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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 2 

AUGUST 9, 14, 16, 20, 22, AND 23, 1951 



Printed for the'use of the Committee on the"Judiciary 




Bwiw a BnoJBtjj Pi i mA 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
22848 WASHINGTON : 1951 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. SouRwiNE, Counsel 



Internal Security Subcommittee 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. OCONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of- Pacific Relations 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

Robert Morris, Special Counsel 
Benjamin Manuel, Director of Research 
II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Page 

Bentley, Elizabeth T 403 

Budeuz, Louis Francis 513-593 

Canning, William Martin 466 

Carter, Edward C 449 

Chambers, Jay David Wittaker 487 

Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A 358 

Yoshikawa, Mitsusada 449 

in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



THUBSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of 
THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat 
McCarran (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins, 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel ; Benjamin Mandel, director of research. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

The committee has before it this morning General Willoughby. 
The Chair wishes to say to the general that his fine service in the 
armed services of the United States and in the Intelligence Depart- 
ment of the Army especially is well known to his countrymen, but 
never did he render a more worthy service, nor one more needed for 
the welfare and protection of this country, than to make known to 
this committee and to the people anything that savors of internal 
danger to this Government and to the American way of life. 

The Chair wishes to congratulate the general for his presence here, 
and we feel certain that beneficial results will flow from his expression 
of his knowledge of the subject. 

The general will be sworn. 

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

General Willoughby. I do. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, MAJOR GENERAL, CHIEF 
OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EAST COMMAND AND UNITED NATIONS 

COMMAND 

ISIr. Morris. General Willoughby, will you give your full name and 
your present military status to the committee ? 

General Willoughby. Charles A. Willoughby, major general, on 
duty as Chief of Intelligence of the Far East Command and the 
United Nations Command at this present time. I am under retire- 
ment procedures for disability and length of service. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, when do you expect to be sepa- 
rated from the service ? 

353 



354 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Willoughby. Presumably on or about September 1. 

Mr. Morris. General, what was your last military assignment ? 

General Willoughby. I have been General MacArthur's director of 
military intelligence on his immediate staff since the fall of 1939 
without interruption- 
Mr. Morris. Were you in the Philippines with the general at the 
time of the Japanese attack ? 

General Willoughby. Yes ; I was on duty in the same capacity with 
General MacArthur. 

Mr. Morris. Did you make the retreat from Bataan to Australia ? 

General Willoughby. Yes; I was one of the small group of staff 
officers selected to accompany him. 

Mr. Morris. Did you make the subsequent invasion trek back 
through New Guinea on to the southwest Pacific and back into Japan ? 

General Willoughby. Yes; I served throughout this period now 
known as the Campaign of the Southwest Pacific Area. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, what position did you hold with 
the occupation forces in Tokyo ? 

General Willoughby. The same as during the campaign, that is, 
chief of military intelligence with the understanding that the ex- 
panded staff of General MacArthur assumed occupation or civil, pri- 
marily civil, duties under SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General Willoughby, how did your duties divide 
functionally while you held that position ? 

General Willoughby. In general terms the division of functions 
would continue the normal military surveillance but would assume 
another aspect dealing with the internal security of Japan. A rough 
distinction would be between military and civil intelligence, and we 
use that term frequently — that is, the term "civil intelligence." 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, here in the United States the 
duties of the FBI are the internal security and not necessarily the 
Army ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. But over in Japan the Army took on both the 
functions as if they were active in the capacity of an FBI; is that 
about what happened ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir; I concur with your definition. 

I would say that under civil intelligence we had developed agencies 
similar to the FBI in America, known in Japan as the Counterintelli- 
gence Service. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General, while you were occupying that position 
which you just described, did you come into the custody of the Richard 
Sorge espionage documents? 

General Willoughby. I did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances of your coming into 
the possession of these documents ? 

General Willoughby. Under the general provisions of the Pots- 
dam declaration we released a number of so-called political prisoners. 
In that group we discovered shortly that there were the remnants of 
an international espionage ring who were then serving varied sen- 
tences. The foreign nationals who profited by this political amnesty 
became especially interesting. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 355 

One case was that of Max Klausen, who turned out to be the radio 
operator of this ring. When this man disappeared via the Soviet 
Embassy, we realized that we were confronted with an espionage case 
of great significance. 

In examining the court records pertaining to this trial — and I may 
say that it was a trial by civil court unconnected with the Japanese 
Army or Navy — we encountered a number of American Communists, 
second-generation Nisei with long residence in California. 

Obviously this link with America made it mandatory that we make 
a thorough examination of this entire operation. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General, were all the exhibits and all the evi- 
dence concerning this espionage ring found in court records or were 
they to be found some place else? 

General Willgughby, They were initially based on a translation 
of the court records supported by interrogation by us, postwar, of 
the judges, the investigating officers, the Attorney General, and other 
Ja]xinese officials charged with this case. 

In addition, we made independent postw^ar interrogations of the 
members, that is, the remaining members of this espionage ring, to 
verify the fact that their statements voluntarily and without pressure 
by the occupation would coincide with the statements previously 
rendered to the Japanese authorities. 

One notable statement to which I invite your attention is that of 
Teitchi Kawai, a still living eyewitness to all the activities of the prin- 
cipals in this case, especially Ozaki Hotsumi, Smedley, and Stein. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Smedley .an American? 

General Willgughby. Smedley was an American citizen. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was Stein ? 

General Willoughby. Stein was a British citizen, acquired citi- 
zenship in Hong Kong in 1941, an itinerant journalist of some repu- 
tation in oriental affairs who is thoroughly implicated in this case. 
If the fact is not known to you, he was arrested by the French secret 
police this spring, the Surrete Nationale, on the advice of the French 
Embassy. The charges were espionage, and he was deported. 

Mr. Morris. Did you learn this through official channels? 

General Willgughby. Yes. Like all police agencies, we are in 
intimate liaison with international police bureaus and there is a con- 
tinuous mutual exchange of information. 

Mr. Morris. You say, General, that Guenther Stein was arrested 
for espionage in France in 1950? 

General Wii-lougiiby. Yes, sir. The significance that I personally 
attach to it is that when the initial report was released in February 
of 1949, Guenther Stein disappeared and has not been heard of since 
that period except in connection with his arrest by the Paris police. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Guenther Stein in prison in Japan? 

General Willgughby. No; he was not present at the time the es- 
pionage ring came to the notice of the Japanese police; otherwise, 
he would have been arrested. I will deal with his implication a little 
later on. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I at this point point out that the 
reason we are stressing Mr. Stein as this particular time, if we are 
stressing him, is that we had testimony from Edward C. Carter, who 
was the head of the Institute of Pacific delations, that Guenther 



356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Stein was the Chungking correspondent for the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in China, and that in addition he was the British delegate 
to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
which was held in 1945. 

There are other activities of Guenther Stein which Mr. Mandel will 
later in in this session introduce in the record, but the significance 
of our dwelling on this particular name is that Guenther Stein was 
one of the IPR personnel whom General Willoughby encountered 
in his scrutiny of the Richard Sorge case. 

The Chairman. That is the same individual referred to by Mr. 
Carter? 

Mr. Morris. That is the same individual, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, what reason do you have to be- 
lieve that these Richard Sorge espionage records are authentic? 

General Willoughby. As an investigating officer of some experi- 
ence, I was of course convinced of their authenticity from the start, 
accepting the court records as evidence. However, in view of the in- 
ferential repudiation of my initial report as of February 1949, the 
Headquarters in Tokyo decided to go over the entire mass of docu- 
ments and employing outstanding American, British, and Japanese 
lawyers then on duty at Headquarters in Tokyo. 

I would like to briefly quote, Mr. Chairman, and make reference 
to the action, opinions, and reports of these lawyers, known as con- 
secutive exhibit No. 12. 

Senator Ferguson. General, you made a report to the Army in 
1939 on this espionage case, did you not? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It received some publicity in America, did it 
not? 

General Willoughby. So I understand. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not that was ever re- 
called, or what happened to that report? 

General W^illoughby. If I interpret your question correctly, Sena- 
tor, the report was filed by us, meaning the Headquarters in Tokyo, 
as a normal intelligence or internal security report of which there 
were many in the period. They decided to publish, to release it be- 
cause it compared most favorably with the then notorious Canadian 
espionage case. We made, of course, no objection. Reports, which 
we file in Washington, are available to them at their discretion. 

Senator Ferguson. At least you figured that the release of this re- 
port would not affect adversely our security, either internally or in 
our foreign relations? 

General Willoughby. I have rather a feeling that it would con- 
tribute toward the internal security by unmasking certain techniques, 
procedures, habits of the clandestine fraternity with which you are 
dealing. 

Senator Ferguson. So that it was then released; is that correct? 

General Willoughby. It was released. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever withdrawn? 

General Willoughby. Not by us. 

Senator Ferguson. By anybody? 

General Willoughby. Actually there was what I would term an 
indirect repudiation based solely on Agnes Smedley's protestation at 
the time, including a threat of libel. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 357 

Senator Ferguson. Agnes Smedley was an American citizen? I 
asked you that before. 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And she was mentioned in the report ? 

General Willoughby. Heavily implicated. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you any reasons or to this day have you 
any reasons to believe that anything that was said about or in connec- 
tion with Agnes Smedley in that report to the Army was not a fact? 

General Willoughby. I take the same position today that I took 
in 1949 or at the time the report was prepared. Whatever was stated 
then is a fact which I am prepared to testify to, and I am about, in 
the quotation of this legal investigation, to give you the professional 
juridical views. 

Senator Ferguson. I anticipated that, but I wanted to clear the 
record first so that it would be clear that this was a report that was 
issued by your office and sent to Washington, it was released, it was 
then withdrawn under a so-called or, as you had learned, a threat 
of libel suit because of one person mentioned in it. 

General Willoughby. Correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And then I wanted to see whether the fact was 
that there was any change in your attitude as to the truthfulness or 
accuracy of that report, and I find that there is not. 

General Willoughby. I concur with your statement, sir, in its 
entirety. 

The Chairman. Ma}^ I ask one question there ? You say they with- 
drew it. Whom do you mean by "they" ? 

General Willoughby. The War Department public relations offi- 
cer, in my recollection, as well as officials of the Secretary of War's 
office, then under Mr. Royall, indicated that this report should never 
have been published. I am at the moment not familiar with the 
exact phraseology but, roughly speaking, that was the statement 
and the intent. 

The result was that no action was taken on this report. Smedley 
never sued for libel, though her legal representative, Mr. Rogge, 
threatened to do that; and the case died, you might say, because of 
lack of further attention. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, the publicity that could be given to 
that was limited because of threats of libel. Now you do not feel, 
do 5^ou, or do you feel as a general in the Intelligence Division that 
anytliing that you are going to say here in relation to Smedley 
in this report can in any way affect adversely our internal or external 
security ? 

General Willoughby. In the sense of adversely you mean the pub- 
lication of data ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Willoughby. Indeed not. On the contrary, anything that 
I say this morning — and I am in complete sympathy with the pur- 
poses of this committee — will tend to clarify, to support, to add con- 
tributory evidence to the very courses that are now under your scrutiny 
and investigation. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I point out since we have men- 
tioned the name of Agnes Smedley that we have introduced evidence 
of her activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations and for that 
reason we are dwelling on that fact. 



358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. This is the same Agnes Smeclley referred to by 
witnesses who have testified here before this committee previously? 

Mr, Morris. Yes. I might point out that Mrs. Paul Massing has 
testified that she knew that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Com- 
munist Party and a member of the Soviet espionage ring of her 
knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore I think it is pertinent to this par- 
ticular inquiry. It is not like taking an outside name. 

Mr. Morris. General, you were about to read from the documents 
of the Sorge case. 

General Willoughby. In line with your thought, senator, as to the 
quality of this evidence and in view of this, shall we say inferential 
repudiation, as I stated, we employed the best legal American talent 
then available in Tokyo to go over this entire mass of evidence run- 
ning into perhaps more than a million words and thousands of photo- 
static exhibits, and this is the deliberate statement, opinion, and con- 
clusion of these high-ranking American lawyers in important legal 
positions : 

Legal Opinions of Documentary Authentications in the Sorge Case 

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are 
necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before 
they may be introduced in courts of record of the United States or be used as a 
basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the 
authentication and verification of the documents listed in the following six 
pages — 

meaning the raw material of the Sorge case — 

and after having duly considered the testimony of vpitnesses and having ex- 
amined their written statements and interrogations together with their seals 
and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authen- 
tication and verification of the documents, including tiie statements from wit- 
nesses, are in accordance with existing law and procedures. 

We therefore certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verifi- 
cation of each of the several documents mentioned is legally sufficient to give 
legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures 
for the courts of the United States or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 

It is our further opinion that : 

(a) The authentications herein referred to are good, sufficient, and legal 
identifications to the documents to which they relate. 

(b) That such records and documents are sufficiently authenticated to permit 
their full use before any coiirt of record subject to tbe limitations imposed by the 
prevailing rules of evidence, and, finally, that the procedures and methods em- 
ployed in tlie authentication of the documents herein referred to are those that 
are normally used in the preparation of documents to be used for the same 
identical purposes for which these documents are or may hereafter be intended. 

Now the signatures to that document are : J. Woodall Greene, mem- 
ber of the Mai\yland bar; J. S. Carusi, member of thv3 Connecticut bar: 
Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma bar and member of 
the New Mexico bar; and finally, E. V. A. de Becker and Eokuro 
Yusami. a firm of international Tokyo lawyers who are members of 
the INIiddle Temple of London and members of the Inner Temple of 
London. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that, General ? 

General Willoughby. I will have to check that date, but it is rough- 
ly in the spring of 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it after the withdrawal of the Smedley 
report ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3 SO' 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then was there any reaffirmation or publication 
of the Sorge-SmecUey report, or whatever we call it ? 

General Willoughby. Not since that date. 

Senator Ferguson. Not since that date, notwithstanding that these 
civilian lawyers gave this opinion after a thorough examination of all 
of the evidence that went into the making of that rejlort? 

General Willoughby. Correct. 

Having presented to you, Mr. Chairman, this reputable American 
legal opinion, I would like to continue and state the conclusions which 
these very men arrived at because they are pertinent to the entire 
juridical quality of this case. I am now speaking of the same men and, 
for your clarification, they were members of the legal sections of the 
Far East Command in tlie Civil Affairs Department. They prac- 
ticed their profession then, their tecluiical knowledge in legal channels 
continuously. 

I aiii now reading the end part of their conclusions, which is again 
a numbered exhibit. By amicable arrangement with Mr. Morris, 
counsel, these cross-references are entirely known to him and avail- 
able. When I speak of exhibits 12 and 20 he knows exactly where 
they are and can lay his hands on them. This is what these able and 
impartial lawyers have to say : 

Based upon our examination of the documents listed immediately heretofore, 
it is the opinion of the undersigned that these evidences establish proof that 
Richard Sorge and his associates were espionage agents for the Russian Army 
and that Agnes Smedley and Guenther Stein are Communists in mind, spirit, 
and practice, and that they were actively and knowingly connected with the 
Sorge spy ring in China and Japan ; and we are further of the opinion that 
the strong chain of evidence fully and conclusively supports the intelligence 
report entitled "The Sorge Spy Ring," dated December 10, 1947, a case study 
of international espionage in the Far East, and that such evidence amply 
justifies its submission to the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, 
by the G-2 of the Far East Command. 

INIr. IMoRRis. Now, General, do you have anything there on the ele- 
ment of coercion, the freedom from coercion ? 

General W^illoughby. I am glad you asked this question, Mr. 
Morris. I do. 

As part of this smear campaign, to use this slightly objectionable 
term, in the wake of my initial publication of this report, Smedley — 
although I am reluctant to bring up the name of a dead woman 
because she is merely a type and there are hundreds of others — at that 
time it was immediately charged that this was an illegal court pro- 
cedure. They suggested that the Japanese Army in its known cruelty 
was involved and that whatever testimony was obtained was under 
pressure, under duress, under torture. 

This element, which, of course, is one of defense, was so important 
that we made unusual efforts, that is, the legal group which I have 
just listed, to determine that that element was lacking. So, we ob- 
tained the affidavit through personal interrogation by the American 
lawyers of the attorney general of Japan, Mr, Yoshikawa Mitsusada. 

It may be of interest to the chairman to know that this attorney 
general is now in tlie States. He is on an investigative or educational 
journey sponsored by both the American and Japanese Governments, 
and is in Washington. It is my understanding that he will be interro- 
gated by another congressional committee. 



360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, he had first-hand knowledge of this 
Sorge case ? 

General Willoughby. Quite. 

Senator Ferguson. Because he was connected with it? 

General Willoughby. Directly connected with it. 

May I refer — merely a concession to age and faltering memory — 
to selected quidk references ? All of them are familiar to your coun- 
sel. These are my personal comments or briefs superimposed over 
perhai^s 50 to 100 typewritten pages, abbreviated in order to assist 
not only this committee and their research staff but also the Washing- 
ton authorities. 

This affidavit— 
I say- 
is an affidavit by a Japanese Government official who was an attorney in the 
Tokyo district criminal court and interrogated Sorge in preliminary hearings in 
October 1941. The significance of this affidavit lies in the fact that Yoshikawa 
employed no in-egular means of duress, third degree, or torture as the Smedley 
innuendo in her press statement at the time implied with a view of discrediting 
from the outset the quality of these important eyewitness statements, reports, 
and interrogation. The court was a normal constituted civil court. There was 
no pressure by the Army or Navy. The document in case was retained by Mr. 
Yoshikawa, as it was a corrected or edited copy of certain portions of the basic 
Sorge statement, and thus escaped destruction by burning as many documents 
were in our area of bombardments that destroyed important Japanese official 
buildings. 

The further significance of the affidavit in substantiating the general court 
record is a clear picture this statement gives of the international character of 
Sorge's espionage ring in Tokyo and Shanghai, its military, strategic, political, 
and social objectives, its evident connection with the Moscow center, the Comin- 
tern, and the Soviet Army intelligence bureau. 

For our purpose, if I understand Mr. Morris correctly, the em- 
phasis is not so much on contents in addition to other evidence but 
the fact that no duress, no irregular means of coercion, no third de- 
gree, or torture, were applied in obtaining these statements or con- 
fessions. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, I wonder if you will tell us in 
general the make-up and the purpose of the Richard Sorge Soviet spy 
ring. Who, for instance, was Richard Sorge ? 

General Willoughby. While this has been fairly well covered by 
the press at one time or another 

Senator Ferguson. I really think, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose 
of the record it should be placed in the record. 

General Willoughby. Though we are merely scratching the sur- 
face, I will give my own version of this case. 

Richard Sorge was a Soviet professional spy working under in- 
struction of the fourth section^-that is intelligence — of the Soviet 
army. He went to China in 1930 under cover as a legitimate journalist. 
As an aside or footnote, you will find that all of these agents somehow 
use an otherwise honorable profession, that of journalism, as their 
cover. You will find Stein being arrested in Paris as the correspondent 
of the Hindustani News. 

You find Smedley operating as a correspondent for the Frank- 
furter Zeitung. You find Sorge appearing as the correspondent of 
t]ie Frankfurter Zeitung. He operated both in Shanghai and Tokyo. 
He obtained the collaboration of Miss Agnes Smedley, who, in turn, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 361 

introduced him to several coworkers of various nationalities — Ameri- 
can, German, Chinese, and Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. When did he start this and when did he go 
there ? Is that date given ? 

General Willoughby. That date is contained accurately in the ex- 
hibit. 

Senator Ferguson. About what year? 

General Willoughby. Between 1930 and 1940. He operated in 
Shanghai in 1930, moved to Tokyo in 1936, remained there until 1941, 
until his arrest and the subsequent development of this case. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Smedley used principally in China rather 
than Japan? 

General Willoughby. Yes. She was used principally in China, and 
so was Guenther Stein. For that reason testimony concerning those 
two is primarily with activities on the China mainland. There is, 
however, as I will develop further, an important link, in fact the link 
with the Japanese operations. That is in the person of Ozaki, a very 
interesting individual whom Smedley procured as a recruit and intro- 
duced to Sorge in China. So there is your link between the China 
mainland and the Japanese background. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I point out at this time that Mr. 
Ozaki was in 1936 the Japanese council delegate to the IPR conference 
at Yosemite? 

General Willoughby. Yes. That makes Ozaki doubly interesting 
to this committee specializing in the quality of the membership of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. Ozaki is a type member in good stand- 
ing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in his days. 

Senator Ferguson. Not to change the subject, but did you run into 
the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were going over this case? 

General Willoughby. Merely in the recognition that some of the 
protagonists here were members. 

Senator Ferguson. And were doing work in that organization? 

General Willoughby. Quite. 

Senator Ferguson. That is how it came into the picture? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that is how this all comes into this 
hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

General Willoughby. I understand your specialization, entirely 
meritorious, and I am merely contributing collateral axillary veri- 
fication. 

In order to once more emphasize the character of Sorge's organiza- 
tion — apparatus is the pseudo or Russian term for it — I would like to 
quote from his diary, duly authenticated reference in the hands of 
tne counsel. This is Sorge speaking : 

As head of the Japan spy ring, I was directly affiliated with the central com- 
mittee of the U. g. S. R. Communist Party. I was also under the fourth bureau 
(intelligence) of the Red army with respect to the technical aspects of my 
work and a few subject matter in'oblems. 
As I see it — 

this is Sorge speaking — 

my espionage group should be considered a special arm of the central committee 
of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. That was its essential characteristic. 



362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Another distinguishing feature was its technical and organization connec- 
tion with the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army. The espionage 
group which I operated in Japan, all of its members have frankly confessed tliat 
they were working to advance the cause of commiunism and not for money or 
personal gain. 

Mr. Morris. General, approximately how many members were there 
in that ring ? 

General Willoughby. Fifteen to twenty. While the personnel of 
this ring varied from time to time, this skillful bank of spies — agents, 
if you wish — worked for nine productive years before their dis- 
covery. The famous Canadian spy case was one of the best examples 
of this type of espionage. I believe, however, that the Sorge efforts 
in Tokyo compare most favorably with this famous case. 

Senator Ferguson. How many nationalities were in this ring? 
Sorge was a German ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Guenther Stein was British? 

General Willoughby. British citizen of German origin. 

Senator Ferguson. Smedley was an American ? 

General Willoughby. Was an American. 

Senator Ferguson. Any Canadians? 

General Willoughby. None in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you have the Japanese and the Chinese? 

General Willoughby. And a class that is important in California 
is the Nisei or ex-California residents who were employed, recruited 
in this service. There were additional American citizens or applying 
for citizenship then resident in California in a certain strata of Jap- 
anese local population. So that is an additional element of member- 
ship. 

Senator Ferguson. They were not in any way, as far as counsel has 
been able to find out, connected with the IPR ? 

General Willoughby. No. 

Senator Ferguson. These California Japanese ? 

General Willoughby. No; they are not connected with the IPR, 
but there are some in conformance to your interest on which I believe 
Mr. Morris has made a fixation there. 

Mr. Morris. General, will you in the forthcoming testimony con- 
fine your testimony to those four people, at least as much as possible, 
whom we have mentioned as people who are involved in the Institute 
of Pacific Relations? Now will you speak very briefly about Hotsumi 
Ozaki ? In the first place, will you tell us. General, what his position 
in the Soviet spy ring was ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
introduce in the record an excerpt from the handbook of tlie sixth 
conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was held at 
Yosemite National Park in California, August 15 to 29, 1936. There 
listed among the members and group secretaries of the conference are, 
Japan, Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far 
East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun; and, secretaries, IPR, Kinkazu Saionji. 
Tliey were both listed in the Handbook of the Sixth Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

I would like that introduced in the record as such. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 363 

The Chairman. How was the handbook secured? How do you 
identify tlie handbook ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the handbook ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the handbook referred to there 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. All right, it may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to w^as marked "Exhibit No. 81" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 81 

[From Handbook For the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite 
National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936] 

Members and Group Secretaries of the Conference 
Japan : 

Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo 

Asahi Shimbun (p. 49). 
Secretaries: IPR : Kinkazu Saionji (p. 50). 

General Willoughby. Do you desire a comment on Ozaki ? 

INIr. Morris. Yes, General, if you please. 

General Willoughby. Next to Sorge, Ozaki Hotsumi was by far 
the most important member of this ring. His death on the gallows 
with Sorge is somber testimony of his relative importance. 

In April 1937 Ozaki became a member of the China section utilized 
by Prince Konoye, several times Prime Minister of Japan, which 
placed Ozaki in immediate contact with a most important Japanese 
governmental circle. This was accentuated when one of his associates 
in tlie China section became chief secretary of the first Konoye Cabinet 
in June 1937. 

When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, the Foreign Office — that 
is tlie Japanese State Department — set up a special investigative 
agency to handle north China affairs and Ozaki was designated as a 
Tokyo liaison representative. 

We thus have the picture of Ozaki, secret Communist, Soviet spy, 
intimate associate of Sorge, to hold first an official position as an 
adviser to the Japanese Cabinet from 1938 to the fall of the Govern- 
ment, as being attached to the entourage of a Prime Minister; in 
other words, unusual opportunities to obtain highly top-flight infor- 
mation. 

]\Ir. Morris. You know, General, from your own military experience 
that a man who was chief secretary to a Cabinet is in a very strategic 
position to obtain information ? 

General Willoughby. Of course. 

Even more important than his official position, Mr. Chairman, was 
his friendship with old friends of college days who became very prom- 
inent at that time, namely, Ushiba and Tomohaiko Kashi, who were 
private secretaries to Prince Konoye. 

]\Ir. Morris. I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that 
Ushiba was predecessor of Saionji as secretary to the Japanese council 
of the Institute of Pacific Kelations. 

General AVilloughby. In these two men were centered the so-called 
"breakfast group," an informal discussion society of the bright young 
men around Prince Konoye. When dinners became inconvenient, 
these men met at breakfast, hence the name "breakfast groups." That 



364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

is an informal gathering of the important individuals closely affiliated 
with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Office. 

The American equivalent would be, if a selected group of State 
Department advisers were in an informal gathering, having access 
to usually top-level information. That was the group actually in 
existence, and we will see presently what they did with their opportun- 
ities. 

Mr. Morris. You say, General, Ozaki was a full-fledged member of 
this spy ring ? 

General Willoughby. That I will demonstrate, or rather it is part 
of the attestation of the American lawyers long after we had already 
arrived at that conclusion. He is, next to Sorge, the most important 
member of this espionage organization. 

Senator Ferguson. General, from your facts are you of the opinion 
that the Institute of Pacific Relations, that is the Japanese branch, 
was in effect being used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and 
the Russian Red army because of the tie-in with the Foreign Min- 
ister's office and the others ? 

General Willoughby. I think that conclusion can be arrived at 
because of the membership, the intimacy, the association of those 
individuals, especially Ozaki, who had an official position and was 
the representative of the IPR in the Yosemite meeting. That rela- 
tionship, of course, continued throughout his activity. 

Senator Ferguson. So it gave them a field to work in, the foreign 
relations of Japan and the foreign relations of America, through the 
American branch and the international branch of the IPR? 

General Willoughby. I would say that I agree with your conclu- 
sions. 

Mr. Morris. Mv. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this 
time and present to the committee at this time a letter from Mr. Ed- 
ward C. Carter to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field relating to the two 
Japanese tliat General Willoughby has just named, IJshiba and 
Saionji? Ushiba was secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR, 
who was succeeded by Saionji as secretary of the Japanese council 
of the IPR. 

Mr. IVIandel, I wonder if you would authenticate that document 
and read the pertinent sections in the record. 

Mr. Mandel. I read a document from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1938, marked "private and confi- 
dential," addressed to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter. 
The following is an excerpt from the letter : 

Dear Fred : As you know, we began early last autnmn trying to get a man of 
the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. 
None of these was available, but in January as you know Yasuo was nomi- 
nated and has proved a very valualde member of the staff. As our work de- 
veloped, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions 
between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5 I cabled Dr. 
Yamakawa as follows : 

Mr. Morris. I think that is enough. We would like to introduce 
the entire letter in the record. 

Tlie Chairman. It may be introduced in the record. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 365 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 82 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 

New York, June 29, 1938. 
Private aiid confidential. 
Feedekick V. Field, Esq., 

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Fked : As you linow, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of 
the rank of Usliiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. 
None of these was available but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated 
and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, 
we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between 
the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5, I cabled Dr. Yamakawa 
as follows : 

"Please cable could Saionji come New York for 1 or 2 months this summer 
to discuss questions arising from Dafoe's letter of February 9. We will pay all 
expenses." 

On May 8, he replied as follows : "Will do best to comply with your request." 

Now I have received a cable from Viscount Ishii, reading as follows : 

"Japanese council regrets unable agree research project envisaged by inter- 
national secretariat. In view of importance of problem for institute, Taka- 
yanagi sailing on July 1.5 to discuss matter with you. Circumstances prevent 
Saionji from leaving." 

I have replied to Viscount Ishii as follows : 

"Takayanagi most welcome. Hope he can remain at least throughout August 
and September. Am confident that on studying our plan of work here, he will 
discover that secretariat project can serve the interests both of Japan and Japa- 
nese council." 

Ishii cabled Dafoe in a similar vein and Dafoe has asked me to indicate that 
he cannot see Takayanagi in AVinnipeg, owing to the dislocation of his work 
by the Royal Commission, but suggesting that I urge Takayanagi to come straight 
through to New York preparatory to going to Lee for the week of August 19 
which Dafoe is planning to spend at Lee. That is the only week he can man- 
age to clear for the IPR between now and the end of the year. 

I do not think it is in the interest of the IPR, either from the Japanese or 
the Pacific council point of view to publicize Ishii's cablegram. As I have stated 
in my reply, I feel that if Takayanagi can come and work with us for .several 
weeks and have the unhurried week at Sunset Farm with Dafoe and others, a 
great deal of progress can be made. 

Of course, we do not know as yet what the Japanese objections are. It may 
be that they want the secretariat to go ahead but with the record showing that 
the Japanese council voted against the project. It may be that they 'want 
the whole basis of the project altered so that the dociuuentation of the inquiry 
will be similar to that of an IPR conference, namely, that it will consist in the 
main of national council contributions. It may be that the reports they have 
received of the attitude toward the conflict expressed in writing and speech 
by members of the secretariat makes them feel that the secretariat is incapable 
of directing an objective study of this sort. It may be that they feel that we 
made some technical mistakes in procechire in the way the project has been set up. 

All of these ai'e at this stage merely surmises on my part. The help that 
I want from you can be given if you will answer the following questions: (1) 
Do you think our procedure is sound to urge Takayanagi to come straight 
through to New Y'ork for consultations here just before going to Lee for the 
round-table conference with Dafoe? (2) If you wish a visit from Takayanagi 
at Pacific center, would you agree that he might render a greater service if he 
visited you on his way back to Japan in the autumn, rather than stopping over 
for a few days on his arrival on the Chichibu Maru on July 29? (3) Have you 
any advice as to whether I should go to San Francisco so as to be on the wliarf 
with you to welcome him and bring him across the continent, or would you be 
willing to meet his steamer and put him on the first train east? 

Takayanagi will doubtless want to have a talk with Alsberg some time while 
he is in the United States. Enclosed is a letter that I am sending to Alsberg 
today which is self-explanatoi-y. I am wondering whether it would not be better 
122848^52— pt. 2 2 



366 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

for Takayanagi to have his talk with Alsberg after he has cleared matters with 
Dafoe, inasmuch as Dafoe, in his circular letter of February 9 to the members 
of the Pacific council, assumed responsibility for recommending that the secre- 
tariat go ahead with the project. 

By September, Takayanagi would be in a very much better position to profit 
fully from Alsberg's sage advice than he might be immediately on landing. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

General Willoughbt. These data that are being furnished on the 
American IPE, are as interesting to me as probably my comments 
are to you. This is an entirely new field. I regret only that I did 
not have that information in 1947, 1948, or 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, this committee just received these 
files within 6 months ; these were the private files of the IPR. 

The Chairman. These files were taken under subpena duces tecum 
and brought from New York here. 

General Willoughby. I must congratulate this committee on its 
fast and decisive action. 

Speaking of Ozaki, in summing up his relation to the Konoye 
Cabinet, the intimacy with Saionji, whom we will examine under a 
magnifying glass presently, I would say it is obvious that Ozaki's 
special position gave him unsurpassed opportunities to learn the 
exact nature and progress of all principal diplomatic or military 
projects of the Japanese Government. 

Does that clarify the position? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. Would you say he was probably the outstanding 
assistant to Sorge in the espionage ring, General ? 

General Willoughby. That has been repeatedly asserted, and he 
was so recognized in the interrogations and in the official appraisal 
of the Japanese judges and the opinion of the American legal 
investigators. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General, the next name I think we will come 
to will be that of Saionji. As we have stated before. General, Mr. 
Saionji was the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations for a period of time. I wonder if you will tell 
us what his connection with the espionage ring was. 

General Willoughby. Yes indeed. 

Saionji is a very interesting figure because of his background and 
the curious sidelight on Japanese social and governmental character. 

To begin w^th, Saionji was the adopted grandson of the late 
famous Genro, Prince Saionji. To understand his position, the Genro 
are of the elder statesmen of Japan who served under the Meija 
restoration which launched Japan as a world power. These elder 
statesmen consequently enjoyed an exceptional degree of veneration 
by the Japanese population, and some of this prestige naturally 
accrued to their family, and especially this man Saionji. 

Saionji was a full-fledged member of the Sorge espionage ring in 
addition to his other qualifications that we developed. He was ar- 
rested by the Japanese police and was found guilty of passing secret 
information to Ozaki, an associate of the breakfast club. Saionji 
was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, undoubtedly 
a concession to the importance of his family connections. 

Mr. INIoRRis. General Willoughby, is there any evidence that Ozaki 
and Saionji were closely associated with, each other ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 367 

General Willoughby. They were intimate, and the association 
ranged over many years. 

Mr. Morris. What was Saionji's position with the Japanese Gov- 
ernment? • 

General Willoughby. He was a consultant of the Foreign Ministry, 
that is the Japanese State Department, and the Cabinet and belonged 
to the bright young men forming the "breakfast club," the bright 
young men around Prince Konoye. 

Senator Ferguson. So they had them in Japan ? 

General Willoughby. I concur. 

Mr. Morris. General, what role did Agnes Smedley play in the 
Sorge spy ring ? 

General Willoughby. That has been covered generally, but here 
again I will give you an abbreviated pointed formation. 

Smedley 's association with tlie China spy ring of Richard Sorge 
dates back to 1930. Smedley introduced Sorge to Hotsumi Ozaki, 
that same Ozaki was his right-hand man, then a special correspondent 
for the Asahi Shimbun, but here again is the predilection of these 
individuals to seek cover in an otherwise honorable profession, to wit, 
correspondents of important newspapers. 

Smedley was also instrumental in securing the services of Teikichi 
Kawai, who is still living and whose affidavit furnished freely to the 
American occupation authorities is one of the most important exhibits 
in this entire series available to the counsel. In fact, may I suggest, 
Mr. Morris, that you quote from exhibit 28, from the question series 
100 onward, what our friend Kawai had to say. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you extract from the records the 
interrogation of Mr. Kawai just referred to by General Willoughby 
and read those portions commencing on about question 98? 

The Chairman. To what records do you refer and how were the 
records made ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this record was a record that was in the 
possession of General Willoughby, which is a pertinent exhibit taken 
from the official files in Tokyo. 

Is that right. General ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. Duplicates are in the War Department, 
the same type of records which I described when I quoted the opinion 
of the American legal group. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, this opinion of the legal group 
went to the War Department and became part of the official files ? 

General Willoughby. It did. 

ISIr. Mandel. This is taken from the interrogation of Kawai Tei- 
kichi, dated March 31, 1948, and x\pril 1, 1949 : 

Question 08. AVhen did serious discussions start about your second assign- 
ment? 

A. I was asked if I would be able to .co back to Mancliuria the same night I 
submitted my report in Smedley's apartment. 

Question 99. When were definite plans made for you to return? 

A. I think we talked about that when we were walking through the park 

Question 100. Describe that a little more fully. 

A. At the first meeting in Smedley's apartment I was asked whether I would 
be able to go back or not at wliich time I answered that I would be able to go. 
When we left that night we decided to meet again the next moi'ning at Smed- 
ley's apartment. Sorge came late after everyone else had assembled, and it was 
decided at that time I would go to IMukden. After the meeting at Smedley's 



368 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

apartment the four of us, Ozaki, Smedley, Sorge, and I, went by automobile to 
the park. We made definite plans for me to go back to Mukden at that park. 

Question 251. Can you tell what Smedley's influence and position were in 
Chinese espionage? Was she a person of high rank in the activity? 

A. Yes, I did get that impression. 

Question 252. In your conversations and contacts with Smedley did you get 
the idea that she had direct contact with Moscow or with Russia? 

A. I got the impression that she had some liaison with the Comintern. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, j^oii are reading from the testimony of 
Mr. Kawai, a member of the espionage group, which testimony was 
taken in 1949 ; is that correct? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

General Willoughby. May I add to this, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General WiLLouGHin'. This interrogation was made by Mr. Wood- 
all Greene, one of the group of American lawyers. This is a volun- 
tary statement of a member of this ring. He happened to be a Com- 
munist belonging to the Japanese Communist Party and that party 
was so apprehensive at that time about his testimony that I was 
obliged to furnish this man police protection because of threats di- 
rected against him. 

Senator Watkins. Did I understand, General, that you said he is 
still living ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, he is available as a personal witness. 
In order to save the committee expense, in view of their known limited 
allocation of funds for this purpose, a completely notarized affidavit 
is available, and it is this affidavit that Mr. Mandel has now quoted 
from. 

Senator Watkins. He was a member of the spy ring ? 

General Willoughby. He was a member of the spy ring, yes. 

Senator Watkins. How did he escape punishment ? 

General Willoughby. He w^as punished. We released him in this 
grandiose gesture following the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. He was 
in jail and was released as a potential amnesty gesture, which released 
all the members of this spy ring. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, there were some executed ? 

General Willoughby. Only two. 

Senator Ferguson. Two had been executed ? 

General Willoughby. All the rest were imprisoned and released. 

Senator Ferguson. Under the Potsdam agreement ? 

General Willoughby. Correct. 

Senator Watkins. Was he not tried by the Japanese at the time- 
Sorge and the others were tried ? 

General Willoughby. He was tried. He was a member of Sorge's 
ring, arrested, and in due process of law was tried and convicted with 
all the others. When we stepped into the picture in 1945 we made a 
sort of grand gesture, primarily designed to protect political prison- 
ers, that is without definition, because in the fall of 1945 we were busy 
disarming the Japanese Army and occupying Japan, ranging from 
roughly Seattle to San Diego, Calif., with four divisions. 

So, this sort of thing was interesting but by no means pressing, and 
we released perhaps people we should have not released. 

Senator Watkins. What was the sentence given him by the Japanese- 
courts ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 369 

General Willoughby. Is the sentence of Kawai listed there? My 
memory being what it is, it would be like asking Edgar Hoover the 
details of case No. 1560. I had a policy-making position. 

Senator Ferguson. You do know he was released in 1945 under 
the Potsdam agreement ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. I think I can answer your question 
in just a moment. Ten years, and the release date of this gentry 
incidentally was in October 1945. 

Mr. Morris. He did prove to be of assistance to the military authori- 
ties in Japan ; did he not ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. We realized that if we could get in 
this group of prisoners someone of sufficient authority in his position 
to give us the story — us, the American occupation forces — it would 
be a valuable confirmation of the documentary evidence, and we pro- 
ceeded then to interrogate all of them, and we found this man Kawai. 

Since my interest was primarily in Stein and Smedley at the time, 
I concentrated on those two. We found his testimony to be conclusive 
of the character of which Mr. Mandel has just given you a sample. 
He was, therefore, of great assistance to us. He is now available on 
call. This affidavit is available. Given time we might produce 
the affidavits of all of them. 

The Chairman. However, you had corroborating evidence besides 
his voluntary statement ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How about Ohashi? 

General Willoughby. Ohashi was in the same category, a relatively 
minor individual whom we also interrogated. Both knew and worked 
with Smedley is the gist of their contribution. 

Senator Watkins. What surprises me about it is that he escaped 
execution if he was a spy and working in the spy ring. 

General Willoughby. That is a very interesting comment. It is 
also to some extent characteristic of the civil quality of this court. 
They did not treat all of them in a summary fashion. They made a 
fine distinction on relative importance. Sorge-was No. 1, Ozaki was 
No. 2, the rest in a descending scale of relative guilt, shall we say." 
However, their sentences ranged, for example, Koshiro 15, Taguchi 
13, Akiyama 10, Kawai 10, Hotzumi 8 — down to 2 years. 

Mr. Morris. Kepeat again the sentence imposed on Saionji. 

General Willoughby. Saionji, according to this record, was found 
guilty of passing secret information to an unauthorized person — 
namely, Ozaki — was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execu- 
tion, a suspended sentence. Talk of the time is that being the grand- 
son of the Genro, who has the same emotional standing with Japan 
as the signers of the Declaration of Independence with us, got him 
off the hook. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read from the testi- 
mony of Ohashi, just referred to by General Willoughby, in connec- 
tion with the supporting evidence on Agnes Smedley- 

Mr. Mandel This is the testimony of Ohashi Haideo, May 2, 1949. 

The Chairman. I take it you are reading from the same document, 
Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. From which you presented the excerpt before ? 



370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir; who is listed here as chief, Ikegmi Police 
Station : 

Question 5. In your voluntary statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge 
mentioned Agnes Smedley. Will you tell us what he said about her? 

A. Sorge was in China before he came to Japan. He organized an espionage 
ring in Shanghai, and Smedley was one of the members of the ring. Sorge was 
introduced by Smedley to Ozaki, who later became one of the leading members 
of the ring in Japan. Sorge met Smedley for the first time in Shanghai, but 
Smedley was not a member of this group in Japan. In 1934 Smedley stopped 
for a day in Japan. She went to the Asahi Shimhun, where she met Ozaki, who 
tried to contact Sorge but was unable to do so. Smedley left the same day. 

Question 6. Did Sorge tell the nature of Smedley's duties in connection with 
his ring in China? 

A. Sorge did not go into details about the actiivties of any of the members 
of the ring in Shanghai. I merely interrogated him concerning the names 
of the members of his ring and did not go into details concerning their activities. 
I was interested only in information covering the Japanese phase. 

Question 7. In your statement of April ItJ, 1949, you said that Sorge praised 
Smedley's work in Shanghai. Is that true? 

A. Sorge did say she was a very intelligent woman, that she had been with 
the Eighth Route Army and knew quite a bit about that organization, and also 
that her information was very good. 

I will skip now to question 9, on Sorce's mention of Smedley and her 
activities in connection with his spy ring in China : 

Question 9. Did you infer that she was an important member of the ring? 

A. Yes; I did get that impression. As far as the members of the Shanghai 
ring were concerned, with the exception of I'aul and Smedley he only listed 
their names. He often mentioned Paul and Smedley, which gave me the im- 
pression that she was an important member of the Shanghai group. 

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members 
in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's house in — — 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, may I suggest that Mr. Mandel defer 
the rest of that until we come to the Stein testimony? 

The Chairman. Very well. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. General, was Guenther Stein a member of Kicliard 
Sorge Soviet espionage ring? 

General Willoughby. He was. Guenther Stein, special corre- 
spondent for a London" newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge 
spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge lists six members to- 
gether with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An 
intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. In 
this connection, we are in possession of courpe of tlie entire series of 
radio code messages dispatched to Moscow by Sorge in this period, 
and many of the operators involved in it are mentioned not 6nly by 
activity but by code references. 

There is testimony by Max Klausen — Max Klausen was his radio 
operator at the time — that this wireless operator erected a transmission 
set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only 
was living on the premises but at the time gave his consent. 

I think, Mr. Morris, that exhibit 23 has a direct quotation from this 
testimony, the establishment of a radio transmitter communicating 
with Khabarovsk, a Siberia station, is damaging activity. 

Mr. Morris. That is right, General. I would like INIr, Mandel to 
read from the police investigation of Max Klausen, which was made 
on the 25th of October in 1945. I would like Mr. Mandel to read page 
9 on this Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, closure No. 1-A. This is from 
the interrogation of Max Klausen, whom General Willoughby has 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 371 

identified as one of the leading members of the Sorge espionage ring. 

The Chairman. You are reading from what again? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel will be reading from Consecutive Exhibit 
No. 23, which was in the custody of General Willoughby in this 
connection. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

GUENTHER STEIN 

One night in December 1935, while I was still at the Sano Hotel, Sorge called 
me to his home and introduced me to Guenther Stein. Stein and I discussed 
radio, and he drew a map to show me wbere he lived. I visited him several 
days later at his home in Motomura-cho Minatoku, examined the house to see 
whether it was suitable for installation of radio equipment and decided with his 
consent to use two of his upstairs rooms. As previously indicated, I installed 
the equipment and began testing around the middle of February. I trans- 
mitted around 30 messages from Stein's home. I stopped using it in 1937 — I 
do not recall the date — when he left for England via Siberia. Stein once con- 
fided to me that while in Moscow, a special correspondent of the Berliner Tage- 
blatt, before coming to Japan, he had been a Communist sympathizer. I did 
not know the nature of his previous activities in Japan, but I am sure that in 
addition to the above he went to Shanghai as a courier. There is no doubt that 
he was a member of our group. 

Senator Ferguson. General, you might just clear that up. 

Of course, the man who was speaking was a member of the espionage 
organization. 

llr. Morris. Max Klausen. 

Senator Ferguson. They are the group of men mentioned. 

General Willoughby. The organization, 

Mr. Morris. General, would you prefer that Mr. Mandel read a 
continuation of the Ohashi testimony, or is your testimony now com- 
ing up more appropriate ? 

General Willoughby. On the subject of Stein? 

Mr. Morris. Guenther Stein. 

General Willoughby. If I may make a suggestion 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

General Willoughby (continuing). I am at your disposal, being a 
Government employee, soon to be on half pay. 

You can continue on this theme, and you will merely reiterate that 
that he set up the radio station in his house, furnishing the cover of a 
fairly respectable position at the time, while the Japanese Secret 
Service was running around in nervous apprehension as to where the 
code messages to Russia were coming from. They didn't think of 
Stein, of course. 

There is your story. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read, then, the next two questions in the 
Ohashi testimony, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Quesion 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in 
his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's home in Motomura-Cho Mina- 
to-Ku Tokyo-To was used by Max Klausen for the transmission of messages to 
Russia. The testimony of Sorge and Klausen contains that information also. 
Did Sorge give you any additional information about Stein? 

A. Not that I recall. 

Question 15. You referred to a notebook which was confiscated from Sorge 
and in which were listed the top members of his ring, including Richard Sorge, 



372 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Branko de Voukelitch, Max Klausen, Stein, Ozaki, and Miyagi. Did you see 
that notebook? 

A. Yes ; I did see that book. 

Question 16. Did you actually see the name Guenther Stein in Sorge's hand- 
writing in this notebook which listed the top six members of his ring? 

A. I do not remember clearly whether Guenther Stein was listed as such, 
-or not, but his pseudonym was listed. 

Question 17. Were all the names listed as aliases in the book? 

A. In that book some members were listed by their real names, some by their 
aliases, some by more than one alias, but I do not remember clearly whether 
Stein's name or his alias was listed, but to anyone knowing these individuals 
by both their real names and by their aliases as I did, it meant the same thing. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. General, will you tell us something about the influential 
position that Guenther Stein was able to assiune in Tokyo ? 

General Willoughby. He had a wide range of contacts, naturally, 
in the press fraternity. He also had some entree in the British Em- 
bassy, being a British subject. 

Generally speaking — and this is based on inquiries from people who 
have known him — they rated him as an individual with access to im- 
portant international information. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder, General, if you think it would be appropri- 
ate if Mr. Man del would read further from the confession of Richard 
■Sorge on the important position that Guenther Stein was able to 
achieve in Tokyo at the time. 

I offer 3^ou this volume, General, and ask you if you will identify 
the excerpt lie is about to read. 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

For your information, Mr. Chairman, this is a sample of actually 
over 150,000 pages, translated from Japanese text court records. This 
is the story as written by Sorge himself, not in the nature of a con- 
fession, because he was interrogated in a series of Attorney General's 
interrogations, but he wrote a sort of diary. 

He was under the impression that, in view of the importance that 
he held in the Soviet hierarchy that he might be released at the last 
moment. 

Waiting 3 or 4 years, his resistance perhaps weakened and he began 
to jot down in an informal diary type his thought sand feelings, his 
record. That is a part of this record. 

Mr. Morris. When was lie executed. General ? 

General Willoughby. Executed in 1944, 1 believe. 

Mr. Morris. And arrested in 1941 ? 

General Willoughby. 1941; yes, sir. 

An interesting sidelight in the international field, if I am not im- 
posing too much on your time, is that the Japanese Government was 
then on a neutrality basis with Russia, as you know, until 5 minutes to 
midnight. They came in in August of 1945, after we had accom- 
plished the Pacific War. The Japanese were very anxious, of course, 
not to upset this neutrality balance, and in one of "the commentaries on 
this case, the Attorney General warns his individuals, his subordi- 
nates, to be sure that the conduct of the trial, the interrogation, and so 
forth, would be of such a humanitarian plane that the Soviet Embassy, 
if they should become interested in the end, could take no offense or 
register objection. 

So this is as close to a voluntary statement by Sorge, this diary, 
which we entitled in our translation as Sorges' own story, typewritten, 
typed by himself at a leisurely pace. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 373 

He even made editorial and stylistic corrections. 
Mr. Morris, Mr. Mandel, I wonder if yon would read from the 
document so described by General Willoughby. 
Mr. Mandel. Keferring to Stein : 

He was a sympathizer but nevei- an actual member of my group. Actually, 
however, he did give us positive cooperation. 

Stein was closely associated with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he had known 
since Moscow, and who looked upon him as an intelligent and important person. 
More significant for our work was the connection with the British Ambassador 
which he enjoyed by virtue of the fact that he represented a British newspaper. 
He was especially close to the famous Sir Sansom in the British Embassy. From 
the British Embassy he was able to obtain information chiefly on general diplo- 
matic policy. At times he had opportunities to talk to the then British Ambas- 
sador and British naval attach^. 

As Stein was also on very intimate terms with all the foreign newspapermen, 
especially the British and American reporters, he sometimes wanted interesting 
individual facts from them. Lastly, he had close connection with Domei and 
hence like Voukelitch was able to scent out the general political undercurrent 
and atmosphere there. He was also very valuable as a source of information 
in that he had studied the Japanese economic situation very conscientiously 
and had written complete books about it. His economic studies clarified many 
facts hitherto little understood. His chief fields of study were Japans' foreign 
trade and financial problems. 

Senator Ferguson. May I just inquire whether, in connection with 
Stein, you ever heard the name Herbert Norman ? 

General Willoughby. That name does not appear in what we have 
now classified as the Sorge record. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, at this ]3oint, I think it might be appro- 
priate if I point out that we had Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is a dis- 
tinguished professor of Columbia University. He is head of the 
Chinese language project of Columbia University. We had him on 
the stand here on Tuesday. He identified as a member of a Commu- 
nist study group and as a member of the Communist Party Herbert 
Norman. 

Herbert Norman is today, Mr. Chairman, Chief of the American 
Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of 
Canada. That is a place of great importance. 

I was wondering. General Willoughby, if you knew Herbert Norman 
at all when you were in Tokyo. 

General Willoughby. Yes, I knew Herbert Normaji. He was the 
Canadian Minister in Tokyo in the period 1946 to 1950. 

Mr. Morris. He was then only the Canadian Minister to Tokyo ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. He has since assumed this high position. 

General Willoughby. The Canadian Minister. 

Technically, all diplomatic representatives maintain their diplo- 
matic classification, ambassador, minister, charge d'affaires. They 
were attached to SCAP. 

In other words, he was the chief of the Canadian diplomatic mis- 
sion attached to SCAP. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think at this place in the record 
we might make reference to the testimony of Wittfogel on page 318. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. It will bring out who Herbert Norman was back 
in 1938 and his connection with the Pacific Affairs and the IPE. 

I think the letter on pages 319 or 320, No. 72, from Edward C. 
Carter to Owen Lattimore, under the name of "Dear Owen," is signifi- 



374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

cant in the light of Wittfogel's testimony, and if it is referred to in 
the record here it could be of importance to this testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the letter No. 72, in the 
record, on page 319 or 320, from Carter to Owen Lattimore. It 
begins: "Dear Owen"' — and that has been identified as Owen Latti- 
more. 

Here is the paragraph that I think onght to be put in here : 

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Aifairs on 
contemporary matters providing he writes under a nom de plume. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the letter, Senator, which referred to the 
using of Mr. Norman as a conduit for transmission of information? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And that he used a fictitious name rather 
than his own name because he would be connected with the Canadian 
Embassy. 

The reason I thought of that General, was that Avhen you brought 
Stein as being connected with the Canadian Embassy in a way 

General Willoughby. British Embassy. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you also said Canadian. Did you not? 

General Willoughby. What was the quotation? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not say both Canadian and British 
when you read that about Stein, Mr. Mahdel ? 

Mr. Mandel. British. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It covered both. That is why I thought 
the Norman testimony was significant. 

General Willoughby. Of course, I was not aware and I am in- 
tensely interested in this Wittfogel testimony on that particular 
name. But, of course, I am in no position to 

Senator Ferguson. That is the reason why I want to know whether 
or not he came into the record. 

General Willoughby. He did not come into this record we are now 
dealing with, and of course my personal acquaintanceship in Tokyo 
was that of a SCAP official with a foreign diplomatic representative, 
and I am reluctant to dwell on this. 

Senator Ferguson. I would not want you to do so. I want the 
testimony emphatic that if it was as it is now, that he was not men- 
tioned at all. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, would you want me to read into the 
record today the testimony of Dr. Wittfogel, or do you think it is 
clear enough? 

The Chairman. I think it would clarify it if you read an excerpt 
from it, so as to tie it in with Wittfogel's testimony. 

Mr. Morris. I am now reading from the testimony of Karl August 
Wittfogel, of last Tuesday. This is page 318. The question put to 
Dr. Wittfogel was : 

Who were some of the other students at this student group? 

This is a Communist student group that met on Cape Cod in the 
summer of 1938. 

Dr. Wittfogel. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was study- 
ing in the Japanese department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman. 

Mr. MoRKis. Was he a member of this study group? 

Dr. WiTTFOGFX. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, did he know that it was a Communist study 
group? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 375 

Dr. WiTTFOGFX. Yes. It was obvious. 

Mr. MoRius. To you. 

Dr. WiTTFOGEL. I think it was obvious in general. 

Mr. MoRKis. Was it obvious, tlierefore, tbiat lie was a Communist? 

Dr. "WiTTFOGEL. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce in the record first 
of all a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's associations with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a record taken from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. 
It reads as follows : 

"Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his 
sailing for Tokyo, with language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very 
eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese 
political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the 
Mei.ii period. I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that 
he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within 
the scope of Pacific Affairs." 

The Chairman. Right there, Mr. Morris, can we get the tie-in 
between the Norman referred to by Senator Ferguson in interrogat- 
ing the witness and the Norman referred to by Wittf ogel ? Are they 
one and the same ? 

Mr. IMoRRis. Yes. Dr. Wittfogel described Herbert Norman as a 
Canadian. 

Senator Ferguson. Pie was going to the Embassy at the time. 

The Chairman. I understand. The witness identifies him as the 
consul. 

General Wh.loughby. As the Canadian chief of the diplomatic 
mission in Tokyo approximately 1946 to 1950. 

The Chairman. I just want to see if they are one and the same 
person. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I think the next letter bears on that point. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, is the letter you just read dated much 
earlier than 1946? 

Mr. Morris. It was 1940. 

I am reading from another letter dated September 5, 1940, which 
was introduced into the record of last Tuesday on page 601. 

Mr. Mandel, there is another letter, apparently a memorandum, 
headed "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," apparently from Mr. Carter to 
Mr. Holland, dated September 5, 1940. 

It is on a typed letterhead of the Gianini Foundation, University 
of California, Berkeley, Calif. : 

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam 
and the major part of Yasuto's Industrial Japan. Among the other manu- 
scripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam 
for the American Council, Wentworth's Philippine Living Standards in Hawaii, 
the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping 
to have the two big books by Mills and Resting published commercially in this 
country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and 
can be reached in care of the Japanese IPR. 

This is the significant sentence, Mr. Chairman : 

Any very secret messages might be sent in care of Herbert Norman at the 
Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the 
Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their 
publications. 

So in 1940 Herbert Norman was associated with the Canadian Le- 
gation. 

The Chairman. Very well. 



376 ■ INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

"VVliat is the question now ? 

General Willougiiby. I might make a remark. As a police officer, 
this is a most interesting statement by Dr. Wittfogel on that subject. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. The Chair understands that at this present time Her- 
bert Norman is Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the 
Department of External Affairs of the Canadian Government. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record 
an extract showing tlie number of articles that Guenther Stein has 
written for the Institute of Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Mandel, will you describe that compilation that appears on that 
page before we introduce it into the record ? 

The Chairman. What is the source of the information? 

Mr. Morris. It is a compilation by Mr. Mandel. I am asking him to 
testify, Mr. Chairman, as to what that represents. 

The Chairman. What is the source of his information? 

Mr. Mandel. These are articles from Pacific Affairs, the official 
organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also another one of its 
publications, called Far Eastern Survey, and lists the writings of 
Guenther Stein. 

Just by way of sample, let me read a few titles : "Japanese State 
Finance," in the December 1937 issue of Pacific Affairs. 

In the Far Eastern Survey we have "What's Free China," June 29, 
1942, and so on, giving a list of approximately 15 titles. 

Also, Mr. Stein was coauthor of a study of American trade with 
Pacific countries, which was slated for fall publication in 1917 by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. We offer that document as the next exhibit. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 83 

Guenther Stein 

Writer of articles in Pacific Affairs : 

Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader, pages 177-190, June 
1936. 

Japanese State Finance, pages 393-406, December 1937. 

The Yen and the Sword, pages 5-19, March 1939. 

China's Price Problem, pages 322-333, September 1941. 

Free China's Agricultural Progress, pages 339-343, 1943. 

Book "The Challenge of Red China" reviewed, page 199, June 1946. 

Book review of American Business with East Asia, page 105, March 1948, 
Writer of articles in Far Eastern Survey : 

China's Inflation Menace, June 1, 1942, page 124. 

What's Free China, June 29, 1942. 

People's Political Council Reorganizing, July 13, 1942. 

Chungking Considers the Future, September 7, 1942, page 190. 

The Chinese Press Weighs Allied Strategy, .Tune 14, 1943, page 117. 

Japan's Army on China's Fronts, July 14, 1943, page 141. 

Free China's Industrial Production, August 11, 1943, page 161. 

China's Fiscal Program, August 25, 1943, page 169. 

China's Internal Transport System, October 20, 1943, page 208. 

Ovei'seas Chinese Look Ahead. November 17, 1943. 

China's Forbidden Crisis, March 12, 1947, pages 49-52. 
Listed on i-esearch and publication program of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, May 9, 1947. 

Study of American Trade with Pacific Countries by Guenther Stein. 
Shirley Jenkins and an advisory committee of businessmen versed in prob- 
lems of far eastern trade. Publication date — fall, 1947. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 377 

Senator Ferguson. Do we find anywhere that Stein ever wrote 
under a fictitious name, an alias ? 

Mr. Mandel. I liave no record of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Norman was supposed to, was he not? Is not 
there evidence in tlie hearing, a letter ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in introducing this compilation of Mr. 
Mandel's, I would like to have the record show that there were 21 
contributions through the years by Mr. Guenther Stein to the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations in one of its subdivisions. 

The Chairman. I want to tie this in properly. 

Mr. Mandel, in your listing here, from what source did you get the 
information ? 

Mr. Mandel. From the Index to Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern 
Survey, as published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. You found it where? 

Mr. Mandel. In the actual index that they publish. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean you looked at the magazines your- 
self, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. At the index. 

Mr, Morris. And you made up this compilation having the official 
records in front of you ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

General Willoughby. Can I contribute something? 

Mr. Morris. Very well, General. 

General Willoughby. This is a purely impromptu, off-the-cuff 
contribution, but as you are establishing, I take it, the literary quality 
of Mr. Stein, this is what we thought about that field. 

Lately I have read a most illuminating study by Mrs. Irene Kuhn 
on the subject of, to me a revealing subject, of how Communist- 
slanted books bought, sold, reviewed, peddled, propagandized, log- 
rolled or log-jammed, as the case may be. 

I am quoting from this article. 

After an absence of 13 years from the United States, I am, of course, 
avid for information that would give me the modern landscape. 

Mrs. Kuhn's article, which had its fifth reprint in the American 
Legion, deals with the technique of propagating, peddling, and sup- 
porting Communist-tainted books. 

Guenther Stein's reports by their titles, I would say, look rather 
innocuous. But this is what one of our investigators has to say about 
him: 

Late in 1944 he was one of a group of six who visited Yenan. 

Yenan is a hot-land of Chinese Communists, the cradle of Chou 
Teh and other gentlemen with whom we are now engaged in North 
Korea. 

He was one of the two correspondents whose accounts of Communist China 
were published as books. His Challenge of Red China (McGraw-Hill, 1945) has 
the outward appeai'ance of thoughtful i-ejiorting. His book has had a great deal 
of effect in perpetuating the legend that Chinese Communists aren't Communists 
and are not in any way connected with the Soviet Union — a legend started and 
kept alive so much earlier by Agnes Smedley. Like Agnes Smedley, Guenther 
Stein was an established Soviet aaent, and one can be certain that neither of them 
was publishing the truth about Chinese Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Again, that is a memorandum from one of your 
staff ; is it ? 



378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Willoughby. Yes, and filed with the War Department, and 
is part of the original report of 1947, 1948, and 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the one that was later suppressed after- 
it was released. 

General Willoughby. It was later, shall we say, released and then 
given the "cold shoulder." 

Mr. Morris. And you think, Senator, it is significant that when 
Herbert Norman did write for Pacific Affairs, Carter and Lattimore 
wanted him to write under a nom de plume ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. I think that ought to appear in 
the record, owing to Wittfogel's testimony. 

Senator Watkins. Would that not be because he was a member of 
the Canadian Foreign Service and could not write, without getting, 
into trouble, under his own name? 

Mr. Morris. It may well be. 

I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr, Chair- 
man, a memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from Mr. "W. W. L." — 
presumably Mr. Lockwood — to "E. C. C. and W. L. H." — presumably 
Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. This reads : 

A further comment on circulating Guentl>er Stein's stuff in Washington :: 
When I mentioned it to John Fairbank lie expressed a great interest in seeing 
it and summoned together his China staff — 

Now, at that time Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI — 

who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be 
asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you 
to handle, however. 

I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as 
evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time 
was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's — 
as Mr. Lockwood says — "stuff" in Washington. 

Tlie Cpiairman. Just a minute. 

Will you identiy that, please ? 

Mr. liloRRis. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as an authentic 
document? 

The Chairman. Where did you get it? Where did it come from? 
"Wliat is its authenticity ? 

Mr. Mandel. I identify this memorandum dated June 24, 1942,. 
from "W. W. L. to E. C. C." marked also "W. L. H." as taken from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 84 

June i24, 1942. 
W. W. L. to E. C. C, W. L. H. 

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington : When 
I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and 
summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John 
also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in 
return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however. 

Tlie Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, I wonder if you would tell us 
what this espionage ring was able to accomplish by way of transmit- 
ting secret information to the Soviet Government and aiding the 
Soviet foreign policy ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 379 

General Willoughby. There is an enormous amount of information 
of records on that subject, Mr. Morris. I will touch upon the high 
lights for this committee. 

For example, under interrogation from memory alone, in the initial 
stages, Sorge dispatched more than 50 reports, Klausen another 50. 
The decoded radio messages added much greater detail. 

The Chairman. Radio messages from whom to whom? 

General Willoughby. From Sorge via Klausen to his Russian su- 
periors. The relays were either via Harbin or direct to Khabarovsk. 

However, the year 1941 was naturally the crucial year for all of us, 
and I think you will get an impression of the quality and importance 
of those reports if I limit myself roughly to that year, 1939-40, with 
empliasis on 1941. 

For example, the relation of Russia with the Central Powers, with 
Germany, was of an immense interest in that year. Sorge, having a 
position as press attache of the German Embassy, on the one hand, and 
having a direct access to Prince Konoye — that is, the Japanese Pre- 
mier — and/or their State Department, through' Ozaki, was in a posi- 
tion of not only obtaining the details of the German negotiations, 
which he relayed promptly to his Russian masters, but he was able to 
get the reaction or actions of the Foreign Office and do likewise. 

Now, that information, if the Allies had known it — ^liad had ad- 
vance notice of this in that critical year 1941 — might have changed 
the course of history. 

For example, the quality of this man's reports is an example : An 
appraisal of the Japanese output of munitions, which, from a military 
viewpoint is, of course, terribly important to all those who were 
then contemplating or considering Japan as a potential enemy. 

He made periodical reports beginning with February of 1940 
throughout 1940 and 1941. 

In August 1941 he reported an item which the American Navy 
was intensely interested in, had they known it; namely, the record 
of petroleum storage and stockage available to the Japanese military 
forces. 

His report was that there was in storage in Japan sufficient 
petroleum for 2 years' use by the Navy, half a year by the Army, 
and half a year by the nation at large. That became a prime mili- 
tary objective for use in the course of the war. 

On the 20th of May, through his connections, of course, with the 
German military attache in the Embassy, of which he was a 
member 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe, General Willoughby, exactly what 
his relationship was? 

General Willoughby. He was the officially designated press re- 
lations officer of the German Embassy in Tokyo. 

The Chairman. You are referring to whom now? 

General Willoughby. Sorge. 

Mr. Morris. Who was the German Ambassador at that time? 

General Willgughe-y. General Ott, whom he had known in China 
and by a process of friendship probably got this assignment. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, did Richard Sorge hold a mili- 
tary rank in the Soviet Army ? 

General Willoughby. He was, as he stated, "a subordinate to 
the Fourth Bureau," which is the intelligence section of the Soviet 
Armv, and hud the assimilated rank of colonel. 



380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

In other words, you find a Kussian intelligence officer being the 
press attache, with diplomatic immunity, at the German Embassy, 
at a time when the relationship of these two nations was one of 
crucial international balance. 

Mr. Morris. And this time you are now describing is May 1941? 
That is just 1 month prior to the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

The type of Sorge's reports was due, of course, probably not to 
inherent talent, but to the advantages of his unusual position. 

On the 20th of May 1941, he flashed a warning — meaning to Russia — 
that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions 
on the Soviet border, and on the 28th of June would attack along 
the entire frontier; the main effort, however, would be made in the 
direction of Moscow. 

This attack did occur on the 22d of June. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course. General, that brings me back to 
many of the things that happened at the Pearl Harbor hearings. 
We were slightly interested in knowing whether Japan was going 
to attack America, Russia, or Britain in her colony. 

General Willoughby. Right. 

Senator Ferguson. And if we had Americans like Smedley in 
this spy ring, they may have been able to acquire, through various 
rings, for instance, here in Washington — we have learned about 
papers being taken from the State Department — that Japan was 
getting some information through this same spy ring to her as to 
what our intentions were. 

Is that not possible ? 

General Willoughby. Your point is well taken. Senator, and I 
think I can give you a connecting link here. 

The potential of Japan to attack Russia via Siberia or to attack 
south, which would involve the Philippines — that is. United States 
and the British — was of equal interest to Russia, but it was also of 
equal interest to us. And the deduction which is permissible, if 
Smedley was in a position of intimacy with this bird Sorge, is that 
she might have obtained that information, too, had she been on the 
right side of the fence. 

But regardless of that, sir, actually that became Sorge's main mis- 
sion. He was ordered to concentrate on what Japan was going to 
do, because without that knowledge the Russians would not with- 
draw from the Siberian mainland the divisions they maintained. 

Once having assurance that Japan would go south — that is, an 
attack which would involve the United States — they were then free 
to denude their Siberian border and put their troops into the defense 
of the frontier then in existence. 

Actually, they came in time to save the situation in the German 
advance — well, their farthest advance in that period: Smolensk, 
Stalingrad. 

So it might be said that, predicated on the information furnished 
by this superbly competent agent, the Russian situation on the west 
front depended as a life and death question. He gave them the 
answer. 

This is very interesting — always with a background of your own 
and pre-Pearl Harbor inquiries, which I remember very well, indeed. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 381 

Sorge maintained a concentrated watch on United States- Japanese 
negotiations during the summer and fall of 1941. His information 
was full and accurate ; naturally so, since Ozaki was so close to Prince 
Konoye, the keyman in these negotiations. 

During early October, Sorge reported on this mobilization, that it 
was completed in mid-September and that men from 25 to 35 years 
had been called up — mobilization of an expansion in forces as a 
prelude to war. 

By the 15th of October, Sorge transmitted his final sober conclu- 
sions that the Japanese had decided to move south, and that there 
now was no serious danger of an attack through Manchuria in the 
direction of Siberia. He felt that his mission was completed. 

He drafted a dispatch, suggesting his recall to the Soviet Union. 
His radio operator Klausen argued that his request was premature, 
and the message was never sent. Three days later Sorge and Klausen 
were under arrest. 

Mr. Morris. It is significant. General, that they were arrested just 
a few days after their mission was accomplished ; is it not ? 

General Willoughby. The throw of the dice — the fortunes of war. 

Mr. Morris. General, we have had testimony before this commit- 
tee that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Kelations, some of 
whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, ex- 
erted great efforts in November 1941 to prevent a 90-day truce being 
worked out between Japan and the United States. 

This committee has that testimony both in executive and open ses- 
sion, namely, that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist 
Party, made great efforts to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out 
between the United States and Japan. 

I wonder if you would care to comment on that and possibly corre- 
late any information or evidence that you have with that testimony. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith, the calendar is to be called on the 
floor. The chairman of this committee has many bills on that calen- 
dar. Will you kindly take the chair and carry on for me ? 

General, I am sorry to have to leave. I will be back to see you 
again. 

Senator Smith. Will you proceed, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. Does the general understand the question? 

General Willoughby. Would you mind repeating it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Before you proceed with that, if I might refer 
back, I would like to introduce a memorandum from the Pearl Harbor 
hearings, joint hearings, page 1160, held in 1945. The memorandum 
is dated Chungking, November 25, 1941. 

Mr. Morris. That can be marked the next exhibit number. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 85" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 85 ^ 

[Exhibit taken from hearings on Pearl Harbor attack, 1945, p. 1160] 

Chungking, November 25, 19Jil. 
Lattchlin Cureie : After discussing ^yith the generalissimo the Chinese Am- 
bassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently 
advise the President of the generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never 



* Previously used as exhibit No. 24. 
22848—52 — pt. 2 3 



382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing 
would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation 
of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the 
Chinese. Any modus vivendi now arrived at with China would he disastrous to 
Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, 
which permanently destroyed Britisli prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists 
would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity 
against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or 
increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. 
The generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his con- 
sistent iwliey but I must warn you that even the generalissimo questions his 
ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America 
is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic 
victory. 

I/ATTIMOBE. 

Mr. Morris. To get back to the question, General : 

We have introduced into the record documents and testimony to 
the effect that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some 
of whom have been identified before this committee in executive and 
open session as members of the Communist Party, or connected with 
the Communist Party, were making efforts in November 1941, to pre- 
vent the United States and Japan from effecting a 90-day truce at the 
time, at the request of the military leaders of the comitry, namely, the 
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 

A 90-day truce was sought in order to prevent any outbreak of 
hostilities. We had evidence, as I say, introduced. General, that IPR 
officials, top officials in the IPR, were trying to prevent that truce from 
being effected. 

I wonder if any evidence or information that you acquired while 
you were in Tokyo would have any bearing on the testimony that we 
have already taken before this committee on that score, General Wil- 
loughby. 

General Willoughby. I would say that this is a very complicated 
question, since it deals with activities in the United States when I 
was absent in the Philippines at that time, since 1938. 

And, of course, I must delegate activity to other officers and cannot 
specifically point to anything that is in the nature of concrete evidence. 

With this limiting background and based purely on recollection, 
and guided solely by a desire, of course, to assist this committee in its 
hard-working enterprise, I will say that, as a student of history and 
of Japan, that I have the impression that Prince Konoye was des- 
perately serious in effecting a last-minute understanding with the 
United States and that there was, in the opinion of many Japanese 
of substance and probity, there was a fear that certain elements, un- 
identified in the States, were opposed to such an understanding. 

That is probably an unsatisfactory answer, but it is the best I can do. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much. General. 

Senator Ferguson has made reference to a dispatch sent by Owen 
Lattimore, who at that time was personal adviser to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek, to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant 
to the White House, in which Lattimore urged that the modus vivendi 
be rejected. The date of that is November 25, 1941. 

Further, General, we had testimony here from Mr. Carter that he 
was called down to Washington bj Harr^r Dexter Wliite, who was 



' INSTITUTE OF rACIFIC RELATIONS 383 

then Under Secretary of the Treasury, asking Mr. Carter to use his 
influence to prevent any — as he described it — sell-out of China at 
that time. 

At that time they were showing a concern for China, when this took 
that form. 

General Willoughby. Amazing, amazing. 

Mr. Morris. This has already been introduced into the record. 

Now, in connection with Guenther Stein, I would like to point out, 
General, that you have been testifying through your records that 
Guenther Stein was doing espionage work for the Soviet fourth bu- 
reau, fourth army. 

General Willoughby. There is his association, with Sorge as one 
of his associates. If we established that he was a trusted and im- 
portant associate of Sorge — and that, I think, is established — I will 
take out the words, "I think"; we've got it all, cross-reference of 
Klausen, his wife, Kawai, et cetera. 

So if we classify him as a bona fide member of this ring, then, 
of course, the reference of reporting to the fourth army is to be under- 
stood in that light. 

He didn't report directly. He reported to Sorge, and it was Sorge 
who relayed the information. 

I think it is a fine distinction which I may be exaggerating, but I 
am making it. 

Mr. Morris. General, I would like to point out that he has written 
21 articles for the Institute of Pacfic Relations and two more letters, 
which Mr. Mandel will authenticate and read into the record on 
Guenther Stein, as well as the letter from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. 
Carter and Mr. Holland that the Office of War Information and 
the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulating — to use their own 
words — "Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington." 

I see here in this letter we have already introduced Lockwood says : 

When I mentioned it to John Fairbank — 
who was then head of the China section of OWI — 

he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China 
staff, who all voiced a similar interest. 

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promul- 
gating Guenther Stein's material. So it apparently served another 
function at that time, did it not. General ? 

General Willoughby. I would agree with you ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, the evidence clearly shows that he 
was an agent of the Comintern, so that he at all times, whether they 
be two or one, the Red army and communism in Russia, he was serving 
both those according to the documented record. Is that not right ? 

General Willoughby. He was ; in his capacity as an indispensable 
and important member of the Sorge organization, whose complete pur- 
poses were for these two agencies that you mentioned, the army, on 
the one hand, the Comintern, on the other. 

I haven't the slightest hesitancy personally, if you wish to ascertain 
that, that Stein is as guilty as Smedley or any of the others listed. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have no doubt, have you, from these 
records, that Stein was a Communist? 



384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Willoughby. None; none whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Smedley was a Communist? 

General Willoughby. I have no doubt about that, personally. 

And I notice there is a reference, which Mr. Morris has, that Sorge 
recommended her to the clearinghouse in Moscow, who pass on the 
bona fides of these agents, and he needed the supporting certification 
of another card-bearing member and he got it from somebody. 

Anyway, that is a very unusual step to have taken, and I base my 
feelings about her on this. 

Senator Ferguson. So you have not any doubt that she was one, 
have you ? 

General Willoughby. I have no doubt. 

Mr. Morris. About Guenther Stein's present activity, General, do 
you know from official authority that he was arrested for espionage 
in France in 1950 ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. Of course, Mr. Morris, when you begin 
to sum up or draw conclusions, my opinion, or, rather, my thought 
process is probably not any better than yours, but when I know of an 
individual with that record disappearing at the time a report was 
published — he disappeared within 24 hours after the War Depart- 
ment released the 1949 version — and then remains incognito at large 
and then picked up by the French police in the spring on an espionage 
charge, he is one of the boys who continued to be in the same business. 

Conversely, talking about Smedley, with due deference to her demise, 
you find her being pictured by a columnist at the time, and notably 
Mr. Harold Ickes, as an upright American woman, of unimpeachable 
reputation, veracity, and political coloring, and then find her willing 
her ashes to Chou Teh, the commander in chief of the Chinese Com- 
munist Army, with whom we are now engaged in Korea, and having 
her ashes placed in a special shrine in Peking, under actual govern- 
mental ceremony of extreme value in the heartland of Asiatic com- 
munism. 

You don't have to be either a police officer or investigative genius to 
draw your almost inescapable conclusion on these two characters. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read into the record 
two letters which bear on Guenther Stein's position and activity in the 
Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. I read one letter from the fiiles of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated July 6, 1942, addressed to Mr. Richard R. 
Sanger, Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic War- 
fare, Washington, D. C, from W. L. Holland : 

In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American council, 
I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther 
Stein in Chungking. 

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far 
Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime. 

As far as possible we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as 
they come in. 

Sincerely yours. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into 
evidence as further evidence of Guenther Stein's activity through the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 385 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 86" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 86 

New York City, July 6, 1948. 
Re : OW-S-FES. 
Mr. Richard H. Sanger, 

Economio Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Welfai-e, 

Washington, D. O. 
Dear Mr. Sanger : In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of th^ 
American Council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio 
letter from Guentber Stein in Chungking. 

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far 
Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime. 

As far as possible, we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon 
as they come in. 

Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

Mr. Mandel. I have another letter here, addressed to W. Mac- 
Mahon Ball, of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, at 177 Collins Street, 
Melbourne, Australia, dated February 3, 1939, from Owen Lattimore. 
I read one sentence : 

Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far 
East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan. 

Mr. Morris. This is now from Mr. Lattimore, is it, Mr. Mandel? 
Mr. Mandel. This is still from Mr. Lattimore's letter : 

If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an 
article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "what is 
on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect 
Australian interests?" 

Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence 
as the next exhibit the letter just read from by Mr. Mandel. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87," and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 87 

300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins Uni\t<:rsity, 

Baltimore, Md., February 6, 1939. 
Dr. W. MacMahon Ball, 
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, 

Melbourne, C. 2, Australia. 

Dear Ball : To my unspeakable chagrin I have missed a cog. I made a mental 
note that your boat sailed on February 9, and was going to catch you by air 
mail. Today I had the article ready for mailing and. on turning up my 
written note found that you had sailed on February 1. I am terribly ashamed 
of this as I like to make a point of hitting my assignments on the nose. 

Anyhow I am sending the article herewith by air mail to Los Angeles, 
hoping it will catch a fast mail from there. If it arrives too late, has to be 
held over an issue, and thereby gets out of date, throw it in the wastebasket 
and blame me. 

I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original 
with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general 
practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me 
whenever I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman. 

Following up our conversation at lunch, I have read the December-January 
issue of the Bulletin, the latest to arrive here. This issue contains an example 
of what I shall rudely call exaggerated neutrality. Guenther Stein, who is by 
long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the 
inherent weakness of Japan. One of your editors hastened to soften the shock 
and to avoid any impression that the Bulletin is anti-Japanese by writing an 



386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

article in which he seeks to prove that there is a lot to he said on the other side. 
The impression thus created is that the war in the Far East is no business 
of Australians. Australians can look at it from a safe distance and say "Well, 
well, how interesting. A lot to be said on both sides, evidently." 

Is this true? If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as 
strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive 
response be "What is to be said on the Japanese side?" Should it not- be "If 
this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?" For the fact of the mat- 
ter is that you in Australia and we in America have the same kind of interest in 
the outcome of this war. We are not distant and disinterested spectators. A 
victory for Japan would mean one kind of world, in which we should be vitally 
interested. A victory for China would mean another kind of world, in which 
we should also be vitally interested. I am distressed at the lack of realization 
of this in both America and Australia. We keep balancing "what can be said 
for China" with "what can be said for Japan" dodpcing the really important 
questions, which are "Where do we come in, or where do we get out?" 

As far as the Bulletin is concerned, all of this is none of my business. Consider, 
therefore, that the seat of my pants presents a broad target, and deliver me a 
long-distance kick in the middle thereof at your leisure. 

I hope we'll be meeting again. 
Very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimoee. 

Mr. Morris. General Willoughby, I understand that there is a 
slight conflict here in the date of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. 
Apparently the testimony conflicts. You said last spring, and again 
I think you said in 1950. 

General Willoughby. Of course, I am not a walking file case, nat- 
urally, having this type of information al my fingertips. 

Have you got a translation which I will identify as having been 
:made by me? That is a message from the French Ambassador to 
me. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, we have that. General. 

General Willoughby. That will give you the date. It must have 
been this spring. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, we will get that, General. 

General Willoughby. The INS carried it as a news item. I am 
so impressed with the accuracy of intelligence reporting by journal- 
istic professionals that I consider their reportage as always a part of 
my evidence. So if you cannot locate it there, I know of an INS 
dispatch at that time. It must have been around February, I should 
say, offhand speaking. 

If the INS hasn't got it, then I am sure AP has. If not, Mr. Bett. 

Mr. Morris. While we are getting that, General, I would like to 
ask you about certain leaders of the IPR who were active at head- 
quarters during the war. 

During last Tuesday's session. General, we had testimony from 
Prof. Karl Wittfogel that T. A. Bisson was a member of the Commu- 
nist Party when Dr. Wittfogel knew him back in 1935 — I think tho 
date was. 

Do you know that Mr. Bisson Avas assigned to j^our headquarters 
and served there until 1948, General Willoughby? 

General Willoughby. I have a recollection that Bisson was a De- 
partment of Army civilian employee in one of the civil sections of 
SCAP, probably the Government section, in the period 1946-48. 

Here again the exact dates you have to indulge the fact that I do 
not have the details of every investigative case at my fingertips. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask a question, if I might, please. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 387 

Mr. Morris. By all means, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. General, are you under the same ban as other 
witnesses who came here, that they are unable to testify in relation to 
personnel files and so-called loyalty files ? 

Genei-al Wiixoughby. I am. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, your lips are closed to this 
committee and you are unable to give to this committee anything in 
relation to a personnel file ? 

General Willoughbt. Correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So if there is or is not a personnel file and its 
contents on any of these people that we are talking about in the United 
States Government, the people cannot learn through this committee 
what that file shows, or anything that is in that file, or your knowledge 
as to that file ; is that correct ? 

General Willoughbt. Will you permit me, Mr. Chairman, as this 
is a question of administrative significance, that I answer that in my 
way? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; you may answer it your way. I do not 
call for a yes or no answer. I just want the evidence. I want the 
facts. 

General Willoughbt. The point was brought up by the counsel 
yesterday in which he requested from me information on Mr. T. A. 
Bisson, one Miriam Farley, and one Grajdanzev, who has since changed 
his name to Grad. 

Mr. Morris. And they, General, are people who have been active 
in the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they ? 

General Willoughbt. I realize that. 

Mr. Morris. Who were employed at your headquarters, who were 
assigned to your headquarters by executive authority in the United 
States? 

General Willoughbt. Correct. They were hired in the States and 
unloaded on Tokyo. 

Senator Ferguson. I think the word "unloaded" may enable us to 
draw some conclusions from that word. 

General Willoughbt. In which case, Mr. Chairman, you must per- 
mit me an editorial rescission. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I understand that. 

General Willoughbt. I would like to put it this way : Mr. Chair- 
man, as a citizen, I am naturally most desirous to assist this important 
committee. However, as a Federal officer, I am expected to observe 
Army orders and Presidential directives. 

I invite your attention to a Department of Army circular letter 
dated August 21, 1948, on the subject, Release of Personnel Records 
and Information. I quote : 

No information of any sort relating to the employee's loyalty and no investiga- 
tive data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the indi- 
vidual's record, shall be included in material submitted to a congressional 
committee. 

The provision of the I*residential directive of March 13, 1949, I 
intended to apply to records of former employees as well as persons 
now in the Federal service. 

These people, Bisson, Farley, Grajdanzev, fall under the category 
of former employees. 



388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Still quoting the regulation : 

Any individual wlio may appear as a witness before a congressional committee 
will respectfuly decline to testify concerning the loyalty of any person or as to 
the contents of any investigative files and will state that he is forbidden to 
answer such questions by pertinent directives of the Army. 

Senator Watkins. I take it, General, that the order of that directive 
is not classified. 

General Willoughby. No. The basis is the Presidential directive 
of 13th of March 1948. 

You can find it in Bulletin No. 6, Department of the Army, on the 
17th of March 1948. 

Senator Ferguson. We have had high military officers and others 
quote the same in the hearings where the present Chair was chairman. 

In other words, you are unable to give us this information? 

General Willoughby. Based on the precise wording of this. 

Senator Ferguson. I shall, however, ask the chairman of this sub- 
committee if he will not again ask the President to allow this com- 
mittee to have access, through you or someone else, to personnel files 
in relation to activities of certain people whose names are brought to 
the attention of the committee, particularly those connected with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I 
join in that request. 

General Willoughby. May I add the following ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Willoughby. I desire to further clarify my position in 
this matter and say that the personnel files and records are within the 
purview of Counterintelligence. 

Wliile this investigation unit, like the Four Hundred and Forty-first 
CIC in Tokyo, is a subdivision of G-2, my personal and prior attention 
was concentrated on the Korean War effort and on military intelligence 
in the Far East. 

Ultimately you must obtain information from officers whose sole 
business it was to develop and maintain personnel investigations. 

I am, of course, not familiar with the details of literally thousands 
of file references or case histories. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently the same rule applies not only to 
personnel files and those that have been employed, but it applied to 
Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who made an application for a posi- 
tion as an official in the Intelligence Branch of the United States 
Military Service. 

The present Chair asked for that file, and all that is in it is merely 
a medical report, but no application for the position or letters of 
recommendation, or anything else. Nothing is in the file except a 
medical report. 

Senator Watkins. That is notwithstanding evidence to the fact that 
numerous other persons had made statements referring to said letters. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; notwithstanding their testimony. 

I want to express my opinion to the witness, the able general in 
Intelligence, that he does feel that he is bound by a Presidential and 
a military superior order, and he has given the reason for not giving 
this information and not answering these questions, that I accept his 
explanation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 389 

But that does not prevent me, as a Senator and temporary chairman, 
from advocating to the chairman and to the counsel that we again, 
in behalf of the people of the United States, ask for this information, 
because I think it is valuable to our internal security and our defense. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, in this connection, I would like to point 
out that the reason we are asking for these particular three files is 
that Mr, T, A. Bisson, Miss Miriam Farley, and Mr. Andrew Grad 
have been active people in the Institute of Pacific Relations, who in 
addition were assigned to General AVilloughby's headquarters. 

Senator Ferguson, That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will further identify from 
the exhibits already introduced, and letters that we may introduce 
now, something about the identity of those three people. 

Senator Ferguson, I might say in reply to that that is true, and it 
is always our duty, as members of this committee, to produce all the 
evidence we can outside of what the official records show, which would 
aid us greatly. 

But it creates an impossible burden on many occasions upon this 
committee to complete its investigation. 

Senator Watkins, This record is from the letters taken from the 
IPK files, is it? 

Mr, Morris, Some of the letters and some from exhibits already 
introduced. Senator. 

Mr. Mandel. It has been previously introduced that the Windows 
On the Pacific biennial report of the American Council, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated 1944 to 1946, on page 11, refers to T. A, Bis- 
son, of the international secretariat. 

Another exhibit previously introduced was a letter to Mr, Bisson 
from Wilma Fairbank, dated October 19, 1943, which referred to Mr. 
Bisson as the acting editor of Pacific Affairs. 

Mr, Morris, So he was a member of the secretariat as well as the 
acting editor of the Pacific Affairs before he was assigned to General 
Willoughby's headquarters in Tokyo? 

Mr, Mandel. Yes, 

Mr. Morris. How about Mr. Grajdanzev? 

Senator Watkins. What is the date of that letter ? 

Mr, Mandel. The date of the letter was October 19, 1943, and the 
date of the report was 1944-46, 

Mr, Morris, They have already been introduced, Senator, 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations, dated November 26, 1941, addressed to Mr. 
Robert K. Straus, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N, Y., from Robert 
W. Barnett. 

I read a portion of this letter which refers to Mr, Grajdanzev : 

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later 
three departments, asked the institnte for a monograph on the carrying capacity 
of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials 
in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round 
houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev pre- 
pared a monograph which has been hailed in three Government departments as 
far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. 
This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and 
explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get 
the services of members of the institute stafE. 



390 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chair- 
man, and have that marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 88," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 88 

November 26, 1941. 
Mr. Robert K. Straus, 

New York, N. T. 
Dear Mr. Stbaus : In response to your request for me to do so, I have tried 
to set down in this letter how the American Council of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations has risen to the demands of the national emergency. 

From the Army, Navy, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Department of Com- 
merce, the Administrator of Export Control, and the Office of Price Adminis- 
tration and Civilian Supplies have come repeated calls for assistance which 
have been fulfilled by our research staff. Owen Lattimore, as you know, the 
editor of Pacifie Affairs, was loaned to serve, on the nomination of President 
Roosevelt, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. We 
loaned first to the Universal Trading Corp. and then to the American, British, 
and Chinese Governments Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve as Secretary General of the 
A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Fund. We are glad that the War Department 
has recognized the ability of our expert on the Netherlands East Indies, Miss 
EUen van ZyU de Jong, by giving her a research appointment. We assisted in 
arranging that Irving Friedman, a former member of the Secretariat, enter the 
division of monetary research of the Treasury Department. William W. Lock- 
wood, on temporary leave, has worked as secretary of the American Committee 
lor International Studies, and simultaneously for General Maxwell's and for 
Colonel Donovan's offices in Washinijton, but recently has taken over the secre- 
taryship of the American Council. Both Mr. Carter and I have been invited to 
serve on the staff of the office of the Coordinator of Information, but have 
remained here because the necessity for popular education and private research 
seemed now more urgent. 

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later 
three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity 
of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials 
in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round- 
houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev pre- 
pared a monograph which has been hailed in three government departments as 
far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. 
This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and 
explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get 
the services of members of the institute staff. 

Our service to governments has not, happily, lessened thus far our aid to 
business groups, the press, and university and secondary-school circles. The 
demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before. 
We provided indispensable information to the Fortune staff as it prepared its 
far eastern issue. We have assisted teachers' organizations to carry out their 
far eastern projects. We have set up some 13 regional conferences. Under 
the leadership of Catherine Porter, Miriam Farley, Dorothy Berg, and Kurt 
Bloch, a greatly enlivened Far Eastern Survey reaches a wider and more atten- 
tive audience. We broadcast weekly over CBS. We are publishing inexpensive 
pamphlets, among them Showdown at Singapore, Philippine Emergency, Japan 
Strikes South, Our Far Eastern Record, American Aid to China, and the Soviet 
Far East. 

In the international field only in France and Holland has the work of the 
institute been curtailed. The Royal Institute in London has recently augmented 
Its studies of the Far East and the far-eastern program of the Canadian and 
Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any 
period in the past. 

You will agree with me, I feel sure, that the reasons which led to your support 

of the American Council last year are doubly valid now. May I suggest that 

you raise your 1940 contribution of $25 to $50 for 1941-42? This may prove to 

be the year of the long-awaited Japanese-American war — or, of Japan's surrender 

. to ABCD economic pressure. Either development will greatly increase the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 391 

American Council's responsibilities to our Government and to the American, 
public. 

Very sincerely yours, 

ROBEBT W. BABNETT. 

Senator Ferguson. For the purpose of explaining to the members 
of the committee, who are Mr. Straus and this man Barnett? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Straus is of no significance in this instance, Sen- 
ator, but Mr. Barnett served as secretary of the Washington office, 
I believe, and is now an important official of the United States State 
Department. 

Senator Watkins. Do the records show that ? 

Mr. Morris. In other places. Senator. 

As I say, at this point we say that Mr. Straus has no significance 
in this. 

Mr. ]Mandel. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1941, addressed to Lt. Col. Fred- 
erick D. Sharp, room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 

Our research has shown that Colonel Sharp was at that time con- 
nected with Military Intelligence. 

The letter states : 

Deab Colonel Sharp: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions 
on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on 
it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father 
and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of 
Belgrade. 

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to 
turn up as much material as possible. Without sources he has drafted the 
enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose. 

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or 
definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of 
very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something 
to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for 
your purposes? 

Sincerely yours, 

Edwaed C. Caeter. 

Then there is another letter addressed to a Mr. Thurber. No initial 
is given. It is under date of July 23, 1941, addressed to the same 
address, room 811, 1207 Sixth Avenue, which was the office at that 
time of Military Intelligence : 

My colleague, Andrew Grajdanzev, has handed me the first draft of his notes 
on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through 
this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing 
that you are in a hurry for this first draft, I am sending it over today and will 
send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edwaed C. Carter. 

Finally, I have a letter to Mr. Carter, Edward C, Carter, dated 
July 24, 1941, from Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, G. S. C. : 

Dear Mr. Carter : I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad 
drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr, Andrew Grajdanzev. 

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May 
it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference 
source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on 
your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the 
next goal. ^p^ 

Senator Ferguson. They will be received in evidence and marked 
the next consecutive exhibits. 



392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 89, 90, and 
91," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 89 

New York, N. T., Jiily 10, 1941. 
Lt. Col. Freberick D. Sharp, 

Room 811, 1210 Sixth Avenue,'' 

New York, N.T. 
Dear Coix)nel Sharp : I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions 
on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on 
it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father 
and two other members of his family were killed in the- German bombing of 
Belgrade. 

Instead, I have asked another of my collegaues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to 
turn up as much material as possible. With sources he has drafted the enclosed 
very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose. 

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or de- 
finitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of 
very thorough research. Mr. Gra.idanzev and I hope we can send you something 
to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for 
your purposes? 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward G. Carter. 

Exhibit No. 90 

New York City, July 23, I94I. 
Mr. Thurber, 

Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, 

New York City. 
Dear Mr. Thurber: My colleague Andrew Grajdanzev has handed me the 
first draft on his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an 
opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues 
<?heck on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft I am 
Bending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my 
desk. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Exhibit No. 91 

New York, N.Y., July 24, 19^1. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations, 

New York City. 
Dear Mr. Carter: I liave received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad 
drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev. 

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difBcult. May 
it suffice to say that our own researclies are at an end with such a reference 
source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your 
knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next 
goal. 

Gratefully yours, 

Frederick D. Sharp, 
Lieutenant Colonel, O. 8. C. 

Mr. Mandel. I have another letter from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, dated April 3, 1942, addressed to Mr. George 
H. Kerr, Military Intelligence Division, AVar Department, Room 
2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. : 

Dear Mr. Kerr: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's 
report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy 



' New York OflBce, Military Intelligence. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC DELATIONS 393 

of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in 
the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of 
Economic Warfare. 

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there 
are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest 
that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an 
errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of 
manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory 
set of proofs. 

Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

Finally, on April 2, 1942, George H. Kerr writes to William L. 
Holland, on the stationery of tlie War Department, War Department 
General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Eoom 2628, Muni- 
tions Building : 

My Deae Me. Holland : I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in 
February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of 
further writing. 

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files — and my Formosa section — a 
set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I 
first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering 
letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final 
gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to sub- 
jects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact 
and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. 
We live very largely on loans these days. 

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some 
day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few 
very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance. 

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not 
be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad 
to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment 
have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously. 
With every good wish, 

George H. KiaiR. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I think that will suffice for Mr. Grajdan- 
zev, who, as the record will show, has now changed his name to Mr. 
Grad. 

Mr. Chairman, we offer that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Kerr, 
and the letter from Mr. Kerr to Mr. Holland, as the next consecutive 
exhibits. 

Senator Ferguson. They will be received. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 92 and 93," 
and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 92 

129 East Fiftt-second Street, New York, N. Y., 

April 3, 1942. 
Mr. George H. Kerr, 

Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 

Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Kerr : Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report 
on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the 
book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the 
Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic 
Warfare. 

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are 
any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that 
you let me know in the next uay or two, as we may want to insert an errata 



394 INSTITUTE QF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manu- 
facturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactorily set 
of proofs. 



Sincerely yours, 



W. L. Holland. 



Exhibit No. 93 



War Department, General Staff, 
MnjTAEY Intelligence Division G-2, 

Washington, April 2, 1942. 
Mr. William Holland, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 
My Deak Mb. Holland : I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in 
February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of 
further writing. 

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files — and my Formosa Section — a set 
of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first 
saw briefly in your office and now read thoroughly. No covering letter came 
with it to me, and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our 
files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and 
distribute it among my folders. If it Is a loan, I shall keep it intact and for- 
ward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We 
live very largely on loans these days. 

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some 
day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few 
very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance. 

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not 

be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to 

read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment 

have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously. 

With every good wish, 

Gbxjegb H. Kerb. 
My residence address : 2700 Wisconsin Avenue NW. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you can just tell us briefly 
who Miss Farley is, in connection with the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, and possiby one letter indicating that she was looking forward 
to her activity in Tokyo ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is an excerpt from the volume entitled "Security 
in the Pacific," a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, at Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 
1945. 

On page 159 Miriam S. Farley is listed as having participated in the 
conferences of 1936, 1939, and 1942. She is listed here also as an editor 
of the American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, 
American Council, IPR. 

Mr. Morris. She was the editor of the Far Eastern Survey; was 
she not, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. We offer that document as the next exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. It may be received. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 94 

{From Security In the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945] 

Conference Membekship, United States 

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942), editor, American Council Pamphlet Series, 
research associate, American Council, IPR (p. 159). 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 395 

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous IPR con- 
ferences. ) 

Mr. Mandel. I have here another letter from the files of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Kelations, dated April 8, 1946, addressed to "Dear 
Bill." 

Senator Ferguson. "\V1io could "Bill" be ? 

Mr. JMandel. It may be William L. Holland, or William W. Lock- 
wood. 

I read only the last paragraph, as follows : 

I've been put to work doing tlie political section of MacArthur's Monthly report 
There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with. 
Yours, 

MlBIAM. 

This is addressed from "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government 
Section, A. P. O. 500, Care Postmaster, San Francisco." 

Senator Ferguson. This would indicate that on April 8, 1946, 
Miriam w^hose name was — what? 
Mr. Mandel. Farley. 
Mr. Morris. Miriam S. Farley? 

Senator Ferguson. "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Sec- 
tion, A.P.O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco." She was then 
a Government employee on General MacArthur's staff and she was 
writing to someone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this 
is in the file and you obtained it from that file, and the paragraph was 
as she had written it. 
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You have identified this from the files ; have you not, 
Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was that personnel file that we were 
asking the general about that we might get some information from. 
That is correct ; is it not ? 
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I will receive the whole letter because we do not 
want to take a section out of context. 

Mr. Morris. The whole letter is introduced into evidence and will be 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit number. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 95 

April 8, 1946. 
Deab Bill: Matsuo asked me to send this on to you after I had read it. It is 
a report which he did for the political adviser's office, and is not for publication. 
I saw Yasuo last week. He looks well though much older, and is working 10 
hours a day as editor of the English edition of Jiji Press. He has a year-and-a- 
half-old son. He told quite a tale of the days of the surrender. It seems he was 
instrumental in breaking the story of the first note (accepting Potsdam terms on 
condition that Emperor, etc.). Domei, with which he then was, got hold of 
the note somehow from the Foreign OflBce and was not authorized to make it 
public. After consultation between Yasuo and his chief, they did so nevertheless — 
put it on the radio. Within half an hour they got a reaction from San Fran- 
cisco. Then the Kernpictai (Gendarmerie) descended on them and they had 
quite a rough time for 3 days. Y.'s chief was locked up for a while. To cover 
themselves they claimed to have gotten the story from the Moscow radio. 



396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly 
report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get 
by with. 

Tours, 

MiEIAM. 

M. S. Faeley, 

GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, care of Postmaster, San 
Francisco. 
P. S. — I forgot to say that Yasuo wanted to be remembered to you, Phil Lillien- 
thal, and others at the IPR. 

Mr.- Morris, Mr. Chairman, we do not want to restrict our request 
for files to those particular people. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. The request may be in con- 
nection with all that you may list. 

Mr. Morris. That are other particular people about whom we would 
also like a file, because we understand that there are such files in the 
Tokyo headquarters. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I think this would be a sufficient example and this 
will be the last we will cite, Hugh Deane, who was an active member 
of the IPE. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane, 
Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C, 
January 12, 1942, and signed by Miriam Farley : 

It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because 
I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to 
several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be 
getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us ; we are standing 
on our heads. 

Mr. Morris. And that was addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane at the 
Office of the Coordinator of Information ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And what was the date ? 

Mr. Mandel. January 12, 1942. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced in the record, Mr. 
Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 96 

JanuaPvY 12, 1942. 
Mr. Hugh Deane, 

Radio Netvs Room, Coordinator of Information, 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Httgh : It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda 
department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am 
passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and 
you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep 
after us ; we are standing on our heads. 

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's 
note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of Decem- 
ber 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the 
peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. 
"We made yon a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," 
etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, 
"the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are 
just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations 
from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia 
magazine for November 1941. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 397 

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff 
that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to 
obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be 
a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a 
short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is 
consistent to the policy of your department. 

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we 
are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch 
with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the 
Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubt- 
less get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as 
he gets established. 

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscription 
department. 

Sincerely yours, 

Miriam Farley. 

Mr. Morris. I would like the record also to show that previous 
exhibits have described Mr. Hugh Deane as the editor of a publication 
now being circulated and printed in Shanghai, which is Communist 
China. 

Hugh Deane was listed as an associate editor of the Shanghai 
Monthly Bulletin, which is now published from Shanghai. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long he has been connected in 
that capacity in Shanghai ? 

Mr. Morris. No. We have just introduced particular volumes, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. Hugh Deane was so associated in Communist 
China ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, at the time China was under Communist 
control. 

]Mr. Chairman, we have planned to introduce many more exhibits, 
such as those we have just introduced, but in consideration of the fact 
that the general is here and has been here all morning, I think we 
would like to discontinue the hearing at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the general something. I know 
he has been ill. 

Mr. Morris. The general has one more thing. 

Senator Ferguson. He has been ill, but I want to ask him one more 
question. 

General, in your experience in the Far East, have you found that 
the policies of communism, the Communist Party line, has been affect- 
ing in any way United States relations with and in the Far East? 

General Willoughby. If I interpret your question correctly, Sen- 
ator, you want me to give you a statement of the impact of communism 
on the Far East, with particular reference to Japan ? 

Senator Ferguson. No. The United States and its relations in the 
Far East. 

General Willoughby. Perhaps it is the fatigue, or the late morn- 
ing hour, but would you mind stating that again, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Here is what I want to find out, if you can give 
me the information : If you have seen any evidence of communism, as 
practiced by Russia, and the principles of communism in the Far East, 
having any bearing or relations to our policies, American policies, 
in the Far East? 

22848— 52— pt. 2 4 



398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Willoughby. I will try to give you a series of perhaps dis- 
connected comments, hoping that at the end the mosaic will become 
clear. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Willoughby. I would say that the impact of communism, 
as practiced by the Russians, of course, is by now pretty well known. 
It affects all Communist parties in all countries. It affects the Japa- 
nese Communist Party, and inferentially, of course, created a prob- 
lem for the occupation forces, that is, America as exemplified by the 
occupation forces, in which we had either to take a stand or support 
the Japanese Government in taking a stand against the Japanese 
Communist Party and what it stood for. 

We felt that that party was not a national party at all. It has no 
political independence or identity, that it took its orders from the 
master mind, the Politburo, like so many other Communist parties 
of national origin. 

We felt that if we could not maintain American predominance in 
the sense of political ideals, that someone else would move in ; that if 
we create a vacuum in the Far East, that that vacuum, on the basis 
of pure applied physics, would be filled by someone. 

That someone is Soviet Russia. 

Then we talk about the problems of the Far East now and in the 
past 10 years. We really mean the corrosive influence exercised by 
the power politics of the Soviet against and upon neighboring areas. 

You had that example in what they have done to North Korea, 
liberated by us in 1945, and within a space of 5 years, converted to 
a warlike opponent of the United States. 

You have seen the same thing in China. And unless the American 
policy is firm along this outpost of western civilization, that runs 
from, roughly, Alaska through Japan, through the Philippines, down 
to and including the British and Indonesian areas; if we create or 
permit the development of a vacuum there, that great and sinister 
power will move into it as it has moved into it on other occasions. 

Whether that falls within the purview of a calculated policy by the 
United States, in that case the policy of our Government, I am not in 
a position to comment in either approving or disapproving manner. 

But to any student of a geographical strategic problems, we must 
accept that the western frontier runs roughly from British Malaya 
through Siam, through Indochina, where there is an active front in 
Chungking; through the Philippines and the island chain leading 
ultimately to Alaska. 

That is an opinion which is a blend of geopolitical military strategic 
factors, predicated on the raw materials which we must seize or not 
permit to fall into opposing hands. 

In other words, it is a global problem of such complexity that it is 
probably difficult to answer in a brief summation statement. 

And I may be disappointing to you. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I am glad to get that opinion. 

I would like to have this answered : We found that there was an 
attempt to get Guenther Stein's works that he had written, to exert 
an influence. We find from this evidence that he was and is a Com- 
munist and was a Russian spy as a Communist. 

Do you find any evidence that the writings of such people have had 
an influence upon America's foreign policy in the Far East? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 399 

I cite merelj^ his writings as one example that he was writing here 
these many articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

General Wiuloughbt. I will attempt to give you a reply consider- 
ing the moral importance of this committee, or any congressional 
committee, which earnestly seeks to arrive at demonstrable facts, and 
it is within the obligation of citizenship, immigrant or otherwise, to 
assist those committees. 

In an appraisal of my reply, which I am developing as I go along, 
you must discount my absence from the United States since 1938. I 
am a sort of oriental Rip Van Winkle, who is returning now in a series 
of shattering disillusions. 

But I will say that, in general, your thesis that that type of writing 
is corrosive, objectionable, deteriorating to public opinion, cannot be 
challenged, and I agree with you. I think that there is a deliberate 
attempt to circulate, to public relation, to sell this type of book by 
every channel which these people are capable of, and I again refer to 
the illuminating article of Irene Kuhn in the American Legion, and 
Ralph Toledano's in Mercury, which are some of the outstanding 
articles that I have read since my return from abroad; that they 
show how that type of book is promoted, supported, book reviewed in 
calculated channels of subversion, while other books which would 
establish a balance of judgment are suppressed, belittled, criticized. 

So in general terms, taking Stein or Smedley, or the ubiquitous 
Grajdanzev, to build up their stuff as the last word in reliable, techni- 
cal, and expert information is part of a pattern of conversion of the 
mind, which is going on, and has been going on apparently for some 
time. 

Does that answer your question ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, it does; because we get from the file of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, June 24, 1942, "W. W. L. to E. C. C." 
and "W. L. H.", a further comment : 

On circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it 
to John Fairbank he expressed a gi'eat interest in seeing it and summoned to- 
gether his Chinese staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested 
that his officer might be asked to trade certain information in return. 

And I underscore: 

John suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in 
return. 

It continues : 

I am leaving the matter to you to handle, however. 

Mr. Morris. John Fairbank, Mr. Chairman, was head of the China 
desk of O^YI at the time. 

General Willoughby. I would say, as an interested bystander, 
that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the 
techniques that they employ in recommending each other and dis- 
seminating their work. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean Communist work ? 

General Willoughbt. People that range from communism to fel- 
low traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category that 
has been described so often in the current press reports. 

Senator Ferguson. In your work in the Far East, you naturally 
came in contact with Communists and their activities, and that is 



400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the reason that I asked you the question, because I know that you 
could not perform your functions as a general in the United States 
Intelligence Service, major general, without having contact and ex- 
perience. I know that your opinion will be of great value to this 
committee. 

Now, General, you had something you wanted to present. 

Mr. Morris. This clears up, Mr. Chairman, a conflict that may 
have come into the testimony earlier, about the time of Guenther 
Stein's arrest in Paris. The general has an official document there 
which he will identify and which will be introduced into the record. 

General Willoughby. I will act as assistant to the counsel to file 
this. It is a message from the French Embassy to me in response 
to a query on the whereabouts and activities of Guenther Stein. In 
order to preserve its authenticity I will read it in its original French, 
and give you the translation immediately. 

Entre en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 
octobre de la meme anuee une carte de correspondant de I'Hindustani Times, 
quotidien de New Delhi. 

* * * Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein obtained, on the 18th of 
October of the same year, an identification card as accredited correspondent 
of the Hindustani Times, which is a daily of New Delhi. 

A son arrivee, il a produit un passeport delivre le 2 septembre 1941 par 
les authorities de Hong Kong, ville ou il avait ete naturalise citoyen brittaique 
le 6 aout 1941. 

At his arrival, he produced a passport, which he obtained on the 2d of 
September 1941, through the authorities of Hong Kong, the town where he 
obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, on August 6, 1941. 

II a ete expulse de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrete du 14 
novembre 1950 at s'est dirige sur I'Angleterre. 

He was expelled from France for espionage — 

The term is "espionage" — 

following his arrest on the 14th of November 1950 and apparently left for 
England. 

II est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays. 

It is likely that he at this time is actually in that country. 

Mr. Morris. Who signed that, General? 

General Willoughby. It has no signature because it is a carbon 
copy, but I will identify it as a report from the French Embassy 
in Tokyo to me. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have it introduced into evidence and 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit, having been identified by 
General Willoughby. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 97" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 97 

Note 
Confidential 

Entr6 en France dans le courant de 1949, Giienther Stein a obtenu le IS 
octobre de la meme annee une carte de correspondant de 1' "Hindustani Times," 
quotidien de New Delhi. 

A son arrivee, 11 a produit un passeport delivr^ le 2 septembre 1941 par les 
autorit^s de Hong Kong, ville oii il avait 6t6 naturalise citoyen britannique le 
6 aoiit 1941. 

II a et6 expuls6 de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arr^t^ du 14 novembre 
19.50 et s'est dirige sur I'Angleterre. 

II est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 401 

GuENTHER Stein 

Translation : 

Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein received a press card for the 
Hindustani Times, a daily of New Dephi on October 18 of the same year. 

On his arrival, he produced a passport issued on September 2 1941, by the 
Authorities of Hong Kong, the city where he obtained naturalization papers, as 
a British citizen, dated August 6, 1941. 

He was expelled from France, on a charge of espionage, following his arrest 
on November 14, 1950, and has left for England. It is probable that he is actually 
in that country. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I want to thank you for coming before 
us this morning. I realize that there has been some handicap by 
virtue of Executive order. I hope that it is not found that you have 
violated any of the sections of that order and that, as the chairman 
has expressed, it is this committee's desire that there be no retaliation 
against any GrovernmeTit employee for testifying before this com- 
mittee. 

Again I want to thank you. I know that you have been ill. We 
appreciate your coming down. We regret the length of the session. 

General Willoughby., Not at all. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess now. I do not want to say 
that we are through with your examination, because we may call you 
at another time. 

We will meet again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday. Counsel will tell 
you as to whether or not you are desired. 

Again I want to tell you that we appreciate your coming down. 

General Willoughby. Glad to be of service. 

(Thereupon, at 12: 55 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of 
THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ I). C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat Mc- 
Carran (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and 
Watkins. 

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, 
committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Ben-' 
jamin Mandel, director of research. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. ' 

Miss Bentley, will you stand and be sworn, please ? 

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Miss Bentley. I do. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, CLINTON, CONN. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the stenog- 
rapher, please ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes, my full name is Elizabeth T. Bentley. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you speak loudly enough so that all can 
hear you, please ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. My address is Clinton, Conn. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us briefly of 
your formal education. 

Miss Bentley. I have an A. B. degree from Vassar College, a 
master's degree from Columbia University, and a year's study at the 
university in Florence, Italy. 

Mr. Morris. Wlien did you first join the Communist Party of the 
United States? 

Miss Bentley. In the middle of March 1935. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you stay in the open Communist Party? 

Miss Bentley. The so-called open Communist Party, that is, where 
I was attached to a unit of some twenty-odd people, for 31/2 years up 
until about October 1938. 

Mr. Morris. You say about 3i/^ years ? 

403 



404 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Miss Bentley. About 3i/^ years. 

Mr. Morris. Did you then discontinue all connection with the 
Communist Party, Miss Bentley? 

Miss Bentley. No, I went with what they called the underground ; 
that is, I was working for an Italian Fascist contact. I was put un- 
der a person under whom I worked. 

Mr. Morris. You say you were working for the Italian Fascist 
Party, you had infiltrated ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. From there you went into what ? ' 

Miss Bentley. I was put in contact with one person to wliom I 
reported. 

Mr. Morris. Who was that ? 

Miss Bentley. Jacob Golos, G-o-l-o-s. 

Mr. Morris. Jacob Golos? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What was his position? 

Miss Bentley. He was quite high up in the NKVD, which is the 
OGPU. He was also a member of the three-man control commission. 

Mr. Morris. You say he was a member of a three-man control com- 
mission of the American Communist Party ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. That is practically the outfit that runs the 
American Communist Party. They are the disciplinary committee 
that can take action against the members. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know who the other two members were at 
that time ? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know offliand. It's on record some place. 

Mr. Morris. But you know he was one of three men ? 

Miss Bentley. He was one of three men. 

Mr. Morris. You say he was also connected with the NKVD ? 

Miss Bentley. He had been connected with it as far back as the 
early twenties. 

The Chairman. What was the NKVD ? 

Miss Bentley. I don't think I know what it means in Kussian, but 
it's the internal security police, translated. It includes all of the 
Soviet espionage work whether military intelligence or rounding up 
the recalcitrants. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, it is the Soviet military police? 

Miss Bentley. That is right, operating abroad. 

Mr. Morris. Abroad, from the Soviet Union? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You say Golos was a representative of the NKVD for 
the Soviet Union ? 

Miss Bentley. And a high-up one. 

Mr. Morris. And a high-up one? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us the nature of your assignment with 
Golos? ^ 

Miss Bentley. Well, after I had left the Italian Library of Infor- 
mation, which was the Italian Fascist outfit I mentioned, I stayed on 
with Mr. Golos as my contact, doing odd jobs for him. Finally the 
odd jobs came into contacting undercover Communists to get infor- 
mation. It started with a gentleman by the name of Abraham Broth- 
man. He was doing espionage work. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 405 

Mr. Morris. He is the man who recently was convicted in New 
York? 

Miss Bentley. He was recently convicted in New York for ob- 
structino- justice. 

Mr. Morris. You were a witness in that case? 

Miss Bentley. I was a witness in that case. 

It gradually worked up to picking up people who were working 
for the United States Government and gathering information. 

Mr. Morris. While you had that job, I wonder if you would de- 
scribe what your relation was to Earl Browder, head of the Commu- 
nist Party ? 

Miss Bentley. I never dealt with Mr. Browder until after Mr, 
Golos' death, at which time I took over his job. 

Mr. Morris. What was your relation? 

Miss Benu-ley. I was the boss, and he took the orders on intelligence 
matters. 

Mr. Morris. On intelligence matters? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct. If we wanted people to run cover 
businesses for agents, he would provide them. In one case that I recall 
a Soviet intelligence agent was about to be drafted into the Army, and 
he was to contact the NMU fraction — that is, the Communist group 
in the union — and get him shifted into the merchant marine. 

Mr. Morris. What year was that ? 

Miss Bentley. 1944 — the beginning of 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would you contact to get him shifted to 
the merchant marine ? 

Miss Bentley. I didn't do that ; it was his job. 

Senator Ferguson. That was his job ? 

Miss Bentley. That was his job. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time Browder was the head of the 
American Communist Party ? 

Miss Bentley. Browder was the head of the American Communist 
Party. 

Senator Ferguson. Since then he is not connected in your opinion 
with the American Communist Party ? 

Miss Bentley. I doubt if he is connected with the American Com- 
munist Party ? 

Senator Ferguson. What about the International Communist 
Party ? 

Miss Bentley. Certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat gives you that opinion ? 

Miss Bentley. He was in 1946, and I see no reason to change my 
opinion. 

Mr. Morris. You say you were the assistant to Mr. Golos from 
what year ? 

Miss Bentley. From the middle of October 1938 until his death 
in 1943. 

Mr. Morris. So for that 5-year period you were the assistant to 
Golos? 

INIiss Bentley. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat happened upon the death of Golos? 

Miss Bentley. Upon the death of Golos, because evidently no plans 
had been made within the secret police, I took over his job tempo- 
rarily. 



406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Was his death from natural causes? 

Miss Bentlet. Yes; he died of a heart attack. He had an ex- 
tremely bad heart. 

Mr. Morris. So at that time, after you had succeeded Golos, your 
relationship to Browder would be that of his superior in intelligence 
work? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know about the Institute of Pacific Kelations 
at that time ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes; I did vaguely before 1943, but much more 
closely starting with the summer of 1943. 

Mr. Morris. "What were your dealings with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations and concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Miss Bentley, Well, it happened rather by accident. I had better 
go back a little bit on that and mention that in February, I think it 
was 1941, we took on a new Communist agent, and that was Mary 
Price, who at that time was secretary to Walter Lippmann. The 
Soviet Intelligence felt that Lippmann had valuable material in his 
files, and therefore we had taken her on to get us copies of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get copies ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes, we got complete copies — or so, at least, she 
told us. 

Senator Ferguson. You know you got some copies ? 

Miss Bentley. We got a tremendous amount. I know I went down 
one time and typed a pile like that [indicating] . 

Mr. Morris. When you say "came down," what do you mean by 
that? 

Miss Bentley. From New York to Washington. I was living in 
New York, and I would come down on trips to Washington. 

Mr. Morris. Where would you go in Washington ? In other words, 
when you say you came to Washington ? 

Miss Bentley. I went to Mary Price's house. She was living on 
Olive Avenue at that time. 

Mr. Morris. You never went to Mr. Lippmann's place ? 

Miss Bentley. Oh, no ; because Mr. Lippmann did not know any- 
thing about it. 

Senator Ferguson. She was a secret agent ? 

Miss Bentley. She was a secret agent. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were attempting to steal things out of 
Mr. Lippmann's files? 

Miss Bentley. Not only attempting, but we succeeded. 

Senator Ferguson. You succeeded. What were these things you 
copied ? Do you recall any of them ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. A number of them were documents dealing 
with our relations with Britain. Some of it was material that seems 
to have had some relation to the War Department and things of that 
sort. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, you stated that your dealings with Mary 
Price at that particular time brought you into contact with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would explain that. 

Miss Bentley. Mary got into rather bad health in the late spring 
of 1943 and went to Mexico on a vacation. She suggested that we 
keep in contact with her through Mildred Price, her sister. Mildred 
Price was a member or executive secretary of the China Aid Council. 

Mr. Morris. Member or executive secretary ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 407 

Miss Bentley. Executive secretary, which is tantamount to being 
the head of it. That was a Communist-dominated organization. 

The Chairman. What was the name of that organization? 

Miss Bentley. The China Aid Council. At that time it was located, 
I think, around Twenty-third Street and Fifth Avenue. At first 
we looked on Mildred as a means of getting word back and forth to 
Mary. Then when we began talking to her we began realizing that 
there was a fertile field from which to get intelligence and that is 
when we began to get interested in the IPK. 

Senator Ferguson. This China Aid was for Communist China? 

Miss Bentley. China Aid Council. I would say so. 

Senator Ferguson. There were different names for China aid, and 
I wondered. 

Miss Bentley. The China Aid Council was particularly concerned 
with the Eighth Route Army and the Communist-dominated part of 
China. 

Mr. Morris. Was the China Aid Council completely dominated by 
the Communist Party ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; according to what she told me. 

Mr. Morris. She was executive secretary ? 

Miss Bentley. Executive secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any way that you can amplify that ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; Mr. Golos told me the same thing, and later 
Earl Browder told me the same thing. 

Mr. MoRi^is. Mildred Price's assistant was the woman named Men- 
tana Sayers? 

Miss Bentley. Michael Sayers' wife. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know her to be a Communist? 

Miss Bentley. Mildred told me that. 

INIr. Morris. But Mildred Price did tell you that Montana Sayers, 
her assistant in the China Aid Council, also was a Communist? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Is this the Mary Price that came from North Caro- 
lina and ran for public office down there ? 

Miss Bentley. I understand that. I believe Senator Hoey told 
me at one time she was running on the Progressive ticket. Was that 
it? 

Senator Smith. Something like that. 

Miss Bentley. She went back to Greensboro, having come fi'om 
there, in 1945. 

Senator Smith. It was some State office, I believe. 

Miss Bentley. That is the same one. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence two 
letterheads with incidental letters of the China Aid Council into the 
record at this time. 

The Chairman. From what source are you getting these? 

Senator Smith. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Is this the same girl that was connected with the 
Southern Council for Human Welfare? 

Miss Bentley. She went with the Southern Council for Human 
Welfare in the spring of 1945 and how long she stayed with them I 
don't know. 



408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Smith. Was she a Communist at that time ? 

Miss Bentley. She had been one for at least 10 years before I met 
her. She was a charter member of UOPWA. 

Senator Smith. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the 
record three letterheads. Mr. Mandel will identify the source, but 
I would like to show these to ask Miss Bentley if the organization that 
she has just testified about is the organization referred to on these 
letterheads. 

First is a letterhead of the China Aid Council of the American 
League for Peace and Democracy. I would like to offer that to Miss 
Bentley and ask her if that is the same organization that she has just 
testified about. 

Miss Bentley. Yes, I imagine that is the same one. There wasn't 
any League for Peace and Democracy at the time I knew the organiza- 
tion, but I was told, again second-hand, that that was an offshoot 
of it. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Here I show you a letterhead dated November 
24, 1941, China Aid Council combined with the American Committee 
for Chinese War Orphans, and ask you if that is the same organization 
about which you are testifying. 

Miss Bentley. That is the same organization. It has the same 
phone number and same address. 

Mr. Morris. Would you notice who the executive secretai-y and the 
administrative secretary to the executive secretary are ? • I think it 
is at the bottom of the list. 

Miss Bentley. Mildred Price is the executive secretary, and Men- 
tana Sayers is administrative secretary. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Now I offer you a third letterhead. Miss Bentley, 
and ask you if you will identify that organization. That is a letter- 
head dated March 1, 1944, 1 believe; is it not? 

Miss Bentley. Yes, this is after the organization moved up to 
around Columbus Circle. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Bentley. It left its quarters at 200 Fifth Avenue. 

Mr. Morris. You say that that is the same organization about which 
you have testified ? 

Miss Bentley. That is the same organization, but it moved uptown 
into a building with, I understand, other Chinese organizations. 

Mr. Morris. That organization was Communist-controlled, you say, 
and you were dealing with Mildred Price, executive secretary, who, 
according to your testimony, virtually ran the organization? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; that is correct. 

The Chairman. Now will you authenticate those exhibits? 

Mr. Mandel. The letter dated March 1, 1944, from the China Aid 
Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War 
Orphans is addressed to William Holland of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

Tlie Chairman. Being the same letter that has just been shown to 
the witness? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes; and going from Mrs. Edward C. Carter, presi- 
dent. It is a part of the Institute of Pacific Relations files which 
were turned over to us. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 409 

Now the letterhead reading "China Aid Council of the American 
League for Peace and Democracy" is not a part of the institute files, 
but comes to us as a result of our research, and I might note that the 
American League for Peace and Democracy has been cited as a Com- 
munist front by Attorney General Biddle. 

We have another letterhead from the China Aid Council combined 
with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans dated No- 
vember 24, 1941, signed by Arthur Upham Pope, chairman, American 
Committee for Chinese War Orphans. 

The Chairman. Being the same exhibit as was shown to the 
witness ? 

Mr. Mandel, Yes, sir. This is also a part of the institute files. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the members 
of tlie executive committee on that last letterhead ? 

Mr. Chairman, in the course of our investigation we are going to 
show that many of the personnel of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
were connected with the China Aid Council, so I think at this time as 
an example I would like to point out the list of people who were on 
the executive board as shown on the last letterhead, which I believe 
is a 1941 letterhead. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. You wanted only people connected with the in- 
stitute read, or all of them ? 

Mr. Morris. Put the whole list in. 

Mr. Mandel. The chairman is Dr. Claude E. Forkner. Then we 
have the honorary vice chairmen 

Mr. Morris. Leave the honorary vice chairmen out. 

Mr. Mandel. Next we have Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer. Then 
we have the executive committee, consisting of Dr. Henry A, Atkin- 
son, Dr. Henry L. Bibby, Lyman R. Bradley, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, 
Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Mrs. Lucy Forkner, 
Margaret Forsyth, Talitha Gerlach, Dr. Claude E. Heaton, Philip 
J. Jaffe, Sally Lucas Jean, Mrs. Philip C. Jessup, Duncan Lee, Mrs. 
Lin Yutang, Dorothy McConnell, Edgar H. Rue, Mrs. Gordon M. 
Tiffany, Mildred Price, executive secretary, and Mentana G. Sayers, 
administrative secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue. Miss Bentley, in connection with 
your development of your association with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You had mentioned Mildred Price and then had got- 
ten to the China Aid Council. 

The Chairman. Does counsel want tliese exhibits to go into the 
record ? 

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce these three letterheads and 
have them marked as the next three consecutive exhibits. 

The Chairman. They may be so marked and entered into the record. 
( The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 98" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 98 

China Aid Counsel Combined With the American Committee for Chinese 

War Orphans 

new york 19, n. y., march 1, 1944 

JVIme. W ei Tao-ming, honorary cbairman 
Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president 
Arthur Upham Pope, vice president 



410 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



Mrs. Elizabeth B, Cotton, treasurer 
Sally Lucas Jean, chairman, children's division 
Dr. Claude E. Heaton, chairman, medical division 
Board of directors: 

Dr. Phyllis Ackerman 

Dr. Henry A. Atkinson 

Samuel L. M. Barlow 

Dr. Leona Baumgartner 

Dr. Henry L. Bibby 

Dr. Peter Bios 

Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi 

Mrs. Angelika W. Frink 

Talitha Gerlach 

Philip J. Jaffe 

Mrs. Philip C. Jessup 

Beatrice Kates 

Dr. Lawson G. Lowrey 

Mrs. C. Reinold Noyes 

Dr. Max Pinner 

Mrs. John Tee-Van 

Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany 

Dr. George M. Wheatley 

Mildred Price, executive secretary 

Mentana G. Sayers, executive assistant 
Participating in National War Fund, Inc., through United China Relief, Inc. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99" and is as 

follows:) 

Exhibit No. 99 

China Aid Council Combined With the American Committee for Chinese 

War Orphans 

200 FIFTH avenue, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941 



Dr. Claude E. Forkner, chairman 
Honorary vice chairmen : 

His Excellency, Dr. Hu Shih 

His Excellency, Dr. W. W. Yen 
Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer 
Executive committee: 

Dr. Henry A. Atkinson 

Dr. Henry L. Bibby 

Lyman R. Bradley 

Mrs. Edward C. Carter 

Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi 

Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton 

Mrs. Lucy Forkner 

Margaret Forsyth 



Talitha Gerlach 
Dr. Claude E. Heaton 
Philip J. Jaffe 
Sally Lucas Jean 
Mrs. Philip C. Jessup 
Duncan Lee 
Mrs. Lin Yutang 
Dorothy McConnell 
Edgar H. Rue 
Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany 
Mildred Price, executive secretary 
Mentana G. Sayers, administrative 
secretary 



Participating in United China Relief 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



411 



(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 100 

.. VNIHO Nl S3An 3AVS Oi 3Aie« f^ 



.HHO|^ 



cn 








V 



THE CHINA AID COUNCIL 

of Ifvi 

American Leagup for P<^«C4» and Democracy 

AMERICAN FfllENDS OF THE CHiNKI P^JRE _^ 

CHINESE HAND I^UNDRY AUJANO JAPANBE PSMS SOC1G1Y 

CHURCH LEAGUE FOA INDUSTWAL DtMOCRACY 
METHODIST FtDERATJON FOR SOOAl SgftVKE. LIAOUf OF W0W6N SH^MSVI 

S9VW of f(» inctMi^jel spooton orai 

Pro?. 9;«i^ ^fshas) Kak^ ft«fc«f« L Hiililil 

Met \fc a a«j^alwl»w A. Hiflip IU i< »1 b » 



Of. O. •• r.r>9 CW 
W]in«m E. Dodd. Sf. 
SiMfwood Eddv 



[>f. H«/T7 F. Wanf 



Hi*^ PirwMts J. M a C— cofl M«w«l 



fUy S«i>^« S. WW 



412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Miss Bentley, During the summer and fall of 1943, we became 
interested in the far eastern field and in the IPR group. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Bentley. Mildred Price at this particular point was Com- 
munist unit organizer for the unit operating in the far eastern field. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain that a little more fully, please, Miss 
Bentley? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. As you probably know, the Communist Party, 
the lowest echelon is made up of what they call the unit. That con- 
tains anywhere from three people on up. In the so-called head of 
that for purposes of party work is the unit organizer. Mildred, being 
a very energetic person and willing to take on a great deal of labor, 
was elected as unit organizer. 

Since she was unit organizer of that far eastern unit, which in- 
cluded the IPR and the other organizations, we turned to her to see 
if there were people in the IPR and others of those far eastern 
organizations tliat came within our sphere of influence who would be 
useful for intelligence work. I once asked Mr. Golos why we just 
■didn't take on the Institute of Pacific Relations itself, and he said, 
"No ; they are operating much too loosely." 

Mr. Morris. What did he mean by that ? 

Miss Bentley. He meant by that that they were operating so much 
in the open and they were making so many blunders that it would 
be a mercy if the FBI didn't get them. 

Mr. Morris. You mean the Communists in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Miss Bentley. The Communists in the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions. 

Mr. Morris. Did Miss Mildred Price indicate to you the degree 
of control that the Communists exercised in the institute? 

Miss Bentley. She told me it was one of our organizations in the 
sense that we exercised a control over it. 

Mr. Morris. Did Golos confirm that? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; he did. 

Mr. Morris. Would you amplify on that? 

Miss Bentley. He told me it was an organization that originally 
had not, as far as he knew, been much under our control but later came 
under our control. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you call an instrument ? 

Miss Bentley, It would be a Communist-front organization of a 
sort. It is hard to find the exact technology for it. 

Mr. Morris. At the time he told you that you were his assistant 
working for the Soviet military police ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct. But, he said the members in that 
were operating in what he said was a dangerous method and therefore 
he said he didn't think we should take it on en masse. However, we 
did go through the list of Communist members in the IPR to see if 
there was anybody to salvage. We had already picked up Duncan 
Lee, who had to go to Washington in 1943. 

Mr. Morris. Duncan Chapin Lee ? 

Miss Bentley. Duncan Chapin Lee. 

Mr. Morris. What had he been doing ? 

Miss Bentley. He had been working for a law firm in New York, 
and then he received a position as a lawyer in OSS. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 413 

Mr. Morris. You say you had taken him out of the institute ? 

Miss Beniley. Yes; he had been brought to our attention by Mary 
Price through Mildred Price, and we found that he would be very 
close to General Donovan. Therefore, we relayed word to Mildred 
to disconnect him with that unit and put him in contact with us. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you meet him ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; I did. JNIary Price took care of him for, I be- 
lieve, 6 months, and then I took him over personally. 

Mr. Morris. You say you took him from the institute for work in 
your particular undertaking? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, was he completely a member of 
your organization at that time? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; he had been a "Communist Party member I 
gathered for some little while. He paid his dues to me, I brought him 
his literature, and he was under Communist discipline. He was quite 
definitely a member. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he at that time working for Donovan ? 

Miss Bentley. He was one of that circle of lawyers who worked 
around Donovan. I don't know what they were called — advisers, 
probably. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get any infoiTiiation from him? 

Miss Bentley. Quite a bit. 

Senator Ferguson. Out of the OSS ? 

Miss Bentley. I think he was our most valuable source in the 
OSS. 

Senator Ferguson. He delivered the material directly to you ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

The Chairman. What was the nature of the material that he de- 
livered to you, in what form, in manuscript? 

Miss Bentley. Most of it was given to me orally because he was 
frightened to death of what he was doing and afraid to pass it on. 
Some of it he had written on scraps of paper. 

The Chairman. You got no microfilms? 

Miss Bentley. No, no ; we only had two people doing our micro- 
filming. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, was there anyone else whom you got into 
your organization via the IPR ? 

Miss Bentley. There was one other, Michael Greenberg. He was 
not strictly speaking a member of the American party, being at that 
time a Britisher, and the policy of the party at that time was not to 
have aliens as members. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this Michael Greenberg, we have had 
testimony last Tuesday on Michael Greenberg and at the same time 
we introduced into the record a seiies of exhibits showing his connec- 
tion with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I just would like to re- 
view those at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliile he is looking that up, was Greenberg 
connected with the United States Government in any way? 

Miss Bentley. Yes; I think it was the summer or fall of 1943 
that he came down to Washington and took a position as sort of 
assistant to Lauchlin Currie, who was then I believe in the White 
House. 

22848— 52— pt. 2 5 



414 mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did Greenberg ever deliver any papers to you? 

Miss Bentley. Yes; he delivered information via Mildred Price 

to me. He was extremely temperamental and I thought it unwise to 

have him meet me. . , j. ^i ^nrr.-^ 

Senator Ferguson. Did this information come out ot the Wmte 

House? . 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; it was mostly on the Far East, on China. 

Senator Ferguson. It came out of the White House and he was as- 
sistant to Lauchlin Currie? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; or one of the assistants. I don't know whether 
he was the only one. 

Mr. Morris. The nature of the exhibits is they showed that (jreen- 
berg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor for the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

The Chairman. You are referring to what exhibits ? 

Mr. Morris. Exhibits 8, 7, and 51. 

The Chairman. Very well. All I want you to do is to identify the 
exhibits and their connection with the party named. 

Mr. IMoRRis. We will have to get that, Senator. I would like to 
comment upon exhibit No. 67, which was taken from the institute 
files. It is from Michael Greenberg on the letterhead of the White 
House in Washington, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute 
of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 

Dear Hilda : Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR 
publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is 
baffled by the problem. 

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them 
out via OWI. 

Sincerely yours, 

Michael. 

That was introduced as exhibit 67 at the open hearings of August 7, 
1951. 

I would like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, at this time a letter dated 
May 23, 1943, from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu to Mr. Carter. I will ask Mr. 
Mandel if he will verify that that was taken from the institute files. 

Mr. Mandel. This letter was taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations and is dated May 23, 1942, addressed to "Dear 
Mr. Carter," and it is from Yung-ying "Hsu. 

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out 
with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater 
New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' 
specific request. Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss 
the same problem. She also suggests my participation. The present memo- 
randum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been sub- 
mitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I intended 
to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been in- 
cluded in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe 
they are reasonably correct. I have not been able to secure an additional copy 
of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed 
copy available to him as you see fit. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evi- 
dence as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted and properly identified. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 101" and is as 
follows :) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 415 

Exhibit No. 101 

Office, May 23, 1942. 

Deab Mr. Carter: Enclosed please find a memorandum whicli Miss Mildred 
Pricf worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills, 
of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by 
the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request. 

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same 
problem. She also suggests my participation. 

The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos 
which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new 
points which I have intended to examine more closely as a part of my research 
work. These have been included in the present document in the form of gen- 
eral statements. I believe that they are reasonably correct. 

I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for 
Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as 
you see fit. 

Sincerely yours, 

YuNG-YiNG Hsu. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we will have the exhibit presently show- 
ing that Michael Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor 
of Pacific Affairs, which is the publication of the International 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did Earl Browder ever come to you to 
talk over about the degree of control the Communist Party had or 
its interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Miss Bentley. Did he come to talk to me about it? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Bentley. It arose from the fact that this particular Com- 
munist Party unit of which Mildred was the organizer and took care 
of business in the field, had as its political commissar Frederick Van- 
derbilt Field. He was to give them directives as to what they were 
to do and to relay messages to the top Communist leaders, especially 
to Browder. Browder had been personally in China and was inter- 
ested in the far eastern situation. 

Mr. Chairman. Wliat did you call Mr. Field ? 

Miss Bentley. I said that the closest I could come to his function 
re the far eastern field would be political commissar. 

Mr. Morris. So, INIiss Bentley, you testify therefore that the Com- 
munist Party exercised control over the institute through Earl 
Browder through Frederick Field ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; and through other groups, the party nucleus, 
the party units within the far eastern field. 

Mr. Morris. Wlio headed that unit within the far eastern field? 

Miss Bentley. Miss Mildren Price, but Frederick Vanderbilt Fields 
was the man who was higher up than Mildred Price. 

Senator Ferguson. During what period would he be the commissar 
in the Far East? 

Miss Bentley. During the period I knew it, I can say from my own 
experience, certainly in 1933 and 1934. I know that three times Mil- 
dred Price complained to me that Fred Field had not shown up to 
have conferences and they did not know how to apply the party line 
in the Far East; that they needed instructions, and would I go to 
Browder and complain. She couldn't go directly. Three times I 
went to Browder and said, "Will you get Fred Field on the job he 
should be doing?" and he, Browder, said, "I will do that." 



416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. So he was the man steering the organization 
and laying down the party line to Mildred Price as far as the party 
line concerned the Far East ? 

Miss Bentley. In other words, he relayed the line. I wouldn't say 
he made up the party line. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He was the man responsible for telling, 
at least, Mildred Price what the party line was ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson, Is that the way that people are steered to the 
party line, through someone like Frederick Vanderbilt Field? 

Miss Bentley. Not entirely, This was an unusual situation. 
Usually you have a pyramiding from your unit to your section to your 
district, but this was considered to be such an important unit that they 
couldn't risk having it go through all these levels of Communist 
Party development, and therefore it went specially. 

Senator Ferguson. From a man like Field down through to her 
so that she could work the party line and hew to it in the Pacific 
Kelations ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct, and it was done that way so that 
there would be less danger. 

Mr. Morris. You testified that her other activity was that she was 
executive secretary of the China Aid Council ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. There was no conflict between that assignment and the 
assignment in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Miss Bentley, No, rather they complemented each other. 

Mr. Morris. May I introduce into the record after Mr. Mandel 
identifies this letter as a copy of a letter to Michael Greenberg, 
managing editor, Pacific Affairs, dated April 28, 1942. This is by 
way of showing that Michael Greenberg was connected with Pacific 
Affairs. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a copy of a letter dated April 28, 1942, from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Eelations addressed to Mr. Michael 
Greenberg, managing editor of Pacific Affairs, 129 East Fifty-second 
Street, JS^ew York City, signed by F. V. F., presumably Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field. 

The Chairman. Wlien you say that is a copy of a letter, did it come 
from the files in this form or have you the original ? 

Mr. Mandel, We have the original, and that is a carbon. 

The Chairman. The original was in the files ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

The Chairman. This is a true and correct copy ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The original is taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Eelations? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire for the record when Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field applied for a commission in the United States Army 
in the Intelligence Section ? Wliat was the date of that ? 

Mr. Morris. I believe it was May 1942, is my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that come in the time when he was Com- 
munist Commissar for the Far East ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 417 

Miss Bentlet. It could have been that. From what Mildred said he 
had been for some time, and that was in the summer of 1943, so it 
could be. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that be an important position, to have the 
commissar on our intelligence staff, for the Communists, I mean? 

Miss Benixet. The Soviet Intelligence didn't like to lose anybody 
to the Army unless they could get into strategic positions — that is, 
not the infantry but with Intelligence they would consider that very 
good. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be an important position? 

Miss Bentley. That would be an important position. 

Senator Ferguson. As you say, though, you tried to keep your mem- 
bers out of the real fighting because they could give you little aid ? 

iSIiss Bentley. They could give us little aid, and they would also get 
knocked off. We tried to get them into Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. You tried to get them into a safe spot. 

Senator Smith. Did you know about the efforts and maneuvers 
made to get Frederick Field in the Intelligence Service of the Army ? 

Miss Bentley. No, I didn't. 

Senator Smith. At that time, I mean. 

Miss Bentley. No. I iiad heard of Fred Field before, but I had 
really not come up against him until 1943. 

Mr. JMoRRis. You have testified that Michael Greenberg was taken 
from the Institute of Pacific Relations and sent to Washington.. 
Would you tell us a little bit about his assignment in Washington? 

Miss Bentley. I am afraid I probably told you most of what I 
know. He was simply one of the assistants to Lauchlin Currie in the 
far-eastern field, which he knew well. 

Mr. Morris. Lauchlin Currie was then executive assistant to the 
President ? 

JNIiss Bentley. That is correct. Right on the heels of that I be- 
lieve he became, was it the head of FEA or Far Eastern Division? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have in the record when Greenberg be- 
came a United States citizen ? 

Mr. Morris. I think we have that later on. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. That will go into the record ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Chairman, I at this point think we should discuss Mr, Lauchlin 
Currie. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 102" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 102 

April 28, 1942. 
Mr. Michael Gkeenbubg, 

Mananing Editor, Pacific Affairs, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, Neio York City. 
Deae Michael: I have read the letter which George Taylor has written to 
Pacific Affairs regarding my review of his book. I understand from you- 
that the editors have opened the way for him to write this letter and intend 
to print it in the same issue which will contain my review. I also understand 
that this is the first time in the history of the journal that the editors have 
permitted a reviewer to be attacked in this manner and without allowing his 
review to stand unchallanged for at least one issue. 

Let me say that I regard Taylor's letter as nothing more nor less than an 
attempt to smear me personally. I am naturally sorry to find my former 



418 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

associates so frightened of their shadows as to lend themselves to this method 
and procedure. 

I shall not offer any reply to Taylor's letter. My review stands ; it expresses 
about all I wish to say on the matter. Anything further would simply add 
to a personal controversy in which I have no interest. A counterreply on my 
part would make the magazine look even more ridiculous than it will under 
present circumstances. 

In order to point out to you, and for the record to show how thoroughly 
irresponsible I believe this matter to have been handled, let me review what 
happened : 

1. Bill Holland telephoned me to ask if I would be willing to review the 
Taylor book. I replied that I had not read it, but would be glad to do so 
and write a review. After reading the book I felt that I should not review it 
for a journal like Pacific Affairs because my review would have to be extremely 
critical. I telephoned you to explain this and asked you to find a substitute. 
You replied that you. wished me to go ahead with the review, knowing that it 
was to be strongly critical. 

2. I turned in the review a few days later. As you were not in your office 
when I went to the I. P. R. I gave the message to Hilda Austern. At this 
point I want to clear up what appears to be another misunderstanding. In 
asking Hilda to give you the re\'iew I asked her to request you to make no 
changes in the copy without my having the opportunity to approve them. I 
specifically did not take the unreason;ible and dogmatic position that no changes 
were to be made. Simply that I wanted to see them if they were made. I 
checked this with Hilda today and find that she agrees that this was thfe 
message she passed on. 

3. Finally, I was informed that the editors had decided to let Taylor write 
an answer for publication with my review, and you then gave me a copy of 
his letter. 

I would have regarded this as entirely appropriate if I had originally been 
asked to contribute to a political discussion of the main impressions given 
Mr. Taylor's book — I say "main impressions" because, as you are well aware, 
somewhere in the book he says everything, therefore, the reviewer can only 
comment on the general impressions he conveys. But I was not asked to do 
this. I was simply asked to write a review for a supposedly scholarly journal. 
'l myself thought I was not the person to do this, but on calling this to your 
attention I was urged to go ahead. Taylor, on the other hand, was apparently 
let loose to write a slippery political rebuttal packed with ridiculous innuendoes 
about my "revelation" received of course straight from Moscow. 

A final word. In printing Taylor's letter I should like to ask the favor that 
you print it precisely as you showed it to me, with no editing, no deletions 
whatsoever. I shall count on its being sufficiently absurd to thoughtful persons 
to vindicate my judgment of his book and, by inferences, of his work. 

I said that was a final word, but obviously there must be one more. If you 
and the other editors want to forget the whole business, I suggest that you 
withdraw my review, get someone else — any of a hundred "scholars" with 
whom you are in contact — to review it for the next issue, forget the entire 
episode yourselves, and give me the very great privilege and pleasure of so 
blanketing this out of my mind that I retain the high respect for my I. P. R. 
colleagues that I am most anxious to preserve. 

With most cordial personal regards, 

F. V. F. 

Mr. MoRKis. We have exhibits to show that Mr. Laiichlin Currie 
was a very active adviser and participant in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations work. While we are introducing those exhibits, Mr. Chair- 
man, I would like to ask Miss Bentley if she will testify concerning 
the relationship that Lauchlin Currie had to her particular activities 
in that period. 

Miss Bentley. Yes. One of the espionage groups that I handled in 
Washington, which I roughly call the Silvermaster group because the 
man who headed it was N. Gregory Silvermaster. 

Mr. Morris. Approximately how many people were in that group? 

ISIiss Bentley. I think there were 8, 9, or 10. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 419 

Senator Ferguson. Silvermaster was in what section ? 

]\liss Bentley. FSA, which is the Farm Security Administration, 
which is a part of the Agriculture Department, although for 6 months 
I think he was in the Board of Economic Warfare. 

Senator FERGUSOisr. Did you have trouble or difficulty in moving 
these agents that you had into strategic positions in Governn^ent 
or in the Army that you were talking about, that you did not want 
them where there was danger but you wanted them in strategic posi- 
tions ? For example, Silvermaster, did you have trouble moving peo- 
ple such as that^ or how were they moved to strategic positions so that 
you could get your information ? 

Miss Benti.et. We didn't have too much trouble. In the case of 
Silvermaster, he pulled strings and got in there. 

Senator Ferguson. What were your avenues for placing people in 
strategic positions ? 

Miss Bentley. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry 
Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount of 
influence and knew people and their word would be accepted when 
they recommended someone. 

The Chairman. Harry Dexter White was in what department? 

Miss Bentley. Under Secretary of the Treasury, under Mr. Mor- 
genthau. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, Currie and White were your 
instrumentalities in putting people in strategic positions ? 

Miss Bentley. I would say they were our most important ones. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you have any other ones? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. I mean, whoever we had as an agent in the 
Government would automatically serve for putting someone else in. 
For example, Maurice Halperin was head of the Latin American 
Section in OSS, and we used him to get Helen Tenney in. Once we 
got one person in he got others, and the whole process continued like 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you desired to shift a person from one 
position to another position you would use White and Currie? 

Miss Bentt.ey. We w^ould use White and Currie if we could. 

Senator Eastland. Do you know who White's principal contacts 
were in the Government so that he could place people in Government? 

Miss Bentley. It was my understanding that he knew practically 
everyone in Washington who had any influence. 

Senator Eastland. You' do not know who he would contact? 

Miss Bentley. No, not specifically ; that was his affair, and we did 
not inquire into it. 

Senator Ferguson. As I recall the Far East, Mr. Morgenthau at the 
time before Pearl Harbor had drawn a plan for the Far East, it was 
the Morgenthau plan. Did you know anything about it? 

Miss Bentley. No, the only Morgenthau plan I knew anything 
about was the German one. 

Senator Eastland. Did you know who drew that plan? 

Miss Bentley. Due to Mr. Wliite's influence, to push the devastation 
of Germany because that was what the Russians wanted. 

Senator Ferguson. That was what the Communists wanted? 

Miss Bentley. Definitely Moscow wanted them completely razed 
because then they would be of no help to the Allies. 



420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. You say that Harry Dexter Wliite worked on that? 

Miss Bentley. And on our instructions he pushed hard. 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard of the Morgenthau plan that 
was set up for the Far East ? 

Miss Bentlet. I don't recall it. 

Senator Eastland. Who else participated in drawing up the Mor- 
genthau plan besides Harry Dexter White? 

Miss Bentlet. I am afraid I don't remember now. 

Mr. Morris. Did Sol Adler have anything to do with it ? ^ 

Miss Bentlet. As far as I remember Sol Adler was in China. 

Mr, Morris. He was in China ? 

Miss Bentlet. He was a Treasury Department expert, but most of 
the time he was in China. I am quite sure he hadn't returned by that 
time. 

Senator Eastland. What you say is that it was a Communist plot 
to destroy Germany and weaken her to where she could not help us? 

Miss Bentlet. That is correct. She could no longer be a barrier 
that would protect the Western World. 

Senator Eastland. And that Mr, Morgenthau, who was Secretary 
of the Treasury of the United States was used by the. Communist 
agents to promote that plot ? 

Miss Bentlet. I am afraid so ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "I am afraid so" ? 

Miss Bentlet. Certainly Secretary Morgenthau didn't fall in with 
Communist plots. 

Senator Ferguson. But you know it to be a fact ? 

Miss Bentlet. I know it to be a fact. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not qualify it, do you ? 

Miss Bentlet. No; I don't qualify it. I didn't want to give the 
thought that he did it knowingly. 

Senator Smith. He was unsuspectingly used. 

Senator Ferguson. So you have conscious and unconscious agents ? 

Miss Bentlet. Of course, The way the whole principle works is 
like dropping a pebble into a pond and the ripples spread out, and that 
is the way we work. 

Senator Ferguson. Some are conscious and some are unconscious as 
to what they are doing ? 

Miss Bentlet. That is correct. A good many of our most valuable 
items came from the fact that many people in the Pentagon couldn't 
contain themselves, and they had to confide in our people. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us for our record the rela- 
tionship that Harry Dexter White had with your work. 

Miss Bentlet. Harry Dexter White, I couldn't tell you that he 
had actually been a member of the party, but to all intents and 
purposes he was because he followed its discipline. According to 
Nathan Silvermaster he was afraid to meet people like myself. He 
had for some years been working for an agent who had turned sour, 
later identified as Whittaker Chambers. That had given him a 
terrific fright, and he had stayed away for a while from these ac- 
tivities. 

Tlien he had met the Silvermasters and they had brought him back 
into their group. His attitude was that I am going to help you, but my 
right hand doesn't want to know what the left is doing. Therefore, 
he didn't want to meet anyone he knew to be a Soviet agent, he wanted 
to pass it through Silvermaster to me. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 421 

Senator Ferguson. This idea of Chambers going sour on the Com- 
munist Party was learned by the State Department because he made 
his report to the State Department, did he not, so that the people 
knew that he had gone sour ? That was before he testified in court or 
in the open, was it not? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know, but the Communists know when their 
people go sour before anybody else does usually. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that Chambers had 
given information to the American Government officials who were 
anti-Communist? 

Miss Benti^y. I didn't know anything about Wliittaker Chambers 
at all except as a man called X who had handled a number of my 
people in 1948. 

Senator Ferguson. So his name you did not learn ? 

Miss Bentley. No. They gave a name such as Sam or Al and you 
don't know his real name. 

Senator Ferguson. So White did not name Chambers as the man 
who went sour ? 

]\Iiss Bentley. No. I don't know whether White knew Chambers. 
Certainly he didn't give it to Silvermaster. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have a confidential Government record come 
to you from Wliite ? 

Miss Bentley. Many of them, all labeled from "Harry" because 
Soviet agents like to know who is providing what. 

Mr. Morris. How many copies of such reports would you receive ? 

Miss Bentley. How many copies ? 

Mr. Morris. Would it come in duplicate ? 

Miss Bentley. Sometimes it was a carbon copy. Many, many 
times those documents were photographed in the Silvermasters' cellar 
because they couldn't be spared. 

Mr. Morris. Would you give us a concrete example of your dealings 
with Harry Dexter Wliite ? 

Miss Bentley. In the way of material ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. Who gave it to you, for instance ? 

Miss Bentley. Well, in the early days Lud Ullmann, who was then 
working in the Treasury, used to bring it out. Sometimes Hariy 
was leery about bringing it out himself. Sometimes it would be given 
to Bill Taylor. 

Mr. Morris. ^Yho is William Taylor? 

Miss Bentley. He was another Communist Party member in the 
Treasury who paid his dues and was a member of the Silvermaster 
group. 

Mr. Morris. Was Ullmann in the same category ? 

Miss Bentley. UHman was in the same category. I knew Ullmann 
as well as the Silvermasters. 

Mr. Morris. Let us take Ullmann. Would he give you a report, 
and tell you it was a rejDort from Harry White ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes, and he would also type on it "from Harry.'' 

Mr. Morris. Wliat would you do? 

Miss Bentley. I would take that back, and when Mr. Golos was 
alive I would give it to him and after he passed on I would give it to 
the successor agent. 

The Chairman. To whom? 



422 ESrSTITtJTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Miss Bentley. To the succeeding Soviet contact I had ; there were 
three of them. 

Mr. Morris. In any case, were they ever microfilmed ? 

Miss Bentlet. Many cases. In many cases the volume got too big, 
and they had to be microfilmed. 

Mr. Morris. Where was that done ? 

Miss Bentley. In their basement. They had a home-made affair 
there where they put their camera. 

Mr. Morris. Could you describe where that was ? 

Miss Bentley. The Silvermaster home? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Bentley. Right off Chevy Chase Circle, I think it was 5515 
Thirty-fourth. I have forgotten the exact number. 

Mr. Morris. You have been there ? 

Miss Bentley. I was there almost every 2 weeks, I should 

Mr, Morris. Wliat was your purpose in going there? 

Miss Bentley. My purpose in going there was to collect Com- 
munist dues and all the information collected during the 2 weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the bulk got so large that you 
could not carry it to New York ? 

Miss Bentley. Physically I could have carried it, but it would 
have been unwise to go hauling large bundles around like that. 

Senator Ferguson. And you got it into microfilms so that you 
could take them into New York without being seen and having a 
package ? 

Miss Bentley. There was also the problem with lots of documents 
that you could only take them overnight and return them in the morn- 
ing. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, would you testify about an idea of Harry 
Dexter White whereby he was going to perfect your intelligence or- 
ganization ? 

Miss Bentley. I don't quite understand the question. 

Mr. Morris. You have testified in executive session that Harry 
Dexter White had a plan whereby he was going to integrate all in- 
telligence matters coming into your ring. 

Miss Bentley. Do you mean the trading of information between 
Government agencies? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Bentley. He not only had a plan, but we put it into effect. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us about that. 

Miss Bentley. We were so successful getting information during 
the war largely because of Harry Wliite's idea to persuade Morgenthau 
to exchange information. In other words, he would send information 
over to Navy, and Navy would reciprocate. So there were at least 
seven or eight agencies trading information with Secretary Morgen- 
thau. 

Mr. Morris. You say this plan of trading information was initiated 
by Wliite? 

Miss Bentley. This plan was initiated by White because he knew it 
would come across his desk. 

Mr. Morris. He being the Executive Assistant ? 

Miss Bentley. He was the Under Secretary, next man down the 
ladder. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 423 

Senator Eastland. Who negotiated that agreement? 

Miss Bentley. From what I was told, it was Secretary Morgenthau 
himself. 

Mr. Morris. You say it was initiated by White ? 

Miss Bentley, It was initiated by Harry White. 

Senator Eastland. You testified he used Morgenthau ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us exactly 
what your relations were with Lauchlin Currie. 

Miss Bentley. Lauchlin Currie was not, as far as we knew at that 
time, a member of the Communist Party, but he was very close to 
various members of the Silvermaster group, including George Silver- 
man, whom he knows very well, and Silvermaster. He was willing 
to bail them out when they were in trouble, when they were being fired 
for disloyalty or when they needed help to get a job. 

Besides that he was passing on information to us. 

Senator Ferguson. Currie was passing it on ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us any information on what you 
received through Currie? 

Miss Bentley. Most of it was far eastern. There was the time 
when he relayed the information that the Soviet code was about to be 
broken. 

Mr. Morris. Broken by whom? 

Miss Bentley. The United States authorities. 

Mr. Morris. He discovered that the United States authorities had 
broken the code, and he relayed it to you ? 

Miss Bentley. Were about to break it. I relayed it back, and my 
Eussian head said, "Which code?" 

Senator Eastland. Did he say which code ? 

Miss Bentley. No, I was unable to get back and find out. He just 
said the Soviet code. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that information? 

Miss Bentley. That information came from White via Silverman, 
as I recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. From Currie? 

Miss Bentley. From Currie. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a highly classified fact at the time ? 

Miss Bentley. Definitely. I don't know enough about Govern- 
ment labelings, but it was certainly something you wouldn't pass 
around. 

^ Mr. Morris. Was it your understanding, Miss Bentley, that Lauch- 
lin Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster group ? 

Miss Bentley. Definitely. 

Mr. Morris. Did he always act in that capacity or was, he reassigned 
in some fashion ? 
_ Miss Bentley. It was my understanding he was going to be reas- 
signed when I left the group in September, I think it was, 1944. My 
Soviet contact told me that they did not believe in having such large 
groups for security reasons because if someone turns sour they know 
too much ; that he intended to put White directly in contact with a 
Soviet superior, and Lauchlin Currie also in direct contact with a 
Soviet agent, and possibly with some of the smaller fry he could put 



424 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

two or three in one group. But he definitely mentioned putting White 
and Currie in direct contact. 

The Chairman. Who was it that mentioned them ? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know his real name, he was known to me 
as Bill. 

The Chaieman. He was living where? 

Miss Bextley. I don't know whether he lived in Washington or 
New York. 

Mr. Morris. But he was your superior in the Soviet military police? 

Miss Bentley. He was my superior in the Soviet military police 
and also I am quite sure it went through. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what particular agent Currie was going 
to be assigned to ? 

Miss Bentley. No, I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy do you say you think it went through? 

Miss Bentley. Because after this Soviet contact had taken over the 
Silvermaster group he requested me to stay on with them for 3 
months. In talking with Silvermaster he told me they had already 
put the plan into effect, and they were about to make contact with 
Soviet agents, so I am convinced it went through. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time we should point 
out what Lauchlin Currie's relations were with the Institute of Pa- 
cific Eelations. I therefore ask Mr. Mandel if he will call to our atten- 
tion some few of the exhibits that we have selected to show what 
Lauchlin Currie's role was in the Institute of Pacific Eelations. 

The Chairman. Are these exhibits to which you refer being made a 
part of the record ? 

Mr. Morris. We will introduce them. 

The Chairman. I would like to have the foundation, the source, 
and how you got it. 

Mr. Mandel. First I refer to the testimony of Edward C. Carter 
on July 25, 1951, in which he identified Lauchlin Currie as a member 
of the Institute of Pacific Eelations. Now I have here a photostat of 
a letter dated October 27, 1942, addressed to Joseph Barnes at 430 
West Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 

The Chairman. Wliere does the instrument come from ? 

Mr. ^Iandel. The instrument comes from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Eelations. 

The Chairman. Is it an original instrument or photostat ? 

Mr. Mandel. It is a photostat. It is signed by Edward C. Carter 
and the letter reads as follows : 

Deae Joe: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the 
hope that some day when you are in Washington you would give him the priv- 
ilege of a i^rivate talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of 
Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he 
would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs 
elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon. 

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the 
White House exchange. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter 
into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive- exhibit. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 425 

The Chairman. It will be so marked and entered into the record 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 103" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 103 

New York, N. Y., October 27, 1942. 
Joseph Barnes, Esq., 

New York, N. Y. 
Dejar Joe : Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope 
that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege 
of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen 
Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would 
find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs else- 
where. I do hope that you can see him soon. 

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the 
White House exchange. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Cakter. 

My. Mandel. Next is a memorandum from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations dated November 80, 1942, and the memorandum is 
addressed to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup at Mont Tremblant. 
This is in connection with the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR. 

In response to your request for designations of American Council members 
of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions. 

This is signed by William W. Lockwood. 

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup 
so that they are merely tentative for the present. 

The Pacific Council : Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be 
in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I 
believe Kizer is the best choice. 

Program Committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as 
alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I under- 
stand you have Field* in mind as program committee secretary, which would 
be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. 

International Research Committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of 
his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank 
Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition. 

International Finance Committee : Brayton Wilbur ; alternate, Brooks Emeny. 

Publications Committee : Tentatively, Len De Caux. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that received into 
the evidence as the next exhibit, pointing out that the significance of 
this document is that Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had 
testimony, on November 30, 1942, was proposed by Mr. Lockwood in 
official capacity to Mr. Jessup as chairman of the program committee 
of the Mont Tremblant conference, which was the triennial conference 
and one of the important functions of the IPR. 

Tlie Chairman. The exhibit will be properly marked in sequence^ 
and inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 104" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 104 

November .30, 1942. 
Memorandum to : Mr. Carter. 
Copy for : Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant. 

In response to your request for designations of American Council members 
of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions. 

These should be 'reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup 
so that they are merely tentative for the present. 



426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Pacific Council : Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be 
In the chair so presumably another American should represent the council. I 
believe Kizer is the best choice. 

Program committee : Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as 
alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I under- 
stand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would 
be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. 

International research committee : Dennett is the best person, in view of his 
availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank 
Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition. 

International finance committee : Brayton Wilbur ; alternate. Brooks Emeny. 

Publications committee : Tentatively, Len De Caux. 

Wm. W. LocKwoop. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Kelations dated February 18, 1941, addressed to Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi 
from Edward C. Carter and reads as follows : 

Dear Chi : What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such 
cable as the following : 
"Lauchlin Currie, 

"American Embassy, Chungking: 

*'It press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public 
opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's 
unified resistance." 

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. How- 
lever, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the 
Pacific for China to start a two-front war. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward O. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into 
the record as the next consecutive exhibit pointing out at the same 
time that Dr. Chi is a man who has been identified by several witnesses 
here as an important member of the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 105" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 105 

New York City, February 18, 1941. 
Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, 

New York City. 
Dear Chi: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such 
cable as the following : 
"Lauchlin Currie, 

"American Embassy, Chungking. 
"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public 
opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's 
unified resistance. 

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. How- 
ever, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific 
nor China to start a two-front war. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Mandel. This is another letter from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Kelations and is dated March 10, 1944, addressed to Dr. John 
Fairbank, care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washing- 
ton, D. C, signed by W. L. Holland. 

Dear John : Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent 
by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire 
whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through 
Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 427 

to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chung- 
king and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do 
this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday 
and probably Thursday also. 

No more stuff seems to have come frorci Hsiang. Is there any way you could 
get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been 
transmitted for the use of the IFR? 

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of Cali- 
fornia into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them 
a travel fund immediately. 

P. S. — As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what 
you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to 
reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture. 

Mr. Morris. The significance of this document, Mr. Chairman, is 
that John Fairbank received his mail care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, at 
the White House. I would like to have that introduced as the next 
consecutive exhibit in the evidence. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 106" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 106 

March 10, 1944. 
Dr. John Fairbank, 

Care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, 

The White House, Washington, D. C. 
Dear John : Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent 
by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire 
whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through 
to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via 
APO to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be 
in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer 
not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next 
Wednesday and probably Thursday also. 

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could 
get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been 
transmitted for the use of the IPR? 

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of Cali- 
fornia into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them 
a travel fund immediately. 
Best wishes. 

Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 
P. S. — As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder 
what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to 
reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture which 
the China IPR published in Slianghai in 1932. One or two chapters, for example, 
on industry are a little out of date but the book is still constantly being quoted 
and asked for though it has long been out of stock. If you thought the scheme 
.worth while, I might ask Hu Shih and perhaps one or two other Chinese here 
to add supplementary chapters which would serve to bring the book partly up to 
date. There's such a demand fromi the publishers today for books from the Far 
East that I don't think we would have any difliculty in finding a publisher. 

Mr. Mandel. Here is another memorandum dated June 20, 1942, 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "1942 con- 
ference personnel, interview WlVXi," presumably with W. W. Lock- 
wood, "with Lauchlin Currie, June 17, regarding IPR 1942 confer- 
ence." 

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor 
on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of 
participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that 
any particular individual will be able or will agree to attencL) 



428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Currie himself would like to be at the conference and presumably we can 
count on his being present. 

Official participation will be essential to success. 

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested 
Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Ser- 
vices. 

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five 
individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed 
with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed to- 
gether. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State 
Department. 

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include 
the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be 
rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited 
and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. 
Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation 
to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to Avhich of the other top 
State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace 
Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. 
He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications. 

There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September 
to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's 
plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence, 
and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit, the item referred 
to. The purpose of introducing this exhibit is to show the role that 
Lauchlin Currie played as a high adviser in connection with the work 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 107 

[1942 conference personnel, June 20, 1942] 

Interview WWL With Lauchlin Currie June 17 Regarding IPR 1942 

Conference 

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor 
on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of 
participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, 
that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.) 

Currie himself would like to be at the conference, and presumably we can 
count on his being present. 

Official participation will be essential to success. 

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested 
Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services. 

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five indi- 
viduals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with 
Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. 
Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department. 

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include 
the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather 
awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Horn- 
beck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's sug- 
gestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him 
personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State 
Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, 
Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He 
expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications. 

3. There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer Septem- 
ber to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's 
plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 429 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a group of telegrams, taken from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

One telegram is addressed to Edward C. Carter : 

Glad to see you at 12 : 30 Wednesday. 

Lauchlin Ctjrrie. 

The telegram does not show a date, but the subsequent telegram will 
undoubtedly indicate the date of the correspondence. 

The next is a copy of a telegram dated September 17, 1941, to 
Lauchlin Currie, White House, Washington, D. C. : 

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday preferably 
Thursday. 

Edward C. Carter. 

Here is another telegram dated October 7, 1942, to Lauchlin Currie, 
Executive Offices of the President, the White House, Washington, 
D. C: 

Visiting Washington tomorrow Thursday will telephone you in morning for 
appointment. 

Edward G. Carter. 

Another one dated October 7, year not given, the White House : 

Edward C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations: 

Eighth any time would be better if convenient. 

Lauchlin Currie. 

Here is another dated June 26, 1942, a note addressed to Currie : 

I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see 
me in the forenoon of that day. 

Edward C. Carter. 

Another telegram, a copy of a telegram, June 23, 1942, addressed 
to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, AVash- 
ington, D. C . : 

Washington visit postponed until next week. 

Edward C. Carter. 

Another copy of a telegram dated May 5, 1942, addressed to Lauch- 
lin Currie : 

Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday. 

Edward C. Cartek. 

And then we have another here, dated April 25, 1942, a telegram to 
Edward C. Carter. 

Planning to attend conference Tuesday. 

Lauchlin Currie. 

The telegram is marked as coming from the White House. 

Mr. Morris. Are they samples of correspondence that you have 
discovered in the files between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. They are not all of the correspondence between these 
two people, are they? 

Mr. Mandel. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these tele- 
grams just read by Mr. Mandel into the record, and have them marked 
as the next consecutive exhibit. 

22848— 52— pt. 2 6 



430 INSTITUTE OP PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The purpose of these telegrams is to show the relationsliip that ex- 
isted between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter, namely, that 
Carter frequently went to Washington and conferred with Lauchlin 
Currie in the Wliite House. Mr. Carter, at that time, was the secre- 
tary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. These will be inserted into the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exliibit No. 108" and 
are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 108 

The White House, 
Washington, D. C, April 25, 1942. 
Edward Oaktee, 

129 East Fifty-second Street: 
Planning to attend conference Tuesday. 

Lauchlin Cureie. 



May 5, 1942. 
Lauchlin Currie, 

White House, Washington, D. C: 
Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday. 

Edward C. Carter. 



June 23, 1942. 
Lauchlin Currie, 

Administrative Assistant to the President, 
White House, Washington, D. C: 
Washington visit postponed until next week. 

Edward C. Carter. 



New York City, June 26, 1942. 
Ml'. Lauchlin Clterie, 

Adminstrative Assistant to the President, 
Wliite House, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Cuerie: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and 
hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Caetee. 



The White House, 
Washington, D. C, October 7. 
Edwaed C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations: 
Eighth any time would be better if convenient. 

Lauchlin Currie. 



October 7, 1942. 
Lauchlin Cuerie, 

Executive Offices of the President, 

The White House, Washington, D. C: 
Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday, will telephone you in morning for 
appointment. 

Edward 0. Carter. 



Septembee 17, 1941. 
Lauchlin Cueeie, 

White House, Washington, D. C: 
Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday, prefer 
ably Thursday? 

Edwaed C. Caetee. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 431 

Washington, D. C. 
Edward C. Cabteb, 

Institute of Pacific Relations: 

Glad to see you at 12 : 30 Wednesday. 

Lauchlin Ctjreie. 

Mr. Mandel. Here is a brief memorandum, dated July 10, 1941. 
"W. L. H." presumably W. L. Holland, from "E. C. C." presumably 
E. C. Carter. 

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go 
ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect 
Chi's work. 

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Wash- 
ington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing any- 
thing which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, 
Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China. 

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of pre- 
cisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit. I understand that Senator 
Ferguson has a question he would like to ask about it before we pass 
it on. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about this program, and 
concerning which I was talking about previously, in China ? Did that 
come to your attention ? 

Miss Bentley. No ; I am afraid not. I was pretty new in the game 
at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew about it in the one in Germany but 
not the one in Cliina ? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to point out at this time that we have thus 
iar introduced into the record evidence that Chen Han-seng, Chi, 
Lauchlin Currie, and Harry Wliite are the four people mentioned in 
this memorandum as having had former connections with the Commu- 
nist Party. 

The Chairman. The exhibits will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 109" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 109 

July 10, 1941. 
W. L. H. from E. C. C. 

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead 
with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's 
work. 

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Wash- 
ington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing 
anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-seng, Chi, Lauchlin 
Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China. 

I had a feeling tljat you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely 
what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted. 

Mr. Mandel. Another exhibit coming from the file of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, dated June 15, 1942. "E. C. C." presumably Mr. 
Carter, from ''W. W. L." presumably W. W. Lockwood. 

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions 
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I 
believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say 
that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in 



432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is 
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key 
positions. 

Then follows a list of individuals. Under the heading of "Govern- 
ment," we have Ernest H. Gruening. 

Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Mandel, we do not have to go into that 
list. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the 
record as evidence of the fact that the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
and, in this case, Mr. Lockwood writing to Mr. Carter, considered that 
the competent advice should be gotten from Currie, who is Lauchlin 
Currie, Barnes who is Joseph Barnes, and Jessup who is Philip Jessup, 
again to establish that Mr. Currie was looked upon by the institute as 
one of the senior advisers of that organization. 

As such, I would like to have it introduced into the record as the 
next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so inserted. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 110" and is a£ 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 110 

June 15, 1942. 
E. C. C. from W. W. L. : 

lu response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestion?; 
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I 
believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say 
that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much 
in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington 
is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key 
positions. 

GOVERNMENT 

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska 

Eean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare 

Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare 

Riefler. Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare 

Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare 

Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare 

Wallace. H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare 

Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget 

Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information 

Eunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information 

Fahs. C. B., Coordinator of Information 

Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information 

Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture 

Ropes, E. C, Department of Commerce, Bureaii of Foreign and Domestic Trade 

Berle, A. A., Department of State 

Davies, .Toseph, Department of State 

Grady, Henry, Department of State 

Hiss, Alger, Department of State 

Hornbeek. S. K., Depaitment of State 

Sayre, Francis B., Department of State 

Stinebower, L. D., Department of State 

Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department 

White, H. D., Treasury Department 

Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board 

Emerson. Rupert, Office of Price Administration 

Nathan, Robert, War Production Board 



Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross 
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council 
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point 
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 433 

Clapper, Raymoud, Washington columnist 

Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register and Tribune 

Dennett, Tyler, historian 

Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp. 

Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland 

Field, Frederick V., New York 

Herod, W. H., International General Electric 

Jessup, Prof. Philip C, Columbia University 

Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission 

Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp. 

Luce, Henry, Time, Inc. 

Molyneaux, Peter, Texas weekly 

Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute 

Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash. 

(ex-Senator) 
Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York 

Sweetlaud, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief 
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives 
Wilkie, Wendell, attorney 
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation 
Wilson, C. E., General Electric 
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navj% retired 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel has just one more, Mr. Chairman, bearing 
on this point of Laiichlin Cnrrie's position in the IPR. 

Mr. Mandel. Here is a letter dated August 28, 1941, from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, 
Executive Offices of the President : 

Deae Cukkie : A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently 
to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's 
appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the 
letters to me. 

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to 
Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others 
before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Latti- 
more if I were to send it to you to forward? 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

The Chairman. To whom was that addressed ? 
Mr. Mandel. This is addressed to Lauchlin Currie. 
Mr. Morris. At the Wliite House. 

Mr. Mandel. Here is the reply, dated September 2, 1941, on the 
stationery of the White House, addressed to Edward C. Carter : 

Dear Carter: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore 
uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for 
airmail postage as far as Hong Kong. 
Sincerely, 

Lauchlin Currie. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the 
record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. Ill" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. Ill 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City, August 28, 1941. 
Lauchlin Currie, Esq., 

Executive Offices of the President, 

White Ho'use, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Currie : A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently 
to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's 



434 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the 
letters to me. 

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to 
Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others 
before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Latti- 
more if I were to send it to you to forward? 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Caetebs, 



The White House, 
Washington, September 2, 19^1. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. 7. 
Dear Carter: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uu- 
censored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for air- 
mail postage as far as Hong Kong. 
Sincerely, 

(Signed) Lauchlin Currie. 

Lauchlin Citreie. 

Mr. Morris. The purpose of introducing those exhibits was to show 
the connection of Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony 
this morning, with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Miss Bentley, do you know Sol Adler ? 

Miss Bentley. Not personally; no. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you know about Sol Adler ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. Solomon Adler was, again, a member of the 
Silvermaster group. He paid his dues through Mr. Silvermaster to 
me. Most of the time I was in charge of that group, he was over in 
China. But he did send reports to various people, including Harry 
Dexter White in the Treasury Department, which were relayed on 
to us. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what were the natures of those reports, Miss 
Bentley? 

Miss Bentley. Reports on internal Chinese politics, mainly, as to 
what the Nationalists were doing and what the chances were for the 
Eighth Army people and the Communists in China. 

Mr. Morris. What was his Communist assignment in China? Can 
you tell us a little bit about that. Miss Bentley ? 

Miss Bentley. "When he went over there he was told — that was be- 
fore my day, so I didn't participate in it — he was told that he should 
follow the party line in China, and carry out to the utmost whatever 
Moscow wanted, in the Far East. 

Senator Eastland. Wlio was that? 

Mr. Morris. This is Sol Adler, Senator, who was one of the high 
officials in the Treasury Department, and who was in charge of the 
Treasury Department for China. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you can tell us something more about Solo- 
mon Adler, Miss Bentley? Anything more about Solomon Adler 
that you can tell us would be helpful. 

Miss Bentley. In what respect? 

Mr. Morris. About his connection with the organization. 

Miss Bentley. I understand that he had been connected with the 
organization for a few years before I came along. 

He not only was connected with the Silvermaster organization, but 
he had Communist contacts within China. One of those was Chi. I 
have forgotten his first name. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 435 

Mr. MoREis. Dr. Cli'ao Ting Chi ? 

Miss Bentley. He was the man proposed to be the Chinese delegate 
to the United Nations. Is that the same one ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Miss Bentley. Well, he had dealings with him, both in this coun- 
try and in China, and with numerous others of the Communists in 
China, although he was supposed to cultivate the Nationalists on 
behalf of our own Government, and also to forward the Communist 
plan. 

He was really quite friendly, for example, with Madam Chiang 
Kai-shek. I remember one report that came through on Adler at one 
time that complained that he was not tending to business and influenc- 
ing the quarters he should be. He was playing too much bridge with 
Madam Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you know a man named Israel Ep- 
stein ? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know him personally, no. I know about 
him. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us' what you know about him, Miss 
Bentley ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. In February 1941, I helped set up a cover 
business, to cover the espionage activities, with funds supplied by 
Earl Browder, of the American Communist Party, and with a contact 
from a Soviet agency which had been arranged by Soviet Intelligence. 
We needed personnel, and Israel Epstein's then wife, Mrs. Edith 
Epstein, had just returned not too long before from China, and we 
considered her. So Mr. Golos got her dossier and discovered that 
Israel Epstein had been a member of the Russian Secret Police for 
many years in China, and because Mrs. Edith Epstein was his wife, 
she would be fit to take on as part of our personnel in the business. 

Mr. Morris. Was there any doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein 
was an important Sovie agent? 

Miss Bentley. No doubt at all. Mr, Golos checked up on him and 
had heard a great deal about him. 

Mr. Morris. How reliable would a report like that, from Mr. Golos 
about Mr. Epstein as a Soviet agent, be as far as you are concerned? 

Miss Bentley. Any report which I would get from my Soviet 
superior on those things would be reliable on that. 

Mr. Morris. So there was no doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein 
was what he told you he was ? 

Miss Bentley. No doubt whatsover. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever take his wife on as an agent ? 

Miss Bentley. No, we simply used her in the office. It turned out 
she was not as far left as her husband, and we did not like our agents 
to know too much about us. Since we hired her in the office, it would 
be unwise to take her as an agent. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did put her in the office? 

Miss Bentley. We did put her in the office because we thought she 
would be discreet and protect us in case anythingcame up. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you can bring forth the ex- 
hibit to show Israel Epstein's connection with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Epstein was the author of the article entitled 
"Hong Kong, Past and Present," in the Far Eastern Survey for 
April 24, 1946. 



436 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Is the Far Eastern Survey a publication of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. It is an official publication of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

Here is a letter dated September 6, and the year is not given. It is 
addressed to "Dear Holland" signed by "I. Epstein." 

The Chairman. That was obtained from where ? 

Mr. Mandel. It was obtained from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations : 

I clean forgot about giving you tiie particulars for the letters on Saturday. 
One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wia-Kou, Kweilin. 
It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, 
because they can work from their own institutions. 

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would 
like to have these back when you are through. 

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of 
it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and 
Elsie. 

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? 
I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York. 
Sincerely. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit bearing on Israel Epstein's 
activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 112 

Dear Holland : I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters 
on Saturday. 

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, 
Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other 
academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions. 

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would 
like to have these back when you are through. 

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, 
I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and 
Elsie. 

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? 
I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York. 
Sincerely, 

(Signed) I. Epstein. 

Septembek 6. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about John K. 
Fairbank. who was mentioned in the last letter? 

Miss Bentley. Only that he was sometimes used by Mildred Price 
to bring material back from China. You see, it was difficult to bring 
things back from China that wouldn't go through the censorship or 
wouldn't otherwise get opened and looked at. Mme. Sun Yat-sen and 
a number of other people in China, a few Communists, were sending 
material to Mildred for the China Aid Council. So, anyone who 
was sympathetic or one of the boys would bring them back on their 
trips. 

Mr. Morris. And do you know that Mildred Price did use John K. 
Fairbank to bring back messages from whom? 

Miss Bentley. From Mme. Sun Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Morris. To? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 437 

Miss Bentley. To Mildred Price, from China, because I know at 
least one occasion when he did bring all these documents back. 

Mr. Morris. Was Mme. Sun Yat-sen a Communist ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Could you develop that a bit for us ? 

Miss Bentley. As to show Mme. Sun Yat-sen was ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes; and her relations with your organization. 

Miss Bentley. Mme. Sun Yat-sen, as far as I know, had been a 
Communist for quite some time, and was very important in the Com- 
munist movement over there. And, therefore, she was in contact 
with the China Aid Council, which was going all out to help the 
Communist area. 

Mr. Morris. So, you do know that she was working with the China 
Aid Council? 

Miss Bentley. Quite definitely. They got consistent letters from 
her, and they wrote back, and their aid was going to Communist 
areas in China. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, would you try to place a date of the time 
when John K. Fairbank brought a message back from Mme. Sun 
Yat-sen to Mildred Price? Was it during the time he was the head 
of the China Division of the Office of War Information? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know exactly when he was head of that. 
I would say it was in 1944. It was after Mr. Golos' death. It must 
have been 1944, or the tag end of 1943. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, could you tell us what you know about 
Philip Jaffe? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. His name first came up w^hen, as I told you, we 
had been canvassing the IPR through Mildred Price to see if we 
could find good intelligence material. We had gone through them. 
It didn't look hopeful; a lot of them were too temperamental, and 
our best prospect as an intelligence worker seemed to be Philip Jaffe, 
according to Mildred, although she did say that she was very much 
afraid that he was rather too well known as a Eed and, therefore, 
he wouldn't be too useful. 

In undercover work, you have to have people who are inconspicuous 
and not too well known. So, we decided not to go on with that project. 
But she described him as being a very loyal comrade and reliable. 

Mr. Morris. So, it is your testimony that you did not take Philip 
Jaffe from the Institute of Pacific Relations for espionage because 
he was too open a Communist ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. We got that information from Mildred Price. 

Mr. Morris. And, for that reason, he wouldn't be suitable? 

Miss Bentley. That is correct; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Were you ever warned against associating with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. I was told to be very careful in dealing even 
with Mildred. As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Golos' phrase was : "It 
was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole." 

Mr. Morris. The IPR ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. He felt, from the point of view of good under- 
cover work, they were far too bungling and they were too much in 
the open, and it was far too dangerous to be associating with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. It might o-et us in trouble. 



438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you ever hear of Edward C. Carter's 
relationship to the Communist organizations mentioned ? 

Miss Bentley. I know very little about Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. What do you laiow about him ? 

Miss Bentley. I know that Mildred Price brought his name up, 
inasmuch as they were associated, and she said he was O. K., and 
by that she meant that he was a reliable person that she could trust. 

Mr. Morris. That she could trust in connection with the party 
work? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. Whether or not he was actually a party mem- 
ber is something I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more you know about Edward C. 
Carter, Miss Bentley ? 

Miss Bentley. Not that I can think of at the moment. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know a Miss Harriet Lucy Moore? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. I knew Harriet Moore personally. This 
forum, that I told you we set up as a cover business in 1941, had a li- 
cense to ship parcels to Eussia. Right after we had set it up in Feb- 
ruary, you remember, the Germaiis attacked Russia. And the result 
of that was that we got the brilliant brainstorm of wanting to send 
packages to Russia, and the Russian War Relief was born not too long 
after that. And in connection with that, I had dealings with Harriet 
Moore, and I was told by Mr. Golos, by the people downtown in the 
Communist Party, that she was a comrade and I should deal with her 
as such. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a 
long series of exhibits showing Harriet Lucy Moore's connections 
with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

In the middle 1940's, she was acting secretary of that organization. 
Prior to that, Mr. Chairman — I think it was 1941 — she was chair- 
man of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions. At that same year she was also a member of the executive com- 
mittee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a member of the board 
of trustees. 

Mr. Chairman, those exhibits have already gone into evidence, to- 
gether with many others, showing that she was very actively asso- 
ciated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Miss Bentley has now 
testified about knowing her as a member of the Communist Party. 

What do you know about Frederick V. Field, Miss Bentley? 

Miss Bentley. I don't know him personally. I know, as I have 
stated before, being told by Browder and by Mildred Price. 

Mr. Morris. Your dealings with him were through Browder? 

Miss Bentley. My dealings with him were through Browder, be- 
cause I was not getting into the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you ever have a meeting at Field's 
house ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. Earl Browder very often used Fred Field's 
house to meet people where it had to be highly underground. 

Mr. Morris. Field was not there ? 

Miss Bentley. Field was not there ; no. He just loaned the house 
to Browder, and Browder was there when I went with a couple of 
people that he didn't want to come out in the open. They met there. 
I understand that was done quite frequently on undercover meetings. 

Mr. Morris. What was the nature of that particular meeting? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 439 

Miss Bentley. That particular meeting was in connection with 
what should happen about the cover business. 

Mr. Morris. And how long did it last? 

Miss Bentley. The cover business ? 

Mr. Morris. No; the meeting? 

Miss Bentley. I would say we were there a good 2 hours, probably. 
We had quite a number of things to talk about. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, do you know of an organization called 
the American Friends of the Chinese People ? 

Miss Bentley. I have heard about it ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. What do you know about it, Miss Bentley? 

Miss Bentley. I have been told that it, again, was in the Com- 
munist sphere of influence. 

Mr. Morris. By whom? 

Miss Bentley. I think I was told that by Mildred Price. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything about the publication Amer- 
asia? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What do you know about Amerasia ? 

Miss Bentley. I was also told that that was Communist-dominated. 

Mr. Morris. Who told you that ? 

Miss Bentley. Both Golos and Mildred Price. 

Senator Eastland. Do you know aiiything about Owen Lattimore? 

Miss Bentley. No ; I don't know Lattimore. 

Senator Eastland. You do not know whether he is a Communist or 
not? 

Miss Bentley. No; I don't. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Robert Miller ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes ; I know Robert JMiller. Robert Miller was one 
of the Communist Party members that I took on as an espionage agent 
May back in 1941. He worked for the CIAA. That is Nelson Rocke- 
feller's Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs, I think it was called. 
I think he was in the Political Division of that outfit. I think in 1944 
1)6 migrated from there to the State Department. He was one of the 
people I dealt with directly, collected his dues and got his informa- 
tion. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you ever have any direct relations 
with John P. Davies? 

Miss Bentley. No. 

Mr, Morris. Did you ever have anything to do with any of his re- 
ports, official State Department reports ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes, through the Silvermaster group. I was told 
that he was quite sympathetic to our cause, and I remember one report 
of his that they gave to me which definitely showed that fact. 

Mr. Morris. You were shown a report written by John P. Davies ? 

Miss Bentley. I think it was just after he came back from India. 
I wouldn't swear to it, but I think so. 

Mr. Morris. What did the report show. Miss Bentley ? 

Miss Bentley. I remember at the time saying, "Yes; they were 
quite right about his sympathies," because the report showed it. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you know James S. Allen ? 

Miss Bentley. I may have met him once. I am not sure. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat do you know about James S. Allen? 



440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Miss Bentley. Not too miicli. You see, he was more or less in the 
open party, and I was undercover. So, if I met him at all, it was in 
the early days in the party, when I could associate openly with people. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I might point out that these people 
that we are asking Miss Bentley about are people who are connected 
with the Institute of Pacific Kelations, and have been shown to be such 
by previous exhibits. 

I would like to ])oint that out, Mr. Chairman. 

Do you know Frank Coe? 

Miss Bentley. Not personally. He, again, was a member of the 
Silvermaster group, worked in the Treasury Department. I collected 
his Communist Party dues from the Silvermaster group, and it was 
my understanding from the Silvermasters, again, that he had been a 
member of the party for quite some time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced the exhibits 
into the record which show that Mr. Frank Coe attended conferences 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Mandel, have you anything further ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Kelations, marked "Private IPR Discussion Group on United Nations 
Cooperation," dated March 15, 1943, at 700 Jackson Place, Washing- 
ton, D. C. On this list is Dr. Frank Coe, Michael Greenberg, and 
others. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. That was taken from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. They all came from the files of the institute. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record at this point. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 113 

Private IPR Discussion Group on United Nations Cooperation, March 1-5, 

1943, Washington, D. C. 

members expected 

The Honorable Frances Bolton, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Ralph Bunche, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Edward O. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y. 

Dr. Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Cabot Coville, Department of State, W^ashington, D. C. 

Mrs. Judith Daniel, Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Michael Greenberg, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C. 

Dr. George H. C. Hart, Research Chairman of the Netherlands and Netherlands 

Indies Council, Washington, D. C. 
Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y. 
Mr. William C. .Tohnstone, dean, junior college, George Washington University, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, Washington, D. C. 
Miss Katrine Parsons, Institute of Pacific Relations. New York, N. Y. 
Mr. L<. B. Pearson, Minister-Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C. 
Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington, D. O. 
Mr. R. Tirana, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C. 
Dr. A. P. Tixier, Fighting French Delegation, Washington, D. C. 
Mr. Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 441 

ATTENDANCE UNCERTAIN 

Mr. Wilfred Benzon, International Labor Office, Montreal. 
Mr. Joseph Jones, Department of State, Washington, D. O. 

Mr. David Weintraub, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 
Mr. Len DeCaux, Publicity Director, CIO, Washington, D.C. 

Mr. MoRKis. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about Joseph 
Barnes ? 

Miss Bentley. Not personally ; no. He was a friend of Mr. Golos. 
Mr. Golos worked with him, and Mr. Golos told me he was O. K. 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by "he was O. K."? 

Miss Bentley. That meant that he could be worked with and would 
take directives. 

Mr. Morris. Communist directives ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Bentley, did you know Vladimir Kazakevich? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us what you know about Vladimir Kaza- 
kevich ? 

Miss Bentley. He was originally a White Russian who came to 
this country, I think, in the twenties, and then fell in with some Com- 
munist Russians on the west coast in the early thirties, never actually 
becoming a member in the sense that he was possessed with a book or 
that he was considered one, but to all intents and purposes was just 
as good. He was a propagandist for the Russians. He lectured for 
them. He wrote articles for them, and he had continuous dealings 
with Mr. Golos. 

Whenever he found any interesting information, he brought it in to 
him, knowing where it was going. In fact, Mr. Kazakevich even 
told me several times he knew that. At one time he got a job at 
Cornell University giving courses on Russian civilization to Army 
students. But someone discovered him, I think it was Mr. Woltman 
on the then World Telegram, and he was exposed. I understand 
that he has now gone back to Russia. At least, I read it in a news- 
paper article. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you can tell us what you know about 
Alger Hiss ? 

Mr. Chairman, we have had previous testimony showing that Alger 
Hiss was an adviser of the IPR, and a member of the board of trustees 
of the IPR. For that reason, we are going to ask Miss Bentley if 
she had any connections, indirect or direct, with Alger Hiss. 

Miss Bentley. They were indirect ones, but to my mind conclusive 
ones. 

In 1944 I took on a group of people I called the Perlo group. 

Mr. Morris. Who is Perlo? 

Miss Bentley. Victor Perlo is a gentleman that I understand was 
a quite brilliant statistician with the War Production Board. He is 
now out of the Government. At the last I heard of him, I think he 
is in the Jefferson School in New York. 

One of the members of the group was a Mr. Harold Glasser, in 
the Treasury. 

In the process of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser 
liad, at one time, been pulled out of that particular group and had 
been turned over to a person whom both Mr. Perlo and Mr. Charles 



442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that he was working 
for the Russians, and later they broke down and told me it was Mr. 
Alger Hiss. 

Of course, I immediately checked that with my Soviet superior, 
because it could have been somebody else's intelligence service, and 
could be dangerous. Word came back to me "that is all right. Lay off 
the Hiss thing. He is one of ours, but don't bother about it any more." 

Mr. Morris. And you did not bother about it ? 

Miss Bentley. No. When you were told by your superior to lay 
off, you laid off. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Cha,irman, we have more testimony from Miss 
Bentley in the executive session, but I think it is of such character, 
particularly inasmuch as it involves foreign governments, that we 
should have an executive session on that score. 

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we adjourn until after lunch and 
commence with an executive session at that time. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

The chairman will be unable to preside after lunch. I have an- 
other committee meeting. 

Senator Smith, could you preside ? 

Senator Smith. I have another committee meeting also. I could 
probably be here for a little while. I think my committee starts 
at 3 o'clock. 

Mr. Morris. It is important testimony, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes. I was wondering if we could meet at a later 
hour in the afternoon, when I might get through. What would you 
say to 4 : 30 ? It would be a little late. 

Mr. Morris. That would be all right, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Smith. I might be able to be here for an hour, at 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Morris. I think we will be able to finish in an hour, Senator 
Smith. 

The Chairman. How about at 4 : 30? 

Mr. Morris. That will be fine. Senator. 

Senator Smith. You spoke about collecting Communist dues and 
making your rounds. 

How often did you make these rounds? I believe you said every 
2 weeks. 

Miss Bentley. I came down every 2 weeks. Once in a while it 
would be less frequent, if people were on vacations, and once in a 
while more frequently if there was extra data. I didn't collect them 
every time. 

Perhaps I should explain. Ordinarily, in the open party, they 
try to collect them regularly. When it comes to undercover work, 
it is done more or less as a matter of tightening 3^our hold on a person. 
In other words, the money that you get out of him isn't so important, 
it is impressing on him that he has one more link in the party. 

Senator Smith. Did you collect the dues in other spots than 
Washington ? 

Miss Bentley. Yes. For example, the Perlo group came up to 
New York to meet me, and I collected them there. 

Senator Smith. What is the amount of the dues? 

Miss Bentley. That is one of the most awful things for anyone 
to try to get. I don't know whether you have ever seen a Communist 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 443 

dues scale, but no one short of a financial wizard can keep them 
straight, and they change all the time. 

All I can remember of my own dues is that at one time when I 
earned $25 a week, I paid 25 cents a week dues. But it was broken 
down in categories, almost like an income tax, and then a surtax 
after so much. 

Senator Smith. Did you have any trouble collecting from your 
members ? 

Miss Bentley. Very often. Very often, at least they said, they 
were financially embarrassed. 

Senator Smith. Did you get any money for this work from Russia ? 

Miss Bentley. No ; in our case we didn't, no. As a matter of fact, 
it went the other way around. People w^ere paying dues, including 
myself, for the privilege of being Communists. We were not being 
paid by Russia. But then, that is good espionage practice. The Rus- 
sians told me that they felt that a person who thought something of 
it would be able to go up higher. 

Senator Smith. They train you also on that phase, do they? 

Miss Bentley. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record 
additional evidence that Harry Dexter White was associated with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations ? We have already put in some, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. Mandel. Taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions is a memorandum dated November 3, 1942, for Miss Harriet L. 
Moore, Prof. Philip C. Jessup, and Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, entitled 
"Invitations Issued for the American Group, Mont Tremblant Con- 
ference, Institute of Pacific Relations." 

Listed here as representing the White House, Currie, Lauchlin (at- 
tendance probable) ; Treasury Department, White, Harry D. (in 
London). 

Others mentioned are Frank Coe, William T. Stone, and others. 

Mr. Morris. That was for the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942, 
is that right, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. That is right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 114 

Novembek 3, 1942. 
For : Miss Harriet L. Moore 
Prof. Philip C. Jessup 
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer 

Invitations Issued for the American Group, Mont Tremblant Conference, 
Institute of Pacific Ructions 

White House: Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable.) 

State Department: Hornbeck, Stanley K. (attendance probable.) 

Treasury Department: White, Harry D. (in Loudon.) 

Board of Economic Warfare : 

Perkins, Milo (declined.) 

Coe, Frank (accepted for part time.) 

Stone, William T. (accepted for part time.) 
OflBce of Strategic Services : 

Remer, C. P. (accepted.) 

Despres, Emile (accepted.) 

Bunche, Ralph (accepted.) 

Brown, Norman (accepted.) 



444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Federal Reserve Board : Hansen, Alvin H. 

Office of War Information : Barnes, Joseph (declined.) 

Office of Price Administration: Emerson, Rupert (declined.) 

Congress : Coffee, John M. 

Journalism : 

Luce, Henry R. (declined.) 

Reid, Mrs. Ogden. 

Waymack, W. W. 
Business and law : 

Kizer, Benjamin H. (accepted.) 

Herod, W. R. (declined.) 

Grady, Henry F. (attendance probable.) 

Hoffman, Paul G. 
Labor : 

DeCaux, Len (CIO) (accepted.) 

Shiskin, Boris (AFL.) 
Academic : 

Sproul, R. G. 

Earle, Edward M. (accepted.) 

Shotwell, James T. (declined.) 

Moore, Harriet L. (accepted.) 

Wilbur, Ray Lyman. 

Jessup, Philip C. (accepted.) 

Emeny, Brooks. 

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP 

Governmental: 

Acheson, Dean, Department of State. 

Barnes, Joseph, Office of War Information. 

Baxter, James P., Office of Strategic Services. 

Berle, Adolf, Department of State. 

Beukema, Col. Herman, United States Military Academy. 

Currie, Lauchlin, White House. 

Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration. 

Hamilton, Maxwell, Department of State. 

Hornl)eck, Stanley K., Department of State. 

Nath£ n, Robert, War Production Board. 

Perki/is, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare. 

Stone, William T., Board of Economic Warfare. 

Studebaker, John W., United States Office of Education. 

Wallace, Henry A., Vice President. 

Welles, Sumner, Department of State. 

White, Harry D., Treasury Department. 

Nongovernmental : 

Bates, Searle, University of Nanking; International Missionary Council, 

New York City. 
Binder, Carroll, foreign news editor, Chicago Daily News, Chicago. 
Clapper, Raymond, Scripps-Howard columnist, Washington. 
Dennison, Eleanor, National League of Women Voters, Washington. 
Earle, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. 
Eliot, Thomas, United States Congressman from Massachusetts. Cambridge. 
Field, Frederick V., New York City. 
Gibson, Hugh, New York. 

Grady, Henry F., president, American President Lines, San Francisco. 
Herod, W. R., vice president, International General Electric Co. ; president, 

United China Relief, New York City. 
Jessup, Philip C, Columbia University, New York City. 
Kizer, Benjamin H., chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission, 

Spokane. 
Luce, Henry R., Time, Inc., New York City. 

Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute, Now York City. 
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States district court, Spokane. 
Sproul, Robert G., president. University of Califoi-nia, Berkeley. 
Sproul, Allan, president. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 445 

Sweetland, Monroe, director, National CIO Committee for American and 

Allied War Relief, Washington. 
Viner, Jacob, University of Chicago, Chicago. 
Wilson, C. E., president. General Electric Co., New York City. 
Wilson, Howard, Harvard University ; American Council on Education, 

Cambridge. 
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. (retired) , Newport. 

Mr. Mandel. Here is a letter from the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
dated October 21, 1942, addressed to Robert W. Barnett, from William 
W. Lockwood, and I read a few excerpts : 

The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on 
the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. 
Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to 
get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain 
about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very 
much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up 
the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, 
though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and 
these I'll take up with you later. 

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do. 

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am 
mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to 
say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his 
return. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 
The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 115 

October 21, 1942. 
Mr. Robert W. Barnett, 

/. P. R. 700 Jackson Place NW. 

Dear Bob : The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite suc- 
cessful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy 
prevents. Despres makes the same reservation ; also he is not yet sure of 
being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, al- 
though uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson 
doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed 
to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 
2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in dis- 
cussion, and these I'll take up with you later. 

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do. 

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his ofllce. I am 
mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to 
say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on 
his return. 

I also invited Len De Caux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO 
News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable 
impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him. 

De Caux suggested Boris Shiskin of the A. F. of L. as another good labor 
person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the nom- 
inating committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Wash- 
ington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you 
had better wait for further word from me. 

In the opinion of Hiss, Coe. and Despres, we ought to try to get Berle or 
Ache.son, or both. More about this later, too. 

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possi- 
bilities are Paul Ailing, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State 
Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric 
Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State I>epart- 
ment men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown, 
22848— 52— pt. 2 7 



446 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of 
Brown's section is first rate — imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know 
Brown's qualifications as a conference participant Renter thinks well of Brown 
as more than tlie conventional academician. In his favor are not only his 
position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little at- 
tention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be 
desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior 
' rank among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter 
unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee. 

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stim- 
son's. Coe and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevens, one of Knox's special assistants. 
Hiss also suggested with some approval Harvey Bundy, former assistant Secre- 
tary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General 
Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?) Also General 
Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that 
it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright 
and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the postwar settle- 
ment. 

Still other suggestion include Robert Sherwood, head of the OWI's Over- 
seas Section, and Gardner Cowles. 

Ben Kizer probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and 
leave it to us to follow up with an interview. 

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on 
invitations and acceptances. 

Read Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your 
telephone number He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the OPA 
regional administrator handling Territories and possessions. Next week he 
probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. 
This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group, working for 
Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place. 
Sincerely yours, 

William W. Lockwood, Secretary. 

Mr. Morris. You see there that Harry White is represented as in- 
vited as representing the Treasuiy Department. 

Senator Smith. I think, Mr. Chairman, that maybe the statement 
should be made there that that does not mean, the introduction of this 
exhibit does not mean, that all of tlie people on here, whose names are 
on here, are called suspects because there are names of a great many. 

The Chairman. I understand it is introduced for a purpose, to 
connect Harrj^ Dexter White. 

Mr. Morris. It is introduced to show that Harry Dexter "WHiite 
was interested in IPR activities. 

In this particular case, he was a delegate to the Mont Tremblant 
'Conference in 1942. 

Senator Smith. I see names of a great many American citizens 
here on these two sheets of paper, and I was wonrdering about it. 

The Chairman. The exhibit does not refer to them at all. 

Senator Smith. That is exactly what I wanted. 

Mr. Morris. I think, further along those lines, Mr. Chairman, you 
have pointed out that incidental association between people whom we 
have named as Communists here, which association reflects only mere 
association and nothing significant, that we have asked the members 
of the committee to withhold any conclusions about their particular 
identity with the Communist organization. 

The Chairman. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. One more question. 

Could you tell us what you know about Joseph Eckhart. 

Miss Bentley. Yes, quite a lot about Joseph Eckhart. I met him 
originally in November 1936 because he needed a secretary, or so the 
excuse was, to edit his letters, because his English wasn't too good. 



* INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 447 

I was introduced to him by the then organizational secretary of the 
city office of the League Against War and Fascism. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Who was that ? 

Miss Bentley. Beatrice Carlin. 

That organization, of course, has been thoroughly branded as being 
Communist dominated ; not only that, the organization originated in 
Moscow. It was understood that Mr. Eckhart was a Communist. 

As time went on, he was unable to use me because he had come to 
this comitry, I understand, for the express purpose of trying to get 
airplanes to Spain. That was during the civil war. He was going to 
sneak them out through Mexico. The Neutrality Act intervened along 
in there, and he stayed on until 1938, and found that he couldn't use 
me. 

But I discovered that he was a highly important person at that 
point, that he had come from Moscow without the usual strings of 
reporting to superiors, and I knew him, as I said, from November 1936 
until January, I guess it was, 1938. 

I found out later on that he was a Soviet military intelligence per- 
son. Mr. Golos told me that. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have introduced that testimony into 
evidence not immediately connecting the Institute of Pacific Relations 
with that individual person. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Is that all you have to offer ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, until we have an executive session, Senator. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

The committee will stand in recess until 4 : 30 when we will have an 
executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951, the hearing 
was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, August 16, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1951 

United States Senate, 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat 
McCarran (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins. 

Also present : Senators McCarthy and Mundt ; J. G. Sourwine, com- 
mittee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin 
Mandel, director of research. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Morris, your witness? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am going to call on Mr. Carter first. 
Mr. Canning and Mr. Chambers, I wonder if you would accommo- 
date the gentlemen of the press by letting them have the pictures? 

The Chairman. Let me say to the witnesses that they are not re- 
quired or do not have to have their pictures taken in this committee. 
If there is no objection on their part, they may sit up here and the 
press may take pictures, otherwise they will not be taken. 

JNIr. Chambers. In my case one more will not matter. 

The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter? 

The Chairman. Now again may I say that the acoustics in this 
room are not very good, and when it is crowded it makes it just a 
little bit worse. Will you kindly bear with the committee and try 
to be as quiet as possible, especially if you have to speak to your neigh- 
bor, in which case please resort to the whisper method only. 

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, the witness has been sworn. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWAED C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC 

RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. The purpose of calling Mr. Carter in today is that we 
have run into a certain amount of difficulty in determining the ident- 
ity of a person mentioned in one of the exhibits. Since Mr. Carter 
was the recipient of the letter involved I thought it would be best to 
have him in here to answer this particular question. We had one 
day last week testimony by Prof. Karl August Wittfogel of the 
School of Chinese Studies in Columbia University, testimony that 
Herbert Norman was in 1938 a Communist. 

449 



450 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

In filing our exhibits at the time there was a possibly sig:nificant 
letter that we introduced at the time, which reads as follows, and this 
is a letter now which was introduced as an exhibit on that occasion. 
It is a letter from W. L. Holland to Mr. Carter dated September 5, 
1940. 

The Chairman. Wliat was the origin of that letter? 

Mr. MoRKis. It was identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the 
IPR files. 

The Chairman. Do you know the exhibit number? 

Mr. Morris. What is the exhibit number, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Exhibit No. 72. 

Mr. Morris. I will read the letter. The significant paragraph 
reads as follows : 

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese 
in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan. 

It goes on to list other things that this Pliil is taking with him to 
Japan. 

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be 
reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent 
him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. 

We do not know who Phil is, Mr. Carter. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that counsel is now reading 
from Exhibit 72 of the hearing of the committee. 

Mr. Morris. We thought we would ask Mr. Carter who Phil is, in 
this letter that you received from Mr. Holland. 

Mr. Carter. I will be very glad, Mr. Chairman. 

Tlie Chairman. Just tell us who Phil is, that is the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Identify him by his last name. 

Mr. Carter. Lilienthal. 

The Chairman. That is the answer. 

Mr. Morris. Do you want to say something ? 

Mr. Carter. If I may. In view of the introductory remarks of 
Mr. Morris regarding Mr. Norman, I wish to say that the reiteration 
by the counsel of this committee of Dr. Wittfogel's slanderous attack 
on Mr. Norman is, I think, out of keeping. 

The Chairman. That is the end of the answer, that is sufficient. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, what the secret 
information was that you wanted to send or was being sent ? 

Mr. Carter. May I answer this question ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carter. Mr. Lilienthal was at that time research assistant to 
Mr. W. L. Holland, whose office that year was provided by the Uni- 
versity of California in the offices of the Giannini Foundation, and 
■we had a large number of research manuscripts which Mr. Lilienthal 
was taking to Shanghai to be printed there for two reasons, one be- 
cause costs in Nationalist China for printing were very low, and sec- 
ond, Shanghai was a very good distribution point for the whole Pa- 
cific. Mr. Lilienthal took these manuscripts, but was to stop in Tokyo 
to visit the Japanese IPR. 

It was a somewhat tricky situation because at that time Japan and 
China were at war, and the Japanese were opposed to the IPR at that 
time because the IPR writers usually supported actively China's 
resistance to Japan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There 
might be some necessity of communicating with Mr. Norman, but it 
was undesirable to involve the Chinese and the Japanese in any fur- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 451 

ther controversy, and so we nsed, or it was proposed by Mr. Holland, 
that the facilities of the Canadian Legation be nsed. 

As a matter of fact, there was no occasion for using them, and no 
message was sent. 

Senator P^'erguson. Why did you not use our Embassy, the Ameri- 
can Embassy ? 

Mr. Carter. You would have to ask Mr. Holland that. 

Senator Ferguson. And the secret messages were these documents 
that were to be printed ? 

Mr. Carter. No, they weren't the documents; they were simply 

Senator Ferguson. Manuscripts to become docum.ents ? 

Mr. Carter. The manuscripts were to become documents, but it 
was not about those manuscripts that were to become books, it was in 
the case the Japanese, who were very critical of the international IPR 
and the American IPR at that time because they regarded the IPR 
as pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti- Japanese, it was simply in case some 
misunderstanding of that sort came up that this precaution was taken 
but never exercised. 

Senator Ferguson. Now Herbert Norman. 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he representing the IPR in Ja])an? 

Mr. Carter. No; he had been a research assistant in the- Interna- 
tional Secretariat sometime before, and after he had finished his 
Rockefeller Fellowship at Harvard he wrote one of the really great 
books in the IPR shelf, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. Be- 
cause of his eminence in the Japanese field, after he terminated his 
work with the IPR the Canadian External Affairs Ministry ap- 
pointed him to their Legation in Tokyo. 

Senator Ferguson. Your only reason then for using Norman was 
that he was a member of the Legation ? 

Mr. Carter. Two reasons. One was, he was a former member of 
our staff and was still interested in the institute, and his book was 
continuing its sale, and he was there in the Legation. Mr. Lilienthal 
would see him, and. it was thought that it might be a convenient post- 
office address, but as I said, it was not used. There was no occasion 
to use it. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask a question. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Watkins. Did not the Japanese at that time have a unit 
in the IPR in good standing ? 

Mr. Carter. Oh, yes. 

Senator Watkins. Wliatever material you sent out would be sent 
to them the same as to other countries that had units ? 

Mr. Carter. The final product would be sent to them just as it was 
to all the other countries in the Pacific. 

Senator Watkins. In view of the nature of your organization, 
why was it necessary to have secrets? 

Mr. Carter. Because Japan and China were in a state of violent 
war, although I think technically it was undeclared. 

Senator Watkins. That is the only reason ? 

Mr. Carter. Obviously. 

Senator Watkins. I do not think it is so obvious, otherwise I might 
have caught it before you gave your answer. 

Mr. Carter. It was obvious to me. I am sorry I did not make it 
obvious to you. 



452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chaikman. Any further questions? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter here, and while we 
have Mr. Carter on the stand I would like to ask him a few questions 
on it. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. We had testimony yesterday, day before yesterday, 
by Elizabeth Bentley that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent. That 
was brought out in the regular course of her testimony, and she knew 
that from her official dealings in the Communist Party. 

Now this letter concerns itself with The Unfinished Revolution in 
China, which was written by Israel Epstein, and this letter, which 
Mr. Mandel will identify, was one of the letters taken from the IPE 
files. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations dated June 12, 1947. Would you like it read ? 

Mr. Morris. May I have a copy of that, please ? 

I think, Mr. Chairman, if we have this read paragraph by para- 
graph and then I will ask Mr. Carter a few questions about it. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read the first two paragraphs? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Morris, if you have copies of that letter, would 
you give a copy to Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is marked "Private and confidential." 

Dear Miss Fobd : 

The reference is to Miss Ann Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown 
& Co.— 

This is to acknowledge Epstein's Tlie Unfinishecl Kevoiution in China, which 
you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it 
and hope to complete it within a few days. 

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting 
it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, 
Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives ; John Foster Dulles and John Carter 
Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make 
certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject 
might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was 
an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my 
recommendation. 

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound under- 
standing and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally impor- 
tant to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you 
thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for 
Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would he all 
to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. 
Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts. 

Mr. Morris. That is enough for the time being. "Wliy were you 
so interested, Mr. Carter, to have the leaders, the heads of our State 
Department, John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, and Secretary 
of State George Marshall, read The Unfinislied Revolution in China 
by Israel Epstein ? 

Mr. Carter. And Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives. It struck 
me as a human document by a man who had been long in China and 
seenied to me to have a rather broad and deep knowledge of things 
Chinese and the Chinese people. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 453 

Mr. Morris. Did you not know that Israel Epstein was a Soviet 
agent ? 

Mr. Carter. I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you recognize the book as a Communist publica- 
tion ? 

Mr. Carter. I did not. I would hardly have sent it to as astute and 
wise and patriotic men as this list if I had thought that it was Com- 
munist propaganda. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you never knew Israel Ep- 
stein was a Communist ? 

Mr. Carter. At that time. 

Mr. Morris. Or a special pleader for the Communists ? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

The Chairman. The question was, Did you know him to be ? 

Mr. CxiRTER. I did not know him to be a Communist on June 12, 
1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you changed your mind since then as to 
whether or not he was ? 

The Chairman. I think you could answer that question "Yes" or 
"No" and then make your explanation. It would save time, Mr. 
Carter, if you do that. 

Mr. Carter. I am terribly sorry. Senator McCarran, but this is 
one of the things that you can't say "Yes" or "No." 

The Chairman. Read the question and see whether you can answer 
"Yes" or "No." 

Senator Ferguson. Let me put the question again. Have you 
changed your mind as to Epstein being or ever having been a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Carter. I have reconsidered and have not reached a final 
conclusion. 

Senator Ferguson. You are now in doubt ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You are familiar with this book, 
are you not, The Unfinished Revolution in China ? 

Mr. Carter. I haven't read it for a long time. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I would like to have the clerk of the com- 
mittee put some of these paragraphs in here, but I do not want to delay 
this examination this morning. 

The Chairman. If you will designate, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I will have them designated and see that they 
go in the record here, and I will have a copy of that furnished to you 
and then ask you, and get an answer later, about what you think in 
the light of your reconsideration. 

Mr. Carter. Thank you. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The witness has made a statement that on June 12, 
1947, he did not know Mr. Epstein to be a Communist ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So that we might have a comprehensive answer on 
that point, Mr. Carter, did you on June 12, 1947, know Mr. Epstein 
ever to have been a Communist or ever to have worked for the Com- 
munists ? 



454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Carter. I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the next to 
the last paragraph in the letter — that is, the next to the last in the 
P. S. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

P. S.— Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think 
this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of 
the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the 
New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other 
publications will make as wise a choice. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter, what did you mean there, that Epstein 
was a special pleader ? 

Mr. Carter. He was pleading for the Chinese people. 

Mr. Morris. That is your interpretation of the expression "many 
will say that Epstein is a special pleader" ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. He was pleading also for a new kind of world, 
was he not ? Do you not say that ? 

The Chairman. It is the P. S., I think. 

Mr. Morris. He has it, I believe. 

Mr. Carter. He is "pleading for a more sound analysis of the 
world than many of the other current special pleaders." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, Mr. Epstein was there pleading for 
what you thought was a sound analysis of the world ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In view of the fact that we had Israel Epstein identi- 
fied as a Soviet agent as of that time, does it surprise you about your 
own opinions of tlie world situation at that time ? 

Mr. Carter. Not completely because some of the identifications al- 
leged in this room haven't convinced me of their authenticity. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony then that you do not believe that 
Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent at that time ? 

Mr. Carter. I had no knowledge at that time that he was a Soviet 
agent, and I do not know today whether he was or was not. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to read one paragraph here about you 
saying that he was a special pleader for a new kind of world and ask 
you whether it was this kind of world that you were talking about. 
This is page 411. 

The only point in this formulation with which a student in political science 
might quarrel was the phrase "Communistic form of government." Communism 
is not a form of government but an economic society. 

Now, is that what you were talking about, that he was a special 
pleader for that ? 

Mr. Carter. Well, not having read the book for some time and 
being confronted with a few sentences out of a big book 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Carter. At the moment I don't feel tliat I would help the com- 
mittee at all by making an answer. I would be very glad to study it 
and send you in writing my reaction and my answer to your question. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were saying that he was a special 
pleader for a particular form of government or kind. 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 455 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that Epstein was advocating 
communism in this book ? 

Mr. Carter. I don't want to be difficult, but I would like to read 
the book unhurriedly. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you questions later on it then. 

]Mr. Carter. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, there was reference there to — 

I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. 
I hope other publications will make as wise a choice. 

I think it would be appropriate to make excerpts from Mr. Lattimore's 
review, which appeared in the New York Times. 

Senator Ferguson. First, I would like to ask Mr. Carter the ques- 
tion, Did you think that Owen Lattimore would give the same kind of 
review of this book as you had in mind, a new form of government 
that was appropriate ? 

Mr. Carter. I can't remember what I had in mind. I did regard 
and still regard Owen Lattimore as very acknowledgeable about 
China, and this was a book by a man who knew a great deal about 
China. Whether I had in mind any particular emphasis on this or 
that point in the book I can't for the life of me remember this 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you were all for the book ? 

Mr. Carter. I thought it was a good book, and that it should have 
wide circulation, and that it should come to the attention of our most 
thoughtful Americans. 

Senator Ferguson. And you felt that if Owen Lattimore reviewed 
this book he would take the same slant on it as you have taken ? 

]Mr. Carter. Well, I thought he probably would see that it was a 
useful book. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You anticipated that he would follow the 
same thinking on it as 3'ou had ? 

Mr. Carter. No. , 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you say "I hope other publications will 
make as wise a choice." 

Mr. Carter. I thought he vv^as a qualified reviewer, and I hoped 
that otlier papers would get equally qualified reviewers. 

Senator Ferguson. And 3'ou anticipated that he would recom- 
mend it ? 

Mr. Carter. I thought it was likely. 

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith, I think, wanted to ask a ques- 
tion. 

Senator Smith. I was wondering if Mr. Carter would read the 
last paragraph on sheet 2 and tell us what he meant by that. 

The Chairman. Will you kindly read that, Mr. Carter? 

Senator Smith. Out loud. 

Mr. Carter (reading) : 

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" 
list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of 
Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like 
Benjamin Welles — 

That is the son of Sumner Welles — 

Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few 
others, before the bronze curtain falls. 



456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Smith. Wliat did you mean by that paragraph, Mr. 
Carter? 

Mr. Carter. I thought that it certainly should be in the hands of 
our Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, who has a lifelong knowledge of 
China, some of our principal American correspondents, and Sun Fo, 
who was a member of the Chiang Kai-shek cabinet, Madame Sun Yat- 
sen, who was a member of the Soong family, and others. 

It seemed to me that I was suggesting that this book come to the 
attention of first, correspondents from the Times and Tribune and 
other American papers. 

Senator Smith. Wlien you put in quotation marks "forbidden list," 
what did 3^011 mean by that ? 

Mr. Carter. I knew at that time that the war- weariness following 
the war, the difficulty of reorganizing China at that time after the 
devastation of the Japanese and so forth, that some agencies of the 
Nationalist Government were very sensitive to any criticism of the 
regime and that they might, that some bureaucrats might, put this 
on a forbidden list. 

Senator Smith. You regard this book as inimical to the ISTational- 
ist interests then ? 

Mr. Carter. No, I though it could be very useful to the National- 
ist Government, but I thought tliat some of the less intelligent bureau- 
crats in the Nationalist Government might think it was hostile. 

Senator Smith. Do you not think it was hostile to the Nationalist 
Government ? 

Mr. Carter. On what point ? 

Senator Smith. The book. 

Mr. Carter. I think I said I would comment after I had read the 
book. But I think it was critical of certain features in the National- 
ist Government, features that our own Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, 
was aware of and constantly labored in private with Chiang Kai-shek 
to reform. 

Senator Smith. Do you not regard the iDook as being one that 
would add to the blame, so to speak, of the Nationalist cause and en- 
courage the Communists ? 

Mr. Carter. I did not so regard it. 

Mr. Morris. Did you not regard it as an open espousal of the 
Communist cause? 

Mr. Carter. I did not. 

Mr. Morris. How can you reconcile the fact that Israel Epstein in 
your opinion was a special pleader for Communist China? It was 
your testimony that he was a special pleader for the Chinese. 

Mr. Carter. I felt that Leighton Stuart was a special pleader for 
the Chinese. 

The Chairman. That is not the question. 

Mr. Morris. In view of your testimony when you discussed the idea 
of Israel Epstein being a special pleader, you felt he was a special 
pleader on the part of Communist China ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How can you reconcile this paragraph which Senator 
Smith has been just examining you on where you say that the book 
would probably be put on the forbidden list by China? 

Mr. Carter. Put on the forbidden list, as I said, by some bureau- 
crat. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 457 

Mr. Morris. By the Chinese Government? Obviously it is an 
official list you are talking about ? 

Mr. Carter. The dichotomy in the various bureaus of the Chinese 
Government, or multichotomy, were such that, as in some other gov- 
ernments, one section of the government doesn't know what the other 
section's right hand and left hand is doing. 

Senator Watkins. Modeled after our own ? 

Mr. Carter. I wouldn't make that aspersion. 

Mr. Morris. I would like an answer, Mr. Chairman, to my question 
whether this book was an open espousal of the Communist Chinese 
cause. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask a question. You at least 
thought, Mr. Carter, that this book was more favorable to the Com- 
munist element in China than it was to the then existing Nationalist 
Government ? 

INIr. Carter. I wouldn't affirm that without reading the book again. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you wanted to get it to Madame Sun 
Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes, and Sun Fo, members of the Cabinet. 

Senator Ferguson. But Madame Sun Yat-sen, you wanted to get 
it to her ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. She was more favorable to the Communist side 
at that time? 

Mr. Carter. She was very keen on the united front. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the united front meant to some of those 
people victory for the Communists, did it not? 

Mr. Carter. I suppose it did to the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson, Yes. Now was she not favorable to the Com- 
munist side? 

Mr. Carter. She is apparently living now under Communist rule. 
I don't know whether she is having a good time or bad time. 

Mr. Morris. She is an official of the Government, is she not? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Have you any doubt that she is sympa- 
thetic to the Communist Government? 

Mr. Carter. Pretty nearly everyone — the Chinese Communist Gov- 
ernment, the Communist Government of China, contains hundreds, 
thousands of former Chiang Kai-shek officials. 

Senator Ferguson. But that does not say that they are not Com- 
munists ? 

JNIr. Carter. They may or may not be. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think the present Chinese Government 
in China proper is not a Communist Government? 

_Mr. Carter. The leaders arc Communists and are following defi- 
nitely an out-and-out Communist line, but there are employed in high 
positions in that Communist Government a great many Chinese who 
were loyal supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the National regime. 
Which category Madame Sun Yat-sen is in today I don't know. I 
have read a great many attacks saying that she has gone over hook, 
bait, and sinker to the Communist cause. 

I have heard other statements that she is very critical of many of 
the features of the Communist regime and not having been on the spot 
I am not able to reach any balance. 



458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You do not want to say then that this book was 
more favorable to the Communist side of the Government, of the 
people in China, that were represented ? 

Mr. Carter. Not until I have read it. 

Senator Ferguson. But not withstanding this statement that you 
were fearful that it was going on the forbidden list and would be kept 
out? 

Mr. Carter. As I said, there were cliques, there are opposition 
groups, within the Kuomintang government, and as the Senator 
hinted, as there exists elsewhere. 

Senator Watkins. I was referring to the fact that you said one 
group would not know what the other group was doing. I thought 
that perhaps you meant they were following what our people were 
doing. 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find Owen Lattimore more sympa- 
thetic to the Communist China side than to the Kuomintang side ? 

Mr. Carter. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. But you thought he was a wise choice to review 
this kind of a book? 

Mr. Carter. I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Mr. Mandel read 
excerpts from this review by Owen Lattimore, which has been referred 
to in testimony. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. This review is taken from the New York Times book 
review section, June 22, 1947, pages 5 and 29. I will read excerpts : 

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and 
Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished- — 
and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what 
they had to say aboUjt China. Israel Epstein has without question established 
a place for himself in that distinguished company * * *. 

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuo- 
mintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the 
Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *. , 

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies 
Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to 
each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has pre- 
sented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion. 

The Chairman. Wlio wrote that? 

Mr. Morris. Owen Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Did tliat disappoint you when you said that 
you hoped other publications would make as wise a choice ? 

Mr. Carter. This was written over 4 years ago. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall now that Lattimore said that 
about the book ? 

Mr. Carter. I don't. I am very glad to see it and discover that 
Lattimore was writing frankly and honestly about the book. 

Senator Ferguson. Now your opinion of Lattimore, does that bring 
you to the conclusion that this book was more favorable to the Com- 
munists than to the non-Communists ? 

Mr. Carter. It does ; certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. No doubt about it? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 459 

Senator Smith. Your letter of June 12, 1947, is the one that had 
the paragraph that I directed your attention to just now. I notice 
this review was published in the New York Times June 22, 1947, 10 
days after you wrote the letter ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Had you seen Lattimore's review that was going 
to be published at the time you wrote your letter of the 12th? 

Mr. Carter. No; I hadn't seen it. Well, I don't remember. I 
think it's unlikely, but I can't swear to it. Mr. Morris might bring 
up something. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter, are you now going to change your testi- 
mony, namely, that you did not recognize that to be an open espousal 
of the Chinese Communist cause on further thought ? 

Mr. Carter. I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that on piecemeal quota- 
tions I would like to read the book. 

The Chairman. The question is. Are you going to change your 
mind ? 

Mr. Morris. I have two other reviews that I think are appropriate. 

Senator Ferguson. You agreed with this opinion of Lattimore? 
You usually agreed with Lattimore's opinion on China; did you not? 

Mr. Carter. Usually, not invariably. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you now in conflict with this opinion? 
Does this not refresh your memory ? 

Mr. Carter. Well, it tells me what Lattimore's reaction to the 
book was. 

Senator Fergi^son. You never got that reaction ? 

Mr. Carter. I can't remember. I am not trying to stall. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it not seem strange to you now, not having 
to use hindsight, that you would recommend a book to George Mar- 
shall, Senator Vandenberg, my distinguished colleague, and others 
mentioned in this article, that Owen Lattimore talked of in this 
language ? Does that not now seem strange to you ? 

Mr. Carter. Well, I have such high respect for the intellectual 
ability and integrity of ail those men that I must have thought they 
would make up their own minds. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to get this side at least to them, 
the Communist side ? 

Mr. Carter. I had no desire to do that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you reconcile that with Latti- 
more's judgment that you respect so much, on China if this was not a 
Communist propaganda book? 

Mr. Carter. Of course, I have to let you do the reconciling. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever know a Communist to do 
some writing that he did not infiltrate his writings with Communist 
propaganda ? You have been a great reader and a student. Have you 
ever kno\yn a Communist to write and not infiltrate his writing with 
Communist propaganda ? 

Mr. Carter. I have read translations of Soviet Eussia, presumably 
Communist scientists on fish, on forests, on cattle breeding, where 
I could never discover a Communist line. That is my answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us get a little closer. I will change my 
question a little. You did answer that, I think, by some avoidance 
when you got to fish and cattle. Let us go into the political field. 



460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Have you ever known a Communist writer to not infiltrate his political 
writings with Communist propaganda? 

Mr. Carter. I think it's their usual pattern. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Not only usual. 

Mr. Carter. Invariably, you would say ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want that answer to stand about the 
fish now, or do you want to strike it out ? 

Mr. Carter. No; I would leave it in. Put reindeer in also. 

Senator Ferguson. 1 still think the Commies have a line on the 
fish question. 

Mr. Carter. The Japanese think so. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you read excerpts from two other 
reviews of the same book ? 

Mr. Mandel. I read excerpts from a review by Frederick V. Field 
appearing in the New Masses for July 22, 1947, on pages 20 and 21. 
The New Masses is a Communist magazine. 

The main subject of the Unfinished Revolution in China is the history, first, 
of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the 
Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imper- 
ialism. * * * 

Then we find further down the following : 

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where 
the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that 
resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurted forward. * * ♦ 

The next is a quotation from the Daily Worker of June 18, 1947, 
a review of the same book by Samuel Si Hen . 

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books 
by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, 
Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book 
published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution in China. 

Mr. Morris. Had you read cither of those reviews, Mr. Carter? 
" Mr. Carter. I don't subscribe to either the New Masses or the Daily 
"Worker. I see them occasionallj^ on subway stands. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recognize now that the three reviews are very 
much similar, in fact, Sillen's analysis of the thing, talking about the 
distinguished company, almost coincides completely with Lattimore's? 

Mr. Carter. Well, not quite ; Lattimore does not mention Smedley, 
Guenther Stein, or Harrison Forman. 

Mr. Morris. He mentioned Edgar Snow's Eed Star Over China, 
and Ted White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China, and 
says: 

Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that 
distinguished company. 

Mr. Carter. Is that from the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. MoKRis. No; that is from the review by Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Was tliat distinguished company ? 

Mr. Carter. Lattimore thought so. You will have to ask him. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Carter, with respect to the thing by Field, pub- 
lished in the New Masses 10 days after your letter, had you seen 
Mr. Field's review at the time you wrote your letter ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 461 

Mr. Carter. No. 

Senator Smith. Were not you and Mr. Field working very closely 
at that time, June 1947? 

Mr. Morris. He was a member of your executive committee, was he 
not, Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Carter. I have forgotten the exact date. Perhaps you could 
refresh my memory as to when he resigned from the board's executive 
committee. He had a long time previously resigned as a member 
of the staff, and when he resigned as a member of the staff my weekly 
or monthly or daily contact with him ceased. He was working on 
other things mostly. 

Senator Smith. Did you subscribe to what Field said in his review? 

Mr. Carter. I don't remember seeing it until this morning. "Which 
particular point? 

Senator FERGUSOisr. About the American imperialism. 

Senator Smith (reading) : 

that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists 

Mr. Carter. That was the usual Communist line all over the world, 
that the people of the United States of America were imperialists if 
we had taken over the job from the French, and so forth. 

Senator Smith. This was a review of that book ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Is this one of the reasons why you wanted this 
book to be distributed in China to slant the people further in favor 
of the Communists ? 

Mr. Carter. "N^^iat I was concerned about, Senator, was that the 
most intelligent people in this country could get an understanding 
of various points of view and stresses in China. I felt that unless 
the Kuomintang cleaned house economically, administratively, mili- 
tarily, the Communists were bound to take over, and I hoped that 
public opinion in this country could be so informed that before it 
was too late Chiang Kai-shek and the better elements in the National- 
ist Government could listen to our Ambassador Leighton Stuart^ 
listen to others, clean house, and prevent the Communists from taking 
over China. 

Senator Smith. But your paragraph here was referring to getting 
the book circulated in China. 

Mr. Carter. Well, my focus first of all with the American edition 
was to get it circulated in the United States. A second suggestion 
was that there be a Chinese edition in the hope that it would reach 
as many Chinese as possible who were in a position to aid in the reform 
of the Kuomintang and shoring it up and making it so democratic, 
so efHcient, that the Chinese Communists would have nothing to offer 
and that Chiang and the better element around liim would remain 
in China. And we now know he is not in China but is in Formosa. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Carter, did you then think that the way to 
change the Chiang Kai-shek government was to espouse the cause 
of communism? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Is not that just what this book did? Is that 
not exactly what the book did ? 

Mr. Carter. If that is your opinion. 

22848 — 52— pt. 2 8 



462 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. I take tliese men who wrote about it. Is that 
not what they say it did ? 

Mr. Carter. It certainly looks like it. 

Senator Ferguson. You read it before you recommended it ? 

Mr. Carter. I read the book, I think, in manuscript or galley proof. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you now think that that was the way 
to change the Government of China, was to advocate the Communists ? 

Mr. Carter. I did not; I just said that I thought we were play- 
ing for time as a chance that Chiang, with American aid, could save 
the situation and stop the Communist avalanche. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you know of any other books 
of similar nature that you recommended to our Secretary of State 
and those that were in the Far Eastern Division or people in Con- 
gress that had som-ething to say in relation to foreign policy that was 
similar to the Epstein book ? 

Mr. Carter. It was our practice to send to appropriate officers of 
our Government copies of all our publications. Of course, they 
automatically went to the Library of Congress, they went to those 
few people in Congress who were members of IPR, the Far Eastern 
Division, the Secretary of State's Office, and so on. 

Senator Ferguson. It was your purpose to influence public opinion 
in America in the Far East? 

Mr. Carter. It was our purpose to provide facts and diverse opinion 
so that the public could make up its own mind. Mr. Koot, Mr. 
Hughes, many of our Secretaries of State have said that the Govern- 
ment has great difficulty in acting intelligently because of the lack 
of an informed public opinion. So far as the Pacific was concerned 
we conceived our role to get the facts, to provide a variety of opinions, 
analyses from all sorts of points of view so that the public, the 
Government, press, and business could make up its own mind. 

Senator Ferguson. You did hope, however, that it would follow 
the sugg^estions that you were making? 

Mr. Carter. The institute as such didn't make suggestions on 
policy at all. 

Senator Ferguson. You were hoping that this book, the Unfinished 
Kevolution in China, would influence American public opinion? 

Mr. Carter. We thought it should be; I thought it should be con- 
sidered. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "we" who do you mean, Mr. Carter? 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Carter. Mr. Larrimore w^as not on the staff of Pacific Affairs 
at that time. I meant my colleagues on the staff. I wish now to 
speak for myself. I hoped that this and other books would aid because 
I think you remember, Senator McCarran, always throughout our 
history we have concentrated on Europe. We teach French, Italian, 
German, and Spanish. It is only recently that we have taught 
Chinese and Japanese. We wanted the public to have ample data on 
the Far East. 

The ChairIman. So for that reason you wanted a Communist 
doctrine spread in this country ; is that right? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you mark this "private and confi- 
dential" when you wanted so many people to know about it? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 463 

Mr. Carter. Well, I was writing to a publisher, Little, Brown & 
Co. in Boston using the names of eminent people whom I had not 
consulted. I had not consulted Senator Vandenberg or General 
Marshall. I simply said, "You may wish to get this book into the 
hands of these people." 

Senator Ferguson. Was the reason that you wanted this private and 
confidential that you were saying that this book would be forbidden 
in your opinion in Nationalist China? 

Mr. Carter. It could be. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be a reason for keeping this con- 
fidential ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, without laboring this point too long 
I would like three more paragraphs read into the record at this time. 
Would vou read the first three paragraphs in the P. S. ? 

The Chairman. Of what? 

Mr. Morris. From the letter of Mr. Carter to Miss Ford. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, 
that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from 
him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy. 

P. S. 2. — Referring to General INIarshall, I wish you could find someone who 
could get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with 
Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative 
effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role. 

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open 
mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he 
has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book 
he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover. 

Mr. JSIoRRis. Mr. Carter, why were you so anxious that John Carter 
Vincent read the book ? 

Mr. Carter. Wasn't he Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the 
State Department at that time ? 

Mr. JNIoRRis. x\s such did he have access to General Marshall? 

Mr. Carter. Well, through, I suppose, the Under Secretary of 
State. I never knew whether he went directly to General Marshall 
or not. 

Mr. Morris. Why do you say here— 

If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it 
from cover to cover. 

Mr. Carter. John Carter Vincent's official duty at the that time was 
to handle the China administration of the State Department, and 
he would probably be regarded in a formal organization of the De- 
partment by General Marshall as one of the far eastern experts. 

The Chairman. And you thought that this book would be a good 
book for General Marshall to be guided by naturally ^ 

Mr. Carter. I thought it would be a good thing for him to read. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat did you mean when you said, Mr. Carter : 

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open 
mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he 
has probably never seen it organized so logically. 

What did you mean by that, Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Carter. I thought John Carter Vincent was very open-minded, 
I still do, and I thought that there would be very little material that 
M'as in it new to him. 



464 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Why do you say that, Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Carter. Because his whole machinery of the State Department, 
War, Navy, Treasury, Agriculture, the data, the intelligence, of that 
whole area came automatically to him and his colleagues. 

Mr. Morris. Including Communist doctrine? 

Mr. Carter. Weil, the State Department's job was to find out what 
was going on, whether the people who were operating were friends or 
foes. Their duty was to study Communist China. They sent people 
to study. Any government tliat is on its job has its intelligence offi- 
cers going into what is called enemy territory and our Government 
apparently did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter, did you ever consider John Carter Vincent 
to be a Communist? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two docu- 
ments received as the next consecutive exhibits. 

The Chairman. They will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 116 

June 12, 1947. 
Private and confidential. 

Miss Anne Ford, 

Publicity Director, Little, Broion & Co., Boston, Mass. 

Dear Miss Ford : This is to acknowledge Epstein's The Unfinished Revolution 
in China, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two- 
thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days. 

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting 
it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, 
Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter 
Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make 
certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject 
might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was 
an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my 
recommendation. 

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound under- 
standing and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally im- 
portant to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have 
you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for 
Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all 
to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. 
Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts. 

Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing 
a cheap paper cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines 
and China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, 
Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies? 

The book combines in one volume several books. It is a penetrating history of 
China during the war years. It is a sociological document of importance, and 
it is a military handbook that might have been of enormous value to the Maquis 
in France and even to the little handful of anti-Hitler Germans in Germany. 
It might become a military and political handbook for Viet-Nam and in other 
Asiastic areas if the imperialist powers try to reassert their pre-Pearl Harbor 
domination. 

The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in 
the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, 
as well as new methods, to the millions of Chinese who are dissatisfied with 
the right wing Kuomintang domination. You have only to read the newspapers 
to discover what a large potential market for Epstein's book there is amongst 
non-rommnnist professors and students in the Chinese universities. The 
history of the last few decades proves conclusively that the Chinese student 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 465 

movements are far more influential in China than in many other countries 
in starting new and cx'eative political and social movements. 

More than at any other time in recent years, there is a large British public 
both in the United Kingdom, Canada, and also in Australia and New Zealand 
which would find the book illuminating, not only with reference to China, but 
in their thinking with reference to a great many movements in the continent 
of Europe and elsewhere. 

I congratulate Little, Brown & Co.'s unerring wisdom in deciding, not only 
to publish this book, but in leaving no stone unturned in getting a very viide 
circulation. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

P. S. — I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, 
however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete sugges- 
tions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately 
a copy. 

P. S. 2. — Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who 
would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end 
with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumu- 
lative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his 
own role. 

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open 
mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but hei 
has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book 
he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover. 

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is 
probably true, bi^t I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world 
than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York 
Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications 
will make as wise a choice. 

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" 
list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of 
Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like 
Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sim 
Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117" and 
is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 117 

Reviews op The Unmnished Revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, Boston, 
Mass., Little, Brown & Co. 

(By Owen Lattimore, New York Times, Book fleview, June 22, 1947, pp. 5 
and 29) : 

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and 
Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished — 
and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what 
they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established 
a place for himself in that distinguished company. » * * 

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomin- 
tang, like ]\Ir. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese 
Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * * 

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies 
Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to 
each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has pre- 
sented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion. 

He convinces me that the trend of the civil war in China is not toward 
the triumph of an ideology or the winning of dictatorial power by individual 
generals or politicians. * * * 



(By Frederick V. Field, New Masses, July 22, 1947, pp. 20-21) : 
• * * The people of China have arisen against both their native and 
foreign oppressors and because it happens that their foreign oppressors are 
today primarily American imperialists the story of this great historical event 
is especially pertinent to the political life of the American people. 



466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

There is no other book that so faithfully or expertly records this momentous 
turning point in history as Epstein's * * * 

What distinguishes Epstein's work from the notable contributions of the 
others is, first, that his is more comprehensive both at the contemporary and 
historical levels, and second, the amazing wealth of detail which he has 
assembled. * * * 

The main subject of The Unfinished Revolution In China is the history, first, 
of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the 
Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. 
* * * He writes about the American missionary who sold out to the would- 
be emperor Yuan Shih-Kai and the reader recognizes the present Congressman 
who now parallels his infamous role. 

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where 
the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that 
resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurted forward. * * * 

The Unfinished Revolution In China deserves to be widely read. 



(By Samuel Sillen, Daily Worker, June 18, 1947, p. 11) : 

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years- 
books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smed- 
ley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a 
book published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution In China. 

Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that is all we want on thi& 
particular point at this time. 

Mr. Carter. Thank you. Senator. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you call Mr. Canning ? 

The Chairman. Mr. Canning, will you come forward, please? 

Will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the 
testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Canning. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARTIN CANNING, CINCINNATI, OHIO 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, will you give your name and address to 
the stenographer, please ? 

Mr. Canning. William Martin Canning, 789 North Crescent 
Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, will you tell us your most recent employ- 
ment? 

Mr. Canning. I was until recently on the staff of Xavier University 
of Cincinnati. 

Mr. Morris. You are a graduate of what college ? 

Mr. Canning. College of the City of New York. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a graduate degree ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, I have a master's degree from Columbia. 

Mr. Morris. In what year did vou obtain that, Mr. Canning? 

Mr. Canning. 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Cannins:, did you ever join the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Canning. I did. 

Mr. Morris. When did you join the Communist Party? 

Mr. Canning. In the early part of 1936 I joined the Communist 
Party unit at the City College. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 467 

Mr. Morris. And how long did you remain a member of the Com- 
mnnist Party? 

Mr. Canning. A little over 2 years, until the latter part of 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, during that period were you ever in a 
position that you were able to discern people in the Communist move- 
ment and learn of their identity? 

Mr. Canning. Yes. I, of course, was active in the City College 
unit and as a student at Columbia I knew others there at Columbia 
who belonged to other units of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. What was your position in the Communist fraction 
there, Mr. Canning. 

Mr. Canning. At City College? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Canning. Well, I had various positions at one time or another. 
I assisted in the editing of a secret publication distributed among the 
staff, the City College Teacher- Worker. I was also literature director 
for another period. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder generally, Mr. Canning, could you give us an 
idea of how many members of the City College faculty were in the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. Canning. Somewhere between 40 and 50. I have forgotten 
that now. 

Senator Ferguson. Out of a total number of how many ? 

Mr. Canning. The total staff? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Canning. The total staff consisted perhaps of 300, at least 300. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, you also had occasion to know who some 
of the people on the Columbia faculty were who were members of the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. Canning. Not so much on the faculty, but I did know graduate 
students who were members of the Columbia unit. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the schools have separate cells? 

Mr. Canning. That is right ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of calling Mr. Canning 
here today is to ask him to identify some of these people that he 
encountered in City College and at Columbia whose affairs have come 
into the Institute of Pacific relations, and we are going to discuss that. 

First, of all, Mr. Canning, did you know a man named Lawrence 
Kosinger ? 
' Mr. Canning. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about him ? 

Mr. Canning. I knew Lawrence Eosinger while he was a student 
at City College and subsequently when he continued on at Columbia in 
graduate work. I knew Lawrence Rosinger to be a member of the 
Columbia University unit of the Communist Party. 

Mr, Morris. Is there any doubt in your mind whatever that Mr. 
Eosinger was a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Canning. No. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you meet him ? 

Mr. Canning. Quite frequently. 

Mr. Morris. Will you estimate it as much as possible? 

Mr. Canning. I would meet him at Columbia several times a week 
during 1936 and 1937, in that period. 



468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the 
record at this time evidence of Eosinger's activities within the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. I would just like to ask a question. Did you dis- 
cuss communism with Rosinger ? 

Mr. Canning, I did ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you feel certain that he was a member of 
the Columbia unit? 

Mr. Canning. There is no doubt in my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. No doubt? 

Mr. Canning. No. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. These excerpts have been taken from the official pub- 
lications of the Institute of Pacific Relations and from books written 
by Mr. Rosinger and I read some of these excerpts. 

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937 — 44, Princeton University Press in 
cooperation with the International Secretariat of the IPR, published in 1944. 

On the jacket of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "State of Asia," and 
this book is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions in 1951, 1 quote: 

Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far-eastern events as a member of the re- 
search staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books in- 
clude China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44 — 

and so forth. 

He is listed as a member of a meeting staff and round table recorder 
in a volume entitled "Problems of the Pacific, 1939, Proceedings of 
the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Con- 
ference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939," page 
275. 

He is listed as a conference member of other conferences in 1939 and 
in 1949. The one held in New Delhi, India, was in 1949. 

Then his writings in the official publications of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, including the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Af- 
fairs, are here listed. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Senator, I would like to have that received as the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 118" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 118 

• La WHENCE K. ROSINGEB 

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44 Princeton University Press In 
cooperation with the International Secretariat, IPR, 1944. 

"Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the 
research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include 
China's Wartime Politics, 1937^4 ; China Crisis ; Restless India, and India and 
the United States." (Jacket of State of Asia. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and 
Associates. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1951). 

Listed as a meeting staff and round table recorder (Problems of the Pacific — 
1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
Seventh Conference, "Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939, p. 
275). 

Listed as a conference member : 

"Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign 
Policy Association." (Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 469 

Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., Jan* 
ary 6-17, 1945, p. 160). 

"L. K. Rosinser, associate member, American Delegation India-American Con- 
ference, New Delhi, December 1949, listed as research associate, American In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations." ( Source : Indian- American Relations, Proceedings 
of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949 issued 
under the joint auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American 
Institute of Pacific Relations. P. 72.) 

"Mr. Rosinger is a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific 
Relation ; and of the editorial board of its magazine, the Far Eastern Survey." 
(Jacket of India and the United States by Lawrence K. Rosinger, An Institute 
of Pacific Relation Book, 1950). 

"Writer of the following articles for the Far Eastern Survey : 

Book Reviews, 1944, pages 73 and 133. 

India in World Politics, 1949, pages 229-33. 

The White Paper In Brief, 1949, pages 205-208. 

Book Review, 1949, page 95. 
Writer of the following articles for Pacific Affairs : 

Book Review, 193G. pages 610-611. 

Book Review, 1937, pa^es 102-103. 

Book Review, 1938, pages 421-432. 

Book Review, 1939, pages 186-188. 

The Far East and the New Order In Europe, 1939, pages 357-369. 

Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War, 1939, pages 263-277. 

Book Review, 1940, pages 3GG-367. 

Book Review, 1940, pages 111-113. 

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1940, pages 263-278. 

Book Review, 1941, pages 480-482. 

Book Review, 1942, pages 117-118. 

Book Review, 1944, page 347. 

China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44, book reviewed, 1945, pages 287-288. 

Book review, 1946, page 97. 

Senator Ferguson. What year were you discussing these matters 
with Eosinger ? 

Mr. Canning. As I recall, throughout this period of my own mem- 
bership he was also a member of the Communist Party. 

Senator Ferguson. The years again ? 

Mr. Canning. From the early part of 1936 to the latter part of 
1938. 

Senator Ferguson. So it is just before these writings ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Some of them even while you were doing the 
discussing ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, did you make available to the proper 
authorities your knowledge that Rosinger was a Communist? 

Mr. Canning. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you will extend that just a little bit. Tell 
us to what extent you made that known to the authorities. 

Mr. Canning. Well, my first testimony on these matters of the 
City College Communist unit and Columbia University activities 
was in 1940 during the hearings of the New York State Legislative 
Committee on the Public Schools, Coudert committee. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you testified publicly that Lawrence 
Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Canning. As I recall. 

Mr. Morris. That fact was probably reported in all the press at 
the time? 

Mr. Canning. As to the publicity, I did testify 'on all of these mat- 
ters both in private testimony and in public but, Mr, Morris, I don't 
recall whether or not the public testimony carried this information. 



470 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

* Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the party, if you did leave 
it? 

Mr. Canning. In the latter part of 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do you have any other letters showing 
Mr. Eosinger's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations? I 
would like to have you read them if you have. 

Mr. Mandel. I have a letter here dated August 9, 1940, from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Edward 
Carter and signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first para- 
graph as follows: 

On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had atrived from the 
New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching 
position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a 
choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have 
decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 
months hence or to be removed from the list and might involve going to a 
far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to. 

Another letter, dated August 19, 1940, from the files of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations headed "E. C. C," presumably E. C. Carter, 
from "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland. I read from the 
paragraph referring to Rosinger as follows : 

Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed 
a job and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his 
request that we extend the research grant of $500 to apply for a longer period. 
Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the 
custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this 
procedure. 

Mr. Morris. Who was that writing, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. That is E. C. C, presumably E. C. Carter, to E. C. 
Carter from W. L. H., presumably "W. L. Holland. 

Mr. Morris. I would like the chairman to take cognizance of the 
fact that this was dated 1940. I would like to have this entered into 
the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit together with 
this previous one. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 119 and 
120" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 119 

Ameeican Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 

Neiv York City, August 9, 1940. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Lee, Mass. 

Dear Mr. Carter : On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had 
arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high- 
school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not con- 
fronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, 
but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to 
accept 6 months hence or be removed from the list and might involve going to a 
far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to. Besides, as 
you know, I expect to be married in the near future, and it may be well to secure 
a steady position as soon as possible. 

This will not interfere with my IPR work, except that it will slow down the 
pace. I have practically finished the research for my inquiry report on China's 
recent political development and will begin writing next week. By the begin- 
ning of the school term (September 9) , T should have about HO printed pages done 
(i. e., approximately* one-third of the book). Teaching will not prevent my 
going forward with the rest in the evenings and over weekends, and the entire 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 471 

'.report should be finished some time in the fall (let us say, by the end of 
November). 

As you know, Bill Holland assigned me $500 for 5 months' research ( Septem- 
her 1940-January 1941) on another book, which is to be my doctoral disserta- 
tion as well as an IPR publication : Nationalism and National Unity in China, 
1924-35. The fact that the inquiry report will extend into the fall means that 
I shall not be able to start on this second project until a few months after the 
expected date. Besides, teaching will make it necessary to devote part time 
rather than full time to the new research. I would therefore like to suggest that 
the $500 grant apply to a period of 12, instead of 5 months, i.e., cover the entire 
year, September 1940-August 1941. I feel that this is a logical arrangement that 
will be fair to the IPR as well as satisfactory to myself. I have not yet written 
to Bill Holland about this, since I am awaiting your approval. If you find it 
satisfactory, I will write to Bill, and perhaps you will want to do the same. 

I have received the pamphlet. Total Defense, and will send you my comments 
in a few days. 

I was very sorry to learn of your sister's death and wish to extend my con- 
>dolences. 

Sincerely yours, 

Lawrence K. Rosinger. 



Exhibit No. 120 

Berkeley, Calif., August 19, 19^0. 
E. C. C. from W. L. H. 

Many thanks for your letter of August 14, about the Fahs manuscript. I think 
you have reached a most statesmanlike compromise and I am very pleased that 
Fahs has agreed to accept so many of the changes. I know that Fahs regretted 
that we did not put the long marks over the vowels of Japanese words. I recog- 
nize that there is a good deal to be said for including them, but our decision 
was based simply on the fact that Hilda and I had gone into the question when 
Norman's book was being printed and had come to the conclusion that the extra 
expense was not warranted, since there were really no instances where the omis- 
sion of the marks would have resulted in error or ambiguity. Having once 
established that rule we felt that we should follow it in the case of Fah's manu- 
script, where the number of Japanese words was even smaller. I would be per- 
fectly happy to be overruled in this matter, particularly if the printer can insert 
the marks without having to do substantial resetting. I personally feel that 
inserting them would be both unnecessary and pedantic. In fact in many of Fah's 
references I felt that he was being unnecessarily learned by quoting the full 
Japanese titles of laws, which for the purposes of the inquiry might better have 
been given in the English translation, as in Allen's book, since there was noth- 
ing peculiarly Japanese about the language. If Fah's had had occasion to 
quote rather long passages of Japanese or to discuss the meaning of certain Jap- 
anese terms, then I sholld have had no hesitation in making full use of the long 
remarks. 

I am interested in his report of the opinions expressed by Borton and Norman. 
Phil and I were both surprised to hear that Norman had raised any question since 
he and Phil and I had extensive correspondence over the bibliography and 
Norman usually had no hesitation in expressing his desires. Neither Phil nor 
I recollect that he raised any objections to the manner of quoting French 
titles. 

I am sending a further personal note to Fahs to thank him for having come 
so far in meeting our wishes. I shall be interested to hear his reaction to the 
letter from Ushiba. 

I have read Angus' memorandum on Peffer's report with great interest. 
While I do not often agree with Angus' interpretations, I have great respect 
for his clarity and powers of criticism. It seems to me that his comments are 
important, and that it would be a good idea for you to make a rather strong 
personal plea with Peffer to attempt some means by which those comments and 
also those made by Dennery Condliffe and myself could be at least mentioned 
in the report. As you know, Toynbee takes account of criticisms in footnotes, 
but if necessary they could be lumped together in an appendix, together with any 
specific replies' or general remarks that Peffer cared to make. In addition to 
this. I think it would be desirable for Peffer or you to explain in the preface 
to the book that it is necessarily different in character from other reports in 



472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the inquiry series because it must be franlsly a personal view and somewhat 
speculative in character. 

I am a little perturbed to know that Angus is still not in favor of publishing 
his own memorandum nor of enlarging and revising it as we had hoped. I don't 
know what we can do about this, but it seems to me that we had reason to 
expect a good deal more from Angus for the money that was paid to him in one 
way or another. Pei'haps there is some totally new subject that he would prefer 
to write on, not strictly in the legal field. At any rate, I hope you will let him 
know that we feel the inquiry will not be complete unless it has a substantial 
report from him on this or some other topic. 

I shall send you my comments on Roth in a day or two. In the meantime 
I have been wondering what the situation is on the manuscripts by Harriet 
Moore and Keenleyside. There is also the same question of Borton's report. 
At one time I thought Leaning had screwed himself up to the point where he 
thought he could attempt a rewrite job. HoAvever, the political situation in 
J^apan has been changing so fast that I now think it might be a better idea for 
you to discuss the whole question afresh with Borton, and ask whether he would 
not rather let you attempt a fairly substantial revision in which he could omit 
the greater part of the economic sections, including the materials on agriculture 
and population which are now being covered more fully by Miriam Farley. I 
would also suggest a working arrangement by which either Shepherd or Leaning 
could go over Borton's revisions from week to week, so that we should not have 
a substantial rewrite job at the end. It might even be desirable to offer Borton 
a further $40 or $50. 

If this plan could be followed, I believe that we might salvage something 
pretty useful from the study. Something should be done because there will be 
a serious gap in the inquiry documentation if we omit a study on Japanese 
political developments. It will parallel the corresponding Chinese study by 
Kosinger. Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has 
landed a job, and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your 
advice on his request that we extend the research grant of $500 to apply for a 
longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned 
over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection 
to this procedure. The only slight reservation I have is that we stretched a 
point or two in making this grant to Rosinger, largely on the ground that it 
would enable him to devote 4 or 5 months full time in the American Council to 
completing a study on which he has already done considerable research. How- 
ever, I know that high-school salaries are pathetically low, especially for any- 
body contemplating marriage, and I also have high regard for Rosinger's scholar- 
ship. So, if you are prepared to back me up, I shall be willing to accede to 
Rosinger's proposal. 

I enclose a letter from Miss Cleeve, which. you may want to read and return 
to me. The last paragraph refers to a suggestion I made some months ago, 
urging that something pretty decisive should be done about leasing or ceding 
some of the British West Indian possessions to the United States as a means 
of getting American good will and increasing material support, and also taking 
the wind out of the sails of the extreme isolationists in this country. Miss 
Cleeve is lukewarm, as I suspected she would be. It was ironical, however, 
that her letter arrived on the very day that the papers announced that actual 
negotiations were in progress about this scheme. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. Carter from 
Owen Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you read that, I would like to inquire. 
Mr. Canning, did you ever Ivnow whether or not Rosinger either 
publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party? 

Mr. Canning. During the period that I was in the Communist 
movement he did not withdraw. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that he had after that? 

Mr. Canning. No ; I never did. 

Senator Ferguson. Either in a public manner or private manner? 

Mr. Canning. No: I had no knowledge of his having left. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Have you read anything by Mr. Rosinger in the last 
few years, Mr. Canning ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 473 

Mr. Canning. I have read several articles of his; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did they impress you as the writings of a man still 
•in the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Canning. It would be hard to say. There is no open sign that 
•what he is writing is Communist propaganda, but the tendency is 
toward support of the Red Chinese group. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, they are not the writings of a man 
who has broken with the Communist Party, in your opinion? 

Mr. Canning. I think tlie writings would give no evidence of his 
either being in or out of the party; that is, the few that I have read. 

The Chairman. What is next? 

Mr. Mandel. Another letter, dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. E. C. Car- 
ter from Owen Lattimore, refers to "Rosinger's promised article on 
Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article 
on the Far East and the World Market." I cite also the testimony 
of Mr. William L. Holland in company with Edward C. Carter in 
executive session on June 21, 1951. JMr. Morris asked : 

How about the grant to Rosinger? 

Mv. HoiJ^ND. I think, either late in 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the 
offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American 
IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post- 
war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, 
vrith contriljutions by some 13 other Far East experts, had just been published 
by Alfred Knopf. 

It continues the quotation. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this is a reading of testimony that al- 
ready has been presented to the committee. The point of that is to 
show that it would indicate from that testimony that Mr. Carter had 
•obtained two grants from the Rockefeller Foundation for Mr. Ros- 
inger to continue his work. 

The Chairman, Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations a typed list of some experts on China, Netherlands Indies, 
and Manchuria, and among those listed is the name of Lawrence 
Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East 
Sixty-third Street, New York. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the last two letters read 
by Mr. Mandel introduced in evidence and marked as the next con- 
secutive exhibits. 

The Chairman. They may be so marked. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 121, 122, 
and 122-a" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 121 

Baltimore, Md., June 6, 1940. 
Jvlr. E. C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. 
Dear Carter: Thanks for sending me Corbett's comments. I am glad to 
see that plans for the next issue of Pacific Affairs fit in with his suggestions. 
Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him ; and so should 
Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market. 

I might also be able to make an article on What Japan Knows About Outer 
Mongolia, from the translation of a Japanese book which Grajdanzev is to 
send me. 

With regard to Corbett's idea for a "substantial review article combining 
iBuell and Bingham * * * working out in practice their plan of Pacific 



474 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

association," wouldn't you consult with Corbett to see whether he himself would 
undertake such an assignment? His qualifications and his outlook indicate- 
that he is the man to give such an article depth as well as breadth. 

If he should want to do it for the September issue, tJie copy would have to- 
be in my hands at the end of this month. 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 



Exhibit No. 122 
[Executive session, vol. 53, June 21, 1951] 

Excerpts From the Testimony of Edward 0. Carter and William L. Holland,, 

(P. 260) 

Mr. Morris. How about the grant to Rosinger? 

Mr. Holland. I think, either late 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the 
oflSces of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American 
IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post- 
war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, 
with contributions by some 13 other leading Far East experts, has just been 
published by Alfred Knopf. 

Now you may also be referring to the fact that in late 1949 the Rockefeller 
Foundation — I think on the request of my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane — made 
a travel grant of, I should imagine, something like $2,000 to Mr. Rosinger to 
enable him to go to India to attend the India-American Conference which was 
held jointly by the American IPR and the Indian Council of IPR in Delhi, in 
the summer of 1949. 



Exhibit No. 122-A 

Some Experts on China, Nethebi-ands Indies, and Manchuria 

(This list is by no means comprehensive. In certain categories it could be 

added to extensively) 
China : 

Economic : 

William W. Lockwood, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J. 

W. L. Holland, Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley 

C. F. Remer, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 

John E. Orchard, Columbia University, New York 

Ch'ao-ting Chi, Universal Trading Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York 

Kurt Bloch, Fortune Round Table and Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fift.v-second Street, New York 
Economic and political : 

William W. Lockwood. (See above.) 

W.L.Holland. (See above.) 

Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second 

Street, New York 
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 

East Sixty-third Street, New York 
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 
T. A. Bisson, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, 

New York 
Cyrus H. Peake, Columbia University, New York 
Kate L. Mitchell, Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York 
Political : 

Nathaniel PeflEer, Columbia University, New York 

John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass. 

Harley F. MacNair, University of Chicago 

Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati, Ohio 

Miriam S. Farley, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second 

Street, New York 
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second 

Street, New York 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 475 

Relation of ancient China to China today : 

Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University, New York 
Owen Lattimore. (See above.) 

L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University, New York 
Herrlee G. Creel, University of Chicago 
Problems of Chinese language : 

George Kennedy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Owen Lattimore. (See above.) 
L. Carrington Goodrich. (See above.) 
Manchuria : 

W.L.Holland. (See above.) 

Kurt Bloch. (See above.) 

Miriam S. Farley. ( See above. ) 

John R. Stewart, National Credit Office, 2 Park Avenue, New York 

Russell G. Shiman, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York 
Owen Lattimore. (See above.) 

Andrew Grajdanzev, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second 
Street, New York 
Netherlands Indies : 

W.L.Holland. (See above.) 

Ellen van Zyll de Jong, international secretariat, IPR, 129 East Fifty-second 

Street, New York 
Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky, Lexington 
Rupert Emerson, formerly of Harvard, now in the Territories Section, De- 
partment of Interior, Washington, D. C. 
All of the foregoing are American citizens except the following : 
Mr. Holland is a New Zealander who has resided in the United States for 
several years. 

Dr. Chi is Chinese, but is employed by the Sino-American Corp., set up jointly 
at the instance of the Chinese and American Governments. 

Dr. Bloch and Dr. Wittfogel have probably taken out their first citizenship 
papers. 

Mr. Grajda'nzev is a Siberian who reads Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. He 
has taken out his first citizenship papers. 

Mr. Mandel. Another item from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Eelations is dated February 5, 1950, "FVF from LKR," pre- 
sumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field, from Lawrence K. Rosinger. I 
read the first sentence : 

I think Lattimore's article is excellent, clearly thought out and very well 
put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it 
further * * *_ 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the letter intro- 
duced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It is so marked and inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 123" and is 

as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 123 

rEBEUAEY 5, 1940. 
F. V. F. from L. K. R. : 

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well 
put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further : 

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3 : Shouldn't "therefore" be "however", since the 
implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position 
toward Japan? 

Page 3, line 10: Since the implication here is that we should develop a cor- 
rect policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they 
have occcurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly under- 
standing and shaping history in the making"? 

Page 4, line 11 : Wouldn't it be better to say : "It will be partly because of 
American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence 
by itself can bring Bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to 
attribute that power to the United States. 



476 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Pages 4-5 : The argument here is that social explosions result when internal 
forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but 
this argument — despite a certain cogency — struck me as a little bit foolish, 
since it is almost equivalent to saying that (e. g.) if Tsarism had been Tsarism, 
then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point 
has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) 
that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical 
quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure 
of the United States. 

Page 5, last line: Considering the highly dubious origin of the New Life 
movement (i. e. it was essentially a political move in the civil-war period), I 
wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," 
"efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the 
movement since the outbreak of the far-eastern war, but my feeling is that 
New Life is pretty much in the background — perhaps almost the discard. 

Page 6, line 10 : Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," 
since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore ele- 
ments in the captured cities, that — whatever their abstract desires — would be 
willing to deal with the Japanese — permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement 
"wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary? 

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5 : "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has 
not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, 
one would be entitled to assume that important Kunmintang elements might 
go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Com- 
munists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would 
actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particu- 
larly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the 
circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" 
of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.) 

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well- 
known fact that Sun Tat-sen turned to Russia back in 192.3-24 only after he was 
convinced that he could expect nothing — except possibly opposition — from other 
powers. 

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line In the article 
to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China — 
just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated October 9, 1940, "E. C. C. from 
W. L, H.," presumably E. C. Carter from William L. Holland, and Mr- 
Holland writes regarding a trip that he is proposing to make : "The 
principal people I want to see," and he lists among others Rosinger. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into 
evidence as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked and received. 

(The document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 124" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 124 

GiANNiNi Foundation, 
University of California, 
Berkeley, Calif., October 9, 1940. 
E. C. C. from W. L. H. 

Thank you for your letters of October 7 about the meeting on the 16th and 
17th. I shall be awaiting your word about whether Tarr can come. 1 can 
easily arrange to meet you in Chicago on the morning of the 15th, and would 
like to leave by an afternoon train that would enable me to spend an hour 
or so that evening in Ann Arbor with Romer and Hayden. I could then go 
into Detroit and get an overnight train to New York from there. I should like 
to have 1 day in Washington and this might be either on the 18th or the 21st 
or 22d, thus leaving the week end free for a possible meeting at Lee. 

I should be glad if you would make some appointments for me in the New 
York office. The principal people I want to see are Shepherd, Yasuo, Grajdanzev, 
Ellen van Zyll de .Jong, Rosinger, Porter, Farley, Austei-n, and Downing. In 
addition I should like to see Leaning, Greenberg, and Virginia Thompson, if she 
is well enough. At Columbia I should like 15 minutes each with Wittfogel, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 477 

Peffer, Leonard, and Roth. Perhaps some of these can be arranged at the IPR 
oflace. Leonard can be reached through Jessup's office or through Catherine 
Porter. I'd also like to see Harry Price and, of course, Fred Field either in New 
York or Wasliington. I shall count on seeing Lockwood either in New York or at 
Lee. In Washington the principal people I want to see are Rupert Emerson in 
the Interior Department, Henry Deimel and Sydney Smith in the State Depart- 
ment, Ladejinsky and Rossiter in the Department of Agriculture and Johnstone, 
Tasca, and Merrill. I can arrange these appointments myself after I know the 
rest of my time table. 

I'd also like to have an evening or an hour or two with Lattimore in Baltimore. 

If time permits, I'd also like to have a word with Bisson, Yarnell, Jaffe, and 
Mitchell, but I expect these can be fitted in easily, perhaps at lunch. I'd also 
like a word with Shinian and Kay Greene. 

Probably Matsuo had better come straight on to New York at fast as possible 
so that I could see him about the 23d. If possible I'd like to leave that night, 
but this can be kept flexible. 

I take it from your letter that you have no particlar business that you want 
me to see Wilbur or Sproul or Mrs. McLaughlin about before I leave. 

W. L. H. 

Mr. Mandel. Another letter referring to France is taken from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 14, 1940, E. C. 
C. from K. M., presumably E. C. Carter from Kate Mitchell. I read 
the first sentence : 

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9 it is of course up to Bill Holland 
to decide whether the research fund is willing to extend the time of the grant 
to August 194L 

Mr. MoKRis, Mr. Chairman, I would like that to be introduced into 
evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 125 

August 14, 1940. 
E. C. C. from K. M. 

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9, it is, of course, up to Bill Holland 
to decide whether the Research Fund is willing to extend the time of the grant 
to August 1941. I should say that there was no objection inasmuch as Larry 
doesn't ask for any more money, and considering the fact that most of our 
research reports are received at least 10 months later than the specified date ! 
Why don't you tell Larry that you approve in general, but that he should take 
the matter up with the Research Committee. As far as his inquiry project is 
concerned, I suppose we will have to be satisfied with a completed manuscript 
in November. Are we allowed to keep our unexpended printing fund balance 
for use after the first of the year? 

With reference to the letter from Peffer of August 6, I haven't any special 
comments to offer as I have not seen a copy of the manuscript, therefore cannot 
pass judgment either on Holland's criticisms or Peffer's I'efusal to accept many 
of them. If there is a spare copy of the manuscript floating around anywhere, 
might I have a look at it over this week end? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I also would like Mr. Mandel to intro- 
duce into the record or to reintroduce if it is necessary, the fact that 
in 1949 Lawrence Rosinger was called down to Washington by the 
Secretary of State to be a consultant on foreign policy to submit a 
memo far-eastern policy and to attend a 3-day conference in the 
capacity of a consultant. 

The Chairman. Do you have an exhibit setting that up or are you 
referring to testimony already taken ? 

22848— 52— pt. 2 9 



478 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I think Mr. Mandel has an official announcement of 
that fact from the State Department that he will make reference to. 

Mr. Mandel. I quote from a release dated May 20, 1950, No. 289, 
Department of State. It says : 

The 31 who submitted memoranda were — 
and included in that list are Lawrence Kosinger, New York, N. Y. 
Then describing further the memo says : 

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the 
round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East 
policy. 

On that list we find Lawrence K. Kosinger, American Institute of. 
Pacific Kelations, New York, N. Y. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 126" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 126 

[For the press, Department of State, May 20, 1950. No. 259 — For release at 7 p. m.. e. d. t., 

Saturday, May 20, 1950] 

EXCEUPT 

The 31 who submitted memoranda were : Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New 
Yorii, N. Y. * * * 

Tne following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended 
the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far 
East policy : Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, 
New ifork, N. Y. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, you also introduced into the record the 
fact that the last publication that was supported by a grant 6f the 
Institute of Pacific Kelations was edited by Lawrence K. Rosinger. 

Mr. Mandel. That is already in the record. 

I have a letter here dated November 12, 1943, from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, 
UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge, Atlantic City, N. J., from T. A. 
Bisson. 

Dear Mr. Vincent : Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, 
I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the orii;inal copy 
of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent 
to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to 
burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we ai'e anxious to 
have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conve- 
niently possible to have it sent back. 

Hoping to see you in New York soon, 
Sincerely yours, 

T. A. BissoN. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record. 

The Chairman. It may be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 127" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 127 

Novembee 12, 1943. 
Mr. John Carter Vincent, 

VNBRA Conference, Hotel Claridge, 

Atlantic City, N. J. 
Dear Mr. Vincent : Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this 
time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original 
copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 479 

sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no 
reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are 
anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if 
it is conveniently posible to have it sent back. 
Hoping to see you in New York soon, 
Sincerely yours, 

T. A. BissoN. 

Mr. Morris. The purpose of this long introduction of documents 
into the record is to show extensive activity on the part of Louis 
Rosinger, who has been identified here as a Communist in the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Rehitions. 

Mr. Mandel. Another letter dated February 21, 1944, is addressed 
to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of 
Cultural Relations, State Department, from W. L. Holland : 

I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's Wartime Politics in 
the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it' and give me your 
criticism. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but 
I have been waiting for some comment from people in the State Department. 
The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know 
how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing thi'ough, 
I wish you would concentrate on the last part from page 47 onward — 

and so forth. 

• Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. There are only 
a few more, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 128." and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 128 

February 21, 1944. 
Dr. John Fairbank, 

Care of Mrs. Wilma Fairiank, 

Division of CulUiral Relations, State Department, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dear John : I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime 
politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and 
give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some 
weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State 
Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, 
but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole 
thing through, I wish you would concentrate on tht: last part, from page 47 
onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because 
Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice us much but had to change 
his plans because of his illness and lack of time. 

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then 
for a few minutes. 
Yours, 

AV. L. Holland. 
P. S. — I have sent ihe books from Lowdermilk to Wilma. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter which comes in "care of Mr. Lauchlin 
Currie, the White House, February 28, 1944," signed "John" and 
typed initials, J. K. Fairbank. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. You said signed "care of Lauchlin 
Currie." Just give us that again to clarify the record. 

Mr. Mandel. The return address is "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, 
The White House, Washington, D. C." 



480 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. In other words, this is John K. Fairbank, and he uses 
as his return address, "care of Lauchlin Currie, The White House, 
Washington, D. C." 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mandel. This is from the files of the Institute : 

"Dear Mr. Holland : I have referred to the latter part," 
and then in pencil "of Rosinger's ms on China." 

"and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send 
Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this, 
but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda. How can we 
expedite bringing our friend to California? 
Sincerely, 

J. K. Faiebank. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 
The Chairman. So marked and inserted in the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 129 

c/o Mr. Lauchlin Currie, 
The White House, Washington, D. O. 

February 28, IQU- 
Mr. W. L. Holland, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y. 
Dear Mr. Holland : I have read over the latter part and it seems like a very 
good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? 
The 'Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they 
can hardly call it propaganda. 

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California! 
Sincerely, 

J. K. Fairbank. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, you noted diat this was care of 
Lauchlin Currie. I am hoping that the committees can subpena Lauch- 
lin Currie here to make an explanation of many of these matters that 
were going through his hands and his connection with the institute. 

Mr. Morris. I would also like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. 
Chairman, that Fairbank says, "It is done so well that they can hardly 
call it propaganda." 

Senator Ferguson. This letter indicates that he ought to be called 
to make an explanation of these things. 

The Chairman. I think, Senator, at the proper time in the hear- 
ings that will be accomplished. 

Mr. Mandel. The next is a letter dated January 5, 1942, from the 
files of the institute, addressed to G. E. Hubbard, Esq., Political Intel- 
ligence Department, Foreign Office, London, England. I read part 
of a paragraph : 

In spite of the war or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We 
have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs, but have man- 
aged to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the 
Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever^ 

and further down — 

Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in 
New York. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 481 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evi- 
dence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 
The Chairman. So marked. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130" and is 

as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 130 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
Jfew York City, January 5, 1942. 
G. B. Hubbard, Esq., 

Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 

London, England. 

Dear HtTBEARD : It was delightful to get your letter. I am enclosing copies of 
two of the broadcasts in the series. Unfortunately no copies are available of 
the initial broadcast which {Y'arnell and I led off. This series has been an at- 
tempt by the American Council of the IPR to make more widely available the 
material which it is so carefully and laboriously assembling. I understand that 
the first eight broadcasts are appearing in pamphlet form in a week or two. I 
will see that a copy goes to you. I assume that you still see the Far Eastern 
Survey and Pacific Affairs. 

In spite of the war, or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We 
have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs but have man- 
aged to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the 
Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever. Lattimore is of course an asset 
in Chungking, though he is not technically on the IPR staff. Michael Greenbei-g 
and Mrs. Dobbs are carrying on Pacific Affairs well within the Lattimore tra- 
dition. Ch'ao-ting Chi is secretary general of the ABC stabilizaton fund in 
China and is gaining experience that will ultimately be of the greatest value if 
and when he is able to return to the secretariat. Friedman, who did that very 
able book on British relations with China, is now in the Treasury in Washing- 
ton. Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here 
in New York. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission, and Miss Ellen van 
Zyll de Jong, to Military Intelligence. 

W. W. Lockwood has come back from Princeton and taken over the secretary- 
ship of the American Council. For a time he had to work in Washington in the 
Office of Export Control, but he has managed to disentangle himself from Gov- 
ernment service. 

Lilienthal got out of Shanghai in time and is back on the American Council 
staff. 

The Government has been after Barnett and me, but both of us have been 
able to persuade the United States authorities that we can render a bigger service 
to every department of the Government by continuing the staffs of the American 
and Pacific Councils intact rather than by scattering our energies through a 
dozen Government departments. 

'I wish you could write us more fully about your own work and views now that 
we are comrades in arms. 
Sincerely yours, 

, Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Mandel. The final exhibit taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations dated December 30, 1943, on the stationery of the 
Foreign Policy Association, addressed to William L. Holland and 
signed "Larry Rosinger." I read the first paragraph : 

DE1A.R Bill: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one 
or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to 
the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evi- 
dence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked and inserted in the record. 



482 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 131 

Foreign Policy Association, 
Ifew York, December SO, 1943. 
Mr. William L. Holland, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

New York 22, New York 
Dear Bill : Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or 
two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the 
suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss. 

I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I 
understand will be sent to you at a 20 percent discount. I think you will be 
interested to know that we will publish on February 1st another report of mine, 
tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia". I doubt that this 
will be available in print much before publication date, but if your conference 
is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some 
copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs in about 2 
weeks. 

Yours, 

Larry Rosingee. 

Mr. Morris. Do any of the Senators have any questions on Mr. 
Hosinger ? 

Senator Ferguson. I don't on Rosinger, 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Canning, we had testimony recently that a man 
named Moses Finkelstein ran a Communist study group. Professor 
Wittfogel has testified that this Communist study group met in New 
York City. At least his contentions were that it met in New York 
City when he so testified. Did you know that Moses Finkelstein ran 
a study group in New York City ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes. I knew Moses Finkelstein as both a teacher 
at City College in the evening session and as a graduate student at 
Columbia. 

Mr. Morris. Was he a Communist ? 

Mr. Canning. He was a member of the Communist unit at 
Columbia University- 
Mr. Morris. Did you know that of your own knowledge ? 

Mr. Canning. I did, and I did attend for some time a group that 
did meet at Moses Finkelstein's house, a Communist study group which 
met there about once a week for a period of several months. 

Mr. Morris. You didn't know all members of the group, did you, 
Mr. Canning? 

Mr. Canning. There weren't very many in that group at the time, 
and I believe I knew all of them. 

Senator Ferguson. They met as Communists ? 

Mr. Canning. That is right. One or two who were not members 
of the party would meet as well. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the purpose of having some come in 
like that? 

Mr. Canning. To interest them in communism. 

Senator Ferguson. To convert them to the idea? 

Mr. Canning. To Communist ideas. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he run any other study groups there that 
you know of ? 

Mr. Canning. Not that I know of. That is the only one that I 
attended. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 483 

Senator Ferguson. The only one that you attended. 

Mr. Canning. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that he ran any others? 

Mr. Canning. No, I don't of my own knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you heard that he ran others ? 

Mr. Canning. No. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that a man named Daniel Thorner was 
a member of a study group there ? 

Mr, Canning. Yes, he was one of the people who met in the study 
group that I referred to. 

Mr. Morris. Was he a Communist? 

Mr. Canning. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that Daniel Thorner was a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Canning. From his own statements to me that he belonged to 
the Columbia University unit. 

Mr. Morris. Do we have anything indicating that Daniel Thorner 
was active in IPE affairs, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. I read from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations dated June 2, 1942, a memo to ECC, presumably E. C. 
Carter, from CP presumably Catherine Porter, and I read a paragraph 
in which Daniel Thorner, who is in the COI, working under Brown's 
direction, is referred to : 

Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is 
one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Tliorner's 
background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at 
Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation 
to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner 
probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other 
person in this country. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I W'ould like that introduced into the 
record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. I think 
that already has been introduced and is exhibit No. 77, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here also as an exhibit previously introduced 
a list of research fellows and students of the Walter Hines Page 
School, 1940 to 1951, which is headed by Owen Lattimore, and among 
these students, research fellows, and so forth, is the name of Mr. 
Daniel Thorner. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that already has been introduced into 
the record. 

Mr. Canning, do you remember when Prof. Karl August Wittfogel 
was invited to address a study group at the home of Mr. Finkelstein ? 

Mr. Canning. No ; I don't know about that. 

Mr. Morris. You don't know that particular session? 

Mr. Canning. Not during the time that I attended the study group, 
I don't recall any invitation to Mr. Wittfogel. 

Mr. Morris. But you did know that at least one study group did 
meet at the home of Moses Finkelstein? 

Mr. Canning. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Where was that? 

Mr. Canning. In the neighborhood of Columbia. 

Mr. Morris. In New York City ? 

Mr. Canning. I think about One Hundred Fourteenth Street, in 
New York City. 



484 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what Mr. Finkelstein is doing today ? 

Mr. Canning. I understand from the newspapers that he is teach- 
ing at Rutgers University, but under a different name. Finley, I be- 
lieve his name is now. 

Senator Ferguson. What is his real name ? 

Mr. Canning. Finkelstein ; Moses Finkelstein. 

The Chairman. Under what name is he going now ? 

Mr. Canning. Finley, F-i-n-1-e-y. 

The Chairman. He would take an Irisliman's name, would he not? 
[Laughter.] 

Senator Watkins. How do you know that? 

Mr. Canning. I believe that was first called to my attention a year 
or so ago when I was questioned by an agent of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 

Senator Watkins. Did you ever check to see that he was actually 
teaching at Rutgers ? 

Mr. Canning. No; I didn't personally check. I was told that by 
this agent of the FBI who was questioning me. 

Senator Watkins. That is where you got your information ? 

Mr. Canning. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Is it public knowledge that Mr. Finkelstein was a 
member of the Communist Party, Mr. Canning, if you know ? 

Mr. Canning. I testified to it previously. 

Mr. Morris. In 1940? 

Mr. Canning. In 1940. 

Mr. Morris. Was he tried by the board of higher education? 

Mr. Canning. I don't believe that he came up for a trial. I think 
he resigned, though I would have to check to be sure. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know if the same gentleman has a grant from 
one of the foundations ? 

Senator Ferguson. Who is that ? 

Mr. Canning. Moses Finkelstein, formerly Moses Finlcelstein. 

Senator Ferguson. What has he to do with this grant from the 
Ford Foundation ? 

Mr. Canning. It is a grant apparently to improve the teaching 
standards of the university. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear, either publicly or privately, 
that he had withdrawn from the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Canning. No, I have never heard that he has withdrawn from 
the party. 

Senator Ferguson. You do know that when you knew him back 
in New York he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Canning. He was a Communist, and especially active in the 
Columbia University unit. 

Senator Ferguson. He was directly connected with IPR, but do 
you know any other Communist in your cells or that you knew up 
in these colleges that came down in the Government, the United 
States Government? 

Mr. Canning, There was one other who belonged to the same 
Columbia University unit, Theodore Geiger. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he a Communist ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes ; he was. 

Senator Ferguson. Any doubt about it ? 

Mr. Canning. No doubt in my mind that he was. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 485 

Senator Ferguson, Where did you know him? 

Mr. Canning. I knew him both at City College where he was a 
student, and later at Columbia University where he continued his 
graduate studies. 

Senator Ferguson. About when did he leave there ? 

Mr. Canning. When did he leave Columbia? City College? 

Senator Ferguson. Or City College. 

]Mr. Canning. I think he finished at City College, he received his 
bachelor's degree in 1935. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did he come in the Government? 

Mr. Canning. Into the Economic Cooperation Administration. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he is in Government now ? 

Mr. Canning. No. I have been informed that he has resigned. 

Senator Ferguson. When ? 

Mr. Canning. Not a very long time ago, several months ago. 

Senator Ferguson. Just months ago. 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his position in Government? 

Mr. Canning. He was, I believe. Deputy Administrator to the 
ECA, though I am not certain of his exact title. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the same man that you knew in Colum- 
bia as a Communist? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he active in communism ? 

Mr. Canning. He was. 

Senator Ferguson. As active as you and Finkelstein? 

Mr. Canning. Not quite as active as Finkelstein, but perhaps as 
active as I was. 

Senator Ferguson. As you were? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there anybody else who came into Govern- 
ment ? 

Mr. Canning. One further person 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, did you ever hear that this man 
had ever left the Communist rank, either publicly or privately hear 
that he had left? 

Mr. Canning. No, sir ; 1 never heard that he had resigned. 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard ? 

The Chairman. I want to say. Senator, that some time ago the 
"watchdog committee" of the Committee on Appropriations made a 
representation to ECA as to this individual and drew the attention 
of ECA to his past history and asked for an investigation, following 
which I think there was a resignation. That is my impression. 

Senator Ferguson. I hope that Geiger will be given an opportunity 
to rebut this or to answer this testimony. 

Is there anybody else who came down here in Government? 

Mr. Canning. During the war I was surprised to read in the New 
York World-Telegram in 1945 that a certain Louis Balamuth had 
been associated in the atomic bomb project at the University of 
Chicago. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that? 

Mr. Canning. I believe it was 1945. 

Senatoi- Ferguson. 1945. Was he — and are you certain about it — 
a Communist? 



486 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir ; he was a member of the same cell at City 
College to which I belonged. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he active as a Communist in that cell? 

Mr. Canning. His main activity in the cell was editing — he was 
in charge of putting out this secret publication I spoke of, the 
Teacher Worker. 

Senator Ferguson. He was active then in the cell as a Communist ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You learned that he went with the Atomic 
Energy Commission activity over in Chicago ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever learned that he either publicly 
or privately withdrew from the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Canning. No; I never learned of any withdrawal from com- 
munism. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Canning. No, I don't know where he is now, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You gave his full name ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes. Louis Balamuth. 

The Chairman. How long did you know him to be a Communist 
in that cell to which you belonged ? 

Mr. Canning. Throughout the entire period of my membership 
he was an active member of that unit. 

The Chairman. That was for about what length of time in years ? 

Mr. Canning. About 21/^ years. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there anybody else who were Communists, 
that you knew to be Communists, who came in the Government? 

M** Canning. No other persons that I can recall. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no doubt and you have no doubt now 
that these men at the time that you are talking about and knew 
them were actually Communists ? 

Mr. Canning. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir. 

The Chairman. I have just one question in addition to the ques- 
tions propounded by Senator Ferguson. You knew them to be 
active participants in the Communist cause in this country? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. All those persons named during the period 
of my membership were actively engaged in Communist work. 

Senator Smith. I would like to ask one question. 

Mr. Canning, during the period that you were a member of either 
of those cells, did you from time to time make any memoranda about 
people who were making up those cells that would give us any light 
now on the membership ? 

Mr. Canning. In the testimony which I gave some 11 years ago and 
in the subsequent hearings before the New York City Board of Higher 
Education, I gave a full account of the Communist activities at City 
College. 

Senator Smith. I mean did you include the names of parties who 
were members at that time ? 

Mr. Canning. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. That is all in the record back there. 

Mr. Canning. All in the New York State Legislative Kecord. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that public? ^ 

Mr. Canning. The hearings were both private and public. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 487 

Senator Smitii. Since that time have you rim across any memoranda 
such as frequently one has, memos, diary notes, and what-not that 
would refresh your recollection and add any other names to that list ? 

Mr. Canning. No, sir. 

Senator Smith. Was there any such thing as a roster of the member- 
ship of those cells that you may have had ? 

Mr. Canning. The chairman of the unit no doubt kept records of 
that sort. 

Senator Smith. Wlio was the chairman ? 

Mr. Canning. The chairman of this particular cell I have been 
speaking of was Louis Balamuth. 

Senator Smith. Wlio was the chairman of the other cells ? 

Mr. Canning. Morris Schappes is a very important organizer of 
the City College unit.. There was an Arthur Braunlich who was for 
a time the head of the entire City College unit. Some six or seven 
persons who were the principal leaders in the Communist cell there, 
the Communist unit. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the last 
part of this testimony does not relate to the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions. It is a subject that has interested the Senators and the evidence 
has come out under that form. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. That is all I have with Mr. Canning, Senator. 

The Chairman. Any questions, Senators ? 

Senator Ferguson. I think it ought to remain in this record because 
it is material to the question being studied by the whole committee 
as to Communists in government. It certainly ought to remain in 
the record. 

The Chairman. It certainly will remain in the record. That is 
where it belongs. That is where it was made, and there is no reason 
for taking it from the record. 

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, with the next witness. That is all, 
Mr. Canning, for this time. I thank you. 

Senator Ferguson. Thanks very much for coming in this morning. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers is the next witness. 

The Chairman. Mr. Chambers, do you solemnly swear the testi- 
mony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Chambers. I do, 

TESTIMONY OF JAY DAVID WEITTAKER CHAMBERS, 
WESTMINSTER, MD. 

]Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the stenog- 
rapher, Mr. Chambers. 

Mr. Chambers. Jay David Wliittaker Chambers, Route 2, Wes- 
minster, Md. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Wliat i^ your present occupation, Mr. Chambers? 

Mr. Chambers. I am a writer and dairy farmer. 

]Mr. Morris. What was your last employment, Mr. Chambers ? 

Mr. Chambers. My last employment was with Time magazine. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat year was that, Mr. Chambers? 

Mr. Chambers. The year 1948. 



488 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell the committee whether or 
not you ever belonged to the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Chambers. I belonged to the Communist Party from the early 
part of 1925 until the middle of April 1938. 

Mr. Morris. At what period of time did you belong to the under- 
ground Communist Party, Mr. Chambers ? 

Mr. Chambers. I belonged to the underground Communist Party 
from about June of 1932 until the middle of April 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Could you describe for us the method by which you 
transferred from the open party to the underground party ? 

The Chairman. First of all, I would like to ask what is meant 
by the underground Communist Party as distinguished from the 
Communist Party proper. 

]Mr. Chambers. The Communist Party internationally has always 
been organized on two planes. There is the open Communist Party 
with which we are all almost or are almost all familiar now, and the 
undergromid Communist Party which is organized as secretly as 
possible. 

The underground Communist Party a great deal of the time is 
actually the more important part of the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers, did you ever have any direct dealings 
with the Insitute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Chambers. No, I do not believe I did. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever know Frederick Vanderbilt Field ? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes, I knew Frederick Vanderbilt Field. 

Mr. Morris. "Will you tell us of your experiences with Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field ? 

Mr. Chambers. To do that I will have to go back of that subject 
a little way to describe my reasons for meeting Fred Field. 

Mr. Morris. By all means, Mr. Chambers. 

Mr. Chambers. I met Fred Field in 1937. I met him in connection 
with Mr. Lawrence Duggan, the late Lawrence Duggan. Mr. Duggan 
was then in the State Department, and I think at that time in the 
Latin American Division. I was then in the Soviet apparatus in 
Washington, which was headed by Col. Boris Bykov. That appara- 
tus worked very closely with the so-called Ware group, which had 
been organized in Washington by Harold Ware, who was a Com- 
munist. The group consisted of Communists and was a unit of the 
Communist Party and its members were all or chiefly Government 
employees. In that group — in fact its secretary-treasurer — was 
Henry Collins, who first worked, I believe, with the NRA and then 
in the Department of Agriculture and later in the military govern- 
ment in German}'. He 4s now head of the Russian- American Institute 
in New York, if my information is correct. That institute I think 
has been cited by the Attorney General. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean cited as Communist? 

Mr. Chambers. Cited as subversive. Mr. Collins had been a col- 
lege friend of Lawrence Duggan, and from my earliest days in Wash- 
ington in the Communist Party, which was the spring of 1934, I 
heard Lawrence Duggan's name mentioned as someone very sym- 
pathetic to the Communist Party. His name was first drawn to my 
attention, I believe, by one Webster Clay Powell, who was then an 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 489 

assistant to Harold Ware in a little Communist front called Farm 
Information, or some such name — Farm Eesearcli, I believe. 
Webster Clay Powell subsequently became an employee of the State 
Department and I think served in Australia in one of the legations. 
In any case Webster Powell first drew my attention to the name 
of Lawrence Duggan. 

Henry Collins was equally sure that Lawrence Duggan was a man 
for the Communist Party to approach and particularly for the Soviet 
apparatus to approach. He voluntarily made at least two eiforts to 
recruit Lawrence Duggan as a source in the State Department for the 
Soviet apparatus. Neither of those efforts was successful. Lawrence 
Duggan was approached obligingly in another way. At one point 
Alger Hiss, after he had entered the State Department, thought that 
he would be able to recruit Noel Field. Noel Field and Lawrence 
Duggan were very close friends and I believe lived in the same 
apartment house. As soon as Alger Hiss began to entertain the 
Fields, he also began to see the Duggans. A question arose early 
in that associat^ion between Hiss and Field about which Soviet 
apparatus Field should belong to, because Hiss discovered, much to 
his surprise, that there was a second Soviet apparatus operating in 
Washington, We now know that it was the apparatus headed here 
by Hede Gumperz, or Hede Massing, as she is now better known. Then 
Noel Field received an offer to work, if I remember correctly, in the 
International Labor Office in Geneva, Switzerland, for the League of 
Nations. He accepted .that offer. Before he left 

The ChairMx\n. Who is this? 

Mr. Chambers. This is Noel Field. I suppose everyone here is 
aware that Noel Field has disappeared into the Russian occupied 
territory. 

Before Noel Field left for Geneva, Alger Hiss had a conversation 
with Field about Duggan, and he asked Field if Duggan would work 
for the Bykov apparatus. Field said that since he. Field, was leaving, 
Duggan would continue his work here for him. I heard nothing 
more of Duggan until the year 1937. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Chambers how did 
he know about the conversation between Duggan, Hiss and Field. 
Were you present or did one of those people tell you ? 

Mr. Chambers. What I know of that conversation is from what 
Alger Hiss told me at that time. 

In the year 1927 Colonel Bykov decided that the apparatus should 
make an attempt, which was I suppose the fourth attempt 

Senator Ferguson. The apparatus was an espionage apparatus. 

Mr. Chambers. That was the Soviet espionage apparatus in Wash- 
ington, the head of which so far as I know was Boris Bykov. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you trying to get information out of the 
State Department? Is that why you wanted these people in your 
apparatus ? 

Mr. Chambers. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. 

Mr. Chambers. To repeat, Colonel Bykov decided to make another 
attempt to recruit Lawrence Duggan for his apparatus. In pur- 
suance of that effort I talked to J. Peters. J. Peters was the head of 
the underground section of the American Communist Party. Peters 
knew that Fred Vanderbilt Field and Lawrence Duggan were friends 



490 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and told me so. I then asked Peters to introduce me to Fred Vander- 
bilt Field, and that Peters did in New York City close to Park Avenue 
and Thirty-fourth Street. I then had lunch with Fred Vanderbilt 
Field, but before I go into our conversation at lunch perhaps I should 
go a little further into what Peters told me about Fred Field in the 
course of a general casual conversation, in discussing Frederick Van- 
derbilt Field. Peters told me that Field was a member of an under- 
ground unit of the American Communist Party, which was meeting, 
if I remember correctly, in a house belonging to Mr. Field's mother 
somewhere in Central Park West, New York. In that unit were 
Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Joseph Barnes. Peters was con- 
siderably disturbed about the unit because some difficulty had arisen 
between the two men about their wives. I believe they subsequently 
divorced their wives and remarried each other's wives. I am not sure 

of the details. . , . , 

Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that 
the present Mrs. Barnes was the former wife of Frederick V. Field. 

The Chairman. That was earlier testimony before this committee. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Barnes has so testified. 

Senator Ferguson. How could that interfere with communism? 
[Laughter.] That you were frightened about it ? Wliat was wrong ? 

Mr. Chambers. What was disturbing J. Peters was what would dis- 
turb any executive if he found such a situation among his persoimel. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a little disturbing. 

Mr. Chambers. A disturbing factor. 

I had, as I said, lunch with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and I asked 
him to go to Washington and try to recruit for the Bykov apparatu9 
Lawrence Duggan in the State Department. Field, as nearly as I 
can remember now, left either that day or the next day for Wash- 
ington, and I saw him a day or two later. He told me that he had 
had a long conversation with Lawrence Duggan, and that Lawrence 
Duggan said that he could do nothing for the Bykov apparatus because 
he was already connected with another apparatus. 

I think that is all. 

Mr. Morris. What was the other apparatus, Mr. Chambers? 

Mr. Chambers. That was not defined. I can't answer that except 
as I assume it was the Hede Massing apparatus. 

The Chairman. There were two apparatuses working here in Wash- 
ington at that time? 

Mr. Chambers. There were at least two. 

The Chairman. One was by Hede Massing? 

Mr. Chambers. One was headed by Hede Massing. 

The Chairman. The other was headed by whom ? 

Mr. Chambers. The other was headed by myself locally and by 
Colonel Bykov. 

Senator Ferguson. Just so the record may be clear, were these so 
divided that you were each trying and getting information out of the 
State Department and other departments unbeknown to the other? 
Mr. Chambers. That is right. That is what is called in the Com- 
munist Party the principle of parallel apparatuses. The apparatuses 
are set up so that neither in theory shall have any knowledge of the 
personnel or the activities of the other. 

Senator Ferguson. That is valuable to get information. It is not 
to check the other apparatus to see whether it is remaining honest? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 491 

Mr. Chambers. I have reason to believe that there are still other 
apparatuses for that purpose. 

Senator Ferguson. Outside of that you have your counter es- 
pionage ? 

]\Ir. Chambers. I believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. So, to get information they are set up parallel. 

Mr. Chambers. These two apparatuses, as I know now, were in- 
formational apparatuses. Unquestionably there are other counter- 
intelligence apparatuses, of which I have no direct knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know how they checked the loyalty 
of tlie Communists ? 

Mr. Chambers. The check on loyalty would be in the first instance 
an inner-organizational check. Everyone in any Communist organi- 
zation is always vigilant about the loyalty of all other Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. You see, they object so strenuously to their 
loyalty being questioned when they are in Government. As I under- 
stand it, they have a very close check in their own organization as 
to loyalty. 

Mr. Chambers. There is a kind of invisible control which is self- 
operating, and self-starting. There are in addition other organiza- 
tional controls, but of their nature I can't speak from direct knowl- 
edge. 

Senator Ferguson. But there is a loyalty check on them? 

Mr. Chambers. The loyalty subject preoccupies Communists a 
great deal for the obvious reason that the conspiracy must be tight 
or it will fail. In other words, I am sitting here. You can't have 
people like that in a conspiracy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the pur- 
pose of this testimony at this time is to show that these three people 
who have been named so far, namely Frederick Vanderbilt Field, 
Joseph Barnes, and Lawrence Duggan, were active in the Institute 
of Pacific Relations and during that period were active members of 
the Communist organization. For instance, we have shown that Jo- 
seph Barnes was the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
from 1931 to 1934. Mr. Frecterick V. Field was the secretary from 
1934 to 1940 and remained on the executive committee until 1947. 
Mr. Duggan, we have had testimony, was the man used by the IPR 
when they gave consideration to founding a Latin- American division 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to relate that as 
much as possible, Senator, to show that this does come within the 
scope of the inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

It may be that we are laboring this too much on Mr. Barnes, Mr. 
Chairman. Mr. Chambers is now the fourth witness who has identi- 
fied Mr. Barnes as a member of some Communist unit and Commu- 
nist organization, and yet I think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman, be- 
cause Mr. Barnes continues to deny it. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chambers, did you ever contact Harry 
Dexter White, who was in the Treasury Department ? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes; I knew Harry Dexter White rather well. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he in any apparatus ? 

Mr. Chambers. Harry Dexter White was a source of the Soviet 
apparatus which I have mentioned. 

The Chairman. Was a source ? Give that again. 



492 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Chambers. Was a source for material. He gave both original 
Government documents and a weekly or fortnightly written memo 
summarizing information which had come to him in the course of his 
activities. One specimen of that memo is I believe now in the custody 
of the Justice Department. 

Senator Ferguson. A memo that White gave ? 

Mr. Chambers. That is right, in his handwriting. 

Senator Ferguson. In his own handwriting. Did you ever see any 
notes of Harry Dexter Wliite in relation to the Far East, the Pacific, 
the Chinese, economic problems? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes, I did, and the specimen that I have referred 
to, the exhibit contains, as nearly as I recall, some information about 
Chinese finances. I am not familiar with the subject, and I have for- 
gotten the exact matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Were those notes in your safety deposit box at 
one time ? 

Mr. Chambers. No, I don't believe they were ever in my safety de- 
posit box. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where they were obtained? 
Were they ever obtained by the Un-American Activities Committee? 

Mr. Chambers. I will have to think for a moment to remember 
what the chain of custody was. I believe that they were first given 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I am no longer quite 
sure. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you tell us the contents of those notes? 

Mr. Chambers. I am sorry, I have forgotten very largely Avhat is 
in that exhibit. The exhibit exists. 

Senator Ferguson. If you can give the committee any information 
on where that exhibit may be now, the committee would appreciate it. 

Mr. Chambers. I should think counsel would know or could find 
very easily. For one thing. Senator Nixon, while he was Congress- 
man, read them I believe into the Congressional Record. 

Senator Ferguson. He did? 

Mr. Chambers. I believe so. Shortly after the conviction of Alger 
Hiss. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that they 
were in the handwriting of White, Harry Dexter White ? 

Mr. Chambers. Without any question. 

Senator Ferguson. There is no question about that. 

Mr. Chambers. Moreover, the handwriting has been certified. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record 
documents showing Harry Dexter White's extensive association and 
activity within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder, Mr. 
Chambers, if you would amplify on your knowledge of Harry Dexter 
White's association with the Communist organization. 

Mr. Chambers. Harry Dexter White was not a member of the 
Communist Party as near as I know, and I have reason to believe 
that is true because he was reluctant to accept any form of discipline. 
I had the impression that he was a man of such character that he 
very much enjoyed being of the Communist Party but not in the 
party and not subject to its discipline. In that relationship he was 
willing to go to great lengths to assist them. 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us about some of the lengths that he did 
go to assist? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 493 

Mr. Chambers. I think I have ah^eady stated the two chief ones. 
He gave original and handwriting memo of his own containing 
Government information. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. And the other one? 

Mr. Chambers. I meant that to inckide two. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers, did you know Solomon Adler ? 

Mr. Chambers. No, I never have known and so far as I know, I 
never have seen Solomon Adler. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know he was a member of the Communist 
organization ? 

Mr. Chambers. I cannot testify definitely that he was. I can, 
however, tell you what I do know about him, which is this : That 
at some jjoint, I presume in the year 1936 or 1937, J. Peters told me 
that one Schloma Adler 

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that please ? 

Mr. Chambers. Well, I probably can't spell it any better than you 
can. I presume it is Schloma, S-c-h-1-o-m-a, and is a Jewish diminu- 
tive of the name Solomon. In any case, J. Peters told me that one 
Schloma Adler was supplying a weekly memo containing information 
about the United States Treasury to the Communist Party. I know 
nothing further about it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, we have introduced documents into the 
record showing Solomon Adler's connection with the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, and we are going to have further testimony bearing 
on Mr. Adler's activity in the Far East and in the American Embassy 
in Nanking. That will come later. Mr. Chambers' testimony related 
to that fact. 

The Chairman". Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers, did you know Len De Caux ? 

Mr. Chambers. No ; I never knew Len De Caux. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he was a Communist? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes; I knew Len De Caux was a Communist and 
I knew he was in Washington, and I believe that he was here for the 
Federated Press roughly from 1934 through 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything at this time that 
we could introduce showing Len De Caux's association with the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have a letter here, August 1, 1944, on the stationery 
of Columbia University, city of New York 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to reading that, Mr. Chairman, I think 
he ought to state how you knew he was a Communist. 

Mr. Chambers. Again, my knowledge of his Communist is subject 
to a conversation with J. Peters, who at one point wanted me to meet 
Len De Caux, whom he thought might be helpful to the Soviet ap- 
paratus. For some reason which I have now forgotten it was never 
accomplished. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever find Peters, in these tops of the 
Communist organization, to be wrong on who were Communists and 
who were not, who could be trusted in the cause and who could not ? 

Mr. Chambers. L have no recollection of any such occasion. It 
seems to me very unlikely that there w^ould be. 

Senator Ferguson. So you always accept as truth that kind of state- 
ments by Peters and other tops ? 

22848 — 52— pt. 2 10 



494 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Chambers. I would have accepted any statement that Peters 
made about such a point. 

The Chairman. I might state here at this point — I don't have to 
state to the Senators who are sitting here— that we are dealing with 
hearsay, but we are also dealing with a conspiracy, and the exception 
to the rule on the receipt of hearsay applies here. 

Senator Ferguson. After you establish the conspiracy, hearsay be- 
tween the conspirators and statements are admissible even in a court 
of law. 

The Chairman. That is right. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do your records show Len De Caux's 
activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. Len De Caux is shown as a member of the Board of 
Trustees of the American Council on page 158 of a volume called 
Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference 
of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945. I have here 
a letter dated August 1, 1944, from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Kelations on the stationery of Columbia University in the city of New 
York as addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American 
Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and signed by Philip C. Jessup. 
It is signed "Phil." This letter reads as follows in part : 

Dear Ray : In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what 
you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation * * * the following 
are people whom I would include — 

and among those suggested is the name of Len De Caux. 

Mr. Morris. I would like that introduced into evidence and have it 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It may be marked and inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 132" and is as 
iollows:) 

Exhibit No. 132 

Columbia University, 
Naval School of Military Government and Administration, 

August 1, lO^Jf- 
Mr. Raymond Dennett, 

Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 

New York 22, N. Y. 

Dear Ray : In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what 
you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we 
have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the 
American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the confer- 
ence and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that pur- 
pose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know. 

The following are people whom I would include : Benjamin Kizer, Brayton 
Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or 
J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry 
White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, 
Robert J. Watt, Len De Caux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, 
Virginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph 
Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Note- 
stein. 

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to 
him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine. 

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that w6 have too much of the 
Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occu- 
pied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore 
Vanderbilt or Commodore Stasseu. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 495 

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. 
I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come 
as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos 
your statement below "Military" on page II, I would get away from the idea of 
California naming a delegate. 

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Way- 
mack of Des Moines. 

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a bal- 
ance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who 
would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and 
Pacific Island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine 
person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things 
add up. 

Sincerely yours, 

Philip C. Jessup. 

Frank Coe of FEA also good (penciled note). 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Mr. White in New Hampshire, Mr. 
Chambers ? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Morris. Has your testimony covered that meeting with him? 

Mr. Chambers.. At great length. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Edmund Clubb ? I 
think before you answer that question, Mr. Chambers, would Mr. 
Mandel tell us who Edmund Clubb is. 

Mr. Mandel. The Biographical Register of the Department of 
State dated April 1, 1950, on page 98, lists Edmund Clubb in his most 
recent position as follows : 

Consul General at Shanghang from May 29, 1949, at Peiping September 23, 
1947. Class I, April 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. What is his present position ? 

Mr. Mandel. Presumably that is his present position. I have no 
later data. 

Mr. Morris. No, that is not his position. Mr. Clubb is the head 
of the Chinese desk, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. In the State Department. 

Mr. Morris. In the State Department. 

The Chairman. I think that should be established by something 
more than that. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is why I want to know what the 
official record shows. 

Mr. Mandel. The New York Times of July 13, 1951, refers to 
Oliver Edmund Clubb as director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. 

Senator Ferguson. Of the United States Department of State ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

The Chairman. How is that spelled ? 

Mr. Mandel. C-1-u-b-b. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the same man you are talking about? 

Mr. Chambers. I believe it is. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Mr. Clubb ? 

Mr. Chambers. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting 
Mr. Clubb? 

Mr. Chambers. Probably in June, in May or June of 1932, while 
I was editing the New Masses. 

Mr. Morris. That is 1932. 



496 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Chambers. 1932. Wliile I was editing the New Masses, which 
is a Communist-controlled magazine, there came into my office a young 
man who asked to see Walt Cannon. 

Mr. Morris. Who is Walt Carmon? 

Mr. Chambers. Walt Carmon had been in effect the managing 
editor of New Masses before I became editor. 

Mr. Morris. Did he have any connection with the Communist un- 
derground ? 

Mr. Chambers. Walt Cannon may or may not have had connec- 
tion with the Communist underground. I don't know. He was a 
Communist. 

This stranger seemed rather disturbed not to find Walt Carmon 
in the office where he expected him. Walt Carmon, in fact, wasn't 
any longer in the building, in the New Masses. The man, the stranger, 
told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you recognize a picture of him? 

Mr. Chambers. I can no longer identify a picture of Clubb. If 
you realize that I spoke to him not more than 15 minutes in the year 
1932, 1 think it is simply impossible to make a positive identification. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot identify the picture. 

Mr. Chambers. I feel that other impressions bear on it, and I 
should not make an identification of him positively. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Chambers. Nevertheless this man told me his name was O. 
Edmund Clubb, that he was a consular official of some kind at Hankow, 
I believe, that he was on leave of absence, and he had some kind of 
message which he wanted to deliver. The difficulty about my recollec- 
tion of Edmund Clubb or Oliver Clubb is that I can no longer re- 
member what that message was or even to whom it was to be de- 
livered, but there has stayed in the back of my mind an impression 
which I will not testify to positively that the rnessage was written 
and that it was for Grace Hutchins. Grace Hutchins is an open 
Communist, a member of the open Communist Party, has run on the 
Communist ticket in various elections, and is well laiown to be a 
Communist. But I cannot testify more positively to anything along 
those lines. Clubb then sat talking a little about China. Naturally 
I don't recall what our conversation was over that length of time, 
but I do remember that we talked about Hayang Arsenal. As you 
probably know, Hankow is one of three cities which lie close together — 
originally called the Wuhan cities where the Communists made 
their last stand when Chiang Kai-shek first swept them out. I 
have a further recollection, which I hesitate to make positive, that 
the message was from Agnes Smedley, but again I can't really testify 
to that positively. 

Senator Ferguson. This is your best judgment ; is it ? 

Mr. Chambers. I find it impossible, with the play of so many influ- 
ences on my mind, because people are always asking me questions, 
bringing me information, and there are actually areas of my experi- 
ence where I can no longer distinguish between what I once knew 
and what I have heard and learned in the course of testifying. I have 
given many thousands of words of testimony by now, as you know. 

Mr. Morris. But there is no doubt about the fact that Clubb came 
into the New Masses office. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 497 

Mr. Chambers. There is not the slightest doubt about it. He fur- 
ther told me that his parents lived in Minnesota and that he was going 
there to spend at least part of his leave with them. 

Mr. Morris. Can you amplify any more about whether or not Clubb 
at that time was a member of the Communist organization? 

Mr. Chambers. I have no knowledge whatsoever. 

Mr. Morris. INIr. Mandel, do you have anything to show that Mr. 
Clubb was assigned to Hankow at that particular time? 

Mr. Mandel, I read again from the State Department Eegister of 
April 1, 1950, which says that Oliver Edmund Clubb was born at South 
Park, Minn. ; and, further, that he was vice consul at Hankow on 
March 12, 1931. That is obviously the date of appointment. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to defer our introducing evidence show- 
ing Clubb's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. I was going to ask you if you have that evidence. 

Mr. Morris. There is that evidence ; yes, sir. I would like to defer 
introducing that until the subject comes up the next time. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. This question is not very necessary, Mr. Chambers, 
but will you identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist? 

JNIr. Chambers. Will I identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. It may not be necessary to your mind, but we are 
making a record here. 

Mr. Chambers. Yes ; Alger Hiss is a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The reason I ask that is that we have introduced into 
the record in the past extensive documents showing Hiss' activity with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, he was a member of the 
board of trustees ; and, as I say, other documents show extensive ac- 
tivity on his part within the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any doubt in your mind that Alger 
Hiss was a Communist? 

Mr, Chambers. None whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. You are positive of that? 

Mr. Chambers. Certainly. 

Mr. Morris, I think this is all for the time being, Mr. Chainnan. 

The Chairman. Very well. What about this afternoon ? 

Mr. Morris. We have nothing planned for this afternoon. 

The Chairman. The committee will rise at this time. 

(Whereupon, at 2 : 15 p. m., the hearing recessed until 10 a. m. 
Wednesday, August 22, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1951 

United States Senate, 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 4 : 30 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Oflfice Building, Senator Willis Smith presiding. 

Present: Senators Willis Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins. 

Also present: Mr. Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel. 

Senator Smith. The committee will come to order. 

Will you take the oath, please? You solemnly swear that you 
will well and truly interpret unto the witness called to testify before 
this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the oath which 
shall be administered to him ; and that you will well and truly inter- 
pret unto said witness the questions which shall be propounded him 
by counsel and by members of the committee and the testimony of 
said witness delivered before this committee, so help you God? 

Mrs. Takeshita. I do. 

Mr. KuRODA. I do. 

Senator Smith. Will you take the oath, please, Mr. Yoshikawa. 
Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give in this pro- 
ceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF MITSIJSADA YOSHIKAWA, MUSASHIHO-SHI, TOKIO. 
DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, ATTORNEY GEN- 
ERAL'S OFFICE, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, INTERPRETED BY 
MRS. KATSUYO TAKESHITA, WASHINGTON, D. C, AND REV. 
ANDREW Y. KURODA, WASHINGTON, D. C, OF JAPANESE SEC- 
TION, DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASH- 
INGTON, D. C. 

Mrs. Takeshita. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, who is presently the Direc- 
tor of the Special Bureau, Attorney General's Office, of the Japanese 
Government. 

Mr. Morris. I will address the questions to you. 

Mr. Yoshikawa, what is your present occupation ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Director of the Special Investigation Bureau, 
Attorney General's Office. 

499 



500 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Do you work for the Japanese Government officially ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What was your position in Japan at the trial and 
prosecution of Richard Sorge and his associates in the Sorg-e es- 
pionage ring? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I was connected with the Tokyo Criminal Court 
as a procurator at the time and was connected with the Tokyo Crimi- 
nal District Court Procuration Bureau. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe your functions in that case ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. At the time of the Sorge case a group of procura- 
tors was formed to investigate the Sorge case, and I was one of them. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he a Japanese Government official? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. They were all procurators. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a Government official position? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Were you in over-all charge of the case? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. No. There was one chief procurator assigned 
to the case. He was the chief of a division of the criminal affairs 
bureau. 

Mr. Morris. What in particular was your function ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. There were two assistant procurators assigned 
to the case under the chief procurator, and one of them was I. 

Mr. Morris. What did you do as opposed to what the other man 
did? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I was appointed to carry on the investigation of 
the foreigners in this group. 

Mr. Morris. Did the other man carry out the investigation of the 
native Japanese ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In that capacity, did you examine Richard Sorge? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I believe that the arrest of Sorge took place in 
the latter part of November 1941, and from that day on until May 
1942 the investigation of Sorge was carried on every day. 

Mr. Morris. Did you examine him every day ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. I gave special orders to the police to carry 
on the investigation of Sorge in the morning, while in the afternoon 
I personally conducted the examination of Sorge myself. However, 
in the first week I carried on the investigation by myself entirely. 

Mr. Morris. Did Sorge freely and willingly speak? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. During the first week he denied all the charges. 

Mr. Morris. Why did he confess after 1 week? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I believe that there are four reasons for his con- 
fession. The first reason that might be given for his confession is 
that much material evidence was unearthed with the arrest of these 
persons. In the material evidence that was discovered in the Klaussen 
home was a wireless apparatus for sending messages and the German 
Statistical Yearbook, which was used as a part of the code, and had 
coded messages, and also the original code. The second reason for 
Sorge's confession could be laid to the fact that, with the arrest of 
these members, practically all members of the ring were apprehended 
at one time. The third reason that might be given is that all the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 501 

other members of the ring had given their confessions before Sorge. 
For instance, we had received a confession from Klaussen that he 
belonged to the fourth section of the Ked army headquarters. Fur- 
thermore, Brando de Boukelitz was a member of the French Com- 
munists, and was in Japan as a correspondent for the Havas news- 
paper. It is one of the very famous news agencies in France. 

Mr. Morris. How many reasons have you given now ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Three reasons. I spoke to Sorge about the dis- 
covery of the material in evidence and the confessions of the other 
person^. It is my belief that Sorge felt much relieved that he had 
just about completed all the work that he had set out to do since his 
arrival in Japan in 1933. That is the fourth reason. 

I discovered this after Sorge had made his confession. About a 
week before Sorge's arrest, I learned that Sorge and Klaussen and 
de Boukelitz gathered together in Sorge's home and met together, 
and they spoke this: "It seems that we have lost contact with the 
Japanese lately. I wonder what the reason for that is. We have 
just about completed all the intelligence work which we had started 
out to do in Japan, and we have learned what Japan is to do it this 
critical time. Since Germany has begun her attack on Russia, let us 
leave Japan and go to Germany to carry on our work, and let us do 
intelligence work in Germany for Moscow." 

This is the sort of conversation that was carried on at the time. 
Sorge and his group in a sense enjoyed a feeling of relief, but they 
felt that they had completed a very important piece of work in 
Japan and had completed their mission successfully. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they say what the mission was ? 

Mr. YosiiiKAWA. They have confessed to that in detail. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the substance of their mission? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. The important question at the time was whether 
Japan, after her long war in China, would send or direct her military 
activities to the north or to the south. 

Senator Ferguson. So, it was not only to obtain intelligence — that 
is, information — but they were to penetrate for the purpose of getting 
Japan to strike to the south rather than to strike Russia, which meant 
that they were to strike America and Britain rather than Russia ; is 
that correct. 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. That was the second motive in Sorge's mission 
in Japan. The first was to gain objective information. 

Senator Ferguson. The second was to have this take place, though, 
of attacking to the south rather than attacking Russia? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How could a German like Sorge accomplish that 
task ? Did he have some Japanese on his side ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Sorge was not only very intimate with the German 
Ambassador Ott, but he was also intimate with many of the military 
general staff. Furthermore, a man with whom Sorge had very close 
connections, Ozaki, was one of the "brain trust" group in the Konoye 
Cabinet, and he belonged to this group which had great influence 
in the policy making of the Cabinet. 

Furthermore, Ozaki was a top-notch newspaperman. 

Senator Ferguson. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was 
Sorge arrested ? Or was it before ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was before Pearl Harbor. 



502 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. How long before ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. The latter part of November 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. The attack took place on the 7th of December. 

Mr. YosiiiKAWA. It was the 8th in Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. Hovn^ long before that was Sorge and his group 
arrested ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. About 2 or 3 weeks before. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Sorge relate anything about a modus 
videndi between Japan and America ? 

Mrs. TAKESHrrA. Would you explain modus vivendi? 

Senator Ferguson. An agreement or stay of proceedings, as it were, 
when they were negotiating prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor. A 
90-day truce, as it were, in their negotiations. 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. No. Sorge's sources of information were not 
just the Konoye Cabinet, but also from the top officers in the military 
clan. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you ever hear of a proposed modus vivendi 
between America and Japan prior to the 8th, as you say, of December? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. No; I do not remember. Sorge considered the 
negotiations taking place between America and Japan as of very high 
importance, and he paid very, very close attention to the negotiations 
that were going on at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then Sorge did say that he was watching nego- 
tiations between America and Japan prior to the attack? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did Sorge confess to you more than you felt that 
he knew ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes ; almost all of it was so. All the information. 

Mr. Morris. Did he confess more than you felt that he Icnew about? 

Mr. YosiiiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I think you have the wrong answer. Did Sorge confess 
to more facts than you felt that he knew ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes, most of what Sorge told me was more than I 
knew. May I explain. The character of the Sorge group in the be- 
ginning was a great question, and if it were connected with Moscow, 
how did they receive instructions. All those questions were very 
important at the time. 

Mr. Morris. You don't understand the question. Was Sorge a 
Communist when he died ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Of course. 

Mr. Morris. Did he freely confess to Mr. Yoshikawa secrets that 
Mr. Yoshikawa could never have learned otherwise ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In part the things that I learned were entirely 
from Sorge's confessions and that part was a very important part. 

Mr. Morris. If Sorge knew that another ring was operating, an- 
other spy ring was operating, does Mr. Yoshikawa think he would 
have confessed about that, too ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. It is my private opinion, but I don't believe that 
he would. 

Mr. Morris. It is your private opinion that you don't think that he 
would ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't think Sorge would. 

Mr. Morris. Why not? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 503 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. If another group had been active in Japan at the 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Were any coercive methods used in obtaining the con- 
fessions ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. No coercive methods were used. 

Mr. Morris. Was there any pressure put on the prosecutors on the 
part of the Japanese Government ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. There was. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. The first man in this group who was arrested was 
Ozaki. Ozaki was a man held in very high esteem in the Konoye 
■Cabinet, and it was expected that the arrest of Ozaki would have a 
very bad political effect on the Konoye Cabinet, but Ozaki immedi- 
ately upon his arrest made the confession to me that he was an inter- 
national Communist. Because of that, Konoye was not able to ignore 
that confession and put pressure on the procurators. Furthermore, 
after the arrest of Ozaki, because of other political reasons, the Konoye 
Cabinet resigned, and it was succeeded by the To jo Cabinet. There- 
fore, we did not have any political pressure put on us in the case of 
Ozaki, but when Sorge was arrested some pressure was put on us. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the pressure to stop prosecution, or was it 
to press it and carry through the prosecution ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was not a pressure that was strong. 

Senator Ferguson. But whatever pressure there was, which way 
was it ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was just a matter of arrest at the time. The 
matter of prosecution had not come up yet. 

Senator Ferguson. About getting a confession, what was the pres- 
sure ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. When Sorge was arrested, Ambassador Ott and 
his wife became highly indignant. The Ambassador, through the 
Tojo Cabinet, requested that they be allowed to see Sorge and to 
have a report of the case immediately. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, Ott was Ambassador to 
Japan ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Seantor Ferguson. And Sorge had some connection with the 
Ambassador, with the German Embassy, is that right ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. As I remember, Ott was a military attache to 
the German Embassy at Nagoya at the time of the ambassadorship of 
Von Dirkson. From that, Sorge had become intimate with Ott from 
that time that he was a military attache. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Sorge hold any positions with the Ger- 
mans ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Sorge did not have any official position, but he 
was considered one of the closest friends of Ott and was regarded as 
one of his highest advisers. Therefore Sorge had access to all the 
German military and political secrets, and consulted him on many 
matters concerning such matters. At times when the German high 
officials connected with the army or the Government came to Japan, 
out of respect for Sorge's position they would divulge many of the 
confidential matters to Sorge, and he would go practically every day 
to the German Embassy and was connected with the newspaper in 
the Embassy. 



504 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Was he a public-relations officer ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Not in the way of liaison; no. He was just con- 
nected with a news service or a press release. 

Mr. Morris. For the Embassy ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes, for the Embassy. At one time Ott said to 
Sorge that he would very much like to have him attached officially to 
the Embassy. Although this was a very high position for Sorge, he 
declined. The reason for his declination was that there would be an 
investigation of his past and he wanted to avoid that. 

Mr. Morris. Was the principal purpose of this ring to collect in- 
formation for the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did they carry on another function ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. As I said before, Ozaki and Sorge, working to- 
gether, tried as much as possible to influence Japanese military news 
to the south. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat was their second function ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. To influence 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us the details of this endeavor to in- 
fluence the foreign policy of Japan ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Although his position w-as unofficial, he enjoyed 
a very high standing in the Germany Embassy, and he was also a 
member of the Nazi Party, and as a correspondent for the Frank- 
furter Zeitung he had many friends among the Japanese and the 
foreigners in Japan. He also knew many persons in the high military 
command. Ozaki also had a very important position as one of the 
brain trust group in the Konoye Cabinet. He also had a good reputa- 
tion as a topnotch newspaperman. Through consultation between 
themselves they initiated this political strategy. Moscow had for- 
bidden that they take any part in political matters, to do anything 
that might connect them w^ith the Japanese Communist Party. Sorge 
asked Moscow whether it would be permissible for him to engage in 
this political maneuvering. There was no answer from Moscow to 
that question. Sorge took it for granted that Moscow had given 
silent consent and, together with Ozaki, engaged in activities that 
would influence Japanese foreign policies as they wished. One of 
their methods was of course to speak to many people about what 
political policy Japan should take, and also to write articles on the 
subject. The main points in their propaganda were as follows : The 
first reason was that the Reds were militarily very strong and that 
their social set-up was also very powerful. If Japan should go to 
the north, it would be very unlikely that she would be the victor. 

Mr. Morris. Wlien you say "go to the north," you mean attack the 
Soviet Union? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Even though Japan should send her armies into Siberia, she would 
find very little there that she could use, and she would probably meet 
with greater difficulties than she had encountered in her war with 
China, and historically speaking, Japan has always failed in any 
military missions to the north. 

Moreover, should Japan send her forces to the south, she would 
find many resources in that area which she needs and could use. 

Mr. Morris. When you testify that Japan should move to the 
south, you mean Japan should attack Great Britain, the United 
States and the Dutch ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 505 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. French Indochina, America, England, and the 
Dutch. 

Mr. Morris. Wlienever in your testimony you refer to moving to 
the south you mean attacking all those countries? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. I mean the dispatching of military forces to 
the south. By "resources" I mean great amounts of oil and rubber 
and other resources. For these reasons, then, it would be more advis- 
able for Japan to go south rather than to the north. 

I would like to add a few explanations as to the political position 
of Ozaki. 

Senator Ferguson. Ozaki is the man who was directly connected 
with Sorge in this espionage ring? 

Mr. Morris. What was Mr. Ozaki's first name? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It probably is Hozumi, but in the group which 
investigated him he was called Hidemi. There are many readings of 
Japanese characters. Although Ozaki was a Communist, his position 
was somewhat different from the Communist Party in Japan. The 
aim of the Japanese Communist Party was to work within the frame- 
work of the Japanese Communist Party in Japan, and to instigate a 
revolution and win political power in Japan. However, Ozaki's 
position diff.ered from the Communist Party in Japan. Ozaki's posi- 
tion was that Japan should be Communized through the cooperative 
efforts of Russia, China, and Japan, and that Japan should become 
a satellite under the leadership of Moscow. ' In the many conversa- 
tions with Sorge we formulated the strategy which I have described. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations' name 
ever come into the investigation? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. In what way? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Ozaki had as one of the sources of information 
a person by the name of Saionji. 

Mr. Morris. What is his first name? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Kimikazu. The acquaintance of Ozaki and 
Saionji began with their attendance at a meeting at an American- 
Pacific conference in America. 

Mr. Morris. That is the Institute of Pacific Relations conference, 
isn't it? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know in what year? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I do not remember distinctly but I believe it was 
about 1937. 

Senator Ferguson. How else, if it did, did the name come into 
these hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Other than that which I have just told you about, 
I don't remember. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that 
by previous exhibits we have identified Mr. Saionji as the secretary 
of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Smith. The record will so show. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain to us the relationship that existed 
between Ozaki and Saionji? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. The intimacy between Ozaki and Saionji in- 
creased with their return to Japan, and both of these men were 



506 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

members of the group closely connected with the Konoye Cabinet^ 
and they were very good personal friends also. 

Mr. Morris. Was Saionji arrested with the other members of the 
ring ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Saionji's arrest came very much later. I believe 
it was in the spring of 1942. 

Mr. Morris. Did he give important secrets to Ozaki? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes, regretably, but Saionji did give many of the 
important state secrets to Ozaki. 

Mr. Morris. Was Gunther Stein implicated in this spy ring? 

.Mr. YosHiKAWA. He was an indirect member of the group. 

Mr. Morris. Did he consciously work for the group ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes; he did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe some of his activities ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. According to Sorge's confession, Gunther Stein 
was a man well versed in economics and a man of great activity. 
Gunther Stein, knowing that Sorge was a member of the group con- 
nected with Moscow, cooperated with him freely. Sorge valued 
Gunther Stein's cooperation very highly, and it was Sorge's wish for 
Gunther Stein to become a direct member of the group. He proposed 
that to Moscow. By a "direct member" I mean a person who is regis- 
tered in Moscow and receives money from Moscow, and furthermore 
is protected by the Moscow network. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that 
we introduced at a recent hearing records that Gunther Stein was 
the representative of the IPR in 1937 and we also introduced into the 
record extensive articles that he wrote for the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. I think the number is 21 , Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Smith. The record will so show. 

Mr. Morris. Was Agnes Smedley a member of this spy ring? 

Mr. YosHiKAwA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Were there any other Americans involved in this spy 
ring ? 

Mr. YosHiKAwA. Yes. It would be a very general statement. I 
would not be able to give definite facts. 

Senator Ferguson. How many? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Several. When Sorge was carrying on his work 
in Shanghai there were more than three, including Agnes Smedley. 

Mr. Morris. In what year was that? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. As I remember, it was about from January 1931 
to December 1932. 

Mr. Morris. Who were the other members in addition to Agnes 
Smedley who operated in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period 
of time ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. One was an American by the name of Jacob, a 
newspaper correspondent. 

Mr. Morris. Was Jacob his true name? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I do not believe that it was his true name. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ask Sorge for his true name? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I asked him. 

Mr. Morris. Did he refuse to tell you ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. He smiled but did not answer me. 

Mr. Morris. Did he give you a description of Jacob ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 507 

Mr. YosHiKAwA. I asked liim that also but he did not give that 
information to me. 

Mr. Morris. Was there any other American in the spy ring in 
Shanghai during that period? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes; there were. 

Mr. Morris. Who was it? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was a young official connected with the Ameri- 
can consulate in Shanghai. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the name? 

]Mr. YosHiKAWA. I asked the name but Sorge did not give it to me. 

Mr. ]MoRRis. Did he give you a description ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I asked him that also but he would not give that 
information to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ever give the name of Agnes Smedley? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. But he wouldn't give you these other names? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. No ; he did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would not? Did you try to get the names? 

]\fr. YosHiKAWA. He would not give them to me, even though I 
asked him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to get the names ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I did not try to compel him to give the names. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that because they were in Shanghai rather 
than Japan? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. That was one of the reasons, yes; because we 
wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them in the other country. 

Mr. Morris. Did part of the spy ring operate in Harbin, in Man- 
churia ? 

Mr. TosHiKAWA. Sorge used another group in Harbin as a mail 
box. 

Senator Ferguson. A mail drop ? 

Mv. YosHiKAWA. As a message center. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Did this message center deal directly with the Soviet 
fourth division? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was an intelligence group connected with the 
fourth section of the Eed army. 

]\Ir. ]\IoRRis. And they operated directly under Sorge ? 

JNIr. YosiiiKAWA. No. 

Mr. Morris. How did it operate ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Under instructions from Moscow, this Harbin 
center would act as a courier, which would relay messages or wire- 
less messages for Sorge to Moscow. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any reason to believe that there were 
Am.ericans associated with that set-up? 

Mr. YosiiiKAWA. It was not I who investigated this case, but it 
was through one of my subordinates who investigated Max Klaussen 
that I obtained this. The fact that this Harbin group was used as 
a message center is in the statement that Sorge made to me. Although 
Klaussen was working under Sorge in Shanghai under the instructions 
from ]\foscow, Klaussen was attached to the Harbin group for a while. 
According to the procurator Avho investigated Klaussen, I was told 
that there was a wireless apparatus set up in the American consulate 
in Harbin. 



508 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Who wasKlaussen? Was he a German ? 

Mr, YosHiKAWA. Yes ; he was a German. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he the man who sent the radio messages ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes ; he was a wireless operator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever find the wireless in the American 
Embassy ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. This was information which I got from the report 
of the procurator who investigated Klaussen. 

Senator Ferguson. But Klaussen must have then stated to the pro- 
curator that the place where he had the wireless was in the American 
Embassy. Is that correct ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Klaussen stated that the wireless was in the Amer- 
ican consulate. 

Mr. Morris. This was a wireless of the spy ring, was it not ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was not an apparatus belonging to the Amer- 
ican consulate. It was an apparatus belonging to the spy ring. 

Mr. Morris. And they used the American consulate general's office 
as a headquarters ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes ; surprisingly it was so. 

Mr. Morris. In what year was that ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Around 1931 and 1932. 

Mr. Morris. Just approximately the same time as the American 
operators in Shanghai ? 

Senator Ferguson. 1931 and 1932? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this in China or Japan where the apparatus 
was in the Embassy ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was in Harbin, Manchuria. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Yoshikawa, we had testimony before this com- 
mittee that Sorge relayed to his superiors the message that the Ger- 
man Army was going to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. 
Do you have any information that would confirm that ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain it? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Before war had been declared between Russia 
and Germany, many members of the German high command came 
to Japan and visited the German Embassy. According to their re- 
ports, although I do not remember whether it was 150 divisions or 
1,500,000 men, it was their report that this large number of the Ger- 
man military were massed on the Soviet-Russian border, and that 
they would be able to attack and accomplish the fall of Petrograd 
within 2 months. That was the plan of the German military. There 
were some differences of opinion among the Germans at the time. 
However, it was already decided that this plan would be put under 
way and that the attack would be launched. This information was 
not only related to Sorge by the German military officials, but also 
by Ambassador Ott. When Sorge heard this he was amazed at the 
plan and he took measures to confirm the information, and then to 
relay the information to Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. Did this spy ring ever learn that there was to 
be an attack on America ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In a broad sense; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us what you know about it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 509 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. In July, after the outbreak of the war between 
the Germans and the Russians, there was a mobilization of 1,300,000 
men in Japan. This was a very, very large mobilization and a highly 
important one. Whether this large force would be deployed to the 
north or to the south was a question of great military importance in 
Japan. Along with this, the Kwantung army in Manchuria, under 
the pretense of special army maneuvers, mobilized the rolling force 
of the South Manchurian railway. Sorge was very zealous in this 
investigation as to whether this army would be deployed to the north 
or the south, and he tried to obtain this information through Ozaki. 

Senator Fergusox. Did he obtain the information that it would be 
used against the American, British, French, and Dutch? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. As a result of his information activities he learned 
that this force would be sent to the south. 

Senator Ferguson. Which meant that it would be an attack on 
America, the British, the Dutch, and the French, rather than upon 
Russia. Is that right? 

Mr. YosniKAWA. It is a question as to whether that meant it would 
be actual warfare to the south, but even at that time many of the 
Japanese forces were being sent into French Indochina. Sorge was 
engaged in a detailed study of the negotiations, which were taking 
place between America and Japan at the time. Not only was he inter- 
ested in what the government was planning, but also what the military 
had in mind. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Sorge tell you that he learned that Japan 
was going to attack America? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. In October or November 1941 Sorge arrived at 
the conclusion that Japan would send her forces south, and sent that 
information to Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you reconcile that testimony with what 
you said before the Un-American Activities Committee that was re- 
ported in the press recently ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I was shown a wireless message which was sent 
by Klaussen, carrying a message to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. You were shown a message that had been sent 
by Klaussen, who was one of the spy ring, to Russia, advising Russia 
that it was the intention of the Japanese military forces to move 
south and not against Russia, is that right ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. This message also contained the sentence that 
Japan would attack. 

Senator Ferguson. Attack what? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Attack the south. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the date of that message? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I do not remember the date, but I saw the mes- 
sage and it brought back the fact that I had seen that. Sorge also 
confessed to the message. 

Senator Ferguson. Was America's name used in that message ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I do not believe that America was mentioned as 
America. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret the message that they 
would attack in the south? The Japanese were already fighting in 
China and in Indochina. 

22848— 52— pt. 2 11 



510 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. In tlie attack, other places such as Java and 
Singapore would be included. 

Senator Ferguson. That was Dutch. Singapore was British and 
Java was Dutch. 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then your language should not be interpreted 
either here or before the Un-American Activities Committee that the 
Sorge ring knew that Japan w^as going to attack America. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr, YosHiKAWA. Sorge stated that of necessity attacking to the 
south would mean going to war with America. 

Senator Ferguson. Then Sorge did tell you the name "America" 
in relation to the attack of Japan, is that right ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Sorge said so. 

Senator Ferguson. Sorge said that ? 

]Mr. YosHiKAWA. Sorge mentioned America. 

Senator Ferguson. So that as I understand it now, your testimony 
here under oath is that Sorge said to you that he had learned from 
the Japanese Government prior to the time of his arrest, which was 
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack on the 8th your time, the 7th our 
time, that he learned that an attack by the Japanese would be made 
upon America 2 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Sorge stated so. 

Senator Ferguson. The answer is yes, that he did state so, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did Sorge visit any American Communist en route to 
Japan ? 

Mr. YosiiiKAWA. He stated so ; yes. But on the details of that mat- 
ter, I had the police make the investigation. 

Mr. Morris. What was the result of the investigation? 

Mr. YosHiKAV/A. After his stay in China, Sorge went to Moscow 
and then lie left for Japan from Moscow by way of America. At the 
time he made arrangements to have a Japanese Communist in Amer- 
ica join him in his activities in Japan. I do not know definitely just 
whom he met and where he met them. 

Mr. Morris. Who was the American Communist? What was the 
American Communist's name? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I had given instructions to the procurator, the 
policeman Okashi, to investigate the matter, but I do not believe that 
Sorge disclosed the man's name. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Ushiba was ever a Japanese 
Communist ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I do not believe that he was a member of the Com- 
munist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that Tsuru was ever a Japanese Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. I had never heard that he was a member of the 
Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Was he active in Communist activities? 

JMr. YosHiKAWA. While I was investigating this case I did not hear 
anything of that nature. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any instance whereby the American 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 511 

Communists aided tlie Japanese Communists in Japan? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain it to us, please ? 

Mr. YosHiKAWA. It was before the arrest of Sorge, and I believe 
it was in either 1937 or 1938. It was a period in which the Japanese 
Communist Party has been greatly weakened and was in a state of 
disorganization. It was a very important matter to the Japanese 
Communists that the party be reorganized. However, that was not 
possible at the time with their own strength alone, and unless they 
received help from AIoscow they would not be able to attain that end.- 
We had the instance that at this time the Japanese branch of the Com- 
munist Party in America gave aid to the Japanese Communists ia 
Japan. 

Mr. Morris. You mean those Japanese and Japanese-Americans 
in the American Communist Party '^ 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Not only the Japanese. Although the gi-oup 
was made up of Japanese, there w^ere also other Americans wha 
participated in tliis aid. The methods which the}^ employed were as 
follows : They put out a very good publication by the name of Inter- 
national Correspondence or Kokusai Tsuhin. The contents of this 
publication were directed toward propaganda in Japan, taking up the 
current problems of that time within Japan, and gave instructions as 
to what steps should be taken by the Japanese Communists and it was- 
also a very radical magazine. Another publication which was put 
out was the Taiheiyo Rodo-sha, which in translation means the Pacific- 
Worker. It was a magazine put out by an organization which en- 
deavored to bring into close relations the various radical trade unions 
of the various countries bordering on the Pacific. This office pub- 
lished this publication. This publication was published in Japanes& 
also, and it took up practical problems such as what the Japanese 
Communists should do within the labor organizations in Japan, 
This publication was sent by mail to all the right, center, and left 
labor front organizations and labor organizations in Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Is it Mr. Yoshikawa's testimony that these publica- 
tions were put out by American Communists in aid of the Japanese 
Communist Party because its ranks had been depleted by the Reds in 
J apan ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I haven't any other questions. 

Senator Smith. I want to thank you very much for your participa- 
tion and testimony here. 

Tlie committee stands adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 6 : 26 p. m. the committee was recessed subject ta 
the call of the Chair.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424 
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman), pre- 
siding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and 
Watkins. 

Also present : Senator Welker ; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; 
Eobert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research 
director. 

The Chairman. The committee .will come to order. 

Mr. Budenz, will you be sworn ? You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony that you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee 
of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Budenz. I do. 

The Chaiman. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you give your name and address to 
the reporter, please. 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y. 

Mr. Budenz. Louis Francis Budenz, Crestwood, N. Y. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, where were you born ? 

Mr. Budenz. Indianapolis, Ind. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation? 

Mr. Budenz. Assistant professor of economics at Fordham Uni- 
versity. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, were you ever a member of the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, I was a member of the Communist Party 
and of its national committee. 

Mr. Morris. For how long were you a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Budenz. For 10 years. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what positions you held in the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Budenz. I held quite a few positions, and I will give some of 
them. 

513 



514 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Yes, give the more notable ones, Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. I was labor editor of the Daily Worker, 
editor of the Midwest Daily Record — that was a Communist paper in 
Chicago — managing editor of the Daily Worker and president of the 
corporation publishing that paper, a member of the national com- 
mittee of the Communist Party, as I have stated, chairman of the 
Commission on Publications, penetrating various publications for the 
Communist Party, and a member of the radio commission, penetrating 
the radio industry. There were other assignments. 

Mr. Morris. For how long were you a member of the national com- 
mittee of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Nine years, six of them public, three of them secret. 

Mr. Morris. And when did you break with the Communist Party, 
Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. October 11, 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Now, since that time, Mr. Budenz, have you cooperated 
with Government agencies in trying to eliminate Communists from 
positions of power? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, to the best of my ability, that is, working with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon their request, and also al- 
ways on subpena. 

Mr. Morris. Well, could you just give us a general idea to what 
extent, say in hours contributed to the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion ? 

Mr. Budenz. During the last 5 y^ars I have contributed 3,000 hours, 
approximately, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in questions 
directed to me and in the research required by those questions. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a witness at the trial of the 11 Communists? 

Mr. Budenz. I was the first witness at the trial of the 11 Commu- 
nists, and I might say that I was on the witness stand 10 days at that 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us if you were also a witness at the 
Santo and Peters proceedings, the deportation proceedings against 
Santo and J. Peters ? 

Mr. Budenz. I was a witness for the Government against Santo 
and J. Peters, Soviet agents, and as a matter of fact I might say I 
was the chief witness against J. Peters, who was one of the chief 
Soviet espionage agents in this country. After my testimony, both 
of these men agreed to go to Europe voluntarily. 

Mr. Morris. And were you responsible for the exposure of Ger- 
hard Eisler? 

Mr. Budenz. In 1936, I stated publicly that Gerhard Eisler was 
a representative of the Communist International. That was con- 
firmed thereafter. And I was a witness at one of his trials. 

Mr. Morris. What trial was that, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. That was the trial down here in Washington, in 
which he was convicted. 

Mr. Morris. Convicted of what? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I am not sure. 

Senator Ferguson. Perjury, was it not, on the passport? 

Mr. Budenz. I think that was it. 

Mr. Morris. And then there were other contributions that you have 
made to various Government agencies, were there not, Mr. Budenz ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 515 

Mr. BuDENZ. Yes, sir, I have appeared many times before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities. I think it is 14 times. And 
before the Honse Labor Committee, before the Senate committee 
which was chaired by Senator Ferguson, and before the committee 
under tlie chairmanship of Senator Tydings. Just recently, I ap- 
peared for the New York Board of Education in the educational sit- 
uation there as an expert on Marxism and Leninism, and most recently 
the State of New York subpenaed me in the case of the International 
Workers Order, which now by court order has been declared to be 
dissolved. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, this committee is conducting an inquiry 
into the Listitute of Pacific Relations. We are going to ask you a 
series of questions, all of which will be related, either directly or 
indirectly, to the Institute of Pacific Relations. And we are going 
to ask you, to the best of your ability, to answer all these questions. 

At the outset, Mr. Budenz, were you in a position in the Commu- 
nist Party where you would have access to more secrets, to the identity 
of more people, than the ordinary Communist ? 

Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly. Indeed, more than the normal mem- 
ber of the national committee. 

Mr. Morris. Why is that, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. As managing editor of the Daily Worker, it was es- 
sential that I know the various delicate turns and twists of the line ; 
not only of the line but of the emphasis of the line in the particular 
period of time. 

The Chairman. When you say "line" in that respect, what do you 
mean, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I mean the Communist viewpoint at that particular 
moment, the Communist objective. This has nothing to do funda- 
mentally wdth the Communist philosophy, except that it is an ex- 
pression of it in action during a period of time. And that had to be 
■ emphasized in the Daily Worker, not merely as to what the line was 
but as to its various delicate nuances, if I may use that term. The 
Daily Worker is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word. It 
is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy giving directives to the 
conspirators. 

Mr. Morris. On individuals? 

Mr. Budenz. On individuals likewise. It w\ts a matter of political 
life and death to have a correct viewpoint of the various individuals 
who were dealt with by the Daily Worker. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it the same today as it was in your day? 

Mr. Budenz. What is that? 

Senator Ferguson. Is the Daily Worker now a telegraph agency 
for the men in the conspiracy ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I can't testify of my own first-hand knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. But as to what you see in it ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy. 
That is its sole function. It parades under the gifise of a daily paper 
in order to protect itself through the cry of freedom of the press, but 
it is not concerned primarily with how much circulation it has. The 
circulation sometimes has gone down to 8,000 a day. Its concern is to 
get out every day to the Communists throughout the country, the 
active ones, the instructions upon which they are to act. It is used in 
that way, by the way. 



516 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Budenz, from the eyes of the then editor of 
the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the 
Communist Party, what was your opinion of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? ^Vliat did you know of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Budenz, Wliat I know is perhaps the better way to put it, be- 
cause I was at Politburo meetings and in consultation with members 
of the Politburo constantly. As a matter of fact, day by day I was 
in consultation. And frequently I was at Politburo meetings because 
of my position. The Politburo in these discussions declared the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations repeatedly to be a"captive organization, com- 
pletely under control of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. You say the Institute of Pacific Relations was a captive 
organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Completely under the control of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. This was during the entire period of my membership 
in the Communist Party. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be from 1935 to 1945 ? 

Mr. Budenz. 1935 to 1945. 

We have to distinguish according to the Communist parlance be- 
tween captive organizations and fronts. Communist fronts are those 
created by the Communist Party itself. Captive organizations are 
those penetrated successfully and taken over. That is to say, the 
policies are imder control of the party, although not necessarily all 
the personnel is. 

The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union is 
a very splendid example of that in the trade-union field. That was an 
organization that was certainly not Communist. The overwhelming 
majority of its members were not Communists. But it was completely 
controlled by the Communists. And the Institute of Pacific Relations 
was viewed in the same light. 

The Chairman. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the Politburo. Would 
you dwell on that somewhat, so that we may know exactly what you 
mean by that, for the record ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Politburo is the name used 
by the Communists for the political bureau of the Communist Party, 
whose name has now been changed to the National Board. Many of 
these Communist organs undergo many changes of name, either for 
conspiratorial reasons, to avoid legal identification later, or for some 
other purpose. The term "Politburo" though, was the original name. 
That is to say, it was modeled after the Politburo in Moscow, and on 
the same leadership principle. 

It is the governing body insofar as there can be one, in America, of 
the Communist Party, although it receives its instructions from the 
Communist International representatives. 

The Chairman. You say it is called what, now ? 

Mr. Budenz. The National Board of the Communist Party. 

Senator Ferguson. You are talking about the American section, 
which is tied directly to the Moscow section; is that correct? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. The Moscow directing body, that is, 
the political body of the Soviet Union, is called the Politburo. But 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 517 

that is the Moscow Politburo. I am speaking about the American 
Politburo. 

Senator Ferguson. I understood. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, would you say there was a cell, a Com- 
munist cell, operating within the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. BuDEXz. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Alexander Trachten- 
berg, in these political bureau discussions, emphasizing the importance 
of the work of this cell, described the Institute of Pacific Relations 
as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Wash- 
ington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East." 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us who Alexander Trach- 
tenberg is, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Alexander Trachtenberg is one of the most important 
members of the Communist conspiracy in this country. He is the 
cultural commissar of the Communists in this country. He has pub- 
lished all the authorized works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, 
and all other works authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
in Moscow. Through his hands these works have to go. He is tech- 
nically the head of International Publishers, but he is vested with 
much more authority, with reference to the Daily Worker. He is in 
charge of the Avhole cultural work of the party, or at least he was when 
I was in the party. 

Mr. MoRKis. And is it your testimony that the Communists use the 
Institute of Pacific Relations to influence foreign policy? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Budenz, 
that when a man like Trachtenberg is speaking about this being an 
educational process, this IPR, here in Washington — and I take it 
that is what is meant by the "little red schoolhouse" — that that was 
an actual fact, that he knew what he was talking about, because of 
his tie-in in the whole Communist activity ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; and because he knew it through the re- 
ports which were received from the Communists within the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, largely through Frederick Vanderbilt Field. 

Senator Ferguson. And when he was giving this information, you 
being the managing editor of the Daily Worker, these were instruc- 
tions to you as part of the party line here in America ? 

Mr. Budenz, It was an observation in the Politburo, a political 
observation, a conclusion. 

Senator Ferguson. So that it was information that you might be 
able to operate on in the future if necessity required ? 

Mr. Budenz. Absolutely. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore had to be accurate? 

Mr. Budenz. Every Communist judgment has to be carried in 
some form into action. 

Senator Ferguson. And it had to be accurate for you to carry on ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Budenz. Communist information among themselves is absolute- 
ly accurate. It must be. It is the foundation of their work. 

Senator Ferguson. You see, we hear a lot said about so much 
evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at 
the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of 
this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your 



518 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by 
a committee ? 

Mr, BuDENZ. This is an official communication between leaders of 
the conspirac3^ 

Senator Ferguson. Among themselves ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. An estimate of their work among 
themselves, borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The 
fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the Ameri- 
can council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which 
we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, there is so much supporting 
evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this 
morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Oil, I could not be more certain if I had heard this 
said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to get your idea on this question. 

Mr. BuDENz. It was based on reports by Frederick Vanderbilt 
Field, an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. He was really the man who reported to your 
agency ? 

Mr- BuDENz. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So that it was coming from the Institute of 
Pacific Relations among the coconspirators and giving it to all of 
them, so that they may operate and act upon it ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

Senator Watkins. May I ask : Could it be possible that Mr. Field 
was mistaken, that he just thought they were acting that way; that 
he really did not have members of the party in their sufficiently strong 
to influence it? 

Mr. BuDENz. Well, I believe that he was not. In fact, I have 
knowledge that there were a considerable number of Communists 
within the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Watkins. Have you given the committee the names of 
those that you say you have no knowledge were members ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I have. 

Senator Watkins. That will come out later, I suppose. 

Mr. Morris. No ; that hasn't come out 5^et, Senator. 

Mr. Budenz, will you tell us how this cell operated in connection 
with the Politburo, this cell that operated within the Institute of 
Pacific Relations ? Will you tell us structurally how it was connected 
to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. Budenz. Of course, this cell, as all Communist cells, changed 
from time to time in personnel. It was largely, though, linked up 
with Amerasia and was a joint cell with Amerasia, and it operated 
by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an officer of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, reporting to the Politburo on the activities of the cell 
within the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the results of these 
activities. 

Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us, Mr. Budenz, approximately 
how many times you were present at meetings of the National Com- 
mitt-ee or the Politburo of the Communist Party, at which Field, as 
secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reported on the activi- 
ties of the cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, approximately? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 519 

Mr. BuDENz. Well, that would be very hard to state. The meetings 
were irregular. I should say four or five times a year. 

Mr. Morris. Four or five times a year, or for a period of 10 years ? 

Mt. Budenz. That is right. With the exception of my being in 
Chicago, although even then Field did report to the Politburo in my 
presence when I was in from Chicago. 

Mr. Morris. And when you say that he reported to the Politburo, 
did he at the same time receive instructions from the Politburo to 
carry on his work? 

Mr. Budenz. Most definitely. That was the purpose of his report. 

Mr. Morris. So there were two purposes then : to report .in on the 
activities of the institute and at the same time receive directives from 
higher authorities in the Communist organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observa- 
tion a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony 
brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the 
following morning from the date on which the chairman made refer- 
ence to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain 
conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is 
not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the estab- 
lishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that 
where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then 
hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received. 
The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testi- 
mony of a nature which would never be received in any court of 
justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected 
by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard 
works on evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the 
same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of 
misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving 
accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the 
law, it is an easy matter for us, but sometimes we feel that there are 
misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the 
press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have 
said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been 
established statements b^ween coconspirators are always admissible 
in evidence. 

The Chairman. As an exception to the rule. 

Senator Ferguson. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that 
applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied 
the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy 
cases and in cases that I tried on the bench. 

So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question 
about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been 
established then the statements among the coconspirators, as we find 
here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law. 

That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt 
about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. 
Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the 
evidence. 

The Chairman. You may continue, Mr. Morris. I am sorry to 
interrupt. 



520 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. May I observe that this is not a court, and no- 
body is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is 
not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by. 

The Chairman. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has. 
been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly 
procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court 
procedure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field 
where there is no limitation. 

Senator Watkins. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement 
on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adher- 
ence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this 
. type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted 
on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried 
conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by 
the chairman and Senator Ferguson. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Morris. May I point out, Mr. Chairman, lest anyone have the 
wrong impression here, that the overwhelming bulk of Mr. Budenz's 
testimony here today will be events that he experienced. 

The Chairman. The only reason that the chairman brought it up 
is that I was reminded of the remark by a well-meaning commentator 
who evidently did not catch the real meaning of my expression. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you describe a few of those many 
meetings of the Politburo that you attended and heard Frederick 
Field report and receive directives with respect to the Politburo? 
Will you take a few of those meetings, some of the more notable ones, 
and describe exactly what happened as you recall it from your own 
personal experience? 

Mr. Budenz. Necessarily, many of these meetings will not be re- 
called with any great clarity as such. However, the first meeting, 
necessarily, at which I met Mr. Field, impressed itself on me. That 
was in 1937, when he was introduced to me by J. Peters as Comrade 
Frederick Spencer. This was a meeting called of certain members 
of the Politburo and of others interested in China work — Harry 
Gannes, foreign editor of the Daily Worker, J. Peters, Ferruei Marini, 
whose name was also Fred Brown in the Communist Party — to receive 
a report of Browder. 

Mr. Morris. Now, are they important Communists, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. These are representatives of the Communist 
International, to whom I have referred. 

Mr. Morris. Are they leaders of the Communist underground 
movement ? 

Mr. Budenz. They were at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Just develop a little bit of their importance. Most 
of their names this committee is not acquainted with. 

Mr. Budenz. J. Peters should be known by now. He was the chief 
espionage agent for the Communist International apparatus. He was 
the link or liaison officer between the Communist international ap- 
paratus in this country and the Soviet secret police. That is on record 
in my testimony against him in his deportation proceeding. His other 
activities have been aired in other investigations. 

Mr. Morris. How about Mr. Gannes ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, he is now dead. He was then foreign editor of 
the Daily Worker. Every foreign editor of the Daily Worker is knee 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 521 

deep in the conspiratorial apparatus, particnlarly in regard to inter- 
national communications. And this was true of Harry Gannes, who 
had been to China and had many very close connections with many 
underground groups and individuals in connection with China. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe who Brown was? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Brown was the man who was in charge of the organiza- 
tion and the preparation of the party for, I should say, violent opera- 
tions. He had charge of the organizational work for the Communist 
International of the Communist Party. There were other members 
of the political bureau there, but I just cannot recall them, because they 
changed from time to time. 

Mr. Morris. You say Browder was present, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. He made the report that day. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe what happened at that meeting as 
you recall it from your own personal experience ? 

Mr. Budenz. xYt that meeting Earl Brower declared that we had 
to end the business of speaking so loudly about the Chinese Commu- 
nists as being champions of Soviet conditions as in Russia. Although 
we had begun to taper off on that, we had to emphasize their demo- 
cratic character. And he described them as being represented as 
North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers. He likewise said that we should 
bring out tlie full democratic content of the Communist movement and 
particularly the fact that they represented Asia for the Asiatics 
against white imperialism, and were for the complete independence 
and democratization of Asia. 

Mr. Morris. Up to that time, how were you treating the Chinese 
Communists ? 

Mr. Budenz. Up until that time largely we had treated them very 
extremely, as Champions of a Soviet Qiina completely. In fact, the 
Communist propaganda used to talk about Soviet China in those 
provinces under Red rule. I say during the time when the transition 
was taking place, however, there had been a tapering off of that, but 
there had not been any sharp decision upon the matter. 

Mr. Morris. And that is as much as you can reall about that particu- 
lar meeting at this time, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. There is more about the meeting if you wish me to 
go into it. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, I wish you would, Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz. Because at that meeting it was decided that Owen 
J. Lattimore, because of his position, should more or less initiate 
or supervise the matter of having writers and authors and people in 
public opinion take up this attitude. 

Mr. Morris. And when you said "because of his position," what 
did you mean by that, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Because of his being in a position where he was not 
— For instance. Field's connections with the Communist Party were 
'\'ery close at that time, even, and were fairly well known in quite a 
circle. And then in addition to that, Lattimore was supposed to have 
quite an influence in the publishing world. 

Mr. Morris. Now, was Lattimore discussed as a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Instructions were given to him as a member of the 
Communist cell, yes, sir. That is, through Field; not in person. 

Mr. Morris. And you say instructions were given by the Politburo 
to Lattimore through Field that he should do some work in connec- 
tion with the change of policy ? 



522 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain what he was supposed to do in con- 
nection with that ? 

Mr. BuDENz. The details were not worked out. As a matter of 
fact, that is a common Communist procedure, that the details are not 
worked up. They are left to the initiative of the individual. They 
are checked on later. And his success or failure is commented upon. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there ? 

Mr. Budenz, you of course have demonstrated clearly your close 
association with the operations and your knowledge of the men who 
were taking an active and an influential part. I would like to ask 
you just a question or two concerning Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Senator O'Conor. The question suggests itself as to whether his 
name might just have been used loosely, or whether in fact, from your 
knowledge of everything, he was identified actively and knowingly 
with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Budenz. He was specifically mentioned as a member of the 
Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of 
his name. 

Senator O'Conor. Do you recall just what position he held at that 
time, if any, with either IPR or with any other movement, either as 
a captive organization or as a front ? 

Mr. Budenz. I don't specifically. It is my impression that he was 
the editor of their publication. As a matter of fact, there was refer- 
ence to the fact that he was — yes, he was the editor of their publication. 

The Chairman. Whose publication ? You say "their publication." 

Mr. Budenz. This was Pacific Affairs, if I remember correctly. 
They had two. 

Senator O'Conor. I was wondering whether in their operations 
there was any possible code designation that might either have at- 
tached to him or in any way might have identified him if he were 
actually an active member. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. Later on; not in connection with this 
meeting. 

Senator O'Conor. No, I said that because you have mentioned his 
name in connection with the meeting. 

Mr. Budenz. During the course of time the Politburo issued for a 
number of years, from the time when I first entered the party, in 
1935, or rather from the time I became a member of the national com- 
mittee, in 1936, to all members of the national committee, an onion- 
skin report of all their proceedings in great detail. However, people 
in key or delicate positions were desigTiated either by blanks, when 
they were easily described by the circumstances, or by initials. Now, 
Lattimore was described as L or XL in these onionskins. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by an onionskin? 

Mr. Budenz. I mean onionskin paper, these light papers sent 
around. They were sent around to every member of the national 
committee up until 1940 and 1941. During the Hitler-Stalin pacts 
they were ended, through fear that the onionskins would be used 
against the Communist Party. 

Senator O'Conor. And was that done frequently? That is to say, 
was his designation indicated on frequent occasions? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 523 

Mr. BuDENZ. Well, rather frequent. I can't designate the number. 

Senator O'Conor. From it all, Mr. Budenz, would you say as to 
his connection with the movement whether his position m the entire 
movement was an important one or an unimportant one? 

Mr. Budenz. His position from the viewpoint of the Communist 
Party was a very important one. It was particularly stressed in 
the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could 
bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was 
non-Soviet. And thev consider that a very valuable asset. I could 
give you many quotations on that. It was discussed more than once. 

Senator Ferguson. What was Field's designation? 

Mr. BuNDEZ. Field was Secretary — — 

Senator Ferguson. No. In this onionskin paper. 

Mr. Budenz. Well, he first was designated under the name of Spen- 
cer. Where they had false names like that, they used "Spencer." And 
for quite a while he went under the name of Spencer and then he 
went under his initial of F. 

Senator Ferguson. Just under F ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Then when XL, who was Owen Lattimore, you 
say — is that right ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Senator Febguson. Were you in high authority given the interpre- 
tation of what tliese initials were on these onionskins, so that when 
you would read them you would know who would make the statement 
and who was designated? 

Mr. Budenz. Only upon inquiry. And I had to inquire, since I 
was editor of the paper in Chicago, the Midwest Daily Record. 

Senator Ferguson. Over what period, would you say, was Latti- 
more described in these onionskin sheets of paper ? Over what period 
of time ? 

Mr. Budenz. I should say about 4 years. It ended in 1940 or 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. About 4 years? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And part of this plan was to change the think- 
ing here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities 
m China and its relation to the Soviet Union. Was that correct? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct; not only on China, but on the whole 
Far East, to advance the Soviet objectives in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever discussed in these meetings that 
Owen Lattimore was a man who could put out propaganda and con- 
ceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of 
the Communists? 

Mr. Budenz. That was precisely the estimate given, that the weight 
of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy, but 
that they were expressed in that language, which was non-Soviet in 
character. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore terms that designated that it was 
coming out of Russia were avoided ; is that correct? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But still carrying out the Communist line ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 



524 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Conor. If I miglit just ask a question there : Mr. Budenz, 
did I understand you to say that Owen Lattimore was designated for 
the purpose of exerting influence on the Japanese as w^ell as the 
China policy? 

Mr. Budenz. That was later on, to my knowledge. 

But during this period we are speaking of, most of the emphasis 
was on China. 

Senator O'Conor. On China. I understand. 1 did not want to 
anticipate what you might come to later, but just so that we can get 
the connection, it did happen that subsequently he was referred to as 
exerting an influence on the Japanese policy as well as on China? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Senator O'Conor. And continuously over 4 years, you would say, 
these matters continued, in relation to which he was supposed to 
exercise an influence on the China policy as w^ell ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. There may have been some gaps. 

Senator O'Conor. But it, however, started from a time and did not 
end until 4 years thereafter. 

Mr. Budenz. That is in regard to that particular incident. How- 
ever, there were other references. 

The Chairman. You used the term "during this period," Mr. 
Budenz. I wonder if you would, just for the record, and for clarifi- 
cation, state what the period was, wdiat years ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, that was the years 1937 or 1936, to 1940 and 
1941. That is the years of the onionskin papers. We are only discuss- 
ing them at the present moment, as I understand it. 

Senator O'Conor. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing this 193T meeting of 
the politburo, and Mr. Lattimore's name came up, and we had this 
series of questions. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you take that up, I would like, along the 
line of the thinking that we were carrying out, to have you read two 
paragraphs in a letter that is already in evidence, dated July 10, 1938. 
I will mark those two paragraphs. 

The Chairman. What is that exhibit. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. I will try and find it. 

Mr. Morris. It is exhibit No. 4, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read them aloud, so that they will go 
in the record ? 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I wanted an executive meeting before 
we commenced this hearing this morning, but members of the com- 
mittee were not present. I would like to take about 5 or 10 minutes 
now in recess, if the members of the committee would come with me 
to the rear room for just a minute, please. 

(A short recess was taken.) 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Budenz, getting back to that memorandum, 
that exhibit 4 that I gave you to read, what do you have to say about 
the language in that? Is that in your opinion carrying out what 
was expressed about Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Budenz. I think it is a splendid example; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That he was telling the IPR in effect that the 
policy of the Communists in Kussia was to be carried out, but it 
was to be carried out, how, as he says ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 525 

The Chairman. I think the whole excerpt should be read, Senator. 

Senator P'erguson. Yes. And then comment on it as you go along, 
explaining how it does carry out the purpose for which Lattimore 
was to be used by the Communist Party. 

Mr. BuDENz (reading) : 

I thiuk that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China sec- 
tion of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the 
absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the 
right touch. 

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring 
position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is 
that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position — far 
enough not to be covered by the same label — but enough ahead of the active 
Chinese liberals to be noticeable. 

That is a typical Lattimore method which was approved by the 
Politburo. That is, to not appear to be a Communist, but to forward 
vhe burden, as I have said, of the Communist line, to throw the weight 
into Communist support. 

Senator Ferguson. To carry it out, but not let it appear that in 
carrying it out you, the man who is advocating it, is a Communist. 

jNIr. BuDENZ, That is correct. 

And as a matter of fact, beyond that, to inlluence people who are 
non-Connnunists by appearing even to present it in non- Communist 
approaches and in non-Communist language : 

For Japan, on the other hand, hang back as not to be inconveniently ahead 
of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. 
So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in 
China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the 
civilian components of aggression in Japan. 

Well, there is a lot about the British here, and the French. 
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would go to the Russian part. 
Mr. BuDENz (reading) : 

For the U. S. S. R. — back their international policy in general, but without 
using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an im- 
pression of "subservience." 

That, again, is indicative of the method of expression to which I 
have referred. This was to throw the weight of support to the 
U. S. S. R., not to American policy, but to the U. S. S. R. 

Senator Ferguson. And to do it in such a way that the American 
people and the other people would not feel that it was being advo- 
cated by a Communist. 

Mr. BuDENz. By anyone subservient, namely, by a Communist ; that 
is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back to the question : Is that the 
position that you say Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, was described in 
this meeting as having the capacity to take, to carry out the policy of 
the Communists? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; in that meeting, and on a number of other 
occasions. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Senator Ferguson, the witness is prepared today to 
testify to five episodes concerning Owen Lattimore, and we are going 
lo come to those later. 

Senator Ferguson. That will ])robably cover this. 

22848 — 52 — pt. 2' 12 



526 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

But I did at this time, when he brought up this question of Owen 
Lattimore's position with the party, want to ask him his opinion as 
in this letter written by Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, exhibit 4, as to 
whether this did in his opinion carry out that policy. 

And your answer is 

Mr. BuDENZ. That is a very fine example of the expression of Mr. 
Lattimore to which reference was made with approval. 

Senator O'Conor. Before you leave that, you made mention in an- 
swer to a question by Senator Ferguson that this was a typical Latti- 
more method, or words to that effect. 

Would you say that he continued to operate in that manner? Or 
did he change after it ? 

Could you say whether or not he has until recent times continued in 
that line? 

Mr. BuDENz. I, of course, am confining myself to such information 
as I obtained officially within the Politburo, and I am stating that it 
was their conclusion lime after time that he was very serviceable be- 
cause of this peculiar facility of his in this matter. 

Senator O'Conor. Would you say that the reference to the Jap- 
anese situation would confirm your previous contention that he did 
have influence on the Japanese policy questions on China ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, Senator, except that later this became more 
pronounced. 

The Chairman. Any question, Senator Smith ? 

Senator Watkins? 

All right. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. We were discussing the meeting of the Politburo in 
1937, and you had gotten as far as the mention of the name of Owen 
Lattimore, and then you had some questions amplifying that point. 

Have you finished testifying about that 1937 meeting, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. BuDENz. No, sir. 

I would like to state, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that 
it was specifically mentioned there that he was to be the political rep- 
resentative of the cell, or was the political representative of the cell, 
for the party. 

Further than that, likewise, at the conclusion of the discussion, 
J. Peters having explained to me that Frederick Spencer was actually 
Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that I would know that later, that I 
would see his pictures, and the like, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, 
Harry Gannes, and J. Peters, at the conclusion of this political bureau 
meeting, in my presence discussed the matter of couriers to Washing- 
ton on underground work in regard to the Far East. 

The details of that work, naturally, I am unfamiliar with. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else about that 1937 meeting that 
you are prepared to tell us about now, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. That seems to exhaust it, so far as my memory goes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, could you think of one or two other meetings 
that you have testified about that you can describe to us in detail? 

Mr. Budenz. There was the meeting in 1943. 

The Chairman. This other meeting was when, this one to wliich 
you referred? 

Mr. Budenz. 1937. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 527 

However, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, if you will per- 
mit, I would like to refer to the meetings in 1940. 

There were a series of meetings of the political bureau in 1940, 
which, to some degree are more or less blurred in my memory, because 
they had to be held at second-hand. Many of the members of the 
political bureau were already in hiding at that time, since the party 
had come to the conclusion that it was about to turn the imperialist 
war into civil war. They expected instructions along that line dur- 
ing the Hitler-Stalen pact period. 

I'lie discussions, though, with the politburo by Mr. Field arose 
over whether he should leave the Institute of Pacific Relations as 
secretary of the American Council and go to the American Peace 
Mobilization as its head. The politburo had decided quite early that 
he should, because they wanted a national organization. They already 
had a localized organization, but they wanted a national one. 

And they held a convention in Chicago, I think in that summer, at 
which Mr. Field was chosen. 

The Chairman. What summer was that? 

Mr. BuDENz. 1940. 

In the course of this discussion, Mr. Field declared that Dr. Philip 
Jessup, who was an official, in fact, one of the responsible officials 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had impressed upon Mr. Field 
that he thought that Mr. Field could be of more service in the I. P. R. 
than he could in the American Peace Mobilization. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Service to whom, or to what ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That was never very clear, at least so far as my memory 
is concerned. I thought to the cause of humanitarianism. But that 
would be only my interpretation. 

The Politburo, however, in a number of zig-zag meetings, because 
some of them had to be conducted, as I say, for instance, by conference 
with Jack Stachel from under cover and the like, decided Mr. Field 
then should go to the American Peace Mobilization for two reasons : 

First, that it was necessary to create a very strong reserve of the 
party eventually, if the party should become illegal completely, and 
that Mr. Field would qualify splendidly as a leader of that reserve, 
being a man of wealth, not having any technical difficulties, as the 
Communists call it, that is, not having any false passports, and hav- 
ing a position in society which would lead to a reluctance on the 
part of the Government to take action against him. 

The second reason given was he need not end his relations with 
the IPR, but could eventually even increase them, though maybe 
not under the guise of being secretary. 

But the first reason was the compelling one, because most of the 
party leaders were going under cover at that time, and they needed 
a structure ^vhich could serve for the party openly, and the American 
Peace Mobilization was, I should say, the chief one chosen for that 
purpose. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 14, which we introduced 
into the record on July 26, duplicates the testimony given by Mr. 
Budenz here, and I think I would like this reread at this particular 
time, to show how the two tie in, Mr. Chairman. 



528 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Exhibit 14 

Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Committee, American Council of 
THE Institute of Pacific Relations, Held at 5 p. m., Thursday, September 
18, 1940 

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo W. Parker, Francis E. Harmon, 
Edward C. Carter. 

The second paragraph of these minutes is as follows: 

The chairman read a long telesram which he had received from Mr. Frederick 
V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in wliich Mr. Field indicated that he had 
been called to the secretarys^hip of a new society which was being created 
to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had 
a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility, 
because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was 
necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone the 
decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated 
criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his 
immediate resignation from all I. P. R. responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained 
that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in 
detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker 
voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that 
Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American 
Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. 
Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the 
committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should 
include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. 
Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The 
hoi>e was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be 
possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American 
Council. 

Senator Ferguson. This democracy that is explained in this letter 
was Communist, was it not ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That was the organization devised to help Hitler. 
It picketed the White House. It assailed President Koosevelt and 
his "war and hunger program." And it was designed to step up 
the tempo of opposition to any defense efforts on the part of the 
United States. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was really the Communist line. 

Mr. Budenz. It was completely controlled by the Communists from 
beginning to end. That was a Communist front, not a captive or- 
ganization. 

Senator O'Conor. Obviously it was a Communist front and it was 
so known and its actions indicated that it was inherently Communist. 
Have you ever heard of any repudiation by Mr. Jessup of that lauda- 
tory expression concerning Field, who, of course, has been proven to 
be one of the greatest traitors in this country. 

Mr. Budenz. No, I have not, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mv. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you; 
attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR ? 

Mr. Budenz. That was a meeting of 1943 which I began to antic- 
ipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meet- 
ing of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely 
was present, and I believe Eobert William Weiner. His name strikes 
me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other 
members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including: 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 529 

Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received 
word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. 
Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken 
there. . It was a communication either personally or in some other 
way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression 
that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore 
stated that information coming to him from the international Com- 
munist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to 
be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say, 
that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a 
positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking 
Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Morris. Did the Communist Party line change at that time? 

Mr. BuDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy 
of this. They were advised that there was in the course of prepara- 
tion an article by Vladimir Eogoff, the Tass correspondent, written 
at ]\Ioscow's request on this question which would attack the ap- 
peasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Chairman. The Tass correspondent, you say. 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Can you explain what Tass was? 

Mr. BuDENz. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this coun- 
try and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely. 

Mr. Morris. Was this article subsequently communicated to the 
Daily Worker? 

Mr. BuDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. 
The first message was received throught Grace Granich who had been 
in charge of Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been 
put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to 
maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, Consulate, and other 
sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we 
were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it. 

Mr. Morris. And was the Communist line actually changed as a 
result of these steps that were taken ? 

ISfr. BuDENz. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name 
of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to 
write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs 
publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the 
Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his 
group represented antidemocracy. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the 
Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of 
Pacific Eelations and its publication Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. I sort of got the two together. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the 
record at this time the article refered to by Mr. Budenz, not as it ap- 
peared originally in War and the Working Class, but as it was re- 
printed in the Daily Worker. I would like to offer this into evidence. 

The Chairman. Please lay the foundation for it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, can you testify to the authenticity of it? 

Mr. Mandel. This is an article taken from the Daily Worker of 
August 12, 1943, page 8. and is headed "Soviet expert warns of ap- 
peasers in China," by Vladimir Rogoff, reprinted from the Soviet 
Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class. 



530 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Does it appear, Mr. Mandel, what date this appeared 
in the War and the Working Class ? 

Mr. Mandel. It does not. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, I offer you the article described by Mr. 
Mandel and ask you if you can recall the existence of such an article 
in the Daily Worker ? 

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness is being shown 
a photostatic copy of the article. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, this is the article. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any particular passage in the article that you 
think the committee should be interested in ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. This article attacks the appeasers of Japan 
in China. You will note in so doing it attacks the whole governmental 
policy, that is to say, it says that 3 years have passed since Chiang Kai- 
shek gave certain orders in regard to reforms. Now, I will quote : 

Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim 
of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were 
not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base 
was not accomplished. The main reason for this is tlie diverse work of the 
"appeasers," the defeatist and capitulators. 

There is more to this line, but this is, I should think, a key expres- 
sion. 

Mr. Morris. W^ere you an editor of the Dail}^ Worker when this 
appeared ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What was your purpose in putting this in the Daily 
Worker ? 

Mr. Budenz. This was our understanding that we were to begin, 
under the guise of attacking the appeasers of Japan, to have an 
onslaught against Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Chairman. The appeasers of whom ? 

Mr. Budenz. Of Japan, that is, in China. 

Mr. Morris. Up to that time what was your official Communist 
policy with respect to the situation ? 

Mr. Budenz. The official Communist policy was very critical of 
Chiang Kai-shek, and that will lead us to other episodes • 

Mr. Morris. Up to that time what had been the policy? 

Mr. Budenz. The policy had been critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but 
the policy now was, as we understood it, that we were to prepare for 
an all-out attack on Chiang Kai-shek, which was entirely different. 
However, if I may continue this, what the Soviet Government was 
trying to tell us was that this should be done under the cover of coali- 
tion govermnent. Later on Rogof f had to explain and in fact apolog- 
ize for his article, and Harriet Lucy Moore had to write an article, if 
I remember correctly, in Soviet Eussia Today. It may have been in 
one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Eelations also explain-, 
ing that Rogoff's article had been misinterpreted, but the purpose 
of this whole thing was to put the skids, if I may use that phrase, 
under Chiang Kai-shek under a gradual developing campaign for 
coalition government. 

Mr. Morris. And that is what you meant by the sharp change in 
policy that you testified to earlier ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. Moscow has difficulty every once in a 
while in letting the Communists know the difference between how 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 531 

they should emphasize things and the general presentation of the sub- 
ject. We could not have such a sharp attack on Chiang Kai-shek if 
at the same time we were to advocate coalition government, but the 
purpose of the coalition government was to destroy him. 

Mr. MoRKis. And is it your testimony that this conference that 
you testified about today took place prior to the publication of this 
article in the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

The Chairman. I think the article should go in the record. 

Mr. Morris. I move that it be introduced into the record and made 
an exhibit. 

The Chairman. It shall be made a part of the record and appro- 
priately marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133" and.i& 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 133 

[From the Daily Worker, August 12, 1943, p. 8] 

Soviet Expert Warns of Appeasers in China 

(By Vladimir Rogov) 

[Reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the WorKlng^ 

Class] 

Moscow, August 11 (by wireless to Inter-Continent News). — During the 6 years 
of war the Chinese command, at the cost of. considerable territorial losses, 
succeeded in saving the troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the 
Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance. 

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. 
The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people 
and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly d»"«*wn 
out, threatening Japan with ever-growiag complications. 

In defensive battles on an extremely long fi'ont the Chinese Army, weakening 
the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and 
strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) 
In October 1938 Chang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the 
country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows : 

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive 
war. 

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement. 

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a 
new, many-millions-strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war 
equipment. 

covert opposition 

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander-in-chief of the 
Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance. Three years have 
passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, 
reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the 
task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. 
The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeaser," the defeatists and 
capitulators. 

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous 
and afford an adequate base for the rearmameut and supply of the massed army. 
On its territory National China has all the strategic raw materials necessary for 
the conduct of a prolonged war. 

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the 
industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than in- 
vest their capital in the armaments industry. 

The unrestrained profiteers advance the "theories" that the people are weary 
of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population 
for goods, etc. 



532 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Tliis situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and 
greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and 
Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the 
beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain. The 
elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the 
internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as 
well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese in- 
vaders. 

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless re- 
ceives no regular reinforcements. There are insuflScient trained reserves. There 
is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the 
law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives 
a large percentage of men unfit for service. 

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding 
personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army 
agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is un- 
pretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned ; whereas the commanding 
personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training. 

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control 
of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is 
the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the 
separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could 
not but affect tlie fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline. 

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this 
does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists tl>ere. 

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomin- 
tang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and 
constitute a serious danger at present. 

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war 
in the Pacific. Tlie war in China has receded to the background. This has 
led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain 
complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify 
thQir peace offensive. 

JAPANESE MACHINATIONS 

The Japanese conquerors are novv' concentrating on deepening and sharpening 
the internal contraditions in China and ^re trying in every way to utilize these 
contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle 
against China. 

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, 
who pi'ovoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to 
undermine the military collaborations of Kuomintang circles with the Com- 
munist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the eighth and fourth 
aifmies, which as units of China's united national array have inscribed many 
heroic pa^es in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese 
invaders. 

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious, and selfless people 
of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited 
prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their 
struggle for national freedom and independence. 

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring 
about tlie dissolution of the Chinese Com.munist Party and the liquidation of 
the eighth and fourth armies. The Chinese command has transferred new 
divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous 
supplies of munitions and food, obviously to preparation for an attack on the 
eighth and fourth armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price 
of unleashing civil war. 

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the eighth and fourth armies 
which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacher- 
ous stabbing in tlie back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the 
Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better. 

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activi- 
ties of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators, and provocateurs. The Chinese 
Govei-nment, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities 
of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's 
resistance against Japanese aggression. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 533 

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT 

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of 
China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and 
Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave con- 
cern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists, and saboteurs. 
^Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke 
civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has 
accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation 
cause of the Chinese people to die. 

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous man- 
power reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the 
enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical 
measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating 
all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces 
against capitulation and defeatist moods, and most important, the genuine 
unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national inde- 
pendence. 

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles 
will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in avert- 
ing the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the 
Chinese people — the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed 
against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party — rests whether 
the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism 
will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese 
people. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Biidenz lias testified that Mr. T. 
A. Bisson figured in the discussions at this time. I would like to 
introduce into the record, after identification by Mr. Mandel and 
autlienticity affirmed by him, excerpts from an article written by T. 
A. Bisson in the Far Eastern Survey which was a publication of the 
American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Mandel. This is from an article, Cliina's Part in a Coalition 
War, from the Far Eastern Survey, published by the American 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in its issue of July 1943, 
and I will read the following excerpts : 

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might 
be called feudal China ; the other, democratic China. These terms express the 
actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the 
two Chinas. 

Then I go further : 

DEMOCRATIC CHINA 

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Com- 
munist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown ofC the feudal 
incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can 
be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. 
Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one sup- 
porting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which 
has freed the peasant — the primary producers in these areas, and, indeed, over 
most of China — from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest 
charges as levied by a feudal economy. 

And further down : 

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the 
landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers 
around this relationship. 

Mr. Morris. Are the other paragraphs on this page, Mr. Mandel, 
excerpts from the article which you have been reading ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those other ex- 
cerpts inserted in the record. 



534 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 134" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 134 

[Prom Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 

1943. vol. XII. No. 141 

China's Part in a Coalition War 

(By T. A. Bisson) 

« * * * * • • 

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might 

be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. (6) These terms express 

the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between 

the two Chinas. 

DEMOCRATIC CHINA 

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Com- 
munist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal 
incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can 
be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. 
Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one support- 
ing the other. Basic to. the whole program has been the land reform which has 
freed the peasant — the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most 
of China — from the crushing weight of rent, taxes and usurious interest charges 
as levied by a feudal economy. 

But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to 
work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the 
final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this 
process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment com- 
mittees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise 
a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers kaow well what their neighbors own. 

Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils — village, town, and dis- 
trict — and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old auto- 
cratic system of feudal^ agrarian China. These councils and officials are either 
unpaid or receive mere pittances which leave them no better off economically 
than their fellow citizens. 

It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free 
competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price con- 
trols are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would 
be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watch- 
ful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. With- 
in limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entre- 
preneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are 
doing so. 

By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed "communism" ; it is, in 
fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. 
The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's 
immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against 
Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, 
the transition to modern nationhood. 

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the 
landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers 
around this relationship. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, you made reference to T. A. Bisson. 
"Was the reference to Bisson to him as a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

1 Tlie term "feurlal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which tlie landlord- 
peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in govei-nmeut centers around this relation- 
ship. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 535 

Mr. Morris. And it was your knowledge that T. A. Bisson was a 
Coflnmunist ? 

Mr. BuDENz. My official knowledge. I have not met Mr. Bisson, 
but I have repeatedly heard him referred to officially and have been 
so advised he is a member of the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. Will you elaborate on that just a little bit when 
you say "officially"? Officially by whom? 

Mr. BuDENz. Officially in Politburo discussions such as this in 1943 
by Earl Browder, who was general secretary of the party, and then 
again on several occasions subsequent to that by Jack Stachel, who 
was the official representative of the Politburo to the Daily Worker. 

The Chairman. As to the T. A. Bisson, can you tie that in individu- 
ally by an expression that you know of ? Could there be other T. A. 
Bissons? 

Mr. BuDENz. No, sir; this was definitely the T. A. Bisson who was 
the so-called far eastern expert in connection with the Institute of 
Pacific Eelations. His activities were discussed, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Morris. That particular article of T. A, Bisson was the sub- 
ject of considerable controversy and I think at the expense of a few 
minutes we should introduce elements of that controvery on the rec- 
ord to see how important an article this particular one was. 

Mr. Mandel, do you have anything from the institute files bearing 
on this subject? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated August 3 from the Chinese News 
Service marked "confidential," addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter. 

It is signed by C. L. Hsia, representing the Chinese News Service. 
I read a paragraph from tliis letter : 

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. 
Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. 
Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the govern- 
ment of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label 
the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my Gov- 
ernment, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other 
than the Chinese Government or Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresenta- 
tion. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of 
the right of free speech. 

Then another letter from the same gentleman is dated July IT, 
1943, addressed to Mr. William Holland. 

The Chairman. From whom? 

Mr. Mandel. From C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News. Serv- 
ice. He says : 

When I telephoned yesterday, I thought it would be polite for me to come 
and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. 
Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I 
don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I 
find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half 
past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me, I think I 
can make it around about 12 noon. 

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a 
friend and member of the IPIl I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my 
official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the 
IPR, but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated 
through the pursuit* of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack 
on one of its memliers, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR 
feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro- 
IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "federal and democratic," 
then I can't think of anvbody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the 



536 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

"democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it — I mean Mr. Bis- 
son or the American Council or the international secretarial are not prepared 
to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment — so I don't see what use- 
ful service can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter — 

et cetera. 

I have here a statement by Hollington K. Tong, who has been an 
official of the Chinese National Govermnent, and whose biography 
can be found in the China Handbook on page 777, and here is his 
full comment on the whole Bisson incident, which I would like to 
introduce into the record. 

Mr. Morris. I would like two more paragraphs read in the record, 
Mr. Chairman. This is a point that has been disputed by Mr. Carter, 
and I think we should elaborate on it just a bit. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. I will read : 

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first 
place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. 
It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China 
branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization. 

Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern Survey, 
would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. 
In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less 
than a boost to the enemy's propaganda. 

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking corre- 
spondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the 
IPR free of charge tlirough Chinese Government radio facilities would be with- 
drawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm 
at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Corre- 
spondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the 
future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed un- 
favorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at 
home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese 
Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from 
IPR. 

Mr. Morris. INIr. Chairman, I would like that whole letter intro- 
duced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. I think it has been identified as having been taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct? 

Mr. Morris. That is correct. 

First, I would like to introduce into the record the previous letters 
referred to, dated August 3, 1943, and July 17, 1943, from C. L. Hsia, 
the letter of August 3 to Mr. Edward C. Carter as the first, and the 
letterof July 17, to Mr. William Holland as the second, and have them 
marked as the next consecutive exhibits. 

The Chairman. They may be so filed. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 135" and 
"Exhibit No. 136," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 135 

Chinese News Service, 
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1943. 
Confidential. 

Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, Neiv York, N. Y. 
Dear Mr. Carter : Many thanks for your note of July 31, which was purely 
for my private information. I greatly appreciate your sending me a copy of 
your confidential memorandum to Miss Porter. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 537 

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. 
Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article, 
freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government 
of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the 
National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my govern- 
ment, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other 
than the Chinese Government are Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresenta- 
tion. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of 
the right of free speech. 

I hope very much that what you wrote Miss Porter can be made public or in 
some other way you can make clear that Mr. Bisson's article does not reflect 
the viewpoint either of the American Council or of the Pacific Council. 

Furthermore, I wish to advise you quite sincerely and frankly that the policy 
or attitude represented by your telegram to Liu Yu-wan will greatly embarrass 
him and his colleagues in Chungking. Knowing the situation as I do, a matter 
like this may make it impossible for some members of the China group to par- 
ticipate in the next IPR conference. I wish to make it quite clear that I am 
speaking as a personal friend and a member of IPR and not delivering an ulti- 
matum, as I am not an officer and cannot speak for the China Council. 

In my other capacity, I am duty bound to report to Dr. T. V. Soong what are 
the reactions of the Pacific Council and the American Council to my request 
that they publicly dissociate themselves from Mr. Bisson's article where he 
attacked the National Government of China. I do not know what he will 
do. He may think it is too small a matter to bother about and let it drop. On 
the other hand, he may wish to inform the China Council of his dissatisfaction. 
So far, the only course open to me is to report to him to the effect that neither 
the Pacific Council nor the American Council is willing to disown any part of 
the article written by Mr. Bisson. 

The suggestion that Mr. Bisson write a second article does not appear to me to 
be any solution of the difficulties with which we are confronted. As I said to you 
the other day, no writer will ever admit that he was wrong. If he says he made 
a slight mistake, probably he will give half a dozen reasons for that slight 
mistake and those reasons will put him more "right" than ever. My frank 
advice is that he had better keep quiet for a time and let other people have a go 
at it. 

I will try to get in touch with Miss Porter as soon as possible and I hope she 
will publish our comments on Mr. Bisson's article. In this connection may I 
repeat what I have said before, that it has been insisted that whatever comments 
we may make will have the same privilege of being circularized as a special 
release as did the summary of Mr. Bisson's article. 
Sincerely yours, 

C. L. HsiA, Director. 



Exhibit No. 136 

Chinese News Service, 
New York, N. Y., July 17, 1943. 
Mr. William Holland, 

International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Neiv York, N. Y. 

Deae IMr. Holland : When I telephoned yesterday I thought it would be polite 
for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article 
written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on 
the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on 
Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after 
half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me I think 
I can make it around about 12 noon. (Will you please telephone my secretary, 
Mrs. Chen?) 

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend 
and member of the IPR. I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official 
capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitious for the interests of the IPR but 
the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through 
the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of 
its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, 
even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. 
If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "feudal and democratic," then I can't 



538 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

think of anybody in the Cliinese IPR wlio can be said to be on the "democratic" 
side. I imagine nothing can be done about it — I mean Mr. Bisson or the American 
Council or tlie International Secretariat are not prepared to do anything in the 
way of retraction or amendment— so I don't see what useful purpose can be 
served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter. But I thought as an old friend 
you would not mind my calling your attention to what I consider to be a highly 
regrettable incident. 

Very sincerely yours, 

C. L. HsiA, Director. 

Mr. Mandel. This is an excerpt from a book called Dateline: 
China, by Hollington K. Tong, from pages 204, 206, and 208, pub- 
lished in 1950 by the Rockport Press. 

]Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce the statement into the record. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 137 

Excerpts From the Book, Dateline : China, by Hollington K. Tonq 
[Pages 204, 206, and 208 — Published by the Rockport Press, Inc., New York, 1950] 

A note of incongruity was given to the whole attack by the fact that it was 
the Institute of Pacific Relations which fired the shot. The institute had been 
established, ostensibly, to promote good will among the peoples living in the 
Pacific area. Even though we knew that leftist influence had long been strong 
in its secretariat, it hurt us to see a blow coming from such a quarter. 

In June 1943, Mr. T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat of the institute, 
wrote the following in an issue of the Far Eastern Survey : 

"The early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of 
Chinese unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic re- 
forms has not been fulfilled. Two Chinas have emerged, each with its own 
government, military forces, political and economic institutions. One is gen- 
erally called Kuomintang China, and the other Communist China. But the 
terms 'feudal China' and 'democratic China' more accurately express the actu- 
alities as they exist today." 

This seemed to us an unwarranted and unfriendly attack upon China and 
the Chinse Government, since Mr. Bisson's "Kuomintang" or "feudal" Cliina 
was the National Government of China. 

We made an issue of it. 

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first 
place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. 
It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China 
branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organiza- 
tion. Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern 
Survey, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China 
branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed 
nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda. 

]My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking cor- 
respondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the 
IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be with- 
drawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm 
at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Cor- 
respondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the 
future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed un- 
favorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at 
home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese 
Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from 
IPR. To give free Government facilities to an organization which maliciously 
attacked the Government seemed to me foolish in the extreme. I also pointed 
out tlie difi;erent status of the IPR as compared to other independent, non- 
organization papers and magazines. 

Meanwhile, a spirited interchange of letters and rejoinders was taking place 
with the IPR. Dr. C. L. Hsia, of our New York office, presented our point 
of view in a letter to the institute which was published with an introductory. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 539 

editorial note stating that "Bisson's article expressed a point of view seriously 
held by many sincere American friends of China." 

Also, in the same issue, Mr. Bisson contributed a rebuttal to Dr. Hsia's letter. 
Althouuh both Mr. Bisson and Mr. Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of 
the IPR, who, incidentally, was also national president of the American So- 
ciety for Russian Relief, stated that Mr. Bisson's article expressed ideas which 
were entirely his own and did not come officially from the organization as a 
whole, it seemed to us that the editorial note appended to Dr. Hsia's letter 
confirmed our feeling that the editorial board of the Far Eastern Survey was 
backing Bisson's point of view. They were setting a precedent which would 
make it possible for prejudiced writers and commentators in the United States 
to issue any sort of libel against China with impunity under cloak of being 
"sincere American friends of China." 

The question of the Bisson article was further discussed a month later (Au- 
gust 1943) when Mr. Carter himself, accompanied by Mr. W. L. Holland, research 
secretary of the IPR, came out to CMiia for a o-week visit. Dr. Moulin Chiang, 
president of the National Peking University and chairman of the China branch 
of the IPR, discussed the matter with Mr. Carter. The members of the China 
branch of tlie IPR were as disturbed by the article as I had been, and the China 
branch finally lodged a formal protest. As a result, the president of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations issued a statement publicly dissociating the Institute 
from the views expressed by Mr. Bisson, and we considered the matter closed. 
Guenther Stein's privilege to make use of our free facilities was restored to him. 

During the controversy, the Institute of Pacific Relations came very close to 
losing its China branch altogether, which would have left it a predominantly 
American rather than an international organization. The China branch, whose 
members are by no means all Government officials, is a liberal-minded organ- 
ization. But its members rebelled at the thought of being made a party to an 
international organization which openly attacked their Government. 

During this period an article appeared in Moscow's War and the "Working 
Class, written by V. N. Rogoff, who had been a Tass correspondent in China, and 
a personal friend of mine. This article was cabled by the United Press corre- 
spondent in Moscow both to England and the United States and appeared in 
hundreds of American and British papers. Mr. Rogoff stated tliat the Chinese 
Government was facing serious internal difficulties that could result either in 
civil war or a victory for Japan. He claimed that "appea.sers" and "defeatists" 
in China were seeking to provoke trouble by urging the dissolution of the Com- 
munist units of the Chinese Army and that the alleged "intriguers" were under- 
mining the Chinese war efforts and "have evolved the theory of an honorable 
peace with Japan or the futility of fighting." He insinuated that no serious 
attempt was being made by China to prosecute the war to a successful con- 
clusion. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more about that particiihir meeting 
you would like to tell us about? 

Do you have any comment on the Bisson article as it was read 
today ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Nothing. It shows that the Politburo's views were 
carried out in this article and that Communist China w\as held forth 
as the democratic China. 

]Mr. Morris. And it is also an example — is it not — that the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations was used as an instrument for carrying out 
that policy? 

Mr. BuDExz. It is a very splendid example, splendid from the Com- 
munist viewpoint. 

Mr. Morris. Before we leave the subject of Frederick V. Field, I 
offer you a pamphlet whicli was put out in his name and ask you if 
you can recall that particular pamphlet. 

JNIr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. We were instructed by the Politburo to 
emphasize this pamphlet. The Daily Worker did so, and throughout 
the party it was emphasized and pushed, as the party does those 
things. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify for us that pamphlet? 



540 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENZ. This is entitled "China's Greatest Crisis," by Fred- 
erick V. Field, published by New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 
Broadway, New York, in January 1945. 

The New Century Publishers, may I say, are official publishers for 
the Communist Party. 

Mr. MoKRis. You knew that from your own experience? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Very definitely. The head of it was Robert William 
Weiner, the head of the secret conspiratorial fund of the Communist 
Party and former treasurer of the Communist Party, and also former 
president of the International Workers Order, but it was also under 
control of Trachtenberg, to whom I have referred before. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall that particular pamphlet ? 

Mr. BuDENz. From first-hand knowledge, having been many times 
in the offices of this publication, conferring with Mr. Weiner, and with 
other officials of that Comnnmist-created organization. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall that particular pamphlet, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes. This pamphlet was, as I say, pushed by the 
Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything significant about that pamphlet that 
we should know in carrying on an investigation of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

In the very introduction of the pamjjhlet it gives an explanation 
of the author. This is called "About the Author." 

Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive 
committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an author- 
ity on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council 
for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of New 
Masses. 

Mr. Morris. Was that reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations 
made with any significance ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. That was in order that the name of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations would be an entering wedge into many 
civic organizations, to ministers, to professors, to others who were 
circularized with this pamphlet; that is, either it was sent to them, 
or their interest was solicited. 

Mr. Morris. This is to show in this particular pamphlet that it was 
a new Communist publication ? 

Mr. BuDENz. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. But that is a subject of common knowledge ? 

Mr. Budenz. It is not. 

Mr. Morris. So, it is your idea with reference to this description 
of Mr. Field and your testimony is that it was done to confuse? 
Is that it? 

Mr. Budenz. It was done specifically, to my knowledge. I was in 
meetings in which this was discussed, the necessity for publishing 
this pamphlet among wide groups of people who were not yet familiar 
with China from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to get their interest 
and attention. 

In order to get their interest and attention it was printed in this 
fashion. 

Mr. Morris. And the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations was 
so used for that purpose ? 

Mr. Budenz. Specifically used for that purpose. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 541 

Mr. Morris. And the material in that pamphlet is Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. It was decisively. It was approved by the Politburo. 

Senator Watkins. I thought you referred to some fund that the 
Communists had in connection with this. 

The Chairman. I believe he referred to an individual who had 
charge of the fund. 

Senator Watkins. Maybe that was it, but at any rate, I wanted a 
f urtlier explanation, if you could give one. 

Mr. BuDENz. I think that would take us quite far afield, to go into 
this fund, but I can say that Kobert William Weiner, to my personal 
knowledge, was the head of the conspiratorial fund of the Communist 
International apparatus in this country wdiich doled out thousands 
of dollars in cash for many purposes ; that is to say, if a Communist 
would take a trip abroad which is illegal, he couldn't put that on 
the books of the Communist Party. Earl Browder, if he had taken 
an illegal trip to the Orient or to Moscow, he was given this expense 
in cash and this was quite a large business. 

Robert William Weiner's assistant incidentally was Lem Harris, 
who springs from the Wall Street brokerage house, although he is 
not in that business. He merely comes from that family. 

Senator Watkins. Would you know whether any of that fund was 
used to finance that pamphlet just as you have described it? 

Mr. BuDENZ. That I would not know. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, what was the date of this pamphlet? 

Senator O'Conor. 1945. 

Mr. BuDENz. 1945. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Chairman, I do think it is pertinent at this 
point to observe that this is the very pamphlet about which we inter- 
rogated Mr. Field and he declined to answer on the grounds it would 
incriminate him. 

Mr. ]\loRRis. It is, incidentally, introduced in the record as exhibit 
10. 

Senator O'Conor. That is right. 

Mr. INIcRRis. The secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
before Mr. Frederick V. Field was Mr. Joseph Barnes, who, according 
to documents, was secretary from 1931 to 1934. 

Did you know that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I did not know Mr. Barnes during this period to 
which you refer. 

Mr. Morris. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if you 
knew Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. BuDENz. I did know Mr. Barnes was a member of the Com- 
munist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that from personal encounters, as well 
as from official conferences of the Communist Party leaders ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe to us any personal encounter you 
had with Joseph Barnes in connection with Communist Party work? 

Mr. Budenz. I had one personal encounter. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat was that? 

Mr. Budenz. I would 

22848— 52— pt. 2 13 



542 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. Before you go into tliat, the name "Joe Barnes" 
or "Joseph Barnes" is not an uncommon one. I would like some 
way to identify the Joe Barnes to which you have reference. 

Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz, if he continues 
with his testimony, will bring that out, and I will make it a point to 
tie up the two names. 

Mr. Budenz. The Josej^h Barnes I have reference to was the foreign 
correspondent for some time of the New York Herald Tribune and 
later on, not to my personal knowledge, but in the public print, took 
over a part ownership of PM. 

The Chairman. PM was a newspaper regularly published in New 
York for some time ? 

Mr. Budenz. It was a daily paper. Its name was changed to some- 
thing like the New York Star. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Budenz. In the 1936 period it is my impression that the 1936 
convention of the Communist Party — my very sharp impression — 
a few newspapermen who were Communists were admitted into the 
convention or into a national committee meeting. I say that on that 
I am not quite clear ; it was either a convention or national committee 
meeting, and I am practically certain it was the convention of the 
Communist Party of 1936. 

The purpose of introducing these Communist newspapermen into 
the convention or national committee meeting, which broke all the 
rules of the party up to that time since those were always executive 
sessions, was to have them go out and represent the party as an Ameri- 
can institution under the new idea that was developed later by Brow- 
der so fully in saying communism is Twentieth Century Americanism, 
and in the hall where these people met, a small room attached to this 
meeting of the Communists, were several newspapermen, among 
whom was Joseph Barnes. 

I was introduced to him by Si Gerson in the presence of J. Peters. 

Mr. Morris. "WHiy does the name stand out^ Why does the name 
stand out since many years have passed and why does it stand out 
that you recall meeting him at this particular time ? 

Mr. Budenz. This incident which is so clear in my memory that I 
have reported it a long time ago to other agencies stands out in my 
memory because Joe Barnes was so emphasized as having been of 
service to the party from the very moment I came into it. 

Mr. Morris. Prior to that time you had heard the name of Joseph 
Barnes? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mentioned in connection wdth the activity of the Com- 
munist organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. On many occasions? 

Mr. Budenz, Oh, a number of occasions, so much so that it be- 
came quite a personality with me without me knowing him. 

Mr. JVIoRRis. And it is your testimony that these people you met on 
this occasion, which you think was 1936, were all Communists? 

Mr. Budenz. I know it was the 1936 period. The only thing I am 
uncertain of, though my uncertainty is not very great, is whether it 
was the convention or national committee meeting. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 543 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I ATOiild like to have one matter brought out clearly 
■for the record. 

Are you stating that you know Mr. Barnes to have been a Com- 
munist because he was one of these newspapermen who was admitted, 
or are you stating that you knew him to be a Communist and that he 
was in this gi'onp which was admitted? In other words, does your 
statement that lie was a Communist rest on the fact that he was one of 
the group which was admitted? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Partly, although it also rests on official reports in the 
Politburo to the effect that Barnes had been of great service to the 
party as a Communist ; secondly, to the fact that he was introduced 
as Comrade Barnes to me by Si Gerson, 

Mr. SouKwiNE. That was on this particular occasion ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would the situation be this : That you knew prior 
to this occasion, and had known for some time prior to this occasion, 
that there was a Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had 
been of great service to the party ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And on this occasion you met a Joseph Barnes who 
was identified to 3'ou and in your mind as the same Joseph Barnes 
who was a Communist and who had been of service to the party ? 

Mr. BuDEKz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that is the Joseph Barnes that you have already 
identified here? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. The Joseph Barnes presented to me was 
presented in such a vivid color as of aid to the party that he was sup- 
posed to be outstanding. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And he was introduced by J. Peters ? 

Mr. BuDENz. By Si Gerson. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have, or did you have, any experience subse- 
quent to that experience which you believe took place in 1936, that 
could confirm j^our understanding that Joseph Barnes was a member 
of the Communist organization ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

I had a number of references to Barnes in the Politburo as a Com- 
munist, and also statements by Jack Stachel to me officially advising 
me of that fact. In about 1941 Earl Browder told me, though I don't 
know positively that he acted on what he said, that he was to take a 
certain newspaper with him to the Atlanta prison, he being privileged 
to only subscribe to one paper, because of the great influence of Joe 
Barnes in that paper and the contributions he had made. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, the chairman of this committee must 
be on the floor very shortly. I am going to ask Senator O'Conor if 
you would kindly take over. I may not be able to be here this after- 
noon. Senator. Do you want to continue with the hearing this after- 
noon ? 

Mr. Morris. I think we will have to get some more testimony in. 
We are just really getting into this testimony. 

The Chairman. Senator, can you preside this afternoon? 

Senator O'Conor. Yes, I can. 

Senator O'Conor (j) residing) . The hearing will please be in order. 



544 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ' 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, I offer you an article written by Joseph 
Barnes entitled "American Dream," which appeared in the At- 
lantic Monthly, pages 111 to 116, in January 1937. I offer you this 
article and ask you when you first saw that article? 

Mr. Budenz. Yesterday. 

Mr. Morris. When did you first communicate to the committee your 
testimony about your meeting with Joseph Barnes ? 

Mr. Budenz. Last spring, and I communicated to other agencies 
before that, but I communicated to the committee specifically last 
spring. 

Mr. Morris. Will you look at that article and tell us what that 
purports to be ? 

Mr. Budenz. This article is a review of the Communist Party con- 
vention of 1936 and also a review of the Communist tendency de- 
veloping out of that convention. It presents the Communists as being 
Americanized. 

Mr. Morris. And does that description of the Communist Party 
convention conform in every way with your understanding of the 
party purpose in allowing newspapermen to cover the convention? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; it may not be always expressed in Communist 
phraseology, but naturally the Atlantic Monthly, although I could talk 
about the Atlantic Monthly too, in that it wouldn't appear in that 
form. 

However, this does express the purpose of the newspapermen being 
admitted, those who were. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this into the record 
in its entirety and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. Has it been identified? 

Mr. Morris. I have described it. 

Mr. Mandel, did you authenticate that document ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the 
Atlantic Monthly in January 1937, pages 111 to 116, entitled "Ameri- 
can Dream," by Joseph Barnes. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted and marked in evidence. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 138 

[From, the Atlantic Monthly, January 1937, pp. 111-116] 

American Deeam 

(By Joseph Barnes) 
I 

The Communist Party of the United States, assembled in convention in New 
York City last summer, nominated its candidate for President as "the new John 
Brown of Osawatomie." This leather-faced Kansan, with a prairie twang in 
his voice, conducted a campaign which was patently not planned from Moscow. 
Over national radio networks, on the platforms of union meeting halls, and 
from a cell in the Terre Haute, Ind., jail, he insisted on the legitimate and 
historical right of his followers to the title of sons and daughters of the Amer- 
ican Revolution, and defenders of American liberty. 

"John Brown's Body" blared from the party's bands in alternation with the 
"Internationale." The American flag festooned the rafters of the party's meet- 
ing places. Mr. Browder's zeal for American democracy, which led him to single 
•"lit the Republican Party as the tool of big business interests, to be defeated 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 545 

at all costs, made his party's campaign for the first time a factor in national 
political discussion. 

This borrowing of American symbols was more than a political strategam, or 
a knavish trick of Communist expropriation. The seventh world congress of 
the Communist International in Moscow a year ago had bent the party line 
more sharply in this direction. But in its membership, its growing press, and its 
special language of exhortation, the Communist Party had for several years been 
naturalizing itself in the American scene. 

JMr. Albert Jay Nock has properly rebuked, in the October issue of the Atlantic, 
the word-mongers who foist "imposter terms" upon a gullible public, twisting 
their meanings to serve new ends. But the true study of semantics is more than 
invective against philological .nigglery; it is the attempt to learn the reasons 
for real changes in the meaning of words. The success or failure which the 
Communists may have in adopting the slogans of 1776 and 1861, and infusing 
them with new life, will show how far and why these terms have changed their 
meanings. 

Many of them, coined or borrowed in a simpler time, when words and slogans 
could be held in the mouth until even their taste was fixed, have inevitably 
changed since they first set the pattern of American speech. Since then, the 
rich have compounded their riches and the poor their poverty. Mr. Browder 
can find ample evidence in the reports of college deans, relief administrators, 
or industrial-relations experts, that freedom, liberty, revolution, the American 
dream, are being given, in many American minds, new definitions not to be 
found in McGuffey's Eclectic Readers. 

Every crackpot third party may appropriate for its own purposes the word 
"American," and the song "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." But in Mr. 
Browder's campaign some of the fighting words were not mere borrowings ; 
they were already a part of the Communist vocabulary. Even in the maze of 
Marxist rhetoric these words may be made for many Americans to sing with 
something of an older throbbing rhythm. They lose the bitter, anxious note 
given them in so many latter-day speeches or in Mr. Hearst's editorials, the 
flatted pitch betraying fear that our liberties may be something less imperish- 
able than the rocks and rills which cradled them. They can carry confidence 
and faith to millions of Americans for whom the old American dream has not 
yet curdled. 

II 

That dream itself was largely one of freedom. It was born in the hearts of 
men who wanted freedom enough to fight the wilderness for it. And for the 
greater number of them, from Daniel Boone who wanted room enough "to rassle 
b'ars in" to the Polish immigrant who wanted a loom and a less crowded ghetto 
and no more pogroms, the wilderness and its simple, natural freedom were forth- 
coming. 

Sir Charles Lyell, English geologist, traveled through the eastern seaboard 
of the United States in 1841, as open-mouthed as any Englishman of his time 
could be at its geological wealth and at the freedom of its people. When he 
asked the keeper of his inn at Corning, N. Y., to find his coachman for him, 
that free-born Yankee called into the barroom : "Where is the gentleman that 
brought this man here?" It was, Sir Charles concluded, the young country's 
chief blessing. 

"I am also aware that the blessing alluded to," he wrote in his diary, "and 
many others which they enjoy, belong to a progressive, as contrasted with a 
stationary, state of society; that they characterize the new colony, where there 
is abundance of unoccupied land, and a ready outlet to a redundant laboring 
class. They are not the result of a democratic, as compared with a monarchical 
or aristocratic, constitution, nor the fruits of an absolute equality of religious 
sects, still less of universal suffrage." 

Karl Marx paraphrased Sir Charles on this point a few years later, but the 
identification of freedom Avith political liberty was already frozen in American 
thinking. Twenty years later, at the beginning of the Civil War, more than 
half the entire area of the United States, over a billion acres, still belonging to 
the Government. The opening of the West had hardly started. So long as a 
man could move, and stretch his arms, and "rassle" new bears, he was not far 
wrong in thinking himself free. And if he thanked the Constitution or his right 
to vote for this blessing of freedom, it was an error which history and the invit- 
ing, empty prairies overlooked. 



546 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONiS 

Today the sons and grandsons of these searchers for freedom have reached 
a full stop in the expansive pressure of a young people into its promised land. 
For a few hundred farmers, crowded from the soil by the relentless growth 
of tenancy — which has claimbed in Iowa until 60 percent of the State's 222,000 
farms are tenant-operated in 1936, and 80 percent are mortgaged — there is the 
Matanuska Valley in Alaska. For a few hundred textile workers in New York 
City, whose very looms have been transported to the cheaper-labor cities of the 
South, there is Mr. Tugwell's Hightstown, N. J., resettlement project. Both 
were designed as symbols to revive the old American confidence in the invin- 
cibility of the pioneer. But both serve today to remind Americans that there is 
no longer an open geographical frontier offering freedom to large numbers of 
those who seek it. 

There are still drought and grasshoppers and business depressions and tax- 
collecting politicians, it is true. But without unoccupied land for a redundant 
laboring class the older pioneer virtues of individual strength and character 
have been seen for nearly 7 years to falter badly against even these old adver- 
saries. You can't "rassle," many Americans have learned, a public utility 
or the United States Steel Corp. 

Instead, a few have learned, you can organize. It is among these few that 
Mr. Browder still numbers most of his 51,000 enrolled supporters. But his 
party's campaign to become a mass revolutionary party has been planned in 
larger figures. Only an embittered class of industrial workers can be won by 
talk of dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, and "Hands Off China." Besides 
them, the black-browed Marxist has slowly but carefully learned, he must win 
the support of millions of Americans vi'ho still feel themselves the sons of 
pioneers and who dream the great American dream. 

For most of these, he argues, property has become an empty word, a memory, 
like stone walls and rail fences to an Iowa farmer. Where the title deeds and 
gilt-printed certificates have survived, the cold, enlacing grip of finance capital on 
management has wrenched both profit and the sense of ownership from the shell 
of property to which the middle class has clung. The old controversy of Marxist 
scholars as to the relative rates of growth of the so-called middle and working 
classes has been forgotten. It has been dwarfed by the blunt, unpleasant fact 
that every year, growing by geometrical progression through prosperity and 
depression, there are more men and women dependent for a living on a job, the 
surplus value of their labor taken from them, the specter of unemployment star- 
ing them in the face. 

The interests of these Americans, Mr. Browder and his board of strategy have 
seen, lie with those of the working class. Only their loyalties, the accumulated 
pressure of a strong tradition, keep them befuddled by a Liberty League which 
works for liberty only for the rich. The Communists have set out this year to 
change these loyalties. 

They have premised their plans on the assumption that the new allegiance of 
these millions need not be to Moscow, but to Bunker Hill and Harper's Ferry. 
They have found in the American dream issues which are fresh and vital today. 
By a policy of "united front" with other groups which recognize these issues, and 
by working on social and economic problems which have replaced the geograph- 
ical frontier, they propose to use the American dream in a new search for free- 
dom. 

Ill 

The primary purpose of the Yankees moving westward across the American 
Continent, and of the later Americans who came as immigrants to a country 
already settled, was to make a living. A better living has been the first prom- 
ise they have demanded of those who wished to change their homes or their ways 
of thinking. In recent years the depression, unemployment, and increasing fear 
of an accelerating spiral of boom and panic leading to some undefined disaster 
have prepared many Americans to listen to tales of greener pastures. 

This the Communists have recognized, and their appeal for new support rests 
squarely on a promise of abundance. To support the promise, they can point 
with powerful effect to the constricting scope of human life and enterprise in the 
middle-class nations of the modern world. With much less effect as yet, at least 
for Americans, they can cite the rising standard of living and the widening world 
of the Soviet Union. But while they wait for these two convex'ging lines to meet 
in inevitable revolution, there are other elements of the American dream which 
they can shape to their own purposes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 547 

The first of these is the desire of security. The depression has been blamed 
perhaps too much, for the rising clamor which has enlisted even the Republican 
Party in support of the principles of socfal insurance. The true cause may have 
heen rather the prosperity of postwar years, which sucked farmers to the cities 
and undermined the independence of the small merchant and producer. Merger 
and monopoly were the order of the day, and the economics of self-sufficiency were 
relegated to the textbooks, unlearned and unpracticed. 

How far this change has already gone may be seen in the increasing repudia- 
tion by large numbers of citizens, not all of them on relief rolls, of the vener- 
able American maxim that insecurity is a necessary incentive to hard work. 
What would make men work, we used to ask, if it were not for the wolf at the 
door? 

How can they work, many now ask instead, if they have no access to the tools 
with which to work? These are no longer the ax and flintlock with which 
. Daniel Boone made insecurity his blessing of freedom. Today they are jobs, for 
corporations, banks, and railroads, work to be done with hand or brain for some- 
one else, and a wage at the end of the week. Even the farmers, caught in the 
spider web of mortgages and closing markets, have begun to learn that the in- 
centive of fear, when independence has dried up with the free land, is small 
defense against the wolf. 

Another traditional element of the American dream, according to the Com- 
munist analysis, is the revolt against injustice. To a nation familiar with 
abolitionists, quakers, and pacifists, this is nothing new. Even its most recent 
forms have only put into the conversation of increasing numbers of Americans 
what Ruskin knew about himself 65 years ago. 

"For my own part," he wrote, "I will put up with this state of things, passively, 
not an hour longer. I simply cannot paint, nor read, nor look at minerals, nor do 
anything else that I like, and the very light of the morning sky has become hateful 
to me, because of the misery that I know of, and see signs of where I know it not, 
which no imagination can interpret too bitterly. Therefore, as I have said, I will 
endure it no longer quietly." 

I once knew a missionary in China, a man of fine, explosive moral indignation. 
His ancestors had been Connecticut Yankees, whose tombstones in the cemeteries 
of Litchfield County, the Western Reserve, Iowa, and California marked one 
of the trails of American history. Its last expansive thrust sent him into China, 
equipped with little but his Bible and the American dream. The misery he saw 
around him made him rage and quiver. 

A few days ago I met his son, organizing unemployed workers in New Jersey. 
With him one of the driving forces of American life had come full circle. The 
religious character of the older emotional protest had changed. But no one who 
has seen a Yankee agitator, like this missionary's son, forced by the misery he 
sees to break his silence, can doubt that his accents are those of his father, and 
of Emerson and of Thoreau. 

Much of the same ethical basis underlies still another of the elements in modern 
American thinking, especially that of a younger generation, on which the Com- 
munists have based their strategy and shaped their language. This is the desire 
for a world of ideas that makes sense. It is the belief that the values and the 
esthetics of a civilized people, like its economies and its social mores, are not 
predestined to perpetual confusion and debasement. 

It is this half-inarticulate conviction that has enlisted so many younger writers 
in the United States under the banner of a still-nascent proletarian literature. 
The treason of the intellectuals has become a series of mass desertions from the 
standards of a business society. The present confusion of many of these younger 
writers belies their avowed desire for synthesis and order. Yet large numbers 
of them have joined the chorus of revolt, apparently for some personal satisfac- 
tion they derive from looking at the still dim outlines of an integral world. 

It may be that the attraction to them of the Marxist world is nothing more 
than the ageless appeal of any church to any believer. It way be simply a 
rock on which to rest a weary head. But there are few such syntheses left 
with equally compelling vitality inside the world of middle-class culture and 
ideas, according to the Communists ; and they claim to be embarrassed by the 
number of their recruits who come to them for faith alone. 

All these things, it may be argued, are not new, by the very token of the ease 
with which the Communists can find American words with which to fit them. 
We have sought freedom and security before, and rebelled against injustice, and 
looked with patience for integration in a world that moves too fast for any simple 
hypothesis to hold it. Those who have failed have become cynical, but have 
gone on living, and there has been little change. 



548 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Some young Americans have found two new and ponderable changes, which 
have made the whole equation new. T^ie first is Soviet Russia. To the imag- 
ination of a Montana wheat grower or a Detroit mechanic, hard empiricists 
in their American dream, the scale of 5-year plans and their tough and palpable 
reality may make them compelling visions. Americans know of their own experi- 
ence that steel and wheat and machines rank high among the things for which 
men live. 

The second is Marxism. It is not the party line of any orthodox or schismatic 
group, but the tool for understanding which a few scholars, and fewer leaders, 
have learned to use. To the English world it is still fresh and untested ; and it 
has the plausible ring in many ears that only those doctrines have which promise 
the millennium — in this case, a society without classes and without poverty, where 
men may be really free. 

"The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history," Engels 
promised, and the promise still holds good, "will then pass under the control of 
men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, 
will fashion their own history ; it is only from this point that the social causes 
set in motion by men wil have, predominantly and in constantly increasing meas- 
ure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity 
into the realm of freedom." 

IV 

For some years it has been easy to dismiss the Communists as foreigners 
in the fatal sense of that term, alien to our people and to our land, speaking 
a language few men understood. Only out of our own soil, it was cheerfully 
repeated, could roots spring that would fulfill what Herbert Croly called the 
"promise of American life." 

In one sense the Communists have admitted the validity of this claim in 
their adoption of Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, and John Brown for their 
political iconology, and their campaign to capture the American dream. In 
another, they have repudiated it, in their steadfast insistence that there is no 
exception to the rules of capitalist decay. 

The continent is no longer virgin, they insist. Its people count their ancestors 
in all the corners of the world. They make their living and sell their labor as in 
any other industrial country. The exceptional scale and speed of American life 
serve only to telescope the inexorable changes inherent in all industrial civiliza- 
tion. The specter that was haunting Europe in 1848 has appeared mysteriously 
lurking in the shadows of America. 

This specter may not be conjured away so easily in the years to come as in 
the last decade. In Gary, Ind., along the Monongahela River, on the San Fran- 
cisco docks, and in the rayon mills of North Carolina, it is reported, the Com- 
munists have found new men, speaking the American tongue, unhampered by 
doctrinaire orders from Moscow, to spread their naturalized doctrine. 

William Z. Foster, the party's elder statesman and three times candidate for 
President, is the son of a Taunton, Mass., carriage washer, who learned his eco- 
nomics not from Karl Marx but from Lester F. Ward. On a platform he chews 
gum with the slow, deliberate rhythm of a baseball fan. Robert Minor, a Com- 
munist candidate in November for Governor of New York State, is a grandson 
of a first cousin to Gen. Sara Houston, first president of Texas. At the 1936 
convention he nominated, as "an average American," Earl Browder, former 
bookkeeper and Standard Oil employee, who wears a gold wedding ring and 
lives in Yonkers, speaks with the slow, dry irony of a Kansas farmer, and writes 
in a style that suggests a little of Daniel Webster mixed with much of "Sockless 
Jerry" Simpson. 

These men spoke at Communist meetings during the campaign to shirt- 
sleeved mechanics and miners, organizers from Alabama textile mills, sailors 
and stevedores from three American coasts. Most of their lieutenants ai>- 
peared to be young. Few were women. A surprising majority had Scotch or 
Irish names and Yankee cheekbones. On these men, more than on Browder, 
or Foster, depends the success of this new experiment with the American 
dream. 

Even more will it depend, perhaps, on the comy>etition they encounter. It 
would be comforting to think that there was a reasonable body of ideas being 
shaped by liberals or conservatives to bring the old American dream into line 
with new realities in American life. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 549 

The depression has uprooted many families and with them many loyalties 
and ways of thinking. When they settle again, it will inevitably be in new 
patterns. 

In the short run, most of these appear to be of two kinds. On the one hand, 
conservatives hold oiit the nostalgic hope of a return to the older agrarian virtues, 
contused themselves between the liassez-faire spirit of independence they 
preach and the controlled monopoly they practice. On the other hand there is a 
fumbling' effort to trim and cut the American dream by endless compromise, a 
liberal muddling-through which pi'omises only scarcity to the sons of men who 
wanted abundance and freedom. 

Given time, either of these sets of ideas might bend the tradition of Daniel 
Boone and the American pioneer to the new and imperious demands that daily 
living makes on millions of confused Americans. But there may well be no 
time. In a world where war and fascism are bacteria in the air we breathe, 
the few who see the danger and prepare to struggle against it may win the 
title they have claimed — sniritual inheritors of the founding fathers. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, we have had testimony here previously 
that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist, and in addition, we have 
introduced extensive records showing that she was a very active person 
in the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Will you tell us if you knew that Harriet Lucy' Moore was a 
Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; I knew Harriet Lucy Moore was a Com- 
munist. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet her personally ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; she attended several meetings of the national 
committee, the enlarged national committee, and I believe, Mr. Chair- 
man, that should be explained. 

The national committee is generally composed of 60 members, 
though it can go up and down according to Communist exigencies, but 
that is not the national committee meeting to which I refer. 

The national committee meeting to which I refer is the enlarged 
national committee which takes place about four times a year and in 
which from 300 to 400 Communist leaders throughout the country are 
invited to attend. A very strict security surveillance is kept on the 
meeting bj' the Communists and it is very secret. It generally took 
place up in the forties in New York in a large hall there which the 
Communists had rented off and on. 

Now, there at that meeting, occasionally in the forties — the exact 
time I couldn't say just at the moment — but Harriet Lucy Moore was 
present. Only Communists were admitted to these meetings. 

Mr. Morris. Was Harriet Lucy Moore a member of the cell that 
operated in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Budenz. She was, both according to my knowledge gained in 
national meetings and in the reports of the Politburo. 

INIr. IMoRRis. Do you know anything else about Harriet Lucy Moore's 
activities, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, they were called so much to my attention that 
I am really at a loss how to express them; that is to say, she wrote 
articles which were passed on by the Politburo and she was specifically 
praised for a review of Owen Lattimore's book which she presented, I 
think, to Soviet Russia Today, though it may have been another 
magazine. I remember the incident. It was brought up as a sample 
of good Communist work. 

Mr. Morris. Was she active in Russian war relief, as well? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; she was. 



550 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have previously indicated that Har-^ 
riet Lucy Moore was the acting secretary of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, as well as at one time chairman of the nominating com- 
mittee of the institute. 

Mr. Budenz, we would like some testimony from you on the subject 
of whether or not Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist 
organization. Can you relate the episodes that indicated to you that 
Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. These episodes which I have brought to your atten- 
tion? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. You have called to our attention five or six 
episodes. 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain these in detail, stressing at all times 
in your relating of them the fact of Owen Lattimore's association with 
the Communist organization? 

Mr. Budenz. These episodes indicate within the conspiracy the im- 
portance of Lfittimore as a sort of an advance guard for the Com- 
munist Party out in the land of the heathens, so to speak, as he was 
not exactly described; but as he was described, and his active and 
prominent part from the Communist viewpoint, such as his being 
assigned to prepare the ground, at least for this campaign of agrarian 
reformers and Asia for the Asiatic, his being conversant with changes 
in the line, which actually did take' place, and after information we 
found the correct way in which to carry them out, his being likewise 
stated by Mr. Jack Stachel when he went with Henry Wallace to 
Soviet Siberia and to China 

Mr. Morris. Will you relate them in chronological order? 

Mr. Budenz. You want me to go over them again? I was trying 
to save time. 

Mr. Morris. You did get into some of them when we were talking 
about Frederick Field. I wish you would rerelate them, stressing on 
each occasion the role that Lattimore had on these particular episodes. 

Senator O'Conor. I think it would be informative to us all if he 
would enumerate the episodes first, and then possibly go into detail 
in confirmation. 

Mr. Budenz. 1937, that was the episode in regard to Browder's 
bringing forward the idea that the Communists should be represented 
as democratic, as agrarian reformers, as Asians for the Asiatics. 

There Lattimore's important role is indicated by his being given 
an assignment by the Politburo. 

Mr. Morris. And what was the assignment in general ? 

Mr. Budenz. The assignment was to be responsible for seeing that 
there was produced in the American publication market articles and 
books which would carry forward this point of view. 

Mr. Morris. Did his role in Pacific Affairs come up at that time? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; at that time it was stressed by Earl Browder 
specifically as leader of the party, that Lattimore was performing a 
very great service for the party in Pacific Affairs by more and more 
bringing in Communist authors. 

Browder said : "We appreciate that every writer for Pacific Affairs 
can't be a Communist," that, however, the number must be increased 
and that Lattimore had shown a willingness and readiness to do so. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 551 

Mr. Morris. Subsequent to that time, did you follow the publi- 
cation Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Yes; although, of course, today that is not all fresh 
in my memory. 

Mr. MoRRTS. Is it your testimony that all of the people writing 
for Pacific Affairs were Communists? 

Mr. BuDENz. No, sir; it is not. I said that Mr. Browder stated 
that it was not understood that everyone who wrote for Pacific Affairs 
was a Communist ; quite the contrary. 

The very function of Pacific Affairs or the Institute of Pacific 
Relations was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Com- 
munist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint 
always. 

Now, the fact is that some of the writers for Pacific Affairs 
undoubtedly were non-Communists. That was stated by Browder, 
and, I thiiik I can say that from him in other discussions this was 
intended to be so. 

As a matter of fact, it was even said that people of outstanding 
position would undoubtedly be attracted to the Institute of Pacific 
Relations as they had been in the past and that would be a gain to 
the Communists because their names would be used and very fre- 
quently they would not know anything about what was happening, 
they being busy people, so the emphasis on Lattimore was that he was 
getting more and more Communists, however, to give the proper 
weight to the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we will, at a subsequent time, during 
Mr. Budenz' testimony, put into the record the Communist writers 
who did contribute to Pacific Affairs, but at this time I would like 
to proceed with Mr. Budenz' narrating the episodes and indicating 
to him from his own experience that Lattimore was a Communist. 

Mr, Budenz. 1943 was the report by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, 
as I say, my understanding being that he had just seen Lattimore 
and that Lattimore told him there was to be a change in regard to 
Chiang Kai-shek, that the negative criticism was to be changed to 
positive criticism. In other words, into an effort eventually to destroy 
Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Nationalist government in 
China. That, of course, was borne out by the fact that we imme- 
diately received verification of that, the only difficulty being that we 
interpreted it somewhat incorrectly, as it happens every once in 
a while. 

This is not only a difficulty of the Communists here ; it is a difficulty 
that Moscow has in getting over their viewpoints, where they have a 
double-talking viewpoint. We had that situation on a number of 
other occasions to which I could refer, but I think I better not or we 
go far afield, but that is not a new experience in the Communist 
policy. 

The Politburo wishes really to smash those with whom they are 
coalescing, but that has to be the property or knowledge of the Com- 
munists, whereas the coalition has to be the property or knowledge of 
the non-Communists. 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Budenz, is it your testimony at that time that Mr. 
Field had received an official Communist communication from Latti- 
more? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us of any other episodes ? 



552 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. 1944, tlie trip of Vice President Henry Wallace. I 
don't know whether I can emphasize the importance of this trip to 
the Commnnists as much as it should be. It received a very great 
attention from the Politburo and it was constantly brought to my 
attention by Jack Stachel as the representative of the Politburo as a 
very important mission which would redound to the benefit of the 
Communist cause in the Far East. 

In that respect a great deal of dependence was placed on Owen 
Lattimore, whom I was told by Mr. Stachel at that time to consider a 
Communist 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean, "consider a Communist" ? Is that 
a technical word you are using? 

Mr. BuDENz. Th^t was a technical term we used which meant he 
was an authority from the Communist viewpoint. He was a Marxist 
authority. 

Mr. Morris. Was that warning given to you by anyone else at that 
time ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Well, there were many other references of similar 
character. I remember specifically Stachel's because my relations 
with him were very close and he was constantly giving me these in- 
structions. 

I do know that similar statements were made within the Politburo 
itself by other members in connection with Wallace's trip. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the significance of that ? Was that a 
note of warning to you by Stachel, or was it an admonition, or what ? 

Mr. BuDENz. No, I should say an underscoring of Lattimore's 
position, that we should be on the alert for anything that Lattimore 
might say or do. That was really carrying out the Communist line. 

If I may explain that for just a moment, there isn't just the line to 
carry out, but you must know at any particular moment how the line 
is to be emphasized. You might talk about united fronts, but you 
might be emphasizing one particular element in the united fronts, 
or something like that, or, in the case of Italy, where we were taken 
by surprise, you might attack Badoglio one day and find you should 
be with him the next day, according to Moscow's policy. 

That was within all one line of procedure with regard to Italy, 
but Badoglio suddenly changed in that line. 

Now, in order to be advised of such things as that, we were to rely 
on anything Lattimore might say or do that we would be aware of. 

Mr. Morris. Were you also to handle the name of Lattimore in any 
particular way? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Well, with consideration; yes, sir. As a matter of 
fact, it has been handled with great consideration. 

Mr. Morris. And you handled it with consideration? 

Mr. BuDENz. That's right. 

Mr. Morris. Could Stachel possibly be giving you misinformation 
under those circumstances ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is utterly impossible. The Communist Party 
is an army and the whole strength of its invasion of the country, which 
is what it is doing, is being advised correctly through the whole 
organization insofar as it is necessary for a person to be advised of 
the facts in a situation, but when someone is designated as a Com- 
munist that is utterly impossible to be false, because if that were so 
then the whole thing would fall into chaos. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 553 

Senator O'Conor. Just before you leave that episode, the one in 
1944, and with specific reference to the conversation with Stachel, 
do you place any significance on the fact that he told you to consider 
Lattimore as a Communist ; that is to say, were those words used, "to 
consider him as" ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Yes, sir. 

Now, you understand that some of these discussions and considera- 
tions had to be carried on under pressure. As a matter of fact many 
offices have arranged their walls so that you can't hear through them 
for various business reasons, but ours were arranged that way so 
that the staff of the Daily Worker couldn't hear what was being said 
by the leadership because many confidential and secret messages were 
brought there. 

Now, the thing is that because of that fact, and the danger of inter- 
ruption, and all that, we tried to reduce everything to what I used 
to call political shorthand, my own term, namely, to make everything 
as concise as possible, and the phrase "to consider a man as Com- 
munist" came to me that he was an authority as a Communist and 
that we should regard him as such. 

That is a distinction from other phrases, like "treat him as a Com- 
munist," or things like that. 

Mr. Morris. What does that mean ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. That he is part of the Communist conspiracy. These 
things had to be divided because of interruptions by staff members of 
conversations of this character. 

Mr. SouBwiNE. Do you mean that when a man had been referred 
to by the phrase "consider him as a Communist" that he was to be 
regarded as speaking with authority on matters of Communist ideol- 
ogy ; that he was an interpreter of the line with the party back of him ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That's correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And if a person was inclined in their own mind 
to differ with what such a man had said that he had better take notice 
that tliere was something wrong with their thinking because he was 
right ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

You must understand in the case of Mr. Lattimore this was only 
said at that time with regard to his functioning in the Wallace 
mission. 

Mr. Morris. I did not understand whether you were trying to 
"treat" or "consider" Mr. Lattimore as a Communist. 

Mr. BuDENZ. Consider him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. I thought you used the word "treat" in your testimony 
a while ago. 

Mr. BuDENZ. I saj that that was also a phrase used. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. 1 ou mean that in connection with the Wallace mis- 
sion the word was passed by the use of the phrase "consider him as a 
Communist," that Avith respect to that mission Mr. Lattimore might 
not be setting the line ; he was giving the line, and he was interpretmg 
that mission in Communist terms ? 

]\Ir. BuDENZ. That's correct. He was a representative of the party 
in the Wallace mission. 

Senator Smith. He was sort of a VIP in tlie movement ? 
Mr. BuDENz. That's risht. 



554 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. MoREis. Would a man like that be allowed to make a statement, 
to voice a criticism of the Soviet Union, which would not be consistent 
with the official Communist Party line ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. In order to explain that, I think we have to under- 
stand the Communist position, the position of the Communist con- 
spiracy. 

Mr. Morris. As best you can answer the question, though, Mr. 
Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz. He would be granted an exemption if the burden of 
his work was such as to rebound to the line of the party in that field 
to which he was assigned. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any such exemptions that were granted 
to people ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain that? 

Mr. Budenz. There was a noted Hollywood actor who was certainly 
a devoted Communist. As a matter of fact, he wept every time 
there was any thought that he might not be a Communist, altliough 
he couldn't publicly proclaim it. He was granted an exemption to 
contribute to the Finnish relief because it was said in the political 
bureau by V. J. Jerome that, ""What are a few cents to Finland com- 
pared to the place he occupies in Hollywood for the party? There 
is no scandal in the party. No one knows he is a Communist." 

An open Communist couldn't do that without being expelled, but a 
concealed Communist is permitted these exemptions. 

In another case a college professor who has done very yeoman work 
for the party, particularly in Communist fronts — he always comes 
back to the Communist fronts, no matter whatl ine is being pursued — 
was given an exemption to say a kind word about Trotsky. Of course, 
Trotsky was thoroughly dead at that time, but he was given permis- 
sion to say a kind word about him in order to distinguish him from 
the Communists because the burden of his activities in Communist 
fronts, to which I say he constantly returned, was much greater from 
the party viewpoint from this casual reference to the fact that he 
wasn't known publicly as a Communist and there would be no scandal 
in the party. That is a phrase used. 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us of any other episodes that indicated to 
you that Lattimore was a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Incidentally, in this respect, I might bring this out in 
another way in order that it be understood and not cause confusion, 
and that is that just recently when a ninnber of Communists who were 
lieads of trade-unions signed affidavits that they had all suddenly 
had a common inspiration to resign from the Communist Party, the 
Daily Worker ran an explanation that their function and the way 
they should act would be different from that of the rank and file. The 
rank-and-file Communist must continue because he is expected to 
assert openly that he is a Communist at all costs, but these leaders, 
because they have responsibilities to great masses, organizations, 
funds, and the like, may properly, while continuing their fraternal 
relation with the Communist Party, swear that they are not Com- 
m.unists. 

In other words, right there is a note. I could bring in many other 
examples. I want to show that there is an open example there in the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 555 

ptages of the Daily Worker that here is a leader of a trade-union who 
is a Communist. Ben Gold is an example, among others. 

Suddenly one day he says he has resigned from the Communist 
Party and he can take the affidavit with the National Labor Kelations 
Board. The Communists in the Daily Worker had to explain that 
because that did create some difficulty, and so they said that the rank- 
and-file Communist must continue to assert his open communism. He 
has no responsibility to large institutions, funds, and to 'the welfare of 
masses, but those who have responsibility, while maintaining their 
fraternal relations with the party, may repudiate the party openly 
in this way, so they went to the extent of repudiating the party in that 
<;ase. 

Mr. MoREis. Would you tell us the next episode, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. The next episode is a brief one, but a rather important 
one, and that was during the Amerasia incident, which occurred vQry 
rapidly and it is not as sharp, even though later, in my memory as 
some others, but nevertheless in the Amerasia case in 1945 there were 
many hurried meetings in the Politburo and segments of the Politburo, 
and in that connection Lattimore's name was mentioned several times ; 
that is, that he should be appealed to for help, and, finally, Jack Stachel 
did report that Lattimore had been of considerable assistance in the 
Amerasia case. 

The nature of the assistance I could not say. 

Senator O'Conor. Could you state, Mr. Budenz, by w^hom Latti- 
more's name was mentioned ? You said it was mentioned by several. 

jSIr. BuDENZo By Jack Stachel specifically mentioning that he had 
been of great assistance to the defendants in the Amerasia case. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you describe for us the role of Jack 
Stachel and your relationship to him at this time ? 

Mr. Budenz. Jack Stachel, who is among those who were convicted 
in the trial on Foley Square, has been for years the most important 
Communist in the United States for all-around activity. He was one 
of the small commission of five which was in constant touch with 
Moscow. 

Mr, Budenz. He also was the one who brought the line very fre- 
quently to the political bureau from this contact with Moscow rep- 
resentatives. When I say "in touch with Moscow," that doesn't always 
mean with the Soviet Embassy or Consulate ; it means through inter- 
mediaries. 

He was the one who v/as in touch with Gerhart Eisler. 

In other words, he was the most important cog in the Communist 
machine linking up the legal party, the open party in this country, 
with the illegal Stalinite representatives from abroad. 

Mr. Morris. Would you say that he monitored your work in the 
Daily Worker? 

Mr. Budenz. In addition to that he became a representative of 
the political bureau of the Daily Worker. That was a custom, though, 
for years, different personnel being involved on that. 

• When I first went with the Daily Worker, Alexander Bittelman of 
the party was the chief even though Hathaway was supposed to be 
editor-in-chief. He met every day with the editorial staff of the 
Daily Worker. He could meet because he knew the line that he had 
received from Communist International representatives. 



556 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Was Jack Stachel your superior? 

Mr. BuDE^z. Just a moment. Even Bittelman was succeeded by 
others like William Z. Foster and others and Stachel for a long time 
during a large part of my being managing editor was a representative 
of the Politburo. He therefore was my direct and immediate superior 
in the conspiracy. 

Mr. Morris. Was there another episode involving Owen Lattimore 
that you can testify about, Mr. Budenz, connected with his Japanese 
activities ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. That leads us, of course, into another held 
and I wasn't thinking along that line at the moment. 

As the war against Japan approached the climax the Communist 
conspiracy proceeded to emphasize the necessity of a hard peace in 
Japan. They had in mind a Morgenthau plan for Japan and anyone 
who was against that, who would treat the Japanese people in any 
reasonable terms, was denounced as a Facist and an agent of the 
Zaibatsu. That is a Japanese term, as I understand it, meaning the 
industrialists of Japan. 

That was the Communist position which you could find very ex- 
tremely emphasized in the Daily Worker and other Communist pub- 
lications of that period. 

They wanted to have a hard peace for Japan, just as they empha- 
sized the necessity of a hard peace for Germany. This was clearly 
told us in order to alienate these countries from the United States. 

In this connection a very valuable Lattimorian contribution was 
made. Just in the middle of the Communist campaign Lattimore 
gave an interview to the United Press attacking the Zaibatsu and 
declaring that the democratic element should be brought forward. 
That's what the Communists were saying, the democratic element 
from the Communist viewpoint being themselves. 

Now, this statement by Mr. Lattimore in that period was considered 
so important that extra copies of the Daily Worker were published 
and distributed throughout the country and the party was advised 
in a private directive — they get out many of these private directives — 
well, they advocated that Guenther Stein's books be published in that 
manner and Harrison Forman's books, and the like. 

In one of these directives they emphasized that Lattimore's inter- 
views, just as it appeared in the Daily Worker, should be given the 
widest distribution in trade-unions, youth groups, and the like; in 
communities, in other w^ords. 

Senator Smith. What year was that ? 

Mr. Budenz. 1945. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Doesn't Zaibatsu mean a little more than indus- 
trialist? Doesn't it mean the larger merchants? Does it not carry 
a connotation of blood-sucking oppression? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. It was the use by the Communists 
of an attack upon a group who perhaps needed criticism, but the 
Communists used that to identify themselves with all of the anti- 
Zaibatsu elements and to make themselves the sole democratic group. 

In the midst of this campaign Mr, Lattimore's statement served 
Communist purposes well. I cannot say that that was the arrangement 
of the Communist Party in this instance — I don't know that — but I 
know that we were instructed to use it because it was so effective. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You think it might have been rather timely? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 557 

Mr. BuDEisrz. It was certainly considered timely by the Commimists. 
It was right in line with their campaign. 

Mr. Morris, You mentioned Guenther Stein and Harry Forman as 
having books published by the Communist Party. Were they both 
Communists ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You know that from your official position with the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have here numerous exhibits bearing 
on the testimony of Mr. Budenz on Communist Party policy on Japan, 
as well as the UP release at that time, the interview at that time 
which Mr. Lattimore gave. I prefer to introduce those into the record 
immediately after lunch. The witness seems to be tired, and I suggest 
that we adjourn until 2 o'clock. 

Senator Smith. I have one question I would like to ask you if 
you can tell us now. 

I thought I heard you say that the purpose of the movement for 
a coalition government in China was to destroy somebody or some 
movement. 

Mr. Budenz, Destroy Chiang Kai-shek and establish Communist 
China. 

As a matter of fact, Senator, if time will permit later, I can refer 
you to statements by the Chinese leaders to that effect right at the 
moment they were advocating a coalition government. 

Senator Smith. Was that before, after, or about the time that 
Lattimore became the confidential adviser of Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr, Budenz, That was after. 

Senator Smith. Do you regard Lattimore's connection or 
appointment as a confidential adviser to Chiang Kai-shek a part of 
that plan to have a coalition government to destroy Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr. Budenz. That I could not testify to. I have my opinion, 
but I cannot testify with absolute knowledge, of my own 
knowledge. 

You see, during that period partly I was out in the Middle West, 
and after taking over the duties of the Daily Worker, and I couldn't 
say that of my own knowledge. 

Senator Smith. You did know that Lattimore turned up as an 
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. And I know that the Communist 
political bureau was not ill-served by that function. That he was de- 
liberately put there for that purpose, I cannot sa3^ 

Senator Smith. You do not kuow who put him there, or how 
that came about? 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir. 

Senator O'Conor. If there are no further questions the commit- 
tee will take a recess until 2 : 30. 

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m,, the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 
2 : 30 p. m., same day.) 

afternoon session 

(The committee reconvened at 2: 30 p. m. upon the expiration of 
the recess.) 

Senator O'Conor. The hearing will please be in order. 

(22848 — 52— pt. 2 14 



558 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.— 

Resumed 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Budenz, just before the noon recess there 
were certain matters referred to concerning Owen Lattimore about 
which I should like to ask you a few questions. You had recounted 
the several episodes starting in 1937 and then up to 1943 and 1944, 
which, in your opinion, referred to Owen Lattimore's activities. I 
would like to ask you whether throughout that period you met Owen 
Lattimore. 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; I did not meet Mr. Lattimore at any time 
until at the hearing in Washington. 

Senator O'Conor. My next question is whether it is significant, 
and inasmuch as you say you were yourself active in the affairs of 
the Communist Party and you attribute to ]\Ir. Lattimore certain 
interests in furtherance of Communist purposes, whether it is sig- 
nificaiit that you did not meet him or know him. 

Mr. Budenz. It is significant. It is significant in the sense that 
many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed — I don't 
know that he was directed — but many men of Mr. Lattimore's func- 
tioning were directed specifically to avoid all contacts with official 
Communist organs that would commit them in any way in the public 
eye. As a matter of fact, there is quite a difference of responsibility 
among members of the Communist Party, Mr. Chairman. 

I don't know whether you want me to pursue that or not. 

Senator O'Conor. I think it would be of very great interest to have 
you do so at this time. 

Mr. Budenz. We have what I call the Communist spectrum. The 
spectrum of Communist allegiance ; that is a term I used while I was 
still a Communist and to some extent was adopted by other people 
who discussed this in the Politburo. That is to say, we will take the 

spy- 
Anyone engaged in espionage like Judith Coplon, and there are 

a number of those people trained for espionage alone, must not give 
any indication of any association with Communists. As a matter of 
fact, they are not even permitted to approach Communist branch 
meetings ; they are ordered not to do so. They cannot have any con- 
tact with known Communists. 

That of course is quite obvious why that would be. The infiltrator 
of government is somewhat in a similar position and is not supposed 
to have any vestige of Communist membership on him and to avoid 
any public relationship with Communists. Beyond that he is also 
permitted of course within limitations to make such statements criti- 
cal of the Communist Party as will assure his non-Communist stand- 
ing so that he may put the burden — I use that word "burden" of his 
activity in the Communist cause because that was the way it was 
used — the weight of his activities in the Communist cause. 

Then there is the infiltrator of other organizations. They like- 
wise liave the same responsibilities, though they are not so much pro- 
tected as anyone in the Government. I mean protected by the Com- 
munist Party. They likewise can misrepresent. 

You take, for example, during the one month that I was supposedly 
a non-Communist, though a Communist, in August 1935, 1 was specif- 
ically directed by Stachel again to criticize the party to non-Commu- 
nists but to do it lightly and to put the burden of my arguments in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 559 

favor of cooperation with the Communists, although I was a fully 
admitted Communist Party member working as a non-Comnmnist 
until they could decide what my function should be. 

We have also the case of even Ben Gold, the open Communist, and 
this was worked out while I was still in the party, though it didn't 
come to fruition until the next CIO convention, who as an open 
Communist signed a report denouncing Communist infiltration in 
the CIO. That was in order to ameliorate the feelings of Philip 
Murray. 

These special exemptions are granted by the district leader func- 
tioning as a non-Communist in infiltrating into other organizations in 
order that his infiltration may be effective^ 

Next in the category are the members of the Communist fronts 
who have still another set of responsibilities, to follow out the fronts, 
to respond when called upon, but who again deny they are Commu- 
nists, and of course in denying it have to express occasionally why 
they are not Communists. You just can't say, "I am not a Commu- 
nist," you have to explain why. They are permitted to do that, al- 
though 95 percent of the Connnunist fronts, according to my knowl- 
edge, are members of the Communist Party. 

When I say members of tlie Communist Party I do not mean neces- 
sarily card-carrying Communists because most Communists do not 
carry cards but are subject to Conmuinist allegiance. 

Then there are the open party members, the expendables as they 
have been called, the rank-an-file Communists, the picket-line Com- 
munists who are supposed to be open, and they are not permitted to 
deviate from the line of the party because they represent the reputa- 
tion of the party. 

Likewise with the bureaucrat or functionary. The word "bureau- 
crat" is not used in the party. Although Lenin said our party is 
bureaucratic, they don't like to use that. They are functionaries. 
They, of course, have a deep responsibility and they cannot deviate 
from the party at all. Anyone who is a section organizer or district 
organizer of the party or the like in his person is the party because the 
leadership principle is very strong. 

Among the bureaucrats, though, there are variations again. There 
are those illegal agents sent in here by Stalin who direct the party, 
who are largely underground ; there are the open party representatives 
like William Z. Foster, today, and Browder when I was there, and the 
like ; and then there are, of course, certain functionaries who for one 
reason or another, from time to time, become concealed. 

Now each one of these, at the time that they perform these different 
functions, have different responsibilities in regard to how much they 
will assert their Communist integrity. The great question that was 
always put in the Politburo and at State committee meetings, and I 
have attended a number of State committee meetings where this ques- 
tion came up for lesser people in the party, those people who were 
concerned, the question always w^as how far they could go in order 
that they could carry on their deceit of others, what scandal it will 
create in the party. 

According to the answer to that question were they granted a cer- 
tain immunity from being quite regular from the party line or party 
,reffulations. 



560 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Coxor. Mr. Budenz, therefore did you consider it excep- 
tional or extraordinary or unusual that Owen Lattimore was not 
known to you or seen by you during this period ? 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir ; that could be said of a number of other people, 
some of whom later on were divulged to be Communists. That would 
be true of Dr. Norman Bethune, a noted Canadian surgeon who also 
was very active in the Communist Party in the United States and for 
various reasons was not known to me. I ncA^er saw him. He was sup- 
posed always to be a non-Communist. He asserted strenuously, he 
was not a Communist, but after he died in China, helping the Chinese 
Eeds, Earl Browder announced at a public meeting that the wish of 
Bethune when he went to Cliina was that he be publicly acknowledged 
to be a member of the Communist Party for many years. 

Now Dr. Bethune was not known to me. I just mention him be- 
cause his case was rather outstanding. 

Senator O'Conor. All right, Mr. Morris, will you proceed then? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had gotten as far as Mr. Budenz' 
testimony on a certain press interview given by Mr. Owen Lattimore. 
I would like to introduce that into the record at this time. 

Mr. Mandel, wdll you identify this photostat you have just given me? 

Mr. Mandel. I have had this photostat made of the Daily Worker 
of September 5, 1945, page 8, of an article by Gwen Morgan entitled, 
" 'Allies Must JBreak Japanese Monopolists' Grip,' says Lattimore." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you recognize that article? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Were you editor of the Daily Worker when that was 
published ? 

Mr. Budenz. I was indeed ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Was that part of the Communist program to impose 
a hard peace on Japan ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. You will find that this is accom- 
panied in the Daily Worker by demands of a similar character though 
expressed sometimes in different language. Just at this time the cam- 
paign of the Communists was for a hard peace in Japan, and this 
hard peace was to be directed against the Zaibatzu. 

That is in accordance with Commuists calling other people Fascists 
or saying they are against monopoly and saying they are the only 
democratic elements. This campaign was to be carried on in that 
manner. 

As a matter of fact, I believe we shall see an interesting develop- 
ment of this in the effort to destroy anyone connected with the Govern- 
ment who opposed a hard peace for Japan. 

Mr. Morris. You mean people in our State Department? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. That was the Communist program,, 
but that would have to be developed further. 

Mr. Morris. Now is there any particular thing in that article that 
you would like to comment further on, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I think not. The article more or less speaks for itself 
and it accompanies the campaign of the Daily Worker, which upon 
investigation would have been found to be along the same line. The 
emphasis of both the Daily Worker and of Mr. Lattimore was that 
the democratic elements in Japan should be brought forward, but 
when you examine who the democratic elements in Japan were, Mr. 
Lattimore doesn't examine them except very superficially, and the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 561 

Daily Worker did, we will find tliem to be those represented by the 
Communists. 

The importance of this article so far as I am concerned and so far 
as my knowledge is concerned is this: (1) That it was quite in line 
with the headline reading, " 'Allies must break Japanese monopolists' 
grip which was what the Communists were driving for at that time; 
(2) that it was used so widely by the Communist Party to my own 
knowledge — that is, among non-Communist groups. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this photostat of the Daily Worker 
article, the Daily Worker of Wednesday, September 5, 1945, page 8, 
with the headline reading, " 'Allies must break Japanese monopolists' 
grip,' says Lattimore," I would like to have this introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O 'Conor. It will be admitted and will be given the next 
consecutive number. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 139 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 5, 1945] 

"Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolists' Grip" Says Lattimore 

(By Gwen Morgan) 

Baltimore, September 4 (UP). — Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang 
Kai-shek, said today tliat the Allies must free Japan of the "Zaibatsu's" grip 
before democracy can develop there. He declared tliat the Zaibatsu — or indus- 
trialists — merged completely vrith the militarists in controlling Japan for ag- 
gression and that the primary control always was civilian. 

"Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles 
which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, 
owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is — although now they are loudly 
disclaiming the militarists." 

Lattimore said in an interview at Johns Hopkins University, where he is 
director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, that pre- 
serving the Emperor and the Zaibatsu means preserving the "entire machinery 
that made Japan an aggressive country." 

The biggest misconception about Japan, he said, is that the interests of the 
industrialists, the militarists and the Emperor differ. 

"The only diffei'ence is th^t the civilians or industrialists are the go-slow 
crowd about aggression," he said. "The militarists are the go-fast. The Emperor 
belongs to both of them." 

The Emperor's holdings alone, he said, amount to thousands of shares in bank- 
ing, railroad, sugar, utilities, paper, and shipping companies, as well as hundreds 
of thousands of acres of land. 

Lattimore said breaking the stranglehold of the Zaibatsu would make possible 
the development of a "genuine spontaneous and thoroughly Japanese movement 
which would substitute for the Emperor a real republic." 

He declared that if this were permitted, supported, and encouraged by American 
policy it would take the form of middle-of-the-road democracy, and there would be 
no "danger" of communism. 

"The only danger of communism would arise if American policy were to choke 
off the development of democracy, leaving communism as the only alternative to 
reactionary Japanese forces supported by the victorious powers," he said. 

Lattimore said a democratic potential does exist in J'apan, composed of 
thousands of small, independent businessmen who were not brought completely 
under the Zaibatsu until the war period and now would like to regain their inde- 
pendence ; laborers who have been shorn of rights and poorly paid, and peasants 
whose cooperatives have been subject to monopoly control and who have been 
dominated by Inndlords, the most powerful of whom are related to the Zaibatsu 
and military families. 



562 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

monopolists' program 

Lattimore said the Zaibatsu were better prepared for defeat than the United 
States for victory. 

"They already have put their collaborationist team on the field to capitalize on 
the United States belief that the Emperor controls them while, in fact, they con- 
trol him," he said. 

He predicted this would be their line of action : 

1. To stimulate disorder and conflict in China. 

2. To work up antagonism between Russia and the other Allies. 

3. To be awfully good boys with the Americans and carry out their wishes. 
If any uprisings occur in the name of democracy, the Japanese authorities would 
run to the Allies and report it as subversive activity. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with a publication called the 
United Nations World, whose editor is Louis Dolivet ? 

Senator O'Connor. I note that it is dated Baltimore, September 4. 
Wliat is the year ? 

Mr. Morris. 1945. 

Senator O'Connor. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the United Nations World,, 
the editor of which in 1950 was Louis Dolivet? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What do you know of Louis Dolivet ? 

Mr. Budenz. Louis Dolivet was officially stated to me by Earl 
Browder to be a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with an article appearing in the 
United Nations 

Mr. Budenz. ]May I explain how that arose? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Budenz. It may take your time. 

Mr. Morris. That is all right. 

Mr. Budenz. There was a predecessor to this paper which was inde- 
pendent, we didn't have the United Nations. It was Free World or 
something like that. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Budenz. As chairman of the publications commission of the 
party I organized for the penetration of the Free World and even 
had arranged for a secretary to be in Louis Dolivet's office, which 
was a very common method of Communist 'penetration to get infor- 
mation. I first consulted because this was partially an international 
matter, I consulted Mr. Browder. He told me not to do this, that 
Mr. Dolivet was with us, that he had technically resigned in order 
to come to the United States, but that he was a Communist in good 
standing so far as the party was concerned. 

Mr. Morris. Tliat is the same Louis Dolivet who became editor of 
United Nations World ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is the same man. 

Mr. Morris. Now I have a copy of the United Nation World dated 
March 1950, the masthead of which shows that Louis Dolivet was 
the editor. On page 22 there is an article, Asia Reconquers Asia, 
by Owen Lattimore. I ask you if you have read that article, Mr. 
Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; I have. 

Mr. Morris. Would you comment on it for us, please? 

Mr. Budenz. This article carries out very skillfully the Asia for 
the Asiatics campaign of the Communists. Of course, this is after 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 563 

my being in tlie party, but it carries forward exactly what the idea 
was. 

Mii\ Morris. Yon learned what the Communist policy was from 
yonr experience in the Communist movement? 

JSIr. BuDENz. That is correct. It begins with this statement : 

It is clear that the change of power in China cannot properly be described as 
primarily a victory of Communist armies or of Communist ideas. The chief 
phenomenon has been the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Gov- 
ernment of China, whose "ability" to collapse greatly exceeded the ability of 
the Communists to push it over. 

Well, we could go forward, but there is another paragraph here that 
might be of some pertinence. 

The shift of power which took place in spite of a formidable American inter- 
vention and in the absence of any ponderable Russian intervention means that 
China for the first time for a hundred years is beyond the control of the most 
powerful of the western nations. . There are a number of reasons for believing 
that the power of control by intervention which has fallen from the hands of 
the west has not passed into the hands of Soviet Russia. It may well be that 
Russia also will not be able to "move in on" China and take over control within 
China. 

Well, Mr. Lattimore must certainly have been advised when he 
wrote that article of the many official declarations of the Chinese 
Communists not only of adherence to Stalin but of adoration of him. 
I have scores of such statements in my own library. To state that 
there was no Russian intervention in China and to picture the whole 
thing as just a revolt against the west is typically in line with the 
Communist position to those who were not Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us the date of that article, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. The dat.e is March 1950. 

Senator O'Conor. Will the hearing please be in order ? Mr. Morris, 
will you kindly resume? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you know Maxwell S. Stewart ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Was Maxwell S. Stewart a Communist to your knowl- 
edge ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Maxwell S. Stewart under circum- 
stances that would conclusively show to you that he was a member of 
the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe those circumstances to the commit- 
tee, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. It was in the early forties. The exact year I cannot 
remember as yet. The incident I remember very definitely. 

There was a confidential matter connected with the party that I 
had to consult Mr. Stewart about. I had an appointment at the Na- 
tion with him. I went to Mr. Browder to consult with him, as the 
leader of the party, as to whether I could talk to Maxwell S. Stewart, 
and in what capacity. 

Mr. Browder said, "You may speak to him as a Communist." So 
in the resultant conference, I disclosed to Mr. Stewart that I Iniew 
that he was under the same allegiance that I was. 

Mr. ]\IoRRTS. You did meet with Mr. Stewart ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes, in the office of the Nation. 



564 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. T\^iat was Mr. Stewart's position in the Nation at 
that time ? 

Mr. BuDENz. He was one of the editors, I believe. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any other reason to believe that Maxwell 
S. Stewart was a Communist ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Many reasons. 

Mr. Morris. Would you describe them, please, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Maxwell S. Stewart has been one of the most active 
members of the Communist fronts that exist in the United States. 
I cannot keep track of all of these Communist fronts. 

In connection with these Communist fronts, over and over again 
Maxwell Stewart was discussed by the leaders of the party with me 
as either an initiator or sponsor or one who could be relied upon 
to see that others joined these Communist fronts. 

In that connection, I learned repeatedly over the years from the 
early forties until I left the party in 1945, that Maxwell Stewart 
continued to be one of the reliables of the party — a phrase which 
was used in his regard by Mr. Browder. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you put something officially into 
the record to show that Mr. Stewa.rt was the editor of the IPE, Popu- 
lar Pamphlet series? 

Mr. Mandel. In the report entitled, "Windows on the Pacific, 
Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations," 
1944-46, page 11, we find this notation : 

In Miriam Farley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known 
Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet 
series. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that excerpt read by Mr. 
Mandel to appear in the record and that exhibit be marked the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted and so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 140 

[From Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Inc., 1944-46 (p. 11)] 

Maxwell S. Stewart 

In Miriam Farley's absence. Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known 
Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet 
series. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you take a sample pamphlet com- 
pletely written by Mr. Stewart and call it to the attention of the com- 
mittee, please? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a pamphlet entitled, "Wartime China." 

Mr. Morris. Will you listen to what is read here, Mr, Budenz ? We 
may ask for a characterization. 

Mr. Mandel. (reading) : 

By Maxwell S. Stewart. IPR Pamphlets No. 10. American Council, Institute 
of Pacific Relations. Published in 1944. 

I read from an excerpt on page 45. 

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel 
elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 565 

countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist move- 
ments that have figured in Araerit-an history. Because there is no other effective 
opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many 
pi'ogressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx 
or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists 
as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices." 

Mr. MoREis. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that whole excerpt 
apjDear in our record and that pamphlet be introduced by reference as 
part of the record. 

Senator O'Conok. It will be so introduced and marked. 

(The pamphlet referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141" and filed 
for the record. ) 

Mr. MoEEis. Mr. Budenz, have you any comment to make on that 
excerpt from Mr. Stewart's article ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. This appeared while I was very active in 
the Communist Party. This is good illustration of the carrying out 
of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League formula. 

This describes the Chinese Communists as the Populists. That is 
similar to the American Populist. It is a complete deceit on the 
American people because, at the same time, if I may be privileged to 
say so, Mr. Stewart and the Institute of Pacific Relations had at their 
disposal official statements by the Chinese Communists, such as they 
made in the opening of the Seventh Congress of the Connnunist In- 
ternational in 1935, that they were pledged to Soviet power through- 
out the world and to mounting the barricades in that pursuit. 

In other words, the Chinese Communists by their official declara- 
tions had thoroughly established in the Communist world their own 
character as adherents of Moscow and completely devoted to Marxism 
Leninism. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, that was a pamphlet written by Mr. 
Stewart. Do you have an example of one edited by Maxwell Stewart ? 

Mr. Mandel. We have a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," 
by Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart. 

Mr. Morris. Is Marguerite Ann Stewart the wife of Maxwell S. 
Stewart ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. This is published as a cooperative project 
between American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and 
the Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, and Los Angeles. 

I have selected some excerpts from that pamphlet to give the tone 
of the pamphlet. I now read a few of these excerpts. 

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most 
widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the 
troubled months of 1017 until, on November 7, they became the government. 

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for 
personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself 
conscientiously to the common good. An additional motive peculiar to the Rus- 
sian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice 
in running the factories. 

Mr. Morris. Just one more, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. In reference to the Soviet purges : 

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It 
regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them 
accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some 
cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated 
and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again ; in a few 
instances they were shot. 



566 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on 
that? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, if the Communist Party circulated that, it could 
not be better done as a Communist apologia. It is precisely what the 
Communists were saying. It is thoroughly a Communist point of 
view. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have such of the ex- 
cerpts as extracted by Mr. Mandel from the pamphlet, Land of the 
Soviets, written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell 
S. Stewart introduced into the record and marked as the next consecu- 
tive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted and so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit JS'o. 142 

Land of the Soviets 

(By Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart, cover by 

La Verne Riess) 

(A cooperative project between American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and 
Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, Los Angeles) 

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely 
at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled 
months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government (p. 3). 

* * * As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may 
be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is 
conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. * * * But, under a Socialist 
system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, 
they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not 
for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all 
the people. * * * And all industry— every single factory, office, bank, 
grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and newspaper^ — is 
the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by 
their organizations (p. 6). 

* * * Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be consiaered a rather typical Russian 
city worker. Blonde, rosy-cheeked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense 
of humor ; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself 
with his friends ; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices 
and machinery. * * * Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of 
the factory committee, elected by the workers to advise the director of the 
plant. Each day he and Anna took Sasha to the attractive nursery school main- 
tained by the factory for the children of its employees (p. 17). 

* * * Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale 
is the worker (p. 21). 

* * * But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display 
ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who 
devotes himself conscientiously to the comomn good. * * * An additional 
motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ow^nership of the Soviet 
workers. They have a voice in running the factories. * * * (P. 26. ) 

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete 
overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so 
different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a 
republic, for example, like that of the United States? (P. 27.) 

* * * On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red 
Guards were sent by the Soviets to siirround the Winter Palace and all the Gov- 
■irnment buildings in the name of the Socialist revolution. All the provisional 
ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who had managed to escape. * * * 
Thus, at one stroke, the i)easants attained the right to more than 500 million 
additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 567 

the church. Industry likewise was taken over as the property of the people 
(p. 37). 

Probably the greatest surprise of Hitler's life lay in the fact that the Russian 
peasants, particularly iu the Ukraine, did not hail his approach in 1941 as a 
signal to revolt against the Soviet Government. * * * (P. 53.) 

* * * The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and 
severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and pun- 
ished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. 
In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was 
confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again ; 
in a few instances they were shot. * * * (P. 60). 

* * * Communists are expected to be an example to others (p. 66). 

* * * Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting 
not unlike our New England town meeting. * * * city Soviets are also elected 
directly by the people (p. 68). 

* * * The 1936 constitution also introduced into the Soviet Union many 
of the elements of democracy as we know them in this country. It introduced 
the secret ballot (p. 69). 

Mr. BuDENz. Incidentally, I did not say that rashly. These phrases 
can be found almost in the same order in official Communist documents. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you know that Ben Kizer is a member 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe how you know that, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. I know this throujjh official information given me by 
Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the party in Washing- 
ton, Plenry Huff. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, at that point, if you do not mind, I think, 
for the same reason that the chairman commented today, it might 
be well at this juncture to identify Ben Kizer. 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. I would be glad to do it. He is a rather 
well known and, as a matter of fact, distinguished lawyer in the State 
of Washington and has quite a wide circle of acquaintances. 

He has been rather active on the Pacific coast advancing the Soviet 
idea of the Far East, that is, those Soviet ideas which could be put 
forth under a non-Communist cover. 

Mr. Kizer has been mentioned to me — I cannot give you exactly 
the occasions, but on a number of occasions — and in reports to the 
national committee on one or two occasions was praised by the district 
leader of the Communist Party in Washington. 

Mr. Morris. What was the name, Mr. Budenz, of the leader of the 
Communist Party in Washington ? 

Mr. Budenz. Henry Huff. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to show that Mr. 
Kizer is presently on the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letterhead, a 1951 letterhead of the Amer- 
ican Institute of Pacific Eelations, showing Benjamin H. Kizer as 
a member of the board of trustees. 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Chairman, I would like this letterhead identified 
by Mr. Mandel introduced into tlie record and marked as the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'CoNOR. It will be introduced and so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 143" and is as 
follows:) 



568 



mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



Exhibit No. 143 

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. 

new york 22, n. y. 



L. Carrington Goodrich 
John R, Hersey 
Joseph B. Johnson 
Benjamin H. Kizer 
Clayton Lane 
Owen Lattimore 
Herbert S. Little 
William W. Lockwood 
Charles F. Loomis 
James A. MacKay 
George C. Marshall 
Charles E. Martin 
Frank E. MidkifiE 
J. M or den Murphy 
William Phillips 
James H. Shoemaker 
Gregg M. Sinclair 
Paul C. Smith 
J. Wallace Sterling 
Donald B. Straus 
George E. Taylor 
Donald G. Tewksbury 
W. W. Waymack 
Sumner Welles 
Brayton Wilbur 
Herbert J. Wood 
Louise L. Wright 



Gerard Swoi^e, chairman 
Robert G. Sproul, vice chairman 
Heaton L. Wreun, vice chairman 
Clifford B. Marshall, treasurer 
William L. Holland, executive vice 

chairman 
Trustees : 

Edward W. Allen 

Raymond B. Allen 

J. Ballard Atherton 

Joseph W. Ballantine 

Knight Biggerstaff 

Hugh Borton 

H. Clifford Brown 

Lincoln C. Brownell 

Edward C. Carter 

Gordon R. Clapp 

Chas. F. Clise 

Arthur G. Coons 

George B. Cressey 

Walter F. Dillingham 

Brooks Emeny 

Rupert Emerson 

John K. Fairbank 

G. W. Fisher 

Richard E. Fuller 

Sidney D. Gamble 

Martha A. Gerbode 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any information on the activities on the 
part of Mr. Kizer ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify them and read them into the record, 
Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Miller Freeman, 
from Charles W. Eliot, Director of the Executive Office of the Presi- 
dent, National Eesources Planning Board, Washington, D. C. It is 
dated May 1, 1943. 

We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. 
Benjamin H. Kizer's, The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as 
reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeo- 
graphed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office 
of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agen- 
cies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have 
given their approval to general publication of the material with some modi- 
fication. 

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency 
and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the 
institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities 
and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to 
the Army for clearance. 
Sincerely yours, 

Charles W. Eliot, Director. 

This comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Then we have here a letter to Benjamin Kizer from Owen Lattimore, 
dated January 27, 1939, which is taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

I read parts of the letter. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 569 

I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your 
article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is 
one of the best statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen. 

Mr. Morris. Is this Mr. Lattimore writing? 
Mr. Mandel. This is Mr. Lattimore writing. 

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most 
shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time 
when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us know already — 
that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and 
disgusted with the Spanish embargo — nothing has been done about it, and 
Barcelona has been allowed to fall. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment on that, Mr. Buclenz, to 
the extent that you heard it read ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. No, except that it followed the Communist position 
at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two letters 
introduced into the record and marked as consecutive exhibits. 

Senator O'Conor. The Chair has brought up the question because 
of our possible doubt as to the propriety of introducing a letter dated 
May 1 from one Charles W. Eliot to Mr. Miller Freeman. 

Mr. Morris, would you indicate why you think it is relevant? 

Mr. Morris. The purpose of introducing that letter was to show 
that Benjamin H. Kizer's book, The Northern Pacific International 
Planning Project, was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
and that it was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Wash- 
ington and by the United States Army. It is being introduced simply 
for those two facts, without any implication whatsoever with respect 
to the addressee or the sender. 

Senator O'Conor. Yes. With regard to those two niatters, it also 
is not indicated whether it was reproduced with or without the au- 
thorization — I do think if it is introduced for that limited purpose, 
without there being any inference upon the sender or the addressee, it 
would be permissible. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. When Senator McCarran had the chair, 
he issued a caveat at one time that these letters being introduced carry 
no implication broader than the mere fact of the letters themselves. 
There is no implication by the mere association of either the ad- 
dressee or the people mentioned in the body, or the senders of the 
letters. , 

Senator Smith. Was this found in the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel testified that it was extracted from the 
files. 

Senator O'Conor. Senator Smith, I had no difficulty about it being 
applicable to the IPR. I did think it might have some unfortunate 
connotations in regard to the sender or the addressee. But with the 
stipulation that has been made 

Senator Smith. The question occurred to me whether or not it 
was reproduced by or with the consent and the approval of any of 
these men. I do not know. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, on that point, the letter says it was repro- 
duced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that letter was in the 
files of the institute. It was for that purpose that we are showing 
Mr. Kizer's association with the institute. 



570 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Smith. That is the only purpose of it? 
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

Senator O'Conor. With that limited purpose, it will be admitted. 
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 144 and 
145" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 144 

Executive Office of the President, 
National Resources Planning Boaed, 

Washmffton, D. C, May 1, 1943. 
Mr. Miller Freeman, 

7i Columbia Street, Seattle, Wash. 
Dear Mr. Freeman : We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 
inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's The Northern Pacific International 
Planning Project, as reprodiTced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because 
this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was 
being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States 
Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and 
related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the mate- 
rial with some modification. 

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency 
and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the 
institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities 
and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and 
to the Army for clearance. 



Sincerely yours, 



Charles W. Eliot, Director. 



Exhibit No. 14.5 

Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, Md., January 27, 1939. 
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, 

Old National Bank Buildinff, 

Spokane, Wash. 

Dear Mr. Kizeb : I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance 
copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, 
I think. It is one of the most statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that 
I have seen. 

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking 
things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the 
Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us knew already — that the 
majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted 
with the Spanish embargo — nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has 
been allowed to fall. Is this purely inertia? Is it just a lag between the forming 
of the popular will and the expression of that will through political action by 
the Government? Not just that, I am afraid. The effect of the natural inertia 
or lag has been very much aggravated by the lobbying and string-pulling of 
those who "view with alarm" just that very thing — the expression of the popular 
will. 

Are we going to be as far behind the run of the play in Asia as we have in 
Europe? Maybe we have a slight edge, because, as you have pointed out, the 
key to the %vhole situation is the fact that Japan is the angle of the Fascist 
triangle. The Japanese don't need to be defeated outright. If they are just 
properly stalled, it will nullify the gain in Europe made by Italy and Germany. 

We have just met here your friends, the Hazelton Spensers, and are enjoying 
them very much. I had dinner there the other night with Archibald MacLeish. 
He has been giving a series of lectures here on modern poetry. Very brilliant, 
and some penetrating analyses. I think he is dead right in saying that in our 
times, the atmosphere of our generation, the genuinely poetic mood is bound to 
be political. 

With warm regards from both my wife and myself. 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 571 

Mr. Mandel. I have a list of positions held in the IPR by Mr. Ben- 
jamin H. Kizer, as taken from the official publication of the IPR, 
which I wish to place in the record. 

The positions include vice chairman, American Council, IPR ; mem- 
ber of the international secretariat, and other positions. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the rec- 
ord Mr. MandeFs compilation of the positions held by Mr. Benjamin 
H. Kizer in its entirety in the record and have it marked as the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. IMr. Budenz, there is no doubt that this is the 
individual to whom you refer? It gives his address as "Attorney, 
Spokane, Wash." 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be introduced. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 146" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 146 
Benjamin H. Kizer 

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936), member of the law firm of Graves, Kizer & 
Graves ; Cliairman, Region No. 9, National Resources Planning Board ; associate 
member of the War Labor Board ; vice chairman, American Council, IPR (p. 160). 

Source : War and Peace in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the eighth con- 
ference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation 
of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 
December 4-14, 1942; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1943. 

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936, 1942), lawyer (Graves, Kizer & Graves), 
Spokane, Wash. ; trustee, American IPR ; associate public member. National War 
Labor Board, 1943-45; Director, China Office, UNRRA, 1945-46 (p. 120). 

Source : Problems of Economic Reconstruction in the Far East, tenth confer- 
ence of the IPR, Stratford-on-Avon, England, September 5-20, 1947 ; international 
secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1949. 

B. H. Kizer, attorney, Spokane, Wash. (p. 456). 

Source : Problems of the Pacific, 1933, economic conflict and control proceed- 
ings of the fifth conference of the IPR, Banff, Alberta, Canada, August 14-26, 
1933 ; edited by Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 111. ; published June 1934. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter on the letterhead of Benjamin 
fl. Kizer, dated August 23, 1937, and addressed to Frederick V. Field 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to read the letter. 
[Reading :] 

Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making 
history of the sort that we have coiue to regard as inevitable, no matter how 
evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to reread, in the quiet of Sunday 
afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy,'' reprinted 
from The Annals. 

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight 
into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a character- 
istic sentence of Judge Holmes : "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article 
has that "final gift"' in its best form. 

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where 
the rest of us who recently contributed in Amerasia left off and give us a 
relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable conse- 
quences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, 
the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blind- 
folded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human 
happiness and human destiny. 

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear yovi on the neutrality 
topic at Victoria next month. 

Yours faithfully, 

B. H. Kizer. 



572 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budeiiz, this letter was written on August 23, 1937. 
At that time did you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of 
the Communist Party? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. I had not yet met him, but I knew from 
official statements that he was a member. 

Mr. Morris. Your earlier testimony was that you attended a meet- 
ing with him in 1937. 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. That was approximately in October. 

Mr. Morris. I see. This was in October. Do you think it is pos- 
sible that Mr. Field could have assumed such an important position 
in the Communist Party in the ensuing 2 months ? 

Mr. BuDENz. No. He had come to my attention before as a Com- 
munist. 

Mr. Morris. So, at the time Mr. Kizer wrote this letter praising 
Mr. Field's writing on the Far East, you know that Frederick V. 
Field was a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. I had not met him, however, until 
approximately October, as far as I recall. I may have met him 
earlier. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be introduced and marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 147" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 147 

Spokane, Wash., August 23, 1937. 
Mr. Frederick V. Fiet.d, 

Arrierican Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
129 East Fifti/second Street, New York City. 
My Dear Fred : Now that dramatic and bloody events in tlie Far East 
are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as 
inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to re- 
read, in the qniet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American 
Foreign Policy," reprinted from The Annals. 

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight 
into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a character- 
istic sentence of Judge Holmes : "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your 
article has that "final gift" in its best form. 

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where 
the rest of us who recently contributed to Amerasia left off and give us a rela- 
tively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. 
It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world 
is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by 
their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness 
and human destiny. 

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality 
topic at Victoria next month. 
Yours faithfully, 

B. H. Kizer. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter on the letterhead of the National 
Resources Planning Board, field office, Portland, Oreg. It is dated 
December 1, 1942. It is addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, and 
it is signed by George Sundborg, senior planning technician, region X. 

Dear Mr. Lockwood : We have just received from the Military Intelligence 
Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your 
American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 573 

on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont 
Tremblaut. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army. 
Can yon take care of this request? The address is : 
North American Group, 
Military Intelligence Service, 
War Department, 
Washington, D. C. 
Attention : Lt. J. S. Culbertson. 
Sincerely yours, 

, George Sundborg, 

Senior Planning Technician, Region X. 

Mr. Morris. The purpose for introducing this letter into the record 
is to show that Mr. Kizer's papers were being distributed and taken 
up by the x\rmy Intelligence on December 1, 1941. With that limited 
purpose, I introduce this letter into the record and ask that it be 
marked the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. Are we to understand that it was found in the 
records of IPR? 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Mandel did so testify. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be then introduced at this time for that 
limited purpose. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 148" and 
is as follows :) 

KxHiBiT No. 148 

National Resources Planning Board, 

Field Office, 
Portland, Oreg., December 1, 1942. 
Mr. W. W. LocKWooD, 

Secretary, American Council, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 'New York, N. Y. 
Dear Mr. Lockwood: We have just received from the Military Intelligence 
Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your 
American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper on 
the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. 
The copies are needed for distribution within the Army. 
Can you take care of this request? The address is: 
North American Group, 
Military Intelligence Service, 
War Department, 
Washington, D. C. 
Attention : Lt. J. S. Culbertson. 
Sincerely yours, 

George Sundborg, 
Senior Planning Technician, Region X. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

"C. L. from E. C. C." "C. L." may be Corliss Lamont, and 
"E. C. C." may be E. C. Carter. 

The letter reads as follows : 

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has heen one of 
our stanchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes pro- 
foundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It 
will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide 
to go to the Northwest, you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane 
and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occa- 
sioned by this letter which I wish you would return. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

22848— 52— pt. 2 15 



574 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Conor. It will be so introduced. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 149" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 149 

[HandAvritten note:] 

R. D. 0. : Please note for me. 

E. C. C. : Thanks, and double congratulations for footnote in both [unintelli- 
gible] — L. 

NovembSr 5, 1948. 
C. L. from E. C. C. 

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one 
of our stanchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes 
profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. 
It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide 
to go to the Northwest you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane 
and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occa- 
sioned by this letter which I wish .you would return. 

[Handwritten] R. D. C. : Has E. C. C. asked Mayer for his India letters? 
P. E. L. might find them a useful suggestion lor FES articles. — K. R. C. P. 

[Handwritten] I'd also like to see them. — W. L. H. 

Mr. Morris. One reason for mentioning this is to show that Ben 
Kizer was for many years associated with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations as a board member. It is also introduced for the other 
comments contained therein. 

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter dated November 2, 1948. It is from 
Benjamin H. Kizer to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It was taken from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Dear Ned : Responsive to your, good letter of the 29th instant, I have con- 
cluded, for this year only, to add $100 to my contribution, and make it $150. 
This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally 
heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can 
in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for 
the generous, self -abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life 
in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all. 

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating 
pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind 
me before remitting. 

With friendliest greetings, as always, 
Yours faithfully, 

Benjamin H. Kizer. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted, 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 150 

Spokane, November 2, 19'f8. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y. 
Dear Ned : Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, 
for this year only, to add $100 to my contribution, and make it $150. This, in 
spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. 
I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. 
I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self- 
abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of 
international relations, now of primary importance to us all. 

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating 
pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind 
me before remitting. 

With friendliest greetings, as always, 
Yours faithfully, 

Benjamin H. Kizeb. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 575 

P, S. — I have a letter from Arthur Mayer that indicates that he has returned 
from his trip to India. His office has sent out mimeographed letters to a circle 
of friends, covering his India experiences. Do ask him for a set of them. You 
will find them richly rewarding. 

B. H. K. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a small note dated August 16, 1942, which 
is headed "W. W. L. from R. W. B." 

We presume "W. W. L." to be William William Lockwood, and 
"R. W. B." to be Robert W. Barnett. 

The letter reads as follows. This is also taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations : 

W. W. L. from R. W. B. 

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting and very sound. I don't 
see Julean Arnold maneuvering ijublic opinion and congressional pressure 
groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. 
Lattimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be 
desirable for Schwellenbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have 
Arnold and Walsh et al. attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you 
about this. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry. 

Senator O 'Conor. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. For whom did you say the initials "R. W. B." 
stood i 

Mr. Mandel. Robert Warren Barnett. The initials "W. W. L." 
stood for William W. Lockwood. 

Senator Smith. What is the basis for your assumption ? 

Mr. Mandel. We have numerous correspondence with those initials 
and those names. 

Senator Smith. The reason I ask this, Mr. Chairman, I do know 
this gentleman Barnett. I know he went to school in my State, our 
State university. About 40 or 45 years ago, I knew his father. I 
was interested when you called out his name. 

Mr. Mandel. He is the secretary of the Washington IPR and there 
is a great deal of correspondence from him with his name written out. 

Senator Smith. There is no question about his identity ? 

Mr. Mandel. No. 

Senator Smith. If there was any question, I wanted to raise the 
propriety of introducing something that carried an assumption. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The situation is this, Mr. Senator. These particu- 
lar initials are found with great frequency in the hies. 

The gentleman concerning whom Mr. Mandel said the initials pre- 
sumably referred to is the only person with those initials who we 
know is closely connected with the institute. He was connected, as 
Mr. Mandel testified. 

Senator Smith. I did not know. 

Senator O'Conor. I might ask Mr. Malidel if he can give us assur- 
ance that as of tliis time, August 16, 1942, or at or about that time, 
those parties w^ere so connected. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. This morning, was there not another name men- 
tioned — Robert Somebody ? Who was that mentioned this morning ? 

Mr. Mandel. Nobody else. 

Senator Smith. There was something said about a Robert Some- 
body this morning. I do not recall now. I just wanted to be sure. 

Mr. Morris. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman, on that? 



576 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Conor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I notice from my perusal of the files in the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, the people did not make any reference by initials 
only to staff members; that is, by their own staff members, and in 
their own offices. Robert Barnett is the only staff member or officer 
who does have those initials. 

Senator Smith. I did not know whether he was a member or not. 

I was just trying to be guarded lest we miglit attach some implica- 
tion to some initials here that is not warranted. What you say puts 
a different light on the subject. 

Mr. Morris. I, myself, understand that Mr. Robert W. Barnett was 
the secretary of the Washington, D. C, chapter of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 

Senator Smith. That is something I had not heard of before. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced into the record. 

Mr. Mandel. The next exhibit is that of a photostat of a round- 
table proceedings of August 26, 1936; obviously connected with the 
Yosemite IPR Conference which occurred at that time. 

This give the comments of the various participants. I want to read 
only the comments of Kizer, who is listed here as representing the 
United States : 

We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dafoe that between 1922 
and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a 
fundamental alteration in the balance in tlie Pacific. 

We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more 
or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of 
date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political ques- 
tions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific 
power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the 
same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations 
emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution 
to the settlement of problems around the Pacific. 

We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation 
trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export 
goods or labor and so disturb other economies. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Morris, before going into that, if we can go 
back for just a brief moment to the previous exhibit, which is a note 
from W. W. L. to R. W. B. 

A reference is made to one Julean Arnold. Is there any further 
information that bears on that individual that might indicate or 
identify him ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce that excerpt from the 
Department of State? 

Mr. Mandel. This is taken from the Register of the Department 
of State. It is dated April 1, 1050. 

Julean Arnold, Jr., is listed here. I will just read his last position 
in the Department of State. ' "P-4, May 3, 1946, as % country special- 
ist." This is his full biographical record. 

Senator O'Conor. This register, 1 note, is as of April 1, 1950. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Reference to him is purely incidental. There is no 
implication in any way. 

Senator O'Conor. I wanted to be certain that he was identified so 
that it would not reflect on anyone else. 

All rio-ht. That will be introduced. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 577 

(The first document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 151" and 
is as follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 151 

August 16, 1942. 
W. W. L. from R. W. B. 

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting ; and very sound. I don't 
see Juleau Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups 
with the finesse leiiuired. He is essentially sentimental about China. Lat- 
timore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable 
for Schwelleubach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold 
and Walsh et al attach themselves to liim? I would like to talk to you about 
this. 



Arnold, Julean, Jr. — b. Hankow, China, of Am. parents Oct. 8, 1914; Shanghai 
Am. Sch, grad. ; Pomona Coll., B. A. 1936 ; Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, 
A. M. 1938 ; cml. agt., Bu. of For. and Dom. Com., 1939-41 ; U. S. Army 1941-46, 
It. col.; app. country specialist, P-4, in the Dept. of State May 3, 1946; P-5 Feb, 
9, 1947; GS-12 Oct. 30, 1949; married. (Register of the Department of State, 
April 1, 1950, p. 18.) 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that the last exhibit read 
by Mr. Mandel be introduced into the record and marked as the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 152" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 152 

Round Table C. August 26, 1936 

(Recorder, C. B. Fahs) 

(Chairman (Motylev) opened discussion on the first three questions of sub- 
topic A in the agenda.) 

KizEB (United States). We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. 
Dafoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers 
Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the 
Pacific. We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now 
more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out 
of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political 
questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific 
power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the 
same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations 
emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution 
to the settlement of problems around the Pacific. We should study the possibility 
of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal 
problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other 
economies. 

ScHiLLiNGLAW (United States) . To what extent does Mr. Kizer imply isolation? 

Kizer. Not in least. The policy of voluntary association will develop 
better when the nations adjust their internal stresses so that the question of 
cooperation with other nations is really a voluntary one. 

Motylev. We should pay attention to military as well as political questions. 
For example, the problem of navies and the denunciation of the Washington 
Treaty. Also changes in the economic strength of various nations and their 
political effects. 

Relshaw (New Zealand). It seems that the emphasis of question (3) is on* 
maladjustment but behind that problem is the actual increase in economic power, 
e.g., of Japan and the U.S.S.R. Japan's increase in armaments is both motivated 
by and made possible by her increasing economic strength. On the other hand 
the preoccupation of the T'nited States and Great Britain with dom<>stic prob- 
lems has made more difilcult the maintenance of a positive interest in the 
Far East and so removed an obstacle to Japanese expansion. The question 



578 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

involves the possibilities of agreement between the great powers as to what 
policy should be in the east. I have an idea that agreement between two parties 
is easier when they are approximately equal in strength. When- there is a wide 
disparity in strength the possibility of agreement is less. In the east it is now 
virtually impossible for the United States or Great Britain to take effective 
action and therefore it is much more difficult to agree on policy. Changes in 
relative power are also influenced by the political situation in Europe. In 
Australia and New Zealand there is a growing feeling that we can no longer 
rely on defense by the British Navy. Therefore there is an emphasis on internal 
defense, e.g., by development of air force. The fear is not of occupation but of 
the changing balance. I should like to see a discussion of the increase in pro- 
ductive capacity and the resulting maladjustment. 

Takahashi (translated by Nagakura). The greatest factor in the change of 
economic conditions is that the principle of freedom of trade has been wiped out. 
This is the fundamental reason for various disputes of a political nature. 

Hamano. Re Takahashi's statement I should like to add that recent changes 
must be traced back to the World War which caused a great price rise and a 
reduction of exports from England. As a result far eastern countries became 
more or less self-sufficient. India which before the war imported three-fourths 
of its cotton piece goods now only imports one tenth or one fifth. This tendency 
was accentuated by the depression of 1929 — also a result of the war — which 
decreased the price and market for the agricultural products of the east (and 
so reduced the exchange resources available for imports). We must consider 
the internal production changes in each country. Takahashi says free trade 
was forbidden but why? The cause is the self-sufficient tendency growing out 
of the high prices of the World War. 

Hopper. (United Spates). Question 1 implies a shift of power in the east, the 
decline of western states and the increase of the U. S. S. R. and Japan. Could 
we not list the changes meant in order to avoid confusion? 

Lattimore (United States). If we are to discuss changes in the distribution of 
power we must get common idea of the nature of power. The present period may 
be considered the period of breakdown of AVashington treaties. The treaties 
were surely the expression of a sigh of relief of the countries dominant after the 
war who thought they could establish a stal)le state of affairs in the Pacific. 
The great omission of the Washington treaties was the Soviet Union. No one 
foresaw the rapid rise of the Soviet Union and the vindication of its principles. 
I said sometime ago that the shift in balance of power in the Far East was from 
a maritime to a land basis. Soviet critics challenged me, prophesying that .Japan 
would demand a larger rather than a smaller navy in connection with its land 
expansion. They were right and I wrong. It is not simply a geographical ques- 
tion of distribution of land and sea power. The rise of the Soviet Union has 
vindicated the efficiency in practice of an economic system quite different from 
that of the other powers. We must he very careful when speaking of nations and 
national policies. Motive powers are frequently interests not nations themselves. 
The question implies a change in the nature of power and a challenge to the 
western system of a new system challenging it in efficiency. The tendency of 
China in the past was to gravitate to the stronger power and to adopt capitalism. 
The rise of the U. S. S. R. not only changed the balance but raised the question 
of relative efficiency and China now shows a conflict of tendencies — half to 
the west, half to the U. S. S. R. This influence of the Soviet Union must not be 
confused with propaganda. 

KizER. Has not Lattimore too easily given up his point that the center of 
gravity was bound to shift from sea to land? Was not the denunciation of the 
Washington treaty by Japan part of its program to establish power on the 
continent? 

LATTiMorxE. I still think the theory is sound as far as it goes but it does 
not go far enough. Must also consider balance of efficiencies between social 
and economic systems. 

MoTYLEv. The discussion has brought us to the question of navies. What is 
the economic and political significance of the denunciation of the Wahs. fsic^ 
•naval treaty? What are the prospects of a naval race? 

Rose (Great Britain). Suggest invite Admiral Taylor who is a naval expert. 

MoTYLEv. All right but question not only a military one. Has economic and 
political significance as well. 

Van Mook. The question especially concerns countries in the tropical sphere 
of the Pacific. As China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. have developed economic 
stability they have developed a certain amount of self-sufficiency which has 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONiS 579 

decreased foreign trade. As Motylev has pointed out the 5-year plan was In- 
tended to supply the home market. Japan has also sought to develop markets 
and sources of material within her control. Nevertheless there have been 
increased Japanese exports to the Dutch East Indies. If this were not balanced 
by Dutch East Indies trade to the United States we would have the contradiction 
of Asiatic countries forcing exports to be limiting exports from the Dutch East 
Indies. 

Another consideration is that if the United States should withdraw from the 
Pacific the Philippine Islands would enter this unhappy family of nations and 
conditions would be worse than now. The policy of self-sufficiency can be 
followed by countries of great area and economic resources but is difficult for 
small countries with limited resources. As long as economic nationalism pre- 
dominates it tends to dislocate trade in the less favored countries. 

Motylev. Called on Admiral Taylor for a statement on the naval issue and 
on the influence of the development of air forces. 

Taylor (Great Dritaiu). Air power may have important effects in certain 
limited regions but not on the general question of sea power in the Pacific 
because of the great distances concerned. Aircraft are an important auxiliary 
to naval forces but their influence by themselves on sea power is slight. They 
cannot carry stores or troops in large quantities. If these are carried by ships 
they must be defended by ships except perhaps at the terminals. 

In regard to sea pov>^er. In our estimate the settlement at Washington of 
naval ration plus status quo agreements gave everyone a fair degree of security. 
It gave Japan a greater degree of security than the British Empire can ever 
possess. 

Hopper. Asked Taylor whether view should not be directed to broad Pacific 
area. Wasn't it shown in the Mediterranean that the air force dictated settle- 
ment? Could this not be applied to the China coast? 

TAYI.OR. I was in the Mediteranean and did not think air power a deciding 
factor. Of course there are certain areas where air power will have to vei'y 
great effect but in the Pacific the distances are too great. Hongkong to Japan 
is 1,500 miles. It is possible but not a "military operation." It would be pos- 
sible for purposes of frightfulness but that is ineffective policy. 

Hopper. The distances in the north are less. Vladivostok to Tokyo is only 
700 miles. 

Taylor. The distance is still very great. 

ScHiLLiNGLAw. What Will be the effect of denunciation of the treaties on 
policies and strengths in the next few years. 

Tayt.or. General answer impossible. Depends on circumstances in Pacific 
and elsewhere. We all hope that although Japan has not signed she will not 
depart from the 1936 agreements to such an extent as to cause any other power 
to have to increase armaments beyond the present ratios and that there wiU 
be no need for change re agreement armaments status quo in the Pacific. 

Wright (Great Britain). Do the Japanese agree that the Washington treaties 
give Japan a greater measure of security. 

Tamura (Japan). The reason for denunciation was the desire on the Japanese 
Government to recover autonomy of national defense. The 5-5-3 ratio was ac- 
cepted reluctantly by the Japanese people and led to many tragedies, such as 
the assassination of the Premier. We do not intend to have the same strength 
as Great Britain and the United States, but psychologically want equality of 
status. It is a question of national pride. Japan is satisfied with the release 
from the restrictions of the treaty and has no intention to increase naval power 
and engage in a naval race with United States or Great Britain. 

Wright. Does this mean that Japan would be opposed to a collective system or 
to all-around disarmament? 

Tamura. That is another question. For 15 years Japan was a loyal member 
of the League of Nations. Difficulty was that Japan's two great neighbors, the 
United States and U. S. S. R., were not members. For example, in the case of the 
North Manchuria Railway dispute of 1929 between the U. S. S. R. and China, 
when hostilities broke out, Japan cooperated with the United States in refusing 
to interfere along with other League powers. Another difficulty in collective 
agreements is that the rise of Russia has changed the conditions under which 
the so-called Nine-Power Treaty was signed. The U. S. S. R. is not a party. 
The treaty guarantees the integrity of China, but Outer Mongolia would seem 
not to be a territory of China. 

China's territorial integrity has been violated by a nonsigner of the Nine- 
Power Treaty. A great power nonparty to the treaty has penetrated Outer 



580 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mongolia and Outer Mongolia has been alienated from China. This is a serious 
problenj to us, because we are direct neighbors. The United States and Great 
Britain are far off, interested only in trade and not concerned, but for Japan it 
becomes a question of self-defense. 

MoTYLEv. Is the Nine-Power Treaty still recognized or not? 

Tamura. Of course. 

Dafoe. The unofficial opinion in the United States seems to be that it has 
lapsed. 

ScHiLLiNGLAW. The Statements of Secretary Stimson and Hull indicate that it 
is still effective. 

Van Mook. Would the accession of the U. S. S. R. to the Nine-Power Treaty 
change the view of Japan? 

Tamura. I cannot answer. Would the U. S. S. R. join the treaty? 

MoTYLEV. That is a conditional question, and I need not answer. Can we turn 
to the question of the influence of reconstruction in China on the changing 
balance of power? 

Lee (China). A full answer is impossible. Reconstruction in China exercises 
a stabilizing influence on peace in the Far East, provided that it does not induce 
aggression on part of other powers. Reconstruction efforts have centered on 
the development of unity — for example, through road building, a nation-wide 
radio network, and so forth — and this unity should be a stabilizing influence. 

Hamano. Recently American air companies have extended lines in the 
interior of China. Are these paying lines or not? 

Lee. Are Japanese airlines paying? Most airlines are not. In any case the 
control of these lines is solely in Chinese hands. 

Hopper. The United States has taken no action in regard to the Nine-Power 
Treaty, but I believe it is the opinion of the State Department that the three 
Washington agreements fall together. 

Dafoe. It is a nice question of international law. 

MoTYLEV. The problem of the balance of power requires attention to tendencies 
of development. From this viewpoint, it is much more complicated. It is neces- 
sary to pay attention to the real economic strength and the strength of the social 
order, tq the influence of real economic possibilities on future development, to 
possible American naval and air expansion, and to the significance to the Pacific 
of the European balance of power. We cannot hope to answer the whole question, 
because the round-table is more or less limited to questions of economies and 
access to raw materials. But clarification requires understanding not only of 
facts but also of tendencies. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment on that exhibit, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. The date is important. Yes; I do. This follows 
exactly the line laid down by Eisler: that the Pacific Ocean was to 
become a Soviet lake. 

It is well known through the Communist Party. It is in line with 
the agreement with the Commimist Parties of China, the Philippines, 
the United States, and Japan — under the guidance of Moscow — to get 
American "imperialism" out of the Pacific, because they declared that 
America is powerless in the Pacific and should turn to its own internal 
development. 

Mr. Morris. That is your interpretation of the article to the extent 
that you heard it? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. Insofar as you would express it in 
non-Communist expressions. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Budenz, 

Mr. Chairman, the next name we have on the list here is a person who 
is now dead. Again, as the chairman has counseled at the outset, we do 
not introduce this name to introduce evidence about that particular 
person. 

Our interest is his associations in the past with people now living. 
It is for that purpose that we introduce the following evidence on 
Evans F. Carlson. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 581 

Mr. Budenz, do you know that lie was a member of the Communist 
Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. General Carlson was a member of the Com- 
munist Party. 

]\Ir. Morris. Did you meet him, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I met him on one occasion in the middle forties. 

Mr. Morris. Were his Communist activities extensive ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. He has been a Communist for a long time 
according to the official reports made in the Politbureau and to me. 
1 met him at Fred Field's house. He was not a general then. I think 
at that time he was for the moment retired. But he returned to the 
Army again. 

I saw him for only a moment because I had to go back to the Daily 
Worker. I met him along with Marian Bachrach. 

Mr. Morris. Along with official party circumstances ? 

Mr. Budenz. It would have been a party meeting. Then, again, 
General Carlson was very widely discussed just before I left the party 
as the man who would lead the movement for a Red China in the 
United States. 

Mr. Morris. Was he — I am sorry. 

Mr. Budenz. That developed later in the organization, I understand. 
This was being discussed very definitely. His consent had already 
been received according to statements in the Politbureau when I left 
the party. 

Mr. Morris. What organization did that become ? 

Mr. Budenz. I just cannot recall its name. If you can recall it to 
my- 



Mr. Morris. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. While you were in the party, you heard that organiza- 
tion being formed? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Morris. And you heard that Evans Carlson was to be the head 
of that organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct, 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read from the 

Senator O'Conor. Can you amplify, or give us any further infor- 
mation as to its objective or purpose other than that which you have 
given in such a general way ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. This organization was to be a new organi- 
zation which would declare that the United States would completely 
withdraw any interest in China and should allow the Chinese Com- 
munists to develop their activities there. 

Of course, it had many ramifications; but that was the general 
idea : Within the United States to drive for the United States' aban- 
doning Nationalist China completely. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do you know if you have a listing that 
that organization is listed as a subversive organization by the Attor- 
ney General? 

Mr. Mandel. It was cited as a subversive organization by the 
Attorney General — Attorney General Tom Clark on April 27, 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you say the name was ? 

Mr. Mandel. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. 

Mr. Morris. You have no doubt that Carlson was a member of the 
Communist Party ? 



582 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. No, sir. That was brought to my official attention 
on many occasions and over a number of years. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce or read the exhibits 
showing Evans Carlson's association with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. I wish to introduce a list of books and articles offi- 
cially published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions and written by Evans Fordyce Carlson. 

Quoting from his book, if I may, an authorized biography of Evans 
F. Carlson, entitled "The Big Yankee." I read from page 257, a letter 
from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Jolmson in 
answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Com- 
munists : 

Their political doctrines are representative democracy ; their economic doc- 
trines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they 
Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * 
They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, would you recognize that as Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. I also would recognize the author of General 
Carlson's biography as a Communist — Michael Blankf ort. He is well 
known to myself as a Communist. He had many consultations with 
me as such. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, were you going to read the list of books 
written by Evans Carlson and put out by the IPR ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. Author of The Chinese Army. Author of 
Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War, Far Eastern Survey, May 19, 
1941, page 99. Author of The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan, 
Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 279-284, and the writer of Letters Regard- 
ing the Guerrilla War in China, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 
183-184. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that excerpt made 
by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record in its entirety and marked 
as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator 0"Conor. It will be so introduced and marked by the 
reporter. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 153 

Evans Fordtce Carlson 

Author of The Chinese Army — Its Origin and Military EflBciency, published 
by the international secretariat. Institute of Pacific Relations ; publications oflSce, 
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, 1940. 

Author of Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War, far-eastern survey, May 19, 
1941, page 99. 

Author of The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 
278-284. 

Quoting from The Big Yankee, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, 
written by Michael Blankf ort (Little, Bxown & Co., 1947), page 257, a letter 
from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to 
the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists : "Their political 
doctrines are representative democracy ; their economic doctrines are the co- 
operative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for 
they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want 
democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest." 

Writer of Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China, in Pacific Affairs, 
June 1939, pages 183-184. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 583 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any letters showing Carlson's activities 
within the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Manclel ? 

Mr. Mandel. We have here several letters from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

One is dated March 27, 1939, which is a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. 
Carter, from Owen Lattimore. I will read the letter : 

Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known 
about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him 
not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable 
view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving 
full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a 
potent elfect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak 
out, he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being 
disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has 
the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence 
to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east, I have no recent impressions 
by which to gage his possible usefulness as a "friend of China." 

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall 
write you again. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimoke. 

Mr. Morris. Is that "Friend of China," in quotes, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator O'Conor. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. I was just wondering why the words "Friend 
of China" were in quotes. Would that mean anything? 

Mr. BuDENz. Where? 

Senator Ferguson. Right at the bottom of the letter there. 

Mr. Budenz. It in itself does not mean anything. No, I would 
not put any particular interpretation on it, except, of course, for one 
who had Mr. Lattimore's allegiance as a "Friend of China" and 

Mr. Morris. Was that the same allegiance that Evans Carlson 
had? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any other comments to make on that 
incident, Mr. Budenz? Did you hear about that within the Com- 
munist Party — the resignation of Carlson? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell what you recall about it? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, in reference to his resignation, I know it was 
partly due to the fact that he had such a strong feeling for the Chinese 
Communists, that he felt he could serve better by being outside the 
Army, where he could express his opinion. 

He had come into contact with them, and had formed a very strong 
alliance with them, or, at least, a friendship with them, and wished 
to speak out on the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that letter indicate to you that Mr. Latti- 
more thought it would be better for him as a "Friend of China" to 
remain in the services and act in the services rather than quit and 
go out ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, most decidedly. That was the way the advice 
was given to Carlson. I was not there. I was not present. That was 
the advice the party gave to General Carlson, and he used the first 
opportunity to take advantage of it when the war came along. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his rank; do you know? 



584 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENZ. He was a colonel most of the time. My understanding 
is tliey made him a general. I do not know the exact specifications. 

We referred to him as colonel Carlson, but he has been referred to 
in recent years as general. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the same man ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Oh, yes. It is the same man. 

Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the 
record this document and have it marked as the next consecutive 
exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be so introduced and admitted, 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154" and 
filed for the record.) 

Exhibit No. 154 

Baltimore, INId., March 27, 1939. 

Mr. E. C. Oakter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City. 

r>EAE Caetee : Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If 
I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing 
to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a 
favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from 
giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had 
quite a potent effect. As an oflScer who has resigned his commission in order to 
speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon 
being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he 
has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence 
to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impres- 
sions by which tO' gauge his possible usefulness as a 'Friend of China." 

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write 
you again. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimoee. 

Mr. Mandel. The next letter from the files of the institute is dated 
June 6, 1940. It is addressed to Mr. John H. Oakie. The sender is 
Mr. Frederick V. Field. I shall read the letter : 

Dear Jack : I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in 
Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills summer institute, and 
that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information 
but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak 
perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct con- 
tacts with our administration people from the top down and has a pretty good 
first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for 
instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which 
if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pa- 
cific for operations ia Latin American waters. This, as you can obviously see, 
has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action- 
even short of military action — in the Far East. 
Sincerely yours, 

FREnERICK V. FlEU). 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you know that on June 6, 1940, Fred- 
erick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. BtjDENz. He certainly was. He not only was a member of 
the Communist Party, but he was openly an enemy of President Roose- 
velt as the head of the Nation and of the United States Government. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment to make on that letter, Mr. 
Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I think it speaks for itself. 

Senator Smith. I would like to ask a question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 585 

Senator O'Conor. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. I notice the word "Administration" is capitalized. 
Whom do you think they were referring to — the national administra- 
tion or the administration of some other activity ? 

Mr. BuDENz, No. He means the national administration* 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 155 

New York City, June 6, 1940. 
Mr. John H. Oakie, 

Sail Francisco, Calif. 
Dear Jack : I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in 
Berkeley for a few weeks in connection witli the Mills Summer Institute, and that 
he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but 1 
want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak per- 
haps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts 
with our Administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first- 
hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, 
is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes 
through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for opera- 
tions in Latin-American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad 
implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action — even short 
of military action — in the Far East. 
Sincerely yours, 

Frederick V. Field. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not know that I know who John H. Oakie 
is. 

Mr. BuDENz. I do not either. 

Senator Fp:rguson. You do not know ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Not offhand. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, he was an officer of the Institute 
of Pacific Eelations. 

Senator Ferguson. I know. 

Mr. Morris. We are not going to introduce any evidence about it at 
this time. 

Senator Ferguson. It would seem from this letter, as I read it, then, 
that Field thought that Carlson had some information in relation to 
our Navy that could be given to Oakie and other men. 

Mr. Morris. He was a Marine officer. . 

Senator Ferguson. Carlson was? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. This Mills Summer Institute; what was that? 

Mr. Mandel. Mills College. It is a women's college on the west 
coast. 

Next is a letter dated June 15, 1943, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, 
and it is from Edward C. Carter. It is taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations: 

Dear Currie : Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign per- 
sonnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If 
there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and 
return this copy to me in due course. 

'"Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with 
new and characteristically valuable experiences behind him. He leaves tonight 



586 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 

for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in 
case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carteb. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the 
record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted, and so marked. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 156 

New York 22, N, Y'., June 15, WJfS. 
liAucHLiN CuKRiE, Esq., 

Executive Office of the President, 

The White House, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Currie : Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign per- 
sonnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If 
there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and re- 
turn this copy to me in due course. 

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new 
and characteristic valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for 
Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case 
you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President. 
Sincerely yours. 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. That letter, Mr. Chairman, seems to imply that Mr. 
Carlson had access to the President. 

Senator O'Conor. It is noted. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Lauchlin Currie, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. BuDENz. By official jeports; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When he was in the Wliite House ? 

Mr. Budenz. The Executive Administrator, or whatever his posi- 
tion was; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you know about him ? 

Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, we have an episode concerning 
Lauchlin Currie that we are going to develop tomorrow in better 
sequence. 

I think it would be more appropriate to wait until tomorrow, if 
you do not mind. 

Senator Ferguson. I will withhold my question. 

Mr. Morris. If that is satisfactory with you, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The reason 1 think it should be brought up — 
two reasons ; one, Currie's connection with the institute, and Currie's 
present position. 

As I understand it, while it could not be classified as officially with 
the United States Government, it is in connection with money that 
is loaned by the United States Government or financed by the United 
States Government. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the episode that I relate to, and suggest that 
we take up at another time, involves many exhibits, and we are not 
quite ready for it. 

Senator Ferguson. I will withdraw it. 

Mr. Morris. It should be interesting to find out. 

Senator Ferguson. I think he ought to be given an opportunity 
to come in here and explain some of these associations and things 
that happened here in the file. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 587 

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter dated August 26, 1939. This is from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. 
Edward C. Carter. It is from Evans F. Carlson. 

I will read excerpts from the letter. 

Dear Mr. Carter: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you en- 
closed the comment from Colonel Faymonville. I agree with Colonel Faymon- 
ville that " * * * ^ijg politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet 
Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in 
Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations 
of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. 
If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that 
angle. 

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian 
assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to 
induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobiliza- 
tion of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from 
my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are 
regarded as important potential military weapons. 

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 2Sth. My plan is to move 
toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can 
negotiate the necessary credentials. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter 
in its entirety into the record and ask it be marked as the next con- 
secutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted and so marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 157" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 1,57 

San Francisco, Calif., August 26, 1939. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations, 

New York, N. Y. 

Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you en- 
closed the comment from Colonel Faymonville. 

I agree with Colonel Faymonville that "* * * the politics, economics, and 
military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any 
event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended 
discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China foi'med a part of the 
subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or 
five hundred words on that angle. 

The Relation of Russia to the Sino-Japanese conflict can be argued from 
various points of view. If approached from the point of view of international 
politics, i. e., based on the self-interest of nations, it must be obvious that Rus- 
sia's interest in China's independence is predominant. I have felt since this 
conflict began that Russia could not permit China to succumb to Japan. She 
has been providing assistance in an unofficial manner since September 1937. If 
China should reach the point where she could not carry on, even with the sub- 
rosa assistance, I believe that Russia would engage Japan openly and offioially 
in order to assure China's independence. 

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian 
assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to 
induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization 
of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my con- 
versations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as 
important potential military weapons. 

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move 
toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I 
can negotiate the necessary credentials. 

I hope to see you in New York. If possible, I would like to make the modi- 
fications in the manuscript which may be indicated. 

With kind personal regards, I am, 
Sincerely, 

Evans F. Carlson. 

Ian Pruitt is en route east. 



588 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 

Mr. Mandel. Finally, there is a reference to exhibit No. 20. This 
is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Eelations. It is dated 
August 30, 1939. 

The note is marked "F. V. F. from E. C. C." Presumably "F. V. F." 
is Frederick Field, and "E. C C." is Edward C. Carter. The note 
reads as follows: 

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to 
furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials. 

Senator Smith. This is from whom ? 

Mr. Mandel. From Carter to Field. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced into the record 
and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator O'Conor. It will be introduced. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 158" and is as 

follows :) 

Exhibit No. 158 

F. V. F. from E. C. C. 

August 30, 1939. 

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to 
furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the purpose for introducing that cor- 
respondence and that testimony about Mr. Carlson was relevant to 
present associations with people now living. 

Mr. Budenz, do you know Talitha Gerlach ? 

Mr. Budenz. She is an active Communist-front member, and en- 
gaged in educational activities. She has been known to me personally. 
She was at several committee meetings in the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. You have no doubt that she was, when you knew her, 
a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Morris. You have no doubt? 

Mr. Budenz. I have no doubt at all. Not only from those occasions, 
but from repeated references to her in the State committee of New 
York and in many other official 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Budenz, j^ou spoke of her as an active Com- 
munist-front member. Does that characterization have a particular 
meaning in Communist parlance, or did you merely mean to generalize 
that she was a member of perhaps many and various Communist 
fronts ? 

Mr. Budenz. No, they do not use the expression "Communist 
fronts." They distinguish them between captive organizations and 
those which the Communists create. Those which the Communists 
create are Communists fronts. This woman has been a member of 
many Communist fronts. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Your characterization of her as an active Commu- 
nist-front member was interesting. I believe it was the first time you 
referred to anyone that way. I was wondering specifically why she 
came to your mind tliat way, since you have almost in the same breath 
testified that she was an active Communist — that is, a member of the 
Communist Party. 

Mr. Budenz. I was endeavoring to identify her to some extent. Her 
name appears on a. number of Communist-front lists. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 589 

Mr. Sour"\\t:ne. You mean she is a person more active than the 
usual Communist in connection with Communist-front matters? 

Mr. BuDENZ. That is correct. 

Senator Smith. In other words, there were some Communists who 
were full-fledged Communists, you might say and who were also mem- 
bers of groups that were referred to as Conmiunist-front organiza- 
tions ? 

Mr. BuDENz. As I have said, to my knowledge 95 percent of the 
members of the Communist-front organizations are actually Com- 
munists, and the other 10 percent are thrown in there to give that 
appearance or that uncertainty of connection with the Communist 
movement. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz. You have 105 percent. 
Will you settle for 90 and 10 ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I would say it was 5 and 95 percent. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have anything to show Miss Gerlach's relations 
with the IPR? 

Mr. JMandel. I have two letters from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 

One letter is addressed to Miss Gerlach and sent to Edward C. 
Carter. 

Deak Miss Gerlach : As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley 
would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short- 
time aiipointment. I cal)led her an invitation some time ago. Today I received 
from Kweilin the following cable : 

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens State Department requesting assistance 
here. 

"Elsie Cholmeley." 
Doubtless, I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought 
you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future. 

I am glad* that she has a temporai-y appointment with a State Department 
official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas 
to come here when she wants. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edwakd C. Carter. 

The other is a letter dated February 6, 1943, and marked "Private 
and confidential." 

Dear Miss Gerlach : Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley, who, as you know, 
is a 200 percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens, of Maryland 
University, who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid 
in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has 
much to fear from Stevens, now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evi- 
dence for the simple reason of showing the influence on the part of 
Miss Cholmeley without any comment whatever with respect to Mr. 
Stevens. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify Miss Cholmeley for us, please? 

Mr. Mandel. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is the wife of Israel Ep- 
stein, whose record we have previously testified about. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, as I recall. Senator Ferguson the other 
day asked for the immigration record on Israel Epstein. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read that record, Mr. Mandel? 

C284S — 52— pt. 2i 16 



590 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel,. I have here a letter from the United States Depart- 
ment of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washing- 
ton, D. C, dated July 20, 1951 : 

Dear Senator McCarran : This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 
28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as 
Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. 

Your communication under reference advised that it was your undei-standing 
that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and re- 
quested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In re- 
sponse thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary 
Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not 
they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion 
of investigations, both aliens departed from the United S'tates. 

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the steam- 
ship Liherte on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel 
Epstein departed on the steamship Batory on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest 
to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein 
executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the 
United S'tates. 

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service 
issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the 
possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time. 
Sincerely yours, 

B. John Habberton, Commissioner. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, does that answer your question? 

Senator Ferguson. That covers the matter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Israel Epstein was a 
Communist ? 

Mr. Budenz. I knew that he was a Communist by oiScial informa- 
tion, and from J. Peters, that he was engaged in Communist under- 
ground activities of an espionage character. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know his wife? 

Mr. Budenz. I just heard her name. I did not hear any reports — 
that is, that I can remember. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to 
a document we introduced into the record the other day. It is from 
Edward C. Carter to Miss Anne Ford, publicity director. Little, Brown 
«feCo._ 

It is dated June 12, 1947, wherein Mr. Carter endorsed the book 
by Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China. 

I would like to make reference to it again at this time. 

Senator O'Conor, Very well. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce into the record the corre- 
spondence on Miss Talitha Gerlach, as well as the letter from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service on Israel Epstein and his 
wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. 

Senator O'Conor. That will be admitted. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 159 and 
160," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 159 

New York, N. Y., February 6, 19^3. 
Private and confidential. 
Miss Talitha Gerlach, 

Foreign Division, YWCA, 

New York, N. T. 
Dear Miss Gerlach : Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley who, as you know, 
is a 200-percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens of Maryland 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 591 

University who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in 
reorganizing CIO. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much 
to fear from Stevens now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward O. Carter, 



New York, N. Y., February ^, IQJfS. 
Miss Talitha Gerlach, 

Foreign Division, YWGA, 

New York, N. Y. 
Dear Miss Gerlach : As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would 
like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time 
appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from 
Kweilin the following cable : 

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens, State Department, requesting assistance 
liere. 

"Elsie Cholmeley." 
Doubtless I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought 
you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future. 

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department 
official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas 
to come here when she wants. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 



Exhibit No. 160 

United States Department of Justice, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

Washington 25, D. C, July 20, 1951. 
Hon. Pat McCarran, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Senator McCarran : This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 
June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known 
as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. 

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding 
that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and re- 
quested that you be informed I'egarding the disposition of these cases. In re- 
sponse thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Ep- 
stein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they 
were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of 
investigations, both aliens departed from the United States. 

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the Steam- 
ship Liberie on November 11, 1950. destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Ep- 
stein departed on the Steamship Batory on Mai'ch 3, 1951. It may be of inter- 
est to you to know that prior to his departur-" from the United States, Mr. Ep- 
stein executed a document for the Service wrterein he abandoned his domicile 
in the United States. 

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service 
issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent tlie pos- 
sible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time. 
Sincerely yours, 

Benj. G. Habberton, 
Acting Commissioner. 

Senator O'Conor. It had been agreed that we would suspend at 
this time because of certain commitments. So at this time the com- 
mittee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 a. m. 

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 
Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 a. m.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



THUBSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951 

Untted States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Acrr and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. O. 
The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presid- 
ing. 

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and 
Watkins. 

Also present : Representative Kersten ; J. G. Sourwine, committee 
counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
research director. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Morris, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FEANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.— 

Resumed 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz at the termination of 
yesterday's session was identifying people associated with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations who were Communists. I would like to 
interrupt that process today and ask Mr. Budenz to discuss at some 
length the extent to which the Communists were able to influence 
our foreign policy, and we will commence our hearing today with 
that aspect. 

The Chairman. Very well, you may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, during the time that you were editor of 
the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the 
Communist Party, did you Communists endeavor to influence the 
Far East policy of the United States ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; that was one of our main assignments from 
the international Communist organization. 

Mr. Morris. Did you succeed in influencing the policy of the United 
States? 

Mr. Budenz. Successes were reported on a number of occasions. 

Mr. Morris. Now, would you tell us how you were able to influence 
the foreign policy of the United States? 

Mr. Budenz. Through personal contacts here in Washington which 
had been laid over a series of years, through organizations like the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, which Browder had designated as an 
umbrella for Communist operations in tliis respect, and through 
other channels. 

593 



594 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could give us some specific details. 

Mr. BuDENz. There is an incident in 1942 which stands out. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe what happened at that incident, 
Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz, In the fall of 1942 — it was sometime ahead of October 
2, and I will tell you why I recall that date later — but sometime ahead 
of October 2 Earl Browder called me to his office and asked me to 
loolv over a rough draft of an attack upon the State Department. 

This was an attack upon the anti-Soviet clique in the State De- 
partment, more specifically. I looked it over and made a few changes, 
which were not supposed to be changes in content but in editing, ancl 
returned it to him. Thereupon very shortly thereafter he gave me 
this document for setting up, for printing, in the Sunday Worker. 

He was to deliver this message at a meeting, if I recall correctly, 
of tlie Young Communist League on October 2, 1942. In that mes- 
sage or speech or document he attacked very sharply the reactionary 
ciique in the State Department which was favoring Chiang Kai-shek 
and injuring the Chinese Communists. 

I do not mean by that to give the inference that there was aid 
given in a military fashion ; I don't mean by troops, but otherwise. 

Mr. Morris. You mean Mr. Browder came to you with this article 
which had been prepared already, and the substance of the article 
was that it was an -attack on the people in the State Department who 
favored Chiang Kai-shek and were against the Chinese Communists ? 

Mr. Budenz. It was directed to those who were opposed to the 
Soviet policy in the Far East. He stated incidentally that this docu- 
ment had been worked out by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie. 

Mr. Morris. Will you amplify on that a little bit, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I can only quote his precise words. He didn't say 
how an arrangement had been made. He said that this had been pre- 
pared by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie in order to smoke out 
the anti-Soviet elements in the State Department. The reason that 
he mentioned that was to emphasize to me the importance of the docu- 
ment, even asking me to read the material both before it went into 
the paper — that is, into type — and also after it was in type. 

Tliat is why he gave it to me sometime in advance. 

Mr. Morris. I offer you a photostatic copy of the Daily Worker 
of October 4, 1942, and I ask you if that is the article to which you 
have testified ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; that is the article. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this article for us, 
please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942,. 
pages 1 and 5, prepared at my direction. 

Mr. Morris. And you say this is the article that you saw in advance 
of its being printed in the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. You say that article had been worked out by Mr. Brow- 
der and, according to Mr. Browder, had been worked out in conjunc- 
tion with Mr. Currie? 

Mr. Budenz. That the article had been prepared through arrange- 
ments with Lauchlin Currie to smoke out the people who were opposed 
to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State Department. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 595 

The Chairman. Let us dwell on that for just a moment. You say 
the article had been arranged by Mr. Browder through arrange- 
ments with Lauchlin Currie ; is that right ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. That is what he said. 

The Chairman. That is what Mr. Brow^der told you ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. He was emphasizing its importance 
and that I should be careful to see that there were no words that 
would give a distortion to the article. 

Mr. Morris. What happened after that, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, later on I saw Mr. Browder either in connec- 
tion with the publication of a further statement on this matter or 
shortly afterward, but it was a discussion of the statement which 
appeared after Mr. Browder made a trip to Washington to see Mr. 
Sumner Welles. 

Mr. Morris. Now, sometime after that is it your testimony, Mr, 
Budenz, that Browder then did go down to the State Department ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; he went down to the State Department with 
Eobert Minor. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us what happened at that meeting? 

The Chairman. He went down to the State Department with 
Robert Minor ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify Robert Minor ? 

Mr. Budenz. Robert Minor then, I think, was assistant secretary 
of the party. At least he was technically second in command to 
Browder. I say "technically" because Jack Stachel was an important 
person, and we have to always remember that. 

Mr. Morris. Was this visit to the State Department connected 
with the original statement which you have already testified about*? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. There was much discussion of this matter. 
I just can't recall all of the discussion, but at any rate it was definitely 
in connection with this first article. 

The Chairman. Now, inasmuch as you have a number of articles 
before you, Mr. Morris, I suggest that the first one to which you have 
referred and which was identified by the witness here be identified 
and inserted in the record or otherwise identified. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the rec- 
ord the photostatic copy of the article in the Daily Worker of Octo- 
ber 4, 1942, which was authenticated by Mr. Mandel. 

The Chairman. It will be received and so designated. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 161" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 161 

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942] 

Bbowdeb Accuses State Department Ci-ique — It Hampers Our War in Pacific, 

Europe 

(By Earl Browder) 

Almost 10 months after the United States is fully committed to the war against 
the Axis we are being told that "the United States is losing the war, period." 

Loss of this war means destruction of our Nation and slavery for our people. 
Yet we are told that we are losing this war. That would seem to be a matter to 
get excited about, something to call for action. 

We are losing this war before we have well begun to fight. 



596 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Would it not be more accurate to say that we are losing this war because we 
Lave not yet begun to fight? 

What is the matter? Whence comes this seeming paralysis which keeps our 
tremendous military potential idle at the moment our fate and the fate of the 
world is being decided? 

Roy Howard, Hearst, and the Patterson-McCormicks, the chief newspaper 
spokesmen for the modern Copperheads, give the double-barreled answer that 
the people are not behind this war and that the President is bungling it. But 
they are liars, any they spread the lies that please Hitler. The people are behind 
this war to the end ; they are ready for every necessary sacrifice ; they are im- 
patient to go ahead. The President is doing the best he can with advisers who 
keep jogging his elbow and holding back his arm ; he can only be criticized for 
hesitating to sweep these mischief makers out of his councils, and for failing to 
crack down on the defeatist newspapers. 

Let us frankly face the facts, however, that the defeatist poison penetrates and 
tends to paralyze the war policies of our Government in Washington. We must 
learn how to locate the seats of this poison, in order to eliminate them. 

Look first of all at the Pacific front. Our Armed Forces in the Pacific have 
already demonstrated that they have a fighting spirit fit for any task given them. 
But what about the policies which direct that fighting spirit? They are not yet 
serious fighting war policies. 

I charge that powerful appeasement forces in the State Department in Wash- 
ington are deliberately withholding 1,000,000 of the most effective soldiers in 
Asia, keeping them out of the fight against the Japanese, and thereby releasing 
that many Japanese soldiers for action against our boys in the South Pacific. 

I charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Depart- 
ment that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war. The army 
under General Hu Chung-han, with 440,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the 
Japanese but in blockading the Chinese Eighth Route Arm^ in the north and 
northwest, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese ; the army 
under General Tang En-po, with 500,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the 
Japanese but in blocking the Chinese New Fourth Army in central and eastern 
China, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese. 

These two Chinese armies, the best equipped and trained in all China, totaling 
ajmost a million men, are being confined to blockading the Chinese Communist 
armies and territories, because the State Department in Washington has informed 
Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if com- 
plete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Com- 
munists. These officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" 
in China ; they tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it 
wishes United States friendship, and they thereby accept responsibility for with- 
drawing a million Chinese troops from the war against Japan, and keep China 
back from full unity in this war. 

What suicidal nonsense is this, by which persons who speak for our own 
Government keep the best Chinese fighters out of the war and create a gap 
which must be filled by a million American boys? 

Tills is not a way to fight a war of survival, this is a sure way to continue to 
lose the war. 

Our attitude toward Europe is equally ambiguous. Our State Department 
continues to do business with Mannerheim Finland, Franco Spain, and Vichy 
France, three puppet regimes of Hitler, to feast the representatives of these 
Nazi agencies in the highest Washington society, to send vital matertals to 
them, and to appease them in every way while they conduct active war against 
the United Nations. 

This two-faced attitude of the State Department toward Europe finds its 
.highest expression in the campaign being waged through the defeatist press 
against the opening of the second front in Wt^sitar-tx Europe. Of course it is 
impossible to carry on a policy of appeasement «* Mannerheim, Franco, and 
Laval, and at the same time energetically prenaro the immediate second front 
in Europe. Find those figures in our Governnifnt who push through this ap- 
peasement policy, and there you will find the hiirh opponents of the second front. 
They are the men who keep our men, guns, plnnp.s, and tanks in idleness while 
our fate is being decided at Stalingrad where men, women, and children hold off 
the full might of a Nazi-occupied Europe without counting the cost to themselves. 

The only way to stop losing this war is to begin seriously to fight it. And 
to fight it we must overcome the infiuence of Munichism, of appeasement, of 
defeatism, in the United States itself. This r.Iunieh influence is not among the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 597 

people, and it does not proceed from our Commander in Cbief ; it is enti-enched 
in some high officials of the State Department, some members of the Cabinet, 
in a disorganized Con.aress, dominated by a clique of Vaiulerbergs, Wheelers, 
Brookses, and Dieses, several powerful industrialists, and above all in the news- 
papers of Patterson-McCormick, Hearst, and Roy Howard, which poison the 
mind of the country with defeatism day after day. The people must be roused 
and organize in support of the President against this cabal of the Munichmen. 

These days we are being shown the most astonishing depths of depravity to 
which the defeatist newspapers will descend in their fight against the second 
front. I wish to impose upon you for a few moments to turn the microscope upon 
an example of this moral and intellectual rottenness. I pick up Roy Howard's 
newspaper for September 29, where this defeatist speaks through his hired 
scribbler, William Philip Simms. At the moment of crisis of the battle of Stalin- 
grad, the miserable voice finds it possible to whine that we "would appreciate a 
little more cooperation from the Russians." In that phrase we can see the 
spirit of a Laval or Doriot, the spirit that rotted out the heart of the French 
Republic and delivered that nation over to Hitlerite bondage. 

"A little more cooperation from the Russians," cries Roy Howard through 
the pen of Mr. Simms. At such a sound, every decent American should vomit, 
in revulsion at the monstrous thought that this covild be America's answer to 
Stalingrad. "A little more cooperation from the Russians," while certain 
gentlemen from high places in the United States and Britain carefully calculate 
the last and final buttons on the uniforms of»our boys which will make it safe 
to throw them into the battle. 

Nothing could be further from the spirit of America's youth, in and out of 
the Armed Forces, than the rotten defeatism, appeasement, and cowardice 
expressed in this slogan of Roy Howard. 

The spirit of our boys in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, is expressed 
in opposite slogans : 

"Let's give some fighting cooperation to our heroic Russian allies." 

"When do we begin to fight?" 

"Open up the second front in Europe now." 

Let us not drop Roy Howards man Simms, however, without looking deeper 
into the cesspool of his mind. What kind of cooperation does he want from the 
Russians that he is not getting in the most magnificent battle for freedom in 
all history? "Perhaps this may require explanation," remarks Mr. Simms. 
Indeed it does. And what is Mr. Simm's explanation? He explains that he 
wants the Russians to teach the Americans and British how to fight. "The 
one place really to learn war is in war," says Mr. Simm's and "Moscow still 
refuses" to pei'mit Americans to learn how to make war in that "one place." 
That, says Mr. Simms, is why we have no second front. Our officers and soldiers 
don't know how to fight and the Russians refuse to teach them. Therefore there 
is nothing to do but wait until Timoshenko gets time and leisure to open up a 
school for us. 

I wonder what American Army officers think of this kind of arguments? I 
think I know. I think the vast majority will "give the works" to anybody 
who tells them they cannot open up a second front because they do not know 
how to fight. The have already learned the great lesson the Russians have 
taught the world, that the way to fight is to fight, to push aside all the hesitators 
and appeasers and if necessary to shoot them, to go to battle and put everything 
you have into it, to engage the enemy, to kill him, to get into the battle without 
delay, to fight, fight, and fight again until the Hitler Axis is crushed. 

Yes, it is true, the one place really to learn war is in war. But who is 
holding us back from learning war by making war? It is the Roy Howards, the 
Hearsts, the Patterson-McCormicks, and their fellow appeasers and one-time 
friends of Hitler, who now join together in their obscene outcries against the 
second front. The second front is the practical school in which British and 
American soldiers will learn how to smash Hitlerism. We are all learning and 
will learn from the mighty achievements of the Red army and the Soviet people, 
but we will not allow the worthy idea of learning from them to be used for the 
purpose of delaying our joint action with them in a two-front war. 

Young people of America have no part or parcel of the appeasement con- 
spiracies. Defeatism is the property of old and corrupt reactionaries and their 
hired men. No young person could possibly live in their stifling atmosphere. 
Young people are particularly immune to the counsels of cowardice and capitula- 
tion. A thousand times they prefer to risk their livQS in combat with Hitler's 
hordes than to risk the living death of a Vichyfied America, the slavery of a 



598 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Hitlerite world. Our young people are demanding the chance to fight. They 
are the front lines of the movement for a second front now. They will not permit 
their future and the future of the world to be gambled away by the Munichmen 
of appeasement and defeatism. They want to know : When do we begin to fight? 

The Young Communist League, dedicating tonight its service flag, has as high 
a percentage of its members in the Armed Forces as any group of Americans. 
And this is not the first time the Young Communists have given their best mem- 
bers to the armed struggle against the Axis. Not less than one-third of the 
Lincoln Battalion composed of Ainericans who gave their lives to stop the Axis 
in Spain in 1936 to 1938 were from the Young Communist League. This first 
American expeditionary force against the Axis, defending the Spanish Republic 
from the Hitler assassins, gave their lives in order to prevent the present war ; 
if their warnings and their example had been heeded and followed, the Axis 
would have been broken before it could challenge the entire world. But their 
blooa was not spilled in vain. They left an imperishable and glorious tradition, 
fully in the spirit of the Stalingrad of today. They helped to hold the Axis 
hordes outside the gates of Madrid for 32 months. They were fully representa- 
tive of the youth of America today, a youth which is ready and eager to strike 
Hitler's gangs now in Western Europe, and guarantee that they will not have to 
stop them on American soil later on. 

There is no room for any issue in our country today except the issue of how 
most quickly and effectively to crush the Hitlerite Axis. There is no room for 
partisanship or special interests. .There must be national unity of all men and 
women regardless of race, creed, or class, who are I'eady to subodrinate all else 
to victory. There must be international unity among all the United Nations, 
who, win or lose, stand or fall together. And at this moment all this is summed 
up in one issue, whether our country can meet the crisis of war with honor, 
whether we win through to freedom or go down into slavery, whether we have 
the quality of victors or whether v^e shall be shamefully defeated without even 
having fought — all this is summed up in the one issue of the immediate opening 
of the second front in Europe. 

We ask our Commander in Chief : When are we going to fight? 

(The above article is based on an address delivered by Earl Browder before a 
second front rally of the Young Communist League in New York on October 2.) 

Mr. MoRKis. Will you tell us the upsliot of the meeting in Wash- 
ington? Who attended the meeting in Washington, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Mr. Browder stated to me, and so he published in the 
Daily Worker if my memory is correct, that the meeting was attended 
by Mr. Browder, Mr. Minor, Lauchlin Currie, and Mr, Welles, 

Mr, Morris. What happened at that meeting ? 

Mr, Budenz. At that meeting an agreement was reached which was 
embodied in this statement. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "this statement," will you identify that, 
Mr. Budenz? 

Mr, Budenz. Yes. This is the statement printed in the Daily 
Worker of October 16, 1942, headed, "Welles states United States 
policy on China. After interview with Under Secretary of State, 
Browder retracts charges against State Department officials," That 
is the article. 

The Chairman. That has not been identified ? 

Mr. Morris. No. 

The Chairman, I think you should lay the foundation. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of October 16, 
1942, pages 1 and 2, the photostat being prepared under my direction. 

The Chairman- It ought to be identified by a number so that we can 
go along and keep these separate. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced as the second 
exhibit introduced thi§ morning. 

The Chairman. It will be identified by the proper number arid 
inserted in the record. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 599 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 162" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 162 
[From the Dally Worker, New York, October 16, 1942] 

Welles States United States Policy on China — After Interview With Under 
Secretary of State, Browder Retracts Charges Against State Department 
Officials 

Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, at liis office at 35 
East Twelfth Street, New York City, made the following statement to the press 
yesterday. : 

"In the Worker of October 4, I made charges that persons whom I designated 
as 'reactionary officials in the State Department' were encouraging the mainte- 
nance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its 
allies. I spoke of strained relations between Kuomintang and Communists, 
resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country. 

"Upon the invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, I 
visited him in his office on October 12, in company with Mr. Robert Minor, and 
heard from him, and from' Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the 
President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect. The information 
received from Mr. Welles and Mr. Currie convinced me that my charges had been 
made on the basis of incomplete information. I believe it is established that no 
responsible official of the State Department is contributing to disunity in China, 
and that the policy of the United States Government is being exerted in the 
opposite direction. 

"T am therefore more than happy to retract those charges without reservation. 

"What I had thought of as a heavy door that needed pushing open proved to 
be but a curtain of lack of information. Since many persons in the United 
States and in China also are without that information which I lacked before 
visiting Mr. Welles, I believe our war effort will be benefited if T make public 
that portion of Mr. Welles' remarks which was given to me in written form." 

Mr. Welles' memorandum follows : 

"With regard to the specific 'charge that it is on the advice of reactionary 
officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies 
out of the war, 'the simple fact is that the nearest approach to 'advice' given 
by any officials in the Department of State in this context has been an exnression 
of anopinion that civil strife in China, at all times unfortunate, would be espe- 
cially unfortunate at a time when China is engaged in a desperate struggle 
of self-defense against an armed invader. The implication of the expression 
of opinion was that the Chinese Government should try to maintain peace by 
processes of conciliation between and among all groups and factions in China. 
And, the course which Chiang Kai-shek has been pursuing is not 'keeping bis 
best armies out of the war ' Both the armies of the National Govornment and 
the 'Communist' armies are fighting the Japanese. No Chinese armies are ac- 
tively engaged in large-scale offensive operations against the Japanese — for the 
reason, principally, that there is lacking to all Chinese armies types and amounts 
of equipment which are essential to such operation;^: but this situation is one 
which both the Chinese Government and the American Government are endeavor- 
ing to remedy as equipment becomes available. 

"With regard to the specific charge that 'the State Department in Washington 
has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be dis- 
pleased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintano' and 
the Communists.' what "this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. 
The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both 
in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete 
unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof. 

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these officials continue the old policy 
of "war against the Communists" in China, this Government has bad no such 
policy, either 'old' or new. This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism 
many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in China. We 
have, for instance, as is publicly and well known, der'Uned to be moved bv Japa- 
nese contentions that presence and maintenance of Japanese armed forces in 
China were and would be desirable for the purpose of 'combatting commnnism.' 

"With regard to the specific charge that officials of this Government 'tell 
Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States 



600 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

friendship,' the simple fact is that no oflBcials of this Government ever have 
told Chungking either that it must fight or that it must continue to tight the 
'Communists'; this Government holds no such belief; this Government desires 
Chinese unity and deprecates civil strife in China; this Government treats the 
Government of China as an equal; it does not dictate to the Government of 
China ; it does not make United States friendship contingent ; it regards unity 
within China, unity within the United States, unity within each of the countries 
of the United Nations group, and unity among the United Nations as utterly 
desirable toward effectively carrying on war against tlie Axis Powers and toward 
creation and maintenance of conditions of just peace when the United Nations 
shall have gained the victory which is to be theirs." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you take some of the highlights and 
discuss them with us inasmuch as you were the editor of the Daily 
Worker at that time, the significance of that statement? I do not 
think it is clear to the committee as to the purpose of that statement. 

Mr. Budenz. Well, this statement says that upon invitation of Mr. 
Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, "I visited him in his 
office on October 12 in company with Mr. Robert Minor and heard 
from him and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to 
the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect." 

In other words, in regard to China. The charges that he made 
were: 

In the Worker of October 4 I made charges that persons whom I designated as 
"reactionary officials in the State Department" were encouraging the mainte- 
nance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its 
allies. 

Browder had spoken of strained relations between the Kuomintang 
and the Communists resulting in the immobilization of large numbers 
of the best troops of that country. The assurance given by Mr. 
Welles, to make this brief, was that the policy of the State Department 
was not against the Communists in China and that there was to be no 
•distinction made between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek. 

That was the understanding which led Browder on his part to make 
what he called a retraction. 

Senator O 'Conor. Could I interrupt you to ask whether or not any 
use was made of that by the Communists on that point ? 

Mr. Budenz. You can see in the first place how it is played up, and" 
the Daily Worker gives directives to the Communists. It was used 
throughout the country as an indication that American policy was 
seeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East. 

As a matter of fact, in a subsequent meeting of the Politburo which 
I attended, Browder safd it was as important as an agreement between 
nations and that we should emphasize it throughout the country as 
something very fundamental, representing what he considered to be 
a great gain for the Communist cause. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Budenz, as I understand the gist of what you 
have just said, plus what you said yesterday, that the Daily Worker 
took its line from the Politburo and then passed that on, and the Daily 
Worker was in effect the instruction sheet to Communist organizations 
all over America ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is exclusively what it is. It is, as I say, the tele- 
graph agency of the conspiracy. 

Senator Smith. So that when the Communists read something in 
the Daily Worker indicating what line is being taken by the Daily 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 601 

Worker, that is the same as definite instructions to them to follow 
through on that line? 

Mr. BuDENz. Every time the Daily Worker arrives in the district 
office of the Commmiist Party it is read immediately by the district 
leader. He calls together his staff, and he assigns to them their tasks 
as a result of the Daily Worker articles and editorials. 

Of course, that is supplemented by other things, mail sent out 
through mail drops and the like, but this is the constant source of 
directives. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether the conference 
that is referred to in that article of the 16th of October was simply 
the successful fruition of a plan which started with the blast that 
was carried in the issue of the 4th or whether blast and conference, 
cause and effect, were all part of a single prearranged plan ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I can only cite Mr. Browder's words. I wouldn't 
want to put my own interpretation into that, but very strongly the 
impression was given that this was all arranged, that this was the 
complete picture; that Mr. Browder when he went to Washington 
understood that he was going to gain. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. And you say, Mr. Budenz, that this statement, after 
it was promulgated by Mr. Welles, was used extensively by the_Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Most extensively ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You say his statement, after it was promulgated 
by Mr. Welles. Wliat statement do you refer to and what exhibit ? 

Mr. Morris. This is the statement in exhibit No. 162 that we have 
introduced this morning, "Welles States United States Policy on 
China." 

Prior to that time, had there been any such statement on the part 
of the United States Government, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, you are not offering that exhibit as 
evidence that Mr. Welles made such a statement but only as evidence 
that the Daily Worker carried that story, that Mr. Browder attrib- 
uted that story, statement, to Mr. Welles, are you not? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

The Chairman. Senator Watkins? 

Senator Watkins. I was going to ask if we have available the 
statement issued by Mr. Welles, the actual statement. I came in 
late, so I do not know what has preceded this, but it seems to me in 
view of what Mr. Sourwine has said that there ought to be some 
follow-up as to the statement actually issued by Mr. Welles. 

The Chairman. Have you a statement issued by Mr. Welles ? The 
Senator is asking for it. 

Senator Watkins. The confirmation. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. We have that, Senator, and we will bring it out in just 
a minute. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not copies of 
the Daily Worker were circulated among employees of the State De- 
partment that were likely to be brought to the attention of Mr. Welles? 



(302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. Well, I wouldn't have knowledge of that. The Daily 
Worker though is pretty well examined by governmental officials, and 
that is a matter of public knowledge. 

Senator Smith. Did you receive any protest from Mr. Welles about 
the publication of these statements? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Oh, no, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, was this statement, as it appears in the 
Daily Worker there, used as a basis for a campaign by the Communists 
to eliminate people who were anti-Communist from places of influence 
in the Government ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; I intended to complete Senator O'Conor's 
question there along that line and had my thought interrupted, that is 
to say, the' campaign began actually then against those who were con- 
sidered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East. It began with an 
attack on Mr. Adolf Berle, who by the way was under fire from the 
Communists at that particular moment, very definitely and strenu- 
ously. It proceeded through the years until in 1944 or 1945 it broke 
out into an organized campaign. 

I don't want to give an exact quote, but this is the essence of it, as 
the Communists express it, "To clean the State Department of all 
anti-Soviet elements." 

Mr. Morris. You say that was a sustained Communist campaign 
all during the war period ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. Of course, it had highlights, but it was 
sustained. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, I offer you a photostat of an article that 
appeared in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942. Mr. Mandel, will 
you authenticate this, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, 
page 5, the photostat being prepared at my direction. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be received and so designated. You are get- 
ting your exhibits a little confused, Mr. Morris, because your exhibits 
have been running along in a series from the beginning of the hearings, 
and now you are starting with a series of this date. I think it might be 
well to have it follow in sequence following your exhibits of former 
days. 

Mr. Morris. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I just want to designate 
that as the third this morning so we will be able to distinguish. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 163" an is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 163 

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942, p. 5] 

The Sinister A. A. Berle — Champion of Munich, Anti-Soviet Intriguer in 

Our State Department 

(By Adam Lapin) 

Washington, October 3. — A few days ago Adolph Augustus Berle, Jr., was dis- 
cussing the Spanish situation with an intimate sroup. The slight, sallow-faced 
Assistant Secretary of State expressed gratification that Franco, the puppet of 
Hitler and Mussolini, had crushed the Spanish Republic. 

He said that the world situation would have been infinitely worse if "com- 
munism" had triumphed in Spain and then spread over Europe. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 603 

This incident is typical of the thinking of Adolph Berle, whom many informed 
observers here consider the nearest thing to an American counterpart to George 
Bonnet, the corrupt French politician, who was one of the principal architects of 
Munich. 

As the last few months have passed without the opening of a second front, the 
voices of the Munichmen in Washington have grown louder. 

Not only in Congress, but in the State Department, the War Department, and 
the War Production Board the men of faint heart have begun to speak up, to 
intrigue against the Soviet Union, to spread anti-Soviet rumors. Even specula- 
tion about a negotiated peace is no longer a rarity. 

Try to trace down the anti-second front and the anti-Soviet talk in Washing- 
ton, and you will find that an exceptionally high percentage emanates from room 
2OOV2, off the dank second floor corridors of the musty State Department Build- 
ing, from the office of Assistant Secretary Berle. 

Berle is no longer the boy wonder who graduated Harvard at 18 and was an 
adviser on Russian affairs to President Wilson at Versailles when he was 23. 

He is now a cynical, power-hungi-y man of 47. He is a brilliant and fluent 
phrase-maker, but beneath the flowery verbiage is the hard inner core of his 
dominant passion : A bitter, last-ditch hostility to the Soviet Union. 

During the Munich crisis Berle wrote in a memorandum to the President that 
the United States should not be swung off base either by diplomacy or emotion. 

The memorandum was quoted by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, the Wash- 
ington newspapermen, in the book which they wrote from a desk in Berle's office. 

They saw Berle every day for several weeks, and they must know whereof they 
speak when they say that Berle pleaded "for the most hard-headed — even cold- 
hearted— approach to the Czechoslovak question." 

Berle was an advocate of Munichism then. There is every reason to think 
that he still is. 

He was one of the men who helped to strangle the Spanish Republic and today 
helps perpetuate the continued appeasement of Franco. 

He was one of the most influential State Department ofiicials to favor the 
shipment of war materials to Japan over several costly and long-to-be-regretted 
years. 

He is an ardent advocate of appeasing "Vichy France. 

Around Berle gathered the more dangerous anti-Soviet element among the 
European emigrees now in the United States. 

The Assistant Secretary of State confers frequently w^ith Alexander Kerensky, 
who has never forgiven the Russian people for turning on his Government in 
favor of the Communists. 

Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian Facist who claims that he is opposed to Hitler 
but is active in sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda in this country, also sees 
Berle frequently. 

Berle was active in trying to spike the conversations between former Soviet 
Ambassador Costantine Oumansky and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 

The newspapermen who saw Berle in those days would almost invariably leaye 
his office with a juicy anti-Soviet story. 

The Assistant Secretary of State is frequently present at Mrs. Evalyn Walsh 
McLean's parties. Last New Year's Eve he was photographed there chatting 
with Finnish Minister Hjalmar Procope, Senator Robert Taft, the notorious Ohio 
defeatist, and Ambassador Espil, of Argentina. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr, Morris. Can you identify this, Mr, Biidenz ? 

Mr, BuDENZ. Yes, sir, we published this in the Daily Worker and 
the character of the article is indicated by the headline, "The Sinister 
A, A, Berle, champion of Munich, anti-Soviet intriguer in our State 
Department," 

Mr, Morris, That is a sample of the campaign which was being 
sustained by the Communists at that time? 

Mr, BuDENz, That is the campaign that was carried into every part 
of the United States, not only among the Communists but the organi- 
zations which they were infiltrating. 

Mr, Morris, Did this campaign extend to other officials in the 
State Department? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 



604 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us who the other officials were ? 
Mr. BuDENZ. Joseph B. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. 
Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State Department but 
connected at least diplomatically with State Department relations; 
Eugene C. Dooman, who was head of the Far Eastern Division, if 
I remember correctly, at least he was in control of the details of the 
far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick Hurley, Ambassador to 
China, who particularly was under attack from the Communists. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, if we take these items 
one at a time it will be a lot clearer. 
The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. In point of time, Mr. Budenz, which is the first one 
of these that we should discuss? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I think Under Secretary of State Grew is the 
first because as early as at least 1944 the Politburo laid plans against 
Mr. Grew, asking him questions, criticizing his policy, and the like. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us the first episode that you can recall 
in point of time, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, there were episodes before this, but the ones 
that I can recall occurred in 1945 and are the most vivid. Mr. Grew 
Avas attacked on two grounds, one that he didn't have the right policy 
in China, and secondly, as we approached the question of what to do 
with Japan, that he favored a soft peace with Japan. 

The Communists wanted a tough peace just as there was to be 
the Morgenthan plan in Germany. They didn't hesitate in their own 
discussions to show that this would tend to drive the Japanese into 
the hands of the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Morris. How did you know they wanted a tough peace? 

Mr. Budenz. They discussed it and planned it and discussed it 
in the Daily Worker. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in aid of the testimony this morning 
I have here a folder full of exhibits which are extracts from the Daily 
Worker. By way of refreshing the recollection of the witness I would 
like to make those available to him while he is testifying to episodes 
that occurred in this campaign. 

The Chairman. You may do so if he identifies them as articles 
published in the Daily Worker under his editorial supervision, 

Mr. Morris. I would like to present them in chronological order. 

The Chairman. If he can identify them as publications in the 
Daily Worker under his supervision. 

Mr. Morris. As each one is pulled out we can identify them. 

The Chairman. Yes. I think that as the witness identifies it there 
should be an identifying mark on the exhibit to show what exhibit 
he is holding in his hand at the time. The clerk will see to that, 
please. 

Mr. Budenz. The first exhibit is from the Daily Worker of June 
4, 1045, page 4. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Mandel, was this photostat prepared under 
your direction? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Budenz. This is a reprint of the statement made by the na- 
tional board of the Communist Political Association, that being the 
temporary name, as you recall, of the Communist Party during a cer- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 605 

tain period. This statement was made on the eve of changing back 
to the Communist Party. 

In the course of their general program they outline a far-eastern 
policy which, to make it brief, includes : 

One, rout and defeat tlie advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese 
imperialists and war lords. Guarantee a free democratic Asia with the right 
of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those 
who seek American imperialist control in the Far East. 

Three, press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Com- 
munists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victoi-y. 

There are other items, but those are the outstanding ones. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so designated and entered into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 164" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 164 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 4, 1945, p. 4] 

The Present Situation and Next Tasks — Resolution of the National Boabd, 
CPA, Adopted on June 2, 1945 

This resolution is submitted as a draft for discussion and action by the national 
committee and the entire membsrship of the Communist Political Association. 

The vote on the resolution in the national board was as follows : 

For: Morris Childs, Benjamin Davis, Jr., Eugene Dennis, Elizabeth Onrley 
Flynn, James Ford, Win. Z. Foster, Gilbert Green, Robert Minor, Robert Thomp- 
son, John Williamson. 

Against : Earl Browder. 

Abstained : Roy Hudson. 

Absent : William Schneiderman. 



The military defeat of Nazi Germany is a great historic victory for world 
democracy, for all mankind. This epochal triumph was brought about by the 
concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition — by the decisive blows 
of the Red Army, by the American-British offensives, and by the heroic struggle 
of the resistance movements. This victory opens the way for the complete 
destruction of fascism in Europe and weakens the forces of reaction and fascism 
everywhere. It has already brought forth a new antifascist unity of the peoples 
in Europe marked by the formation in a numlier of countries of democratic gov- 
ernments representative of the will of the people. It has also created the pre- 
requisites for bringing about the speedy defeat of Japanese imperialism. Thus 
great possibilities have been opened up for realizing a durable peace. 



However, a sharp and sustained struggle must still be conducted to secure 
the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and throughout the world and to 
guarantee that the possibilities which now exist for creating an enduring peace 
shall be realized. This is .so because the economic and social roots of fascism 
in Europe have not yet been fully destroyed. This is so because the extremely 
powerful reactionary foices in the United States and England, which are centered 
in the trusts and cartels, are striving to reconstruct liberated Europe on a reac- 
tionary basis. Moreover, this is so because the most aggressive circles of 
American imperialism are endeavoring to secure for themselves' political and 
economic domination in the world. 

With the ending of the war against Nazi Germany, important groupings of 
American capital, which were opposed to German imperialist world domination, 
are joining hands with the most reactionary and profascist circles of monopoly 
capital — with the profascist du Pont clique in the leadership of the NAM. Now 

22848—52 — pt. 2 17 



606 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

that Nazi Germany has been crushed, these big business circles which heretofore 
supported, though inconsistently, the war against Hitler, in order to eliminate 
their German imperialist rival are today frightened by the democratic con- 
sequences of that victory. 

Like their British counterparts, they are alarmed at the strengthened positions 
or world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the 
national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries. There- 
fore they seek to halt the march of democracy ; to curb the strength of labor and 
the people. They want to save the remnants of fascism in Germany and in the 
rest of Europe. They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the 
Soviet Union which bore the main brunt of the war against the Nazis, and which 
is the stanchest champion of national freedom, democracy, and world peace. 

This regrouping in the ranks of American capital, reacting to the defeat of 
Germany, has been reflected in many recent actions of the State Department. It 
is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the American delegation at San. 
Francisco yielded on certain issues to the extreme reactionaries. In so doing 
they departed from Roosevelt's foreign policy of Big Three unity as worked out 
at Tehran and Yalta. 

This regrouping in the ranks of capital explains why, on most basic (luestions, 
Stettinius and Connally were influenced to join hands with Vandeuberg — the- 
spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance 
capital. This explains the seating of Fascist Argentina and the British-Ameri- 
can reluctance to live up to the Yalta accord on Poland and Germany. This is 
the reason why the American delegation at San Francisco refused to join with 
the Soviet Union to pledge the right of national independence for mandated 
territories and colonies, and refused to give official recognition to the repre- 
sentatives of the World Labor Conference who spoke for 60,000,000 organized 
workers. 

This shift in the position of certain big business circles explains the reaction- 
ary intervention at Trieste and the threat of armed force against our Yuu^oslav 
.ally. This development also explains why Washington and London are pursuing 
the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united, and democratic China, 
and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime 
which is obstructing an all-out war against Japan. It accounts, too, for the 
new campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine 
Anierican-So\ let friendship and cooperation which was the cornerstone for 
victory over Hitler Germany and is the indispensable key to attain postwar 
peace and world security. 

On the home front the camp of reaction is blocking the development of a sat- 
isfactory program to meet the hvmian needs of reconversion with its accompany- 
ing economic dislocatinns and severe unemployment. Iteactionary forces — es- 
pecially the NAM and their representatives in Congress — are planning a new 
open-shop drive to weaken or smash the trade-unions. They are trying to pre- 
vent the adoption of governmental measures which must be enacted at once if 
our country is to avoid the most acute consequences of future economic crisis. 
Likewise they are vigorously preparing to win the crucial 1946 elections. 

If the.se reactionary policies and forces are not checked and <lefeated, America 
and the world will be confronted with new aggressions and wars and the growth 
of reaction and fascism in the United States. 



However, the conditions and forces exist to defeat this reactionary threat, and 
to enable our country to play a progressive role in world affairs in accord with 
the true national interests of the American people. For one thing, the military 
defeat of Nazi Germany has changed the relationship of world forces in favor 
of democracy. It has enhanced the role and influence of the land of socialism. 
It has strengthened those forces in our country and elsewhere which seek to 
maintain and consolidate the friendship and coopei'ation of the United Stat<^s 
and the Soviet Union — a unity which must now be extended and reenforced. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the American 
people, and in the first place labor, are opposed to reaction and fascism, support 
the foreign and domestic policies of President Roosevelt as embodied in the de- 
cisions of Tehran nnd Criip.oa. nnd in the second hill of ri'rhts. 

This majority must now speak out and assert its collective strength and 
will. The united power of labor and of all democratic forces must express itself' 
in a decisive fashion so as to influence the course of the Nation in a consistently 
progressive direction. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 607 

It is imperative that the American people resolutely support every effort of 
the Truman administration to carry forward Roosevelt's program for victory, 
peace, democracy, and 60,000,000 jobs. It is equally necessary that the people 
sharply criticize all hesitations to apply this policy, and vigorously oppose any 
concessions to the reactionaries. The camp of reaction must not be appeased — 
it must be isolated and routed. 

Toward this end it is necessary, as never before, to decisively strengthen the 
democratic unity of the Nation. It is essential to weld together and consolidate 
the broadest national coalition of all anti-Fascist and democratic forces, including 
all supporters of Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies. To forge this democratic coali- 
tion most effectively and to enable it to exercise decisive influence upon the 
affairs of the Nation, it is essential that the working class — especially the pro- 
gressive labor movement and the Communists — strengthen its independent role 
and activities and display far greater political and organizing initiative. It is 
imperative to develop the maximum unity of action between the CIO, the AFL, 
and the Railroad Brotherhoods and to achieve their full participation in the new 
World Federation of Trade Unions. 

While cooperating with the patriotic and democratic forces from all walks of 
life, labor must, in the first place, strengthen its ties with the veterans, the 
toiling farmers, the Negro people, the youth, the women, pi-ofessionals and small- 
business men, and with their democratic organizations. 



To achieve the widest democratic coalition and the most effective anti-Fascist 
unity of the Nation, it is vital that labor vigorously champion a program of 
action that will promote the complete destruction of fascism, speed victory over 
Japanese imperialism, curb the powers of the trusts and monopolies — advance 
the economic welfare of the people and protect and extend American democracy. 

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should 
be based (m the following slogans of action : 

I. Hasten the defeat of Fascist-militarist Japan ! 

Rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese 
imperialists and warlords. 

Guarantee a free, democratic Asia with the right of national independence for 
all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist 
control in the Far East. 

Press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists 
and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory. Full 
military aid to the Chinese guerrillas led by the heroic Eighth and Foui'th Armies. 

Contini;e uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike pledge 
for the duration. Stop employer provocations. 

II. Complete the destruction of fascism and build a durable peace. 

Cement American-Soviet friendship and unity to guarantee the fulfillment of 
Tehran and Yalta accords for an enduring peace and a world fi'ee of faseisni. 

Carry out in full the decisions made by the Big Three at Crimea. 

Punish the war guilty without further delay. Death to all Fascist war crimi- 
nals. Make Germany pay full reparations in labor and in kind for the recon- 
struction of Europe. 

Strengthen the World Labor Congress as the backbone of the unity of the 
peoples and the free nations. 

Support the establishment of an effective international security organization 
based upon the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Yalta agreement. 

Guarantee to all peoples the right to determine freely their own destiny and 
to establish their own democratic form of government. Put an end to Anglo- 
American intervention against the peoples, such as in Greece, Belgium, and Italy. 

Grant immediate national independence to Puerto Rico. 

Break diplomatic relations with Franco Spain and Fascist Argentina. 

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials. 

Heli> feed and reconstruct stai'ving and war-torn Europe. Reject the Hoover 
program based on reactionary financial mortgages and political interference. 

Pass the Bretton Woods proposals and other democratic measures designed to 
promote international economic cooperation and expanding world trade. Grant 
extensive long-term loans and credits, at low interest rates, for purposes of 
reconstruction and industrialization. 

III. Meet the human needs of reconversion — Push the fight for 60 million jobs. 
Make the right to work and the Roosevelt second Bill of Rights the law of the 

laud. 



608 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Increase purchasing-power to promote maximum employment. No reduction 
in weekly take-home pay when overtime is eliminated. 

For an immediate 20 percent wage increase to meet the rise in the cost of 
living. Establish an adequate minimum hourly wage on a national scale. 

Establish the principle of the guaranteed annual wage. 

For a shorter workweek without wage reductions, except where this would 
hamper war production. 

Support Truman's proposals for emergency Federal legislation to extend and 
supplement present unemployment insurance benefits. Start unemployment in- 
surance payments promptly upon loss of job and continue until new employment 
is found. Provide adequate severance pay for laid-off workers. Insure the re- 
training, education and x-eemployment of the young workers. 

Prevent growing unemployment during the reconversion and post war period 
by starting large-scale Federal, State and municipal public works programs — 
slum clearance, low rental housing developments, rural electrification, the build- 
ing of new schools, hospitals, roads, etc. 

No scrapping of Government owned industrial plants. If private industry 
cannot operate these at full capacity for peacetime purposes the Government 
must. 

Maintain and rigidly enforce rent and price control and rationing. Strengthen 
the law enforcement powers of the OPA. Smash the black market. 

Utilize the Labor-Management Charter to press for the organization of the 
unorganized, to strengthen collective bargaining, to defend the trade-unions from 
all attacks by the open-shoppers, to raise living standards, and to promote the 
fight for 60 million .iobs. 

Prosecute the war profiteers. No reduction in corporate, excess profit and in- 
come taxes for the millionaires. 

Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill. 

Maintain equitable farm prices and assure adequate Federal and State aid 
to all needy farmers. 

IV. Repay our debt to the men who fought for victory. 

Guarantee jobs and security for all returning veterans regardless of race, creed 
or color. 

Extend the scope and benefits of the GI bill of rights and eliminate all red tape 
from the Veterans' Administration. Guarantee adequate medical care to every 
veteran. 

Press for the speedy enactment of legislation providing for substantial de- 
mobilization pay, based on length and character of service, and financed by taxes 
on higher personal and corporate incomes. 

Insure full benefits of all veterans legislation to Negro veterans. 

V. Safeguard and extend democracy. 

Enforce equal rights for every American citizen regardless of race, color, creed, 
political affiliation or national origin. 

End Jim Crow. Outlaw anti-Semitism. Eliminate all anti-Communist legisla- 
tion. Pass a national FEPC. Abolish the poll tax and the white primary. End 
every form of discrimination in the Armed Forces. 

Protect labor's rights, especially the right to organize and bargain collectively. 

Outlaw and prohibit all fascist organizations and activities. 

Curb the powers and policies of the monopolies and trusts which jeopardize 
the national welfare and world peace. Prosecute all violations of the antitrust 
laws, and all moves and acts to restox-e or continue the Anglo-German-American 
cartel system and practices. Protect and extend Federal aid to small business. 

This program represents the most urgent interests of the American people and 
the Nation. It is not a program for socialism which alone can completely abolish 
insecurity, exploitation, oppression, and war. This is an immediate program of 
action around which all progressive Americans can unite today. It is a program 
of action which will advance the destruction of fascism, help realize a more 
stable peace. 

(Continued on Page 5) etc. 



CPA National Board Decides Upon 
Discussions on Resolution 

The national board of the CPA, at its meeting of June 2, also adopted the fol- 
lowing additional motions : 

1. The national committee shall he convened within 2 weeks. 

2. The discussion by the membership of the association on the resolution of 
the national board shall start immediately in the clubs and in other meetings 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 609 

of the association to be determined by each State committee. Tlie discussion 
shall continue up to a date to he decided by the national committee, CPA. 

3. For the period of the discussion, arrangements shall be made with the 
Daily Worker to publish a semiweekly discussion bulletin as a supplement to 
the paper. This bulletin shall be open to all members of the association. 

4. State organizations may publish special discussion bulletins if they so 
desire. 

5. During the entire period of the discussion, the policy and practical mass 
work of the association shall be governed by the resolution of the national 
board. 

Mr. Morris. I might say that that exhibit is the fourth one we have 
introduced today. 

JNfr. BuDENz. I am going by chronology rather than a rounded-out 
picture, but the picture will be given, Mr. Chairman. 

The next one as far as I can see is dated June 26, 1945, page 9, 
headed, "One of Six Arrested Hits Clique in State Department." 

The Chairman. That is of the issue of the Daily Worker of what 
date? 

Mr. BuDENz. June 26, 1945, page 9. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. BuDENZ. This refers to Andrew Roth, one of those arrested 
in the Amerasia case and the Daily Worker predicts : 

Roth's forthcoming book. Dilemma in Japan, "dissects" the State Depart- 
ment's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes 
Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor 
Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the 
book would come out in September. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced into the record 
as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. That will be done and it will be received in the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 165 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 26, 1945, p. 9] 

One of Six Arrested Hits Clique in State Department 

Andrew Roth, on inactive status as senior lieutenant in the United States 
Naval Reserve since his arrest June 6, declared yesterday that charges against 
him "reflect the hopes of a powerful conservative clique in the State Department." 

In a copyrighted article in the New York Post Roth warned that, should this 
clique have its way, "the end result will almost certainly be a China wracked 
by civil war, a Japan in which the roots of aggression have been left intact, and 
a sharp clash of American and Soviet interests in the Far East.' 

Roth expressed confidence that he would be cleared of the accusation against 
himself and five others, of having been party to a conspiracy to transmit confi- 
dential information to unauthorized persons. 

Roth's forthcoming book. Dilemma in Japan, "dissects" the State Department's 
"past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Under 
Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. 
Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come 
out in September. 

Mr. Sourwine. To save time, could Mr. Maude! be asked whether 
these photostats which have been handed to the witness are all photo- 
stats of the Daily Worker, photostats prepared under his direction? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 



610 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. The next is an editorial in the Daily Worker of August 
6, 1945, page 6, and reads : 

It is for Under Secretary Grew to answer : Why are American guns being used 
to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being talieu to halt such 
crimes and guarantee against their repetition? 

This is an attack on Mr. Grew under the title, "Question to Mr. 
Grew." 

Mr. Morris. I offer that into the record as the next consecutive ex- 
hibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so received. 

.(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 166" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 166 
r [From, the Daily Worker, August 6, 1945, p. 6] 

Question to Mr. Grew 

Far up in northern China, Chinese are fighting Chinese at this very moment — 
yet how is it possible that hardly a mention of this gets to the American people? 

The Yenan radio has charged that American lend-lease guns ai"e being used 
against the Chinese Communist guerillas by the armies of Gen. Hu Tsung-nan — 
yet the War Department and the State Department say nary a word. 

We think this warfare in northern China is scandalous. And equally scan- 
dalous is the absence of any recognition by the State Department of American 
responsibility in this deadly serious affair. 

For who gains when a Kuomintang soldier is ordered to attack a Chinese Com- 
munist guerilla? Only Japan, the common enemy. 

And who profits by this silence from the United States? Only the Kuomin- 
tang dictatorship, which interprets silence as giving consent to its evil plans 
for the disunion of the Chinese nation. 

The Yenan radio has twice appealed to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to call off 
the attack of Kuomintang's Fifty-ninth Division. It is an appeal directed to 
Americans as well. 

For the plain fact remains that American lives are being jeopardized if the 
Chungking regime is permitted to continue such policies. 

And if such things can happen while the Kuomintang is supposedly liberaliz- 
ing its dictatorship, while the Soong-Stalin discussions are about to be resumed — 
the American people can have no confidence whatsoever in the Chungking leaders 
and all their promises and plans. 

It is for Undersecretary Grew to answer : Why are American guns being used 
to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such 
crimes and guarantee against their repetition? 

Mr. BiTDENZ. The next that I can find is the Daily Worker of 
August 13, 1945, page 5, headed "The Allied Reply and the Role of 
the Emperor," in which they state: 

Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the 
Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan re- 
sponsible for the war and the oppression of Asia. 

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces, represented by such 
men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want 
to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. 
They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can. 

Tliat is an editorial. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert that as the next 
consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 167" and is as 
follows :) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 611 

Exhibit No. 167 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 13, 1945. p. 5] 

The Allied Reply and the Role of the Empekoe — an Editobial 

Reprinted from late edition of Sunday Worker 

Tlie four great powers have given tlieir answer to Japan's acceptance of the 
Potsdam surrender declaration, in which the Japanese rulers asked for clarifica- 
tion on the Emperor's role. The world awaits the nest developments while the 
war itself is being pressed forward on all fronts. 

Faced with the overwlielming power of the United Nations, the vast American 
Air and naval power, the atom bomb, the Soviet Union's rapid advances in Man- 
churia and Korea, the Japanese rulers were forced to accept the Potsdam terms. 

The great powers have elaborated these terms to the extent that the Emperor 
will have to subordinate himself entirely to the Allied Supreme Command. He 
will have to carry out the Supreme Conmiand's orders in compelling the Japanese 
troops to lay down their arms. Tiie institution of the monarchy itself will ulti- 
mately be decided by the Japanese people. 

If we remember that the Potsdam declaration provided a good basis for eradi- 
cating Japanese fascism, eliminating the possibility of renewed aggression and 
opening the path for democratic development in Japan, it is clear that the 
United Nations stand on the eve of an immense victory. The tremendous fact 
Is that fascism in Asia as well as in Europe has at last been forced to its knees. 

We do not know, and cannot know, all the factors which entered into the 
Big Four's reply. Certainly, one of them is the necessity of intimate unity 
among the great powers. For without such unity a common program for ending 
the war, occupying the strategic areas of eastern Asia, and beginning the 
destruction (if fascist-militarism would be endangered. 

This should be remembered, even though on the role of the Emperor himself 
the American people are understandably disappointed. He is continuing on 
the tlirone, even though he is a war criminal, and the people rightly want to 
treat him as such. Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese 
history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up 
in .Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia. 

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces represented by such 
men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Plurley, want 
to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. 
They want to preserve as much of .Japanese fascism as they can. The Vanden- 
bergs and the Tafts unquestionably will attempt to use the royal house for des- 
perate efforts to sabotage the impending United Nations victory. 

That is why the American people must continue their vigilance — even though 
the war will undoubtedly end before the Japanese people have decided the 
ultimate fate of the royal house. 

A great victory of epic dimensions is unfolding before the democratic world. 

It is a victory well earned. It is a victory for which heavy sacrifices have 
been made. It is a victory which must lead to the complete eradication of fas- 
cism, and for this task — the precondition of a long and real peace — the unity of 
the great powers is decisive. 

The advance of democracy in China, the full independence of the colonial 
peoples is equally decisive. It is on all these issues that continued vigilance and 
struggle will be required. 

Mr. BuDENz. This is August 15, 1945, an editorial in the Daily 
Worker, page 2, which means it was given particular prominence. 

The Chairman. As regards this last one that you just identified, 
you said it was an editorial in the Daily Worker. Were you the 
editorial writer at that time? 

Mr. BuDENZ. I was the managing editor of the Daily Worker. The 
writing of the editorials was assigned at each editorial board meeting 
to various editors on the board. This was very likely written by 
Joseph Starobin, although that wasn't always the case. It was writ- 
ten under the supervision of the editorial board. 



612 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This is entitled "Prevent Civil War in China," and at the con- 
clusion states : 

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the 
recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate 
cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy. 

That is, the policy which they were condemning. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce that as the next consecutive 
exhibit in the record. 

The Chairman. It will be given its proper number and will be 
received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 168" and is 
as follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 168 

I From the Daily Worker, New York, August 15, 1945, p. 2] 

Pkevent Civil War in China — An Editorial 

With Japan's surrender just around the corner, the danger of civil war in 
China assumes immediate and alarming proportions. During the last few days 
Chiang Kai-shek has clearly revealed his intention of launching the civil war 
immediately, using Central Government troops which have been held ready 
for this moment, as well as puppet troops which collaborated with the .Japanese. 

And especially disturbing to the American people, in the midst of their jubila- 
tion over the approaching end of the war, are the reports from Chungking that 
American airplanes, troops, and munitions may be placed at the disposal of the 
Fascist-feudal clique in Chungking. 

The calamity of civil war in China must be prevented. For should it take 
place the peace for which we have fought a long and hard war would be seriously 
endangered. The American people, as well as our allies, must not be cheated 
of the fruits of the global victory. Much less can we permit the continuation 
of government policies which give aid to a reactionary, Fascist clique, a clique 
which has stood aloof fi-om the war against Japan since 1938, which has con- 
nived with the collaborationist regime at Nanking against all the democratic 
forces of China and which now rushes to make open war against them. 

CONFIRMATION IN UNITED STATES PRESS 

The charges made by the Tenan radio against Chiang, accusing him of col- 
lusion with the puppet troops and of setting up a united front with the Nanking 
collaborationists for the immediate launching of the civil war, are fully con- 
firmed by A. T. Steele's report to the New York Herald Tribune yesterday. 

"It is no secret," writes Mr. Steele, "that many puppet officials and army offi- 
cers are in league with Chungking and plan to declare allegiance to the Central 
Government when the time is ripe." 

According to the same correspondent, Chiang "is counting on assistance from 
Chinese puppet troops in enemy-held areas." This was openly admitted by the 
Generalissimo when he forbade the Communist-led armies and guerrillas to 
disarm the enemy, and called upon the puppet armies to "maintain order." 

In the tense and dangerous situation it is absolutely impermissible for Am- 
bassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer to place American material and men at 
Chiang's disposal. 

According to reports from Chungking, the two top American representatives 
have been conferring with Chiang for the pui^pose of planning the rapid occu- 
pation by Kuomintang troops of key ports and areas which have already been 
largely liberated by the Yenan armies. It is reported that American planes 
are ready to transport Chiang's troops into sectors already occupied or soon 
to be taken by the Communist-led and guerrilla forces. 

WORLD PEACE ENDANGERED 

For Chiang to attempt to possess these areas would mean to oust the liberation 
armies and declare war upon the people. We cannot be a party to such nefarious 
and dastardly plans. They would endanger the prospects of peace in the Pacific 
and in the world. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 613 

For Hurley and Wedemeyer to participate in this scheme is to place our 
Government policy entirely at the disposal of the most reactionary and imperi- 
alist forces in our country who want to prevent a united and democratic China, 
and will stop at nothing to achieve their end. 

The American people, especially the labor movement, should intervene directly, 
and at this very moment when the end of the war is at hand. 

We do not want the continuation of the war in another form, in the shape of a 
civil war in China. 

We want peace in the Pacific and in the world, and that means a democratic 
and united China. It means that the Chinese collaborationists, the Nanking 
puppets, and their Kuomintang- traitors should be held strictly to account and 
made to suffer for their treachery. 

Not a single American gun, soldier, plane or other war equipment must be 
placed at the disposal of the Fascist clique in Chungking. 

The Chinese liberation armies, including the eighth and fourth route 
armies whi<h did the major land fighting against the enemy, should be fully 
represented in working out the allied occupation of Japan and liberated areas. 

As with the other main problems of the peace, American-Soviet cooperation 
must be maintained and extended in the process of preventing civil war in China. 

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the 
recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleans- 
ing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy. We 
want a durable and democratic peace. 

Mr. BuDENz, Well, I have stepped out of the chronology, Mr. Chair- 
man, unfortunately, but I will introduce this anyway. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. BuDENz. This is the Daily Worker of July 24, 1945, an editorial, 
the chief editorial, "Mr. Grew Must Explain," in which they accuse 
the State Department under Mr. Grew's direction of playing up to 
the Japanese imperialists and appealing to them to surrender in time 
to save themselves. 

INIr. Morris. I would like to introduce that for the record as the 
next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be received and so designated. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 169" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 169 

[From the Daily Worker, July 24, 1945] 

Mb. Gkp:w JSIust Explain 

There is something very strange, very rotten, and very alarming in the way 
American policy toward Japan is developing. It is time the entire Nation 
realized what is going on, and what is at stake. 

Early last week, the Herald Tribune's Washington correspondent reported 
that plans were being made to modify the unconditional-surrender policy. Japan 
was going to be told that her Imperial Government might remain if only she 
would subordinate herself to the United States and submit to a peace which 
would not necessarily destroy her feudal-militarist structure. The Navy and 
State Department were reported favorable to such a plan. But it was all a 
matter for the future, to be decided by President Truman himself. 

Now it is disclosed that a direct Navy Department representative, Capt. E. M. 
Zacharias, has been broadcasting to Japan for the OWI. On Friday night he 
openly appealed to the Japanese industrialists to surrender in time. He said 
that American patience was running short, that unless the Japanese leaders 
surrender now, the peace may be complicated by the pressure of China, Aus- 
tr;alia, and perhaps also by the Soviet Union, japan, unlike Germany, would 
be well treated under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. In other words, an 
open appeal to negotiate a peace. 

Under Secretary Joseph Grew last week did not deny the Herald Tribune 
reports ; he merely said that no official peace offers had been received, which 
could be an invitation for them. And Elmer Davis now discloses that Captain 



614 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Zacharias has already made 12 such broadcasts. Evidently, what was going 
to be a modification of policy in the future is already a fact — to this officer — 
and has been the basis of repeated broadcasts. 

This is a scandalous situation. Both the Herald Tribune and the New York 
Times have in recent days devoted sharp editorials to it, which shows that 
while there is serious resistance to modification of the unconditional-surrender 
policy in the very highest circles, there is also plenty of fire to cause such smolie. 

Both newspapers point out that this Ijind of thing is only prolonging the 
war. It is encouraging the Japanese to resist even more fiercely. Instead of 
shortening the war, this is literally costing American lives. The Tribune cites 
a commentator of the Japanese Broadcasting Co., Kuso Oya, who gleefully 
predicts an impending about-face by the United States, urging the Japanese to 
fight on until that happens. Of course, it is not only the fact that the war is 
being prolonged by such tactics. The very basis of a democratic Asia would 
be undermined if the State Department conception wins out. 

Explanations to the American people are in order. The Navy Department 
should explain the case of Captain Zacharias. Mr. Grew should openly and 
frankly inform the American people whether and why the policy of unconditional 
surrender is being modified. 

Mr. BuDENZ. The next two are from' the Daily Worker of August 
18, 1945, the first of them being on page 2 and being a news dispatch 
from Art Shields, the Daily Worker correspondent at that time in 
Washington. In the course of this article, which is headed "See 
danger of United States intervention for Chiang," it says : 

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick 
Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces 
operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designa- 
tion means that the United States intends to follow the united policy urged by 
General Stilwell, before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang. 

That "designation" is a typographical error, it means "resignation" 
because they have just mentioned that Grew has resigned. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce that into the record as the 
next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It will be received and so designated. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 170" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 170 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 18, 1945, p. 2] 

See Danger of United States Intervention foe Chiang 

(By Art Shields) 

Washington, August 17. — The resignation of Joseph C. Grew, long a foe of 
Chinese unity, from his strategic post as Under Secretary of State, might be seen 
as an encouraging token of American policy toward China if taken by itself. 
Unfortunately it cannot be taken by itself. And there is too little time to specu- 
late, hopefully on inconclusive data, while the danger of further American inter- 
vention in the civil war, which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is preparing, 
remains so obvious. 

This intervention in the next few days may take a more active form than it 
has in recent months when the United States was merely equipping the Kuomin- 
tang armies, which were giving more attention to the blockade against the popular 
an ti Japanese resistance forces, led by the Communist General Chu Teh, than to 
fighting the enemy. 

The best informed authorities on China in Washington, in talks with the Daily 
Worker, yesterday foresaw certain types of American military and naval inter- 
vention to help the reactionary dictatorship, as distinct possibilities for the very 
near future. 

Military intervention could come if General Wedemeyer, commander of Ameri- 
can forces in China, carried out his reported promise to Chiang to carry airborne 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 615 

Kuoniintang troops to areas where the Japanese are surrendering. In most of 
those areas the Japanese and puppet troops would otherwise be forced to sur- 
render to Chu Teh's armies, which are engaging more enemy forces than Chiang's 
armies are engaging. 

Such action, if it takes place, would constitute American military intervention 
on behalf of the Chinese reactionaries, who are plotting civil war. It would 
involve tlie loss of American lives and a breach of faith with the Chinese people. 
It would jeopardize postwar peace in Asia and the world. 

Chiang has already appealed to the Japanese not to surrender to the democratic 
forces, in other words to continue resisting them until he can take over with 
American help, thus encouraging the Japanese to continue the war in violation 
of the Allied orders for immediate and unconditional surrender. He also has 
told the puppet troops under Japanese command that he will hold them "responsi- 
ble for maintaining local peace and order." 

This means that Chiang is seeking an alliance with foreign enemies and 
Chinese traitors against the people. And it means, says a statement from the 
people's government at Yenan, that Chiang is seeking to get possession of enemy 
arms for the purpose of launching large-scale civil war against the heroic anti- 
Japanese guerilla fighters and the Eighth and Fourth Route Armies led by the 
Communists. 

NAVAL INTERVENTION 

The danger of naval as well as military intervention may come in port cities 
like Shanghai. The democratic, anti-Japanese armies, not Chiang's are ad- 
vancing on Shangiiai and most of the other large cities. The people, not the 
Kuoraintang, will take these cities unless America intervenes. 

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick 
Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces 
operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation 
means that the United States intends to follow the unity policy urged by General 
Stilwell before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang. 

Authoritative observers of the Chinese scene here also point out that Ameri- 
cans should not develop hasty illusions from Chiang's recent request to Mao 
Tse-tung, Communist political leader in Yenan, to confer with him in Chungking. 

Conferences that are intended as more than gestures are not called in such 
vague fashion, they declare. There must first he preliminary meetings of rep- 
resentatives of the two groups to prepare the ground before the principals sit 
down together. There must be understandings regarding the specific issues to 
be discussed. Chiang's florid but brief invitation to Mao does not provide such 
understandings. 

And. most important, the invitation must be accompanied by such measures 
of good faith as the cessation of civil war by the Kuomintang, the lifting of 
the blockade against the border region, the release of political prisoners, and 
the establishment of democratic civil liberties. 

TERKORISTIC ATMOSPHERE 

Chungking's present terroristic atmosphere is not conducive to the conference 
Chiang proposes. 

America's first concern, however, is to tell our Government that there must 
be no intervention against the anti- Japanese fighters in China. No intervention 
on the side of a civil war plotter like Chiang, who, Yenan spokesmen have re- 
vealed, has set up a special Chinese brand of fascism — the brand called Com- 
pradore fascism, which is a reactionary dictatorship under the wings of foreign 
imperialism. 

Mr. Morris. May I make it clear that we are reading these articles 
and editorials from the Daily Worker to show that the Commmiist 
Part}', diirino; this period, was carryinii; on an extensive campaign 
against the then Under Secretary of State Grew, because he was 
advocating a so-called soft peace for Japan? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

]\Ir. Morris. Is that the case ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. What was the Communist policy for Japan? 



616 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENZ. It was that of a tough peace for Japan. 

Mr. MoRpas. And Mr. Grew was not carrying out that policy and 
therefore they were opposing him ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. That is correct. 

We have here an editorial, Stop the Monkey Business, appearing 
on the same date, August 18, 1945, on the regular editorial page of 
the Daily Worker, page 6. This is the leading editorial, which 
concludes as follows : 

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. Ttie dilly-dallying 
with the Emperor in Japan must stop, and, incidentally, Joseph Grew must 
really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing 
with far-eastern affairs. 

Mr. Morris. Now was this campaign being carried on against any- 
one else in the Japanese Division of the State Department, Mr. 
Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz, Yes, sir ; it was carried on at the same time extensively 
by the party, much more than these articles in the Daily Worker indi- 
cate. They corroborate the campaign, but through communications 
of the Politburo it was also against Eugene C. Dooman, who I under- 
stand was then connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State 
Department. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any reference to Mr. Dooman in those articles ? 

Mr. Budenz. There are references which I don't see in these articles, 
but there were many. There is an announcement here that the State 
Department "retires soft-peace advocate," but this is a United Press 
dispatch played up in the Daily Worker. This is dated September 6, 
1945, page 2. It indicates that the campaign against Mr. Dooman 
was meeting with success. 

Mr. Morris. The campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with 
success ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have these introduced into the record, 
Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. They will be so received and so designated. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 171 and 
172," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 171 

[From the Daily Worker, August 18, 1945, p. 6] 

Stop the Monkey Business 

The American people are watching the spectacle of Japan's delayed surrender 
with very suspicious eyes. And when you take into account the treacherous poli- 
cies of Chiang Kai-shek, and the rip-roaring apjieal to the reactionaries of the 
entire world by Winston Churchill — you get a very strange picture indeed. The 
American people are in no mood for monkey business. And that's what they 
fear is afoot. 

For example, there is today's report of a Japanese airplane attack upon our 
bombers, who were peacefully photographing Tokyo. The Kwantung army is 
still fighting. 

The behavior of the .Japanese Emperor is very strange, and all his rescripts 
read as though Japan still thinks she can make war again at some future time. 
At least three war criminals, members of the old Cabinet, have been reappointed 
to the new one; and one of these ministers even has the portfolio for "Greater 
East Asia," as though to say that Japan still expects to exercise imperialist 
control over the peoples of Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and 
Burma, and Thailand. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 617 

Tlip Japanese Government explains to its people that the war was won "spir- 
itually" ; the Tokyo radio breathes insidious suggestions of revenge; there is no 
mention of the war guilt of the former Japanese Cabinet whatsoever. 

And the Emperor's emphasis on the atom bomb makes it appear that Japan 
lost the war because of some scientific freak and not because she was forced to 
her knees. This is exactly the kind of propaganda to prepare for sabotaging the 
I'otsdam declaration. We cannot share President Truman's complacency about 
it. 

SURRENDER DELAYED 

But the main thing is that the cease-fire order is being delayed. Russians and 
Mongolians — our allies — are still dying. And our own soldiers face treachery at 
every point. No wonder the American people are suspicious. It is as though the 
American supreme command is just as worried about a social and political crack- 
up inside of Japan as the Emperor himself. It is as though our State Depart- 
ment is trying to help the Japanese feudalists and industrialists to weather 
their internal crisis. That is none of our business. Any leniency to the Japanese 
along those lines contains the prospect of rupturing the Allies and laying the 
basis for future wars. 

And then there is the crisis in China. The facts are brutally plain. Chiang 
Kai-shek is trying to keep the Japanese armies intact and fully armed until 
his own troops can get to Shanghai and Nanking. In other words. Chiang 
Kai-shek is afraid of the Chinese people who have suffered so long under the 
Japanese heel ; he prefers to keep them under that heel rather than allow them 
to liberate themselves. 

What does it mean, after all, when the Japanese puppet at Nanking publicly 
offers to hold the city with quisling troops until Chiang Kai-shek gets there? 
This is simple treachery. If it had happened in Europe, the country would be 
crying "sellout" from the housetops. 

But how can Chiang Kai-shek dare to fly his troops into Shanghai and Nan- 
king? Only because the American general, Albert Wedenieyer offers to help 
him with the services of American planes. In blunt language, this is interven- 
tion in the affairs of the Chinese people. It is encouraging Chiang to make 
civil war on all Chinese democrats. It is a dastardly game, and neither our 
soldiers nor our people want any part of it. 

And finally, there is the Herliert Hoover of Great Britain — Winston Churchill. 
His speech in Parliament was much more than a challenge to the British Labor 
Government, although it was that, too, and we hope the British people and 
their leaders will know how to answer it. The speech was also a call to Amer- 
ican reactionaries, urging them to treat Japan and to handle China in such a 
way as to prevent the victory of the democratic forces. 

His reference to communism in Eastern and Central Europe, and his defense 
of the poor Germans in eastern Prussia is dangerous in itself, but most important, 
it bears immediately on the Issues in Asia. 

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly' 
dallying with the emperor in Japan must stop, and incidentally Joseph Grew 
must really be retired from public life and in no ca.se appointed to any post 
dealing with far-eastern affairs. 

The United States must disavow Chiang Kai-shek's plans for civil war in 
China and give no support whatsoever to such a pro.1ect. Vigilance of the 
NaticHi is required today, a responsibility which falls particularly upon the labor 
movement. 



Exhibit No. 172 
[Prom tlie Daily Worker, New York. Thursday, September 6, 1945, p. 2] 
State Department Retires "Soft Peace" Advocate 

Washington, September .'") (UP). — Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, shap- 
ing a stilf occupation policy toward Japan, today was replacimr old-line Japanese 
policy-making officials in the State Department with experts on China. 

Eugene Dooman, special assistant to the director of the Department's Far 
Eastern Division, retired on August ."U, it was revealed today, alter li'.i years 
of diplomatic service in the .lapanese department. He was born in Japan and 
has been criticised by liberal j)ub!ications for a "soft" attitude toward Japan. 



618 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

He had held a key spot in formulating occupation procedure for Japan as 
chairman of a joint State, Army, and Navy Department committee responsible 
for occupation policy. 

John Carter Vincent, chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese 
Affairs, was recalled hurriedly from his vacation to fill Dooman's place on the 
committee. Vincent also retained his China post. 

OTHERS MAY GO 

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's recent resignation, and Dooman's 
retirement intensified speculation that Byrnes would replace other old liners 
in the Japanese section. Mentioned prominently were Ballantine and Erie R. 
Dickover, Chief of the Japanese Section. 

Observers regarded it significant that Vincent was the second China specialist 
to be appointed to a vital Japanese policy-making post within the last few days. 

Byrnes yesterday appointed United States Minister to Thialand George Atche- 
son to be acting political adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both Vincent 
and Atcheson have spent years in China and have seen the effects of Japanese 
aggression. Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. Panay when the Japanese bombed 
it on December 12, 1937. 

At his press conference Byrnes made it clear that United States policy toward 
Japan was more stringent than had yet been disclosed. 

Asked if he had seen reports that the Japanese did not believe they had lost 
the war, he said the terms of the occupation would soon be presented to the 
Japanese and if they didn't bring defeat home to them he didn't know what 
would. 

Mr. BuDENZ. May I state, Mr. Chairman, tliat I have one more ex- 
hibit, which v^hile I have taken it out of order is slightly different, it 
indicates the continuation of the campaign against Mr. Grew in 
order to drive him completely out of public life, as the editorial of 
August 18 stated, and this is a very large display article playing up 
with a great deal of praise John Stewart Service for having been 
vindicated after he had allegedly taken State Department documents 
and given them to Philip Jaffe. 

After his vindication and reinstatement in the State Department 
this says — 

"So sorry," says Grew ; State Department reinstates man he called spy. 

There is a very prominent picture of John Service, and it says — 

Mr. Gi'ew, late but unlamented Undersecretary of the State Department, 
popped off, too. 

Then they go on to indicate that Grew was compelled personally to 
apologize to one of the victims of the witch hunt, John S. Service, 
who was reinstated to his State Department job. 

So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American 
equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn 
in Tokyo. 

This is written up by a special writer for the Daily Worker and 
plays up Mr. Service, and or course belittles Mr. Grew. 

Senator O'Conor. I would like to ask a question. 

The Chairman. Go right ahead. 

Senator O'Conor, In view of your reference just made I am going 
to ask the question whether you considered Amerasia a Communist 
publication? 

Mr. BuDENz. Oh, yes. Amerasia was organized, according to of- 
ficial information given to me, under complete Communist auspices. 
As a matter of fact, the first copy of Amerasia when it first appeared 
was presented to me before it ever appeared to get my opinion. This 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 619 

was done, however, within the Communist apparatus and not by the 
Amerasia people. 

After I passed on it it went back to the Politburo. They said it had 
been submitted to me first before publication. 

Mr. Morris, You mean issue No. 1 of volume No. 1 was submitted 
to you for approval ? 

Mr. BuDENz. For my comments as to whether it was going to per- 
form its task. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce the previous 
photostat we were discussing into the record as the next consecutive 
exhibit. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 173" and is 
as follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 173 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 24, 1943, p. 4] 

"So Sorry," Says Grew ; State Department Reinstates Man He Called Spy 

(By John Mel don) 

Yes, sir ; it was all quite a mistake — but you won't find acknowledgment in those 
newspapers which screamed "Spy ring" a short time back. 

You recall the case: Five men and a woman were arrested and the Scripps- 
Howard pi-ess and Dirty Willie's Journal-American and Mirror, as well as the 
staid Times, ran the story in banner headlines. The six were accused — by the 
press and not the authorities — of constituting a "spy ring" with "connections" 
with those awful Communists. 

For several days the newspapers raved and ranted, and Mr. Grew, late but 
unlamented Under Secretary of the State Department, popped off, too. He hinted 
darkly that the six accused — three employees of the State Department and several 
editors and writers for the magazine Amerasia — had done everything but back a 
Mack truck up to the State Department and expropriate all sorts of "confiden- 
tial" documents relating to the China situation. 

Payoff came yesterda.v when Mr. Grew personally apologized to one of the 
victims of the witchhunt — John S. Service — who was reinstated to his State De- 
partment job by Secretary Byrnes. In putting Service back on the job, Mr. 
Byrnes praised Service to the skies for his excellent 12-year record with the 
Department. So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the 
American eqnivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long 
sojourn in Tokyo. 

But do you think the newspapers which went to town on the "spy ring" phony 
had anything to say yesterday? Of course not. For that matter when, on last 
August 10 only three of the original group accused were indicted — not as spies, 
mind you, but on the far less serious charge of removing documents without per- 
mission — the newspapers buried the fact in little one-column stories somewhere 
back among the want ads. 

However, don't get the idea Mr. Howard or Mr. Dirty Willie are sorry. They 
accomplished what they set out to do. They planted a terrific lie and some of it 
stuck. You see, the whole thing behind the story is that the accused group were 
fed up with Mr. Grew's policies toward our Chinese allies. So Mr. Grew and the 
big-circulation press nailed them. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously that 
the first issue of Amerasia appeared in 1937. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. While the campaign against Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman 
was proceeding with respect to policy for Japan, was there a policy 
in the Communist Party councils also being carried out with respect to 
certain officials concerning our China policy? 



620 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENZ. Yes, sir; definitely. As we have indicated here it was 
against Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, against Ambassador and Gen. 
Patrick Hurley. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow the same pro- 
cedure with respect to this folder. Mr. Mandel, will you testify as to 
the contents of that folder ? 

Mr. Mandel. All copies from the Daily Worker appearing in this 
folder have been prepared at my direction. 

The Chairman. Photostatic copies? 

Mr. Mandel. Some are photostated and a couple are typed. 

Mr. Morris. I am forwarding this list to the witness, Mr. Chairman, 
so that it will refresh his recollection in testifying to the coming 
incidents. 

Mr. Budenz. This first photostatic copy of the Daily Worker is 
linked up with the campaign on Grew to some extent in addition to 
the campaign on Hurley. It was engineered, to my knowledge, b}^ the 
Communist Party — that is, by official reports that I have received. 
This was the statement by 21 prominent Americans urging President 
Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point to show 
that these 21 people who signed the statement, which according to the 
testimony of Mr. Budenz was signed to influence our foreign policy, 
that a great number of them were connected Avith the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. I would like to go through that list with this in 
mind. Mr. Budenz, have 3^011 a copy of the list ? 

Mr. Budenz. It appears here in the Dail}^ Worker. 

Mr. IMoRRis. I wonder if we could linger here for a minute and I 
would like to ask you to read out the names. 

Mr. Budenz. All of them ? 

]Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Budenz. Dr. Phyllis Ackerman ; T. A. Bisson, writer 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have 
had testimony concerning Mr. Bisson's relations with the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 

Mv. Budenz. ^Mrs. Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Is she the wife of Edward C. Carter, the secretary 
general of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is my understanding. 

Mr. Morris. Continue, Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz. Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, cor- 
respondent. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have 
had testimony that Israel Epstein was connected with the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Budenz. Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee. In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. I think that speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Budenz. Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's 
Christian Association 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Talitha 
Gerlach, according to ]:)revious testimony, has been associated with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Budenz. Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, 
president. United Office and Professional Woi'kers of America; 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 621 

Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union ; Rev. 
Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for 
Democracy ; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute ; Martin 
Popper, executive secretary. National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. 
Salisbury, editor. Far Eastern Survey. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the Far 
Eastern Survey is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

Senator Smith. May I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Buclenz, do you know Mr. Martin Popper? 

Mr. BuDENz. I have talked to him on the phone and my impression 
is that I have met him. 

Senator Smith. Do you know about his alleged trip to Russia in the 
spring of 1946? 

Mr. BuDENz. I don't recall that. 

Senator Smith. Did you know about that? 

Mr. BuDENz. I couldn't recall it offhand. His relations with the 
Daily Worker were of the closest. 

Senator Smith. I saw him in Europe myself, and it was alleged 
that he went from Nuremberg to Russia and I wondered if you knew 
about it. 

Mr. BuDENz. I do not. 

Mr. Morris. I think that will be enough, Mr. Budenz. 

The purpose of that, Mr. Chairman, was to show the high incidence 
of the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations which partici- 
pated in that which Mr. Budenz described as a Communist maneuver. 

The Chairman. This is a list on some document addressed to the 
President ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Was it arranged by the Communist Party? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Iklr. Morris. What is the date of that? 

Mr. Budenz. August 17, 1945. 

Senator O'Conor. I do understand, Mr. Budenz, that you either 
are prepared to say or have said it that the telegram was signed by the 
individuals in their individual capacity? You did make reference 
to certain organizations such as the Young Women's Christian Asso- 
ciation. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Senator O'Conor. I do not think you wanted to give any impres- 
sion that they were speaking for the organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. No; but this is a typical Communist procedure, put- 
ting the organization down and giving the impression that they are 
linked up in some way. I might say that they call themselves the 
Friends of Chinese Democracy. It was a committee called that, so 
it was under the cover of that committee. 

Senator Smith. The same might be said with respect to the Na- 
tional Lawyers Guild, Mr. Martin Popper of the National Lawyers 
Guild? 

Mr, Budenz. Yes, sir. I would prefer not to discuss the National 
Lawyers Guild today because I have to indict it and that would take 
quite a bit of time. 

22848 — n2— pt. 2 18 



622 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Is that all there is to this particular one? 
Mr. BuDENZ. There is another name, Ilona Kalf Sues, writer. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be received and given the proper designa- 
tion. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 174" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 174 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Friday, August 17, 1945, p. 2] 

Americans in Plea to Truman on China 

Twenty-one prominent Americans yesterday urged President Truman to avert 
the serious danger of civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to 
prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over 
to the Chungliing government. 

Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese 
troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," 
the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid 
civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic 
Chinese groups on the spot. 

The message to President Truman noted that the Communist-led Eighth Route 
and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack "have 
borne the brunt of the Allied fight in North Central China. 

SIGNERS 

The telegram was signed by the following in their individual capacities 
(organizations listed for purpose of identification only) : 

Dr. Phylles Ackerman ; T. A. Bisson, writer; Mrs. Edward C. Carter; Maurice 
P. Davidson, lawyer ; Israel Epstein, correspondent ; Frederick V. Field, mem- 
ber, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations : Melvin J. Fox ; Talltha 
Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association ; Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Na- 
tion; Lewis Merrill, president. United Office and Professional Workers of Amer- 
ica ; Frederick N. Myers, vice president. National Maritime Union. 

Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary. United Church Council for Democ- 
racy ; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute ; Martin Popper, executive 
secretary. National Lawyers Guild ; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor. Far Eastern 
Survey ; Vincent Sheean, writer, Mrs. Edgar Snow, writer ; Ilona Ralf Sues, 
writer; Richard Watts, writer; Dr. Max Yergan, director. Council on African 
Affairs, and Reid Robinson, president. Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO. 

A committee called The Friends of Chinese Democracy, is being formed, the 
purpose of which will be to press for an American foreign policy designed to sup- 
port all efforts of the Chinese people for unity and democratic government, it 
was announced yesterday. 

The full text of the message to President Truman follows : 

"We are alarmed at the news that the Chungking government is planning to 
use American planes and other military equipment made available to them by 
General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley to combat the perfectly legitimate 
efforts of patriotic Chinese forces in north and central China engaged in dis- 
arming enemy troops and liberating areas in which they alone have fought 
throughout the war. 

"If these plans are carried out it can only mean civil war in China instead of 
Chinese democratic unity on which the security of the Far East depends. 

"We are particularly disturbed by Chiang Kai-shek's recent order to Chinese 
puppet troops who have been serving the Japanese enemy and who now appar- 
ently are to be used by the Chungking and American Governments against pa- 
triotic forces. 

"The latter, despite never having received any assistance from the United 
States or Chungking, have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in north and central 
China, cooperated with American military personnel and rescued almost 100 
American airmen forced down in the vicinity of Peiping, Taiyuan, Hankow, 
Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 623 

ENC0UKAGE8 FOE 

"Generalissimo Chiang, moreover, encourages continued resistance of the 
enemy by inviting them to police the areas which they hold at present, and by 
stating that they will be held "strictly accountable" for arms which they or 
their puppets "might surrender to any organization or party other than officers 
or men duly authorized by the Chinese (Central) Government." 

If carried out, such a policy would violate the purposes of this war. It would 
seriously jeopardize the peace that has been won. Americans would not support 
a policy toward China similar to that of the British in Greece. 

Under circumstances existing w China today we believe that the only American 
policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender to patriotic 
Chinese troops on the spot and simultaneously to encourage all Chinese efforts 
to a democratic government. 

"Such action must be based on full agreement with Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union. « 

"In appealing to you, Mr. President, we reflect the views of thousands of 
Americans, including many of those serving in the Armed Forces in China." 

Mr. Morris. Are there any other articles, Mr. Budenz, establishing 
the point that the Communists were then carrying on a policy such 
as 3' ou testified to ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. Having disposed of Grew and Dooman, 
the campaign was laid before I left the party, and it was already 
under way, as you can see from tliese editorials to which I have re- 
ferred, for attack on Ambassador Hurley, which was more prolonged 
than we have indicated here. I say, before I left the party because 
these copies of the Daily Worker are after I am out of the party. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Mr. BuDExz. However, I recognize them as copies of the Daily 
Worker which I have read. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Will you continue your testimony on that point? 

The Chairman. Just on that point, do 3^ou intend to follow up, 
Mr. Morris, as regards the attack on General Wedemeyer? If not 
I would like to ask a question or two. If you have it in the course 
of your presentation, all right. 

Mr. Morris. Are you prepared to testify about the campaign 
against General Wedemeyer, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Not in great detail. I just know that this campaign 
in the Daily Worker was carried out to the various sections of the 
Communist Party and was made the order of business for the Com- 
munists in other organizations. 

The Chairman. I am interested in that phase of the campaign 
which seems to have been pointed toward General Wedemeyer. Wede- 
mej^er was at that time, or at some time either prior to or subsequently 
sent under the auspices of the State Department to China, as I recall? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. 

The Chairman. And was the representative of the State Depart- 
ment in China. Was it during that time that he was attacked by the 
Communists ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is my impression. As a matter of fact, the Com- 
munists viewed General Wedemeyer as the enemy of the Soviet 
interests in the Far East, 

The Chairman. General Wedemeyer's report was a controversial 
thing here for a long time and was refused to congressional commit- 
tees even under subpena when we issued subpenas for the presentation 
of General Wedemeyer's report on China and the Far East. 



624 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I am just wondering why the attack was directed against Wede- 
meyer, if you Imow. 

Mr. BuDENz. The attack was directed against Wedemeyer from 
the Communist viewpoint because they consider him to be an enemy 
of Soviet policy in the Far East. The policy of the Communists was 
to work out a coalition government in which they could strangle those 
who coalesced with them. That was the phrase used in the discussion 
so that I am not straining the question. 

General Weclemeyer's tendencies — I can't go into them in detail, 
were in opposition to that course — that is, at least to the extent that 
the Communists viewed him as one who would not go along fully 
with their program. 

Senator Watkixs. ISfay I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Watkins. With respect to General Wedemeyer, the public 
press reported him to have told about a time when he was appointed 
Ambassador to China and then his appointment was canceled because 
some intereststs in China objected. Do you know anything about 
that campaign about getting his appointment canceled? 

Mr, BuDENz. Not specifically. I know there was a general cam- 
paign against General Wedemeyer as one of those in our diplomatic 
service who was inimical to Soviet interests. 

Senator Watktxs. Do you recall his testimony where he said he 
bought his clothing for that particular assignment? 

Mr. BuDENz. I read in the public press and that is the only knowl- 
edge I have. 

Senator Watkixs. Were you connected with the part}^ at that time? 
That goes back a immber of years. 

Mr. BuDENz. That I am not sure of. I don't know the date of it, 
and I would want to be precise. 

The CiiAiRMAx, Senator Smith? 

Senator Smith. When General Weclemeyer's report was held up, 
do you know, Mr. Budeuz, enough about the influence of the Com- 
munists on anybody in State Department that tended to cause that 
re])ort to be held up ; and, if so, how was that worked out? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Of my own knowledge I wouldn't know that. I 
wouldn't know everything about Communist activity. But I do Iviiow 
that tlie Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter 
Vincent in the campaign against Amliassador Hurley, for example. 

Senator Smith. Was a part of the campaign against General Wede- 
meyer to have his report suppressed, as it was indeed suppressed for 
several years ? 

Mr. Morris. Senator Smith, it may be that INIr. Budenz' experience 
in tlie Communist Party terminated in 1045. Was not General Wecle- 
meyer's report issued subsequent to that time? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is my impression. 

Senator Smith. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Mv. Budenz, you have been testifying up to this point 
with regard to the people that the Conmiunists planned to eliminate 
from the State Department because they interfered with Communist 
policy. What people were you relying on to put over your policy ? 

The Chairman. The policy of elimination? 

Mr. Morris. The policy of elimination. Let's take the Japanese 
situation first. Did the Communist Party make use of Owen Latti- 
more or Owen Lattimore's writings with respect to Japan ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 625 

Mr. BuDENz. Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japan policy and 
otliers. 

Mr. Morris. Will you ehaborate on that ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. His book. Solution in Asia, was it not? — was used by 
the Communists and other writings of his. 

Mr. Morris. Did you not testify about a certain press release 
yesterday ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is what I referred to just now. 

Mr. Morris. Will you amplify that, please? 

Mr. BuDENZ. This press release we can see runs in line with the 
■Communist charges here against everybody; that they are for the re- 
tention of vested interest in Japan. 

The Chairman. To what press release do you refer when you say 
"this press release"" ? 

Mr. BuDENz. This was a press release which was introduced in evi- 
dence the other day issued in 1945. I don't say that I have any knowl- 
edge that Mr. Lattimore conferred with the Communists before mak- 
ing the statement. I do say that this statement was used extensively 
by the Communists to my knowledge, it was made a special order of 
business for the Communist Party to press it. 

Mr. Morris. You say that supplemented the Communist campaign 
to eliminate Grew from the State Department? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. And also in imposing a hard peace on Japan? 

]Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Were any writings of Andrew Roth used for this pur- 
pose? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. Dilemma in Japan was not only advanced by 
the Communists but it was submitted to the Politburo before publi- 
cation. 

]\Ir. Morris. Was Andrew Roth a Communist? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir, from many official reports he was a Com- 
munist. These came up particularly in the Amerasia case and defi- 
nitely ]Mr. Roth was described as a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that Andrew Roth's 
book was used to supplement this Communist campaign ? 

Mr. Budenz, Most decidedly. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of 
the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. From official reports that I have received, he was. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he went to China with Henry Wal- 
lace and Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did you hear at that time in official Communist Party 
circles that John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore were members 
of the Communist Party traveling with Henry Wallace? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I wish you would elaborate on that. 

Mr. Budenz. As I have stated, the trip by Wallace to China was 
followed by the Communists w^ith a great deal of interest in dis- 
cussions in the Politburo. In those discussions it was pointed out 
that Mr. Wallace was more or less under good influences from the 
Communist viewpoint, that is to say, that he had on one hand Mr. 
Lattimore and on the other John Carter Vincent, both of whom were 



626 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

described as being in line with tlie Communist viewpoint, seeing eye 
to eye with it, and that they would guide Mr. Wallace largely along 
those paths. 

The Chairman. To what are you referring, are you referring to 

Eublications or statements made in party conclave, or statements made 
y high officials of the Communist Party or to what are you referring 
when you say that it was stated that Mr. Wallace was under good 
influence? 

Mr. BuDENz. That was stated by Communist officials in the Polit- 
buro at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. This is 
also confirmed to some degree, not the Wallace business but the de- 
pendence on John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent, that is 
confirmed by the Daily Worker's subsequent statement that they were 
responsible to a great degree for getting Mr. Hurley out of the State 
Department. 

Senator O'Conok. Mr. Budenz, at that point could I ask you if 
you knew what position John Carter Vincent held at tliat time? 

Mr, Budenz. I could not. I know as yet he wasn't head of the Far 
Eastern Division of the State Department and that he was subse- 
quently placed in that Division. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official 
Communist Party secret shared by a few people that at that time 
John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Was one of the objectives of the Communists to 
put Mr. Vincent in the position he afterward acquired ? 

Mr. Budenz. The Communists were eager tliat Mr. Vincent ad- 
vance and that he obtain a place in the State Department where he 
could get rid of Hurley and in addition to that could also influence 
policy. 

Senator Smith. Was that purpose achieved by his being put in the 
position that he \\as placed in ? 

]Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, Mr. Dooman was got out and he was put in 
his place. 

JNIr. JNIoRRis. Mr. Mandel, will you read extracts from Henry AVal- 
lace's book at that time which elaborates on Mr. Budenz' testimony? 

Tlie Chairman. What was the name of the book and when was it 
published? 

Mr. Mandel. I read from the book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission," 
by Henry A. Wallace, published by Reynal & Hitchcock, the fol- 
lowing two paragraphs on page 172. 

The Chairman. Have you the date of the publication ? 

Mr. Mandel. It was 1944 or 1945-. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. This is Henry Wallace's writing. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk 
with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied 
in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials 
Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. 
He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was 
conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings 
were revealed in telling incidents during our entire .iourney. 

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruii, proposed a toast: "To the 
modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification : 
"May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 627 

China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, 
after our return from Chiua, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen 
Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests 
great responsibility for China's future." 

]\Ir. Morris. Mr. Manclel, is there anything in the previous para- 
graph that identifies who Goglidze was'^ 

IMr. Mandel. Goglidze, according to the same book, was a Georgian, 
an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin, president of the executive com- 
mittee of Khabarovsk Territory, under which this far northern area 
is governed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like this introduced into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit, this excerpt from Mr. Wal- 
lace's book. But I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question on that 
last toast Mr. Goglidze proposed. 

The Chairman. That will be inserted in the record and properly 
marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 175" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 175 

Soviet Aslv Mission 

(By Henry A. Wallace — Regnal and Hitchcock) 

I was assisted by expert interpreters who accompanied me. They were. In 
addition to Mr. Lattimore : Mr. John Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for 
Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration of Chinese Affairs, State De- 
partment (p. 21). 

******* 

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with 
Sergei Goglidze. He was curious ' about the Chinese situation. I replied in 
the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Gog- 
lidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. 
He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was 
conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings 
were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey. 

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the 
modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modifica- 
tion : "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese mili- 
tarism, China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At 
dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen 
Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests 
great responsibility for China's future" (p. 172). 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you hear the toast that Goglidze pro- 
posed, "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts 
on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future" ? As 
an exjDert on the Communist movement, bearing in mind the fact that 
Mr. Goglidze was an intimate of Marshal Stalin and that he made 
that toast, would it have any significance to you ? 

Mr. Bddenz. I think it speaks for itself. I think it speaks for 
itself that the Russians always make these toasts for political pur- 
poses. Of course, everybody they toast is not a Communist, but I 
think that they were definitely trying to establish the place of Owen 
Lattimore ancl John Carter Vincent in Mr. Wallace's mind for Mr. 
Wallace and also placing upon them the responsibility. 

Mr. Morris. When Mr. Goglidze speaks of China's future he does 
it with what in view ? 



628 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. Definitelj^ he does it with the view of a Red China, 
that is no secret, that was told us long ago and was the whole program. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters there showing John 
Carter Vincent's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. John Carter Vincent 

The Chairman. What are you reading from ? 

Mr. Mandel. I am reading from a list of attendance at the discus- 
sion conference held in Washington, D. C, of the American Council 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations held December 9 to 10, 1938, and 
Mr. John Carter Vincent attended that conference. He was also a 
conference member of the Hot Springs IPR conference held January 
6 to 17, 1945, according to a volume called Security in the Pacific, a 
preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, on page 159. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, is there anything showing when Mr. 
Vincent was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. No, I do not have that. 

Mr. Morris. Will you make that a part of the record later today? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

December 27, 1944. 
Mr. .ToHN Carter Vincent, 

Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Vincent: This is just a last minute reminder to you about the 
conference. According to our records, you are expected during the following 
dates : January 9 through 17. 

I would urge you to carefully observe the following suggestions : 

1. There are no additional copies of data papers available. This means 
that you should bring your data papers with you or have them sent to you 
care of room 250, which is the headquarters of the American delegation. 
Any papers so sent should get out as soon as possible in order for them to 
arrive by January 5. 

2. Additional data papers, not previously distributed, are being mailed 
direct to Hot Springs and Avill be distributed to you upon arrival. 

3. Prior to January 4, please notify us of any change in your schedule 
by telegi'am to this office. After January 4, please notify us of any such 
change by wiring us at room 250, Tlie Homestead, Hot Springs, Va. 

The following is a listing we have for you in the conference who's who.' If 
you have any changes, will you please let me know immediately : 

"Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. 
Member. Board of Trustees, American Council, IPR." 

I need not impress upon you again the importance of this meeting nor urge 
that you keep us informed of your plans. 

Looking forward to seeing you at our sessions in Hot Springs, I am, 
Very cordially yours, 

Raymond Dennett, Secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Are there any letters, Mr. Mandel, that we can intro- 
duce at this time ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated February 4, 1944. It is really a memorandum 
headed "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland," "from M. S. F.," 
presumably Miriam S. Farley. It says: "Copy to H. M." That 
might be Harriet Moore. 

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max 
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China. 

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among 
others. Vincent said fin confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought 
it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be 
said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 629 

Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. 
Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points 
of detail. 

That is an excerpt from the memorandum which is offered as an 
exhibit. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit and then I would like to ask Mr. 
Budenz a question. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record and properly 
marked. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 176" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 176 

Februaky 4, 1944. 
W. L. II. from M. S. F. 
(Copy to H. M.) 

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max 
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China. 

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among 
others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis, that he 
thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things 
should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive 
rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to 
leave tlie IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful 
suggestions on points of detail. 

I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent 
and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it 
down any more. Nevertheless I am making some changes along lines recom- 
mended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My 
position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid 
offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's 
value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information 
for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for 
this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not 
get anytliing out of it. 

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of 
this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by 
such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. 
I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle 
under to them. 

The American Council is of course prepared to take full responsibility for this 
pamplilet and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. 
Nevertheless we should welcome your views. Perhaps I have assumed too much 
from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let 
me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, have you previously testified that Maxwell 
Stewart is a Communist? 

Mr. BuDExz. Yes, sir; I have met him as such. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; not by personally meeting him but by official 
reports, particularly in 1945. 

Mr. Morris. You have already testified that John Carter Vincent 
was a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr, Morris. Now I call your attention to the second paragraph in 
that letter, Mr. Budenz. Will you read that second paragraph? 
Mr. Budenz, the "Ms." stands for manuscript, I believe. 

JNIr. Budenz. "I am now editing the manuscript" 



630 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. The second paragraph. 
Mr. BuDENz. I beg your pardon. 

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbauk and John Carter Vincent 
among others. Vincent said, in confldence, with a certain emphasis, that he 
thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things 
should he said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive 
rewriting. Witliout this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to 
leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful 
suggestions on points of detail. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator O'Conor. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Budenz, I particularly note the parenthesis 
that John Vincent said in confidence and with a certain emphasis. 
Can you give any reason why any such statement should be made in 
confidence or just what significance that had? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. It certainly was part of the Communist 
plan to protect, as I have said, those who were in key and delicate 
positions and therefore what he would give would be in confidence 
so that his name could not be used extensively but for immediate 
purposes involved among those in whom he had confidence. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, from your own experience was it a prac- 
tice before a manuscript was issued that it be looked over by members 
of the Communist Party for perfection? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Can you elaborate on that a bit for us ? 

Mr. Budenz. Of course, that doesn't prove this was looked over 
by Communists. 

Mr. Morris. I understand. 

Mr. Budenz. That was a practice; that is to say, frequently a 
pamphlet was referred to the Politburo or to someone immediately 
in charge of that particular work involved. He would then assign 
it to two or three people to look it over. I have looked over pamphlets 
and then people outside the immediate Communist apparatus would 
look over it for determination as to whether it stood up for the Marx- 
ist viewpoint, and to see whether it met the peculiar exigencies of 
the moment. 

Mr. Morris. You do know with respect to this particular docu- 
ment, the author of which was Maxwell Stewart, read by John Carter 
Vincent and John Fairbank, that they were members of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a brief slip taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations that is undated, which is headed "E. 
C. C." and the name of Mortimer Graves is attached at the end. It 
reads as follows : 

I have been asked by the Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call to- 
gether a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information 
Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am 
quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way 
with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, of course, I 
won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. 
Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking. 

Mr. Morris. That is signed "Mortimer Graves" ? 
Mr. Mandel. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the 
record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 631 

The Chairman. It may be so inserted and identified. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 177" and is 

as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 177 
E. C. C. : 

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call to- 
gether a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information 
Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am 
quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way 
with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't par- 
ticipate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is 
waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking. 

MoBTiMHSi Graves. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on 
that particular memorandum? 

Mr. Budenz. I don't think so. I don't think so unless you want to 
ask me some question about it. 

Mr. Morris. Was the Council of American-Soviet Friendship a 
Communist organization ? 

Mr. Budenz. That was a Communist front. That was a dupli- 
cate, if I may use the word duplicate here, because of many other 
organizations involved, founded by the Russian apparatus all over 
the world. They were first known as Friends of Soviet Russia and 
then became the Council of American-Soviet Friendship, completely 
controlled by the Communists, as it was created by them. 

Mr. Morris. Was the staff of the Russian War Relief made up of 
Communists, Mr. Budenz, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; at least to my knowledge. I don't know that 
I can detail them at the moment. 

Mr. Morris. Generally would you describe it? 

Mr. Budenz. The Russian War Relief was organized by the Com- 
munists. It was organized under orders of the So\ iet Embassy, at 
least from the statements made in the Politburo that they had received 
instruction to see that Russia War Relief was not only organized but 
made efficient and this matter was discussed on many occasions. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you continue with your going through 
those exhibits there with the view toward supplementing your testi- 
mony on the point that Communists were influencing our foreign 
policy with respect to China? 

Mr. Budenz. These are Daily Workers published after I left the 
Communist Party, but I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker 
I have read, as I continue to read the Daily Worker up to the present 
day. This one is dated November 28, 1945, page 3, Hurley Out as 
Envoy to China, Backs AVar Policy in Far East. 

The paragraph to which I wish to direct your attention here, the 
one at least in my opinion that should be given attention, reads : 

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. 
Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The 
former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the 
Embassy in China. 

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called 
Communists — 

By the way, the Communists made particular point of attacking 
Hurley's mentality, representing him as a crude fellow. I could, if I 
had time, give you many examples, but they wouldn't be profitable. 



632 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Com- 
munists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State 
Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as 
specifically in China." 

This article is significant beyond being an article in the Daily 
Worker because it is a specially written article by Joseph Starobin, 
foreign editor of the Daily Worker. 

Mr. MoRKis. Were you managing editor of the Daily Worker at 
that time ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. I was not. 

Mr. Morris. Can you describe the significance of the language there^ 
"liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the 
State Department" ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Tliat is generally used, liberal and progressive, for 
those who are Communist or pro-Communist. It doesn't necessarily 
mean that, however, but I think these speak for themselves. 

Mr. Morris. What did you know about John Stewart Service, Mr. 
Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I might add that those who are allies of the Com- 
munists, and some may be unconsciously, are designated as liberals 
Progressiv-es are always identified as Communists, so when the Com- 
munists speak of liberals they mean those that go along with Commu- 
nist policy either because of their own self-interest or because of being 
in line with the Communist views. 

Mr. Morris. Now, in this case I notice they use the term "liberal" 
in connection with John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Yet at the same time you knew that Vincent was a 
member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes ; the stressing of Vincent and Service as "lib- 
eral" by Starobin the moment Hurley is thrown out is significant. 
They are being r -commended as people who stand for the things that 
the Daily Worker stands for. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evi- 
dence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Mr. Sour wine. Mr. Morris, before you introduce that, did you want 
this one introduced ? 

Mr. Morris. That is the one I referred to. 

The Chairman. That has been identified by the witness. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is the one the witness referred to ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record and properly 
designated. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 178" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. ITS 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 28, 1945, p. 3] 

Hurley Out as Envoy to China, Backs War Policy in Far East 

(By Joseph Starobin) 

Ma.i. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley resigned yesterday from the post of Ambassador 
to Chungking with a statement indicating an all-out drive of the Hoover Repub- 
licans and American imperialists to encourage the Truman administration's 
headlong intervention in China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 633 

Hurley's inflammatory 1,500-word statement was essentially the voice of those 
American imperialists who are openly anti-Soviet and call everything democratic 
in Europe and Asia a manifestation of "Communist imperialism." 

At the same time, it was a criticism of American support for British imperial- 
ism in Asia in the sense that Hurley feels American capital should be getting 
more out of support for Britain than it is now getting. 

The decision not to return as Ambassador in China came after weeks of a 
varied criticism of Hurley's policies from liberal experts on China, from the 
labor movement, from six progressive west coast Congressmen and even from 
the Republican independent paper, the New York Herald Tribune. 

BLATANT POLICY SEEN 

The White House immediately announced the appointment of Gen. George C. 
Marshall, who resigned last week as Chief of Staff. 

This choice of a conservative military man gave no indication that American 
policy is today concerned with conciliation or peace in China. 

Hurley, while criticizing the professional diplomats in the State Department — 
that is, the civilian pro-Iloosevelt elements who have been increasingly worried 
by where our policy is going — nevertheless associated himself completely with 
I'resident Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. 

Major political interest was focused yesterday on the Hurley resignation, since 
it indicates the various personal, factional, and political conflicts within the 
administration. These in turn reflect the great popular alarm with the adminis- 
tration's course. 

The way to take advantage of these conflicts, of course, is not to bank on their 
stopping the Truman-Byrnes policy, but to redouble pressure on all elements in 
the administration. 

HOOVER LANGUAGE 

Hurley used the characteristic language of the Hoover-Vandenberg crowd. He 
claimed to be favoring "democracy and free enterprise" against "imperialism 
and communism." 

He was full of praise for the Atlantic Charter and was bitter at the "profes- 
sional Foreign Service men," who, he said, were sympathetic to the "Communist 
armed party in China." 

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. 
Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The 
former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of 
the Embassy in China. 

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Com- 
munists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State 
Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as spe- 
cifically in China." 



Step Up "Quit China" Fight in Congress 
(By Art Shields) 

Washington, Nov. 27. — Ambassador Patrick Hurley's resignation, and his 
replacement by General Marshall, will not stop the congressional campaign to 
end America's intervention in China. 

"Regardless of who is the ambassador to Chungking, we will press for the 
passage of our anti-intervention resolution until the Marines and Gls and trans- 
ports are taken out of China," declared Representative Hugh DeLacy (Demo- 
crat, Washington), the leader of the group. 

The stop-the-iutervention drive will be pushed at two meetings on Capitol Hill 
tomorrow. 

At 4:30 p. m.,a number of congressmen are expected to meet in the Indian 
Affairs Room to press for action by the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

DeLacy, Charles Savage, (Democrat, Washington), John M. Coffee (Democrat, 
Washington) and Ellis E. Patcrson, Ned II. Healy and Helen Gahagan Douglas, 
California Democrats who sponsored the resolution, will be joined by others. 

At 2 p. m. DeLacy is calling a meeting of representatives of'the CIO, the AFL, 
Americans United, the Young Men's Christian Association and other groups. 



634 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Representative Savage told this reporter yesterday : 

"Trade unions, farm organizations and many individuals are writing me daily^ 
against tlie intervention. We are getting more letters on the China issue than oin 
anything else except army demobilization." 

"We expect early action by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The pressure for 
such action will continue." 

Hurley's leave taking must be followed by an exodous of Hurley's policies, said^ 
DeLacy today. 

"The resignation of Ambassador Hurley," he said, "presents the Secretary of 
State with a great opportunity." 

Mr. BuDENz. We liave here November 22, page 9, an article in the 
Daily Worker written by Helen Simon, who to my knowledge was a 
very important member of the staff of the Daily Worker and also en- 
gaged in Soviet underground international work through Mexico and 
other places. 

The Chairman. November 22 of what year? 

Mr. BuDENz. 1945, excuse me. Senator, page 9. 

This article deals with "Social Workers Get the Truth About 
China." It is carrying forward clearly the Communist campaign on 
this question. 

Mr, Morris. ]\Iay I see that, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that 
in this article the following people were mentioned and these people 
have been identified by this committee as Communists and as associat- 
ing with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Paragrapli 2 reads : 

Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author 
of Challenge ot lied China, making his tirst public appearance in New York 
since his return, painted a pictui'e of the feudalism that has been China's 
centuries-old curse. 

Do you know that Gunther Stein was a member of the Communist 
Party, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, and also that he was engaged in Soviet under- 
cover work. 

Mr, Morris. And I think, Mr, Chairman, we have put into the' 
record his associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Morris, At a later paragraph in the same article, Mr. Budenz,. 
we find the following : 

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American corres- 
pondents' trip to Yenan last sununer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in 
Yenan areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas wliich 
serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged 
workers are not allowed. 

Did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist ? 

Mr, Budenz. Israel Epstein was emphasized as one of the most 
important Communists in regard to Far East affairs. There was 
great solicitude in getting him into this country, and J. Peters said 
he was also engaged in Soviet undercover work. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced evidence of his 
association with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Later in the 
article, Mr. Budenz, it reads : 

Chu Tong, an e*tor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the pic- 
ture. 



INSTIITFTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 635 

Then it goes on to say : 

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imi>erialism, he explained, outlining the 
100-year history of Anglo-Aiiiericau intervention which "has always been on the 
wrong side." 

Did you know that the New York China Daily News was a Com- 
munist publication ? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. 

Mr. MoRKis. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. It will be received and properly identified. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 179" and "is. 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 179 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 22, 1945, p. 9] 

SociAx Workers Get the Truth About China 

By Helen Simon 

The CIO social service workers who attended Local 19 forum on the crisis, 
in China Monday night were outraged and angry. The speal^ers, outstanding: 
experts in the field, presented the facts and the union members felt that now 
they were better armed to fight America's undemocratic intervention and to 
get their men folk home. 

Gunther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author 
of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York 
since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been Cliina's. 
centuries-old curse. 

FEUDALISM CITED 

The Chungking government is based on the identical feudal landlords, money 
lenders, parasites who had to be ousted from power in ISth and 19th century 
Europe to make way for industrialization, Stein said. The oriental village,, 
with its thankless primitive toil, its exorbitant rents and innumerable taxes, 
is the key to China's problem. 

Chiang Kai-shek's central government is "corrupt and inefiicient;" its control 
is limited to the Chungking area and based elsewhere on compromise with local 
chieftains. It is incapable of developing industry — which would be to the 
interest of American investors — because it does not consider raising mass pur- 
chasing power. It is interested in using American loans for a new war industry, 
for a dumping-export industry — but not for consumption. 

This is the feudal set-up which Washington supports. Stein charged. And 
this is the set-up which the Communists undertake to replace. 

Stein spoke of rent and tax reduction in Yenan areas ; of the first successful 
program anywhere in the Orient of village self-government; of doubling farm, 
production and creating ingenious factories despite the blockade. 

"The Chungking feudal regime can never win," Stein concluded. 

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American cor- 
respondents' trip to Yenan last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in 
Yenan areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which 
serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged 
workers are not allowed. 

He compared "trade unions" in Kuomintang China — many of which have no 
right to strike or bargain collectively — to Yenan unions which have full rights, 
even sharing in the planning of government-owned industries and fully re- 
sponsible for spending the three percent social-security fund paid out by 
employers. 

CONTRAST IN WAGES 

As to wages, even otficial Kuomintang figures admit that real wages dropped 
(50 percent during the war. In Yenan two equally beneficial wage systems apply : 
either the worker receives free rent, three suits a year, food, soap and other 
goods for himself and an additional one and one-half persons i)lus a money wage' 
or else his wage is computed by the market price of a fixed measure of millet, 
the staple food. 



636 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

There is no free medical care in Kuomintang China while all medical care is 
free in the north, Epstein reported. 

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the 
picture. 

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 
100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on 
the wrong side." 

The Chinese-American editor demolished arguments currently used to justify 
the transporation of Kuomintang troops to Communist-liberated areas and 
their armed support by American marines. 

It's just to disarm Japanese? But the Japanese are not disarmed and are 
working alongside Kuomintang, puppet and American troops against Communist- 
led forces. 

We must back the legal government? Was this so of Spain's Republican 
government? Should Lafayette have helped George III rather than Washington? 

WARNS OF UNITED STATES ROLE 

We must protect the lives of Americans? But we are risking them by becom- 
ing involved in China's civil war. And this traditional excuse for intervention 
was used by the Japanese, too. 

Remember that United States General Wedemeyer said that we must make 
North China a military base to prevent Russian expansion, Chu Tong warned. 
Remember that some United States monopolists may be interested in China as 
an economic colony. 

The room teemed with questions when the speakers stopped. What is Russia's 
role? Russia is not intervening, is withdrawing as promised from Manchuria. 

Why 'was General Stihvell replaced? Because he opposed corruption and 
inefficiency in "the Kuomintang armies and sought cooperation with the Com- 
munist-led armies. 

RAP INTERVENTION 

How do Chinese groups other than Kuomintang and Communists stand? All 
demand withdrawal of United States troops. 

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution condemning United States inter- 
vention (see box) and determined to circulate a petition. One girl, to strong 
applause, urged mass action — meetings, parades, demonstrations. 

The wife of a marine now stationed in Tientsin added a note of desperate 
urgency : 

"Our boys don't understand what's happening to them. They are being wined, 
dined, corrupted by the Kuomintang mayor of Tientsin. We've got to get to 
them somehow and explain how terribly wrong it is to fight against tne demo- 
cratic peoples of China." 

Mr. Morris. You say this was part of the Communist campaign to 
influence foreign policy ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I can say that definitely because this campaign was 
organized ahead of time, not with Gunther Stein, but ahead of time 
for a great number of organizations which were not necessarily Com- 
munist organizations but were infiltrated with Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue ? 

Mr. BuDENz. This is another article, November 29, 1945, which I 
have here, page 2, written by Joseph Starobin and, therefore, of very 
high standing in Communist directives and information, and it says : 

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and 
brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, 
headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspaper- 
men like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman, and Israel Epstein, who knew 
China better than Hurley, were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and 
the Communists. 

Then they^o on. This is an attack upon General Hurley, it is quite 
evident, to belittle Hurley as a man who liked Cadillac cars. 

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers 
"college fellers" and pro-Communists. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 637 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry, proceed. 

Mr. BuDENz. "College fellers," by the way, is in quotations to indi- 
cate that Hurley is not coherent. 

Mr. Morris. To what extent do you know the Communist affiliation 
of those people ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. I know Israel Epstein. I know the close association 
of Harrison Forman with the Communists. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was intimately connected with the 
Communist Party; is that correct? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. How about Raymond Ludden? 

Mr. BuDENz. Raymond Ludden I only know in this way : That the 
group around Stilwell were constantly referred to as those relied upon 
to help advance the Communist cause in China. - I wouldn't want to 
indict one individual of that group, although Mr. Ludden is one of 
them, but the discussions did not refer to individuals. 

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony that, when you were talking about 
people that the Communists could rely on, the reliance was on the 
whole group around General Stilwell and not to any one individual ? 

Mr. BuDENz. The group around Stilwell, in persuading him to 
antagonism toward Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. That completes this. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced into the record, 
Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 180" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 180 

[Prom the Daily Worker, New York, November 29, 1945, p. 2] 

Hurley's Colokful Career Painted in Oil 

(By Joseph S'tarobiu) 

Sympathetic newspapers always use the word "colorful" to describe men like 
Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. It is part of big business mythology about democ- 
racy and free enterprise that such oil speculators (preferably with plenty of 
gold braid on their shoulders) should run the foreign policy of the United States. 

Yet Hurley has colorfully succeeded in master-minding the present warfare 
in China. The result is that American boys are dying — 3 months after V.T day — 
to bolster a dictatorial regime which the Chinese people themselves don't want. 

Who is Hurley, and what do his resignation statements mean? 

It does not say enough to call him an imperialist, for so are Byrnes and Tru- 
man. For that matter, Roosevelt who appointed and tolerated Hurley, also 
wanted to advance the specific American interest in Asia. 

Hurley is first of all a big-business man, with the typical concern for direct 
money interests, with the special streak of a frontier background in the old 
Choctaw Indian territory of Oklahoma, where he was born 62 years ago. He 
served as attorney for the Choctaw Indians and saw action in the First World 
War, becoming a colonel by the end of it. 

big oilman 

Hurley assisted in organizing the United States Chamber of Commerce in 
1912, and was chairman of the Oklahoma Republican S'tate convention in 1926. 
He did big business in oil development, and was instrumental in forcing Mexico 
to indemnify the oil interests when their imperialist properties were seized. 

22848 — 52 — pt. 2 19 



g38 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

And he became, as a reward for services rendered, the Secretary of War in 
Herbert Hoover's administration, serving from 1929 to 1933. He vpas in office 
when Gen. Douglas MacArthur shot down the bonus marchers in 1932. He is, 
incidentally, a great friend of John L. Lewis. 

Hurley's prewar mentality can best be seen from a speech on November 11, 
1939, to the Overseas Masonic Lodge at Providence, R. I. 

Hurley proposed that western civilization should be saved by an alliance 
between Germany and Great Britain, impossible as that might seem, he added. 

Otherwise, the gates will be opened to an avalanche of orientalism, namely 
Soviet Russia, he said, from which it would take western civilization a century 
to recover. 

This fear of orientalism sounds funny, doesn't it, in view of Hurley's supposed 
love for China. What he meant, however, was clear. 

He was bitterly afraid of the Soviet Union, afraid that the war might develop 
in such a way as to let the Soviet Union share in the victory. And he sought 
some way to reconcile the Anglo-German struggle. 

But he was an Amerit^a Firster enough to stress that we should not intervene 
in Europe and should develop a cash-and-carry trade with France and Britain. 

The reason why the Republicans and all the former isolationists now rush to 
embrace Hurley is that they recognize the former Republican isolationist in him. 

GLOBE-TROTTER 

He favored victory over the Axis, not because he opposed fascism as such but 
because he wanted the United States to cash in on that victory by pursuing an 
anti-Soviet course simultaneously with a policy of forcing Britain to shell out 
to the USA. Only if you see this in Hurley can you understand his opposition 
to Communist and colonial imperialism. 

During the war he was sent to all corners of the globe as Ambassador to New 
Zealand, as special emissary in the Near East, as observer in Moscow during 
the critical days of 1942. And finally, he bobbed up with Donald Nelson's eco- 
nomic mission in China in the late summer of 1944. 

In China, Hurley's flamboyant self-advertising methods were notorious; he 
was strongly attracted to Chiang Kai-shek for he recognized the man who might 
build a reactionary China subservient to a strong imperialist America — at the 
expense of the Soviet Union and Great Britain as well. 

Hurley's first bit of "colorfulness" was to maneuver Gen. Joseph Stilwell and 
the former Ambassador, Clarence E. Gauss, out of China. Stilwell had been 
critical of the way Chiang was saving American lend-lease weapons for the 
ultimate civil war ; Gauss knew more about Kuomintang corruption than anyone 
else. 

When Chiang demanded Stilwell's scalp. Hurley said to ""Vinegar Joe": "I 
have only two stars to your four, but I'm going to tell Washington one of us has 
to leave." 

From November 1944 until April 1945 Hurley put on a big show of trying to 
bring about Kuomintang-Communist unity. He even thought a personal visit 
to Moscow last April would solve all problems in China. Hurley, who knew 
nothing about China, acted very much the prima donna. He tried to trick the 
Chinese Communists into an abject surrender to the Kuomintang. When that 
finally failed, he became openly pro-Chiang and bitterly anti-Communist. 

IRKED BY CRITICS 

What irked him just as much as his failure to force a Chinese settlement was 
the fact that well-informed American opinion among experts and journalists was 
very critical of the Kuomintang and of Hurley's methods. 

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and 
brought back favorable impressions ; there was an American mission in Yenan, 
headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspaper- 
men like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman and Israel Epstein (who knew 
China better than Hurley) were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang 
and the Communists. 

Hurley was the kind of man who could arrange for a specially designed Cad- 
illac to be flown in from India to Chungking. He insisted on wearing his uniform 
in performing civilian duties, although he was not entitled to do so. Roosevelt 
had to tell him point blank to cut it out. Tliis kind of man had no use for the 
pro-China experts, and succeeded in forcing them out of the Chungiving Embassy 
one by one. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 639 

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers 
"college fellers" and pro-Communists. Actually they are only the last of the 
pro-Roosevelt Mohicans in a Department which is increasingly dominated by the 
Byrnes type of political ignoramus. 

Now Hurley resigns with a big bang, which is completely in keeping with his 
bang, bang career. 

The moral of the tale is this : when Truman and Byrnes broke with the Roose- 
velt policy and backed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans, they naturally had to 
rely on Hurley more and more — for he expressed the logic of their position and, 
moreover, carried it out in practice. 

So it is in every phase of foreign affairs. Wherever American-Soviet under- 
standing is abandoned and an attempt is made by Democratic politicians to 
embark on world domination, the Hurley Republicans will make the most of it. 
They will go the Truman-Byrnes type one better. They will rapidly drive this 
country to an internal coup d'6tat and external aggression in other people's 
affairs. 

Mr. BuDENz. This was written while I was still in the Communist 
Party, and I recall it. It is a special dispatch by Virginia Gardner 
and Art Shields, Communist correspondents here in Washington, 
Daily Worker correspondents in Washington. It is headed Wash- 
ington Notes, and says : 

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James 0. Dunn, Eugene 
Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental commit- 
tee representing State, War, and Navy, and former acting Secretary Joseph 
Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti- 
imperialist were strengthened. 

That is found on page 2 of that issue. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 181" and 
is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 181 

[From the Worker, October 7, 1945, p. 2] 

Washington Notes 

(By Virginia Gai'dner and Art Shields) 

WAR department DIVISION ON JAPANESE POLICY/ UNITED STATES CHAMBEB ADVISES 

OPTIMISM WITH HUMOR 

The recent rebuke to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's policies given by Assistant 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the culmination not only of a split in the 
State Department but in the War Department itself. 

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Door- 
man, who was chairman of SWINK. the powerful interdepartmental committee' 
representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew 
out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist 
were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which 
had been held up in committee theretofore, so that the set of directives for treat- 
ment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than 
the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur and apparently 
lay ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts. 

But in the War Department itself there developed what amounted to virtually 
a revolution. Among those most alarmed and exercised by the MacArthur 
policies and the complete lack of carrying out of directives from the State 
Department was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In fact, McCloy 
is said to be determined that the new directives shall be carried out even if 
he has to go over to Japan and take a look-see himself. 

Yet Senator H. Styles Bridges (Republican of New Hampshire) continues to 
attribute to Washington officials who represent "the leftist thinking of the 
Nation" the wave of critici-sm against MacArthur. 



640 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

You don't hear much these days in Washington about what a good adminis- 
trator President Truman is, since MacArthur has flouted the directives sent 
him and the Ways and Means Committee declared a lockout on all unemploy- 
ment-compensation legislation. In all the years during which the late Presi- 
dent Roosevelt took such a beating as a poor administrator, there never was 
quite such contempt shown for legislation he recommended or directives sent 
to any part of the Govenment by a constituted authority. 

The United States Chamber of Commerce determined to be sunny, even if 
it hurts. So in a piece which underlines with a note of grimness its advice to 
business to exude confidence the Chamber of Commerce Business Action for 
September 24 says : "If we read the signs aright, the great mass of the popu- 
lation is ready to welcome an active, aggressive leadership by business * * * 
But labor is afraid of unemployment, just as business fears it * * *. Some 
believe the answer is to be found in the Murray (full employment) bill. The 
sharp, forceful movement behind that measure is a manifestation of fear * * *. 
The formulas have got to be achieved on the local or industry level, or more 
specifically on the individual level." 

Then, in italics : "This is the time for businessmen to think, talk, plan and 
act in forceful tones of optimism, with the confidence which they are fully jus- 
tified in feeling — and with a sense of humor." 

What amomits to an actual conspiracy to build up an anti-Communist labor 
movement in Germany under official United States auspices is under way. Spark 
j)lug in it from Washington is Irving Brown, who along with many of his former 
associates in the Labor Section of the War Production Board had a Social- 
Democratic orientation. 

For 3 months he did little else but busily recruit candidates on the basis of 
such refined qualifications as their devotion to the cause of Red-baiting. Among 
^others he has picked are Joseph D. Keenan of the AFL, Vice Chairman for labor 
production of WPB. Paul Porter, Wisconsin Socialist, who has been kicking 
around the Government for years now trying to retrieve his standing with labor 
after the fiasco he pulled at the airframe wage hearing he conducted early in 
the war, and David Saposs of the WPB Labor Section, who is a natural for the 
assignment. In Germany as a result they are dealing only with non-Communist 
elements in the labor movement, and actively encouraging anti-Communists in 
the unions being established or revived. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that terminates the phase of Mr. 
Budenz' testimony concerning the Communist effort to infiltrate 
and influence American foreign policy. I would like to get back 
to Mr. Budenz' identification of people who were associated with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations and their Communist affiliation. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know James S. xA.llen? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; Mr. Allen was well known to me. He was 
foreign editor of the Daily Worker for a considerable period of time 
while I was managing editor, and then he had a sort of special as- 
signment as foreign adviser to the Daily Worker. 

Prior to that he was Communist International representative in 
the Philippines with all the powers of a Communist International 
representative in the islands. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record 
Mr. Allen's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations on 
a previous occasion. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Abraham Chapman ? 

Senator Smith. Is this Mr. Allen the man who wrote a review of 
some books or the review of an attack on some of the Southern States 
and was part of a group to incite the Negroes down there ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. That is not involved here now, however. 

Senator Smith. He was a Communist at that time ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 641 

Mr. Morris. He held a high place in the Communists ? 

Mr. BuDENz. He was a very much trusted man, and this is shown 
by the fact that he was the Communist representative in the Philip- 
pines, sent on a special mission there and directing the Philippine 
Communist Party. 

In addition to that, he was the leading authority on foreign affairs 
for the Daily Worker, and even when he resigned as foreign editor 
to do special writing he continued to be foreign affairs adviser and 
was closely in touch with many International agents. I can say 
that from his own statements and from my knowledge of what a 
foreign editor of the Daily Worker does. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was 
a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. From official reports. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record evi- 
dence of Miss Austern's association with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. Hilda Austern was also known as Mrs. Bretholz. 

The Chairman. What are you reading from ? 

Mr. Mandel. Her associations with the Institute of Pacific Eela- 
tions are taken from War and Peace in the Pacific, a Preliminary Re- 
port of tlie Eighth Conference of the IPE. on Wartime aiid Postwar 
Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, 
page 162 being the proceedings of the Mont Tremblant, Quebec, con- 
ference of December 4 to 14, 1942. 

In that volume she is listed as a member of the international secre- 
tariat and as having participated in the 1936 and 1939 conferences as 
assistant treasurer. 

Mr. Morris. Assistant treasurer of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Next I read from Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR 
at Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936, page 62, 
where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secre- 
tariat and conference staff and also a member of the finance committee. 

I read from Security in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the 
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot 
Springs, Va., January 6 to IT, 1945, page 160, where Hilda Austern is 
listed as a member of the international secretariat. She is again so 
listed in the proceedings of the Virginia conference, Virginia Beach 
conference, held November 18 to December 2, 1939, and she is also 
there listed as assistant treasurer. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like those references made by 
Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record. 

The Chairman. They will be so incorporated. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 182"' and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 182 
Miss Hilda Austern 

International secretariat (also known as Mrs. Bretholz) : Miss Hilda Austern 
(1930, 1930). Assistant treasurer. (Source: War and Peace in the Pacific 
(A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and 
Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacifie and the Far East), 
Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4^14, 1M2, p. 162.) 



642 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

International secretariat and conference staff, finance committee : Minute 
secretary, Hilda Austern. ( Source : Handbook for the Sixtli Conference of the 
IPR, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15-29, 1936, p. 62.) 

International secretariat: Hilda Austern (1936, 1939, 1942). Assistant treas- 
urer, IPR. (Source: Security in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the 
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations), Hot Springs, Va., Jan- 
uary 6-17, 1945, p. 160.) 

International secretariat: Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer (1936). (Source: 
Problems of the Pacific (Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18-December 2, 1939, p. 274.) 

Mr. Mandel. I have here an item from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated September 1, 1941, being a letter marked 
"Strictly Confidential," addressed to Miss Hilda Austern from Ed- 
ward C. Carter. I will read excerpts from this letter as follows : 

Dear Hilda: Would you like to tackle the following research job for the 
War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll, and 
I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service. 

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to dis- 
cover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, 
preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the 
following islands. 

Then there is a list of islands in the Pacific which is given. 

Supplementary information which would be required would be : 

Then there is a list given such as prevailing winds, possibilities for 
landing supplies, and so forth. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that letter introduced 
into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. By whom is that signed ? 

Mr. Mandel. Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Addressed to Hilda Austern, about whom we were 
talking. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record and properly iden- 
tified. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 183" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 183 

Lee, Mass., September 1, lO^l. 

Strictly Confidential. 
Miss Hiu)a Austern, 
Office. 

Deiar Hilda : Would you like to tackle the following rush research job for the 
War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll and I 
do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service. 

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover 
what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, pref- 
erably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the follow- 
ing islands : 

Palmyra Baker 

Enderbury Christmas 
Samoa (British and United States) Fiji group 

New Hebrides New Caledonia 

Howland Jarvis 

Johnson Canton 
Loyalty 

Supplementary information which would be required would be : 
(a) Prevailing winds, storms, monsoons, etc. 
(&) Possibilities for landing supplies by steamer. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 643 

(o) Natural defenses, i. e., would the fields be far enough inland or, if 
near the sea, protected by higher ground from, say, the gunnery range of 
submarines that might emerge from the sea nearby. 

id) Health conditions, i. e., mosquitoes, malaria, or other diseases. 

(e) Local food supply. 

(/) Local labor supply. 

(g) Local government and its political orientation. 

(/t) Local police or military organization, if any. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Cakter. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that 
that last letter was introduced for the purpose of showing that Miss 
Austern was on the payroll of the Institute of Pacific Kelations and 
the general nature of some of the work that she performed for that 
organization. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know Abraham Chapman? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; he is a veteran Communist, also known as 
John Arnold. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "John Arnold" is that his party name? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, he wrote under these diilerent names and was 
sometimes known in the party as John Arnold. It was a party name. 
He was on the editorial board in connection with Freiheit, which is 
the Communist daily paper in New York, published in the same build- 
ing as the Daily Worker. Therefore I conferred with Mr. Chapman 
many times and know him as a Communist. He has a very high posi- 
tion so far as the regard of the Communist Party leaders in the 
Communist movement. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record the as- 
sociations of Mr. Chapman with the Institute of Pacific Kelations? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a memorandum found in the files of the In- 
stitute of Pacific Kelations dated May 9, 1947, headed, "Kesearch and 
publication program of the American Institute of Pacific Kelations," 
and listing books and research projects and studies under way for 
1946-47. It lists Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chap- 
man. 

Then I have here a list of articles written for the Far Eastern 
Survey by Abraham Chapman. There are four articles. It is to be 
noted also, however, that Abraham Chapman is coauthor with Earl 
Browder of a pamphlet entitled "The Meaning of the Palestine Parti- 
tion," published in 1937. 

Mr. Morris. Was that published under the auspices of the Institute 
of Pacific Kelations ? 

Mr. Mandel. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. But the first four articles were ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I would like Mr. Mandel's notation showing Abraham 
Chapman's relations with the Institute of Pacific Kelations in the 
record. 

The Chairman. These are notations, Mr. Mandel, as I understand 
it, from instruments that you found in the records, these notations 
were made by you or notations that you found ? 

Mr. Mandel. They are notations in the first case from the memoran- 
dum of the Institute of Pacific Kelations and in the second case from 
the actual volumes of the Far Eastern Survey, the official organ of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations. 



644 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. Who made the notation ? 
Mr. Mandel. I did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You examined the volumes yourself ? 
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 184" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 184 

Research and Publication Program of the American Institute of 
Pacific Relations — Books and Research Projects 

Studies under way 1946-47 : Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraliam Chap- 
man. 

Abraham Chapman, author of American Policy in the Philippines (Far Eastern 
Survey, June 5, 1946). 

Abraham Chapman, author of Hawaii Seeks Statehood (Far Eastern Survey, 
June 17, 1946). 

Abraham Chapman, author of Pacification in Central Luzon (Far Eastern 
Survey, August 17, 1946). 

Abraham Chapman, author of Notes on the Philippine Election (Pacific Affairs, 
June, 1943, p. 193). 

Abraham Chapman, coauthor with Earl Browder, of pamphlet. The Meaning 
of the Palestine Partition (1937). 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Kathleen Barnes? 

Mr. BuDENZ. I knew of her, I did not meet her personally. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know she was a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. I will not say that I knew it through the 
whole 10 years I was in the Communist Party, but I heard it men- 
tioned at various times. 

Mr. Morris. So you do know that at one time she was a Communist? 

Mr. BuDENz. I would say a couple of times. She did not receive 
the constant reference that some of the other names that you have 
mentioned received. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us of Mrs. Barnes' associa- 
tion with the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. This is taken from the files of Pacific Affairs and 
the Far Eastern Survey, both organs of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, and is a long list of articles by Kathleen Barnes which is here 
submitted for the record. 

Mr. Morris. Will you indicate the number of articles in each pub- 
lication, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. For Pacific Affairs, 8, and for Far Eastern Sur- 
vey, 23. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that compilation intro- 
duced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. Who was that compilation made by, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. By actual consultation of the volumes of both publi- 
cations. 

The Chairman. By yourself ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you had the volumes in your possession ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, it will be received. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 645 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 185" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 185 
Kathleen Baknes 

Member of board of directors of the American Russian Institute for Cultural 
Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc., 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City. 

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in Pacific Affaii's : 

Eastward Migration Within the Soviet Union, December 1934 (pp. 395-405). 

Review of Project for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of 
the National Economy of the U. S. S. R., December 1934 (pp. 470-471). 

Review of Birobidzhantsy na Amure (The Birobidjans on the Amur) by M. 
Goldstein, September 1935 (pp. 507-508). 

Review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer, June 1935 (pp. 254-256). 

Comment and Opinion of Another Perspective, September 1935 (pp. 477-481). 

Review of Soviet Communism : A New Civilization by Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, June 1936 (pp. 294-296). 

Review of The Soviets by Albert Rhys Williams, December 1937 (pp. 490-492). 

Review of Over the North Pole, by George Baidukov, June 1938 (pp. 274-275). 

Review of Great Soviet World Atlas, volume 1 ; edited by A. F. Gorkin, et al., 
September 1940 (pp. 354-355). 

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in the Far Eastern Survey : 

Industrialization of the Soviet Far East, April 10, 1935. 

Japanese Soviet Friction, September 25, 1935. 

The Soviet Economic Stake in the Orient, January 29, 1936 (p. 19). 

Siberia— From Mongolia to the Arctic, May 6, 1936 (p. 93). 

The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific, November 18, 1936 (p. 243). 

The Agricultural Foundation of Siberia's Economy, February 17, 1937 (p. 37). 

Tanna Tuva Showing Signs of Industrial Activity, March 17, 1937. 

Siberian Gold Production Tops Previous Figures, May 12, 19.37. 

New Bed of Radio Active Ores Found in Central Asia, June 23, 1937. 

Overcoming Obstacles to Rubber Control, August 4, 1937 (p. 177). 

Alaska Salmon in World Politics, March 2, 1938. 

.Japanese Government Given Blank CTlieck, April 6, 1938 (p. 79). 

Asiatic Russia, Storehouse of Mineral Wealth, July 13. 1938 (p. 157). 

Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire, January 5, 1939 (p. 1). 

Konisomolsk — Pioneer City on the Amur, February 15, 1939. 

Japan Seeking Larger Contribution From Her IMandate, March 15, 1939. 

Outer Mongolia on the World Stage, August 30, 1939, (p. 207). 

Soviets Promoting Migration to Siberia, October 25, 1939. 

Soviets Hope for Rubber Self Sufficiency by 1942, November 8, 1939. 

Soviet Union Improving Railway Network, December 20, 1939. 

Pacific Islands Double Phosphate Cutput, May 22, 1940. 

Soviets Stress Program for Far Eastern Section, July 17, 1940. 

Fisheries, Mainstay of Soviet-Japanese Friction, March 27, 1940 (p. 75). 

Mr. Morris. Are there any letters from the Institute of Pacific 
Relations addressed to Mrs. Barnes? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here two letters taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the Council of 
the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated April 16, 1938, 
addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from E. V. Harondar, who has 
been previously designated as an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of 
the IPR. 

Dear Mrs. Bapnes : Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis 
the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1) 
Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of 
the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all 
these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor. 
Sincerely yours. 

The Chairman. Where was that written from? 

Mr. Mandel. From Moscow, 20 Razin Street, April 16, 1938. 



646 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chaieman. Who signed that first letter ? 

Mr. Mandel. E. V. Harondar. 

Mr. Morris. Wlio is he ? 

Mr. Mandel. He is an official of the U. S. S. E.. Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Then we have another letter dated August 29, 1939, to Mrs. Kathleen 
Barnes on the same type of letterhead from the same individual, E. 
V. Harondar, as follows : 

Dear Mrs. Barnes : Referring to your letter of June 14 and July 6, I take 
pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. 
We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, 
The United States in World Affaii's, 1938, has already been received. We have 
recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection 
with the Eighteenth party congress under the title, The Land of Socialism, and 
an .English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under 
separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet 
agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union 
wliich will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could 
include in the next shipment of books the following publication : Panama Canal 
and its Ports, United States War Department, United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, revised 1938. 
Sincerely yours. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced 
into the record. The purpose of introducing this exhibit, these two 
exhibits, would be to show the functions being carried on by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly by Kathleen Barnes, who 
has been identified by Mr. Budenz as a member of the Communist 
Party. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 186" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 186 

Council of the U. S. S. R., 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 

Moscoto, August 29, 19S9. 
Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, 

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 

New York City, N. Y., U. 8. A. 

Dear Mrs. Barnes : Referring to your letter of June 14, and July 6, I take 

pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. 

We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, 

the United States in World Affairs, 1938, lias been already received. We have 

recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with 

the XVIII Party Congress under the title The Land of Socialism and an English 

edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover 

I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet Agriculture. Our 

librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be 

forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the 

next shipment of books the following publication : Panama Canal and Its 

Ports. U. S. War Department, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Revised 1938. 

Sincerely yours, 

E. V. Harondar. 



Council of the U. S. S. R., 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 

Moscow, April 16, 19S8. 
Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, 

American Council. Institute of Pacific Relations, 
New York City, N. Y., U. 8. A. 
Dear Mrs. Barnes : Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis 
the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 647 

Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of 
the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get aU. 
these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor. 
Sincerely yours, 

• E, V. Hakondab. 

Mr. Morris. Have you any comments on that, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. I would like to call attention to the History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I don't know what the date 
of this letter is. 

Mr. Morris. What is the date of that letter, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. 1939. If I am correct, this is an advance copy before 
the American Communists got it. We must understand the signifi- 
cance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist 
doctrine. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "this book" ? 

Mr. Budenz. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union Bolsheviks, to which he refers, which is now fully credited to 
Josef Stalin. It is required reading by every Communist and is used 
as a basis of their thought and action. This was not got out in the 
United States until after this was sent. 

The Chairman. Is ifa modern edition of Marxism ? 

Mr. Budenz. It is Stalin's rendition of Marxism-Leninism under 
the guise of history. It shows the necessity for violent revolution, 
the overthrow of the bourgeois government, and the importance of 
a Communist Party devoted to revolution, a party of a new type, 
in order to bring about this overthrow of these governments. 

Senator Smith. Is that available here now? 

Mr. Budenz. That is available in the English translation, gotten 
out by the Communist Party through the International Publishers, 
headed by Alexander Trachtenberg. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. I refer to a previous exhibit already introduced, 
exhibit 58, and I read one paragraph of that exhibit, being a memo- 
randum on Personnel in Connection With Soviet Studies. It is 
marked "confidential, not for distribution outside the office." 

This is dated August 10, 1934, and the last paragraph reads as 
follows : 

The fourth group — 

That is, the people engaged in these studies — 

consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record 
in the Soviet Union, or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen 
Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the ad- 
vantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about 
bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may 
at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, 
however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young 
person of promise to IMoscow to train him for the job. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Harriet Moore 

The Chairman. Just a minute. By whom was that signed? 
Mr. Mandel. This has no signature. 
The Chairman. Evidently it is addressed to somebody? 
Mr. Mandel. It is evidently an interoffice memorandum. 
The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that Harriet Moore identified in that 
document is a Communist ? 



648 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. BuDENz. I think I identified her yesterday as a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had evidence that Kathleen 
Barnes was the first wife of the Joseph Barnes who has been identified 
before this committee. • 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Mandel. I have another letter here from the S. S. Chitral dated 
January 24, 1935. The document comes from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations and is addressed to Frederick Field from E. C. 
Carter, and 1 read : 

Dear Feed: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow 
gave me, indicating precisely what American Fisheries Publications they already 
have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would 
undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you 
would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect 
of the fish business. 

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our 
friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by 
way of confirmation. 

The Chairman. That is signed by whom ? 

Mr. Mandel. As I understand, by E. C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that is addressed to Frederick Field. 
Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record again as 
an example of the type of work being carried on by Kathleen Barnes. 

The Chairman. This is already an exhibit, is it not? 

Mr. Morris. No. 

The Chairman. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 187" and is 
as follows :) 

ExHimx No. 187 

Steamship "Chitkal," 

January 2Jf, 1935. 
F. Field, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City, U. S. A. 
Dear Fred: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow 
gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already 
have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would 
undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you 
would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect 
of the fish business. 

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our 
friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by 
way of confirmation. 
Sincerely yours, 

E. C. Carter. 
Send all stuff to Oceanography people via Kantarovich. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here some quotations from Mrs. Barnes' actual 
writings in the magazine of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in Pacific 
Affairs. The first is reviewing a book called The Soviets, by Albert 
Rhys Williams. 

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The 
Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements 
of the covintry under consideration." 

From Pacific Affairs, December 1937, page 492. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Albert Rhys Williams 
is a Communist? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 649 

Mr. BuDENZ. I know Albert Rhys Williams personally, and he is a 
Communist. 

Mr. Mandel. Then next is a review of Soviet Journey by Louis 
Fischer. 

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fisclier, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: 
"Agitation in foreign countries is not lil^ely to be productive of revolutionary 
results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under 
bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? 
What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question 
is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey." 

From Pacific Affairs, March 1935, page 255. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. 
Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. I didn't catch it fully. I was distracted by the spell- 
ing of Albert Rhys Williams' name. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen 
Barnes, page 294 fC : "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration 
of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is 
replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet 
communism." 

From Pacific Affairs, Jime 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like those excerpts made by 
Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 188" and is 
as follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 188 

Kathleen Barnes 

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes : "The 
Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements 
of the country under consideration" (Pacific Affairs, December 1937, p. 492). 

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: 
"Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary 
I'esults until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under 
bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? 
What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question 
is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey" (Pacific Affairs, March 
193.J, p. 255). 

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen 
Barnes, page 294fe: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the considera- 
tion of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' 
is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet coui- 
munisiu" (Pacific Affairs, June 1936). 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you know Angus Cameron to be a 
member of the Communist Party 'i 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; from official reports, 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any dealings with Angus Cameron ? 

Mr. Budenz. None at all. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat was the nature of the official reports. Mr. 
Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. The official reports had to do with the conduct of the 
Communist Party in I\Iassachusetts, with which I was very closely 
in touch ; that is to saj^, I was in Massachusetts a great deal as a mem- 
ber of the national committee of the Communist Party, perhaps more 
than in any other State. It repeatedly was called to my attention 



650 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

at State committee meetings the important part that Angus Cameron 
was playing in the Communist Party. 

Secondly, and more important than that, he was called to the atten- 
tion of the Politburo by Alexander Trachtenberg as having committed 
himself to the Communist cause and also with the statement by Alex- 
ander Trachtenberg that Little, Brown & Co. was being made into the 
international publishers of the Communist front. 

I said the other day that Communist leaders didn't use the words 
"Communist front" ; that was one time that Trachtenberg in a sort of 
jesting way used the term. The work of Angus Cameron in getting 
published the works of those who were pro-Communist but not neces- 
sarily known publicly as such was commended by the Politburo and 
his plans particularly for doing that in the future. 

Mr. Morris. What firm was he associated with, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Little, Brown & Co. in Boston. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that testimony was to 
show the nature of this publishing firm which did put out quite a few 
books of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I understand that there 
has been a reorganization of the firm recently. 

Senator Smith. Little, Brown & Co.? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Senator Smith. That is one of the oldest firms in America, a pub- 
lisiiing firm; is it not? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; Mr. Budenz just testified to that. 

Do you have any comments to make, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Little, Brown & Co. had a high and distinguished 
record as publishers and maintains it by some of the works they pub- 
lish and some of the authors they bring forth. That was, of course, 
of great value to the Communists. 

Mr. Morris. You did know of many Communist publications which 
were gotten out by Little, Brown & Co. ? 

Mr. Budenz. I know that was the plan, and I Imow that many 
people in Communist fronts have had their books published by them. 
I can't say that I know specifically that it was all arranged, because I 
wasn't present. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, you previously testified that John K. 
Fairbank was a member of the Communist Party to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, do you have any letter at this time that 
we can introduce showing Mr. Fairbank's association with the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. John K. Fairbank is listed as a member of the board 
of trustees of the American council of the publication IPR News, in 
a letter dated March 1950. We have had previously testimony that 
he was chairman of one of the subcommittees of the Mont Tremblant 
conference. 

Mr. Morris. He is presently a member of the board of trustees of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations ; is he not ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. I have here a letter from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 29, 1944, and I read a section 
of this letter as follows : 

If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manu- 
scripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some 
American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 651 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the 
record as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 189" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 189 

April 29, 1944. 
Message for Prof. Chien Tnan-sheng, 

Southwest Associated University, Kunming, or care of 

Lt. Robert W. Barnett, Headquarters, Fourteentli Air Force, 
Kunming Airfield. 

Dear Mr. Chien : I was extremely disappointed to receive your cable stating 
that you were discontinuing work on the study of Chinese government and 
politics. As you will know from my cabled reply of April 10, I had already sent 
you a message about the project in care of Professor Staley, asking him to leave 
it with Kobert Barnett in Kunming. I do hope it has now reached you ; but, in 
case it has not, here is wliat I said : 

"Holland approves outline of project on Chinese government as described in 
Chien's letter of December 6. Holland is cabling approval on February 17, 1944. 
]n addition to the $300 already turned over to Professor Chou, Holland will 
arrange a further payment of $G00. Part of this might be paid with the help of 
Barnett if he agrees and informs his wife or Holland accordingly. Holland 
is also consulting Wong Sliih-chieh about facilitating part of the payment. 
Holland hopes that a substantial part of the manuscript may be completed and 
in his hands by the end of September, so that portions of it might, if necessary, 
be used as a document for tlie IPR conference in January 1945. Holland also 
hopes that Chien or his colleague can make available part of the chapter on 
recent trends of the Kuomintang, which might be used as an article in the 
September issue of Pacific Affairs. This should reach New York by June 30 
at the latest. If this topic is not convenient, an article on some problems of 
postwar political readjustment in China might be substituted. For safety's sake, 
Holland thinks that there ought to be at least three copies of the manuscript, 
but Chien can decide whether these shall be rough copies or clean copies. It 
might be wise to send Holland a copy of each chapter as it is completed. If 
Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts 
to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American 
or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank. 

It has not been as easy as I expected to send the money to you in the form 
requested, but I trust that by this time you will liave already received an install- 
ment of $200 from Barnett and more will be coming shortly. 

I realize that with prices rising so fast the original fee I proposed may now 
be inadequate and it was for that reason tliat I suggested in my cable that we 
could increase the amount from $800 to $1,100. I most earnestly hope that 
you will not have to drop the project, as we have been counting on it very much. 
Even if it is not possible to complete the study on the original scale, I would 
urge you or Mr. Wang to prepare a short monograph and send it to me by October 
or November at the latest. 

If there is anytliing else we can do to assist you in completing the study, please 
let me know. I realize that conditions for doing this kind of research work 
must be terribly difficult now, and I am anxious to do everything possible to 
facilitate matters for you. I am sure that Wellington Liu will be just as disap- 
pointed as we are if you do not produce a manuscript. As you know, your 
study has been included in the list of research projects announced by the China 
Council of the IPR. 

With all good wishes and looking forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

P. S. — Would you kindly tell Dr. Chiang Mon-lin when you see him that I have 
received his letter of April 11 with some errata for his book. We have tried two 
publishers so far but have not yet succeeded in getting the book accepted. It is 
now being considered by the Oxford University Press, and I hope to get a decision 
soon. One of the diJficulties is the paper rationing. 

Mr. Mandel. We have previously introduced a letter signed by I. 
Epstein to W. H. Holland, from which I read a paragraph. This 
was exhibit 112. 



652 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, 
I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and 
Elsie. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that has ah-eady been introduced into 
the record. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Jltlr. Mandel. I have here a letter dated March 10, 1944, addressed 
to John Fairbank care of Lauchlin Currie of the White House, Wash- 
ington, D. C. I read : 

Here is a letter to Liu Yu-\van whicli I sliould lilie to have sent by hand or via 
the A. P. O. in Cliungkiug. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John 
Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking 
in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via A. P. O. to Mac 
Fischer or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and 
willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do tliis, don't 
hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and prob- 
ably Thursday also. 

That is signed, "W. L. Holland." 

The Chairman. Addressed to whom? 

Mr. Mandel. Addressed to John Fairbank, care of Lauchlin Cur- 
rie, the White House, Washington, D.C. 

Senator Ferguson. What was Fairbank doing at that time ? What 
was his job ? Why did he get his mail at the White House ? 

Mr. Mandel. I believe he was connected with the Office of War 
Information. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did he not get at the Office of War Infor- 
mation ? Have you any records to show ? 

Mr. Morris. We do not have any records to show why. We will 
have to ask Mr. Fairbank that. 

Mr. Mandel. This is exhibit 106, previously used. 

Senator Ferguson. We notice quite a bit of this mail going through 
courier. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I have to go to the floor. I am in 
charge of a bill that is coming up. Senator Smith, would take over ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Max Granich was a 
member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. I know Max Granich very well, know him to be a 
member of the Communist Party and engaged in underground work. 
He is the husband of Grace Granich to whom I previously referred 
and a brother of Mike Gold, the Communist columnist of the Daily 
Worker. 

Mr. Morris. You know he is a trusted member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Budenz. Very trusted, part of the very protected apparatus, 
or protective apparatus, the security apparatus. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a letter that will show the connection 
between Mr. Granich and the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. 
Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. An exhibit that was previously used. 

Senator Ferguson. Might we get the time when he was a Com- 
munist? 

Mr. Budenz. All through the period of my membership, 1935 to 
1945. 

Mr. Mandel. This letter is dated December 13, 1939, and is exhibit 
54, addressed to Mr. Max Granich at China Today. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 653 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, will you listen particularly to this, please? 

Mr. Mandel. It is addressed to him at 168 West Twenty-third 
Street, New York City, and as I understand by Owen Lattimore. I 
read from the letter as follows : 

I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible 
for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the 
international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that 
one of my employers is the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of 
Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the 
board of China Today, wiiich is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than 
Amerasia. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on 
that particular publication? 

Mr. Budenz. China Today was the Communist publication run by 
Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Philip Jaffe. 

Mr. Morris. Did they run it under their own names ? 

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; they ran it under the names of Frederick 
Spencer and J. W. Phillips or some such name. I think that is correct, 
J. W. Phillips. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Amerasia a Communist publication ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; Communist-created, but in order to have a 
certain different function than China Today. China Today was 
clearly Communist from its inception. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that account for the language that is used 
there about having a different slant ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. This letter, it seems to me, is very revealing. 
You will note Mr. Lattimore did not reject the policy of China Today, 
he just thinks it wouldn't permit him to function as well if he were 
connected with it. China Today was clearly a Chinese publication 
devised by the Communists in secrecy, to a degree, but with Communist 
policies very clearly defined for the purpose of influencing other 
agencies and organizations, penetrating them, and in that way work- 
ing out the Communist program in the United States for China. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was more openly for the Communist 
cause than Amerasia ? 

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes; that is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Beading that letter, Mr. Budenz, would you not say 
that Owen Lattimore knew the nature of those organizations when 
he used the term "one is more partisan than the other" ? 

Mr. Budenz. I can't see as an expert of the Far East how he could 
avoid knowing it because these were prominent publications in New 
York activity. 

Senator Ferguson, Would you say the words "more partisan" 
meant more communistic ? 

Mr. Budenz. Decidedly. 

Senator Ferguson, As far as China was concerned and the Far 
East? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. If you are Communist in regard to China, you 
are Communist everywhere. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Philip Jaffee was a 
Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; both by official information and by person- 
ally being acquainted with Mr. Jaffe in his not too frequent but 
nevertheless several visits to the Politburo. 

22848—52 — pt. 2 20 



654 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. There is no doubt in your mind that Philip Jaffe was 
a Communist ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I know it definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. During the whole period that you were one ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. Of course, during the whole period I didn't 
always see him jDersonally, but from official reports. Not only may I 
say that he was a Communist, but he was a Soviet espionage agent 
from advice given to me by J. Peters, immediately following conversa- 
tions of Peters with Jaffe. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, I have here a photostat of the Daily 
Worker of December 3, 1945. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate 
that document for us ? 

Mr. Mandel. This photostat was made at my direction. It is a 
photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945, page 11. 

Mr. Morris. I call your attention to the review of Joseph Starobin 
there of Jaffe's book on the Far East. I ask you if you will make 
comments on it, Mr. Budenz. You will note some part of it is 
underscored. 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. Well, of course, Mr. Starobin — this by the way, 
was published after I was out of the Communist Party, but it is an 
issue I have read. Mr. Starobin begins by attacking Patrick J. 
Hurley all over again and says : 

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of 
American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The 
writers, experts, journalists — and even career diplomats in the State Depart- 
ment — are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of 
the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, 
and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India, 

Then he goes on to say : 

This has given rise to virtual renaissance of American v^riting and think- 
ing on the Far East. 

The renaissance in this case is evidence by Philip Jaffe. 

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. 
It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressive literature about Asia in the 
last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia ; Kate Ivlitchell's 
study of India, and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also 
had Lawrence K. Rosinger's China's Crisis and Andrew Roth's Dilemma in 
Japan — excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. 
And then tliere were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists 
by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein. 

It goes on then with quite an acclaim of Jaffe's contribution. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that Kate Mitchell was a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; I met her as such at enlarged meetings of 
the Communist Party. 

Senator Smith. Is this Harrison Forman a Communist ? 

Mr. Budenz. I am glad you asked me that question, Senator. 
Yesterday in the double question raised by Mr, Morris on Harrison 
Forman and Mr. Stein I said "Yes," they were Communists. Technic- 
ally and legally I cannot say that Harrison Forman is a Communist. 
This is the situation : Harrison Forman was working with the Com- 
munists, knew he was working with them. 

xVccording to all official information I have he consented to have the 
Communists get out a special campaign for his book. He consented 
to have Joe North look over his book, and in addition to that was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 655 

referred to as one of "our people," but I have never heard him re- 
ferred to as Communist specifically and I like to be meticulous about 
that. 

I would like to make that sharp distinction. He was as close to 
the Communists as one could be without having been called such. 

Mr. Morris. And he consciously worked with them ? 

Mr, BuDENz. Oh, he consciously worked with them and arranged 
that the Communists should send out a secret memorandum which 
plugged his book and Gunther Stein's at the same time as required 
reading for all Communists and also as those books which should be 
pushed forward in non-Communist organizations. 

Senator Smith. Is he any relation to Dr. Clark Forman? 

Mr. BuDENz. He is no relation so far as I know. Dr. Clark Forman 
is another man. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Clark Forman to be a Communist? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Morris. You read there that Kumar Goshal wrote a book. Did 
you know that Kumar Goshal was a Communist? 

Mr. Btjdenz. I have heard him referred to as such though not very 
emphatically. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into the record and given the next consecutive number. 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 190" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 190 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, December 3, 1945, p. 11] 

Jaffe's Book on Fae East Stresses Need for Demockacy, Industkialization 

(New Frontiers in Asia, by Philip Jaffe. Alfred A. Knopf, $3. Reviewed by 

Joseph Starobin) 

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of Ameri- 
can intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, 
experts, journalists — and even career diplomats in the State Department — are 
almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuo- 
mintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and 
their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India. There is prob- 
ably no other phase of American policy on which there is such a broad agreement 
among well-informed people. This has given rise to a virtual renaissance of 
American writing and thinking on the Far East. 

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It 
follows a remarkable outpouring of progressives literature about Asia in the 
last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia ; Kate Mitchell's 
study of India ; and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also 
liad Lawrence K. Rosinger's China's Crisis, and Andrew Roth's Dilemma in 
Japan — excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And 
then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists — by 
Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein. 

PROGRAM FOR ASIA 

Jaffe's contribution is in the same tradition of scholarship ; but in addition to 
presenting the facts as they are, Jaffe has attempted, like Lattimore, to couch 
his scholarship in the framework of a general proposition. This pi'oposition is 
that the needs of American capitalism demand a large-scale program of indus- 
trializing China and India on the basis of democratic and progressive govern- 
ments in those countries. Not only do the needs of America require such a pro- 



656 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

gram bnt also the necessity of minimizing rivalry with Great Britain, securing a 
peaceful Asia and establishing a real basis for cooperation with Soviet Russia. 

In reality, there are two separate aspects to the book : One is a detailed exposi- 
tion of recent history in India and China, an excellent and rich library of infor- 
mation in itself. The other aspects, linked with the first but quite separate, is 
an essay on how the United States can solve the problems created by its enor- 
mous wartime productivity. The first aspect of the hook is easier to appraise 
than the second. 

SKILLFUL ANALYSIS 

The discussion of India and China offer an excellent picture of whafs what in 
both countries. The strategy of British imperialism in the Cripps proposal is 
exposed with great skill, and Jaffe makes full use of his detailed knowledge of 
the All India National Congress both before and after the August 1942 events. 

He also uses the letters of William Phillips to the late President Roosevelt to 
good advantage, and what gives the passage on India particular depth is his 
treatment of her economic problems, the various proposals which have come 
from India itself for postwar economic development. 

The discussion of China is probably the most elaborate single aspect of the 
book. It adds up to a damning indictment of the Kuomintang regime and a very 
firm statement on behalf of Conununist China's achievements — or more exactly — 
"new China's" achievements. 

These passages are jam-packed with material of the greatest topical value 
to the layman and yet of equal academic value to the student of China. The 
full story of Kuomintang deception over the draft constitution is iiere ; like- 
wise, the hitherto unpublished summary of what really happened in Sinkiang, 
the details of General Hurley's antics and the meaning of the Stilwell-Gauss 
ousters a year ago. All this offers as fresh a background for today's headlines 
as one could hope for. 

BRITAIN'S DILEMMA 

I would have liked an equally thorough treatment of the Indonesian, Indo- 
Chinese and Philippine independence movements, and a greater differentiation 
in analyzing French as compared with British imperial policy. 

On the other hand, one comes across rare material that is so little under- 
stood in this country — such as the story of Anglo-American rivalry in Siam. 
In general, one of Jaffe's strong points is his delineation of the British imperial- 
ist dilemma and the use which he makes of sidelights and comments from 
British sources. This enriches the entire discussion. 

QUESTIONS ON ASIA 

The second aspect of this book — the proposal for large-scale development of 
Asia — raises many more questions, and I can only indicate them here. 

Jaffe does not say that American capitalists will accept his proposals ; he does 
not regard them as inevitable in any sense, and in fact exhibits many doubts as 
to whether the United States will take the course he advises. 

He is also quite well aware that the alternative to a program of democratic 
cooperation with the progressive forces of Asia is a policy of imperialist expan- 
sion and cut-throat rivalry with Great Britain. 

Yet it is also true that his appeal has a certain one-sidedness. It does not 
analyze very sharply the actual possibilities of realizing his program. And of 
course, this discussion is entirely within the framework of the continuation of 
capitalism as such. 

AMERICAN POLICY 

I think that American Communists can certainly agree with the concept of 
American assistance in the industrialization of an Asia in which an independent 
India and a progressive, anti-feudal China would be the recipients of this aid. 

But the immediate problem, as recent events show, is that American policy is 
blocking the independence movements of Asia and shows no inclination to accept 
Or work with the anti-feudal, democratic program of the Chinese Communists. 

It is this aspect of American policy which determines our approach to every- 
thing else about United States relations with the Far East. And this refusal 
to accept a democratic Asia is not sufficiently foreseen in Jaffe's discussion and 
even in his premises. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS i)57 

This was perhaps understandable since the bulk of the book was written in 
the summer of 1944. But when read today, it gives rise to illusions about the 
nature of American policy. 

In all fairness, I see these faults only as an aspect of the book, and not neces- 
sarily the decisive aspect. For its factual material and its elaboration of the 
true issues inside of India, China, and Japan it ranks second to none in the grow- 
ing library of progressive thought on the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice that this writing kind of himped all 
these books together. Would you say that was a proper classification ? 

Mr. BuDEXz. These are some exhibits of those books which carried 
forward the idea of Communists represented by Mr. Browder in 1937 ; 
that the Chinese Communists should be represented as the democratic 
elements for the salvation of China. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you were to class the writings of this 
writer that we have been talking about would you class them the same 
as he did ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing Philip Jaffe. I offer 
you there an article from the New Masses and ask you if that recalls 
anything to you. 

Mr. BuDENZ. This article from the New Masses is its issue of Oc- 
tober 12, 1937, with the chief article, the one to which you refer by 
Philip Jaffe, China's Communists Told Me, a Specialist in Far 
Eastern Affairs Interviews the Leading Men of Reel China in Their 
Home Territory. This expedition, if you wish to call it that, under 
Jaffe's supervision to Yenan was a Communist project so far as 
discussions in the Politburo showed. 

Mr. Morris. You knew it was a Communist project from your po- 
sition in the Daily Worker, is that correct ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. Not only in the Daily Worker, it was discussed 
with the editors of New Masses before the Politburo and was con- 
sidered to be a very important mission to stimulate activity among 
intellectuals everywhere about Red China to bring out that which 
Joseph Stalin later pointed out that the intellectuals have been won 
to sympathy for Red China. 

Mr. Morris. So you knew this was a Red project? 

Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly. 

Mr. Morris. Are there any other excerpts that you care to comment 
on, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. We shouldn't take too much time on it. I think the 
significant part is the concluding part. 

Mr. Morris. Would you read that, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. The part I shall quote is this : 

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu 
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students 
of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from 
other schools. 

Mr. Morris. Who is Chu Teh? 

Mr. Budenz. Chu Teh is one of the great leaders of the Chinese 
Communists. Bisson, he is identified as T. A. Bisson in other parts of 
the article. Lattimore is identified as Owen Lattimore, editor of 
Pacific Affairs, in another part of the article. 

Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the 
United States of America? How do American workers live and how developed is 
their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's NRA campaign? What is 



658 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the present situation in the left literary movement in America? What do the 
American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions 
concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the 
American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the 
Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. 

Then omitting one paragraph he conckides with Agnes Smedley's 
estimate of their trip — that is, of the trip of Bisson, Jaffe, Lattimore, 
to the Red Chinese areas. In this letter Miss Smedley says, or rather 
Jaffe says, that Miss Smedley indicates "better than I am able," how 
much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former 
Soviet regions. 

This is Agnes Smedley now being quoted : 

In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I 
speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I 
want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the 
effect of that meeting until 2 or 3 days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I 
have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, 
has had a colossal effect upon all people. 

Then she goes on with other similar praises for the contribution 
made. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that article of 
October 12, 1937, in the New Masses magazine, incorporated by 
reference. 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 191" and was 
filed for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. And I would like to have such extracts as read by Mr. 
Budenz completely incorporated into the record. 

Senator Smith, That will be done. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know Anthony Jenkinson ? 

Mr. Budenz. I knew him personally, sir; Anthony Jenkinson. 

Mr. Morris. Was he a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; he, according to his own statement to me, 
was sent here under instructions from Moscow to penetrate the con- 
servative labor press with the Allied Labor News. I had a number of 
conferences in his office in mid-Manhattan on this question. 

These conferences — may I explain ? 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Budenz. These conferences arose from the fact that the Daily 
Worker was having difficulty in getting full coverage from Moscow, 
and we wanted to get the help of the Allied Labor News and Anthony 
J-enkinson declared in a series of conferences I had with him that this 
was contraiy to the instructions which he had received in England ; 
that the instructions he had received from Moscow were to confine the 
Allied Labor News to the conservative labor press and to try to pene- 
trate the American Federation of Labor newspapers under the guise 
of being merely a labor service on the international basis. 

Later on, after further discussions and because in part the Allied 
Labor News didn't get into the A. F. of L. newspapers as they 
wanted — the A. F. of L. labor leaders have a remarkable ability to 
smell out Communist institutions — they did then relent in regard to 
the Daily Worker first by permitting the Daily Worker to quote the 
Allied Labor News, and then finally by allowing us, if I remember 
correctly — at least we were on the eve of that — to use its name, its 
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 659 

Mr. Morris. You have no doubt, then, that they were completely 
controlled ? 

Mr. BuDENZ. Completely controlled by the Communists. Not only 
do I know that from the Politburo but Jenkinson told me definitely 
he had been sent from England for that purpose. You must under- 
stand that a great many of the translations, for popular purposes, of 
Moscow publications at that time took place in London. They had 
over there at that time for that purpose a division of Communist 
International and he had received his instructions from the Soviet 
capital for that purpose. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Was he an English citizen ? 

Mr. Btjdenz. That is my understanding. He was even supposed 
to be titled. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, in connection with your statement that it 
was created by the Communist Party, I would like Mr. Mandel to 
introduce a certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News. 

Mr. ISIandel. I have here a photostat of the certificate of incorpora- 
tion of the Allied Labor News, dated May 12, 1942, in which Anthony 
B. Jenkinson and Robert Terrall, T-e-r-r-a-1-1, are listed as the incor- 
porators. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Eobert Terrall? 

Mr. BuDENZ. I don't recall him now. 

Mr. Morris. But you do know that Anthony B. Jenkinson is a 
Communist ? 

Mr. BuDENz. Definitely. 

Mr. Morris. I notice he uses the address of 16 West Twelfth Street, 
New York City. 

Do you know what address that is ? 

Mr. BuDENz. I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the home residence of Frederick Vanderbilt 
Field? 

Mr. BuDENz. It's near it ; it's opposite the Daily Worker. 

ISIr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate where that came 
from ? 

Mr. Maistdel. That photostat was made at my direction from the 
records of the county clerk. 

Mr. Morris. Also the records of the secretary of state of New York ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. That will be received as an exhibit. 

Mr. Mandel. To indicate the nature of the Allied Labor News. 

Mr. Morris. Not on that, his association with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 192" and is 
herewith inserted.) 

Mr. Mandel. I have the follow^ing letters from the files of the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations, one is dated February 2, 1942, addressed 
to Philip E. Lilienthal, from W. L. Holland, referring to Sir Anthony 
Jenkinson. I read the following excerpt : 

The Shepherd book and the second vohime of the handbook slionld be out this 
week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the 
Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. ' Elizabeth is 
greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department 
for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief, elementary 
affair, called Know Your Enemy, Japan, by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting 
them to order 15,000 copies of your pamphlet. 
Sincerely j'ours, 

W. L. Holland. 



660 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. iSIoKRis. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this is to show that 
Anthony Jenkinson's book was the subject of interest of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations and also that the War Department had ordered 
20,000 copies of his pamphlet. 

May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next conse- 
cutive exhibit? 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 193" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 193 

New York City, Fehruary 2, 19^2. 
Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

8a 71 Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Phil : Many thanks for your notes of Friday and Saturday and the 
earlier note about Condliffe's approval of the Mitchell proofs. 

I am not surprised that the Washington proposal smelled bad to you, but I 
thou,a;ht I ought to let you know about it in case you had caught the prevailing 
yearning to be in the Nation's Capital. Personally, I should much prefer you 
here. Thus far Luce apparently has not been able to persuade the Government 
to give Bob Barnett passage to China on a bomber, so the whole business is still 
in suspense. Please dont feel bound to leave exactly on the 14th. I only sug- 
gested it because it was the end of the week. If you want to stay a week longer, 
please do so. 

I wrote last week to Albany for a certificate of ownership for my car and 
hope the GMAC will send it to me soon. I am sorry to be giving you so much 
trouble over the car. I enclose a check for $40 to cover part of the expenses 
you have been incurring, e. g., for E>oreen's excess baggage and license plates. 
I am awfully grateful for all you did to help Doreen and hope the cleaning-up job 
has not been too awful. The laundry box arrived safely. We seem to have 
brought a few of Miss Stewart's things and have apparently left our electric 
kitchen clock behind, but I will write Miss Stewart about this when I return her 
things. 

The first part of the Broek manuscript looks pretty good, and Hilda thinks tye 
printer will be able to read the manuscript quite well. Farquhar was on a con- 
siderable bender in New York. Whether it was because of this or not I don't 
know, but Hilda was finally able to make a pretty remunerative deal with him 
on the Burma book which is now being reprinted by Haddon. We are actually 
going to get 10-percent royalties on it. I hope Sammy won't repudiate the agree- 
ment when he sobers up. 

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this 
week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the 
Formosa book and that should l)e out in about two more weeks. Elisalieth is 
greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Depart- 
ment for oiir pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief ele- 
mentary affair called "Know Your Enemy Japan," by Tony Jenkinson. We are 
expecting them to order 50,000 copies of your pamphlet. 
Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

Mr. Mandel. This is the next letter taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 24, 1940, addressed to Chen 
Han-sen^, care of the American Express Co., Hong Kong. He is ad- 
dressed as "Dear Geoffrey," and I read a section of the letter, as 
follows : 

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few 
months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an in- 
valuable friend. 

That is signed by Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. By that he means the international secretariat of the 
IPR? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 661 

Mr. Mandel. yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce that into the record and 
have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 194" and is as 
follows :) 

New York, N. Y., July 2It, 1940. 
Chen Han-seng, Esq., 

Care of American Express Co., Hong Kong. 

Dear Geoffrey : Yesterday was certainly a red-letter day in the office, for I 
received two letters from you both dated the 8th of July. It is very exciting 
to be in direct communication with you again, for we have all missed you 
greatly and no one has missed you more than I. 

What you have said about Pacific affairs is most timely. I have sent copies 
of your Pacific Affairs letter to Owen, Lockwood, Field, Porter, Holland, and 
others. I know that they will all enjoy it as much as I have. 

I wish you would write me frankly your private estimate of the Far Eastern 
Survey. I assume that you get it regularly. Do you have time to read it? 
Is it of use (a) to you, (&) to any Chinese of your acquaintance in China or 
Hong Kong, (c) to any foreigners of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong? 

What is your reaction to Amerasia as at present operating? Does it fill the 
need of a monthly, or do you still feel that Pacific Affairs should become a 
monthly in competition with Amerasia? 

I am glad that you have sent Bill Holland direct a copy of your other letter 
of July 8 reporting on your program of work. I am sure he will be glad to 
have this letter and will doubtless be writing you as to several questions in due 
course. I know he will be as excited as I am to be in direct communication 
with you again. 

The next month is likely to be fatefvil for both Hong Kong and England. 
We hope that no damage will come to you and Susie or to Elsie or to Wellington 
and all of the members of his family. 

We feel important here in the midst of the enormous, but undirected, latent 
power of the United States. The administration is preparing to be strong 
in a military way in 2 or 3 years, but is doing little to use its moral and material 
strength now when it is needed. 

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few 
months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invalu- 
able friend. 

Linebarger has written most enthusiastically of the help you gave him when 
he was in Hong Kong. 

With kindest regards, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a letter dated January 18, 1937, from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed tg Dr. James T. 
Shotwell. It comes from Frederick V. Field. I read : 

Dear Dr. Shotwell: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yo- 
semite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office 
and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young 
Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people 
the impression of being superficial but who on longer acqi^aintance turns out 
to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or 
four years ago he wrote a book called America Came My Way, which I am 
told had phenomenal sales in England. 

Since the Yosemite Conference, Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada, gath- 
ering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large 
study of the Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very 
anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an 
opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write 
you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment. 

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you 
will find that Jenkinson is well wortli while. 
Sincerely yours, 

Frederick V. Field. 



662 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have Mr. Field's letter of January 18, 
1937, introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive 
exhibit, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Smith. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 195" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 195 

Jan u All Y 18, 1937. 
Dr. James T. Shotweix, 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Mr. Shotwell: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yo- 
semite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office 
and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young 
Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the 
impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be 
exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four 
years ago he wrote a book called America Came My Way, which I am told had 
phenomenal sales in England. 

Since the Yosemite Conference Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada gath- 
ering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large 
study of Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very 
anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an 
opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write 
you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment. 
I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you 
will find that Jenkinson is well worth while. 
Sincerely yours, 

Frederick V. Field. 

]NIr. Mandel. I have here a list of writings, articles, by Israel Ep- 
stein, writing for the Allied Labor News and appearing in the Daily 
Worker. 

I would like to incorporate that list into the record. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be incorporated in the record? 

Senator Smith. That will be done. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 196" and is 
as follows: ) 

Israel Epstein — Articles for Allied Labor News 

Daily Worker, July 29, 1946. 
Daily Worker, January 30, 194S. 
Daily Worker, August 26, 1948, page 8. 
Daily Worker, August 27, 1948, page 8. 
Daily Worker, .December 1, 1948. 
Daily Worker, August 18, 1949, page 6. 
Daily Worker, August 19, 1949, page 6. 
Daily Worker, September 5. 1949, page 6. 
Daily Worker, August 16, 195U, page 6. 
Daily Worker, September 11, 1950, page 6. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know him to be a Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, I have met him both at the headquarters of 
the Communist Party and also up at the offices of Soviet Russia To- 
day, or, yes, Soviet Russia Today. 

]\Ir. Morris. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, 
Mr. Budenz? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; he is a well-versed Communist. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 663 

Mr. Morris. Do you have anythino; to show Mr. Mandel's connec- 
tion with the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. William Mandel, listed as a research associate of the 
American Russian Institute, IPR — no relative of mine — was the au- 
thor of a paper on the Soviet Far East and Central Asia which was 
presented at the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions at Mount Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, when you said "member of the American 
Council." do you mean the American Council of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. He is listed as a research associate of the Amer- 
ican Russian Institute which is one of the organizations listed by the 
Attorney General and in the foreword to his study, had the following 
note: 

This study, constituting part 2 of a larger worl^ on tlie Soviets in tlie Far 
E'ast, is to be publisbecl later by the IPR and is submitted by the international 
secretariat 

Mr. Morris. Of the IPR? 
Mr. Mandel. Of the IPR. 

as a document of the eighth conference of the IPR to be held in December 1942. 
The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion in his study 
that later appeared as a book entitled, "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," 
which is listed as follows : "By William Mandel, research associate, American 
Russian Institute, IPR, inquiry series, issued under the auspices of the Inter- 
national Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, the Dial Press, Inc., New 
York, N. T., 1944. 

Now, I have made some excerpts from the book which are worthy 
of note, and I read from the foreword : 

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. 
J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his suc- 
cessors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the 
international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in 
connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. D. 
Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern carried the. major share 
of this responsibility. 

Now, I have an excerpt from the book 

Mr. Morris. Mr. MandePs book? 

Mr. Mandel. William Mandel's book. The author's preface might 
be worthy of note and I read : 

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-a-vis 
Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler 
and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. 
Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 
1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 
4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality 
means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be reiDlenished and 
supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to 
reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment. 

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred 
to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas INlikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, 
and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce those excerpts 
into the record. 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 



664 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 197" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 197 

The Soviet Far East and Central Asia 

(By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute IPR 
inquiry series issued under the auspices of the international secretariat. 
Institute of Pacific Relations. The Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944) 

FOREWORD 

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the 
Far East. 

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American 
Russian Institute. 

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. 
Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors. Dr. 
Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international 
secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection 
with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss 
Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of 
this responsibility. 

* * * * ill: * 4: 

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems 
arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide 
members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPIl conferences 
with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with 
a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future 
adjustment of international relations in that area. 

* * 4: 4s 4^ 4: « 

(Pp. vii, viii, ix) 

Edward C. Carter, 

Secretary-General. 
New York, May 15, 1943. 

author's preface 

* *■ * * * * * 
The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-i-vis 

Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat 
Hitler and thus deprive .Japan of the partner without which it cannot liope for 
victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese 
attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during 
China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neu- 
trality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished 
and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue 
to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombard- 
ment. 

* * * For the most complete pi'ewar data available, the reader is referred 
to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in 
English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger. 

* * * Industrial enterprises have been evacuated to. and erected in central 
Asia in such numbers during the course of the war as to have completely changed 
the basis of its economy. Refugees have been resettled en masse. They include 
not only Slavs, but large numbers of Jews, as well as persons from the Baltic 
states. As a result of the Soviet policy of safeguarding not only cultural insti- 
tutions, but the creative individuals who are the bearers of culture, these 
evacuees include a large proportion of scientists, artists, writers, the personnel 
of the motion-picture industry, and the like. 

* * * ilf * * i»i 

(Pp. xii, xiv, XV) 

William Mandel. 
New York, September 1943. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 665 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, two previous witnesses have identified 
Michael Greenberg as a niejnber of the Communist Party. Did you 
know that Michael Greenberg is a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. I knew him from official communications to be a 
member of the Communist Party, yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have already shown Mr. Greenberg 
is connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but I think we have 
one inquiry by Senator Ferguson which has not been answered. 

Mr. Mandel. Senator Ferguson asked about the naturalization of 
Michael Greenberg. Our files show that Michael Greenberg was 
naturalized in the United States District Court of Washington, D. C, 
June 6, 1944, certificate No. 6370908. 

Senator Smitii. Where was he from? 

Mr. Mandel. England. 

Mr. INIoRRis. May the record so show ? 

Mr. Budenz, do you know Andrew Roth to be a member of the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, from official communications. My impres- 
sion is that I met Andrew Roth but I am not sure. He was very active, 
particularly during the Amerasia difficulties in sending suggestions 
to the Communist leaders. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know his book. Dilemma in Japan? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. This book. Dilemma in Japan, was sub- 
mitted to the Politburo for reading before it was published. 

Mr. Morris. You know that from your own knowledge? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; I saw at least what purported to be a copy 
of it. It was to be given to several people and I didn't read it. 

Mr. Morris. Who published Dilemma in Japan ? 

Mr. Budenz. I think it is Little, Brown & Co. 

Mr. Morris. It so states in that article? 

]Mr. Budenz. That was my remembrance. 

Mr. Morris. Could you comment any further on Dilemma in Japan 
as used by the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, this particular photostat that has been given 
me, which is the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945 — the date is 
obscure, but it's 1945 — page 8, Seeds of New Pearl Harbor still in 
Japan, Writer Warns, by Samuel Sillen, was a leading article in order 
to focus attention on Japan, which the Communist leaders were on 
orders to advance everywhere they could. In this book. Lieutenant 
Roth attacks very sharply Under Secretary of State Grew, or rather 
former Under Secretary of State Grew, because Grew had resigned 
while this book was in the course of being prepared or published 
rather. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photostat, if it is 
authenticated by Mr. Mandel, to be introduced into the record and 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of September 
12, 1945, page 8, which was reproduced at my direction. 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 



666 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 198'' and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 198 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 12, 1945, p. 8] 

Seeds of New Pearl Harbor Still in Japan, Writer Warns 

(By Samuel Sillen) 

A new Pearl Harbor will threaten America unless sweeping changes are quickly 
effected in Japan's political and economic structure. The imperialist rulers of 
Japan have a carefully planned come-back strategy which calls for retention of 
their power within the country and for creating disunity among the victor na- 
tions. If United States policy is not directed toward smashing this strategy 
at the outset, the blood of American boys will again redden the Pacitic. Tliis 
urgent warning is the theme of Dilemma in Japan, a book completed after VJ-day 
and published this morning by Little, Brown & Co. 

Andrew Roth, the author, is one of the group of the Far East experts, wlio 
earned the displeasure of former Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, 
leading advocate of friendship with the Emperor both before and after Pearl 
Harbor. He is at present under indictment for allegedly making use of State 
Department documents marked "Confidential." 

But there is nothing confidential in this book. The public record of tragically 
wrong-headed policy speaks for itself. And a review of that record — which promi- 
nently includes Mr. Grew's published diary, Ten Years in Japan — casts a dis- 
turbing light on the events of the past few days in b'outhern Korea, China, and 
Japan itself. 

Mr. Both rips away the unreal distinction between the moderates and ex- 
tremists among Japan's rulers. The moderate elenuents — Emperor, navy, busi- 
nessmen — on whom the State Department experts relied for peace, joined hands 
enthusiastically with the most rabid militarists in the sneak attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 

And today again. Both warns, the group in Japan that will try most eagerly 
to please us will be our greatest danger. 

"These self-proclaimed angels of peace," he writes, "will be the front men 
for the Zaibatsu, which is Japanese for plutocracy or moneyed groups." 

In view of General MacArthur's announcement that he does not intend to 
interfere with Japan's internal economy, Roth's analysis of Japan's Big Four 
financial combines — Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda — assumes vital 
significance. Emphasizing that they boast a concentration of financial power 
unparalleled anywhere else in the world, Roth notes that "the relative position 
of the Mitsui or Jlitsubishi concerns in the life of Japan is so important that 
beside them the role played by organizations like du Pont and Standard Oil 
seems small." 

"During most of the modern period," he writes, "Japan's giant trusts have 
been important and willing partners of the militarists in the acquisition of new 
territories for exploitation, with quarrels restricted to the question of methods, 
division of spoils, and supreme power over the domestic economy." 

A surrender that would leave these elements in power would fall far short of 
victory. 

Like these imperialists, the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal. Roth 
believes. Hirohito, a wealthy landowner, is also a substantial member of the 
Zaibatsu, an integral part of the economic oligarchy. The occupying forces 
should encourage literature critical of the Emperor institution. The opponents 
of the throne, who favor popular sovereignty against imperial sovereignty, should 
be strengthened, he declares. 

These antiimperialist elements in Japan are described historically in one of the 
most important sections of Roth's valuable book. Japanese censorship has kept 
the world in virtual ignorance of popular resistance movements within the 
country, so that the average American thinks of Japan as one undifferentiated 
mass. 

But the severity of Japanese reaction reflects, as in Germany, the imperialists' 
need to stamp out or siphon off the discontent of the people organized in trade- 
unions and democratic political movements. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 667 

Roth recalls that in the Diet elections of 1928, for example, the laborites won 
8 seats with 438,000 votes, and the Communist-influenced Workers and Peasants 
Party won 2 seats with 188,000 votes. 

STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR 

The Japanese Communists have consistently fought against Japan's imperialist 
war even under the most savage repression. 

"On July 8, 1937, the day after the beginning of the China Incident, the Com- 
munists issued a statement denouncing Japan's attack as an 'unjust robbers' 
war which every Japanese should oppose." 

Roth cites dramatic evidence of labor resistance, under Communist leadership, 
even after Pearl Harbor. 

The problem, says Roth, is to convert Japan's democratic minority into a 
majority. Working with the labor movement which has persisted, even if in 
rudiuieiitary form, during the war is indispensable for achieving a peaceful and 
democratic Japan. 

But Roth understands clearly that American monopolists, who certainly don't 
like to encourage labor at home, will be most reluctant to promote labor organiza- 
tion in Japan. 

Under the slogan of working with the forces of "order" and "stability," American 
reactionaries will resist essential modification of the class structure in Japan. 
That way lies another Pearl Harbor for America. 

Mr. MoREis. Mr. Budenz, I notice that we are introducing quite a 
few people, mentioning quite a few people, as Communists connected 
with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Was there ever any comment made in official Communist Party 
circles that you know of that indicated the degree of concentration 
by Communist writers and Communist members '( 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; there were a number of discussions within 
the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPE, 
was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in 
governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they con- 
stantly criticized the Institute of Pacific Relations comrades for not 
spreading out more — that is, they felt that the institute was too much 
a concentration point for Communists ; that control could be main 
tained without such a galaxy of Communists in it. These problems 
were presented to the Communist Party from time to time. This dis- 
cussion, therefore, went on for several years, to my knowledge, and 
the constant criticism by the Communist leaders was that those within 
the Institute of Pacific Relations were too much concentrated in regard 
to Communist personnel. 

Mr. Morris. Then they had too many Communists for their purpose ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right, they didn't need so many. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have anything else that would associate Andrew 
Roth with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is taken from the official publications of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. We find a list of books and articles by 
Andrew Roth, for example, French Interest and Policies in the Far 
East, coauthored by Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. I have 
here four articles, three articles by Roth and one a review of his book, 
Dilemma in Japan, taken from Pacific Affairs. Then there are three 
articles by Roth or about his book in the Far Eastern Survey. 

I offer that for the record. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that compilation be introduced 
into the record and made a part of it with the next consecutive num- 
ber « 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 



668 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 199" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 199 

Andrew Roth 

ipr books 

French Interests and Policies in the Far East by Roger Levy, Guy Lacam, 
Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. (IPR Boolis, New and Forthcoming 
Publications on the Far East and Pacific Area — IPR (p. 11) ) . 

ARTICLES IN PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Japan Strikes South, 371-372 (Review 1941, volume XIV. 

Review of Blood on the Rising Sun by Douglas G. Haring, 235-236, 1944, 
volume XVII. 

Review of Our Japanese Foe, by Ian ^Morrison ; My Life With the Enemy, by 
Phyllis Argall ; Nippon : The Crime and Punishment of Japan, by Willis Lamott, 
351-352, 1944, volume XVII. 

Dilemma in Japan (review) 114, volume XIX, 1946. 

ARTICLES IN FAR EASTERN SURVEY 

War Leads to Sharp Rise in Soviet-United States Trade, October 1940. 
Cotton for the Soviets, January 2, 1941. 

Dilemma in Japan, Little Brown. Reviewed by Richard Watts, October 10, 
1945. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here, taken from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Kelations, a press release from the Federated Press, Eastern 
Bureau, 30 Irving Place, New York City, sheet 2, February 19, 1941. 
The article is by Andrew Both and at the top it says : 

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the 
author's. 

Mr. Morris. Who was the author? 

Mr. Mandel. Andrew Roth. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, could you tell us what the Federated 
Press was? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. As chairman of publications, Dick Sellers 
reported to me. He was in charge and afterward so was Mark Stone 
or Finestone, the brother of I. N. Stone, who reported to me. He was 
its business manager or manager and the Federated Press was com- 
pletely controlled by the Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Have you any connnents to make on the fact that 
Andrew Kotli's book was released by the iVmerican Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations and by the Federated Press ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I must say that if someone who was a non- 
Communist in the American Council was responsible for that, he was 
very naive. Undoubtedly, it was due to Communist influence. 

Mr. Morris. That was an article, not a book? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes. The article was released in that fashion because 
the Federated Press by that time had a well-established reputation. 

Mr. Morris. It was openly Communist? 

Mr. Budenz. It wasn't openly Communist but everybody in New 
York knew. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record 
as the next consecutive exhibit ? 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 669 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 200" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 200 

Looking Abkoad 

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American 
Council of the Institute of Pacitie Relations and by Federated Press. 
Opinions are the author's. 

(By Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina) 

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back 
pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines. 

Friction between the unoflicial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached 
a new intensity. The late of Indochina is a key to future developments in the 
area. 

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where 
Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard 
the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to 
obtain Camrahh Bay, Indochina's iJartly developed naval base on the south- 
east coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south. 

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses 
of the Philippines and the Netlierlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 
750 miles of Singapore — the British Gilbraltar of the East. 

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases 
that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan 
to step in as mediator. The peace conference between Thailand and ludochlua 
is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with 
the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand — as well as Indochina — as pay- 
ment for its mediation. 

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 
inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great 
mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous 
burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely 
ov.-ued by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was 
Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Keynaud cabinet and also in the early days 
of the Petain regime. 

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and 
the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. 
This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay iu 1930, with 
sporadic fighting continuing into 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, 
but the basic cause — peasant poverty — was not removed. 

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots 
and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and De- 
cember of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 rebels were arrested, 
200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the 
part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or 
the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of 
the Far East. 

Mr. BuDENz. The American Federation of Labor had publicly 
labeled it as Communist. I don't know the exact year, but it was on 
several occasions. 

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter dated September 26. 1940, from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Owen Lattimore 
from Edward C. Carter. 

Dear Owen : Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important mono- 
graph for the IPR inquiry is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has 
completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has 
done a guod deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history, 
and also on Indian history. 

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal 
to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and 
will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs 

22848— 52— pt. 2 21 



670 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

during the next 2 yeax-s. I think you know that he is rated very liighly by 
Jessup and Peffer. 

Mr, Morris. Who signed that ? 

Mr. Mandel. It is signed by Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced 
into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 201" and is 
as follows :) 

EXHIEIT No. 201 

Sunset Fakm, 
Lee, Mass., September 26, 1940. 
Owen Lattimore, Esq., 

300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins Universiiy, Baltimore, Md. 
Dear Owen : Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important mono- 
graph for the IPK inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastei-n studies. He has 
completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and 
has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar 
history and also on Indian history. 

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal 
to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and 
will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs 
durins,' the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup 
and Peffer. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. That is a recommendation of Andrew Roth showing 
other members of the IPR, and Jessup is Philip Jessup. 

Mr. jMandel. Next is a letter dated May 23, 1940, from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Holland from Mr. 
Carter, and reads : 

Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10. 

Then the last paragi'aph says : 

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at 
Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record 
and marked as the next consecutive exhibit? 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 202" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 202 

129 East Fifty-second Street, Netvv York City, 

May 23, 1940. 
W. L. Holland, E.sq., 

Giannini Foundation, Unlt)crsity of California, 

Berkeley, Calif. 
Dear P.tij, : Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to 
him oC May 10. He is prepared to undertake to add the chapter that you have 
proposed ; namely, to bring the history of French political and economic relations 
with Cliiiin and Japan up to the present time, since Levy's report does not go 
beyond VX'.s. I luive assumed that you want Roth to cover anything he can in 
l!j:!;) and thus f;ir in 1!)40. 

I have told Roth that I hope he can finish his work by July 1 or July 15 at 
the latest. 

As he is headed for a scholastic career, he is wondering what he can get out 
of this task professionally; that is, what sort of a byline he could get. I said 
I supposed there were three possibilities : First, that he might be mentioned in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 671 

the foreword as having contributed a chapter; second, that he might be men- 
tioned on the title page as having contributed a chapter ; and, third, that the 
book might be published as being written by Levy and Roth. I, myself, think 
that the latter would probably not be possible, but I told him that this was a 
mattei- that you would have to decide, and that I could not commit myself at alL 
Will vou let me know what your reaction is? 

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at 
Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edwaed C. Carter. 

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter from the Department of the Navy, 
dated July 19, 1951, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, and reads ; 

In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew' 

Roth are submitted for your information. 

Rotli was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at 
Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract 
was canceled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval 
Reserve. On 8 September 1942, he was commissioned as an ensign in the United 
States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the 
Navy. 

On 6 June 1945, Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. 
The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of 
section 31 title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th 
Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 
18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371. On that 
date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy 
which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy. 

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States 
Government records from the liles of various Government agencies and con- 
verting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently 
nol-prossed by the LTnited States attorney. 

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 
3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States 
Navy. 

That is signed by Dan A. Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Chairman, may that letter from Under Secretary 
of the Navy be introduced into the record and marked as the next con- 
secutive exhibit? 

Senator Smith. So ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 203" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 203 

Department of the Navy,