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Full text of "Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first[-second] session .."

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTirxATE THE ABMINISTKATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 3 

SEPTEMBER 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 1951 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 



r^ 




Ersfem Bnsiness BrricS 
DEC 24 1952 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
22848 WASHINGTON : 1951 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chwirman 

HARLBY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Micliisran 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. SouRwixE, Counsel 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations 

JAMES O. EASTLAND,"^Mississippi, Chairman 

PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

ROBERT MORRIS, Special Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 

II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Page 

Carter, Edward C 896 

Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth 905 

Dooman, Eugene H 703 

Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired) 843 

Kornfeder, Joseph Zack 864 

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (retired) 775 

Widener, Mrs. William Harry 755 

in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



miDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

OF the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424, 
Senate Office Buildino;, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding. 
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North Caro- 
lina. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel ; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
The chair regrets that, due to the absence of the chairman from 
the Senate for 2 weeks, the matter of these hearings has been delayed. 
They will proceed more expeditiously from now on. 
Wlio is our witness today, Mr. Morris ? 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Eugene Dooman. 

The Chairman. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are 
about to give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judi- 
ciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and notliing but the truth, so help you God? 
Mr. Dooman. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE H. DOOMAN, LITCHFIELD, CONN. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, 
please, Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Dooman. Eugene H. Dooman, and my home is at Litchfield, 
Conn. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation, Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Dooman. I am retired. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, will you tell us what positions you have 
held in the United States State Department? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, from the beginning, in 1912, when I entered the 
Foreign Service, I was first assigned to the Embassy at Tokyo to study 
the Japanese language. 

After several years' tour of duty in several of the consulates in 
Japan, I was assigned to the American Embassy at Tokyo as third 
secretary in 1921. 

I remained there until 1931, when I was transferred as first secre- 
tary of the Embassy at London. 

703 



704 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

From 1933 to 1937 I had the Japanese desk in the Far Eastern 
Division of the State Department, and in that last year I was trans- 
ferred to Tokyo as counselor of the American Embassy. 

In 1942 after my return from Japan I was assigned to the Embassy 
in Russia as minister consular. I returned to the State Department 
in 1942 and after doing various things I was assigned in February 
1945 as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, 
and Navy Coordinating Committee. 

And I retired on the 31st of August 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain the importance of that Far Eastern 
Committee mentioned as your last position held in the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It had previously been found that discussions be- 
tween the various departments — that is, primarily the State Depart- 
ment, the War Department, and the Navy Department — in connec- 
tion with problems that arose out of the war through negotiations 
were unsatisfactory. 

And in 1944, I believe it was, a committee was formed, known as 
the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. The members 
of that committee were the Assistant Secretaries of those repective 
Departments, the Chairman being James Dunn, who was Assistant 
Secretary of State. 

Under the Coordinating Committee there were two subcommittees, 
one for Germany and one for Japan, and it was the function of those 
committees to formulate a joint agreement or meeting of the minds 
of the three Departments on various problems that had both political 
and military content. 

Tlie Subcommittee on the Far East, of which I was Chairman, then 
had the function of developing and formulating policies with respect 
to Japan primarily, which had both military and political content. 

I would therefore say that it was the original source of all of the 
ultimate decisions that were made in the field of policy respecting 
Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Dooman, can you recall that Owen Lattimore 
was proposed at one time as a consultant to the chief of the China desk 
of the Department of State? 

Mr. DooMAN. I can; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us your recollection with respect to that 
particular incident, Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. DooMAN. At that time, which must have been early in 1945, 
I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of this Far Eastern Sub- 
committee of S WINK, and I was therefore not primarily interested 
in the functions and operations of the Far Eastern Division, or the 
Far Eastern Office, as it was then called. 

But one of the men in the office told me that papers were going 
through the State Department calling for the appointment of Dr. 
Lattimore as adviser to the China Division, the papers having been 
initiated by the Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. Morris. Who was that ? 

Mr. DooMAN. That was Mr. John Carter Vincent. 

I discussed the matter with Mr. Ballantine, wiio was then Director 
of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out that Lattimore at that 
time, and for several months previously, had been using every oppor- 
tunity to discredit the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 705 

And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a man who had 
expressed himself so freely on Mr. Grew to be occupying a position 
under Mr. Grew. 

With that I reported the matter to Mr. Grew, and he then called up 
the administrative people who had charge of appointments and or- 
dered that the papers be quashed. 

Senator Eastland. Wliat did Mr. Lattimore have to say against 
Mr. Grew ? What was the complaint against him ? 

Mr. Doom AN. That would take a long time. 

Senator Eastland. Was it because he had been opposing com- 
munism in the Far East and because he wanted a peace treaty that 
would prevent the Communists from getting Japan? 

The Chairman. By "he," you refer to Mr. Grew ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DooMAN. The principal cause of complaint Avas that Mr. Grew 
had advocated an attitude on the part of the United States of nonin- 
terference with the Japanese themselves in the form of government 
which they wanted to institute. 

In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, by all means 
let them keep it. If they wanted to disestablish the monarchy, by 
all means let them disestablish it. 

Senator Eastland. Why would the Communists want the Emperor 
overthrown ? 

Mr. Dooman. The point which you have mentioned. Senator, was 
one of the cardinal points of the Communists not only in the United 
States but also throughout the world. They knew perfectly well, of 
course, that communism and a monarchial system were incongruous. 

Therefore, the first thing was to get rid of the monarchial system. 

They knew also that the communalistic type of society which has 
existed in Japan for 2,000 years existed largely because of the Em- 
peror being a sort of an element which brought the Nation together. 

Now, this is the type of thing which I do not understand myself, 
and I do not believe any occidental can, but nevertheless, it is a fact. 

Senator Eastland. Lattimore understood that fact? 

Mr. DooMAN. Lattimore understood the fact that it was the Em- 
peror who did bring it together. 

Senator Eastland. His opposition to Grew was that Mr. Grew was 
favoring a policy after the war was won that would prevent the Com- 
munists from getting Japan. That is it in a nutshell, is it not? 

Mr. DooMAN. That would be — if I were to answer your question, 
Senator, it would be largely question of opinion. 

Senator Eastland. That is your judgment? 

Mr. DooMAN. That is my judgment. 

Senator Eastland. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging the 
appointment of Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a question ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Eastland's proposed question was: Was Mr. 
John Carter Vincent urging the appointment of Owen Lattimore at 
that time? 

Mr. Doom AN. Yes. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, the papers calling for the assign- 
ment of Lattimore as adviser to the China Division were initiated 
by Vincent. 



706 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris, Mr. Chairman, at this point, since we have gotten into 
the subject, I think it is appropriate that we should introduce into 
the record a resohition of the Communist Party at this juncture with 
respect to the policy toward Japan. 

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the resolution that has been dis- 
cussed so far today ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a mimeographed copy of excerpts from a 
magazine called Political Affairs for July 1945, the official organ at 
that time of the Communist Political Association. 

It is headed "The present situation and the next tasks." 

The Chairman. That is published where? 

Mr. Mandel. In Political Affairs, July 1945, published in New 
York City. 

These excerpts are taken from a draft resolution of the national 
board of the CPA, which is the abbreviation for the Communist 
Political Association, as amended and approved by the national com- 
mittee on June 20. 

This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the member- 
ship and for final action by tlie emergency national convention of the CPA on 
July 26-28. 

The following excerpts are quoted [reading] : 

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist 
Europe in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms 
of government and social system has been reflected in many of the recent actions 
of the State Department. 

This explains wliy, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands 
with Vandenberg — the spolvesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of 
American finance capital. * * * 

It is this reactionary position of the American big business which explains 
why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of 
preventing a strong, united and democratic China ; and why they bolster up the 
reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shelv regime and why they harbor the idea 
of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a 
reactionary bulwark in the Far East. 

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militarist Japan, it is necessary 
that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with 
all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism. 

However, labor and other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that, 
amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, tiiere 
are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking 
a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, 
at tlie expense of Cliina and the other Far East peoples, and directed against 
the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including 
many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for 
imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in 
China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East. * * * 

In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, such a program should 
be based on the following slogans of action : 

* * * * * * - * 

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary 
ofBcials. * * * 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into 
the record the excerpts of the extracts from Political Affairs of July 
1945, which was read by Mr. INIandel. I would like to introduce that 
into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. It will be so marked and received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 234," and is 
as follows:) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 707 

[From. Political Affairs, July 1945] 

The Present Situation and the Next Tasks 

Di-aft resolution of the National Board, CPA (Communist Political Associa- 
tion), as amended and approved l)y the national committee on June 20. This 
draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and 
for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July 
26-28 (p. 579) : 

t^ ***** * 

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist 
Europe, in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms 
of government and social system, has been reflected in many of the recent 
actions of the State Department. This explains why, at San Francisco, Stet- 
tinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg — the spokesman for Hoover 
and the most predatory sections of American linance capital * * * (p 58O). 

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why 
Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of prevent- 
ing a strong, united and democratic China ; why they bolster up the reactionary, 
incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming 
to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary 
bulwark in the Far East * * * (p. 581). 

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist militarist Japan it is necessary 
that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war 
with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese im- 
perialism. 

However, labor and the other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact 
that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, 
there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are 
seeking a compromise peace v.iiich will preserve the power of the Mikado after 
the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed 
against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, 
including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of 
Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang 
regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far 
East * * * (p. 583). 

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should 
be based on the following slogans of action : 

* * * * * * * 

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary 
officials * * * (p. 584). 

Mr. DooMAN. May I add something to that story about the papers 
for appointment ? 

Mr. MoRPas. By all means, Mr. Dooman. 

Mr. Dooman. I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this episode 
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, came 
to see the President. That mnst have been then, I think it was, along 
about February of 1945. He came to see the President and asked the 
President to intervene on behalf of Dr. Lattimore with the State 
Department. And the matter was brought to the attention then of the 
State Department and no further action was taken. 

May I correct it again? This must have been about April of 1945. 

Mr. Morris. What position did John Carter Vincent hold at that 
time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers for employing Mr. Latti- 
more as consultant were submitted ? 

Mr. Dooman. He was Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. Morris. Did he hold any other position in the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Dooman. Not at that time, 

Mr. Morris. Was he associated with one of the area committees? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intradepart- 



708 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

mental committee at which there "was an attempt made to get a con- 
sensus of opinion about various policies concerning the Far East. 
And the coni]iosition of that committee varied with the problems that 
were discussed. 

But, generally speaking, the standing members of that were Dr. 
Blakeslee, who was chairman. Dr. Hugh Borton, who was secretary,, 
and then the Chief of the Japan Division, Mr. Earl Dickover; INIr. 
Ballantine, Director of the Far Eastern Office, and myself as chair- 
man of this far eastern subcommittee. 

And then, depending on the problems to be discussed, there was 
representation from other divisions of the Department who were 
interested in that particular problem. 

For example, if we were discussing the question of the mandated 
islands, we would have representatives from the Legal Section and 
from, we will say, the European Section, and so on. 

Mr. Morris. Could you say this was a policy-making committee,. 
Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was a policy-developing committee. 

Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent a member of that com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes; he could come in whenever he wanted to. As 
a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often. He was usually 
represented by a man from his office called Julian Friedman. 

The Chairman. You were asked the question: Was John Carter 
Vincent a member of that committee. 

I would like to have an answer to : Was he a member of that com- 
mittee? 

Mr. DooNAN. Well, as I tried to explain, the membership in that 
committee was a fairly loose thing, because it varied with the subjects 
to be discussed. There were no officially appointed members of the 
committee. There were certain standing members, those primarily 
concerned with Japan. 

And then the composition of the committee was extended, depend- 
ing upon the character of the subject to be discussed. Naturally^ 
China would be very much influenced by whatever policies we set 
up for Japan, and, therefore, it was quite right and proper that the 
China Division should be fully familiar with whatever was going on 
in the committee. 

The Chairman. "When John Carter Vincent did attend, did he have 
full authorit}' the same as any other member of the committee both 
to speak, act, and vote? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 
. The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Did you testify, Mr. Dooman, that when Mr. John 
Carter Vincent did not attend he sent a representative? 

Mr. DooMAN. Sometimes they both came. 

Mr. Morris. Sometimes both Julian Friedman and John Carter 
Vincent came? 

JNIr. Dooman. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did Julian Friedman take a position and express him- 
self at these meetings? 

Mr. DooMAN. Not very often. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 709 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever make any charges against Julian Fried- 
man at that time in connection with his attendance at the area meet- 
ings ? 

Mr. DooMAisr. No; I did not make any charges because that implies 
that I complained to somebody else, some higher authority. 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt again. I may have lost track of 
this. 

Who was Julian Friedman ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Julian Friedman was a member of the China Divi- 
sion of the State Department. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

]Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the rec- 
ord at this time a letter which indicates Julian Friedman's associa- 
tion with the State Department, and at the same time his connection 
with the Institute of Pacific Kelations, which composition is being 
considered by this committee. 

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate both of those documents ? 

Mr. Mandel. The first is a letter from the State Department to the 
Honorable Pat McCarran, dated April 23, 1951, signed by Eldridge 
Durbrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel. 

The letter reads as follows : 

My Dear Senator McCarran : Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the 
Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman, has been referred to me for reply. 

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior 
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the 
termination of his employment on November 12, 1946. 

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was 
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently, it had been decided to abolish the 
Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 
12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary 
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or 
Auxiliary officers, including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that 
his services were terminated without prejudice. 

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs. 
Sincerely yours. 

The Biographical Register of the State Department, dated October 
1, 194.5, on page 106, lists the positions held by Julian Friedman, which 
I would like to put into the record. 

I can read them, if you desire. 

Mr. Morris. I do not think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mandel. I also submit Security in the Pacific, a preliminary 
report of the ninth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, on page 1061, which 
shows that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secre- 
tariat. 

And further I submit a circular distributed by the Institute of 
Pacific Relations showing a meeting held announcing a new IPR 
study,^ Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel 
Epstein, with a supplement called Labor in Nationalist China, 
1945^8, by Julian R. Friedman. 

Introduce that circular into the record. 

Mr, Morris. I would like to introduce into the record, to have 
marked as the next consecutive exhibits, the four documents just 
described and read by Mr. Mandel. 



710 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The first is a letter from the State Department to the chairman on 
Julian Friedman's position in the State Department. 

The second is the Biographical Register excerpt. 

The third is the record from Security in the Pacific, the Institute 
of Pacific Relations publication, showing that Julian Friedman was 
a member of the conference secretariat, and the fourth being a throw- 
away indicating that Julian Friedman had written the publication 
under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record and properly 
identified. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 235, 236, 
237, and 238," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 235 

Department of State, 
Washington, April 23, 1951. 
The Honorable Pat McCarran, 

United States Senate. 
My Dear Senator RIcCarran : Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the 
Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply. 

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior 
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until 
the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946. 

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was 
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the 
Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 
12, 1946. In i)roceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary 
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or 
auxiliary oflScers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that 
his services were terminated without prejudice. 

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs. 
Sincerely yours, 

Eleridge Durbrow, 
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel. 



Exhibit No. 286 

Julian R. Friedman : App. div. asst. in the Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1943 ; asst. 
to chief Div. of Labor Relations, Sept. 1, 1944; divisional asst., Nov. 20, 1944; 
asst. sec. of comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; re- 
search and analysis asst., May 17, 1945. (Biographic Register, Dept. of State, 
Oct. 1, 1945, p. 106.) 

Exhibit No. 237 

Julian R. Friedman 

conference membership 

Conference Secretariat : 

* « * 

Julian Friedman 

* * * 

(Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., Jan. 6-17, 1945, p. 161.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 711 

Exhibit No. 238 

Announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, 
by Israel Epstein (159 pp. mimeographed), $2.25. 

With a supplement : Labor in Nationalist China, 1945^8, by Julian R. Fried- 
man. Chapters: The War and Industry; Hours and Wa,i,'es ; Migrant Skilled 
Workers; New (Local) Workers; Women and Children in Industry; "Coolie" 
Labor; Conscript, Contract, and Slave; Kuomintang Labor Law and Decrees; 
Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement * * * with a documentary ap- 
pendix with the text of important Natioi.cilist and Communist labor laws and 
policy statements. 

International Secretariat, iNSTifUTE of Pacific Relations 

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. T. 

[Attached] 

Please send me copies of "Labor Notes on Nationalist China." 

$2.25 enclosed Bill me (Postage added). 

I am an IPR member entitled to $1.80 price. 

Name 



Address 



Mr. Morris. I think we have shown in past hearings the connec- 
tion between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Ke- 
lations to a great extent, and John Carter Vincent. 

I think we may as well at this point show the connection of John 
Carter Vincent with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

INIr. Mandel. I have a letter dated November 12, 1945, addressed 
to E. C. Carter, that was taken from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. I read the first paragraph : 

In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of 
the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of 
their election, the amounts of their current contribution, and the largest amount 
they have ever contributed. 

On this list we have the name of John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, this shows that John Carter Vincent 
was in 1945 a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. I would like that introduced into the record and 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

The Chairman. From what source does this come ? 

Mr. Mandel. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

The Chairman. Very well. It may be marked and filed with the 
committee. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 239" and is as 

follows:) 

November 12, 1945. 
Dear Mr. Carter : In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached 
hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the 
dates of their election, tlie amount of their current contribution, and the largest 
amount they have ever contributed. 



712 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The answers to your other questions can be summarized as follows : 
The most active trustees in the New Yorli area are those on the executive 
committee. Of these, Callj;ins, Barnett, Huggins, Jessup, and McConaughy have 
been the most active. Morris has regularly attended meetings, made a special 
gift to the library of some books in his father's collection, is available for 
advice, but is neither a large contributor nor will he assume any responsibility 
for fund raising. Seymour regularly attended meetings the first 6 months 
after my arrival but has been reorganizing a new company and so has been un- 
available for anything more than telephone comment for some months. He is 
more allergic to Kohlberg's charges than most members of the committee, but 
is unquestionably of value in money raising, as he is well known downtown 
and generally well liked. The most important person to rely upon Seymour's 
judgment currently is E. B. Kilner of the Associated Telephone Services, who 
has repeatedly told me that his company is on the verge of supporting us bv 
a contribution of $1,000 to $5,000 or withdrawing their current $250 support 
entirely. 

In Seattle, the most active members of the board are Martin and Allen. Other 
active people in Seattle are Greenwood, Baillargeon, and Fuller, although Reg- 
inald Parsons has renewed a good deal of his old interest. Allen is a potential 
troublemaker but I find he can be handled by talking as tough to him as he talks 
to you. If the current plans for a National Conference of Amco go through 
and Allen is completely sold on our bona fides, he will be of considerable use 
in money raising in the Northwest. It would be unwise to rely on Ben Kizer 
in that area as many of the Seattle businessmen, although close friends of Ben, 
regard him as an outsider by virtue of his Spokane connections. 

The most active members of the board in San Francisco are Greenslade, Allen, 
-Hmma McLaughlin, Hunter Galen Fisher, Brayton Wilbur, and Wickett. Of 
these, Brayton Wilbur and Wickett are the most important in money raising. 
<Jalen Fisher has contributed articles to the Far Eastern Survey. Mrs. Mc- 
i,aughlin, Mrs. Dorothy Rogers (not a national board member), and Lynn White, 
Jr., president of Mills (not a national board member) have been most active in 
the school program and in general membership activities. 

In Los Angeles, Rosecrans, although technically chairman of the now defunct 
Los Angeles committee, has done little more than make his annual contribiition, 
Arthur Coons is the spearhead in that neighborhood and, if Rosecrans can be 
persuaded to give Coons a go-ahead signal, a Los Angeles committee can very 
easily be reconstituted. Harvey Mudd is interested — almost entirely in re- 
search — but would probably be available for financial support if a research 
program centered at the Huntington Library were undertaken. Dr. Millikan is 
interested in such a program and would put on a meeting in Huntington Library 
for discussion of such activities. 

In Chicago, an entire new slate of trustees is required with the exception 
of the Quincy Wrights. Edward Embree freely admits that he has only a small 
portion of his time available for the IPR and would like to be relieved of re- 
sponsibility. The same is true of McNair; and, Colegrove, although willing to 
talk, is carrying a torch against us because of our handling of India and the use 
of people like Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal. 

In other sections of the country, the most interested trustees, as shown by 
correspondence, are Jerome Green and Mortimer Graves, both of whom have 
written cements on articles in the Survey and are interested in activities gen- 
erally. 

Apart from the executive committee, Fisher, Ned Allen, Mortimer Graves, 
Arthur Coons, Brayton Wilbur, and Morison represent the only individuals on 
the naticmal board of trustees with whom there has been correspondence on 
anything other than renewing their contributions. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



713 



Exhibit No. 239 
AMCO board of trustees 



Greene, Jerome D 

Wild, Payson 

Chapman. Mrs. Ralph.. 
Embree, Edwin R 

Wright, Mrs. Louise 

Allen, Riley H 

At.'ierton, Frank C 

Dillinsham, W. F 

Looniis, Ciiarles F__ 

Morison, George Abbot. 

Bamett, Eusrene E 

Calkins. Robert D 

Chamberlain. Joseph P_ 

Field, Frederick V 

Gilchript, Huntington.-. 
Hoggins, G. Ellsworth.. 

Jessup, Piiilip C 

LTice, Henry R 

McConaushv, James L.. 

McCoy, Frank R 

Morris, Lawrence 



Parker, Philo W 

Seymour, Lawrence D_ 
Kizer, Benjamin H 



Martin. Charles E. 

Allen, Captain 

Charles, Allan E... 

Davis, Joseph S 

Fisher, Galen M... 



Do. 



Orady, Henry F 

Greenslade, Admiral 

Do 

McLaughlin, Mrs. A 

Rowell, Chester 

Sproul, Robert G 

Wickett, F. A 

Do 

Do 

Wilbur, Brayton 

Wilbiu', Ray Lyman 

Rosecrans, W. S 

DeCaux, Len 

Fairbank, John 

Graves, Mortimer 

Lattimore, Owen 

Thomas, Elbert D 

Vincent, John Carter 

Btick, Pearl S 

Emeny, Brooks 

Emeny, Brooks and Mrs. 

Hoffman 

Notestein, Mrs. A 

Trippe, Juan 

Yarnell, Admiral H. E... 



Year 
elected 



1928. 



1943.. 
1924-3; 



1943. 
1929. 
1932. 



1937. 
1933. 



1943. 
1943. 



1937... 
1943... 
1935-.. 

1927... 



1927. 



1927- 
1927. 



1934- 
1943- 
1943' 



1943. 
1927. 



Present contribution 



Date 



Nov. 15, 1944- 
Aug. 7, 1945.- 
Nov. 2, 1944.- 
Mar. 19, 1945. 
June 18, 1945. 

1943 

1913 

1043 

Dec. 16, 1944. 
June 5, 1945.- 
ucc. 21, 1944. 
Mar. 12, 1945. 
Aug. 4, 1944.. 

1944 

Dec. 29, 1944. 

1944 

Julv 20, 1945-. 
Dec. 16. 1944- 
Jan. 12, 1945.. 
Oft. 13, 1944.- 
Oct. 20, 1944.. 



Aug. 7, 1945- . 
Julv 13, 1945. 
Dec. 15, 1944. 



Jan. 30, 1945 

Feb. 12, 1945 

Jan. 20, 1945 

Dec. 1, 1944.- 

Julv 3, 1945, New 

York. 
Mar. 6, 1945 



Oct. 31, 1944. 
Feb. 7, 1944.. 
Dec. 6, 1944.. 
Dec. 6, 1944 -. 
Feb. 8, 1945.. 
Apr. 6, 1945 -. 
Jan. 26, 1945. 
Jan. 26, 1945. 



Mar. 14, 1945.... 

May 2, 1944 

Jan. 5, 1945 

Feb. 26, 1945 

Mar. 8, 1937 

Nov. 20, 1944--. 

Mar. C, 1945 

Complimentary- 
Dec. 26, 1944 

Oct. 25, 1943 

WPF 

Mar. 28, 1945.... 

July 18, 1945 

i:>ec. 30, 1944 

Nov. 0, 1944 



Amount 



$10 

5 

10 

10 

10 

25 

650 

100 

250 

10 

10 

10 

500 

760 

25 

650 

10 

2.500 

10 

25 

25 

25 
25 
50 

10 
10 
15 
5 
25 

50 

100 
10 
50 
75 
10 
10 
40 



150 

100 

10 

5 

5 

10 

10 

"""'25 
500 

2, 500 
100 
100 

2,500 



Highest contribution 



Date 



19.30 

Jan. 2.3," 1943."!!-] 

i94U--!".---] 
Dec" "21", "1943 .". . - '. 
19.38 

Oct. "23",""r9'43, 

WPF, 3 vears. 
Feb. 24, 1942 

a"u?"""'i"7, " "1943, 
WPF. 

1940," 'N"e"w"Y"o"rk ." '. 

1940, San Fran- 
cisco. 

i946-""'"""I""' 
December 1929..., 

June 30, 1941 

Mar. 29, 1944 

Sept. 21, 1944 

Dec. 14, 1944 

1942 

1940 

June8","f938"."--!. 



Amount 



$10, 000 
25 

250 



25 

1,000 
12, 600 



300 
50 
10 



275 
315 



450 
500 
25 
5 
100 
350 
100 
300 



20 



714 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, could you describe for us Owen Latti- 
more's position with respect to Japan at the time of the episode we 
have just had testimony concerning? 

Mv. DooMAN. Mr. Morris, may I remind you that I have not an- 
swered the last question that you put to me? 

Ivlr. Morris. I am sorry. 

The Chairman. I was going to draw that to your attention. I did 
not think the last question had been answered. You interrupted 
him with the insertion of some material. 

Mr. DooMAN. You asked me whether I had made any charges against 
Julian Friedman, and I said I had not made any charges because that 
implied that I had complained to some higher authority. 

The fact was that a very short time after statements had been made 
in secret meetings of this Far East Area Committee, the proceedings 
and the statements made by various individuals immediately were 
quoted in various left-wing periodicals and newspapers There were 
literally dozens of such occasions 

Senator Eastman. Such at P]\I ? 

Mr. Dooman. That would include PM. 

It so happens that among all these instances that actually occurred, 
I happened to keep one, and that was in the Nation of February 3, 
1945, where there appears an article by one Pacificus, entitled "Danger- 
ous Experts." 

Amoncr other things here is the following paragi\aph which I would 
like to read, if I may. I might say that Dangerous Experts refers 
among others to myself. 

Mr. Doornail not only believes in retaining the emperorist system minns some 
of tlie more militaristic forms of emperor worship, but also thinks that the only 
elements we can rely on in Japan are tlie business leaders, court circle aristo- 
crats, and bureaucrats. 

It SO happened that at one of the meetings of the Far Eastern Area 
Committee, a few days before this article was published, we were dis- 
cussing the question of education, and I pointed out that the big busi- 
ness leaders, members of the aristocracy, the people in the professions 
in the higher levels, included by far the largest majority of those who 
had been educated at Yale and Harvard and Cambridge and Oxford, 
and other universities, both in England and the United States. 

If there was any value whatsoever in reeducation along our lines it 
was obvious, then, that either these people had enjoyed the benefits of 
our educational facilities and were, therefore, the most progressive ele- 
ments, or there was no value whatever in reeducation. You could not 
have both. 

Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbled version of what 
I said. But the important thing is that it appeared a few days later 
in The Nation. 

"Well, by a process of elimination in a number of instances of this 
kind, I found that outside of those who were more or less standing 
members of the committee who appeared every time and who were 
completely reliable, that Friedman was the constant element. 

I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with being the source 
of information for these articles that appeared in Amerasia, in PM, 
The Nation, New Republic, and so on. He denied that he had given 
any of this information to unauthorized persons. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 715 

He said that he reported only to his chief, who was then Mr. 
Vincent. 

The Chairman. Mr. who? 

Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Vincent. 

Mr. INIoRRis, That being Jolni Carter Vincent'? 

Mr. DooMAN. John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Doonian, woukl you tell us to the best of your 
ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at that time with respect 
to Japan '( This is in 1945. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, there is a wliole library that could be made up 
of statements made by Mr. Lattimore diu'ing that period. I suppose 
the best known, the one most frequently quoted, is a book called 
Solution in Asia, which was published, I think, in about February 
1945, and was very widely circulated during the spring and early 
summer, in fact until the surrender of Japan. 

In general, he took the position that the Japanese people, when 
they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against the system and 
overthrow the monarchy; that there were elements in the State De- 
partment, the so-called reactionary Fascist elements, who knew noth- 
ing whatever about Japan except what they had picked up from people 
in high social levels in Japan, and that these elements were intended to 
use the prestige and the force of the influence of the United States 
to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people. 

Another point which* he made was that the chief militarists were 
not the war lords. General Tojo and others, but the big industrial 
leaders. That these, the army and the navy, were merely puppets and 
instruments of the big industrialists. 

Therefore, his position was that we should allow the Japanese people 
to have their revolt and disestablish the monarchy and that we should 
then try these industrialists as war criminals and put them out of 
the way so that they would never be in a position of influence. 

And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system, should be 
completely broken u]) and a highly developed competitive economic 
system should be instituted. 

Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a great many places. 

Mr. Morris.' Will you give us whatever documentation you can? 

Mr. DooMAN. I have here, for example, a radio discussion, a round- 
table discussion that was carried out, I believe, under the auspices of 
the University of Chicago. It was along about July 8, 1945. 

Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr. Lattimore as hav- 
ing said that his position had been consistently one of urging that 
we do not interfere in the event that the Japanese wanted to disestab- 
lish the monai\ hy. That is not the whole story. 

In Solution in Asia, he makes this statement, which I cannot quote 
textually, but it runs somewhat along these lines. He says : 

I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanese people will themselves 
revolt and disestablish the monarch. 

Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time — that is, before 
the surrender — that people like Mr. Grew and myself were intending 
to keep the Emperor in power implied, then, that we proposed to use 
the influence and the position of the United States to prevent the exer- 
cise by the Japanese people of their own will. 

'22848— 52— pt. 3 2 



716 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussion about the 
Emperor carried on by the leftist press at that time was a piece of 
sheer lunacy. If the Japanese people wanted to get rid of the Em- 
peror there was obviously notliing we could do to keep him in ; if, on 
the other hand, the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it 
would have been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablished 
a monarchy. 

Senator Eastland. Did John Carter Vincent endorse those views 
of Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I never heard him express that opinion, except prob- 
ably indirectly through — and this is only an assumption — no, Sena- 
tor ; if I may correct my statement, I will say no, I have never heard 
him express it. 

Senator Eastland. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place in the 
Department did Mr. Vincent get ? 

Mr. DooMAN, ]\Ir. Grew retired, or at least presented his resignation 
on or about the 14th of August. I may be off a matter of a few days or 
so. But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it was an- 
nounced in the papers that Mr. Dean Acheson has been appointed as 
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson having previously re- 
tired as Assistant Secretary of State with the announcement that he 
was going to resume private practice. 

Mr. Acheson then returned to the State Department somewhere 
around the 25th of August 1945. And the day after he returned there 
he announced that I would be replaced as chairman of the Far Eastern 
Subcommittee of Swink by Mr. Vincent. 

Senator Eastland. I would like also to know, if I am not getting too 
far afield 

Mr. JMoRRis. That is all right. 

Senator Eastland. The difference in what was advocated by John 
Carter Vincent for Japan and the policies that the Communists put 
over in Eastern Europe. I would like to know the difference between 
the policies that he advocated f oi;^ Japan' and the policies that the 
Communists put over in Eastern Europe. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, sir, I am not competent to discuss authoritative- 
ly what the Communists put over in Eastern Europe, but I can tell 
you what was done in Japan. 

And it may, perhaps, occur to you that there are certain very dis- 
tinct analogies between what was done there and what was done in 
Eastern Europe. 

Senator Eastland. They were practically the same ; were they not ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I would prefer, if I may. Senator, to describe 

Senator Eastland. Wliat is it ? You have discussed it, in executive 
session. Is it not your judgment, now, that the policies that Mr. 
Vincent attempted to put over in Japan were the same as the policies 
that Russia dictated for the satellite countries? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, I am trying to be as accurate 

Senator Eastland. What is your judgment? 

Mr. Doom an. My judgment is it is the same. 

Senator Eastland. They were the same ? 

Mr. DouMAN. Obviously the same. But I would like to amplify 
that, if I may. 

Senator Eastland. I want you to. I want you to explain what our 
State Department attempted to do in Japan, and the similarity with 
what Russia did in the satellite countries. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 717 

Mr. DooMAN. On Sepember 22, 1945, the White House released 
a paper, which was entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surren- 
der Policy for Japan." That paper was the work of our committee, 
the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, for a period of about 7 or 
8 months, except for certain important changes which I will refer to. 

As I was to retire from the State Department on the 31st of August 
I asked Mr. Dunn, as chairman of SWINK, to call a meeting for the 
express purpose of adopting this paper that we had been working 
on for a long time; namely, the United States Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy for Japan. 

That paper was adopted by SWINK on the 29th of August, and on 
the 29th of August that was telegraphed out to General MacArthur as 
a firm United States policy for Japan. 

However, in this release that was issued on the 22d of September, 
it was pointed out, or it was clear, that the paper had been reopened. 

On September 6 — mind you, on September 6 — by September 6, JSIr. 
Grew had retired as Under Secretary, and had been replaced by Mr. 
Acheson. I had retired and had been replaced as chairman of the far 
eastern subcommittee by Mr. Vincent. 

Well, I was very much interested in seeing whether there had been 
any changes. And I found these, which I will quote. These were 
among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had 
been adopted on the 29th of August [reading] : 

Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of 
the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the 
policy of the Supreme Commander — 

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the 
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort 
solely toward peaceful ends. 

Please do not ask me to explain what that means. 

(&) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank- 
ing combinations which have exei'cised control of a large part of Japan's trade 
and industry. 

It is on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to 
destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan. 

Senator Eastland (presiding). Who attempted to eliminate the 
capitalist class in Japan? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Who attempted to eliminate it? 

Mr. DooMAN. These were the instructions sent from Washington. 

Senator Eastland. That was the American State Department? 

Mr. DooMAN. W^ith the concurrence of the Navy Department and 
the War Department. 

These were the instructions sent to General MacArthur through the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Senator Eastland. That was the work of John Carter Vincent, was 
it not? 

Mr. DooMAN. He was chairman at that time of this Far East sub- 
committee. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead. Excuse me. 

Mr. Morris. May I just keep the record straight. It may be unneces- 
sary, but may I point out that Mr. Dooman is testifying that this is 
the promulgation of American policy, and it represents a document 
that Mr. Dooman worked upon while he was officially connected with 
the State Department. 



718 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

And lie noticed that when the program was finally promnlgated 
these were the changes that had been made by his successors from the 
program that had been adopted by Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew prior 
to that time. 

Mr. DooMAN. That is so. 

Senator Eastland. That was the Acheson- Vincent program there ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. What did they attempt to put over under that 
program ? 

Mr. DooMAN. The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946, 
was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in 
excess of $1,000. 

Senator Eastland. Did Russia do that in the countries of Eastern 
Europe? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, that is why I hesitate to answer your questions 
directly, Senator, because I do not know whether they did, or not. 
1 know that the end means was achieved by perhaps the same means, 
or by other means ; I don't know. 

Senator Eastland. All riffht. Go ahead. 



o 



Mr. DooMAN. You can imagine what that meant. That is, a capital 
tax of from 60 to 90 percent of all property above $1,000. That almost 
at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class. 

The excuse for that was that it was necessary to prevent an inflation. 

At that time, if I am correct, in my recollection, the Japanese yen 
was pegged to the dollar at 15 yen to the dollar. And this was a 
measure purportedly to prevent any further inflation. 

It was not more than a month or two after this thing was carried out 
that the yen then was pegged at 50 to 1. In other words, it had de- 
clined by more than a third. That was the ostensible reason given. 

Of course, as anybody could see, it would not have been an effective 
one. But it did have the effect 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead. What were the other things that 
were proposed ? 

Mr. DooMAN. The next thing was,- and this is somewhat contro- 
versial, but perhaps a good case might be made out for it, but as 
everybody has seen today, after this thing has been in effect for some 
years, the thing is not working. 

The next thmg was to expropriate ail land in excess of 5 acres 
held by any one owner. 

Senator Eas'ixand. That was a Communist system, was it not? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit 
at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million people are 
trying to make a living off an area 

Senator Eastland. I understand, but they were following now 
the Communist system, were they not? 

Mr. Dooman. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead. 

Senator Smith. May I ask him one question? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. I understood you to say just now the yen was first 
pegged at 15 to 1. 

Mr. Dooman. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 719 

Senator Smith. Later on at 50 to 1. And then you made the obser- 
vation that that was a decline of one-third. It would decline 300 i)er- 
cent, would it not ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes ; that is right. 

Senator Smith. You were in error about the one-third? 

Mr. DooMAN, Yes. 

Well, all land was expropriated in excess of 5 acres. There was 
an ostensible effort to pay them compensation for this land, but by 
this time they were paying for land in yen which had depreciated to 
one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land. 

For example, if the land had been valued in 1920, as it was — that 
was wlien the financial panic was taking place — if the land was valued 
at $1,000 an acre, they paid the owners of the land at $1,000, but in 
currency that had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the 
value. 

In other words, if a man had $1,000 in land, he was paid one-one- 
hundred-and-eightieth. 

There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead and describe what else there was. 

Mr. DooMAN. Then all holdings by any one individual in any large 
corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated. There were more 
polite terms used. That is, they were transferred to a go t^ernment 
pool. 

And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares 
in a certain order of priority to farmers' cooperatives, labor unions, 
and shopkeepers, at whatever price might be offered. 

And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to dis- 
regard any relationship between the price offered and the real value ; 
and, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to finance 
any bids for the shares by farmers' cooperatives and labor unions. 

So that the net result was then to destroy the previously existing 
capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their 
places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and 
Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit 
trade of various kinds and have then amassed this enormous fortune. 

The net result was then to replace people who had traditionally had 
property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of 
various kinds. 

Senator Eastland. Were those recommendations favored by Gen- 
eral MacArthur ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Let me cite in reply to that the statement made by 
INIr. Acheson in reply to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the 
Japanese people. I think it was on the first anniversary of the occu- 
pation where General MacArthur had indicated that he looked for- 
ward to the time when the American occupation in Japan could be 
reduced to some figure below 200,000 soldiers. 

■That aroused great resentment in the State Department, and at 
that time Mr. Acheson issued the statement that General MaciVrthur 
or the military occupation were there merely to carry out the orders 
of the executive in Washington ; that they were not the f ormulators 
of policy. 

By implication policy was formulated in Washington. 



720 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Therefore, in general, one would say that it didn't really make — 
I don't know whether General MacArthur approved or disapproved. 

Senator Eastland. What other policies were there ? 

]SIr. DooMAN. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper, which 
had been prepared under my chairmanship, with regard to people who 
were suspected of being war criminals or being militarists, it was 
provided that they should be purged; that is, removed from any posi- 
tion of authority, in the light of their own personal record, as brought 
out by some form of judicial investigation. 

In other words, a man would stand or fall on his own personal 
record. 

As you will see from that statement that I just read out, people 
were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically 
the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of 
boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white-collar ele- 
ment in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because 
there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain 
positions. They destroyed it. 

Senator Eastland. Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese 
capitalism? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains 
of Japanese business. 

Senator Eastland. If you destroy the brains, you destroy 

_ The Chairman. Wait a minute. Let us see if we can get the ques- 
tion and answer together. The question was : Was this not an effort 
to destroy Japanese capitalism, and you converted that into saying 
Japanese brains. Let us get them together. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, I am saying 

The Chairman. Answer the Senator's question. 

Mr. DooMAN. In my opinion it was. I would like to stress that 
in my opinion it was. 

Senator Eastland. All right. 

What else did they attempt to put over? 

Mr. DooMAN. Just following thaf question, following that point, 
I want to quote from this round-table discussion of the University of 
Chicago on July 8, this statement attributed to Mr. Lattimore 
[reading] : 

That includes a lot of economic and political action as well because we can- 
not forget that the civilian warmakers, that is the big industrialists and 
financiers of Japan, are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's 
going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and navy are only 
the striking instruments and the tools. 

Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japanese indus- 
trialists were put in prison, and they were held m prison for 18 
months while every effort was made to dig up evidence which would 
warrant their being put on trial, just as the military and political 
people were put on trial and later condemned. 

They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and released because there 
was no evidence. 

Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we obviously did a 
great injustice to General Tojo in hanging him, because according to 
Mr. Lattimore, we released his lords and masters and hung the tool 
and the instrument. 

Senator Eastland. Wliat other things were in the policy for Japan ? 



IXSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 721 

Mr. DooMAN. I have with me a copy of a paper known as Far East 
Commission 230. This is a paper of considerable length, Senator, 
in which all of the principles are laid out for the atomizing of Japa- 
nese industry. 

Senator Eastland. The what? I did not understand. 

Mr. DooMAN. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japanese in- 
dustry. It is a very long paper. 

The general purport was to see to it that the Japanese economy, not 
only in industry but in banking and in every other field, should be 
reduced to the smallest possible element. 

The Chairman. How is that tied in here? Who is the article by? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, it was a paper. It Avas introduced as follows : 
To the Far Eastern Commission by the Secretary General, Mr. Nel- 
son T. Jonathan, under a paper which reads as follows [reading] : 

The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive con- 
centrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States, is cir- 
culated herewith for the consideration of the Far East Commission and is refer- 
red to Committee No. 2, economic and financial affairs. 

Who prepared this paper, I have no means of knowing. 

Mr. Morris. Is it an official publication of the State Department? 

Mr. Doom AN. This has been released 

The Chairman. You can answer that yes or no. 

Mr. Dooman. I don't know. 

The Chairman. Is it an official publication of the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I do not know. 

This is a privately printed paper I have before me. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. DooMAN. This was obtained, and given to me by a friend of 
mine, Mr. James Lee Kaufman, an American lawyer in New York, 
who went out to Japan and discovered the existence of this paper, 
and he had it privately printed and distributed among his friends, 
and he also had a copy of it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for 
News Week 2 years ago. 

Senator Eastland. Where did he get the paper in Japan? 

Mr. DooMAN. He was told of the existence of this paper, and was 
told if he went to a certain office he could find it. So he went to 
this — I don't know where — some repository of documents and asked 
a young lady 

Senator Eastland. It was there to guide the occupation forces, was 
it not ? It Avas a policy to guide our occupation, was it not ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I was getting around to that in just a second, Senator, 
if I may. I am answering the question. 

The Chairman. The question has been propounded to you. Was 
it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces? 

Mr. D(^OMAN. This paper was submitted through the Far Eastern 
Commission for consideration, and it was never adopted by the Far 
Eastern Commission. 

However, in draft form, it w^as sent out to Tokyo to the occupa- 
tion authorities in the economic section and they acted on it. 

Senator Eastland. It was sent by our State Department ? 

Mr. Dooman. Sent by whom, I do not know. But it was sent to 
the occupation authorities and they acted on it. 



722 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kaufman, that 
this paper had been acted on, it was then disavowed as merely being 
a draft and merely presented to the Far Eastern Commission for 
consideration. 

But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, for all practical 
purposes, an official document, because it was on the basis of this 
that various instructions were sent to the Japanese Government. 

Senator Eastland. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there 
is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan 
and the policies laid clown by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern 
Europe, is there not ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I think that would be a fair statement to state. 

Let me amplify that, if I may. You may remember that there had 
been, before this establishment of this Far Eastern Commission, in 
existence in London, the so-called European Commission of which 
the members were representatives of the United States, England, 
Eussia, and, I believe, France. And it was pretty well known in the 
discussions before the Far Eastern Commission what the ideas of the 
Russians were with regard to Germany, with regard to the treatment 
of Japan. 

Therefore, when it came to the question of Japan, there were those 
elements who, knowing what the Russians wanted in Germany, 
assumed that they would be satisfied with parallel policies in Japan. 

Senator Eastland. Of course, what Russia wanted was to set up 
a chaos and a system by which they could move in;- was that not it? 

Mr. DooMAN. I think so. 

Senator Smith. May I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Are there now in positions of power and trust in 
the American Government any of the men who were responsible for 
the enunciation of this policy you have described to us ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Oh, yes. 

Senator Smith. Who are they ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Some, I say are resi5onsible, from the chain of com- 
mand. 

Senator Eastland. Name them, please. 

Mr. DooMAN. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policy was 
promulgated, the responsible people were, from the top, Mr. Byrnes, 
Secretary of State. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Byrnes. 

Mr. Dooman, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson, Under 
Secretary of State; John Carter Vincent, as chairman of the Far 
Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and also Director of the Far East- 
ern Division; Mr. Edward Barton, who is still an economist, I be- 
lieve ; he is the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occupa- 
tion of this area ; James Pennfield, and then 

Senator Smith. What position is he in now ? 

Mr. Dooman. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor of the Em- 
bassy, I believe. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat was his position at that time? 

Mr. Dooman. He had just returned from the Far East and was 
assigned as deputy to Mr, Vincent in the Far East Subcommittee of 
SWINK. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 723 

Now, subsequently — and this is hearsay — the people who have been 
busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, in addition to those I 
have named, would include Mr. John Allison, and — what is his nar^e 
now — an economist, Barnett. I don't know what his first name is. 
Barnett. 

I think those are the principal ones. 

Senator Smith. Well, now, is there any indication of any activity 
by the top two men you mentioned in the furtherance of this policy, 
Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Acheson ? Is there any evidence at all, indication 
of activity on their part toward favoring the carrying out of that 
policy ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, in m}^ personal knowledge, and this requires — 
well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case. 

In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the full Committee of 
SWINK, the chairman at that time for that day being Mr. McCloy, 
John McCloy, wdio was then Assistant Secretary of War. And the 
committee as a whole had been discussing some European matter with 
which I was not concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room when 
they had completed their discussion of this European problem. 

And I noticed among the people present was Mr. Dean Acheson. 
Now, he had been called in, apparently, for consultation on the Euro- 
pean problem, and he had nothing whatever to do with the problem 
that I w^as to discuss, wdiich w^as the question of the Japanese political 
system. 

However, he staved on. He was then Assistant Secretary of State 
for Congressional Kelations. He had nothing to do with this officially. 

And I made my report to the committee, and at the end of that 
report Mr. McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson : 

Dean, yon are a great authority on far eastern matters. What do you think 
of what we have just heard? 

And the reply was : 

I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny a dozen. And you 
can find some experts which will support any point of view that you care to have. 
And I, myself, do not go along with what we have .Inst heard. I prefer to be 
guided by experts who think more along my point of view. 

From then on he quoted virtually textually from this Solution in 
Asia by Dr. Lattimore. 

Senator Smith. Do you mean he quoted from this paper that you 
mentioned ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japanese 
people, he predicted that the Japanese people would rebel and dis- 
establish the monarchy, and that if the monarchy existed it would 
be only because there are certain Fascist groups in the State Depart- 
ment who used the prestige of the United States. 

Senator Smith. Did he approve of this policy that was enunciated 
about practically confiscation of property? 

Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes; he was Under Secretary of State. 

And, as I say, I don't know, except from the fact that he would 
have been in the chain of command. That paper could never have 
gone through. 

Senator Eastland. Who appointed Vincent? 

Mr. Dooman. I think I testified that the day after Mr. Acheson 
returned as Under Secretary of State 



724 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Eastland. Just name him. Who appointed Vincent ? Jast 
name the man. 

JNIr. DooMAN. Mr. Acheson. 

Senator Smith. Is there any indication that Mr. Byrnes, the Sec- 
retary of State, knew about this at all ? 

Mr. DooMAN. No ; there is no indication. 

Senator Smith. That surprises me that that had developed, and 
I ask you specifically was there any evidence that Mr. Byrnes him- 
self knew about this promulgation or enunciation of policy? 

Mr. DooMAN, No; there is no indication to my knowledize. 

Mr. Morris. May I get back to the episode you have just testified 
to. When did that take place ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was in the spring of 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Were you thoroughly conversant with Owen Latti- 
more's Solution in Asia at that time? 

Mr. DooMAN. Thoroughly. 

Mr. Morris. When you heard INIr. Acheson enunciate his views on 
Japan, is it your testimony that they coincided with the views ex- 
pressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution in Asia ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Exactly. 

Mr. Morris. Did his view on experts being a dime a dozen coincide 
with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes; his opinions about certain types of experts; 
yes. He had a very dim view of experts who did not agree with him. 

As a matter of fact, he said, in effect, in his book. Solution in Asia, 
that people like myself had spent a long time in Japan, but we were 
spending all of our time with very polite people, ^nd we really didn't 
know very much about what was going on. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. May I get back to some previous testimony that we 
have not completely finished. 

I asked you earlier if you would document as much as possible your 
expression of Owen Lattimore's views at that time. You had given 
a rather precise summary of what his views were, and then I asked you 
if you had any documentation to support that. 

I also offer you just by way of assistance in connection with that 
extracts from Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia that may aid you in 
answering the question I have just put to you. 

Mr. DooMAN. Here is a very reminiscent phrase. 

The Chairman. W.ait a minute. What are you testifying from? 

Mr. Morris. These are extracts from Owen Lattimore's book, 
Solution in Asia. 

The Chairman. All right. • 

Mr. DooMAN (reading) : 

Washington is full of experts who will tell you that the Japanese are mysteri- 
ous, fanatical, and not to be understood by any ordinary use of the intellect. The 
same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore which, they tell you con- 
descendingly, explain why the Japanese always do this or never do that. 

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr. Lattimore to 
put into ridicule people who did not agree with his point of view. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 725 

Tliere is missing from this that quotation to which I have just re- 
ferred, and I think it runs : 

As a political prophecy — 

whatever that may mean — 

As a political prophecy, the Japanese people will disestablish the monarchy 
unless there is interference on the part of people in the State Department. 

The Chairman. You are attempting to quote now from Latti- 
more's 

]\rr. DooMAN. From memory, yes. I do not have a copy of the book. 

Mr. MoRKis. "VVe have a copy here, Mr. Chairman. I think we 
might ask Mr. Dooman if he would put the precise quotation in if 
possible. 

Is it page 189, Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, this is not the quotation I have in mind : 

I assume that the Japan of the future will be a republic. 

That follows another reference where he says, as a matter of politi- 
cal — will you give me just a minute? 
Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Dooman. 
Mr. Dooman. Here it is. It is on page 187 [reading] : 

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely 
to overturn the throne unless we prevent them. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Dooman. Will you proceed with your 
documentation of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testified 
to here today ? 

Mr. Dooman. Would you like further references to Mr. Lattimore's 
opinion about the Emperor? 

Mr. Morris. Yes; I think if you would -put in a few more of those, 
Mr. Dooman ; those extracts are of no assistance to you, are they, Mr. 
Dooman ? 

Mr. Dooman. Yes ; on page 189, 1 quote as follows [reading] : 

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. 
If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated 
that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible 
for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, 
preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations Commission 
to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to mem- 
bers of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an 
agrarian reform program, conspmiously without his sanction and by order of 
the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service 
and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining 
members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New 
vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy. 

The Chairman. From what did you read that extract ? 

Mr. Dooman. I am reading from page 189 of Solution in Asia, 
by Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole of the 
Solution in Asia laid in the record ? 

The Chairman. You mean that book ? 



726 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

• 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; as well as the document referred to by the witness 
on the Round Table Conference from which quotes have been taken. 

The Chairman. I do not think we will put the book in the record. 
We will make it a part of the files of this committee. 

Mr. Morris. I meant make it a part of the files of the committee. 

The Chairman. The excerpts are from the book, are they not ? 

Mr. Morris. We have read the excerpts from the record, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. They are from this? 

Mr. Morris. Some excerpts are from Solution in Asia, IMr. Chair- 
man, and others are from this publication of the Round Table Con- 
ference. 

The Chairman. You want all of these put into the record ? 

Mr. Morris. So much of them as have been quoted by Mr. Dooman. 

The Chairman. Veiy well. 

Mr. Morris. Meanwhile, I would like both of these documents made 
a part of the file of the record. 

Tlie Chairman It will be made part of the record so much as you 
select as havino; been testified to by the witness, but I may say that it all 
has not been testified to. 

(The documents referred to were filed for the information of the 
committee.) 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. JMoRRis. Mr. Dooman, we have not finished the line of question- 
ing before which concerns the official attitude or the attitude of John 
Carter Vincent with respect to these particular discussions. 

Now, you said, to your own knowledge you have never heard John 
Carter Vincent give expression to any views that coincided with those 
of Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Dooman. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any official publications of the Far 
Eastern Division of the State Department that would show that the 
views of the head of that Department coincided with the views ex- 
pressed by Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Dooman. Yes ; I have already — I thought I made it clear that 
primarily this initial post-surrender policy for Japan was one for 
wliich ]\Ir. Vincent would have primary responsibility, and I have 
tried to show that. 

]Mr. Morris. How do you know that, Mf. Dooman? 

Mr. Dooman. Because ipso facto he was an ex officio. He was chair- 
man of this committee that produced that document. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was the working chairman of the 
committee? 

]Mr. Dooman. He was the working chairman of that committee. 

Mr. Morris. The reason I ask that, Mr. Dooman, is that awhile ago 
you gave expression to the view that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of 
State, you did not know that he personally shared the views put forth 
in this publication ? 

Mr. Dooman. No; I did not. 

The question was whether I knew the people who were responsible 
and I mention Mr. Byrnes as being responsible by reason of the chain 
of command, he being the Secretary of State and the person ultimately 
responsible. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 727 

Mr. JkloRRis. But is it your testimony, then, that John Carter Vin- 
cent, in addition to being the nominal head of tlie Far Eastern Divi- 
sion of the State Department and your successor in SWINK, that he 
was an active member, working member ? 

Mr. Doom AN. Yes. May I say that he was more than the nominal 
director of the Far Eastern Office, he was the actual working director 
as of the 7th of September, 1945. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. It is your testimony that Mr. Byrnes, as 
Secretary of State, his work in that position did not necessarily coin- 
cide with the position taken by 

Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Byrnes actually had very little interest in the 
Far East. 

Senator Smith. What I was trying to fix, Mr. Dooman, was that 
it was inconceivable to me that Mr. Byrnes had any such ideas. 

Mr. DooMAN. I tried to make it clear. I mentioned Mr. Byrnes 
among those responsible purely on grounds of chain of command. 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

The Chairman. The responsibility that you apply to Mr. Byrnes, 
if I understand it, stems from the fact that he was Secretary of State 
and that all mentioned in your testimony were under him; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dooman. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of 
policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your 
reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this 
time 'I 

Mr. Dooman. Very much. 

Mr. Morris. Will you proceed, then, Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Chairman, this is a fairly long story, and I hope 
you will bear patiently with me while I go into it. 

The Chairman. Well, I want to know what the question is now, 
please. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the question back, please ? 

(The reporter read the pending question, as follows:) 

Mr. MoEEis. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that 
you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of 
them that you care to put into the record at this time? 

The Chairman. Promulgation of policies as to what ? 

Mr. Morris. Promulgation of far-eastern policy with respect to 
Japan. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Smith. By whom? Anybody connected with the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Morris. By the State Department, particularly the Far East- 
ern Division thereof. 

Senator Smith. That is all right. 

Mr. Dooman. You wnll notice that all through my testimony I have 
referred constantly to this question of the Emperor. 

In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, w^ho was Chief 
of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, came to Washington and saw 
Mr. Grew and myself. His conclusion, drawn from interrogating 
high-ranking Japanese prisoners of war, was that the Japanese weie 
ready to surrender but that the various statements and the trend oi 



728 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

public opinion with regard to the question of the monarchy was such 
that so long as the Japanese were left with the impression that the 
Emperor was personally to be tried as a war criminal and punished, 
that the monardiial system would be disestablished, so long as those 
ideas were assumed to be public opinion and would be implemented 
as American policy after Japan's surrender, that the Japanese would 
not surrender. 

Shortly thereafter on, I think it was the I7th of April 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he tell you that was his opinion? 

Mr. DooMAN. He did, sir. 

On April 17, there was a change of government, a general retired 
as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the Government 
at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki, who was then Chamberlain 
to the Emperor and who had been throughout his career a moderate. 
He took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were ready to 
surrender, ready to talk about this matter. 

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages between 
the Japanese Government and their Ambassador in Moscow, and it 
was clear from these and other indications that the Japanese were 
ready to surrender if only it were made clear that this trend of opin- 
ion that had been developed by the leftist press in the United States, 
namely, that the Emperor would be tried as a w^ar criminal and the 
monarchial system disestablished, it was made clear that those were 
not policies of the United States. 

We then started on preparing a document. About the middle of 
May, Mr. Henry Luce came back from a visit to the Pacific, and he 
was very much aroused. He said that the failure of the American 
Government to persuade the Japanese to surrender was causing, was 
doing, great damage to the morale of the American forces who had 
fought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were anticipating then 
the assault on Japan and were fearful of the losses that would have 
to be paid there. 

Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce^ explained to him that we were 
working on that eifort, we were working on a plan along those lines. 

It was, I think, on the Sltli of May, if that happens to be, if my 
recollection is correct. 

Mr. Morris. 1945 ? 

Mr. DooMAN. 1945. It was on a Saturday that Mr. Grew called me 
in and instructed me to have ready Monday morning a paper which 
he would then present to the President outhning the policies that the 
United States would follow if Japan surrendered. 

I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr. Grew on Monday 
morning. 

So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned, my 
original draft reads as follows — this was paragraph 12 [reading] : 

The occurying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon 
as these objectives — 

namely, those previously enumerated — 

have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peace- 
fully inclined, i'esi)ousible government of a character representative of the 
Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present 
dyujisty if the peace-lovinj^ nations can be convinced of the genuine determination 
of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible 
the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 729 

Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting of the Policy 
Committee of the State Department. The Policy Committee of the 
State Department at that time consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of 
State and the Legal Adviser. He read this document to them, and 
there was no dissent until he came to that paragraph which 1 have just 
read. There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr. Acheson 
and ^Ir. MacLeish. 

Mr. MoKRis. What position did both of those gentlemen hold at 
that time? 

Mr. DooMAN. I was not present at the meeting but the whole idea 
of allowing the monarchy to remain was distasteful. 

Mr. Morris. To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, 

Mr. SouKWiNE. Mr. Dooman, if you were not present at the meet- 
ing, I think you ought to explain how you knew what took place. 

Mr. Dooman. This was immediately told to me by Mr. Grew after 
the meeting. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What you are describing, then, is Mr. Grew's de- 
scription of what took place at the meeting 'I 

Mr. Dooman. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that this committee 
was, after all, advisory to him, and that he was ultimately responsible, 
and that he would take the responsibility for presenting that docu- 
ment to the President with the recommendation that he include that 
document within a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriate 
occasion. 

On the 28th of May, with Judge Rosenman, he went in to see the 
President. The President read it over and he said that he would 
approve, accept, the document, provided that it was agreeable to the 
armed services. 

On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, and myself 
attended a meeting in Mr. Stimson's office. 

The Chairman. Whose office? 

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War. 

This was at the Pentagon. There were present Secretary Forrestal, 
Mr. McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was then Director of the Office of 
War Information, Mr. Grew, myself. General Marshall, and I should 
say in addition about 10 to 12 of the highest military and naval 
officers — who they were I do not remember at this time. 

We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution so that eacti 
member present would have a copy. 

Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said that he 
approved the document right along, he went right along with the 
paper. In fact, he thought, as a matter of fact, that we did not give 
sufficient allowance to the Japanese for their capacity to produce as 
they had in the past such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hama- 
guchi, and Wakatsuki, and others. These are former Japanese Prime 
Ministers. 

Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed. Mr. McCloy agreed also. 

The Chairman. Agreed, or approved? 

Mr. Dooman. Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted very violently 
and would have none of it. 

Mr. Morris. What position did he hold at this time? 



730 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. DooMAN. He was, as I said, Director of the Office of War Infor- 
mation. Various other officers approved of it, but there was a feeling 
that the publication of that document 

Mr. Morris. Vincent was not present? 

Mr. DooMAN. No. As a matter of fact, information on this was re- 
stricted to a very small number of people, those people that I have just 
indicated. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were present at this conference ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I was present. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. When you speak of Mr. Davis having reacted vio- 
lently, you were there and saw the reaction ? 

Mr, DooMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How did Mr. Davis react, what was the nature of 
his violent reaction ? 

Mr. DooMAN, He did not approve, he did not approve of anything 
which might be construed in any way as forming a basis for a negoti- 
ated surrender. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that what he said? 

Mr. DcOMAN. Yes; that was, in effect, what he said. However, the 
thing was pigeonholed because of the view among the military people 
that the publication of this document at that time would be premature. 

Mr. Morris. What military people? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, principally, General Marshall. 

Mr. Morris. Did not General Marshall express disagreement? 

Mr. DooMAN. No ; he weiit along with the paper but his statement 
was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and 
this word I remember textually, "premature." With that, the paper 
was set aside for the time being. However, a very short time after 
that, it was a matter of perhaps 2 or 3 weeks 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the time again, the week and month, 
if possible ? 

Mr. DooMAN. The 29th of May 1945, that this meeting took place 
in Secretary Stimson's office. Within a very short time, I should say 
a matter of a fortnight, information was available in the State De- 
partment that Dr. Lattimore had called on the President and had re- 
monstrated very strongly against any position or decision taken by 
this Government which would enable the monarchy to remain in 
Japan. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. What do you mean "information was available in 
the State Department," Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, you understand, Mr. Sourwine, that so far as 
Japan was concerned, I was in a rather key position, and there was 
information passing iDack and forth between the State Department 
and the White House which was very closely guarded. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean official information? 

Mr. DooMAN. Official information. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you learned of Mr. Acheson's protest to 
the President from official^ 

Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Lattimore's 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore's protest from official papers which 
came across your desk ? 

Mr. DooMAN. No ; word of mouth. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who told you ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Grew. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 731 

Mr. Sour WINE. Did anyone else tell you ? 

Mr. DooMAN. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What you meant by information becoming avail- 
able was that Mr. Grew told you ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was Mr. Grew who told me. 

The Chairman. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. DooMAN. Now, Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportu- 
nity for a period of a year or more to propound the doctrine that the 
Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and that there were a 
group of people in the State Department, Fascists and reactionaries, 
who were going to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the 
Japanese people. 

But, to me, it was very queer that once a decision — now, mind you, 
up to that time, there had been no decision within the State Depart- 
ment on the question of the Emperor. There was a trend of thinking 
but there was no decision until the recommendation was made to the 
President. To me, it was very queer that immediately, well, within 
a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after that decision was made, that Mr. 
Lattimore went to the President and remonstrated with this decision. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other incidents or episodes 
or official reports that you know that would document your views on 
Owen Lattimore, which you are now testifying to? 

Mr. DooMAN. I would like to identify this document that I have 
been talking about if I may. 

Mr. Morris. I think we should put that into this record, too, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. DooMAN. This document, as I say, was put aside. 

The Chairman. You say "this document," and we have been deal- 
ing with a number of documents. Is this the document which you 
prepared at the instance of the Secretary ? 

Mr. DooMAN. As the Acting Secretary of State. 

I am proceeding now to identify the document. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. DooMAN. This paper, then, was taken by Mr. Stimson to Pots- 
dam. I arrived myself at Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was 
told by Mr. McCloy, who was then there, that Mr. Stimson was in 
active discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to that document 
and I heard later, I believe also from Mr. McCloy, that there was an 
agreement between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Churchill, and that they had 
then gone to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an accept- 
ance of the document. It was then telegraphed to General Chiang 
Kai-shek, and on May 29, it was promulgated then as the Potsdam 
Proclamation to Japan, and it was on the basis of that document that 
Japan surrendered. 

May I also add, for the benefit of — I do not want to take credit that 
really belongs to somebody else, but I would like to put on record 
here that the preamble to the Potsdam Proclamation was taken from 
a document prepared by Douglas Fairbanks, who was then in the 
Navy Department in the Psychological Warfare Department. 
The Chairman. Douglas Fairbanks ? 
Mr. DooMAN. Douglas Fairbanks. 
I would like to make acknowledgment, if I could, of his contribution 

2284S— 52 — pt. 3 3 



•732 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to a paper which, after all, is part of history. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You are referring to the movie actor i 

Mr. DooMAN. The movie actor. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Father or son ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Son. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. . -, ^r ^ » 

Mr. Morris. Have you finished with that episode, Mr. Dooman { 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. ^^ ^^ ^-s^ 

The Chairman. Do I understand now that he started out to identity 
this instrument and he does not identify it ? 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe in detail so that we might make that 
a part of our record if the chairman deems it necessary? 

Mr DooMAN. Yes. This was entitled when prepared: "Draft 
Proclamation by the Heads of the State, U. S.-U. K.-Chma," and it 
was then ultimately issued on the 29th of July at Potsdam, by Prime 
Minister Attlee, Mr. Truman, and General Chiang Kai-shek, and 
when Kussia came into the war, the Soviet Union then adhered to this 

document. , . • i i. 

The Chairman. Let me go back and get the document straight 

again, please. 

Is this the document that you are now testifying to the same docu- 
ment that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of 
Stale? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that the one that was rejected at the instance 
of General Marshall ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was later signed. 

The Chairman. That is what I mean, but temporarily, at least, laid 
aside ? 

Mr, DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is the document that afterwards was adopted 
at Potsdam? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And the preliminary to that, the preamble to that 
was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks ? 

Mr. DoOMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to mention this thing that the 
only portion of my draft which was changed, not in substance but in 
text, was that paragraph 12 which I have just read ; that was cut down 
to read that the Japanese might have such form of Government as 
they desired. 

The Chairman. Had your document set up or attempted to set up 
the continuation of a monarchy ? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, I haven't read it ; that the occupation of Japan 

should cease — 

when a responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese 
people had been set up. This may include a constitutional monarchy under 
the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine 
determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will 
render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan. 

As I say, that particular paragraph was cut down to the effect that 
such type of government as they pleased, in accordance with the 
wishes of the Allies, or something of that sort. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this now. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 733 

Mr. DooMAN. Excuse me, that includes some other papers. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced 
into the record in its entirety, it is only three pages and I would like to 
have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. It reads: "Draft 
Proclamation by the Heads of State, U. S., U. K., USSR-phina." 

The Chairman. Now, this instrument that I now hold in my hand, 
consisting of three pages, was that the entire instrument that you 
prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State ? 

Mr. DooMAN. That was prepared at the direction of Mr. Grew, then 
Acting Secretary of State. 

The Chairman. Acting Secretary of State. 

Mr. DoOMAN. Yes. 

The Chairman. Was this the entire instrument? 

Mr. DoOMAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Going back a little bit, this was the instrument 
which was discussed in the Pentagon at the time Mr. Marshall was 
present, and it was at his instance, laid aside? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This is the instrument that was shown to the Presi- 
dent in the White House ? 

Mr. Dooman. As I recall, on the 28th of May. 

The Chairman. This may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 240" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 240 

Deatt Proclamation by the Heads of State U. S.-U. K.-[U. S. S. R.]-China 

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war] 

(Completed in Department of State May, 1945) 

(1) We, — The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic 
of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred 
and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this 
war on the terms we state herein. 

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British 
Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from 
the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union 
and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is 
sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute 
the war against Japan until her capitulation. 

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of 
the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example 
to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably 
greater than that which, when apijlied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid 
waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German 
people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve will 
mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and 
just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. 

(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to 
follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent 
calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? 
The time has come for- the Japanese people to decide whether to continue on to 
destruction or to follow the path of reason. 

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no 
alternatives. We shall brook no delay. 

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of 
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world 
conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be 
impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. 



734 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof 
that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied 
to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are 
here setting forth. 

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese 
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokliaido, Kyushu, Shikohu 
and such minor islands as we determine. 

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be 
permitted to return to their homes, with the opportunity to lead peaceful and 
productive lives. 

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or de- 
stroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, 
Including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic 
tendencies among the Japanese shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom 
of speech,' of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental 
human rights shall be established. 

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as are determined 
to offer no potential for war but which can produce a sustaining economy and 
permit the Japanese to take their part in a world economic system, with access 
to raw materials and opportuniies for peaceful trade. 

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as 
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established 
beyond a doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character 
representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional mon- 
archy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced 
of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace 
which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism 
in Japan. 

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to 
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and 
to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. 
The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. 

The Chairman. Let me go back again for a question or two. What 
part of that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was the preamble. 

The Chairman. What do you call the preamble? 

Mr. DooMAN. The preamble consists of those paragraphs preced- 
ing the numbered paragraphs in that paper. 

The Chairman. Preceding? 

Mr. DooMAN. Preceding the nuihbered paragraphs. 

Mr. Morris. The first paragraph here is a numbered paragraph. 

The Chairman. That is correct, the first paragraph is a numbered 
paragraph. 

Mr. DooMAN. My recollection was faulty. It consists of para- 
graphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. In other words, paragraphs 1 to 4, inclusive, 
were prepared by, largely by, Mr. Fairbanks. 

The Chairman. Where was Mr. Fairbanks at that time? 

Mr. Dooman. He was in the Psychological Warfare Section of 
the Navy Department at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, when you testified in executive session 
on July 11, 1951, at the beginning of your testimony with respect to 
a conflict of views between yourself and Mr. John Carter Vincent, 
you said then : 

My view was then that a country such as Japan with a population far in 
excess of what it could support without colonies was in very grave danger of 
being communized unless certain of the natural resources available on the con- 
tinent could be made available to the Japanese. Vincent's position always was 
that the opportunities for these 70- or 80-million Japanese to make a liveli- 
hood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their 
own metropolitan area of Japan, the four main islands. 

Senator Eastland. Whose policy was that? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 735 

Mr. DooMAN. That was the general policy, Vincent's. 
Senator Eastland. Vincent's? 
Mr. DooMAN. Yes. 

Now, I wonder, Mr. Dooman, if you would, either from your own 
personal experiences or from your reading of official documents pub- 
lished by Mr. Vincent or Mr. Vincent's division, support that testi- 
mony. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, those views were set forth in a broadcast under 
the auspices of the State Department. I think it was carried on in 
D. C. on the night of October 6, 1945. 

Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of that broadcast ? Did you 
hear the broadcast, or did you read a transcription of it? 

Mr. DooMAN. I read a transcription of it in the newspapers. 

The Chairman. By whom was the broadcast made ? 

Mr. Dooman. There were several people who participated in it. 
General Hilldring, who was a member of SWINK for civil affairs 
matters. Captain — I can't remember his name now, but he is now 
the President's naval aide — Captain Davidson. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a copy of that transcription with you, 
Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Dooman. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of what took place on that 
broadcast ? 

Mr. Dooman. Well, it was substantially along the lines testified to 
previously by me in the executive session. 

Mr. Morris. Namely, that Vincent's position always was that the 
opportunity for these 70 or 80 million Japanese to make a livelihood 
should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on 
their own metropolitan area, the four main islands? 

Mr. Dooman. That's right. In other words, emphasis was to be 
laid on agriculture and fishing and such minor industries as they could 
support. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that transcription 
inserted in the record because of its considered importance. 

The Chairman. What transcription ? 

Mr. Morris. This is the transcript. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document? 

Mr. Mandel. This is headed "Department of State Bulletin, Our 
Occupation Policy for Japan." The date of the bulletin is October 
7, 1945, and it gives the participants in this broadcast to which Mr. 
Dooman has referred. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are 
any particular passages you would like to underscore in that trans- 
cript. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to introduce the 
whole transcript into the record. 

The Chairman. That is a photostatic copy of the original? 

Mr. Morris. Pardon, sir? 

The Chairman. This is a photostatic copy of the original? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel has so identified it. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

The Chairman. That is taken from the files of the State Depart- 
ment? 



736 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel. That photostat was made at my direction by the 

Library of Congress. 

The Chairman. All right. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 241" and is as 

follows :) 

Exhibit No. 241 

[From the Department of State Bulletin. October 7, 1945] 

OiTR Occupation Policy fob Japan 
Participants 

John Cartehj Vincent : Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of 
State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating 
Committee. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Huxdring : Director of Civil Affairs, War Department. 

Capt. R. L. Dennison: U. S. Navy, Representative of tlie Navy Department 
on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. 

Sterling Fishek : Director, NBC University of the Air. 

[Released to the press October 6] 
Announcer : Here are headlines from Washington: 

General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken 
Up ; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines ; Promises 
Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military 
Fanatics. 

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; 
Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified, 
and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free 
Assembly and Free Discussion. 

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil 
Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and 
Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan. 

Announcer: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our 
Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by 
Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the 
people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and 
women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed 
Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also 
available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain 
them. 

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast 
on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan", Participating are Mr. John Carter 
Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department ; 
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; 
and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far 
Eastern Subcommittee of the State. War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They 
wil be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the 
Air. Mr. Fisher — 

Fisher: No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and 
general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate 
has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious 
of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese. 

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much 
of the confusion surrounding this debate.* But it also raised many questions — 
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have 
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War, 
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy. 

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at 
least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our 
policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that 
policy is determined. 

Hilldring: Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will 
try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee — 



1 Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945. p. 423. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 737 

"SWING", we call it— formulates policy for the President's approral, on ques- 
tions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the 
approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces 
in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we 
think he is doing it very well. 

Fisher : Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chair- 
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it. 

Vincent: That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far 
Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. 
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with 
which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and 
I sit in an advisory capacity. 

Hilldring: The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing 
the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James 
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary 
of the Navy, Artemus Gates. 

Fisheb: Mr. Vincent, I'd like to kno^^ whether there is a — shall we say — 
strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. 

Vincent: No, tliere is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There 
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the 
State Department. I can assure you that General INIacArthur is receiving our 
support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment. 

Fisher: There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian 
advisers. 

Vincent : That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists 
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has 
welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with 
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to 
send more and more such people out. 

Fisher : As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain 
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. 
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, 
and voice in, the policy for Japan. 

Dennison : We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 
vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in 
the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country 
separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always 
present a naval problem. 

Fisher : What part is the Navy playing now in that control? 

Dennison : Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this 
duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General 
MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil- 
affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the 
former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands. 

Fisher: Does that include Okinawa? 

Dennison : Yes. 

Fisher: That's not generally known, is it? 

Dennison : No, I believe not. I'd like to add — besides these immediate duties 
the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long 
after our troops are withdrawn. 

Fisher: Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcom- 
mittee which drafts our occupation policy, can you give us a statement of our 
over-all objectives? 

Vincent : Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces 
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratise Japan — to 
encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will 
not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world. 

Fisher: And how long do you think that will take? 

Vincent : The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the 
Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this : The occupation will continue 
until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue 
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its 
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American 
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic 
tendencies. 



738 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Fisher: General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy 
Japan ? 

Hilldking: To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of 
clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish 
our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until 
we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned. 

Fisher: To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy? 

Hilldring : That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves 
matters of high policy on which tlie Army must look to the State Department. 
I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question. 

Fisher: Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it? 

Vincent: Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States 
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of 
regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries 
interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced 
recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies 
for tlie control of Japan." In addition to the four principal powers in the 
Far East, a number of other powers ar§ to be invited to have membership on the 
Commission. 

Fisher : Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about the 
demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone? 

Hilldring : Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is 
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed 
soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and 
food and housing problems are serious delaying factors. 

Fisher : And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of 
Asia ? 

Hilldring : It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on 
shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. 
Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of 
Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place. 

Fisher : Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the 
Japanese forces scattered through Asia? 

Dennison : It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to 
three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacitic, and for 
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home. 

Fisher: And what is being done with the Japanese Navy? 

Dennison : The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's 
nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed. 

Fisher: Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military sys- 
tem — the police system, for example. JThe Japanese secret police have been 
persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what 
will be done about that? 

Vincent : That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the 
top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its 
hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America 
will liave to be substituted for it. 

Dennison : We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and 
not an ai'my in the guise of police. 

Hilldring : As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already 
abolished the Kempai and political police. 

Fisher : It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, 
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, 
from the Emperor on down. 

Vincent: Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes 
in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would 
hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the 
people of Japan must be removed. 

Fisher: Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible govern- 
ment? 

Vincent: The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to 
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher. 

Dennison : The Emperor's authority is subi'ect to General MacArthur and 
will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Direc- 
tives sent to General MacArthur establish that point. 



» See p. 545. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 739 

FiSHEE : Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, 
Captain Denuison? 

Dennison : I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur 
said: 

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the 
state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You 
will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. 
Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an uncon- 
ditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain 
any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope. 

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to 
the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does 
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders 
issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, in- 
cluding the use of force." ^ That's the directive under which General MacArthur 
is operating. 

Fisher: That's clear enough. . . . Now, General Hilldring, you have to do 
with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main differ- 
ence between them? 

Hilldring : Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re- 
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again 
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism 
of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Gov- 
ernment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, 
and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally. 

Fisher: Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of 
the national Government in Japan? 

Hilldring: The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the 
national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Gov- 
ernment available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole 
complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million 
people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By 
cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are 
saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are 
requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the 
specifications. 

Fisher: But some people argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese Gov- 
ernment we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't 
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry 
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression? 

Hilldring: Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japa- 
nese groups or individuals, eitlier in government or in industry. If our policy 
requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be re- 
moved. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. 
Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur. 

Dennison : Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not 
to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to 
feel out the situation. 

Fisher: Would you say. Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went 
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite? 

Dennison : In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General 
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corre- 
spondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies. 

Fisher : He certainly has. Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, 
Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me. 

Vincent : Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today 
that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict 
exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it 
will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by 
General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out. 

Fisher : Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war 
criminals? 

Vincent : We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we 
can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being 
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection. 



« Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480. 



740 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Hiixdeing: We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they 
are beins arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is 
applying in Germany are being used in Japan. 

Dennison : Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they 
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not. 

fisher: All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let 
me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus- 
trialists — who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, 
among the guilty? 

Dennison : We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall 
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals. 

Fisher: General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big indus- 
trialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making pov»-er? 

Hh-ldring: Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos — militarists — will be 
removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and 
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's 
war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's 
no other way to accomplish it. 

Fisher: What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent? 

Vincent: Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those 
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as Gen- 
eral Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family com- 
bines have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent. 

Fisher: And the financial combines as well? 

Vincent: Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already 
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of 
their loot. 

Fisher : Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu." 
Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous? 

Dennison : There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. 
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and 
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occu- 
pation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about 
this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested 
and tried as a war criminal. 

Fisher : General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany 
has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. 
Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed 
in Japan. What about that? 

Hilldring: I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big 
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild 
them in the future. The same policy will -prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only 
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans 
or the Japanese to do so. 

Fisher: And that applies to all industries that could be used for war pur- 
poses ? 

Hiixdring: The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or 
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as 
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the 
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a 
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steeel, 
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equip- 
ment. 

Vincent : This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese 
economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. 
Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and 
natural resources to the ends of peaceful living. 

Fisher: Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything 
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, 
for example? 

Vincent: Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving 
their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing 
and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruc- 
tion work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any 
attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll 
give them all the encouragement we can. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 741 

Fisher: What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out 
of heavy war industry''' 

Vincent : They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to 
retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy 
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more 
and more for their domestic market. 

Fisher : They'll have to have some foreign trade of course to keep going. 
Vincent: Of course, but not the unhealthfnl sort they had before the war. 
A large portion of Japan's pre-war foreign trade assets were used for military 
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap-iron and 
oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign 
trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable 
to what they had before the war. 

FisHEK. Tliere have been some dire predictions about the food situation over 
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our 
policy be on food? 

HiLLDRixG : General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does 
not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this 
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other 
occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy popu- 
lations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that 
might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The 
Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports. 

FiSHEB : They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going 
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine? 

Dennison : We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's 
the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships 
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's 
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may 
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships. 

Fishee: Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot 
of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some 
Japanese transport planes to resume operations. 

L^ENNisoN : That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of Gen- 
eral MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in 
Japan. 

Vincent: Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a spe- 
cific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency. 

Fisher : In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of 
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big indus- 
trialists will be? 

Vincent: Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri- 
culture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider dis- 
tribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. 
But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself — 
and will, we expect. 

Fishee: And the labor unions? What about them? 

Vincent: We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, 
because that's an essential part of democracy. 

Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals 
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out? 

Vincent: General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons 
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs. 

Fisher : That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces 

in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces? 

Dennison : Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies 

among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to 

adopt a constructive reform program. 

Vincent: All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured 
the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation author- 
ities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political 
parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all 
barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press. 

Fisher : I take all this to mean that the democratic and anti-militarist groups 
will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group 
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods? 

Vincent: It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides 
calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan". It 



742 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies 
of the government are to be permitted and favored". 

Fisher: And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force 
to attain their objectives? 

Vincent: In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where 
necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve 
liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force. 

Dennison : We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as 
such. I think we should make that doubly clear. 

Fisher: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been 
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand 
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are get- 
ting together in one party — a Socialist party. What stand will we take on 
that. General Hilldring? 

HiLLDRiNG : If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every 
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in 
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military 
fanatics. 

Fisher: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way 
for the democratic forces. 

Hilldring : We're prepared to support the development of democratic gov- 
ernment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops 
and our over-all objectives are not endangered. 

FisHBH : I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will 
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of 
nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"? 

Vincent : Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not 
to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be 
done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there 
will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. 

Fisher : That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto. 

Vincent : Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina- 
tion of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will 
be completely suppressed. 

Fisher: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That 
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent. 

Vincent : Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their 
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic learnings 
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible. 

Dennison : That's where the real change must stem from — the school system. 
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes 
for the older generation as well. 

Fisher : And that may take a very long time. Captain Dennison. 

Dennison : How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives 
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through 
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on. 

Fisher: What's the basis for your optimism. Captain? 

Dennison : Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many 
Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in 
Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, 
to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they 
found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great 
majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved 
their loyalty there during the war. 

Fisher: What accounts for that loyalty? 

Dennison : Simply that they like the American way of life better. At seven, 
it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older 
they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I 
believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a 
taste of them — of real civil liberties — they'll never want to go back to their old 
ways. 

Hiixdring: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite 
possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining 
the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to craek^ 
they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctri- 
nated with one basic idea : obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 743 

Vincent : Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you 
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if 
there's to be a real, working democracy iu Japan. 

HiLLDRiNG : I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. 
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done. 

Fisher : Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese 
under the occupation? 

Vincent : The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent 
indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious 
about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness 
to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military 
domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about 
the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle 
the East", or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and 
political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully 
fostered. 

Fisher: Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring 
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa- 
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic 
policy — one that's aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialists and 
every possible encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now begin- 
ning to reappear in Japan. 

Announcer : That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the 
Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department ; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, 
Director of Civil Aff:airs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy 
representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Co- 
ordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. 
This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," 
presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain 
printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to 
receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. 
Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC 
University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites 
your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State 
Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina 
and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our 
guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just re- 
turned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of 
American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this im- 
portant program. . . . Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D, C. 

INIr. DooMAN. Will you give me just a minute? Here is one quo- 
tation. 

The Chairman. Let me have the question now, please. 
(The record was read by the reporter as follows :) 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any par- 
ticular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that the counsel handed the 
witness the photostatic copy of the transcript of a radio speech. 

Mr. DooMAN. I will have to read several quotations from other 
people here. 

Mr. Morris. Please do. 

Mr. Dooman. This is General Hilldring speaking [reading] : 

Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or 
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as 
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the 
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a 
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as 
well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment. 

Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ- 
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under 



744 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural 
resources to the ends of peaceful living. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything 
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, 
for example? 

Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their 
economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishinsi and the 
production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work 
to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by 
the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all 
the encouragement we can. 

That, I think, is indicative of the thinking of Mr, Vincent, in other 
words, that the Japanese would have to subsist primarily on the re- 
sources that they found within their own islands, main islands, and 
confine their efforts largely to agriculture and fishing and the develop- 
ment of consumer goods. 

As I remarked previously, here were today 85,000,000 people sup- 
posed to be able to make a living off an area equivalent, roughly, to 
one-quarter of Pennsylvania, and with no natural resources in the way 
of iron, steel, coal, cotton, wool, or any of the primary raw materials. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other documents that you 
care to introduce into the record at this time to support the conclusion 
just arrived at, your conclusion? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, I refer to a statement made by General Mac- 
Arthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, in which 

Mr. Morris. What year ? 

Mr. DooMAN. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anniversary of 
the setting up of the occupation in Japan. At that time, he issued a 
statement to the Japanese people warning them of the dangers from 
the left as well as from the right. 

In other words, he was warning them of the dangers of communism. 
As a matter of fact, a short time after that, in February 1947, the 
Communists tried to take over the country by means of a general strike 
which was prevented only by General MacArthur preventing it. 
However, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, publishes a 
dispatch from Mr. John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent in Washington, 
stating that there was in effect, that there was considerable unfavor- 
able reaction in the State Department to General MacArthur's pro- 
nouncement to the Japanese people. 

It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows ; if I may read : 

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General Mac- 
Arthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the 
cry of "communism" in Japan. The source said they were taken completely by 
surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement, such as that the Japanese 
islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous 
springboard for war." 

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in 
the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world. 

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establisJiment of a 
just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at 
"building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up 
"a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources 
added. 

The Chairman. That was what year? 

Mr. Dooman. September 3, 1946. 

The Chairman. 1946? 

Mr. Dooman. Yes. 

The Chairman. And published in what publication? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 745 

Mr. DooMAN. The New York Herald Tribune. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know who the sources referred to in that arti- 
cle are^ 

Mr. DooMAN. I do not know first-hand, I only know from rumor. 

The Chairman. Do you know that writer, byline writer? 

Mr. IMoRRis. John C. Metcalfe? 

Mr. Doom AN. No ; I do not know him. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, introduce it into the evi- 
dence, for whatever probative value it may have. 

The Chairman. It may be admitted. 

(The document marked "Exhibit No. 242" is as follows 

Exhibit No. 242 

[From the New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1946] 

MacArthur Blast Against Reds Draws State Department's Fike 

(By John C. Metcalfe) 

Washington, September 2. — General Douglas MacArthur, Allied Supreme Com- 
mander in Japan, was charged by State Department sources today with having 
launched on his own initiative an anti-Coiumuuist campaign in violation of 
American policy directives to him from President Truman. 

The charge, unofficial in character, was based on General MacArthur's pub- 
lished statement yesterday on the first anniversary of Japan's formal surrender. 
In the statement, he suggested that in certain circumstances the Japanese people 
might fall prey to those seeking to impose the "philosophy of the extreme radical 
left." 

It was stated bluntly at the State Department today that General MacArthur 
made public his statement "without any consultation" in advance with American 
officials directly responsible for the foreign policy of the United States. 

controversy threatens 

The development threatened to revive an old controversy between General Mac- 
Arthur and Washington policy makers. President Truman made it clear 6 
months ago that he, in consultation with James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, 
is responsible for policy and that General MacArthur's job is solely to carry out 
that policy under White House directives forwarded to him by the War Depart- 
ment. 

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General Mac- 
Arthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the 
cry of "communism" in Japan. The sources said they were taken completely by 
sui'prise by comments in the MacArthur statement such as that the Japanese 
islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring- 
board for war." 

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in 
the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world. 

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just 
and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building 
a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark 
against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added. 

statement held unwarranted 

"There is nothing which the Japanese have done since their surrender to 
warrant the statement issued by General MacArthur," one official commented. 

General MacArthur's task is to "neutralize Japan" and to get along with the 
other interested Allied powers, it was explained. If the United States holds any 
fears about its security, it will counter any Soviet threat with a strong Navy 
and Air Force, it was said. 

Private advices from Tokyo gave the following information today : 

"The emphasis on important developments in Japan has shifted from General 
MacArthur to the doings of the Japanese. One is apt to get (from headquarters) 
a completely false view of what is going on in this country. Listening to the 



746 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

military authorities one wonders why the occupation is not ended right now. 
Actually, however, the Japanese are no more ready to govern themselves on a 
democratic basis than they were a year ago. The Conservatives are firmly in 
the saddle and are doing all in their power to preserve the status quo. 

"Everyone must be aware by now that the Allied Council here is a farce and 
that the Far Eastern Commission seems to us out here like something on an- 
other planet." 

DEMOCJRAOY PREFEEBED 

At the state Department it was said that if the Japanese have a tendency to 
go anywhere they will "most likely turn toward democracy" as the preferred 
type of government. But it was also pointed out that the Japanese, like the 
Germans, are primarily interested in extricating themselves from their unhappy 
situation and will take any course that might lead to a way out. They are playing 
off democracy against communism, it was said, and statements like those by 
General MacArthur are extremely helpful to them. 

Department officials, moreover, were particularly annoyed by the MacArthur 
statement because of the disturbing situations in Korea and China. 

"Maybe General MacArthur thinks he is bolstering Mr. Byrnes at the Paris 
Peace Conference, but he is not helping the situation in the Far East with his 
comment," a State Department official said. • 

Diplomatic observers also pointed out that American-Soviet relations at the 
Paris Conference, in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and at the United Nations 
Security Council are none too calm. They were, therefore, particularly disturbed 
by anything resembling a move to launch an anticominunist campaign in Japan. 

State Department sources considered the whole incident as "undoubtedly 
especially embarrassing" to Maj. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, Soviet representative 
on the Allied Council for Japan, which meets at Tokyo. 

There was no indication tonight whether the State Department would make 
any official comment, since most officials were away for the Labor Day week end. 

Mr. Morris. Are there any other incidents or episodes concerning 
this part of the testimony that you care to add at this time ? If there 
are, we ask you to do so. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, I can't recall any, offliand, bearing on this par- 
ticular point. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitude of the 
State Department, or any individuals in the State Department, was 
with respect toward Japanese Communists ? 

Mr. DoOMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese 
Communists ? 

Mr, DooMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain those to the committee, Mr. Doo- 
man? 

The Chairman. Did you have any personal experience with Jap- 
anese Communists, that is your question ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Did you experience the State Department's policy with respect to 
Japanese Communists first hand? 

Mr. DooMAN. May I submit that the question is perhaps not 
relevant to the situation as it existed, because the State Department 
had no policy at that time with regard to 

Mr. Morris. Any individuals in the State Department, Mr. Doo- 
man. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, some time in May I believe it was. May or 
June, I think it was May, there returned 

Mr. Morris. 1945? 

Mr. DooMAN. 1945. 

There returned from China a Foreign Service officer named John 
K. Emerson, who, before the war, had been one of my subordinates 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 747 

at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I understood that he had been 
sent to Yenan. Yenan in China then was the capital of the Chinese 
Communists. There were present at that time in Yenan a Nosaka, 
the leading Japanese Communist, and other leading Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, head of the 
Japanese Communist Party? 

Mr. DooMAN. I believe the latter is a pseudonym. I believe that 
Emerson had been sent to Yenan to study methods used by the Japa- 
nese Communists in Yenan in indoctrinating Japanese prisoners of 
war taken by the Chinese. As I said, he returned to Washington in 
about May of 1945. 

The Chairman. Who did? 

Mr. DooMAN. Emerson. He brought back a report describing at 
considerable length the method used by the Japanese Communists 
with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, and as I recall, he recom- 
mended that Japanese prisoners in American stockades be then turned 
over to Japanese Communists in the United States for indoctrina- 
tion along methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yenan. 

At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS, the Office of 
Strategic Services, where I was helping with my own services in 
the field of psychological warfare to address a group on what he had 
found in Yenan. At that time he displayed a large number of posters 
and papers of various kinds and he also showed me a number of letters 
that he had brought from Yenan. These letters were written by 
Japanese Communists in Yenan to certain Japanese Communists who 
were then employed by OSS in psychological warfare against Japa- 
nese. 

Mr. Morris. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with a publication that is entitled 
"Eighteen Years in Prison'' by Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published 
by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948 ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes; I have a copy of that book. The title in 
Japanese is "Gokuchi juhachi-nen" which means Eighteen Years in 
Jail. 

Mr. Morris. That publication, which is in Japanese, which you 
understand, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the 
Japanese Communist Party? A translation here from the Library 
of Congress, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the 
Japanese Communist Party in 1948. 

Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes. I see. It was published by the Japanese 
Communist Party, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, on page 159 to 161, there is described an 
episode which involves individuals concerned with the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 

I ask you if you have any supplementary or corroborative knowl- 
edge of the facts described by these two Japanese Communists in the 
publication that you have in your hand. 

I think it would be best if I read the episode referred to, Mr. 
Dooman, and ask you if you had read it in the book and whether you 
know of any corroboration of it. 

Mr. Dooman. All right, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you describe what this is, please ? 

2284S— 52^pt. 3 4 



748 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel. This is a translation from the book entitled "Eighteen 
Years in Prison," the last chapter written by Yoshio Shiga, pages 159 
to 161, published by the Japanese Connnunist Party in 1948 and 
translated by Andrew Y, Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orientalia Divi- 
sion, the Library of Congress. 

JMr. MoRius. Will you read the episode to which we are referring, 
Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

THE DOCK OF FREEDOM 

At last the day came when we could become active asain. That day came after 
those who called us traitors had turnod Japan into a ruined wastoland, had talcen 
the lives of a million people and had destroyed all peace and happiness. 

On August 15 (1945) all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, as- 
sembled around a radio speaker, to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called 
August Voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but 
I cauglit the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure 
that Japan had lost the war. 

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We 
had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. 
We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, how- 
ever, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, 
and that settled the situation. 

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three 
times to investigate. He asked tlie warden if he still kept political prisoners 
in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, 
Mr. Isaac of Newsweek, and M. iMarukyusu and M. Giran of a French news 
agency came to the prison. They did not ask altout the political prisoners. In- 
stead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctant- 
ly si lowed' them lirst the work shop. Next they requested to see the wards. After 
they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The 
Fuchu Prison is an American style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells 
at the center. As they can>e to the section which contained the solitary cells, 
the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank : "You have political 
prisoners here, don't you?" The officials, taken olT guard, tried to evade the 
question and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring 
in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So tinally the prison officials 
admitted holding such prisoners and said, "That over there is their detention 
quarters " The three newsmen came rushing to our section, RI. INIarceuse 
shouting aloud. "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is JMr. Shiga"?" That was the 
first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years. 

From that day on, until we came out of the jail— about 10 days — war cor- 
respondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mi*. 
Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked, "What 
are you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies 
of SCAP. "On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the 
prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open and we com- 
rades arm-in-arm stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment 
of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those com- 
rades who, with red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some 
of them had been there since the previous night. 

"Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit." 

Mr. INIoKRis. Now, ISIr. Dooman, this committee is interested in the 
episodes that are reported in that book. 

I ask you if you will supplement the facts presented in this book 
from whatever knowledge you have of the episode. 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, what knowledge I have is derived largely 
from — is largely second-hand. I was not there, naturally, and I have 
no first-hand information. 

Mr. Morris. Have you heard about these episodes from State De- 
partment officials? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 749 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about it from the 
sources that we reco^iize are second-hand ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, there are two categories. I have heard from 
State Department people, other State Department people, who were 
there at that time. Also I have heard of this from a large number of 
Japanese whom I met in New York since the war, because this thing 
became a sensation among the Japanese people, it was talked about 
from hand to mouth, it was talked about from person to person, al- 
though there was no reference to this in the papers. It was a matter 
of general discussion among the Japanese. 

Mr. Morris. Was it a matter of common knowledge among the 
Japanese ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was a matter of common knowledge among the 
Japanese. I gather so from the fact that perhaps a dozen people, 
dozen Japanese, with whom I have talked of the matter since the war 
in New York were quite familiar with the story. 

Now, combining these two sources, that is, from State Department 
officials wlio were there and from what tlie Japanese themselves said, 
this was in efl'ect the substance of what I heard; that Harold Isaac 
and a French correspondent who was known to be a Communist went 
to this prison. Fuchu Prison, and the events took place pretty much as 
described by Shiga, in his book. 

The story then continues that they came back, Isaac and this 
Frenchman came back and reported their experience to John Emerson 
in SCAP headquarters. 

A few days later, Emerson and, I believe, Herbert Norman 

Mr. Morris. Who was Herbert Norman ? 

Mr. DooMAx. Herbert Norman was a Canadian, member of the 
Canadian Foreign Service, who had been in Tokyo before the war, 
and who had been sent back by the Canadian Government to Japan 
as soon as the occupation started to undertake the repatriation of 
Canadian citizens left in Japan during the war. When he got through 
with that, he was assigned to Counter-intelligence under SCAP. The 
story goes on to say that Emerson, and I believe they weren't quite 
certain whether Norman went with Emerson or not, a few days later 
went back to this prison and demanded to see Tokuda and Shiga and 
the other Communists. 

The story further continues, and tliis was a matter that was gener- 
ally talked about by the Japanese in Tokyo at that time, was that on 
the day they were released, apparently October 10, following the or- 
der by General MacArthur for the release of political prisoners, that 
Emerson and Norman went in a staff car to the prison and brought 
Shiga and Tokuda back to their homes. 

The Chairman. Who are Shiga, and Tokuda? 

Mr. Doomax. Shiga was one of the top leaders of the Japanese 
Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat was the effect of that on the Japanese population 
from what you know, Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. Dooman. The effect of that, as said by one of the Japanese to 
me, was to add 100,000 new members to the Japanese Communist 
Party. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the prestige accorded by the Ameri- 
can and Canadian officials in transporting Japanese Communists in 



750 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

an official limousine afforded the Japanese Communists a certain 
amount of reputation? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes, a substantital increase in prestige and standing, 
of course. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know from your own knowledge 
anything of the report prepared by Ambassador Pauley on Japanese 
reparations? Are you acquainted with that document? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. AVill you tell us what you know about that document 
with respect to the policy he enunciated therein ? 

Mr. DooMAN. Mr. Pauley, who was sent out as Reparations Com- 
missioner or Ambassador, made a survey, was supposed to make a 
survey, of the Japanese industry potential and needs and what could 
be removed for reparation purposes. He took with him, as his eco- 
nomic adviser, Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore ; and, without knowing 
first-hand, the belief is quite general that Mr. Lattimore wrote the 
report which Mr. Pauley submitted when he returned to the United 
States. 

Well, the report, which I believe, is readily accessible, in effect pro- 
vided for the "pasteurizing" of Japan — that is, the reduction of Japan 
to, as has been previously indicated in that broadcast by Vincent, to a 
very simple economy ; that is, one of primarily agriculture and fishing, 
plus small consumer industries. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to press Mr. Dooman 
as to his knowledge that Mr. Lattimore did write the Pauley repara- 
tions report inasmuch as Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged in executive 
session, his connection with that particular report. 

Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged ? 

Mr. Morris. In executive session. 

The Chairman. Do you propose to oiler that to the committee in 
open session ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; I will do that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DooMAN. I may add that, in general, the report reflects the 
view set forth by Mr. Lattimore and others and the Nation, and so on : 
the general concept that Japan should be reduced to a very simple 
type of economy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention so much to intro- 
duce, although I will do that since you ask, any of the executive session 
we had with Mr. Lattimore, but I was making that suggestion to 
account for the fact that I was not going to press Mr. Dooman as to 
how he knew that Mr. Lattimore wrote that particular report. 

The Chairman. I have no desire to direct you as to how you present 
the evidence, but I just thought, if you had it available for the open 
session, it would probably clarify some things because Mr. Dooman 
testifies largely from hearsay in that regard. 

Mr. Dooman. On that particular point. 

Mr. Morris. In that particular point. 

We have sat for it, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dooman, did you have any dealings with John K. Fairbank? 

Mr. Dooman. No. Only periodically. 

Mr. Morris. Well, you did encounter John K. Fairbank in your 
official capacity ; did you not ? 

Mr. Dooman. Yes. 



mSTTTUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 751 

Mr. Morris. Would you describe your connections with John K. 
Fairbank, whatever they were ? 

The Chairman. Who is he ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had John K. Fairbank's asso- 
ciation with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forth in the record at 
great detail. 

We have also had testimony on the part of three witnesses in con- 
nection with his association in connection with the Communist Party. 

I am asking Mr. Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr. John K. 
Fairbank in his associations. 

T]ie Chairman. All right. 

Mr. DooMAN. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that section of the 
Office of War Information which dealt with psychological warfare 
against Japan. 

Now, the practice was that — I believe it was — once a month a group 
would come over from the Office of War Information with a draft 
program of the propaganda that was to be directed against Japan 
for the ensuing month, and the various targets and subjects which 
were to be dealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and the pur- 
pose of their visit to the State Department was to get clearance on 
these targets. 

As I say, my contacts with Mr. Fairbank were limited primarily to 
those visits to the State Department when he brought over these pro- 
grams of proposed psychological warfare. 

Mr. Morris. From your association, what was his view toward 
these 

Mr. DooMAN. I don't know what responsibility or what part Mr. 
Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs — that is, the 
setting up of the targets — but I found that invariably in these pro- 
grams there would be found an item directing the psychological war- 
fare toward creating in the minds of the Japanese an attitude of re- 
sentment and opposition to the Emperor and to the monarchial system. 

At that time we had not come to any decision as to what our policy 
should be in that resepect, and I invariably red-penciled these items 
referring to the Emperor. However, they would always appear either 
overtly or covertly in the next program that would be presented. 

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the part of the 
Office of War Information to get our approval toward phychological 
warfare directed at the relationship between the Japanese people and 
the Emperor. 

The Chairman. You say you underscored it in red ? 

Mr. Doom an. I crossed out with a red pencil. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I made reference to the executive ses- 
sion that we had with Mr. Owen Lattimore here on the 13th of July 
1951 ; and from the executive minutes, on page 15, 1 would like to read 
the following excerpt. 

The Chairman. Was the witness testifying under oath at that 
time? 

Mr. Morris. The witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore, was testifying under 
oath. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

Mr. Morris. After you returned, Mr. Lattimore, what was your next assign- 
ment as far as the Government was concerned? 



752 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. I was a member of the American Mission to Japan on the 
subject of reparations. 

Mr. MoREis. In that assignment, you were on the payroll of the State Depart- 
ment; were you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I understand that it was a White House mission ; that all or 
some of the members including myself were on the State Department payroll. 

Mr. Morris. How long were you on that payroll, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Four or five months, from about October 1945 to about Febru- 
ary or March 1946. 

Mr. Morris. What part did you play in the preparation of the report of that 
mission? 

Mr. Lattimore. I helped to draft the report in Tokyo. 

Mr. Morris. To what extent did you help? 

Mr. Lattimore. Quite largely. 

That is the acknowledgement I referred to. 

Mr. Chairman, I may as well finish the paragraph, however. [Con- 
tinues reading :] 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe that for us, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, when we were in Tokyo, we had a number of experts 
with us, economists, engineers, and so forth ; each expert was given access 
through General MacArthur's headquarters to figures and data on Japan. Each 
person assembled his own material, and I was largely responsible for the con- 
tinuous writing of the report. Each expert was responsible for his own figures. 

I would like to have that incorporated in the record, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. It is in the record now; you have read it. 

Mr. Morris. I think with respect to the, extracts from the book 
Eighteen Years in Prison, inasmuch as it was read by Mr. Mandel, 
nothing more is necessary. 

With respect to the book itself, I suggest that it be filed with the 
records of the committee. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(The book referred to was filed for the information of the com- 
mittee.) 

Mr. MoKRis. Thank you. 

The Chairman. That instrument that you had there a minute ago, 
which is a transcript from this book, has not been admitted in the 
record; it was read by Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel read that. However, if you think it is 
necessary, I will introduce that into this record. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 243" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 243 

[Translation 1] 

The Dooe of Freedom * 

At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came 
after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had 
taken the lives of a million peoijle, and had destroyed all peace and happiness. 

On August 15 [1945] all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assem- 
bled around a radio speaker to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called 
august voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but 



1 Translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orentalia Division, the Library of 
Congress. 

2 Last chapter, written by Yoshio Shiga, pp. 159-161. From Gokuchu juhachi-nen (18 
years in prison) by Kyuichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japan Communist 
Party, 1948. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 753 

I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure 
that Japan had lost the war. 

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We 
had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. 
.We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, how- 
ever, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, 
and that settled the situation. 

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three 
times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in 
his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, 
Mr. Isaac, of Newsweek, and M. Marukyusu [Marceuse?] and M. Giran [Gil- 
land?],^ of a French news agency, came to the prison. They did not ask about 
the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The 
prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the workshop. Next they re- 
quested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested 
next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American-style cross- 
shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the sec- 
tion which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked tlie prison 
authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here; don't you?" The 
officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question, and replied, "No ; we don't." 
They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all 
right?" So, finally the prison officials admitted [holding such prisoners] and 
said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came 
rushing to our section, M. Marceuse shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda? 
Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard 
for those long years. 

From that day on, until we came out of the jail — about 10 days — war corre- 
spondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mr. 
Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked "What are 
you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies of 
SCAP. 

On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It 
was raining. The great iron doors were swung open, and we comrades, arm in 
arm, stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years. 
We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with 
Red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been 
• there since the previous night. 

Then we plunged into our new activ-ities with renewed spirit. 

Mr. Morris. The volume itself is in Japanese, which Mr. Dooman 
has translated for ns. 

The Chairman. It will become a part of the files of this committee. 

Mr. DooMAN. Just to bring that Pauley report into proper per- 
spective, may I add that the following year — I think it was 1947 — 
a mission was sent out by Mr. Strike, one of the leading consulting 
engineers in this country. He sent to Japan a large group of, I think, 
over 20 consulting engineers that went out to Japan, and they returned 
with a report generally overruling the Pauley report, and the report 
of the Strike committee in turn was then upheld by another mission 
consisting of Mr. Johnson, who was president of the Chemical Bank 
in New York or chairman of the board of the Chemical Bank, and Mr. 
Paul Hoffman, who, between them, submitted a report which virtually 
wiped out the recommendations of the Pauley mission. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know Lawrence Salisbury, who 
was editor of Far Eastern Affairs, which was the publication of the 
American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. DooMAN. I did. 

Mr. Morris. Did he ever make any effort to change the personnel in 
the State Department, to your knowledge ? 

' These names are difficult to Identify from their transcription into the Japanese 
syllabary. 



754 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. DooMAN. Well, he is the ringleader of a group of men in the 
Far Eastern Division, who protested against the assignment of Dr. 
Hornbeck as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, when Secre- 
tary of State Stettinius organized, carried out, his reorganization of 
the State Department in, I believe, January 1944. 

As a result of that rebellion, which was successful, Dr. Hornbeck 
was then, I believe, sent to the Netherlands as Ambassador. 

JMr. Morris. In other words, it was a successful movement ? 

Mr. DooMAN. It was a successful movement. 

Mr. Morris. And you say Mr. Salisbury was the ringleader? 

Mr. DooMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You know that from your own experience? 

Mr. DooMAN. I know that from personal laiowledge. 

The Chairman. Anything further, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. I think not. 

Have we neglected anything that we should know, Mr. Dooman? 
If you know of anything within the scope of our inquiry, the chairman 
and I ask that you present that knowledge to this committee. 

Mr. DooMAN. "Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been to give 
you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the other man was a 
Communist or not, because I am in no position to give you any such 
evidence. 

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general that policies 
put forward by the left-wing press, from the Daily Worker right 
down through the line, were in effect substantially translated into 
United States policies and to indicate from personal knowledge how 
that operation was carried out. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that at no time was Mr. 
Dooman asked whether or not any particular person was a Communist. 

The Chairman. The record will speak for itself in that regard. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you identify for the record as much 
as you can, who Lawrence Salisbury was, with respect to his con- 
nection with the IPE. ? 

Mr. Mandel. Our files show that Lawrence Salisbury was at one 
time the editor of Far Eastern Survey, official organ of the American 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Was he a State Department officer, according to your 
files? 

Mr. Mandel. Editor of Far Eastern Survey, Official Organ of the 
American Council of IPR, former Foreign Service official, 12 years in 
Japan, 5 years in China, and 2 in Manila, and 5 in the Department of 
State. 

Mr. Morris. You know that from our records, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. That comes from the biographical register of the 
State Department. 

The Chairman. Was he serving in the State Department while he 
was writing for that publication ? 

Mr. Mandel. No, sir. 

The Chairman. When is your next meeting, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. Next Tuesday at 10 a. m. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until that 
time. 

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., Friday, September 14, 1951, the hear- 
ing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, September 17, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presid- 
ing. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Ferguson. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris'^ 

Mr, Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you kindly stand and be sworn ? 

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mrs. Widener. I do. 

TESTIMONY OP MRS. WILLIAM HARRY WIDENER, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness is here under 
subpena. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, last Friday during the testimony of 
Eugene Dooman the name of Julian Friedman turned up. Accord- 
ing to Mr. Dooman's testimony, Julian Friedman was John Carter 
Vincent's assistant. John Carter Vincent was then head of the Far 
Eastern Division of the State Department and Mr. Dooman would 
attend the Far Eastern area committee meetings for John Carter 
Vincent. Mr. Dooman testified in the course of the day that he sus- 
pected that Julian Friedman was the person responsible for leaks of 
classified information from those meetings to the left wing press and, 
according to Mr. Dooman's testimony, he made specific charges against 
Julian Friedman to Julian Friedman. 

I thought it would be appropriate this morning to have someone 
here who had encountered Mr. Julian Friedman, 

Mrs, Widener, will you give your name and address to the reporter, 
please. 

Mrs. Widener. I am Mrs. William Harry Widener. My address is 

829 Park Avenue, New York City. 

755 



756 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. What is your occupation, Mrs. Widener ? 

Mrs. WiDENEE. I am a writer and a housewife, a professional writer. 

Mr. Morris. Are you qualified in any way as a writer for the United 
States Government, Mrs. Widener? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes. I wrote free lance scripts on a WAE basis for 
the Voice of America from January 1, 1951, to the end of May 1951. 
I applied for classification as an information expert and I received 
such classification. 

INIr. Morris. Do you have any record of that classification with you? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes ; I have. 

Mr. Morris. Would you mind letting me have it so I might put it 
in the record, please ? 

Mrs. WiDNER. Here it is. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify these papers for us, Mrs. Widener? 
What are these papers ? 

Mrs. Widener. They give a classification for me as an information 
specialist from the United States Civil Service Commission, a notice 
of rating from the Department of State. 

Mr. Morris. What is your rating? 

Mrs. Widener. They are dated June this year — radio, GS-12, radio, 
GS-11, radio, GS-11, periodicals and publications, GS-11. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like these in the record. 

The Chairman. I would like to know what these signify and what 
the designations testified to by the witness signify. What does GS-11 
mean ? 

Mrs. Widener. As I understand it. Senator, when I was taken into 
the Voice of America on a WAE basis, I filled out a civil service appli- 
cation stating my qualifications. 

The Chairman. What is a WAE basis and what does it mean ? 

Mrs. Widener. 1 was on a purchase order basis. The Voice of 
America ordered from me eight scripts a month. They paid me $40 
per script. I was up for what they called classification under civil 
service and investigation by the security officers. 

" When I filed my papers, I had to-state what qualifications I would 
have for such an appointment with the State Department. I happen 
to speak several languages. I had to give the entire history of my edu- 
cation, my background for security investigation and for professional 
qualifications a list of my publications in the writing field and my 
experience. 

I was told to start out to be classified in that field ; GS-12 was a very 
good classification. I believe it was not in the lowest category. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have those introduced in the record by 
way of describing the witness. 

The Chairman. Those instruments, are they from your own hand, 
or just what are they ? 

Mrs. Widener. Those were sent to me by the Department of State, 
Senator. 

The Chairman. What is the object of this, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. To establish who Mrs. Widener is. They are just for 
a description of the witness. 

The Chairman. A copy of each will be inserted in the record by 
reference and filed with the committee. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 757 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 244 and 
245" and filed in the committee's files for the record.) 

Mr. MoREis. Do you know a man named Clark Andrews ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How long have you known Clark Andrews ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I first met Mr. Andrews, 1 believe, in 1946. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions, approximately, have you met 
Mr. Andrews ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. A great many. He was a fiance of a friend of mine. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, can you recall an experience that you 
had regarding Clark Andrews in the spring of 1947 that would be of 
interest to this committee ? 

The Chairman. Read the question again, please, Mr. Reporter. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that you could pin that down 
more, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, would you tell us who Clark Andrews is? 

Mrs. Widener. Mr. Andrews was a radio producer. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat was his occupation when you first met him? 

Mrs. Widener. He had returned from China where he had been in 
radio, I believe, in Chungking. 

Mr. Morris. What year was this ? 

Mrs. Widener. In 1946 when I first met him. The pertinence would 
be in reference to Mr. Julian Friedman whom you mentioned to Sen- 
ator McCarran. 

Senator Ferguson. Andrews had been in private radio work in 
China? 

Mrs. WroENER, No, sir; with the Armed Forces, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. Working for the United States Government ? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What was he doing in the spring of 1947 ? 

Mrs. Widener. He was a radio producer for the American Broad- 
casting System. 

Mr. Morris. You have testified that you had previously met him 
on numerous occasions ? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall an episode that involved Mr. Friedman 
and Mr. Andrews ? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us an account of what happened on that 
particular occasion? 

Mrs. WroENER. One evening in the spring of 1947 Mr. Andrews 
telephoned my home 

The Chairman. Where was this ? 

Mrs. Widener. In New York City — and asked if I would care to 
join him and his fiancee after dinner to meet a very special friend that 
he would like me to meet, a very brilliant man and a man who had 
been in China. 

At that time I was not married to Mr.Widener, but I was married 
to a composer, and my husband was not really included in the invita- 
tion. He was busy with music and professional duties. I accepted the 
invitation to go along. When I reached the home of my friend, my 
friend didn't feel well and retired. I remained with Mr. Andrews. 



758 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

We had a long talk and discussion. He said to me that his friend 
was expected but might be a little late. We chatted and waited. I 
should say certainly more than an hour later Mr. Andrews said to me, 
"Confidentially, I want to tell you that the man you are going to meet 
is absolutely brilliant. In fact, he is one of the top brains of the 
Communist Party." 

At that moment the doorbell rang and the gentleman appeared. 

Mr. MoREis. Did he account for the delay in any way of Julian 
Friedman in arriving ? 

Mrs. WroENER. Mr. Friedman accounted for the delay. Mr. Fried- 
man came in. I didn't know his name at that moment. Mr. Andrews 
introduced Mr. Friedman to me as Mr. Julian Friedman. He said that 
he was very sorry to be late and to have kept us waiting, but that he 
had been occupied with a case that was being heard, a very important 
case, in arbitration in New York City before Mr. James Fly. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that James Lawrence Fly ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I don't know his middle name. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it the Mr. Fly formerly with the Federal Com- 
munications Commission ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I believe so. 

Mr. Friedman said he was delighted that the case seemed to be going 
very well and that 

Mr. Morris. This is the case of which James Fly was the arbitrator? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. And he said, "You see, I am conducting 
the defense from behind the scenes." I said, "May I ask what you 
mean by 'behind the scenes?'" He said to me, "It is an extremely 
complicated case. It is a case involving a worker" — I think he said 
social welfare worker or social service worker — "who was dismissed 
from New York City employ and who claimed she was unjustly dis- 
missed because of her political beliefs." 

I said, "Wliat are her political beliefs?" He said, "Well, of course, 
she is a Communist but she is saying that she is not a Communist." 
I said that that struck me as very complicated indeed. Mr. Friedman 
said, "Of course, since she is a member of our party, I am defending 
her, but not out in the open." 

Then Mr. Andrews interrupted the conversation and talked about 
me and my professional activities and what I had done. He and Mr. 
Friedman began to discuss China and international politics. I lis- 
tened for quite a while. Mr. Friedman said to me, "I had a very 
interesting time in China." I said, "Well, when did you leave?" I 
remember I asked him what he was doing. He said that he was with 
the State Department. Prior to Mr. Friedman's arrival Mr. Andrews 
had told me that Mr. Friedman had graduated with the highest honors 
from Harvard University. I believe he graduated either with magna 
or summa cum laude. 

Mr. Friedman took up the story of his going to China. He said to 
'me that after he graduated from Harvard University he entered the 
State Department and that eventually he was sent to China where he 
was connected, I believe, with the Embassy in Shanghai, our Em- 
bassy there. He said, "I was able to do very useful work there, but 
eventually I got in a very tough spot." I asked him what he meant 
by a "tough spot." He said, "I really was on the spot. I was doing 
very good work for our cause, the Communist cause." 

Mr. Morris. He said it was the Communist cause. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 759 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir ; "in China, but somebody must have gotten 
wise to me." . 

He was asked to write a report on the Communist Chinese labor 

movement. 

The Chairman. Let me have that again, please. "He said 

Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Friedman said to me : "I was asked to write a 
report on the Chinese Communist labor movement." He said, "That 
put me in a tough spot. Naturally I wouldn't write anything against 
the party. If I did write what I wanted to write, it would tip my 
hai]d and destroy my usefulness. So I wrote a report that any 14- 
year-old boy could have written and got myself dismissed without 
prejudice." 

Senator Ferguson. Dismissed from the State Department, you 

mean ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Without prejudice? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I asked him then what does "dismissed without 
prejudice" mean ? He said, "It means exactly what it says." 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, may I interrupt at this time? Mr. 
Chairman, at our last session we introduced a letter from the State 
Department official indicating that Mr. Friedman had been dismissed 
without prejudice. That is a part of our record. 

The Chairman. Is that letter available now ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand that he was dismissed be- 
cause he had written such a poor report ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I understand Mr. Friedman told that he wrote a 
report that any li-year-old child could have written. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tie that with his dismissal, the report? 
I mean what he said. 

Mrs. WiDENER. He said to me that he got himself dismissed with- 
out prejudice. 

Senator Ferguson. Because of writing this report? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what he said ? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes, sir. That isn't exactly his every word. 

Senator Ferguson. But that is the substance of what he said ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir ; that was my understanding. 

Senator Eastland. Was Mr. Andrews in China? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I have no knowledge of Mr. Andrews' activities in 
China whatsoever. 

Senator Eastland. Was he in China ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. He did show a sympathy and friendliness toward the 
Communist movement ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. He showed friendliness toward Mr. Julian Fried- 
man. 

Senator Eastland. Had Mr. Andrews been with the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I do not know. 

Senator Eastland. Who was he with in China ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I only know that he said he had been with radio. 
He was in the Armed Forces and had been with our United States 
radio in China. 



760 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman, Let the Chair interrupt here. The letter referred 
to is one dated April 23, 1951, over the signature of Elbridge Dubrow, 
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, and is addressed to me. 
It has "Exhibit No. 235" on it. It says [reading] : 

Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary concerning Julian R. 
Friedman has been referred to me for reply. 

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior 
economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from August 5, 1945, until 
the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946. 

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was 
effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the 
auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 
12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the auxiliary, it was necessary 
to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or 
auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr, Friedman's record shows that 
his services were terminated without prejudice, 

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs. 
Sincerely yours — 

That is now an exhibit in this case. 

Senator Ferguson. Hasn't the State Department ever made an 
explanation as to what they mean "your services are terminated with- 
out prejudice"? Prejudice to what? 

The Chairman. I take it to mean prejudice, but you may apply 
again and be reemployed. That is just a guess on my part. 

Go ahead, Mr, Morris, 

Mr, Morris. What happened then, Mrs. Widener ? 

Mrs, Widener, Up to that stage I had been listening very carefully 
to what Mr, Friedman had been saying. He stopped talking, I said, 
"Mr. Friedman, I would like to ask you a couple of questions if I 
might," He said, "Certainly," I said, "When you said to me before 
you were conducting a defense in an arbitration hearing for someone 
who claimed that she was being unjustly treated because of a charge 
against her political beliefs, you also told me that she was a member 
of the Communist Party, 1 can't understand the need for 'behind 
the scenes,' If she is sincere in her membership in the Communist 
Party and it is a legal party, why doesn't she say she is a member of 
the Communist Party and stand on her rights to belong to it, and why 
do you need to be 'behind the scenes' if you believe that she is right?" 

He said to me, "Those things are very complicated and you have to 
go about them in the most suitable way," 

I said, "I would like to ask you another question. When you joined 
the State Department, didn't you take an oath of allegiance to the 
United States Government?" He said, "Yes, I did," I said, "Well, 
you yourself say to me you graduated from Harvard with honors 
and you told me that in the performance of your duties you wrote a 
report that any 14-year-old child could have written. How do you 
reconcile that with your sworn duties? 

He said to me, "Well, I believe that the end justifies the means." 

We got into a discussion of ends and means. 

Mr, Morris, Did he say what his end was ? 

Mrs, Widener, No, he did not; not specifically in that way, but I 
think it came out what at least I believed his end was eventually. I 
said to him that I believed the use of the wrong means can preclude 
a riglit end. He went into further discussion, saying that to achieve 
the objective you liave to use whatever tools were necessary to that 
objective. I said to him, "I think what you have just told me is the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 761 

most immoral story that I have ever heard, and I would like to ask 
you one more question: Do the means that you advocate to achieve 
an end include violence?" 

The Chairman. Include what? 

Mrs. WiDENER. "Include violence." 

He said, "Yes, if necessary." 

I stood up and I said : "Sir, it is my own belief that what you have 
just said to me is treason, and I cannot remain here." I said, "I want 
you to know that I don't consider myself bound by any confidence as 
to what 1 have listened to here and I want you to know that I am going 
to report you to the proper authorities." 

Senator Ferguson. Did you report him to anyone? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Eventually I did. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom? 

Mrs. WiDENER. To the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

But I would like your indulgence to continue, if I may. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not want to interrupt you, but I wanted to 
know what you did and whether you did report. 

Mrs. WiDENER. I did eventually as the result of more knowledge, 
I would say, of that particular subject. 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt you there. 

At this interview that took place, who was present in the course 
of this conversation ? The picture I have, it was your friend who had 
invited you there and Mr. Friedman and yourself; is that correct? 

Mrs. WiDENER. There was Mr. Andrews, Mr. Julian Friedman, and 
myself. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this to be a dinner party ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir. I was invited after dinner. 

Senator Ferguson. Just merely to come to the home? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it Mr. Andrews' home ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. It was the home of his fiancee. 

Senator Ferguson. Did she just retire to another room? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. She was not feeling well. 

Senator Ferguson. She retired to another room in her home? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Which left you and Andrews and Friedman 
together talking? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir, Mr. Andrews and myself. Then after Mr. 
Friedman's arrival, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Andrews and myself. 

Senator Ferguson. The invitation came from Andrews and not 
your friend? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Let's put it this way: Mr. Andrews telephoned 
me and I spoke to him on the telephone. 

Mr. Morris, Did you gather they were trying to get you to do 
something for them? Was that the purpose of this visit? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I didn't gather anything. I was simply — I went 
home alone. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. I am not accustomed 
to going home unaccompanied at that hour. I left. 

Senator Ferguson. What could you have done to help them in any 
manner ? I am not clear as to the reason they would invite you and 
carry on this conversation. I can see part of the conversation, that 
part about his being late and he gave you that, and that started this 



762 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

conversation; but he carried it on into China and how he got dis- 
charged and all. 

Mrs. WiDENER. I suppose, Senator — I don't like to suppose— — 
Senator Ferguson. 1 do not want you to suppose. I am trying to 
get a reason. 

Mrs. WiDENER. I have a certain record as a professional writer. As 
a person during the war I had a radio show called Women of the 
World. It won a citation of merit from the Eadio Institute of 
America for the promotion of international understanding in the 
women's field. I had a certain reputation. I think it was natural 
that anyone interested in politics might discuss them with me, espe- 
cially foreign politics. 

Senator Ferguson. Particularly anyone who was desirous of carry- 
ing out propaganda would have a source through you to get certain 
propaganda carried out ; is that correct ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. That would be a possible source. 
Senator Ferguson. If you took up their cause ? 
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they in any way ask you to take up this 
cause of communism? 
Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or the cause for this worker that had been 
discharged ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. No, sir. Most of the conversation that took place 
was between Mr. Friedman and me after Mr. Friedman's arrival. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you say your success with your radio show 
Women of tlie World marked you in circles familiar with that produc- 
tion as a liberal ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I think, Mr. Sourwine, perhaps the fairest way to 
answer is to say I think if anyone is in professional activity and field 
of public information they speak out in public. They say what they 
think out in public and the public, the press, and the critics judge 
them. 

I had had favorable press notices and favorable comment. I feel 
that I would have — in general, people like to discuss politics with 
you or any professional activity if you are in that field. I was in 
that field. 

The Chairman. The query naturally arises, as has been evinced by 
the questions of Senator Ferguson, and it is in my mind, as to why 
would one in Mr. Friedman's position open up the whole subject to 
you without first having known what your turn of mind was on that 
subject. In other words, he disclosed to you his communistic leanings 
and his communistic attitude, according to your statement, without 
having first determined, so far as we know now, what your turn of 
mind was. 

Mrs. WiDENER. I would like to say this: I think Mr, Andrews on 
several occasions had made very complimentary remarks about what- 
ever qualities I possessed. Mr. Friedman knew when I met him, or 
seemed to know, that I was a professional writer and commentator, a 
speaker. I don't think my work was of national importance or of such 
prominence that everybody would know about me. 

Mr. Morris. Clark Andrews met you on numerous occasions? 
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. He knew all about my activity. 
Mr. Morris. You had seen him on very many occasions? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 763 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You were introduced to Mr. Friedman by Mr. An- 
drews ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; I was. 

Mr. Morris. Everj^tliing he indicated was that he had discussed you 
prior to your meeting? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. Mr. Friedman, the first thing he did was 
apologize for his being late, apologize to me. 

Mr. Morris. He knew you were going to be present when he arrived? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I assume if he apologized to me for being late that 
he must have expected to meet me. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your profession discussed? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; oh yes; certainly, in the course of normal 
conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did this conversation take with Fried- 
man ? You say you left about 2 o'clock. 

Mrs. WiDENER. My best recollection is that Mr. Friedman arrived 
about 11 o'clock or shortly thereafter, 11 o'clock at night. And I 
know that I left close to 2 o'clock in the morning. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, in the course of the 1-hour conversation 
with Mr. Andrews and the 3-hour conversation with Mr. Friedman, 
did Mr. Andrews tell you that Friedman was a Communist? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Andrews said to me: "Confidentially, I want 
you to know that this man is one of the top brains in the Communist 
Party." 

Mr. Morris. Then subsequently did Mr. Friedman acknowledge he 
was a Communist? 

Mrs. WiDENER. When he said, "our party" and said the social worker 
or social-service worker was a Communist "in our party," and when 
he spoke of "our cause in China" and said "Naturally, I would not 
do anything to hurt our cause, the Chinese Communist cause," it was 
obvious. 

Mr. Morris. Did you report this conversation to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Mrs. Widener? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I did after making an inquiry. 

Mr. Morris. What inquiry did you make ? 

The Chairman. Just a moment before she answers. 

Some time back the witness asked to be permitted to continue and 
Senator Ferguson, Senator Eastland, and I think myself broke in on 
what you wanted to continue with. Do you have something that you 
want to bring out there ? There was an interruption. 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Excuse me. 

Mrs. WiDENER. Thank you. 

The following morning after that conversation I received a tele- 
phone call from Mr. Andrews who said that "Well, we certainly took 
you for a ride last night. You really fell for a practical joke." 

I said, "Maybe it was and maybe it wasn't, but I would like to tell you 
this : I am going to make every effort and do my level best to find out if 
it was or it wasn't." I did make that effort. 

I knew a presswoman in the United States Mission to the United 
Nation. Her name is Sarah Hodgekinson. 

The Chairman. How do you spell that? 

22848— 52— pt. 3 5 



764 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mrs. WiDENER. H-o-d-g — I am not sure whether there is an "e" — 
k-i-n-s-o-n. 

I telephoned Miss Hodgekinson and said that I would like to come 
and see her. I went down to the United States Mission to the U. N. and 
saw her. I said, "If I am not imposing on you, I would like to ask 
you if you can get some information for me. I would like to know if 
there was a Julian Friedman in the employ of the State Department 
in China." 

She said, "That is not hard to find out and I will be glad to do so." 
So she excused herself and came back and said, "Yes, there was." I 
said, "Well, then, may I ask you could you get me more information 
about Mr. Friedman ? And she said, "Well, I can try. What would 
you like to know ?" I said, "Can you find out for me if he is a graduate 
of Harvard University and if he graduated with honors." 

She said, "You know, we have a direct line to Washington here and 
I will go in and ask the Department if I can use it, and I will try to 
find out for you." So I waited for, I guess, 20 minutes or half an hour. 
She came back and said, "I have checked on it for you. Yes, Mr. Fried- 
man did graduate from Harvard and he graduated with high honors." 

Then I said "Could I ask you to find out one more thing for me if I 
am not intruding or embarrassing you in any way?" She said, "No; 
not at all. It is all a matter of record." I said, "Would you find out 
if Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice?" 

She again left the room and came back and said "Mr. Friedman was 
dismissed without prejudice." She said, "Why do you want to know 
all this?" I said, "Because I had a long conversation with Mr. Fried- 
man last night and it disturbed me very nuich." I said, "Do you know 
anything about an arbitration case taking place before James FlyT' 
She said, "No ; I don't know." I said, "Well, I would like to find out." 

I phoned a reporter that I knew and he was out. She said, "Why 
don't call — " I forget what name, the name of a reporter she knew. 
She said, "I will get him on the phone and find out." She did get her 
friend on the phone. He said, "Yes, there was a case before Mr. James 
Fly and it was being heard and it was a question of a dismissed 
worker." '' 

Then I told Miss Hodgekinson about the conversation I had with 
Mr. Friedman. In the meantime the newspaper reporter had said 
that the World-Telegram newspaper had been following this case 
very closely, the New York World-Telegram. Sarah Hodgekinson 
said to me, 'Well, if it has to do with a Communist problem, Mr. 
Frederick Woltman on the New York Telegram knows a great deal 
about the Communist activities, and why don't you call him?" I 
said that I had never met Mr. Woltman but I said I would. She 
said, "You can call him up and say I said to call him," which I did. 

I asked Mr. Woltman was there such as case as had been described 
to you and did he know if a Mr. Julian Friedman was appearing in 
the case. He said "Not on the record but off the record he is; not 
on the scene, off the scene." I felt that verified the information that 
had been given to me. I reported it to the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, is it your testimony that at the termina- 
tion of your session with Julian Friedman you told him you felt 
free to report the incident to the necessary authorities. 

Mrs. Widener. I did. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 765 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that the next day you corroborated 
certain parts of the story told to you by Mr. Friedman in order to de- 
termine whether or not he was telling you those things in jest? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In making those efforts to verify details of the story, 
did you find that in fact those things he told you the night before 
were indeed true? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I did. 

Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact report the incident to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Yes; I did. 

The Chairman. Do you remember how long after this incident 
you made the report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, approxi- 
mately ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. The morning I went down to the United States Mis- 
sion to the United Nations and saw Sarah 

The Chairman. That was the morning after? 

Mrs. WiDENER. That was the morning after. In the afternoon I 
spoke to Mr. Woltman. 

The Chairman. To whom? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Mr. Woltman on the New York World-Telegram. 
I believe it was that afternoon or the next morning I reported it to 
the authorities. 

The Chairman. You reported it where, to the Washington office of 
the FBI or to the FBI re])resentative in New York? 

Mrs. W^iDENER. To the New York office, 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I recommend that we request of 
the State Department the report by Julian Friedman referred to by 
Mrs. Widener in her testimony on the Communist Chinese labor 
movement ? 

The Chairman. Will you kindly write that out so that I can make 
the request ? 

Mr. Morris. I have it here. It is in regard to the Chinese Com- 
munist labor movement, and I will use the exact wording in the testi- 
mony by Friedman. 

Mrs. Widener has testified Friedman told her he wrote such a report 
and described the report. 

The Chairman. That request will be made at once. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that you re- 
quest also further information about his discharge, what they meant 
by without prejudice, the facts surrounding his dismissal. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris, Mrs. Widener, while you were working with the Voice 
of America did you encounter any publication of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Eelations in any way ? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe whatever you did encounter? 

Mrs. Widener. I think I must have a record of the date. I was 
given an assignment to write a script for the Voice of America cover- 
ing confidential material that was sent by our Embassy in Moscow bade* 
to the United States. The report was written by, if my memory serves, 
me correctly, Mr. John Stines. It covered conditions for women — I 
only wrote about the women's field, of course, for the Voice of Amer- 
ica — it covered conditions for women in central and southeast Asiatic 



766 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

parts of the Soviet Union. Mr. Stines' report covered in a very thor- 
ough way the deplorable or what he considered the deplorable condi- 
tions for women there, the fact they were being forced into heavy in- 
dustry, into labor in pig iron production and heavy production des- 
tined for, I suppose, such things as armaments and so on. 

The report was given to me to cover for a script for the Voice. I 
took it home. It was given to me to take home. When I studied it, I 
felt I needed a great deal of research material to write an effective 
script for it. So I went back to the Voice and I put in a request to the 
editor-in-chief if he could suggest good sources of research material. 
He said to me that the Foreign Affairs Publication section of the State 
Department had issued a very excellent bulletin on these deplorable 
conditions in the Asiatic regions of the Soviet Union and he would 
give that to me to study. No one at the Voice could find it. I waited 
a long time and though all other copies were in order in the files, this 
particular copy was missing. I waited quite a while, while they looked 
it up. Then the editor-in-chief said he would send me over to the 
research library of the Voice of America, which is about a block and 
a half away from the building in which I work. I did go over there. 
I was given a book issued under the sponsorship of the Institute of 
Pacific Affairs as research material for this script. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. You mean the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. I am sorry. Institute of Pacific Relations. 
When I took the book home and I started to try to do my research, 
really, I am sorry, I just burst out laughing, because it was diametri- 
cally opposite Mr. Stines' report. The research in this book was 
diametrically opposed to everything in Mr. Stines' report. 
Senator Ferguson. What was the name of it ? 
Mrs. WiDENER. Let me see. Either the Central Southeastern Soviet 
Russia — let me think — or Middle Eastern. I just can't quote the title 
to you. I Iniow the author. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was it? 

Mrs. WiDENER. William Mandel. When I opened the book I was 
very much interested to see the Office of War Information was in it. 
Wlien I noticed that I thought I would get some really good material 
for my script. But I couldn't use it. It was my belief and feeling 
that the book was largely Communist propaganda. At least if Mr. 
Stines' report and other material thart I had studied on the subject 
consistently is accurate, then this book is inaccurate. It paints con- 
ditions there in those regions of the Soviet Union as a kind of paradise. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we 
have introduced into the record evidence that Mr. William Mandel 
is a member of the Communist Party, in addition to the fact that we 
did show some connection of his with the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions. I mention that to show the fact this is germane testimony. 
Was that the end of that episode, Mrs. Widener? 
Mrs. WiDENER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have taken, in executive session, 
testimony by an adviser of the Free China Labor League who spent 
•Some time on Formosa and in Shanghai. This gentleman is now cur- 
rently in Europe. We have the choice today of either taking his 
executive session testimony and introducing it into the public record, 
or we can wait until he returns from Europe and he will give the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 767 

testimony in person. I think it is a decision that should be made by 
the chairman and the committee, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. He was sworn. The testimony was taken in 
regular executive session? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

The Chairman. Who was present? What Senators were present 
and where was it taken ? 

Mr. Morris. It was taken in executive session here in Washington. 
I know Senator Ferguson was present because it took place in the 
Senator's room. I think Senator Eastland was also present, but the 
transcript will show it. 

The Chairman. The witness is now in Europe ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. We summoned him to be here today. His wife 
notified us last week he could not be present for he is in Europe for 
a period of about 2 months. We have the decision of deciding whether 
or not we should use his executive session testimony and make it 
public, or wait until he returns from Europe. 

The Chairman. It would be the view of the Chair that we would 
defer until we can have the witness present, but that view of the 
Chair will be governed by the will of the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. I would say normally that should be the pro- 
gram. I do not think we should delay the hearings because of the 
present condition when this could be made public. 

The Chairman. I think I will take that up in committee in execu- 
tive session at a later date as to what the 'decision will be. If it is 
necessary, we can use the executive testimony. I would prefer to 
have the witness appear and testify in open session. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, for security purposes I feel we should 
not give his name, but this is the executive session taken Friday, 
July 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding. 

The Chairman. Very well. That will be taken up by the com- 
mittee in executive session and we will come to a conclusion on it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have here some evidence by Mr. 
Mandel which would corroborate the episode related by Mrs. Widener 
in connection with Mr. William Mandel's book. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a little pamphlet entitled "IPR books, 
1950-51, Institute of Pacific Relations." It lists new and forthcom- 
ing publications on the Far East and the Pacific area. On page 24 
of this list we find The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, by Wil- 
liam Mandel, inquiry series. This is the book we have. 

The Chairman. Does that title "The Soviet Far East" refresh your 
memory any? 

Mrs. Widener. Yes, it does. Could I see the book? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. Please see whether you can identify that as 
the book. 

Mrs. Widener. Yes; this is the book that was given to me. 

I would, if I may, like to call attention to something that struck 
me when I looked at the book. It has a foreword. I read the fore- 
word. It was the first thing I read. Before I had read any of the 
book, it struck me that the foreword is, well, it is double talk. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it? 



768 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sour WINE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I think the entire fore- 
word should be made a part of the record and then the witness can 
comment on it if she likes. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(The matter referred to is as follows :) 

The Soviet Pak East 
(By William Mandel) 

FOREWORD 

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the 
Far East. 

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American 
Russian Institute. 

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of 
whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process 
of revision. 

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final 
text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. 
The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the 
view of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any 
of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility 
of the author. 

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. I. 
W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors. 
Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international 
secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection 
with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss 
Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of 
this responsibility. 

In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the con- 
flict in the Far East the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following 
advisers : Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia ; Dr. J. B. 
Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole 
des Sciences Politiques. 

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general 
in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry 
conform to a proper standard of sound anji impartial scholarship. Each manu- 
script has been submitted to at least two of the advisers and although they do 
not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, 
they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry. 

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems 
arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide 
members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences 
with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East 
with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any 
future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the 
analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which 
produced the situation existing in .July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan, 
and to the other foreign powers concerned ; an evaluation of developments dur- 
ing the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies 
and programs of all the powers in relation to the far eastern situation ; and 
finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic, and social conditions 
which may be expected in a postwar period, the possible forms of adjustment 
which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjust- 
ments upon the countries concerned. 

The Inquiry does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the 
far eastern situation. Its aim Is to focus available information on the present 
crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the 
expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already 
published in a number of languages. 

The present study, "The Soviet Far East," falls within the framework of the 
first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows : 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 769 

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the 
present course of the policies of western powers in the Far East; their territorial 
and economic interests; the effects on their far-eastern policies of internal 
economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign poli- 
cies vis-a-vis other parts of the world ; the probable effects of the present conflict 
on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with 
respect to their future relations in that area. 

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present 
course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; 
the extent to which Japan's policy toward China lias been influenced by Japan's 
geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political 
and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formu- 
lation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in 
China, by the external policies of other powers affecting Japan; the principal 
political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar 
Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which 
could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems. 

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the 
present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future develop- 
ments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward 
the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political 
cohesion'and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments 
on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with 
foreign powers ; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may 
be expected in a postwar China ; possible and probable adjustments on the part 
of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems. 

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of 
information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; 
analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political 
and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure ; types 
of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative 
effectiveness ; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a 
postwar period and the most helpful methods which might be devised to meet 
them ; necessary adjustments by the powers concerned ; the basic requirements 
of a practical system of interaational organization which could promote the 
security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area. 

Edwakd C. Cakter, Secretary General. 

Mrs. WiDENER (reading) : 

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the 
Far East, 

I took tliat to mean that the Institute of Pacific Eolations sponsors 
this book. I think anybody would. [Continues reading:] 

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American 
Russian Institute. 

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of 
whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process 
of revision. 

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final 
text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. 
The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the 
national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the 
author. 

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the genei'al direction of Dr. 
J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his suc- 
cessors. Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Evei-y member of the 
international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in 
connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. 
Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Plilda Austern, who have carried the 
major share of this responsibility. 

In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems ai'ising from the con- 
flict in the Far East, the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following 
advisers — 



770 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

May I say that I take the word "institute" here to mean the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations, and it seems to me that this foreword — "so 
far as we are publishing it, but we are not responsible for it" — is 
double talk. I mean, to a professional writer it is. It seems to me 
that way, anyway. [Continues reading :] 

Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia ; Dr. J. B. Condliffe, 
of the University of California ; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole des Sciences 
Politiques. 

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general — 

I take that to be the chairman and the secretary-general of the 
institute. 

The Chairman. What else would you take it? 
Mrs. WiDENER (continues reading) : 

in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry 
conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. 

Now, it seems to me before they said they were not responsible for 
the opinions expressed in this book. Here they are guaranteeing its 
impartiality. 

Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers ; and, 
although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or 
any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the 
subject of the inquiry. 

The inquiry is being conducted, I understand, by the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. The more I read this foreword, frankly — I did feel 
like Alice in Wonderland. 

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony that that book was given to you 
as a guide in your writing ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. Oh, yes, sir. This was given to me as research mate- 
rial. It was the only material given to me. 

The Chairman. ]3y whom was it given to you ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. By the research library of the Voice of America. 

Mr. Morris. Can you think of an individual in there ? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I don't know the name of the librarian who gave it 
to me, but I do know it was given to me. [Continues reading :] 

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the 
members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the 
situation in the Far East. 

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries 
and the members of the IPR conferences, and then it goes on. Then 
it says it does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with 
the Far East situation. Then it goes on to guarantee that these are the 
contingencies. Anybody can read it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out again we have 
had testimony before this committee that Mr. William Mandel, the 
author of that volume, was a member of the Communist Party. This 
episode is brought forth at this time, Mr. Chairman, simply as one 
episode that this particular witness is able to testify to and is offered 
for that purpose. 

Mrs. WiDENER. May I say something? 

Mr. Morris. If it is pertinent ; yes. 

Mrs. WiDENER. If you will permit me, I would like to make a sug- 
gestion here. I think this kind of thing is typical of the plight of the 
serious researcher and student and would-be accurate writer and re- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 771 

porter. I feel that if a book such as this exists in a Government 
library, for research purposes, a book which is I do not believe im- 
partial, that somehow or other that book should be labeled so that the 
researcher who is writing for the Voice of America, or any other 
agency of the United States Government, knows when they are pick- 
ing a book up such as this that this is in truth not an impartial fac- 
tual document, or at least it is not when compared with the Govern- 
ment's own information. 

I have no way of judging any of this information, except by what 
was given to me, but I do know what was given to me by the State 
Department on this subject whicli was in direct refutation of what 
is in this book. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then you feel, when the Gov- 
ernment has in its library of research for the Voice of America a book 
and they present that book to a person to get out a script for the 
Voice, they in a way sponsor the accuracy of the information in the 
research book? 

Mrs. WiDENER. I should think that the book in the research library 
would be classified as Communist propaganda or else Marxian-So- 
cialist views, or Lenin-Stalin views. So, when you pick it up and 
read it, yovi know what you have. These are very complex, difficult 
matters covered in this book. If I had not been given special informa- 
tion by an expert, written by an expert in our own Embassy, how 
could I have any knowledge of the existing conditions in the central 
Asiatic part of the Soviet Union ? 

Senator Ferguson. You could have accepted it as being the truth 
and the facts and given it on the air in your script. 

Mrs. Widener. I could have accepted this book if I had not had any 
other information. If I had received an assignment and was given 
by my own Government this book to write about, which I was, it 
seems to me I would have accepted this as material suitable. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, at the Friday session we introduced 
documents showing Mr. Julian Friedman was connected with the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. I think Mr. Mandel has one more con- 
tribution to make to that list. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here an issue of the Spotlight on the Far East, 
published monthly by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern 
Policy, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General. 
This is the issue of April 1947. On page 5 we find an article under 
the heading "Guest Column," by Julian Friedman, entitled "China's 
Unions Refuse to be Puppets." Under his name it says [reading] : 

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attache in China. He 
became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with 
authority on the Chinese labor movement. 

I would like to put the article, which is brief, into the record and 

just quote a portion of it by way of example. 

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism 
because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade- 
unionists are certainly opposed to the present antilabor National Government — 

and so on in the same strain. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this whole column 
introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 



772 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This is a column tliat Julian Friedman wrote for the Committee for a 
Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been termed "a subversive 
organization" by the Attorney General. 

Mr. Sour WINE. It is at least a column which appeared in that pub- 
lication under his name. 

Mr. Morris. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. I see there is a photograph. Is that fi photo- 
graph of Friedman ? Maybe the witness can identify it as being the 
person she spoke to on the night she has been talking about. 

Mrs. WiDENER. It resembles ; I wouldn't say positively. 

Mr. Morris. Let the record show it is a very small photograph, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The photograph shows head and shoulders and the 
entire photograph is less than an inch square, and it is square. 

Mrs. WiDENER. It resembles the person, but I wouldn't say posi- 
tively it was the person. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. I would like that exhibit made part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 246" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 246 

[From, the Spotlight on the Far East, vol. II, No. 4, piihlished monthly by the Committee 
for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, N. Y., April 1947] 

GUEST COLUMN 

China's Unions Refuse To Be Puppets 

(By Julian Friedman) 
[Photograph] 

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attach^ iu China. 
He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks 
with authority on the Chinese labor movement. 

Genuine trade-unionists are not easy to find in Kuomintang China. To 
reach them, you have to visit obscure, innocent-looking alleys or out-of-the-way 
fields in the suburbs of the cities. 

But it is most dangerous for them to be known as trade-unionists or to work 
openly for real trade-unionism. 

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutel.v- opposed to trade-unionism 
because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade- 
unionists ai-e certainly opposed to the present anti-labor National Government. 

Many were originally either company-union or Kuomintang headquarters 
appointees. There were also secret-society agents and gangsters in labor roles. 
The latter are quickly exposed today by the workers themselves. 

As for the company-union and bureaucratic-union officials, the workers have 
given them every opportunity to work for the real trade-union movement. So, 
they now face this dilemma : serve as Kuomintang stooges and 'finks' and lose 
support among the workers or fight with the workers and be attacked by the 
Fascists. 

That several have chosen the latter course has enraged the National Govern- 
ment and Kuomintang, which has retaliated with arrest, threats of violence, 
expulsion from official labor circles, purging of official unions, and reorganizing 
them. 

Nothing illustrates the change in labor so aptly as the Shanghai anti-civil-war 
demonstration of June 23, 194G. On the day before, the Government had called 
official trade-union representatives to a meeting and dictated resolusions which 
said that no workers or unions would participate in tlie demonstration, and that 
any persons in the demonstration could not be considered workers. The resolu- 
tions were "unanimously adopted" because the Government chairman said so, 
with no one else given a chance to speak. But more than 100,000 workers 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 772 

turned out the next day. And the representatives who had "passed" the resolu- 
tions the previous day marched at their head. 

The Chairman. Is there anything else? 

Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. When did you wish the committee to meet again? 

Mr. Morris. Tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, Mr. Chairman. We 
will have General Wedemeyer as a witness. 

The Chairman. Are there any questions, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. IS^o. 

The Chairman. The committee stands in recess until tommorrow 
morning at 10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 11. 15 a. m. Tuesday, September 18, 1951, the hear- 
ing was recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, September 19, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



wednesday, september 19, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Cominiittee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran ( chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Mor- 
ris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. The subcommittee will come to order. 

General Wedemeyer, will you stand and be sworn, please? 

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 
before tiie subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the 
truth, the whole trutli, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

General Wedemeyer. I do. 

TESTIMOITY OF LT. GEN. ALBEKT C. WEDEMEYER, (RETIRED), 

AVCO, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. General, will you give your name and address to the 
reporter, please? 

General Wedemeyer. A. C. Wedemeyer, AVCO, 420 Lexington 
Avenue, New York City. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation? 

General Wedejieyer. I am vice president and a member of the board 
of directors of AVCO. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell the committee what service commands 
you have held in the American Army with respect to the China 
theater. 

General Wedemeyer. I was designated theater commander and 
chief of staff to the Generalissimo in the fall of 1944 when General 
Stilwell was relieved from those two posts. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you hold that position? 

General Wedemeyer. Approximately 2 years. 

Mr. Morris. That would be, then, until the fall of 1946? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What was your next command then. General? 

General Wedemeyer. I commanded the Second Army with head- 
quarters in Baltimore. 

Mr. Morris. That was the end of your China command ? 

775 



776 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Wedemetee. That is correct. I went out to Qiina again in 
1947 for 2 months. 

Mr. Morris. What was the purpose of that trip, General ? 

General Wedemetee. I was sent out there as an envoy of the Pres- 
ident to make a survey of conditions in China and Korea. 

Mr. Morris. Did you write a report as a result of that survey ? 

General Wedemeyer. I did. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the report which is now referred to as the 
Wedemeyer report on China? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, when you assumed command of 
the China theater what civilian members were there on duty at that 
time? This is now in the fall of 1944. 

General Wedemeyer. What civilian members were on duty on my 
staff?' 

Mr. Morris. On your staff. 

Genera] Wedemeyer. I had four political advisers who had been 
serving is that capacity on General Stilwell's staff. They included 
Mr. Jack Service, Mr. John Davies, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr. 
John Emmerson. 

Mr. Morris. How long did they remain as political advisers to your 
command after your arrival? 

General Wedemeyer. Only a few months. 

Mr. Morris. General, during that period of time were you able to 
form an opinion of the various political reports that they submitted 
at that time? 

General Wedemeyer. My analysis of the reports submitted by those 
gentlemen could not properly be called an intelligent or thorough- 
going analysis, and this is the reason : In my judgment, if I had it to 
do over again, I would have more carefully analyzed those reports, 
but at that time, that is, at the time I assumed command of the theater, 
the Japanese were pushing us around and it looked for a ^yhile as if I 
were going to have difficulty remaining there and to retain China in 
the war. I had two areas of strategic importance— Kunming and 
Chungking. Kunming was the terminal of my principal base of sup- 
ply. All of my supplies, as you gentlemen know, came over the 
"hump" by air. We were cut off from the outside world except by air, 
so if I lost that, China might be put out of the war. 

The other area of importance was the seat of the wartime govern- 
ment in Chungking. If I lost that, psychologically and militarily 
China again might be out. So I was hard put to it to retain my situa- 
tion there, to stabilize the military situation, with the result that I 
neglected the political, diplomatic, or psychological factors which I 
properly should have taken heed of and taken appropriate steps. 

These four men who were political advisers, two or three of them I 
had known previously. I had met them socially over in India when 
I was serving there with Lord Louis Mountbatten. 

Mr. Morris. Who were they ? 

General Wedeinieyer. I met John Davies, John Emmerson, and Jack 
Service. I had not met, prior to my assuming command in China, 
Raymond Ludden. 

Mr. Morris. General, did the recommendations of these four po- 
litical officers coincide with American policy at that time? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 777 

General Wedemeyer. At that time the American policy, as I inter- 
preted it, was to keep China in the war and to support the Chinese 
Nationalist Government. There were no clear-cut American policies 
enunciated, insofar as I can recall, pertaining to China or any other 
area of the world. Theater commanders in remote areas had often- 
times to interpret or try to conjecture what was desired in a broad 
sense, what was desired to accomplish what the Government wanted. 
However, I felt that my job in China was to continue China in the 
war, to contain as many Japanese in that area fighting so that they 
could not be removed from the area and sent over to oppose General 
Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific. As I stated, also to 
support the Chinese Nationalist Government which our own Govern- 
ment recognized as the sovereign government in that area. 

So everything that I did militarily or otherwise was in consonance 
with that interpretation of American policy in China. If I had fol- 
lowed the advice of these four advisers, some of the advice that they 
embodied in these reports, in my judgment I would not have been 
carrying out my directive, nor would I have been following the policy • 
of my country in that particular area. 

Senator Ferguson. When you say "the policy," are you speaking 
about the policy as laid down by the military or by the State Depart- 
ment, or was there a difference? 

Gejieral Wedemeyek. Senator Ferguson, I made a real effort back 
in 1040, 1941, 1942, and 1943 to determine American policy or policies 
insofar as our own country was concerned which were not clearly 
enunciated. Most of them were found in the Constitution, tlie bill of 
rights, and so forth, but our policies pertaining to other areas of the 
world were never, in my judgment, clearly enunciated. That goes 
right up to today. I don't think many people in our country know 
what we are striving to do in the Far East, in the Middle East, or in 
Western Europe today. The objectives established are too nebulous 
and, in my judgment, until we do have clearly enunciated policies by 
the appropriate authorities, not by the military but by civilian authori- 
ties, as is contemplated in our Constitution, we are going to have a 
difficult time in accomplishing what I think the American people be- 
lieve to be our national objectives. 

I said all of that because oftentimes as a theater commander I 
had to take action in the absence of clearly enunciated policy. I had 
to take action that inevitably created policy. Then if that action 
that I took had been wrong or had been subject to criticism on the 
part of our people, I would have been to blame. The military is as- 
suming responsibility that they should not. But if the policy hap- 
pened to be in consonance with the views of the American people, 
then the military would not be criticized. I just mention that because 
I think it is a vacuum that must be filled. 

Senator Eastland. What was the policy that your political ad- 
visers put forth ? What was their advice to you ? 

General Wedemeyer. Sometimes it is quite implicit. Senator. Other 
times it is veiled, but the idea was to give more support to the Com- 
munist forces in lieu of the Nationalist forces. These reports would 
play up the shortcomings, the maladministration and the unscrupu- 
lousness of Nationalist leaders, play up the orderliness or the poten- 
tialities of the Communist forces in Yunan. 



778 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I could not support the Communists' political party and still carry 
out what I believed to be the American policy in the area. 

Senator Eastland. Those policies were pro-Communist, were they 
not? 

General Wedemeyer. I would not state that categorically, sir. I 
remember a newspaperman out there whom I thought was an out-and- 
out Communist. The reason I thought so, after considering it more 
carefully, I was sure that he was so critical of the Nationalists. There 
was much to be criticized in the Nationalist set-up. There was mal- 
administration and there were dishonesties. 

Senator Eastland. That was true with regard to the Communists, 
too, was it not ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. It was a smaller set-up. The op- 
portunities w^ere not quite tliere. 

Senator Ferguson. The Communists were not in power and did not 
have the opportunity ? 

General Wedmeyer. That is right, sir. 

Senator Eastland. If the Communists had the opportunity 

General Wedemeyer. They w^ould act just the same way; yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Knowing that these advisers favored the Com- 
munists over the Nationalists? 

General Wedemeyer. That is implicit in these reports, if you will 
read them over. 

Mr. Morris. Were these reports critical of the Nationalist Govern- 
ment that you were there to clef end and uphold ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that ? 

The Chairman. I would like, if it is possible, for the general to 
designate which, if any, of the four people he has named rendered the 
reports that he makes mention of, the four advisers who were on his 
staff. 

General Wedemeyer. Actually, Senator, I do not recall ever receiv- 
ing a written report from Mr. John Emmerson. The other three did 
submit written and oi^al reports to me. I stated clearly, sir, that I did 
not give them the attention that I properly should have, but I was 
involved in a military situation. 

Mr. Morris. General, to whom were these reports made? I mean 
these reports that we are discussing. 

General Wedemeyer. They were submitted to me as theater com- 
mander. 

Mr. Morris. Were they submitted through the State Department 
representative in China? They were State Department employees, 
were they not ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. They were all Foreign Service offi- 
cers, professionals. 

Mr. Morris. Do they report to you through the ranking State De- 
pai'tment representative in China ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. When I assumed command of the thea- 
ter, Mr. John Davies — I believe he was the senior one of the group — 
reported to me, indicated what they had been doing for General Stil- 
well, and expressed the desire to cooperate and to assist me in every 
way possible. All of them spoke Chinese. They were all Chinese 
language students. I think two of them were born out there, the sons 
of missionaries. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 779 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, may I refer you to the first report 
that is on that list of papers there in front of you on the table and 
that you will see is a report made by John S. Service. It is one of the 
reports that we are discussing. 

Mr. Chairman, I am now referring to Report No. 40 from the United 
States Army Observer Section, APO 879. This is a report from 
John S. Service to General Stihvell, conmianding general, USAF- 
CBI. It is dated October 10, 19M. 

Are you acquainted with that memorandum. General ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. It was not submitted to me, of 
course, but when I assumed the command of the theater in order to get 
background for my duties, I read every document I could possibly get 
hold of in my headquarters. This document I definitely read at that 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything outstanding in that memorandum 
that made an impression on you in the past ? 

General Wedemeyer. A¥hen I read it over I just recalled being 
impressed with the writer's criticism of the Chinese Nationalist Gov- 
ernment. There were criticisms emphasized throughout the paper. 
When I took command of the theater, I found the American military 
were criticizing the Chinese military and the relations were not good. 
It was not a happy situation. I recall vividly visiting the Chinese 
headquarters to obtain from the Chinese generals a resume of the 
situation as it existed at that time. I went over there with my chief 
of staff, a general named Hern. I was astounded at the attitude of 
the Chinese. They were correctly polite, but I did not get any infor- 
mation from them. I decided either they did not have any informa- 
tion or there was an intolerable situation that just couldn't continue. 

So I suggested to the generalissimo that we set up a combined staff. 
I would sit at the head of this table and next to me would be the head 
of the Chinese Army. On my right would be one of my staff officers, 
say my Intelligence officer; and sitting next to him would be the 
Chinese Intelligence officer. That worked beautifully. At first the 
Chinese were not very cooperative. They were very quiet. When 
the war was over they gave a party for my staff officers, indicating 
that marvelous relationship had developed. That just was a thing 
because it permeated the field where we got better cooperation between 
the military Chinese and American. * 

I mention that because when I got over there there was no coopera- 
tion and there was mistrust and suspicion prevailing in the theater. 
These reports on the civilian side just played up that same philosophy 
that pervaded in the theater. 

Mr. Morris. General, may we get back to this report? Is there 
anything outstanding in that particular report that you would care to 
comment on at this time ? 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment the military capabilities of 
the Communist forces in Yunan were not great, were invariably over- 
emphasized in this and other reports submitted to me by these political 
advisers. 

I think I am qualified to speak knowingly on that subject, because 
I am a trained military man and those men were not. On the political, 
economic, and diplomatic side I would feel inclined to yield to their 
views and opinions. 

22848— 52— i>t. 3 6 



780 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, in this particular report there is cer- 
tain underscoring. I think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel 
were to read the underscored portions of this report and we can have 
particuhir questions addressed to General Wedemeyer concerning the 
views expressed therein. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

With tlie glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within 
China is growing raiDidly. The prestige of the party was never 'lower, and 
Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader. 

The Chairman. I think before that question is discussed by the 
general you had better lay a foundation. Whose report is this? 
From where does it emanate? 

Mr. Morris. This is a report of John S. Service dated October 10, 
1944, and it is submitted to General Stilwell, commanding general, 
USAF-CBI, on that date. 

As testimony has brought foi'th, General Stilwell was the predeces- 
sor of General Wedemeyer. This letter came to the attention of Gen- 
eral Wedemeyer when he assumed command in China. 

The Chairman. Now, General, the underscored matter is drawn to 
your attention. Do you wish to discuss it? 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment on that particular aspect of 
the Service report ? 

General Wedemeyer. From the American viewpoint as expressed to 
me by practically everyone with whom I came in contact, that state- 
ment might be said to epitomize the entire American viewpoint toward 
Chiang Kai-shek and his government when I arrived in the theater in 
October 1944. 

The Chairman. "\Ylien you say "the entire American viewpoint," 
just what do you encompass by that expression ? 

General Wedemeyer. Mr. Chairman, practically everyone with 
whom I spoke felt that there was nothing that could be done construc- 
tively to keep China fighting in the war. 

The Cpiairman. That is those with whom you spoke in that theater? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. And Mr. Wallace was out there, the 
then Vice President. He stated that nothing but a miracle could keep 
China fighting in the war. He was quoted in the papers saying that. 

That was the pessimistic view uniformly expressed to me when I 
went over there to assume command by military and by civilians with 
whom I came in contact. 

Senator Ferguson. General Wedemeyer, I wonder whether this was 
in line with what you thought to be the policy [reading] : 

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-sheli; apparently continiie on the basis of the un- 
realistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is 
time, for the salje of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we 
take a more realistic line. 

He was the head, was he not, at that time of the Nationalist Govern- 
ment ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, he was. 

Senator Ferguson. How could that be in line with your idea of the 
policy of the United States in China, that sentence? 

General Wedemeyer. It was not, Senator. I state categorically these 
reports were not in consonance with my interpretation of my directive 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 781 

or of American policy. That contravenes American policy as I under- 
stand it, sir. 

Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Mandel, will you read the second underscored pas- 
sage? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

In the present circumstances, the Knoinintang is dependent on American 
support for survivaL But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang. 

Then, skipping down — 

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang 
■will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued 
power. 

General Wedemeyer. My comment on that is this : The Communist 
Party in the U. S. S. R. was dependent upon America for support 
during the war. We gave plenty of it to the U. S. S. R., much more 
than we ever gave to China. A statement like that is just inane, in 
my judgment. 

JNIr. Morris. Did we need the Chinese Government in the war, 
General Wedemeyer? 

General Wedemeyer. We needed it just as much as we needed the 
U. S. S. R. Any diversion of the Japanese effort that could be ac- 
complished, it was sound to do so. The Chinese were containing in 
their fighting with the Japanese a million and a half Japanese that 
might have been deployed against our boys coming up through the 
Philippine Archipelago and through the Ryukyus. 

So the fact that the Chinese fighting, not as well as we would like 
them to have fought, but doing increasingly better as the war went 
on, they contained one million and a half Japanese which I think was 
creditable and under the circumstances, a very great contribution. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony we did need the Chinese Gov- 
ernment at that time to that extent ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; just as today we need Franco, any- 
one that will help us in this struggle against communism. We may 
not approve of everything they do. We may not go along with their 
governmental structure, but if they can help us in our struggle, I 
say use them. We needed them then. 

Mr. Morris. On the basis of your entire experience in China would 
you say that the situation as described to you by the political officers 
was erroneous in this respect ? 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment they were erroneous. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you were able to make use of the 
Chinese Nationalist forces? 

General Wedemeyer. If I had followed the advice I would not 
have been carrying out my orders. 

Senator Ferguson. General Wedemeyer, isn't the w\^y this would 
read and what you have said make it apparent that if you had followed 
the political advice you would have tried to take the Communist Gov- 
ernment in China as lining up with the United States and have noth- 
ing to do with the Nationalists ? 

General AVedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I think that is a fair statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Their advice was to recognize in effect the Com- 
munist Government in China ; whereas, you felt as we were then recog- 
nizing the Nationalists that that. was the Government that you were to 



782 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

support and to get the Nationalists' aid in your efforts in China ; is 
that correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. I think that is a fair statement. The Chi- 
nese Communists offered me command of their army and I notified 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in America. I, through the Ambassa- 
dor, also notified the President that I did not want command of the 
army. At that time I recognized the implications of communism 
in the Far East as I did in Europe. I did not want to support people 
whom I knew were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin. 

Senator Ferguson. You felt that the best interests of America 
would be served if the Nationalists were recognized? 

General Wedemeyer. Not only for America but for the world, for 
the Far East. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read further? 

Mr. Mandel (continues reading) : 

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other 
groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new govern- 
ment under any other than the present reactionary control will be more coopera- 
tive and better able to mobilize the country. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that paragr.aph, please, General 
Wedemeyer ? 

General Wedemeyer. Here I am commenting on China in regard 
to experts' political views. It makes me rather vulnerable. But in 
my experience, which is only 5 years in China, or over 4 years, I 
found that most of the Chinese cannot read or write. They do not 
understand a thing about political philosophies, political structures, 
and economic structures. They mean nothing to them. They want 
shelter, food, and peace. 

When he talks, when this man writes about other parties, there are 
not other parties over there worthy of the name. Tliere was no other 
leadership through which I could work, except Chiang Kai-shek on 
the one hand, and on the other Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist 
leader. They were quite well organized, these Communists, and very 
articulate, much more so than Chiang Kai-shek, and very intolerant 
of criticism which Chiang was not. He did permit people to criticize 
him. 

Mr. Morris. Did the Chinese Communists help j^ou in your confining 
the Japanese on the mainland ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. I did make the effort to coordinate 
our military operations over there. They were operating in sporadic 
efforts to the north of wartime capital up in the Yunan area and 
Shansi Province. They never launched a concerted attack in coordi- 
nation with those attacks that I was putting on down below. 

Now I should say in fairness to those people when my fliers would 
be shot down behind the Japanese lines, frequently the Chinese Com- 
munists would facilitate the return of those fliers. I don't want to 
overemphasize that point because I don't want it to be given dispro- 
portionate emphasis. But that is true. At times they did do that. 

But their military operations did not make the contribution so often 
one reads in the press or hears about on the radio. The military opera- 
tions of the Chinese Communists, at least while I was in command of 
the theater, were not significant. 

Mr. Morris. You say that on the basis of fact you were the theater 
commander ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 783 

General Wedemeter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. General, I call particularly your attention to the next 
sentence in the paragraph that Mr. Mandel has just read : 

Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will 
be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country. 

Would you comment on that ? 

General Wedemeyer. As I stated, there were only two broad polit- 
ical parties, one the Communists and one the Kuomintang. The splin- 
ter parties were absolutely impotent. There were not enough people 
involved. If we threw over the Kuomintang, it meant we were going 
to assume support and cooperate with the Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Would that then have been true, namely, that under any 
other than the present reactionary control, to use Mr. Service's words, 
the Communists would have been more cooperative ? 

General Wedemeyer. The Communists, in my judgment — and I 
have tried to be objective, I have tried to find good in Marxist 
theories — the Communists will cooperate when the advantage accrues 
to them. At no time will a Communist cooperate otherwise. That 
was applicable then and it is applicable now. We are naive if we 
think otherwise. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue reading, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel (continues reading) : 

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or 
democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance 
in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the 
country, now and after the war. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer ? 

General Wedemeyer. Again I do not know what other groups he is 
talking about. You had the professors 

Mr. Morris. Certainly the Communists were one of those groups. 

General Wedemeyer. They were the major group. There were 
only two major groups there. There were splinter parties made up of 
a few of the intelligentsia and they were not significant. _ They had no 
power. They were not articulate, so I think you can disregard them. 

Mr. Morris. As a matter of fact, General, the Chinese Communists 
have not proved to be friendly to the United States and they have not 
looked to us for the salvation of their country then or after the war ; 
is that correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. The Chinese Communists have no 
friendly attitude toward anyone, in my judgment, except the Kremlin. 
They certainly have no friendly attitudes or friendly intentions to- 
ward countries that they call capitalistic nations. Their objective is 
to destroy caj^italism. Their avowed intention is to destroy capital- 
ism, expressed to me personally. 

Mr. Morris. General, their performances, particularly during the 
past year, would seem to be a complete refutation of that statement, 
would they not, sir? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel (continues reading) : 

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and 
more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist 
forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied 
areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek 



784 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's govern- 
ment in London, ignoring Tito. 

Mr. Morris. Would you comment on that, General? 

General Wedemeyer. I think events that have transpired since we 
supported Tito have proved us wrong. I think the real patriot over 
in Yugoslavia, Mikhailovitch, we let down. Personally I think we 
should have supported him. The same would be true in China. With 
all his faults, and he does have faults, I think Chiang Kai-shek was 
the proper leader to support at the time we did. I do not know of an- 
other leader today whom we might support and obtain best results in 
China from other than Chiang Kai-shek. To me today he epitomizes 
leadership there. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more there, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel (continues reading) : 

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot 
hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we 
cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without 
consideration of the opposition forces — Communist, provincial, and liberal. 

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is 
an old trick of Chiang's. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General ? 

General Wedemeyer. It sounds exactly like somebody was writing 
about the attitude of Stalin when we were worried. Stalin was 
pressurizing the Allies in World War II to establish a second front. 
It was always the implicit threat there "If you don't establish a 
second front, we will make a separate peace with Germany." 

I think the same philosophy behind the situation in Russia applied 
out in China, and this chap points out we should not support Chiang 
Kai-shek because he is a reactionary. So was Stalin, the worst kind, 
yet we supported him. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel (continues reading) : 

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit 
to the Communist capital at Yenan would have signticance that no Chinese 
would miss — least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even 
if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be 
more than a mere demonstration ; we must, for instance, plan an eventual use of 
the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomiiitang terms. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that. General Wedemeyer? 

General Wedemeyer. I think that would be just like foreign repre- 
sentatives coming over here and visiting Bob Taft and ignoring 
President Truman, The only difference is Senator Bob Taft would 
not have an armed force to support his political Republican Party. 

The Chairman. You do not think that would disturb Mr. Truman, 
do you ? 

General Wedemeyer. I did not mean to imply any disparagement 
of any name I mention. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this document pre- 
paratory to its being put in the record ? 

Mr. Mandel. This document, listed as No. 40, was taken from the 
transcript of the proceedings of the Loyalty Security Board meeting 
in the case of John S. Service as a reprinting of a State Department 
employee loyalty investigation. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, as such may that be introduced in the 
record and marked with the next consecutive exhibit number ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 785 

The Chairman. It is to be understood and the record will show 
that this is the exhibit from which Mr. Mandel has been reading that 
the excerpts were commented on b}^ the witness; it that correct? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 247" and is 

as follows:) 

ExHiniT No. 247 

United States Army Observer Section, 

APO 879, October 10, 19U. 
Report No. 40 
Secret 

Subject: The need for greater realism in our relations with Cliiang Kai-shek. 
To :' General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI. 

1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to 
express myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have 
seen it. Although in Yenan I am only a distant observer of recent develop- 
ments in Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the con- 
tinued frankness which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding 
the stronger policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Central Government. 

2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines 
suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it 
have both military importance and far-reaching political significance; the two 
aspects cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of 
the high level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agree- 
ment and mutual support between our political and military branches. But 
this will be ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by 
the President. 

3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the 
American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters USAF-CBI, for the 
information of Mr. Davies. 

(Signed) J. S. 
(Typed) John S. Service. 
Enclosure : Memorandum, as stated. 

[First endorsement] 

United States Army Observer Section, 

APO 879, October 16, 19U- 
To: Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding United States Army Forces, China, 
Burma, and India, APO 879. 

Approved : 

David D. Barrett, 

Colonel, GSC. 

MEMORANDUM 

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the 
unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. 
It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, 
that we take a more realistic line. 

The Kuomintang government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its 
military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster. 
Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwilling- 
ness to submerge selllsh power seeking in democratic unity, and tlie statements 
of Chiang himself to the People's Political Council and on October 10, 1944, 
are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership. 

With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within 
China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and 
Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader. 

In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American 
support for survival. But tve are in no icaij dependent on the Kuomintang. 

We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air bases 
and cannot hold any section of the sea coast. Without drastic reforms — which 



786 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

must have a political base — its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively 
no matter how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms 
because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own 
undemocratic power. 

On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chinese regime, 
because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of 
Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang attitude prevents 
the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or provincial troops, who 
should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies. 

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang 
will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for con- 
tinued power. But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally 
traitorous relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue 
sowing the seeds of future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for 
eventual consolidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led 
forces of popular resistance. 

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other 
groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new gov- 
ernment under any other than the present reactionary control will be more 
cooperative and better able to mobilize the country. 

Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend 
to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the Government which 
are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our 
support, the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively 
losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. 
Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of 
the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own 
interests by more direct opposition. 

We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons. The 
day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the Big Four is 
past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia propaganda 
loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present Kuomin- 
tang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British Empire in 
the Far East. 

On the contraiT, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his unrea- 
sonableness. The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will be much 
better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even in books 
like China's Destiny, hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating minority 
nations (such as Tibet and Mongolia), recovering lost territories (such as the 
southern peninsula), and protecting the rights and at the same time nationalities 
of its numerous emigrants (to such areas as Thailand, Malaya, and the East 
Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in pow«r of the present Kuomintang can only 
mean a weak and disunited China — a sure cause of international involvements 
in the Far East. The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This 
can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation. 

We need not support Chiang in the heUcf that he represents pro- American or 
democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance 
in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the 
country, now and after the war. 

In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American- 
educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers, 
military, and secret police cliques which control the party and are Chiang's main 
supports are the most Chauvinist elements in the country. The present party 
ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books China's Destiny and Chinese Economic 
Theor.v, is fundamentally antiforeign and antidemocratic, both politically and 
economically. 

Finally, we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept 
around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable, and obstructive, 
Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extrava- 
gant demands and unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff, and black- 
mail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has 
fought only passively— not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought 
to have us' save him — so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. 
In the process, he has worked us for all we were worth. 

We seem to forget that Chiang is an oriental; that his background and vision 
are limited ; that his position is built on the skill as an extremely adroit politi- 
cal manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 787 

and flattery for weakness ; and that he listens to his own instrument of force 
rather than reason. 

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot 
hope to deal successfully with Chiang without 'being hard-toilfd. Second, we 
cannot hope to solve China's prohlems [which are now our problems] without 
consideration of the opposition forces — Communist, provincial, and liberal. 

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and 
more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist 
forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied 
areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek 
the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's govern- 
ment in Lonon, ignoring Tito. 

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This 
is an old trick of Chiang's. 

There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government, but it will not be 
the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion 
but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up 
for this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent — and at the same time 
increases the weight of our influence. The crisis is the time to push—^wt to 
relax. 

We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting 
time in futile discussions as to who is to be American commander. This is an 
obvious subterfuge. 

There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is 
that no one who knows anything about China and is concerned over American 
rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang. 

We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk 
only to Chiang. This piits the trump card in Chiang's hands. 

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit 
to the Communist capital at Yenan would have significance that no Chinese would 
miss — -least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were 
only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than 
a mere demonstration ; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the Com- 
munist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms. 

Finally if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations 
with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary 
abandonment of our strongest weapon. 

Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were shown 
obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not be 
misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards; they are not the peo- 
ple. The Kuomintang government could not withstand public belief that the 
United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition 
of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance. 

More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time we 
start playing them. 

(Signed) J. S. 

(Typed) John S. Service. 

October 10, 1944. 

Mr. Morris. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we 
showed a connection between Mr. Service and the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

Mr, Mandel, will you bring something forth on that score, please? 

Mr. Mandel. From the same loyalty board meeting transcript of 
proceedings, the date being May 27, 1950, I read the following testi- 
mony : 

Question. Under what circumstances did you give that otf-the-record talk at 
the IPR? 

This was a question directed to Mr. Service. 

Answer. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much 
sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having 
visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these 
interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspapermen were sent 
to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New 



788 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

York to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White, 
and various other people. And the IPR asked 

The Chaiuman. Will you just explain IPR? 

Answer. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR? 

The Chairman. Afterward, yes. 

Answer. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe 
was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for 
me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people 
in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's 
telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it 
would be all right with me. 

Question. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the 
IPR? 

Answer. That is right. 

Question. I notice that in your statement .vou subscribed at that time to a 
number of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern 
Survey. What is the character of that? 

Answer. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publication put out by the 
American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations containing articles written 
by a very large number of people on sub.1ects related to the Far East generally. 

Question. And Pacific Affairs? 

Answer. Pacific Alfairs is a quarterly published by the International Council 
of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps — I'm not sure of the exact 
wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Question. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that 
the Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do 
you have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the 
IFR first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking? 

Answer. No ; I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its maga- 
zines, I have had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never  
attended its i)eriodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Cer- 
tainly it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable 
type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were 
some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period, 
but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when that 
was or how influential those people were. 

******* 

Question. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed 
to the magazine Araerasia. How could you describe that magazine? 
Answer. I subscribed to it just after it was established, I think. 

****••• 

Trawscript of Proceedings — Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case 

OF John S. Service 

Date : Tuesday, ]\Tay 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12 : 30 p. m. 
Place : Room 2254, New State. 

******* 

Mr. Rhetts. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327, 
which is a receipt signed by the assistant treasurer of the American Institute of 
Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for the 
year ending February 1951 in the amount of $15. 

Mr. Morris. That will be introduced into the record, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. I did not fret it clear. This document represents 
interrogation and answer by whom? 

Mr. Mandel. The Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S. 
Service, the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department. 

The Chairman. With John S. Service answering? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 



mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 789 

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel 
was marked "Exhibit No. 248" and filed for the committee's informa- 
tion. ) 

Mr. Morris. That bears on the precise connection that John S. Serv- 
ice had with the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. I now come to the report of January 23, 1943. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I inquire whether that was sworn testi- 
mony? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

This document is marked No. 103 and is taken from the same pro- 
ceeding in the case of John S. Service before the State Department 
Loyalty Security Board. 

Mr. Morris. This is the report of January 23, 1943 ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Is this a report by Mr. John S. Service ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Morris, General, may I call your attention to the report of 
January 23, 1943? I think that should be the second one in that 
group of papers before you. 

General Wedeimeyer. I have it. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with that particular report of 
John S. Service? 

General Wedemeyer. I have read it over, yes. 

!Mr. ISIoRRis. It was not made at a time you were theater com- 
mander? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir ; several months prior to my becoming 
commander. 

Mr. Morris. It did come to your attention after you became theater 
commander? 

General Wedemeyer. There was a copy in the headquarters of the 
China theater. 

Mr. INIoRRis. You recognize it is a report made by John S. Service ? 

General Wedemeyer. Frankly, I couldn't say under oath that I 
could say that. 

Mr. Morris. You do remember reading it ? 

General Wedemp^yer. I remember reading all these memoranda in 
the headquarters submitted by the political advisers. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth 
paragraph on that page? 

The Chairman. Wliat is the instrument? 

Mr. Morris. This has been identified by Mr, Mandel as a John 
Service report that was made part of the record of the loyalty pro- 
ceedings of the State Department in the case of John S. Service. 

Mr. Mandel, please read part of the second paragraph, not the 
fourth paragraph, beginning with the third sentence. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

In Kuomintang-controlled Cbina the conntering of commnnism is a growing pre- 
occupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, 
and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous 
suppression of anything coming under the ever-widening definition of "commu- 
nism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward fonns of 



790 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war- 
can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a vic- 
tory over Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General? 

General Wedemeyer. Frankly, I do not know what to comment. 
I clon't want to repeat over and over again and take the Senators' 
time. I have tried to make it clear that the Nationalist Government 
with which I dealt was improving steadily, cooperated with me to 
the best of its ability, and, on the other hand, I received no cooperation 
from the Communists. I didn't consider them a government, of 
course, but there wasn't much cooperation requested. The little I 
asked them to do was not done, namely, conducting these military 
operations coordinated with my over-all operations. 

I really do not know what thoughts I could give. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything in that particular report, in the 
entire report, you would care to comment on ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this in the record and 
have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit ? 

The Chairman. Very well. It will be inserted and properly 
identified. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 249" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 249 

January 23, 1943. 
Subject : Kuomintang-Commuuist Situation. 

An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chung- 
king and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most care- 
ful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly 
the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists. 

The united front is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to 
find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present 
tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both civil 
and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deter- 
iorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a 
growing preoccupation of propaganda, -of both military and civilian iwlitical 
indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only 
a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition 
of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the out- 
ward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether 
civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after 
a victory over Japan. 

The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching. 
Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort 
by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation 
therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the 
present time a large and comparatively well-trained and equipped portion of 
the Kuomintang army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to 
blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well 
established by multiple lines of block houses and those large forces remain in 
a condition of armed readiness. Further south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu) 
the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone 
on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the 
initiative, continue. 

On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and forced 
in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers 
the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme 
tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Com- 
munists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved 
them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, fur- 
thermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 791 

its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan. 
This strengthening of the position of (he Knomintang will of course assist it in re- 
establishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical 
part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found, 
of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken 
the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of 
the Communist guerrilla zones. To support this thesis the Communists point 
to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate 
abolition of the border area. Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to 
provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability, 
from the Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds 
itself an active ally of Kussia against Japan. 

The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort 
should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access 
may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases. 
The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of 
Kussia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but 
fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shan.si indicate that the 
Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese mopping up 
campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Commu- 
nist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the 
fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the 
anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever collaborationist elements there may 
be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang. 
This activity in Shausi and the difiiculties of the Japanese there contrast with 
the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts. 

Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situa- 
tion are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being 
averted, the eventual defeat and \Vithdrawal of the Japanese will leave the 
Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most 
of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shan- 
tung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei). In addition the Communists will be 
in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from 
Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some 
Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of 
elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of 
uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's fear 
of their power, and the power of whytever underground organization the Commu- 
nists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the 
size and activity of its various secret police organs. 

But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason 
why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time, 
is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese. 
Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently 
been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession 
of a secret Koumintang publication describing the Communist control of Hopei. 
It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such means, for instance, 
as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to 
cooperate (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang domination) they must be 
exterminated. I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would 
appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it 
will pursue in these areas. It seems I'easouable to question, as some thoughtful 
Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of 
political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial sovietization, 
will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such 
a spirit and implemented ljy military force and the political repression, and 
secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of 
party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded. 

Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of 
the well-known late editor of the Ta Kung Fao) consider the likelihood of civil 
war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists 
are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies 
for 10 years in central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves 
that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guer- 
rilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist 
infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those 
of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the 



792 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kiiomintang, or for either side^ 
impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average, 
nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may 
indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and eflfectiveness of its conscript troops. 

Belief in tlie certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to ques- 
tion whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the 
future in Cliina of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's 
advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the 
Kuomintang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging 
from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will 
be available for civil war to enforce unity in the country by military force. 
These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may 
be in China (in support of the Kuomintang army) if there should be a civil 
war ; and wonder what will be the attitude of llussia, especially if it has become 
by that time a partner in the victory over Japan. 

But ignoring these problematical implications, thei'e can be no denial that 
civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the 
present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This 
blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously 
and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the 
continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already 
serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. 
If there is a civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course 
greater. 

There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary, 
overconscripted and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda 
and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which 
the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist govern- 
ment would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is 
probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists 
for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Commu- 
nist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with 
Russia than with Great Britain and Arnerica. 

For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United 
States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation 
in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement. 

The Communists themselves ( Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with 
John Carter Vincent and the undersigned aboiit November 20, 1942) consider that 
foreign influence (obviously American) witli the Kuomintang is the only force 
that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful 
foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully 
made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, 
official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of 
leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo. 

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be 
the enjpliasizing in our dealings with the Chanese (government, and in our prop- 
aganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict ; democracy against 
fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing 
the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomin- 
tang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. 

Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army 
as a participant in the war against facisin. The United States might intervene 
to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support he given 
by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Communists hope 
this nn"ght include a specification that the Communist armies receive a propor- 
tionate share of American supplies sent to China. 

Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang 
would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have 
not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that 
they would welcome such action. 

Tills visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with 
comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the sit- 
uation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the fol- 
lowing pertinent questions : How faithfully have the Communists carried out 
their united front promises? What is the form of their local government? How 
Commnnistic is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has 
it won any support of the people? How does it compare witli conditions of govern- 
ment in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people iu 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 793 

such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor 
compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is tlie military and econ- 
omic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied 
cause? IIow have they dealt with problems such as intlatiou, price control, 
development of economic resoui'ces for carrying on the war, and trading with the 
enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the 
degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare? 

Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conlllcting reports and reach 
a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding 
conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information 
as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and 
probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had a limited 
knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able 
to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists. 
They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in 
the area for an extended period. 

I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist 
area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or two men 
might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence at Yenan or 
its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important 
that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit iluring which they would 
be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time 
to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day observations. 

There is mail and telegraphic communicatiim between Yenan and Chungking, 
and similar communication between various parts of the Conimuuist area. The 
officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if It is 
thought desirable, make periodic reports. 

]Mr. Morris. General, may I call your attention to the report of 
April 7, 1944, that is before you? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Manclel, will you read pertinent excerpts from 
that? 

The Chairman. Before we go into that, what is this instrument, 
where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it? 

Mr. IVIandel. The date is April 7, 1944 [reading] : 

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded 
to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 24G1, April 21, 1944, under title 
"Situation in Sinkiang; Its lielatiou to American Policy vis-a-vis China and 
the Soviet Union." 

This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before 
the State Department in the case of John S. Service. 

Chiang's persisting in. an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies 
(or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal 
dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical 
desire to destroy unity among the United JS'ations is serious. 

Mr. Morris. What paragraph is that? 

Mr. Mandel. The second paragraph. Further : 

Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American 
aims run counter to hers, .and that she must therefore protect herself by any 
means available ; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence. 

Mr. Morris. General, can you comment on that ? 

General Wedemeyer. This statement was made at a time when there 
were a lot of people in our country who were making similar state- 
ments. Today they are on the band wagon of opposing communism. 
Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line. In 
fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous, and 
I could only talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to 
talk realistically about the implications of communism in this coun- 
try and in the world in general. I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek 



794 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

even at that time epitomized opposition to communism and thank God 
for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others 
were playing footsie with communism, many others. I think Chiang 
showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his op- 
position. 

As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did 
not persist in the China theater. The contribution they made in the 
war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to 
understand that clearly. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask in relation to this : Is this not an 
indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had 
better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's 
desires rather than w'hat was well for America or the world? That 
is, when he says "We should make every effort to learn what the 
Russian aims in Asia are," and the previous sentence that was read 
to you about Russia having her way. Is that right ? 

General Wedemeter. It could be interpreted that way. I think 
that is a sound interpretation of the statement. 

JNIr. Morris. General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John 
P. Davies, one of the four political advisers? 

The Chairman. Has this last one been inserted in the record ? 

Mr. Morris. No, sir. That may be introduced in the record, having 
been identified. 

The Chairman. It may. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 250" and 

is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 250 

April 7, 1944. 

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, for- 
warded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 
21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang ; Its Relation to American Policy 
Vis-a-Vis China and the Soviet Union." 

We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they 
are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Riis- 
' sia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military re- 
lations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and 
postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian 
aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a 
careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of 
the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in 
Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly 
in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog. 

As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we 
are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in 
an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when liis policies (or lack of them) are 
accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be 
characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity 
among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang 
unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by in- 
ternal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will 
render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so 
doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave ; not only north China and Man- 
churia but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven 
into the arms of the Soviets. 

Neither now nor in the immediately foreseeable future does the United States 
want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia ; nor does it want to see 
ilussia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China. 

The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, 
in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary Government of 
China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 795 

military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other 
support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal 
anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists — who probably 
hold the key to control, not only of north China but of Inner Mongolia and 
Manchuria as well — that we are on the other side and that their only hope 
for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does 
not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must there- 
fore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of 
her direct power or influence. 

It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in 
its dealings with China : 

1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations ; avoid all 
appearance of unqualified diplomatic support of China, especially vis-a-vis 
Russia ; and limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war 
against Japan. 

This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and eco- 
nomic rehabilitation, unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within 
China. 

2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in 
China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against Japan. 

In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese 
war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope 
lies in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also 
are friendly toward Ajnerica, believe that democracy must be the next step in 
China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States 
is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital 
that we do not lose this good will and influence. 

3. Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the Kuomintang 
promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of pro- 
gressive reform. 

There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang knows 
that it is dependent on us ; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihila- 
tion ; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward communistic Russia ; and Great 
Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Com- 
munists will be a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house 
in order. 

The Communists would undoubtedly play an important part in a genuinely 
unified China — one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of 
military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and 
unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States, and that the 
United States, by virtue of sympathy, position, and economic resources, would 
enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have the Davies report ? That is dated June 
24, 1943. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. May I refer to the second extract made on that page, 
General, November 7, 1944 — Davies [reading] : 

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze 
that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. 
They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which 
they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Com- 
munists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been oper- 
ating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of 
communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists. 

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese 
offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than 
the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe 
blockade imposed by Chiang. 

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has 
been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square 
kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to 
about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. 
And they will continue to grow. 



(22848 — 52— pt. 3- 



796 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and funda- 
mental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments 
and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to 
have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because 
the governments and armies are genuinely of the people. 

I wonder if you would comment on that extract, General ? 

General Wedemeyer. As of that date, of that period, I think the 
writer is incorrect in the military capabilities of the Communists, and 
the statement there, the correctness of which I question namely, they 
had withstood the heavy attacks of the Japanese is not correct for the 
period I commanded the theater. I do not believe it was correct prior 
to my assuming command, because I read the history of the operations 
that had taken place from the beginning of the war, 1937. At no time 
were large numbers of Communist forces involved with Japanese 
forces, and at no time did the Chinese Communist military forces 
make a real contribution to the over-all China war effort. Most of 
their operations were guerrilla in nature. They were designed to 
capture blockhouses established by the Japanese and to capture small 
quantities of arms and equipment. 

He goes on to say the reason for the success that he alludes to of the 
Chinese Communists is simple and fundamental. He says it is mass 
support, mass participation. I would change that and then go along 
with the statement [reading] : 

It is Soviet support and police participation, secret-police participation and 
propaganda participation. 

Those are the things that took over China. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say he was wrong when he said that 
*'they have this support because the govermnents and armies are gen- 
uinely of the people ?" Were the Chinese people Communists at heart, 
or were they dominated by the Soviet Union ? 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment — and this man is an expert 
and I am not on China; he has lived most of his life there and he 
speaks the language — but in my humble judgment the Chinese people 
per se are not communistically inijlined. They are individualistic. 
The family is the integral unit. We often accuse them of nepotism 
because they have these strong family ties. If one enjoys economic 
success, he is duty-bound to take care of the other members of his 
family. 

I would go back to this. Senator : The Chinese people don't under- 
stand political philosophies. I mean the bulk of them do not. There 
is just a thin veneer of educated people in China who understand 
what we are talking about. When anyone talks about any leader, 
any war lord, any political party having the support of the Chinese 
people, you can see how nebulous that is. 

Mr. Morris. Generel, I draw your attention to the same document 
on the second page. 

Mr. Mandel, will you read that extract, please? 
Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

The generalissimo realizes that, if he accedes to the Communist terms for a 
coalition government, they will sooner or later disposses him and his kuo- 
mintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a 
genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, 
passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Com- 
munist issue must eventually be joined. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 797 

It further says : 

The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement 
with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize 
that Chiang's positon is crumbling ; that they may before long receive substantial 
Russian support, and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority 
in at least north China. 

Mr. Morris. General, do you believe, if the generalissimo had ac- 
ceded to the Communist terms for a coalition government, that they 
would sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I do. The Communists at that time 
had very little power. The generalissimo had most of the power. 
The Communists were determined to have all the power, and the gen- 
eralissimo was just as determined to retain all the power. It just 
makes sense to me. That is the way the situation maintained out there. 
Any other solution I do not accept. I do not think it is sound. 

Mr. Morris. With respect to the second paragraph there, you agree 
with Mr, Davies when he said that the Communists had no intention 
of reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine 
coalition government? 

General Wedemeyer. I think the Communists had the idea of a 
coalition government just a step toward acquisition of all power. 
They would violate any agreement they made just as they have in 
other areas of the world. When the time came they would seize all 
the power and there would be no represenation on the part of the 
Kuomintang. The Kuomintang would be liquidated. 

Senator Ferguson. General, if this advice of Mr. Davies of De- 
cember 9, 1944, was taken, how could we hope to sustain a democratic 
government in China by the use of philosophy of General Marshall's 
mission to form a coalition ? 

General Wedemeyer. We couldn't, sir. I never did believe that a 
coalition with the Communists was possible. You can coalesce po- 
litical parties at times over the years. The Republicans and Demo- 
crats have gotten together in a bipartisan approach to international 
problems. Personally I do not agree with that. It is the American 
way to make a man defend what he proposes to do. I think we should 
always question the other man's judgment; do it in a respectful but 
intelligent way, and continuously. I think that is the whole philoso- 
phy behind democracy. 

Now, you will get no such philosophy or get no such modus oper- 
andi in operations with the Communists. All you have to do is read 
the Communist Manifesto and Karl Marx's Das Kapital and you will 
have it laid out for you just as Hitler so obligingly told us what he 
was going to do and we ignored his warnings. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you get a clearer statement than an 
indication of Davies as to what the Communists were. They were 
dominated by Russia and "if they have patience they will succeed to 
authority in at least north China." He limited it to the north of 
China, but he indicated that they would get the support to take over 
China. Is that not true ? 

General Wedemeyer. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. If you were to back the Communists, it was to 
back the idea that Russia would be the dominant power of China. 

General Wedemeyer. That is true. 



798 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I have told you earlier, sir, I neglected to give the attention that 
I should have when I was commanding that theater — give attention 
to these reports. As an alibi, I was involved in military operations 
and busy as the dickens. Later, in analyzing these reports and going 
back over many things that had happened in tliis, the psychological 
or diplomatic field, I realized I had been remiss in my duties as a 
theater commander in not analyzing them more carefully. I did not 
take the advice. I adhered to the path of trying to contain the J apa- 
nese and supporting the Nationalist Government in my personal rela- 
tions with the Chinese military and civilians. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not follow this advice, in other words ? 

General Wedemeyer. No. I was fortunate in having a very loyal 
American out there as a diplomatic representative, Patrick J. Hurley. 
I admired him a great deal and felt he represented American policies 
realistically, courageously and continuously. He was the American 
Ambassador. 

Mr. Morris. General, may I draw your attention to the next extract 
we have on this page ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Under date of November 15, 1944, Mr. Mandel, and 
will you read that for us, please ? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture 
would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being con- 
tinue recognition of Chiang's Government. 

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically 
bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we 
must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists 
rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, 
we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai- 
shek Government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying 
regime and severely restricted in working out military and political coopera- 
tion with the Chinese Communists. 

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory 
place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our great- 
assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent and friendly China — our 
basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach 
a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our 
point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Com- 
munists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are 
going to support. 

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in 
mind these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting from 
Chiang to the Communists. 

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope 
to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of 
supplies and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction 
of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control. 

Mr. Morris. Would you comment on that excerpt, General Wede- 
meyer ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, I think prior comments on other ex- 
cerpts cover that, sir, namely, that a coalition government meant a 
Communist government, insofar as I am concerned. It would not be 
such a thing as a coalition government, the Communists would have all 
control. 
^ Mr. Morris. Did you think that the Chinese Communist organiza- 
tion was a complete auxiliary and part of the international Com- 
munist organization ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 799 

General Wedemeyer. Definitely. I felt they were operating under 
the aegis of the Kremlin, and most of the leaders had been trained in 
the U. S. S. R., over the years, over a period of 20 years. And it is 
that hard core of fanatic loyal leadership that the Communists have 
generated in the various areas of the world that has enabled these 
well-organized minorities to take over unsuspecting intimidated 
masses. And particularly, where the masses are illiterate, unem- 
ployed, improvident, as they are in China and in India ; those areas 
are particularly vulnerable to the Marxian philosophies and methods. 

Mr. Morris. And is there not implicit in this statement, General 
Wedemeyer, an assertion that the Chinese Communists were inde- 
pendent of Moscow ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Is that not obvious. General? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In which you do not believe? 

General Wedemeyer. Definitely, Senator. I think that all of these 
satellites are oriented toward the Kremlin. Now, the Soviet leaders 
wisely adjust and change the application of their political and eco- 
nomic ideas to conform more or less to the customs, the organization, 
and to the traditions of the particular area where they are applying 
these ideas. They make adjustments. But the basic idea is the de- 
struction of free enterprise, the enslavement of mind and body and 
destruction of any spiritual force in this world. Those are the basic 
objectives of communism, and they are making progress toward ac- 
complishing those objectives. 

Mr. Morris. May I call your attention to the first full paragraph on 
page 3 in that statement. It begins [reading] : 

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in 
mind these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting from 
Chiang to tlie Communists. 

Do you not interpret that, General Wedemeyer, as a recommenda- 
tion that we should support the Chinese Communist faction ? 

General Wedemeyer. That is one interpretation, yes. 

Mr. Morris. What is your interpretation. General Wedemeyer? 

General Wedemeyer. My interpretation is that this chap felt that 
the Communists in China were getting increasing power. I do not 
go quite so far as to suggest just from that statement that this Foreign 
Service officer wants us to feel that we should support the Communists. 
I think there is always danger in reading into a statement 

Mr. Morris. We do not intend to do that. 

General Wedemeyer. I know you don't, and I cannot do it. 

The Chairman. You would say the language was an inducement 
toward that conclusion, though ; would you not 5 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; it inclines in that direction. In fair- 
ness to the writer, however, I think he is the best witness on that. 

Senator Ferguson. It could be taken as a recommendation that if 
you wanted to be on the power side you take his views ; is that correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce all of these 
excerpts into the record, but Mr. Mandel has not yet told us from what 
sources he has put these together, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. This document that we have in hand here on which 
General Wedemeyer has been testifying has not been offered for the 
record ? 



800 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. That is right. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what these 
are ? 

Mr. Mandel. These are taken from a publication called United 
States Relations With China, a Department of State publication, Far 
Eastern Series, released August 1949. 

The Chairman. Released by whom and by what authority? 

Mr. Mandel. By the State Department. That is popularly known 
as the white paper. 

The Chairman. That is the paper I have in my mind. 

Mr. Morris. Those are extracts from that publication. Senator. 
Before introducing that into the record, I think Mr. Sourwine would 
like to ask a few questions of General Wedemeyer on that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, referring to the excerpt headed November 
15, 1944, which has been previously discussed, the second paragraph 
starts out with the sentence, "But we must be realistic." Would it be 
fair, therefore, to judge the rest of this excerpt on the basis of whether 
it is realistic ? 

General Wedemeyer. I thinl? it would, yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, the third sentence is the one referred to by 
Mr. Morris obliquely when he asked you if you shared the apparent 
feeling of this writer that the Chinese Communists were free agents, 
were independent, and that is the sentence which reads : 

And if the Russians are going to enter tlie Pacific war, we must make a deter- 
mined elfort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow 
them to go by default wholly to the Russians. 

That necessarily implies, does it not, that the Chinese Communists, 
at the time of this writing, were not tied up with the Russians? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes ; that is implicit in that statement, but I 
do not agree with it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is also implicit in that statement, is it not, that 
we could "capture" politically the Chinese Communists? 

General Wedemeyer. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you agree with that statement ? 

General Wedemeyer. I don't agree with it, but that is implicit in 
the statement as you read it to me, yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, is either of those implications 
realistic ? 

General Wedemeyer. Definitely not. In my judgment, in my 
humble judgment, definitely not. 

I want to say one thing there to you, sir : In my relations with the 
Communists they were not emotional, they were not unobjective. They 
had illness up in that area and it was remote, and at great cost to my 
limited war effort I sent 15 tons of medical supplies to help Mao Tse- 
tung and Chou En-lai, with the permission of the Generalissimo. 
I want you to understand that my attitude toward them was just as 
humanitarian as the record of our great country over many years. 

Now, therefore, when I make statements they are not emotional 
replies, sir, they are just in the interest of the country; not in my 
own personal interest or not in the interest of the Communists or the 
Kuomintang. 

I want to make a statement to you, because I have emphasized that 
I do not agree with the implications there. I accept the statements, 
that the statements are implicit in the way you interpret them, I accept 
that, but I do not agree with them. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 801 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General, I am attempting here to be quite coldly- 
logical about this passage and not emotional at all, and I appreciate 
your answer. 

General Wedemeyer. I am not saying you were suggesting emotion. 
I do not want emotionalism to enter into it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The next sentence reads : 

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the 
Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily 
decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political 
cooperation with the Chinese Communists. 

That phrase "are committed to a steadily decaying regime" can only 
be interpreted as a charge that the Chiang Kai-shek government was 
steadily decaying, is that not correct? 

General Wedemeyer. You mean that the government was decaying? 
Is that what you are asking me, if it is correct ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is implicit in this language ? 

General Wedemeyer. It is implicit in that language, but again 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was not true, was it ? 

General Wedemeyer. That would require quite a lot of develop- 
ment. I do not know whether the Senators want me to develop that, 
Mr. Sourwine, or not, but I would be happy to do it. In other words, 
I am not going to answer yes or no and establish a very important point 
that will militate against my entire testimony here. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that would take an explanation ? 

General Wedemeyer. It would take an explanation, Senator Fergu- 
son, in my judgment, of about 10 minutes, indicating the development 
that brought about the steadily deteriorating situation in China, eco- 
.nomic, psychological, and military. 

The Chairman. Would the committee care to hear it? 

Senator Ferguson. I think because of the question it would be of 
interest on this record. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, then. General. 

General Wedemeyer. Do you want to hear it, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

General Wedemeyer. You all are familiar with the fact that Chiang 
Kai-shek took over the Chinese Nationalist Government upon the death 
of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. At that time there were Soviet Russian advisers 
in the area and they had agreed that there would be no political prop- 
agandizing, but they would assist the new Chinese Republic in evolv- 
ing a stable economy and building up their military forces. 

In typical Communist fashion they violated their agreement with 
reference to the dissemination of Communist political propaganda 
and just brought about the conflict that ended up with the Communists 
being pushed back clear up in Yunan, in a remote western province 
of China. 

The period 1927 to 1937 was often alluded to by Americans, British- 
ers, and other foreigners in the area who had lived there many years 
as the golden decade. From 1927 to 1937, during that period, com- 
munications were being improved, the economy was being better 
stabilized, and schools were being built to extend advantages of edu- 
cation, and many improvements, in other words, were being instituted. 

Now, you all know that there are many dialects in China, but basic- 
ally there are three areas and people living in those three areas, 



802 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

respectively, cannot understand each other. They all read and write 
the same hieroglyphics, the same characters. 

Chiang Kai-shek also was striving to bring about an alphabet that 
■would be universally understood to simplify the education that he 
envisaged for his people. 

Now, the military jingoists of Japan, recognizing the develop- 
ments which would bring about a nationalization, a political conscious- 
ness in China, a unity, were concerned, and they had ideas of a co- 
prosperity sphere in Asia under their domination. So many observers 
with whom I talked in the Far East who had lived there many years, 
they refer to this golden decade — mind you now, under Chiang Kai- 
shek's regime and approximately the same leaders whom we have 
today, and we read in the press considerable criticism about them, 
they had that period where they were improving conditions in China 
and many people feel that the thing that precipitated the war in 
1937 on the part of the Japanese was the fact that a strongly unified 
China would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to 
take over in that area. So that precipitated the attack in 1937. 

Now, for 8 years China fought the Japanese. The Japanese were 
a modern military nation. In the first year or so of the war we 
suffered many humiliating reverses at the hands of the Japanese in 
the battles that we fought with them on the sea and in the air and 
on the ground, as did the British. Gradually we evolved forces that 
enabled us to defeat the Japanese militarily. 

But the Chinese did not have competent or well-organized military 
forces, and they did not fight well — they fought well with what they 
had — ^but by our standards it was not a great contribution. And I 
have never in any testimony stated that the contribution made by the- 
Chinese in the war was overwhelming, but it was important to us in 
that it did contain large numbers of Japanese that might have been 
employed at crucial places and critical times aginst our forces as they 
advanced up north against the Japanese Archipelgo. 

But during the war, and immediately subsequent to VJ-day, prop- 
aganda increased in that area, propaganda that denounced you and 
me, the Americans, and distorted our objectives in that area, called us 
imperialists, Yankee imperialists, and indicated our determination 
to take over the Far East, to dominate the Far East. These programs 
emanated from Yunnan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, and 
frequently were reaffirmed in articles appearing in Pravda and other 
Communist-inspired newspapers and radio releases. 

It was perfectly obvious to those Americans who were out there with 
me in 1945 at the close of the war that this propaganda campaign was 
being intensified against us to cause the Chinese people to suspect our 
motives and to turn against us. 

Now, in considering any problem in China, I think all of that 
period, the development in that period, must be thought about objec- 
tively. And I also think about those things in relation to the state- 
ments that I read here by experts on the area. This is just a soldier's 
view, a practical view that I personally experienced and concluded. 
These are conclusions that I drew as a result of serving out there just 
a few years. 

That is the background I wanted to give you. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Thank you. General. I have just two or three more 
questions about this particular section of the report, this November 
15, 1944, item. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 803 

General Wedmeyer. All right, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In the same sentence which elicited the answer you 
have just given us is a phrase, and I had better read the whole sen- 
tence and underline the phrase vocally [reading] : 

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of 
the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a 
steadily decaying regime — 

and here is the phase I want to underline — 

and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with 
the Chinese Communists. 

Does that not carry with it, implicit in it, the thought that the work- 
ing out of military and political cooperation with the Chinese Com- 
munists was one of our objectives that it was important to us? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, it does. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that true ? 

General Wedemeyer. Have you been here all morning? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, sir, and I heard your previous testimony, but I 
am attempting to get the answer to this. 

General Wedemeyer. I will be glad again to say it. The contribu- 
tion made by the Communists was very limited militarily, and eco- 
nomic assistance would be nil. 

Now, if the theater commander had been directed to assist the Chi- 
nese Communists hj giving them equipment and advisers it would 
have been a very difficult logistical job for me to get it way up there by 
air. I had no other way of getting it up there. Just sending 15 tons 
of medical supplies, I indicated to you, impinged upon my little war 
effort in the southeastern part of China. 

Mr. Sourwine. But that difficulty was not caused by the fact that 
we were supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it ? That 
logistic difficulty you speak of was a logistic problem. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, it was, because I could not put my planes 
in operation in logistical support in southeast China and concurrently 
up to the north. So, in a way, it did militate against supporting the 
Communists. If I had been directed to support the Communists in 
lieu of the Nationalists, I would have carried out my orders, and I 
would have gotten supplies up there, but at much greater difficulty, 
because of the distance. 

Now, may I explain to you, it may not be apparent to you right 
away, but intratheater distribution, within the theater, was a real 
problem, because I had to bring the fuel to operate the planes over 
the hump. But when we captured Bhamo and Mytchinya I had a 
staging area so my planes could hop over the short hop and unload 
and go back without refueling in my theater, so I kept the gasoline 
they brought. Once I started to distribute in China it was a real 
problem because I was burning up gasoline at long distances. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. What I was attempting to get at is whether there 
was some outstanding advantage to us to be gained through military 
and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists, which we 
were losing at that time. In your opinion was there such an advantage f 

General Wedemeyer. No, I don't think there was an outstanding 
advantage to be gained. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is the point. 

General Wedemeyer. No. 



804 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. There was another item in which your own opinion 
is at variance with the opinion implicit in this statement ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The final comment I want to ask you for, sir, is on 
this, and this says [reading] : 

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory" 
place is the solution of this impass6 most desirable to us. It provides our g^reatest 
assurance of a strong united, democratic, independent, and friendly China. 

And in view of the statements already made by Mr. Davies, in one 
of these reports and in other testimony here with regard to what would 
have happened in the event there had been a coalition government, I 
would like to ask you, sir, Would a coalition Chinese Government in 
which the Communists found a satisfactory place have provided us 
with assurance of either a democratic or an independent or a friendly 
China? 

General Wedemeyer. No. For many reasons, in my judgment, it 
would not have provided a cooperative, friendly China. I indicated 
earlier, sir, that in my judgment the Chinese Communists were deter- 
mined to take over all the power. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. Yes, sir. 

General Wedeiheyer. And that they were working under the aegis 
of the Kremlin power whose avowed purpose is to destroy your 
country and mine. And it is just inconsistent ; we are being naive if 
we consider for a moment that we could generate a friendly spirit 
among the Chinese as long as the Communists are influencing them 
with their sinister propaganda. We just cannot do it. And they are 
most vulnerable to that propaganda because they are illiterate and 
they are capable of intimidations that the Communists so skillfully 
handle. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. Does it not then become apparent. General, that not 
only is that passage not realistic, but that in the space of a dozen 
lines it has advanced a half dozen propositions, all of which are un- 
sound and untenable ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. For example, one other point that 
you could develop is the Chinese are not ready for a democratio 
government. Democracy, as I understand it, is predicated upon an 
informed electorate. So that as long as you have 80 percent of the 
population illiterate it is impractical to have a true democracy there 
There are a lot of things that are just inconsistent, in my judgment. 
^ Mr. SouRwiNE. That is as far as I wanted to develop that point, 
sir. 

Mr. Morris. That document therefore may be introduced into the 
record, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 251" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 251 

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949] 

United States Relations With China 

memoranda by foreign service officers in china, 1943-45 

June 24, 19J^S {Davies) 

Chinese Communist policy appears to have followed the Comintern line. In 
its initial expression the i)olicy adhered to the program of world revolution. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 805 

With the Comintern's abandonment of this program, the Chinese Communists 
embraced in 1935, in compliance with Moscow directives, the policy of the united 
front. 

The new line, so far as it applied to Asia, was in all probability prompted by 
the Kremlin's realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's position in the Far East 
Russia was threatened by Japan. The Japanese Army had with its Manchurian 
adventure apparently decided upon a policy of continental expansion. Con- 
fronted by a strong Russian Army in eastern Siberia, the Japanese seemed to be 
intent upon outflanking the Russians through China. China could not be ex- 
pected to offer strong resistance to Japanese expansion so long as it was torn 
by internal dissension. It was therefore evident that China should become 
unified and actively resist Japanese pressure westward. 

As the Chinese Communists moved away from world revolution to nationalism 
they also moved in the direction of more moderate internal political and economic 
policy. Whether these other moves were in compliance with Comintern dictates 
is less material than that they were historically and evolutionarily sound. 

The trend toward nationalism is believed to be strongest among the troops 
and guerrillas who have been fighting the national enemy. Although we have 
no accurate information on the subject, it is suspected that the political leaders 
of the party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwith- 
standing the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow 
direction. This probable schism within the party may prove at some later date 
to be of major importance (p. 565). 

November 7, 194i (Davies) 

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the 
Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north 
China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley 
which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The 
Commxinists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been 
operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal 
lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists. 

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese 
offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than 
the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe 
blockade imposed by Chiang. 

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has 
been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square 
kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to 
about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. 
And they will continue to grow. 

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and funda- 
mental. It is a mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments 
and ai'mies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to 
have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because 
the governments and armies are genuinely of the people (pp. 566-567). 

January 4, i945 (Davies) 

The current situation in China must afford the Kremlin a certain sardonic 
satisfaction. 

The Russians see the anti-Soviet government of Chiang Kai-shek decaying 
militarily, politically, and economically. They observe the Chinese Communists 
consolidating in north China, expanding southward in the wake of Chiang's 
military debacles and now preparing for the formal establishment of a separatist 
administration. 

It is equally evident to the Russians that the Chinese Communists will not in 
the meantime be idle. The Communists have amply demonstrated a capacity 
for independent, dynamic growth. However Marshal S'talin may describe the 
Chinese Communists to his American visitors, he can scarcely be unaware of the 
fact that the Communists are a considerably more stalwart and self-sufficient 
force than any European underground or partisan movement (p. 567). 

June 24, 19JfS (Davies) 

Basis for conflict : The Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek recognize that the 
CJommunists, with the popular support which they enjoy and their reputation for 
administrative reform and honesty, represent a challenge to the Central Govern- 
ment and its spoils system. The Generalissimo cannot admit the seemingly 
innocent demands of the Communists that their party be legalized and democratic 



806 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

processes be put into practice. To do so would probably mean the abdication of 
the Kuomintang and the provincial satraps. 

The Communists, on the other hand, dare not accept the Central Government's 
invitation that they disband their armies and be absorbed in the national body 
politic. To do so would be to invite extinction. 

This impasse will probably be resolved, American and other foreign observers 
in Chungking agree, by an attempt by the Central Government to liquidate the 
Communists. This action may be expected to precipitate a civil war from which 
one of the two contending factions will emerge dominant. * * * 

Chiang Kai-sliek and his Kuomintang lieutenants fully realize the risks of an 
attack on the Communists. This may explain the reported statements of high 
officials in Chungking that they must prepare not only for the coming civil war 
but also for the coming war with Russia. Chiang and his Central Government 
recognize that they cannot defeat the Communists and the Soviet Union without 
foreign aid. Such aid would naturally be sought from the United States and 
possibly Great Britain. 

* * * We may anticipate that Chiang Kai-shek will exert everv effort and 
resort to every stratagem to involve us in active support of the Central Govern- 
ment. We will probably be told that if fresh American aid is not forthcoming, 
all of China and eventually all of Asia will be swept by communism. It will be 
difficult for us to resist such appeals, especially in view of our moral commitments 
to continued assistance to China during the postwar period. 

It is therefore not inconceivable that, should Chiang attempt to liquidate the 
Communists, we would find ourselves entangled not only in a civil war in China 
but also drawn into conflict with the Soviet Union (p. 571). 

Deceniher 9, 1944 (Davies) 

* * * The Generalissimo realizes that if he accedes to the Communist terms 
for a coalition government, they will sooner or later dispossess him and his 
Kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, 
form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present govern- 
ment, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the 
Communist issue must eventually be joined. 

The Communist, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with 
the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that 
Chiang's position is crumbling, that they may before long receive a substantial 
Russian support and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in 
at least north China * * * (p. 572). 

November 15, 1944 (Davies) 

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would 
be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recog- 
nition of Chiang's government. 

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically 
bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we 
must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists 
rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, 
we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai- 
shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying 
regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation 
with the Chinese Communists. 

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory 
place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our 
greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent, and friendly 
China — our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Com- 
munists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved 
from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the 
Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we 
are going to support. 

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind 
these basic considerations : Power in China is on the verge of shifting fron} 
Chiang to the Communists. 

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to 
win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 807 

and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese 
nationalism and independence from Soviet control (p. 574). 

December 12, 194^t {Davies) 

The negotiations looking to an agreement between the Generalissimo and the 
Chinese Communists have failed. It is not impossible, however, that one or the 
other side may in the near future revive the negotiations with a new proposal. 

So long as the deadlock exists, or new negotiations drag on, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Generalissimo will continue to refuse us permission to exploit 
militarily the Chinese Communist position extending into the geographical center 
of Japan's inner zone. With the war against Japan proving so costly to us, we 
can ill afford to continue denying ourselves positive assistance and strategically 
valuable positions. 

It is time that we unequivecally told Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with 
and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contri- 
bute most to the war again Japan. We should tell him that we will not work with 
or supply any Chinese unit, whether General Government, Provincial or Commu- 
nist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil conflict. We should 
tell him that we propose to keep him as head of the recognized government, in- 
formed of what supplies we give to the various Chinese forces. 

It is time that we make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that we expect the Chinese 
to settle their own political differences ; that we refuse to become further involved 
in and party to Chinese domestic political disputes. We greatly hope and desire 
that China will emerge from this war unified, democratic, independent and strong. 
We feel that this goal is to be achieved most expeditiously and with the least 
possible expenditure of Chinese and American blood and treasure if the United 
States bends its efforts in China primarily toward working with and assisting 
whatever elements can contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan (p. 574). 

Mr. Morris. We have some other reports here that I would like to 
get your advice on as to what we should do with them, Mr. Chairman. 
There are four reports here, and I believe they are all reports by Mr. 
Service, are they not, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you take those into the record, Senator ? They are 
amplifications of the same theme that we have been developing. Do 
you think we should go into them in detail ? 

The Chairman. No. But I want to lay the foundation for them. 
The foundation is the same as those that we have already inserted in the 
record ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what they are ? 

Mr. Mandel. They deal with the theme developed by Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us where they are from. 

Mr. Mandel. They are all from the transcript of the testimony be- 
fore the State Department Loyalty Security Board in the case of John 
S. Service. 

Senator Ferguson. Have they all been published in the white paper ? 

Mr. Mandel. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they become 
at least part of this official record. 

The Chairman. I do not see any reason, if they are taken from an 
official record made in the State Department, that they should not be 
admissible. 

Senator Ferguson. And they should become part of this record. 

Senator Jenner. Yes. 

The Chairman. They will be admitted. 



808 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 252, 253, 
254, and 255," and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 252 

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949] 

United States Relations With China 

memoranda by foreign service officers in china, 1943-45 

October 9, 1944 (Service) 

Reports of two American officers, several correspondents and twenty-odd for- 
eign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Commu- 
nist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual ob- 
servation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from 
those facts an important conclusion. 

The Japanese are being actively opposed — in spite of the constant warfare 
and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gain- 
ing in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the 
concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this 
simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence. 

This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla war- 
fare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobil- 
ization the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers, 
have become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people 
themselves. They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly 
fight with them. There is complete solidarity of army and people. 

This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what 
amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has 
been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the 
peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. It 
has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness and a sense 
of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self- 
respect, self-reliance and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The 
common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for. 

The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign in- 
vaders but because they deny this revolution. The people vpill continue to 
fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains 
(p. 566). 

June 20, 1944 (Service) 

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it 
has been for the past 10 years. 

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army 
and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes 
of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a 
China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unex- 
pected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weak- 
nesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the 
process of unification. 

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is a general feeling 
of hopelessness. 

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away 
from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of control cannot 
be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government 
to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy. 

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demor- 
alized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness. 

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily 
from infiation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not 
only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years 
of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and 
leadership they once had. 

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other 
arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is 
ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest 
may increase in scale and find political motivation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 809 

6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and 
with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their position. 
Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central 
Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor. 

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one imi)or- 
tant instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher 
plane, the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence 
and are thus creating a new warlordism. 

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows 
no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time : the 
inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted. 

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its 
selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to 
revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing 
ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and 
cliquism within the party, which grows more rather than less acute, the leader- 
ship is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers cliques. 

10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a. 
hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his 
unfortunate attempts to be sage as well as leader — shown, for instance, by 
China's Destiny and his book on economics — have forfeited the respect of many 
intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of 
his dictatorship is becoming outspoken. 

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang 
is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese society, the role 
in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China. 

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle 
by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies ai'e precipitating the crisis. 

Some war-weariness in China m.ust be expected. But the policies of the 
Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and in the presence of obvious 
signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This 
truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the 
situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive 
Committee. 

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to 
perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is 
the enthronement of reaction. 

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the 
country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the 
party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitu- 
tionalism remains an empty promise for which the only preparation is a half- 
hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local 
self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese 
utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control. 

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the consti- 
tution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the 
dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental 
conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. 
Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic 
character to the existing but impotent Peoples Political Council are ignored. 

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls 
on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the para- 
phernalia of a police state — the multiple and omnipresent secret police or- 
ganizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth — it continues to strengthen them 
as its last resort for internal security. 

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective 
steps to check inflation which woiild injure the landlord-capitalist class. 

It is directly responsible for the increase of ofiicial corruption which is one 
of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situa- 
tion. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and specu- 
lation — all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or 
with intimate political connections. 

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures 
of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have 
intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as for 
instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulation. 



810 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft pro- 
duction to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for 
speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal 
productive process. 

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate 
the manufacture and trade of luxury goods, many of which come from areas 
under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely 
paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy. 

It fails to malie an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and in- 
crease revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of 
landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to hog down 
in corruption and inefiiciency, to the point that possibly not more than one- 
third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge 
government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy. 

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even at- 
tempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of 
gold and foreign currency. 

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as 
the growing concentration of land holdings, extortionate rents and ruinous in- 
terest rates, and the impact of inflation. 

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots 
in the composition and nature of the party. 

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has 
lost its power of leadership ; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against 
Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in 
China ; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country. 

The answer to all these question is to be found in the present composition 
and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American de- 
scription becomes ever more true ; the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative 
political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power 
against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Eco- 
nomically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural-gentry-land- 
lords and militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy, and 
merchant bankers having intimate connections with the Government bureau- 
crats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang 
no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's indus- 
trialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence 
politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities. 

The relations of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions pro- 
pounded above is clear. 

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is 
no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience 
of the war is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the 
party's selfish shortcomings. 

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater 
reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national 
energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present 
conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater 
political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as 
the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of 
foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only 
real reform can regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though 
basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's 
present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would 
mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded 
monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present 
state of passive inertia. Thus are they sacrificing China's national interests to 
their own selfish ends. 

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give whole-hearted coop- 
eration to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily 
requii-es the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to 
carry out or make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears the large scale, 
widespread and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will 
expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing 
Influence (pp. 567-570). 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 811 

October 9, 19 H {Service) 

Just as the "Japanese Army cannot crush these militant iieople now, so also 
will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organization, 
knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they have been 
fighting for, these people — now some 90 million and certain to be many more 
before the Kuomintang can reach them — will resist oppression. They are not 
Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at present 
they regard the Kuomintang, from their own experience, as oppressors ; and the 
Communists as their leaders and benefactors. 

With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated. 
Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy. 
This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people; a Communist 
victory will be inevitable. * * * 

From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a 
magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw 
the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in 
China's future * * * i suggest the future conclusion that unless the Kuomin- 
tang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and other- 
wise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it 
yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the domi- 
nant force in China within a comparatively few years (p. 572-573). 

February 14, 1945 (Ludden and Service) 

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the 
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of 
American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations 
should be subordinate. 

The attainment of this objective demands the eifective mobilization of China 
in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of 
a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic re- 
sources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone 
of defense. Denied the eltective use of these resources the attainmnt of our 
primary objective will be unecessarily delayed. 

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government 
the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in 
power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity 
and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utiliza- 
tion in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the Generalis- 
simo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not 
been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preserva- 
tion depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor 
opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Jap- 
anese through fear that it will then vis-^-vis other groups. 

The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the 
United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable 
preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our 
policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On 
the contrary, it has retarded its effect because our statements and actions in 
China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to 
support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will 
receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if 
past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great 
reluctance, if at all. 

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand 
the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable in- 
fluence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by 
this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by 
diplomatic means has failed ; * * *. 

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which 
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support 
for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows : 

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and 
factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and 



22848— 52— pt. 3^ 



812 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological 
preferences for one side or the other." 

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to 
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military 
aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. 
It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to malie use of all availaole 
means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm 
rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China 
would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make conces- 
sions of power and permit united-front coalition. The present opposition 
groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would 
be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, 
a united ally (pp. 575-576). 

Exhibit No, 253 

Yenan, May 1, 1945. 
Congress of Communist Party Meets 

Yenan, May 1. — The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party was held in Yenan in the latter part of April. This is one of the most 
important events in the history of modern China. 

"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve of 
the counteroffensive to save the nation from the crisis which is the consequence 
of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly to 
defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free, 
democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China. 

"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Com- 
munist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates. 

"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu, 
Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao 
Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the congress. Jen 
Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the congress. 

"agenda items 

"There were four items on the agenda : The political report by Comrade Chu 
Teh, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi, and 
the election of members of the central committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 

"Since its foundation in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party held six national 
congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, 
January 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war 
and struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present seventh congress could 
be convened. 

"At the convention of the present congress, the power of the Chinese Commu- 
nist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige among 
the people of China are higher than at any period in the past. 

"total strength 

"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 mem- 
bers but also has under its leadership the Eighth Route, New Fourth, and other 
anti-Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 People's 
Volunteer Corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Man- 
churia, north, central, and south China, with a total population of 95,500,000. 

"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing, 
these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party 
and liberated areas under its leadership have really become the center of gravity 
of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese "national salvation movement" and 
struggle for liberation. The present congress will undoubtely have an extremely 
important influence on the future development of the war of resistance and 
internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 
1, 1945, 9:30 a. m. e. w. t.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 813 

"Coalition Government Needed," Sats Mao 

"Tenan, May 1. — On the 'coalition government' was the title of the political 
report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist 
Party, to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. 

"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and 
nonparty representatives, to form a provisional democratic coalition government 
so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis, mobilize and 
unify the national forces of the vrar or resistance to effectively collaborate with 
the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor, and to secure the 
thorough liberation of the Chinese, are the basic demands of the Chinese people 
at present.' 

"national assemblt 

"China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the 
war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the 
National Assembly, based on a broad, democratic foundation, should be called 
to form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature embracing 
more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This gov- 
ernment will lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build up an inde- 
I)endent, free, unified, prosperous, and strong new country. After China has had a 
democratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the 
basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the 
Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assembly.' 

"immediate formation 

"Mao Tze-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a 
coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the antipopula- 
tion group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tze-tung, is not only 'a fundamental 
obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the strength of the Chinese people 
in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.' " 

MAO reveals postwar PLAN FOR CHINA 

The following is Yenan's continuation in English Morse of the political report 
given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Com- 
munist Party held in Tenan, the first part of which was reported under the 
heading "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao." 

"In his report, Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the 
Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is 
divided into two sections — namely, general and specific — and furnishes the 
answers to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the 
thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a halfway 
compromise, Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret under- 
standings and dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang 
government and the Japanese seci-et emissaries. 

"no compromise 

"He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang govern- 
ment must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any com- 
promise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the Eighth Route 
and New Fourth Armies and other People's Armies. Moreover, wherever the 
enemy has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily 
develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies 
in the fighting.' 

"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resis- 
tance to the Japanese aggressors from them, "The Chinese people should in self- 
defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile." 

people's freedom 

"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their 
struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese people 
is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang government 



814 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, render- 
ing them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors. 

"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their free- 
dom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom. 
The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic 
force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.' 



"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided 
China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is 
not 'absolutist unification by dictators' but the 'democratic unification by the 
people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy, 
and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.' 

"With regard to the People's Armies, Mao pointed out that without any army 
which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed. 
The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the 
people. Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently 
suffered [words missing] oppress the people and discriminate against other 
troops should be reformed. Mao Tze-tung declared : 'As soon as the new demo- 
cratic coalition government and the united high command is formed in China, 
troops in the Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But 
all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time. 

"private capitalism 

"Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Party in the entire period 
[words missing]. The new democracy approves the development of private 
capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory 
propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen; namely, to carry out the principle of 'tillers 
own their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life 
of the people in the country.' 

"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas 
the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and 
peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance. 

"Mao also declared : 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to 
carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and in- 
terest will be carried out throughout the country and then [words missing]. 
Then appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the [words 
missing] "tillers own their land." ' [Next paragraph garbled in transmis- 
sion — Ed.] 

"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be 'protected', while on the other 
band 'guaranties are given to [words missing] profits from proper commercial 
[enterprise — Ed.].' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities 
will certainly be [words missing] widespread [development — Ed.] of a private 
capitalistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and co- 
operatives. 

"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the 
industrialization of China 'will [afford — Ed.] a very great amount of foreign 
Investments.' 

"culture and education 

"'With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out [words 
missing] respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made [words 
missing]. He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of illit- 
eracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out that the 
ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.' 



"Concerning the national minorities problem, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 
'national minorities should be helped [asterisks supplied by Tenan — Eld.] to at- 
tain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally. Their 
language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be respected.' 

"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'accord- 
ing to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow evey 
school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 815 

and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees, 
will be protected by the Government.' 

"Mao Tze-tung in his report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' [words 
missing] principle of the Chinese Communist Party in diplomatic policy, de- 
clared Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic 
relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and 
postwar problems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, com- 
mercial intercourse, investments, [words missing] of thorough extermination of 
the Japanese aggressors, upholding of world peace [words missing] for equal 
and independent status of tiie nation [words missing] interests and friendship of 
nations and peoples.' 

"international conferences 

"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was [words missing] Moscow, 
Cairo, Tehran, and Crimea international conferences, Mao Tze-tung said, that the 
Chinese Communist Party [words missing] the Crimea Conference on this ques- 
tion. The Chinese Communist Party 'welcomes the San Francisco United Na- 
tions Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in 
order to express the will of the Chinese people.' 

"Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords [words missing] with the 
policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese 
and oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of [words 
missing] be adopted in the Orient and Cliina." 

4-POINT PROGRAM 

"He said that '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and 
the Japanese Fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly extermi- 
nated. There should be on halfway compromise: (2) [words missing] the ves- 
tige of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to 
remain; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not al- 
lowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship [words missing] must be abol- 
ished [words missing.] After its abolition it should at first be supplanted by 
a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole na- 
tion. [Words missing] territories having been recovered, the i-egular coalition 
government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unre- 
stricted elections." 

SOVIET UNION 

"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '[We are of the opinion — 
Ed.] that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward 
the Soviet Union and swiftly improve [Sino — Ed.] Soviet diplomatic relations.' 
'On behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tze-tung expressed [words missing] which 
has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in 
China's war [words missing] liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal Sta- 
lin's speech [words missing] and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese 
neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.' 

"Mao Tze-tung added : 'We believe that without the participation of the 
Soviet Union it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the 
Pacific question.' " 

. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 

"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations, Mao Tze-tung 
said : 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great Brit- 
ain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggres- 
sors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to 
China, deserve our thanks. [Words missing] will or Chinese people and thereby 
injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign government 
helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese 
people, a gross mistake will have been committed.' 

"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China [words 
missing], Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome [words missing] 
Chinese people on a footing of equality. But he pointed out, China 'definitely 
cannot rely on an [words missing] equality [words missing] being given by the 
good will of foreign governments and peoples. [Words missing] and actual 
footing of equality must in the main rely oji the efforts of the Chinese people 



816 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to build up politically, economically, and culturally a new democratic country^ 
which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong. China 
assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy 
of the Kuomintang government at present in force?" 

FAE EASTERN COUNTRIES 

"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to 
the countries in the Far East: After the [words missing] unconditional sur- 
render of the Japanese aggressors, all democratic [words missing] of the Japa- 
nese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese 
people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough ex- 
termination of the Japanese [words missing] would not be possible to guarantee 
peace in the Pacific [asterisks supplied by Yenan — Ed.] 'The decision of the 
Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese 
people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation [words missing].* 
With regard to Thailand, she 'should be dealt with according to the measures of 
dealing with a Fascist turncoat'." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, 
May 2, 1^5.) 

Exhibit No. 254 

Junes 1944. 

The Situation in China and Suggestions Rexjarding Ameeioan Pomct 

/. The situation in China is rapidly becominff critical 

A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as mili- 
tary, has so far been eminently successful. 

Japan has had the choice of two alternatives. 

1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale 
military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there 
was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real 
mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps 
rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China. 

2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow 
strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the 
continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Com- 
munist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won 
for him outside of China by his allies, this policy had the advantage that as long 
as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the 
steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any active 
or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual exten- 
sion of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit 
the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost. 

Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang 
would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so 
far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by 
slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And 
China cannot, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined 
Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China. 

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it 
has been for the past 10 years. 

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and 
the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of 
growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China 
which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected 
strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses 
are becoming accentuated, and there is taking place a reversal of the process of 
unification. 

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of 
hopelessness. 

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away 
from the larger cities, and Government mandates and measures of control cannot 
be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government 
to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy. 

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoral- 
ized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 817 

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily 
from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not 
only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress ; the vs^eight of years of 
political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and 
leadership they once had. 

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other 
arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever 
increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may in- 
crease in scale and find political motivation. 

6. The Provincial groups, are making common cause with one another and 
with other dissident groups ,and are actively consolidating their positions. Their 
continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Govern- 
ment is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor. 

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang Armies is increasing, as shown in one impor- 
tant instance by the "young generals' conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher 
plane the war-zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence 
and are thus creating a "new warlordism." 

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows 
no signs of being closed but grows more critical with the passage of time ; the 
inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted. 

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its 
selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable 
to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a 
growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissension and 
cliquism within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership 
is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers' clique. 

10. llie Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hard- 
ening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his un- 
fortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader — shown, for instance, by 
"China's Destiny" and his book on economics — have forfeited the respect of many 
intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his 
dictatorship is becoming more outspoken. 

These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased 
by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the 
Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of 
east China south of the Yangtze. 

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is 
ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role 
in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China. 

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle 
by its own initiatives : on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis. 

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the 
Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious 
signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This 
truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with 
the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the central execu- 
tive committee. 

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to per- 
petuate their own power overrides all other considerations. 

The result is the enthronement of reaction. 

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the 
country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the 
party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitu- 
tionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half- 
hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local 
self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese 
utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control. 

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution 
and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation 
of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of 
freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the 
educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character 
to the existing but important People's Political Council are ignored. 

On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means 
as compulsory political training for Government posts, emphasis on the political 
nature of the army, through control, and increasing identification of the party 
and Government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, ein Reich, 



818 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ein Fiihrer," even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure. 

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the autoritarian controls on 
which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the para- 
phernalia of a police state — the multiple and omnipresent secret-police organi- 
zations, the gendarmerie, and so forth — it continues to strengthen them as its 
last resort for internal security. (For the reenforcement of the most impor- 
tant of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortu- 
nately, bear some responsibility.) 

Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears 
may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomin- 
tang, despite the pretext — to meet foreign and Chinese criticism — of conducting 
negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans 
which can only result in civil war. In so doing, it shows itself blind to the 
facts: that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success- 
without outside assistance is most problematic, that such a civil war would 
hasten the process of distintegration and the spread of chaos ; that it would 
prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan ; and that the only 
parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Prepara- 
tions for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets 
■which augur ill for future unity and democracy, 

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective 
steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class. 

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one 
of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situa- 
tion. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation, 
all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with inti- 
mate political connections. 

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of 
■wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have 
intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as, for 
instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations. 

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft pro- 
duction to run down, as they, of course, must when it is more profitable for 
speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal 
productive process. 

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the 
manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under 
Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid 
for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy. 

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and 
increases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of 
landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down 
in corruption and ineflacieney to the point that possibly not more than one-third 
of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge Gov- 
ernment funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy. 

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempt- 
ing palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and 
foreign currency. 

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China, such as the 
growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents, and ruinous interest 
rates, and the impact of inflation. 

3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly 
short-sighted by progresive estrangement of its allies. 

By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail, most inappro- 
priate to its circumstances, and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly, 
and to extend whole-hearted cooperation, which its own interests demand, the 
Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It 
has already alienated its other major jwtential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which 
its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists. 
The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that 
Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting 
Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria. 

It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is de- 
pendent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is en- 
dangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy : There are indications that it 
is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and 
Russia. When speedy victory, and any victory at all, demands maximizing of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 819 

agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage 
of the war effort of the United Nations. 

4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let 
America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from 
active participation. 

Its most important present contribution is to allow us, at our own and 
fantastic cost, to build and use air bases in China. 

It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the 
purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan, 
even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in north Burma, 
the purpose of which is to open a life line into China and facilitate the eventual 
landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of 
obstruction. 

It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed 
with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been 
transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have 
been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purpose. China has displayed a dog in 
the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorat- 
ing in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make 
available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in 
China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interest directly 
served. 

It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transiwrta- 
tion. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture 
of Burma and west Yunnan ; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation 
on which military activity must depend. 

It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial 
demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made these 
excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China 
(against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add 
to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China 
at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for postwar use 

It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtain- 
ing supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers, 
some of whom have been known to have oflicial connections. It has permitted 
the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic 
exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through 
American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies that 
can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be devoted 
to other essential military items. 

It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to col- 
lect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is exem- 
plified by the disapi)ointing fruits of promised cooi)eration by Chinese espionage 
organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large sums) ; 
by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by American 
observers to the actual fighting fronts, and by the steadfast refusal to permit any 
contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious to the 
urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this in- 
telligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for the fact 
that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-range 
bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives. 

In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which 
works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and the 
strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves 
and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is 
greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people 
as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that 
the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically 
cared for, trained and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political con- 
siderations — the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China, 
and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies. 

For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only 
kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively — a i)eople's guerrilla 
war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomin- 
tang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people, as it is of the 
Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate 
on the perpetuation of its own power. 



820 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown 
most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy 
armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers, 
absence of support by the people, who have been consistently mistreated, lack 
of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the ofBcers through such prac- 
tices as trade with the occupied areas. 

If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership 
does not want to tight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further 
and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battle- 
ground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to 
explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and pupi)ets. 
Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain 
its own position and power, save the east China homes of practically all of its 
oflBcials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities. 

If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership, 
which means the generalissimo, a cynical disregard of the added cost of the 
inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources. 

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in 
the composition and nature of the party. 

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost 
its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against 
Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China, 
and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country. 

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and 
nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description 
becomes ever more true : the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political 
cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all 
outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the 
Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords, the militar- 
ists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy and merchant bankers 
having intimate connections with the bureaucrats. This base has actually con- 
tracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, 
the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much 
weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the 
coastal cities. 

The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded 
above is clear. 

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is 
no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience 
of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the 
party's selfish shortcomings. 

It cannot fight an effective war becaiTse this is impossible without greater re- 
liance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national 
energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present 
conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater 
political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the 
genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude ; the threat of foreign 
invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform 
can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic 
to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present 
leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that 
the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. 
Bather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of 
passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their 
own selfish ends. 

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted co- 
operation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily 
requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable, to 
carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large- 
scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort 
will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a 
liberalizing influence. 

The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from 
the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's 
economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are in- 
capable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this 
objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of 
an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 821 

centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party 
with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization — such as con- 
nections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no 
objection to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups 
in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of 
which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups. 
This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of 
luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore 
not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between 
the Kuomintang and the puppet regime. 

E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure ; if that 
failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both 
to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far Bast. 

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present 
leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which 
could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its 
preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result, 
to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disin- 
tegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be 
expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take 
steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case : 
Precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efiorts to 
maintain and monopolize control. 

The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run 
counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin. 
Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution 
of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to 
American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we mignt welcome the 
fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive 
government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan. 

But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the 
Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China 
of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing 
China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets 
might be able to occupy this vacuum, at much less cost than by a major military 
campaign, it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank posi- 
tion and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be 
prolonged and made more difl5cult. 

Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China, which 
would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government, an indispensable 
precondition for stability and order in the Far East. 

China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major 
liability. 

F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the 
present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might 
avert the threatened collapse. 

These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the Government and the party 
responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army oflScers ; the small mer- 
chants ; large sections of the lower ranks of the Government bureaucracy ; most 
of the foreign-returned students ; the intelligentsia, including professors, stu- 
dents, and the professional classes ; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who 
make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo ; the 
minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy 
great prestige ; the Chinese Communist Party ; and the inarticulate but increas- 
ingly restless rural population. 

The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous. 
A Kuomintang oflScial recently admitted that resentment against the present 
Kuomintang Government is so widespread that if there were free, universal 
elections 80 percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these 
groups are nebulous and unorganized, feeling — like the farmers — perhaps only 
a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and 
varying political beliefs, where they have any at all. They are tending, how- 
ever, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the 
change of the status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by 
the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal. 

The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act 
independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such 
might be the case in a military putsch, a possibility that cannot be disregarded. 



822 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the 
greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself 
more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang, 
the Japanese, or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much 
larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. 
A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of 
the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial 
warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese poli- 
tics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy. 

The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem 
in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires 
emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will 
to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism, 
the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies 
which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually sup- 
ported by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all 
important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political. 

It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective 
unity — certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must 
be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well — lies neither 
with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic 
combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within 
the Kuomintang, and the probably large sections of the Communists who would 
be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the 
resurrection of a united front. 

Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure 
that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken 
in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government — and only such 
a government — will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring na- 
tional morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription 
and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a govern- 
ment — and only such a government — will automatically end the paralyzing in- 
ternal dissention and political unrest. Such a government — and only such a 
government — will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase pro- 
duction, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end 
corruption, hoarding, speculation, and profiteering. 

It is, of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic 
government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve 
the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as, 
only as, the government moves toward democracy. 

II. In the light of this developing crisis ichat should be the American attitude 
toicard China f 

It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China 
can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic 
effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we 
can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost 
certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately 
and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward 
China. 

A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dei)endence on 
us and will be forced to appeal for our support. 

We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand 
it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military 
salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explana- 
tion of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism. 
The Kuomintang — and particularly the Generalissimo — know that we are the 
only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn. 

The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well- 
worn but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past 
and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan 
on what are falsely stated would have been favorable terms. They have claimed 
and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan 
saved Russia, Great Britain, and ourselves, ignoring the truth that our own 
refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl 
Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and 
will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of 
materials than any other major ally, forgetting that they have done less fighting. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 823 

have not used the materials given, and vs^ould not have had the ability to use 
what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay 
the blame on us for their difficulties, distorting the effect of American Army 
expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only 
a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese 
economy. 

But however far-fetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have 
several embarrassing effects. 

1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war 
effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged, 
and possible Russian intervention attracted. 

2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public 
opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse. 
(In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we 
have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but 
also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better 
part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.) 

3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose 
international prestige, especially in the Far East. 

On the other hand, if we conae to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own 
terms we would be buttressing, but only temporarily, a decadent regime which 
by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems. 
Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate 
day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a 
situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between 
two such unpalatable alternatives. 

B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence. 
Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to 

ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in 
no position — and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able — to turn down or 
render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward 
China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be 
tremendous. 

C. There are three general alternatives open to us. 

1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it althogether. 

2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he 
asks for it. 

3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take 
the necessary steps for its implementation. 

D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives 
in China, 

The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play 
an important and perhaps decisive role in — 

1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hasten- 
ing the defeat of Japan. 

2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political 
and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhance 
the chances of its orderly postwar recovery. 

3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in 
postwar east Asia. 

4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the progressive, independent, and 
democratic China. 

E. We should adopt the third alternative — a coordinated and positive policy. 
This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation 

in China and the proper objectives of our policy there. 

The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds, but also 
for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases 
and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot 
afford to wash our hands of China. 

The results of the second alternative — which, insofar as we have a China 
policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing — speak for themselves. 
The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered 
away with neglibible, if any effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic 
collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase 
China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for 
the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted and ruin- 
ous policies. 

The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the re- 
jection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advis- 



824 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Ing China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only question is 
whether we give this help within a framework which malies sense, or whether 
we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. lu 
the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the 
left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be 
dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable 
benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to these already 
troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent 
short-termed expediency. But most important is the possibility that this hap- 
hazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save 
the situation ; even with it, China may continue toward collapse. 

F. This positive policy should be political. 

The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past ta 
ignore politcal considerations of direct military significance or whether we are 
to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political 
forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objective. 

We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement 
toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This 
can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic polit- 
ical reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this 
process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exer- 
tion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically 
used. 

///. TJie implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects^ 
is practical and can &e carried out by many means 

A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such 
a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as disting- 
uished from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost 
all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation 
In China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate 
and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. 
This tact and sensitivity wHl be required not only of the top policy-directing 
agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned 
in direct relations with China. 

There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American 
Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China. 

The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government 
agencies — State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations — de- 
tracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence, 
when it is most needed. 

It must be recognized — and it will be even more the case under the iwlicy 
proposed — that all our dealings with all our activities in China have political 
implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity 
of policy and synchronization of action. It's attainment will require intelligent 
and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chunking, 

The logical person to coordinate activities in Chunking is obviously, because 
of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding 
person in Wahington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Depart- 
ment who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet 
member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close con- 
sultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of 
the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operat- 
ing in China. 

C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there 
should be careful selection and timing. 

Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be 
deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more force- 
ful or dii'ect and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to 
change its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand. 

D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this posi- 
tive policy include the following : 

1. Negative: (a) Stop our present mollycoddling of China by: Resti'icting 
lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing train- 
ing of the Chinese Army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, 
or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can 
be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become moi-e cooperative 
in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 825 

reasonable on financial questions, or allowing ns freedom in such military require- 
ments as establishing contact with the Communist areas. 

(6) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige in- 
ternationally and in the United States. Such "face" serves only to bolster the 
regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of 
China as one of the Big Four served a useful purpose in the early stage of the 
war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justi- 
fication. 

We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the 
meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and 
the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference. 
Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign 
of either stupdity or weakness. 

Abandonment of glib generalities for hard-headed realism in our attitude 
toward China will be quickly understood, without the resentment that would 
probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be 
given when praise is due. 

(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such 
lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid, and political support. We can make it 
clear without having to be vei*y explicit that we stand ready to help China when 
China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of pub- 
licity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar eco- 
nomic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the 
landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people. 

(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police 
organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite 
of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results 
in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming in- 
creasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusions Chinese liberals, who 
look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders 
in pressing for democratic reform. 

2. Positive: (o) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese lead- 
ers in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and 
unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, finan- 
cial, and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come 
from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the 
visits of the Vice President Wallace to China and H. H. Kung to the United 
States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of 
Congress regarding affairs in China. 

(&) We should take up the repeated, but usually insincere requests of the 
Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are 
provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and 
support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice 
we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect. 

(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every prac- 
tical means available. 

The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of report- 
ing American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent 
political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We 
should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more 
direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recogni- 
tion and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China. 
Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive, and objec- 
tive plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nation- 
alistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of 
the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country. 

A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The 
present diversion, b.v Koumintang wishes, to technical subjects should be recti- 
fied and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political 
subjects such as American Government administration. We should increase our 
aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored, 
such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunity for 
study or lecturing in the United States. 

Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service 
representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a 
center of American influence and contact with Chinese lilierals and returned 
students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American 



826 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chi- 
oese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for. 
Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been 
close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence. 

(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States 
toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The 
most obvious means would be making background information available, in an 
unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research 
workers. Without action on our part their writings will become known to Chi- 
nese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We 
should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above 
to promote dissemination in China. 

(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the 
Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can, and should for 
its maximum effect, be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition 
which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese. 

Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distin- 
guished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for 
special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in in- 
ternational commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the 
United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation to 
Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House. 

We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural 
relations, and other lines of work in China. 

(/) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists. 
This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, pub- 
licity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued 
pressure for the dispatch of observers to north China. At the same time we 
should stress the importance of north China militarily for intelligence regarding 
Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data, 
and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should 
consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to north 
China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and 
guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds 
do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers any- 
way. 

(g) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other 
armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Jap- 
anese. 

ih) We should continue to press, and if necessary insist, on getting American 
observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible 
assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his 
treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care. 

(i) We should publicize statements by responsible Government ofiicials indi- 
cating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitvide toward such questions as 
the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is 
interesting for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regard- 
ing American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuo- 
mintang that publication in China was prohibited. 

This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to 
the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops. 

E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively. 

This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the 
conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion 
in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, minor 
party leaders, and the Communists can advance. 

F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an 
uncoordinated and only partially effective manner. 

What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned 
expension of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases uncon- 
sciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal 
groups ; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area ; 
we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some at- 
tempts to propagandize American democratic ideals. 

G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in 
Chinese affairs. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 827 

It must be admitted that some of the measures pi'oposed would involve taking 
more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they 
do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovei'eignty. If we choose to make 
lend-lease conditional ou a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom 
to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as im- 
perialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for 
instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomin- 
tang, as the Russians did in the case of the Communists. 

Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The 
Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the 
statements and writing of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through 
Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese 
Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized 
American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble 
in American politics, througli Madame Chiang, Luce, Willkie, and Republican 
Congressmen. They have had, and will continue to have, freedom to try to influ- 
ence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do 
it in China. 



Exhibit No. 255 

MiLiTART Weakness of Our Fab Eastern Policy 

February 14, 1945. 
To the Commandinff General, USAF: 

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the 
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of Ameri- 
can lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be 
subordinate. 

The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China 
in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of 
a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic 
resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner 
zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources, the attainment of 
our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed. 

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang government 
the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in 
power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity 
and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utiliza- 
tion in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the generalissimo 
to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been 
abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation 
depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposi- 
tion groups are willing to expend their military resourses against the Japanese 
through fear that it will weaken them vis-tl-vis other groups. A recent instance 
is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the 
Hankow-Canton Railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on pre- 
venting the strengthening of other groups: Witness the blockade of the 
Communists. 

The aim of American policy, as indicated clearly by official statements in the 
United States, is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable 
preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our 
policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On 
the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and 
undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced 
the Kuomintang government that we will continue to support it, and it alone. 
The Kuomintang government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of 
American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, 
it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all. 

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand 
the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable in- 
fluence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this 
time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplo- 
matic means has failed ; we should not be deceived by any face-saving formula re- 



22848 — 52— pt. 3- 



828 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

suiting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of 
failure. We should also realize that no goverament can survive in China with- 
out American support. 

There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by 
which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the 
Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread 
secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain help- 
less to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that 
we are champions of the status quo. 

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which 
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support 
for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows : 

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and 
factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and 
thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological prefer- 
ences for one side or the other." 

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to 
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military 
aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It 
would serve notice, however, of our preparation to malie use of all available 
means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm 
rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China 
would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make conces- 
sions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, 
no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won 
wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a 
united ally. 

Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force 
in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our 
primary mission. In spite of hero-worshipping publicity in the United States, 
Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly 
supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves 
oft' from millions of useful allies ; many of whom are already organized and in 
position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to 
Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the coun- 
try. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a 
condition which is potentially present throughout Chiha. Other important 
groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Communist- 
agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions — but 
the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and 
strength openly to foster such revolutionary ideas. 

Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from 
which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the generalissimo 
is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to 
marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the generalissimo 
is but one means to an end ; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements 
of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should 
be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach 
to our primary objective may be restored. 

Mr. Morris. Would you testify that to the best of your recollection 
the reports of these four political officers were uniformly derogatory 
of the Chinese Nationalist Government ? 

General Wedemeter. I could state that the reports oral and writ- 
ten of three, Mr. Service, Mr. Davies, and Mr. Ludden, were very 
commendatory in references to the Commiuiists, and frequently de- 
rogatory in references to the Nationalist Government. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, can you recall that any friction 
or disagreement was openly expressed between yourself and General 
Hurley on the one hand and these political advisers on the other? 
You have testified that generally you were in support of General 
Hurley's position. 

General Wedemeyer. Well, my position out there was I was just 
a military man and I looked up to the Ambassador as the senior rep- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 829 

resentative of my country in that area. And when I first reported to 
take over the command I paid my respects to Ambassador Gaus. He 
was the Ambassador to China at that time. And shortly thereafter, a 
month or so hater, he resigned, and Mr. Patrick J. Hurley became the 
Ambassador. And I evolved a system of working together, and, as I 
stated, I recognized him as a senior, a civilian, and I deferred to his 
ideas in the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural fields. In 
the military field I felt that I was responsible and he did too. 

Senator Ferguson. General, when you were assigned to China on 
this mission, was it to carry out a new policy ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir, 1 received no instructions about a 
new policy. 

Senator Ferguson. You were assigned to carry out a mission which 
in your opinion was the mission previous to your assignment ? 

General Wedemeyer. To support the Nationalist Government of 
China and to actually, to put it bluntly, kill as many Japanese as 
possible. 

Senator Ferguson. To help them in the Japanese cause. 

General Wedemeyer. To assist them or to cooperate with them in 
their military operations against the Japanese, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you understood that that was a carrying 
on of a policy that had been there ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you found in the files of the foreign officers 
a different philosophy ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But you kept to the assignment that you felt 
that you had and carried that out as nearly as you could ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was the policy at least of Hurley who 
came there as the Ambassador of the United States ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, there was a question, I think, on 
the record : Did you recall any expressions of disagreement between 
any of these Foreign Service officers and yourself and General Hurley ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, I did not have any disagreement with 
them. 

Mr. Morris. Did you hear of any ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about it. General Wedemeyer ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, Ambassador Hurley moved over to my 
house during the winter of 1944-45 because the Japs used to bomb us 
there and a big boulder had rolled into the Ambassador's house, so 
he moved into my house for a few weeks while his house was being 
renovated. And he, in the evening discussions in my home, sug- 
gested that these four political advisers that I had be placed under 
him. That seemed logical to me. I looked to the Ambassador for my 
intructions in political matters, diplomatic matters, and I told him 
I would agree to that. 

So we were ordered home in February of 1945 by President Koose- 
velt. And when we got back to this country, to the Capital, Mr. 
Hurley requested that those four men be returned to him and to 
operate in the Embassy, and said that General Wedemeyer had no 



830 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

objection; which was correct. That was done. Mr. Stimson, as 
Secretary of War, had requested those four political advisers for his 
friend General Stilwell when General Stilwell assumed command 
out there some years earlier. 

So, Mr. Stimson was interested in my view, and I had lunch with 
him and expressed agreement that they should be put back over under 
the Embassy. I did not express disapproval or concern about these 
men. I had none. They had been loyal to me. I did not agree with 
their reports. I found them to be very bright, keen, and they cer- 
tainly knew most of the Chinese leaders. But, as I indicated, I did 
not analj^ze their reports nearly as carefully as I should have, and 
talk to them about it, because I was so busily involved with military 
duties. They were put over under the Ambassador. 

Wlien we got back, we were only home about a week, and we 
flew back to Uhina, and Mr. Hurley then had some difficulties with 
these men. He felt, as he expressed it, that they were undermining 
his efforts to bring about a stability in the China area. He finally 
had one of them transferred. And some had already left, I think. 
Mr. Service had come back, and Mr. Emmerson and Ludden and 
Davies still were there. And finally Davies was transferred to Mos- 
cow, and he came over to say good-by to me. At that time Hurley 
was still living with me, and they had quite a heated argument in 
my home. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you tell us what the argument was about ? 

General Wedemeyer. Of course, one does not remember all of the 
details. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that. Just give us the substance. 

General Wedemeyer. This has not occurred to me in the years inter- 
vening. But Hurley stated to Mr. Davies that he, Davies, had not 
supported Mr. Hurley and had made reports that contravened Amer- 
ican policy as he. Hurley, understood it, and that he was going to ask 
the State Department to relieve Mr. Davies ; that is, to discharge him. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean discharge him entirely from the 
service ? 

General Wedemeyer. Discharge him entirely from the Foreign 
Service. Mr. Hurley made that statement. 

And Mr. Davies protested very strongly and became highly emo- 
tional, as did the Ambassador, and there were exchanges. I do not 
recall, really, in fairness to either one of them, what was said. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you can give the substance of it. 

General Wedemei^er. The substance was that Mr. Davies felt that 
he had been loyal, and Mr. Hurley that he had not been loyal to him, 
Hurley, and finally Mr. Hurley agreed not to request his discharge 
but definitely that he should be transferred and go to Moscow to see at 
first hand the operation of some of these ideas that Mr. Davies had 
been espousing. 

Senator Ferguson. So, it was Mr. Hurley's idea that he would not 
ask for his discharge from the service ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But he recommended that Davies be sent to 
Moscow to experience things that he had been advocating in China ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. That is my recollection of the con- 
versation that took place in my house in about February or March 
or April, right around in there. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 831 

Senator FEROusoisr. Of course, you felt, when their advice was not 
in line with wliat you thought your mission was, that you, being a 
military man and assigned there to do a certain mission, did not have 
any personal feeling against them ? 

General Wedemeyer. Oh, yes; I did, Senator, but I was too busy 
with -the military job. But if I had known — those men were under 
me, and if I ever have anybody, civilian or military, under me, and 
he is doing anything that I interpret as disloyal, I will go after him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you interpret these things as being dis- 
loyal 'i 

General Wedemeyer. I did not, sir, because I did not analyze them 
as I should have carefully. 

Senator Ferguson. I will put it to j^ou now : What is your opinion 
now after you read these rejDorts in the light of all the circumstances? 
Were they disloval to the Government and the policy that we had 
there? 

General Wedemeyer. I cannot answer that question, sir ; honestly I 
cannot answer it. But I can say this : If I had followed their advice, 
communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly 
than it did. And I would not have carried out my directive or my 
instructions as I understood them. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that is an answer to my question. 

General Wedemeyer. I would hesitate to call any man categorically 
disloyal, sir, unless I had the proof. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand your answer. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, when General Marshall went to 
China, did you ever see his directive that he took with him? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know who prepared that directive ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir; I don't. I think that General Hull 
and General Lincoln and General Marshall himself had something to 
to with it. 

Subsequently I saw a carbon copy of that directive in the Pentagon, 
and it had the initials J. C. V. in the lower left-hand corner, as I 
recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose initials could they be? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, the head of the Far Eastern Division 
was John Carter Vincent at that time. 

Mr. Morris. You say you saw the initials J. C. V. on the draft of the 
directive ? 

General Wedemeyer. I have seen them on a carbon copy of that 
directive, sir. Whether it was the final directive, I don't know. I 
mean, I did not compare the phraseology exactly. 

Senator Ferguson. General, I wonder whether you have an opinion 
as to why it is so difficult for committees to actually ascertain who 
did prepare this directive. Why should there be any argument about 
who prepared this or any secrecy about who prepared it ? Why should 
it not be an open book? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Senator Ferguson, I can understand 
why we should protect sources of information in the FBI. I can 
understand that where the FBI at times does not want you to have 
access, or anyone to have access, to their files. 

Senator Ferguson. To their source. 



832 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ! 

General WedeMeyer. Yes, sir. You will destroy a source. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. 

General Wedemeyer. Or jeopardize a source. But I do not under- 
stand at all why the repersentatives of the American people do not 
have more information concerning national and international develop- 
ments. 

Senator Ferguson. As to who prepared a document. 

General Wedemeyer. I think that who prepared a document cer- 
tainly should be available to you representatives of the American 
peoples. 

I could not understand, for example, why Wedemeyer's name was 
mentioned so frequently in the MacArthur hearings, associated with 
a telegram, and yet we could not find out who in the State Department 
had direct contact with the same matter. And I do not know to this 
day, and I tried to find out. Yet my name was bandied about freely. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, it was not a secret on your part? 

General Wedemeyer. And my permission was not requested either. 
If I had some compunction about it, I certainly was not given the op- 
portunity to express it, but I did not care. 

Senator Ferguson. When it comes to a State Department official, 
then it becomes a deep, dark secret ? 

General Whjemyer. I could not say that as a generality, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It did in that case. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is certainly true as to who prepared the docu- 
ment of the Marshall situation ; is it not ? 

General Wedemeyer. I don't know, sir. I did not know that you 
people had made the request to get this information, sir. I did not 
know that. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that at 
this time we have not made such a request for that document. 

Senator Ferguson. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I now suggest 
and ask that the Chair and the committee obtain this information as 
to who actually did, and let us havelt on the record so that it will not 
be in dispute. 

The Chairman. You mean we will try to obtain it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is all the committee can do. It can 
do its best. 

The Chairman. The committee will proceed through its chairman 
at once to try to secure the information by every means that we know 
of. I wish to say, however, that the Chair has had some difficulty in 
times past. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

The Chairman. The witness on the stand now. General Wedemeyer, 
rendered a very valuable report that would have been of great interest 
to the people of this country, and the chairman, then chairman of 
another committee of the Senate, attempted by subpoena to get that 
report, and the subpena was denied, or the document was denied to the 
subpena officer. So, we may have some trouble here again, but we will 
try. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, do you recall the recommenda- 
tions made in the directive that General Marshall took with him to 
China? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 833 

General Wedemeyer. Well, I could give you substantially what was 
in it. It required General Marshall, as a special envoy of the Presi- 
dent, to go to China and to broaden the base of the Government, to 
bring about a coalition of the various political parties there and to 
create stability in that area. 

Mr. Morris. And you say that was the substance of the directive? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General Wedemeyer, were you in China when 
General Marshall first arrived on his mission ? 

General Wedemeyer. You mean on this mission? Yes, sir; I met 
him at the airport. 

Mr. Morris. Were you the ranking American military commander 
in the field at that time ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Were you consulted on military matters by General 
Marshall in the execution of his mission ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I gave General Marshall a resume 
of the situation that maintained in China at the end of the war and 
indicated my intention, which was hardly necessary to do, but that 
every resource in the China theater was at his disposal to help him out. 

Mr. Morris. Did General Marshall make an effort to bring about a 
coalition between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Com- 
munist government ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I think he made a very continued 
and studied effort to bring about a coalition of the political factions, 
and also to do away with the military forces of any particular political 
party, and to amalgamate them with the political forces, and they 
would be tlie army or the military force of the political entity that 
he ended up with. Obviously, it would be impossible to carry on a 
political entity if Republicans had an army and Democrats had an 
army in our own country. 

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, do you have any knowledge that 
General Marshall imposed an embargo on the Chines Nationalist 
Government at that time ? 

General Wedemeyer. The term "embargo," in the connotation of 
that term, I do not know whether it had application to what I know 
about it. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us just what you know ? 

General Wedemeyer. There was, as I recall it, $500,000,000 appro- 
priated by the Congress to help China. I do not know whether the 
help was military or economic or both, but I know that General Mar- 
shall was authorized by the President to determine the assistance, 
economic and military, that would be given to China. This, of course, 
was to assist him in bringing about this coalition that he was ordered 
to accomplish. 

Mr. Morris. And do you know that this money was withheld from 
the Chinese Government ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, sir, when I returned, I was put in com- 
mand of the Second Army over here with headquarters in Baltimore. 
But I did receive calls from Chinese friends here telling me that they 
were desperate for ammunition and for maintenance parts for their 
vehicles, American vehicles that they had secured during the war, and 
they urged me to do what I could. I was in no official status and could 



834 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

do nothing about it, but it would indicate that there were retardations 
or stoppages of the flow of supplies to China. That was my only 
contact with that situation. 

Mr. Morris. I have no further questions to ask General Wedemeyer 
on this score. 

Senator Ferguson. I have a question. 

You did answer some questions to the United States News ; is that 
correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And I am asking you in relation to the answers 
to questions on how our policy was influenced. Do you recall those 
answers ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I think Mr. David Lawrence asked 
me if in my judgment there were influences 

The Chairman. I think the questions and answers might be 
submitted. 

Senator Ferguson. I just wanted to know whether or not there 
was any change that you wanted to make in those answers or whether 
that is your opinion. 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir ; that is my considered opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your considered opinion ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we 
insert this. 

General Wedemeyer. I would like to emphasize there. Senator 
Ferguson, that in referring to that I know of my own personal ex- 
perience that there are thousands of loyal Americans in Government 
service. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that in here. 

General Wedemeyer. And I want it emphasized here, sir, because 
I do not want in any way to reflect against the many of my own com- 
rades in military service, or against many fine people in the Gov- 
ernment service in general. 

Senator Ferguson. But that does not detract from these answers 
in here? 

General Wedemeyer. Not one iota, sir. I believe those statements 
to be correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that 
this excerpt of an interview of General Wedemeyer appearing in the 
September 14, 1951, issue of United States News and World Report 
be inserted in the record. That is, only that portion of it beginning 
with How Policy Was Influenced and down to Basic Mistakes of the 
United States. 

The Chairman. I believe that is proper. It may be inserted in 
the record. 

(The information referred to is as follows :) 

How Policy Was Influenced 

Question. What do you mean by "sinister influences"? 

Answer. Communist influences which had their genesis in tlie Kremlin, but 
which were implemented by representatives in tliis country, both by Soviet 
representatives and, unfortunately, by some of our own misguided citizens. 

Question. Inside the Government? 

Answer. Undoubtedly to a limited extent. I do not want to reflect against 
the thousands of loyal Americans in Government service who have been stead 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 835 

fast in their devotion to duty and to the principles of democracy. They are 
in the vast majority. 

Question. I suppose you include the State Department? 

Answer. Yes. I mean in many departments. 

Question. Do you thinlc there are communistic influences in the military 
departments? 

Answer. I never came into direct contact with a man in uniform in any of 
the services of whom I could say categorically that he was a Communist or 
had Communist connections. 

Question. But were there suspicions as to that voiced from time to time in 
the Far East? 

Answer. Yes. Take the newspaper that we published and disseminated 
widelv in the China theater during and subsequent to the war. It was called 
The China Lantern. There were editorials that appeared in that paper from 
time to time that were inimical to the best interests of our country. The men 
on the staff of that paper were in the military service. 

Question. Going back to this matter of the influences on our policy, isn't it 
possible that some of these influences were those that swallowed the com- 
munistic line and believed it to be the better line of the two? 

Answer. Yes, sir ; I accept that explanation. But as far back as 1933, when 
we recognized Soviet Russia, I perceived in my small way the real implications 
of communism. I had read Das Kapital and had studied and followed as much 
as I could the developments in Soviet Russia. During the 2 years, 1936 to 1938, 
that I was in Germany as a student at the German War College, the Nazis con- 
tributed considerably — not intentionally — to my education pertaining to Soviet 
objectives. It was not all propaganda that the Nazis put out about the Soviets. 
I warned both civil and military leaders with whom I was associated in America 
about the implications of what I called "indiscriminate assistance to the Soviet 
Russians." 

From 1940 through most of 1943, I was connected with strategic planning 
in the then War Department and had an opportunity to express views. There 
were a number of American officers who realized the real implications of what 
I term "indiscriminate assistance" to a nation whose objectives or aims were 
just as dangerous to America, if not more so, than were those of Hitler and his 
henchmen. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever express disagreement with General 
Marshall on the advisability of forming a coalition government in 
China? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. When General Marshall first came 
out and showed me his directive I told him I did not believe it was 
possible of accomplishment. I testified to that effect before in the 
MacArthur hearings, and that is in coincidence with the view I ex- 
pressed earlier today several* times, namely, you cannot coalesce Com- 
munists with people who desire individual freedom. It just is not 
going to work. People who have a spiritual belief, people who respect 
the dignity of the individual, they are just antithetical to the views 
or philosophies of Marxism. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this 
time. 

The Chairman. Senator Jenner? 

Senator Jenner. I have no questions. 

Senator Fekguson. You would say then that the old proverb of say- 
ing you cannot mix oil and water would apply to trying to mix these 
two philosophies, and that you would have domination by the Com- 
munists? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I am always afraid of cliches, you 
know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But at least you think the Communist philos- 
ophy would dominate? 

General Wedemeyer. Definitely, yes, sir. They will dominate if 
they are permitted to. 



836 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. That is, if you try to compromise with them. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I have no further questions at this particular time of 
General Wedemeyer. 

The Chairman. Do you have any questions, Senator Jenner? 

Senator Jenner. No. 

The Chairman. General, we wish to express our sincere gratitude 
for your presence here and for your splendid testimony and coopera- 
tion generally. 

General Wedemeyer. I would like to make just one statement, sir. 
I have been following the work of this committee, and I commend both 
the Democratic and Republican members for what I believe to be an 
objective investigation in the interest of the country. Don't pay any 
attention, please, to the smear campaigns that are being instituted by 
those very same forces that you are investigating. I wish you success. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen of the committee, the chairman of this 
committee has received a letter dated September 15, 1951, on the letter- 
head 450 Eiverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y., purporting to be 
signed by Corliss Lamont and bearing his signature. The letter starts 
out by saying (reading) : 

I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Internal Security, of which you are chairman — 

and so forth. I will not detain the committee to read the letter. 

Senator Jenner. I received a copy, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The members of the committee, I think, have re- 
ceived copies. 

The letter from Mr, Lamont will be inserted in the record with the 
permission of the committee. 

(The letter referred to is as follows :) 

New York 27, N. Y., September 15, 1951. 
The Honorable Pat McCarran, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Senate Office Building, Washington^ D. C. 

My Dear Senator McCarran : I wish to protest again to you and the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman, against 
the repeated actions of that subcommittee in attemipting to smear me as a Com- 
munist and to associate me with the alleged betrayal of American foreign policy 
in the Far East. Your subcommitee has dragged me into this picture as part of 
a shabby endeavor to discredit the American Institute of Pacific Relations and 
to establish it as a subversive organization. 

The Subcommittee on Internal Security has tried to give the totally false im- 
pression that I am a far-eastern expert and have been a prime mover in the 
affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But in fact I have never been par- 
ticularly interested in the Far East and have only a few years been a member 
of the institute, and a very inactive one at that. 

However, my late father, Thon-jas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan & Co., did have 
considerable knowledge of the Far East and visited both Japan and China. For 
more than 20 years he participated actively in the work of the Institute of Pacific 
Relationti and contributed generously to it. From 1925 until the time of his 
death in 1948 he made to that organization 14 donations amounting to $14,700. 

On the other hand, I did not start contributing to the institute until 1946. 
From that year until the present I made six donations totaling $800, or about 
one-eighteenth of the total of my father's gifts. Yet your subcommittee and its 
investigators have never once mentioned my Republican father's long and deep 
interest in the institute. Instead, this subcommittee has stressed my own slight 
and brief association with the institute, obviously as part of its effort to paint 
that excellent organization as red by concealing the fact that leading bankers 
and conservatives have been among its chief backers. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 837 

At its hearing on August 22, 1951, your subcommittee read into its records 
the crudest sort of dishonesty about me. Your counsel submitted on that occa- 
sion a memorandum headed, "C. L. from E. C. C," and then suggested that it 
had been written to Corliss Lamont from E. C. Carter, former secretary general 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Testimony continued for some time on this 
assumption ; and nobody was given an opportunity to refute it and to show that 
the memo was from Mr. Carter to Clayton Lane, at one tinoe an oflSicer of the 
institute. 

The memorandum itself was perfectly innocent. And this episode well illus- 
trates the method of your subcommittee in striving to mislead public opinion. 
Evidently some members of this subcommittee would be glad to see me hung for 
the nonexistent crimes of sonieone else whose initials happen to be the same 
as mine. 

On August 2, 1951, a self-confessed ex-spy, Mrs. Hede Massing, testified before 
your subcommittee that I was a Communist. I wrote your subcommittee August 
12 disproving this charge and saying in part: "For the one-thousandth time I 
completely and categorically deny that I am or ever have been a Communist. 
My numerous disagreements on fundamental points with Communist and Soviet 
docti-ines, such as those regarding philosophy, civil liberties, the Tito controversy, 
and the aggression of the North Koreans in 1950, show clearly that I rely on my 
own independent thinking and follow nobody's line. I am a radical American 
dissenter carrying on as best I can the dissenting tradition of my ancestors who 
came over on the Mayflower." 

I requested your subcommittee to enter the above statement into its oflacial 
records. But I did not even receive an acknowledgement of my letter. 

From its record, Mr. Senator, it seems to me that your subcommittee is con- 
stantly encouraging the violation of the Ninth Commandment, "Thou shalt not 
bear false witness against thy neighbor." It is turning representative govern- 
ment into government by misrepresentation. It is causing the American people 
to lose faith in their democratic institutions and is thereby doing more to under- 
mine the political system of the United States than all the Communists who have 
ever existed in this country. 

Other congressional investigating committees, of both House and Senate, have 
behaved just as scandalously. The procedures of such committees ought to be 
revised by law in order to guarantee defendant witnesses, organizations, and 
other victims their legitimate rights and a fair hearing. The new rules should 
apply whether bankers or teachers, labor leaders or Communists, liberals or 
independents, Republicans or Democrats are being investigated. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me earnestly request that in the interests 
of the truth you enter this letter in the official records of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Internal Security as my refutation of the untrue accusations 
made against me at its hearings. 
Very truly yours, 

Corliss Lamont. 

The Chairman. In connection with Mr. Lament's letter the chair- 
man desires to insert in the record at this time the reply of the chair- 
man of this committee dated September 19, 1951, addressed to Mr. 
Corliss Lamont and signed by the chairman of this committee. Those 
letters will be inserted in the record so as to become a part of the 
record of this hearing. 

(The letter referred to is as follows :) 

Septembeb 19, 1951. 
Mr. Corliss Lamont, 

New Yorlc 27, tf. Y. 

Deiab Mr. Lamont: I have your letter of September 15, 1951, which I notice 
you have released to the press. 

I take note of the fact which you impart in your letter that your father, 
Thomas W. Lamont, contributed $14,700 to the Institute of Pacific Relations 
during the period 1925-48 and that he took an active interest in the institute 
and in the Far East. I also note that you point out that your own six donations 
to the institute totaled only $800 by contrast. 

I would like to jwint out, however, that you are wrong in your statement 
that this committee has never once mentioned your father's name in its hear- 



838 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ings. In fact, the only substantial testimony involving either you or your 
father concerned an episode which took place in 1945. As you must know, if 
you read the record, this episode involved an effort made by Mr. Owen Latti- 
more and Mr. E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations to induce your 
father, Thomas W. Lamont, through you, to sign a draft prepared by Mr. 
Lattimore in answer to an article that appeared in the Reader's Digest by J. B. 
Powell and Max Eastman. Testimony showed that Mr. Lattimore prepared 
a draft of an answer after consultation with Mr. T. A. Bisson and made arrange- 
ments to have it published in the name of some prominent American. According 
to testimony, they selected your father, Thomas W. Lamont, as a person who 
might sign the article. Arrangements for the carrying out of this plan, according 
to testimony and documents introduced into the record, were made through 
you. When your father declined to have his name signed to the article, this 
committee took especial care to bring out his refusal to do so. 

It is also to be noted that the committee and the staff questioned Mr. Carter 
at length on the unusual language used in the letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. 
Lattimore who were admittedly good friends. The letter of June 19, 1945, reads 
in part : 

"Dear Owen : Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. 
Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw 
the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and prob- 
ably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son 
and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person 
or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic sug- 
gestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought 
it would better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said 
the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually 
like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I 
suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared 
in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as 
I can write on the off-chance that he might be will to do something. * * * 

"Edward C. Carter." 

I believe if you will read or, if you have already done so, reread that testimony 
you will find that the committee was simply trying to bring out the facts, and 
the incidence of your name and your father's name was dictated by the under- 
lying circumstances and by nothing else. 

With respect to the second point you make in your letter, therein you accuse 
the committee of dishonesty to you. The record you refer to is as follows : 

"Mr. Mandel : I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 'CL from ECC. 'CL' may be Corliss 
Lamont, and 'ECO' may be E. C. Carter." ' 

Two letters "OL from ECC" were introduced into the record at this point and 
there was no significance whatever attached to the identity of the "CL." 

As you must know, it was the habit of the lu'^titute of Pacific Relations to refer 
to individuals in the various memoranda by their initials only. The assumption 
that it may have been Corliss Lamont was without significance and represented 
a mere guess on the part of the research director as to the addressee therein. 
Certainly there was no invidious connotation drawn from this conchisiun. How- 
ever, inasmuch as you point out that the "CL" is Clayton Lane and not Corliss 
Lamont, your statement of this fact will be cross-indexed to that testimony. 

As for the fact that you have been identified before this committee as a Com- 
munist, I call attention to the fact that this committee has made no findings nor 
drawn any conclusions from the sworn testimony before it. 

As you request, your letter is being put into the official record. 
Sincerely, 

Pat McCakran, Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan has 
received a letter from Henry A. WalLace, and I do not know whether 
other members of the committee have also received it, but I would ask 
that that be inserted in the record also. I will turn it over to the 
committee. 



1 See p. 574, pt. 2. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 839^ 

The Chairman. As regards the letter to which Senator Ferguson 

refers, that letter and the reply will be inserted also. 

(The letters referred to are as follows :) 

Septembek 13, 1951. 

Hon. Henry A. Wallace, 

South Salem, N. Y. 
My Dear Henry : Upon my return from Turkey, I found your letter of August 
20 which had been previously acknowledged by my secretary. 

If you would permit me to do so, I shall be very glad to place your letter in the 
official record of the committee. 

With kindest personal regards, I am. 
Yours sincerely. 



South Salem, N. Y., August 25, 1951. 
Hon. Homer Ferguson, 

Senate Office Building, 

Washington, D. €. 

Dear Senator Ferguson : In a UP report of August 22 you are quoted as say- 
ing that much of the Budenz testimony was hearsay. Therefore I am moved to 
call your attention to the Budenz testimony on August 23 before the Senate 
Internal Security Committee to the effect that I was under the influence of 
Communists (Lattimore and Vincent, according to Budenz) on my trip to China 
in 1944. 

For your information I may say that Lattimore was sent along on the trip 
not as a member of my personal staff but as a representative of OWI at the 
instance of Elmer Davis and Roosevelt. He was an expert on the nomadic 
tribes and occasionally was helpful as an interpreter but he had nothing whatever 
to do with my report to President Roosevelt or with my communication to 
President Roosevelt on June 28, 1944. 

The person who had by far the greatest influence on me was a Republican, 
Ambassador to China, Hon. Clarence E. Gauss. You may remember that in the 
fall of 1945 Senator Hart, of Connecticut, was urging him for the Republican 
place on the Export-Import Bank. It was at instance of Gauss that I re- 
ported to Roosevelt that in spite of Chiang's weaknesses as a leader that at the 
moment we had no alternative to the support of Chiang. 

It was at Chiang's instance that I sent a message from Kunming to Roosevelt 
on June 28, 1944. suggesting the name of General Wedemeyer as liaison between 
Roosevelt and Chiang. While Vincent did not inspire this suggestion he was 
cognizant of what was in my cable and did not in any way object. 

On December 15, 1945, the Honorable Patrick Hurley, recently resigned as 
Ambassador to China, told me in the presence of Herbert Brownell that he never 
had any quarrel with me with regard to the Chinese situation. 

I thought you ought to have these facts in view of the Budenz testimony. 

With cordial regards, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

Henry A. Wallace. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter from Mr. Carter ad- 
dressed to me which I think should go in the record. It is very short. 
Mr. Mandel, will you read that very briefly ? 

Mr. Mandel. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter dated September 
6, 1951 [reading] : 

Dear Mr. Morris : In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated 
that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the 
present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems 
that when the clhancellor children were young they went to stay for long 
periods in Yorkshire at the Cholomeley's home. It was because of this intimate 
relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were 
cousins. 

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it. 



840 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr._ Morris. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we allow that letter 
to go into the record as a correction of Mr. Carter's own testimony. 
The Chairman. It may be inserted. 
(The letter referred to is as follows :) 

New York Citt, September 6, 1951. 
Mr. Robert Morris, 

Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. 0. 
Dear Me. Morris : In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that 
Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the 
present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems 
that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods 
in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate rela- 
tionship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were 
cousins. 

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant but I want to correct it. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter.* 

Senator Ferguson. When it is printed in the record, if it is possible, 
could this not be put in at that place so that it will correct the record 
without too much trouble ? Has it already been printed ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would it be satisfactory if that were cross-indexed 
back to it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; so that at least it would be clear that the 
correction was made. 

The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. There is one other letter that the War Department has 
asked us to put into our record. It concerns the testimony of General 
Willoughby. It is not very important, but I think inasmuch as the 
Army has requested that it should go in, we could put it into the 
record. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

Mr. Morris. That letter is dated August 15, 1951, from Miles Reber, 
major general, GSC. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(The letter referred to is as f ollow§_:) 

Department of the Army, 
Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, 

Washington, D. C, August 15, 1951. 
Hon. Pat MoCakran, 

Chairman, Suhcommittee on Internal Security, 

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 
Dear Senator McCarran : In connection with the recent testimony of General 
Willoughby before your committee pertaining to his official report on the Sorge 
case, it is respectfully requested that the following facts in connection with his 
report be included in the record of the hearings of your committee. 

Copies of all consecutive reports and exhibits pertaining to the Sorge case 
received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, from 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FECOM, were distributed to the FBI, CIA, 
and State Department between the dates of March 9, 1949, and November 22, 
1950. No reports or exhibits to the Sorge case have been received since Novem- 
ber 22, 1950. 

On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, may I suggest that this letter be made 
a part of the record of hearings in this case. Your cooperation in such action 
will be very much appreciated. 
Sincerely yours, 

MrLES Reber, 
Major General, OSC, 
Chief of Legislative Liaison. 

> See p. 51, pt. 1. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 841 

Mr. Morris. Tomorrow, Senator McCarran, we have General 
Fortier who is theater intelligence commander in the Far East Com- 
mand. He will be our witness tomorrow. That will be at 10 o'clock 
or 9 o'clock, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. I think it can be 10 o'clock. It is very difficult to 
convene at 9 o'clock. I think we will be able to meet at 10 o'clock. 
I have discussed it with the leader and I think it will be all right to 
proceed. 

Mr. Morris. General Fortier is under subpena to appear here at 
9 o'clock. May I inform him that he may come in at 10? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

The committee is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Wliereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed to be recon- 
vened at 10 a. m. Thursday, September 20, 1951.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, Jenner, and 
Watkins. 

Also present: Senator McCarthy. 

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee 
counsel ; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. "Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Please stand and be sworn, General. 

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 
before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

General Fortier. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. L. JOSEPH FORTIER, UNITED STATES 
ARMY (RETIRED), McLEAN, VA. 

Mr. Morris. General Fortier, will you give your full name and 
address to the reporter, please? 

General Fortier. Louis Joseph Fortier, brigadier general, United 
States Army, retired. Spring Hill Eoacl, McLean, Va. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present military status? 

General Fortier. United States Army, retired. 

Mr. Morris. What was your last military assignment, General ? 

General Fortier. Director of Theater Intelligence Division of the 
Far East Command. 

Mr. Morris. Wlien did you relinquish that command ? 

General Fortier. I sailed from Japan in October, the middle of 
October 1950. I was the Director of Theater Intelligence Division 
until some time in September 1950. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe briefly the nature of your assign- 
ment, General Fortier, at that time ? 

General Fortier. From around the 1st day of February 1949 until 
September 1950 I was in charge of the Theater Intelligence Division 
under G-2, Far East Command, GHQ, Tol^yo. 

22848— 52— pt. 3 10 843 



844 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, Morris. Will you describe for us generally the functions that 
you had to perform in that post ? 

General Fortier. As Director of this Division, my job was that of 
observing, studying the capabilities of any external threat to the Far 
East Command. In other words, I was concerned with any potential 
outside enemy that might threaten the security of the Far East Com- 
mand. 

Mr. Morris. As such, General, did you take recognition of the de- 
velopment of Red China ? 

• General Fortier. Besides observing the capabilities of the Soviets 
in that area, probably my greatest interest was that of watching the 
development in China. 

Mr. Morris. Had you been interested in communism in China as a 
professional matter, General Fortier? 

General Fortier. I had been in and out of Intelligence for the last 
14 years and, as a matter of fact, ever since 1921-23 when I took a 
master of science degree in political science, in which I specalized 
on the problems arising from the Versailles Treaty, I have been closely 
observing the development of Soviet Russia and communism in general. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that while you held this posi- 
tion you were concerned with the development and the consolidation 
of communism on the mainland of China ? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that not be right in line with your duties 
if you were to look into the questions that might be a threat to your 
command ? Communism in China could be a threat to the command 
in Tokyo, could it not? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. 

May I explain this? That whereas I had the division that was 
charged with the external security, in other words, a threat from 
outside, there was another division of G-2 which was charged with the 
internal security. My primary interest was watching the development 
in China and seeing the advance of communism and Mao Tse-tung's 
forces in China. 

Mr. Morris. General, did you ever have occasion to brief important 
leaders of the United States Government as an adviser to Japan ? 

General Fortier. It was what we call in the service a standard 
operating procedure that whenever any distinguished representative 
of the United States Government came to Tokyo, he was given a brief- 
ing as to the situation as we saw it and in turn we endeavored to obtain 
from him his views, or the Washington view if he came from Wash- 
ington. 

Mr. Morris. That was standard operating procedure? 

General Fortier. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall a visit that Ambassador at Large Philip 
C. Jessup made to Japan in late 1949 or early 1950? 

General Fortier. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Morris. Will you relate the circumstances to this committee, 
please ? 

General Fortier. As I recall it, Mr. Jessup came to Japan, to Tokyo, 
in the early days of January 1950. It was just about the time that 
we had gotten word that Britain had recognized Communist China. 
We gave Mr. Jessup the normal briefing that was given to visiting 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 845 

people from Washington. And it so happened, the instance that 
Mr. Morris is referring to, that during one of the intermissions, I 
found myself alone with Mr. Jessup 

The Chairman. Found yourself where? 

General Fortier. Standing next to him in the conference room, and 
I put the following question to him. I said : "Wlien will we recognize 
Communist China?" 

Senator Ferguson. You knew at that time he was connected with 
the State Department of the United States Government? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. He was there as an ambassador with 
that rank. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did you put the question that way, in the 
affirmative, General? 

General Fortier. I had been very much concerned about Britain 
recognizing Communist China. 

Senator Ferguson. Had he been briefed on that question? Was 
that mentioned in the briefing ? 

General Fortier. I don't recall that it was. We had a set briefing 
that involved our views on Asia as a whole ; that is, on the periphery 
of the Far East Command. That briefing was usually given by 
General Willoughby who was G-2. 

Senator Ferguson. Y^ou usually had around the table more than 
Oeneral Willoughby and yourself, did you not ? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is, as I recall, your briefing form. 

General Fortier. All the key staJff officers of GHQ Far East Com- 
mand were present at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know whether that question was 
raised in the briefing ? 

General Fortier. I don't think it was, as a matter of fact. 

Senator Eastland. What did Mr. Jessup tell you ? 

General Fortier. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, in about 2 or 3 weeks." 

Mr. Morris. Was it as a categorical statement ? 

General Fortier. It is a little bit difficult for me to remember his 
exact words as to whether it was a categorical statement or not, but 
I do remember that I picked up the statement and I argued with Mr. 
Jessup and told him that I thought it would be a grave error if we 
recognized Communist China. 

Senator Eastland. Why did you think it would be a grave error? 

General Fortier. I thought it would be a grave error for the fol- 
lowing reason : that as far as I knew never in its history had China 
been consolidated under one particular regime or one head. China 
had always had these regional groups and throughout the history of 
China there had been an attempt made to consolidate it, but never 
with success. 

Having followed the development in China, in Communist China, 
and seeing Mao Tse-tung's army overrun the key areas, and feeling 
that Mao Tse-tung was being aided and abetted by the Russians, I felt 
that Mao Tse-tung had a very fine chance of consolidating that coun- 
try for once under a regime that would be inimical to us and against 
the best interests of the United States. 

Senator Eastland. If we recognized them ? 



846 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Fortier. Yes ; if we recognized the country and gave them 
that moral and political support that would be received bj^ them should 
we grant recognition. 

Senator Fergusox. What did Jessup say about that ? 

General Fortier. Mr. Jessup said, 'AVel'l, we must face facts." I am 
not putting in quotes and end quotes now. I am giving you my recol- 
lection on this. He said, "We must face facts. After all, Mao Tse- 
tung's armies have overrun the vast portion, in fact the key areas of 
China. They are in the process of reestablishing law and order and 
the mere fact that we should recognize them does not mean we approve 
either of the character of their government or of the nature of it. In 
arriving at a decision as to recognition or nonrecognition, the criteria 
should be whether the government that has come in has established 
sovereignty, has control of the majority of the country, and is in the 
process of reestablishing law and order." 

Senator Eastland. Had they consolidated China at that time ? 

General Fortip:r. In my opinion, no. 

Senator Eastland. Had they consolidated their position in China 
when you left Japan ? 

General Fortier. In my opinion, no. 

Senator Eastland. Have they consolidated China today? 

General Fortier. In my opinion, no. 

Senator Eastland. You think recognition by this country would 
do much to consolidate communism in China ? 

General Fortier. I certainly do. 

Senator Ferguson. You told Jessup that ? 

General Fortier. I told him substantially that. 

About that time, someone else came in. Here was this conference 
room and the conversation was interrupted and never came to a final 
conclusion. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you we had an agreement with 
Great Britain that after recognition by Britain that we would recog- 
nize China ? 

General Fortier. No, sir. ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Did he mention anything about the fact of 
Britain's recognition? 

General Fortier. Ho did not, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Eight there, as a general in intelligence and 
from your sources of information and your feel of the atmosphere 
and general knowledge, did you not think that there had been an 
understanding betA^■een this country and Great Britain that Great 
Britain's recognition of Communist China would be followed by our 
recognition ? 

General Fortier. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I 
prefer to give you the atmosphere. 

Senator Eastland. Was that not your judgment. General, and is 
not that the reason you asked Mr. Jessup the question you did ? 

General Fortier. Well, some time in October or November 1949, I 
had become so much concerned with the fact that Britain might 
recognize Communist China that I had made a study for my own 
satisfaction of the situation as faced by the British in Hong Kong 
in 1941, in December, when the Japanese invaded Hong Kong, and the 
situation as existed in 1949, late 1949. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 847 

I studied it from a political, economic, military, and psycliological 
point of view, I drafted mainly for my own information and that of 
my immediate entourage, a study in which I concluded that while it 
would be a great error should Britain recognize Connnunist China, I 
feared very much they would and that possibly the economic factor 
would be the determining one because there was no question but that 
there had been a terrific increase in trade through Hong Kong be- 
tween 1948 and 1949. 

To answer Senator Eastland's question, I have no information, 
direct evidence, on which to base any deal between the United States 
and Britain. On the other hand, I feared, you might say, that the 
United States would follow a recognition by Britain, and if I remem- 
ber correctly, either Britain had just recognized Communist China, 
at the time I spoke to Mr. Jessup, or I had obtained some information, 
that they would do so shortly. I believe that is what prompted my 
questioning of Mr. Jessup, the fact that a day or two before there had 
been some sort of an official announcement that Britain had recog- 
nized Communist China. 

Senator Eastland. You were worried about Formosa, too? 

General Fortier. I was worried we might follow suit. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get his pereonal opinion, or was he 
speaking, that the Government was going to do this ? 

General Fortier. No, sir. This was a man to man conversation 
between Jessup and me. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was his personal idea that it should be 
recognized ? 

General Fortier. Senator, the entire conversation  

Senator Ferguson. Because you were giving him your personal 
argument and he was giving his. 

General Fortier. I feel he was. 

The Chairman. That is the way it impressed you at the time? 

General Fortier. Yes. The whole conversation did not last more 
than 2 or 3 minutes, as you can well understand. We were having this 
conference and about every 50 minutes there would be a 10-minute 
intermission. It was in one of them I tackled him on that subject. 

Senator Eastland. Were you afraid of the loss of Formosa, too? 

General Fortier. I was very much concerned with that. 

Senator Eastland. Wliy were you concerned with that? 

General Fortier. Because I shared the view that Formosa is a 
key area — I do not like to use the word "vital" because the word has 
been overworked, but that Formosa lies between the Philippines and 
Japan and if it fell in enemy hands it would be a very serious threat 
to either country. 

Senator Eastland. Would it not put Japan in a nutcracker be- 
tween the islands we have given Russia on the north and those islands 
south of Japan ? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Were there many airfields on Formosa ? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir ; there are. 

Senator Eastland. Did the Far East Command have trouble with 
the State Department in getting in Formosa, or did the United States' 
State Department attempt to keep generals in the Far East Com- 
mand away from Formosa? 



848 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Fortier. Well, tlie correct answer to that is I know of no 
important official of GHQ who was ever barred admittance to 
Formosa. 

Senator Eastland. Did you not have to resort to subterfuges to 
get in? 

General Fortier. I think the Senator is referring to the fact that 
there was at times a tendency to scrutinize the group from GHQ that 
had requested admission to Formosa, and I will say, Senator, that it 
was based largely, at least from the information we obtained, on the 
lack of hotel reservations and facilities there. 

Senator Eastland. Did you not think that was a subterfuge, 
General ? 

General Fortier. In my particular case, when I went to Formosa, 
every one in GHQ knew, of course, of my particular job, that of Di- 
rector of Theater Intelligence Division, and the United States Gov- 
ernment had its set-up in Formosa, including military, air, and naval 
attaches. At least, theoretically, any information that we desired 
concerning Formosa could have been obtained through those sources. 

Senator Eastland. Did you not have to resort to subterfuge to get 
in Formosa ? I want you to answer that question. 

General Fortier. I don't know whether I had to or not, but I did. 

Senator Eastland. What was that subterfuge ? 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you hesitate on this ? 

General Fortier. Because, if I seem to hesitate it may have been 
in this particular instance being referred to that it was overplayed. 
I have no reason to believe that had I applied formally for admission 
to Formosa that that would not have been granted me. I think it 
would, but on a particular occasion, I had heard certain reports about 
the defense capabilities of Formosa that bothered me. I wanted to 
get over there and get there in a hurry, because it was a time when 
actually it was a critical period. It was late May, early June, of 1950. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you have to ask the State Department ? 

Senator Eastland. Please go ahead and answer the question. 

General Fortier. So, in order to get there and get there in a hurry, 
an arrangement was made whereby I was invited as a guest of a very 
high-ranking official in Formosa. 

Senator Eastland. Who was that official ? 

General Fortier. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Eastland. Is it true that you sent word you were coming 
to the State Department representative and got in a plane and left 
before he had time to answer ? 

General Fortier. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Was it not general knowledge that the Far East 
command was not welcomed down at Formosa by the American State 
Department ? 

General Fortier. Well, it was my impression that we were none too 
welcome, at least those of us in the intelligence field. 

Senator Eastland. Did you ever hear of a General Merritt who was 
being sent subrosa by the State Department to organize an anti-Chiang 
faction in Formosa ? 

General Fortier. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You made a statement a little while ago. General, 
that when you attempted to go to Formosa you seemed to be "scruti- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 84^ 

nized." Why do you use the word "scrutinize" ? Your going to For- 
mosa was scrutinized. By whom and how ? 

General Fortier. Did I use that word ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Fortier. I believe I don't recall in a particular thing, but 
I said those officers who were involved in the intelligence field, their 
request for admission into Formosa would have been more closely 
scrutinized by the American representation in Formosa than would 
others. After all, let's be fair about this thing. The United States 
Government had. a consul general, had United States Military, Air 
and Naval attaches in Formosa. Certainly, theoretically, we had 
appropriate United States representation in the place. If I was not 
satisfied with their views and reports and I desired my own estimate,. 
V7hy, you might attribute that to my own idiosyncrasy, that I preferred 
my own evaluation to that which I was receiving. 

Senator Ferguson. But, General, you don't claim that the military 
and attaches at an embassy are Intelligence officers, do you, in the sense 
of the word you were ? 

General Fortier. No, sir; they are not. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you had to obtain information out 
of Formosa. Why did you have to ask the State Department for 
permission to go to Formosa ? 

General Fortier. Sir, one has to obtain a visa from the State De- 
partment or through the State Department channels to visit any 
foreign country. Formosa was not under the aegis of the Far East 
Command. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it true that civilians who went to Japan, for 
instance, connected with the United States Government and not con- 
nected with the State Department, had difficulty going to Formosa? 

General Fortier. Sir, that I would not know. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that? 

General Fortier. That is the first I ever heard of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get a visa from the State Department? 

General Fortier. I got one from the State Department representa- 
tive. General MacArthur's chief political adviser, Mr. Seabald, was 
my channel of getting into any country. Through him, we could 
contact these various missions that were in Tokyo. For example, 
when I went to Hong Kong or Indochina, or to Korea, that was proc- 
essed through the State Department representative in Tokyo. 

Senator Eastland. That State Department representative in Tokyo 
told you how to get into Formosa, did he not ? 

General Fortier. He aided and abetted me. 

Senator Eastland. That was through subterfuge, to send a mes- 
sage to Formosa you were coming and get in your plane and go before 
they had time to answer. Is that true ? 

General Fortier. That is the way I got in there; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I might tell you. General, that I had a similar 
experience to get. into Formosa aft^ I was in the air in the plane. 
We had to obtain permission to go in instead of getting clearance 
from the State Department. 

Is that not what you did ? You got in the plane and got permission 
to land? 



850 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Fortier. I had anticipated that I would have trouble 
getting in. 

The Chairman. Trouble from what source ? From our authorities 
or from whom ? 

General Fortier. Through Mr. Robert Strong, who was our con- 
sul general there. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out the relevancy 
of this testimony to our Institute of Pacific Kelations inquiry. 

Our records are replete with the association of Mr. Jessup to the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. So Mr. Mandel has compiled a list of 
the important positions that Mr. Jessup held in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. I would like those introduced in the record at this time. 

The Chairman. He has compiled them from what source? 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe your compilation ? 

Mr. Mandel. According to Problems of the Pacific, 1933, Proceed- 
ings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held 
August 14 to 26, 1933, one of the conference members was Philip Jes- 
sup. 

The Chairman. That is a publication of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. The Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Then, according to Problems of the Pacific, dated 1939, Proceedings 
of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at 
Virginia Beach, November 18 to December 2, 1939, page 273, one of the 
international officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Philip 
C. Jessup, who was also chairman of the Pacific Council. 

Then, according to the Annual Report of the American Council 
of the IPR, 1938, page 58, Philip C. Jessup was vice chairman and a 
member of the board of trustees. 

Then in the volume called War and Peace in the Pacific, A Prelimi- 
nary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations held at Mont Tremblant, December 4 to December 14, 1942, 
page 159, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member and as 
chairman of the Pacific Council. 

Again in a volume called Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary 
Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to January 17, 1945, page 157, 
Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member ; and, finally, we have 
a telegram addressed to Edward C. Carter from "Fred" 

Senator Eastland. Do you know who that Fred is ? 

Mr. Mandel. It may be Field. 

Senator Eastland. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Mandel. November 23, and the year is not given. 

It says : "Approve nominations suggest Jessup for research chair- 
man." 

Mr. Morris. There is no other Fred on the staff of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations other than Fred Field ? 

Mr. Mandel. None that I know of. 

Senator Eastland. Have you any idea what year that is? 

Mr. Mandel. We can check it and establish the year from other 
correspondence. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 851 

Mr. Morris. When yon do verif}^ that, which we are not prepared to 
do now, verify the position that Mr. Jessnp did hold as research 
chairman, you will be able to relate it to that telegram. 

Mr. MANDEii. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had another question of the 
witness. I wanted to ask whether or not it was a fact, to your knowl- 
edge, that in the Far East in the various embasssies there were rumors 
about the insecurity of the defense and the fact that Formosa was 
just ready for an overthrow of the Nationalist Government? That 
was back around the time you were talking about. 

General Fortier. There was considerable rumor and misgiving 
about the state of defense of Formosa in general. 

To be very honest with you, that is the reason I was anxious to go 
down there. 

Senator Ferguson. To go down and see and get the facts? 

General Fortier. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know on October 26, I think that is 
the date, the United States Government sent a message to the Nation- 
alist Government at Formosa that we would not give them any more 
military aid, and that was 1949 ? 

General Fortier. No, sir; I do not know that. I had heard they 
were not receiving any military aid, but I did not know of any message 
such as you spoke of. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that such a message was 
sent ? 

General Fortier. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To the Nationalist Government ? 

General Fortier. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did you stay in Formosa ? 

General Fortier. As I recall, I stayed there 3 days. 

Senator Ferguson.. I assume you talked to General Sun ? 

General Fortier. I did, at long length. 

Senator Ferguson. You had no trouble getting hotel space? 

General Fortier. I did not live in a hotel. 

Senator Ferguson. You lived in the palace ? 

General Fortier. No ; but I lived in a cottage, a very comfortable- 
cottage in the mountains. 

Senator Ferguson. Near Chiang Kai-shek's place? 

General Fortier. Yes ; where the generalissimo lived. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not know they had plenty of space for 
visitors in Taipei ? 

General Fortier. The facts are not quite that way. Senator. In 
late August 1950, I was the deputy chief of the Far East Command's 
survey group that made a complete, exhaustive study of Formosa. 
This was after the Korean war had broken out. This was in August 
1950. 

We sent a rather sizable group of officers and enlisted men to For- 
mosa, to Taipei, to conduct the survey. We had, as I recall, something 
between 40 and 50 officers. We had considerable difficulty in find- 
ing 

Senator Ferguson. But I am talking about the number of people 
you had in mind going down just to get information. 



852 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Fortier. Hotel accommodations 



Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about the hotels; I am talk- 
ing about the place that the former resident commissioner of Japan 
used as a guest house for visiting people. 

General Fortier. Sir, I am inclined to agree that hotel accom- 
modations in Formosa were extremely limited, that one or two in- 
dividuals might not have been taken care of would not stand too 
close scrutiny. But if there were a group of 10 or 12 people  

Senator Ferguson. If you tried to send a large mission over 
there; but that was not your purpose, was it? It was to get some 
man in there to get accurate information for you ? 

General Fortier. The problem was to get just a few to obtain 
information. 

Senator Eastland. The problem was for you to get in? 

General Fortier. I got in, sir. 

Senator Eastland. General, it is just to get your full background 
in the record, but were you ever stationed in Yugoslavia? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. I was military attache to Yugoslavia 
from the latter part of May 1939 until I wrote my own orders to 
get out of there after the Germans had overrun the country. 

Senator Eastland. Did you have anything to do with setting up 
the coup that overthrew the regency ? 

General Fortier. Not that I had anything to do with it, but I was 
a very intimate friend of Gen. Bor Mirkovic, who was the deputy 
chief of aviation. He was the one who planned and implemented 
and executed the coup d'etat on the 26th of March 1941. One of his 
lieutenants was Mikhailovich. I knew him quite intimately. 

Senator Eastland. Did you know Tito ? 

General Fortier. I did not know Tito. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now it would be a grave mistake 
to recognize Red China ? 

General Fortier. I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now as you did in the past that 
it would consolidate them and give'prestige and aid to them in their 
communism and their efforts as Communists? 

General Fortier. I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you feel very strongly about that? 

General Fortier. I have felt right along there were two things 
that might happen that would consolidate Communist China. One 
would be for Chiang Kai-shek to make a deal with Mao Tsetung 
and lend his support to Mao Tse-tung. 

The other would be for us to recognize them. In so doing, then 
they would have the moral and the economic force that would be 
needed to consolidate the country. 

Senator Eastland. Would an armistice in Korea help consolidate 
the Communist regime in China ? 

General Fortier. I doubt that seriously. 

Senator Watkins. May I inquire when it was that you had this 
conversation with Ambassador Jessup ? 

General Fortier. Sir, it was in the early winter of 1949-50. If I 
recall correctly, it was in early January of 1950. The date can be 
fixed hj^ studying Mr. Jessup's itinerary when he made that Far East 
survey in the winter of 1949-50. I have not any access to any records 
to determine the exact date on which I spoke to him. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 853 

Senator Watkins. It was at least before the outbreak of the Korean 
police action ? 

General Fortier, Yes, sir. It was several months before the out- 
break of the Korean war. 

Senator Watkins. I notice you refer to that as a "war." I said a 
police action. 

General Fortier. Well, a police action. I am sure it is a war to 
the man in there fighting. 

Senator Watkins. I quite agree with you. 

This might be a bit far afield, but somewhere along the line, Mr. 
Chairman, it seems to me we ought to make some inquiry into what 
caused the United States to get out of Korea when we had our forces 
there, to get out when they moved back into Japan. 

Do you know the situation with respect to what prompted us to 
get out of Korea at that time ? I mean when we withdrew our forces. 

General Fortier. I would not have been too well informed on that. 
I may have seen the papers, in fact I probably did see the papers, in 
connection with it ; but as I recall it, it was some United Nations agree- 
ment that by a certain date the United States would remove its forces 
from Korea. I went to Korea in April of 1949 and at that time we had 
a reinforced regiment there plus a number of instructors. By the 
30th of June 1949, we had removed all troops from the area and had 
nothing but military advisers in a group. 

Senator Watkins. Do you know whether or not it was the recom- 
mendation of the Army that caused us to get out of Korea ? 

General Fortier. I wouldn't know, sir. You can probably obtain 
that from National Defense. 

Senator Watkins. Would you inform the committee now without 
violating any classified information just what the situation was in 
Korea at the time we got out ? 

General Fortier. From what point of view, sir ? 

Senator Watkins. From the point of view of whether it was a wise 
or unwise move. 

General Fortier. In my opinion, it was a wise move for us to move 
out at that particular stage in the game. After all, a reinforced regi- 
ment is purely a token force. We would have been neither fish nor 
fowl with a reinforced regiment. 

Senator Watkins. Do you believe that the North Koreans or the 
Chinese would have attacked the United States forces even if they 
were only a token force ? 

General Fortier. That, I do not. I do not believe they would have 
attacked us. 

The Chairman. They were not making sporadic drives across the 
line before we moved out, or were they ? 

General Fortier. Throughout the entire period there were border 
incidents. 

Senator Watkins. There were no actual attacks on American 
troops, however? All of the attacks occurred later on after the 
American troops had been withdrawn ? 

General Fortier. There had been border incidents with the South 
Koreans even when we were there. 

Senator Ferguson. Almost weekly ? 

General Fortier. Not against our forces. 



854 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. That was part of your investigation, to investi- 
gate any possible threat to the United States from North Korea, from 
China, and that particular section ? 

General Fortier. When I went over there, it was to get the feel of 
the country, to study the capabilities, get information direct from the 
people on the ground as to what might be the North Korean capabili- 
ties. I did the same thing by traveling, for example, to the Kowloon- 
Hong Kong front. I went to Saigon and Hanoi and spent a week in 
Tonkin. I was a house guest there of the French deputy commanding 
general. 

I studied the location of his advance posts and talked with his staff 
about the situation internally and externally in Indochina. We did 
not feel too secure about the whole situation there in the spring of 
1950. 

Senator Watkins. What are you referring to now, just Korea? 

General Fortier. No, sir. This map that we had was showing more 
and more red. We were getting this encroachment on our command. 
Here were these four Japanese islands and Okinawa. The Beds were 
driving south. At first our attention had been drawn to the north 
around Hokkaido, but as it swept down, don't you see, here was our 
southern flank becoming more and more exposed. We had the respon- 
sibility for the Philippines, too. 

So, naturally, anyone who is in the intelligence profession, and 
particularly one who had that special responsibility that I had, would 
concern himself with what was going on and where were the build- 
ups, what were the capabilities, where might they strike if they did 
strike. 

Senator Eastland. Did you expect war to break out on one of those 
four fronts in 1950? 

General Fortier. To answer your question directly, sir, I was very,, 
very much concerned. I was afraid. I had enough of an intuition 
that something was going to break out in the Far East that the record 
will show that I was constantly on the move traveling, trying to find 
out where it might break out. 

Senator Eastland. Did Intelligence know where the Chinese 
divisions were concentrated? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. We had very good information on where 
all these threats were, exactly how they were distributed. But I 
would like to say right here that to know what a potential enemy is 
capable of doing and to determine what he intended to do on the 
spur of the moment or at the last minute, those are two entirely 
different things. 

The Chairman. Who was our potential enemy at that time that 
you were apprehensive? 

General Fortier. I was mostly apprehensive — well, of course, the 
Soviets never left my mind, and Mao Tse-tung and his forces. 

The Chairman. It was in this atmosphere that you have described 
here that you discussed with Mr. Jessup as to when we might recog- 
nize Red China? 

General Foriter. Yes; it was. From nround September 1940 until 
June 1950, to use the vernacular, I was "sweating it out" in the Far 
East Command. 

Senator Jenner. When you talked to Jessup. he made his tour and 
inspection of Korea at that time? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 855 

General Fortier. I think he was on his way out. 

Senator Jenner. What did lie say in regard to Korea? 

General Fortier. I did not discuss Korea with him. 

Senator Jenner. Have you seen any statements he made to the 
American public upon his return to America about the situation in 
Korea being awfulb' peaceful over there and everything lovely? 

General Fortier. No, sir; I did not. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions, Senators? 

Senator Watkins. I would like to know if he can give us that 
information as to what the real situation in Korea was as far as the 
Army knew it just prior to the outbreak of this police action in Korea. 

General Fortier. We were quite well informed about the disposi- 
tion of the North Korean forces, their strength, their armament. We 
knew their capabilities. We did not know on the morning of the 
26th day of June 1050 at 4 : 30 a, m., or whatever time it was, they 
were going to jump off. 

Senator Watkins. Did you know in a general way an attack from 
that section was impending? 

General Fortier. Not any more so than any of these others ; not any 
more so than it would have been against Formosa or Indochina. 

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, the indications were pretty 
.strong there was likely to be an attack on Formosa, were they not ? 

General Fortier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Watkins. And also Indochina ? 

General Fortier. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. If it were put in the same category, it would be 
in the realm of a probable attack coming from that point ? 

General Fortier. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. That was your business to find out ? 

General Fortier. It was my business to find out. 

Senator Waticins. Did you evaluate the North Koreans as a danger 
to your security? 

General Fortier. Yes, we did ; not as much so as the Chinese Com- 
imunists. 

Senator Watkins. What I would like to know: Were you really 
caught flat-footed hj the North Korean attack on South Korea ? 

General Fortier. We were not surprised, but we were amazed. 
Xet's put it that way. 

To answer your question, I think the greatest surprise was what 
liappened 2 days later when we got word we would intervene in that 
action. 

Senator Watkins, You were surprised at that? 

General Fortier. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. Why were you surprised at that? 

General Fortier. I don't know why. I am just telling you. 

Senator Watkins You say you were surprised. There must have 
'been some reason for it. 

General Fortier. In the first place, we had no responsibility in the 
Far East Command for Korea at all, as you probably well know. 

Mr. Morris. You ]iad no authority whatever to send troops in there 
:at the time? 

General Fortier. No. 

Senator Jenner. Was it not a determined fact among the high 
•command that Korea was militarily untenable? 



856 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

General Fortier. I didn't share that view. 

Senator Jenner. Was that not the view ? 

General Fortier. I don't know of any official expression that ever 
came from the Far East Command to that effect, but I think that it 
has been shown that South Korea is tenable and those of us who were ' 
there in the days of the latter part of June, July, and August learned 
what America can do with very few resources with every one playing 
as one team and as one coordinated unit. 

Senator Eastland. How many American divisions would you think 
it would take to bring the Korean war to a speedy conclusion ? 

General Fortier. We have had in the military service a rule of 
thumb in determining the number of divisions to hold its own against 
a potential enemy, and that has been usually a division for every ten 
miles of front. Korea happens to be a peninsula. If I recall cor- 
rectly, it is about 150 miles wide. With the superiority of naval 
forces we have guarding either flank, with the Air Force that we have, 
if we had a total of 12 to 15 divisions in there, I do not think there 
would be any question about the liquidation of the Korean conflict 
successfully. 

Senator Eastland. We could go to the Yalu River ? 

General Fortier. You are asking me to pit my knowledge of mili- 
tary strategy — in other words, you are shifting my role, sir. I have 
been playing in the role of an intelligence officer. Now I am to become 
the commander in chief. 

The Chairman. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with your questions. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had commenced to show the associa- 
tion between Mr. Jessup about whom we have had testimony today, 
and the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had set forth, to a partial 
extent, Mr. Jessup's association with the IPR. 

I would like to put in in detail, Mr. Chairman, some of the roles 
that he did have in some of the more important conferences of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. For instance, the IPR holds a triennial 
conference which is one of the features of that organization, one of 
the principal means of expression. 

I would like to show he had an important role certainly during the 
two conferences that were held during the war, the one at Mont Trem- 
blant in 1942 and then again in the Hot Springs convention in 1945. 

Mr. Mandel, will you put in the record Mr. Jessup's association 
with those two conferences? 

The Chairman. From what are you reading, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This was formerly entered into the record as exhibit 
No. 110 on August 14, 1951. It is a letter dated June 15, 1942, from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed : "E. C. C. from 
W. W. L :". The memorandum reads as follows : 

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions 
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe 
we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say that of 
Currle, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in the 
regular groove as regards nongovernment people. So far as Washington is 
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key 
positions. 

Then a list of names follows. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that reintroduced in the 
record and one of the points is to show that the leaders of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, E. C. C. and W. W. L., were consulting at this 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 857 

time Currie, Barnes, and Jessup for the makeup of the representation 
to that particular conference. As such, I would like it in the record. 
The Chairman. For that purpose it will be inserted again, 
(The document referred to previously marked "Exhibit No. 110;' 
was reintroduced and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 110 

June 15, 194?:. 

E. C. C. from W. W. L. 

In response to your request I have hastily jotted clown a number of suggestions 
for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I belie-vo 
we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say that of 
Currie, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in the 
regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is 
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key 
positions. 

GOVERNMENT 

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska. 

Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare. 

Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare. 

Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare. 

Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare. 

Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare. 

AVallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare. 

Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget. 

Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information. 

Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information. 

Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information. 

Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information. 

Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture. 

Ropes, E. C, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade. 

Berle, A. A., Department of State. 

Davies, Joseph, Department of State.  

Grady, Henry, Department of State. 

Hiss, Alger, Department of State. 

Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State. 

Sayre, Francis B., Department of State. 

Stinebower, L. D., Department of State. 

Vince, Jacob, Department of the Treasury. 

White, H. D., Department of the Treasury. 

Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board. 

Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration. 

Nathan, Robert, War Production Board. 

Currie, Lauchlin, White House 

Lubin, I., White House 

OTHEES 

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross 
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council 
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point 
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News 
Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist 
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune 
Dennett, Tyler, historian 
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp. 
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland 
Field, Frederick V., New York 
Herod, W. R., International General Electric 
Jessup, Prof. Philip C, Columbia University 

Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission 
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp. 
Luce, Heni-y, Time, Inc. 
Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly 
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute 

Schwellenhach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash. 
(ex-Senator) 



858 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Sproiil, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York 

Sweetlaml, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief 

Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives 

Wilkie, Wendell, attorney 

Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation 

Wilson, C. E., General Electric 

Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired 

The Chairman, Did you have something else ? 

Mr. Mandel. Then we have former exhibit No. 104 from the open 
hearings of August 14, 1951, 

It is a letter from the IPE files dated November 30, 1942. Memo- 
randum to Mr, Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant, It reads 
as follows : 

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of 
Mont Tremblant committees, I am putting down the following suggestions. 

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup 
so that they are merely tentative for the present. 

The Pacific Council — Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in 
the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I 
believe Kizer is the best choice. 

Program committee — Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as 
alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and 1 
understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would 
be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. * * *" 

That is a partial excerpt from the exhibit, 

Mr. Morris, Mr, Chairman, I notice that this exhibit and the pre- 
vious one have already been introduced in the record at previous 
hearings. 

I believe Mr, Mandel gave the previous hearing dates. 

The Chairjman, Very well, 

Mr. Mandel, This is former exhibit No, 132, used in open hearings 
on August 16, 1951, It comes from the files of the IPE, and is on the 
letterhead of the Columbia University, addressed to Mr, Raymond 
Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
from Philip C. Jessup, and I read portions of this exhibit : 

In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in 
mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever 
made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American 
delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and 
some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. 
Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know. 

Mr, Morris. This is Mr, Jessup writing ? 
Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

The following are people whom I would include : Benjamin Kizer, Brayton 
Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or 
J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Hari'y White, 
Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert 
J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius 
Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Josepli Barnes, 
Frederick V, Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Adam Comstock Notestein. 

Further : 

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to 
him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine. 

There is a pencil note at the bottom which says : "Frank Coe of FEA 
also good." 

Mr. Morris. I would like to point out in that list of names are names 
.of 10 people identified before the committee as being members of the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 859 

Communist organization. I think it would be proper to make that 
comment as that exhibit number 132 was introduced in the open 
hearings of August 16, 1951. 

The Chairman. I think this should go in the record at this point, 
notwithstanding the fact that the excerpts are already in. 

Mr. Morris. May it be incorporated in its entirety ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(Exhibit No. 132 is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 132 

Mr. Raymond Dennett, 

Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
New York 22, N. Y. 

Deae Ray : In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what 
you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we 
have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the 
American delegation. The Pacific council provides a secretariat for the con- 
ference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific council for that 
purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know. 

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton 
Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Mori son, Mansfield Freeman or 
J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry 
White, Ruperl Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Mo'tfat, 
Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Vir- 
ginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmanu, Sunnier Welles, Joseph 
Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock 
Notestein. 

In reply to your of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to 
him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine. 

I definl tely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the 
Kizer group ; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occu- 
pied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore 
Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen. 

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. 
I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come 
as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos 
your statement below "Military," on page II, I would get away from the idea of 
California naming a delegate. 

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Way- 
mack, of Des Moines. 

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a bal- 
ance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who 
woidd be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and 
Pacific island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine 
person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things 
add up. 

Sincerely yours, 

Phiop C. Jessup. 

Frank Coe, of FEA, also good. [Penciled note.] 

General Fortier. I would like to have it quite clear that the Far 
East Command was not caught short on an external enemy. In other 
words, our function in General MacArthur's headquarters was to take 
care of the security, both external and internal, of the Far East 
Command. No attack came on Japan, no attack came on Okinawa 
that we had not foreseen or anticipated. In other words, we had no 
responsibility in the Far East Command or for the intelligence be- 
tAveen South and North Korea. There was a State Department repre- 
sentation there in South Korea and likewise there was a mission func- 
tioning under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea. It was not 
the MacArthur mission by any means. 

22848^52— pt. 3 11 



860 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. The reason I asked the question about that was 
because it had been reported that the Far East Command had been 
caught napping. 

The Chairman. May I say, and I think Senator Ferguson will con- 
firm what I am about to say, that before the Appropriations Com- 
mittee many months ago there was presented to us evidence that the 
Intelligence Department had full knowledge of what was going on and 
that they knew that munitions were being delivered from Kussian 
boats into North Korea and that was also brought to the attention of 
the State Department and to the attention of the White House. That is 
testified before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate. 

Senator Ferguson. And the withdrawal of civilians away from 
the line. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. I merely wanted to give you an^opportunity to 
explain that situation if you were caught napping or if you had any 
responsibility so that we would know about it. 

Mr. Morris. Let the record show that Korea was not General For- 
tier's command. I hope that is understood. 

General Fortier. It was never my command. Korea was not under 
General MacArthur's command. 

Senator Ferguson. You did need some intelligence in order to do 
your own work out of both Formosa and Korea ? 

General Fortier. And we got considerable intelligence from these 
otlier sources, occasionally to confirm on the ground that which was 
confirmed in cables and dispatches, which I think is a very reasonable 
reaction. 

Mr. Morris. In reply to your question about the 10 people who have 
been identified as part of tlie Communist organization on that last 
list recommended by Mr. Jessup, I will point out that we have had 
testimony that Benjamin Kizer was a member of the Communist 
Party, testimony that Lauchlin Currie was associated with an espi- 
onage ring and gave vital military secrets to the Russian espionage 
system, the military secret being, iifone case, the fact that the United 
States had broken the Soviet code. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire whether Currie is in the United 
States'? 

Mr. Morris. My information is he is in Colombia. 

John Carter Vincent has been identified as a member; Harry Dexter 
White as a member of an espionage ring ; Owen Lattimore as a mem- 
ber of the Communist organization; Len DeCaux as a member of the 
Communist Party ; Alger Hiss as a member of the Commuinst Party ; 
Joseph Barnes as a member of the Communist Party; Frederick V. 
Field as a member of the Communist Party, and Frank Coe as a 
member of the Communist Party. 

We have had other evidence on some of the other people there, but 
none of it that would warrant any such conclusion as we can make 
about those 10. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morris, have you any evidence that any 
salary or money is being paid to Mr. Lauchlin Currie furnished by the 
taxpayers of the United States Government? 

Mr. Morris. I cannot answer that question, but that is one of the 
things we are inquiring about. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 861 

Senator Ferguson. I ask now that we get that information as to 
whether- or not taxpayers' money is being paid to Mr. Currie. 

The Chairman. Whether he is on any payroll of the United States 
Government. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; or getting money that the taxpayers are 
furnishing. 

Senator Watkins. Directly or indirectly. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I read a newspaper clipping last night. It would take 
me just 3 minutes to find it. It describee! his resignation from th& 
World Bank and accepting the position with Colombia, and there was 
a related story about that. 

Mr. Chairman, if you think it is appropriate, we could put in more 
associations of Mr. Jessup with the institute in the record at this time. 
]\Ir. Mandel is prepared to do so. For instance, his activity in the IPR 
bearing on the American Peace Mobilization. I wonder if you want 
that in the record now ? 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you not insert that ? 

The Chairman. Please go on with your laying a foundation for 
each insertion. 

Mr. Mandel. I read exhibit 14 from the open hearing of July 28, 
1951, being a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, elated 
September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup, as follows : 

I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from 
all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organization. This is a 
genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people 
and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They 
are asking me to become the executive of {\, continuing organization, and I feel 
a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will 
meet to elect officers tomorrow. I must, despite obvious personal preference to 
postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive 
must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show 
has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect 
of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do 
the job in tliis country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable 
criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in 
the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resig- 
nation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accent. Finally 
I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you 
will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you. 

The Chairman. From whom was that and to whom, again, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is from Frederick V. Field to Philip C. Jessup, 
dated September 1, 1940. He is referring to his acceptance of a posi- 
tion with the American Peace Mobilization which was organized at 
that time. 

May I read at this point the statement of Attorney General Francis 
Biddle in reference to the gathering that Mr. Field was to be made 
an official of? He declares in regard to the American Peace Mobili- 
zation : 

It was formed in Decemlier of 1940 under the auspices of the Communist 
Party and the Young Communist League as a front organization designed to 
mold American opinion against participation in the war against Germany. 

The second communication is a part of exhibit 14, introduced in 
open hearings on July 26, 1951. It purports to be minutes of a meet- 
ing of the executive committee of the American Council of the Insti- 



862 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tute of Pacific Relations and it was taken from the files of the insti- 
tute. Present, among others, was Philip C. Jessup, chairman, and 
Edward C. Carter. I read an excerpt : 

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick 
V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had 
been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to 
strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a 
deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because 
the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary 
to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending 
consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and mis- 
understanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the afiirmation of his immediate resignation 
from all IFR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently 
talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had 
led him to accept tlie new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present 
when he inquired whetlier Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded 
to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that 
he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved 
that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation 
with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of 
the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of 
service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his 
new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leader- 
ship in the work of the American Council. 

That is an excerpt from the exhibit. 

Mr. Morris. That has already been introduced in evidence. 

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter memorandum from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 20, 1940, headed 
"WLH from ECC." I read this memorandum for the record: 

For your private information I enclose a copy of a telegram which Field sent 
to Jessup on August 31 or September 1. Field telephoned me late on the afternoon 
of August 30 from Chicago saying that great pressure was being put on him to 
become secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. I told him that institu- 
tionally I hoped he could postpone a decision, but that if personally he decided 
it was his national duty to take the Chicago job, I would do everything I could 
to back him up. From Ellsworth early the next morning I sent him a wire 
urging him to postpone a decision for another week. I thought it was of the 
utmost importance that he should first consult Edith, Jessup, and his colleagues 
of the New York office. 

The immediacy of the program, the pressure of the 20,000 attending the 
Chicago convention, and the very short time that was left before the Conscription 
Act would be voted in Congress made him feel, however, that he must make an 
immediate and affirmative decision. He took a thousand people from Chicago 
to Washington where they bombarded Congressmen for several days and I 
think Fred believes that the conscription bill got 100 less votes in Congress than 
it otherwise would. He is now working night and day with a large staff and 
thousands of backers throughout the country, to get the conscription bill repealed 
or nullified. 

He expects at any moment he may go to prison but desires to work full steam 
ahead until the moment of arrest in a gigantic Nation-wide effort to launch a 
movement which will preserve our democratic institutions so that if we do 
have to go to war we will have something worth fighting for. He does not wish 
to have the United States imitate France. 

For a considerable time he lived on benzedrine instead of sleep and feels, 
I think, that he is in exactly the same position as a man who is suddenly drafted 
to throw everything else over and join in the work of the national defense council 
or join the ranks. He was here for 2 days this week and has agreed next week 
to go into the whole question of the handbook. It is on his conscience, though 
I cannot make out whether it is on his conscience as much as it is on yours and 
mine. 

I shall use your letter in my talk with him, so I don't know that there is any 
point in your writing him yet. I have asked Miss Greene to prepare for Fred, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 863 

you, and me a very careful analysis of just how much progress has been made 
in quantity and quality and a detailed slietch of what still remains to be done. 
When we have this we will have to make a cost accounting of what would be 
required to finish the job. I am wondering whether I would be justified in 
telling Fred that he ought to consider giving whatever money is necessary to 
enable us to employ a staff to finish the book. Though I think he imagines he 
can give a little time to it each week, I personally do not think there is a ghost 
of a chance of his being able to give enough time to bring the book to a speedy 
conclusion. 

Can you give me an estimate of what the project has cost us thus tax, or 
should I get this from Miss Austern? 

I heard Fred speak to an audience of 2,000 in the Manhattan Center a couple 
of nights ago. There must have been 5 minutes sustained cheering when he 
stood up before he could begin his speech. He has long wanted to be a part of a 
great mass movement. Now he is at the head of one. I think the Pacific will 
be a marginal interest from 1 to 5 years. Some day it may come back as the 
focus of his life, but there is no point in putting on any pressure at the present 
time. 

If you have anything to add to your letter of September 18 on this matter, 
please send it to me by air mail. 

The Chairman. By whom is that? 

Mr. Mandel. That is headed "WLH from ECC." There is no 
signature. 

The Chairman. Do you know who WLH is ? 

Mr. Morris. It is the practice, Mr. Chairman, of the institute to 
refer to their staff members by initials only. "WLH" is generally 
W. L. Holland, and "ECC" is generally E. C. Carter. That is almost 
without exception true. 

Mr. Mandel. I might quote from Attorney General Francis Biddle, 
who describes the organization. 

The Chairman. Wliat organization? 

Mr. Mandel. The American Peace Mobilization. 

The most conspicuous activity of the American Peace Mobilization was the 
picketing of the White House which began in April 1941 in protest against lend- 
lease and the entire national defense program. On the afternoon of June 21, 
1941, Frederick V. Field, national secretary, suddenly called off the picket line 
around the White House. 

Here is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Public Rela- 
tions headed "Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations" and com- 
ing from the Columbia University, signed Phil. The signature cor- 
responds to the signature of Philip C. Jessup on other letterheads in 
the file. 

I read this letter, to Mr. Edward C. Carter : 

October 29, 1940. 

Dear Ned : I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as 
I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the 
two, something like this : 

"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since 
1928, has resigned in order to become executive secretary of the American Peace 
Mobilization. The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of pro- 
gressive trade-unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedi- 
cated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening 
of American democracy and through nonparticipation in the war between Eng- 
land and the fascist powers. Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was 
obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance 
of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection 
with the IPR. The executive committee, being forced to the conclusion that 
Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation 
with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service 
that Mr. Field had rendered during his 11 years of service to the American Coun- 



864 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

cil and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be 
possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the IPR." 

Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from 
the staff. 

How does that strike you? 

The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent. 
Sincerely yours, 

Phil. 

Mr. Morris. Wliile we are reading these exhibits, Mr. Chairman, 
I might point out it is no longer necessary for General Fortier to be 
here. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Thank you, General, for your presence. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. General. 

May that letter of October 29, 1940, be introduced? 

The Chairman. It will be. 

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel 
was marked "Exhibit No. 256," and filed for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. We have Mr. Joseph Kornfeder available, Mr. Chair- 
man, and he is prepared to testify today. The general nature of his 
testimony is to show that the Chinese Communist Party has been 
in the past a full-fledged member of the Communist Internationale, he 
having been in Moscow to make personal observations on this fact. 

The Chairman. I would like to hear that testimony, but I would 
like to have other members of the committee present also. I am in- 
clined to believe we will have to defer on account of the vote being 
taken. 

Mr. Morris. Until some time later today ? 

The Chairman. I suggest we convene at 2 : 30. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder is from Detroit and he is not easily 
summonable. 

The Chairman. Mr. Kornfeder, please be here at 2 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 30 a. m., the hearing recessed until 2 : 30 p. m., 
this same day.) 

afternoon session 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Has the wit- 
ness been sworn ? 

Mr. Morris. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you 
are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the 
Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER, DETROIT, MICH. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this hearing, one of 
the purposes of this hearing, is that we would like the record to 
show something of the nature of the Chinese Communist organization. 

It has been said on many occasions that Chinese Communists are 
not real Cominunists. An example of this can be found in a pamplilet 
which represents a cooperative project of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. It is called China Yes- 
terday and Today, by Eleanor Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 865 

On page 108 of that pamphlet, we read the expression : 

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they 
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word 
^'Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, 
unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise 
in the areas under their control. 

Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic con- 
ditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable 
of taking part in political Ufe, they are often described as a peasant party. 

Then it goes on on that page, that is page 108 and page 109. Taking 
this, Mr. Chairman, as typical of such an attitude of the Chinese Com- 
munists, I think it is necessary that we have a witness here who can 
testify, first-hand, about the nature of the Chinese Communist organi- 
zation. 

For that reason, we have asked Mr. Kornf eder to be here. 

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, would you give your name and address 
to the reporter, please? 

Mr. Kornfeder. My name is Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 3210 Book 
Tower, Detroit, Mich. 

The Chairman. How do you spell your name ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. K-o-r-n-f-e-d-e-r. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, when did you join the Communist 
Party ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I joined the Communist Party at the time of its 
formation in 1919. 

Mr. Morris. And how long did you remain a member of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I remained a member until October 1934. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us what the highest position you achieved 
in the Communist Party was, Mr. Kornfeder? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was a member of the district committee of the 
Communist Party, New York district, a member of the central execu- 
tive connnittee of the Communist Party, now known as the national 
committee, for several terms. 

While in Moscow, I was a member of the Anglo-American secre- 
tariat of the Communist International at the Communist International 
headquarters, and later a representative of the Communist Interna- 
tional in South America. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a Comintern delegate to North and South 
America ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was a Comintern delegate to South America. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, did you have any training in Moscow? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes; I took a 3-year course in the Lenin School. 

The Lenin School is a college to train leaders for the various Com- 
munist Parties in the various methods of political warfare. 

Mr. Morris. What years were you so trained, Mr. Kornfeder ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was in Moscow from the latter part of 1927 until 
April or May 1930. 

Mr. Morris. And what was your next assignment after your train- 
ing period ? 

Mr. Kornfeder, After that, I went as a representative of the Com- 
munist International to South America. 

Mr. Morris. Would you describe your relationship under those 
circumstances to the Communist Party of South America ? 



866 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, as representative of the Communist Inter- 
national in the Communist Parties of Columbia and Venezuela, I 
was in charge of these parties, that is, I was their political director 
about the same way Gerhardt Eisler was of the Communist Party of 
the United States, while he was here. 

Mr. Morris. That is, in other words, Mr. Kornf eder, you were not a 
member of the Communist Party of South America, but you were 
their superior and their boss ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Is that really what your position was? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. And when you say that you were then the counterpart 
of Gerhardt Eisler in the United States, do you mean that Gerhardt 
Eisler was the Comintern man that was sent here to run the Commu- 
nist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow did 
you have any opportunity to observe the workings of the Chinese 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us whatever you can in connection 
with that question, Mr. Kornfeder ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, in 1927, there developed a big crisis inside of 
the Chinese Communist Party 

The reason for the crisis was that the Chinese Communist Party 
who, until then, had been a part of the Kuomintang, had been ex- 
pelled from the Kuomintang by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, 
and that created a crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party. 

The subject of that crisis and the question as to what was wrong 
in the policy. Communist policies, in China then became an item of 
discussion in all of the higher committees of the Communist Inter- 
national. 

I attended the discussions. The result of these discussions was 
that the leading committees of tire Chinese Communist Party were 
purged, reorganized, and those that Moscow disapproved of were ex- 
pelled from the Communist Party as Trotskyites. 

I also had an opportunity to become familiar with the Chinese 
Communist politics by attending the various meetings of the Commu- 
nist International leading committees. 

Mr. Morris. Now, before you get on to that, Mr. Kornfeder, in what 
capacity did you attend these other discussions that you have testified 
about? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat 
of the Communist International. That was a subcommittee in charge 
of the Communist Party's English-speaking countries. 

The Communist Party of the United States always played a large 
role in the affairs of the Communist Party of China. So, because of 
that, I was interested to stay informed on affairs in China. 

Mr. Morris. You say, Mr. Kornfeder, that the American Com- 
munist Party was very active in the affairs of the Chinese Communist 
Party in China ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 867 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, why were the American Com- 
munists employed in connection with the Chinese Communist activi- 
ties? What is the reason for that? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the reason, as I get it from attending these 
discussion, is that America wielded a large influence in China all the 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Wielded a large influence? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. And the Comintern wanted to avail itself 
of that influence even if it was just in the form of representation from 
the United States, whether they had been Communist or Communist- 
controlled unions that claimed to represent a big following in the 
United States, or any other form. 

It seemed to hav.e an effect of building up the morale of the Chinese 
Communists to have Communist representation on the leading com- 
mittees in the Chinese labor movement. 

The Chairman. You say Communist representation, or do you 
mean American representation? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right, American Communist representa- 
tion. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow at 
these various Comintern meetings, did you encounter Chinese Com- 
munists there? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so. 

The Chinese Communist Party was represented on all the leading 
committees in the Communist International. They were on the execu- 
tive committee of the Communist International, they were on the 
agitation and propaganda commission of the Communist Inter- 
national, on the organization commission of the Communist Inter- 
national, and there was a special secretariat of the Communist Inter- 
national which preoccupied itself entirely with the problems of China, 
Japan, Malaya, Indochina, and so on, the so-called far eastern sec- 
retariat of the Communist International. 

Mr. Morris. Now could you tell us, Mr. Kornfeder, the evidence as 
you experienced it which indicated to you that the Chinese Com- 
munists were an integral part of the Comintern organization ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, in the first place, there was a tremendous 
college, the largest college to train leaders in the arts of political 
warfare, the so-called Far Eastern University, formerly also known 
as the Snn Yat-sen University. 

The Chairman. And that is located where? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Located in Moscow. 

That university had a capacity to train 2,000 organizers and agi- 
tators a year. 

At the time I was there, the number of Chinese Communists being 
trained there was 1,200. 

Mr. Morris. Would that be 1,200 a year, Mr. Kornfeder ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. 1,200 a year; yes. 

This training system started in 1926 and, as far as I know — Vt^ell,, it 
certainly was there while I was in Moscow, and as far as I Imow from 
others that were there subsequently, it continued throughout the years. 

The Chairman. How long were you there ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was there until 1930, 



868 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. From when ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. From 1927. 

The Chairman. Attending that university ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. I attended anotlier one, the Lenin School, which was 
a college to train leaders for the more advanced countries, like the 
United States, Germany, England, France, and so on. 

But the Eastern University trained Communist leaders for China, 
Japan, Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, India, and so on, the so- 
called colonial countries. 

Mr. Morris. And it is your testimony, then, that the Chinese Com- 
munist leaders were being trained in Moscow ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Definitely so. 

Mr. Morris. Was the discipline exerted by the Comintern organiza- 
tion on the Chinese Communist Party as strong as the discipline exer- 
cised in other Communist parties throughout the world ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. It certainly was, even stronger because they had a 
civil-war situation. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain that, Mr. Kornfeder? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, in a strange situation like existed inside of 
China, the Communist Party under such conditions maintained a 
discipline that is even more severe than in countries where conditions 
are relatively stable. 

This manifested itself in the control that Moscow headquarters had 
on the personnel of the Chinese Communist Party. There was not a 
single official of any consequence that could be elected by the Chinese 
Communist Party without previous consent of the Communist Inter- 
national, whether it be a secretary of the party, whether he be a head 
of, let us say, trade-union activities commission, or organization com- 
mission, or of the guerrilla army that they were already then forming. 
All of these leading personnel were all decided first in Moscow before 
they could be put into position. 

The same procedure was true, by and large, with all of the other 
Communist parties. 

The Chinese Communist Party was an integral part of the world 
Communist Party, which is monolithic, and there is no difference 
between the control of Moscow over that party as compared with 
other parties, except that discipline was even more severe because of 
the more severe internal situation in China. 

The Chairman. How did these students, as you termed them as 
such, maintain themselves in this University of Moscow ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, the university, its teaching staff, and oper- 
ating personnel, and all the trainees, all the expenses of that were paid 
by the Soviet Government and, coming there, that is the transjDorta- 
tion costs, were also furnished from the same source. 

If they had relatives back home, which they had to maintain, then 
a subsidy was allowed for that purpose. 

There were all together about four colleges like that in Moscow. 
They were all at the expense of the Soviet Government. 

The Chairman. The students then, so-called, were maintained with 
their tuition, their living, their housing, their clothing, everything 
was furnished to them by the Soviet Government? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. JSIr. Kornfeder, have you ever met Stalin, personally ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 869 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us whether or not he took an active 
interest in the affairs of the Chinese Communist organization? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Stalin was in charge of the affairs of the Chinese 
Communist Party by decision of the political bureau of the Commu- 
nist Party of the Soviet Union since 1926, 

All matters of policy, whether relating to the line to be adopted or to 
organization strategy, were decided in the final sense by Stalin himself. 

I am not the only one that says that. At the celebration for Stalin's 
seventieth birthday which took place, I believe, 2 years ago, Beria, 
the head of the political police, known as the MVD, in a laudatory 
speech on Stalin, which appeared in some of the papers, also said 
that the successes in China are due to the brilliant leadership of our 
great leader, Joseph Stalin, who has been guiding the affairs of the 
Communist Party of China ever since 1926. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. And you know that to be a fact, that statement of 
Beria, you know that to be a statement of fact from your own personal 
experience ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right. I knew it long before he made the 
speech. 

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, did you attend the Sixth World 
Congress of the Communist International ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes ; I attended the Sixth World Congress of the 
Communist International in Moscow. 

Mr. Morris. When was that held ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. The summer of 1928. 

Mr. Morris. Did anything take place at that congress bearing on 
the importance of the Chinese Connnunist Party in its future role 
in world affairs ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. The situation in China, from a Communist 
point of view, was one of the very principal topics of discussion and 
decision at the congress. I have here, and if I may I could quote it. 

Mr. Morris. What is it that you have there? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I have here the Theses on the Revolutionary Move- 
ment in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, which was adopted at that 
congress, and all the principal parts of which w^ere written by Joseph 
Stalin himself. 

Mr. Morris. From what are you reading, Mr. Kornfeder? From 
what publication? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I would like to read from a copy of this, decisions, 
that appeared in the International Press Correspondence, which was 
a weekly news service of the Communist International, a thesis on 
the colonial question. 

Mr. Morris. What is the date of the publication you are reading 
from, Mr. Kornfeder? 

Mr. Kornfeder. December 12, 1928. 

Mr. Morris. And you attended this congress ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. 1 attended the congress, and I know this is the 
resolution, the thesis that was adopted there. 

Now, the decision at that congress revolved largely on the subject, 
that is, in reference to China, whether to orientate the activities 
of the Communists in China on the peasantry. 

There is the accepted Marxian theory and the theory of Lenin, the 
founder of the Soviet state, that the Communists should orientate 



870 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

themselves on the factory workers and by forming labor unions there 
and so on and so forth, entrench themselves. 

That was the accepted theory up until about the time of this con- 
gress, also for colonial countries. 

Now, at the sixth congress, by the initiative of Stalin, the base of 
Communist politics in this type of country was fundamentally 
changed. From there on, the Communists were to base themselves on 
the peasants. 

Now, the peasant, to make an illustration, would be something like 
a very poor sharecropper down in the South, not a farmer as we under- 
stand it. A farmer would be a relatively rich man. The peasant is 
something like the poorest type of sharecropper down in the South, 
except that in China their conditions are even worse. 

Now, the Communists were to base themselves upon this strata, and 
conquer the countryside first, and then, after forming guerrilla armies 
in the countryside, conquer the cities. 

Those of you gentlemen who may have followed the course of events 
must have noticed that that is the thing that took place in China, first 
the countryside was conquered and then the cities, instead of the tra- 
ditional Marxian method of first conquering the cities and then con- 
quering the rest of the country. 

Now, the change in that direction, which required the Communists 
to change their organization methods, their agitation methods, to 
concentrate on what we call agrarian reform, and out of which some 
intellectuals here in this country got the impression that the Com- 
munists in China are agrarians — of course, that was entirely false. It 
was just the change of operational tactics on the part of Moscow. 

Now, to show you here, I will quote this change. I will quote a part 
of this resolution on page 1665. 

Along with the national-emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution con- 
stitutes the axes of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the chief colonial 
countries. 

The chief colonial country was, of course, in Asia, China. It is the 
peasantry that, from here, becomes the center of operation. 

Another part which was already then introduced in the strategy of 
the Communists in this type of country is to exploit nationalism. 

You see, prior to this, the Communists operated, well, under their 
own flag. All the propaganda was outright Communist and so on and 
so forth. 

After this Congress, more and more, • they shifted to the use of 
nationalism, to operate behind nationalist movements, to infiltrate 
nationalist movements, to use their flag and operate under it, and so on. 

There is a part here which introduces that change of tactics. It is 
on the same page. 

It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investi- 
gate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con- 
siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and 
to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned. 

The Chairman. How would that apply in the United States ? Have 
you an illustration of it ? Can you give us an illustration of it ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, in the United States they apply this thesis 
only to the Negroes. They consider the Negroes as colonials who are 
being exploited and oppressed by American imperialism, and who 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 871 

should have an independent Kepublic based on the Negro Belt in the 
South. 

That is the only part of this thesis that would apply to the United 
States, because the United States is an industrially advanced country 
where conditions are different. 

You see, their strategy adjusts itself in its method of operation to 
the type of country in which the Communists operate. 

In this country this would also be translated to the Communists 
hiding behind the skirts of the liberals. 

The Chairman. Hiding behind what? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Operating behind the skirts of the liberals. That 
is, using the liberals as a front or pretending to be liberals. 

They could not use nationalism in the sense that it is in China be- 
cause, well, we are an independent Nation and the leading Nation. 

But in their internal operations, they would make an assimilation 
of this tactic by not operating under their own flag, operating as lib- 
erals or so-called progressives, and so on. 

Mr. Morris. That concludes your comments on that world congress, 
Mr. Kornfeder, does it? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. 

I would suggest that it may be of use to introduce this part into the 
record, which is entitled "Comnmnist Strategy and Tactics in China^ 
India, and Similar Colonial Countries." 

Of course, the Communist methods since that was adopted have gone 
through considerable changes, have become smoother. But the basic 
principles are still in here and are being used even today. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we have that introduced 
into the record for the purposes described by Mr. Kornfeder. 

That is an official publication of the Communist International, and 
therein is a thesis on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and 
semicolonies. We have had testimony from Mr. Kornfeder on that 
score. 

The Chairman. And this is under date of December 12, 1928, vol- 
ume 8, No. 88. 

Mr. Morris. That is an official publication of the Communist Inter- 
national ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 

The Chairman. That part referred to by the witness may be in- 
serted in the record, commencing on page 1665, under the caption 
"On Communist strategy and tactics in China, India, and similar 
colonial countries," extending down to the middle of page 1670, just 
before "The immediate tasks of the Communists." 

It will be inserted in the record. 

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 257" and is as 
follows:) 

[From International Press Correspondence, December 12, 1928] 

III. On Communist Strategy and Tactics in China, India, and Similar 

Colonial Cotcjntries 

16. As in all colonies and semicolonies, so also in China and India the develop- 
ment of productive forces and the socialization of labor stands at a comparatively- 
low level. This circumstance, together with the fact of foreign domination and 
also the presence of powerful relics of feudalism and precapitalist relations, 
determines the character of the immediate stage of the revolution in these coun- 



872 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tries. In the revolutionary movement of these countries we have to deal with 
the bourgeois democratic revolution, i. e. of the stage signifying the preparation 
of the prerequisites for proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution. Corre- 
sponding to this, the following kinds of tasks can be pointed out, which may be 
considered as general basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the 
colonies and semicolonies : 

(a) A shifting in the relationship of forces in favor of the proletariat; 
emancipation of the country from the yoke of imperialism (nationalization of 
foreign concessions, railways, banks, etc.) and the establishment of the national 
tmity of the country where this has not yet been attained ; overthrow of the 
power of the exploiting classes at the back of which imperialism stands ; organ- 
ization of Soviets of workers and peasants and organization of the Red Army; 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry ; consolidation 
of the hegemony of the proletariat. 

(&) The carrying through of the agrarian revolution; emancipation of the 
peasants from all precapitalist and colonial conditions of exploitation and bond- 
age ; nationalization of the land ; radical measures for alleviating the position 
of the peasantry with the object of establishing the closest possible economic 
and political union between the town and village. 

(c) In correspondence with the further development of industry, transport, 
etc., and with the accompanying growth of the proletariat, the widespread de- 
velopment of trade union organizations of the working class, strengthening of 
the Communist Party and its conquest of a firm leading position among the toil- 
ing masses ; the achievement of the 8-hour working day. 

(d) Establishment of equal rights for nationalities and of sex equality (equal 
rights for women) ; separation of the church from the state and the abolition of 
caste distinctions ; political edvication and raising of the general cultural level 
of the masses in town and country, etc. 

How far the bourgeois-democratic revolution will be able in practice to realize 
all its basic tasks, and how far it will be the case that part of these tasks will be 
carried into effect only by the Socialist revolution, will depend on the course of 
the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and its successes or 
defeats in the struggle against the imperialists, feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. 
In particular, the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is facil- 
itated by the development of the Socialist revolution in the capitalist world and 
can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of the proletariat in the leading 
capitalist countries. 

The transition of the revolution to the Socialist phase demands the presence 
of certain minimum prerequisites, as, for example, a certain definite level of 
development in the country of industry, of trade union organizations of the 
proletariat and a strong Communist Party, The most important is precisely the 
development of a strong Communist Party with a big mass influence, which would 
be in the highest degree a slow and difficult process were it not accelerated by 
the bourgeois-democratic revolution which already grows and develops as a result 
of the objective conditions in these countries. 

17. The bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies is distinguished from 
the bourgeois-democratic revolution in an independent country chiefly in that 
it is organically bound up with the national emancipatory struggle against im- 
perialist domination. The national factor exerts considerable influence on the 
revolutionary process in all colonies, as well as in those semicolonies where 
imperialist enslavement already appears in its naked form, leading to tlie revolt 
of the mass of the people. On the one hand, national oppression hastens the 
ripening of the revolutionary crises, intensifies the dissatisfaction of the masses 
of workers and peasants, facilitates their mobilization and endows the revolu- 
tionary mass revolts with the elemental force and character of a genuine popular 
]-evolution. On the other hand, the national factor is able to infiuence not 
only the movement of the working class and peasantry but also the attitude 
of all the remaining classes, modifying its form during the process of revolution. 
Above all, the poor urban petty bourgeoisie together with the petty bourgeoise 
intelligentsia is during the first period, to a very considerable extent, brought 
under the influence of the active revolutionary forces ; secondly, the position 
of the colonial bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still for the 
most part an ambiguous one and its vacillations in accordance with the course 
of the revolution are even more considerable than in the bourgeoisie of an inde- 
pendent country (e. g., the Russian bourgoisie in 1905-17) . 

It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investi- 
gate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 873 

siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and 
to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned. 

Along with the national emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution con- 
stitutes the axis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the chief colonial coun- 
tries. Consequently, Communists must follow with the greatest attention the 
development of the agrarian crisis and the intensification of class contradictions 
in the village ; they must from the very beginning give a consciously revolutionary 
direction to the dissatisfaction of the workers and to the incipient peasant move- 
ment, directing it against imperialist exploitation and bondage as also against 
the yoke of the various precapitalist (feudal and semifeudal) relationships as a 
result of which peasant economy is suffering, declining, and perishing. The 
incredible backwardness of agriculture, the prevalence of oppressive rent rela- 
tions, and the oppression of trading-usury capital represent the greatest hind- 
rance to the development of productive forces in village economy in the colonies 
and stand in monstrous contradiction with the highly organized forms of ex- 
change between the village agricultural production of the colonies and the world 
market created by monopoly imperialism. 

IS. The national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries does not adopt 
a uniform attitude in relation to imperialism. A part of this bourgeoisie, 
more especially the trading bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of im- 
perialist capital (the so-called compradore bourgeoisie). In general, it more 
or less consistently defends the antinational imperialist point of view directed 
against the whole nationalist movement, in common with the feudal allies of 
imperialism and the more highly paid native officials. The remaining portions 
of the native bourgeoisie, especially the portion reflecting the interests of native 
industry, support the national movement and represent a special vacillating 
compromising tendency which may be designated as national reformism (or, 
in the terminology of the theses of the Second Congress of the Communist Inter- 
national, a bourgeois-democratic tendency). 

This intermediate position of the national bourgeoisie between the revolu- 
tionary and imperialist camps is no longer to be observed, it is true, in China after 
1925 ; there the greater part of the national bourgeoisie from the beginning, 
owing to the special situation, took the leadership in the national-emancipatory 
war; later on it passed over finally into the camp of counterrevolution. In 
India and Egypt, we still observe, for the time being, the typical bourgeois- 
nationalist movement — an opportunistic movement, subject to great vacilla- 
tions, balacing between imperialism and revolution. 

The independence of the country in relation to imperialism, being to the 
advantage of the whole colonial people, corresponds also to the interests of the 
national bourgeoisie, but is in irreconcilable contradiction to the whole nature of 
the imperialist system. Various native capitalists, it is true, are by their im- 
mediate interests to a great Extent bound by numerous threads to imperialist 
capital. Imperialism is able directly to bridge a considerable portion of them 
(it may be even a greater portion than heretofore) and to create a definite Com- 
pradore position, a position of intermediary trader, subexploiter or overseer 
over the enslaved population. But the position of slave owner, of monopolist 
supreme exploiter, imiierialism reserves for itself alone. Independent rule, a 
future of "free" independent capitalist development, hegemony over an "independ- 
ent" people — this imperialism will never voluntarily yield to the national bour- 
geoisie. In this respect, the contradiction of interests between the national 
bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism is objectively of a radical 
character. In this respect, imperialism demands capitulation on the part of 
the national bourgeoisie. 

The native bourgeoisie, as the weaker side, again and again capitulates to im- 
perialism. Its capitulation, however, is not final as long as the danger of class 
revolution on the part of the masses has not become immediate, acute and men- 
acing. In order, on the other hand, to avoid this danger, and, on the other hand, 
to strength its position in relation to imperialism, bourgeois nationalism in 
these colonies strives to obtain the support of the petty bourgeoisie, of the 
peasantry and in part also of the working class. Since, in relation to the work- 
ing class it has little prospect of success (as soon as tbe working class in these 
countries has at all begun to avv-ake politically), it becomes the more important 
for it to obtain support from the peasantry. 

But just here is the weakest point of the colonial bourgeoisie. The unbear- 
able exploitation of the colonial peasantry can only be put an end to by the way 
of the agrarian revolution. The bourgeoisie of China, India, and Egypt is by its 
immediate interests so closely bound up with landlordism, with usury capital 



874 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and with the exploitation of the peasant masses in general, that it takes its stand 
not only against the agrarian revolution but also against every decisive agrarian 
reform. It is afraid, and not without foundation, that even the more open 
formulation of the agrarian question will stimulate and accelerate the growth 
of the process of revolutionary fermentation in the peasant masses. Thus, 
the reformist bourgeoisie hardly dare to decide to approach practically this 
basic urgent question. 

Instead, it attempts by means of empty nationalist phrases and gestures to 
keep the petty bourgeois masses under its influence and to compel imperialism 
to grant certain concessions. But the imperialists draw the reins ever tighter, 
for the national bourgeoisie is incapable of offering any serious resistance. Ac- 
cordingly, the national bourgeoisie in every conflict with imperialism attempt, 
on the one hand, to make a great show of their nationalist "firmness" of prin- 
ciple, and on the other hand, they sow illusions as to the possibility of a peace- 
ful compromise with imperialism. Through both the one and the other, the 
masses inevitably become disillusioned and in this way they gradually outlive 
their reformist illusions. 

19. An incorrect estimation of the basic national-reformist tendency of the 
national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries gives rise to the possibility of 
serious errors in the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties concerned. In 
particular, two kinds of mistakes are possible : 

(a) A nonunderstanding of the difference between the national reformist and 
national-revolutionary tendency can lead to a "khvostist" policy in relation to the 
bourgeoisie, to an insufiiciently accurate political and organizational delimitation 
of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, and to the blurring of the chief revolu- 
tionary slogans (especially the slogans of the agrarian revolution) , etc. This was 
the fundamental mistake into which the Communist Party of China fell in 
1925-27. • 

ib) An underestimation of the special significance which the bourgeois na- 
tional-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist camp, possess owing to 
its mass influence on the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a 
portion of the working class, may lead, at least in the first stages of the move- 
ment, to a sectarian policy and to the isolation of the Communists from the 
toiling masses. 

In both these cases, insufficient attention is given to the realization of precisely 
those tasks which the Second Congress of the Communist International had al- 
ready characterized as the basic tasks of the Communist Parties in the colonial 
countries, i. e. the tasks of struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movement 
inside the nation itself. Without this struggle, without the liberation of the 
toiling masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie and of national-reformism, 
the basic strategical aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-demo- 
cratic revolution — the hegemony of the proletariat — cannot be achieved. With- 
out the hegemony of the proletariat, an organic part of which is the leading role 
of the Communist Party, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be carried 
through to an end, not to speak of the socialist revolution. 

20. The petty bourgeoisie in the colonial and semieolonial countries plays a 
very important role. It consists of various strata, which in different periods of 
the national-revolutionary movement play very diverse roles. 

The artisan, who is hit by the competition of foreign imported goods, is hos- 
tilely disposed toward imperialism. At the same time, he is interested in the 
unlimited exploitation of his journeymen and apprentices, and accordingly, he 
is hostilely disposed toward the class-conscious labor movement. At the same 
time, also, he usually suffers himself from the exploitation of trading and usury 
capital. The exceedingly ambiguous and hopeless position of this stratum of the 
petty bourgeoisie determines its vacillations, and it frequently falls under the 
influence of Utopian reactionaries. 

The small tradei" — both in town and village — is connected with village exploi- 
tation through usury and trade, and he clings to the old forms of exploitation in 
preference to the prospects of an expansion of the internal market. These 
strata, however, are not homogeneous. These sections of the trading bourgeoisie 
which in one form or another are connected with the Compradores occupy a 
different position from tho.se sections the activity of which is limited mainly to 
the internal market. 

The petty bourgeois intelligentsia, the students, and such like, are very fre- 
quently the most determined representatives, not only of the specific interests 
of the petty bourgeoisie, but also of the general objective interests of the entire 
national bourgeoisie, and, in the fii'st period of the national movement, they 
often come out as the spokesmen of the nationalist struggle. Their role at the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 875 

head of the movement is comparatively important. In general, thpy cannot act 
as representatives of peasant interests, for the very social strata from which 
they come are connected with landlordism. Tlie upsurge of the revolutionary 
wave may drive them into the labor movement, bringing with them their petty 
bourgeois ideology of vacillation and indecision. Only a few of them in the 
course of the struggle are able to break with their own class and rise to an 
understanding of tlie tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat, and to become 
active defenders of the interests of the latter. It frequently happens that the 
petty bourgeois intellectuals give to their ideology a socialist or even Communist 
color. In the struggle against imperialism they have played, and in such coun- 
tries as India and Egypt they even now, still partially play a revolutionary role. 
The mass movement may draw them after it, i>ut it may also push them into the 
camp of extreme reaction or at least, cause the spread of Utopian reactionary 
tendencies in their ranks. 

Alongside of these strata, there are to be found in the colonial towns con- 
siderable sections of urban poor, the position of which objectively drives them to 
the support of revolution — artisans who do not exploit the labor of others, street 
traders, unemployed intellectuals, ruined peasants seeking work, etc. Further, 
the colonial town, as also the village, has a populous section of "coolies", semi- 
proletarians who have not passed through the school of factory production and 
who live by casual labor. 

The peasantry, along with the proletariat and in the character of its ally, 
represents a driving force of the revolution. The immense many-millioned 
peasant mass constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population even in 
the most developed colonies (in some colonies it is 90 percent of the population). 
The many millions of starving tenant-cultivators, petty peasants oppressed by 
want and groaning under all kinds of precapitalist and capitalist forms of ex- 
ploitation, a considerable portion of them deprived of the possibility of cultiva- 
tion even on the lands that they rent, thrown out from the process of production 
and slowly dying from famine and disease, village agricultural laborers, all 
these are the allies of the proletariat in the village. The peasantry can only 
achieve its emaucipation under the leadership of the proletariat, but the prole- 
tariat can only lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory in union with 
the peasantry. 

The process of class differentiation of the peasantry in the colonies and semi- 
colonies which possess important relics of feudalism and of precapitalist rela- 
tionships, proceeds at a comparatively slow rate. Nevertheless, market relation- 
ships in these countries have developed to such a degree that tiie peasantry 
already no longer represent a homogeneous mass, as far as their class relations 
are concerned. In the villages of China and India, in particular in certain parts 
of these countries, it is already possible to find exploiting elements derived from 
the peasantry, who exploit the peasants and village laborers through usury, 
trade, employment of hired labor, the sale or letting out of land on rent, the 
loaning of cattle or agricultural implements, etc., etc. 

In general, it is possible that, in the first period of the struggle of the peasantry 
against the landlords, the proletariat may be able to carry with it the entire 
peasantry. But in the further development of the struggle some of the upper 
strata of the peasantry may pass into the camp of counter-revolution. The 
proletariat can achieve its leading role in relation to the peasantry only under 
the conditions of unflinching struggle for its partial demands, for complete carry- 
ing through of the agrarian revolution, and only if it will lead the struggle of the 
wide masses of the peasantry for a revolutionary solution of the agrarian 
question. 

21. The working class in the colonies and semicolonies has characteristic 
featvires which play an important role in the building up of an independent 
working class movement and proletarian class ideology in these countries. The 
predominant part of the colonial proletariat is derived from the pauperized 
village, with which the worker remains in connection even when engaged in 
production. In the majority of colonies (with the exception of some large factory 
towns such as Shanghai, Bombay, Calcutta, etc.), we find, as a general rule, 
only a first generation of proletariat engaged in large-scale production. Another 
portion is made up of the ruined artisans who are being driven out of the decay- 
ing handicrafts, which are widely spread even in the most advanced colonies. 
The ruined artisan, a petty owner, carries, with him into the working class a 
guild tendency and ideology which serves as a basis for the penetration of 
national-reformist influence into the labor movement of the colonies. 

22,S48 — .52 — pt. .3 12 



876 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The great fluctuation in the composition of the proletariat (frequent renewal 
of the labor force iu the factories owing to workers returning to the villages and 
the inflow of new masses of poverty-stricken peasants into production) ; the 
considerable percentage of women and children ; the numerous different lan- 
guages ; illiteracy ; the wide distribution of religious and caste prejudices — all 
make diflScult the work of systematic agitation and propaganda and retard the 
growth of class consciousness among the workers. Nevertheless, the merciless 
exploitation, practiced in the most oppressive forms by native and foreign capital, 
and the entire absence of political rights for the workers, create the objective 
pre-conditions on the basis of which the labor movement in the colonies is 
rapidly overcoming all obstacles and every year draws greater and greater masses 
of the working class into the struggle against the native exploiters and the 
imperialists. 

The first period of the growth of the labor movement in the colonial and semi- 
colonial countries (approximately 1919-1923) is organically bound up with the 
general growth of the national-revolutionary movement which followed the world 
war, and' which was characterized by the subordination of the class interests of 
the working class to the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle headed by the 
native bourgeoisie. Insofar as the labor strikes and other demonstrations bore 
an organizational character, they were usually organized by petty bourgeois in- 
tellectuals who restricted the demands of the workers to questions of the 
national struggle. The most important characteristic of the second period of 
rapid growth of the labor movement in the colonies, on the other hand, the period 
which began after the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, was the 
emergence of the working class of the colonies into the political arena as an 
independent class force directly opposing itself to the national bourgeoisie, and 
entering upon a struggle with the latter in defense of its own immediate class 
interests and for hegemony in the national revolution as a whole. The history of 
the last few years has clearly confirmed this characteristic of the new stage of 
the colonial revolution, first of all in the example of the great Chinese revolution, 
and subsequently in the insurrection in Indonesia. There is every ground to 
believe that in India the working class is liberating itself from the influence of 
the nationalist and social-reformist leaders and is being converted into an inde- 
pendent political factor in the struggle against the British imperialists and the 
, native bourgeoisie. 

22. In order correctly to determine the immediate tasks of the revolutionary 
movement, it is important as a starting point to take into consideration the degree 
of maturity attained by the movement in the separate colonial countries. The 
revolutionary movement in China is distinguished from the present movement in 
India by a series of essential features, characterizing the different degrees of 
maturity of the movement in the two countries. The previous experience of the 
Chinese revolution must, undoubtedly, be utilized in the revolutionary movement 
in India and other analogous colonial countries. But it would be a completely 
mistaken application of the Chinese experience if, at the present time in India, 
Egypt, etc., we were to formulate the inunediate tasks, slogans and tactical meth- 
ods in exactly the same form as took place in China, for example in the Wuhan 
period, or in the form in which it is necessary to formulate them there at the 
present time. 

The tendency to skip over the inevitable difficulties and special tasks of the 
present stage of the revolutionary movement in 'India, Egypt, etc., can only be 
harmful. It is necessary to carry through much work in the building up and 
consolidation of the Communist Party and trade-union organizations of the 
proletariat, in the revolutionization of the trade-unions, in the development of 
economic and political mass demonstrations and in the winning over of the 
masses and their liberation from the influence of the national-reformist bour- 
geoisie, before it is possible to advance in these countries with definite prospects 
of success to the realization of such tasks as those which were fully carried out in 
China during the Wuhan period as the immediate tasks of the struggle of the 
working class and peasantry. 

The interests of the struggle for the class rule of the national bourgeoisie 
compel the most important bourgeois parties in India and Egypt (Swarajists, 
Wafdists) still to demonstrate their opposition to the ruling imiTierialist-t'eudal 
bloc. Although this opposition has not a revolutionary but a reformist and class 
collaborationist character, this by no means signifies that it has not a special 
significance. The national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in 
the struggle against imperialism. Nevertheless, this bourgeois-reformist opposi- 
tion has its real special significance for the development of the revolutionary 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 877 

•movement— and this both in a negative as well as in a positive sense — insofar 
as it possesses any mass influence at all. 

Its chief feature is that it exerts a braking retarding influence on the develop- 
ment of the revolutionary movement, insofar as it is successful in drawing the 
toiling masses in its wake and holding them back from the revolutionary 
struggle. On the other hand, however, the demonstrations of the bourgeois 
opposition against the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc, even if they do not have 
any deei^ foundation, can exert a certain accelerating influence on the process 
of the iwlitical awakening of the wide masses of toilers; the concrete open 
conflicts of the national-reformist bourgeoisie with imperialism, although of 
little significance in themselves, may, under certain conditions ; indirectly serve 
as the cause of the unleashing of even greater revolutionary mass actions. 

It is true' the reformist bourgeoisie itself endeavours not to allow of any such 
effect of its oppositional activities, and in one way or another seeks to prevent 
it in advance. But, wherever the objective conditions exist for a far-reaching 
political crisis, there the activities of the national-reformist opposition, even 
their insignificant conflicts with imperialism which are least of all connected 
with the real hearth of the revolution, can become of serious importance. 

The Communists must learn how to utilize each and every conflict, to develop 
such conflicts and to broaden their significance, to connect them with the agitation 
for revolutionary slogans, to spread the news of these conflicts among the wide 
masses, to arouse these masses to independent, open manifestations in sui^port 
of their own demands, etc. 

23. The correct tactics in the struggle against such parties as the Swarajists 
and Wafdists during this stage consist in the successful exposure of their real 
national-reformist character. These parties have already more than once betrayed 
the national-emancipatory struggle, but they have not yet finally passed over 
to the counter-revolutionary camp in the manner of the Kuomintang. There is 
no doubt that they will do this later on, but at the present time they are so 
particularly dangerous precisely because their real physiognomy has not yet 
been exposed in the eyes of the wide masses of toilers. For this exposure there 
is still needed a very large amount of Communist educational work and a very 
great deal of new political experience on the part of the masses themselves. 
If the Communists do not already succeed in this stage in shaking the faith of 
the toiling masses in the bourgeois national-reformist leadership of the national 
movement, then this leadership in the coming upsurge of the revolutionary 
wave will represent an enormous danger for the revolution. 

Consequently, it is necessary, by means of correct Communist tactics, adapted 
to the conditions of the present stage, to help the toiling masses in India. Egypt, 
Indonesia and such colonies to emancipate themselves from the influence of the 
bourgeois parties. This is not to be achieved by any noisy phrases, however, 
radical they may sound superficially, about the absence of any distinction be- 
tween the oppositional national-reformists (Swarajists, Wafdists, etc.) and the 
British imperialists or their feudal counter-revolutionary allies. The national 
reformist leaders would easily be able to make use of such an exaggeration in 
order to incite the masses against the Communists. The masses see the chief 
immediate enemy of national emancipation in the form of the imperialist feudal 
bloc, which in itself is correct at this stage of the movement in India, Egypt, and 
Indonesia (as far as one side of the matter is concerned) . 

In the struggle against this ruling counter-revolutionary force,- the Indian, 
Egyptian, and Indonesian Communists must proceed in advance of all, they must 
fight more determinedly, more consistently and more resolutely than any petty 
bourgeois section or national-revoluntary group. Of course, this fight must not 
be waged for the organizing of any kind of putsch or premature attempt at a 
rising on the part of the small revolutionai-y minority, but for. the purpose of 
organizing the widest possible strata of the masses of toilers in demonstrations 
and other manifestations so that in this way the active participation of these 
masses can be guaranteed for a victorious uprising at a further stage of the 
revolutionary struggle. 

At the same time, it is no less important mercilessly to expose before the toil- 
ing masses the national-reformist character of the Swarajist, Wafdist and other 
nationalist parties, and in particular of their leaders. It is necessary to expose 
their half-heartedness and vacillation in the national struggle, their bargainings 
and attempts to reach a compromise with British imperialism, their previous 
capitulations and counter-revolutionary advances, their reactionary resistance to 
the class demands of the proletariat and peasantry, their empty nationalist- 
phraseology, their dissemination of harmful illusions about the peaceful decolon- 



878 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ization of the country and their sabotage in relation to the application of revolu- 
tionary methods in the national-emancipatory struggle. 

It is necessary to reject the formation of any l<ind of bloc between the Com- 
munist Party and the national-reformist opposition ; this does not exclude the 
formation of temporary agreements and the coordinating of separate activities 
in connection with definite antiimperialist demonstrations, provided that the 
demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition can be utilized for the development 
of the mass movement, and provided that these agreements do not in any way 
limit the freedom of the Communist Parties in the matter of agitatimi among 
the masses and among the organizations of the latter. Of course, in this work 
the Communists must linow how at the same time to carry on the most relentless 
ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the 
slightest signs of its influence inside the labor movement. In such cases, the 
Communist Party must take particular care not only to maintain its complete 
political independence and to make quite clear its own character, but also, on 
the basis of facts, to open the eyes of the masses of toilers who are under the 
influence of the bourgeois opposition, so that they will perceive all the hope- 
lessness of this opposition and the danger of the bourgeois democratic illusions 
that it disseminates. 

24. An incorrect estimation of the chief tendency of the parties of the big 
national bourgeoisie gives rise to the danger of an incorrect estimation of the 
character and role of the petty bourgeois parties. The development of these 
parties, as a general rule, follows a course from the national-revoluntionary to 
the national-reformist position. Even such movements as Sun Yat-senism in 
China, Gandhism in India, Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, were originally radical 
petty bourgeois ideological movements which, however, as a result of their 
service to the big bourgeoisie became converted into a bourgeois nationalist- 
reformist movement. After this, in India, Egypt, and Indonesia, there was 
again founded a radical wing from among the different petty bourgeois groups 
(e. g. the Republican Party, Watanists, Sarekat Rayat), which stand for a more 
or less consistent national-revolutionary point of view. In such a country as 
India, the rise is possible of some new analogous radical petty bourgeois parties 
and groups. 

But tlie fact must not be lost sight of that these parties, essentially con- 
sidered, are connected with the national bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois in- 
telligentsia at the head of the parties puts forward national-revolutionary de- 
mands but at the same time appears more or less conscious as the representative 
of the capitalist development of their country. Some of these elements can 
become the followers of various kinds of reactionary Utopias, but when con- 
fronted with feudalism and imperialism, they, in distinction from the parties 
of the big national bourgeoisie, appear at the outset not as reformists but as more 
or less revoluntionary representatives ot the anti-imperialist interests of the 
colonial bourgeoisie. This is the case, at least, so long as the development 
of the revolutionary process in the country does not put on the order of the day 
in a definite and sharp form the fundamental internal questions of the bourgeois- 
democratic revolution, particularly the question of the realization of the agi-arian 
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. When this 
happens, then it usually denotes the end of the revolutionary character of the 
petty bourgeois parties. As soon as the revolution has placed the class interests 
of the proletariat and the peasantry in critical contradiction not only to the 
rule of the feudal-imperialist bloc, but also to the class rule of the bourgeoisie, 
the petty bourgeois groups usually go back to the position of the national-re- 
formist parties. 

It is absolutely essential that the Communist Parties in these countries should 
from the very beginning demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion, both 
politically and organizationally, from all the petty bourgeois groups and parties. 
In so far as the needs of the revolutionary struggle demand it, a temporary co- 
operation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary unTon 
between the Communist Party and the national revolutionary movement, pro- 
vided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, tliat it genuinely 
struggles against the ruling power and tliat its representatives do not put ob- 
stacles in the way of the Communists educating and organizing in a revolutionary 
sense the peasants and broad masses of the exploited. In every such coopera- 
tion, however, it is essential to take the most careful precautions in order that 
this cooperation does not degenerate into a fusion of the Communist movement 
with the bourgeois-revolutionary movement. 

The Communist movement in all circumstances, most unconditionally pre- 
serve the independence of the proletarian movement and its own independence in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 879 

agitation, in organization and in demonstrations. To criticize tlie half-hearted 
ness and vacillation of the petty bourgeois groups, to anticipate their vacilla- 
tions, to be prepared for them and at the same time to utilize to the full all the 
revolutionary possibilities of these strata, to carry on a consistent struggle 
against petty bourgeois influence over the proletariat, employ all means to 
liberate the wide masses of the peasantry from the influence of the petty bour- 
geois parties and to win from them the hegemony over the peasantry — these are 
the tasks of the Communist Parties. 

25. How rapidly the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., will reach 
such a high degree of maturity as it has already reached in China, depends to an 
essential extent on how quickly there arises there a big revolutionary wave. 
In the event of its postponement for a considerable time, the political and organ- 
izational ripening of the driving forces of the revolution can only proceed by way 
of a gradual and relatively slow process of development. If, however, the com- 
ing powerful revolutionary wave rises earlier, then the movement may quickly 
be able to attain a much higher stage of maturity. 

Under exceptionally favorable circumstances, it is not even excluded that the 
revolution there may be able in one single mightly wave to achieve the conquest 
of power by the proletariat and peasantry. It is also possible that the process 
of the development of the revolution from one stage to another more mature stage 
will be interrupted for a more or less prolonged period of time, in particular if 
the coming wave of revolutionary' upheaval reaches a relatively small height 
and is not of great duration. Consequently, it is necessary in every case to sub- 
ject the concrete situation to the most detailed analysis. 

The following factors are of decisive significance for the immediate growing 
over of the revolution from one stage to another higher stage: (1) The degree 
of development of the revolutionary proletarian leadership of the movement, i. e. 
of the Conuuunist Party of the given country (the numerical strength of the 
Party, its independent character, consciousness and fighting readiness, as well 
as its authority and connection with the masses and its influence on the trade 
union and peasant movement) ; (2) the degree of organization and the revolu- 
tionary experience of the working class, as well as, to a certain extent, of the 
l>easantry. Tlie revolutionary experience of the masses signifies experience of 
struggle : in the first place, liberation from the influence over them of the bour- 
geois and petty bourgeois parties. 

Since these prerequisites for the first big mass outburst of the revolution, 
even in the best circumstances, are present only to an insufficient degree, an un- 
usually deep revolutionary crisis and an unusually high and persistent revolu- 
tionary wave are required for it to be possible for the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution with the aid of this one wave of upheaval to lead to the complete vic- 
tory of the proletariat and peasantry. Such a possibility is most easily pre- 
sented, for example, when the ruling imperialism is temporarily distracted by 
a long-continued war outside the frontiers of the colonial country concerned. 

26. Living, concrete, historical dialetics, such as were demonstrated by the 
now completed first period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, will 
give to the Communists, especially those working in the colonial countries, a 
valuable experience which it is necessary to study carefully in order to draw 
the correct conclusions, especially from the mistakes committed in the course 
of Communist work in the colonies. 

The rise of the revolutionary wave in China was unusually prolonged (over 2 
years), since it was connected with a protracted internal war. Inasmuch as the 
Northern Expedition was not conducted directly against the great imperialist 
powers and inasmuch as the latter, owing to competition between them, were 
partially passive during the first period, while the bourgeois leadership of the 
national movement had already for some years held Canton in its hands — a 
definite, though limited, territory — as well as a centralized power backed up by 
the army, and so forth, it is understandable that in this exceptional case a great 
part of the bourgeoisie in the beginning looked upon the national emancipatory 
war as its own particular affair. The Kuomintang, in which it pi-acticnlly played 
a leading role, in the course of a short time came to be at the head of the national 
revolutionary movement, a circumstance which in the course of further events 
represented an extremely great danger for the revolution. 

On the other hand, among the peculiarities of the situation in China nuist be 
numbered the fact that the proletariat there was stronger in relation to its bour- 
geoisie than the proletariat of other countries. It is true that it was weakly 
organized, but during the upsurge of the revolutionary wave the growth of labor 
organization proceeded at a very rapid rate. 



880 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Communist Party also rose in a short time from a small group to a party: 
with 60,000 members (and presently even more) and possessing a wide influence 
among the workers. Naturally, in these conditions many petty bourgeois ele- 
ments also entered the party. The party was lacking in revolutionary expe- 
rience and, even more, in traditions of Bolshevism. In the beginning, the upper 
hand in its leadership was taken by wavering elements, which were still only to 
a very small degree liberated from petty bourgeois opportunist tendencies which 
inadequately understood the independent tasks and role of the Communist Party 
and which came out against any decisive development of the agrarian revolution. 
The entry of the Communists for a certain period into the leading party of the 
national revolution, the Kuomintang, in itself corresponded to the requirements 
of the struggle and of the situation, and was also in the interests of the indis- 
pensable Communist work among the fairly wide masses of toilers who followed 
this party. In addition, at the beginning, tlie Communist Party of China received 
in the territory under the rule of the Kuomintang Government the possibility of 
independent agitation among the masses of workers and peasants and among the 
soldiers of the national army and their organizations. At that time the party 
possessed greater possibilities than it actually made use of. 

At that time the party did not sufficiently clearly explain to the masses its 
proletarian class position in distinction from Sun Yat-senism and other petty 
bourgeois tendencies. In the ranks of the Kuomintang, the Communists did not 
conduct any independent policy, leaving out'of account that in any such inevi- 
table bloc the Communists must adopt an unconditionally critical attitude toward 
the bourgeois elements and always come out as independent force. The Com- 
munists failed to expose the vacillations of the national-bourgeoisie and of 
bourgeois-democratic nationalism, just at the time when this exposure ought to 
have constituted one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party. The 
inevitable disruption of the Kuomintang drew nearer and nearer as the national 
army advanced, but the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party undertook 
nothing or almost nothing in order to prepare the party in case of a breach, and 
in order to guarantee its independent position and to unite the revolutionary 
workers and peasants in an independent lighting bloc which would oppose itself 
to the leadersliip of the Kuomintang. 

Thus, the bourgeois-counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang Kai-shek found the 
revolutionary proletariat completely unprepared and threw its ranks into con- 
fusion. Further, the leadership of the Communist Party even at that time 
badly understood the process of the development of the revolution from one 
stage to another and did not carry through the correct changes in the line of 
the party made necessary by this coup. Inasmuch as the left wing of the petty 
bourgeois leaders of the Kuomintang during the course of a certain time still 
went together with the Communist Party, there took place a territorial separa- 
tion ; there arose the separate governments of Nanking and Wuhan. But the 
Communist Party did not occupy a leading position even in Wuhan. 

Very quickly, in the Wuhan territory there commenced a second period, char- 
acterized, among other things, on the one hand, by the presence of elements of an 
incipient, still indefinite dual power (the seizure by peasant unions of a number 
of ruling functions in the villages, and the extension of the functions of the trade 
unions, determined by the endeavour of the masses to reach a "plebeian" inde- 
pendent solution of the questions of power), and, on the other hand, by the 
absence of sufficiently mature conditions for the organization of Soviets as organs 
of revolt against the Wuhan government, insofar as the latter still carried on a 
revolutionary struggle against the Nanking government which represented the 
treachery of the bourgeosie to the revolution. 

Tlie Communist Party at that time directly hindered the independent actions of 
the revolutionary masses, it did not facilitate their task of gathering and or- 
ganizing forces, it did not assist in breaking down the influence of the leaders of 
the Left Kuomintang and their position in the country and in the army, instead 
of utilizing its participation in the Government for these purposes, it, on the 
contrary, screened the whole activity of this Government (individual petty 
bourgeois leading members of the party went so far that they even participated 
in the disarming of the workers' pickets in Wuhan and in sanctioning the 
punitive expedition to Changsha!). 

At the bottom of this opportunist policy lay the hope of avoiding a rupture with 
the petty bourgeois leaders of the Wuhan governments. But, as a matter of 
fact, this rupture could only be put off for a short space of time. When tlie mass 
risings acquired a threatening character, the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang 
also began to reach out toward unity with their allies on the other side of the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 881 

barricades. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants still con- 
tinued to exert all its forces in order to achieve victory. 

The Communist Party of China now also corrected its line, elected a new lead 
ership and took its place at the head of the revolution. But the revolutionary 
wave had already ebbed. The heroic mass struggles under the slogan of Soviets 
could only achieve a few temporary successes. Only in individual localities did 
the uprising of the agrarian revolution begin sufticiently early, in the remainder 
the many millions of the ijeasants' rearguard were delayed in their advance. 
Instead of the former gross errors of opportunist leadership, there were now 
revealed on the contrary, in various places extremely harmful putschist mistakes. 
The preparations for risings also did not take place without great defects on the 
part of tlie Communists. The heavy defeats once more threw back the revolu- 
tion, which in the south had already entered into the second stage of develop- 
ment, to the starting point of this stage. 

27. Thanks to the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie obtained power, 
the composition of the former bloc of the imperialists and militarists was partly 
altered and the new ruling bloc now represents the immediate chief enemy of the 
revolution. In order to overthrow it, it is necessary to win over the decisive 
masses of the proletariat and peasantry to the side of the revolution. This con- 
stitutes the most important task of the Chinese Communist Party for the im- 
mediate future. The Chinese workers have already acquired an enormous 
experience. The further strengtliening and revolutionization of the trade union 
movement and the further strengthening of the Communist Party is essential. 
A certain portion of the Chinese peasantry has already outlived bourgeois dem- 
ocratic illusions and shown considerable activity in the revolutionary struggle, 
but this is only an insignificant minority of the huge peasant population of China. 

It is very probable that some petty bourgeois groups will take up the position 
of national reformism (inside or outside the Kuomintang), in order by a certain 
display of bourgeois-democratic opposition to conquer influence over the toiling 
masses (to these petty bourgeois reformists belong also Tang Ting-san and the 
Social Democratic trade-union, leaders). Under no circumstances must the 
significance of these attempts be underestimated. The isolation of these groups 
and their exposure before the masses by means of correct Communist tactics 
constitutes an absolutely essential precondition for the Communist Party to be 
able to take a really leading position in the moment of the coming new rise of the 
revolutionary wave in China. 

Already at the present time, the party must everywhere propagate among 
the masses the idea of Soviets, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed 
uprising. It must already now emphasize in its agitation the necessity of over- 
throw of the ruling bloc and the mobilization of the masses for revolutionary 
demonstrations. Carefully studying the objective conditions of the revolution 
as they continue to mature, utilizing every possibility for the mobilization of 
the masses, it must consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of 
state power, organization of Soviets as organs of the insurrection, expropriation 
of the landlords and big property-owners, expulsion of the foreign imperialists 
and the confiscation of their property. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, after you finished your assignment 
in South America, that is, you were Comintern delegate to South 
America, what was your next assignment? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, my next assignment was I was put in charge 
of the Communist Party's labor union activities in the New York 
area. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you were assigned from South America 
back to New York ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat year was that? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That was about the end of 1931. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what you did when you reported 
for your duties, you new duties ? 

The Chairman. I think before you get into that, I have a question 
I would like to ask you. When you left South America, did you re- 
turn to Russia ? 



882 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. No, I returned to the United States, 

The Chairman. Tell me, what was the date of your departure from 
Moscow to go to South America ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I departed from Moscow, I believe, in April 1930. 
It may have been the early part of May. 

Mr. Morris. So you were in South America a little more than a 
year? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was in South America about 17 months. 

The Chairman. Where were you in South America ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. I was first in Colombia, stationed in the capital of 
Colombia, Bogota, and then I was in Venezuela, in the capital, Caracas. 

The Chairman. Specifically, what was your mission down there? 
Was it to organize? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the strategic objective was to get at the oil 
fields of Venezuela and Colombia. But since there were no com- 
petent Communist Parties in existence, the job was, first, to organize 
Communist Parties with which to do it, and after organizing native 
Communist Parties, and organizing a labor federation, then to con- 
centrate on the organization of the oil fields. 

The Chairman. Through the labor population, is that right ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 

The Chairman. How far along did you get with it while you were 
there ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, I succeeded to reorganize a very loose, in- 
efficient, socialistic political party in Colombia, and make out of it a 
Communist Party, and organized also a committee for the formation 
of a labor federation, which had the affiliation of the existing local 
unions that then were operating in Colombia. 

I also succeeded to organize organizing committees amongst the 
Colombian peasants and plantation hands — that is, the plantation 
workers, the coffee plantations, and some groups, two small organizing 
groups, in the oil areas and in the banana region. 

Mr. Morris. Was the purpose olthis work of the Communist or- 
ganization to cut off raw materials from the United States in the event 
of an emergency with that country ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the whole strategic purpose of activities in 
this type of country is to isolate the hinterland from the advanced 
countries, and does deprive the advanced countries from raw mate- 
rials and markets for their goods. That is the broad strategic purpose. 

In the specific case of Venezuela and Colombia, the general purpose 
was similar, but the specific purpose was that, in the event of a war, 
a war between the United States and Russia, which was, of course, 
anticipated in Moscow all the time — because the United States was 
considered the ultimate fortress of capitalism — they wanted to be in a 
position during a strategic moment to tie up the oil fields. That was 
the immediate strategic objective of organizing Venezuela and 
Colombia. 

Mr. Morris. A few years ago, Mr. Kornfeder, there was a Com- 
munist demonstration in Bogota. Do you know whether or not any 
of the people engaged in that uprising were people you organized when 
you were in South America? 

Mr. Kornfeder, Yes. All the leaders whose names appeared in 
the news dispatches from there were, at the time I was there, members 
of the central committee of the Communist Party that I had organized. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 883 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, we are just getting a little bit from our 
principal subject here. 

Will you describe the activities, or rather describe your visit back 
to the United States in 1941 ? What was the first thing you did when 
you got to the United States ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, the first thing I had to do was to find a place 
where to live, and since I didn't have one, I camped in Earl Browder's 
apartment for 6 weeks. 

Mr. Morris. Who else was there during that period of 6 weeks? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, almost all the then leaders of the party off 
and on used to come to that apartment for discussions, tactical and 
organizational and strategic problems. 

The Chairman. That was in the city of New York? 

Mr. Kornfeder, That was in the city of New York. 

And among them was one that I imagine you would be interested 
in, Harrison George. 

Harrison George was then taking the place of Earl Browder in the 
Pan-Pacific Union secretariat. 

The subsidiary body of the Red international labor unions, which 
w^as seeking to infiltrate the labor movement in China and Japan, and 
other countries in the Far East, had received a new project. The 
project was that this secretariat that he was then heading was to move 
from China to San Francisco because, in China at that time, the sit- 
uation had become difficult for the Communists, and they were moving 
the headquarters of the Communist International that was operating 
secretly in Shanghai or Hankow, moving them to the United States. 

There is one special episode I think I should mention before this 
committee. 

From then on, the Communist Party of the United States began 
to concentrate on the district in California, which had been neglected 
until then. A great many of the agitators, writers, organizers, were 
from there on assigned to develop the party organization in Cali- 
fornia, especially in 'Frisco, Los Angeles, and so on. 

The Chairman. Now you say from there on. From about what 
date would that be? 

Mr. Kornfeder. From 1932 on. 

Now, among the problems that Harrison George raised was the 
problem under what auspices to do a great deal of this work, not only 
in the United States but in the countries at which these activities were 
especially aimed, that is, China, Indochina, Indonesia, India, and so 
on. 

It is in this connection that I first took notice of the organization 
known as the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The subject came up because there was needed an organization that 
could function as a front for the operations in that area, a respectable 
enough front that is not suspect. 

Earl Browder, as I recall it, said that the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations could be made an instrument for that purpose, that the party 
had already important contacts in there at that time. 

Mr. Morris. And was that in your line of activity in the Communist 
movement, to work on such a project, Mr. Kornfeder? 

Mr. Kornfeder. No, that was not in my line of actviity. 

Mr. Morris. And you learned that just because of the fact that you 
happened to be staying at Earl Browder's house at that time ? 



884 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. And then you continued on and worked in the Com- 
munist Party until how long ? 

Mr. KoRXFEDER. I Continued in charge of their labor union and 
unemployment activities in the New York area and later on in Ohio, 
until 1934. 

Mr. Morris. And then did you break with the Communist Party 
in 1934? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornf eder, as a matter of interest, how long did it 
take you to completely dissassociate yourself from the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, to disassociate myself completely, not only 
from their organization but from their theories and ideology, I would 
say it took me until 1937, about 3 years. 

I first rejected, of course, Stalin's methods and then I questioned 
Lenin's theories, but still held on to the principal concepts of Marxism, 
and then I sweated through that subject as to whether Marx was right 
or not. 

Politically, I thought he was wrong 2 years after, but as to whether, 
on his economics, he was wrong, it took me another year. 

So it took me about 3 years to completely disassociate myself from 
the philosophy, theory, et cetera, of that movement. 

The Chairman. How did you initiate the break? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, the break occurred on a difference on current 
policy, which, at that time, involved the question as to whether the 
Communist Party should work through the craft unions of the Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor and dissolve the independent nonaffiliated 
unions that it controlled, or whether it should form a new organization 
of the type, as later on, as the CIO became. 

I was in favor of the type of organization like the CIO which, at 
that time, was contrary to the line dictated from Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you a Marxist before you were a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is why it took some time to break your 
ties with Marxism? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you see now really any difference between 
Marxism and communism ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Not in the objectives, but there is a big difference 
in methods. 

Senator Ferguson. In the methods ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. But do you not think that in the end they have 
to be one and the same if they are going to be successful ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDx-iiR. In the end, if they get control, in order to stay in 
control they will have to use more and more Communist methods 
themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. They will have to use force to keep their con- 
Iro], will they not? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 885 

Senator Ferguson. And is that not really their policy, was that not 
the Marxist policy ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. That was Marxist policy ; yes. 

You see, the disputation between the Socialists and the Communists 
is, to a considerable extent, on the interpretation of what Marx meant. 
But they both consider Marx as their ideological prophet. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Kornfeder, after you broke with the Communist 
organization, and you say that break took you about 3 years, still you 
were not orientated to the point of view that you would have testified 
before a Senate committee at that time, would you, Mr. Kornfeder? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Definitely not. I would not have appeared before 
any official body of the Government, whether judicial, legislative, or 
any other. It requires the complete break and the realization that 
this thing is a menace. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you not mean that it requires more than a com- 
plete break, Mr. Kornfeder, that in addition to the complete break 
there must also come this realization you speak of, the menace of com- 
munism ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes, definitely so. Yes. 

I came to look upon communism as a modern form of reaction in 
the sense that it seeks to reimpose the domination of the state in an 
absolutist form, a thing that humanity has struggled against for 
centuries. 

So once that picture dawns upon your mind, well, then you are 
finished with the whole thing. 

Senator Ferguson. But it is sold to you in the package that it is 
something new ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes; that it is something new, that through its 
methods you are going to achieve great innovations that are good for 
the humanity as a whole, and especially for the underdog; and 
especially, if you are one of the underdogs, it is very appealing. 

Senator Ferguson. It does not show you the side that you become the 
slave of the state ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Definitely not. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, it criticizes the economic royal- 
ists and it advocates the political royalists, does it not ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. It criticizes the monopolies of capitalism and im- 
poses a supermonopoly of the state. 

Senator Ferguson. Of statism ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So it would be well for us to see how we can get 
rid of the monopolies of the economic royalists and not impose upon 
ourselves a political monoply ? 

Mr. Kornfeder, Something even worse. 

Senator Ferguson. Something even worse? 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this pamphlet again ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. I would like to have the following passage, two or 
three passages, read into the record, and then I will ask Mr. Kornfeder 
a few questions on it. 



886 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This is from page 107, from a pamphlet called China Yesterday and 
Today, by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Marguerite Ann Stewart, a 
cooperative project between the American Council, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and Webster Publishing Co. 

Until early 1946, however, the Kuomintang refused to recognize other parties 
as legal political bodies. Friction has been especially bitter between the Gov- 
ernment and the Communists. Soon after the war with Japan ended, armed con- 
flicts occurred between them which, if allowed to become an all-out civil war, 
could -easily have destroyed all that China had gained during her war against 
Japan. 

For the Communists are by no means the small minority party they were when 
they were driven from the south by Chiang's troops. They are now second 
to the Kuomintang in size and influence, and control an area inhabited by about 
100,000,000 people. 

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they 
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the 
word Communist. 

And the word "Communist" is italicized. 

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Rus- 
sians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas 
under their control. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you read that again ? 
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Rus- 
sians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas 
under their control. 

Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic con- 
ditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable 
of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party. 

They have established a system of popular elections in the regions under their 
control ; they favor extending the vote to the people of the rest of the country ; 
and they have long declared that they would support a democratic republic in 
which not only they themselves but all other Chinese political parties would 
be represented. 

At the time this is being written — 

and the date is 1946 — 

negotiations are being carried on between the Chinese Government and the 
Communists which, it is hoped, will result in a more democratic government. 
For not until China achieves a government in which the Chinese people are ade- 
quately represented and which brings about agricultural reforms designed to 
give her farmers enough to live on will the underlying causes of communism be 
removed. 

Mr. Kornfeder, I ask you if you will comment upon those passages 
that I have just read. I offer this book for your scrutiny. 

Mr. Kornfeder. Well, I think I already covered one angle of this, 
namely, that the Chinese Communists are just a peasant party. 

The change of strategy from basing upon the factory workers to 
the Chinese peasants was important, decisive, tactical change. 

Mr. Morris. Was it decided, Mr. Kornfeder, at that Sixth World 
Congi-ess that you attended, that the Chinese Communists would be 
represented as a peasant party ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. No; it wasn't decided. They don't accept the 
peasant party, they only accept affiliations of Communist parties. 
The change was to orientate the strategy on the peasants. The peas- 
ant can be made ideologically a Communist just like a factory worker. 

A Communist is not necessarily made in the economic category, he 
is made through ideology. So the calculation of Stalin worked out, 
that you can work, which was one of his major contributions to Com- 



i 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 887 

muiiist strategy, by the way, tlie change of orientation in the colonial 
€oantries from the workers which, in the colonial countries, are only a 
few. There is not much industry. But the peasants which are the 
big, downtrodden mass, and the Chinese Communist Party became a 
Communist Party, recruited mainly from peasants who had become 
Communists. But it was a Communist Party in every sense. 

Senator Ferguson. When you say Communist Party, you mean 
international, under the domination of the Kremlin? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Under the complete domination of the Kremlin; 

yes. 

Now, as to private propertj^ Well, you see, this is a very skillful 
piece of sugar-coating the Communist position, very cleverly writ- 
ten. You could imply this, and you could imply another thing. 

But it is a part of Communist strategy when they seize a country 
not to expropriate the peasants and the small shopkeepers right 
away. They cannot do it. But they nationalize the land. 

Here it says that nationalization is taking place. Well, national- 
ization means that the Government takes title to all the land, whether 
it enforces that title right away or not in a matter of tactics, of opera- 
tion. 

In Russia, the land was nationalized immediately after seizure of 
the power by the Bolsheviks, but the nationalization wasn't really 
enforced until years later when they had consolidated themselves 
and collectivized the farms, had supercollectivized them, and so on 
and so forth. 

So you can say, half-truths, that they are going to maintain private 
property. But for how long? 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that the facts today, that China 
today, and I am talking about the mainland, has disproved that 
statement ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Well, they nationalized the land. They have 
not yet taken the land off the peasants. They have taken the land 
from the larger landowners and distributed it among the peasants 
in order to get the support of the peasants and their cooperation 
until they entrench themselves. 

Then, after they have entrenched themselves, they will do in 
China, carry out, the same Bolshevik program as in Russia. They 
will make state farms, and they will make supercollectives which are 
dominated, controlled, and managed by the state. 

But in the first stage, in a colonial country, that would be a suicidal 
method, if the Communists would attempt to force collectivization 
immediately. They first have to have complete control of the Gov- 
ernment apparatus, a well-organized political police, a well func- 
tioning Communist Party, and all the committees, before they can 
attempt to create a war with the peasants because when they begin 
to take the land away from the peasants, and the so-called collectives, 
the peasants will resist. 

They resisted in Russia and they certainly will resist in China. 
So this is a very misleading, skillful piece of selling the Com- 
munist program with the pretense that it isn't Communist. But 
it is. 

The Chairman. Now you are referring to the article in the book 
handed to 3'ou by Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. KoRNFEDER. Yes. 



888 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. And that is "China Today',' is that it ? 

Mr. Morris. No ; this is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations and the Webster Publishing Co., by Eleanor Lattimore, pub- 
lished in 1946, and it is entitled "China Yesterday and Today." 

In other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you do not agree with Mrs. Latti- 
more when she says here : 

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they 
stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the 
word "Communist." 

Mr. Kornfeder. That is right. I disagree with it in every sense. 

Mr. Morris. And you know that the Chinese Communists, from 
your own experience, is a member of the Comintern organization ? 

Mr. Kornfeder. They are not only Communists, they are among 
the most intransigent, they are among tlie best Communists. 

They really believe and they are thoroughly indoctrinated, like 
semi-illiterate persons. When they absorb a doctrine, they really are 
all-out for it. The Chinese Communists are that type. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before putting this into the record, I 
would like to make the observation that the photograph appearing on 
page 108, from which we have made these extracts, has been supplied 
by courtesy of the China Aid Council, and I would like the record to 
show that two witnesses have identified the China Aid Council as a 
Communist-controlled organization. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you say what the photograph is? 

Mr. MoRRrs. It is the photograph tliat appears on page 108. It says 
"Courtesy China Aid Council," and the caption is "Communist stu- 
dents of China's northwest studying in front of the loess cave which 
is their classroom." 

May that go into the record. Senator? The text does not have to 
go in because I have read it. 

The Chairman. I cannot put the picture into the record. The rest 
will go into the record. 

(The document referred to was mg^rked "Exhibit No. 258" and filed, 
for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. I think that is all we have of Mr. Kornfeder. 

The Chairman. Are there any questions. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have some more exhibits. I think 
we will take a few minutes to put them into the record, if you have 
the time. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this last exhibit that went in, 
this pamphlet, is there any description in the record as to who Eleanor 
Lattimore is? 

Mr. Morris. Eleanor Lattimore is the wife of Owen Lattimore, and 
is the Eleanor Lattimore who has held c^ce in, and who has worked 
for, the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

There would seem to be absolutely no doubt that she is the wife of 
Owen Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 880 

The Chairman. I'liat is in the record from before ? 

Mr. Morris. She has testified in executive session before this com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Mandei,. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated March 31, 1938, addressed to Philip C. Jessup 
from Edward C. Carter. It reads as folloAvs : 

Dear Jessup : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at 
the Century Club at 7 : 15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 
hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constan- 
tine Oumansky, the able, two-listed counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Wash- 
ington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen 
of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of 
my guests care to put. 

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting 
evening. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edwakd C. Carter. 

The Chairman. To whom is that addressed ? 

Mv. ]\Iandel. To Prof. Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter. 

We have a letter, also from the files, from Birchfield, Norfolk, Conn., 
dated April 2, 1938, addressed to Mr. Carter, from Philip C. Jessup, 
reading as follows : 

Dear Mr. Carter: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday the 20th. 
Many thanks. 

Sincerely yours, 

Philip C. Jessttp. 

Senator Ferguson. May I have the letter ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, and ask that that be intro- 
duced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. 

Mr, Mandei, will you kindly identify that as having been taken 
from the institute's files? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes; I do. 

The Chairman. Taken from where? 

Mr. Mandel. The files of the Institute of Pacific Kelations. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record, and properly 
identified. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 259" and 
are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 259 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City, March 31, 1938. 
Prof. Philip C. Jessltp, 

Norfolk, Conn. 

Deab Jessup : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at 
the Century Club at 7 : 15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 
100-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantino 
Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 
to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my 
friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests 
care to put? 

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting 
evening. 

Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 



890 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

BmCHFIELD, 

Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 1938. 
Deak Mr. Caeteb: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th. 
Many thanks. 

Sincerely yours, 

Philip 0. Jbssup. 

Senator Ferguson-. Could you identify the Moscow trials ? 

Mr. Mandel. The Moscow trials were in 1937, and were popularly 
known as the purge trials, and created a tremendous furor throughout 
the world because noted Soviet leaders were brought to trial, and they 
confessed to having tried to overthrow the Soviet Government. Many 
of them were liquidated or disappeared. They aroused indignation 
throughout the world and especially in the United States. 

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed. 

Mr. Mandel. I refer now to a document which is from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 12, 1943, addressed 
to Hon. John H. Kerr, chairman. Special Subcommittee on Committee 
on Appropriations, and it is signecl by Edward C. Carter. 

Now, the reference in this letter that I want to read is this : 

I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member 
of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in 
1936. Tlie late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation. 

As a member of the research stafC of the Foreign Policy Association, I have fol- 
lowed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has con- 
sistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such 
a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American 
policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University was 
chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. 
Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, I would like to point out that Mr. Bisson 
has been identified before this committee as a member of the Commun- 
ist organization. 

May I offer this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, for whatever pro- 
bative value there may be in that one reference ? 

The Chairman. As I understandjt, this is a document taken from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And, Mr, Chairman, the Hon. John H. Kerr was the 
chairman of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria- 
tions, of the House of Representatives, and apparently the question 
of Mr. Bisson's loyalty had come up and letters of recommendation 
were sent in from various people, according to our scrutiny of the 
files, 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 260" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 260 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 

Neiv York City, April 12, 1943. 
Regarding T. A. Bisson. 

Hon. John H. Kerr, 

Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, 
House of Representatives , Washington, D. C. 

Dear Sir : I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He 
was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite 
National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that 
delegation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 891 

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have 
followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has 
consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of 
such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on 
American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, 
was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to 
Mr. Bissou with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending 
you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the 
quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many 
outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide 
sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university 
libraries. 

Mr. Bisson is 100 'percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace 
long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace 
of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully 
stated the issues that the United States must face vis-^-vis Japanese military 
expansion. 

If you wish further information, please let me know. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. IMandel. I have here a letter from the tiles of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated February 16, 1940, addressed to Mr. Motylev, 
Pacific Institute, 20 liazin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R. 

Dear Motylev : You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from 
the New York Herald Tribune of February 1.5, 1940, giving the views of Dr. 
Philip C. Jessup with reference to the City of Flint at Murmansk. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

And I have here the clipping, a copy of the clipping, from the New 
York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1910, and I read the last para- 
graph of the article referred to as follows : 

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest STip- 
porters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had 
committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter City of 
Flint at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing 
the Mormacsnn to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the 
neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international 
law. 

May I point out that this occurred during the period of the Stalin- 
Hitler pact ? 

Mr. MoREis. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record and be 
marked as the next consecutive exhibit? That is the letter from the 
institute's files, Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, as well as the clipping 
from the New York Herald Tribune that Mr. Mandel read. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 261" and are 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 261 

129 East 52d Street, 

New York City, 
Fehniary 16, 19J,0. 
Dr. V. E. Motylev, 

PacifiG Institute, 20 Rasin Street, 

Moscoio, U. S. S. R. 
Dear Motylev : You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from 
the New York Herald Tril)une of February Ift. 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip 
C. Jessup with reference to the City of Flint at Murmansk. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Cartkk. 
(22848— 52— pt. 3 13 



892 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

[From tlie New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1940] 

United States Neutrality Dogma Called Mild-Mannered — Jessup, of 
Columbia, Finds Change in International Law 

The assertion of neutrality rights by the United States was called mild-man- 
nered yesterday by Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of the Columbia University Law 
School, at a luncheon of the school's alunmi association at the Lawyer's Club, 
115 Broadway. He said the British blockade was not a blockade in any technical 
sense but a measure of reprisal against Germany for its submarine warfare. 

Under earlier concepts of international law, Dr. Jessup explained, the burden 
of proof was on the captor of a merchant vessel in wartime. Under the present 
procedure of British prize courts, he said, this burden of proof had been shifted 
to the complainant, making it almost impossible for the neutral owner of a 
vessel to prove what would be the eventual destination of his cargo. 

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest sup- 
porters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had 
committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter City of 
Flint at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing 
the Mormacsun to enter a belligerent port, he described as contrary to the neu- 
trality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law. 

Mr. Mandel. In connection with the last item, may I refer to the 
New York Times of October 29, 1939, which carries a statement as 
follows, under the headline "United States accuses Soviet in Flint 
confusion. Formal charge is made that Russia treats American en- 
voy with contempt." 

The first paragraph : 

With the freighter City of Flint evidently having left Murmansk carrying 
her American crew on board under a German prize detail, and with Laurence 
A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to 
communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department 
tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate coopera- 
tion." 

The article goes into greater detail. 

Senator P'erguson. May I inquire, then, is it a fact that Mr. Jessup 
was taking a stand contrary to the stand taken by the United States 
of America through its State Department ? 

Mr. Mandel. Correct. 

Senator Ferguson. That is, in that article? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then this stand, which was opposing the 
stand of the United States of America, was being sent by Mr. Carter 
to a Russian Communist in Russia? 

Mr. Mandel. To a Russian official. 

Senator Ferguson. And a Communist in Russia ? 

Mr. Morris. Whether he is a member of the Communist Party, we 
cannot say, Senator. But Dr. Motylev, who is the representative of 
the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether he 
is a member of the Russian Communist Party, we cannot say. 

Senator Ferguson. And this letter says "I think it will be inter- 
esting." You will be interested in this stand, in other words, of Dr. 
Jessup against the stand of the United States Government; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Mandel. Correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I had a little difficulty at first getting the sig- 
nificance when you put it in at first. Until you read the last, I won- 
dered whether I was right in my conclusions. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 893 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Mandel make a 
photostat of this article from which he read, and have that intro- 
duced into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I think it should be, to make tliis perfectly 
clear as to what this is. 

The Chairman. That may be done. See that it gets into the record 
at the proper sequence. 

(The information referred to is as follows :) 

[From the New York Times, October 29, 1939] 

United States Accuses So^aET in "Flint" Confusion — Formal Charge Is Made 
That Russia Treats American Envoy With Contempt 

(By Bertram D. Hulen) 

Washington, October 128. — With the freighter City of Flint evidently having 
left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize 
detail and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Rus- 
sia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the 
ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "with- 
holding adequate cooperation." 

The charge, made in a formal statement, reflected the intense irritation felt 
in Washington over the cavalier fashion in which the diplomatic representative 
of this Government in Moscow has been treated by the Soviet authorities. OflS- 
cials expressed unconcealed anger over the failure to ascertain any definite facts 
officially regarding the vessel. 

State Department officials discussed the situation from every angle during 
the day. It was learned that staff conferences, headed by Secretary Cordell 
Hull, were held behind closed doors twice during the day. Officials, however, 
preserved an unusual reticence and nothing more than the formal statement 
was made public. 

HIGH officials CONFER 

Conferring with Mr. Hull were top-flight officials of his Department, including 
R. Walton Moore, counselor ; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State ; 
and Green H. Hackworth, lesal adviser of the Department. 

It is generally believed that the City of Flint sailed, possibly 2 or 3 days 
ago, to run the British blockade and reach a German port in the Baltic before 
institution of prize court proceedings by the Nazi authorities. 

According to press reports, the United States Embassy in Moscow was con- 
vinced tonight that she had sailed. This word had not been communicated to 
the State Department by the Embassy, but it was regarded as a reasonable 
assumption. 

Previous reports from Moscow and from Berlin, first that the City of Flint 
had sailed, then that she had not, were considered an obvious effort to confuse 
the situation in order to minimize, if possible, the risks the ship must take in 
eluding British blockaders. 

But it was apparent from the State Department's statement tonight that 
if she does run the blockade German claims to her permanent possession will be 
resisted in the expected legal proceedings. 

The statement, factual in its contents and reciting the circumstances that 
have surrounded the City of Flint since her seizure, clearly implied that the 
Russian Government had disregarded the requirements of international law. 

It implied also that neither Russia in her dealings with Ambassador Stein- 
hardt nor Germany in her conversations with Alexander C. Kirk, the United 
States Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, had been frank, if indeed honest. 

It emphasized that Mr. Steinhardt throu^Jiout had been denied access to the 
primary source of information, the vessel herself. 

So far, Mr. Stcinhnrdt has lieen unsuccessful in persuading the Soviet regime 
to conform to the customary diplomatic procedure, even although this be of 
the most formal character. In short, official Washington considers that he has 
been treated with nothing less than contempt. 



894 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The State Department statement was considered as forming a basis for resist- 
ance to any claim for permanent possession of tlie vessel tliat Germany might 
advance in prize court proceedings. 

VIEVPS NOT VOICED IN NOTE 

The statement could be considered a protest, although outside formal diplo- 
matic channels. While some thought may have been given to voicing these 
views in a note, that course has not yet been adopted, at least so far as was 
revealed tonight. 

An emphatic form of protest could be registered by ordering Mr. Steinhardt 
home for consultation, but no consideration is said to have been given to that 
course as yet. 

Today's statement pointed out that, judging from press reports from German 
sources, the German authorities were not without information, although Mr. 
Steinhardt was having extraordinary difHculty in obtaining the facts and was 
given no facility for personally verifying them. 

A short time b?fore the statement was issued, the Ambassador reported to 
the State Department that again he had been unable to make telephone contact 
with Captain Gainard. 

Officials here were satisfied that the vessel had left Murmansk and was seek- 
ing to reach a German harbor. Obviously, it was pointed out, Russia would not 
give this information if she were deliberately siding with Germany. If really 
neutral, she might feel that to announce departure of the ship would be to in- 
form Great Britain and for that reason be an unneutral act. 

That Germany would bend every effort to conceal the departure of the vessel 
"was considered only natural, so reports on this score from Berlin today were 
discounted. 

IMr. Kirk reported from Berlin to the State Department that in reply to an 
inquiry at the Ministry of Marine this afternoon he was told that the American 
crew was on board the City of Flint at Murmansk. After a further inquiry late 
this afternoon at the Foreign Office, Sir. Kirk was informed that, according to 
the latest reports, the vessel and crew were still in the Arctic port. It was also 
said that if, after the completion of repairs, the ship were taken to another port, 
the American crew would presumably be kept on board to operate the vessel. 

Mr. Kirk also reported that, according to information he had received from 
the American consul general in Hamburg, the prize commissioner has received 
no news of the vessel. 

The rebuffs received at the hands of Russia were resented here no less because 
the Foreign Office was following its customai'y course of putting off and humiliat- 
ing an Ambassador and his Government^ It is a well-understood technique of 
the Soviet regime. 

An Ambassador will seek official information, only to be refused an appoint- 
ment at the Foreign Office or be told that there is no information available. 
Later the substance of what he has sought will appear in press reports, and 
when he again calls at the Foreign Office this will be given him. In this and 
other ways the Moscow Government follows a calculated policy of insolence 
toward the envoy. 

Diplomats of long experience in revolutionary Russia know the pattern well 
and are not surprised, thoiigh their resentment reaches the boiling point. To 
them it reflects Bolshevist philosophy of treating governments with contempt 
in making announcements first through Soviet press channels on the theory 
that in this way they are dealing directly with the people of a country, not with 
their representatives. 

But the White House and the State Department are not concerned with the 
philosophy that might explain the treatment accorded the United States Govern- 
ment in this case. They are deeply resentful over the whole episode. 



United States Statement on "Flint" 

Washington, Oftober 2S. — Following' is the text of the statement issued by the 
State Department tonight on the case of the steamer Citij of Flint : 

"The Citii of Flint was captured by a German cruiser at an estimated distance 
of some 1,250 miles from New York, with a mixed cargo destined for British 
ports. The date of capture is understood to have been October 9. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 895 

"The Citii of Flint was taken into the harbor of Tromsoe on Or-tober 21, with 
a German crew and flying the German flag. After remaining 2 hours to talce 
water, it was ordered by the Norwegian Government to depart, which it did. 

The Citi/ of Flint was taken into the harbor of Murmansk on tlie evening of 
October 23. 

"On October 25 the American chargt^ d'affaires cabled from Berlin that the 
Foreign Oflice, at its press conference, said that the City of Flint was captured 
by a German vessel and contraband was found on board, destined for England. 
The Foreign Oflice then added that it was found, however, that the sliip was 
unsea worthy in that it did not have navigation charts adequate for bringing 
the ship into a German port. 

"When the vessel entered the harbor of Murmansk, according to an announce- 
ment presmuably from the Soviet Government through the Tass news agency, 
'the naval forces at the port of Murmansk have temporarily held the vessel 
and interned the German crew.' 

"On October 2.5 the American charge d'affaires at Berlin cabled that the Ger- 
man Foreign OflSce, referring to the seizure of the City of Flint, said that 'the 
German authorities were communicating with the Soviet authorities in the 
matter.' 

"On the same day [October 25] the Tass Agency reported that 'the German 
crew of tlie cargo steamer City of Flint has been released from internment by 
the maritime authorities of Murmansk in view of the fact, as has been estab- 
lished, that the vessel was brought into port for repair of her machinery. The 
vessel is meanwhile remainiig in Murmansk for verification of the exact compo- 
sition of her cargo.' 

•'On October 26 the American charge d'affaires cabled from Berlin quoting a 
memorandum received that morning from the Foreign Office relative to the City 
of Flint and its crew, which, among other things, stated that a 'prize crew placed 
on board [the City of Flintl has brought the steamer to the harbor of Mur- 
mansk because of sea damage.' 

"When transmitting the memorandum an official of the Foreign Office stated 
informally to the charge d'affaires that the Foreign Office had no details as to 
the damage which necessitated taking the ship to Murmansk, but he maintained, 
in response to an inquiry, that the term 'damage' would cover the case of a 
ship lacking charts with which to navigate the waters through which she had to 
proceed. 

"For some reason as yet unexplained the German crew was interned in spite 
of the fact that according to German authorities they were without charts and 
liad put into Murmansk because they could not proceed to a German poi't without 
charts. Later, they were released, seemingly under a plea that their entry into 
Murmansk was required for necessary repairs to defective machinery. 

"A prize crew may take a captured ship into a neutral port without internment 
only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel and provisions, or necessity of 
repairs. In all other cases, the neutral is obligated to intern the prize crew and 
restore the vessel to her former crew. 

"The conclusion from the foregoing facts and circumstances indicates that 
when the City of Flint entered the harbor at Murmansk, any plea relating to the 
chart requirements if advanced must have been ignored since the German crew 
was interned. A second and entirely different reason for entering Murmansk, 
namely, defective machinery which called for immediate repairs, was not ad- 
vanced until later. 

"A subsequent cable from the American charge d'affaires at Berlin, also dated 
October 26, quoted a statement of the Foreign Office at its noon press conference 
to the effect that the fact that the Russians have freed the German crew indicates 
that the Soviet authorities have confirmed the view of the prize crew that the 
City of Flint was unseaworthy and it was therefore permissible to take the ship 
into a neutral harbor. 

"Testimony of the American crew as to the full facts pertaining to the taking 
of the City of Flint into Murmansk is not yet available. 

"It seems manifest that even if it is assumed that the German crew was pro- 
ceeding legally prior to the entry of the City of Flint into the harbor of Murmansk, 
the known facts and circumstances support the contention of the American Gov- 
ernment that the crew did not at the time of entry offer any reasonable or justi- 
fiable grounds such as are prescribed by international law for taking the vessel 
into this port, and that, therefore, it was the clear duty of the Soviet Government 



896 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to turn the City of Flint over to the American crew. This has been the major 
contention of the American Government. 

"In view of tlie foregoing facts and circumstances, each person can judge for 
himself the question as to how much light is shed on this entire transaction by 
the action of the Soviet Government in withholding adequate cooperation with 
the American Government with respect to assembling and disclosing to the Amer- 
ican Embassy in Moscow the essential facts pertaining to the landing, the where- 
abouts, and welfare of the American crew ; by the facts that it was first alleged 
by the German authorities that the need for charts was the ground for bringing 
the vessel into port ; and by the fact that later this ground seems to have been 
abandoned and a new ground or theory relating to defective machinery was 
set up." 

Ml'. Morris. Mr. Cliairman, we are preparing more exhibits along 
the lines that we are presenting today, and I ask that they be presented 
at some other time. 

The Chairman. Very well. Is there anything further today ? 

Senator Ferguson. I hope, Mr. Chairman, if they are along this 
same line, that they may all be put into the record as soon as possible 
because I understand there will be another hearing of another com- 
mittee where Mr. Jessup's name will be up for confirmation by the 
Senate. 

I think it is only fair to Mr. Jessup and to the Senators that any- 
thing that this committee has in relation to these exhibits should go 
into the record. 

The Chair]max. I may say. Senator Ferguson, that today I have, as 
chairman of this committee, addressed a letter to the chairman of the 
subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
advising him that I am having a transcript of the proceedings of this 
committee bearing on Mr. Jessup prepared for that committee's pe- 
rusal and use. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that is proper because we should not 
have a hearing where one matter is brought up and then not refer that 
to another committee that is going to pass upon Mr. Jessup. 

The Chairman. The entire files of this committee will be made 
available to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, may I point out some of the diffi- 
culties ? 

There is one point that arose this morning on whether or not Fred 
Field is the one who recommended Mr. Jessup for a particular office. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Carter is here. Why do we not clear this up 
and ask Mr. Carter if the Fred who signed that telegram is Fred 
Field? 

Mr. Carter, can you give us information on this? 

The Chairman. Come forward, Mr. Carter, if you care to. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC 

RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have the telegram ? 

The Chairman. You were here this morning when that wire was 
read ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes ; I was in the back row. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you look at this wire? 

Mr. Carter. I would be delighted. 

Mr. Morris. One of the difficulties here. Senator, is that we have an 
estimated 300,000 letters here, and then we have all the files of the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 897 

institute. It takes a long time to track anything down, as Mr. Carter 
can appreciate. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, and that is wliy I knew Mr. 
■Carter was here, and he might clear this up. 

Mr. Carter. Well, the internal evidence, which is very slender, 
would seem to indicate that this was Frederick V. Field. 

In what year was this, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. The year is not given. 

Mr. Carter. That is rather important. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Can you remember such a recommendation that Field 
made? 

Senator Ferguson. It is a recommendation at a certain convention 
■or committee meeting that might bring it back to your mind. I think 
the place of the meeting is shown on the next page. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that Mr. Carter 
has been sworn. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter, when did Jessup serve as research chair- 
man? Do you recall that? 

Mr. Carter. I think it is here in the document you just gave to me. 

Senator Ferguson. The meeting is given, Mr. Carter, on the sheet 
.attached to the telegram. 

Mr. Carter. I wouldn't want to be too sure, but, frankly, I am 
mixed up as to whether Mr. Field was speaking of Mr. Jessup, I am 
■confused on two points: One, whether it refers to the Mount Trem- 
blant conference in 1942, or the Hot Springs conference in 1945. 

It says, "approve him as research chairman." For the life of me, 
on the spur of the moment, I can't remember whether it was Mount 
Tremblant, 1942, or Hot Springs, 1945, where Jessup was proposed as 
research chairman and so served. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But was he proposed by Fred Field at 
•either one of those? Did you have another Fred in either 1942 or 
1945? 

The Chairman. That is, on your staff. 

Mr. Carter. I think we only had one Fred. 

Senator Ferguson. That was Fred Field? 

Mr. Carter. From the text of this short telegram, Fred doesn't 
3iominate him ; someone else has nominated him. 

Senator Ferguson. But he approves him? 

Mr. Carter. But he aj^proves him. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would be Fred Field ? 

Mr. Carter. That would be Fred Field. 

Mr. Morris. That is not quite right, is it, Mr. Carter ? It says here, 
approve the nominations and suggest Jessup for research chairman." 

In other words, the suggestion is coming from Field, if it is Field, 
ihat Jessup be research chairman ? 

Mr. Carter. Yes. But just on the one telegram, without refreshing 
myself on all of the operations — this was a complicated international 
■organization, Avith a dozen countries and committees within each 
country, trying to get agreement between the British and the French 
and the Australians, and so on. 

Mr. Morris. This Winsted, Conn., November 23 would not give you 
a clue, would it? The Hot Springs convention was in the summer, 
was it not? 



■(( 



898 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Carter. No ; it was along, I think, in January. 

Mr. Morris. Hot Springs? 

Mr, Carter? Winsted is far away from Hot Springs. 

Mr. Morris. But someone may have lived there in 1942 and not 
in 1945. That does not mean anything to you? 

Mr. Carter. No. 

Senator Ferguson. I think he identified it earlier. Fred Field is 
the only one they have. Therefore it is apparent that it is Fred Field. 

Mr. Carter. I could call up Mr. Holland, who has the remains of 
the files there, and his memory might be better than mine. 

The Chairman. Is that all for today? 

Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairinan. 

The Chairman. The committee will be called any time you want 
it called. 

Mr. Morris. We have a witness for next Tuesday. 

The Chairman. In the meantime, if you have any additional files 
or records bearing upon matters that should go before the Committee 
on Foreign lielations, would you so advise the committee? 

We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Thursday, September 20, 1951, the 
hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Adminstration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. G . 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat 
 McCarran (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senators ISlcCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; liobert 
Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of 
research. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order, please. 

Mr, Morris, have you anything to proceed with ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of re- 
quests made by this committee of the various branches of the Executive 
Departmeiit that are in a state of either we have been turned down on 
our requests, or else we have gotten a generally unsatisfactory answer. 
I would like that the record show some of the difficulties we have 
encountered in this respect. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Today, Mr. Chairman, we are going to take testimony 
on a 3-day conference that Avas held by the State Department in Oc- 
tober 1949. At that time Secretary of State Acheson had appointed 
Philip C. Jessup to be the head of a panel of three people to advise 
him on the formulation and the review of far eastern policy. Think- 
ing this to be completely in line with the line of our investigation be- 
cause most of the people invited were Institute of Pacific Relations 
people, we requested on August 24, 1951, of Hon. Dean Acheson, Sec- 
retary of State, Washington, D. C, over your signature, a request 
which reads as follows : 

My Dear Mr. Secretaky : The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has 
had testimony in executive session concerning tlie :>-day round-table discussion 
arranged by the Office of Public Affairs of the State Department for the pur- 
pose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States for- 
eign policy toward China, and which took place on October 0, 7, and 8, 1949. 

It is requested that the minutes, which our testimony indicates were taken 
at the time, be made available to this committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like that request on your part to Secretary 
of State Acheson on August 24, 1951, introduced in the record. 

The Chairman. It will be introduced in the record. 

(The document referred to and read into the record by Mr. Mandel 
was marked "Exhibit No. 262" and filed for the record.) ' 

The Chairman. What is the answer ? 

899 



900 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. The answer is dated September 12, 1951, and reads: 

Deab Senator McCarran : I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 
(received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Depart- 
ment on October 0, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. 
I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many depart- 
mental officers in San Francisco. 

As I think you knovF, the record kept of this decision was classified con- 
fidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government 
people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their 
remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To 
honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department 
believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a 
confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this 
meeting. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jack K. McFaix, 
Assistant Secretary 
(For the Secretary of State). 

I would like that introduced. 

The Chairman. That will be inserted in the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 263" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 263 

September 12, 1951. 
Hon. Pat McCarran, 

CJiairman, Internal Security Suico^nmittec, 

United States Senate. 
Dear Senator McCarean : I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 
(received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Depart- 
ment on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. 
I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many depart- 
mental officers in San Francisco. 

As I think you know, the record kept of this discussion was classified con- 
fidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Govern- 
ment people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that 
their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. 
To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department 
believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a con- 
fidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this 
meeting. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jack K. McFat.l, 
Assistant Secretary 
(For the Secretary of State). 

List of Consultants, Conference on Problems of United States Polict in 

China 

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C. 

Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New 

Haven, Conn. 
Claude A. Buss, director of studies. Army War College, Washington, D. C. 
Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science. Northwestern University, 

Evanston, 111. 
Arthur G. Coons, president. Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif. 
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y. 
John K. Fairbanks, committee on international and regional studies. Harvard 

University, Cambridge, Mass. 
William R. Herod, president. International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y. 
Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 

Mass. 
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash. 
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations. 

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 901 

Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland, 

Oreg. 
George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C. 
J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president. Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y. 
Nathaniel Pelfer, department of public law and government, Columbia University, 

New York, N. Y. 
Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, Minn. 
Edwin O. Reischauer, department of far-eastern languages, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, Mass. 
William S. Roberston, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y. 
John D. Rockefeller III, president. Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y. 
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y. 
Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, 

San Francisco, Calif. 
Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. 
Phillips Talbot, tFniversity of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 
Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati, 

Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, during the testimony of General Wil- 
loughby testimony turned up which indicated that there are records 
in the War Department which could be available to this committee and 
which would aid us in our investigation. Accordingly, on August 
20, 1951, a letter was sent to the President at the White House in 
Washington, D. C. It reads : 

Dear Mr. President : During the open public hearing of the Internal Security 
Subcommittee held on August 9, 1951, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby was questioned 
concerning the loyalty of three individuals who were attached to SCAP head- 
quarters in the postwar period. General Willoughby replied that he was for- 
bidden by oflScial directive to testify on the contents of the files of the tliree em- 
ployees involved. Each of these three persons, namely, Miriam S'. Farley, An- 
drew Gi ajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson, was an active leader of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations prior to, during, and subsequent to their assignments to Tokyo. 

It is respectfully rquested that the contents of tliese files be made available 
to the members of the Internal Security Subcommittee in order that they may 
translate the information in such files into evidence for the subcommittee, if 
the facts wai'rant such action. Naturally, if any confidential sources of in- 
formation must be protected, the subcommittee will scrupulously protect iden- 
tities. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Pat McCarran. 

I would like that introduced. 

The Chairsian. It will be inserted. 

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was 
marked "Exhibit No. 264" and filed for the record.) 

Mr. MoRuis. On September 19, 1951, over the signature of Harry 
Truman, President, we received a letter reading : 

Dear Senator McCarran : I have your letter asking that the files of Miriam S. 
Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson be made available to the Senate In- 
ternal Security Subcommittee. 

I am informed that none of these persons is now employed by the Federal 
Government. However, all three were formerly employed at the headquarters 
of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan. According to the 
records of tlie Department of tiie Army, Miriam S. Farley was employed there 
from January to May 1946; Andrew Grajdanzev was employed from January 
1946 to August 1947 ; and T. A. Bisson was employed from October 1945 to May 
1947. 

I have asked the Secretary of the Army to make available to the subcommit- 
tee the employment records of these three persons. However, for reasons which 
I have set forth at length on a number of occasions, I do not feel that the in- 



902 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

formation so made available to the subcommittee shoulcl include investigative 
data of a confidential nature. 
Sincerely yours, 

Harry Truman. 

T would like to have that introduced, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted. 

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was 
marked "Exhibit No. 265" and filed for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. On August 27, 1951, over the signature of Pat Mc- 
Carran, chairman, a letter was sent to the Hon. Dean Acheson. 

Senator Ferguson. JNIight I go back to this and ask what the em- 
ployment records of the three persons mean to us ? It only means the 
dates, does it not ? 

Mr. Morris. We have received nothing. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. But it is all confidential data and the personnel 
file is kept from us ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. The reason for discharge if they were dis- 
charged, recommended for their employment, and so forth? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Will you read this, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated August 27, 1951, addressed to 
Hon. Dean Acheson from Pat McCarran : 

Mt Dear Mr. Secretary : The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee intro- 
duced into the record on.Auwst 23, 1951, two items from the Daily Worker, 
copies of wliich are enclosed herewith. One is dated October 4, 1942, pages 1 
and 5, and is an article by Mr. Earl Browder, general secretary of the Com- 
munist Party U. S. A., on the State Department ; and the second is an article 
entitled "Welles States United States Policy on China," published October 16, 
1942, pages 1 and 2. 

The second article is preceded by a statement that the memorandum was the 
result of an interview between Mr. Earl Browder and ]Mr. Robert Minor, both 
representing the Communist Party, U. S. A., Under Secretary of State, Mr. 
Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauehlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the Pres- 
ident, held on October 12, 1942. 

It was pointed out in the course of the hearing that in fairness to the State 
Department it miglit be well to request a brief statement on this matter fi'om 
the Department. In this connection, we would appreciate the following infor- 
mation : 

1. Was there an interview held at the State Department in which Mr. Earl 
Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, INIr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauehlin Currie par- 
ticipated on October 12, 1942? 

2. Who arranged this interview and how was it arranged? 

3. Is the enclosed memorandum, as taken from the Daily W^orker of October 
16, 1942, a true copy of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Sumner Welles and 
Mr. Lauehlin Currie on that date? 

Your kind cooperation in this matter will be appreciated. 

The reply dated September 1, 1951, is signed by Jack K. McFall, 
Assistant Secretary, and reads as follows : 

My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 
August 27, 1951, addressed to Secretary Acheson requesting information con- 
cerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department October 12. 1942, in 
which Earl Browder, Robert Minor, Sumner Welles, and Lauehlin Currie par- 
ticipated. 

The Department received a similar request from a INIember of Congress some 
time ago and at that time made a thorough but unsuccessful search of de- 
partmental files for evidence of such a meeting. These efforts to obtain in- 
formation respecting the meeting were complicated by the fact that the De- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 903 

partiuent officers who reportedly participated were no longer with the De- 
partment. , . ^ , J.  . 

The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining in- 
formation bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and 
will write you further upon completion of this reexamination. 

Tlie CiiAiKMAN. What is the date of that letter again? 

j\rr. Mandel. The date is September 1, 1951. 

Then on September 21, 1951, a telephone message came to the 
office from Mr. Holland, Chinese Affairs Division of the State De- 
partment, -who said that they are vv'orking on the answer to the letter 
of August 27 in regard to Browder. This requires considerable re- 
search^ but they waiit us to know that they are working on it. That 
is not a verbatim transcript of the message. 

Mr. INIoRRis. I would like those two letters to go in the record, 
along with the telephon.e conversation as read by Mr. Mandel, and 
given the next exhibit numbers. 

The Chairman. They will be inserted. 

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel were 
marked as "Exhibit Nos. 266, 267, and 288" and hied for the record.) 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter from Senator Pat McCarran dated 
July 10, 1951, to the Honorable Dean Acheson : 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : Perhaps it might save some time for all of us if, in 
addition to my previous requests for information on loyalty cases, you sent 
us a complete list of individuals dropped or permitted to resign from the State 
Department since the end of 19-14 because of loyalty considerations. 

Thank you for your courtesy in this matter. 

The reply is dated August 2, 1951, from the Department of State, 
signed Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary: 

My Dear Senator McCarran : I refer to your letter of July 10, 1951, in 
which you request to be supplied with a complete list of the individuals who 
were dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end 
of 1944 because of loyalty considerations. 

I regret that I am precluded from furnishing you with the information which 
you requested, by reason of the President's directive of March 13, 1948 (Fed- 
eral Register, March 16, 194S), with regard to the confidential status of em- 
ployee loyalty records. 

Mr. Morris. JNIr. Chairman, I would like those tvro letters intro- 
duced and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers. 

Tlie Ciiairiman. They may be inserted. 

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked 
as "Exhibits Nos. 269 and 270" and filed for the record.) 

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated August 31, 1951, addressed to 
Hon. Dean Acheson and signed by Eva B. xVdams, administrative 
assistant to Senator McCarran : 

In connection with some matters now under consideration by the Senate In- 
ternal Security Subcommittee, we will have occasion to refer to certain memo 
randa from Foreign Service officers quoted in part on pages 5(>4 to 5157 of the 
State Department's publication "Tlie United States Relations with China." 
In all fairness to the Department and the individuals involved, we would like the 
full documents for our use rather than the excerpts quoted. We would appre- 
ciate your sending us the full memoranda from which the quotations were taken. 

Thank you for your cooperation, 
Sincerely yours, 

Eva B. Adams. 

Tliat refers to the reports of Davies. Ludden, and Service, along 
with Emmerson, in the white paper. The reply is dated September 



904 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

12, 1951, Department of State, signed by W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy 
Under Secretary : 

My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of Miss Adams' 
letter of August 31, 1951, requesting the full text of certain memoranda quoted 
in part in pages 564 to 576 of the Department publication "United States Rela- 
tions With China." 

The Department will examine its files for the documents in question and will 
communirntp with you further respecting this matter. 
Sincerely yours, 



(For the Secretary of State). 

The Chatrman. Wliat is the date of that letter ? 

Mr. Mandel. September 12, 1951. 

Mr. Morris. I recommend that these two letters be introduced into 
the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers. 

The Chairman. They will be inserted. 

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandell were 
marked as "Exhibits Nos. 271 and 272" and filed for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. I have just one more exchange, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Has any further reply come from the State De- 
partment on that last letter ? 

Mr. Mandel. I am searching to find if there is any further reply. 

This is a letter dated September 12, 1951, to the Hon. Dean Acheson 
from Senator Pat McCarran : 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : For puriwses of use by the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee, we would like to have a copy of a report sent to the State Depart- 
ment by John Kenneth Emmerson, dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political 
Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, 
entitled "The Japanese Communist Party." 

We would like to use this material in connection with a hearing on Friday, 
September 14. We shall be glad to send a messenger to the Department if you 
will telephone us that this material is available. 

Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 

Pat McCarran, Chadrman. 

On Thursday, September 13, we received a telephone message from a 
Mr. Anderson of the State Department, extension 2206, in reference to 
the documents mentioned in our letter of September 12, 1951, telling 
us we would hear further. 

On September 14 Mr. Walter K. Scott of the State Department 
called and stated that a letter "is being written us that they will not 
be able to release the documents requested." 

We did not receive the letter for unexplained reasons, but we got 
this letter over the telephone from the State Department that they 
had sent us dated September 19, 1951 : 

My Dear Senator McCarran : This is in reply to your request for copies of 
two reports sent to the State Department by Mr. John*Keiineth Emmerson, one 
dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese 
Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Commu- 
nist Party." 

It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting 
by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In 
the present context, the release of these reports by individual officers would 
undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views 
by officers in the field in their reports to the Department. For that reason, 
the re(iuest must be respectfully declined. 

As this matter is of great importance to the Department, I should very much 
appreciate an opportunity to discuss it with you at your convenience. 
Sincerely, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 905 



Signed by Mr. Webb, Acting Secretary, 

Mr. Morris. I would like those letters to go in the record, together 
with the memoranda and marked with the next consecutive exhibit 
numbers. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked 
as "Exhibits Nos. 273, 374, and 275," and filed for the record.) 

Mr. Morris. I would like the record to show that Professor Cole- 
grove is here today under subpena, and we are going to aslc him to 
testify about a meeting that took place 2 years ago. Mr. Chairman, 
there is a transcript of this meeting, and we have requested it and it 
has been denied us. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not want to take time now, but I do want 
to comment on some of this information that is now put in the record 
about the cooperation of the executive branch, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH COLEGHOVE, NOKTHWESTEEN 
UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL. 

Senator Ferguson. We asked the professor to come here and he has 
been waiting quite a while. I did want the record to show that I did 
not want the record to stand as it was. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, 
Professor ? 

Mr. Colegrove. My name is Kenneth Colegrove. My address is 
Harris Hall 305, Northwestern University, Evanston, 111. 

Mr. Morris. What are your present duties ? 

JMr. Colegrove. I am professor of political science, Northwestern 
University. 

Mr. Morris. How long have you held that position ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have held that position since 1919. I have been 
absent from Northwestern University on sabbaticals, traveling in 
Europe and Asia, but the position has been held since 1919. 

Mr. Morris. What has been your major assignment in Northwestern ? 

Mr. Colegro\te. Teaching political science, particularly the field of 
international law and international relations and also Asiatic politics 
in government. 

Mr. Morris. What 'degrees do you hold, Professor? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have an A. B. degree from the State University 
of Iowa, a Ph. D. from Plarvard University. Columbia University 
gave me an honorary Doctor of Letters some years ago. 

Mr. Morris. When was that? 

Mr. Colegro\t2. That was in 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, what books have you written? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have written one book on Militarism in Japan, in 
1936 ; a book on International Control of Aviation. That was back 
in 1930. I have written a book on United States Senate and W^orld 
Peace, in 1944. 



906 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Professor, what has been your specialty in interna- 
tional affairs? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. My specialty has been international control of avia- 
tion and treaty-making in the United States, and then government 
and ])olitics and diplomacy of Japan. I might say that my studies on 
Japan amoimt to about 20 articles which are published in the Amer- 
ican Political Science Review, the American Journal of International 
Law and other learned journals. 

Mr. INIoRRis, Professor, when did you first join the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I joined at an early date. I am sorry to say I didn't 
refresh my memory on that, but somewhere in the middle of the thir- 
ties, I think. 

Mr. Morris. How long have you remained a member of the institute ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have been off and on, a member of the institute. 
You joined the institute simply by paying your dues. That is all it 
amounts to. 

May I say I joined the institute back in the early thirties because at 
that time the institute had the reputation of unbiased scientific system 
of investigation and many of the books that it published and the 
survey which it published were very excellent helps in teaching and 
in research. 

It also purported at that time to be wholly unbiased, wholly sci- 
entific, and a very large number of professors and libraries subscribed 
to it. I think most of the members like myself became members in 
order to get the publications rather than to participate in the studies. 

Senator Ferguson. The studies were done by a group that could 
spend the time and the effort? 

Mr. Colegro"st3. Yes, 

Senator Ferguson, The books that were sent out to the student of 
international affairs and teachers, you did want to be in a position to 
get these as they came out? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. We referred" our students to these studies. 
They were excellent studies on the Avhole. Sometimes you coidd detect 
a bias but you attached that to the writer rather than to the institute 
itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know people were writing under ficti- 
tious names or aliases? 

Mr. Colegrove. I didn't realize that ^yith reference to the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Ferguson. That Avas not what the teacher really wanted. 
He wanted to know who the writer was, his experience, et cetera? 

Mr. CoLEGRO\T.. Exactly. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, were you associated with the publication 
Amerasia? 

Iklr. Colegrove. Yes; I was, from the first issue down to the time 
when I resigned. 

Mr. Morris. Was the first issue in 1937? 

Mr. Colegrove. 1987. I resigned from the advisory board. I was 
a member of what was called the advisory board of editors from 1937 
until 1942 when T resignod fii'st and was persuaded to come back. 
Then I resigned for good in 1943. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 907 

Mr. jNIorris. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your 
first beconnuf^ associated with the publication and the two resignations 
you have just mentioned? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was invited to join the editorial board by Fred- 
erick Field Avho was and still is a very personable young man. 

Senator Eastland. What year was that ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was' in 1936, the year before the first pub- 
lication. 

At that time the American people were not widely awake to Asia 
and Asiatic problems. I was among those who felt we ought to know 
more about Asia, that we ought to study Asia more in the schools 
and we ought to have mor.i information with reference to Asia and 
we ought to awaken a large public opinion with reference to Asia. 

America knew a great deal about Europe but Asia had been very 
greatly neglected. What Frederick Fiekl and what Mr. Jaff'e and 
others connected with Amerasia, prof>osed to do was to publish a 
monthly journal called Amerasia, America-Asia, running the two 
together, which would translate into popular language the learning 
regarding current affairs in Asia. To me that was a very attractive 
proposition. I think most of the editors, most of the scholars who 
agreed to become editors, felt that they were really doing a service 
to the American people and doing a service to the schools, doing a 
service to public opinion, by serving on this Amerasia. 

The first numbei-s of Amerasia were excellent. Some of the very 
best things we have on Asia were published in Amerasia. 

The Chairman. Would jou raise your voice just a bit, Professor? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes. 

Some very good articles were published in Amerasia. I did not de- 
tect any special line in 1937, 1938, and 1939. I knew that some of the 
editorial board were attached preeminently to the American inter- 
ests, looked at the national interest of the American people as first 
and foremost. I knew that others were not so careful of the Ameri- 
can interests and sympathized with revolutionar}- processes, some of 
which are rather dangerous. 

I thought at the time it was a well-balanced board. All views were 
expressed there. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, looking back do you think there was a line 
there or do you think you just did not detect a line? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. In the first few years as I look over the old num- 
bers I would say there was no line to bo easily detected. Eater on 
the line appeared, especially in articles by a Chinese scholar by the 
name of Chi. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the line, Professor? 

Mr. CoLEGRO\'E. It is very hard to say exactly what the line was. 
When I use "the line," I mean a person is following the policy of 
Soviet Russia. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if you had followed the line you 
would have gone to the Kremlin? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes ; the line would go back to the Kremlin. 

]\Ir. Morris. You say that is right ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. That is what I meant by party line. 

22848— 52— pt. 3 14 



908 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Professor. I "would like to offer you an exchange of 
correspondence involving you, which Mr. Mandel will certify came 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. Do you want the witness to see them first? 

ISIr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. This is a letter from Mr. Lockwood. 

Mr. Morris. There were three letters, a copy of a letter from Mr. 
Lockwood to you and the second letter is one which purports to be an 
original of yours. 

Mr. CoLEGEOVE. I recall the correspondence. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that? 

Mr. Mandel. These letters dated November 30, 1942, November 
20, 1942, November 18, 1942, and November 17, 1942, were taken from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, will you tell us your recollection of this 
exchange of correspondence ? 

Mr. Colegrove. As I just said, I served on this advisory editorial 
board from 1937 on. I was one of the few members from the West, 
and I must say I never attended a meeting of the editorial board, 
although I understand meetings were held about every month in New 
York City. I never happened to be in New York City when such 
a meeting was held. 

In the bsginning it was my understanding with the board that I 
would be given the right to approve all the articles on Japan that were 
published in Amerasia. These articles were sent out to me in bunches. 
I read them and sent back my comments. Later on I noticed that 
Amerasia did publish some articles on Japan which I had not O. K.'d. 
I was very busy at the time and didn't protest at this seeming neglect: 

Then around 1940 a number of articles began to be published in 
Amerasia by Kate Mitchell and by Mr. Mattuch and Mr. Gohol very 
antagonistic to the British rule in India and also to the Dutch rule in 
Indonesia. 

During the war Great Britain became our ally, or we became an 
ally of Great Britain and I thought this was very bad policy to publish 
these articles without having articles on the other side. I protested 
at this lack of impartiality and scholarship. Mr. Jaffe promised me 
that I would have the riglit before any article attacking British rule 
in India or Dutch rule in Indonesia 

INIr. Morris. Will you please speak up ? 

Mr. Colegrove. American articles were published in Amerasia at- 
tacking the British rule in India and the Dutch rule in Indonesia. 
That of course was following the Communist line. I didn't know that 
at the time. I thought it was very unscholarly to publish articles 
attacking British rule in India and Dutch rule in Indonesia without 
publishing articles on the other side. Mr. Jaffe agreed with me on 
this matter because I suppose he wanted to keep the old members 
of the board together, and said that before any article attacking the 
British in India or the Dutch in Indonesia was published, he would 
allow me to secure some other writer to publish an article on the 
other side. 

Mr. Jaffe, I am sorry to say, in my view broke that agreement, and 
in the fall of 1942 I i-esigned from the editorial board, saying this was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 909 

not following^ tlie scholarly procedure. This correspondence relates 
to my resignation. 

Mr. JafFe later on persuaded me to come back, with the very firm 
promise that it would never happen again. I regret to say that it 
did happen again and I resigned for good in April 1943. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, docs ]\Ir. Lockwood concede there was a line 
to Amerasia in his letter to you there? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. I am afraid he does. ]Mr. Lockwood seems to be 
on both sides. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the second paragraph ? 

This is his letter ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date ? 

Mr. Colegro\t3. November 30, 1942. 

It seems to me that as matters now stand the editors are put in an emliar- 
rassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned 
and therefore all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything 
that is said whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen 
it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this olijection and promised to 
think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again. 

In later correspondence Jaffe promised that would not be done in 
the future. 

Mr. INIoRRis. I ask that these four letters identified by Professor 
Colegrove and by Mr. jMandel as letters from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations be introduced into the record and be marked with 
the next consecutive exhibit numbers. 

The Chairman. There seems to be something more than letters 
here. 

Mr. Morris. This is just our summary of the exchange. The four 
letters should go in the I'ecord. 

The Chairman. The letters will be inserted into the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked as exhibits Nos. 276, 277, 
278, and 279, and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 279 

Northwestern University, 

November 17, 19Jf2. 
Mr. PniiJp J. Jaffe, 

Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. 

Dear Mr. Jaffe : I am writing you regarding the lack of objectivity and 
scholarsliip displayed in recent articles in Amerasia dealing with India. 

In the October 2.5 issue of Amerasia occurs an article by Mr. Kurt II. Mattusch 
under the title "The American Public and India," which is not only bitterly 
anti-British but also unscholarly. 

For instance, on page 403 he says that the debate on the Cripps Mission in the 
House of Lords envisaged safe reservations for British interests within India. 
As a matter of fact, tlie debate of July 30 was on Europeans in India and was 
not on the Cripps mission. The Marquess of Crewe, whose speech is quoted, was 
not an official spokesman. Mr. Mattusch completely ignores the statement of the 
Duke of Devonshire, who, speaking for the Government, said : "It is really 
impossible to make an offer both of complete self-government and to exact 
guaranties for specified British interests." 

Again, his statement aboiit taxes and the upkeep of Gibraltar, Malta, and Eden 
is simply fantastic. Numerous other errors in this art'cle could be pointed out. 

I wish also to refer to the number of Amerasia published in May and devoted 
to India and the war. This number contained numerous misrepresentations tliat 



910 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

DO scholar would tolerate. For instance, on pages 4 to 8, the onus of defeat of 
the Cripps mission seems to be laid on Mr. Jinnah, who is pictured as a scheming 
politician. Now, everyone with even a slight acquaintance with Indian affairs 
knows that the working committee of the Indian National Congi'ess contains 
politicians just as scheming and sellisli as Mr. .Jinnah. Nevertheless the com- 
mentator ignores this fact. 

The commentary also fails to give a proper consideration to Pakistan, to 
explain tlie Moslem case, to give proper consideration to the plight of the untouch- 
ables under the Hindu domination. It fails to call proper attention to the very 
small percentage of Indian people, barely 10.000,000 out of 3S9,000,(X)0, who are 
political-minded. A scholarly treatment of the question should point out all 
these facts. 

There is another consideration other than lack of scholarship in the publication 
of these one-sided articles and comment. We are engaged cooperatively in a war 
for the self-preservation of our institutions. Great Britain is our ally in this 
war. The publication of articles which misrepresent the facts while attacking 
Great Britain can do little else than impair our war effort. Loyalty to our own 
country requires intellectual honesty and moderation in any criticism of our ally. 

I find myself under necessity of resigning from the editorial board unless 
Amerasia is willing to publish in the very near future two articles to offset the 
above-mentioned anti-British articles. I would like to see this principle also 
applied to the editorials. 

it is a matter of deep regret to me to be compelled to write to you in this 
fashion. There is nothing personal in my feelins; in this matter. But as a 
teacher I cannot permit my name to be used on an editorial board of a magazine 
which prin.ts such unscholarly and unfair articles without also publishing articles 
on the other side. 

It is probable that in any case I ought not be on the editorial board, inasmuch 
as I live so far from New York City and cannot attend the periodical meetings 
of the editorial board. 

Please do not consider this letter as any ultimatum in this matter. T have 
nothing but the most friendly feeling toward you personally and all my colleagues 
on the board. 

Faithfully yours, 

Kenneth Colegbove, 
Professor of Political Science. 

Exhibit No. 278 

Northwestern UNivERSiri% 
^ College of Liberal Arts, 
Evanston, 111, November 18, 1942. 

Mr. William Lt^iCKWoon, 

Secrefari/, American Committee for International Studies, 
Princeton, N. J. 

Dear Mr. Lockwood : I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have just 
sent to Mr. Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia. I regret very much the necessity 
of sending this letter, but I feel that I cannot remain a meml)er of the editorial 
board of a magazine which publishes articles severely criticizing our ally Great 
Britain unless those articles are scholarly in character and also unless the 
British side, or again the Moslem side, is also expressed on the pages of the 
ma' azine. 

I suiijjo^e. anyway, it is time for me to withdraw from the editorial board, 
inasmuch as, living in Chicago. I cannot attend the Ixiard meeetings. I hope, 
of course, if the editorial board cannot arrange to publish some articles on the 
other side of the Indian question, and if I find it necessary to withdraw from 
the board, Amerasia will publish my letter of resignation, indicating exactly my 
reason for retiring. 
Hastily yours, 

Kenneth Colegrove, 
Profe.^sor of Political Science. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 911 

Exhibit No. 277 

The Institute for Advanced Study, 

Princeton, N. J., November 20, 1942. 
Mr. WiU-iAM W. LocKwooD, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City. 
Dear Bill : I am sorry we opened the enclosed letter from Kenneth Colegrove, 
which is not on American committee business even though it is addressed to you 
as secretary of the committee. 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) Ed. 

(Typed ) Edward Meade Earle. 

P. S. — Incidentally, I was pretty peeved about the review of Mackinder, which 
I thought flippant. 



Exhibit No. 276 

November 30, 1942. 
Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, 

105 Harris Hall, Northwestern University, 

Evanston, III. 

Dear Professor Colegrove : I have read with interest and some sympathy 
your letter to Phil Jaffe on Amerasia. I felt the same way about the treatment of 
India and have said so to him and to Kate Mitchell. 

It seems to be that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarras- 
sing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned ; and, 
therefore, all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything 
that is said, whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen 
it in advance. .Jafl'e recognized the validity of tliis objection and promised to 
think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again. 

For some time I've been frankly rather puzzled as to whether to remain on the 
boai'd, Ijeing torn between reluctance to sponsor the "line"' being taken and, on the 
other hand, the feeling that Amerasia had a lot of useful stuff in it. Also, I 
dislike making any sort of break with Jaffe and Miss Mitchell, both of whom 
are close personal friends of mine. 

It may be that the whole board of outsiders ought to disappear and the maga- 
zine be made frankly the personal vehicle of the two people doing all the work. 
They are reluctant to have that happen. The real reason I haven't withdrawn, 
conlidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could 
be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen 
their total usefulness to the public and eliminate the present duplication and 
competition. From the IPR standpoint, this of course would preclude a con- 
sistent and personalized editorial line, though it wouldn't by any means preclude 
a forum of opinion presenting a variety of views. Personnel is getting so scarce 
that there ought to be some combination in this general field of Far East peri- 
odicals. The new form of Amerasia serves really to increase the duplication 
and competition with Pacific Affairs and tlie Far Eastern Survey, particularly the 
former. 

My own ideas aren't very clear on this, and I'm writing you my puzzlement 
ii\ the hope that you may have some suggestions. As a nonstalf person who has 
been interested both in Amerasia and in the IPR, I would very much appreciate 
having your views as to what we ought to do. 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood. 

Note. — I understand this is what happened : IPR people would not go along 
with Jaffe's personal views as reflected in Amerasia, which had started as an 
objective and substantiated paper. — Clayton Lane, January, 1950. 

(Above is handwritten.) 



912 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Were you invited to participate in Government serv- 
ice during the war ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I was invited to be a consultant by tlie Office 
of Strategic Services. 

Mr. Morris. By whom ? 

Mr. CoLEGRO^^. I was invited by Charles Burton Foss. I might 
say as a matter of amusement here, that during the war a great many 
of us old professors were invited to serve in Government agencies by 
our bright young students who had gone into the Government serv- 
ice and gotten into positions of some importance. Charles Burton 
Foss was a former student of mine. He was inviting his old professor 
to come down and help him during the war, which I did. 

]\Ir. Morris. What other invitation did you have to join the Gov- 
ernment service. Professor? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. During the war my consultation with the Office of 
Strategic Services was my only service. Immediately after the war, 
I was invited to become a consultant for General MacArthur, the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. That was in 
1946. 

Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact work for OSS, Professor ? 

Mr. CoLEGRO^^. Yes. I served as a consultant on four or five differ- 
ent occasions in Washington for the OSS. I might say that Charles 
Burton Foss was first the Chief of the Japan Section of the OSS under 
the Far Eastern Division. Then he succeeded Carl Eemer and was 
Chief of the Far Eastern Division of OSS. 

Mr. Morris. Were you ever asked to join the Office of War Infor- 
mation ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I w^as offered the post of head of the Japan- 
ese desk in the OWI in Japan. I was asked to take that position by 
Prof. Owen Lattimore, who was serving the Office of War Informa- 
tion from the San Francisco position. 

Mr. Morris. Did you accept that offer. Professor ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. No ; I declined that position. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Lattimore at 
the time of your declination. Professor ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Professor Lattimore wrote me several letters 
and then asked me to meet him as he came through from Washington 
to San Francisco ; asked me to meet him in Chicago. I met him. 

Mr. Morris. Will you relate to us what happened during the course 
of that conversation, Professor ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was in December 1943, and Lattimore again 
offered me the post of the Japan desk in San Francisco. He seemed 
a little annoyed that I didn't accept it. We had dinner together. I 
was courteously awaiting until his plane took off for San Francisco; 
so we continued the conversation. We discussed first the position 
that Amerasia had taken with reference to the British in India, and I 
objected to Amerasia's attitude and articles and said that was one of 
the points why I resigned. Lattimore seemed to take great offense at 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. At your position ? 

Mr. Coi^.ROVE. Yes, at my position ; very great offense at my argu- 
ments, and I was entirely wrong regarding it. For some reason or 
other, we got on the subject of the Dutch in Indonesia. Lattimore 
was still more furious at my contradicting him with reference to the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 913 

benefits of Dutch rule in Indonesia. I was opposed to liquidating 
Dutch imperialism in Indonesia immediately after the war. Then 
I mentioned something about the Chinese Communists, and this sur- 
prised me a great deal to have Lattimore, whom I thought by this 
time had lost some of his control, claim that he had more information 
on China than I had, which was, of course, true. He went so far 
as to say that Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real 
democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no 
connection with Soviet Russia. 

Senator Ferguson. You say Professor Lattimore said the Chinese 
Communists were democrats, agrarian reformers, and had no con- 
nection with Soviet Russia? 
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you taken the opposite view ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I think most scholars felt the same way 
at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. That you were right ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I felt I was right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did most scholars feel 

Mr. Colegrove. At that time I think most impartial scholars were 
very hesitant to believe that the Chinese Communists did not have 
some connection with. Soviet Russia, that Mao Tse-tung was a Marx- 
ian doctrinnaire and not a mere agrarian reformer, and certainly 
not a democrat in any respect. 

I told Lattimore on this occasion that I felt that he was saying 
something he didn't believe himself, and I was surprised to see Latti- 
more back down. 

Mr. INIoRRis. You say he was conversing with you in a state of 
temper ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I think he got very annoyed with me and didn't 
exercise caution which he generally does exercise. 

JMr. Morris. Did he mention whether or not he felt that the Chinese 
Communists were receiving aid from Soviet Russia ? 

Mr. Colegrove. He claimed they were not. In fact, he went so 
far as to say there was no means of communication. 

The Chairman. Was it not quite well known at that time that young 
Chinese had been taken to Moscow and indoctrinated and trained? 
That was a matter of pretty common knowledge ; was it not ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Certainly, among persons who followed the situa- 
tion in Asia, that was very well known. 

The Chairman. Mao Tse-tung was one of them ? 

Mr. Colegroms. Well, Mao Tse-tung had not gone to Moscow. He 
was one of the few who did not. Every one of his lieutenants were 
Moscow-trained. That applied especially to Chou En Lai. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you not somewhat surprised at Latti- 
more's stand being in the OWI, Lattimore taking the stand he did in 
relation to these Communists in China? 

Mr, Colegrove. I was amazed, frankly. I got the impression that 
perhaps Professor Lattimore was not folloAving instructions from the 
State Department that he should be following with reference to his 
duties in San Francisco. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I meant. 

Mv. Colegrove. About this time the official view of the United 
States was that nothing disparaging should be said of the Japanese 



914 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Emperor, the Tano system; nothing should be done to arouse hatred 
or antagonism of the imperial household, because my understanding is 
that Mr. Grew, who was the Under Secretary of State, had the opinion 
that the Emperor would be of very great assistance in bringing about 
the surrender of Japan when finally Japan should wisely surrender. 
The militarists would never give in. So, if you could only get the 
Emperor, you would save a situation. 

Owen Lattimore's view from conversations was, as I recall, that the 
Emperor's system was the greatest deterrent to democracy in Jai)an 
and that the Emperor and his whole family should be exterminated. 

Senator Eastland. You mean killed ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Killed, destroyed. Publicly he did not go that far. 
He went that far privately. 

Senator Ferguson. With you? 

Mr. CoLEGKOVE. Yes. Publicly his proposal was that the Japanese 
Emperor and his whole family should be sent over to China to be 
dealt with by the Chinese. Everybody vvdio knew Asia at that time 
would realize the Chinese would annihilate the Emperor and his 
family or put them beyond all power of living. 

Senator Ferguson. Professor, this line that Lattimore was taking, 
both on the Emperor and the situation of the Chinese, was that, in your 
opinion, the Soviet line ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. That has always been the Soviet line. The 
Coimnunist Party in Japan ever since 1921 has opposed the Emperor. 
That has been the line of the Communist Party in Japan while they 
were underground. They were underground from 1923 on. Of 
course, the Communist Party, line in Japan was dictated by the 
Kremlin. 

Senator Ferguson. But here was a man, Owen Lattimore, that was 
well informed as to America's stand, or should have been, and as to 
the world situation. When he was advocating to you privately these 
matters, in your opinion, as you said to him once, I believe, that he 
was advocating something that he ci)uld hardly believe himself but 
he was still advocating it, that was the Communist line? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 1 do not charge him 



Senator Ferguson. With being a Communist? 

Mr. Colegrove. No. I did not charge him with following the 
Communist line. I simply told him I was sure he knew better, that 
Mao Tse-tung was not a democrat and a mere agrarian reformer. I 
probably did not make my statement clear here when I said 1 talked 
these tilings over with Lattimore on the occasion of our visit in 
December 1943. 

Also I discussed with Lattimore the policy of the United States 
toward the Emperor that was being followed by the State Depart- 
ment, the War Department and the OWI at that time. 

Senator Eastland. Why did you decline a job in San Francisco? 

Mr. Colegrove. Largely personal. I did not trust Owen Lattimore. 
1 did not care to be associated with him. 

Senator Eastland. You thought they were following the Com- 
munist line out there? 

Mr. Colegrove. I can't say that I was that alert. Senator. Some 
of us professors are not as alert as we should be. I could not say that 
Owen Lattimore was following the Communist line. I didn't like his 
attitude on Asiatic problems. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 915 

Senator Eastland. You say it was a Communist line? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I say it was the Connnunist line. 

Senator Eastland. You say you did not trust him. Therefore, you 
did not take the job. Is that right? 

Mr. Colegkove. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Why did you not trust him? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. For those reasons. 

Senator Eastland. Because he was following the Communist line? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I would say in the back of my mind that 
would stand out, but at that time I would not have said that Owen 
Lattimore is following the Communist line. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no doubt about it now ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That was the Communist line. As you look back 
over the situation and compare it with the editorials in the Daily 
Worker, you can see definitely that was the Communist line. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, on the 10th of July of this year while you 
were examined in executive session you were shown a letter dated 
July 10, 1938, by Owen Lattimore to Mr. Carter. I would like to 
show this to you once again and ask you if you will make any general 
connnent on the last full paragraph on the first page and the first 
paragraph on the second page. 

The Chairman. What is this? 

Mr. Morris. This, Senator, is a letter which has been introduced 
in evidence previously, a letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C. 
Carter, dated July 10. 1938, and officially made a part of our record. 

The Chairman. You are drawing his attention to certain para- 
graphs? 

Mr. Morris. Two paragraphs. 

The CiiAiR3iAN. What is your question? 

Mr. Morris. I have just called attention to the fact that he was 
shown that letter in executive session and asked to comment on it, I 
am going to ask him if he will make any comments now. 

The Chairman. I think it would be well for you to read the para- 
graphs. 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. One paragraph that you refer to here Professor 
Lattimore says : 

I think that yon are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section 
of tlie inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the ab o- 
Uitely essential radical aspects, but can be depended ou to do it with the right 
touch. 

Chi was a member of the editorial board of Amerasia and I did not 
know at that time he was a Communist, but it was very evident that 
he was following the Communist line. 

Mr. Morris. It was evident to you. Professor, that Chi, while you 
were on the board of Amerasia with him, was follovving the Com- 
munist Party line? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That came gradually into our minds, that he was 
following the Communist line. At first we thought he was a bright 
young Chinese scholar who had a mass of information, which he did. 
He had a mass of information. We finally realized it was along the 
Communist line entirely. 

The Chairman. When you use the term "we" aj-e you using the 
editorial "we" applying to yourself? 



916 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. I would say it included members of the committee 
like Cyrus Peake and myself. I assume otlier members who were very 
sympathetic toward the Kremlin knew it all the time. 

The last paragraph reads : 

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me tlnit the good scoring 
position for the IPR differs with d'fferent countries. For Cli'na, my liunch is 
that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position — far 
enough not to be covered by the same label — but enough ahead of the active 
Chinese liberals to be noticeable. 

That sentence, together with his whole letter, seems to me to be one 
of the most intellectually dishonest academic documents that I have 
ever seen. This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to pro- 
fessors and teachers all over the country that it was. In its solicita- 
tion for membership it had always emphasized the scholarly, scientific 
viewpoint that it was presenting, amplified by the fact that it was 
not trying to advocate the interest of any particular country but only 
giving us the benefit of their researches and their scholarship. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you thought it was an honest 
organization and this sentence indicates to you that it was really a 
fraud ? 

Mr. CoLEGRO\TE. Ycs. This is fraudulent. This is one of the most 
contemjDtible things I know from the whole academic world. Thou- 
sands of university professors and hundreds of thousands of students 
all over the country who were beginning to study Asia looked upon 
this institute as an unbiased, wholly scientific institution engaged in 
research, engaged in discovery of the truth and in not following any 
line. 

I and other scholars would have been shocked if we knew that one 
official of the Institute of Pacific Relations was writing to the secre- 
tary-general telling him to follow a certain line with reference to 
China, Japan, with reference to Indonesia. 

Senator Ferguson. Professor, to do it in such a way as to deceive 
the people, not to come out and announce it was a Communist propa- 
ganda agency but to deceive the people, isn't that true with that 
sentence ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. It was shocking. It is almost revolting to 
think that you yourself were misled by such an organization. This 
will have done a very great injury to organized scholarship in the 
United States. It is no wonder people are suspicious of the Rocke- 
feller Foundation or of the Carnegie Corp. which gives so much 
money to organizations of this sort. 

Senator Ferguson. Then to realize those that had charge of it 
would use it as a means of deceiving the people and use it really as a 
propaganda agency or front ? 

Mr. Colegrove. This shows behind the front the Institute of Pacific 
Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization support- 
ing a line. 

Senator Eastland. A Communist line? 

Mr. Colegrove. In this case a Communist line. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. Professor. 

This, Mr. Chairman, has already been introduced into the record as 
exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the open hearing. 

The Chairman. Let the record show exhibit No. 4 is the exhibit 
in the hands of the witness at this time from which he testified. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 917 

Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, did you attend a conference held 
under the auspices of the State Department on October C, 7, and 8, 
1949? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I was invited to attend that conference. The 
invitation came in a telegram signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of 
State. 

Mr. Morris. What was your understanding of this conference, 
Professor ? 

Mr. Colegrove, My understanding had been that Professor Jessup 
had been charged by the State Department with the formulation of 
a new policy for China and that a committee had been set up with 
Professor Jessup as chairman, President Case and Dr. Fosdick as 
the two other members, and that Ambassador Jessup and the State 
Department wished to receive advice from experts regarding what 
the policy of the United States in China should be. 

I might say the collapse of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Govern- 
ment had occurred that summer. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, were Messrs. Jessup, Fosdick, and Case all 
three IPR men ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I believe they were, but Mr. Jessup of course was 
the member of the board of trustees. I believe Dr. Fosdick was also. 
1 have always assumed that President Case was a member. 

Mr. Morris. You testified, Professor, that this conference, to your 
understanding, was called by Mr. Jessup in order to assist the Secre- 
tary of State in formulating far-eastern. policy ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I wouldn't like to be positive about that. I would 
say that impression was that the list was prepared by Ambassador 
Jessup. The invitation was over the signature of the Secretary of 
State. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the 
conference we are now having testimony about is the conference, the 
transcript of which was asked for by you of the State Department 
and which was denied. 

The Chairman. Let the record so show. 

Mr. Morris. At the time of receiving a letter from the State Depart- 
ment a list of consultants who did attend this conference was made 
available. I would like now to show this list to Professor Colegrove 
to refresh his recollection on the make-up of that particular con- 
ference. 

The Chairman. This is the list attached to the letter addressed to 
me under date of September 12, 1951, over the signature of Jack K. 
McFall, Assistant Secretary ; is that correct? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. Colegrove. May I use this ? 
. Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Would you just state that most of the participants of that confer- 
ence were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Colegrove. It seems to me, Mr. Morris, that most of these are 
members of the IPR,_ and many of them are high-ranking officers. 

The Chairman. High-ranking officers of what ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Of the IPR, that is, members of the board of 
trustees. I must say I was never a high-ranking officer in the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations. I was merely a member. Thousands of 



918 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

people in the United States were members simply to subscribe to the 
Survey and other publications. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the editorial staff ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. No; but I was a member of the advisory editorial 
board of Amerasia but not of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I propose that the best way of identifj^- 
ing or establishing whether or not these people were connected with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations is during the course of the testimony 
of the next wifness on this conference to ask Mr. Holland, presently 
secretary-general, to confirm those who were associated with the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel has made a compilation from 
our records, but I suggest it is inadequate and that the best way of 
establishing it would be to have Mr. Holland assert for our record who 
the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations are. 

The Chairman. He is coming on ? 

Mr. Morris. No; but during the testimony of our next witness in 
regard to this conference have Mr. Holland establish that fact. 

The Chairman. Very well. As I understand the witness' testimony 
now, he is saying that a considerable number of the names on that list 
were high-ranking officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations ; is that 
right? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; many were, not a majority, but many were. 

Mr. Morris. Will you describe for us the developments of the con- 
ference as they unfolded, Professor? 

The Chairman. You did attend the conference, first of all ? 

Mr. Coi.EGROVE. Yes, I was present during the 3 days that the con- 
ference was held. 

The Chairman. Where did it assemble? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. In the State Department, in the large conference 
room I'ight off of the offices of the Secretary of State. 

The Chairman. Who if anyone was the presiding officer ? 

Mr. Colegrove. The presiding officer was Ambassador Jessup, but 
Dr. Jessup was detained in Lake Success with the United Nations 
affairs and was not present in the opening session. 

Mr. Morris. He was present during the second and third sessions ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. Dr. Fosdick presided over the first day's 
session. 

Mr. Morris. What were some of the subjects discussed at that con- 
ference ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Mr. Morris, may I say with reference to giving 
testimony on the subject of this conference in the State Department 
that the State Department did say that the proceedings would be con- 
fidential and would not be given to the press. The implication was 
that members of the conference should not discuss this matter with 
the press. 

On the other hand, I take it that it is proper for any member of the 
conference who is testifying before a Senate committee to speak very 
frankly with reference to what was said and done in the conference. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. It is not only proper, sir; you are under oath, 

Mr. CoLEGROM-:. And must answer the questions. 

Senator Ferguson. You were called in by the United States Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. The telegram was signed Dean Acheson. 
Secretary of State. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 919 

Senator Ferguson. You were acting as a Government official? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Fercuson. "Were you paid or not? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE, Travel expenses were given and a per diem. 

Senator Ferguson. You were to advise with the various members 
there ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Advise with Ambassador Jessup's committee. 

Senator Ferguson. It was public business; that is, the Govern- 
ment was paying for it, setting it up and taxpayers" money was being 
used 'for it? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. The obvious purpose was to formulate far eastern 
policy ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. So we understood. 

Senator Jenner. Were there any press releases issued from this 
conference? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Some time later, as I recollect, and I am 
sorry I cannot give you the exact date, the State Department pub- 
lished a list of consultants. 

Senator Jenner. Did they publish any news or anything said in 
the conference? 

Mr. Colegrove. No. My understanding is they did not. 

Mr. Morris. Was the question of Communist China discussed ? 

JNIr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. The recognition of Communist China was 
one of the very important questions discussed. When Ambassador 
Jessup arrived he frankly said that the Department wanted the ad- 
vice of these consultants on the question of recognition of Communist 
China, on the question of the Japan Peace Treaty, on the question of 
a Pacific pact, and on the question of giving economic aid to Commu- 
nist and non-Communist countries in Asia. Those four subjects were 
broadly discussed and a great many other subjects, too. 

Mr. Morris. Was there a tendency of the various people during the 
course of these 3 days to break clown into groups and take positions 
on the subjects as they arose? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, there was that tendency. As you will notice, it 
always occurs in a group of individuals. You can classify them more 
or less closely into groups. If you are going to limit the groups to 
thre'e. I would say that one group was very obviously pro-American in 
its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the 
national interest of the American people. 

Mr. Morris. Did that group generally take a strong anti-Commu- 
nist position? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That group took a very strong anti-Communist posi- 
tion. Now on the other side of this group they were not thinking so 
much of America as they were thinking of other things and that group 
tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very con- 
siderate of the Kremlin. 

Senator Eastland. Who was that group ? 

Mr. CoLEGRo^^5. I would say the leader of that group, if you consider 
he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Owen Lattimore. I would put in that group Mr. 
Rosinger. 

Mr. Morris. Is that Lawrence K. Rosinger? 



920 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, of IPR. 

Mr. Morris. I would like the record to show at this time that Law- 
rence K. Rosinger has been identified by two witnesses as having been 
a member of the Communist Party. 

The Chairman. By two witnesses before this committee? 

Mr. Morris. Before this committee. 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. More or less, Professor Fairbank. 

Mr. Morris. Prof. John K. Fairbank? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

To some extent E.eischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of 
Columbia University. 

Senator Eastland. As I understand. Ambassador Jessup invited 
Owen Lattimore to a conference in Washington to advise and assist 
in formulating United States Government's China policy and advise 
with him on the Japanese Peace Treaty; is that right? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. Well, if Owen Lattimore received the very same 
telegram that I received, it was signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of 
State. 

Senator Eastland. You say the list was made up by Professor 
Jessup ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I assume that. I don't know ; that was the talk. 

Mr. Morris. You do know that Professor Jessup was in charge of 
this particular conference you attended ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I think the Secretary of State would not 
act very wisely if he didn't allow Ambassador Jessup to select his 
own expert. 

Senator Eastland. Was that in 1949 ? 

Mr. Colegrove. October 6, 7, and 8, 1949. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned the interest for America in the 
first group and then you said there were others you thought were 
thinking of something else than the primary interest of America and 
her relations to the world. What was that other thing? 

Mr. Colegrove. With reference to^this extreme group? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Colegrove. I felt that they were very sympathetic toward Chi- 
nese Communists and also were extremely careful with reference to 
the Kremlin. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were favoring, in 'your 
opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the 
United States of America ? 

Mr. Colegrove. That was my impression. 

Senator Ferguson. From what was said ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist 
China? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes, very, very strongly. 

Senator Ferguson. And recognition of Communist China? 

Mr. Colegrove. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and 
were very much opposed to a Pacific pact. 

The Chairman. You have named certain people who were present 
at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored 
Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them 
that you can recall who belonged to that group? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 921 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of , Mr. 
Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes 
Eugene Staley, Professor Staley. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the chairman take any side as to what 
group he was with ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Ambassador Jessup gave no sign he was in favor 
of one or the other. He w^as a good presiding officer. He was a good 
parliamentarian. Ambassador Jessup is suave, courteous, almost 
deferential. He knows how to cut off debate without offending any- 
one's sensibilities. He is an excellent presiding officer. 

At the same time Professor Jessup is a great scholar. I have very 
great respect for his scholarship, his learning, and his books on inter- 
national law particularly are very notable contributions. 

In this conference Mr. Jessup did not indicate his own personal 
attitude on any question whatsoever. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, as a matter of fact which group 
dominated the conference ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red 
China dominated the conference. Governor Stassen was among those 
who were very much opposed to Soviet Russia. Ballantine, Joseph 
W. Ballantine, was opposed. Professor Brodie was very much op- 
posed. I was decidedly opposed myself. I think we could add the 
name of Professor Buss as among those who took a strong anti-Com- 
munist attitude. I felt that we were in the minority, I am sorry to 
say. 

Mr. Morris. And the people avIio did favor Communist China were 
in the majority and they dominated the conference? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

Then the third group I mentioned was a group between, that was on 
one side once and on the other side again, persons who were a little 
unstable — well, a little undecided as to the position they wished to 
follow. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may the record show at this time that 
a subpena has been sent to Governor Stassen to appear before this 
committee next Monday afternoon in connection with the testimony 
given today by Professor Colegrove? 

The Chairman. Very well. The subpena has been issued ? 

Mr. Morris. It is going out today. Senator. 

Mr. Colegrove. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have not had an op- 
portunity to read the transcript that the State Department kept. 

The Chairman. Was there a transcript ? 

Mr. Colegrove. A transcript was made of everything by the State 
Department. Governor Stassen was very shrewd; I believe he had 
his own secretary there making a transcript. But I have had no 
opportunity to review this, the proceedings, and I am speaking wholly 
from my memory 2 years ago. 

Senator Ferguson. You have spoken generally of opinion, so you 
have not attempted to give specific statements. 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes; except I would be specific on the question of 
recognizing Red China. Mr. Lattimore was wholly for it. Mr. 
Kizer was for it. Mr. Rosinger was for it and Mr. Staley Avas for it, 
also Mr. Fairbank. I was opposed to it, Governor Stassen opposed to 
it, Ballantine opposed to it, and Brodie opposed to it. 



922 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Jenner. Was there anything discussed in this conference 
with regard to our attitude toward Korea and Formosa? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Owen Lattiniore, who had furnished the State 
Department with a memoranda, proposed in that memoranda that 
tlie United States immediately liquidate its responsibilities for Korea, 
and in the conference he expressed the same view. I remember that 
very distinctly. 

Senator Eastland. As a loyal American, were you satisfied with 
the men who were invited to that conference at the State Department 
to advise Mr. Jessup on the formulation of China policy? 

Mr. CoLEQROVE. Frankly, Senator, I was very much surprised. 

Senator Eastland. You were disappointed, were you not? 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. I was very much disappointed. 

Senator Eastland. In fact, the group that had been invited was 
the group largely that had betrayed the Chinese Government to the 
Communists? 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. That is exactly the situation. 

Senator Eastland. In fact, there were no new experts but it was the 
same crowd that had betrayed this country and sold China down the 
river ? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. And the State Department knew their views. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I might add this, and I have nothing to back it up 
except my impression — I thought the State Department in its brief- 
ing was doing a little propaganda work on a professor such as myself. 

Mr. Morris. Who did the briefing ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. There were several officers who briefed us. Nelson 
Johnson of the Far Eastern Commission did a very good job of brief- 
ing. I was very much disappointed in the briefing done by Cora 
Du Bois, who briefed the conference upon southeast Asia. I suspect, 
but I haven't much to go on, that the State Department thought it 
was good for some of the experts, so-called experts, to indoctrinate us 
and when it was over to approve the new policy which would be 
recognition of New China. 

Mr. Morris. You thought that had been the policy and they just 
wanted to get somebody to back them up? 

Mr. CoLEGROATc. I got that impression, I am sorry to say. 

Senator Eastland. Now did you read the American white paper 
on China? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, all students of Asia studied that with a great 
deal of care. 

Senator Eastland. Was that an honest or dishonest and false 
document? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. In my opinion it was one of the most false docu- 
ments ever published by any country. 

Senator Eastland. It was a dishonest document? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Thoi'oughly dishonest. 

Senator Eastland. Who supervised the preparation of that white 
paper? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. The New York Times said that Ambassador Jessup 
had been appointed by the State Department to edit that but I can 
hardly believe that Phil Jessup really supervised that document. He 
is a scholar, he is a learned man, and as a scholar the man must have 
realized that that document is not the real story. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 923 

Senator Jenner. Owen Lattimore is a scholar and learned man? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, a fine scholar, he has a fine command of certain 
Asiatic lano;iiages, that is true. 

Senator Eastland. What about the letter of transmittal? 

Mr. CoLEGRO^^. That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dis- 
honest, especially the paragraph of the letter which says that there 
is nothing that the United States could have done to save Chiang 
Kai-shek and again, except to reemphasize it, the United States had 
left nothing undone that might have saved him and kept the Com- 
munists from winning the victory. 

Senator Eastland. You thought that was a lie? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. That obviously was a lie, and I must say that those 
sort of statements are one thing we try to teach freshmen at North- 
western University never to make, such general sweeping statements 
like that, and I think by the time they have become seniors we have 
taught them those are not the kind of statements to make. 

Senator Eastland. Who signed that letter of transmittal ? 

Mr. Colegrg^t:. That letter was under the signature, I understand, 
of the Secretary of State, but obviously someone in the Department 
drafted it for him. 

Senator Eastland. In reality was it drafted by Professor Jessup ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE, I don't know. I hope it was not. I sincerely hope 
that Phil Jessup did not draft that letter. 

Senator Eastland. But the newspaper said he prepared that white 
paper, did it not? 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. My understanding was that he supervised the edit- 
ing of the paper. 

Senator Eastland. Yes, supervised the editing. 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Do you remember when Mr. Alfred Kohlberg 
made charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was Com- 
munist-controlled ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I was one of the members at that time that 
voted in favor of Mr. Kohlberg when an attempt was made to change 
the direction 

Senator Eastl^vnd. All he wanted was an investigation? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Merely an investigation, an outside investigation. 

Senator Eastland. Did he get that investigation ? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. No ; he did not. 

Senator Eastland. It was whitewashed, was it not ? 

Mr. CoLEGRovE. Very distinctly. 

Senator Ferguson. He did not even get an inside investigation, 
did he? " ^ 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Presumably he got an inside investigation because 
a letter was sent saying that his charges had been found utterly false. 

Senator Eastland. You know it was a whitewash, do you not? 

Mr. Colegroat:. I felt that very strongly even at the time. 

Senator Eastland. Did Professor Jessup have a hand in that white- 
wash ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I regret to say that Jessup's name is among the 
eight who signed the letter to the members informing them that the 
charges were false. 

22848— 52— pt. 3 15 •'■' '^'-^ *-■' 



924 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Eastland, And he had a hand in whitewashing and con- 
cealing Communist control of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an 
organization which was offering alleged experts in foreign policy to 
the American Government? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. To my great regret, his name was in the list of 
eight informing the members. 

Senator Eastland. Now what about Indonesia? Were you satis- 
fied with Professor Jessup's stand in the United Nations on the Dutch 
Government in Indonesia ? 

Mr. CoLEGROA^. I might sa}'-, in answer to that, that my whole at- 
titude in this matter goes back some years and I was utterly surprised 
that Phil Jessup would accept the chairmanship of the board of 
trustees of the IPR. He is a great international jurist; that is his 
field. He had not made a reputation, had not at that time, in the Far 
East. He had written no articles I know of and no books. He had 
made no special study. So the appointment of Professor Jessup as 
chairman of the IPR. seemed to me at the time to be very peculiar, 
something extraordinary. 

Senator Eastland. Yes ; but then it was extraordinary and in his 
attacks on the Dutch Government and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia 
he followed the Communist line ? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes ; the Communist line for many years has been 
the destruction of the Dutch rule in Indonesia. 

Senator Eastland. Is it your judgment that he went beyond his 
instructions from the State Department to follow the Communist line 
in this instance? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Well, it seemed to me that the speeches that Am- 
bassador Jessup made to the Security Council in December 1948 and 
again in January 1949 against the Dutch Government were very unfair 
and were not the speeches that a scholar should make. There was a 
rumor around the State Department that Ambassador Jessup had 
exceeded his instructions in pressing the Security Council to take 
drastic action against the Dutch. 

I recall a dinner I had with Ambassador Jessup in February of 
1949 at which I said to him that rumors had been to the effect that he 
had exceeded his instructions in the Indonesia affair. Phil Jessup, 
however, denied that had been the case and told me that he had not 
exceeded his instructions. Nevertheless the rumors persisted. 

Senator Eastland. He was following the Communist line ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Well, that is the Communist line. 

Senator Eastland. Now, do you know Edward C. Carter? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; he is a fine, old gentleman. I have always been 
annoyed by Mr. Carter. He is really, let me say, not the type of man 
who should have headed a research institute. 

Senator Eastland. I certainly agree with you. He ought to have 
been on Union Square. 

Now in April of 1945 there were charges that Carter was attempting 
to influence the State Department to force the Generalissimo to take 
the Chinese Communists into his government ; that is true, is it not ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes; those rumors were present and began even 
before that time. 

Senator Eastland. Do you think the board of trustees of the in- 
stitute should have called Carter to rein then ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 925 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was very much disturbed by those rumors. I 
wrote to Raymond Dennett, who was acting as secretary at that time, 
and also I chose him because I knew him very well. I wrote to him 
informing him that the rumors were that Edward Carter and other 
IPR officers had been lobbying for the State Department to force 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his gov- 
ernment and even to share the Chinese govermnent on a 50-50 basis. 
I said I objected very strongly to any officer of the IPE. lobbying this 
way with the State Department and particularly on work that was 
said to have been done by Edward Carter. 

Senator Eastland. Do you not think that Professor Jessup and the 
trustees of the institute should have stopped Carter ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Certainly. I got a letter back saying that Carter 
wasn't doing anything like that but I can hardly believe that letter 
because I think the letter informing me was 

The Chairman. From whom was the letter ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Raymond Dennett, son of Tyler Dennett. Dennett 
at that time was acting as secretary of the IPR. 

Senator Eastland. In that instance were you not disappointed in 
Professor Jessup, that he did not attempt to prevent Carter from 
lobbying with the State Department to force Communists in the 
generalissimo's government ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I was disappointed with the whole board of 
trustees. 

Senator Eastland. Jessup was one of them ? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. Jessup was one of the board of trustees at that 
time. I was disappointed with all of them for not taking these 
rumors and examining them and for not taking action against Carter, 
who I believe unquestionably was lobbying with the State Department. 

Senator Eastland. You believe unquestionr»bly he was lobbying 
with the State Department? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. To force Chiang Kai-shek to put Communists 
in the government? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. You said on a 50-50 basis ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, that was the rumor. 

Senator Eastland. That would have meant a bloodless revolution 
in China? 

Mr. CoLESGROVE. Yes. Whenever the Communists move in, even 
on less than a 50-50 basis, they take over the government in a very 
short time. We have seen that too frequently in Europe. 

Senator Ferguson. We have had great trouble discovering who in 
the State Department prepared the memorandum for General Mar- 
shall when he went out to accomplish that mission. 

Senator Eastland. In fact. Professor Jessup had been close to this 
left-wing group all along, had he not, Lattimore, Field ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Unfortunately that seems to be the case. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to go back to this question of the ex- 
perts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that 
briefing before you were asked to give your opinion ? 

Mr. Colegrove. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the 
very first day and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much 



926 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a confer- 
ence upon the Far East and George Kennan didn't tell us anything 
that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years. 
I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference. 

Senator Ferguson. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was 
to give you some propaganda to take back to the people ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Du Bois 
was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by 
Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in 
the New York Times. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you get an impression from this conference 
on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda, 
that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of 
great leniency at least toward the Connnunists in China ? 

Mr. Colegrove. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this 
respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about his action but the lady 
who briefed you. 

The Chairman. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his 
sentence there. It would be interesting. You said didn't tip its 
hand? 

Mr. Coij:grove. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a 
very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own 
views, but the briefing by Cora Du Bois was a briefing very sympa- 
thetic toward the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Those were the kind of questions that were being 
brought up in the meeting ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when her briefing took place? 

Mr. Colegrove. I think her briefing took place in the second session. 

Senator Ferguson. When was the question discussed on the recog- 
nition of China by the United States ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Curiously enough t^at was discussed in every ses- 
sion but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session. 

Senator Ferguson. How did this lady who briefed you stand on 
that question ? Did she express herself ? 

Mr. Colegrove. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did 
not cover other subjects. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record 
at this time the only document that we have on the reports made at 
this particular conference. That is a text of Lattimore's memoran- 
dum which he himself released during the time of the Foreign Policy 
Committee's investigation of the same subject a year ago. I think it 
is appropriate if we put that in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we mi^ht ask Mr. Colegrove whether or not the views set 
forth there coincide generally with the views that Mr. Lattimore ex- 
pressed at the conference, according to his testimony. 

The Chairman. Have you read this memorandum ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have read this memorandum. 

The Chairman. This that has been handed to the chairman pur- 
ports to be the New York Times of Tuesday, April 4, 1950. It is a 
photostatic copy of certain parts of the New York Times. What is 
it that you want ? How do you identify it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 927 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel will authenticate that 
photostat. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the New York Times of April 
4, 1950, pages 1 and 21, being a news release accompanying the text 
of Lattimore's memorandum on the United States far-eastern policy. 
It says : 

Following is the text of Owen Latimore's memorandum on United States in 
the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August 
and made public today by Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. That is the photostat of the New York Times of the 
morning of 

Mr. Mandel. April 4, 1950. 

Mr. Morris. As such may it be introduced in the record? 

The Chairman. It may be introduced. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 280- A" 
and "Exhibit No. 280-B" and are filed as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 280-A 

[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950] 

Lattimore Bares His Memorandum On Far East Policy — Professor Acts 
After Senator Challenges State Department to Release the Document — 
He Opposed Aid to Chiang But Urged Efforts to Convince Orientals They 
Should Turn to United States and Not Russia 

Washington, April 3. — Prof. Owen Lattimore made public today a secret 
memorandum on proposed far-eastern policy that he had submitted to the State 
Department last August. 

He did so after Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, who 
has accused the Johns Hopkins University professor of being a "top Soviet es- 
pionage agent," demanded that the State Department release the document, or 
"it will be my duty as a United States Senator to do so." 

The State Department said, however, that Mr. Lattimore's views, together 
with those of about 30 other persons, were solicited on a confidential basis, and 
that it had no right to make them public. 

Then a few hours later, Mr. Lattimore, who has called the spy charge "an 
unmitigated lie," released the contents of his memorandum, saying : 

"Senator McCarthy in typical fashion is seeking by insinuation and conceal- 
ment to spread some of the poison of which he has an inexhaustible supply." 

aid for CHIANG OPPOSED 

In the memorandum. Professor Lattimore warned against United States sup- 
port for the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, but recommended efforts 
to convince the far-eastern peoples that it was this counti'y and not the Soviet 
Union to which they should turn. 

Mr. Lattimore bade the State Department "avoid premature or excessive" 
commitment of American resources in the Far East, and said that if there was 
to be war, "it can be won only by defeating Russia — not Northern Korea, or 
Viet Nam, or even China." 

He said that Russia had won gains in the Far East without lessening the 
strength she could "deploy toward Europe" and cautioned against any United 
States assumption that Russia would become so involved in China that she 
would no longer be able to "maneuver in Europe." 

WOULD BAR USE OF JAPAN 

'"It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American 
policy," he said, and "South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the 
interests of the United States." 

"The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai- 
shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of "little Chiang 
Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia," he wrote. 



928 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

In his statement, Senator McCarthy said that the State Department con- 
sidered tlie Lattimore report "so important and of such a confidential nature 
that the American people were not entitled to know its contents." He has been 
arguing that Mr. Lattimore laid down a policy line as a State Department con- 
sultant that aided the Cliinese Communists and "betrayed" the Chinese Na- 
tionalists. 

The Senator had called a press conference for this morning at the Naval 
Medical Center in nearby Bethesda, Md., where he is undergoing treatment for 
a sinus condition. But after about 20 reporters arrived, they were told by 
the commanding officer of the institution, Capt. R. M. Gillett, U. S. N., that Mr, 
McCarthy was "under minor surgical procedure" and could not appear before 
them for interviews and questions. 

Some reporters had intended to ask the Senator whether he wished to repeat 
off the Senate floor, and thus outside his congressional immunity from suit for 
libel, the charges he had made against Professor Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore, head of the Walter Hines Page School of International Eela- 
tions at Johns Ilopkins, has threatened, through his lawyers, to sue Senator 
McCarthy if given an opportunity outside the area of immunity. 

The Senator's statement asserted in substance that Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had not been truthful in saying last week that he believed he had never 
even met Professor Lattimore. 

Mr. McCarthy declared that Drew Pearson, a newspaper columnist and one 
of the Secretary's "very loyal friends," had written in August 1945 that Mr. 
Acheson had arranged for a meeting between the professor and President 
Truman. 

This meeting, Mr. McCai'thy said, was "for the purpose of weaning Truman 
away from the Byrnes-Grew far-eastern policy." (He was referring to former 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and former Under Secretary Joseph C. 
Gi*ew ) . 

"While Lattimore was not unsuccessful in convincing Truman at that par- 
ticular time," the Senator went on, "it is significant that very shortly after- 
ward both Grew and Byrnes left the State Department and the Acheson-Latti- 
more crowd took complete control." 

The Senator coupled with this charge that Secretary Acheson had not con- 
ceded having received the Lattimore memorandum "until after learning that I 
knew the contents." 

JESSUP REPLIES TO CHABGE 

Tonight, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who had been accused by Sen- 
ator McCarthy of "accepting" contributions for the American Council of Institute 
of Pacific Relations from Frederick Vanderbilt Field, denounced this as a false 
"insinuation" that the council was "being paid to peddle the Communist Party 
line." 

Mr. Jessup declared in the first place that he was not, as alleged by Mr. Mc- 
Carthy, largely in control of the organization. At the time in question, 1942 and 
1943, the Ambassador added, its head was Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, president 
of the University of California, and sponsors for a drive for funds included 
Henry Luce, the magazine publisher, and Juan Trippe of Pan-American Airways. 

Mr. Field's contributions of $3,500, Mr. Jessup said, were part of $200,000 
taken up, much of it from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., and 
large industrial concerns. 

Of Messrs. Luce and Trippe, Ambassador Jessup observed : 

"Surely these gentlemen would never have accepted payments from Mr. Field 
or anyone else for 'selling the Communist Party line.' Neither would I if I had 
been in control." 

Senator McCarthy had called Mr. Field a known Communist. 



Exhibit No. 280-B 
[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950] 

Text of Lattimore's Memorandum on United States Far Eastern Policy 

Washington, April 3 (AP). — Following is the text of Owen Lattimore's mem- 
orandum on United States policy in the Far East, drafted for a State Department 
advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore : 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 929 

"In clearing the way for a fresh approach to the problems of United States 
policy in the Far East, several negative statements can usefully be made. 

"1. The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more 
harm than good to the interests of the United States, and no modification of this 
policy seems promising. Chiang Kai-shek was a unique figure in Asia. He is 
now fading into a kind of eclipse that is regrettably damaging to the prestige of 
the United States, because the United States supported him. His eclipse does 
not even leave behind the moral prestige of a good but losing fight in defense of 
a weak cause. 

"On the contrary, he put up the worst possible fight in defense of a cause that 
was originally strong and should have won. The kind of policy that failed in 
support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is 
applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in 
Asia. 

"2. China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade. 
Nothing could be more dangerous for the American interest than to underestimate 
the ability of the Chinese Communists to achieve the minimum level of economic 
stability that will make their regime politically secure. Sound policy should 
allow for a cautious overestimate of the ability of the Chinese Communists in this 
respect, and avoid a rash underestimate. 

'•3. It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American 
policy. There are two alternatives in Japan. The first alternative is to keep 
Japan alive by means of American "blood transfusions' of raw materials and 
credits. Under this alternative Japan can be made to put on the surface appear- 
ance of a strong ally ; but the reality will be an overcommitment of American 
resources to a distant and vulnerable region. 

"Under the second alternative Japan can keep herself alive by coming to terms, 
economically and politically, with its neighbors in Asia, principally China. Under 
this alternative Japan cannot serve as a trusted American ally. Its own interests 
will compel it to balance and bargain between what it can get out of Asia and 
what it can get out of America. 

"4. South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy 
of the United States. It is doubtful how long the present regime in South Korea 
can be kept alive, and mere effort to keep it alive is a bad advertisement, which 
continually draws attention to a band of little and inferior Chiang Kai-shecks 
who are the scorn of the Communists and have lost the respect of democratic 
and would-be democratic groups and movements throughout Asia. 

"5. The colonial and quasi-colonial countries of southeast Asia cannot be forced 
to grant priorities to the economic and military recovery of Europe at the 
expense of their own economic and political interests. In this region as a 
whole there is a rapid development of combined political and military resistance 
to coercion which can be indefinitely sustained by local resources. On the 
other hand, attempts at reconquest by European countries are so expensive that 
they defeat their own ultimate purpose, which is the strengthening of the country 
attempting the reconquest. 

"The situation can now be handled only by convincing the Nationalist leaders 
in those countries that any sacrifices they are asked to make are matched by 
sacrifices made by their former or titular rulers, and are not designed to give 
priority to the interests of these rulers, but to bring joint benefits both to the 
ruling countries and to the colonial country, on terms that satisfy the colonial 
aspiration to equality. 

"6. The United States cannot assume that Russia will move in to take over 
direct control in China, and will thus be subjected to heavy strategic and 
economic strains. It is dangerous to assume that there will be a diversion and 
commitment of Russian resources in Asia which will limit Russian ability to 
maneuver in Europe. Recent developments in the Far East have been favorable 
to Russia, but not in a way that lessens the resources that Russia can deploy 
toward Europe. 

"Policy toward Russia and policy toward the Far East meet at the point where 
such a move as the imposition of an economic cordon sanitaire around China 
is considered. Such a move would increase Chinese dependence on Russia ; but 
it would probably not make it necessary for Russia to undertake a large-scale 
program in China. The Russians would get credit in Asia, multiplied by 
propaganda, for any grants they might make to China, but would probably 
not have to make grants large enough to distort or strain their own resources, 
"It would be possible, therefore, if the mistake is made of waiting for the 
Chinese Communists to come hat in hand to ask for American terms, for United 



930 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

States policy to encounter another set-back in Asia, without even the compensating 
advantage of hampering Russia's ability to apply pressure in Europe. 

"The foregoing statement defines negative aspects of the situation in Asia, 
limiting the freedom of maneuver of United States policy. Within these limita- 
tions, it seems advisable that a number of positive objectives should be defined. 

"1. Policy in the Far East and policy toward Russia have a bearing on each 
other. It certainly cannot yet be said, however, that armed warfare against 
communism in the Far East, on a scale involving a major commitment of Amer- 
ican resources, has become either unavoidable or positively desirable. Nor can 
it be said with any assurance that, in the event of an "armed conflict imdertaken 
for the purpose of forcing Russia back from Europe, the Far East would be an 
optimum field of operation. 

"There are still two alternatives before us — a relatively long peace, or a rapid 
approach toward war. If there is to be war, it can only be won by defeating 
Russia — not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China. Sound policy should 
therefore avoid premature or excessive strategic deployment in the Far East. 

"If there is to be a long peace, the primary factor in making peace possible will 
be a stabilization of relations between the United States and Russia, Sound 
policy should therefore maintain a maximum flexibility. If and when negotiated 
and mutually acceptable agreements with Russia become possible, American 
policy in the Far East should be in a position to contribute to Russo-American 
negotiations. It should not be so mired down in local situations that direct 
American-Russian negotiations are actually hampered. 

"2. Any new departures in United States policy in the Far East must be able 
to fend off any accusation of 'appeasement' of local or Russian communism. 
In view of the effectiveness of the Russian issue as a weapon in in-fighting in 
American party politics, it would seem that the advice of experts on domestic 
politics should be coordinated with the opinions of those who are consulted on 
foreign policy. 

"The dilemma is simple, but not easy to solve; but unless it can be solved, 
no successful United States policy in the Far East is possible. Any United 
States policy that is interpreted in various countries in the Far East as pressure 
applied for the purpose of creating a league against Russia will merely increase 
the ability of those countries to bargain with both the United States and Russia. 

"It will also increase the identification, in those countries, between local 
nationalism and local communism. On the other hand, any proposed United 
States policy in the Far East that is attacked in America itself as a bid for 
better relations with Russia runs the danger of being defeated. 

"3. The success of United States policy in the Far East will be measured 
largely by the contribution that it makes to the recovery of economic relations 
between the Far East and Europe. This^recovery will be possible only if the 
assent and good will of the far eastern countries are won. 

"Assent and real cooperation, in turn, can only be won if the representatives of 
the far-eastern countries, including those that are still technically the subjects 
of European countries, are convinced that they have as direct access to the 
highest American authorities as do the European representatives, and if they are 
convinced that their economic needs and political standards are not being given 
a second priority, lower than that of the European countries involved in the 
same negotiations. 

"The two test cases in southeast Asia on which the leaders of various nation- 
alist movements will rate the difi'erence between what can be attained tlirough 
friendly association with representatives of the United States and what can be 
attained through outright defiance of a European country which has strong 
economic support from the United States are Indonesia and the Viet Nam regime 
under Ho Chi Minh. 

"If the negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians, brought about largely 
through benevolent United States pressure, eventuate in a settlement which 
seems, in Indonesia, to contain too much of hope deferred, while the resistance 
in Indochina under Ho Chi Minh achieves more and more of hope fulfilled, 
the results throughout southeast Asia will be adverse to the United States in- 
terest. 

"Heavy and primary United States commitments in Western Europe makes 
it diflicult to bear constantly in mind that when the Dutch-Indonesian negotia- 
tions are consummated, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of popular opinion in 
Indonesia, will have wider repercussions tlian the satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
of Dutch public opinion. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 931 

"It is a fact, nevertheless, that Indonesian opinion is more difficult to satisfy 
than Dutch opinion, and it is also a fact that the rei^ercussions will be more 
serious if Indonesian opinion is not satislied than if Dutch opinion is not satis- 
fied. These facts mark an important difference between prewar and postwar 
colonial Asia. They are facts that Americans fully accepted; but they are 
also facts that are critical for the formulation of an over-all United States 
policy in Asia. 

"4. The foregoing considerations indicate that the major aim of United States 
policy in the Far East should be to convince the countries of the Far East that 
they can get along well with the United States and with the countries of 
Western Europe. They must be persuaded that they can get along well because 
of the mutual benetits to themselves, to the United States, and to "Western Eu- 
rope. 

"They must not be made to suspect that the real aim of the United States 
is an ulterior aim of using them against Russia. 

To put it in another way, the aim of the United States policy should be to 
enable the countries of the Far East to do without Russia to the maximum ex- 
tent. 

This is a much more modest aim than an insistence on and organization of 
hostility to Russia ; but it is an attainable aim, and the other is not. 

"A few suggestions for implementation are appended. 

"1. Conferences with tlie independent governments of the Far East, on 
the basis of helping them to build their own economies, to revive their trade 
with Europe, and to expand their trade with us. Emphasis on positive steps 
that can be taken. No negative conditions, such as prohibitions of trade with 
Russia or Communist China ; no conditions that could be interpreted as Amer- 
ican regulation of their political parties. 

"2. Working relations, and a refusal to be bound by a protocol, with legitimate 
nationalist leaders in countries whose full political aspirations have not been 
met by their European rulers. 

"3. The United States should not allow any European country, in its relations 
with any country in the Far Elast, to state openly or to imply by propaganda 
that its iwlicy is 'backed by the United States.' European representatives, in 
negotiating with the representatives of countries in Asia, should be discouraged 
from stating or implying that they are authoritative interpreters of United 
States policy, or intermediaries without whom the United States cannot be 
approached. 

"4. It should be made clear that if there is delay or difficulty In establishing 
relations between the United States and Communist-controlled countries, such as 
China, the trouble comes from the Communist side and not from the United 
States side. 

"5. It should be made clear that friendly and beneficial relations with the 
United States depend essentially on the inherent friendliness or unfriendliness 
of the nation concerned, and not on the formalities of diplomatic recognition. 
In order to facilitate the contrast between countries which are on friendly terms 
with the United States and countries which are not, the number of countries 
formally recognized by the United States should be increased. 

"As a first step, tlie United States should accept the list of countries recom- 
mended for admission to the United Nations by Mr. Tryg\'e Lie, Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. In the first place, it would at this time be a 
good move for the United States to accept with good will an initiative from 
the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the second place, the list is on balance 
more favorable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. In the third place, 
and with particular reference to the Far East, the move would bring within the 
scope of United States diplomatic activity the Mongolian People's Republic 
(Outer Mongolia), an increasingly important potential listening-post country 
in the heart of Asia. 

"6. The United States should disembarrass itself as quickly as possible of its 
entanglements in South Korea." 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the views expressed by Latti- 
more in the record ? 

Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes. 

The Chairman. You say you have read this ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, I have read that memoranda. That memo- 
randa covers many of the points that Mr. Lattimore made in the con- 



932 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ference. The memoranda among other things calls for liquidation 
of American responsibilities in Korea. That was a point which Mr. 
Lattimore made during the conference. This was in October 1949. 
Professor Lattimore took the position of prompt recognition of Red 
China. He was very careful to say we should bargain with them 
when we were doing it, but nevertheless we should recognize them. 

Professor Lattimore was opposed to dividing economic aid in Asia. 
He wanted to give economic aid to Communist countries equally with 
non-Communist countries. 

Mr. Morris. Did you hear expressed at the conference, Professor, 
a sentiment as to the disposition of Formosa ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Governor Stassen made a very strong appeal to de- 
fend Formosa to the letter. I said something on that subject myself. 
I particularly commended the acceptance of General MacArthur's 
concept of what is now called the MacArthur line, namely from Ko- 
rea, Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines, and around to Hawaii. 

Senator Ferguson. Doctor, do you know that on October 26, if that 
is the exact date, 1949, the State Department sent a message to the 
Nationalist government in China notifying them they would not give 
them any more military aid? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien did you learn that ? 

Mr. CoLEGRO\"E. I didn't learn that until I saw that in the news- 
papers. 

Senator Ferguson. That was after this meeting? 

Mr. Colegrove. That was shortly after this meeting. 

Senator Ferguson. So the policy was really laid down before you 
went to this meeting as far as Formosa was concerned ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, with respect to Formosa and 
breaking the so-called MacArthur line they were therefore aiding 
the Communists of China ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. Specifically^ Governor Stassen has spent a 
good deal of time on maintaining Formosa and I believe — I am speak- 
ing without any record here — I believe that Joseph Ballantine said 
something on that subject that is favorable to holding Formosa. 

Mr, Morris. Professor, did General Marshall attend that confer- 
ence ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes, General Marshall was present at every session. 
He was one of the first ones there. 

Mr. Morris. Did he take part in this discussion at all ? 

Mr. Colegrove. No. General Marshall sat in the same seat at the 
end of the room, not at the conference table, about 5 feet from the 
end of the conference table, opposite Ambassador Jessup. 

Mr. Morris. And was he sitting near Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Colegrove. He was about 5 feet away from Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Did he hear Owen Lattimore express his views on 
those occasions? 

Mr. Colegrove. I assume he heard Owen Lattimore talk the 13 or 
14 times. 

Mr. Morris. Thirteen or fourteen times Lattimore spoke? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now could you testify whether or not Rosinger had 
an active part in this conference ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 933 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Not as active a part as Owen Lattimore. He spoke 
probably six times, and all of his speeches, his comments, were very 
favorable to Red China. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that we 
have had testimony in the past that Benjamin Kizer and John K. Fair- 
bank, whom Professor Colegrove has included with this group domi- 
nated by Lattimore, to the effect that both of those were members of 
the Communist Party also. 

How many times did you speak at that conference, Professor Cole- 
grove ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I believe I spoke about 8, 9, or 10 times. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in view of the line of questioning 
developed by Senator Eastland on the importance of the actual prepa- 
ration of the letter of transmittal on the white paper, I was wonder- 
ing if you thought it necessary that we should ask the State Depart- 
ment for the facts behind that letter of transmittal. 

The Chairman. I shall be very glad to write a letter. I may not 
be able to get any more information than I have, however. 

Senator Ferguson. I move, Mr. Chairman, that you do write a 
letter, that we keep on trying, because I thinly this is so vital to the 
Congress and to the people that we should not be discouraged. 

Professor Colegrove, have you anything further to say about the 
letter of transmittal ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I objected to that letter of transmittal because of 
the bland statement that the white paper had given all of the evidence 
and presented a very unbiased view of it. It was very obvious that 
it had not given all the evidence. Even the Wedemeyer report was 
slightly expurgated as published by the State Department. All rec- 
ords as to Korea were pulled out of that report and it did not have 
the Wallace report in it. I felt that the State Department had glossed 
over the trouble between the State Department and General Hurley. 
They had not given both sides of that story. 

What I objected most strongly to in the letter of transmittal was the 
argument that the letter made in favor of our policy, favored by with- 
drawing help to Chiang Kai-shek, and glossing over what help we had 
given the Chinese Reds, and in particular that paragraph at the end 
where the State Department sums up, in which it says that the United 
States Government had done everything that was possible to save the 
Nationalist government and that the United States had left undone 
everything that would have been helpful to Red China. 

Senator Eastland. Do you not really think there was a conspiracy 
by people in the State Department to throw China to the Communists ? 

Mr. Colegrove. I have been of that opinion for quite a while. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, have you testified to the best of 
your ability on the question that arose at the conference we have been 
discussing on the possibility of sending economic aid alike to Com- 
munist and non-Communist countries? Is there anything more you 
can testify to on that score ? 

Mr. Colegrove. At least four members took strongly the position 
that no economic aid — of course no military aid — should be given to 
Communist countries in Asia. That would include Governor Stassen, 
myself, Mr. Brodie, and Mr. Ballantine. 

Mr. Morris. You say you four took opposition to that ? 

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. 



934 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Yourself, Mr. Brodie, Mr. Ballantine, and Governor 
Stassen ? 

The Chairman. In other words, the four whom you mentioned, in- 
cluding yourself, took the position that aid should go to Nationalist 
China? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes ; and in no way to Red China. 

The Chairman. Now the other group ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. The other group took the position that economic aid 
should go to to Communist and non-Communist countries alike. 

Senator Jenner. Wliat was their argument for that ? 

Mr. CoLEGROVE. Their argument, curiously enough, was this : That 
if we gave aid only to non-Communist countries, Soviet Russia would 
use this as propaganda, saying we were imperialistic, that we were 
trying to guide the affairs of Asia and be very effective propaganda 
against it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show the diffi- 
culty the witness would have without the benefit of the transcript 
which he requested be made available during the testimony. 

Tlie Chairman. Wliat transcript ? 

Mr. Morris. The transcript of the proceedings about which we are 
taking testimony. 

The Chairman. You want the record to show that the witness is 
testifying from memory because the transcript is not available; is 
that correct? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, and that Professor Colegrove did ask 
before testifying that he be aided by the transcript in the course of 
his testimony. 

The Chairman. Very well, the record will so show. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions? 

Senator Ferguson. As a committee, I think we should take up this 
question of getting aid from the executive branch of the Government. 
Here is a good example that if the committee had, in executive session 
at least, this transcript which we are asking witnesses to come up and 
testify on several years later, that we would be aided in the solution 
of the problem that we have before us, which is a very important 
problem; and while some of the members of the committee may get 
discouraged that we are not being given the aid that we should have, 
and we certainly are not, I think the Chair should keep after this 
information. 

For instance, I can cite another example that was not brought up 
here. That is where the question came up as to Fred Field trying to 
become an officer in the OSS of the United States Government. When 
we tried to get who were his sponsors and who recommended him, 
and so forth, all we could get from the military authorities even was 
the memorandum as to his physical examination. Now that is the 
only thing. I would say if anything was to be kept from the com- 
mittee, that is the one thing that they must have held out, his physical 
examination, because that could have shown things that probably did 
not concern the IPR, but certainly the other items in the report were 
of ffreat value to this committee in the solution of this problem. 

So I hope that the Chair will keep after this, because I think that 
the time will come when public opinion in America will have some- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 935 

thing to say on this, and we should have this information before the 
Congress and the people. 

The Chairman. I want to say, Senator, that the Chair does not get 
discouraged when it is pursuing a course for the protection of this 
Government of ours. This committee has pursued that course with 
diligence and will continue to pursue it with diligence. We will ask 
for every aid that we think we might be able to get from any of the 
executive branches of the Government or from any other source that 
is at all authentic. To that end we will persist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, our witness for tomorrow will be Ray- 
mond Dennett, who was the secretary of the American Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in 1944 and 1945. 

The Chairman. Very well. We stand in recess until tomorrow at 
10 o'clock. 

(The hearing recessed at 12 noon until 10 o'clock, Wednesday, Sep- 
tember 26, 1951.) 



22848— 52— pt. 3^ 1& 



INDEX 



(Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organi- 
zation in this index.) 

A 

Page 

Acheson, Dean 716, 717, 718, 719, 

722, 723, 724, 729, 730, 858, 859, 899, 902, 903, 904, 917, 918, 920, 928 

Adams, Eva B 903,904 

Agriculture Department {See United States Department of Agriculture.) 
Air Force. (See United States Air Force.) 

Allen, Captain 713 

Allen, Riley H 712, 713 

Allied Powers 728, 732, 733, 734, 738, 739, 741, 745, 784, 793, 812, 828, 901, 912 

Allison, John 723 

AMCO 712 

Amerasia 714, 788, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 915, 918 

American & Foreign Power Co 901 

American Broadcasting System 757 

American Committee for International Studies 910 

American Federation of Labor 884 

American Government. (See United States Government.) 

American Journal of International Law 90Q 

American labor 706, 707 

American lend-lease 826 

American Mission to Japan 752 

American Peace Mobilization 861,862,863 

American Political Science Review 906 

American Red Cross 857, 901 

American ReiJublic Affairs 743 

American-Russian Institute 768, 769, 857 

American White Paper 922, 933 

Anderson, Mr 904 

Andrews, Clark 757, 758, 750, 761, 762, 763 

Angus, Prof. H. F— 768, 770 

Armed Forces Radio Service 736, 757, 759 

Armed Services. (See United States Army.) 

Army Intelligence 779, 843, 844, 849, 860 

Army War College 900 

Asiaticus. (See Hans Moeller.) 

Associated Telephone Services 712 

Atherton, Franli C 713 

Atlantic Cliarter 815 

Attlee, Prime Minister 732, 733 

Austern, Miss Hilda 768, 769, 863 

AVCO 775 

B 

Baillargeon 712 

Balier, Newton D 890 

Ballantine, Joseph W 704, 708, 900, 921, 932, 933, 934 

Banlsers Trust Co. (New York City) 901 

Barnes, Joseph 856, 857, 858, 850, 860 

Barnett, Eugene E 712, 713, 723 



II INDEX 

Pag:* 
Barrett, David D ^ 785 

Barton, Edward 722 

Bassett, Arthur 857 

Bates, Searle 857 

Bean, Louis 857 

Beria 869 

Berle, Adolpli A., Jr 857, 893 

Beukema, Col. Herman 857 

Biddle, Attorney General Francis 861, 863 

Big Four 786, 825 

Binder, Carroll 857 

Biographical Register. (See State Department, Biographical Register.) 

Bissell, General 859 

Bisson, T. A 888, 890, 891, 901 

Blakeslee, Dr 708 

Board of Economic Warfare 857 

Bolsheviks 880, 887, 889, 894 

Borton, Hugh 708' 

Bowman, Dr. Isaiah 707 

Braden, Spruille 743 

Briggs, Ellis O 743 

Brodie, Bernard 900, 921, 933 

Brookings Institute 900 

Browder, Earl 826, 888, 902, 903 

Brownell, Herbert 839 

Buck, Pearl S 713 

Budenz 839 

Bunche, Ralph 857 

Burden, W. A. M 858, 859 

Bureau of the Budget 857 

Buss Claude A 900 921 

Byrnes, James fZI ZI__IZZI__~722, 723, 724, 726, 727,'731, 738, 745, 746, 928 

C 

Cairo Conference 816 

Cairo Declaration 734 

Calkins, Robert D 712, 713 

Cambridge University 714 

Canadian Foreign Service 749 

Canadian Government 749 

Carlson z 793 

Carnegie Corp 857, 916, 928 

Carter, Edward C ^ 711, 769, 837, 838, 

839, 840, 856, 857, 862, 863, 888, 890, 891, S92, 896-905, 915, 924, 925 

Case, Everett 917 

Central Executive Committee (Chinese) 809 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 840 

Century Club 889 

Chamberlain, Joseph P 713 

Chancellor, Christopher 839, 840 

Chapman, Mrs. Ralph 713 

Charles, Allan E 713 

Chemical Bank (New York City) • 753 

Chen, Han-seng 786, 809, 817 

Clien, Dr. K. P 786,809,817 

Chen, Peng 812 

Chen Yi 812 

Chen Yun 812 

Chio, Chao-ting ("Hansu Chan") 907,915 

Chicago Daily News 857 

Chicago University 715, 720, 901 

China Aid Council 888 

China Lantern , 835 

Chinese Army 779, 812, 813, 814, 820, 824, 826 

Chinese black marketeers 719 

Chinese Central Government 785, 795, 805, 806, 808, 809, 812, 816, 817, 828 



INDEX III 

Page 

Chinese Government (coalition) 804,^806,^813 

Chinese Nationalist Government '•'09, 711, 

732, 733, 772, 771, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 790, 792, 794, 
798, 801, 803, 807, 820, 827, 828, 829, 833, 851, 886, 917, 922, 925, 

927, 928, 929, 932, 933, 934. 

Chinese Republic 801 

Chinese revolution 876 

Chou En-lai 792,800,812,913 

Chu Hsueh-fen 825 

Churchill, Winston 731, 811, 828 

Chu Teh 812 

CIA. (-S^ee Central Intelligence Agency.) 

Cincinnati University 901 

CIO. ( See Congress of Industrial Organizations. ) 

Citif of Flint (steamship) 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896 

Civil Service Commission. {See United States Civil Service Commission.) 

Clapper, Raymond 857 

Clayton, Will 858, 859 

Coe, Frank 858, 859, 860 

Colegrove, Kenneth W 712, 900, 905-935 

Columbia University 857, 858, 860, 861, 863, 890, 891, 892, 901, 905, 920 

Comintern 805, 865, 867, 868, 881, 888 

Commerce Department. (See United States Department of Commerce.) 

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 771, 772 

Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate 896, 898 

Communist International 864, 865, 866, 867, 871, 883 

Communist International (Anglo-American Secretariat) 865,866 

Communist International (Fifth Congress) 876 

Communist International (Second Congress) 873,874 

Communist International (Sixth World Congress) 869,886 

Communist International (South America) 865 

Communist Manifesto 797 

Communist Party (China) First National Congress 812 

Communist Party (China) Second National Congress 812 

Communist Party (China) Third National Congress 812 

Communist Party (China) Fourth National Congress 812 

Communist Party (China) Fifth National Congress 812 

Communist Party 706, 

707, 711, 716, 718, 744, 746-752, 754, 758, 760, 763, 764, 766, 770, 
778, 779, 781-784, 786-788, 790-792, 794-809, 811-819, 821, 822, 
825-828, 833, 835, 839, 844-847, 852, 854, 856, 859-861, 864-872, 
874, 876-882, 884-888, 913-914, 915, 919, 920, 922-926, 928-934. 

Communist Party (China) 747, 

759, 763, 765, 778, 779, 781-784, 786-788, 790-792, 794-809, 811- 
819, 821, 822, 825-828, 833, 835, 844, 845-847, 852, 854, 856, 864- 
870, 871, 874, 8S0, 881, 886-888, 913, 916, 919, 920, 921, 924, 926, 

928, 929, 931-934. 

Communist Party (China) Sixth National Congress 812 

Communist Party (China) Seventh National Congress 812 

Communist Party (Indonesia) : 877 

Communist Party (Japan) 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 752, 904, 914 

Communist Party (New York district) 865, 881 

Communist Party (Russia) 781, 794, 892, 930 

Communist Party (South America) 865, 866 

Communist Party (United States) 705,866,867,883,902 

Communist Political Association 706, 707 

CondlifEe, J. B 768, 770 

Congress. {See United States Congress.) 

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 884 

Connally 706, 707 

Coons, Arthur G : 712, 859, 900 

Coordinating Committee. (See State, War, and Navy Coordinating Com- 
mittee.) 

Coordinator of Information 857 

Counter-intelligence ( SCAP) 749 

Cowles, Gardner 857 



IV INDEX 

CPA. (See Communist Political Association.) Page 

Cripps Mission 909, 910 

Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford 909, 910 

Currie, Lauchlin 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 902 

D 

Dabney, Virginius 858, 859 

DaFoe, Dr. I. W 768, 769 

Daily Worlier 754, 902, 915 

Davidson, Captain 735 

Davies, John P 776, 778, 785, 794, 795, 797, 804, 806, 828 

Davies, Joseph 857, 903 

Davies, Lieutenant Colonel 748, 753 

Davis, Elmer 729, 730, 839 

Davis, Joseph S 713 

DeCaux, Len 713, 858, 859, 860 

Decker, John W 900 

Democratic Party 797, 833, 836, 837 

Dennery, M. Etienne 768, 770 

Dennett, Raymond 858, 859, 925, 935 

Dennett, Tyler 857, 925 

Denuison, Capt. R. L 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743 

Department of Defense 843 

Derevyanko, Maj. Gen. Kuzma 746 

Des Moines Register & Tribune 857 

Dickover, Earl 708 

Dillingham, W. F 713 

DoUard, Charles 857 

Dooman, Eugene H 70.3-754 

Du Bois, Cora 922, 926 

Duke of Devonshire 909 

Dunn, James 704, 717, 737 

Durbrow, Eldridge 709, 710, 760 

Dutch Government 924 

E 

Earle, Edward Meade 911 

Eastman, Max 838 

Ecole des Sciences Politiques 768, 770 

Eighth IPR Conference 850, 856, 858 

Eighth Route Army ^ 812, 814 

Eisler, Gerhardt 866 

Ellsworth 862 

Embree, Edwin R 712, 713 

Emeny, Brooks 713, 857 

Emeny, Mrs. Brooks : 713 

Emerson, Rupert 857, 858, 859 

Emmerson, John Kenneth 746, 748, 749, 753, 776, 778, 830, 903, 904 

En-lai, Chou 792, 800, 812, 913 

Epstein, Israel 709, 711 

European Commission 722 

Executive Department 899 

Export-Import Bank 839 

P 
Fahs, C. B 857 

Fairbank, John K 712, 750, 751, 900, 920, 921, 933 

Fail-banks, Douglas, Jr 731, 732, 734 

Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miss Elsie 839, 840 

Farbenindustrie, I. G 740 

Far East Area Committee 714 

Far East Command 841, 843, 844, 845, 847, 848, 849, 851, 854, 856, 859, 860 

Far East Commission 721, 722, 746, 922 

Far East Subcommittee. {See State, War, and Navy Coordinating 

Committee.) 
Far East Advisory Commission 738 



INDEX V 

Page 

Far Eastern Affairs "^^^ 

Far Eastern Series 800, 804, 808 

Far Eastern Survey 712, 754, 788, 911 

Far Eastern University 867, 8G8 

Farley, Miriam S 901 

Fascist Party 707, 713, 723, 731, 740, 772, 815 

Fnymonville, Col. Carl 858, 859 

FBI. {See Federal Bureau of Investisation.) 
FI5A. {See Foreign Economic Administration.) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 761, 763, 764, 765, 840 

Federal Communications Commission 758 

Federal Govei-nmcnt. {See United States Government.) 

Federal Reserve Bank 858 

Field, Edith 862 

Field, Frederick V 713, 850, 857-860, 862, 863, 896-898, 907, 925, 928, 934 

Fifth IPR Conference 850 

Fifth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

First National Bank (Portland, Oreg.) 901 

First National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

Fisher, Galen M 712,713 

Fisher, Sterling — 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744 

Fly, James Lawrence 758, 764 

Fo, Sun 821 

Foreign Affairs Council (Cleveland) 857 

Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 858,859 

Foreign Policy Association 890, 891 

Foreign Policy Committee 926 

Foreic:n Service. (See United States Foreign Service.) 

Foreign Service Act of 1946 709,710,760 

Forrestal, Secretary 729 

Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired) 843-864 

Fosdick, Dr 917, 918 

Foss, Charles Burton 912 

Fourth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

Fourth Route Army 812, 813, 814 

Franco 781 

Free Cliina Labor League 766 

Freeman, Mansfield 858, 859 

Freeman, R. E 858, 859 

Friedman, Julian 70S, 709, 

710, 711, 714, 755, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 771, 772 

Fu-chen, Li 812 

Fuchu Prison 748, 749, 753 

Fuller 712 

G 
Gainard, Capt. Joseph A 892, 893, 894 

Gates, Artemus 737 

Gauss, Clarence E 829, 839 

General Electric Corp 858 

George, Harrison 888 

German War College 835 

Gestapo ^ 818, 825 

Gilchrist. Huntington 713 

•Gilland. ( See M. Giran. ) 

Gillett, Capt. R. M 928 

Giran, M 748, 753 

Gohol, Mr 908 

Goshal, Kumar 712 

Grady, Henry F 713, 857 

Grnjdanzev, Andrew 901 

Graves, Kizer & Graves 900 

Graves, Mortimer 712, 713, 900 

Green, Jerome 712, 713 

Greene, Miss 862 

Greenslade, Admiral l 712, 713 



VI INDEX 

Page 

Greenwood 712 

Grew, Joseph C 704, 705, 715, 716, 717, 718, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 733, 914, 928 

Gruelling, Ernest H 857 

Gulick, Luther H 857 

H 

Hackworth, Green H 893 

Hamaguchi 729 

Hankow-Canton Railway 827 

Han-seng, Gen. Chen 915 

Hart, Senator ^ 839 

Harvard University 714, 758, 760, 764, 900, 901, 905, 920 

Hayden, J. R ^ 857 

Herald Tribune, New York 744, 745, 891, 892 

Hern, General 779 

Herod, W. R 857, 900 

Higashi-Kuni Cabinet 739 

Hilldring, Gen. John H 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743 

Hirohito, Emperor 705, 706, 713, 716, 725, 727, 728, 731, 736, 738, 739, 751, 914 

Hiss, Alser 857, 858, 859, 860 

Hitler, Adolph 835, 891 

Hobson 823 

Ho Chi Minh 930 

Hod^'ekinson, Sarah 763, 764, 765 

Hoffman, Paul 713, 753 

Holcombe, Arthur N 900 

Holland, W. L 768, 769, 862, 863, 898, 903, 918 

Ho Lung 812 

Hoover, Herbert 706, 707 

Hopkins 788 

Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K 754, 857 

House Appropriations Committee 890 

House of Lords 909 

Hsiang-chien, Hsu 812 

Hsueh-fen, Chu 825 

Hsu Hsiang-chien 812 

Huggins, G. Ellsworth 712, 713 

Hulen, Bertram D 893 

Hull, Cordell 893 

Hull, General 831 

Humelsine, Carlisle H -' 903 

Huntington Library 712 

Hurley, Patrick J 798, 828, 829, 830, 839, 933 

I 

Indian National Congress 910 

Institute for Advanced Study 911 

Institute of Pacific Relations 709, 710, 711, 712, 747, 751, 

753, 754, 765. 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 787, 788, 789, 836, 837, 838, 
850, 856, 858, 859, 861, 862, 863, 864, 883, 886, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 
896, 901, 906, 908, 909, 911, 916, 918, 920, 923, 924, 925, 928, 934, 935 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 711, 

753, 754, 788, 836, 850, 858, 861, 862, 863, 864, 886, 901, 928, 935 

Institue of Pacific Relations (Eighth Conference) 850,856,858 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Fifth Conference) 850 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Ninth Conference) 709, 710, 850, 856, 897, 898 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 768, 769, 850, 858, 859 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference) 890 

Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro) 743 

International General Electric Co 857,900 

International Labor Office Conference 825 

International Missionary Council 857, 900 

International Press Correspondence 869, 871 

International Secretariat (IPR) 711,768,788 

Iowa State University 905 

IPR. (See Institute of Pacific Relations.) 

Isaac, Harold 748, 749, 753 



INDEX vn 

J Pasre 

Jackson, Justice 740 

Jaffe, Philip J 907, 908, 909, 910, 911 

Japanese- Americans 742 

Japanese Army 734, 738, 805, 811 

Japanese Emperor. (See Hirohito.) 

Japanese Government 719, 722, 728, 733, 738, 739, 741 

Japanese industrialists. (See Zaibatsu.) 

Japanese Navy 738 

Japanese Peace Treaty ; 919, 920 

Jen Pi-shih 812 

Jessup, Pliilip C 712, 

713, 768, 769, 844, 845, 846, 847, 851, 852, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 
860, 861, 862, 864, 889, 890, 891, 892, 896, 897, 899, 917, 918, 919, 920, 
921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 928, 932, 

Jinnah, Mr 910 

Johns Hopkins University 707, 900, 927, 928 

Johnson, Mr 753 

Johnson, Col. Dana 727 

Johnson, Nelson 922 

Johnston, Eric 858, 859 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 737, 782, 859 

Jonathan, Nelson T 721 

K 

Kai-shek, Chiang 706, 

731, 732, 771, 772, 775, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 792, 793, 
794, 795, 796, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 805, 806, 807, 808, 811, 
812, 817, 822, 823, 824, 825, 828, 839, 848, 851, 852, 866, 880, 923, 
925, 927, 929, 933. 

Kai-shek, Madam Chiang 827 

Kang, Kao 812 

Kang Sheng 812 

Kao Kang 812 

Kaufman, James Lee 721, 722 

Kampai (political police) 738 

Kennan, George 925, 926 

Kerr, John H 890 

Kilner, E. B 712 

Kirk, Alexander C 893, 894 

Kirk, Grayson 858, 859 

Kizer, Benjamin H 713, 857, 858, 859, 860, 900, 921, 933 

Kohlberg, Alfred 712, 923 

Kornfeder, Joseph Zack 864-896 

Kremlin 782, 783, 799, 804, 805, 834, 887, 907, 914, 916, 919, 920 

Kung, H. H 825 

Kuni 739 

Kuomintang government 706, 

707, 711, 772, 780, 781, 782, 783, 785, 786, 787, 789, 790, 791, 792, 
793, 795, 796, 797, 800, 805, 806, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 913, 815, 
816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 866, 877, 
879, 880, 886, 917. 
Kuroda, Andrew Y 748, 752 

L 

Lamont, Corliss 836. 837, 838 

Lamont, Thomas W 836, 837, 838 

Lane, Clayton 837, 838, 911 

Lasker, Bruno 864 

Lattimore, Eleanor 864, 886, 888 

Lattimore, Owen ^ 704, 

705, 707, 711, 713, 714, 715, 716, 720, 723, 724, 725, 726, 730, 731, 750, 
751, 752, 838, 839, 858, 859, 860, 888, 900, 912, 913, 914, 915, 919, 920, 
921, 922, 923, 925, 926, 927, 928, 931, 932, 933. 

Lawrence, David 834 

Lawyers Club (New York City) 892 



Vni INDEX 

Page 

Lenin 771, 865, 869, 884 

T.enin School (Moscow) 865, 86S 

Library of Congress 747, 748, 752 

Lie, Trygve 031 

Li Fu-clien 812 

Lincoln, General 831 

Lin Po-hn 812 

Lin Yu-tans- 827 

Lippmann, Walter 858, 859 

Li Sliao-Chi 812 

Lochliead, Archie 857 

Lockwood, William W 856, 857, 908, 909, 910, 911 

Loomis, Charles F 713 

Los Anjreles committee 712 

Loyalty Security Board 784, 788. 789, 793, 807 

Lubin, I 857 

Luce, Henry R 718, 728, 788, 827, 857, 928 

I/udden, Raymond 776, 811, 828, 830, 903 

I-udlam, Kennedy 743 

Lung, Ho 812 

Mc 

McCann, Colonel 926 

McCarthy, Joseph R 927, 928 

McCloy, John J 723, 729, 731, 737 

McConaughy, James L 712, 713 

McCoy, General 859 

McCoy, Frank R 713 

McFall, Jack K 900, 902, 917 

McLaughlin, Mrs. A 713 

McLaughlin, Emma 712 

M 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 717, 719, 720, 736, 737, 738, 739, 741, 742, 

743, 744, 745, 746, 749, 752, 777, 794, 832, 835, 849, 859, 901, 912, 932 

MacKay, J. A 858, 859 

Mackinder 911 

MacLeish, Archibald 729 

MacNaughton, Ernest B 901 

Mandel, William 7- 766, 767, 768, 789, 770 

Manhattan Center 863 

Mao Tse-tung 782, 800, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 844, 845, 846, 852, 913, 914 

Marceuse. {See M. Marukyusu.) 

Marquess of Crewe 909 

Marshall, Gen. George C 729, 730, 732, 733, 797, 831, 832, 833, 835, 901, 925, 932 

Martin, Charles E 712, 713 

Marukyusu, M 748, 753 

Marx, Karl 771, 783, 797, 835, 869, 870, 884, 885, 913 

Massing, Mrs. Hede 837 

Mattusch, Kurt R 908 

Merritt, General 848 

Metcalfe, John C 744, 745 

Mikado. {Hee Hirohito.) 

Mikhailovitch 784, 787, 852 

Millikan, Dr 712 

Mills College 712 

Minh, Ho Chi 930 

Minnesota University 901 

Mirkovic, Gen. Bor . 852 

Mitchell, Kate 712, 768, 769, 908, 911 

Mitsubishi 740 

Mitsui 740 

Moeller, Hans "Asiaticus" 915 

Moffat, Abbot Low 858, 859 

Molyneaux, Peter 857 

Mongolian Peoples Republic 931 



INDEX IX 

Page 

Mont Tremblant 850, 856, 858, 897 

Moore, Harriett L 857 

Moore, R. Walton 893 

Morgan, J. P., & Co 836 

Morisou, George Abbot 712, 713, 858, 859 

Morniacsun (steamship) 891, 892 

Morris, Lawrence 712, 713 

Moscow Government 894 

Moscow Trials 889, 890 

Moscow University 868 

Motylev, Dr. V. E 891, 892 

Mountbatten, Lord Louis 776 

Mudd, Harvey 712 

Murphy, J, Moi-den 901 

MVD 869 

N 

Nathan, Robert 857 

Nation 714 

National Board (Communist Political Association) 707 

National Broadcasting Co. (-See NBO University of the Air.) 

National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief 858 

National defense. {See Department of Defense.) 

National Resources Planning Board 857 

National Salvationists 821 

National Shinto (Japanese) 736, 742 

Nationalist Chinese Government. {See Chinese Nationalist Government.) 

Naval Medical Center ( Bethesda ) 928 

Navy. {See United States Navy.) 

Navy Department 704-707, 717, 731, 734, 736, 737, 743, 824 

Nazis 733, 742, 835 

NBC University of the Air 736, 743 

New Republic 714 

News Week 721, 748, 753 

New York Herald Tribune 744, 745, 891, 892 

New York Times 892, 893, 922, 926, 927, 928 

New York World-Telegram 764, 765 

Nimitz, Admiral 777 

Ninth IPR Conference 709, 710, 850, 856, 897, 898 

Norman, Dr. Herbert 748, 749, 753 

Northwestern University 900, 905, 909, 910, 911, 923 

Nosaka. (-See Susumo Okano.) 

Notestein, Mrs. A 713 

Notestein, Adam Comstock 858, 859 

O 
Occidental College 900 

Office of Price Administration ( OPA) 857 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 747,912,934 

Office of Strategic Services (Far Eastern Division) 912 

Office of Strategic Services (Japan section) 912 

Office of War Information (OWI) 729, 730, 751, 766, 825, 826, 839, 912, 914 

Okano, Susumo 747 

OPA. (See Office of Price Administration.) 
OSS. (-See Office of Strategic Services.) 

Oumansky, Constantine 603, 685, 686, 889 

OWI. ( -See Office of War Information. ) 

Oxford University 714 

P 

Pacific Affairs 911 

Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission 857 

Pacificus 714 

Page, Walter Hines. ( -See Walter Hines Page School. ) 

Pan American Airways 928 

Pan-Pacific Union 883 



X INDEX 

Page 

Paris Peace Conference . 746 

Parker, Philo W 713, 862 

Parsons, Reginald 712 

Pauley, Ambassador 750, 753 

Pauley Report 750, 753 

Peake, Cyrus 916 

Pearson, Drew 928 

Peffer, Nathaniel 901, 920 

Pence, Captain 859 

Peng, Chen 812 

Pennfield, James 722 

Pennsylvania University 901 

Pentagon 729, 733 

Pen, Tah-huai 812 

Peoples Political Council (China) 785, 809, 817 

Peoples Volunteer Corps 812, 813, 814 

Perkins, Milo 857 

Peter, King 784, 787 

Piao, Lin 792 

Pi-shih, Jen : 812 

PM 714 

Po-hu, Lin 812 

Politburo. (See National Board, Communist Political Association.) 

Political Affairs 706 

Potsdam Declaration 731, 782 

Powell, J. B 838 

Pravda 802 

Psychological Warfare Department 727, 731, 734 

Q 
Quigley, Harold S 901 

R 
Radio City 743 

Radio Institute of America 762 

Readers' Digest 838 

Reber, Miles 840 

Reischauer, Edwin O 901, 920 

Republican Party 784, 797, 827, 833, 836, 837, 839 

Reuters 839,840 

Rhetts 788 

Riefler, Winfield 857 

Robertson, William S 901 

Rockefeller Brothers' Fund 901 

l^ockefeller Foundation 858, 916, 928 

Rockefeller, John D., Ill 901 

Rogers, Mrs. Dorothy 712 

Roosevelt, President 707, 728, 729, 785, 787, 825, 829, 833, 839, 902 

Ropes, E. C 857 

Rosecrans, W. S 712, 713 

Rosenman, Judge 729 

Rosinger, Lawrence K 901, 919, 920, 921, 932 

Rowell, Chester 713 

Russian Army 805, 872 

Russian Military Intelligence 860 

S 

Salisbury, Lawrence 753, 754 

San Francisco Conference (United Nations) 815 

Sarekat Rayat 878 

Sayre, Francis B 857 

SCAP ^ 748, 749, 753, 901 

Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B 1 857 

Scott, Walter K 904 

Seabald 849 

Second National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 



INDEX XI 

Secretariat 710, 859, 883, 931 

Security Council. (See United Nations, Security Council.) 
Senate. (See United States Senate.) 

Senate 'Appropriations Committee 860 

Sen, Dr. Sun Yat 801 

Sen, Madam Sun Yat 826 

Service, Jack 776 

Service, John S 779, 780, 783, 784, 785-89, 793, 807, 808, 811, 828, 830, 903 

Seventh National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

Seymour, Lawrence D 712, 713 

Shao-Chi, Li 812 

Sheng, Kang 812 

Shidihara, Baron 729, 739 

Shiga, Yoshio 747, 748, 749, 752, 753 

Shinto. (See National Shinto, Japanese.) 

Shoemaker, Ool. James H 857, 858, 859 

Sixth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

Social Democrats 881 

Socialist Party 771, 885 

Socialist Party (Japan) 742, 872 

Sorge, Richard 840 

Soviet Embassy (Washington) 889 

Soviet Press 894 

Soviet Union _ 706, 

707, 716, 718, 722, 732, 733, 738, 744-746, 766, 770, 786, 791, 793, 
794, 797-801, 805, 806, 815, 818, 834, 835, 844, 845, 847, 860, 865, 
868, 869, 872, 881, 886, 887, 890-895, 907, 913, 914, 921, 927, 929-931 

Spotlight on the Far East 771 

Sproul, Allan 858 

Sproul, Robert Gordon 713, 928 

Sprout, Harold 858, 859 

Staley, Eugene ; 857, 901, 921 

Stalin-Hitler 891 

Stalin, Joseph 771, 784, 805, 815, 868, 869, 870, 884, 886, 891 

Stassen, Harold 901, 921, 932, 933, 934 

State Department _ 703, 

704, 706-710, 713, 716, 717, 719, 721, 723, 725-727, 729-731, 733, 
735-738, 743-746, 748, 751-756, 758, 760, 764-766, 771, 777, 778, 
784, 787-789, 793, 794, 800, 804, 807, 808, 824, 831, 832, 835, 840, 
847, 848, 849, 857, 859, 860, 892-894, 899, 900, 902-904, 913, 914, 
917-919, 921-928, 932, 933. 

State Department (Biographical Register) 709,710,754 

State Department (Bulletin) 735, 735 

State Department (China Division) 704, 705, 707, 708, 709, 788, 824, 903 

State Department (Division of Foreign Service Personnel) 709, 710, 760 

State Department (Division of Labor Relations) 710 

State Department (European Section) 708 

State Department (Far Eastern Division) 704, 

708. 726, 727, 736, 743, 754, 755, 831 

State Department (Foreign Affairs Publication Section) 766 

State Department (Foreign Service Auxiliary) 709, 710, 760 

State Department (Japan Division) 704, 708, 912 

State Department (Legal Section) ' 708 

State Department (Loyalty Security Board) 784, 788, 789, 793, 807 

State Department (Office of Public Affairs) 899 

State Department (Policy Committee) 729 

State Department (Psychological Warfare Department) 727,731,734 

State University of Iowa 905 

State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee 704, 716, 717, 722, 736, 737, 743 

Steinhardt, Laurence A 892, 893, 894 

Stettinius 7O6, 707,' 7r)4 

Stewart, Marguerite Ann 886 

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W 775, 776, 778, 779, 780, 785, 830 

Stimson , 729, 730, 781, 830 

Stinebower, L. D 857 

Stines, John ~765, 766 

Stone, W. T 857 



XII INDEX 

Page 
Strike 753 

Strong, Robert 850 

Sumitome 740 

Sun Fo ^L 821 

Sun, General 851 

Sun Yat-sen, Dr 801,814,878,880 

Sun Yat-sen, Madam 826 

Sun Yat-sen University, (see Far Eastern University.) 

Survey 7l2 

Suzuki, Admiral 728 

Swarajists 876,877 

Sweetland, Monroe 858 

Swing 859 

S-wink 704, 716, 717, 722, 723, 727, 735, 737 



Taft, Senator Bob 784 

Tah-huai, Pen 812 

Tang, Ting-san / 881 

Ta Kung Pao 701 

Talbot, Phillips 901 

Tano, System 914 

Tarr, Edgar J 768, 769 

Tass 895 

Taylor, George E 931 

Teh, Chu 812 

Texas Weekly 857 

Theater Intelligence Division (Far East Command) 843, 844, 848 

Third National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812 

Thomas, Elbert D 713 

Time, Ine 857 

Times. {See New York Times.) 

Ting-san, Tang 881 

Tito, Marshal 784, 787, 811, 828, 852 

Tojo, General 715, 720 

Tokuda, Kyuichi 747, 748, 749, 752, 753 

Treasury Department. {See United States Treasury Department.) 

Trippe, Juan 713, 928 

Trotsky, Leon 866 

Truman, President 730, 731, 732, 733, 136, 745, 776, 782, 784, 901, 902, 903, 928 

Tse-Tung, Mao 782, 800, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 844, 845, 846, 852, 854, 913, 914 

U 

United Kingdom 732, 733 

United Nations 710, 725, 746, 765, 793, 794, 815, 819, 853, 918, 924, 931 

United Nations (Conference of International Organization) 710 

United Nations (San Francisco Conference) 815 

United Nations (Security Council) 746,924 

United Nations (United States Mission) 763,764,765 

United Press (UP) 839 

United States Air Force 745, 779, 780, 827, 849, 856 

United States Army 729, 736, 738, 748, 753, 757, 759, 775, 779, 785, 792, 810, 

820, 823, 825, 826, 833, 843, 849, 853, COl 

United States Civil Service Commission 756 

United States Congress 736, 833, 862, 902, 935 

United States Department of Agriculture 857 

United States Department of Commerce 857 

United States District Court (Spokane) 857 

United States Embassy (London) 703 

United States Embassy (Moscow) 704, 765, 771, 893, 896 

United States Embassy (Shanghai) 758 

United States Embassy (Tok.vo) 703, 704, 747 

United States Embassy (Yugoslavia) 722 

United States Foreign Service 703, 

710, 746, 754, 760, 778, 793, 799, 804, 808, 825, 829, 830, 903 



INDI-]X xin 

Page 

United States Government T28, 

730, 732, 733, 756, 757, 760, 771, 777, 824, 825, 834, 844, 845, 848, 
849, 851, 860, 861, 892, 894, 895, 896, 901, 912, 918, 919, 920, 924, 
933 934 935. 

United States Navy L 1 737, 745, 849, 858, 928 

United States News 834 

United States Senate 710, 905 

United States Treasury Department 824, 857 

Universal Trading Corporation 857 

University of Britisli Columbia 768, 770 

University of California 768, 770, 928 

University of Chicago 715,720,901 

University of Cincinnati 901 

University of Minnesota 901 

University of Moscow 868 

University of Pennsylvania 901 

Universtiy of Washington 901 

UNNRA 825 

UP. (See United Press.) 

USAF-CBI 779, 780, 785 

U. S. S. It 706, 

707, 716, 718, 722, 732, 733, 738, 744-746, 766, 774, 786, 791, 793, 
794, 796-801, 805, 806, 815, 818, 834, 835, 844, 845, 847, 860, 865, 
868, 869, 872, 881, 886, 887, 890-894, 907, 913, 914, 921, 927, 929-931 

V 
Vandenberg 706,707 

Versailles Treaty 844 

Vinacke, Harold M 901 

Vince, Jacob 857 

Vincent, John Carter 704, 

705, 707, 708, 711, 713, 715, 716, 717, 718, 722, 723, 724, 726, 727, 
730, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 750, 755, 
788, 792, 831, 839, 858, 859, 860. 

Voice of America 756, 765, 766, 770, 771 

Voorhis, Jerry 858 

W 

W. A. E -' 756 

Wafdists 876, 877 

Wakatsuki 729 

Wallace, Henry A 780, 825, 838, 839, 857 

Walter Hines Page School 900, 928 

War Department— 704, 717, 736, 741, 743, 745, 824, 835, 840, 901, 914 

War Production Board 857 

Washington University 901 

Watanists 878 

Watt, Kobert J 858, 859 

Waymack 859 

Webb, Mr 905 

Webster Publishing Co 864, 886, 888 

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (retired) 775-841,933 

Welles, Sumner 826, 858, 859, 902 

^Vest Point Military Academy 857 

AVheeler, Leslie 857 

White 788 

White, Harry D 857, 858, 859, 860 

White Plouse 717, 730, 733, 736, 745, 752, 826, 857, 860, 863, 894, 901 

White, Lynn, Jr 712 

White paper. (See American white paper.) 

White Russians 872, 873 

Wickett, F. A 712, 713 

Vvidener, Mrs. William Harry 1 755-773 

Wilbur, Brayton 712, 713, 858, 859 

Wilbur, Ray Lyman 713 

Wild, Payson 713 



XrV INDEX 

Page 

Willkie, Wendell L 827, 858 

Willits, Joseph H 858 

Willoughby, Gen. C. A 840, 845, 901 

Wilson, C. E 858, 859 

Woltman, Frederick 764, 765 

Women of the World (radio show) 762 

World Affairs Ck)uncil of Northern California 901 

World Bank 861 

World-Telegram (New York) 764,765 

World War II 784 

Wright, Mrs. Louise 713 

Wrights, Quiney 712 

T 

1 ale University 714, 900 

Yarnell, Admiral H. E 713, 858 

Yat Sen, Dr. Sun  801, 814 

Yi, Chen 812 

Yosemite Conference (IPR) 890 

Young Communist Leagiie 861 

Yun, Chen 812 

Yu-tang, Lin 827 

Z 
Zaibatsu 715, 720, 725, 736, 740 

X 



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