 
boots,  holding  the  big  sword  with  his  left  hand  to  keep  it 
from  getting  between  his  legs,  and  with  the  right  carefully 
leading  a.  big  black  Austrian  chai'ger  on  which  sat  Philippi, 
knapsack  on  his  back,  holding  on  to  the  saddle  with  both 
hands,  his  legs  pulled  up  high,  his  back  arched,  and  in  reai' 
of  the  liorse,  as  "escort,"  a  troop  of  20  captured  Austrians 
and  Saxons  of  all  arms,  some  in  odd  garb;  the  procession 
provoked  ringing  laughter.  Thus  are  grave  and  comical 
scenes  combined. 

According  to  statements  made  to  me  by  Lieutenant  von 
Kedern  of  F. — 10th,  who  had  met  Philippi  afterward,  the 
"bayonet  thrust"  was  an  accident  due  to  his  own  awkward- 
ness. But,  as  it  usually  goes  with  such  things.  Philippi 
became  an  "interesting"  personality,  and  however  often  he 
told  his  story,  I  have  never  believed  it.  The  "bayonet 
thrust"  in  the  first  edition  of  the  Regimental  History  of  the 
57th  Regiment  has  been  changed  to  a  "contusion"  of  the 
foot,  probably  in  consequence  of  my  w'ritings. 

The  Saxon  Official  Account  says  that  the  1st  Rifle  Bat- 
talion distinguished  itself  highly  by  its  stubborn  defense  of 
the  abattis,  though  at  the  time  threatened  in  rear.  It  was 
the  ."^d  Company  of  the  57th  Regiment  that  advanced  against 
the  rear  of  the  1st  Rifle  Battalion.  The  battalion  had  occu- 
pied a  copse  to  the  north  of  the  wood  of  Briz,  and  its  retreat 
was  probably  difficult.  It  also  lost  the  greatest  number  of 
prisoners.  There  Avas  no  bayonet  fighting  at  this  point 
either,  but  there  was  probably  a  stubborn  fire  fight  at  50 
paces,  and  closer,  against  I. — 17th. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  95 

The  tactical  leading  must  be  pronounced  excellent. 
The  action  of  the  28th  Brigade  in  forming  squares  under  the 
circumstances  might  be  criticised,  and  I  have  been  told  that, 
instead  of  complying  with  the  signal,  General  von  Hiller 
meant  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  assault  on  the  abattis.  To 
this  it  may  be  replied  that,  the  signal  having  once  been 
given,  the  general  could  not  prevent  the  troops  from  obey- 
ing it.     It  has  never  been  ascertained  who  gave  the  signal.* 

Owing  to  the  cover  in  front,  the  appearance  of  cavalry 
was  not  at  all  an  impossibility. 

The  Prussian  Official  Account  says,  on  page  394,  that 
"further  pursuit  was  entrusted  to  Captain  Streccius  with 
the  2d  Company  of  the  17th  and  2d  Company  of  the  57th 
Regiments  and  some  re-formed  skirmish  platoons."  The 
reader  may  decide  for  himself  whether  and  how  far  Cap- 
tain Streccius' advance  (to  the  northeastern  edge  of  the  copse 
of  Bor)  may  be  called  a  pursuit.  It  is  certain  that  the 
2d  Company  of  the  57th  Regiment  was  never  for  a  minute 
under  Captain  Streccius'  orders,  whom  I  never  saw  on 
the  day  of  the  battle,  and  that  none  but  men  from  the  Sev- 
enteenth could  have  been  among  the  formed  skirmish  pla- 
toons. For  the  3d,  1st,  and  2d  Companies  of  the  57th  Regi- 
ment, which  were  following  the  same  direction  in  open 
order,  were  never  separated  from  the  regiment;  F. — 57th 
was  too  far  away  from  the  17th  Regiment;  II. — 17th  did 
not  reach  Bor  until  after  it  had  been  taken  by  I. — 17th,  and 
no  one  got  farther  than  that  point  I 

The  wood  of  Briz  was  now  occupied  as  follows  (5  p. 
m.):t  northern  edge  and  northeastern  angle,  including  Bor, 

*This  is  confirmed  by  a  letter  from  Greneral  von  Hiller  of  Feb- 
ruary,  1890,  to  the  author. 

tAs  regards  time,  I  will  state  that,  according  to  my  observa- 
tions, Problus  fell  about  2:45  p.  m.,  and  that  the  farmstead  of  Bor 
and  the  wood  of  Briz  may  have  been  taken  about  3:30  p.  m. 


96  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

3d — 57th,  1st — 57tli;  eastern  edge,  F. — 57th;  northern  edge, 
2d — 57th;  Bor  and  the  two  copses,  I. — 17th  and  II. — 17th. 
About  6:30  p.  m.,  General  von  lliller  conducted  the  28th 
Brigade  to  the  plateau  west  of  the  wood  of  Briz,  where  the 
entire  brigade  camped  during  the  night.  The  27th  Brigade 
bivouacked  in  and  around  Problus. 

Hiller's  brigade  had  purchased  its  success  with  the  loss 
of  10  officers  and  190  men,  and  had  captured  12  officers  and 
300  men. 

Of  these  losses,  S  officers  and  99  men  fell  on  the  8  com- 
panies of  the  Fifty-seventh,  and  2  officers  and  91  men  on 
the  8  companies  of  the  Seventeenth;  the  3  companies  of 
I. — 57th  (firing  line)  had  suffered  most — viz.,  6  officers  and 
64  men;  the  2d  company  lost  2  officers  and  20  men. 

The  account  on  page  43  of  the  History  of  the  Fifty- 
seventh  would  make  the  reader  believe  that  General  von 
Hiller  was  encouraged  to  make  the  attack  by  the  King's 
adjutant,  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Stiehle,  and  that  the 
lieutenant-colonel  arrived  before  the  signal  "Cavalry." 
According  to  the  written  statement  of  General  von  Hiller, 
now  before  me,  both  statements  are  in  error.  If  it  were 
otherwise,  the  general's  credit  as  a  leader  and  as  a  hero 
would  be  lowered.  In  fact,  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Stiehle 
did  not  arrive  until  after  General  von  Hiller  had  brought 
up  Bieberstein's  battalion  (II. — 17th)  and  "the  lieutenant- 
colonel  did  not  strengthen  the  general's  resolution  to  at- 
tack," hut  hrorigJit  him.  a  categorical  order  not  to  advance  further 
when  he  saw  what  arrangements  General  von  Hiller  had  made  for 
the  occupation  of  Bor  and  of  the  tvood  of  Briz!  After  General 
von  Hiller  had  arranged  for  the  occupation  of  the  edge  of 
Bor,  the  troops  there  received  fire  from  the  southeast;  from 
their  headgear.  General  von  Hiller  recognized  the  firing 


Military-Historical  Studies.  97 

troops  as  Prussians,  and  sent  the  adjutant  of  I. — 17th,  Lieu- 
tenant Hesse,  to  inform  them  of  their  error.  When  he 
reached  them,  he  found  that  the  second  battalion  of  the 
Thirty-third,  under  Major  von  Bieberstein,  had  taken  the 
Prussians  at  Bor  for  enemies.  Further  mischief  was  thufe 
happily  averted.  Not  until  after  these  incidents  did  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Stiehle  find  General  von  Hiller.  Soon 
afterward,  after  dark,  an  order  came  from  the  14th  Division 
for  the  brigade  to  move  to  Problus.  As  the  men  were  very 
much  fatigued,  General  von  Hiller  sent  his  adjutant.  Lieu- 
tenant Arndt,  to  request  permission  of  Count  Mtinster  to 
let  the  brigade  camp  where  it  was,  which  request  Count 
Miinster  granted. 

When  yet  beyond  the  enemy's  fire  the  brigade  had  been 
divided  into  two  lines,  and  after  the  advance  had  begun, 
three  lines  were  formed.  This  formation  was  retained  un- 
til the  first  halt  (250  meters  from  the  abattis).  The  regi- 
ments were  one  in  rear  of  the  other.  Their  march  was 
across  open  fields,  and  during  the  movement  a  considerable 
oblique  movement  and  a  wheel  to  the  left  were  made. 
Within  effective  infantry  range  (200 — 250  meters)  the  bri- 
gade passed  from  the  open  to  the  close  formation  (squares), 
and  then  resumed  open  order;  all  its  forces  closed  on  the 
enemy  simultaneously,  surmounted  high  abattis,  closely  fol- 
lowed the  withdrawing  enemy  through  underbrush,  very 
dense  in  parts,  and  soon  after  overthrowing  the  enemy  the 
brigade  again  stood  assembled  and  formed  as  though  after  a 
bloodless  peace  exercise.  It  traversed  over  2000  meters, 
and  used  exclusively  double  column  on  the  center  with  skir- 
mishers in  front.  I. — 57th  alone,  whose  able  commander 
was  subsequently,  as  colonel  of  the  Eleventh,  wounded  at 
R^zonville  on  August  16,  1870,  in  one  of  the  many  bloody 


98  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

attacks  on  Height  1)70,  had  been  completely  deployed  during 
the  action,  with  the  exception  of  2  platoons.* 

At  about  ;>r)()  meters  the  slvirmishers  [lid  and  1st — 57th) 
opened  fire  and  flred  while  in  motion,  and  not  without  good 
i-esults,  as  we  found  later.  Notwithstanding  their  op^Mi 
order,  they  sulTered  the  greatest  losses,  which  may  be  in 
pai't  attributed  to  the  signal  "Cavalry."  The  small  losses 
of  the  strong  columns  may,  in  view  of  the  uniform  character 
of  the  terrain,  be  thus  explaimHl:  that  the  Saxon  musket  did 
not  carry  as  far  as  the  second  and  third  lines.  All  officers, 
including  company  commanders,  remained  mounted  during 
the  whole  of  the  action. 

The  attack  may  well  be  tailed  a  model  of  brigade  lead- 
ing, and  General  von  Herwarth,  who  had  watched  it  attent- 
ively, used  to  speak  of  it  up  to  his  death.  General  von 
Falckenstein  said  to  General  von  Ilillcr  at  Hanover  that 
(Jeneral  von  llerwarth  had  expressed  himself  to  him  to  the 
effect  that  he  owed  his  success  to  the  14th  Division,  and  I 
can  testify  that  General  von  Falckenstein  addressed  the 
regiments  (IGth  and  57th)  in  the  same  sense  at  Hanover 
when  they  were  transferred  from  his  own  to  the  X.  Corps, 
then  in  the  process  of  formation. 

The  night  on  the  plateau  of  Problus  was  very  chilly  and 

*One  of  my  readers  has  written  me  on  this  point  as  follows: 
Colonel  von  Schoning  had  been  severely,  though  not  mortally, 
wounded  by  a  rifle  bullet  in  the  upper  part  of  the  arm.  He  was  to 
be  carried  off  by  four  fusiliei-s  on  their  rifles,  and  gave  his  consent. 
But  as  the  French  soon  afterward  made  a  counter-attack.  Colonel 
von  Sch(>ning  ordered  the  men  to  leave  him  and  retire  alone.  "I 
don't  want  you  to  be  killed  on  my  account."  he  added.  In  the  attack 
subsequently  made  on  our  side,  the  Eleventh  reached  the  place  where 
Colonel  von  Schoning  was  lying  immovable  on  his  back,  his  face 
toward  the  enemy.  "Never  again,"  saj's  my  correspondent,  Mr 
Heinemann,  of  Altona,  "have  I  had  such  an  opportunity  to  admire 
a  hero  as  here.  Notwithstanding  his  sufferings,  he  called  to  us: 
'Children,  are  we  winning?'  'Yes,  Colonel.'  'Well,  then,  let  us 
give  cheers  for  our  king''  and  we  gave  three  cheers  with  a  will.  I 
have  not  seen  him  since." 


Military-Historical  f^tudies.  99 

rarely  have  I  suffered  so  much  from  cold;  but  I  was  able  to 
satisfy  my  hunger.  Up  to  that  time  my  food  on  July  3d 
had  consisted  of  a  small,  hard  piece  of  bread,  which  I  had 
been  carrying  in  my  knapsack  since  Mtinchengratz.  At 
Bor  two  musketeers  of  the  Forty-ninth  reported  to  me  and  I 
put  them  in  my  platoon  and  kept  them  until  next  morning. 
My  wounded  servant  had  meanwhile  been  taken  to  Problus, 
so  that  I  was  destitute  of  the  most  necessary  things,  and 
when  night  descended,  I  fell  asleep  in  the  midst  of  the  men 
buzzing  about  like  so  many  bees  and  hunting  for  food. 
Their  pains  were  in  vain,  however,  as  darkness  rendered 
their  "expeditions  of  discovery"  difficult,  and  the  men  had 
to  content  themselves  with  coffee  without  anything  else. 
During  the  first  refreshing  sleep  I  was  aroused  by  the  two 
brave  Pomeranians;  one  of  them  had  a  steaming  pot  in 
his  hand,  the  other  raised  me  up:  ''Ensign,"  said  the  first, 
"here  is  something  to  eat."  I  was  touched  by  their  good- 
ness of  heart  and  gratefully  accepted  the  kind  offer,  which 
consisted  of  rice  soup  with  bacon.  I  have  never  forgotten 
these  kind  Pomeranians,  nor  has  that  night  been  effaced 
from  my  memory.  The  men,  closely  crowding  together  for 
mutual  warmth,  were  sleeping  between  numerous  small 
cooking  fires;  others  moved  between  them  like  shadows; 
flaring  masses  of  fire  rose  in  the  distance;  the  air  was  im- 
pregnated with  the  well-known  resinous  odor  of  burning 
pine;  some  shots  would  fall  in  the  wood,  and  off  and  on  I 
would  hear  the  groans  of  the  wounded.  I  rose  and  walked 
some  distance  northward,  but  the  irregular  groups  of  the 
men  soon  caused  me  to  cease  my  wanderings,  and  I  lay  down 
again.  I  did  not  wake  up  until  0,  when  all  were  on  their 
feet.  The  commanders  now  restored  order  and  regularity; 
part  of  the  men  went  for  water  and  food;  others  were 
detailed  to  bury  the  dead,  which  I  was  to  superintend. 


100  hiquiriva  into  the  Tavtica  of  the  Future. 

\\hh\[  \0  i\.  \\\.  \\c  hoiXixn  to  oook  wUixi  i\\\u\ii'\[\o\\i^  ami  pro- 
vision Nvjiii»»us  lijul  tnniisluHl;  it  was  luiiihtv  lil(h\  About 
ui>ou  I  ho  oOiotM's  sMul  doloiiJi  lions  of  nuMi  from  tho  rojjinionts 
«>f  (ho  IJth  l>i\isit>n  nvimK  to  Tivblns  (o  burv  tho  doad  ot^l- 
ooi*s  in  ih(>  mavovard  of  ih(>  villajio.  (Mr.  It  was  an  impi-os- 
sivo  ooi*onu>nv;  all  tho  hiiihof  otVtooi-s  \vort»  a^sonibltHl 
around  tho  jirav»>s.  and  n»>\t  to  tluMii  \voro  tho  o«>rps  of  otlb 
oors.  MinistiM's  o\'  both  d(Mn>n»inati»»ns  pr»>nonm't>d  briof 
funoral  sonuotis;  oaoh  of  us  thott  stoppod  up  to  pav  tho  hist 
t^arthlv  iributo  to  tlu>  di^id.  and  thoti  >vo  loft  tho  vlllajjo. 
whith  now  niado  tho  iinprossion  «>f  tt>tal  tlovastatii>n.  On 
our  arrival  at  tho  camp  o\\  i\\o  platoan  wo  lu^ard  tho  jovful 
HOWS  that  tho  train  had  i-omo  up  with  bii^ad.  and  mtMi  woro 
at  onoo  soin  to  draw  tho  rations.  l>ut  our  disappointnnMtt 
was  irroat:  tho  broad  wa.s  sti  nuWd.v  that  it  \\i\d  \o  bo  buriod 
at  ouot*:  rii'<\  poas.  oi>lVot\  and  salt  wtM't*  itt  insutUoiont  i^uan- 
tttios.  V\'tto,  howovor.  iti  suoh  situatiiMis  frotpnMitlv  o]>ons 
a  wido  tit^d  to  morrimont.  a.nd  joUtvs  on  tln^  "huniioi"  oam 
paiu'n,"  as  it  was  ovon  thon  justly  oalUnl,  wtM-o  not  lai'kinu-. 
Standinji' about  in  jiii>tips.  tht»  ovonts  of  tho  battlo  woro 
disiiisstHi;  »moi\v  tuu^  undorst ood  that  a  viotmn  had  boon 
won.  but  ovtM-v  thouuhtfnl  i>t^K'or  roali/.od  tin*  total  absoitoo 
of  pursuit.  I  romombiM'  laouttMumt  l.anooUo  sayinu-  in  a 
vory  dissatistlod  way:  ">\'hat  havt*  wo  iiot?  nothinu  but 
tho  battlo  t\old."  About  'J  p.  n\..  1  wont  alom^  into  tho  wood 
of  l\r\r.  to  s<H>  what  kind  o\'  a  ivtitMt  tho  onomy  had  matl(\ 
Wltat  I  saw  il(Mit\s  tiosoripti<>n:  tht>  oorpst^s  of  inon  and 
horsos  wort^  litorally  pilod  in  hoai>s  wluMovor  I  lookod.  I 
start od  baik;  tho  sun  shom^  ploasai\tly  i>n  tlu^  othorwiso 
loYoly  valloy  of  tho  Klbo.  1  had  hanily  ivjoinod  tlu^  bat- 
talion, vvhon  wo  woro  ordoitni  to  liot  roady  to  ntaroh.  Wo 
inarolttH^  aloni;  tho  wostorn  tnliro  of  tho  W(Mid  of  l>ri/.  and 
saw  tho  ontirt>  battlo  «;rtuind  (*f  tho  ir>th  Hivisiini.      In   tho 


M  ilitary  1 1  iHlorwal  Sludi('H.  101 

(tlcariiif^H  Im'Iw<'''Ii  K(«'inf«'l(l  ;iri<l  KU-zirck  the  (•(>v]m<'H  lay  ho 
<l(;iiHO  lliaL  I  caniiol.  rcmainlxtv  hccAih^  il.  woi'hc  irj  the  Franco- 
I'njHHian  War  at  Mar-H-Ia-Tour;  the  riflcH  hjid  all  br^en  Hluck 
in  tbo  ground  vvilli  (lio  bayonet,  an  tliouj^li  Hie  vietorH 
(lenired  to  hIiovv  I  he  ext<'iil  of  <h(!  enerny'H  de'feal,  and  an  the 
heavy  bultH  were  np,  the  riflcH  hnd  a  HJanlin^  poHJIion,  ko 
that  the  cloarin^jH  in  I  Ik-  full  H<'nHc  ;if)j)r'iir('(l  liUf  hji'^f,-  hop- 
ficldH.  I'ruHHianH  I  Haw  lyin^  about  Hi'nf^ly;  the  diHtance 
betvv(-'en  IJieirj  and  (he  Haxonn  and  llie  AnsfrianH  of  th(; 
VIII.  Corjm  aveni^ed  loO — 200  pacen.  The  men  were  Bing- 
iiiK  on  Mm-  ii\:tv<\\,  l)ul  ;i(  lliiil  Hi^:ht  the  eoliium  became 
Hih-nl;  (ncn  I  he  hij^liei-  crMninander  K<'e(ned  nITecled,  for  the 
bn.H.'ilioriH  rnjiih'  a  nliorl  Inill,  ;is  fliou^h  to  t^ive  i'vcry  oik;  an 
o[)poil  unit  y  lo  observe  wli;il  loHKen  the  i-epenled  ollenKive 
of  (In?  opponent  ii/^aiiiHt  (he  J5(li  I>iviHioii  had  eoHt  him. 
At)out  0:.'>0  J),  in.  we  resiched  (he  village  of  I.«ibc}in,  prettily 
Hitunied  on  (he  mountain  HJope;  the  entire  valley  of  tin;  Elbe 
jiH  fji.r  n,H  Koni^^rJil/,  Hpre;i<|  pict  ureHfjiiely  before  uh  in  the 
nivH  of  the  setting  snn,  but  the  iinn^er  would  not  let  uh 
think  of  anything  but  eatifi^.  At  that  (inn;  l^ibcan  had  big 
cheri7  orchards,  and  it  wan  not  lon^  t»efore  the  men 
were  [)erched  in  the  Hplendid  cherry-trees  to  the  topmost 
bninchen;  t)y  next  iriorning  th(r  lre(«H  were  entirely  bare, 
ivarge  |)o(a,to  heldn  were  phmj^hed  uji,  but  the  potjitoen  were 
not  bigK'^*''  than  a  finger.  We  did  not  get  brend  until  we 
reached  Kollin  I 
//.     77tc  AUacIc  of  Ilia  lUlh  Half- Division  (S8Ui  Infantry  JJri- 

f/nde)  on  the  Jleif/hl.s  of  Jiruvilh  in  the  Battle  of  VionviHe 

on  the  10th  of  August,  J 870. 

(a)  The  March  to  the  lialtle- Field.— At  ry.'.U)  a.  m.  on 
the  loth  of  AugUHt,  tJie  .''8th  Infantry  Hrig.'i<l(;,  KegiinentH 
N(w.    10   :ind    r,7,    with    LM    I-ight    and    2d    IFr-avy    I'.;ittery, 


102  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Futnir. 

aiul  with  iho  '2d  ;unl  ',k\  oomnjuiios  of  pionoers  of  (ho  X. 
An\iy  Torps.  siartod  from  Thiauoourt  undor  (lOiiornl  von 
Si'hw;u/.ko|>i>iMK  Aooordiuji-  to  (ho  Historv  of  (ho  1st 
((iKUil  l>r;\>ioon  KoiiiiiUMU.  bv  H.  von  Kohr.  iho  bripnh^ 
had  boon  piooodoil  a(  4::U)  a.  n\.  bv  (ho  dnaid  dragoon  Hri- 
jiado  widi  (ho  horso  ba((orv  (^lMani(/.).  This  do(at'hniont 
arrivod  a(  S(.  llilairo.  (ho  oonmion  dostina(ion  of  (ho 
troops.  a(  10  a.  ni.*  (\nin(  Hiandonbavg  11..  (ho  ooni- 
niandor.  on  hoarinji'  at'(iUoi\v  tiro  from  (ho  oas(.  doi'idod, 
ui(h  (ho  oononrrtMU'o  of  lionoral  von  Sohwar/.koppon.  (o 
nniroh  (oward  (ho  si>nntl  of  (lio  gnns.i  Tln^  ls(  linard 
Dragoon  Kojiimon(  and  (ho  horso  ba((iM-\  wori»  aUuu^  avail- 
ablo  for  tho  pnrposo  at  tho  timo. 

l.iontonant  (uMioral  von  Sohwar/.koppon  know  boforo 
tho  s(ar(  from  'rhianoonr(  (ha(  a  roi'onnoi(orinji"  dotaohniont 
nndor  l.ion(onan(  t\>lonol  von  Oaprivi,  ohiof  of  s(alY  of  tho 
X.  Army  thorps,  had  boon  son(  on(  to  asoor(ain  (ho  whoro- 
aboiKs  of  (lu^  lariio  bodios  of  (l\o  onomy  obsorv^nl  on  Angnst 
15th.  noar  Vionvillo,  and  ho  miglu  liavo  oonnootod  (ho  ar(il- 
lory  t\iv  with  tho  nvonnaissanoo.  \\c  was  jKn-sonally  with 
tho  10th  Half-Division. I  as  appoars  from  tho  statonumts  of 
A'on  Kohr  and  of  \\\c  o7(h  l\ogimon(  (pajio  771. 

AUhoniih  it  was  an  in(onsoly  ho(  Anu;ns(  day.  (ho 
infan(ry  marolunl  so  smardy  (hat  i(  roachod  S(.  llilairo 
shordy  aftor  11  a.  m.  A(  ^VotM  a  rost  of  1(^  nunn(os  was 
1akoi\.  and  m>  odior  hah  was  mado.^j 

Aooordinji  (o  n\y  oalonladon.  tho  distanoo  from  Thian- 
court  to  St.  llilairo  is  nt  h-nst  '2'2  kilomotors:  aooordinir  (o 


♦Official  Account,  page  602.  I.    The  cavalry,  according  to  this 
statement,  made  22  kilometers  in  5U  hours. 

tText  of  tho  Offldixl    Account. 

3:Page  266  of  the  History  of  Regiment  No.  16. 

§The  Official  Account.  T..  page  594.  fixes  the  hour  of  dovvxrture 
of  the  19th  Half-Pivision  fivm  Thiaucourt  at  7  a.  m.     The  distance 


M Uilari/  H isloricul  ^ladlcH.  103 

that  of  thr-  l<;ili  Uc^'irrM'iit,  liO  kilornctorH.  (Sor-  pa^(;  2(i(;  of 
the  rogirnon(al  hiHJory.j* 

from  Thiauftourt  to  Woi'-l  Ih  17  kilomf;torH.  As  the  best  Infantry  can 
not  keop  up  a  faHtc;r  paco  than  at  the  rate  of  12  mlnuteH  per^kilo- 
meter,  the  march  to  W(w"'l  required  .'{  h/jurs  and  34  mlnutcH,  including 
a  rcKt  of  10  minutcH.  The  Official  A<;count  further  HtatcH  that  General 
von  VoiKtH-llhet.z  left  Wof-l  at  10  a.  rc    to  ride  to  the  battle-fieUl.    As 

he  was  in  rear  of  the  half-diviHion,  the  latter  must  have  been  pant 
Woi'l  at  10  a.  m.;  otherwise  we  should  have  seen  General  von  Voigls- 
.Ithetz.  That  alone  is  Biiffieient  to  prove  tiiat  the  19th  Half-lJivision 
sidilcd  from  Thidiicoiirl  hcforc  7  a.  vi.  it  was  not  until  later  that  Gen- 
eral von  Sfhwarzkopjjen  Icarnrd  tiiat  General  von  Vrjigts-Rhetz  had 
ridden  toward  the  sound  of  the  guns. 

]j(it  us  compare  with  this  the  statements  of  the  1st  Guard 
Dragoon  and  of  the  ItJth  and  r»7th  infantry  Ilegiments.  On  page 
124  of  the  history  of  the  former  Ijy  Von  ilohr  it  is  stated:  "The 
brigade  (iirandenfjurg  fl.)  started  at  4:30  a.  m.  and  marched  through 

St.  iJenoit  en  \Vo("'vre  and  Woi-I  to  St.  Hilaire.  The  5th  Squadron 
of  the  2d  Guard  Diagoons  (Von  Trotha)  formed  the  advance  guard. 
Just  as  the  brigade  (-onimander  was  about  to  post  outposts  at  St. 
Hilaire,  the  sound  of  guns  was  heard  from  the  direction  of  Metz. 
As    it   increased    every    minute,    ('(junt    van    lirandenburg   marched 

toward  the  Kound  of  the  guns  with  our  regiment,  i^lanitz's  battery, 
anil  with  the  4th  Squadron  (Von  fiindenburg)  of  the  2d  Guard 
Dragoons,  whicii  latter  was  joined  by  the  commander  of  that  regi- 
ment. Count  PMnckenstein,  and  ncrU  a  mcntiafio  to  thai  (■(feet  to  demral 
ron  Srlnrdrzhojiitcn,  with  the,  remark  timt  Trotha'x  Hqiuidron  left  in 
the  oiilixt.st  posUioii  vas  at  the  dispoftat  of  the  divinioH." 

It  does  not  sf;cm  probable  that  the  cavalry  started  two  and  one- 
half  hours  before  the  infantry.  On  the  other  hand,  the  difference 
between  his  statement  and  that  of  th(;  Official  Account  as  to  the  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  departure  of  General  von  Brandenburg  II. 
for  the  Imttle-fleld  is  by  no  means  trifling  (compare  page  602  of  the 
Official  Accxjunt,  I.). 

On  page  2(10  of  the  History  of  the  16th  Regiment  we  read: 
"The   detachment    [the   10th    Half-Division,    author's    note|    started 

from  Thiaucourt  at  6  ><.  m.  for  St.  Hilaire,  the  Fusilier  Battalion  of 
the  16th  Regiment  forming  the  advance  guard,  and  arrived  there 
about  12  o'clock." 

In  the  History  of  the  57th  Regiment  by  Von  Schimmelmann, 
published  in  1883,  page  77,  the  hour  of  departure  is  stated  at  6  a.  m., 
that  of  the  arrival  at  St.  Hilaire  as  12  o'clock  noon. 

■^Since  August  9fh  the  infantry  of  the  19th  Division  had  been 
marching  without  packs.  At  St.  Ingbert  the  packs  had  been  loaded 
on  the  cars  at  the  railway  station  under  the  supervision  of  an  adju- 
tant from  each  regiment;  in  the  case  of  the  57th  Regiment  that  duty 
had  devolved  on  me.  The  men  carried  the  mess-tins  strapped  to  the 
rolled  overcoat,  an('  the  ammunition  in  the  knapsack  was  transferred 
to  the  haversack.  /  ccording  to  the  calculation  in  the  preceding  foot- 
note, the  19th  Half- Division  must  have  been  past  Woel  by  10  a.  m. 


104  liKiuirUfS  into  thv  Tactics  of  the  Fiitiiir. 

Tho  pivsumixion  was  thnl  (Ihmmiimwy  was  rinifaiiuii  to 
\'tM"diu\.  ill  part  on  [he  vo'm\  on  whii-li  \vi»  (hiMi  weiv.  ami  on 
that  aoi'oiint  tluMc  had  boon  soino  anxiot v  ainonu;  iho  slalYs 
ilurini;  tho  niaroh  to  St.  Uihiiiv.  Tho  maps  >voiv  fivoly 
oonsnltoil.  a.iul  the  surprise  was  jjiwit  >vhou  >vo  roavhed  tho 
ononiv's  lino  of  rotroat  without  sooinj;  a  traco  of  hint.  Tho 
o  battalions,  tho  _  battorios.  and  'J  pioiuHM-  oiunpanios  wont 
into  oanip  siMithoast  of  St.  Uilairo.  tho  outposts  boins; 
furnisluHl  bv  F. — oTth  and  Trotha's  S(\uadron  of  tho  iM 
Guaitl  Dra^roons.  Moanwhilo.  tho  tollinj:-  of  tho  ihurvh- 
bolls  in  the  snrroundius;  oountrv  piiH'lainiod  tho  arrival  of 
tho  onomy.  Tho  view  Avas  unobstructed  as  far  as  the  hills 
of  the  Mouse,  and  there  was  no  traoe  of  a  bivt^/.e.  .Vs  far 
baok  as  St.  Honoit  en  >V(.h'>vio  others  had  drawn  my  atten- 
tion to  uun  shots,  whieh  1  was  unable  to  hear  in  spitt^  of  my 
bt^t  endeavors,  and  only  here  in  the  eamp  at  Wool  1  was 
able  to  distinjiuish  them.  1  thoui^ht  the  sound  eame  from 
our  i*ij;lit  rear.  In  that  t-aiie  we  would  have  been  in  rear 
of  the  enemy,  whieh  ito  one  was  disposini  to  believe.  It  soon 
turned  out  to  be  a  faet. 

At  St.  llilaire  tlu^  troops  were  orderetl  to  oook.  despite 
our  vexiuix  situation.*  Ouriui;  this  time  1  was  with  the 
rijrht  thuik  guard  with  several  other  otVieers.  amonu:  them 
Lieutenaut-Ooloiiel  von  Koll.  The  otVuers  were  listiMiin-; 
attentively  to  the  sound  of  the  guns,  aiul  thought  that  we 

Fivm  tluMV  to  St,  lUlairo  tho  distaiioo  is  5  kilometei-^.  which  can 
rei\vlily  bo  oovoroii  in  U,  hovn-s.  Thoro  is  no  donbt.  thoroforo.  that 
tho  SSth  Pri^arjuio  trorht'il  St.  Hiloiir  tyirlicr  than  stated  in  tho  Othoial 
Aoconnt  and  in  tho  historios  of  the  "liUh  and  r«7th  Rogimonts.  Ao- 
conling  to  tho  timo  of  tho  I.  Battalion  of  tho  "-Tth  Kfi^iuuMU  it  w.is 
just  11  o'clock.  Being  aiijntant  of  that  battalion,  and  it  InMng  my 
wook  to  got  tho  oniors.  on  which  occasion  tho  watches  wore  daily 
ixnnparod  with  that  of  the  g^Munal  staff  oflicer  of  tho  division.  Major 
von  SchertT.  my  st.atoments  may  safely  make  some  claim  to  tvlative 
accuracy. 

♦Tho  Olhcial  .\ivonnt  savs  nothing  about  that. 


MiUtary-Ilutorical  studies.  106 

would  rcHunic  I  Ik-  riuirch  u.i.  orico,  ThiH  "bat  fit;  fover"  ih 
almoHt  invjuiahly  tin;  n-HuH.  of  ihit  \n\(<-vin\i\\y  of  the 
troopH  n-^sirdin^  Iho  plariH  of  tho  coininandor  in  (-hief.  It 
waH  not  HO  hen*.  Kinoo  ihc.  morning  of  tho  IfJth,  alrnoHt 
evory  ofTlc«T  kru-w  tin-  Htratcgic  Hituation  approximately  and 
the  obj«*(l  of  our  rruircli  c/xddly.  The  eonverHation  had 
tunH'<l  on  the  Kul)jc«|  during;  fhe  march;  all  wer«*  in  ex[)ef;- 
tation  of  w.  g^i-cnf  cvcnl  ;uid  highly  Huri>riH<Mj  to  find  Ht. 
riilairc  unoccujjied,  altliougli  the*  Houiid  of  guriH  iuid  been 
heard  from  th(;  right  for  Hom(;  time. 

Tlu'  order  to  cook,  received  by  the  troojis  nf)t  without 
iniHgivingH,  Ih  Hignificant  in  judging  (Icncral  von  Schwarz- 
kf)i)i>en'H  conccj>lion  of  the  si  tun  lion.  It  showed  a  i)ur[>OHe 
to  remain  at  St.  Ilil;iir<*  until  further  orders  should  be  re- 
ceived; alHO  that  the  ojiinion  jtrr-vjiilcd  thnt  there  was  am- 
jile  time  to  cook  before;  tlje  arrival  of  orders,  notwitlistand- 
ing  tliat  the  sound  of  guns  haxl  been  audible  for  some  time 
and  was  getting  stronger.  It  is  certainly  cr)rrect  to  use 
fVf'vy  oj)i)ortunity  to  cook  in  fu-der  th;it  the  ti-oojis  rn;iy  not 
reach  their  destirifition  in  jiri  enfeebled  stale.  I'ut  (^leneral 
von  Hchwarzkojipen  liad  failed  to  find  the  enemy  where  he 
expected  to  meet  him,  and  from  the  right  rear  he  heard 
continued,  severe  artillery  fire;  the  enemy  must  therefore 
have  been  engaged  atHorneotheryjoint,  Unfortunately,  we  do 
not  know  the  general's  conception  of  the  situation  in  detail; 
it  HufTices  tluit  al  that  time  he  had  no  idea  of  what  was  going 
on  in  his  rear,  that  he  hejird  the  sound  of  the  guns  and  did 
nothiny  to  ascertain  its  <;ause,  negle(;ting  fin;  first  duty  of  a 
commander  who  finds  that  the  premises  on  which  an  order 
is  based  are  wrong.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  Count  Bran- 
d(mburg  had  his  susfu'cions  Jis  enrly  as  10  a.  m.,  and  acted 
accordingly  and  sent  word  to  General  von  Kchwarzkoppen, 

that  the  former  never  thought  of  cooking,  but  was  imbued 
8 — 


106  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

with  the  sole  idea  of  marching  to  the  sound  of  the  guns — 
it  might  be  supposed  that  General  von  Schwarzkoppen 
should  have  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  all  the  more  as 
Count  Brandenburg  had  shown  him  the  right  road,  as  it 
were.  While  the  fires  were  burning,  some  horsemen  came 
galloping  from  the  east,  attracting  every  one's  attention. 
On  the  right  of  the  Fifty-seventh,  where  the  view  to  the 
right  was  unobstructed,  the  men  felt  so  certain  of  our  im- 
mediate departure  that  they  were  pouring  the  boiling  soup 
on  the  ground  before  it  was  ordered,  and  the  alarm  signal 
was  not  given  until  an  officer  arrived  on  a  horse  covered 
with  foam.  The  camp-kettles  were  now  emptied  and  the 
troops  put  in  march.  It  was  12  o'clock  noon,*  our  destina- 
tion was  Chambley.  We  hardly  believed  our  eyes  when 
we  found  the  place  on  the  map. 

The  order  of  march  was  as  follows:  4th  Squadron  of  the 
2d  Guard  Dragoons,!  Fusilier  Battalion  of  the  16th  Regi- 
ment,J  2d  Light  Battery  X.,  I.— 16th,  II.— 16th,  2d  Heavy 
Battery  X.,  F. — 57th,  I. — 57th,  two  pioneer  companies  X. 
The  II. — 57th,  with  some  mounted  orderlies  from  the  4th 
Squadron  of  the  2d  Guard  Dragoons,  was  left  to  the  north- 
west of  St.  Hilaire  for  the  protection  of  the  train. 

At  this  point  we  will  briefly  refer  to  the  opinion  pre- 
vailing at  the  headquarters  of  the  II.  Army  regarding  the 
situation  on  the  evening  of  the  15th.      It  was  believed  that 

*The  Official  Account,  page  603, 1.,  fixes  the  time  of  our  departure 
from  St.  Hilaire  at  12:30;  the  History  of  the  16th  Regiment  (page 
266)  at  "soon  after  12:30  p.  m.";  the  History  of  the  57th  leaves  the 
question  open. 

fOne  squadron  of  the  regiment  had  been  ordered  to  report  to 
the  commander  of  the  X.  Corps,  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz;  another 
had  been  detached  to  the  brigade  division  of  horse  artillery  of  the 
X.  Corps;  the  third  had  gone  with  Count  Brandenburg. 

$At  Suzemont  F. — 16th  turned  off  to  the  south  to  establish  com- 
munication with  the  remaining  portions  of  the  X.  Corps  by  way  of 
Mariaville  Ferme. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  107 

the  hostile  army  would  do  its  best  to  get  unmolested  across 
the  Meuse,  and  the  anticipation  of  the  enemy  at  that  river 
with  the  greater  part  of  the  II.  Army  was  made  the  goal  of 
the  operations.  Orders  to  that  effect  were  issued  from 
army  headquarters  at  7  p.  m.  on  August  15th.  But  the 
same  order  assigned  to  the  smaller  portion  of  the  II.  Army, 
consisting  of  the  III.  and  X.  Corps  and  the  6th  and  5th 
Cavalry  Divisions,  a  different  direction  of  march,  which 
implied  a  certain  tactical  task.  The  parts  of  the  II.  Army 
diverged  in  two  principal  directions  on  the  16th  of  August, 
the  main  part  westward,  the  smaller  part  northward.  The 
object  of  the  latter  was  to  attack  a  strong  hostile  rear 
guard,  which  it  was  thought  might  possibly  be  on  the  Metz 
— Vionville — St.  Hilaire  road.  Subsequently  the  right 
wing  of  the  II.  Army  was  to  follow  the  main  body  westward 
according  to  circumstances.  In  reality,  however,  some- 
thing else  happened;  the  smaller  right  wing  of  the  II.  Army 
encountered  the  entire  hostile  army,  and  the  main  body, 
abandoning  its  original  direction,  had  to  be  brought  up  to 
the  right  wing.  The  interesting  events  connected  there, 
with  and  their  consequences  we  shall  not  discuss  here.  If 
any  one  desires  to  study  them  in  detail,  we  refer  him  to 
the  Militdr  Wochenhlatt,  Nos.  71-78  of  1891;  it  should  be 
stated,  however,  that  the  destination  of  the  III.  Corps  was 
Vionville  (Mars-la-Tour),  and  of  the  X.  Corps,  St.  Hilaire. 
A  more  detailed  examination  of  General  von  Schwarz- 
koppen's  conception  of  the  situation  is  here  necessary. 
General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  knew  that  on  the  15th  the  en- 
emy was  still  west  of  Metz;  it  had  been  reported  among 
others  by  the  9th  Dragoons  from  Nov^ant.  and  was  -the 
cause  of  the  measures  presently  to  be  discussed.  Army 
headquarters,  corps  headquarters,  and  division  headquar- 
ters were  on  the  15th  in  Pont  k  Mousson.       Here  "the  en- 


I  OS  Inquiries  into  thf  l\idics  of  tlit  Fututr. 

oinv's  plans  and  owv  own."  as  tluMi  assuiU(Ml.  wiM't*  disonssod 
l>t>(>vt»tMi  tho  rrim»>  ami  CuMUMal  von  Wnjits  l\h(M;'. ;  >vhcllu>r 
(uMicral  vou  Sil\\vailvi>ppiM»  \vas  piuv^tMil,  1  do  \\o\  Um»w. 
Tht^  (lisoussioii  luul  r«>ft>r«MHt>  onlv  to  what  Iho  Prinro 
loarmnl  or  assununl  o(  tho  »>utMii}  u\>  to  tlio  arrival  of  in- 
struotions  from  (l(MUM-aI  von  Moltk«*  ^ll):.'U)  \^.  \\\.).  That 
was  sutliti«Mit  [o  liiroot  (uMioral  von  N'oi^ts  Khot/'s  attoii- 
tion  nu<n^  to  ilu>  iiort!:  than  to  tho  ir<\<!,  sinco  W  boliov»Hl 
that.owinji'  ti>  tho  rt^pv>rt(Ml  prostMUt*  of  tl\o  FrtMU'h  at  Ko/.oii- 
villo  ami  Mot/,  it  n»ii:l\t  IxH'onn*  noi't^ssarv  to  or»hM-  tho 
X.  (\»rps  to  nun  t>  to  tlu^  lirt^at  road  sonimvhai  farthiM-  to 
{\w  oixsi  o(  St.  Hilairo.  It  is  not  to  bo  snppostMl  that  (umi- 
oral  von  NtMjits  Khot/.  withhold  fri>ni  (uMu^ral  von  Schwarz- 
koi>pon  tho  opiniiH\  ho  ha»l  fiMMno«l.  and  as  tlu»  latttM-  i^iMi- 
oral,  boinii  fartlu^si  to  ilu^  U>ft.  woiild  probaMx  hav«>  tho 
luoivdiftloult  task,  ho  shonld  havo  ondoavorod  from  tho  tlrst 
to  Av»»/>  in  rommunicotion  ^(U^tworti  with  lho,<t'  troofK'i  which  had 
hr'm  iu<itiijnt<d  that  dinvtion  by  l^onoral  von  Voijrts-Khot/.,  «,<? 
Otnfnil  von  Schtcankoppcn  ircU  htftr.  Mntiial  twchan^c  of  m« 
fonuation  is  ono  of  tho  most  in\portant  dntit^s  in  tho  oaso  of 
sovoral  oobnnns.  partii'nlarly  wIumi  thoy  W(M*(^  s«>  far  sopa- 
ratotl  fron\  t>at'h  othor  as  horo  aiid  wIumi  tho  situation  itst^lf 
was  s»>  shrou(h>d  in  donbt.  I'roni  tho  b(\uinninu-  of  tho 
n\arih  (uMUM-al  von  Sohwar/Uopi^tMi  shonld  havo  iMnploytni 
for  that  pnrpost^  part  of  tho  strong-  oavalrv  nndtM-  his  I'om- 
inanii.  and  a  half  sqnadri>n  wouM  havo  sntVu'tHl.  l>nt  that 
renj  <'>\<f'«/»<»/  was  noj^lootod,  witli  tho  rosnlt  that  ono  of  tho 
main  oolninns  was  ignorant  of  tho  dt^injrs  of  tho  othors. 
Ami  loast  of  all  slionld  that  pnvantion  havo  boon  noj;lootod 
aft  or  tlu>  liontM'al  hford  the  fsound  of  ^uns  from  the  fast! 

iuMUM-al  von  Voiiits  Khot/.  had  boon  diroottnl  to  ivaohSt. 
llilairo  Mai/.oray  with  tho  \.  Corps,  "brinsiinjr  np  as  noar 
as  possibh^  tho  portioiis  of  tho  i-orps  still  at  Voui  ^   Mons 


M Hilary- 1 lidorical  Htudien.  109 

HOfi  ;irj<]  in  Ih*-  v;ill<-y  ()f  \\\c  M«h<'II<*."  fri  af^cfjrnpliHhing 
hiH  laHk  ;iri(l  in  vif'vv  of  Ifir-  *\\\Scrcu(('  of  oi>iriion  \n-iwo<tn 
hiinH(;lf  and  (hf  rririf^c,  (iouoral  von  Voij^tH  Ithotz  drow 
very  clevr-rlv  orji  of  I  lie  dil(frnrna.  H**  w;nt  only  the  10th 
Ilalf-DiviHion  ;ind  duiud  l)r;it^'oon  Hri^ude  to  Ht.  Ililaire. 
making,'  ;il  I  Ik*  huuh'  firrif  a  rr-'onnaiHHanf;f  in  force  a(;ainst 
flie  froo|»H  of)H<  rvt'<l  Jif  Itz-zonv  illf  on  the  fvfnin^  of  the 
inth  (I.,  n41,  (>ni<i;il  Arconntj.  Thr-  Hth  r'avalry  DiviHion 
waH  to  make  the  reconnaiHHanee,  Not  eontent  with  that,  he 
diHpatchcd  hiw  chief  of  HlafT,  Lifutcnant  Colonel  von  Cap- 
rivi,  with  2  hoiHe  hattcrieH  and  a  H(iu;idron  of  the  2d  Guard 
Draj^ooriH  fioni  'riiijiiicourt  to  Xonville.  At  Thianeonrt 
waH  the  JMhI  Itc^'irnenf  and  1.— 7Sth,  at  Xovr'-jint  I\.  and 
F.— 7S(li,  iHt  Lit^hl  liattery,  Int  and  '.U]  HrjUfidronH  of  the  9th 
Dra^ooiiH.  I'.ofli  of  theHe  detaohrnentH  were  to  aHHenible 
at  (>harnl)ley  irj  Hijj»|»oif  of  llie  reconnaiHHanee;  the  20th 
I)iviHir)n  wJix  to  follow  to  Tliijiiicourt. 

Xonville  jirid  riiMrnbley  are  HJtuated  5  kilonieterH  to  the 
HouthweHt  ;uid  houIIi  reHpectively  of  MarH-la-Tour,  Thian- 
(;ourt  iH  fiboiit  IS  kilornetepH  from  Marw  la  Tour,  and  Bt. 
Ililaire  iH  15  kilomr-terH  from  Mars  laTonr;  the  T'liambley— 
Xonville — Snzerrifint  road  iH  ajiproximately  parallel  to  the 
St.  I'erioil  S(.  llihiire  roJid,  and  the  dintanee  between 
them  av<'r;ij^r'H  iiboiit  15  kilonieterH.  In  examininj^  the  de«- 
tination  of  the  III.  rorj)H,  a  point  half  way  between  Vion- 
ville  and  MarH-la-Tonr,  the  conception  and  x^lan  of  General 
von  Voi^tH  Khetz  become  (piite  plain  from  hiH  diHpOHitions. 
Tie  meant  to  comply  with  the  T'rince'H  order  and  at  the  HJime 
time  tjik*'  fiH  much  ground  io  the  northwent  ;ih  jiOHnible,  ho 
;iH  to  be  .'ible,  in  ciiw  of  necennity,  to  bring  three-quarters 
of  the  X.  GorpH  to  the  Hupport  of  the  TTI.  OorpH  by  the 
HhortcHt  route.  In  view  of  the  above  diHtanccH,  the  diKymRl- 
tionfi  certainly  permitted  of  thin  for  three-quarterH  of  the 


110  Inqitiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

corps  on  llie  10th,  tliouj-b  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  19tb 
Half-Division,  etc.,  Avonld  have  been  able  to  arrive  in 
time  after  it  once  reached  St.  Hilaire.  Since  General  vou 
Schwarzkoppen  knew  of  these  ai'rangements  before  the 
march  from  Thiaucourt,  it  was  incumbent  upon  him  to 
adhere  to  this  plan.  That  could  be  done  only  by  maintain- 
ing communication  with  the  Chambley — Xonville — Su7,e- 
mont  road  by  cavalry.  It  may  be  a  matter  of  dispiitl^ 
whether  that  was  the  duty  of  General  von  ^\1ili•ts-Ehetz  or 
of  General  von  Schwarzkoppen.  According  to  my  opinion, 
it  was  an  obvious  duty  for  the  latter,  since  he  commanded 
the  column,  while  General  von  Yoigts-Rhetz  merely  ac- 
companied it:  and  the  general  was  very  jealous  of  his 
prerogatives. 

It  having  been  neglected  to  place  cavalry  between  the 
two  roads  on  which  the  X.  Corps  marched,  it  was  the  more 
necessary  to  take  the  proper  steps  at  the  first  sign  of  a  con- 
flict in  the  east,  as  no  enemy  was  in  sight  at  St.  Hilaire  and 
vicinity.  As  many  organs  of  communication  as  possible  should 
have  been  set  in  o})eration  before  10  a.  m.;  first,  toward 
(Chambley:  second,  toward  Xonville;  and  third,  even  toward 
Thiaucourt.  They  would  have  learned  how  things  were 
looked  at  there  and  what  was  being  done,  and  would  have 
informed  General  von  Schwarzkoppen.  The  situation  at 
St.  Hilaire  being  known,  several  orderly  officers,  officers' 
patrols,  should  have  been  dispatched  in  these  directions, 
while  the  general  staff  officer  of  the  lOtli  Division  should 
have  been  sent  in  the  direction  of  Xonville,  where  every 
endeavor  should  have  been  made  to  discover  the  most 
important  spot,  the  trail  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Capri  vi. 

The  soundness  of  my  propositions  is  proven  by  the  Offi- 
cial Account  (I.,  505).  1.  rrompted  by  the  artillery  fire 
resounding  from  the  north.   General   vou   Kraatz,   before 


Military-Historical  Studies.  HI 

reaching  Thiaucourt  with  the  20th  Division  at  11:30  a.  m., 
had   dispatched   officers'    patrols    northward.       The    statement 
points  out  what  General  von  Schwarzkoppen  should  have 
done  in  the  same  direction.       General   von   Kraatz  then 
marched  his  division  toward  the  sound  of  the  guns.       So 
much  as  regards  reconnaissance.      2.  The  detachment  of  the 
Seventy-eighth,  etc., above  referred  to,  had  been  at  Nov<5ant, 
whence  it  was  to  join  the  91st  Regiment  (minus  1st  and  2d 
Companies),  I.— T.^th,  1st  Heavy  Battery  and  2  sciuadrons  of 
the  9th  Dragoons  at  Chambley.      The  leader  of  the  latter 
employed  half  a  squadron  to  establish  communication  with 
the  detachment  at  Novdant;  this  is  an  illustration  of  the 
communication  between  the  marching  columns  (Official  Ae> 
count,  I.,  5G9).      3.  The  20th  Division  was  at  Thiaucourt  at 
11:30  a.  m.  (Official  Account,  I., 595);  Lehmann's  detachment 
(of  the  91st,  etc.)  placed  itself  at  the  disposal  of  the  III. 
Corps  as  early  as  11:45  a.  m.  (Official  Account,  I.,  569),  like 
wise  on  account  of  the  artillery  fire  heard  at  Chambley;  the 
distance  thence  to  Vionville  being  G^  kilometers,  the  rear 
of  Lehmann's  detachment  was  probably  still  at  Chambley 
at  10  a.  m.    Had  patrols,  from  the  first,  been  sent  out  toward 
Chambley    (15    kilometers)    to    maintain    communication, 
they  would  have  learned  that  that  detachment  was  con- 
tinuing   its    march    to    the    northeast,    and    General    von 
Schwarzkoppen  could  have  known  by  10:30  a.  m.,  that  the 
detachment  at  Chambley  was  also  marching  toward  the 
sound  of  the  guns.     Maintenance  of  communication  would 
have  evolved  a  system  of  reports  from  the  decisive  direc- 
tion!    The  order  to  march  to  Chambley  did  not  reach  the 
Nov^ant  detachment  until  it  had  marched  off  to  follow  the 
5th  Division;  when,  at  Gorze,  the  leader  of  the  detachment 
heard  continued  artillery  fire,  he  also  marched  toward  the 
battle-field  (I.,  555).      We  see  thus  the  leaders  along  the 


119  Inqvirifs  into  the  Tadics  of  fhti  Futurt, 

wholo  lino  tioviato  from  (heir  oixiors  for  i\\c  dixy  on  thrir  own 
rfS^HUiaibiliifi  iuui  in  <*«>M>vt/N«'M(Y  of  fh^ir  ;>r(*ri(M<.<  m(>nsurcit, 
spontoneousifi  /dlvH.'  I.  i\MiMt  HrainlonlMirii  m;\r»ht^s  from 
St.  llilnirt^  at  l(^  a.  tu.  on  at  roiu\t  of  \\\o  artilloiv  llrt\  >vhtM\ 
tho  IIM1\  Half  l>ivisii>n  was  snll  a  iriH>d  ho\u's  inartli  in  roar 
(l>orhaps  \o  tho  south  of  WooU:  *J.  t\>U>iu>l  l.t>huiann 
marolu^  about  10  o'olook  from  ("hambU^v  f»>r  tho  samo 
rtnison:  .'^.  ("olont^l  voa  l.vnkor  maroht^s  ovtMi  lu>fon^  that 
hour  fro»»\  Nov»\M\t;  i.  r>onoral  you  Kraatr.  maivluvs  froui 
Thiaut-ourt  at  U  :.'U^  a.  u».:  o.  l.itMitonant  t\>hu»ol  von  i'ap- 
rivi  luaroht^s  from  XinwiUt^  ttoutTal  vi>u  Sohwarr.koppou 
>vas  thooulv  ou»^  whodivl  not  maroh.  althi>ujrh  ho  Utumv  that 
tho  oiitMuv  was  not  at  St.  Uihiirt^  a.uil  as  tho  liMh  llalf- 
Pivisiot»  was  mortH>vor  farthost  otT  tho  main  dirootii>n.  \W 
uooossity  10  bo  "i)  f>ort(^f"  was  tht»  uu>st  prossiuir  it\  tho  oaso 
of  tho  half  division.  It  was  Oonoral  von  Sohwar/.koppou's 
dntv  to  n\ako  tho  utH-ossarv  arrauiromtMUs  whirh  wtM'o  v«»ry 
simpU*  imitHHi.  V'vtMi  hail  somo  of  tho  moasnros  boon  too 
lato  at\d  had  thov  faiUn!  to  produoo  tho  dosirini  otTtvt.  still 
thoy  would  havo  st^t  him  richt  as  a  loailor. 

Tho  distanot^  luMwoon  Mars  la  Tour  and  St.  llilairo  is 
lo  kilomotors;  had  tht^  oth  Oavalry  Pivisiou  aoooniplishod 
its  task,  it  mijiht  havo  iuformtni  litMioral  von  \oii:ti«  Hhotr. 
(and  Sohwarr.koppoiO  on  tho  ri^ail  to  St.  llilairo  not  \-Mov 
than  \0  a.  m.  V\^r  tho  Trinoo  at  Tout  ;^  Moussou  roooivtnl 
tho  tirst  rt^port  from  Niouvillo  from  lltM\tM*al  voii  .Mvous 
lobon  at  10;.*>0  a.  m..  whiv-h  is  alumt  (»  kiUunott^rs  miM'o  than 
tho  distanoo  thonoo  to  tho  Thiauoourt^-8t.  Hilain^  roail. 
Tho  omission  rtMjdortnl  tho  situation  of  tho  l!>th  Half- 
l>ivisioi\  dit^ioult:  it  is  woll  known,  howovor.  how  roadily 
tho  rtMnliM-iuir  of  tln^  most  important  roports  is  fors^iMton 
in  tho  boat  of  battlo.  Front  all  thoso  ivasons  1  boliovo  that 
tho  onlor  to  oook.  oto..  was  injiulioious,  and  lonsidor  niysolf 


Military  II iKtoricM  HluduM.  118 

homr;  out  by  lfi<*  furi  Wr.ii  t\u'  20fli  [>iviHion,  which  wuh  in 
rear  arid  whi'fi  al  Thiaiioourt  wan  farJh«r  from  fJi<r  batJh;- 
i'n-\i\  (li;ifi  l)i<-  IfltJi  waM  at  Hf.  Hilair^',  <Jif)  not  f-ook,  but. 
iri;irrh<-(l  ;i,n«l  H«fil  r<-[)0(lH;  ;iii«J  in  lii'-  hilU-r  vcH\ift\  tii'-  f;ir- 
«(itnHj»cr(ion  of  i(H  i^cix-nil  ;ifnl  iJi*'  coriN-rifH  of  tiiH  vc\><>vtH 
{()  the  army  <:ttuitniu\t\<v  rruiv  Ix-  onHid'-rfrJ  um  <-x«:fu\>\iU'y* 
Th<*  jfffKTal  alMO  inforKicl  Hi<-  lf)ili  hiviMJon  MpontarK-oiiMly 
of  hiH  »fi;uf  fi  (o  Mk-  h;illl«-  fi<hl.  VV'jiH  Ih^rr*  any  rrtoiprocfil 
a<'(ion  on  (h«-  i);ir(  of  i\n'  lOlfi  iJivinion  toward  th*-  20lh? 
And  W5IH  not  tin-  fonuov  witfi  itH  Htronpj  cavalry  in  a  f;<'rtain 
W?nH'-  Um-  ^.'iiid'-  of  Wn-  hitl<-r? 

The  (J<'Hf inalion  of  Hie  FII.  CorpH  waH  MarH  laTonr — 
Vionvilh',  t)ijf  the  FrctK\i  rnij^iit  very  wr-II  hav*-  paHK^-d  bf?- 
yorid  MjjrH  hi  Toi/r  by  (lu*  firrK-  tti*-  III,  Cor[)H  rr-ach'-d  the 
tiijrhro;id.  'I'h'-  ;irlion  rnii.'hl  (liiiH  \niv<-  \)<->-u  f;ikinj.'  ]A',u-m 
•,\.\  ;i  |»oint  l«-HH  ()i;in  15  kilonK-lcrH  Ji  w;iy,  for  if  iH  wr-ll  known 
that  Hoijn(J  may  \}C  vftry  d(*'0[»f  ivr-  jH-r-orrJirif.'  fo  w«;ilh«r  and 
direction  of  wind. 

(h)  Ucjiloymcnt. —  \'u  to  liiH  arrival  !if  Kijzr*niont,  tiie 
diviHionjil  crjrrirriandcr  int<'nd<'d  \<}  takr-  liic  ffK-my  in  fbink 
t»y  w;iy  of  Vilh-  Hur  Vrrjn;  t)iif,  on  Jirrivint^  fhoro,  that  flir<-f- 
tiori  H<''-ni<-d  loo  riM)(y.  I-'roni  our  liorHfH  wr*  could  only  HOff 
lon{<  firing  lincH  Jind  dcuHc  cloudH  of  rJUKi,  but  tho  Hovority  of 
th(;  tiro,  ;i.nd  fli<'  woundr-d  of  \\\<-  III.  CorfiH  corninf^  toward 
the  a[)i»roa(liinj^  luilf  (liviHif>n,  witli  no  ycry  favorablo  re- 
I)or(H  of  I  Ik-  h(;)I<*  of  I  Ik-  h;iltl«',  ni;iy  hfivc  [>roini»l«d  liiiri  to 
Hcok  in  lh<'  firHf  iil;i«-o  to  drsiw  fi<-;ir*'r  \o  t|i<-  r<'ni;iin<l'-f  of  the 
X.  TorjiH,  whi<-h  wjih  r|iii(«'  ri;;lil. 

Arrionf^  the  wounded  I  recot^ni/ed  f jeij(cn;iril  I)reiHinj^, 
adjutant  of  the  n2<j  (?)  Rejiiirir-nl ;  horne  jirid  rider  were  cov- 
ered with  (>erH[)ir-;i  lion  ;i.nd  dnHt  .;in<l  tlx-  rider  H'-<-r(i<-d  loh;ive 

••'Kri';'   ;";;';hlchf,ll(;ho  Klriz«:lw;hrlfU5D,"  No.  1),  pri^':  fi'il. 


I  14  Inquiries  into  the  'l\ic(ics  of  the  Future. 

had  a  fall;  ho  was  also  slu>t  throuuh  tho  h\u;  ami  his  foat- 
uri'swtM'i^  almost  bovontl  fiH'i\iiiution.  As  wo  hadboon  cathMs 
toj;t>thor.  I  rodo  up  to  him  and  shook  hands,  makinjj  a  tow 
romarUs.  hut  ho  lodo  listlossly  on.  Ou  askinj;  his  sorvant 
about  tho  stato  oi  tlu^  battU\  ho  said,  "HadI"  Soon  aftor- 
ward  1  mot  auothor  ofliotM-  of  tho  llOth  ['!)  Hoiiimont.  who 
was  shi>t  tlu'ouiih  tho  ohost.  Hofoiv  I  had  timo  to  spoak,  ho 
said:  "\\\^11.  1  luipo  viui  will  bt^  moi'o  lucky  than  wo  havo 
btHMi.  You  will  bo  suiprisod.  This  is  no  oat-killinji.  as 
iu  '()(»."  That  did  not  sound  voiy  onoourajiinii.  but  thoiv 
was  a  touoh  of  soldiorly  humor  in  his  words.  Thoso  and 
others,  all  had  takoa  tho  road  to  St.  Hilairo.  Uoinji  struck 
by  that  faot.  1  oallod  tho  attoujion  of  my  oon\n\andor  to  it. 
and  was  ordorod  by  him  to  dolloot  tho  stroam,  as  ho  oallod 
it.  of  tho  woundod  ti>ward  tho  south.  Most  of  tho  lattor  did 
not  ijuito  undoistaml  my  loason.  but  tho  sorvaait  of  Liou- 
tonant  Oroisiui::.  a  ouuuinu:  liraudonbnrgor,  at  oneo  turnod 
his  mastor's  horso  iu  that  dirootion  and  tho  othors  foUowod. 
so  that  1  was  ablo  to  rosumo  my  ]^laoo  in  a  fow  miuutos. 
Fato  willod  it  that  l.ioutonant  Oroisinu;  should  bo  my  noigh- 
bor  that  nijxht.  In  tho  tomporary  hospital  our  trousors 
woto  probably  oxohaiiijtxl  by  mistako:  at  any  rato.  on  tho 
noxt  day  I  had  ridinir  trousors  with  a  shot-holo  through 
tho  oalf.  whilo  my  own  woro  missinj::.  and  1  was  trans- 
]>ortod  to  tho  roar  in  Droisinii's  trousors. 

Tln^  Othoial  Aooount  statics,  on  pajro  t>04,  that,  aftor  dt^ 
ployiuj;  for  battlo  at  Sii/.omont.  tho  4  battalions  had  ro- 
sumod  thoir  advamo  ou  Tronvillo.  aiul  tixos  tho  hour  of 
doploynumt  at  4  p.  m.;  both  statements  are  in  error. 

The  brijrade  deploytni  but  onoe  for  battle,  and  that  was 
not  at  Suzomont.  but  about  1000  meters  southwest  of  Mars- 
la-Tour  on  tho  U^ft  batik  of  tho  doopout  branoh  of  tho  Yron. 
on  whose  stooy>  slope  a  surgeon  of  I. — 57th,  Pr.  .loston,  fell 


Military- J  J  islorical  Studies. 


115 


Willi  liiH  lioi'Hc.*  As  fiirdici-  Hiipport,  for  my  Hlatement  1 
liuve  a  iiM'dicinc  cjirl,  u  siirj^coii,  and  homk*  hoHjiital  aHHiHt- 
antw;  tlio  cart  had  lont  a  vvliccl;  the  Hurgcoii  told  iiic  in  an- 
Hwor  to  my  iiKjuiry  how  h(!  Imd  come  there,  that  he  had  bare- 
ly escaped  «ome  chanseurH,  who  had  attacked  hiH  drcHsing- 
HtJifion.  Sii(;li  iiKiidoiilH  fiirninh  good  markw  for  the 
iiiciiiory. 

The  brigade  was  drawn  up  facing  Tronville,t  and,  more- 
over, it  waH  not  at  Suzemont  at  4  p.  rn.  The  dintance  from 
St.  Hilaire  to  Marn-ia-Tonr  in  15  kilometerH;  we  marched 

♦During  the  fall  the  horse  slipped  off  the  bridle,  the  reins  being 
torn.  In  his  embarrassment,  the  doctor  asked  me  what  to  do.  I  told 
him  to  let  his  horse  stay  with  the  broken-down  medicine  cart  men- 
tioned below,  which  he  did. 

fSketch  of  the  deployment  of  the  19th  Half-Division,  1000  meters 
southwest  of  Mars-la-Tour. 


RoKimont  No.  Ti?. 
I.  Hnttiilion.  Fn-i.  Hatt/dion. 


Piori.  X. 


2d  Hoavy  Unttory.  2<1  Li«ht  Battery. 


Rffffiinoiit  No.  10. 
II.  ISiittalion.  I.  Hattalioti. 


^V 


To  Maiiaville  Fermo,  where 
F.  —Kith  was  posted 


(Compare  Hketcli  pa^e  604,  Vol.  I., 
of  tiio  Official  Account.) 


116  Tnq^uirics  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

without  n  n///,//c   |>;his«\  aiul  must  liave  ilrawu  up  southwost 
of  Mars  la  Tour  not  lator  than  o :.'>()  p.  ni.* 

From  Su/.omont,  (uMiorals  von  St'hwar/.kopptMi  ami  von 
^Vt^loll  had  riddon  forward  to  inform  thiMustMvos  of  tho 
situation  anti  o\'  tho  terrain.  Dotinito  information  of  tho 
lattor  could  havo  btHMi  obtaimnl.  as  (uMUM-al  (\>unt  HrandtMi- 
burji"  11.  had  Ihhmi  on  tho  litliio  from  Hrnvillo  to  Villo  sur 
Yron  and  i'h^s(>  to  tlu>  onomv  siui't^  noon  with  1.  an*l  lator. 
with  5  squadrons  and  a  hattorv.  Whon  tho  onemy's  IV. 
Corps  bojian  to  doploy  on  tho  loft  of  our  111.  Corps  (from 
St.  Marool  to  (^royt^ro  FtM'mo).  (^ount  l>i-andonburjr  was 
obliiit'd  to  withdraw  \o  Mars  la-Tour,  whoro  ho  arrivod  at 
."i  p.  m.     It  is  thus  I'ortain  that  tho  H'.  C\>rps  arrired  on  the 

*Tho  Rosimental  History  of  tho  KUh  Rofrimont  states,  on  page 
2lU\  as  follows:  ".\t  o:;>0  tlio  brigado  drew  up  iitwr  Snzomont  on  a 
meadow  soutli  of  the  villaso.  and  traversed  hy  a  bra-ueh  of  the  Yixin 
brook."  That  a^rret^  with  my  nott^.  only  Mars-la-Tonr  should  be 
substituted  for  Suzemout.  as  we  formed  nearer  to  the  former  than  to 
the  latter. 

The  Regimental  Hist.or>-  of  the  57th.  page  75.  approximatt^  my 
statements  more  closely,  in  that  it  tlxes  the  hour  of  our  formatiou  at 
3:45  aud  locates  the  place  betwivn  Maa-s-la-Tour  and  Suzemont, 
south  of  the  sivat  road;  on  the  other  hand,  ita  statement  that  the 
liUh  Regiment  was  in  first  line  is  incorrtvt,  as  the  57th  Regiment, 
which  had  been  marching  in  ivar  of  the  UUh,  was.  much  to  our  sur- 
prise, moved  to  the  front  through  the  ranks  of  the  KUh.  probably 
bet^-ause  it  was  the  junior  regiment,  which  the  tlieu  custom  assigned 
to  the  first  line. 

The  ernM-  of  tJie  OfhciaJ  Account  at  this  point  is  thus  explaine<l 
on  page  70  of  the  History  of  the  57th  Regiment,  -'thaf  in  the  piriutni- 
tion  of  the  Offirial  Arcointt  onli/  those  offirial  tr[H)rts  were  araihihlc  which 
tear  irrittcn  imniatinttl!/  after  the  btittle,  aimm<)  whirh  that  of  the  .uth 
RetjinieiU  inis  not  sii/tieientlii  e.rha  list  ire."  I  want  to  state  in  this  con- 
ntvtion  that  the  report  written  immediately  after  the  battle  com- 
prist\>  but  about  10  lines,  and  contains  next  to  nothing;  that  the 
"researches  of  the  author"  of  that  regimental  history  were  probablv 
limited  to  the  "Two  Brig-adt^s, "  the  only  available  source  at  the  time; 
aaul  that  the  description  of  the  Othcial  .\ccouut  was  prepared  bv  the 
historical  section  of  the  general  staff,  based  on  the  preliminarv 
study  of  an  othcer,  then  a  major  of  the  general  staff.  To  be  sure, 
the  report  of  the  57th  Regiment  was  very  incomplete,  but  instead 
of  simply  stating  these  facts,  which  were  probably  known  not  to  me 
alone,  ajid  which  exonerate  the  description  in  the  Official  .\ccount. 
the  author  attempts  to  whitewash  the  general  staff— at  the  expense 
of  the  innocent  regiment,  without  accomplishing  his  other  object' 


Military-Historical  Studies.  ]  ]  7 

line  of  battle  at  and  after  2  p.  m.  Tlu*  j^oneral,  therefore,  was 
the  best  autliority  on  the  terrain  and  on  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  innst  have  made  reports  about  them.  The  l.'Uh  Dra- 
goons must  likewise  liave  made  reports.  Whetiicr  they 
were  sufTieient  is  an  o[)en  (jueslion,  but  no  reports  of  that 
kind  reached  Oencral  von  Sfliwar/koi)j)fn. 

After  2  p.  m.  the  (ierman  line  of  battle,  which  uf)  to 
that  time  had  extended  to  the  northern  edge  of  the  Tron- 
ville  copse,  oblicjuely  across  the  (Iravelottfi — Mars-la-Tour 
— Verdun  rr)ad,  luid  been  pushed  back  to  tliat  road.  IJy 
2  p.  m.  (irenier's  division  liad  already  occupied  Height  840,* 
and  ]>y  2MU  p.  m.  the  northern  edge  of  the  Tronville  copse ;t 
at  4  o'clock  j)ortions  of  Cissey's  division  j)rolonged  the  line 
in  the  direction  of  (trcyf'rc  Ferme.  Hastening  to  the  front, 
the  ntli  Chasseur  t)attalion  of  (Jrenier's  division  o(;cupied 
the  wood  lo  the  norlh  of  .Mars  la-Tour  on  Ihe  angle  between 
the  two  creeks  atiout  2:.'»0  p.  m.,  and  was  subserjuently 
join(;d  by  the  !J8th  Regiment.  Altliough  the  French  cav- 
alry ymsted  at  Ville  sur  Yron  was  not  very  active,  it  had 
n<'vertheless  noted  the  approach  of  hostile  forces  in  rear  of 
its  position  f'>S(h  ]'>r'iga(h'),  and  iiad  informed  (leneral 
i^admirault,  who  tiien  oidered  the  at>ove  movement  and 
hastened  to  occupy  the  strong  natural  7>o8ition  north  of 
Mars-la-Tour.J 

♦All  references  to  the  terrain  are  based  on  the  maps  of  the 
Official  Account. 

tThe  French  never  had  poKsession  of  the  entire  copse  of  Tron- 
ville, but.  only  of  its  northern  portion,  and  the  danger  of  our  being 
assailed  from  there  was  small,  as  the  copse  was  impassable,  or,  at 
any  rate,  difficult  to  cross,  on  af;fxjunt  of  the  dense  underbrush. 
It  seems  that  (leneral  Crenier  purposely  avoided  the  copse  on  that 
account.  This  will  alH<f>  appear  from  the  subsfKjuent  description, 
inasmuch  as  one  of  his  brigades  tcyok  the  diref;tion  of  Mars-la-Tour 
from  the  northern  edge  of  the  copse,  while  the  20th  Divifiion  only 
encountered   small   detachments   and    dispersed   men   in   the   brush. 

JMarshal  MacMahon  had  also  urged  the  acceleration  of  the 
march. 


118  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

lleiiiht  S4(>  -was  the  si  ratejric  jitunt  of  tlio  battle-field  on 
the  left,  north  of  the  VionvilU> — Mars-la  Torn*  road.  It 
toninianded  the  eonntrv  in  all  directions  (1  have  oonvineed 
myself  of  this  subset|uently).  and  it  lies  exactly  on 
the  line  Flavijjny — \'ionvilK^ — l>ois  de  Ti-onvilU^ — Uruville. 
Thence  the  French  tired  on  Mars-la-Tcur  and  had  the  en- 
tire battle-field  of  the  :v^th  l^riijade  nnder  fire.  Flaviug 
failed  to  anticipate  the  enemy  on  lleiuht  S4(>.  \ve  shonld 
never  have  thonjrht  of  assaultinjj  it.  as  failure  was  certain. 

The  case  of  an  isolated  weak  brigade,  far  out  on  tTie 
enemy's  fiank.  approachinir  the  battlefield  on  his  line  of 
retreat,  is  so  strange  that  it  could  not  but  fill  the  enemy 
with  api>rehension.  For  the  latter,  noting  the  movement 
from  lleiiiht  84(5,  had  naturally  to  assume  that  further 
forces  would  come  from  the  same  direction  and  that  so 
far  the  advanced  troops  alone  were  in  sight.  Placing  our- 
selves in  the  enemy's  situation,  we  would  ivach  that  con- 
clusion solely  because  any  other  action  on  our  part  would 
have  seemed  unintelligibU'.  Without  further  infornunion, 
the  enemy  was  not  at  liberty  to  assume  that  a  single  bri- 
gade alone  was  advancing  from  that  direction.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  point  this  out:  otherwise  the  suitden  {-heeJc  of  Lad- 
mirouWs  counter-uttncl-  in  the  battle  at  the  moment  when  he 
was  victorious  and  when  he  held  the  fate  of  the  French 
army  in  his  hands  is  unintelligible.  In  addition,  the  cap- 
ture of  Prussian  Guard  Dragoons  tended  to  strengthen  his 
belief  that  the  Prussian  (luard  had  arrived.  (Compare  the 
statements  of  Ba/.aine  and  vt>n  Kohr.^ 

We  cannot  close  with  these  remarks.  The  interesting 
situation  calls  for  an  investigation  as  to  what  might  have 
been  if  General  von  Sclnvar/.koppen  had  more  seriously  con- 
sidered the  circumstances.     Shortly  after  11  a.  m.*  his  de- 

*A11  data  as  to  time  are  based  on  notes  made  by  himself  on 
that  day  by  order  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll.      When   I  wi\s 


Military-Historical  Studies.  119 

tachment  Btood  at  Kt.  Ililairo  roady  to  march;  he  could  have 
marched.  Was  it  permissible  to  march?  Y(tn,  without  a 
doiibl,  j)r'r)vid('d  he  n'poitcd  his  a<;tioii  at  once!  (leneral  von 
Schwarzkoi)j>eii  had  orders  to  reach  St.  Hilaire;  he  ap- 
proved of  the  departure  of  General  Count  Brandenburg  and 
remained  in  rear  himHcIf  at  a  moment  when  the  general 
K(rat('gic  KJl nation  had  Ivoi  KlripjM'd  by  the  kindling,  battle 
of  the  obHcurity  heretofore  euBhrouding  it.  If  he  merely 
decided  to  divide  IiIk  forcew,  Hhould  he  not  have  ordered: 
"I'jirt  of  the  cavalry  remains  here,"  and  should  he  not  have 
led  the  infantry  and  artilh-ry  without  delay  toward  the 
sound  of  the  guns?  Had  there  been  any  demand  for  the 
cavaby  hiter,  it  could  have  reached  Mars-la-Tour  by 
2  p.  m.  We  are  therefore  justified  in  saying  that  not  only 
the  situation,  but  also  the  characteristics  of  the  arms  were 
misunderstood,  inasmuch  as  the  cavalry  was  given  an  in- 
fantry task  and  vice  versa. 

Had  (Jieneral  von  Kchwarzkoppen  started  at  10  a.  m.  to 
march  from  Woel  to  Mars-laTour  on  learning  that  the 
vicinity  of  St.  Hilaire  was  free  of  the  enemy,  the  half- 
division  would  assuredly  have  been  able  to  reach  the  battle- 
fiehl  by  1  p.  m,,  and  in  that  case  the  seizure  of  Height  840 
would  probably  have  been  considered. 

(c)  The  Ballle-Field.— At  :\:P>0  p.  m.  the  half-division 
had  reached  the  previously  stated  point  to  the  southwest  of 
Mars-la-Tour.  Our  previous  description  has  already  given 
some  data  on  the  conformation  of  the  battle-field.  In  refer- 
ring tlu*  reader  to  <lie  maps  of  the  Official  Account  I  wish  to 
state  that  Mars-la-Tour  is  commanded  from  the  north  and 

wounded,  I  dropped  the  note-book.  It  bore  my  name,  contained  a 
change  of  ribbon  for  my  decorations  and  other  marks  serving  to 
Identify  the  owner.  On  policing  the  battle-field  the  note-book  was 
found  near  the  body  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll  and  sent  to 
me  at  the  hospital. 


120  Inquinea  into  //(c  Tnclics  of  (he  Ftihnr. 

wcM.  It  w:is  (litMi  !i  inisiMiibh'  villap;(>  and  ocrupic*!  h\  :\  few 
rlu»ss(Mirs  A  »lit>v!il,  who  wit  lulirw  ou  our  aitproach.  Tin*  (lis 
taiu'o  from  [\\c  'Vvou\'\\\v  copsi*  to  tlio  Mais  la  Tour  ,laniy 
voixd  is  L'oDt)  uu'liMs;  t l\(Mlislauc(>  fi'iMu  ll«M,ulit  SU»  («n\vt'^ro 
1'\muu>  I»>  tho  Mars  la  Tour  N'ionvillo  road  is  tho  sanu\ 
A  ravine  start ini:  on  tlu>  oast  of  Mars-la 'l\)ur  oncirt-U^s 
tho  villa^o  on  tlio  oast  and  north;  opposili*  tho  >vost- 
orn  oxtrtMuit.v  of  llu^  villair*"  it  turns  sharpl.v  to  i\\o  tiorth, 
an»l  hiloi-  on  boais  (lu>  nan\t>  of  Vr(»n.  About  ('>()(•  nuMors 
si>nth  *)f  (irt\v^ro  I'Nmmuo  it  is  jointMl  bv  anolhor  ravino  com- 
iu};  from  (ho  oast  from  th«>  Uois  {\o  Triuivillo.  which  oncir- 
clos  that  oo|>S(M>n  tho  (>ast  and  tho  north  and  on  roachiuii"  tho 
nortluM'n  point  of  tlu>  copst^  takos  a  wostoi-lv  oourso.  Its 
iivtM-aj;o  tlistam-o  from  tho  b'rtMuh  position  (lloiuht  v'^U* — 
(<ro,V('^r(»  l"\'rn\(>1  is  ab(>ut  (lot)  !iu>t(Ms.  At  tlu»  Uois  do 
Tr«>nvill(>  llu^  sidos,  i\oi  sto(>p  at  first,  boconu'  prot-ipitons, 
and  n\idwav  b(>two<Mi  thtM'opso  and  (iroN^ro  l'\Mnn>  thov  aro 
abt>nt  \'2  motiMs  in  luM^lit.  tho  bottom  itsolf  btMuj;  about 
('»()  mot(M-s  witl<\  Tho  oonlli;uration  of  tho  tlrst  of  thoso 
ravin(>s.  tho  owe  rnnniuix  to  tht>  north,  was  similar;  both 
woro  iUy  and  liard  on  \\\c  da.v  of  tlu>  batth\  thi»  bottt>m  of 
tho  formor  sonu^what  w  idtM*.  howi^vor.  Tln>  hii;host  pi»iut  of 
Uw  l'""romh  position  was  lloiiiht  SUJ,  which  falls  awav  io  tho 
w»>st  to  Contour  T'Jt).  About  half  wa.v  b(>tw(>on  thoso  points, 
and  oblitpiolv  to  tluMr  (•onnoctinj',  lint\  a  r«>ad  ran  fr(>m  l>rn 
villo  to  Mars  la  Tour,  which  was  jointMl  farther  oast  b_v  a 
sot'ond  also  oblitiui*  n>ad  from  ih(>  same  villa_m\  Holh  l(>d 
obliquolv  across  iho  ravint^  in  front  of  tho  FrtMich  position. 
Tlio  lattor  >u>t  onlv  I'ommandtHl  tin*  battlotU>ld  in  this  wlnjx. 
but  had  in  its  front  a  considorablo  obstach\whicli  t'onld  not 
bo  approailuHl  ntith'v  conr  oxct^pt  from  tho  Tronvilh*  t'opso 
and  from  tln^  ravim*  which  runs  from  st>uth  to  nortli. 
Othorwiso  tho  quadranjjlo.  w  hoso  sid(>  had  a  lonjith  of  L'otH) 


MiUlary-f/iHlorical  HlwUm.  121 

rn<'l<T'H,  ofr<T<<J  litll'-  <ov<f.     'V\\i-  Hrjrfjior;  liaH  5i  j;<'fi<Tul  in- 

rliiiJilion    lo    (fi<-    Hoiilh    ;ih    f;ir    .'ih    \\\c    Vionvilh; — MufM-la- 

Toiir  ro;j<l,  jjjkI   IIk-ii   il    f^^j^ijjH  <o  rJHr*  nlif^hfly   towjird  Ihf; 

Moulli,     Our  hf-Hl.  )i;if  rjf  i\]i]innu\\  wuh  llif;  ruvjru;  vvhif;fi  ex- 

ffn(I<-<I  norHivvMrd,  buf  ru'coifti'i'/.tu^  i(H  irni>orf;inr;r;,  <^Jf?noral 

I,;i<lmir;ii)ll  Ii;mI  <  Ioh«'<I  i(  hy  fho  5fli  ChaMHfMjr  iiattalion  h(;- 

forc  (lio  ;j.rriv;il  of  flic  .",><( Ii  Uri^jidf.       In  flir?  aiiiiU'  vvIkto 

Ihc  I  wo  r;i  viticH  join  vvjik  ;i  Hiruill  <-<)\ih<',  vvliifh  w:iH  hf-lf)   by 

tlijil    rlijjHH'-iir    b;il  t;ilioJi ;    li<'fi<<'   ;i,    (urnin;^    '>f    lb«-    l-'p'-noh 

pOMJIir)ri  fforn  IhiH  ot li<'r'wiH<M'X<;<'ll<*nt  Win-  of  iii»]n<ni(;]i  waH 

irni>njr(i';ibl<'  ufifil   i\\<-  (■<t]>H<-  Hhoiild  ]><■  fjikcn.     ]''rofri   tho 

(wcHlfffij   roii<J   from    I'mvillo   lo   Mnrn  Iji  Tour,   Jif    ;i    f>oifit 

;iboiil  HO      M)()  rrH'IciH  Houlh  (»!'  Iho  rjiviti'-  runiiifi}.'  <-uhI  ;iru] 

wohI,   au    <-iti\)UtiUitict\i    and    fir-dj^f   cxb-ndf-d    r-aHtward    for 

ahoul   ino  ifirflcfH;  IhiH  bnrik  of  r;ar(,h  waH  of  threat  irrifiort- 

aiMc  in  (lir*  HubHcqufTit  (^votiIh.       I  rnenliori  il  on  that  ac- 

rounl ;  i(,  ftior<-ovcr,  foriti<(l  lli<-  only  cov(;r  avail.'iblf  in  lliat 

wliol*'  H<*flion  nordi   of  T'onlour  780.     Not  only  of)ulrl   jhiH 

bsiHIr- j^round  jiol  bo  lurnod  ;jnrJ   wjih  dovoid  of  covi-v,  but 

olli*'f  obHtncb'H  vv<T*'  jiIho  HubH^fjU'-nl  ly  cnrounffffd,  which 

tli(?  OfTi^ijil  A<<oiinl   fjiiJH  fo  rnonlion.*     Thr-  ravino  oncir- 

c.Wuif  Mar-H  la  Tour  cotiHiHlod  of  Hulxlividod  rnoadowH,  which 

woro  fi-nrtod  in  wifh  wiro  and  (-xb'ndr'd  lo  <''onfr)ur  780 — i.  e., 

from  III*'  MarH-Ia-ToiJi' — Vionvilh-  ro;id  (o  fli<-  «orilour;  fhoy 

<ov<rod  a  Hi);i.fo  of  oOO  rno(<iH.        I'orlioriH  of  thiH  ground 

could  not  ]><'  fovf-rod  by  Iho  onorny'H  infantry  lirff,  Htill  tho 

cullin}^  of  IIk-  i'i-tii-('H  cauH<'d  a  Iohh  of  time  and  chocked  the 

moviricnl  jiiid  brf)ii^li(  on  (li<-  571  h  K<-f^imont  HoriouH  \ohwh 

from  arlill"ry,  milrnilhuHf,  ;ind  infantry  i\v(t. 

ThoHo  (h-hiilH  of  I  ho  ;^round  were  nof  Hhown  on  fho  ^cn- 

enil  Hhifl  ni;i|i  and  wore  unknown  (o  fho  troopH;  moroover, 

•M<!rit.)ori  of  f.h<;m  Ih  only  marlo  In  f/>nnf;r;t.lon  with  thr;  charge;  of 
the  Int  fliianl  lJraKf>onH;  y«jt.  It  woh  chlofly  tho  Infantry  that  had 
been  delayed  by  theae  obHtaclea. 

9 


fl\o  substHiuont  «lopU\\ u\»MU  of  iho  T^  l>;U(aHo\>s  was  n\i>ilo 
so  rniMi^lv  that  thort^  was  uo  thwo  for  oxatnlnittji  tho  ground. 

All  thtv^o  things  mi:hi  havt^  l>oou  VnorM  to  tho  hijihor 
Uwiiors.  as  that  onthv  sootiotj  had  b<sM\  \\\  our  um!isp\»t<Hl 
jHvsst^sion  up  to  «  p.  in.:  atui  wo  »^m\m-  )\ot  mon^lv  (»>  tho  ttM" 
rain,  but  also  tt>  tho  strtM\jith  of  tho  onotwv,  r»ut  tho\j>ih 
thot>^  was  laok  of  infonuatiou  ott  tho  lattor  poittt  hofort^ 
wo  wvi>*  or\iortHl  to  attaoU.  wo  oouhi  n»ako  out  tho  j^Mf^mw'.* 
w»K<.vyv<  alonjj  tho  wholo  lit\o  faJrlv  woll  with  tho  In^iv  oyo 
just  hofotv  tho  attaok. 

Ot\  our  sidt^  o  hattaUons  wo»^^  a\ailahh\  siiviuu  t\ot 
Quito  2  tuou  por  tuotor.  Tho  hattlo  jHH>uutl  of  tht\so  hat- 
taUous  waii,  luortnnor,  dovoid  of  oovor  fr\uu  i^otttour  'J^O  to 
Uoijjht  S4t> — Ort\\^rt*  bVnuo.  1\>  vat»qnish  tho  ouotu^y-  thoy 
had  to  trjworso  from  Toutowr  7S(>  to  tho  ouotuv.  V.U>0  u\ottM*s 
of  j^Mitlv  slopii\ii  jrr\Miud  with  a  ooi\sidt^rablo  and  \inkui>wn 
obstaoh^  ah>t>j»  tht^  ot\tir^^  fnMtt  atid  with  auotluM-  iU»staolo 
rtlouj;  i^irt  of  tho  jir\>uud.  Pisiistor  was  oortaiu  ovou  if  wo 
had  to  travorso.  ftvtu  Contour  TSO  to  tho  onouiv,  11H>0  t»»otori4 
Althvnigh  tho  oxivtitiou  of  tho  attaok  is  o^hmj  io  oritioism 
fn>m  tho  thiH^rtMioal  |H>iut  of  viow\  vot  its  taotioak  at\d  |»j\r- 
tiouk'jrlv  it^  morak  otTtvt  on  tho  onoinv  was  vorv  jjrtwt.  bt^ 
oaust^  it  was  oartitnl  t>ut  with  an  onorijv  vorv  ratvlv  tn^ualod 
sinoo.  Tho  visjx^r  of  tho  attack  oont\nutHl  t^onoral  \A\i\' 
mirj^ult's  apprt^housiou  th^it  fuH^tr  Otrman  fi^fr^  «yr*  jijik 
/»r\S),-%««.;  '♦\>»jj  v^K  //»7,)»»Y.*  His  anxioty  for  his  rij^rht  riv^ 
otxHl  i^onoral  U'\dmirault*s  attontioti  ii\  that  dir»vtion.  and 
his  ftwr  v>f  boinjj  assiviUnl  thort^  with  superior  foroos  kopt 
him  friMU  rx\'tpititf  tho  full  bonotlt  of  his  taotioal  suo- 
vH>ss,    \MuH\  iitu^tio»uHi»howovor,  bofon^  tho  court  of  iu» 

♦Th?  OfRctal  Act>owt\t.  T..  iv  W>1,  statps  thts  tn  ttaJIcs. 


MilUo/ry-niHt/trical  HludU^.  1^'' 

qrjjry,  why  he.  ha/1  not   ]ir<ft\U'<\  from  hb  mioxtftm,  be  an- 

WhiUf  \\\tt  '.'M\\\  Hr'ni.hi^t'  h\(><n\  timwn  up  »^>ijthwf^.t  of 
Man*  )a-Toiir,  Ihrj  oh;iplainH  «yJrJrr-«>^-d  fhf;  rrK^n.  The  Prot- 
imijiut  chaplain,  A(t\t*trt,  who  «fK>ke  fimt,  naU'McA  Him  wordu 
>w>  injridi'riouMly,  wai«  k^>  dr-^fply  rnov^d  hhnw^f,  an^l  n\n»\n'  in 
Much  a  whiijjnfr  way,  fhal  no  one  corjjrj  h^^  much  edified  by 
that  Horf.  of  "spiritual  comfort,"  and  the  incident  hau  rjon- 
vinced  me  that,  uuUmn  he  alK^>  nmrtlff'ntM  wAHUtU  feelingn, 
a  chaplain  may  do  more  harm  than  jto^kI  in  nuch  momentu, 
and  that  in  moMt  can^^H  it.  will  he  h^-*«t  to  k^f^'p  the  chapJain« 
away  from  the  troof»«  alt/>gether.  While  Chaplain  Aebert 
waM  H])('',ik\fiii,  we  Haw  a  Hinj.'le  rider  cominj^  from  Tronville 
at  full  Kpeed,  hiK  ¥>\ir\)\\cM  tiuW-nnij^  in  the  air,  and  an  he 
approached,  f  recoj^niz^d  him  a«  the  Catholic  chaplain, 
Ktuckmann,  a  d*^r  friend  of  mine  since  l>40ft.  In  front  of 
<^'oIofiel  von  <^.'ranach  Hxt  line;  he  reifrned  up  like  a  f>^-rfe«'rt 
horxeman,  the  nij^ht  of  which  in  itnelf  had  a  revivinj^  effect, 
and,  after  exchan^in^  a  few  word«  with  the  colonel,  he  rr>«f; 
in  bin  Mtirnifm  and  Hpoke  in  hiw  wharp  VVVf«tphalian  diale^rt: 
"Comr-jjuJ^fH,  the  [II.  (l<n'\t¥>  \h  enj^aged  in  a  K^rvere  Htruj(f^Ie, 
To  you  han  fallen  the  duty  to  nave  it.  Attiick  therefore  the 
enemy  with  intrepidity  and  <^)od  will  bf^  with  you.  A  men  I" 
That  Hounded  more  like  it,  and  acted  lik^'  a  charm.  Imme- 
diately afterward  the  rejrimentn  unfurled  their  colorn.  the 
]nn(:<in  were  loa/Jed,  and  Colonel  von  Cranach  n(h\r(^nft<\  hin 
men  about  an  followH:  "You  have  nhown  yourwelve**  jjal- 
larit  fcIlowH  on  the  march;  Khow  yourm-lvftn  now  the  name 
in  halt  le,  and,  whatever  may  happen  to  you,  keep  your  colors 
hij^h,  HO  that  no  Prenchraan'n  hand  may  touch  them.  Xow 
with  Cod!" 

'^ofy  Jjc/}inninfi  of  fM  Attack. — Upon  the  arrival  of  the 
10th  and  20th  DivinionH  and  of  their  hfoAcin  on  the  battle- 


194  Inquiries  into  ihe  Tactics  of  the  Future, 

tieUl.  r«oiunal  von  Noiiits-Khetz  luul  at  his  disposal  S 
frt'>sl\  biigados,  and,  in  view  ot"  the  state  of  tho  bat- 
tle, ho  thoujiht  it  iuomuboiu  upon  him  to  omv^lov  thorn 
ottonsivolv  for  tho  roHof  of  tho  111.  Corps.  Tho  arraujio- 
iiiouts  iiuulo  for  tho  purposo  t>v  tho  X.  (\nps  vvoro  as 
follows:  1.  Conoral  von  Kraatx  with  10  frosh  battal 
ions  was  to  advanco  through  tlio  oo\>so  of  'rroiivillo  against 
tho  hoight  of  Kruvillo,  so  that,  as  tho  battlo  stood, 
tho  fnnUal  attaok  propor  foil  to  hiui.  2.  Ooueral  von 
Sohwarzkoppon  was  to  support  this  frontal  attaok  by  an 
attaok  in  a  uorthoastorly  dirootion  ^northwost  auglo  of  tho 
Tronvillo  oopsel.  It  was  boliovod  at  tho  hoadquartors  of 
the  X.  Oori>s  that  this  latter  attaok  would  take  tho  enemy 
in  flank,  t^.  Both  attaoks  were  to  be  made  in  oombiuation. 
Assuminti  that  an  otTensive  of  that  kind  under  existinj;  oir- 
cumstauot^  was  oonsideivitnl  proper,  the  same  was  wt^ll 
planutHl  by  the  oomniauder  of  the  X.  Corps;  for.  assuming 
oorroot  oonooption  and  judgment  on  tho  part  of  the  loaders 
of  tho  two  moYomeuts.  the  Hois  do  'rronvillo  otTorod  tho 
safest  approaoh.  and  had  the  ll>  fresh  battalions  soon  after- 
wanl  appeaitnl  on  the  northern  edge  of  the  oopse.  Grenier's 
division  would  not  have  btvn  able  to  take  the  otTensive  in 
the  dirtH'tion  of  Mai*s-la-Tour.  and  would  have  at  least  been 
oontaintHi.  Within  oortain  limits  the  10th  TTalf-Division 
also  had  some  oover  in  the  Yron  ravine.  l*ut  the  suoooss 
of  the  two  movements  depended  on  tho  loaders  of  tln^  two 
attaoking  groups;  and  they  should  have  oonsulted  together. 
But  between  the  issue  of  the  order  on  the  part  of  the  oorps 
commander  and  the  attaok  of  the  ;^Sth  Brigade,  the  situ- 
ation on  tho  enemy's  side  ohangtxl,  inasmuch  as  the  latter 
considerably  extondtHl  his  line  toward  the  west,  so  that  by 
continuing  to  make  tho  northwest  angle  of  tho  Bois  de 
Tronville  its  point  of  attaok.  the  :>Sth  Brigade  would  be 


Mxl.xUj,rijli%>M/ruM  HtwluH,  \2i/ 

tisiiiktitl  Uni'M,  iunUmA  of  flanking  Uu;  Hm^my.  Thtirh  wnumn 
Ut  tinvi'.  ft4'Mn  wtutt'  \tiiviU'M\ii.r  tllttit-jilty  on  that  day  in  rhf^n 
latJng  a  coniiAin^d  uttjutk  of  larg<;  tt^nlUm  fontn-A  udur  tintth 
other,  UtHMUiHi'.U  hm  thtt  [tlau  whm  not  only  not  cjarrSttA  out, 
////./  ihf.  10  h(dUdv/Ti.H  of  Ifi/i  20ik  hxxiai/m  vAlMr^M  aX  lliA  rAry 
ifi//f(iMd  VjivfM  t'm  W^/klCx  Wujo.rk  oMo/MfA.  The  e/fUUimplaUid 
frontal  attiwM  faiUitl  Ut  UiSLUfr\A\\7j(t  aXUp^etUer,  nad  the 
\m\HU'A  'AitmU  of  iUe  UnU  Ifalf  lHvinion  r*^nUM.  It  in 
not  ihe  luieuiloit  to  examine  why  th'?  eonthlneA  atta/;k  an 
plann<^j  emmhleA  fiont  ihe  U-j(inninjf.  hut  yhe  commanding 
t^enei'iil  of  tbft  X.  <Utr\m  an  well  a«  the  ^^^mroander  of  the 
IfMfi  htv'mion  were  \Aiu:tH\  in  the  fn<r/«t  \m.\nfn\  nittiAtUm.  f<ft 
they  did  not  J^-arn  the  r-f:*t)  «tiiU;  of  ntfiurfi  until  tyK>  late.  It 
l«  hard  t/>  unthtrHiMu]  how  that  ^^>uld  have  liaf/fKfn*!^  had 
there  f>ee»  the  ne<^«««ary  comrnnnieation  Ytetwfum  th*  com- 
manding general  and  the  two  division  commandertj  and  be- 
tween the  latter  \\ieutnt'.\ven;  >«»ill  it  may  l><-  explaine^l  by 
the  fa/di  that  at  that  monrieot  the  attention  of  the  c^^ramand' 
ing  general  and  of  the  commander  of  the  ir;>th  f>ivi«jon  wa« 
ii\Xrii.i:Uti\  hy  movemeniM  the  enemy  whm.  making  toward 
dreyere  Vermn.  To  l>^f  «ure,  a  ^infe  <ti^;f</.i:^  nhould  not  be 
made  until  the  /ro»/  In  tudlvely  engaged.  In  that  ren^tefd 
deneral  von  K^rh warzkopjK'n  wax  left  in  the  lurch,  and  no 
bjani'-  'ran  aUiuh  to  him,  but  Htiil  he  wa*  not  depriv<-rl  of 
the  [fini,M\n\\ty  of  finding  ont  what  (Uiueral  von  Kraatz 
waj*  doing. 

General  von  B^rhwarzkopfA-n  had  commnmented  hi«  in- 
UmtionH  tjo  General  von  U'edell,  but  the  lower  officers  were 
not  informed  at  all,  and  even  ('AtioneXn  von  Cranaeb  and  von 
linxen  hud  merely  the  g^-nr-ral  direction  jpoiuUid  out  to 
them.  At  any  rat^?,  Hueh  an  opfK^rtune,  exhauKtive,  mutoal 
r^mMultation  an  at  Pof>owit7.  did  not  take  place,  and  the 
whole  YtuHinem  bore  the  Ht^mp  of  precipiiaium  and  uncertnin- 
ty  frf)ni  the  beginning.   I  know  for  f-ertjihi  that  the  battalion 


126  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

commanders  did  not  know  ^^bat  was  expected  of  thoni,  for 
Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Koll,  who  was  subsequently  killed, 
said  saroastioally:  "If  Stuckniaun  had  not  been  there,  I 
should  have  been  totally  in  the  dark.  What  little  I  know 
I  have  learned  from  the  address  he  made.  Stuckmann,  it 
seems  to  me,  is  in  charge  to-day."  As  General  von  Wedell 
and  Colonel  von  Cranach  were  ridini;  some  50  paces  in  front 
of  Koll,  I  suggested  that  he  make  inquiry  there.  INIean- 
"while,  I. — r)7th  was  crossing  the  ravine  about  1000  meters 
southwest  of  Mars-la-Tour,  whose  slopes  were  so  steep  in 
part  that  order  could  only  be  preserved  with  the  greatest 
ditticulty  and  the  two  batteries  advancing  to  the  left  of 
I. — 57th  got  into  a  serious  predicament.  They  succeeded, 
however,  in  coming  from  the  trot  down  to  a  walk  and  in 
taking  the  slopes  obliquely;  neither  battery  had  an  idea  of 
their  character.  The  incident  with  its  comical  and  serious 
aspects  prevented  von  Roll  from  following  my  suggestion. 
As  General  von  Wedell  and  Colonel  von  Crajiach  were 
watching  the  passage  of  the  ravine  from  its  eastern  edge, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Koll  had  an  opportunity  to  join 
them,  and  I  was  again  in  position  to  observe  all  measures 
taken  by  the  superiors  up  to  the  divisional  commander.  I 
did  not  hear  much,  to  be  sure,  but  I  saw  all  the  more. 

Meanwhile,  the  French  had  resumed  the  fire;  against 
whom  we  did  not  know,  but  soon  learned.  II. — 16th  was 
marching  from  the  point  of  assembly  straight  on  Greyt^re 
Ferme,  passing  by  the  west  of  Mars-la-Tour;  I. — IGth  ad- 
vanced through  Mars-la-Tour,  and  the  enemy's  increased 
fire  was  chiefiy  meant  for  these  two  battalions,  which  were 
engaged,  when  F. — IGth,  I. — 57th,  F. — 57th,  2  pioneer  com- 
panies, and  the  2  batteries  were  still  south  of  Mars-la-Tour 
and  west  of  the  great  road  leading  thence  to  Les  Barques. 
They  all  passed  the  village  on  the  east.      There  was  nO 


Military-Historical  Studies.  127 

Buch  thing  aH  preparation  \>y  artillery,  which  took  up  itn  firBt 
pOHition  Kouth  of  th<'  MaiH-la-Tour — Vionvillo  road  when 
the  infantry  fll.  and  I, — IfJth)  waH  already  under  fire. 
There  was  no  sign  of  any  selection  of  a  firing  position  or  of 
any  orders  for  the  artillery.  It  was  not  until  we  crossed 
the  Mars-la-Tour — Les  Baraques  road,  which  is  lined  with 
poplar  trees,  that  we  could  fairly  well  make  out  the  enemy's 
position,  which  extended  from  Height  840  to  Greyiire  Ferme. 
At  the  same  moment  a  storm  of  shells  was  fiying  about  us, 
an  indication  that  the  French  had  noticed  our  movement 
and  had  been  waiting  for  our  appearance.  About  200  paces 
farther  on.  General  von  Hchwarzkopjien  joined  the  officers 
above  mentioned,  and  at  that  moment  our  batteries  opened 
from  their  first  position.  The  38th  Brigade  here  formed  a 
single  line  from  left  to  right,  as  follows:  II. — IGth,  I. — 
10th,  F. — 10th,  I. — 57th,  F. — 57th,  and  2  pionef-r  companies 
X.,  F. — ICth  being  somewhat  in  rear  at  first  fit  came  from 
Mariaville  Fermej.  Up  to  that  time,  a  moment  of  deci- 
sive ini})ortance  for  his  tactical  dispositions,  General  von 
Bchwarzkoppen  was  southeast  of  Mars-la-Tour.  It  is  an 
established  fact  that  up  to  that  moment  the  commanding 
general  of  the  X.  Corps  personally  directed  the  left  wing  of 
the  battle,  and  that  he  considered  the  duty  of  the  X.  Corps 
to  be  to  save  the  III.  Corps  from  being  crushed.  Defensive 
action  would  not  have  accomplished  the  object;  it  became 
the  duly  of  tactics  to  understand  the  situation  and  to  act 
accordingly. 

The  question  is:  1.  AN'as  General  von  Schwarzkoppen 
aware  of  the  general  situation?  2.  Did  he  correctly  under- 
stand his  order?  'i.  Did  he  make  report  of  the  change  of  the 
situation  on  the  enemy's  side  (extension  of  his  right),  or  did 
he  take  steps  to  meet  it?  The  first  will  never  be  known; 
2  and  3  are  inconsistent  with  his  measures.     There  is  no 


128  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

doubt  that  the  commander  of  the  X.  Corps  had  ordered  an 
attach,  iut,  on  account  of  the  intervening  changes  on  the  enemifs 
side, it  became  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  19th  Half -Division 
to  regulate  the  attach,  so  far  as  concerns  the  38th  Brigade,  accord- 
ing to  time  and  circumstances.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  division 
commander,  and  it  was  practicable,  to  give  unmistakable 
orders  how  far  to  advance  and  what  to  hold.  As  regards 
infantry  tactics.  General  von  Schwarzkoppen,  wherever  he 
was  present,  endeavored  to  have  the  proper  tactical  forms 
employed.  It  was  exactly  4  o'clock*  when  the  brigade 
started.  We  had  been  facing  east,  as  above  stated,  and  the 
left  flank  battalion  (II. — 16th)  was  nearest  to  Mars-la-Tour. 
As  that  battalion  advanced  straight  from  the  spot  on 
Grey^re,  while  the  companies  on  the  extreme  right  had  to 
make  a  wheel  of  some  2500  meters,  the  movement  was  loose  and 
ragged  from  the  beginning.  II. — 16th  was  firing  when  the 
other  battalions  were  just  starting,  and  the  general  result 
was  a  successive  arrival  of  the  battalions  on  the  line  of  bat- 
tle; and,  as  the  troops,  the  more  they  had  to  take  ground  to 
the  east,  endeavored  to  make  up  for  the  greater  distance  by  a 
faster  pace,  this  caused  precipitation.  But,  despite  the  accel- 
erated pace,  it  was  impossible  to  restore  proper  uniformity 
to  the  movement;  the  battalions  were  defeated  in  detail  from 
left  to  right,a,nd.  the  right  reached  the  enemy's  line  completely 
exhausted  and  at  a  time  when  the  battalions  on  the  left  had 
already  suffered  defeat. 

(e)  Personal  Observations. — In  executing  the  move- 
ment we  passed  the  southwestern  edge  of  Mars-la-Tour, 
where  General  von  Schwarzkoppen  and  Major  von  Scherfif 
were  halting  mounted  in  the  midst  of  a  severe  artillery  fire. 

*Von  Rohr  says,  page  127,  that  the  38th  Brigade  passed  Mars-la- 
Tour  at  5  p.  m.,  and  fixes  the  attack  of  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  at 
5:45  p.  m.    The  former  is  too  late;  the  latter  is  correct. 


Military -Historical  Studies.  120 

Near  them,  somewhat  in  rear,  were  2  squadrons  of  the  4th 
Cuirassiers,  which,  however,  soon  turned  about  and  with- 
drew when  tlie  artillery  fire  ineieased  (see  Sketch  II.j;  tli(* 
1st  Guard  Dragoons  took  their  place;  Count  Brandenburg 
II.  was  riding  along  tlie  Vionvillc — Mars-la-Tour  chauss(?e. 
The  troops  were  rapidly  advancing,  and  when  the  skir- 
mishers of  1st — 57th,  with  which  Lieutenant-Colonel  von 
Roll  was  riding,  passed  General  von  Schwarzkoppen,  the 
brave  general  joined  him,  addressing  some  cheering  words 
to  the  troops.  When  the  severity  of  the  mitrailleuse,  artil- 
lery, and  infantry  fire  from  the  left  front  gained  an  amazing 
severity.  General  von  Schwarzkoppen  remarked  to  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Roll:  "Roll,  deploy  strong  skirmish 
lines,  and  we'll  catch  them;"  and  later,  "The  left  shoulder 
forward  a  little,  toward  the  angle  of  the  wood,"  pointing  to 
the  northwest  angle  of  the  Tronville  copse.  Meanwhile, 
1st — 57th  had  deployed  2  platoons  and  taken  the  direction 
of  that  angle  of  the  Bois  de  Tronville,  so  that  it  looked  as 
though  there  was  going  to  be  a  gap  between  the  16th  and 
57th  Regiments.  General  von  Schwarzkoppen,  who  re- 
mained for  some  time  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll, 
then  ordered:  "Roll,  put  a  whole  company  in  there."  It 
was  done  (2d — 57th).  Soon  after,  the  horse  of  the  captain 
of  that  company  was  killed;  the  captain,  being  very  short- 
sighted and  pinned  to  the  ground  for  a  little  while  by  the 
horse,  lost  the  supervision  of  the  company,  which  was  ad- 
vancing its  right  shoulder  too  much.  That  was  due  to  the 
direction  of  the  ravine  around  Mars-la-Tour,  into  which  the 
men  crowded  in  quest  of  shelter  from  the  enemy's  murder- 
ous fire.  The  3d  platoon  connected  with  the  left  of  the 
skirmishers  of  the  Ist — 57th,  and  the  gap  between  the  Six- 
teenth and  Fifty-seventh  was  only  closed  when  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Sannow  pushed  in  F. — 16th.     Originally  F. — 16th 


130  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Fidiire. 

was  about  150  meters  to  the  rear  of  1st  aud  2d — 57th,  but, 
haviufj  a  shortor  wlieol  to  make,  the  battalion  subsequently 
gained  that  distance.  AVe  anticipate  this  in  order  to  ex- 
plain how  the  line  of  battle  was  formed,  because,  when  it 
halted,  the  companies  of  F. — 10th  were  between  1st  and 
2d — oTth,  which  were  deployed. 

Outside  of  these  orders  from  the  division  commander, 
none  were  received  by  the  troops  during  the  action,  except 
the  order  of  retreat.  The  brigade  commander  rode  north- 
ward of  Mars-la-Tour,  followed  by  Colonel  von  Cranach, 
and  as  I. — 57th  was  crossing  the  Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
road,  both  batteries  came  in  position  to  the  north  of  the 
village.  T  will  now  state  what  else  I  heard  and  saw  while 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  division  commander.  Lieutenant 
Eggeling,  from  the  staif  of  the  comanding  general  of  the 
X.  Corps,  was  just  riding  away,  when  Major  von  Scherflf 
pointed  to  the  map  and,  turning  to  the  west,  remarked  to 
General  von  Schwarzkoppen :  ''That  is  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division  which  is  going  to  support  the  attack  on  the  flank."* 
At  this  time  the  division  was  trotting  past  Mars-la-Tour 
on  the  south.  As  I. — 57th  reached  the  Vionville — Mars- 
la-Tour  road,  I  noticed  to  the  right  rear  the  approach  of 
heavy  columns  (it  Avas  the  40th  Brigade);  soon  afterward  1 
noticed  some  statf  to  our  rear  riding  on  and  alongside  of  the 
chauss«^e  (Count  Brandenburg  IT.).  Of  the  line  of  battle 
east  of  the  Bois  de  Tronville  nothing  whatever  could  be 
seen.  On  reaching  the  Mars-la-Tour — Vionville  road.  Gen- 
eral von  Schwarzkoppen  turned  his  horse  and  rode  back 
with  Major  von  Scherff. 

(f)     Events  on  the  Side  of  the  French. — Before  detail- 

*It  is  to  be  inferred,  therefore,  that  this  officer  communicated  to 
General  von  Schwarzkoppen  the  intentions  of  General  von  Voigta- 
Rhetz  regarding  that  cavalry  division. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  131 

iiig  the  course  of  the  attack,  I  deem  it  necesHary  to  state 
how  things  had  devr^loped  up  to  that  hour  on  the  enemy's 
side,  according  to  present  results  of  historical  research.  On 
receiving  orders  to  join  in  the  battle.  General  Ladmir- 
ault  directed  Grenier's  and  Cissey's  divisions  to  turn  south- 
ward, Grenier  in  front,  Cissey  behind  him,  Legrand's  cav- 
alry division  bringing  up  the  rear,  the  artillery  reserve 
between  the  last  two  divisions.  After  the  corps  had  been 
given  the  direction  of  liruville,  the  general,  hastening  to  the 
front  with  his  staff,  reconnoitered  in  person  the  ground 
from  the  Yron  to  the  Bois  de  Tronville.  On  arriving  at 
Grey^re  Ferme  he  saw  the  necessity  of  securely  closing  the 
valleys  (of  approach)  joining  here  from  the  south  and  east.* 
He  therefore  ordered  at  once: 

1.  A  12-pounder  battery  to  be  brought  up,  which  he 
posted  himself  to  the  west  of  Grey^re  Ferme  so  as  to  sweep 
the  valley  to  the  south.  That  battery  opened  fire  as  early  as 
2  o'clock  against  the  4  squadrons  of  the  1st  Guard  Drag- 
oons then  opposite  the  battery,  killing  the  horse  of  Lieutenant 
von  Bismarck,1[  and  continued  its  fire  without  interruption  as  it 
found  objects  to  fire  at. 

2.  To  secure  his  flank,  General  Ladmirault  ordered  up 
the  5th  Rifle  Battalion,  and  subsequently — 

3.  The  entire  98th  Regiment,  to  the  vicinity  of  Grey^re 
Ferme.  These  troops,  at  2:'Uj  p.  m.,  stood  as  follows:  5th 
Rifle  Battalion  to  the  west  of  the  valley  covered  by  the  bat- 
tery, and  500  meters  to  the  latter's  front  (south);  the  98th 
Regiment  stood  east  of  the  valley  and  southeast  of  the 
battery.  After  the  general  had  thus  posted  the  troops 
marching  at  the  head  (advance  guard)  of  Grenier's  division, 
the  main  body  came  up,  which  he  allowed  to  continue  the 

♦Bonie,  Campagne  de  1870,  quoted  by  von  Rohr,  p.  125. 
tVon  Rohr,  p.  125. 


182  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

luaroh  dm^  south  (^approximatt'  dhtHtion  of  Tronville). 
Suooossful  at  tirst  in  its  oftViisivo  moveuuMit.  tlio  division 
Avas  drivon  baok  by  tlio  iJOtli  ^liornian. —  Tr.)  Division,  and 
had  approximatoly  the  foUoAvinj;  positit>n  on  the  ridjie  of 
Bniville  before  the  arrival  of  General  von  SohNvar/.koppen: 
Kejrinient  No.  13  depU\ved  as  skirmisliers,  nortli  of  the  rav- 
ine within  1200  meters  of  the  great  road  liruvilK^^ — ]Mars  la- 
Tour;  in  its  rear  juul  overhippinu'  on  the  U^ft  Avas  the  48d 
Keginunu;  farther  in  rear,  baok  of  the  right  of  the  13th 
Kegimeut.  was  the  tUth  Hegiinent.  extending  ajs  far  as  the 
great  road.  On  the  great  road  was  a  mitraiUense  battery, 
and  another  battery  on  Height  840  ^both  beU^nging  to 
tlivnier's  di visional. 

l>y  3  p.  m.  the  entire  artillery  of  Oissey's  division  had 
eome  forward  and  had  taken  up  one  oontinuous  position 
west  of  the  great  road  from  Bruville;  the  57th  and  T3d  Regi- 
ments of  Cissey's  division  are  said  to  have  been  resting 
siuoe  2:30  p.  m..  "north  of  the  ravine  of  Orey^re."  removing 
their  packs.  The  regiments  "Nos.  1  and  t».  the  -0th  Chas- 
seurs, the  artillery  reserve,  and  Legrand's  oavalry  division 
were  approaching.  But  lIOOO  meters  north  of  Orey^re 
Ferme,  west  of  the  road  to  Jarny.  1  regiment  of  Chasseurs 
d'Afrique,  1  of  Guard  Dragoons,  and  1  of  Cuard  Lancers 
had  been  posted  since  2  o'clock.  Hence  there  were  quite 
considerable  forces  of  all  arms  between  the  great  road  from 
Bruville  and  the  road  to  Jarny  and  west  of  the  latter  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  Ceneral  von  Schwar/.koppen.  Though 
they  were  not  directly  visible,  still  artillery  and  infantry 
fire  had  been  kept  up  from  Creyt^re  Ferme  ever  since 
2  o'clock,  the  former  being  directed  against  Mars-la-Tour 
about  the  time  of  General  von  Schwarzkoppen's  arrival. 
Generals  von  Barbv  and  Count   Brandenburg  had   with- 


Military  Uisloricai  Hludien.  J  '^'> 

drawn  to  Mui-h  la-Tour  hefore  tliat  iirtt,  before  2  i>.  rn.  roni':ial 

Account,  I.,  r/>o,  oo:',^ 

To  give  the  rffadcr  a  connrjcted  ar;count  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  French  line  of  battle,  I  Hhould  Htiite:  AfU^r  4, 
Mnd  h<'fore5  o'clock  p.  rn.,the  entire  divJKion  of  CiMKey  hucc^^- 
Hively  join^-d  the  Jirnt  line;  firnt,  the  57th  i^'ginIent  (f^Mt  of, 
and  on,  Ww.  great  roiid  from  lirnville;  to  itK  right  rear  the  VUl 
Uegiujent;  they  were  HubHequently  joined  on  the  right 
(witnif  by  the  20th  ChaKHeur  battalion  and  reginjr-nlK  Now.  1 
and  «,  the  former  in  ftrKt,  the  latter  in  Kccond  line.  I  have 
be(;n  unable  to  aHf;er1iiin  accurately  the  time  when  the  artil- 
lery rcHcr v<-  joj n <'<l  i  n  1  he  arrtion .  I  have  the  i mpr*?«Hion  that 
it  wan  at  the  i'nno  when  w^'  w^-re  crwHing  the  Vionville— 
MarH-la-Tour  road — t.  e.,  when  we  were  attiu;king  (about 
4:.">0  p.  m.^;  for  from  that  time  on  the  artillery  fire  became 
much  more  Hevere  and  we  could  fe^d  from  the  detonations 
that  reinforcenx'ntH  rnuKt  have  arrived.  All  the  batterif^ 
having  Hufl'ered  loKneK,*  it  Ik  evident  that  the  entire  artillery 
rftWirxo,  took  part;  in  the  caHe  of  one  battery  only,  7th— 8th 
(Dick  HayH  9th— 8thi,  no  figureH  are  given. 

Though  it  may  not  have  been  practicable  to  observe 
directly  from  tlK-  O^-rman  left  after  'A.'Mi  p.  m.f  what  troopH 
were  in  the  vicinity  t,f  Grey^:;re  Ferme  and  what  was  f/oing  on 
to  the  wcKtof  the  great  road  from  liruville,*  ntill  it  could  be 
seen:  1,  that  the  entire  Bruville  ridge  waw  Htrongly  occu- 
pied; 2,  KhotH  were  conHtantly  heard  from  the  vicinity  of 
Grey^re  Ferme,  even  artillery  fire,  which  nat  Marfs-la-Tour 
on  fire  about  4  p.  m.;  Ti,  an  immeuHe  cloud  of  duKt  waH  viHi- 
ble  in  the  air  for  a  long  time  over  the  wtction  north  of  Grey- 
ere  Ferme.    The  atmo«f»here  waw  clear,  pure,  and  light. 

•Dick,  pa«e  242-275. 

f Standpoint  of  General  ron  Schwarzkoppen.     See  sketch. 


134  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

The  immense  cloud  of  dust  was  the  first  thing  to  engross 
our  attention  on  that  day,  more  even  than  the  fire,  and  was 
Tisiblo  before  "we  turned  off  toward  the  place  of  assenMy  of  the 
brigade,  1000  meters  southwest  of  Mars-la-Tour.  It  was 
our  "point  de  rue.''  As  one  is  in  tlie  habit  of  observing 
the  flight  of  a  baUoon,  so  we  followed  that  oloud  of  dust 
around  which  we  were  moving  in  a  semicircle.  We  de- 
bated what  it  might  be,  and  my  commander,  with  his  unus- 
ually keen  eyes,  declared  that  the  enormous  wall  of  dust  was 
steadily  moving  from  northeast  to  southwest.  I  did  not 
notice  any  break  in  it  while  we  were  circling  around  it.  On 
approaching  the  standpoint  of  General  von  Schwarzkoppen, 
w'e  could  see  plainly:  1,  that  the  dust  cloud  was  moring; 
and  2,  to  the  soufhirest.  exactly  toward  Grey^re  Ferme; 
3,  also  that  the  heights  of  Bruville  were  strongly  held,  and 
therefore  that  the  cause  of  that  dust-cloud  was  still  adire. 
What  was  that  cause?  llie  nwvcment  of  large  bodies,  which, 
however,  could  not  be  discerned  themselves!  But  the  sight  was 
so  striking,  (I  have  never  seen  the  like  in  my  military  career), 
and  having  plainly  before  our  eyes  the  heights  of  Bruville 
garnished  with  masses  of  troops,  it  was  not  difficult  to 
foresee  that  something  of  importance  would  soon  develop 
from  Grey^re  Ferme. 

(g)  Course  of  the  Afiacl-. — The  arri^■al  of  considera- 
ble reinforcements  on  the  enemy's  side  had  been  noticed 
since  2  o'clock;  active  movements  were  observed  in  his 
line  at  R^zonville  (withdrawal  of  the  IT.  Corps,  inser- 
tion of  the  Guard  Corps  and  of  a  division  of  the  III. 
Corps),  and  no  diminution  of  the  forces  in  the  center 
was  perceptible.  At  2  p.  m.  it  was  known  on  the  Ger- 
man side,  from  captured  prisoners,  that  the  II..  VI.,  and 
Guard  Corps  were  present   on  the  other  side.      At  3:15 


Military-Historical  Studies.  135 

p.  m.  the  length  of  the  French  line  of  battle  was  almost 
doubled— from  St.  Marcel  to  Oroy^re  Ferme— and  the  con- 
viction gained  ground  on  the  Cjerman  side  that  the  entire 
Army  of  the  Rhine  was  in  front  of  us.  On  our  side  2  army 
corps,  a  division,  and  2  cavalry  divisions  could  be  counted 
on  becoming  successively  available  until  late  in  the  even- 
ing; the  enemy's  withdrawal  had  been  prevented:  Flav- 
igny,  Vionville,  Mars-la-Tour  were  in  our  hands;  only  our 
left  wing  had  temporarily  quitted  the  Bois  de  Tronville 
because  ontflanlccd  after  2  ]).  m.  by  two  fresh  army  corps 
(III.  and  IV.). 

Between  2  and  a:15  p.  m.  the  situation  had  been  crit- 
ical, for  the  enemy  might  at  any  moment  be  expected  to  ad- 
vance across    the   Vionville — Mars-la-Tour    road.       When 
these  anxious  hours  were  over,  the  88th  Brigade  had  reached 
Mars-la-Tour,  the  enemy  having  withdrawn  from  the  Bois  de 
Tronville  since  3:1.5  p.  m.    The  left  of  Orenier's  division  and 
some  batteries  had  continued  their  advance  on  the  west  of 
the  Tronville  copse  until  about  3:15  p.  m.,  and  until  opposite 
the  southern  edge  of  the  northern  portion  of  the  copse. 
They  withdrew  to  the  position,  ITeight  840— Grey^re  Ferme, 
when  they  met  the  artillery  which  had  hastened  forward  in 
advance  of  the  20th  Division  under  Colonel  von  der  Goltz. 
At  a  point  600  meters  north   of  the   Vionville— Mars-la- 
Tour  road,  where  shortly  before  the  enemy's  artillery  had 
been.  Colonel  von  der  C.oltz  took  up  the  battle  about  3:30 
p.  m.      Two  battalions  of  the  Seventy-ninth  were  in  the 
Tronville  copse,  while  the  remainder  of  the  20th  Division 
was  forming  up.      The  batteries  of  Colonel  von  der  Goltz 
were  joined  by  those  of  the  40th  Brigade,  so  that  after  3:30 
p.  m.  he  had  24  guns  under  him  west  of  the  Tronville  copse. 
The  appearance  of  these  fresh  forces  in  front  in  connection 
with  the  reported  approach  of  German  troops  from  Hannon- 


136  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Tille  against  his  right  flank,  and  the  order  from  Marshal 
Bazaine  to  hold  the  position,  were  the  causes  of  Ladmir- 
ault's  defensive.  A  subsequent  offensive  on  the  part  of  the 
French,  as  soon  as  they  should  feel  strong  enough,  was  not 
precluded. 

General  von  Yoigts-Khetz  decided  to  take  the  offensive 
himself  against  these  new  forces,  and  issued  the  necessary 
orders  at  3:30  p.  m.  The  general  meant  the  20th  Division 
to  attack  in  front,  the  3Sth  Brigade  to  attack  the  enemy's 
right  flank,  and  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  to  act  on  the  ex- 
treme left  according  to  circumstances.  The  commander  of 
the  20th  Division  misunderstood  that  order — at  any  rate,  he 
did  not  act  in  accordance  with  it.  For  that  reason  the  at- 
tack was  not  carried  out  as  planned,  inasmuch  as  of  the  15 
half-hattalions  ordered  to  make  the  afta-cJc,  10 — those  of  General 
von  Kraatz  of  the  20th  Division — ivithdrew  in  consequence  of  the 
misunderstanding  at  the  very  minute  when  General  von  Schwarz- 
Jcoppen,  agreeahly  to  his  directions,  had  thrown  forward  the  SSth 
Brigade. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  left  Pout  t\  Mousson  on  horse- 
back at  2  p.  m.,  and  was  at  Vionville  at  4  p.  m.  (26  kilo- 
meters). The  commander-in-chief  intended  to  keep  on  the 
defensive  on  his  right  and  to  attack  the  heights  of  Bruville 
with  his  left,  X.  Army  Corps  (see  Official  Account,  I.,  611), 
which  was  in  perfect  accord  with  the  measures  initiated  by 
General  von  A'oigts-Khetz. 

General  von  Schwarzkoppen  had  been  ordered  to  sup- 
port the  frontal  attack  of  the  20th  Division  by  a  flank  at- 
tack. The  execution  had  been  left  to  him,  and  it  became 
his  duty  to  make  certain  of  the  cooperation  of  the  20th  Divi- 
sion, by  waiting  the  latters  development,  and  by  keeping  a 
sharp  eye  on  the  doings  of  the  enemy.  The  general's  station 
permitted  both  of  the  foregoing  to  be  done,  and  although  the 


Military-Hislorical  Studies.  137 

criHiH  juKt  paHW^d  had  been  Herious,  Btill  at  this  hour,  about 
4  p.  m,,  there  was  nothing  pre8Hing  in  the  8ituation;  the  en- 
emy wa«  rather  delaying.  Hince  General  von  Hchwarzkop- 
pen  had  received  the  order  to  attack,  the  situation  on 
the  Wu\<'.  i)i  the  enemy  had  been  conKiderably  changed 
Cwhich,  however.  General  von  VoigtB-Rhetz  could  not  Re<f 
from  hi8  station  at  Tronville),  the  French  right  having 
been  extended  to  the  road  to  Jarny  and  advanced  to 
Grey^re  Ferme.  Admitting  that  General  von  Bchwarzkop- 
pen  was  unable  from  his  station  to  gain  a  suflScient  idea  of 
the  strength  and  extent  of  the  French  right,  still  the  above 
mentioned  movements  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  could 
hardly  have  escaped  him  altogethf^r.  and  in  looking  over 
the  wide  space  between  the  road  to  Jarny  and  the  Tron- 
ville  copse,  he  should  have  realized  that  5  half-battal- 
ions were  not  sufficient  for  an  attack  there,  and  that  if 
he  attacked  nevertheless,  his  front  would  be  too  extended 
and  he  would  be  taken  in  flank  himself.  Timely  repre- 
sentation made  under  these  circumstances  would  perhaps 
have  caused  General  von  Voigts-Khetz  to  modify  his  order. 
No  such  message  was  sent  and — what  is  much  worse — Gen- 
eral von  Hchwarzkoppen  did  not  wait  for  the  deployment  of 
the  2mh  Division. 

For  the  execution  of  the  attack  General  von  Bchwarzkop- 
pen  assigned  to  the  right  wing  (I.,  F. — ^57th.  2  pioneer  com- 
panies), the  northwest  angle  of  the  Bois  de  Tronville  (^Official 
Account,  I.,  605);  to  the  left  (11.,  I. — 10th),  he  gave  a  due 
north  direction  toward  Greyere  Ferme  (^Oflficial  Account.  I., 
C07j,  whence  it  becomes  plain  that,  as  the  brigade  was  deploy- 
ing by  wings.  F. — 10th  and  I. — 57th  would  have  to  advance 
in  a  northeasterly  direction  between  the  two  wings.  These 
dispositions  having  been  made,  the  attack  was  undertaken 
without  obtaining  sufficient  information  of  the  extent  and 

10  — 


188  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future, 

strength  of  tlio  ononiv's  lijilit  wiiij; — a  fradirt'  that  was  ro- 
peated  two  days  lattM-  a(  St.  l*i-ivat — tliouj^h  such  infonna- 
tion  shoiihl  bo  aseorlaiiiod  before  ani/  attack;  moroovor,  as 
the  objectives  of  attack  assigned  to  the  wings  of  the  brigade 
were  widelj'  apart,  the  one  being  to  the  north,  the  other  to 
the  northeast,  and  as  the  brigade  had  been  formed  on  the 
then  prescribed  maximum  front  1000  meters  southwest  of 
^lars-la-Tour  and  facing  toward  Tronville,  scattering  and 
irreguhir  movements  became  unavoidable,  unless  front  was 
first  taken  toward  Oreyt^re  Ferme  and  toward  the  north- 
west angle  of  the  Bois  de  Tronville. 

That  General  von  Voigts-Khetz  dispatched  the  5th  Cav- 
alry Division  to  the  vicinity  of  Yille  sur  Yron  to  act  against 
the  enemy's  right  during  the  contemplated  attack  of  the 
8  brigades  was  probably  due  to  a  higher  consideration,  inas- 
much as  it  sprang  from  accurate  information  of  the  em^- 
my's  doings  furnished  by  the  latest  rei)orts  from  Barby's 
brigade.  Barby's  reports  were  sent  to  corps  headipiarters, 
and  they  were  probably  not,  certainly  not  early  enough, 
communicated  to  General  von  Schwarzkoppen.  That 
should  be  kept  well  in  mind  in  criticisiug  General  von 
Schwarzkoppen's  measures.  On  the  withdrawal  of  Barby's 
brigade.  General  Count  Brandenburg  "also"  withdrew  at 
3  p.  m.  in  the  direction  of  Mars-la-Tour.  The  cavalry  had 
therefore  been  in  close  touch  with  the  enemy  since  he  had 
emerged  from  Doncourt,  it  had  seen  w^ell,  and  had  reported; 
that  was  2  hours  before  the  attack  of  the  88tli  Brigade,  but 
the  proper  rules  and  necessary  arrangements  for  an  effi- 
cient system  of  reports,  particularly  on  the  Hanks,  do  not 
seem  to  have  prevailed.  Thus  it  may  be  explained  that 
General  von  Schwarzkoi)pen,  who  should  have  been  best 
informed  and  to  whom,  as  the  senior  officer  present,  all 
reports  should  have  been  brought — if  merely  shown  him  in 


Mililary-IIulorical  Studies.  139 

puHHiriK — v\JiH  ill  fiicl  not.  in  u  ponilioii  lo  fuHill  llio  rolo  that 
under  Huch  cirouinHtancoK  fallH  to  the  lot  of  the  Henior  ofTi<fT 
on  the  \'.ic\\c;i\  ari<]  Htnifej^icnl  flnnk.  It  Ih  one  of  many 
inHt}in<<'H  (hat  ^o  lo  hIiow  i\ut  irnportanee  of  a  properly 
rr'^iil;il<'<l  KyKlfMn  of  r^poilH. 

The  allaek  of  Ihe  Iroojm  of  the  .''>8th  lirigade  whi(;h 
were  advaneinj?  (^antward  was  diHJointed,  and  ho  waw  that 
of  the  individual  hallalions.  I  waH  from  beginninf^  to  end 
exactly  in  the  eenlf-r  of  th^  line  of  fjattle,  mounted,  and 
eoijh]  Koe  in  nil  dii<'<(  ioriH  unlil  Ihe  Hmoke  became  ho  denne 
that  11. — IfJLh  and  I. — lOth  were  liicM^n  from  my  vi<'w;  I 
:im  (iMMcfore  an  eye-witncHH. 

The  individnul  battalionH  HUCceHHively  advanced  from 
left  to  ri^hl  lovvnrd  the  north  and  norfheaHt,  tlie  two  battcr- 
icH  Hupjjorlin^  tin*  movement  fi-om  Iheir  Cnecondj  position 
norlli  of  MarH-la-Tour.  'I'ho  two  left  llnnk  battalionH,  It. 
and  I. — loth,  havinj^  the  HhortoHt  road,  advanced  farth- 
<;Ht  to  the  north,  croHHed  the  ravine  of  Hruville,  preserved 
their  lead  to  the  end  of  the  action,  and  may  be  Haid  to  have 
fought  a  separate  action  under  Colonel  von  lUixen,  On 
the  ri^ht  F. — 571h  and  the  2  f*ioneer  comf)anieH  had  to 
doHcribe  the  greatest  arc,  and  when  we  consider  that  the 
lino  which  executed  the  wheel  extended  as  far  as  the  Bois 
de  Tronville  and  had  a  length  of  2500  meters,  it  becomes 
plain  that,  nothwithstanding  the  acceleration  of  its  march, 
that  wing  would  arriv<*d  on  (he  line  of  battle  al,  least  half  an 
hour  after  Ihe  battalions  on  (he  left.  The  su[)f)ortH  of  the 
two  center  battalionH  (12th  and  IJth— lOth  of  F. — Kith,  and 
4(h  and  '.Ul — r»7th  of  I. — 571  hj  moved  forward  exactly  on  a 
line,  while  (lie  skirminhers  of  2d — 57th  became  mingled  with 
those  of  10th— 16th.     (Bee  Sketch  III.)* 

♦It,  wiJH  owing  to  the  fact  that  V. — 16th  did  not  reaf;h  Its  place 
from  Mariaville  Ferme  until  iHt  and  2d — 57th  had  deployed  skirmish- 


liO  Inquiries  inio  the  Tactics  of  ihe  Future. 

lu\c:inuinii  at  Oontonr  ISO.  tho  forniatioii  of  \\\o  hv\iX'M\o 
(vom  lofi  to  rijiht  was  as  follows: 

Fu"«t  lino:  oth  UUh.  T(h-  UUh.  'M  Itiih.  iM  Kith. 
llth — U»th.  *J  platoons  of  lM — oTth.  lOth— l(»th.  I  plattHUi 
of  l!d — o7ih.  o  platoons  of  Ist — oTtli  as  skirntishors  as  far  aa 
tho  l>ois  do  Tronvillo. 

Sorond  lint\  lot*  ttitMois  in  voiw.  Sth.  t>th  lt>ih:  Hit. 
liSt—ldtlK  1-th.  ;)(h-U»th;  tth.  :Ui  oTih:  Utli.  !Mh  :>7th; 
I2th.10th— r>7th:2r.  T.  X. 

From  this  point  and  from  tho  i-avim»  north  of  Mars  la 
Tour  tho  formation  was  ohaniiod  as  follows,  singlo  lino  ho- 
inj;  formod   ovorywhoro   and    tho   sorond    lim^    ]nishini;    in 
whort^vor  it  found  room: 

rirsi  lino:  5th— KUh.  (Uh— l(>th.*  Tth  Kith,  v^th— 
KUh.t  4th— U>th.  :'.d— UUh.  "Jd- lt»th.  llth— l(»th.  1st— l»5th. 
i!  platoons  of  2d — oTth.  \0{\\ — IGtli.  1  platoon  of  i!d — 57th. 
12th.  Oth— ItUh.J  1  platoon  of  1st— o7th.  llth.  l^th— o7th. 
1  platoon  of  1st  -o7th.  I'Jth.  U>th  -o7th.  1  platoon  of 
1st — 57  th. 

ors  south  of  tho  Vionvillo — Mars-la-Tour  chausstV  by  Couer.nl  von 
Sohwaiv.UoiHHMi's  onior.  b\— liUh  then  tidvanood  oxaotly  botwtvn  tho 
loft  of  tho  skirmishors  of  1st— fiTth  and  tho  risht  of  2d— r>Tlh  and 
maintaiuod  its  souoral  dlrei'tiou.  thus  hroakiug  up  1.— STth  from  the 
bosinniug. 

*0u  tho  maps  of  the  Rogimoutal  Historios  of  tho  KUh  and  57th 
Rogimonts,  tho  r-.th  and  (Uh  Oomvvvnios  of  tho  KUh  Rosimont  aro 
shown  too  far  to  tho  north,  noar  tho  nwino  rnnniug  oast  aud  wost. 
I  disputed  that  in  tho  first  edition  of  this  book,  and  to-day.  after 
ivpoatod  n->soatvh.  1  repeat  that  it  is  wrong,  for  tho  5th  Frenoh 
Chasseur  l»attalion  Jioror  ct'ont'd  to  hold  the  angle  where  the  two 
ravines  join. 

tit  is  doubtful  which  of  the  two  oompanios.  Tth  or  Sth.  was  on 
the  right;  it  is  of  no  taotioal  oons^Hiuonoo  jvnyway. 

JThis  statement  agrot^s  with  page  271  of  tho  History  of  tho  UUh 
Regiment,  hut  ditTers  materially  with  rog-jxrd  to  tho  Fusilier  I'at- 
t:Uion  of  tho  regiment.     Captain  Ohly  has  oontirmed  my  statement. 

While  abroad  in  tho  fall  of  ISSO.  I  Uwrned  of  tho  impending 
publication  of  the  History  of  the  l(5th  Regiment.  Knowing  th.at 
such  publications  boar  an  official  character.  I  endeavored  to  come 


Military- JI iHlorical.  Hl/udiefs.  I  H 

K<'f;orul  lirif,  20()  iii>-\«-vh  to  thr;  Houth:     4fh — 57th,  'Ul — 

r,7th,  2  r.  (;.  x. 

(.'f>  to  Tonlour  7S0  t\\c  )ohh<'H  wcrx'  not  vr-ry  hoavy,  Jind 
vvhiU-  ilir-  advance  waH  coniifni'd  thence  to  the  north,  we 
could  diHiinctly  Hee  the  advance  of  a  portion — ffHtimated  by 
von  Koll  af  OhaftalionH — of  (/reni^'r'H  divJHion  in  a  Hontherly 
dir<''lioii.  II  moved  with  threat  rafjidity,  in  double  time, 
<h»ufi  III'-  Hlfjpe,  and  rear^hefj  lli'-  norflu-rn  edj^e  of  the  ravine 
before  we  liad  apf)roach<'d  to  within  80 — 100  inetr-rH  of  the 
Huiiw  from  the  Houth,  <^)p[)OHed  to  thin  infantry  of  the 
enemy  waH  the  j^reater  f^art  of  F. — IfJth,  f. — 57th,  F. — 57th, 
2  ]i')<)ii<-cr  'oinpanieH,  X. 

On  the  other  hand,  II.— Hith  and  I.-  Hilli  ff^uiid  the 
further  edi;e  of  the  ravine  unoccupied,  aw  CiHHcy'H  divi.sion 
waH  Htill  on  the  niarr;h  between  Orey?^re  Ferine  and  the 
great  road  i'voiu  P.tuville  to  MarH-la-Tour;  I  could  plainly 
obHcrve  the  movement  frf>m  my  horne  fbein^  with  F. — 10th 
and  I.-57thj.  The  rij^lit  and  eenter  of  the  brij^ade  were 
(jnder  Hevr-re  fire  from  Heve/;i|  tieiH  M,  from  the  northern  eflj^e 
of  the  ravine;  2,  from  Ibti^ht  84t»  to  the  road  liruvilh — MarH 
laTourj,  Tlie  Iohhch  increaxed;  we  had  ex[)ected  to  take  the 
enemy  in  flank,  and  now  were  flanked  ourHelvcB  fronn 
Oreyere  Ferme  (CiHHey'H  diviHionj.  Thref?  deployed  bri- 
gadeH  of  the  enemy  were  i^itted  against  us  at  5  o'clock, 

to  an  iin']f;rHt,anfllng  with  thf  rf;girriffnt  in  order  to  prevent  further 
incorre<;t  HtaternentB  by  furniHhinK  data  bawed  on  my  extenwive 
r('.H«-/,i.r(.ht:H.  It  would  have  been  Impertinent  on  my  r^art  to  Inform 
tbe  re^^lment  dlreetly  that  Hueh  and  Kueb  KtatementH  v/ere  ineorreet. 
I  therefore  aHked  the  regimental  eomrnander  for  anKwerH  it)  Heveral 
fjueHtlonw  whieh  I  Htated  would  be  Important  for  a  taetleal  study 
baw;d  on  tbat  event.  I  Ktated  at  the  same  time  that  it  waH  my  Inten- 
tion to  publiKh  the  Htudy  In  1881.  The  regimental  commander 
declined,  and  Hlmply  informed  me  of  the  Impending  appearance  of 
the  IflHtory  of  the  l«th  Regiment,  and  that  I  would  find  In  it 
the  anHwerH  to  my  queHtlonH.  The  settlement  of  doubtful  jxjintH 
thuH  became  Impractlcahle. 


142  Inqviries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

which,  subsequently,  were  reinl'oreetl  by  half  a  brigade  (of 
Cissey's  division)  and  1  chasseur  battalion  (of  Grenier's 
division).  Up  to  this  time  our  opponents  were  lying- 
flat  on  the  ground,  so  that  nothing  was  visible  except 
the  upturned  visors  of  their  headgear,  and  they  cov- 
ered our  detachments  on  that  shelterless  ground  with 
a  destructive  fire.  At  about  80 — 100  meters  south  of 
the  ravine  F. — Kith,  and  the  line  from  F. — 10th  eastward, 
halted  and  attempted  to  reply  to  the  enemy's  fire.  From 
that  moment  the  attadc  flagged;  the  men  lay  down,  but  even 
then  failed  to  obtain  cover;  two-thirds  of  the  oflicers  were 
hors-de-coni1)ot,  and,  deprived  of  its  soul,  the  attack  col- 
lapsed. The  men  held  out  for  a  little  while  longer,  then  the 
unavoidable  happened — they  fell  back. 
The  following  was  the  result: 

1.  The  5  battalions  did  not  make  their  appearance  be- 
yond the  ravine  of  Mars-la-Tour  as  brave  assailants,  for,  out 
of  the  20  companies,  but  8  (1st,  2d,  8d,  4th,  7th,  8th,  11th— 
16th  and  2d — a7th)  reached  its  northern  edge.  The  troops  of 
the  16th  Regiment  opened  the  action  before  the  center  and 
I'ight  as  stated,  having  the  shorter  distance  to  cover;  they 
did  not  find  the  battle-field  so  well  prepared  by  the  enemy  as 
did  the  others,  and  anticipated  Cissey's  division  at  the  north 
ern  edge  of  the  ravine;  only  when  the  latter  came  up  in  dou- 
ble time  were  our  companies  compelled  to  give  way  before 
the  enemy's  greatly  superior  numbers. 

2.  With  the  exception  of  these  8  companies,  no  pavt 
of  the  line  got  farther  north  than  a  point  80 — 100  meters 
south  of  the  ravine. 

8.  Needle-gun  and  chassep6t  did  not  mutually  exer- 
cise their  destructive  effect;  the  destruction  fell  on  us  alone. 

4.  After  we  had  begun  to  retreat,  the  French  got 
within  50  to  30  meters  of  us   simply  because,   concealed 


Mililary-IIislorical  Studies.  H3 

by  the  denso  smoke,  they  surijiised  us,  and  because  our  in- 
fantry was  too  exhausted  to  run.  On  the  left  of  the  bri- 
gade alone  (I.  and  parts  of  II.— IGth)  the  French  inter- 
mingled with  our  men;  hence  the  400  prisoners  lost  by  the 
16th  Keglment. 

5.  It  was  only  now,  on  the  retreat,  that  our  losses 
amounted  to  destruction.  Details  will  be  found  in  the 
chapter  on  losses. 

As  the  French  line  arrived  within  150  meters  north  of 
Contour  780  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  appeared  and  whirled 
the  enemy's  infantry  down.  The  latter  ran  to  the  rear, 
masking  the  front  of  the  French  position ;  they  forgot  to  fire, 
or  fired  wildly,  and  threw  away  knapsacks  and  arms.  A  gen- 
eral pause  ensued  along  the  entire  line  of  battle;  even  the 
artillery  was  silent;  the  action  seemed  ended.  The  brave 
horsemen  saved  many  of  our  men  from  captivity. 

Subsequently  the  signal  "All  advance"  was  heard  from 
the  direction  of  the  Tronville  copse.*  It  came  from  .the 
20th  Division.  A  few  minutes  later  the  38th  Brigade  could 
be  seen  divided  into  two  groups,  one  in  the  angle  between 
the  Tronville  copse  and  the  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  road, 
the  other  500  meters  east  of  Mars-la-Tour:  the  former  the 
57th  Regiment,  under  Major  von  Modem;  the  latter  the  16th 
Regiment,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sannow.  Six  bat- 
teries were  in  action  north  of  the  Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
road.    The  above  is  the  course  of  the  action. 

To  reach  the  battle-field  the  38th  Brigade  had  marched 
37  kilometers  under  an  oppressive  heat;t  still  its  strength 
was  not  all  spent. 

At  a  distance  of  2500 — 2000  meters  (approximate  dis- 
tance of  the  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  road  from  the  line 

*Itmay  have  been  5:45  or  6  p.m. 

fThe  Oflficial  Account  states  the  distance  as  42  kilometers. 


144  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Height  S46 — Grey^re  Ferme)  one-third  of  the  companies 
were  deployed  as  skirmishers.*  At  the  beginning  the  first 
line  was  formed  of  skirmish  lines  supported  by  a  platoon 
each.  In  second  line  followed,  in  half-battalion  formation, 
8th,  6th— 16th;  4th,  1st— 16th;  ,12th,  9th— 16th;  11th, 
9th — 57th;  12th,  10th — 57th  (in  company  column,  two  to- 
gether); while  4th — 56th,  3d — 57th,  2  pioneer  companies,  X. 
followed  as  individual  company  columns.  When  the  first 
line  halted  80  or  100  meters  south  of  the  ravine,  it  was 
joined  by  the  second  line.  The  4th — 57th  and  3d — 57th  were 
retained  lying  on  the  ground  in  close  order  200  meters  far- 
ther south  upon  signal  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll.f 
In  the  last  stage  of  the  action  12th,  9th — 16th  were  lying 
doivn  in  close  order,  11th,  9th — 57th  and  12th,  10th — 57th  were 
standing  in  closed  line;  11th,  9th — 57th  fired  several  volleys, 
after  which  the  advance  was  resumed,  which,  20 — 30  meters 

♦General  von  Schwarzkoppen  accompanied  the  troops  on  horse- 
back as  far  as  the  Mars-la-Toiir — Vionville  road — ;.  c,  within  the 
zone  of  infantry  fire,  remarking  repeatedly,  "Skirmishers  only, 
gentlemen." 

tHe  did  not  wish  these  two  companies  to  slip  from  his  hand, 
because,  as  he  said,  he  anticipated  bad  results  from  this  "chase"  and 
from  the  disorder.  Both  companies  suffered  small  losses.  (Compare 
later  on  with  chapter  on  losses.)  In  the  History  of  the  57th  Regi- 
ment,-which  in  other  respects  has  profited  much  from  the  first  edition 
of  this  book,  these  two  companies  have  been  located  on  the  extreme 
right  by  the  side  of  I. — 57th.  The  author's  error  is  all  the  more 
unintelligible  to  me  as  he  was  with  4th — 57th,  and  I  can  still  see  him 
as  he  fell  when  hit  by  a  glancing  bullet.  I  moreover  saw  both  com- 
panies on  the  retreat.  Had  they  been  at  the  spot  indicated  in  that 
history,  atid  formed  as  a  half -battalion  hi  company  columns,  their  losses 
would  have  been  treble  those  they  suffered,  and  something  like  those 
of  12th,  10th— 57th. 

But  in  addition  these  two  companies,  as  the  action  stood,  could 
not  have  reached  that  point  except  by  a  diagonal  movement,  irliich 
wotild  have  carried  them  over  about  1000  meters  of  the  most  exposed  part 
of  the  entire  battle-field.  This  statement  alone  has  been  sufficient  to 
draw  from  every  practical  officer  to  whom  I  have  mentioned  the  sub- 
ject the  remark  that  it  u'as  impossible.  But  I  saw  these  things  plainly, 
and  the  small  losses  of  4th,  3d — 57th  constitute  additional  proof. 
Aside  from  the  military-historical  point  of  view,  such  errors  are  to 
be  deplored  as  standing  in  the  way  of  correct  conclusions  and  lessons! 


Military-Historical  Studies.  145 

further,  brought  it  up  against  the  advancing  masses  of  the 
enemy  (skirmishers  and  columns  intermingled  in  one  line). 

The  brigade  thus  had  employed  very  different  forma- 
tions, ''swarms  of  skirmishers,"  ''closed  platoons,"  "closed 
company  columns,''  half-battalions  "in  column"  and  "in 
line,"  and  that  on  ground  of  uniform  character.  This  consti- 
tuted a  tactical  error  from  the  moment  when  Contour  780 
was  crossed;  beyond  that  line  skirmishers  should  alone  have 
been  used,  but  in  those  days  we  had  neither  an  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  efficiency  of  the  enemy's  rifle  nor  the  requi- 
site skill  in  the  fighting  of  masses  of  skirmishers. 

The  regiments  of  the  brigade  fought  abreast  of  each 
other,  and  on  arriving  80 — 100  meters  south  of  the  ravine 
had  crossed  1400  meters  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
masses;  according  to  the  Official  Account,  they  lost  72  offi- 
cers and  2542  men  out  of  95  officers  and  4546  men  which 
they  numbered  before  the  battle.  The  strength  as  given 
is  approximately  correct;  in  the  case  of  the  losses  the  fig- 
ures are  incorrect.*  There  was  no  lying  down  or  rushes 
during  the  advance.  Three  battalions  of  the  brigade, 
F. — IGth,  I. — 57th,  and  F. — 57th,  advanced  in  the  then  much 
affected  "accelerated"  step,  without  pause  of  any  kind,  and 
did  not  halt  until  forced  by  the  fire  and  by  the  attack  of  the 
enemy.  Hence  the  expression  "chase"  on  the  part  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll,  and  hence  the  physical  ex- 
haustion when  forced  to  halt.  I  am  unable  to  state 
whether  II.— IGth  and  I. — 16th  advanced  by  lying  down  and 
by  rushes;  I  could  not  always  observe  them;  but  I  consider 
that  statement  to  be  one  of  the  stories  which  are  wont  to  be 
spread  as  history  and  by  other  means  in  connection  with 
most  any  event.  The  57th  Regiment  is  indebted  to  the 
1st  Guard  Dragoons  for  losing  but  few  prisoners  and  for 

♦Compare  later  chapter  on  losses. 


146  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

tbe  escape  of  most  of  those  that  had  been  captured;  the 
10th  Regimeut  fared  N\orse  and  lost  more  than  300  men, 
mostly  from  the  2d  and  1st  battalions,  because  the  charge 
of  the  dragoons  could  have  no  effect  in  that  quarter.  From 
the  right  of  3d — 57th  (extreme  limit  of  their  attack  to  the 
north  and  east),  the  dragoons  wheeled  to  the  left  and  gal- 
loped back  circling  around  Mars-la-Tour  250  meters  to  the 
north  of  Contour  780.  The  material  results  of  the  attack 
were  not  proportioned  to  the  losses.  Lieutenant  von  Streit, 
who  visited  the  enemy's  position  on  the  next  morning,  as- 
sured me  that  not  10  French  dead  were  lying  north  of  the 
ravine  which  runs  east  and  west.  The  half-division  had 
had  nothing  to  eat  all  day. 

III.     Eefrospects. 

Of  the  two  attacks  which  we  have  undertaken  to  eluci- 
date after  thorough  research,  the  first,  in  view  of  the  mod- 
ern state  of  tactics,  can  claim  historical  interest  only;  its 
details  could  not  be  carried  out  against  an  opponent  armed 
with  small-caliber  rifles,*  and  what  was  formerly  practica- 
ble in  the  way  of  tactical  leading  of  large  units  is  barred 
by  the  modern  rifle  with  its  flat  trajectory,  long  range,  and 
great  penetration.  The  second  attack,  on  the  other  hand, 
remains  to-day  almost  the  only  source  from  which,  by 
judicious  use,  we  may  derive  practical  laws  for  the  tactics 
of  the  future;  for  that  purpose  it  is  necessary,  however,  to 
dissect  the  events  under  the  magnifying-glass,  so  to  speak. 

Notwithstanding  the  difference  in  the  general  state  of 
the  battle,  of  the  numbers  engaged,  of  the  armament,  and 
of  the  unequal  results  of  the  attacks,  both  have  many  fea- 
tures in  common  which  provoke  instructive  reflections. 

♦Wherever  small-caliber  rifles  are  mentioned,  smokeless  pow- 
der is  also  assumed. 


Military-IIisiorical  Studies.  147 

The  dissimilarities  are  to  be  found  in  the  first  place  in 
the  objects  of  the  opponents.  The  object  of  the  defense  of 
the  wood  of  Briz  was,  and  could  not  be  anything  else  but 
to  cover  a  retreat  already  begun.  At  Vionville  (Mars-la- 
Tour),  liowever,  the  French  meant  to  hold  the  field  of  battle 
and  to  repulse  our  attacks.  At  Problus  the  forces  of  the 
defender  were  about  equal  to  those  of  the  attacker;  at  Mars- 
la-Tour  they  were  far  superior  to  ours. 

The  armament  of  the  f?axon-Austrian  infantry  was 
inferior,  that  of  the  artillery  equal  to  ours,  if  not  superior, 
but  at  Vionville  (Mars-la-Tour)  the  arm  of  the  French  in- 
fantry was  much  better  than  that  of  the  German  infantry, 
while  the  artillery  of  the  latter  excelled  that  of  the  French. 

The  attack  on  Problus-Bor  succeeded;  that  on  the 
heights  of  Bruville  was  the  greatest  tactical  defeat  suffered 
in  any  attack  in  the  entire  war.  The  conditions  were 
similar  at  Konnigratz  and  Vionville:  1,  as  regards  the 
morale  of  the  Saxons  and  of  the  French;  2,  as  regards  their 
tactical  efficiency;  and  3,  as  regards  the  field  of  battle. 
The  position  in  the  wood  of  Briz  had  been  artificially 
strengthened,  but  it  was  not  thereby  rendered  more  difficult 
to  assault  than  was  the  other  by  the  ravine  extending  along 
the  front  of  the  French  position;  and  if  the  obstacles  on 
the  latter  field  are  considered — wire  fences,  which  were  cov- 
ered by  the  enemy's  infantry  fire — the  French  position  is  to 
be  considered  stronger  than  the  Austrian. 

The  attacks  of  the  14th  Division  on  Problus-Bor  and 
of  the  19th  Half-Division  on  the  heights  of  Bruville  differ 
chiefly  in  respect  to  the  preparations,  the  deployment,  the 
proper  disi»ositions,  and  the  promulgation  in  unmistakable 
form  of  the  object  of  the  action ;  as  regards  the  leading  of 
large  units  under  the  enemy's  fire,  they  are  instructive  on 
account  of  what  was  done  as  well  as  on  account  of  what 


Its  Inquirit's  into  the   Tactics  of  the  Future. 

WAS  i\oi  tloiu\     'riu>  \\'\\\  \o  \vi\i\  Mini  i'oniritl  was  (lu>  saiut* 
on  ho{\\  oiOMsious;  llu>  sUill  dilTorcil. 

I  am  (lisiiu'liiuMl  to  admit  as  a  faot  that  dirtH-tiiui  >vns 
moriMlilVuull  at  Mars  la  'l\n\r  than  it  was  at  IM-oMus;  tluuiiih 
ii  was  moiT  ri^strioltHl— /.  c.  in  spai-t'.  Tlu*  (HHUMillit's  of 
loadinji'  and  control  wtMo  probably  jiroattM*  at  Trobhis.  for 
thoro  loatitM's  and  troops  w(Mt>  aliUo  without  warliko  t>xptM'\- 
oniH» — »'.  ('.,  prartii'o.  and  1  bolit>vo  that  on  that  vorv  ai'coiint 
llu>  ailiim  was  diroctt^l  with  (ho  ii't>n  strii-lni^ss.  and  at 
tlu^  san»t>  timo  with  tho  si-rupuhmsnoss.  ohara^'ttM'istic  of  a 
poaotM^xot'iiso.  At  Mars  la 'Pour  all  tho  headers  and  uiauy 
of  tho  nuMi  had  war  t>x|>(>rionrt>.  'V\\v  arnnnl  poav'o  from 
18(U>  to  ISTO  and  tho  manifost  dosiro  for  war  on  tho  part  of 
tho  Fronoh  had  uiortH>vor  rompt^lod  ns  to  stndv  tlioir  tao 
tics,  so  that  a  knowliHluo  of  thorn  on  our  ])art  may  b(»  as 
sumod.  Oral  and  writltm  instructions  issutnl  bt^foro  tho 
war  attest  that.  It  cannot  bo  admitttnl  that  wo  faiUul  to 
foresee  bt>fort>  the  collision  what  was  impendiuii'  and  what 
would  be  required  of  tlu»  leaders.  They  knew  that  on 
ground  devoid  of  shelter  and  under  destructive  infantry 
fnv  combined  dirtnMion  was  bound  to  conic  to  an  end.  and 
that,  once  that  point  was  reached,  the  troops  would  be  out 
of  hamf :  if  such  was  tht^  fact,  practical  success  could  not  be 
ijainiHl  under  !iuch  circunisti}nee.<.  If,  n\oreover,  the  leadiM's 
exposed  themselves  unduly — as  was  dom^ — fiu*  the  purpose 
of  compt^Uinji-  success — the  loss  of  the  leaders,  t^vtMi  of  the 
superior  leaders,  became  unavoidabh\  which  happenoil,  as 
we  know,  and  nothitiji'  could  remain  of  a  large  body  of 
troops  but  dead  scoria\  morally  and  physically  broken,  with- 
out orjjauizativui,  without  leaders,  and  for  the  time  heini]  nut\t 
for  stM'vice. 

It    is    wrouii'    to   exan\int^    the   situation    of    individual 
troop  units  in  an  abstract  way.       Frontal  attacks  against 


Military- ffistorkal  Htudip./t.  149 

:i  w«'ll  l<'<l  <-ii<-tiiv  proiiiiH*-  rcHullH  only  Jiflcr  lli«-  Hup'-riorify 
of  fin-  liJJH  br'cri  j^aiiicfJ.  To  (l;iy  the  dociHiori  jh  Wic  work  of 
(lio  fIsinkH  more  IIijjii  t-vi'V,  and  horo  Ihf;  action  of  Iho  Army 
of  flic  Klhc  on  .Inly  ''.,  IHOfJ,  alHO  forniH  {^oo<l  illuHfrafioii. 
Mh  niiirvli  (o  (he  field  is  (»|>cn  lo  fril iciHiii,  ;iri(l  in  Hfafirijj 
Oiaf  flic  Jiriny  waH  i(>]\i\H'\\c(\  to  wiiMJ  through  a  <l<'flIo 
(Xccluniilzj  tlic  ()tli(;iii.|  A(:<:ot]nt  \h  in  error.*  To  ndrlnco 
[)ioor  iH  (piitc  nnn«'<'('HHary.  Rtill,  after  the  delay  of  (wo 
lionrH,  the  cxeollenc*'  of  Hut  leading  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe 
(Mtli  and  IHtli  DiviHioriH)  eannot  be  denied.  The  initiative 
of  the  Hubor-dinate  lead<'rH  never  tr-ariHf^reHHed  beyond  the 
boiindH  of  llie  fij^htin^-f^ronnd  of  (he  brigade,  and  the  mo- 
ment, a  HnceeHH  had  been  won,  meanureH  were;  taken  to 
Hecure  it  before  i)ro('eedint^  further.!  We  have  here  nii- 
merouH  nieaHureH,  none  of  whieh  waH  laekin^^  in  uniformity 
an<l  eombiriJition  of  leading.  It  might  be  ealied  ;iti  ideal 
cawe  of  the  liiHk  HyHt<'jn,  but  ;i  moment'H  reflection  will  show 
that  modern  conditionK  would  <all  for  material  modifica- 
tiouH.  Such  i»rogreHHive,  HyHtematic,  and  cautiouH  action 
loHt  to  the  victor  great  reHultH,  to  be  Huro,  for  there  can  be  no 
doubt  flint  after  the  capture  of  the  wood  of  I*ri7>,  the  entire 
2Kth  I'ligjKh'  might  have  advaneed  on  liriz  and  KoHnitz,  if 
the  Mill)  Division  li;id  followed  (he  j4(li  by  the  HhorteHt  route 
through  Pi'obluH  and  KoHiiifz,  iuHtead  of  making  a  long 
detour  and  getting  Htuck,  and  if  the  IHth  DiviHion  had 
been  y)ut  in  motion  in  the  HJiine  direction,  which  waw  not  at 
:ill  iriifiracticable.  Tli;i(  would  have  rcHnlted  in  a  catas- 
trophe to  the  AuHtriauH  on  the  field  of  battle.      One  of  the 

♦PaKo.  399,  II.,  Omcfal  Af.coiint  of  1800. 

tSelziir<;  of  lli(!  croHHitiK  .'if  NffliunH.K,  ejipl  iiie  of  .Ncfluinitz,  utn] 
Liibrio,  oftfii nation  of  f,h»!  wf)0'l  and  riffRo  of  I'opowltz,  of  the  wooi] 
of  0()fM-I'rlrn,  of  the  villaKfrH  of  Nffii-  and  Nifjdor-I'rlm,  of  the  pheaH- 
antry  of  .lehlitz,  of  Stezire)<,  Steinfelrl,  01)er-l'rlnri,  ProbluH,  height  of 
ProinuH,  wood  of  liriz,  and  farmstead  of  IJor. 


1;>0  Inquiries  info  ihe  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

oluof  roasous  >vliv  things  iliil  noi  lakt'  siuli  a  uiiu  was  ra*ii- 
oral  voii  Horwartli's  failure  to  havo  tho  loqiiisito  bridijos 
built  at  tlu>  proper  time.  Kut  even  as  utattois  aotuallv 
stoiHl.  the  luaiu  foiees.  .'>  ilivisious  of  the  Arniv  of  the  Klbt\ 
would  have  reaehed  the  Austrian  line  of  retreat  sutVu'ieutly 
earlv.  if  the  eoiuiuander  oi  tln>  h»th  division  had  resolutely 
followed  the  direetion  of  Problus.  The  division  -would  eer- 
tainly  have  been  joined  by  the  troops  at  that  village  and  in 
the  vicinity,  a^si  they  felt  themselves  morally  ami  physically 
equal  to  it,  ami  tlu>  situation  dematuh\i  the  utovement. 
That  was  wt^U  reoojjni/.ed  by  the  14th  Division.  Here, 
however,  we  have  the  ease  of  (uMieral  von  Kt/.el,  which 
resembles  that  of  tuMieral  voii  Kraat/.  at  \ionviUe.  lu 
order  to  see  the  connection  of  thinjjs,  it  is  necessary  to  lay 
bare  the  causes  without  sparinj;:  otherwise  we  fail  to  arrive 
at  history  or  at  correct  deductions,  or  to  jiain  anythiup:  use- 
ful. Moreovt>r.  the  tnitire  cavalry  should  have  been  at 
CMiarbnsit/.  which  was  likewise  practicable. 

The  fact  that  we  confronted  an  opponent  whom  we 
never  had  overcome  in  a  ui'eat  battle,  and  whose  ethcieney 
we  respected,  accounts  for  these  cautious  tactics;  they  re- 
(luired  the  presence  of  the  hiijhest  leaders  at  the  decisive 
points.  In  that  respect  the  attack  of  the  14th  Oivision 
airain  furnishes  a  model. 

Subsequent  history  has  demonstrated  how  easily  the 
lutxiern  tire  tijjht  may  degenerate  into  an  action  of  numerous 
companies  and  smaller  bodies  impelled  forward  by  the  more 
bold  than  enlightened  initiative  of  their  oflicers.  ^Ve  have 
had  to  experience  the  mischievous  side  of  such  individual- 
i/.ed  combat  but  rarely  and  in  a  limited  way,  but  the  tiuestion 
of  what  will  result  when  the  individualized  contlict  emls  in 
ilefeat  is  most  uncomfortable.  The  question  might  have  been 
answered  by  the  battles  of  Vionville  on  August  ItUh.  and  of 


M Hilary- I/islorical  Hludun.  151 

Loijfny  on  IX'coniber  2,  1870,  IijkI  not  Ww.  cwcmy  b*.'<;n  i»oh 
hchh<mJ  of  Hiirli   iiiiliiiiilcd  Hhort-HiglitodnoHH. 

/  V.  '/'aclicH  at  l'rohlunlior  on  July  S,  1806. 
On  .July  .'',  IHOfJ,  w<;  boliold  an  fiiliro  diviHion  on  diffi- 
cult ground  and  ncvf-r  for  u  rnorriont  Hlipping  from  thu 
graHp  of  itfi  cornniiiinjc;'  fr-oui  hr-j^inning  to  (;nd  of  the 
•action;  everything  waH  reguhitod,  and  whatevf-r  did  creep 
in  waH  at  once  Hnhjfctfd  to  control.  in  the  attack,  long 
HkirrnJHli  lincH  followed  by  Hniall  HiipportH  alternated  with 
llic  double  eoliinin  on  the  cr-ntr-r  (FuHilier  Battalion  57tli, 
II.  and  I.  Jiattalion  ITtlij.  At  the  key-point  of  the  enemy'H 
poHition,  one  battalion  (F. — 5fith)  Hnffered  Ioshch  er|ual  to 
thoHe  HnH'err'd  in  1H70  at  the  handH  of  Irn[>erial  French 
troo[)H  ju-nied  with  breecfiloaderH,  Jind  uKliou^li  deprived 
of  ilH  leadei-H,  it  carried  tli<;  obntinately  defended  village  by 
aHHault.  Immediately  after  the  HucceHHfiil  aHHault  the  flrHt 
care  waH  for  the  defenne  of  the  captured  point.  The  diH- 
ordered  Hwarmn  were  re  formed.  Everywhere  the  diviwion 
and  brigadr;  genenilH  were  active  in  the  first  line,  gave  their 
orders  there  in  perHon,  jind  Hfmrred  on  the  troopH.  The  bat- 
taliooH  were  re  formed  id  ;i,  v<-vy  short  space  of  time,  and 
every  cover  was  carefully  utilized  to  minimize  the  losseH. 
In  that  way  an  entire  division  remained  in  the  hands  of 
one  man  all  the  time  and  throughout  the  several  hours  of  a 
difficult  attack;  he  always  knew  where  the  tactical  units 
(battalionsj  were.  It  was  the  ben  u(  if  ill  idejil  of  a  Inrge  move- 
ment in  attack,  carried  out  vvilh  a  perfection  probably  never 
seen  on  any  other  occasion. 

Not  only  did  the  officers  throughout  the  military  hier- 
archy, each  in  his  place,  h;ep  their  Iroops  in  hand,  but  there 
was  at  the  same  time  no  neglect  of  the  second  great  tactical 
hiw  of  Iceepinf/  the  troops  in  motion  as  long  as  possible  and  of  de- 


152  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

laying  the  lire  until  it  promised  good  results.  The  action 
of  the  entire  14th  Division  as  it  was  would  have  been  im- 
possible had  not  time  and  circumstances  been  utilized  before 
the  battle  in  the  manner  in  which  they  actually  were. 
The  lirst  requisites  for  any  tactical  success  are  correct  dis- 
position, correct  direction,  undisturbed  posting  of  the  indi- 
vidual, principal  units  (brigades)  beyond  the  enemy's  fire; 
and,  after  the  completion  of  the  deployment  from  the 
marching  column,  resolute  and  uniform  advance  to  the  at- 
tack. These  preparations  are  not  the  least  instrumental 
in  securing  success,  and  we  attach  the  greater  importance  to 
them  in  the  attack  because  all  were  not  sutticieutly  respected 
in  the  attack  of  the  38th  Brigade  on  August  IG,  1870,  and  be- 
cause plan,  disposition,  and  deployment  are  rendered  more 
difficult  by  smokeless  powder  and  long-range  rifles.  Generals 
and  general  staff  officers  had  spent  the  forenoon  of  July  3d  in 
familiarizing  themselves  with  the  battle-ground;  to  be  sure, 
they  had  more  time  than  on  August  16,  1870.  After  the 
tactical  bodies  had  been  directed  into  their  courses,  the 
most  important  law  on  which  all  tactics  are  based,  that  of 
human  nature,  was  strictly  observed.  The  march  was  not 
stopped  at  the  edge  of  the  zone  of  fire,  but  continued  within 
the  same,  without,  however,  losing  control  of  the  troops.  The 
first  halt  in  the  attack  of  the  28th  Brigade  being  made  within 
250  meters  of  the  enemy's abattis.  Up  to  that  time  the  resist- 
ance of  two  Saxon  battalions  on  the  edge  of  the  height  south 
of  Problus  had  to  be  overcome,  and  the  rows  of  dead  Saxons 
bore  witness  to  the  efficiency  of  our  infantry  fire.  The  height 
of  Problus  commanded  the  entire  fi^ld  which  the  28th  Brigade 
had  to  cross,  and  in  front  of  the  abattis  of  the  w^ood  of  Briz 
the  ground  was  devoid  of  any  cover  for  .300  meters.  That 
we  were  able  to  advance  so  far  without  check  was  due  to 


Military-Historical  Studies.  153 

the  enemy's  armament,  to  the  tactical  forms  employed  by 
the  assailant,  to  the  unequal  distribution  of  the  defender's 
forces,*  and  to  the  uniformity,  celerity,  and  vigor  of  our 
movements. 

Psychological  Matters. — The  great  Frederick  overcame 
the  armies  of  half  of  Europe,  not  only  because  of  his  great 
personal  military  superiority,  but  also  because  his  tactics, 
their  nature,  and  the  appropriateness  with  which  he  applied 
them,  rested  on  a  sound  basis,  on  a  knowledge  of  human  na- 
ture. Where  he  deviated  therefrom,  as  at  Kollin,  his  grena- 
diers, notwithstanding  their  iron  discipline,  vanished  as  did 
the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour.  The  great  king  and  leader 
was  a  psychologist,  and  expressed  himself  in  that  direction 
as  unreservedly  as  in  all  other  directions.  Hence  his  con- 
tinued success.  When  his  army  was  already  imbued  with 
the  confident  military  spirit  which  generals  spread,  the 
great  king  in  his  secret  instructions  to  his  generals  w-rote  as 
follows:  ''The  average  Prussian  soldier  is  indolenff — i.  e., 
he  does  little  or  nothing  of  his  own  accord,  he  has  to  be 
driven.  The  great  king  never  forgot  that  no  one  likes  to  die, 
and  that  natural  egotism  strives  for  the  longest  possible 
preservation  of  life  and  shuns  mortal  danger,  and  his  words 
may  still  be  applied  to  many  of  our  men.  In  taking  notice 
of  this  fact  we  gain  an  approximately  correct  idea  of  what 
may  be  expected  of  the  man  in  the  way  of  self-sacrifice,  and 
how  much  remains  to  be  accomplished  by  discipline  and  by 
the  personal  example  of  the  officers.  This  knowledge  will 
assist  us  in  devising  suitable  forms  by  w^hich  we  can  make 
use  of  the   indolent   individuals.      There   is   an   anecdote 

*F.— 57th.  for  instance,  hardly  met  with  any  resistance,  so  that 
it  would  seem  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  that  point,  while 
I.— 57th  as  well  as  I.  and  II. — 17th  encountered  obstinate  resistance. 

t'Tlie  General  Pilnciples  of  War  'ir  struct  ions  by  Frederick  the 
Great  after  the  second  Silesian  war. 
11 — 


154  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Avliicli,  like  many  others,  characterizes  the  lack  of  suscepti- 
bility of  our  men,  aud  I  quote  it  as  showiuj;  (hat  beautiful 
words  aud  fervent  speeches  frequeutly  are  lost  on  them. 
A  commander  of  the  Pouieraniau  Cuirassier  Regimeut,  in 
proud  remembrance  of  the  past  achievements  of  the  regi- 
ment, is  said  to  have  begun  his  address  as  follows:  "Cuir- 
assiers, lloheufriedberg  Cuirassiers,"  etc.  The  words 
sounded  strauge,  and  through  the  ranks  of  the  armored 
horsemen  passed  a  whisper:  "What  's  that?  We  are  Pase- 
walk  Cuirassiers!"* 

Many  of  our  men  are  inii)ri'ssed  by  one  thing  only,  by 
deed.  Hence,  the  great  king  rewarded  on  the  spot  every  dar- 
ing deed,  every  bold  resolve,  in  order  to  spur  ambition  and 
exercise  a  direct  intluence  on  the  masses  through  the  zeal 
and  heroism  of  the  ollicers.  Success  in  the  great  king's 
attacks  rested  on  the  conviction  that  any  check  in  the  attack 
movement  was  equal  to  a  failure  of  the  attack.  Hence  he 
did  not  create  artiricial  rest-  and  breathing-spells,  but 
endeavored  to  aroid  them,  and  tactics  culminated  in  the 
cultivation  of  that  sense  of  honor  of  the  olticers  which  is 
our  particular  strength,  and  in  the  develojnnent  of  their 
will-power. 

That  constituted  their  training.  The  moral  effect  of 
fire  is,  as  a  rule,  more  destructive  than  the  material  effect; 
this  is  still  more  the  case  to-day  in  consequence  of  the  small- 
caliber  ritles,  and  particularly  of  the  new  projectiles  (im- 
proved shrapnel,  torpedo  shells),  than  formerly;  and  in  the 
purely  theoretical  sense  those  tactics  ought  to  be  the  best 
in  which  the  moral  force  of  the  leaders  is  most  effectively 
manifested.  But  the  attack  on  decisive  points  was  as 
bloody  under  the  linear  tactics  of  Frederick  as  at  the  time 
of  Napoleon's  column  tactics,  and  in  the  more  recent  past. 

♦The  regiment  was  quartered  in  Pasewallj.— T/*. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  155 

which  partakes  of  both.  The  great  king's  tactics  were 
based  on  disriplino  as  strict  as  that  of  the  Romans,  and  his 
generals  were  heroes  like  the  generals  of  old  Rome.  Move- 
ment and  fire  effect  were  intimately  connected,  the  soldier 
fired  by  command;  the  ranks  were  kept  closed  as  much  as 
possible;  fire  was  opened  at  short  range  (about  200  paces), 
and  with  a  heretofore  unknown  intensity  and  rapidity;  anfl 
that  which  the  great  king  accomplished  by  closing  on  the 
enemy  with  as  many  muskets  as  possible,  and  then  shaking 
him  by  fire  regulated  hy  command,  constitutes  to-day  the 
aim  of  many  tacticians;  compare  the  "Summer  Night's 
Dream."*  It  is  a  significant  fact  that  in  the  case  of 
every  large  attack  heavy  losses  were  reckoned  with  from 
the  beginning,  and  that  the  will  to  be  the  first  in  the  hostile 
ranks  and  the  last  to  withdraw  was  systematically  culti- 
vated. The  bold  spirit  of  the  attack  of  the  Prussian  Army 
is  the  gift  of  the  great  king,  and  should  be  fostered  par- 
ticularly on  account  of  the  modern  arms.  The  tactics  of 
the  great  king  took  account  of  the  weakness  of  human  na- 
ture, were  in  keeping  with  time  and  circumstances,  and  were 
healthy.  We,  on  the  other  hand,  take  no  account,  or  too 
little  account,  of  human  egotism,  and  look  upon  man  as  part 
of  some  sjjlcndid  mechanism  and  expect  him  to  act  with 
the  same  precision,  instead  of  giving  due  consideration  to 
the  failings  of  human  nature.  Meckel  and  his  followers 
represent  one  extreme  with  impossible  demands  on  the  pres- 
ervation of  closed  "firing  machines,"  and  their  opponents  rep- 
resent another  extreme  with  impossible  demands  on  the 
morale  of  the  men,  such  as  the  majority  of  them  are.  There 
the  closed  ''firing  machine" — i.  e.,  the  officer — is  expected  to 
do  everything;  here  demands  are  made  on  the  man  such  as 
will  be  fulfilled  only  in  an  army  of  heroes,  in  the  belief  that 

♦Berlin,  E.  S.  Mittler  &.  Son,  1887. 


150  Int]uiri(\<  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  iniiul  Nvoultl  rt^placo  the  soul,  and  intolliiiviu-o,  courage. 
Of  all  tho  levors,  ogotisiu  alone  never  ceases  to  operate; 
it  sni)presses  the  other  forces  in  the  case  of  most  men  when  in 
great  danger;  and  if  self-preservation  is  habitually  looked 
upon  as  the  most  natural  aim,  while  the  leader,  on  the  other 
hand,  must  at  all  times  insist  on  the  highest  personal  sacri- 
fice, that  of  the  man's  life,  this  existing  and  permanent 
antagonism  should  prompt  us  to  lay  our  stress  on  the  culti- 
vation of  nu>ral  ftu'ce  and  intelligence,  and  to  endeavoi'  to 
retain  or  regain  the  command  and  control  of  men,  so  that 
the  leader  may  be  able  to  lead  his  men  and  nmy  be  held 
accounfahU  for  the  fulfillment  of  his  duty.  The  requisite  con- 
ditions, contempt  of  death  and  heroism,  will-power  and  zeal, 
determination  and  discipline  of  the  s]urit.  can  be  found  in 
satisfactory  (|uality  tmly  among  i>rofessional  si^ldiers;  not 
among  hirelings,  and  only  in  a  corps  of  oflficers  which,  wher- 
ever it  may  be,  makes  intelligence  and  moral  force  and  un- 
swerving sense  of  duty  its  aim.  and  which  is  burning  with  an 
v.raltcd  ambition,  the  ambition  of  devotion  to  the  common 
weal,  to  king,  fatherland,  and  nation,  to  all  the  ideals  which 
fill  the  breast  of  the  man  of  superior  education,  of  sujierior 
moral  strength  and  of  noble  views  of  life,  which  make  a  man 
of  the  officer  and  exalt  him.  These  moral  forces  will  ever  be 
intrinsic  properties  of  healthy  tactics,  but  they  do  not  de- 
velop their  beneficent  eftects  until  the  individual  is  sufti- 
eiently  advanced  in  years  to  comprehend  the  meaning  of 
the  term  rcsponsihilitif.  Responsibility  in  itself  compels 
reflection  and  Jahor,  generates  a  moral  conception  of  the 
profession,  a  sense  of  duty,  a  love  for  one's  own  goal,  and 
inspires  men  who  are  appointed  to  act  with  courage, 
provided  they  possess  inner  worth,  faith,  and  confidence. 
Weak  men  invariably  shun  responsibility;  instead  of  dis- 
closing and  stimulating  their  determination,  responsibility 


Military-Historical  Studies.  157 

does  not  manifest  itself  in  such  men  at  all.  It  is  requisite, 
therefore,  that  among  men  whose  inldlectual  powers  are  ex- 
pected to  operate  consciously  in  great  danger  and  under  great  re- 
sponsihility,  the  strengthening  of  the  character  be  made  the 
basis  for  everything  else;  and  although  unusual  strength  of 
character  is,  as  a  rule,  an  inherited  gift,  yet  it  may  be  im- 
parted to  a  certain  degree  to  all  well-disposed  men  by  sensible 
training;  chiefly  by  the  citation  of  fine  examples  of  deeds 
of  devotion  and  self-sacrifice,  by  assigning  a  conspicuous 
place  to  the  ethic-moral  principle  in  the  theory  of  life  and 
in  education,  by  the  exercise  of  abstinence  and  of  renunciation 
of  the  pleasures  of  life,  hy  an  introspective  mode  of  life,  by  the 
acquirement  of  love  for  v;orh,  which  of  all  is  the  only  lasting 
pleasure  on  earth.  Legitimate  and  moral  egotism  is  not 
debarred  by  such  a  theory  of  life  from  having  a  strong, 
material  aspect,  which  is  fortunate,  since  everything,  in 
order  to  be  sound,  should  have  a  moral  and  a  material  side. 
The  sense  of  duty  and  consciousness  of  responsibility  to- 
gether are  the  chief  levers  stimulating  the  intellectual 
powers,  for  it  is  only  under  the  agency  of  the  sense  of  respon- 
sibility that  one  works  seriously.  Eesponsibility  teaches 
reflection!  Acute  thinking,  if  continuous,  is  the  greatest 
strain  that  can  be  imposed  on  man.  Its  effect  is  strength- 
ening, not  weakening;  for  it  becomes  indispensable  to  the 
brain,  which  forces  the  material  substance  to  follow,  even 
though  the  miserable  body  be  struggling  against  it.  Re- 
sponsibility also  engenders  the  proper  sense  of  shame,  which 
constitutes  a  powerful  lever  in  overcoming  moments  of 
weakness.  I  have  seen  men  who  succumbed  in  such  mo- 
ments, and  have  convinced  myself  in  the  course  of  associa- 
tion that  they  were  men  devoid  of  innate  worth,  or  possess- 
ing it  only  to  a  small  degree,  but  who,  in  the  absence  of  the 
true  sense  of  shame,  were  all  the  more  haughty.     Culture  en- 


158  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

genders  modesty,  lack  of  culture  arrogance;  and  though,  iu  think- 
ing of  the  many  dangerous  situations  in  which  I  have  been, 
I  can  by  no  means  deny  a  creeping  sensation,  I  have  in  every 
case  inwardly  rejoiced  to  have  overcome  the  weakness  and 
to  have  risen  superior  to  the  lower  instincts  inborn  in  man; 
and  I  am  free  to  state  that  I  invariably  rose  superior,  without 
asserting  that  I  am  naturally  and  unusually  brave.  In 
inquiring  what  made  me  invariably  rise  superior  to  myself, 
I  find  in  the  main  two  forces:  intellect,  and  through  it  duty; 
responsibility,  and  through  it  shame.  I  have  made  a  psy- 
chological study  of  myself  iu  order  to  render  an  honest  ac- 
count to  myself  in  every  instance  as  to  how  my  heart  stood, 
whether  I  retained  control  of  my  mental  powers,  etc. 
I  considered  it  a  discipline  of  intrinsic  attraction  to  me,  and 
have  made  the  discovery,  that  progress  therein  is  toilsome, 
that  it  frequently  has  to  be  begun  over  again,  and  that  the  goal 
cannot  he  reached  unless  the  mind  has  previously  heen  trained  to 
work.  I  therefore  think  less  of  the  "smartness  (Schneid)  of 
youth,"  though  it  frequently  leads  to  fine  results,  than  I  do 
of  that  of  the  more  mature  age,  because  the  latter  implies 
greater  development  of  the  mental  powers;  the  smartness 
of  youth  and  the  will-power  of  women  frequently  resemble 
each  other.  Human  nature,  however,  easily  defies  far-reach- 
ing theories;  the  more  developed  mind  of  mature  years 
should,  therefore,  never  be  in  doubt  as  to  what  it  wants — 
what  is  reasonable,  in  order  not  to  ruin  the  buds  of  youth  be- 
fore they  unfold  into  blossoms.  I  could  almost  wish  again, 
in  my  more  advanced  age,  to  see  a  war  with  man-killing  bat- 
tles for  the  sole  purpose  of  comparing  my  own  self  of  these 
years  with  that  of  my  youth.  In  no  danger  did  I  ever  con- 
sider myself  more  than  a  fair  average,  but  I  have  seen  many 
officers  above  this  average,  and  some  below;  among  the  for- 
mer were  those  for  whom  I  could  not  suppress  my  adraira- 


Military -Historical  Studies.  159 

tion,  and  I  must  add  that  many  soldiers  have  also  excited  my 
admiration,  and  these  brave  men  I  place  above  the  best  of  the 
officers.  I  cannot  say  that  I  ever  felt  hatred,  or  that  hope 
of  reward  was  much  of  a  spur  to  me;  on  the  other  hand, 
an  understanding  of  the  situation,  keeping  my  eyes  and  ears 
open,  observing  the  action  of  my  peace-time  acquaintances, 
that  of  our  own  troops,  and  of  the  enemy,  etc.,  has  had  a 
greater  attraction,  for  to  me  man  has  ever  been  and  is  most 
instructive;  I  found  that  man  changes  more  or  less,  not 
excepting  those  whom  I  ought  not  hesitate  to  consider  as 
endowed  by  Nature  with  the  essential  gifts  of  the  hero. 

Since  I  am  an  average  man,  who,  nevertheless,  re- 
mained  master  of  his  intellect  in  serious,  staggering  situa- 
tions, it  ought  to  prove,  that  by  means  of  careful  education 
and  training  the  same  average  measure  of  moral  strength 
may  be  produced  in  the  case  of  all  men  who  are  not  dejenerafed 
— officers  as  well  as  men — particularly  so  in  the  case  of 
officers;  and  it  would  be  right  to  administer  inexorable  punish- 
ment tchenever  that  average  fails  to  materialize.  In  this  respect, 
however,  we  seem  to  have  become  very  indulgent;  great 
victories  have  induced  a  disijosition  to  leniency.  This  is  of 
doubtful  expediency,  and  may  lead  to  evil  consequences.  In 
order  to  avoid  sensation  and  publicity,  many  things  have 
been  covered  with  the  veil  of  charity;  this  may  be  political, 
tut  it  is  not  military.  Even  in  the  case  of  people  of  superior 
order,  the  effect  of  shame  on  their  actions  should  not  be 
underrated.  Shame  was  a  powerful  stimulus  in  the 
rising  of  1813.  Shame  then  spurred  the  officers  to  the 
highest  human  efforts — shame  over  the  defeats  suffered, 
shame  over  the  lost  position  in  the  state,  in  society, 
and  in  the  intellectual  world.  Shame  presupposes  con- 
temporaneous society  and  a  certain  relation  between 
the    same    and    the    individual.       If    the    contemporaries 


160  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

remain  in  ignorance  of  shameful  deeds,  tlieir  noble 
impulses  will  not  be  roused  to  action,  and  it  was  the  recog- 
nition of  the  necessity  of  this  action  that  prompted  the 
great  Romans  to  adopt  their  punitive  measures.  Again,  if  a 
member  of  a  community  has  the  comforting  knowledge  that 
nothing  will  penetrate  beyond  the  four  walls,  such  knowl- 
edge may  be  instrumental  in  stunting  the  sense  of  shame, 
the  sense  of  responsibility,  etc.  Publicity,  like  everything 
else,  has  its  disadvantages;  but,  as  war  constitutes  an  act  in 
which  all  passions  and  forces  of  the  individual  are  publicly 
manifested,  punishments  should  be  made  public  no  less 
than  rewards.  And  in  the  case  of  men  who  are  not  degen- 
erate fear  of  punishment  is  a  much  more  effective  means  than 
hope  of  reward. 

I  have  observed  that  those  who  were  conscious  that  1 
knew  of  some  weakness  they  had  shown  were  ashamed,  no 
matter  how  often  they  had  done  the  utmost  of  which  human 
nature  is  capable;  I  have  known  others  w^ho  avoided  me  on 
that  account,  who  could  no  longer  look  straight  into  my 
eyes.  Shame  is  invariably  the  lever,  and  it  should  therefore 
be  utilized. 

If  an  army  is  composed  of  the  dregs  of  society,  the 
officer  with  his  moral  qualities  is  everything,  his  men  are  in 
reality  nothing  but  a  shooting-machine  in  battle;  and  when- 
ever the  battle  has  gone  against  them,  these  machines  have 
collapsed,  even  under  Frederick,  since  the  parts  of  the  dis- 
ordered machine  have  run  so  far  that  they  could  not  be 
gotten  back  under  fire.  Frederick  himself  has  bequeathed 
to  us  much  classic  testimony  in  this  particular.  When, 
however,  the  army  represents  the  sum  of  the  nation's 
strength,  as  is  the  case  to-day,  the  distance  between  oflScers 
and  men  as  regards  their  qualities  naturally  becomes  less; 
and  nothing  is  gained  by  the  rod  and  other  means,  which 


Military-Historical  Studies.  J  61 

formerly  served  their  purpose.  The  greater  respect  for  the 
oflQcers  should  therefore  be  inspired  by  their  higher  intel- 
lectual level,  the  road  to  which  should  be  prepared  with 
clearnessand  directness.  The  presenceof  themost  ideal  class 
of  enlisted  men  in  a  national  army,  however,  cannot  extin- 
guish the  moral  differences  between  officers  and  men;  it  can 
merely  modify  them.  Tacticians  are  wrong,  therefore,  in 
•resuscitating  the  forms  of  Frederick  or  those  of  the  attack 
of  the  14th  Division  at  Problus-Bor  (though  it  otherwise 
stands  as  a  model  in  military  annals)  as  the  only  means 
for  controlling  the  forces,  necessary  for  a  decision,  in  the 
act  of  advancing  on  the  enemy;  but  it  is  no  less  wrong  to 
renounce  at  once  all  forms  on  the  battle-field,  and  leave 
the  man  to  his  own  devices,  because  that  puts  leading  out  of 
the  question  altogether,  and  because  most  men  will  not  ad- 
vance sufficiently  close  if  left  to  themselves  from  the  be- 
ginning. The  days  of  closed  formations  in  the  execution 
of  the  attack  are  over,  and  probably  no  one  believes  in  their 
practicability  to-day.  Every  important  action  is  bound  to 
be  a  conflict  of  masses  of  skirmishers,  and  it  only  remains  to 
determine  whether,  in  the  application  of  this  correct  princi- 
ple, the  proper  means  have  been  adopted.  Fighting  in  masses 
of  skirmishers  restricts  the  authority  of  the  leaders;  and  the 
disorder  thereby  rendered  unavoidable  threatens  to  destroy 
it  entirely.  Officers  from  the  captain  down  should  be  par- 
ticularly impressed  with  this  fact.  It  will  not  be  practica- 
ble to  eradicate  the  evil  completely,  but  reasonable  steps 
should  be  taken  to  minimize  it.  The  proper  means  will  be 
found  in  suitable  tactics,  in  the  moral  training  of  the  sol- 
dier, in  the  efficiency  of  the  officers,  and  in  the  greatest  pos- 
sible number  of  subalterns  and  non-commissioned  officers. 
Modern  tactics  require  more  subalterns  and  non-commis- 


162  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

sioned  officers  tbau  formerl}',  but  this  xery  essential    is 
impossible  with  our  modern  mass-armies. 

V.     The  Tactics  at  Mars-la-Tour  on  August  16,  1S70. 

(a)  PsycJiological  Matters. — Before  analyzing  the  action 
of  the  38th  Brigade,  I  ask  the  reader  to  return  with  me  to 
the  description  which  I  have  given. 

The  work  is  not  very  cheerful,  but  it  is  indispensable  in 
order  to  gain  correct  ideas  and,  perhaps,  no  less  correct  de- 
ductions. The  circumstances  antecedent  to  the  action  of 
the  brigade  and  the  psychical  and  physical  condition  of 
the  men  will  also  have  to  be  considered,  since  the  tension  of 
the  spirit  in  most  men  of  the  lowlier  kind  is  dependent  on 
the  physical  condition  of  the  body. 

The  38th  Brigade  had  marched  from  Bingen  to  Pont  h 
Mousson  in  ten  days,  and  had  stood  the  fatigues  well  despite 
the  heat.  During  the  march  news  of  victories  arrived  from 
right  and  left,  and  the  men  were  looking  forward  to  an 
encounter  with  the  enemy  with  the  greatest  confidence.  I 
dislike  the  term  "burning  with  eagerness,"  since  it  consti- 
tutes simply  a  falsification  of  human  nature,  which  would 
rather  preserve  life  than  sacrifice  it.  But  in  this  case 
Napoleon's  wicked  declaration  of  war  had  affronted  king 
and  nation;  there  was  but  one  opinion  and  one  sentiment 
as  to  the  king's  resentment  of  the  neighbors'  insolent  pre- 
sumption, and  what  was  then  imbuing  the  German  soldiers 
was  ardent  love  of  country  and  fervent  patriotism — in  one 
word,  passion.  The  individuals  therefore  exerted  their 
strength  spontaneously,  and  their  splendid  marching  and 
good  behavior  in  battle  constitute  a  fine  field  for  inquiry  as 
to  how  far  offended  political  honor  may  affect  the  morale  of 
troops  in  battle. 

The  cause  of  the  general  had  become  that  of  the  sol- 


Military-Historical  Studies.  163 

dier,  the  cause  of  the  nation  that  of  the  army,  producing  a 
degree  of  most  intimate  and  passionate  fusion,  the  equal  of 
which  is  rarely  shown  by  the  psychology  of  war,  even  in  its 
fortunate  periods.  The  course  of  events  nevertheless 
shows  what  passion  may  accomplish  and  what  it  may  not,  and 
it  may  well  warn  us  not  to  place  too  high  expectations  on  it. 
The  battalions  of  the  38th  Brigade  reached  the  battle-field  of 
the  16th  of  August  with  an  average  strength  of  900  men — 
truly  a  splendid  feat.*  In  comparing  therewith  the  high 
percentage  of  losses  from  sickness  and  infirmity  customary 
on  marches  in  peace  and  in  war,  it  becomes  plain  that  here 
will-power  was  the  underlying  cause:  the  will-power  of  the 
individual,  and  thus  of  the  army,  withstood  fatigues  and 
night  marches,  and  insufficiency  and  irregularity  of  food. 
With  the  thousand  kinds  of  danger,  however,  in  which 
the  life  of  the  individual  is  directly  threatened  and  where 
the  individual  remains  constantly  under  the  impression  of 
such  danger,  battle  reiiuires  a  much  higher  degree  of  will- 
power. While  it  manifests  itself  on  the  march  in  dogged 
perseverance,  here  it  calls  for  buoyancy  and  heroism,  and 
frequently  the  same  man  who  has  marched  until  ready  to 
drop  cannot  he  gotten  from  behind  sheltering  cover  by  word 
or  whistle,  order  or  command,  or  even  the  repeated  and 
heroic  example  of  the  officer,  to  advance  again  over  the  fire- 
swept  space;  and  the  same  non-commissioned  officer  who 
through  a  long  term  of  service  has  enjoyed  the  reputation 
of  being  a  brave  soldier,  and  has  returned  from  some  other 
war  decorated  with  the  outward  signs  of  his  bravery,  who  is 
expected  to  possess  superior  morale,  and  who  is  appointed 
to  the  honorable  duty  of  holding  on  high  the  symbol  of 

♦According  to  the  History  of  the  57th  Regiment,  the  two  bat- 
talions of  the  Fifty-seventh  numbered  31  officers  and  1825  men  as 
they  entered  the  battle  (page  88),  which  agrees  with  the  figures  I 
gave  in  the  first  edition. 


0\o  \hvKm"«  \>hou  tho  ort\oo\\«*  NNUtoUful  t\\o  is  not,  or  ran  l><> 
»\o  Um\)SV>\  ou  hi\«»  «iui  0»ou  oul,v  »U>«s^  tho  muoi^hI  ou\Mou\ 
wrtvx^  ovov  0\o  rtoUi  whou  iho  oomumu«l  ^'Ooloi^w  on  \\\^W  u^- 
\s^U*  0\o  Ih^»mvv  t^nwjHM^U'U^Y  tv>  his  \hU,Y,  Suoh  U  \»i»u  au»l 
s«oh  ttUo  \s  iW  ^*o^^io^^  h\"»<iv  of  *U^Ut>  rhawji^^s  \uo?»(  of 
thorn  oom\^UM<^lv>  awtt   viyivotT  m>o>\   (htM>>Nol\os  u»n,\    vS\jo 

\  ««\t>    t^>    its 

Whoow^^  U^uis*  (»>»o\vN  luust  Kuow  \uo\\»  i\\\\\  iho  ortloor 
who  o\Mo»^  thou\  into  knOo  shouUi  uovor  forjjx^t  (hat  tho 
mtNj^suw  ho  av\^U<^  to  himsolf  Is  j^»)>Uoahh^  to  hut  fow  of 
J\i«  t\wn>»  Nor  !iho\th<  ho  forjjxM  that  wUl  powor,  <h^YOtiow, 
\HMm^H^\  auti  hra\on  »K^  not  \u\arlahlv  aot  \\\  tl\o  sa>uo  do 
jiiw  \«  an  othor\v\so  <>t\so\uto  uuu\,  Vavio\\s  phouo»uo»a 
au\i  !i^nuimo«t?ix  h\M^il\  «tul  «\o«ttt\  ^^lvS|H\!4Uiot\s,  wUI  t«\\v<\tr 
tho  s\>«\Ns  stt>n>jith;  uoYor  xyJU  it  ho  to  iU^^y  a?*  it  was  ,Y<\stxM^ 
*^«l\\  a«d  tomovtvYY  it  XYiU  W  ditYo\v«t  ftv«>  \Yhat  it  is  to 
*hv>»  TTho  t>^oiutiou  to  ^iio  a  )ii>^M  and  uohU\  oaiu>  atnl 
hoixYio  dtv^th  marks  that  mowont  \Yho«  »ua«  oxalts  hitwsolf 
to  tho  hijjhtvit  ottioiouoY,  ln>t  it  is  not  tho  t)*M'*).3v  .vf^iUfum  of 
jvs^Yohioai  \it\\  l»v  stud^viuji  \vs^Yoholoj£\  iu  taotios  yyo  o«« 
wot  tt^\m^  with  kno\Yt\  quatuitit'^s,  sitt^v  \vj^>'ohi\^U  viuai\titio«t 
<^itYor  as  nw^oh  as  do  \\\ow  a«d  van  in  tNU*h  of  thon\  OYor,\* 
motnontx  Tho  s^uno  dt^nt  that  I  \><M'fortu  toda.Y  »\\sol«to\,v 
and  ««h*^itati«>il,Y  t«a>  at  somo  othor  momont  tiud  \uo  it^ss 
\vt\^\^mH^  aud  t\\ul^v.  Tho  S4UU0  is  tht^  t^^st^  with  tho  tnajoi^ 
itY  of  ot^»v\^  and  ho  who  snviv{\ss»^s  this  \n»\>sntv  is  a\>  ox 
tmot>Una»\v  n\an;  ho  has  stnj^jHHi  hi\>\solf  of  h\uuanit,Y;  ho 
is  ji\>>«Uv  F»«»tio  wiU  and  othi^-^t  will  aiHHnnvUst\  jM^ai^ 
ti^N^ll^v  tho  siuno  t>^sn\ts,  Tho  iattor  oxaits  wan  ahovo 
hnman  watnrt^;  \vhi\o  tho  fornvor  in>hn»^  him  YYith  an  onthns 
iasiu  whioh  »\*»m*\s  him  to  tho  limits  of  hnman  aohioYo^nont^ 

b\  an  art^vv  >vx^  havx^  no  nst^  for  fanaticism  on  a^^^nnt  of 


fh*'  ((.'■■  .  /^. 

m*!  f'jfttntmfry  .  .-ink,      h  r>.fU^   »,,    ;,'^(>n,j 

ffftA*  r  J»W' 

rr,  .v*^fy 

#*j*f*,  h*fW0^*^t  trill  *t^#rf  r*wMphi'  **  *r%fr*^$^m  ih  fh*r  fn\0f^  T> 
)^  'A  \nAy('  fA  ♦h i '  <  r*^  If r^  «M  mll*ir*A  wMf  fh^ 

ff(0t(^,  ithti  Uft/f    ;vv4  *fMM  f^M^**,    ^Pftr  ffvwf* 

I9r*<^^  rth4*^  th*'  fftHft*^^A  *A  *rrtrfytUiftf(  fh»f  »ft*^>**  *ft4 

r^^Mvt^f  9ihA  *rif*m  ihtr  mi^iu^M  Ws*A  *  ^ftj^mr  SA*^,  f%ikt  if 
'  'yft  fA  iAU^  miffrpffj  HU^j^  fftt  a  nnnitj^iMi 

'*  (^^l>f^/^   tdhA    mrrff  *A  ffc*   ifi*'r '-^' '' ^  A        t  fl 

\..  A  1-^  k^  \U  fd'iftA.      ffiA  ftU  fllM*«r»r  tif,  '% 

yr*^*rm  tit*'.  f0if^tA*r  irftm  ^^'itt^  «r*/?  4fiA  fh*^  imltt^A  i/ft 

.n\A  h*^  *  i¥mr*'jk  tA  ftAU'tcfym  fjfp  fh*'.  *Att^A:f,  h*/;t^m€ 
mUmftAi/fAHitt  r  ftnA 

<■;.-.  .n 

*'/mttt  fh*',  *Aff^':f  'A  fh<^  bfliffl*'  »«  ';tf*<tf^^  Ir. 


166  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

with  it.  booauso  it  will  enable  bim  as  a  leader  to  give 
sensible  orders. 

I  do  not  hesitate  to  aoknowledire  that  the  tire  at  Mars- 
hi-Tour  atVeeted  niv  nerves  for  months.  Troops  exposed  to 
anything  similar  are  demoralized  for  some  time — the  oflS- 
cers  as  well  as  the  men:  nor  am  I  alone  in  holding  this 
opinion.  General  SkobeletV.  whose  force  and  rare  personal 
courage  no  unbiased  mind  will  deny,  said  after  the  third 
battle  of  rievna:  "We  have  made  the  assault  and  taken 
the  enemy's  works,  but  the  assault  has  cost  us  less  than 
the  retreat.  The  terrible  fire  has  demoralized  oflBcers  and 
men.  It  should  be  well  considered  whether  the  prize  is 
worth  such  exhaustion.  Demoralization  is  infectious,  even 
in  the  best  army."  Yet  the  losses  of  his  troops  did  not 
equal  those  of  the  oSth  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour.  Serious, 
thinking  men  will  not  gainsay  what  1  assert,  since  they  know 
themselves  and  human  nature  and  judge  its  failings  lenient- 
ly: narrow,  vain  minds  will  oppose  it,  and  to  attempt  to  eon- 
Tinee  them  would  be  to  carry  owls  to  Athens.  Couragt 
not  based  on  transcendental  convictions  will  soon  pale.  It 
is  said  that  before  going  to  the  war,  Skobeleff  consulted  a 
fortune-teller,  and  that  she  prophesied  that  he  would  escape 
all  danger  unscathed;  that  from  that  time  on  he  wore  a  tal- 
isman in  which  he  reposed  implicit  faith.  It  would  not  be 
the  first  of  such  instances.  Trajan,  one  of  the  finest  and 
most  heroic  personages  in  the  annals  of  war,  did  the  same. 
Their  opponents  may  call  it  weak,  superstitious,  unworthy, 
and  unchristian,  and  so  it  may  be.  but  the  warrior's  Psyche 
has  nothing  in  common  with  the  word :  whence  she  derives 
her  strength  is  inmiaterial  to  the  cause,  so  long  as  she  is 
there  and  is  of  the  moral  kind. 

(i)  Bemarhs  on  the  Battle-Field  and  on  the  Enemy's  Forces. 
— Of  the  line  of  battle  of  the  X.  and  III.   Corps  east  of 


Military-Historical  Studies.  167 

Mar8-la-Tour  nothing  waH  viKible  except  four  batterifiS, 
which  were  in  action  north  of  the  MaiK-la-Tour — Vionville 
road  and  west  of  the  Tronville  copse.  On  horweback,  how- 
ever (from  Slope  780  of  the  map,  Houth  of  the  Mars-la- 
Tour — Vionville  roadj,  we  could  survey  the  French  position, 
which  extended  from  Height  840  to  Oreyere  Ferme;  we  even 
could  diHtinguinh  a  mounted  group  of  some  size  among  the 
Troops  on  Height  846.  It  wan  General  Ladmirault  with  his 
staff.  To  the  right  and  left  were  long  lines  which  we  could 
follow  to  the  west  as  far  as  Greyere  Ferme.  Among  the 
infantry  we  could  make  out  lines  of  artillery,  which  even 
then  were  directing  a  lively  fire  on  Mars-la-Tour  and  on  the 
4th  Cuirassiers.  It  was  not  jjossible  to  make  a  correct  es- 
timate of  the  enemy's  forces,  but  there  could  be  no  doubt 
that  at  least  we  had  a  division  in  front  of  us.  Moreover,  the 
sun  was  shining  slantingly  along  the  entire  French  position, 
which  was  as  yet  free  of  smoke  and  dust.  The  conditions 
were  as  favorable  for  a  good  view  as  they  could  be  at  that 
distance.  The  clock  pointed  to  4  o'clock  as  the  brigade 
started.* 

In  time  of  peace  any  general  officer  who  would  attack 
an  opponent  of  whom  he  has  no  information,  learning  when 
too  late  that  he  had  run  up  againts  a  position  unassailable  by 
frontal  attack,  and  which  was  held  by  greatly  superior  and 
better  armed  forces  than  his  own,  would  be  sent  to  Cov- 
entry on  the  spot.  That  standard  of  measure  is  inappli- 
cable in  war,  because  in  actual  war  various  favorable  circum- 
stances might  counterbalance  the  numerical  inferiority  of 
the  attacker.  Such  circumstances  could  not,  however,  be 
counted  here,  as  the  enemy  was  awaiting  us  in  deployed  lines 
under  cover.r  and  we  could  not  expect  to  surprise  him.     The 

♦When  the  57th  Regiment  moved  off,  I  wajj  asked:  "What  time?" 
I  answered  in  a  loud  tone  of  voice:     "It  is  4  o'clock." 

^At  lea.st  Grenier'8  division. 


168  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Vvvuch  posilit)!!  was  as  stroiiu  as  Ihoujjh  Nalnrc  meant  lo 
show  by  (his  cxampK'  how  positions  shonhl  bo  soh'ctod  in  fn- 
turo.  A  slanlinij  exposed  plane  oipiallin};'  in  oxiont  tho  i-an<:;(^  of 
the  rifle;  at  niedivni  range  an  obstacU'  in  tho  shapo  of  a  nioad- 
o\v-bottom  Ji — 400  i)ares  wido  and  en  I  np  b.v  nnniorous  wire 
fonees;  at  close  ranuv  a  ravint^  which  rondorod  tho  position 
noxt  to  nnassailabU'.  Ami  of  all  this  thoso  in  connnand 
know  nothinij,  althoniih  that  part  of  tho  uronnd  had  b(>on  in 
onr  possession  the  whole  forenoon  I  Tho  example  is  1_v])ieal 
for  the  seleetion  of  a  i)osilion  on  the  part  of  a  defender 
who  desires  to  profit  to  the  fnllest  extent  by  the  small- 
caliber  rifle;  f  lie  samo  (>xami)h'  also  u;o(^s  to  show  how  caralrjf 
should  not  act,  how  the  si/steni  of  orders  should  not  be  r(\i:;nlated, 
how  the  sifsteni  of  reports  should  not  he  mana.ued.  Snftieient 
reconnaissanee  and  eorrei-t  and  quick  leports  will  pretMui- 
nentl}'  be  required  in  the  future,  and  the  omissions  in  these 
respects  and  on  fhat  ground  are  valuable  lessons. 

Before  ii'oin.U"  into  battle  on  the  llUli  of  August,  Grenier's 
division  nnmberiHl,  accordini;-  to  the  latest  resean-hes,  7750 
rifles.  At  the  time  when  the  ;>8th  r>rii>ade  attacked  that 
division,  the  latter  no  lonjjer  had  the  same  strength,  as  it 
had  previously  taken  the  offensive  and  been  driven  back  to 
the  height  of  Bruville.  Let  us  nevertheless  take  that  figure. 
The  08fh  "Regiment  and  the  ."th  Chasseur  TJatfalion  of  this 
division  stood  at  (^reyC're  Ferme,  whence  they  maintained 
a  rather  weak  tire  action.  The  :^8th  Brigade  witli  its  4400 
rifles  was  fluM-efore  pitttnl  against  7750  rilles  ou  the 
other  side. 

Cisseif's  division  numbered  S350  rifles;  it  did  not  take 
part,  however,  until  the  catastro]>he  had  become  imminent. 
The  57th  and  7:>d  Kegiments  and  part  of  the  20th  Chas- 
seur Battalion  (about  one-half  of  Cissey's  division,  some 


Military -II islorical  Studies.  109 

417.1  i\\\cH}  \\\vuc(\  oil  I  Ik-  ."'^tli  lirij^adf,  whilo  \\\c  rf-rnain- 
iuiL,  4175  rifloH  v/cac  (ttii^nircil  in  tho  dirf?frtion  of  MarH-Ia 
Tour  and  againnf  fho  Ooinian  artillfry  y>OKtod  farlh*fr  woHt. 

At  tho  (MJJininatin^^  point  of  tho  action,  thr-rofon',  th<; 
oppoHinj;  forcfH  wore  11,925  rifleH  a^ainnt  4400;  tho  former 
w*'ro  on  flu'  Hfiot  from  thr-  b^'j^inninf^,  thf  lattor  r-nj^agod 
f>.v.r:res<iii:':l.y  and  <it  ahorter  ranj(o, 

A  flirt lior  jioint  aj^ainHt  the  OermanH  Khould  be  «pecial- 
ly  mentioned — viz.,  the  very  j^reat  Huperiority  In  the  nt]m- 
ber  of  FrfiH-h  t^unn,  and  in  that  partifiilar  the  attack  of  the 
.'{Sth  IJrif^ade  diflerH  materially  from  others.  The  fact  haH 
been  eHtabliHhed  that  the  entire  Frr-rnh  artillery  of  both 
diviKioriH  and  the  icH'^rv*'  artillery  were  in  action  at  the 
time  when  the  .'{8th  lirij^ade  wan  croKHinj;  the  Vionville — 
MarH-la-Tour  road — i.  «.,  'id,  12,  12,  and  in  addition  2  mit- 
railleuHe  batterlcK,  making  in  all  72  giinH.  Ah  against 
these  72  guns  we  had  but  '50.  The  nnperiority  of  fir^,  not 
only  of  the  French  infantry,  but  also  of  the  artillery,  could 
not  but  be  great  under  the  'ircurnHtanceB. 

{cj  The  Dephymmt. — Thr;  brigade  as  formed  to  the . 
south  w^Kt  of  Mars-la  Tour  lent  its  flank  so  much  to  the  enemy 
that  its  line  was  almost  perpendicular  to  the  enemy's  front, 
which  may  be  explained,  but  not  justified,  by  the  fact  that 
Tronville  had  been  assignf-d  to  thf  brigade  as  its  first  objec- 
tive. The  order  to  attack  was  now  received.  The  battle- 
ground sprc*ad  before  us  extended  2.500  meters  from  left  to 
right,  and  the  regiment  which  had  to  take  most  ground  (^57th 
Regiment  and  2  pioneer  companies  X.)  should  first  have 
gained  its  new  front  by  a  large  wheel  to  the  left,  before  the 
general  advance  was  begun.  That  was  not  done,  as  I  have 
shown  above. 

During  the  movement  the  unavoidable  evil  results  be- 
came apjmrent,  and  to  minimize  them  every  battalion  com- 
\z — 


170  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

mandor  urged  his  troops  forward  at  an  increased  pace.  It 
did  not  lu'li)  any.  The  original  error  could  not  be  made  good 
by  a  more  rapid  gait.  The  brigade  had  not  paid  sufficient 
heed  to  the  question  of  "space";  the  battalions,  even  the 
'Companies,  became  successively  engaged,  and  were  succes- 
sively rei)ulsed,  from  left  to  right,  so  that  the  IGth  Regi- 
ment (.11.  and  I.  liattalion)  had  already  come  to  a  halt  at 
the  moment  when  the  Fusilier  Battalion  of  the  Fifty- 
seventh  (right  Hank  of  the  brigade)  just  reached  the  skir- 
mish line.  The  numerical  conditions  were  quite  inade- 
quate for  carrying  out  the  attack,  and  the  method  of  em- 
ployment of  our  forces  destroyed  the  last  hoi)e  of  success. 

To  the  blunder  of  ignorance  as  to  the  enemy's  strength, 
his  position,  and  the  battle-field,  another  no  less  fatal  one 
was  added:  proceedimj  to  ihc  a  I  lad-  irifhout  previous  suitahle 
deployment* 

(d)  The  .-l/^rtrA-.— During  the  great  wheel  to  the  left  the 
I.  Batallion  of  the  Fifty-seventh,  when  about  2500  meters 
from  the  enemy  (south  of  the  Mars-la-Tour — Vionville  road), 
deployed  two-thirds  of  2  companies  (1st  and  2d)  as  skirmish- 
ers by  order  of  the  division  commander,  and  one  of  these 
companies  (2d — 57th)  was  directed  by  the  division  com- 
mander in  person  toward  the  IGth  Regiment,  so  that  when 
the  battle  came  to  a  standstill,  the  distribution  of  the  trooi>s 
was  as  indicated  in  Sketch  111. 

During  the  advance  the  troops  crossed  each  other 
obliquely.  The  attack  itself  was  a  "chase,"  so  that  the  men 
colla]>sed  in  front  of  the  enemy's  position  from  sheer  ex- 

*At  the  inspection  of  F. — 57th  on  the  drill-ground  on  the  Cher- 
near  Tours,  by  General  von  Voigrts-Rhetz  in  February,  1S71,  General 
von  Schwarzkoppen  was  present,  who  just  before  had  resumed  com- 
mand of  the  19th  Division.  On  noticing  me,  he  came  riding  up  and 
said,  in  his  jovial  way:  "Comrade,  you  were  the  adjutant  of  the 
brave  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Riill.  That  was  a  had  bufihirs>t  at  Mars- 
la-Tour.    Who  could  have  guessed  that  so  many  were  against  us?" 


Military -Historical  Studies.  171 

haustiou.       This  brings  me  to  the  ravine  at  Mars-la-Tour. 

The  Oflicial  Account  states  that  all  5  battalions  crossed 
the  ravine.  I  say  only  1st,  2d,  3d,  4th,  7th,  8th,  11th— KUh 
and  2d — 57th.  During  our  advance  the  French  opposed  to 
F.— IGth,  I.— 57th,  F.— 57th,  2  C.  P.  X.  a  strong  line  which 
came  forward  to  the  northern  edge  of  the  ravine;  our  3  half 
battalions  halted  80 — 100  meters  south  of  the  southern 
^dge  of  the  ravine  and  did  not  get  one  step  farther.  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  say  so,  however;  proof  must  be  adduced.  In 
doing  that  I  beg  indulgence  for  stating  some  personal  ex- 
I)eriences  which  I  cannot  omit,  as  they  are  part  of  the  proof. 
1  do  not  thereby  intend  to  bring  myself  to  the  fore,  and  in 
order  to  escape  any  such  suspicion,  the  first  edition  of  this 
book  was  publislH'd  anonymously.* 

As  far  as  150  meters  to  the  north  of  Contour  780, 
Ohly's  half-battalion  (12th,  9th— IGth)  and  4th,  3d— 57th 
moved  abreast  of  each  other.  The  latter  here  threw  them- 
selves down  upon  signal  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll, 
while  the  former  continued  its  march  by  an  order  from 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Sannow,  delivered,  according  to  the 
History  of  the  Sixteenth,  by  the  adjutant,  Lieuten.ant  von 
novel.  I  was  at  the  most  30  meters  to  the  right  of  12th, 
9th — IGth.  At  that  moment  Vice-Sergeant-Major  Thiel,  who 
commanded  a  platoon  of  2d — 57th,  came  up  from  the  left 
and  reported  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll:  "I  report 
respectfully  that  my  platoon  no  longer  follows  me.  They 
are  lying  down.  I  have  repeatedly  rushed  forward.  It 
was  of  no  use."  •  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll,  a  man  of 
quick  disposition,  turned  to  me  saying:  "These  fellows!" 
and  ordered  summarily;  "Ride  back  with  the  platoon 
leader.     You  will  find  me  with  Lieutenant  von  Warendorff" 

•Various  reasons  have  in  the  meantime  prompted  me  to  put 
my  name  on  the  title-page. 


IT'J  ltujuirit'!<  into  the  'l\u'tics  of  the  Future. 

^Ist — 57th).  I  rt';uh(>(l  llu>  platooti.  :in«l  tlu>  brave  ])l;»l(H)n 
U'!\dtM'.  a  Uovo  in  iUv  t'ullcsl  si'use  o{  i\\v  wovA,  wavitii:;  his 
8\vonl  and  calliii.u;  "l'\>r\vardl"  suctMMHh'd  in  cari'vin*;'  sonu' 
noui'oniniissioncd  olVictTs  and  men  >viHi  liini.  Most  of  tho 
rtMunininj;  nuM\  \v«M-t'  Ivinu'  d»>ad  or  wt>nn(h'd  o\\  \\w  urouud  ns 
[\\c\  had  stood  in  [ho  ranks,  anions  thi'ni  sovtM'al  whom  1  had 
trained  as  i-ocrnits  ii\  lS(!(i  and  IStlT.  and  whom  1  kniMv  wtdl. 
'rh»\v  had  ah-oad.v  nu>t  tho  I'ati*  of  tho  bravt>  sohli(>r.* 
To  tho  h'ft  roar.  ah>nsido  of  (Milv's  half  hat  talitm,  woro 
(ho  rt^st  of  those  whi>  advant'(>d  to  the  foremost  line. 
TluM'e  the  plattXHi  leadtM*.  N'iet*  St>rm>ant  IMajor  Thiol,  was 
UilltMl,  iu\i\  also  two  non  I'onimissiontHl  oflieers  whom  1 
knew.  1  rejoined  Lieutenant  Colont^l  von  \\o\]  t^xactly  in 
rt»ar  of  th(>  riuht  of  Ohlv's  half  battalion.  At  that  moment 
nth.  !Mh— oTth  was  o\\  onr  riiiht  foiinini;  line  and  t»rin«; 
•J  or  ."*  vi>lh\vs.  l.iiMittMiant  (''i>lonel  von  Kidl  remarked: 
"Well.  AVai'ondortY  [Ist — r»7th|  will  bo  lilad."  [Uo  assumed 
that  that  eom])an,v  was  btMUtr  sh(>t  into  U'ou\  the  rear.)  Kid- 
inu  straijjht  forward,  lu^  said  to  me:  "Is  that  laentonnnt- 
(^oliMiel  Sannow?"  1  said  it  was.  l.itMitenant  (^olonel 
von  ludl  rtMiiarktHl:  "1  am  lilad;  we  must  iret  sonu>  order 
in  this  business.  V.-  -.~)7th  is  lirinij  into  my  llrst  I'lMupany 
U'ou\  tlu>  rear,  my  stH'ond  eompany  has  botMi  torn  apart  by 
tlu>  nuMi  of  the  Sixtt^enth.  If  only  Hernewit/.  [chief  of 
;M — r>7th]  will  take  .mux!  oiwo  of  (h(>  iH>lors.  That  is  a 
hellish  tirt\" 

He  made  several  i>thtM-  rtMuarks.  1  omit  tluMu  bt>eause 
they  were  of  a  personal  eharaettM-  and  had  little  io  do  with 
the  nuitter  before  us. 

Thus  we  reaohed  F. — l()(h.  The  followiuii  was  tho 
sight  wo  behold:     Liontonant-Coloiud  Sannow  had  ordered 


•Although   oomplotoly    iloployoil   as    skiimishors.   tho   company 
lost  8  officers  and  90  men. 


M Hilary- Historical  Studies.  173 

Oljly'H  half'-halalljo/i  to  lie  down  in  roar  of  \\nt  hrd^f;  which 
haH  Heveral  timcH  been  mentioned,  and  waH  availing  hiinnelf 
of  the  cov(!r  alHo.  To  the  right  lay  hin  adjutant,  Lieutenant 
von  Hovel,  Heverely  wounded,  and  the  dead  liorHen  of  both. 
Cai)tain  Ohiy  wan  in  the  center  of  12th,  0th — lf»th,  mounted, 
clifrriiig  liiH  UM-n  jind  firing  re[>eatedly  from  the  Haddle.  In 
front  and  on  i-iWM-v  Hide  of  the  h}j|f  hafjillion,  HkirniiHherH 
W(?re  lying  on  tli<-  ground:  thoHr;  on  flu-  left  from  10th — lOtli 
and  2<l—r>7ih,  thoHO  on  the  right  from  Int — 57th;  the  half- 
battalion  itHelf  wan  in  cIohc  formation;  a  few  nhotH  were 
fired  from  the  firnt  linr*,  but  no  regular  fire  action  was 
maintainffd.  Never  have  I  Heen  an  oflicer  of  Huch  cooIuchh 
jjrid  bravery  an  Cai)tain  Olily,  chief  of  12th — IfJth.  The 
Higlit  Ih  indelibly  inipreHKcd  on  my  mind.  IIIh  Hharji  voice 
rang  (hrough  Ihe  rolling  fire  of  the  enemy:  "F.^rwiird.  lids!" 
''Then;  they  come;  look  out!"  Again:  "High  the  colorw!" 
Finally  he  rode*  forward  to  carry  (everybody  with  him,  but 
it  wJiH  in  vain.  The  dr-ad  and  wounded  were  too  many.* 
Ah  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Koll  halted  in  front  of  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Hannow,  the  latter  Hald:  "Roll,  you  had 
better  dinmount."  He  did  ho;  immediately  afterward  the 
horHe  wan  hit  in  the  chewt;  it  rearr-d,  and  after  a  few  boundn 
foil  dead.  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Roll  then  knelt  bcHide 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Hannow,  the  latter  remarking:  "This 
iH  the  only  Hhelter.  VV'e  cannot  advance  an  long  aH  the  fire 
Ih  ho  Hevere.  We  have  to  wait  until  they  have  fired  away 
their  ammunition." 

iH  HO  Hevere.  We  will  have  to  wjjit  until  they  have  fired 
awjiy  their  ammunition." 

A  f(;w  minutcH  later  Lieutenant  von  Wolzogen,  adju 
tant  of  I. — lOtli,  reported  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hannow, 
HiH  white  borne  wan  bleeding  from  Heveral  woundH;  he  him- 

•Thls  half-battalion  lost  8  offlcors  and  about  210  men. 


174  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

solf  was  uutoiuhod  mul  prosorved  a  horoio  coolness*  The 
import  of  his  inessajjo  was:  "My  commander  is  wounded, 
we  are  repulsed  [I. — lOth],  Colonel  von  Brixen  is  dead." 

The  adjutant  had  barely  finished  his  words  when  the 
enemy  eharjjed  from  all  directions  cryinj;;  ''En  avant,  en 
arant!  courage,  courage  Tf  Lieutenant-Colonel  Saiinow 
ordertnl:  "Back  to  the  ravine;  assemble  there."  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  Roll:  "Warendortf  [1st — HTth],  there!"J 
That  ofticer,  however,  turned  instead  toward  the  Bois  de 
Tronville.  Then:  "Take  n>y  adjutant  to  the  rear."  These 
were  his  la^t  words;  a  bullet  pierced  his  brave  heivrt,  and  he 
fell  without  a  sound. 

He  was  sickly,  and  suiTerinj;  from  abdominal  a 'id 
nervous  ailments,  but  a  rare  will-power  swayed  the  feeble 
frame  of  his  body.  11  Is  heart  was  full  of  noble  impulst^s. 
A  lucid  intellect  and  admirable  judgment  were  his.  Idea 
succeeded  idea  in  rapid  succession;  the  mind  was  never  at 
rest.  To  his  nuMi  he  was  a  father;  his  sentiments  were 
those  of  a  sterling  Prussian  otticer.     Honor,  duty,  devotion, 

•Of  all  the  mounted  officers  who  entered  the  zone  of  th.nt  sweep- 
ing fire,  but  three  remained  untouched:  Captain  Ohly  and  the  Lieu- 
tenants von  Wolzogen  and  Bermuth,  all  of  the  liUh  Regiment.  Their 
horses  bore  several  wounds. 

tF. — 16tJi  and  I. — 57th  were  probably  20 — 25  minutes  behind  and 
on  the  flank  of  the  hedge. 

tOvD  this  part  of  the  battle-field  not  a  man  got  to  the  north  of 
the  ravine  of  Mars-la-Tour.  V^'hen  visiting  Captain  Ohly  in  Cologne, 
after  the  appearance  of  the  portion  of  the  Official  Account  here  con- 
cerned, I  expressed  my  surprise  as  to  who  could  have  prepared  that 
statement.  Captain  Ohly's  words  were:  "You  know  best  where 
I  was  juid  my  half-battalion.  You  were  there."  The  fable  of  the 
drummer  who.  after  the  victory  of  Belle  Alliance,  was  put  on  a  horse 
to  alarm  the  tlooing  enemy,  has  been  preserved  down  to  our  days. 
Ollech,  in  his  biography  of  General  Reyher,  mentions  only  one. 
Delbriick,  in  his  biography  of  General  Gneisenau.  mentions  severaJ, 
although  the  falsity  of  that  widespread  statement  is  proven  by  the 
History  of  the  2d  Dragoon  Regiment,  which  appeared  several  years 
before  Delbriick's  book.  The  attack  of  the  SSth  Brigade  has  lii  like 
manner  been  converted  into  a  fable  to  the  detriment  of  history.  I 
do  not  care  to  be  instrximental  in  perpetuating  the  fable. 


Military- II igtorical  Studies.  175 

and  kindnoKH  j^uidod  him.  ff  urnan  fa'iUut^H,  which,  sm  a  rule, 
iLr(t  har'KhJy  uud  njfJiU'HKJy  oori<J'-rnn<?r3,  wcr^re  invariably 
irt'iiUid  hy  him  with  indnJgr:fnoe. 

IliH  nij^hlK  wfffC'  for  the  moKt  part  \hihh('<]  without 
HU'ftp.  In  i]\<t  i\<']t]  }\('.  liardly  r^vor  indultjod  in  more  than  a 
modfrato  drink  of  wine  or  a  cup  of  coffee. 

Ife  waH  fond  of  Ktirnulatinj^  youn;^  offleerH  to  reflection, 
and  never  evaded  eriticiKm  wljen  preferred  in  a  befitting 
and  conHiderate  manner.  He  HometiraeH  «eemed  to  pro- 
voke criticiHm  in  order  to  change  the  Kubject  and  to  know 
the  men.  He  knew  them  and  mjide  a  formal  ntudy  of  them, 
lie  had  a  lueKentiment  of  hiK  death.  ()u  tfie  march  to  the 
battle-field,  he  Haid  to  me:  "I  nhall  noon  have  an  opportu- 
nity to  prove  my  pf^ace  exjimple — but  no;!  shall  not  survive  it/* 
lid  became  Hilent  then.  After  a  while,  he  got  out  hiH  cigar- 
oaHe.  "We  will  divide,"  he  remarked,  "PerhapH,  it  Ik  the 
IfiHt  thing  I  give  you.  The  battle  will  be  bloody,  verv 
bloody.  liemembf'r  me  when  I  anj  no  more  and  when,  at 
Kome  future  day  in  beautiful  Hanover,  you  are  Kpeaking  of 
to-day."  He  then  relapwed  into  a  brooding  «ilence;  it  wa« 
only  in  the  battle  that  the  buoyancy  of  hlH  Bpirit  returned. 

I  want  to  mention  Komething  else.  At  Pont  a  Moub- 
Kon  we  were  (iuart<rfd  on  a  noble  family,  and  the  lady  of 
the  houHe  Hhowed  uHtounding  familiarity  with  the  French 
Army.  At  Hupper  a  lively  conver-«ation  developed,  which 
turned  on  generalH,  armie«,  etc.;  afterwardH  wc  letired  to 
our  room.  During  the  night,  an  I  waH  about  to  lie  down, 
Home  one  knocked  at  ray  dfK>r.  "Do  not  lie  down,"  8aid  the 
lieutenant-f'olonel  on  entering.  "It  Ik  clear  outsid*;  and 
quiet,  the  warlike  noine  haH  Kubnided,  there  is  a  beautiful 
Htarlight  8ky;  let  u«  enjoy  it,  and  take  a  walk  in  the  Hlum- 
bering  KtreetH."  The  convernation  turned  on  the  probable 
outcomr'  of  the  w^r.       On  the  market  Houarc  Lieutenant- 


176  //;</// 1 /iV.s'  i"///()  the  Tactics  of  llic  Future. 

(\\Un\v\  voii  K('>ll  s(op|)('il  ill  Iroiil  of  (lu>  (own  hall  and 
spoke  ill  an  aninialcd  lone:  "He  nhaJl  overthrow  the  imjieriul 
arntics,  the  throne  of  Nupotcon  irill  rollupsc,  I'dris  will  fall.  'I'lte 
nation  is  sicl-  ami  orcr-i'.rcitctt  and  is  noinu  to  rise.  Thinl-  of  the 
l>ufi-e  of  Urunsirieli-,  tlrink  of  Napoleon  I.  t>uch  a  man  is  (joinij 
to  arise  III  is  time  also;  the  name  of  the  modern  dirlulor  vill  proh- 
ably  be  Leon  (iambetta."  Hardly  had  (ho  echo  diod  away, 
when  an  ahinn  sijiiial  ronsod  (lu»  sihMit  camp.  It  was 
Napoh'on  (hiy,  (ho  \TA\\  of  An«;iis(,  and  wo  nn>vod  in(o  a 
]>osi(ion  of  ro.uiiiicss  Ixm-miiso  ini'oniia(ion  had  Ixmmi  I'o- 
ooivod  (ha(  on  (iu>  ir>(h  of  Any;nsl  (ho  I'^ronch  niii;h(  (Mk»> 
tho  olVonsi\(>. 

lltM'o  I  nins(  diijjiTss  for  a  inonion(  \o  o(hor  ihMails,  bo- 
oauso  (hoy  aro  instruotivo.  As  1  shall  i>rov(>  in  iUo  chap 
tor  on  lossi^s.  ours  Inid  boon  <;roa(  so  far;  s(ill  no(  so  heavy 
thai  W(>  would  luwc  Ixmmi  (o(ally  incapable  of  sonu'  rosist- 
anco.  NN'liy  did  wo  not  niako  that  rosistanco?  Uocauso 
wo  woro  surpris(Ml  in  (ho  fulU>s(  sonso  of  (ho  ((Mmu;  so  much 
so  (ha(  (ho  (roops,  already  for  (he  mos(  part  deprived  of  (hoir 
oHlcors.  lost  (hoii'  heads.  ]\'<iirholo(jiral  mot  ires,  therefore, 
surprise  and  rinisternation  with  their  ronsequenres,  irere  in  part 
the  causes  of  the  disaster.  The  course  of  ovonls  was  such  (hat 
bo(h  sides,  takinj;  (ho  olV(Misivt\  burst  upon  each  olhor  at  the 
most  eritieal  pidut  and  at  the  most  eritieal  moment,  so  (hat  in 
some  places  tho  opponen(s  aclnally  ran  iu(o  one  aiioduM*. 

Holh  had  exocu(od  a  bi«j  wheel  (o  (he  lef(  at  tin*  same 
(inu\  Tin*  Frencli  wi(h  Knoll  S4(5,  tho  Oermans  with  Mars 
la 'l\uir  as  (ho  pivt)(.  Tuilor  llu^se  cii'cnnistaiu'os.  it  w.is 
natural  (hat  our  rij^ht  winii'  encoun(iM-od  (ha(  i)or(ion  of 
tin*  iMUMiiy  wliiih  had  doploytMl  durinu'  our  advaiico,  or  bet- 
ter, which  was  awailinji'  us.  wliile  our  loft  and  llu>  tMiemy's 
rijjht  mulually  mi^t  on  tho  otTensivo. 

l?nt  whih*  wt>  had  Won  unabh*  to  do  the  oiumuv  either 


Military -Historical  Studies.  177 

niutorial  or  iiioriil  (huiiaj^o,  his  poHilion,  arranged  in  ticrn, 
permitted  of  Die  employment  of  liiH  fire-arms  on  the  most 
extensive;  scale,  and  of  tin*  employment  of  a  part  of  Ida  forces 
on  tin;  offcjiMvc  at  Uie  sanu'  time.  Tliereby  we  suffered  much 
materially  and  niorally.  1'li(*  fire  increased  instead  of 
diminislied,  it  came  nearer  and  nearer,  the  smoke  became 
imi>»;netrable.  A  greatly  superior  force;  stood  close  in  our 
front  unsuspected.  Had  the  French  not  halted  80 — 100  me- 
ters south  of  the  ravine,  and  had  they  fought  instead  of 
despoilin<;  oiii-  dead  and  wounded  ukmi  and  liorseH,  Ihe  l»ri- 
gad<'  would  liavt*  been  done  for,  and  future  history  would 
have  chronicled:  "To  this  jioint  five  brave  I'russian  bat- 
talions i)enetrated;  none  canu*  back."  It  would  at  the  same 
time;  liav(;  been  the  most  suitable  inscription  on  their  monu- 
ment on  the  field  of  honor  as  iji  the  annals  of  war. 

I  was  being  led  to  the  r<*ar  by  a  fusilier  of  the  Sixteenth 
and  by  a  musketeer  of  I. — n7tli,  part  of  the  time  by  the 
side  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sannow.  After  he  had  turned 
to  the  east,  Lieutenant  Ililken,  of  F.— 57th,  came  along;  he 
was  leading  the  horse  of  Captain  Kcholten,  of  the  Sixteenth, 
who  had  been  killed,  and  asked  me:  "Don't  you  want  to 
mount?"  I  replied:  "I  can't;  I  am  wounded."  He  said: 
"Kteinmetz  has  probably  got  enough  by  this  time.*  What 
nonsense  this  is!  Thank  heaven,  the  French  are  not  send- 
ing cavalry  after  us." 

When  he  had  gone  along  a  few  paces,  a  fusilier  of 
12th — 57th  by  the  name  of  Opderbeck  passed  us;  In?  was 
shot  through  the  left  arm  or  through  the  left  liand.  which  he 
held  out,  scicaming  with  pain.  T  addressed  him  rather 
roughly,  "Don't  yell  so;"  Dpd<'rbeck  then  took  the  direction 

*It  was  ihon  believed  that  the  battle  was  being  conducted  by 
General  von  Steinmetz  in  continuation,  as  it  were,  of  that  of  the 
14th  of  August,  and  he  was  the  first  that  would  be  credited  with 
"taking  the  bull  by  the  horns." 


178  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

of  Mars  la-Tour,  Avith  cvidcMit  doliberation,  and  I  noticed 
generally  dial  I  lie  men  had  well  observed  the  terrain,  as 
those  who  >\t'r(>  without  leaders  went  back  to  where  they 
had  come  from.*  Immediately  afterward  my  two  men 
were  hit;  they  fell,  and  we  all  remained  lyinj?  on  the  sr«""d. 

The  French  hailed  in  (he  i)osi(lon  relinqnished  by  ns 
(80 — 100  meters  south  of  the  ravine)t  in  order  to  close  np 
their  lines  in  rear,  which  had  probably  biH'ome  disordered 
in  crossing?  the  steep  ravine.  Jt  was  not  nn(il  some  time 
afterward  that  Greuier's  division  passed  over  ns,  first  a 
skirmish  line,  then  anoth(M\  then  battalions  in  line.  The 
first  skirmish  line  kept  u])  a  brisk  fire;  in  the  second  the 
men  were  iu(erminj;lin<i'  in  confusion. 

Every  one  seemed  bent  on  enconraji;in'i;  himself  by  yell- 
ing, ^'Courage,  courage!  En  avanir  No  one  jiaid  heed  to  the 
enemy  except  to  those  of  his  men  and  horses  that  were 
stretched  on  the  ground.  This  was  the  moment  when  the 
1st  Guard  Dragoons  charged. 

(c)  The  Betreat. — 1  am  unable  1o  state  how  long  the 
French  remained  south  of  the  ravine,  because  time  is  wont  to 

*Opderbeck  and  I  had  been  cadets  together.  Afterward,  as  an 
artillery  officer,  he  committed  some  indiscretion  Ihat  cost  him  his 
office:  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  he  reported  as  a  volnneer  to  the 
57th  Regiment.  In  this  rather  difficult  position  he  behaved  toward  me 
with  much  tact,  and  was  a  source  of  much  merriment  to  the  men  on 
account  of  his  irrepressibly  cheerful  disposition;  he  bore  all  fatigues 
of  the  march,  etc.,  without  apparent  effort,  and  yet  he  did  not  strike 
one  as  strong.  Opderbock  was  soon  cured,  but  was  again  wounded 
in  the  same  arm  at  Beaune,  on  November  2Sth,  and  so  severely  that 
an  amputation  was  necessary.  Owing  to  his  valorous  bearing,  he 
was  again  commissioned,  and  is  at  present  mayor  of  Liidenscheid. 

tHere  Lieutenant  von  H(>vel,  adjutant  of  F. — 16th,  who  waa 
lying  some  200  meters  north  of  me,  was  picked  up.  carried  off.  and 
brought  before  General  Tiadmirault.  who  asked  him  to  what  army 
the  troops  engaged  here  belonged.  Hiivel  said,  "To  that  of  the 
Crown  Prince,"  which  caused  visible  surprise.  It  Is  possible  that 
the  statement  was  of  decisive  influence  on  the  enemy's  measures. 
Lieutenant  von  H«ivel  told  me  this  when  we  both,  subsequently,  were 
undergoing  treatment  at  Bonn. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  1T9 

fly  during  such  occurrences.  It  should  be  noted,  however, 
that  the  French  infantry  did  not  penetrate  into  Mars-la-Tour, 
wliich  had  been  burning  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  bat- 
tle, or  get  farther  on  the  east  of  the  village  than  to  within  150 
meters  to  the  north  of  Contour  780.  General  von  Voigts- 
Rhetz,  observing  the  ill  fortune  of  the  38th  Brigade,  ordered 
the  Onard  Dragoon  Brigade  to  attack,  but  the  1st  Guard 
Dragoons  alone  were  on  the  spot.  Coming  around  the  east  of 
Mars-la-Tour,  th^y  charged;  tho  hostile  infantry  lost  every 
vestige  of  order,  the  lines  intermingled,  though  in  the  main 
remaining  on  the  spot,*  and  busied  themselves,  as  hereto- 
fore, with  policing  the  field  and  leading  back  wounded  and 
unwounded  prisoners.  For  a  little  while  the  hostile  in- 
fantry fire  ceased  altogether,  and  it  would  have  been  pos- 
sible to  assemble  all  parts  of  the  brigade  in  an  orderly 
manner  and  lead  them  to  the  rear;  at  any  rate,  we  could  now 
see  numerous  men  endeavoring  to  carry  off  their  wounded 
comrades.  A  little  man  of  2d— .57th,  who  with  another 
was  leading  a  wounded  man,  picked  me  up,  saying:  "Boy, 
carry  him  alone;  there  lies  our  adjutant,  I'll  fetch  him." 
The  name  of  the  brave  man  to  whom  I  probably  owe  my 
life  was  Dienemer;  he  lived  at  Solingen,  where  subsequent- 
ly (1873-74),  as  adjutant  at  Griifrath,  I  saw  him  frequently. 
A  fatal  circumstance  here  occurred:  An  adjutant  gallop- 
ing along  the  brigade  from  left  to  right  called  out  at  the 
top  of  his  voice,  "Retreat  to  Thiaucourt."t     I  raised  myself 

♦The  statement  to  the  contrary  on  page  86  of  the  History  of 
the  Fifty-seventh  is  wrong. 

tit  was  the  adjutant  of  the  brigade.  In  the  manuscript  of  my 
winter  essay,  1872-73,  the  fact  is  noted  on  the  margin  in  the  hand- 
writing of  Colonel  Arnold,  no  doubt  after  he  had  found  my  state- 
ments correct.  The  brigade  adjutant  was  von  Kalbacher,  recently 
deceased,  as  colonel  and  commander  of  the  74th  Regiment.  The 
order  for  the  retreat  had  been  issued  by  General  von  Schwarzkoppen 
not  by  General  von  Wedell.  The  order  had  been  delivered  by  Lieu- 
tenant von  Bernuth  I.     On  hearing  of  it,  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz 


m*  to  oast  a  lrts(  ^^inuw  o>»m'  tho  iioU\.  VvvvxXAc  mis»M-\  all 
ar\MUul  im\  ««<t  thou  that  onior;  could  1  asv«»uuu^  auvihiuir 
olso  but  that  ovorvthiuij  was  hvst?  l>otl\  iv.^jiniouts  hail 
h^f  tu^irlv  all  (htMi*  ot\U>tMs;  tht^  nion  sul>s»^|uontlv  tiH>K  in 
l^^rt  tho  dirtvtiou  of  Trouvillo.  luaiulv  tuulov  l.iouUMiaiu 
Tolouol  Siuuiow:  tho  jjrtNitor  i^uM,  without  ot^loors,  it^trao<^i 
thoir  stoi^  ou  tho  r\v\ii  to  Thiauoourt,  aiu!  tlU!  uot  ivjolu 
thoJr  vH^h>rs  uutU  tho  uoxt  aftoruoou.  This  o\au»|>lo  ^ijtu^  to 
shinv  hvnv  u\isohioYOUs  suoh  a  *Muoihi>t\  of  doUvoriujs  onltMs" 
ma^Y  Ih\  Afitn*  i»ouoral  \am\  WtHh^ll  ivooJy<h\  tho  oitlor.  in 
ssti^ul  of  iHnumuuioatiujj  tho  satuo  quiotlv  to  i\^louol  vou 
l>auaoh  auil  Major  you  M^hUmu.  both  v>f  wIumu  oimUi  oasilv 
UuYO  Ihvu  fouudx  au^l  iustt^ul  of  huutiu^j  u\>  a  fow  uioiv 
ot^loors.  for  which  thorr^  was  au\ph^  timo,  tho  atl^jutaut  noIUhI 
rt^lH^\ttHilY  at  tho  top  of  his  luuus.  "Kotivat  to  Thiauoourt." 
^YOt  uouo  of  tho  oommauiUujj  otthvrs  rtvoivtHl  tho  vudor!  At 
that  \uotuout  tho  rtMuuauts  of  tho  briiiat^o  wtMV  uothiuu  but 
shadows, 

Tho  sjuuo  prtvi^utatiou  which  charactorixtnl  the  ad 
\auiV  prtnaiUni  ou  tho  n^trtwt,  aud  it  was  oulv  boYoud  (\ub 
tour  7v^^  that  thiujjs  moudtnl.  Hort\  ou  tho  tlold  strt^wti 
with  tho  cor|vst\!5  of  mou  aud  horst^  attd  uudtn*  artillUn\v 
t\rt\  which  had  btvu  nn^ivutni  with  tho  jjrtwtt^t  voI\ouum»co. 
l.ioutouaut  Nouuioistor.  fnnu  tho  statT  of  tho  X.  Corps,  was 
ridiuj*  at  a  walk  aloujr  tho  liuo  of  attack,  stoppiujr  hort*  aud 
thort^  aud  jjiviujj  ortiors.  Tho  otiicor  displavtHi  horruc 
strxnijrth  of  charactor  aud  is  dtNsorYiug  of  tho  hijjht^t  praise 
for  his  doYOtiou  aud  ciH^htc^i^.  It  hms  he  r.^iV'ftf  tt^ho  HHtan.}lfJ 
ihf  ("Atvvt.  His  u\orit  is  as  imiH^rishablo  as  u\y  jjratitndo. 
*'Ooiwnxdo,"  he  said»  *'ha\-v  yt[»«r«olf  taken  over  there.  wbort> 

countt"»n«ank\tHl  iho  c>r\i«t»r.  Th<»  troojvs  w*r*  to  be  ass<»mb\tHl  ii\  th* 
iltr^-tion  of  l^xnwtlle.  but  tt  was  ti>i>  late  to  r^^aU  ;Ul  tho  mi^u 
d<e>jvrlYiHt  of  th^lr  l^^i^der*. 


MtliUxrij  HuU/rwU  Hbuiwi.  I  hi 

^UtfTh  \n  a  4r*fmiuie/ittjAiiof$,**  It  wan  to  1^  tifmth  *A  Majm- 
laTour.    'Th'/**-  uoi  i»o  »/j»  tf*ait  r'iWa^t'.^  t^r  MiM, 

'#  rj«*;'  \n  our  iu-nrtM  that  all  m\0tt  n^fi  \ttt  Uftd;  ft^m  of  joy 
f.*'\U'A  in  our  *fyt^.  U'h^f  t(*^ufhfU-n$tM  4o  ufft  wirar  fb^  war- 
rJof'«  h<-art  at,  K»i''h  mtttttfuiM'!  U'hat  <J/m*  wr/f.  tb^  an- 
ffHinUt'A  wni\,  tb*;  t/rrHblr  iUi*st\f\rf>\uU'i\  m\nA  <A  \%tn\hftrA  ai$d 
i'/rttHAirttt  nufti^  think,  aftd  f<?*rl,  and  bop^??  How  awfnllj 
'/  '-  i«  tb^f  af/f/f<y'ia»jori  ^/f  KU'b  a  At^f-at*.    On^  ft*?** 

f;  ';;i/j  tb'-  ^fv^f  ift'TiftitM;  ou*-.  woul4  lik/r  t//  know  bow 

tiiiufcn  Ht**,  %'nuv:  on  tlw;  brft  and  H0it;  wi^  baK  but  'jw-e  bfcau 
Han  it  b^i^fn  *fnd/*d  In  o«r  faror?  liff^tat,  ^K^ore  ii«,  oiw*r- 
tuiniy  around  ri«,  jn  fblx  w/Kt  t/rrrlbb?  '/f  all  unfniinhfin  w« 
b-av<f  f b*;  ifHtxlti'iif'Ul,  Tb^r  <jfJu1ort'iu%  un^n  tbat  "tb^  jf':r»- 
<'fai  niUiai.iifU  in  Wft  iinfarr^rabb^  d/i<«  not  r*;a^rb  nu;  arid 
on  H'f  w^mf,  (Sflt-^u-A.  «bot  t/>  \f\tii'jt^,  nnifatbt^U^,  toward  our 

Tb^r  r*dr<iat  of  tb«>  '{^tb  Firi^cad^?  r^/njttjt«t^*  tb^  modt 
horrible  drama  of  tli/;  j^«iai  war.  Tti/?  brigade?  loirt  53  p^r 
(■*'%ii.*  \\\H  \tro\t<tr\'\<tu  of  th'r  d/t*id  to  tb^r  worjnd*^!  '  ':  t; 

strong  m^j  drof/j^-d  d<;«»/J;  tbfr  t/rrribb-  b^^asit,  tb'r  ,  ,',^ 

*-xfra/frdInary  marcb,  and  tb**  f^jnalljr  ^fxtraordlnary  at- 
t^^;k  b^  t'/ffintim*iil  lh*'.  Istnt  r'ffonant  of  ijtr'fnjftb.  and  tfa^ 
t,*'.hnYior  of  tUt^nti  U^rrWAy  dj^aj/p^/jnt/rd  warriom  wan  aji 
varying  a«  tb^^ir  b<-art«,  f  saw  m/m  cry  Iik^  cbildren, 
otb^-tn  <'.o\\A\mt'.  without  a  mtuni^:  in  nn^^t  caw*?*  tb*;  n^*fd  of 

*A/;^/r4tD«  to  pSM^  ((2<  of  tlM  OtUiM  A*jttfmm,  1,,  ^/t  p^  e^tL 
^  \ufAnAtA.    Tb«  latter  ar<^  al«o  SmtSnAhA  \n  thf:  fiirnr««  of 


18'2  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

^v;l(^M•  supprt^ssod  ;\11  otluM*  t'colinu,s;  (lio  bodv  tltMuandt^d  its 
riijhts.  •'\>';itorI  watorl"  \vas  jibout  llu^  only  sound  I 
h(>ard  from  (hoso  phantoms.  Tho  onomy's  load  dropjuHl 
anu>n.ii-  tlio  misiM'ablo  (/(7»ri's  liko  hail;  tht\v  nun-iMl  on  slowly, 
thoir  lu\uls  droopinj;'  from  fatiiiuo.  foaturos  oovtM'od  with 
linn^stono  dust  oiiniiinj;-  to  tho  porspirinu,-  faoos,  disiortotl 
and  oblitonitod.  Tho  tonsion  oxooodod  human  oapaoity; 
{he  man  had  ooasod  to  bo  siisoi^ptiblo  to  anythina:;  noithor 
tho  sublime  nor  tho  vulgar  appoalod  to  him;  ho  faihMl  to 
rtH'ojiiiizo  his  frionds  and  his  superiors.  Thus  tho  mon 
moved  ai'ross  the  Held  where  shortly  InM'ort^  tht\v  had  been 
singinji"  eheerfnl  mart'hing  songs.  A  ftnv  nimble  s»iuadrons 
juul  t\ot  a  soul  would  have  esoaped.  Anyone  who  has  over 
IooUihI  intelligently  into  such  features  knows  how  deeply 
they  impress  themselves,  for  they  remind  one  of  the  expres- 
sion of  ihe  madman:  mad  from  bodily  over-exertion,  mad 
from  awful  impressions  on  his  soul;  and  madmen  seemed 
to  be  there  in  faot.  Through  the  midst  of  these  infantry 
phantoms  single  riders,  powerful  men  on  big  steeds,  are 
galloping  in  the  direction  of  Tronville,  the  saber  at  the 
ihargw  eonvulsivoly  gripping  the  panting  horse  with  the 
thighs,  their  faces  red  atid  streaming  with  perspiration. 
They  were  cuirassiers  (No.  \).  What  did  they  want?  No 
one  knew,  for  they  did  not  know  themselves.  Evidently 
they  believe  themselves  still  in  the  charge. 

•AVhen^  are  yi>ur  otVicers?"  asked  the  comrades  i^f  the 
batteries  in  actiott  of  those  passing.  "We  have  no  more." 
was  the  sad  rt^ply.  lltMt^  and  ther(\  however,  one  was  left, 
and  thus,  after  all  the  ntisery.  the  blood-soaked  tleld  still 
witnessed  some  heroic  sights.  We  mention  here,  in  the 
first  place.  Tolom^l  von  Oranach.  who,  riding  toward  the 
ileJtris  of  1. — 57th.  took  the  colors  from  the  hands  of  the 


Military -Historical  Studies.  183 

exhausted  bearer  and  brought  them  to  a  place  of  Haf<*ty.* 
Keveral  irufii  had  been  wounded  or  killed  while  carrying  the 
colors  of  F. — 57th,  when  Lieutenant  von  Streit  Haw  itw  lawt 
bearer  (Lance  Corporal  Dorn)  fall  some  25  meters  in  rear. 
Roin(?  Fren(;h  HkiriniHherH  were  wilhin  a  few  steps  of  Dorn; 
and  now  tli(!re  was  a  race  for  the  colors  between  them  and 
Htreit.  The  young  officer  was  quicker;  he  seized  the  colors; 
on  all  sides  rang  out  the  "Vive'Vempereur!"  everywhere  the 
enemy's  bands  struck  up;  joy  there,  apathetic  men  here. 
Th(?  Hoiinds  of  the  music  cut  deep  to  the  heart,  destructive 
fire  HweejiH  the  field,  but  the  young  officer  has  no  thought 
but  that  of  saving  flu;  colors;  some  Frenchmen  run  after 
him,  others  send  Iheir  bullets,  none  hits  the  mark,  the  lead 
seems  to  honor  virtue;  the  strength  of  the  hero  does  not 
flag,  panting  he  carries  the  colors  out  of  the  zone  of  fire,  and 
finally  finds  safety  for  fhem  with  1st — 57th. f  Too  'great 
efTorts  had  been  demanded  of  the  troops,  physical  and 
psychical  exhaustion  was  the  result;  an  accident  was  instru- 
mental in  saving  their  honor.  Had  not  Providence  been 
kind,  execration,  dishonor,  and  ignominy  would  have  at- 
tached to  the  number  of  the  regiment,  and  no  one  would 
ever  muster  sufficient  courage  to  write  in  its  vindication. 
Yet  these  troojis  did  Iheir  duty  like  brave  men,  and  the 
annals  of  war  probably  do  not  record  an  instance  wliich, 
taken  all  in  all,  can  be  compared  to  this  one;  yet  the  sacri- 
fices will  not  have  been  made  in  vain,  if  the  proper  lessons 
are  deducted  therefrom. 

Another  young  officer  of  F. — 57th,  Lieutenant  de  R6ge, 
came  unscathed  out  of  the  battle.       Men  were  wandering 

♦Prince  Frederick  Charles,  who  heard  of  it,  intended  to  have  the 
scene  painted.  So  far  as  I  know,  the  preparations  had  all  been  made, 
when  he  suddenly  died.  The  Fifty-seventh  was  thus  deprived  of  the 
great  honor  of  becoming  the  counterpart  of  Keith  at  Hochkirch. 

tFrom  a  written  communication  from  Lieutenant  von  Streit. 


184  //N//n'r/V.s-  iitto  the  Tdclica  of  the  Fiihirc. 

sinjilv  about  (hi>  wide  badlo  tii'Ul ;  lu>  stMztvs  a  stray  ami  rid- 
crU'ss  horse  aiul  nuii'klv  mounts.  Kaisiuu'  his  sword,  ho 
coUofts  tho  orphauod  uumi  ou  tho  road  fituu  Mars  laTour 
lo  NioMviUo.  So(>u  a  bodv  ol'  ,■")()—(>()  mon  is  assombhMl; 
froutinji  (htMjunly  assaulttnl  position,  Iho  bravo  mou  stand 
in  nudes,  toars  slroaminj»;  from  thoir  (\v«»s.  It  is  tlio  young 
(dVii'or  who  sliows  what  tjroatnoss  can  (K).  "I loads  up, 
men  I"  ho  says;  "wo  aro  not  dot'oatod;  wo  iwo  n\oroly  ro- 
pulsod.  Tlio  foituno  ol"  war  is  ohanuH^ablo.  To-«lay  wo 
havo  bo(Mi  'lii'kod';  tho  noxt  tlnu^  wo 'II  pay  thoso  f'oUows 
bai'k  with  intorost."  llo  i^ivos  ilu>  comnuind  "About,"  and 
llu^  nuMi  march  ou{  of  tho  enemy's  tiro. 

Only  tlu)so  who  havt>  hovu  prosont  in  a  similar  mur- 
tlorous  contlict.  when  almost  ovory  stH'ond  man  was  shot 
dowU'  *■'*'•  form  an  idi-a  of  what  moral  strouiith  and  con- 
tidonco  in  one's  own  powt'r  wi'ro  necessary  to  act  thus  at  a 
monuMit  when  nothini»'  was  loft  of  the  briuade  but  sonu^ 
phantom  like  forms.  That  is  the  Psyche  the  army  m>eds 
that  wishes  lo  comiut>r.  As  reijards  tlu>  uumi.  1  will  not 
«unil  to  mention  that  1  did  not  see  a  siujile  num  throw  away 
his  ritle  ov  auythinji'  else;  hardly  did  1  hear  a  wounded  man 
numii  ov  wail.  The  well-trained  soldier,  it  seems,  ])reserves 
a  certain  ureatness  o(  soul  (>ven  in  tlu>  nmst  terrible 
misforlum>. 

.\ft(M'  dark  some  fu^itivc^s  of  tlu>  ;?Sth  l>rij;ade  arrived 
at  the  camp  of  St.  llilaire,  where,  as  jM-evionsly  stati'd. 
11. — r>Tth,  with  some  Canard  Drajjoons  and  the  headquarters 
jiuard  of  the  X.  .\rmy  (''orps  had  been  left  for  the  safety  of 
the  trains  of  ilu>  l!Mh  Hivislon.  of  the  (luard  Drajioon  Uri- 
j:ade,  and  (>f  ihe  ht^idquarters  of  tlu'  X.  Corps. 

At  about  l():;>0,  ou  the  t>veninji-  of  the  KUh.  the  column 
marched  otY  for  Thiam-ourt  in  the  foUowinu:  order:     At  the 


MiliUirylliHlorical  Studies.  185 

hfad  tho  adjutant  of  the  battalion,*  with  the  headquarterB 
t^nard  and  (Jlnard  Ora^oonH  next,  the  train,  II. — 57th  bring- 
iiijj^  uj»  tlie  rear.  I>(;tw'een  .'*  and  4,  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  the  head  reached  the  deserted  and  Hilent  village  of 
Tliiaiiroiirt.  Iff-re  an  intendanee  councillor  of  the  X.  CorpH 
brought  the  adjutant  an  order  to  march  to  the  battle-field 
of  AuguHt  10th.  The  adjutant  rode  back  on  the  road  to 
St.  Hilaire  to  communicate  the  order  to  hiH  commander,  and 
found  the  battalion  between  5  and  0  a.  m.,  near  St.  lienoit, 
soundly  HleejMng  on  both  Kid<'H  of  the  road.  IIIh  oom- 
njander  had  meanwhile  r^'f-eiv^d  the  same  order  from 
another  Kource. 

Between  0  and  7  the  start  for  Tronville  was  made. 
When  the  commanding  general  of  the  X.  Army  Corps  saw 
the  battalion  intact,  he  shed  tears. 

1  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  by  whose  order  the 
battalion  retreated  to  Thiaucourt  during  the  night.  It  is 
possible  that  the  statements  of  the  fugitives  of  the  10th 
promjjted  the  commander  to  retreat;  if  the  order  origin- 
ated with  some  higher  commander,  it  would  likewise  ex- 
f)laiii  tlif  situation. 

On  that  evening  the  38th  Brigade  stood  southeast  •t 
Tronville.  None  of  the  battalions  numbered  more  than 
.'{00  men. 

The  result  of  my  observation  is  as  follows: 

1.  The  brave  assailants  did  not  emerge  in  front  of  the 
••nemy  VlTt  paces  beyond  the  ravine;  they  did  not  get 
farther  than  to  a  point  80—100  meters  south  of  the  ravine 
(F.— lOth,  I.— 57th,  F.— 57th,  2  P.  C);  I.— 10th,  7th,  8th— 
10th,  11th— 10th,  and  2d— 57th  alone  got  farther  north. 
I'roof:  The  first  three  battalions  were  never  out  of  my 
sight  from  beginning  to  end.     1  was  mounted  up  to  the  re- 

•Accordlng  to  a  communication  from  him  (Lieutenant  Kropp). 


180  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

treat,  was  able  to  see  and  had  a  good  view,  and  rode  the 
distance  from  F. — 57tli  to  I. — lOtli  (see  my  previous  state- 
ment)* l\v  order  of  my  late  commander,  who  did  not  want  to 
lose  his  second  company.  I  also  walked  over  the  battle- 
field during  November,  1870,  and  found  that  the  large 
graves  corresponded  with  these  statements.  I  established 
the  extreme  line  of  the  10th  and  57th  Regiments  by  corpses, 
buttons  with  numbers,  scabbards,  etc.  One  of  the  largest 
graves  was  just  south  of  the  bank  and  hedgef  behind  which 
3  companies  had  sought  shelter.J  The  bank  and  hedge 
still  existed  in  the  fall  of  1S7G. 

2.  The  distance  was  not  passed  over  hi/  rushes,  certainh/ 
not  in  the  case  of  F.— 10th,  I.— 57th,  F.— 57th,  and  2  P.  C. 
According  to  Major  Meissuer's  statement  (Milifar  ]Yochen- 
hlatt,  1891),  II.  and  I. — IGth  did  advance  by  rushes,  but  I 
doubt  it.  for  the  reason  that  in  those  days  the  advance  by 
rushes  was  not  practiced  and  such  things  cannot  be  im]n'o- 
vised.  The  entire  distance  was  covered  at  the  accelerated 
step  and  the  movement  was  checked  100  meters  south  of 
the  ravine.  The  men  lay  down,  and  nothing  human  or 
divine  could  have  gotten  them  forward  once  more.  Those 
who  may,  nevertheless,  think  that  it  might  have  been  jios- 
sible,  fail  to  consider  the  moral  strength  of  the  musketeer, 
in  connection  with   that  tire,  the  exposed  plateau,  those 

♦Position  of  troops.  Sketch  III. 

t  Sketch  III. 

;  Nothing  is  to  be  seen  to-day  of  the  former  large  graves  on  the 
battle-field  of  the  38th  Brigade.  The  ground  is  French  territory,  and 
the  French  Government  had  the  bodies  exhumed  and  reinterred  in 
a  large  cemetery  near  Mars-la-Toui-.  There  on  a  bare  slope  rest  4.000 
warriors  I  Since  then  local  studies  in  that  respect  have  become 
impossible.  I  will  also  state  that  the  French  Government  had  a 
grand  monument  erected  in  the  cemetery:  somewhat  displeasing,  to 
be  sure,  since  it  does  not  seem  to  stand  to  the  honor  and  glory  of  her 
dead  warriors,  but  as  a  monument  of  vengeance. 


Military-Historical  Studies.  1S7 

losseft,  and  the  cornplete  physical  exhaustion.  Devotion 
and  self-sacrifice  have  their  limits. 

'.i.  Beyond  (north  ofj  the  ravine,  Chasse[>6t  and  needle- 
gun  did  not  mutually  do  their  work  of  destruction;  the 
effectiveness  of  the  fire  was  all  on  the  French  side.  For, 
(a J  We  never  were  where  we  are  said  to  have  been. 
{bj  During  the  entire  action,  both  regiments  fired  but  few 
►  rounds.  The  statement  under  fa)  is  not  likely  to  be  con- 
tradicted by  military  history;  that  under  fbj  will  presently 
be  explained.  Although  they  are  based  solely  on  the  tes- 
timony of  jjarticipants,  my  statements  will  be  found  indis- 
putable in  so  far  as  the  .38th  Brigade  did  not  succeed  in 
opening  a  regular  fire  action,  and  could  therefore  inflict 
but  insignificant  losses  on  the  enemy.  Bince  the  French 
losses  were  considerable,  they  must  have  been  inflicted  by 
some  one  else — i.  e.,  by  the  German  artillery  and  by  the 
Heventy-ninth. 

(f)     Losses. — The  German  losses  were  as  follows: 

(a)     Regiment  Xo.  10: 

KILLED.  WOUNDED.         CAPTUBED. 

Officers.    Men.       Officers.    Meti.      Officerg.    Men. 

I.   Battalion "|  220  ^i  269 

IL  Battalion y     27     123  y     21     220  .     1     356 

F.   Battalion j  1&3  j  292  j 

Total 27     526         21     m       T  ~356 

48  officers  and  1313  men,  exclusive  of  1  officer  and 
423  men  missing,  of  whom  1  officer  and  356  men  had  been 
capture^l,  which  statement  agrees  with  the  Oificial  Account. 
Total  loss,  48  officers  and  1736  men. 


188 


Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  pf  the  Future. 


(bj     Kegimom  No.  57 


1st  I'onipanv  .  .  . 

-d  C'ompanv .... 

od  Company    1 

4th  Ooinpnnv  ... 

5th  Ooiupanv  . .  . 

<>th  Ooiupanv ... 

Tth  Ooni]\'iny ... 

8th  Company  ... 

0th  Company ... 

10th  Cinnpany  .  .  . 

1 1th  Company.  .  . 

l'2th  Company  . .  . 


KlLUKl^. 

\VOlNl->Kl>. 
Oftuvrs.      Mon. 

OArVlKED. 
Orticors.      Mou. 

1 

10 

51  ^ 

1 

;ii> 

2 

58 

1 

14 

O 

4-2 

10 

41 

y    1 


^26 


10 

o 

37 

48 

.) 

82 

44 

o 

48 

44 

1 

^4 

423 


1 


26 


G       230       1 8 
Total  loss,  24  otfioors,  t>53  mon.  f 

ic)  2d  and  ;'d  IMonoor  Companies  No.  N.:  1  officer, 
8  men. 

(i1)  1st  Foot  •'Abtheilnnir*'  of  the  Hanoverian  Field 
Artillery  Kegiment  No.  X.:     44  mon  and  40  horses. 

(e)  1st  Guard  Dragoon  Kegiment:  14  officers,  82 
ujeu.  204  horses.:|: 

On  the  French  Side: 

I.  Orenier's  Division:  Keirimeut  08th:  1  officer.  10 
men.  Chasseui-s  No.  5:  1  officer,  20  men.  The  forejroini; 
troops  fought  against  5th  and  0th — 10th,  the  latter  losing 
in  all  0  officers  ;.nd  127  men:  the  contliot  therefore  was  least 
Moody  at  this  point. 

♦According  to  the  OflicijU  Account.  IS  men. 

tAcciirding  to  the  regimental  records.  The  Official  Account 
states  the  losses  of  the  57th  Regiment  as  follows: 

Killevl,  6  otlicers,  3t?6  men;  wounded.  17  officers,  42i!  men;  cap- 
tured. IS  men;  total  loss,  -o  officers,  S06  men. 

tPage  lo4  of  the  History  of  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  by  H.  von 
Rohr  the  losses  are  stated  as  15  officers.  126  men.  246  horses. 


MilUaryHUtoriml  Htvditi.  1*>9 

llhy^xmt'Mt  No.  L'i:  f;  oflScerw  and  91  men,  killed  and 
wonnded. 

liej^irnent  No.  4^'>:  5  otfifjirn  and  18^1  men  killed^ 
wounded,  and  rn'mniBi:. 

K^fginrient  Xo.  f;4:     1  officer  and  2^  men. 

Artillerj':     14  men. 

yVAiZ,  />^  offtctitu  find  ZJtZ  ro/:n.  TTieir  ^'nn<r  /»>««  exT/fride^J 
from  the  {rr-'-at  road  from  liruville  to  about  the  Hoi>j  d<- 
Tronville. 

Ke^ment«  Xo«,  I'ilh  and  4.>1  were  »abered  by  the  lirt: 
Otiard  Draji^rxjnH  and  fired  into  from  the  rear  Tby  Herentr- 
ninth,  (itiniiiiU).  The  lr^He«  of  these  reg^iment^  of  Orenier'g 
diviiiion  are  thereby  explained.  They  were  probably,  «f 
<A<f<  A//ttr,  mostly  due  to  the  fire  of  the  H*ivhTtty  ninth,  which 
fired  into  the  wildly  retiring  maHHes  withont  receiving  fire 
in  return.  It  should  al»o  l>e  noted  that  in  the  foregoing 
figures  are  included  the  Umnen  suffered  by  the  regimentJi 
Xr>«,  i;i  and  4'i  ^^e^'/re  the  arrival  of  the  38th  Brigade,  during 
Grenier's  offensive  movement  toward  the  road  Mar»-la- 
Tour — \'ionville;  in  other  word*.  the«e  regiments  snffered 
their  principal  losses  to  the  «oa//t  of  the  ravine. 

2.     Cissey's  Division: 

Regiment  Xo.  1:     10  officers  and  4<K)  men. 

Regiment  Xo.  6:     3  officers  and  17  men. 

Regiment  Xo.  57:  23  officers  and  279  men  (97  killed, 
177  wounded,  5  missing^ 

Regiment  Xo.  73:  18  officers,  347  men  Skilled,  wounded 
and  missing), 

Chasfieurs  X'o.  20:  5  officers.  68  men  Hcilled  and 
wounded;. 

Artillerj':    20  officers.  <5  men. 

To^a?;     5-5  <:;)^cerj?  ar</?  77/7  m«n. 

Who  inflicted  these  losses  on  the  division?    With  the 


ISH")  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

attiU'k  of  Cissov's  division  tho  battlo  at  this  point  was  prac- 
tically ended.  The  88th  lirifrade  encountered  in  its  front 
the  regiments  Nos.  18  and  48,  which  sntTered  comparatively 
little.  It  is  impossible  that  at  this  point  (^hassep6t  and 
needle-gun  mutually  did  their  deadly  work.  'V\w  French 
Kegiments  Xos.  57  and  ~'.\  did  not  attack  until  the  strength 
of  the  88th  lirigade  was  as  good  as  spent;  nu>reover,  they 
took  the  debris  in  the  left  flank,  nor  did  the  French  Fifty- 
seventh  suffer  so  very  much. 
8.     Artillery  Keserve: 

Battery  tUh — Sth 1   man. 

Battery  7th— Sth \ 

Battery  oth — 17th 1    othccr,     4  men. 

Battery  (S\\\ — 17th *J  otHcers,    (>  men. 

Battery  1  Ith — 1st 5  men. 

Battery  12th -Ut 8  men. 

8  otiicers,  24  men. 
Add  l.egrand's  Cavalry  Division  (4th): 

2<l   Hussars 28  otticers,     80  men. 

7th  Hussars 9  officers,     53  men. 

3d    Dragoons 13  officers,  105  men. 

45  officers,  238  men. 

According  to  French  sources,  therefore,  the  entire 
IV.  French  Army  Corps  lost 

Grenier's  Division 14  officers,     348  men, 

Oissey's  Division 85  officers,  1117  men. 

Artillery  Keserve 3  officers,       24  men, 

Legrand's  Cavalry  Division 45  officers,     238  men. 

147  officers,  1722  men, 
as  compared  with  the  heretofore  accepted  figure  of  200 
oi^cers  and  2258  men. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  statenuMits  as  given 
by  the  various  troop  units  are  based  on  ditVerent  assump- 
tions.    Some  merelv  uive  killed  and  woundt^l;  others  also 


Military-Historical  Studies.  101 

Ihff  miHHing;  othor-H  rncroly  give  the  total  number  hors-de' 
conihal.  To  go  into  the  detailH  of  these  figures  would 
had  UH  too  far;  an<l  having  given  an  account  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  French  firing  line,  I  must  leave  it  to  the 
reader  to  judge  in  how  far  these  losses  may  have  been  in- 
flicted by  the  38th  Brigade. 

((j)  Notes  to  the  Official  Account  Ihfjardinfj  the  Terrain. 
— The  description  of  the  terrain  is  insufficient,  and  how 
liarmful  such  inaccuracies  may  turn  out  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  in  Colonel  von  Lettow's  tactical  examples,  which 
are  intended  for  instruction  at  the  war  schools,  the  attack 
of  the  '>8th  Brigade  is  described  as  taking  i)lace  over  open 
ground.  It  vjas  more  than  that,  although  up  to  Contour  780 
II.,  I.,  F.— U;th  and  I.— 57th  found  some,  and  F.— 57th  and 
2  P.  C.  found  less  cover.  For  it  was  the  two  great  ob- 
stacles (wire  fences  and  ravine),  in  connection  with  the 
absence  of  cover,  that  gave  the  ground  its  character. 

The  land  around  Mars-la-Tour  is  ver}-  much  subdivided. 
The  subdivisions  were  then  enclosed  by  wire  fences,  like- 
wise the  meadows  along  the  brook  which  encircles  Mars-Ia- 
Tour  in  the  north.  The  wires  had  to  be  cut  with  the  sword 
bayonet  under  the  enemy's  fire,  causing  checks,  delays,  and 
losses.  Hince  the  general  direction  of  the  movement  was 
from  south  to  north,  the  transverse  wires  alone  were  cut, 
and  when  subsequently  the  1st  Guard  Dragoon  Regiment 
I»assed  around  the  south  of  Mars-la-Tour  to  attack  the  hos- 
tile infantry,  it  encountered  the  intact  longitudinal  wires, 
and  had  to  jump  them.  These  circumstances  are  men- 
tioned in  connection  with  the  dragoons,  not  with  the  in- 
fantry.    The  fences  extended  up  to  Contour  780. 

It  was  necessary  to  mention  the  bank  and  hedge  on 
Height  780,  80 — 100  meters  south  of  the  ravine,  because  they 
constituted  our  sole  cover,  and  the  natural  objective  of  our 


19:J  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

luarvli  and  targtn  for  the  tHunnv.     In  fact,  about  ouetifth 
i>f  the  luigado  was  Iviug  near  it.* 

IV.  Objectives  of  the  French  and  German  Commanders. 
Tlio  eneui\'  iuterrupttHi  liis  movement  in  onler  to  re- 
pulse the  attack  of  lieruians,  intendinu  to  resume  the  march 
so  imivrativelv  deuiandtnl  bv  the  situation  of  the  French 
armv.f  That  a  oajKible  letxder  might  have  secured  a  tactical 
victory  is  uudisputtHl.  AH  the  I\'.  French  Corps  had  to  do  to 
have  victory  fall  in  its  lap  was  to  advance  after  r>::'0  p.  m., 
and  to  take  the  direi'tion  of  Tronville,  as  there  was  not 
a  single  effei'tive  Imttalion  to  op^H^se  the  advance  of  these 
15.000  men.  The  situation  of  the  Germans  would,  for  a 
time,  have  btvn  most  critical:  but  in  view  of  the  positions  of 
the  German  XII..  IX..  ^  111..  \  II..  and  Gimni  Corps,  it  is 
a  matter  of  doubt  whether  the  victory  would  have  atYorded 
the  Fi-ench  ijVi  tVtrt'  results.  But  that  uetnl  not  have  bt^n 
the  Marshal's  aim:  having  shaken  himself  loose  at  5  p.  m.. 

•Plan  5B  of  tha  Official  Account  shows  the  position  of  both  sides 
nnder  the  designation  '"in  the  5th  hour  of  the  afternoon."  On  this 
plan,  as  well  as  on  that  given  in  the  History  of  the  1st  (.Juani  Dra- 
goons, the  lines  marking  the  attack  of  our  infantry  are  prolonged 
to  the  north  of  the  triinsvei"se  hi\x>k  in  front  of  the  French  p<.>sition. 
That  is  incorrect.  In  like  manner,  the  charge  of  the  1st  Guard  Dra- 
goons is  incorrectly  notevi  on  plan  oB  of  the  Official  Account  and  on 
the  plan  of  the  little  in  the  History  of  the  Sixteenth:  the  4th  Cuii-as- 
sier  Regiment  also  seems  to  be  markeii  incorrectly.  At  one  time  the 
1st  and  Sd  squadrons  are  southeast  of  Tronville.  at  another  time 
the  Sd  and  4th  squadrons  are  west  of  the  Bois  de  Tronville.  More- 
over, in  the  onlir  dt  tnUitilie  (.Supplement  I.,  page  11.  I.)  Legrand's 
cavalrj-  division  is  mentioned  as  having  16  squadrons,  while  on  Plan 
SB  it  numbers  IS. 

The  trooj»s  of  the  3Sth  Brigade  are  marked  altogether  wrong 
on  Plan  5B  of  the  Official  Account  (.compare  Sketch  HI."*.  The  History 
of  the  Sixteenth  goes  still  farther,  in  that  it  shows  the  entire  SSth 
Brigade,  with  the  exception  of  -fith  16th.  t)  the  north  of  the  ravine, 
how  it  really  was  has  been  explained. 

"♦"We  shall  not  attempt  to  inquire  whether  that  cv  ntinued  to  be 
yiiirsMtl  Ba:aine's  intention  on  the  afternoon.  According  to  their 
statements  before  the  court,  the  commanding  generals  had  no  other 
plan;  Ladmirault's  action  is  not  otherwise  intelligible. 


Oft  tbif?  Wtti,  hM  uUfmld  r*4.ih*^  havfi  tcuAfrstrtfrti^  to  withArHiW 
towHtd  fiwf  iaUfrUfT  hr  every  AnuUiftU:  road;  aor  eaw  it  b*; 
Afttit'A  ihax  fit-  miiiht  Jiar*r  490«  uo  until  ftooft  on  tb^  17tb, 
wft^:*-  Mp  t//  tMt  hour  tUti  ^fervaoLOM  voold  uot  hsLwe  Yteeo  af>l<e 
to  reuew  tbeir  attack,  \>ntiu%  thht  upajfjt;  of  tim^  RaaoListe 
mi^ht  havf  psiiaed  a  irtart  r/f  3*1  ktU/mtfUfm.  Aod  virfit'tiier  ttr 
ftot  he  i'jftild  \iaiV*t  ]o\ueiA  huftdM  with  yhif'Mii\if/u  d^ytgoAtA 
Oft  tU*;  fjxafrtiiftg  itttwi-f*.  of  hiM  Hirfsiy.  Ifowf v<ir  poorty^ 
VfHyjiirie  utay  have  \teeu  iuf'trmed.  he  t-xmUl  not  fmt  naUer- 
Hiaud  tfiat  if  he  reniaUteA  vKrt*/rioij>j  on  tb<e  J^Jtik  and  falVed 
to  wijarcb  a«rar  at  oor^^,  Iw;  ira«  *'.eniiXu  ttt  \te  samaSMk  by 
auiMfrior  Un-t-M*  Anrtuf^  tbfr  iMjxt  f^w  da/K.  For  to  tli«  novtli 
of  M^rtz^  where  tfaie  Oermsum  were  adraoefo^  «w  a  broad 
f r'^t,  thier*;  waj*  ufftMiuiL  Ut  o{t\ttDV!^.  them, 

iu  jod^og  tb^  fj/urae  td  eren^  tke  fttrate0e  i^nsL- 
tion  rnoKt  \te  kefA:  in  rtew,  Bazaiae  bad  fteen  brooj^t  to 
bar,  he  bad  itei-'U  forcM  to  a  hUt*Ar  \taxt\e.  hM  phuM  had 
Xteen  dm-jfutierted.  stud  he  aUowod  h\mi¥>M  to  \te  iaHnfmeed 
Yfx  the  result  of  tb<e  battle  to  Uinu  tm  the  Ufrtrem  of  lAetx. 

\S'bil<e  <wi  tbfe  French  isid^  it  «ra»  mseemarj  to  he  rU:- 
UfTwoM — L  e^  tft  rec^fOfiner  the  battle-fidd  «f  the  i0tk  amd  to 
regs^  tbe  VUmrlWe — Mjuu-la-Toar  r*tad,  the  Oenmam  iaA 
wan  to  for^^tall  tb<e  eoetny  and  to  liare  fmperior  Ufreem  tm 
hand  for  tbe  a<ext  few  dar«  f<M(>  t]»e  por):^;«e  of  wioumfi  the 
tactical  d^ri«ioo  in  battle,  Tbe  »fetlM»d  deyeoded  extixt^j 
on  tfa<e  fm<:ta/t§  aeti«w;  tb^^  objeet  eonld  iM»t  be  igaioed  fry 
imrely  defennire  aetUm^  the  offimnire  9kM»e  eoold  roodMHife 
it,  Tb<?  qaeKtMm  va«  i«o  t/,  fsaatge  the  attaek  an  t/t  remam 
nafHetesiily  i^r*m%  for  defeuxe  td  what  nrigltt  be  j^ain^d. 
That  wnM  dfme  hy  tbe  ^tb  and  <Stb  THrhmnm,  To  b<e  «are. 
tbej  v<;«»;  nu:tf»;  farorablr  mtaated  after  i  ft,  m^  a»  no  offeo- 
tire  waa  latuiehedagatut  them  after  that  honr,  InhatOe 
it  i«  «onnd  to  aamine  Ihe  eaemx  ax  afUntL  in  tbe  manner  one 


liH  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Ftttttre. 

would  adopt  if  in  bis  plaoo.  Ilis  aim  should  uaturallv  havt* 
boeu  a  tactiral  viotorv  ou  his  right,  aud  tho  t^onuan  aim  to 
proveut  such  a  viotorv.  If  in  doing  so  \vt^  exhausted  our- 
selves, Nve  would  be  facilitating  his  task;  if  we  remained  ou 
the  purely  defensive,  we  would  not  be  giving  him  enough 
TO  do.  Action  >Aas  therefore  called  for  on  the  Oerman  side, 
offensive  action,  but  not  without  due  IuhhI  to  the  smallness 
of  the  force  on  hand.  That  was  not  done:  the  llOth  Division 
failed  to  attack  altogether  and  the  ;>8th  Urigade  was  de- 
stroyed at  the  decisive  strafeijicol  point  of  the  htftle-feld. 

The  order  for  the  X.  Corps  to  attack  Avas  j^erfectly 
proper  under  the  circumstances;  the  execution  was  the  duty 
of  the  subordinates,  whose  eyes  should  have  supplemented 
those  of  the  commanding  general.  In  view  of  the  small- 
ness of  the  available  force,  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy 
could  not  be  driven  from  the  Height  84(5 — (^rey^re  Ferme. 

VII.      How    Should    the   Attaek    of    the    SSth    Briijade    Have 

Been  Arranged? 

1.  The  order  should  have  stated:  The  brigade  will 
attack:  line  of  direction  is  Height  S4l> — Grey^re  Ferme; 
northern  limit  of  the  attack  is  Contour  780.  Communica- 
tion with  The  Trouville  copse  aud  with  The  SevenTy-ninth. 
which  advanced  to  that  point. 

2.  The  signal  for  The  aTTack  will  be  The  advance  of  the 
20th  Division. 

o.  Execution,  (a)  2  P.  C.  occupy  Mars-la-Tour  and 
prepare  the  village  for  defense. 

(h)     Opening  out  the  brigade  and  wheel  to  the  left. 

(c)  The  brigade  commander  Takes  sTation  uorih  of 
Mars-la-Tour. 

((/)  Battle  formation  and  de]iloynuMit  of  skirmishers 
on   the   VionvilU^^ — Mars-la  Tour   road,   clearing  awav    ob- 


Military -lliHtorical  Studies.  195 

HtriJctiorjH,  inlv'dx\<<t  to  Contour  780,  halt.     DiHtribution  of 

th<,'  trooj>K  from  wff«t  to  ea«t:* 

On  Height  7ii5: 
."ith— l<Jth,  6lb  — 16th,  and  a  battery; 

then  7th— 16tb,  8tb— 16tb,  l»t— 16tb,  2.1— HJtb,  3d— 16tb,  Bojg 

4th— 16tb.  de 

Ist-oTtb,  2d-r,7th,    3d-57tb,    9tb-57th,   10tb-'i7th,  llth-57lb,  Tron- 

4th-57tb,                                        12th-57tb,  ville. 

The  ii.\('.r'd.y^<t  dJKtarjco  betwrftTj  Contour  780  K^Hith  of 

thfi  brook  and  the  Hamr?  contour  north  of  the  brook   m 

oOO  maUiiH.     For  our  then  arm,  thJH  dJHtance  wa«  to<j  frreat, 

and  a  fire  action  could  not  be  conducted  with  effect.    If  we 

could  not  entice  the  French  to  come  farther  to  the  Houth, 

where  we  could  belter  deal  with  them,  there  remained  the 

pOHHibility  of  maintaining  a  careful  fire,  during  which  our 

loBHCH  would  have  b^^^n  nmall  and  which  would  have  accorn- 

pUf.hed  our  ohjed.     And  up  to  thai  point  our  loHKeH  had  in  fact 

been  Hnjall;  they  be<'ame  great  only  on  the  ridgf. 

{ej  One  battery  to  take  position  north  of  MarH- 
la-Tour. 

II.,  I. — HJth  and  I. — .'j7th  could  approach  under  cover; 
F, — 57th  wa«  le«H  favorably  Hituated.  Xone  but  Bkir- 
miKherK  nhould  therefore  have  been  thrown  out  on  the  ex- 
pOH/rd  plane;  in  other  rf-Hpef-t.s  the  artill^-ry  Khorjld  have 
maintained  the  action .f 

(f)     F. — 16th  an  reserve  at  Marn-la-Tour. 

All  thewearrangementH  could  have  bf^r-n  made,  but  they 

could  not  have  been  directed  and  watched  by  the  brigade 

commander.       In  ca.se  the  enemy  failed  to  come  forward, 

I. — 57th    might   have  been    puHhf-d    forward    to   the   bank 

and    hedge    IfiO    meters    HOuth    of    the    brook,    and    J. — 

Ifith  might  hiave  been  sent  forward  an  e<iual  distance  to 

tWe  know  that  24  guns,  under  Colonel  von  der  Goltz,  were  here 
posted.     Compare  page  13,-. 

"The  Comj>anies  4th — 6th  and  4th  and  12th  —.57th  formed  a  second 
line,  and  were  posted  in  rear  of  th*;  companies  underneath  whose 
numbers  they  are  placed. 


tho  wtv^t  undor  oovor  uloujr  Oonlour  7S0:  ihoso  n»ovoi\\o>\is 

jjjuio  vH>miuaiuior.  but  that  was  tho  HtnJt.  For  as  sooti  as 
tho  infantrv  oan»o  on  tho  phu<\\\u  tho  trattsmissiou  of  oniors 
wouKi  Kvomo  imi>o^bK^  and  sdivrior  dirtvtion  would 
vHWso  altv>jivthor.  It  was  absolntoly  uivt^siirv  that  tho 
brijfjido  oommaudor  shouUi  ivtain  a  ix^orvo  of  iufai»trv.  tho 
t\jihtinjj  jHnvor  of  tho  1st  l»uar\i  Oraji\HM\s  for  such  a  pur- 
iH^so  iHMUjr  tiH>  UntittHl  and  out'^sidtni. 

Tht^o  lv\ttalions,  having  soino  oo\or.  inniM  probablv 
havo  hold  this  oxtont  of  jinMuid  «non  ajjainst  unwt  sii^tM-ii^r- 
itv  of  foriv.  it\  }>r\>of  of  whivh  wo  mav  aooopi  tho  ciotiou  of 
tho  SiVino  tivoi^s  ajr;iii\st  ovoii  4i«\^\tor  suporioritv  at  \»oauno 
la  Kohmdo.  whon  tho  bouos  of  thoir  bi^t  nion  wort^  bloaoh- 
injr  ot\  tho  tlold  of  Marsda  Tour,  and  whon  tho  nMt\oni bran 00 
of  that  dav  stiU  olung  to  thorn,  a  faot  not  oalonlatini  to  in- 
ortwst^  thoir  tfK'>\ik.  Tho  supi^ortinir  ooni|>;init^  shoisld 
havo  Ihvu  br\>ujiht  nj>  oKvso  to  tho  skirtuishorjt.  and  with 
tho  ojHm  tiold  of  t\n^  of  tho  platt\iu  in  our  fr\>nt.  wo  niiuht 
havo  awaitiHl  tho  ovonts  with  oontldonoo.  No  division 
would  havo  iHvn  jr;\i!UHl  in  that  wav.  l>ut  it  was  tu^f  /i>  our 
oMr/HVvY  to  stvk  it ;  it  was  to  our  intort^t  to  tlijht  a  dolavinjr 
aotion  and  to  i>rt^orvo  our  strtMiijth.  In  that  oaso.  »">  half- 
Ivittalions  and  a  fortitunl  villajiv  would  havo  stotni  whoiv 
now  thort^  was  a  tiohl  oovortnl  with  oorpsos.  and  no  soldiors. 
Had  tho  att;\ok  of  tho  X.  Oori^s  on  this  iv\rt  of  tho  tlold  btvn 
oarritHi  out  on  that  plan,  its  pri^ivtration.  oxtvution,  and  ri^ 
suits  would  oortainly  havo  bivn  mort^  in  ktvpinir  with  tho 
j;ttnioral  situation  than  it  was  now,  whon  tho  loft  of  th? 
^<}N.<M?  (irmit  laokoii  all  supiH>rt  and  was  doprivinl  of  in 
faiUry  whi^o  prt^sionoo  to  tho  ond  of  tho  battlo  was 
indisiHM»s;\blo. 


SHliiarij  IhA'/ric/tX  Hludm.  1^7 

All  ihcw-  uicitum'tm  would  \f*:  i'(\tiii\\y  pratXn-HhU:  with 

V/ //.  7'o.dU;al  C^/Mmenf.M. 
'The,  c.iiMc.  will  \t*',  rar^'whffra  a  Wiy^mlc  of  5  baJfbaf  till  ion « 
in  rliar-jrwl  with  ;j  duty  Ilk*'  that  at  Marj^laToaf ;  »till  rar^rr 
Jin-  iuHtiiiU't-n  whi'-h,  lik<'  fh<'  ou*-  Iti'foro  »j«,  afford  an  ojipor- 
tiinity  for  (■xntu'imuu,  into  th*.-  xfjit^hilit^'  of  thj«  or  that 
im'i'u'A]  form  in  th*;  attar^k  and  drawing?  f/nuAnnUmH.  (hia 
thinj<,  \u>WHVfir,  which  no  power  on  (mrih,  no  i¥t\A\\nirj,  can 
oxipuui!/'.  from  th<f  pa(r^*<  of  Utnlory:  the  ''^th  fJrijrarl^;  car 
ri<'d  Hi*'  uWai-M  {(nwnn]  without  ch*,'ck  until  it  luUfrtfuu- 
\i\ci\  with  Jifi  *-ncrny  douhly  Mui^^frior  in  rirt*-**  and  doub- 
ly HUf><;Hor  in  ^unn.  It  accurat/;ly  prtiw-rsi-A  th^r  dir^-c- 
tion  indicat^fd  by  th«f  division  cornrnand^fr,  «nd,  a*  a 
bri^ad*-,  remained  within  th'f  lirnitM  of  the  Kj»a/r<'  aMKi^ied 
lo  it  in  the  battle.  Whatever  may  tx;  a/lvanced  aj?ain><t 
^ome  minor  matterH,  the  brigade  did  accomplish  what 
on  all  other  occai4ionH  failed  aj^ainut  the  imj^rrial  army: 
il  <:nrr'u-<\  o,n  oMach  cm  ma.nii.c  wc.r  the,  open  fidd,  thouj(h  uniufj^ 
antirjuated  forrnM,  J  vividly  remember  the  wonln  ad 
drenned  by  <^'olon<'l  von  ('r»ttn<h  to  the  a«Hembb-d  (tff'u.*rrn 
during?  the  mobilization  of  1870.  when  urgint?  them  to  prar:- 
tice  their  compani^^.  Amon^  other  thin^M,  he  said:  "Ttie 
French  are  not  goin^  to  att^rk;  they  will  wait  for  hh  in  lon^ 
lin^*«.  Tliey  will  let  uh  come  on  before  advancing?  them- 
Ht-lvcn.  They  have  abandoned  th'-ir  o/TenHive  in/tt'icM  and 
lay  their  nirf^n  on  tJre  tiicticM.  TlicAr  fire-arm  h^adx  them  to 
that.  You  Hhould  therefore  indu«triouHly  practice  a  lively 
and  vi^orouH  advance,  »^>  that  we  may  «/>mewhat  counter- 
balance the  inferiority  of  our  arm  by  rapidity  of  move- 
ment."*   The  hint  wax  more  significant  than  any  one,  the 

•On  July  18, 1870,  LJ^^nit.fmant-Cok/nel  Count  von  WaldCTJtee,  then 
military  aWit-M  at  ParJ«,  roadt  full  wrltt*!n  Tfi\f(m  to  King  William 


l^^S  iHtiuirifs  into  tMf  7\jdic$  of  the  Futitrt. 

sijHakor  not  oxoopttnl.  tbon  susptvttHi.  and  wo  woiv  soon  ti 
Iv  oouvinoiHl  of  it*  ooruvtuoss.  Kvou  bofoio  the  War  of 
1S70.  the  opiuiou  pnnaiKyl  in  ilit^  r«ein\au  Aiiuv  that  our 
thou  oou\i^w\>-  oolmun  taotios  wort*  no  longvr  applioablo 
whon  oppo!5iHl  to  tho  tiro  of  tho  Ohaj*s5ov0>t.  \Vhilo  now 
forms  wort^  boing  studitHl.  war  was  lioolarod  and  tho  infant 
rv  tiH>k  tho  t\old  oousoioiis  of  tho  inforioritv  of  its  arm  and 
of  its  lack  of  praotiiv  in  tho  attack  «»m  m<}oJ>v.  Wo  woro  snro 
that  wo  wonUi  rtvoi\o  oiTootivt^  iiifaiitrv  tiiv  at  jiivat  dis- 
tiuu^^  and  had  to  bo  propartni  to  cross  that  r.ono  with- 
out replying  to  tho  onomv's  t\rt*  and  nudor  oonsidorabU* 
lo$st\s,  Uut  howovor  much  tin*  arms  may  bo  imprv>vtHl.  it 
rtnnains  tvrtain  that  tho  attaokor  who  dosirtvs  to  boat  down 
tho  dofoudor  and  to  occupy  his  iH>sition  must  advance,  and 
thri>u4rh  a  distance  at  which  tho  fnllost  otYoct  may  bo  oxpoct 
tnl  fnnu  his  tirt^ — iHH^  motors  and  mort^ — iloponding  on  what 
maybt*  tacticallxcorrtvt  under  tho  circumstances  to  produce 
the  des^ireil  ettWt.  The  "how"  of  tho  advauoe  aa\d  the  "how" 
of  the  action  at  cU>so  range  have  chaniitnl,  but  both  continue 
to  exist.  Tho  Frtntch  won^  the  tinjJt  to  systematically  prac 
titv  loug-raugt*  tire,  aud  to  apply  it  in  the  War  of  IJ^TO.  The 
FrtMich  infantry  was  traiutnl  and  skilUnl  in  it  to  a  hiirh  d(^ 
jrrtv.  The  Fnuich  did  not  choose  tho  l>;utU^tield  of  the  ItUh 
of  Aujrust;  they  were  forv'tni  to  jrive  battle  ajrainsi  their 
wilL  It  was  due  to  accidfnt,  not  to  prtMutnlitation.  that  at 
most  of  the  imiH^rtant  points  the  battlt^tlold  wasfavorablo  to 
the  otTtvi  of  tho  ritU\  It  rtxlounds  to  the  jrlory  of  tho  FriMich 
headers  to  have  discornetl  the  advantages  of  tbe  jxvsition  frt^m 
Height  S4(?  to  On\v^re  Forme,  and  to  have  turntnl  the  same  to 
immiHiiate  account.    The  attack  of  the  :>Sth  Rrigjule,  on  the 

on  tlie  taotk*s  of  the  French  Army,  which  was  printe<t  and  distrihuted 
iuucm^  the  trooiv?,  Everythins:  turned  out  as  Count  von  Walder^ee 
had  predicted.  tvij-ticularl>-  in  regnrxi  to  infantry  tactic*,  but  the  time 
was  too  short  to  modify  our  method  of  attack. 


uWii'.V  h'AlA,,  t;Oht^Uin  UihtH  HM  Ut  whfftUf^  in  l,h/r  friVir':  k'lrU 

n  ztfUh  of  tivh  uiny  txr  f:r*fim*^  with/>ut  Umt  of  all  fizM^f-'^ 
<rflficj<fiirry,  Tli';  t^n*mt.Uff$n  am:  t.  Wan  It  rftsum  tirt^  with 
whir;b  <it*'.tt\tit'n  i\t'.\t\o}'*^  6'tvMfm  arid  tb^;  nntrntmnafttly  ijtti- 
\f\o\'\uv,  rJ»vi«ion  of  •"  'zrtif^^rA  *'      '     r^iAftt*    2,  CV/W 

th<f  fir*;  hav*;  !/«;<?«  .  'J  a«  r^jr-  nurfi}f^  of  rifl** 

hrofiiiUt  to  tt*:nr'!  'A,  Uiny  a  \ttftUir  diredu/n  of  fire  SMd  a 
r/w>r«  *«tr<;r«  and  rn^rre  effedhe  fSrft  \p('  <fXp^:l/nl  fr<nn  xtnAhni 
w«all'<raliUrf  arrnx?  4,  Wan  th^r  'ASMukHt  ivtSi-^nA  with 
fir*;  at  /ort//  rang**?  5,  Ik  th/;  fir*;  of  utnm*iin  *iff etctirn  at 
%f(ti%.Uir  rAnf/^frn  than  h/?r*f? 

To  I,  2, .'{,  4,  rny  an«ir*fr  j«,  V*;»;  t/»  o.  \o. 

In  ord/fT  to  lUnnimlJi  tb*;  *;ff#;r;t  of  fftsum  fim  hy  an  ex- 
arripb;,  tl»/;  attarrk/^r  dbould  U;  aiM»nwi/;d  t/>  t^  lal^orinj^  tiudhr 
tht'.  njo#rt  unfavorablfe  eirfcttmHijanfjut,  I  bare  »boirrj  that 
tb<;  fnt^ifuMl  of  (irnfAoymhnt  of  ih*-.  ZHth  IWiyLnAh  wan  annaita- 
bbr,  y*'t  that  atfiick  i«  th*-  MJo«t  in«trrjrrtive  a«  tt^vAriiik 
■xtuAtmi  tar;tic«. 

1.  \\'h*:m  tb*;  .'{8th  SWi'^uAc,  d*fplov*^l  for  th^  att.a*;k  at 
4,  f>.  ffj-,  th*;  ttut'irt',  front  froth  Jf*;jj?ht  8^1*;  to  <}r*iyer(i  Ferme 
(fully  2o(Xi  mtftjirn}  wan  b*;ld  by  trr^opK  of  all  arniM.  Or*;- 
nier**  (llvinUnt  kUmmI  in  tUfjtloyfid  liiw*,  in  two  tieru,  oiMr  iii 
r^-ar  of  th*;  oth^rr    T'  7><()  and  %J^;;.    Tlie  ffrrmer  wan 

erownwj  by  d/rn»</r  - lin*-«  (2  rfrnitnunU,  Jitm.  iZ  and 

^;,  the  latt^ir  by  th«r  remaind^  of  th*f  infantrj-  and  by  the 
art'tlUiry  of  tbr?  divi»ion,  IVrtb  fir*;d  inc^f^Mantly,  and  an  we 
nuij-hiTii  ih*;  Vionville — 3far»«  la  Tour  r^/a/I  both  infantry  and 
anUU-ry  fire.  r*fa*rh*fd  rin,    Hcvcr^tl  ni*Ti  fell  on  the  road,  and 

'Aeeordtoc  to  mr  ofMi«^ati<nw,  eonqMUiwnw,  and  intptMe*, 
)^r»»  twdtes  of  ClAwr'f  dfrtefon  did  not  take  part  tmttl  we  had  ero—ed 
Cont/>9r  740:  np  to  tliat  tine  tbe  fire  we  r<eefred  from  the  dfreetion 
of  c  >nDe  waji  re«trl/:t>^  to  the  *«th  Resfnieot,  the  5th  Cba*- 

•et.  ri,  nomerotM  ArtlUtrr,  and,  ft  would  Mem,  2  mitrailletMe 

tiatj^r:'r'..  wooM  pfewoee  wa«  •fsnified  bjr  tbefr  tinguiar  eraekUnt 

TOlt 


200  Inquiries  into  the  I'octics  of  the  Future. 

the  leador  of  4th — 57th,  First  Lioutonant  von  Itoroko,  was 
woiuuhd  thiM't\  At  tlrst  wo  otuild  distinjiiiisli  tho  rapiil  llro 
of  thoskinuishors  from  tho  voUov  tlrins;  of  tho  chist^d  ti'oops. 
V\^  {o  Coniouv  7S0,  11.,  1.,  F. — l(5th  ami  I. — .Mtli  iDnml  i't)vor 
in  tho  im^adow  bottom.  Imt  tho  tiro  m>vor  slacUom'il. 

L\  Tho  front  of  l!r>(H)  motors  was  o»H'n|>it>il  l>>  two  divi- 
sions, all  of  ono  and  ono  half  of  tho  otlnM'  IxMnjx  doployod 
and  tlrinu — i".  (•.,  ll.!)L*5  ritios;*  l»«Mwt>on  tluMo  T'J  i^nns  wort* 
in  action,  inolndinj;  VJ  mitraillousos.  l.oavinu-  Ki^iirand's 
cavalrv  ilivision  ont  of  lonsidtMation.  wt>  tind  for  tho  'JaOO 
motors.  r>  mon  por  vard  in  a  dofonsivo  position. 

.■^.  A  moro  sovoro.  hot  tor  dirootod  mass  tiro,  and  otio 
moro  olYootivo.  owini:  to  tlattor  trajootory,  jjroator  ponotra- 
tion  and  aoonracy.  than  on  tho  l(>th  of  .Xniiiist.  is  prartioa- 
hh>.  althoniih  tlu'rt>  was  no  panso  whatt'viM-  and  tho  liro  ro 
taim>d  its  inttMisity  np  to  tlu>  miuntMit  whon  tho  FrtMU'h 
infantry  attaokod;  wo  conld  disiiniinish.  howovor,  that  thr 
v(dh\v  tirinir  booamo  moro  irroi;tilar,  and  toward  tho  ond  bo- 
oamo  irivijular  rapid  tiro.  Tlu>  lattor  foatnro  may  bo  ron- 
sidortnl  tho  rnio  in  fiituro. 

t.  From  tho  timo  whon  mo  orosstMl  tho  \'ionvilIo — 
Mars-la-Tonr  road.  tlu>  rnomy  maintainod  an  nnintorrnptod 
tiro.  Tho  distam'o  from  thoro  to  Oontonr  ISO  ^north  of  tho 
ravino)  is  ir>00  motors;  to  lloijiht  S4t>  it  is  ilotU)  motors.  It 
was  thoroforo  a  mass  tiro  at  lonir-ranjjro.  n.^  we  inulerafand  it 
to-itoii,  and  tho  atiaikor  was  oovonnl  with  tiro  at  1500 — 
•JOOO  motors. 

."■).  Kvon  with  modorn  arms,  a  mass  tir»^  at  greattM' 
rani^os  is  \\o\  to  bo  rtH'omnunuhHl.  Tho  followiiiir  ironorat 
t'onsidorations  aro  statod  in  this  oonnootion:     1.  Tbo  on- 


•In  1ST5  General  Cissey  stated  to  tho  Chamber  that  hts  entire 
division  was  engaged.  It  is  not  clear  whether  he  therehy  meant  the 
fire  action  or  the  subsequent  advance  of  the  division. 


MilUaryJIiHU/rical  Studies.  201 

tiro  ih\i\  of  fif;  wjjlh  HWffj^f,  v\'it}j  tho  <:x<M\ti\<)U  of  th<;  low 
ttKTiuhiWH  (iXUituViui;  arounrl  th^f  north  of  MarH-Ia-Tour  (II.,  I., 
F. — Kith,  I. — itlWi),  othf;rwiw;  wan  inoKt  Mujt^blo  for  (^tfftcA- 
ivc  muMH  tint  at  lonj^  ranj^o.  2.  Of  the*  2.'i — 25^K)  mnUiVH  of 
Hw<'j»t  ground,  th<?  hrigad<;  U'iiVtfin(;d:  II.  and  I. — 10th, 
1000  timiern;  F.— 10th,  I.— 57th,  F.— «7th,  and  2d  P.  C, 
HOO  iiKticr-H. 

All  thoHC  f;irr;ijinHtiinc<*K  coml/iiitt  to  rnakf;  it  an  attiick 
with  grr*at  nuni^rkral  inferiority,  with  iufcrior  armament, 
and  on  ground  and  in  a  general  Htate  of  the  battle  without 
a  parallel. 

We  expeeted  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank,  but  were  tak'-ri 
in  flank  ourwdve**  and  rolled  up  from  left  to  right. 

^«y     77a«  To/Mcal  Vorran  EmpU/ijeA. — H^i  far  ax  J  could 
aneertain,  they  were  an  follovvn: 
At  2500  meterh: 

II. — 10th.     Conjpany  eolumuH, 
I. — 10th.     Comjiuny    eolumnn    ('.'A,    2dj;    in    rear   the 

ha  If -battalion   4  th— iHt. 
F. — 10th.     ('jnii\niuy  eoiumnn  filth,  l^Khj  in  rear  the 

half-battalion  12th— 9th. 
I. — 57th.  lOntire  eompanirfH  deployed!  aw  KkirminherH 
Hsf.  2di;  in  rh«-ir  rear  ilh,  '.Ui — ^57th  in 
half-battalion  and,  HubHerjaently,  at  1500 
meterH,  in  company  eolumnH. 
y. — 57tl!.  liouble  column  on  the  center.  100  meterH 
Houth  of  the  road  Vionville — MarH  la  Tour 
change  to  half  battalionH,  11th — 9th  and 
12th— 10th.  rin  thiK  battalion  the  le-aderH 
of  the  0th  and  12lh  CompanicH  were  firHt 
lientenantB;  of  10th  and  11th,  cajjtainH. 
In  order  to  have  each  half-batalion  com- 
manded by  a  captain,  the  battalion  com- 

14 — 


*JOl*  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

iiiaiultM-  m;ul«>  llu>  t\»rni;Uioii  lUh.  SMh — 
r»7tli.  I-lli.  lOih-    r»T(h. 

2d.  'M\  1*.  r.     roinpauv  <'i>hMuns  ai  laOO  uuMors. 

Ad\MiH'«>  in  owv  fri>nt.  bolh  rt^jjiuuMits  siih*  bv  sido;  on 
haltin.u  in  ilu>  (Mumuv's  front,*  Slh— KiUi;  •tth--l()th;  12th, 
JMh-  Uilli;  inii.  ^Mli  r»7tli:  IJlh.  lOili  r>7(h  wcro  broujjht 
inti»  (he  llrsi  line. 

Half  o\'  th(>  romnanics  of  ilu>  brijiado  liad  doplovod 
tluMi*  platoons  as  skirmisluMs;  tho  ft>llo>vini;  ronuiinod  o1os(m1 
thronjihont  \\w  aition:  rJth.  !)(h— Kltli;  Ith— 57th:  :U1 — 
:.7(h:   lltlu  Sbh— ;)7th;t      TJili.    KMli     :.7ili:     "Jd.   'M   V.   C. 

(/•)  Ihtration  of  the  Attach-.  I  assnnio  thai  wtMnade  lOOO 
nictors  in  \'2  niinntos.  Tho  av«>raji(>  liriMind  uaintMl  to  tho 
front  bv  all  tlio  conipanit^s  was  '2000  niottM-s.|  tlioso  on  tho 
rij;ht  liavini;  lo  «>\iond  inor«^  and  nun-o  in  that  dirootion. 
The  attack  was  brisk,    ronntinii  in  ilio  delav  oaused  bv  the 

•Compare  Sketch  III. 

IThe  entire  front  of  F. — 67th  was  oovorod  by  \\w  skirmisbors  of 
lst--57(h.  oxtoniUnj;  ;»s  far  as  tlu  lUiis  ilo  TiMnviUo.  Aoi'onling  to 
Lioutonant  SohroilHM-,  thon  adjiilant.  tho  two  half-battalions  of  F. — 
r<7th  joinoil  tho  skirinishors  in  litic.  Thoy  throw  out  no  skirmishors 
througbotit  tho  action,  an  unhoard-of  oaso.  at  any  rato  undor  snob 
oiroumstanoos.  wbioh  roqniros  oxplanation.  Tho  battalion  oom- 
mandor  wantod  to  jiot  tho  battalion  noar  tho  ouomy  as  qulokly  as 
possible.  a.nd  nuioh  tinio  bad  boon  lost  by  tho  whoel.  Tho  minomout 
now  was  so  aoooloratod  that  it  was  impossiblo  to  throw  skirmishors 
to  tho  front,  and  as  Major  von  Modon\  saw  skirintsbors  in  his  front, 
none  woro  thrown  out  from  tho  battalion.  Half-battalion  1 1th. 
J>th--fi7tb  thod  two  or  throo  voUoys  boforo  roaohing  tho  lino  of  skir- 
mishors. advanood  with  drums  boatin.i;.  and  roaohod,  liko  Half-bat 
talion  12tb.  10th-  67tb.  tho  s,>iitlitTii  odgo  of  tho  ravino.  Tho  lattor 
did  not  tiro  at  all  whllo  advanoinj;.  and  only  tlrod  ((  ftic  sbots  on  tho 
rotroat.  Tho  two  balf-bat'alions  had  baroly  roaohod  tho  sonthorn 
odiio  of  tho  ravino.  whon  tho  Fronoh  triXH^s.  who  woro  lyitis  on  tho 
fnrthor  odso.  i(«c'.r;i(V/»^//i/  burst  on  thorn  out  of  tho  donso  snuiko. 
Horo  tho  fusiliers  soattorod.  F.-  r«7th  was  tho  only  battalion  that 
found  no  oovor  of  any  kind:  It  romaii\od  but  a  briof  nu>mont  in  tho  flr« 
ing  lino  and  lost  10  othoors  and  ;?Si'>  mon  out  of  900,  tbo  10th  Company 
alone  losing  S  oftloors  and  ISO  mon. 

lOouuting  from  the  starting-point  southwest  of  Mars-la-Tour. 


'  M ilitaryJI intorical  Hindus.  20.^ 

iMiiovjil  of  Ww.  otjHtacN.H  in  i\u:  rnr-adow  bottom,  I  rnakr^  it 
.'{0  rniniJtc*H  until  th*?  coxxicr  (F. — IfJth,  f. — 57th;  rcfuhff}  the 
h<'<)^r^  and  bank.  In  jwldition,  'JO  rnjnntr'«  for  the  entire  line^ 
dnrint^  \vhif:ii  ]Ki\()f]  U\c  action  w«h  Htationary,  and  .'{0  rnin^ 
nl^H  for  thf  K-Uciil.  I  fhuM  nuike  the  total  duration  1^ 
honr-H.  The  remnantH  of  the  brij^ade  were  probably  aHHem- 
,  I)i<d  Houffi  of  th»-  r-fjjid  Ahirs  la  Tour — Vionville,  uft'T 
5:1.1  p.  ni, 

fcj  I'Jxpendilure  of  ArarauidlAon  o.nd  Fire  Eff eel. — The 
ealeulafion  of  the  ammunition  <x\nu(\t-<\  in  very  difficalt, 
HH  I  did  not  find  /^liable  data  in  thin  reHfHjet  in  the  reports 
an<l  reoordH  of  the  froopH.  The  opinion  wan  general  Ihal 
v:e  vere  horH-de-cornhal  before  v:e  fired  a  nhd.  I  fence,  we  Hhall 
havr-  to  content  onrwdvcrx  with  a  probability. 

The  .*>  batfalionH  moved  into  battle  with  a  Htrength  of 
ti."  ofTifrerH  and  454(1  men,* 

The  loMHeH  until  the  eaMt-and-went  ravine  wan  reached 
were  jirobybly  20  ficj-  cent;  h^-rice  thr-  number  of  riflew  at 
that  point  w{ji<  .'iOJO;  not  a  Hfiot  uaH  tired  by  12th,  0th — lOth, 
4th — 57th,  'id — 57th,  KHtimatinj?  these  organizationn  at 
000  rillcH  and  deducting  therefrom  20  per  cent  for  loHHeH, 
there  remained  2010  rifh-H  in  ii'tirm.  According  to  the 
HtatemcntH  of  Hr-veral  ofTir-erH,  tiie  companicH  of  F. — 57th 
may  have  tired  between  .''  and  5  rounds.  Assuming  4  as 
the  average  and  10  for  (he  rather  troops,  we  have  21,850-|- 
200K=2I.7.'^  shots.  At  this  point  we  have  a  further  dim- 
inution from  losses  which  reached  u?,  per  cent  during  the 
ar;tion,  and  since  the  f^rcnicr  part  of  the  same  was  inflicted 
rjn  thr-  retreat,  further  estimates  become  v<;ry  unreliable. 
XeverthelesM  the  total  expenditure  of  ammunition  of  the 
brigade  may  be  f>laced  at  about  18 — 20,000  cartridgf^.f 

•Official  Account,  page  626,  I. 

tMaJor  MelBHner  HtateB  in  the  MlUtfir   Wtxhrnftlatt  of  1891  that 


204  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

The  oxpoiulituro  of  nunminiiiou  on  the  pari  of  tho  on- 
emj  could  not  be  ascertained.  But  it  must  have  been  very 
great  during  that  brief  space  of  time,  as  General  Tiadmir- 
ault  (IV.  Armv  Corps)  reports  on  the  evening  of  the  KUli 
that  he  is  short  of  anununition.  On  the  ITth  ninny  cart- 
ridges were  found  aUmg  the  French  positions,  which  served 
to  indicate  the  extent  of  the  enemy's  line.  Some  men  of 
Grenier's  division  stated  that  they  had  tired  as  many  as 
150  rounds>  and  that  their  rifles  were  so  hot  they  could 
barely  hold  them. 

Assuming  that  the  enemy  expended  but  SO  rounds  ]>er 
man.  the  11.025  ritles  in  action  would  have  tired  054.000 
shots.  According  to  this.  1  bullet  out  of  452  reached  its 
billet*  under  the  following  conditions:  long  range,  tlat 
trajectory,  absence  of  cover,  employment  of  closed  columns 
and  lines  on  our  side:  artillery  aiul  mitrailleuse  fire  not  in- 
cluded in  the  calculation.  To  be  sure,  we  must  consider  that 
many  men  were  hit  by  more  than  oiu^  bullet:  indeed,  dead 
and  woundeii  with  four  ami  five  shot  woumls  were  not  at  all 
rare.  Of  course,  this  calculation  is  but  an  estimate,  but  it 
is  not  saying  too  much,  that  the  modern  ritie.  with  its  long 
range,  its  greater  accuracy,  tlatter  trajectory,  and  greatly 
increased  peiuM ration,  would  at  many  ]Hunts  have  trebled 
or  quadrupled  the  losses,  if  the  same  tactical  forms  were 
used  again. 

some  men  of  the  5th  Company  fired  30  rounds.     Admitting  the  state- 
ment to  be  correct,  the  total  result  is  but  little  affected  thereby. 

•This  calculation  is  based  on  the  figures  in  the  chapter  on  losses, 
v..  (f1.  page  1S7: 

Regiment  No.  16.  4S  otficers.  33S0  men;  Regiment  No.  57.  24  offi- 
cers, 653  men.  among  them  one  man  of  the  5th  company:  making  72 
otficers.  2033  men.     Total.  2105 


Military-Historical  Studies. 


205 


There  were  placed  hors-de-comhat . 


Killed  or  Woundf-rl. 
Officers.      Men. 


Mi8Hin«. 
Offic<;rH.    Men 


Remarks. 


l8t— 16th 7 

2d  —16th 5 

3rl  _16th 5 

4th— 16th 3 

5th— 16th 2 

6th— 16th 4 

7th— 16th 2 

8th— 16th 3 

9th— 16th 5 

10th— 16th 4 

nth— 16th 4 

12th— 16th 4 

48 

1st— 57th 4 

2d  —57th 3 

3d  —57th 3 

4th— 57th 3 

9th— 57th 3 

10th— 57th 3 

nth— 57th 2 

12th— 57th 3 


423 


^ 


Cover  as  far 

as 
Contour  780. 


26  I     Over  open 
\        ground 
C  b  jth  ways. 

J 


24     t653 


Total 72     1966       2       449 

Of  those  missing  from  the  16th  Regiment  (1  officer, 
423  men),  1  officer  and  356  men  returned  from  captivity  on 
the  25th  of  August,  1870;$  the  remaining  07  have  to  be 
added  to  the  losses  of  the  regiment  in  the  battle,  which  thus 

♦Companies  marked  ?  lost  more  than  100  men. 

IThe  figures  given  In  the  first  edition  of  the  Abridged  History 
of  the  57th  Regiment,  by  Capt.  Hilken,  have  been  correspondingly 
amended  in  the  second  edition  of  1889. 

iPage  278  of  the  History  of  the  16th  Regiment. 


'J0(>  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

reach  a  total  of  48  otticers  and  1."'80  uhmi.  It  is  piobaMy 
tho  jiroatost  loss  sunVrod  by  any  ivyinuMit  in  1870-71.  The 
total  lossos  of  tho  o  battalions  from  tho  enemy's  tire  there- 
fore amount  to  7i!  ot\toers  and  )l(y^'^  men,  not  counting 
prisoners.* 

The  tirst  reliable  accoimt  of  the  end  of  the  battle  I 
received  throuiih  a  letter  from  (\donel  von  Cranach.f  which 
had  been  written  a  few  days  after  the  battle  with  a  view  of 
being  sent  to  von  l^ernewitz.  von  Neree.  von  Rorcke.  and 
to  myself.  It  said,  among  other  things:  *'Tt  was  on  tlu> 
succtHHling  day  that  T  fully  comprehended  what  the  regi- 
ment [57th]  had  done,  and  1  must  say  that  the  men  fought 
like  lions;  T  am  now  all  the  ]M'ouder  of  being  at  the  head  of 
the  regiment Urave  Erhardt  [com- 
manding the  12th  Company]  died  soon  after  the  battle,  and 
the  same  fate  seemed  likely  for  brave  Schreiber  [adjutant  ()f 
F. — 57th],"  who  was  shot  through  the  right  temple,  tlu^ 
bullet  coming  out  on  the  left,  destroying  the  right  eye  and 
severely  injuring  the  left,  ami  he  had  another  shot  in  the 
foot,  lie  was  given  up  by  everybody,  but  the  Lord  directs. 
Sohreiber  was  restored,  is  now  captain  on  the  retired  list, 
and  for  the  fourth  time  representing  the  district  of  Nord- 
liausen  in  the  Diet.  lie  is  the  same  man  who  was  men 
tioned  at  Problus  as  ensign,  and  his  wound  is  a  case  in  point 

♦The  singular  ways  of  Providence  are  shown  by  the  following: 
Among  the  killed  was  Lieutenant  Weiuhagen.  who  was  adjutant  at 
Griifrath.  On  the  completion  of  the  mobilization  he  had  taken  a 
leave  for  the  purpose  of  being  present  in  at  least  one  action,  after 
which  he  intended  to  return.  He  joined  the  regiment  on  the  11th  of 
August  and  was  assigned  to  the  l'2th  Company  of  the  Fifty-seventh. 
When  we  were  marching  to  the  battle  of  the  10th.  he  was  full  of 
happy  anticipation:  but  the  tirst  action,  by  which  he  meant  to  satisfy 
his  ambition,  which  we  can  easily  understand,  cost  him  his  life. 
Oddly  enough,  warrants  for  his  arrest,  giving  his  personal  descrip- 
tion, were  issued  for  this  brave  man  long  after  he  was  slumbering 
under  the  soil  of  Mars-la-Tour. 

tLives  now  at  Berlin  and  is  general  of  infantry. 


Military- 1 1  inlorical  Hludies.  207 

in  oonnocliofi  with  tho  oxporimcntH  mado  by  ProfoHHor 
iJi-uriH  and  otiiorH,  to  bo  roform]  to  ialr-r  on.  Tha  wound  of 
entrance  can  barely  be  diHcerned  to-day;  that  of  exit,  which 
waH  Hornewhat  larger,  \h  move  conHpir:nonH. 

Tlu-  n  b;if<;iIioriH  of  the  .''.Sth  Hrif^ndf*  went  into  battle 
with  or,  oHifeKij  and  454(;  rnen.  They  loHt  72  officerH  and 
20;{:',  men  in  kilh'd  and  wounded — i.  e.,  74^  per  cent  of  riflfi- 
cerH,  and  45  per  font  of  men,  not  counting  thoHe  captured. 

The  Frencli  fV.  Army  forf»H  iian  Htated  itH  Iohhch  on 
tlic  HVth  of  AugiiHt,  ;iH  200  ofTicerH  and  2258  rnen.  Thewe 
HgiircH  we  have  rcdiucd  on  jtjige  190  to  147  ofTlcerH  and  1722 
men,  incluHive  of  f.cgnind'H  cavalry  diviHion  ;  thfw?  lf>sHeH  are 
great  in  vir*w  of  tiie  brief  fire  action  on  the  part  of  the  38th 
Brigade  and  of  itH  vary  Hmall  expenditure  of  ammunition. 
The  greater  part  of  fhf-Hf  h>HHeH  iH  probjibly  due  to  our  jirfil- 
lery  and  to  the  Keventy-ninth.  Jn  order  to  elucidate  this 
and  other  matterH,  I  addrcHsed  mvHelf  to  rJeneralH  Ladmir- 
ault,  (irenier,  and  CiHsey;  the  tirwf  jidlK-red  to  the  ofTieial 
ttgureH,  the  other  two  failed  to  anHwer. 

It  iH  probably  Hafe  to  annume  that  one-half  of  our  Ioksch 
were  incurred  on  the  retreat;  henee  5  battalions  loHt  .",0 
OfTicerH  and  1010  men,  while  advancing  1,500  meterH,  and 
before  the  rcU-cat.  The  brigade  therefore  arrived  within 
then  effective  range  of  the  enemy  in  good  condition,  not- 
withHtanding  the  long  attack  movement  under  the  moHt  un- 
favorable eircumHtanceH.  The  tactical  formw  employed— 
i.  e.,  advance  without  halt  and  without  fire,  with  nkir- 
miHherH  and  company  columnn— proved  ade(|uate  undf-r 
long-range  and  nhort-range  mass  fire,  it  being  moreover  a 
frontal  attack  taken  in  flank  by  the  enemy. 

The  defeat  of  the  brigade,  at  the  same  time,  was  due 
more  to  its  numerical  inferiority  and  lack  of  knowledge  of 
the  enemy,  than  to  its  tactics.     The  ground  wan  afl  unfavor- 


208  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ahlo  to  an  attack  as  it  posv^^iMv  oouUl  be.  atul  as  suitablo  for 
mass  thv  at  lotiir  ami  slu>rt  ranj^o  as  thoniih  it  had  boon 
siHHMallv  prt»v>arod;  yot  in  tliis  tlankod  frontal  attack  np  to 
tlio  retroat  tho  lossos  woro  no  un^ator  than  in  othor  niodorn 
battlos  assnniinij  tho  tlguros  handod  down  to  ns  to  bo  oor 
root,  and  OAon  sniallor  than  in  many  a  battlo  of  Fivdoriok 
and  Napoloon  wIumo  tho  th>oision  liad  to  bo  aainod  by 
assanlt. 

Tho  oironmstanoos  oan  thoroforo  not  bo  oallod  oxtra- 
ordinary.  On  tlio  othor  hand,  do  not  the  battlos  of  T^oanno. 
of  Villiors,  of  l>apannu\  and  on  tho  T.isaino  1:0  to  show  that 
tho  opponent  siilYorod  similar  lossos  aijainst  ns?  To  be 
sure  tho  Oormans  wtro  tactically  mnch  tho  superiors  of 
those  troops  of  tho  enemy. 

Tho  picture  1  have  presented  of  tho  battle,  and  tho  man- 
ner in  which  1  have  endeavored  to  analy/.e  it  and  to  explain 
its  details,  should  ]>revont  false  conclusions.  The  small- 
caliber  rities,  etc..  have  furnished  the  opponents  of  all 
closed  formations  with  now  arguments  for  their  theories,  to 
bo  sure,  but  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  tluu'o  will  not  be 
situations  in  the  futui-o  whore  it  will  bt^  possible  to  advance 
in  closed  formation  to  within  t> — 400  motors  of  the  enemy. 

IX.     ^Vhl/  Was  the  Charge  of  the  1st  Guard  Dragoons  Successful? 

Evorythinir  I  have  stHMi.  heard,  and  read  of  the  Austro- 
Saxon  troops  cajiuot  but  impress  their  friends  atid  enemies 
alike  with  respect  for  their  discipline  and  for  their  behavior 
on  the  battk^tield.  In  ISOO  tht^  Saxons,  for  instance,  prt^ 
served  their  onlor  and  tactical  formations  under  dostruct 
ivo  infantry  tiiv.  and  it  was  only  the  defeat  that  destroyed 
them.  It  also  ap]>earod  that  wherever  (hoy  wore  tem- 
porarily victorious,  their  spirit  and  discipline  did  not  desren- 
orato  into  reprehensible  and  low  outbursts  of  hatred   or 


M Hilary  IJiHUrrical  Sttuiies.  2<i'.j 

oWtcr  wil<l  imnHiouH,  oven  wU<:u  iiit-  itit'it  wr-n-  not  \nn\*'V  con 
frol  or  rjrj(J<-r  o!)wrv;itiori.     T'.idK'.il  ;<-;iko/i«  n<-v<r  cj'Hmni  to 
(»r«<Jof/iinat<-,  ;in<J   fh'?  itovtciU-yn,    wourKl**!   or   rj/iwound'r^J, 
pfiHorKT  waH  Kure  of  kind  treatrnr^nt. 

Our  <'.x\><'y\i'n<H'n  on  fh^'  baffUf-fi^jJd  of  Mar-K-laTour 
w^'f-r;  diff'T'-nf,  I  jun  t^hid  to  Jtrknow  U'df('?  that  w<f  thf^n  hrfid 
our  ofijjon'-nt  in  rnilifjirv  uu<\  mora)  n-wf^-rrt,  knowinj^  that 
*th<-  Vvt'\\<]\  nation  r-onnifl'-r'-d  itH<')f  ;if  th'-  h^iid  of  ^iviliza- 
fion.  JI<rif<*,  v\f'  ronid  not  w<ll  ^nt'•rlain  a  j>oor  id'-a  of  tho 
Hpiril,  of  Ml*'  imperial  frf>^>pH,  and  our  diKafipointrnr^nt  waw 
i\\*'it'Un'tt  all  thr^  t^rttnUtr.  I  would  paxK  fh'f  rnatt'T-  ov^t  in 
Hik'riw  were  it  not  that  it  in  iriHtnu'tiv*-. 

Kitfint?  at  the  i!r<^-ti  tabh-  on^  lookn,  at  hu^Ij  rnattr-iH 
diffr•r^ntly  than  wh^n  lyin;^  wound'-d  on  the  battle-field. 
l\  IK  hut  natural  that  in  the  latter  eawe  one  rnav  make  min- 
takeM,  hut  even  the  <juiet  of  the  Htudy,  where  reanon  Ih  ex- 
I>eete<l  to  manter  paMHioii.iM  no  bar  to  errorH.  There  are  th(m(t 
who  think  that  the  imjierial  Freneh  infantry  wax  taetic- 
ally  Htjperior  to  the  German;  amon^  them  are  very  influen- 
tial AuHtriari  ofTi'^rH,  and  evr-n  the  (ifrrfiuriH  do  not  deny  the 
Frenf;h  Kuj^eriority  in  the  employment  of  fire  and  in  village- 
fighting,  where  the  Frenehmen  can  nhow  hiH  fine  qnalitie«. 
In  other  rr^HpeetH,  alKO,  the  German  infantry  committed 
many  tactir-al  errorn  in  the  firKt  period  of  the  war,  but  what 
waH  the  courne  of  the  French  attack  here? 

After  the  88th  Brigade  had  br-en  Hwept  away,  it  wa» 
followed  firHt  by  a  divinion.  and  then  by  half  of  another  in 
Keveral  lineH.  Neither  had  effective  infantry  to  encounter, 
Btill  the  advance  waH  clumKy  and  kIow,  Firnt  came  a  Hkir- 
miwh  line,  in  which  everybody  commingled,  in  which  every- 
body yelled,  in  which  there  waH  no  tactical  order,  and  which, 
moreover,  halted  rcf^-atedly,  although  there  wan  no  r^twint- 
ance.     It  wan  fr»llovvrd  by  a  Hecond  HkirmiHh  line,  and  tiio 


210  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

latter  by  battalions  in  lino,  with  tlioir  eajjles.  INIoro  I  was 
unable  to  obser\e.  The  artillery  did  not  join  in  the  move- 
ment and  remained  in  its  position,  with  the  exception  of 
one  battery  of  Cissey's  division,  which  followed  as  far  as  the 
northern  edg^e  of  the  frequently  mentioned  ravine  and 
opened  fire  on  Tronville.  The  first  skirmish  line  fired, 
7nost]y  from  the  hip,  without  aiming;  both  skirmish  lines 
passed  over  us.  and  the  battalions  halted  on  the  line  where 
most  of  our  dead  and  wounded  were  lying,  150 — 300  meters 
south  of  the  ravine.  The  distances  between  their  lines 
were  very  unequal,  and  during  the  advance  portions  of  the 
first  two  lines  became  intermingled.  The  French  had  prob 
ably  arrived  within  about  150  meters  to  the  north  of  Con- 
tour 780,  when  they  were  attacked  by  the  1st  Guard  Dra- 
goons, and  now  there  arose  an  indescribable  confusion. 
Both  skirmish  lines  rushed  to  the  rear — throwing  away 
ritles  and  equipments;  other  skirmishers  laid  themselves 
down  alongside  of  and  between  us  or  endeavored  to  form 
groups;  the  men  were  firing  in  all  directions  and  an  irregu- 
lar fire  came  from  the  closed  battalions.  Considering  their 
small  strength  and  the  unfavorable  conditions  of  the  at- 
tack, it  sounds  incredible  that  3  squadrons  of  the  1st  Guard 
Dragoons  rode  through  three  lines,  threw  two  into  flight 
and  the  third,  closed  one,  into  disorder,  and  staggered  all 
three  of  them.  TTere  is  the  point,  and  however  mucli  has  been 
written  on  that  (jlorious  event,  not  a  single  officer  has  tried  to  find 
the  explanation.  I  shall  give  it;  it  is  simple  indeed.  Had 
the  French  infantry  been  in  possession  of  that  which  an 
eflScient  body  of  troops  cannot  do  without — viz.,  tactical 
order  and  discipline,  no  cavalry  could  have  gained  the  least 
success  under  circumstances  where  the  unobstructed  view 
of  the  field  pr(M'luded  amjthing  lilr  surprise.  Yet  the  sur- 
prise was  com])lete:  hence  the  confusion  and  stupefaction 


Military-Historical  Studies.  211 

■of  the  enemy.  That  is  what  gave  the  dragoons  success. 
How  could  they  have  surprised  the  enemy?  Because  the 
hostile  infantry  masked  the  greater  part  of  their  own  rifles 
by  an  advance  of  the  13th  and  4.3d  Regiments  from  the  left 
of  Grenier's  division  in  a  sharp  westerly  direction  toward 
Mars-la-Tonr.  Forming  an  acute  angle  with  the  Fren<'h 
front,  they  prevented  the  latter  from  firing  and  lent  their 
flank  to  us,  and  their  rear  to  the  Seventy-ninth,  to  portions 
of  the  Fifty-seventh  in  the  Bois  de  Tronville,  and  to  the 
artillery  southwest  of  the  latter.  To  these  tactical  errors 
are  to  be  added  other  circumstances  which  tended  to 
lighten  the  work  of  the  1st  Cluard  Dragoons:  namely,  the 
boundless  disorder,  the  lack  of  discipline,  the  bad  spirit  of 
that  infantry,  the  helplessness  of  the  oflScers  and  the  lack  of 
heed  paid  to  the  enemy.  When  the  skirmishers  of  the  13th 
Regiment  joined  those  of  the  infantry  in  the  first  line — 
right  over  our  dead  and  wounded — it  was  as  though  the 
happy  meeting  and  victory  wore  to  be  celebrated  together; 
there  may  have  been  cause  for  that,  to  be  sure,  but  they 
were  not  yet  masters  of  the  battle-field.  They  shouted, 
called,  and  drank  to  each  other,  waved  their  forage  caps, 
and  occupied  themselves  exclusively  with  the  unfortunate 
victims  of  the  battle,  heaping  all  kinds  of  ignominy  on 
them.  Whole  groups  stopped  at  a  prostrate  Prussian,  and 
what  did  that  infantry  do?  It  polluted  its  name  by  inde- 
scribable cynicism  or  by  brutalities  with  which  it  threatened 
our  wounded. "  The  first  greeting  presented  to  most  of  us 
was  the  muzzle  of  a  gun,  the  coats  of  most  of  us  were  torn 
open  from  top  to  bottom,  most  of  us  were  robbed  of  our  pos- 
sessions, and  if  that  had  only  been  the  worst!  Entire  com- 
panies disappeared  as  tactical  bodies,  the  men  picking  up 
Prussians  that  were  not  yet  dead  and  carrying  them  off  as 
prisoners,  or  unsaddling  our  officers'  horses  which  were  lying 


*212  Itujuirics  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Futttre. 

\\vvi\  and  taking  saddles  and  bridles  to  a  safo  plaoo.  1  niy- 
st'lf  >vas  spaivd  any  molestation,  bocanso  a  FnMU'Ti  otVioor 
took  I'liarjio  of  mo;  but  while  .liivinp;  mo  a  drink  from  his 
rantoon,  his  luvu  tapped  hin\  on  the  shoulder  in  a  most 
familiar  wav,  as  thonjih  to  i>xpress  their  disapj>roval.  That 
was  the  reason  thev  felt  themselves  masters  of  the  battle- 
tield.  and  oeeupiinl  themselves  with  thins;s  whieh  should 
not  have  been  tolerated;  order  was  destroved.  and  in  the 
midst  of  this  heedh>ssn»>ss  burst  our  eavalrv;  it  was  sueeess- 
ful  and  was  bound  to  W.  1  would  not.  however,  advise  it 
to  attempt  the  same  thinj;  aj;ainst  sonu^  other  infantry,  for 
it  would  not  eheek  them  for  "10  minutes."  This  cavalry 
did  not  jiet  fartluM*  east  than  to  the  extreme  rijjht  of 
;U1 — 57th;  thert>  it  wheeled  to  the  left,  rode  throujih  and 
oonfoundiHl  the  lines  alonj:  the  entirt>  front,  and.  passin,-; 
around  the  north  of  Mars-la-Tour.  disappeared  behind  the 
villaiiv.  (^ur  front  was  now  elear.  and  those  who  eould 
erawl  to  the  rear  saved  themselves,  as  a  perfectly  nnid  fire 
from  the  rijiht  front  was  sweepinj;  for  some  tinn'  ovtM* 
the  battle-tield.  on  whieh  not  an  enemy  was  standiuir.  The 
statement  is  not  corrtH't.  that  the  FriMU'h  infantry  did  not 
auain  advance,  as  luiiiht  b»>  inferred  from  all  books  dealini; 
with  this  evtmt.  and  as  is  expressly  stated  in  the  Histories 
of  the  KUh  and  571  h  Kejjinu^nts.  whieh  j::o  so  far  as  to  assert 
that  the  hostile  infantry  recrossed  the  ravine  in  conse- 
quence of  that  attat'k.  On  the  contrary,  as  soon  as  the 
dra,mH)ns  had  disapi>eared.  it  aiiain  advanced  fi-oni  tln^  rij::ht, 
utilizinj;  the  time  to  police  the  tield.  Tn  this  period  falls 
the  capture  of  the  brave  liorseless  or  wounded  draii-oons, 
and  of  many  ofticers  and  men  of  F. — Kith.  I. — 57th,  and 
F. — 57th.  The  ca]>ture  of  the  drajroons  in  itself  proves  the 
accuracy  of  my  statement.  How  could  they  have  been  cap- 
tured if  the  FrtMuh  had  run  awav  before  iheui  across  the 


Military-Historical  Studies.  213 

ravine?  It  wuh  not  until  later  that  a  general  withdrawal 
to  the  original  ponition  took  place  in  consequence  of  the 
appearance  of  lth(;inbaben'H  Cavalry  Division  at  Ville 
Hur  Yron.  The  withdrawal  wan  made  in  the  warne  carelesH 
manner  an  had  been  the  advance;  the  lin(;H  were  without 
any  protection  and  nimjily  faced  about.  On  our  extreme 
h'ft  they  w(;re  i>receded  by  a  lonj;  dark  column:  it  was 
our  captured  men.  It  iH  therefore  due  to  the  bad  Hpirit 
and  the  lack  of  diHcipline,  in  addition  to  tactical  errorn, 
that  the  French  failed  to  gain  anything  beyond  the  direct 
rcHultH  of  their  fire. 


214  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 


PART  II. 

PSYCHOLOGY  AND  TACTICS. 

1.  General. 
Tlu'  will  is  tlu^  powor  that  diroi-ts  tho  masses,  and  dis- 
cipline is  the  niodinni  throiij^h  whioh  the  will  is  bronuht  to 
bear  on  the  men;  a  clear  and  determined  will  and  rnthless 
exercise  of  discipline  are  in  battle  the  most  valuable  quali- 
ties of  the  lower  otticers.  whose  constant  endeavor  should 
be  to  preserve  the  ascendency  over  their  subordinatt^s  by 
means  of  their  higher  moral  strength  and  their  tactically 
trained  intellect.  The  most  perfect  arms  may  moilify,  but 
will  never  ahro(jate.  that  law,  and  those  alone  will  travel  the 
right  road  in  tactics  who  keep  in  mind  that  many  thousands 
of  men  are  involved,  who  all.  however  ditVerent  tht\v  may  be 
in  other  respects,  have  in  common  the  natural  egotism  luhich 
aims  at  the  safeti/  and  preserration  of  one's  life.  By  the  side 
of  the  material  egotism  there  is  a  transcendental,  moral, 
national — in  brief,  a  psychical  tine,  which  may  exert  a  ]>ow'- 
erful  iufluenoe.  The  higher  the  development  of  the  latter, 
the  better  will  it  rise  above  the  im])ulses  of  material  ego- 
tism. Mohammed  showed  himself  the  type  of  an  army  psy- 
chologist in  teaching  that  the  beyond  is  all.  and  the  present 
life  nothing.  In  any  nation  this  moral  egotism  can  only 
spring  from  conditions  and  causes  germane  to  the  indi- 
vidual; it  cannot  be  imparted  by  influences  operating  from 
without.  Tactics  should  be  in  keeping  with  it.  should  be 
national.  There  are  times  when  the  gn^t  mass  is  im]>elled 
by  the  motive  of  the  war.  and  such  a  time  has  been  men- 
tioned (1870).     Although  this  is  an  exception,  still  it  will 


Psychology  and  Taciics.  '216 

be  necf^HHary  in  tacticH  to  reckon  with  a  feature  which  for- 
merly waH  not  HO  dominant  as  it  may  be  expected  to  be  in 
the  fntnre — i.  e..  the  increaHe  of  the  national  sentiment. 
More  than  that,  in  the  case  of  our  prospective  opponents, 
the  Russians  and  French,  there  is  a  sj^ecial  psychic  aug- 
mentation in  the  shape  of  hatred  which  has  been  artificially 
^created  and  nurtured  through  a  whole  generation.  On  the 
I>art  of  the  French  the  hatred  arose  from  the  defeats  suf- 
fered in  1870-71 ;  on  the  jjart  of  the  Russians,  from  their  dis- 
content with  the  results  of  the  victorious  \\'ar  of  1877-78. 
Moreover,  in  both  nations,  the  military  spirit  has  grown 
much,  because  all  their  ho7>es  are  based  on  their  armies. 
In  Russia  the  x>olitical  hatred  is  fed  by  the  orthodox  clergy, 
in  France  by  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy,  and  the  Czar  is 
not  only  the  political,  judicial,  and  military,  but  also  the 
religious,  head  of  the  state.  The  moral  strength  of  the 
army  is  bound  to  be  benefited  by  both  of  these  sources,  and 
the  future  war  is  bound  to  be  a  national  war.  a  war  of  the 
peojile.  The  armies  of  nations  aiming  at  ends  whose  ac- 
complishment they  believe  indispensable  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  their  political  honor,  are  likely  to  be  moved  by 
more  effective  moral  influences  than  the  armies  of  nations 
which  are  politically  satiated,  so  to  speak,  and  merely  bent 
on  the  defense  of  their  possessions,  their  position  among 
the  nations,  etc. 

This  constitutes  a  matter  doubly  impjortant  in  tactics, 
where  the  personal  influence  of  the  superior  can  no  longer 
exercise  the  sway  it  did  in  former  tactics.  Much  will  there- 
fore in  the  future  depend  on  the  moral  strength  jjossessed 
in  each  case  by  the  soldier;  indeed,  the  tactics  of  masses 
of  skirmishers  will  be  feasible,  if  at  all,  chiefly  because 
grounded  on  this  basis.  The  increased  sense  of  x>^i'«'^nal 
honor  and  the  principle  of  national  honor  are  alone  able  to 


216  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

eounterbalauee  to  a  certain  degree  the  lessened  personal 
inlluence  of  the  leader  over  the  masses.  Armies  will 
be  opposed  to  each  other  more  equal  iu  strength,  condi- 
tion, armament,  and  training  than  ever  before,  and  each 
army  is  bound  to  display  those  superior  qualities  which 
live  and  operate  in  its  nation.  National  psychology  thus 
becomes  a  true  element  in  future  war,  and,  naturally, 
also  in  tactics.  Every  officer  should  industriously  labor 
to  understand  it  thoroughly,  and  that  opponent  will  have  a 
great  advantage,  so  far  as  tactics  is  concerned,  who  has 
secured  for  himself  the  superiority  in  moral  influences  by 
peace  training.  I  am  abstaining  from  a  comparison  be- 
tween these  forces  of  the  prospective  opponents,  because 
it  is  so  easy  to  err;  but  everything  should  be  done  to 
strengthen  the  moral  spirit.  Tactics  would  have  light 
work,  if  we  should  ever  reach  the  stage  where  every  man 
would  regard  the  assailing  of  our  national  honor  or  the  vio- 
lation of  our  territory  as  an  attack  in  an  equal  degree,  and 
where  every  one  w'ould  be  urged,  from  his  own  inner  motives, 
to  demand  satisfaction,  and  to  offer  life  or  limb  to 
obtain  national  redress.  This  cannot  be  hoped  for 
to-day,  for  in  all  modern  nations  a  continuous  and  bit- 
ter struggle  is  waging  between  the  material  and  moral 
egotism.  The  entire  modern  society  is  embroiled  in  it,  and 
the  discontent  with  the  existing  social,  political,  and  relig- 
ious conditions  absorbs  a  large  part  of  the  moral  strength. 
Society  and  the  people,  the  state  and  its  institutions,  are 
exhausting  themselves  in  the  mutual  struggle  and  consume 
most  precious  forces.  Some  nations  show  a  certain  intel- 
lectual and  political  apathy,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
their  national  sentiment  can  mature  those  advantages  for 
tactics  which  are  to  be  expected  from  healthy  moral 
conditions.        Even    at    times    when    flaming    patriotism 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  217 

8\vays  every  man's  heart,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  great 
majority  grows  dumb  at  the  door  of  death,  material 
egotism  gains  the  mastery  over  idealism,  hodily  weakness 
over  intellectual  strength,  and  the  instinct  of  self-preser- 
vation over  the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice.  A  small  minority 
alone  preserves  its  enthusiasm,  and  among  the  many  vex- 
mtions,  fatigues,  and  deprivations  of  war  hut  few  of  this 
minority  retain  the  same  buoyancy  of  spirit  and  will-power 
and  the  same  resoluteness  in  all  dangers.  In  my  own  case 
I  admit  that  these  forces  changed  just  as  does  one's  dis- 
position, the  condition  of  the  body,  and  the  atmosphere  in 
which  we  live.  The  low  egotism  knocks  many  times,  and 
man,  clinging  much  to  the  material  world,  much  more  than 
is  believed  by  non-penetrative  persons,  frequently  becomes 
more  or  less  the  '^personal  battle-field,"  where  human  weak- 
ness struggles  against  noble  and  sturdy  impulses.  Some 
acknowledge  it;  others  are  ashamed  to  do  so.  It  should 
not  be  covered  with  silence;  on  the  contrary,  it  should  be 
particularly  brought  out.  as  it  is  only  wiien  every  one  under- 
stands it,  that  we  reach  healthy  views  and  the  means  to 
conquer  ourselves.  Then  collapses  the  current  theory 
of  the  soldier's  courage;  it  is  a  myth,  and,  as  a  rule,  cannot 
be  anything  else;  manful  examples  alone  will  hold  a  great  and, 
according  to  my  experience,  calming,  influence  over  men  with  the 
sense  of  honor.  In  the  school  of  war  man  gathers  warlike 
experience;  there  the  leader  continuously  disciplines  his 
mental,  moral,  and  physical  powers  in  reaching  for  higher 
aims  and  in  looking  upon  war  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
artist.  It  may  be  stated  as  a  rule,  that  in  war  courage  in- 
creases in  few,  not  in  the  great  mass,  and  these  few,  officers 
as  well  as  men,  are  the  soul  of  the  troops.  The  most  cour- 
ageous soldier  is  the  one  who  has  not  been  under  fire,  since 
peace  habitudes  maybe  so  strong  in  him  that  hewill  for  some 

16 — 


218  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

time  move  in  battle  as  on  the  maneuver  ground.  But  not 
always;  it  will  only  be  so  long  as  he  does  not  know  the 
danger  into  which  he  has  been  led.  As  soon  as  he  becomes 
conscious  of  the  danger,  he  is  beset  by  uneasiness  for  his 
own  self  instead  of  finding  in  himself  courage  and  strength 
for  the  cause  and  for  the  idea.  When  an  advancing  body  of 
troops  suddenly  stops,  it  cannot  be  explained  psychologic- 
ally in  any  other  way  but  that  the  men  have  become  con- 
scious of  the  peril  of  the  situation ;  these  are  decisive  mo- 
ments which  are  overcome  only  by  a  few  strong  spirits  of 
sufficient  vigor  to  revive  by  their  own  will-power  the  falter- 
ing courage  of  the  troops  and  to  carry  them  over  such  mo- 
ments of  w^eakness.  Between  these  moments,  however,  and 
the  phenomena  arising  from  a  consciousness  of  numerical 
inferiority,  there  is  a  vast  difference. 

The  brigade  which  carried  out  the  attack  on  Height  846 
would  hardly  repeat  it  in  the  same  manner  now  that  it 
knows  the  danger.  No  human  power  could  have  made  it 
rise  and  advance  after  it  once  lay  dowm  near  the  enemy. 
There  are  limits  in  tactics  where  will-power  fails  and  w^here 
personal  ascendency  is  no  longer  effective,  and  the  appre- 
ciation of  these  limits  on  the  part  of  officers  and  men  is  a 
purely  instinctive  one,  springing,  as  it  were,  from  the  recog- 
nition of  the  enemy's  materially  superior  fighting  power — 
i.  e.,  of  their  ow'n  tactical  inferiority.  It  cannot  be  explained 
in  any  other  way,  that  in  such  moments  leaders  and  men 
suddenly  turn  about  without  previous  arrangement,  with- 
out orders,  without  signal  of  any  kind,  etc.;  that  a  closed 
body  of  troops  which  at  one  moment  exhibits  the  finest  of 
bearing,  completely  collapses  at  the  next  like  a  house  built 
of  cards.  Passion,  enthusiasm,  and  the  courage  of  the  in- 
dividual should  not,  therefore,  be  solely  relied  upon,  but  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  as  regards  tactics,  the  major- 


Psycliologij  and  Tactics.  219 

ity  of  the  men  remain  indolent — for  anyone  who  acts  not 
spontaneously,  but  merely  upon  exterior  impulses,  may  in 
so  far  be  called  indolent.  In  keeping  that  in  mind,  despite 
universal  liability  to  service  and  other  assertions,  we  shall 
best  serve  our  king,  country,  and  nation,  and  be  apt  to  take 
the  correct  steps  in  an  emergency.  What  officer  who  has 
Jbeen  exposed  to  destructive  fire,  is  willing  to  assert  that  it 
did  not  cost  him  a  struggle  to  rise  from  behind  the  cover 
and  to  rush  forward  over  the  open  field  where  death  and 
destruction  were  reigning?  "NA'ho  will  deny  that  the  same 
readiness  of  resolve  cannot  be  the  gift  of  the  majority  of  the 
men;  that,  unlike  the  ofQcers,  they  do  not  act  spontaneously, 
but  in  response  to  an  exterior  impelling  force?  Who  has 
not  observed  that  the  signal  of  the  whistle,  though  heard, 
was  unheeded;  that  when  the  men  were  under  cover,  but 
few  followed  resolutely  from  the  beginning  when  the  officer 
rushed  to  the  front,  others  slowly,  others  not  at  all,  and  that 
the  entire  advance  came  to  a  stop  as  soon,  for  instance,  as 
the  leading  officer  fell  under  the  enemy's  fire?  We  have 
musketeers  behind  us,  not  heroes.  Under  the  modern 
destructive  mass  fire,  it  is  not  only  difficult  to  cause  the 
swarms  of  skirmishers  to  quit  their  cover  and  to  carry  them 
forward,  but  the  combined  leading  of  man}-  small  detach- 
ments is  much  more  difficult  than  formerly,  and  on  open 
ground  it  will  frequently  be  found  impossible.  As  striking 
illustrations,  we  have  selected  the  two  examples  (Problus 
and  Mars-la-Tour),  separated  by  an  interval  of  four  years, 
which  took  place  under  circumstances  resembling  each 
other  in  many  particulars.  While  in  the  former  attack 
the  army  of  the  Elbe  retained  unbroken  control  over 
the  divisions,  brigades,  and  even  some  battalions  and 
companies;  while  division,  brigade,  and  regimental  com- 
manders were  from  beginning  to  end  with  the  skirmish  lines 


220  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

or  >vith  their  supports;  and  whiU\  for  instaiu'i'.  Major  von 
Thiole,  j^eueral  staff  oftioor  of  tho  14th  Division,  traversed 
the  distance  from  the  captured  viUay;e  of  Problus  (27th 
Brijjade)  to  the  soutlieast  and  back  in  close  proximity  to  the 
enemy's  entrenched  position,  in  order  to  deliver  to  tlu>  'JSth 
Brigade  the  order  to  attack  the  wood  of  Hriz;  while  the  I'Sth 
Brigade  executed  a  ditticult  wheel  under  etlective  tire  for 
the  purpose  of  attacking  the  wood;  while  the  connecting  link 
between  leader  and  combatants  never  broke — at  INIars-la- 
Tour  the  entire  brigade  quickly  slipped  from  the  hands  of 
the  superior  leaders.  What  was  practicable  four  years 
before  on  the  same  kind  of  ground  was  impracticable  then 
within  the  zone  of  the  mass  lire  of  the  breech-loader,  and  it 
will  remain  so  forever  under  like  circumstances. 

In  all  fire  tactics  the  knowledge'  of  the  fallings  of 
human  nature  heretofore  called  for  the  longest  possibh'  ki>ep- 
ing  together  of  bodies  controllable  by  one  hand;  to-day  the 
small-caliber  ritie  by  no  means  relieves  us  from  that  i>rinci- 
ple,  it  com]>els  us  rather  to  ai>]ily  it  intelligently  if  there  is 
to  be  any  control  at  all.  If  the  latter  is  detMued  retiuisite, 
the  meajis  must  be  shaped  accordingly,  for  whoever  wants 
a  certain  end  necessarily  wants  the  means  thereto. 

No  tactician  should  contend  against  this  principle,  and 
it  should  be  left  to  the  artist  to  sha]>e  the  same  into  a  use- 
ful and  sufficient  tactical  means  iinder  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  battle-field.  It  requlrc^s  a  clear,  tactical  eye,  rational 
peace  experience,  a  knowledge  of  the  ballistic  qualities  of 
the  arm  (infantry  and  artillery),  etc.,  matters  not  always 
found  where  modern  conditions  require  that  they  should  be, 
in  the  ranks  of  the  subordinate  leaders.  Since  even  enthusi- 
asm fails  to  remedy  the  failings  of  hunmn  nature,  it  follows 
that  modern  tactics  requires  on  the  part  of  all  leaders  Ji 
higher  degree  of  knowledge  and  abilitv,  of  initiative  and 


I'Hijt-holfxjy  and  Tactics.  221 

vi^^or,  of  innij^lil  jiikJ  jxTKcvcranoe  than  formerly;  that,  in  a 
word,  (adicH  lias  b<'(;oin<'  nior*?  pHijcliolof/ifMl.  Ah  ooinparod 
M'ilh  tlic  action  in  itH  entiroty,  attackn  on  poHitionH,  an  at 
I'l-obliJH,  MarH-la-Tour,  and  Kt.  Privat,  will  bo  exceptional;  yet 
wKli  inteJlif^ent  preparation  Jind  utilization  of  the  terrain 
they  might  b(,'  cani^-d  out  to  day  denpite  Kniallcalibf^r  rifleg, 
etc.,  without  exjjosing  ijh  to  annihilation;  and  rar<;r  Htill  will 
lie  the  caHe,  an  at  MarH-Ia-Tonr,  of  a  ningle  brigade  flinging 
ItKflf  againKl  an  impregnable  position  without  making  the 
aftenipl  of  acfing  wifh  one  of  ifs  baffalionH  agjiinnt  the 
enemy's  flank  or  without  being  supported  by  such  a  flank 
movement  on  the  part  of  troops  engaged  alongside.  That 
whi<;h  the  .'{8th  Brigade,  on  August  1«,  1870,  the  1st  Brigade 
of  the  Ouard  at  Kt.  I'rival,  and  the  various  brigades  at  the 
Mance  ravin<*  on  the  181h  of  August,  wanted  and  were 
ordered  to  do,  wjih  Ijound  to  f;iil  b('(;au»e  based  on  a  miscon- 
ception of  the  situation.  It  would  have  been  equally  disas- 
trous in  the  days  of  Frederick  or  of  Napoleon  as  in  1870,  be- 
cause not  in  kee{)ing  with  taclics.  A  frontal  attack  under 
such  conditions  will  never  lead  to  a  decision;  it  will  rather 
have  to  be  bi-ouglit  about  by  tlj<'  troops  on  the  right  and  left; 
and  just  as  the  '>8th  Brigade  was  bound  to  succumb  before 
sui)erior  hostile  forces  in  a  strong  position,  so  it  is  certain 
that  under  like  circumstances,  at  St.  Privat,  the  Guard 
r'orps  would  never  have  taken  the  village  by  assault  had  not 
the  turning  movement  of  the  XII.  Army  Corps  gained  that 
decision  on  the  flank  which  could  not  be  obtained  in  front. 
What  a  hopeless  situation  for  tlir-  troojjH  which  are  thrown 
against  the  front  I  No,  not  liopeless;  as  honorable  as  pos- 
sible, as  demonstrated,  not  by  the  leading,  but  by  th(;  bear- 
ing of  the  Guards  at  St.  Privat  and  of  the  1.5th  Division  at 
fit.  Hubert.  They  are  called  upon  to  bear  the  heaviest  losses, 
and  to  hold  out  under  a  destructivr-  fire;  only  to  relinquish 


222  Ttiquirics  into  the  Taciics  of  the  Future. 

the  palm  of  virtof.v  propiM*  (o  others.  TIkmt  lanks  ai'e 
thiuiKHl  every  miiuile;  at  Hu*  seeiuiiifxiv  opporhiiu^  uionuMit 
the  eiuMiiv  st>eks  io  ailvaiu't>  in  orihM-  lo  crush  (he  dross  uiultM' 
his  het>l;  (htMi  it  is  that  troops  show  the  stnlT  th(\\  arc  ina<h^ 
of  and  of  what  th(\v  must  l)e  capabh'.  Tlie.vshonhl  not  h)8»'  their 
vu)rah\  and  in  this  respect  they  can  be  materially  assisted  by 
the  snpei-ior  leaders  taUinj;  into  consideration  the  phi/fiirnl 
streuijth  of  the  men.  >\h(Mi  that  is  spent  to  the  same  d«\iiroe 
as  that  of  the  :>Sth  Krijiade  at  INIars  la  Tonr.  a  man  is  no  bet- 
ter than  a  stick  of  wood,  and  can  be  kicked  out  of  the  way 
us  easily:  he  can  no  lonijer  defend  himstMf.  It  is  not  the 
size  of  the  loss(^s  that  nu\isurcs  tln^  valn(>  of  troops;  it  is 
their  behavior  notwithstanding;  tlu^  loss(>s — /.  c.  the  dciirt^e 
of  their  power  of  resistance  and  of  their  efliciency  in  action: 
in  other  words,  their  moral  force  is  what  ttMls.  It  in  tnrn 
depends  ou  the  i)hysical  strenjjth,  and  what  the  Guards  were 
able  io  accomi>lish  at  St.  Privat,  because  their  physical 
strcnjjth  was  not  s])ent,  was  bound  to  be  impt)ssibh>  for  the 
3Sth  lirijjadeat  ]\rars-la-Tour,  even  had  tluMuimerical  condi- 
tions been  more  favorable  on  both  sidt^s.  simply  bccaust*  the 
brij^ade  ii'(},<  phi/.^iicolli/  spent. 

11.     MtLviins. 

From  what  has  been  said  the  followinj;-  jiiMUMal  maxims 
may  ho  dedncinl: 

1.  K(\nar(l  for  hnman  wt^iknc^ss,  which  set^vs  cover 
rather  than  i^xposure. 

12.  St'lcction  of  snch  forms  for  tlu^  attack  as  olTci-  to 
the  (MUMuy  the  poorest  possible  tariitMs.  and  urantinji  to  the 
individual  sntlicient  freiMlom  for  the  purpose  of  utili/inp:  the 
terrain  and  his  arrti,  for  fjaininji'  a  favorable  tirinj;  ])osition. 
jind  for  obtaining:  there  the  sui)eriority  of  tire. 

.*>.     The  infantrv  attai'k  is  a  conllit'l  of  masses  of  skir- 


I'Hycholoffy  and  TacticH.  323 

TfiiKlifrH  v*'(\\n\\\\\r,  <'jirly  and  Hiifficifiit  i\i'\i'\<>\>mc\\t  of 
HkJrrniHhoiH  and  opportune'  an-ival  of  Hiiflficient  HupportH. 
For  the  movement,  the  fire,  the  attainment  of  the  position, 
the  reinforcement,  and  the  ruHh  from  firinjij  position  to  fir- 
ing? poKJlion,  there  can  be  but  one  formation — namely,  an 
o[>r'n,  HJngle  rank  line.  There  can  b^'  but  one  kind  of  fire; 
fire  of  skirmiHherH,  That  in  the  universal  fighting  method 
of  infantry. 

4.  liJHorder  and  intermingling  of  organizations  become 
the  rule.  Jt  is  one  of  the  foremost  duti'-s  of  the  subordinate 
leadr-rs  to  r;xercis<?  such  control  as  will  best  preserve  the 
figJiting  eflif-iency  at  each  point;  heme  an  increaiie  in  the 
number  of  subordirfate  leaders  is  requisite. 

5.  In  carrying  out  the  attack  there  will  no  longer  be 
sucessive  arrays  (Treffen)  down  to  include  the  reser-ves; 
there  will  be  nf>thing  but  opened  single-rank  lines;  even  the 
term  "e<helon"  is  antiquated.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
"7V«/few"  are  indispensable,  previous  to  \\\c  deployment. 
The  use  of  smokeless  powder  is  presumed,  of  course,  for  the 
present  generation  will  probably  not  fight  with  any  other. 
The  term  ''normal  attack"  should  not  be  used  at  all,  and 
the  tfrms  ''long-range  fire"  and  "short-range  fire,"  in  the 
sense  of  1870-71,  an*  sirnply  confusing  rubbish,  the  dispute 
as  to  their  admissibility  having  been  settled,  Movf^mont 
and  fire  are  but  the  different  forms  of  one  act.  As  to  the 
distance  between  supports,  there  is  only  a  maximum  limit, 
which  may  be  deviatf'd  from.  dey)f'nding  on  the  character  of 
lli<;  gi'ound. 

0.  Deployment,  forming  for  attack,  and  execution  of 
the  attack  are  thr^-e  separate  stages  for  which  some  r^gle- 
mentary  prescriptions  arc  indispensable;  otherwise,  there 
would  be  no  means  of  control  in  connection  with  a  tactical 
division   of  labor,   none  for  the  organized   action    of   the 


224  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Futttre. 

uiassos  of  sUirmisluTs.  uouc  U)v  i'ouivolWuiX  (lisordiT, 
Evory  brijiiulo  sliould  strirlly  cDiilino  ilst>H'  lo  (lu-  allot (i>d 
oxtoiil  of  front.  Witliiu  tlio  bripulo  fiout  aiul  ilopiMuling 
on  tlu»  tonain,  doviations  from  tho  ordinary  oxtonts  of 
front  aro  frotintMitly  nnavoulablo.  Thoy  slionld  thoroforo 
l>t>  porniiittHl.  N\  luMi  lljihtinji'  in  deep  formation  ( "(U/.s*  dcr 
Tiefe  I'echtcn'^ )  tho  brijijulo  front  may,  in  (ho  pitcluul  battle, 
bo  oxtondod  to  1  U)0  motors. 

7.  I'rontal  attacks  ovor  opon  j;ronnd  aro  to  bo 
avoidod  as  n\nrli  as  possiblo;  if  that  is  impossiblo.  tho  foroos 
omployod  shonld  bo  so  nnmorous  that  aftor  sntlorinji;  hoavy 
lossos,  thoy  still  rotain  sntliciont  moral  sironjith  to  hold 
out,  and  sntVu-iont  moral  and  physical  ttaotioal)  stron»»tli  to 
resist.  IUmu-o  pri>por  apportitmmont  of  rt>sorvt>s,  selection 
of  a  suitable  pt»sition  for  tluMn,  and  sondinu  thorn  promptly 
forward. 

v'N,  The  aitai-k  in-oper.  the  sciutir  of  the  cnenuf-s  position, 
will  usually  require  fresh  troops.  I'uless  a  superiority 
of  tire  has  been  gained  by  the  infantry  and  artillery,  any 
attack  is  hopeless,  and.  nu>reovor,  the  particular  moment  is 
dirticult  to  recojiui/e,  and  ihcroforo  also  that  for  briniiitiii  up 
fresh  troops,  a  duty  exclusively  bcli>n,uinii-  to  tho  hiuluM* 
loaders. 

!».  Tho  advanc(^  to  be  continued  as  lonu-  as  possible 
\Yithout  halt,  at  tho  same  tinte  utilizinsi-  t^very  cover,  for 
protection,  not  for  a  pruhuKjcit  stai/.  This  "vvlll  in  most 
cases  bo  found  practicable  for  swarms  of  skirmishers  \^^  to 
within  (!l>0  motors  of  tho  enemy;  and  at  shorttM*  distances 
and  even  in  closed  formations,  when  tluMV  is  cover. 

10.  The  tire  action  should  be  opened  accordinjily,  and 
so  ns  to  cover  the  entire  front  allotted  to  tho  brigade. 

11.  All  elTective  means  should  bt>  employed  for  the 
rush  forward;  tho  best  way  is  to  carry  tho  uumi  alonp:  with 


pHycholof/}/  and  'luctu^a.  225 

fr*'Hh  troojm,  even  if  the  latter  Jx;  ?>iit  hastily  gatherffd 
MfjiiafJH;  it  will  be  practicable  in  rnoHt  eaK*^  to  bring  thern 
up  at  the  rij^hi  moment ,  if  tbe  field  of  fire  i«  0[K;n,  they 
Hhould  move  in  HwarrnM  of  MlcirmiHherM  only,  flow  many 
ruHh<m  iL  borly  of  troofm  in  capable  of  making;  in  very  miu'MV- 
tain.  We  have  no  Huflicient  rlat>i  on  that  point,  and 
nowhere  i>*'rha|>H  Hhall  we  meet  with  w>  many  rJi>iapj»oint- 
mentH  an  in  tlie  a/lvance  by  ruMh^fH,  becaun^;  it  will  be  diffi- 
cult in  moMt  caH^fH  to  harmonize  theory  with  the  practical 
actual  conditionH,  J  place  no  j^reat  hofK-H  on  the  a/lvance 
by  ruHh^;«,  particularly  when  begun  at  a  great  diKtance. 

12,  Infantry  in  to  be  Hupported  by  a  vigorouH  artil- 
lery fire. 

l'{.  Jf  the  enemy  givf^  way,  the  victorn  nhould  follow 
him  up  rapidly,  but  all  the  engaged  troopH  which  do  not 
have  an  oppoH unity  to  fire,  Hhould  be  rapidly  re-forrnf^. 

14.  If  the  attack  failB,  artillery  will  be  called  upon  to 
offer  the  firKt  reKiKtance.  Hujifjorted  by  the  r^-^^^rve  of  the 
variouK  armn. 

The  attacker  winheK  to  conquer,  and  for  that  purjHXie 
he  muKt  advance  to  day  aw  much  aH  formerly,  nkillfully  util- 
izing the  terrain  i>reviouHly  reconnoitered  by  the  lea/lern, 
until  at  a  range  at  which  the  fire  can  have  the  requisite 
effect.  KeconnaiHHance  and  utilization  of  the  terrain  were 
formerly  of  great  importance;  that  importance  ha«  b*^;i» 
materially  increased  by  wmokeleHH  powder,  TheKe  duti^*H 
have,  moreover,  I>een  renderwl  more  difficult,  and  one 
Hhould  rcHolutely  face  the  unavoidable  fact  that  every 
attack  coHtH  blood;  the  man  Hhould  be  trained  to  that, 
nhould  he  hahituaied  to  that  idea;  and  it  nhould  be  t^ken  into 
account  in  adopting  tactical  forrnn  for  battle. 

DoffH  not  military  hintory  tc^ach  that  attackn  on  Htrong- 


226  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ly  occupied  positions,  even  before  the  introduction  of  the 
breech-loader,  cost  as  many  men  as  in  the  War  of  1870? 
Compare  Leipsic* 

Attacks  by  large  bodies  of  troops  over  open  ground  may 
become  necessary,  and  should  therefore  be  practiced  in 
peace.  Even  the  knowledge  that  the  attack  will  fail  of  its 
object  should  not  be  suffered  to  remove  that  necessity. 
The  effect  of  an  attack,  though  it  be  unsuccessful,  may  be 
very  great. 

The  smaller  the  losses,  the  better  will  the  morale  of  the 
troop  usually  be  preserved.  But  in  every  case  of  attack  in 
peace  the  soldier  should  be  informed  of  the  great  impend- 
ing losses  and  be  psychologically  (morally)  trained  on  that 
point.  Unless  the  soldier  is  possessed  with  a  high  degree 
of  will-power,  unless  his  training  is  such  as  to  show  him  in 
everything  and  everywhere  the  necessity  of  self-control  and 
disregard  of  danger,  unless  there  is  vigor  and  will — the 
will  to  advajice — all  forms  will  remain  artifices  and  fail 
to  mature  results. 

Not  infantry  alone,  but  artillery  also  has  been  pro- 
vided with  improved  arms,  and  both  arms  have  become 
more  independent  and  capable  of  resistance. 

Where  the  conformation  of  the  ground  compels  the 
infantry  to  halt  at  medium  range  from  the  enemy  and  to 
hold  out  there  (in  first  line,  on  open,  swept  ground),  it  will 
probably  be  practicable  to  carry  on  the  action  in  combina- 

*The  Prussians  lost  40  per  cent  at  Leipsic,  38  per  cent  at  Zorn- 
dorf,  40  per  cent  at  Kunersdorf;  the  French  30  per  cent  at  Borodino, 
50  per  cent  at  Aspern;  the  Germans  22  per  cent  at  Mars-la-Tour,  the 
bloodiest  battle  of  the  War  of  1870-71.  To  be  sure,  the  data  of  former 
days  cannot  be  strictly  authenticated.  I  cannot  discuss  that  subject 
here.  Those  who  wish  to  inform  themselves  are  referred  to  the 
essays  of  Bleibtreu,  von  Boguslawski,  and  von  Lettow  in  the  Mili- 
Uir  Wochcnhlntt  of  1893.  and  of  von  Roloff  in  No.  69  of  the 
DeKtsche  Hcercszcitinw  of  1893,  and  in  the  April  number  of  the  Preus- 
sische  Jahrbiiclier  for  1893. 


Psycholofjy  and  Tactics.  227 

tion  with  strong  artillery  as  implied  in  the  characteristics 
of  that  arm.  Should  infantry  believe  itself  capable  of 
fighting  independently  in  the  future,  it  will  have  to  pay 
a  heavy  penalty  in  blood.  The  defense  has  gained  in 
strength,  and  will  jn'obably  make  more  extensive  use  of  pre- 
pared positions,  and  the.  attack  and  defense  of  the  latter 
will  be  materially  modified. 

///.     Inquiries  into  the  Maxims. 

It  requires  no  argument  to  prove  that  troops  lying 
behind  cover  will  not,  without  exterior  impulse  from  their 
officers,  rise  in  order  to  repair  from  a  place  of  comparative 
immunity  from  danger  to  one  of  great  peril,  and  every 
action  in  which  the  officers  wore  killed  or  placed  hors-de- 
conibat  furnishes  examples.  In  such  cases  there  is  usually  an 
end  to  further  advance,  and  more  cannot  be  expected  of  the 
troops  than  that  they  hold  the  [)oint  they  have  reached.  In 
carrying  out  something  extraordinary,  man  requires  extra- 
ordinary resolution  and  great  will-power,  which  spring 
only  from  an  absolute  devotion  to  the  cause.  Devotion  to 
ideals  may  in  itself  be  able  to  suppress  the  impulses  of 
material  egotism,  to  enroll  man  in  the  service  of  higher 
aims,  and  to  induce  him  to  surrender  his  own  existence. 
The  soldier,  like  the  artist,  should  therefore  have  an  ideal- 
ism in  which  he  believes,  and  for  which  he  is  prepared  to 
sacrifice  his  all.  This  is  a  theorem,  but  it  does  not  imply 
that  its  requirements  could  be  fulfilled  in  the  case  of  every 
soldier.  Idealism  may  be  as  different  as  man;  whether  it 
bear  the  name  of  faith,  fidelity,  love  of  country,  political 
creed,  whether  it  may  seek  glory  and  honor,  greatness  and 
elevation,  its  action  will  be  the  same,  and  that  is  its  import- 
ant point  in  tactics.  iiTo  one  will  deny  that  the  risking  of 
one's  life  is  something  extraordinary,   likewise  that  the 


228  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Futtire. 

umsketeer,  by  himself,  cannot,  as  a  rule,  have  the  jjift  of 
devotion  to  the  cause  for  which  he  is  calhnl  upon  to  sur- 
render his  life;  he  should  therefore  be  trained  with  j^reat 
care,  and  that  is  the  duty  of  his  officers  in  jx^ace.  Should 
any  military  man  decline  to  subscribe  to  this,  I  would  like 
to  ask  him,  whether  that  courage  ever  existed  which  is 
habitually  spoken  of  in  non-military  and,  unforunately, 
also  in  military  accounts;  whether  cases  did  not  occur 
within  his  own  exi>erlence  where  not  only  a  heroic  per- 
sonal example  was  necessary  to  get  the  men  to  rise  from 
behind  the  cover  and  to  advance,  but  also  something  more 
which  no  one  likes  to  mention — the  gods  know  why — i.  c, 
jtalpable  aids?  The  majority  of  men  will  endeavor  to 
avoid  endangering  their  lives  as  long  as  possible,  and  in 
battle  but  few  will  spontaneouslif  overcome  the  temptation 
to  seek  shelter  in  the  ditch  they  are  crossing;  these  few 
deserve  the  highest  ]n'aise,  they  are  the  heroes  of  their 
fatherland.  The  remainder  ultimately  obey  necessittf  alone 
— i.  e.,  discipline  and  the  ascendency  of  their  officers.  It  is 
well  to  keep  this  in  mind  even  where  the  motive  of  the  war 
has  seized  upon  the  great  mass  of  the  amny  and  has  impas- 
sioned them  more  or  less.  We  know  then  how^  much  the 
men  are  apt  to  yield  uj)  spontaneously,  and  how  much  has  to 
he  extorted.  This  extortion,  requiring  for  its  most  efficient 
application  closed  formations  which  are  no  longer  practicable 
on  open  ground,  has  been  rendered  very  difficult  by  modern 
arms.  For,  as  we  shall  explain  later,  closed  formations  of 
any  kind  on  open  ground,  beginning  at  a  distance  of  1500 
meters,  are  prohibited  by  the  flat  trajectory,  the  great 
range  and  penetration  of  small-caJiber  arms  and  by  the 
enormously  increased  fire  effect  of  the  artillery.  Wherever 
the  ground  admits  of  their  use,  th^y  should  be  retained  as 
the  surest  means  of  getting  the  units  to  the  spot  where  we 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  229 

want  them;  where  that  is  impracticable,  a  sensible  substi- 
tute should  be  sought  for  the  formations  no  longer  prac- 
ticable, and  here  we  are  decidedly  favored  by  HrnokeJess 
powder.  I  have  frccjuently  seen  the  smoke  of  black  powder 
so  obscure  the  view  that  at  a  distance  of  20— '{0  meters 
closed  bodies  of  troops  could  be  made  out  in  ill-defined  out- 
line only.  In  such  cases — they  were  the  rule  in  the  decisive 
stages — closed  formations  in  no  way  favored  the  [)ersonal  in- 
fluence of  the  leaders,  or  but  very  little.  That  is  worthy  of  seri- 
ovs  considernlion.  It  was  about  the  same  as  though  we  were 
in  a  dense  fog.  Smokeless  y)owder  has  changed  this;  the 
leaders  can  always  see  their  men  and  the  men  their  leaders, 
other  circumstances  which  may  happen  not  prohibiting. 
The  control  of  leaders  over  swarms  of  skirmishers  ns  com- 
pared with  closed  formations  never  was  nil  and  is  not 
now;  it  is  simply  less,  and  since  the  advent  of  smokeless 
powder,  the  personal  exami)le  can  be  more  easily  seen,  be- 
cause the  view  is  clearer.  There  are,  moreover,  two  other 
means  to  strengthen  the  control  over  swarms.  The  first 
lies  in  a  careful  moral  training  of  men  and  leaders;  the  sec- 
ond in  an  increase  of  leaders.  The  former  is  feasible  at  once; 
the  latter  requires  an  increase  of  officers  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers  on  the  peace  establishment.  Although  I  do 
not  believe  that  the  leaders  of  swarms  would  thereby 
be  relieved  of  all  disadvantages,  still  these  would  bo 
greatly  diminished  and  the  troops  would  preserve  a  certain 
fighting  power,  which  with  the  use  of  closed  formations 
would  quickly  disappear,  since  with  the  collapse  of  these 
formations  the  fighting  power  is  also  lost.  It  seems  to  me 
to  admit  of  no  doubt  that,  on  open  ground  and  with  the  use 
of  modern  arms,  closed  formations  are  bound  to  collapse, 
even  at  long  and  medium  distances. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that,  .is  n  rule,  man  exposes  himself 


230  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

to  daujicr  only  uiulor  ooin])ulsioii.  tl\o  (ju'tiral  forms  should 
bo  siu'h  that  tompulsion  tan  bo  bronijht  to  boar  on  tho  unit. 
Tbo  oolumn  tattios,  old  as  woll  as  modorn.  woro  bost  suitod 
to  tho  purposo.  uoxt  tho  oloso  lino,  loast  of  all  tho  skirmish 
lino;  tho  tirst.  moroovor.  admits  of  livoatot-  rapidity  and 
prooisiou  of  niovoniont. 

Tho  moro  fXtondt>d  tho  swarms,  and  tho  nioro  thov  aro 
ooYorod  and  concealed  by  folds  of  tho  i;ronnd.  (ho  moro  aro 
tontrol  and  oompulsion  rostriotod.  and  tho  jjroator  is  tho 
tomptation  to  whioh  human  woaknoss  is  oxposod,  and  it  is 
/•(■(////  here  uhoro  a  groator  moasuro  of  direct  compulsion  is 
indispensable.  It  involves  a  taitioal  ])roblom.  To  j;o  bai'k 
to  oloso  formation  for  tho  sako  of  this  compulsion.  ])orhaps 
by  olosinj;  tho  mou  toj^othor  in  a  moohanioal  way.  would 
ontail  unjustitiablo  saoritioos  for  (ho  sako  of  a  priuoi- 
plo  without  any  oorrospoudin^-  irain.  t\Mupulsion  should 
thorofort*  bo  suppUMUontod  by  (raininj;  (ho  loadors  to  ijreafer 
actirittf,  ami  tho  mon  to  (jreater  attentiveness.  Tho  task  of 
tho  stdwriiinale  loaders  booomos  moro  diflfioult  simn^  tlu\v 
booomo  tho  roal  supports  of  tho  tiro  action  in  all  its  stages, 
and  tho  exercise  of  their  trill  should  bo  nu>ro  an  infellectual 
than  a  mechanical  one  in  consotpionco  of  thoir  trainiuj;, 
»'ducation.  practice.  mu(nal  unih'rstandiuii  of  each  other, 
tactical  judjiuiout.  and  thoir  uniformi(y  of  (raininji'.  Dur- 
in«;  the  contiict  modorn  tactics  chiotly  rest  on  tho  subordi- 
nate loaders  and  on  tho  qualities  of  the  individual;  such  is 
their  nature;  tho  morale  should  bo  as  hv^h  as  possible,  so  as 
not  to  nu^lt  under  tiro.  The  former  should  bo  tacticians  (o  a 
jxroater  t>xtont  than  formerly,  and  tho  latter  should  bo  able 
always  to  understand  tho  tacticians.  Shrapnel  (ire  and 
torpedo  shells  of  the  artillery,  which  spread  over  tho  tiold 
like  the  jots  of  a  rose-head,  make  columns  and  close  lines 
useless  at  considerable  distances,  small-ialiber  rides  pro- 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  231 

hibit  them  altogether  at  medium  and  short  ranges,  and  a« 
infantry  and  artillery-  may  be  expected  to  direct  their  fire 
Hkillfully,  and  as  they  moreover  always  fight  in  eonjune- 
tion,  columns  and  close  lines  of  any  kind  on  open  ground 
are  barred  from  the  battle-field  altogether.  The  close  line 
I>articularly  is  impracticfible.  owing  to  the  width  of  target  it 
jiresents  and  its  unhandinens.  and  there  remains  the  single- 
rank  swarm  alone,  as  the  most  unfavorable  target  and  as  the 
best  formation  for  movement  under  thesecircumstances.  The 
H warms  should  not  be  too  large;  'iO  men  in  3  groups  of  10 
men  each  would  probably  be  the  most  suitable  limit  for 
their  control. 

But  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  with  this  fighting 
method  troops  will,  as  a  rule,  slip  rapidly  from  the  grasp  of 
the  higher  leaders,  and  in  many  cases  also  from  the  hands 
of  the  subordinate  leaders  during  subsequent  stages  of  the 
action.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  it  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  controlling  a  battalion,  but  of  employing  brigades 
and  divisions,  no  longer  in  the  Napoleonic  form,  but  in  the 
Napoleonic  spirit,  as  great  problems — to  which  all  struggles 
for  decisive  points  belong — ran  only  be  solved  with  masses. 
In  order  that  they  may  be  controlled  from  above  to  some 
df-gree  at  least,  their  leaders  should  know  what  they  are 
expected  to  do  and  what  they  want  to  do;  they  should  base 
their  measures  on  thorough  reconnaissance  and  be  held  respon- 
sible for  their  decisions  and  orders.  Hence  the  scox^r*  of 
their  authority  should  be  fully  established  and  known. 

It  is  by  reconnaissance  alone  that  the  leader  can  form 
an  idea  of  his  opponent  and  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  for 
overcoming  him.  This  duty  should  never  be  left  to  the 
subordinate  leaders;  it  should  pertain  exclusively  to  the 
superior  leaders  from  the  brigade  commander  up.  Prepara- 
tion (deploymentj,  and  forming  for  attack  are  the  exclu- 


232  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Fiiiurc. 

sive  duties  of  tho  latter;  in  the  execution  of  the  combat  the 
hij>hei'  and  subordinate  leaders  both  share,  but  even  at  that 
stag:e  it  is  chiefly  the  superior  leaders  who  take  the  ])roi)er 
steps  for  a  prompt  advance  of  the  supports  in  order  to  gain 
an  elfective  firing  position  and,  subse(]uently,  the  superior- 
ity of  fire.  Whatever  the  skill  and  self-activity  of  the 
subordinate  leaders  may  be,  it  is  ini])ossible  for  them  to 
judge  from  the  bearing  of  the  firing  skirmish  line  when  the 
proper  moment  for  advance  of  the  supports  has  arrived. 
No  one  who  has  had  war  exi)erience  will  deny  this,  for  in 
most  cases  the  very  first  retiuisite,  a  good  view  of  the  whole, 
is  lacking,  and  sufficient  view  and  deliberation  can  only  be 
expected  on  the  part  of  the  superior  leaders:  hence  if  tho 
execution  of  the  combat  is  not  to  be  left  to  chance,  a 
proper  scox>e  must  be  conceded  to  the  superior  leaders  dur- 
ing its  execution,  since  it  is  in  that  way  alone  that  a  proper 
degree  of  combination  and  uniformity  of  the  act — i.  e.,  of 
the  organized  action  of  masses  of  skirmishers,  can  be 
secured. 

It  is  altogether  erroneous  to  assume  that  the  initiative 
of  the  subordinate  leaders  is  thereby  suppressed;  they  are 
rather  restrained  from  license,  and  it  is  only  thus  that  the 
brigades  are  enabled  to  preserve  the  assigned  direction 
(spaces),  that  army  corps  are  enabled  to  reckon  with  fight- 
ing spaces  of  divisions,  and  aimies  with  fighting  spaces  of 
army  corps.  These  things  are  so  simpU^  that  they  hardly 
need  comment.  If.  however,  platoons,  companies,  and  bat- 
talions are  at  liberty  to  choose  their  direction  (space) 
according  to  the  ground  (cover),  lateral  movements  and  dis- 
placements are  unavoidable,  which,  beginning  below,  ulti- 
mately affect  the  highest  units  and  block  and  render  im])os- 
sible  control  on  the  i)art  of  the  superior  leaders.  Avho  bear 
the  responsibility.       It  is  only  necessary  to  look  at   these 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  233 

thinf^H  from  the  mechanical  point  of  view  to  realize  that 
they  must  not  be  allowed  to  happen. 

I  am  goin^  furllier  and  aHsert  that  in  many  cases  the 
superior  leaders  will  best  be  able,  besides  allotting  the  front, 
to  desij^nate  the  principal  firing  station,  and  to  make  the 
same  known  before  the  deployment.  It  is  in  obstructed 
terrain  alone — i.  e.,  in  all  cases  where  the  fighting  will  be 
all  the  more  intense,  that  they  will  be  less  able  to  see  than 
the  subordinate  leaders  in  front.  It  is  quite  in  keeping 
with  the  law  of  control  to  designate  the  firing  station 
approximately,  without  thereby  either  suppressing  or  re- 
stricting the  freedom  of  the  subordinate  leaders.  More- 
over, it  stands  to  reason  that  in  many  cases  this  freedom 
will  only  be  operative  beyond  the  "approximate"  firing- 
station,  and  will  chiefly  consist  in  "correcting"  the  approx- 
imate to  the  best  possible  firing-station.  Huch  are  the 
facts.  From  the  time  when  this  "correcting"  begins,  the 
control  in  front  passes  more  and  more  to  the  subordinate 
leaders,  but  the  limits  of  space  assigned  to  the  brigade 
should  be  observed  as  much  as  possible.  Any  transgres- 
sion of  these  limits  on  the  right  or  left  is  justified  only  by 
i  m perati ve  ci re u  m stan  ces. 

With  the  "correcting"  there  coincides  in  point  of  time 
the  increase  of  the  number  of  rifles — i.  e.,  the  arrival  of 
sufficient  sujiports  at  the  main  firing-stations  to  gain  and 
preserve  the  superiority  of  fire.  Probably  none  who  has 
had  war  experience  will  deny  that  the  superior  leaders 
alone  are  in  position  to  attend  to  these  matters;  hence  it  is 
their  duty  to  provide,  according  to  time  and  circumstances, 
for  the  arrival  of  supports  (sustaining  the  fire).  More  than 
this  is  not  to  be  required  of  them,  until  the  time  for  the 
employment  of  the  correctly  posted  reserves  arrives. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  effect  produced  by  the 

16 — 


234  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

main  firing-station  can  be  better  observed  from  the  front 
than  by  the  superior  leaders  farther  in  the  rear,  and  it  is 
therefore  quite  right  that  the  impulse  for  seizing  the 
enemy's  position  should  come  from  the  former.  But  even 
at  that  point — i.  c,  just  before  the  decision,  the  relations 
betvreen  superior  and  subordinate  leaders  should  not  cease 
to  be  reciprocal. 

In  many  cases,  depending  on  time  and  space,  it  will  be 
diflScult  to  define  these  relations;  it  will  hardly  be  possible 
to  maintain  communication  between  front  and  rear,  to 
promptly  supplement  each  other's  decisions  and  measures; 
at  this  stage  the  decision  is  left  to  the  tactical  intuition  of 
the  subordinate  and  higher  leaders.  These  difficulties 
should  be  fully  recognized. 

It  follows  that  I  am,  as  I  always  have  been,  opposed  to 
the  so-called  ''normal  attack,"  but  I  am  an  unreserved  advo- 
cate of  the  fundamental  law  of  control  in  action.  In  former 
times  it  was  very  important  to  properly  gauge  the  deploy- 
ment as  to  time  and  place,  and  to  promptly  gain  and  hold  a 
vantage-point  from  which  to  survey  the  ground.  Accord- 
ing to  the  experiences  of  1870-71,  the  entire  leading  should 
exclusively  rest  in  the  hands  of  the  superior  leaders ;  it  was 
found  impracticable  and  we  were  in  a  tactical  quandary. 
The  ''normal  attack"  was  abolished;  it  was  well;  but  the 
control  was  also  surrendered.     We  must  regain  the  latter. 

Since  the  long-range,  small-caliber  rifles  restrict  us  to 
a  greater  distance  before  entering  into  battle,  the  work  of 
the  leaders  as  regards  the  deployment,  direction  of  attack, 
and  the  preparatory  measures  for  lateral  and  longitudinal 
extension  (forming  for  attack)  is  rendered  much  more  diffi- 
cult. It  is  therefore  all  the  more  necessary  to  lay  down 
some  fixed  rule  for  the  action  of  the  leaders  of  the  higher 
grades  at  these  stages. 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  235- 

The  superior  leaders  will  probably  be  to  the  front 
early,  and  as  far  out  as  possible,  accompanied  by  suflBcient 
mounted  orderlies,  about  4 — f>  to  a  brigade  commander. 
There  they  will  pass  through  several  "stages  of  doubt," 
continue  to  observe  to  the  front  and  flank,  and  to  send 
orders  to  the  rear.  It  will  therefore  happen  that  divisions 
sometimes  complete  their  "preliminary"  tactical  deploy- 
ment far  from  the  enemy,  as  has  been  described  in  the  intro- 
duction in  the  case  of  armies.  From  that  time  on  "correc- 
tions" of  the  tactical  deployment  will  be  found  necessary  at 
many  points,  perhaps  while  the  advance  guard  is  engaged, 
which  will  in  turn  require  precision  of  marching  on  the 
part  of  closed  brigades.  For  this  purpose  we  must  be  pro- 
ficient in  everything  required  in  connection  therewith,  and 
we  can  do  neither  without  columns  nor  without  lines  [Tref- 
fen),  as  there  is  no  longer  such  a  thing  as  passing  from  the 
"preliminary  tactical  deployment"  to  the  marching  col- 
umn; the  units  must  make  all  the  "corrections"  while  de- 
ployed. On  this  point,  therefore,  the  Regulations  should 
as  much  contain  precise  prescriptions  as  to  the  maximum 
width  (and  depth)  of  the  brigade,  the  maximum  limits  of 
the  supporting  lines,  and  of  the  position  of  the  reserves. 

These  constitute  the  maximum  limits  for  the  scope  of 
the  brigade  commander's  activity  in  forming  for  and  carry- 
ing out  the  attack.  If  the  battle-field  everywhere  pre- 
sented the  same  conditions,  if  it  showed  the  same  character 
at  all  points,  and  if  the  action  fought  on  it  did  likewise,  a 
scheme  for  a  normal  attack  would  of  necessity  formulate 
itself.  The  great  battles  of  the  future  will  require  a  space 
25 — .30  kilometers  square  for  the  stages  of  deployment  of 
both  opponents,  for  forming  for  attack,  and  for  its  execu- 
tion; a  great  variety  of  terrain  is  thus  of  necessity  encoun- 
tered, and  it  falls  within  the  scope — in  fact,  it  is  the  duty 


236  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Futvre. 

— of  the  superior  loadoi's  to  make  provisions  oomj)ortinj; 
therewith. 

Ill  carrying  out  the  combat  the  troops  will  certainly 
arrive  at  a  stage  where  they  will  act  like  "hordes."  but  there 
should  nevertheless,  or  rather  ou  that  account  there  should, 
be  definite  rules,  because  at  any  rate  it  is  more  ditticult  to 
tight  a  controlled  action  than  to  learn  the  theoryofa"uormal 
attack."  In  the  place  of  regulations  which  would  endanger 
the  control,  we  need  such  as  will  be  its  safeguard.  'riu>  dis- 
tances of  the  supporting  lines  may  vary;  but  the  supporting 
bodies  should  be  pro])erly  fornuHl  and  suitably  posted  in  rear 
of  each  other.  The  brigade  commander  alone  is  the  man  to 
give  the  orders  for  that.  It  follows  that  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  control  the  latter  must  be  conceded  some  definite, 
and  at  the  same  time  indispensable,  powers;  that  two  bri- 
gades will  never  be  formed  for  the  attack  in  the  same  way,  or 
that  they  will  carry  out  the  attack  in  an  identical  manner; 
hence  controlled  attack  and  normal  attack  are  two  ditferent 
things.  St'herlT  and  his  adhei-'Mits  advocate  the  former,  and 
their  opponents  alone  construe  it  into  a  mechanical  normal 
attack.  Another  proof  of  how  readily  the  letter  may  kill 
the  spirit. 

I  have  repeatedly  spoken  of  "corrections"  on  a  large  and 
small  scale.  So  far.  I  have  nowhere  heard  this  new  feat- 
ure of  tactics  prominently  mentioned,  which  modern  arms 
render  unavoidable.  Modt'rn  arms  make  uncertainty 
greater,  increased  uncertainty  enjoins  greater  caution,  the 
latter  calls  for  more  reflection  for  every  emergency.  In 
modern  tactics,  therefore,  no  leader  can  from  the  beginning 
be  in  possession  of  so  much  that  is  detinite  on  which  to 
base  his  conception  and  arrangements  as  formerly.  That 
basis  can  by  no  means  be  gained  by  mere  observation  and 
reconnaissance;  an  action  will  be  necessary  in  many  cases. 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  2'67 

From  thin  ^ifal,  rolativo,  and  yjrotracted  state  of  uncer- 
tainty followH  the  neeesKity  of  eonntant  ''correction";  it  goes 
through  the  entire  higher  and  minor  tactics;  both  are,  in 
fact,  nothing  but  "corrections  from  case  to  case,"  based, 
however,  on  the  spaces  provided  for  the  deployment  of  the 
brigade  in  the  pitched  battle.  It  will  be  conceded  that  such 
"corrections"  have  a  special  object;  that  they  should  be 
made  accordingly;  that  control  is  requisite,  which  should 
rest  in  the  hands  of  the  brigade  commander  without  preju- 
dice to  the  freedom  of  the  subordinate  leaders  in  the  front 
line.  The  function  of  "tactical  corrector"  is  his  to  a  much 
higher  degree  than  could  formerly  be  the  case,  and  no  one 
can  solve  the  j)roblem  better  and  more  quickly  by  suitable 
subdivision  of  his  brigade,  by  pushing  forward  subdivi- 
sions according  to  the  tactical  necessities.  For  these  rea- 
sons I  consider  the  brigade  commanders  the  leading  pillars 
in  the  pitched  battle,  and  they  should  attach  the  greatest 
importance  to  a  subdivision  suited  to  the  circumstances  in 
each  case.  Fighting  in  a  formation  of  great  depth  is  to-day 
the  universal  task  of  leaders;  it  is  maintained  in  its  legiti- 
mate place  by  this  continuous  "correction,"  as  "correc- 
tions" can  best  be  ordered  and  made  from  the  rear.  While 
a  normal  system  would  be  wrecked  by  the  many  varieties 
of  the  battle-ground,  the  difficulties  of  terrain  which  im- 
pede control  should  not  be  underestimated.  Under  fire 
any  cover  exercises  ai>owerful  attraction,  as  is  well  known, 
and  though  it  may  be  possible  to  resist  it,  yet  the  tactician 
should  look  upon  all  cover  also  in  its  cay>acity  as  an  obsta- 
cle to  the  forward  movement  and  as  a  hindrance  in  the  con- 
trolled attack.  With  respect  to  the  attraction  of  cover,  I 
call  to  mind  the  ravine  of  Mars-la-Tour,  and  the  bank  and 
hedge,  and  above  all,  Kt.  Hubert,  where  a  whole  division  was 
crowded  together.    As  regards  obstacles  to  movement,  I  call 


238  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

to  miud  the  wive  fences  at  Mars-la-Tour,  the  hop-tiekls  at 
^y6l'th,  the  gardenlike  character  of  the  country  around 
Orleans  and  Le  Mans,  with  its  innumerable  scattered  farm- 
steads, houses,  and  villages,  the  various  hedge  and  wall- 
fences,  the  guttered  vineyards,  etc.  To  look  upon  un- 
broken skirmish  lines  as  constant  features  of  the  controlled 
system  would  be  to  mistake  the  hitter's  object  and  nature. 
Should  the  ground  consist  of  short  undulations,  as  at  Worth 
and  Beaune,  it  is  unavoidable  that  the  skirmish  action 
should  ninke  unequal  progress  within  the  same  brigade; 
that  it  will  stand  still  at  one  point  perhaps,  and  recede  tem- 
porarily at  another,  though  the  attacker  have  the  advan- 
tage at  other  points.  None  of  these  considerations  should 
be  allowed  to  invalidate  the  idea  of  control  or  be  considered 
a  sound  objection.  AVithout  the  initiative  of  the  subordi- 
nate leaders  the  controlled  system  is  inapplicable.  Both 
belong  together:  they  are  but  different  forms  of  the  same 
act.  It  is  the  subordinate  leaders  that  should  make  up  for 
the  lack  of  personal  observation  on  the  part  of  their  supe- 
riors; that  should  constantly  look  to  the  tactical  coherence 
in  the  controlled  system;  that  should  maintain  the  action, 
or  revive  it  when  at  a  standstill,  because  the  occasions  are 
rare  when  such  steps  can  be  promptly  ordered  by  the  supe- 
rior leaders.  In  that  connection  the  War  of  1870-71  offers 
several  typical  examples,  not  only  within  the  limits  of  the 
brigade,  but  within  the  limits  of  larger  bodies,  made  up  in 
some  instances  of  two  or  more  army  corps,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  deficiencies  in  the  details  of  execution.  Here 
belong,  for  instance,  the  systematic  tactics  of  the  XI.  Corps 
at  Worth,  and  its  cooperation  with  the  V.  Corps,  more  par- 
ticularly the  capture  of  Froschweiler  by  troops  of  four 
army  corps  encircling  the  hostile  center.  Here  belongs 
the  cooperation  of  brigades  of  two  army  corps  at  St.  Marie- 


Pfsycholoyy  and  Tuctics.  2'6i) 

aiJx-Ch^iiC-t,,  at  Ht.  Privat,  and  at  IMi^ny.  In  the  first 
ca«e  both  flankB  were  turned  in  connection  with  a  frontal 
aHBault  ;  in  the  la«t  two  cai*e«  the  flank  attack  of  con 
trolled  hi'li^iuh^.  an  at  Worth,  gives  the  impulj^e  for  the 
frontal  asBault  and  becomes  the  controlled,  and  combined 
action  of  several  army  corp»s.  The  battle  of  the  VIII.,  VII., 
and  II.  Corps,  at  the  Mance  ravine  constitutes  a  grand  exam- 
ple of  the  reverfre,  and  at  the  capture  of  Bt.  Quentin  the 
commanding  general  failed  to  obtain  the  control  he  wanted. 
Here,  as  at  the  Mance  ravine,  it  wai»  found  impossible  to 
retain  the  desired  degree  of  control  over  the  battle  act. 
because  the  control  of  the  tactical  act  was  lacking.  Con- 
trol of  the  battle  act  imperativelv  re^juires  control  of  the 
attack  of  briga/les.  and  control  is  therefore  equally  indis- 
pensable from  the  point  of  view  of  the  conduct  of  the  bat- 
tle. Rtill  the  circumHtanf-es  at  the  Mance  ravine  should  not 
be  exclusively  jndged  by  the  tactical  features.  The  exam- 
ple shows  that  the  greatest  possible  accumulation  of  troops 
within  a  fighting  space  for  not  more  than  a  division  neither 
constitutes  a  controlled  system  nor  is  it  calculated  to  pro- 
mote control,  because  such  concentration  no  longer  j>er- 
mits  of  extension  for  battle;  but  if  we  imagine  the  com- 
manders of  the  15th  and  13th  Divisions  and  several  brigade 
commanders  replaced  by  men  like  Treskow.  Wittich,  and 
Kottwitz,  things  would  have  taken  a  different  course  at 
the  Mance  ravine.  There  three  evils  combined:  lack  of 
control  in  the  attack,  incapacity  of  many  superior  leaders, 
and  lack  of  control  of  the  battle  act. 

The  companies  and  battalions  forming  the  firing  lines 
are  no  longer  to  be  considered  as  under  the  control  of  the 
superior  leaders;  all  these  swarms  are  more  or  Jess  lost  to  them; 
they  fight  simply  straight  to  the  front!  It  follows  that  the 
sui>erior   leaders   should    understand   from   the   first   how 


24(^  I iu}uirii\<  into  the   Tactirs  of  Ihc  Fithtrr. 

miit'li  tlu\v  cjui  s|>nr»>  ft)r  <lu'  llr»»  action,  nnd  how  nuuh  tlioy 
must  U«>(>p  back  in  onltT  to  Itc  nblo  to  «Mujthiisi/.(>  tlit>  t\ro- 
aotion  at  llio  docisiv*'  nu>niont  for  biinjxin};  about  tho  (bu't- 
sion,  or  to  uxovi  tIumUs.  Moiu-o  brijiados  can  no  lonpM*  nso 
"'/'n/ZV/i"  in  the  traditional  sense,  but  onlv  lines  natnrally 
dilTerinji'  in  nnniber.  str(M»«;th,  distanct^s.  an«l  forms  accord- 
iui;-  \o  circumstances. 

nissolntion  is  not  bi'set  by  the  dan^jtM's  witli  whicli  its 
op|>onents  would  surround  it.  ^^>r.  1,  the  tMUMny  is,  as  a 
rule,  no  bettiM*  olT.  except  in  |)rc|tarc«l  positions;  2.  infantry 
and  artilitM'y  always  (iulil  in  combination:  ;>,  fire  is  very 
»>lT(>ctive  at  MH)  nn>ters.  .Vs  reijards  the  decisit)n,  it  will  in 
nuun/  ames  itot  Iw  fotitut  iinpossil)J('  in  the  latter  phnsea  of  the  hat- 
ih  to  hriug  up  {tiuall  chK^ed  bodies  even  over  open  (jround,  hecauae 
the  enemif^s  fi<ihtin<j  power  diminiaheti  from  hour  to  hour.  At 
8»ich  moments,  a  con»parativ<>ly  snnill  closed  body  may  jiain 
a  dei'ision  (\.i\  'ruilerit>),  wliiih  could  not  have  Wow  «:;ained 
by  mere  fire.  It  follows,  in  turn,  that  the  su[>erior  leaders 
should  from  the  first  employ  the  fire-aetion  of  infantry  and 
artillery  with  the  sjn^atest  enerjiy  in  order  to  «iain  the  supe 
rit>rity  of  \\n\  That  onct\i;ain(Hl,  the  decision  will  in  future 
differ  hnt  Utile  from  that  of  the  past,  and  restM-ves  must  be  kept 
in  hand  ft)r  the  purpose.  Nor  should  frontal  attacks  sup- 
ported by  turninj;  n\ovements  W  shunm>d:  they  should  not 
be  undertaktMi.  however,  until  the  suptM'iority  of  tirt>  has 
betMi  ,i;ain»>tl. 

To  day  the  ilistanc(>  bt>twe(Mi  the  last  flrini^-station  and 
the  point  o{  attack  is  bimnd  to  bt^  much  iireater,  as  a  rule, 
than  forn\tMly.  and  will  hardly  ever  be*  less  (han  WW  mettM's. 
It  constitutes  a  jiravi*  disatlvanta,ue  in  die  (inal  rush. 
There  have  been  rushes  of  'JtK) — 24t)  meters  without  stop, 
but  th<^  conseqmMit  exhaustion  is  diMrinuMital.  Mort^  ditll- 
oult  than  (he  accomplishmtMit  of  thai  physical  task  is  the 


I'Mt/ffiolof/i/  arid  TaMicn.  241 

N'rrojrnition  of  fh'-  rifrht  inorrxnt  for  th<-  t-u\\A<)\u\*i\\  of  th^f 
rcHcrvcn,  whioli  oonHtif uffts  thr-  rnoMt  rjjffjoult  itrohlcm  con- 
fronting thr;  brigade?  ooxumninXcv .  I'ltUmn  the  rfmarva  han 
moved  forward  in  aeeordance  with  the  Mtiite  of  the  arjtion, 
it  JH  apt  to  be  too  Ijite  for  th^  'amhumW  and  will  be  of  no  iK^Tje- 
fit.  Again,  it  will  be  doi/btful  in  many  r;aH*-*«  whether  the 
r«'Herve  can  follow  without  loHing  itH  fighting  jx/wer. 

In  analyzing  the  attaek  of  the  'i8th  Brigade  I  have 
Hhown  that  a  field  of  attack  aH  at  MarH-la-Tonr  Ik  rare  and 
<xe<'ptional;  that  notwithstanding  the  then  (^defective)  tiic 
tifral  fontiH  Tchiefiy  company  eoInmn«  with  a  front  of  'iO 
meterMj,  controlled  lejiding  of  the  \)r\i[ii/\<'.  wonld  have  br-^-n 
I>raetieable  aH  far  aH  Coritour  780;  that  notwithstanding  the 
then  tactical  forms,  and  without  losing  all  fighting  power, 
the  brigade  appro()/:hed  the  Hhelkred  enemy  to  within  150 
meters  and  closer,  and  '-ven  intermingled  with  him,  he 
being  ultimately  completely  concealed  by  the  increasing 
density  of  the  smoke,  which  dung  heavily  to  the  ground; 
and  that  the  brigade  would  not  have  b*f<fn  defr^ted  had 
ofher  brigades  been  available  in  support  as  at  Ht.  I'rivat. 
A  general  tiictical  inquiry  should  not  be  re«tricted  to  the 
action  of  a  single  brigade,  to  Jk?  sure,  but  should  cover  a 
number  of  events  taking  place  on  a  front  of  12 — lo  kilo- 
nxtf-rs  and  more,  Kince  battle-fields  of  such  extent  'an 
hardly  be  fissumed  to  t>e  devoid  of  cover,  it  may  be  tiiken 
for  granted  that  iif>  to  000  meters  from  the  enemy  the 
majority  of  the  infantry  will  find  more  shelter  from  his  fire 
than  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  Ht.  Privat.  Ifow  a  brigade 
should  cross  that  spa/;e  no  one  can  determine  in  advance 
for  every  case  and  for  every  kind  of  troops,  since  the  decid- 
ing circumstancf:rs — t.  «.,  opponent,  armament,  enemy's  tac- 
tics, and  terrain — will  differ  in  each  case;  the  solution  must 


242  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

be  loft  to  the  discretion  of  the  brijjade  commanders  in  con- 
ueotion  with  the  initiative  of  the  subordinate  leaders. 

These  retiections.  though  based  on  psychology,  facts, 
and  experience,  are  not  meant  to  establish  a  universal 
law  to  be  followed  under  all  circumstances;  they  merely 
constitute  considei'ations  whose  application  is  the  business 
of  the  tactician.  In  unwise  hands,  and  without  theimi>ellini; 
force  of  the  will,  the  best  tactical  doctrines  remain  a  thing 
without  life  that  had  better  be  left  in  a  pigeon-hole. 
Where  they  may  or  should  be  applied  or  deviated  from  can 
be  determined  solely  by  the  individuality  of  the  leaders, 
by  their  military  talent  (ability),  but  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  all  tactics — ;'.  e.,  aiming  at  the  ascendency  over  the 
individual  bodies  with  a  view  to  their  control,  remains 
sound  whether  long-range  and  mass  fire  or  not,  and  the 
prescriptions  of  any  regulations  should  rest  on  that  basis. 
It  will  not  always  be  found  practicable,  but  an  endeavor 
should  be  made  to  regain  control  if  lost,  since  those  troops 
alone  will  conquer  which  can  be  led.  IModern  fire-action 
thus  makes  very  high  demands  on  the  efficiencii  of  the  indi- 
riitual  sohh'er  and  on  the  lenders  of  many  men.  and  the  major- 
ity of  them  will  be  found  wanting  as  in  all  unusual  things. 

The  fact  that,  according  to  the  official  reports,  the  sec- 
ond line  of  the  Congressionals  at  Placilla  in  1801  followed 
in  close  fornuition  at  a  distance  of  500  meters  furnishes  food 
for  reflection.* 

As  regards  the  movement,  halts  during  the  advance 
should  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible,  as  they  may  be  con- 
sidered nails  in  the  coflfin  of  healthy  tactics.  Up  to  this 
day  the  Fi*ench   infantry  constantly  practice   movements 

♦For  details  see  "The  Decisive  Conflicts  in  the  Civil  War  in 
Chili.  1892  "  Vienna.  Reichswehr.  1S92.  and  Hugo  Kunz.  "The  Civil 
War  in  Chili."  Leipsic.  1892,  F.  A.  Brockhaus. 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  243 

in  double  time,  and  Cis.sev'8  division  at  Mars-la-Tour  was 
enabled  to  take  a  timely  part  against  the  38th  Brigade, 
simply  because  it  alternately  marched  and  ran.  The  sol- 
dier, as  a  rule,  carries  his  pack,  which  makes  movements  in 
double  time  very  difficult  and  fatiguing;  moreover,  even  a 
regulated  double  time  will  bring  on  unsteadiness  and 
exhaustion  of  physical  strength.  For  that  reason  I  am 
ox>posed  to  the  suggested  use  of  double  time  in  the  case  of 
small,  handy  bodies  in  all  zones  of  fire.  On  the  other  hand, all 
troops  must  to-day  be  able  to  move  more  smartly  than  ever; 
precipitation,  as  at  Mars-la-Tour,  in  taking  a  rapid  gait, 
more  running  than  walking,  which  uses  up  lungs  and  mus- 
cles, and  whifh  brings  the  troops  in  front  of  the  enemy  in 
an  exhausted  condition,  should  be  avoided. 

After  the  War  of  18G4,  General  von  Moltke  published 
a  book,  "Notes  on  the  Effect  of  Improved  Fire-arms  on 
Tactics."  in  which  he  says,  among  other  things:  '-'It  may 
be  assumed  that  at  a  distance  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile  (not 
quite  1900  meters)  a  close  column  will  not  be  able  to  JwJd 
out  under  the  fire  of  a  rifled  battery.  The  opponent  is 
forced  to  deploy,  and  finds  his  only  protection  in  the  dis- 
persed order  and  in  motion." 

In  the  same  place  we  read  aboiit  the  fire  of  the  breech- 
loader: ''Under  ordinary  circumstances,  and  in  the 
pitched  battle,  the  decision  will  be  gained  not  by  fine  marks- 
manship, but  by  mass  fire  at  those  ranges  where  the  unavoida- 
ble errors  in  eslimating  the  range  are  neutralized." 

Who  in  1865  would  have  thought  of  the  perfection  of 
the  fire-arms  of  infantry  and  artillery  which  has  been 
reached  to-day,  by  all  armies  of  the  European  powers?  In 
the  case  of  the  infantry  the  improvement  had  so  far  pro- 
gressed by  1870  that,  under  circumstances  as  at  Mars-la- 
Tour  and  St.  Privat,  the  mass  fire  of  the  infantry  produced 


244  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

a  sensible  material  and  great  moral  effect  at  almost  the  same 
ranges  as  artillery  fire,  and  that  will  be  still  more  so  in 
future.  It  was  bound  to  liaye  a  further  effect  on  ''forma- 
tion" and  "movement";  but  the  "dispersed  order"  should 
not  be  permitted  to  degenerate  into  a  condition  making 
leading  impossible,  nor  should  "movement"  become  a 
"chase,"  or  "seeking  of  cover"  a  theory  that  paralyzes  the 
will,  the  initiative,  the  application  of  compulsion,  makes 
personal  example  impossible,  and  delivers  tactics  over  to 
license.  The  modern  fire-arms  of  infantry  are  more  con- 
structed for  a  flat  trajectory  than  for  fine  marksmanship — 
i.  e.,  the  greatest  possible  extension  of  the  swept  zone  was 
sought  and  attained,  and  the  fire  is  effective  not  only  at 
short,  but  also  at  long-ranges.  The  soundness  of  the 
words  of  Count  Moltke  has  thus  increased  with  time; 
another  bright  mind  (Captain  May,  who  was  killed  at 
Amiens),  who  asserted  in  1869  that  with  rifles  with  flat 
trajectory  mere  horizontal  aim  would  ensure  effective  fire, 
became  the  object  of  derision  and  hostility.*  His  tactical 
suggestions,  which  have  since  been  adopted  in  practice, 
were  in  part  based  on  that  theory. 

Where  the  defender  has  the  choice  of  position,  he  will 
select  one  with  a  wide  field  of  fire;  he  will  not  always  be 
able  to  do  so,  because  interfered  with  by  the  enemy.  At 
Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  we  haA^e  seen  that  the  defender  was 
able  to  do  so  although  he  was  surprised;  hence  tactics  should 
invariably  reckon  on  the  long-range  fire,  and  the  attacker 
should  seek  to  minimize  its  effect  by  adroit  advance  and 
by  rapidity  of  movement,  while  the  infantry,  thrown  to  the 

♦The  idea  of  the  horizontal  aim  did  not  originate  with  Captain 
May.  As  early  as  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  the  French  generals 
converted  the  same  into  practice,  because  they  had  learned  that  in 
the  excitement  of  battle  the  horizontal  aim  is  one  of  the  few  things 
the  soldier  may  be  relied  on  to  observe  in  firing. 


Psrjchology  and  Tactics.  245 

front  for  fire-action  and  gradually  reinforced,  will,  in  com- 
bination with  the  artillery,  keep  the  enemy  busy,  shake 
and  demolish  him.     I  consider  the  advance  by  rushes  prac- 
ticable only  when  the  leaders  are  many,  the  units  small, 
and  the  distances  short;  I  do  not  believe  that  more  than 
three  rushes  could  be  gotten  out  of  troops  in  the  absence 
of  these  prerequisites.     How  far  do  we  get  in  rushing  and 
where  does  the  outer  limit  for  the  beginning  of  rushes  lie? 
I  do  not  believe  that  a  large  unit  can  advance  by  rushes 
without  injury  to  their  control;  I  do  not  believe  in  the  prac- 
ticability of  fire  and  movement  as  exemplified  in  the  "rush 
tactics";  I  do  not  believe  in  it  at  all,  owing  to  the  amount  of 
freedom,  akin  to  license,  which  the  Regulations  concede  to 
the  subordinate  leaders  in  the  "choice  of  the  ground."     I 
consider  these  tactics  an  office  production.     I  would  rather 
have  the  entire  infantry  creep  on  all  fours  in  single  rank 
lines;  it  would  at  any  rate  be  approaching  the   enemy. 
Within  the  brigade,  full  authority  should  be  given  for  the 
use  of  all  means  that  will  make  it  possible  to  reach  effective 
distances.     Dissimilitude  and  ridiculousness  should  not  be 
permitted  to  constitute  a  bar.     How  many  things  matured 
by  the  battle-field  would  be  ridiculous  if  they  were  not  so 
serious!       It  should  not  be  concluded  that  the  infantry 
should  be  drilled  always  to  approach  to  within  600  meters, 
indiscriminately;  that  would  be  a  pernicious  scheme.       It 
should  rather  observe  the  rule  of  remaining  as  long  as  pos- 
sible in  motion  without  stop.     The  force  of  that  rule  dates 
only  from  the  adoption  of  the  open  single-rank  line.      In 
fact,  it  will  be  the  losses  that  fix  the  time  for  making  a  halt 
and  for  advancing  subsequently  by  rushing  or  creeping. 
I  believe,  above  all,  that  the  "attack  by  rushes"  robs  the 
spirit  of  the  attack  of  much  of  its  determination  and  dash. 
This  subtilizing  with  the  terrain  is  bound  to  make  pedants, 


246  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

is  bound  to  impair  vigor;  and  those  who  deny  that  an' attack 
movement  can  be  carried  to  effective  range  without  stop 
are  thinking  more  of  the  drill-ground  than  of  the  battle-field. 
On  the  latter  we  moreover  stand  in  need  of  every  moral  lever; 
an  attack  on  a  large  scale  is  something  tremendously  inspir- 
ing, it  carries  everything  with  it;  rush  tactics  are  wholly 
without  such  influences.  They  have  not  even  been  tried. 
Of  the  former  we  know  at  least  what  may  be  expected  from 
it.  The  Congressionals  are  said  to  have  advanced  by  rushes 
in  the  battle  of  Placilla,  but  I  cannot  believe  it.  That  pro- 
cedure would  require  a  state  of  efficiency  such  as  troops 
which  for  the  most  part  had  but  2 — 3  weeks'  training  could 
not  possess.  The  statement  is  moreover  controverted  by 
the  arrangements  for  the  attack,  under  which  the  reserves 
were  to  follow  in  close  formation  at  a  distance  of  500 
meters,  and  the  first  line  to  reserve  its  fire  until  within  400 
meters  (Placilla).  We  have  there  the  same  tactical  features 
that  are  to  be  observed  with  militia  troops.  The  victory 
of  the  Congressionals  was  due  to  superior  leading,  to 
superior  armament,  and  to  the  enemy.  There  can  be  no 
doubt,  however,  that  the  fire  was  opened  at  such  a. late 
stage  because  the  experiences  at  Concon  had  shown  its 
necessity  in  order  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  a  deficiency 
in  ammunition.  Those  objects  were  not  accomplished,  how- 
ever.* In  general,  both  parties  expended  150 — 200  rounds 
per  man  in  2 — 3  hours.  The  reports  show  that  the  superior 
arm  gave  superior  results.  According  to  these  reports, 
the  Balmacedists  lost  20  per  cent  at  Concon  and  30  per  cent 
at  Placilla,  the  Congressionals  10  per  cent  and  10  per  cent 
respectively.  The  tactics  of  the  side  which  possessed  the 
superior  armament  were  on  the  whole  as  follows:       Ad- 

*See  the  reports  of  Tel  Canto  and  KiJrner  in  the  writings  above 
cited. 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  247 

vance  of  the  skirmishers  without  stop  and  without  fire  to 
within  4 — 300  meters;  opening  fire  at  that  range;  reserves 
follow  at  500  meters.  No  conclusive  deductions  should  be 
made  therefrom,  because  Balmaceda's  army  was  a  very 
poor  one. 

As  regards  the  opening  of  fire  on  the  part  of  the 
assailant,  I  am  unable  to  change  my  opinion  on  account  of 
the  small-caliber  rifle.  The  danger  of  running  out  of  ammuni- 
tion is  much  diminished  by  the  fact  that  every  man  now  car- 
ries 150  rounds  instead  of  100,  as  he  did  up  to  1890.  That, 
however,  does  not  free  us  from  the  danger  of  a  consumption 
of  all  our  ammunition  which  is  invited  by  the  magazine 
rifles.  Although  a  late  opening  of  fire  does  not  protect 
troops  from  the  danger  of  firing  away  all  their  ammuni- 
tion, still  it  constitutes  an  additional  means  for  diminish- 
ing that  danger.  I  advocate  a  late  opening  of  fire  on 
the  further  ground  that  an  early  opening  of  fire  is  the 
greatest  enemy  of  a  vigorous  advance.  I  am  not,  of  course, 
referring  to  the  cases  where  volleys  are  practicable.  Unless 
they  promise  unusually  fine  results,  it  is  better  to  do  with- 
out them,  to  seek  to  approach  under  cover,  to  save  ammu- 
nition, and  to  engage  in  fire  action  at  a  range  where  the 
ballistic  qualities  of  the  rifle  promise  corresponding  tacti- 
cal results,  which,  as  a  rule,  is  at  600  meters.  Cases  where 
fire  at  longer  ranges  may  be  of  some  value  will  probably 
not  be  exceptional,  but  in  general  the  attacker  will  have 
to  advance  to  about  600  meters,  as  at  and  within  that  dis- 
tance infantry  will  best  be  able  to  quickly  gain  the  superiority 
of  fire.  The  advocates  of  long-range  fire  suggest  the  open- 
ing of  the  fire  action  at  1200  meters  with  increasing  inten- 
sity; it  may  be  useful  under  certain  circumstances,  but  to 
accept  it  as  a  rule  would  be  to  greatly  handicap  the  offen- 
sive power  of  infantry  and  to  diminish  and  even  endanger  its 


248  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

entire  tightiug  power  with  lospeot  to  later  stages;  the  advo- 
cates of  long-range  fire  (more  than  1000  meters)  are  usiialli/ 
men  who  do  not  thinl-  highh/  of  the  effect  of  arliUery,  aud  who, 
altliougU  not  saviug  so  iu  so  many  words,  are  inwardly  cou- 
viueed  that  the  infantry  can  do  the  business  alone.  They 
are  infantry-tacticians,  not  tacticians,  as  the  latter  always 
reckon  with  the  three  arms. 

If  we  would  make  it  an  invariable  rule  to  open  fire  at 
600  meters,  we  would  be  foregoing  the  benefit  of  many 
moral  and  material  advantages  of  the  arm.  It  would  be 
quite  absurd  to  use  a  rille  of  great  etficiency  at  1000  meters 
in  the  same  way  as  one  which  possesses  the  same  qualities 
only  up  to  400  meters. 

In  our  army  there  is,  unfortunately,  an  excessive  reli- 
ance on  iiifanlri/  hi/  itself.  In  battle  the  latter  is  no  longer 
the  principal  arm  in  all  stages  up  to  the  decision;  without 
artillery  it  will  frequently  be  unable  to  advance  or  to  hold 
its  ground;  it  is  therefore  dependent  on  the  artillery,  and 
the  latter  in  turn  on  the  infantry.  The  artillery  has  made 
gigantic  progress  by  the  improvements  in  the  gun,  in  the 
projectile,  in  training,  etc.  In  consequence  of  smokeless 
powder  and  increased  elfeet  of  fire  the  artillery  has  become 
more  independent  and  capable  of  resistance,  and  can  now 
carry  on  the  action  until  just  before  the  decision  without 
interfering  with  its  own  infantry,  while  in  1870-71  the 
troops  were  much  endangered  by  the  artillery  when  firing 
over  them.  The  view  remaining  unobstructed,  artillery  can 
always  see,  always  aim.  always  observe,  and  make  better 
practice.  For  the  same  reason  such  direction  of  fire  as 
meets  higher  demands  has  become  practicable  and  the 
fire  may  now  be  coiicentrafed  on  the  decisive  points,  which  was 
im]>ossible  heretofore.  Nor  should  the  tests  and  experi- 
ments be  considered  as  concluded  in  this  respect.     For  all 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  249 

these  reasons  tlie  firo  action  at  ^reat  distances  should,  as 
a  rule,  be  left  to  the  artillery.  There  will  be  exceptions, 
of  course,  and  infantry  had  better  abandon  the  idea  of 
initiating?,  carrying  out,  and  deciding  the  battle.  It  has 
cost  us  bitter  lessons  and  many  lives,  and  has  brought  us 
little  or  no  result  against  the  breech-loader.  In  looking 
over  all  the  imjiortant  actions  against  the  Imperial  French 
Army  in  1870,  we  find  Sedan  the  only  instance  where  the 
artillery  is  employed  in  a  manner  in  keeping  with  modern 
tactics;  there  its  fire  destroyed  the  enemy,  and  the  infantry 
relying  on  its  effect  could  be  held  back. 

At  Worth,  Vionville,  and  (Jravelotte  fMir  infantry  was, 
as  a  rule,  employed  too  soon  and  the  artillery  too  late;  but 
even  then  (III.  Corps  at  Vionville,  Guard  at  St.  Privat, 
VII.  and  VIII.  Corps  at  (iravelotte),  the  artillery,  whenever 
it  acted  in  large  bodies,  took  charr/e  of  the  fire  action  at  lonq 
range.  In  view  of  the  unfavorable  conditions  at  Vionville 
and  St.  Privat,  its  action  was  moreover  of  great  general 
significance  tactically  and  of  incalculable  effect  on  the 
situation  of  the  infantry  of  the  III.  and  Guard  Corps. 
Infantry  should,  as  a  rule,  leave  long-range  fire  to  the 
artillery. 

If  artillery  delays  its  fire  until  the  main  body  of  the 
infantry  is  thrown  into  the  action,  it  cannot  suflSciently 
shake  the  enemy  by  the  time  when  delay  means  destruction 
to  the  infantry,  and  when  the  latter  must  seek  to  hasten 
the  decision  as  much  as  possible.  Tliis  law  is  of  greater 
force  to-day  than  formerly,  because,  according  to  human 
calculation,  the  increased  fire  effect  may  under  certain 
circumstances  perhaps  bring  about  the  decision  even  before 
that  moment.  No  body  of  troops  will  to-day  be  able  to 
stand  a  well-directed  combined  infantry  and  artillery  fire 
as  long  as  was  possible  in  the  past.     Hence  the  artillerv 


260  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Fufure. 

s\\o\\\{]  ho  (h'irlopcd  (If!  carlii  otuJ  in  ofi  ijrcat  aircnijlh  as  possible. 
If  it  sm'ooeds  in  j;<>ttiiij;  in  pt>sition  witlioiit  drawing  ftre 
and  in  antiiipatinu;  (ho  tMuuny  in  «i(>((inj;  \\\o  ran<2:(\  ono 
principal  povlion  of  tlio  work  is  done.  All  ils  (MTorls  shonld 
he  bi'ut  to  (hat  end.  '1\)  ho  snro.  artillorv  should  ho  pro- 
ttH'tod  (0(hjv  from  (ho  tirst  by  infan(ry  (hrown  sonio  500 — - 
(iOO  n\o((M*s  (o  (lu>  front;  odiorwiso  it  niijiht  bo  provtMit(>d  by 
(ho  ontMny's  infan(ry  tir(»  froni  ooninjj  into  action  at  all. 

How  in  (  ach  cast>  \ho  h>adinu;  of  iho  Wwos.  in  roar  is  (o 
bo  r(\i;nla(od  depends  on  (ho  si(na(ion.  and  in  (hat  con- 
no('(itin  (ho  nso  of  prtH'iso  points  of  dirocdon  and  (ho  obsorv- 
anci>  of  (ho  aljo((od  spaco  aro  indisponsablo.  If  tho 
irronnd  is  opon,  (ho  distanoos  bo(wo(>n  (ho  linos  shouUl 
bo  incroasod:  if  tho  jrronnd  is  nioro  covorod,  tho  distanoos 
may  bo  diminishod.  dt^ptMidin*;  on  tho  amount  of  covor.  On 
opon  ji'ronnd  (horo  will  bo  no  ihoict^  bnt  (o  nso  singlo-rank, 
oponod,  linos  with  jiroat  dis(ancos.  Sinco  tho  lii.i>:lu>r 
ballistic  qualitios  i>f  (In*  ritlo  t'onftM'  on  tlu*  skirmish  linos 
incroasiHl  powors  of  rosis(anc(>.  thor(>  will  bo  no  risk  in 
inoreasinjr  tho  dis(anc(>s.  Hut  ox<'rcisos  of  lari;t>  nnits  in 
closo  formation  in  [ho  terrain  shonld  not.  on  that  accoimt,  bo 
dispensed  with,  and  in  travorsinji'  woods  particular  stress 
shonld  bo  laid  on  tattical  cohesion.  Woods  play  a  great 
role  in  battle;  1  will  merely  mention  (hat  of  ^laslowod  and 
tho  Rois  dos  (^(''nivanx;  (heir  ns(*  for  covering  (ho  approach 
in  (ho  manner  of  (ho  *JT(h  l>riuado  a(  Problus  will  probably 
be  frot]uen(  in  the  future,  when  opportunit i(>s  will  be  atVord- 
ed  to  (ako  advajitajio  of  closo  forniations  and  to  cover  the 
enemy  at  a  comparatively  short  ranjje  with  a  crushing 
tire.  Tho  very  thing  tho  27th  brigade  did  at  Problus  for 
mnsking  its  approach  will,  under  similar  circumstances, 
be  practii'ablo  in  the  future.  no(withs(anding  tho  small- 
caliber  arms. 


Psychology  and  TurticH.  251 

The  diBruption  of  units  Bhould  also  be  avoided  as  much 
as  possible.  The  intermingling  of  troops  within  a  certain 
space,  however,  which  is  inseparable  from  the  eombat  of 
masses  of  skirmishers,  should  not  be  confounded  with 
divergence  of  troops  in  different  directions  and  transgres- 
sion beyond  the  allotted  battle-space,  whereby  fractions  of 
different  units  become  intermingled  without  having  a  com- 
mon object.  That  lies  chiefly  within  the  power  of  division 
and  brigade  commanders;  a  sufficient  reserve  must  be  pro- 
vided at  all  events.  For  those  who  have  observed  the  condi- 
tion of  troof)H  thnt  have  ber-n  unfortunate  in  battle  will  ad- 
mit that  in  the  hands  of  men  physically  exhausted  and  mor- 
ally spent  the  best  rifles  are  no  better  than  none.  In  1870 
battalions,  regiments,  brigades,  divisions,  and  even  army 
c(U'7>s,  were  mixed  in  wild  confusion;  at  the  first  shot  every- 
bodyrushed  to  the  front  as  though  it  were  a  signal  that  there- 
after no  orders  need  be  given  or  obeyed.  For  hours  battalion, 
regimental,  and  brigade  commander  did  not  have  a  man  in 
hand;  the  soldier  was  fighting  the  battle,  in  fact.  Divi- 
sional generals  did  not  have  even  companies  at  their  dis 
posal — not  even  in  defeat — because  their  brigades  had 
crumbled  to  pieces  at  the  most  heterogeneous  j>oint8. 
Corps  commanders  had  two  or  three  little  reduced  battal- 
ions under  them,  while  in  the  front  the  fate  of  the  battle 
was  hanging  in  the  balance  for  hours.  With  such  tactics 
we  need  only  lieutenants  and  soldiers,  but  they  will 
accomplish  no  great  result;  the  latter  will  invariably 
require  superior,  well-planned  leading,  the  employment  and 
( ontrol  of  masses  for  a  definite  object,  and,  within  these  lim- 
its, control  on  the  part  of  the  infantry  brigade  commanders. 

In  capturing  the  enemy's  jjosition,  its  increa.sed  distance 
fiom  the  last  firing-station  will  form  a  distinctive  feature 
as  compared  with  former  conditions.     Any  one,  however, 


253  lnqtiiri$s  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

who  has  visitiHl  tho  battlo  iiiomuis  oi  Kissinji'en  aiul 
Worth  will  oome  to  tho  oonolusion  that  in  i\\v  strujiiile  tor 
tho  koy  of  a  }H>sition  tho  samo  phononioiia  whioh  ai>pt»artHl 
horo  will  froquoutlv  room*  in  tho  fntnrt^ — i'.  t*..  that  it  will 
bo  jKussiMo  to  appioaoh  within  S(> — 100  nnMors.  Tho 
oaptnro  of  Fiosohwoilor  is  tvpioal  for  tho  ailvanoo  of  tho 
rosorvo  (StarkloiY's  Wiiitoniborii  lU-iuatloV  for  tho  impulso 
to  tho  tinal  rnsh.  for  tho  intonninjiling-  of  troops  of  four 
ditforout  arinv  oorps  in  tho  oaptnrotl  villajro.  and  also  v>n 
aooount  of  tho  rapidity  with  whioh  thov  ro-fonnod.  This* 
oxaniplo  absolntoly  illustratos  all  tho  lossons  and  is  a  jjood 
reforonoo  for  any  snooossfnl  attaok.  It  is  approxiniatod 
among-  tho  important  aotions,  by  tho  attacks  on  St.  Trivat 
(north).  Loigny.  and  t^t.  Qnontin:  bnt  in  fntnro  tho  tinal 
nssanlt  >Yill  probably  bo  dirootod  moro  against  artitioial 
keys  than  against  villagos.  This  doos  not  modify  tho  prin- 
ciples of  oxooution  in  any  ^^•ay. 

In  tho  oaso  of  an  unsnooossful  attai'k  tho  dofoatod 
troops  will  hardly  lind  immodiato  snpport  fiom  infantry  in 
their  rear;  the  support  will  oome  exolusively  from  the  artil- 
lery. On  that  aooount  T  atu  opposed  to  having  tho  artillery 
aooompany  tho  attacking  infantry,  t^hangos  of  positions, 
being  easily  visible,  should  bo  avoided  as  mui'h  as  possible; 
excepting  moral  grounds,  theiv  is  no  reason  why  artillery 
should  accompany  tho  attack,  for  the  use  of  smokeless 
powder  makes  it  protitable  for  artillery  to  remain  \v,  ono 
etTectivo  tiring  position,  and  tho  improvement  of  tho  prin- 
oijnil  projectile  ishrapnob  admits  of  groat  etfoct  at  dis- 
tances which  render  it  wholly  unnecessary  to  accompany 
the  attack.  Yet  it  may  bo  useful  in  some  cases.  Kut  the 
rapid  occupation  of  a  captured  position  by  artillery  is  im- 
practicable per  se  on  many  grounds. 

At  the  moment  of  tho  defeat  of  an  infautrv  attack  cav- 


•a\v\'  will  find  t>\t\Ktr\nuit'u^  tor  fraining  hrWVmni.  ¥,niAA')m, 
<-Hj><'<'jaIJv  if  it.  ¥>\u\i\('%i\\  nAvamj-n  from  *:oin'J:ii\m*fUt  <fHt, 
(■itufutinf.  Vai'JoiJM  IntMentM  at  VumviWti  t^^faeb  tlwi?  iMiine 
U-%%tm.  ('avalry  niiouM  th^T^'for^'  K<^'k  favorahUt  ]tfmilUmn 
for  Kijch  t'%u('%'i[t'Ut''U'%.  i'la/rJJJa  nhown  iYmt  a  titu;*-^nfn\ 
iufauxry  aiiiuk  i-uiinufj-n  mifcjinti  to  an  unF^/uud'^l  d^^tp"*:^. 
TUitr*'.  \n  mxu'h  to  U^r  U^ruttd  from  fiial  ttsamxA*^.. 

I V,  Of  itc4!  Mf/ral  Trainiruj  of  Trwp». 
\t  in  not  alway«  <;ai*y  to  rtti'My^'v/M  tht^  ta/rticaDy  rt/>< 
UihUioiit.  Tlj<-  <'n<f«iy  rnay  <i*^:H\v*i  un  m  t>iat  rei<jM^;t.-  an  be 
^JJ<J  at  VionvilJeand  (irn\'<i\otUr,  and.  «j^>f*^>v*;r,  one  may  be 
rni«titken  on  one's  own  j^art  for  other  niOMimn.  In  that 
caw*'  the  %r<K)\m  niunt  hold  their  trround,  for  e%'ery  conqof^ed 
t>it  of  i'arih  njii>»t  h<'  held  on  jj^^fwr^i]  principles;  here  it  i« 
where  the  moral  strength  of  \roti\tv,  shows  itself.  At  Ht. 
Privat  the  Ouard«  held  out  f^>r  three  botirs  nnder  a  destnjct- 
jv*'  fire,  though,  to  tMf  sure,  th^'V  were  nr^  calUtl  ufK>n  to  meet 
a  ttountcraU^-.k;  the  'J8th  brigade  held  out  'i'i  minute* 
within  8^J — loO  meters  of  the  tftufmy  without  the  support  of 
other  infantry  or  of  sufficient  artillery.  I  state  tbiu  in 
reply  to  the  a^s^^rtion  that  "no  body  of  troo\m  will  remain 
halted  under  sww^ping*  fire;  that  it  will  crowd  either  for- 
ward or  to  the  r^iiar."  That  is  a  pernicious  doctrine,  par- 
ticularly to-^lay,  when  the  continuous  danger  sf/ace  extend* 
f^'Mi  meters  from  the  muzzle.  It  thus  be^romes  incumbent 
on  infantry  to  hold  out;  otherwise-  an  action  could  not  be 
fought  within  the  continuous  danger  n\fa('M.  I  doubt  that  a 
Kujx^riority  of  fire.  ><nfficjent  for  a  de*fisioD,  can  be  gained 
at  a  greater  range  tlian  fXK)  meters. 

*Tb6  aatbor  tues  the  t^m  "raiemt,"  meaning  tbat  ao  part  of  tlie 
trajecv^ry  exceed*  the  beifdiit  of  a  marj.  We  hare  no  eorre^ondtog 
technical  term.  In  the  abtsenee  of  anytbinj?  better,  the  term  "sweep- 
ing" haJ5  been  premsed  into  »«^ice. — TrnrusUitvr. 


Soi  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Losses  will  have  to  be  put  up  with.  ;uul  tlu'  resolution 
to  bear  them  should  be  injiraiued  in  tlii>  troops  bv  peaee- 
training:,  for  that  moral  foree  is  the  most  precious  jiit't  the 
soldier  and  subordinate  holder  ean  ])ossess.  '1\)  develop  it 
is  the  work  of  the  ps\ehoU>.irieal  education  of  troops  in 
peace;  we  should  take  care  not  to  mistake  exttM-ior  matters, 
such  as  a  smart  manual,  tirm  step,  loud  auswiM's.  etc.,  for 
the  spirit,  or  to  judiie  the  moral  (MVicieucv  of  a  rejiiment  by 
its  display  of  these  thiniis.  Tht^  moral  efficiency  of  troops 
is  not  so  much  the  result  of  practical  exercises  as  oi  intel- 
ligently and  judiciously  conducted  instruction. 

At  the  time  the  08th  liriiiade  employed  in  part  the  most 
dangerous  tactical  forms;  yet  it  advanced  without  sto]>  until 
intermingling  with  the  enemy.  What  does  that  teach? 
That  the  moral  (i^sychical)  education  of  the  troops  should  be 
looked  to  above  all.  because  it  outweighs  everything  else, 
and  it  is  the  point  to  which  I  constantly  recur. 

The  last  few  wars  do  not  show  a  single  instance  of  a 
devoted  and  deadly  attack  that  can  at  all  be  compared  with 
that  of  the  :?8th  lirigade. 

Kottwitz's  brigade  at  Loigny  and  Skobeleff's  attack  in 
the  third  battle  of  Plevna  approximate,  but  are  not  equal 
to  this  instance,  because  in  either  case  the  circumstances 
were  more  favorable  to  the  assailant. 

The  feat  of  arms  culminated  in  a  horrible  disaster,  but 
it  is  instructive  as  showing  what  stout-hearted  regiments 
can  do. 

And  passing  to  the  nniterial  side:  if  losses  constituted 
the  greatest  glory,  the  3Sth  Brigade  would  be  entitled  to  it. 
Of  all  the  Gernnin  troops  it  sutlered  the  greatest  losses 
in  the  shortest  time  as  compared  with  other  units. 
The  occurrence  is  therefore  equally  singular  and  notable 
both  from  the  psychical  (moral)  and  tactical  ])oints  of  view. 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  255 

It  iH  rnoro  difficult  to  ooutrol  many  small  dotachm^ntn 
than  few  largo  oneH;  it  Ib  moro  difficult  yet  to  control  bri- 
gadoH  fighting  entirely  as  BkirrniHherH,  which  will  be  the 
rnh'.  ThiK  undeniable  disadvantage  of  the  superior  leaders 
should  be  nullified  as  much  as  possible  by  the  tactical  train 
ing  of  the  leaders  and  the  moral  training  of  the  troops. 

Conceding  the  control  on  the  part  of  the  higher  leaders 
within  the  zone  of  destructive  fire  to  be  i>erforce  restricted, 
how  can  that  deficiency  be  compensated  for?  I  have  men- 
tioned in  this  connection:  1,  careful  training  of  the  sol- 
dier in  skirmishing  and  in  firing;  2,  development  of  the 
feeling  of  self-reliance  based  on  the  confidence  in  the  arm 
and  on  the  training  of  the  skirmisher;  '.',.  higher  tactical 
efficiency  of  the  subordinate  leaders  of  all  grades;  4,  in- 
crease of  the  number  of  the  lower  leaders;  5,  clear  and  pre- 
cise orders  regarding  the  object  to  all  officers  down  to  the 
captains  before  entering  the  action,  and  the  endeavor  to 
prevent  misunderstanding  during  the  action.  All  these 
requirements  are  of  purely  mechanical  character  or  addr^^ss 
themselves  to  the  intellect  alone,  and  remain  without  effect 
if  both  fail.  It  should  therefore  be  endeavored  to  prevent 
that  failure;  the  means  thereto  are  purely  moral.  It 
is  hardly  necessary  to  refer  here  to  the  officers,  as  they  are 
all  more  or  less  imbued  with  an  idealism  for  the  sake  of 
which  they  are  pr(?pared  to  surrender  their  all.  That  is 
not  sufficient,  however;  it  should  be  endeavored  to  develop 
some  degr(?  of  idealism  among  the  great  mass  of  the  com- 
batants. In  the  case  of  more  highly  developed  men  and 
strong  characters  (^officersj  this  may  spring  from  very  different 
groundSjbut  in  tlie  caseof  thesoldier  it  should  be  basedon  the 
most  natural  grounds.  They  are  faith,  national  sentiment, love 
of  country,  esprit.  The  entire  training  of  the  soldier  should 
be  systematically  built  up  on  the  basis  of  these  four  qualities, 


256  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

so  that  he  may  learn  to  distinguish  between  virtue  and 
wealcness.  It  is  by  no  means  easy,  because  the  development 
of  culture,  intellect,  and  moral  sense  of  the  men  differ  very 
much  in  degree,  aud  it  requires  no  small  amount  of  time, 
patience,  and  devotion  on  the  part  of  the  officers.  The 
choice  of  the  means  will  therefore  very  much  depend  on  the 
character  of  the  troops,  and  they  should  be  so  chosen  as 
to  enlarge  the  soldier's  conception  by  instruction,  to  rouse 
and  increase  his  susceptibility  for  the  sublime;  in  a  word, 
the  man  should  be  subjected  to  moral  training,  keeping  the 
enlargement  of  his  intellect  in  view  at  the  same  time. 
The  best  means  to  insure  progress  in  each  one  of  the  four 
qualities  consists,  in  the  first  place,  in  rousing  the  men's 
interest,  inclination,  zeal,  and  love  for  the  profession;  in 
making  intelligible  to  them  the  sublimity  of  the  duties  to 
which  they  are  called;  in  strengthening  their  hearts  by 
numerous  examples  of  how  the  heroes  of  the  Fatherland, 
whether  carrying  the  marshaVs  taton  or  the  nmsl-et,  have  con- 
ceived these  duties  and  have  surrendered  their  lives  for 
them.  That  can  always  be  done,  opportunity  for  it  is  never 
lacking  in  military  life,  and  even  in  practical  exercises  this 
or  that  example  may  be  interwoven  and  enlarged  upon. 
The  chief  work  will,  however,  have  to  be  accomplished  by 
instruction  by  such  oflScers  alone  as  can  speak  in  a  compre- 
hensible and  stirring  manner  on  such  topics.  What  may  in 
this  way  be  gained  by  the  right  kind  of  officers  may  easily 
be  undone  by  less  able  officers,  because  a  man's  feelings  are 
very  sensitive  and  should  be  touched  only  by  a  careful  and 
gentle  hand.  While  the  powers  of  the  intellect  and  feeling 
are  thus  being  roused,  kind  treatment,  such  as  will  make 
the  man  aware  that  he  is  profiting  hy  it,  should  be  used  to 
rouse  his  ambition,  because  we  need  that  for  everything  and 
always,  and  because  the  entire  training  must  rest  on  the 


Psychology  and  Tactics.  257 

sense  of  honor;  in  it  the  soldier's  aims  and  life  should  cul- 
minate, and  he  should  be  unable  to  separate  his  own  honor 
from  that  of  his  corps,  of  the  army,  and  of  the  country.  It 
is  always  the  sense  of  pride  and  shame  which  in  the  case  of 
the  soldier — because  with  him  everything  takes  place  pub- 
licly— are  of  such  great  moral  effect  on  the  whole  character 
of  the  army  and  its  behavior  in  battle,  and  not  a  day  should 
be  allowed  to  pass  by  without  the  officers  thinking  over  it 
and  acting  accordingly.  It  is  true,  part  of  the  men  to-day 
are  indolent  in  Frederick's  sense,  but  the  remainder  are 
easily  susceptible  to  a  higher  and  nobler  conception  of  the 
duties  of  their  profession.  That  fact  should  be  judiciously 
and  strenuously  taken  advantage  of,  and  hours  of  instruc- 
tion are  worth  more  than  days  of  spirit-killing  drill,  al- 
though I  would  not  have  one  iota  abated  from  the  custom- 
ary rigor  and  precision.  Although  a  taste  for  the  sub- 
lime and  heroic  is  far  from  making  heroes,  still,  once  roused 
and  refined,  it  furnishes  us  with  a  means  to  act  on  the  pride 
and  shame  of  the  men  and  to  quicken  their  sense  of  honor, 
their  will-p6w^er,  and  their  sense  of  responsibility  toward 
God  and  man,  toward  their  king,  their  fellow-citizens,  their 
families,  and  toward  their  own  wordly  goods.  There  are 
plenty  of  means  available  for  this  end,  but  I  omit  them 
because  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  enumerate 
and  discuss  them. 

If  the  soldier  can  be  made  susceptible  to  honor,  pride, 
and  shame,  courage  may  also,  to  a  certain  degree,  be  trained 
into  him;  history  shows  instances  where  injury  to  their 
honor  has  driven  men  not  in  themselves  courageous  to 
heroic  resolves,  to  great  vigor  of  action,  and  to  a  remarka- 
ble degree  of  devotion !  But  we  find  them  invariably  men 
of  but  one  faith,  however  singular  that  faith  may  have  been ; 
hence  I  am  convinced  that  a  careful  moral  training  of  any 


iJ5S  Inquinfit  into  the  Tactks  of  the  Future, 

tivu>ps  will  lu^  toll  on  tho  battlo  tii>Ui.  juul  ihat  troops  sua- 
ivptiblo  to  uoMo  impulsos  will  alono  oomo  up  to  tho  iviiuirt^- 
uitMits  luaiio  on  iho  unni  In  (ho  modorn  tlrotlnlu.  This 
boiuii  I  ho  oiilv  moans,  all  (-duciition  and  triiininij  should  be 
bastHl  i>n  it;  anil  havinii  loarntnl,  bv  a  oloso  sorntinv  of  my 
o>vn  uaturo,  thai  sv>UlitMlv  courajio  admits  of  otiltivation. 
1  fail  to  stv  whv  tho  samo  shouUl  uoi  bo  pi>ssibU»  with  tho 
bt^ttor  I'lass  of  tho  mon. 

Tho  ivsnlts  aooomplislunl  will  not  bt^  unit'orm :  n  portion 
of  tho  mtMi  will  iiivo  no  proof  whatt^vor  of  thoir  poaoo- 
traiuinii  on  tho  battUMiold.  Thov  aro  a  class  of  boasts; 
with  othors  will  and  woaknoss  will  t'lMtttMid  ajjainst  oaoh 
other,  tho  struuiilo  onditiii'  in  favor  of  tho  lattor:  tho  third 
(smallest^  part  will  stantl  tho  tt^si.  Tht\v  art»  ilu>  proilmi  of 
iiiberittHi  qualitit^  juui  subsonuont  training  in  tho  school, 
in  tho  homo,  and  in  sooioty ;  thov  aro  tho  hoart  of  tho  troops, 
and  with  thom  and  with  tho  otYorts  of  tht*  ot^U'ors  it  w  ill  bo 
possible  tomakt>  tho  sooond  i-lassstand  to  thoir  uiins.  Wo  aro 
duly  appreoiatinii'  the  evil  otVoets  protlneod  on  human  nature 
by  the  skirmish  tijiht.  but  it  would  be  wronu  to  rejeet  that 
method  of  tightinir  on  account  of  their  existenoe.  It  is 
only  ntvessary  that  ovtM'y  one  should  be  eoijni/.ant  of  the 
weaknesses  and  dark  sides  of  his  profession,  the  ot^U'or  ot 
those  of  his  taetiis.  in  ordtM-  to  oonnteraet  them  intelli- 
jjently.  They  will  m^tu"  bi>  oompletely  oradit'attHi  from 
taetios.  as  that  would  mean  to  eradieato  human  nature. 
Stout  hearts  are  moreover  found  everywhere:  Nature  does 
not  piek  out  a  special  class  of  men  for  that,  and  the  loaders 
should  honor  thom  suitably  where  they  come  to  the  fore;  it 
will  inviiTorato  the  military  spirit  and  stimulate  all  wtMl 
disposiHl  characters. 

Every   battlo-tiold  roiiuiros  special   measures!     Obsta- 
cles of  all  kinds  exert  their  otVov't  and  cause  delay,  displace- 


i/i.'/i»H,  ;j.»,rj  vrrf,<iuU,.riiu»..  Jf.  jm  fjj«;  aim  .,/  //,«  ///^-^ior//  /mimn,^ 
»l  IM  UafkrH  lo  ov«'ir;oHi<^  thctti  anrj  to  k^^jp  in  i\ut  utUUt  of 
<Uti:M\(t  itui\  uuirx\H'MUti\  itt,uti\\'u,un  an  oj><fTJ  <'y<;  on  fh«; 
ro;irJ«  which  h^J  to  Uit'XUMl  nuiHirlorU.y;  iu.nt  jh  wUant  thn 
^liU-n-nrM  hcXwi.,.u  tmritUuulr.il  m-Mon  and  iUtt  Una  iMWMp- 
Hon  of  Uiir  Hitn:i.iion,  IM  vo.hiH  of  p^ynonaX  rMroAUridwH,  which 
wiiJ  i-yi,v  U:  of  /j/yi  Jn/,,orfanw,  will  b^^corn*.  uvauSU^X. 

W'*-  niaj^  H^fioct  any  innovation  and  any  flrdrj  imu-Mi-A 
f/j  I  he  Hunie;  in  fhr-ir  aj^pli^af  ion  nia/i  r-aKily  ovcrHh^K>fH  fh*^ 
nja/k,  anrj  i/,  (Joinj<  Mr,  inflin  on  hiniH^if  morr,  or  h^M  painful 
wounriH.      Thoot'ht    antidpat.^   fa.;t   ^^jK^ciilativrr   th.^orvj. 
;in(J  cxj,r.H..nr:c  alone  can  dcnionHlraf/;  what  th«  riw^rit**  of 
Wi*-  j/inovafion  n.aijy  arc.    Trnc,  war  alone  oflTcrn  fhc  f„|J 
nica>.urc  of  that  cx/x-ricncc,  hut  ninch  can  he  done  in  jxrace 
in  the  way  of  i;re,,aratio«,  if  the  innovations  are  followed 
in(elliKenf  ly  and  wUhoiif  hian  for  principlr^.     On  no  field  im 
(he  p.iniHhnM-nt  of  faJn*;  speculation  k<^  fafal  aj<  on  that  of 
tactics,  and  nowhere  shorjid  wrf  be  more  careful  rhan  th^-re, 
Whr-n  one  of  the  lar^e  anni^-s  bad  adopt/-d  lon^^  range 
/JrearnjM,  oUier  ronjpetinj(  arnilr^s  could  not  afford   to  re- 
main behind,  and  hji/i  to  <'nter  on  the  path  of  progrr:««.     If 
not  on  others,  it  was  necessary  on  moral  grounds,  as  they 
are  all  imj/ortant  in  baffle.     It  should  be  kept  in  mind,  how 
ever,  thaf  fhe  rmn  who  shoots  is  more  important  than  the 
f<hol,htul  that  m  fur  as  n</i?/ra/  -?/7/>^wm  and  the  m  Uhh  irddivfihU 
irukknce  iutt  I'.otKtarinu},  man  remains  the  same  df^pit*-  sujx- 
rior  education   and   a   higher   moral    level.      /fence  fhos*? 
troopH  alone  will  comjmr  wkick  ar".  led.       It  is  certain  that 
under   many   circumstance^   leading   will    rin\n'mt   gn^ater 
Hiu:ni'Kj-H  fhan  fornierly;   who  falls,  di*;s  for  his  country, 
for  his  profr-sMJon,  and  also  for  his— in  this  instance,  noble^ 
egotism, 

Ifj  war  the  most  sublime  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  soul. 


2l>0  Inquiries  into  the  'I\ictics  of  the  Futuir. 

On  it  tlio  tiii'htinsi:  prinoii^los  should  Ih^  Inisod  and  Tho  iiuid- 
inji'  idoas  (ov  iraininji  and  Icadiui:;  bo  built  u]>;  with  the  holp 
of  oxporitMU'o.  tho  tii;ht  views  will  tluMi  bo  lakou.  Tho 
attaokor  ivaohos  all  too  earlv  tho  point  whoro  ovoi\v  rule  is 
shattered  and  supplanted  l\v  irre«;ularity,  and  in  the  chaos 
whiih  is  utuivoidabU>  bef(U-e.  at.  aud  afttM"  the  deeisiiui,  uutn 
should  stand  above  disorder  aud  confusion,  still  capabU^  of 
exertiuii  his  will-power,  uiiided  bv  the  intellect,  to  bend  so 
niauv  unchained  forces  under  his  swav;  to  briuj;  them  for- 
ward auaiu  under  control  is  the  second  part  of  this  ditVicult 
problem.  If  sm-h  men  cHunmand  in  battle,  tuir  baniuM's 
will  continue  to  wave  over  captured  heiiihts.  There  sluuild 
be  constant  tMult>avor  io  reduce  the  numy  ai'cideuts  of  bat- 
tle which  tan  not  be  wholly  eliminated.  To  transfer  the 
battle  to  the  niuht.iu  luder  to  estape  the  moral  and  material 
etTects  is  to  formally  invite  these  accidents,  and  no  wise  nuiu 
will  coui'ur  in  that  proposititm. 

1  have  frctiuiUitly  sought  Un-  the  rt^ason  of  our  "phil- 
osophy of  losses."  Is  the  same  justitled  bei-ause  we  no 
longer  look  at  things  in  the  right  way,  or  have  we  become 
weaklings  as  compared  with  our  progenitors,  or  does  the 
superior  nuiterial  of  uumi  constituting  nunleru  armies  cause 
that  wail  to  go  up  after  every  battle,  or  is  it  the  nu)ral 
effect  of  the  breech-loader  that  has  set  so  many  springs  in 
operation? 

Many  theories  might  be  adv;nu'iHl  on  this  point;  I 
refrain  from  advancing  any, because  wt>  art'  already  laboring 
under  a  pletluua  of  them.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  a 
particular  degree  of  civilization  also  engenders  effeminacy, 
aud  strengthens  that  egotism  which  culminates  in  personal 
comfort  or  craves  high  living,  thus  sapping  virile  strength 
and  self-sacritice;  also  that  the  stuptMying  lire  of  the  breech- 
loader produces  an  overptnvering  niornl  imju'ession   on   by 


Fnycholofjy  and  Tactics.  '^^Bl 

far  fh<-  groat  majority.  We  kw*,  therefore,  that  taetieally 
the  greater  portion  of  warfare  falls  aH  much  within  the 
Hi>here  of  the  will  an  huH  always  been  the  case  strategically. 
'Jo  lliose  who  would  charge  rne  with  lapsing  from  justi- 
fied psycliological  requirements  into  psychological  reveries, 
1  make  this  brief  re[)ly:  ''^'onsider  that  all  we  have — all  we 
enjoy — has  been  gained  by  long  p(;riodH  of  suffering  on  the 
j)arl  of  our-  forefathers.  They  liavr-  given  us  all.  They  ask 
as  much  of  us.  They  gave  us  the  body,  protected  it,  and 
fonned  and  united  our  soul.  They  ask  our  body  and  soul  for 
themsrdves.  However  freely  we  may  spread  our  pinions  as 
individuals,  we  remain  a(;countable  to  these  creditors  for  the 
use  of  our  [towers,  even  if  such  accountability  make  legiti- 
mate demands  for  both  body  and  soul."  A  military  system 
that  does  not  constitMle  a  training  sdiool  in  virtue,  fails  in 
its  duty  to  the  state;  and  the  uninterrupted  cultivation  of 
all  the  ethical  qualities  of  the  men  will  ultimately  inure  to 
the  benefit  of  tactics  on  the  battle-field.  The  great  mass  is 
not  converted;  that  is  not  necessary,  liut  we  shall  convert 
some,  and  that  sufTicf-s  for  f>ur  jtiupose  and  is  worth  the 
labor. 


'202  Inquirit\<  info  the  Tocfica  of  the  Fiihur. 

PART  111. 

TACTUW  L  DKDrcn^ONS. 

/.     Iic marls  on  'J'arlical  'reiuJt'ncics. 

Had  tho  ballistii'  iiualitics  of  (he  chassopAt  beon  geiior 
ally  known  in  our  army  bt^foro  1870,  tlio  (lornians  would 
not  havo  ontored  nj)t)n  llio  war  with  any  doubt  as  to  what 
was  in  storo  for  thoni.  Tho  authoritit^s  (h>aliu,<;  with  such 
nuittors  niijiht  havo  readily  asoortainod  tho  ballistic  quali- 
ties of  that  rillo,  since  it  had  been  in  their  possession, 
tojjether  with  the  retiuisite  aninnmition,  since  18(58.  Instead 
of  spreading;'  c(U'rei't  notions  of  that  rille.  the  error  was 
('onunitted  of  concealiuy;  from  the  students  of  the  tirinj; 
school  and  from  th(>  army  at  lar^e  the  ureat  superiority  of 
the  (^hassepot  over  the  needle  liun  in  ballistic  (lualities.* 
Hence  it  is  not  the  troops  and  the  otlicers  on  practical  ser- 
vice that  iwc  to  be  charji'ed,  in  the  lii'st  place,  with  the  iireat 
losses,  which  might  have  easily  been  avoidt>d.  and  which 
freiiiuMitly  failed  of  any  j;ood  result  \vhal(>V(M'.  Still  tlu> 
troops  had  learned  a  jiood  vleal  of  the  truth  by  other  means; 
but  as  nothingwas  done  to  I'onform  their  traininiiaml  tactics 
to  that  truth,  the  infantry  was  in  a  very  unfavorable  posi- 
tion in  1870,  which  was  aii'.iiravated  by  th(>  fact  that  the 
correct  ideas  advocated  in  the  "Tactical  l\t>trospt>cts"  (open 
lines,  liorizontal  aim)  were  prom])tly  smotlu>r(Hl  by  the 
(alh^jjed)  "official"  reply  of  l>ronsart  and  others.  Arnu'd 
with  an  inferior  ritle  and  aware  that  the  cnstonuiry  tactics 
were  inapplicable  ai;ainst  the  Chassepot,  the  troops  at  the 
sudden  outbreak  of  the  war  were  suspended  between  heaven 
and  earth,  as  it  were,  and  it  was  only  after  the  saiijjjuin- 

*See   page   3-5,    •■Wintertagswirklichkelt"("Wintei-day  Facts  "), 
Berlin,  R.  Felix.mllltary  publisher. 


Tactical  Deductions.  '2fi^ 

uvy  t-xitcv'iciK<-H  of  t[i<'  Auf/uHt  h<)ltl<K  tfijif  th<-  infantry 
b<'^an  to  toiJ<;h  f hut  tar;tioal  j^round  wliich  iniKht  hnvc  bof;ri 
(•anily  found  bf^forff  th(?  war  ha<l  th<5  balliHtir  (pjalitirfH  of 
tlu-  CbnHHr'pof  boon  rnad(?  HufWcutuWy  known.  Thin,  too, 
alfhoij^'l)  two  yt'itvH  liad  clapHod  Hinoo  tho  "rniracIeH" 
wroijj^ht  by  tho  ]'r<-n<li  ri/lo  at  Montana!  Wo  can 
hardly  Kpoak  in  truth  of  nuix-rior  ta<;tioH  on  i\n-  part  of 
thff  Oorrnnn  infantry  in  tlio  Au^'UHt  battlon;  Uu-  Oer- 
rnanH  oon<|uorod  abovo  all  throuj^h  Huporior  Htrato^'v  of  Huoh 
firopond^rant  w^itrht  that  victory  foil  to  tho  (iovuinn  loadorH 
notwitliMtandirij^  thoir  antiquiitcd  tuoticH.  ThiH  provJ-H  inoi- 
dontjilly  how  much  Huporior  Htrato^y  aHHJHtH  in  tho  HUOOffMH- 
fuj  iHMuo  of  a  war. 

Mcanwhilo  a  now  loaf  has  boon  turnod  ovor  in  Oorrnany, 
and  it  may  bo  Htatod  that  tho  Hupronio  authoritioM  and  mili- 
tary writorH  havo  dono  ovrfrythinj?  to  Kjjrf^id  tru'-  and  oor 
roct  idojiH  of  tho  r-ffcrt  of  modern  armn,  inKuffi^iontly  por- 
ha|>H,  amon^  tho  infantry  and  cavjilry  an  ro^ardH  knowlrf<Jgo 
of  the  offect  of  artiJIory  firo.  ft  now  romainH  with  the 
troopH  to  digoHt  what  haH  br-cn  pr^wontod  i<,  thcrn  by  the»e 

HOUroffH. 

Whorovor  wo  may  turn  in  th'-  Hnnaln  of  war,  ij^no- 
ranoo  and  arrogance  have  invariably  boon  tho  chief  cauHen 
of  dofoat,  and  it  iH  a  Kin^nlar  fact  that  th<*«o  two  aro  always 
found  in  combination  in  ovory  nation.  In  that  particular, 
thoy  are  aH  alike  an  two  poaK.  It  Ih  not  HufTiciont  to  HprcnA 
knowlodgo;it  \h  ne^.-OHHary  to  drawfrorn  f h'-  roKultK  of  experi- 
montH  practical  and  tjictical  d^ductiouH  for  tho  roj/ulationg 
and  fi^htinj^  rules  wliich  aro  ho  very  variable;  for  tho  rjuan- 
titioH  determined  in  Hcientific  wavH  offer  in  time  of  peace 
imjiortant  HupportH  for  a  Hound  development  of  ovorything 
that  haM  roforonco  to  tho  mutable  Hide  of  tarrticH.  Tho  true 
corrigent,    however,    of    thoretical    roHoarchoK    and    practi- 


ctt\  ex|>*^rlm<MU»  Ih  (ho  oxjhm'Umuv  of  [\w  l>a(tloi\oU<        It 
«iihouUi  ovor  Ih^  oousuUtnl.  i\(  oinlor  to  jjuaiti  against  uu^uikt^v 

Kvor  siuoo  Moltko  o«moou(  with  hi?*  bo*>k,*  (ho  tuviioal 
aw«trt>vo»^^\  h«?»  uoYor  »"tv>»l<H\;  thinm^h  Mav*H  "Taotlv^ttl 
Koti^Ksj^vl**"  tho  q\u^(iou>»  ut  l«t*»o  >i»U\uHl  ^nmuil  \\\  k\\\ 
^vrwi  anouv^,  hut  it  U  woU  kuo\v»>  {\u\t  ta^tU-al  luuovatlo»>H 
I'xNIuitv  a  KMiji  timo  to  ^^^^^aiU  In  Uoituauv  iworo  than  two 
thviuhvs  \^\Hs<Ht  aftor  tho  puhUoutlou  ot  MoUkoV  book  ht^f\M*t* 
uow  \V4i»»lat\ous  f^u*  iufiu\tn  taotios  >votv  I^siuhU  uotwith- 
stamiiuji  tho  faot  that  tho  war  of  lS7tV7t  hail  oxpostnl  tho 
uti\vhoh\s\uoou<\s!4  of  tho  tliou  taotio?*,  aiui  that  tho  iv 
anuamout  with  tho  Ma«soi'  ritio  lM\uan  i\un\»HUatolY  aft«>r 
tho  war! 

Was  uot  that  au  inoousistonov? 

lu  ISTtVTl  tho  i^onuau  iufautrv  kuow  »>o  normal 
attaok;  it  ha^l  almnvhM\»Hi  tho  thon  lino  ( t*»v/^>M)  taotios,  b«t 
faihnl  to  t^^rthor  Uovolop  tho  oon\|><\nY  oohmm  taotios  in 
tho  s^M»5»o  of  tht^  sikirmishinu  of  inasst\>4;  at  tho  onthrr^jik  of 
tho  war  it  hail  t»o  svstotn  of  attack  of  anv  kitul  and  ouo 
was  fornwihu^Hl  Uurinjj  tho  war,  insutWoiout,  of  iH>nrst\  as  it 
was  bound  to  bo,  and  not  a  noin\al  svstom  i»\  tho  tru«^  stM\s«v 
llonw  tho  shovtov»nuniis  obsorvabh^  in  n»\>ulv  all  attaoks 
ou  a  larjiv  soalo  should  not  bo  oharjjtH^  to  traitdn^is  \\\  a 
normal  attack.  Om  tho  ^vntrar^w  U  mav  bo  assun>tMl  that 
had  tho  it^fantrv  btvn  in  possession  of.  and  skilhnl  in.  a  nor 
mal  sYstom.  it  would  haYo  foujiht  to  much  btMttM-  advantaijo. 
Tho  rt^^j^on  why  tho  attack  tactics  wtMt^  such  a  faiUu>^  lit^ 
in  tho  fact  that  tho  uifantrv  did  not  know  how  t<>  tljiht 
t^attack^  in  mass*^;  it  did  not  know,  b»va»ist*  it  had  not  boo»> 
tn\intH\  d\irinu  \h^\iV  in  u  suitable  sYstom.  and  btvanso  tho 
actual  sYstom  was  rt^triotv^l  YYithin  tht^  linvits  of  dotach 
mout  tactics,  i^till  wo  havo  thrtv  jirt^U  attacks  during::  which 


tuiht'^  !., J,.. ''.'■■"■"     .„.  ...-    .,   .;,.,-....        '-  ?-i- ?.*** 

%%w  HffX/fftn;  H4*A  flMr  mtM  Wfnt  tMt4^  Iff  th^  Imifft^^  *A  Hf^lr 

wt' fir*' U4^*'f,ffitt/'tuM)  vn^U  Uif- 

*^f'Utn'i¥t4f,    Wyff^M"  fh^  iufsoftrf  tt^tit*^^k*A  *rt$  rlMr  nAiUt  ^4 

in  t- '-  -  '   -  '   -  ■    " .■    -■  ■    '^^^   t4 

Su'/  *• 

W^/ftl»  flMr  UtfMttrf  t4  fliMr  %\,  Army  iUtr\m  nU*m*^\ 

nfii,tp$m  hi  \\,t'  ^Hf  in  ;,..>   ./    .  ,/-  f//  t$t^  -.-.,,.>>.    ^  ,.,.:  ,r,tmf 

''''$< - .:  - - <     "    '  ". 

n*rw  r"iinhfUmn  in  f^mltrrttti^y  witt$  fh^  r*rfinir*^t*^fin  *4 

fSl.U.'  ■    .'■•  '  •      ■    ■  ''.^t9^,¥f,^iU(■ 

WAM  fi'nU'4  in  ifm  tntp^fff  Urtt/U^Mf  pttt4  %\mft^  wtm  n  ^/m- 
ntnttt  ftwiif'ft^i  wfH4tfiUr  \t*^wtr^t  iU^  n*i\p*^Ufr  ttJttA  itfi*<t^tf 

fjffftftffir    ■'     -:'■-'      '■--       ■-■-■'--      -    -    -•       -..-^       .*      :..  '-^^         fj,^ 

itfTttttf  Jt,  HttA 

tim  ffifiif^  f'H4tHi  ItfT  fi4jnntfft*<fft^  whif^h  ws4m  ttr^/mtp\Mt*r4 

hy  fU*'  .''  '/r»«  fff  ik^.  Ut  ff  tun:  ■<-.  imp*'. 

v\tff  c/m ■.   ,hftMtun^',h  ftn  rt»^ ' '"  '  ,..,,'*af  wttM 

t^tirttn^i'A  to  tit*'  iuitititivk  tA  fttU\  *^*fry 

^'\%im*'jf,  *4  cjimtftA  wfiM  imrrf*fuA*tt'A,    'Htitt  \n  nifttpiy  to  jmt 

How  *U/\  vft' f(H  to  thftt  if^Atff! 

T\itr  ttumt  ffr*ftftift*f$t  chfuu^Afftm  t4  imirahi*'  f*r%nWti^ffmt 
t» 


266  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

in  so  far  as  they  have  committed  themselves  to  the  press, 
are  successively  Moltke,  May,  Boguslawski,  Schlichting, 
Liebert.  The  oldest  and  most  prominent  opponents,  not  so 
much  in  regard  to  principles  as  to  specific  suggestions,  are 
Bronsart,  Scherfe,  Meckel.  Recently  the  former  current 
was  joined  by  Honig  and  Kleim,  but  Malachowski  has  gone 
far  beyond  the  pretensions  of  this  category,  and  so  has  the 
Militdr  Woclienhlatt  during  the  past  few  years. 

All  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  new  regulations  were 
necessary  and  the  greater  the  improvements  in  fire-arms, 
the  more  urgent  became  the  necessity. 

In  the  course  of  time  several  fusions  and  reactions  took 
place.  Shortly  before  his  death,  the  late  General  of 
Infantry  von  Bronsart,  the  man  who  had  for  a  long  time 
thrown  the  weight  of  his  voice  in  the  scales  against  new 
regulations  on  May's  plan  and  whose  public  expressions 
marked  him  as  the  chief  advocate  of  a  system  of  control, 
joined  May's  colors  and  rejected  the  normal  attack;  in  this 
case  the  system  of  control,  though  normal  attack  and  con- 
trol are  usually  two  very  different  things.* 

Meckel,  in  following  up  the  important  moral  princi- 
ple during  the  execution  of  the  combat,  went  so  far  as  to 
demand  the  closing  together  of  extended  lines;  he  became 
reactionary.! 

Boguslawski  long  and  strenuously  championed  a  suita- 
ble training  and  tactics  in  various  writings  and  numerous 
essays;  his  demands  were  so  far  outdone  in  the  Regulations 
of  1888  that  he  also  appears  reactionary,  though  he  never 
was;  for  that  general  neither  changed  nor  modified  his  posi- 
tion.    It  is  likewise  with  Honig,  Keim,  and  probably  with 

*See  "Betrachtungen  iiber  eine  zeitgemasse  Fechtweise  der  In- 
fanterie,"  E.  S.  Mittler,  1891. 

tSee  "Sommernachtstraun-!,"  E.  S.  Mittler. 


Tactical  Deductions.  267 

Liebert.  They  are  all  opposed  to  a  normal  attack  in  so  far 
as  it  is  understood  to  mean  a  fixed,  reglementary  scheme 
for  the  execution  of  the  combat  that  is  not  to  be  departed 
from.  All  are  agreed  that  deployment,  forming  for  attack, 
and  execution  of  the  combat  constitute  three  separate 
stages  succeeding  one  another  in  time  and  space,  for  which 
some  reglementary  provisions  should  be  made  in  order 
to  render  possible  the  control  of  masses  in  attack.  All 
demand  but  one  formation  for  movement,  the  single-rank, 
open  line;  but  one  formation  for  fighting,  the  swarm  of  skir- 
mishers; but  one  kind  of  fire,  skirmish  fire.  Boguslaw^ski 
and  Honig  also  recommend  fire  while  in  motion. 

The  Regulations  of  1888  intensified  the  dispute  because 
the  task  system  was  formally  adopted,  the  fullest  freedom 
of  the  subordinate  leaders  in  the  execution  of  the  action 
was  invested  with  the  force  of  principle,  and  the  princi- 
ple of  control  in  action  was  surrendered.  In  view  of  the 
improvements  of  fire-arms.  General  von  Scherff,  the  old 
and  tried  champion  of  control  in  action,  modified  his  regle- 
mentary requirements  in  the  course  of  time  and  his  propo- 
sitions ultimately  fused,  in  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  with 
the  views  held  by  Boguslawski  and  Honig.  He  contrasts 
the  task  system  with  control  in  action,  not  with  the  normal 
attack.* 

Until  he  wrote  the  book  mentioned  under  3,  Von  Schei*ff 
did  not  employ  the  deductive  method  in  his  expositions, 
since  up  to  that  time  he  did  not  base  his  writings  on  the  tac- 
tical phenomena  of  the  battle-field;  he  was  battling  for  prin- 
ciples w^hich  he  absorbed  from  his  war  experience  in  gen- 
eral, and  had  evolved  from  them  his  system  of  control  in 

*1.  "Reglementarische  Studien,"  Berlin,  1891-92,  A.  Bath. 
2.  "Praktische  Taktik  und  Taktische  Theorie,"  1893,  R.  Felix,  Berlin. 
S.  "Unsere  heutige  Infanterietaktik  im  Spiegel  der  Augustkiimpfe, 
1870  urn  Mete,"  1893,  R.  Felix,  Berlin. 


268  Iiiqiiirli's  into  the  TacHcs  of  the  Future. 

action.  As  loiijj;  as  noitlun*  Si'Ium'IT  uov  his  adherents 
addni'od  ])i'oofs,  based  on  facts,  for  the  soundness  of  that 
system,  Seherll's  opponents — /.  c,  the  advocates  of  our  ]>res- 
ent  refjuhitions — were  free  to  charj^e  them  ^^ith  beinj;  mere 
theoretical  specuhitors,  whereupon  opinion  stood  against 
opinion  and  princii)le  asiainst  ])rincii)le.  In  this  dispute 
Lieutenant  (\)lonel  von  JNIahichowski  joined  witli  the  most 
radical  demands.*  He  rejects  all  nt)rninl  action  (c'ontrol  in 
action),  and  carries  the  "principles"  and  points  of  the  task 
system  to  the  extreme:  according  to  him,  the  execution  of 
the  combat  is  a  "horde-like"  combat  of  masses  of  skirmish- 
ers conducted  by  the  subordinati'  leaders.  He  thus  con- 
curs in  the  views  of  Oeneral  von  Sehlichting.  and  these  two, 
in  their  writings,  are  the  nu)st  radical  advocates  of  the 
task  system. 

Having  in  view  his  "Inquiries  into  Tactics,"  Honig  was 
meanwhile  basing  himself  on  the  phenomena  of  the  battle- 
field in  his  "24  Hours  of  Moltke's  Strategy"  and  the  "Strug- 
gle for  the  Quarries  of  Rozerieulles, '  and  deej)  research  led 
him  to  the  conclusion  that  all  actions  fought  in  1870,  by  the 
troops  of  all  army  corps  in  the  sense  of  the  modern  task 
system,  failed,  and  that  nothing  could  be  gained  by  these 
tactics. 

(leneral  von  SchertV  fo\ind  in  these  expositions  welcome 
material  for  substantiating  his  own  views,and  by  employing 
Honig's  method  in  his  own  way  in  his  subsequent  studies  he 
was  able  to  prove  the  soundnessof  his  views  to  the  last  detail 
in  his  "Unsere  heutige  Infanterietaktik."  Whatever  may  be 
the  opinion  entertained  by  the  authorities  on  this  point  and 
on  the  Regulations  of  188S,  I  believe  that  the  ''task  battle,'- 
which  was  found  wanting  in  1870,  has  been  adopted  in  these 

*"Scharfe  Taktik  und  Revuetaktik,"  E.  S.  Mittler. 


Tady-al  Deduciions.  209 

Regulations,  and  with  it  a  normal  HjHtcni,  which  it  had  been 
the  intention  to  aboliwh  aH  sonietliing  perniciouH.  I  am 
convinced  that  the  tank  HVHteni  is  not  in  keeping  with  the 
times,  that  it  should  be  relin(|nished — i.  e.,  that  the  Regula- 
tions should  be  revised  and  that  we  should  return  to  the 
system  of  undivided  authority,  if  the  execution  of  the 
action  is  not  to  be  left  to  the  license  of  the  subordinate 
leaders. 

Closely  connected  therewith  are  the  questions  of  long- 
ynd  short  range  fire,  of  the  advance  to  effective  range,  of 
gaining  the  superiority  of  fire,  and  of  turning  movements. 

In  the  Regulations  of  1888  the  task  system  simply 
becomes  a  normal  system,  since  the  German  infantry 
attacks  now  on  the  task  system  alone.  The  freedom  con- 
ceded to  the  subordinate  leaders  is  too  great,  it  is  bound  to 
lead  to  tactical  license,  and  it  has  done  so.  It  was  bound 
to  impair  control  and  the  practicability  of  an  early  develop- 
ment of  strong  firing  lines.  The  necessity  of  seeking  cover 
has  sensibly  dulled  the  recpiisite  keenness  and  destroyed 
the  observance  of  normal  sjjaces.  Things  cannot  remain 
that  way  and  the  signs  of  a  revulsion  have  from  year  to 
year  become  more  apparent.  It  would  not  do  to  wipe  out 
whatever  good  there  is  in  the  task  battle,  and  to  advance 
some  normal  scheme;  the  question  rather  is  one  of  restor- 
ing to  the  superior  leaders  the  ways  and  means  of  control. 
Such  initiative  as  is  requisite  on  the  part  of  the  subordi- 
nates and  can  be  exercised  by  them  alone  is  perfectly  com- 
patible therewith.  The  opposing  tactical  tendencies  are 
not,  as  formerly,  "task  system  or  normal  attack";  thorough 
investigation  has  reduced  them  to  this:  controlled  system, 
and  within  the  same,  beyond  certain  variable  limits,  task 
system  or  horde-system. 


270  Inquiries  into  the  2'actics  of  the  Future. 

By  means  of  a  sauaoions  comparison*  Oouoral  von 
SohortY  has  donionstratod  that  in  1870  tho  Oiormans  gainod 
the  suporiority  of  tho  only  ^horo  tho  attaoktM*  opposed  to 
tho  assailant  a  broadtM*  front  of  tiro.  Whoro  that  was  sno- 
oossfnlly  done,  a  strong  dovolopmont  of  front  somotimos 
rolioYod  tho  attaokor  from  tho  necessity  of  an  assault 
altoirother.  In  proof  he  cites  from  the  battle  of  Oravolotto, 
the  events  at  St.  Marie.  Konconrt— St.  Privat  (north\  and 
St.  Herbert,  and  it  would  not  be  ditlicult  to  multiply  the 
instaaices.  On  the  other  hand,  all  the  nndertakinsrs  in  the 
center  and  on  tho  ritrht  at  Oravelotte  faiUnl.  because  the  tire 
front  did  not  overlap  the  eneniv :  the  ireneral  iniuht  belter 
have  said:  because  there  was  no  infantry  tire  front  at  all. 
And  this,  notwithstanding;  the  conctMit ration  of  an  enor- 
mous numerical  superiority  at  the  Mance  ravine.  Here  the 
task  system  collapsed  completely,  not  the  slightest  advan- 
tage wa^  derived  from  the  great  numerical  superiority  be- 
cause in  ma.ny  cases  lateral  deveU^pment  ^ravine  theory), 
having  btHMi  neglected  in  t]\e  beginning,  became  inipt>ssi- 
blo  altogether,  notwithstanding  that  every  "task  leader" 
sought  to  enforce  it.  If  sui>eriority  of  tire  is  desired,  the 
broadest  possible  front  is  necessary  from  the  beginning,  as 
well  as  an  advance  in  that  formation  to  otYoctivo  range. 

On  account  of  the  "ravine  theory."  neither  frontal 
development  nor  a  firing-station  was  attained  at  Oravelotte 
preparatory  to  the  attack!  At  St.  Marie  and  St.  Trivat 
(north)  we  gained  both,  despite  the  then  not  very  ideal  yet 
controlled  system.  Again,  with  the  ravine  practice  we 
sutlVred  much  greater  losses  than  with  an  early  develop- 
ment of  front.  Oeneral  von  ScherlT  moreover  demon- 
strates that  when  not  in  themselves  strong  enough  for  the 
assiiult,  troops  brought  forward  on  a  broad  front  and  under 

♦Pages  192-194  of  "Unsere  heutlge  Infanterietaktik." 


Tactical  iJeduclions.  271 

control  ((UiiirdH  at  Ht.  i'rivat,  8th  KifloH  and  thfi  Kixty- 
Hovonlli  at  St.  Ifnlx-it)  \v<.Tr;  ablf  to  maintain  t]\ftmH<i]\<-H  on 
Iho  ground  tlioy  had  gain^^d,  wh<iioaH  thoy  invariably  lackf^l 
pow^^r  of  roHiHtanco  whenever  there  waH  no  frontal  develop- 
ment from  the  Htart  (Point  du  Jourj.  Th<*«e  roKftarcheH  are 
imporlniit  in  d^oiflinj^  what  infantry  tiu-AicH  Khould  ha;  ihay 
muHt  be  baK<'d  on  unrlividr'd  authority  and  control  und  thiiH 
it  will  ever  be. 

In  examining  the  mapH  of  the  battle-fieldB  of  the  28th 
Brij^ade  at  ProbluH,  of  the  .''.8th  Brij^ade  at  MarH-la-Tonr, 
and  of  the  iHt  Guard  lirij^ade  at  St.  Privat,  any  one  will  ad- 
mit that  under  modern  conditions  and  with  a  judicious  use  of 
the  ground,  open  lines  could  be  moved  forward  without  stop 
to  within  000  meters  of  tlie  enemy.  Troops  will  hardily  ever 
have  to  faf:e  a  more  unfavorable  situation.  At  Problus  as 
well  as  at  Mas-la-Tour  and  St.  Privat  the  combat  in  front 
would,  according  to  modern  ideas,  be  chiefly  carried  on  by 
the  artillerv',  which  would  be  quite  able  to  perform  that 
duty;  in  all  thref^  casfts  sufficient  cover  could  be  found  for 
the  infantry  to  approa/;h  by  various  methods  to  within  effect- 
ive range  (000  meters),  and,  advancing  thence  by  rush^fS, 
to  gain  an  a^lditional  150  meters,  if  greater  fire  effect  may 
there  be  expected.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulty  of  such 
situations  and  despite  modern  fire-arms,  entire  brigades,  led 
and  conlrolkd,  could  in  this  way  be  brought  to  within  000 
meters  of  the  enemy;  when  at  that  point  they  are  flung  into 
the  destructive  fire  action,  superior  leading  ceases,  the  fur- 
ther conduct  of  the  action  rests  with  the  subordinate  leaders, 
with  the  efficiency  of  the  individual  soldier  and  in  the  timely 
employment  of  sufficiently  strong  reser-^'es  on  the  part  of 
the  superior  leaders.  I  do  not  believe  that  much  sound 
argument  could  be  advanced  against  this. 

At  any  rate,  we  must  rigorously  adhere  to  the  basis  of 


272  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  whole — namely,  eonsideration  for  man's  frail  nature — 
and  for  that  reason  most  of  the  men  should  be  kept  as  long 
as  possible  under  the  eye  and  will  of  the  leaders.  The  prob- 
lem of  bringing  the  greatest  possible  number  of  rifles  to 
within  fiOO  meters  of  the  enemy  is  therefore  not  to  be 
entrusted  to  the  task  system,  but  is  a  matter  of  brigade 
leading,  and  is  best  solved  by  skillful  use  of  the  ground  and 
by  a  smart  advance.  That  will  remain  true  despite  all  improve- 
ments of  the  rifles.  In  advancing  to  the  first  firins-station 
the  infantry  would  of  course  have  to  be  vigorously  sup- 
ported by  the  artillery.  The  latter  will  be  able  to  do  so  only 
by  anticipating  the  opposing  artillery  in  getting  the  range. 
If  the  enemy's  artillery  is  not  thus  anticipated,  the  advance 
of  the  infantry  will  soon  reach  its  limit,  and  infantry  will 
be  restricted  to  fire-action  at  long  range. 

//.     Besults  of  Surgical  and  Ballistic  E.rperiments. 

According  to  page  50of  "Die  Geschosswirkungder  neuen 
Kleinkalibergewehre"  ("Effects  of  the  New  Small-Caliber 
Rifles"),  by  Professor  Dr.  Paul  Bruns,  Tubingen,  1889,  H. 
Laupp,  one  and  the  same  bullet  goes  through  4 — 5  ranks  at  a 
range  of  100  meters,  even  when  it  strikes  the  heaviest  bones 
of  the  human  body;  through  .'? — 4  ranks  at  400  meters,  and 
through  2 — 'A  ranks  at  800 — 1200  meters.  Experiments 
with  the  Lebel  rifle  in  France  and  with  the  ^lannlicher 
rifle  in  Austria  have  given  similar  results,  so  that,  as  regards 
the  ballistic  qualities  of  their  rifles,  the  opponents  will  in 
the  future  be  about  on  an  ecjual  footing. 

Since  the  appearance  of  the  Third  Edition  of  this  book 
these  data  have  been  confirmed  by  further  experiments  in 
many  respects,  with  which  the  tactician  should  be  familiar. 


Tactical  Deductions.  273 

I  shall  therefore  mention  them  briefly,  and  in  doing  ho  fol- 
low Dr.  Johann  Habart.* 

With  the  assistance  of  the  Austrian  military  authori- 
ties, Dr.  Habart  conducted  a  series  of  experiments  on  live 
animals  and  comparative  experiments  on  human  corpses. 
In  addition  he  made  examinations  of  suiciders,  of  men  acci- 
dentally killed  on  the  target-ranges  and  at  labor  riots,  and 
took  account  of  the  phenomena  on  the  various  theaters  of 
war  from  that  of  1870-71  to  include  the  Chilian  War  of  1891. 

Near  Hermannstadt  a  rifleman  was  mortally  wounded 
by  a  shot  through  the  occipital  bone  from  the  Mannlicher 
rifle  at  a  range  of  2700  paces. 

On  May  20,  1890,  a  platoon  of  10  rifles  at  Nurschau 
fired  5  volleys  into  a  mob  of  workingraen  at  a  range  of 
30—80  paces.  It  is  stated  that  10  bullets  made  32  hits, 
making  3 — 4  and  perhaps  5  hits  for  1  bullet.  Seven  were 
killed  on  the  spot,  G  died  the  next  few  days  of  their  wounds, 
19  wounded  recovered.  The  propor-tion  of  the  killed  to  the 
wounded  is  therefore  1:3.5;  almost  the  same  as  at  Biala, 
where,  out  of  18  hit,  4  were  killed.  The  destructive  effect  of 
the  bullet  at  short  range  is  thus  proven  beyond  a  doubt. 

The  loss  of  the  Dalmacedists  at  Concon  was  about  even 
in  killed  and  wounded,  at  Placilla  the  proportion  is  reported 
to  have  been  1 :2.o7. 

At  Cilli  a  man  in  the  act  of  aiming  was  hit  by  an  8  milli- 
meter bullet  (Mannlicher)  which  had  passed  through  a  butt 
of  earth  140  centimeters  in  thickness.  The  projectile 
remained  in  the  body.     The  man  died  on  the  sixth  day. 

At  a  range  of  3000  meters,  a  bullet  entered  the  thorax 
of  a  woman  and  remained  there. 


♦Fragment  of  an  experimental  study  and  lecture  delivered  at  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Army  Firing  School  at  Bruck  on  the  Leitha,  July 
1,  1892. 


274  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

At  Rosenkreuz  three  of  Witboi's  men  were  killed  by 
one  bullet  (German  mod,  88). 

The  results  at  Concon  and  Plaeilla  I  have  already  men- 
tioned; the  losses  of  the  interiorly  armed  defender  were 
almost  double  those  of  the  attacker,  one-third  of  whom  at 
the  most  were  armed  with  Mannlicher  and  Gras  rifles.  The 
moral  effect  of  the  superior  armament  on  the  Balmacedists 
must  have  been  such  as  to  shake  them;  these  troops,  how- 
ever, should  not  be  regarded  in  the  same  light  as  good 
European  troops.  Hence  the  tactical  importance  accorded 
to  these  various  phenomena  in  Chili  should  be  a  quali- 
fied one. 

Among  the  experiments  here  enumerated,  those  made 
at  the  firing  schools  of  the  various  armies  should  also  find 
a  place.  The  results  of  these  experiments  have  not  become 
much  known  publicly,  and  in  Germany  particularly  pro- 
found  silence  has  been  observed  in  that  respect.  But,  on 
the  one  hand,  we  can  draw  very  conclusive  deductions  from 
the  German  Regulations  on  these  points;  on  the  other  hand, 
they  are  confirmed  by  experiments  in  Austria  and  France. 
Here  should  be  mentioned  in  the  first  place  the  valuable 
data  given  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Regenspursky.*  We 
read  there: 

"Recent  firing  experiments  have  proven  that  a  closed 
platoon  will  suffer  sensible  losses  at  1600  meters  (15  per 
cent);  that  the  small  company  column  forms  a  good  target 
at  2100  paces  (44  hits  out  of  215  shots),  and  that  a  battalion 
in  the  act  of  changing  from  column  to  a  broader  formation 
received  56  hits  out  of  400  shots  (18  per  cent)  at  2000  paces. 

*"Studien  iiber  den  taktischen  Inhalt  des  Exerzirreglements  fiir 
die  k.  u.  k.  Fusstruppen"  ("Studies  on  the  Tactical  Contents  of  the 
Drill  Regulations  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foot  Troops"),  Wien, 
L.  W.  Seidel  und  Sohn,  1892. 


Tactical  Deductions.  275 

"It  was  found  at  the  same  time  that  at  medium  ranges 
troops  in  double  rank  suffered  four  times,  and  in  single  rank 
double,  the  losses  that  troops  in  single  open  line,  with  1 
pace  interval  between  men,  did  at  the  same  distances.  The 
results  of  these  peace  experiments  make  it  advisable  to  de- 
ploy the  platoons  at  long  ranges  (1500 — 1600  paces),  to  group 
the  companies  designated  for  the  fire  action  in  skirmish  lines 
and  company  reserves  when  3000  and  2000  paces  from  the 
enemy,  while  battalions  and  larger  units  will  have  to  relin- 
quish the  deep  column  on  entering  the  zone  of  infantry  fire 
(about  3000  paces)." 

Comparative  experiments  were  next  made  in  Austria, 
based  on  the  prinicples  of  the  reglementary  frontal  attack  on 
one  hand  and  on  those  of  K.  v.  K.'s  battle  attack.*  "The 
reglementary  attack,"  says  Regenspursky,  "lasted  26  min- 
utes and  38  seconds,  of  which  12  minutes  and  18  seconds 
were  fire  pauses  and  14  minutes  and  20  seconds  were  taken 
up  in  firing.  Total  hits,  27,7  per  cent.  The  so-called  battle 
attack  (two  ranks,  beginning  at  long  distances,  constantly' 
passing  each  other  in  double  time  and  delivering  a  rapid 
fire,  are  to  reach  the  enemy  as  quickly  as  possible)  lasted 
only  18  minutes  and  40  seconds,  of  which  7  minutes  and  40 
seconds  were  pauses  and  11  minutes  were  consumed  in  fir- 
ing. Total  hits,  20  per  cent.  The  reglementary  attack 
came  within  200  paces,  the  battle  attack  within  100  paces  of 
the  enemy.  Alternate  rushes,  passing  of  the  front  line,  and 
firing,  was  done  between  the  distances  of  1400  and  600  paces 
from  the  enemy,  the  battle  attack  scoring  49  hits  out  of  700 
shots,  or  7  per  cent,  while  the  reglementary  attack  at  the 
same  distances  scored  117  hits  out  of  700  shots,  or  16.7 
per  cent. 

*"Wie  sollea  wir  im  nachsten  Kriege  angreifen?"  K.  v.  K., 
1890,  R.  Felix,  military  publisher,  Berlin. 


270  Inquiries  into  fhe  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

The  battle  attack  thus  provod  itself  inferior  in  tire 
pinver.  and  the  men  >vere  exhausted  and  uutit  for  further 
service  for  the  time  beinji'. 

iMMween  (\0{) — lt)0  paces  from  the  enemv  the  battle 
attack  scored  4."v>  hits  out  of  1(572  shots,  or  '2T\.{\  per  cent;  the 
rei;lementary  attat-k  betwtHMi  (500 — 100  paces  T^iVA  hits  out  of 
1582  shots,  or  .'h~».(5  per  cent. 

The  procedure  was  no\v  reversed,  the  battle  attack  and 
the  rejrlementary  skirmish  line  beinir  shot  at  bv  the  defender 
from  l.'iOO  paces  on. 

"lietwtHMi  l.'UX) — 700  {tai'cs  the  defenders  scored  on  tlu' 
ta-rj;ets  of  the  battle  attack  2;n  hits  out  of  700  shots,  or 
3J>  per  cent,  and  ou  the  targets  of  the  rejxlementarv  attack 
only  128  hits  out  of  1400  shots,  or  1>.2  per  cent;  bet  ween  (500 — 
200  paces  the  targets  of  the  battle  attack  ret'eived  500  hits 
out  of  5>r)8  shots  or  (51.5  jhm-  cent,  the  targets  of  the  rejjle- 
mentary  attack  (540  hits  out  of  ir>l4  shots,  or  45.8  per  cent. 
The  averajje  number  of  hits  received  by  the  target  of  the 
battle  attack  was  51.2  per  cent ;  of  thivse  of  the  reglementary 
attack.  :>2.2  per  cent." 

In  all  armic^s  the  question  of  tiring  while  in  motion  is 
btMiig  agitated,  because  during  the  tire  pauses  of  the  attack 
no  etTect  is  produced  on  the  enemy  at  the  very  time  when  the 
latter  can  produce  his  greatest  tire  eftVct.  With  a  view  to 
having  the  tire  in  motion  ottiiially  adopted.  (^leneral  Tiuisson 
invented  an  attachment  to  the  ritU>s.  which  1  shall  not  dis- 
cuss here.*  Firing  experiments  lasting  two  wt>eks  were  then 
made  at  the  camp  of  Ohalons-surMarne  with  detachments 
of  20  men  each  of  nunlium  firing  proficiency.  The  average 
results  were: 


•Formation  und  Taktik  dor    franzosischen  Armee.  Berlin.  1892. 
R.  Eisenschmidt. 


Tactical  JJeductionH.  '^77 

1.  Inrontrollcr]  firo  at  Iho  oharKiriK  {<ait   from  200—100 

ijKffx'fH;  18  [XT  <;onl.  hitH, 

2.  (JncoritrolN'd   fire  at  the  frharj^lnj?  gait   from    100 — 50 

m<'tfrH;  .'iO  per  f:enl  hitK. 
.'',.      I'nf'onfrolN-rl  fin-  ijt  donhW-  lirrif  from  200 — TOO  ificii-VH; 
18  per  r-ent  liitH. 

4.  I'neonlrolled  tint  in  double  lim*-  from  100 — oO  meters; 

42  per  cent  hitH. 

5.  Firint.'  by  command,  firMt  at  Ihe  eliarginj?  gait,  next 

in  double  timr-,  from  'iOO — 50  nieterH;  21  per  cent  hitH.* 
The  rapidity  of  firf  waH  10  shotK  i>er  minute;  the  targeth 
were  2  meters  in  heiglit,  pont^d  on  a  front  of  20  meterH,  equal 
to  the  front  of  the  platoon. 

The  fear  k^t  the  men  might  hit  <'iic]\  oUx-r  [proved 
groundleHH,  According  to  liuiHHon, the  attack  vvilh  fire  Hhould 
begin  400  nu'lern  from  llie  on^my  at  the  charging  gait,  the 
firr?  being  kei>t  u{>  until  within  100  met(,'rH  from  the  enemy. 
Fifteen  paccH  in  rear  of  the  first  KkirmiKh  line  folIowB  a 
Hecond  line  to  promptly  fill  the  gapH  in  front;  15  pacen  in 
rear  of  the  Hecond  line  donr-d  bodies  are  to  follow  to  give 
the  atta(;k  energy  and  momentum. f 

According  to  the  Firing  Inntructions,  the  German  rifle 
model  88  has  an  initial  wlocity  of  020  meters,  and  a  range  of 
'',800  meters  with  an  elevation  of  'i'Z"^.  Its  projectile  will 
pierce  45  centimeters  of  pine  at  400  meters,  and  25  centi- 
moters  of  pine  at  800  meters,  and  jienetrates  50  centimeters 
into  fresh  sand  at  400  metern  and  'i5  centimetern  at  800 

♦Charging  gait,  140  meters  per  minute;  double  time,  180  meters 
per  minute. 

lAs  is  well  known,  bullet-proof  uniforms  have  been  suggested 
a«  protection  against  modern  fire.  I  do  not  believe  in  them.  F^or 
defensive  purposes,  however,  thf  "Holsteln  shield"  might  be  taken 
lnU.>  eonsideration,  which  has  been  made  part  of  the  Danish  equip- 
ment. The  Idea  may  be  susceptible  of  Improvement,  and  for  pur- 
poses of  defense,  Is  not  without  advocates  in  France. 


278  Inquiries  into  the  Tactia>  of  the  Future. 

nu'tci'H;  lliin  brick  walls  jirr  iiisiinici<'ii|   prolcclion,  as  tlicy 
arc  ]>('fl()i-al<'(l  wlicii  several  sliols  sh-ikc  (lie  saine  spot. 

The  averaj;-e  onliiiales  of  I  lie  Imllel  in  iiielers  above 
and  below  the  horizon hil  lino  of  wight  are  0.2  at  2(K)  motors; 
0.5  at  400  meters;  1.0  a(  000  meters;  e(c.,  a(  SOO,  1000,  1200, 
1400  meters. 

The  vertical  dispersion  a.t  200  meters  is  25  centimeters, 
the  horizontal  dispersion  2t)  centimeters;  at  400,  (100,  800, 
1000  meters  these  tiKuroH  are  70,  42,  140,  04,  and  200,  112, 
208,  100  centimeters,  roBpoctively. 

With  the  lixed  sight  all  objocte  representing  a  target 
CJin  to  2.0  meters  in  height  lie  within  the  dangorons  space; 
with  the  small  leaf  all  targets  O.S.'"»  to  2.0  meters  in  height; 
with  the  500 meter  sight  all  targets  1.70  to  2.0  meters  in 
height;  with  the  (JOO-meter  sight  and  witli  targets  0.85 
meters,  1.20  meters,  and  1.70  motors  in  height  th<'  dangerous 
spaces  are  48,  72,  and  111  meters;  with  the  800 motor  sight 
and  the  same  height  of  target  those  spaces  are  25,  .'58,  and  54 
meters,  reH])octively. 

When  the  arm  is  properly  managed,  every  shot  may  be 
expected  to  hit :  all  objects  within  250  meters;  single  kneel- 
ing enemies  np  to  .'>50  motors;  a  kneeling  file  (men  close 
alongside  each  other)  uj>  to  500  motors;  a  standing  file  (men 
close  alongside  each  other)  ajid  single  njountod  men  up 
to  COO  motors. 

With  regard  to  distances,  it  is  stated  that  up  to  000 
motors  they  are  short,  thence  U])  to  1000  medium,  and  beyond 
1000  motors  long  ranges. 

The  point-l»lank  range  of  the  Itxed  sight  is  250  motors; 
of  tlie  small  loaf,  ;?50  meters. 

Moreover  it  is  roijuired  that  the  men  should  be  export 
in  judging  distances  u])  to  000  nutters,  and  otlicers,  non- 
commissioned oHicors,  and  bi-ighl    men    up  to   H)00  meters. 


Tfuiical  DeAv/iionH.  27'J 

"L()(t\n'j\  at  pur*.'Jy  from  1h<'  point  of  th<;  theory  of  bal- 
IJHticM,"  Kay  Hid  Firiiij^  l/iKtruotiouK,  "colurnriK  will  he  rriuoh 
jnof;  vulnerable  at  diHtanccH  of  more  than  1000  UK'Xarn  than 
tr^XipH  of  ^Hjual  Htrenj^th  forrnr^iJ  irj  line." 

It  would  he  inHuJTicient  to  consider  the  (-A^t-jX  of  the  rifle 
alone,  Hi'nee  the  effeet  of  the  artillery  projectile  ha«  likewiHe 
attained  an  efjual  augmentation,  under  certain  circum- 
Kfancen.  We  will  not  jro  into  detailK  here;  a  ^"neral  refer- 
ence in  KufTicient  to  reniove  any  douht  in  that  r^^Kpect  when 
taking  into  account  the  improvement  in  the  effr^rt  of  the 
Khrapnel.  While  the  cone  of  dii«fK;rKion  of  the  hurKting 
Khrapnel  HpreadH  the  hulletK  forward  and  Kideward  only, 
Htill  the  cone  Ih  of  Kuch  dirnennionK  that,  if  the  range  in  eHti- 
mated  with  apf^roximate  accuracy,  it  partak^^  of  the  char- 
ar;teriHticH  of  the  former  can  inter  even  at  the  Umi^ant  ranges. 
On  that  m:(:(tuiii  it  ha«  become  the  principal  projectile  of  the 
(idntian  field  artillery,  which  may  h<'  naid  to  have  fought  the 
War  of  1870-71  with  the  common  Hhell  only.  Tiie  efTwt  of 
common  nh^'ll  han  alHO  been  much  iri*rt'Hii(ti]  at  all  rang^^^, 
and  then  th'-re  Ik  the  effc^;t  of  high-exploKive  KhellH  to  be  con- 
Hidered,  but  in  the  cane  of  the  latter  it  in  necr^Hary  to  deter- 
mine the  time  and  height  of  burnt  with  gn^at  accuracy. 
Ifigh-exploHive  KhellK  Hcaiicr  their  fragments,  not  only  to 
the  front,  but  in  all  directionn — i.  e.,  forward,  laterally,  to  the 
rear,  and  downward  ThiH  Hhould  be  kept  in  mind  in  con- 
nection with  poKitionn  in  r^^r  of  wallB  and  similar  cover. 
The  high-exploKivr*  nhell  ban  thuK  to  a  certain  degrf:;^^  Holved 
the  fjucKtion  which  pr^ticnted  great  difTJculti<-K  in  act- 
ive field  operation H  and  could  not  bf  Holved  except  by 
Indirect  fire.  Hut  an  the  exact  CKtimation  of  the  range 
\h  difficult,  and  a«  the  fragmentH  of  the  high-explo«ive 
«hell  up  to  date  are  Ux*  many  and  too  ineffective,  the 
hopew  at  fi rnt  ba>ied  on  the  torpedo  nhell  have  not  been 


280  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

completely  fulfilled;  this  question  of  projectile  mar  not  be 
considered  as  closed.  The  defender's  first  endeavor  will  be  to 
beat  down  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  the  attacker  will  pursue 
the  same  object  with  regard  to  the  defender's  artillery.  In 
this  endeavor  artillery  alone  may  not  always  succeed  and 
the  cooperation  of  infantry  may  be  required.  It  is  also  quite 
plain  that  modern  field  artillery  should  possess  a  very  high 
degree  of  mobility.  Field  artillery  is  not  to  destroy  forti- 
fications, its  effect  is  to  be  produced  by  the  large  number 
of  its  fragments;  it  is  therefore  possible  to  make  it  light  and 
mobile.  It  should  be  capable  of  covering  long  distances  at 
a  trot  in  large  bodies,  of  passing  marching  columns,  and 
of  deploying  en  masse.  We  do  not  propose  to  inquire  as  to  how 
far  the  German  field  gun  meets  these  requirements.  What 
has  been  stated  of  the  German  field  artillery  applies  equally 
to  the  French;  the  state  of  the  Russian  field  artillery  cannot 
be  fully  determined  at  this  time;  but  the  Austrian  and  Ital- 
ian field  artilleries  may  be  assumed  to  be  on  a  level  with 
the  German. 

The  sum  total  of  these  expositions  is  that  the  armaments 
of  infantry  and  artillery  are  everywhere  on  about  the  same 
level.  No  one  is  likely  to  possess  a  notable  superiority  of 
armament,  and  superiority  of  power  nmy  be  gained  only  by 
training  and  leading. 

III.  SmoTceless  Powder. 
Of  all  the  inventions  made  since  that  of  gunpowder, 
none  probably  has  exercised  such  great  influence  on  tactics 
as  has  that  of  smokeless  powder.  Aside  from  other  ballistic 
properties,  the  new  powder  imparts  to  the  projectile  a  much 
higher  velocity,  which  should  be  fully  appreciated  in  tactics; 
it  is  not  necessary  here  to  go  into  details,  because  the  prac- 
tical results  are  alreadv  laid  down  in  the  Firing  Regulations 


Tactical  Deductions.  281 

for  Infantry  and  Artillery.  It  is  requisite,  however,  to  briefly 
review  the  optical  and  tactical  sides  of  the  question  for 
all  arms. 

AVhile  the  use  of  smokeless  powder  has  not  done  away 
with  all  smoke,  either  in  the  case  of  the  rifle  or  of  the  gun, 
still  smoke  has  been  so  much  diminished  that  it  is  alivays 
transparent; it  may  be  discerned  b}^  a  close  observation,  and  in 
S.  clear,  humid,  and  calm  atmosphere  the  smoke  is  greater 
than  in  a  warm,  dry,  and  agitated  atmosphere.  No  matter 
how  lively  the  fire,  the  smoke  never  obstructs  the  view  of 
the  rifleman  or  gunner;  they  can  follow  the  projectile  with 
the  eye,  as  it  were,  and  the  rifleman  and  gun  are  themselves 
exposed  to  view  unless  otherwise  concealed.  Before  they 
can  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  the  latter  is  delayed  by  enterprises 
necessary  to  gain  a  first  glimpse  of  the  outlines  of  the 
position.  This  would  seem  to  render  reconnaissance  more 
difficult  and  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  combat.  The 
former  is  generally  admitted;  the  latter  cannot  be  suffi- 
ciently determined  in  peace. 

Unobstructed  \iew  in  combination  with  the  great  range 
of  the  small-caliber  rifle  gives  a  much  greater  importance 
to  infantry  fire.  To-day  infantry  is  always  able  to  see  and 
sometimes  to  see  far,  and  to  take  advantage  of  both  by  the 
lo7iij  range,  fat  trajectory  and  great  peneiration  of  its  arms.  It 
will  be  able  to  observe  the  movements  of  large  bodies  of 
cavalry  from  their  inception  and  to  take  them  under  fire  at 
such  ranges  as  to  diminish  the  value  of  that  arm  as  against 
infantry,  because  in  human  judgment  surprise  must  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  possible  only  in  very  exceptional  cases.  Cavalry 
patrols  will  rarely  be  able  to  discover  individual  riflemen 
promptly.  The  reconnoitering  powers  of  cavalry  are  there- 
by much  impaired. 

The  new  powder  and  the  new  arm  likewise  confer  a 


282  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

great  advantage  on  infantiy,  when  opposed  to  artillery, 
unless  the  latter  has  reconnoitered  the  gi*ound  in  front  and 
has  protected  itself  from  effective  infantry  fire  by  skirmish- 
ers in  its  front.  In  such  a  case  artillery  might  be  suddenly 
subjected  to  so  great  a  loss  of  horses  and  men  that  part  of 
it  may  be  unable  to  come  into  action  and  that  another  part 
may  not  get  the  range  as  quickly  as  it  should  when  opposed 
to  artillery.  In  1870-71  our  artillerymen  feared  the  enemy's 
(long-range)  chassepot  fire  more  than  that  of  his  artillery, 
and  the  German  artillery  suffered  in  fact  much  more  from  the 
former  than  from  the  latter,  which,  however,  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted in  part  to  the  inferiority  of  the  opponent's  gun.  Since 
guns  and  their  effects  are  now  approximately  on  the  same 
level  everywhere,  and  since  the  opponent  possesses  a  rifle 
more  perfect  than  that  of  1870,  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  in 
future  our  artillery  will  encounter  much  greater  difficulties 
than  in  1870-71,  while  our  infantry  will  oppose  to  the 
enemy  an  equally  good  arm  and  is  now  better  off  in  that 
respect.  I  believe,  therefore,  that  (1)  before  coming  into 
action  artillery  should  make  a  more  thorough  reconnais- 
sance than  formerly,  and  (2)  that  it  should  make  it  a  rule  to 
protect  its  flanks  and  front  by  considerable  skirmish  lines 
thrown  out  in  front.  If  either  or  both  are  omitted,  artillery 
may  at  first  find  itself  in  much  more  serious  difficulties  than 
was  the  case,  for  instance,  with  the  artillery  of  the  IX.  and 
VII.  Army  Corps  at  Gravelotte.  Both  instances  enjoin  cau- 
tion in  this  respect. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  artillery  has  made  a  thorough 
reconnaissance  and  has  protected  itself  against  hostile  in- 
fantry fire  by  infantry  skirmish  lines  thrown  not  less  than 
500  meters  to  the  front — things  which  have  ever  been  re- 
quired by  tactics — then  the  artillery  can  draw  extraordinary 
advantages  from  the  absence  of  smoke,  and,  when  skillfully 


Tactical  Deductions.  283 

handled,  its  action  may  become  decisive,  provided  it  knows 
how  to  shoot,  provided  it  comes  into  position  with  as  little 
exposure  to  the  enemy's  fire  as  possible,  and  provided  it 
anticipates  the  enemy  in   getting  the  range  by  means  of 
correct  observation  and  direction.     Instruction  in  firing  is 
imparted  in  peace,  and  it  may  be  expected  that  in  future  our 
artillery  will  know  how  to  shoot.     Against  this  it  may  be 
stated,  with  much  truth,  that  the  firing  in  action  is  not  equal 
to  that  on  the  firing-ground,  and  that  dead  gunners  cannot 
be  replaced,  or  not  without  difficulty;  that,  however,  should 
not  be  allowed  to  divert  us  from  what  is  rational — i.  e.,  from 
getting  the  range  quickly.    That  accomplished,  the  artillery 
at  once  gains  great  power,   since  the  absence  of   smoke 
makes  laying  and  observation  always  possible,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  diminished  recoil  permits  of  greater 
rapidity  of  fire,  and  all  these  causes  combine  to  dispropor- 
tionately increase  the  effect  of  the  improved  projectiles.  Not 
only  that:  up  to  this  time  the  so-called  concentration  of  fire 
against  the  decisive  points  was  more  a  theoretical  idea  than 
a  tactical  possibility.     The   great  amount  of  smoke  soon 
enveloped  long  lines  of  artillery,  so  that  laying,  observation, 
and  control  of  large  bodies  of  artillery  were  impossible;  the 
effect  was   correspondingly   diminished.      That   has   been 
changed.      Moreover,  the  masses  of  artillery  may  now  be 
posted  closer  together  or  in  tiers,  and  can  always  develop 
their  full  fire  power.    That  may  not  always  be  advisable, 
still  it  may  offer  advantages  in  certain  circumstances;  for 
instance,  after  gaining  the  superiority  of  fire.     If  the  artil- 
lery has  been  well  trained  in  peace,  if  it  has  learned  how  to 
shoot  and  how  to  observe,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  effect 
of  artillery  will  be  increased  to  an  extraordinary  degree.     It 
is  but  necessary  to  realize  that  to-day  36  guns  emit  3000  frag- 
ments per  minute!  When  artillery  possessing  such  efficiency 


2S4  Inquirits  Into  the  l^aciics  of  the  Future. 

jrains  tho  raiijro  iiioiv  quioUlv  than  tho  oiiponont.  tlio  oxist- 
oiuv  of  tho  latter  Nvill  bo  liiuitod  to  a  vory  briof  spaoo  of  time 
and  one  main  part  of  the  work  has  boon  aooom]>Hshod  for  the 
assaihtnt !  To  bo  snio,  artiUiM-v  w  ill  not  bo  ablo  to  dispose  of 
j::ood  infantry  onsoonotHi  in  skirmish  lim^s  in  the  folds  of  the 
jrronnd.  and  it  is  and  will  bo  the  duty  of  infantry  to  drive 
them  aA\ay.  Neither  will  oovtM-  niuhM'  oiM-tain  conditions  be 
of  any  avail  to  the  eitemy's  infantry,  eavalry.  or  artillery, 
sinee  tield  artilUMv  is  now  ablo  to  attat'k  any  kind  of  troops 
under  oover.  thoni^h  this  (|nestion  eannot  as  yet  be  considered 
as  clost.Hl.  The  artillery  pt>ssesses  the  additional  irrt^at 
advantage  of  being  able  to  di>termine  the  distance  by  means 
of  its  appliances,  which  the  infantry  is  unable  to  do  at 
lone:  range:  it  has  to  depend  on  getting  the  ranges  from  the 
artillery. 

It  may  be  conclndtHl  that  well  trained  and  well-led 
artillery  has  btvome  ///(•  lon(]-niiu;c  iirni  jhir  rxcelJencc  and  muter 
all cireumstance^^.  and  that  according  to  theory  the  (/jtjVio/j  will 
be  brought  about  more  quickly  than  formerly. if  artillery  and 
infantry  concentrate  their  action  on  the  same  object,  which 
was  impossible  before  the  introdn«'tion  of  smokeless  ])Owder. 

!Sn\okeless  powder  has  S(nne  disadvantages,  inastnnch 
as  it  will  be  more  ditVicult  to  make  otit  the  position  of  the 
hostile  infantry,  but  the  disadvajitages  are  common  to  both 
sides  and  may  be  greatly  diminislntl  by  the  use  of  gomi 
glasses.  Against  this  it  may  be  nuMitioned  as  an  advantage 
that  the  cor>p(M'ation  of  infantry  and  artilhMy.  the  hading, 
is  facilitated. the  more  as  thesonnd. though  it  has  not  become 
weakiM".  has  beconu^  shorter.  Since  stUMng  and  nndi^rstanding 
are  the  prerequisites  for  all  intelligent  hnnian  action,  it  must 
be  admitted  on  the  whole  that  the  advantages  of  smokeless 
powder  far  outweigh  its  disadvantages,  and  that  it  is  only 
now  thai  tlu'  two  principal  arms  possess  the  prtM-eqnisit<>s  for 


Taxlicoi  UfAwAxona.  285 

powerfully  prepanng  an  attack  in  a  brief  v>\)?iu(At  of  time. 
Heretofore  exiKtinf^  taetleal  rulen  are  not  abolinhed  by  thiK 
invention;  on  tlir?  contrary,  it  is  only  now  tijat  they  become 
ajiplicable  in  tii'-ir  fiill  extent. 

In  an  oiJtflani<in^  attack,  even  a^ainHt  a  prej^ared  pOHl- 
tion,ri  j  the  defender  will  HufTer  much  more  from  the  comhined 
fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  than  heretofore;  (2)  breaHtworku 
'and  trencheH  do  not  by  any  meanH  afford  the  requiHite  cover; 
hence  i'A)  the  inventionH  more  than  ever  eall  for  outflanking, 
and  (i)  outflanking  iH  bound  to  be  more  prrxiuctive  of  rf^ultH. 
The  concluHion,  therefore,  would  be  that  the  pro8j»ect«  for  the 
HucceHH  of  an  attaz-k  are  rather  increawed  than  diminished. 
ThiH  iH  from  the  theoretical  Htandpoint! 

If  J  be  permitted  to  reeall  here  the  example  of  ProblnH, 
wherr'  on  one  side  the  wood  of  I'ofiovvitz  enabled  large  b^xliea 
to  be  brought  to  within  000  meters,  and  where  on  the  other 
side  LVieder  J'rim)  a  covererl  approach  to  within  200 — 'iOO 
meters  was  pra/:ticable,  and  if  we  imagine  thf^HC  positions  to 
be  held  by  troops  with  uuxlcrn  annarnent,  we  might  conclude 
that  the  role  of  the  attacker  has  not  become  so  very  much 
worse,  since  battle-fields  of  like  character  will  rather  be  the 
rule  than  the  exception  in  the  future.  More  stress  would  in 
future  be  laid  on  outflanking  by  taking  more  ground  by  way 
of  Nieder  I'rim,  but  even  against  the  front,  the  space  Pro- 
bluH — Xieder  J'rim,  strong  skirmish  lines  could  be  brought 
up  unobserved  to  a  similar  distance  through  the  fields  of  rye  as 
tall  as  a  man,  so  that  the  Jtoslik  artillery  could  not  see  these  skir- 
mishers or  ohserve  their  progress  no  longer  hetrayed  hy  smoke,  and 
that,  approadiing  thus  under  cover,  the  skirmishers  vjould  render  the 
position  of  the  artillery  nntenahU  hy  their  fire  at  a  range  of  J 000 
meters  or  less.  The  conditions  will  not  always  be  similar; 
still  the  example  shows  that  they  did  exist,  and  why  should 
they  not  recur?     It  follows  that  in  similar  situations  the 


2SG  Itiquirii's  inlo  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

defondor  >vouI(l  have  io  burn  (lio  no  lu'ld  to  a  dislanci'  of 
2000  motors;  ovon  simple  liodjios  and  ssliiiht  folds  of  tho 
jiTonnd  may  booomo  voi y  troublosomo  to  artillory. 

Tn  any  ovont  tlioro  aro  two  roasons  why  the  tactical  om- 
jtloyuuMit  of  artillery  should  bo  modified:  the  first  lies  in  the 
improved  rillo;  tho  second,  in  the  incroai^od  fire  elToct  of 
artillory.  lioth  become  noticeable  in  tactics,  in  the  first 
place,  by  the  greater  range  of  the  }>rojoctilos.  The  German 
Infantry  Drill  Eegulations  state  \ery  correctly:  "In  action 
against  artillory  it  should  bo  observed  that  that  arm  has  the 
superiority  of  tiro  at  ranges  greater  than  1000  meters,  and 
that  the  chances  only  become  etpial  at  ranges  of  less  than 
1000  meters.  Cases  may  be  imagined,  however,  where  the 
action  of  infantry  may  be  effective  against  artillery  at  greater 
ranges,  but  it  will  I'all  for  tho  oxptMidituro  of  a  considerable 
amount  of  ammunition." 

T  a.ju  inclined  to  believe  that  in  many  cases  it  will  be  pos- 
sible for  infantry  to  direct  such  a  fire  against  artillery  ex- 
posed to  view,  at  ranges  greater  than  1000  meters,  that  it  will 
be  impossible  for  tho  latter  to  rcMuain  in  action,  provided  tho 
exact  rang(^  is  found  ami  the  fire  is  t'ontrollod.  This  advan- 
tage will  i'hietly  accrue  to  tho  infantry  of  the  defender,  be- 
cause it  may  bo  assununi  that  in  most  cases  it  will  be  able  to 
lie  in  wait  for  tho  artillery.  The  defender's  artillery  will 
also  probably  prepare  to  greet  that  of  tho  attacker  with 
mass  fire  at  known  ranges.  From  both  of  those  suppositions 
I  conclude  that  tho  artilleries  of  tho  attacker  and  defender 
will  try  to  fight  it  out  at  long  ranges,  but  will  find  a  natural 
limit  imposed  on  themselves  by  the  optical  conditions  of  the 
battle-field.  At  any  rate,  artillery  should  learn  in  peace  how 
to  deliver  an  otYoctivo  fire  at  long  range,  and  bo  traiiuni  in 
one  kind  of  mass  fire  that  can  bo  controlled.  In  combating 
the   dj'fondor  tho  artillerv   of   tho   attacker   will    tluM'oforo 


Tactical  Deductions.  287 

strive  to  develop  as  many  guns  as  possible,  to  gain  a  favora- 
ble position,  and  to  take  it  up  without  exposing  itself ; during 
the  action  it  should  make  as  few  changes  of  position  as  pos- 
sible. In  most  cases  1  deem  it  neither  useful  nor  advisable 
that  artillery  accompany  the  infantry  attack.  The  positions 
of  the  artillery  will  vary  between  3500 — 1200  meters;the  prin- 
-cipal  distance  will  probably  be  2500  meters,  the  fire  of  shrap- 
nel at  these  distances  being  efiective — nay,  annihilating, 
if  the  artillery  promptly  gets  the  range.  It  may  therefore  be 
assumed  that  the  artillery  battle  will  under  certain  circum- 
stances be  of  brief  duration  and  of  increased  severity,  and 
that  there  will  be  pauses  in  the  artillery  fire;  at  any  rate,  it 
seems  to  me  tliat  such  would  follow  theoretically  from  the 
endeavor  to  promptly  get  the  range  and  to  develop  masses 
of  artillery,  in  combination  with  the  greater  effect  of  fire. 

Artillery,  however,  is  a  rather  complicated  arm,  and  at 
equal  distances  will  be  more  endangered  by  the  enemy's 
proximity  than  infantry.  It  becomes  the  duty  of  the  infantry 
to  keep  the  hostile  infantry  as  far  away  as  possible. 

It  is  thus  necessary  for  artillery  to  be  protected  by  infan- 
try in  front,  and  to  take  as  good  cover  as  possible.  At  any 
rate,  smokeless  powder  calls  for  much  greater  proficiency  in 
firing  than  black  powder,  and  for  greater  circumspection  and 
prudence  on  the  part  of  the  leaders,  in  order  to  select  a  posi- 
tion so  close  and  so  effective  that  the  fewest  possible  changes 
of  position  may  become  necessary. 

The  greatest  change  in  tactics  has  beyond  doubt  been 
brought  about  by  the  element  of  uncertainty  resulting  from 
the  use  of  smokeless  powder.  It  enables  infantry  to  conceal 
its  weakness  and  to  mislead  the  enemy  to  enterprises  that 
require  much  time.  The  defender  in  particular  will  strive 
to  conceal  his  real   position  as  much  as  possible  and  to 


288  liKjiiirirs  iiilti  the  Tdrlics  of  (he  Fulurc. 

iMiiitlov  his  jirtillt'i'V  iiccordiiifilv.  I'^or  liis  :irl  illci'V  one*' 
r('\ cjilcd.  Ills  I'cnl  |»(>si(i()n  is  (liscloscd,  wliicli  would  iiuilc- 
rijillv  riitililnlc  llic  (iisk  of  llic  Mtliickcr.  .Iudj;in}i,-  li-oin 
]»(»;u'(' (>x|)('ri(Mi<'('S.  I  believe  il  \vv\  iiii|trol>;il)l('  lliiii  cnvMlry 
pMlfois  :ind  rccomioilcriiiu  olliccrs  will  evei-  he  iible  It) 
lU'onipl  Iv  ascci'lnin  I  lie  eiieiiiv's  position.  Tliese  iiieium 
may  help  (o  hx-ale  the  enemy's  Hanks,  and  1  place  no  j^reat 
expeclalions  on  (he  caidiNc  lialloon  in  Held  operalions. 
lOvei'v (hin^-  else  will  hav<>  lo  be  I'onnd  onl  by  li.uhlinj^',  and 
tliis  is  the  new  leature,  parlicnlaily  tor  artillery. 

II  is  my  opinion  that  this  arm  is  bonnd  to  become  a 
"i-econnoiterin^-  arm"  lo  a  hiuh  dejii'ee;  that  instead  of 
(lepi'ivinu-  the  ad\ance  .<;nai(l  of  artillery,  the  same  slionld 
b<>  made  very  stronj;  in  that  arm;  and  that,  as  previously 
(Mn|»hasi/.e(l.  artillery  should  j)ossess  ijreat  m»)bility.  The 
mounted  soldier  can  no  longer  approach  sutVicienlly  near  for 
correct  and  sutlicient  observation.  Should  he  attempt  it, 
the  chances  ai-(^  100  to  I  that  he  will  not  return,  and  his 
obser\  aliens,  if  any,  will  be  lost.  The  deploynuMit  of  strong 
infantry,  in  order  to  ^ain  information  by  nu>ans  of  its  action, 
reijuires  much  time,  and  there  is  nothing  left  for  that  pur- 
])ose  but  a  skillful  and  viii'orous  employment  of  artillery. 
In  such  a  cas(>  the  defender,  when  his  main  position  is 
involved,  must  show  his  hand,  if  he  do(>s  not  wish  to  suc- 
cumb at  once;  if  it  is  uuM-ely  an  advanced  j)ositiou,  he  will  be 
unable  lo  hold  il  and  will  betray  the  main  ])osilion  by  his 
withdrawal.  Tlu'  place  of  the  artillery  in  the  marchinii-  col- 
umn should  thereftu-e  fnllill  two  renuirennMits:  1,  vi^-oious 
reconuaissam(>;  L',  to  advance*  from  the  preliminary  deploy- 
uu'ut  with  the  ^realest  possibl(>  snpeiiorily  in  point  of  liuns 
to  tlu»  pi'incipal  deployment  fm-  subduins;'  the  enemy's  main 
])ositiou,  II  is  uum>cessary  lo  state  that  tii'eat  ditlu'iilties 
will  ha\  (>  to  be  overctune  in  doinu'  so. 


Tactical  Deduclions.  280 

liijl  it  will  no  u\()V<'  ]>('  possiblo  for  ar-tillery  to  effect  the 
reconnaJKHaricr'  alone  than  it  would  be  adviBable  for  it  to 
lake  up  itH  priri'-ipal  firirifi  station  without  having  infantry 
thrown  out  in  ilK  front.  It  Ik  unable  by  itself  to  do  either; 
it  reipjirr-H  in  either  case  the  protection  of  infantry  against 
the  enemy's  infantry. 

It  thus  follows  from  smokeless  powder,  as  a  general 
result,  that  infantry  and  artillery  are  tactically  rendered 
more  interdependent,  and  that  tactical  reconnaissance  will 
have  to  b«^  effected  chiefly  by  these  two  arms.  Smokeless 
powder  does  not  facilitate  that  kind  of  work  in  any  way;  it 
rather  makes  it  more  difficult  in  many  particulars  through 
ihf  element  of  uncertainty. 

Every  discharge  of  the  field-j)iece  shows  a  very  bright 
flash,  and  if  the  gun  is  on  loose  ground,  the  flash  is  accom- 
panied by  a  very  conspicuous  cloud  of  dust.  If  the  gun 
stands  on  sod,  grass,  etc.,  or  along  the  edge  of  a  wood,  the 
dust  is  replaced  by  vapor  plainly  visible  against  the  green 
ground.  Artillery  will  thus  betray  its  position  in  a  very 
conspicuous  manner.  Its  fire  will  not  only  betray  the 
general  location  of  the  battery,  but  will  make  it  possible  to 
count  approximately  the  number  of  guns,  which  was  never 
the  case  heretofore.  Artillery  should  therefore  more  than 
ever  be  bent  on  concealing  its  position  from  the  two  firing 
branches  of  the  enemy,  and  indirect  fire  should  not  be  con- 
demned outright  as  an  artifice. 

The  absence  of  smoke  has  made  artillery  an  arm  whose 
total  victory  or  destruction  lies  close  together;  its  fate  may 
depend  on  a  moment,  on  a  single  steji,  but  chiefly  on  the 
action  of  the  opposing  artillery.  It  became  thus  necessary 
for  artillery'  to  adopt  an  entirely  different  tactical  spirit, 
which,  as  we  have  stated,  it  has  done.  It  was  reserved 
for  smokeless  powder  to  make  artillery  an  arm  capable  of 


ii5H)  Inquiries  into  the  l\jclics  of  the  Future. 

doalinji'  ;jbsolulo  destruction;  but,  tlu)n};h  tho  technical 
arraufivnu'iits  are  complete,  much  remains  to  be  done  to 
derive  from  them  the  ultimate  tactical  advanta}»es.  It  is 
not  opportune  to  enter  into  these  details. 

Mass  etl'ect  ilirout;h  individual  elVect  is  to-day  the  tacti- 
cal huv  of  artilUM'v  as  \vi>ll  as  of  infantry.  The  latter  knows 
noAV  only  the  action  of  masses  of  skirmishers,  and  all  it  had 
to  do  was  to  modify  its  principles.  Smokeless  i)t)wd(U-  has 
not  detracted  from  the  vaJue  of  cavalry,  but  has  relejjated 
its  action  to  other  phases  and  modified  the  form  of  the 
action.  If  cavalry  knows  how  to  utilize  these  moments, 
it  may  enhance  the  value  of  the  victory  enormously,  but  it 
will  no  Kui«;er  decide  battles! 

The  moments  of  "tactical  doubt"  will  increase  in  num- 
ber and  duration,  caused  by  the  element  of  uncertainty 
imparted  to  tactics  by  smokeless  powder. 

/v.  Tactkal  Deductions  Rvi/anlint/  the  Attach-,  from  the  Expori- 
mcnts  of  Bruns,  from  the  Ballistic  Properties  of  Small- 
Calihcr  Fifles,  and  from  the  Properties  of  Smokeless  Powder. 

The  stated  experiments  of  Professor  Bruns,  of  Dr.  I.  Ha- 
bart,  of  Professors  lUisch,  Kocher,  Kejjer,  von  liillroth,  and 
von  Bardeleben,  and  of  iheFrenchmen  D«.^horme,Cha.uvel,Ni- 
mier,  Breton,  a.nd  Pesme.*and  the  prescriptions  of  the  Infan- 
try and  Artillery  Firing  Regulations  are  not  only  of  surgical 
and  ballistic, but  of  high  tactical  importance  in  several  w^ays. 
The  fact  that  one  and  the  same  projectile  pierces  3 — A  ranks 
at  400  meters,  2—3  ranks  at  800—1200  meters— the  distance 
of  100  meters,  at  which  4 — 5  ranks  are  iiierced,  is  disregarded 
because  I  believe  that  the  attacker  will  rarelv  reach  that 


♦"Recherches  expi'rimontjiles  sur  los  effets  des  arms  nouvelles 
et  des  balles  de  petit  calibi'e  a  eoiveloppe  n^sistante."  Ardiir  (ji^nt^ral 
<f-«>  HI ('(/..  Octobre.  1888. 


Tactical  Deductions.  291 

range  before  the  enemy  ha8  abandoned  his  position — simply 
signifies  when  translated  into  tactir;s  that  formations  four 
ranks  deep  at  400  meters  and  three  deep  at  1200  meters 
would  receive  4  or  .'J  times  as  many  hits  as  a  single-rank  for- 
mation. These  results  were  obtained  on  level  ground,  but 
that  does  not  diminisli  their  value,  and  it  would  be  foolish  to 
contend  that  such  level  ground  will  not  be  encountere<l  in 
fact,  and  that  firing  on  the  battle-field  differs  in  result  from 
that  of  the  firing-grounds. 

With  respect  to  level  ground,  an  inspection  of  the 
maps  of  Problus,  Mars-la-Tour,  Kt.  Privat,  and  particularly 
Loigny,  will  show  that  battle-fields  15  kilometers  and  more 
in  extent  do  show  extensive  j.lains,  and  it  would  not  be  dif- 
ficult to  multiply  the  number  of  examples  if  it  were  intended 
to  do  HO  in  this  book.  Military  history  shows  that  excep- 
tional features  of  ground  are  not  so  uncommon,  and  it  is 
quite  natural  that  he  who  remains  on  the  tactical  defensive 
on  account  of  his  numerical  inferiority,  or  who  perhaps 
intends  to  remain  on  the  defensive  at  the  beginning  for 

other even  purely  tactical— reasons,  or  for  other  reri^sons 

springing  from  the  general  situation,  will  select  positions 
with  an  open  field  of  fire  in  order  to  make  the  task  of  the 
attacker  difficult  and  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  proper- 
ties of  his  own  fire-arms.  It  may  also  be  expecte<l  that  at 
points  which  may  be  approached  to  within  000  meters  or 
less,  the  defender  will  construct  entrenchments  enabling 
him  to  increase  the  effect  of  his  fire  against  such  points  by 
a  concentration  of  fire  at  short  range;  nor  will  he  disdain 
entrenchments  on  his  flanks  and  fronts  where  there  is  a 
wide  field  of  fire,  (1)  to  break  as  much  as  possible  the  force 
of  the  cross-fire  of  an  outflanking  enemy,  and  (2)  as  protec- 
tion against  artillery,  the  true  representative  of  long-range 
fire.     Incidentally  it  may  be  remarked  that  modern  shrap- 


292  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

iiel  fire  makes  this  indispensable  for  the  defender.  Antici- 
pating somewhat,  I  will  state  that  the  width  of  front  covered 
by  a  shrapnel  is  about  GO  meters.  The  distribution  of  the 
hits  is  almost  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  dispersion — t.  e., 
counting  from  the  center,  it  amounts  to  25,  16,  7,  and  2  per 
cent.  This  pro])ortion  is  the  same  at  all  ranges.  After 
regulating  its  lire,  a  battery  will  make  78  hits  with  every 
shrapnel — i.  e.,  it  will  score  that  number  of  hits  against 
a  detachment  of  infantry  with  a  front  of  (JO  meters.  It  fol- 
lows that  between  2500 — 1200  meters  the  subordinate 
leaders  of  infantry  should  be  at  liberty  to  diminish  the  front 
by  every  possible  means  while  crossing  that  space.  I  am 
here  following  the  statements  of  the  Journal  des  sciences  mili- 
taires  and  abstain  for  obvious  reasons  from  making  other 
statements.  At  any  rate,  between  2500  and  1200  meters  the 
advance  should  be  regulated  by  ditfereut  considerations 
from  what  it  is  at  shorter  ranges. 

In  all  cases  where  tactical  reasons  demand  the  advance 
of  infantry  on  an  extended  plain,  800 — 600  meters  from  the 
enemy  may  be  assumed  as  the  nearest  distance,  and  in  no 
case  should  it  be  less  than  400  meters.  The  3Sth  Brigade 
has  demonstrated,  at  ]\Iars-la-Tour,  that  with  good  troops 
and  poor  formations  it  is  possible  to  rush  forward  over  open 
ground  until  intermingling  with  the  enemy  and  under  a  fire 
which  cannot  be  much  exceeded  by  the  small-caliber  rifle, 
though  I  do  not  by  any  means  recommend  this  exhibition  of 
bravery  as  a  standard  example  in  tactics.  The  1st  and  3d 
Infantry  l>rigades  of  the  Guard  have  demonstrated,  at  St. 
Privat,  that  it  is  possible  for  the  attacker,  if  sufficiently 
strong,  to  hold  out  for  hours  on  open  ground  and  under 
extraordinary  losses  notwithstanding  the  use  of  antiquated 
forms  that  should  long  have  been  discarded.  Both  exam- 
pies  are  to  be  condemned  from  the  tactical  ])oint  of  view. 


Tactical  Deductions.  293 

but  are  worth  takin}^  to  heart,  though  that  resistance,  when 
closely  examined,  does  not  seem  to  constitute  such  a  great 
feat  of  bravery.  The  'M  Infantry  l^rigade  of  the  Guard 
possessed  sufficient  fighting  power  to  repulse  about  six  vig- 
orous counter-attacks,  and  both  brigades  took  part  in  the 
last  acts  of  the  victory,  right  on  top  of  an  action  which  was 
not  quite  in  the  ordinary,  to  be  sure,  and  which  had  con- 
sumed almost  all  their  fighting  power.  Therein  is  where 
the  extraordinary  lies!  Where  the  open  plain  cannot  be 
avoided,  there  is  but  one  form  of  movement  and  combat  under 
the  enemy's  fire,  the  single-ranl-  skirmish  line.  The  leaders 
should  endeavor  to  continue  the  forward  movement  as  long  as 
possible,  because  every  halt  takes  from  the  vigor  of  the  move- 
ment. To  deny  this  is  to  deny  human  nature.  In  view  of 
the  ballistic  xjroperties  stated  in  the  Firing  Regulations, 
infantry  may  in  such  cases  be  expected  to  do  what  can  rea- 
sonably be  expected  from  it  at  ranges  from  1000  to  000 
meters — namely,  to  keep  the  enemy  under  an  uninterrupted 
skirmish  fire.  If  broad  columns  or  closed  lines  were  used 
between  2500  and  1200  meters,  the  losses  would  amount  to 
annihilation  according  to  the  figures  quoted.  The  Regula- 
tions should  therefore  indicate  the  best  formations  for 
advancing  under  infantry  and  artillery  fire,  because  the 
zones  of  fire  differ  considerably.  It  will  be  rare  indeed  that 
shrapnel  fire  will  have  to  be  feared  at  1200  meters.  This 
difference  in  the  method  of  advancing  again  calls  for 
control. 

The  proportion  of  killed  and  wounded  of  the  .^8th  Bri- 
gade on  the  loth  of  August,  1870,  was  3:4.  This  singular 
fact,  which  has  heretofore  not  been  closely  examined,  may  be 
explained  in  this  way,  that  the  brigade  moved  within  the 
zone  of  explosive  effecl  of  the  T'liassepot  until  intermingling 


294  Inquiries  inlo  iltc  I'adics  of  the  Future. 

with   the  enemy   aiul   back   again — i.   e.,  400 -f  400  =  800 
meters.* 

Still  another  i)oint  is  to  be  mentioned  hero:  the  experi- 
ments of  Beckf  and  of  Bruns (pages  4;)-52)havedenu)nstrated 
that  down  to  300  meters  the  wounds  inflicted  by  the  small- 
caliber  rilie  will  be  relatively  less  dangerous,  because  the 
penetrative  force  and  hardness  of  the  bullet  make  clean 
wounds  without  dangerous  splintering  of  bones.  Men  hit 
elsewhere  than  in  the  head,  heart,  throat,  bladder,  etc.,  may 
in  most  cases  count  on  recovery.  The  man  is  merely  placed 
hors-dc-comhat,  and  crippling  and  mutilation  are  not  to  be 
feared  so  much  as  with  the  former  infantry  bullet.  The 
action  of  the  many,  but  small,  fragments  and  balls  of  the 
artillery  projectile  is  similar.  But  wounds  inflicted  at 
ranges  between  300  meters  and  the  muzzle  of  the  rifle  are  of 
very  severe  character  on  account  of  the  explosive  effect,  and 
here  the  proportion  is  reversed.  All  clases  of  the  army 
should  be  familiar  with  these  things,  especially  the  officers, 
as  salvation  or  destruction  may  depend  on  whether  they  take 
them  in  account  or  not.  In  view  of  the  modern  method  of 
fighting  with  swarms  of  skirmishers,  the  scientific  and  moral 
forces,  particularly  of  the  common  soldier,  should  under  all 
circumstances  be  strengthened  in  the  first  place.  In  addi- 
tion to  other  things,  the  modern  officer  should  be  expert  in 
physics  and  psychology;  otherwise  he  is  nothing  but  a  cor- 

*Billroth  and  Bardeleben  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  proportion 
of  killed  to  wounded  on  the  battle-field  will  in  the  future  probably 
be  rather  increased  than  diminished.  The  mortality  among  the 
wounded  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  expected  to  diminish  consider- 
ably. It  was  almost  26  per  cent  among  the  Russians  in  1877-78, 
12  per  cent  among  the  Germans  in  1870-71,  6.6  per  cent  among  the 
Austrians  in  1878;  in  1888  it  rose  to  9.5  per  cent,  and  fell  in  1885-86 
to  2  per  cent.  The  latter  flgiu'e  closely  approximates  the  experiences 
in  Chili. 

IB.  von  Beck,  "Ueber  die  Wirkung  moderner  Gewehrprojektile" 
("The  Effect  of  Modern  Rifle  Projectiles"),  Leipzig,  1885. 


Tactical  Deductions.  295 

l>oralora  tradesman.  None  wants  to  be  that;  his  pride  would 
rebel  against  it.  The  moral  strength  of  the  ordinary  man— 
and  the  great  majority  are  ordinary  men — is  increased  in  the 
same  deyree  as  he  knows  that  the  dangerous  character  of  wounds 
from  infantry  bullets  is  dirtvinishal.  Men  knowing  themselves 
exposed  only  to  temporary  injury  will  act  with  more  dash 
than  if  they  expect  death  from  every  bullet  with  more  or 
less  certainty.  This  is  the  state  of  affairs,  and  what  the 
above  named  scientists  have  ascertained  should  be  dissem- 
inated throughout  the  army.  It  is  not  merely  a  surgical  mat- 
ter; it  is  also  a  tactical  one,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the 
efficacy  of  the  small-caliber  rifle  is  such  between  000  and  400 
meters  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  nearer  unless  it  can  be 
done  under  cover,  or  to  enter  that  zone  where  the  wounds 
from  the  small-caliber  rifle  are  of  terrible  severity — i.  e., 
from  oOO  meters  on. 

If  it  is  possible  to  avoid  that  zone  without  sensibly  im- 
pairing the  efficacy  of  our  own  fire,  then  it  should  be  made  a 
law  in  tactics  which  should  be  ingrained  in  every  one,  leav- 
ing the  matter  of  human  nature  entirely  out  of  considera- 
tion. For  mere  selfishness  and  the  motive  not  to  destroy 
our  material  fighting  forces  ourselves  senselessly  through 
ignorance  and  want  of  judgment  and  not  to  render  ourselves 
incapable  of  fighting  demand  that  these  matters  be  made 
known,  that  they  be  thoroughly  weighed  and  taken  into 
account.  War  cannot  be  attractive  except  as  an  art;  art 
alone  will  carry  us  over  its  vexations  and  will  lead  us  to  vic- 
tory. If  it  degenerates  into  senseless  butchery,  it  becomes 
repulsive  and  loses  everything  noble  that  science  and  art 
may  impart  to  it.  It  sinks  to  the  level  of  a  brutal  trade; 
brutality  stifles  all  that  is  beautiful  in  any  art.  Unfortu- 
nately, great  artists  are  not  always  found  in  the  [jlaces  they 
ought  to  fill,  in  consequence  of  the  fact  that  officers  are 


296  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

almost  systematically  trained  to  contemn  the  sciences. 
When  war  breaks  out  after  a  peace  which,  though  affording 
many  leisure  hours  for  study,  has  been  idled  away,  many 
"leaders"  find  themselves  as  unfamiliar  with  their  own 
branch  as  though  in  a  strange  world  I  Some  do  not  know 
how  to  act,  others  lose  their  heads;  they  have  not  learned  to 
understand  what  intellectual  power  may  accomplish,  and  their 
ignorance  and  lack  of  tactical  skill  put  thousands  iu  the 
grave  and  rob  the  fatherland  of  them. 

In  the  Firing  Instructions  ranges  up  to  600  meters  are 
called  close.  It  follows  that  at  that  point  there  occurs  a 
palpable  restriction  to  the  ballistic  properties;  that  up  to 
that  point  the  effect  is  fairly  even  (though  increasing  up  to 
300  meters  so  as  to  amount  almost  to  annihilation);  hence 
we  are  justified  in  demanding  that,  as  a  rule,  the  zone  of  the 
explosive  effect  (less  than  .300  meters)  be  only  entered  when 
there  is  cover,  when  the  enemy  is  shaken,  when  his  strength 
is  gone,  and  when  he  is  ready  to  withdraw.  As  regards 
results,  it  makes  no  difference  in  the  conduct  of  the  fire 
action,  assuming,  of  course,  a  good  field  of  fire,  whether  the 
fire  is  delivered  at  400,  500,  or  600  meters;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  explosive  effect,  the  power  of  penetration,  and  the  flat 
trajectory  make  it  well  worth  while  considering  whether 
the  increased  losses  and  the  increased  severity  of  the 
wounds  should  not,  as  a  rule,  forbid  an  approach  to  within 
300  meters  and  over.  In  my  opinion  it  is  impracticable  In 
the  pitched  battle  on  purely  tactical  grounds. 

People  warning  others  against  orthodoxy  ought  them- 
selves to  be  the  first  to  fight  shy  of  it.  The  explosive  effect 
of  the  old  Chassepot  extended  over  a  distance  greater  by 
25  per  cent  than  that  of  the  modern  Lebel  and  Mannlicher 
rifles — i.  e.,  400  against  the  present  300  meters  (Bruns,  page 
51);  yet  I  witnessed  a  case  myself  where  we  advanced  over 


Tactical  Deductions.  297 

a  free  field  of  fire  (Mars-la-Tour)  until  we  in  part  inter- 
mingled with  the  enemy  and  the  rest  reached  an  average 
distance  from  the  enemy  of  100  meters.  Other  cases  I  wit- 
nessed in  the  January  actions  at  Chateau  Renault,  where 
I  succeeded  in  an  early  morning  action  (January  6th),  not- 
withstanding the  apparently  level  characterof  the  ground,  in 
conducting  a  half-battalion  divided  into  two  company  col- 
umns, under  cover,  to  within  250  meters  of  the  enemy's  skir- 
mish line,  after  showing  the  same  road  to  a  horse  battery 
and  to  a  squadron  of  the  3d  Cuirassiers,  all  of  which  used 
it  on  their  advance  and  on  their  return  without  notable 
losses,  although  the  hostile  bullets  rattled  like  peas  against 
the  tile  roofs  of  the  village  of  Vilthion,  which  was  one  kilo- 
meter in  length  and  ran  parallel  to  this  road  for  some 
distance.  Lieutenant  de  R^ge  and  I  never  dismounted  in 
traversing  that  distance  under  a  very  severe  rifle  fire,  and 
neither  was  hurt.  Subsequent  to  our  retreat,  in  hunting  up 
a  company,  12th — 57th  (Lieutenant  von  Kehler),  which  had 
been  forgotten,  at  the  southwest  exit  of  this  uncanny  village 
defile,  I  again  galloped  throughout  the  length  of  the  village, 
whose  southern  side  had  meanwhile  been  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  pointed  out  to  that  company  a  road  around  the 
north  of  the  village  by  which  it  effected  its  retreat,  likewise 
without  much  loss.  On  meeting  Mr.  von  Kehler  (now  com- 
mander of  the  71st  Regiment),  at  Berlin,  in  1889,  he  again 
expressed  his  thanks  to  me.  On  the  morning  of  January  7th 
I  witnessed  an  assault  on  the  village  of  La  Garionni^re  by  F. 
and  II. — 57th,  where  the  attack  movement  was  elegantly  car- 
ried out  in  close  formation  by  two  companies  of  the  II.  Bat- 
talion, notwithstanding  the  good  field  of  fire  and  the  firm- 
ness of  the  enemy,  while  the  major  part  of  the  fusiliers,  who 
were  fighting  in  skirmish  lines,  did  not  gain  ground  as 
rapidly  as  those  two  companies.    It  should  be  stated,  how- 


298  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ever,  that  the  fusiliers  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  action  in 
front,  and  that  the  II.  Battalion  was  able  to  approach  from 
the  flank  under  fair  cover;  the  enemy  defended  himself  from 
house  to  house.  I  purposely  cite  these  offensive  actions 
from  the  pitched  battle  as  representing  actions  with  suc- 
cessful and  unsuccessful  issue,  and  simple  village  fights, 
because  they  show  the  possibility  of  advancing  in  the  face 
of  Chassepot  fire,  provided  the  ground  was  utilized.  I 
abstain  from  other  quotations.  The  Chassep6t  possessed  the 
properties  of  the  present  small-caliber  rifles,  though  not  to 
the  same  extent.  It  approximated  them  in  range,  but  was 
considerably  Inferior  in  power  of  penetration  and  flatness 
of  trajectory.  According  to  the  present  state  of  research, 
the  wounds  it  inflicted  at  ranges  from  the  muzzle  up  to  400 
meters  exhibited  the  severe  effects  of  the  small-caliber  rifle 
without  the  corresponding  beneficial  effects  which  the  lat- 
ter possesses  from  that  range  to  2000  meters — i.  e.,  the 
wounds  inflicted  by  it  both  at  short  and  long  range  were 
severe,  because  it  fired  a  lead  bullet,  which  on  striking  the 
bone  became  much  deformed  and  caused  most  severe  splin- 
tering of  bones  and  laceration  and  contusion  of  soft  tissues. 
The  fact  that  these  things  have  been  considerably  remedied 
by  the  modern  small-caliber  rifle  is  due- to  the  use  of  bullets 
cased  in  hard  steel  or  nickel,  which  up-set  but  very  little.* 
It  thus  was  the  hard  lot  of  the  Germans  to  fight  against  the 
(from  the  humane  point  of  view)  most  detestable  rifle  that 
ever  was  used  in  war — a  perfect  fiend  of  a  rifle,  particularly 
at  the  ranges  from  100 — 400  meters.  They  had  a  thorough 
taste  of  all  kinds  of  its  fire,  and  having  preserved  and 
handed  down  their  experiences,  the  Germans  would,  in  case 
of  war,  suffer  far  less  surprise  at  the  hands  of  the  Lebel 

*The   latest   projectile,    the    so-called    "hollow   hiillet,"    besides 
other  things,  shows  these  same  attributes. 


Tactical  Deductions.  299 

rifle  than  may  be  in  store  for  the  French  (knowing  the  effect 
of  the  needle-gun  only)  if  they  were  confronted  by  an  equal 
or  superior  rifle;  for  instance,  our  rifle  model  '88.  This  is  an- 
other moral  point  with  which  officers  and  men  should  be 
made  acquainted  in  the  course  of  their  instruction. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  may  be  assumed  that,partic- 
jilarly  in  independent  actions,  it  will  be  found  possible  to 
advance  to  close  range  (GOO  meters),  in  order  to  bring  about 
the  decision,  and  still  closer  by  taking  advantage  of  the 
ground,  fog,  or  darkness.  For  meeting  such  conditions  the 
troops  should  be  well  trained  in  those  formations  which  are 
requisite  and  whose  front  and  depth  ever  depend  on  the 
ground.  At  any  rate,  the  difference  between  Chassepot  and 
Lebel  is  not  so  great  for  us  as  is  that  between  needle-gun 
and  rifle  model  '88  for  the  French.  What  the  Germans 
accomplished  against  the  Chassepot  is  known;  what  the 
French  are  going  to  accomplish  against  the  rifle  model  '88 
remains  to  be  seen. 

The  power  of  penetration  of  the  small-caliber  rifles  is  so 
great  that  trees  no  longer  constitute  good  cover,  unless  they 
are  very  big,  which  is  the  exception,  and  in  many  respects 
it  is  the  same  with  masonry.  There  is  really  not  much  left 
for  the  attacker  to  use  as  cover,  and  all  the  men  should  know 
that,  not  to  mention  the  officers.  The  fire  action  will  fre- 
quently take  place  between  1000  and  500  meters,  and  in 
view  of  the  data  given  in  theFiring  Instructions, the  greatest 
skill  in  the  use  of  the  spade  becomes  indispensable  for  in- 
fantry. In  many  cases  the  enemy's  fire  may  make  such  work 
impossible,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  succeed,  particu- 
larly in  the  frontal  action.  A  bank  of  earth  of  35  and  50  centi- 
meters does  not  require  much  work  where  it  is  at  all  practi- 
cable. Trenches  of  that  cross-section,  extending  for  many 
kilometers,  were  "scraped"  out  by  the  Americans  with  great 


300  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

rapidity.  I  use  the  term  "scrape/'  for  they  were  not  sup- 
plied with  our  spade,  but  did  the  work  with  their  hands, 
using  their  side-arms,  their  cooking  utensils,  etc.,  for,  being 
practical  soldiers,  they  knew  how  to  help  themselves.  But 
the  stupid  "Michael"*  nowhere  becomes  more  conspicuous 
than  when  called  upon  for  such  work.  To  compel  an  active 
person  to  watch  the  clumsiness,  slowness,  indifference,  and 
laziness  of  some  German  tribes  in  such  work  amounts  to  pun- 
ishment, and,  unless  energetic  steps  are  taken  in  these  mat- 
ters, they  will  exact  heavy  penalties.  Nor  would  it  do  any 
harm  if  the  o£0cers  would  look  upon  this  "scratching"  with 
less  sovereign  contempt,  and  if  they  would  learn  more  and 
accomplish  more  in  that  field — but,  great  heavens!  every- 
thing that  bears  the  slightest  reference  to  that  "unmilitary, 
plebeian  work"  is  hateful,  as  though  it  were  to  be  considered 
more  military  to  be  killed  on  a  level  plain  than  to  save  one's 
fighting  power  by  "scratching." 

The  Instructions  for  Field  Entrenchments  of  April  6, 
1893,  are  based  on  similar  grounds.  It  is  laid  down  there  in 
Section  1:  "In  the  attack  the  entrenching  tool  may  also  be 
used  to  advantage  for  holding  and  strengthening  conquered 
ground";  and  in  Section  45:  "If  the  work  has  to  be  done 
under  the  enemy's  fire,  those  men  of  the  skirmish  line  who 
carry  spades  put  down  the  rifle,  construct  cover  for  them- 
selves, and  then  pass  their  spades."  Not  much  could  be 
gained  by  that  procedure  in  an  attack,  yet  enough  "to  pre- 
serve sufficient  strength  to  repulse  any  counter-attack";  it 
may  be  possible  later  on,  under  favorable  circumstances, 
to  push  these  trenches  to  the  front  and  thus  to  gain  a  much 
more  effective  firing-station.     To  be  sure,  military  history 

*"The  German  Michael"  is  a  term  used  by  the  Germans  them- 
selves to  characterize  their  own  apathy  and  conservatism.  "Michael" 
is  supposed  to  be  sleepinn^  most  of  the  time  with  a  nightcap  pulled 
over  his  ears. — Translator. 


Tactical  Deductions.  301 

does  not  furnish  an  example  of  attacking  infantry  succeed- 
ing in  entrenching  itself  under  fire  at  close  range,  in  holding 
out  in  that  artificial  firing-station,  and  in  taking  part  in  the 
subsequent  assault.  The  most  effective  work  in  that  respect 
was  done  by  General  Skobeleff  on  the  ''Green  Hills";  but 
the  work  was  difficult,  owing  to  the  stony  character  of  the 
ground;  the  infantry  was  not  skilled  in  the  work,  and  there 
"was  a  deficiency  of  tools ;  the  work  required  much  time,  the 
troops  suffered  great  losses,  were  not  supported,  and  had 
to  withdraw.  None  of  these  difficulties  is  likely  to  be 
encountered  in  future,  but  it  will  nevertheless  be  difficult 
for  the  attacker  to  entrench  himself  under  the  enemy's  fire. 
In  the  first  place,  there  should  be  a  strong  second  line  in  rear 
of  the  entrenching  troops  to  prevent  any  interference  with 
the  work.  I  am  nevertheless  of  the  opinion  that  with  suffi- 
cient skill  and  preparation  and  with  good  judgment  an 
entrenched  firing-line  might  have  been  established  at  the 
Mance  ravine  about  GOO  meters  from  the  enemy,  and  the 
effect  of  such  a  line  garnished  with  modern  rifles  would 
have  been  no  small  one,  even  if  the  attacking  infantry  were 
compelled  to  keep  at  a  distance  of  800  meters.  Under  such 
conditions  the  fire  may  be  very  effective  against  the  skir- 
mishers as  well  as  against  the  enemy's  artillery  and  reserves. 
Much,  of  course,  will  depend  on  the  relative  elevation  of  the 
opposing  lines.  It  would  be  foolish  to  reject  entrenching 
and  long-range  fire  under  such  circumstances.  The  letter 
should  not  be  permitted  to  kill  the  spirit,  and  I  have  stated 
above  that  it  would  be  foolish  to  possess  a  long-range  fire- 
arm without  using  it  in  that  sense. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  give  here  detailed  data  on  the 
results  obtained  from  long-range  fire,  in  so  far  as  they  might 
be  established  from  German  firing  experiments.  One  fact 
I  will  mention.     In  France  the  question  of  long-range  or 


302  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

short-range  fire  is  much  more  hotly  debated  than  in  Ger- 
many, where  the  maxim  of  long-range  and  short-range 
fire,  according  to  circumstances,  has  been  adopted  long  ago. 
In  the  summer  of  1893,  in  an  experimental  firing  at  Grenoble, 
50  hits  were  scored  out  of  300  shots  at  2000  meters.  Though 
but  one-tenth  of  that  result  may  be  expected  in  war,  still,  if 
the  fire  were  continued  for  some  time,  it  might  demonstrate 
how  dangerous  infantry  may  become  to  artillery  at  very 
great  distances;  the  more  as  the  above  results  cannot  be 
called  very  good  shooting.  If  this  be  accepted  as  indis- 
putable, it  constitutes  one  more  proof  of  the  soundness  of 
my  opinion,  that  the  deployment  of  skirmishers  along  the 
entire  front  is  necessary  from  the  beginning  in  order  to  use 
our  rifles  against  every  suitable  target,  however  briefly  it 
may  be  visible.  Whether  or  not  fire  should  be  opened  at 
long  ranges  depends  to  a  great  extent  on  the  manner  in 
which  the  targets  present  themselves  to  the  attacking  in- 
fantry. The  difficulty  of  firing  with  high  sights  is  somewhat 
of  an  obstacle,  to  be  sure,  but  in  this  direction  the  tactician 
may  expect  great  improvements  before  long. 

It  is  further  laid  down  in  the  Firing  Regulations  that 
every  shot  may  be  expected  to  hit  any  target  at  250  meters, 
a  kneeling  man  at  350  meters,  a  kneeling  file  at  500  meters, 
and  a  standing  file  at  600  meters.  This,  in  connection  with 
the  power  of  penetration  and  explosive  effect  of  the  bullet, 
both  of  which  we  have  elucidated,  seems  to  me  to  fix  the  lim- 
its (namely,  600  meters)  to  which  it  will  ordinarily  be  possi- 
ble to  approach.  We  should  remember  that  the  ballistic 
qualities  of  our  model  '88  rifle  surpass  those  of  the  needle- 
gun  three  or  four  times  in  every  respect,  and  that  the  zone 
of  destructive  fire  extends  now  to  600  meters,  while  that 
of  the  needle-gun  was  200  meters. 

The  men  are  also  expected  to  be  proficient  in  estimat- 


Tactical  Deductions.  303 

ing  ranges  up  to  600  meters;  greater  stress  is  laid  on  the 
training  in  field  firing,  and  the  accuracy  of  the  model  '88 
rifle  has  also  been  greatly  increased,  all  of  which  seems  to 
indicate  that  the  fire-action  will  ordinarily  be  restricted  to 
between  600  and  300  meters.  Surgical  investigations  and 
ballistic  experiments  with  small-caliber  rifles — all,  without 
a  single  exception — lead  to  the  same  conclusion,  which  is 
confirmed  in  every  particular  by  the  smokeless  powder. 

The  Firing  Regulations  also  say  "that,  looked  at  from 
the  purely  theoretical  standpoint  of  ballistics,  columns 
would  be  much  more  exposed  at  ranges  greater  than  1,000 
meters"  (than  UneB.— Author.).  The  Regulations  do  not  draw 
that  conclusion  from  the  greater  penetration  of  the  bullet, 
but  from  the  form  of  its  trajectory,  the  angle  of  incidence, 
and  from  the  dispersion.  It  would  certainly  be  foolish  to 
leave  that  question  open  in  future  and  to  say  that  these 
are  peace  experiments,  are  not  results  gained  in  war,  and 
are  of  no,  or  of  little,  value.  In  1870  the  army  did  not  have 
the  benefit  of  all  these  private  and  official  researches  which 
we  now  have,  and  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  authori- 
ties are  making  them  known,  and  in  the  same  breath 
renouncing  their  observance  and  consideration ;  nor  do  they 
do  so,  as  appears  from  the  spirit  of  the  Firing  and  Drill 
Regulations!  Moreover,  these  things  are  not  mere  "peace\ 
experiments";  on  the  contrary,  the  researches  with  the 
new  rifle  made  in  a  scientifically  empirical  way  have  con- 
firmed to  a  high  degree  what  we  experienced  in  1870  at  the 
hands  of  the  Chassepot,  without  at  the  time  recognizing  the 
causes,  or  gaining  a  satisfactory  insight  into  the  true  inward- 
ness of  the  ballistics  of  that  rifle.  It  is  thus  the  ground  of 
war  experience  on  which  the  present  state  of  science,  and 
consequently  of  tactics,  has  grown  up  ''post  hdlum."  This 
is  the  state  of  things!     For  the  study  of  small-arm  ballistics 


304  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

was  not  generally  taken  up  until  after  1870;  it  was  based 
on  the  phenomena  of  that  war,  and  the  information  thus 
gained  has  since  been  accruing  to  the  benefit  of  tactics;  it 
would  be  plain  stupidity  to  possess  information  and  to  dis- 
regard it;  it  is  on  account  of  that  very  information  that 
training,  leading,  and  all  scientific  moral  forces  retain  their 
value  in  applying  the  results  of  research  to  the  tactics  of 
the  battle-field. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  experiments  (Firing  Regulations, 
Kegenspursky)  ascertain  that,  at  ranges  greater  than  1000 
meters,  columns  will  be  more  exposed;  and  if,  on  the  other 
hand  (Bruns.,  etc.),  the  same  bullet  will  pierce  two  or  three 
ranks  at  a  range  of  1200  meters,  we  can  but  draw  the  con- 
clusion that,  for  this  double  reason,  columns  should  not  be 
used  at  smaller  ranges  than  1000  meters  at  any  point  where 
the  enemy  hjis  a  field  of  fire  of  that  extent.  Moreover,  if  the 
researches, on  the  one  hand  (FiringRegulations), teach  that  at 
600  meters  every  shot  may  be  expected  to  hit  a  standing 
file,  and  if,  on  the  other  hand  (Bruns.,  etc.),  it  is  shown  that  at 
ranges  of  300  to  400  meters  the  same  bullet  will  penetrate 
3  to  4  ranks,  and  that  at  about  300  meters  the  wounds  begin 
to  be  very  severe,  we  may  conclude  from  both  conditions  that 
coluransare  inapplicable  at  these  rangesbecause  trebling  and 
quadrupling  the  losses.  No  data  are  available  in  this  respect 
for  ranges  between  600  and  1000  meters,  but  it  is  safe  to 
assume  that  they  are  similar,  and  that  movements  of  columns 
and  closed  lines  are  things  of  the  past  at  all  ranges,  and  the 
better  we  take  that  to  heart  the  less  will  be  our  disappoint- 
ment. Within  1200  meters  but  one  formation  remains  ap- 
propriate for  movement,  the  single-rank,  ojien  lines;  and  it 
should  also  be  the  endeavor  not  to  incur  the  disadvantages 
of  the  open  column,  since  open  lines,  unless  they  fol- 
low each  other  opposite  the  intervals,  are  in  fact  nothing 


Tactical  Deductions.  305 

but  open  columns  with  a  considerable  distance  between 
ranks.  It  is  not  expected  that  these  things  can  be  done  in 
war  just  as  is  demanded  here;  but  every  officer  should  be 
fully  informed  about  them  before  going  to  war,  and  then 
he  will  at  least  try  to  help  himself  with  sensible  means  as 
best  he  can.  All  difficulties  cannot  be  removed  in  this  way, 
nor  should  the  military  man  strive  for  that,  as  it  would  no 
longer  be  war,  but  a  mechanical  arrangement  governed  by 
Regulations. 

V.     Of  the  Extent  of  Ground  in  Battle,  of  Control,  and  of  the 

"Treffen." 

No  maxim  established  by  experience  is  so  much  sinned 
against  in  peace  as  that  applying  to  the  extent  of  front  of  the 
various  units.  The  peace  exercises  with  units  of  compara- 
tively low  strength,  and  our  detachment  tactics  assisted  by 
the  task  system,  minister  to  this  evil,  which,  however,  is 
common  to  all  armies.  This  evil  harbors  grave  dangers,  since 
we  do  in  war  what  we  have  practiced  in  peace,  and  if  every 
leader,  from  that  of  the  division  down  to  that  of  the  com- 
pany, were  accustomed  in  time  of  peace  to  extend  his  front 
according  to  circumstances — i.  e.,  ''at  pleasure" — to  use  the 
terrain  as  he  pleases  in  order  to  escape  a  frontal  action  by 
means  of  turning  movements,  overlapping  and  outflank- 
ing, we  could  not  be  certain  that  the  prescribed  limits  of 
front  would  be  observed  in  pitched  battle,  that  the  troops 
would  be  at  the  spot  where  the  leader  wants  to  have  them. 
The  resulting  conditions  would  be  much  like  those  at  Grave- 
lotte  (right  wing  and  center,  etc.) — i.  e.,  there  would  be  no 
development  of  front.  But,  in  the  pitched  battle,  the  allotted 
spaces  are  the  only  conspicuous  bounded  posts  for  all 
troop-leading  of  the  higher  and  lower  kind;  they  should  be 
strictly  maintained  in  order  that  tactics  may  not  be  at  the 


306  Itiqtiiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

mercy  of  boundless  license.  It  follows  as  a  simple  logically 
tactical  and  juditial  sequence  that  in  such  an  event  no 
leader  caji  be  held  responsible  for  the  accomplishment  of 
his  task. 

Task,  space,  ground,  and  strength  of  troops  are  closely 
connected — /.  c,  a  battle  order  should  invariably  harmonize 
>Ni(h  the  three  last  i)oints;  and  leaders  and  troops  should 
be  practiced  in  lighting  itfraight  to  the  front  within  the 
assigned  space,  and  in  fully  utilizing  all  existing  cover. 
Lateral  displacements  may  be  made,  but  only  within 
the  limit  of  front  of  each  unit,  not  within  the  space 
allotteil  to  the  whole  fon-e,  or  beyond.  The  evil  resembles 
a  disease;  and  the  disease  has  si>rung  from  fear  of  the 
frontal  action.  We  must  relearn,  in  the  lirst  place,  how  to 
tight  the  frontal  action  with  masses;  which  is  impossible 
unless  the  proper  extent  of  front  is  observed,  as  otherwise  all 
tactical  landmarks,  as  regards  space,  distribution  of  troops, 
and  tlie  direction  within  that  space,  are  wiped  out. 

The  front  of  the  brigade  should  never  exceed  1400 
meters  except  under  urgent  necessity — i.  e.,  when  it  is  in- 
tended to  outtlank  the  enemy  or  nuike  a  turning  move- 
ment; and  since  we  are  here  concerned  only  with  the  pitche<l 
battle,  such  cases  will  be  exceptional.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  sjHH'ify  the  maximum  depth  of  the  formation,  because 
that  depends  chietly  on  the  ground,  which  varies  greatly. 
Assuming  a  maximum  distance  of  250  meters  between  the 
supporting  lines,  the  average  depth  of  the  formation  of  a 
brigade  will  be  about  1200  meters;  under  certain  circum- 
stances it  may  be  much  less;  all  battle  tactics  have  to 
reckon  with  that  amount  of  front  and  depth. 

The  modern  task  system  leads  to  non-observance  of  the 
limits  of  front  and  depth;  the  troops  are  thrown  into  the 
fight  in  driblets,  the  tactical  object  is  placed  in  jeopardy. 


Tactical  Deductions.  307 

hence  also  the  control  of  the  action;  the  combination  of 
these  diHadvantagcH  may  render  the  task  system  fatal,  and, 
in  the  absence  of  prompt  readiness  for  action,  the  system 
may  be  instrumental  in  preventing  the  desired  tactical  bene- 
fit from  being  derived  from  the  initiative  of  the  subordinate 
leaders.  It  will  not  always  be  practicable  to  evade  all  dan- 
ger, but  the  most  effective  remedy  no  doubt  \\c^  in  the  con- 
trol of  brigade  action. 

In  the  formation  by  wings  the  regiment  has  a  front  of 
700  meters,  the  battalion  of  'ioO  meters,  4  battalions  being 
required  from  the  beginning  for  the  firing  lines  and  sup- 
ports, and  two  in  reserve.  This  nee<l  not  necessarily 
yxt  BO,  however;  it  is  merely  one  of  the  possible  cases, 
but  may  be  recommended  for  all  frontal  actions.  Circum- 
stances due  to  the  ground,  the  object  of  the  action,  or 
the  tactical  object,  may  make  a  departure  from  the  rule 
advisable,  though  it  will  probably  be  rare  in  serious  frontal 
actions.  A  battalion  may  find  it  advisable  to  deploy  at  once 
an  entire  company  as  skirmishers  covering  its  front,  though 
it  probably  would  ordinarily  deploy  a  full  platoon  each  from 
two  or  three  companies;  never  from  all  four  companif^, 
because,  aside  from  other  obje<;tions,  the  initiative  of  the 
subordinates,  which  up  to  the  assault  manifests  itself  chiefly 
in  the  skillful  use  of  the  ground,  would  thereby  be  consid- 
erably restricted,  if  not  renderft<l  wholly  impossible.  Two 
or  three  comi>anies  will  ordinarily  be  best,  each  company 
thus  having  a  fighting  front  of  175  and  115  meters  respect- 
ively. This  space  is  somewhat  large,  but,  for  the  sake  of 
the  initiative  of  the  subordinate  leaders,  it  is  expressly 
insisted  upon  in  the  controlled  system.  With  three  com- 
panies we  would  have  three  open  lines;  the  second  and  third 
lines  would  not  be  restricted  as  to  distance  Cmaximurn,  2.50 
metersj,  nor  as  to  formation  (^open  lines,  small,  closed,  dou- 


308  Inquiries  inio  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ble-rank  column  of  files  or  soetions),  nor  as  to  pace  (walk, 
double  time,  rushes,  stoopinjx,  creeping).  In  all  of  these 
things  the  subordinate  leaders  should  be  given  full  freedom 
and  the  bfittalion  commaiidei*s  should  chiefly  look  to  the 
observance  of  the  allotted  spaces  and  to  the  unity  of  action 
— not  uniformity  of  means  employed  by  their  companies — 
and  see  that  their  companies  do  not  transgress  the  limits 
assigned  to  the  brigade.  It  is  not  necessary  to  state  that 
there  will  be  a  limit  even  to  these  arrangements. 

The  means  to  be  adopted  for  maintaining  unity  of 
action  and  for  gaining  the  object  of  the  action  will  vary 
with  the  ground.  How  the  4th  company  of  each  battalio^n 
is  to  be  employed,  whether  in  open  line  or  in  two  or  three 
lines  with  full  distances,  depends  on  circumstances  and 
the  question  as  to  where  the  company  is  needed.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  battalions  in  reserve,  for  the  employ- 
ment of  which  the  tactical  object  is  chiefly  decisive.  To  give 
them  the  right  start  and  to  lead  them  is  more  difficult  than 
under  former  tactics,  but  the  steady  forward  movement  is 
still  characteristic  of  the  attack;  to  be  sure,  not  an  uninter- 
rupted advance,  as  formerly,  for  the  final  assault,  but  by 
many  stages,  successively,  as  illustrated  by  the  beautiful 
example  of  Colonel  von  Wechmar  (see  Kunz,  "The  Action 
of  Nuits").  However  difficult  it  may  be  to  combine  an 
early  development  of  a  strong  firing  line,  sufficient  freedom 
for  the  subordinate  leaders  in  utilizing  the  terrain,  the  sub- 
jection of  the  enemy  to  fire  along  his  entire  front,  unity 
of  action  within  the  limits  of  the  allotted  space,  and  the  sup- 
port of  the  firing  line  from  the  rear  by  detachments  suitably 
formed  for  delivering  their  fire  and  escaping  that  of  the 
enemy  (open  line),  still,  this  method  would  guarantee  at 
least  some  degree  of  consideration  for  all  these  points.  We 
thus  would  preserve  the  initiative  of  the  subordinate  lead- 


Tactical  Deductions.  309 

ers  and  unity  in  the  actual  battle  within  the  brigade;  the 
control  would  lie  with  the  sui>orior  leaders  up  to  the  moment 
of  the  final  rush,  and  would  not  pass  to  the  subordinate 
leaders  until  then. 

I  consider  the  mixing  of  platoons  within  the  company, 
of  comjianies  within  the  battalion,  and  of  battalions  within 
the  regiment,  so  self-evident  and  (to-day)  so  unimportant 
a  matter  that,  although  some  attention  must  be  paid  to  it, 
it  can  never  be  decisive.  All  men  of  the  regiment  should 
know  how  to  fight  within  these  limits,  no  matter  where  they 
stand  or  who  commands  them.  In  frontal  actions  it  may 
happen  that  the  brigades  of  one  and  perhaps  of  two  divi- 
sions will  have  to  fight  on  about  the  same  ground;  even  then 
the  mixing  of  several  regiments  should  not  interfere  with 
unity  of  action.  The  chief  consideration  in  every  attack 
is  a  prompt  development  of  the  heaviest  possible  fire,  or. 
in  other  words,  the  greater  part  of  the  unit  should  from 
the  beginning  be  properly  proportioned  for  that  purpose, 
thrown  into  the  fight,  and  kept  in  sufficient  numerical 
strength  for  completing  the  action.  To-day  the  firing  line 
of  the  infantry  is  much  in  the  same  position  as  the  first  line 
of  the  cavalry.  What  the  first  line  fails  to  accomj)lish 
will  hardly  be  accomplished  by  the  second  or  third;  ITence 
the  first  line  should  be  made  as  strong  as  possible;  for 
the  decision  of  the  infantry  action  rests  to-day  to  a  cer- 
tain degree  with  the  firing  line;  the  stronger  the  latter,  the 
better.  Kifles  not  actively  employed  are  useless;  and  the 
small-caliber  rifle  calls  for  a  tactical  use  differing  from 
that  of  the  flintlock. 

The  statement  that  it  is  wrong  and  impracticable  to 
assign  to  a  company  a  front  of  175  or  115  meters,  because 
it  would  not  admit  of  observation  and  control  by  one  man, 
may  be  met  by  the  reply,  that  since  the  introduction  of 


310  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

smokeless  powder  it  does  admit  of  sufficient  observation, 
the  ground  also  permitting,  which  was  not  the  case  for- 
merly. In  that  respect,  therefore,  the  small-caliber  rifle  is 
instrumental  in  enlarging  the  extent  of  ground  for  suh- 
ordinate  leading.  As  regards  leading  under  fire,  we  should 
rather  place  our  expectations  too  low  than  too  high.  Ac- 
cording to  my  war  experience,  the  term  "leading"  is  justified 
only  for  the  group;  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  to  do  what  is  best 
at  the  time.  Every  larger  unit  will  naturally  get  beyond  the 
pale  of  its  leader;  he  has  no  influence  beyond  his  immediate 
vicinity.  Cooperation  of  groups  is  practicable  only  through 
the  cooperation  of  their  leaders  with  platoon  leaders;  coop- 
eration of  the  platoons  is  practicable  only  through  cooper- 
ation of  their  leaders  with  the  company  leader;  beyond 
which  nothing  is  to  be  expected  in  the  firing  line.  Every 
attack  movement  therefore  requires  in  the  first  place  effi- 
cient group  and  platoon  leaders.  It  is  not  impossible  that 
several  platoons,  abreast,  may  move  together,  if  they  have 
learned  in  peace  how  to  do  it  and  if  front  and  direction  are 
fixed  for  the  particular  case,  which  is  not  a  difficult  matter. 

I  believe,  however,  that  these  tactics  will  make  it  nec- 
essary to  increase  the  extent  of  ground  allowed  for  a  bri- 
gade, and  I  have  therefore  assumed  a  front  of  1400  meters, 
and  that  the  ground  allowed  to  a  division  will  be  somewhat 
diminished,  while  that  of  the  army  corps  will  remain  as 
it  now  is — i.  e.,  1400,  2100,  4000  meters.  It  is  simply  due  to 
the  absolute  necessity  of  fighting  in  deep  formation,  to  the 
great  losses  of  the  firing  line,  and  to  the  endeavor  to  pre- 
serve the  strongest  possible  frontal  firing  line. 

How  many  of  their  own  men  did  the  company  com- 
manders have  with  them  at  the  final  rush  on  Froschweiler, 
St.  Privat,  Loigny,  notwithstanding  the  tactics  then  pre- 
vailing?    Perhaps  10  or  12!     All  the  rest  belonged  to  other 


Tactical  Deductions.  311 

companies.  Why  should  we  strive  for  something  which 
exi)erienee  has  proven  to  be  impracticable?  Cohesion  and 
cooperation  are  two  different  things.  Organization  by  divi- 
sion, brigade,  regiment,  battalion,  and  company  is  needed 
for  the  deployment  and  forming  for  action;  for  the  actual 
conflict  we  only  need  groups  that  can  be  led.  They  are 
restricted  to  the  space  of  the  regiment;  their  unit  is  the 
regiment;  no  formalities  are  required  for  closing  them 
together,  the  sole  consideration  being  the  faculty  to  gain 
and  exert  suflScient  power  for  the  assault.  This  is  regu- 
lated by  the  distribution  of  the  leaders;  the  soldier  obeys 
the  nearest  leader,  no  matter  whether  he  knows  him  or  not. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  point  out  the  difficulty  of  preserv- 
ing unity  of  action,  because  every  case  will  require  a 
particular  method.  The  difficulty  and  difference  lie  chiefly 
in  the  variety  of  ground  of  a  battle-field,  and  here  lies 
the  strongest  objection  to  the  so-called  "normal  attack."  It 
will  indeed  be  the  exception  when  the  leaders  have  acquired 
sufficient  information  of  the  ground,  about  to  be  entered 
upon  by  their  units,  by  personal  observations;  still  the  infor- 
mation will  enable  the  leaders  to  form  a  general  idea  and  to 
give  sufficiently  clear  orders  to  their  subordinates.  The 
enemy's  action  also  increases  the  difficulties  of  unity  of 
action,  for  it  may  bring  surprises,  as  the  conformation  of  the 
ground  on  which  the  action  is  to  be  fought  sometimes  does. 
The  "finer  work"  in  preserving  unity  of  action  therefore  rests 
on  the  leaders  of  all  grades  below  the  brigade  commander. 

We  are  thus  using  a  combination  of  the  task  system 
and  of  the  unity-of-action  system  and  fixing  the  maximum 
limits  alone,  in  order  to  have  the  conditions  requisite  for 
the  initiative  within  a  space  which  is  still  quite  considera- 
ble. Between  the  mere  ditch  and  the  steeply  sloping  hill, 
between  the  hedge  and  the  dense  wood,  there  may  be  a  great 


312  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

variance  that  will  naturally  affect  the  advance.  The  differ- 
ences of  elevation  may  be  very  great  and  the  heights  may  be 
near  together  or  far  apart;  obstacles  and  concealment  of  the 
most  various  kinds  and  unknown  to  the  brigade  com- 
mander will  be  found  on  the  ground,  and  yet  under  the 
unity-of -action  system  it  is  one  of  the  foremost  duties  of  the 
initiative  of  the  subordinate  leaders  to  seize  and  utilize 
them.  The  formations  for  the  movement  which  are  to 
secure  unity  of  action  will  therefore  vary  greatly,  and  in 
that  respect  absolute  freedom  should  be  conceded  to  the  tac- 
tical judgment  of  the  subordinate  leaders.  It  is  immate- 
rial whether  it  will  look  well  and  whether  it  will  result  in 
a  precise  geometrical  figure  or  not,  so  long  as  the  irregular- 
ity of  formation  is  adapted  to  the  momentary  tactical  im- 
portance of  the  terrain,  I  use  the  term  "momentary"  inten- 
tionally, in  order  to  make  it  understood,  that  for  the  various, 
sometimes  very  prolonged  moments,  corresponding  meas- 
ures are  required  from  the  same  troops.  Every  tactician 
should  ask  himself,  in  the  first  place:  Can  I  see? — i.  e.,  see 
a  piece  of  ground  as  it  ought  to  be  seen  by  the  tactician.  A 
clever  critic  once  characterized  the  art  of  painting  of  some 
great  nation  as  defective,  because  the  nation  no  longer  knew 
how  to  see.  The  antagonism  against  unity  of  action  springs 
perhaps  from  the  fact  that  the  terrain  is  too  much  looked 
upon  as  uniform  and  its  level  parts  only  are  considered. 

But  the  unity-of-action  system  should  never  go  so  far 
as  to  demand  uniformity  of  formation.  According  to  my 
observation,  this  uniformity  has  been  developed  by  the 
task  system  to  a  degree  that  is  inharmonious  and  was  not 
contemplated  by  its  former  advocates,  of  which  I  am  one. 
There  are  no  definite  prescriptions  laid  down;  it  is  perhaps 
for  that  very  reason  that  a  normal  svstem  has  been  formu- 


Tactical  Deductions.  313 

lated.  I  conclude  therefrom  that  the  subordinates  are  either 
not  conceded  the  freedom  required  in  the  skirmish  fight  of 
masses,  or  that  they  do  not  know  how  to  use  it.  Tac- 
tical individualization  of  the  men  is  not  suflScient;  indi- 
vidualization of  the  leaders,  particularly  of  the  subordinate 
leaders,  should  be  more  cultivated  than  heretofore.  It  is 
^Iso  clear  that  when  the  brigade  is  formed  by  wings,  as  laid 
down  in  the  Regulations,  the  wing  should  in  turn  be  given 
that  tactical  freedom  within  the  suggested  maximum  limits 
of  space  which  the  circumstances  demand;  never,  however, 
neglecting  to  strive  for  the  best  cooperation  permitted  by  the 
terrain.  The  movement  will  therefore  take  place  in  many 
different  forms. 

I  am  aware  that  my  ideas  on  the  extent  of  front  will 
provoke  a  dispute,  since  therein  lie-s  the  germ  of  everything 
that  is  of  importance  for  the  infantry  attack.  Some  will 
say  that  the  front  is  too  extended  and  will  reject  the  result- 
ing "thin"  skirmish  line;  the  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages of  "thin"  and  "thick"  skirmish  lines  will  be  further  dis- 
cussed; some  will  say  that  my  suggestion  promotes  the  mix- 
ing of  units  and  that  the  celebrated  "closing  together"  (Zu- 
sammenschliessen)  is  impracticable.  I  reply:  That  is  theory 
grown  gray,  and  I  appeal  to  the  judgment  of  men  with  war 
experience  who  have  witnessed  stubborn  fire-actions. 

In  carrying  out  the  action — i.  e.,  in  all  stages  from  the 
opening  of  fire  to  the  final  rush — none  but  line  formations 
are  practicable,  except  in  case  of  the  reserve:  there  we  do 
not  reckon  either  with  platoons,  companies,  or  battalions; 
knowing  that  mixing  of  units  is  unavoidable,  we  should  from 
the  first  make  every  preparation  for  fighting  with  mixed 
units,  and  by  carrying  this  rule  to  its  logical  conclusion  we 
shall  learn  how  to  control  the  disorder  when  everything  is 
intermingled.       This  is  the  character  of  the  horde  system. 

21 


314  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

It  calls,  in  the  first  place,  for  space — space  for  keeping  the 
enemy's  front  busy  and  for  concealment  of  the  lines  in 
rear;  space  for  the  freedom  of  subordinate  leaders  in  utiliz- 
ing the  ground;  space  for  passing  from  a'^thin"  to  the  ''thick" 
skirmish  line;  in  one  word,  for  bringing  up  the  supports 
before  the  final  rush  to  the  principal  firing  point. 

This  is  best  accomplished  by  using  from  the  first  de- 
ployed companies  abreast  of  each  other.  To  permit  proper 
freedom  in  the  attack,  the  companies  should  from  the  begin- 
ning have  that  extent  of  front  which  is  assigned  them  in 
the  subdivision  of  the  brigade  space.  After  that,  we  may 
take  up  the  consideration  of  initiative  in  the  method  of 
advancing  (creeping,  rushing,  double  time,  accelerated  pace) 
and  of  the  use  of  the  ground;  space  is  the  prerequisite  for 
the  indispensable  freedom  of  the  subordinate  leaders.  If  a 
different  method  be  adopted  or  the  front  be  diminished,  the 
use  of  the  ground  will  under  certain  circumstances  be 
reduced  to  zero.  How  could  utilization  of  the  ground  be 
expected,  if  there  were  no  room  for  permissible  lateral  dis- 
placements? I  have  conceded  that  a  company  deployed  as 
skirmishers  cannot  be  controlled  by  one  man.  But  all  men 
and  all  leaders  may  be  assigned  a  preliminary  objective  of 
attack  toward  which  to  w^ork.  The  idea  of  having  the  skir- 
mishers advance  in  a  well-dressed  line  should  be  scouted. 
To  enable  the  subordinate  leaders  to  utilize  the  ground  and 
the  situation,  there  must  be  a  difference  of  level  in  every  line 
throughout  the  depth  of  the  brigade;  and  some  portions  of  it 
will  be  able  to  advance  more  rapidly  than  others.  Nor  will 
it  be  possible  for  one  man  to  lead  a  whole  platoon  as  by  a 
string;  its  front  is  too  extended  for  that;  but  it  may  be  done 
with  groups  of  not  exceeding  ten  men,  particularly  when  it 
is  practiced  rigorously  in  time  of  peace  and  when  the  leaders, 
from  that  of  the  company  down  to  that  of  the  group,  keep 


Tactical  Deductions.  3 1 5 

up  some  alignment  on  each  other — like  markers,  as  it  were. 
More  than  this  cannot  be  implied  in  the  term  "controlled" 
advance.  It  is  necessary,  however,  that  in  peace  exercises 
the  flanks  of  the  brigade  be  conspicuously  marked. 

The  same  freedom  which  I  claim  for  the  first  (open)  line 
must  likewise  be  conceded  to  every  line  in  rear.  The  latter 
may  find  it  proper  to  change  from  the  open  line  when  cir- 
cumstances make  it  advisable.  Within  certain  limits  it 
should  also  be  permissible  to  accelerate  the  movement  tem- 
porarily and  to  make  the  line  denser  in  order  to  quicklj^  seize 
favorable  points  in  front,  without  regard  to  the  alignment  of 
the  whole  line;  I  am  convinced  that  every  maneuver  offers 
opportunities  for  demonstrating  the  practicability  of  this 
method  of  attack. 

Assuming  the  front  of  a  brigade  formed  by  wings  (i.  e., 
the  two  regiments  side  by  side. — Tr.)  as  1400  meters  in  round 
numbers,  and  limiting  the  maximum  distances  between  lines 
to  250  meters,  the  depth  of  the  formation  would  be  750 
meters.  Adding  to  this  600  meters  as  the  distance  from  the 
enem}',  the  total  depth  of  ground  would  be  1350  meters, 
which  is  not  too  great  for  the  brigade  commander  to  keep 
under  observation. 

Again,  we  should  have  the  right  idea  of  the  so-called 
leading  on  the  ijart  of  subordinate  leaders.  What  we  see 
in  time  of  peace  will  in  most  cases  be  found  impracticable  in 
war.  When  black  powder  was  in  use,  it  sometimes  hap- 
pened that  the  influence  of  the  subordinate  leaders  was  re- 
stricted to  the  men  in  their  immediate  neighborhood;  smoke- 
less powder  has  brought  an  improvement  in  that  respect, 
but  the  best  guarantee  for  the  leading  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  mechanical  delimitation  of  the  distances;  it  rests  in  the 
tactical  education  and  training  of  the  subordinate  leaders 
and  of  the  men ;  and  particularly  in  a  courageous  though  pru- 


310  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

dent  advaiu'o  with  strict  imitual  attonlion  of  loaders  and 
men.  In  the  fii'st  place,  (he  develoinnont  of  stronj*-  skir- 
mish lines  from  the  start  makes  it  possible  to  lake  the 
defender's  entire  front  under  fire,  and  not  only  will  the 
assailant  ])roduce  a  jjreater  elTect  from  the  bejiinninj;-,  but 
when  companies  and  battalions  become  mixed,  a  certain 
degree  of  evenness  in  the  distribution  of  the  leaders  along 
the  entire  firinjij  line  can  be  arranjjjed  from  the  rear.  With- 
out such  a.  distribution  of  the  leaders — not  according  to 
units,  to  which  they  belong,  but  according  to  tactical  require- 
ments— no  superiority  of  fire  will  ever  be  gained.  We  can- 
not dispense  witli  this  disposition  of  the  subordinate  lead- 
ers, and  it  cannot  be  arranged  except  from  the  rear  and  with 
the  help  of  an  advance  of  fresh  troops. 

The  ease  will  indeed  be  rare  when  all  four  brigades  of 
the  army  corps  will  be  ranged  side  by  side  with  a  front  of 
1400  meters  for  each.  These  limits  become  somewhat  dimin- 
ished inasmuch  as  the  divisional  command  becomes  to  a 
certain  degree  a  regulator  within  the  army  corps.  As  a 
general  rule,  2100  meters  would  be  assumed  for  the  division, 
including  its  artillery;  on  the  flanks  the  front  will  probably 
become  extended,  but  we  cannot  give  figures  here;  the  force 
of  circumstances  decides  all  that;  but  the  extension  of  the 
front  should  be  a  limited  one,  and  an  army  corps  should  not 
occupy  more  than  4000  meters. 

In  fixing  the  space  for  it,  a  company  is  assumed 
to  number  200  rifles  in  round  numbers.  It  will  thus  find 
numy  o]>portunities  for  exercising  a  freedom  in  the  use 
of  ground,  but  above  all,  the  relatively  large  front  makes 
it  possible  for  the  supports  to  follow  opposite  the  gaps 
Avhere  they  are  later  on  to  come  into  action;  this  is  very 
important. 

We  recommend  250  meters  as  the  maximum  distance 


Tactical  Deductions.  317 

for  the  8uj>porting  lines;  it  may  be  possible,  however,  to 
shorten  the  distance,  which  would  be  the  duty  of  the  leaders 
of  the  lines,  and  to  relinquish  the  sinj^le-rank,  o[>en  line, 
where  the  ground  permits.  Kince  the  distances  for  close- 
range  fire  between  the  opponents  has  become  much  greater, 
and  lies  ordinarily  between  000  and  300  meters,  and  since,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  firing  line  has  derived  increased  powers 
of  resistance  from  the  improvements  of  arms  and  the  greater 
effcH:t  of  artillery,  the  maximum  limit  of  250  meters  can- 
not endanger  the  promptness  of  SJipport  from  the  lines  in 
rear.  Good  troops  are  not  going  to  run  when  a  counter- 
attack develops;  by  the  time  the  counter-attack  does  take 
place,  we  may  be  sure  the  foremost  supporting  lines  will  be 
up  before  the  distance  between  the  hostile  yjarties  has  been 
r(:^luced  to  300  meters;  in  most  cases  the  second  line  of  sup- 
ports would  arrive  in  good  time,  and  sometimes  the  third. 

The  real  difficulties  begin  at  GOO  meters  from  the  ene- 
my's skirmish  line.  The  principal  work  will  then  have  to 
be  left  to  the  subordinate  leaders,  the  superior  leaders  at- 
tending chiefly  to  the  employment  of  the  reserve.  The  lat- 
ter may  be  held  as  far  as  .oOO  meters  in  rear  of  the  rearmost 
line  of  supports.  In  the  course  of  the  action  it  may  be 
brought  up  closer,  but  only  by  order  of  the  brigade  com- 
mander, and  when  advancing  to  the  decisive  assault  it 
should  traverse  the  distance  witiiout  halt  and  in  suita- 
ble formation,  as  did  Htarkloff's  Wiirtemberg  Brigade  at 
Froschweiler. 

The  demand  for  such  development  is  basf^d  on  three 
grounds:  1,  in  order  to  have  the  enemy's  entire  front  under 
fire  from  the  beginning;  2,  in  order  to  fix  the  direction  of  the 
attack  beyond  doubt;  3,  in  order  to  bring  up  supports,  insert 
them  in  the  front, and  redistributethe  leaders  in  thf-most  nat- 
ural way.  which  will,  as  a  rule,  be  straight  to  the  front.    The 


318  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

open  formation  and  great  distances  are  necessary  on  account 
of  the  low  trajector}^  and  great  penetration  of  the  bullets. 
It  may  not  always  be  possible  to  prevent  two  men  from  being 
directly  in  rear  of  each  other  somewhere  in  the  space  of  1350 
meters,  but  in  most  places  there  will  be  but  one  man  as  a  tar- 
get. -  On  large  battle-fields  and  within  the  depth  of  formation 
assumed,  much  cover  will  befound  that  will  have  to  be  utilized, 
although  it  will  not  guard  the  lines  in  rear  from  all  loss;  but 
who  would  expect  that?  This  fighting  with  great  depth  of 
formation  has  the  further  great  advantage,  that  the  indi- 
vidual lines  may  be  developed  for  action,  undisturbed,  be- 
yond the  great  danger  zone  and  in  the  order  best  suited  for 
their  subsequent  employment.  No  other  method  permits 
of  this,  least  of  all  the  ravine  theory.  Unless  the  fire-front 
is  from  the  beginning  equal  in  extent  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
a  successful  opening  of  fire  and  promoting  it  to  superior- 
ity of  fire  are  impossible.  These  reasons  combined  call 
imperatively  for  a  full  development  of  front  from  the  begin- 
ning. This  method,  moreover,  safeguards  to  the  brigade 
commander  an  indispensable  control  in  action  without 
depriving  the  subordinate  leaders  of  the  freedom  to  take 
their  detachments  farther  to  the  front  under  certain  circum- 
stances— i.  e.,  without  depriving  them  of  their  initiative. 
It  is  unavoidable  that  the  firing  line  when  halted  should 
be  more  open  in  some  places  than  in  others,  but  by  no  other 
means  than  those  stated  can  the  entire  front  of  the  enemy  be 
continuously  and  early  brought  under  fire.  The  single-rank, 
open  line  is  therefore  to  be  the  formation  for  movement  as 
well  as  for  fire,  whenever  other  forms  are  inapplicable. 
Unity  of  action  would  thus  be  preserved,  and  it  should  be 
preserved,  at  least  until  the  several  subordinate  leaders 
make  their  initiative  more  and  more  felt  from  the  first  firing- 
X»oint,  which  will  ordinarily  be  600  meters  from  the  enemv, 


Tactical  Deductions.  Bid 

and  until  the  brigade  commander  in  turn  makes  preparation 
for  the  decisive  moment  by  correctly  timing  the  advance  of 
the  reserve. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  advancing  in  such  open  lines 
has  its  disadvantages,  but  thej  may  be  minimized  by  mak- 
ing the  swarms  within  each  platoon  as  small  as  possible,  not 
to  exceed  10  men,  and  by  training  subordinate  leaders  and 
men  to  advance  straight  to  the  front  without  stop,  so  as  to 
preserve  the  general  direction  by  means  of  unremitting 
attention  and  mutual  intelligent  cooperation.  The  further 
disadvantage  of  the  mixing  of  units  of  different  battalions 
(reserve  included)  should  not  deter  us.  It  may  be  somewhat 
diminished  by  a  suitable  deployment,  depending  on  circum- 
stances, but  beyond  that  the  men  of  the  same  regiment  should 
have  lio  difficulty  in  fighting  although  completely  mixed  from 
the  first  firing-station  to  the  princii)al  station.  Every  man 
is  to  obey  the  nearest  leader ;  these  leaders  are  not  restricted 
to  certain  places  or  troops;  they  should  distribute  themselves 
around,  should  mutually  observe  one  another,  and  see  to  it 
that  the  thread  between  the  men  and  their  leaders  does  not 
break.  Such  training  will  moreover  lay  the  foundation  for 
the  subsequently  indispensable  spontaneous  action  of  the 
subordinate  leaders. 

There  would  be  some  danger  in  this  method  of  advanc- 
ing over  long  distances,  if  the  advance  were  made  by  rushes. 
The  number  of  skulkers — i.  e.,  of  rifles  lost — might  become 
considerable;  hence  it  is  sound  to  remain  as  long  in  motion 
as  possible,  and  not  to  make  the  first  halt  farther  than  600 
meters  from  the  enemy  as  a  rule. 

What  has  been  stated  suffices  to  show  that  the  pre- 
ponderance gained  by  the  defense  from  a  previously  occu- 
pied, selected,  and  specially  prepared  position  vindicates 
Clausewitz,  who  has  been  subject  to  much  attack  on  that 


320  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

point.     It  is  nevertheless  necessary  to  add  the  tactical  fo 
the  strategical  offensive  in  order  to  conquer  the  enemy. 

"An  attack  pushed  home  with  determination  will 
always  succeed,"  say  the  Regulations. 

This  cannot  mean  the  attacks  of  single  isolated  com- 
panies and  battalions  under  favorable  circumstances;  such, 
for  instance,  as  covered  approach  as  far  as  the  enemy's 
position  or  concealment  by  fog,  II.  and  F.— 57th  at  La 
Garionni^re  January  7,  1871;  I.,  II. — 57th  at  Reaune  on 
the  afternoon  of  November  28th;  II. — 56th  at  La  Tuil^rie 
on  the  evening,*  or  the  numerous  attacks  on  advanced  posts; 
the  context  indicates  that  the  attack  of  large  units — i.  e., 
of  brigades — in  the  pitched  battle  is  meant.  In  that  case 
control  is  all  the  more  necessary,  because  without  it  an 
attack  cannot  be  "carried  forward  with  determination." 
Since  we  were  unacquainted  with  any  "suitable  method  of 
control"  in  1870-71,  many  attacks  failed  (Worth,  front; 
Mance  ravine). 

At  Spicheren  the  attack  was  carried  to  the  enemy's 

line  at  several  points  by  companies  and  platoons,  which 

were  fighting  a  kind  of  soldiers'  battle;  they  labored  for 

hours  through  the  cut-up  ground  with  great  perseverance 

and  disregard,  and   gained  the  victory  by  their  superior 

morale.      Nor    is   this   controverted   by    General    Francois' 

attack,  because,  after  it  once  started,  it  also  degenerated 

gradually  into  a  soldiers'  battle,  the  general  succeeding  in 

getting  but  one  battalion  to  the  spot  where  he  wanted  his 

whole  brigade.     We  might  also  quote  some  very  fine  attacks 

of  fresh  brigades  in  the  pitched  battle;  for  instance,  the 

attack  of  Starkloff's  Wiirtemburg  Brigade  on  Froschweiler 

♦The  prevailing  account  of  the  capture  of  La  Tuil^rie  is 
Incorrect.  The  position  was  actually  captured  by  3d  and  4th — 17th. 
It  was  only  after  its  capture  that  Captain  Montbard  arrived  with 
II. — 56th  and  informed  the  leaders  of  3d  and  4th — 17th.  First  Lieu- 
tenant Casimir  and  Captain  von  Reichenau,  that  "his  orders  were 
to  relieve  these  troops." 


Tactical  Deductions.  321 

(Worth,  August  Gth),  that  of  the  33d  Brigade  on  Loigny,  etc. 
(December  2, 1870),  and  of  the  Saxons  against  Ste.  Marie  and 
St.  Privat  (north)  on  the  18th  of  August.  Here  also  belongs 
the  attack  of  the  3d  Division  on  the  second  day  of  Villiers,  of 
the  38th  Brigade  at  Mars-la-Tour,  and  that  of  Colonel  von 
Wechmar  at  Nuits. 

The  statement  is  therefore  fully  justified,  since  any 
troops  may  be  called  on  for  such  service;  hence  the  will  to 
close  with  the  enemy  should  be  developed  in  every  indi- 
vidual soldier  by  peace  training,  and  the  same  thing  is  nec- 
essary for  various  onslaughts  in  the  course  of  a  battle. 
Wherever  the  attack  succeeded,  the  brigades  had  developed 
their  full  fronts  from  the  beginning  (Worth,  XI.  Army 
Corps,  Starkloff's  Brigade;  Ste.  Marie,  St.  Privat  (north), 
Loignj).  Wherever  the  attack  failed  the  ravine  theory 
(VIII.,  VII.,  II.  Army  Corps)  prevented  deployment  or  the 
troops  were  employed  on  the  modern  task  system  (IX. 
Corps).  It  may  be  assumed  that  in  future  as  many  attacks 
will  be  unsuccessful  as  have  been  in  the  past;  hence  the  fol- 
lowing should  also  be  demanded:  ''When  the  attack  fails 
to  reach  the  enemy  at  once,  it  is  the  duty  of  leaders  and 
men  to  hold  the  ground  gained,  and  as  long  as  the  troops 
have  ammunition  they  should,  in  such  situations,  success- 
fully repulse  the  enemy's  attacks."  Unless  the  attack  is 
made  contrary  to  tactical  requirements  as  regards  time, 
objective,  and  strength,  the  foregoing  may  justly  be  required 
of  all  troops,  as  illustrated  by  many  of  the  examples 
from  1870. 

In  Sections  96  and  130,  Part  I.  of  the  Reprint  of  1889,* 
it  is  stated  that  at  ranges  of  900  and  1000  meters  fire  may  be 
opened  on  columns  and  on  artillery;  and  in  Section  130: 
"At  long  distances  it  may  happen  that  the  objective  will  be 

♦Infantry  Drill  Regulations. — Translator. 


322  I  iKiiiirIrs  liilo  llir  Tdclics  of  llic  Fill  lire. 

viHibIc  oiilv  by  Hie  use  of  ^liisscs,  .-uhI  not  ;il  :ill  lo  (he  skir- 
luislicrs  lliciiisclves.  TIm'  IjiI(<m'  slioiild  in  lli:il  case  be 
(Urcch'd  (()  :iini  ;i(  ccrlMin  points  of  llio  lerriiin." 

II  is  riiiMicr  sI;i((mI  in  SccHon  i:>."{:  "In  liu'  conrsc  of 
the  ju'lion  a.  lull  diicclion  of  (he  lire  will  fr('(iiH'nll.v  be  iin- 
poHsiblc.  To  mcol  (iuil  condUion  skinnislicrs  should  have 
i\w  I'ulc  iuiprcsscd  <vii  (Iumu  in  their  jmsk'c  Ifjiininjjj,  (hat  in 
tlu»  absence  of  lire  (liicclion  ail  objecis  williin  (JOO  inelers 
iiui.v  be  (ired  a(,  belvveen  (»()()  and  1000  nu'leis  only  hij^h  and 
broa.d  larj^els,  and  thai,  as  a  rule,  lirin<;  beyond  1000  nielers 
is  in'oliibitod." 

The  nolions  of  close  ran<jjes  have  been  much  modified  of 
lale.  Willi  the  needle-}»un  shoi-l  ranjje  was  250  paces;  with 
the  Mauser  71,  84 — 400  meters;  and  wilh  I  he  rille  model 
'88 — as  wilh  all  sniall-calibei-  rilles  il  is  (JOO  melers.  None 
will  deny  the  (>tTects  of  lon^-  i'an};-e  lire;  on  the  other  ha.nd, 
every  (Uie  will  be  fully  juslilied  in  ever  ])ointin}i  lo  the  dis- 
a.dvanta.}?es  of  lonj;' ranj^c  lire  (over  1000  melers),  which  «'on- 
sist  in  this,  that  the  visual  ])ower  is  too  small  lo  ]>ermit  ^ood 
aim,  and  that  the  lonfi-ranjic  lire,  parlicniarly  wilh  the  mod- 
ern multiloaxhM-,  ^^^ll  lead  to  waste  of  ammunition;  a}j;ainst 
the  latlel"  none  of  the  nice  expedients  ado])te<l  in  peace  is 
of  avail.  In  connection  with  the  flattcM'  trajectoi*y  it  nuiy 
Im'  mentioned  that  th<>  swejd  /one  is  diminished  if  the  eleva- 
tion of  tlu^  lirer  and  that  of  the  !j:round  he  is  lo  sweeji  is  not 
the  same.* 

On  tluil  account  it  is  i^erfectly  correct  foi-  tlu'  lvep;ula- 
tiona  to  prescribe  "that  in  the  course  of  the  action  a.  full 
direction  of  tlu»  flro  will  frequently  be  imi)ossiblo,  and  that 
the  soldi(M'  is  not  to  fire  over  1000  meters." 

The  conlroversv  over  lou<;:-ran}j:e  and  shoi-t  ran<j;e  fire, 


•For  details,   see   "Lottrcs  d'un   cavalier,"    FobruaiT.    March, 
April.  1893,  of  the  Ifvnie  de  Oarahrh: 


Tactical  Deductions.  ':i23 

hovvovep,  will  nevor  ccMm,  nor  will  theomploymerit  of  oitluT 
rrif^Uiod  of  firo.  Mijr;b  rnij^lit  bo  jHlvancofl  /vro  anr]  on.  In 
conKorjur-ncf;  of  u\y  itxpcrutnci'M  in  war  I  am  an  advfx;ato  of 
Hhort-raiige  fire,  and  there  are  i>robably  not  many  who  have 
had  more  experience  in  uetion.  In  the  ca«e  of  well-trained 
and  wr-ll-diHoipline<l  troopH  I  would  invariably — and  7>ar- 
ticularly  on  the  df-fennive — decide  for  whort-range  fire;  an 
opponent  who  Ih  compelled  to  retreat  under  Hhort-range  fire 
iH  no  longer  to  be  feared.  It  in  Hnre  death  for  him.  I  ha/1 
to  undergo  that  trial  niynelf.  Jf  any  one  were  to  Heek  for  an 
InHtance  of  Hhor-t-range  fire,  he  conid  find  a  perfect  type  at 
lieaune  la  Kolande,*  and  I  doubt  whether  the  Imperial 
French  v\rmy  could  hIiow  anything  HUperior  in  the  way  of 
long  range  fire.  Today  troopH  Hhould  be  able  to  fight  and 
to  fire  in  all  zones  of  fire.  Any  one  who  will  reflect  and 
aHcertain  by  actual  trial  what  it  meanH  to  deHignate  certain 
pointH  in  the  terrain  will  find,  in  90  caw^  out  of  100,  that 
unlcHH  thewe  pointH  in  the  terrain  are  farmnteads  or  Home- 
thing  Himilar,  they  cannot  be  found  or  Huccewnfully  taken 
under  fire. 

The  cauH^j  of  the  ob.stinacy  obHervable  on  both  Hides  in 
all  actions  in  1870-71  lay  in  the  method  of  fighting,  itself 
the  rcHult  of  improved  fire-armH,  and  no  material  change  in 
this  renpect  will  result  from  nmokeleHH  powder  and  nmall- 
caliber  armH.  An  attack  can  no  longer  be  made  as  formerly 
by  flinging  the  brigades  into  the  fight  in  order  to  rapidly 
win  the  deciHion  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  small- 
caliber  rifles  make  swarm  tactics  with  nkirmish  fire  the  uni- 
versal method  of  fighting.  The  proficiency  of  the  indi- 
vidual soldier  in  skinriishing  thus  gains  in  imy»ortance  and 
the  course  of  a  battle  will  consist  of  a  series  of  swarm 


•Compare  H?>nlg'8  "The  National  War  on  the  Loire,"  II  ,  Chap 
ter  V. 


324  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

attacks  more  frequently  than  in  1870-71.  On  that  account 
the  control  of  the  action  should  firmly  rest  in  the  hand  of 
the  brigade  commander.  These  attacks  admit  of  ready 
explanation.  Both  opponents  fire  at  each  other;  the  one 
believing  himself  in  the  superiority  advances,  and  either 
succeeds  or  fails.  In  the  former  case  the  repulsed  party 
redoubles  its  efiforts,  for  that  onslaught  is  not  decisive;  it 
merely  confers  a  tactical  advantage.  When  the  repulsed 
party  feels  itself  strong  enough  to  push  the  enemy  back,  it 
advances  and  perhaps  drives  the  opposing  swarms  back. 
The  latter  fall  back  until  assisted,  either  by  the  ground  or 
by  troops  in  rear,  or  by  both,  to  put  a  stop  to  the  enemy's  suc- 
cessful onslaught.  The  enemy  is  now  brought  to  a  stop  at 
least;  sometimes  he  may  face  about,  for  he  will  not  always 
be  able  to  hold  out  under  greatly  superior  fire.  At  that 
moment  the  party  which  so  far  has  been  driven  back  re- 
sumes the  offensive  and  regains  the  tactical  superiority. 
This  is  the  course  of  the  modern  action,  this  is  the  "surg- 
ing to  and  fro,''  which  is  so  apt  to  confuse  the  heads  of  those 
who  have  never  beheld  it.  The  number  of  such  rushes  made 
on  either  side  may  vary  greatly,  and  will  depend  chiefly  on 
the  use  made  of  the  troops  in  rear  and  on  how  frequently  the 
swarm  line  gains  new  strength  from  the  accession  of  fresh 
troops.  Hence  the  importance  of  the  disposition  of  the  rear- 
ward lines,  their  distance,  number,  and  employment,  and  the 
necessity  of  great  care  in  dividing  them,  holding  them  in  read- 
iness, and  bringing  them  to  the  front.  That  problem  cannot 
be  eliminated  by  smokeless  powder,  but  it  may  be  modified, 
and  in  manj'  cases  it  may  be  made  more  difficult.  The 
future  action  will  be  a  skirmish  fight  consisting  of  rushes;  it 
will  show  a  certain  variableness, acontinuousdisplacementof 
the  opposing  lines,  and  the  variableness  will  be  characterized 
by  great  persistence,     it  has  its  cause  in  human  nature, 


Tactical  Deductions.  325 

which  is  excited  by  the  fire  so  that  men  feel  inclined  to  with- 
draw themselves  from  its  effect.  There  will  ever  be  cases 
where  a  strong  and  determined  rush  will  secure  permanent 
possession  of  the  captured  position  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  the  battle  and  against  which  the  enemy's  attacks 
are  shattered;  but,  as  a  rule,  the  decision  will  be  brought 
about  gradually  by  a  number  of  rushes,  by  gain  and  loss  of 
ground,  and  that  side  will  be  best  assured  of  success  which 
provides  a  superiority  of  force  for  these  rushes.  The  supe- 
rior leader  alone  can  see,  observe,  judge,  and  calculate  all 
this.  This  character  of  the  action  will  not  be  denied,  how- 
ever unsympathetic  it  may  be  to  some,  and  if  we  keep  it 
before  our  mind,  we  shall  make  few  or  no  mistakes  in  the 
choice  of  our  tactical  means.  This  fighting  method,  insep- 
arable as  it  is  from  the  small-caliber  rifle,  should  not  be 
inveighed  against  because  it  "is  not  decisive,"  is  "difficult 
to  watch,"  and  "still  more  difficult  to  control."  To  be  sure, 
the  rush  of  a  swarm  decides  nothing,  but  what  enormous 
fighting  power  did  we  not  repeatedly  observe  in  swarms  of 
skirmishers,  which,  though  for  six  or  eight  hours  engaged 
in  the  materially  and  morally  destructive  fire  action  of  high- 
est tension,  yet  ultimately  rushed  the  key  of  the  enemy's 
position!  Where  has  there  ever  been  in  tactics  such  a 
fighting  power!  These  are  some  additional  reasons  why  I 
remain  opposed  to  any  normal  attack! 

In  connection  with  the  character  of  the  conflict  and  its 
duration  I  wish  to  recur  to  the  question  of  ammunition. 
The  more  rapidly  the  man  fires,  the  more  quickly  will  he 
expend  his  ammunition.  This  rapid  fire,  which  has  been 
reintroduced  by  the  Reprint  of  1889  in  place  of  maga- 
zine fire,  disturbs  me,  and,  in  view  of  the  properties  of  the 
modern  rifie,  I  deem  it  necessary  to  definitely  discard  it. 
That  word  should  not  be  given  space  in  the  Regulations;  on 


326  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  contrary,  on  every  page  we  should  find  the  words  ^'econo- 
mize  your  fire."  When  the  man  is  trained  in  rapid  firing, 
there  is  danger  of  his  making  freer  use  of  it  than  if  he  had 
never  known  it.  Rapid  fire  was  proper  with  a  rifle  where 
the  time  for  accurate  firing  was  limited  to  about  one  minute ; 
but  to-day,  when  the  fire  is  such  that  its  accuracy  is  perma- 
nent within  600  meters  it  does  more  harm  than  good,  be- 
cause leading  to  a  waste  of  ammunition.  Experience  has 
moreover  taught  me  that  the  greater  the  danger,  the  more 
unsteady  will  the  soldier  become  and  the  more  rapid  his  fire. 
Why  then  have  rapid  fire  laid  down  in  the  Regulations? 
Instead  of  rapidity  of  fire,  I  want  economy  of  fire. 

A  few  words  about 'Tre^m."  In  discussing  the  execution 
of  the  combat  I  have  declared  myself  against  their  retention 
and  mentioned  open  lines  alone  in  that  connection.  Still  we 
cannot  dispense  with  '^Trejfen'^  for  the  deployment,  for  form- 
ing for  attack,  and  in  all  tactical  problems  where  a  surprise, 
a  sudden  attack  under  cover  of  fog,  of  favorable  ground,  and 
of  darkness  is  contemplated.  We  should  therefore  know 
how  to  move  in  "Treffcn'^  and,  if  necessary,  to  fight  in  them. 
On  level  ground  1200  meters  from  the  enemy  the  swai*m 
should  be  the  usual  and  only  formation  of  the  "Treffen,'^ 
though,  depending  on  circumstances  of  terrain  and  battle, 
line  and  column  may  also  be  used.  This  matter  and  the 
distances  between  lines  are  the  most  important  questions 
and  have  therefore  been  thoroughly  discussed.  Maximum 
distances  and  maximum  fronts  alone  should  be  laid  down; 
never  normal  distances  and  normal  fronts. 

Any  fear  lest  the  rearward  lines  be  too  late  for  the 
attack  or  for  the  rescue  in  case  of  defeat  should  be  obviated 
by  a  strong  firing  line;  the  distances  are  not  so  much  deter- 
mined by  the  element  of  time  as  by  the  range  and  flat  tra- 
jectory of  the  rifle.      At  the  time  when  the  latter  had  the 


Tactical  Deductions.  327 

same  effect  at  200  meters  that  they  now  have  at  600  metere^ 
the  lines  were  ranged  at  correspondingly  closer  distances. 
It  follows  logically  that  to-day  they  should  follow  farther 
apart. 

As  regards  number  and  strength  of  the  lines,  it  may  be 
stated  that  they  should  be  so  constituted  as  to  be  able  (a)  to 
gain  the  superiority  of  fire  at  the  range  of  about  600  to 
300  meters,  and,  (h)  reinforced  by  fresh  troops,  to  deliver 
their  blow,  which  owing  to  the  considerable  distance,  is 
likely  to  take  the  form  of  a  threat  rather  than  of  actual 
assault.  Here  lies  the  problem  in  the  assault.  It  will,  as 
a  rule,  be  impossible  for  the  firing  line  to  aj)proach  closer; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  muscles  and  lungs  are  unequal  to 
crossing  the  space  in  one  rush;  hence  the  position  will  be 
found  evaluated  by  the  enemy  and  the  act  of  its  capture 
will  merely  consist  in  stepping  into  it.  In  this  connection  I 
would  again  refer  to  Elsasshansen  and  Froschweiler,  as 
instructive  examples,  and  also  in  part  to  St.  Privat.  They 
may  be  taken  as  types  for  the  future  in  so  far  as  we  may 
speak  of  types. 

VI.     Of  the  Defense. 

There  is  a  saying  that  troops  who  know  how  to  attack 
will  also  defend  themselves  well.  This  is  confirmed  in  many 
respects  by  history;  but  it  does  not  show  many  instances 
where  troops  good  in  defense  w^ere  also  good  in  attack.  For 
this  reason  our  previous  expositions  have  treated  of  the 
attack  alone,  but  it  seems  necessary  to  me  to  point  out  some 
features  as  regards  leading,  which  will  inure  to  the  benefit 
of  the  defense  more  than  heretofore. 

In  the  first  place,  in  regard  to  the  leading  of  armies,  it  is 
quite  likely  that  in  future  several  armies  simultaneously 
operating  on  difierent  theaters  will  have  to  accomplish  dif- 


328  Inquiries  info  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ferent  objects.  Situations  may  ociiir  whero  tho  temporary 
and  permanent  strategic  and  tactical  defensive  r61e  may 
have  to  be  assumed.  In  the  war  against  the  republic  in 
1870  the  Germans  took  the  strategic  and  tactical  offensive 
within  certain  limits:  yet  thei*e  were  two  cases  where  the 
armies  were  forced  on  the  strategic  and  tactical  defensive, 
and  fought  resolutely  in  both. 

I  mean  the  II.  Army  with  the  Army  Detachment  (army 
of  the  Grand  Duke  of  IMecklenburg. — Tr.)  on  the  Loire  at 
the  end  of  November  1870,  and  Werder  on  the  Lisaine  in  the 
middle  of  January,  as  his  corps  is  to  be  considered  an  army 
for  our  purposes. 

In  both  cases  the  defender  passed  subsequently  to  the 
strategical  and  tactical  offensive  in  the  sense  of  combined 
operations  of  two  armies; and  notwithstanding  certain  errors 
in  the  execution,  the  defender  successfully  solved  on  each  of 
two  theaters,  and  in  widely  different  ways,  a  problem  which 
is  rightly  considered  most  difficult,  and  in  each  case  with 
great  results,  in  one  case  even  destroying  the  hostile  army. 

I  believe  that  such  things  will  recur  in  a  more  marked 
degree;  I  believe  that  the  war  of  the  future  will  closely 
approach  the  "position  war"  with  all  its  peculiarities  and 
drawbacks.  To  this  we  have  to  reconcile  ourselves,  whether 
we  are  pleased  or  not;  for  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  future 
war,  in  consequence  of  the  remai'kable  rdle  which  technique 
— and  under  that  heading  the  improved  arms  are  to  be 
classed — is  destined  to  play.  Hence  both  the  general  and 
his  troops  should  be  familiar  with  all  means  of  defense. 

Cases  are  likely  to  happen  where  the  general,  though 
recognizing  the  general  direction  of  the  operations  (end  of 
November,  1870),  will  have  great  difficulty  in  ascertaining 
Xiromptly  where  the  attacker's  main  body  is  and  where  the 
attacker  means  to  deliver  his  main  blow.     There  is  but  one 


Tactical  Deductions.  329 

means  for  meeting  him  prompth' — namely,  concentration 
and  prepared  positions  on  the  line  of  the  probable  direction 
of  the  operations.  The  II.  Ar-my  recognized  the  latter  some- 
what late,  prompt  but  insufficient  measures  were  taken  jfor 
concentration,  and  nothing  whatever  was  done  to  make 
a  good  selection  for  the  jjrobable  battle-ground  and  to 
strengthen  the  same  promptly. 

General  von  Werder,  although  rather  taken  unawares 
by  the  enemy's  operations,  suceeded  in  concentrating  every- 
thing for  the  defense,  in  promj)tly  occupying  the  position 
(selection  of  the  battle-fieldj,  and  in  preparing  the  same  in 
so  far  as  permitted  by  the  xavy  troublesome  winter  season. 

It  certaiul}'  would  have  been  in  keeping  with  both  these 
defensive  tasks  to  devote  particular  attention  to  the  left 
flank  on  the  Loire  and  to  the  right  flank  on  the  Lisaine;  it 
was  neglected  in  both  cases,  though  the  strategic  situation 
plainly  showed  the  necessity  therefor.  It  follows  that  cor- 
rect strategical  understanding  is  requisite  for  the  selection 
of  the  space  and  of  the  points  within  that  space  where  the 
defender  means  to  accept  battle — i.  e.,  strategic  laws  deter- 
mine the  selection  of  the  ground  and  the  extent  of  the  posi- 
tion (product  of  trooi)S  and  distance). 

The  leader  of  the  army  will  also  be  cognizant  of  the 
line  to  the  rear  of  which  he  must  not  permit  the  operations 
to  pass.  That  line  depends  on  the  object  to  be  covered  by 
his  operations  and  on  the  distance  of  his  general  line  of 
reconnaissance  from  that  of  the  enemy,  who  may  withdrav? 
his  line  sooner  or  later.  A  proper  selection  of  the  position 
should  not,  as  a  rule,  be  difficult,  provided  the  connection  of 
the  strategy  in  the  particular  case  with  the  general  situation 
is  properly  understood;  it  will  thus  be  possible  to  determine 
in  a  general  way  the  points  where  works  should  be  promptly 
planned  and  constructed. 


330  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

The  worst  thing,  for  instance,  that  could  have  happened 
to  General  von  Werder  was  to  be  pushed  back  in  the  angle 
Belfort — Switzerland.  That  strategic  consideration  should 
have  overruled  all  others;  hence  the  right  flank  should  have 
been  made  strongest  and  the  reserve  should  have  been 
posted  as  near  it  as  possible. 

The  worst  thing  that  could  have  happened  to  the  X. 
Corps  at  Beaune  was  to  be  cut  off  from  the  II.  Army 
and  to  be  pushed  in  a  northeasterly  direction.  The 
maintenance  of  the  touch  with  the  II.  Army  should  have 
been  the  decisive  consideration  in  the  selection  and  forti- 
fication of  the  position,  and  hence  the  right  wing  should 
have  been  made  specially  strong.  These  are  but  two  situa- 
tions, but  the  defender  will,  as  a  rule,  be  able  to  determine 
the  point  where  he  means  to  meet  the  attacker  long  in  ad- 
vance, and  to  begin  the  preparation  of  the  position  accord- 
ing to  strategic  considerations  alone.  The  rest — the  com- 
pletion of  the  position — can  be  done  later.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  construct  a  regular  fortress;  it  is  only  necessary 
to  securely  hold  important  points  with  small  numbers,  in 
order  to  have  sufficient  forces  available  for  other  points 
and  objects  which  might  be  of  an  offensive  character.  In 
most  cases  it  will  be  possible  to  have  a  skeleton  promptly 
designed  and  constructed  which  in  itself  may  confer  a  tacti- 
cal advantage,  as  at  Gravelotte  and  on  the  Lisaine. 

In  order  to  promptly  reach  the  position  (occupation  of 
the  position  and  setting  apart  a  force  for  other  service),  the 
troops  should  be  kept  assembled  at  their  stations,  which 
may  be  done  without  danger  if  the  cavalry,  in  combination 
with  other  arms  attached  to  it,  reconnoiters  and  guards  the 
front  and  flanks. 

To  enable  him  to  see  ahead  and  to  follow  the  events 
from  their  beginning,   the   defender  should   be   especially 


Tactical  Deductions.  331 

strong  in  enterprising  and  suitably  armed  cavalry  with  artil- 
lefy.  Without  it  any  defensive  undertaking  will  in  future 
be  highly  jeopardized. 

It  is  therefore  the  function  of  the  army  leader  to  deter- 
mine the  general  outline  of  the  position.  He  is  best  in> 
formed,  has  familiarized  himself  with  the  task  before  him, 
is  best  able  to  fix  upon  the  points  of  support  on  which  the 
framework  is  to  be  erected,  but  he  should  know  the  ground 
not  merely  from  the  map,  but  from  inspection.  The  lat- 
ter may  not  always  be  possible.  As  the  matter  passes  from 
the  army  commander  to  his  inferiors  of  the  several  grades, 
the  details  of  construction  gain  more  and  more  in  precision, 
dependent  on  subsequent  information  received;  the  road 
leads  from  the  whole  to  the  details,  from  large  considera- 
tions to  smaller  ones. 

It  follows  that  the  authorities  of  the  various  grades  and 
arms,  particularly  the  officers  charged  with  the  trace  of 
the  works,  should  have  a  full  understanding  of  the  strat- 
egic aspect  of  the  problem— t.  e.,  that  they  should  be  aware 
of  the  object  and  grasp  it  in  all  its  details;  and  that 
within  the  outlines  determined  by  the  superiors  all  tac- 
tical advantages  should  be  turned  into  account.  Barring 
some  exceptions,  marked  feats  in  both  of  the  foregoing 
respects  have  been  rare,  but  instead  of  complaining  and 
instead  of  anticipating  nothing  better  in  future,  the  insep- 
arability of  strategy  and  tactics  should  be  kept  in  mind, 
which,  considered  from  the  ideal  point  of  view,  blend  on  the 
battle-field  (position)  in  every  essential  aspect.  When  we 
are  accustomed  thus  to  think,  to  reflect,  to  observe,  then  the 
works  will  rarely  be  constructed  at  the  wrong  points  and 
the  prejudice  against  them  will  vanish  because  no  one  can 
deny  their  effect.  We  had  not  learned  to  think  thus;  imag- 
ination was  lacking;  the  fault  was  that  the  education  of  the 
young  does  not  address  itself  to  the  nerve  of  all  intelligent 


332  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

mental  work;  it  fails  tiist  to  formulate  an  idea,  a  conception 
of  what  is  to  be  accomplished.  We  cannot  dispense  with 
book  knowledge,  but  not  every  one  need  be  a  scientist. 

The  defender  sometimes  succeeds  in  deceiving  the 
enemy,  as  evidenccni  by  the  great  exami)les  of  Konig- 
grjitz,  Gravelotte^ — St.  Privat,  and  the  Lisaine.  In  the  last 
two  named  cases  the  extent  of  the  front  was  greatly  under- 
estimated, and  in  the  first  case  a  proper  idea  of  the  strength 
of  the  defender  and  the  trace  of  his  position  was  lacking. 
In  the  execution  of  the  same  idea,  Frenchmen,  Germans, 
Austrians,  unintentionally,  caused  the  enemy  a  good  deal 
of  uncertainty;  success  followed  in  but  one  case,  that  of  the 
Germans  on  the  Lisaine.  The  Austrians  ultimately  fought 
in  front  of  their  position,  and  succumbed  chiefly  on  that 
account  and  because  the  position  was  not  occupied  and  did 
not  remain  occupied  as  ordered.  We  also  note  there  the 
harmful  inlluence  that  may  be  exercised  by  an  advanced 
position  (Maslowed  wood).  Although  the  Germans  were 
greatly  mistaken  as  to  the  extent  of  the  position,  the  French 
were  nevertheless  defeated,  because  the  strategic  tlank  was 
in  the  air  and  was  crushed — crushed  all  the  more  easily  be- 
cause not  artificially  strengthened,  thus  rendering  all  the 
other  works  which  should  have  begun  at  St.  Privat  of  no 
value.  The  facts  show,  however,  that  the  defense  was 
not  complete,  because  at  Koniggriitz.  as  well  as  at  Grave- 
lotte,  a  great  leader  was  lacking.  In  both  cases  we  observe 
the  same  objectionable  feature.  At  Koniggriitz  the  left  is 
posted  at  Popowitz;  at  Gravelotte,  the  right  at  Verneville. 
Both  were  the  strategic  flanks,  and  it  was  only  due  to  the 
efforts  of  the  corps  commanders  that  the  better  positions 
of  Problus  and  St.  Privat  were  occupied! 

Thus,  even  before  the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder, 
the  defense  was  in  possession  of  certain  features  difficult 


Tactical  Deductions.  333 

to  r(Monnoiter  and  greatly  embarrassing  the  assailant,  ahd 
it  may  be  admitted  that  they  constituted  part  of  the  strength 
of  the  defense.  I  advocate  the  offensive,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  smokeless  powder  brings  the  effect  of  that 
strength  of  the  defensive — i.  e.,  the  uncertainty  in  which 
it  is  able  to  keep  the  asKuilant — home  to  the  latter  much 
more  severely;  but  the  favorable  aspects  of  the  defense 
should  not  on  that  account  be  undervalued. 

The  defender  can  determine  the  general  trace  of  his 
position  by  the  map,and  the  assailant  may  likewise  itifer  that 
trace  or  the  range  in  a  general  way  from  strategic  consid- 
erations. Events  may  happen,  however,  which  are  contrary 
to  the  sjurit  of  strategy,  as,  for  instance,  Bazaine's  with- 
drawal into  the  position  of  August  18th,  which  had  first  been 
selected  by  mai>  and  was  given  its  real  shape  subsequently 
after  an  inspection  of  the  ground. 

The  assailant's  uncertainty  could  even  in  those  days  be 
very  great,  depending  on  whether  right  or  wrong  strategic 
conceptions  prevailed  in  both  camps;  smokeless  powder, 
however,  renders  it  much  more  difficult  for  the  assailant  to 
promptly  make  out  the  defender's  position  even  in  case  he 
has  hit  upon  the  enemy's  strategic  line  of  retreat. 

The  great  range  of  modern  rifles  and  artillery  projec- 
tiles, taken  in  connection  with  the  absence  of  smoke, 
makf>s  it  diflicult  to  lof-ale  the  enemy.  Tlie  weaker  oppo- 
nent will  usually  be  compelled  to  resort  to  the  defensive  and 
entrench  himself;  but  the  defender  is  able  to-day  to  greatly 
increase  the  assailant's  uncertainty,  to  force  him  to  delay 
while  employing  means  to  deceive  him,  and  to  employ  his 
own  countf;r-measures  in  such  a  way  as  to  swure  the  numer- 
ical superioritj'  at  a  certain  point  notwithstanding  his  gen- 
eral numerical  inferioritv. 


334  Inquirifs  into  Ihc  Tactici<  of  the  Fulurr. 

AdvanoiHl  positions  aro  uood  moans  to  (liis  v\u\,  ami  a 
(.'ousiilorntion  of  tho  battlo  of  (^iravolotto  will  show  what 
groat  ailvantaiios  tlu\varo  apt  to  oonfoi-  on  iho  dofonso  t«>  dav, 
and  whioh  wo  will  loavo  \o  tlu>  roadiM-  io  dolormino.  boianso 
militaiv  history  is  iisod  by  dilToriMit  poople  to  provo  dilVoront 
things.  It  is  my  opinion  that  it  is  sniokoK'ss  poAvdoi*  alono 
that  in  great  battlos  will  onablo  tho  oommandor-in  ohiof  of 
tho  dof(Miso  to  promptly  tako  his  moasuros  whiU>  his  id»>as 
aro  still  of  bnt  agonoral  I'haraoti^r.booanso  smokoloss  powdor 
givos  him  an  amonnt  of  timo  not  formerly  possessed,  should 
he  oontemplate  a  taotioal  oountor-otVensive.  In  that  ease 
time  is  gained  by  tho  nse  of  advanoed  positions,  and  it  may 
be  asoertained  by  raUiilating  tho  ratio  of  the  breadth  and 
depth  of  the  line  of  defense  to  the  depth  of  ground  oom- 
luanded  by  the  advaneed  positions  up  to  the  line  of  defense. 
This,  eonibineil  with  rei'onnaissanee.  1  doom  the  prineipal 
moditioation  introduoed  in  grand  tactics  by  smokoh  ss 
powder,  and  also  the  chief  advantage  which  the  conunandei^ 
in-chief  of  the  defense  may  dori\  o  i'voin  it. 

Lack  of  space  and  other  reasons  prevent  nie  from  going 
into  details  of  results  to  both  defender  and  assailant.  I  wish 
to  point  out.  however,  the  opinion  of  tlu»  French  Colonel  Lan- 
glois.  who  approves  of  tho  advancetl  positiorsT — SkiUmieters 
in  front  of  the  main  position,  ajid  refer  the  reader  to  Nos.  17, 
18.  28,  58.  :>«>,  and  (JO  of  the  M  Hi  far  WochniMatf  of  18!);?. 
While  I  coueur  in  general  in  the  ideas  expressed  in  the  last 
three  numbers  of  that  periodical,  I  think  that  a  vigorous 
counter-otTonsive  should  be  the  first  consideration  in  select- 
ing tho  main  position,  and  that  advanced  positions  cannot 
then  be  dispensed  with.  Skill  is  roipiired  in  selecting  and 
utilizing  advaJictHl  positions  and  in  promptly  rendering 
them  harnUess  bv  a  vigorous  method  of  attack.     Tho  strug- 


TacUcal  Uedudions.  336 

j^lf  for  iIkiii  uiiiy  ut.  llio  Harno  tirru;  HufTioifjnf.ly  din^rhjHe 
tlif  tiijiin  pohilion,  if  tlioy  are  about  1000  mcXc.Yn  in  front 
of  Ihf  lalt<-f;  tlio  farttjf-r  Ih^fy  aye  to  th(;  front  tho  more  arc 
th«-y  aj^f  to  iriiHU^ad  tlio  jisKailant,  and  the  g^reater  wouUl 
he  the  FifjK'fit  deriver]  from  ifi'-rn  hy  tfie  commander-in-cbief 
of  the  defence.  It  is  unnec<'8Hary  herr-  to  quote  unfavorable 
inntanrteH  from  Korum^ri'iiz,  ete.,  or  to  point  out  that  the 
French  derived  little  advantage  from  their  advanced  pOKi- 
tionH  on  the  l^th  of  AuguHt.  We  are  simply  face  to  face 
with  an  important  qneHtion,  which  it  iw  nece-WHary  to  <lft<UU' 
before  committing  onrH^iveH  to  battle;  and  I  believe  that 
maneiJverH  might  be  ho  arranged  as  to  be  of  great  benefit 
in  thiH  rcHpect,  In  this  way  we  would  ]><■  more  apt  to  select 
the  right  means  for  defense  and  attack ;  which  must  he  found, 
for  I  do  not  believe  that  any  defender  harboring  great  de- 
signs would  relinfjuish  the  advantages  offered  by  advanced 
j)OHitions. 

Tiie  main  circumstance  of  benefit  to  the  defender  and 
deceiving  the  assailant  is  the  latter's  uncertainty,  which  will 
cause  him  much  delay.  On  that  account  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  several  deployments  of  the  army  and  of  the  battle  units 
of  the  assailant  may  become  necessary;  for  grand  tactics  to- 
day confer  on  the  dffr-nder  the  power  to  keep  his  ar^nies  sepa- 
rated at  distances  and  in  combinations  suitable  for  the 
oflFensive  employment  of  one  of  the  armies,  depending  on  the 
amount  rjf  information  and  time  gained  by  the  strnggbfS.  etc., 
for  the  advanced  positions.  Xot  only  should  the  s'-h-ction  of 
the  main  position  be  considere<l  from  tliaf  [joint  r,f  view, 
but  also  the  relation  of  the  advancer]  jK>8itions  to  the  main 
position  and  the  strengthening  of  the  latter;  if  it  results 
in  a  I'levna,  it  will  have  to  be  invested;  if  in  a  Gravelotte, 
it  will  have  to  be  attacked,  as  heretofore.  The  only 
technical-tactical  point  to  be  consid^Tcd  is  that  the  advanced 


336  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

positions  should  no  longer  consist  of  farmsteads  and  villages, 
but  should  be  located  in  the  general  terrain  and  as  -incon- 
spicuous as  possible;  woods  may  prove  very  useful  for  that 
purpose.  When  deciding  on  the  use  of  advanced  positions, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  extend  the  front  as  much  as  possible 
and  to  give  it  an  irregular  shape,  wherein  the  improved 
arms  will  be  found  of  great  assistance  and  will  much  en- 
hance the  effect. 

Section  13  of  the  Field  Entrenchment  Regulations 
states:  "The  preparation  and  occupation  of  advanced  posi- 
tions is  not  to  be  recommended  as  a  rule,  because  it  may  easily 
lead  to  the  defeat  of  the  advanced  troops  and  mask  the  fire 
from  the  main  position.  It  is  therefore  better  to  concen- 
trate all  available  means  for  the  fortification  of  a  single 
line."  I  might  concur  in  the  preparation,  but  not  in  the 
occupation.  To  be  sure  I  am  assuming  here  that  the  army 
will  be  boldly  led  and  that  small  technical-tactical  consid- 
erations and  inconveniences  will  have  to  give  way. 

It  may  generally  be  said  that  the  defensive  is  the 
stronger;  but  it  rarely  matures  great  results,  unless  they  are 
brought  about  by  other  means  (Manteuffel-Werder);  for  so 
has  it  ever  been  and  will  ever  be.  Worth,  Gravelotte  (we 
purposely  quote  only  field  battles  where  both  sides  had  full 
room  for  development),  Beaune,  Loigny,  Lisaine,  St.  Quen- 
tin,  etc.,  all  point  to  the  strength  of  the  defensive.  In  case 
of  an  equality  of  arms  the  relations  between  attack  and 
defense  may  at  best  be  slightly  shifted,  and  it  is  advisable 
to  adhere  to  the  attack, not,  however,  without  always  striving 
for  early  and  strong  development  of  fire  and  for  the  greatest 
possible  numerical  superiority.  The  long-range  arms  con- 
fer many  advantages  on  the  assailant;  he  has  greater  free- 
dom of  movement  than  the  defender;  he  can  develop  a 
greater  fire  effect,  though  at  first  by  progressive  stages  only; 


Tactical  Deductions.  337 

to-day  he  can  take  the  rearward  positions  of  the  enemy 
bj'  fire  action  much  sooner  than  formerly,  because  the  arms 
carry  farther.  He  has,  above  all  things,  greater  freedom  of 
decision.  The  attack  will  be  more,  difficult  to  initiate  and 
to  carry  through;  it  will  require  more  time;  and,  in  some 
places,  it  will  entail  greater  losses,  which  result  must  be 
accepted;  but  when  crowned  by  success,  it  will  mature 
results  never  before  dreamed  of. 

It  will  not  be  often  that  the  defender's  position  will  ful- 
fill all  requirements;  he  will  have  to  concentrate  his  troops 
at  various  points;  if  the  defender  wishes  to  escape  sensible 
losses  from  artiller^^  fire  from  the  beginning,  his  position 
to-day  should  be  like  a  great  artificial  enclosure  protecting 
the  trooxjs,  which  would  never  accord  with  simplicity  and 
rarely  with  troop-leading.  The  defender  will  be  compelled 
to  remain  much  longer  in  a  condition  of  readiness,  which  is 
not  calculated  to  increase  the  morale;  and  in  order  to  pro- 
tect his  artillery  he  will  have  to  deploy  a  large  part  of  his 
infantry  on  the  slope  toward  the  enemy,  in  most  cases 
without  cover.  He  will  concentrate  the  full  force  of  his  fire 
on  certain  points,  but  at  the  point  or  points  of  attack  the 
assailant  will  be  able  to  develop  a  superior  fire,  particularly 
if  he  succeeds  in  promptly  locating  the  enemy's  flanks.  The 
defender  will,  in  many  cases,  have  to  shun  farmsteads  and 
villages,  and  construct  trenches  in  a  comparatively  short 
time,  which,  while  useful  for  purposes  of  concealment,  per- 
mit at  the  same  time  of  greater  fire-effect.  Kecently  the 
plow  has  been  the  subject  of  frequent  experiments  in  the 
construction  of  hasty  entrenchments ;  and  in  France,  in  1898, 
Genera]  Morin,  in  particular,  is  said  to  have  been  very 
successful  with  it.  I  have  omitted  technical  details,  as 
to-day  there  is  no  appreciable  difference  to  be  found  in  the 
French,  German,  Austrian,  and  Russian  regulations  regard- 


338  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ing  the  value,  design  and  construction  of  field  entrench- 
ments; and  it  could  not  be  otherwise; the  same  ballistic  quali- 
ties of  the  arms  were  bound  to  lead  to  the  same  conclusions 
in  field  fortification.  On  that  account  heavy  calibers  will 
be  brought  in  the  field  by  both  sides.  Thus  it  was  stated  in 
the  French  Instructions  of  March  23,  1878 :  ''Field  entrench- 
ments have  at  all  times  been  of  great  importance;  since  the 
introduction  of  the  rapid-firing  arms  they  have  become  a 
power  and  an  expedient  on  the  battle-field  which  is  always 
useful  and  frequently  indispensable.  They  permit  the  de- 
fender to  make  up  for  his  numerical  inferiority  at  certain 
points,  and  enable  the  assailant  to  destroy  the  former's  de- 
fensive positions  or  to  turn  them  against  him.  They  also 
enable  one  to  entrench  on  captured  ground  and  thus  to 
hold  it." 

All  investigations,  in  whatever  direction  made,  point 
toward  position  warfare,  though,  on  account  of  the  great 
warlike  energy  of  the  spirit  of  the  times,  its  course  will  be 
different  from  what,  it  was  in  the  past.  Rifle  and  spade, 
regulations  for  fire  and  field  entrenchments  (field  pioneer 
regulations  for  the  infantry),  to-day  form  the  component 
parts  of  one  and  the  same  means,  the  greatest  possible 
development  of  fire.  It  is  in  fact  the  culmination  of  the 
entire  fighting  act  I  I  deem  it  probable  that  the  selec- 
tion of  suitable  covered  positions  of  the  local  and  general 
reserves  will  prove  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of 
the  defender,  especially  if  he  intends  to  pass  from  the 
defensive  to  the  offensive.  In  future  the  reserves  will  una- 
voidably be  more  exposed  to  danger  than  formerly.  They 
will  sometimes  suffer  very  much  from  echelon  shrapnel  fire, 
and  it  may  be  accepted  that  the  former  manner  of  massing 
reserves  and  of  bringing  them  up  to  the  main  position  are  no 
longer  applicable.     But  to  be  able  to  pass  to  the  offensive  in 


Tactical  Deductions.  339 

order  to  gain  the  victory,  it  is  necessary  to  hold  masses  in 
readiness  in  the  vicinity  of  the  line  of  direction  the  offensive 
is  to  take;  and  the  undoubtedly  impending  great  expenditure 
of  ammunition,  not  to  mention  losses,  will  compel  the  de- 
fender to  have  local  reserves  all  along  the  rear  of  his  line  of 
battle  if  he  wishes  to  exert  his  full  fire  power.  In  pre- 
pared positions  both  requirements  may  be  more  or  less  met 
by  artificial  cover;  in  other  cases  not  at  all,  or  but  rarely. 
We  concede  that,  particularly  at  the  opening  of  the  battle, 
the  defender  will  usually  be  able  to  develop  a  greater  fire 
power  than  the  assailant,  but  whatever  may  be  the  extent  of 
ground  covered  by  his  movements  and  measures,  the  defender 
will  be  cramped  by  the  law  imposed  on  him  b}^  the  assailant, 
who,  having  more  freedom,  can  paralyze  the  fire  and  ulti- 
mately exceed  it,  though  it  may  require  more  time  and  entail 
greater  losses  at  some  points;  but  the  ultimate  prize  of  vic- 
tory will  be  all  the  greater. 

VII.  Of  Beconnaissarice  and  of  Preparation  hy  Artillery. 
It  is  odd  that  so  much  should  have  been  written  about 
losses  suffered  and  to  be  suffered  in  future,  and  how  they 
might  be  avoided,  without  ever  getting  at  the  root  of  the 
evil.  For  two  decades  w'e  have  been  on  the  wrong  trail;  we 
have  been  circling  around  the  "guiding  motive"  at  greater 
or  less  distances;  we  have  done  much  that  is  bound  to  lead 
to  effeminate  ideas;  we  have  looked  for  the  causes  where 
they  do  not  exist,  and  we  have  not  looked  for  them  where  they 
are.  In  this  way  we  have  deceived  ourselves  in  order  to 
spare  others,  and  we  have  likewise  deceived  those  who  do 
not  know  w^ar  from  personal  experience^  and  those  whose 
positions  forbid  them  to  see  anything  outside  of  their  own 
troops,  for  the  same  purpose  of  sparing  others!  Instead  of 
admitting  outright  that  90  per  cent  of  the  causes  of  our 
losses  in  1870-71  are  to  be  found  in  the  perfunctory  character 


340  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

of  the  drill-ground  in  time  of  jjeace;  in  our  defective  training 
and  in  our  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  army;  in  the 
tactics  and  in  the  incapacity  of  numerous  leaders  of  various 
grades;  and  instead  of  making  a  thorough  investigation  of 
the  causes,  we  have  attributed  the  losses  to  the  positions,  to 
the  terrain,  to  the  ballistics  of  the  rifle,  etc.;  we  have  failed, 
however,  to  convince  a  single  thinking  mind,  because  those 
were  not  the  causes.  If  we  review  the  series  of  peace  errors 
between  1871-88,  we  find  that  the  true  cause  was  probably 
concealed  because  we  did  not  wish  to  probe  our  own  ideas. 
It  has  ultimately  brought  us  to  the  point  that  we  are  seri- 
ously thinking  of  transferring  the  battle  to  the  night,  in 
order  not  to  be  seen — i.  e.,in  order  not  to  be  shot  at  or  hit.  If 
it  had  all  been  a  mere  waste  of  labor,  it  would  not  be  so  bad; 
but  that  a  whole  generation  has  had  an  opportunity  to  imbibe 
wrong  ideas  is  unfortunate  and  cannot  be  remedied  at  once, 
smce  the  men  thus  affected  remain  among  the  living!  In  all 
the  great  powers  of  Europe,  re-armament  called  forth  new 
regulations  for  the  various  arms,  new  firing  regulations, 
new  regulations  for  field  entrenchments  and  field  ser- 
vice, in  all  of  which  Germany  led  the  way,  and  by  1889 
France,  Austria,  England,  Russia,  and  Italy  had  followed 
suit.  The  year  of  1888  gave  to  Germany  the  small-caliber 
rifle,  and  the  following  year  the  smokeless  powder,  things 
which  in  1881,  when  this  book  was  fii-st  published,  were  in 
part  matters  of  aspiration,  and  in  part  had  not  been  given 
any  consideration  whatever.  These  technical  improve- 
ments have  made  the  defensive  the  stronger,  but  success- 
ful defense  does  not  ensure  a  successful  issue  of  the  war; 
the  attack  is  required.  The  defensive  being  the  stronger, 
it  follows  that  the  attack  is  necessarily  more  diflScult  and, 
at  the  decisive  points,  bloodier.     This  is  the  reason  why 


Tactical  Deductions.  341 

tactical  rules  and  forms  are  being  sought  for  the  attack 
which  would  tend  to  diminish  the  assailant's  losses. 

In  reviewing  the  battles,  etc.,  of  the  War  of  1870-71,  we 
find  that,  throughout,  two  main  rules  were  ignored,  and 
that  these  neglects  were  the  causes  of  our  "great"  losses, 
one  of  them  is  the  total  neglect  of  or  insufficiency  of  recon- 
naissance on  the  part  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  of  all 
leaders  down  to  the  division  and  even  brigade  commanders, 
whenever  they  had  a  separate  task;  the  other  is  the  lack  of 
preparation  by  artillery  before  the  main  forces  of  infantry 
were  thrust  into  battle. 

There  is,  for  instance,  the  defective  reconnaissance  on 
the  IGth  of  August,  notwithstanding  that  the  German  cav- 
alry was  on  the  battle-field  that  was  to  be,  before  the  arrival 
of  the  X.  Corps,  and  had  been  for  hours  in  close  touch  with 
the  enemy.      Closely   connected   with  it   was   the  further 
shortcoming,  in  that  the  system  of  reporting  was  not  suita- 
bly organized,  so  that  reports  were  late  in  arriving,   or 
inaccurate,  or  were  not  rendered  at  all  to  that  leader  who 
on  account  of  the  situation  should  have  been  first  informed. 
On  the  17th  and  18th  of  August  we  are  met  by  the 
equally  surprising  fact,  that  the  large  forces  of  our  cavalry 
failed  to  promptly  locate  the  extent  of  the  French  right, 
notwithstanding  our  intention  to  give  decisive  battle. 

On  the  1st  of  December  Bernhardi's  brigade  acted  even 
more  unskillfully  than  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  at  noon  on 
the  lOth  of  August.  Reconnaissance  and  the  organization 
of  the  system  of  reporting  must  go  hand  in  hand. 

In  both  of  these  respects  Napoleon  1.  still  remains  our 
never-attained  ideal,  and  however  much  he  may  have  served 
the  Germans  as  an  instructor,  they  have  learned  little  from 
him  in  that  respect.     Any  one  loth  to  believe  this  should 


342  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

inform  himself  of  Napoleon's  mobility  before  battle,  his 
reconnaissances  on  horseback,  his  exertions  and  bodily 
fatigue  (at  Jena,  Dresden,  Borodino)  in  order  to  gain  all  im 
portant  information  of  the  enemy  by  personal  inspection, 
before  committing  himself  to  battle.  Having  acted  in  this 
manner  before  the  arrival  of  the  reports,  and  having  on 
these  rides  familiarized  his  staff  with  the  situation,  he  made 
his  last  dispositions,  which  never  failed  of  their  effect  I 
must  here  state  in  vindication  of  the  Germans  in  1870, 
that  of  the  most  important  battles  fought  against  Imperial 
France,  but  three  were  fought  with  the  sanction  of  the 
commander-in-chief — Gravelotte,  Beaumont,  and  Sedan;  all 
the  others,  as  regards  time,  object,  and  forces,  were  without 
that  sanction.  However  imposing  may  be  Moltke's  feat  of 
assembling  9  army  corps  and  6  cavalry  divisions  on  the 
evening  of  August  17th,  ye,t  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  that 
Napoleon  would  have  issued  the  order  of  attack  on  the  17th 
without  being  approximately  sure  of  the  enemy's  position 
and  of  the  extent  of  his  right ;  that  information  was,  in  fact, 
only  gained  after  the  battle  had  begun,  and  we  found  to  our 
sorrow  that  the  enemy's  line  was  twice  as  long  as  had  been 
supposed.  To  obtain  better  results,  there  is  need  not  only 
of  a  proper  employment  of  the  cavalry,  but  also  of  a  nimble, 
mobile  commander-in-chief,  who  makes  a  personal  inspection 
before  the  dice  are  cast  and  after  the  cavalry  has  sent  in 
its  reports.  Little  of  that  kind  is  to  be  found  throughout 
the  war.  We  learn  that  the  positions  were  visited  on  horse- 
back after  the  battle,  but  never  before  that  event;  and  as  it 
was  in  great  things,  so  it  was  in  small  affairs.  As  a  conse- 
quence we  were  always  in  doubt,  and  as  soon  as  the  subordi- 
nate leaders  encountered  the  enemy,  they  flung  themselves 
against  him,  though  ignorant  of  his  position  and  strength, 
and  without  taking  time  to  reflect  how  he  might  be  attacked 
to  best  advantage.        There  is  but  one   general   who   in 


Tactical  Deductions.  343 

this  particular  acted  like  Napoleon;  it  was  General  von 
Herwarth,  at  Koniggratz.  Hence  also  his  splendid  suc- 
cess without  appreciable  losses!  All  events  which  I  wit- 
nessed took  such  a  course  as  to  firmly  convince  me  that  the 
species  of  men  who  know  how  to  reconnoiter  in  Napoleon's 
way  no  longer  exist,  just  as  the  species  of  cavalry  leaders 
a  la  Seidlitz  seem  to  have  vanished  from  the  earth.  Will 
either  ever  return? 

An  evil  must  first  be  located;  the  proper  remedy  for  it 
is  selected  afterward.  The  chief  cause  of  our  losses  is  to 
be  sought  in  the  lack  of  reconnaissance  preceding  the  col- 
lisions, in  connection  with  the  brave  but  unplanned  rush  of 
infantry  in  insufficient  numbers.  Keconnaissance  should 
extend  to  the  ground,  to  the  strength  and  position  of  the 
enemy;  with  the  information  thus  gained  his  intentions  may 
be  inferred  with  fair  accuracy,  and  the  ways  and  means  for 
carrying  out  our  own  intentions  are  thus  pointed  out  at  the 
same  time.  All  officers  down  to  the  field  officer  should  be  in- 
formed in  a  few  words  of  the  intentions  in  each  particular 
case  (it  is  now  required  by  Regulations),  so  that  they 
may  know  what  is  expected  of  them;  and  if  it  be  objected 
that  there  is  no  time  for  it,  I  reply  that  in  the  principal 
case  (Gravelotte)  there  was  time,  and  that  it  was  easy  to  do 
it,  owing  to  the  enemy's  complete  inactivity,  the  like  of  whicli 
is  hardly  of  record,  had  only  the  superior  leaders  realized  and 
taken  to  heart  that  time-saving  measure.  But  what  was  the 
rule?  Brigades  and  divisions  arrived  and  were  thrust  into 
the  fight:  it  was  "Forward!"  without  deploying  them  in  the 
direction  of  the  action.  This  was  all  the  information  vouch- 
safed their  commanders;  in  some  cases  the  objective  of  the 
attack  Was  pointed  out.  •'Forward!"  That  was  all  that  the 
officers,  down  to  the  field-officers,  learned,  and  it  was  even 
frequently  communicated  by  signal.     That  was  the  actual 


344  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

rule.  The  troops  attacked  from  the  point  where  they  stood, 
straight  to  the  front,  though  adjacent  ground  offered  plenty 
of  opportunity  for  a  covered  approach.  Thus  it  was  in 
many  cases  at  Worth,  and  along  the  entire  line  of  battle 
at  Gravelotte,  with  the  exception  of  the  XII.  Army  Corps; 
in  the  latter  battle  the  consequences  of  the  omission  of 
reconnaissance  and  artillery  preparation  pile  up  mountain 
high.  Neither  suitable  formations,  nor  suitable  methods, 
nor  control  in  so  far  as  practicable,  are  to  be  found  there. 
What  is  spent,  is  spent!  The  imprudent  and  precipitate 
rush  of  columns  over  open  ground  was  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  our  losses!  Had  the  action  suited  the  circum- 
stances, military  history  would  know  nothing  of  a  Mance 
ravine,  St.  Privat,  etc.,  as  they  are;  our  literature  on  losses 
would  not  have  existed.  We  can  record  but  few  attacks  of 
large  bodies  which  were  satisfactory  in  preparation  and 
execution.  Either  they  were  not  made,  or  failed,  or  barely 
succeeded,  as  at  St.  Privat  and  Worth,  etc.  The  conceal- 
ment of  the  true  evil  became  the  further  cause  of  our  many 
tactical  errors  in  peace,  of  the  entire  confused  literature  on 
losses,  and  who  knows  whether  the  controversy  over  long- 
and  short-range  fire  would  ever  have  arisen,  if  our  troops  had 
been  properly  led,  if  we  had  had  tacticians  and  tactics? 
Whenever  the  evil  is  looked  for  at  the  wrong  place,  it  will 
invariably  result  that  the  historical  tactical  truth  is  buried 
under  a  legion  of  errors,  that  erudite  sophism  obscures  the 
simple  demands  of  reason.  Sophism  was  the  prevailing 
disease  from  1871  to  1888;  sophism  as  regards  toying  with 
forms,  the  kinds  of  fire,  direction  of  fire,  short-  and  long- 
range  fire  and  fire  effect,  fire  with  counted  cartridges, 
swarm  volleys,  suspension  of  fire,  supply  of  ammunition, 
etc.,   although   the   whole  business    could   have   been   set- 


Tactical  Deductions.  34-5 

tied  with  few  words,  if  the  truth  had  been  disclosed. 
We  have  not  always  adopted  the  right  ways  since  1888,  but 
the  purification  of  the  atmosphere  since  that  year  has  had 
a  refreshing  effect. 

To  the  principal  fault,  lack  of  reconnaissance  with  its 
flood  of  resulting  evils,  there  is  to  be  added  the  second  one, 
insufficiency  or  total  lack  of  artillery  preparation.  It  is 
odd  that  the  artillery  finds  so  little  sympathy  in  the  German 
Army,  has  so  little  popularity,  and  finds  so  little  under- 
standing of  its  employment.  Prince  Hohenlohe  himself  has 
not  hesitated  to  attack  the  honor  of  the  artillery.  What 
could  there  be  worse  than  to  raise  and  spread  against  one's 
own  arm  the  charge  of  cowardice  and  laxity  in  its  sense  of 
honor?* 

Before  Sedan  the  effect  of  artillery  was  not,  or  but  lit- 
tle, appreciated  by  the  generals;  after  that  event  opinions 
changed.  In  not  a  single  one  of  all  the  August  battles  can 
we  speak  of  a  preparation  by  artillery,  and  if  at  Amanvil- 
liers  and  St.  Privat  we  had  taken  the  time  to  subject  the 
points  d'appui  to  the  fire  of  available  artillery,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  both  places  wonld  have  fallen  sooner  than  they 
did,  and  with  much  less  loss,  notwithstanding  the  faulty 
attack  formations  of  the  infantry.  Moreover,  had  we  had 
tacticians  to  take  acount  of  the  inviting  conformation  of  the 
ground  and  to  promptly  drop  closed  formations,  the  capture 
of  St.  Privat-Amanvilliers  would  not  have  been  difficult,  or 
costly  in  time  and  blood;  as  regards  tactics,  we  should  have 
gained  clear  conceptions  and  ideas,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  false  conclusions  drawn  from  faulty  measures  have 
spoiled  the  tactical  views.  Thus  the  art  decayed  through 
the  fault  of  the  artists!  

♦Compare  "Die  Feldartillerie  in  ihrer  Unterstellung  unter  die 
Generalkommandos,"  Berlin,  E.  S.  Mittler,  1889. 

23 


346  Inquiries  into  tlic  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

l.ac'k  of  i-t'coimaissaiu'c  and  of  pi'oparatioii  by  artil- 
lery are  the  two  roots  of  our  discoinlitures  and  of  our  "scien- 
tific" errors.  The  second  result  in  i)art  from  the  first; 
Avhen  ^Ye  do  not  even  approximately  know  where  the  enemy 
is  and  what  his  position  and  strength  are,  the  first  requisite 
for  an  intellijient  and  retTsonable  preparation  by  artillery 
is.  of  course,  lackinri:.  The  best  of  artillery  is  then  unable 
to  fulfill  its  task;  it  is  hauled  here  and  there.  ]>articularly  if 
the  system  of  transmission  of  orders  is  faulty  or  not  used  at 
all,  or  it  is  assigned  too  many  objectiACS  and  has  neither  suf- 
ficient time  nor  power  against  any  one  of  them  and  accom- 
plishes nothing,  because  groping  in  the  dark.  Unless  these 
evils  are  rigorously  counteracted,  we  shall  be  subject  to 
further  numerous  disappointments,  which  will  produce  fur- 
ther tactical  evils  of  secondary  character,  and  because  that 
should  by  all  means  be  prevented,  we  have  here  called  the 
child  by  the  right  name  without  ''giving  names."  Neglect 
of  the  siiui>lest  tactical  rules,  faulty  measures  in  many 
forms,  neglect  of  the  ground,  ainilessness  and  lack  of  in- 
sight in  attenij)ting  the  same  impossible  thing  by  the  same 
impossible  method  until  disgusted,  the  employment  of  anti- 
quated forms,  ignorance  of  the  ballistics  of  the  enemy's  wea- 
pon, all  of  these  are  some  of  the  points  that  ])roduced  our 
losses  and  our  subsequent  tactical  errors,  and  the  appear- 
ance of  the  ''Summer-night's  Dream"  was  ])erfectly  intelligi- 
ble, although  I  find  much  in  it  to  disapprove  and  consider 
as  downright  incorrect  and  harmful.  Troops  do  not  con- 
(pier  unless  they  are  led.  The  war  artist  (tactician)  is  not 
served  with  a  scheme.  The  pu]nls  distort  the  master's 
good  ideas  into  the  radical:  the  radicals,  declaiming  against 
the  one-sidedness  of  others,  are  themselves  preaching  one- 
sidedness  in  all  its  polypic  forms,  until  the  reality  of  war 


Tactical  Deductions.  347 

applies   the   correction   that   can   not   be   made   in    peace. 
Unfortunately,  the  same  is,  as  a  rule,  of  a  trist  character. 

If  the  enemy  is  thoroughly  reconnoitered,  if  the  leaders 
know  what  they  are  fo  do,  if,  in  a  word,  there  is  tactical  lead- 
ing, if  the  moral  and  destructive  effects  of  artillery  are  util- 
ized, then  frontal  attacks  are  practicable  after  infantry  and 
artillery  have  gained  the  superiority  of  fire. 

The  faulty  lessons  frequently  drawn  from  attacks  ruth- 
lessly undertaken,  have  found  their  generic  term  and  expres- 
sion in  the  word  "Schneid"  (smartness,  keenness.— Tr.) ;  it 
is  to  be  feared,  however,  that  the  term  may  lead  to  overesti- 
mation  of  one's  self  and  to  underestimation  of  the  enemy. 
Without  stoutness  of  heart,  courage,  and  determination, 
nothing  can  be  accomplished  in  a  perilous  situation,  but  the 
advocates  of  "»S'c/meir/,"  which  is  now  so  prevailing,  are 
moving  on  false  ground  because  they  are  nearer  to  the  drill- 
ground  than  to  the  battle-field.  We  may  rest  content  if  in 
war  20  per  cent  of  the  "Schneid"  observable  in  peace,  par 
ticularly  with  the  cavalry,  materialize.  I  only  fear  that 
the  first  great  action  will  prove  a  considerable  corrective. 
The  "Schneid,"  that  may  spring  from  erroneous  ideas  of  war. 
that  is  based  on  mechanical  forms,  and  seeks  to  force  a  deci- 
sion by  a  ruthless  rushing  in,  represents  an  unthinking  ten- 
dency which  is  bound  to  lead  to  bloody  defeat  if  put  into 
I)ractice;  it  is  like  the  mad  rule  of  brute  force,  which  has 
never  accomplished  anything.  The  "Schneid''  that  we  need 
should  be  the  result  of  careful  education  and  training,  the 
intelligent  guidance  and  framing  of  moral  qualities,  intelli- 
gence, and  knowledge,  in  reasonable  tactical  rules  and  ideas 
of  battle.  It  should  have  its  seat  in  the  man's  breast;  other- 
wise we  shall  constantly  relapse  into  lifeless  and  inefficient 
mechanics.  The  "Schneid"  of  the  First  Infantry  Brigade  of 
the  fJuard  convevs  a  terrible  lesson.  Not  until  the  attack  had 


348  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

failed  was  it  remembered  that  the  artillery  should  prepare 
the  attack,  and  what  should  have  been  done  long  before  was 
done  only  then.  In  this  one  example  insufficient  reconnais- 
sance and  insufficient  preparation  by  artillery  exacted  cruel 
penalties;  such  instances  occurred  repeatedly  afterward, 
though  not  to  the  same  degree.  Le  Bourget,  on  the  other 
hand,  shows  how  we  had  profited  by  experience;  there  recon- 
naissance was  sufficient  and  the  "Schneid-^  manifested  was 
of  the  right  kind,  because  resting  on  a  rational  basis  and 
directed  into  a.  proper  system  for  the  particular  circum- 
stances, etc.  Reconnaissance  has  been  rendered  much 
more  difficult  by  smokeless  powder,  a  cogent  reason  for 
devoting  particular  care  to  it,  in  order  not  to  fare  worse  in 
future.  As  a  result  the  preparations  for  the  action  will  per- 
haps take  up  much  time.  It  being  probable  that  an  army 
may  have  to  make  several  deployments,  it  follows,  in  the 
first  place,  that  the  independent  cavalry  should  gain  supe- 
riority over  that  of  the  enemy  by  its  strength — i.  e.,  by  bat- 
tle. It  is  employed,  as  it  were,  only  as  an  element  of  grand 
tactics — i.  e.,  it  is  its  duty  always  to  locate  the  enemy's  flanks 
as  soon  as  possible  and  to  maintain  uninterrupted  communi- 
cation with  army  headquarters  by  means  of  a  well-organized 
system  of  reporting,  and  to  send  direct  reports  to  the  nearest 
corps  commanders  also.  Unless  the  enemy's  flanks  are 
promptly  located,  cavalry  fails  of  its  task  and  adds  to  the 
difficulty  of  the  superior  command  in  devising  its  further 
steps.  Reports  may  be  transmitted  by  good  riders,  by  tele- 
graph, or  by  cyclists.  In  the  maneuvers  at  Beauvais  and  at 
Oiins  in  1893  the  brigades  had  communication  with  the 
divisions  within  two  hours  after  the  cavalry  reached  its  posi- 
tions. In  applying  modern  practice  to  Gravelotte  we  may 
say  that  the  laying  of  the  field  telegraph  could  easily  keep 
step  with  the  advance  of  the  II.  Army,  and  that  there 


Tactical  Deductions.  349 

should  never  have  been  any  sensible  interruption  of  com- 
munication between  it  and  grand  headquarters. 

Though  the  flanks  may  have  been  ascertained,  much 
remains  to  be  done,  before  the  pitched  battle,  that  does  not 
appear  at  once  from  the  map  with  respect  to  the  flanks. 
The  practice  of  riding  boldly  up  to,  and  through,  the  enemy's 
advanced  troops,  as  we  see  it  in  peace,  is  impossible  in  war, 
and  the  results  of  the  reports  from  patrols  will  be  insuffi- 
cient; the  captive  balloon  may  under  certain  circumstances 
be  of  great  service,  but  is  not  a  reliable  means  of  reconnais- 
sance in  field  operations,  though  nearly  100  years  (since 
Fleurus)  old;  it  should  therefore  not  be  looked  upon  as  a 
remedy  for  the  uncertainty  caused  by  smokeless  powder. 
The  captive  balloon  in  all  its  trials  has  disappointed  its 
most  ardent  advocates.  Fastened  to  the  ground  it  is  sub- 
ject to  sudden,  troublesome,  and  dangerous  jolts,  when 
there  is  the  least  wind;  complete  calmness  of  the  atmos- 
phere is  very  rare,  many  times  the  soaked  ground  may  make 
it  difficult  or  impossible  for  the  wagon  to  follow,  and  thick 
atmosphere  may  prevent  any  great  range  of  vision. 

The  observation  ladders  also  are  mere  palliatives. 

From  a  favorable  point  an  army  commander  armed  with 
good  glasses  may  have  a  good  view  for  8  kilometers  on 
either  side — i.  e.,  in  all  directions;  but  such  points  are  rare, 
and  points  permitting  sufficient  view  to  the  front  are  still 
rarer. 

The  onl}'  other  remaining  means  of  tactical  reconnais- 
sance is  to  engage  the  enemy  in  such  a  way  as  to  compel  him 
to  develop  his  forces  to  an  extent  that  will  allow  inferences 
to  be  drawn.  The  very  best,  and  best  led,  bodies  of  cav- 
alry no  longer  possess  the  fighting  power  necessary  for  that 
purpose.  Infantiy  may  not  be  able  to  deploy  and  produce 
effect  fat  long  range)  as  quickly  as  may  be  desirable,  an3 


850  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

thus  the  artillery,  protected  by  cavalry,  alone  remains  for 
long-range  fire  for  these  purposes.  The  assailant  will  then 
experience  the  disadvantages  advanced  positions  may 
entail  on  him  to-day;  they  cannot  be  taken  without  fight- 
ing, and  the  final  reconnaissance  cannot  be  made  until  they 
are  taken.  It  is  therefore  not  improbable  that  in  a  case 
like  that  of  Gravelotte  an  entire  daj^  will  be  spent  in  recon- 
noitering  actions. 

Intimately  connected  therewith  are  the  questions  of  or- 
ganization of  the  system  of  transmitting  orders,  and  of  the 
distribution  and  emploj-ment  of  artillery.  The  former  we 
have  suflQciently  discussed;  about  the  latter  a  few  more 
words  are  necessary.  Experiments  have  been  made  in  the 
maneuvers  of  recent  years  in  not  attaching  any  artillery  to 
the  advance  guard  so  as  to  avoid  the  danger  of  being  prema- 
turely forced  to  deploy  in  an  undesirable  direction.  That 
fear  implies  a  prior  commission  of  errors.  Full  information 
cannot  always  be  promptly  gained  by  the  use  of  patrols,  offi- 
cers, and  other  means  that  have  been  referred  to, but  enough 
may  be  ascertained  for  forming  a  general  idea.  What  infor- 
mation is  lacking  will  have  to  be  supplied  by  fighting  on  the 
part  of  artillery  and  infantry'.  At  this  stage  infantry  will 
hardly  be  able  to  compel  the  enemy  to  show  his  artillery; 
artillery  is  needed  for  that  purpose,  and  in  considerable 
strength.  It  is  not  easy  to  skillfully  lead  artillery  without 
information  beyond  the  general  result  of  previous  recon- 
naissance, but  we  have  to  learn  it;  the  artillerist  should 
therefore  be  a  far-seeing  man  and  competent  to  judge  the 
situation.  Provided  the  advance  guard  cavalry  does  its 
duty,  I  can  reach  no  other  conclusion  than  that  an  "Ahthei- 
Jung"*  of  artillery  should  be  attached  to  every  advance 
guard  of  a  division,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the  divisional 

*A  battalion  of  two  or  more  batteries. — Translator. 


Tactical  Deductions.  35  L 

artillery  be  inserted  in  the  column  of  the  main  body.  By 
means  of  a  good  eye,  of  sudden  appearance  in  force,  quick 
ranging,  and  continued  accurate  observation,  artillery 
will  in  the  future  be  able  to  accomplish  feats  that  could 
not  heretofore  be  expected  from  that  arm.  Nothing  should 
be  left  undone  to  develop  the  tactical  judgment  of  artillery 
officers. 

Moreover  the  commanders  will  frequently  have  to  make 
the  reconnaissance  for  their  own  work  in  person,  or,  depend- 
ing on  the  strength  of  their  command,  they  may  despatch 
officers  of  judgment  on  fast  horses,  who,  accompanied  by 
3  or  4  well-mounted  despatch  riders,  will  approach  the  ene- 
my as  much  under  cover  as  possible  to  gain  an  insight  in  the 
state  of  affairs  from  elevated  points  by  the  use  of  good 
glasses,  or  to  survey  portions  of  the  enemy's  position  from 
a  flank.  What  I  emphasize  in  this  connection  is  judgment, 
excellence  in  horsemanship,  and  delight  in  daring.  Without 
that  combination  of  qualities  these  officers  will  never  be 
able  to  accomplish  their  task  in  a  satisfactory  manner. 

As  a  type  in  this  respect  I  have  in  mind  the  present 
commanding  general  of  the  XVI.  Army  Corps,  Count  von 
Haseler,  and  I  know  all  will  agree  with  me  who  know  what 
that  one  officer  accomplished  in  peace  and  war  by  just  such 
a  combination  of  qualities.  Well,  Haselers  are  no  common- 
place men,  and  should  for  that  reason  be  emulated;  without 
such  men  an  army  will  be  poorly  advised  where  the  variable 
situation  on  the  enemy's  side  is  concerned.  That  leads  me 
back  to  the  statement  I  made  in  the  Introduction, and  which 
I  meant  to  elucidate  and  vindicate  in  this  chapter — namely, 
that  great  care  should  be  taken  not  to  employ  general  staff 
officers  too  much  in  duties  of  a  bureaucratic  tendency,  and 
too  little  in  active,  practical  employment.  The  two,  as  a  rule, 
do  not  go  well  together;  those  who  incline  to  the  former 


352  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

as  the  aim  of  their  lives  will  dislike  the  bodily  exertion 
required  for  practical  work.  I  acknowledge  that  it  may  be 
difiScult  always  to  find  the  right  road,  but  the  latter  should 
never  be  lost  sight  of,  because  too  much  depends  on  it  that 
would  not  follow  as  a  natural  result  in  time  of  war.  Field- 
marshal  Moltke  demanded  good  horsemanship  and  daily 
reading  of  good  newspapers.  It  may  perhaps  not  be  out 
of  place  to  point  out  that  newspaper  reading,  as  handled  by 
Moltke,  does  not  seem  to  prevail  to-day,  and  I  would  also 
like  to  point  out  that  there  is  no  better  means  of  preparing 
for  the  general  work  of  the  general  staff  officer  than  the  crit- 
ical reading  of  newspapers.  The  news  contained  therein 
is  in  a  sense  reports  and  accounts  of  doubtful  matters,  and 
is  frequently  contradictory.  It  offers  a  fine  opportunity  for 
the  officers  to  constantly  exercise  and  test  their  powers  of 
conjecture,  to  distinguish  the  correct  from  that  which  is  in- 
correct, and  to  discover  by  their  own  judgment  the  "true 
inwardness"  in  the  labyrinth  of  inaccurate  statements.  In 
this  respect  there  is  no  position  that  so  much  resembles  the 
work  of  the  general  staff  officer  in  peace  and  war  as  does 
that  of  an  able  editor.and  the  great  Moltkeknewexactlyhow 
to  point  out  everywhere  the  means  that  lead  up  to  the  great 
aim  of  the  general  staff  officer — namely,  to  gain  by  personal 
examination  and  judgment  a  more  or  less  correct  conception 
of  the  truth  and  of  the  facts  from  a  mass  of  inaccurate 
and  uncertain  statements,  inferences,  and  paraphrase.  All 
cannot  accomplish  it  by  mere  work — much  depends  on  nat- 
ural gifts — nor  is  it  possible  in  every  case  to  point  out  the 
methods;  the  proverb  ''Practice  makes  perfect"  applies 
here;  nay,  daily  discipline  in  such  matters  is  the  bread  of 
the  general  staff  officer,  because  it  requires  all  the  powers 
of  the  mind  to  be  concentrated  on  one  point,  which  psychic- 
ally, bureaucratically,  and  tactically,  is  the  vocation  of  the 


Toxtical  Deductions.  353 

general  staff  officer.  These  things  enlarge  and  sharpen  the 
judgment;  they  are  to  him  daily  mental  and  moral  gym- 
nastics, not  only  in  the  military,  but  still  more,  in  peace,  in 
the  political  field.  The  general  staff  officer  should  there- 
fore be  master  of  the  latter;  it  will  save  him  from  false, 
bureaucratic  bias,  since  in  tactics  variation  alone  is  con- 
stant, while  war  and  politics  are  one  in  character,  insep- 
arable and  indivisible.  The  change  in  the  direction  of 
the  mai'ch  toward  Sedan  shows  how  difficult  it  is  to  discern 
the  truth  among  contradictory  newspaper  statements  or 
reports  that  seem  improbable.  We  here  have  the  same 
requirement  again  in  the  strictly  military  field;  reconnais- 
sances (in  the  strategic  sense)  are  frequently  made  in  conse- 
quence of  newspaper  and  other  reports;  the  character  of 
reconnaissance  is  always  the  same  and  should  always  be 
most  extensively  practiced  in  doubtful  situations  of  large  or 
small  import.  It  may  be  said  that  the  general  staff  officer 
is  not  always  available  for  such  duties;  I  do  not  insist  on  it; 
care  should,  however,  be  taken  that  reconnaissance  be  dealt 
with  in  a  way  befitting  its  present  and  future  importance, 
and  that  nothing  be  undertaken  without  thorough  reconnais- 
sance in  order  that  we  may  not  again  witness  such  a 
lamentable  occurrence  as  at  Gravelotte,  not  to  mention 
other  things  not  quite  so  bad.  General  staff  officers  will,  as 
a  rule,  be  the  only  ones  sufficiently  familiar  with  the  ideas  of 
the  superior  commanders  to  carry  out  a  reconnaissance  with 
skill.*  Every  action  entered  upon  without  thorough  recon- 
naissance is  a  game  of  chance;  every  attack  undertaken 
without  proper  artillery  preparation,  an  indiscretion. 

♦Compare  the  role  of  Captain  Seebeck  in  "Die  Gefechte  von  Bois- 
comiinm  nnd  Lorcey  am  24ste  nnd  2<iste  Xnvembor,  1870"  ("The 
Actions  of  Boiscommun  and  Lorcey  on  the  24th  and  26th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1870"),  Berlin,  1893,  R.  Felix,  military  publisher. 


354  Inquiries  into  ike  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

VIII.     Of  Turning  Movements.* 

Turning  movements  are  as  old  as  war,  tactically  as  well 
as  strategically,  and  many  great  leaders,  conscious  of  their 
superiority,  have  so  planned  their  operations  that  the  tac- 
tical turning  movement  followed  as  a  natural  sequence  from 
the  continuation  of  the  strategical  movement.  Thus,  for 
instance,  Cromwell  acted  at  Worcester,  Napoleon  I.  at 
Ulm.  in  1805,  and  at  Jena  in  1800,  and  the  Allies  did  the 
same  at  Leipsic;  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians,  we  find  it  in 
1866  at  Koniggratz,  and  in  1870-71  at  Worth,  Gravelotte,  and 
Sedan;  on  the  part  of  the  French  at  Coulmiers,  Beaune  la 
Eolande,  Loigny-Poupry,  Bapaume,  on  the  Lisaine;  again,  on 
the  part  of  the  Germans,  at  St.  Quentin,  and  in  Manteuflfel's 
operations  against  Bourbaki,  etc. 

In  all  these  cases  the  initiatory  measures  are  of  strate- 
gic origin;  in  their  highest  development  they  result  in  a 
complete  surrounding,  of  which  Ulm.  Metz,  and  Sedan  are 
good  examples. 

In  order  to  study  military  history  and  apply  its  lessons, 
it  is  necessary  to  thoroughly  investigate  the  causes  in  each 
case,  which  in  turn  requires  full  knowledge  of  the  meaning 
of  terms,  of  strategy  and  tactics  as  a  whole,  and  of  their 
details.  A  certain  tendency  unfortunately  seems  to  be 
formulating,  which,  if  prevailing,  should  be  counteracted  by 
every  available  means,  because  bej-ond  doubt  leading  to  con- 
fusion and  to  a  decay  of  the  art  of  war;  it  is  the  tendency  no 
longer  to  respect  any  boundary  between  strategy  and  tac- 
tics. Judging  by  what  comes  to  our  ears,  that  tendency  has 
many  adherents,  but  we  fear  it  would  merely  furnish  us 
with  ^'routiniers''  lacking  in  appreciation  of  the  finer  aspects 
of  the  art,  and  who  would  ever  remain  superficial  imitators 


*The  term  here  used  by  the  author  is  "Vrnfassung,"  a  general 
term  for  overlapping,  outflanking,  and  turning  movements. — Tr. 


Tactical  Deductions.  355 

and  who  can  never  lay  claim  to  a  thorough  understanding  of 
the  nature  of  things.  I  have  no  intention  to  write  a  dis- 
course on  strategy  or  tactics,  in  order  to  convert  men  mis- 
led in  their  intellectual  conceptions.  Those  who  have 
preached  such  doctrines  have  burdened  themselves  with  a 
heavy  responsibility.  I  will  briefly  say  that  a  person,  for 
instance,  who  is  incapable  of  appreciating  the  difference 
between  one  of  Beethoven's  symphonies  and  a  rhapsody  by 
Brahms  is  to  be  pitied,  because  Nature  has  denied  him  the 
faculty  of  recognizing,  discerning,  enjoying,  and  of  survey- 
ing the  vast  field  lying  between  the  two  in  all  its  gradations 
and  of  understanding  all  its  fine  distinguishing  shades.  To 
such  men  it  is  all  simply  music,  to  such  soldiers  strategy  and 
tactics  are  simply  war,  and  war  merely  tactics.  Their  place 
is  in  the  barracks.  Because  the  spirit,  mind,  and  emotions 
of  such  men  are  insensible  to  all  the  finer  shades,  these  fine 
distinctions,  which  are  a  source  of  real  enjoyment  to  supe- 
rior minds,  do  not  therefore  disappear,  nor  do  the  gradations 
of  art;  art  is  simply  beyond  the  comprehension  of  those  piti- 
able men  and  soldiers  in  whom  an  understanding  of  it  has  not 
been  cultivated.  Though  some  people  may  be  unable  to  dis- 
tinguish between  bright  and  faint  red,  and  though  they 
may  deny  any  difference  in  them  because  they  do  not  per- 
ceive it,  that  difference  of  shade  nevertheless  remains,  it 
is  simply  beyond  the  grasp  of  their  uncultivated  eye;  it  is 
the  same  in  the  science  of  war  with  those  who  deny  a  differ- 
ence betwen  strategy  and  tactics!  Whoever  fails  to  com- 
prehend that  the  measures  resulting  in  the  closing  of  the 
ring  at  Sedan  are  of  strategic  origin  should  keep  at  a  long 
distance  from  the  art,  for  to  him  the  art  of  war  is  a  closed 
book. 

However  foolish  it  would  be  to  deny  the  fundamental  dif- 
ference between  strategj^and  tactics,it  would  be  equally  fool- 


356  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  tli^  Future. 

isli  to  keep  them  ever  pedantically,  schematicallY  separated. 
Just  as  in  the  highest  product  of  art  of  any  kind  the  sum 
total  of  artistic  effect  is  brought  out  so  that  it  is  impossible 
to  say  this  line  stops  here,  that  one  begins  there,  so  in  the 
highest  product  of  military  art,  in  battle,  the  strategic  lines 
merge  into  the  tactical,  and  then  to  go  to  work  and  seek  for 
a  difference  would  be  to  betray  the  instincts  of  the  artisan. 
It  is  a  perfectly  logical  phenomenon  in  military  history  that 
all  great  generals,  of  whatever  nation,  have  been  men  of 
aesthetic  tastes,  with  a  love  for  the  fine  arts,  men  of  fine  sen- 
sibilities, of  sharp  discernment,  of  bright  and  powerful 
mind;  they  all  had  the  make-up  of  artists,  if  I  may  express 
it  in  this  way,  and  in  our  military  education  nothing  is  more 
to  be  deplored  than  the  total  lack  of  everything  that  tends 
to  develop  and  refine  the  taste  for  art,  the  {esthetic  taste,  and 
all  finer  sensibilities.  For  that  reason  many  do  not  strive 
for  the  highest,  their  conception  of  their  vocation  is  super- 
ficial, they  never  reflect  on  its  artistic  aspect.  Their  intro. 
duction  to  a:»sthetics,  particularly  in  connection  with  ra- 
tional lectures  on  philosophy,  would  be  of  a  thousandfold 
more  benefit  than  many  other  things  to  which  half  a  lifetime 
is  devoted,  which  merely  touch  the  outlines,  and  which  ai-e 
matters  of  course!  With  such  a  system  of  education,  tactics 
and  strategy  would  never  have  been  thrown  in  the  same  pot 
and  there  Avould  be  more  of  spontaneous  effort  to  become  an 
artist.  It  ma}-  not  be  inopportune  to  say  so,  since  it  appears, 
from  what  has  been  stated,  that  the  bounding  lines  between 
strategy  and  tactics  have  been  somewhat  displaced  by  re- 
cent inventions,  and  that  in  the  position  warfare,  which  will 
certainly  ensue,  the  position-battle  will  be  a  normal  feature. 
A  decision  can  hardly  be  expected  in  such  cases  without 
turning  movements. 

It  is  natural  that  the  numerically  superior  should  use 


Tactical  Deductions.  357 

his  superiority  for  turning  movements,  but  up  to  within 
recent  times  those  who  employed  turning  movements  did 
not  invariably  possess  a  great  superiority,  nor  has  their  vic- 
tory been  due  in  every  case  to  the  turning  of  the  enemy  and 
to  the  tactics  of  the  superior  number  of  combatants  em- 
ployed. Other  important  causes  are  therefore  bound  to 
exist  which  bring  about  the  real  decision  after  the  material 
object  has  been  accomplished.  Moreover,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  if  anything  at  all  were  normal  in  tactics,  turn- 
ing tactics  might  be  said  to  have  been  the  rule;  in  modern 
times,  on  every  occasion,  in  the  insignificant  action  as  in 
the  great  battle,  there  must  be  some  reason  for  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  generals  have  made  turning  movements  with 
inferior  forces  even  before  the  introduction  of  the  present 
improved  arms,  and  have  conijuered  whenever  that  minor- 
ity was  conscious  of  superior  fighting  power.  It  is  plain 
that  we  should  not,  either  here  or  anywhere,  content  our- 
selves with  reducing  such  phenomena  to  rule,  with  explain- 
ing them  in  a  purely  mechanical  way,  and  with  measuring 
them  with  the  dividers,  which  seems  to  be  the  favorite  occu- 
pation of  our  peace  war-artists;  military  history  is  useful 
only  when  the  causes  in  each  case  are  investigated  and 
understood. 

Notwithstanding  his  considerable  inferiority.  General 
Davout  flanked  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  at  Auerstadt,  and 
could  do  so  without  danger,  because  the  fighting  power  of 
the  Trench  Army  was  much  greater  than  that  of  the  Prus- 
sian Army,  or  because  the  French  tactics  were  better,  to 
express  it  differently.  Davout  did  not  at  all  act  as  the 
"lucky  soldier,"  but  as  a  man  fully  cognizant  of  the  supe- 
riority of  the  French  tactics  on  account  of  the  superior  lead- 
ing and  greater  effect  inherent  in  them,  and  what  to  the 
uninitiated  did,  and  does,  appear  as  very  hazardous,  is  in 


368  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

fact  something  very  natural,  something  intended  and  well 
considered,  I  do  wish  to  call  Davout's  resolve  something 
extraordinary,  but  I  desire  to  point  out  that,  particularly  in 
view  of  Davout's  unfavorable  strategical  (the  "collectors" 
will,  of  course,  insist  on  calling  it  tactical)  situation,  the 
example  furnishes  a  standard  for  all  times  of  what  a  gen- 
eral may  risk  without  speculating,if  he  knows  both  sides  and 
is  thus  aware  when  he  may  deviate  from  those  rules  which 
"tacticians"  are  wont  to  consider  inviolable.  To  be  a  tacti- 
cian is  not  to  cling  to  rules,  but  to  adapt  reasonable  means 
to  the  circumstances  in  order  that  all  the  fighting  power 
there  is  in  the  troops  may  be  utilized.  Davout  acted  thus, 
and  is  entitled  to  one  of  the  first  places  among  tacticians  on 
account  of  his  intelligent  action.  I  know  of  no  other  exam- 
ple of  flanking  at  all  comparable  with  this  one,  considering 
the  great  inferiority  of  numbers  and  the  victory  gained  de- 
spite that  inferiority;  the  firing  power  of  the  French  infantry 
and  artillery  was  certainly  not  superior  to  that  of  the  Prus- 
sians. The  example  goes  to  show  that  given  two  opponents 
armed  with  like  weapons,  they  will  by  no  means  produce 
the  same  effect  with  them,  and  that  the  effect  depends  on 
the  use  made  of  the  weapons.  It  is  exactly  so  to-day! 
Fighting  power  and  firing  powder  are  two  different  things, 
and  we  should  not  only  declaim  against  those  who  would 
recognize  but  one  tactical  example  as  regards  forms,  but 
also  combat  those  doctrines  which  rely  solely  on  firing 
power.  Firing  is  but  a  part — the  material  part — of  the 
fighting  power,  of  which  the  other  components  are  to  be 
sought  in  the  field  of  morale,  of  intelligence,  and  of  disci- 
jjline,  all  of  which  qualities  should  be  subordinate  to  it.  If 
firing  power  had  been  the  decisive  factor  in  Davout's  resolve, 
he  would  have  been  guilty  of  a  piece  of  stupidity,  as  it  is 
plain  that  40,000  muskets  can  project  more  bullets  than 


Tactical  Deductions.  359' 

25,000,  provided  the  qualities  of  the  arms  are  the  same  on 
both  sides. 

Auerstadt  furnishes  proof  that,  notwithstanding  great 
numerical  inferiority,  and  with  equally  good  fire-anns  on 
both  sides,  flanking  may  produce  great  results,  if  the  flank- 
ing opponent  employs  superior  tactics. 

While  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  ballistic  qualities  of 
all  arms  are  incomparably  superior  to-day,  still,  when  look- 
ing at  both  opponents,  we  have  to  acknowledge  that  they  are 
about  on  the  same  level  as  regards  armament.  Hence  there 
has  been  no  change  in  the  essential  chracteristics;  the  im- 
proved arms  simply  extend  the  limits  of  movement  and 
of  fire  more  or  less,  thus  rendering  the  dispositions  for,  and 
the  execution  of,  turning  movements,  and  the  success  of  any 
kind  of  enterprise,  much  more  difficult.  I  shall  endeavo^ 
to  prove  this. 

When,  after  the  establishment  of  the  republic,  the 
French  had  gained  superiority  of  numbers,  it  was  the 
rule  with  them,  not  the  exception,  to  seek  strategic  turning 
movements,  and  the  resulting  tactical  flanking,  in  the  same 
way  as  did  the  Germans  in  1800  and  1870-71,  not  only  when 
the  numbers  were  equal,  but  also  when  they  were  inferior  or 
superior  (compare  Trautenau  June  28th,  Gitschin  June  29th, 
Koniggratz  July  3d,  Blumenau  July  24th,  with  equal  or 
inferior  numbers;  Worth  August  0th,  Gravelotte  August 
18th,  Sedan  September  1st.  with  superior  numbers ;  Le  Mans 
January  10th  and  11th,  St.  Quentin  January  19,  1871,  with 
Inferior  forces).  The  very  first  action  fought  by  the  republic 
against  the  Germans  at  Coulmiers  on  November  9th  was 
planned  strategically  as  a  turning  movement  and  tactically 
as  "Umfassung,''  as  was  Beaune  la  Rolande  on  November 
28th,  Loigny-Poupry  on  December  2d,  Bapaume  January  2d 
and  3d,  1871,  Lisaine  15th,  IGth,  17th  of  January,  1871,  Le 


360  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

Mans  on  and  after  Januai'y  5th;  all  of  these  instances  are 
taken  from  field  operations.  As  regards  position  warfare, 
Noisseville  (first  day),  Le  Bourget,  December  21,  1870,  were 
planned  as  "Umfassungs"  battles,  but  Coulmiers  was  the 
only  one  where  some  success  was  gained,  chiefly  because  the 
German  cavalry,  which  should  have  acted  decisively  on  the 
right  flank,  failed  in  its  task.  In  all  of  these  cases  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  French  plan  for  each  battle  provided 
for  an  effective  strategic  turning  movement,  that  in  every 
case  the  French  had  a  considerable  numerical  superiority, 
and  that  on  account  of  their  superior  armament  they  should 
also  have  possessed  a  great  superiority  of  fire  power.  That 
they  nevertheless  failed  was  due  to  the  fact,  1,  that  battles 
vvith  turning  movements  are  very  diflScult  to  direct;  2,  that 
they  require  an  excellent  system  of  transmission  of  orders; 
3,  clear  judgment  and  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  leaders; 
and  4,  a  high  degree  of  mobility ;  in  brief,  a  higher  degree  of 
training  and  efficiency  on  the  part  of  the  troops  than  is  pos- 
sessed by  the  enemy.  Armies  devoid  of  that  combination 
of  qualities  ai*e  unsuccessful,  as  is  strikingly  illustrated  by 
the  battle  on  the  Lisaine.  There  the  French  commander-in- 
chief,  in  planning  the  turning  movement,  was  as  much  mis- 
taken with  regard  to  the  extent  of  the  German  line  as 
were  the  Germans  on  August  18,  1870,  about  the  French 
position.  It  is  well  known  that  in  both  cases  the  front  of 
the  position  proved  to  be  twice  as  long  as  was  anticipated. 
In  both  cases  the  turning  movements  were  planned  on 
wrong  premises,  and  in  both  cases  the  error  was  only  found 
out  when  the  turning  movement  was  under  way.  By  dint  of 
the  higher  efficiency  of  their  armies  the  Germans  repaired 
their  error,  in  the  main,  within  three  hours,  and  gained  the 
decision  and  victory  on  the  18th  of  August  by  means  of 
the  turning  movement  as  planned,   whereas   the   French 


Tactical  Deductions.  361 

East  Army,  whose  corps  were  closely  concentrated  on 
the  right,  accomplished  no  more  in  three  days  than  to 
disentangle  them!  The  turning  movement  ultimately  as- 
sumed the  right  direction,  but  by  that  time  the  fighting 
power  of  the  entire  army  was  broken,  and  instead  of  conquer- 
ing, the  army  suffered  a  defeat  which  culminated  in  a 
catastrophe. 

A  turning  movement  therefore  requires,  in  the  first 
place,  an  eflBeient  army  with  efficient  infantry  of  superior 
fighting  power.  Wherever  these  requisites  were  combined, 
there  the  turning  movement  with  equal  numbers,  and  even 
with  inferior  numbers  (Auerstadt,  St  Quentin,  and  lastly  Le 
Mans)  led  to  success;  where  that  combination  is  lacking, 
neither  superior  number  of  combatants,  nor  the  greater  num- 
ber of  rifles,  nor  superior  fire  power  will  ensure  success, 
for  a  stout  opponent  is  not  driven  off  by  fire;  even  in  the 
"Umfassungs"  battle  the  tactical  point  has  to  be  carried  by 
assault,  and  after  a  protracted  fire  action  the  infantry  must 
still  possess  sufficient  fighting  power  for  the  final  onslaught. 
Such  was  the  case  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  at  Worth, 
Gravelotte,  and  St.  Quentin,  while  Sedan  is  less  entitled  to 
mention  in  this  connection.  Chanzy's  operations  against 
Vendome  (January  5,  1871),  where  he  meant  to  turn  the  Ger- 
mans, show,  on  the  other  hand,  that  of  the  two  opponents 
meeting  on  the  offensive  the  numerically  weaker  Germans, 
who  were  to  be  turned,  themselves  turned  the  French  as  the 
operations  progressed,  and  that  on  accomplishing  the  turn 
ing  movement  (La  Tuil^rie)  the  battle  was  decided  by  the 
bold  action  of  a  few  companies.  I  do  not  believe  that  modern 
arms  and  the  new  powder  greatly  change  the  nature  of  the 
"Umfassvngs^'  battle;  that  the  decision  on  the  turned  flank 
for  flanks)  requires  an  assault  as  the  last  act ;  that  the  latter 
cannot  be  much  more  difficult  than  it  was  in  1870,  against 

24 


362  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  Imperial  Army  witli  the  Chassepot,  since  the  fire  power 
cannot  become  much  greater  than  it  was  at  St.  Prlvat, 
for  instance;  that  the  side  undertaking  turning  movements 
is  better  able  to  solve  the  tactical  part  of  the  problem  than 
was  the  case  then ;  and  that,  on  account  of  the  unobstructed 
view,  the  turning  movement  can  be  much  better  directed 
than  formerly.  The  decisive  blow  will  be  equally  required 
in  future;  it  may  even  be  delivered  by  swarms  intermixed 
with  small  and  more  solid  bodies,  the  swarm  being  of  neces- 
sity the  prevailing  formation  as  heretofore. 

In  that  connection  we  cannot  dispense  with  successive 
lines  (Treff en), and  they  should  not  be  condemned  on  general 
principles  because  wrongly  used  heretofore;  it  is  only  neces- 
sary that  they  be  properly  used  in  certain  situations  and 
phases,  the  formations  to  be  employed  in  each  case  being  left 
to  the  judgment  of  the  leaders.  Owing  to  the  unobstructed 
view,  great  skill  is  indispensable  in  bringing  the  troops  for- 
ward— i.  e.,  in  utilizing  the  ground  for  the  approach,  which  is 
a  prime  requisite  in  such  matters.  It  goes  to  show  that  suc- 
cess requires  the  cooperation  of  many  essentials,  and  that 
turning  movements  to-day  make  higher  demands  on  the 
superior  leaders  than  on  the  troops.  The  leader  should 
therefore  make  a  thorough  personal  reconnaissance  and  so 
inform  himself  of  all  important  matters  as  to  gain  a  clear 
insight  into  the  situation  while  the  troops  are  on  the  march, 
and  to  be  able  to  instruct  and  dispose  them  intelligently  on 
their  arrival.  It  requires  great  mobility,  personal  observa- 
tion, and  a  tactical  eye  on  the  part  of  the  leaders. 

Turning  movements  having  gained  in  favor  since  the 
notable  increase  of  fire  effect  in  1866,  it  is  to  be  expected, 
and  it  is  unavoidable,  that  they  should  gain  still  more  in 
future.  As  regards  any  fear  for  the  front  entertained  by 
the  opponents  of  turning  movements  and  the  swarm  tactics 


Tactical  Deductions.  363 

inseparable  therefrom,  we  believe  that  our  expositions  from 
military  history  show  that  what  is  usually  called  a  weak 
front,  because  of  the  relativeh'  small  number  of  infantry,has 
invariably  proven  sufficiently  strong  to  guard  the  front,  pro- 
vided the  infantry  was  good,  i)rovided  its  tactical  employ- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  leaders  was  correct,  and  provided 
it  was  supported  by  a  numerous  artillery,  A  good  infantry 
is  what  is  specially  needed  to-day  for  a  turning  movement, 
and  it  will  be  well  to  keep  a  few  battalions  in  hand  for  emer- 
gencies. If  their  morale  is  good,  the  troops,  armed  as  they 
are  with  'modern  rifles,  may  be  expected  to  develop  suffi- 
cient jjowers  of  resistance  if  superior  forces  should  turn 
on  them;  and  with  greater  probability,  as  it  is  only  since 
the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder  that  leaders  are  able 
to  lead  in  a  manner  approximating  the  ideal  in  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  employment  of  large  bodies  and  their  common 
object.  Again,  in  the  turning  movement,  infantry  and 
artillery  are  now  able  to  concentrate  their  fire  on  the  most 
important  point  and  just  about  treble  the  effect  as  compared 
with  the  past,  firing  from  various  points,  perhaps  from  the 
front  and  flank,  which  neither  infantry  nor  artillery  could 
formerly  do  on  account  of  the  smoke.  This  possibility  of 
common  fire  direction  of  infantry  and  artillery  against  the 
decisive  point,  and  the  fact  that  the  long-range  rifle  and  the 
shrapnel  echelon  fire  are  bound  to  reach  the  enemy's  re- 
serves from  the  front  and  flank,  will,  in  my  opinion,  make 
the  attack  and  the  habitual  use  of  "Umfassungs'^  more  expe- 
dient than  ever.  This  should  not  provoke  the  friends  of  the 
defensive;  facts  Mall  prove  it  as  surely  as  it  is  better  to  have 
eyes  than  to  have  none. 

In  the  future  attack  we  have  to  distinguish  between 
two  cases:  the  assailant  can  either  approach  under  cover,  or 
he  can  not.     It  is  unnecessarv  to  state  that  in  the  latter  case 


364  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  assailant  labors  under  a  great  disadvantage,  but  it  should 
be  pointed  out  that,  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  smoke, 
it  will  be  much  more  difficult  to  subdue  him  than  formerly 
whenever  he  is  able  to  open  the  action  from  covered 
positions. 

Stupid  measures  on  the  part  of  the  '^sub-tacticians"  may 
cause  the  best  planned  turning  movement  to  fail  in  the  exe- 
cution; St.Quentin  is  an  instructive  example  in  that  respect. 
Although  inferior  in  numbers,  Goben  intended  to  turn  the 
enemy's  right,  to  push  him  away  from  his  line  of  retreat,  and 
to  destroy  him.  It  resembles  the  case  of  Davout  at  Auer- 
stadt.  The  stupid  action  of  the  IGth  Division  and  the  delay 
of  the  15th  Division  in  coming  into  action  destroyed  Goben's 
l)lan,  and  the  decision  was  brought  about  in  the  front,  ex- 
actly the  point  where  he  did  not  want  it!  But  even  while  the 
decision  was  being  made,  and  after  it  was  enacted,  the  mass 
of  cavalry  on  the  German  left  remained  inactive,  though  its 
leading  troops  had  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  within  their 
grasp  and  their  opponents  were  troops  of  inferior  quality. 
In  order  that  harmony  might  not  be  lacking,  the  cavalry  on 
the  right  flank  acted  in  like  manner,  though  confronting  a 
shaken  and  defeated  enemy.  Coulmiers,  Beaune,  Loigny, 
and  St.  Quentin  utterly  condemn  the  German  cavalry  lead- 
ers. In  the  first  case  the  enemy's  turning  movement  suc- 
ceeded on  account  of  the  inactivity  of  our  cavalry;  in  the 
other  cases  we  failecj  of  our  object  for  the  same  reason. 

Prussia's  and  Germany's  opponents  in  1866  and  1870-71 
never  succeeded  in  piercing  the  German  front  while  the  lat- 
ter were  turning  their  opponent's  flank.  At  Gravelotte, 
where  there  was  a  splendid  opportunity  between  noon  and 
o  p.  m.  for  breaking  through  our  IX.  Corps  in  the  direction 
of  Verneville,  the  enemy  failed  to  perceive  his  advantage; 
while  it  would  not  have  been  impossible  after  4  p.  m.  to 


Tactical  Deductions.  365 

break  the  German  front  at  some  point  there,  it  would  not 
have  amounted  to  more  than  a  temporary  success,  because 
at  that  hour  a  secoud  line  (III.,  X.,  and  II.  Army  Corps)  was 
forming  in  rear  of  the  first.     The  various  frontal  attacks  of 
the  French  at  Worth  brought  but  transient  advantages  and 
ultimately  shivered  against  our  artillery.     The  six  attacks 
against  the  3d  Infantry  Brigade  of  the  Guard  at  Amanvil- 
liers  were  repulsed,  but  they  were  intended  as  mere  forward 
movements,  and  not  meant  to  break  our  front.     On  the  other 
hand,  there  are  two  very  instructive  cases  where  the  supe- 
rior enemy,  who  undertook  to  turn  his  opponent,  was  not 
only  not  able  to  defeat  the  latter,  but  was  himself  defeated 
and  had  his  line  of  battle  pierced.     They  are  the  remarkable 
battles  of  Beaune  la  Rolande  on  the  28th  of  November,  and 
of  Loigny-Poupry  on  the  2d  of  December.     In  both  battles 
the  situation  bears  a  certain  resemblance;  at  Beaune  the 
enemy  meant  to  turn  the  three  brigades  of  the  X.  Army 
Corps  with  his  XX.  and  XVIII.  Army  Corps,  while  portions 
of  his  XV.  Corps  were  to  support  the  French  left  and  reap 
the  fruits  of  the  expected  victory;  at  Loigny-Poupry  the 
enemy  intended  to  do  the  same  thing  with  his  XVI.  and  XV. 
Corps  supported  by  the  XVII.    In  either  case  two  separate 
battles  resulted:     1,  Beaune  and  Juranville;  2,  Loigny  and 
Poupry.     In  the  first  case  the  38th  Brigade  was  very  suc- 
cessfully turned  on  three  sides,  but  the  turning  movement 
of  the  XVIII.  Army  Corps  failed  against  the  37th  and  39th 
Brigades  at  Juranville,  both  of   which  maintained  them- 
selves between  the  two  hostile  corps  in  such  a  way  that 
the  latter  could  not  join  hands  effectively  until  very  late. 
The  very  much  inferior  Germans  held  out  in  that  situa- 
tion,   and    finally,    at    3    p.  m.,    when    supported    by    the 
heads   of   the    III.    Corps,   they   turned    the    enemy   them- 
selves, notwithstanding  their  numerical  inferiority.     There 


366  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

was  no  intention  on  our  part  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
turning  movement;  yet,  looked  at  from  the  tactical  point, 
the  offensive  taken  at  Juranville  practically  had  that  effect. 
At  Loigny-Poupry  the  French  meant  to  turn  the  Germans 
on  the  East,  but  a  promx^t  change  of  front  on  the  part  of 
the  22d  Division  made  the  movement  impossible,  while  at 
the  same  time  the  capture  of  Loigny  by  the  17th  Division 
pierced  the  enemy's  main  position  in  front.  The  French 
center  was  successfully  pierced  in  this  manner.  We  have 
dwelt  on  these  two  instances  at  some  length  because  the 
latter  particularly  is  almost  unique  in  military  annals  on 
account  of  the  numerical  inferiority.  It  is  one  of  the  cases 
that  mark  the  culmination  of  the  tactics  of  the  Germans  as 
regards  the  leading,  as  well  as  the  endurance  and  fighting 
power  of  the  troops.  In  both  battles  (at  Beaune  and  Loigny) 
the  swarm  intermixed  with  small  bodies  in  close  order  was 
usually  employed  on  the  offensive.  That  the  lines  of  the 
French,  who  were  making  a  turning  movement,  were  pierced 
is  chiefly  due  to  the  high  degree  of  offensive  spirit  still 
extant  in  the  German  troops  after  the  heavy  losses  of  the 
war  (I.  Bavarian  Army  Corps  and  22d  Division),  and  to  the 
clumsiness  of  the  French  leading  and  of  the  French  troops. 
No  army  should  make  the  "Umfassungs^'  battle  its  rule, 
unless  its  leaders  and  troops  are  fully  equal  to  the  task; 
where  such  is  not  the  case,  it  is  all  the  more  necessary  that 
the  army  corps  be  so  formed  and  disposed  before  the  begin- 
ning of  the  turning  movement  that  the  resulting  line  of 
battle  will  show  no  gaps,  where  the  enemy  may  penetrate, 
maintain  himself,  and  pierce  the  hostile  front.  The  French 
invariably  endeavored  to  dispose  their  troops  in  this  man- 
ner before  the  movement,  but  did  not  succeed  even  in  that. 
It  need  therefore  not  be  specially  stated  that  they  would 
never  have  been  successful  in  launching  a  turning  move- 


Tactical  Deductions.  367 

ment  direct  from  the  march.  Xor  did  they  ever  attempt  it. 
The  diversity  of  ^^Umfassungs"  battles  and  actions  as 
fought  by  the  Germans — notwithstanding  a  number  of 
errors — thus  constitutes  the  most  eloquent  proof  that  a 
highly  efficient  army  alone  can  develop  such  diversity  and 
gain  success,  while  the  French,  on  the  other  hand,  never  suc- 
ceeded in  carrying  out  a  grand  turning  movement — notwith- 
standing their  great  numerical  superiority,  not  even  at 
Coulmiers  and  Bapaume,  both  places  being  evacuated  by 
the  Germans  of  their  own  accord  after  repulsing  the  enemy. 
All  turning  movements  partake  more  or  less  of  the  char- 
acter of  great  "combined  movements,"  which  are  very  diffi- 
cult; an  army  not  thoroughly  efficient  had  better  avoid 
them.  The  fact  that  certain  tactical  fanatics  declaim 
against  the  "Umfassungs''  battles  of  the  Germans  simply 
goes  to  expose  their  inferiority  as  "tacticians,"  and  if  one 
side  is  invariably  successful  and  the  other  invariably  unsuc- 
cessful in  the  same  thing,  the  proof  that  superior  efficiency 
won,  in  spite  of  our  opponent's  superior  fire  power,  is  so  con- 
vincing that  it  is  superfluous  to  say  anything  about  it.  It 
follows  with  certainty  that,  in  consequence  of  the  superior 
fire  power  (small-caliber  arms,  increased  fire  effect  of  artil- 
lery, absence  of  smoke),  the  Germans  will  more  than  ever  be 
partial  to  turning  movements ;  and  that  in  doing  so  they  will 
be  the  more  protected  from  the  danger  of  having  their  line 
pierced  because  our  fire  power  has  been  at  least  trebled  since 
1870-71,  while  that  of  the  French,  in  comparison  with  that 
of  the  Chassepot,  has  merely  gained  in  strength.  We  should 
therefore  preserve  our  composure,  base  our  calculations  on 
facts,  and  give  no  more  room  to  the  play  of  imagination  than 
is  rational ;  then,  not  only  shall  we  be  able  in  the  future  to 
carry  out  the  same  things  as  deliberate  designs,  but  we  shall 
<;arry  them  out  much  better,  because  we  can  give  more  empha- 


368  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

sis  to  our  intentions;  and,  for  the  latter  purpose,  a  proper  use 
of  the  artillery  is  requisite  above  all  other  things.  That  done^ 
there  is  no  reason  why,  after  the  superiority  of  fire  is  at- 
tained, the  final  onslaught  should  not  be  made  with  hurrah 
and  beating  of  drums  just  as  in  1870-71;  at  that  stage  the 
enemy's  fire  will  not  be  as  dangerous  as  at  the  beginning, 
and  formations  may  then  be  used  which  would  have  been 
inapplicable  for  purposes  of  fire  action  up  to  the  attainment 
of  the  superiority  of  fire.  I  can  only  repeat  that  there 
should  be  legitimate  freedom  and  no  orthodoxy,  either  in 
favor  of  or  against  any  particular  method.  One  considera- 
tion, however,  it  is  well  to  point  out — namely,  that  the  side 
making  a  turning  movement  will  probably  never  have  suf- 
ficient artillery  (i.  e.,  efflcient  artillery)  to  batter  the  ene- 
my's front.  Where  the  enemy  selects  wide,  open  plains 
for  the  battle,  the  artillery  question  becomes  the  main  ques- 
tion, and  that  arm  will  never  be  pressed  for  space.  Two 
instances  of  defense  remain  to  be  mentioned  where,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  conformation  of  the  ground,  the  Germans, 
though  on  the  defensive,  flanked  the  enemy — namely,  at 
Villiers  on  November  30th  and  December  2d,  and  in  the  bat- 
tle of  Mont  Val^rien  on  January  19,  1871.  In  both  cases 
the  enemy  had  a  considerable  numerical  superiority  and  his 
intention  was  to  turn  us;  but  all  attempts  to  gain  any 
imj)ortant  advantage  by  combined  front  and  flank  attacks 
failed  because  outflanked  by  the  defensive  position  of  the 
Germans  and  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Germans  turned 
their  advantage  to  tactical  account. 

A  few  words  about  the  "Umfassuiu/s''  action  at  Le 
Bourget  on  October  30th.  The  three  columns  assailing  the 
village  from  the  north,  east,  and  south  had  about  one-half 
of  their  troops  formed  in  close  order,  the  other  half  in 
swarms.     All  three  columns  advanced  simultaneously  and 


Tactical  Deductions.  369 

resolutely  in  that  formation  by  companies,  and  for  tlie  most 
part  without  halt;  it  was  about  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and 
the  enemy's  infantry  could  fire  1000  to  1500  meters,  in  three 
directions.  It  was  not  a  real  surprise  of  the  enemy,  since 
all  three  columns  were  still  800  to  900  meters  from  the  vil- 
lage when  our  artillery  fire  called  the  enemy  to  his  lines  of 
defense.*  None  of  the  columns  suffered  itself  to  be  em- 
broiled in  a  fire  action;  all  accelerated  their  advance.  The 
loss  of  450  men  suffered  here  by  nine  battalions  can  surely 
not  be  called  excessive  in  view  of  the  Chassepdt  fire,  and  the 
hostile  garrison,  which  numbered  about  four  battalions. 
Le  Bourget  was  an  advanced  post,  but  the  action  is  never- 
theless instructive,  and  what  could  be  done  there  will  be 
possible  in  the  future,  though  the  columns  would  not  be  so 
disposed  in  the  north  and  south  as  here,  because,  on  account 
of  the  long  range  and  power  of  penetration  of  modern  rifles, 
they  would  inflict  losses  on  each  other.  In  other  respects 
Le  Bourget  remains  the  standard  for  similar  cases,  of  which 
there  are  bound  to  be  more  in  the  future  than  there  were  in 
the  past. 

The  unobstructed  view,  the  long  range,  and  the  in- 
creased effect  of  infantry  and  artilery  fire  make  it  necessary 
to  begin  all  preparatory  measures  for  a  turning  movement, 
either  against  an  advanced  post  or  in  the  pitched  battle,  at 
a  greater  distance.  In  this  respect  the  consideration  of 
unobstructed  view  will  affect  us  more  thaa  the  range  of  the 
enemy's  rifle,  wMch,  in  comparison  with  that  of  the  Chasse- 
p6t,  has  not  so  very  much  increased  since  1870-71,  It  fol- 
lows that  the  superior  leaders  should  precede  their  troops 
in  order  to  divert  them  from  the  column  at  the  proper  time. 

*For  details,  see  Von  Kries  and  Von  Besser.  History  of  the 
Empress  Augusta  Hrenadier  Regiment  and  of  the  Rifle  Battalion  of 
the  Guard. 


370  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

This  is  an  important  duty  for  the  division  and  brigade  com- 
manders and  still  more  for  the  commanding  generals,  as  it 
is  the  only  way  to  avoid  crowding,  crossing,  and  delays.     It 
is  the  more  indispensable,  as  the  improved  fire-arms  will 
naturally  impel  the  fighting  troops  to  exert  their  fire  power 
— i.  e.,  to  extend  toward  the  flanks.       At  this  point  supe- 
rior leading  encounters  diflSculties  which  cannot  be  deter- 
mined in  advance  and  which  can  be  overcome  only  by  early 
reconnaissance,  by  the  prompt  diversion  of  the  troops  as- 
signed to  the  turning  movement,  by  circumspection  and  un- 
derstanding, by  good  organization  of  the  system  for  the 
transmission    of    orders,    and   by    a   sufficiency    of    means 
for  the  same,  etc.;  to  avoid  and  overcome  them  all  will, 
of  course,  be  impossible.     That  these  difficulties  will  be 
very    great    is    evident    from    what    was    intended    and 
what    was    accomplished    at    Gravelotte,    and    what    had 
to  be  done  to  gain  success  at  all.      In  forming  a  concep- 
tion of  what  the  course  of  the  battle  of  the  future  will 
be   like,   Gravelotte  is   and   remains   tacticallj'    the   most 
instructive   example   on   account    of   what   the    tacticians 
failed  to  do,  and  on   account  of  the  many  critical   tac- 
tical situations  they  thus  invited.     In  all  military  history 
there  is  hardly  a  battle  where  not  only  the  subordinate  but 
also  the  superior  leaders  made  so  many  tactical  blunders 
as  did  the  Germans  at  Gravelotte.     In  my  opinion,  the  con- 
centration of  the  .armies  before  the  battle  was  the  greatest 
strategic  feat  accomplished,  while  in  tactics  the  Germans 
did  their  very  worst;  tactically  Gravelotte  is  a  perfect  night- 
mare.    Considering  the  excellence  of  the  generals  present, 
we  can  hardly  expect  to  have  better  ones  in  the  future.    As 
the  best  are  apt  to  commit  errors,  it  is  the  more  reason  why 
we  should  learn  to  see  things  in  the  right  way;  we  note  but 
two   exceptions   at   Gravelotte — namely,    the   commanding 


Tactical  Deductions.  371 

generals  of  the  XII.  and  VIII.  Army  Corps,  since  the  short- 
comings of  the  latter  corps  cannot  be  charged  against 
General  Goben. 

Cases  will  probably  be  more  rare  in  future  where,  as  at 
Worth  and  Koniggratz,  the  last  march  before  the  battle 
"converts  the  more  or  less  intentional  turning  movement 
into  tactical  flanking.  I  also  believe  that,  as  regards  con- 
centration before  the  battle,  Gravelotte  is  also  the  strategic 
standard  of  the  future  battle  in  so  far  as  it  is  at  all  proper 
to  speak  of  standards — i.  e.,  marching  and  concentrating  on 
the  first  day,  and  fighting  on  the  second.  The  second  day 
may  perhaps  be  lengthened  out  into  two.  As  regards  infor- 
mation of  the  enemy  gained  after  the  concentration,  Grave- 
lotte is  not  a  good  example,  to  be  sure;  and  in  view  of  the 
present  nature  of  the  employment  of  cavalry  w^e  may 
assume  that  there  will  be  no  repetition  of  such  things ;  also, 
that  it  will  be  the  rule  to  concentrate  the  armies  before  the 
battle,  as  was  Napoleon's  method,  and  that  the  assailant  will 
not  issue  his  orders,  particularly  for  turning  movements, 
until  after  the  concentration.  The  opposing  lines  of  battle 
will  probably  not  often  be  closer  to  each  other  than  the  two 
opposing  armies  at  Gravelotte  on  the  morning  of  August 
18th  were  in  the  center,  on  the  line  from  Montigny  la  Grange 
to  Verneville  and  to  our  IX.  Corps.  It  may  thus  be  further 
stated  that,  assuming  information  of  the  exact  position  of 
the  enemy  to  have  been  gained,  the  turning  movement  will 
have  to  be  initiated  5  to  6  kilometers  and  more  from  the  ene- 
my. It  entails  great  difficulties  for  the  direction  of  the 
concentrated  army.  The  Germans  overcame  the  difficulties 
at  Gravelotte,  and  since  turning  and  flanking  will  be  the 
rule  in  large  and  small  actions,  we  should  study  the  disturb- 
ing elements  in  the  course  of  that  battle.  In  that  way  our 
modern  "war  scientists,"  who  no  longer  acknowledge  any 


372  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

difference  between  tactics  and  strategy,  may  perhaps  be 
brought  back  into  the  right  path;  it  will  show  them  how  in 
the  dispositions  for,  and  in  the  execution  of  the  pitched  bat- 
tle, the  strategic  consideration  prevails  and  is  decisive,  and 
that  on  that  very  account  the  task  of  the  tacticians  from  the 
beginning  and  through  all  the  phases  of  the  battle  has  be- 
come one  of  graver  responsibility.  If  they  do  not  know,  or  if 
they  fail  to  understand,  the  strategic  motive,  the  troubles 
of  Gravelotte  will  be  repeated  in  an  aggravated  form ;  owing 
to  the  necessary  extensive  measures,  it  will  result,  not  in  a 
Gravelotte  such  as  it  turned  out  after  all,  notwithstanding 
all  the  blunders,  but  in  a  Lisaine  battle,  such  as  it  was  fought 
by  the  French — i.  e.,  there  will  be  no  turning  or  flanking, 
and  the  result  will  be  defeat.  In  such  a  case  the  Napoleonic 
method  of  piercing  the  opponent's  line  will  have  as  much 
prospect  of  success  as  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  himself.  If 
the  tacticians  know  the  strategic  motive,  if  they  assist  in 
its  execution,  then  Sedan  shows  what  skillful  turning  move- 
ments, resulting  in  a  complete  envelopment,  may  accom- 
plish; if  the  strategists  have  "lost  the  thread,"  the  battles 
of  Beaugency-Cravant  (8th,  9th,  and  10th  of  December)  ex- 
hibit the  anomaly  of  a  frontal  battle,  which  certainly  has 
nothing  in  it  to  invite  its  repetition:  firing  on  both  sides  for 
three  days,  without  other  result  than  expenditure  of  much 
lead,  is  not  indeed  an  elevating  spectacle  for  an  anny  whose 
successes  had  heretofore  been  chiefly  due  to  turning  move- 
ments and  flanking.  Flanking  may  sometimes  not  have  the 
expected  result;  a  frontal  battle  may  have  none  at  all! 
Frontal  battles  should  be  altogether  expunged  from  the 
military  dictionary  ;it  is  not  fire  alore  that  gains  theobject,it 
is  the  flanking  combined  with  proper  direction  of  fire.  When 
the  opposing  forces  are  equal,  modern  arms  remove  any  dan- 
ger there  may  be  in  outflanking  the  enemy;  the  assailant  will 


Tactical  Deductions.  373 

therefore  make  it  a  rule  to  turn  his  opponent,  and  all  tacticians 
should  be  fully  imbued  with  that  rule.  The  many  instances 
quoted  of  far  superior  opponents  on  various  theaters  of  war: 
Noisseville,  first  day;  Bapaume,  North  Army;  Le  Bourget, 
December  21st,  Army  of  Paris;  Lisaine,  East  Army;  Baune 
la  Rolande  and  Loigny-Poupry,  Loire  Army,  etc.,  all  under 
the  most  varying  conditions  prove  the  same  truth,  that  turn- 
ing the  enemy  calls  for  more  than  ''a  good  plan" — namely, 
jsuflScient  reconnaissance,  proper  disposition  of  the  troops, 
careful  regulation  of  the  system  of  orders  and  reports,  and, 
above  all,  an  army  equally  good  in  all  its  parts,  and  excel- 
lent infantry.  That  militia  armies  are  unequal  to  outflank- 
ing operations  is  strikingly  show  n  by  the  campaign  against 
the  republic,  and  as  the  "Umfassungs^^  battle  will  be  the 
rule  in  future,  wise  army  leaders  will  more  than  ever  insist 
on  good  infantry.  What  Davout  demonstrated  at  Auer- 
stadt  was  repeated  in  1870-1871  in  various  ways — namely, 
that  superior  tactics  proffer  the  greatest  safety  in  outflank- 
ing; superior  tactics  are  impossible  without  superior  edu- 
cation and  training — i.  e.,  without  an  army  of  superior 
quality,  superiority  of  numbers  being  of  less  importance. 
Armies  without  training  (republic,  1870-71),  and  armies  mis- 
guided by  drill-ground  fancies  (1806),  are  equally  impotent! 
As  regards  the  forces  to  be  concentrated  for  battle,  the 
approximate  limits  are  also  indicated  at  Gravelotte;  other- 
wise direction  would  become  more  difficult  than  it  is  al- 
ready. The  latter  should  not  be  misunderstood,  and  impos- 
sible things  should  not  be  expected  from  it,  so  far  as  the 
commander-in-chief  is  concerned;  for,  as  regards  leading,  he  is 
merely  a  strategist ;  he  cannot  do  much  more  than  assign  to 
battle  units  their  directions  and  objectives, and  keep  in  hand 
a  reserve;  everything  else  is  the  business  of  the  tacticians 
— i.  e.,  of  the  commanders  of  battle  units.      In  that  respect 


374  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  conduct  of  battle  bas  been  much  modified  as  compared 
with  Napoleon's  methods;  divisions  and  army  corps  once 
engaged  can  no  longer  be  diverted  at  pleasure,  but,  from  the 
strategic  point  of  view,  Napoleon  I.  is  and  remains  never- 
theless the  great  master  in  conducting  a  battle,  and  whom 
the  Germans  have  equalled  but  once,  at  Sedan.  As  com- 
pared with  Napoleon,  they  failed  above  all  in  reconnais- 
sance, in  the  use  of  artillery  with  its  sequences,  and  in  pur- 
suit. Koniggratz  and  Gravelotte  approximate  the  Ulm 
and  Jena  of  Napoleon.  If  the  outflanking  opponent  is 
equal  or  slightly  superior  in  strength,  he  may  outflank  on 
one  flank;  if  superior,  as  at  Worth  and  Sedan,  he  may  turn 
both  flanks,  and  in  the  latter  case  the  battle  should  invaria- 
bly result,  and  has  resulted,  in  a  catastrophe.  While  the 
commander-in-chief  can  do  no  more  in  the  way  of  leading 
after  the  battle  is  opened,  than  expend  his  battle  units  as 
he  intended,  he  is  compensated  for  this  shortcoming  by  the 
fact  that  he  is  able  to  prepare  from  the  beginning  for  out- 
flanking the  enemy  in  the  most  effective  (strategic)  direc- 
tion, and  by  the  fact  that  he  is  at  the  same  time  able  to  take 
care  that  the  cavalry  shall  be  on  hand  for  pursuit  after  the 
turned  flank  or  flanks  have  been  defeated.  The  practica- 
bility of  turning  both  flanks  will  depend  on  the  character 
of  the  enemy's  position  (negative  at  Gravelotte,  positive  at 
Worth).  The  foregoing  goes  to  show  the  extraordinary 
preponderance  of  strategy  over  tactics,  because,  according 
to  human  judgment,  outflanking  tactics  must  be  the  rule  in 
battle  for  any  one  who  wishes  to  attack  at  all. 

I  have  frequently  cautioned  against  any  kind  of  ortho- 
doxy, and  desire  to  do  so  again  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  as 
regards  leading  in  battle.  As  there  is  no  rule  without 
exception,  so  the  exception  of  Loigny-Poupry  teaches  that 


Tactical  Deductions.  375 

under  certain  circumstances  a  battle  may  yet  be  directed 
as  were  those  of  Austerlitz  and  Liitzen  by  Napoleon. 

IX.  Of  the  Frontal  Action. 
Various  events  of  1870-71  go  to  prove  the  soundness  of 
my  opinion  that  with  proper  dispositions,  when  the  enemy 
has  been  subdued  by  the  fire  action  of  infantry  and  artil- 
lery, the  attack  of  a  brigade  is  not  only  practicable  to-day, 
but  also  successful.  I  call  to  mind  the  determined  assault 
-of  the  33d  Infantry  Brigade  under  General  von  Kottwitz  on 
Loigny  with  part  of  the  troops  in  close  order.  Three  bat- 
talions of  the  Seventy-sixth  and  one  battalion  of  the 
Seventy-fifth  shared  in  the  assault,  and  not  until  they  had 
penetrated  the  town  from  the  northeast  and  east — i.  e., 
from  the  flank — did  the  swarms  of  the  Bavarians  enter  from 
the  front.  I  am  convinced  that  without  the  assistance  of 
the  former  the  skirmishers  of  the  latter  would  never  have 
succeeded  in  getting  into  the  town.  When  the  attack  is 
preceded  by  the  proper  tactical  preparation,  as  in  this  in- 
stance, the  defender's  fire  power  will  be  so  reduced  in  the 
end  that  the  controlled  attack  is  the  quickest  and  least 
bloody  way  of  deciding  the  conflict.  An  indispensable 
prerequisite  is,  of  course,  that  there  be  tacticians  and  that 
the  several  arms  be  logically  employed,  for  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  logic  even  in  tactics;  another  prerequisite  is  that 
the  ground  be  utilized  during  the  advance,  which,  in  that 
case,  should  be  resolute.  Our  large  attacks  failed  almost 
without  exception  on  account  of  their  inopportunity,  of  the 
selection  of  the  wrong  tactical  moment,  of  the  disregard  of 
the  situation  of  the  battle  and  of  the  ground,  and  because 
the  troops  were  flung  into  the  fight  by  driblets.  After  the 
capture  of  Loigny,  General  von  Kottwitz  brought  up  his 
two  fresh  battalions  of  the  Seventy-fifth,  which  drove  the 


376  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

enemy  from  Villours  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  captured 
the  village,  and  thus  decided  the  battle.  Such  instructive 
examples  are  rare,  Fate  is  chary  of  them;  but  when  we  do 
have  a  few,  we  should  turn  them  to  good  account. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  state  that  where  the 
terrain  affords  points  of  direction  as  at  Chilteau  Goury, 
Loigny,  Villours,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  announcing  them 
to  the  troops  beforehand;  they  can  direct  themselves  by 
them  without  further  misunderstanding.  In  spite  of  this 
precaution,  part  of  Kottwitz's  brigade  swept  past  Loigny 
toward  Fougeu.  When  on  a  perfectly  open  plain,  or  when 
emerging  on  open  ground  from  a  defile,  it  is  easier  to  select 
a  point  of  direction  in  the  terrain  some  distance  in  front, 
than  among  the  troops  themselves,  which,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances are  availing  themselves  of  cover. 

A  nice  parallel  to  Kottwitz's  brigade  at  Loigny  is  Stark- 
loff's  Wiirtemberg  brigade  at  Worth.  It  reached  the 
battle-field  after  the  enemy  had  been  shaken;  crossed  the 
Hauer  by  the  bridge  at  the  Bruchmiihle,  took  the  direction 
of  Elsasshausen  and  then  of  Froschweiler,  passed  the  line 
of  battle  of  the  V.  Army  Corps  after  a  brief  fire  action,  and 
was  the  first  to  get  into  Froschweiler,  its  troops  at  that 
instant  being  chiefl}^  in  close  formation.  The  advance  of  the 
three  groups  of  the  brigade  with  flying  colors  exercised  an 
animating  effect  over  the  other  troops,  part  of  whom  joined 
the  Wiirtembergers,  Daring  the  march  requests  for 
assistance  reached  the  brigade  from  Elsasshausen  as  well  as 
from  Froschweiler;  it  approached  Froschweiler  under  Gen- 
eral Starkloff  in  the  following  order:  Third  Rifle  Battalion, 
in  its  rear  the  First  Battalion  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  west  of 
Froschweiler;  First  Battalion  of  the  Second  Regiment, 
south ;  and  on  the  east  of  the  village  Second  Battalion  of  the 
Fifth  Regiment,  and  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Companies  of  the 


Tactical  Deductions.  377 

Second  Regiment.     The  advance  having  been  skillfully  con- 
ducted and  proper  preparations  having  been  made,  the  con- 
trolled assault  was  as  successful  asat  Loigny,and  it  is  really 
the  simplest,  shortest,  and  least  bloody  way  to  success  under 
such  conditions; nor  is  it  any  different  if  the  preparations  are 
made  in  the  early  morning,  as  at  Le  Bourget.    How  about  the 
losses?      The  four  battalions  (minus  one  companj^)  of  the 
Twenty-eighth  Brigade  lost  at  Koniggriitz  10  officers,  190 
men;  the  9  battalions  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Guard  at 
Le  Bourget  lost  about  450  men;  the  U  battalions  of  Stark- 
loff's  brigade  at  Worth,  17  officers  and  3^9  men;  and  Kott- 
witz's  brigade  at  Loigny,  21  officers  and  423  men.     Are  the 
conditions  of  rationally  conducted  attacks  so  very  much  dif- 
ferent now?     I  should  say,  no!     Of  course,  when  the  prere- 
quisites we  have  named  are  not  there,  there  will  be  no  such 
success;  I  refer  to  Maire's  brigade  at  Worth,  to  the  assault  on 
Loigny  led  by  General  de  Sonis,  and  to  the  various  attacks 
by  the  brigades  of  Vivenot,  Brissac,  and  Durochat  at  Beaune. 
Outflanking,   or   turning    without    engaging   in    front, 
is  inconceivable,  and,  however  frequently  I   have  warned 
against  orthodoxy  in  this  or  that  direction,  I  must  do  so 
again.     I  have  frequently  stated  that  it  is  really  the  supe- 
rior command,  not  the  man,  the  company,  or  the  battalion, 
that  fights  an  "Umfassungen^'  action,  since  these  units  al- 
ways fight  a  frontal  action.     It  follows  that  the  conflict  will 
always  be  along  the  tactical  front,  since  there  is  nothing  that 
could  take  its  place;  its  execution,  however,  should  be  suit- 
able and  tactically  correct.     Conflict  along  the  tactical  front 
being  inseparable  from  the  conduct  of  battle  and  from  the 
decision,  it  would  be  foolish  and  anomalous  to  banish  every 
frontal  attack  from  the  battle-field;  the  faulty  ones  should 
be  banished  and  the  good  ones  retained.     Military  history 
teaches,  in  the  first  place,  that  in  case  of  a  very  strong  front 


378  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  frontal  attack  promises  no  success  against  the  muzzle- 
loader.  The  frontal  action  of  the  I.  Army  at  Koniggratz  is 
a  case  in  point ;  the  same  thing  recurred  at  the  Mance  ravine 
at  Gravelotte.  In  the  first  case  the  "tacticians"  did  not  seek 
the  decision  in  the  front,  and  it  was  well  they  did  not;  in 
the  second  case  the  ''tacticians"  did  want  it  and  piled  blun- 
der on  blunder  without  notable  result.  But  at  Koniggratz 
the  result  of  the  frontal  action  of  the  I.  Army  was  neverthe- 
less enormous,  and  so  was  that  of  the  frontal  action  of  the 
V.  Army  Corps  at  Worth.  The  attacks  on  both  sides  were 
frontal,  and  most  of  them  netted  more  or  less  success.  Thus 
will  it  also  be  in  future.  I  call  to  mind  the  counter-attacks 
of  the  Austrians  in  the  wood  of  Maslowed,  the  counter- 
attacks of  the  French  at  Worth  and  against  the  Mance 
ravine,  etc.  In  all  these  cases  both  opponents  fought  purely 
frontal  actions,  yet  the  enemy's  lines  were  completely 
driven  back.  On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  frontal 
attacks  of  Prussians  and  Germans,  quitting  the  defensive 
position  to  assail  the  enemy,  were  successful,  even  that  of 
the  II.  Army  Corps  on  the  second  day  of  Villiers,  and  of  the 
Wiirtemburgers  on  the  first  day  of  the  same  battle,  and  that 
brings  me  to  the  salient  point.  Wherever  the  ground  is  in 
any  way  favorable,  good  infantry  should  keep  on  charging 
the  enemy  in  front;  fire  alone  does  not  suffice  to  subdue 
him,  and  from  this  resulted  the  typical  character  of  the 
offensive  battle  in  the  front  at  Worth  distinguished  by  the 
surging  to  and  fro  of  the  various  charges.  Who  will  deny 
that  the  charges  of  the  Germans  did  not  net  a  great  result, 
notwithstanding  many  defects  which  will  in  future  be  reme- 
died by  greater  unity  of  action?  It  is  the  vigorous  charges 
alone,  in  connection  with  fire,  that  enhance  the  severity  of 
the  action  to  the  maximum  limit  of  endurance  on  both 
sides.     This  should  invaviablv  be  the  course  along  the  tac- 


Tactical  Deductions.  379 

tical  front,  so  as  to  enable  the  flanking  troops  to  deliver  the 
decisive  blow.  To  neglect  it  and  to  engage  in  a  frontal  fire 
action  at  long  range  would  be  to  suppress  the  offensive 
spirit  of  our  infantry,  to  diminish  its  tactical  value,  and  to 
lose  the  battle!  Frontal  attacks  should  not  be  discarded, 
but  they  should  be  better  organized  and  undertaken  with 
larger  bodies  under  single  control.  They  may  entail  losses, 
disorder,  and  indecisive  surging  of  the  troops,  but  they  are 
highly  instrumental  in  preparing  the  decision. 

In  the  front,  the  action  of  infantry  assumes  the  form  of 
a  series  of  onslaughts  while  the  commander  should  seek  to 
gain  tlie  decision  by  outflanking — i.  e.,  pushing  the  attack 
home.  I  am  thus  distinguishing  between  onslaughts  for  the 
purpose  of  wearing  the  enemy  out  along  the  tactical  front  and 
the  attack  for  gaining  the  decision  on  the  tactical  flank; 
neither  should  be  made  before  the  superiority  of  fire  has  been 
gained.  To  be  sure,  we  did  not  always  take  sufficient  time 
for  it.  This  rule  should  never  be  deviated  from ;  otherwise  we 
are  apt  to  return  to  the  indecisive  position  warfare.  The  fact 
that  infantrj' — for  instance,  the  Fiftieth  Regiment  at  Worth 
—after  being  engaged  all  day  on  the  tactical  front,  retained 
sufficient  power  to  rush  the  key  point,  Froschweiler,  should 
silence  those  who  deny  the  necessity  of  frontal  action  as  a 
general  principle.*  To  malce  concessions  to  human  nature 
in  such  questions  would  be  to  betray  weakness  and  timid- 
ity. It  was  fresh  troops,  as  a  rule,  mostly  closed  squads  or 
companies,  that  carried  the  swarms  with  them  in  a  charge 
(Worth),  and  it  was  the  closed  bodies  on  which  the  worsted 
swarms  rallied;  it  is  not  expected  that  it  will  be  the  same  in 

*0n  rallying  in  the  wood  near  Elsasshausen,  Captain  von 
Bnguslawski  had  about  20  men,  and  on  entering  Froschweiler  about 
25,  of  the  Third,  Sixth,  and  Twelfth  Companies  of  the  Fiftieth 
Res:iinent.  (Pages  243  and  248  of  the  History  of  the  Fiftieth  Regi- 
ment, by  Von  Boguslawski.) 


380  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

the  future.  After  a  success  or  repulse,  the  leaders  are 
endeavoring  (Boguslawski)  to  rally  their  men  in  order 
to  lead  them  forward  again;  that  constitutes  the  true 
^'Schneid,"  because  it  is  coupled  with  good  sense  and  brings 
about  that  high  degree  of  resisting  power  and  of  stubborn- 
ness in  the  modern  fire  fight.  To  relinquish  one  iota  of 
this  would  be  the  very  worst  thing  we  could  do,  for  I  repeat : 
the  action  of  the  troops  is  always  a  frontal  one.  It  should 
be  conducted  rationally  and  in  a  manner  in  keeping  with 
modern  arms.  By  beginning  rushes  at  more  than  1000 
meters,  I  say  we  would  deprive  ourselves  of  the  possibility 
of  making  those  successful,  though  bloody,  onslaughts. 
The  advance  by  rushes  in  combination  with  long-range  fire 
paralyzes  the  offensive  spirit.  The  advance  should  be  made 
without  pause,  with  fully  deployed  front,  and  successive  open 
lines,  depending  on  the  terrain.  Opportunities  for  long- 
range  fire  should,  of  course,  be  taken  advantage  of,  but  it 
should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  leaders,  as  should  the 
choice  of  formation  during  the  advance,  and  of  the  direction 
of  the  advance  within  the  sphere  of  the  brigade.  From  what 
has  been  stated  it  is  plain  that  the  difficult  question  is  not 
settled  by  the  mere  statement  that  the  troops  in  rear  should 
be  formed  either  in  line  or  in  column.  The  defender  would 
indeed  be  foolish  not  to  select  positions  permitting  of  the 
full  efl^^ect  of  improved  arms.  In  the  case  of  such  positions, 
stretches  of  ground  may  be  encountered  where  neither  line 
nor  column  can  be  maintained  in  close  formation  when  the 
assailant  enters  the  medium  range.  Thus  in  the  maneuvers 
of  1893,  for  instance,  the  XVII.  Army  Corps  employed  open 
lines,  the  VIII.,  XIV.,  XV.,  and  XVI.  Corps  promptly  devel- 
oped strong  skirmish  lines,  followed  by  closed  bodies  at  a 
distance  of  300  to  400  meters.  I  consider  the  latter  wrong, 
for  it  is  a  normal  attack. 


Tactical  Deductions.  381 

The  assailant's  troops  invariably  fight  a  frontal  action, 
whether  they  flank  the  enemy  or  not.  The  effect  on  the 
enemy  of  this  frontal  action  against  his  front  and  flank  iS 
best  understood  by  a  reference  to  Worth.  In  the  same 
degree  as  the  French  felt  the  clamps  around  them  tighten- 
ing, they  sought  to  disembarrass  themselves  by  frontal 
charges  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  clamp  was  thus  some- 
times bent  outward,  but  was  immediately  contracted  by 
the  offensive  spirit  of  our  infantry.  There  was  a  constant 
repetition  of  this  at  Worth  until  the  end  of  the  battle,  when 
the  enveloping  flanks  came  together  in  the  center  at  Frosch- 
weiler.  Though  the  flanking  troops  are  thus  fighting  a 
frontal  action,  still,  the  unobstructed  view,  the  great  range 
of  the  rifle,  and  the  practicability  of  intelligent  cooperation 
of  infantry  and  artillery  combine  in  conveying  to  the  indi- 
vidual soldier  the  impression  that  he  is  fighting  an  envelop- 
ing action,  and  that  is  a  decisive  consideration,  because  ad- 
dressing itself  to  the  individual!  The  flanked  opponent,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  the  impression  that  he  is  seen  and  fired 
at  from  two  or  three  directions,  which  is  bound  to  lessen 
his  morale  at  the  very  time  when  that  of  the  assailant  is  in- 
creased by  what  he  is  seeing  and  effecting.  The  "Umfas- 
sungs''  action  should  therefore  become  the  normal  form  of 
battle,  as  it  were;  but  to  make  it  feasible,  the  flanker  must 
undertake  a  series  of  frontal  onslaughts,  under  whose  pro- 
tection alone,  in  combination  with  fire,  the  flanking  move- 
ment can  be  effectively  carried  out.  The  improved  arms 
cannot  abolish  the  frontal  attack.  Frontal  actions  will  be 
indispensable  for  assailant  and  defender  in  the  future  as 
they  were  in  the  past;  it  is  by  flanking  the  enemy  that  the 
full  effect  of  which  the  new  arms  are  capable  may  be  real- 
ized; thus  the  sum  total  of  moral  and  material  effect  is 
accomplished! 


382  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

These  expositions  will  explain  the  extent  of  mv  concur- 
rence in  the  suggestions  of  the  book"Der  gegenwartige  Stand 
der  Gefechtslehre  und  die  Ausbildung  zum  Gefechte"  ('The 
Present  State  of  Tactics  and  Training  for  Battle").* 

X.     Of  Village  and  Wood  Fighting. 

We  frequently  hear  the  statement  that  the  role  played 
in  battle  by  villages,  farmsteads,  and  woods  would  in  future 
undergo  many  modifications.  I  have  to  be  brief  on  this 
point,  because  a  thoroughly  satisfactory  inquiry  would 
take  too  much  space.  The  reader  will  be  able  to  form  his 
own  opinion,  and  it  will  become  plain  whether  and  to  what 
extent  these  statements  are  justified. 

It  is  assumed  that  the  destructive  power  of  modern 
infantry  and  artillery  fire  in  connection  with  unobstructed 
view,  and  the  practicability  of  concentrated  mass-fire  of 
both  arms,  will  make  the  obstinate  defense  of  villages, 
towns,  and  farmsteads  impossible  in  future;  that  on  this 
account  it  is  better  not  to  undertake  a  direct  defense  of  such 
places,  but  to  use  them  rather  as  protection  against  obser- 
vation and  fire  of  the  enemy.  It  is  further  recommended  to 
employ  infantry  in  front  of  these  places,  ensconced  in 
ditches  and  other  natural  and  artificial  cover.  Such  also 
is  the  drift  of  the  German  Kegulations. 

Three  questions  are  evidently  involved:  1,  the  loca- 
tion of  the  village;  2,  its  extent;  and  3,  its  construction. 
It  has  already  been  explained  that  villages  and  farmsteads 
will  no  longer  be  found  useful  as  advanced  posts,  and  in  that 
particular  the  conditions  have  actually  undergone  material 
modifications.  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  for  instance,  and  St, 
Hubert  would  no  longer  play  the  same  role  as  on  August 
18,1870;  still  less  would  an  isolated  advanced  post,  as  Worth 

*By  Keim,  Berlin,  1890,  E.  S.  Mittler. 


Tactical  Deductions.  383 

and  Le  Bourget,  even  if  of  the  dimensions  of  these  two  lat- 
ter places.  In  that  respect  the  question  is  settled  and  it 
only  remains  to  say  something  about  villages  and  farm- 
steads in  the  line  of  battle.  I  am  well  aware  that  Worth  did 
not  gain  its  importance  until  the  French  decided  to  capture 
that  post  in  front  of  their  position. 

We  have  seen  that  on  an  Austrian  target-range  a  rifle- 
man posted  behind  an  embankment  of  a  cross-section  of 
140  centimeters  was  mortally  wounded  by  a  Mannlicher  bul- 
let at  a  range  of  200  meters,  but  this  point  merely  involves  a 
question  of  earth  cover,  of  rifle-trenches.  Villages  do  not 
everywhere  bear  the  same  character;  a  French  village  and 
one  in  Poland,  for  instance,  are  greatly  different,  and  on  ac- 
count of  their  situation,  construction,  and  extent,  the  former 
may  be,  under  certain  circumstances,  as  suitable  for  defense 
as  formerly,  though  it  was  equally  faulty  in  former  days  to 
restrict  the  defense  to  the  place  itself.  To  defend  Baaeille, 
for  instance,  it  would  be  necessary  to  include  the  adjacent 
heights  in  the  problem. 

In  future  many  villages  and  localities  will  be  found 
within  the  battle-field,  and  it  is  necessary  to  make  up  one's 
mind  whether  or  not  their  defense  should  be  undertaken. 
I  believe  that  in  France  the  answer  will  in  many  cases  be  in 
the  affirmative,  because  chateaus  with  extensive  parks,  sur- 
rounded by  walls  half  a  meter  and  more  in  thickness,  are 
frequently  situated  in  the  vicinity  of  villages.  The  Ger- 
mans did  well  to  defend  the  castle  of  Montb^liard  and  those 
of  Villiers  and  Goury  with  their  parks,  and  to  convert  them 
into  the  chief  points  d'appui  of  their  positions.  I  fail  to  see 
why  we  should  do  otherwise  in  future.  The  French  de- 
fended Froschweiler  and  St.  Privat  with  great  stubborn- 
ness; the  Germans  could  not  be  driven  from  Beaune  by  the 
enemy's  fire,  in  spite  of  his  ten-fold  superiority,  and  notwith- 


384  Inquiries  info  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

standing  the  fact  that  f requentl}-  the  attacks  almost  reached 
the  stage  of  a  haud-to-hand  conflict.  The  obstinacy  of  the 
defense  of  Froschweiler  and  St.  Privat  was  chiefly  due  to  the 
fact  that  much  of  the  defending  infantry  was  ensconced 
under  cover  in  front  of  the  villages.  Special  advocacy  of 
that  sort  of  defense  to-day  raises  no  new  issue;  it  merely 
tends  to  give  the  force  of  principle  to  a  feature  that  has 
proved  effective.  It  would,  nevertheless,  be  an  error  not  to 
make  places  having  the  location  and  extent  of  St.  Privat 
and  Loigny  the  principal  supporting  points  of  the  position, 
either  on  the  flanks  or  in  the  center.  I  have  already  pointed 
out  the  solid  construction  of  French  villages,  among  which 
some  may  be  found  that  will  give  some  protection  even 
against  the  destructive  power  of  field  artillery.  We  cannot 
therefore,  expect  to  simply  reduce  such  places  to  ruins  or  to 
destroy  them  completely  by  conflagration.  They  are  too 
extensive  for  that.  Though  a  great  part  of  Froschweiler, 
St.  Privat,  Beaune,  and  T.oigny  were  in  flames,  they  were 
not  abandoned  on  account  of  either  the  conflagration,  or 
the  enemy's  fire,  or  the  hail  of  fragments  of  stone  and 
of  projectiles.  Froschweiler,  St.  Privat,  and  Loigny  suc- 
cumbed only  to  assault.  We  omit  the  singular  street  fight- 
ing at  Bazeilles,  because  not  typical  either  for  defense  or 
attack;  but  St.  Privat,  Froschweiler,  and  particularly  Le 
Bourget  and  Loigny,  show  how  obstinately  the  defender  may 
hold  on  after  the  edge  of  the  village  has  fallen  into  the 
enemy's  hands.  The  street  fighting  at  Le  Bourget  and 
Loigny,  for  instance,  lasted  several  hours,  and  would  have 
given  the  French  ample  time  for  the  arrival  of  considerable 
reinforcements.  This  consideration  alone  should  be  suflS- 
cient  reason  for  not  expunging  village  fighting  from  tactics. 
The  exterior  reserves  and  the  troops  fighting  on  the 
flanks  have  at  all  times  been  of  prime  importance,  and  a  dis- 


Tactical  Deductions.  385 

cussion  of  tbe  defense  of  a  village  in  the  main  position  is 
inconceivable  vvatliout  giving  them  due  consideration. 

I  believe  it  would  be  well  to  reckon  in  the  future  on 
village  fighting,  chiefly  on  account  of  smokeless  powder, 
in  all  cases  where  the  fire  may  be  arranged  in  tiers  as  at 
St.  Privat  and  Loigny.  If  it  was  difficult  formerly  to  see 
the  infantry  posted  under  cover  in  front  of  the  village  and 
to  take  it  under  fire  (St.  Privat,  Froschweiler),  it  will  be  far 
^more  difficult  in  future,  which,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
extensive  villages,  will  make  the  defense  of  villages  more 
feasible  than  formerly.  We  may  be  sure  that  the  struggle 
for  the  ground  in  front  and  for  the  edge  will  be  more  pro- 
tracted and  obstinate  than  formerly;  which  is  due  to  the 
character  of  smokeless  powder  when  the  defender  has  a  wide 
field  of  fire.  Owing  to  the  long  range  and  sheaf-like  form 
of  artillery  fire,  I  should  consider  it  an  error  to  restrict  the 
use  of  villages  chiefly  to  that  of  shelter  for  reserves  and 
large  bodies  of  troops,  because  heavy  losses  are  hard  to  bear 
for  inactive  troops  thus  posted;  on  the  other  hand,  I  hardly 
know  of  an  instance  of  good  troops  being  driven  from  any 
defensive  position  by  mere  fire.  It  might  rather  be  recom- 
mended to  post  the  reserves  at  points  where  the  assailant's 
means,  usually  known  to  the  defense,  will  make  him  expect 
them  least.  I  do  not  desire  to  go  further  into  details ;  I  be- 
lieve, however,  that  the  more  conspicuous  isolated  farm- 
steads are,  the  less  their  value. 

The  principal  defense  of  villages  will  probably  be  made 
in  the  foreground.  The  reserves  will  probably  be  posted 
on  one  or  both  flanks;  as  their  employment  will  be  as  hereto- 
fore, for  increasing  the  fire  power,  in  counter-attacks,  in  en- 
trenching and  holding  rearward  positions  and  in  covering  the 
retreat.  All  these  duties  are  inseparable  from  village  fight- 
ing in  battle.     Since  favorable  localities  offer  such  a  variety 


386  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

of  means  to  the  defender  for  the  defensive  as  well  as  for  the 
offensive,  it  follows  that,  owing  to  the  attraction  exerted  by 
such  objectives,  both  sides  will  exert  their  full  power  when 
struggling  for  these  points.  The  superior  destructive  power 
of  modern  fire,  the  greater  range  and  fire  effect  will  not 
change  this  much.  And  in  what  way  should  the  new 
method  of  fighting — the  result  of  new  arms — change  the 
fighting  in  the  interior  of  the  village?  Since  it  is  not  pos- 
sible to  remove  objects  like  villages  from  the  position,  it  is 
better  to  utilize  them  for  the  battle;  infantry  should  no  more 
think  it  impossible  to  victoriously  hold  a  village  than  to 
carry  it  by  assault.  It  should  be  able  to  do  both,  and  it  is 
able  if  it  wants  to,  and  if  it  possesses  the  tactical  qualities. 

Although  we  shall  ever  find  extensive  positions  devoid 
of  localities  and  farmsteads,  but  few  will  be  found  devoid  of 
woods,  which  may  be  situated  in  the  position,  in  front  or  in 
rear  of  it,  and  at  different  points;  they  may  vary  much  on 
account  of  the  character  of  the  trees  and  of  the  ground, 
their  character  depending  on  these  features  as  much  as 
on  their  extent  in  width  and  depth,  and  on  the  shape  of 
their  edge.  In  battle  a  wood  may  serve  as  cover  for  the 
approach,  it  may  be  the  objective  of  the  struggle,  or  ft  may 
serve  to  cover  the  retreat,  in  all  of  which  phases  it  is  of  first 
importance  to  know  whether  the  wood  is  practicable  for 
troops.     We  are  dealing  here  mth  tactical  considerations. 

I  cannot  go  into  the  details  of  the  many  and  great 
differences  of  woods.  The  handling  of  a  French  wood 
is  based  on  different  principles  from  that  of  a  German 
or  Russian  one,  and  it  is  necessary  that  the  officer  under- 
stand the  tactical  differences  springing  therefrom.  Every 
officer  should  therefore  be  well  informed  on  these  subjects, 
which  are  fundamental  in  tactical  training.     In  general  it 


Tactical  Deductions.  387 

may  be  stated  that  the  French  as  well  as  the  Russian  (Pol- 
ish) woods  make  higher  demands  on  leaders  and  troops  than 
the  German  variety,  and  that  smokeless  powder  has  greatly 
facilitated  the  direction  of  an  action  in  them.  All  woods, 
even  small  ones  on  dry  ground,  possess  a  considerable 
degree  of  humidity.  In  combination  with  the  moist  air, 
the  smoke  used  to  form  an  impenetrable  stratum,  which 
obstructed  the  view  and  made  control  of  the  action  impos- 
sible. That  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  woods  used  to  be 
avoided.  The  smoke  is  not  in  the  way  to-day,  and  the  young 
officer  has  no  idea  of  the  former  difficulties.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  other  obstacles,  the  fighting  in  a  wood  may  in- 
deed be  controlled  to  day,  though  the  echoes  of  musketry 
discharges  and  of  words  of  command  are  even  now  very 
troublesome  in  woods  of  small  extent.  The  more  extensive 
the  wood,  the  more  difficult  is  the  control,  which  in  large 
woods  is,  even  to-day,  only  practicable  to  a  certain  degree  at 
particular  and  favorable  spots.  Aside  from  the  fact  that 
artillery  and  cavalrj-  cannot  be  used  in  them,  woods  have 
grave  disadvantages,  since  extensive  woods  frequently 
obstruct  the  view  of  the  commanding  generals  and  other 
leaders.  Owing  to  the  increased  power  of  penetration  of 
infantry  projectiles,  trees  will  rarely  prove  effective  as 
shelter;  the  great  dispersion  of  artillery  projectiles  also 
deprives  the  wood  of  most  of  its  character  as  cover  from 
artillery  fire;  moreover,  woods,  and  particularly  pine  woods, 
will  be  more  apt  to  be  set  on  fire.  On  the  defensive  it  is 
most  important  to  hold  the  edge  of  the  wood;  when  that  is 
lost,  attackers  and  defenders  are  about  on  even  terms,  and 
it  is  only  at  clearings  that  the  defender  again  has  the  advan- 
tage (wood  of  Maslowed,  July  3,  1866);  farmsteads  may 
serve  to  revive  resistance,  as  strikingly  illustrated  by  the 
action  at  Ladon  on  November  24,  1870.      ^^'oods  are,  as  a 


388  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

rule,  poor  supports  for  the  flanks,  and  are  most  useful  when 
of  moderate  extent  and  situated  in  the  front  line.  Thus, 
for  instance,  the  little  fir  copse  of  Colombey  on  August  14, 
1870,  and  the  Bois  de  Tronville  on  the  16th  of  August,  1870. 

After  these  general  remarks,  we  have  to  discuss  the  role 
of  woods  somewhat  in  detail,  because  they  can  hardly  be 
wholly  avoided  on  the  future  battle-field;  and  it  should 
be  remembered  in  this  connection  that  it  will  be  more  diffi- 
cult to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the  defenders,  that  by  a 
suitable  distribution  of  his  fire  the  defender  may  greatly 
deceive  the  assailant,  and  that  in  the  future  the  latter  will 
have  to  fight  for  the  sake  of  reconnaissance,  and  cannot 
make  his  principal  dispositions  until  afterward. 

Among  the  woods  used  as  cover  and  traversed  on  the 
advance  we  may  mention  the  wood  of  Popowitz  (July  3, 
1866),  the  wood  of  Maslowed  (Swiepwald),  the  Bois  de  Vaux 
on  August  18th,  and  the  wood  of  Beaumont  on  August  30, 
1870.  The  first  and  last  of  these  woods  were  turned  to 
such  excellent  account  by  the  Twenty-eighth  Brigade  and 
by  the  IV.  and  XII.  Army  Corps  respectively,  that  the  subse- 
quent successes  may  be  ascribed  to  it.  Deductions:  After 
sufficient  reconnaissance  has  furnished  a  correct  idea  of  the 
wood,  it  should  be  entered  unobserved,  and  traversed  quietly 
in  close  formation ;  on  reaching  the  farther  edge,  the  deploy- 
ment should  be  made  simultaneously  upon  preconcerted 
signal,  in  order  to  open  the  action  from  as  many  points  as 
possible.  In  the  second  case,  the  Swiepwald  at  once  as- 
sumed the  character  of  extensive  wood  fighting;  it  became 
an  advanced  post,  and  the  advanced  post  became  the  main 
position :  ultimately  two  Austrian  army  corps  were  fighting 
here  against  a  Prussian  division;  they  quitted  their  pre- 
scribed main  position,  and  thus  rendered  our  victory  at  the 
main  position  comparatively  easy.     Both  the  assailant  and 


Tactical  Deductions.  389 

the  defender  suffered  great  losses  in  this  wood  fighting; 
both  lost  their  direction,  especially  the  Prussians,  so  that 
ultimately  they  in  part  faced  to  their  original  rear.  The 
direction  is  more  easily  lost  in  woods,  especially  when  fight- 
ing in  extensive  woods,  than  in  villages.  We  find  it  every- 
where to  be  the  case  more  or  less.  Practice  maj'  somewhat 
diminish  the  evil,  but  it  is  well  to  state  right  here  that  it 
can  never  be  entirely  removed.  In  the  third  case,  the  pene- 
trable wood  furnished  a  means,  though  a  difficult  one,  for 
covering  the  approach,  the  deployment,  and  the  develop- 
ment; but  all  designs  in  this  respect  miscarried,  owing  to 
lack  of  experience  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  and  troops, 
and  to  lack  of  uniformity  of  design.  But  one  condition 
was  here  fulfilled:  sheltering  the  repulsed  troops,  which, 
however,  could  not  be  promptly  rallied  and  re-formed.  All 
these  lessons  are  contained  in  this  sketch.  All  four  exam- 
ples are  highly  typical  for  the  future,  the  success  or  miscar- 
riage of  the  plans. 

The  Niederwald  and  the  wood  of  Langensulzbach 
(Worth,  August  6th),  and  the  Stiringwald  (Spicheren,  Aug- 
ust 6th),  play  a  different  role,  inasmuch  as  they  could  not  he 
traversed  without  fghting,  and  thus  made  still  higher  demands 
on  the  leaders  and  troops.  None  of  the  three  woods  served 
to  cover  the  flank  of  the  defender  effectively.  Owing  to 
various  influences,  the  Second  Bavarian  Corps  failed  to 
utilize  the  wood  of  Langensulzbach  as  intended;  the  XI. 
Corps  overcame  all  the  difficulties  of  the  Niederwald;  of  the 
five  battalions  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Brigade  (at  Stiring), 
the  battalion  led  by  General  von  Woyna  in  person  was  the 
only  one  to  reach  that  point  of  the  Stiring- Wendel  wood 
where  he  wanted  them  to  be. 

In  traversing  a  wood  while  fighting,  the  considerations 
of  order,   steadiness,   maintenance  of   direction   and    com- 


390  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

munication,  and  of  division  into  several  columns,  should 
receive  strict  attention  and  be  the  subjects  of  frequent  prac- 
tice in  peace.* 

In  addition  to  the  previously  mentioned  fir  copse  of 
Colombey  (August  14,  1870),  the  park  and  wood  of  Goury 
(December  2,  1870),  the  Bois  de  Tronville  (August  16,  1870), 
the  Bois  de  G^nivaux  (August  18,  1870),  and  above  all  the 
group  of  woods  of  Poupry  (December  2,  1870)  played  an 
important  role  in  the  conduct  of  the  battle  in  the  main  posi- 
tion. The  phenomena  attaching  to  them,  though  varying 
much,  coincide  in  several  particulars,  particularly  as  re- 
gards the  stubbornness  of  the  struggle  for  the  edge  of  the 
wood,  the  losing  of  the  direction  during  the  struggle  (G^n- 
ivaux  and  Poupry),  the  intermingling  of  troops,  and  the 
impossibility  of  leading  large  bodies  of  intermixed  troops 
(Poupry).  The  latter  case,  where  the  wood  consisted  of  sev- 
eral separate,  irregular  groups,  is  one  of  the  most  instruct- 
ive instances  of  wood  fighting  for  the  future,  inasmuch  as 
the  conflict  was  partly  waged  at  dusk,  and  because  the  dis- 
positions for  the  final  French  attack,  very  properly  directed 
against  the  northern  angle  (tactical  point)  because  the 
frontal  attack  did  not  promise  success,  decided  the  posses- 
sion of  the  wood.  We  have  the  additional  example  here  of 
cavalry  attacking  successfully  in  one  of  the  open  spaces 
under  General  von  Colomb. 

Skillful  use  of  woods  for  the  protection  of  the  retreat 

was  made  in  the  following  cases:  by  the  Saxons  (wood  of 

Briz,  July  3,  186G);  by  the  French  (Reichshofen,  August  0, 

1870),  and  again  by  the  French  (wood  of  Jaumont,  August 

28,  1870).  

*To  avoid  repetition  I  refer  the  reader  to  "Die  Kampfe  una  die 
Steinbriiclie  von  Rozerieulles"  and  "Viorundzwanzig  Stunden  Molt- 
ke'scher  Strategic"  ("The  Struggle  for  tlie  Qiianies  of  Rozerieulles" 
and  "Twenty-four  Hours  of  Moltke's  Strategy"),  Berlin,  R.  Felix, 
military  publisher.    Both  l»y  Fritz  Honig. 


Tactical  Deductions.  391 

Lastly  we  come  to  the  operative  and  tactical  aspects  of 
large  wooded  districts,  their  possibilities  for  covering  the 
deploj'-ment,  for  traversing  them,  for  battle,  and  for  cover- 
ing the  retreat  as  exhibited  by  the  typical  instances  of  the 
forest  of  Orleans  and  that  of  Marchenoir. 

Unless  large  as  well  as  small  bodies  in  any  kind  of  wood 
scrupulously  observe  the  simple  laws  of  order,  of  keep- 
ing direction,  and  of  control,  confusion  is  bound  to  quick- 
ly ensue.  In  crossing  a  wood,  painstaking  care  should  be 
exercised  by  sending  men  ahead  to  mark  the  direction,  and 
others  to  reconnoiter.  If  the  edge  is  to  be  taken,  the  greater 
part  of  the  assailants  should  be  at  once  re-formed  upon  its 
capture,  follow  the  skirmishers,  and  envelop  the  flanks  of 
the  wooded  district.  The  important  rdles  heretofore  played 
by  woods  are  more  apt  to  be  enhanced  in  future  than  the 
reverse,  and  it  is  interesting  and  useful  to  consider  each  case 
in  connection  with  the  efl'ect  of  modern  arms.  In  general  we 
are  taught  by  military  history  that  woods  as  well  as  locali- 
ties gain  their  highest  significance  only  from  the  quality  of 
the  troops;  it  is  particularly  true  of  woods.  Thus  the  forest 
of  Orleans  was  largely  instrumental  in  the  defeat  of  the 
French,  while  the  Germans  remained  masters  of  the  varying 
and  often  perilous  situation,  although  they  were  themselves 
unable  to  maintain  the  desired  communication  for  some 
time  during  the  action.  Under  such  conditions  the  struggle 
assumed  the  character  of  march  encounters.  The  latter 
may  in  future,  under  similar  circumstances,  be  expected  to 
be  more  obstinately  contested,  since  wood  fighting  will  in 
such  cases  approximate  that  of  defiles. 

Village  and  wood  fights  render  general  control  diffi- 
cult, give  rise  to  uncertainty,  and  easily  lead  to  precipitate 
steps  and  wrong  movements. 

The  leading  of  troop  units  is  difficult,  the  units  are  eas- 


392  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ily  disrupted;  hence  the  great  number  of  dispersed  men 
in  village  and  wood  fights.  The  delivery  of  fire  is  restricted 
to  short  range.  Since  the  troops  deployed  in  wood  fighting 
are  usually  beyond  the  control  of  the  leaders,  suitable 
employment  of  the  reserves  is  all  the  more  important. 

XI.     Of  Night  Battles. 

The  philosophy  that  has  been  formulated  on  the  sub- 
ject of  losses,  half  of  which  might  have  been  avoided  by 
intelligent  leadership,  notwithstanding  the  employment  of 
wrong  formations  against  the  Imperial  Army  in  1870,  has 
been  the  cause  of  part  of  the  "tacticians"  desiring  to  trans- 
fer to  the  darkness  of  night  what  they  no  longer  dare  to 
undertake  in  broad  daylight;  and,  as  is  usual  in  cases  where 
knowledge,  experience,  and  reflection  are  called  for,  the 
great  majority,  neither  possessing  the  one  nor  liking  anoth- 
er, have  accepted  the  preaching  of  these  false  prophets.  If 
one  method  is  not  suitable,  another  is;  the  example  is  easily 
settled  that  way.  While  I  consider  the  tendency  repre- 
sented by  the  "Summer-night's  Dream"  as  an  unhealthy 
excrescence  of  a  healthy  idea,  and  criticize  and  reject  the 
same  only  in  its  consequences  and  forms,  the  tendency  of  the 
"night  tacticians"  deserves  the  sharpest  condemnation  as 
being  the  expression  of  an  unhealthy  idea.  I  say  purposely 
"darkness  of  night,"  not  "night,"  for  there  are  nights  that 
are  not  dark,  and  these  tacticians  wish  for  darkness,  which 
they  think  will  protect  them  from  being  either  seen  or  hit. 

In  order  not  to  rest  tactics  on  a  wrong  basis,  we  should 
ever  start  from  a  consideration  of  man;  a  serious-minded 
man  can  best  study  human  weakness  by  making  a  serious 
study  of  his  own  nature.  In  making  the  study  of  himself  he 
can  easily  ascertain  that  whatever  he  may  be  doing  in  the 
dark,  he  is  acting  with  less  assurance,  and  consequently 


Tactical  Deductions.  393 

with  less  determination  and  effect,  than  in  daylight.     Any 
kind  of  human,  intelligent,  ijractical  work  requires  the  sense 
of  sight;  otherwise  the  Creator  would  not  have  given  us 
eyes.     By  their  means  we  control  the  action  of  the  other 
senses  and  are  enabled  to  make  full  use  of  them.     The  latter 
purpose  requires  light;  in  choosing  darkness  we  relinquish 
one  of  the  decisive  means  of  action.     Every  tactical  act  is 
based  on  movement;  every  movement  of  the  individual  in 
'  the  dark  is  unsteady,  even  walking,  which  is  the  simplest 
requisite  for  every  conflict.     Every  phenomenon  perceptible 
to  the  senses  in  the  dark  acts  at  first  as  a  surprise,  and 
frightens;  no  one  will  gainsay  this  who  remembers  how  fre- 
quently one  thing  or  another  at  night  "made  his  heart  beat." 
I  could  cite  hundreds  of  cases  from  my  own  recollection ;  the 
terrifying  vision  only  disappears  upon  the  return  of  the 
mental  faculties,  usually  styled  presence  of  mind,  which  is 
somewhat  incorrect,  since  the  "presence"  is  subsequent  to 
the  vision  and  dependent  on  time  and  circumstances;  nor 
does  the  vision  then  invariably  disappear  at  once.      If  the 
use  of  his  mental  faculties  enables  man  to  recognize  at  once 
all  the  causes  of  terror,  he  will,  if  possessing  will-power,  re- 
main master  of  the  situation.     This  "orientation  by  means  of 
intellect"  presupposes  certain  conditions — above  all,  famil- 
iarity with  the  surroundings;  for,  if  such  is  not  the  case,  the 
intellectual  powers  do  not  triumph  over  the  imagination  <as 
quickly  as  is  desirable;  and  experience  teachers  that  under 
unfamiliar  circumstances  and  in  the  dark  the  imagination 
develops  such  power  as  to  conjure  up  phantom  after  phan- 
tom, and  to  fetter  the  intellect  completely.     Man  then  has 
lost  the  equilibrium  of  his  senses  and  powers,  and  is  a  being 
whom  his  excited  imagination  leads  to  acts  of  the  greatest 
folly,  precipitation,  etc.,  which  in  tactics  furnishes  the  most 
fruitful  soil  for  panics.     These  simple  truths  have  kept  all 


394  J^iqiiiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

generals  of  renown  from  night  enterprises  (we  speak  here  of 
great  and  decisive  operations  alone),  and  Cromwell  is  the 
only  general  who  acted  differently,  though  under  justifiable 
circumstances.  His  first  exploit  was  in  the  decisive  battle  of 
Dunbar  on  September  3,  1650.  Cromwell  was  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  terrain  and  with  the  enemy's  position,  he 
approached  during  darlcness,  deployed  at  dau^n,  and  fought 
and  pursued  in  hroad  daylight.  The  march  did  not,  however, 
exceed  2  kilometers,  his  forces  did  not  exceed  12,000  men, 
and  the  roads,  crossings,  direction — everything  was  well 
known.  His  second  example  is  the  crossing  of  the  Firth  of 
Forth,  but  here  also  the  preparations  had  been  made  to 
include  the  most  minute  detail,  and  with  astounding  care, 
and  there  was  no  real  darkness  during  the  crossing  (ap- 
proach), as  it  was  a  starlight  night. 

That  all  generals  have  shunned  the  dark  night  for  deci- 
sive battle  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  were  acquainted  with 
the  human  heart,  an  indispensable  requisite  of  a  general. 
It  is  unintelligible  why  ^'tacticians"  who  consider  all  close 
formations  inapplicable  to  battle  in  daylight,  should  recom- 
mend night  battles.  Believing  themselves  unable  to  suffi- 
ciently control  the  troops  in  swarm  formation,  they  choose 
the  night  so  as  to  be  able  to  use  close  formations  and  act 
intelligently.  We  fail  to  see  where  the  intellect  comes  in, 
if  the  same  men  want  to  transfer  the  battle  to  the  night, 
which  renders  all  acts  and  aims  difficult  or  wholly  impos- 
sible, since  they  all  require  mutual  vision  and  recognition. 
The  man  is  unable  to  see  his  leader  in  the  dark  or  to  follow 
his  example;  at  best  he  can  hear  his  voice.  If  the  night  is 
light,  it  gives  no  protection  against  fire,  and  protection  is 
what  the  "tacticians  of  darkness"  want.  That  protec- 
tion is  the  hobby  of  their  theory.  The  splendid  action  of 
Laon  on  March  9,  1814,  took  place  at  night  under  similar 


Tactical  Deductions.  395 

conditions  as  at  Dunbar,  at  least  in  so  far  as  familiarity  with 
the  terrain  is  concerned;  but  the  night  was  not  dark;  it  was 
so  lit  up  by  a  clear  starry  sky  and  by  the  burning  village  of 
A  this  as  to  afford  fair  marks  by  which  to  direct  the  move 
ment;  but  in  other  respects  surprise  is  an  essential  require- 
ment of  effective  night  battles,  they  bear  the  characteristics 
of  the  unexpected  attack.  It  follows  from  the  foregoing: 
(1)  that  under  certain  circumstances  night  battles  may  be 
very  effective  if  the  state  of  discipline  of  the  troops  makes 
such  an  undertaking  feasible,  if  there  is  prospect  of  surpris- 
ing the  enemy,  if  terrain  and  enemy  are  well  known  so  that 
the  troops  do  not  miss  their  objectives  and  the  task  is  a  sim- 
ple one;  (2)  that  the  body  of  troops  should  not  be  greater 
than  can  be  controlled  on  the  march.  In  order  to  surprise 
the  enemy  it  is  necessary  to  approach  quickly,  quietly,  and 
without  fire;  to  march  in  battle  formation  and  thus  to 
strike  the  enemy,  as  deployment  takes  up  too  much  time  and 
diminishes  the  chances  of  surprise.  Small  units  alone  are 
capable  of  rapid  and  surprising  movements,  the  distances 
to  be  traversed  should  be  relatively  short,  and  to  assign  dif- 
ferent directions  to  the  troops  is  to  jeopardize  combination 
as  at  Chenebier.  (3)  An  army  needs  many  roads  for  its 
march;  it  cannot  move  in  the  dark  in  battle  formation;  it 
cannot  traverse  great  distances  in  the  dark,  the  army  corps 
cannot  keep  themselves  mutually  informed,  they  cannot  be 
controlled;  hence  it  is  unlikely  that  a  decisive  battle  will  be 
fought  in  the  dark.  We  should  keep  in  mind  the  conditions 
on  the  17th  and  18th  of  August  before  the  battle  of  Grave- 
lotte.  It  would  have  been  easy  to  gather  full  information 
of  the  terrain  for  the  march,  to  start  the  troops  in  the  right 
direction,  and  to  maintain  them  on  the  march.  Next  con- 
sider the  difficulties  actually  encountered  in  the  movements 
of  the  two  armies,  the  march  of  the  Saxons  and  of  the 


396  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

X.  Corps  in  battle  formation,  and  then  imagine  sucb  a  task 
in  future  accomplished  in  the  dark  by  8  or  9  army  corps. 
I  believe  that  events  would  have  been  quite  different  from 
those  happening  in  daylight!  Daylight  will  be  needed  for 
the  decisive  battle  in  the  future  as  it  has  been  in  the  past, 
night  actions  will  be  exceptional,  night  battles  are  out  of  the 
question;  night  actions  are  therefore  relegated  to  the  domain 
of  minor  operations  and  of  position  warfare,  where  they 
have  always  been. 

It  is  not  unlikely  that  fine  night  actions  like  that  of 
Podol  on  the  27th  of  June,  1806,  might  be  repeated  under 
similar  circumstances,  and  it  is  even  advisable  to  give  lead- 
ers and  men  some  training  in  that  direction;  the  situation, 
however,  was  very  simple:  Assaulting  a  bridge  and  main* 
taining  the  captured  bridge  against  attacks  on  open  ground 
are  very  simple  tactical  problems,  wiiich,  on  a  bright  June 
night  like  this  one,  require  nothing  more  than  determina- 
tion and  discipline.  When  matters  are  more  complicated, 
as  they  were  soon  afterward  at  Gitschin  on  June  29th,  the 
disadvantages  of  night  actions  become  at  once  apparent, 
even  after  a  victory  and  with  relatively  small  bodies  of 
troops. 

In  the  movement  of  an  army  corps  a  distinction  is  to 
be  made  between  the  march  on  the  roads,  the  deployment  in 
the  terrain,  and  the  continuation  of  the  latter  up  to  the  col 
lision  with  the  enemy.  The  march  of  several  army  corps 
at  night  on  roads  as  good  as  those  in  France  presents  no 
insurmountable  difficulties  for  well-broken  troops,  and  con- 
trol and  communication  can  easily  exist  and  be  maintained. 
I  have  taken  part  in  night  marches  in  the  heat  of  summer 
and  cold  of  winter.  At  the  end  of  the  first  very  long  march, 
lasting  from  1  p.  m.  until  H  a.  m.,  the  troops,  not  yet  broken 
in,  arrived  with  much  straggling  (4th  and  5th  of  August, 


Tactical  Deductions.  397 

1870).  At  the  second  and  third  night  march  (August  10,  13, 
1870)  we  were  marching  by  brigade  through  night  and  day 
with  the  same  facility  as  in  daylight;  the  night  marches 
from  Blois  to  La  Chapelle  (December  31st),  thence  to  Ven- 
dome  (Januai-y  1st),  and  from  Chateau-Renault  to  Blois 
(January  15th),  were  no  trouble  at  all,  notwithstanding  that 
the  last  named  march  was  through  country  deeply  covered 
with  snow.  If  the  night  is  starlight  and  if  the  ground  is 
covered  with  snow,  the  only  real  disadvantage  is  the  loss  of 
sleep  on  the  part  of  the  men.  The  difficulties  for  large 
units  only  begin  after  the  deployment,  which  would  have 
to  take  place  not  less  than  5000  to  6000  meters  from  the 
enemy,  if  w^e  wished  to  escape  observation  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, and  even  that  distance  might  prove  too  small  when 
opposed  to  a  watchful  enemy.  It  is  unlikely  that  such 
distances  could  be  covered  by  several  army  corps  in  battle 
formation  in  unknown  ten'ain  without  confusion,  with  which 
result  night  battles  would  fall  to  the  ground. 

So  far  we  have  onlj^  dealt  with  night  actions  begun  and 
ended  or  broken  off  in  tlie  dark,  the  approach  being  made 
in  the  evening  or  at  night.  There  are  other  actions,  in 
which  the  march  to  the  battle-field  was  made  in  daytime, 
which  were  arranged  and  carried  out  in  daytime,  and  which 
were  not  decided  until  dusk  or  dark.  Foremost  among  such 
actions  is  that  on  the  3d  and  4th  of  December,  1870,  in  front 
of  Orleans;  next  is  La  Tuil^rie,  and  a  number  of  other 
instances  from  the  battles  of  Le  Mans,  of  lesser  tactical  and 
strategic  import;  and  here  I  come  to  a  point  which  I  deem 
of  the  greatest  importance.  Night  enterprises  may  fall  to 
the  lot  of  any  troops,  which  is  sufficient  reason  why  they 
should  be  trained  accordingly,  in  order  that  the  leaders  at 
least  may  have  an  idea  of  their  difficulties.  It  is  moreover 
to  be  expected  that  many  actions,  and  even  battles  (Grave- 


398  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

lotte,  Orleans,  Le  Mans,  Beaune,  Loigny,  St.  Quentin),  v/ill 
be  continued  until  late  in  the  eA'ening — i.  e.,  until  dark,  and 
it  is  there  that  sagacious  tacticians  and  good  troops  may 
gain  success.  If,  for  instance,  after  the  French  withdrawal 
from  St.  Privat,  the  III.  and  X.  Army  Corps  had  been  mar- 
shaled to  the  assault  on  Amanvilliers,  they  might  have 
gained  great  results.  If  General  von  Goben  had  even  been 
slightly  supported  by  his  cavalry,  or  if  he  had  had  some 
fresh  infantry  on  the  evening  of  January  19,  1871,  the  ene- 
my's retreat  would  have  been  converted  into  a  complete 
route.  A  few  companies,  boldly  led,  decided  the  battle  of 
Le  Mans  by  capturing  La  TuiMrie,  for  the  possession  of 
which  the  battalions  had  been  contending  in  vain  since 
noon;  at  dusk,  single  companies  and  small  battalions  daily 
took  the  enemy's  points  cVappui  at  Le  Mans,  all  of  which 
entailed  but  small  losses,  and  even  greater  results  could 
have  been  gained  with  comparatively  small  losses.  Such 
tasks  require  strict  discipline  and  an  efficient  corps  of 
officers;  it  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  many  of 
these  successful  issues  occurred  in  the  last  phase  of  the  war, 
when  the  troops  had  naturally  lost  much  of  their  fresh- 
ness and  efficiency.  Decisions  which  could  not  be  gained  in 
daytime  by  swarms  of  skirmishers  were  thus  gained  by 
close  columns  not  only  at  the  end  of  the  battle,  but  at  the 
end  of  the  war.  They  do  not  desert  e  to  be  styled  "night 
actions";  the  situation  became  approximately  known  with 
the  assistance  of  snow,  a  starlight  sky,  conflagrations,  and 
the  action  just  preceding.  We  should  not  cling  to  names,  but 
endeavor  to  understand  the  true  inwardness  of  things,  and 
in  doing  so  the  moral  power  of  the  troops  will  regain  its  full 
importance  as  a  decisive  factor.  It  is  certain  that  im- 
proved arms  will  make  the  attack  in  daytime  more  difficult; 
and  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  not  unlikely  that  by  evening  the 


Tactical  Deductions.  399 

defender's  strength,  though  he  may  still  hold  his  position,  is 
for  the  most  part  consumed  by  the  exhausting  struggle  dur- 
ing the  day.  This  is  naturally  the  moment  for  hurling 
closed  troops  against  the  enemy's  broken  strength  under  the 
cover  of  dusk  or  darkness,  and  in  such  cases  these  troops 
must  and  should  be  expected  to  gain  the  position  by  their 
onslaught.  The  charging  pace  is  most  suitable  for  the  occa- 
sion, and  moral  grounds  will  usually  by  themselves  suflSce 
to  decide  the  success  of  a  blow  delivered  with  determination; 
and  if  any  one  desires  to  call  this  a  night  action,  well  and 
good,  I  do  not  cling  to  the  letter;  but  I  am  convinced  that 
night  actions  are  very  proper  here,  because  based  on  human 
nature  in  tactics.  Care  should  be  taken  that  fresh  troops  be 
on  hand  at  the  decisive  point,  that  they  have  stout  hearts,  and 
that  the  leaders  have  that  "Schneid^^  which  is  indispensable  in 
such  enterprises.  It  is  thus  not  impossible  that  battles  which 
have  remained  undecided  throughout  the  day  may  be  de- 
cided in  the  dark ;  that,  at  any  rate,  is  the  import  of  the  sins 
of  omission  and  commission  in  the  battles  of  Gravelotte,  Le 
Mans,  Loigny,  St.  Quentin,  and  even  Villersexel.  Thus, 
though  our  roads  may  diverge,  I  join  my  opponents  at  the 
goal.  The  future  will  show  who  is  right,  and  if  we  cannot 
have  the  best  we  should  content  ourselves  with  the  good. 
These  decisions  after  dark,  as  recommended  by  me,  have  the 
grave  disadvantage  that,  as  a  rule,  there  can  be  no  pursuit; 
at  least,  with  the  exception  of  Waterloo,  I  know  of  none. 
That  is  certainlj'  bad,  but  the  suggestions  made  by  the  other 
side  have  the  much  graver  disadvantage  that  in  the  dark 
large  bodies  cannot  be  led  with  the  requisite  surety.  In  the 
former  case  the  decision  will,  at  any  rate,  be  gained ;  in  the 
latter  case  we  do  not  get  as  far  as  that. 

In  the  Russian  Army,  General  Kuropatkin  is  one  of  the 
advocates  of  night  attacks.     His  arguments  are,  however, 


400  [nquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

chiefly  based  on  the  Tekinzeu  campaign  and  are  inapplicable 
to  European  armies.  Yet  the  reference  to  the  moral  power, 
which  is  so  much  emphasized  both  by  Kuropatkin  and 
Dragomirow,  should  not  be  underestimated.  The  soldier 
who  knows  only  ''victory  or  death"  may  generally  be  con- 
sidered a  myth.  ]}ut  even  if  that  were  not  so,  night  actions 
would  not  lose  their  dangers,  so  far  as  the  higher  command 
is  concerned. 

The  French  have  also  recently  dropped  night  battles, 
once  80  much  recommended  by  Boulanger.  The  maneuvers 
at  ChA-lons-sur-Marne  in  1891,  as  is  well  known,  ended  in  a 
grand  attack  at  dawn,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  in  war  an 
army  could  be  suitably  concentrated  and  disposed  for  the 
purpose. 

Among  the  older  French  generals,  Marshal  Pelissier, 
who  took  Sebastopol  by  assault,  was  greatly  opposed  to 
night  enterprises.  He  stated  with  emphasis  that  the  chief 
cause  of  the  failure  of  his  first  assault  (June  18,  1855)  was 
that  it  was  made  at  night.  This  experienced  soldier  also 
stated  that  at  night  the  men  are  sleepy,  that  many  lie  down 
and  hide,  and  that  confusion  is  unavoidable.  If  a  general 
of  the  French  Army  then  existing  expresses  such  an  opinion, 
what  are  we  to  expect  from  modern  iroo]>s,  who  cannot  lay 
claim  to  the  appellation  of  veterans? 

In  America,  General  Early  expressed  himself  as  follows 
on  the  subject  of  night  actions,  in  connection  with  Gen- 
eral Jackson's  death,  who,  as  is  well  known,  was  mortally 
wounded  by  his  own  men  in  a  night  action  in  the  Wilderness: 
"The  fire  directed  on  General  Jackson's  staff,  however 
lamentable  in  its  results,  was  simply  due  to  an  accident,  or 
rather  to  the  confusion  Avhich  is  unavoidable  in  all  cases 
where  troops  have  to  be  maneuvered  in  the  dark.  I  have 
perhaps  been  as  often  under  fire  as  any  living  person,  and 


Tactical  Deductions.  401 

my  experience  and  observations  lead  me  to  believe  that,  if 
the  enemy  is  watchful,  offensive  movements  at  night,  par- 
ticularly at  their  inception,  do  more  injury  to  one's  own 
troops,  through  mistakes  and  accidental  meetings,  than  to 
the  enemy;  I  also  believe  that  all  experienced  leaders  agree 
with  me.  The  danger  is  increased  if  the  movements  have 
to  be  made  in  a  dense  wood."      (Wilderness.) 

It  is  well  known  that  it  has  never  been  determined  at 
the  hand  of  what  troops  General  Jackson  received  his  mor- 
tal wounds,  and  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  won  as 
General  Jackson  was  about  to  relieve  Rhodes'  Division  by 
that  of  A.  P.  Hill  in  order  to  pursue  the  enemy.  Even  under 
such  conditions,  night  operations  are  therefore  not  to  be 
recommended. 

XII.     Conclusion. 

At  the  time  of  the  introduction  of  the  needle-gun  it  was 
the  general  opinion  that,  owing  to  the  greater  rapidity  of 
fire  of  that  rifle,  a  section  of  skirmishers  could  accomplish 
as  much  as  a  platoon  heretofore;  and  it  was  also  believed 
that  by  employing  three  or  four  times  as  many  combatants 
from  the  beginning,  the  battle  would  be  proportionately 
shortened.  Though  this  was  several  times  the  case  in  1866, 
yet  the  wars  of  1870-71  and  of  1877-78  showed  that  when 
both  sides  were  armed  with  breech-loaders,  battles  were  not 
more  quickly  decided  than  formerly;  that,  on  the  contrary, 
the  struggle  had  become  more  obstinate;  that  the  fighting 
power  of  skirmishers  armed  with  breech-loaders  was  extra- 
ordinary and  surprisingly  great.  In  seeking  for  proofs 
among  the  prominent  examples,  we  cannot  find  better  ones 
than  those  of  the  V.  Corps  at  Worth,  and  of  the  ITT.  Corps 
at  Vionville,  notwithstanding  many  checks  in  the  battle. 

Though  the  use  of  smokeless  powder  does  away  with  all 
obstructions  to  view  from  smoke,  and  though  the  efficacy 


402  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

of  rifle  and  gun  has  been  greatly  increased  as  compared  with 
1870-71,  it  would  be  j^remature  to  conclude  that  a  more 
rapid  course  and  (luicker  decision  will  be  the  rule.  That  is 
in  itself  sufficient  to  convince  those  who  have  studied  the 
operations  preceding  battle  that  an  absolute  shortening 
of  great  battles  cannot  be  expected.  Masses  of  8  or  9  army 
corps  are  not  killed  off  in  a  few  hours.  It  is,  moreover, 
beyond  doubt  that  skirmish  tactics  endow  the  soldier  with 
greater  fighting  power  than  any  other  tactics.  It  may,  on 
the  other  hand,  be  assumed  as  fairly  certain  that  in  future 
the  superiority  of  fire  of  one  side  over  the  other  can  in  many 
cases  be  gained  more  swiftly  than  heretofore.  It  will 
chiefly  depend  on  which  of  the  opposing  artilleries  will  first 
shatter  that  of  the  enemy,  and  it  seems  to  me  beyond  doubt 
that  superiority  of  training  and  leading  may  accomplish  that 
end  with  great  swiftness.  It  may  therefore  happen  that 
shortly  after  the  opening  of  the  battle  entire  batteries  Avill 
be  disabled,  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  the  foretaste  we 
had  at  Verneville  (IX.  Corps)  and  at  St.  Hubert  (VII.  Corps), 
and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  on  the  18th  of  August, 
such  as  the  situation  w^as,  the  entire  artillery  of  the  18th 
Division  should  simply  have  been  captured  by  the  French 
infantry  advancing  from  both  flanks,  in  the  very  first  hour 
of  the  battle.  At  Worth,  on  the  other  hand,  before  the  at- 
tack of  the  corps  on  the  flanks,  the  massed  artillery  of  the  V. 
Corps  was  the  rock  against  which  the  billows  of  battle 
were  again  and  again  broken,  and  constituted  the  firm  sup- 
port of  our  infantry.  These  two  examples  are  simply 
typical  as  regards  the  superiority  of  fire  and  the  continua- 
tion of  the  action,  in  a  negative  as  well  as  a  positive  sense; 
hence  the  artillery  should  be  employed  in  large  bodies 
from  the  beginning  and  covered  in  front  and  flank  by 
infantry  posted  at  some  distance.     The  superiority  of  fire 


Tactical  Deductions.  403 

may  thus  be  gained  step  by  step,  and  when  it  is  accom- 
plished, we  may  perhaps  read  of  whole  lines  of  disabled 
guns  which  a  successful  issue  of  the  battle  is  bound  to 
deliver  into  the  victor's  hands.  This  all  the  more  as  the 
concentration  of  the  fire  of  artillery  on  one  objective  is  now 
perfectly  feasible. 

Superiority  of  fire  and  the  decision  can  not  be  coinci- 
dent in  point  of  time;  the  latter  cannot  be  gained  until  the 
former  is  attained,  and  it  also  depends  on  whether  the  side 
which  has  gained  the  superiority  of  fire  will  have  sufficient 
fighting  power  left  to  gain  the  decision.  Until  4  p.  m.  the 
French  had  undoubtedly  the  superiority  of  fire  along  the 
whole  line  of  battle  at  Gravelotte,  but  nevertheless  failed 
to  gain  decisive  advantages  at  any  point.  It  is  also  more 
difficult  to  ascertain  the  superiority  of  fire  than  is  popularly 
assumed,  which  is  demonstrated  by  the  action  of  the  French 
left  wing  at  Gravelotte.  Artillery  which  is  silent  for  some 
time  is  not  necessarily  disabled;  it  may  merely  be  held  back 
for  the  decisive  moment.  It  follows  that  it  would  not 
always  do  to  hold  the  actual  or  supposed  superiority  of  fire 
equivalent  to  the  decision;  the  latter  requires  a  general 
forward  movement  against  the  decisive  points,  of  which 
infantrj'  alone  is  usually  capable.  (XII.  and  Guard  Corps 
at  St.  Privat,  33d  Brigade  at  Loigny,  etc.)  Hence  the  new 
arms  do  not  change  the  roles  of  infantry  and  artillery;  the 
one  cannot  perform  the  duty  of  the  other;  the  absence  of 
smoke,  etc.,  strengthens  their  combination  as  fighting 
branches;  it  is  only  now  that  all  the  requisite  conditions  for 
battle  tactics  are  at  hand. 

Artillery  as  well  as  infantry  must  be  intelligently  and 
correctly  disposed  and  led,  and  comparatively  large  forces 
of  either  must  be  engaged  in  order  to  gain  the  superiority  of 
fire  as  soon  as  possible  by  their  common  effort.     It  is  feasi- 


404:  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

ble  in  the  case  of  either  arm  only  after  careful  reconnais- 
sance and  through  unity  of  action;  hence  all  commanders, 
down  to  those  of  regiments,  should  be  well  mounted  and 
far  out  in  front  to  observe  and  guide  the  troops  into  the 
proper  direction  at  the  requisite  great  distances  from  the 
enemy.  If  artillery  and  infantry  act  from  the  beginning  in 
considerable  force,  the  further  course  of  the  action,  and  ques- 
tions as  to  the  employment  of  the  arrived  and  of  the  com- 
posite bodies,  need  give  no  uneasiness.  I  again  refer  to 
Problus  and  St.  Privat  as  examples  of  tactical  correctness 
and  errors;  these  matters  have  changed,  not  as  regards  prin- 
ciples, but  as  regards  distances  at  which  the  preparatory 
measures  have  to  be  taken.  They  will  therefore  require 
more  time  than  formerly,  but  on  that  account  I  would  not 
jump  to  the  conclusion,  like  some  tacticians,  that,  the  prep- 
arations once  completed,  the  course  of  the  battle  proper 
would  be  swifter,  for  against  it  stand  the  undoubted  in- 
crease of  fighting  power  which  the  individual  soldier  derives 
from  the  much-improved  arm,  the  greater  supply  of  ammu- 
nition, and  more  careful  training.  Nor  should  we  attempt 
to  solve  such  questions  in  advance,  because  it  is  impossible 
and  is  apt  to  lead  to  wrong  conclusions  and  ideas.  In  tac- 
tics we  should  invariably  base  ourselves  on  facts;  they  con- 
tain plenty  of  lessons  for  study. 

Correct  disposition  and  apportionment  of  the  forces  is 
impossible  without  the  intelligent  employment  of  forma- 
tions suitable  to  the  terrain.  The  only  formation  is  that  of 
successive  lines,  which  is  the  most  suitable  for  developing 
masses  of  skirmishers  for  the  solution  of  the  problem.  I 
again  refer  to  Problus  and  St.  Privat  (north),  to  Frosch- 
weiler,  Loigny,  and  St.  Quentin.  For  the  deployment  from 
the  marching  column,  "Treffeii^^  are  indispensable.      Close 


Tactical  Deductions.  405 

formations  should  therefore  not  be  banished  from  the  battle- 
field; they  should  rather  be  used  with  judgment. 

Since  the  employment  of  strong  artillery  and  infantry 
from  the  start  is  the  best  guarantee  to  gaining  the  superior- 
ity of  fire,  such  employment  becomes  a  tactical  law.  If  the 
assailant,  for  instance,  has  gained  the  superiority  of  fire,  the 
danger  for  intelligently  led  close  formations  becomes  less. 
These  formations  may  be  applicable  in  many  cases,  and  I  re- 
*peat  that  then  a  few  closed  companies  or  small  battalions 
will  be  best  able  to  quickly  decide  the  conflict.  (Frosch- 
weiler,  Loigny,  La  TuiMrie.)  The  small-caliber  arms,  etc.,  do 
not  make  such  action  impossible,  since  a  superior  arm  will 
be  of  small  use  to  an  enemy  whose  fire  power  is  broken.  Let 
us  calmly  and  coolly  retain  and  use  what  is  good,  and  not 
stickle  on  rules. 

It  is  the  same  way  with  long-range  and  short-range  fire. 
The  danger  of  running  short  of  ammunition  seems  some- 
what diminished  by  the  greater  number  of  rounds  carried  by 
the  soldier,  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  increased  by  the  maga- 
zine system  and  by  the  great  range  of  the  rifle.  At  Loigny  3 
battalions  of  the  Fourth  Bavarian  Brigade  expended  all 
their  ammunition,  and  in  the  same  battle  the  First  Bava- 
rian Division  had  expended  so  much  of  its  ammunition  by 
noon — i.  e.,  in  an  action  of  4  to  5  hours — that  General  von  der 
Tann  had  to  have  it  supplied  with  ammunition  before  it 
could  resume  the  action.  Under  circumstances  such  as  here 
and  at  Beaune,  where  the  Sixteenth  and  Fifty-seventh  had 
to  replenish  their  ammunition  several  times — i.  e.,  on  the 
defensive — it  will  be  practicable  in  the  future  also  to  bring 
up  fresh  ammunition;  but  the  danger  of  running  out  of 
ammunition  is  very  likely  to  exist  in  future  as  in  the  past, 
and  so  is  the  difficulty,  perhaps  impossibility,  of  replenish- 
ing it.  Both  will  best  be  guarded  against  by  economizing 
one's  fire,  and  by  opening  fire  as  late  as  possible.     Several 


406  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  ths  Future. 

instances  occurring  at  Wortli,  where  troops  of  the  Y.  and 
XI.  Corps  had  expended  nearly  all  their  ammunition  and 
where  any  considerable  supply  of  fresh  ammunition  was  out 
of  the  question,  urgently  enjoin  us  to  delay  the  opening  of 
fire  as  long  as  possible.  I  do  not  think  much  of  our  peace 
methods  of  replenishing  ammunition  during  the  attack. 
For  obvious  reasons  I  abstain  from  going  into  details;  the 
first  requirement  is  to  supply  the  man  before  the  action  with 
as  much  ammunition  as  he  can  carry  without  losing  his 
mobility.  It  should  also  be  made  a  rule  in  battle  to  collect 
the  ammunition  of  the  killed  and  wounded. 

If  infantr}'  is  capable  of  inflicting  sensible  losses  on  the 
enemy  (by  controlled  fire,  if  the  range  is  1000  meters  and 
over),  it  would  be  foolish  not  to  do  so.  Mistakes  and  lack 
of  foresight  are  bound  to  occur,  and  every  body  of  troops 
should  be  formally  trained  in  taking  advantage  of  them. 
But  fire  and  movement  cannot  alwaye  be  so  combined  as 
though  the  army  consisted  of  automatons.  Fire  and  move- 
ment are  antagonistic  in  their  character;  the  antagonism 
may  be  diminished,  but  not  altogether  removed;  in  general 
the  weakness  of  human  nature  inclines  to  making  the  fire  a 
welcome  pretext  for  halting.  No  one  will  gainsay  that.  It 
entails  two  disadvantages:  1,  the  offensive  blow  loses  some 
of  its  force;  2,  the  fire  is  delivered  at  less  effective  ranges 
and  encourages  waste  of  ammunition.  Every  tactician 
should  therefore  strive  not  to  open  fire  until  medium  ranges 
have  been  reached,  because  in  point  of  leading  there  is  the 
additional  reason,  that  troops  not  firing  cau  be  more  easily 
led  than  those  which  are  firing. 

Though  it  may  be  assumed  that  efforts  to  direct  and 
lead  will  never  be  lacking,  it  is  unlikely  that  this  end  will 
always  be  accomplished.  Fire  enforces  dispersion,  and  dis- 
l)ersion  places  the  colors  in  great  danger.     Keeping  in  mind 


Tactical  Deductions.  407 

the  Sixteenth  and  Fifty-seventh,  it  should  be  made  a  I'ule 
not  to  take  the  colors  into  action.       Otherwise,  in  addition 
to  the  disabled  line  of  artillery,  (juite  a  number  of  colors 
might  be  fonnd  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  tell  how  they 
were  lost.     To  be  sure,  the  account  of  the  loss  of  the  colors 
of  the  Sixteenth  is  not  calculated  to  support  that  conclu- 
sion; I  am  opposed  to  all  legends,  however  fine  they  may 
sound,  because  they  prevent  actual   facts  from  being  un- 
'  derstood    and    rendered    instructive.      The    Sixteenth    did 
lose   the    colors    of    the    second    battalion,    and    whoever 
Avants  to  see  them  should  go  to  the  Dome  of  the  Invalides 
at  Paris.     The  colore  were  not  missed  until  the  men  were 
re-formed  after  the  attack;  one  or  more  bullets  broke  the 
lance  about  the  middle,  presumably  during  the  attack.     On 
reaching  the  point  where  the  colors  were  lying,  the  French 
carried  off  the  upper  part,  the  colors  proper;  the  lower  part 
was  left  on  the  ground,  and,  as  the  French  withdrew  soon 
afterward  from  this  point,  owing  to  the  appearance  of  Rhein- 
baben's  cavalry  division,  it  was  found  there  by  the  Six- 
teenth on  the  17th  of  August.     These  are  the  simple  facts, 
which  in   my  opinion  contain  nothing  derogatory   to  the 
troops.     Still  the  loss  of  the  colors  is  very  apt  to  be  consid- 
ered disgraceful,  and  their  capture  is  always  considered 
glorious.     These  are  the  reasons  why  the  facts  were  prettily 
decked  out  by  the  Sixteenth,  and  converted  by  the  French 
into  an  abominable  lie.     I  do  not  care  to  go  into  details,  bu.t 
am  curions  to  know  how  long  a  legend  will  stand  in  print, 
which  every  experienced  soldier  feels  is  "prettily  gotten  up," 
of  which  I  have  the  proofs.      The  French  Fifty-seventh, 
which  fought  against  the  second  battalion  of  the  16th  Regi- 
ment, caused  a  statement  to  be  printed  in  the  Petit  Journal 
in  1885,  to  the  effect  that  the  colors  were"/;?-is  en  plein  action.'' 
I  contradicted  the  statement  in  the  Deutsche  Heereszeitung, 


408  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

because  reputable  French  military  journals,  like  the  Avenir 
militaire  and  Progres  militaire,  also  stated  that  the  colors  had 
been  captured.     That  is  not  so;  they  were  picked  up. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  outflanking  tactics  are 
more  theory  than  fact.  In  great  battles  the  flanks  alone  are 
capable  of  effective  outflanking  movements,  and  even  in  that 
case  it  should  be  remembered  that  as  soon  as  the  enemy 
extends  his  line  to  confront  the  outflanking  movement 
(which  he  is  very  apt  to  do),  the  soldier  will  be  fighting  a 
frontal  action,  and  that  the  commander  alone  is  doing 
the  outflanking.  But,  owing  to  the  great  range  of  small- 
caliber  arms,  the  effect  of  the  outflanking  troops  engaged  in 
a  local  frontal  action  cannot  but  be  very  severely  felt  in 
rear  of  the  defender's  front,  for  tactical  outflanking  is  eo  ipso 
favorable  for  a  speedy  attainment  of  the  superiority  of  fire, 
since  the  theoretically  ideal  concentration  of  fire  is  rendered 
practicable  only  by  delivering  the  same  from  two  lines  mak- 
ing an  angle  one  with  the  other,  while  the  absence  of  smoke 
in  turn  is  favorable  for  concentrating  the  fire  of  both  fronts, 
and  of  infantry  and  of  artillery,  on  the  objective.  Outflank- 
ing the  enemy — with  all  three  arms — is  the  most  effective 
form  of  attack,  and  admits  of  great  variety  in  execution. 

This  tactical  law  should  not  mislead  us  to  hold  the 
frontal  action  in  light  esteem,  which  seems  to  be  the  case 
more  or  less.  The  front  must  not  only  be  kept  busy  in  the 
future  as  it  was  in  the  past,  but  should  be  attacked  with 
great  energy;  it  would  be  wrong  not  to  take  full  advantage 
of  the  fire  power  and  of  the  oiTensive  power  of  infantry  and 
artillery.  We  should  keep  in  mind  the  services  rendered 
by  both  arms  at  Worth,  Vionville,  and  Loigny.  No  timid- 
ity should  be  allowed  to  creep  into  our  ideas.  War  demands 
sacrifices,  and  every  decision  exacts  blood;  troops  in  the 
front  line  will  in  the  future,  as  they  did  in  the  past,  take  a 


Tactical  Deductions.  .  409 

prominent  part  in  the  decision,  otherwise  the  enemy  is  apt 
to  crush  the  weak  front;  mistakes  and  weakness  render  this 
as  possible  to-day  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  I.,  the 
only  difference  being  that  such  a  man  is  not  always  present. 
Hence  we  should  not  try  to  overdo  the  outflanking:  where 
the  front  is  not  sufficiently  strong,  outflanking  is  wrong.  We 
cannot  give  figures;  numerical  conditions  in  themselves 
make  the  front  neither  strong  nor  weak — it  is  the  manner  in 
which  the  figures  are  applied  in  the  front.  At  any  rate,  we 
insist  that  the  soldier  should  know  nothing  but  to  be  the 
first  in  attack  and  the  last  in  defense;  and,  in  the  future,  as 
in  the  past,  battles  will  be  decided  by  stout  hearts  and  bright 
minds  who  know  how  to  use  the  improved  arras.  The  lat- 
ter may  be  overcome  by  the  former,  the  former  by  the  lat- 
ter never!  The  most  favorable  case  is,  of  course,  if  the  stout 
hearts  and  bright  minds  in  combination  have  at  their  dis- 
posal superior  arms;  yet  all  the  advantages  will  rarely  be 
found  on  one  side. 

With  well-disciplined  troops,  of  good  morale  and  in  the 
hands  of  determined  leaders,  the  decisive  blow,  which  many 
reasons  may  combine  in  making  unpromising  of  success  in 
daytime,  will  retain  its  full  tactical  value  in  the  evening, 
at  dusk,  and  in  the  dark,  not  to  mention  foggy  and  misty 
days.  During  the  battles  in  front  of  Le  Mans  in  1871,  all 
points  were  simply  assaulted  at  dusk  with  hurrah  and  beat- 
ing of  drums,  and  among  many  successful  cases  I  know  of 
but  one  failure.  This  is  another  case  where  close  forma- 
tions are  suitable;  such  things  can,  in  fact,  not  be  accom- 
plished in  any  other  way. 

In  general  the  future  fire  action  may  be  said  to  take 
place  chiefly  between  600  and  300  meters,  and  to  reach  its 
culmination  between  400  and  300  meters;  there  will  be  ex- 
ceptions, of  course.     The  leaders  must  be  sufficiently  famil- 


410  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

iar  with  the  ballistic  qualities  of  the  small-caliber  arms  to 
know  how  far  in  each  case  they  may  push  their  swarms  for- 
ward. Lack  of  such  knowledge  will  cost  much  precious 
blood. 

It  is  idle  to  argue  whether  the  infantry  or  artillery 
derives  greater  advantage  from  smokeless  powder;  in  my 
opinion,  both  have  enormously  gained  in  tactical  value  from 
this  invention,  and  both  at  the  expense  of  the  cavalry ;  and 
however  strenuously  I  have  contended  for  the  retention  of 
that  arm  on  the  battle-field,!  consider  its  useful  employment 
there  as  extremely  diflScult.  But  when  the  hostile  army  is 
morally  and  physically  broken  by  the  exhaustive  fire  fight, 
well-led  cavalry  may  be  upon  the  enemy  before  he  has  recov- 
ered; battles  will  be  preceded  by  great  cavalry  actions,  since 
it  is  necessary  to  defeat  the  enemy's  cavalry  before  w'e  can 
observe,  reconnoiter,  and  make  our  last  dispositions.  I  con- 
sider it  so  great  and  honorable  a  duty,  that  the  cavalry 
might  well  be  content;  in  any  event,  in  small  or  large  bodies, 
cavalry  will  have  to  do  much  fighting,  and  it  consequently 
continues  to  be  a  battle  arm,  since  it  makes  no  difference, 
so  far  as  the  effect  is  concerned,  whether  it  is  produced  at 
the  beginning  or  at  the  end  of  the  battle,  or  ad  interim.  The 
characteristic  duties  of  cavalry  can  never  be  performed  by 
the  other  arms. 

I  have  repeatedly  stated  that  Gravelotte  seems  to  be 
about  the  typical  battle  of  the  future,  but  I  am  of  the  opin- 
ion that  when  the  position  is  of  greater  natural  or  artificial 
strength,  the  decision  may  not  arrive  until  the  second  day  or 
later.  Perhaps  we  shall  resort  to  battles  of  circumvalla- 
tion.  Belgrad,  Mantua,  Plevna  may  be  repeated  in  more 
or  less  similar  form.  For  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
assailant  may  not  gain  a  victorious  battle  at  all,  that  he 
may  enclose  the  defender  by  a  circumvallation  where  he 


Tactical  Deductions.  411 

finds  him,  that  attempts  at  relief  may  bring  on  several  bat- 
tles, etc.,  until  hunger  and  exhaustion  compel  the  invested 
defender  to  surrendei', 

I  also  believe  that  an  offensive'  of  Moltke's  kind  will 
hardly  be  seen  again.  Everything  points  to  an  obstinate 
defense  on  the  frontier  and  to  the  continuation  of  the 
defense  on  a  grand  scale  in  fortified  districts.  The  v^ar  will 
progress  spasmodically.  A  protracted  struggle  will  be  waged 
for  positions,  exacting  much  blood  and  other  sacrifices,  and 
that  side  which  possesses  the  greater  endurance  and  gains 
permanent  superiority  by  means  of  a  well-selected  base, 
etc.,  will  gain  the  ultimate  victory'  and  witness  the  complete 
collapse  of  the  material  and  moral  force  of  the  opi)onent. 
It  follows  that  greater  enterprises  will  be  launched  against 
the  vital  arteries  of  an  army.  The  war  will  thus  be  carried 
abruptly  from  stage  to  stage,  with  complete  annihilation  of 
one  side  at  each  stage,  and  the  stages  themselves  may  be 
much  protracted.  Metz,  Paris,  Belfort,  Plevna,  and  Schipka 
are  cases  in  point. 

Though  smokeless  powder  does  not  introduce  new  prin- 
ciples into  tactics,  still  it  greatly  modifies  existing  ones, 
and  affects  the  conduct  of  the  war  where  tactics  and  strategy 
blend.  When  there  is  no  smoke,  one  can  of  course  see  as 
fai'  as  it  is  at  all  possible  to  see;  hence  the  defender,  or  rather 
both  sides,  will  be  able  to  watch  the  approach  and  deploy- 
ment beyond  the  line  of  battle,  which  is  important,  particu- 
larly in  prepared  positions;  and  we  should  not  permit  our- 
selves to  believe  that  it  can  be  obviated  by  a  skillful  use  of 
the  topographical  conditions,  since  we  shall  have  to  take 
the  theater  of  operations  as  we  find  it.  In  some  cases  unob- 
served approach  and  deployment  may  be  possible,  and  im- 
possible in  others,  and  in  the  latter  case  the  assailant  will 
encounter  difficulties  which  he  should  not  underestimate. 


412  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

When  the  weather  is  not  quite  clear  (in  fog,  or  rain),  unob- 
structed view  no  longer  exists;  in  our  climate,  misty  days  are 
not  at  all  rare,  particularly  in  the  fall,  spring,  and  winter. 
What  advantage  would  the  new  powder  have  conferred  on 
the  Prussians  at  Jena,  on  the  Austrians  at  Kouiggratz,  on 
the  French  at  Sedan,  on  the  latter  in  most  of  the  battles  and 
actions  during  the  winter?  But,  under  conditions  similar 
to  those  obtaining  at  Kissingeu,  neither  party  would  derive 
much  advantage  from  the  small-caliber  rifle — i.  e.,  the  ter- 
rain may  remove  all  advantages.  Hence  topogi'aphy  and 
weather  put  a  considerable  curb  on  theory. 

Another  tactically  important  point  is  the  color  of  the 
uniforms.  In  order  to  make  cavalry  as  inconspicuous  as 
possible,  all  glaring  colors  should  be  removed  from  its  uni- 
forms, especially  white  and  red;  in  the  infantry  also  the 
bright  helmet  trimmings  should  be  discarded  and  all  metal 
parts,  particularly  of  the  rifle,  should  be  of  dull  color.  It 
has  been  my  observation  in  the  peace  exercises  that  hostile 
infantry  ensconced  and  concealed  at  300  to  400  meters  be- 
trayed itself  by  its  helmets  and  by  the  motions  of  loading 
and  firing;  even  at  more  than  1000  meters  the  infantry  was 
only  discovered  by  the  movements  of  rifles — metal  pai*ts  glis- 
tening in  the  sunlight — whereupon  the  artillery  was  able  to 
take  it  under  fire. 

Something  else  I  want  to  mention:  On  the  18th  of 
August,  1870,  I  was  able  from  near  Remilly — i.  e.,  more  than 
6  German  miles  (about  30  English  miles. — Tr.)  distant — to 
make  out  the  opposing  lines  of  fire  with  the  bare  eye,  which, 
as  I  afterward  learned,  were  hanging  curtainlike  in  dense 
white  clouds  over  the  battle-field  of  Gravelotte,  and  this 
although  not  a  sound  could  be  heard. 

The  principal  cause  of  the  defeat  of  the  Thirty-eighth 
Brigade  on  the  16th  of  August  was  the  fact  that  the  French 


Tactical  Deductions.  413 

approached  under  the  cover  of  smoke,  and,  without  firing  a 
shot,  attacked  us  suddenly  at  close  quarters;  the  smoke  pre- 
vented us  from  seeing  the  danger.  In  the  former  case,  the 
smoke  might  have  been  of  some  advantage  for  the  superior 
leading  in  case  of  unsuitable  arrangements  for  the  march; 
in  the  latter,  the  smoke  conferred  an  advantage  on  the  de- 
fender and  a  disadvantage  on  the  assailant.  It  is  safe  to 
assume  that  the  assailant  would  not  have  rushed  to  the  front 
without  halting  had  he  known  that,  without  being  aware 
of  it,  as  it  were,  he  was  intermingling  with  the  enemy;  he 
would  have  been  more  cautious  and  would  at  least  have 
been  able  to  fight  an  energetic,  defensive  fire  action,  for 
which  the  surprise  left  him  no  time.  When  the  view  is 
unobstructed,  smokeless  pow  der  acts  as  a  safeguard  against 
any  kind  of  surprise,  which  both  sides  should  constantly 
bear  in  mind. 

Nor  should  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  guided  by  the  theo- 
retical fancies  hatched  in  the  studio  as  regards  unobstructed 
view;  but  w^e  should  endeavor  to  gain  a  clear  conception  of 
true  warlike  situations.  At  Gravelotte  the  French  might 
have  observed  all  movements  of  the  Germans  from  Mon- 
tigny  la  Grange  as  far  as  Roncourt  with  the  same  facility 
which  is  now  theoretically  claimed  to  be  invariably  the  case 
with  smokeless  powder.  There  was  nothing  to  hinder  it, 
there  was  no  smoke  because  the  battle  did  not  begin  until 
after  the  movement  and  deployment,  the  air  was  clear,  and 
yet  the  IX.  Army  Corps  surprised  the  enemy;  although  the 
battle  was  raging  at  that  point, the  enemy, who  had  an  unob- 
structed view  from  St.  Privat  of  all  our  movements,  did 
nothing  to  check  or  disturb  our  turning  movement.  In  such 
cases,  smokeless  powder  changes  nothing,  since  before  the 
opening  of  the  battle  one  could  formerly  see  just  as  far  as 
to-day.       The  theorv  of  war  should  therefore  not  reckon 


414  Inquiries  into  the  Tactics  of  the  Future. 

without  the  shortcomings  and  failings  of  man;  they  are  the 
chief  sources  of  victory  for  the  opponent.  He  will  ever  be 
the  victor  who  makes  the  fewest  mistakes! 


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Army).  The  German  Cavalry  in  the  Battle  of  Vlonville — 
Mars-La-Tour,  by  Major  Kaehler  (German  General  Staff).  The 
Operatious  of  the  Cavalry  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  by 
lileutenant-Colonel  George  B.  Davis,  U.  S.  A.  Illustrated;  full 
blue  cloth.     Sent  postpaid  on  receipt  of  $1.50. 

TACTICAL  STUDIES  ON  THE  BATTLES  AROUND  PLEVNA. 

By  Thilo  von  Trotha,  Captain  of  the  Grenadier  Regiment  Fred- 
erick William  IV.  (Attached).  1  volume,  8vo,  handsomely 
bound  in  blue  cloth.    Sent  postpaid  on  receipt  of  $1.50. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  AN  INFANTRY  CAPTAIN'S  JOURNAL  ON 
THE  TRIAL  OF  A  METHOD  FOR  EFFECTIVELY 
TRAINING  A  COMPANY  IN  SKIRMISHING  AND  OUT- 
POST DUTY,  by  Major  von  Arnim,  of  HohenzoUern  Fusilier 
Regiment  No.  40;  translated  by  Major  C.  J.  East,  41st  Regi- 
ment, D.  A.  Q.  M.  G.    Full  blue  cloth,  $1.50. 


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